Lange and Nietzsche (Monographien Und Texte Zur Nietzsche-Forschung)

Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung Herausgegeben von

Ernst Behler • Mazzino Montinari Wolfgang Müller-Lauter • Heinz Wenzel

Band 10

1983 Walter de Gruyter • Berlin • New York

Lange and Nietzsche

by

George J. Stack

1983 Walter de Gruyter • Berlin • New York

Anschriften

der

Herausgeber:

Prof. D r . E r n s t B e h l e r C o m p a r a t i v e Literature G N - 3 2 University of Washington Seattle, W a s h i n g t o n 9 8 1 9 5 , U . S . A . Prof. D r . Mazzino Montinari via d ' A n n u n z i o 2 3 7 , 1-501 35 F l o r e n z Prof. D r . Wolfgang M ü l l e r - L a u t e r K l o p s t o c k s t r a ß e 2 7 , D - 1 0 0 0 B e r l i n 37 Prof. D r . H e i n z W e n z e l H a r n a c k s t r a ß e 1 6 , D - 1 0 0 0 Berlin 33 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Stack, George J . Lange and Nietzsche. (Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung ; Bd. 10) Includes index. 1. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844—1900. 2. Lange, Friedrich Albert, 1828—1875 — Influence. I. Title. II. Series. B3317.S65 1983 193 83-18891 ISBN 3-11-008866-5

CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme

der Deutschen

Bibliothek

Stack, George J . : Lange and Nietzsche / von George J . Stack. — Berlin ; New York : de Gruyter, 1983. (Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung ; Bd. 10) ISBN 3-11-008866-5 NE: GT

Copyright 1983 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., vormals G.J. Göschen'sche Verlagshandlung J . Guttentag, Verlagsbuchhandlung - Georg Reimer - Karl J. Trübner - Veit & Comp. - Printed in Germany - Alle Rechte des Nachdrucks, einschließlich des Rechtes der Herstellung von Photokopien und Mikrofilmen, vorbehalten. Satz und Druck: Heenemann GmbH & Co., Berlin Bindearbeiten: Lüderitz & Bauer, Berlin

Preface Lange and Nietzsche? T h a t there is an intimate relationship between the reflections, observations, and theoretical orientations o f the n o w obscure philosophical historian o f materialism, economist, and social scientist, F . A . Lange, and the philosophy o f Nietzsche may c o m e as a surprise to those w h o have been, o r are, interested in the thought o f Nietzsche. In English studies o f N i e t z s c h e , Lange is scarcely mentioned. Even though R . J . Hollingdale, an excellent biographer o f Nietzsche, shows that he understands and appreciates the

relation

between

Lange's

phenomenalism-cum-agnosticism

and

N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophical standpoint, he devotes o n l y a few paragraphs to the influence o f Lange on Nietzsche. Neglect o f an understanding o f the nature and extent o f this influence has typically affected otherwise valuable o r excellent interpretations

o f Nietzsche's thought that treat it as if it were

anomalous in Western thought or as if it arose out o f no discernible back­ ground. In N i e t z s c h e ' s published writings, we typically encounter the results of his thought, assertoric conclusions that seem to c o m e from nowhere. It is one o f m y intentions to alter this c o m m o n perception o f the critical and constructive reflections o f N i e t z s c h e , t o seek the genesis o f some o f his central concerns and conceptions. Such a project is in keeping with his own concern for unearthing origins and his habit o f offering genetic analyses and interpretations moralities, cultural idelas and values, and fundamental

philosophical

of and

scientific concepts and principles. Although early twentieth century commentators on Nietzsche such as Bernoulli, E . H o c k s and H a n s Vaihinger had pointed out the close relationship between Lange's critical history o f materialism and the background out o f which many o f Nietzsche's philosophical concerns, interests, and orientations emerged, it was n o t until very recently that serious attention was paid to the rather extensive influence that Lange had on the roots o f Nietzsche's philoso­ phy. In some contemporary studies o f the Lange-Nietzsche relationship, J ö r g Salaquarda has done a great deal t o illuminate the deep intellectual currents that flow from Lange's fertile reflections and extensive understanding o f the evolution o f materialism and nineteenth century science to what may be called the undercurrents o f Nietzsche's various streams o f thought.

VI

Preface

O u t s i d e o f G e r m a n y , the complex, numerous,

and frequently

quite

specific lines o f influence that link Lange's philosophical concerns, emphases, and specific orientations towards knowledge, the natural world, and cultural ideals to Nietzsche's dramatic and experimental philosophy are virtually u n k n o w n . Because o f this lacuna in the history o f ideas, this neglect or indifference, interpretations o f Nietzsche tend to focus upon his variegated insights, critiques, and visionary notions as if they were spontaneously and magically produced by Nietzsche's astonishingly fertile imagination. It is as if an impressive apex o f a pyramid o f thought was assumed to have had no base. A careful study o f Lange's phenomenalism, his conventionalist approach to science, his questions, proposals, and incisive criticisms, as well as a scrutiny o f his insightful asides, reveals precisely the broad base upon which Nietzsche built his elaborate philosophical pyramid. T h e impressions made on a philosophical mind at formative stages o f its development often endure throughout a lifetime. This is clearly the case, I believe, in regard to Nietzsche's youthful Geschichte

des Materialismus.

enthusiasm for F . A . Lange's

Nietzsche's early praise o f this detailed study o f

the development o f materialism from the ancient G r e e k s to the 1870's is sometimes excessive. B u t it is not misplaced. F o r , it is a w o r k that has long been recognized as a classic study o f materialist philosophy. Bertrand Russell, among others, o n c e called attention to its value and importance. I f Schopenhauer was Nietzsche's inspirational Erzieher pessimistic wisdom, then Lange was his critical Forscher

o r "teacher" o f

w h o taught him the

importance o f empirical knowledge, the value o f the methods o f the exact sciences, w h o opened up the world o f the independent sciences to a young philologist turned philosopher. W i t h the youthful hunger o f what he later called a "warrior o f knowledge", N i e t z s c h e consumed everything that Lange and the philosophers, physio­ logists, biologists and physical theorists whose w o r k he discusses could teach him. T h e power and significance o f the burgeoning European sciences, as well as a cautious agnosticism and healthy skepticism, was communicated from Lange to Nietzsche. A great deal o f his energetic intellectual self-development was stimulated by the writings o f Lange. A n d he followed up most o f the indirect suggestions that Lange made concerning further reading not only in philosophy, but in political e c o n o m y , biological theory, chemical theory, and physical theory. In the course o f criticizing Hegel's Philosophy

of

Nature,

Lange remarks that n o serious philosophical thinker can any longer afford not to be familiar with the theories and discoveries in the independent sciences. A s far as he was able to do so, Nietzsche tried to put in practise Lange's advice and, in Morgenröte,

he passed it on to others.

VII

Preface

T h e names, concepts, principles and theories o f the plethora of thinkers and scientific theorists Lange discusses in his major w o r k have a curious way of turning up in Nietzsche's voluminous notes. In his early notes o f the mid1860's one finds direct references to Lange's Geschichte

and even in the notes

of the late 1880's there are numerous entries that are identifiable Langean themes. This is especially the case in regard to epistemological conceptions found in these notes that are usually considered purely Nietzschean inven­ tions. In point o f fact, many o f these ideas are originally presented by Lange. Although Nietzsche did not acquire expertise in any one o f the sciences (even though his philological studies fall within the scope of the ten),

Wissenschaf­

he was far more knowledgeable in the sciences o f his day than we have a

right to expect a "poetic genius" to be. And there is no doubt that Lange was his first cicerone

through the labyrinth o f pre-nineteenth and

nineteenth

century science. Lange provided Nietzsche with a general perspective on the sciences that profoundly conditioned substantial amounts of the content o f his philosophy and specifically shaped his experimental approach to philosophical thought. Aside from seeking to bring to light the significant ideas and theories presented b y , or discussed b y , Lange which deeply influenced Nietzsche's thought, I've also offered interpretations o f his central philosophical c o n c e p ­ tions, placing special emphasis upon his theory o f knowledge and truth, the eternal recurrence o f the same, and the will to power. In doing so, I have been encouraged by the revealing juxtaposition o f the thought of Lange and many o f those he discusses and the complex patterns o f Nietzsche's experimental thought. Looking

for

the

pre-form

o f Nietzsche's

philosophical explorations in Lange's Geschichte

critical and

constructive

provides what I believe is a

fruitful, fresh approach to Nietzsche's multidimensional philosophy. B e c o m ­ ing acquainted with the complex background o f the thought o f Nietzsche, we m a y attain a clearer understanding o f his global philosophical project and discern the significance o f the diverse pathways o f thought he pursued. It is m y hope that this combination o f scholarly inquiry, critical c o m m e n t a r y , and philosophical interpretation will contribute to an understanding o f Nietzsche's impassioned thought and, in some measure, add something to the difficult task o f philosophical understanding itself. J u n e 1983

G e o r g e J . Stack

Contents Preface

V

Introduction

I

I.

T h e Treasure-House

II.

Eternal Recurrence

25

Recurrence as Psychological T e s t

30

T h e C o s m o l o g i c a l Arguments

32

F o r c e - C e n t e r s and Recurrence

37

Existential Meaning and Recurrence

44

III.

IV.

10

C o n t r a Platonism

51

Lange versus Plato

60

T h e P r o b l e m o f Christianity

70

Lange and Christianity

.

79

V.

Materio-Idealism

90

VI.

Human, All-Too-Human

112

Lange and A n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m

132

V I I . D a r w i n and T e l e o l o g y

156

V I I I . T h e Shadow o f K a n t

195

IX.

A Force-Point World

224

X.

T h e L u s t o f P o w e r and the W i l l t o P o w e r T h e Lust o f P o w e r The Will to Power

262 273 289

XI.

T h e Standpoint o f the Ideal

302

Index

334

Introduction Friedrich Albert Lange has sometimes been mentioned in relation to the pyrotechnical writings o f Nietzsche and, on occasion, has been said to have had influence on his philosophical thought. T h e extent o f this "influence" has rarely been subjected to extensive analysis. It will be m y contention that the intellectual influence o f F . A . Lange on Nietzsche was far more extensive than has previously been suspected. Lange's running commentary in his major w o r k , Geschichte obiter

des Materialismus,

his novel insights, his philosophical

dicta, as well as his thorough exposition o f the theories o f philosophers,

scientists and other writers, directly contributed to the intellectual develop­ m e n t o f N i e t z s c h e and provided stimulus to his o w n reflections. T h e extent and depth o f Lange's influence on central themes in the philosophy o f N i e t z s c h e have been vastly underrated. It would not be too much to say that m a n y o f the essential issues that Nietzsche grapples with throughout

his

creative life can only be clarified when placed against the background o f Lange's remarkable study. I f we examine The History

of Materialism

in light

o f N i e t z s c h e ' s voluminous writings, and if we attend to a variety o f details, we shall see h o w thoroughly. Nietzsche's thinking was shaped and formed by his early study o f Lange's original history o f materialism. W h a t we gain b y looking backwards to The History

of Materialism

is an insight into the springs

o f Nietzsche's thought, as well as an overview o f the main currents o f thought that c o m e together in kaleidoscopic form in the writings of Nietzsche. T h e central concern o f this exploration o f the background o f Nietzsche's philosophy is not merely a scholarly uncovering o f highly specific threads o f influence. Rather, an attempt is made to illuminate the rich tapestry o f N i e t z s c h e ' s creative labors by seeking the primitive origins o f his thought, by focusing on the many cognitive imprints that Lange's extensive study made on a twenty-two year old Nietzsche, imprints that can still be found in the notes o f his last creative years. M a n y of the insights, flashes o f thought and intuitive interpretations found in Nietzsche's writings owe their inspiration to what can only be characterized as Nietzsche's microscopic study of Lange's exposition, c o m m e n t a r y and interpretation o f the history o f materialism from pre-Socratic thought up to the latter part of the nineteenth century. Nietzsche did not merely read Geschichte

des Materialismus;

he studied it with remarkable care

and must have returned to it for inspiration over and over again throughout his

2

Introduction

intellectually active life. In his earliest notations o f the 1870's and in his last notes before madness overtook him, traces o f Lange's influence can be found. So detailed and refined is the influence o f Lange on Nietzsche that it is very difficult to piece together all o f the threads o f relationship. Even though N i e t z s c h e ' s startling creative abilities enable him to elaborate on a massive variety o f themes he first found in The History

of Materialism,

it is surprising

h o w many quite specific themes in Lange's writings find their way into the polychromatic tapestry Nietzsche wove. M u c h that remains obscure o r i n c h o ­ ate in Nietzsche's published and unpublished writings is brought into the light w h e n put under the searchlight o f Lange's towering study. F o r N i e t z s c h e , Geschichte

des Materialismus

was not merely yet another scholarly G e r m a n

treatise. It was a source of inspiration, a stimulus to thought, a repository o f ideas that he returned to again and again. Nietzsche's sharp, cutting, aphoristic style creates a glare that often blinds readers to the content o f his flashing prose. E v e n though he soars in imagination far beyond the standpoint o f Lange, his conceptual roots are firmly planted in the rich soil that is tilled b y Lange. Perhaps b y tracing Nietzsche's variegated reflections to their roots we m a y better understand the meaning o f the dazzling foliage he has left for us to explore and appreciate. F . A . Lange lived from 1828 to 1875 and was a professor o f philosophy at Zürich and Marburg. Aside from The History w o r k was Die Arbeiterfrage

of Materialism,

his other major

which was published in 1 8 6 5 . In the latter study,

he defended the interests o f the workers and their political and e c o n o m i c demands. In general, he was sympathetic with the early G e r m a n socialists and spoke at meetings arranged by them. Lange's interest in the soziale

Frage,

as

well as his aptitude for e c o n o m i c theory, made him sensitive to the emerging social forces in the nineteenth century and provided him with a unique understanding o f the social sciences. Aside from his obvious talents as a historian o f philosophy, a social and political theorist, Lange also displays, in his tour de force,

a definite talent for

what could be characterized as the philosophy of science. His detailed examination o f the state o f the art o f philosophy o f science in the nineteenth century had an enormous impact on a youthful Nietzsche w h o saw him as a "scientific investigator." T h e scholarly details, the extensive expositions o f the thought o f numerous philosophical and scientific thinkers, the insightful asides and illuminating references sprinkled throughout The History

of

Materialism

justify N i e t z s c h e ' s view that there is far m o r e than meets the eye in this w o r k . U n l i k e many other competent historians o f philosophy, Lange manages to present a consistent interpretation o f then contemporary currents o f thought that is rich, ingenious and stimulating. M a n y o f his critical evaluations o f philosophers ( e . g . , Plato) will be adopted tout court by Nietzsche.

3

Introduction

O n e finds in Lange's analysis o f the philosophy o f Kant not so much a complete exposition o f all aspects o f Kant's thought (as, for example, could be found in the w o r k s o f K u n o Fischer), as a set o f insightful and sound

criticisms

o f K a n t ' s theory o f knowledge. Despite his avowed N e o - K a n t i a n i s m , Lange offers a n u m b e r o f pithy criticisms o f (for example) the notion o f the "thingin-itself" (Ding-an-sich),

criticisms that will find their way, thinly disguised,

into the writings o f Nietzsche. In a chapter on " T h e Shadow o f K a n t , " I shall indicate h o w Nietzsche appropriated

Lange's psychologistic variation on

K a n t ' s epistemology. In point o f fact, it will be argued that Nietzsche's understanding

o f K a n t was shaped and formed b y his reading o f Lange.

Despite his repeated sarcasm about the predominance o f theory of knowledge in then recent philosophy, Nietzsche's major philosophical orientations were conditioned b y epistemological issues in general, and those o f K a n t and Lange in particular. T h e skeptical analyses o f truth and knowledge that lie at the heart of N i e t z s c h e ' s reflections are especially indebted b o t h to Kant and Lange. A l t h o u g h Nietzsche is notorious for his bold and unrelenting critique o f Christianity and Christian morality, it is in Lange's magnum

opus that we first

find many o f the critical appraisals o f Christianity for which Nietzsche has b e c o m e famous or infamous. In a discussion o f Christianity, I shall try to s h o w that m a n y o f Lange's negative comments about Christian belief and the effects o f an ecclesiastical hierarchy on European culture and civilization find their way, amplified to be sure, in Nietzsche's sustained polemic against the Weltanschauung

o f Christianity and the power o f the "priestly caste." Even

though N i e t z s c h e transcends Lange's relatively mild standpoint on this issue, it is clear that the inspiration (if such it may be called) for his elaborate critique o f Christianity came from Lange's rapier thrusts against the questionable effects o f the dominance o f the Christian religion for almost two thousand years. It will also be noted that Lange's opinions were themselves formed, in part, b y his sympathetic understanding o f the critiques o f Christian culture found in the writings o f the historians G i b b o n and L e c k y . Even themes intimately associated with Nietzsche - such as his ingenious thesis that the Christian religion provided the cognitive background for the development o f the scientific interpretation o f the text o f nature - are clearly derived from Lange's precisely similar observations. In fact, the relationship between religion and science is one o f Lange's central themes, a preoccupation that pervades his entire history. It is this preoccupation that leads Lange to speculate (in a manner that is a prolepsis o f Nietzsche's prophetic remarks) about the cultural effects that may occur in the near future as a result of the confluence o f the rise o f the scientific understanding o f the world and man and the decline o f traditional religious belief. T h e brooding concern about what lies ahead for Western man in the future that is characteristic o f so m u c h o f

4

Introduction

Nietzsche's writings is already present in Lange's massive study o f the evolution o f materialism in Western thought. I t has been said that the American philosopher, C . S. Peirce, read Kant's Kritik

der reinen

Vernunft

about twenty-five times. I don't k n o w h o w many

times N i e t z s c h e read F . A . Lange's Geschichte

des Materialismus,

but I do

k n o w that he was m o r e thoroughly influenced b y , and m o r e deeply impressed b y , this single w o r k than by anything else he ever read. W e find in Lange's scholarly study embryonic forms o f concepts that are later fully developed by N i e t z s c h e . A m o n g s t many other themes and insights, we find intimations o f the notion o f the eternal recurrence o f the same, o f the dynamic theory o f a "force-point-world" (eine Kraft-Punkte-Welt),

the possibility o f an "ethical

naturalism," the manifestations o f what is called a "lust o f p o w e r " in a variety o f human and institutional actions, the anti-teleological implications o f D a r w i ­ nian theory, the valuation o f the wisdom, sanity and healthy-mindedness o f G o e t h e , the austerity and coldness o f the mechanistic world-view in physical theory, suggestions about the breakdown o f the Euklidean notion o f threedimensional space, the growing agnosticism amongst scientists concerning the ultimate nature o f actuality ( W i r k l i c h k e i t ) , theoretical speculations concerning the possibility o f " s u b - a t o m i c " entities (as early as 1872!), the rise of socialism and c o m m u n i s m (with references to the works o f a rising "political e c o n o m ­ ist," K . M a r x ) , the recognition o f the need for a new ideal presented in the form o f a " m y t h " that will inspire man and replace the declining vision o f the Christian outlook, and much, much more. Since Nietzsche adopts, transforms, expands, reformulates and revises m a n y of the basic themes he first found in Lange's writings, the task o f relating the scattered aperçus

o f Nietzsche to their prototypes in Lange is a difficult

o n e . It requires, at a minimum, the imposition o f an order o r a form upon dispersed materials that is not intrinsic to them. A s Nietzsche's dependence on Lange decreases, the relation between his thinking and Lange's text becomes m o r e difficult to discern because we are dealing with a palimpsest or, to use a Nietzschean coinage, a "polympsest." But even though the original Langean source may be obscured, there are faint traces o f it that can be discerned. Often the key to an analogy between an observation found in Nietzsche's writings and a point in The History

of Materialism

is found in a mode o f expression, a

phrase o r even a word. T h e value o f seeking to trace such direct o r indirect lines o f influence is that we may see the clear and original context

out o f which

a portion o f Nietzsche's philosophy has developed. Typically, Nietzsche presents us with conclusions, pronouncements, judgments that suggest a background o r a context, but are given none. T h u s , for example, many o f his published w o r k s (e. g., Beyond

Good

and Evil

and The Joyful

Wisdom)

are

pervaded with references to "physicists" o r "scientists" w h o m N i e t z s c h e

Introduction

5

addresses sometimes constructively, sometimes critically. T o w h o m is he referring? W h a t scientific theories is he alluding to in his writings? Even though we can find much o f the raw materials for his published works in his voluminous notes, the basic theoretical context in which his observations emerge still often eludes us. Juxtaposing Lange and Nietzsche often brings out the theoretical background that highlights the episodic, truncated foregrounds that comprise his imaginative insights. Aside from the numerous particular points o f resemblance between the views o f Lange and those o f Nietzsche, we can also see the scaffolding that Lange constructs for the general "task" Nietzsche takes upon himself. This is especially apparent in regard to what Lange calls der Standpunkt

des

Ideals.

Even though the importance o f "the standpoint o f the ideal" for an under­ standing o f Nietzsche's philosophical project has occasionally been mentioned by commentators on Nietzsche, its full impact has often been overlooked. As I shall indicate in the appropriate place, Lange sought to restrict knowledge proper to phenomena alone, to the specific details uncovered by scientific inquiry. H o w e v e r , he also saw that if the belief in "the ideal" is lost b y Western man, then the barrenness o f a purely quantitative, scientific under­ standing o f reality will create a spiritual vacuum. T h e Kantian restriction o f "knowledge" to phenomena constituted b y the intuitions o f time and space, sensibility and categories o f the understanding does not satisfy the needs of the heart, the spiritual aspirations o f man. N e i t h e r the man on the street nor the philosophical thinker can live for long without some guiding ideal, without some purpose. Lange suggests, then, a poetic representation o f an ideal that is n o t represented as a metaphysical certainty, but as a goal for the future. H e speculates about the possibility o f a new "religion o f the future" that will be an ideal for all men, a vision that will satisfy the deeply rooted spiritual needs o f mankind. W e can imagine a young Nietzsche reading these statements, heeding Lange's message, agreeing with him entirely on this point. Perhaps he already began to form images that would play a role in the creation o f his "standpoint o f the ideal." In the last chapter o f his history o f materialism Lange sets the stage for what will be constructive in Nietzsche's thought: the forging o f a new " m y t h " that will rescue man from the icy impersonality o f a quantitative, mechanistic world and from the social tendency towards atomistic "egoism." T h e o u t c o m e o f this elaborate analysis o f the development o f materialism anticipates, on a large scale, precisely the dual standpoint o f N i e t z s c h e : on the one hand, there is the gathering o f multiple scientific facts, the proliferation o f scientific interpretations, the radical, even skeptical phenomenalism that yields "an­ thropomorphic truths," and, on the other hand, a new, radical ideal that will (hopefully) bring about the transformation of man and inaugurate a new era.

Introduction

6

A s I shall attempt to show, a careful analysis o f the content o f Lange's massive w o r k will disclose many quite specific elements that can be found b o t h in N i e t z s c h e ' s earliest and last writings. T h e radical skepticism concerning " k n o w l e d g e " that runs through so much o f Nietzsche's interrogations is n o t an entirely original creation. T h e tools for the making o f such a radical skepticism are found scattered throughout the expositions, commentaries and interpretations proffered by Lange. In a chapter entitled, " H u m a n , A l l - T o o - H u m a n , " I seek to show that N i e t z s c h e ' s uncovering o f anthropomorphism at the basis o f all knowledgeclaims follows the lead o f Lange. Especially in his epistemological analyses is N i e t z s c h e indebted to Lange's critical acumen. In this regard, it is not a case of influence alone, but direct appropriation. Nietzsche's style o f epistemic analy­ sis, his clever sophistication, his slyness and teasing manner are his own. B u t it will be made quite clear that he absorbed many technical details from, and learned a great deal about, the problem o f knowledge from a man w h o , in this regard, must be called his mentor. Virtually every argument to agnosticism that can be found in the corpus

o f Nietzsche has its analogue in Lange. N o t

only the elaborate critique o f anthropomorphism that pervades the w o r k s o f N i e t z s c h e , but the postulation o f its inevitability in the interpretation o f the text o f nature as well, is found in another text, Lange's. B y examining the specifics o f Lange's text, we discover the origin o f many o f what are taken to be Nietzsche's original arguments and insights. W h a t is valuable in this examination is that we see the context out o f which Nietzsche's m o s t basic reflections arose. Although there is n o reason to assume that all o f the patterns in Nietzsche's philosophical tapestry are woven after the manner o f Lange, it is astonishing, I believe, to see h o w many threads are borrowed from a man whose thought is assumed to have had little impact on later thinkers. O n e o f the most surprising things about Geschichte

des Materialismus

is its discussion o f penetrating

questions in what we could call "philosophy o f science." In embryonic form w e can find a sketch o f "conventionalism" in science, the hypothetical, not to say "fictional," nature o f scientific concepts and principles and much m o r e . Needless to say, such suggestions were not lost on Nietzsche. Indeed, as I shall argue, N i e t z s c h e ' s own version o f conventionalism and fictionalism owes a great deal, if not everything, to the originality o f Lange. Given the intima­ tions in this exhaustive study o f what very closely resembles "pragmatism" (especially in regard to a humanistic theory o f knowledge), one may speculate that Lange's masterwork may, in an indirect way, have had some influence on the development

o f the pragmatic concept o f truth in A n g l o - A m e r i c a n

philosophy. W h a t is admittedly speculation in such a case, is removed from the k n o w n and direct influence that Lange's analyses had on the development

7

Introduction

o f a form o f the pragmatic theory o f truth in Nietzsche's reflections on the problem o f knowledge. O n e o f the fascinations o f Nietzsche's prolific writings is that they seem to comprise an enormous, complex puzzle. T h e profusion o f themes creates a syncretistic totality that is often bewildering. Perhaps b y tracing some o f the lines o f influence that lead from Nietzsche back to Lange we may better understand what he meant and, perhaps more importantly, h o w he came to hold the views he did hold. T h e confluence o f streams o f thought that c o m e together in The History

of Materialism

are often bewildering enough. I f we

imagine N i e t z s c h e culling bits and pieces out o f the fabric o f Lange's thought and assembling them in the w o r k s h o p o f his mind, we may c o m e to under­ stand w h y Nietzsche's total philosophical accomplishment is so complex. F o r it is, I believe, a complex pattern o f thought that has been constructed, in large part, out o f an already complex pattern. Certainly, it will not be denied that we need as m u c h help as we can get in order to understand as fully as we can the deep concerns that animate Nietzsche's reflections. It is obvious b y n o w that it is m y conviction that Lange's magnum

opus contains not only a k e y to

the background and meaning o f Nietzsche's philosophy, but a number o f keys. T h e theoretical and social problems that are delineated by Lange echo through the labyrinth created by a man who deserves to be called the first twentieth century philosopher. W h e t h e r it is a foreshadowing o f the notion o f perspectivalism, the argument for the sensory origin o f the categories o f the understanding, the prototype o f the ideas o f an internal and an external " p h e n o m e n o l o g y , " we shall find all o f these sprinkled throughout Lange's field o f study. T o be sure, Nietzsche develops these themes, dramatizes them and presents them in his o w n unique forms. Presented as aphoristic gems in Nietzsche's polished prose, we do not see where they came from nor do we have any sense o f the

rationale

for which they were proposed. T h e enormous power o f scientific understand­ ing preoccupied Nietzsche throughout his life and he wondered h o w science became possible amongst mankind and asked whether mankind will still be possible with science. This preoccupation, these questions, the promise and danger o f the triumph o f science in the world, all o f these were no doubt first suggested to Nietzsche by his microscopic study o f Lange's painstaking discussions o f the course o f the

Wissenschaften.

Although N i e t z s c h e never actually t o o k the time (due to his p o o r health and his failing eyesight) to delve into the sciences in a serious way, he did undergo a course o f study o f the main trends in the sciences up to his time by means o f a scrutiny o f a compendium o f the evolution o f scientific knowledge: Geschichte

des Materialismus.

In addition, some seven years after the appear­

ance o f the first edition o f Lange's history he began a serious study o f

Introduction

B o s c o v i c h ' s theory o f nature. Lange's erudition is such that it is no exaggera­ tion to say that one could acquire a basic understanding o f the methods and results o f the sciences up to the 1870's by a careful reading o f his w o r k . W h a t is even m o r e significant for an understanding o f the development o f Nietzsche's thought is that Lange repeatedly raises profound questions concerning the philosophical implications o f particular scientific advances. A theme in some o f the recent works o f Karl Popper is that materialism transcends itself by virtue o f its own internal development. This particular theme is one that recurs throughout Lange's history o f materialism and one that provides a clue to some o f Nietzsche's central ideas. O n e finds in N i e t z s c h e b o t h an understanding o f the material basis o f actuality and very definite tendencies towards idealism. This is often either puzzling o r chalked up to his "inconsistencies." I f we revert to the Langean source o f many o f his basic notions, we m a y discover that this apparent fusion o f materialism and idealism is positively developed by Lange himself. W h a t we find in Nietzsche's thought concerning this issue is an attempt to accomodate a form o f Lange's materiale

Idealismus.

W h a t may seem to be obscure modalities o f thought in

N i e t z s c h e are illuminated by juxtaposing them to the context from which they seem to have arisen. First Lange's and then Nietzsche's attempts to unify the perspectives o f materialism and idealism seem to be but a modern version o f the age-old problem o f G e r m a n philosophy: the relationship between and Natur.

Geist

A retrospective l o o k at Lange's nineteenth century study may,

once again, give us some insight into the large-scale philosophical issues that exercised Nietzsche. T h i s attempt to trace the various influences o f Lange on Nietzsche is not only a scholarly project that deals solely with historical matters. F o r b o t h Lange and N i e t z s c h e deal with important issues and philosophical paradoxes that have only been exascerbated over the last hundred years. Aside from the themes already mentioned, and aside from a n u m b e r o f incidental points that will be referred to in the following, attention will be focused upon the nature o f language, its relation to actuality and truth, the suggestion in Lange o f a fictionalistic interpretation o f philosophical and scientific concepts, the many speculations concerning the nature o f life found o n Lange's pages, and a host o f relatively minor motifs. Since N i e t z s c h e deliberately avoided systematic philosophy, many o f the basic issues and questions originally discussed b y Lange find their way, in a more o r less fragmented form, into the writings o f Nietzsche. M a n y o f the fragments o f thought,

the coruscating insights, found

in Nietzsche's works are often

replications o f specific points or references in Lange's magnum

opus.

The

grenade-like explosions o f thought we encounter when reading Nietzsche are often detonations o f the explosive material that Lange had already provided.

Introduction

9

A s we shall see, many o f the questions that Lange raises are answered b y N i e t z s c h e sometimes in his own terms and sometimes in precisely the terms suggested b y Lange. T h e relationship between Lange and Nietzsche is a complex one. H o w complex and detailed it is will be seen as we try to discover exactly what was found in Lange's "treasure-house."

CHAPTER I THE TREASURE-HOUSE W i t h i n a year after he had discovered Schopenhauer's Die Welt als und

Vorstellung

Wille

in a b o o k s h o p , N i e t z s c h e w r o t e to his friend, Carl von

Gersdorff, extolling the virtues o f F . A . Lange's Geschichte

des

Materialismus.

B o t h Schopenhauer and Lange lured h i m away from philological studies that were already b e c o m i n g boring. T h e impact o f the thought o f b o t h these m e n o n N i e t z s c h e was profound. T h e immediate reaction to Lange's account o f the development o f materialism was enthusiastic: he called it the m o s t significant philosophical w o r k t o have appeared in the last hundred years.

1

I n a letter to von Gersdorff, N i e t z s c h e praises Lange's w o r k and quotes its conclusions. 1. die Sinnenwelt ist das Produkt unsrer Organisation; 2. unsre sichtbaren (körperlichen) Organe sind gleich allen andern Teilen der Erscheinungswelt nur Bilder eines unbekannten Gegenstandes; 3. unsre wirkliche Organisation bleibt uns daher ebenso unbekannt wie die wirklichen Außendinge. Wir haben stets nur das Produkt von beiden vor uns.

2

F u r t h e r m o r e , N i e t z s c h e continues, "the true essence o f things" ("the thing in itself") is n o t o n l y u n k n o w n to us, but the very conception o f it is the end

1

2

Nietzsche Briefwechsel. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, eds. G. Colli and M. Montinari, Berlin and New York, 1975, I 2. Briefe an Hermann Mushsacke (Nachschrift), November, 1866, 184. Cf. Jörg Salaquarda, "Der Standpunkt des Ideals bei Lange und Nietzsche," Studi Tedeschi, X X I I , 1, (Napoli, 1979), 140. Ibid., 160 (Briefe an Carl von Gersdorff, August, 1866). "The world of the senses is the product of our organization. 2. Our visible (bodily) organs are, like all other parts of the phenomenal world, only images of an unknown object. 3. Our real organization is, therefore, as much unknown to us as are real external things. We continually have before us nothing but the product of both." (Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.) In this letter Nietzsche is quoting from F. A. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Be­ deutung in der Gegenwart, J.Baedeker Verlag, Iserlohn, 1866, 493. In the second edition (Vol.I, 1873; Vol.II, 1875) Lange adds the following to the last conclusion: "3. Die transzen­ dente Grundlage unsrer Organisation..." F. A. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1974, II, 864. Subsequent references will be made either to the first edition (GdM followed by the page number) or to the reprint of the second edition (GdM followed by I or II and the page number). Cf. J . Salaquarda, op. cit., 138.

The Treasure-House

11

product o f an antithesis that is conditioned b y "our organization." W e have n o knowledge whether this "antithesis" has any meaning b e y o n d o u r experience. T h e r e f o r e , N i e t z s c h e notes, Lange thinks that philosophers should have a free hand as long as they edify us. In regard to this point, N i e t z s c h e asks: " W h o w o u l d refute a phrase o f B e e t h o v e n , and w h o would find error in Raphael's Madonna?"

3

W h a t N i e t z s c h e infers from his understanding o f L a n g e is that,

even in relation to a kritische

Standpunkte

such as Lange's, the philosophy o f

Schopenhauer has value. M o r e o v e r , " i f philosophy should edify," then there is n o one m o r e edifying than " o u r Schopenhauer." N i e t z s c h e understands Lange t o be saying that philosophy has an edifying role to play because it is a form o f 4

"art." E p i t o m i z e d in this letter are themes that will haunt N i e t z s c h e through­ o u t his philosophical life. Precisely this c o m b i n a t i o n o f epistemological skep­ ticism and the aesthetic nature of philosophy will inform much o f N i e t z s c h e ' s thought. E v e n though N i e t z s c h e drastically condenses the central o u t c o m e s o f L a n g e ' s critical history o f materialism, it is not the case that he has misunder­ stood him. R e c e n t l y , it has been said that N i e t z s c h e "misinterprets Lange's History

of Materialism"

b y seeing it as an "apology for Schopenhauer's 5

s y s t e m " and that he "had distorted Lange's rational criticisms." B o t h o f these claims are false. N i e t z s c h e did not see Lange's w o r k as an apology for the p h i l o s o p h y o f Schopenhauer or any other philosophy. R a t h e r , he understood that, despite his critical analysis o f human knowledge, Lange had encouraged the projection o f edifying conceptions from "the standpoint o f the ideal." T h e restriction o f " k n o w l e d g e " to p h e n o m e n a alone (the ground o f which is u n k n o w n ) , L a n g e held, does not negate the aesthetic meaning o f philosophical ideals for culture, for the value and meaning they give to people. A s we shall see in later, m o r e detailed, discussion o f this question, Lange insisted that the poetic value and meaning o f philosophical views persists even though they are n o t justified b y the empirical sciences o r supported b y cool reason.

3

4

5

Ibid. "Also das wahre Wesen der Dinge, das Ding an sich, ist uns nicht nur unbekannt, sondern es ist auch der Begriff desselben nicht mehr und nicht weniger als die letzte Ausgeburt eines von unsrer Organisation bedingten Gegensatzes, von dem wir nicht wissen, ob er außerhalb unsrer Erfahrung irgendeine Bedeutung hat. Folglich, meint Lange, lasse man die Philosophen frei, vorausgesetzt, daß sie uns hinfüro erbauen. Die Kunst ist frei, auch auf dem Gebiet der Begriffe. Wer will einen Satz von Beethoven widerlegen, und wer will Raphaels Madonna eines Irrtums zeihen?" Cp. F . A. Lange, GdM, 268, 556. Ibid. "Du siehst, selbst bei diesem strengsten kritischen Standpunkte bleibt uns unser Schopenhauer, ja er wird uns fast noch mehr. Wenn die Philosophie Kunst i s t . . . wenn die Philosophie erbauen soll, dann kenne ich wenigstens keinen Philosophen, der mehr erbaut als unser Schopenhauer." Ivo Frenzel, Friedrich Nietzsche: An Illustrated Biography, trans. J. Neugroschel, New York, 1967, 32-33. Originally published in Germany under the title Friedrich Nietzsche in Selbstzeug­ nissen und Bilddokumenten (1966).

The Treasure-House

12

T h e charge that N i e t z s c h e distorted the critical reason o f Lange is errone­ ous insofar as N i e t z s c h e clearly understood, even at the time he w r o t e to his friend,

that

Lange restricted knowledge to the phenomenal

order

alone.

M o r e o v e r , as the reference to the latter's conclusions show, he k n e w full well that agnosticism pervaded Lange's "rational criticism." In his published and unpublished writings, N i e t z s c h e reveals that he understood only t o o well the implications o f Lange's radical phenomenalism. In fact, the particular form that N i e t z s c h e ' s skepticism assumed was modeled

on Lange's

numerous

c o m m e n t s on the p r o b l e m o f knowledge. W h a t is often overlooked b y those w h o refer to the influence o f Lange on N i e t z s c h e is that he was profoundly impressed b y the t w o major aspects o f Lange's philosophy: the conception o f the world o f appearances as a representation determined b y "our organization" (and the consequent agnosticism that follows from this) and the appeal t o "figurative" o r " p o e t i c " ideals that carry us b e y o n d the realm o f empirical actuality. C a r l B e r n o u l l i was absolutely correct when he observed that the Geschichte

des Materialismus

N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophical

is "the best path-finder through the labyrinth o f presuppositions."

6

I n s o m e cases, the references to the letter o f 1866 indicate that s o m e c o m m e n t a t o r s on N i e t z s c h e do not realize that its k e y passages on Lange are direct quotations from the Geschichte

des Materialismus.

T h a t N i e t z s c h e was

able t o relate Lange's conclusions to another passage in which he asserts that "the true essence o f things" is u n k n o w n to us indicates that he had a good sense o f what Lange was about. As he reads, "again and again," the b o o k he called a "treasure-house," he absorbs more and m o r e o f the details in it and appropriates hundreds o f specific points in an almost unconscious process o f osmosis. A l t h o u g h it has been pointed out that Bernoulli, E . H o c k s , D e l - N e g r o , M i t t a s c h , D i c k o p p and A . Anders have touched upon the importance o f Lange's Geschichte

des Materialismus

7

for an understanding o f N i e t z s c h e , their

observations have been quite often neglected. J ö r g Salaquarda has done the

6

7

Carl A. Bernoulli, Franz Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche: Eine Freundschaft, 2 vols., Jena, 1908,I, 146, 221. Cited in Jörg Salaquarda, "Nietzsche und Lange," Nietzsche-Studien, Band 7, (1978), 237. There are dozens of allusions to, or citations from, the Geschichte in Nietzsche's notes during 1867-1868. Werke und Briefe. Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, Munich, 1933-42, III, IV. Cf. E . Hocks, Das Verhältnis der Erkenntnis zur Unendlichkeit der Welt bei Nietzsche, Leipzig, 1914. Walter Del Negro, Die Rolle der Fiktionen in der Erkenntnistheorie Friedrich Nietzsches, München, 1923. Alwin Mittasch, Friedrich Nietzsche als Naturphilosoph, Stuttgart, 1952. Dickopp, Nietzsches Kritik des "Ich—denke", Bonn (Dissertationsdruck) 1965. Anni Anders/Karl Schlechta, Friedrich Nietzsche. Von den verborgenen Anfängen seines Philo­ sophierens, Stuttgart, 1962. Cited in Jörg Salaquarda, "Nietzsche und Lange", NietzscheStudien, 7 (1978), 237.

The Treasure-House m o s t , at the present time, to call attention to this important k e y to N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophy.

8

H e has pointed out that the depth and extent o f the influence o f

F . A . L a n g e o n a variety o f themes in the thought o f N i e t z s c h e has rarely been fully appreciated. T h i s insight is the p o i n t o f departure o f this inquiry.' In a later letter to von Gersdorff, N i e t z s c h e again waxes enthusiastic a b o u t L a n g e ' s w o r k , saying it is "a b o o k which gives infinitely m o r e than the title p r o m i s e s , a real treasure-house to be l o o k e d into and read repeatedly." O n e finds in this b o o k , he continues, an a c c o u n t o f the "materialist m o v e m e n t o f our

times, the

materialism."

10

natural

sciences with

their

Darwinian

theories...

ethical

Interesting, but disputable, c o m m e n t s have recently been made

a b o u t N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophical understanding in 1 8 6 8 . It has been said that the c o n t a c t with L a n g e ' s w o r k led N i e t z s c h e to see that Schopenhauer's claim

8

Salaquarda has shown, in two illuminating articles, that the influence of Lange on Nietzsche has been greatly underestimated, that Lange's relation to Nietzsche discloses the philosophicalhistorical and scientific background of the latter's thought. He points out that Lange's notion of "der 'Standpunkt des Ideals' spielte zwar in der Geburt der Tragödie und in den Unzeitgemäßen Betrachtungen eine große Rolle." Jörg Salaquarda, "Der Standpunkt des Ideals bei Lange und Nietzsche," Studi Tedeschi, X X I I , 1 (1979), 142.

9

Although I have only very recently seen Salaquarda's articles, I had come to similar conclusions without his grasp of earlier German studies that touched upon this question. In a review of R. H. Grimm's Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge [Walter de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1977] that was written in 1978 and appeared in Man and World, 12, 2 (1979), I had remarked that "the importance of Nietzsche's careful reading of Lange's History of Materialism for an understanding of his philosophy has not generally been noticed." (249-250) I also mentioned that "In Lange's meticulous History of Materialism (which Nietzsche praises to his friend Gersdorff in letters sent in 1866 and 1868) Nietzsche had access to the main theories of the natural sciences {circa 1 8 6 6 ) . . . " (250). Cf. also: G. J . Stack, "Nietzsche and Lange," The Modern Schoolman, LVII, 2 (January, 1980), 137-148. Salaquarda's insightful comments have helped me avoid some errors of scholarship. However, I think that the "standpoint of the ideal" had a more profound effect upon Nietzsche's thought than he indicates and I disagree with him, in some respects, concerning the meaning of "the standpoint of the ideal." In addition, Salaquarda proves that Nietzsche had in hand the 1882 printing of the fourth edition of Lange's Geschichte des Materilaismus. O n the basis of this, he seems to assume that Nietzsche probably did not see the second, greatly expanded, edition of Lange's work between 1868 and 1882. O n the contrary, I believe that it is more probable that he did have access to the second edition before 1882. In other respects, I agree with his central points and have been informed by his careful scholarship. The fact that Nietzsche occasionally makes critical comments on Lange's thought and style in random notations in the Nachlass does not mean that he was not influenced by him in many respects. Nietzsche treats Kant in a sarcastic manner even though he is indebted to him for many of his epistemic notions. When quite numerous and specific analogies are found between many of Nietzsche's philosophical concepts, principles and arguments and those of Lange, there are good grounds for suggesting derivation independent of the precise means by which this took place and independent of Nietzsche's direct comments about Lange or his thought. In addition to philosophical influence, Nietzsche seems to have used Lange's Ge­ schichte as a sourcebook for further reading and study insofar as many of the authors he mentions are mentioned or discussed in Lange's exhaustive critical history of materialism.

10

Nietzsche Briefwechsel. KG, I 2. Briefe an Carl von Gersdorff (Februar, 1868), 257-258. Cf. J . Salaquarda, "Nietzsche und Lange," Nietzsche-Studien, (1978), 239-240.

The Treasure-House

14

to k n o w that the "thing in itself" was "will" was questionable because ultimate reality is n o t only not knowable, but the idea o f it is part o f the phenomenal world. T h i s critical approach to any claims about ultimate reality is then related to the Nietzschean view that we cannot make the distinction between the apparent and the real world.

11

These comments accelerate Nietzsche's

thinking in a misleading way. F o r , it t o o k him some time to shake off the specter o f the Ding-an-sich. w r o t e Die

Geburt

Even then, he did not do so entirely. W h e n he

der Tragödie

he was, as he admits, under the spell o f

Schopenhauer and he had no special misgivings about the idea o f "things-inthemselves." In his critical essay, Uber chen Sinne

Wahrheit

und Lüge

im

außermoralis­

( 1 8 7 3 ) , he n o t only retains the notion o f "things-in-themselves,"

but developes a critical analysis o f truth that is largely dependent on its assumption. T h e explicit analysis o f the issue o f appearance and reality was stimulated b y Lange, but did n o t c o m e into prominence until the 1880's and finds its m o s t forceful expression in Götzen-Dämmerung

(1889). Even though the question

o f appearance and reality appears in his earliest writings, the

attempted

resolution o f this question (by means o f the negation o f the distinction between the two) is a later development. T h e point is to avoid the temptation to anachronistic interpretations o f Nietzsche's thought. Lange planted many seeds in Nietzsche's mind that t o o k some time to germinate. I n regard to the reference in Nietzsche's letter to the

Naturwissenschaften

and their Darwinian theories, it has been said that the triumph o f D a r w i n ' s t h e o r y o f natural selection meant to Nietzsche that apparent purpose in nature 12

could be "explained as a consequence o f random and fortuitous change." T h e impression is conveyed that the implications o f Darwin's theory were immedi­ ately grasped b y a young N i e t z s c h e whose brilliance as a philologist did n o t exclude familiarity with the natural sciences. T h a t Darwin's theory o f evolu­ tion b y means o f natural selection undermined the assumption o f teleology is specifically discussed b y Lange in considerable detail in a section entitled „Die neueren

Naturwissenschaften".

Lange (and Nietzsche after him) links the n o n -

teleological implications o f Darwinism with the anti-teleological views o f the pre-Socratic philosopher, Empedokles.

13

O t h e r topics o f interest to Nietzsche that are mentioned b y him are the " c o s m i c systems" o f the materialists and die Manchester-Theorie

o f political

e c o n o m y . This initial acquaintance with such theories will have a long-range

11

R. J . Hollingdale, Nietzsche, London, 1973, 55-56.

12

Ibid., 56.

13

F. A. Lange, GdM, 404. Nietzsche specifically refers to this point and this page reference in his notes of 1867-68. Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Munich, 1937, 4, 54.

15

The Treasure-House effect u p o n his thinking. T h e kosmische

Systemen

that Lange discusses n o

d o u b t stimulated his cosmological speculations. I n the first edition o f Lange's w o r k , there is a hint o f the idea o f eternal recurrence in a discussion o f Lucretius' De rerum n a t u r a .

14

As I shall s h o w in the next chapter, the idea o f

the possibility o f eternal recurrence is reinforced b y Lange's references t o L o u i s B l a n q u i ' s L'eternite second edition o f the

par les astres

and to U e b e r w e g ' s Kosmogonie

in the

Geschichte.

T h e casual reference t o the Manchester school o f political e c o n o m y is o n e that gives us a clue t o N i e t z s c h e ' s criticisms o f crass egoism and the selfish pursuit o f material acquisitions as an end in itself. A t times, especially in Menschliches,

Allzumenschliches

and Morgenröte,

N i e t z s c h e ' s criticisms o f

materialistic " e g o i s m " and selfishness match the vitriolic language o f K a r l M a r x . A l t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e never studied M a r x , he was familiar with s o m e o f his opinions from his reading o f H e n r y C a r e y

15

and probably from his reading

o f the second edition o f Lange's history in which M a r x is mentioned in four places. Lange's critical c o m m e n t s on " e g o i s m " and political e c o n o m y p r o b ­ ably provided N i e t z s c h e with material to mull over and cite as evidence o f man's

drive

to

attain

economic

power

and

prominence

over

others.

N i e t z s c h e ' s emphasis upon self-regard, self-respect and pride o f self have nothing to do with the selfish acquisitive drive in man that he condemned. T h e Langean delineation o f social egoism as a form o f "atomistic" individualism clearly influenced N i e t z s c h e ' s critical attitude towards this p h e n o m e n o n . D e s p i t e the fact that N i e t z s c h e rarely mentions Lange in his

Nachlaß

(usually critically) or in his letters, and n o t at all in his published writings, does n o t mitigate the enormous influence that Lange had on his thinking. T h e r e is justification in H a n s Vaihinger's remark that " N i e t z s c h e must definitely be set d o w n as a disciple and successor o f L a n g e . " "Standpunkt

des Ideals"

16

In his discussions o f the

and its relation to N i e t z s c h e ' s fictionalism and "will

t o illusion", Vaihinger emphasizes the impact o f Lange on N i e t z s c h e . T h e

Ibid., 53. Henry C. Carey's Lehrbuch der Volkswirtschaft (Wien, 1870) was known by Nietzsche and may have been a source from which he obtained information about Marx. This was suggested in a discussion with Jörg Salaquarda by S. L. Gilman (Nietzsche-Studien 8, 255). Carey is mentioned in the first edition of Lange's Geschichte in two places and Lange mentions his own study of 1866: Mill's Ansichten über die Sociale Frage und die angebliche Umwälzung der Social-Wissenschaft durch Carey. Cf. F. A. Lange, GdM, 517, 528. In the second edition of his work, Lange refers to Marx's Das Kapital in two notes. GdM, I, 298 and GdM, II, 1006. In another place he refers to "zur Kritik der polit. Ökonomie, Berlin, 1859." Marx is described as "...bekanntlich wohl der gründlichste jetzt lebende Kenner der Geschichte der Nationalökonomie." GdM, I, 304-305. Henry C. Carey (1793-1879) was an American political economist whose major work was translated into German in 1870. He was considered to have brought about a revolution in social science. Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As-If, trans. C. K. Ogden, London, 1935, 341.

The Treasure-House

16

n o t i o n o f the value o f poetically expressed ideals is said to have made a deep impression on Nietzsche. Lange criticizes claims to metaphysical "knowledge," but stresses the value o f rhetorical o r "figurative truth". T h e pretention to grasp the ultimate nature o f reality is first undermined b y Lange and then by Nietzsche. Heidegger's claim that N i e t z s c h e is the "last metaphysician" is an understandable, misleading, judgment. F o r , Nietzsche follows Lange in denying

but

"absolute

k n o w l e d g e " o r "absolute truth." W h a t can be said about the "riddle o f existence" must be presented in the form o f poetic, metaphorical, aesthetic, hypothetical constructions. In his idea o f a universal "will to p o w e r " pervad­ ing all things N i e t z s c h e does not, as some have said, regress to a metaphysical standpoint; rather, he follows Lange b y presenting figurative, metaphorical representations

that

are not claims to knowledge. Nietzsche's

apparent

"metaphysical" theories are, I believe, modeled upon Lange's notion o f "the standpoint o f the ideal" and are aesthetically construed experimental ideas that have a primarily existential

significance. T h e y are projected and valued for

their presumed "effects" upon men (or "overmen") and their new cultural world. Vaihinger is perfectly right to point out that there is m o r e o f K a n t in N i e t z s c h e than has been noticed. Despite his sarcastic remarks about Kant, N i e t z s c h e ' s basic approach to the problem o f knowledge is indebted to Kant. A n d Lange's psychologistic modification o f Kant's concept o f knowledge is especially apparent in Nietzsche's epistemological writings. T h e theory that o u r "psycho-physical organization" conditions all o f our experience and knowledge, a theory that Lange forcefully defends, is virtually co-opted b y N i e t z s c h e . Vaihinger is correct to cite the "neo-Kantian origin o f Nietzsche's doctrine." Even though Nietzsche did not have a technical grasp o f the details o f K a n t ' s thought, he did understand the spirit of Kant, of the real Kant who understood the nature of appearance through and through, but who, in spite of having seen through it, also consciously saw and recognized its usefulness and necessity. 17

Even though Vaihinger unduly restricts Nietzsche's philosophical c o n ­ tributions to the "will to illusion" and a theory o f fictions, he fully grasps the direct relation between Lange and Nietzsche. In his discussion o f the punkt

des Ideals,

Stand­

he argues persuasively that there is embedded in Lange's

original position a discernible theory o f fictions. This is so in regard to "figurative representations" and in regard to scientific notions as well. V a i ­ hinger sees in Lange's stress upon the role o f "hypothesis" and postulation in

17

Ibid., 342.

17

The Treasure-House

science the basis o f N i e t z s c h e ' s theory o f fictions. It is held that Lange emphasizes "the purely fictional significance o f the difference between "ap­ pearances" and "things in themselves"." K a n t ' s notion o f the "as-if" (als-ob),

18

Although Lange did not arrive at

he independently arrived at something

analogous t o it. Specifically in regard t o the positing o f an overarching ideal as an aesthetic creation does Lange insist that such a posit has value as an "image, a s y m b o l " o r , in effect, as what Vaihinger calls a "useful fiction." O u r ordinary understanding o f the world, as well as the m o r e sophisticated understanding o f the nature o f things in science, is shot through with imagina­ tive n o t i o n s . Lange avers, and N i e t z s c h e after him, that the concept o f "thing" is a fictional n o t i o n , albeit a useful o n e . T h e concept of "matter" is one demanded b y the nature o f our thinking, an assumption that has no "validity for actual reality." A s Vaihinger points out, Lange maintains that m a n y o f the basic conceptions employed in the sciences are not accurate representations o f an independent actuality. T h e y are conceptual posits. I f this m o d e o f thought sounds reminiscent o f N i e t z s c h e ' s similar views, this is because he derived his theory o f "psychistic fictions" from his careful study o f Lange. In subsequent discussions, the precise analogies between Lange's concept o f knowledge and N i e t z s c h e ' s critical standpoint will be examined. T h e r e is n o doubt

that

Vaihinger had an accurate comprehension o f the intimate relationship between m a n y central ideas o f N i e t z s c h e and those o f his epistemological m e n t o r . E v e n though Lange does not draw out all o f the implications of his philosophical analyses, he provided the groundwork for a surprising n u m b e r o f issues and themes that preoccupy N i e t z s c h e . " A n overview o f Lange's reflections yields the following: the rise o f materialism, in coordination with the development o f the Naturwissenschaften,

has led to a point at which there

is a restriction o f genuine knowledge (as in K a n t ) to p h e n o m e n a alone. A l t h o u g h this involves a progress in the evolution o f human understanding, it leads to a paradox insofar as the natural sciences encounter what

many

nineteenth century scientists call "the limits o f natural scientific k n o w l e d g e . " L a n g e maintains that this consequence o f the advancement of scientific theory is,

ironically, a

confirmation

of

Kant's

critical theory

of

knowledge.

Philosophical agnosticism fuses with scientific agnosticism. T h e n e o - K a n t i a n orientation in the philosophy o f science (echoes o f which are heard even today) had its roots precisely in this insight o f Lange's. T h e m o r e the natural scientists

18

19

Ibid., 330-331. Concerning the Geschichte, it has been said that it " . . . ist das Werk, das Nietzsche die Grundlagen seiner philosophischen Bildung gegeben hat. Überhaupt kann der Einfluß dieser Lektüre gar nicht groß genug eingeschätzt werden..." E. Hocks, Das Verhältnis der Erkenntnis zur Unendlichkeit der Welt bei Nietzsche, Leipzig, 1914, 3. Cited in Jörg Salaquarda, "Nietzsche und Lange," N.-S. 7 (1978), 238.

18

The Treasure-House

p r o b e the nature o f the physical world, the m o r e mysterious b e c o m e the ultimate constituents o f reality. Insightfully, Lange sees that the disciplined scientific mind can live with this agnosticism, but he doubts that a people, a culture or a civilization can exist for long without some ideals o f a religious o r post-religious nature. Lange accurately predicts that a spiritual vacuum will occur if the scientific Weltanschauung

attains cultural dominance. L i k e N i e t z s c h e , and before him,

he foresees violent struggles in the future, struggles that will emerge out o f the conflict between religion and science, as well as out o f the growing tensions o f the "sociale

20

Frage. " W h a t is needed is a post-Christian cultural ideal that will

unify Western civilization and give direction and meaning to the lives o f those w h o cannot accept the austere realm o f scientific probabilities. Although Lange is sympathetic to the materialism he examines so carefully, he is not b y any means a dogmatic materialist. In fact, he views the results o f a purely materialistic standpoint as leading to the transcendence o f materialism. T h e position towards which he gravitates is a kind o f materio-idealism that issues in a universal phenomenalism. Because he is alert to the importance b o t h o f the ideal objectivity o f scientific understanding and the need for ideal cultural values, Lange approaches the position that D i l t h e y later adopts. T h a t is, he desires to preserve the standpoint o f the Wissenschaften, Geisteswissenschaften.

as well as that o f the

In many respects, Lange anticipates a number o f trends

in philosophy that c o m e to fruition in the later part o f the nineteenth century and the early part o f the twentieth century. Lange provides the contextual background for many aspects o f Nietzsche's experimental philosophy. T h e "treasure-house" that Nietzsche discovered so early in his intellectual life presented him with what he believed were the philosophical challenges o f his time. His phenomenalism, his skepticism and his analysis o f knowledge, in combination with ideals that are visionary, are virtually syntheses o f the polarities already laid out by Lange. T h e critique o f "truth-in-itself", fictionalism and the attempt to show that science does n o t give us "truth" are all implicit in Lange's thought. A l t h o u g h there is nothing in Lange's w o r k corresponding to Nietzsche's meticulous analysis o f European nihilism, the confluence o f social, e c o n o m i c and theoretical-scientific conflicting forces that Lange describes points to a c o m i n g crisis in the Western world that only lacks the designation "nihilism." In fact, en passant,

Lange does refer to the fact that the R o m a n poet, Lucretius,

presents in his philosophical p o e m , De rerum

natura,

an attempt to save the

ancient R o m a n world from spiritual and intellectual dissolution: he is said to oppose the salvation o f the philosophy o f Epicurus to "the nihilism o f the 20

GdM, 548.

19

The Treasure-House

times."

21

In a few places, Lange compares the crisis endured b y the decline o f

ancient R o m a n civilization to the crises he sees on the horizon. O n e o f the typical ways in which Nietzsche utilizes the materials found in Lange's treasure-house is to synthesize in a central conception what is pre­ sented seriatim. T h u s , to cite one o f m a n y examples, the idea that sensation is the surest foundation o f knowledge is treated in a number of places b y Lange, ranging from the thought o f Epicurus to the then recent philosophy o f Feuerbach. N i e t z s c h e synthesizes these congruent standpoints in his o w n form o f sensationalism. Aside from the habit o f combining what is separated in Lange's writings, N i e t z s c h e quite often superimposes one set o f principles o r concepts on another related set o f principles o r concepts that have been examined. This is the case, I believe, in the formation o f the idea o f eternal recurrence. E v e n though he may have forgotten it later, Nietzsche found in the Geschichte

des Materialismus

three separate discussions o f the possibility o f

eternal recurrence. In the first edition o f this w o r k , Lucretius' theory o f eternal return is mentioned. In the second edition o f the Geschichte,

reference

is made to a w o r k b y a F r e n c h author, Louis Blanqui, in which the notion is suggested and, in the context o f an exposition o f Ueberweg's c o s m o g o n y , the theory o f an eternal process o f creation and destruction b y means o f "the play o f forces" (das Spiel

der Kräfte)

is briefly discussed. T o complicate this

tendency towards conceptual superimposition, we must add to the theories already mentioned the similar notions o f Pythagoras and Heraclitus with which N i e t z s c h e was familiar from his study o f G r e e k thought and culture. Wherever else he m a y have c o m e upon the idea o f eternal recurrence and by whatever subjective experiences he may have been led to it, we do k n o w that he studied Lange's w o r k thoroughly and must have received the primitive imprint o f this idea relatively early in his life. T h e gradual process b y which this conception acquired significance for him is indicated b y the fact that when, in Vom Nutzen

und Nachteil

der Historie

für das Leben

(1874), he

refers to it in a casual manner, he m o c k s the notion and remarks that in order for such an idea to be propounded astrologers again.

astronomers would have to b e c o m e

22

T h e underestimation o f the influence o f Lange on Nietzsche that J ö r g Salaquarda has quite recently called attention to is seen in a recent biography o f N i e t z s c h e . O n l y passing reference is made to the content o f Lange's philosophical reflections and his position is summarized in a misleading way. It is said that "the age o f idealism had ended in 1830 with the J u l y Revolution,"

21

Ibid., 37.

22

Nietzsche Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, eds. G. Colli and M. Montinari, Berlin and New York, W. de Gruyter, III 1, Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen (UB), II, 2.

The Treasure-House

2C

that "the pressure o f material interests on spiritual life had" engendered a "new realism." In addition, The rapid growth of industrialism, the development of the railway system, and the popularity of David Strauss's Das Leben Jesu all contributed to a revival of interest in philosophy as an alternative to religious idealism, but though a revolutionary impulse was visible among philosophers, they had not caught up with the implica­ tions of the new materialism. 23

Although this is not a false account o f some o f the content o f Lange's major w o r k , it is superficial and misleading. It completely misses the rich philosophi­ cal content o f the Geschichte.

M o r e o v e r , Strauss' Das Leben

Jesu

is barely

mentioned. T h e "new materialism" referred to plays an important role in Lange's study primarily as leading either to agnosticism about the ultimate constituents o f nature or to the transcendence

o f materialism. A n d the "re­

volutionary impulse" that Lange clearly sees entails a turn away from a religious world-orientation towards a neo-pagan, atheistic humanism. A m o r e enlightened view o f the relation between Lange and Nietzsche indicates that N i e t z s c h e was indirectly influenced b y K a n t via the basically n e o - K a n t i a n orientation o f Lange. A s in the case o f Kant, Lange accepts an agnosticism about ultimate reality while finding r o o m for the satisfaction o f the needs o f the heart. It is Lange w h o suggested to Nietzsche that philosophy is akin to art and poetry. It has been said that in proposing to do away with the distinction between "appearance" and things in themselves Nietzsche follows 24

the "extreme views o f L a n g e . " It is mentioned that the belief that illusion is a legitimate part o f the life-process was suggested to Nietzsche b y Lange's quotation o f Schiller: Wage

du zu irren

und zu t r ä u m e n

25

Although such

observations are accurate as far as they go, the attempt to link Schiller's advice t o " T a k e courage, then, in erring and dreaming" with Nietzsche's unpublished essay, Ü b e r Wahrheit

und Lüge

im aussermoralischen

Sinn (1873), is mislead­

ing and overlooks the fact that this essay is a condensed presentation o f ideas found in Lange's Geschichte.

This essay is an example o f the way in which

N i e t z s c h e creatively synthesizes a variety o f notions he first found in Lange's magnum

opus.

Despite the merit o f the observations cited, they reveal the

underestimation o f the influence o f Lange on Nietzsche pointed out b y Salaquarda, an underestimation that it is m y intention to rectify. T h e attempt to overcome the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves that Lange proposes entails, as a result o f Lange's study o f H e r m a n n C o h e n ' s w o r k on Kant between 1866 and 1 8 7 5 , the elimination o f

23

24

25

Ronald Hayman, Nietzsche: A Critical Life, New York, 1980, 82. W.M.Salter, Nietzsche the Thinker, New York, 1917, 49.

Ibid., 497 n.

The Treasure-House

21

the concept o f "things in themselves" as a meaningful conception. Nietzsche will remember m a n y o f Lange's arguments against Kant's most vulnerable conception when, in the Nachlass

o f the late 1880's, he tries to develope a

critical epistemology. Such epistemic concerns are not a late development, however, in Nietzsche's thinking n o r is the Langean inspired criticism o f Dinge-an-sich

a late-blooming insight. F o r , as early as the Nachlass

o f 1872

Nietzsche indicated a preoccupation with epistemological problems. A n d even in Menschliches,

Allzumenschliches

(1878) he thought the idea o f the thing in

itself "worth a H o m e r i c laugh." In a recent interpretation o f Nietzsche there are some interesting comments on the relation between Lange and Nietzsche. A t Leipzig and later at Basel, it is said, Nietzsche's interest in the natural sciences was kindled b y "materialist" writers such as Paul R e e and F . A . Lange. It is further noted that philosophers had to take into account the powerful expansion o f scientific knowledge and that N i e t z s c h e was led in this direction by "the facts o f life themselves." Following in the wake o f this overstatement, it is said that the Geschichte Materialismus tive

presented

des

had some impact on Nietzsche's thought. T h e critical perspec­ there

was

said

to

have

Schopenhauer's "metaphysical presumptions."

made 26

Nietzsche

skeptical

of

Even though this was not the

case when N i e t z s c h e wrote to von Gersdorff extolling the virtues o f Lange and seeing that he provided a basis for "edifying" philosophy, there is little doubt that Lange was instrumental in turning him away from metaphysical specula­ tion. Although the theme o f the basing o f knowledge on phenomenal appear­ ances is duly mentioned in this account, the role o f the "standpoint o f the Ideal" in Nietzsche's philosophy is ignored. It is perhaps for this reason that it is said that Lange pretermits any breakthrough to any other "plane o f reality" even in imagination. T h i s false assumption probably accounts for the puzzle­ ment (in Hollingdale's Nietzsche) Macht.

concerning the theory o f the Wille

zur

After it is pointed out that Nietzsche decided to devote himself to

"phenomenalism", it is then held that he "diverted from this path back on to that o f metaphysics."

27

T h i s claim o f a disrelationship between Nietzsche's

phenomenalism and his so-called "metaphysics" is a misunderstanding

of

Nietzsche's philosophical intentions. A s I shall try to show in subsequent discussions o f this issue, the soi-disant

"metaphysics" that is attributed to

N i e t z s c h e does n o t entail any apodictic claim to "truth." Rather, Nietzsche's attempt to probe the ground o f internal and external phenomena is put forward in the form o f what Lange called "figurative truth" or a poetic representation o f actuality from "the standpoint o f the ideal."

26

27

Hollingdale, op. at., 44, 55. Ibid., 137-138.

The Treasure-House

22

In the "treasure-house" that Nietzsche read "again and again" there is not o n l y a defence o f phenomenalism, but a running critique o f anthropomorph­ ism, especially in scientific thinking. T h e s e themes are joined by Lange with a n u m b e r o f references to what amounts to an early version o f conventionalism in science. T h e r e is little doubt that Lange's insights, comments and observa­ tions contributed to the development o f the practical o r pragmatic conception o f knowledge that N i e t z s c h e uncovered as early as 1873. O f course, N i e t z s c h e adopts a critical stance in relation to "anthropomorphic truth", stressing its practical, instrumental and conventional meaning. This, as I've suggested, was a viewpoint that was put forward b y Lange in his numerous, insightful dicta.

obiter

A s is typically the case, Nietzsche draws out the implications o f points

that are made b y Lange. T h u s , he accepts the phenomenalistic account o f human knowledge and then insists that the "phenomenal w o r l d " is a creative falsification o f actuality, a schematization, a simplification that

provides

human truths that are ultimately in the service o f life. As I shall attempt to s h o w , Lange does n o t assemble his insights in precisely this way. It is N i e t z s c h e ' s skillful synthesizing o f insights, hints o r suggestions in the chichte

Ges­

that generates a radical approach to the problem o f knowledge. N o t

o n l y the critique o f anthropomorphism in science is first emphasized b y Lange, but also the persistence towards personification is discussed in such a w a y as to suggest to N i e t z s c h e the inevitability o f anthropomorphic interpre­ tation. We

must bear in mind the two basic poles o f Lange's philosophical

reflections if we would understand h o w he provided the background for N i e t z s c h e ' s general philosophical orientation. T h e identification o f knowledge as "conditional knowledge," as a form o f praktische

Erkenntnis,

undermines

any claim to "absolute truth" o r "absolute knowledge." O n the other hand, there is a place for imaginative, aesthetically construed philosophical ideals that are projected b e y o n d the range o f finite, relative, empirical actuality. T h i s is what Lange calls imaginative thinking from the Standpunkt

des

Ideals.

N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophy must be understood from b o t h o f these perspectives against the background created b y Lange. Because N i e t z s c h e has rarely been understood in light o f these two perspectives, there has been understandable confusion about the precise relation between Lange and Nietzsche. T h a t N i e t z s c h e seeks to build an affirmative, positive understanding o f actuality on what appear to be epistemological negations has been sometimes seen as an indication o f contradictions o r inconsistencies. I f we l o o k at the background o f his thought in light o f the theoretical framework presented in the

Geschichte,

w e gain an illuminating perspective on the historical ground o f many o f N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophical reflections.

23

The Treasure-House

O n e o f the curious indications o f the neglect to follow up hints o f Nietzsche's indebtedness to Lange is the fact, as Salaquarda has pointed out, that none o f the commentators on Nietzsche seem to have noticed that Lange, in the second edition o f the Geschichte, Nietzsche's Die Geburt

der Tragödie.

makes a flattering reference to

Lange remarks that:

der apollinische Zug der sokratischen Geistesrichtung ist neuerdings in eigentüm­ licher Weise scharf hervorgehoben worden von Nietzsche, die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (Leipzig 1872). 28

Surprisingly enough, as Salaquarda has shown, Nietzsche himself apparently did not see this mention o f his first w o r k . Because o f this, it has been said that N i e t z s c h e only saw the 1882 printing o f the fourth edition.

Unfortunately,

Nietzsche's name does not appear in the index o f names

(Namensregister).

29

W i t h o u t questioning this interesting piece o f scholarly detective w o r k , I believe that Salaquarda is much too cautious when he argues for Zeugnisse"

o f the influence o f Lange on N i e t z s c h e .

30

"indirekte

T h e evidence for this

influence m a y be technically "indirect," but, as I shall try to show, it is overpowering

circumstantial evidence. Even though I cannot explain the

absence o f any reaction to Lange's praise o f his first major w o r k , N i e t z s c h e seems to have been familiar with the contents o f the newer edition o f the Geschichte

before 1 8 8 2 . Although n o direct references are made to specific

authors o r themes that appear in the second edition o f the Geschichte in the first), there are a number o f isolated notes from the Nachlass

(but not

o f 1880 and

1881 that seem to touch upon issues discussed in the second edition o f Lange's book.

31

In the discussions that follow, I shall try to trace as many o f the lines o f influence that lead from Lange to Nietzsche as I can. A n d the special foci o f attention will be the ideas o r assumptions that are central to Nietzsche's thought. A n attempt will be made to delineate the essential ingredients o f Lange's philosophical views and critical asides in such a way as to create a ground against which the figures o f Nietzsche's kaleidoscopic thought may be

28

29

30

31

GdM, I, 138 n. Cf. J. Salaquarda, "Der Standpunkt des Ideals bei Lange und Nietzsche," Studi Tedeschi, X X I I , 1 (1979), 145. Cp. also: Salaquarda, "Nietzsche und Lange," N.-S. 7 (1978) 240. J . Salaquarda, "Nietzsche und Lange," N.-S. 7 (1978), 240. J. Salaquarda, "Der Standpunkt des Ideals...," Studi Tedeschi X X I I , 1 (1979), 148. KGW, V 1, 566, 636, 656, 766, 767. These notes appear to refer to points mentioned in the second edition of the Geschichte. That is, in order, the denial of the principle " A = A , " the merely representational nature of three dimensional space, movement and lines, the ChristianBuddhist elevation of "pity" into something good, the physiological determination of "the world" and that the "effects" we experience are conceived of as effects of "forces" modeled upon our own experience of a feeling of force.

24

The Treasure-House

illuminated. Although the boldness and originality o f N i e t z s c h e is not put in question here, the importance o f the contribution o f Lange's "treasure-house" t o the nature and form o f numerous aspects o f Nietzsche's often condensed and fragmentary insights and arguments, as well as the role it played in setting the stage for his philosophical concerns, has been t o o long and t o o often neglected.

CHAPTER II ETERNAL R E C U R R E N C E In a retrospective evaluation o f his writings in Ecce Homo, us that the fundamental thought o f Thus Spake Ewige-Wiederkunfts.

Zarathustra

N i e t z s c h e tells was that o f the

H e experienced this "weighty thought" " 6 0 0 0 feet b e y ­

ond man and time." T h i s is certainly a dramatic picture o f philosophical discovery, a stirring representation o f hyperbolic thought. A n d yet we may wonder whether this was precisely h o w and when he actually discovered this most exotic o f philosophical ideas. Whatever may have been the subjective conviction that N i e t z s c h e had about the original intuitive thought o f the repetitious occurrence o f all events, the recurrence o f precisely every event in the life o f an individual, a people, a culture and in the cosmos itself that has occurred previously, w e do k n o w that, after Schopenhauer, it was Lange w h o made the deepest and earliest impres­ sion on his thinking. Chronologically, it is clear that the first suggestion o f the possibility o f the endless repetition o f all things was found in Schopenhauer's Die

Welt als Wille

und Vorstellung.

In t w o passages in his most important

w o r k Schopenhauer suggests the replication o f existence. H e maintains that an entire eternity has already elapsed up to the present instant and that, therefore, 1

"everything that can o r should b e c o m e must have b e c o m e already." In a m o r e extended argument along the same lines, Schopenhauer contends that the present existence o f any individual is necessary because if an individual ever could n o t be, then he o r she would not be now. O n the metaphysical assumption that we are the "inner nature" that time itself has taken into itself, "this inner nature fills up the whole

o f time, present, past and future." It is

unthinkable, Schopenhauer concludes, that what once existed could ever be reduced to nothing. T h e infinity o f time that is assumed to have already 2

elapsed entails "the exhausted possibility o f events." Although neither o f these arguments is precisely equivalent to the idea o f the eternal recurrence o f

1

Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E . F. J . Payne, IndianHills, Colorado, 1958, I, 273-274.

2

Ibid., II, 489.

Eternal Recurrence

26

the same, they certainly suggest a view very similar to it. Given the impact that Schopenhauer had o n N i e t z s c h e , it is unlikely that he was unaware o f these striking passages. A l t h o u g h this possible link between Schopenhauer's metaphysical specula­ tions about the infinity o f time and the recurrence o f what has already happened and the Nietzschean idea o f eternal recurrence is fairly w e l l - k n o w n , n o o n e , as far as I k n o w , has ever called attention to the fact that very similar notions can also be found

in Lange's critical history o f materialism. I n

sequential order the first allusion t o a cosmic repetition o f events is mentioned in the c o n t e x t o f discussing the views o f Lucretius in De rerum

natura.

In the course o f explaining the Epicurean theories presented b y Lucretius, L a n g e refers to passages in the third b o o k o f De rerum argued

natura

in w h i c h it is

that b o t h the indestructible atoms and empty space are eternal.

Lucretius maintains that "the sum total o f the universe is everlasting." A l ­ though he insists that at death there is a dispersion o f the atomic elements out o f w h i c h w e are assumed t o b e c o m p o s e d (and, therefore, there is a real extinction o f o u r individual being), Lucretius goes o n to say that "even if the matter that c o m p o s e s us should be reassembled b y time after o u r death and b r o u g h t b a c k into its present s t a t e . . . that contingency w o u l d . . . be o f no c o n c e r n o f ours o n c e the chain o f our identity had been snapped."

3

The

possibility o f o u r reoccurrence, even if it were identical in all respects to o u r previous existence, would not involve, Lucretius tells us, any recollection o f this previous state o f being. W e w h o presently exist are n o t concerned with any previous existence w e m a y have had insofar as the sufferings o f "those selves do n o t t o u c h us." Lucretius clearly is presenting a materialistic t h e o r y o f the possibility o f the eternal recurrence o f an individual, even though he is n o t particularly m o v e d

b y this possibility. Although

expressed in terms o f

E p i c u r u s ' atomistic theory o f nature, Lucretius' conception is not far removed in spirit from Schopenhauer's arguments. F o r , it is said that when we consider "the immeasurable extent o f time gone b y and the multiform m o v e m e n t s o f matter, y o u will readily credit that these same atoms that c o m p o s e us n o w m u s t m a n y a time before have entered into the self-same combinations as now."

3

4

4

T h e form o f this argument is quite similar t o s o m e o f N i e t z s c h e ' s

Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, trans. R. Latham, Middlesex, 1951, 121. In notations written during 1867-68, Nietzsche made numerous references to Lucretius, and some specifi­ cally to the discussion of Lucretius in the Geschichte. Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke, Munich, 1937, Band 4, 54. Other references to Lucretius are: Ibid., 42, 65, 74 f, 78, 120, 364, 501. The research Nietzsche was engaged in probably was in preparation for an essay, "über die unechten Schriften Demokrits." Cf. Briefe an Carl von Gersdorff (November 24 and December 1, 1867). Nietzsche Briefwechsel, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Berlin and New York, 1975, I 2, 240. Ibid., 121-122.

Eternal Recurrence

arguments for eternal recurrence as a cosmological principle. W e shall have to examine later the details o f Nietzsche's arguments. T h a t Lucretius presented a clear example o f a theory o f eternal return is indisputable. H o w e v e r , in Lange's account o f his thought, he places emphasis upon the possibility o f the existence o f an infinite number o f concurrent worlds. F o r , he asserts that Der Gedanke, daß die gesamte Summe der Möglichkeiten bei der Unendlichkeit der Welten auch irgendwo vertreten ist, paßt durchaus in das System; die Summe des Denkbaren der Summe des real Möglichen und also auch in irgend einer der unendlich vielen Welten Vorhandenen gleichzusetzen, ist ein Gedanke, der noch heutzutage auf die beliebte Lehre von der Identität des Seins und des Denkens ein nützliches Streiflicht werfen kann. 5

If I understand what Lange is saying here, he believes that the concept o f an entire series o f possibilities being in an infinity o f worlds in actual existence is compatible with the notion that the sum o f the conceivable corresponds to the actually possible. T h i s is taken to be relevant to the Hegelian notion o f the identity o f being and thought.

Presumably, because it is suggested

that

conceivable possible worlds may correspond to actually existing worlds. B y thinking o f Lucretius' doctrine in this way, Lange almost misses the point that a series o f possible beings o r "possible worlds" could, according to Lucretius' principles, be repeated. A l m o s t as an after-thought, he notes that this c o n c e p ­ tion also includes the view that the same Summe

des Seienden

could be

repeated. Ironically, Lange's interpretation o f Lucretius is closer to c o n t e m ­ porary astronomical theories concerning if n o t an infinity o f worlds, at least billions o f universes. Despite this variation on the theme o f a reduplication o f previously existing individuals, Lange indicates that he grasps the central point that Lucretius is making. In the context o f discussing Lucretius' interesting theories, Lange (in the second edition o f his w o r k ) calls attention to an essay b y a F r e n c h author that was published in 1 8 7 2 . In L ' E t e r n i t é par les Astres,

Hypothése

astronomique,

one A . Blanqui is quoted as arguing that w e may propose the idea that everything possible is somewhere and at some time realized in the universe, and, in fact, has often been realized, and that as an inevitable conse­ quence . . . of the absolute infinity of the universe... [and] of the finite and

3

Lange, GdM, 53. "The idea that the whole series of possibilities is, in the infinity of worlds, somewhere in actual existence, is in complete accordance with the system; to make the sum of the conceivable correspond to that of the actually possible and, therefore, the actually existing in some of the infinitely numerous worlds, is a thought that, even today, may throw a useful cross-light upon the favorite doctrine of the identity of being and thought."

Eternal Recurrence

28

everywhere constant number of the elements, whose possible combinations must also be finite. 6

T h i s formulation is certainly compatible with Lucretius' theory and is obvi­ ously reminiscent o f some o f Nietzsche's various attempts to formulate his idea o f the eternal recurrence o f the same. H o w e v e r , as w e shall see, N i e t z s c h e substitutes the concept o f Kraft

("force") or Kraftcentren

("force-centers") for

the vague "elements" referred to in Blanqui's statement o f the astronomical t h e o r y . In doing so, he incorporates a theoretical notion he first encountered in B o s c o v i c h ' s writings into his o w n version o f this theory. W e have seen, then, that the discussion o f Lucretius' assumption o f the contingency o f the reduplication o f an individual's existence, as well as the brief summary o f an astronomical theory, m a y have planted the seed o f the idea o f the eternal recurrence o f the same in Nietzsche's mind. I f w e add to this the brief arguments along similar lines in Die Welt als Wille und

Vorstellung,

w e seem to have uncovered the original loci o f one o f Nietzsche's central conceptions. This is n o t the end o f the story, however. F o r , there is even another place in Geschichte

des Materialismus

where we find further reinforce­

m e n t o f this general theory. Aside from numerous references to the indestructibility and eternality o f matter sprinkled throughout Lange's text, there are a number o f citations (in the second edition o f the Geschichte)

from letters sent from U e b e r w e g to

C z o l b e that are intriguing. U e b e r w e g offers a summary o f his " c o s m o g o n y " that acknowledges its indebted to the Kant-Laplace hypothesis. H e argues (in Lange's paraphrase) that Aufglühen und Zerstreuung der Materie im Raume, worauf dann das Spiel der Kräfte wieder eine neue Weltbildung folgen läßt. Das Leben geht bei der all­ mählichen Erkaltung der Weltkörper verloren, aber der Zusammensturz stellt früher oder später die Wärme wieder her und es ist kein Grund vorhanden, warum sich nicht das Leben, wenn wir auch nicht wissen wie, genau aus denselben Gründen wieder erzeugt, aus welchen es bei uns entstanden ist. Der KantLaplacesche Anfangszustand i s t . . . nur relativ ein Anfangszustand. Er setzt den Zusammensturz früherer Welten voraus und wird sich unendlich oft wiederholen, da wir keinen Grund haben, die Unendlichkeit der Materie und des Raumes zu bezweifeln. 7

In this sketch o f U e b e r w e g ' s c o s m o g o n y we are presented with a cosmic process o f creation and destruction "that will infinitely often recur," a massive 6

7

Louis A. Blanqui, L'Eternité par les Astres, Hypothese astronomique, Paris, 1872. Cited in Lange, GdM, I, 147 n. Henri Lichtenberger mentions Blanqui's book and suggests its influence on the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same. Die Philosophie Fr. Nietzsches, Leipzig, 1899, 204-209. In the Nachlass of 1883 Nietzsche made the following entry: "A. Blanqui L'eternite par les astres Paris 1872." KGW VII 1, 588. Lange, op. tit., II, 964. "Ignition and distribution of matter through space, upon which the play of forces makes a new world-formation follow. On the gradual cooling of the planets life

29

Eternal Recurrence

"play o f forces" without end. Aside from the fact that some o f the features o f this briefly stated theory are incorporated into Nietzsche's dithyrambic pic­ ture o f the c o s m o s as Wille zur Macht,

it is interesting that U e b e r w e g describes

not only a recurring process, but one specifically characterized b y creation and destruction. In an exposition o f the then new w o r k o f Strauss, Der Alte und der Glaube,

Neue

presented in the second edition o f his critical history, Lange mentions

the following points: Strauss, like Ü b e r w e g , follows the c o s m o g o n y o f K a n t and stresses the eternity o f the "infinite whole." H e especially emphasizes that Das Leben

ist ewig.

Since the "eternal process" o f creation and destruction can

no m o r e have a beginning than an end, this conception o f the c o s m o s banishes any basis for assuming "a creator" (einen

Schöpfer).

8

Given the subsequent

development o f Nietzsche's philosophy, this is certainly an interesting collec­ tion o f ideas: the eternal process o f creation and destruction, the dynamic play o f forces, the notion o f a cosmos eternally recurring as a justification for the denial o f G o d as creator o f the universe. It is interesting, too, that despite his vehement attack on Strauss in the first o f his Unzeitgemässe

Betrachtungen

it is

surprising h o w much (except for his superior style and his repudiation o f the worship o f material and financial success that Strauss displays) N i e t z s c h e has in c o m m o n with him. A s I've mentioned earlier, the first time that Nietzsche touches upon the possibility o f a form o f eternal return, he is skeptical and ironical. In his essay, Vom Nutzen

und Nachteil

der Historie

für das Leben,

he treats the whole idea

in a casual way. In the course o f criticizing the approach to historical understanding he describes as "monumental history," he remarks, en

passant,

that, in the final analysis, was einmal möglich war, sich nur dann zweiten Male als möglich einstellen, wenn die Pythagoreer recht hätten, zu glauben, daß bei gleiche Konstellation der himmlischen Körper auch auf Erden das gleiche, und zwar bis aufs einzelne und kleine, sich wiederholen müsse. 9

O n l y if a detailed repetition such as this actually occurred could the "archetypic truth in monumental history" be found. In order for this to happen, the Astronomen

8

9

would have to b e c o m e Astrologen.

It is interesting to note that the

disappears, but the collision restores the heat sooner or later, and there is no reason why life, though we do not know how, should not reproduce itself from exactly the same causes from which it has been produced with us. The Kant-Laplace initial state is . . . only relatively an initial state. It presupposes the collision of earlier worlds, and, as we have no reason to doubt the infinity of matter and space, will recur infinitely often." Ibid., II, 973-974. KGW III 1, UB, II, 2. " . . . what was once possible can only become possible a second time, according to the Pythagorean theory, that when the heavenly bodies are in the same position again the events on earth are repeated to the smallest detail."

30

Eternal Recurrence

t h e o r y o f eternal repetition is attributed here t o Pythagoras in terms o f an astronomical t h e o r y even though the original report o f this doctrine b y E u d e m u s does n o t refer to cyclical succession in this way. H e simply says that If one is to believe the Pythagoreans, with the result that the same individual things will recur, then I shall be talking to you again sitting as you are now, with this pointer in my hand, and everything else will be just as it is now, and it is reasonable to suppose that the time then is the same as now. 10

I n this passing reference, N i e t z s c h e (despite his thorough knowledge o f classical literature) seems to fuse t w o theories in o n e : the Pythagorean idea o f cyclic return and the views found in Chaldean astrology. Certainly, at this stage o f his life and thought, he does n o t seem to take eternal recurrence very seriously at all. In fact, he seems t o consider it a mere bagatelle.

Recurrence

as Psychological

Test

A b o u t five years after the last o f his "thoughts out o f season" appeared, N i e t z s c h e unveiled the thought o f eternal recurrence in a very s o m b e r light indeed. T h e n o t i o n o f the eternal repetition o f the same is n o t first presented in the form o f a c o s m i c theory. R a t h e r , it is proposed in the form o f a kind o f psychological or spiritual test o f the mettle o f one's courage and character. A l t h o u g h the n o t i o n o f recurrence is mentioned in four aphorisms in Die fröhliche

Wissenschaft,

its m o s t dramatic expression is found in the well-

k n o w n passage in w h i c h he asks us h o w w e would react if a d e m o n approached us in o u r loneliest m o m e n t and said, Dieses Leben, wie du es jetzt lebet und gelebt hast, wirst du noch einmal und noch unzählige Male leben müssen; und es wird nichts Neues daran sein, sondern jeder Schmerz und jede Lust und jeder Gedanke und Seufzer und alles unsäglich Kleine und Große deines Lebens muß dir wiederkommen, und alles in derselben Reihe und Folge. 11

W o u l d w e fall t o the ground and gnash o u r teeth and curse such a d e m o n ? O r w o u l d w e accept such a thought and either be transformed o r crushed? I n this

10

11

G. S. Kirk and J . E . Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, London, 1964, 223. Gomperz claims that Eudemus' report must not be derived from the (Babylonian) astrological beliefs. Theodor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers; A History of Ancient Philosophy, trans. L. Magnus, London, 1901, I, 143. Nietzsche was familar with Eudemus from his classical philological studies and mentions him a number of times in his philological notes. HKG HI, IV, 262, 266; 42, 64, 223, 559, 584. KGW, V 2 , Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (FW), 341. "This life, as you live it at present and have lived it, you must live it once more and also innumerable times; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy, every thought and every sigh, everything unspeakably small and great in your life must come to you again, and all in the sequence and series."

31

Eternal Recurrence

context, the main concern is with eternal recurrence as a psycho-spiritual test, as a w a y o f measuring our feelings and attitudes towards our own life. Later Zarathustra is presented as the teacher o f the Ü b e r m e n s c h , the prophet w h o declares that man is something to be overcome. A n d Zarathustra is also called the "teacher o f eternal recurrence." A l m o s t throughout sprach

Zarathustra

there are hints and foreshadowings

o f an

Also

"abysmal

thought." Gradually, the teaching is revealed. Before the idea is announced fully in Der Genesende

o r " T h e Convalescent," part o f its meaning, as well as

its terror, is indicated in Vom

Gesicht

und

Rätsel.

This highly charged,

symbolic mixture o f a "vision" and a "riddle" links courage with the capacity to will one's life again, without substraction or addition, to say: „ W a r das das Leben? W o h l a n ! N o c h einmal!" W h a t makes this portrayal o f courage in the face o f the repetition o f one's life so poignant and so powerful is that it is directly joined to what appears to be Nietzsche's childhood experience o f hearing a howling dog and then finding his father lying on the street, unconscious and seriously injured. T h i s same "vision" (which is obviously a nightmarish m e m o r y ) is immediately followed b y what is clearly the m o s t terrible image in Also sprach

Zarathustra.

Sudden­

ly, in a ghastly vision, Zarathustra sees a shepherd b o y chocking on a large, black snake that has crawled into his mouth. O n Zarathustra's c o m m a n d , the b o y bites off the head o f the serpent and spits it out o f his mouth. T h i s startling condensation o f images generates a powerful tension and virtually begs for interpretation. A t the very m o m e n t at which Zarathustra projects a courageous acceptance o f the eternal repetition o f one's existence, the terror o f Zarathustra's (or, in this case, N i e t z s c h e ' s ) recollected childhood experience seems to overcome him. A n d in the very next sequence, a snake is pictured as chocking

a young

shepherd b o y . T h i s dreadful image suggests the chocking feeling o f nausea, a nausea directly connected with the acceptance o f the eternal recurrence o f the same. T h i s chain o f images and symbols - the vision o f the unending repetition of everything in life, the painful childhood m e m o r y , the shocking picture o f the chocking shepherd b o y - seems to mark a turning-point in

Zarathustra.

After the shepherd b o y has bitten off the head o f the serpent, he is described as Nicht mehr Hirt, nicht mehr Mensch - ein Verwandelter, ein Umleuchteter, welcher lachte! 12

A m o n g s t other things, Nietzsche seems to be saying that the most terrible aspect o f willing the eternal return o f all things is not the repetition o f what o n e

12

KGW, VI 1, Also sprach Zarathustra (AsZ), III, "Vom Gesicht und Rätsel." "No longer shepherd, no longer man - a transformed, radiant, laughing being!"

32

Eternal Recurrence

has chosen to do with o n e ' s life, but the necessity o f living through the m o s t painful experiences o f o n e ' s life when o n e is m o s t vulnerable. T h r o u g h o u t this section o f Also sprach

Zarathustra,

there are a n u m b e r o f references to "pity".

W h a t seems t o be suggested is that this last temptation to feel pity for others, a debilitating p i t y for the sufferings o f others, must b e o v e r c o m e . O n l y if w e are able t o o v e r c o m e such a temptation to pity, if we are able to endure the c h o c k i n g feeling o f reliving the m o s t terrible m o m e n t s o f o u r lives, will the idea o f eternal recurrence have a liberating and transforming effect u p o n us. W h a t N i e t z s c h e seems to be depicting is a deep psychic experience o f the negation o f the negations entailed b y the n o t i o n o f eternal return. T h i s understanding o f the everlasting recurrence o f the same as generating an existential transformation is a far cry from the abstract formulations o f c o s m i c cycles o f creation and destruction found on the austere pages o f Lange's c o o l , critical history o f materialism. T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f eternal recurrence as a test o f life-affirmation, as an acid test for the Übermenschen

o f the future, or as an "existential imperative" has

been skillfully defended in recent interpretations o f N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophy. W h a t we must be aware o f here is that the meaning for Existenz

13

o f the

acceptance o f the possibility o f eternal recurrence should b e distinguished from N i e t z s c h e ' s various attempts t o seek a "scientific" justification for the objective validity o f this theory. B e f o r e making s o m e concluding remarks o n the role that eternal return plays in the existential transformation o f the self, w e must examine its logical and cosmological formulations. T h i s is especially appropriate because, o n c e again, the shadow o f L a n g e falls u p o n s o m e o f the details contained in such formulations o f the idea o f the eternal recurrence o f the same.

The

Cosmological

Arguments

T h e formulation o f eternal return in terms o f attempts to demonstrate it o r indicate its probability is primarily a reflection o f N i e t z s c h e ' s desire to enlist a scientific c o n c e p t i o n in the service o f his philosophy. A l t h o u g h I agree with Danto

13

14

14

in this regard, I do so for reasons quite different from his o w n . T h e

Cf. Tracy Strong, Frederich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, Berkeley, 1976. Cp. also: Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential Imperative, Bloomington and London, 1978. Walter Kaufmann recognizes the "experiential" significance of the idea of eternal recurrence, but does not develope this insight. Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche, New York, 1968, 323-324. Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, New York, 1965, 209.

33

Eternal Recurrence

claim that D a n t o is mistaken in assuming the temporal priority o f the empirical, cosmological arguments for recurrence in Nietzsche's thought is unwarranted

15

because we k n o w that one o f his first contacts with this general

conception was in Lange's critical history. In the versions that are discussed b y Lange, n o "normative" o r "ethical" significance is attached to the theory of the ewige

Wiederkunft

des Gleichen.

T h e psychological, "normative" o r existen­

tial meaning o f the acceptance o f the idea o f eternal return is Nietzsche's original creation. T h e empirical possibility o f the repetition o f all events to eternity presup­ poses its logical possibility. T h e rudiments o f such an argument are found in Schopenhauer's Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung expository comments in Geschichte

des Materialismus.

presentation o f this idea in Zarathustra,

and also in F . A . Lange's Even in the most poetic

an argument for its logical possibility

is mentioned. F o r , Zarathustra avers that if "an eternity lies behind us," then " M u s t not all things that can happen have

already happened"?

16

If it is granted

that time is infinite, and if the sum o f primal elements out o f which all entities are composed is finite, then it is surely logically possible that every single event in cosmic history m a y be repeated. Nietzsche clearly sees the implications o f such a position insofar as he maintains that the repetition o f an isolated event or even o f the life o f an individual would not be possible unless all intercon­ nected events are also repeated. In order, say, for Lucretius to exist again, he must be physically identical to his previous incarnation, as well as psychologi­ cally and intellectually identical to his earlier manifestations. H o w e v e r , this would require the recurrence o f R o m a n culture, o f the physical and cultural world that prevailed during his lifetime, o f everything, in short, that concur­ rently existed when Lucretius lived. T h e entire series of happenings

during the

" n e w " lifetime o f our Lucretius must also occur in precisely the same

15

16

Magnus, op. cit., 178. It is said that Danto is mistaken in his view that the "doctrine of eternal recurrence as an empirical cosmology" is temporally prior to other formulations (e.g., "normative" ones). Since Nietzsche was at least familiar with the possibility of eternal recurrence as a cosmological thesis by virtue of his reading of Lange in 1866 and thereafter, the "normative" or ethical significance of the idea of eternal recurrence is a later development. Danto is right, but not for the reasons he gives. As I shall try to show in the last chapter of this study, Nietzsche synthesized two ways of thought that he found in Lange's Geschichte des Materialismus, the consideration of the range of empirical possibility or probability and the use of ideas as poetic ideals or "figurative truths." Magnus' notion of an "existential imperative" is perfectly sound. For, Nietzsche found in Lange's study instances of the adoption of a philosophical standpoint or conception on "moral" grounds in Lange's presentation of the thought of Czolbe. Nietzsche's originality is displayed by his fusion of a cosmological possibility and an existential imperative adopted for its "effects." KGW, AsZ, loc. cit., 2. "Muß nicht, was geschehn kann von allen Dingen, schon einmal geschehn..."

34

Eternal Recurrence

sequence. T h a t it is theoretically possible that an individual may undergo a recurrent existence is plausible, is as indisputable as Bertrand Russell's claim that a m o n k e y sitting at a typewriter for an infinite period o f time could c o m p o s e all o f Shakespeare's plays. T h e cases are not, o f course, the same because what N i e t z s c h e ' s theory proclaims is the everlasting recurrence o f the same events o n a small as well as o n a large scale. A l t h o u g h it is logically possible that the entire sequence o f specific events in the history o f the c o s m o s and the history o f the world m a y be repeated over and over again, if the c o m p o n e n t s out o f which these histories or events are c o m p o s e d are finite, and if time is assumed to b e infinite, it is n o t logically possible for a specific temporal sequence to be entirely repeated in all respects even if time is infinite. T h u s , for example, Lucretius, his cultural world and the complete totality o f which he was but a small part m a y be repeated at s o m e temporal period in the future o r m a y have been repeated a n u m b e r o f times already. B u t , in a strict sense, the repeated life and times o f Lucretius w o u l d n o t be a recurrence o f the same

temporal segments o f the "eternal ring o f

b e c o m i n g . " E v e n if we assume the cyclic destruction and creation o f the c o s m o s and the entire process leading up to the life o f Lucretius, this could not be an actual repetition o f the same temporal sequence if temporality is assumed 1

t o b e real, objective and infinite. A n event that occurs at T simply cannot be the same event (even if every detail o f it is repeated) that happens at T n . T h e logical possibility o f the ewige

Wiederkunft

des Gleichen

1 7

would, in the

strictest sense, require the postulation o f epochs o f temporal processes that are themselves repeated in a cyclic fashion. Since this would introduce an obvious discontinuity into the c o s m i c temporal cycle, it would n o t be compatible with

This argument is derived from Magnus' analysis of eternal recurrence as an empirico-cosmological theory. Cf. Magnus, op. cit., 60, 110. In the Nachlass it is said that ein unendlich Prozeß can only be thought of as periodisch. Werke, GOA, X I I , 370. Even though, with the postulation of infinite time and finite "force" and, hence, finite constellations of force, the logical possibility of the recurrence of the same must be allowed, the empirical probability is quite remote. For, according to Nietzsche's understanding of events (as, for example, in Zarathustra), everything that happens, every individual entity or occurrence is interrelated with all other events or entities. Thus, if a single, relatively simple event were to reoccur, it would have to be accompanied by precisely the "same" events that accompanied it previously. If we add to this Nietzsche's imaginative speculation concerning the constantly varying degrees of power not only in every phenomenal being from moment to moment, but in every Kraftcentrum, the precise repetition of an event under precisely the "same" conditions becomes extremely unlikely. If, for example, the Brownian movements of molecules in a known gas under ostensibly the "same" conditions are unpredictable, there is a question here concerning what, in certain domains, a singular event is. If indeterminism is an actual feature of the "behavior" of sub-atomic particles, then a literal repetition of "the same" event may very well be empirically impossible.

35

Eternal Recurrence

Nietzsche's theory o f recurrence. T h e various instances o f logical arguments for everlasting recurrence found in Nietzsche's writings could only be used to defend the theoretical possibility o f the unending recurrence o f the similar, n o t "the same." As far as the issue o f the empirical recurrence o f specific event-sequences is concerned, this is extraordinarily empirically improbable. Because o f the necessary assumption o f the relational interaction o f all events, the empirical possibility o f the concurrent reoccurrence o f compatible events (which would, of course, have to include an astronomical number o f simultaneous happen­ ings) in precisely the sequence in which they had previously happened is a remote possibility. O f course, when we introduce the logical possibility o f infinite time and the finitude o f the "elements" that are combined

and

recombined, it is theoretically possible that an empirical order o f events may recur. In such a case, the literal repetition o f similar

events is empirically

possible. Again, if time is objectively real and infinite, then it is not empirically possible for the same

actual events to recur. If, for the sake o f argument, we

assume, as relativity theory does, that there are n o absolutely simultaneous events occurring in the c o s m o s , then the presumption o f simultaneous recurr­ ence in accordance with the theory o f eternal repetition is further undermined. As we shall see, it is n o t only the importation o f features o f relativity theory that tends to undermine Nietzsche's theory. It is, in fact, his o w n competing cosmological o r 'ontological' principles that do so. W h e n w e turn to an examination o f Nietzsche's best formulations o f the idea under discussion as a cosmological doctrine, w e discern a number o f k e y conceptions that he first encountered in his careful study o f Lange. Intermit­ tently throughout his major w o r k Lange refers to the principle o f the "persist­ ence o f force", to the principle o f "the conservation o f energy," as well as to the complementary principle o f the "indestructibility o f matter" keit des Stoffs).

(Unsterblich­

In order to defend his theory, Nietzsche relies upon precisely

such principles, specifically the principle o f the conservation o f energy, in a number o f his arguments. It is crucial to his various, so-called "empirical" arguments that it be assumed that the amount o f "force" o r "energy" in the universe is constant, neither diminishing n o r increasing. T h e three premisses essential for the arguments for eternal return are: the constancy o f force or energy, the finitude o f the number o f possible combinations o f forces o r forceunits and the infinity o f time. In the course o f analyzing the theories o f the G r e e k atomists, Lange cites D e m o c r i t u s ' principles: that nothing can be created ex nihilo,

that nothing that

comes to be can be destroyed and that change involves the combination and separation o f primal units o r atoms. In regard to these, Lange remarks that

Eternal Recurrence

36

Dieser Satz, der im Prinzip schon die beiden großen Lehrsätze der neueren Physik enthält, den Satz von der Unzerstörbarheit des Stoffes und den von der Erhaltung der Kraft. 18

T o add justification to the comparison he has made, Lange refers to Kant's first "analogy o f experience": Bei allem Substanz,

und das Quantum

vermindert."

Wechsel

derselben

der Erscheinungen

wird in der Natur weder

beharret vermehrt

die oder

In a n u m b e r o f other places, the principle o f the conservation o f

energy is introduced. T h u s , while dealing with R o b i n e t ' s eighteenth century essay, Nature,

Lange uses the idea o f the conservation o f energy to explain the

view that in all human actions, from sensations through brain functions, language-use and action, the total available amount o f force o r energy is preserved.

20

In a later reprise o f the same issue (in the second edition [1875] o f

the Geschichte), lecture, Uber

Lange makes reference to D u B o i s - R e y m o n d ' s influential die Grenzen

des Naturerkennens.

I t is argued that the internal

brain functions cannot be considered as exempt from, o r as exceptions t o , the universal Gesetz

der Erhaltung

21

der Kraft.

Again and again, this " l a w " o r

"principle" is appealed to and its universal applicability to all phenomena o r processes is emphasized. T h u s , for example, it is reported that argued that the principle o f Erhaltung organic, as well as to the inorganic world. o f a mechanistic interpretation

der Kraft 22

Überweg

must be applied to the

T h e repeated arguments in defense

o f all phenomena, the conception o f the

conservation o f energy, the notion o f finite, discrete elements combining and recombining within an infinite process, all o f these notions are found sprinkled t h r o u g h o u t Lange's critical history. C o ns c i o u s l y o r unconsciously, N i e t z s c h e seems to have synthesized these conceptions specifically in relation to "the calculus o f probabilities." I n the wake o f a discussion o f the application o f Laplace's theory o f probability (as presented in Essai philosophique

sur les probabilites)

o r extraordinary cases that have the appearance o f "human

to unusual purposefulness

about t h e m , " Lange notes that the letters " E U R O P A " might be formed if they 18

19

Lange, op. cit., I, 15. "These statements already contain in principle the two great theoretical assertions of the latest physics, the principles of the indestructibility of matter and of the conservation of force." Cf. Lange, GdM, 7-8. Ibid. Cf. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Hamburg, 1956, A182, 235: "In all change of appearances, substance is permanent and its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished."

20

Ibid., 331.

21

Ibid., II, 602. A consideration of the relevance or irrelevance of the principle of the conservation of force or energy to the mind-body problem is discussed by C. D. Broad in The Mind and Its Place in Nature, London, 1925, 97-121. Broad concludes that this principle is basically irrelevant to the theory of mind-body interaction, even though it sheds light on the nature of mind-body interaction if such occurs.

22

Ibid., II, 960.

Eternal Recurrence

37

were blindly o r randomly drawn from a b o x o f printer's type. T h i s might occur even if any other combination o f letters would be just as probable. In turn, Lange refers this example to D i d e r o t ' s argument, in Pensees ques,

that the Iliad

philosophi-

could probably be composed b y a fortuitous combination 23

of letters if the n u m b e r o f "experiments" were infinite. I f N i e t z s c h e attended to o r recalled such related questions (as I certainly believe he did), then one o f the attractions o f the theory o f eternal recurrence as a logical and an empirical possibility was that it effectively eliminates

teleology

nalizes actuality. T h e conception o f the ewige

and, o f course, eter­

Wiederkunft,

like so many o f

Nietzsche's central ideas, is a syncretistic creation that brings together a variety o f interrelated themes that he first discovered in his reading o f Lange.

Force-Centers

and

Recurrence

In Lucretius' early materialistic theory o f eternal repetition, an extensive, but finite, n u m b e r o f atoms is presupposed that may c o m b i n e and recombine throughout an infinite period o f time. T h a t Nietzsche's version o f eternal return does n o t begin with the assumption o f unitary atoms has been said to weaken the persuasive p o w e r o f his arguments. It has also been held that m a n y commentators on N i e t z s c h e w h o take the theory o f eternal recurrence serious­ ly as a physical theory do so because they understand him as transcending the "corpuscular-kinetic t h e o r y . " T h e replacement o f atoms b y Kraftcentren

or

"force-centers" is said to mean that Nietzsche does n o t have to assume the persistence o f atoms as material substrata that are not subject to change. E v e n though those w h o adopt this understanding o f Nietzsche's assumptions claim that this interpretation makes the theory o f unending recurrence m o r e plaus­ ible, this has been denied on the grounds that the presupposition o f "forcecenters" undermines theories o f recurrence "as contemporary physics and c o s m o l o g y have amply demonstrated."

24

This is an incisive observation which

requires considerable amplification in order to be fully understood. Before turning to this task, we m a y wonder w h y Nietzsche did not rely, as Lucretius did, upon atomistic theory for support for the theory o f the eternal recurrence of the same. W h y does he posit Kraftcentren O n c e again, the Geschichte

des Materialismus

at all? helps us clear up some o f the

mystery here. W i t h o u t engaging in a full exploration o f the important c o n c e p ­ tion o f "a force-point-world" (ein Kraft-Punkte-Welt)

at this point in our

discussion, it m a y be mentioned that Nietzsche first came across criticisms o f

23

24

Ibid., II, 751-752. Magnus, op. cit., 217n.

38

Eternal Recurrence

atomistic materialism and a consideration o f the theory o f non-extended "centers o f f o r c e " in his scrutiny o f Lange's writings. F o r , Lange frequently maintains that, despite its value as a postulate, the atom is a purely "hypotheti­ cal" construct. H e shows himself to be quite sympathetic to dynamic theories o f natural processes as opposed to the then ruling mechanistic theories o f nature. T h e belief in a permanent, stable, unitary material entity, the atom, Lange argues, is an attempt to retain the substance theory o f res externa

or

"extended things." D u r i n g the course o f his interpretive analyses o f physical theories, Lange indicates t w o main, theoretically plausible, alternatives to "dogmatic atomism." O n e theory o f the ultimate constituents o f the natural world that emerged in nineteenth century physical theory postulated the possible existence o f Unteratomen

o r "sub-atoms." In Fechner's theory, for example, the c o n c e p ­

tion o f "simple" atoms n o longer corresponds to atoms in any strict sense. F o r , he developes eine Konstruktion der Welt aus Kraftmittelpunkten ohne alle Ausdehnung streng genommen zu den dynamischen Ansichten rechnen müßte. 25

T h i s "world-construction" in terms o f the postulation o f force-points without extension is considered b y F e c h n e r to be based upon a relation between physics and philosophy. In point o f fact, he explicitly characterizes his position as that o f 'philosophische'

Atomistik.

In this regard, it is curious to see

D a n t o mildly criticizing Nietzsche for being seduced b y the lure o f scientific t h e o r y and consequently caught in a web o f conceptual and psychological difficulties because o f this.

26

It has often been the case that a converse

relationship between science and philosophy has marked much o f the scientific w o r k in theoretical domains in the nineteenth century, as well as some o f the writings

of

twentieth

century

scientists.

Many

scientists

often

seek

"philosophical assurance" for their theoretical positions o r have attempted to give their scientific findings a philosophical meaning. W h e n one considers the enormous impact that the science o f linguistics has had on certain streams o f A n g l o - A m e r i c a n philosophy, it is clear that N i e t z s c h e is not the only philosophical thinker w h o has turned to the sciences for inspiration. Aside from a fairly extensive discussion o f Fechner's Atomenlehre,

Lange

reports the then novel theoretical assumption o f L o t h a r M e y e r that atoms are, in all probability, "not the ultimate smallest particles," that they p r o b a b l y

25

26

Lange, op. tit., II, 640. Lange refers in this context to Gustav Fechner's Atomenlehre, Leipzig, 1864. " . . . a construction of the universe out of force-centers without any extension must, strictly considered, be reckoned with dynamical views." In the edition of 1866 there is a reference to Fechner's work and to the concept of "Kraftcentra." GdM, 365-367. Danto, op. tit., 209.

Eternal Recurrence "consist o f particles o f a t h i r d . . . o r d e r . "

27

39

I n another place, attention is called

t o C a u c h y ' s innovative speculation that the atom should be construed as comprised o f even smaller Unteratomen

("sub-atoms").

28

T h e r e are other

occasional references t o early, rudimentary formulations o f a theory o f sub­ atomic particles that are invariably associated with a theoretical shift from mechanistic t o dynamic physical theories. The

particular

theoretical

system

that

had

the

deepest

impact

on

N i e t z s c h e ' s thought was that o f the J e s u i t mathematical physicist, R o g e r B o s c o v i c h . Since the details o f this fairly extensive influence will b e dealt with in another context, it will suffice to say here only that B o s c o v i c h ' s elaborate conception

of

"force-points"

or

"force-centers"

was

reclaimed

nineteenth century because o f its compatibility with the emerging

in

the trend

towards a dynamic rather than a mechanistic t h e o r y o f natural processes. Independent o f the role that B o s c o v i c h m a y have played in this theoretical shift in nineteenth century physical theory, it is a fact that N i e t z s c h e himself followed up his original encounter with B o s c o v i c h ' s thought in the writings o f F e c h n e r with a study o f the major w o r k o f this startlingly original physical theorist, Philosophia

Naturalis.

29

T h e theoretical assumptions o f Kraftcentren

and Unteratomen

discussed

by Lange n o t o n l y had a profound impact o n N i e t z s c h e ' s earliest reflections, but they find their way into some o f his central doctrines. W h a t N i e t z s c h e is often c o n c e r n e d with is a philosophical

interpretation

o f a scientific interpreta­

tion. Eternal recurrence is presented neither as a metaphysical t h e o r y n o r as a physical o r empirical t h e o r y about cosmic processes: the " d o c t r i n e " o f the eternal recurrence o f the same is an experimental

conception through and

through. T h i s is n o t t o say that, when N i e t z s c h e thought through his idea o f eternal return, it had no psychological impact on him. Nonetheless, the

27

28

29

Lange, op. cit., II, 657-658. Ibid., 642-643. Apparently, Nietzsche began reading Boscovich's Philosophia Naturalis (probably after seeing references to him in Fechner's work) sometime in 1873 when he borrowed the two volume work from the Basel University library. In a letter to Peter Gast written from Sils-Maria on August 28, 1883, Nietzsche refers to his early study of the Quartaten des Jesuiten Boscovich and characterizes him as der zuerst mathematisch demonstriert hat, daß die Annahme erfüllter Atompunkte eine für die strengste Wissenschaft der Mechanik unbrauchbare Hypothese sei: ein Satz, der jetzt unter mathematisch geschulten Naturforschern als kanonisch gilt. Werke in Drei Bänden, ed. K. Schlechta, München, 1966, III, 1212. "At that time I was studying the atomistic doctrine up to the quartos of the Jesuit Boscovich, the first to demonstrate mathematically that, for the exact science of mechanics, the premiss of solid atomic points is an unusable hypothesis: a proposition that now has, for natural scientists trained in mathematics, canonical validity." Cf. J . Salaquarda, "Nietzsche und Lange," N.-S., 7 (1978), 243. "Lange erwähnt dieses Buch [z. B. Philosophia Naturalis] erst in der zweiten Auflage, aber durch Lange wurde Nietzsche auf Fechner aufmerksam und durch dessen Arbeiten dann auf Boscovich."

40

Eternal Recurrence

primary use that is made o f this theory is for the sake o f the subjective, existential transformation o f the individual w h o accepts it as if it were 'true.' T h r o u g h the full thought o f eternal recurrence, the acceptance o f its negative and positive meaning, an individual m a y achieve an ecstatic, liberating feeling o r state o f being that enables the individual to attain a transcendence o f actuality (Wirklichkeit)

in terms o f a subjective transformation o f

Existenz.

L e t us examine one o f Nietzsche's best arguments for eternal recurrence. Perhaps recalling Lange's numerous appeals to the law o f "the persistence o f f o r c e , " he argues that (1) Das Maaß liches";

(2) die Zahl der Lagen

lungen

dieser

Kraft...

der All-Kraft

Veränderungen

[ist] nicht unendlich;

ist bestimmt, Kombinationen

(3) die Zeit [ist]...

nicht

"Unend­

und

Entwick­

unendlich.

If

the amount o f total force in the universe is finite, and if "the number o f states, changes, combinations and developments o f this force o r energy" is finite, and, furthermore, if "time is infinite," then an infinity has already passed during which alle möglichen

Entwicklungen

müssen

schon

dagewesen

sein. I f

all o f the above is assumed, it is possible that the present state o f the cosmos is a repetition o f previous states and that it will occur again in the 'future.' T h u s , die Gesammtlage

aller Kräfter

immer

wiederkehrt.

In this particular argument

N i e t z s c h e admits that whether everything "identical" o r "the same" has ever actually reoccurred is "indemonstrable" (ist ganz

unerweislich).

This remark

clearly shows that Nietzsche is quite aware o f the hypothetical nature o f this exotic doctrine. M o r e o v e r , he wonders if the Gesammtlagen

o r "configura­

t i o n s " can actually be identical to each other in every detail. H e doubts, for example, whether " t w o leaves" presumably appearing at different times or at different points in "infinite t i m e " could be identical in all respects. In this sophisticated argument for eternal recurrence it is only the Gesammtlage Kräfte

("configuration o f all forces") that may be repeated.

noted is the difference

30

aller

W h a t is to be

between this carefully crafted argument and the highly

specific, literal repetitions that are assumed in the m o r e dramatic, poetic versions o f this theory. In what is probably one o f his best arguments for his hypothesis, Nietzsche specifically relies upon the notion o f Kraftcentren,

a notion that is only implied

in the argument previously considered. T h e r e he vaguely refers to the endless repetition o f "configurations o f forces." This theoretical posit o f "centers o f f o r c e " (as well as the implicit assumption o f the principle o f the "persistence o f f o r c e " o r "the conservation o f energy") indicates h o w much Nietzsche learned from his dissection o f Lange's critical history and his study o f B o s c o v i c h . A n d it shows clearly h o w conscientiously he followed the leading scientific tenden-

30

KGW, V 2 , 421.

41

Eternal Recurrence

cies o f his day. A recent judgment that Nietzsche's " s c i e n t i f i c . . . p r o n o u n c e ­ ments were based m o r e on inspired guesswork and self-observation than on reading and research" In the Nachlass

31

is n o t merely questionable, but false.

o f 1 8 8 8 - 1 8 8 9 , it is argued that if the world is construed as a

determinate Zahl von Kraftcentren,

it follows that, in "the great dice-game o f

existence," the " w o r l d " must pass through "a calculable number o f c o m b i n a ­ tions" (eine berechenbare Zeit, jede

mögliche

Zahl von Kombinationen).

Kombination

Again, in eine

unendliche

would be realized not only at some time, but

a number o f times. O n the assumption that each series o f such combinations o f centers o f force is conditioned b y the previous series and, in turn, conditions future series, eine

Kreislauf

von absolut

identischen

Reihen

bewissen.

presumption o f an "identical series" o f combinations o f Kraftcentren

This

seems to

contradict the previously cited passage in which the occurrence o f a strictly identical

particular is considered "indemonstrable." A n identical series o f

combinations o f force-centers would entail the existence o f a series o f identical individual entities at different points in the phases o f the "circular m o v e m e n t " of the world.

32

Earlier in our discussion it was noted that Magnus' belief that the presup­ position o f Kraftcentren

in lieu o f permanent, unitary atoms tends to under­

mine the argument to the eternal recurrence o f the same. Magnus presents an extensive, thorough examination o f the first argument from the Nachlass

that

we've referred to and then concludes that if t w o "configurations" o f force cannot be identical, then each Grundlage

must be "rich in novelty and detail. "

T h u s , it is said that "there are no good empirical reasons for suggesting the recurrence hypothesis in the first place."

33

O n the basis o f the difficulties and

apparent inconsistencies in Nietzsche's formulations o f unending return, it is concluded that the ostensible empirical o r cosmological arguments for recurr­ ence are expressed in the form o f "thought experiments."

34

O n this particular

point Magnus is certainly right. H o w e v e r , I think that the reasons given for this accurate conclusion are not the most relevant or most important ones in this context. In an extended analytical argument Magnus maintains that in order to understand Nietzsche's strongest argument for eternal recurrence we must " H a y m a n , op. cit., 360. In J . P. Stern's opinion, the analysis of the "will to power in nature" "contains amateurish references to contemporary physics and biology." [Friedrich Nietzsche, New York, 1978, 87 n.] Although Nietzsche was not a serious student of either natural science or biology, his studies in these areas were earnest and he probably had a better understanding of science than many of his philosophical contemporaries and probably knew as much about scientific theory as the average "working scientist." KGW, VIII 3, 166. Magnus, op. cit., 85. 32

33

34

Ibid., 86.

42

Eternal Recurrence

distinguish between Lagen

("states") and Gesamtlagen

doing so, we may assume that the "sum o f Lagen

("configurations"). B y

forms one Gesamtlage."

o f this is well and good except for the belief that each Lage

All

or "state" that

occurs is a discrete world-event. T h a t is, for example, that the death o f Socrates is a discrete world-event that happens in a particular Gesamtlage "configuration."

35

or

L o o k i n g at the specifics o f Nietzsche's argument, we see

that he avers that the total amount o r quantity o f force

in the c o s m o s (as in

accordance with the principle o f the conservation o f force o r energy) is massive, but nevertheless finite. Secondly, the total number o f individual states (Lagen)

o f this totality o f force are exceedingly numerous, but, again, finite.

N o w , as far as I can see, there is n o "inconsistency" o r "circularity" in N i e t z s c h e ' s argument. F o r , he claims that if the premisses cited are granted, then it is possible

that "the total configuration o f all forces" in the cosmos may

be repeated without the entailment that the specific repetition o f each unique entity will occur. W h a t Nietzsche seems to be defending here is the m o s t general, abstract version o f eternal recurrence, one that does n o t assume the endless repetition o f particulars or individuals. In the context o f Magnus' argument the particular reference to Socrates' death as a "discrete world-event" is quite misleading. F o r Socrates himself, as well as the occurrence o f his death, is a configuration o f "states" or F o r , the Lagen

Lagen.

o r "states" that Nietzsche refers to are finite states o f force o r

energy that are s y n o n y m o u s with the finite (though changing) states o f combinations o f what may be characterized as force-units. T h e configurations o f all o f the available force in the cosmos are the extraordinarily complex systems o f related states within it at any stage o f its existence. Such a massive configuration (of total forces extant) is itself comprised o f an astronomical n u m b e r o f combinations o f "states" or Lagen

within lesser configurations

( e . g . , a leaf). T h e event designated as "the death o f Socrates" is a complex configuration o f numerous states that is but a miniscule configuration o c c u r ­ ring within the total system o f "configurations" we call the cosmos. N e i t h e r a "leaf" n o r "the death o f Socrates" is a discrete

event in the cosmos.

T h e second argument that Nietzsche presents in his Nachlass

shows m o r e

clearly the intimate association between the hypothesis o f repetitious occurr­ ences and the theory o f "centers o f force" (that was first encountered b y N i e t z s c h e in his study o f Lange). T h e "determinate quantity o f force" that is referred to in the second argument we've considered is tantamount to the "total amount o f force" in the universe mentioned in the first argument we examined. It is asserted, then, that a universe comprised o f a finite number o f

35

Ibid., 82.

43

Eternal Recurrence

Kraftcentren

must pass through a finite number o f Kombinationen.

Gesamtlagen

("configurations") and Kombinationen

T h e terms

("combinations") are, in

Nietzsche's usage, virtually synonymous. A n d it is precisely the conception o f "centers o f f o r c e " that are combined to form a Konstellation that is stated in Lange's discussions o f the dynamatisch

in einem

Ganzen

theory o f nature.

36

N i e t z s c h e is at pains to deny that his theory o f the eternal recurrence o f the same is derived from mechanistic

principles insofar as mechanistic physical

theory leads inevitably to the assumption o f a "final state." Since this "final state" has not yet been reached, it is asserted that der Mechanismus unvollkommene

und nur vorläufige

Hypothese

gelten.

uns als

Even aside from this

precaution about the "tentative" nature o f mechanistic principles, there is a very specific statement in this argument that should signal to us its purely experimental nature. F o r , in the course o f his argument, Nietzsche refers to the demonstration o f eine unendliche

Wiederkehr

[der] identischer

Fälle.

37

As

we shall see in our examination o f the Langean origin o f many aspects o f Nietzsche's critical theory o f knowledge, there are few conceptions

that

N i e t z s c h e attacks more frequently than the belief that, in actuality, there are any "identical cases" (identischer

Fälle).

Therefore, the argument for the

precise repetition o f identical

events or occurrences is undermined b y one o f

his most ardently

notions: that the belief in identical cases in

actuality is a fiction.

defended

A n d , as we might expect, even this epistemic point is

strongly suggested, once again, b y Lange in a number o f places. In terms o f virtually everything else he has to say about the dynamic, changing nature o f actuality, the fluctuating realm o f " b e c o m i n g , " the possibility o f the unending repetition o f all events is severely undermined. In his Nachlass

Nietzsche, at one point, calls his idea o f eternal recurrence

of the same the most wissenschaftlich

theory. This has often been taken to

mean that he believes that the idea o f eternal return has scientific justification. In turn, this has led many able commentators to seek either to show that

36

37

Lange, op. cit., II, 741 n. Cp. Lange, GdM, 366-381. KGW, VIII 3, 166. " . . . an infinite recurrence [of] identical cases." In regard to the reference to the mechanistic theory - that there will be a "final state" attained in the universe - , Nietzsche was familiar with the rudiments of Clausius' concept of entropy (i.e., that the totality of cosmic energy is continually 'wasting' into heat and, hence, that the universe is tending to a state of thermonuclear equilibrium or a final state) from his reading of Lange. Cf. Lange, op. cit., II, 646, 655, 672. Nietzsche understood the idea of entropy well enough to present an interesting, if inconclusive, argument against it. He held that if we assume an endless temporality, then if an end state were to be attained in the physical world in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics, then such a state would have already been attained. The most universal characteristic of the cosmos is flux or change. This flux could not have occurred if a state of equilibirium had been attained in the past and it could not have begun at a finite point in time. Since mechanistic theory assumes a final end state at a finite time in the future, it is "refuted" in terms of the above. Werke, GOA, XVI, 400 f.

44

Eternal Recurrence

eternal recurrence can be given scientific support o r that it is scientifically questionable. T h e fact that Nietzsche often treats his theory as purely tentative and provisional should be taken seriously. T h u s , he maintains in one place that Wenn die Kreis-Wiederholung auch nur eine Wahrscheinlichkeit oder Möglichkeit ist, auch der Gedanke einer Möglichkeit kann uns erschüttern und umgestalten, nicht nur Empfindungen oder bestimmte Erwartungen! Wie hat die Möglichkeit der ewigen Verdammniß gewirkt! 38

Aside from such hypothetical, postulatory formulations o f his conception for the sake o f self-transformation and intensification o f Existenz,

Nietzsche's

characterization o f one of his central notions as "scientific" seems to mean, in terms o f his completely conventionalistic understanding o f scientific principles and concepts, that it is not merely provisional, tentative o r hypothetical, but perhaps "fictional" as well. I n terms o f Lange's conception o f philosophical ideals, eternal recurrence m a y be construed as a quasi-scientific, quasi-poetic vision that is put forward primarily for the value o f its "disciplinary" function, its psychological and existential effects. M o r e o v e r , the doctrine o f eternal return is obviously embraced because it "excludes every goal and purpose."

39

T h e highest form o f

life-affirmation is the willing o f the unending repetition o f one's own existence and all existence. In m y concluding remarks I will try to indicate w h y the absolute dissolution o f objective purpose in the cosmos is so highly prized. W h e n we turn our attention to an examination o f Nietzsche's most consistent interpretation o f the nature o f actuality, we shall argue that it is antithetical to the very idea that there are any self-identical entities in the world and is, a fortiori,

opposed to the objective reality o f eternal recurrence. T h e

recent commentators on the philosophy o f Nietzsche w h o insist upon the hypothetical nature o f the idea o f eternal return, in conjunction with its function as an "existential imperative," are no doubt correct in this judgment. B u t , as I shall attempt to show, there is one more turn o f the screw in N i e t z s c h e ' s visionary thought.

Existential

Meaning

and

Recurrence

T h e r e is little doubt that the existential meaning o f the theory o f eternal return is central to Nietzsche's thought. Against the Platonic-Christian view

38

39

KGW, V 2, 421—422. "Even if the circular return is only a probability or possibility, the thought even of a possibility can shatter or transform us - not only experiences or specific expectations! Look how the possibility of eternal damnation has worked!" KGW, V 2 , 400.

Eternal Recurrence

45

that there is an immanent teleology in the world, that the destiny o f man lies in a transcendental world, Nietzsche argues that this world is the only world we shall ever k n o w , that there is n o teleology in actuality o f any kind and that it is in "time and b e c o m i n g " that the "redemption" o f man can or may be attained. Reversing Platonism, Christianity and Hegelianism, Nietzsche seems to say that if there is an objective teleology ruling our existence, then our individual being is without meaning. B u t eternal recurrence, like Kierkegaard's idea o f "the possible," gives us "the dreadful" as well as the "smiling." Having the courage to accept the possibility o f the repetition o f every detail o f one's life, as well as the dreadful spectacle o f the eternal return o f "the last man," is an acid test for Übermenschlichkeit.

T h e "thought o f eternal return" is b o t h liberating

and terrifying. W h a t the fundamental meaning o f this theory is is expressed b y Nietzsche in the most uncertain terms. Although rescuing us from extinction in any absolute sense and eternalizing actuality and life, it has decidedly negative consequences as well. A t one point in Also sprach

Zarathustra

Zarathustra's animal companions

announce a curious 'truth.' Alles geht, alles kommt zurück; ewig rollt das Rad des Seins. Alles stirbt, alles blüht wieder auf, ewig läuft das Jahr des Seins. 40

In response, Zarathustra accuses his animal cohorts o f having made his doctrine into a "hurdy-gurdy song." In the same context he tells us that it was he (not the shepherd b o y ) w h o experienced the horror o f the "monster" that crept into his throat and c h o c k e d him. S o o n after an impassioned speech on the cruelty o f mankind, Zarathustra tells us precisely what the monstrous serpent means: Der große Überdruß am Menschen - der würgte mich und war mir in dem Schlund gekrochen. 41

This "great disgust at m a n " is a double-barrelled shotgun: it is generated by the knowledge that man is the "crudest animal", an animal which will return, along with "the smallest man," "the last man," again and again ad

infinitum.

W h e n the animals tell Zarathustra that he teaches that each individual shall eternally return, he remains curiously silent. Although we cannot presume to k n o w the meaning o f this strange silence, it is possible that Zarathustra is simply pondering the dark side o f unending recurrence, looking into the heart of its darkness. T h e joyful affirmation and liberation that eternal recurrence • KGW, VI 1, AsZ, "Der Genesende", 2. "Everything goes, everything comes back; the wheel of existence rolls on forever. Everything dies, everything blooms anew: the year of existence runs on forever." • Ibid. "The great disgust at man - it choked me and had crept into my throat." Cf. Thus Spake Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Middlesex, 1969, 235.

46

Eternal Recurrence

can engender in a courageous individual also embraces the negativity entailed b y this visionary conception. T h e r e is little doubt that Nietzsche intended the ideal o f eternal recurrence as a supreme test o f courage, strength and life-affirmation. It is described as a disciplinary idea that would enhance the life and existence o f the strong and paralyze and break the world-weary. means to the Überwindung

42

T h e thought o f eternal return is also a

des Nihilismus.

B u t precisely h o w does this exotic

n o t i o n o v e r c o m e that form o f nihilism that would turn its back upon life and seek its ultimate obliteration? W h a t Magnus has called Nietzsche's "countermyth," the eternal recurr­ ence o f the same, is used as a means for the overcoming o f nihilism in the most paradoxical way imaginable. M a n y commentators w h o have c o m e upon the nihilistic implications o f eternal return often treat it as a separate, dark side o f the theory that N i e t z s c h e considers and then puts to one side when he affirms recurrence in a positive way. Insofar as the nihilistic aspect o f recurrence is ignored o r put aside, I believe that Nietzsche's standpoint is misunderstood. Certainly, there can be n o doubt that the eternal recurrence o f the same is characterized in Nietzsche's notes as die extremste

Form

des Nihilismus.

This

would be the conception o f "the meaningless forever." Nietzsche sees this insight as a "crisis" because the very thought that was designed to deliver man from one kind o f nihilism hands him over to another, equally

dreadful,

modality o f nihilism. In the very next breath in which he states the nihilistic implications o f eternal recurrence, Nietzsche describes the idea as that belief towards which "the energy o f knowledge and o f strength" leads us. It would be a "European form o f Buddhism." A European form o f Buddhism? This from a thinker w h o has, in general, condemned Buddhism as a nihilistic faith, a will to nothingness, as, in Schweitzer's terms, a doctrine o f "world-and-life" denial. Although this is not the place to go into a lengthy discussion o f the relationship between Buddhism and Nietzsche's thought, a relationship that is real and complex, a few comments may be made on this curious juxtaposition o f " E u r o p e a n " and "Buddhism." S o m e have understood

this linking o f

B u d d h i s m and eternal recurrence as suggesting similarities between Buddhist philosophy and N i e t z s c h e . T h e r e are a number o f similarities between the two and a n u m b e r o f points o f relationship. T h e following indicate some o f these: the denial o f substance, the emphasis upon impermanence (anicca),

the denial

o f the self as substance, the absence o f objective teleology, the rooting o f the primal nisus towards expressive existence in "desire" (trishna)

or pathos

(one o f

Werke. Grossoktavausgabe (GOA), Leipzig, 1901-1911, X V I , 279. Cf. The Will to Power, trans. A. M. Ludovici, The Complete Works of Nietzsche, New York, 1964, XV, 422-423.

Eternal Recurrence N i e t z s c h e ' s characterizations o f the Wille

zur

47 Macht),

attaining a liberating, illuminating state o f being (satori)

the importance o f

and the universality o f

flux. In regard t o this relationship between B u d d h i s m and the philosophy o f Nietzsche, J o a n Stambaugh is o n target when she notes that it is " N i e t z s c h e ' s absolute affirmation o f recurrence" that distinguishes his position from that o f the Buddhist. I n her account o f the nihilistic implications o f eternal recurr­ ence, she seems to think that the inevitable recurrence is understood as having a "finale into nothingness."

43

B u t N i e t z s c h e does not say this. R a t h e r , he

envisions the senseless process o f ineluctable recurrence as without

finale.

In

other words, N i e t z s c h e is depicting a cyclic process from which there is " n o exit," a repetitious process without

meaning. T h i s misunderstanding

of

N i e t z s c h e ' s point obscures the insight that N i e t z s c h e ' s idea includes the belief in the content

o r actuality o f this world-process whereas B u d d h i s m typically

emphasizes the transitory and ultimately unreal nature o f the "world o f b e c o m i n g , " o r what the H i n d u s called the realm o f nāmarūpa,

"name and

form." T h e m o s t extreme interpretation o f this linking o f Buddhism and eternal recurrence is put forward b y Andler. H e maintains that " N i e t z s c h e founded a ' E u r o p e a n B u d d h i s m ' " that supposedly sprung from "knowledge and e n e r g y " and was established for the sake o f "those conquering the world, not for ascetics w h o renounce life."

44

T h i s is a highly questionable interpretation.

N i e t z s c h e does n o t say that he intends to create a " E u r o p e a n B u d d h i s m , " but that the understanding o f eternal recurrence as the eternal recurrence o f the meaningless forever w o u l d be a European form

o f Buddhism. F u r t h e r m o r e ,

this nihilistic thought is n o t designed for world-conquerors, but for those w h o would attain an overcoming o f passive nihilism and c o n q u e r themselves: the thought o f eternal return is, as Magnus has said, designed as an acid test for the courage o f the

43

44

Übermensch.

Joan Stambaugh, Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Recurrence, Baltimore and London, 1972, 18. The passage in the Nachlass is: "Denken wir diesen Gedanken in seiner furchtbarsten Form: das Dasein, so wie es ist, ohne Sinn und Ziel, aber unvermeidlich wiederkehrend, ohne ein Finale ins Nichts. "Die ewige Wiederkehr." Das ist die extremste Form des Nihilismus: das Nichts (das 'Sinnlose') ewig! Europäische Form des Buddhismus: Energie des Wissens und der Kraft zwingt zu einem solchen Glauben. Es ist die wissenschaftlichste aller möglichen Hypothesen." Werke in Drei Bänden, III, 853. Cp. The Will to Power, trans. W. Kaufmann and R. J . Hollingdale, New York, 1968, 35-36: "Let us think this thought in its most terrible form: existence, as it is, without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without finale of nothingness: "the eternal recurrence." "This is the most extreme form of nihilism: the nothing (the "meaningless"), eternally! The European form of Buddhism: the energy of knowledge and strength compels this belief. It is the most scientific of all possible hypotheses." Charles Andler, Nietzsche: sa vie et sa pensee, Paris, 1958, I, 462.

Eternal Recurrence

48

T h e nihilistic view o f eternal recurrence is like Buddhism in that it assumes a cycle o f birth and death that is spurred by a universal nisus (Wille zur the seeking o f the maximal "feeling o f p o w e r " (Machtgefühls),

Macht),

the desire for

greater mastery o f one's environment and one's self. It is unlike Buddhism insofar as it offers no way out o f this cyclic repetition and, in fact, is something that must be willed. Applying Buddhistic views to Nietzsche's philosophy o f the nisus towards power, Buddhist thought would counsel the negation o f the "will to p o w e r " in oneself in order to attain liberation

from

the "wheel o f birth

and death." T h e thought o f eternal return we are considering proclaims an endless cycle o f repetitious events and lives from which there is n o escape. T h u s , it is " E u r o p e a n " in the sense that it stresses a realistic acceptance o f actuality as actuality. T h e thought, then, that we are subject to an endless cycle o f recurrences from which there is no escape, that we are chained to the Ixion's wheel o f repetitious existence, in a completely real world o f process, is an excruciating one. T h e European form o f Buddhism to which Nietzsche refers is the theoretical acceptance o f eternal recurrence as objectively valid in the cosmos. W h a t Nietzsche intends when he emphasizes the nihilistic understanding o f unending recurrence is the total acceptance o f the theoretical vision o f the meaningless forever in order to banish the last shred o f teleology from the c o s m o s . W h a t he is seeking is the self-suppression o f nihilism b y means o f the complete acceptance o f the theory

o f endless return as a modality o f nihilism

that cannot be surpassed b y thought alone. W h a t is being suggested is that only in a meaningless world, devoid o f any objective purpose o r goal, can the intensification o f human meaning be attained. T h e self-suppression o f this nihilistic theory, the negation, in Hegel's terms, o f this negation, can only be attained in Existenz.

I f objective meaning is banished, then it is possible to

create meaning through the self-affirmation o f existence. J u s t as N i e t z s c h e seeks to negate traditional morality in order to attain a state " b e y o n d good and evil,", so, t o o , does he negate (by means o f the idea o f eternal return) objective meaning in order to affirm all the stronger the need to create a "human meaning" for the earth. N i e t z s c h e uses Lange's standpoint o f the ideal in the creation o f his m y t h o f eternal recurrence in a way that Lange could never have anticipated. F o r , he uses a theoretical-poetic ideal as a means for the elimination o f objective meaning and objective teleology. This serves to force those w h o are capable o f affirming eternal recurrence to create meaning in Existenz,

to create meaning

b y means o f the complete affirmation of life in the face o f the total absence o f any objective meaning in the c o s m o s . In effect, Nietzsche seemed to believe that there can be meaning in existence only in a meaningless universe. T h e " d o c t r i n e " o f the eternal recurrence o f the same is the supreme test o f courage,

Eternal Recurrence

49

strength, endurance and life-affirmation precisely because it is, objectively considered as a theoretical n o t i o n , nihilistic. Reversing the entire tendency o f W e s t e r n philosophy, N i e t z s c h e deliber­ ately creates a scientifically molded m y t h that is so negative in its implications, so t h o r o u g h l y devoid o f teleological and moral significance, that it requires heroic life-affirmation and spiritual strength in o r d e r to o v e r c o m e its negative p o w e r b y means o f an existential negation o f its negativity. Perhaps in his o w n unique and b o l d w a y N i e t z s c h e did heed Lange's advice to create ein Ideal

großes

that w o u l d appear amongst people as a "stranger from another w o r l d , "

that w o u l d , b y demanding the impossible, "unhinge reality."

45

T h e r e is n o need to speculate about the role o r function o f the c o n c e p t i o n o f eternal return in N i e t z s c h e ' s p h i l o s o p h y since he tells us quite plainly what it is. H e tells us that w h o e v e r has tried to think pessimism to its ultimate nadir must first l o o k d o w n into die weltverneinendste

aller

möglichen

Denkweisen

with a "super-Asiatic e y e . " H e must see into the "heart o f darkness" w i t h o u t the blinders o f " m o r a l i t y . " Having done s o , such an individual will e n c o u n t e r an opposite ideal, das Ideal des übermütigsten, lebendigsten und weltbejahendsten Menschen, der sich nicht nur mit dem, was war und ist, abgefunden und vertragen gelernt hat, sondern es, so wie es war und ist, wiederhaben will, in alle Ewigkeit hinaus, unersättlich da capo rufend. 46

45

46

Lange, op. cit., II, 998. "Den Sieg über den zersplitternden Egoismus und die ertötende Kälte der Herzen [der Wissenschaft] wird nur ein großes Ideal erringen welches wie ein 'Fremdling aus der andern Welt' unter die staunenden Völker tritt und mit der Forderung des Unmöglichen die Wirklichkeit aus ihren Angeln reißt." "The victory over disintegrating egoism and the deadly chilliness of the heart [of science] will be won only by a great ideal that appears amidst the astonished peoples as a 'stranger from another world', and, by demanding the impossible, unhinges reality." A further discussion of the idea of eternal recurrence in the context of Lange's emphasis upon the need for a new "great ideal" can be found in the last chapter of this work, "The Standpoint of the Ideal." Cp. Lange, GdM, 557. Although in this first edition Lange speaks of the need for man to live "...unter dem Banner einer großen Idee," he does not express himself as fully or as dramatically as he does in the second edition. KGW, VI 2, Jenseits von Gut und Böse (JGB), 56. "Whoever has endeavored... to think pessimism through to its depths . . . whoever has . . . with . . . supra-Asiatic eye, looked . . . down into the most world-denying of all possible ways of thinking - beyond good and evil and no longer... under the spell and delusion of morality - m a y . . . have opened his eyes to the opposite ideal: the ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and world-affirming human being who has not only come to terms and learned to get along with whatever was and is, but who wants to have what was and is repeated into all eternity, shouting insatiably da capo..." Beyond Good and Evil, trans. W. Kaufmann, New York, 1966, 56. Since Nietzsche, in the notes that have come to be called Der Wille zur Macht, characterizes the "eternal return" as the most extreme form of nihilism, it may be identified with what is called in the above passage "the most world-denying of all possible ways of thinking." This is especially the case insofar as this terrible vision is identified with his supra-moral standpoint "beyond good and evil." The affirmation of life and existence (what is called the

50

Eternal Recurrence T o affirm willfully existence and to desire its eternal repetition gives an

individual a deep "feeling o f p o w e r . " T h e very m o m e n t o f "ecstatic nihilism," the expression o f a "nihilism o f strength," entails the obliteration o f nihilism. F o r , the extraordinary affirmation o f life and existence that N i e t z s c h e requires cancels out all nihilistic sentiments in a "high point o f meditation." T h e thought

o f the eternal recurrence o f the same is, for N i e t z s c h e , the imposition

o f B e i n g ( = conceptualization) on Werden

o r " b e c o m i n g , " a peak experience

o f aesthetic, existential depth that involves the Selbstaufhebung suppression" o f nihilism in Existenz.

or

"self-

T h e imposition o f " B e i n g " on " b e c o m ­

ing" involves the spiritual expression o f the individual's Wille zur Macht

and,

hence, the maximal "feeling o f p o w e r . " T h e point that N i e t z s c h e seems t o be m a k i n g is that the c o n c e p t i o n o f the m o s t extreme form o f nihilism cannot be o v e r c o m e o r transcended b y further thought o r analysis o r conceptualization: it can o n l y be surpassed in experience, in a heightened, affirmative state o f being o r existence.

"Dionysian affirmation of existence") in the face of this "abysmal thought" is directly linked with the Übermensch in the Nachlass. Nietzsche admits that he himself was not capable of such a courageous life-affirmation. In a note he remarks that he does not want life again, that he has been able to endure it only through schaffen, "creating," through a foreseeing of the "overman" who affirms life. Werke, GOA, X I I , 359. However, he does suggest that he occasionally achieved states of what may be called Dionysian ecstasy. In Ecce Homo, he tells us that during the period from August, 1881 to February, 1883 he was imbued with "das jasagende Pathos par excellence." KGW, VI 3, Ecce Homo, "Also sprach Zarathustra," 1. This jasagende Pathos is equated with tragische Pathos and this, in turn, with tragische Erkenntniss. In the concluding portions of this inquiry an interpretation of the nature of the pathos generated by the thought of eternal recurrence is put forward.

CHAPTER III CONTRA PLATONISM B y n o w N i e t z s c h e is well-known for his repeated criticisms o f Plato in particular and Platonism in general. Always m o r e fascinated b y the preSocratic philosophers - especially Empedocles and Heraclitus - , he seems almost ab initio

opposed to the Platonic conception o f the "true w o r l d " that

transcends this world o f temporality, change, antitheses and contradiction. I f Nietzsche does n o t stop to grapple with the technicalities and aporia

discussed

in the Platonic dialogues, he does seek to epitomize what he believes to be the essence o r spirit o f Plato. H e probes the underlying motivations o f Plato's philosophical activity and condemns the moralistic, hyperbolic rationalism o f his mentor, Socrates. H e is not so much concerned with the grounds for Plato's metaphysics, the arguments he offers in defense o f his views, as he is with the reasons w h y this metaphysics was brought into being and its effects upon man and his perception o f his place in the universe. N i e t z s c h e is n o t overly concerned with the validity o r invalidity o f Plato's conception o f reality. Rather, he wants to uncover its meaning for us, what it symbolizes or signifies. Plato is pictured b y Nietzsche as repulsed b y actuality, b y temporality, b y ineluctable change and " b e c o m i n g . " H e creates, Nietzsche charges, a "truly real" world o f forms o r ideas that is the repository o f shining exemplars o f abstract perfection. In the "cave" o f everyday life, Plato seems to say, men chase phantasms o r b e c o m e fascinated b y the objects o f perception. Sensuous beings are corrupt, corrupting and corruptible. T h e things o f this world that are immersed in transitory becoming are but mere simulacra o f the true, eternal forms o r ideas. T h e real world, Plato says again and again in his dialogues, is the ideal, transcendental, permanent, immutable world o f perfect forms. All o f this, for N i e t z s c h e , is philosophical " E g y p t i c i s m . " It exemplifies a flight from actuality, from the realities o f change, becoming and death. This world that Plato's metaphysical skills created is built out o f fear and a debilitating case o f

decadence.

In his published and unpublished writings, Nietzsche frequently lashes out at Platonism for its betrayal o f life, existence and this world. It provided the original texts that were translated into ordinary language b y the Christian

Contra Platonism

52

tradition. T a k i n g St. Augustine's Christian Platonism as paradigmatic o f Christian doctrine, he mercilessly attacks it and condemns its author as a divided self, a man at war with his instincts, yearning for release from this "vale

o f tears."

Nietzsche's

opposition

to

Platonism

is philosophical,

psychological and temperamental. T h e exoteric version o f Plato's thought that Nietzsche puts under a microscope is condemned for a number o f reasons. It is considered a classic case o f a carefully wrought metaphysics that is designed primarily for the sake o f morality or, m o r e accurately, a particular morality. Plato is in good philosophical c o m p a n y in this regard because Nietzsche condemns most o f the major thinkers in the Western philosophical tradition for precisely this reason. T h e y are charged with constructing their metaphysical systems (or, in the case o f K a n t , allowing metaphysical loopholes in a philosophical contract) specifi­ cally for moral

motives.

Needless to say, Nietzsche sees this as disastrous

insofar as the theoretical scaffolds that support traditional systems o f morality have provided theoretical justification for moral values that have turned man against himself, sapped his vitality and spontaneity, rendered him hypocritical and unnatural.

T h e sanctioning o f Socratic morality (or, as Nietzsche prefers

to say, "moralic acid") in Plato's rational, idealistic metaphysics only streng­ thened the grip o f decadence

on G r e e k civilization and culture. Comparing

Socrates and Plato to the worldly, sanguine, calmly relativistic Sophists, N i e t z s c h e sees the former as " u n - G r e e k . " Plato, like Socrates, is charged with making a "tyrant o f reason," with denigrating this world in which we move, live and have our being as a world o f appearance (Erscheinungswelt).

T h o u g h praised and venerated for centuries,

N i e t z s c h e finds the thoughts o f Socrates and Plato as Verfalls-Symptome, Werkzeuge

der griechischen

Auflössung,

als pseudogriechisch,

als

antigriechisch.

T h e "moralism" o f such philosophers is characterized as pathologisch N i e t z s c h e , the master o f ad hominem

als bedingt . 1

arguments, uses every variation o f the

form to attack the Socratic-Platonic standpoint. T h e philosophy o f Plato inaugurated the philosophical habit o f encourag­ ing the apotheosis o f "reason" (Vernunft).

B y taking concepts out o f the

context in which they originally appeared such thinkers create an unhistorical modality o f thinking and venerate "conceptual m u m m i e s " T h i s unconscionable elevation o f Vernunft

(Begriffs-Mumien).

leads to the denigration o f the

senses and o f the b o d y as well. T h e equation o f reality with Being (das Sein) leads, as in Plato's metaphysics, to the relegation o f this world to a realm o f appearance, deception and illusion. In Platonism there is not only a transvalua-

1

KGW, VI 3. Götzendämmerung

(G), "Das Problem des Sokrates", 2, 10.

53

Contra Platonism

tion o f thought, but a transvaluation o f value. T h e eternal, the immutable forms are real and are valued as absolute entities. B u t the world o f time, change, suffering and existence is disvalued or, at least, devalued. Ultimately, Nietzsche charges, it is "reason" or Vernunft Zeugnis

2

der Sinne fälschen .

that ist die Ursache,

daß wir das

C o m p a r e d to reason and its conceptual universals,

the senses do n o t lie. Reversing the Platonic standpoint, Nietzsche argues that it is reason, in alliance with grammar, that leads to falsification and deception. Plato has performed his metaphysical magic by hypostasizing

abstract c o n ­

cepts, b y creating a domain o f ideality which concrete actuality cannot touch. Grammatical distinctions and logical classifications that have proven useful for life and social existence have been projected b e y o n d the world and, in the process, have been transmuted into eternal perfections and immutable forms. D o e s this "true w o r l d " created by Plato's "will to truth" really exist? In the same year in which Die Geburt

der Tragödie

was published ( 1 8 7 2 ) ,

Nietzsche w r o t e a brief, truncated essay (that remained unpublished) called Über

das Pathos

der Wahrheit.

In it he emphasized the personal nature o f

philosophy as manifested in the lives o f Pythagoras, Empedocles and H e r a c litus. H e pointed to the pathos

o f truth as leading philosophers to pursue

knowledge as an end in itself, leading them b e y o n d the illusions o f life and art to a finality they did n o t anticipate. Foreshadowing his later comments in Zur Genealogie schaft

der Moral,

Jenseits

von Gut und Böse

and Die fröhliche

on the counterfinality o f the "will to truth" (Wille

Wissen­

zur Wahrheit),

he

remarks that Die Kunst ist mächtiger als die Erkenntniß, denn sie will das Leben, und jene erreicht als letztes Ziel nur - die Vernichtung. 3

Although N i e t z s c h e will later develop elaborate interpretations o f the internal dialectic o f the "will to truth," he never really changes his mind about the p o w e r o f the negative that lies concealed within the "knowledge drive" and the aim to attain "knowledge-in-itself." T w o points can be distilled from these early speculative forays: philosophies are expressions o f the individual (specifi­ cally, he says elsewhere, o f the stage o f life o f an individual) and that the drive for metaphysical knowledge is fueled b y a personal or cultural need that carries thinkers away from life and the aesthetic embellishments necessary for life. T h e conscious o r unconscious goal o f the metaphysical will to truth o r knowledge is Vernichtung

o r "destruction" - n o t in a physical sense, but in the

sense that knowledge seeks to fix, determine and objectify, to attain a stasis

2

Ibid., "Die 'Vernunft' in der Philosophie", 2.

3

KGW, III 2, "Über das Pathos der Wahrheit," 254. "Art is more powerful than knowledge because it desires life; knowledge attains its final goal in - destruction."

54

Contra Platonism

that is antithetical to the dynamic process o f life. In addition, claims o f transcendental knowledge create "a higher reality" o r a "true w o r l d " that tends to demolish the value, meaning and "truths" o f this world. Weltanschauung,

in

N i e t z s c h e ' s view, achieve a "transvaluation o f values", an Umwertung

Platonic

der

Werte.

metaphysics

and

later

the

Christian

H o w e v e r , even as he performs his critical surgery on the metaphysical

impulse, he is aware o f the persistence o f the Pathos

der Wahrheit

in human

culture and, perhaps, in himself as well. F o r he fully realizes that he is inaugurating a "tragic philosophy" (tragische

Philosophie)

because he is re­

nouncing what has been prized b y all previous philosophers: ' T r u t h . ' In the same year in which he appears to be embracing the central notion in the metaphysics o f Schopenhauer, the Ur-Wille Geburt

der Tragödie,

that acts through all things, in Die

N i e t z s c h e already is expressing skeptical doubts about

the attainment o f any metaphysical truth. In Ueber for example, he characterizes Wahrheit

das Pathos

as the Schwärmerischer

der

Wahrheit,

Wahn

eines

G o t t e s ! T h a t he understands, but rejects, the metaphysical impulse o r

pathos

4

that leads a Plato to construct an ideal world for essentially " m o r a l " reasons is clear from the following: Jedes Verschwinden und Untergehen sehen wir mit Unzufriedenheit, oft mit der Verwunderung als ob wir darin etwas im Grunde Unmögliches erlebten. Ein hoher Baum bricht zu unserem Mißvergnügen zusammen und ein einstürzender Berg quält uns. Jede Sylvesternacht läßt uns das Mysterium des Widerspruches von Sein und Werden empfinden. Daß aber ein Augenblick höchster Welt-Vollendung gleichsam ohne Nachwelt und Erben, wie ein flüchtiger Lichtschein verschwände, beleidigt am allerstärksten den sittlich Menschen. 5

T h e transitory nature o f Wirklichkeit,

the going under o f the most perfect

m o m e n t , the realization that everything is becoming

and nothing ever is - these

seem like violations o f our sense o f "the ought." A n impulse to transcendental philosophy is stimulated b y the realization o f the fragility and evanescence o f all things. In his essay on Die Philosophie

im tragischen

Zeitalter

der

Griechen,

N i e t z s c h e returns to this theme again in the context o f presenting the epitome o f Heraclitus' thought. B u t here we already detect a sign o f his later affirma­ tion o f Werden

4

5

or " b e c o m i n g . "

Ibid., 253. "Truth! Rapturous illusions of a god!" Ibid., 250. "Every passing away and perishing we view with dissatisfaction, often with astonishment, as if we witnessed something basically impossible. When a tall tree breaks, we are displeased; a crumbling mountain distresses us. Every New Year's Eve lets us experience the mysterious contradiction of being and becoming. The moral man is most offended by the realization that a moment of supreme, universal perfection should disappear like a gleam of light, without posterity or heirs."

55

Contra Platonism

Das ewige und alleinige Werden, die ganzliche Unbeständigkeit alles Wirklichen, das fortwährend nur wirkt und wird und nicht i s t . . . eine furchtbare und be­ täubende Vorstellung und in ihrem Einflusse am nächsten der Empfindung ver­ wandt, mit der Jemand, bei einem Erdbeben, das Zutrauen zu der festgegründeten Erde verliert. Es gehört eine erstaunliche Kraft dazu, diese Wirkung in das Entgegengesetzte, in das Erhabne und das beglückte Erstaunen zu übertragen. 6

W i t h his typical penchant for psychological interpretations o f philosophi­ cal standpoints, N i e t z s c h e insists that the underlying motive for the creation o f a Platonic world o f perfect, eternal, immutable ideas was precisely a flight from the Heraclitean world o f flux, impermanence, uncertainty and insecuri­ t y . Although granting that eros

lies at the basis o f Plato's philosophy,

7

Nietzsche searches out the anti-natural morality that transcendental idealism promotes. In his sketch o f the way in which the idea o f the "true w o r l d " („wahre

Welt") became a m y t h or a fable, he characterizes Plato's view in the

following w a y : Die wahre Welt, erreichbar für den Weisen, den Frommen, den Tugendhaften, - er lebt in ihr, er ist sie. (Älteste Form der Idee, relativ klug, simpel, überzeugend. Umschreibung des Satzes „Ich, Plato, bin die Wahrheit".) 8

Despite the cleverness o f this quip, it doesn't help us understand the full significance o f Plato's conception o f the true or real world. In fact, insofar as Plato does not present a defense o f personal

immortality, allowing only the

survival o f the "rational part o f the soul," the individual " P l a t o " was n o t considered as die Wahrheit

in his o w n metaphysics. T h e "true w o r l d " is

comprised o f eternal, universal forms that are entirely without individuation. T h e real is the universal and the ideal. Platonic ideas are transcendentals that comprise the unchanging "truth w o r l d " that is itself "the T r u t h . " I f the realm of ideal Being is the true world, then this world o f time, history and becoming must be a false

world, an inferior realm, a world o f imperfections. If, as Plato

says in The Republic,

the "Idea o f the G o o d " is a principle o f unity and value,

then whatever may be said to have "unity," "value" or "goodness" in this

6

KGW, III 2, 318—319. "The eternal and exclusive becoming, the complete impermanence of everything actual, that constantly acts and becomes but never i s . . . is a terrible and paralyzing thought. Its influence on us may be compared to the sensation in an earthquake when one loses confidence in a firmly grounded earth. It takes amazing strength to transform this effect into its opposite: sublimity and blessed astonishment."

7

KGW, VI 3, G, "Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemäßen,"

8

Ibid. "Wie die 'wahre Welt' endlich zur Fabel wurde." "How the 'true world' finally became a fable." "The 'true world' attainable to the wise, the pious, the man of virtue - he lives in it, he is

23.

it. (Oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, convincing. Transcription of the proposi­ tion 'I, Plato, am the truth.')"

Contra Platonism

56

world has it in a derivative modality by way o f "participation." I f we focus, as Aristotle did, upon the "separation" o f forms and the phenomenal world, then the alienation from perfection o f individuals is complete. Nietzsche charac­ terizes his o w n standpoint as "inverted Platonism," the attempt, one might say, to turn Plato upside down. In place o f Plato's transcendental philosophy N i e t z s c h e offers a philosophy o f immanence. F o l l o w i n g through the historical sketch o f the conversion o f the idea o f the "true w o r l d " into a myth, it is contended that Christianity postpones the attainment o f the true world, but promises it to the pious, virtuous man o r to the "sinner w h o repents." B y the time the conception o f the true world has b e c o m e königsbergisch

o r Kantian, it has b e c o m e "unattainable" and "inde­

monstrable," but nonetheless the thought o f it is a "consolation, a duty, an imperative." In this remark Nietzsche condenses the two major aspects o f K a n t ' s philosophy: the true order o f things, the Dinge-an-sich,

is unattainable,

but in the form o f the "intelligible w o r l d " it has moral significance. T h e next stage through which the idea o f the true world passes is one in which it is unattainable and unknown. T h i s is a form o f empirical positivism that is analogous to Lange's phenomenalism. Finally, the conception o f a real or true world is seen as unnütz,

überflüssig.

Welt leaves n o t the scheinbare

Finally, the abolishment o f the

wahre

Welt, but the world o f Zarathustra. A s we shall

see, it is questionable whether Nietzsche does, in fact, overcome the distinc­ tion between the "apparent w o r l d " and the "true w o r l d " despite his heroic efforts. F o r , as w e shall argue, the phenomenal world that we are capable o f knowing

is not reality and, in fact, is a simplified, organized world that our

senses, our categories and our psychic needs have constructed in order that we m a y function effectively and master our environment. T h e clever summary o f the dissolution o f the notion o f a wahre Götzen-Dämmerung

Welt

in

has occasionally been interpreted in quite questionable

ways. It has been held, for example, that Nietzsche shows himself to be a "thoroughgoing materialist" in Götzen-Dämmerung.

Furthermore, it is said

that this "materialism" is derived from the philosophy o f Lange. Although it is reasonably

correct to say that

Nietzsche agreed with

Lange that

any

"metaphysical w o r l d " is entirely inaccessible, that we only have "knowledge" o f this world o f phenomena, the claim that Nietzsche was a "materialist" is fallacious. T h e entire question concerning what Nietzsche considers as ulti­ 9

mately "real" is the most perplexing question in a philosophy o f unusual complexity. B u t one thing can be said with some degree o f assurance: that he did not maintain that matter or material processes or material objects comprise

9

Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ, trans. R . J . Hollingdale, Middlesex, 1968, "Appendix D," 192.

57

Contra Platonism "reality" o r Wirklichkeit.

Insofar as F . A . Lange insists upon the value and

meaning o f the "ideal standpoint," and insofar as he refers quite often to the transformation o f radical materialism into "idealism," he was the very opposite o f a dogmatic materialist. T o characterize Nietzsche as a "materialist" is to miss entirely the exploratory, experimental nature o f his thinking. I f N i e t z s c h e is concerned with any issue involving traditional 'metaphysical' questions, it is a concern to overcome the d i c h o t o m y between materialism and idealism. In effect, he sought to overcome the bifurcation of Geist

and Natur.

I f he learned

anything from Lange, it was the untenability o f a strict materialism. W e shall return to this important issue in our discussions o f Nietzsche's epistemology (and its relation to Lange's thought) and the possibility o f a materio-idealism. Although in his account o f the devolution o f the conception o f the "true w o r l d " N i e t z s c h e claimed that we have gotten rid o f the "apparent world," this does not jibe with some o f his most affirmative statements. T h u s , for example, in Götzen-Dämmerung

he praises Heraclitus because he did not join

other philosophers w h o rejected the testimony o f our senses because they revealed change and multiplicity. It is stressed that insofar as the senses indicate passing away, change and becoming, they do n o t deceive us. H e r a ­ clitus is in the right, Nietzsche continues, when he declares that das Sein leere bare"

Fiktion

ist. In the next breath he tells us quite clearly that Die

Welt ist die einzige.

10

eine

„schein­

Relating this assertion to what he says about the

"apparent w o r l d " or the "phenomenal w o r l d " in his Nachlass,

it would seem

that the " w o r l d " that is conditioned o r constituted by our senses, our categories and OUT psyche

is an apparent

world that is, as he says, "true for us."

T h e sensory, conceptual and psychological determination of a world for us involves an inevitable falsification

insofar as it is our senses, our concepts and

our psychological needs that shape and form such a world. Therefore, the phenomenal o r empirical world that we claim to " k n o w " is, as M e r l e a u - P o n t y will later say, a world pour

nous. T h u s , the "apparent" world is a 'real' world

for us insofar as it was constructed for the sake o f psychological needs and for the sake o f the preservation o f our species. W h a t N i e t z s c h e wants to say is that the apparent world (or, m o r e accurately, considering the variety o f interpreta­ tions o f the process o f becoming, worlds)

is the only 'real' world to which w e

have cognitive-sensory access. H o w e v e r , it is not the only actuality that we experience.

F o r , the world that is closest to us, our most intimate world, is

unsre

der Begierden

10

11

Welt

und Leidenschaften...

unsrer

Triebe.

11

However,

KGW, VI 3, "Die Vernunft in der Philosophie," 2. "The 'apparent world' is the only one." KGW, VI 2, JGB, 36. Danto has claimed that this assumption that our desires, passions and drives are "given" is something that "Nietzsche quite literally means" - i.e., "that nothing else is real." Cf. Nietzsche as Philosopher, 150. Such an interpretation is questionable because Nietzsche insists upon the "phenomenality" of the "inner world". The psychic states or feelings

Contra Platonism

58

even this "world o f desires, passions and drives" is also phenomenal for N i e t z s c h e . Even the most intimate aspects o f our "inner world" are ap­ prehended b y means o f interpretation, simplification, schematization and organization. Insofar as the "outer w o r l d " and the "inner w o r l d " are b o t h ultimately phenomenal in nature, are, in effect, the only worlds we are acquainted with, they comprise our 'real' world. Nietzsche, however, is consistent in denying that there is a wahre

Welt that is entirely transcendent to

us, that has any independent reality. Although in Menschliches,

Allzumenschliches

Nietzsche is quite willing to

admit the logical possibility o f eine metaphysische

Welt, he is not interested in

it because it could only be negatively determined. man könnte von der metaphysischen Welt gar nichts aussagen als ein Anderssein, ein uns unzugängliches, unbegreifliches Anderssein; es wäre ein Ding mit negativen Eigenschaften. 12

R a t h e r than attacking claims to metaphysical truth, he advises that theological and metaphysical questions be "put on i c e . " Such an orientation does not stop him from pursuing the problem o f the distinction between a "true w o r l d " and an "apparent world." In the Nachlass is the "valuation" {Werthschätzung)

it is held that the Wesen der

"Wahrheit"

o f a belief that such and such is the case.

T h i s valuation, in turn, is fundamentally practical or in the service o f "condi­ tions o f life." Presumably, then, the theoretical assumption o f a "true w o r l d " that transcends the world o f becoming also serves practical, psychological needs. Metaphysical creations o f transcendental "realities" serve, then, as consolation, as repositories o f moral value, as philosophical images o f perma­ nence, eternality, perfection and the absence o f change. T h e "real w o r l d " cannot, according to this way o f thinking, be subject to change and b e c o m i n g ; it must be a stable world o f " B e i n g . " Nietzsche argues, then, that the very distinction between an "apparent w o r l d " and a "true w o r l d " is traceable to value relations. „die wahre und die scheinbare Welt" - dieser Gegensatz wird von mir zurück­ geführt auf Werthverhältnisse. wir haben unsere Erhaltungs-Bedingungen projicirt als Prädikate des Seins überhaupt.

12

that we experience are, of course, quite 'real' for us insofar as we feel their immediacy in Erlebnis. However, they are by no means reality as such or the sole reality. They are considered as Symptome of an unconscious, underlying process. As we shall see, Nietzsche interprets the "inner" character of actuality according to human analogy. But this is not because our drives, desires and passions are the sole "reality." A fuller discussion of the importance of "internal phenomenology" for Nietzsche and the question of anthropomorphic interpretation will be presented in subsequent chapters. KGW, IV 2, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, I, 9. "...one could state nothing whatsoever about it except that it was a being-other; it would be a thing with negative qualities."

59

Contra Platonism

daß wir in unserem Glauben stabil sein müssen, um zu gedeihen, daraus haben wir gemacht, daß die „wahre" Welt keine wandel­ bare und werdende, sondern eine seiende ist. 13

T h e metaphysical conception o f a true world o f being, then, is derived from our conditions o f preservation, our need for stability and permanence. Naturally, this apotheosis o f the world o f timeless Being entails the devalua­ tion o f this world o f time and becoming. F o r N i e t z s c h e , the nihilistic consequences o f this bifurcation o f the true or real world and the apparent, phenomenal, ultimately 'unreal' world are two-fold: the projection o f good­ ness, perfection, eternity, value and meaning into the world o f Being nullifies the value and meaning o f temporal life; and the loss o f belief in this " o t h e r " world (itself a consequence o f the valuation o f truth that initiated its creation), will lead to the feeling that this world o f change and becoming is n o w valueless and senseless because, for centuries, the transcendental, "true" world was considered as the ground o f the value and meaning o f this world. Before turning to a consideration o f Lange's influence on Nietzsche's thinking concerning Plato, metaphysical absolutism and the notion o f the "apparent world," there are t w o observations that I would like to make here. T h e first involves what is a misinterpretation o f Nietzsche's attitude towards the Socratic-Platonic ideal and the second pertains to the often quoted, but rarely examined, assertion that "the true world is only the apparent world o n c e again." In regard to the first point, it has recently been argued that Nietzsche's attitude toward Plato and Socrates w a s . . . ambivalent. On the one hand Socratic-Platonic rationalism is itself spiritualized will-to-power. Its will to truth is the will to power itself: "To stamp the character of being upon becomingthat is the highest will-to-power." The Platonic will to truth can be conceived as articulated will-to-power, in which order is imposed upon the world and upon the turbulent, disquieting passions of the individual as well. . . . Platonism . . . has given form to becoming by placing it under the yoke of reason.... 14

N o w , in the first place, even though it is the case that the will to truth is an expression o f the Wille zur Macht,

this is not unique to Plato. M o r e o v e r , in

Nietzsche's view, all philosophizing is der geistige

13

14

15

15

Wille zur Macht.

Second-

KGW, VIII 2, 16-17. "'Thetrue and the apparent world' - this antithesis was traced back by me to value-relations. We have projected our preservation-conditions as predicates of being in general. That we must be stable in our beliefs, if we would prosper, we have made the 'true' world a world not of change and becoming, but one of being." This passage, as well as other similar arguments, shows why Nietzsche maintains that the transcendental, "true world" is a duplication of the "apparent world" that has come to be accepted as the true world (in an empirical sense) of causally related "objects," "things" or "substances." Nietzsche denies that either "world" is "true" in any strict, ontological sense. Magnus, op.c i t . ,125. 9.

KGW, VI2,JGB,

Contra Platonism

60

ly, it is not the case that Socratic-Platonic rationalism imposes B e i n g on b e c o m i n g . F o r , especially in the case o f Plato's exoteric philosophy, the realm o f B e i n g ( = the world o f forms o r ideas) is separate from, and transcendental t o , the realm o f b e c o m i n g . T h e "truly real" is a transcendental world unsullied b y b e c o m i n g and imperfection. T h i s was Aristotle's central criticism o f P l a t o : that he separated

the forms or ideas from being in the world. T h a t there is

considerable misunderstanding

here is clearly shown b y the reference to

N i e t z s c h e ' s remark that stamping the character o f Being on b e c o m i n g is the highest expression o f will-to-power. F o r , what N i e t z s c h e is referring to in this 16

c o m m e n t is his o w n theory o f the eternal recurrence o f the same. T h e thought o f the eternal recurrence o f the same is radically paradoxical for N i e t z s c h e insofar as he has insisted often enough that the imposition o f "being" ( b y way o f conceptualization o r linguistic determination) on a "world o f b e c o m i n g " entails falsification.

Therefore, the thought o f the eternal recurrence o f the

same is precisely this paradoxical imposition o f B e i n g upon the "ring o f b e c o m i n g . " T h e ordering conceptualization o f a dynamic process o f b e c o m i n g is N i e t z s c h e ' s (experimental) "will to truth" and, a fortiori,

"the highest will-

t o - p o w e r . " T h u s , the attempt to impose Being o n becoming that is referred to above is falsely attributed to Plato, but could be imputed to N i e t z s c h e himself, specifically in regard t o the conception o f the eternal recurrence o f the same.

Lange

versus

Plato

W h a t e v e r m a y have been N i e t z s c h e ' s independent reasons for criticizing Platonic metaphysics, the idea o f a "metaphysical w o r l d " or a Welt,"

"Wahrheits-

there is little doubt that Lange played the role o f catalyst. F o r , he

engages in a persistent assault upon Plato and Platonism, upon absolute idealism and anything resembling abstract metaphysics. N o t only that, but the specific emphasis in N i e t z s c h e ' s arguments against the dualism o f a "true" and an "apparent" w o r l d is implicit in Lange's defence o f "phenomenalism." G o i n g against the grain o f the philosophical trends during the middle o f the nineteenth century, Lange shows a marked preference, as N i e t z s c h e later will, for the Sophists vis-à-vis

Socratic-Platonic rationalism. In particular, Lange is

o b v i o u s l y sympathetic with the Protagorean stress on the particular as o p ­ posed t o the universal and with the emphasis upon "relations." Aside from 16

Werke in drei Bänden, ed. K.Schlechta, III. 895. "Dem Werden den Charakter des Seins aufzuprägen - das ist der höchste Wille zur Macht... Daß alles wiederkehrt, ist die extremste Annäherung einer Welt des Werdens an die des Seins." "To stamp upon becoming the character of Being - that is the highest will to power... That everything returns is the most extreme approximation of a world of becoming to a world of Being."

61

Contra Platonism

relating such forms o f thought to B ü c h n e r and M o l e s c h o t t , Lange remarks that the thought o f Protagoras marks a turning-point in the development o f G r e e k philosophy because o f his orientation: instead o f starting from the object in external nature, he starts with the subjective, die geistige More

important

for

an

understanding

Wesen

des

o f Lange's thought,

Menschen. as well

as

N i e t z s c h e ' s , is the observation that Die Aussage, daß etwas sei, bedarf stets der näheren Bestimmung: im Verhältnisse wozu es sei oder werde; sonst ist gar nichts damit gesagt! Ganz so sagt B ü c h n e r . . . daß „alle Dinge nur für einander da sind und ohne gegenseitige Beziehungen nichts bedeuten." 17

C o n t r a r y t o accepted philosophical opinions, Lange (and N i e t z s c h e after him)

sees the relativity o f the Sophists as an advance in the theory o f

knowledge, n o t the culmination o f philosophy, but its authentic beginning. H e wonders if the influence o f Socrates and Plato has been fortunate or unfortunate and then speculates about the direction that Sophistic thought was taking. H e sees in their analyses the rudiments o f a kind o f nominalism.

The

seeds for a reversal o f Platonism are already present. Das Allgemeine wäre dann freilich in einer solchen Lehre nicht realer und gewisser gewesen, als das Besondere, sondern im Gegenteil weiter entfernt vom Objekt und ungewisser, und zwar im direkten Gegensatze zu Plato, um so ungewisser, je allgemeiner. 18

T h i s last point coincides with N i e t z s c h e ' s "inverted P l a t o n i s m " insofar as he believes that the further

something is removed from the 'true' world o f

conceptual universality, the m o r e significant it is. T h e more abstract, deindividuated o r universal a conception, the m o r e it is removed from the actuality o f b e c o m i n g . A l t h o u g h the treatment o f language in N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophy will be discussed in another place, it m a y be said that N i e t z s c h e inverts the Platonic equation o f the ' t r u e ' with the conceptual-linguistic universal. F o r , in his view, neither concepts nor language can describe Wirklichkeit.

17

18

Ordinary

Lange, op. cit., I, 32-33. "The expression that something is, always needs a further determina­ tion in relation to what it is or is becoming; otherwise our predication has no meaning. In exactly the same way Büchner says . . . that 'all things exist only for each other, and have no significance apart from mutual relations." There are about twice as many references to Plato in this second edition than in the first edition. Ibid., I, 45. "In such a theory the universal would not have been more real and certain than the particular, but would have been further removed from the object, and more uncertain; in fact, in direct opposition to Plato, the more uncertain as it became universal." This position certainly anticipates Nietzsche's attempt to defend an "inverted Platonism". The further removed something is from "true being," Nietzsche tells us, the "purer, the finer, the better it is." Cf. Werke, GOA, I X , 190. The rationale for adopting this orientation is not to hold that the particular is "more real" than the universal; rather, it is to emphasize the Ziel or "goal" of lebendig an Erscheinung, "living in semblance."

62

Contra Platonism

language, philosophical and scientific language ultimately serve a practical purpose, are saturated with logico-metaphysical notions and conventions and have meaning and use primarily for the survival o f the species, social relations, conventional designations and the dominance o f man's environment. T h e joining together o f language and o n t o l o g y (that has b e c o m e so fashionable in Anglo-american philosophy) inevitably leads, Nietzsche believes, to deception and falsification, to a cognitive-linguistic structure that is extraordinarily useful, but misleading. Returning to Lange's comments on Plato and Platonism, we m a y call attention to the following salient observations. It is mentioned that the Sophists tended to designate the 'true' or the 'certain' in reference to the individual feeling o f the particular person. This orientation is contrasted with des transzendenten

und mythischen

Allgemeinen

that Plato introduced. C o m ­

menting on the Platonic response to the Sophists, Lange asks a question that must have made quite an impression on Nietzsche. Warum Umschwung

eintreten,

platonischen

Idealismus

der die Welt leitete?

auf Jahrtausende

mußte

der

grobe

in den Irrweg

des

19

After making a passing acknowledgement o f the relation o f A p o l l o to the Socratic movement that is pointed out b y Nietzsche in Die 20

Tragödie,

Geburt

der

Lange unleashes a number o f criticisms o f the Platonic standpoint.

H e charges that the "essence" that Plato exalted above individual entities tended to lead to the degradation o f the latter to "mere appearance" Scheine),

(bloße

that the "Platonic errors" are significant because they are intimately

associated with "the nature o f our thinking" and with our entire Organisation,

psychische

that Plato relapsed into mythical forms o f thought and, b y

means o f figurative expressions, created a chimerical supersensual world, that the presumption o f authentic knowledge o f what is absolutely transcendental is absurd, that Plato created a hierarchy o f ideas b y virtue o f the J a c o b ' s ladder o f "abstraction" insofar as, the further away thought is from concrete facts, the nearer he believed it was to truth.

21

Furthermore, the Platonic belief that das

Sein ist ewig

was shaped, in large part, b y grammatical and linguistic decep­

tion.

hypostasizes

Plato

linguistic

universals

and

converts

them

into

"realities." Classifications that have a practical and logical significance and

19

20

21

Ibid., I, 46. "Why must the great reaction [to the Sophists] intervene which was to lead the world for thousands of years in the errors of Platonic idealism?" Ibid., I, 138 n. The fact that Lange had read Die Geburt der Tragödie and commented favorably on it seems to be virtually unknown to commentators on the philosophy of Nietzsche. This reinforces my belief that until very recently a serious study of Lange's influence on Nietzsche has rarely, if ever, been undertaken. Cf. Jörg Salaquarda, "Der Standpunkt des Ideals bei Lange und Nietzsche," Studi Tedeschi, X X I I , 1 (1979), 145. Ibid., I, 54, 57-59.

63

Contra Platonism

value are quixotically transformed into mythical entities. B y attributing "true being" to such universals, Plato relegated individual, actual beings to a realm o f phenomenal becoming in which they have n o authentic being at all.

22

Finally, Lange charges that despite the "poetic exaltation o f spirit" that Platonic thought provides, it is shot through with mythical, symbolic think­ ing, with poetic

representation.

In spite o f its visionary power, Platonism has

had the detrimental effect o f forestalling die Beherrschung durch

den Verstand

und die sichere,

methodische

der

Wissenschaft.

Erscheinungen 23

All o f the above critical reactions to Platonism should sound familiar to any serious reader o f Nietzsche. Virtually every particular critique o f Plato's thought that Lange presents will find its echo in Nietzsche's m o r e sophisti­ cated philosophical prose. Even a long passage in which Lange expresses sympathy with the mythical meaning o f Plato's philosophy while denying that it represents "knowledge" indicates the value that he placed upon poetic, symbolic philosophy for its vitalizing, freshening influence on the human imagination. F r o m the "standpoint o f the ideal", mythopoetic philosophy has a role and function. N i e t z s c h e will certainly bear this in mind when he later creates his three major countermyths: the eternal recurrence o f the same, the Übermensch

and the universal Wille zur Macht.

B y means o f these powerful

myths, N i e t z s c h e seeks to combat the lure o f what he considers the PlatonicChristian m y t h o l o g y . Lange asserts that b y attributing true being (wahre

Sein) and "undisturbed

permanence" to the universal alone, Plato pictured this world as

wesenlos,

flowing appearances. This "ideal t h e o r y " is developed in part out o f the bricks o f hypostasized words and in part on the basis o f the assumption that there is a reine

Vernunft

gemeine,

o r "pure reason" that is capable o f apprehending das

das Abstrakte,

von Empfindung

das Übersinnliche,

und W a h r n e h m u n g .

24

die Ideen,

ohne

alle

All­

Vermittlung

T h i s particular tack adopted b y Lange

in his critique o f Platonism is intimately associated with one o f his (and Nietzsche's) favorite epistemic contentions: that the categories have a sensuous origin. T h i s very precise and direct link between Lange and N i e t z s c h e will be considered in the examination o f the neo-Kantian background o f N i e t z s c h e ' s analysis o f knowledge. T h e war against Platonic idealism, against "absolute truth," against a permanent, eternal realm o f perfection that Nietzsche engages in was already waged b y Lange. H e denies the possibility o f genuine knowledge o f the

22

Ibid., I, 58-60.

23

Ibid., I, 63. Ibid. Nietzsche's repeated denials of reine Vernunft, reine Erkenntnis and reine Denken are

24

precisely the same as Lange's forceful denials of such notions.

64

Contra Platonism

"absolutely transcendental," denies "absolute truth," and condemns Plato for constructing a mythical Reich

des Ideals

out o f the "utterly unknown." W i t h a

vehemence w o r t h y o f Nietzsche, he m o c k s the Platonic and Hegelian assump­ tion o f the attainment o f "absolute knowledge." H e criticizes, as Nietzsche later will, the notions o f "pure reason," N i e t z s c h e calls the "pure knowing subject."

"pure knowledge," 25

and

what

O n these particular points, as

well as on m a n y others, the correspondence between the thought o f Lange and that o f N i e t z s c h e is quite precise. It is astonishing h o w completely N i e t z s c h e c o - o p t e d Lange's anti-Platonism. Nietzsche's polemic against Platonism is an extension of, and an elaboration of, Lange's criticisms. T h i s is most obviously the case in his attempt to dissolve the distinction between the "real w o r l d " and the "apparent world." It has recently been said that Lange's influence on Nietzsche had a deleterious effect insofar as it caused him to w o r r y about "ancient p r o b l e m s " such as that o f appearance and reality. Moreover, Nietzsche did n o t see that the distinction between 'being' and 'becoming', and between 'appearance' and 'reality', is altogether irrelevant to the phenomenalism to which he had, in intention, committed himself when he repudiated metaphysics. 26

T h i s is a rather serious misinterpretation o f Nietzsche's position. F o r , the only "phenomenalism" that Nietzsche admits is his o w n slight variation on a K a n t Langean form o f phenomenalism. A s we shall attempt to show in our discussion o f epistemology, Nietzsche admits a "phenomenal world," but one that is formed out o f "conventional fictions," our selective sensorium and our psychic needs. In the most general sense in which Nietzsche uses the terms, such a " w o r l d " does depend on the distinction between 'being' and ' b e c o m ­ ing.' A s far as the "distinction" between "appearance" and "reality" is c o n ­ cerned, N i e t z s c h e ' s intention is to overcome it. A l t h o u g h it is seen that the "solution" to the d i c h o t o m y between the 'true' world and the 'apparent' world was suggested to Nietzsche b y his study o f " F . A . Lange's H i s t o r y o f Materialism," the statement o f this solution is n o t quite accurate. It is contended, b y Hollingdale, that "Lange argues that all knowledge is knowledge o f the phenomenal (apparent) world." M e r e l y b y virtue o f coming to k n o w something we k n o w it as "phenomenon." T h e r e ­ fore, it is held, the very idea o f the separation o f true and apparent worlds, as well as the idea o f the "content" o f the world, "can only be p h e n o m e n a . "

27

W h a t is missing in this account o f the relation between Lange's phenomenal­ ism and Nietzsche's denial o f the distinction between a "true w o r l d " and an

25

26

27

KGW, IV 1, 246. "Das 'reine Subjekt der Erkenntniss' ist eine Chimäre." Hollingdale, op. at., 137.

Ibid., 138.

Contra Platonism

65

"apparent w o r l d " is the important Kantian c o n n e c t i o n . Lange is an avowed n e o - K a n t i a n . H i s epistemic standpoint is a psychological variation o n K a n t . F o r , he argues that every genuine object o f knowledge is conditioned b y o u r "psycho-physical organization," b y o u r sense, pur intellect and o u r psychic 'organization.' Lange, like K a n t , restricts knowledge, in the strict sense, to p h e n o m e n a alone. T h i s does not, however, restrict speculation, hypothetical reasoning o r imaginative-poetic uses o f the mind. It is not the idea

of the

d i c h o t o m y between the real and the apparent world that is reduced to a " p h e n o m e n o n . " Lange proposes a m o r e sophisticated notion that N i e t z s c h e understood quite well. O n e o f the m o s t often cited and m o s t often misunder­ stood assertions in N i e t z s c h e ' s vast corpus Welt"...

sie war immer

die scheinbare

is the following: Die

Welt noch e i n m a l .

28

"wahre

T h i s statement o f

the duplication o f the "true w o r l d " after the pattern o f the "apparent w o r l d " is said to be a " p r o o f " that is n o m o r e than the claim that we cannot "imagine" a real world that does n o t turn out to be the (apparent) world we are familiar with in o u r experience. It is further noted that this does n o t mean that a "real w o r l d " m a y not be a "necessary postulate." T h i s entire account is a c o n g l o m ­ eration o f misunderstandings. W h a t N i e t z s c h e means b y the above assertion is that w e c a n n o t conceive

of a transcendental "true w o r l d " without doing so in

terms o f concepts or categories that we already apply to the "phenomenal w o r l d " we experience. H e does n o t deny that we can postulate

a real,

"metaphysical w o r l d " insofar as such a w o r l d is logically possible. H o w e v e r , he does precisely deny the necessity to postulate such a transcendental world. One

o f the greatest errors, he believes, in Western thought has been the

postulation o f another world, a "true" world that is perfect and eternal. T h i n k i n g o f the way in which Plato conceived o f a world o f " I d e a s , " the realm o f "true being," Lange maintains that this transcendental world is "represented in the forms o f the phenomenal w o r l d . " H e avers that Plato [sich] in der Ideenlehre genötigt [sieht] zum Mythus zu greifen und damit sind wir aus der höchsten Abstraktion mit einem Schlage in dem wahren Lebensele­ ment aller Mystik - dem Sinnlich-Übersinnlichen. Der Mythus soll nur bildiche Geltung h a b e n . . . soll dasjenige, was an sich nur Gegenstand der reinen Vernunft ist, in der Form der Erscheinungswelt [darstellen] . 29

28

29

KGW, VIII 2, 266. "The 'true world'... has always been the 'apparent world' once again." Lange, op. cit., I, 62. "Plato, in his theory of ideas, is obliged to have recourse to myth, and thus we pass from the highest abstraction to the real life-element of all mysticism - the sensuous supersensuous. The myth is . . . to have only a figurative force... what in itself is only an object of pure reason is to be represented in the form of the phenomenal world." This, of course, is precisely what Nietzsche means when he says that Die ' "wahre Welt'... sie war immer die scheinbare Welt noch einmal."

Contra Platonism

66

T h e p o i n t that L a n g e is making is that the means b y which we think o f a supposed transcendental world b e y o n d our experience is conditioned b y a cognitive-linguistic structure that is derived from o u r way o f thinking about the "phenomenal w o r l d " in which we live, m o v e and have o u r being. T h e application o f this m o d e o f argument to the philosophy o f K a n t in Lange's Geschichte

makes the point o f it clearer. H e says that although thought seeks

t o carry us b e y o n d the limits o f o u r sensible experience, we still must rely u p o n categories that are intimately associated with sensation and e x p e r i e n c e . W e c a n n o t , he continues, even imagine something as one o r m a n y , as substance opposed t o qualities o r even as a predicate o f any kind without the infusion o f sensory experience. Again, Lange seeks to undermine the preten­ tions o f transcendental metaphysics b y virtue o f the assumption o f the sensory origin o f the categories o f thought.

30

In addition to this kind o f argument,

Lange first (and later N i e t z s c h e ) proffers a linguistic argument against the n o t i o n o f a thinkable transcendental world. T h a t is, that human languages have developed primarily for the sake o f social relations and interactions, are shot through with anthropomorphisms and "personifications", and have evolved for the sake o f the description and designation o f objects and events e n c o u n ­ tered in experience. Language is designed, then, for the sake o f practical needs in a p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d o f experience. T h e use o f such language to refer t o , o r "picture," transcendental entities o r a transempirical world does not o v e r c o m e its close association with phenomenal actuality. N i e t z s c h e , o f course, adds to such arguments his o w n brand o f p s y c h o l o g i ­ cal argument that o n c e again assumes the motive

for the postulation o f

" a n o t h e r w o r l d " that is the ostensible "true w o r l d . " In

Götzen-Dämmerung,

for example, he asserts that Von einer "andren" Welt als dieser zu fabeln hat gar keinen Sinn, vorausgesetzt, daß nicht ein Instinkt der Verleumdung, Verkleinerung, Verdächtigung des Lebens in uns mächtig ist: im letzteren Falle rächen wir uns am Leben mit der Phantasmagorie eines "anderen", eines "besseren" L e b e n s . . . Die Welt scheiden in eine

30

Ibid., I, 63. "Selbst wo uns unser Denken über die Schranken unsrer Sinnlichkeit hinaus­ weist . . . müssen wir uns noch des gewöhnlichen Verstandes bedienen, dessen Kategorien samt und sonders von der Sinnlichkeit unzertrennlich sind. Wir können uns weder das Eine und Viele, noch die Substanz gegenüber ihren Eigenschaften noch irgendein Prädikat überhaupt ohne Beimischung des Sinnlichen vorstellen." "Even where our thought carries us beyond the limits of our sensory experience... we must avail ourselves of the ordinary understanding, whose categories, one and all, are indissolubly connected with sensation. We cannot imagine either the one and the many, or substance as opposed to qualities, or even a predicate of any kind without an infusion of the sensible."

Contra Platonism

67

"wahre" und eine "scheinbare"... ist nur eine Suggestion der decadence Symptom niedergehenden Lebens..." Although what might be called Nietzsche's argumentum

- ein

ad decadence

is

substantially his o w n creation, most o f the m o r e technical arguments against the reality o f a wahre and a scheinbare

Welt and against the distinction between a wahre

Welt

Welt

o w e a great deal to the inspiriation o f Lange. T h e

accusation that Nietzsche, in the ostensible manner o f Lange, reduced the 32

problem o f appearance and reality to a physiological or psychological issue is besides the mark. T h e further suggestion that reason may " c o m p e l " us to assume a real world

and that Nietzsche did n o t seem aware o f this compounds

the misinterpretation. F o r , Nietzsche is quite aware o f the pathos

that leads us

to conceive o f a real world and is also quite aware o f the "tragic knowledge" to which his o w n thinking led him. N o t only does reason, in Hollingdale's terms, " c o m p e l " us to think o f a true world, but reason (Vernunft)

is precisely that

force that creates such magnetic, but misleading, notions. F o r Nietzsche, the illusion that human reason can comprehend a "reality-in-itself" o r a

wahre

Welt is absolutely essential to his conception o f actuality. H e argues that w e can neither think of, n o r speak of, a 'real' o r 'true' world without doing so in terms derived from the so-called "apparent world" in which we exist, the only world there is. In regard to Lange's original position on this issue, it has been said that what he shows is only a "preoccupation with phenomenalism". Within this "discipline" the separation

o f appearance

and reality has no place. O f

Nietzsche, it is held that he wanted to embrace phenomenalism, but was "diverted from this path back on to that o f metaphysics." This is said to account for his "unsatisfactory" speculations concerning reality and appear­ ance. Although the points about Lange are reasonably correct, it is, I believe, a mistake to see N i e t z s c h e reverting to a metaphysical standpoint that he spent so much time and energy repudiating. T h e "hypothesis" o f the Wille Macht

zur

is n o t a metaphysical conception. Rather, it is a provisional explanatory

principle that serves as Nietzsche's interpretation

o f the meaning o f a multi­

plicity o f psychological, historical, social, biological and physical theoretical data or observations. I t is decidedly not a knowledge-claim, not a positive assertion about an "unconditioned reality." It is Nietzsche's "working h y -

31

32

KGW, VI 3, G, III, 6. Cp. KGW, VI 3, Ecce Homo, 2. "Man hat die Realität in dem Grade um ihren Wert, ihren Sinn, ihre Wahrhaftigkeit gebracht, als man eine ideale Welt erlog Die 'wahre Welt' und die 'scheinbare Welt' - auf deutsch: die erlogne Welt und die Realität." "Reality has been deprived of its value, its meaning, its veracity to the same degree as an ideal world has been fabricated... The 'real world' and the 'apparent world' - in plain terms: the fabricated world and reality." Ecce Homo, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Middlesex, 1979, 2. Hollingdale, op. cit., 138.

68

Contra Platonism

pothesis," his verkleinerte

Formel,

the text o f homo

Although we will have occasion to deal with this

natura.

his interpretation of the text o f nature and

central conception o f his in another place, it may be said at this point that N i e t z s c h e tells us quite plainly that the idea o f Wille zur Macht

is neither an

apodictic claim to truth nor a metaphysical principle: it is hypothetical through and through; it is an attempt to understand Wirklichkeit

"from within" and it

is extended to all entities on the basis o f "human analogy" o r precisely the kind o f anthropomorphism that Nietzsche characterizes as

falsification.

Returning to the particular question under consideration, it should be noted that what Lange maintains is that man has genuine knowledge o f p h e n o m e n a only for a number o f reasons. H e argues that (1) Die letzte aller Erkenntnis

ist die sinnliche

nis nur als eine

kleine

möglicher sind

35

Bloßem

Erkenntnis,

34

Insel

Wahrnehmung, darstellt

33

(2) die menschliche

in dem ungeheuren

(3) Kategorien...

Verstande

oder

reiner

Vernunft,

ist nichts

überhaupt unzertrennlich

and (4) that K a n t is right to insist that Alle Erkenntnis reinen

Erkennt­

Ozean

von der Sinnlichkeit

Basis

von Dingen, als lauter

aus

Schein.

36

Lange's agnosticism is further reinforced b y the recognition in nineteenth century science o f the Grenzen

des Naturerkennens.

In point o f fact, Lange

specifically sees the scientific encounter with "the limits o f natural knowledge" as a confirmation o f Kant's theory o f knowledge. F o r the Kantian, as well as for the nineteenth century scientist, unser Weltbild

wesentlich

Vorstellung

ist.

37

Given all o f these presuppositions, it is clear that Lange believes that any attempt via metaphysical speculation to probe the "true nature o f things" is in vain. Insofar as we have "knowledge" at all, it is restricted to what is constituted b y our senses, our categories and our psyche.

F o r Lange, as later

for N i e t z s c h e , human knowing is a process o f transubstantiation. Therefore, n o t only is a genuine transcendental knowledge (as in Platonism) precluded, but even o u r knowledge o f the phenomenal world is not absolute o r apodictic. As Lange puts it, weder für

die absolute

Natur

die Erscheinungswelt der Dinge

genommen

noch

die Idealwelt

werden

kann.

38

schlechthin

N o t only does

this coincide with Nietzsche's epistemic standpoint, but it leads him to deny any access to any "true world" in any absolute sense, whether it be a Platonic world o f forms o r a purely objective empirical order. 33 34 35 36

37 38

Lange, op cit., I, 85. "The ultimate basis of all knowledge is sensory perception." Ibid., II, 546. Ibid., I, 63. Ibid., II, 461. I. Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik..., Riga, 178 s, 204. "All knowledge of things from pure understanding or pure reason only is nothing but appearance." Ibid., II, 593. "our world-picture is essentially representation." Ibid., II, 594. "...neither the phenomenal world nor the ideal world can be regarded as the absolute nature of things."

69

Contra Platonism

A s we have seen, N i e t z s c h e ' s anti-Platonism was preceded b y Lange's quite similar polemics. Even though the psycho-spiritual motivations for postulating a "true w o r l d " that N i e t z s c h e imputes to his philosophical o p p o ­ nents is foreign to Lange's position, the emphasis upon our immersion in a world-process that is a shifting system o f appearances in N i e t z s c h e ' s thought is traceable t o the suggestions o f Lange. Although N i e t z s c h e says that b y eliminating the wahre

Welt we have also deleted the scheinbare

easily done. I n the Nacblass

he reminds himself to nota

Welt, this is not

bene:

Schein wie ich es verstehe, ist die wirkliche und einzige Realität der D i n g e . . . Ich setze also nicht "Schein" in Gegensatz zur "Realität" sondern nehme umgekehrt Schein als die Realität, welche sich der Verwandlung in eine imaginative "Wahrheits-Welt" widersetzt. 39

There is n o ambiguity here at all: reality is appearance. Perhaps one reason, amongst others, w h y N i e t z s c h e was attracted to this conception o f reality was because it satisfied his powerful aesthetic sense. W h e t h e r this is the case o r not, there is no d o u b t that he was stimulated b y Lange's observation that Kein Gedanke ist so geeignet, Dichtung und Wissenschaft zu versöhnen, als der, daß unsre ganze "Wirklichkeit" . . . nur Erscheinung ist. 40

39

40

KGW, VII 3, 386. " N . B . Appearance, as I understand it, is the actual and only reality of things... I do not posit 'appearance' in opposition to 'reality,' but, on the contrary, take appearance as that reality which resists transformation into an imaginative 'world of truth.'" Lange, op. cit., II, 511. "No thought is so calculated to reconcile poetry and science as the thought that all our reality . . . is only appearance." Although Lange was the stimulus to Nietzsche's thinking in regard to the issue of the denial of a "true world" and the attempt to do away with the antithesis of the "true" and the "apparent" worlds, it should be mentioned that Nietzsche was concerned with attacking the philosophical views of Spir and Teichmüller, was in reaction to their basic conceptions. Nietzsche refers to, or alludes to, two works that deal with the question of the distinction between the "apparent" and the "true" worlds: Gustav Teichmüller, Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt (1882) and Afrikan Spir, Denken und Wirklichkeit (1877). Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Samtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe, de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1980, Band 14, 388.

CHAPTER IV THE PROBLEM O F CHRISTIANITY In Ecce Homo

N i e t z s c h e tells us that his struggle against Christianity was a

special case o f a larger struggle against every form o f "vengefulness

and

vindictiveness." W i t h lynx eyes he scans the horizon o f belief in search o f the slightest sign o f the dreadful "spirit o f revenge." Nietzsche saves his most stinging invective, his most devasting adjectives, for his assaults on Christian Weltanschauung,

the

C h r i s t e n d o m and Christian culture. T h e Christian

faith is, he tells us, antagonistic to all higher human types, is decadent, "crime against life," is a declining form o f Wille zur Macht "will to nothingness." In Der Antichrist

is a

that is, in fact, a

he piles invective on top o f invective

until the reader is almost wearied b y the tension o f this prolonged polemic. Because it lures us out to the " b e y o n d " and condemns this world as, in Kierkegaard's phrase, a "prison-house,"

Christentum

is Platonism with a

vengence. In a word, N i e t z s c h e characterizes Christianity and its culture as nihilistische.

In regard to all aspects o f the Christian faith and culture, w e

certainly can see Wie man mit dem Hammer

philosophiert!

W i t h o u t engaging in disputes about the validity o r invalidity o f Nietzsche's various criticisms o f the Christian faith, let us see if we can distill the essence o f N i e t z s c h e ' s antagonistic position. P r o b a b l y the most general point that is made concerning the Christian system o f belief is that it is a continuation, in a sense, o f Platonism, a Piatonismus

für's

1

"Volk".

Even though this is an

exaggeration and, in regard to the Christian doctrine o f personal

immortality,

incorrect, it is persuasive. T h e Platonic eternal world o f "being" o r "pure f o r m s " is preserved in the being o f G o d . T h e wahre

Welt that Plato postulates

is converted into the belief that Gott

This world, according to

ist Wahrheit.

traditional Platonism, is one in which everything is becoming and nothing ever is; it is radically imperfect, its images and appearances are deceptive and, in the form o f art, corrupting. T h e G o d o f Christianity is actus purus,

that being than

which, St. Anselm argues, nothing is greater. T h e perfect realm o f forms

1

KGW, VI2,JGB,

Vorrede.

The Problem of Christianity

71

corresponds to the absolute perfection o f G o d . T h e truth o f G o d and the truth of eternal forms implies the falsity o f this world o f phenomena. T h e idea o f man is eternal; individual, psychophysical men are finite; G o d is the eternal n o w and man is a created, finite being. As we can see, and as N i e t z s c h e saw, the transition from the Platonic idea o f "the G o o d " to the idea o f G o d is but a step, a step that, for example, St. Augustine easily t o o k . N i e t z s c h e ' s announcement o f the "death o f G o d " is s y n o n y m o u s with the declaration o f the negation o f the transcendental wahre

Welt

o f Plato. A l ­

though Heidegger's linking o f the Platonic ideas and G o d is perhaps a bit t o o 2

facile, it is n o t without substance. Although the world o f ideas o r "ideals" is comprised o f impersonal, transcendental forms while G o d is a person w h o loves man, there is the similarity that Heidegger argues for in the sense that b o t h represent a " b e y o n d , " a realm o f absolute perfection, the repository o f ewige

Wahrheit.

T h u s , we have the contrast that N i e t z s c h e repeatedly de­

plores. B u t in the Christian Weltanschauung The

we have much m o r e .

Christian faith unhinged the ancient pagan world, achieved what

N i e t z s c h e calls a "transvaluation o f values." In place o f a "master morality," it puts forward a Sklaven-Moral Moral).

that entails a "morality o f p i t y "

T h e moral underpining

charged with ressentiment,

(Mitleids-

o f Christianity is, N i e t z s c h e alleges, sur­

hostility to "noble values," the spirit o f revenge,

jealousy, envy and all o f the seamy sentiments o f an underclass. T h e virtu o f the noble pagan is looked upon as "sin" and all o f the ancient virtues are seen, as St. Augustine says, as "splendid vices." T h i s reversal o f values undermined and overthrew the ancient w o r l d in Nietzsche's view. A "nihilistic" religion, a "religion o f death" c o m b i n e d with a negative morality to create a vampiric culture that sapped the energy, vitality and p o w e r o f the ancient world. L i k e others before him, as we shall see, N i e t z s c h e blamed the fall o f the Romanum

Imperium

on the rise o f Christianity.

Das, was aere perennius dastand, das imperium Romanum, die großartigste Orga­ nisations-Form unter schwierigen Bedingungen, die bisher erreicht worden i s t . . . jene heiligen Anarchisten haben sich eine „Frömmigkeit" daraus gemacht, „die Welt" . . . das imperium Romanum zu zerstören... Das Christentum war der Vampyr des imperium Romanum... die ungeheure Tat der Römer, den Boden für eine Große Kultur zu gewinnen... über Nacht ungetan gemacht. 3

2

3

Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", in Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main, 1950. KGW, VI 3, Der Antichrist, 58. "That which stood aere perennius, the Roman Empire, the greatest form of Organization created under difficult conditions that has been attained . . . the holy anarchists have sought, through "piety", to destroy 'the world'... the Roman E m p i r e . . . Christianity was the vampire of the imperium Romanum... the tremendous act of the Romans in preparing the way for a great culture was undone overnight."

72

The Problem of Christianity

N i e t z s c h e not only holds the Christian movement responsible, in large measure, for the implosion o f the G r e c o - R o m a n world and its civilization, but he charges that the earliest followers o f this "cult" were fanatics, desperate zealots w h o gratefully gave up lives that were intolerable to them, burdens they willingly renounced. This "anarchistic," anti-cultural movement bristles with resentment against the healthy, cheerful, open pagan nobility. It de­ nounces n o t only wealth and privilege, but learning and culture as well. It l o o k s upon the splendor o f R o m e with unconcealed contempt, with righteous disdain. It enlists the support not only o f the ancient proletariat, but courts the outcastes o f the ancient world. S o m e o f the early C h u r c h Fathers, particularly Tertullian, express sadistic delight in contemplating the punishment

that

awaits the non-Christians after death. Although Nietzsche spares Jesus Christ in his polemic, describing him as the only authentic Christian, he charges Paul with the distortion o f the essential meaning o f Christianity, with injecting the exotic beliefs o f Mithraism, the religion o f the Gaea O s i r i s into the teachings o f Jesus.

Tellus

and the cult o f

4

In order to understand Nietzsche's critique o f Christianity, we must be aware o f what exactly he is attacking. A t times, he condemns Paul and his followers for their fanaticism, their rancor, their nihilistic destructiveness. A t other times, he is obviously lambasting the early apologists for the Christian faith for their "Chandala revengefulness" against the best aspects o f R o m a n culture. Sometimes he points to Luther's hostility towards the " w h o r e " reason or to the "unspiritual" (ungeistige)

impulse that he finds in the attitudes o f

m a n y ostensible 'Christians.' Finally, he criticizes the social, cultural and psychological effects o f this triumphant religion. H e believes that the insinua­ tion o f guilt, anxiety and self-doubt has ruined many lives. H e especially cannot forgive this religion for crippling a genius like Pascal. Although it may be

granted that the Christian religion has saved many individuals

from

personal disaster, from self-destructiveness, there is also considerable evi­ dence, as Nietzsche well k n o w s , that for some sensitive, conscientious indi­ viduals the Christian religion has been poison. N i e t z s c h e assaults the Christian dispensation because it encourages crippl­ ing guilt, a religious guilt that is virtually immune to therapy, that has ruined m a n y otherwise valuable human beings. This faith adds to the real suffering in life more

suffering, "voluntary suffering," a morbid anxiety about one's

salvation, guilt over one's sinful condition, fear o f G o d and divine punish­ ment, "morbid introspection", unconscionable pity and m u c h m o r e . A l ­ though he admits that this magnetic faith has served as a defense against "practical nihilism," on balance he believes that the overall effects o f the 4

Ibid.

73

The Problem of Christianity

teachings o f this religion have been damaging and negative. I n regard t o his apparently tireless search for evidence for his perception o f Christianity, it is unfortunate that he did n o t have access t o Kierkegaard's writings. H e w o u l d have found m u c h that would startle and intrigue him and he would also, unfortunately,

have found assertions that confirmed his worst suspicions

about the Christian orientation. T o w a r d s the end o f his life, Kierkegaard offers the following "Christian reflection" in his

Papirer:

A man is born in sin, he enters the world by means of a crime, his existence is a crime - and procreation is the f a l l . . . when one is born - one enters a prison, this world is a prison. And the punishment... is to exist... you will thank God that some time through death you may get out of i t . . . from a Christian standpoint, this life is a suffering of punishment. 5

A l t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e was b y no means blind t o the positive virtues o f the Christian tradition, he was repulsed b y the life-denial and negativism, the misanthropy that can certainly be found in the writings o f some o f the most outstanding representatives o f the Christian faith. B y encouraging, o r seeming to encourage, a debilitating pity as a virtue, this faith weakened the spirit and sapped the fortitude o f m a n y and led some to renounce this world o f struggle and effort. In this regard, N i e t z s c h e even turns against his

"educator,"

Schopenhauer, because o f his pessimism and advocacy o f pity. H e would, n o doubt, have been fascinated to learn that a Christian predecesor o f his, Kierkegaard, was surprised to see the affinity between his standpoint and that 6

o f Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer, at any rate, is charged with perpetuating the morality o f pity and sanctioning a nihilistic will to nothingness. T h e "pessimistic w i l l " that N i e t z s c h e discerned in G e r m a n philosophy, especially G e r m a n philosophy o f the nineteenth century, was, he believed, only the penumbra o f the Christian world-view. N o t o n l y does N i e t z s c h e engage in a sustained polemic Morgenröte

to the Nachlass

o f the 1880's - against the decadence

from

the

that he thinks

lies at the r o o t o f Christian faith and morality, but he ingeniously argues that, ironically, it was the Christian virtue o f honesty, the valuation o f "truthfulness," that ultimately turned m a n y against the religion. As a corollary t o this assertion, he maintains that the scientific habits o f mind that have evolved in W e s t e r n culture are the indirect by-products o f the Christian tradition. I n Die fröhliche

5

6

Wissenschaft

he puts forward the insightful argument that

Søren Kierkegaard, The Last Years, Journals 1853-1855, trans. R.G.Smith, New York, 1965, 113. Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, eds. and trans., H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong, Bloomington and London, 1976, IV, 31-34.

74

The Problem of Christianity die christliche Moralität selbst, der immer strenger genommene Begriff der Wahr­ haftigkeit, die Beichtväter-Feinheit des christlichen Gewissens, übersetzt und sublimirt zum wissenschaftlichen Gewissen, zur intellektuellen Sauberkeit um jeden Preis. Die Natur ansehn, als ob sie ein Beweis für die Güte und Obhut eines Gottes sei, die Geschichte interpretiren zu Ehren einer göttlichen Vernunft, als beständes Zeugniss einer sittlichen Weltordnung und sittlicher Schlussabsichten; die eigenen Erlebnisse auslegen, wie sie fromme Menschen lange genug ausgelegt haben, wie als ob Alles Fügung, Alles Wink, Alles dem Heil der Seele zu Liebe ausgedacht und geschickt sei: das ist nunmehr vorbei, das hat das Gewissen gegen sich, das gilt allen feineren Gewissen als unanständig, unehrlich, als Lügnerei..

I m m e d i a t e l y after citing this insightful passage from Die fröhliche schaft,

Wissen­

N i e t z s c h e makes a general observation that appears to have a Hegelian

ring to it. H e remarks that Alle großen Dinge gehen durch sich selbst zugrunde, durch einen Akt der Selbstaufhebung; so will es das Gesetz des Lebens, das Gesetz der notwendigen „Selbstüberwindung" im Wesen des Lebens. 8

T h u s , t h r o u g h a gradual, dialectical process o f S e l b s t a u f h e b u n g ,

9

the Christian

w o r l d - v i e w and its a c c o m p a n y i n g habits o f mind and practices give rise to the

7

8

9

KGW, V 2 , FW, V, 357. "...Christian morality itself, with its central notion of truthfulness, ever more strictly applied, the casuistic subtlety of the Christian conscience, sublimated and translated into the scientific conscience, into an intellectual integrity that is maintained at any cost. The interpretation of nature as proof of God's goodness and care; the interpretation of history to the glory of divine reason, as perpetual testimony to moral purposes and a moral world-order, the interpretation of individual experience as preordained, arranged purposefully for the salvation of the soul: that is now past - it has conscience against it, it is regarded by all the more refined consciences as disputable, dishonorable, dishonest..." KGW, VI 2, Zur Genealogie der Moral (GM), III, 27. "All great things perish of their own accord, by an act of self-suppression; thus is the law of life, the law of the necessary 'selfovercoming' in the essence of life." Although Walter Kaufmann recognizes the operative presence of the Hegelian concept of aufbeben in Nietzsche's thought, he relates it primarily to Nietzsche's idea of sublimiren, indicating that both concepts are applied to "cosmic processes." He specifically relates Nietzsche's notion of the various sublimations of Wille zur Macht to Hegel's conception of Geist as expressing itself through many manifestations and then to "sublate" (aufheben) its embodiments. [Kaufmann, Nietzsche, New York, 1968, 236-238], Nietzsche, however, also uses the idea of aufheben or Selbstaufhebung in a conceptual or methodological way. In fact, it is a formula that informs some of his key positions. Thus, for example, it is held that through a long, gradual, historical process, an ideal, a value, a way of being that had a specific role in one cultural context or in a Weltanschauung comes to have another role or meaning at a later stage of history. Asceticism as a religious practice evolves, by means of cultural transformation, into the discipline of scientific inquiry or scholarly attention to detail. Both of which entail a lowering of physiological drive. Or, the Wille zur Wahrheit that originally seemed to serve a positive, creative purpose in the development of the human world gradually undergoes a process of selfcancellation: it leads to the uncovering of "terrible" truths that are life-threatening or, as in the case of Nietzsche, to the "truthful", but demoralizing, judgment that es giebt kein Wahrheit: thus the "will to truth" leads to the negation of the belief in 'Truth.'

75

The Problem of Christianity

growth o f the scientific interpretation o f actuality and man. T h e ideals o f the Christian m o r a l i t y developed habits and standards o f veracity that undermine the faith that previously gave sanction t o them. N i e t z s c h e puts it s u c c i n c t l y : das Christentum

als Dogma

zugrunde,

an seiner

eignen

10

Moral.

Coincidental-

ry, Kierkegaard had earlier made a similar observation in his Papirer.

He

laments that the humanism o f the nineteenth century w o u l d n o t have been possible w i t h o u t a cultural training in Christianity, that an ethical humanism derived from Christian culture is n o w turned against Christianity.

11

Despite

this paradoxical undermining o f a dogma, N i e t z s c h e realizes that Christianity as praxis

o r as w a y o f life is still possible, perhaps even necessary for s o m e

individuals.

10

11

Even in regard to the repeated attacks on morality in general and not only Christian morality, the "immoralist" Nietzsche appeals to the notion of "self-suppression". In one of his many revealing, abbreviated discussions in his "Prefaces," he analyzes his own position vis-avis the problem of morality. He claims that Morgenröte was the start of his campaign against morality. He pictures himself as a "subterranean" who unearths a thousand year old faith of philosophers, the Vertrauen zur Moral. Philosophers from Plato to Kant have labored to discover "truth" and certainty under the seductive influence of morality. The valuation of Wahrheit and the search for Gewissheit were only apparent motives. The genuine motive was the erection of what Kant called "majestätische sittliche Gebäude." Even the philosophical, especially the German, philosophical faith in reason and logic is, au fond, ein moralische Phänomen. If the Morgenröte is pessimistic about morality, it actually represents a contradiction: it is a retraction of confidence in morality -Aus Moralität! Even though he is opposed to older forms of morality, Nietzsche admits that the German tradition of Rechtschaffenheit und Frömigkeit ("uprightness and piety"), as well as a "pessimistic will" lives on in the "immoralists" and "atheists" whose spokesman Nietzsche has become. The "pessimistic will" is overcome and denied "with joy." A formula is offered for the attack on morality; it is die Seihstaufhebung der Moral. As in Hegel's original conception of Aufhebung, this means that morality is negated (in one form) and preserved (in another form). The motive for the "selfsuppression" of morality is a moral one. "Honesty" or Redlichkeit has resulted from a long period of training and the Selbstkritik der Moral is itself "a moral phenomenon" or event. Cf. Werke, G O A , XIII, 121. Even when it is not directly cited, this notion of "self-suppression" seems to play an important role in Nietzsche's thought. The eternal recurrence of the same, for example, is an ultra-nihilistic idea which, if fully accepted, seems to result in a self-cancellation of nihilism by virtue of complete affirmation of life in the face of such an idea. In Also sprach Zarathustra, the "will to power" is described as "the greatest danger" for the Übermensch; it is such if it is not mastered, controlled, sublimated or "overcome." In effect, it is suggested that Übermenschlichkeit requires the Selbstaufhebung of Wille zur Macht. Although generally opposed to Hegel's rationalistic idealism, Nietzsche was not opposed to the Hegelian conception of aufheben or Selbstaufhebung. As Kaufmann has pointed out, it is central to the core idea of Selbstüberwindung insofar as this seems to be a difficult, dialectical process of Selbstaufhebung in Existenz. Ibid. "Christianity as dogma has perished of its own morality." Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, eds. and trans. H. V. Hong and E . H. Hong, Bloomington and London, 1975, IV, 301. "...the purely human is boldly appealed to nowadays, in contrast to Christianity. But what is it that we call 'the human'? It is volatilized Christianity, a culture-consciousness which Christianity has deposited. Consequently, it is due to Christianity - and then asserted in contrast to Christianity."

76

The Problem of Christianity

Heute noch ist ein solches Leben möglich, für gewisse Menschen sogar notwendig: das echte, das ursprüngliche Christentum wird zu allen Zeiten möglich s e i n . . . Nicht ein Glauben, sondern ein T u n . . J u s t as the habitual cultivation o f veracity leads to the undermining o f belief in the dogmas o f Christianity, so, t o o , do ascetic ideals developed within the Christian tradition b e c o m e converted into the discipline o f the scholar, the conscientiousness o f the w o r k i n g scientist. Ironically, N i e t z s c h e argues, the very "discipline in truth" (Zucht

auf

Weisheit)

that has been valued

and

cultivated for almost t w o thousand years puts in question the monotheistic belief that gave sanction to it. T h e sciences require a cooling o f the e m o t i o n s , a seriousness o f purpose, a deliberate unspontaneity, a kind o f physiological reduction o f vital impulses that represents a secular form o f the Ideal.

13

asketische

T h e attitudes, values, beliefs, practices and orientations that have

developed within the Christian tradition have contributed, b y virtue o f an ironic, diachronic counterfinality, to the negation o f that tradition.

This

negation is not construed as absolute. Rather, it is a kind o f Hegelian negation and preservation, an

Aufhebung.

A l t h o u g h it has been suggested that N i e t z s c h e ' s massive assault o n C h r i s t ­ ianity is primarily directed against "hypocritical Christians,"

14

this is debat­

able. F o r , he is equally offended b y those w h o sincerely and passionately embrace Christian faith

if they indict life and this world, if they undermine

reason, culture and civilization, if they are motivated b y rancor, resentment o r vengefulness, if they c o n d e m n the sensuous world as "evil," if they undermine the confidence o f the physically and emotionally strong, if they value w e a k ­ ness, impotence and sickness, if they have a craven desire to flee

from

actuality, and if they have a consuming desire to punish those w h o do n o t share their faith. N o matter h o w one tries to soften the b l o w , there is n o way in w h i c h N i e t z s c h e ' s critique o f the Christian faith and morality can be mitigated. H e is unambiguously opposed to what he considers the essence o f Christian culture. O n e o f the sources o f the negative portrait o f the "ideal type," if such it m a y be called, o f "the Christian" that is displayed b y N i e t z s c h e is said to have been H e i n e ' s unflattering depiction o f the " N a z a r e n e t y p e " in his essay o n the life o f o n e Ludwig B ö r n e . H e i n e compares this type o f personality, with its ascetic tendencies and its desire for spiritualization, to the life-loving, healthy,

12

13

14

KGW, VI 3, Der Antichrist, 39. "even today such a life is possible, for certain men even necessary: genuine, original Christianity will be possible at all times. ...Not a belief, but an action..." KGW, VI 2, GM, III, 25. Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche, New York, 1968, 342-343, 371-372.

77

The Problem of Christianity

strong and realistic " H e l l e n e s . "

15

H e i n e deplores the resentment o f the

" N a z a r e n e " personality and applauds the healthy-mindedness o f the " H e l ­ lenes." T h i s d i c h o t o m y o f human types does seem to suggest Nietzsche's distinction between the ostensibly 'decadent' Christian and the neo-pagans w h o "say Y e s to life," w h o are strong, w h o can endure terrible truths without making the "leap o f faith." T h a t the source o f the idea o f ressentiment

may be

found in H e i n e ' s portrayal o f the "Nazarene t y p e " is certainly plausible. H o w e v e r , it m a y be equally plausible that Nietzsche's understanding o f the underlying p s y c h o l o g y o f the typical Christian may have had other intellectual sources as well. S o m e o f these will be indicated in our discussion o f Lange's attitude towards Christianity. Before considering the Langean background o f some o f Nietzsche's deeply rooted attitudes towards Christentum,

there is another aspect o f the religious

standpoint that also exercises his thought. L i k e Voltaire, w h o m he admired so much, N i e t z s c h e wanted "to destroy the infamy" o f a priestly hierarchy. H e is sternly opposed to all forms o f sacerdotal organization, seeing them as detrimental to genuine culture, as psychologically damaging and socially regressive. In what may be understood as a kind o f subjective p h e n o m e n o l o g y , he examines the essence o f the asketische

Priester.

H e is unsparing in his

criticism o f the type. H e finds in such individuals a tyrannical dogmatism, a disdain for, if n o t a hatred of, all living things. T h i s proud human type is said to be disgruntled, desirous o f power, a "species" that views earthly existence as a bridge to transcendence. H e r e he is attacking not only the various priestly classes o f the Christian tradition, but the universal type o f "ascetic priest" that has appeared virtually everywhere at o n e time or another. Although it may be thought that N i e t z s c h e is thinking o f Christian examples o f the type, he is m o r e often than n o t alluding to the powerful priestly caste o f India, the Brahmins. E v e n though he found much to admire in the Hindu Laws of

Manu,

he also found on its pages a portrait o f the priestly caste that displays its cunning, its subtlety, its political astuteness, its capacity for social control and its obvious Wille zur M a c h t .

16

N i e t z s c h e discerns in the ascetic, priestly type o f individual a curious blend o f weakness and strength, rancor and power-motives. H e finds that hier herrscht ein Ressentiment sondergleichen, das eines ungesättigten Instinktes und Machtwillens, der Herr werden möchte, nicht über etwas am Leben, sondern über das Leben selbst. 17

15

16

17

Ibid., 376-377. Cf. George J . Stack, "Nietzsche and The Laws of Manu," Sociology and Social Research (October, 1966), 94-106. KGW, VI 2, III, 11. " . . . here we find an unparalleled resentment, an insatiable power-drive that would dominate not only one aspect of life, but life itself."

78

The Problem of Christianity

Pursuing his analysis, he sees the ascetic type as using energy to b l o c k the flow o f energy, sees in this cunning human type an attempt to preserve existence b y means o f a clever defense mechanism: the asketische

Ideal.

M o v e d by a desire

to be elsewhere, b y a morbidity that nonetheless clings to life, the ascetic type is driven b y ambition and the pursuit o f power. H e r e , Nietzsche tells us, life wages war against life in the interest o f a kind o f life! O r , expressed in another way, the Wille zur Macht

turns against life and the human world in the interest

o f a "higher" ideal that lies above this world, in "the b e y o n d . " Morbid

introspection,

cultivated,

disciplined

suffering,

conspiratorial

preoccupations, a thirst for vengence, political cunning and the clever manipu­ lations o f the fears, doubts, insecurities and anxieties o f others comprise the expertise o f these artists in asceticism. Underlying a deceptive moralistic exterior there lies a strong Wille zur Macht.

Even though the presence o f such

types o f individuals as the asketische

is considered as a sign o f growing

decadence,

Priester

even "sickness," Nietzsche sees the emergence o f ascetic ideals,

ascetic habits o f mind o r ways o f acting as an indication that man has b e c o m e an "interesting animal." T h e ascetic ideal traditionally associated with a priestly caste has n o t disappeared in m o r e secular times. It survives in the unlikely forms o f the agnostics, the atheists, "immoralists," nihilists, skeptics and anti-Christians. W h o e v e r still believes in Wahrheit last Idealisten

der Erkenntnis

o r ' T r u t h ' reflects ascetic ideals. F o r , these

are n o t yet "free spirits" because they still cling

to a belief in ' T r u t h . ' T h e Christian crusaders, he tells us, encountered truly liberated, free spirits, the "order o f the assassins," the elite corps o f which had as their slogan: Nichts been abandoned

ist wahr,

alles ist erlaubt.

H e r e the belief in ' T r u t h ' has

and w e are in the presence o f authentic freien

Geister.

A l t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e seems here to be attempting é p a t e r les bourgeois

or

engaging in his penchant for literary swashbuckling, his intent is clear and serious. T h e slogan o f the assassins is n o t intended as a banner for immorality o r active nihilism. Rather, Nietzsche emphasizes the denial o f ' T r u t h ' as a maximal feeling o f freedom, as a liberation from the last vestige o f the ascetic ideal. B y implication, he is not looking at the assassins from the traditional Christian perspective, but is viewing them in a positive light. T h e rationale

for

doing so is n o t given here and, therefore, Nietzsche is often taken to mean that he is espousing a nihilistic standpoint. A s we shall see in the subsequent discussion o f this issue, Nietzsche was exposed to a m o r e constructive portrait o f the assassins than that which has b e c o m e accepted. I t is contended that the "absolute will to truth" is itself an unconscious belief in the asketische

Ideal.

T h e ascetic personality is said to need a belief in a

"metaphysical value," a belief in einen zur Wahrheit

Wert an sich der Wahrheit.

I f this Wille

is put in question, then "the G o d o f the ascetic ideal" that has

79

The Problem of Christianity

inspired the metaphysical impulse o f Western thought and is also present in science as the "metaphysical belief" in ' T r u t h ' will no longer reign and a new p r o b l e m will emerge: das vom Werte

der

Wahrheit.

W h a t N i e t z s c h e seems to suggest is that, on the one hand, the dissolution o f belief in Wahrheit-an-sich

is a good insofar as it is consonant with maximal

feelings o f liberation and " p o w e r " and insofar as it precludes the valuation o f a "true w o r l d " o r a metaphysische

Welt over this world. O n the other hand, he

fully realizes that the loss o f belief in ' T r u t h ' as absolute (= der Glaube Gott das asketische

Ideal)

is so revolutionary in its cultural, psychological and

social implications that a m o r e virulent form o f nihilism, the kind of Nihilismus

an den praktische

that has already been displayed in this century in so many different

forms, will follow in its wake. Although Nietzsche identifies and describes m a n y forms o f nihilism, in this context he is criticizing the asketische form o f Nihilismus Welt, the metaphysische

Ideal

(from his perspective) because it has created the Welt, Gott als Wahrheit

and the idea o f

as a wahre

Wahrheit-an-

sich - all o f which have entailed the condemnation o f this world o f time, change and becoming. In the wake o f the previous, deeply-rooted cultural belief in ' T r u t h ' and the ideal world, the loss o f this repository o f value, meaning, goodness and perfection will lead to the pervasive experience o f the loss o f meaning and value, the feeling that life and existence are Sinnlos:

hence,

the "advent o f nihilism" as practical negativity in culture and history.

Lange

and

Christianity

Although N i e t z s c h e has been vehemently criticized and lavishly praised for his relentless attack on Christian culture and morality, the nature o f his critique, as well as some o f the specific details within it, is not entirely original. Given that N i e t z s c h e studied Lange's major w o r k in a scrupulous way, it is interesting to note h o w m a n y o f the views and attitudes o f Lange and o f thinkers whose writings he cites are incorporated into Nietzsche's attack on Christentum. T h e neo-paganism that is found in Nietzsche's reflections was n o t b y any means unique to him. Aside from G o e t h e ' s neo-pagan sentiments, his anta­ gonism to the "shadow o f the C r o s s " that Nietzsche approved of, there was virtually a neo-pagan revival in nineteenth century G e r m a n y before N i e t z s c h e published his first major w o r k . Lange refers, in o n e context, to Strauss' essay Julian,

in which a tendency towards a new Hellenism in the nineteenth century

is heralded. Strauss avers that die freie, harmonische Menschlichkeit des Griechentums, die auf sich selbst ruhende Mannhaftigkeit des Römertums ist es, zu welcher wir aus der langen,

The Problem of Christianity

80

christlichen Mittelzeit und mit der geistigen und sittlichen Errungenschaft von dieser bereichert, uns wieder herauszuarbeiten im Begriffe sind. 18

Lange agrees with Strauss and is quite sympathetic with C z o l b e ' s antimetaphysical attack upon all forms o f "supersensuous", ideal worlds. H e , t o o , sees that G e r m a n y is turning b a c k to classical antiquity for inspiration in order to recover that Einheit

von

Geist

und Natur

which once again must be

approximated. T h e apotheosis o f Hellenic culture found in Hegel and H ö l d e r ­ lin is re-echoed b y a number o f G e r m a n thinkers in the nineteenth century. Given the span o f his intellectually productive life, Nietzsche may be said to be the last influential G e r m a n thinker w h o elevates neo-Hellenic ideals. C o m m e n t i n g on the world o f difference between the ancient, G r e c o R o m a n conception o f virtue and that o f Christianity, Lange indicates the following contrasts: Unrecht abwehren und Unrecht dulden, die Schönheit verehren und die Schönheit verachten, dem Gemeinwesen dienen und das Gemeinwesen fliehen.. T h e s e t w o orientations represent essentially different moral principles. T h e r e is n o doubt, Lange continues, that Christianity was viewed from the stand­ point o f ancient culture as distinctly "immoral" (unsittlich).

In a number o f

places, Lange remarks that the Christian religion "unhinged

the ancient

w o r l d " and thoroughly undermined its system o f values. In the course o f discussing the fall o f the R o m a n world, Lange refers with approval to the observations o f G i b b o n and L e c k y that the rise o f the "slave class" in ancient R o m e was linked with the spread o f Christianity, that this new religion was a revolution that overturned all existing attitudes, beliefs and institutions. T h e tendency towards a self-denying life is contrasted with the cheerfulness and natural sensuousness o f the R o m a n s . Renunciation and world-denial became the hallmarks o f the religion o f Christianity, die Religion und

20

der Sklaven.

der

Unterdrückten

M o s t o f Lange's discussion o f the nature o f primitive

Christianity owes its inspiration, as he admits, to the historical studies o f G i b b o n and L e c k y . M a n y o f Nietzsche's criticisms o f early Christianity and its origins would be familiar to any reader o f G i b b o n ' s Decline L e c k y ' s History

18

19

20

of European

Morals.

and Fall of the Roman

Empire

or

B o t h historians display an aristocratic

Lange, op. cit., II, 556. "The free, harmonious humanity of Hellenism, the self-supporting manliness of ancient Rome, is the goal towards which we are about to struggle from out of the Christian interval, enriched with the spiritual and moral gains derived from it." The same passage from Julian is quoted in the first edition. GdM, 316. Ibid., 908. "To repel wrong and to suffer wrong, to revere beauty and to despise beauty, to serve society and to flee society." Ibid., I, 155. "The religion of the oppressed and the slave."

81

The Problem of Christianity

disdain for the early Christians and b o t h emphasize the beginnings o f C h r i s t ­ ianity as a kind o f slave-revolt against the nobility, wealth and p o w e r o f the R o m a n s . G i b b o n , in particular, offers an ironic, not to say sardonic, account o f the way in w h i c h a fanatical cult overthrew the might o f R o m e . H e , and Lange after him, quotes with obvious agreement T a c i t u s ' judgment that the early Christians displayed a "hatred against m a n k i n d " (Hasses Menschheit).

Edward

gegen

die

G i b b o n treats the early Christians virtually in the

m a n n e r o f the m o s t critical ancient historians. H e finds the R o m a n soil out o f w h i c h Christianity arose a mixture o f error and corruption, the o u t c o m e o f years o f ruling and residing with "degenerate" peoples. T h e primitive C h r i s t ­ ians are characterized as "inflexible," intolerant zealots w h o s e "unsocial m a n n e r s " s h o c k e d the R o m a n nobility. T h e doctrine o f the immortality o f the soul was adopted b y the Christians from other religions and was promulgated b y an "established priesthood" that used it as an "instrument o f ambition." W h a t G i b b o n calls the "revolution o f seventeen centuries" began with a " c o n d e m n a t i o n o f the wisest and m o s t virtuous pagans" and a hostility towards the privileged nobility that was expressed as "resentment and spiritual pride." G i b b o n quotes Tertullian's exultation at the thought o f the punish­ m e n t that awaits the pagan philosophers, poets, scholars, tragedians, etc. H e points t o the offensiveness o f such sentiments and forebears any

further

reference t o Tertullian's "infernal description." G i b b o n deplores n o t o n l y the bitterness and resentment o f the primitive Christians, but laments the influ­ ence o f their "degenerate successors." H e laments the attacks o n knowledge, learning, reason and the arts that have issued from so many Christians. W i t h his typical sarcasm, he asserts that " T h e virtue o f the primitive C h r i s t i a n s . . . was very frequently guarded b y poverty and ignorance." G i b b o n stresses the pretense t o virtue that disguised the desire for position and authority o f the "ecclesiastical governors." H e is amazed at h o w easily "active prelates" managed to c o m b i n e "the arts o f the m o s t ambitious statesman" with the show o f Christian virtue. After referring to the R o m a n thinkers and writers w h o "exalt the dignity o f human nature," G i b b o n calls attention to the " g l o o m y and austere aspect" o f the Christian, to the "sect o f m e n w h o , " according to Suetonius, "had embraced a new and criminal superstition."

21

21

Again and again,

Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, New York, n. d., I, 382-458. Lange refers to Lecky's History of European Morals (London, 1869, I, 271) and says that "Lecky shows quite rightly... how the Roman virtue, so intimately fused with the local patriotism of the early Romans and the native religion, must inevitably perish through the destruction of the old political forms, and the rise o f . . . foreign cults." In another place, Lange attributes the following remarks to W. H. Lecky (op. cit., II, 66 f): "Slavery no longer reacted... upon the civilization of the ancient world by means of the dread of great servile wars, but did s o . . . by the influence which the subject class more and more exercised on the

82

The Problem of Christianity

G i b b o n , under the mantle o f impartiality, characterizes the primitive C h r i s t ­ ians as unsavory, as resentful, bitter, fanatical and desperate. B o t h the tone, style and c o n t e n t o f G i b b o n ' s history o f the rise o f Christianity are reminis­ cent o f m a n y passages in Der Antichrist.

Even without consulting G i b b o n ' s

history, o n e m a y find o n Lange's pages c o m p a c t summaries o f his views of, and attitude toward, Christianity. N o t o n l y does Lange reflect and cite the critical histories o f the origin o f Christianity found in the w o r k s o f L e c k y and G i b b o n , but he makes insightful observations o f his o w n that m a y be compared to notions that are closely identified with N i e t z s c h e ' s understanding o f Christianity and its effects upon certain aspects o f W e s t e r n culture. Aside from a critical to unsympathetic representation o f the primitive Christians, Lange shares with N i e t z s c h e the following related views: (1) that the influence o f a priestly class, a sacerdotal hierarchy, has a detrimental effect o n h u m a n culture and society, (2) that Christianity indirectly contributed t o the development o f a scientific understanding o f the world and the discipline o f scientific inquiry, and (3) that socialism and c o m m u n i s m are motivated b y the same impulse that supposedly motivated the early Christians: revenge. T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f the paradoxical evolution o f scientific orientations out o f the Christian tradition that is considered one o f the hallmarks o f N i e t z s c h e ' s intuitive genius is specifically stated b y L a n g e . It is said that the

"self-

abnegation and determination" that characterizes the w o r k o f C o p e r n i c u s , G i l b e r t , H a r v e y , K e p l e r and Vesalius seem to b e "moral in their nature."

whole modes of thought of the population. This influence, one diametrically opposed to the ancient ideals, became especially marked with the spread of Christianity." Cited in Lange, GdM, I, 215 n. The extreme attitudes of self and world-renunciation in the first centuries of the development of Christianity are critically discussed by W. H. Lecky in his History of European Morals, II, 107 ff. Nietzsche makes three references to Lecky in his Nachlass. One is a textual note and the other two are critical comments. He calls Lecky "dense and unscientific." Cf. KGW, V 2, 371; VII 1, 248, 266. The history cited by Lange is not in Nietzsche's Bibliothek, even though he did have a few of Lecky's other works. In the same context as the above, Lange quotes a passage from Tacitus' Annals (XV, 44) that is also cited by Gibbon. Referring to Nero's punishment of Christians for the burning of Rome, Tacitus describes Christianity as "a most mischievous superstition" which originated in Judaea and emerged in Rome, "where all things hideous and shameful from every part of the world find their center and become popular." Tacitus reports that "an arrest was made of all who pleaded guilty; then, upon their information, an immense multitude was convicted, not so much of the crime of firing the city, as of hatred of mankind." Cf. Lange, op. cit., I, 217-218 n. In his notes Nietzsche specifically refers to Tacitus' charge that the early Christians displayed an "odio generis humani" des Hasses gegen die Menschheit." Concerning this judgment, Nietzsche declares: "Das ist wahr!" KGW, V 1, 604. Nietzsche makes numerous references to Tacitus in his writings. He refers to Gibbon twice in the Nachlass and paraphrases him in Von Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben. KGW, III 1, 321. The favorable Nachlass references are: KGW, III 4, 301; KGW, V 2, 434.

83

The Problem of Christianity

Lange finds ein Analogie... tums und dem Verfahren

zwischen der Forscher.

den sittlichen

Prinzipien

des

Christen­

Furthermore, intellectual progress and

moral progress are said to have the same origin: an absorption in the object o f concern, a loving comprehension o f the entire phenomenal world and the natural tendency to shape this world harmoniously.

22

T h e absorption o f

"Christian ideas" in Western civilization has led, indirectly, to Fortschritt,

intellektuellen

as well as to the self-discipline needed for scientific investigation.

T h e explanation o f this historical phenomenon is directly compared b y Lange to a Hegelian process and it is said that Solche Metamorphosen einer Idee sind in der Kulturgeschichte nichts Seltenes . . . die Nachwirkung eines großen Gedankens [nimmt] sehr häufig durch eine verän­ derte Kombination mit andern Elementen der Zeit eine fast entgegengesetzte Richtung an. 23

T h e r e is little doubt that this insight is the germ o f Nietzsche's appeal to the obviously Hegelian notion o f Selbstaufhebung

with the difference o f an

emphasis on it as a law o f life that, presumably, is manifested in history as well. A s far as the criticism o f the Christian morality as an expression o f resentment is concerned, N i e t z s c h e need not (as has been said) rely upon H e i n e ' s negative portrait o f the " N a z a r e n e " type. H e can find precisely the same attitudes in the "treasure-house" that he read so carefully. T h u s , for example, Lange remarks that amongst many recent criticisms o f Christian traditions one specifically characterizes the morality expressed in them as 24

reflecting "the envy and hatred o f the p o o r against the rich." Aside from the fact that Lange's summary o f Strauss' Der Alte und der Neue

Glaube

calls

attention to his belief that "we Europeans" are no longer Christian, that Christianity is antagonistic to civilization and culture, it is in U e b e r w e g ' s letters to Lange that we find very direct analogies between his attitude towards Christian faith and that o f Nietzsche. U e b e r w e g criticizes Christianity because it encourages envy o f the privileged, "vengence b e y o n d the grave," "earthly resignation" and "the sacrifice o f independence." A s N i e t z s c h e does later, he particularly abhors the influence o f Paul on the Christian teachings. T h e essence o f these teachings is that

22

23

24

Lange, op. cit., II, 907-908. " . . . an analogy may be established between the moral principles of Christianity and scientific procedure..." Ibid., II, 930. "Such metamorphoses of an idea are not uncommon in cultural history... a great thought very frequently assumes an almost diametrically opposite tendency through a fresh combination with other elements of the age." Ibid., II, 959. "...das Christentum als eine Religion des Neides und des Hasses der Armen gegen die Besitzenden bezeichnet."

84

The Problem of Christianity

das Elend getragen und im Opiumrausch der Vorstellungen von der Seligkeit des Messiasreichs oder überhaupt des Jenseits vergessen [wird] Paulus... bei ihm schlug das jämmerliche Bettelprinzip des Christentums nach innen, wo es fast noch verderblicher wirkte: die Gnade Gottes trat an die Stelle selbstbewußter ethischer Tat, das Offenbarungsprinzip an die Stelle der Forschungsarbeit. Zur ersten Zähmung von Barbaren mochte der geistige Opiumrausch gut sein; jetzt wirkt er lähmend und deprimierend fort. 25

E v e n though Lange charges that Strauss' social, political and ethical views are superficial and reminiscent o f older forms o f Philisterlebens

(compare

N i e t z s c h e ' s remark about the embodiment o f Philister-Kultur

Deutschland

in

in the writings o f Strauss), he seems to agree with him in the rejection o f selfmortification, fanatical asceticism, the contempt o f the world and features o f Christianity.

26

other

I f w e synthesize all o f the criticisms o f Christian

morality and practice that Lange presents or discusses, as well as his insight i n t o the transformation o f religious attitudes and values into the scientific o u t l o o k and discipline, we clearly see a foreshadowing o f Nietzsche's elabora­ tions on the same themes. T w o other major themes that crop up in Nietzsche's polemical writings are the negative nature of, and negative consequences of, a priestly hierarchy and the linking o f Christianity with c o m m u n i s m and socialism. As we might expect, b o t h o f these themes are also found in Lange's rich w o r k . It is contended that the social sciences reveal the tendency o f ecclesiastical groups t o c o m e t o terms with the material interests o f their time and thereby gain a great deal o f social control. T h e following condemnation o f priestly classes includes t w o anticipations o f Nietzschean opinions: ein mächtiges und herrschsüchtiges Kirchentum [dient] stets d a z u . . . die Völker wirtschaftlich, intellektuell und moralisch zu hemmen... Glaube und Unglaube [macht] im Verhalten der Menschen im großen ganzen und soweit es äußerlich in auffallenden Handlungen zutage tritt, keinen irgendmerkbaren Unterschied.. . 27

If w e search Lange's writings for an indication o f the motivational drive that underlies the ecclesiastical type, we will find that it is, as Nietzsche will later

25

26

27

Ibid., II, 970. " . . . misery is to be endured and forgotten in the opium-intoxication of ideas of the blessedness of the Messiah's kingdom or of life beyond this. P a u l . . . with him the pitiable begging principle of Christianity struck inwards, where its effects were almost more mischiev­ ous; the grace of God replaced self-conscious ethical action, the principle of revelation took the place of the labor of inquiry. For the first subjugation of barbarians the spiritual opiumintoxication might be useful; now its effects are crippling and depressing." Ibid., II, 976. For an interesting discussion of the similarity between Lange's and Nietzsche's criticisms of David Strauss see: Jörg Salaquarda's "Der Standpunkt des Ideals bei Lange und Nietzsche," Studi Tedeschi, X X I I , 1 (1979), 148-152. Ibid., II, 930. " . . . a powerful and ambitious ecclesiasticism serves to hamper a people economically, intellectually and morally... belief and unbelief make no discernible difference in the conduct of men on the whole and so far as it is externally observable in obvious actions."

The Problem of Christianity say, "love o f p o w e r " (Herrschsucht)

o r Wille

zur Macht.

85 Even the hostility

towards ecclesiastical groupings that N i e t z s c h e expresses is matched already b y Lange. Calling for a "battle for emancipation," he urges that it be directed against those social organizations which threaten liberty and hinder truth and justice. T h e usually c o o l Lange b e c o m e s passionate in his denunciation o f the institutions that support Kirchengesellschaften. den

Einfluß

H e attacks their

depravieren-

and urges thrusts

gegen die unterjochende Gewalt einer perfiden, die Freiheit der Völker sys­ tematisch untergrabenden Hierarchie. Werden diese Einrichtungen beseitigt, wird der Terrorismus der Hierarchie gebrochen, so können die extremsten Meinungen sich nebeneinander bewegen, ohne daß fanatische Übergriffe entstehen, und ohne daß stetige Fortschritt der Einsicht gehemmt wird. 28

Repeatedly, L a n g e advises the deprivation o f the worldly p o w e r o f sacerdotal hierarchies and suggests that if this "spiritual t y r a n n y " is b r o k e n , then it might be possible t o usher in a n e w 'religion' that will be positive, affirmative, that will elevate life and provide a reconciliation between science and imagination. O n e o f N i e t z s c h e ' s persuasive arguments is that socialism and c o m m u n i s m represent secularized versions o f Christian sentiments, that their emergence in m o d e r n times is attributable to the centuries o f preaching a doctrine o f universal equality and t o the transformation o f Christian values into secular humanism. It is surprising, o n c e again, to see that Lange's commentaries and assertions express the same views. It is said that August C o m t e ' s moral thought is clearly Christian in origin and that F r e n c h and English c o m m u n i s m is pervaded b y Christian, religious impulses. passage from J o h n Stuart M i l l ' s On Liberty

29

In another place, he cites a long

in which it is held that the decline

in religious belief does not entail the dissolution o f religious impulses o r ideas. L a n g e agrees that the social revolutions o f his time in favor o f "the masses" are intimately c o n n e c t e d to the N e w T e s t a m e n t even though they are opposed to Christianity per

se. H e specifically refers to this fusion o f religious and

c o m m u n i s t i c ideas in the left-wing o f the reformation m o v e m e n t o f the sixteenth c e n t u r y .

28

29

30

30

Ibid., II, 999. "...against the enslaving power of a perfidious hierarchy that systematically undermines the freedom of the people. If these institutions are removed, if the terrorism of the hierarchy is broken, then the most extreme opinions may move side by side without fanatical encroachment, without the steady progress of insights being hindered." Cp. Lange, GdM, 553-554. Ibid., II, 930. This, of course, is a familiar theme of Nietzsche's. In Morgenröte, he avers that "August Comte . . . hat mit seiner... Moralformel vivre pour autrui in der Tat das Christentum überchristlicht." KGW, V 1, M, 132. Throughout Der Antichrist the relation between Christ­ ianity and socialism is stridently expressed. KGW, VI 3, Der Antichrist. Cf also: Der Wille zur Macht, Leipzig, 1901, 430. KGW, VIII 3, 12. Ibid., II, 929.

The Problem of Christianity

86

C o m m e n t i n g on a remark in Mill's August

Comte

and Positivism,

Lange

points to the survival o f a predilection for a hierarchical guidance o f the people in C o m t e ' s "cult o f humanity." Despite his animadversions about priestly castes, Lange raises a question that could be put in Nietzsche's Zur der Moral

Genealogie

without any conceptual dissonance at all.

Sind nicht die psychologischen Gesetze, welche jede Hierarchie, jedes über den Stand des Volkes emporgehobene Priestertum herrschsüchtig machen und die Eifersucht auf Erhaltung der Autorität in ihm wecken, unbänderlich in der menschlichen Natur begründet und unabhängig vom Inhalte des Glaubens? 31

In a n u m b e r o f places, Lange speculates about the drive for dominance in man (in the form o f the pursuit o f wealth or political p o w e r ) ; but he finds this desire in its m o s t insidious form in the sacerdotal hierarchies he excoriates. T h e most severe criticism o f the cunning o f priesthoods is expressed in the context o f a discussion o f H a m m e r ' s The History

of the

Assassins.

It will be remembered that Nietzsche had called the leaders o f the " O r d e r o f Assassins" authentic "free spirits" and had referred to their infamous m o t t o : " N o t h i n g is true; everything is permitted!" This dramatic saying, sometimes used b y critics o f Nietzsche as evidence o f his nihilism, is also found in Also sprach

Zarathustra.

Zarathustra's "shadow" complains to him that he has

wandered everywhere and longs for a " h o m e , " laments his restlessness and his transcendence o f all prohibitons. Der Schatten

says:

,Nichts ist wahr, alles ist erlaubt' so sprach ich mir zu. In die kältesten Wasser stürzte ich mich, mit Kopf und Herzen. 32

W h a t should be noticed here is that Zarathustra's shadow

tells us that it told

itself that " N o t h i n g is true, everything is permitted." T h i s complete nihilism is something that is in the past for Zarathustra's shadow; therefore, the implica­ tion is that this is a fortiori

the case for Nietzsche himself. Bearing this in

mind, we must l o o k closely at what Lange says about the " O r d e r o f Assassins" and see h o w H a m m e r understood this notorious, esoteric order. Lange reports that the assassins are typically portrayed as murderers w h o are alleged to have had a secret doctrine o f complete atheism, following out to its logical conclusion an egoism that seeks only to gratify its desire o f pleasure and its "lust o f p o w e r " (herrschsüchtige).

I f this traditional portrayal o f the

assassins were accurate, Lange remarks, they would represent a model o f the

31

32

Ibid., II, 949. "Are not the psychological laws which make every hierarchy, every priesthood, that is elevated above the people, ambitious of power, and that awake in it jealousy of the maintenance of its authority, immutably grounded in human nature and independent of the context of the faith?" KGW, VI 1, AsZ, IV, "Der Schatten." " 'Nothing is true, everything is permitted': thus I told myself. I plunged into the coldest water, with head and heart."

87

The Problem of Christianity

materialists such as the ignorant, fanatical partisans like to imagine them. I f the legends about the order o f assassins were true, they would be the sole historical example o f a synthesis o f materialistic philosophy and "cruelty, lust o f power, and systematic c r i m e . " Aside from the fact that this passing remark is given n o special significance by Lange, Nietzsche obviously descried here the first primitive sign o f what was to b e c o m e his conception o f a psychologi­ cal Wille zur Macht,

specifically in its most naked and brutal form. In our

tracing o f the roots o f Nietzsche's central idea, der Wille zur Macht,

we shall

see that this particular reference to a "lust o f p o w e r " is only one o f a n u m b e r o f similar observations that first appear in the Geschichte

des

Materialismus.

Although N i e t z s c h e may have "discovered" evidence o f a "will to p o w e r " in man in his o w n life-experiences, he also was influenced b y Lange's previous discovery o f precisely the same phenomenon. Lange, under the influence o f H a m m e r ' s historical study, sees the assassins as a religious

order that m a y have been misrepresented b y Christian authors.

T h a t the assassins engaged in extreme "free thinking" is n o t in question. H o w e v e r , they are considered b y H a m m e r (and Lange) as an Islamic sect that was similar to the Jesuits. Lange assumes that "malicious misrepresentation" characterizes later Christian accounts o f this sect. H e admits, however, that we cannot underestimate the "psychological subtlety o f the mixture o f genuine religious emotions with coarse selfishness and vicious habits." H e cites with approval H a m m e r ' s analogous psychological explanation o f the assassins: Unter allen Leidenschaften, welche je Zungen, Federn und Schwerter in Bewegung gesetzt, den Thron umgestürzt und den Altar erschüttert haben, ist Herrschsucht die erste und die mächtigste. Verbrechen sind ihr willkommen als Mittel, Tugen­ den, als Larve. Nichts ist ihr heilig, und dennoch flüchtet sie sich am liebsten, weil am sichersten, zu dem Heiligsten der Menschheit, zur Religion. Daher die Ge­ schichte der Religionen nirgends stürmischer und blutiger, als wo die Tiare mit dem Diadem vereint demselben größere Macht erteilte als von demselben empfing. 33

H a m m e r compares the role and function o f the assassins to that o f the Jesuits w h o , it is said, retained power over the faithful b y means o f a "genuine fanaticism." T h e suggestion is made that the assassins were extremely ambiti­ ous individuals w h o dissimulated and wore the mantle o f religion in order to

33

Lange, op. cit., 221 n. Lange quotes the following passage from Hammer's Geschichte der Assassinen, Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1818. "Of all the passions that have ever called into action the tongue, the pen or the sword, which have overturned the throne and shaken the altar to its foundation, ambition is the first and the strongest. It uses crime as a means and virtue as a mask. It respects nothing sacred, and yet has recourse to what is most beloved, because it is the most secure, that held most sacred by man - religion. The history of religion is never more tempetous and sanguinary than when the tiara, united with the diadem, imparts and receives an increased power." In the first edition of his work Lange refers to the assassins without citing Hammer's work. Cp, Lange, GdM, 82-83.

The Problem of Christianity

88

disguise their egoism and selfishness. T h i s brief analysis o f the 'secret' o f the assassins

is a c o m p l e x , prismatic

Nietzsche's

thought:

the primal

reflection

of a number

o f themes

in

in man,

the

nature o f the power-drive

ambitious striving for p o w e r on the part o f "religious" individuals, the free thinking o f nihilists w h o deny truth and recognize n o moral restraints o r restrictions, the role o f pretense o r "acting" in human life as a means o f attaining

basic goals and

the dangers

o f a Wille

transformed, sublimated o r "spiritualized." time,

34

zur

Macht

that

is n o t

T h e r e is little doubt that, at one

N i e t z s c h e theoretically, empathetically and imaginatively identified with

the nihilism o f the assassins, immersing himself, "head and heart", in their i c e cold

water.

Selbstaufhebung

This

is

the

in Existenz.

long,

dark

'shadow'

that

must

undergo

a

E v e n though the assassins "live dangerously" and

have an " h e r o i c w i l l , " they lack A p o l l o n i a n order and restraint, lack c o n t r o l o f their passions, lack a creative channeling o f powerful energies and lack the " m o d e r a t i o n " required o f the I n Zur Genealogie

der Moral

Übermensch. N i e t z s c h e contrasts the perilous reflections o f

the assassins (as he imagines them) with those o f the "Christian freethinker" (christlicher

Freigeist)

w h o has never followed out the consequences o f the

slogan o f the assassins and has never "experienced the labyrinthine c o n s e ­ q u e n c e s " o f such a slogan o r faced "the M i n o t a u r living in this m a z e . " N i e t z s c h e seems t o mean here is that the soi-disant

34

35

35

What

"free thinkers" o f his time

In Also sprach Zarathustra, the "wisest men" are told that "their will and values are placed on the Fluß des Werdens, that "it is not the river that is your danger . . . it is . . . the will to power" itself. Nicht der Fluß ist eure Gefahr ... sondern ...der Wille zur Macht..." KGW, VI 1, AsZ, II, "Von der Selbst-Überwindung." In "Von der Erhabenen", Zarathustra asks the Gewaltiger or the "powerful men" to let goodness be the ultimate Selbst-Überwältigung. "Alles Böse traue ich dir zu: darum will ich von dir das Gute." Although Nietzsche agrees with the assassins that there is no ultimate 'Truth,' and although he admires their boldness and daring in thought, and agrees with their belief that "everything is permitted" in the sense that there is no moral worldorder that restrains human action, he is not sympathetic with their nihilism in praxis. They have not learned to overcome or sublimate their "heroic wills," their passion for pleasure and their reckless, violent pursuit of power. The "lust of power" or Herrschsucht of the assassins (or, for that matter, their twentieth century counterparts) is not a good for Nietzsche because it has not been transfigured or "spiritualized," because it is gross and lacks beauty, because it is devoid of "creative" (schöpferische) good, because its strömende Leidenschaft [ist] nicht stille geworden in der Schönheit ( " . . . gushing passion has not yet become still in beauty."). The psychologically strong, well-integrated, physically healthy Übermensch will be able to live without 'Truth', without the consolation of certitude, unspoiled by negative "moralic acid," able to endure terrible truths, capable of thinking the "most extreme form of nihilism" while fully affirming life. But the "overman" is not encouraged to engage in a nihilism of action, to express petty passions, vengefulness, resentful hostility, or cruelty and violence. The Übermensch is depicted as one who restrains, controls, channels and creatively expresses the powerful energy of "the lust of power." Because the assassins lack such capacities, they cannot be admitted to the disciplined school of Übermenschlichkeit. KGW, VI 2. GM, III, 24.

89

The Problem of Christianity

are still in the shadow o f Christianity and therefore can be characterized b y the o x y m o r o n i c phrase, "Christian freethinkers." T h e y have never experienced, as he had, the dreadful feeling o f being lost in a labyrinth from which there seems to be n o exit, n o escape. N o r have they experienced the existential terror o f facing the Minotaur o f nihilism. Unless the full consequences o f nihilism are understood and experienced, the Ü b e r w i n d u n g des Nihilismus

will not really

be possible. W i t h o u t detracting from Nietzsche's creativity and boldness, the above discussion clearly indicates that many o f the specific themes in his massive attack upon Christentum

were found in the writings o f Lange. It is surprising

to see h o w Lange, L e c k y , G i b b o n , H a m m e r , Ueberweg and others laid out the problem o f Christianity in such a way that Nietzsche could, b y means o f synthesis and creative elaboration, build his critical analysis o f Christian culture and values in accordance with specifications already provided.

CHAPTER V MATERIO-IDEALISM Nietzsche's writings are kaleidoscopic: when examined carefully from different angles the patterns shift. T h e y are m o r e complex than the ordinary kaleidoscope because the elements comprising the images also shift from time to time. T h e shifting patterns o f meaning are difficult to grasp in large part because we do not have the code index b y which to interpret what we see. Q u e s t i o n s that

can be answered

fairly easily when

dealing with

other

philosophers b e c o m e puzzling when trying to understand Nietzsche. I f we ask, for example, what is reality for Nietzsche? there are many answers that can be given. It is " b e c o m i n g " o r it is "Wille zur Macht" o f Machtquanta.

o r it is a multiplicity

Actuality is also characterized as a dynamic system o f

interacting relations o f Kraftzentren.

A n d the "world" we k n o w is depicted as

a systematic falsification, an interrelated system o f "errors" without which life would n o t be possible. Nietzsche has been called a naturalist, a nihilist, a materialist and a subjectivist. H e has been said to defend an ontology o f 1

p o w e r , a "flux o n t o l o g y " o f power. T h e most universally accepted interpreta­ tion o f Nietzsche's so-called "metaphysics" is that he identifies Wirklichkeit Wille

zur Macht.

as

W h a t led him to the conception o f a universal "will to

p o w e r " pervading all entities? W h a t is the theoretical background for his understanding o f nature in man and man in nature? Perhaps Lange's analyses o f the question o f the nature o f Wirklichkeit,

as well as his theory o f materio-

idealism, may help us answer these questions. A m o n g the numerous themes one can find in Lange's critical history, there is one that is dealt with quite extensively. Lange, in a number o f places, illustrates the paradoxes to which a strict materialism leads. H e maintains that the ancient atomists were unable to offer a plausible explanation o f the process b y which the atomic elements out o f which the body is presumed to be c o m p o s e d produce what we experience as sensation or psychic states. In subsequent discussions o f mechanistic treatments o f sensory and psychic experience it is shown (by a number o f authors) that the transformation o f

1

Ruediger H.Grimm, Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge, Berlin and New York, 1977, 45.

91

Materio-Idealism

physiological states o f the brain into what we experience as "consciousness" cannot be adequately explained. It is remarkable, in reading Lange's detailed discussions o f a number o f mechanistic materialistic interpretations o f human experience, h o w closely they parallel contemporary materialistic theories o r the "identity thesis." T o be sure, the language of the defenders o f such theories is not as sophisticated as that o f J . J . C . Smart, Armstrong o r others; but the arguments are, mutatis

mutandis,

the same. While today we have philosophers

in Australia, England and the United States appealing to data in physiology to support reductive materialism, in the latter part o f the nineteenth century we find m a n y physiologists, physicists and natural scientists admitting that the discoveries in their fields, although tending towards materialism, do n o t provide justification for a strict materialistic account o f human experience. Physiological theories may show the dependence o f mind on physiological changes in the brain, they say, but they do not explain

the origin, derivation o r

activity o f human consciousness. As w e shall see, the m o o d o f the nineteenth century scientists is distinctly one o f agnosticism. T h e i r m o t t o is:

ignorabimus.

A l m o s t b y osmosis N i e t z s c h e will absorb this agnostic tendency o f thought. It will, in conjunction with a Kantian agnosticism, pervade his thinking. In the same year in which he will discover Lange, Nietzsche gives us a revealing insight into his youthful impression o f nature. During one of his solitary walks he found himself caught in a storm. H e sought sanctuary in a hut on a hilltop and watched the storm. Das Gewitter, entlud sich höchst gewaltig mit Sturm und Hagel, ich empfand einen unvergleichlichen Aufschwung, und ich erkannte recht, wie wir erst dann die Natur recht verstehen, wenn wir zu ihr aus unsern Sorgen und Bedrängnissen heraus flüchten müssen. Was war mir der Mensch und sein unruhiges Wollen! Was war mir das ewige „Du sollst", „Du sollst nicht"! Wie anders der Blitz, der Sturm, der Hagel, freie Mächte, ohne Ethik! Wie glücklich, wie kräftig sind sie, reiner Wille, ohne Trübungen durch den Intellekt! 2

This condensed, symbolic, e m b r y o n i c expression o f his later thought is a romantic vision that will be subdued later in 1866 by the cold water o f Lange's analyses. Even as Die Geburt

der Tragödie

is being published, Nietzsche is

turning away from the conception o f an Ur-Wille

that, in the manner o f

Schopenhauer, acts through all things. T h e romantic Artisten-Metaphysik

of

this seminal w o r k was already being put behind him. Nietzsche's skepticism

2

KGW, Nietzsche Briefwechsel, I 2 , 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 . An Carl von Gersdorff, 7 April, 1866. "The storm broke with immense force, with wind and hail. I felt an incomparable elation, and I knew with certainty that we can only understand nature rightly when we have to run to her, away from our troubles and pressures. What was man and his unquiet will to me! What were the eternal "Thou shalt," "Thou shalt not!" How different the lightning, the wind, the hail: free powers without ethics! How fortunate, how strong they are, pure will, unclouded by intellect!"

92

Materio-Idealism

goes into full gear in 1873 (a time at which, he says in one o f his prefaces, he "didn't believe in a blessed thing") and is apparent in Ueber Lüge

im außermoralischen

Wahrheit

und

Sinn. In this unpublished essay there are signs that

the agnosticism encountered in Lange's Geschichte

des Materialismus

has taken

root. O n e o f Lange's general arguments was that the Kantian theory o f k n o w ­ ledge that restricted knowledge to phenomena alone was being confirmed b y numerous scientists in the nineteenth century. This neo-Kantian standpoint was supported b y the elusiveness o f the ultimate constituents o f the natural world in then current physical theory and b y the physiological theories that emphasized the subjective nature o f our sensations and our perception o f sensory qualities. In Die Geburt

der Tragödie

Nietzsche n o t only defended a

form o f Schopenhauerian metaphysics, but he also expressed a Kantian notion that the empirical world structured in terms o f space, time and causality is a realm o f phenomena and not true reality. J u s t as Schopenhauer had claimed to have discovered the secret identity o f the Ding-an-sich

to be a pervasive,

irrational "will," so, t o o , does Nietzsche, in his first major w o r k , claim to have discovered a powerful "primal will" that is manifested through p h e n o m e ­ na. A l m o s t at the same time at which Die Geburt

der Tragödie

was published,

however, Nietzsche's skepticism and agnosticism undermined

metaphysical

claims to truth. In the third o f his Thoughts

Out of Season,

Schopenhauer

als

Erzieher,

N i e t z s c h e sympathizes with the feeling o f Heinrich von Kleist that Kant's philosophy leads to Skeptizismus entscheiden,

und Relativismus,

ob das, das wir Wahrheit

nennen,

wahrhaft

that „Wir können Wahrheit

nicht

ist, oder

ob

3

es uns nur so scheint. T h e study o f Lange served to reinforce Kant's skeptical conclusions. F o r , the sciences that were supposed to give us certainty and objectivity find themselves driven to an even deeper skepticism than that entailed by Kant's Kritik

der reinen

Vernunft.

E v e n though Lange insisted that Die letzte sinnliche

Wahrnehmung,

4

Basis aller

Erkenntnis

ist die

he also saw that analyses o f physiology clearly

indicated that our sensory modalities are limited, selective and responsive only to a relatively limited range o f stimuli. Lange maintained that we are m o r e deceived by the hypostasizing tendencies o f our thinking, as well as b y the universalizing character o f language, than by our senses. H o w e v e r , our senses themselves do not, in a strict sense, give us direct knowledge o f external entities o r processes. In effect, the scientific analysis o f sensory experience

3

4

KGW, II 1, UB, III, 3. " . . . skepticism and relativism... 'We cannot decide whether what we call truth is really truth, or if it only appears so to us.'" Lange, op. cit., I, 85. "The ultimate basis of knowledge is sensory perception."

93

Materio-Idealism

eventually leads, paradoxically, to the conclusion to which idealism led: die Welt ist meine daran

gewöhnt

Vorstellung. haben,

A s Lange puts it, [daß] die Naturforscher

daß uns die Sinne

nur eine

„Welt

als

[sich]

Vorstellung"

5

g e b e n . T h e advances in the study o f physiology in the nineteenth century have shown that the quality o f our sensory perceptions is conditioned by our sense organs o r sensory modalities and that o u r experience o f the external world is like an island in a sea o f sensory possibilities. Lange sees such views as 6

confirming Protagoras' belief that "man is the measure o f all things." Precisely the t w o positions defended b y Lange find their w a y into Nietzsche's thought. F o r , on the one hand, he insists often enough that the senses are m o r e trustworthy than "reason" (Vernunft)

and, on the other hand, he realizes that

our senses involve us in a realm o f appearances that has meaning, validity and value for us. Despite the fact that Nietzsche frequently claims that our senses are our m o s t reliable guides, that they bring us closer to the truth o f things than abstract reasoning, he accepts the notion that, from another standpoint, the sensorium

o f man does not yield an objective actuality. If, in addition, one

follows Lange and proclaims that the categories o f thought have their origin in o u r senses, then one can understand h o w Nietzsche reached his early epistemic agnosticism. I f we add to this M o l e s c h o t t ' s remark that the "knowledge" o f the spider (die Spinne),

its awareness o f the effects o f the external world, must 7

be quite different from that o f man, we have the background for Nietzsche's dramatic assertion in Morgenröte

that

Die Gewohnheiten unserer Sinne haben uns in Lug und Trug der Empfindung eingesponnen: diese wieder sind die Grundlagen aller unserer Urteile und „Erkenntnisse" - es gibt durchaus kein Entrinnen, keine Schlupf- und Schleichwege in die wirkliche Welt! Wir sind in unserem Netze, wir Spinnen, und was wir auch darin fangen... als was sich eben in unserem Netze fangen läßt. 8

It is from this perspective that man seeks to "measure

the world." N e i t h e r our

senses, n o r o u r reason, n o r our intuition, n o r our imagination give us incontrovertible access to the world o f actuality. Within the context o f the physiology o f the senses, there are m o r e specific theoretical reasons w h y our identification o f our sensations and our perceptual

5

Ibid., I, 434 n. " . . . even the scientists have accustomed themselves to see that the senses give us only a 'world as representation'."

6

Ibid., II, 456. Ibid., II, 547.

7

8

KGW, V 1, M, II, 117. "The habits of our senses have wrapped us in a tissue of lies and deceptions of sensations; these, in their turn, are the basis of all our judgments and our 'knowledge' - there is no means of escape, no crooked path or exit into the real world! We are like spiders in our webs . . . whatever we may catch in them will be something that our webs are able to catch!" Cp. Lange, GdM, 306.

Materio-Idealism

94

judgments remove us further from actuality. Although Lange discusses quite a n u m b e r o f physiological theories, it is H e l m h o l t z ' s theory that seems to have made an impact on Nietzsche's thinking, especially at the time he wrote his brief essay, Ueber

Wahrheit

und Lüge

im außermoralischen

Sinn. H e l m h o l t z

averred that the phenomena we are aware o f through perception are "mere effects o f o b j e c t s " that are unknown to us but act upon our senses. T h e notion that sensation and perception give us an accurate 'picture' o f an external object (such as we find, for example, in Lenin's belief that sensory experience is a 9

"reflection o f being" o r an "ideally exact" reflection o f external objects) is repudiated by H e l m h o l t z . In fact, Lange claims, the belief in "material things" is undermined precisely b y an analysis o f physiology. H e summarizes H e l ­ m h o l t z ' s theory in the following w a y : die Farben, Klänge, Gerüche usw. nicht den Dingen an sich zukommen, son­ dern . . . eigentümliche Erregungsformen unserer Sinnlichkeit sind, welche durch entsprechende aber qualitativ sehr verschiedene Vorgänge in der Außenwelt her­ vorgerufen werden. 10

O u t o f the apparent "chaos o f motions and vibrations" (Chaos brationen

und Bewegungen)

von

Vi­

with which the circumambient media are filled,

specific forms o f m o t i o n that are repeated in particular numerical relations are singled out, strengthened relatively, and made perceptual objects. In effect, H e l m h o l t z maintains that colors, sounds and other sensory phenomena are p h e n o m e n a for the perceiver alone. A n o t h e r important aspect o f H e l m h o l t z ' s t h e o r y that Nietzsche probably became familiar with is that our sensations are n o t copies o f external objects, but are signs (Zeichen)

that may bear n o

relationship to what is signified. T h e relationship that holds between sign and signified consists simply in the fact that the 'same' object under the 'same' conditions elicits the same sign. In Ueber

Wahrheit

und Lüge

11

im außermoralischen

Sinn, Nietzsche avers

that the sensation o f c o l o r does not correspond to any external entity, even though he assumes that there are external processes emitting the stimuli we respond to in sensation and perception. T h e r e occurs a stimulation o f our nerve centers that gives rise to our sensation (say, o f c o l o r ) . T h i s color sensation is then identified by a sound (a word) that serves as a sign represent-

9 10

11

Nikolai Lenin, Selected Works, Moscow, n. d., X I , 377. Lange, op. cit., II, 862. "... colors, sounds, smells, etc., do not belong to things themselves, but ... are peculiar forms of excitation of our sensibility which are called forth by corresponding, but qualitatively very different, phenomena in the outer world." Cp. Lange, GdM, 482—483. The rudiments of Helmholtz's theory of the "Physiologie der Sinnesorgane" can be found in this first edition of the Geschichte. Hermann Helmholtz, Physiologische Optik, Leipzig, 1867, 26. Cf. Ernst Cassirer, Substance and Function, W. C. Swabey and M. C.Swabey, Chicago, 1923, 304-306.

95

Materio-Idealism

ing the specific sensation. T h e w o r d "red" (when referred to a sensation) is a sign representing a particular color sensation; the c o l o r sensation is said to be a s y m b o l o r sign that represents some external source o f stimulation. T h e entire process is characterized as metaphorical.

As in the case o f H e l m h o l t z ' s theory,

it is assumed that there are unknown, unperceived Dinge-an-sich.

When,

Nietzsche continues, w e believe that we perceive "trees, colors, s n o w and flowers," we actually have only Metaphern to the assumed ursprünglichen

der Dinge 12

Wesenheiten.

that do not correspond

E v e n though N i e t z s c h e never

published this brief essay, it was a prolepsis o f many o f his later reflections. It was also the beginning o f his critique o f Wahrheit.

In addition, this essay

contains a highly condensed analysis o f his conception o f Wahrheit.

anthropomorphische

T h e basic ingredients in his critical account o f sensation is indebted

to Lange's discussion o f a variety o f theories o f sensation in the first edition o f the Geschichte.

B y virtue o f a careful reading o f Lange, Nietzsche draws out

the implications o f the physiological theories discussed b y Lange for o u r knowledge o f the external world and for the question o f truth. It is to be noted that his critique in this unpublished essay is n o t directed against metaphysical truth as such, but against the foundation o f empirical knowledge. Even though, in Menschliches, Nachlass,

Allzumenschliches

and in some o f the entries in the

he will express admiration for the precision o f the exact sciences, for

scientific method, the conventional and "anthropomorphic" nature o f empiri­ cal knowledge is expressed as early as 1873. W h a t Nietzsche is undermining is what Lange called "one-sided empiricism." T h a t Lange is probably the inspiration for Nietzsche's early standpoint is clear from the following remark: Was die einseitigen Empiristen nicht beachten, ist der Umstand, daß die Erfahrung kein offenes Tor ist, durch welches äußere Dinge, wie sie sind, in uns hineinwan­ dern können, sondern ein Prozeß, durch welchen die Erscheinung von Dingen in uns entsteht. ... unsere Dinge von den Dingen an sich selbst verschieden sind. 13

This is illustrated b y the distinction between a tone and the vibrations o f a string that occasions it. In his unpublished essay Nietzsche illustrates the same point in a similar w a y b y pointing to the relation between a " t o n e " and die chladnischen

Klangfiguren

im S a n d e .

14

T h e skeptical o r agnostic implications o f the analysis o f sensations fuses with K a n t ' s theory o f knowledge. In the course o f presenting a clear exposi-

12 13

14

KGW, III 2, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn, 373. Lange, op. cit., II, 477. "What the one-sided empiricists do not notice is that experience is no open door through which external things, as they are, wander in to us, but a process by which the appearance of things arises within u s . . . . our things are different from things in themselves." KGW, III 2, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn, 373. "... the Chladni soundfigures in sand." Ernst Chladni was a German physicist who produced sound-figures or patterns on a sand-covered flat surface by means of vibrations of sound produced by a string.

96

Materio-Idealism

tion and critique o f Kant's epistemology, Lange calls attention to the fact that K a n t held that w e can never arrive at a knowledge o f the internal constitution o f things. T h e internal constitution o f things eludes determination as the ultimate ground o f explanation o f phenomena. Lange cites with emphasis the following passage from the

Prolegomena:

Naturwissenschaft wird uns niemals das Innere der D i n g e . . . was nicht Er­ scheinung ist, aber doch zum obersten Erklärungsgrunde der Erscheinung dienen kann, entdecken. 15

Lange immediately connects this assertion with the emphasis o f E m i l du B o i s R e y m o n d on "the limits o f natural science." T h e restriction o f knowledge to p h e n o m e n a constituted b y our senses, by a priori

categories o f the understand­

ing and the intuitions o f space and time in Kant's Kritik residue o f the noumenal world o f Dinge-an-sich.

left the conceptual

Kant's Grenzen

o f human

knowledge dovetail with du B o i s - R e y m o n d ' s position in regard to knowledge of nature. In Ueber

die Grenzen

der Naturerkenntniss

he argued that even if

the question o f the nature o f life was reduced to physical and chemical explanation, the conceptions o f matter and force (necessary to such reductionism) were only abstractions from phenomena. Such abstract, hypothetical "entities" provide n o ultimate explanation o f the natural world o r life. D u B o i s - R e y m o n d concluded that the question concerning the ultimate c o n ­ stituents o f the physical world are forever beyond the reach o f human knowledge. H e n c e , his slogan became: ignorabimus.

D u B o i s - R e y m o n d , as

well as other scientists in his time, indirectly confirmed Kant's theoretical assumption that Naturwissenschaft

wird

uns niemals

das Innere

des

Dinge...

entdecken. Lange emphasizes the agnostic implications o f the sciences in his time and accepts the skeptical conclusions to which the union o f Kant's theory o f knowledge

and

the

reflections

o f those

who

today

would

be called

philosophers o f science led him. H e critically probes Kant's analysis o f knowledge and argues that the categories o f the understanding are not pure a priori

conceptions, but must be derived from sensory experience. I f the basic

categories o f thought have a sensuous origin, then the priority o f

Sinnlichkeit

leads, b y virtue o f physiological theories that have emerged in the nineteenth century, to a conclusion that Lange believes is implicit in Kant's analysis o f knowledge. T h a t is, that our knowledge o f the surrounding world is entirely

15

I. Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können, Riga, 1783, 167. "Physical science will never discover the internal constitution of things which is not appearance, yet can serve as the ultimate ground of explanation of phenomena." Cited in Lange, op. cit., II, 460.

97

Materio-Idealism

constituted b y our "psycho-physical organization."

16

L i k e Kant, Lange as­

sumes that our senses and our understanding have a c o m m o n , but

unknown

root. T h e confluence o f themes discussed above leads to the paradox o f the transformation o f a strict materialism into a variation on idealism. A n d Lange identifies his o w n position as a kind o f materio-idealism. With

this

conception

o f a materiale

Idealismus

17

Lange, before

the

phenomenologists, and independent o f them, was seeking a mediation b e ­ tween materialism and idealism, a "third way." A n d even though it is difficult to piece together Nietzsche's fragmentary statements on this complex issue, I believe that he absorbs and reflects the materio-idealism o r idealo-materialism that Lange sketches. F o r , he is neither an idealist n o r a materialist. I f he sometimes sounds like the o n e or the other, it is because he sometimes focuses on a physicalistic interpretation o f phenomena and sometimes emphasizes the subjective,

cognitive, sensory and psychologistic interpretation o f phenomena.

Lange's philosophical standpoint ends in a circle o f agnosticism: the search for the ultimate constituents o f the physical world leads to abstract, hypotheti­ cal notions o f "matter" and "force" (each o f which is defined in terms o f the other) and physiological analyses lead to a subjectivity o f sensation and perception that is entirely rooted in unknown effects and an unknown

external origins o f perceived

process underlying complex physiological processes.

B o t h in our "internal" experience and our experience o f "external" entities we encounter o n l y phenomena or effects o r relations o f effects.

18

In his letter to

Gersdorff, N i e t z s c h e refers to the conclusions o f L a n g e : the true essence o f things is u n k n o w n and unknowable, the world o f appearances exists in relation to our Organisation

(our psycho-physical organization) and our senses them­

selves are part o f the Erscheinungswelt

and have an u n k n o w n origin. A great

deal o f Nietzsche's thinking will concern itself with interpreting these conclu­ sions in his o w n terms. A n d his o w n skepticism and agnosticism owe as much to Lange as to his o w n critical thinking. T w o very important keys to Nietzsche's philosophical explorations are found in the notions o f an "internal" and an "external phenomenalism." Following out Lange's suggestion, Nietzsche embraces neither mentalism n o r mechanism. Rather, he regards both as symptoms o f an actual process that cannot be directly known. Seeing analogies between "inner" phenomena and " o u t e r " phenomena, he asserts that we m a y speak metaphorically o f one in the language o f the other. T h e stream o f consciousness is construed as phenomenal as are "external" phenomena apprehended in sensation and perception. In

16

Lange, op. cit., II, 571 n.

17

Ibid., II, 484.

18

Ibid., II, 674, 871-872.

Materio-Idealism

98

point o f fact, he avers that the world o f inner experience, precisely because it is so familiar to us, is m o r e difficult to grasp than external phenomena. H e is skeptical about the "inneren

Welt" and the "Tatsachen

des Bewußtseins."

The

p h e n o m e n a o f the inner world are n o t better k n o w n to us; in fact, Die große Sicherheit der natürlichen Wissenschaften im Verhältnis zur Psychologie und Kritik der Bewußtseins-Elemente... ruht gerade darauf, daß sie das Fremde als Objekt nehmen." F o r this reason, an "external phenomenalism" is more accurate, m o r e precise than the self-observation o f 'mental' states. T h e phenomenon o f the b o d y is given priority even though Nietzsche does not propose physicalism o r reduc­ tive materialism. L i k e Lange, he reserves judgment concerning the ultimate, underlying processes that are manifested in physical effects. T h i s must be kept in mind when Nietzsche's affirmation o f the bodily nature o f the "self" in Also sprach

Zarathustra

is taken as indicating his "materialism" o r his "physical­

i s m . " I f one takes the following assertion from the section Von den des Leibes

Verächtern

in isolation from other views, one might assume that physicalism is

being defended. „Ich" sagst du und bist stolz auf dies Wort. Aber das Größere i s t . . . dein Leib und seine große Vernunft: die sagt nicht Ich, aber tut I c h . . . Hinter deinen Gedanken und Gefühlen... steht ein mächtiger Gebieter, ein unbekannter Weiser - der heißt Selbst. In deinem Leibe wohnt er, dein Leib ist er. 20

T h e " b o d y " that is referred to is, however, a manifestation o f an interplay o f "forces," is, in fact, a multiplicity.

A s far as legitimate knowledge is concerned,

the underlying 'reality' that is presumed to be manifested through the dynamic multiplicity o f the b o d y is not known. Virtually every notion that has been attributed to Nietzsche above has its primitive origin in Lange's Geschichte

des Materialismus.

Lange maintains that

matter m a y just as well be considered as a "product" o f our psycho-physical organization as, say, " c o l o r " . It is, he says, a matter o f indifference whether we speak o f mental o r physical organization. H e suggests the use o f a 21

Ausdruck

19

20

21

neutrale

and thereby comes very close to anticipating Bertrand Russell's

KGW, V 2 , FW, 355. "The great certainty of the natural sciences in relation to psychology and the critique of the elements of consciousness... rests precisely on the fact that they take as their object what is alien." KGW, VI 1, AsZ, "Die Reden Zarathustras," "Von den Verächtern des Leibes." " T you say and you are proud of this word. But greater than this i s . . . your body and its great intelligence, which does not only say 'I' but does ' I ' . . . Behind your thoughts and feelings... stands a powerful commander, an unknown sage - he is the self. He dwells in your body, he is your body." Lange, op cit., II, 852.

99

Materio-Idealism

later concept o f "neutral m o n i s m . " T h e mental and the physical are assumed to be modalities o f a "third" something that Lange considers unknowable. N i e t z s c h e sometimes seems to rely upon a " p h e n o m e n o l o g y " in a way and in a context that is not Hegelian. A t one time, he adopts a " m e t h o d " o f phenomenalistic analysis that resembles that o f later phenomenologists. H e employs such a method to good effect in Jenseits

von Gut und Böse,

in his

analysis o f willing. It is possible that he may have found the rudiments o f an internal and an external phenomenology in Lange's theoretical asides or he may have noticed the reference to Brentano's Psychologie Standpunkte

( 1 8 7 4 ) in the second edition o f the Geschichte.

Lange o f self-observation and the Kantian idea o f inneres

von

empirische

T h e discussion b y Sein ends with a

criticism o f the validity o f "self-observation" (Selbstbeobachtung)

that m a y

have been the inspiration o f Nietzsche's similar criticisms. In a long footnote (in the second edition o f his w o r k ) Lange cites the notion o f "internal perception" as a process b y which "psychical phenomena" are apprehended and refers to the intentional

"inexistence" o f objects o f consciousness.

W h e t h e r N i e t z s c h e saw o r noticed these discussions of psychische

Phänomene

2 2

is a matter o f speculation. W i t h o r without the indirect influence o f phenomenological notions, Nietzsche was certainly familiar with a recurring theme in Lange's writings, the t w o modes o f description o f psychic experiences. H e avers that what is for external observation understood as a complex sequence o f molecular m o v e ­ ments is, from the standpoint o f the individual undergoing the experience, a "subjective state." T h e psychic experiences o f the subjective individual are the physical p h e n o m e n a experienced o r seen from another perspective. In his discussions o f this issue, Lange refuses to reduce the physical to the psychic o r the psychic to the physical. H e suggests, in a number o f different ways, the c o m m o n origin o r source o f b o t h aspects o f man's sensory experiences. Lange consistently tries to avoid a strict materialism o r a strict idealism. F o r this reason his theoretical position may be characterized as a kind o f materioidealism that points to an u n k n o w n source o f the mental and the physical. In his frequent analyses o f human experience, he points to a theme he reiterates throughout the Geschichte:

that we again c o m e upon a limit to materialism

insofar as the subjective, experiential phenomena o f sensations are, considered objectively, "nerve processes" that do not indicate the nature o f the subjective, qualitative states experienced. There is a relationship between physiological processes and the subjektiver

Empfindungsvorganges

even though this relation

Ibid., II, 886 n. In passing, Lange also makes reference to Stumpfs Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung, Leipzig, 1873. In his Nacblass, Nietzsche refers to a method of "internal and external phenomenology." Werke, GOA, 45.

Materio-Idealism

100

cannot be entirely explained materialistically and even though the subjective experiences o r sensations have qualitative characteristics that cannot be re­ duced to observed o r observable material o r physical states. T h u s , Lange holds, w e c o m e upon eine Grenze

des Materialismus.

23

Lange is reluctant to reduce phenomena to the physical o r to the mental because he accepts the validity o f b o t h aspects o f human experience. W e cannot adequately explain h o w the "external natural p h e n o m e n o n " is at the same time an "internal" phenomenon for the experiential subject. In the face o f this difficulty, we encounter, from another perspective, "the limits o f natural k n o w l e d g e " (die Grenzen

des Naturerkennens).

Lange suspends judgment

about the ultimate constituents o f actuality, but adopts the provisional, heuristic methods o f internal and external phenomenology. Even though Lange does not specifically refer to such descriptive methods, Nietzsche's statement o f his " m e t h o d s " accurately depicts Lange's standpoint. T h a t he sought to fuse a form o f phenomenology and Lange's internal and external analyses indicates that he understood the need for a descriptive method in philosophy. N i e t z s c h e ' s relation to this aspect o f Lange's thought is made complex b y virtue o f the fact that he typically uses arguments from empirical physiology against idealism and as a means o f characterizing "religious" o r " m o r a l " feelings as primarily physiological states o r disturbances. O n the other hand, he often attacks mechanistic materialism o r positivistic claims to purely objective, scientific knowledge b y using subjectivistic arguments that are basically

psychologistic.

The

apparent

physicalism

and

the

apparent

psychologism one finds in Nietzsche's writings are real aspects o f his thought that represent different phenomenological perspectives. A n d precisely this "double-aspect" approach to experience reflects Lange's variation on Spinoza's t h e o r y , a variation that does not claim any knowledge o f the ultimate ground o f the mental and the physical. Lange's version o f the double-aspect theory receives reinforcement in his Geschichte

from W u n d t ' s physiological psychol­

ogy and Bain's "qualified materialism." F o r , Bain acknowledges the contrast between mind and body, but argues that the b o d y is the same thing, objective­ ly considered, as the subjectivity o f the immediate consciousness o f the individual.

24

In Morgenröte

N i e t z s c h e succinctly expresses what was to remain his basic

position on this issue:

Ibid., II, 816. Ibid., II, 840.

Materio-Idealism

101

Wir haben so viel Mühe gehabt, zu lernen, daß die äußeren Dinge nicht so sind, wie sie uns erscheinen, - nun wohlan! mit der inneren Welt steht es ebenso!" T h i s relatively early defense o f the apparent nature o f psychic phenomena is reiterated in the notes included in Der Wille zur Macht.

T h e r e the "phenomen-

ality o f the inner w o r l d " is affirmed" with the consequence that our ' k n o w ­ ledge' o f subjective states o f being, as well as our 'knowledge' o f the external world, involves simplification, arrangement, organization and interpretation. T h u s , the apprehension

o f internal (subjective) states dovetails with

the

account o f o u r understanding o f the world in which we find ourselves. B o t h are phenomenal through and through and both are "falsifications" o f our immediate experience and o f actuality. T h e cognitive, sensory and psychic factors that, according to Nietzsche, shape what we accept as

Erkenntnis

ineluctably simplify our complex "inner" o r "outer" experiences. T h i s process o f simplification is augmented by linguistic simplification and metaphorical transposition. M a n cannot apprehend Wirklichkeit

in a direct way and cannot

apprehend it conceptually o r express its authentic nature in language. W e can, of course, describe describe

h o w our subjective states appear to us and we can naturally

h o w external, empirical phenomena appear to us in terms o f the

constituting activities o f our Kategorien,

our Sinnlichkeit

and our

psychische

needs, attitudes and beliefs. B y virtue o f our subjective psychic states and our perceptual judgments, we encounter not something given,

but a "world" for

us. O n one basic point, N i e t z s c h e agrees with a general phenomenological principle: the constituted world o f phenomena exists, as Merleau-Ponty later says, pour

nous and that Erscheinung

ist Realität,

"appearance is reality." A

significant difference is that, for Nietzsche, what is known a falsification.

b y us is necessarily

F o r , it is assumed that there is a transphenomenal

that is a dynamic, dialectical process o f " b e c o m i n g " (Werden)

Wirklichkeit

the actuality o f

which is suggested to us in sensory experience and by scientific interpretations of nature, but which eludes precise conceptualization o r linguistic determina­ 27

tion. T h e Protean nature o f transphenomenal actuality, its essentially process character, its chaotic, antithetical 'forms' render it impervious to linguistic description o r conceptual formulation.

25

26

27

KGW, V 1, M, 116. "We have taken great pains to learn that external things are not as they appear to us - Well? with the inner world it is the same!" KGW, VIII 2, 295. "Ich halte die Phänomenalität auch der inneren Welt fest: alles, was uns bewußt wird, ist durch und durch zurechtgemacht, vereinfacht, schematisirt, ausgelegt - " "I hold the phenomenality of the inner world, too. Everything we become conscious of is arranged, simplified, schematized, interpreted through and through -." Ibid., 46. "Erkenntnis und Werden schließt sich aus." "- die Ausdrucksmittel der Sprache sind unbrauchbar, um das Werden auszurücken . . . " Ibid., 278.

102

Materio-Idealism

C o n s c i o u s l y o r unconsciously, Nietzsche follows through Lange's idea o f the self-transcendence o f materialism. A strict materialistic analysis leads to an idealist orientation towards experience and the world. It undergoes, to use N i e t z s c h e ' s Hegelian term, a process o f Selbstaufhebung.

U n d e r analysis,

Lange admits, it is not possible to draw a fixed line zwischen äußerer

Beobachtung.

2 8

innerer

und

In point o f fact, since what we experience and k n o w

about the external world is necessarily conditioned b y our psycho-physical organization and is expressed in the universalizing, simplifying medium o f language, Lange accepts entirely the notion that the world o f phenomena is a Welt

als Vorstellung.

T h u s , a radical materialism that was going to abolish

idealism ironically leads us back to a new form o f idealism. T h e general notion that external phenomena are determined b y our psyche,

our specific

sensorium

and our inherited philosophical categories led Lange first and then Nietzsche to anticipate, in a non-systematic way, the development o f phenomenology from an empirical psychology to a subjectivity. N o t , to be sure, to the pure, "transcendental subjectivity" o f Husserl, but to a subjectivity immanent in nature and affected b y its "forces" or "effects." However, the psychological p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f Sartre in L'Être

et le néant

is not that far removed from

Lange's overt psychologistic analysis o f knowledge and experience. N i e t z s c h e follows Lange and other thinkers cited by him (especially Lichtenberg) when he developes his conception o f the conventional

nature o f

scientific understanding or, sometimes, the subjectivity o f scientific Auslegungen.

T h r o u g h o u t the Geschichte

des Materialismus,

Welt-

numerous sug-

gestions o f a conventionalism in science, as well as a theory o f fictions, are put forward. H a n s Vaihinger was correct in seeing the seeds o f a theory o f fictions in K a n t ' s philosophy and was wise to include Lange's Standpunkt his account o f the background

des Ideals

in

o f the theory o f philosophical fictions.

29

H o w e v e r , he did not dig deeply enough into Lange's various analyses because he overlooks a number o f highly specific notions that Lange identifies either as purely hypothetical posits or fictions. Nietzsche, on the other hand, relies quite heavily on Lange's most ingenious formulations of 'fictions' in his analysis of knowledge in general and scientific knowledge in particular. Vaihinger himself indicates this bridge from Lange to Nietzsche in his summation o f Lange's views on this question. F. A. L a n g e . . . had already recognized that in science and life, imagination plays a part, that erroneous concepts, as measured by empirical reality, must be employed 28

Lange, op.c i t . ,II, 825. Nietzsche makes a very similar claim, holding that our awareness of the "external" world involves an exteriorization of "inner" experience. There is really no genuine separation betweeen the two. "Gefühle sind uns gegeben, und die äußere Welt: und selbst die

29

Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As-If, trans. C.K.Ogden, London, 1935, 328-340.

Gefühle localisirt in dieser." Werke, GOA, XIII, 47.

103

Materio-Idealism

and this with full consciousness of their falsity: he recognized... that to thought and life fictions are indispensable. 30

T h i s transition from the internal transformation o f materialism into a form of idealism to the interpretation o f the natural world in terms o f conventional constructs o r fictions is n o t an arbitrary one. I f the foundation o f materialism is built upon a set o f theoretical notions that are themselves "hypothetical" o r postulatory, then it would seem that the metaphysics o f materialism is derived from basic concepts that, in turn, are, in Lange's view, ultimately derived from sensory experience o r subjective notions. O u r sensations and percepts, our impressions o f ourselves, are "internal phenomena" that have subjective meaning and value. In the manner o f Kant, but with a decided psychologistic twist, Lange argues that the elaborate scientific interpretation o f nature is infiltrated b y rudimentary

notions that are derived from man's

internal

p h e n o m e n o l o g y . In our experience w e are aware o f effects and relations only and anything w e say about the supposed origin o r "cause" o f the panorama o f phenomenal relations and effects we are acquainted with is hypothetical, postulatory o r fictional. T o be sure, neither Lange n o r N i e t z s c h e deny the value

o f such "heuristic" fictions for scientific praxis

"world-picture" (Welt-Bild).

o r the development o f a

In fact, in the next chapter, I shall s h o w h o w

thoroughly Lange's analysis o f anthropomorphism in scientific understanding influenced Nietzsche's philosophical reflections and led to his early formula­ tion o f the concept o f anthropomorphische

Wahrheit,

a concept that antici­

pated the later development o f the "humanistic" o r "pragmatic" conception o f truth. Lange argues that the ganze physisch-psychische

Organisation.

Welt der Verhältnisse

is conditioned b y our

T h e hypotheses used to explain the natural

w o r l d and its processes are formulations o f "articles o f faith"

(Glaubensartikel)

that have a functional o r heuristic value. Insofar as we focus on Nietzsche, after Lange, calls the Relations-Welt,

what

a form o f idealism seems

inevitable. L a n g e remarks that echter Idealismus im ganzen Gebiete der Naturerklärung, soweit es sich um die Relationen zwischen den Erscheinungen handelt... mit der Naturwissenschaft Hand in Hand geht... 31

Such a view is reinforced by similar assertions about the inability to avoid s o m e mode o f idealism in scientific theory that are mentioned b y Lange. T h e physicist Lichtenberg, for example, is quoted as saying that

30

Ibid., 340.

31

Lange, op. cit., II, 684. " . . . genuine idealism in the whole sphere of natural explanation, so far as relations between phenomena are concerned, g o e s . . . hand in hand with natural science."

Materio-Idealism

104

Wenn wir glauben, wir sähen Gegenstände, so sehen wir bloß uns. Wir können von Nichts in der Welt Etwas eigentlich erkennen, als uns selbst und die Verän­ derungen, die in uns vorgehen. 32

This basically Kantian idea o f the active creation o f ' o b j e c t s ' o f knowledge (as opposed to the model o f a passive discovery o f 'what is there') is one that N i e t z s c h e will retain and paraphrase twenty years after he had read L i c h t e n berg's succinct remark. F o r , in the Nachlass

o f 1 8 8 5 - 1 8 8 6 he asserts that

der Mensch findet zuletzt in den Dingen nichts wieder als was er selbst in sie hineingesteckt hat: das Wiederfinden heisst sich Wissenschaft... 33

T h i s conception o f the projection o f our sensory-cognitive forms o f understanding into the objective world is a slight variation on a theme in K a n t ' s theory o f knowledge. M a n y o f the neo-Kantian scientists that Lange discusses iterate the same basic conception. D u B o i s - R e y m o n d , for example, insists that the mind is shaped b y its "internal experience" and this experience is expressed in formulae that are then applied to the external world. Subjective intuition plays a key role in scientific understanding. A n d certain fundamental concepts such as " f o r c e " and "matter" are actually inexplicable. T h e assump­ tion o f atomistic entities is but a substitute

for real knowledge. Everywhere, du

B o i s - R e y m o n d laments, we run into the "limits o f natural knowledge." Lange sees that the limits o f natural knowledge are entailed b y the limits o f k n o w ­ ledge in general and believes that in the agnostic, critical ideas o f scientific knowledge in his day we find einer Bestätigung der Erkenntnistheorie

von naturwissenschaftlicher

des kritischen Seite

34

Standpunktes

in

Again, in the spirit

o f K a n t ' s critical philosophy, a reference is made by Lange and others (specifically, Zöllner) to the assumption that the world is Vorstellung,

that the

world o f material forces or processes and the world o f sensation must be manifestations o f some "third" unknown something: ein unbekanntes tes.

35

Drit­

Zöllner, du B o i s - R e y m o n d , H e l m h o l t z and Lange himself are hesitant to

say what this "third" source o f the sensory and the physical world might be and, hence, retain a deep agnosticism about this presumed

transphenomenal,

transrepresentational "third." F o r a long time, Nietzsche will also restrain his impulse to say anything about this mysterious "third." Eventually, his o w n experience and reflections, as well as selected interpretations o f empirical data,

32

33

34

35

Ibid., II, 852-853. "When we believe we see objects, we only see ourselves. We can, properly speaking, know nothing of anything in the world except ourselves and the changes that take place in us." KGW, VIII 1, 152. " . . . man finds in things ultimately nothing other than what he himself has imported into them: the finding again is called science..." Lange, op. cit., II, 607. " . . . a confirmation from the scientific side of the critical standpoint in the theory of knowledge." Ibid., II, 612-613.

105

Materio-Idealism

will lead him to guess at the riddle, to proffer his o w n "hypothesis," his own creative verkleinerte

Formel:

he names "the third" der Wille

zur

Macht.

H o w e v e r , this imaginative, hypothetical "theory", as I shall argue subsequent­ ly, is not a claim to knowledge and not a "metaphysical truth." F o r Nietzsche, there is no transphenomenal, transexperiential answer to the riddle o f exist­ ence, n o "unconditional reality," that can be known.

H o w e v e r , he feels free, in

the manner o f the scientists, to put forward his "postulate," his "interpreta­ t i o n " o f the supposed underlying nature o f actuality "seen from within ." Lange n o t only hesitates to speculate about the source o f the appearances in nature and our o w n subjective states, but he uncovers the various ways in which the subjective beliefs o f individuals

have been transferred

to the

external, natural world. Scientific research, naturally, requires "hypothesis" o r an explanatory assumption that is m o r e o r less supported by facts. B u t , Lange tells us, history shows us h o w marvellous theories c o m e and go while the "facts o f experience" and observation seem to provide some concrete k n o w ­ ledge. Lange, like some recent philosophers of science, is struck b y the replacement o f theories in the sciences, by the rapidity o f this replacement even in his o w n lifetime. Theories in the natural sciences seem to have a psychological character o r seem to be rooted in certain models o f interpreta­ tion. Scientific theories are actually created out o f a variety o f human experi­ ences, sensation, imagination, cultural orientations, etc. I f we l o o k carefully at the origins o f the conflicting scientific theories, we discern, he believes, der anthropologische

Ursprung

o f such theories.

36

Virtually anticipating the conventionalism o f Poincaré, Lange maintains that the mathematical interpretation o f natural processes does not represent the actual forms o r relations o f entities. Mathematical intuitions cannot, he says, exhaust the complexity and variability o f nature.

37

W i t h o u t denying

the

extraordinary value o f mathematical representations o f physical processes, he sees the simplifying function o f mathematical concepts and is skeptical about the synthetic a priori

nature o f propositions. H e sides with Zimmermann (who

clearly anticipates Wittgenstein here) in construing assertions such as the one K a n t uses ("7 + 5 = 1 2 " ) as n o t only analytical, but as identisch.

38

Cutting

through a substantial number o f expositions, commentaries and interpretive c o m m e n t s , we find Lange questioning the notion o f Substanz,

denying that it

has any real referent, analyzing the concept o f causality and suggesting that it is suffused with anthropomorphische

36 37

38

ideas (such as the attribution to cause o f

Ibid., II, 614. Ibid., II, 470. Ibid., II, 476. "Zimmermann, behauptet, das Urteil 7 + 5 = 12, welches Kant für synthetisch erklärt, sei nicht nur analytisch, sondern sogar identisch."

Materio-Idealism

106

an active power) and should be eventually reduced to a conceptual m i n i m u m .

39

T h e traditional separation o f "substance" and "accident" is merely a " c o n v e ­ nient" way o f understanding entities; but it is a misleading one because it suggests a permanent relation o f quality to object whereas everything is subject to beständigem

40

Wechsel. .

This emphasis on constant change, process, " b e ­

c o m i n g " and the dynamic character o f actuality will n o t be lost on Nietzsche and simply adds fuel to his Heraclitean "fire." Lange repeatedly interprets many o f the basic categories used in the sciences as anthropomorphic, "personifications," convenient notions that have n o ontological referent. Although he rarely uses the term Fiktion,

the implica­

tion o f his standpoint is precisely that many o f the concepts and principles employed in the sciences are, m o r e or less, convenient fictions. O n e interpre­ tation that will play an important role in Nietzsche's thinking is the under­ standing o f the atom as modeled on the idea o f "the subject" o r the " e g o . " After discussing a number o f atomistic theories, Lange remarks that the value o f the atomic theory o f the physical world lies (as Nietzsche will later say) in its "picturability" (Anschaulichkeit).

T h e atom conceived o f as an

o b j e c t " is a reflection o f our own conception o f our " e g o . "

41

"isolated

In other places,

the concept o f an " e g o " is related to the idea o f "subject" or Substanz example, in D e s c a r t e s ' idea o f res cogitans

(as, for

conceived as a "spiritual subst­

ance"). B y transference, Lange avers, our conception o f ourselves as substan­ tial egos is projected into our interpretation o f natural phenomena. H e n c e , the atom is a 'substance,' an ' o b j e c t ' o r "thing" that endures through change. Even 4 2

t o the concept o f matter, then, do we "transfer a part o f our ego. " Since Lange understands man's Organisation

as dynamic and subject to change, the impli­

cation is that the idea o f the isolated atom is a Fiktion

that is based upon

another m o r e basic fiction: the permanent, substantial Subjekt

o r ego.

In all o f these original insights we see that Lange delves into the phenomena o f "internal" experience in order to find the models for an understanding o f external phenomena. This orientation, this form o f argument, is appropriated entirely by N i e t z s c h e . A n d , o f course, the specific argument concerning the conception o f the atom in physical theory is taken verbatim from Lange's Geschichte. In Jenseits

von Gut und Böse it is held that the false idea o f the

o r the ego entered into the Schema

39 40

Ibid., II, 576. Ibid., I, 176.

41

Ibid., II, 656-657.

42

Ibid., II, 651.

that postulated das Atom

or

Subjekt-Ich Klümpchen

107

Materio-Idealism

Materie.

43

T h r o u g h o u t the Nacblass

o f the late 1880's, Nietzsche presents a

number o f terse, condensed arguments that follow Lange's lead quite closely. T h e conception o f the Subjekt

is a modern residue o f the ancient belief in the

"soul." A n abstract notion such as that o f Substanz a separate, unified Ich

substantial ego is a psychische and logic. T h e Subjekt

is derived from the belief in

or ego. Nietzsche maintains that the belief in a Fiktion

that has b e c o m e embeded in language

that is the consequence of our interpretation o f our o w n

psychic states o r psychic phenomena is construed as a Substanz.

It is even said

that the notion o f "substantiality" in general is modeled upon this fallacious interpretation o f our nature. F o r N i e t z s c h e , there are keine and keine S u b s t a n z .

44

Subjekt-"Atome"

Although Nietzsche himself conceives o f the "self" as a

dynamic multiplicity o f forces, he realizes the power that the interpretation o f the self as a unified entity holds over us. In fact, the "Ich"-begriff

is the

primitive model for a number o f basic categorial determinations. T h e central concept o f "unity" (Einheit)

that is, of course, one o f K a n t ' s categories o f the

understanding is not based upon something sensed, perceived o r "given." Rather, Wir haben

den Begriff

- unserem

Glaubensartikel.

ältesten

der Einheit 45

entlehnt

von unserem

"Ich"-begriff,

T h e fictional idea o f Ding is also consi­

dered as a projection into the external world o f our false phenomenology o f an isolated ego. A veritable host o f categories are said to be derived from the " I c o n c e p t " : Substanz,

Atom,

Einheit,

Ding

and Sein.

In regard to the last

category, the category o f "being," it should be noted that Nietzsche believes that the c o n c e p t o f being

lies at the basis o f logic. H e is suggesting, then, that

the assumption o f the logical structure o f the world is a fallacious (but highly useful, heuristically valuable) view o f actuality that is ultimately based upon a false notion o f a separate Ich o r ego that is a Subjekt.

It is astonishing to realize

h o w m u c h N i e t z s c h e makes o f an insight that he first discovered in Lange's Geschichte. W h e n N i e t z s c h e challenges the belief that we have explained a p h e n o m e ­ non b y means o f mathematische

Formel,

46

we hear a distinct echo o f Lange's

understanding o f what Heidegger, in Sein und Zeit, calls the "mathematical projection" o f nature. T h e belief, that Nietzsche's valuation o f science in his "positivistic" period was because he saw that science deals with theoretical posits, hypotheses and metaphorical representations that do n o t pretend to

43

44

45

46

KGW, KGW, KGW, article KGW,

VI 2 , J G B , 17. VIII 2, 55-56. VIII 3, 50. "We have derived the concept of unity from our "I"-concept, — our oldest of faith." VIII 1, 103.

108

Materio-Idealism

apodictic certainty,

47

is correct up to a point. B u t we must acknowledge that

Lange laid the groundwork for Nietzsche's conventionalistic understanding o f scientific interpretations. I t has often been said that the critical analysis o f the grammatical subjectobject relationship and its effect upon our comprehension o f external objects o r events is an original insight o f Nietzsche's. Certainly, the analysis o f the subject-predicate relation in terms o f our o w n assumption that we are agents (causes) that produce effects (actions) is ingenious and, incidentally, one that Wittgenstein has suggested in recent philosophy; the prototype for this kind o f analysis is, once again, found on Lange's pages. In the course o f analyzing the abstract idea of Kraft

or " f o r c e " in

nineteenth century physics, Lange remarks that the Kantian "category o f substance" seems to be surrepetitiously introduced as a symbol for an assumed substratum Kraft

underlying observed effects. W e interpret the relation between

and Materie

as if one were the subject and the other the predicate. A

familiar formula o f nineteenth century physics is cited: kein Stoff, ohne keine

Kraft

Kraft,

ohne Stoff. This formula is succinctly analyzed as a consequence o f

the unstated grammatical principle: kein Subjekt ohne Subjekt.

48

ohne Prädikat,

kein

Prädikat

This original insight is immediately related to a very important

notion that N i e t z s c h e will long remember and use in his arguments for the imaginative "hypothesis" o f a universal Wille zur Macht

acting through all

things. T h e r e is, Lange notes, a distinct tendency to personify natural entities o r processes. Assuming the transference o f psychistic phenomena o r "inner" experience to the world o f non-human beings, Lange maintains that the idea o f Kraft

is related to Materie

construed as a Subjekt.

Referring to a study o f

Redtenbacher's, Lange notes that he claims that we recognize the existence o f "forces"

47

Walter del Negro, Die Rolle der Fiktionen in der Erkenntnistheorie Friedrich Nietzsche, München, 1923, 132-137. Commenting on del Negro's observations, Grimm notes that del Negro wonders if Nietzsche's "perspectival illusions" comprise an echte als-ob Annahmen in Hans Vaihinger's sense. Grimm correctly points out that Nietzsche's fictionalism antedates, and may have influenced, that of Vaihinger. [Grimm, op. cit., 66 n]. What Grimm does not suspect is that Lange's idea of hypothetical fictions had already suggested to Nietzsche, in an unsystematic way, a conventionalistic and nationalistic orientation towards scientific under­ standing. Aside from the repeated notion that the sciences work with hypothetical constructs that do not correspond to any actual entities, Lange specifically refers to the useful "Fiktion" of the egoistic soziale Atome postulated in the theory of political economy. [Lange, op. cit., II 899].

48

Lange, op. cit., II, 651. " . . . n o matter without force, no force without matter... no subject without predicate, no predicate without subject."

109

Materio-Idealism

an den mannigfaltigen Wirkungen, welche sie hervorbringen, und insbesondere durch das Gefühl und Bewußtsein von unsern eignen Kräften. 49

A l t h o u g h w e shall have occasion to return to the place that this analogical reasoning has in N i e t z s c h e ' s experimental interpretation o f a dynamic theory o f nature later, the significant point here is the transition from the understand­ ing o f subjective feelings o f force through the grammatical relation o f subject and predicate to the understanding o f theoretical notions in physical science. T h i s c o m p l e x pattern o f thinking is typical o f N i e t z s c h e ' s manner o f analysis. H e discloses the understandable,

but erroneous, subjective, psychologistic

beliefs w e have, traces them to logico-grammatical forms and then t o concepts employed in the construction o f scientific Welt-Bilden. subject-predicate relation as the fundamental c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f relations o f events. A Subjekt

N i e t z s c h e sees the

model that man applies t o a is assumed as the belief that

o u r variegated feelings must be rooted in a unity, a substantial, causal center o f a host o f "effects." the category o f

50

T h i s putative Subjekt

is a Fiktion

that lies at the basis o f

Substanz.

W h a t D a n t o has called N i e t z s c h e ' s "philosophical p s y c h o l o g y " plays a central role in his thought. F o r , our understanding of the external w o r l d , as we have seen, is largely conditioned b y what N i e t z s c h e designates an "internal p h e n o m e n o l o g y . " A l t h o u g h he never denies that there are external processes that act u p o n us o r stimulate o u r sensory responses, he also saw the creative, active, constructive nature o f knowing. I n this regard, he was a hyperbolic Kantian w h o sought a genetic analysis o f the categories o f thought that K a n t had delineated. H e did this in t w o ways (ways that were first suggested b y L a n g e ) : he argued for the sensory origin o f our basic categories or for their derivation from o u r interpretation

o f our o w n being and our psychic states. A

misleading, but highly useful, internal p h e n o m e n o l o g y was believed to be preserved in grammatical distinctions. T h u s , it is argued that Ehemals nämlich glaubte man an „die Seele", wie man an die Grammatik und das grammatische Subjekt glaubte: man sagte, „Ich" ist Bedingung, „denke" ist Prädikat und bedingt - Denken ist eine Tätigkeit, zu der ein Subjekt als Ursache gedacht werden muß. 51

The

subject-predicate relation represents a logico-metaphysical orientation

that has c o m e to pervade Western thought. It is especially relevant to the

49

50

51

Redtenbacher, Das Dynamidensystem, Grundzüge einer mechanischen Physik, Mannheim, 1857, 12. Cited in Lange, op. cit., II, 651. "... by the manifold effects which they produce and especially through the feeling and consciousness of our own forces." Cp. GdM, 374. KGW, VIII 2, 131. KGW, VI 2,JGB, 54. "Previously one believed in 'the soul' as one believed in grammar and the grammatical subject: one said 'I' is the condition, 'think' is the conditioned, the predicate thinking is an activity to which thought must supply a subject as cause."

Materio-Idealism

110

concept o f causality. T h e separation o f cause and effect is conditioned, o n c e again, b y our belief that we are causes, that a "will" is capable o f producing "effects." Presumably, Nietzsche assumes that this unexamined p h e n o m e n o l ­ o g y o f o u r psychic life becomes incorporated in the function o f reason. F o r , he maintains that Die Sprache gehört ihrer Entstehung nach in die Zeit der rudimentärsten Form von Psychologie: wir kommen in ein grobes Fetischwesen hinein, wenn wir uns die Grundvoraussetzungen der Sprach-Metaphysik, auf deutsch: der Vernunft, zum Bewußtsein bringen. Das . . . glaubt an Willen als Ursache... glaubt ans „Ich", ans Ich als Sein, ans Ich als Substanz und projiziert den Glauben an die Ich-Substanz auf alle Dinge - es schafft erst damit den Begriff „Ding." 52

Physical theories o f the world are, as Lange had noted, saturated with such psychologically derived notions. Rather than giving us a purely objective picture o f the nature o f things, physics is primarily an interpretation

put

forward in terms o f linguistic-conceptual and psychistic notions that, for N i e t z s c h e , falsify actuality. T h e central concept o f mechanistic materialism, that o f causality, is said to be derived from psychistic fictions. Before Wittgenstein in the Tractatus

Logico-Philosophicus,

Nietzsche had suggested

that the traditional notion o f causality was a " m y t h . " H o w e v e r , it must be remembered that, for him, it is a conception that has enormous practical value and heuristic power. Nietzsche is not so much interested in abolishing the use o f the idea o f causality as he is in undermining a mechanistic metaphysics that relies upon this basic notion. In addition, o f course, he maintains that the conceptual separation o f a "cause" and an "effect" is a distortion o f actuality, a simplification and falsification o f the process

nature o f actuality.

All o f Nietzsche's arguments mentioned above have their roots in Lange's analysis o f internal p h e n o m e n o l o g y and the anthropomorphic interpretations o f the natural world. Lange saw that science proceeds b y means o f abstractions from a manifold, complex reality. T h e exactness o f scientific observation and t h e o r y is created b y man b y virtue o f abstract conceptualization modeled upon subjective understandings o f our psychic activities. F o r this reason, he avers that there is n o absolute knowledge and no absolute truth, that the sciences everywhere reveal only relations and yield only eine relative

Wahrheit.

53

I t is clear that the conventionalism and fictionalism in Nietzsche's thought, the weapons b y which mechanistic materialism is undermined, owe a great

52

53

KGW, VI 3, G, III, 5. "In its origins language belongs to the time of the most rudimentary psychology: we find ourselves in a crude fetishism when we uncover the basis of a metaphysics of language - that is to say of reason . . . it believes in the will as cause in general... believes in the 'ego,' in the ego as being, as substance, and which projects its belief in an ego-substance onto all things - only thus does it create the concept 'thing.'" Lange, op. cit., II, 898.

111

Materio-Idealism

deal to Lange's original analyses and insights. O n the points already discussed and on others as well, Nietzsche follows Lange quite closely. W h e n we read in Lange that die Geometrie mit ihren einfachen Linien, Flächen und Körpern uns vorwärts hilft, obwohl die Maße des Wirklichen fast immer inkommensurabel sind, 54

we are struck by the similarity o f Nietzsche's assertions in Die Wissenschaft.

C o m m e n t i n g on the conceptions o f Ursache

fröhliche

und Wirkung,

he

remarks that w e do n o t attain explanation by virtue o f them, but only "description"

(Beschreibung).

Wir operieren mit lauter Dingen, die es nicht gibt, mit Linien, Flächen, Körpern, A t o m e n . . . wie soll Erklärung auch nur möglich sein, wenn wir alles erst zum Bilde machen, zu unserem Bilde. 55

T h e r e is little doubt o f the profound influence that Lange had on Nietzsche in regard to a n u m b e r o f significant philosophical orientations. W i t h Lange's prompting, he undermines a mechanistic materialism that would render the world sinnlos,

follows his suggestion o f an inner phenomenology that, in turn,

is directly relevant to our construction o f the external world in thought and science and developes a radical form o f conventionalism and a theory o f fictions. T h e judgment that "matter is an error" was surely made in the wake of his grasp o f Lange's leading arguments, as well as an understanding o f Boscovich's natural philosophy. Furthermore, as we shall see, Lange laid the foundation for Nietzsche's persistent uncovering o f anthropomorphism

in

virtually all forms o f knowledge. Language, reason, science and philosophy (especially Kantian philosophy) do not give us access to authentic actuality; rather, they preserve, conserve and express a humanization

o f the world that

Nietzsche, after Lange, seems to think is ineluctable.

54

55

Ibid., II, 899. " . . . geometry, with its simple lines, surfaces and bodies, helps us forward, though its lines and surfaces do not occur in nature, although the mass of real things is almost incommensurable." Cp. GdM, 503. Lange relates such hypothetical posits to what he calls the "Fiktion" of isolated, mobile social atoms in the theory of political economy. KGW, V 2, FW, 112. "We operate with things that do not exist, with lines, surfaces, bodies, a t o m s . . . how can explanation be possible when we make everything a picture or a conception, our conception!" Cp. KGW, V 2, Nachgelassene Fragmente (1881-1882), 446. "Eine Linie ist eine Abstraktion im Verhältnis zu dem wahrscheinlichen Thatbestand: wir können mit keinem Zeichen eine bewegte Kraft malen, sondern isoliren begrifflich 1) die Richtung 2) das Bewegte 3) den Druck usw. In der Wirklichkeit giebt es diese isolirten Dinge nicht."

CHAPTER VI HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN In Die Geburt

der Tragödie

the empirical world o f space, time, causality

and unending becoming was conceived o f as a continuous manifestation of, or representation of, the " P r i m a l - U n i t y . "

1

In the very next year, N i e t z s c h e

finished an essay that remained unpublished, Ueber

Wahrheit

und Lüge

im

aussermoralischen

Sinn. In it there is n o mention o f a Schopenhauerian primal

one o r Ur-Wille.

T h e tone o f the essay is critical, aggressive and negative.

Having expressed himself in an artistic, romantic metaphysics previously, he n o w begins, as it were, from scratch. L o o k i n g upon man with a jaundiced cosmological eye, Nietzsche m o c k s the arrogance o f man. T h e power o f knowing has given man an overblown sense o f his importance. His prized reason is not b y any means a Vernunft.

reine

In fact, it is a sophisticated weapon o f defense o r aggression. Stating

a theme that will appear quite often in his writings, Nietzsche remarks that Der Intellekt, als ein Mittel zur Erhaltung des Individuums, entfaltet seine Haupt­ kräfte in der Verstellung; denn diese ist das Mittel, durch das die schwächeren, weniger robusten Individuen sich erhalten, als welchen einen Kampf um die Existenz mit Hörnern oder scharfem Raubthier-Gebiss zu führen versagt ist. Im Menschen kommt diese Vorstellungskunst auf ihren Gipfel: hier ist die Täuschung, das Schmeicheln, Lügen, und Trügen, das Hinter-dem-Rücken-Reden, das Repräsentiren, das im erborgten Glanze Leben, das Maskirtsein, die verhüllende Convention, das Bühnenspiel vor Anderen und vor sich selbst... 2

Reason and intellect, then, are sophisticated weapons developed b y those w h o could n o t struggle for their existence in a directly physical way. Dissimulation and life are inextricably bound together. This belief that survival virtually

1

KGW, III 1, Die Geburt der Tragödie (GT), 4.

2

KGW, III 2, Uber Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne, 370. "The intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, displays its basic powers in dissimulation, which is the means by which weaker, less robust individuals preserve themselves insofar as they have been denied the opportunity to wage the struggle for existence with horns or with the sharp teeth of beasts of prey. This art of dissimulation reaches its peak in man. Deception, flattering, lying, deluding, talking behind the back, putting up a false front, living in borrowed splendor, wearing a mask, hiding behind convention, playing a role for others and oneself."

113

Human, All-Too-Human

requires deception is later linked by Nietzsche to non-human forms o f life. W h a t Nietzsche liked about natural forces was the direct expression o f their "powers," the apparent absence o f any deception. It is with the organic world that deception and semblance

enter the world.

3

H e agreed completely with

Schopenhauer that the human intellect is a tool that serves irrational o r practical needs. Given these assumptions about the function o f

Vernunft,

N i e t z s c h e raises the question whether man could even be capable o f valuing truth. W h y has man c o m e to value

Wahrheit?

N i e t z s c h e ' s answer to this question gives us a clear insight into his entire critique o f the idea o f truth. It is man's need for social relations, for communal existence that gave rise to the valuation o f truth. In general, man is quite indifferent to pure knowledge. H e values knowledge and truth primarily for its Leben

erhaltenden

Folgen.

4

T h e linguistic conventions by which "truth" is

expressed indicate that truthfulness is actually a process o f radical simplifica­ tion or a paradoxical mode o f error. Reversing the traditional belief that language corresponds to an empirical state of affairs, Nietzsche argues that language does not "picture" the world at all. W o r d s are symbols o r metaphors that are used to represent sensory phenomena. B u t they "represent" subjective modifications o f our sensory modalities and are, therefore, at a remove from the original stimulus. N o t only that, but c o m m o n words such as "snake" (Schlange)

designate only a particular property o f the being (e.g., something

that can "twist" o r "wind" - schlingen).

T h e properties o f beings preserved in

nouns referring to them are arbitrary and purely conventional. T h e r e is n o natural o r appropriate relation between certain words and their referents. C o n c e p t s are abstractions that n o t only do not indicate the specificity o f what they refer to, but actually refer to a large class o f similar things. B y their very nature, concepts are remote from that which they designate. T h e r e is no such thing in nature as "leaf." T h e individuation

o f things is deleted in

concept-formation. Linguistic-conceptual expression is far removed

from

"things-in-themselves." It may be noted that in this brief, unpublished essay N i e t z s c h e still retains the notion o f Dinge-an-sich,

a notion he will later seek

to negate entirely. A t any rate, the socially valued truth is not at all what we might assume it to be. Was ist...

Wahrheit?

Nietzsche answers that it is

Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen, kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch und rhetorisch gesteigert,

3

Werke, G O A , XIII, 288.

4

KGW, III 2, 372.

114

Human, All-Too-Human

übertragen, geschmückt wurden, und die nach langem Gebrauche einem Volke fest, canonisch und verbindlich dünken. 5

T r u t h in its ordinary sense is conventional, a social value that has utility. T h e expression o f truth in concepts and language is an elaborate metamorphosis o f the world into man, a process o f humanization. Therefore, socially useful, practical truth is necessarily anthropomorphisch.

T h e world that man perceives

is not the same world as that perceived b y other creatures. Therefore, the essence o f things does not appear

in a world that is constituted by man's

senses, his concepts, his language and his metaphorical transformation o f immediate experience. B o t h truth and the world are entirely anthropomor­ phic. T h e representation o f the world in terms o f "laws o f nature" is c o n ­ ditioned b y our intuitions o f space and time, our experience o f the relations o f 6

succession and number. Relying on one o f his favorite metaphors, Nietzsche claims that our Vorstellungen

o f the world follow with the same necessity with

which the spider spins its w e b . T h e language that lies at the basis o f our concept-formation does n o t change its form when it is later taken over b y science (Wissenschaft).

In this overly condensed essay we find a number o f

interesting things. T h e notion that neither in perception n o r knowledge do w e grasp the "true essence o f things," the understanding o f language as metaphor­ ical, abstract, simplifying, schematizing, and the anthropomorphic nature o f truth in general and scientific truth in particular. W e find here what seems to be the earliest presentation o f a humanistic o r pragmatic theory o f truth. T h e general view that truth and knowledge and our construction o f the world are entirely anthropomorphic is one that pervades Nietzsche's writings. H e spends a great deal o f time and energy unveiling humanizing modes o f thought and is concerned with the exposure o f naive

anthropomorphism

wherever he finds it. O u r senses, our categorical schema, our reason and our p s y c h o l o g y enclose us in a thoroughly human world. W h e r e we believe that w e find objective truth we actually find transferences o f ourselves. O u r senses (which are assumed to be the origin o f our categories) are selective, affected b y needs and interests. T h e human sensory perspective is a limited one and n o t the o n l y one. Psychological notions that have been inherited from the past (and preserved in language) infiltrate even our most abstract thinking. T h e categories o f the understanding that K a n t discloses were not created b y K a n t ; rather, they are inherited concepts that man has found highly useful for the understanding o f the world and for life itself. Although each person's immedi-

5

Ibid., 374. "A moving host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transfered and embellished, which, after long usage, seems to a people fixed, canonical and binding."

6

Ibid., 379.

115

Human, All-Too-Human

ate experiences and subjective feelings are different, the collective notions o f mankind within a civilization o r a language-group have b e c o m e sedimented through a long diachronic process. T h r o u g h a kind o f process o f transubstantiation, man transforms whatever he experiences o r thinks into something humanized. O u r values, our moralities, our concepts, our knowledge and our science are "human, all-too-human." O u r intellect is a t o o l in the service o f life and our knowledge is, in the broadest sense, practical o r pragmatic. For

a

time,

zumenschliches,

especially

when

he

was

writing

Menschliches,

All­

N i e t z s c h e turned away from all metaphysical speculation and

advised that we put theological and metaphysical questions "on i c e . " H e was attracted to the precision, the discipline, the lack o f illusions he found in the exact sciences. Perhaps, he thought, the sciences do gain some access to the nature o f things, do attain an approximation to actuality. T h e scientific orientation seemed to have gained a greater degree o f objectivity than previous speculative thinking. A s he puts it in Morgenröte,

even the most insignificant

inventions o f his day require greater intellect, discipline and scientific imagina­ tion than has existed in the past.

7

Nietzsche sees the liberating power o f

science, its capacity to nullify superstition. H o w e v e r , despite its precision, its testing o f hypotheses, its disciplined search for "small, unapparent truths," the scientific enterprize is still governed b y the kind o f human, constituting activity that K a n t emphasized. T h a t is, Wenn Kant sagt „der Verstand schöpft seine Gesetze nicht aus Natur, sondern schreibt sie dieser vor," so ist dies in Hinsicht auf den Begriff der Natur völlig wahr, welchen wir genötigt sind mit ihr zu verbinden (Natur=Welt als Vorstel­ lung, das heißt als Irrtum), welcher aber die Aufsummierung einer Menge von Irrtümern des Verstandes ist. - Auf eine Welt, welche nicht unsere Vorstellung ist, sind die Gesetze der Zahlen gänzlich unanwendbar: diese gelten allein in der Menschen-Welt. 8

Despite its sophistication, then, the scientific interpretation o f the world does n o t transcend anthropomorphism. M a n never encounters "nature-in-itself," b u t only a natural world comprehended in terms o f percepts, concepts and psychic beliefs that are deeply rooted in human experience and Inevitably, we can only k n o w the world as Vorstellung. Tragödie,

7

8

thought.

In Die Geburt

der

N i e t z s c h e had already characterized as a "metaphysical illusion" the

KGW, V I , M, 36. KGW, IV 2, MAM, I, 19. "When Kant says, 'the understanding does not derive its laws from nature, but dictates them to her', it is perfectly true with regard to the concept of nature which we are compelled to associate with her (Nature = world as representation, that is to say, as error), but which is the summary of a number of errors of the understanding. The laws of numbers are completely inapplicable to a world which is not our representation - these laws obtain only in the human world."

116

Human, All-Too-Human

belief that b y means o f the principle o f causality we are able to penetrate the 9

heart o f being. Science, again and again, runs up against its limits. In the same w o r k he attributes to Socrates the initiation o f the scientific orientation that has c o m e to full b l o o m in the nineteenth century. T h e techniques of reasoning, conceptualization, judgments and inferences applied to the natural world have produced an enormous pyramid o f knowledge (Wissenspyramide).

As the

scientific thinker, fired by the tradition o f Socratic inquiry, probes deeper and deeper into the structure o f nature, he eventually comes to the point at which he encounters the unfathomable (Unaufhellbare).

This encounter with the

u n k n o w n and the unknowable generates, N i e t z s c h e believes, a new form o f knowledge, a tragische protection.

Erkenntnis

that requires art or an ideal as a remedy o r a

10

T h e entire modern world has b e c o m e enmeshed in an Kultur,

alexandrinische

a culture o f scholarship, inquiry, scientific theory and detailed analyses

o f every conceivable kind. Knowledge, within such a culture, is seen as a panacea, a means o f solving all human problems. In place o f metaphysical truth, the Alexandrian culture offers facts, theories, hypotheses, skepticism, agnosticism and a conscious relativity o f knowledge. T h e scientific thrust o f this kind o f culture has shown man that appearances are all we can attain because we have no access to des innersten

und wahren

Wesens

der D i n g e .

11

T h e latest forms o f the Socratic-Alexandrian culture leave man with nothing to hold o n t o , with no ideals: it entails the death

of myth.

T h e world that is a

consequence o f the fulfilment o f the Alexandrine culture is a world that is and will b e c o m e entirely practical, pragmatic, a technological transformation o f the earth that signifies a hyhris before.

12

the likes o f which man has never k n o w n

Although Nietzsche is not at all anti-scientific, and is profoundly

aware o f the revolutionary impact that science will have on Western civiliza­ tion, he also sees the enormous danger in a purely scientific

Weltanschauung,

the excessive preoccupation with the practical and utilitarian. T h e humanization o f the world in science creates a world in which man is m o r e and m o r e master. B u t N i e t z s c h e worries about what will happen to man and his aspirations, to his humanistic culture, to his artistic vision, if the scientific world-view predominates. T h e o u t c o m e o f the fruition o f Alexandrine culture could entail the dissolution o f man as a cultural being and could hasten the

9 10 11

12

KGW, III 1, GT, 15. Ibid. Ibid., 18. KGW, VI 2, GM, III, 9. "Hybris ist heute unsere ganze Stellung zur Natur, unsre NaturVergewaltigung mit Hilfe der Maschinen und der so unbedenklichen Techniker- und IngenieurErfindsamkeit." "Hybris is our entire attitude towards nature today, our violation with the aid of machines and the unscrupulous ingenuity of our technicians and engineers."

117

Human, All-Too-Human

leveling o f the type man. W i t h the enormous power o f the sciences, the winds of nihilism could accelerate to a dangerous speed. W h e r e v e r we l o o k , we find man. T h e philosophical conception o f the world that has gained the greatest influence over modern thought, the Kantian system, does n o t give us any knowledge of actuality as actuality. T h e categories o f the understanding enable us to conceive o f a phenomenal world in which w e can function effectively and survive. Categorical determinations serve the life o f the species and have a predominantly practical value. T h e inventive, creative capacity that created the categories worked in the service o f human needs. O u r need for rapid understanding in terms o f signs o u r need for abbreviation. Basic categories such as Substanz, Sein, Ding,

(Zeichen),

Subjekt,

Objekt,

etc., have nothing to do with 'truth' in any objective sense." K a n t

has said that knowledge is restricted to phenomena that are constituted by our intuitions o f space and time, our sensibility and our categories o f the under­ standing. In a sense, Nietzsche agrees with him. B u t what he does is to ask why

we believe in this categorical scheme, to seek the human rationale

accepting the Kantian account o f "knowledge." In Jenseits he asks w h y we believe in synthetic a priori

for

von Gut und

Böse

judgments. H e answers that

nämlich zu begreifen, daß zum Zweck der Erhaltung von Wesen unsrer Art solche Urteile als wahr geglaubt werden müssen; weshalb sie natürlich noch falsche Urteile sein könnten! . . . Nur ist allerdings der Glaube an ihre Wahrheit nötig, als ein Vordergrunds-Glaube... in die Perspektiven-Optik des Lebens gehört. 14

J u s t as our particular sensory system serves our perspectival life-needs, so, t o o , does belief in the 'truth' o f synthetic a priori N i e t z s c h e , presupposes

assertions. Judgment, for

belief and belief is primarily oriented to what is

practically useful to us or o f value to us for the sake o f life. Analyzing the Kantian categories, Nietzsche arrives at a conclusion implicit in Kant's der reinen

Vernunft:

Kritik

categorization is humanization. T h e phenomenal world is

a world for us that is 'true,' insofar as it may be said to be 'true,' for us. W h a t we accept as phenomenal knowledge has a heuristic and practical value. H o w e v e r , the only kind o f "truth" that can be said to be found in Kant's analysis o f knowledge is anthropomorphische

Wahrheit.

thropomorphic "truth" embodied in the understanding

Naturally, the an­ of the phenomenal

world is n o t only not truth in any strict sense, but it is necessarily a creative falsification

13

14

o f actuality. This apparently paradoxical notion is not as paradoxi-

KGW, VIII 1, 243. KGW, VI 2, JGB, 11. " . . . namely to understand that such judgments must be believed to be true for the purpose of the preservation of beings such as ourselves; though they might, of course, be false judgments nonetheless! . . . the belief in their truth is necessary as a foreground belief... belonging to the perspective optics of life."

118

Human, All-Too-Human

cal as it sounds. F o r , if o u r senses are, as N i e t z s c h e maintains, limited, coarse, restricted t o a range o f responses, and if o u r intuitions o f space and time are unique to ourselves, and if the categories o f the understanding are abstract simplifications that are derived from psychistic fictions, then empirical k n o w ­ ledge is a kind o f 'falsification' o f actuality as process, as b e c o m i n g

(Werden),

as a dynamic flux. T h e phenomenal world is a construction, a creative organization o f a " w o r l d " (Welt),

a Welt als Vorstellung.

T o schematize what

we experience is an action, an acting upon something, a sensory-cognitive process o f construction. T h e imposition o f the category o f causality, for example, upon o u r immediate experience involves a separating out o f " c a u s e " and "effect," one Ding

acting upon another Ding.

N i e t z s c h e plausibly argues

that this categorical understanding o f the realm o f experience is a distortion o r "falsification" o f actuality. Ursache und Wirkung: eine solche Zweiheit gibt es wahrscheinlich nie - in Wahrheit steht ein Kontinuum vor uns, von dem wir ein paar Stücke isolieren; so wie wir eine Bewegung immer nur als isolierte Punkte wahrnehmen, also eigentlich nicht sehen, sondern erschließen. . . . Es gibt eine unendliche Menge von Vor­ gängen in dieser Sekunde der Plötzlichkeit, die uns entgehen. 15

Because o u r theoretical conceptions abstract from a process o f dynamic change, and because the basic notions that we employ in scientific interpreta­ tion do n o t accurately represent any external process, N i e t z s c h e concludes that die Wissenschaft betrachten, Dinge

wir lernen

als möglichst immer

genauer

getreue

und ihr Nacheinander b e s c h r e i b e n d .

external w o r l d is presumably

Anmenschlichung

uns selber 1 6

beschreiben,

der Dinge indem

zu

wir die

What we call o u r knowledge o f the

entirely a product o f an

anthropomorphic

projection. A l t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e consistently argues for the conventional, fictional, metaphorical, anthropomorphic and simplifying nature o f ordinary

"know­

ledge," o f philosophical " k n o w l e d g e " o f the Kantian variety and scientific " k n o w l e d g e , " his arguments rest upon a fragile o r inconsistent foundation. In a recent study o f N i e t z s c h e ' s t h e o r y o f knowledge it is repeatedly said that man's previous philosophical and scientific understanding o f the world is false or is an " e r r o r " because,

as N i e t z s c h e maintains, actuality is in flux, is in a

constant process o f b e c o m i n g , is dynamic, dialectical, a system o f ever-

15

16

KGW, V 2, FW, III, 112. "Cause and effect: there is probably never such a duality - in truth, there is a continuum before us from which we isolate a few pieces just as we always observe a motion as isolated points and thus do not see it, but infer it. . . . There is an infinite multiplicity of processes in that abrupt second that eludes us." Ibid. "... science is the most exact humanization of things possible; we always learn to describe ourselves more accurately by describing things and their successions."

Human, All-Too-Human changing relations o f " p o w e r . "

17

119

T h i s i s a perfectly accurate, if uncritical,

presentation o f what N i e t z s c h e says. H o w e v e r , it m a y be asked h o w precisely N i e t z s c h e can be said to know

that actuality is other than it is construed in a

consistent phenomenalism. T h i s is an especially crucial question because he designates virtually every modality o f knowledge as anthropomorphic. I f conditional knowledge is a systematic falsification, we can only maintain this if w e know

what actuality is in itself. B u t N i e t z s c h e repeatedly tells us that w e

c a n n o t conceptually o r linguistically express the nature o f actuality. T h i s is a fortiori und

the case if w e hold him to the views he expresses in Ueber

Lüge

im aussermoralischen

Sinn.

Wahrheit

F o r , his argument leads t o the inevitable

conclusion that language cannot accurately represent or "picture" authentic actuality. A t o n e point in his Nachlass,

he includes Werden

categories that bear no relation to "truth."

18

as one o f those

I f this category is a s y m b o l i c

abbreviation that has utilitarian value for the preservation of the species, then it, as he says, is true for us. B u t , in a strict sense, we cannot say that it refers t o something that we c o m p r e h e n d in any strict sense o f the word. N o w , if it is argued that in the Götzendämmerung

he states plainly that Sofern

das Werden,

zeigen,

das Vorgehn,

den Wechsel

lügen

sie nicht,

19

die

Sinne

this actually is

a case o f special pleading. F o r , in the same context, he avers that Heraclitus is t o be praised because he, unlike other philosophers before him, "rejected the evidence o f the senses." T h a t is, Heraclitus rejected their testimony because t h e y showed things as possessing "duration and unity" (Dauer

und

Einheit).

T h e n he says that Heraclitus did an injustice to the senses because they do not, as he is supposed to believe, lie or deceive at all. If, N i e t z s c h e continues, the senses s h o w us change, process or becoming, then they do not lie. T h i s entire passage is confused and misleading. Heraclitus, the philosopher o f flux and b e c o m i n g w h o m N i e t z s c h e follows, is said to have rejected the senses even though o n e has the impression that the images he actually uses in his fragments t o illustrate process are derived from sensory experience. F u r t h e r m o r e , the senses acquaint us with relative permanence and change. It is highly doubtful that the p r e - S o c r a t i c philosophers before Heraclitus assumed permanence o n the basis o f the duration and unity o f things perceived. In addition, in this

17

18

19

Cf. R. Grimm, op. cit. KGW, VII 1, 243. KGW, VI 3, G, II, 2. "Ich nehme, mit hoher Ehrerbietung, den Namen Heraklits beiseite. Wenn das andre Philosophen-Volk das Zeugnis der Sinne verwarf, weil dieselben Vielheit und Veränderung zeigten, verwarf er deren Zeugnis, weil sie die Dinge zeigten, als ob sie Dauer und Einheit hatten. Auch Heraklit tat den Sinnen unrecht. Dieselben lügen weder in der A r t . . . noch wie er es glaubte - sie lügen überhaupt nicht. Was wir aus ihrem Zeugnis machen, das legt erst die Lüge hinein, zum Beispiel die Lüge der Einheit, die Lüge der Dinglichkeit, der Substanz, der D a u e r . . . Die 'Vernunft' ist die Ursache, daß wir das Zeugnis der Sinne fälschen. Sofern die Sinne das Werden, das Vergehn, den Wechsel zeigen, lügen sie nicht."

Human, All-Too-Human

120

c o n t e x t , as well as elsewhere, N i e t z s c h e emphasizes that "reason" o r

Vernunft

is the cause o f the falsification o f the evidence o f the senses. N o w , if this is the case, and if Heraclitus rejected the testimony o f the senses, then we may w o n d e r if his knowledge o f b e c o m i n g m a y not have been based upon

reason.

N i e t z s c h e wants to have it b o t h ways. In fact, his claim that the senses do not deceive us if they give evidence o f becoming indicates that there may be some d o u b t about this. H i s position is question begging o r tautological. T h a t is, if the senses provide evidence o f becoming, then they do not lie. A n d if they don't? E v e n the above argument against N i e t z s c h e ' s attempt to gain s o m e access t o the reality o f constant b e c o m i n g is not really necessary. H i s own c o n c e p t i o n o f what takes place in sensation and perception precludes any claim that o u r senses can give us any acquaintance with process, flux, change o r b e c o m i n g . A s if this were n o t bad enough, he quite frequently relies upon

scientific

theories o f physical processes or physiological theories o f the sensory process. T h a t is, he introduces data that, according to his understanding

o f the

a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c nature o f science, cannot be used to establish anything about the authentic nature o f things. W e have already seen that in Morgenröte

it was said that our senses involve

us in a kind o f deception and that judgments based upon such perception are equally suspect. E v e n in his later notes he refers perceptual judgment to a m o r e primitive process o f assimilation in sensory experience. T h e judgement that there are perceptual p h e n o m e n a that are similar or identical cannot be itself the result o f perceptual judgment. T h e r e could be no such judgments unless a process o f "equalization" had already taken place in sensation itself. T h i s process o f "assimilation" is compared to the biological process present in the behavior o f lower organisms. It is held that perceptual judgment requires a prior "process o f assimilation" that includes unconscious cognitive processes.

20

T h e assumption, then, is that a primitive process o f synthesis occurs in sensory

KGW, VII 3, 367. "Es könnte gar keine Urtheile geben, wenn nicht erst innerhalb der Empfindungen eine Art Ausgleichung geübt wäre: Gedächtniß ist nur möglich mit einem beständigen Unterstreichen des schon Gewohnten, Erlebten - Bevor geurtheilt wird, muß der Prozeß der Assimilation schon gethan sein: also liegt auch hier eine intellektuelle Thätigkeit (vor), die nicht in's Bewußtsein fällt. ..." "There could be no judgment if a kind of equalization did not take place within sensations: memory is only possible with a continual stressing of what is already familiar, experienced - Before judgment takes place, the process of assimilation must have already occurred; thus here also there is an intellectual activity that does not enter consciousness...". Cp. Op. cit., 154. "Der Intellekt und die Sinne sind ein vor allem verein­ fachender Apparat." Cp. also: KGW, VIII 3, 126. "das Zurechtmachen, das Ausdichten zum Ähnlichen, Gleichen - derselbe Prozeß, den jeder Sinneseindruck durchmacht, ist die Entwick­ lung der Vernunft!" "The development of reason is adjustment, invention with the aim of making similar, equal - the same process that each sense-impression goes through."

121

Human, All-Too-Human

experience itself. N o t only that, but the understanding o f the operation o f the senses includes the n o t i o n that the human senses are highly selective and respond to only a limited range o f stimuli. T h u s , it cannot be said that the senses give us access to a pure b e c o m i n g . I f neither reason n o r the senses enable us to apprehend the process o f becoming that N i e t z s c h e insists upon, then perhaps it is an intuition. Unfortunately, N i e t z s c h e does not conceive o f o u r awareness o f Werden

as an intuition. Despite his claim that the senses are

less deceptive than reason, his o w n analyses o f sensory experience indicate that form-giving activity, synthesis, arrangement and simplification o c c u r in sen­ s o r y experience as well as in judgment. T h u s , for example, he avers that we do n o t passively receive sense impressions because we give form (Gestalt)

to what

we perceive. F u r t h e r m o r e , since m e m o r y is necessary for sensory apprehen­ sion, the act o f m e m o r y produces a simplification, a "reduction" o f a psychic process to a sign.

21

(Abkürzung)

Such observations are consistent with his

earliest speculations concerning the metaphorical relation between a sensory sign and the entity o r process signified, but raise doubts about the optimism entailed in the belief that the senses "do not lie" when they give evidence o f "becoming." I n his Nachlass

N i e t z s c h e occasionally toys with a formula that is obvious­

ly a parody o f Spinoza's famous statement, Deus variation is Chaos

sive Natura.

sive Natura.

H i s suggested

Although he never uses this formula in his

published writings, as far as I k n o w , he does say that Der Gesamtcharacter der Welt ist dagegen in alle Ewigkeit Chaos, nicht im Sinne der fehlenden Notwendigkeit, sondern der fehlenden Ordnung, Gliederung, F o r m . . . und wie alle unsere äesthetischen Menschlichkeiten hießen. 22

Throughout

Die

fröhliche

Wissenschaft,

attention

is

called t o

the

an­

t h r o p o m o r p h i c , aesthetic nature of the scientific interpretations o f the world, to man's imposition o f order upon a presumed chaos. A t times, N i e t z s c h e alludes to the chaos o f actuality in terms that sound like H u m e ' s notion that we are aware o f a "stream o f impressions" in sensory experience o r like K a n t ' s assumption that, in immediate experience, we encounter a manifold o f sense impressions. T h u s , for example, when he tries to distinguish his position from that o f those w h o postulate a "true w o r l d " or a realm o f "things in t h e m ­ selves," he remarks that

21

Werke, GOA, XIV, 18, 47.

22

KGW, V 2, FW, III, 109. "The total character of the world is to all eternity chaos; not by the absence of necessity, but by the absence of order, structure, form . . . and whatever else our aesthetic humanities are."

122

Human, All-Too-Human

der Gegensatz dieser Phänomenal-Welt ist nicht „die wahre Welt", sondern die formlos-unformulirbare Welt des Sensationen-Chaos, - also eine andere Art Phänomenal-Welt, eine für uns „unerkennbar." 23

T h i s reference to a transphenomenal world that is a "chaos o f sensations" runs against m a n y other statements about the cognitive, arranging,

simplifying

process that is said to be in sensation itself. N o t only that, but there is a curious slip of the pen in this observation. F o r this realm o f chaos cannot, in terms o f everything else N i e t z s c h e has said, be characterized as a " p h e n o m e n ­ al-world" o f any kind. F o r , if it were a phenomenal world, then it would, a fortiori,

have t o be n o t only k n o w a b l e , but k n o w n . I f there is assimilation,

simplification and reduction in sensory experience, then we never actually experience this ostensible chaos that N i e t z s c h e refers to in this remark. O n c e we piece together the fragments

o f Nietzsche's theory o f knowledge, it

b e c o m e s clear that he has cut himself off from any apodictic claims about the authentic nature o f Wirklichkeit. Ding-an-sich,

Although he repudiated K a n t ' s idea o f the

this n o t i o n haunts his thought. T h e chaotic process o f b e c o m i n g

that he refers to can o n l y be postulated or put forward as an experimental hypothesis insofar as he has n o consistent way in which to conceive o f it o r speak o f it. T h e r e seems to remain in N i e t z s c h e ' s thought a kind o f an-sich

Werden-

that is assumed to be a formless actuality upon which we impose

sensory selectivity, psychological habits and categories o f the mind. W h e n he puts forward his imaginative hypothesis o f a universal Wille-zur-Macht seems to be uncovering the secret o f the D i n g - a n - s i c h recapitulate his early speculations in Die Geburt

24

he

in a way that seems to

der Tragödie.

W h a t saves him

from such a charge is that he consciously developes his interpretation in a tentative, provisional o r experimental way. As I've said previously, he b y n o means pretends t o have uncovered a metaphysical reality o r to have attained knowledge

o f an "unconditioned reality."

In a strict sense, if we hold N i e t z s c h e to his belief that assimilation, primitive synthesis and unconscious cognition o c c u r in sensory experience, then the chaos that he refers to cannot be said to b e discovered in immediate sensation. T h o u g h t , conceptualization and judgment build upon an already

23

24

KGW, VIII 2, 60. "The antithesis of this phenomenal-world is not 'the true world,' but the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations - another kind of phenomenal world, one 'unknowable' for us." It has been pointed out, correctly I believe, that Nietzsche's "characterization of the will to p o w e r . . . ironically bears some resemblance to Kant's negative characterization of the thing-initself." [Grimm, op. cit., 62] Grimm's further claim that the Wille zur Macht serves as a "model" of reality is also insightful and accurate. His disagreement with Heidegger's belief that Nietzsche is proposing a metaphysical theory is one I completely share. However, Grimm overlooks the evidence that the postulation of a universal will to power, as it is presented by Nietzsche, cannot be 'true' except in a purely figurative, experimental sense.

123

Human, All-Too-Human

constituted phenomenal order. Apollonian order is imposed upon D i o n y s i a n chaos in a process o f humanization

that N i e t z s c h e presents as habitual,

unreflective and inevitable. I f w e examine carefully m a n y o f N i e t z s c h e ' s assertions about the dynamic, chaotic nature o f actuality, w e find, paradoxically, that they are, for the m o s t part, based upon scientific theories o f the structure o f the physical realm and u p o n physiological theories that delineate our sensory repertoire and the range o f sensory responsiveness. T h i s is paradoxical because he chides the scientists for assuming that their theories o r "world-interpretations" representations o f Wirklichkeit.

are objective

H e reminds them often enough that o u r

aesthetic, a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c importations run through the language o f the Wissenschaften.

T h a t N i e t z s c h e uncovers anthropomorphisms in the sciences

means - given the extensiveness o f this term, the fact that it includes virtually any serious inquiry as well as scholarship in general - that they are quite pervasive in a variety o f disciplines. Despite the paradox o f doing so, N i e t z s c h e formulates his n o t i o n o f Chaos

sive Natura

on the basis o f scientific

theories emerging in the nineteenth century. U n l i k e philosophers w h o casually assume that p h i l o s o p h y should be a handmaiden to the sciences, N i e t z s c h e takes seriously the findings o f nineteenth century inquiry and draws out their startling implications for an understanding o f nature and o f man in nature o r homo

natura.

W e ' v e already

seen h o w skepticism was supported

b y physiological

theories that showed that our qualitative sensory experiences take place in a different domain than the supposed "original" stimulus. W h a t w e sense is transformed, simplified, designated in metaphorical terms. T h e transmission o f external stimuli along the afferent nerves to nerve centers and to the brain produces a physiological change or event or, as o u r c o n t e m p o r a r y materialists like to say, "a firing o f the C-fibres o f the brain."

25

So far, the external

p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the process. A s a response to these stimuli, we experience this "brain-state" and identify the physiological state in thought o r language as, say, "sensation o f blue." N i e t z s c h e follows the physiologists quite closely and holds that the qualitative sensory experience is not like the purely physical process that occasions it. In turn, the designation o f the physical event in language introduces metaphorical signification. I n the scientific language o f his day, it was assumed that w e respond in sensation to "vibrations" that act upon o u r senses. T h e s e "vibrations", like the electro-magnetic waves and/or parti-

Le Gros Clark, The Physical Basis of the Mind, Oxford, 1952, 14. "...it is only when the impulses have been relayed from the base of the brain to a much more complicated mechanism in the grey matter on the surface of the brain - the central cortex - that a conscious sensation becomes possible."

Human, All-Too-Human

124

cles that are referred to today, do not have the qualities

that we experience in

sensation. N o t only that, but we respond, o f course, only to a limited range o f stimuli and do not b y any means sense o r perceive all externally present physical processes. N i e t z s c h e concluded from his understanding o f the essentials o f physiolog­ ical t h e o r y that the sensory world that we take for granted is a representational w o r l d comprised o f selected features. It is not actuality as such that we perceive, but an individual and collective human perspective. there is a realm o f chaotic processes that surround

H e assumed that

us out o f which we

selectively apprehend o r respond to only some stimuli. O u r sensory response is often called " c o a r s e " for the simple reason that we do not grasp the infinitely c o m p l e x processes that theorists assume are continually occurring at each m o m e n t . Sinnlichkeit

is not only "simplification", but adjustment

"perspective o p t i c s " o f human

t o the

life. T h e world we uncritically accept as

objective is, in point o f fact, a Welt für uns, a Welt als

Vorstellung.

It is held that there is a transphenomenal chaos "out there" that we would perceive if o u r senses were more refined, m o r e penetrating. N i e t z s c h e is quite aware that this assumption

o f the deep structure of physical actuality is

theoretical. A s a thought-experiment, he follows out the implications o f the advances in the sciences (following the lead of Lange in this regard) and c o m e s t o conclusions that are similar to those of J a m e s Jeans. T h e English physicist o n c e maintained that We may picture the world of reality as a deep-flowing stream; the world of appearance is its surface, below which we cannot see. Events deep down in the stream throw up bubbles and eddies onto the surface of the stream. These are the transfers of energy and radiation... which affect our senses and so activate our minds; below these lie deep waters which we can know only by inference. 26

N i e t z s c h e often appeals to the theory of the "indescribable c o m p l e x i t y " o f actuality in physical theory as a way o f showing that o u r sensory, cognitive, psychologistic and linguistic construction o f a Welt anthropomorphic

is a creative, inventive,

"falsification." W h a t is interesting about the

similarity

between N i e t z s c h e ' s views and s o m e central notions of Jeans is that we k n o w that N i e t z s c h e inherited a Kantian theory o f knowledge applied to science from Lange that anticipated J e a n s ' standpoint. F o r , it has been said that in the w o r k s o f J e a n s and others w h o shared his standpoint "we find an epistemological interpretation o f physics evolved b y the physicists themselves which is pronouncedly

26

27

Kantian in its character."

27

It is astonishing to realize the

Sir James Jeans, Physics and Philosophy, Ann Arbor, 1958, 193. Errol Harris, Nature, Mind and Modern Science, London, 1954, 385.

125

Human, All-Too-Human

longevity o f the n e o - K a n t i a n interpretation o f science that was probably inaugurated b y Lange in 1 8 6 6 . T h a t N i e t z s c h e ' s understanding o f the constituents o f the natural w o r l d was profoundly influenced b y nineteenth century scientific t h e o r y is shown in a n u m b e r o f places. T h e natural world we perceive is said to be infiltrated b y aesthetic, humanistic embellishments that are the result o f "errors" that have been inherited from the past experiences o f multitudes o f men and have proven useful for life. W h a t N i e t z s c h e seems to suggest in that our current mode o f perception is o n e that has been culturally and genetically transmitted over long periods o f time. Das Großartige in der Natur, alle Empfindungen des Hohen Edlen Anmuthigen Schönen Gütigen Strengen Gewaltigen Hinreißenden; die wir in der Natur und bei Mensch und Geschichte haben, sind nicht unmittelbare Gefühle, sondern Nachwir­ kungen zahlloser uns einverleibter Irrthümer, - es wäre alles kalt und todt für uns, ohne diese lange Schule. 28

It is assumed that nature w o u l d appear kalt und todt, " c o l d and lifeless," if we perceived it as science depicts it. A l m o s t in the very language A . N . Whitehead will later use, N i e t z s c h e alludes to the difference between the qualitative " w o r l d for u s " and the w o r l d as interpreted b y physical theory. C o m m e n t i n g o n seventeenth century physics in particular and, b y implication, mechanistic materialism in general, Whitehead maintains that, according to this theory, bodies are perceived as with qualities which in reality do not belong to t h e m . . . Thus nature gets credit which in truth should be reserved for ourselves... The p o e t s . . . should address their lyrics to themselves... Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly. 29

A l t h o u g h a great deal o f N i e t z s c h e ' s reflections are centered precisely on the p r o b l e m o f what Whitehead called "the bifurcation o f nature," the facile association o f N i e t z s c h e ' s thought Process

and Reality)

with that o f Whitehead (especially in

should be avoided. Despite a n u m b e r o f quite similar

observations and theoretical agreements between N i e t z s c h e and Whitehead, there are t w o central ideas in the latter's philosophy that N i e t z s c h e would n o t accept: the reinstatement o f Platonism in the form o f "eternal o b j e c t s " and the general acceptance o f the objective validity o f causation. Generally speaking, N i e t z s c h e presupposes muthmaaßlichen 28

29

absoluten

Fluß

des Geschehens.

that there is in actuality a T h i s "presumed

absolute

KGW, V 2, 455. "The sublimity of nature, all those impressions of grandeur, nobility, grace, beauty, goodness, austerity, power and rapture that we record in the experience of nature, history and mankind are not immediate feelings, but the aftermath of innumerable, deep-rooted errors - everything would appear cold and lifeless to us were it not for this long schooling." A . N . Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, New York, 1925, 56.

126

Human, All-Too-Human

flow o f events" is not normally perceived because o f unserer

groben

Organe,

" o u r coarse o r g a n s . " E a c h entity o r event that occurs in the world is " s o m e ­ thing new in each m o m e n t " even though we cannot observe the subtle 30

m o v e m e n t s that are taking place. Presumably, then, the qualitative,

relatively

stable world we ordinarily perceive and conceive o f is a world constructed in terms o f our senses, our reason and our psychological prejudices. T h e transp h e n o m e n a l actuality that N i e t z s c h e assumed to be dynamically operative is quite obviously a scientific, theoretical understanding o f exceedingly c o m p l e x , continuously changing physical processes. In the dynamics o f physical actuality, nothing is ever the " s a m e " from m o m e n t to m o m e n t ; at best, we may speak o f a sequence o f approximate similarities. It is believed that there is m o r e consistency in the structure o f s o called "inorganic" entities than in living beings. Since N i e t z s c h e eventually abandons the n o t i o n o f purely inorganic entities in his experimental thoughts, w e m a y say that the lower the level o f Potenz

o r " p o w e r " or the lesser the

degree o f complexity in an entity, the greater degree o f duration through time in a succession o f gradual transformations o f structure. C o m p a r e d to the Proteus-nature o f man, the changes that are theoretically assumed to take place in a tiny steel bar are relatively slower, m o r e gradual, m o r e subtle than those that o c c u r in man. H o w e v e r , it is contended that no entity is numerically identical through time. E v e r y Geschehnis c o n c e p t i o n , entirely novel.

o r "happening" is, according to this

I f this generalization seems directly to clash with

the t h e o r y o f the eternal recurrence o f the same,

there is no doubt that it does.

In this regard, it has been said that the idea o f emergent novelty and the absence o f sameness

in natural processes that N i e t z s c h e proposes conflicts with

the " d o c t r i n e " o f the eternal recurrence o f the same. The recurrence is identical, and Nietzsche has otherwise denied identities in nature... he bases that denial on the improbability of any two things being exactly alike - which would imply identical histories - and this he continues to maintain except for eternal recurrence, where of course the histories are identical. 31

T h i s is a very generous and sanguine approach to what are clearly t w o logically incompatible theoretical positions. T o m y mind, the very fact that so m u c h of N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking is devoted to the "absolute flow o f events," events that do n o t repeat themselves, that are never

self-identical, that have n o isolated

existence, means that he cannot consistently maintain a theory that states that each event in the life-history o f each individual entity recurs nor can he claim that the total structure o f systems o f events recurs. N i e t z s c h e ' s entire critical attack upon o t h e r philosophical positions depends upon the denial o f

30

KGW, V 2, 452.

31

George Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, Cambridge, Mass., 1941, 289.

iden-

127

Human, All-Too-Human

tische Fälle

o r "identical cases" (concurrently or successively), as well as upon

the denial o f "unities" (Einheiten)

in actuality.

T h e doctrine o f the eternal recurrence o f the same is clearly incompatible with N i e t z s c h e ' s crucial epistemic assumptions if it is taken to be a "scientific" o r objectively valid theory. If, as he frequently argues, no entity is ever "selfidentical" at any m o m e n t in its being (hence, the law o f identity, " A = A " , is n o t valid for any existing entity), then nothing that impermanent o r volatile could ever be repeated in the same

way. So m u c h hangs upon N i e t z s c h e ' s

epistemic principles that it is m y belief that those w h o have insisted upon the als-ob nature o f eternal recurrence o r upon its existential significance (most recently, T r a c y Strong and B e r n d Magnus) are indirectly supported

by

N i e t z s c h e ' s strong denial o f a literal repetition o f "the same" in natural processes, as they are directly supported b y some

o f his own formulations o f

eternal recurrence as an article o f belief o r as an als-ob 'truth' the importance o f w h i c h lies in the radical, subjective transformation o f the individuals w h o accept it as if it were objectively valid, as an acid test for

Ubermenschlichkeit.

R e t u r n i n g t o o u r main concern here, it is clear that N i e t z s c h e cannot base his understanding o f the flowing, fluctuating nature o f Wirklichkeit

upon

sensation, perception o r reason. O f t e n enough, he criticizes the notion o f pure sensation o r unmittelbaren

Empfindungen

("immediate sensations"). Sensa­

tions are said t o entail primitive interpretations or "assimilations." T h e attempt in Götzendämmerung

to attribute to the senses a direct awareness o f flux,

process o r b e c o m i n g is not a typical approach t o sensibility. H e had learned from m a n y thinkers ( w h o m Lange discusses in this regard) that cognition and synthesis percolate d o w n into unconscious sensory processes. T h e senses have a tendency towards form-giving activity just as reason does; and they engage in a pre-judgmental process o f making alike, similar o r equal what they encount­ er. In general, N i e t z s c h e agreed with these points and held that man's senses are selective and powerfully influenced b y the scanning o f the circumambient environment for what is o f interest, o f value to the individual and for what is beneficial t o human life: alle unsere Erkenntnißorgane und -Sinne sind nur entwickelt in Hinsicht auf Erhaltungs- und Wachsthums-Bedingungen. 32

Numerous

potential stimuli that scientific inquiry discloses (electrical

processes, ultra-violet waves o r particles, magnetic fields) are, o f course, n o t directly perceivable b y man. Perceptual awareness extends, N i e t z s c h e argues, o n l y so far as it is useful and it is suffused b y primordial valuations. J u s t as

KGW, VIII 2, 16. "All our organs of knowledge and sense are only developed in regard to conditions of growth and preservation."

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Human, All-Too-Human

insects and animals are attracted t o some colors and repulsed b y others, s o , 33

t o o , do c o l o r s c o m e to have value and psychological meaning for us.

Given

all that is said about sensation and perception, it is obvious that the absolute flux, the "unspeakable c o m p l e x i t y " o f the actual, cannot be said to have been discovered in sensation and perception per se. I f our senses were coarser o r m o r e subtle, the " w o r l d s " we would then perceive would be quite different from the o n e we do perceive. A t one point, N i e t z s c h e avers that if our senses were keener, sharper, m o r e penetrating, we would perceive not the solid surfaces o f a cliff, but a mobile chaos.

34

I f we w o n d e r w h y he believes this, it

would seem that he does so because he has adopted the physiological and physical theoretical

Welt-Bilden.

O n the basis o f the validity o f the dynamic theory o f unconscionable c o m p l e x i t y in natural processes, N i e t z s c h e attacks or seeks to conceptions o f Wirklichkeit

undermine

that do not reflect o r acknowledge the process

character and relational nature o f physical actuality. H e accepts, then,

some

scientific theories as plausible and reasonably valid. H e accepts s o m e theories o f p h y s i o l o g y and physical science as " p r o b a b l e " and precinds any charge o f " a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m . " T h e experimental hypothesis o f the "will to p o w e r " is, as shall be shown in some detail later, a philosophical interpretation

of a

dynamic physical t h e o r y o f actuality that N i e t z s c h e provisionally assumes t o be plausible o r valid. I n neither case is there any claim made either t o apodictic certainty o r objective knowledge. Aside from the repeated attacks on the physicists' claims to objective knowledge in Die fröhliche

Wissenschaft,

we

m a y recall the conventionalistic, not to say subjectivistic, view N i e t z s c h e has o f physics in Jenseits

von Gut und Böse.

F o r , he remarks that

Es dämmert jetzt vielleicht in fünf, sechs Köpfen, daß Physik auch nur eine WeltAuslegung und -Zurechtlegung (nach uns! mit Verlaub gesagt) und nicht eine WeltErklärung ist. 35

A n y o n e w h o could understand physics as a "world-interpretation"

that is

formed in accordance with principles o f simplicity and convenience, would o n l y appeal t o the dynamic, fluctuating

theory o f a Relations-Welt

in a

provisional, hypothetical o r heuristic way. I n general, scientific inquiry is seen as pervaded b y obvious o r subtle a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m s , b y conventional fictions that are primarily derived from psychistic fictions, from sophisticated "signs" (Zeichen) not

33

34

35

"explain" and from theoretical interpretations

that designate but do that may o r may

not

Werke, GOA, XVI, 505. Ibid., XVI, 33. KGW, VI 2,JGB, 14. "Perhaps it is dawning on five or six heads that physics, too, is a worldinterpretation and world-exegesis (to suit us, if I may say so) and not a world-explanation."

129

Human, All-Too-Human

correspond t o any external events or event-processes. N i e t z s c h e selects those hypotheses supporting dynamic forces, exceedingly complex dialectical in­ teractions, as p r o b a b l y valid o r as heuristically useful assumptions. I n part, this is an intuitive selection and, in part, it is a response to rising theories in nineteenth century physics. F r o m Heraclitus, Lange and Buddhism, his o w n experiences and reflections, his o w n temperament and intuitive preferences, N i e t z s c h e fairly early o n came to think o f actuality as a c o m p l e x , dynamic process o f " b e c o m i n g . " H o w e v e r , despite his numerous affirmations o f the chaotic, fluctuating character o f the actual, he does not put forward this vision o f the actual as an absolute truth. R a t h e r , the vision o f a chaotic, antithetical " b e c o m i n g " seems to satisfy an "aesthetic instinct" o r seems to be an expres­ sion o f "taste" (Geschmack).

It is even suggested that it is a w a y o f thinking

that must, in the final analysis, be

willed.

Der Wille zum Schein, zur Illusion, zur Täuschung, zum Werden und Wechseln ist tiefer, "metaphysischer" als der Wille zur Wahrheit, zur Wirklichkeit, zum Sein. 36

T h a t the "will to b e c o m i n g " is to be preferred over the "will to B e i n g " is said t o be a m o r e "metaphysical" view is probably meant ironically since the c o n t e x t in which it is said refers t o desire and aesthetic vision. I n addition, the Wirklichkeit

that is mentioned

is not "actuality-as-process," but a m o r e

traditional c o n c e p t i o n o f "reality" as permanent, stable and unchanging. T h e p o i n t o f this passage is that, in the final analysis, the acceptance o f a philosophy o f B e i n g o r a philosophy o f becoming is something that must b e willed and must satisfy an aesthetic and personal desire. Before William J a m e s , N i e t z s c h e emphasized the powerful influence that personal, temperamental orientations had o n the formation o f philosophical theories.

37

A t any rate, the sensory habits and unconscious synthesizing activities that are presumed t o infiltrate sensation, the categorical schema that has evolved over a long period o f time, the psychological attitudes

that

accompany

perceptual experience and shape basic categorical forms, all o f these contribute t o the construction o f a world out o f an assumed " c h a o s " o f competing impressions. Surrounded b y a massive number o f stimuli, we have learned to respond to only some o f these. O u r responses are influenced b y needs, preservation o f life, values, contexts, circumstances o r situations. W e have inherited the perspectival optics o f life that runs through our species and we also encounter other p h e n o m e n a from o u r own subjective perspective as well. T h e Welt that has c o m e to be structured over a very long period o f time is an entirely anthropomorphische

36

37

Welt. A s N i e t z s c h e expresses it,

KGW, VIII 3, 18. "The will to semblance, to illusion, to deception, to becoming and change is deeper, more "metaphysical", than the will to truth, to reality, to Being." KGW, VI 2 , J G B , 5, 6.

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Human, All-Too-Human

wir haben unsere Erhaltungs-Bedingungen projicirt als Prädikate des Seins überhaupt - daß wir in unserem Glauben stabil sein müssen, um zu gedeihen, daraus haben wir gemacht, daß die „wahre" Welt keine wandelbare und werdende, sondern eine seinde ist. 38

W h a t N i e t z s c h e is referring to in this context is the sensory-cognitive structuring o f the phenomenal world after which the metaphysical

"true

w o r l d " was modeled. T h e phenomenal world is arranged, schematized and formed in accordance with our needs. T h i s world is the c o m m o n s e n s e w o r l d augmented b y philosophical (Kantian) categories, one that has c o m e to b e accepted as "true" and is, if we grant anthropomorphic determination, " t r u e " for us in a conditional sense. F r o m a Kantian point o f view, the phenomenal w o r l d that w e can k n o w is an "apparent w o r l d " because it is not a representa­ tion o f the nature o f Dinge-an-sich.

Since N i e t z s c h e denies that the notion o f

"things-in-themselves" is meaningful, and since he denies the existence o f any transcendental wahre

Welt,

what for Kantians is a phenomenal world is, for

us, "true" in a conditional sense, in the sense that it is constructed b y us and is a w o r l d in which w e function, survive and prosper. T h e point is that all o f the factors that N i e t z s c h e believes contribute to o u r comprehension o f a

Welt

indicate that any w o r l d k n o w n b y man is o n l y a world adjusted t o anthropomorphische

Idiosynkrasie.

F r o m the purely hypothetical perspective o f a

being o r beings w h o could transcend the human orientation that has developed over a long period o f time, the anthropomorphic world would be seen as a creative falsification.

H o w e v e r , since man can only know

a world that is

constituted b y his "coarse senses," his reason, his psychic habits o f mind, his needs and his praktische

Werte,

every conditionally k n o w n w o r l d is a p h e n o ­

menal w o r l d that is only conditionally "true" for him. A s N i e t z s c h e puts it, „Scheinbarkeit" ist eine zurechtgemachte und vereinfachte Welt, an der unsre praktischen Instinkte gearbeitet haben: sie ist für uns vollkommen wahr: nämlich wir leben, wir können in ihr leben: Beweis ihrer Wahrheit für u n s . . . : die Welt, abgesehen von unsrer Bedingung, in ihr zu leben, die Welt, die wir nicht

38

KGW, VIII 2, 17. "We have projected the conditions of our preservation as predicates of being in general. Because we have to be stable in our beliefs if we are to prosper, we have made the 'true' world a world not of change and becoming, but one of being." This passage, as well as similar arguments presented elsewhere, indicates why Nietzsche maintains that the transcendental "true world", the unchanging world of perfection, is a duplication of the "apparent world" that has come to be accepted as the phenomenal world comprised of causally related "objects" or "things." The "true world" that is referred to in this passage is the phenomenal world that is "true" for us insofar as it is structured in terms of categories under which experience is subsumed, and which have proven valuable for our practical needs. Neither the transcendental realm constructed with the bricks of categories nor the phenomenal world constituted by our senses, our concepts and our psychology (a world that is conditionally true for us) is true in any ontological sense for Nietzsche.

Human, All-Too-Human

131

auf unser Sein, unsre Logik und psychologischen Vorurteile reduziert haben, existiert nicht als Welt „an sich." 39

W h a t is referred to in the same passage as a Relations-Welt

does not pertain t o

a humanized phenomenal world. Rather, it refers to the theoretical picture o f actuality that the sciences present to us, a Welt-Bild

that N i e t z s c h e considers

as relatively deanthropomorphic.

is implied b y the theoret­

T h e Relations-Welt

ical notions o f physiology and physics; it is a protean, kaleidoscopic process comprised o f constantly shifting relations that can o n l y be referred to in an abstract w a y because it is m u c h t o o c o m p l e x actually t o be described. T h i s presumed Relations-Welt

has, under certain conditions,

von jedem Punkt aus ihr verschiedenes Gesicht: ihr Sein ist essentiell an jedem Punkte anders: sie drückt auf jedem Punkt, es widersteht ihr jeder Punkt - und diese Summierungen sind in jedem Falle gänzlich inkongruent. 40

T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f actuality as a dynamic system o f relations o f "points" is clearly indebted, as we shall see, to dynamic interpretations o f nature such as B o s c o v i c h ' s and those discussed b y Lange. It is put forward as N i e t z s c h e ' s provisional acceptance o f this interpretation o f physical actuality as the m o s t deanthropomorphic

world-interpretation

imaginable. T h e "points" that are

referred to in this passage are ambiguous because they are separated from a general t h e o r y o f a Kraft-Punkte-Welt

in which their theoretical meaning is

imbeded. It m a y be noticed that in this passage no philosophical interpretation o f the meaning, for man, o f this conception o f Wirklichkeit W h e n N i e t z s c h e seeks to give a human

is mentioned.

meaning to this entirely

dean­

t h r o p o m o r p h i c vision o f actuality, he will, ironically, rely upon the very a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m that he has exposed in the theories o f others. In addition to all o f the "human, all-too-human" modalities o f comprehension that have been discussed, we must include the culminating anthropomorphic conception o f a universal Wille

zur Macht

acting through all entities.

Aside from his o w n temperamental and aesthetic attraction to a "world o f b e c o m i n g , " N i e t z s c h e found a great deal o f grist for his mill in Lange's frequent discussions o f a relational c o m p l e x in which there are "vibrations" and " f o r c e s " that are acting upon us and interacting amongst themselves. B o t h the vision o f a deanthropomorphic world-process and the various forms o f

39

40

KGW, VIII 3, 63. "'Apprearance' is an arranged and simplified world, at which our practical instincts have been at work: it is entirely true for us: namely, we live, we are able to live in it: proof of its truth for u s . . . The world, apart from our condition of living in it, the world that we have not reduced to our being, our logic and our psychological prejudgments, does not exist as a world 'in itself.'" Ibid, "...it has a different aspect from each point: its being is essentially different from each point: it presses upon every point and every point resists it - the summation of these is, in each case, entirely incongruent."

Human, All-Too-Human

132

a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m in human thought and in science are found in Lange's Geschiebte

des Materialismus.

O n e o f Lange's central themes is precisely the

a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c nature o f scientific principles and concepts, the interpreta­ tion o f nature in terms o f man. T h e notion o f a realm o f relations immersed in a stream o f Werden

is also emphasized in Lange's history o f materialism. A n d

if w e l o o k carefully enough at Lange's pages, we m a y even discern the scattered fragments

that N i e t z s c h e put together in his formulation

of a

perspectival analysis o f 'knowledge.'

Lange

and

Anthropomorphism

As w e have seen in previous discussions o f the anthropologische of

knowledge

in general and

scientific knowledge

Ursprung

in particular,

Lange

repeatedly uncovers human analogies o r human projections in representations o f ' o b j e c t i v e ' knowledge. T h i s is in large part because o f his o w n psychologistic interpretation o f K a n t and, in addition, is reinforced b y the n e o - K a n t i a n sentiments o f a n u m b e r o f nineteenth century scientists. T h e closest that L a n g e c o m e s t o espousing the idea that the advancement o f scientific knowledge leads t o an approximation o f "truth" is in a passage in which he virtually anticipates C . S. Peirce's general conception o f scientific discovery: unsre Hypothesen und Theorien ohne Feindschaft und ohne Glauben als das betrachtet werden, was sie sind: als Stufen in jener unendlichen Annäherung an die Wahrheit, welche die Bestimmung unsrer intellektuellen Entwicklung zu sein scheint.' 41

All theories are but a means o f approximating to truth and mastering facts for o u r purposes. T h i s orientation is one which is n o t typical o f Lange's usual skeptical approach t o hypothesis and theory, to his conventionalism and fictionalism. M o r e often than not, he refers to the "limits o f natural k n o w ­ ledge" and points to the unknowability o f truth in science. W e are only able to describe as 'true' what necessarily appears so to our menschliche

Organisation.

O u r concepts are phenomenal, are products o f the same process that yields sense-perceptions and judgments. O u r categories have a sensuous origin and are affected b y the same psychologische

Prozesses

that infiltrate sensory experi­

ence. T h e roots o f o u r intellectual or conceptual "values" (Werte) into o u r immediate sensations and then disappear into the innermost nature o f man.

41

42

run down unknowable,

Even though sensory observation is basic in

Lange, op. cit., II, 619. " . . . o u r hypotheses and theories are regarded, without enmity and without faith, as what they are: as stages in that endless approximation to truth which seems to be the destiny of our intellectual development."

133

Lange and Anthropomorphism

scientific inquiry, the senses provide a colored and perhaps ultimately inade­ quate picture o f actual entities or processes. B o t h at the level o f sensory perception and conceptualization there is a synthesizing process that takes place and the p h e n o m e n o n that is k n o w n is never a purely objective s o m e ­ thing. T o be sure, Lange argues, the exakte

Wissenschaften

do try t o eliminate

the "prejudices" that tend to enter into even the m o s t immediate perceptions. E v e n in the precision o f the "exact sciences" the m o s t important elements do n o t lie in the "material fact," but in the conceptual synthesis o f the results, in the resulting "logical and mathematical interpretation."

43

In the scientific interpretation o f nature "sensuous intuition" plays an important role. T h e general acceptance o f the atomistic theory is said t o be due primarily to the "picturability" o f atoms. It is said that D a l t o n sought a anschauliche

Vorstellung

b y which to conceive o f the cause o f the relation o f

simple volumetric p r o p o r t i o n s .

44

T h e reliance o n "picturability"

(Anschaulich­

keit) in science is in part the result o f o u r typical dependence on o u r senses and is also an aesthetic feature o f our understanding. U n c o n s c i o u s l y , it w o u l d seem, sensuous intuitions, simplified images and various

anthropomorphic

considerations enter into the ' o b j e c t i v i t y ' that the sciences seek. D u B o i s - R e y m o n d , in particular, was quite sensitive to o u r tendency t o represent physical processes to ourselves in personified forms. T h e c o n c e p t o f " f o r c e " or Kraft

in particular is considered as only a recondite product o f an

apparently irresistable "tendency to personification" (Hanges 45

tion).

zur

Personifika­

A s we have already seen, Lange adds to this kind o f observation that the

supposed relations between Kraft grammatical relation o f Subjekt

and Materie

and Prädikat.

are thought o f in terms o f the T h e r e is n o matter without force

because we think that there is n o subject without a predicate. F u r t h e r m o r e , the very c o n c e p t i o n o f a unity o f matter, an isolated " a t o m " that

produces

"effects", is patterned after the subjective assumption that we are subjective unities that have "forces" that produce "effects." S o distressed was du B o i s R e y m o n d b y the ambiguity o f " f o r c e " and "matter" and b y their personified nature that he threw his hands in the air and proclaimed that, counter to its initial intentions, science must comprehend that the nature

o f things is

incomprehensible. T a k i n g the opportunity to express his o w n views, Lange adds that the task o f philosophy should not be to seek a mythical "metaphysi-

42

Ibid., II, 623.

43

Ibid., II, 735-736 n, Ibid., II, 633-634. Ibid., II, 649-650.

44

45

134

Human, All-Too-Human

cal k n o w l e d g e , " but to see that we cannot go b e y o n d the Kreis the "circle o f experience."

der

Erfahrung,

46

T h e agnosticism in nineteenth century science began to metastasize. T h e ultimate constituents o f the physical world are elusive, vaguely conceived or simply personified notions. W h a t , according to Lange, can we k n o w ? W e l l , we k n o w effects that w e perceive, bearing in mind that o u r perception is highly selective, discerns qualities not found in physical processes and is relative to o u r state, condition and perspective. A n d the evidence o f the independent sciences suggests that we have knowledge o f the relations are uncertain about the basis o f such relations.

47

o f entities even if we

Although quite willing to

grant the hypothetical existence o f atoms, H e l m h o l t z reflects on the history of hypotheses that have fallen b y the wayside and states his preference for sticking t o observed "effects" and relations o f effects. Again and again, L a n g e points t o the failure t o discover the ultimate constituents o f the natural world. T h e p h e n o m e n a the scientist deals with are Vorstellungen

that are shaped

and formed b y o u r "psycho-physical organization." A n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m has played a paradoxical role in the advancement o f science. O n the one hand, it has given man s o m e o f his m o s t fruitful hypotheses or picturable n o t i o n s ; o n the o t h e r hand, it has led to an agnosticism about the ultimate nature o f things precisely because man projects his beliefs about himself, his feelings, his subjectivity into the natural world and thereby disguises what is sought. I t is interesting to n o t e that Lange is attracted to the positing o f extensionless Kraftzentren

o r "force-centers" because this gives up the "principle o f pictura-

bility." I n the same place, he points to E r n s t M a c h ' s and Zöllner's c o n c e p t i o n o f four-dimensional space o r the suggestion o f non-Euklidean space as entail­ ing a c o m p l e t e revision o f the entire theory o f knowledge.

48

W h a t L a n g e seems

t o like in these sophisticated theories (that provide the background for the development o f relativity theory) is their deanthropomorphic character. H e sees that physical t h e o r y is moving away from the N e w t o n i a n system o f nature that is dominated b y a causal n e t w o r k o f determinate entities. H e fully agrees with H e l m h o l t z that w e are reasonably certain only about the "effects" o r "properties" o f entities. W e k n o w a 'Ding' the n o t i o n o f a Ding

o n l y through its properties. I n fact,

is simply a resting place o f our thought, an assumption

that is m o r e a figment o f o u r mind than a real object. T h e abstract c o n c e p t o f a thing is formulated b y virtue o f o u r cognitive-sensory organization. T h e r e are no isolated things and there is nothing corresponding to "the same thing." W e

47

48

Ibid., II, 651-653. Ibid., II, 653. "...mit dem Fortschritt der Wissenschaft immer sicherer in der Kenntnis der Beziehungen der Dinge und immer unsicherer über das Subjekt dieser Beziehungen."

Ibid., II, 658.

135

Lange and Anthropomorphism

call entities "the s a m e " because we extract them artifically from their position in relation t o o t h e r entities and ignore their reactions t o , or interactions with, o t h e r entities.

49

T h e sciences in general are pervaded,

Lange claims, b y

hypothetical entities o r "substances", b y hypostasizations, b y reifications. A s Lange sympathetically examines the currents o f thought in nineteenth century science, he is driven further and further into skepticism. A l t h o u g h he does not o b j e c t to postulating bearers o f relations in physical theories, he warns against treating such hypothetical entities as "real" beings. Concluding his analysis o f Kraft nur

und Stoff,

he remarks that „die Naturwissenschaften

in den Relationen

zu finden

ein sicherer

Boden

50

ist. " O b v i o u s l y , it is here that we find the

b a c k g r o u n d for N i e t z s c h e ' s conception o f a Relations-Welt

comprised o f

dynamic actions, reactions and interactions. T h e sensorium

o f man has evolved, as D a r w i n has said, out o f the "struggle

for existence," out o f a need for adaptation to his environment. M a n is a c o m p l e x organism furnished with "an infinitely complex apparatus"

(Unend­

licher

Apparat,

verwickelter

Apparat).

H i s survival depends not only o n this

but o n unconscious "mechanisms." L i k e m a n y o f his contemporaries, Lange was deeply impressed b y the Darwinian theory o f evolution b y means o f natural selection. D a r w i n ' s major w o r k s were fresh from the presses, challeng­ ing, exciting and revolutionary in their implications. T h e oldest form o f a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m , that o f a teleology in nature, was challenged and man's origins were firmly placed in a naturalistic setting. Lange's exposition of, and c o m m e n t a r y o n , D a r w i n ' s theories had considerable influence o n N i e t z s c h e in the earliest stages o f his development. Schopenhauer had earlier compared the intellect t o a t o o l that is in the service o f the "will to live" and had said that it is to man as weapons o f defence are to animals. N o w Lange's discussion o f D a r w i n reinforces the n o t i o n that man's senses and his intellect have evolved over a long period o f time and have contributed, in an important way, to his survival, his capacity for adaptation and his prosperity on earth. Since other species o f living beings live and survive o n the same earth, they also must have developed sensory patterns and habitual responses that have contributed t o their survival. M a n ' s sensory system is highly c o m p l e x and powerful. B u t o t h e r creatures with entirely different "organizations" must "interpret" the world

quite differently,

must,

in fact, live and act in entirely

different

K a n t o n c e again coincides with scientific knowledge. T h e human

Sinnlich­

" w o r l d s " than the world o f man.

keit is receptive t o a certain variety o f appearances. If, b y analogy, we assume

49

50

Ibid., II, 659. Ibid., II, 665.

Human, All-Too-Human

136

that there are an indefinite n u m b e r o f types o f sensory organizations, then eine ganze

Unendlichkeit

verschiedener

Auffassungen

möglich ist.

51

T h i s insight will

be recalled b y N i e t z s c h e a n u m b e r o f times and often for the purpose o f emphasizing that the system o f appearances we experience is o n l y one o f an infinite n u m b e r o f possible "interpretations." T h e r e is n o "nature-in-itself" because each species o f living beings perceives, lives in and acts in a different natural

environment and responds to different stimuli. A s a philologist,

N i e t z s c h e was already familiar with the importance o f interpretation for an understanding o f a text. B u t it was Lange w h o suggested t o him the universal­ ity o f Auffassung

o r Auslegung,

its importance for life, sensation, thought and

knowledge. B o t h the understanding

o f science as offering a "plurality of

interpretations" and the sense o f the variety o f interpretive perspectives that is possible are indebted to Lange's insights. In Die fröhliche

Wissenschaft,

N i e t z s c h e virtually quotes Lange when he asserts that Die Welt ist uns vielmehr noch einmal „unendlich" geworden: insofern wir die Möglichkeit nicht abweisen können, daß sie unendliche Interpretationen in sich schließt. 52

Naturally, he immediately calls attention to the menschliche,

allzumenschliche

interpretation that w e k n o w so well. Lange presents a similar view in a different light. H e says that man is in a unique position insofar as he can, through scientific investigation, discover that his sensory-cognitive perspective is just as one-sided as that o f other kinds o f animals. Morgenröte,

53

T y p i c a l l y , as in

N i e t z s c h e ' s reaction to this intelligence is m o r e dramatic. H e sees

o u r senses as "lying," as enclosing us in a prison from which there is n o escape. E a c h individual has his o r her personal, subjective perspective, a perspec­ tive that is physical and psychic. A n d all o f us share the inherited perspectives that have presumably evolved over a long period o f time and have b e c o m e habitual and unconscious. L a n g e points out that ultra-violet rays, for example, are imperceptible, as are m a n y other stimuli that can be detected b y sensing devices. O d o r s that attract m o t h s t o each other over considerable distances are unnoticed b y us. O n the basis o f numerous phenomena such as this, Lange concludes that o u r sense-organs are selective and are "organs o f abstraction." T h e y eliminate m a n y "effects" that are available in the environment and select out others. If, as Lange argues, unsre

51

52

53

Sinnesapparate

sind

Abstraktionsappa-

Ibid., II, 499. KGW, V 2, FW, V, 374. "The world has once again become 'infinite' to us: insofar as we cannot dismiss the possibility that it contains infinite interpretations." Lange, op. cit., II, 549.

137

Lange and Anthropomorphism

rate,

then w e have a "one-sided picture o f the w o r l d " that is made even m o r e

so b y abstract thinking.

54

A l t h o u g h philosophers such as B e r k e l e y had said that there is no inference in immediate fortiori

perception, L a n g e maintains that seeing is inference. T h i s is a

the case if there is "unconscious thinking" immanent in the perceptual

process. A mechanistic physiology inevitably leads to the realization that our sensations and perceptions are not " c o p i e s " o r "representations" o f some external o b j e c t , but, rather, are acquainted with constituted appearances that m a y b e construed as signs o f transphenomenal entities or processes. T h e w o r l d apprehended in sensory experience is not the world, but a system o f appear­ ances that exists for us. W i t h an irony that Lange refers t o , a physicalistic analysis o f sensation and perception leads to a conclusion that is not unlike that of subjective idealism. T h e rich qualitative w o r l d we are acquainted with in sense-experience is a w o r l d that is valid or 'real' for us. O r , as N i e t z s c h e will later write, Die Qualität

ist eine perspektivische

Wahrheit

für uns; kein

55

"an sich."

Imagina­

tively, L a n g e pushes his perspectivalism to its limits. It is possible, he argues (before what he calls H e l m h o l t z ' s and R i e m a n n ' s " 'metamathematical' specu­ lations" concerning intuitions o f non-Euklidean space), that beings with spatial intuitions o f m o r e or less than three dimensions m a y exist w h o would have representations o f p h e n o m e n a that we cannot even imagine.

56

It is

obvious from this remark, as well as others, that Lange was N i e t z s c h e ' s inspiration for the idea that an infinite n u m b e r o f differing interpretations o f the w o r l d o r p h e n o m e n a is possible. T h e three basic forms that N i e t z s c h e ' s perspectival theory o f experience and knowledge take have their prolepsis in Lange's original reflections. First, there is the ineluctable individual perspective from which each specific being experiences the world, one which has as its content the subjective modifica­ tions o f o u r senses and the individual psychic states that are part o f the lifehistory o f each individual. Secondly, there is the perspective o f o u r species that has evolved over a long period o f time and has presumably been genetically transmitted. O n this point, N i e t z s c h e imagines, in a kind o f speculative a n t h r o p o l o g y , that individuals w h o did not perceive the world as others came t o were either treated as mad or eccentric or simply died out. T h o s e , for example, w h o were unable t o discern "the like" or the similar p r o b a b l y perished.

54

55

56

Ibid., II, 862-863. KGW, VIII 1, 201. "Quality is a perspectival truth for us, not an 'in itself'." Lange, op. cit., II, 870, 891 n.

Human, All-Too-Human

138

Wer zum Beispiel das „Gleiche" nicht oft genug aufzufinden wußte, in betreff der Nahrung oder in betreff der ihm feindlichen Tiere, wer also zu langsam sub­ sumierte, zu vorsichtig in der Subsumption war, hatte nur geringere Wahrschein­ lichkeit des Fortlebens als der, welcher bei allem Ahnlichen sofort auf Gleichheit riet. Der überwiegende Hang aber, das Ahnliche als gleich zu behandeln . . . hat erst alle Grundlage der Logik geschaffen. 57

N i e t z s c h e seems t o have assumed that these habitual modes o f perception and judgment were transmitted to subsequent generations and had b e c o m e c a n o n i ­ cal. A l t h o u g h such an argument sounds Darwinian, we k n o w , from other sources in N i e t z s c h e ' s writings, that he tended towards a Lamarckian biology insofar as he believed that, for example, patterns o f sensory apprehension, responses to stimuli and judgments are learned and b e c o m e "acquired charac­ teristics" that are believed to be transmitted to future generations. W h a t c o m e to be natural propensities o f behavior have a long history and are r o o t e d in transmitted processes o f "assimilation." T h r o u g h o u t his history,

58

Lange argues that consciousness is fundamentally

based upon sensations or complexes o f sensations. Sense impressions are transmitted

to

"nerve-centers" and

are identified

b y a particular

sound

( = w o r d ) . I n sensory experience language is used to designate the psychical import o r subjective meaning o f a sensory excitation. L a n g e refers t o the localization o f speech centers o f the brain in the cerebral cortex where sounds are said to be c o m b i n e d to form significant w o r d s .

59

I f we c o m b i n e these

observations with Lange's assumption that the primary function o f language is to name particulars in a symbolic manner, that language should be understood in a nominalistic w a y and that linguistic signs have a naturalistic origin and a conventional meaning, we have virtually all o f the ingredients that N i e t z s c h e brought together in his unpublished essay, Ueber aussermoralischen

Sinne.

Wahrheit

und Lüge

im

N i e t z s c h e creatively synthesizes Lange's scattered

observations on sense-perception and linguistic signification in his creation o f the notion o f anthropomorphische

Wahrheit

and what amounts to a pragmatic

account o f ' k n o w l e d g e . '

57

58

59

KGW, V 2, FW, III, 111. "Whoever could not discern the 'similar' often enough in regard to food and animals dangerous to him, whoever was too slow in subsuming or was too circumspect in subsumption, had a lesser probability of survival than one who, in all similar cases, immediately discerned the similarity. The dominant inclination to deal with the similar as the equal... first created the basis of logic." Werke, GOA, XIII, 256-257. Lange, op. cit., II, 802-803. In the first edition of the Geschichte Nietzsche would have found similar views (especially in de la Mettrie's theory of Zeichen) expressed. GdM, 176-177, 470 ff. In his essay on "truth and lying" Nietzsche seems to paraphrase Lange's phrase "Tempel von Begriffen." 471.

139

Lange and Anthropomorphism

O n the occasion o f discussing the medieval concern with the analysis o f language in general and with nominalism in particular, Lange offers his dicta

obiter

o n these issues. H e contends that the development o f ultra-formal

analyses in later Scholasticism coincided with the rise o f empiricism that, in turn, tended to undermine Scholasticism. H e sees the need for a thorough analysis o f language in his o w n time, as well as the need for a critical treatment of the relation between w o r d and meaning. Lange even accurately predicts that the important p r o b l e m o f language that the late medieval thinkers dealt with will have to b e taken up again in philosophy "in another c o n n e c t i o n and with another ultimate purpose." J u s t as Aristotle had once tried to

understand

language as " c o n v e n t i o n a l , " so, t o o , did O c c a m seek to show the conventional nature o f "the language o f science." Lange applauds this concern with "preci­ s i o n " and praises O c c a m for opposing Platonism and for restricting knowledge to the sensory particular. B y separating out doctrines o f faith as incapable o f p r o o f and b y developing a nominalistic theory o f knowledge, O c c a m paved the way t o "freedom o f thought." L a n g e is sympathetic with nominalism because h e holds that the further w e move from the sensory particular, the m o r e likely w e are to fall into error or Platonic hypostasization. Even here, however, we must remind ourselves that language functions in relation t o designated particulars as "arbitrary signs" (gebrauchende

Zeichen).

T h e criti­

que o f language should focus upon the purely logical aspect o f language (or what Wittgenstein later calls the "logic o f language"), as well as upon the psycho-historical element o f language (what would be called the diachronic aspect o f language). Given the conventional nature o f language, the claim that "truth"

is the

"chimera."

correct c o m b i n a t i o n

o f signs forming

a judgment

is a

60

In a later discussion o f the philosophy o f Lamettrie, Lange finds earlier support for his o w n views about sensation and language. A l o n g the way, a few assertions o f Lamettrie and some o f Lange's c o m m e n t s may be o f interest as indications o f h o w thoroughly N i e t z s c h e assimilated what he found

on

Lange's pages. T h e account o f sensation and language found in Lamettrie's L'Homme

Machine

is especially interesting. Lamettrie pictures man as an

animal a m o n g animals, but one w h o acquires the p o w e r o f inventing signs b y virtue o f the better organized specimens w h o had developed this skill. T h e physiological response to sounds produced, in the brain, words. W o r d s or signs came t o be used to refer to "similar" things and eventually concepts were formed out o f the representational function of "signs." En passant,

Lamettrie

observes that the various temperaments we b e c o m e familiar with rest upon a

60

Ibid., I, 283-284.

140

Human, All-Too-Human

physiological basis that determines the character o f the man. T h e slightest physical disturbance o r abnormality can convert a genius into an idiot. A s Lamettrie expresses it, Ein Nichts, eine kleine Fiber, irgend etwas, was die subtilste Anatomie nicht entdecken kann, hätte aus Erasmus und Fontenelle zwei Toren gemacht. 61

In

his "positivistic" period, N i e t z s c h e places special emphasis upon

the

physiological determinants o f behavior and, at one point, proffers an observa­ tion that resembles that o f Lamettrie. Ein Tropfen Blut zu viel oder zu wenig im Gehirn kann unser Leben unsäglich elend und hart machen, daß wir mehr an diesem Tropfen zu leiden haben, als Prometheus an seinem Geier. 62

Aside from such relationships between Lamettrie's account o f sensation and language, his " p h y s i o l o g i s m " , and Nietzsche's thinking when he c o m p o s e d Morgenröte,

there are other curious similarities between some o f Lamettrie's

views and those o f N i e t z s c h e when he was engaged in what might be called a natural history o f man. Lamettrie observes that man should take pride in his excellence and should prize genius, nobility and beauty even though they are often "children o f c h a n c e "

63

or, in the case o f N i e t z s c h e ' s superior types o f

human beings, "happy accidents." T h i s F r e n c h materialist claims, as N i e t z s c h e will in Menschliches,

Allzumenschliches,

that animals display what m a y b e

called a sense o f good and evil, that their behavior sometimes indicates what 64

m a y be taken as a rudimentary moral sense. In addition, he alludes to the selfcreating p o w e r o f nature, to the belief that atheism m a y allow the return o f the rights and purity o f nature and remove the "consecrated p o i s o n " that religion has injected into it.

65

O t h e r relevant views o f Lamettrie that are discussed b y

Lange are the following: despite their prestige, intellect, reason and knowledge are often useless to secure happiness and they may even be injurious; the origin from w h i c h o u r "virtues" spring is b y no means pure and, in order to attain well-being, we must r o o t out the sting o f conscience which is due to a defective education that unfairly condemns sensuous e n j o y m e n t .

61

62

63

64

63

66

66

A l t h o u g h there are

Ibid., I, 358. "A mere nothing, a tiny fibre, some trifling thing that the most subtle anatomy cannot discover, would have made two idiots out of Erasmus and Fontenelle." Cp. GdM, 175. The discussion of De la Mettrie's thought is substantially the same in the first and second editions of the Geschichte. KGW, V 1, M, I, 83. "A single drop of blood too much or too little in the brain may make our life unspeakably miserable and difficult, and we may suffer more from this single drop of blood than Prometheus from his vultures." Lange, op. cit., I, 359. Ibid. Ibid., I, 362. Ibid., I, 368-372.

141

Lange and Anthropomorphism

other similarities between the views o f Lamettrie and N i e t z s c h e , a considera­ tion o f them w o u l d carry us t o o far afield. O n e o f the startling effects o f reading Lange's Geschichte

des Materialismus

through Nietzschean spectacles

is that we see that N i e t z s c h e learned not only from Lange himself, but from virtually everyone Lange discusses. So far, then, we have seen that Lange and some o f the philosophers he treats in his history contributed a great deal b o t h to Nietzsche's understanding of sensation and perception and language. T h e perspectival nature o f sensory experience c o m b i n e d with the c o n c e p t i o n o f language as comprised o f natur­ ally evolved arbitrary

signs is pretty

m u c h assimilated b y N i e t z s c h e . It

comprises his overall understanding o f the anthropomorphic perspective as a highly limited, restricted one that is, b y implication, a falsification o f the world, albeit a creative and practical o n e . T h e everyday, domestic world in which man lives is one that has been "constituted" b y our sensory organiza­ tion, b y o u r languages and o u r metaphorical, simplifying concepts. F o r a time, Nietzsche seemed to believe that the exact sciences c o m e quite close to an understanding "unapparent

o f actuality as actuality, that their disciplined concern with little

truths"

might

overcome

a

tendency

towards

t h r o p o m o r p h i s m . Ironically, the so-called "positivistic" standpoint in Menschliches,

Allzumenschliches

an­

adopted

is one which N i e t z s c h e knew, if he had

remembered his Lange, w o u l d not lead us closer to objectivity o r 'truth.' As early as 1873, N i e t z s c h e had already expressed philosophical views that disclosed the anthromorphic nature o f truth and knowledge. I n his prefaces to his major

works,

Nietzsche

says that,

typically, he has

surpassed

the

philosophical positions that are presented in these w o r k s even as he is writing them. T h e suggestion is made that he adopts a philosophical stance for dialectical

purposes in order to represent various interpretations from various

points o f view. T h i s is all well and g o o d and p l a u s i b l e . . . except for Wahrheit

und Lüge

im aussermoralischen

Sinne.

Ueber

F o r , as we have seen, he

reaches conclusions in that brief essay that are antagonistic not o n l y to Die Geburt

der Tragödie

and its romantic metaphysics, but to the positivistic faith

in observation, experiment and precision in the exakte his extensive study o f Lange's magnum

opus,

Wissenschaften.

Given

we k n o w that he was already

quite familiar with the pervasive role o f anthropomorphism in the sciences that he repeatedly refers t o later in Die fröhliche

Wissenschaft.

epistemological fragments in the Nachgelassene

W h e n we turn to the

Fragmente,

we realize that

many o f these condensed insights are n o t really new at all even though the language in which they are expressed m a y be. T h e claim that Heidegger makes that the authentic p h i l o s o p h y o f N i e t z s c h e is found in the N a c h l a s s 67

Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Pfullingen, 1961, I, 17.

67

is highly

142

Human, All-Too-Human

debatable for t w o reasons: m a n y o f the ideas and theoretical notions presented there can be found in the published w o r k s

68

and, perhaps m o r e importantly,

the influential b a c k g r o u n d o f Lange's thought, as well as the views o f m a n y o f the thinkers he examines, shows that N i e t z s c h e has returned in his notes to issues, questions and themes that he had c o m e upon twenty o r m o r e years earlier. E v e n though the Nachlass the meaning o f the Wille

contains numerous attempts to formulate

zur Macht

and its virtually universal modalities o f

manifestation, he had already conceived o f all living beings as will to p o w e r in Zarathustra von

and had extended the principle t o all entities whatsoever in

Gut und Böse.

T h e Nachlass

Jenseits

is filled with remarkable, even explosive,

insights and marvellous, highly condensed analyses. It is indispensable for a full understanding

o f N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophy. H o w e v e r , there are a great

many observations, occasional notations and opinions expressed in the

Nach­

lass that are never used in N i e t z s c h e ' s published writings and are, at best, tangential t o his considered thought. W e do n o t find his true philosophy here and we do not find a "metaphysics." Returning to L a n g e ' s humanistic analysis o f knowledge, it is interesting to note that he discerned a close link amongst teleology, morality and an­ t h r o p o m o r p h i s m . I n his interpretation o f the early G r e e k philosophers, he claims that the emergence o f Teleologie

in the thought o f Socrates, Plato and

Aristotle was a reaction t o not o n l y the ethical relativity o f the Sophists, but to the materialistic t h e o r y o f nature. L a n g e believes that Ethischen vor allem

die T e l e o l o g i e .

69

Ursprungs

ist

T h r o u g h o u t his critical history o f materialism he

will reiterate this and add that metaphysical systems typically have an "ethical origin" as well. T h i s is a central idea o f N i e t z s c h e ' s , one that is frequently used as a means o f indicting any thinker w h o puts forward a metaphysical theory in order to justify a particular morality. It is also used for condemning even the slightest hint o f teleology. N i e t z s c h e not only sees teleology as a n t h r o p o m o r ­ phic, but as fallacious and nefarious. It is a false assumption because, if the c o s m o s did have an end o r goal towards which it was moving, this would have already been attained. It is nefarious because an objective

teleology

deprives the

individual and the human w o r l d o f any real existential significance. I n addi-

68

69

Werke in Drei Bänden, ed. K. Schlechta, München, 1956, III, 1433. "Den bereits publizierten Nachlaß lasse ich weg, weil in ihm nach meiner Kenntnis kein neuer zentraler Gedanke zu finden ist." Although, in general, I believe that this is substantially correct, the Nachlass contains material that is essential for a full understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy. It provides a background from which to see how Nietzsche arrives at the views he does publish and it indicates his goals, his projects, his intentions. Although the Nachlass includes a great deal of material that is not used in published works, the central themes in the published writings are found in Nietzsche's fascinating notes. Lange, op. cit., I, 137n. The notes entered between October 1867 and April 1868 indicate a very early concern on Nietzsche's part with Teleologie and its "valuation." HKG 3, 371-392.

Lange and Anthropomorphism

143

tion, the belief in a teleology in nature and the w o r l d justifies the most horrendous events or the m o s t absurd accidents and, as in H e g e l , glorifies success. N i e t z s c h e is hostile b o t h to mechanistic materialism and to objective teleology. I n the final analysis, so, t o o , is Lange. A t any rate, the critique o f anthropomorphism in ancient p h i l o s o p h y focuses primarily on Aristotle. T h e following observation is intended as a critical view o f Aristotle's thought, even though it contains what is, I believe, the first o f a n u m b e r o f suggestions that N i e t z s c h e will bear in m i n d w h e n seeking arguments for the universality o f the Wille

zur

Macht.

Aristoteles... eine Kraft der Selbstverwirklichung in alle Naturwesen gelegt, welche als Naturerscheinung schlechthin unfaßbar ist und dagegen im praktischen Bewußtsein des bildenden und gestaltenden Menschen ihr einziges Urbild hat. 70

In Socrates, Plato and A r i s t o t l e , the w o r l d is said to be explained from men and not from laws o f nature o r natural processes. L a n g e charges Aristotle with reckless "Anthropomorphismus,"

with a repeated reliance on arguments from

human activity. H e sees the naturalistic tendency in Aristotle, but emphasizes his tendency t o interpret nature in terms o f an immanent teleology that acts through

all beings. Surprisingly, he

does

not

mention

the

typical

an­

t h r o p o m o r p h i c model o f causality that Aristotle presents, especially in regard to efficient and final causes. T o be sure, in another context, he does call attention, as N i e t z s c h e later will, to the modeling o f causality o n the grammat­ ical s u b j e c t - o b j e c t distinction and t o o u r feeling that our " e g o " produces "effects" through acts o f will. En passant,

L a n g e shows himself quite sympathetic to at least one c o n c e p ­

tion o f Aristotle's, that o f the belief that there are natural Rangverhältnisse

or

"relations o f r a n k " that are arranged b y degrees according t o value. Lange is sympathetic to such a scheme because it is n o t based upon human opinions but is rooted in the "nature o f things." I n a note to a previous reference t o Aristotle, this general c o n c e p t i o n is called a R a n g o r d n u n g .

7 1

T h e r e is n o doubt

that this summary o f A r i s t o t l e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f gradations o f rank in accord­ ance with Wert conception o f a

70

71

o r "value" was the primitive inspiration for N i e t z s c h e ' s later Rangordnung.

Ibid., I, 137n. "Aristotle . . . imported a power of realizing themselves into all natural things which is completely inconceivable as a natural phenomenon, and has its sole original in the practical consciousness of the forming and creating human beings." Aside from suggesting a Potenz in all beings that is based upon human analogy, this same footnote refers to Aristotle's establishment of a Rangordnung aller Naturdinge. In all probability, this was the first imprint that Nietzsche received of the idea of a natural Rangordnung of capacities, of "powers" and of men. Ibid., I, 84.

144

Human, All-Too-Human

In

the course o f his exposition o f ancient thinkers, Lange praises (as

N i e t z s c h e later will) the Sophists for their critical theory o f knowledge and for their critical analyses of words and their meanings. H e understands the Sophists to have put forward a kind o f nominalism that considered words as "signs" (Zeichen)

that are used to represent eine Summe

von

Empfindungen.

7 2

T h i s m o d e o f understanding words as signs that signify "a sum o f sensations" suggests, in a general way, N i e t z s c h e ' s early definition o f Wahrheit

as a "sum

of human relations." Ironically, Lange is quite sanguine about P r o t a g o r a s ' statement that der Mensch

ist das Maß der Dinge

form o f Anthropomorphismus.

even though this is a radical

Even though Lange does not express it, the

p r o b a b l e reason w h y he does not object to this aspect o f the Sophists' thought is that they do not project anthropomorphic notions into the natural w o r l d and, in fact, m a k e a clear distinction between the "conventional" social w o r l d in which man lives, acts, speaks and writes and the amoral realm o f nature in w h i c h the strong lord it over the weak. I f we are to believe Plato's Gorgias,

the

y o u n g Sophist, Callicles, understood quite well that ' N a t u r e ' and convention are opposed to o n e another and that nature reveals a brutal struggle for survival and " p o w e r . " N i e t z s c h e , o f course, will later stare into this heart o f darkness in nature, at first reacting with h o r r o r , then with resignation and, finally, with the realization that it is precisely this energistic conatus

that must be trans­

formed, controlled, channeled and "sublimated" into positive, enhancing and creative expression. U n l i k e Callicles or his m o r e powerful twentieth century counterparts,

N i e t z s c h e saw clairvoyantly that a Selbstaufhebung

crudest form o f Wille

zur Macht

o f the

was absolutely essential to an authentic,

creative existence. In an ironic w a y , N i e t z s c h e will m o r e o r less accept the Sophists' notion that truth is relative t o man, that "man is the measure o f all things." T h i s delineation o f the Sophistic standpoint is ironic insofar as N i e t z s c h e uses it to s h o w that what is taken to be objective truth is, in fact, human or "subjective" truth. H i s critical analysis o f "anthropomorphic truth" is an implicit critique o f the Sophists in the sense that he considers such "truth" an elaborate falsification, an error that is necessary for the survival o f our species, an anthropomorphische

Idiosynkrasie.

T h e accounts o f the physiology o f the

senses, the conventional or social nature o f language, the simplifying nature o f o u r categories, the teleological interpretation o f nature, the Sophistic t h e o r y o f knowledge, the reliance upon human models for an understanding o f natural forces

o r relations (e. g., cause and effect) -

N i e t z s c h e ' s expose

72

all o f these contribute

to

o f the anthropomorphic nature o f knowledge and "truth."

Ibid., I, 45. Cp. GdM, 12-21.

Lange and Anthropomorphism

145

As w e have seen so far, he derived m u c h o f the material for this critical aspect of his thought from Lange. N o doubt thinking o f the Sophists, Lange asks, at one point, whether the presumed immediate certainty o f the particular concrete perception might be the foundation o f all "truth." I n typical fashion, he immediately relates this question to the assumptions o f the empiricists o f his o w n day. F o r , do they not rely u p o n a belief in the validity o f immediate perception? D o they not continually speak o f the discovery o f "facts"? Lange's treatment

o f this

question is one that N i e t z s c h e will recall (and elaborate o n ) in his Nachlass

of

the 1 8 8 0 ' s . Unsere heutigen Empiriker fordern die Bestätigung durch die „Tatsachen." Über das Vorhandensein einer Tatsache aber richtet wieder nur die Wahrnehmung. Wendet der Logiker ein: nicht die Wahrnehmung, sondern die methodische Prüfung entscheide über das Vorhandensein einer Tatsache, so ist dagegen zu erinnern, daß sich die methodische Prüfung... nur auf Wahrnehmungen und deren Deutungen beziehen kann. 73

Such an observation undercuts, to some extent, the belief that there are pure, uninterpreted

"facts." Given Lange's sympathy with the Kantian emphasis

upon the active, constructive nature o f knowing and o f perceptual judgment, his phenomenalistic empiricism is b y n o means dogmatic. O n the other hand, he does see the importance o f joining "Empirismus

und logischer

Formalis­

mus, " especially if w e m a k e experience and the natural sciences the foundation o f o u r views. H e certainly sees this new orientation as an improvement on the "prejudices o f past centuries" and "the childish stages" o f human reflection.

74

In his o w n "positivistic" stage o f thought, N i e t z s c h e certainly seemed to have agreed with Lange o n the value of a strict empirical method o f discovery. H o w e v e r , his remarks "against positivism" that echo Lange indicate that even before he w r o t e Menschliches,

Allzumenschliches

he had some inkling o f the

hypothetical, interpretative nature o f empirical understanding. Given that the above orientation that Lange promotes - the union o f "empiricism and logical formalism" - is a very brief anticipatory sketch o f logical

positivism,

it is

possible that N i e t z s c h e is not, in the following, criticizing F r e n c h positivism, but the implicit form o f logical positivism that Lange, at one point, embraces. I f this is the case, then N i e t z s c h e is using Lange to criticize Lange! Given the deep

73

74

and

convoluted

relation

between

the

philosophy

of

Lange

and

Ibid., I, 87-88. "Our present-day empiricists demand ratification through "facts." But as to the presence of a fact, we can again only appeal to perception. If the logician objects that it is not perception but methodical proof that determines the presence of a fact, we have to remind him that this methodical proof . . . can only be referred to perceptions and their interpretation." Ibid., I, 185.

146

Human, All-Too-Human

Nietzsche's thought, this w o u l d not be unusual. Virtually paraphrasing Lange, N i e t z s c h e writes that Gegen den Positivismus, welcher bei den Phänomenen stehn bleibt „es gibt nur Tatsachen," würde ich sagen: nein, gerade Tatsachen gibt es nicht, nur Inter­ pretationen. Wir können kein Faktum „an sich" feststellen: vielleicht ist ein Unsinn, so etwas zu wollen. 75

Despite his skepticism towards dogmatic empiricism, N i e t z s c h e did not preclude any empirical knowledge whatsoever. B o r r o w i n g an arrow from the scientists' quiver, he stressed the probability o f this or that judgment or factual claim. Having excluded certainty from the sphere o f human knowledge, and having disclosed the humanizing nature o f knowing, he offers only h y p o ­ theses,

heuristic

principles,

provisional

assumptions

and

probabilities.

N i e t z s c h e tells us that he is the first philosopher t o have banished not o n l y metaphysical "truth" from his intellectual terrain, but he is also the first to claim not to have possession o f the truth.

76

As far as the range o f human knowledge is concerned, there are relative degrees

of probability

(as, for example, in C . S. Peirce's probabilism), useful

"errors" o r Fiktionen

o r purely experimental "truths" that are proposed as

heuristic devices o r as theoretical possibilities that are designed to produce probable, valued, long-range effects. E m p t y tautologies do not interest him at all. I n fact, as we shall see, he seeks to show that the assumption o f conceptual self-identity that lies at the basis o f logic is either an imperative (as, for example, in Peirce's c o n c e p t i o n o f logic as normative) or, as he suspects, it is derived

from

a fallacious

assumption

of

identische

Fälle

in

actuality.

N i e t z s c h e ' s general probability-orientation is one that was previously e m ­ phasized b y L a n g e . T h e r e are frequent references t o probability and probable knowledge in the Geschichte

des Materialismus.

Lange is very m u c h aware o f the importance o f

"the calculus o f probabilities" (Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung) life. T h e advances in the exakte

Wissenschaften

in science and in

have been based upon abstrac­

tion from a highly c o m p l e x manifold o f processes in actuality. T h e exactness o f the sciences does n o t yield absolute Wahrheiten.

o n presupposition

75

76

Wahrheiten,

but only probable,

relative

Such relative truths are expressed in "propositions" that are based (Voraussetzung)

and deviate from concrete actuality in

KGW, VIII 1, 323. "Against positivism, which halts at phenomena - "there are only facts" - I would say: no, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact "in itself"; perhaps it is foolish to want to do such a thing." KGW, V 1, 382. "Das Neue an unserer jetzigen Stellung zur Philosophie ist eine Überzeugung, die noch kein Zeitalter hatte; daß wir die Wahrheit nicht haben. Alle früheren Menschen 'hatten die Wahrheit'..." (Italics my own.)

147

Lange and Anthropomorphism

carefully delineated ways. T h e exact sciences provide us, then, o n l y with p r o b a b l e , approximate, relative

77

Wahrheiten.

T h i s orientation towards knowledge and truth is one that seems to be echoed in N i e t z s c h e ' s succinct formula, presented under the rubric, "the experimenter" (Der

Versucher):

Es giebt vielerlei Augen. Auch die Sphinx hat Augen: und folglich giebt es vielerlei „Wahrheiten," und folglich giebt es keine Wahrheit. 78

T h i s compressed assertion tells us a great deal about N i e t z s c h e ' s thought. W e m a y l o o k at it from t w o perspectives. First, we m a y see it as meaning that there is n o Wahrheit-an-sich,

but there are innumerable "unapparent," relative

truths. T h e negation o f the possibility o f attaining absolute truth o r absolute truths leaves us with the probable, relative Wahrheiten

that Lange proposes.

Secondly, w e m a y l o o k closely at this statement and see that it is said that there is n o ' T r u t h ' because

there are only a n u m b e r o f kinds o f "truths" that can be

k n o w n . W h a t we find in this terse statement is virtually the first premise o f William J a m e s ' pragmatic theory o f 'truth.' F o r , J a m e s attacks the n o t i o n o f a bloodless " A b s o l u t e " and the concept o f absolute truths in the same spirit as Lange and N i e t z s c h e and he specifically refers to the pragmatic c o n c e p t i o n as o n e that admits "truths in the plural."

79

T h e fact that N i e t z s c h e openly refers to "truths" in the above passage without his usual c o m m e n t s about " e r r o r s " and "falsification" indicates that he is willing to admit that there are "truths" that the experimenter can discover o r adopt provisionally. Despite his critical analysis o f humanistic truth, the " a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c idiosyncrasy" that takes man as a "criterion" o f truth and reality, he sees the value, meaning and usefulness o f praktische

Wahrheiten

for

life, for social existence, for scientific inquiry and for survival in the p h e n o ­ menal world we have constructed. T h e r e are conditional 'truths' that are "true for u s " even though they are constituted b y our senses, o u r concepts, o u r psychological prejudgments, o u r needs, our inherited linguistic habits and modes o f expression. T h e s e practical truths, however, are p r o b a b l e o n l y , anthropomorphically colored, restricted, conditional and have n o ontological o r metaphysical import. N i e t z s c h e states and elucidates the basic premisses o f pragmatism, critically examines them, and worries about the long-term effects o n civilization and culture o f the wholesale adoption o f a purely practical orientation towards knowledge.

77

78

79

Lange, op. cit., II, 898. KGW, VII 3, 218. "There are many eyes. Even the Sphinx has eyes: and consequently, there are many 'truths;' and consequently, there is no Truth." Cf. William James, "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth," in Pragmatism, New York, 1907.

148

Human, All-Too-Human

N i e t z s c h e recognizes, but

surpasses, the pragmatic

standpoint

for a

n u m b e r o f reasons. H e is not sanguine about the long-range effects o f applied science o r technological development. laments the hybris

In Zur

Genealogie

der Moral,

he

o f man in his massive exploitation o f nature. T h e c o m b i n a ­

tion o f practical knowledge and technological development is seen as the Zeitgeist,

one which threatens the quality o f culture and human life. T h i s o n e ­

sided system o f values tends to measure everything, man included, in terms of utility

alone. N i e t z s c h e also believes that a philosophy o f praxis

(as in

A m e r i c a n pragmatism and M a r x i s m ) has a distinct propensity to level human­ ity,

to create a cultural world that is primarily designed for technicians,

engineers, for the "mass m a n " o r the "average m a n " , for what the early M a r x calls man's Gattungswesen.

T h e orientation o f "scientism" tends to exclude

artistic culture o f a superior kind, to have no use for " e x c e p t i o n s " or for exceptional individuals w h o do not fit in with practical utilitarianism. T h e r e is a relationship between the rise o f technology and the rise o f collectivistic ideologies. A practical, utilitarian culture encourages conformity, standar­ dized patterns o f thought and cooperative "team w o r k . " T h e values emerging out o f a pragmatic, utilitarian orientation are diametrically opposed to kratische

aristo­

Werte.

It is at this point that N i e t z s c h e ' s positive, experimental, poetic "truths" enter into his thought. T h e conceptions o f the eternal recurrence o f the same, the will t o p o w e r and the Übermensch opposition to the praktische

Weltbild,

are put forward not so m u c h in but as means o f surpassing that stand­

point. A n t h r o p o m o r p h i c , functional and pragmatic "truths" have b o t h their proper place and their use. H o w e v e r , there is a need for the transformation o f the nature and thought of those w h o can accept challenging ideals that may contribute to the development o f an elite

corps of individuals w h o w o u l d

perpetuate the highest ideals o f culture, w h o would espouse a life-affirming, healthy, individualistic and creative attitude towards life. Such individuals would be honest, endowed with spiritual courage, independence o f mind, capable o f a moderation

that does not require absolutes o f any kind, able to

live without fanaticism, dogmatic convictions, certainty or comfortable secur­ ity.

T h e s e Übermenschen

would strive for the Selbstüberwindung

that is

characteristic o f ascending life. T h e y would be integrated individuals w h o are able to synthesize Apollonian order, measure and reason and D i o n y s i a n chaos, passion and desire. N i e t z s c h e ' s experimental truths are essentially designed for such individuals; they propose the "dangerous perhaps" that is put forward from what Lange called the m y t h o p o e t i c "standpoint o f the ideal." N i e t z s c h e absorbed and extended Lange's depiction o f a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c understanding, p r o b a b l e knowledge, hypothetical assumptions and relative truths. T h e entire orientation towards knowledge that Lange presents from so

Lange and Anthropomorphism

149

m a n y different vantage-points obviously had a profound effect o n N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophical development. O n c e we fill in the background o f Lange's tenta­ tive, hypothetical approach to knowledge in general, and scientific knowledge in particular, we clearly see that the context out o f which A n g l o - A m e r i c a n pragmatic

humanism

emerged is virtually

N i e t z s c h e ' s consistent experimental specifically

the

same one out

o f which

approach to knowledge arose. Lange

refers to the need to extend K a n t ' s rudimentary

a n t h r o p o l o g y " in order to create an empirically buttressed

"pragmatic pragmatische

80

Anthropologic.

It w o u l d be no exaggeration to say that the basic ingredients o f what became pragmatism are already embedded in the substance o f Lange's Ge­ schichte

des Materialismus.

N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophical orientation was p r o ­

foundly influenced b y what we m a y justly call Lange's 'philosophy o f science.' H e virtually adopts as his own Lange's basic philosophical stance when he proclaims that he offers, in lieu o f Grundwahrheiten

o r "fundamental truths,"

provisionally assumed guides or Grundwahrscheinlichkeiten probabilities") b y which one may think and live.

81

("fundamental

T h i s revealing remark

indicates that N i e t z s c h e ' s experimental approach to the problems o f k n o w ­ ledge was primarily derived from his understanding o f the orientation and m e t h o d o l o g y o f the sciences, an understanding that is repeatedly emphasized by Lange. In regard to m y central theme, it is illuminating to note that L a n g e , at one point, refers, en passant,

to the transfer o f the seat o f ancient learning t o

Alexandria after the death o f Epicurus. It is said that the alexandrische

Geist is,

in one sense, identified with pedantry and meticulous, but dry, research and, in another sense, involves the development of refined methodologies. T h i s particular kind o f intellectual activity is also said to arise when a strong national life and culture is shipwrecked. Lange goes on to say that the progress o f m e t h o d o l o g y in the nineteenth century, as well as the outburst o f scientific activity in general, is similar to the Alexandrine tradition. T h e revival o f

80

81

Lange, op. cit., II, 833. Although historians of pragmatism have noted the influence of Kant on the pragmatic orientation, they have not focused upon the pragmatische Anthropologic Peirce emphasized the importance of the pragmatisch because it is related to human action and purpose. Cf. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, eds. C.Hartshorne and P.Weiss, Cambridge, Mass., 1931-1935, 5.412. What is significant about Kant's "pragmatic anthropo­ logy" is that it stresses the practical function of Vernunft in the struggle for existence insofar as Kant, as Lange mentions, anticipated, in a general way, Darwinian notions concerning the evolution of man. Thus, Kant's anthropology contained, in embryo, two central idea of pragmatism: the practical use and value of reason for the sake of life and survival and its relation to human purposes. For further discussion of this issue, see Chapter VII, "Darwin and Teleology." Werke, GOA, XIII, 72.

150

Human, All-Too-Human

interest in the special sciences is attributed

first b y Lange and then b y

N i e t z s c h e t o the recrudescence o f "Alexandrian principles." In Die Geburt

der Tragödie,

82

the originator o f Alexandrine culture is said t o

be Socrates. Presumably, this is because o f his hyper-rationalism, his emphasis u p o n dialectical, analytical modes o f thinking and what N i e t z s c h e considers his excessive logic-chopping ratiocination. T h e thread o f this Alexandrine culture is then traced to the growth o f scientific theory in the nineteenth century, to the full-scale expression o f the "will t o knowledge." A l t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e sees the value and p o w e r o f the modern version o f the Geist,

alexandrische

he also sees it as dangerously one-sided, as leading to the desiccation o f

the passionate life-impulses. W h e r e , he wonders, will this drive for k n o w ­ ledge, this rapid production o f theory after theory, lead o u r civilization? In his analysis o f the use and abuse o f history, N i e t z s c h e lamented the excessive production o f knowledge as an end in itself, criticized the distancing effect that habitual reflection and intellectual pursuits tend to generate. H e laments, in particular, the replacement o f authentic culture b y eine Art um

die Bildung,

Wissen

"a kind o f knowledge about culture," a set o f feelings and

thought about it without any sense o f direction. culture, this alexandrische

Kultur,

83

I n contrast to this secondary

N i e t z s c h e offers his sagacious definition o f

authentic culture: Kultur ist vor allem Einheit des künstlerischen Stiles in allen Lebensäusserungen eines Volkes. 84

Aside from the fact that over one hundred years later there p r o b a b l y isn't a single nation o n earth that even approximates this ideal and most c o n t e m p o ­ rary societies have, at best, fragmentary pieces o f culture or what m a y be characterized as cultural electrons, it is clear that N i e t z s c h e equates the rise o f Alexandrine 'culture' with what he believes is the dissolution o f culture in his o w n time. In the third o f his Unzeitgemäße

Betrachtungen,

N i e t z s c h e pictured a

crepuscular w o r l d in w h i c h there is a sense o f impending d o o m , a misty w o r l d in w h i c h man feels alone in the face o f a desolate, silent nature. H e senses a pervasive m o o d o f Angst

in society, feels that primitive forces are in the air and

suspects the c o m i n g o f a world-convulsion. T h i s early vision of, or prevision of, the advent o f nihilism is m o r e appropriate to the twentieth century than t o his o w n times. In a sense, it is the dark side o f the alexandrinische

Geist.

Summarizing his understanding o f the w o r l d o f his day, he writes that: Wir

82

83

84

Lange, op. cit., I, 89-90. In the first edition of his history Lange refers to the Alexandrian emphasis on Wissenschaften and to the traits of the "alexandrinischen Zeit." GdM, 100. KGW, III 1, UB, II, 4. Ibid., I , 1 . "Culture is, above all, the unity of artistic style in every expression of a people's life."

Lange and Anthropomorphism leben

die Periode

der Atome,

des atomistischen

151 85

Chaos.

Overcoming our

astonishment at the unintentional ironic meaning this has for a twentieth century reader, w e realize that this is an image o f a natural world c o m p o s e d o f isolated atoms ceaselessly, meaninglessly moving in ' e m p t y ' space that is reflected

in the mirror o f a social world comprised o f isolated, atomic

individuals moving about, scurrying, aimlessly in a cultural vacuum. Aside from N i e t z s c h e ' s uncanny

sensitivity to historical and

cultural

trends, his barometric responses to the pressures o f his times and his prophetic sense o f what lies ahead for the twentieth century, the foreboding he expresses was also expressed b y L a n g e (in the first edition o f his w o r k ) and b y U e b e r w e g in the second edition o f the Geschichte. of Umsturzes

oder...

Stagnation.

Lange sees E u r o p e faced with a future

U e b e r w e g later argues that the triumph o f

socialism will bring about "stagnation" and b o t h he and Lange fear that the dying out o f the Christian religion o r the conflict between religion and science will bring revolutions in its wake. T h e r e is n o doubt, Lange believes, that a soziale

Umwälzung

o r "social revolution" lies ahead. It is the soziale

Frage

that has b e c o m e the focus o f all the revolutionary aspects of religion, science and politics. Lange is not sure whether this coming "battle" will remain ein unblutiger

Kampf

einer

vergangenen

unter

den Trümmern

der Geister Weltperiode 8 6

begräbt .

or will be einem donnernd

Erdbeben

in den Staub

gleich wirft

die

und

Ruinen Millionen

Aside from predicting future "earthquakes" in

E u r o p e , L a n g e ' s critical history itself displays precisely the "alexandrine spirit" that he identifies. T h e bewildering variety o f theories presented on its pages, the relativity, uncertainty and agnosticism that is continuously u n c o ­ vered no d o u b t contributed to the theoretical nihilism that N i e t z s c h e exposes, succumbs t o , and then continuously fights against with laser-like intensity. The

"warrior o f k n o w l e d g e " was lured into the dark labyrinth o f critical

reflection and then had to flee the M i n o t a u r o f nihilism that constantly pursued him. W h e t h e r he ever found the Ariadne's thread that would lead him to safety is doubtful. E n c l o s e d in the Kreis

der Erfahrung,

surrounded b y

anthropomorphic

projections, the Langean thinker looks towards the u n k n o w n and u n k n o w a b l e essence o f things in hope o f finding some answer to the riddle o f existence.

Ibid., III, 4. "We live in the age of the atom, the atomistic chaos." This statement is, I believe, a dual allusion. It refers to the physical theory of atomism and to the theory of social atomism put forward by nineteenth century political economists. Cp. GdM, 503-538. What Lange calls ethische Materialismus is equivalent to practical, egoistic self-interest. Lange, op. cit., II, 1003. "... a bloodless conflict of minds [ o r ] . . . like an earthquake that throws down the ruins of a past epoch with thunder into dust and buries millions beneath the wreck." In the first edition of his critical history Lange says virtually the same thing. Cf. GdM, 557.

152

Human, All-Too-Human

Although Lange seems unperturbed within nature and within homo

b y the agnosticism he uncovers b o t h

natura,

he is tempted at times to name the

hidden "third" that manifests t w o aspects: mind or psyche

and matter. W h a t he

and others say about o u r w a y o f seeking t o comprehend this presumed, but u n k n o w n , "third" is illuminating for an understanding o f N i e t z s c h e ' s postulation o f a universally immanent Wille

zur

Macht.

Lange maintains that the task o f gaining a general picture o f nature requires acquaintance with the positive sciences, but is fundamentally a philosophical one. T h e supersensuous realms o f previous thought must be denied, as C z o l b e argues, out o f "a moral feeling o f duty towards the natural w o r l d - o r d e r " - das moralische

Pflichtgefühl

gegen

die natürliche

Weltordnung.

87

A s we shall see in

our discussion o f N i e t z s c h e ' s naturalistic ethics, the views o f C z o l b e (and others as well) are quite similar to those later espoused b y N i e t z s c h e . Lange, at any rate, shares this naturalistic spirit entirely and proclaims that Es gibt ausser

der Natur.

nichts

F o r the m o s t part, he believes that the history o f philosophy

up to his o w n time has been " a history o f human errors." Even though the limits o f natural knowledge prohibit any real knowledge o f the ground o f things, we are tempted to speculate about the origin o f the t w o worlds we are acquainted with - i . e . , the subjective world o f sensation and perception and the material w o r l d o f physical processes that is what m a y be called a wellfounded Vorstellung.

Zöllner, for example, believes that the p h e n o m e n a o f the

sensory and the material world point to a c o m m o n origin, to ein Drittes.

unbekanntes

88

Although w e cannot, in any strict sense, know own third" is, w e m a y offer

what this supposed "un-

a philosophical interpretation

o f the data

disclosed in the internal phenomenal ' w o r l d ' and the external phenomenal order that is a representation for o u r senses, thought and psyche.

Whatever our

imaginative speculation about the ultimate nature of actuality m a y b e , L a n g e tells us, it must be tempered b y empirical data, b y the information provided b y the exakte

Wissenschaften.

It is for this reason that he condemns purely

speculative philosophies o f nature such as those o f Schelling and Hegel. Knowledge-claims are made b y them that are unjustified b y scientific facts o r principles

and

scientific

knowledge

is

treated

in

a cavalier way.

The

philosopher w h o seeks to present a synthesis o f natural phenomena and internal p h e n o m e n a must n o t distort facts and theories in order to justify a specific metaphysics. R a t h e r , he should proceed in a manner analogous to that of scientific m e t h o d , infering the u n k n o w n

87

88

Ibid., II, 559. Ibid., II, 613. "...an unknown third."

from the k n o w n ,

proposing

Lange and Anthropomorphism

153

tentative h y p o t h e s e s and adopting provisional assumptions o n the basis o f p r o b a b l e data. E v e n though L a n g e cautions against arguing b y analogy from p h e n o m e n a in m a n to natural p h e n o m e n a , and even though he says that such thinking has led t o the n o t i o n o f "immaterial causes" operative in nature,

89

what he and

others say elsewhere suggests a certain inevitability in the tendency to interpret nature nach

Analogie

menschlicher

Handlungen.

B o t h in nineteenth c e n t u r y

physical t h e o r y and in primitive cultures there is discernible a m a r k e d tenden­ cy towards personification and a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m . A s an example o f this propensity in primitive societies, L a n g e refers to the w a y savage peoples project

imaginary,

menschlicher

Art)

superhuman into

human

their environment.

beings 90

(Wesen

übermenschlich

T h i s primitive

-

attribution o f

superhuman p o w e r s to imaginary beings presumably has its counterpart in the personifications that are said to lie at the basis o f the idea o f the a t o m , the principle o f cause and effect and the understanding o f " f o r c e s " in nineteenth c e n t u r y physical t h e o r y . E v e n research into the relation between the brain and p s y c h i c states is said to have been hampered because o f der abstrakter one

Vorstellungen.

9 1

o f these personified,

Personifikation

A s w e shall see in further discussions o f this point, abstract representations that

L a n g e and

others

criticize is that o f " w i l l . " O u r understanding o f nature as a w h o l e is largely a matter o f poetic vision o r interpretation. I f we l o o k to nature for edification, w e will c o n c e n t r a t e o n

89

90

91

Ibid., II, 723-724. Although it is doubtful that this term had as much to do with Nietzsche's conception of the Übermensch as suggestions in Goethe's works of a supreme human type or the portrait of the solitary, courageous, independent, moderate person of "inner strength" and "self-reliance" that Ralph Waldo Emerson presents in his essays, it is curious to wonder if this term may have made an imprint on Nietzsche apart from the context in which it is used. It would not be the only instance in which Nietzsche used a term or phrase he discovered in Lange's critical history. Thus, to cite two cases in point, the title of one of his earlier works, Morgenröte, was no doubt suggested by the following remark in Lange's work: "... Fichte verkündete das Morgenrot einer neuen Weltepoche durch . . . der Geist der Wissenschaft." Lange, op. cit., II, 993. "...Fichte announced the dawn of a new world-epoch through. . the spirit of science." Elsewhere, Lange mentions that the refusal to give alms to a beggar requires a capacity for "Selbstüberwindung." Ibid., II, 910. In Zarathustra and elsewhere, Nietzsche specifically refers to the need for a "selfovercoming" of the temptation of "pity" virtually in the sense that Lange intended. Nietzsche's first use of the term "superman" is in the context of discussing the creation of "Ubermenschen aller Art" in the early history of man or in primitive societies. This reference coincides with Lange's allusion to "superhuman human beings" that populate the world of primitive peoples. KGW, V 2, FW, III, 143. The numerous and sometimes quite specific similarities between Emerson's depiction of the ideal, self-reliant individual are pointed out by W.M.Salter. Cf. Nietzsche the Thinker, New York, 1917, 427, 472, 489, 501, 513-517, 520. There are numerous references to Emerson in the Nachlass of 1881-1882. KGW, V 2, 516-570. Lange, op. cit., II, 788.

154

Human, All-Too-Human

its beauty and comparative perfections. I n this light, nature b e c o m e s the repository o f the good and the beautiful. H o w e v e r , if we focus on the endless succession o f life and death, the upsurge o f superabundance and the sudden decline, w e see nature under the aspect o f the Dionysus-Kultus

and, seeing the

clash between the highest ideal and all living beings, we seek redemption. W h a t e v e r form a holistic, "edifying" vision o f nature m a y take, it lays n o claim t o "unconditioned truth."

92

A n y imaginative representation o f the presumptive

hidden "third" that pictures nature as beautiful, dramatic, as a cosmic spectacle or in any poetic w a y whatsoever, can o n l y be an expression o f "figurative truth" o r an aesthetic

'truth.' W h e t h e r nature is pictured in an idealistic w a y o r

in a tragic w a y , such visions serve to edify the opposite o f the Bruchstücke

man. Such c o s m i c visions are quite

der Wahrheit

or the "fragments o f truth" that

the independent sciences continually give us. In den Relationen der Wissenschaft haben wir Bruchstücke beständig mehren, aber beständig Bruchteile bleiben.

der Wahrheit, die sich

93

Figurative, poetical or mythical 'truths' are primarily anthropocentric in form and intention. T h e acceptance o r rejection o f edifying o r figurative "truths" is n o t a matter o f objective knowledge: it is, as N i e t z s c h e will r e m e m b e r , " a matter o f taste" ( G e s c h m a c k s s a c h e ) . of

such a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c

94

T h e question o f the nature

projections and their justification is raised b y

U e b e r w e g in a letter to Lange written in 1 8 6 0 . U e b e r w e g wonders about the justification o f a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c beliefs that have "poetic validity". H e claims that this issue raises an important question for the philosopher: that is, what is it that poetic representation embellishes? Is it the "unity o f the universe"? Is it the unity o f the human mind? A n d , finally, what is the relation between universal p h e n o m e n a and the human m i n d ?

95

Synthesizing m a n y o f Lange's

observations and relating them to U e b e r w e g ' s questions, the suggestion is made that we m a y create, b y means o f poetic, anthropomorphic, figurative 'truths' an Einheit

der Geist und Natur.

T h i s , I believe, is precisely N i e t z s c h e ' s

central intention in postulating a universal Wille zur Macht

92

93

94

95

acting through all

Ibid., II, 941-942. This reference to the "cult of Dionysus" could be derived from Nietzsche's Die Geburt der Tragödie. In the first edition of Lange's work there is no reference to this "cult." Ibid., II, 938. "In the relations of science we have fragments of truth which are continually multiplying, but continually remain fragments." Ibid., II, 939. In the final analysis, Nietzsche holds that ultimate valuations are matters of taste (Geschmack). Werke, GOA, X I I , 95; XIII, 257; XV, 400. In Ecce Homo, it is suggested that his atheism was not the result of rational analysis, but a matter of taste. KGW, VI 3, Ecce Homo, II, 1. The role of "taste" in Nietzsche's thought is referred to in another context in Chapter X I . Cf. Chapter X I , note 33. Lange refers to the importance of "Geschmackssache" in the first edition of his work. Cf. GdM, 542. Lange, op. cit., II, 962.

Lange and Anthropomorphism

155

beings. A s w e shall see, given the w a y in which the "will to p o w e r " is argued for, it can o n l y b e a "figurative" o r metaphorical "truth." T o w a r d s the conclusion o f Geschichte

des Materialismus,

Lange refers to

the coldness and austerity o f a purely scientific Weltanschauung

and, against

his o w n advice, wonders about what lies behind o u r psychic syntheses or Vorstellungen,

that ' s o m e t h i n g ' that does not spring from ourselves. O u r laws

o f nature, though imposed upon nature in a constant process o f " b e c o m i n g , " suggest evidence o f "something else" underlying them. This "something else," this " o t h e r , " he suggests, is eine Macht, n o w dominated b y u s . "

96

"a p o w e r that n o w compels us, and is

A s Lange strains to glimpse that "absolute reality"

that he has strictly excluded from knowledge and scientific understanding, he admits that w e have n o access t o such a reality because of the ineluctable subjektive

Faktor

transphenomenal

that intervenes: we can o n l y think and talk about the actuality nach

Analogie

unsrer

Wirklichkeit.

97

Inevitably,

then, even though we try t o go b e y o n d the human standpoint, especially in the exact sciences, when

we seek any global understanding

o f the

Weltall,

(whether this is poetic, philosophical or scientific), we find ourselves in "the circle o f a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m . "

96

97

Ibid., II, 984-985. "Wir haben in den Naturgesetzen nicht nur Gesetze unsres Erkennens vor uns, sondern auch Zeugnisse eines andern, einer Macht, die uns bald zwingt, bald sich von uns beherrschen läßt. Wir sind in Verkehr mit dieser Macht ausschließlich auf die Erfahrung und auf unsre Wirklichkeit angewiesen." Ibid., II, 987.

CHAPTER VII DARWIN AND T E L E O L O G Y T h e relation between N i e t z s c h e and D a r w i n is a curious and c o m p l e x o n e . P r o b a b l y the earliest contact that N i e t z s c h e had with the then n e w and revolutionary theory o f evolution was in reading Lange's critical discussion o f Darwinismus

und Teleologie.

I n this discussion Lange is clearly sympathetic

with the essentials o f D a r w i n ' s t h e o r y and accepts without quarrel its antiteleological consequences. A s we shall see, N i e t z s c h e adopted a Darwinian understanding o f man's place in nature, his descent from animal forms, his use o f tools for defence (reason) and the e m p l o y m e n t o f "dissimulation" for the sake o f survival. T o be sure, he does not b y any means end in a Darwinian standpoint n o r does he agree with D a r w i n that adaptation for the sake o f survival alone is the essential characteristic o f living beings. In this regard, he is justified in m o c k i n g the idea that he is a follower o f D a r w i n in Ecce

Homo.

N o n e t h e l e s s , there are a n u m b e r o f fundamental notions that are retained in N i e t z s c h e ' s p h i l o s o p h y that are at least related to Darwinian theory. Lange saw clearly the revolutionary implications o f D a r w i n ' s t h e o r y o f evolution b y means o f natural selection and saw that it dealt a death-blow to any P l a t o n i c , Aristotelian or Christian belief in a teleology in nature. H e sees in K a n t ' s Anthropologie

a general anticipation o f D a r w i n insofar as K a n t had

said that man had raised himself from an animal pre-existence b y means o f internal development. W h a t came to distinguish man from the animal k i n g d o m was the emergence o f I-consciousness and the sense o f the Einheit Bewußtseins.

virtue o f his p o w e r over them.

1

des

M a n is distinguished in dignity and rank from the animals b y 1

Lange, op. cit., II, 757, 873 n. The work cited is Kant's Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, 1797. Amongst many interesting observations, Kant emphasizes that man is a terrestial, rational being who is "an animal endowed with the capacity for reason (animal rationalis)... [who] can make of himself a rational animal (animale rationale) and, as such, he first preserves himself and his species." I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Mary Gregor, The Hague, 1974, 183. If we join this statement with the elucidation of the foundation of knowledge in the Kritik, we could say, as Nietzsche does, that the primitive function of rationality, as well as its categorical determinations, is the preservation of the species. There is no doubt that it is Kant who plants the seeds for a pragmatisch analysis of knowledge, Lange who cultivates them, and Nietzsche who brings them to fruition. Mittasch is no doubt right when he says: "Durch

Darwin and Teleology

157

Despite his emphasis upon the dignity o f man, K a n t insisted that we cannot s h o w any absolute distinction between man and the animals; the natural origin of man is accepted as indisputable. K a n t even makes a brief pass at evolutio­ nary notions b y noting that the infant's cry at birth could n o t have been present at earlier stages o f development. In a Darwinian spirit, L a n g e wonders if there might not have been a revolution in nature "when an ourang-outang or a c h i m p a n z e e " might not have acquired the "structure o f man." W a r m i n g t o his subject, L a n g e speculates that the large brain o f early man p r o b a b l y did not serve higher mental functions, but was a "coordinating apparatus" used for action.

N i e t z s c h e seems to express a similar belief when he writes that

Erkenntniss-Apparat

nicht

auf ,Erkenntniss'

2

eingerichtet.

Unser

In passing, Lange

notes that the majority o f people do not use their mental capacities to the fullest and that the advances in civilization and culture have been achieved b y a m i n o r i t y o f individuals. T h e technical advances o f the modern world provide a base that supports a very large n u m b e r o f people w h o are not inventive, creative o r cultured. L a n g e doubts whether such masses o f people are really so far advanced b e y o n d primitive peoples.

3

Reflecting o n the origin o f speech, Lange refers to D a r w i n ' s theory in The Descent

of Man

that man's progenitors, in a process o f sexual selection,

p r o b a b l y used their voices first for song in courtship and, out o f this practice, arose articulate sounds and words. T h e basic origin o f language is attributed to 4

the imitation o f animal sounds. Even though N i e t z s c h e will not refer to the origin o f language-use precisely in this way, he certainly will insist that language has a naturalistic origin and emerges in a social context. Perhaps observations such as the above m a y have suggested to N i e t z s c h e b o t h the metaphorical and conventional nature o f language. In addition to the e n o r m o u s advantage that man gained through languageuse (the identification o f sources o f food, warning cries, rapid c o m m u n i c a t i o n , etc.), man m a y be said to have developed a convenience in the arranging o f thoughts and feelings and thence became the m o s t "cunning" o f animals. In the brutal struggle for survival, List

und Grausamkeit

("cunning and c r u e l t y " )

must have played an important role. T h e violent and aggressive behavior o f modern man m a y be attributed, L a n g e tells us, to a relapsing into primitive

2

3

4

die Beschäftigung mit dem Philosophen Fr. A. Lange hat Nietzsche dann den Darwinismus genauer kennen(ge)lernt." A. Mittasch, Fr. Nietzsche als Naturphilosoph, Stuttgart, 1952, 13. Cited in J . Salaquarda, "Nietzsche und Lange," N.-S. 7 (1978), 243. KGW, VII 2, 181. Ibid., II, 876 n. Ibid., II, 769. In notes for 1871-72 Nietzsche alludes to Darwin's idea of the "Genesis der Sprache," though not precisely in this way. KGW III 3, 277.

158

Darwin and Teleology

m o d e s o f behavior. A l t h o u g h Lange doesn't use the word, he is describing 5

atavism.

In general, N i e t z s c h e agreed with such observations and, in Die der Tragödie,

Geburt

said that if the m o v e m e n t towards science and the accumulation

o f knowledge (which, from another point o f view, has its dangers) did n o t originate with Socrates and b e c o m e the central tendency o f Western civiliza­ tion, then the Summe Welttendenz

von Kraft

that has been diverted into this Alexandrine

w o u l d p r o b a b l y have been expended in brutal egoism, in "wars

of destruction" (Vernichtungskämpfen) love o f life. O n l y die Kunst,

that would crush man's instinctive

in the form of religion or science, has been a 6

remedy for man's primordial tendency towards savagery and violence. T h i s observation indicates that the alexandrische a one-sided, single-minded

Geist that he otherwise deplores as

cultural thrust has been a civilizing force in

history. N i e t z s c h e later indicates his attitude towards man's primitive nature b y m o c k i n g Rousseau's naive view that a "return t o nature" would be a good. A return to nature, in Rousseau's sense, would b e a return to being a beast o f 7

prey o r a ferocious criminal. M a n in his early natural state is pictured as fearful, terrified o f attacks b y animals o r men and brutal because o f his tremendous fears and lack o f restraint. Although N i e t z s c h e sometimes offers proto-psychoanalytical observations o n violent behavior in terms o f b l o c k e d instinct, frustration o f desires, psychological torment and maladjustment, he specifically alludes to atavism in Menschliches,

Allzumenschliches.

Die Menschen, welche jetzt grausam sind, müssen uns als Stufen früherer Kulturen gelten, welche übriggeblieben sind: das Gebirge der Menschheit zeigt hier einmal die tieferen Formationen, welche sonst versteckt liegen, offen. Es sind zurückge­ bliebene Menschen, deren Gehirn, durch alle möglichen Zufälle im Verlaufe der Vererbung, nicht so zart und vielseitig fortgebildet worden ist. Sie zeigen uns, was wir alle waren, und machen uns erschrecken. 8

A m o n g s t m a n y other c o m m e n t s o n Darwinian theory, Lange maintains that the c o n c e p t o f species as an absolute notion is a superstition, o n e that has its roots in the Platonic-Aristotelian concept o f eidos.

5

6 7

8

H e appeals to D a r w i n ' s

Ibid., II, 773-774. KGW, III 1, GT, 15. KGW, VI 3, G, I X , 48. Cp. Kaufmann, op. cit., 169-170. Kaufmann appropriately adds that Nietzsche did not desire any "return to nature". Rather, he urged that we should "cultivate" and "improve" or "transfigure" our nature. KGW, IV 2, MAM, I, 43. "Men who are cruel today must be accounted for by us as stages of earlier cultures that have survived. Here are revealed those deeper formations in the mountain of humanity that usually remain hidden. They are backward men whose brains, through all kinds of accidents in the course of heredity, have not been developed in so delicate and manifold a way. They show us what we all were and frighten us."

159

Darwin and Teleology

principle o f increasing stability for support for the view that organisms, over a long period o f time, tend to group themselves into what we identity as a "species." T h i s tendency o f individual organisms to "define" themselves in relation to each other is not the same as the fallacious absolute

Speziesbegriff.

9

In N i e t z s c h e ' s writings w e find very similar judgments. In particular, he considers the abstract idea o f species a fiction. A "species," in the valid sense o f the term, refers to a group o f similar organisms that are drawn together and from generation t o generation change in imperceptible ways. A species evolves out o f organic similarities and an encounter with c o m m o n ,

unfavorable

conditions. T h i s tendency to stability is, at first, a valuable asset. Gradually, however, the Feststellungen

o r "fixations" o f type reach a limit b e y o n d which

there is n o further evolution.

10

N i e t z s c h e seems to adopt the n o t i o n o f a

tendency t o stability in D a r w i n i s m , but, unlike D a r w i n , he sees this process o f fixation as deleterious because it p r o m o t e s a leveling o f a type to the least c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r capable o f adaptation. I f an evolved inertia sets in, there will be t o o m u c h stability and a kind o f regressive

tendency in a 'species' m a y

emerge. N i e t z s c h e does not disagree with D a r w i n about the "struggle for existence" o r about the importance o f adaptation to an environment o r about the drive for survival in a 'species.' H o w e v e r , the parting o f the ways occurs in relation t o the question concerning what kind o f beings evolution has actually produced. D a r w i n sees the surviving species and types as "the fitest" on the basis o f the plausible assumption that those groups o f living beings that have adapted well and have survived the struggle for existence are stronger, m o r e "cunning", m o r e flexible and m o r e powerful than those that haven't. Against this popular n o t i o n o f D a r w i n i s m , N i e t z s c h e argues that collective survival tends to favor the average

type within a species and, in the case o f man,

evolution generally favors the " m e d i o c r e . "

11

O n this point, even D a r w i n

himself admitted that survival does n o t always result in "perfect" forms o f life, that the "contrivances in nature" preserve beings that are sometimes " a b h o r ­ rent t o o u r ideas o f fitness."

12

O n the other hand, this is not a typical

expression o f his position. M o r e typical is the belief that those individuals and species that avoid extinction are "new and improved" forms o f life and that

9

10

11

12

Lange, op. cit., II, 686, 744 n.

KGW, VI 2, JGB, 262. Cf. Werke, GOA, XII, 120. Ibid., 242, 262. Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, London, 1968, 445. Originally published in London in

1859 under the title: The Origin of Species by Means of Natural

Selection.

Darwin and Teleology

160

success in nature is measured b y the preservation o f those w h o are the "fitest."

13

A l t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e disagrees with Darwin about the supposed tendency of living beings to seek preservation through adaptation, he generally agrees that one aim o f organic beings is to survive, t o conserve and

preserve

themselves and their species. H i s picture o f man as cunning, deceptive, equipped with sophisticated "weapons o f defense" such as reason, language and knowledge is compatible with D a r w i n i s m . T h e account o f the extinction o f those w h o could not perceive "similarity" o r "equality" in nature, the elimination o f those w h o did not o r could not perceive the w o r l d as the species supposedly came to see it, these are vintage Darwinian interpretations. In fact, the repeated references to our way o f sensing and thinking as being intimately related t o o u r Existenz-Bedingungen

or "conditions o f existence" is not o n l y a

D a r w i n i a n notion, but one expressed in terms o f a phrase that is frequently used in The Origin

of Species.

B e that as it may, N i e t z s c h e distinguishes his

standpoint from that o f D a r w i n especially o n the question o f the tendency towards survival and preservation. H e argues that living beings do not o n l y seek survival. R a t h e r , Die Physiologen sollten sich besinnen, den Selbsterhaltungstrieb als kardinalen Trieb eines organischen Wesens anzusetzen. V o r allem will etwas Lebendiges seine Kraft auslassen - Leben selbst ist Wille zur Macht - : die Selbsterhaltung ist nur eine der indirekten und häufigsten Folgen davon. 14

In the next breath, N i e t z s c h e makes a curious remark. W e must beware, he says, o f superfluous teleological assumptions such as a drive for, or an instinct for, self-preservation. N o w , it would seem that if an instinct for self-preserva­ tion is seen as a teleological assumption, then the projection o f a "will to p o w e r " into living beings is, a fortiori,

an assumption that surely sounds

teleological. T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f Wille zur Macht

entails not only intentionality,

but an intentionality that smacks o f anthropomorphism.

A l t h o u g h we shall

return to this issue in another context, it may be noted that N i e t z s c h e does not disagree with the basic premisses o f D a r w i n ; he disagrees, rather, with his conclusions about the end-products o f evolution and supplements the t h e o r y

13

14

Ibid., 448. "The extinction of species and of whole groups of species, which has played so conspicuous a part in the history of the organic world, almost inevitably follows on the principle of natural selection; for old forms will be supplanted by new and improved f o r m s . . . Recent forms are generally looked at as being . . . higher than ancient and extinct forms; and they are insofar higher as the later and more improved forms have conquered the older and less improved organic beings in the struggle for life." KGW, loc. cit., 13. "Physiologists should reflect before stating the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living being seeks above all to discharge its forces Life itself is will to power - : self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences."

Darwin and Teleology

161

o f adaptation for survival with the postulation o f a m o r e primordial drive for p o w e r . D e s p i t e his jibes at D a r w i n , N i e t z s c h e learned a great deal from him and often seems to try to transcend his standpoint b y using his t h e o r y as a launching pad. I n addition, he competes with D a r w i n b y picturing nature in even darker hues than he did. Lange quotes a passage from D a r w i n ' s The Origin

of Species

that resembles

N i e t z s c h e ' s various depictions o f nature. D a r w i n notes that the natural world, to the superficial eye, seems beautiful and bountiful. W e forget, however, that life is constantly destroying life, that "beasts o f p r e y " r o a m the world seeking food, that food is often scarce and that the struggle for it is terrible. C o m m e n t ­ ing o n this, L a n g e remarks that in nature luxuriant propagation and painful destruction are opposing forces seeking equilibirium.

15

W h a t D a r w i n calls a

struggle for survival N i e t z s c h e characterizes as a conflict o f wills to power. It is contended b y N i e t z s c h e that D a r w i n ' s theory puts t o o m u c h emphasis upon external conditions determining development, despite the fact that he himself stresses that a will t o p o w e r needs "resistances", that the "evolution" o f superior types o f beings will n o t take place naturally, but will require cultural, social, psychological and intellectual conditions that will provide the conditions for the possibility o f the emergence o f " o v e r m e n "

(Übermenschen).

In regard to his image o f supreme types o f beings, N i e t z s c h e has n o faith in " r a n d o m , " "natural" o r "sexual" selection. It will take a "transvaluation o f values", a positive discipline and rearing o f superior individuals over a long period o f time to make possible the emergence o f superhuman types. H e does not hesitate to speak o f Züchtung

or "breeding" o r "training" in this regard, in

the sense o f a deliberate process o f "selection." H e believed that if n o effort is made "to cultivate" (züchten)

superior types o f beings, then decadence and

nihilism will metastasize and there m a y even be a reversion to animality, a devolution. T h e means b y which such superior types o f beings would b e cultivated is often left vague o r discussed in visionary tones that are not at all clear. I n s o m e w a y , he linked the idea o f eternal recurrence with the cultivation of those w h o w o u l d n o longer be "human, all-too-human": those w h o could will the idea o f eternal recurrence would supposedly have remarkable spiritual courage and w o u l d be capable o f transforming the world. T h o s e w h o could not accept such a vision o f existence would be crushed b y its power. T h a t the conception o f the eternal recurrence o f the same would be spread throughout the world is a belief that indicates that N i e t z s c h e became overly fascinated with his pet c o n c e p t i o n and vastly overestimated its persuasive p o w e r . It is m o r e plausible to see select individuals accepting eternal recurrence as if it were

15

Lange, op. cit., II, 691-692.

162

Darwin and Teleology

true having their natures transfigured b y it. T h e r e is a tension in N i e t z s c h e ' s thought between a strong temptation to create designs for a new world order, t o prepare blueprints for a radical social engineering that would transform the human w o r l d and to provide a guidebook for individuals o f moderation w h o might achieve a transfiguration o f their spiritual Existenz.

W i t h or without

N i e t z s c h e ' s vision o f an international c o m m u n i t y o f "lords o f the earth," it is unlikely that the twenty-first century will tolerate the crime, the terrorist violence and the random anarchistic actions that have plagued this century. O n one plane, N i e t z s c h e ' s vision o f superior types o f beings in the future is n o longer merely visionary: the advances in medicine and the rapidly increasing longevity o f man in technologically advanced societies is going t o change o u r conceptions o f human life and will, n o doubt, produce considerable social change. W h e t h e r this will have any positive effect upon the quality o f life o r the quality o f human culture is a m o o t question. The

central characteristic o f the Lebensprozeß,

ganizing p o w e r (Gewalt)

for N i e t z s c h e , is an o r ­

that is form-creating, a shaping process that uses and

exploits external conditions.

16

Adaptation is considered a secondary process

that does n o t explain the action upon, and modification of, the surrounding environment. A l t h o u g h this is a legitimate correction o f D a r w i n ' s basic views, it seems t o place t o o m u c h emphasis upon creative and aggressive behavior. I f we l o o k at the elaborate defensive behavior o f animals and insects, we see adaptive behavior for the sake o f survival that is often passive. Smaller animals, when threatened b y a predator, fall into a state o f tonic i m m o b i l i t y . Such survival responses are in reaction to recurrent, threatening external conditions and are often characterized b y passivity or inaction, b y a blending into the environment (as, for example, in the case o f the praying mantis resembling a blade o f grass when i m m o b i l e ) . E v e n predatory behavior, as especially in the behavior o f the sea anemones, involves a passive lying in wait for prey, as well as a disguise o f harmlessness. Defensive behaviors are generally passive and predatory behavior is typically, though not always, aggressive. O r g a n i s m s also engage in aversive behavior that does not display a putative "will to p o w e r " so m u c h as a will to escape perceived threat or danger as quickly as possible b y any means. T h e perpetual striving for m o r e and m o r e that N i e t z s c h e claims to have found in all living beings is n o t typical o f organisms at all, but it is typical of

Faustian,

acquisitive o r

Hobbesian

"man."

T h e empirical data

that

N i e t z s c h e draws u p o n in order to justify his theory o f will to p o w e r (with the notable exception o f m a n ) is highly selective and sometimes surcharged with subjective interpretation. A great deal o f the behavior o f organisms is simply

16

Werke, GOA, XVI, 120.

Darwin and Teleology

163

directed towards adaptation for the sake o f survival o f a species. T h e evidence for a "will t o p o w e r " in n o n - h u m a n living beings is neither persuasive n o r substantial. A n o t h e r m a j o r p o i n t o f disagreement with D a r w i n ' s general t h e o r y o f evolution is o n e w e ' v e already t o u c h e d u p o n : that is, that it is the "fitest" o r the strongest o r best that survive in the struggle for existence. Against this " o p t i m i s t i c " belief, it is held that Die Gattungen wachsen nicht in der Vollkommenheit: die Schwachen werden immer wieder über die Starken Herr - das macht, sie sind die große Zahl, sie sind auch klüger... Darwin hat den Geist vergessen ( - das ist englisch!), die Schwachen haben mehr Geist... Ich verstehe unter G e i s t . . . die Vorsicht, die Geduld, die List, die Verstellung... und alles, was mimicry. 17

I f N i e t z s c h e is considering n o n - h u m a n organisms here, there is plenty o f evidence that his point is well-taken. A h o r d e o f driver ants, for example, can dispatch a powerful lion b y sheer force o f numbers. I f he is thinking o f man, as n o d o u b t he is, then his o b j e c t i o n to the dominance o f the m a n y over the few is strange given his apparent neutrality towards the natural acting out o f the will to p o w e r . O f t e n he takes the stance o f the reporter o f the fact that life lives at

KGW, VI 3, G, I X , 14. "Species do not grow more perfect: the weaker dominate the strong again and again - the reason for this is that they are more numerous and more clever... Darwin forgot the spirit ( - that is English!): the weak have more spirit... Under 'spirit' I include foresight, patience, dissimulation... and all that is 'mimicry.'" Danto's claim that Nietzsche maintains that the "unfit" survive and the "fit" perish, and that this is a "blind spot" in his thought is a misreading of Nietzsche. In the remote past, when the environment was harsh and life more difficult, the "strong," in the sense of the healthy, physically powerful and dominating individuals, did survive. These "blond beasts" (surely an anthropological fiction of Nietzsche's) are considered superior to "modern man" in terms of their natural powers; however, they were harsh, brutal and cruel. The evolution of civilization, with the aid of the Judaeo-Christian morality, tamed these "wild beasts." In this sense, Nietzsche claims, Christianity was necessary for the civilizing of man. Modern, democratic, egalitarian society, however, has so domesti­ cated man that he has become weaker and more numerous. For Nietzsche, the growth of the average type of man creates a social and cultural world that undermines the cultivation of superior, creative, spiritually stronger, independent, autonomous individuals. The "exception­ al" individual is outnumbered and overpowered by sheer numbers. Though individually "weak," modern, collective men have acquired vast power through collective cooperation. They are called "unfit" by Nietzsche though they are able to define what is "fit" insofar as they are the dominant type of human beings. The exceptional individual is considered as rare, complex, a comparatively delicate mechanism who is vulnerable because of his or her independence, lack of resentment or cunning against others and because he or she has "the majority against them." [Cf. Werke, GOA, X V I , 149]. In Renaissance Italy, Nietzsche believed, the authentically "strong" did rise to positions of prestige and power; hence, his admiration for this cultural epoch. For Danto's critique of Nietzsche, see: Danto, op. cit., 223. For Nietzsche, "genius" involves a greater complexity, a greater coordination of elements, than the average type of man and is a sublime machine that is "fragile", especially in a socio-cultural world in which the average or typical human being is prized, valued and promoted. Cf. Werke, GOA, XVI, 148.

164

Darwin and Teleology

the expense o f other life, that there is a ruthless struggle o f "wills to p o w e r " in the natural order. H e prides himself on his unsentimental view o f life as essentially "exploitation" (Ausbeutung).

B y protesting the way things have

turned out for man, he clearly introduces another valuational perspective, an ideal that is ' m o r a l ' in some sense. F o r , he cannot consistently object to the natural

w o r k i n g out o f the struggle amongst a variety o f "wills to p o w e r . " I f

N i e t z s c h e were an advocate o f the rapacious action o f a will to p o w e r o r o f wills t o p o w e r , he w o u l d simply have to resign himself to whatever o u t c o m e o c c u r s . T h a t the natural, competitive process o f selection in Darwinian evolution does n o t result in the emergence o f the " b e s t " human beings and that the " b e s t " (the strongest, the healthiest, the m o s t integrated, those w h o have achieved a transformation o f their 'nature') and the exceptional, the creative, ought

to achieve dominance clearly indicates that N i e t z s c h e is not the c h a m ­

pion o f the ruthless expression o f a crude will to power. A n d it indicates that his version o f morality entails a creative transformation of the energy o f the zur

Wille

Macht. T h e " b l o n d beast o f p r e y " that N i e t z s c h e projects b a c k into man's past as

an exercise in imaginative anthropology is sometimes admired for his cunning, his courage, his daring, his free expression o f p o w e r in comparison with the "domesticated" m o d e r n man. N o t i n g that this mythical creature does not correspond to his typical picture o f fearful early man, it is clear that he remains neutral towards the ostensible dominance o f this type o f man in the past. T h i s is tantamount t o Lange's belief that early man p r o b a b l y was ruthless and cruel in order t o survive and, therefore, needed, even at later stages o f development, the strong moral medicine o f Christianity. N i e t z s c h e , at any rate, creates an ideal o f what man was at earlier stages o f evolution in order t o contrast him to the democratic, "domesticated" men o f modern times. H e repeatedly laments the rise o f "herd m a n , " o f all o f the leveling tendencies o f his age, o f the reduced value o f the typical man. A s we've said, in terms o f a purely neutral account o f the manifestations o f will to p o w e r in life, there is no basis for protesting any manifestation o f dominance whatsoever. Paradoxically, he has to argue that the will to inferior forms o f life, even the will to nothingness, is a turning o f the will to p o w e r against life itself. T h e absence o f any neutrality towards the w o r k i n g out o f the will to p o w e r in human life brings us b a c k to a p o i n t previously stressed: the full, uninhibited expression o f a "will to p o w e r " is not, despite all that is said about it, a positive value for N i e t z s c h e . T h e complete unleashing o f the energy o f the nisus towards p o w e r would result in universal chaos and destruction. H i s "return to nature" involves a recapturing of natural instincts, drives and passions and a reshaping and reforming o f them in a process resembling artistic creation that m a y bring about

an

integration o f all aspects o f o u r nature in an aesthetic-existential wholeness.

Darwin and Teleology The

Übermenschen

Aufhebung

165

o f the future he pictures are those w h o have attained an

of, o r an Überwindung

of, the primitive expression o f the will t o

power. T h e y will have achieved a "spiritualization" o f homo

natura.

R e t u r n i n g to the treatment o f D a r w i n i s m in Lange's critical history, one important focus o f attention is on the implications for teleology o f evolutio­ nary t h e o r y . L a n g e calls attention t o the fact that the belief in a teleology in nature is purely anthropomorphic. T h e view in Darwinismus

that, in the

absence o f divine purpose, nature, in its o w n way, achieves its "purposes" in the sense o f the survival o f the fitest is described b y Lange as a species o f optimistische

Metaphysik.

18

T h e covert importation

o f purpose into

the

evolutionary process in the sense o f the presumed value o f the o u t c o m e o f the process is ridiculed b y L a n g e . H e remarks that die Methode

der Natur,

if such

it m a y be called, is to t h r o w thousands o f gifted and aspiring people into wretchedness and despair for the sake o f producing a einzige Zur Genealogie

der Moral,

Genie.

Later, in

N i e t z s c h e will reverse this observation and harshly

r e c o m m e n d that the sacrifice o f humanity en masse

for the sake o f a single,

stronger human species would constitute progress. A t any rate, Lange sees in natural processes a haphazardness that, to us, seems like chance. T h e empirical data accumulated b y the evolutionists points b a c k to the fragmentary philoso­ phy of Empedocles.

19

E m p e d o c l e s depicts a cyclic process in nature in w h i c h

nothing is either created o r destroyed, in which teleology is absent and in which chance combinations o f elements form all the beings that have existed. I f we add t o this that E m p e d o c l e s denied the existence o f "substances," c o n ­ ceived o f perception as perspectival and viewed the world-process as imbued with strife and pluralistic diversity, we can see w h y N i e t z s c h e felt a magnetic attraction to his thought. It is not surprising that he considered E m p e d o c l e s one o f his philosophical "ancestors." T h e rejection o f teleology may have been reinforced b y Lange, D a r w i n and E m p e d o c l e s , but N i e t z s c h e ' s hostility towards the notion was as m u c h a matter o f passion as o f reason. T h e idea infuriated h i m because it was used t o justify suffering or, w o r s e , used t o s h o w that suffering was inflicted o n s o m e o n e because o f "sinfulness." T e l e o l o g y , as in H e g e l , makes the real the rational and the rational the real: in effect, it deifies success. D a r w i n i s m , once cleansed o f its unjustified optimism and linked with E m p e d o c l e s ' c o s m i c vision, was appropriated b y N i e t z s c h e and, in his o w n terms, transcended. C o m m e n t i n g o n the vast play o f organic forces depicted in D a r w i n ' s theory, 18

19

Lange, op. cit., II, 745 n. Ibid., II, 692. In notes from 1867-68 Nietzsche refers to this relation between Empedokles and Darwinism, specifically referring to Lange's Geschichte. Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke, Munich, 1937, Band 4, 54. He notes of Empedokles' notion of fortuitous creation of living beings that: "Diese Ansicht entspricht der darwinischen Theorie Gesch des Mat., p. 404."

166

Darwin and Teleology

Lange asserts that the occurrence o f a favorable, valuable individual case in the world is a glücklieber

Zufall,

20

a " l u c k y accident." Although Lange makes little

o f this, N i e t z s c h e , o f course, will claim that superior types o f human beings — a Julius Caesar, a L e o n a r d o da Vinci, a G o e t h e - were, at best, fortunate accidents in the past. Such superior types o f human beings have miraculously appeared from time to time, but they have not been

willed.

Dieser höher wertigere Typus ist oft genug schon dagewesen: aber als ein Glücks­ fall, als eine Ausnahme, niemals als gewollt. 21

N i e t z s c h e , like Lange, denies that there has been any real progress in the sense that m o d e r n m e n are "better" than men o f the past. T h e r e is no necessary evolution up to a higher species o r superior individuals. H o w e v e r , In einem andern Sinne gibt es ein fortwährendes Gelingen einzelner Fälle an den verschiedensten Stellen der Erde und aus den verschiedensten Kulturen heraus, mit denen in der Tat sich ein höherer Typus darstellt: etwas, das im Verhältnis zur Gesamt-Menschheit eine Art Übermensch ist. Solche Glücksfälle des großen Gelingens waren immer möglich und werden vielleicht immer möglich sein. 22

Lange argues that the discovery o f teleology in nature is simply a case o f a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c projection, that processes in nature display what to human understanding appears to be the "blindest chance." W h a t w e consider 'natural' development to maturation is actually the exception in a world in which there is e n o r m o u s waste o f vital energy and vital beings. A n y anthropomorphe der

Teleologie

is completely untenable.

23

Form

N i e t z s c h e follows up these sugges­

tions o f Lange and wages war against the idea o f an objective, immanent teleology. W h a t actually survives in nature o r in history is not b y any means always the best o r the m o s t valuable. T h e r e is no inevitable fulfillment o f a plan or a 'purpose' in nature, history o r society. N i e t z s c h e is opposed to teleology in the f o r m o f the Platonic-Aristotelian idea o f purpose

in nature,

the

Christian c o n c e p t i o n o f providential design and the Hegelian theory o f the unfolding o f the " I d e a " in history or the "march o f G o d through the w o r l d . " If there were a teleology to be realized, it would already have been realized.

20

21

22

23

Ibid., II, 693. KGW, VI 3, Der Antichrist, 3. "This higher type has often already appeared in the past: but as a fortunate accident, an exception, never as willed." Ibid., 4. "In another sense, success in individual cases is often encountered in the most widely different cultures and places: here we do find a higher type that is, in relation to the totality of mankind, a kind of overman. Such happy accidents of great success have always been possible, and will always probably be possible." Lange, op. cit., II, 745 n. Under the heading Z[ur] T[eleologie] Nietzsche refers to the human analogy underlying the idea of teleology in nature. HKG 3, 371-372. In the spirit of Lange, he remarks that "Optimismus und Teleologie gehn Hand-in-Hand." Ibid., 371. Cp. 375.

167

Darwin and Teleology

F u r t h e r m o r e , if there were a universal teleology, then the brutality and irrationality that permeates human history would b e justified and given sanction. A teleological orientation seems to entail the belief in a "progress" that N i e t z s c h e steadfastly denies has occurred. J u s t as strenuously as he rejects teleology does he reject mechanistic causation. T h e mechanistic

Weltbild

represents a meaningless c o s m i c picture in which bits o f matter act u p o n other " c l u m p s " o f matter in a senseless machine-like process. Mechanistic material­ ism

deprives existence o f value and meaning. T h i s is what such a

schauung

Weltan­

w o u l d b e if it were "true." Strictly speaking, however, the mechanis­

tic t h e o r y is based upon "fictions," is a regulative conception that is "ideal" in the sense o f being constructed b y means o f anthropomorphisms (e. g., "cause" and "effect": modeled after o u r subjective belief that w e are endowed with a " w i l l " that produces "effects", "attraction" and "repulsion": modeled o n o u r p s y c h i c feelings, etc.) and because it reduces a fluid actuality to a system o f symbols o r signs that do not literally correspond t o any actual entities. A l t h o u g h w e will examine this conventionalistic interpretation o f mechanism in o u r discussion o f interpretations o f Wirklichkeit

in science, it m a y be

m e n t i o n e d that N i e t z s c h e ' s arguments against mechanistic materialism o w e a great deal to Lange's conventionalistic arguments, as well as his previously considered n o t i o n that a consistently developed materialism leads to a form o f idealism. Despite his animadversions concerning teleology, N i e t z s c h e admits that w h e r e there is an accumulation o f strength, there appear arrangements that resemble a teleologisch

design. B u t such apparent ends are not intended even

though the accumulation o f powers suggest a Rangordnung

that resembles a

means-end order. T h e r e is n o definite directionality in evolution primarily because o f the intervention o f chance factors, accidents, unforeseen events. Apparent teleology in the evolution o f organisms is accounted for in terms o f the interaction o f wills to p o w e r that have a nisus towards g r o w t h .

2 4

In the course o f discussing the p h e n o m e n o n o f the alteration o f generation, Lange remarks that it undermines the concept o f absolute species. Studies o f the organic individual reveal what he considers interesting insights. F o r o n e , there are n o perfectly unified organisms; in fact, "the assumption o f absolute unities" is fallacious because there are no Einheiten

in the natural w o r l d . U n i t y

is a relative c o n c e p t that is useful for thought, but does n o t represent the actuality o f c o m p l e x organic multiplicities.

25

T h i s remark will b e applied b y

Werke, GOA, XVI, 58. Lange, op. cit., II, 694. In the Philosophische Notizen of 1867-68, this issue of the conception of Einheiten in nature is mentioned a number of times. Cf. Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke, Munich, 1935, 3, 379 ff.

168

Darwin and Teleology

N i e t z s c h e to the epistemological notion that the category o f unity is not applicable in any descriptive sense to actual entities. T h a t is, Wir haben Einheiten nothig, um rechnen zu können: deshalb ist nicht an­ zunehmen, dass es solche Einheiten giebt. Wir haben den Begriff der Einheit entlehnt von unserem „Ich"-begriff, - unserem ältesten Glaubensartikel. Wenn wir uns nicht für Einheiten hielten, hätten wir nie den Begriff „Ding" gebildet. J e t z t . . . sind wir reichlich davon überzeugt, dass unsere Conception des Ich-Begriffs nichts für eine reale Einheit verbürgt. 26

In the same passage, it is held that the fictional concept o f the ' a t o m ' is derived from o u r c o n c e p t i o n o f our psychic experience o f ourselves as Einheiten

or

"unities." H e r e N i e t z s c h e manages to bring together a n u m b e r o f insights that Lange offers in various parts o f his Geschichte.

N o entity o f any kind is a

unity; all entities are dynamic multiplicities. Therefore, the concept o f ' u n i t y ' cannot be applied to any real entity. It is a thought-form, a s y m b o l that is, like the c o n c e p t o f a unified atom, derived from o u r Ich-Begriff. "thing" (Ding)

T h e category o f

is also not given in experience. Rather, it is modeled after o u r

idea o f ourselves as permanent entities o r separate, unified subjects. N i e t z s c h e creatively synthesizes what in Lange's writings are separate observations, asides o r passing insights. The

reference t o the organism as a multiplicity suggests to Lange the

unique c o n c e p t i o n o f the individual that he finds in G o e t h e ' s

Morphologic

T h e passage that is quoted from this essay is w o r t h citing in full because o f the light it sheds o n what I believe is the basic origin o f N i e t z s c h e ' s fragmentary t h e o r y o f the individual in general and the human individual in particular. G o e t h e argues that Jedes Lebendige es ist kein Einzelnes, sondern eine Mehrheit; selbst insofern es uns als Individuum erscheint, bleibt es doch eine Versammlung von lebendigen selbstän­ digen Wesen... J e unvollkommener das Geschöpf ist, desto mehr sind diese Teile einander gleich oder ähnlich, und desto mehr gleichen sie dem Ganzen. . . . Die Subordination der Teile deutet auf ein vollkommeneres Geschöpf. 27

26

27

KGW, VIII 3, 50 f. "In order to be able to reckon, we need unities: that does not mean that we must assume such unities exist. The concept of unity we have borrowed from our 'ego'-concept - our oldest article of faith. We would never have formed the concept 'thing' if we did not take ourselves to be unities. N o w . . . we are firmly convinced that our I-concept does not guarantee any real unity." J. W. von Goethe, Morphologie. Cited in Lange, op. cit., II, 694. "Every living being is not a single thing, but a plurality; even insofar as it appears to us as an individual, it still remains a collection of living, independent beings... The more imperfect the creature is, the more are these parts the same or similar, the more they resemble the whole... The subordination of pans points to a more perfect creature." It has been pointed out that Nietzsche seems to paraphrase these remarks of Lange when he says that: "Alle Einheit ist nur als Organisation und Zusammenspiel Einheit . . . ein Herrschafts-Gebilde, das Eins bedeutet, aber nicht eins ist."

169

Darwin and Teleology

Lange points out that V i r c h o w made use o f this conception o f the individual in his t h e o r y o f the organic individual as an "inner c o m m u n i t y " (innige schaft)

Gemein­

in which each living cell strives to realize itself through the totality.

V o g t is said to have held that the form

o f organisms gives the appearance o f

unity, but the dynamics o f the living being are "forces." Seen from within, an individual (say, a plant) is a " c o l o n y . " E a c h living, dynamic multiplicity exists in relation to o t h e r dynamic entities in an environment. N o living entity can exist in isolation from its environment and its relations t o other beings. V o g t goes o n t o say that individuation is a gradual process that increases step b y step. H e finds s o m e confirmation for his general theory in the discovery (in the B r y o z o a ) o f a "colonial

nervous

system.

28

"

M a n y o f these conceptions, especially that o f G o e t h e , are found

in

N i e t z s c h e ' s disjointed remarks about individual organisms and the "self" o f man. T h e materials out o f which he forms his biologism are first found amidst the impressive details Lange amasses. Aside from G o e t h e ' s speculative understanding o f organic entities, Lange discusses the famous

formula

of Haeckel: "ontogeny

recapitulates

phy-

l o g e n y . " T h e r e are expositions o f theories that emphasize the unity o f all organisms, as well as o f Preyer's view that the life-impulse cannot be entirely explained mechanistically. J e a n - B a p t i s t e de L a m a r c k ' s evolutionary theory is mentioned with special emphasis upon the theory o f acquired characteristics. References to experiments on the behavior o f lower organisms abound in Lange's Geschichte.

T h e sense o f the continuous process o f development and

evolution, the n o t i o n o f long periods during which gradual, imperceptible organic changes o c c u r in organisms, all o f the burgeoning biological theories that Lange cites and c o m m e n t s on no doubt made a deep impression o n N i e t z s c h e . Repeatedly, Lange (or one o f the biological theorists he refers t o ) raises questions about the "essence" o f life, the possible unity o f all living beings, the riddle o f life, in such a way as to tempt a philosophical reader to offer a solution t o such questions. Even though, as we have seen, Lange does n o t encourage the development o f a metaphysics o f life, he does see the value o f a figurative, philosophical overview that would seek a poetic interpretation o f life o r nature that would be closely linked with the data o f the Wissenschaften.

exakte

T h e complexity o f the wide range o f theories, facts and

speculations that Lange displays is reflected in the complexity o f N i e t z s c h e ' s thought.

It is n o t surprising

that he developed a perspectival theory o f

KGW VIII 1, 102. Jörg Salaquarda, "Nietzsche und Lange," N.S., 7 (1978), 247. In notations written between October 1867 and April 1868 Nietzsche quotes the first sentence cited from Goethe's Morphologic HKG III, 376. Cf. Lange, GdM, 406. Lange, op. cit., II, 695-697, 746 n.

170

Darwin and Teleology

k n o w l e d g e : such a t h e o r y grew out o f his o w n sensitivity to a variety o f theoretical perspectives, a variety o f forms o f life, and was virtually illustrated b y Lange's Geschichte

des

Materialismus.

T h e description o f the self in Also

sprach

Zarathustra

has sometimes led

interpreters o f N i e t z s c h e to suspect that he embraced a form o f physicalism, behaviorism o r epiphenomenalism. F o r , in Zarathustra,

the intelligence o f the

b o d y is praised and it is said to be the ruler o f the ego. T h e b o d y has, N i e t z s c h e says, m o r e reason than the wisdom o f the mind. B e h i n d o u r thoughts and feelings is the bodily self. Das schaffende Leib.

T h e primary tendency o f the b o d y is über

Selbst

sich hinaus

is the

schaffende

zu schaffen:

"to

29

create b e y o n d itself." T h e self is not a mind, n o t a spirit, not a consciousness, n o t a Substanz,

n o t a Subjekt.

single entity; rather, Das

E v e n the concept o f " I " o r Ich does not signify a "Ich"...

ist...

nur eine

begriffliche

30

Synthesis."

T h i s "conceptual synthesis" is formed out o f a variety o f "urges," "drives" o r " f o r c e s " that w a x and wane. Such primitive urges, drives o r desires manifest themselves through the b o d y and are represented to ourselves b y means o f an inner p h e n o m e n o l o g y . W h a t w e take to be "facts o f consciousness" are already constituted p h e n o m e n a that comprise unsere

innere

Welt. T h e s e phenomena,

like external p h e n o m e n a , are arranged, organized and simplified. F o r this reason, the p h e n o m e n a o f the inner world are characterized as "appearance" 31

(Erscheinung).

W h a t has been called N i e t z s c h e ' s "philosophical p s y c h o l o g y "

is actually a kind o f phenomenological p s y c h o l o g y that seeks to analyze and interpret o u r subjective states o f consciousness or feelings. It is a reflection u p o n what D i l t h e y will later call "lived-experience" (Erlebnis).

A l t h o u g h we

shall have occasion t o refer to this analysis o f internal states when we examine the critique o f the c o n c e p t o f "will" and the analysis o f "willing", o u r focus here will be o n N i e t z s c h e ' s conception o f the self as b o d y . A t this point, it should be noted that the interpretation o f the self as b o d y and the interpreta­ tion o f the self in terms o f subjective feelings, beliefs o r drives are but interpretations o f t w o aspects o f the self, neither o f w h i c h is conclusive o r ontologically exhaustive. N e i t h e r an internal p h e n o m e n o l o g y n o r an external p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the "self" exhausts the complexity o f the m i c r o c o s m i c nature o f selfhood. Because N i e t z s c h e m o r e o r less accepts Lange's d o u b t about the validity o f self-observation, he believes that the p h e n o m e n o n

o f the b o d y is m o r e

accessible and m o r e tangible than psychic phenomena. H i s emphasis o n bodily existence is n o t a dogmatic reductionism; it is, rather, a methodological

29

KGW, VI 1, AsZ, "Von den Verächtern des Leibes."

30

KGW, VIII 1, 28. KGW, VII 2, 159.

31

171

Darwin and Teleology

approach t o the self. A s we shall see, his identification o f the self with the b o d y is n o t b y any means his last w o r d o n the subject. F o r , he interprets the states, functions and actions o f the b o d y in terms o f hypothetical "centers o f f o r c e " (Kraftcentren)

o r "will-points" (Willens-Punktationen).

Such postulated n o n -

extended points o r force centers are applied to an interpretation o f man's being not in terms o f any positive knowledge, but o n l y in the spirit o f a thoughtexperiment. W h a t N i e t z s c h e is looking for here is a relatively d e a n t h r o p o m o r ­ phic hypothesis concerning the nature o f man that relies, for the m o s t part, o n terms b o r r o w e d from a dynamic physical theory o f the ultimate constituents of the natural w o r l d . Given his skepticism about the capacity o f physical theory to attain "truth" about the nature o f things, his hypothetical explora­ tion o f the nature o f man is d o u b l y removed from any claim to possess certain knowledge about what, essentially, man is. In o n e o f his notations, N i e t z s c h e identifies his "hypothesis" as the following: das Subjekt

als Vielheit.

T h i s "subject" that is construed as a

"multiplicity" is n o t considered as a separate, substantial atomic subject. In this formula, he seems t o be tentatively experimenting with the n o t i o n that each 'individual' is like a multiplicity o f " s u b j e c t s " in a c o m m u n i t y o r a society. I t is said that Die Annahme des Einen Subjekts ist vielleicht nicht nothwendig; vielleicht ist es ebensogut erlaubt, eine Vielheit von Subjekten anzunehmen, deren Zusammenspiel und Kampf unserem Denken und überhaupt unserem Bewusstsein zu Grunde liegt? 32

W h e n he refers to these " s u b j e c t s " as a kind of Aristokratie

von "Zellen,"

we

m a y surmise that this "aristocracy o f ' c e l l s ' " is comprised o f a multiplicity o f " s u b j e c t s " . T h i s is tantamount to G o e t h e ' s idea o f a collection o f living, independent beings. W h a t N i e t z s c h e seems t o be approaching, but n o t quite accepting, is a c o n c e p t i o n o f an individual organic being as a " f o r m " that has apparent

unity, but is, in fact, a multiplicity o f fundamentally psychistic

"subjects". W h a t N i e t z s c h e proposes in his analysis o f organic, bodily form into a multiplicity o f " s u b j e c t s " that are analogous to "cells" or m e m b e r s o f a c o m m u n i t y is a panpsychistic interpretation o f a system o f " s u b j e c t s " w h o s e actions and

reactions and propensities

are expressed through

the

body.

A l t h o u g h , as others have noted, this sounds like L e i b n i z ' s m o n a d o l o g y , N i e t z s c h e is at pains to distinguish his t h e o r y from that o f L e i b n i z (without naming h i m ) precisely because he is aware o f the similarities between his

32

KGW, VII 3, 382. "The assumption of a single subject is perhaps not necessary. Is it perhaps just as allowable to assume a multiplicity of subjects whose struggle and interaction is the ground of our thought and our consciousness in general?"

172

Darwin and Teleology

postulated "will-points" and L e i b n i z ' s monads. A t one point, he even admits that w e m a y speak o f Monaden

in a "relative" sense. W h e r e N i e t z s c h e ' s "force

centers" o r " s u b j e c t s " differ from L e i b n i z ' s monads is in terms o f their nature or form. T h e y are not "windowless" entities, but are in relation to other centers o f force. T h e y are not, as L e i b n i z ' s monads are, "substances." T h e y are dynamic elements that wax and wane, that gain and lose

"power."

A l t h o u g h he does refer to an "oligarchy o f subjects", N i e t z s c h e does not, as L e i b n i z does, refer t o the mind as the "dominant m o n a d . " W h e n N i e t z s c h e describes the b o d y as the self in Zarathustra

and, in his Nachlass,

speaks o f a

c o m m u n i t y o f " s u b j e c t s " o r a "constellation o f centers o f f o r c e " , he is not contradicting himself. F o r , as we shall see in m o r e detail in our discussion o f his c o n c e p t i o n o f a "force-point-world," he adopts a dynamic t h e o r y o f " m a t t e r " that is at odds with mechanistic materialism, a theory o f "matter" that is closer to c o n t e m p o r a r y microphysics than it is t o the Materialismus

that assumed the reality o f Klümpchen-Atome.

atomistische

Needless to say,

it was in Lange's "treasure-house" that N i e t z s c h e first encountered a dynamic interpretation o f nature that showed him the way to outflank a powerful theoretical e n e m y , mechanistic materialism. A t o n e point in the Nachlass, is put

forward.

an atypical view o f the multiplicity o f the self

It is one that clashes with what he usually says about

individuals being comprised o f a multitude o f dynamic quanta. Die Sphäre eines Subjektes beständig wachsend oder sich vermindernd - der Mittelpunkt des Systems sich beständig verschiebend - ; im Falle es die angeeignete Masse nicht organisiren kann, zerfällt es in 2. 33

T h e r e is a serious deviation in this passage from the notion consistently presented elsewhere that each individual organism (including, o f course, m a n ) m a y b e construed as a dynamic system o f interacting Kraft-Quanta Machtquanta

or

each o f which is an individual center o f force. I n this passage

N i e t z s c h e seems to shift from one universe o f discourse t o another. In the context o f denying that there is a distinct ego that is a Subjekt

(in the sense o f a

metaphysical subject), he asserts that there are no " s u b j e c t - a t o m s . " S o far, so g o o d . H o w e v e r , he then uses the term 'Subjekt'

in a positive sense and refers

to its increasing and decreasing sphere. T h i s cannot mean an

Ich-Subjekt

because this is one idea he repeatedly criticizes. T h e next reference t o the shifting center o f the " s y s t e m " p r o b a b l y refers to a multiplicity o f what are here misleadingly called "subjects." T h e reference to an "appropriate mass" suggests a physical process whereas the " s u b j e c t s " spoken o f here are else-

33

KGW, VIII 2, 55 f. "The sphere of a subject constantly growing or decreasing - the center of the system constandy shifting - ; in cases where it cannot organize the appropriate mass, it breaks into 2."

173

Darwin and Teleology

where designated as "will-points" o r Machtquanta.

F u r t h e r m o r e , the c o m ­

m e n t about something dividing in t w o does not refer in a clear w a y t o a subject o f the sentence. D o e s it refer to the "sphere o f the subject" or to the "center o f the s y s t e m " ? T h e next part o f this confusing note states the following: 'Substanz,'

vielmehr

nur indirekt

Etwas,

"erhalten"

das an sich nach

Verstärkung

will (es will sich überbieten).

strebt

Keine

und das sich

N o w , this " s o m e t h i n g "

that is n o t a substance, that strives for greater strength

and seeks self-

preservation o n l y indirectly because it primarily seeks to surpass itself, is clearly analogous t o the living being as such that is so characterized in

Jenseits

von Gut und Böse. T h u s , the implication is that a living system is comprised o f " s u b j e c t s " that gain and lose p o w e r o r strength. T h e term " s u b j e c t " in this context seems t o refer to each living, independent being (as in G o e t h e ' s t h e o r y ) that is part o f a living system. W h e n N i e t z s c h e refers to the splitting o f a " s u b j e c t , " he seems to be applying to his o w n abstract, experimental analysis o f the dynamics o f living beings a n o t i o n appropriate to the fission that takes place in s o m e lower organisms. T h i s is an anomalous presentation o f his views because he typically treats

each " s u b j e c t , " each "Machtquantum"

as an

individual center o f force that strives to maximize its p o w e r and has its own "perspective." W i t h o u t belaboring the point, it may be noted that in his argument for eternal recurrence he refers to Kraftcentren

as if they are individual units o f

force. In addition, it must be emphasized that, for N i e t z s c h e , the fundamental elements out o f which all things are c o m p o s e d are understood as " l i k e " wills or, as he says in one place, Willens-Punktationen, treated as irreducible posits insofar as die kleinste 34

teste ist.

Welt an Dauer

die

dauerhaf­

T h i s assumption o f "the smallest w o r l d " being "the m o s t durable" is

clearly a quantification presented as a qualitative Kraft.

"will-points." T h e s e are

o f a theoretical posit that is elsewhere emphatically interpretation o f the physical concept o f " f o r c e " o r

A s we shall see in o u r discussion o f the physical theory that inspired him

t o b r e a k d o w n the distinction between the organic and the inorganic and view all entities as dynamic complexes comprised o f "will-subjects" o r "willpoints",

Nietzsche's

criss-crossing o f disciplines, his use o f

analogies and anthropomorphisms

metaphors,

sometimes produces strange results. S o -

called " s u b j e c t s " o r "force-centers" m a y be said to gain or lose power, to c o m b i n e t o create greater strength, but they cannot be capable o f splitting without creating havoc for a theory that is already complex enough as it is. A l t h o u g h I w o u l d agree that the individual quanta which go to make up this aggregate [we call the human self] function on the basis of some sort of self-identity or self-assertion, since their sole 34

KGW,

VIII 2, 278.

174

Darwin and Teleology

drive is to increase or enhance their own will to power... we might say that the "selfhood" or unity of a human "individual" is the sum of the lesser "selves" which collectively make up the human aggregate, 35

it is doubtful that N i e t z s c h e consistently holds that each power-quantum

is

divisible. W h e r e a s it is consistent with other aspects o f his experimental theory to hold that power-quanta can merge to form m o r e powerful "constellations o f force"

(as human

" s u b j e c t s " increase their individual

power

b y joining

organized social groups), it is a violation o f essential assumptions to grant that each unit o f force or p o w e r can be further divided. F o r , this would lead to an infinite regress or infinite divisibility. I f each Kraft-Quantum

was not thought

of, in s o m e sense, as self-identical, then N i e t z s c h e could not have used this aspect o f his t h e o r y in his argument for eternal recurrence o f the same. T h e claim that Der Begriff

'Individuum'

ist falsch

means that the c o n c e p t i o n o f the

self as a simple, unified individual is false because the organic totality, as in G o e t h e ' s view, is an exceedingly complex multiplicity. T h e concept "individu­ al" is a useful fiction that signifies a being that is comprised o f a vast n u m b e r o f specific 'elements', states, drives, urges, physical and psychic conditions or acts. In this sense, der Mensch Rangordnung

stehen.

36

eine

Vielheit

von Kräften

ist, welche

in

einer

H o w e v e r , even though these "forces" produce physical

effects and, in fact, comprise the totality we designate as " b o d y , " they are n o t divisible. T h e y c a n n o t be divided because the model that N i e t z s c h e uses for an understanding o f the underlying dynamics o f each being is a physical theory that posits unextended

point-centres

that are construed as finite in number.

T h i s elaborate and sophisticated theory was p r o b a b l y brought to N i e t z s c h e ' s attention through his reading o f F e c h n e r ' s discussions o f it and later it was pursued b y N i e t z s c h e in his study o f R o g e r B o s c o v i c h ' s A Theory Philosophy.

As

we

shall

see in

subsequent

discussions,

this

of

Natural

complex,

mathematical physical t h e o r y had a profound impact o n N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking and was instrumental in the development o f his theory o f a universal Wille Macht

zur

in nature.

T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f the organism as a collectivity o f " f o r c e s " or "urges" is often compared with the notion o f a c o m m u n i t y as comprised o f a multiplicity o f " s u b j e c t s " w h o have varying degrees o f p o w e r within it. T h i s image o f organisms was (as we have seen) suggested to N i e t z s c h e b y s o m e o f the biological theories that Lange expounded. W h a t we call the " b o d y " is a s y m b o l for an interplay o f forces, a " c o l o n y " o f living subjects that have various gradations o f p o w e r and are subject to a kind o f "division o f labor." F r o m time to time, the "sovereigns" in this c o l o n y change. H o w e v e r , b o t h

35

36

Grimm, op. cit., 160. KGW, VII 3, 181-182.

Darwin and Teleology

175

these metaphorical sovereigns and the "subjects" within this dynamic c o l o n y or c o m m u n i t y are each characterized b y fühlend,

wollend

and

denkend.

3 7

T h u s , G o e t h e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f organisms is carried a step further b y N i e t z s c h e insofar as he personifies each "living independent

being" and

attributes

"feeling", "willing" and "thinking" to it. T h i s personification o f each living element in the b o d y , this notion that each 'part' strives for an enhancement o f its p o w e r , gives us an insight into b o t h the nature o f the self as b o d y and the idea o f a plurality o f "wills to p o w e r . " T h e self is the b o d y , but the b o d y is a multiplicity o f feeling, willing and thinking "subjects" that comprise, at any stage o f life, a hierarchy o f Kräften.

I f at different stages o f life there are

different arrangements o f these "forces," then, in a sense, there are different "selves." Insofar as the multiplicities comprising the b o d y are continually changing, and insofar as dominant "forces" are not constant, the self o f an individual is a process, a gradual process in which one bodily self is replaced b y another and that b y another and so o n . N o t only is this projection o f an immanent nisus into living "cells" an obvious form o f vitalism, it also a c c o m ­ plishes something N i e t z s c h e sought to attain: to find a place for the hypothese

Seele­

in his new p s y c h o l o g y . O n e possibility is t o conceive o f the " s o u l "

as Subjekts-Vielheit

o r a multiplicity o f subjects.

38

T h i s notion reinforces

tendencies towards panpsychism and clarifies what he means b y the "self" as a multiplicity o f " s u b j e c t s . " W h e n he remarks that unser Gesellschaftsbau len,

39

vieler

Seelen

Leib

and equates these Unter-Seelen

ist ja nur ein with

Unterwil­

even m o r e light is shed o n his experimental theory. F o r , the b o d y is the

apparently unified structure o r form that is actually comprised o f organs and systems that, in turn, are c o m p o s e d o f cells. E a c h biological 'unit' is a dynamic entity, a kind o f "under-will" that seeks to discharge its energy: the total system o f vital relations and interactions is that total p h e n o m e n o n we desig­ nate as "the b o d y . " T h e energy o f each elementary, organic c o m p l e x is interpreted

as if it were o u r subjectively experienced "will-force," as if it were

that Affekt

that N i e t z s c h e designates "will to p o w e r . " I f we relate this notion

to the various accounts o f Kraftcentren, can

Macht. ity

Machtquanta

o r Kraft-Quanta,

see the justification o f Muller-Lauter's references to die 40

Willen

we zur

Insofar as every entity is construed as being comprised o f a multiplic­

o f dynamic quanta that are understood

as "under-wills" or "wills t o

p o w e r , " the pluralistic emphasis in N i e t z s c h e ' s thought certainly seems to be predominant.

57

58

19

40

Werke, GOA, XVI, 17f. KGW, VI 2 , J G B , 12. Ibid., 19. "... our body is only a societal structure comprised of many souls." Cf. W. Müller-Lauter, "Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht," Nietzsche-Studien, (1974), 1-60.

III

Darwin and Teleology

176

It has been said that " N i e t z s c h e was aroused from his dogmatic slumber b y Darwin."

41

T h e r e certainly is s o m e substance t o this especially if we consider

the early reactions o f N i e t z s c h e in his Unzeitgemäße

Betrachtungen

to the

social and cultural dangers o f the theory o f evolution. H e sees it as true, but deadly in its consequences. I f this doctrine is filtered d o w n to the people, it will, he believes, generate conflicts between men that will issue in " r o b b e r y and exploitation."

42

Even though N i e t z s c h e himself could appropriate

the

n o t i o n that man is but a m o s t cunning animal without turmoil, he felt that it would have a nihilistic effect upon masses o f people. It is not D a r w i n alone w h o awakened N i e t z s c h e from a dogmatic slumber. H i s awakening was m u c h ruder than that. F o r , he was assaulted b y a multiplicity o f theories, ideas and facts that must have produced a chaotic impression. W i t h i n pages in w h i c h the rudiments o f D a r w i n ' s t h e o r y are presented, F e c h n e r ' s Einige Schöpfungs-

und Entwicklungsgeschichte

der Organismen

Ideen

zur

is cited in c o n n e c ­

tion with the intimate relation between the inorganic and the organic. F e c h n e r argued that the particles in organic and inorganic molecules are simply in different states o f mobility and that the traditional distinction between the organic and the inorganic worlds is merely a relative o n e . with G o e t h e ' s Morphologie

43

T h i s theme merges

in N i e t z s c h e ' s mind to b e c o m e a conception o f all

entities as organic o r quasi-organic multiplicities. A n d these notions are bereft of teleological interpretation b y the implications o f D a r w i n i s m and the sugges­ tion offered b y Lange o f a scientific justification o f E m p e d o c l e s ' dysteleology. A n a n o n y m o u s review o f Radenhausen's Isis proclaims that in place o f an otherworldly causality s o m e men n o w substitute the possibility o f "happy accidents" (glücklicher

Zufälle).

for the fact daß alle Erscheinungen zwecklos

sind.

44

T h e reviewer finds this only a compensation der Welt in ihrem

letzten

Grunde

sinn-

und

A l t h o u g h this nihilistic view is not directly joined with the

dysteleological consequences o f evolution b y means o f 'natural' (or "artifi­ cial") selection, the implication is there. I f we add to these views L a m a r c k ' s assumption o f the transmission o f acquired physical characteristics and F e c h ­ ner's t h e o r y that psychical

traits that are acquired m a y also be transmitted, that

psychic efforts and conditions are but the inner aspect o f physical organiza­ tion,

45

we begin to discern the palimpsest upon which N i e t z s c h e w r o t e his

philosophy.

41

42

45

44

45

Kaufmann, op. cit., 167. KGW, III 1, UB, II, 9. Lange, op. cit., II, 744 n. Cited in Lange, op. cit., II, 690. "...that all phenomena are fundamentally senseless and purposeless." Ibid., 11. 701-702. The question concerning Nietzsche's possible acceptance of Lamarck's principle of the transmission of acquired characteristics may be illuminated by the fact that

Darwin and Teleology

177

A m o n g s t m a n y fascinating conceptions that Lange discusses in mus

und Teleologie,

Darwinis­

o n e in particular made a deep impression o n N i e t z s c h e :

D a r w i n ' s description o f the p h e n o m e n o n o f " m i m i c r y . " T h e p h e n o m e n o n o f m i m i c r y is, o f course, the capacity o f animals o r insects to create illusions o f f o r m o r c o l o r o r b o t h that blend them into their environment o r enable t h e m t o pass for o t h e r organisms. C o n c e r n i n g this, Lange notes that such a capacity p r o b a b l y arose because individuals underwent a fortuitous modification o f a protective kind that proved beneficial for these types within a species over a long period o f time. T h o s e individuals o r groups capable o f m i m i c r y tended to propagate their kind and b e c o m e m o r e n u m e r o u s . Whereas m o s t o f us w o u l d find this a fascinating piece o f information in the rich lore o f the naturalist, N i e t z s c h e makes a great deal o f it and, in c u s t o m a r y fashion, applies it to the species that fascinated him m o s t o f all, homo in Morgenröte

sapiens.

I n the following passage

he moves with typical rapidity from a curious natural fact to a

sweeping and b o l d conclusion. T h u s , lernen die Tiere sich beherrschen und sich in der Weise verstellen, daß manche zum Beispiel ihre Farben der Farbe der Umgebung anpassen . . . daß sie sich tot stellen oder die Formen und Farben eines anderen Tieres oder von Sand, Blättern, Flechten, Schwämmen annehmen (das, was die englischen Forscher mit mimicry bezeichnen). So verbirgt sich der einzelne unter der Allgemeinschaft des Begriffes „Mensch" oder unter der Gesellschaft, oder paßt sich an Fürsten, Stände, Parteien,

Lange attributes the principle of Vererbung erworbener Eigenschaften to Darwin. Ibid., II, 713. This is not a terrible error on Lange's part because Darwin himself recognizes Lamarck as having put forward a general theory of evolution and reports Lamarck's central thesis without criticism. At one point in The Origin of Species, Darwin acknowledges the "effects of habit" on organic change in species. The disagreements between Darwin and Lamarck were not obvious to most early readers of Darwin. The fact that Herbert Spencer (who first used the phrase "the survival of the fittest") was considered a (Darwinian) evolutionist even though he accepted the validity of Lamarck's principle of the inheritance of acquired characteristics indicates that the question of "how" evolution worked was not too clear during the period immediately following the publication of The Origin of Species. Cf. R. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, Boston, 1955, Chapter 2. Cf. Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, 54, 74. According to a leading interpreter of evolutionary theory, Darwin did not reject entirely Lamarck's theory of the transmission of acquired characteristics, "despite his emphasis upon selection." [George Simpson, The Major Features of Evolution, New York, 1953, 133.] Although Nietzsche sometimes toys with Lamarckian notions (such as the idea of the transmission of "organic memory" and the development of characteristics out of "need"), his biologism is neither Lamarckian nor Darwinian. Certainly, he accepts some Darwinian concep­ tions: that existence is a "struggle", that reason developed as a tool for survival, that there is an evolutionary process (but not a necessarily progressive one), that the natural world is permeated by a violent struggle for survival, etc. In the final analysis, he is "anti-Darwin", especially in regard to his denial that "adaptation" is the primary aim of organic life, that evolution is progressive, that the most "fit" (in a qualitative sense) survive, that there are distinct "species," that there is a clear distinction between the organic and the inorganic, that there is a "natural" evolution towards "stability" that is good. Insofar as Nietzsche himself has a theory of evolution, it is a dialectical one characterized by ascending and descending cycles.

Darwin and Teleology

178

Meinungen der Zeit oder der Umgebung an: und zu allen den feinen Arten, uns glücklich, dankbar, mächtig, verliebt zu stellen, wird man leicht das tierische Gleichnis finden. 46

T h i s general c o n c e p t i o n o f deception for the sake o f survival is a Leitmotiv N i e t z s c h e ' s writings. W i t h the organic world begins List

or

in

"cunning,"

deception o r what is sometimes called "lying." In the inorganic world (that differs slightly from the organic world) we see Macht

gegen

Macht

in a raw,

direct, open way. T h i s is the free expression o f " p o w e r " that he mentions in o n e o f his early letters. Even the plant w o r l d is said to display remarkable adaptation b y means o f "cunning." D e c e p t i o n and illusion-creation are c o n s i ­ dered as inextricably interwoven with all forms o f life. In the human world, this deception and cunning for the sake o f preservation is said to be perfected insofar as it is given the m o s t noble-sounding names. Social conventions, conventional "truths," morality, custom, the herd mentality, all o f these are masks that hide motives and desires that N i e t z s c h e does not consider particu­ larly n o b l e . Having seen a "great m a n " like W a g n e r up close, he was amazed at his theatrical skills, his manipulative powers, his genius at "play-acting." T h i s is an undeveloped theme in N i e t z s c h e ' s thought, but one that he worries over from time to t i m e : H o w m a n y o f the great men he admired m a y have been 47

clever Schauspieler?

T h e role o f " m i m i c r y " in human life intrigued him in the

sense that he saw h o w important it is in social existence. H e assumes that like beings seek out like beings, that mediocrity spreads because everyone wants to blend into his social environment. A "herd m o r a l i t y " is c o n d e m n e d because it is a negative morality, a morality o f prohibition, a morality for groups, not exceptional individuals. N i e t z s c h e is often criticized because he does n o t see the importance and value o f "institutions" and because he overemphasizes a life o f a u t o n o m y , self-mastery, individuated E x i s t e n z .

48

T h i s falsely presup­

poses that he did n o t see that social institutions are, for the m o s t part, designed for the majority, are artificially created environments formed for security, c o m f o r t , well-being, for the sake o f a feeling o f "belonging." M e n band together in groups for the sake o f security, to o v e r c o m e fear, anxiety and the

46

47

48

KGW, V 1, M, 26. " . . . animals learn to control and disguise themselves to such an extent that they can adapt the color of their bodies to that of their environment . . . can simulate death or adopt the colors and forms of other animals, of sand, leaves, moss or fungi (what the English naturalists call mimicry). It is in this way that an individual conceals himself within the universality of 'man' or society or adapts to, and attaches himself to, princes, castes, political parties, opinions of the time or his surroundings; we can easily find the animal equivalent of all those subtle means of making ourselves happy, thankful, powerful and fascinating." WDB, III, 598. J . P. Stern, Friedrich Nietzsche, New York, 1978, 127. "... a pervasive limitation of Nietzsche's thinking... is his consistent neglect of, and his indiscriminate bias against... the sphere of

association."

179

Darwin and Teleology

strain o f realizing their "higher self." Play-acting, m i m i c r y , deception, illusion and making oneself " l i k e " others are the main ingredients o f social existence. N i e t z s c h e , t o o , sees the profound value o f illusion in life; but the difference between his "illusions" o r "ideals" and those o f institutional man o r groupman is that they are designed to lead b e y o n d the human, b e y o n d the "fixations" o f the species, to the Übermenschen

all-too-human, w h o m a y take a

thousand years to b l o s s o m . Illusion n o t for the sake o f the preservation o f the m o s t adaptable kind o f life, but for the sake o f the highest form o f life. O n e o f m a n y things that has prevented man from attaining a m o r e meaningful world, a w o r l d with a human meaning, a w o r l d that frankly faces up to the need for a Rangordnung,

is a virtually universal tendency towards Schauspielerei

or

" h y p o c r i s y . " N i e t z s c h e virtually makes " h y p o c r i s y " a philosophical category and suggests that its derivation is the m i m i c r y that was discovered b y natural­ ists. M i m i c r y in the world o f insects and animals is hypocrisy in the human world. In his unpublished essay, Ueber Sinn,

Wahrheit

und Lüge

im

aussermoralischen

N i e t z s c h e argued that the intellect is a tool which has the primary

function o f dissimulation, a t o o l that was developed in weaker individuals t o preserve t h e m in the struggle for existence. Im Vorstellungskunst

auf ihren

Gipfel.

49

Menschen

kommt

diese

W i t h a cynicism that only a true man o f

virtue is capable of, N i e t z s c h e sees deception, lying, flattering,

wearing

disguises, hiding behind conventions and playing a role as the rule amongst men. T h e s e are evolved patterns o f behavior that have proven immensely useful for life, especially for those w h o are physically, psychologically and spiritually weaker than the relatively rare types o f men. Intellect, knowledge and conventional ' t r u t h ' are tools that have evolved in man for the sake o f the m o s t practical interest o f all: survival. T h e y serve the ends o f social adaptation. W h a t social man calls "virtue" also has served the preservation o f the group, the species. B u t , in fact, even "virtue" is often a clever form o f " m i m i c r y . " The

50

aim o f traditional forms o f morality is to encourage an equalizing o f

feeling, desire, impulse and aim; it is basically an instrument o f socialization. N i e t z s c h e pictures it as a form o f m i m i c r y because it serves adaptation and survival, because it is imitative. T h e ultimate principle o f typical, group m o r a l i t y is: b e as w e are. I n an ingenious way, N i e t z s c h e b o r r o w s a n o t i o n from one universe o f discourse and applies it t o another w i t h

surprising

results. A l t h o u g h he says a great deal "against D a r w i n , " there is no d o u b t that

KGW, III, 2, 370. "In man the art of dissimulation reaches its peak." KGW, VI 3, G, I X , 14. "...was mimicry ist (zu letzterem gehört ein großer Teil der sogenannten Tugend)."

Darwin and Teleology

180

his thinking was stimulated b y Darwinian conceptions and that he creatively adapted its principles to his o w n interpretation o f life. A l t h o u g h D a r w i n and Spencer see evolution as a m o v e m e n t from the lower forms o f life to higher forms, N i e t z s c h e claims that the plant and animal worlds develope all together, in a competitive, promiscuous process in which each species strives for its o w n growth.

51

D u r i n g this long process o f struggle,

there is evolution, even evolution in accordance with "natural" or "artificial" selection. H o w e v e r , N i e t z s c h e disagrees that this selective process favors gifted

o r exceptional individuals or the "fitest." L o n g - t e r m evolutionary

processes tend, as we have seen, t o favor the typical, average o r mediocre individuals in a species. Given his conception o f a universal will to p o w e r , a will to growth, this m a y seem paradoxical. W h a t N i e t z s c h e seems to mean is that in the r e m o t e past (when the environment was m o r e overpowering, when men were m o r e brutal) physically stronger, m o r e robust, m o r e " c o m p l e t e " types o f men tended t o survive and rule barbaric groups. W i t h the growth o f civilization, with greater control o f the natural environment, the evolutionary process was modified and the m o r e c o m m o n members o f the species achieved p o w e r b y virtue o f their numbers and their self-protective cooperation. W h a t N i e t z s c h e does n o t deal with directly, even though he implies it, is that the rise of the sciences and the industrial revolution brought about a transformation o f nature such that "evolution" no longer t o o k place in an entirely environment. I n his Economic

and Philosophic

Manuscripts

natural

of 1844, Karl M a r x

put his finger on this important change in the conditions o f human life b y maintaining that man, for the m o s t part, no longer lives in a purely natural environment as his ancestors did, but, rather, he lives in a socio-historical w o r l d that has been created b y means o f his productive activities. M o d e r n man does n o t live in nature as such, but in an anthropomorphische

51

Natur.

Even

though N i e t z s c h e is keenly aware o f this p h e n o m e n o n in his epistemological analyses, as his numerous praktische

Welt

references to man's creation o f a humanized,

indicate, his attacks o n D a r w i n i s m are focused primarily on

the optimistic assumption that nineteenth century man is the peak o f a long evolutionary process rather than o n the intervening technical, industrial and e c o n o m i c factors that transfigured human evolution. A l t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e does not entirely deny the importance o f external conditions

for

organic development,

he

tends

to

emphasize

"internal"

development and places a great deal o f stress o n self-command, effort, striving and "discipline." H e does so primarily because he believes with L a m a r c k and F e c h n e r that, in some way, such internal efforts or habits o f striving are

51

Werke, GOA, XV, 204.

52

Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Moscow, n.d., 104-105.

181

Darwin and Teleology

transmitted to future generations. H e m a y have formed this belief o n the basis o f a t h e o r y o f one K ö l l i k e r (who is cited b y Lange). K ö l l i k e r argued that D a r w i n placed t o o m u c h emphasis upon the principle o f utility and did not see that this principle has meaning in combination with the struggle for existence. H e also claimed that D a r w i n and his followers, in explaining variation, had suggested that innere

Anlagen

or "inner capacities" played a role in develop­

m e n t . K ö l l i k e r points out that in doing so the Darwinians undermine their main hypothesis: that external conditions determine, for the m o s t part, organic variations and adaptations. O r g a n i c development, then, should e m ­ phasize internal causes o f modification.

53

N i e t z s c h e adopts similar views and

avers that the utility o f an organ does not explain its emergence because during the period in which it was forming it m a y n o t have been useful to an organism in its struggle for existence o r in relation to external forces o r threats.

54

I n the

same context, N i e t z s c h e raises the question o f the meaning o f the "useful" in regard to a m o r e basic question: useful for what? H e speculates that what in fact proves useful in the long run m a y actually be unfavorable to the accumula­ tion o f strength, to growth. O b v i o u s l y thinking o f man, he remarks that what has proven useful for preservation o f a species might "arrest and Entwicklung.

halt"

I n another place, he suggests that the subjective feelings o f an

organism (obviously thought o f as human) has a powerful effect upon the will t o struggle and survive. „Nützlich" im Sinne der darwinistischen Biologie - das heißt: im Kampf mit anderen sich als begünstigend erweisend. Aber mir scheint schon das Mehrgefühl, das Gefühl des Stärker-werdens, ganz abgesehen vom Nutzen im Kampf, der eigentliche Fortschritt: aus diesem Gefühle entspringt erst der Wille zum Kampf. 55

T h a t the subjective feeling o f b e c o m i n g stronger is the real progress in the life o f an organism is a view that p r o b a b l y is shaped b y N i e t z s c h e ' s heroic attempts willfully t o o v e r c o m e his m a n y illnesses. A l t h o u g h such a n o t i o n m a y sound fanciful, it is not far removed from the current conception o f holistic medicine that stresses the importance o f positive attitudes, positive feelings and a will t o struggle to survive. T h i s passage also seems directly linked with a central emphasis in N i e t z s c h e ' s thought o n der Steigerung

des

Machtgefühls,

"the enhancement o f the feeling o f p o w e r . " This strongly suggests that the will t o p o w e r in man (and, perhaps, other organisms as well) is construed as a will t o the enhancement o f the feeling mation in Existenz Wille zur Macht

55

54

55

over others. Presumably, this feeling o f p o w e r is expressed in

Lange, op. cit., II, 706-707. WDB, III, 889.

Ibid., 894.

o f p o w e r . T h i s , in turn, suggests a transfor­

rather than the popular view that N i e t z s c h e is counseling a

Darwin and Teleology

182

the nisus o f life, Selbstüberwindung.

T h a t a striving for p o w e r and m o r e p o w e r

can be expressed b y means o f the attempt t o gain physical, material, social and p s y c h o l o g i c a l p o w e r over others is central to N i e t z s c h e ' s p s y c h o l o g y o f man. B u t it is questionable that this is what he advocated. I f w e focus o n this idea o f the e n h a n c e m e n t o f a subjective feeling o f b e c o m i n g stronger, this feeling o f p o w e r , then the repeated attempts to interpret N i e t z s c h e as a "social D a r ­ winist"

56

m a y be laid to rest. H e does n o t believe that the best always attain

w o r l d l y p o w e r . I n fact, he specifically m e n t i o n s that the degeneracy o f the ruling class o r o f rulers has been the bane o f w o r l d history. I t was, he believes, the u n c o n s c i o n a b l e c o r r u p t i o n o f the R o m a n Caesars and R o m a n society that o p e n e d the d o o r to the rise to p o w e r o f Christianity. W h e n Caracalla and N e r o occupied the throne, a dreadful paradox was created: der Mensch

ist mehr

wert

als der da o b e n !

insofar as it is m e n t i o n e d , in Also

sprach

5 7

niedrigste

T h i s is n o t a passing observation

Zarathustra,

that

Es gibt kein härteres Unglück in allem Menschen-Schicksale, als wenn die Mächti­ gen der Erde nicht auch die ersten Menschen sind. Da wird alles falsch und schief und ungeheuer. 58

56

57

58

Stern, op. cit., 131. "It is Nietzsche's readiness to follow the fashion of 'social Darwinism' and resort to its 'natural' explanation of a life-and-death struggle . . . which leads to his conception of society as a thing rigid and unadaptable to gradual change . . . societies seem to move from complete stability (which he always identifies with oppressive inertia) through sudden catas­ trophe or authoritarian command to total re-formation..." N o t only is the claim that Nietzsche embraces social Darwinism highly questionable, but Stern's understanding of Nietzsche's conception of socio-historical change is fallacious. Although he does predict that the confluence of the loss of Christian faith, the rise of science and the emergence of collectivistic ideologies will result in explosive social change in the twentieth century, he recognizes the long evolution of man before civilization and the gradual process of change in historical societies. He was certainly sensitive to the long period of stability in Indian civilization (as represented in the Hindu Laws of Manu) and aware of the stability in Roman civilization before its fall. Nietzsche pointed to a fact that is now generally acknowledged that there are some periods in history when change and conflict are accelerated and catastrophe occurs. His general view seems to be that excessive stability leads to creative and social inertia, to stagnation and that excessive instability or conflict leads to chaos. A vital and creative society, like a vital and creative individual, is characterized by a tension between Apollonian and Dionysian tendencies. He believed that the total emphasis upon practical concerns, in coordination with socialistic or communistic forms of community, would lead to a levelling of human life, uncreativity, inertia and social stultification. One of his main points was that man needs a telos that is above him and above the commonplace world of everyday life in order to add zest and vitality to life. Stern forgets that Nietzsche was as opposed to "anarchists" as he was to "socialists." The ideal social pyramid he mentions in Der Antichrist is hardly a destructured social order. WDB, III, 427. "...the lowest man is worth more than the one up there." KGW, VI 1, AsZ, "Gespräch mit den Königen." "There is no harder misfortune in all human destiny than when the powerful of the earth are not also the first men. Then everything becomes false and distorted and monstrous."

Darwin and Teleology

183

I f N i e t z s c h e were a genuine social Darwinist, he could n o t have penned these w o r d s . F o r , according to this doctrine, the fitest prove themselves superior because they survive and attain power. S o m e o n e like B a g e h o t held that those social groups that attain p o w e r are the noblest, the best: " T h e majority o f " g r o u p s " w h i c h win and c o n q u e r are better than the majority o f those w h i c h fail and p e r i s h . . . thus t h e . . . world grew better and was improved."

59

Unlike

N i e t z s c h e , social Darwinists tend to accept the extant rulers as the dominant force in the w o r l d because they believe that out o f competition they have achieved success. It is just this optimism, this belief in progress

through

"natural" evolution that N i e t z s c h e vehemently opposes. H e r b e r t Spencer, n o t N i e t z s c h e , praised the rise o f universal equality, the rise o f the c o m m o n man because he accepted an optimistic faith in social evolution. S o unfortunate has been the o u t c o m e o f a long process o f evolution, in N i e t z s c h e ' s view, that a complete overturning o f values, a transvaluation o f values, would be necessary t o set mankind on the path t o exceptional overmen. N o t o n l y has the "natural" evolution o f man not brought about the rise o f the best, but it has brought about the condition in which "the strongest" human

types are overpowered

"majority."

60

b y the "organized herd instincts" o f the

H i s t o r i c a l l y , there have been instances when a superior individu­

al attained position, status o r p o w e r b y a "happy accident" or cases in which a particular culture supported and b u o y e d up outstanding individuals, as R e ­ naissance culture encouraged the creative powers o f da Vinci, B e n v e n u t o Cellini and m a n y others. F r o m J a c o b Burckhardt himself and from his history o f the Renaissance in Italy, Die Kultur

der Renaissance

in Italien:

Ein

Versuch,

N i e t z s c h e learned t o admire the fusion o f astonishing creativity and culture, the liberating atmosphere o f Renaissance Italy. Although thousands o f years o f evolution was necessary for such an outstanding culture to c o m e to birth, the

59

Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics. Works, London, 1915, VIII, 141. Although Nietzsche was familiar with the thought of Bagehot, he did not agree that social evolution always indicates that the "strongest" groups survive and prosper. This may have been the case in the remote past, but the modern world illustrates that 'natural' social selection is by no means always beneficial. It will be remembered that in his early writings he criticized Hegel for his "worship of success." That the social evolution of peoples or social groups does not necessarily turn out well is one of Nietzsche's main points. He looks upon "modern man" as an unfortunate consequence of a long process of social evolution. On two points, Nietzsche did agree with Bagehot: that life amongst primitive, early man was a bellum omnium contra omnes (as Hobbes called it), that a crude "natural selection" was at work in early human history insofar as the strongest annihilated the weakest as they could. Ibid., 16. And that the outbreak of violence in modern times is a kind of "atavism" that reveals the "secret and suppressed side of human nature . . . the outbreak of inherited passions long repressed by fixed custom." Ibid., 100. The version of "social Darwin­ ism" that infuriated him most of all was Spencer's optimistic belief that man was inevitably progressing not only materially and in terms of scientific advancement, but morally as well. The "morality" that Spencer praised is characterized by Nietzsche as a Herdentier-Moral.

60

Werke, GOA, XVI, 149.

184

Darwin and Teleology

efflorescence in fifteenth century Italy was not the product o f a natural evolution, but a cultural system based upon values that enhanced life and prized creativity and remained faithful t o the earth and man. Despite the fact that N i e t z s c h e criticized H e g e l ' s worship o f success in history, he did not, as his love o f the Renaissance shows, believe that success is always o f the Ubermenschen

bad. T h e ideal

o f the future was an aesthetically conceived ideal that

projected a n e w renaissance o n a global scale. All o f the

"evolutionary"

tendencies o f N i e t z s c h e ' s day were viewed b y him as disastrous. H i s desire was to reverse the trends o f modern evolution (or, from his perspective, devolution), n o t to praise them. In o n e respect, N i e t z s c h e m a y be mistaken for a kind o f social Darwinist. T h a t is, in his oft-repeated notion that his overturning o f values would be so demanding, so psychologically, intellectually and spiritually demanding, that m a n y w o u l d n o t be able to survive. W h a t he seems t o have intended was to create a c o n c e p t i o n o f man in the world that r o b b e d individuals o f every consolation, every hope in an objective teleology, o f every naive hope and superficial optimism, that, in Kierkegaard's phrase, "jacked up the price o f existence" so m u c h that only the most psycho-spiritually courageous, the m o s t independent-minded,

the m o s t autonomous

individual

could survive

and

prosper. T h e eternal recurrence o f the same, as we have seen, was primarily designed as an ultimate acid test o f life-affirmation, a test that would challenge those w h o could accept existence as insecure, uncertain, tragic and joyful, permeated b y antitheses that could not be resolved in any Hegelian "media­ t i o n " (Vermittlung).

A t times, when he holds up this "great disciplinary

t h o u g h t " (of eternal recurrence) like a h a m m e r that would smash those w h o cannot endure it, his tone b e c o m e s harsh and strident and seems to express his doctrine o f "survival o f the fitest." In halcyon m o m e n t s , he sees that it is not necessary to disturb the beliefs o f the majority, that this thought is designed for those w h o are capable o f enduring terrible truths, w h o seek the highest m o m e n t o f the consciousness of, the feeling of, p o w e r : the

Ubermenschen.

H o w e v e r , it must be said that the t w o poles o f his thought o n this crucial issue are not unified. O n the one hand, his "teaching" is directed to individuals w h o w o u l d achieve a transformation o f the self, an ecstatic acceptance o f existence with its contradictions and suffering, w h o are capable o f the deepest feeling o f p o w e r . O n the other hand, the eternal recurrence o f the same is treated as a "principle o f selection" that is directed against

those w h o could n o t live

w i t h o u t G o d , a moral world-order, cosmic purpose, hope in the " b e y o n d , " or extrinsic consolation o f any kind. W h e n he proposes what may b e called a principle o f unnatural

selection, he reveals a ressentiment

m a n k i n d that he, o f all people, should c o n d e m n in himself.

towards

modern

Darwin and Teleology

185

A l t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e sometimes speaks as if he believed that rather than see an age o f decadence o c c u r , it would be better if man perished, we must remind h i m that, at other times, he thought that a nihilistic, decadent period in history w o u l d provide the very conditions that w o u l d be necessary for the emergence of exceptional men. In the manner o f a naturalist, he notes that the "humanizat i o n " o f man, the "progress" o f man or "civilization" that is taking the form o f increasing " d e m o c r i t i z a t i o n " is breeding a new kind of E u r o p e a n , one that is supra-national, nomadic. T h e Europeans are b e c o m i n g "similar" to each other and a m a x i m u m capacity for adaptation (Anpassung) T h i s growing Anpassungskraft

is b e c o m i n g wide-spread.

o r " p o w e r o f adaptation" m a y have, however,

an unexpected result. Dieser Prozeß läuft wahrscheinlich auf Resultate hinaus, auf welche seine naiven Beförderer und Lobredner, die Apostel der „modernen Ideen", am wenigsten rechnen möchten. Dieselben neuen Bedingungen, unter denen im Durchschnitt eine Ausgleichung und Vermittelmäßigung des Menschen sich herausbilden w i r d . . . sind im höchsten Grade dazu angetan, Ausnahme-Menschen der gefähr­ lichsten und anziehendsten Qualität den Ursprung zu geben. 61

T h i s standpoint tends to undermine his intention t o use the idea o f the eternal recurrence o f the same as a disciplinary t o o l that will select o r filter out superior human types. I n point o f fact, the notion that out o f increased leveling, out o f the socio-historical Zeitgeist

o f universal equalization would

emerge the very opposite type o f individual, or antithetical types, is consistent with N i e t z s c h e ' s adoption o f the Hegelian notion o f Lange's that dominant historical orientations give rise to attitudes, beliefs and values that are opposed to o r undermine that orientation. N i e t z s c h e ' s other approach to the creation o f the conditions for the development o f " o v e r m e n " b y virtue o f the promulga­ tion o f the idea o f eternal recurrence o f the same is, compared t o the above view, quixotic. I t would b e an extraordinary irony if history itself brings about the development o f supreme human types, the transvaluation o f values, that he thought could only be brought about b y his "doctrines," b y his heroic effort t o reverse the trends he saw in his own time. In the course o f elaborating on the theory o f evolution, Lange refers to the growing tendency t o explain living processes in mechanistic terms. E r n s t

61

KGW, VI 2, J G B , 242. "... this process will probably lead to results which would appear to be least expected by those who naively encourage and praise it, the apostles of "modern ideas." The very same new conditions that will typically lead to the leveling and mediocritization of m a n . . . are likely, in the highest degree, to give birth to exceptional human beings of the most dangerous and attractive quality." In this regard, an analogy has been suggested between Nietzsche's ideal of "overmen" of the future and Lange's Lamarckian notion of the develop­ ment of a new, superior class of men in his work, Die Arbeiterfrage (1865). Cf. Jörg Salaquarda, "Der Standpunkt des Ideals bei Lange und Nietzsche," Studi Tedschi, X X I I , 1 (1979), 27-28.

186

Darwin and Teleology

H a e c k e l , in particular, argued that all vital phenomena, especially nutrition and propagation, are purely physio-chemical processes. T h e material nature o f the organism determines its form and its behavior. Lange is, up to a point, sympathetic to such developments. H o w e v e r , he views the Weltanschauung

mechanische

as unsatisfying and repulsive to our feelings. It must receive

its compensation in another sphere, a sphere that he later designates as "the standpoint o f the ideal." T h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f mechanistic materialism and Darwinian evolution seems to present us with a picture o f the world as comprised o f powerful forces that manifest no purposes. M a n is understood as a c o m p l e x physio-chemical mechanism that is subject to numerous

natural

forces and an evolutionary process over which he has no c o n t r o l . Later, N i e t z s c h e will describe the mechanische

Weltanschauung

as revealing a

world and will point to the nihilistic consequences o f this scientific

sinnlos Weltbild.

A l t h o u g h L a n g e is critical o f anthropomorphic interpretations o f natural p h e n o m e n a in the form o f primitive assumptions o f "superhuman

human"

beings that bring about events, he also realizes, as we have seen, that even scientists are tempted to interpret natural phenomena, forces in particular, nach

Analogie

menschliche

Handlungen.

T h i s humanization o f nature is part

and parcel o f the development o f civilization. W h a t distinguishes modern man from his ancestors is the transmission o f Methoden

that enables him to achieve

great advances in technical and material development. H o w e v e r , Lange notes that this obvious external advance does not support the Dogma stetigen

Fortschritt

der Menschheit.

von

dem

T h e progress in external development does

not entail the improvement o f man himself. T h e main concern o f the people 62

and the 'cultured' as well seems to be material well-being. Later in his critical history, Lange expresses himself in stronger language that is reminiscent o f N i e t z s c h e ' s attitude towards modern man. Daß der Fortschritt der Menschheit kein stetiger ist, lehrt jedes Blatt der Ges­ chichte; ja, man kann immer noch Zweifel darüber hegen, ob überhaupt im großen ganzen ein solcher Fortschritt besteht... Es ist also auf keinen Fall mit einem Glaubensartikel oder einer allgemein anerkannten Wahrheit hier etwas auszurich­ ten, und wir müssen die Ursachen, welche den Rückgang der Kultur... her­ beiführen könnten, noch genauer betrachten. 63

Aside from a general acceptance o f the Darwinian notion o f an evolutio­ nary process that accounts for the similarities amongst the members o f the

62

63

Lange, op. cit., II, 770. "... dogma of the continual progress of humanity." Ibid., II, 920. "That the progress of mankind is not continuous, every page of history teaches us; nay, it is still possible to doubt whether there exists, on the whole, such a progress... It is not the case that we can aid ourselves here by an article of faith or a generally accepted truth, and we must consider more closely the causes which may bring about . . . the decline of civilization."

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Darwin and Teleology

human species that have survived, Lange speculates about "a

mysterious

constructive impulse o f humanity" that seems to build upon a m o r e or less shared Tempel

von B e g r i f f e n ?

64

This phrase, "a temple o f c o n c e p t s , " certainly

is similar to N i e t z s c h e ' s reference to the complicated Begriffsdome,

"the

cathedral o f c o n c e p t s " that are used in the sciences. B u t it is m o r e significant than this because it is part o f a relatively undeveloped,

but

important,

conception in N i e t z s c h e ' s thought. Finding support for his belief that there is a constructive tendency in human development

that is expressed in similar

conceptual systems in the w o r k o f Bastian (i. e., Der Mensch te),

in der

Geschich­

Lange cites with approval the theory that, in opposition t o D a r w i n i s m , die Gleichmäßigkeit im geistigen Zustande der Völker und namentlich in ihren mythologischen Überlieferungen nicht sowohl aus der Abstammung von einem gemeinsamen Urvolke zu erklären, als vielmehr aus der gleichen psychologischen Grundlage, welche mit Notwendigkeit zu gleichen und ähnlichen Gebilden des Aberglaubens und der Sage führen mußte. 65

W e recognize in such a t h e o r y the rudiments o f contemporary

structuralism.

A n d we find precisely the same kind o f arguments in Nietzsche's writings with an additional t o u c h that clearly anticipates elements o f linguistic structuralism. J u s t as structuralists such as Levi-Strauss discover an unconscious a present in the thought

o f diverse peoples w h o share structurally

priori similar

mythical notions, so, t o o , does N i e t z s c h e believe that the early p s y c h o l o g y o f man, his early cultural beliefs, contain similar conceptual structures that are preserved in languages amongst which there is a family resemblance. Such conceptual schema are not necessarily traceable t o a c o m m o n primitive origin, but reflect psycho-cultural beliefs, feelings and values. Es liegt eine philosophische Mythologie in der Sprache versteckt, welche alle Augenblicke wieder herausbricht, so vorsichtig man sonst auch sein mag. 66

64

Ibid., II, 829.

65

Ibid., II, 887n. "...the similarities in the mental condition of people, and especially in their mythological traditions, are to be explained, not so much by their descent from a common, primitive stock, as by the same psychological disposition, which must necessarily lead to the same or similar creations of superstition and myth." That Lange has here offered a rudimentary sketch of structuralism, especially that of Levi-Strauss, is clear insofar as the latter analyzes a variety of myths in order to discover a common "structure" that, in turn, reveals a kind of cultural psychoanalysis. The presence in various myths in the cultures of different groups suggested a kind of "unconscious a priori" that was expressed in mythological language. A symbolic relation between language and culture was assumed which converged in tribal societies in the form of myths. Cf. Claude Levi-Strauss, Anthropologie structurale, Paris, 1958. Cf. also: Le Cru et le cuit, Paris, 1964. KGW, IV 3, MAM, II, 11. "Language contains a hidden philosophical mythology which, however careful we are, breaks out anew at every moment."

66

188

Darwin and Teleology

T h e development o f language is intimately associated with the development o f culture and the creation o f a linguistic ' w o r l d ' gives man mastery o f things and is the foundation o f his claims to "knowledge." T h e designation o f things b y means o f language was considered b y primitive man as a discovery, as a solution to a p r o b l e m . H o w e v e r , these s y m b o l s , these signs, these words were, in fact, obstacles to the solution o f a problem. In time, they became 67

sedimented, hardened, fixed. N i e t z s c h e assumes that the language developed long ago has b e c o m e the basis o f our way o f thinking about the w o r l d in everyday

experience and

has been preserved

in philosophical

language.

N i e t z s c h e brings together the basic ingredients o f a structuralist interpretation in an illuminating passage in Jenseits

von Gut und

Böse.

Daß die einzelnen philosophischen Begriffe nichts Beliebiges, nichts Für-sichWachsendes sind, sondern in Beziehung und Verwandtschaft zueinander empor­ wachsen, daß sie, so plötzlich und willkürlich sie auch in der Geschichte des Denkens anscheinend heraustreten, doch ebensogut einem Systeme angehören als die sämtlichen Glieder der Fauna eines Erdteils: das verrät sich zuletzt noch darin, wie sicher die verschiedensten Philosophen ein gewisses Grundschema von mög­ lichen Philosophien immer wieder ausfüllen. Unter einem unsichtbaren Banne laufen sie immer von neuem noch einmal dieselbe Kreisbahn: sie mögen sich noch so unabhängig voneinander mit ihrem kritischen oder systematischen Willen fühlen: irgend etwas in ihrem führt sie, irgend etwas treibt sie in bestimmter Ordnung hintereinander her, eben jene eingeborne Systematik und Verwandtschaft der Begriffe. Ihr Denken ist in der Tat viel weniger ein Entdecken als ein Wiedererkennen, Wiedererinnern, eine Rück- und Heimkehr in einen fernen uralten Gesamt-Haushalt der Seele, aus dem jene Begriffe einstmals herausgewach­ sen sind - Philsophieren ist insofern eine Art von Atavismus höchsten Ranges. Die wunderliche Familien-Ähnlichkeit alles indischen, griechischen, deutschen Philo­ sophierens erklärt sich einfach genug. Gerade, wo Sprach-Verwandtschaft vorliegt, ist es gar nicht zu vermeiden, daß, dank der gemeinsamen Philosophie der Grammatik - ich meine dank der unbewußten Herrschaft und Führung durch gleiche grammatische Funktionen - von vornherein alles für eine gleichartige Entwicklung und Reihenfolge der philosophischen Systeme vorbereitet liegt. 68

67

KGW, V 1, M, 47.

68

KGW, VI 2, JGB, 20. "That individual philosophical concepts do not evolve at random or autonomously, but in reference and relationship with each other; that however arbitrarily and suddenly they appear in the history of thought, they belong to a system as much as all of the members of a fauna of a continent - is revealed by the fact that the most diverse philosophers again and again fill in a basic schema of possible philosophies. Under an invisible spell, they always revolve in the same orbit. N o matter how independent of each other they may feel themselves with their critical or systematic wills, something leads them, something impels them in a definite ordered sequence - an innate systematization and relation of concepts. Their thinking is not so much a discovering as a recognizing, a remembering, a return and a homecoming to a remote, primitive and inclusive household of the soul, out of which the concepts originally grew: to this extent, philosophisizing is a kind of higher order atavism. The peculiar family resemblance amongst all Indian, Greek and German philosophizing is simple

189

Darwin and Teleology The

philosophical suggestions t h r o w n

out in this remarkable passage

indicate that N i e t z s c h e has gone w a y b e y o n d Lange's interesting n o t i o n o f a c o m m o n l y shared mythical m o d e o f thinking that is based upon psychological dispositions. W h a t N i e t z s c h e is stressing is the p o w e r o f linguistic, conceptual and cultural forces in shaping an understanding o f the world and the self, a p o w e r that evolved coeval with biological development, but has far-reaching effects. Since N i e t z s c h e , before Wittgenstein, suggested that language is an expression o f a form o f life, the c o m m o n s t o c k o f concepts, the family resemblances between languages, as well as the equally similar world-views, are, in part, the result o f a long process o f evolution and are indications o f sedimented psychological

o r psycho-social cultural beliefs that are part o f a

cultural system. T h e link between languages, cultural forms o f life and patterns o f belief and behavior clearly connects N i e t z s c h e ' s views with structuralism. T h a t N i e t z s c h e ' s w a y o f thinking in this regard is also related to linguistic, analytic p h i l o s o p h y has been pointed out b y A r t h u r D a n t o . T h i s association is a viable o n e since N i e t z s c h e assumes, as J . L . Austin did, that

natural

languages contain the distinctions that men have found useful to make. It is true, also, that Wittgenstein's emphasis upon the use o f language in a social, conventional c o n t e x t that is assumed to be governed b y "rules", as well as his reference to "family resemblances" between "language-games", do indicate that N i e t z s c h e is, in some respects, a precursor o f such forms o f analysis.

69

H o w e v e r , there are significant differences between N i e t z s c h e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f language and that o f linguistic philosophers. In the Philosophical

Investigations

Wittgenstein argues that " W h a t we do is to bring words b a c k from their metaphysical to their everyday use."

70

T h i s is opposed to N i e t z s c h e ' s view that

neither philosophical n o r ordinary language is free o f preconceptions, prejudg­ ments o r metaphysical importations. T h e r e f o r e , ordinary language analysis, in assuming the epistemic, metaphysical and valuational neutrality o f ordinary natural language, is diametrically opposed to N i e t z s c h e ' s understanding o f language. Language and typical human consciousness preserve those logicometaphysical assumptions that have proven useful in the struggle for survival and are instruments o f the typical members of the human species. O r d i n a r y , natural languages, for N i e t z s c h e , contain those falsifications

o f actuality that

enough to explain. Where there is a similarity of languages, it cannot fail that, because of a common philosophy of grammar — I mean, the unconscious domination and guidance by similar grammatical functions - that everything lies prepared, at the outset, for a similar development and sequence of philosophical systems." Danto, op. cit., 83, 121-122. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. E. M. Anscombe, New York, 1953, 48 e. "Wir führen die Wörter von ihrer metaphysischen, wieder auf ihre alltägliche Verwendung zurück."

190

Darwin and Teleology

have, nonetheless, high pragmatic value. T h e y are not, b y any means, neutral structures the analysis o f which will lead us to a clear understanding o f the world. W e m a y also imagine h o w N i e t z s c h e would react to Wittgenstein's belief that philosophy leaves the world o f conventional social existence just as it is! N i e t z s c h e ' s understanding o f language is rooted in his assumption that a particular language contains psychic beliefs that are rooted in primitive stages o f human evolution. T h e inherited scheme o f concepts that are, for example, given sanction in K a n t ' s Kritik

der reinen

Vernunft

are not inventions o f K a n t ,

but are notions that are rooted deeply in man's linguistic-conceptual evolu­ tion.

For

Nietzsche,

Kant

only

formalizes

what

had

already

become

sedimented in I n d o - E u r o p e a n languages long ago. As N i e t z s c h e puts it, Die Sprache gehört ihrer Entstehung nach in die Zeit der rudimentärsten Form von Psychologie: wir kommen in ein grobes Fetischwesen hinein, wenn wir uns die Grundvoraussetzungen der Sprache-Metaphysik, auf deutsch: der Vernunft, zum Bewußtsein bringen. 71

In this sense, N i e t z s c h e agrees with Lange that the similarities o f thought and belief found in natural languages are reflections o f early, Grundzügen.

psychologische

N i e t z s c h e ' s belief that primitive, not to say "childish", modes o f

thought are preserved in advanced language forms is also an observation that Lange makes in the same context. N i e t z s c h e seems to agree with Lange that the consciousness and language o f modern man are atavistic in the sense that they continue to perpetuate ways o f thinking and forms o f belief that were dominant in relatively early stages o f man's cultural, social and psychological development.

72

Insofar as Lange's insights are based upon then recent w o r k in

cultural anthropology, the foundation for his views, as well as N i e t z s c h e ' s m o r e sophisticated extension o f them, are the same as those o f c o n t e m p o r a r y structuralism. N i e t z s c h e is in the habit o f saying that the m o s t important evolution o f man t o o k place s o m e time ago, that modern man is, in his thinking and his psychological "prejudices," not so far removed from his ancestors. T h e "fixation" o f the human species is shown in the type of men that are valued, the type o f individuals whose existence is encouraged and p r o m o t e d and in b o t h language and consciousness. T h e emergence o f consciousness was origi­ nally practical, functional, designed for c o m m o n forms o f sign-communica-

71

72

KGW, VII 3, G, "Die Vernunft in der Philosophie," 5. "Language belongs in its origin to the time of the most rudimentary form of psychology: we find ourselves in the midst of a coarse fetishism when we bring to consciousness the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language - that is to say, of reason." Lange, op. cit. II, 833.

191

Darwin and Teleology

tion. I n modern man, N i e t z s c h e seems to think, consciousness has b e c o m e over-developed, a hindrance to survival rather than an aid to it. Consciousness is a late evolutionary development that has not yet b e c o m e precise. O n e o f N i e t z s c h e ' s points is that our consciousness, our knowledge, should b e c o m e "instinctive." Originally a t o o l o f the "organism," consciousness has b e c o m e dangerous

because it is used in "morbid introspectionism," because it is

consumed in the "knowledge drive," because it is prone to

day-dreaming,

superficiality, vagueness and fantasy. Since consciousness has evolved, it is presumably useful. H o w e v e r , it must not be severed from instinctive feelings, from unconscious instinctive reactions. O n this point, N i e t z s c h e plausibly argues that Wir könnten nämlich denken, fühlen, wollen, uns erinnern, wir könnten ebenfalls „handeln" in jedem Sinne des Wortes: und trotzdem brauchte das alles nicht uns „ins Bewußtsein treten." 73

O u r thinking, feeling and volitional life could go on just as it does without the "mirroring"

o f these activities in consciousness. N i e t z s c h e raises the

question concerning the "purpose"

o f consciousness. H e argues that

the

subtlety and strength o f consciousness are proportionate to the "capacity for c o m m u n i c a t i o n . " T h i s capacity for communication in man o r an animal is, in turn, proportionate t o the Mitteilungs-Bedürftigkeit.

It is assumed that this

compelling need for communication developed from generation to generation because o f the need for rapid, subtle communications with fellow human beings. A surplus o f this art and skill o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n built up and has been transmitted t o later human beings. Presumably, these later developments o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n and amplifications o f consciousness no longer serve to satisfy dire needs. Originally, however, Bewußtsein

überhaupt

Drucke

hat.

des Mitteilungs-Bedürfnisses

entwickelt

74

sich nur unter

dem

Consciousness emerged

out o f this necessity for communication between man and man

primarily

because man is such an endangered creature that he needed assistance and protection. Virtually in Lange's language, N i e t z s c h e speculates that

man

needed consciousness because he had to " k n o w " what he lacked, what he felt, what he thought. T h e origin o f consciousness is revealed in that

reduced

sphere o f "conscious thinking," a form o f thinking that employs words o r " s y m b o l s for c o m m u n i c a t i o n . "

It may be noted that this conception o f

conscious thinking as a kind o f silent speech is reminiscent o f behavioristic theories o f " c o n s c i o u s n e s s . " W e might be tempted to believe that N i e t z s c h e

73

74

KGW, V 2, FW, V, 354. "We could, in fact, think, feel, will and recollect, we could even 'act' in every sense of the word, and nonetheless none of it all necessarily need 'come to conscious­ ness.'"

Ibid.

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Darwin and Teleology

anticipated the behaviorists here except for the fact that L a n g e had said that o u r thinking is a kind o f gentle internal speaking, that especially in emotional states there are "impulses in the vocal organs." T h e notion o f "conscious thinking" that N i e t z s c h e proposes is tantamount to Lange's idea o f 75

Sprechen.

innerliche

A t any rate, it is plausibly argued that the development o f speech

and consciousness go hand in hand and that b o t h have a social function. C o m m u n i c a t i o n b y means of "signs" is a utilitarian function that is rooted in man's gregarious, social tendencies. T h u s , even though our o w n experiences and reflections are unique and personal, once we express them in language o r o n c e they b e c o m e self-conscious in us, they are shown to be public, collective significations that reflect the beliefs and sentiments o f the typical, average human being. O r d i n a r y consciousness, ordinary language reflect not actuality in its dynamic c o m p l e x i t y , but a picture o f a simplified, generalized, ordinary world. W h a t generally c o m e s to be accepted as " k n o w l e d g e " pertains to the w o r l d constructed b y the average members o f the species. T h a t " k n o w l e d g e " man claims t o possess is only as m u c h as is useful to the species. N i e t z s c h e sees this concentration o n pragmatic knowledge as a "fatal stupidity b y w h i c h we shall one day be ruined." Although N i e t z s c h e seems to be thinking o f the decline in human culture that he believed would result from excessive pragmat­ ism, he m a y have been m o r e prophetic than he thought he was. F o r , one o u t c o m e o f practical, utilitarian human " k n o w l e d g e " is the proliferation o f guided missiles with nuclear warheads that increasingly threatens civilization and life. T h e pragmatic genius o f the species has already turned against its o w n preservation. T h e linguistic-conceptual world that man has inherited is the handiwork o f the typical m e m b e r s o f the species which has b e c o m e the "condition o f the human species." Despite its remarkable utilitarian value, its values for survival and preservation o f the average members o f the species, it is a w o r l d representation that is comprised o f errors o r useful fictions. In terms o f the practical survival and increment o f p o w e r o f the human species, der Triebe Wahrheit

75

76

sich als eine lebenerhaltende

Macht

erwiesen

76.

hat.

zur

H o w e v e r , before

Lange, op. cit., II, 810. KGW V 2, FW, III, 110. "...the drive to truth has also proved itself to be a life-preserving power." Nietzsche's attitude towards the "knowledge-drive" is complex. It is an issue he reflected upon in his earliest notes (1872) and was still concerned with in his last writings. The Erkenntnisstrieb is, in one sense, an obvious good insofar as it is life-preserving. In this regard, it serves a social purpose. However, Nietzsche sees the metastasization of this "knowledgedrive" as dangerous for a number of reasons. The unrestrained pursuit of "truth" in the Wissenschaften undermines religious, metaphysical and aesthetic conceptions of reality. Ulti­ mately, the uncontrolled drive for knowledge undermines culture and eventually leads to what amounts to a nihilistic attitude towards the world. The progress of science in the broadest sense

193

Darwin and Teleology

the settling o f practical, utilitarian knowledge, there was a struggle for dominance amongst those conceptions or ideals that claimed to be useful for life: out o f this emerged what could be called a cultural Machtgelüst.

Although

N i e t z s c h e doesn't refer to it here, it would seem that this observation is related t o his view that the Christian, democratic, socialistic ideals in coordination with the "humanization" of, and mastery of, nature became the cultural bearers o f "truth" and have b e c o m e victorious. T h i s , for N i e t z s c h e , marked the evolutionary triumph o f the c o m m o n man, the average o f the species. H i s ideal o f the Ü b e r m e n s c h is obviously considered as a countercultural ideal that w o u l d reverse what he believes has been a disastrous development. H e n c e , his desire to create a new "principle of selectivity" that will weed out the " w e a k , " the "utilitarian," the "decadent" and the life-denying nihilists. N o w h e r e does N i e t z s c h e deny the process o f evolution. E v e r y w h e r e he denies that the o u t c o m e o f the long process o f evolution is a good, o r is the optimistic production o f the " b e s t " o r the "fitest." I n a sense, he desired to create his evolutionary experiment for the sake o f higher types o f beings. O n e o f the m o s t neglected features o f N i e t z s c h e ' s critique o f Darwinian optimism, is his insight that the evolution o f a practical, utilitarian, average type o f man has produced one g o o d : the mastery o f natural forces, the growth o f technological power. T r u e , from one point o f view, this exploitation o f nature is hybris.

B u t , from

another

perspective, it can be seen as providing the

basis for a n e w world, a future that would dazzle even the m o s t visionary Utopians.

F o r , "when p o w e r is w o n over nature," then man can creatively use

that p o w e r

in

order to

attain

a free development o f

progress can be the basis for Wille zur Macht ening.

77

himself.

Material,

als Selbststeigerung

technical

and strength­

W h e n w e reflect o n this observation, we see that it is vaguely familiar.

N i e t z s c h e seems to b e treating man's mastery o f nature as a means to the creation o f maximal feelings o f p o w e r and self-enhancement (presumably in

has led to "decline" even though it has enhanced man's power over nature. Art and illusion are necessary for the advancement of culture. If the knowledge-drive continues without restraint or direction, Nietzsche believes, it will produce a levelling effect and will become dangerous when it is joined with "practical interests." Thus, the "tragic philosopher" seeks to control this knowledge-drive, to put it in the service of "the best life." Cf. KGW III 4, 5-123. Related to this general orientation is the belief, mentioned in the text of this chapter, that ordinary language and its distinctions serve the needs and reflect the attitudes of the average type of human being. On this point, Nietzsche cites Lange against the "Bayreuther". For, Lange wonders if, in the intelligibility of things, there is a common understanding that is appropriate to an average mode of understanding. Cf. KGW VII 2, 119. "Lange 'liegt etwa die Begreiflichkeit der Dinge darin, dass man von seinem Verstand grundsätzlich nur einen mittelmäßigen Gebrauch macht?' gegen die Bayreuther." Nietzsche developes this suggestion into a doctrine in his emphasis u p o n the preservation of the ordinary in consciousness and language. Cf. KGW V 2. FW, 354. Werke, G O A , XV, 434. "...will to power as self-enhancement."

194

Darwin and Teleology

the ideal type o f the " o v e r m a n " ) in the way in which M a r x treats the maturation o f industrial capitalism as the base upon which his ideal o f a c o m m u n i s t society can be built. T h e assertion also reveals that he was n o t intrinsically opposed to a belief in progress and its value for the further " e v o l u t i o n " o f man o r , m o r e accurately, " o v e r - m e n . " T h e r e is one last point in N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophy that indicates that he did learn a great deal from D a r w i n even if he did not agree that the fitest survive o r that the preservation o f life is the primary aim o f living beings. F o r , he himself adopts a kind o f evolutionary theory in the sense that he sees actuality as characterized b y a rhythmic process o f evolution, a dialectical process that rises t o a peak and then descends o n l y to reascend once m o r e . A l t h o u g h this dialectical r h y t h m o f existence is mythically construed as circular, it is o n e characterized b y long periods o f gradual, evolutionary development. Even the poetic, aesthetic ideal o f the "overman" envisions very long periods o f time during w h i c h such superior types o f beings would be cultivated, developed and brought to fruition. T h e evolution that D a r w i n postulates

produced

certain types o f human beings w h o have acquired p o w e r collectively, w h o have developed utilitarian values and a morality designed for their needs. N i e t z s c h e ' s question is, w h y should there not be an evolution o f higher types o f persons w h o possess great health (große heit),

Gesundheit),

ripeness o r "perfection" (Vollkommenheit),

"wholeness"

(Ganz­

a p o w e r to live without

extrinsic meaning, the capacity to endure "terrible" truths, a spiritual strength in w h i c h goodness is n o t weakness, w h o contain within themselves and c o n t r o l the "antithetical" characteristics o f existence itself? Since N i e t z s c h e envisions a thousand-year experiment in the cultivation o f such individuals, he is proposing a long term period o f evolution. T h i s evolution, he thought, can n o t c o m e about through "natural" or "artificial" selection, but b y means o f deliberate selection, b y means o f an intervention in the socio-historical order, by means o f a "transvaluation o f values."

CHAPTER VIII THE SHADOW O F KANT D e s p i t e his unfair jibes at Kant, N i e t z s c h e was, in m a n y ways, indebted t o h i m for his o w n conception o f knowledge, for many o f his skeptical arguments against absolute knowledge and for his conventionalist analysis o f scientific knowledge. A l t h o u g h he did n o t have a t e x t b o o k knowledge o f K a n t , he understood

o n l y t o o well the implications o f K a n t ' s critique o f human

knowledge. H i s understanding o f the main points in K a n t ' s philosophy was colored b y Lange's exposition and c o m m e n t a r y in „Kant and „Der

philosophische

Materialismus

seit Kant."

und

Materialismus"

I n his discussion o f K a n t ,

Lange focuses u p o n the question o f the origin o f the categories and the n o t i o n of Dinge-an-sich.

C o n c e r n i n g the latter, as we shall see, he offers some

interesting criticisms that were not lost on N i e t z s c h e . W h a t is essential for an understanding o f N i e t z s c h e ' s use o f Kantian notions is that we realize that Lange presents a psychologistic

interpretation o f K a n t ' s theory o f knowledge.

In addition, as w e shall try to show, Lange links K a n t ' s agnosticism with the agnostic standpoint to which nineteenth century science was attracted. T h i s n e o - K a n t i a n , scientifically warranted agnosticism was appropriated and crea­ tively exploited b y N i e t z s c h e . I n m a n y ways, the epistemic reflections o f N i e t z s c h e are expressions o f his attempts to deal with K a n t ' s account o f the nature and scope o f human knowledge. Even though he is often critical o f K a n t , the conception o f the "phenomenal w o r l d " that he refers to is funda­ mentally that o f K a n t . H o w e v e r , he turns the Kantian critique o f knowledge o n e m o r e n o t c h and argues that the phenomenal world that is structured in terms o f what are primarily Kantian categories o f the understanding is not authentic actuality, but a constructive, simplified, arranged, organized world that is a system o f falsification. In the course o f his account o f the elements o f K a n t ' s critical philosophy, Lange points out that, for K a n t , the "true essence o f things" transcends our knowledge. T h i s , it will be remembered, was one o f the items o f interest N i e t z s c h e mentioned in his letter to von Gersdorff. H e was especially struck b y Lange's s u m m a r y o f the consequences o f the Kritik. quotes a large c h u n k from the following passage:

S o m u c h so that he

196

The Shadow of Kant Das wahre Wesen der Dinge, der letzte Grund aller Erscheinungen, ist uns aber nicht nur unbekannt, sondern es ist auch der Begriff desselben nicht mehr und nicht weniger als die letzte Ausgeburt eines von unsrer Organisation bedingten Gegen­ satzes, von dem wir nicht wissen, ob er außerhalb unsrer Erfahrung irgendeine Bedeutung hat. 1

T h a t the essence o f things transcends our knowledge plays an important role in N i e t z s c h e ' s thought

insofar as his skepticism concerning

human

knowledge is, in his early writings, based upon it. T r u e , in Die Geburt Tragödie,

der

he suggests that the "primal will," the primordial O n e , is the

ultimate reality. B u t after that excursion into metaphysical speculation he plunges into a radical skepticism that is based, in part, o n the impossibility o f k n o w i n g the true essence o f things or the origin of the stimuli that impinge u p o n o u r senses. Later, he will deny that the notion o f Dinge-an-sich

is

meaningful o r refers to anything. Since the arguments against the c o n c e p t i o n o f "things-in-themselves" will be dealt with below, we shall forego any further discussion o f it here. Lange offers a n u m b e r o f interpretations o f K a n t ' s theory of knowledge that have a long-range effect on N i e t z s c h e . T h u s , for example, he maintains that the question o f the origin o f the categories is a dark spot in K a n t ' s theoretical system. Although he agrees with K a n t that phenomenal knowledge involves the constitution o f objects in terms o f o u r sensibility, our intuitions o f space and time and o u r categorical scheme, Lange finds that K a n t does not clarify the origin o f o u r categories o f the understanding. Underlining the subjective activity o f the mind in knowing, he points out that K a n t ' s position leads to the view that die Gegenstände der Erfahrung überhaupt nur unsere Gegenstände sind, daß die ganze Objektivität mit einem Wort eben nicht die absolute Objektivität ist, sondern nur eine Objektivität für den Menschen und etwaige ähnlich organisierte Wesen. 2

Lange is quick to point out that K a n t ' s theory of knowledge is one that is compatible with the views o f "men o f science." H e relates Kant's account o f the constitutive function o f Sinnlichkeit

to the studies in the physiology o f the

senses and to P r o t a g o r a s ' principle that "man is the measure o f all things." P r o b i n g behind K a n t ' s n o t i o n that our senses apprehend appearances, L a n g e argues that the quality and nature o f our sense-perceptions is conditioned b y

1

2

F. A. Lange, op. cit., II, 499. "The true essence of things, the last ground of all appearances, is, however, not only unknown to us, but even the concept of it is nothing more and nothing less than the last outcome of an antithesis determined by our organization, and of which we do not know if, beyond our experience, it has any meaning." Cp. GdM, 268. Ibid., II, 455. "... the objects of experience are only our objects, that the whole objectivity is, in a word, not absolute objectivity, but only objectivity for man and any similarly organized being." Cp. GdM, 234.

197

The Shadow of Kant

o u r organs. I f we add to this the idea that o u r experience is conditioned b y our "intellectual organization," then we see that the phenomenal appearances we apprehend are specifically relative to o u r sensory-cognitive organization and that beings with another Organisation

would experience different phenomena.

A l o n g the way, he mentions that the belief that the phenomenal w o r l d is a c o p y o f "another world o f real o b j e c t s " is one that is found in India, in G r e e k (Platonic) p h i l o s o p h y and is given sanction b y K a n t . Precipitously, Lange rushes to say that the restriction of knowledge to the phenomenal world that w e are capable o f apprehending is similar to Protagoras' acceptance o f the phenomenal w o r l d , his abandonment o f absolute truth and his assumption that that is true to a man what seems to him 'true.' remarks, L a n g e is at pains to understand

3

As we can see from such

K a n t ' s t h e o r y o f knowledge as

leading to a f o r m o f subjectivism. Even though such an interpretation is hardly idiosyncratic,

this

kind

o f emphasis

will have

considerable impact

on

Nietzsche. The

skepticism about the scientific understanding o f the ultimate c o n ­

stituents o f the w o r l d is n o t a Langean importation, but a conception that is clearly defended b y K a n t in his Prolegomena.

Since this has been previously

discussed,we will here briefly summarize Kant's position. H e argues that the ultimate, interior constitution o f things cannot be discovered b y physical science. W h a t can be k n o w n in the physical sciences is what is brought in relation to o u r sensibility, o u r real perceptions and what is subject to the "laws o f experience." L a n g e fully realizes that K a n t is seeking an epistemological foundation

for empirical knowledge. T h e r e f o r e , he quotes with

approval

K a n t ' s observation that Alle Erkenntnis von Dingen, aus bloßem reinen Verstande oder reiner Vernunft, ist nichts als lauter Schein, und nur in der Erfahrung ist Wahrheit. 4

W e m a y imagine N i e t z s c h e pondering the implications o f this statement with the aid o f Lange's critical asides. I f Wahrheit

is found in Erfahrung,

and if

experience, as K a n t understands it, is the cooperative interaction o f o u r senses, o u r intuitions o f space and time and our categorical scheme, then truth pertains o n l y to phenomena

that are constituted b y ourselves. H e n c e , truth is

relative to us and is o n l y phenomenal or "conditional" truth insofar as, for K a n t , the true essence o f things transcends our knowledge. T h e "truth" discovered in " e x p e r i e n c e " is necessarily, as N i e t z s c h e will say often enough, Wahrheit

3

4

für uns.

Ibid., II, 456-457. Cp. GdM, 236, 305. Cited in Lange, op. cit., II, 461. Cp. GdM, 240-241.

198

The Shadow of Kant P r o b i n g K a n t ' s analysis o f experience, Lange notes that a one-sided

empiricism does not appreciate that there is n o direct access t o external objects insofar as what we actually apprehend are the appearances o f things that rise up in us. T h a t our p h e n o m e n a are different from things in themselves is shown b y the fact that there is discernible an opposition between hearing a tone and the vibrations o f a string that occasions this experience. Lange takes this o p p o r ­ tunity to launch a thought-experiment that should sound familiar to followers of English analytic philosophy. Lange imagines that we might only have the sense o f hearing. I f this were the case, we would only have experiences o f sounds.

O u r knowledge w o u l d then, o f course, follow from o u r experience.

H e n c e , o u r knowledge would be conditioned b y the nature o f o u r auditory experience and w o u l d

be restricted to a phenomenal w o r l d o f sounds.

5

A l t h o u g h this brief anticipation o f P. F . Strawson's analysis o f " S o u n d s " in Individuals

is interesting as a curiosity, the critical analysis o f the origin o f the

categories is m o r e important for an understanding o f N i e t z s c h e ' s epistemic contentions. At System.

one point, Lange focuses upon ein dunkler

Punkt

im

T h i s "dark point" concerns the question whether the a priori

are deduced from a priori

Kantischen concepts

valid principles or whether they are sought out

empirically. Lange contends that K a n t has not considered the possibility that experience is an inductive process. If, as Lange suspects, this is the case, then, since K a n t begins with ordinary reflection, he cannot avoid psychological importations. A w a r e that K a n t himself does n o t intend t o do this, Lange points t o a basic circularity in the project o f the Kritik.

K a n t claims for his

procedure a certitude that does not rest upon mere "hypothesis." H e avers that the determination o f pure, a priori

cognition must be established o n a

priori

grounds. As K a n t puts it, das kündigt eine jede Erkenntnis, die a priori feststehen soll, selbst an, daß sie für schlechthin notwendig gehalten werden will, und eine Bestimmung aller reinen Erkenntnisse a priori noch vielmehr, die das Richtmaß, mithin selbst das Beispiel aller apodiktischen (philosophischen) Gewißheit sein soll. 6

T h u s , the determination o f all a priori

knowledge is based upon a

priori

grounds. I f we ask for the basis for these grounds, we are led to an infinite regress. I f we allow the statement to stand, then it is circular, especially since

5

6

Ibid., II, 478. "...knowledge that claims to hold a priori shall be held to be absolutely necessary. This particularly applies to any determination of all pure a priori knowledge since such determination has to serve as the measure and example of all apodictic (philosophical) certainty." Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Hamburg, 1956, Vorrede zur ersten Auflage, 9.

The Shadow of Kant

199

K a n t is attempting to determine the nature o f human knowledge. B y claiming certitude for his m e t h o d o f analysis, K a n t tries t o base his account o f knowledge o n the presumption o f knowledge. T h i s particular passage cited b y Lange is n o d o u b t the stimulus for N i e t z s c h e ' s harsh, but n o t inaccurate, criticism o f K a n t ' s starting-point. Was ist Erkenntniss: Wenn wir nicht wissen, was Erkenntniss ist, können wir unmöglich die Frage beantworten, ob es Erkenntniss giebt. . . . Aber wenn ich nicht schon „weiss", ob es Erkenntniss giebt, geben kann, kann ich die Frage „was ist Erkenntniss" gar nicht vernünftigerweise stellen. Kant glaubt an die Thatsache der Erkenntniss: es ist eine Naivetät, was er will: die Erkenntniss der Erkenntniss! 7

K n o w l e d g e o f knowledge. T h a t is precisely the p r o b l e m that Lange zeros in o n . K a n t did n o t see, he charges, that his method for the discovery o f the a priori

could n o t b e other than the Methode

that were thought to be a priori

der Induktion.

M a n y conceptions

have been found to be a posteriori

from experience. I f the fundamental origin o f a priori

or derived

knowledge is experi­

ence, then perhaps the categories have a "sensuous origin." A t this point, Lange's o w n epistemological standpoint begins to emerge. It is held that the origin o f the a priori Organisation

is rooted in our

physisch-psychischen

that is so named in order to indicate that the physical organiza­

tion, as p h e n o m e n o n , is, at the same time, the psychic o n e . Lange realizes this "goes b e y o n d K a n t , " but he insists that it is clearer than his n o t i o n o f the transcendental presuppositions

o f experience. M a n ' s psychic and physical

nature is already organized in a certain way before self-consciousness emerges. H e n c e , it m a y be assumed that what we take to be a priori

concepts that are

universal o r necessary m a y , in fact, be modalities o f thought that were appropriate to certain stages o f human development. It is suggested that deeply r o o t e d universal notions m a y have arisen at early stages o f human development and then became accepted as apodictic certainties. M a n y o f the forms o f thought we n o w accept as "true" o r certain may, in time, turn out to be Irrtümer

a priori.

T h i s p r o t o - N i e t z s c h e a n phrase, "errors a priori",

is adequate

t e s t i m o n y that N i e t z s c h e follows Lange's lead quite closely when he declares that what w e take to b e veridical a priori

notions are fundamentally

errors,

albeit constructive, useful and creative ones. In

amplifying his conception o f man's physico-psychic organization,

L a n g e notes that there are three basic positions that can be adopted in regard to

7

KGW, VIII 1, 272. "What is knowledge: If we do not know what knowledge is, it is impossible to answer the question whether there is knowledge... But if I do not already 'know' whether there is knowledge, whether there can be knowledge, I cannot reasonably put the question 'what is knowledge?' Kant believes in the fact of knowledge: what he wants is a naivete: knowledge of knowledge!"

200

The Shadow of Kant

the foundation o f physical and psychic p h e n o m e n a : the basis of o u r organiza­ tion is material, the foundation o f our organization is spiritual (as in L e i b n i z ' s m o n a d i c idealism) o r our organization has an u n k n o w n origin. Lange finds in K a n t ' s analysis o f knowledge the suggestion that what in one sense is a corporeal p h e n o m e n o n m a y also be construed internally as a "subject" which is simple and thinks. T h e notion o f an isolated thinking subject that is n o t in the w o r l d is sarcastically described b y N i e t z s c h e as a "Subjekt-an-sich."

It may

be noted, however, that he will remember K a n t ' s assumption of the "internal" dynamics o f entities that can n o t be p h e n o m e n a for knowledge and will rely u p o n it when he proposes his metaphorical interpretation o f the "world seen from w i t h i n " as Wille

zur Macht.

Lange, at any rate, makes much o f K a n t ' s

reference to the " c o m m o n u n k n o w n r o o t " of Sinnlichkeit

and Verstehen.

This

could be characterized, in terms o f previous discussions, as equivalent to the " u n k n o w n third" that stimulates N i e t z s c h e ' s imaginative speculations. In the course o f his c o m m e n t a r y on K a n t ' s theory o f knowledge, Lange makes a n u m b e r o f remarks that are relevant to N i e t z s c h e ' s later reflections. H e points out that w e cannot assume that the "thing-in-itself" is the "cause" o f the a priori

or, for that matter, the "cause" o f anything for the simple reason

that the c o n c e p t o f causality cannot be extended to Dinge-an-sich. said that the idea o f Sinnlichkeit

It is also

in Kant's thought m a y be filled out b y the

studies in the physiology o f the senses. Lange claims that such studies confirm K a n t ' s view that sensory experience is imbued with basic synthetic processes. In immediate sense-impressions are found cooperative processes that already resemble conscious cognition. T h i s point is made m o r e forcefully towards the end o f Geschichte

des Materialismus

when Lange attributes to sensory experi­

ence a primitive capacity o f synthesis. T h i s is, in all likelihood, the origin o f the previously mentioned n o t i o n o f N i e t z s c h e ' s that sensation and perception are characterized b y unconscious processes o f assimilation, organization and selective simplification. Against K a n t ' s theory that the synthesis o f the impres­ sions in a thing is brought about b y the application o f the category o f Substanz, aus welcher

it is argued that die sinnliche eine Kategorie

der Substanz

Synthesis

der Eindrücke

erst entwickelt

wird.

8

die

Grundlage,

Although Lange

does n o t delve t o o deeply into this question, what I think he means is that a category o f substance is n o t applied to a set of impressions b y the understand­ ing because a specific set o f impressions is already recognized as a "thing" in perception. A n d this is so referred to b y Kant. H e n c e , the recognition o f impressions "in a thing" already indicates that a synthesis has taken place in s o m e way. T h e w e a k point in K a n t ' s Kritik

is the c o n c e p t o f a "thing," a

Ibid, II, 574n. "...the sensuous synthesis is the foundation out of which a category of substance is first developed."

The Shadow of Kant

201

c o n c e p t that is frequently used uncritically, that is never defined and that, as L a n g e first and then N i e t z s c h e saw so clearly, is a primitive " c a t e g o r y " that is p r o b a b l y based upon an even m o r e primitive belief.

I n an ingenious way,

N i e t z s c h e takes up Lange's critical theme and developes it. H e argues that the c o n c e p t s o f "substance" and "thing" have a c o m m o n origin: they are trans­ positions o f subjective conceptions o f ourselves as independent,

isolated

" e g o s " to all phenomena. das glaubt an's „Ich", an's Ich als Sein, an's Ich als Substanz und projicirt den Glauben an die Ich-Substanz auf alle Dinge - es schafft erst damit den Begriff „Ding". 9

A l t h o u g h he presents slight variations on this theme elsewhere, his basic view is that the categories o f "thing" and "substance" (as well as that o f " b e i n g " ) are derived from o u r fallacious belief that our " e g o " is a being, a substance or a thing. It is interesting that N i e t z s c h e absorbs Lange's inconsistent views o n this issue. F o r , L a n g e claims that a concept such as that o f the " a t o m " is a kind o f scientific substitute for K a n t ' s category o f Substanz

and is ultimately

derived from o u r belief that we are isolated " e g o s , " and he also maintains that there is a synthesis in sensory experience that is the basis for o u r n o t i o n o f a " t h i n g " or a "substance." N i e t z s c h e presents precisely these t w o opposing views: he claims that there is a process o f assimilation and organization in sensory experience and proclaims that the categories have a sensuous

origin. A t

o t h e r times, he argues that it is our false understanding o f ourselves as an IchSubstanz

that is the basis o f the category o f 'substance' o r 'thing.' N e i t h e r

L a n g e n o r N i e t z s c h e can have it b o t h ways. A l t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e , after Lange, wants to say that Alle Kategorien Welt,

sind

sensualistischer

he does n o t

Herkunft:

abgelesen

von

consistently develope this theory.

unsere der

Vernunftempirischen

H i s m o s t typical

argument is that logico-metaphysical categories are derived from a fallacious internal p h e n o m e n o l o g y that yields a Subjekt

or an Ich that is possessed o f a

" w i l l " that is capable o f producing "effects,"

a doer and a deed. I f the

categories o f the understanding are derived from this misleading and false selfunderstanding, then the argument to the sensuous derivation o f the categories is superfluous. T h e p r o b l e m , as I've said, is that it is precisely these t w o strands o f thought that are found in Lange's w o r k , strands that Lange does n o t integrate either. T h e fact that N i e t z s c h e had to postulate unconscious o r unnoticed primitive acts o f synthesis in sensation and perception should have signaled to h i m that a t h e o r y o f the sensuous origin o f the categories, despite

9

KGW, VI 3, G, "Die Vernunft in der Philosophie," 5. "...belief in the 'ego,' in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and projects this belief in the ego-substance onto all things - thus does it first create the concept 'thing.'"

202

The Shadow of Kant

its attractions, is very difficult t o justify. B o t h Lange and N i e t z s c h e try to dig beneath the surface o f K a n t ' s analysis o f knowledge and seek t o find the locus o f knowledge in sensory experience. B u t neither succeed in finding a m o r e substantial explanation o f knowledge than K a n t ' s notion o f the synthesis o f sensibility and cognition. N i e t z s c h e tries to project a capacity for "equaliza­ t i o n " into the pre-conceptual realm o f sensory experience, but he never really consistently developes this notion. A t best, he produces interesting analogies between the assimilation o f food in lower organisms and man's "assimilation" o f p h e n o m e n a in a sensuous process that, despite his intentions, is construed as having cognition immanent in it. Insofar as sensory selectivity is based upon desire, need, interest and value, it w o u l d seem to be thought o f as suffused b y s o m e kind o f discriminating cognition. I f he wants to say that elementary sensory experience is imbued with an instinctive wisdom, he cannot consis­ tently do so because o f his argument that the way we have learned to perceive the w o r l d is a creative, functional, utilitarian m o d e o f perception that has survived because it has proven successful for life and that those w h o did not, or could not, perceive as survivors did perished. M a n y o f the criticisms that N i e t z s c h e offers o f the idea o f

Dinge-an-sich

have their p r o t o t y p e in Lange's critical asides. A s we've already seen, it is said that causality cannot b e attributed to the thing-in-itself because the category is applicable o n l y to phenomena. F o r Kant, the process o f knowledge applies o n l y to what we have conditioned or constituted and, therefore, knowledge is restricted to p h e n o m e n a alone. Lange asks what o u r " k n o w l e d g e " amounts to if we o n l y find the " l a w s " created b y ourselves or projected b y ourselves into the p h e n o m e n a Vorstellung

w e apprehend. T h e world

that we k n o w is a Welt

als

that is determined b y the "laws o f experience." I n this regard,

N i e t z s c h e agreed with K a n t . Wenn Kant sagt „der Verstand schöpft seine Gesetze nicht aus der Natur, sondern schreibt sie dieser vor", so ist diess in Hinsicht auf den Begriff der Natur völlig wahr, welchen wir genöthigt sind, mit ihr zu verbinden (Natur = Welt als Vorstel­ lung, das heisst als Irrthum). 10

F r o m this passage, as well as Lange's reinforcement o f K a n t ' s conception o f the phenomenal w o r l d als Vorstellung,

we can see h o w N i e t z s c h e reached the

conclusion that the realm o f human knowledge is comprised o f a system o f errors, errors that are presumed to be the result o f a long process of sensory and cognitive development.

KGW, IV 2, MAM, I, 19. "When Kant says, 'The understanding does not derive its laws from nature, but dictates them to her,' this is perfectly true in regard to the concept of nature which we are compelled to associate with her (Nature = World as representation, that is, as error)."

The Shadow of Kant Lange argued

that any attempt

203

to think the thing-in-itself naturally

b r o u g h t it within the compass o f phenomena. Because he believed that c o n c e p t s o r categories have a sensory origin, he also held that ideas stellungen)

(Vor­

were phenomena. Given these assumptions, it is not surprising that

h e began to w o n d e r what use this idea o f things-in-themselves served at all. Wozu führt alle unsre Wissenschaft, wenn wir uns die absolut existierenden Dinge, die „Dinge an sich" ohne Raum und Zeit, also in einer für uns völlig unfaßbaren Weise vorstellen sollen? . . . Wer sagt . . . daß wir uns mit den für uns unfaßbaren „Dingen an sich" überhaupt befassen sollen?" It is perfectly possible to eliminate the idea o f things in themselves and still retain meaningful

knowledge and scientific advance. F u r t h e r m o r e , Lange

argues, K a n t c a n n o t prove that timeless, spaceless things in themselves exist because this w o u l d involve a "transcendental" (transphenomenal) knowledge that K a n t prohibits. T h e very meaningfulness o f the projected realm o f things in themselves is questionable. A s we mentioned above, L a n g e charges that any attempt t o attribute causality t o the mysterious thing in itself is a misuse o f the category o f causality in K a n t ' s terms insofar as the category o n l y has validity in the sphere o f experience. Although Lange recognizes that K a n t thinks o f the Ding-an-sich

as a limitative concept o r a Grenzbegriff,

he still sees it as a

completely problematic something that tends t o evaporate into a p h a n t o m . T h e m o r e this n o t i o n is refined away, the m o r e do we tend to see the w o r l d o f p h e n o m e n a as the "real" world insofar as our knowledge o n l y discloses p h e n o m e n a . T h i s conception, it need hardly be said, is p r o b a b l y the inspira­ tion for N i e t z s c h e ' s view that the distinction between an apparent w o r l d and a real w o r l d is illegitimate, insofar as the so-called "apparent w o r l d " is the world w e k n o w , the world we act in, the world for us. T h e world o f things in themselves is K a n t ' s version o f the "true w o r l d , " one that is misty, cold and, as N i e t z s c h e puts it, Königsbergian. As we shall see, N i e t z s c h e takes up Lange's criticism o f K a n t ' s m o s t vulnerable idea and adds a few twists o f his o w n . In the course o f his exposition and critique o f K a n t ' s thought, Lange makes a n u m b e r o f observations that will have quite an impact o n N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking. First o f all, he underlined the importance o f K a n t ' s t h e o r y o f p h e n o m e n a l knowledge b y pointing out that the " w o r l d " we take as actuality is a conditioned, constituted world, one shaped b y our senses, o u r categories and o u r intuitions o f space and time. T h i s means, o f course, that the w o r l d is 11

Lange, op. cit., II, 485. "Where does all our knowledge lead if we must represent to ourselves the absolutely existing things, the 'things in themselves', outside space and time and, therefore, in a manner inconceivable to us? . . . W h o . . . says that we are to concern ourselves at all with the, to us, inconceivable 'things in themselves'?" Lange's criticisms of the idea of things in themselves are forcefully expressed in the second edition of his work. He derived a number of his insights from H.Cohen's Kants Theorie der Erfahrung [Berlin, 1871].

204

The Shadow of Kant

human o r is created through a process o f humanization. T h i s leads Lange to speculate that for beings w h o have a different Organisation

than w e , the

" w o r l d " must appear different. N o t only that, but if there are beings that do n o t experience actuality in terms o f three dimensional space, then there are innumerable possible "worlds." Bluntly put, the w o r l d we experience is dependent o n o u r "organs," is but one way o f experiencing the vast ocean o f actuality. B y analogy, then, we m a y suppose that eine verschiedener verschieden

Auffassungen organisierte

möglich

Wesen?

1 2

ist < f ü r >

ganze

all diese

Unendlichkeit Auffassungsweisen

T h i s statement, in coordination with refer­

ences to the different senses o f different species o f insects o r animals, is clearly the m o d e l for N i e t z s c h e ' s theory o f "perspectivalism." W h e r e there

are

different sensory systems, different modes o f " c o g n i t i o n " or awareness, there are different worlds. N i e t z s c h e , o f course, takes these c o m m e n t s and amplifies them. H e argues that not only each species has its own perspectival way o f experiencing things, but each individual has its specific perspectival optics. A l t h o u g h this is his general position, he later extends the concept o f perspec­ tive to the hypothetical "wills to p o w e r , " "will-points" o r "centers o f force." N i e t z s c h e first attributes interpretation to organic beings in the sense that they structure, form, o r organize whatever enters their life-sphere. Since, as we have seen, he conceives o f organic beings as complexes o f "wills to p o w e r , " as dynamic multiplicities, he feels no c o m p u n c t i o n in ascribing a perspective t o these posited "entities." F o r the sake o f clarification, let us refer to the perspective o f a " b o d y " as a macroperspective and the perspective o f posited Kraftcentren

as a microperspective. In the following, N i e t z s c h e seems t o be

speaking o f the larger perspective o f bodies: Der Perspektivismus ist nur eine complexe Form der Spezifität. . . . jeder spezifische Körper darnach strebt, über den ganzen Raum Herr zu werden und seine Kraft auszudehnen ( - sein Wille zur Macht:) und Alles das zurückzustossen, was seiner Ausdehnung widerstrebt. Aber er stösst fortwährend auf gleiche Bes­ trebungen anderer Körper und endet, sich mit denen zu arrangiren („vereinigen"), welche ihm verwandt genug sind: - so conspiriren sie dann zusammen zur Macht. Und der Prozess geht weiter.. T h i s notion o f the perspective o f bodies

that seek to attain a maximal extension

o f force suggests the macroperspective o f entities that assemble in order to

12

13

Ibid., II, 499. "... a whole infinity of different interpretations is possible [for] all these different modes of apprehension of differently organized beings." KGW, VIII 3, 165f. "Perspectivalism is only a complex form of specificity... each specific body strives to become master of the whole of space and extend its force ( - its will to power:) and to push back all that resists its extension. But it encounters continually similar strivings on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those that are sufficiently related to it - thus they conspire together for power. And the process goes on -."

The Shadow of Kant

205

augment their collective power. In this passage, N i e t z s c h e , as he often does, brings together t w o ways o f explaining activity: the bodies that seek to expand and extend their Kraft

are construed as physical forces (as in physics), but the

c o m i n g together in an arrangement o r assembly for the sake o f increasing p o w e r suggests social forms o f vereinigen.

T h i s nisus towards mastery, c o n t r o l

and expansion o f force on the part o f each organism, each " b o d y , " is the foundation o f an ineluctable " e g o i s m . " T h e point seems to be that what, from a moral p o i n t o f view, is criticized as " e g o i s m " is, in fact, deeply rooted in the being o f any organic entity, is a striving for p o w e r that cannot be eliminated without eliminating life itself. T h i s is p r o b a b l y one reason, amongst m a n y , w h y N i e t z s c h e is so vehement in his criticisms of altruism. H e r e , o f course, he is n o t p r o m o t i n g " e g o i s m , " but merely describing and interpreting the nature o f living beings as inevitably dominated b y , and motivated b y , their perspec­ tives. W h e n it is said that jedes Perspektive Wider

d. h. seine 14

Standsart,

ganz

Kraftcentrum bestimmte

hat für den ganzen Werthung,

seine

Rest

Aktions-Art,

seine seine

we realize that he is referring to a microperspective. F o r , we

already k n o w that an organic entity is a multiplicity o f "forces," a multiplicity o f Kraftcentren

o r a multiplicity of "wills to p o w e r . " In the passage previously

cited, we find a reference to each b o d y as a specific entity imbued with a striving for an extension o f force that is equated with its will to power. B u t , as we have seen, each particular organic b o d y is comprised of a dynamically interacting system o f forces o r wills to p o w e r ; hence, the will to p o w e r o f a particular being is itself the accumulation o f "forces," "urges,"

"drives,"

"impulses," etc., each o f which is thought to have its drive for Macht.

Given

this background, we can understand the theory o f perspectivalism as being applied to each force-center o r Macht-Quantum

that acts and reacts within a

" b o d y . " A b o d y , then, at each stage o f its existence, is construed as a Konstellation

o f Kraftcentren

or Machtquanta

each o f which has its specific

"perspective." A l t h o u g h there is anthropomorphism here, N i e t z s c h e is not o n l y talking about man. F o r , he maintains that there is a notwendigen Perspektivismus, vermöge dessen jedes Kraftzentrum - und nicht nur der Mensch - von sich aus die ganze übrige Welt konstruiert, d. h. an seiner Kraft mißt, betastet, gestaltet. 15

14

15

KGW, VII 3, 163. "Each center of force has its own perspective for all the remainder, i.e., its own particular valuation, mode of action, and mode of resistance." Ibid., 165. "... necessary perspectivism by virtue of which each center of force — and n o t only man - construes the rest of the world from its own standpoint, i. e., measures, feels and forms in accordance with its force."

206

The Shadow of Kant

T h e development o f a t h e o r y o f perspectivalism begins with N i e t z s c h e ' s recognition that

the phenomenal

world

that we k n o w

is a

thoroughly

humanized w o r l d , a " w o r l d " constituted b y our senses and our t h o u g h t : a perspectival, human

world. F o l l o w i n g Lange's suggestions, N i e t z s c h e then

sees that other living beings must, if they have a different Organisation,

live in

a different experiential w o r l d than that o f man and in a different w o r l d than that in which o t h e r species live. Applying this to the social world o f man, N i e t z s c h e maintains that each group (cultural group, age group, political group, etc.) has its o w n perspective. A n d , o f course, each individual person has his o r her unique, subjective perspective. Interpreting the nature o f organisms, he averred that not only does each organism and each species have its specific perspective, but each "organ," each "cell," each vital element in an organism has its o w n "perspective." Finally, after adopting provisionally the d y n a m i c physical t h e o r y that posited "force-centers" as the ultimate c o n ­ stituents o f the natural world, N i e t z s c h e went all the w a y and assumed that each Kraftcentrum

has its o w n "perspective." Although we shall examine the

full significance o f the dynamic theory o f nature for N i e t z s c h e ' s hypothetical, aesthetic interpretation o f the humanistic meaning o f universal " f o r c e , " we m a y here call attention to the distinction between perspectivalism as a theory o f knowledge and the hypothesis o f perspectival awareness that is part o f N i e t z s c h e ' s imaginative, experimental vision o f the interior dynamics o f actuality. T h i s is often difficult to do because N i e t z s c h e himself shifts b a c k and forth from an account o f knowledge as relative to perspective, as comprised o f interpretation

from a standpoint

understanding

o f the structure o f actuality in terms o f physical theoretical

or methodological point o f view, to an

language and human analogy. A m o n g s t other critical insights, Lange offers analyses o f the categories o f the understanding that seem to provide the foundation for N i e t z s c h e ' s under­ standing o f the Kantian categories as useful fictions. T h e o u t c o m e o f K a n t ' s t h e o r y o f knowledge is that the system o f phenomena that we can k n o w is ordered, shaped, and formed b y the spontaneity o f the understanding, b y o u r Sinnlichkeit

and b y our a priori

understanding

intuitions o f space and time. T h e objects o f o u r

are constituted b y o u r subjective sensory-cognitive nature.

T h e r e are certain forms o f thought that w e , o f necessity, must impose o n our 'material' o f experience in order for our experience t o be intelligible. If, as K a n t said, "percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts are e m p t y , " then knowledge must be the synthesis o f percepts and concepts. T h e "laws o f experience" are the necessary conditions that make knowledge o f the w o r l d possible; they give us a Welt shows that a priori

als Vorstellung.

E v e n though K a n t

categories o f the understanding are applicable to the world

and are conditions for the possibility o f knowledge, he denied that they have

207

The Shadow of Kant

application to the world o f Dinge

an sich. Knowledge,

then, pertains to what

has been constituted b y o u r senses, our concepts and the a priori

intuitions o f

space and time. H o w e v e r , this knowledge does not tell us what the true essence o f things is. W e have, then, two realms o f "truth." T h e "truth" o f analytic propositions, synthetic propositions that are verified in experience and synthetic a priori

truths, and what N i e t z s c h e sardonically calls "truth-in-

itself." T h i s d i c h o t o m y is precisely the basis o f the pessimistic reaction of von Kleist that N i e t z s c h e reports and c o m m e n t s on in Schopenhauer

als

Erzieher.

H a v i n g read K a n t , von Kleist feels despair over the implications o f his p h i l o s o p h y . Wir können wahrhaft

Wahrheit

nicht

ist, oder

entscheiden,

ob das, was wir Wahrheit

ob es uns nur so scheint.

16

nennen,

I f Kant becomes

popular, N i e t z s c h e reflects, then a corroding skepticism and relativism will spread through the world. T h e implications of K a n t ' s critical philosophy are that the o n l y world we can understand is a world for us, that we cannot attain a k n o w l e d g e o f ultimate reality o r truth. Lange analyzes the c o n c e p t o f causality from H u m e ' s critique o f necessary causal c o n n e c t i o n to K a n t ' s notion that the concept o f cause is an a priori

idea

that determines our experience and has validity in the sphere o f experience o n l y t o his o w n view that causality is an idea rooted in our "organization" and the disposition t o think in terms o f it is before

experience. Lange's understand­

ing o f causality differs from that of K a n t b y virtue o f the fact that he stresses its psychological origin in our anthropomorphic belief in an Ursache

that has

generative p o w e r , that is active and is m o r e important than an effect. Lange denies that causality (or, for that matter, any o f K a n t ' s categories) yields "external k n o w l e d g e . " Despite this, categories are valuable intellectual posses­ sions that are rooted in our psychological make-up. Lange suggests that categories such as "unity," "cause" and "effect," "substance," etc., are highly useful notions that do not have any ontological significance. T h a t is, they are basically psychistic notions that serve to organize our experience o f the external world. K a n t believed that he could deduce the primitive conceptions o f human understanding from the different forms o f judgment as they are preserved in logic. Lange is n o t convinced b y this procedure insofar as he believes that K a n t puts t o o m u c h faith in "formal logic" and does n o t see that it is contaminated b y grammatico-linguistic, psychological and anthropomorphic

notions.

Er bedachte nicht, daß in der überlieferten Logik aus ihrer natürlichen Verbindung mit der Grammatik und der Sprache noch psychologische Elemente stecken, welche in ihrer anthropomorphen Beschaffenheit sehr verschieden sind vom eigent-

16

KGW, III 1, UB, III, 3. "We are unable to decide whether what we call truth is really truth or whether it merely appears as such to us."

The Shadow of Kant

208

lieh Logischen in der Logik das freilich bis auf den heutigen Tag noch auf eine strenge Sonderung von den unhaltbaren Beimischungen wartet. 17

N i e t z s c h e will take arguments such as the above as points o f departure for his o w n critical analysis o f the foundations o f logic. A n d he found m u c h m o r e in Lange's exposition and critique o f K a n t ' s critical philosophy that enriched his thinking. I n the course o f discussing the nature o f synthetic judgments, Lange points out that in the exact sciences absolute truth has been banished and o n l y "relative truths" are considered. H e relates this to synthetic judg­ ments and says that they are, at best, hypothetically valid. H e r e , again, is L a n g e ' s probabilism. In regard to knowledge o f nature, even mathematics o r g e o m e t r y provide us with no perfectly accurate representation o f a force o r magnitude. Mathematical concepts are hypothetically applicable to natural p h e n o m e n a o r processes. N o external object corresponds to any mathematical formula insofar as we assume that the actual form o f an object is exceedingly c o m p l e x and variable. T h e implication is that mathematical formulas

or

s y m b o l s do not, and cannot, represent actual entities or processes in a perfectly accurate way. T h i s entire line o f argument is virtually a conventional­ ist interpretation o f mathematical s y m b o l s , an interpretation that N i e t z s c h e will assimilate completely. A s if Lange's arguments were not already persua­ sive enough,

he

refers

to

R . Zimmermann's

remarkable

anticipation

of

Wittgenstein's, A . J . A y e r ' s and others' conception o f mathematical proposi­ 18

tions as analytical o r "identical" ( = tautological). Although Lange disagrees with Z i m m e r m a n n

about this, the imprint has been made: the synthetic

element in mathematical propositions can be deleted. T h u s , mathematical propositions o r mathematical formulae may be construed either as analytical o r tautological statements o r as approximations

to actual events, relations o f

objects o r natural processes. T h i s view will play a central role in N i e t z s c h e ' s conventionalist t h e o r y o f scientific knowledge. B e f o r e discussing the way in which N i e t z s c h e employs these insights o f L a n g e , there are concluding remarks that Lange makes about the Kantian restriction o f knowledge to a phenomenal world that may shed light on certain aspects o f N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking. K a n t ' s critique o f reason raises doubts about the absolute nature o f human knowledge, or the capacity o f the mind to arrive at "truth in itself." Although there will be progress in the natural sciences, K a n t believed, the inner constituents o f things can never be k n o w n . W h e r e v e r w e l o o k and k n o w , we find phenomena. B u t phenomena are constructs, 17

18

Lange, op. cit., II, 501. "He did not reflect that in traditional logic, due to its natural connection with grammar and language, there still lingers psychological elements which, in their an­ thropomorphic constitution, are quite different from the strictly logical element in logic which, even today, still awaits a rigid purification of these admixtures." Ibid., II, 469-476.

209

The Shadow of Kant

products

o f the receptivity o f the senses, our a priori

intuitions and o u r

categories. T h e phenomenal world that man can k n o w is an island in an ocean o f possible actualities and knowledge. Since it is rooted in our sensorycognitive organization and is (as Lange believes) conditioned b y our psyche

as

well, this k n o w a b l e w o r l d is n o t actuality as such. K a n t ' s attempt to preserve moral a u t o n o m y b y virtue o f the n o t i o n o f an "intelligible w o r l d " is seen b y Lange as a piece o f poetry. As a poetic idea, it has value and nobility and is a counterbalance to the blandness and pessimism o f the phenomenal world. I n the creation o f the "intelligible w o r l d " , K a n t b e c a m e the "teacher o f the ideal" he refers to towards the conclusion o f the Kritik.

E v e r y attempt to penetrate the noumenal world o f things in themselves

leads us into the sphere o f poetry or what Lange also calls "figurative truth."

19

T h i s c o n c e p t i o n should be b o r n e in mind when we discover that N i e t z s c h e refers to the will to p o w e r as the world described and determined in accord­ ance with its "intelligiblen

Charakter."

T h i s should signal to anyone that he is

n o t here talking about positive knowledge or "metaphysical truth" when he postulates his hypothetical-poetic conception o f a universal Wille

zur

Macht.

Putting together the t w o aspects o f Lange's understanding o f the implica­ tions o f K a n t ' s critical philosophy, w e find that the phenomenal w o r l d is a humanized w o r l d that exists for us, that is 'true' for us, but possesses only relative o r (as N i e t z s c h e will later say) "conditional" 'truth.' A n y attempt to transcend the limits o f o u r senses, our intuitions o f space and time o r the boundaries

o f our basic categories leads only to an imaginary world, a

delusional realm. H o w e v e r , if we understand that we can make n o legitimate knowledge claims about any transphenomenal realm, and if we put forward o u r vision o f "reality" as a poetic, figurative, ideal construction, we are free to d o so for the sake o f presenting an edifying o r aesthetic vision o f the 'real' that m a y enhance the existence o f individuals and lead to cultural rejuvenation. T h e bleakness o f the empirical-phenomenal world that accumulates m o r e and m o r e data and is reinterpreted b y one theory after another must, Lange believes, b e supplemented b y a poetico-philosophical vision, a picture projected from the "standpoint o f the ideal", that m a y edify us and intensify existence. A l t h o u g h H a n s Vaihinger claims, in Die Philosophie

des 'Als-Ob',

rudiments o f a form o f fictionalism m a y be found in K a n t ' s Opus

that the postumum,

there is n o need to search out K a n t ' s Nachlass

for indications o f a form o f

fictionalism. F o r , his conception o f praktische

Vernunft

certainly employs

notions that are n o t k n o w n to be true, that are not based upon "experience," in order to defend moral freedom, moral action and moral responsibility. N o t

19

Ibid., II, 509-511.

210

The Shadow of Kant

o n l y that, but the conception o f regulative principles o f reason is already a p r o t o t y p e o f as-if n o t i o n s . Vaihinger is aware o f this, o f course, but he does n o t link such hypothetical presuppositions with the attempt o f K a n t to create a philosophische

Anthropologic

As we have seen, Lange refers to K a n t ' s n o t i o n

that man has evolved, that there is n o absolute distinction between man and the animals and that man's knowledge o f the w o r l d is not only theoretical, but "empirico-practical." M a n is distinguished b y K a n t from other animals b y his capacity for a technical manipulation o f objects and his pragmatic capacity for socialization and the transmission o f culture and knowledge. Although Lange does n o t relate the theoretical and the practical orientations o f K a n t in his expository treatment o f K a n t , N i e t z s c h e does. T h a t is, with the assistance o f L a n g e , he applies the practical aspects o f K a n t ' s thought (the reliance o n regulative principles and the joining o f reason with the preservation o f the species) t o Lange's psychologistic interpretation o f K a n t ' s theory o f k n o w ­ ledge. T h e categories, then, b e c o m e "regulative articles o f belief" and they are said t o serve a practical purpose in the preservation o f the species. W h a t N i e t z s c h e seeks is the foundation o r origin o f the categories o f the understand­ ing that K a n t considers a priori.

H i s question is, w h y have the particular

categories that K a n t delineates b e c o m e the accepted elements in the pattern o f human thought? Since N i e t z s c h e seems to believe that the basic categories in philosophical discourse are sedimentations o f thought that occurred some time ago, he m o r e o r less accepts K a n t ' s categories o f the understanding as formalizations o f developed patterns o f thought. K a n t ' s question was, h o w are synthetic a

priori

judgments possible? N i e t z s c h e , however, asks w h y we believe that they are true. H i s answer is that such judgments must b e believed 'true' (even though they are, strictly speaking, "false") because o f their value for the preservation o f the human species. Faith in the 'truth' o f such judgments is necessary in terms o f the Perspektiven-Optik

des L e b e n s .

2 0

I t m a y be noted that N i e t z s c h e

does n o t question the formulation o f synthetic a priori

judgments nor does he

deny that they are "necessary." H o w e v e r , he explains their "necessity" in terms o f their practical value and in terms o f the "perspectival optics o f life." T h i s pattern is typical o f N i e t z s c h e ' s analysis o f the categories: he denies that t h e y have any real ontological reference and, therefore, considers them "false" o r "falsifications." H o w e v e r , he insists that they are necessary

modalities o f

thought that preserve and conserve the species. In his arguments against the veracity o f K a n t ' s categorical scheme, N i e t z s c h e seems t o rely on an intuitive understanding

20

o f actuality as a dynamic process, an exceedingly c o m p l e x ,

KGW, VI 2, JGB, 11.

211

The Shadow of Kant

chaotic process. W h a t is interesting in this regard is that the suggestion that knowledge is the imposition o f form on a chaotic stream o f impressions is a variation on a Kantian theme. F o r Kant, there is no knowledge synthesis. T h e r e f o r e , "Die Synthesis zuerst

eine

Erkenntnis

eines

Mannigfaltigen

aber

without

...

bringt

21

hervor."

N i e t z s c h e ' s analysis o f knowledge is fundamentally a kind o f hyperbolic Kantianism. H e learned from K a n t (through Lange) that the mind is active in k n o w i n g , that knowledge is form-giving, structuring, an imposition o f order on a primitive manifold o f impressions. T h e significant difference from K a n t ' s views is the addition o f the purpose o f the form-giving activity o f the intellect. E v e n this practical dimension o f knowledge (though first encountered

by

N i e t z s c h e in Schopenhauer) was suggested b y K a n t himself and reinforced b y L a n g e ' s psychologistic interpretation o f K a n t . T h u s , when N i e t z s c h e charac­ terizes knowledge, he superimposes a pragmatic intention on what is identifi­ able as a Kantian n o t i o n o f knowledge. . . . nicht „erkennen," sondern schematisiren, dem Chaos so viel Regularität und Formen auferlegen, als es unserem praktischen Bedürfniss genug thut In der Bildung der Vernunft, der Logik, der Kategorien ist das Bedürfniss massgebend gewesen: das Bedürfniss, nicht zu „erkennen", sondern zu subsumiren, zu schematisiren, zum Zweck der Verständigung, der Berechnung.. . 22

E v e n though N i e t z s c h e claims that our aim in conceptualization is not "to k n o w , " his account o f the process is expressed in K a n t ' s terms. " S u b s u m p t i o n " and "schematization" are, despite N i e t z s c h e ' s paradoxical claims, acts o f knowledge independent o f the "purpose" o f such cognitive acts. Elsewhere in his Nachlass,

N i e t z s c h e does n o t deny knowledge at all. H e o n l y adds that

what we have taken t o be " k n o w l e d g e " is, in fact, only one

interpretation

amongst m a n y . E v e n this view, as w e have seen, is suggested b y K a n t indirectly insofar as his analysis o f knowledge indicates that beings with different senses and a different mode o f cognition would " k n o w " in a different w a y and would k n o w a different "world." N o t h i n g in the following actually contradicts K a n t ' s position.

21

22

Kant, op. cit., 116. "Synthesis of a manifold... is what first gives rise to knowledge." KGW, VIII 3, 125f. "...not 'to know,' but schematization upon chaos of as much regularity and form as our practical needs require. In the constitution of reason, logic, the categories, it was need that was authoritative: the need, not 'to know,' but to subsume, to schematize for the purpose of intelligibility, calculation..." It may be noted that here Nietzsche is speaking of "need" in the sense of a cognitive aim and not in the sense of an immediate biological need related to survival. In this respect, he clearly anticipates John Dewey's conception of the "instrumental" conception of knowledge. Dewey held that "... the logical is an inherent or organic expression of the practical, and hence is fulfilling its own logical basis and aim when it functions practically." John Dewey, Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality, Chicago, 1903, 13, 10 n.

The Shadow of Kant

212

Soweit überhaupt das Wort ,Erkenntnis' Sinn hat, ist die Welt erkennbar: aber sie ist anders deutbar, sie hat keinen Sinn hinter sich, sondern unzählige Sinne ,Perspektivismus.' 23

In yet another formulation o f the nature o f knowledge, N i e t z s c h e argues that c o m i n g to k n o w is actually „sich-irgend-wozu-in-Bedingung-setzen"

or "put­

ting oneself in a conditional relation to something." T h i s is described further as feeling oneself conditioned b y something and conditioning it.

24

E x c e p t for the

suggestion o f action, this is quite close to what K a n t considers k n o w i n g to b e : being conditioned b y something through the receptivity o f sense and condi­ tioning that something b y means o f the spontaneity of thought. As often as N i e t z s c h e tries to avoid a Kantian conception o f knowledge, he eventually finds himself rephrasing K a n t and adding a pragmatic, biological twist. A t times, N i e t z s c h e emphasizes the subjective pole o f knowledge in a way that is reminiscent o f K a n t . T h e difference, again, arises out o f the stress upon o u r needs, o u r practical interests, our psyche

as active in the selective process o f

categorical simplification. W h e n he refers to o u r "truths" concerning the p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d as "conditional truths," however, he is not far from K a n t . F o r , according to K a n t ' s account o f knowledge, a synthetic judgment must be " c o n d i t i o n a l " in the sense that it is a constituted or "conditioned" truth. O f course, in the following c o m m e n t , N i e t z s c h e has the advantage over K a n t insofar as he is aware that, as Lange pointed out, non-Euklidean conceptions o f space are possible. Die Kategorien sind „Wahrheiten" nur in dem Sinne, als sie lebenbedingend für uns sind: wie der Euklidische Raum eine solche bedingte „Wahrheit" ist. 25

W h a t the possibility o f non-Euklidean space does for N i e t z s c h e is to streng­ then his repeated claim that what we consider o u r knowledge o f the external w o r l d is, in actuality, a systematic falsification, a system o f functional "er­ r o r s . " H o w e v e r , it should be said that this repeated stress upon "falsification" is not supported b y certain unavoidable facts. Even if, for example, a fourdimensional n o t i o n o f space is feasible, a great deal can be accomplished in the w o r l d o n the basis o f the practical assumption o f a three dimensional space. I f w e link this n o t i o n with what Heidegger calls the "mathematical projection o f nature," we see that highly c o m p l e x activities have been carried out (in space voyages, the moon-landing and other space explorations) that suggest that man's c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f the structure o f space is hardly a gross "falsification."

23

24

25

KGW, VIII 1, 323. "Insofar as the word 'knowledge' has meaning, the world is knowable: but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings - 'Perspectivism'." KGW, VIII 1, 139f. KGW, VIII 3, 125 f.

The Shadow of Kant

213

R a t h e r , the technological accomplishments o f recent years tends to vindicate man's experience of, and comprehension of, the structure o f space. A t the very least, it would have to be admitted, against N i e t z s c h e ' s strongest view, that o u r "intuition" o f space and our mathematical " p r o j e c t i o n " o f the external w o r l d are approximations

t o the actual spatial and quantitative structure o f the

w o r l d . W h i l e it m a y be granted that other interpretations of the structure o f space m a y have yielded the same successful results as recent space exploration, it is very difficult to support the belief that the interpretation o f the w o r l d structure, in this case at least, is a "systematic falsification" o f actuality. W h a t is interesting in N i e t z s c h e ' s analysis of knowledge is his c o n c e p t i o n o f the p s y c h o - b i o l o g i c a l basis o r origin o f human knowledge. B y insisting that the categories are in the service o f life, that they are based upon physical and psychological needs, he adds a new dimension to the question o f knowledge that, o f course, was brought to fruition in pragmatism. It is our need for a sense o f permanence, o u r need for quick calculation and abbreviated notions, o u r need t o function in a 'created' environment that lies at the basis o f o u r categorical scheme. H o w e v e r , his insistence that we must think in terms of, say, unities, substances o r cause and effect, even though nothing outside us corresponds to these concepts, is a view that once again is a hyperbolic version o f K a n t ' s thought. K a n t , for example, does not say that there are substances, unities or causes and effects. Rather, he argues that the structure o f o u r mind is such that we must think o f objects and their relations in terms o f such concepts. Insofar as K a n t emphasizes the subjective determination o f objects o f knowledge, he points to the form-giving activity o f the mind, the

construc­

tive nature o f all knowing. Although K a n t does not refer to human knowledge as an interpretation o f the world or actuality, all that is missing is the term. T h u s , the nature that w e can comprehend is not "nature in itself," but a realm constituted b y our subjective apperception. Daß die Natur sich nach unserem subjektiven Grunde der Apperzeption richten, ja gar davon in Ansehung ihrer Gesetzmäßigkeit abhängen solle, lautet wohl sehr widersinnig und befremdlich. Bedenkt man aber, daß diese Natur an sich nichts als ein Inbegriff von Erscheinungen, mithin kein Ding an sich, sondern bloß eine Menge von Vorstellungen des Gemüts sei, so wird man sich nicht wundern, sie bloß in dem Radikalvermögen aller unserer Erkenntnis, nämlich der transzendenta­ len Apperzeption, in derjenigen Einheit zu sehen, um derentwillen allein sie Objekt aller möglichen Erfahrung. 26

26

Kant, op. cit., 166-167. "That nature directs itself according to our subjective ground of apperception, and indeed should depend upon it in regard to its conformity to law, sounds very strange and absurd. But when one considers that this nature is not a thing in itself, but merely an aggregate of appearances, a great many representations of the mind, we should not wonder that we can only discover it in the radical faculty of all our knowledge, namely in transcendental apperception, in that unity by which alone it can be called object of all possible experience."

The Shadow of Kant

214

It w o u l d seem that the sense o f this passage is that o u r conception o f nature is o u r interpretation

o f nature. I f we grant this, and if we grant that N i e t z s c h e

often speaks o f "things" in the sense o f " o b j e c t s , " the following remarks from the Nacblass

o f 1 8 8 7 represent only a slight variation o n a Kantian theme.

Dass die Dinge eine Beschaffenheit an sich haben, ganz abgesehen von der Interpretation und Subjektivität, ist eine ganz müssige Hypothese: es würde voraussetzen, dass die Interpretiren nich wesentlich sei, dass ein Ding aus allen Relationen gelöst noch Ding sei. Umgekehrt: der anscheinende objektive Character der Dinge: könnte er nicht bloss auf eine Graddifferenz innerhalb des Subjektiven hinauslaufen?... dass das Objektive nur ein falscher Artbegriff und Gegensatz wäre innerhalb des Subjektiven? 27

Insofar as N i e t z s c h e points to the subjective constitution o f our objects o f knowledge, and insofar as he refers to the categories as valid "for us," he has n o t gone b e y o n d the sense o f K a n t ' s basic understanding o f the k n o w i n g process. In fact, he occasionally refers to our "constituting" o f the world w e k n o w and even says that we cannot get b e y o n d "thought and sensation." All o f the references to the form-giving, conditioning, meaning-giving activity o f the mind in the creation o f knowledge are indebted to K a n t ' s theory of k n o w ­ ledge. N i e t z s c h e is innovative when he works behind the scenes o f the

Kritik

and tries to explain w h y we think as we do and what purposes it serves. W e have already seen that Lange averred that there are n o unities, no selfidentical entities in the world. N i e t z s c h e seizes upon this and argues that the belief in "identical cases" or in "self-identical" entities lies at the foundation o f logic. T h o s e w h o perceived the similar as "equal" survived; those w h o didn't presumably perished. K a n t had suggested that if it were not for the synthetic function o f consciousness, we would experience a chaos o f multiplicities. H i s c o n c e p t i o n o f a given "manifold" already suggested this. N i e t z s c h e virtually paraphrases stellungen. and

28

Kant

when

he

declares

that

Ursprünglich

Chaos

der

Vor­

O u r senses and our categories impose order on this original chaos

thereby

produce

"knowledge."

The

most

primitive

synthesis,

for

N i e t z s c h e , is the thought that entities are "equal" o r are "self-identical." T h i s

27

28

KGW, VIII 2 , 1 7 . "That things have a constitution in themselves, entirely apart from interpreta­ tion and subjectivity, is a wholly idle hypothesis: it presupposes that interpretation and subjectivity are not essential, that a thing liberated from all relations would still be a thing. Conversely, the apparent objective character of things: could it not be only a difference of degree within the subjective? . . . that the objective is only a false kind-concept and an antithesis within the subjective?" Although it has been said that this is "not an especially devastating argument against Kant's position," [Grimm, op. cit., 57] it would seem that it is not an argument against Kant, but, in point of fact, a variation on Kant's conception of our knowledge of "objects." Even though Kant doesn't even use the term "interpretation" (Auslegung), his entire analysis of the process of acquiring knowledge certainly suggests it. Werke, G O A , XVI, 24. "Originally a chaos of representations."

The Shadow of Kant

215

n o t i o n o f the self-identity o f beings is incorporated into logic in terms o f the assumption o f a "self-identical A . " N i e t z s c h e argues that es ein solches selbst-identisches

Sich­

A gar nicht gibt. It is the fictional n o t i o n o f "thing" that is the

basis o f the equally fictional idea o f a self-identical unit. N i e t z s c h e charges that unser

Glaube

an Dinge

ist die Voraussetzung

für den Glauben

an die Logik.

In

fact, die Logik (wie die Geometrie und Arithmetik) nur von fingirten Wahrheiten, die wir geschaffen haben. Logik ist der Versuch, nach einem von uns gesetzten SeinsSchema die wirkliche Welt zu begreifen, richtiger, uns formulirbar, berechenbar zu machen... 29

T h u s , the belief that there are equal o r self-identical things b e c o m e s the basis o f the belief in self-identical concepts. T h i s , in turn, is the foundation o f logic as the law o f identity. F u r t h e r m o r e , as w e k n o w , the belief in a "thing" is a fiction that is presumably derived from the fiction that we are " s u b j e c t s " o r subject-things that possess unity. T h i s entire analysis is ingenious, and it w o u l d be natural to attribute it to N i e t z s c h e ' s original cast o f mind. U n f o r t u ­ nately, we find m o r e o r less the same arguments in Lange's Geschichte Materialismus.

des

W e have seen that L a n g e argued that the idea o f the isolated,

individual " a t o m " is considered as a scientific version o f K a n t ' s c o n c e p t o f Substanz.

Lange goes o n to suggest that the idea o f the atom (and, a fortiori,

of

the underlying "substance") is derived from o u r c o n c e p t o f our self as an " e g o . " T o further cement the relationship between Lange and N i e t z s c h e o n this point, it m a y be mentioned that towards the end o f his critical history Lange argues that the Begriff subjektive

Faktor.

des Dinges

is based upon what he calls a

T h a t is, that we conceive o f things after the analogy o f o u r

o w n impression o f our Wirklichkeit.

30

Putting the separate pieces o f Lange's

argument together, we realize that this impression o f the self as a unified " e g o " is a fallacious o n e , albeit one that has a magnetic attraction for us. Finally, the

29

KGW, VIII 2, 54-55. "...logic (like geometry and arithmetic) applies only to fictitious truths that we have created. Logic is the attempt, according to a fixed scheme of being, to understand the actual world, to make it formulable and calculable for us..." The counterpoint to this argument is that if we assume that, for example, the law of contradiction prohibits the application of opposing attributes to actuality, then this law would make Logik ein Imperativ. Logic would then be a prescription concerning how we ought to think of actual entities or of the world. [Ibid., 53] Nietzsche's basic position is that the principles of logic are reducible to the "law of identity" ( A = A ) which is a "postulate." This postulate is itself derived from the erroneous perception of, or discrimination of, "identical cases." Logical self-identity is not applicable to actuality not only because it is abstract or purely "formal," but because it is assumed to be derived from the fallacious belief that perceived entities are "identical" to other similar entities or are themselves self-identical. In Nietzsche's conception of Wirklichkeit, nothing is ever identical to itself from moment to moment or even, in a strict sense, at any given moment. This follows, of course, from his assumption of the "absolute flux of occurrences."

30

Lange, op. cit., II, 986-987.

216

The Shadow of Kant

n o t i o n that the law o f identity in logic does n o t pertain to any actual entities was suggested b y Spir, a philosopher w h o m Lange cites with approval. Spir had said that the principle " A = A " does not correspond to any reality. T h i s foundation o f knowledge and logic is said to be derived from a primitive synthesis b y which the idea o f "equality" is posited, an idea that does not correspond to any natural being even though it is applied to natural beings. T h e principle o f identity, then, is founded upon a shaky base and because o f this we find at the very threshold o f logic die Relativität unsres E r k e n n e n s ?

3 1

und Idealität

alles

W h a t is remarkable in all o f this is that N i e t z s c h e was able

t o piece together the various arguments he found scattered in Lange's text (supplemented b y his independent reading o f Spir, Teichmüller and others) and formulate a m o r e o r less consistent analysis o f knowledge. T h e psychologistic twist that Lange gave t o K a n t ' s theory o f knowledge had long-range and long-lasting impact on N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking. T h e c o n v e n ­ tionalism that he adopts in regard to ordinary, c o m m o n s e n s e knowledge and t o scientific concepts and principles was clearly instigated b y his depth understanding o f what Lange was driving at. M o r e o v e r , the conception o f g e o m e t r y and arithmetic as c o m p o s e d of artificial "signs" that did not, in his opinion, represent any actual events o r relations in actuality was suggested to N i e t z s c h e b y Lange. T h a t the sciences operate with "conventional fictions," symbols o r signs that do n o t correspond to any external process or event, was a notion that L a n g e discussed from a n u m b e r o f points o f view. T h e interpreta­ tion o f categories as "regulative articles o f belief" was one that could be found sprinkled o n Lange's pages even though N i e t z s c h e brought together elements that Lange left as isolated insights. In addition, the entire conception o f useful "fictions," "psychistic fictions" and fictional models that we impose o n a fluctuating, c o m p l e x actuality was repeatedly implied in Lange's various accounts o f scientific knowledge. T h a t primitive syntheses are ultimately fruitful " f i c t i o n s " or, in N i e t z s c h e ' s dramatic language, "falsifications," is a n o t i o n that could be gleaned from K a n t ' s analyses and, in fact, was derived from K a n t ' s thought b y Lange's inventive mind. T h a t L a n g e prefers to speak o f basic concepts or categories as "hypothetical" or as "hypostasizations" does n o t mitigate the fact that he came within an inch o f developing a theory o f fictions before N i e t z s c h e or Vaihinger. Certainly, he overtly argued that the idea o f the self as a unitary " e g o " was a falsification o f the nature of the self. E v e n here, he p r o b a b l y absorbed this notion from his obvious mastery o f K a n t ' s Kritik.

31

F o r , at o n e point, K a n t had argued that our representation o f

Ibid., II, 1010n. Afrikan Spir is not mentioned in the first edition of the Geschichte. Nietzsche had read Spir's works and quoted from his Denken und Wirklichkeit in his essay: Die

Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen (1873). KGW III 2, 351-352.

217

The Shadow of Kant

ourselves as an " I " is a simple representation that synthesizes all that is manifold in the self and thereby intuits the manifold self as it is not, or 32

wie es ist.

nicht

It is n o wonder, aside from the hyperbolic language in w h i c h it is

expressed, that there is so m u c h of K a n t in N i e t z s c h e . F o r , he absorbed a psychologistic, critical interpretation o f K a n t ' s critical philosophy through his painstaking study o f Lange's "treasure-house." There

is one final relationship

between

the

thought

o f Lange

and

N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophical reflections that we must consider: that is, the critique o f the n o t i o n o f Dinge-an-sich.

Although N i e t z s c h e , in his earlier

writings, m o r e o r less accepted the concept o f a world o f things in themselves, he gradually began to question the meaning o f this curious spaceless and timeless realm o f "things." H i s questioning, as well as his most penetrating arguments, o w e a great deal to Lange. As we have seen, at one point in his discussion o f K a n t ' s thought Lange questioned whether we really needed a n o t i o n o f things in themselves at all. W h a t function did it serve? W h a t meaning did it have? C o u l d not the empirical sciences proceed to augment

their

knowledge o f the phenomenal world without positing a realm o f things in themselves? Lange worries over such questions and, in the final analysis, c o m e s to skeptical conclusions. M o r e o v e r , his consideration o f the Kantian idea o f things in themselves as a Grenzbegriff

seemed on the verge o f

designating the idea a "fiction." After Lange, Vaihinger openly claimed that K a n t himself suggested that the very idea o f things in themselves as a "limitc o n c e p t " meant that it was, at best, an indefinite, hypothetical notion, an ens rationis.

33

A l t h o u g h Lange hesitates to call the idea o f things in themselves a

fiction, what he actually does say implies this. H e claims, as we have seen, that the very c o n c e p t i o n o f "things" existing in themselves in a spaceless, timeless realm in which there can be no sense to causal action is a paradoxical, if n o t an absurd, c o n c e p t i o n . I n all probability, N i e t z s c h e ' s critical c o m m e n t s about the idea o f Dinge-an-sich

were inspired b y Lange's queries and doubts.

T h e notion o f things in themselves arises understandably out o f the very nature o f K a n t ' s analysis o f knowledge. I f the objects that are k n o w n and k n o w a b l e are conditioned b y our sensibility, o u r a priori

intuitions o f space

and time and o u r categories o f the understanding, then k n o w n p h e n o m e n a are shaped and formed b y ourselves. Even though there is a given,

it is formless

and unintelligible until it is filtered through our sensory-cognitive system. W h a t things are in themselves, apart from cognitive synthesis, constitution and determination, must be u n k n o w n . N o u m e n a l realms are two-fold: the trans­ cendental unity o f apperception that is the activity of consciousness is not in

32

33

Kant, op. cit., 90. Vaihinger, op. cit., 314.

218

The Shadow of Kant

the w o r l d because it is the condition for the possibility o f there being a world and "things", as they are in themselves, are also noumenal. K a n t himself wrestled with this m o s t vulnerable aspect o f his theory and concluded that the idea o f things in themselves is an ens rationis,

a Grenzbegriff.

T h i s was

ingenious, but it did n o t stop him from continually distinguishing the k n o w n p h e n o m e n a l world from the unknowable X or Ding-an-sich.

Lange wonders

about the legitimacy o f this conception and suggests that it is not needed. M o r e o v e r , as we have seen, he suggests that it is either unintelligible or is itself p h e n o m e n a l . W h a t he meant b y this interesting thesis has sometimes been misunderstood. W h a t Lange held was that we cannot speak o f the realm o f things in themselves as the "cause" o f our a priori

categories for the simple

reason that the c o n c e p t o f cause cannot be used "transcendentally." F o r the idea o f the thing in itself, Lange argues, we must substitute the p h e n o m e n o n . F o r , the notion "thing in itself" is comprehensible only as p h e n o m e n o n . is, the attempt to understand the c o n c e p t o f thing

34

That

in itself leads us to convert it

into a kind o f shadow p h e n o m e n o n insofar as what is intelligible must be p h e n o m e n a l . I n a sense, the idea o f a thing in itself is similar t o Platonic forms because it is said to be transcendent to consciousness. W h e n K a n t tries t o shift the locus o f the idea o f things in themselves to the subjective mind, he moves closer to the idealism he wanted to avoid. F o r , it is suggested that it is the n o u m e n a l consciousness that is the ultimate origin o f all phenomena. I f we k n o w that there is a thing in itself, and if it is an intelligible notion, Lange seems to say, then we comprehend it as p h e n o m e n o n (which, o f course, for K a n t , is illegitimate). L y i n g at hand in Lange's writings is a telling argument against the very idea o f a thing in itself: we cannot speak o f such an " e n t i t y " except in phenomenal terms because a "thing" is a conception (like that of ' o b j e c t ' ) that presupposes unity, substantial being and causal relations. T h i s argument, implicit in Lange, will be made explicit in N i e t z s c h e ' s critique o f the idea o f a thing in itself. N i e t z c h e offers a n u m b e r o f objections against K a n t ' s conception o f things in themselves m o s t o f which are derived from suggestions implanted b y Lange. H e maintains, for example, that K a n t has n o right to the distinction between things in themselves and p h e n o m e n a insofar as he is prohibited b y his o w n t h e o r y from making inferences from p h e n o m e n a to any cause o f phenomena. The

c o n c e p t o f causality has validity only within a phenomenal

domain;

hence, it cannot b e used to refer to "things in themselves." M o r e o v e r , the very idea o f an independent, isolated Ding

is a fictitious notion because there are no

such things. A l t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e himself does not assume that there are

34

Lange, op. cit., II, 572 n.

The Shadow of Kant

219

"things," he argues within K a n t ' s context in order to show that if there were "things," they would have to exist in relation

to other things.

Die Eigenschaften eines Ding sind Wirkungen auf andere „Dinge": denkt man andere „Dinge" weg, so hat ein Ding keine Eigenschaften d. h. es giebt kein Ding ohne andere Dinge d. h. es giebt kein „Ding an sich." 35

T h i s ingenious argument seems to be an echo of Lange's references to the fact that no natural entity can exist in complete isolation from other natural beings, that p h e n o m e n a exist in relation to one another. Even if a "thing" is construed as being in relation to something else, this relationship cannot be a causal

one.

N i e t z s c h e takes apart K a n t ' s concept and shows that the idea o f a "thing" existing outside all relations is absurd; then he argues that the conception o f anything an sich is equally absurd. T h e Ding

an sich, if it existed, w o u l d be an

"unconditioned reality." B u t if it is an unconditioned reality, then it cannot be k n o w n . Such an u n k n o w a b l e "unconditioned reality", N i e t z s c h e says (after L a n g e ) should not concern us at all - especially since knowledge has nothing t o do with any an sich.

36

T h e very notion o f things-in-themselves is as questionable as "meaning in itself" or "facts in themselves." W e cannot refer to a "meaning" or a "fact" apart from conditioning something, apart from "interpretation," apart from the projection o f meaning into something. N o t h i n g has a "constitution in itself." T h e r e f o r e , the idea o f a "thing-in-itself" is unintelligible. T h i s line o f argument follows Lange's tendency to use Kant's theory against itself. A n d it anticipates Husserl's n o t i o n that the mind is "meaning-giving," that the " w o r l d o f fact" is a world constituted b y cognitive acts. In addition, N i e t z s c h e is consistent with his o w n analysis o f "facts" insofar as he argues that there are n o "given" facts, but o n l y interpretations, that it is n o t possible to k n o w a fact "an s i c h . "

37

I f an "in itself" is inconceivable, and if, as N i e t z s c h e argues, the concept o f a "thing" is a psychistic fiction, then the entire notion o f Dinge-an-sich negated. T h e idea that Realität

is

is a transphenomenal something, that there are

things as they are in themselves, is one that dies hard. Indeed, in the case o f N i e t z s c h e , as w e shall see in o u r discussion o f his interpretation o f the real as "will to p o w e r , " this idea returns to haunt his thought. Insofar as he argues

35

36

37

KGW, VIII 1, 102. "Properties of a thing are effects on other 'things': if one removes other 'things', then a thing has no properties, i. e., there is no thing without other things, that is, there is no 'thing in itself." KGW, VIII 1, 139 f. Although Nietzsche was critical of the notion of the thing in itself as early as the writing of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, he offers no sustained arguments against the idea. He remarks, for example, that it is "worth a Homeric laugh." KGW IV 2, 34. Ibid., 323.

220

The Shadow of Kant

that process o r b e c o m i n g cannot be conceptualized, cannot be described in language, it is treated as transphenomenal, as an "unconditioned reality." D o e s this not posit a " b e c o m i n g in itself" that lies behind the phenomenal world? T h e postulation o f a "will to p o w e r " o r "wills to p o w e r " is subject to the same interrogation. T h e categories o f the understanding are considered as construc­ tive fictions that enable us to shape and form a " w o r l d " in which we can function, in which we can survive and prosper. T h e " w o r l d " that is k n o w a b l e is an elaborate "falsification" that has no ontological referent. I f N i e t z s c h e stopped here, he w o u l d be very close to Lange's skeptical phenomenalism. H e tries, however, to represent "reality" or "actuality" as it is, tries to present reality as he interprets

it. I f our categorical scheme is deceptive, if o u r senses

perform acts o f "assimilation" that emulate the synthetic p o w e r of the mind, and if o u r psychological prejudices and needs condition what we c o m e to accept as "the w o r l d , " then h o w can N i e t z s c h e claim to know

that the ultimate

principle o f reality is a universal, immanent "will to p o w e r " ? Since it is doubtful

that he has forgotten all o f his strictures on knowledge, or his

skepticism about the validity o f (Kantian) forms o f knowledge, he surely is n o t presenting his "hypothesis" o f the will to p o w e r acting through all beings as a piece o f knowledge n o r is he claiming to have certain understanding o f an "unconditioned reality." A s we shall show in m o r e detail below, the theory o f the will to p o w e r can only be a "figurative" o r a poetic "truth", an elaborate aesthetic c o n c e p t i o n o f the interior dynamics o f actuality. N o t only that, but in precisely the terms in which he presents his general theory, it must be fictional. We

have seen that N i e t z s c h e found

in Lange's magnum

opus

many

weapons which he could use against the critical philosophy of Kant. A n d we have also seen that his pragmatic interpretation o f that theory takes for granted the accuracy (not, o f course, the "truth")

o f the Kantian delineation o f

knowledge. T h a t is to say, he gives a kind o f backhanded practical justification for K a n t ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f human knowledge since he thinks o f it as a way o f thinking that cannot, even though it is "false," be transcended. T h e "necessi­ t y " o f synthetic a priori

judgments, o f the a priori

categories o f the understand­

ing remains even though it is n o longer a formal necessity, but a practical, lifepreserving o n e . E r r o r s are essential for life just as illusions are. Even though the empirical truths we accept are "false" o r are "errors," this does not mean that they are not Wahrheiten mon

ami, l ' e r r e u r aussi

für uns. W h e n Voltaire's saying, Croyez

a son mérite,

moi,

is quoted, N i e t z s c h e agrees with it

completely. T h a t "errors" comprise human knowledge o r the "humanization" o f the w o r l d is not an o b j e c t i o n : it inevitably follows from his perspectival, interpretive conception o f "knowledge." T h e r e is no "truth" for any living being because, in the interest o f life, actuality is "falsified," is shaped and

The Shadow of Kant

221

formed b y the living being, is simplified for the sake o f survival and the expansion o f power. As soon as life appears, so does "deception"

and

"illusion". W i t h o u t the creative, active, form-giving activity o f cognition (in human o r n o n - h u m a n forms), life and the perpetuation o f life would not be possible. T h e Kantian construction o f die Welt yields a phenomenal world that does n o t correspond t o any extra-human

actuality. It is a sophisticated,

elaborate system o f "falsification" that is p r o b a b l y necessary for the preserva­ tion o f beings such as ourselves. O u r belief in "truth" has, as a youthful N i e t z s c h e o n c e said, proven extremely useful and life-preserving. In fact, as he later says, Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrthum, ohne welche eine bestimmte Art von lebendigen Wesen nicht leben könnte. Der Werth für das Leben entscheidet zuletzt. 38

N i e t z s c h e wonders w h y n o one has asked why we value truth rather than error. H i s answer is that man c o m e s to value that truth which has proven serviceable for life, that has evolved out o f the experience o f o u r ancestors. Collapsing K a n t ' s theoretical understanding o f knowledge into his n o t i o n o f the practical value o f certain conceptions and beliefs, N i e t z s c h e reduces all knowledge to praktische

Erkenntnis,

all reasoning to praktische

Vernunft.

runs into p r o b l e m s , however, when he wants to claim, as he does in Homo

He Ecce

and elsewhere, that there are some genuine truths that give us insight

into life

and

existence. Such psychological o r existential truths are, in

N i e t z s c h e ' s view, m o s t l y terrible truths. W h a t we learn from o u r experience, w h a t we see and observe, what we suffer o r enjoy gives us truth as insight, n o t as propositional, logical or theoretical "truth." W h a t he aimed at, but never quite elucidated, is something like Kierkegaard's conception o f "subjective" o r existential truth. T o hold N i e t z s c h e strictly to his equation o f "truths" with errors would mean that every claim t o truth in his own writings would have t o be construed as an error. W h a t he is proclaiming, however, is primarily what he referred to in Die Gehurt

der Tragödie

as tragische

Erkenntnis.

T h e Welt thought o f in terms o f "subject," " o b j e c t , " "substance," "cause" and

"effect,"

"things," "unities," "being," "equality," "sameness,"

"self-

identity," " p e r m a n e n c e , " etc., is an ideal world, a logical structuring o f an actuality that does not have a logical structure. I f we discover a logical structure in the world, it is because we have projected it there. All in all, the p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d , the constructed w o r l d that N i e t z s c h e claims is the result o f schematization, simplification, organization and "falsification,", is, in general, the w o r l d according to K a n t . I f we realize that the phenomenal world that

KGW, VII 3, 226. "Truth is the kind of error without which a certain kind of living being could not live. The value for life is finally decisive."

The Shadow of Kant

222

K a n t and Lange claim is the only one we can truly k n o w is our interpretation, is a construction devised to serve practical and instrumental needs, then we will n o t mistake it for a metaphysical o r an ontological reality. T h i s , N i e t z s c h e believes, is the ultimate error, one which is a "cause o f nihilism." T h a t der Glaube

an die Vernunft-Kategorien

ist die Ursache

des

Nihilismus

seems, at first glance, like an extravagant claim. H o w e v e r , N i e t z s c h e ' s argu­ m e n t is persuasive. T h e prestige o f Kant's synthesis o f empiricism and rationalism gave rise to a positive conception o f philosophical activity. K a n t gave theoretical support to scientific knowledge and provided three criteria of legitimate k n o w l e d g e : synthetic a priori

truth, analytic statements and synthe­

tic propositions that are verified o r verifiable. T h i s Weltbild

was supported

basically in terms o f the categorical scheme K a n t provided. T h e r e f o r e , the p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d is the only w o r l d about w h i c h knowledge is possible. N i e t z s c h e argues that when this sophisticated structuring

o f a w o r l d is

understood (as N i e t z s c h e would have it understood) as fabricated primarily out o f psychological needs, the final form o f philosophical nihilism ushers in at this point. T h e metaphysical w o r l d has been put in doubt so that transcend­ ence o f the phenomenal world is theoretically closed. H o w e v e r , if the w o r l d according to K a n t is not a representation o f the "true order o f things," then it is n o t true. H e n c e , "there is no truth." Although die Realität

des Werdens

is

viable, it is a process without aim, without substantiality, without unity. T h e loss o f faith in the "truth" o f the (Kantian) phenomenal world, c o m b i n e d with the withdrawal o f the "value" o f the world that categories such as

"Zweck",

"Einheit,"

appears

39

werthlos.

and

"Sein"

gave to it will be negated and the w o r l d

It is for this reason that it is said that the belief in the categories of

reason brings about a philosophical form o f nihilism. Although this is a far c r y from

L a n g e ' s undramatic prose, the stimuli for N i e t z s c h e ' s anti-Kantian

reflections were sent forth like sparks from Lange's pen. W h a t is especially prevalent in N i e t z s c h e ' s critique o f K a n t is his psychologistic interpretation o f the origin o f the categories and the rationale

for their formulation. T h i s was

certainly suggested b y L a n g e and reinforced b y his own replacement o f the transcendental consciousness with the idea o f man's physico-psychic organiza­ tion. F o r , this placed man in the world, in nature, in the "world o f relations", in the antithetical realm o f incongruities that cannot be fit into the Procrustean b e d o f Kantian categories. A l t h o u g h Lange did not see the nihilistic implica­ tions o f his n o t i o n o f a phenomenal world o f relations, o f action and interaction, he did realize that this Weltbild

was one that would "chill the

heart" and offer n o consolation or inspiration to m o s t human beings. A l -

39

KGW, VIII 2, 290-291.

223

The Shadow of Kant

t h o u g h m a n y read Lange's Geschiebte

des Materialismus,

only Nietzsche

seems to have absorbed the full implication o f the then scientific picture o f the w o r l d , its dehumanizing effect, its austerity, its extraordinary complexity, its implicit negation o f every humanistic, aesthetic illusion. Insofar as Lange desired to expose a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m in order to purify science o f it, the d o m i n a n t tendency o f his thought was deanthropomorphic. H o w e v e r , he also saw that his skeptical phenomenalism needed to be supplemented b y the "standpoint o f the ideal," b y a vision o f "reality" that would transcend the "limits o f natural k n o w l e d g e " and stir the imagination o f the people. T h i s duality o f perspective, as I have said, was not lost o n N i e t z s c h e . D e s p i t e the fact that N i e t z s c h e quite often criticizes epistemology, there is little doubt that his own critical analysis o f knowledge and truth lies at the basis o f a great deal o f his thinking. H i s own fragmentary

analysis o f

knowledge is dominated b y the long shadow o f K a n t as reflected through the prism o f Lange's p s y c h o l o g i s m . N i e t z s c h e ' s pragmatic analysis o f knowledge and truth (which he seeks to transcend and sees as a narrow, overly utilitarian, p r o b a b l y dangerous,

epistemic orientation) was created, in part, on

the

foundation o f K a n t ' s t h e o r y o f knowledge, in part, o n the basis o f Lange's notions o f psychistic hypotheses and instrumental conceptions and, in part, o n the Darwinian suggestion and Schopenhauerian assertion that "reason," the "intellect", and man's sensory-cognitive organization in general were in the service o f the "struggle for existence."

CHAPTER IX A FORCE-POINT

WORLD

O n e o f the m o s t important clues to the essence o f N i e t z s c h e ' s experimental p h i l o s o p h y is his appropriation o f the emerging dynamic theory o f nature in nineteenth century science. E v e n though he m o r e or less adopts a dynamic t h e o r y o f a force-point world, he does not accept this Welt-Auslegung

in

physics as the last w o r d . F r o m his reading o f Lange and others, as well as from his o w n reflections o n scientific theory, he is quite aware that general physical theories are replaced b y other theories in an historical sequence. Intuitively, he felt that the mechanistic materialism that was growing b y leaps and bounds in the nineteenth century was a false interpretation o f the natural world. T o be sure, F . A . Lange, E r n s t M a c h and B o s c o v i c h had given him ammunition with w h i c h t o try to undermine the p o w e r o f mechanistic materialism. In fact, for a t h i n k e r called a "philosopher o f culture," he had a fairly good grasp o f the basic principles o f the dynamic theory o f nature presented b y the mathematical 1

physicists. W h a t has c o m e to be called " N i e t z s c h e ' s p h y s i c s " is, in point o f fact, n o t his at all. Virtually every aspect o f his examination o f the structure o f the natural w o r l d is derived from the views o f B o s c o v i c h and from the physical theories that are examined b y Lange. T h a t he has been credited with having developed a physics is testimony t o his understanding o f the fundamental principles o f a rather c o m p l e x theory o f nature. It is n o t surprising that some commentators o n N i e t z s c h e ' s thought have seen a relationship between his " c o s m o l o g y " and L e i b n i z ' s m o n a d o l o g y . H o w e v e r , the reason for this is n o t an absorption o f L e i b n i z ' s metaphysics, but the reflection in N i e t z s c h e ' s writings o f a mathematical theory o f nature that is related to L e i b n i z ' s philosophy. F r o m his study o f L a n g e and F e c h n e r , N i e t z s c h e found a means b y which to undermine dogmatic materialism and m e c h a n i s m . H i s o b j e c t i o n to mechanism and materialism was in part tempera­ mental and in part theoretical. H e believed that the mechanistic, materialistic c o n c e p t i o n o f actuality displayed an ungeistige w i t h o u t meaning, sinnlos. was,

1

Welt

that was completely

T h e thrust o f nineteenth century scientific t h e o r y

for the m o s t part, in the direction o f reductionistic materialism and

Kaufmann, op. cit., 262.

225

A Force-Point World

mechanistic analysis o f all phenomena. T h e virtual explosion o f scientific knowledge in the nineteenth century provided scientific thinkers with a mass o f data that seemed to point to the reduction o f all things, o f life-processes, o f actuality itself, to the m o v e m e n t o f atoms. B y 1850 atomistic materialism had gained a great deal o f prestige. Although J o h n D a l t o n ' s chemical atomism was still being challenged, his New

Systems

of Chemical

Philosophy

( 1 8 0 8 ) had

already had a profound impact o n scientific thought. G a y - L u s s a c advanced Dalton's

chemical theories

and

Faraday's

work

implied

that

electrical

p h e n o m e n a are best understood in terms o f "atoms o f electricity." In England the advance o f science t o o k place on all fronts. In G e r m a n y the mysterious aspects o f speculative philosophy o f nature were being jettisoned. Hegel's Philosophie

der Natur

turned m o s t scientists against speculative philosophy

and s o m e against p h i l o s o p h y in general. Scientific experiments and scientific theories grew apace. E r n s t H a e c k e l , V o g t and B ü c h n e r became enthusiasts o f a n e w materialism. Despite extant strong criticism o f atomism, N i e t z s c h e was n o t w r o n g in characterizing the period during which he w r o t e his zeitgemäße

Betrachtungen

Un­

as an "atomistic age." Given his artistic tempera­

m e n t , his classical philological training and his prophetic sensitivity, N i e t z s c h e w o r r i e d over this growth o f "Alexandrine culture" and sensed the danger o f a t h e o r y o f nature that seemed to render everything soundless, scentless and meaningless. T h e quantitative reduction o f all phenomena seemed to picture a cold and e m p t y universe, an atomistic chaos that signified nothing. H e was ripe for Lange's and B o s c o v i c h ' s theoretical suggestions o f a way out o f the labyrinth o f materialism. A m o n g s t the numerous

theories o f nature

that Lange discussed

and

analyzed in insightful ways, one theory made a deep imprint on N i e t z s c h e ' s thought. Ironically, it was atomistic theory itself that gave rise to the question w h e t h e r what D a l t o n called "extremely small particles, or atoms o f matter" might not be c o m p o s e d o f even smaller particles or Unteratomen.

T h e atomic

t h e o r y o f matter presupposed "forces" o f attraction and repulsion that b o u n d together or separated atomic particles. W i t h his keen eye for anthropomorphic m o d e s o f thought, Lange noted that D a l t o n ' s atomic theory was imbued with a streng

sinnliche

Vorstellungsweise.

2

This observation leads Lange to a consid­

eration o f the views o f a chemist named S c h ö n b e i n . T h e latter maintained that w e are m o r e easily deceived b y words than we are b y imaginary pictures o f p h y s i c o - c h e m i c a l processes or phenomena. "Sensuous picturality" is prefer­ able t o the m o r e misleading playing with words. Schönbein then c o m b i n e s such useful, picturable fictions in science with a conventionalist orientation.

2

Lange, op. cit., II, 633. " . . . a strong sensuous mode of representation."

226

A Force-Point World Eine streng durchgeführte Anschauung dient, selbst wenn sie materiell falsch ist, oft in ausgedehntem Maße als Bild und einstweiliger Ersatz der richtigen Anchauung. 3

T h i s conventionalist valuation o f picturable theoretic models is also asserted b y N i e t z s c h e , especially in regard to the theory o f atoms. F o r , he claims that the atomic theory is pictorial representation o r construction designed for the 4

purpose o f calculation. T h a t imagination, picture-construction and h y p o t h e ical constructs are typical, useful ways in which scientists represent events and physical processes was suggested to N i e t z s c h e b y a n u m b e r o f scientists cited b y Lange and was reinforced b y Lange's conventionalism itself. T h e interpretation o f the physical world that intrigued N i e t z s c h e was the mathematical, physical theory o f B o s c o v i c h . It is in Lange's Geschichte

that he

first found brief expositions of the central theoretical notions o f a dynamic interpretation o f nature. B o s c o v i c h ' s mathematical theory was being revived in physical science because o f the similar views o f A m p e r e , C a u c h y and Faraday. The

former conceived o f ' a t o m s ' as unextended,

einfache

Kraftzentra

offered eine Konstruktion dynamatische

and Faraday

postulated

in lieu of paradoxical unextended 'bodies.' F e c h n e r , t o o , der Welt aus Kraftmittelpunkten.

T h e emergence o f

physical theories brought about a recrudescence o f interest in

the hitherto neglected mathematical physical theories o f the Jesuit, R o g e r Boscovich.

5

O f the theorists that Lange discusses in this context, F e c h n e r

p r o b a b l y directed N i e t z s c h e ' s attention to B o s c o v i c h . Fortunately, this is n o t a matter o f speculation because N i e t z s c h e refers to B o s c o v i c h ' s physical t h e o r y in his letters and mentions his views at a crucial point in Jenseits Gut

und Böse.

von

In a letter to Peter G a s t he writes that

. . . Boscovich . . . und Kopernikus sind die beiden größten Gegner des Augen­ scheins. Seit ihm gibt es keinen Stoff mehr. . . . Er hat die atomistische Theorie zu Ende gedacht. Schwere ist ganz gewiß keine „Eigenschaft der Materie", einfach weil es keine Materie gibt. Schwerkraft i s t . . . gewiß eine Erscheinungsform der Kraft, einfach weil es nichts anderes gibt als Kraft! 6

3

4

5

6

Ibid., II, 636. "A rigidly carried out intuition, even if it is false in itself, often serves, to a great extent, as a picture and temporary substitute for the correct intuition." Werke, GOA, XIV, 325. Cf. Ibid., XIV, 45. Lange, op. cit., II, 639-640. Although the theories of Cauchy, Ampere and Faraday are briefly mentioned in the first edition of Lange's work, Boscovich is not discussed. There is a brief sketch of the latter's views in the second edition. WDB, III. Briefe (An Peter Gast, 20 März 1882), 1178. "... Boscovich... and Copernicus are the greatest opponents of visual observation. With him [Boscovich] there is no longer any 'matter'... He has thought the atomistic doctrine through to the end. Gravity is certainly not a "property of matter", simply because there is no matter. Gravitational force is . . . certainly a manifestation of force simply because there is nothing other than force!"

A Force-Point World

227

T h e mathematical conceptions o f B o s c o v i c h are prized because they negate the n o t i o n o f the Klumpchen-Atom.

Even though N i e t z s c h e attributes this under­

standing o f the undermining o f the concept o f the solid, " c l u m p - a t o m " to his study o f B o s c o v i c h ' s Philosophia c o n c e p t i o n s o f Kraftcentra

Naturalis,

he had first c o m e across similar

in Lange's history. In 1883 he remembers that

w h e n he was at Basel he studied the Quartanten

des Jesuiten

Boscovich.

He

describes him as der zuerst mathematisch demonstriert hat, daß die Annahme erfüllter Atompunkte eine für die strengste Wissenschaft der Mechanik unbrauchbare Hypothese sei: ein Satz, der jetzt unter mathematisch geschulten Naturforschern als kanonisch gilt. 7

W h i l e at Basel, N i e t z s c h e , sometime in 1 8 7 3 , b o r r o w e d B o s c o v i c h ' s major w o r k from the university library. Apparently, then, as a result o f reading F e c h n e r he pursued the study o f B o s c o v i c h ' s original physical theory. In all likelihood, then, it is this mathematical physical theory that is the main dynamic t h e o r y o f nature that he refers to in his Nachlass

and is the basic

m o d e l for a c o n c e p t i o n o f a "force-point-world." A n d in all probability, it is B o s c o v i c h ' s dynamic theory o f nature that comprises the physical-theoretical foundation for N i e t z s c h e ' s qualitative interpretation o f the natural world as Wille

zur Macht.

W h a t must be borne in mind, however, is that N i e t z s c h e , the

Langean conventionalist par excellence, sionally adopting

is very much aware that he is provi­

the force-point physical theory as a valid hypothesis.

D e s p i t e N i e t z s c h e ' s assertoric tone in some o f his entries in his n o t e b o o k s , his entire approach to scientific t h e o r y is radically instrumentalistic and conven­ tionalist. H e has learned from Lange and from some o f the

outstanding

scientists o f the nineteenth century that theories are not, in a strict sense,

true,

that they are subject to revision, reformulation and replacement. T h e recent attempt to s h o w parallels between N i e t z s c h e ' s approach to science and that o f T h o m a s K u h n (in The Structure

of Scientific

but is an entirely justified standpoint.

7

8

Revolutions)

is n o t only plausible,

8

Ibid. (An Peter Gast, Ende August 1883), 1212. "...the first who mathematically demonstrated that, for the exact science of mechanics, the premiss of solid, corporeal atoms is an unusable hypothesis: a proposition that now has canonical validity among natural scientists trained in mathematics." Grimm, op. cit., 85 n, 101 n, 133 n, 188 n, 196. The resemblance between Kuhn's concept of "paradigm shifts" in the evolution of science and Nietzsche's perspectivalism is especially emphasized. Although this is an attractive analogy, a caution is necessary. Kuhn would probably not agree with Nietzsche's idea that each "center of force" has its own perspective or unique "interpretation" of actuality. Even though Kuhn's theoretical standpoint coincides with Nietzsche's stress upon a "plurality of interpretations" from a scientific point of view, Nietzsche's general conception of a multiplicity of unique "interpretations" goes far beyond what Kuhn has in mind.

A Force-Point World

228

T h e F r e n c h physicist, C a u c h y , analyzed electrical forces mathematically and held that the atom may only be relatively indivisible, that we m a y postulate infinitely small "points" that are centers o f force. T h e assumption o f unextended bearers o f force b y A m p e r e and C a u c h y , as we've seen, resusci­ tated interest in B o s c o v i c h ' s notion o f non-extended point-centers. T h e syn­ thesis o f these theories led to the view that within the atom are infinitely small magnitudes o r Unteratomen

that, in turn, are reducible to force-points. A s

Lange points out, the tendency in the physics o f his day was to move away from "solid m a t t e r " to " f o r c e " o r Kraft.

T h e emphasis upon the interior

dynamics o f matter refined away previous conceptions o f a solid, unitary piece o f "matter." I n effect, the ground was being prepared for the emergence o f microphysics. A m o n g s t other remarkable theoretical discoveries, B o s c o v i c h saw that in order to explain the p h e n o m e n o n

o f elasticity, especially the reaction to

impact, it had to be assumed that elasticity presupposes a dislocation o f the relative positions o f particles in the elastic b o d y . Such a dislocation suggests that the atoms out o f which the object is supposed to be c o m p o s e d must be comprised o f smaller particles o r " s u b - a t o m s . " O b s e r v e d p h e n o m e n a

are

considered as "effects o f force" or as emanating from a hypothetical center o f force. C o m m e n t i n g o n such ideas, Lange notes that scientists have b e c o m e m o r e certain o f the relations

of things and m o r e uncertain about the bearers o f

these relations. T h a t is, the scientific theory o f nature reveals a comprised o f interacting "forces."

Relations-Welt

9

Reflecting on the undermining o f the concept o f the atom, Lange c o m ­ ments that it is, as we have seen, the "picturability" o f the atom that reinforced its theoretical h e g e m o n y . H e wonders if this tendency to think of unified entities is n o t a reflection o f an insight o f Kant's theory o f knowledge. T h a t is, that the fusion o f category and intuition leads to a synthesis in an

"isolated

o b j e c t . " In this way, an object is separated from the infinite chain o f relations that bind it to everything else. T h i s is, o f course, not an accurate representa­ tion o f the c o m p l e x world o f phenomena, Organisation.

but it is a reflection o f o u r

In this light, atomistic theory may be seen as an ideal construc­

tion, and das Atom

wäre

eine Schöpfung

des Ich.

10

It need hardly be said, at this

point, that this is the basis for N i e t z s c h e ' s very similar arguments. Returning to Lange's summary o f B o s c o v i c h ' s theory in the second edition o f the Geschichte,

9

10

it may be noted that Lange maintains that the concept o f the

Lange, op. cit., II, 644, 653. Ibid., II, 657. In the first edition Lange suggests a similar argument (equating Subjekt with Substanz) and refers to "personification" and anthropomorphism in scientific theories. GdM, 374 ff.

A Force-Point World

229

a t o m was submitted to modifications such as the denial of any kind o f extension in its theoretical, interior structure. B o s c o v i c h had earlier c o m e to similar conclusions. Er fand in der Lehre vom Stoß der Atome Widersprüche, die sich nur dadurch lösen ließen, daß die Wirkungen, welche man gewöhnlich dem Aneinanderprellen materieller Teilchen zuschreibt, aus Repulsivkräften herrühren, welche von einem räumlich bestimmten, aber ausdehnungslosen Punkte ausgehen. Diese Punkte werden als die Elementarbestandteile der Materie betrachtet." T h e constellation o f forces comprising atoms were considered as subject to attraction and repulsion. Gravitational processes are brought about not b y direct contact, but b y means o f unsinnliche

Kräfte.

As we have seen, this

mathematical theory o f the structure o f nature was given additional support b y then recent theoretical developments in physical theory. A dynamische Bild

was replacing a mechanische

Welt-Bild.

Welt-

C o m m e n t i n g o n this conception

o f dynamic force, Lange notes that we tend, as we mentioned previously, to think o f such " f o r c e s " along the lines o f o u r o w n "forces." In addition, it is m e n t i o n e d , in passing, that B ü c h n e r asserts that „Eine äußert,

kann

nicht

12

existieren."

Kraft,

die sich

nicht

T h e notion o f the externalization of forces is

seen as central to this dynamic theory o f nature. L a n g e takes this occasion to call attention to the anthropomorphic nature o f the idea of force, to the ineluctable personification o f "matter" or " f o r c e " after the manner o f our understanding,

as R e d t e n b a c h e r put it, o f our " e g o " and unsern

eignen

Kräften.

I n this way, we give to mathematical, physical knowledge

Färbung

des G e f ü h l s .

idea o f Kraft

13

die

R e d t e n b a c h e r ' s belief that we understand the physical

on the basis o f o u r consciousness of, and feeling of, our o w n

" f o r c e s " is o n e that obviously made a deep imprint on N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking insofar as it is a belief he will appeal to when he seeks to formulate a human interpretation o f the physical theory o f " f o r c e " . Lange avers that research in the field o f atomic theory moves m o r e and m o r e in the direction of the vanishing o f the ultimate constitutents o f "matter" into the realm o f the inconceivable. T h e postulation o f unextended tren

11

12

13

Kraftzen­

is a theoretic substitution for a possible analysis o f an infinite series. H e

Ibid., II, 638. "He found contradictions in the theory of the impact of atoms that could only be solved by assuming that the effects usually ascribed to the resilence of material particles are due to repulsive forces acting from a point situated in space, but without extension. These points are regarded as the elementary constituents of matter." Ibid., II, 649. "A force that does not express itself cannot exist." Cp. Nietzsche's comment in the Nacblass of 1885-1886. "Ist jemals eine Kraft constatirt? Nein, sondern Wirkungen, übersetzt in eine völlig fremde Sprache." KGW, VIII 1, 141. "Has a force ever been verified? No, only effects translated into an entirely foreign language." Ibid., II, 651. Cp. GdM, 367-370.

A Force-Point World

230

correctly sees that if this theory is applied to man, then we w o u l d say that the effects that act upon o u r senses are emanations from "centers o f force" and that o u r senses themselves are comprised o f Kraftzentren.

O u r conception o f

" b o d i e s " , then, b e c o m e s one o f a "constellation in a w h o l e " (Konstellation einem

Ganzen).

in

A l t h o u g h Lange does not c o n n e c t this dynamic conception o f

a force-point-world

with

the metaphysical views o f L e i b n i z , N i e t z s c h e

learned, from his study o f B o s c o v i c h ' s Philosophia

Naturalis,

that B o s c o v i c h ' s

mathematical theory o f the structure o f nature was suggested to him b y L e i b n i z ' s metaphysics o f nature. T h e "material" points posited b y B o s c o v i c h resemble L e i b n i z ' s monads in a number of ways. T h e y are unextended entities that "express" themselves in such a way as t o give rise to

"well-founded

p h e n o m e n a " o r " b o d i e s . " Although B o s c o v i c h avoids considering his forcepoints as substances, his idea o f unextended, dynamic entities emanating " f o r c e " is very close to L e i b n i z ' s thought, especially when y o u consider his definition o f the m o n a d as un ê t r e capable

d'action.

T h e notion o f an entity

"capable o f a c t i o n " immediately suggests an entity with the potential for action. I f we deny substantial being to such "entities," and if we emphasize the "appetition" (as L e i b n i z called it) o f such entities, we are not far removed from hypothetical "wills to p o w e r . " This is especially the case if we place stress u p o n N i e t z s c h e ' s ascription to his primal centers o f force Tendenz

and

Potenz.

B o s c o v i c h , at any rate, absorbed from L e i b n i z the notion o f dynamic relations o f vis, as well as the principle o f the relativity o f space and time. T h a t is, B o s c o v i c h emphasizes that there is n o absolute spatial location and no absolute temporal relations. In addition, he denies "rest" and absolute spatial location o r absolute distance.

14

T h e novelty and originality o f B o s c o v i c h ' s theory was

far in advance o f his o w n times and his conceptions did n o t take hold until the middle o f the nineteenth century and the twentieth century. T h e appropriation o f B o s c o v i c h ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f the relational character o f all spatial observation and the consequent relativity o f mechanical and inertial properties in the m o v e m e n t towards relativity theory brought his theories into twentieth century physics.

15

Considering that it was B o s c o v i c h , m o r e than any other

scientific thinker, w h o influenced N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophical reflections, it is n o t surprising that the anticipations o f twentieth century physical theory that have been found b y s o m e in his writings should be found there. N i e t z s c h e ' s " t h e o r y o f relativity" in regard t o the relativity o f "perspective" o f each "center o f force" is indebted initially t o the careful study o f Lange and t o his study o f B o s c o v i c h himself.

14

15

Roger J . Boscovich, A Theory of Natural Philosophy, Cambridge, 1966, 197-201. [Originally published in 1758.] L. L.Whyte, Essays on Atomism, Middletown, Conn., 1961, 54-55, 72-73.

231

A Force-Point World

T h e rich, c o m p l e x patterns o f thought that acted upon N i e t z s c h e gave him a total c o n c e p t i o n o f the dynamics o f the natural world that, in turn, conditioned his hypothetical interpretation o f natural processes o f interaction in terms o f his conception o f a finite n u m b e r o f "point centers" that he construed as "will p o i n t s . " O n

Lange's pages he m a y also have

found

suggestions o f the development o f a t h e o r y o f a space o f four dimensions in the w o r k s o f Zöllner and M a c h presented in the second edition o f his w o r k . Lange is sympathetic to this emerging view dass unser

Raum

nicht-euklidisch

16

ist.

If

the hypothesis o f four dimensional space is conceivable and functional, then the

Kantian t h e o r y

o f knowledge w o u l d

have to be revised. T h i s ,

for

N i e t z s c h e , o n l y reinforced his notion that the conception o f knowledge that K a n t put

forward

was a fertile, useful construction, but was only one

interpretation o f " k n o w l e d g e . " T h e entire conception o f theoretical "falsifica­ t i o n " in N i e t z s c h e ' s thought was indirectly fired b y numerous insights o f L a n g e and the scientists w h o s e theories he examined. It is no w o n d e r that N i e t z s c h e ' s t h e o r y o f knowledge and his creative interpretation o f actuality are c o m p l e x and often m u r k y : he was grappling with the rudiments o f a relativistic dynamics at a time when such a theory was in its infancy and he was trying to translate the results o f nineteenth century science into a daring, imaginative philosophical interpretation. W h e n we add to this the critiques o f traditional morality and religion, as well as his cultural criticisms, N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophi­ cal task was herculean. T h e w o r l d conceived o f as a system o f relations, o f effects, is n o t only a dynamic o n e , but one characterized b y action and interaction. W e k n o w nothing but properties, Lange tells us, and their concurrence in an u n k n o w n something. W h a t we call a Ding

is not an actual entity, but only a "resting-

place for o u r thought." W e call an " o b j e c t " or a "particle" the "same thing" o n l y because we leave out o f account its relation to other entities and the resulting "reactions." In terms o f the picture o f nature presented in the theory o f force-points, there are n o isolated entities o f any kind, no "things,", only processes. A s H e l m h o l t z says, we obtain knowledge o f natural entities o n l y b y means o f their "effects."

T h e p o w e r to produce effects we attribute

to

" f o r c e s . " W h a t we k n o w about matter is restricted to what its " f o r c e s " manifest to us. A w a r e o f the incognito o f "matter-in-itself," H e l m h o l t z claims that "matter" is an "assumption" that is put forward as a matter o f thought rather than o f existence. H e characterizes matter as that which we " h y p o s tasize as the origin and bearer o f . . . f o r c e s . "

16

17

17

Lange adds that force, in a

Lange, op. cit., II, 658. Neither the theories of Mach nor Zöllner are discussed in the first edition of the critical history. Ibid., II, 662. Cp. GdM, 379-380ff.

232

A Force-Point World

strictly physical sense, is a function o f mass. W e have resolved a given force i n t o a Summe

hypothetischer

Kräfte.

W i t h this theoretical assumption o f

bearers o f " f o r c e , " w e have reached the Grenze

des N a t u r e r k e n n e n s .

1 8

Reflecting o n the tendencies o f physical t h e o r y , L a n g e maintains that the idea o f "laws o f f o r c e " is ambiguous insofar as these " l a w s " are " l a w s " o f equilibrium

and m o t i o n . W e cannot

"explain" m o t i o n in terms o f force

because this substitutes o n e expression for another. T h e "explanation" o f m o t i o n is ultimately reduced to a description o f "relations o f p h e n o m e n a . " A l t h o u g h F e c h n e r and others try to explain m o t i o n in terms o f " l a w s , " L a n g e does n o t accept this because he holds that a " l a w " is o n l y an expression for die Gesamtheit

der Relationen

unter

einer

Gruppe

von

Erscheinungen.

1 9

When

N i e t z s c h e turns his attention to a critical analysis o f explanation in science, he will r e m e m b e r m a n y o f L a n g e ' s fertile analyses. T h e o u t c o m e o f L a n g e ' s p h i l o s o p h y o f science is that w e have relatively sure k n o w l e d g e o f "relations" o n l y . A t t e m p t s to characterize the bearers o f

18

19

Ibid., II, 663. Although there are some references to Du Bois Reymond in the first edition, it is in the second edition that his theme of the "limits of natural scientific knowledge" is sounded. Ibid., II, 664. Probably it was observations such as this that led Nietzsche to deny that Kräfte obey any "law," that a recurring sequence of phenomena displays a law. He explains eventsequences as "power-relationships" between two or more Kräfte. The "regularity" in succession that we observe is a metaphorical expression that gives us the impression of an als-ob rule being followed. The appearance of law-like events or reactions may be attributed to the internal constitution of an entity that is what it is and can only "act" or respond as its power allows. Nietzsche appeals to resistance and degrees of power to explain regularity of change. A MachtQuantum is designated by the "effects" it produces and by the "effects" it resists. Cf. KGW, VIII 3, 53, 49 f. On this question, it has been said that "The only law or principle which a quantum of will to power 'follows' is the 'law' of its own nature." Grimm, op. cit., 180. It would seem that if something is subject to "law" in terms of its own nature, this does not obviate the application of law to phenomena. If, for example, what we designate as "water" ( = a multiplicity of power-quanta) boils when heated (when, in Nietzsche's terms, acted upon by another quanta of forces), and if, as Nietzsche admits, something like this happens regularly, then the "law" that states that "water" boils at 212 °F (under standard atmospheric conditions) is as valid under Nietzsche's assumptions as it is in standard scientific discourse. That "constella­ tion of centers of force" we call "water" has a "nature" such that if it is heated to 212 °F cannot "resist" the conglomeration of power-quanta generated by the heat (under the "force" of standard atmospheric pressure) and, hence, it "boils." Insofar as Nietzsche admits that entities are as they are and respond to other "forces" in a predictable way, he attributes relative stability to "constellations of power" such that laws could be applied to the dynamic complexes he posits. Nietzsche's arguments against scientific laws are not convincing and they are puzzling insofar as he accepts Kant's notion that "laws" are imposed upon natural events by ourselves and are not "discovered." If he wants to say that scientific "laws" are ideal and do not corrrespond perfectly to actual event-sequences, this is defensible. However, entities (no matter how they are construed) do exhibit recurring patterns of "behavior" or "reactions" and are therefore subject to prediction. It is the predictive power of science that gives it that "mastery of nature" that Nietzsche grants to science. And it is the predictive power of scientific laws that Nietzsche mitigates or ignores. Nietzsche, in this regard, offers a cumbersome alternative language of explanation that adds nothing to the scientific assumption of laws that he criticizes.

A Force-Point World

233

these relations must be understood as purely hypothetical. A l w a y s , we must beware o f reification in such cases, of the tendency to confer ontological status o n what we m a y safely consider "working hypotheses." Lange's understand­ ing o f the concepts and principles in the physical sciences are illuminating in themselves, and they shed considerable light on many o f N i e t z s c h e ' s critiques o f scientific conceptions. Having been forewarned b y Lange's conventionalism o r his early version o f instrumentalism, N i e t z s c h e does n o t even seize upon the force-point theory o f nature as an absolute theory. R a t h e r , he considers it a powerful, growing c o n c e p t i o n that should be taken into account b y s o m e o n e , like himself, w h o would seek to offer an imaginative, philosophical interpreta­ tion o f actuality. Virtually every major point that N i e t z s c h e makes in his critique o f science (as a purely objective representation o f 'reality') is more o r less b o r r o w e d

from Lange. In fact, his entire approach to philosophical

understanding is, I believe, modeled

upon the provisional,

hypothetical,

experimental and heuristic methods o f the sciences as Lange represents them. T h e very c o n c e p t i o n o f philosophy as essentially experimental

is one that he

seems to have absorbed b y osmosis from his meticulous reading o f Lange's Geschichte. T h a t N i e t z s c h e only provisionally adopts the theory o f a force-pointw o r l d is clear from his remark that Die mathematischen Physiker können die Klümpchen-Atome nicht für ihre Wis­ senschaft brauchen: folglich construiren sie sich eine Kraft-Punkte-Welt, mit der man rechnen kann. 20

Naturally, this construction o f a world that is arranged so that one is able to " r e c k e n " is attributed to all organic creatures. T h e r e is presumably a continui­ ty between the form-creating activity o f lower organisms and the m o s t sophisticated thought o f man. A t any rate, it is this force-point-world

that

N i e t z s c h e identifies as the ascending theory in the physical sciences. It is one he is attracted to for a number o f reasons: it seeks to go b e y o n d those theories that rely u p o n anthropomorphic, sensuous representation, it demolishes the idea o f a " c l u m p - a t o m " and it represents the c o s m o s as a dynamic relational system in which there is action and reaction o f "forces." In effect, it is a process t h e o r y o f the natural w o r l d that dovetails with N i e t z s c h e ' s Heraclitean c o n c e p t i o n o f flux and " b e c o m i n g . " T h e restlessness and change in man is, in such a general t h e o r y , reflected in the natural world. H o w e v e r , N i e t z s c h e is n o t entirely opposed to a mechanistic theory o f nature if it is entertained for methodological purposes, if it is understood as hypothetical, if it is given n o

KGW, VII 3, 378. "The mathematical physicists are unable to use the solid atom of their science: consequently, they construct a force-point-world with which one can calculate."

A Force-Point World

234

ontological or metaphysical significance. W h a t he likes about mechanism is its practical application, its avoidance o f teleological interpretation, its lack o f sentimentality about the world. It should be retained as a w o r k i n g hypothesis, a useful model o f the natural world. T h u s , die mechanistische entirely acceptable als regulatives

Princip

21

der Methode.

Vorstellung

is

T h i s previously

d o m i n a n t c o n c e p t i o n o f the c o s m o s is primarily a representation o f nature and natural events b y means o f "signs" or " s y m b o l s " (Zeichen).

T h i s quantitative

symbolization o f the world yields a meaningless world and it should not be taken as the authentic representation o f a fluid actuality, actuality as process, any m o r e than musical notations should be mistaken for music itself. F o r , eine essentiell mechanische Welt wäre eine essentiell sinnlose Welt! Gesetzt, man schätzte den Wert einer Musik danach ab, wie viel von ihr gezählt, berechnet, in Formeln gebracht werden könne - wie absurd wäre eine solche „wissenschaftliche" Abschätzung der Musik! Was hätte man von ihr begriffen, verstanden, erkannt! Nichts, geradezu nichts von dem, was eigentlich an ihr „Musik" ist!... 22

T h i s comparison o f Wirklichkeit

with music is an authentic Nietzschean

n o t i o n , one that is not offered in passing. F o r , in Die Geburt

der Tragödie,

he

had said that language is inadequate to describe the essence o f music, to capture die Weltsymbolik

der Musik.

J u s t as language and knowledge cannot

describe " b e c o m i n g , " so, t o o , die Sprache,

als Organ

scheinungen,

Innere

21

kehren.

nie und

nirgends

das tiefste

und Symbol

der Musik

der

nach

Er­

aussen

B o t h in language and in science we engage in a s y m b o l i c representa­

tion o f actuality that does not capture the volatile, fluctuating, antithetical and incongruent nature o f actuality itself. T h e r e are a n u m b e r o f reasons w h y N i e t z s c h e rejects the mechanistic Auslegung

Welt-

and embraces a conception o f nature that assumes interacting

forces. T h e one universal process that is everywhere observable is that o f change. Since change characterizes the c o s m o s n o w , N i e t z s c h e reasons, there could n o t have been a time when there was n o change, no movement. It is p r o b a b l e that flux is infinite. I f the c o s m o s were heading towards a terminal state, it w o u l d already have been reached. It is, unlikely, then, that there is an end-state towards which the entire c o s m o s is moving. Mechanistic theory proposes that the energy in the world is constant, but that there is a tendency

21 22

23

Ibid., 163. KGW, V 2, FW, 373. "... an essentially mechanistic world would be an essentially meaningless world! Let us suppose we valued the worth of music with regard to how much it could be counted, calculated or formulated - how absurd such a 'scientific' estimate of music would be! What would one have conceived, understood or known of it! Nothing, absolutely nothing of what is truly 'music' in it." KGW, III 1, GT, 6. "...language, as the organ and symbol of appearance, can never, by any means, disclose the deepest inner heart of music."

A Force-Point World

towards maximal equitable distribution

235

o f energies. I n a later edition o f

L a n g e ' s Geschiebte,

N i e t z s c h e m a y have found a brief reference to Clausius'

t h e o r y o f Entropie.

A c c o r d i n g to Clausius, the tendency towards thermal

equilibrium in the c o s m i c system leads towards a maximal condition

or

" e n t r o p y . " W h e n this equal distribution o f heat and energy o c c u r s , change will no longer be possible and life will be extinguished. Although Lange is impressed

b y these consequences o f the mechanistic theory o f heat,

he

wonders if it might not be possible that the death o f one physical system m a y n o t give rise to a cosmic shift that w o u l d bring about the m o v e m e n t o f another physical system across e n o r m o u s distances and cause a collision that would produce a large-scale c o s m o g o n y . Pondering the dissolution o f the physical universe, Lange mentions, in passing, C z o l b e ' s view that we should postulate an "eternal persistence o f terrestial life" from the standpoint o f our spiritual needs.

24

Presumably, C z o l b e holds that the belief in the eternality o f life is

m o r e encouraging and life-enhancing and "edifying" than the belief that the physical universe and life itself is finite. A s we shall see in another context, C z o l b e had a definite penchant for what can o n l y be called 'pragmatic' arguments (in the manner o f William J a m e s ) for accepting one philosophical standpoint over another. N i e t z s c h e was also attracted to a dynamic theory o f nature such as that o f B o s c o v i c h because, as we've suggested, it undermined a materialism o f solid, physical units o f matter. I f the ultimate constituents o f 'matter' are reducible theoretically t o point-centers that are assumed to emit Kraft,

then the tradi­

tional c o n c e p t i o n o f " c l u m p s " o f physical units has been conceptually negated. N i e t z s c h e is overjoyed b y this news from the scientific front in large part because he saw the p o w e r and consistency o f mechanistic materialism and w h a t he considered its nihilistic consequences. B y virtue o f a physical theory that posits Kraftzentren

as irreducible "entities," „Wir

sind

die

Stofflichkeit

25

los. " It is astonishing to realize that N i e t z s c h e (with an assist from Lange and B o s c o v i c h ) was one o f the earliest thinkers to react to what physicists such as J e a n s and E d d i n g t o n later reacted t o : the paradoxical "dematerialization" o f matter in physical theory. Even though N i e t z s c h e occasionally employs a physicalistic analysis o f human behavior for methodological purposes,

he

never embraced materialism in any sense. Philosophical materialism is built u p o n a shaky foundation: die Materie

24

25

26

ist ein...

Irrtum.

2 6

Lange, op. cit., II, 672-673. The references to Czolbe's thought in later editions of Lange's work are substantially the same as those in the first. Cf. GdM, 312 ff. KGW, VIII 2, 48. "We have got rid of materiality." KGW, V 2, FW, 109. " . . . matter is an . . . error."

236

A Force-Point World

W h a t the mathematical physicists call "centers o f force" are plausibly considered b y N i e t z s c h e to be Macht-Quanta.

E a c h m a c r o s c o p i c entity we

perceive is k n o w n through its effects. T h e interior substructure o f such p h e n o m e n a l beings is considered to be a multiplicity o f Kraftcentren

or p o w e r -

quanta that radiate force. N i e t z s c h e maintains that the dominance o f the mechanistic interpretation o f nature is waning, that its explanation in terms o f "stress" and "pressure", as well as the mechanistically unjustified assumption o f "action at a distance," is in question. Mechanistic physics is m o r e "descrip­ t i o n " than explanation, a description supplemented b y hypothetical assump­ tions that border o n the fictitious. M o s t o f these observations, as we have seen, were suggested b y L a n g e o r some o f the scientists he cites. N e i t h e r Lange n o r N i e t z s c h e seem to be aware that B e r k e l e y had presented an original fictionalistic interpretation o f N e w t o n i a n theory in De Motu. willing to accept provisionally die dynamische

N o n e t h e l e s s , N i e t z s c h e is Welt-Auslegung.

" e m p t y space" and negates the idea o f Klümpchen-Atome. 27

an "inner quality in dynamis."

It denies

T h i s theory posits

T h i s is the assumption o f Potenz

or

Tendenz

or the capacity to expend o r "express" force. Although N i e t z s c h e does not m e n t i o n it, this dynamic theory presumably includes the notion o f a tendency t o discharge Energie

o r Kraft

that is attributed to force centers. T h a t N i e t z s c h e

understood the dynamic interpretation o f nature in this w a y is indicated b y a cryptic, but revealing, n o t e in the H e characterizes Dynamis aktualisiren. Macht"

Nachlass.

as a "reale

Tendenz

zu Aktion",

die sich

O n the next line there is an obvious equation between "Wille and

"Spannkraft"

or "tension."

28

Here, a phenomenon

zu zur

within a

d y n a m i c physical t h e o r y - potentiality as a tendency to action, a "striving" for actualization - is related t o "tension" in a physical sense. T h e figurative use o f Spannkraft

conveys the notion o f "vigor" which, in turn, suggests "strength"

or " p o w e r . " A l t h o u g h these terms in physical t h e o r y do n o t suggest anything like "willing", they do suggest an immanent nisus

towards something, that

something, in this case, apparently 'acts' in the discharge o f force or energy. T h e r e is n o doubt that in his attempt to p r o b e the " u n k n o w n third" that underlies psychic and physical existence, N i e t z s c h e turns to the dynamic t h e o r y o f a force-point-world and appropriates its essential ideas, giving them an a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c interpretation. B u t he also seems to superimpose the dynamic interpretation o f nature over conceptions o f an immanent " t e n d e n c y " or nisus

in the natural w o r l d .

O n c e again, the materials in Lange's Geschichte

suggest a possible source

for N i e t z s c h e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f a dynamic tendency towards actualization o f

27

28

KGW, VII 3, 288-289. KGW, VIII 2, 51.

A Force-Point World

237

p o w e r . A m o n g s t m a n y other similar discussions, Lange explains H o l b a c h ' s system o f nature in terms o f notions in the c o n t e m p o r a r y thought o f his time. H o l b a c h ' s holistic idea o f nature includes the principle that Le mouvement un

effort

par lequel

un corps

change

ou tend

à changer

understands this in terms o f then recent ideas o f nisus

de p l a c e .

and conatus

est

29

Lange

in natural

processes. Perceptively, Lange notices that a central notion in H o l b a c h ' s naturalism is that o f "effort." H e points out that this entails the concept o f m o t i o n and is, at b o t t o m , one that has a decidedly anthropomorphe

Färbung.

Q u i t e naturally, Lange views the attribution o f "effort" or Anstrengung physical processes as another case o f personification in thought.

to

However,

Lange is sympathetic to H o l b a c h ' s naturalism and summarizes his general views in the following w a y : Alles im Universum ist beständig in Bewegung, und jede Ruhe ist nur scheinbar... was die Physiker "nisus" genannt haben, ist nur durch Bewegung zu erklären... Aktion ist nie ohne Reaktion. Die sogenannten toten und die lebendigen Kräfte sind daher von derselben Art und entwickeln sich nur unter verschiedenen Umständen. Auch die dauerhaftesten Körper sind beständigen Veränderungen unterworfen. Die Materie und die Bewegung ist ewig.. Lange's extensive exposition o f H o l b a c h ' s philosophy covers some other interesting points. It is said, for example, that H o l b a c h conceived o f nature as subject to an endless cycle in which there is creation and destruction and in w h i c h the sum o f existence always remains the same. H o l b a c h averred that the totality o f nature can have n o purpose (Das Ganze

kann

keinen

Zweck

haben)

because, outside o f it, there is nothing it could aim at. In passing, it is m e n t i o n e d that, for H o l b a c h , neither order n o r disorder is given in nature, but they result from different ways o f understanding nature. H o l b a c h is also said t o see the liberating effects o f atheism insofar as the free creativeness o f the human mind is granted as opposed to the realities o f nature. Filtered through the imaginative mind o f N i e t z s c h e , there are discernible traces o f the philoso­ p h y o f H o l b a c h . O n c e again, we see that N i e t z s c h e synthesizes and relates, superimposes and juxtaposes, what in Lange's text is spread out on a large and lavish canvas.

Lange, op. cit., I, 439-440. Although the quotation is probably from Dietrich von Holbach's Systeme de la nature [1770], no references are given. "Movement is an effort by which a body changes or tends to change place." In notes from 1867-68 Nietzsche misquotes Lange's quotation from the "Preface" to Systeme de la nature. HKG 3, 334. Cf. Lange, GdM, 191. Ibid., I, 384. "Everything in the universe is constantly in motion and rest is only apparent... what the physicists have called 'nisus' is explained only through movement... Action is never without reaction. The so-called dead forces and the living ones are, therefore, of the same kind and develope themselves under different circumstances. Even the most durable bodies are subject to continual change. Matter and motion are eternal..."

238

A Force-Point World The

Welt-Bild

o f a force-point-world, then, is a model for N i e t z s c h e , a

hypothetical c o n c e p t i o n that is related to emerging ideas o f a cosmic acting through all things. T h e previously mentioned reference to a

nisus

Tendenz

towards actualization naturally suggests the metaphysics o f Aristotle. I f we bracket the n o t i o n o f an objective teleology in nature and focus upon the nisus towards actualization in Aristotle's thought, N i e t z s c h e ' s conception o f a nisus or "thrust" towards Macht

is not that far removed from Aristotle's assumption

o f an immanent tendency towards maximal realization. J u s t as Aristotle speaks o f the pathos (theos)

o f "desire" that leads all beings t o strive to b e c o m e as like god

as they can b e , so, t o o , does N i e t z s c h e sometimes conceive o f the "will

t o p o w e r " as a pathos

that entails a striving for maximal feelings

o f power. H e

even experiments with the idea that " G o d " m a y be construed as a "maximal state," an epogee in the "evolution o f the will to p o w e r . "

31

E v e n threads o f the

p h i l o s o p h y o f Aristotle can be found woven into the multicolored tapestry that N i e t z s c h e has created. B u t they are only threads. One tische tren,

o f the reasons w h y N i e t z s c h e applauded the negation o f

Atomistik,

materialis­

especially in the form o f B o s c o v i c h ' s conception o f

was that it was a great Triumph

über

die Sinne.

Kraftcen-

H e r e we have an echo o f

Lange insofar as he called attention to the role o f sensuous intuition in scientific concepts and preferred the theory o f point-centers because it picturability. T h e fact that N i e t z s c h e rejects the idea o f the ErdenrestKlümpchen-Atom

lacked und

because he believes that it is based upon sensory experience

indicates a serious conflict in his thinking. F o r , in Götzendämmerung, insisted in n o uncertain terms that Vernunft

32

he had

or "reason" is what leads us to

misconstrue the nature o f actuality and that, in general, "the senses do n o t l i e . " W e m a y also remind N i e t z s c h e that he has repeatedly argued that the c o n c e p t o f the isolated, unitary " a t o m " is modeled upon a false belief that we ourselves are " s u b j e c t s , " " e g o s " o r " s u b j e c t - a t o m s . " I f this is truly h o w we have c o m e t o think o f the " a t o m " as the basic physical unity, then the critical reference t o the senses is unnecessary. T h e truth o f the matter is that N i e t z s c h e (in part because o f his synthesizing of Lange's different arguments and standpoints) offers at least four origins o f the concept o f the ' a t o m . ' (1) I t is a notion that serves as a hypothetical o r instrumental idea for the sake o f "calculation"; (2) it is derived from a psychistic

fiction,

the belief that we are " e g o s " o r " I - s u b j e c t s " ;

(3) it is a product o f o u r sensuous intuitions or o u r "picture-language"; (4) it is derived from a grammatische

Gewohnheit

that leads us to assume an agent that

acts o r produces "effects"; an entity ( = atom) that is that in which

Kraft

KGW, VIII 2, 201. "Die einzige Möglichkeit . . . für den Begriff 'Gott'... w ä r e . . . Gott als Maximal-zustand, als eine Epoche . . . in der Entwicklung des Willens zur Macht." KGW, VI 2, JGB, 12

239

A Force-Point World resides and out o f which it operates. explanations o f the formulation

33

E a c h o f these m a y be plausible genetic

of the idea of the atom. H o w e v e r , if a

sensuous representation o f the physical world or o f physical p h e n o m e n a that is itself derived from o u r sensation and perception is considered misleading o r erroneous, then N i e t z s c h e cannot consistently claim any apprehension o f "flux,"

" p r o c e s s " o r " b e c o m i n g . " Having praised B o s c o v i c h (as well as

C o p e r n i c u s ) for attaining a "triumph over the senses," it is strange that he should insist that the senses provide us with "subtle instruments for observa­ t i o n " and that Wir besitzen heute genau so weit Wissenschaft, als wir uns entschlossen haben, das Zeugnis der Sinne anzunehmen - als wir sie noch schärfen, bewaffnen, zu Ende denken lernten. 34

T h i s is a very strange position for someone to take if the theory o f a forcep o i n t - w o r l d is provisionally accepted because it represents a "triumph over the senses." M o r e o v e r , N i e t z s c h e goes on to say that there is a science that is "formal," that is a logico-mathematical Zeichen-Lehre.

Unfortunately, such a

science o f signs does not represent or give us access to Wirklichkeit.

35

Since the

mathematical theory o f extensionless centers o f force is precisely such a "formal science," such a theory o f signs, it cannot be said to actuality. T h u s , the dynamic theory o f nature

represent

that N i e t z s c h e uses as a

theoretical foundation for the extension o f the will to p o w e r into the natural world

is not merely accepted as a provisional assumption

or

"working

h y p o t h e s i s , " but as a c o n c e p t i o n that does not represent physical actuality. Insofar as the will to p o w e r in nature is clearly modeled upon B o s c o v i c h ' s t h e o r y o f force-centers plus the assumption o f a nisus

or Tendenz

in the

c o s m o s , the extension o f the theory of the will to p o w e r into nature is doubly hypothetical. H e r e we have experimental thought with a vengence: the as­ sumption o f a universal will to power or a multiplicity o f wills to p o w e r acting through all beings is a theoretical fiction based upon the theoretical fiction that physical actuality is comprised o f a finite number o f Kraftcentren Quanta

or

Kraft-

that act upon and react to each other!

W h a t N i e t z s c h e has done in regard to the dynamic theory o f nature is to have provisionally adopted an hypothesis in the physical sciences that is a purely theoretical logico-mathematical theory o f signs as a possible Auslegung.

33

34

35

Welt-

T h e theory o f the will to power, in turn, is a philosophical

Ibid., 17. KGW, VI 3, G, "Die Vernunft in der Philosophie," 3. "We possess science today precisely to the extent that we have decided to accept the evidence of the senses - as we have learned to sharpen and arm them, to think them through to the end." Ibid.

A Force-Point World

240

interpretation o f a physical-theoretical interpretation that N i e t z s c h e himself believes does not accurately represent actuality. S o m u c h for the view o f Heidegger and others that N i e t z s c h e ' s notion o f the will to power is a "metaphysical" c o n c e p t i o n o f ultimate reality. N i e t z s c h e has taken

quite

seriously his o w n view that there is neither "truth" nor absolute "facts," that there are o n l y m o r e o r less plausible, interesting, viable or heuristically valuable "interpretations."

Wirklichkeit

is considered to be so mutable, so

volatile, so extraordinarily c o m p l e x , so antithetical and incongruent that it is, strictly speaking, unintelligible.

Insofar as man makes his world, the world o f

his group o r species, the world for scientific or philosophical understanding, intelligible, such " w o r l d s " are necessarily individual, group o r theoretical, instrumental perspectival interpretations. All claims to knowledge are ulti­ mately reduced to creative, inventive "falsifications" o r perspectival interpreta­ tions. Whereas m o s t thinkers make their primitive notions, their assumptions, presuppositions and principles exceptions to their o w n theoretical framework, N i e t z s c h e goes all the way and admits that his philosophical notions are themselves, in the final analysis, perspectival interpretations. I n N i e t z s c h e ' s thought p h i l o s o p h y has b e c o m e self-conscious and self-critical in a way that it never has before him. If we are able to avoid cognitive vertigo when entering

Nietzsche's

kaleidoscopic conceptual world, we may consider what he makes o f the dynamic theory o f nature that he accepts as a heuristic matrix. T h e experimen­ tal approach to the emerging idea o f force seems to b e : let us see what actuality w o u l d be if we assume a dynamic n o t i o n o f force-centers. Bearing in mind the observations o f scientists w h o m Lange cites, N i e t z s c h e assumes that there is n o absolute distinction between the organic and the inorganic. Therefore, the assumption o f a force-point-world must be universal in extent, just as c o n t e m ­ porary physical theory treats all entities as having the same physical structure. E v e n though N i e t z s c h e freely uses the concept o f Kraft,

he is quite aware that

it, t o o , is a hypothetical notion. Apparently remembering Lange's discussion o f the issue, N i e t z s c h e realizes that we do not directly observe "forces," but o n l y "effects"

that are attributed

to "hypothetical forces." I f we cannot

imagine a " f o r c e , " then the notion remains quite abstract. T h e illusion o f the theoretical physicists is that we " k n o w " something when we have s y m b o l i z e d an event in eine bezeichnet,

mathematische

beschrieben.

36

Formel.

A t best, such an event is only

Mathematical physics is considered as a symboliza-

tion o f nature, a representation o f actuality b y means o f "signs." J u s t as in the case o f Lange, theoretical physics (whether mechanistic or dynamic) is c o n -

36

KGW, VIII 1, 103.

A Force-Point World

241

strued as a semiotics that presents an idealization o f natural p h e n o m e n a and natural processes. Granting this, we m a y note once again that N i e t z s c h e p r o b e s the concepts that support a theory o f force-points in order to disclose their a n t h r o m o r p h i c o r psychologistic nature. I f the m o s t deanthropomorphic "world-interpretation" in physics can be shown to rely upon a n t h r o p o m o r ­ phic metaphors, upon notions transferred from human experience to the world of nature, then, N i e t z s c h e seems to reason, it cannot be accepted as a purely " o b j e c t i v e " representation o f actuality. M o r e o v e r , this m a y indicate, as Lange and others had indicated, that anthropomorphic interpretation is inevitable. I f it is inevitable, then there is r o o m for N i e t z s c h e ' s interpretation o f actuality as Wille

zur Macht.

T h e pattern o f N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking seems to be the follow­

ing: the disclosure o f the anthropomorphic nature o f truth in everyday life, in p h i l o s o p h y and in science and the consequence that neither ordinary language, n o r p h i l o s o p h y n o r scientific inquiry give us access to an objective reality leads t o the view that anthropomorphic interpretation o f "reality" is an ineluctable feature o f o u r thought. Having exposed the humanistic, aesthetic and an­ t h r o p o m o r p h i c nature o f all thought, N i e t z s c h e eventually yields to precisely the kind o f "humanization" o f the world, nature and actuality that he had previously

criticized so vehemently.

T h e significant difference

between

N i e t z s c h e and those he accuses o f naive, unconscious anthropomorphism is that he puts his cards o n the table and openly admits that his interpretation o f actuality is an a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c construction. Aside from the fact that Kraft

in physical t h e o r y is an irreducible, but

abstract, n o t i o n , N i e t z s c h e acutely spys the anthropomorphism in the ideas o f "attraction" and "repulsion." „Anziehen" und „Abstoßen" in rein mechanischen Sinne ist e i n e . . . F i k t i o n . . . Wir können uns ohne eine Absicht ein Anziehen nicht denken. - Den Willen, sich einer Sache zu bemächtigen oder gegen ihre Macht sich zu wehren und sie zurückzustoßen - das „verstehen" wir: das wäre eine Interpretation, die wir brauchen könnten. 37

T h e ideas o f "attraction" and "repulsion" certainly do seem t o be derived from human experience and it is plausible to argue that when we think o f a force o f attraction a kind o f intentionality is projected into the notion. T h e interpretation

o f attraction and repulsion in terms o f willful activities is

considered as the primitive basis o f such abstract conceptions. M a n under­ stands n o n - h u m a n , physical processes b y virtue o f a transference o f his o w n

KGW, Vlll 1, 100-101. "'Attraction' and 'repulsion' in a purely mechanistic sense a r e . . . fictions... We cannot think of an attraction without an intention. - The will to possess a thing or to defend oneself against or repel its power - that, 'we understand': that would be an interpretation we could use."

A Force-Point World

242

subjective interpretation

o f his o w n behavior to the natural world. T h i s

understanding o f the world in terms o f psychistic notions is not something that N i e t z s c h e believes we can easily o v e r c o m e : it is presented as an inevitable feature o f o u r thinking. T h e abstract, quantitative schematization of nature must be translated into qualitative terms that we can understand. T h e physical w o r l d is interpreted in science b y means o f "signs" that are the invention o f man and include s y m b o l i c representations that are reflections o f o u r senses and o u r p s y c h i c nature. I f we strip physical theory o f its phenomenal importa­ tions, if we abstract those notions that are derived from our sensory and psychological experience, all that would remain w o u l d be dynamische

Quanta.

Phänomenal ist also: die Einmischung des Zahlbegriffs, des Subjektbegriffs, des Bewegungsbegriffs: wir haben unser Auge, unsere Psychologie immer noch darin. Eliminiren wir diese Zuthaten: so bleiben keine Dinge übrig, sondern dy­ namische Quanta, in einem Spannungsverhältnis zu allen anderen dynamischen Quanten: deren Wesen in ihrem Verhältniss zu allen anderen Quanten besteht, in ihrem „Wirken" auf dieselben... . 38

T h i s theoretical reductionism attempts

to purify

physical theory o f an­

t h r o p o m o r p h i s m , t o attain a deanthropomorphic picture o f actuality. T h e " d y n a m i c quanta" referred to here are clearly Kraftcentren

or

Macht-Quanta

o r the " p o i n t - c e n t e r s " that are posited in B o s c o v i c h ' s theory o f nature. E a c h " b o d y " is assumed to be c o m p o s e d o f a multiplicity o f such "dynamic quanta" and the perceptible "effects" we observe are emanations from these centers o f force o r power. T h e quanta referred to are not unchanging "units," but hypothetical force-points w h o s e " p o w e r , " " f o r c e " or "energy" increases and decreases. A n assembly o f power-quanta that arrange themselves into groups is a Machtkonstellation.

T h e s e are metaphorically characterized as social

groupings for the sake o f the enhancement o f power. Although N i e t z s c h e understandably uses quantitative language in describing such conglomerations o f power-centers, we must r e m e m b e r that such quanta are conceived o f as extensionless points. Presumably, what we identify as "extension" is a result o f the "effects" o f the activity o f dynamic force-centers. W i t h the proviso that we are n o t talking about unchanging, substantial "spiritual a t o m s , " the theory that N i e t z s c h e adopts is reminiscent o f L e i b n i z ' s metaphysics o f "nature." N o n - m a t e r i a l , non-extended centers o f force are presumed to be the basis for what w e perceive as corporeal entities or what L e i b n i z calls "well-founded p h e n o m e n a . " I n all likelihood, it is the hidden presence o f L e i b n i z ' s thought in

38

KGW, VIII 3, 51. "Phenomenal, therefore, are: the injection of the number-concept, the concept of subject, the concept of movement: our eye, our psychology are still part of it. Eliminating these additions, no things remain, but dynamic quanta in a tension relation to all other dynamic quanta: their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, in their 'effect' upon these."

243

A Force-Point World

B o s c o v i c h ' s t h e o r y o f nature that accounts for the similarities o f thought between N i e t z s c h e and L e i b n i z . If w e see actuality through the eyes o f the dynamic interpretation o f nature, and if w e exclude the "phenomenal" importations that N i e t z s c h e identifies, then "reality" would be a c o m p l e x system o f interacting Quanta

Macht-

in w h i c h each dynamic quantum acts upon or reacts to every other

such " e n t i t y " in a dialectical relationship in which there is constant change and a waxing and waning of p o w e r b o t h within Machtkonstellationen constellations" and in each Kraftcentrum.

or "power

Although N i e t z s c h e tends to e m ­

phasize dialectical opposition between these posited force-centers, he also m e n t i o n s that power-quanta are capable o f unification for enhanced p o w e r with those force-centers that are sufficiently related to one another.

39

This

process o f unification and disunification and reunification is said to go on indefinitely. T h i s is a conception o f a c o m p l e x , dynamic Relations-Welt

which

has a different aspect from each "point" in the system, the sum o f these interacting " p o i n t s " being "incongruent." I f we could view "reality" from the perspective o f each Kraftcentrum,

it would appear differently and we would

experience the universal "relativity" that we can only conceive o f abstractly. I f w e could deduct each o f these "perspectives," there would be n o totality, n o "appearances," n o world. In one o f the few passages in which he actually speaks o f "reality," N i e t z s c h e declares that Die Realität Partikulär-Aktion

und

Reaktion

jedes

Einzelnen

besteht

gegen

exakt

das

Reality? Presumably, this would be 'reality' as represented

in

dieser 40

Ganze...

.

in the

dean­

t h r o p o m o r p h i c version o f force-point-world, 'reality' understood in terms o f this Welt-Auslegung.

T h i s is a picture of 'reality' as if seen by superhuman

eyes, a 'reality' n o t t o o far removed from the sophisticated, complex under­ standing o f the c o s m o s in c o n t e m p o r a r y physics. T h i s stark interpretation o f a meaningless c o s m o s is o n e that lacks a human meaning. It is at this point that N i e t z s c h e restores a self-conscious anthropomorphism in order to translate the austere theory o f 'reality' in a dynamic physical theory into human terms. B y virtue o f superimposition and transposition, N i e t z s c h e has c o n c o c k e d a Welt-Bild

out o f the raw materials provided b y Lange, B o s c o v i c h and others.

It is a c o s m o s without " o b j e c t s , " "things," or c o m m o n entities, one without any comprehensible Tendenz

o r nisus.

It is a dynamic

force-point-world

denuded o f "intentionality" and direction. This process theory o f 'reality' includes the idea o f constant change, action and reaction, the "discharge o f f o r c e " and reponses t o the "discharge o f force" o f Kraftcentren

39 40

o r conglomera-

KGW, VIII 3, 165-166. Ibid., 163. "Reality consists exactly in this particular action and reaction of every individual part towards the whole."

244

A Force-Point World

tions o f them. In a purely physical, theoretical sense, N i e t z s c h e has identified, in his thought-experiment, the Macht

that Lange thought acts through us and

on us. B u t the resolution o f the p r o b l e m o f actuality is accomplished in a strange way. Despite the warnings o f Lange, du B o i s - R e y m o n d and others w h o m N i e t z s c h e had read, a personification o f Kraft

or Energie,

a deliberate

a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m , is adopted in order to give a dynamic conception of nature a human meaning. T h e "victorious c o n c e p t " " f o r c e " b y which

physicists

( n o t a b l y the mathematical physicist B o s c o v i c h ) have "created G o d and the w o r l d " must be completed. R e m e m b e r i n g that N i e t z s c h e only adopts the dynamic interpretation o f natural processes provisionally or experimentally, we n o w see h i m giving this "world-interpretation" o w n philosophical

a meaning in terms o f his

interpretation.

Es m u ß ihm eine innere Welt zugesprochen werden, welche ich bezeichne als „Willen zur Macht", d.h. als unersättliches Verlangen nach Bezeigung der Macht; oder Verwendung, Ausübung der Macht, als schöpferischen Trieb usw. Die Physiker werden die „Wirkung in die Ferne" aus ihren Principien nicht los: ebensowenig eine abstoßende Kraft (oder anziehende). Es hilft nichts: man muß alle Bewegungen, alle „Erscheinungen", alle „Gesetze" nur als Symptome eines innerlichen Geschehens fassen und sich der Analogie des Menschen zu Ende bedienen. 41

T h e extension o f will to p o w e r to all entities involves the postulation o f something like a "creative drive" or nisus

in natural beings on the basis o f

human analogy. H u m a n analogy? H e r e N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking comes full circle: he has spilled a great deal o f ink trying to show that truth-claims fundamentally

"anthropomorphic,"

that

science

represents

the

are

greatest

humanization o f nature conceivable, that the error o f previous thinkers was n o t to have seen the basic humanization

o f the world that pervaded

their

c o n c e p t i o n s . Reversing his field, he n o w submits t o an interpretation o f a scientific world-picture in terms o f der Analogie

des Menschen.

H e seems to

violate his o w n critical principles, to reverse his belief that to take man as the measure o f reality is an anthropomorphische

Idiosynkrasie.

It is not correct that

he bases his general t h e o r y o f will to power on "empirical data."

42

O n the

c o n t r a r y , he extends an intentional will to p o w e r to all beings in order to translate the results o f a dynamic interpretation in physical theory into terms

41

42

KGW, VII 3, 287. "... an inner world must be ascribed to it which I designate 'will to power,' that is, as an insatiable desire to express power; or as the use and exercise of power, as a creative drive, etc. Physicists cannot do without 'action at a distance' in their principles: nor can they eliminate a repulsive force (or an attracting one). There is nothing for it: one must understand all motion, all 'appearances', all 'laws' only as symptoms of an inner occurrence and to use man as an analogy to this end." Kaufmann, op. cit., 207.

245

A Force-Point World that man can understand - the abstract, theoretical idea o f Kraft

is deliberately

humanized. A s we shall see in subsequent discussions o f the will to power, the arguments that are given for the universal explanatory principle o f Wille Macht

zur

are based upon an understanding o f human volitional activity that is

elsewhere criticized as fallacious.

T h i s is not an error on N i e t z s c h e ' s part for he

k n o w s exactly what he is doing and he fully understands that he is n o t making a claim to We

knowledge.

have seen that N i e t z s c h e holds that there is an

anthropomorphic

element in even the m o s t abstract physical theory that assumes force-points or force-centers as the ultimate constituents o f the natural world. A t t r a c t i o n and repulsion,

for example, suggest human

intentionality, a "will" t o m o v e

towards something o r a "will" to avoid something. A c t i o n at a distance in the n o t i o n o f gravitation cannot be comprehended in terms o f direct physical c o n t a c t and, in effect, suggests something like perception. Since such basic principles are fundamental

to physical theory, and since they are already

c o l o r e d in an a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c way, N i e t z s c h e extends to the idea o f " f o r c e " a humanistic interpretation. H e maintains that the only kind o f Kraft

we can

truly c o m p r e h e n d is one that is analogous to our o w n experience o f " f o r c e " in 43

the life-impulse, in willing. T h u s , mechanische

Kraft

or mechanische

Macht

is

translated into the language o f our o w n experience o f " f o r c e " o r " p o w e r . " A " f o r c e " that w e are unable t o represent (vorstellen)

would remain a denatured,

abstract idea. H e r e we have what is clearly an echo o f du B o i s - R e y m o n d ' s belief that the c o n c e p t o f Kraft

as the 'cause' o f m o t i o n is a "recondite product

o f the irresistable tendency to personification," a tendency that extends to the notion

o f the

reciprocal attraction

between

two

particles. In

addition,

N i e t z s c h e ' s interpretation in accordance with human analogy recapitulates R e d t e n b a c h e r ' s claim, in Das Dynamidensystem

( 1 8 5 7 ) , that

Die Existenz der Kräfte erkennen wir an den mannigfaltigen Wirkungen, welche sie hervorbringen, und insbesondere durch das Gefühl und Bewußtsein von unsern eignen Kräften. 44

N i e t z s c h e accepts the notion that we can o n l y understand

a dynamic

interpretation o f nature in terms o f o u r own subjective experience. In order to c o m p r e h e n d the dynamics o f force, the activity o f force, we project a

conatus

o r "striving" into the processes o f the natural world. I f we assume a conatus

or

nisus as immanent in the world, then this implies intentionality, directionality, a m o v e m e n t towards something, a Tendenz.

43

44

Given that N i e t z s c h e agrees with

Werke, GOA, XVI, 105. Redtenbacher, Das Dynamidensystem, Mannheim, 1857, 12. Cited in Lange, op. cit., II, 651. "The existence of forces is recognized by the manifold effects which they produce, and especially through the feeling and consciousness of our own forces." Cp. GdM, 374.

A Force-Point World

246

the thinkers discussed b y Lange w h o argue that the distinction between the organic and the inorganic is n o t viable, the striving attributed to forces is understood on the model o f living beings. O r g a n i c beings, as we have seen, are construed as apparent unities comprised o f a plurality o f "wills t o p o w e r , " as imbued with a form-giving, simplifying, assimilating, creative capacity. T h e dynamic changes in organic beings are not only brought about b y external factors, but b y an internal

Tendenz,

a "striving" to master, control o r

overpower. G r o w t h and development b e y o n d what is necessary for mere survival o r adaptation is characteristic o f all living things. T h e unified living entity (e. g., the plant o r the tree) is a fiction. E a c h living being is pervaded b y eines

millionenfachen

Wachsthums

mit eigenen

und halbeigenen

G r o w t h and development imply the attempt to realize a Potenz,

Initiativen. a process o f

change that exceeds the needs o f life. H e n c e , N i e t z s c h e claims that trees struggle with each other in a forest for the sake o f Macht.

45

T h e interpretation

o f the dynamics o f n o n - h u m a n living beings in terms of a striving for p o w e r is already an a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c interpretation. It is put forward for the same reason that he understands the concept o f force in physics as if it were a creative drive o r a striving for power. T h a t is, we interpret the discharge o f energy in n o n - h u m a n living beings in terms o f o u r understanding o f o u r o w n tendency to discharge energy for the sake o f the enhancement o f our feeling o f p o w e r . W h e n he speaks o f the millionfold initiatives acting through organic beings, he is thinking in terms o f the dynamic activity o f each primitive " e l e m e n t " in a living being. T h e s e are interpreted as the "underwills" o r "willsouls" he referred to in Jenseits

von

Gut

und Böse.

A n organic b o d y is

conceived o f as a c o m m u n i t y o f "wills to p o w e r " in which there is a division o f labor. W h a t N i e t z s c h e does not make clear is that the supposed 'volitional' activity o f each fundamental "underwill" is unconscious. Although he, like L a n g e , was very critical o f H a r t m a n n ' s popular Philosophie

des

Unbewußten,

he seems to have adopted the notion that b o t h in man and in other living beings there is a continuously operative unconscious

tendency, drive or urge.

T h e "urges" o f men and animals have developed over a long period o f time as conditions o f existence; they are the after-effects o f perspectival valuations that n o w function instinctively or unconsciously. scious drive, urge o r nisus

46

I f we assume, then, an u n c o n ­

in all living beings, it is not unreasonable to hold

that where there is such "appetition" there must be what we would call an " e n d " o r a " g o a l . " Despite his efforts to delete all forms o f teleology from his thought, N i e t z s c h e imports what might be called a subjective teleology into

45

46

KGW, VIII 2, 294. Werke, GOA, XIII, 256.

247

A Force-Point World

his interpretation o f actuality. J u s t as Aristotle attributes "desire" or orexis

to

n o n - h u m a n organisms, so, t o o , does N i e t z s c h e attribute goal-directed activity t o all centers o f force. T o say that "trees strive for p o w e r " is clearly an a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c and teleological ascription. T h i s is a fortiori N i e t z s c h e ascribes to Kraft

itself or Kraftcentren

the case when

or Machtkonstellationen

"an

insatiable desire to manifest p o w e r " or a "creative drive." The

m o s t curious feature o f N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophy is his reliance o n

analogical thinking. C o n c e p t u a l thought is reduced to psychological processes and these are reduced to feelings o f force, urges, drives, passions or desires. T h e s e psychistic states are assumed to have a m o r e primordial origin in u n c o n s c i o u s processes that are construed as if they were primitive "wills." T h e s e "underwills" are then related to the theoretical posits o f dynamic physical t h e o r y : Kraftcentren,

Macht-Quanta,

o r dynamische

Quanta.

Com­

pleting the analogical circle, N i e t z s c h e then conceives o f man and his psychic states as if they were manifestations o f the activity o f dynamic forces. T h u s , the physical interpretation o f the natural world is understood in terms o f human analogy and man is interpreted in terms o f the language o f physical science. T h e latter is illustrated in the claim that the "individual" person is a fictional n o t i o n because der Mensch

eine

Vielheit

von Kräften

47

ist.

The so-

called "faculties" o f man are fictional unities that are useful only to facilitate c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r for the sake o f convenience. T h e various "mental func­ t i o n s " are interrelated: there is no "pure will," no "pure reason," n o "pure feeling." T h o u g h t is a Verhältniszustand

o r a relatedness o f different urges or

passions and every "feeling" has its Quantum

der V e r n u n f t .

48

Psychic states

seem here t o be understood as if they were "constellations" o f quanta in much the same w a y in which, according to the force-point theory, effects are p r o d u c e d b y the activity o f dynamic quanta. In accordance with his t h e o r y o f the "phenomenality o f the inner w o r l d , " N i e t z s c h e is suggesting that each p s y c h i c state (say, anger) is a c o m p l e x o f "forces" that we simplify and arrange into a fictious unified state. N i e t z s c h e tries to probe what Lange called the u n k n o w n origin o f o u r psychic or cognitive-sensory "organization." I f we realize h o w he tries to do s o , we see that we have c o m e full circle in this reductionistic, experimental analysis. If man is abstractly conceived of as a "multiplicity o f forces," then it is o b v i o u s that this is " m a n " as construed in a dynamic theory o f nature. F o r , these " f o r c e s " are the Kraftcentren

that N i e t z s c h e refers t o in a n u m b e r o f

places. T h i s interpretation o f the being of man is, in turn, interpreted in terms o f the activity o f "wills to p o w e r . " Since N i e t z s c h e equates "centers o f force"

47

48

Ibid., 169. Werke, GOA, X V , 419.

A Force-Point World

248

or " p o w e r quanta" with the "radiation o f power-will" (Strahlung twillen)

o r with ein Quantum

„Wille

zur M a c h t , "

49

von

Mach­

w e see that the imaginative

' t h e o r y ' o f a universal will to power (or, m o r e accurately, a plurality o f wills to p o w e r ) is neither a claim to knowledge n o r metaphysical truth. T h e model o f a dynamic force-point-world is only used in a provisional, hypothetical o r heuristic sense insofar as N i e t z s c h e holds that every physical theory is an elaborate world-interpretation

that is supported b y psychistic fictions and

a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m s . M o r e o v e r , given all that he has said (after Lange) about the disrelationship between numerical and symbolic formulae and actuality, a mathematical

physical theory is necessarily understood

as fictional. T h e

assumptions o f physical theory are "ideal" inventions o r "regulative fictions." As w e have seen, the construction o f a force-point-world is primarily for the purposes o f calculation and it is based upon what N i e t z s c h e considers an ideal Erdichtung

( e . g . , a Kraft

residing in mathematische

50

Punkte).

T h e further

interpretation o f "centers o f f o r c e " as "power-wills" o r quanta o f "will to p o w e r " on the basis o f human analogy removes us o n e step away from any real „knowledge" o f the essence o f reality. H u m a n analogy necessarily entails falsification. N o t o n l y that, but the specific argument for the postulation o f a universal will to p o w e r employs conceptions o f human mental activity that N i e t z s c h e consistently regards as

fallacious.

If it is objected that w e cannot use fragmentary notes for a w o r k that was never completed, let us turn to an argument for the principle o f will to p o w e r that is part o f N i e t z s c h e ' s published corpus.

In Jenseits

von Gut und Böse, w e

find a hypothetical argument for the presumable "explanatory" principle o f will to p o w e r . I t is argued that w e m a y suppose that nothing is given to us as real except o u r subjective world o f passions and desires. Given N i e t z s c h e ' s skepticism about "inner experience" and the interpretive nature o f conscious p h e n o m e n a o f experience, the above is truly a supposition and n o t , as D a n t o suggests, a claim to the "reality" o f such states. Granting the supposition, w e might understand the mechanistic world in terms o f eine primitive Welt

der Affekt.

for Affekt

Form

der

W e m a y w o n d e r w h y N i e t z s c h e assumes that w e must l o o k

in the non-human world at all. T h e answers would seem to be ( 1 )

that w e seek to understand the exterior, as Lange argued, in terms o f o u r " i n t e r i o r " subjective experiences; ( 2 ) that man is inseparable from nature and hence m a y be conceived o f as a m i c r o c o s m ; and ( 3 ) that w e cannot think o f activity o r dynamic change without assuming a "feeling" that is directional o r intentional.

49

50

KGW, VIII 3, 50.

Werke, GOA, X I I , 33.

249

A Force-Point World

T h e next step in the argument is to propose a possible unity o f everything before it undergoes ramifications in organic processes (eine Lebens).

Vorform

des

H e r e we must remind N i e t z s c h e that he repeatedly denies that there

are any "unities," any "identical cases," any "self-identical" entities. A

fortiori,

w e would not expect to find a "powerful", stable unity in which everything is synthetically interrelated. Proceeding with his argument, N i e t z s c h e argues that m e t h o d o l o g y demands the assumption o f o n l y one kind o f causality. Since o u r faith in causality (a c o n c e p t called a "conventional fiction" in the same w o r k ) is derived from our belief in the efficacious p o w e r o f the will, let us hypothetically assume a "causality o f the will." T h i s supposed

causality

involves "will" acting on "will." H e r e we find a statement that is often quoted b y c o m m e n t a t o r s o n N i e t z s c h e as if it were crystal-clear. F o r , as we shall see in greater detail when we discuss the p s y c h o l o g y o f willing, N i e t z s c h e denies that there is a " w i l l . " T h e only sense this statement makes is in terms o f his o w n n o t i o n o f "will-points" as centers o f force. B u t to introduce the notion that every " b o d y " is a dynamic system o f "wills" or "under-wills" that act u p o n each other and on other constellations o f "power-wills" at this point in his argument w o u l d entail the illicit anticipation o f a consequence o f the c o n c l u s i o n o f the argument. I n effect, there would be a circularity coiled in the heart o f the argument. N i e t z s c h e ' s next m o v e , then, is to risk the (question­ able) hypothesis that will only acts on will and then interpret mechanistic events as Willenskraft in the Nacblass

o r Willens-Wirkung.

H e r e we recognize the references

to " p o w e r - w i l l " or Kraft

understood as will. O n c e again, this

supposition already presupposes a relation between will and force that the c o n c l u s i o n o f the argument m a y be said to entail. Finally, it is said that given the previous assumptions, w e might trace all the ramifications o f life b a c k t o o n e form o f will, Wille

zur Macht.

T h e r e is a question here whether the

assumed "will to p o w e r " is actually a Grundform an expression

o f will. It would seem to be

o f will or a m o d e o f expressing will as, for example, in a will to

life, a will t o happiness, a will to pleasure, etc. I f Kraft Willenskraft,

is reducible to

this w o u l d n o t entail that it be expressed or manifested as will to

p o w e r o n l y . T h e concluding statement in this argument is the strangest o f all. F o r , it is said that the "effective force" o f the will to p o w e r would be von

innen

gesehen

o r the "world in its 'intelligible character.'"

Die Welt

51

Given N i e t z s c h e ' s skepticism, his view that conceptualization "falsifies," that o u r ' k n o w l e d g e ' o f p h e n o m e n a is only a conditional ' k n o w l e d g e ' that has validity for us, we are unable to k n o w what the w o r l d from within would b e . T h r o u g h o u t this argument, human analogies keep cropping up. T h e notion o f

KGW, VI 2, JGB, 36.

A Force-Point World

250

the " i n n e r " nature o f the world is clearly analogical insofar as it is only in ourselves that we experience subjective, inner states of mind, feelings, drives, desires, passions, etc. Even that there is an "inner" dimension to the world is questionable except o n the analogy o f man's Erlebnis. cal

Finally, this hypotheti­

argument ends b y referring to something that N i e t z s c h e consistently

ridicules: the Kantian n o t i o n o f "intelligible character." In Zur Genalogie Moral,

the Kantian c o n c e p t o f the "intelligibler

characterized as an absurd notion that turns Vernunft "intelligibler lich ist.

52

Charakter"

Charakter gegen

pertains to something that ganz

der

der Dinge" Vernunft.

und gar

is

Kant's unbegreif­

Earlier we had mentioned that N i e t z s c h e does not entirely escape

from the shadow o f the Ding-an-sich.

A n d in the argument we've considered,

it is clear that the idea o f the world determined according to its "intelligible character" as will to p o w e r confronts all o f N i e t z s c h e ' s objections t o a " n o u m e n a l " realm o f "things in themselves." I f we take this conclusion seriously, he is clearly violating his principle that an "unconditioned reality" is inconceivable. F o r , the "intelligible character" o f the world must

be construed

as unconditioned, as something that is not in the world. I n this regard, N i e t z s c h e ' s attempt to offer a philosophical interpretation o f the "effects" disclosed in physical theory runs afoul o f many o f his m o s t consistent criticisms. Aside from the objections raised above, and aside from others that will be presented in a fuller analysis o f the idea o f will to power, it should be noted that the will t o p o w e r is granted causal efficacy: all "efficient force" is attributed t o a will t o power. T h i s is all the m o r e the case because o f the use o f the analogy o f the causal efficacy o f human willing. N o w , if we hold N i e t z s c h e t o this view, then he cannot say, as he does, that the will to p o w e r is that w h i c h expresses itself and discharges its energy through what seem to be particular, discrete power-quanta or aggregations o f power or force centers.

53

T h i s view is

often expressed b y c o m m e n t a t o r s on N i e t z s c h e as meaning that die Welt is will t o p o w e r . H o w e v e r , as the argument that we've analyzed shows, this cannot be the case. T h e Kraft-Quanta

referred to are described as "power-wills" o r

"will-points." T h e s e manifest effects, act upon and react t o , other such quanta o f force. N i e t z s c h e ' s pluralistic reductionism is m o r e consistent than the postulation o f the will to power. F u r t h e r m o r e , he specifically treats the will to p o w e r as causally efficacious and, therefore, he cannot say that it is in its particular ramifications o r manifestations except in a poetic sense. I f the will t o p o w e r is considered as the "intelligible character" o f the world, then it is not understood as being in the world o r in that dynamic, relational c o m p l e x that is

52

Ibid., GM, III, 12.

53

KGW,

VIII 2, 278 f.

251

A Force-Point World

actuality for N i e t z s c h e . M o r e o v e r , what is called "the w o r l d " is repeatedly characterized as a system o f phenomena, a systematic falsification, a construc­ tion, a realm constituted b y o u r senses, o u r reason, o u r needs and o u r psychological prejudices. T h e "relations-world" he speaks o f is a dynamic, constantly changing " s y s t e m " o f changing power gradations and p o w e r rela­ tions. T h e total process o f actuality is n o t a " s y s t e m " at all, but a " c h a o s . " D e s p i t e the various indications found in Nietzsche's biologism, he does n o t conceive o f the world as an organism. F o r , he asserts that die Welt kein

Organism

54

ist, sondern

the Nachlass.

das Chaos.

durchaus

T h i s is n o t merely a passing remark in

I t coincides with a n u m b e r o f quite similar observations and

reflects a formula he does n o t use in his published w o r k s : Natura

sive

Chaos.

Since a chaos would, o f course, be unintelligible, N i e t z s c h e offers a sketch o f this dynamic process in terms o f the action and reaction, the increase and decrease o f power, o f constantly changing, waxing and waning, Quanta.

Macht-

I n a strict sense, neither language n o r conceptualization is adequate t o

describe Wirklichkeit

as N i e t z s c h e construes it. A " w o r l d " , according t o

N i e t z s c h e ' s basic principles, would have t o be a perspectival construction, o n e that w o u l d have t o exclude the pathos-process 55

through Willens-Punktationen.

that is the will t o p o w e r acting

T h e m o s t consistent presentation o f his crea­

tive interpretation o f actuality, as Müller-Lauter has suggested, is a pluralistic one. F o r , it is clear that the idea o f "will-points" is the qualitative interpreta­ tion o f the quantitative constitutents

analysis in mathematical physics o f the ultimate

o f the natural world into "point-centers." I n addition, the

pluralistic understanding o f "will t o p o w e r " is consistent with the analysis o f living bodies in terms o f multiple intentional, volitional strivings for power. In this regard, N i e t z s c h e posits relativ

unities. H e must do so if he is t o present

the kind o f argument for the eternal recurrence o f the same that he does. F o r , in o n e o f his best arguments, he assumes that actuality is comprised o f a bestimmte

Zahl

von Kraftcentren.

I f force-centers, power-centers o r "will-

p o i n t s " are the ultimate relative unities whose interactions comprise actuality, then, if eternal recurrence is t o be conceivable, they must be irreducible dynamische

Quanta.

I f the "will-points" that are referred to are modeled o n

point-centers in physical theory, then the rare occasion o n which Nietzsche speaks o f a "splitting" o f such "points" involves a slip o f the p e n : since such " p o i n t s " are n o t extended, the question o f divisibility is irrelevant. T h e action and reaction o f these force-points generates relatively enduring "effects" and, for this reason, there must be relative unities that appear t o observers to be subject t o a slower t e m p o o f change. In order t o deal with this issue, N i e t z s c h e

54

Ibid., 279.

55

Ibid., 278-279.

252

A Force-Point World

admits that there are "similarities" in the structure o f natural entities even though there is no Gleichheit ähnlich

Qualitäten

or "sameness." F o r our observation there are

or "similar qualities."

56

T h u s , an entity appears subject to

relative endurance b y virtue o f relative unities that undergo

an

apparent

slowing o f tempo. Presumably, "similar" discharges o f force o r Energie that are observed from a human perspective as relatively enduring The

occur

"effects."

recurring tendency (on the part of N i e t z s c h e and many o f his

interpreters) to hold that "effects" are "the will to p o w e r " does not seem to be consistent with m a n y o f his assumptions. If, as D a n t o has said, "an effect 57

might be regarded as the impact o f will upon w i l l , " then it would seem that an "effect" would be the product o f the interaction Konstellationen

not o f t w o "wills," but

o f "will-points." F o r , according to N i e t z s c h e , the simplest

effect is the result o f posited complex processes o r interactions o f "centers o f f o r c e . " If, for example, we observe a small circle that is yellow in c o l o r , these "properties" or these "qualities" would presumably be the "effects" generated by

the action and reaction o f finite, but numerous,

Kraftcentren.

As I

understand N i e t z s c h e ' s point, he is saying that what we experience as effects are the actions and reactions of unperceived force-points that are acting upon the observer ( w h o is also a constellation o f "dynamische Quanta). of

Quanta"

or

Macht-

Put in the language o f his imaginative hypothesis: a conglomeration

"wills to p o w e r " is acting upon another conglomeration o f "wills to

p o w e r . " I f this is a reasonably accurate interpretation o f his view, then all "effects" that are encountered, observed or experienced are not "the will to p o w e r , " but the result o f the interaction

o f dynamic multiplicites o f wills t o

p o w e r , "power-wills" or Willens-Punktationen.

Apart from this relational

interaction there are n o "effects" at all. All o f this may seem strange or exotic until w e realize that what N i e t z s c h e is proposing is analogous to the p r o b l e m o f the effects o f measurement and observation on the "behavior" o f electrons in microphysics. Heisenberg's principle o f uncertainty states that the m o m e n ­ tum and position o f a sub-atomic particle cannot b o t h be determined. I f its position can be estimated, the speed o f its m o v e m e n t cannot be determined and vice

versa.

T h e process o f measurement

and the observer

interference factors that affect the experimental o u t c o m e .

58

introduce

Elementary particles

are conceived o f as producing " f o r c e " and being acted upon b y "forces," as well as manifesting a "field o f force." In microphysical observation, the

56 57

58

Werke, GOA, X I I , 28. Danto, op. cit, 220. Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, New York, 1958, 160. Heisenberg compares the contemporary concept of energy with Aristotle's potentia. This relationship immediately suggests Nietzsche's reference to Kraft as dynamis or "potentiality."

253

A Force-Point World

observer is part o f the experiment and, hence, the "observation plays a decisive r o l e " in the occurrence o f the experimental "event."

59

A general consequence

o f the theoretical w o r k o f Heisenberg is that quantum mechanics does not support the notion o f a purely objective representation of, or description of, natural processes. O r , to put it another way, there is an element o f subjectiv­ ism

in quantum theory. T h i s subjective element cannot be eliminated b y

mathematical precision. F o r , as Heisenberg maintains, almost in the language o f Lange and N i e t z s c h e , When we represent a group of connections b y . . . axioms, definitions and laws which in turn is represented by a mathematical scheme we have in fact isolated and idealized this group of connections with the purpose of clarification. But even if complete clarity has been achieved in this way, it is not known how accurately the set of concepts describes reality. 60

If w e extend the analogy suggested, man is no exception in the physical universe: he, t o o , m a y be construed, somewhat abstractly, as a dynamic system o f " f o r c e s " emanating from hypothetical "points." Assuming such points as hypothetical, an 'individual' would be a highly c o m p l e x energy system comprised o f a vast multitude o f sub-atomic particles that emit force fields. T h i s sketch o f " m a n " (assuming the particles and forces referred to are "theoretical entities") w o u l d be a quantification o f man. Granting this model, any sensory relation between man and any other dynamic "entities" w o u l d necessarily involve interaction. Therefore, on this model, the "effects" that w o u l d be observed would be the result o f the interaction o f t w o (or m o r e ) "constellations o f p o w e r . " I f N i e t z s c h e stopped at this point, he

would

embrace an impersonal process theory of actuality. T h a t such a t h e o r y is present in his writings is clear when we read his advice to Nota Prozesse

als " W e s e n . "

61

Bene:

Die

B u t this picture o f interacting "combinations o f forces"

is a semiotic representation o f actuality, one that is a quantitative conception. A b s t r a c t force o r equally abstract force-points are held to be unimaginable. A t this point, a qualitative

interpretation o f the dynamic theory o f nature is

introduced. It was N i e t z s c h e ' s view that the mechanistic and the dynamic worldinterpretations were ultimately not t o o different from a subjective worldinterpretation. A l t h o u g h the reason that is given for this is weak compared to Heisenberg's sophisticated theory, the o u t c o m e is approximately the same. It is said that the mechanistic world-picture is construed with "extended senses" that nonetheless are o u r senses. W e k n o w , o f course, from other statements,

59

Ibid., 52.

60

Ibid., 107-108. KGW, VII 3, 284. "Processes as 'essence'."

61

254

A Force-Point World

that this is an understatement

o f his conventionalistic understanding

of

science. I n the next breath, he puts forward an argument, as he often does, that presupposes the validity o f his o w n perspectivism that is, in turn, based upon the provisional assumption o f a force-point-world. T h a t is, that the "physi­ cists" left out the perspectivism b y which each Kraftcentrum world from its o w n standpoint.

62

'interprets' the

N i e t z s c h e cannot legitimately use a theory

constructed on the m o d e l o f a Kraft-Punkte-Welt

that is considered pure

invention, symbolization, a hypothetical construct, as a means o f criticizing Physikers. Bild,

I f physicists are collectively charged with creating a subjektive

Welt-

then, o f course, a t h e o r y o f the relativity o f perspective o f supposed

centers o f force must itself be based upon a subjective world-picture. T h a t N i e t z s c h e posits will-points o r power-wills as the creative drive, the inner aspect o f force, indicates an attempt to translate the quantitative into the qualitative b y means o f human analogy. T h e hypothesis o f will to power is, as I've suggested, an attempt to answer the question that is found in Lange's study: what is the hidden "third" that underlies what we consider the mental and the physical? W h a t seems to be suggested in the arguments for a universal Wille

zur Macht

construed as a primitive affect form, as Pathos,

as a striving

conceived o f as if it were "willing," is the kind o f neutral m o n i s m Lange hinted at: that Affekt-Kraft

o r primordial nisus that is that which is transformed into

what we experience as "the physical" and "the mental." T h i s is made explicit w h e n N i e t z s c h e claims that everything we classify as material m a y be c o n s i ­ dered as Bewegung-Symptom

o r " m o t i o n s y m p t o m " for an " u n k n o w n " event.

In the same way, everything that is conscious and felt is a s y m p t o m . Even though the world m a y have other such " s y m p t o m s , " we are acquainted with these t w o aspects. M o t i o n s are signs or s y m p t o m s just as psychic states are. B e h i n d b o t h o f these aspects o f die Welt,

we sense the presence o f Lüste

"desires." A n d the m o s t primordial 'desire' is Wille zur M a c h t .

63

or

T h i s Langean

project o f trying to discover the " u n k n o w n third" is clearly being fulfilled b y N i e t z s c h e ' s postulation o f a universal Pathos expressed through

that pervades all entities and is

Willens-Punktationen.

U l t i m a t e l y , N i e t z s c h e ' s thought-experiment

translates the

quantitative

into the qualitative because the qualitative experiences o f "urges," "desires," "strivings," "passions," "drives," as well as the qualitative "effects"

we

perceive, are m o r e immediate and intrinsic to o u r human perspective. T h e subjective, qualitative world is that which dominates our Erlebnis

even if, like

N i e t z s c h e , we c o m e to see it as illusory, anthropomorphic or a systematic

62

Ibid., 165.

63

KGW, VIII 1, 21.

A Force-Point World

255

"falsification." Phenomenologically, the qualitative nature o f o u r experiences o f everything has a kind o f existential priority over any attempt to reduce a qualitative w o r l d to a quantitative one. The

logico-mathematical symbolization o f the world must exclude any

importation o f goals or "affects" in order to present a consistent quantitative world-interpretation. K n o w l e d g e in scientific inquiry increases b y deleting, as far as possible, qualities. B u t , N i e t z s c h e argues, our sensory experience o f quantities (the large and the small, for example) is such that we convert, as it w e r e , the quantitative into the qualitative in relation to our "conditions o f existence." O u r experience o f qualities presumably has b e c o m e "instinctive" as a result o f a long process o f evolution. T h e "habits o f our senses" are attuned t o qualitative differentiations that have proven serviceable for life. N i e t z s c h e believes that this process o f experiencing the world has evolved, that the m o s t important features o f human development occurred in Urzeiten

("pre-his-

t o r i c " ) times. W h a t seem to some as unalterable "instincts" o r permanent, habitual behaviors are evolved patterns o f behavior.

64

T h e qualitative w o r l d o f

h u m a n experience n o w possesses a sovereignty that dominates not o n l y our sense-experience, but perspektivische

Wahrheit

o u r thinking für uns; kein

as well. T h u s , Die „an s i c h . "

65

Qualität

ist

eine

Qualitative experience is

insurpassable. It is possible, N i e t z s c h e maintains, that quantities m a y be but Zeichen

o r "signs" o f qualities. Insinuating his o w n thesis, he holds that the

desire for an increase in the quantum o f power grows out o f a quality. I f the actual were o n l y comprised o f quantities, it would be "dead" o r lifeless. I f I understand N i e t z s c h e here, he is saying that if o n l y quantities existed, the tension, the Tendenz,

the dynamic thrust we see in living beings would b e

inexplicable and even non-human, non-living beings would lack a dynamic nisus.

T h u s , the reduction, for us, o f qualities to quantities is Unsinn

or

" n o n s e n s e . " Q u a n t i t y and quality appear simultaneously and bear an analogi­ cal relation o n e to the o t h e r .

66

T h e points that N i e t z s c h e makes above are highly compressed versions o f the double-aspect analyses that were extensively discussed b y Lange. W h a t physiologists reduce to quantitative

physical processes, according to

the

revised Spinozistic standpoint Lange examines, is experienced as sensations o r p s y c h i c states. T h u s , subjective qualitative experience is analogical to an ' o b j e c t i v e ' quantitative reduction o f physical events. O f course, Lange and N i e t z s c h e realize that the quantitative interpretation

64

65

66

analysis o f event-sequences is an

that is based upon theoretical posits. Ultimately, quantitative

KGW, IV 2, MAM, I, 2. KGW, VIII 1, 201. "Quality is a perspective truth for us, no 'in itself'." Ibid., 140.

256

A Force-Point World

interpretations o f p h e n o m e n a are considered, as we have seen, as infiltrated b y "subjective" factors, factors that involve the projection o f

"phenomena"

disclosed in an "internal p h e n o m e n o l o g y " into the " o b j e c t i v e " p h e n o m e n a that are being interpreted in a quantitative way. If, as we have seen, we strip the quantitative world-interpretation o f everything "phenomenal," then all that remains are dynamic power-quanta

or force-quanta. A t this point,

N i e t z s c h e argues that a qualitative notion must be experimentally introduced because a purely abstract, quantitative " w o r l d " would lack meaning, m o v e ­ m e n t ( m o v e m e n t being construed as a phenomenal projection), directionality o r intentionality. T h e affects expunged from the quantitative world must be reinstated in order that Kraft

be given a human, qualitative meaning. H e n c e ,

the nisus towards " p o w e r . " Since, in N i t z s c h e ' s view, qualitative understanding

is an ineluctable

feature o f human experience and thought, he remarks that wir können durch nichts verhindern, bloße Quantitäts-Differenzen als etwas von Quantität Grundverschiedenes zu empfinden, nämlich als Qualitäten, die nicht mehr auf einander reduzierbar sind. 67

T h e " k n o w l e d g e " that has gained prestige through science is what pertains to measurement, calculation, weighing, etc. H o w e v e r , this quantitative k n o w ­ ledge is given a qualitative meaning because o f the "values" that pervade o u r senses and, b y implication, our cognitive judgments. T h e qualities that man experiences are idiosyncratic to man, are perspectival. T h e r e f o r e , qualitative interpretation is n o t constitutive o f Wirklichkeit.

Insofar as we understand the

reduction o f the actual to quantities, we tend to interpret these as qualities. T h e r e f o r e , any qualitative understanding o f actuality must be a falsification o r humanization o f the actual. T h e implication o f these observations is that the interpretation o f a provisionally adopted dynamic theory o f " f o r c e - p o i n t s " is a "falsification" or a "humanization" o f "reality" reduced to fundamental quan­ tities. F o r this reason, amongst others, the "hypothesis" o f a universal zur

Macht

is an ineluctably fictional

Wille

Auslegung.

T h e m o s t abstract reduction o f actuality to posited point-centers (that are modeled after mathematical points) is represented in mathematische

Formel.

" M a t t e r " is reduced t o "force-centers" or "power-quanta." T h e translation o f this model o f the actual into the qualitative form embodied in N i e t z s c h e ' s perspectival interpretation yields an anti-mechanistic understanding o f lichkeit.

67

F o r , N i e t z s c h e insists upon the Absoluter

Ausschluß

des

Wirk­

Mechanismus

Ibid., 244. "...we cannot avoid feeling that mere quantitative differences are something fundamentally different from quantity, namely as qualities that cannot be reduced to one another."

257

A Force-Point World und

des Stoffs.

B o t h mechanism and matter are expressions designating the

" l o w e r stages" o f actuality. B o t h represent die entgeistigste fektes

("des Willens

zur M a c h t " ) .

68

Form

des Af­

W h a t is conceived o f mechanistically as the

m o s t reduced form o f materiality is construed as the least spiritual form o f "affect" or wills to power. Since "Gott"

is considered as the high-point o f

" p o w e r , " we see that the qualitative interpretation o f a dynamic theory o f nature reveals a geistige

Hierarchic

In his own way, N i e t z s c h e has attained

what Lange and other G e r m a n thinkers believed was a supreme value: die Einheit

von Geist

und

Natur.

69

T h e means b y which postulated wills to power are said to produce "effects" further indicates that the central hypothesis in Nietzsche's thought, despite his positive and dogmatic assertions about it, is fundamentally fictional. F o r , we have seen that he claims that "will can only act on will." Although he rejects the mechanistic idea o f cause and effect, the action o f one "thing" on another "thing" that results from push and pressure, he formulates a kind o f voluntaristic causation that has often been taken b y commentators on N i e t z s c h e as indisputable. B u t , b y N i e t z s c h e ' s o w n admission, even this mode o f causal efficacy is founded upon a psychische

Fiktion.

In the wake o f criticizing K a n t

for assuming a causal relation between "things in themselves" and between "appearances," he notes that Tatsächlich stammt der Begriff „Ursache und Wirkung", psychologisch nach­ gerechnet, nur aus einer Denkweise, die immer und überall Wille auf Wille wirkend glaubt, - die nur an Lebendiges glaubt und im Grunde nur an „Seelen" (und nicht an Dinge). 70

T h a t "will o n l y acts upon will" is a psychistic belief that is based upon the belief that there are living beings o r "souls", but not "things." In accordance with everything N i e t z s c h e has said about such psychological beliefs, they must be psychic fictions. It is also clear that N i e t z s c h e himself, despite his criticisms o f the idea o f "soul," postulates Unter-Seelen

as the spiritual "will p o i n t s " that

act through all beings. A n d these Willens-Punktationen,

as we have seen, are

qualitative posits modeled upon the "force-points" that were said to be the ultimate constituents o f the natural w o r l d in B o s c o v i c h ' s conception o f a "force-point-world."

KGW, VIII 2, 7 "...the least spiritual form of affect ('of wills to power')." Lange, op. cit., II, 556. "... the unity of spirit and nature." KGW, VIII 1, 133. "As a matter of fact, the concept 'cause and effect', psychologically speaking, only derives from a mode of thought that believes that everywhere and always will acts on will - that believes only in living beings and fundamentally only in 'souls' (and not in things)." Since Nietzsche consistently argues that the idea of cause and effect is a "conventional fiction" that is derived from "psychistic fictions," it would seem that the belief that will only acts on will is precisely such a psychistic fiction.

A Force-Point World

258

In a creative and imaginative way, N i e t z s c h e has synthesized a n u m b e r o f theories, principles and conceptions that he first encountered in his reading o f L a n g e ' s Geschichte

des Materialismus

and later found in his study o f B o s ­

covich. W h a t Lange discusses seratim, N i e t z s c h e sees as a set o f superimpositions. W h a t complicates matters further is that he rarely adopts in toto

any

single theoretical position, but selectively interrelates concepts, principles and theories that are presented

b y Lange separately. T h u s , for example, the

discussion o f the analogical relation between the quantitative and the qualita­ tive w e discussed above is hinted at b y H e l m h o l t z in his Abhandlung Erhaltung

der Kraft

über

die

( 1 8 4 7 ) . H e l m h o l t z points out that science l o o k s upon the

external world in terms o f t w o abstractions: considering entities apart from their effects upon other objects or our senses, we refer to them as " m a t t e r " ; qualitative distinctions cannot be ascribed to matter insofar as they are relative t o ourselves. Matter-in-itself is an abstraction and we cannot conceive o f it except in terms o f change in space o r " m o t i o n . " T h e phenomena o f nature we o n l y k n o w b y virtue o f their "effects." W e argue from these "effects" to a supposed "cause" o f the effects. W h a t is called "matter" is that which produces effects: that is, Kräfte.

Ultimately, we attribute this power to produce effects

t o " f o r c e . " H e l m h o l t z insists that the concepts used in the physical sciences are o n l y assumptions that are a consequence o f o u r w a y o f thinking and are not valid for a grasp o f "absolute reality."

71

T h e panpsychistic tendencies in Nietzsche's imaginative representation o f actuality as a dynamic interaction o f "spiritual" "will-points" or "power-wills" m a y be attributed

to the fact that Lange's critical history o f materialism

contains a bewildering number o f theories that are variations on this theme. F r o m the n o t i o n o f the obscure philosopher D i k a e r c h o s that everything is suffused b y eine allgemeine

Kraft

des L e b e n s

7 2

to the assumption o f U e b e r w e g

that "matter" has "internal states," that it is capable o f "sensations feelings," that "psychical processes" pervade the universe,

73

and

Lange's study

exposits a variety o f panpsychistic theories. Aside from the spiritualistic pluralism o f B r u n o , L e i b n i z , and the suggestion o f something similar in G o e t h e ' s view in Morphologie

(i. e., that entities are comprised o f a multiplici­

ty o f "living b e i n g s " ) , a pluralistic theory o f H e r b a r t ' s is discussed that vaguely resembles N i e t z s c h e ' s notion o f wills to power. It is said that the ultimate existents are simple entities or "souls" that produce "the w o r l d " as representa­ tion from themselves. T h e s e spiritual entities act upon each other and struggle t o avert action u p o n themselves. T h e s e conflicting entities seek self-preserva-

71

Lange, op. cit., II, 661-662.

72

Ibid., I, 141.

73

Ibid., II, 959-964.

259

A Force-Point World

tion b y means o f ideation or Vorstellungen.

Encountering the "resistance" o f

o t h e r such entities, each simple being uses ideation to overcome this resistance. H e r b a r t conceives o f the essence o f the activity o f such spiritual entities as acting upon other simple beings o r reacting to them. Naturally, Lange sees in this t h e o r y an analogy to the physical conception o f "forces" reciprocally related to other forces.

74

I f we consider that on top o f discussions o f panpsychistic theories, Lange frequently expresses the need to breakdown the "antithesis" between material­ ism and idealism, the antithesis between the physical, mechanistic materialistic interpretation o f the world and the subjective, psychological, qualitative and anthropomorphic

world-picture,

we can see that,

amongst

other

things,

N i e t z s c h e grappled with a p r o b l e m that was first set forth b y Lange. F o l l o w ­ ing the suggestion o f Lange and others, N i e t z s c h e sought to divine the nature o f the " u n k n o w n third," the u n k n o w n " f o r c e " that gives rise to the p h e n o m e ­ n a o f the external and the internal worlds. T h e generic name he gives to this mysterious "third" is "will to p o w e r . " A n d the specific, hypothetical 'explana­ t i o n ' o f its dynamic activity is put forward in terms o f a finite plurality o f d y n a m i c "will-points" o r "wills to p o w e r . " G i v e n the account o f the development

o f the qualitative,

humanistic

interpretation o f a mathematical physical theory o f nature, it is clear that it makes no pretension to " k n o w l e d g e " and makes no claims to "truth" (except in a figurative or metaphorical sense). W h a t is sometimes called "nature or c h a o s " is schematized, organized, conceptualized and symbolized in the physical sciences and in the construction o f a "phenomenal w o r l d " that is "true for us." T h i s structuring o r ordering o f a chaotic actuality is itself an expression o f the p a t h o s - i n - p r o c e s s that is designated "will to p o w e r . " A n d the chaos itself is also an expression o f this same Macht

o r Kraft

or Energie

that is the

immanent nisus pervading actuality. T h e c o s m o s is conceived of as a dynamic, relational, self-creating multiplicity o f interpretations. T h e pathos

that under­

lies b e c o m i n g and change and is manifested in chaotic multiplicity is also that w h i c h is believed to underlie "form-giving," form-creating sensation, thought and language. T o m y mind, the most accurate and m o s t succinct formulation for what m a y n o w be called N i e t z s c h e ' s m y t h o f the will to power or o f wills 75

to p o w e r is: Die Welt als ein sich selbstgebärendes

Kunstwerk.

T h i s vision o f

the c o s m o s as a self-creating or, more accurately, self-generating w o r k o f art is N i e t z s c h e ' s perspectival interpretation o f actuality, an interpretation that is a qualitative, anthropomorphic

74

75

understanding

o f a dynamic, physical

Ibid., 820-821. WDB, III, 495. "The world as a self-creating work of art."

Welt-

260

A Force-Point World

Auslegung

that was considered as an "idealization" o f nature. T h i s is as far

removed from any claim to dogmatic, metaphysical truth as one can imagine. The

interpretation o f natural processes in terms o f a tendency

towards

p o w e r that is construed as analogous to the process o f human willing involves the comprehension o f nature as imbued with Geist.

B y virtue o f a n t h r o p o m o r ­

phic analogy and b y virtue o f an inventive interpretation o f B o s c o v i c h ' s t h e o r y o f nature, N i e t z s c h e dematerializes actuality. Natural processes are manifesta­ tions o f creative tendencies, form-giving activity. T h e monistic idea of a single will to p o w e r acting and "interpreting" through all beings seems to be but a general w a y o f referring to the total activity o f a multiplicity o f "wills to p o w e r . " Insofar as N i e t z s c h e insists that each "center of force," each " p o w e r will," each "will-point" views, experiences o r (to use L e i b n i z ' s terminology) "expresses" actuality from its o w n specific

perspective, there is a definite

suggestion o f an individuation o f wills to power. J u s t as each "urge" or "drive" in man strives to attain the maximum power possible, so, t o o , does each "willp o i n t " endeavor to augment its power. I f the multiplicity o f "wills to p o w e r " is a variation, as N i e t z s c h e says it is, o n the Seele-Hypothese,

then the idea o f

the will to p o w e r m a y be understood, as he suggests, as a reductive simplifica­ tion, a "formula"

76

(Formel).

A l t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e refers to a variety o f ways in which a nisus

towards

p o w e r is expressed, m o s t o f these are "masked" modalities o f expression. Since man is the model for the interpretation o f actuality and the underlying basis o f change, it is natural that we should l o o k at human behavior in order to find the m o s t obvious and blatant expression o f will to power. In the passionate craving for p o w e r o r dominance, in the "lust o f power," we find an un­ adorned, undisguised form o f the will to power. Although men, like other

76

Werke, GOA, XVI, 101. In the Nachlass of 1885-1886, man is emphatically described as "eine Vielheit von 'Willen zur Macht'." Each of these hypothetical "wills to power" is construed as having a "multiplicity of means of expression and forms" (einer Vielheit von Ausdrucksmitteln und Formen). KGW, VIII 1, 21. As I've argued, these "wills to power" are synonymous with the "will-points" or "power-wills" that are posited (in terms of an analogy with point-centers in physical theory) in the notes from the late 1880's. To my mind, the idea of the will to power adds nothing to the hypothetical notion of a multiplicity of "wills to power" that are conceived of as imbued with a nisus towards power or the accumulation of power. The pluralistic interpretation of the "inner" nature of Wirklichkeit is consistently defended by Nietzsche from a number of different perspectives. What are called Unter-Seelen in Jenseits von Gut und Böse and Willenspunktationen in the notes of 1887-1888 are tantamount to the Willen zur Macht that are said to comprise the "being" of man and are elsewhere considered the ultimate constituents of all entities. Insofar as these hypothetical "wills to power" are neither material nor extended entities, the provisional, hypothetical interpretation of the nature of the interior dynamics of all actuality is clearly a form of pluralistic panpsychism. The monistic notion of a single Wille zur Macht seems to be only an economical way of referring to the provisional, pluralistic "hypothesis."

A Force-Point World

261

beings, may be unaware o f the drive for power in themselves, some individuals bring this primitive "affect" or tendency to self-consciousness. Although much has been written about "the discovery of the will to p o w e r " , it will be s h o w n , in the following discussion, that it is Lange, o n c e again, w h o provided a clue that N i e t z s c h e uses to solve, in his own unique way, the riddle o f existence.

CHAPTER X THE LUST O F POWER AND THE WILL TO POWER T h e reduction o f the philosophy o f N i e t z s c h e to a phrase, "will to p o w e r , " that has been taken t o mean that man ought to express his insatiable drive for p o w e r in any w a y possible is a gross simplification and distortion. T h a t N i e t z s c h e has been understood to have espoused an activistic, nihilistic pursuit o f p o w e r over others is as unfair as charging a seismologist with desiring, p r o m o t i n g and applauding earthquakes. N i e t z s c h e suspected that his writings might be used b y ideologists to justify attitudes or movements that he w o u l d have repudiated. H e warns, in one o f his prefaces for his revolutionary attempt at a "transvaluation o f values", his potential readers that his b o o k is für Denken

and only for thinking. T h e reduction o f a c o m p l e x pattern o f

philosophical thinking, a multi-dimensional series o f reflections, to a single formula, "will to p o w e r , " confirms N i e t z s c h e ' s notion o f the simplifying tendency o f human thought. It must be said, however, that N i e t z s c h e ' s desire to s h o c k his readers, to give the impression that he was tough-minded in the extreme, does, o c c a s i o n ­ ally, invite misunderstanding. H i s psychological and physical sufferings, his loneliness and perhaps, m o s t o f all, his lack o f recognition prior to his mental illness sometimes led h i m to express himself in intemperate, if n o t inflamatory, language. As N i e t z s c h e k n e w only t o o well, there was a dark streak of nihilism in him that could, at times, not be restrained. H i s contempt for modern man, for decadence, for all that is mean-spirited, paltry, inane and stupid in human life sometimes reached an hysterical peak. I f one l o o k s hard enough for it, one can find a harsh, strident N i e t z s c h e deep within the b o s o m o f the gentle, "soft" N i e t z s c h e . H i s attitude towards " p o w e r " was decidedly ambivalent. A s a y o u n g man he admired the "free p o w e r s " o f natural forces and, in later years, he sometimes transfers that admiration to the new "barbarians o f the twentieth c e n t u r y . " Despite his repeated qualifications o f his idea o f powerful individu­ als, his numerous attempts to separate himself from those w h o admire brute force, there are rare m o m e n t s when he seems to delight in the destruction and perishing he sees on the h o r i z o n , when he relishes the rise o f a new N a p o l e o n out o f the "anarchical collapse o f our entire civilization." I f we are judicious in

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

263

o u r treatment o f N i e t z s c h e ' s writings, we will find that he does not admire naked power, that he foresees and deplores the emergence o f "petty tyrants" (in Zarathustra),

that he does not sanction nihilistic activism. A n d yet his

fascination with Macht

is such that there is a disturbing, subliminal residue o f

sentiments in s o m e o f his writings that cannot be entirely expunged. H e was such a meticulous student o f the lust o f power that, on very rare occasions, his own

thinking was contaminated b y a subject-matter he typically

found

repulsive. T h e refinement o f the conception o f the will to power found in the Nachlass

is usually cited with little o r no c o m m e n t . T h e hypothesis that all

beings are comprised o f "power-wills," "under-wills," o r "wills to p o w e r " was, in effect, a qualitative interpretation o f the dynamic theory o f nature put forward b y B o s c o v i c h , in coordination with something like G o e t h e ' s concept o f organic beings as a conglomeration o f "living beings" that discharge their energies. A s strange as this notion of the Tendenz

pervading all beings is, it is

n o t without precedent in Western o r Eastern thought. W i t h his mastery o f analogical thinking, N i e t z s c h e found relations o f similarity amongst a diversi­ ty o f p h e n o m e n a that issued in a kind o f panpsychistic theory. T h e striving to master a " w o r l d " in which an organism can live, function and prosper is inferred from a variety o f data. T h i s biologism is then transferred to the natural w o r l d in toto. D y n a m i c activity is seen as the essential process that is universal. T h e pluralistic conception o f Willen

zur Macht

is at least a clear one. H o w e v e r ,

w h e n it is said that the will to p o w e r is the pre-form o f life, that it is the "primitive form o f affect," we seem to enter a strange universe o f discourse. W e w o n d e r what a primitive form o f Affekt nothing. I f one says that Affekt

is that is the affect o f no one or

is fundamental in human experience, we can

understand what this means. B u t a primordial "feeling" that is construed as the underlying 'reality' that acts through all beings is virtually a mystical notion. Clarifying his central idea, N i e t z s c h e avers that der Wille zur Macht nicht ein Sein, nicht ein Werden, sondern ein Pathos ist die elementarste Thatsache, aus der sich erst ein Werden, ein Wirken ergiebt.. A l t h o u g h it is tempting to compare this notion to aspects o f A . N . W h i t e ­ head's idea o f the "feeling" that he ascribes to elementary "actual entities," there are problems in doing so. Whitehead's philosophy is very c o m p l e x in itself and his n o t i o n o f "feeling" is m o r e consistent with N i e t z s c h e ' s pluralism than with his monistic formulations. F o r , "all actual entities in the actual w o r l d , relatively to a given actual entity as 'subject', are necessarily 'felt' b y

1

KGW, VIII 3, 51. " . . . the will to power not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos - the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first result from..."

264

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power 2

that subject, though in general vaguely." A kind o f cognitive awareness is attributed to all entities to some degree and this awareness is understood as "feeling." In the m o s t basic entities there is "mutual sensitivity", interaction and a relational b o n d that Whitehead calls "prehension." Despite these and m a n y other relations o f similarity between Whitehead's process theory o f reality and N i e t z s c h e ' s hypothesis o f wills to power, there are many differ­ ences between the t w o interpretations. Invariably, Whitehead refers to "feel­ 3

ing" as a particular, and often speaks o f the " s u b j e c t " o f a feeling. T h e r e is no single pathos

out o f which a ' b e c o m i n g ' issues.

It should be said at the outset that the understanding o f will to p o w e r as pathos

is an anthropomorphic attribution. In his previous uses of the term,

human experiences are obviously intended - e. g., "the pathos Pathos

der Distanz.

o f truth" or der

Because N i e t z s c h e believes that "affects" are basic in man,

he attributes them to organic beings, to all natural beings and to the will to p o w e r . W h e n the will to p o w e r is conceived o f as "passion," "feeling," "suffering" or pathos,

it is still being thought of in terms o f "human analogy."

If this is the case, we may be looking in the wrong place for an answer to this puzzle. Since N i e t z s c h e has precluded any creative being or G o d as "cause" o f the c o s m o s , he must l o o k for the origination o f change in an impersonal Potenz.

O n the other hand, he has long since renounced the Ur-Wille

Schopenhauerian "primal will" that he had spoken of in Die Tragödie. o f der

Geburt

or the der

Although what appears to be N i e t z s c h e ' s considered understanding Wille

zur

Macht

is vaguely reminiscent o f Schelling's idea o f the

dynamic activity o f "willing" lying within what he called the "first p o t e n c y " or the Potenz

der N a t u r ,

4

especially since S e n d l i n g held that the " p o w e r " that

acts through the artist acts through all o f nature, it is possible that N i e t z s c h e m a y have reached further b a c k into another philosophical tradition for his formulation. In Buddhism, a creative G o d is excluded and therefore some other principle or " f o r c e " must be postulated to explain the origination o f beings, the process o f b e c o m i n g and the appearance o f phenomena. T h e Buddhists hold that "desire," "thirst," "longing" or "thirst for life"

(tŗişnā)

gave rise to the c o s m o s and is that which perpetuates the cycle of birth and death, creation and destruction. I f this seems an exotic interpretation, let us listen to what D . T . S u z u k i says about "desire" or "thirst."

2

5

4

A . N . Whitehead, Process and Reality, New York, 1978, 41. Ibid., 221. Cf. Friedrich W . J . von Schelling, Idee zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797); Allgemeine Deduktion des dynamischen Prozesses (1800); Über den wahren Begriff der Naturphilosophie (1801).

265

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

Buddhist philosophy considers tŗişnā or tanhā, or "thirst", the first principle of making things come into existence. It wills to have a form in order to express itself, which means to assert itself. . . . Tŗişnā is the creator of the universe. . . . We as [one of its expressions]... can have an insight into [its nature]... and its working. When we really see into ourselves, tŗişnā will bare itself before itself in us. ... Tŗişnā lies in us not as one of the factors constituting our consciousness, but it is our being itself. . . . As long as we a r e . . . we can never do away with tŗişnā. ... The destruction of tŗişnā will surely mean the annihilation of ourselves. . . . Tŗişnā is . . the basis of all existence. 5

It is interesting to note that Suzuki claims that "craving" or "desire" is deeper than Schopenhauer's " W i l l " and is manifested in the behavior o f physical particles, behavior that can be expressed in mathematical formula because o f the active presence o f tŗişnā interpretation

in such entities! Even m o r e remarkable is that this

o f "craving" includes the n o t i o n that it can be expressed

positively or negatively, that its negative expression takes the form o f a selfish, brutish craving for " p o w e r . " T h e positive expression o f "craving" is expressed in the life-impulse. I f this " f o r c e " is purified

(or, in N i e t z s c h e ' s terms,

"spiritualized"), it can enable an individual to achieve "emancipation." A l ­ though there is n o direct evidence that N i e t z s c h e appropriated

this basic

n o t i o n in Buddhism, he was m o r e than familiar with oriental thought (e. g., t h r o u g h Schopenhauer, the w o r k s o f his friend, Paul Deussen - Das des Vedānta

and Die Philosophie

der Upanishads

or w o r k s , especially the H i n d u Laws

of Manu).

System

- and through other studies Certainly, his poetic interpre­

tation o f 'reality' was one that stretched b e y o n d the confines of traditional W e s t e r n thought. It is possible that he arrived at his idea o f will to p o w e r as a kind o f pathos

that is a Potenz

for form-giving creative expression in " b e c o m ­

ing" independent o f any other notion b y virtue o f the internal development o f his o w n thought. H o w e v e r , the emphasis upon the centrality o f "urges," "cravings," and "drives" in man that are said to be derived from a m o r e primitive form o f "affect" ( = the will to power) suggests something analogous t o the Buddhist c o n c e p t o f

tŗişnā.

T h e reduction o f will to p o w e r to pathos

appears to be one o f N i e t z s c h e ' s

last w o r d s on a theme that runs through his writings. Often, the dithyrambic D i o n y s i a n vision o f the cosmos in an 1885 entry in his notes is taken to be his s u m m a r y o f his " d o c t r i n e . " T h e c o s m o s is pictured as an Ungeheuer Kraft,

ohne

Anfang,

ohne

Ende,

an eternal b e c o m i n g was ewig

a creating and destroying Spiel von

wiederkommen

muß.

6

von Kräften,

T h i s D i o n y s i a n vision o f

the " w o r l d " as will to power clearly indicates, as Heidegger has said in his Nietzsche,

that the idea o f will to p o w e r and the m y t h o f eternal recurrence are

5

D. T. Suzuki, Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist, New York, 1957, 94-95.

6

KGW, VII 3, 338-339.

266

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

intertwined. Der Wille

zur Macht

it is the "longing," the Tendenz,

is that which initiates and sustains

Werden,

the nisus towards p o w e r and perfection that is

the m o t o r force underlying actuality. N o t h i n g would return eternally if it were n o t assumed that a striving towards power is immanent in the cosmic process. F o r , without this c o s m i c nisus there would be nothing that would b e c o m e and there w o u l d be n o b e c o m i n g . A c c o r d i n g to N i e t z s c h e ' s conception o f change, if there were an objective telos

towards which the c o s m o s was moving, it

w o u l d have already been attained. I f a stable, h o m o g e n e o u s state were to be attained, it would have been attained already. I f a perfect state o f h o m o g e n o u s stability had been attained, neither change n o r b e c o m i n g nor life would n o w be possible. F u r t h e r m o r e , if the conatus

o f dynamic change were directed, as

in Spinoza, to a state o f "self-preservation," change should c o m e to an end. Der Satz der Spinoza von der Selbsterhaltung müßte eigentlich der Veränderung einen Halt setzen: aber der Satz ist falsch, das Gegentheil ist wahr. Gerade an allem Lebendigen ist am deutlichsten zu zeigen, daß es alles thut, um nicht sich zu erhalten, sondern um mehr zu werden... 7

N i e t z s c h e does n o t mean to suggest that living beings do not seek selfpreservation at all. R a t h e r , he claims that the primal tendency o f living beings is towards the accumulation o f m o r e " p o w e r " o r to the enhancement o f the feeling o f p o w e r ; self-preservation is a by-product o f this immanent propensi­ ty. N i e t z s c h e seems to think o f this immanent propensity in all beings as a kind o f "longing" or "desire" for more.

Pathos

seems t o b e a kind o f active

p o t e n c y and seems t o be used in the sense o f Kierkegaard's notions o f the "pathos

o f faith" or the "pathos

o f resolve." T h i s retains the G r e e k idea o f

"undergoing s o m e t h i n g ; " but it also suggests something like the subjective human experience o f "longing." Kaufmann's comparison o f will to p o w e r to 8

the G r e e k c o n c e p t i o n o f E r o s is certainly a plausible o n e . B u t there is an ambiguity in regard to the aim o f this "craving," "striving" or "desire." S o m e t i m e s it is said to be Macht o f p o w e r , " the Gefühl

des Macht

itself and sometimes it is said to be "the feeling or

Machtgefühl.

If w e take seriously the admission o f " G o d " as the "high-point of p o w e r , " then it w o u l d , b y implication, seem that every entity that is not G o d must be frustrated in the pursuit o f maximal power. Self-perfection or maximal p o w e r m a y be the aim o f a striving for power, but it is an ideal state that apparently can only be attained b y a divine being. I f each "quantum o f will to p o w e r " strives for a maximal increment o f power, then it would seem to follow that

7

KGW, VIII 3, 93. "Spinoza's law of self-preservation should really put a halt to change: but the law is false, the opposite is true. Every living being directly does all that it can to become more, not [merely] to preserve itself." * Kaufmann, op. cit., 246-256.

267

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

each such entity endeavors to be as like the postulated G o d o f N i e t z s c h e as it can be. N i e t z s c h e ' s typical emphasis, then, is on the process o f striving, on the nisus

immanent

in

"growth,"

o n the endeavor

to achieve

C h a n g e , development, growth seem to entail a Tendenz

"perfection."

towards a condition

o f absolute p o w e r . I f each "power-will" could attain absolute perfection, absolute p o w e r , then the entire cosmos would b e c o m e divine. B u t N i e t z s c h e suggests that the fulfilment o f what m a y be called the Potenz

o f will t o power,

the maximal state o f power, would immediately lead to destruction, to an "undeifying" o f this c o s m i c process. T h i s follows from Nietzsche's repeated belief that the propensity in all beings does not aim at a condition o f

stability.

H e r e a certain c o s m i c aestheticism seems to set in insofar as the c o s m o s understood

as "evolving" towards an ideal state o f p o w e r and perfection

w o u l d presumably attain a state o f equilibrium if a maximal state o f p o w e r were achieved. T h e n o t i o n that destruction or dissolution must o c c u r in the w a k e o f maximal organization or form-creation suggests an artist engaging in destructurization in order to repeat the creative process all over again. H o w ­ ever, all change

is attributed to the striving

for power. T h e implication is that if

maximal p o w e r were attained, change would c o m e to an end. A s in the case o f H e g e l ' s thought, dynamic movement, evolution and change presuppose

a

" l a c k , " a "negativity" at the heart o f actuality. If, as N i e t z s c h e says, there is an "eternal ring o f b e c o m i n g , " then the pathos

or "longing" that is postulated b y

N i e t z s c h e must never be satisfied, the complete attainment o f p o w e r must never occur. N i e t z s c h e ' s experimental speculations about the will to p o w e r seem to lead us into the realm o f the ineffable. A s in the case o f the m y t h o f eternal return, the existential interpretation o f the meaning o f will to p o w e r seems m o r e promising. It is often suggested that the aim o f all beings is the attainment o f the maximal "feeling o f p o w e r . " T h e intention to increase p o w e r is attributed t o all occurrences. A "creative drive" is ascribed to all entities, a striving for mastery, perfection, a willing for m o r e . I n the most familiar form o f existence k n o w n t o us, life, we find a drive towards the accumulation o f "force." A s s u m i n g that "life is a special case" o f will t o power, what do w e find characteristic o f it? : : : :

9

strebt nach einem Maximal-Gefühl von Macht ist essentiell ein Streben nach Mehr von Macht Streben ist nichts anderes als Streben nach Macht das Unterste und Innerste bleibt dieser W i l l e . . . 9

KGW, VIII 3, 54. " . . . [it] strives for a maximal feeling of power: [it] is essentially a striving for more power: striving is nothing other than striving for power: the basic and innermost thing remains this will."

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

268 T h i s Tendenz

in the life o f man takes many forms, some crude and cruel, some

manifesting the highest degree o f "spiritualization" possible. Extrapolating from a n u m b e r o f observations that N i e t z s c h e makes, we c o m e to see that the "sublimation" of, o r the "spiritualization" of, a primitive will to p o w e r that pervades man's being can lead to the maximal attainment o f the "feeling o f p o w e r . " T h e intensification o f this "feeling o f p o w e r " seems t o be the ideal aim o f human Existenz.

Such peak experiences appear to be high-points in the

experience o f "self-overcoming." W h a t N i e t z s c h e seems to suggest is a trans­ cendence in temporality o f the "human, all-too-human." T h e highest affirma­ tion o f existence would

be one made in the face o f the most negative

possibility. T h e "will to nothingness" is a turning o f life upon itself, a turning o f the will to p o w e r against itself that signifies decadence. T h e spiritualization o f the pathos

o f will to p o w e r in its maximal expression would presumably

bring about a transforming state o f being. T h e dynamic energy o f "the will to p o w e r " o r o f "wills to p o w e r " would receive its most creative expression in m o m e n t s o f D i o n y s i a n affirmation. B y emphasizing the feeling o f p o w e r , N i e t z s c h e seems to be thinking o f a peak experience involving an intensifica­ tion o f Existenz.

D e l e u z e ' s claim that the affirmation o f eternal return gener­

ates an orientation towards the world that is an active state o f existence when the idea o f eternal recurrence is linked with nihilism is, I believe, on the right track. H e sees this existential state as resulting from une negation negation.

10

de la

Since, as we have seen, N i e t z s c h e characterizes eternal recurrence

as the m o s t extreme form o f nihilism, the affirmation o f this "thought o f t h o u g h t s , " this "abysmal thought," requires courage and heroic stamina. T h e acceptance o f eternal return as if it were 'true,' the belief in its 'truth', is the acceptance o f the m o s t nihilistic idea. A n affirmation of Existenz such a thought

so transforms

the individual

in the face o f

that nihilism is negated

in

existence. T h a t is, the m o s t intense affirmation o f existence possible is attained and the Ü b e r w i n d u n g des Nihilismus

is attained in existence.

T h i s state w o u l d

be the greatest possible "feeling o f p o w e r . " Heidegger's contention that the eternal recurrence o f the same belongs with the will to p o w e r

11

is entirely justified. H o w e v e r , his emphasis upon the

priority o f Being, as well as his view that all Sein is Werden,

is questionable.

N i e t z s c h e is not, as Heidegger says, seeking "the Being o f b e i n g s . "

12

T h e key

passage that Heidegger focuses upon is an important one that has a meaning that he does not consider. U n d e r the rubric Rekapitulation,

10

11

12

Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophic Paris, 1962, 80-81. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Pfullingen, 1961, I, 15.

Ibid., I, 26.

N i e t z s c h e offers a

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

269

c o m p a c t formula for his thought that gives us a profound insight into his project. Dem Werden den Charakter des Seins aufzuprägen - das ist der höchste Wille zur Macht. ... Daß alles wiederkehrt, ist die extremste Annäherung einer Welt des Werdens an die des Seins - Gipfel der Betrachtung. 13

T h i s passage is crucial not only because o f the emphases on phrases that are o b v i o u s l y important to N i e t z s c h e , but because it is one o f the rare instances in w h i c h eternal return and will to p o w e r are linked. Heidegger takes literally the B e i n g o f the b e c o m i n g o f will to p o w e r (its "what and h o w " ) as the eternal recurrence o f the same

14

and thereby converts N i e t z s c h e ' s cryptic statement

into a metaphysical principle. Earlier, Karl Jaspers had reached the conclusion that N i e t z s c h e ' s "metaphysical doctrine" proclaimed what being is: " B e i n g is the eternal

recurrence

15

of all things. "

It is surprising that t w o o f the m o s t astute

interpreters o f N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophy should take the assertions in the crucial passage cited as comprising a metaphysical claim and as a positive assertion o f the imposition o f Sein

on Werden.

W h a t N i e t z s c h e actually says is that the

imprinting of, o r imposition of, the character o f Being on " b e c o m i n g " would be the highest expression o f will to power. In addition, he specifically avers that the idea o f eternal return o f the same would be the closest

approximation

o f a world o f b e c o m i n g to a world o f being. Finally, w h y is it said that the thought o f this relationship between a realm o f b e c o m i n g and a realm o f being w o u l d be a "peak o f meditation"? Despite his psychological reaction to the idea o f eternal recurrence and his glorification o f its presumed effect upon mankind, N i e t z s c h e puts forward

this idea as an hypothesis, a thought-

experiment. A t times, he specifically refers to it as an as if notion. B e r n d M a g n u s ' recent interpretation o f the meaning of eternal recurrence is persua­ sive: it is an allegorical c o u n t e r m y t h that makes no claim to truth and it is a "conceptual

representation

of a particular

attitude

toward

life",

an attitude

towards life that entails the overcoming o f nihilism and is that life-affirming attitude expressed b y the Ü b e r m e n s c h .

1 6

A n o t h e r equally ingenious interpreta­

tion o f the meaning o f the affirmation o f eternal recurrence precludes any relation to will to power, but defends the notion that N i e t z s c h e sees the idea o f eternal recurrence as a means of overcoming nihilism, o f transfiguring the "human, all-too-human"

13

14

15

16

into the "over-human."

It is said that a certain

KGW, VII 1, 320. "To imprint on becoming the character of being - that is the highest will to power... That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being - peak of meditation." Heidegger, op. cit., I, 27. Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to an Understanding of His Philosophical Activity, trans. C. Wallraff and F.Schmitz, Tucson, 1966, 430. Magnus, op. cit., 142.

270

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

orientation towards the world and existence "produces eternal return," that what is sought is the transformation of nausea and suffering (as in

Zarathustra)

into j o y . Finally, it is held that those w h o live in eternal recurrence undergo a long process o f "transfiguration" that enables them to live " b e y o n d good and evil."

17

T h i s view o f N i e t z s c h e ' s idea o f eternal recurrence is questionable o n

t w o scores: invariably, N i e t z s c h e emphasizes the effects on an individual w h o accepts the n o t i o n o f eternal recurrence and not some prior

"orientation"

towards the w o r l d and life; in addition, the relation between will to p o w e r and eternal recurrence is ignored and the interpretation is thereby weakened. Magnus seems closer to the truth when he stresses the existential signifi­ cance o f the thought o f eternal recurrence and its role as an acid test for Ubermenschlichkeit.

B u t , once again, the association between will to p o w e r

and eternal recurrence is obscured. B y pointing to the fact that the act o f imprinting eternal return o n becoming would be the highest expression o f will t o power, N i e t z s c h e seems to be saying that the conceptual act o f organizing the chaos o f b e c o m i n g b y imposing the idea o f eternal recurrence (the " m o s t extreme form o f nihilism") on it as if it were " B e i n g " would be the m o s t spiritual expression o f will to power. T h a t becoming eternally returns suggests a permanent order that becoming is subject to in actuality. H o w e v e r , we must remind ourselves what N i e t z s c h e has said about "being." H e has surely not forgotten that he has characterized it as a "fiction," a category that is useful, but falsifying. I n an illuminating note written in J u n e or J u l y o f 1 8 8 5 , N i e t z s c h e separates his thinking from Platonism. H e declares that he, unlike Plato, does not believe that there are any eternal concepts, values or forms. F r o m the study o f language, he continues, we see that concepts have evolved, are still evolving. T h e m o s t general conceptions are the oldest and thereby the m o s t false conceptions. „Sein," „Substanz" und „Unbedingtes", „Gleichheit," „Ding" - : das Denken erfand sich zuerst und zu ältest diese Schemata, welche thatsächlich der Welt des Werdens am gründlichsten widersprachen... 18

T h e use o f the concept "being" entails the imposition of stability and perma­ nence o n an actuality that is unstable and impermanent; its use, then, entails falsification. I f we speak instead o f a "world o f being," we have seen that there is no such w o r l d , that it would be the mythical Platonic realm o f eternal perfection. T h e r e are few ideas that N i e t z s c h e has attacked so much as the

17

18

Tracy Strong, Fredrick Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, Berkeley, 1975, 276, 282, 292. KGW, VII 3, 341. "'Being', 'substance' and 'unconditioned,' 'sameness,' 'thing' - : thought devised for itself these schemata at the first and earliest period, which, in fact, contradict the world of becoming most thoroughly."

271

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

n o t i o n that there is a "world o f being," that there is a "real" world o f perfect, eternal forms o r "Ideas." W h e n it is said, at one point in the Nachlass, m o s t extreme m o d e s o f thought are brought together als Ideale o f eternal return - die mechanistische

und die platonische

that the

in the concept this seems to

confirm the views o f those w h o interpret the eternal recurrence as a m y t h . F o r , N i e t z s c h e has repeatedly rejected Platonism in any form and, therefore, can o n l y be referring to a purely fictive "ideal" - that the " f o r m " o f the c o s m o s m a y be construed as "eternal recurrence." M e c h a n i s m has been criticized frequently

and it has been described as an ideal, regulative method

that

involves falsification o f the actual insofar as it assumes causality and "things" o r " o b j e c t s " related in a causal sequence. Since N i e t z s c h e regards mechanism and Platonism as fallacious

systems o f thought, the suggestion that they are

" r e c o n c i l e d " in the idea o f eternal recurrence indicates the purely imaginative, hypothetical nature o f the idea. W h a t strongly suggests the existential significance o f the whole-hearted acceptance o f eternal return as "true" is that the imprinting o f Being on " b e c o m i n g " is, in the c o n t e x t o f N i e t z s c h e ' s thought, absolutely paradoxical. N i e t z s c h e rarely refers to Sein

except in a negative, critical o r ironical sense.

F r e q u e n t l y , he uses "being" as s y n o n y m o u s with a conceptual determination that entails fixity, permanence and immutability. H e reverses Parmenides' formula. Parmenides hat gesagt „man denkt das nicht, was nicht ist" - wir sind am anderen Ende und sagen „was gedacht werden kann, muß sicherlich eine Fiktion sein". 20

E v e n if w e grant exaggeration here, this general position is not incompatible with the critique o f knowledge we have already considered. Sein is seen as one o f the basic categories o f reason that is highly useful for classification, is one o f those primal concepts that man's psychic prejudices and needs engendered or it is one o f the earliest creations o f putative "artists in abstraction" w h o formu­ lated it. T h e radical disrelationship between being and b e c o m i n g is reinforced b y the belief that o u r Seins-Schema entities.

21

enables us to think of fingierten

o r "fictitious"

A n d this scheme, as we have seen, is derived from o u r belief o r

"feeling" that o u r " e g o " is a stable, permanent "being." A t a conceptual level, the attempt to relate being to becoming necessarily involves "falsification." T h e " t h o u g h t " o f eternal return as the closest approximation o f being t o b e c o m i n g is the thought o f an absolute paradox that serves to generate an

19

20

21

WDB, III, 919. KGW, VIII 3, 124. "Parmenides said, 'one cannot think of what is not' - we are at the other end and say, 'what can be thought of must certainly be a fiction.'" KGW, VIII 2, 55.

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

272

intense feeling. J u s t as Kierkegaard thought that the idea o f an eternal being ( G o d ) c o m i n g into existence in time was the "absolute paradox," so, t o o , does N i e t z s c h e suggest that the n o t i o n that the endless process o f b e c o m i n g can be approximated to the idea o f being as the eternal recurrence o f the same is a reason-destroying

paradox that can o n l y be felt, believed, or willed.

The

t h o u g h t that is considered here is intended as a means o f generating a high p o i n t o f meditation that completely transforms the individual w h o accepts it. T h i s peak o f meditation requires a spiritual expression o f the will to p o w e r that wills the "meaningless forever." B u t the importance o f this ecstatic state o f being is the "feeling o f p o w e r " that is experienced, the sense that o n e has transcended time and history and the all-too-human. T h e D i o n y s i a n affirma­ tion o f the process o f b e c o m i n g as an endless process transforms what w o u l d crush others w h o (understandably) cringe in the face o f the terror o f eternal r e t u r n : in effect, an existential Selbstaufhebung The

is attained in experience.

maximal spiritual expression o f will to p o w e r is the will to have

everything, every detail o f o n e ' s life, every event, o c c u r again and again. A n intense and joyful affirmation (Seligpreisung)

o f the process o f b e c o m i n g with

its i n c o n g r u e n t features, its antithetical character, in the light o f eternity is a maximal e p o c h o f " p o w e r . "

22

T h e analogy with " G o d " is clear and it w o u l d

seem that the experience in pathos

o f the meaning o f eternal return enables an

individual to attain a " g o d - l i k e " feeling o f p o w e r and liberation. R e t u r n i n g to the passing reference to a " E u r o p e a n form o f B u d d h i s m , " w e m a y say that the

Werke, G O A , X I V , 301. Cf. Joan Stambaugh, Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Return, Baltimore, 1972, 16. In Ecce Homo, Jenseits von Gut und Böse and Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, as well as in a number of notes, the experiential significance of the "thought" of eternal return is emphasized. The appropriation of this "abysmal thought" in the pathos of experience seems to be a way of overcoming nihilism. In terms of conceptual thought alone, nihilism cannot be surpassed: the only way out of the labyrinth of nihilism is by means of a profound, intense experience that liberates the individual at least at peak moments of existence. The conceptualimaginative projection of eternal recurrence as a mere hypothesis is presumably not enough. In order for an individual to be transfigured or transformed by the idea, it must be appropriated. The affirmation of this thought, as appropriated, is the highest expression of will to power. The subjective appropriation of the thought of eternal recurrence is a "disciplinary thought" for the Übermenschen of the future. Nietzsche suggests that the appropriation of the thought of eternal return generates the highest "feeling of power". The appropriation of the thought of eternal return would entail the experience of "truth." For, the central criterion of "truth" is the enhancement of the feeling of power. "Das Kriterium der Wahrheit liegt in der Steigerung des Machtgefühls." Werke, G O A , XVI, 45. This "truth" is not a cognitive truth and certainly not a "conditional truth". It is clearly intended as a "lived-truth," an existential truth. The Ja-sagen to the eternal recurrence of the same abolishes "truth" in the sense of "ugly" truth or nihilism. In Die Geburt der Tragödie the "truth" that art enables us to endure is Nihilismus. But truth in this sense is not the "supreme power." The "will to illusion" in art surpasses negative truths. KGW VIII 3, 21. Thus, the "truth" referred to in terms of the enhancement of the feeling of power is a kind of existential-aesthetic "truth." And such a truth is experienced or "lived" if and when one completely appropriates the "thought of thoughts": eternal recurrence.

273

The Lust of Power

ecstatic state o f existence that N i e t z s c h e refers to entails the affirmation o f an endless cycle o f birth and death, creation and destruction, without any desire t o escape, as in Buddhism, from this process. T h i s view is " E u r o p e a n " because it affirms existence, accepts the reality o f this world and " b e c o m i n g , " the reality o f all o f the antithetical features o f existence and seeks no exit from "the wheel o f birth and death." R a t h e r than seeking to efface effort, striving, attachment, desire or "will to p o w e r , " N i e t z s c h e insists that these be affirmed. In the experience o f maximal life-affirmation there is the fullest enhancement o f the feeling o f power that eternalizes that m o m e n t and satisfies the longing for

"deep eternity" referred to in Also

sprach

Zarathustra.

In such peak

m o m e n t s , the conceptual and theoretical ladders that have enabled one to reach this peak are jettisoned and what remains is the experiential fulfilment o f the striving for p o w e r in

pathos.

W e have c o m e a long way from Lange's sober skepticism and relativity, his theoretical caution and unartistic reserve. H o w e v e r , N i e t z s c h e was started on the path to these radical thought-experiments b y Lange. F o r , it was Lange w h o first taught N i e t z s c h e to l o o k for the hidden presence o f a "lust o f p o w e r " in man. A n d it was Lange w h o suggested the way out o f the skeptical and relativistic circle that he himself created. N i e t z s c h e adopts an anti-metaphysi­ cal stance, but does not exclude, thanks to the suggestions o f Lange, aestheti­ cally conceived standpoints o f the ideal. Although Nietzsche's imagination soars b e y o n d anything Lange would probably have anticipated, it was Lange w h o pointed the way. L e t us see what he had to say about the "lust o f p o w e r " and what he and others said about the concept o f "will." L o o k i n g backward, w e m a y discern the path that was cleared for N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophical experimentalism.

The

Lust of

Power

As we have seen in o u r discussion o f the problem o f Christianity, Lange had an instinctive dislike o f the religiously colored pursuit o f power. In a n u m b e r o f places in his history, he attacks sacerdotal hierarchies in tones that already have a Nietzschean sound to them. T h e leaders o f the Assassins represented

to him the dreadful

combination o f fanaticism, cruelty

and

religiosity. I f he had been familiar with oriental culture, he would have found a similar mixture o f sentiments and behaviors in the Indian cult o f Kāli, the goddess o f destruction in whose name r o b b e r y and murder were justified b y the Thugge

w h o were her ardent followers. Although Lange seems t o accept

H a m m e r ' s account o f the Assassins uncritically, the observations cited from the latter's Geschichte

der Assassinen

are not without historical support. T h e

274

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

p o w e r and influence o f ecclesiastical groups in Western and Eastern history has been e n o r m o u s and they have sometimes used very unholy means indeed t o achieve their ends. B o t h in India and in E u r o p e the influence o f religious leaders o n political and social practice has been unconscionable and has been carried out with a cunning that matches the secular practice o f

Realpolitik.

H a m m e r ' s comparison o f the Jesuits with the Assassins is extreme and unfair, but, as F ü l ö p - M i l l e r ' s judicious study (The Power

and Secret

of the

Jesuits)

shows, the J e s u i t s ' religious teleology often led them to adopt the principle that "the end justifies the m e a n s . "

23

W h a t seems to fascinate H a m m e r , Lange

and N i e t z s c h e is the religious mask that hides a "lust o f p o w e r . " T h e nihilism o f the Assassins is a perversion o f the religious impulse as, today, terrorism is a perversion o f political aspirations. T h e unholy marriage o f religiosity and political p o w e r produces increased p o w e r (Herrschsucht).

T o this observation

o f H a m m e r ' s Lange adds the following: wo wäre eine Priesterschaft, die nicht herrschsüchtig wäre, und wie kann Religion noch das Heiligste der Menschheit sein, wenn ihre ersten Diener in ihr nichts finden, als ein Mittel, ihre Herrschsucht zu befriedigen. 24

T h i s prejudicial, but n o t absolutely unwarranted observation, is one that N i e t z s c h e seems to make his o w n . F o r , he simply starts with the assumption that the ascetic, religious personality is motivated b y a desire for power. In effect, he, like Lange, generalized about a human type and presented a portrait o f this "ideal t y p e " as if it were a completely accurate one. O n e o f N i e t z s c h e ' s weaknesses as a thinker is his repeated habit o f generalizing about a human type, creating an "ideal" version o f this type, and then treating it as if it were a real human type with a rigid set o f attitudes, beliefs and values. W h a t he actually does is to represent

an "ideal t y p e " that is constructed out o f

impressionistic, fragmentary and often prejudicial phenomenological bits and pieces. W h a t N i e t z s c h e lacked was D i l t h e y ' s ability to present a reasonably well-rounded portrait o f an Ideal

Typ.

Lange does not only find a drive for power in priestly castes, but he sees the same motive operative in philosophies as well. T h e philosophy o f H o b b e s , for

example, is characterized as the expression o f the national spirit o f a

practical people "striving after p o w e r and wealth." Pointing t o D e s c a r t e s ' valuation o f his physical theories, he observes that Descartes saw the value o f

23

24

René Fülop-Miller, The Power and Secret of the Jesuits, New York, 1930, 150 ff. Lange, op. cit., I, 221 n. "...when was there ever a priesthood that was not ambitious; and how can religion be the most sacred element of humanity if its first servants find in it only a means to satisfy their desire for power?"

275

The Lust of Power

physics for a practical philosophy that would enable men, through a k n o w ­ ledge o f the forces o f nature, to b e c o m e Herren In the course o f examining the "Regeneration

und Eigentümern

25

der

Natur.

der Wissenschaften,"

Lange

makes m a n y references to the importance o f the resurgence of interest in the natural sciences for the advancement o f civilization and culture. In passing, he makes a n u m b e r o f observations that will be simply cited because o f their possible or p r o b a b l e relation to N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking. It is mentioned that K e p l e r was animated b y a haughty freedom o f thought and prided himself on being animo

liber

o r a "free spirit." B r u n o ' s conception o f entities as imbued

with an "active p o t e n c y " is referred to and emphasis is placed upon the n o t i o n that the sensible appearances o f entities are consequences o r effects o f a continuous active p o t e n c y that manifests itself through "development." Lange understands Paracelsus' exotic interpretation o f nature as animated b y Spiritus as tantamount to the modern conception o f Kräfte.

B a c o n ' s attribution o f

" p e r c e p t i o n " to non-living entities is mentioned and so is his valuation o f the restoration o f science for the sake o f mastery o f nature. Lange, in typical fashion, calls attention to the strange mixture in representatives o f sixteenth and seventeenth century thought of anthropomorphism and scientific acu­ men.

26

A l t h o u g h I am n o t suggesting that N i e t z s c h e accepted any or all o f

these ideas, they did seem to insinuate themselves into his thinking in an indirect way. I n the case o f Kepler's reference to himself as den Mann Geistes,

freien

it is n o t improbable that N i e t z s c h e may have adopted this phrase

w h e n he subtitled Menschliches,

Allzumenschliches,

Ein Buch für freie

Geister.

R e t u r n i n g to the theme o f a "lust for p o w e r " in man, Lange reflects on the question o f the Zeitgeist

o f the third quarter o f the nineteenth

century.

A l t h o u g h he champions the rise o f scientific theory and experiment and praises the refinement o f Methode

in the exakten

Wissenschaften,

he casts a jaundiced

eye u p o n the growing desire for material comfort and material gain. Even t h o u g h he was n o t a dogmatic socialist and was, in fact, skeptical o f some o f the goals o f socialism, he did share a critical evaluation o f bourgeois political e c o n o m y and the passion to accumulate wealth. T h e r e is a natural transition in L a n g e ' s reflections from an examination o f the core o f H o b b e s ' socio-political t h e o r y to Mandeville's Fable

of the Bees,

to the English political economists

and t o the footnote reference to the critique o f political e c o n o m y in K a r l 27

M a r x ' s Das Kapital.

25

26

27

Although N i e t z s c h e p r o b a b l y did not read M a r x h i m -

Ibid., 250-251. Ibid., 188-232. Ibid., 298 n. In this second edition of his work Lange specifically refers to Marx's belief that Mandeville was a precursor of Adam Smith. In the first edition of the Geschichte, Lange briefly mentions Smith and links Mandeville's cynical views with Volkwirtschaftslehre. Cf. GdM, 502, 508, 513, 523.

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

276

self, there is evidence that, at one time, he sympathized (at a considerable distance) with the plight of the workers

and believed that if e c o n o m i c

conditions were n o t improved a revolution would be forthcoming. T h i s phase o f N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking definitely indicates the influence o f the sentiments o f Lange and perhaps the early and temporary socialist sympathies o f Richard W a g n e r . T h e point that Lange made was that the egoistic self-interest that H o b b e s attributed to man in general (what Lange calls the "egotistical rabble o f human beings" that H o b b e s depicts) has been exacerbated b y the rise o f scientific t e c h n o l o g y and the accumulation o f wealth on a large scale. H o b b e s ' vision o f the war o f all against all, the inevitable clash o f egoistic interests (in the absence o f a ruling absolute sovereign) is seen as a foreshadowing o f nineteenth century egoism. In passing, Lange calls attention to the appropri­ ateness o f H o b b e s ' name for the State-Leviathan - insofar as it is indeed an Ungetüm, and

a " m o n s t e r " that ordains law and judgment, right and possession

determines

good and evil b y arbitrary

fiat.

28

W h e n , in

Zarathustra,

N i e t z s c h e seeks an appropriate metaphor b y which to describe the State, he characterizes it as das kälteste

aller

kalten

29

Ungeheuer.

Lange associates the cynical theory o f Mandeville with the extreme views of

the " M a n c h e s t e r s c h o o l " o f political e c o n o m y . In Fable

of the

Bees,

Mandeville proposed that the vitality o f a social system is found in the egoistic pursuit o f self-interest on the part o f each person in a struggle with others. I f selfishness were artificially removed from man's nature and altruism put in its place, the social mechanism would c o m e to a standstill because egoism is the motive force in civilization. H i s famous cynical formula was: private vices lead t o public welfare. S o m e w h a t modified and softened, this orientation towards society was adopted, M a r x thought, b y Adam Smith in terms o f each person pursuing his or her e c o n o m i c self-interest. Lange discerns a recrudescence o f egotistic self-interest in the nineteenth century and cites as a case in point the philosophy o f M a x Stirner. M a n y have wondered whether N i e t z s c h e had read Stirner because o f the alleged similarities in their views. W h i l e it is doubtful that N i e t z s c h e actually read Stirner, he was familiar with the summary o f his t h e o r y he found in Lange's history. It is said that Stirner argues, in Einzige

und Sein Eigenthum

Der

( 1 8 4 5 ) , that everything that places itself above the

individual is a hateful limitation. O n l y out o f the unlimited " E g o " can one generate every kind o f idealism as my will, my idea. Stirner den

Willen

dermaßen,

daß er als Grundkraft

betont

des menschlichen

28

Ibid., 256.

29

KGW VI 1, AzZ, "Vom neuen Götzen." " . . . the coldest of cold monsters."

in der Tat Wesens

er-

277

The Lust of Power

scheint.

30

F o r L a n g e , Stirner is a sign o f the times, a sign, as he later calls it, o f

"disintegrating egoism." On

the occasion o f discussing D a r w i n ' s theory o f evolution and

the

"struggle for existence," Lange associates this with the sad facts unearthed b y political e c o n o m y : the struggle for survival in society, the effects o f misery and famine on the regulation o f population.

31

A s we have seen, Lange suggests that

man's struggle for survival required his conquest o f animals; this must have required a great deal o f cruelty and cunning. T h e "savage violence" o f man's ancestors has not entirely disappeared and, from time to time, in isolated cases, it breaks out again. N o t only that, but the struggle for survival in civilization still continues in the form o f competition for food and goods, in e c o n o m i c conflict. A t times, Lange c o m e s very close to offering a rudimentary sketch o f what later will b e c o m e "social D a r w i n i s m . " H e does not endorse it; he merely describes it. I n Lange's observations on political e c o n o m y , we find two notions that p r o b a b l y caught N i e t z s c h e ' s eye. H e argues that the assumption o f individual " m o b i l e atoms

o f s o c i e t y " in political e c o n o m y is a fictional

heuristically valuable "hypothetical assumption"

notion,

a

that gives us access to a

dimension o f human existence, o f e c o n o m i c behavior, that is useful for an understanding o f man and society. T h e r e is, in modern society, an increase in human needs under the influence of e c o n o m i c realities that grow m o r e rapidly than they can be satisfied. T h e r e is a direct tie between political e c o n o m y and egotism: a drive for capital accumulation, material acquisition and the pursuit o f c o m f o r t and pleasure are the central aims o f modern man. In general, Lange sees an increase in individualism,

an increase in egotism, an increase in

e c o n o m i c materialism and needs that appears in the drive for acquisition. O n this point, he makes a psychological observation that may have suggested the idea that man always strives for more

to N i e t z s c h e . H e maintains that men

claim to seek happiness, but this is a relative feeling. W h a t actually is desired is the feeling o f difference, a feeling o f an increase o f quantity. Acquisitiveness seems to be a striving for pre-eminence, a desire "to surpass o t h e r s " that is

30

Lange, op. cit., II, 529. "Stirner puts so much stress upon the will, in fact, that it appears as the root force of human nature." In the first edition of his work, Lange makes a reference to Stirner's Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum and makes the same remark. GdM, 292.

31

Ibid., 692.

32

Ibid., 899-901.

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

278

capable o f increasing ad infinitum.

Lange sagaciously observes that the egoism

and acquisitiveness o f modern man points b a c k to a natürliche

Egoismus.

33

T h e " e n o r m o u s development o f p o w e r and wealth" that is taking place in E u r o p e , Lange believes, indicates a pursuit o f "selfish interests", an egoism that may signal the emergence o f a new morality that will replace that o f Christianity. Despite his sympathies with socialism, Lange speaks in favor o f the repression o f "self-denying altruism" and the pursuit o f individual selfinterest as a possible means to "moral progress." Although Lange is here cautiously considering the value o f egoism, he insinuates that it is possible that the uncovering o f self-interest in political e c o n o m y may reveal something that might lead to "moral and intellectual progress." W h a t is especially interesting is that he realizes that the avoidance o f an inclination to care for the interests o f others requires considerable Selbstüberwindung. windung"

T h e value o f the

"Selbstüber­

o f " s y m p a t h y " is expressed because Lange sees that "many attempts

t o make m e n h a p p y " have caused havoc on earth. A t the same time, in nations in w h i c h individuals pursued their own interests wealth and prosperity fol­ lowed. Lange's point is that Sympathie

has often caused harm to mankind.

Finally, it is said that the recovery o f a child-like naive egoism would be a recovery o f an " i n n o c e n c e " in which the good is done unconsciously. W h a t Lange is proposing is a modified, purified egoism, an "enlightened e g o i s m " that may be an appropriate morality for "transitional periods."

34

Lange is n o t

proposing a "dogmatic egoism", brutal selfishness o r a competitive desire t o o v e r c o m e others. T h i s aspect o f man unveiled in political e c o n o m y is the acquisitive greed behind the mask o f "free trade" and a laissez

faire

S u c h an immoral egoism is derived from der rein atomistischen

Auffassung

Gesellschaft.

35

I t is this kind of aggressive, selfish egoism that

criticizes in his Meditation

economy. der

Nietzsche

on Schopenhauer. I t creates an atomistisches

Chaos.

T h e r e is little doubt that N i e t z s c h e appropriated Lange's description o f the "social a t o m i s m " that he held was supported b y the defenders

of

Vol­

36

kswirtschaftslehre.

T h e r e is little d o u b t that N i e t z s c h e was influenced b y Lange's ironic and critical understanding o f the

33

34

35

36

"new

morality"

proposed

by

the

political

Ibid., 906. At one point, Nietzsche relates the localization of "atoms of force" to the inevitability of perspectival egoism in living beings. He remarks that "ein lebendiges Wesen durch und durch 'egoistisch' ist." KGW VII 3, 284. In the first edition of his critical history, Lange also refers to "die rein atomistische Auffassung der Gesellschaft" and "the 'moving atoms in society'" in the same context. GdM, 503, 516. Ibid., 908-911. Ibid., 911. Karl Marx had described the "egoistic individual of civil society" as "an atom" and called the "atoms of civil society" "egoistic men." Cf. Die heilige Familie, Frankfurt, 1845.

The Lust of Power

279

e c o n o m i s t s . H e sees the modern world as pervaded b y a selfish, anarchistic pursuit o f e c o n o m i c gain with n o concern for "the w h o l e " , for the quality o f the total culture. A t times, N i e t z s c h e ' s attitude towards those w h o pursue wealth as an end in itself matches the moral indignation o f Karl M a r x . Seht mir doch diese Überflüssigen! Reichtümer erwerben sie und werden ärmer damit. Macht wollen sie und zuerst das Brecheisen der Macht, viel Geld - diese Unvermögenden ! 37

Elsewhere in Also

sprach

Zarathustra,

he is at pains to distinguish his o w n

brand o f "selfness" (conceived o f as a "gift-bestowing virtue" that stores "treasures" in the soul) from what he vehemently characterizes as Selbstsucht

o r "sick selfishness."

kranke

38

O n only a few pages o f Lange's Geschichte

we find a surprising n u m b e r o f

specific points o f agreement with themes in Nietzsche's philosophy. T h e main p o i n t is that the modern world is characterized b y the pursuit o f wealth as a means to p o w e r and b y a fragmentation o f society into atomistic individuals w h o care for o n l y their interests. T h i s image o f modern society is similar to M a r x ' s critical analysis o f English political e c o n o m y and the free trade e c o n o m i c s o f the " M a n c h e s t e r S c h o o l " that represents, in M a r x ' s view, the self-conscious English bourgeois w h o seek social and political p o w e r .

39

In the

letter to G e r s d o r f f cited earlier, N i e t z s c h e specifically mentioned the discus­ sion o f die Manchester-Theorie

as an item o f interest. Lange's discussion o f the

highlights o f this t h e o r y is as critical as M a r x ' s scathing critique o f bourgeois, capitalistic, British laissez faire

e c o n o m i c and social ideas.

D e s p i t e his well-deserved reputation for anti-communism, anti-socialism and anti-liberalism, N i e t z s c h e was, in some o f his earlier writings, sensitive to the plight o f the exploited. H e equates merchants and pirates and sarcastically describes the Kaufmanns-Moral Moral,

or the "merchant's m o r a l i t y " as the

Seeräuber-

"the morality o f pirates." F o r , the former b u y in the cheapest market

and sell in the m o s t expensive. T h e powerful man promises to establish an equilibrium against the robbers and thereby aids the weak b y providing the

KGW VI 1, AsZ, "Vom neuen Götzen." "Look at the superfluous ones! They accumulate riches and become poorer. They desire power and first of all the lever of power, much money - these impotent ones." In Morgenröte, it is said that in modern times a Fanatismus des Machtgelüstes is often expressed in a restless impatience to accumulate more and more wealth. "Die Mittel des Machtgelüstes haben sich verändert, aber derselbe Vulkan glüht noch immer . . . was man ehedem 'um Gottes willen' tat, tut man jetzt um des Geldes willen . . . was jetzt am höchsten Machtgefühl . . . giebt." KGW, V 1, 204. "The means of the lust of power have changed in our day, but the same volcano is still smoldering . . . what once was done 'for the will to God', is done now for the love of money . . . what today gives us the highest feeling of power..." Ibid., "Von der schenkenden Tugend." T. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, New York, 1964, 197.

280

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

possibility o f life.

40

W h a t N i e t z s c h e objected to in the "optimistic liberalism"

o f his time was the belief that a free e c o n o m i c development without

any

c o n c e r n for the quality o f culture, without any clear cultural ideal, would bring about a Utopian world. In one o f his early essays he w r o t e that . . . i c h . . . als gefährliches Charakteristikum der politischen Gegenwart die Ver­ wendung der Revolutionsgedanken im Dienste einer eigensüchtigen staatlosen Geldaristokratie bezeichne... 41

T h i s "gold aristocracy" is precisely what Lange sees in the ascendency in his time. T h e o t h e r themes in Lange's w o r k that are related to N i e t z s c h e ' s thought m a y simply b e indicated. T h e y are: the tracing o f modern acquisitiveness t o a natural egoism in contrast, say, to M a r x ' s belief that egotism, selfishness and greed were generated b y the capitalistic e c o n o m y itself; the picture of m o d e r n society as comprised

o f atomistic individuals;

the distinction between

grasping, covetous selfishness and a "refined egoism" o r an e g o i s m " , with

a decided preference for the latter; the hostility

altruism; the need to strive for a Selbstüberwindung Sympathie;

a

"enlightened towards

o f a propensity towards

the suggestion that out o f sympathy the world has often been

t h r o w n in turmoil b y those w h o would make men happy (recapitulated as N i e t z s c h e ' s critique o f the "improvers o f m a n k i n d " ) ; the idea that material acquisitiveness is an expression o f a m o r e basic drive to surpass others o r feel dominance over t h e m ; and, finally, the simple statement that the ability to recapture a child-like egoism would enable us to express a natural, spontane­ ous and unconscious 'morality.' T h i s last point, as quixotic as it may seem, is, in a m o r e elaborate form, incorporated into Also sprach

Zarathustra.

T h u s , in

the three metamorphoses o f the spirit, Geist is said to b e c o m e first camel, then lion and finally child. T h e camel is the beast o f burden; it o b e y s : it is "reverent" and self-renouncing. T h e lion is strong and can create freedom for the forging o f new values. B u t the child is "innocence and forgetfulness," ein Neubeginnen, ein Spiel, ein aus sich rollendes Rad, eine erste Bewegung, ein heiliges Ja-sagen Ja, zum Spiele des Schaffens . . . bedarf es eines heiligen Ja-sagens: seinen Willen will nun der Geist, seine Welt gewinnt sich der Weltverlorene. 42

40

41

42

KGW, IV 3, MAM, II, 22. KGW, III 2, "Der griechische Staat," 268. " . . . I . . . designate as the most dangerous charac­ teristic of the political present the application of revolutionary thought to the service of a selfish, stateless gold-aristocracy..." KGW, VI 1, AsZ, "Von den drei Verwandlungen." " . . . a new beginning, a play, a self-rolling wheel, a first motion, a holy Yes-saying. Yes, a holy yea-saying is needed... for the play of creation: the spirit now wills its own will, sundered from the world it wins its own world."

281

The Lust of Power

A l t h o u g h this image o f the p o w e r o f the child recalls Christianity, the emphasis u p o n Ja-sagen

and the creation o f new values through willing its will

suggests a natural ' m o r a l i t y ' rooted in selfhood or the "enlightened e g o i s m " that L a n g e suggests is a transformation o f a m o r e ruthless "natural egoism." R e t u r n i n g to the question o f Lange's stage-setting for the idea o f Wille Macht,

we find that the competition o f the free enterprize system has replaced

previous systems o f privilege and exploitation in the form o f the von

zur

Herr

und Knecht.

Gegensatz

T h i s Hegelian-sounding reduction o f previous s o c i o ­

e c o n o m i c relations to that o f "master and slave" leads Lange to w o n d e r w h e t h e r we m a y n o t be so constituted that a Maximum

von Kraft

develops in

us w h e n w e think exclusively o f ourselves. W h a t is obviously being suggested here, in a very rudimentary form, is a psychological explanation for man's propensity to strive for dominance. Lange w r y l y remarks that the m o r e one is superior to o n e ' s fellows, the easier it is to satisfy and h u m o r o n e ' s pleonexia. The

" m o r e p o w e r " an individual acquires, the m o r e "resistances" can be

overcome.

43

L a n g e laments the rise to p o w e r o f the "capitalists" because their

" p o w e r and wealth" are used to undermine law and morality, because under their aegis the state b e c o m e s insubstantial and a degraded "proletariat" is used as a football b y the few. T h i n g s are such that a soziale

Erdbeben

o r "social

earthquake" threatens capitalist nations and what is left o f the states is "venal." E g o i s m has b e c o m e so powerful in the striving for material wealth that if it goes u n c h e c k e d for m u c h longer, w e m a y see a " d e c o m p o s i t i o n " o f modern society. It is possible that the advance o f egoistic individualism m a y bring a b o u t the Verfall In Menschliches,

unsrer

Kultur?

4 4

Allzumenschliches,

N i e t z s c h e is very m u c h alert to t w o

things: the growth o f socialistic ideas and values and the injustice o f the exploitation o f w o r k e r s . Temperamentally and intellectually opposed t o s o ­ cialism, N i e t z s c h e nonetheless sees in the socialist's anger some justification. E v e n though he believes that "the desire f o r . . . pre-eminence is an ineradicable trait o f human nature" that is older and m o r e primitive than a valuation o f "equality,"

45

he is aware that something must be done if a leftist revolution is to

be avoided. H e r e c o m m e n d s "moderation" and suggests that a remedy for the circumvention o f socialism would be the prevention o f lavish displays o f 46

wealth, as well as heavy taxation of luxuries. In the same place he charges the rich " b o u r g e o i s " with provoking envy in the less privileged through conspicu­ ous c o n s u m p t i o n and blames this class for the rise o f socialism. Elsewhere he 43

44

45

46

Lange, op. cit., II, 913-914. Ibid., 916-919. KGW, IV 3, MAM, II, 226. "...das Siegen- und Hervorragenwollen ein unüberwindlicher Zug der Natur ist, älter und ursprünglicher, als alle Achtung und Freude der Gleichstellung." Ibid., II, 304.

282

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

advises that the acquisition o f wealth suddenly and without effort should be prevented and suggests that trade and transportation industries be taken out o f the hands o f the private sector. L i k e Lange, he chastises the capitalists for creating dangerous social conditions b y accumulating m o r e and m o r e property and exploiting w o r k e r s . Die Ausbeutung des Arbeiters war, wie man jetzt begreift, eine Dummheit, ein Raub-Bau auf Kosten der Zukunft, eine Gefährdung der Gesellschaft. Jetzt hat man fast schon den Krieg: und jedenfalls werden die Kosten, um den Frieden zu erhalten, um Verträge zu schließen und Vertrauen zu erlangen, numehr sehr groß sein, weil die Thorheit der Ausbeutenden sehr groß und langdauernd war. 47

T h e r e is little doubt that such sincere charges against the Ausbeutenden

of

w o r k e r s are made in light o f the influence o f L a n g e not o n l y in terms o f his remarks in his Geschichte,

but in terms o f his social thought in Die

Arbeiter­

frage. T h e point o f this discussion is to show that N i e t z s c h e first came upon the idea that man is i m b u e d with a lust o f p o w e r b o t h in his primitive past (in the need t o master his environment and his cruelty to animals) and, in m o d e r n times, in the form o f the accumulation o f capital. L a n g e considers the unequal distribution o f wealth a "rank evil" that is a s y m p t o m o f a tendency towards acquisition and the increase o f Kraft

o r power. I n uncivilized conditions, the

strong take the larger share o f b o o t y and lord it over the weak. I n modern times, der Gewaltigen

or "the powerful" achieve the same dominance b y

means o f the accumulation o f wealth in the industrial w o r l d .

48

I f w e put aside

o u r sentiments and sympathies, Lange suggests, we will see that this striving for d o m i n a n c e is r o o t e d in the primitivity o f nature. Das erste Recht welches recht.

49

die ganze

Natur

anerkennt

- ist das Recht

des Stärkeren,

-

Recht,

das

Faust­

T h i s first right o f the stronger, the right o f might, is replaced o n l y

w h e n a higher right is recognized. I f the moral principle o f right is eroded, the primitive right o f the stronger is revitalized. T h i s is happening in the misuse o f the Macht

des Kapitals

in modern societies. A s Lange contemplates this n e w

" p o w e r o f capital" and its use for enjoyment and pleasure, he b e c o m e s indignant at the "misery o f the proletariat" and at the "degenerate" w h o have lost all sympathy with the sufferings o f the workers and the p o o r . A s he has before, he compares the conditions in E u r o p e in his time to those at the time o f

47

48

49

Ibid., II, 286. "The exploitation of the worker was, as we now know, a stupidity, a robbery at the expense of the future, a jeopardization of society. We almost have war now, and, in any event, the cost of maintaining peace, of concluding treaties and gaining confidence, will from now on be very great, because the foolishness of the exploiters was very great and long-lasting." Lange, op. cit., II, 922. Ibid., II, 923. "The primitive right - a right which all nature recognizes - is the right of the stronger, the right of might." Cp. GdM, 527.

The Lust of Power

283

the fall o f R o m e . A n d he suggests b y this comparison that European civiliza­ tion m a y be ripe for "destruction" ( U n t e r g a n g ) .

50

A confluence o f forces is

forming that leads one t o believe that a "mighty revolution" is coming, a revolution sparked b y the enormous increase o f wealth, a massive proletariat b e c o m i n g conscious o f its oppression, "the decay o f religion and morals," and the emergence o f political conflicts. As previously mentioned,

Ueberweg

shares Lange's sense o f impending d o o m and believes that the Gegensatz Weltanschauungen,

der

in coordination with the decline o f religious faith, will

b e c o m e entangled with politischen

Gegensätzen

und K r i e g e n .

5 1

W e see, then,

that w h e n N i e t z s c h e is called the prophet o f the twentieth century because he claims that in the near future there will be "wars the likes o f which man has never k n o w n , " he acquired an appelation that m a y just as well be given to Ueberweg or Lange. C o n t r a r y t o previous claims, it m a y be said that the "discovery o f the will t o p o w e r " was made b y N i e t z s c h e ' s detailed assimilation o f many o f Lange's observations and insights. E v e n the association o f Christianity with socialism and c o m m u n i s m was suggested b y Lange to N i e t z s c h e . F o r , in the course o f discussing the emergence o f social movements that seek to favor the under­ privileged and the lower classes, Lange asserts that e s . . . sehr wahrscheinlich < i s t , > daß die energischen, selbst revolutionären Be­ strebungen unsres Jahrhunderts, die Form der Gesellschaft zugunsten der zertrete­ nen Massen umzugestalten, mit den Ideen des Neuen Testamentes sehr eng zusammenhängen, obwohl die Träger jener Bestrebung in andern Beziehungen dem Wesen, das man heutzutage Christentum zu nennen beliebt, glauben entgegentre­ ten zu müssen. Die Geschichte liefert uns einen Beleg für diesen Zusammenhang in der Verschmelzung religiöser und kommunistischer Ideen bei der äußersten Linken der Reformations-Bewegung im sechzehnten Jahrhundert. 52

50

Ibid., II, 926.

51

Ibid., II, 967. In a letter to Lange dated 29. Dezember 1862, Ueberweg wrote "..., daß in nicht zu ferner Zukunft das religiöse Element, der Gegensatz der Weltanschauungen, sich mit politischen Gegensätzen und Kriegen sehr eng komplizieren wird." Lange does not include these references in his first edition, but he does predict "social earthquakes" and the probability of violent conflicts. Cf. GdM, 503-557. Ibid., 929. " . . . it [is] . . . v e r y probable that the energetic, even revolutionary, efforts of this century to transform the form of society in favor of the downtroden masses are very intimately connected with the New Testament ideas, even though the champions of these efforts feel themselves bound, in other respects, to oppose what is today called Christianity. History affords us a claim for this connection in the fusion of religious and communistic ideas in the extreme left of the reformation movement of the sixteenth century." Cp. Nietzsche's very similar, but explosively expressed, remarks in KGW, VI 3, Der Antichrist, 43, 57. 62. The claim that democracy, socialism and communism are ultimately derived from Christian principles, attitudes and values, that the long cultural and historical tradition of Christian morality laid the groundwork for the emergence of secular egalitarianism, is one of Nietzsche's favorite themes.

52

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

284

A l o n g the way, it is also said that C o m t e and the English communists are imbued with a "religious impulse" that is traceable t o Christian principles. T h e discussion o f the influence o f religion on secular political movements naturally brings t o Lange's mind the theme o f the deleterious effects o f "powerful and a m b i t i o u s " ecclesiastics. T h e Herrschsucht

o f priestly groups has played havoc with the social order

and has been a dreadful

influence in history. C o m m e n t i n g o n

Comte's

positivistic social ideal, Lange detects the recrudescence o f a thinly disguised priestly caste in C o m t e ' s idea o f the "hirarchical guidance" o f the people. H e ponders the universality o f the appearance o f ecclesiastical hierarchies that are "ambitious o f p o w e r " (just as N i e t z s c h e will in Zur Genealogie

der Moral).

At

o n e point, Lange clearly anticipates N i e t z s c h e ' s assumption o f a universal will t o p o w e r in man. H e wonders if some theoretical advance might

afford

p r o t e c t i o n from the persistent emergence of sacerdotal hierarchies. B u t then he questions this possibility because he doubts whether any other " p o w e r " could displace what seems t o be a pervasive and ineluctable einschleichenden der Herrschsucht.

Gelüste

W h a t is even m o r e astonishing about Lange's uncovering o f

a universal "lust o f p o w e r " in man is that he characterizes it as unwillkürlich "involuntary."

53

or

T h i s is astonishing because N i e t z s c h e ' s proto-psychoanalyti-

cal t h e o r y that man is fundamentally motivated b y a "lust o f p o w e r " (what N i e t z s c h e calls, after Lange, Herrschsucht

in Zarathustra)

includes the n o t i o n

that, for the m o s t part, this lust o f p o w e r is involuntary or unconscious. It is a primal Tendenz (Kraft)

r o o t e d in life and nature; it is an irrational drive or " f o r c e "

that acts through us. L i k e sexuality, N i e t z s c h e believes, it is an

essential aspect o f all natural beings. Nietzsche's task is to bring it into the light, to expose its deep roots, in order that man o r , m o r e likely, the overman m a y channel its powerful energy. N e i t h e r Lange n o r N i e t z s c h e admire the naked expression o f

Herrschsucht.

A p p r o b a t i o n o r disapprobation are irrelevant here because the lust o f p o w e r is suspected b y Lange and believed b y N i e t z s c h e to be the m o s t primordial, unconscious force permeating man's being. A s others have said, N i e t z s c h e is t o "will to p o w e r " in man what Freud is to "unconscious drives." W h i l e F r e u d , o f course, postulates sex and aggression as the primal drives, Lange suggests and N i e t z s c h e affirms that Herrschsucht

is the basis o f these drives o r

Ibid., 950. The fact that Lange specifically identifies a "lust of power" as a fundamental human trait may put to rest some of the more exotic explanations of how Nietzsche came upon the idea. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche's claim that the notion that life is will to power came to her brother while he was serving in the medical corps during the war of 1870 - the sight of fresh troops rushing eagerly to battle ostensibly revealed to her brother that life is a struggle for power - is romantic and picturesque, but probably false. Cf. Das Leben Frederich Nietzsche's, Leipzig, 1895-1904, II, 682.

The Lust of Power

285

urges. T h e lust of, o r passionate desire for, Macht

is deeply imbeded in o u r

natural being, in o u r organic structure. W h a t is essential for an understanding o f N i e t z s c h e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f the Wille zur Macht its expressions, Herrschsucht)

(as distinguished from one o f

is that N i e t z s c h e ' s hypothetical assumption o f a

will to p o w e r in all beings entails a geistige

Tendenz

towards " p o w e r . " It is as

if F r e u d were t o postulate a spiritual basis for the primitive unconscious drives o f sexuality and aggression. A s Lange first saw and then N i e t z s c h e thought through, the "lust o f p o w e r " is the m o s t c o m m o n , m o s t universal way in w h i c h living beings strive for something. T h e energy o r force expressed in the lust o f p o w e r is neither g o o d n o r evil. How the lust o f power is expressed o r manifested makes all the difference in the world. In Die Geburt

der Tragödie,

the unrestrained, natural D i o n y s i a n man is

depicted as passionate, irrational and cruel. I f this cruel lustfulness were completely unleashed, the world would be a chaos of violence. T h e natural, uninhibited tendency o f man is to express a lust o f power. In Wettkampf,

Homer's

N i e t z s c h e points to the fact that man is intimately r o o t e d in

nature. Der Mensch, in seinen höchsten und edelsten Kräften, ist ganz Natur und trägt ihren unheimlichen Doppelcharakter an sich. Seine furchtbaren und als un­ menschlich geltenden Befähigungen sind vielleicht sogar der fruchtbare Boden, aus dem allein alle Humanität, in Regungen Thaten und Werden hervorwachsen kann.

54

E v e n the ancient G r e e k s w h o m he admired so m u c h had a tiger artige tungslust,

Vernich­

a "tigerish lust t o annihilate", that burst forth from time to time.

T h i s image o f the "tiger" in man is one that occurs a n u m b e r o f times in N i e t z s c h e ' s writings and is obviously a s y m b o l for one expression o f the lust o f power. In Ueber

Wahrheit

und Lüge

im außermoralischen

Sinne,

an insight

into the primal nature o f man is described as a terrible vision. wehe der verhängnissvollen Neubegier, die durch eine Spalte einmal aus dem Bewusstseinszimmer heraus und hinab zu sehen vermöchte und die jetzt ahnte, dass auf dem Erbarmungslosen, dem Gierigen, dem Unersättlichen, dem Mörderischen der Mensch ruht, in der Gleichgültigkeit seines Nichtwissens, und gleichsam auf dem Rücken eines Tigers in Träumen hängend. 55

54

55

KGW, III 2, 277. "Man, in his highest and most noble powers, is entirely nature and embodies its uncanny dual character. His capacities which are terrifying and considered inhuman may be the fertile soil out of which humanity may develope in impulse, deed and work." Ibid., 371. "...woe to that fatal curiosity which might one day have the capacity to look out and down through a crack in the chamber of consciousness and then suspect that man is held in the indifference of his ignorance by what is pitiless, greedy, insatiable and murderous - as if hanging in dreams on the back of a tiger."

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

286 In Ueber

das Pathos

der Wahrheit

illustrating what nature has concealed

the same image occurs in the c o n t e x t o f from m a n .

56

I t is N i e t z s c h e ' s painful task

t o u n c o v e r what has been concealed, to cut through the veils o f illusion that have o b s c u r e d this "terrible truth." T h i s exposure is necessary in order for man to o v e r c o m e and transform this primitive energy into constructive and creative forms. Because the lust o f p o w e r has hitherto been concealed, it has worked

underground,

has been a force that has alienated man from

potentiality for perfectibility. N i e t z s c h e does n o t endorse this

56

his

Herrschsucht,

Ibid., 254. A recent claim that Nietzsche did not recognize the danger of the destructive expression of the lust of power, that he did not see that the malevolent despot reveals a destructive "will to nothingness", is completely mistaken. Although J. P. Stern's Friedrich Nietzsche [New York, 1978] is fine when it focuses upon the literary and stylistic aspects of Nietzsche's work, its treatment of the idea of will to power takes Nietzschean scholarship back about sixty years. As early as Die Geburt der Tragödie, Nietzsche saw that the uninhibited expression of Dionysian destructiveness would result in social chaos. Destruction for the sake of a drive for power and the turning of this drive upon everything, oneself included, was clearly recognized by Nietzsche. In the depiction of the three evil things in Also sprach Zarathustra, he specifically identifies this scorpion-like tendency of Herrschsucht. The "lust of power" that desires the destruction of "cities and empires" is so ferocious that it turns its fanatical hostility back upon itself and says: "Away with me!" KGW, VI 1, AsZ, III. Nietzsche had a profound understanding of the nihilistic expression of the will to power; but he did not advocate it. It has been pointed out by Magnus that the will to power "expresses itself in everything . . . and hence also in the attempt to master, dominate, in a psychological and political sense." Magnus, op. cit., 215 n. T o need direct power over others is considered as an inferior expression of the will to power, one that betrays a feeling of impotence. The person with the highest expression of "will to power" is one who is least dependent upon the praise or blame, or the sufferings of others for his or her sense of mastery and power. The distinction that Stern and others who share his opinion about the idea of will to power overlook is between Nietzsche's brutally frank description of the various forms that a "lust of power" or a "will to power" can take (and have taken in history long before Nietzsche wrote) and his prescription of a mastered, controlled "will to power." In Homer's Wettkampf, Nietzsche cites the cruelty of Alexander the Great and says that we shudder as we gaze into the abyss of hatred we find in him: Wir sehen hier in die Abgründe des Hasses. When the ancient Greeks fully expressed their hatred, "der Tiger schnellte hervor, eine wollüstige Grausamkeit blickte aus seinem fürchterlichen Auge." KGW, III 2, 278. The ancient Greeks' love of contest (agon), their ambition, their desire for fame, their hybris, their capacity for cruelty in victory is not praised by Nietzsche. The transformation of this deep-rooted tendency in man is the striving for das Gefühl der Macht, a striving that Nietzsche finds in the most geistige or "spiritual" men. The search for a deep "feeling of power" in religion is a sublimation of a more primitive urge for power. The desire to attain the highest feeling of power is attributed to the most sincerely religious individuals. Nietzsche finds this desire for a maximal feeling of power in all religious individuals, but he specifically refers to its refined presence in the Hindu Brahmins. Cf. KGW, V 1, 475 ff. One of Nietzsche's most original and most paradoxical claims is that the highest and most spiritual aspirations of man, his will to morality, as well as his creative activity and quest for scientific knowledge, are ultimately derived from the most terrible propensity in his nature: a cruelty intermixed with a lust of power that seeks its goal by any means, no matter how dreadful it is. This primordial craving for what one lacks ("power") produces "moralities" in an indirect way, over a long period of time. Morality is a transmutation of feelings, sentiments and drives

The Lust of Power

287

h e o n l y brings it into the o p e n , examines it, exposes its subterranean w o r k i n g s in man.

Although

he is sometimes fascinated b y the dreadful,

explosive

potentialities in man, for the m o s t part he is repulsed b y them. T h e lust o f p o w e r was n o t invented b y Lange o r N i e t z s c h e : it was o n l y discovered b y the f o r m e r and subjected to an autopsy b y the latter. J u s t as F r e u d was excoriated for uncovering sexuality in the infant, so, t o o , has N i e t z s c h e been attacked because he discovered and examined a craving for p o w e r in man. T o m y mind, the clearest presentation o f his understanding o f

which, in their original form, are distinctly "immoral." The history of morality is seen as a history of the variety of ways in which man has sought to transfigure a "natural" Tendenz which, if unrestrained, would destroy the world. The often repeated and often misunderstood claim that what we regard as "evil" must not be extirpated (for then, in Nietzsche's view, there would be no posited "good" and no morality either), means that it must be mastered, controlled and channeled into creative paths. Kaufmann is correct when he says that man can go beyond the animal and the all-too-human by means of a transfiguration of, an improvement of, his physis, even though the way he arrives at this conclusion somewhat obscures the role of man's most fundamental, most "natural", propensity, Herrschsucht, and does not indicate that this "lust of power" is considered as one expression of a presumably universal Wille zur Macht. Cf. Kaufmann, op. cit., 154-161. Reflecting a youthful sentiment, Nietzsche holds that, from an ideal standpoint, the disinterested unorganische Welt includes "the greatest synthesis of forces," and expresses the "will to power" in its purest, most innocent, most direct way. Inorganic entities (even though they are not absolutely "inorganic" according to Nietzsche's considered view) are the highest and "most worthy" entities because they are devoid of "error" and "perspectival narrowness." KGW, VIII 1, 32. Such a view is consistent with the often repeated notion that with organic beings "deception," "cunning" and "lies" enter the world. Cf. KGW, VIII 2, 216. A striking epitome of the notion that moral attitudes may have their origin in the transformation of, and sublimation of, cruelty is found in a passage from the notes of 1880-1881. Pity is said to be engendered by the "sublimation of cruelty" - as God in Christianity undergoes suffering in order to create the striving of Christians. The experience of pity for the sufferings of another is particularly bitter when one cannot help the victim. It generates a pathos that is analogous to the painful overcoming of the tendency to pity described in Also sprach Zarathustra (III, "Vom Gesicht und Rätsel") and suggests the pathos and feeling of helplessness that Nietzsche felt as a child when he saw his father lying on the ground, severely injured from a fall. "Mitleid empfinden und nicht helfen können ist äußerst bitter. Sublimierung der Grausamkeit: Mitleid erregen. Gott leidend zu machen Bestreben des Christen." KGW, V 1, 733-734. If Mitleid is a mitleiden or "suffering with" someone that is a "sublimation" of a more primordial tendency towards "cruelty," then the overcoming of pity requires a strenuous act of Selbstüberwindung, a "cruelty" towards a deeply rooted feeling of compassion, the overcoming of a "virtue" for the sake of life-affirmation and the transcendence of demoralizing pessimism. An ethics of pity is attacked because it is seen as debilitating, as encouraging feelings that could destroy an otherwise healthy, strong individual. The theme of the Sublimierung der Grausamkeit is dealt with succinctly in the following: "Fast alles, was wir 'höhere Kultur' nennen, beruht auf der Vergeistigung und Vertiefung der Grausamkeit — dies ist mein Satz; jenes 'wilde Tier' ist gar nicht abgetötet worden, es lebt, es blüht, es hat sich nur - vergöttlicht." "Almost all that we call 'higher culture' is based upon the spiritualization and deepening of cruelty - this is my proposition. The 'wild beast' has not been mortified - it lives and flourishes, it has only become - deified." KGW, VI 2,JGB, 229.

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

288

this primal propensity in man in found in Also sprach drei

Bösen",

Zarathustra.

In "Von den

he identifies these three evils as "sex, the lust o f power and

selfishness." T h e aim o f his poetic representation o f what Herrschsucht

seems

to be is to display its transformation from something that can be deadly for man

to

something

Herrschsucht

that

can

be

the

basis

of

"gift-bestowing

virtue."

is characterized as: the scourge o f the hardest o f the hardhearted,

the hideous torture saved for the c r u d e s t , a "malicious gadfly" that m o c k s uncertain virtue, the earthquake that smashes what is h o l l o w and

opens

sepulchers, the p o w e r before which man b e c o m e s " l o w e r than snake and s w i n e , " the mad craving that wants to destroy everything, even itself. T h i s negating force, however, also ascends up to the "pure and lonely," "up to selfsufficient heights." Finally, this Herrschsucht

is n o longer lust "when what is

high longs d o w n w a r d for p o w e r . " Transformed n o w , this primitive striving is converted into a "longing" that expresses itself as Schenkende

Tugend.

5 7

P r e s u m a b l y , w h o e v e r could transmute these evils and the particular evil o f Herrschsucht

into a creative energy could achieve self-transformation, could,

in effect, b e c o m e an Übermensch.

N i e t z s c h e fully realized that this was a

delicate and dangerous process that few would be able to complete successful­ ly. T h e truly powerful individual is o n e w h o has a capacity for cruelty and evil, but w h o has mastered it, has channeled this energy into a poised, controlled existence. In the overman the "lust o f p o w e r " is not destroyed, for this w o u l d be t o destroy life itself. R a t h e r , the overman is one w h o is able Mit lässigen Muskeln < z u > stehn und mit abgeschirrtem Willen. . . . von nieman­ den will ich so als von dir gerade Schönheit, du Gewaltiger: deine Güte sei deine letzte Selbst-Überwindung. Alles Böse traue ich dir zu: darum will ich von dir das Gute. 58

In such an individual the Herrschsucht

is harnessed, controlled, held in check.

T h e r e is a "self-overcoming" o f a tendency that has been the bane o f humanity, a transmutation o f a primal energy, a Selbstaufhebung

o f Herrschsucht.

T h i s is

N i e t z s c h e ' s long thought out answer to Lange's question whether there is a higher, m o r e n o b l e " p o w e r " that can provide a " c o u n t e r p o i s e " to the der

57

58

Herrschsucht.

Gelüste

It lies in the "spiritualization" of, o r "sublimation" of,

KGW, VI 1, AsZ, III, "Von den drei Bösen." Ibid., II, "Von den Erhabenen." "To stand with relaxed muscles and unharnessed wills...And from no one do I desire beauty as much as I desire it from you, you powerful men: may your goodness be your ultimate self-overcoming. I believe you capable of any evil: therefore I desire from you the good."

The Will to Power

289

precisely this same primordial energy. T h e "tiger" within must be tamed; tamed, n o t destroyed, b y means o f Sublimierung

The

Will to

and V e r g e i s t i g u n g .

59

Power

A l t h o u g h we have examined the hypothesis o f the will to p o w e r from a n u m b e r o f points o f view, it m a y be fruitful to see whether Lange's analyses o f will m a y n o t have contributed to N i e t z s c h e ' s critique o f the concept o f 'will' and his emphasis o n the importance o f "willing." W e have already seen that various panpsychistic theories were discussed b y Lange that m a y have c o n t r i ­ buted t o the discovery o f Geist

in Natur

in N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophy. In

addition to such suggested ways o f understanding the nature of the " u n k n o w n third," L a n g e engages in a lengthy discussion o f the notion o f 'will' in w h i c h he presents the views o f a n u m b e r o f thinkers and includes his own observa­ tions. In the course o f examining the claims o f physiological p s y c h o l o g y , Lange refers with approval to Gall's denial o f the c o m m o n l y accepted faculties o f the mind. It is said that the terms judgment, m e m o r y and will (Willenskraft)

are

" m e r e abstractions" that classify various cognitive functions, but do

not

60

The

possess the elementary significance and simplicity attributed to them.

tendency to isolate a mental o r cerebral activity in a faculty o f the mind is a reflection o f the proclivity to personify functions. M a n y o f the cognitive processes that have been attributed to one o r the other o f the "faculties" o f the m i n d are, in fact, the result o f "unconscious ideation." are m o r e c o m p l e x than psychologists have thought

61

Cognitive processes

and the language o f

p s y c h o l o g y ( e . g . , "thinking, feeling, willing") is comprised o f mere names. W o r d s used t o classify a mental activity are hypostasized and then a " m e t a p h y ­ sical delusion" projects a basis for mental p h e n o m e n a into a "substance." W e c a n n o t and ought not introduce a dualism between the mental and the physical because this w o u l d violate the Prinzip

der Erhaltung

der Kraft.

A n "impulse o f

w i l l , " for example, is n o t an isolated mental event; it is an "organic process."

59

60

61

KGW, VI 3, G, "Moral als Widernatur," 1. What Nietzsche says about the "spiritualization of the passions" applies, a fortiori, to the spiritualization of, or sublimation of, Herrschsucht. Although Kaufmann correctly links this idea with Hegel's notion of aufheben, he does not specifically relate Vergeistigung to the "lust of power." Cf. Kaufmann, op. cit., 236 f. Lange, op. cit., II, 777-778. The discussion of the physiology of the senses and problems in what today would be called "philosophical psychology" in the second edition of Lange's history is a replication of the discussion of "Anthropologische Fragen" in the first edition. Cp. GdM, 410-500. Ibid., 879-880.

290

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

In point o f fact, Lange argues, what we take to be a Willensimpuls sum o f functions, functions that are probably "partial."

62

is actually a

W h a t we think o f as

acts o f will m a y be subtle physiological processes that unify elementary effects into "purposeful

activity." T h e term "will" does not refer to any distinct

entity, but is a simplified, abstract designation o f a complex process. In purposive activity, Lange maintains, we seem to find physical effects that are the result o f an entire "cooperative s o c i e t y . " Activity seems to b e propagated b y means o f "paths o f living force" (Wege

der lebenden

Kraft)

that

issue in an intentional action. T h e r e seem to be "numerous effects that radiate through the entire b o d y . " T h e subjective stream o f experiences eludes o b j e c ­ tive analysis even though it seems to accompany physiological processes. T h e precise m a n n e r in which external natural processes b e c o m e subjective states o f being o f the individual is u n k n o w n and reveals o n c e again the limits o f natural knowledge. A l t h o u g h we can describe the external physical process and the internal mental states (via reports o f subjective experiences), "we can k n o w nothing o f the ultimate ground o f all things."

63

T h o u g h it is n o t mentioned in

this context, this points to what is elsewhere called the p r o b l e m o f the "third," that w h i c h w e tend t o believe underlies physical and psychic experience o r p h e n o m e n a . A s we have seen previously, N i e t z s c h e understands the interpre­ tation o f external p h e n o m e n a as m o r e accurate than the interpretation o f internal states o r psychic states. H o w e v e r , he also holds that the understanding o f physical p h e n o m e n a , as in K a n t , must be subject t o the sensory-cognitive activity o f the observer. H e n c e , external p h e n o m e n a are constituted, in brief, b y what Lange calls o u r "organization." It is for this reason, amongst others, that N i e t z s c h e characterizes the physicists' Welt-Bild

as n o t entirely unlike a

subjective interpretation o f phenomena. As w e have seen previously, Lange presents without c o m m e n t H e r b a r t ' s speculation that man is not possessed o f a single soul, but is comprised o f a multiplicity o f simple entities that m a y be designated as "souls." T h e s e simple entities interact with o n e another, act upon and react to each other. T h e reciprocal relations between such posited entities is compared, b y Lange, to the relations amongst forces. A l t h o u g h Lange does not m a k e any critical c o m m e n t o n this somewhat exotic theory, he is quite vehement about the traditional c o n c e p t i o n o f a single soul. In fact, he asserts that a truly scientific p s y c h o l o g y will n o t be possible until we banish "the m y t h o f the s o u l " (Fabelwesen

der S e e l e ) .

64

T h i s is a judgment with which N i e t z s c h e heartily

agreed. Primarily in Jenseits

62

Ibid., 806-807.

63

Ibid., 820. Ibid., 823.

64

von Gut und Böse,

the c o n c e p t o f the soul is

The Will to Power

291

criticized n o t o n l y as a metaphysical falsity, but as an obstacle to the development o f a "conscientious p h y s i o - p s y c h o l o g y . " Despite his repeated repudiations o f a soul, his insistence that the idea should be expelled from science, N i e t z s c h e retains the "soul-hypothesis" in the form o f the assumption o f a c o m m u n i t y o f souls acting through the b o d y . Such views seem to reflect the attitudes o f Lange as well as some o f the panpsychistic notions that he reports. L i k e N i e t z s c h e after him, Lange criticizes the simple acceptance o f the validity o f "self-observation" and avers that the reformation o f p s y c h o l o g y will require a radical critique o f Selbstbeobachtung.

It was K a n t w h o suggested

that the psychic experiences o f the individual must be construed

as

phenomena

in the same w a y in which external appearances are. It is observations such as this that suggested t o N i e t z s c h e his conception o f the "phenomenality o f the inner w o r l d . " In association with this notion, Lange points out that the way t o a scientific p s y c h o l o g y must be paved with the negation o f faculty p s y c h o l o g y and the assertion o f c o m p l e x processes. O n this point, N i e t z s c h e makes sport o f the Kantian theory o f faculties

65

even though he elsewhere b o r r o w s quite

freely K a n t ' s suggestion o f an internal phenomenalism that entails the notion that the p h e n o m e n a o f "inner experience" are constituted in m u c h the same w a y as are external " o b j e c t s . " I n regard to this phenomenalism o f inner experience, Lange adds that the internal and the external are intermingled and (as N i e t z s c h e will r e m e m b e r ) b o t h perception and thought require interpreta­ tion.

66

In an earlier discussion o f psychic activities, Lange criticizes the process b y w h i c h Descartes arrives at the conclusion that " I a m " (sum).

H e buttresses his

criticism o f this thinking subject b y appealing to Lichtenberg's observations. L i c h t e n b e r g held that Descartes postulates the " I " o r ego in his claim that " I t h i n k " (cogito).

It is proposed that Descartes cannot legitimately assume a

subject o f thinking, that we might better say " I t t h i n k s " as we say, "it lightenings."

67

T h e r e is little doubt that this terse analysis had a profound

impact o n N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking. F o r , it is central to his critique o f the notion o f the " I t h i n k " , as well as to the understanding o f the Subjekt

as a fiction. T h e

subject is construed as a creation o f various cognitive activities (e. g., imagin-

65

66

67

KGW, VI 2, JGB, 11. Lange, op. cit., II, 827. Ibid., I, 241. The fact that Nietzsche had read Lichtenberg's analysis of the cogito makes doubtful the claim that Nietzsche was influenced, in regard to this kind of analysis, by the Sapir-Whorf analysis of language. This association was made by Hermann Wein in "Métaphysique et antimétaphysique," Revue de métaphysique et de morale, LXIII (October-December, 1958), 385-411. This particular reference to Lichtenberg is not in the first edition of the Geschichte, even though there are three references to him.

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

292

ing, thinking, sensing, etc.), as a kind o f "thing". T h e idea o f a " s u b j e c t " is a simplification that is designed to represent the p o w e r that is supposedly active in thinking, inventing and supposing. It is considered as distinct from these activities.

68

N i e t z s c h e ' s arguments are very closely related to the argument

presented b y Lichtenberg. H e contends that the " I " that is considered as the agent in thinking is actually the result o f a cognitive synthesis. Ehemals nämlich glaubte man an „die Seele", wie man an die Grammatik und das grammatische Subjekt glaubte: man sagte, „Ich" ist Bedingung, „denke" ist Prädikat und bedingt - Denken ist eine Tätigkeit, zu der ein Subjekt als Ursache gedacht werden muß. Nun versuchte man, mit einer bewunderungswürdigen Zähigkeit und List, ob man nicht aus diesem Netze herauskönne - ob nicht vielleicht das Umgekehrte wahr sei: „denke" Bedingung, „ich" bedingt; „ich" also erst eine Synthese, welche durch das Denken selbst gemacht wird. 69

N i e t z s c h e denies that w e have any immediate certainty that " I think." H e sees the cogito

o f Descartes as involving a n u m b e r o f assumptions and interpreta­

tions. I t is assumed that there is an " I " that thinks, that we k n o w what thinking is, that thinking is an activity, etc. A t o n e point in his analysis o f the cogito,

he seems t o have in mind Lichtenberg's formula even as he goes b e y o n d

it. ...[daß] es eine Fälschung des Tatbestandes ist zu sagen: das Subjekt „ich" ist die Bedingung des Prädikats „denke." Es denkt: aber daß dies „es" gerade jenes alte berühmte „Ich" sei, ist, milde geredet, nur eine Annahme, eine Behauptung, vor allem keine „unmittelbare Gewißheit." . . . schon dies „es" enthält eine Auslegung des Vorgangs und gehört nicht zum Vorgange selbst. Man schließt hier nach der grammatischen Gewohnheit „Denken ist eine Tätigkeit, zu jeder Tätigkeit gehört einer, der tätig ist, folglich -" 70

T h a t N i e t z s c h e ' s analyses o f the relation between the " I " and "thinking" was stimulated b y Lichtenberg's brief c o m m e n t s o n this issue is supported b y L a n g e ' s remark that Lichtenberg's statement o f the p r o b l e m "demonstrates in

68

69

70

WDB, III, 487-488. KGW, VI 2,JGB, 54. "Previously, one believed in 'the soul' as one believed in grammar and the grammatical subject. One said that 'I' is the condition, 'think' the predicate that conditions thinking is an activity for which a subject must be thought as cause. Then one tried with admirable cunning and perseverence to escape this net and asked whether the opposite might not be the case: 'think' the condition, T the conditioned. T is then first a synthesis created by thinking." Ibid., 17. "...it is a falsification of facts to say that the subject T is the condition of the predicate 'think.' It thinks; but this 'it' is precisely the famous old T , is, to put it mildly, a supposition, an assertion, and definitely not an 'immediate certainty'." One has gone too far even with this "it thinks" - even the "it" contains an interpretation of the process, and is not part of the process itself. One infers here in accordance with a grammatical habit: "Thinking is an activity; every activity requires an agent; consequently - . "

293

The Will to Power the simplest way the surreptitious nature o f the s u b j e c t . "

71

N i e t z s c h e has a

great deal t o say about the surreptitious nature of the subject, the grammatical habit o f assuming an agent that causes action. A n d it is precisely this analysis that leads him to deny that the c o n c e p t o f a causality o f will is valid. Since this critique o f the causal p o w e r o f the will is central to one o f his m o s t elaborate arguments for a will to power, it should be examined in this context. Earlier, I had said that the argument for a universal will t o p o w e r presented in Jenseits

von

Gut

und Böse

was questionable for a n u m b e r o f reasons,

n o t a b l y the reliance o n a causality o f the will that N i e t z s c h e repudiates elsewhere. T h e critique o f the agent-act relation imbeded in a subject-predicate grammar and logic leads N i e t z s c h e to see that this putative relation includes the n o t i o n o f causality. F o r , an " I " is postulated as the cause o f "thinking." T h e same relation holds between " I " and "will." A n I o r an ego is assumed as the agent that wills and produces effects. Bearing in mind that the o n l y published argument

for a pervasive will to p o w e r depends upon the assump­

tion o f the efficacy o f the will, a causality o f will, a Willenskraft,

the following

critique o f precisely such a notion indicates that N i e t z s c h e demolishes his own argument for a causally efficacious Wille

zur Macht.

In

Götzendämmerung,

the "false causality" o f the will is specifically attacked. Previously, it was assumed that causality had been caught in the act in acts o f will. J u s t as it was believed that the ego causes thought, so, t o o , was it assumed that the will is a cause. T h e possibility o f "spiritual causes" is denied, precisely the kind o f causation that is assumed in the argument for a will to power. Psychological errors lie at the basis o f a "world o f causes," a "world o f will." B y means o f a fallacious interpretation o f "inner facts," thinkers had populated the world with "agents" that bring about "effects" b y means o f acts of will. T h e entire n o t i o n o f a causality o f will is fallacious.

72

Applying this criticism o f the efficacious p o w e r o f a will to N i e t z s c h e ' s argument for the will t o p o w e r , we see that this argument is a hypothetical argument based upon premisses that are considered fallacious or fictional. T h e r e is no demonstration that there is a will to p o w e r ; the conception is defended in terms that indicate that the entire conception is fictional. T h a t a will to p o w e r acts through all things is not a "fact" (especially in light o f N i e t z s c h e ' s analysis o f facts) and it is n o t a " t h e o r y . " It is an elaborately constructed m y t h . H o w e v e r , the psychological theory that man is motivated primarily b y a "lust o f p o w e r " is a viable theory that is based, alas, upon an astonishing n u m b e r o f facts. W h e t h e r all human actions can legitimately b e reduced t o a single r o o t "impulse," "drive" or Tendenz

71

72

Lange, op. cit., I, 292 n. KGW, VI 3, G, "Die vier großen Irrtümer," 3.

is disputable. T h e

294

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

point is that the psychological hypothesis that the springs o f human action are essentially derived from a deep-rooted will to power in man is a self-standing n o t i o n that does n o t require the postulation o f a universal will to p o w e r o r even a multiplicity o f "wills to p o w e r . " T h e conceptions o f a will t o p o w e r and wills t o p o w e r are n o t metaphysical claims to "truth" and are n o t claims t o " k n o w l e d g e . " T h e y are experimental "truths" o r what Lange calls "figurative truths." A s w e have seen, the idea o f a pervasive will to power seems to have been built u p o n Lange's suggestion o f a universal tendency in man (and perhaps in all living beings) t o strive for power. A lust o f p o w e r is found everywhere: in the behavior o f representative ancient G r e e k s and their c o n c e p t i o n of life as a "struggle" o r agon

( " c o n t e s t " ) ; in the cunning striving for power o f ascetic

priests; in the capitalists w h o seek supremacy through wealth; in the striving for m o r e and m o r e that seems t o characterize life itself, and in the " k n o w l e d g e drive" and the "will to truth." I f this powerful energy could be mastered and controlled, N i e t z s c h e seems to say, it could be the means o f generating a new aristocracy, a powerful type o f being w h o would be the "meaning o f the earth." F o l l o w i n g the lead o f Lange, N i e t z s c h e seized upon the analogy between the effort to attain o r express p o w e r and the physicist's conception o f Kraft Energie.

T h e abstract, denatured

or

concept o f force in physics cannot be

understood, N i e t z s c h e believes, except b y virtue o f human analogy. N a t u r e is interpreted in terms o f homo

natura.

Insofar as man is inseparable from nature,

nature is understood in terms o f man and man in terms o f nature. T h e phrase "will t o p o w e r " is N i e t z s c h e ' s name for the u n k n o w n Kraft

that manifests

itself in millions o f ways in the c o s m o s . M a n is the interpretive model n o t because o f s o m e arbitrary preference, but because of the inevitability o f a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c understanding, because man cannot completely understand what has n o t been "humanized."

E v e n what Müller-Lauter avers is the

fundamental feature o f will to power, its antithetical character keit),

73

(Gegensätzlich­

is n o t a feature o f actuality that is entirely foreign t o man. F o r , man is

construed

as a battlefield o f urges, drives and affects that are often

in

opposition t o one another. H u m a n existence itself is characterized b y antithet­ ical tendencies, antithetical forces. E x i s t e n c e is a "struggle" because o f the clash o f antithetical " f o r c e s " b o t h within and without. B y virtue o f his ability t o synthesize opposing impulses and urges, man has b e c o m e master o f the earth. T h e highest type o f human being would be one in w h o m the Charakter

o f existence was m o s t intensely realized.

73

Müller-Lauter, op. cit., 10-33.

74

Werke, GOA, XVI, 344.

74

Gegensatz-

A n d the antithetical

295

The Will to Power

character o f existence is clearly related to the nature o f man himself. F o r , N i e t z s c h e proclaims that nature must be represented in terms o f

"human

analogy," it must b e understood as erring, struggling, experimenting, striving t o o v e r c o m e itself.

75

W e seek t o understand the forces o f nature b y relying

u p o n an analogy t o o u r o w n "forces," our o w n "energies." W e m a y say o f the understanding o f actuality as will to p o w e r what N i e t z s c h e has said about the scientific

Welt-Auslegung:

it is the m o s t extreme form o f

humanization

imaginable. A n d , for this reason alone, it must be understood as a mythical interpretation. F o r , as N i e t z s c h e has told us again and again, humanization is falsification. Martin Heidegger has argued that N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophical reflections end in a humanization and anthropomorphism that is intentional. H e adds that the final position adopted b y N i e t z s c h e is "subjectivism", a standpoint that brings metaphysics t o an end and is nihilistic.

76

T h e charge o f "subjectivism" is

somewhat misleading because the actual is comprised o f the action and reaction o f a vast multiplicity o f "will-points" that manifest wills t o p o w e r . T h e s e hypothetical, dynamic entities exist only in relation to o t h e r such posited entities and they are the opposite o f isolated "subjects." T h e interpre­ tation o f the process o f b e c o m i n g as brought about b y an activity analogous to "willing" is, as Heidegger points out, humanization and

anthropomorphism.

B u t w e have seen the long, tortuous j o u r n e y that N i e t z s c h e has taken to arrive at such a modality o f thinking. Effects are understood as " s y m p t o m s " o f an "inner event" that, in a strict sense, we cannot know.

N i e t z s c h e ' s guess at the

riddle o f existence takes the form o f volitional activity because change thought o f as a nisus

is

towards an unconscious goal: a will to p o w e r . I n

N i e t z s c h e ' s thought this posited universal process is brought to self-con­ sciousness. T h e dynamics o f life indicate a striving that is like human willing, that resembles man's insatiable drive for more and m o r e . N i e t z s c h e is fully aware that this interpretation o f the non-human is a falsification, a humaniza­ tion o f Wirklichkeit.

Heidegger seems to minimize N i e t z s c h e ' s critiques o f

knowledge and language. F o r , despite his radical critique o f knowledge and his analysis o f the metaphorical, falsifying nature o f language, he realizes the inevitability o f o u r conceptual-linguistic structures. Actuality itself is an incongruent, antithetical chaos that, o f course, cannot be conceived o f clearly and cannot be adequately described in language. A n y cognitive-linguistic expression o f the nature o f actuality is necessarily false. B u t despite his occasional suggestions o f a need for a new language b y w h i c h to express his insights and his interpretation o f the actual, N i e t z s c h e accepts the

75

Ibid., XII, 240.

76

Heidegger, op. cit., II, 653-654.

296

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

ineluctability o f using the accumulated sedimentations o f thought and lan­ guage. H e maintains that rational thinking entails an interpretation in accord­ ance with a scheme that we cannot jettison and that we cease to think when w e 77

do n o t do so under the restraints and constraints o f language. Because o f this, N i e t z s c h e ' s rational and linguistically sound hypothetical, experimental in­ terpretation

o f actuality as "will t o p o w e r "

necessarily entails the

an­

t h r o p o m o r p h i s m that Heidegger and others have identified. Because H e i d e g ­ ger insists upon seeing N i e t z s c h e as the "last metaphysician," he does n o t realize that the imaginative, elaborately constructed conception o f a universal will to p o w e r operating through all beings is one o f the m o s t sophisticated m y t h s ever created in the history o f Western thought. W e have already seen that Lange and some o f the thinkers he cites provided the g r o u n d w o r k for N i e t z s c h e ' s understanding o f actuality in terms o f willing. T o b e sure, Schopenhauer's philosophy also added fuel to his fire b y virtue o f the emphasis in it o n the importance o f "will." B u t N i e t z s c h e has learned from Lange and others that the idea o f a faculty named "will" is a fiction even though there is validity to the notion o f a Willensimpuls.

H e agrees with the

psychologists w h o claim that the idea o f will is o n l y a means o f classification, a simplification. Es giebt

keinen 78

Conzeption

des V e r s t a n d e s . ...

„Willen";

das ist nur eine

vereinfachende

A l t h o u g h the phrase "will to p o w e r " seems to

include the legitimacy o f the concept o f "will," it is, I believe, only a manner o f designating what should properly be called willing to p o w e r o r striving for p o w e r . Even this does n o t quite capture the idea that N i e t z s c h e wants to express: willing is a c o m p l e x process that issues from an intentional "affect o f c o m m a n d . " Willing is n o t an empty striving or desiring. It is ein wollen,

Etwas­

"a willing something." T h e aim o f willing cannot be detached from

"willing."

79

T h e process o f willing is an intentional feeling o f c o m m a n d .

Willing is a creative, shaping and forming activity. It implies not only overcoming

obstacles

or

resistances,

but

self-overcoming

as

well.

Schopenhauer is criticized for claiming that the will is immediately k n o w n to us, that there is an " I " that wills. N i e t z s c h e describes willing as a c o m p l e x process that involves a "plurality o f sensations." T h e r e is presumably an experience o f a "sensation", o f a state o f aversion, a state o f moving towards 80

something and accompanying muscular sensations. T h e s e subjective

77

78

79

80

Gefühle

KGW, VIII 1, 197. Werke, GOA, XVI, 135. KGW, VIII 2, 296. KGW, VI 2,JGB, 19. Kaufmann's translation of Gefühle as "sensations" is a bit misleading here insofar as Nietzsche seems to be emphasizing "feelings" more than more specific "sensations" in this context.

297

The Will to Power

(that are m o r e "feelings" than "sensations") indicate the complexity o f willing as a process that involves the confluence o f a number o f states. D e s p i t e the ingenuity o f N i e t z s c h e ' s analysis, Lange's discussions o f willing m a y also have influenced N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking in this regard. F o r , he and others he mentions tend to reduce psychic p h e n o m e n a to

"sentient

impressions" o r complexes o f sensations that are designated b y us as a single process. T h e s e sensations and the "consciousness o f m o t o r impulses" are considered as the subjective correlates o f physiological processes that are not immediately experienced. I f we add to such conceptions o f the nature o f apparently simple psychic processes the various descriptions o f the c o m p l e x process o f willing presented b y Lange, we c o m e fairly close to N i e t z s c h e ' s understanding o f the process o f willing.

81

N i e t z s c h e found on Lange's pages

descriptions o f the subjective experience o f psychic states that resemble a rough form o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y , a phenomenological description o f "inner experience." I n all probability, Lange's method o f analysis o f psychic p r o c e s ­ ses influenced what m a y legitimately be called N i e t z s c h e ' s phenomenology

of

willing. W h a t is unique in the analysis o f the process o f willing that N i e t z s c h e presents is that it links willing t o an urge to feel power. T h u s , he argues that what is called " w i l l " is a complex comprised o f concurrent sensations, thought and (predominantly) affect, an affect o f c o m m a n d . T h e individual appears to b e the commanding and obeying party in a process that is falsified b y the introduction o f a synthetic " e g o " o r " I " into it. Because w e believe that there is an " I " that wills, we believe that "will" and action are o n e . T h e success in the execution of, the completion of, o r fulfilment of, the entire willing process is then attributed to the will itself and the individual enjoys the Machtgefühl

or

"feeling o f p o w e r " that accompanies all experience o f success. N i e t z s c h e has n o quarrel with the subjective experience o f the feeling o f p o w e r (the maximi­ zation o f which w o u l d be experienced in the imposition o f being o n b e c o m i n g o r in the thought o f the relation between eternal recurrence and b e c o m i n g ) , but he denies that it should be attributed to an act o f will that executes a successful action. Successful willing is not the act o f an " I " or o f an individual, but is the cooperative accomplishment o f a c o m m u n i t y o f "souls." Bei allem Wollen handelt es sich schlechterdings um Befehlen und Gehorchen, auf der Grundlage, ...eines Gesellschaftsbaus vieler „Seelen." 82

Lange, op.cit., II, 827 ff. Probably under the influence of Lotze, Lange offers descriptions of psychic experience that could be considered proto-phenomenological. In the second edition of his work he refers to the writings of Stumpf and Brentano. Ibid., 885-886 n. KGW, VI 2,JGB, 19. "In all willing it is completely a question of commanding and obeying on the basis... of a social structure comprised of many 'souls.'"

298

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

H e r e a p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f willing is transcended b y an appeal to the h y ­ pothesis o f a c o m m u n i t y o f wills that is characterized elsewhere as a c o m m u n i ­ t y o f "wills to p o w e r . " I f we synthesize t w o o f Nietzsche's central ideas, we see that the feeling o f p o w e r that an individual experiences is a consequence o f the cooperative activity o f a multiplicity o f "wills" ("will-points") that success­ fully execute an action. The

interpretation

o f willing leads to the panpsychistic notions

that

N i e t z s c h e posits as his answer to the question o f the nature o f the " u n k n o w n third" that is the ground o f "external" and "internal" phenomena. W h e n N i e t z s c h e goes out o f his way to say that willing is included within "the doctrine o f the relations o f supremacy under which the p h e n o m e n o n o f "life" emerges," he seems to reiterate G o e t h e ' s notion that organic beings are "a collection o f living independent beings", that the more perfect creature is one in w h i c h there is a subordination o f "parts" to the aim o f the whole. I f the relation to G o e t h e ' s Morphologie

is a genuine o n e , then what is called "the will

t o p o w e r " is a general designation o f a vast multiplicity o f "will-points" or "power-quanta"

"under-souls,"

that are assumed as the "essence" o f all

beings. T h e s e entities are pre-forms o f affect that are, like " t h e " will to p o w e r , a pathos

imbued with an irrational, inexpungeable Tendenz

A l t h o u g h the term pathos

towards p o w e r .

has a n u m b e r o f connotations, in his

A r i s t o t l e relates it to dunamis

Metaphysics

in its t w o senses o f "potentiality" and " p o w e r . "

Specifically in regard to qualitative change (alloiosis), occurs "with respect to pathos.

"

8 3

it is said that such change

Although derivation is not being suggested,

there is a certain similarity between Aristotle's conception o f pathos N i e t z s c h e ' s n o t i o n o f the pathos

and

that is the underlying 'reality' o f the "world

seen from within." T h i s juxtaposition o f conceptions does not undermine the earlier reference t o the Buddhist concept o f "craving" or "thirst." F o r , as I've tried t o s h o w , the philosophy o f N i e t z s c h e is a rich tapestry woven o f m a n y threads, a highly syncretistic pattern o f thought. A l t h o u g h Lange's

Geschichte

is not the o n l y source o f the syncretistic elements that comprise N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophical reflections, it certainly was a profound

stimulus t o his own

thinking, as well as being a repository o f a variety o f theories and conceptions that N i e t z s c h e assimilated and translated into his o w n idiom. The

"lust o f p o w e r " that Lange and then N i e t z s c h e found in man and

traced to organic beings is considered as one manifestation o f the propensity that is given a geistige

Ursprung

in the will to power as pathos.

It is an energy, a

force that can be creative o r destructive, the " p o w e r " that Lange thought acted through us and upon us. Wille zur Macht

is not construed as a being, but as an

Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. R.Hope, Ann Arbor, 1960, X I I , 1069b.

The Will to Power

active p o t e n c y with a Tendenz

zur Aktion.

living, d y n a m i c process sustained b y a nisus

299

T h e vision o f the c o s m o s as a towards maximal p o w e r o r a

m a x i m a l "feeling o f p o w e r " is n o t derived from positive knowledge, b u t is a m y t h o p o e t i c , imaginative c o n s t r u c t i o n that is c o m p o u n d e d b y a synthesis o f art and science. T h i s a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c , aesthetic world-picture is created b y means o f fictions (e. g., a causality o f will) and is a deliberate humanization o f t h e c o s m o s that n o t o n l y is n o t held to be "true" in any metaphysical sense, b u t m u s t b e , in terms o f N i e t z s c h e ' s m o s t consistent principles, a m y t h o p o e t i c creation. W h e n H e i d e g g e r and others cite the claim that the will to p o w e r is the ultimate factum

at w h i c h w e arrive, they neglect to m e n t i o n that N i e t z s c h e

has banished any "facts-in-themselves" and has arrived at this putative " f a c t " b y virtue o f an interpretation o f human nature. F o r , it is said that man's intellect, will and sensations are ultimately dependent on his values. A n d these Wertschätzungen

c o r r e s p o n d to drives o r urges and their conditions o f exist­

e n c e . A l l o f m a n ' s urges are reducible to Wille supposed " f a c t " at w h i c h w e ultimately arrive.

84

zur Macht

and this is the

In the interpretation o f the

nature o f m a n it appears that o u r "drives," "urges," "affects" and "passions" are the m o s t basic aspects o f o u r nature. B u t , o f course, N i e t z s c h e k n o w s that this is an interpretation

o f o u r p s y c h i c experiences. T h e so-called "facts o f

c o n s c i o u s n e s s " are n o t immediate certainties, but, rather, they are " p h e n o m e ­ n a " that are selected, schematized, simplified, organized and arranged. O u r c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the "inner w o r l d " is as deceptive as o u r construction o f the

Werke, GOA, X I V , 327. Analogically, it is assumed that since life indicates a Tendenz towards power, this may be taken as a "diminutive formula" (als verkleinerte Formel) for the total tendency of all existence. "Was alles Leben zeigt, als verkleinerte Formel für die gesammte Tendenz zu betrachten: deshalb eine neue Fixirung des Begriffs 'Leben,' als Wille zur Macht." KGW, VIII 1, 321. "Considering what all life reveals as a diminutive formula for the total tendency: therefore, a new definition of the concept of 'life', as will to power." Given Nietzsche's analysis of knowledge, this means that (1) the fundamental or essential characteris­ tic of all life is interpreted as "will to power" and (2) this interpretation then serves as a reduced or diminutive formula that is extended, analogically, to all existence. The analogical transference of this ostensible Tendenz of life is, as we know from other passages pertaining to the "will to power," based upon man's interpretive understanding of his own activity of "willing," his own intentionality. Again, we see how far removed Nietzsche is from apodictic claims to "metaphy­ sical" or, a fortiori, "empirical" truth. The assertion that Nietzsche's "conception of the will to power is. . . . essentially an empirical concept, arrived at by induction" [Kaufmann, op. cit., 204] is highly questionable. For someone so skeptical of empirical knowledge, schooled by Lange, Mach, Czolbe and others in a conventionalist understanding of science, the idea of a "will to power" or "wills to power" is entirely provisional, hypothetical, a notion adopted for heuristic purposes or as an imaginative philosophical interpretation of selected empirical data. There are, for Nietzsche, no pure facts, but only value-interpretations put forward from different perspectives. Nietzsche's speculative, imaginative, poetic representation of the interior dy­ namics of Wirklichkeit is admittedly his perspectival interpretation. The idea of will to power or wills to power is an elaborately constructed, skillfully defended centerpiece of the "myth of the future" that he believed was needed. Cf. Werke, GOA, X I I , 400.

300

The Lust of Power and the Will to Power

"external w o r l d . " T h e r e are n o "immediate certainties" in our subjective p s y c h i c life as there are n o n e in o u r perception. T h e inference o f a will to p o w e r in man (let alone all beings), if such it m a y be called, is a postulate based u p o n the m o r e primitive postulation o f "urges" as fundamental in man. W h e n the hypothesis o f will to p o w e r is put forward experimentally, N i e t z s c h e has not forgotten that he had said that es giebt

keine

„Wahrheit."

85

A l t h o u g h there are perspectival "truths," "conditional truths," "truths for us," there is n o " T r u t h . " I f p h i l o s o p h y is essentially Auslegung,

then w e c a n n o t any

l o n g e r l o o k to it for " T r u t h " o r "truth-in-itself." A t best w e m a y p r o p o s e experimental ' t r u t h ' o r figurative ' t r u t h ' in the form o f h y p o t h e s e s , postulations o r interpretations. H o w e v e r , as N i e t z s c h e learned from L a n g e , p h i l o s o ­ p h y can n o longer ignore the vast accumulation o f ' k n o w l e d g e ' in the Wissenschaften.

exakte

A global philosophical interpretation must seek to present an

aesthetic c o n c e p t i o n o f actuality that is compatible with the findings o f the sciences. In his y o u t h N i e t z s c h e already saw the direction that his thinking (in part under the stimulus o f L a n g e ) was taking: I n a letter to E r w i n R o h d e he w r o t e that Wissenschaft,

Kunst

und Philosophie

wachsen

jetzt

so sehr

in mir

85

KGW, VIII 1, 112. "There is no 'Truth'." This assertion is no more a "metaphysical nihilism" than is William James' denial of absolute truth or his emphasis upon "truth in the plural." Every way of knowing is perspectival and all perspectival knowing is a "falsification." If one assumes that the analysis of language is the sole method of philosophical illumination, this is a narrowing of perspective within the currently viable perspectives in philosophy. Some small, unpretenti­ ous "truths" will emerge within a narrow perspective, but other fruitful perspectives are negated. The very adoption of a very narrow perspective within the compass of human experience and knowledge entails the denial of "Truth." Nietzsche held that (1) the nature of the knowing process precludes the apprehension of "Truth-in-itself"; (2) what we are able to grasp of "actuality" seems to indicate that it is radically "incongruent" and, hence, eludes linguisticconceptual determination; (3) the claim to possess "Truth" assumes that one has a clear grasp of "the whole", an assumption that is arrogant and absurd because no one can attain such a vantage-point. These are some of the reasons why Nietzsche denies that there is "Truth." That Nietzsche is not proclaiming a positive claim to nescience as some kind of hostile act is clear from his recognition that the loss of belief in 'Truth' is the beginning of the tragic pathos, is a tragische Erkenntnis. Philosophers who believe that the reduction and narrowing of cognitive perspectives is a good seem blind to the nihilistic consequences of their standpoint and attribute a "metaphysical nihilism" to Nietzsche that is far more appropriate to their philosophical orientation.

86

Nietzsche Briefwechsel, II 1. An Erwin Rohde (Ende Januar und 15. Februar 1870). "Science, art and philosophy are now growing into one another so much in me that I shall one day, in any case, give birth to a centaur." Later, Nietzsche had said that it is necessary "to subordinate science," but not to destroy it. Werke, GOA, X , 114. In the Versuch einer Selbstkritik that was added to Die Geburt der Tragödie, Nietzsche prides himself on having seen science itself as a problem, as problematic, questionable. KGW, III 1, Die Geburt der Tragödie, Versuch einer Selbstkritik, 2. His aim was die Wissenschaft unter der Optik des Kunstlers zu sehen, die Kunst aber unter der des Lebens. Ibid. The outcome of the relation between art and science is a tragic, "Dionysian" wisdom that incorporates the scientific Weltanschauung as a conventionalistic

301

The Will to Power zusammen,

daß ich jedenfalls

einmal

Zentauren

gebären

werde.

S6

"

Nietzsche's

youthful prediction was fulfilled: he did give birth to a Centaur, the c o n c e p ­ tion o f the Wille

zur

Macht.

world-interpretation that has enormous practical value and is able to transform the physical world. Theoretically, the natural sciences have been moving towards nihilism in their progres­ sive development. "Seit Kopernikus scheint der Mensch auf eine schiefe Ebene geratener rollt immer schneller nunmehr aus dem Mittelpunkte weg - wohin? ins Nichts?' ins 'durchbohrende Gefühl seines Nichts?" Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW, VI 2, XV. "Since Copernicus man has been rolling down an incline, faster and faster, away from the center - whither? into nothing? into 'the piercing feeling of his nothingness?' Nietzsche is especially skeptical of the optimistic belief that a scientific world-view will replace religious faith and provide a meaningful world for man. Although at one time he himself suggested that by means of science one approaches "the real nature of the world," [KGW, IV 2, MAM, I, 29], his considered opinion was that science reveals the flux of things, but not the goal. However, it is science that provides the "presuppositions" (Voraussetzungen) with which a new Ziel or "goal" must agree. Werke, G O A , X I I , 357. The growth of scientific technology, the increasing mastery of the earth, will provide the strong base of the cultural pyramid that Nietzsche envisions. When mankind achieves power over nature, then this power can be the basis of the development of higher types of beings; here is a strengthening and enhancement of will to power. Werke, GOA, XV, 434. Scientific advancement is seen as a means to the possibility of a new geistige Aristokratie. The "myth of the future" that Nietzsche concocts out of the ideas of eternal return, the will to power and the "overman" is not antagonistic to scientific technology, but is built upon the presumed practical advancement of scientific mastery of the world. Without the ideals he projects, Nietzsche seemed to believe that scientific inquiry alone, without "myth", would exacerbate the feeling of nihilism. Analytical methods produce a greater and greater fragmenta­ tion of knowledge and the deeper man probes the world, the more human "valuation" (Wertschätzung) dissipates and the more meaningless everything becomes. Cf. Werke, GOA, X V I , 96. Hence, the more urgent is the need for a new "ideal," a new "myth."

CHAPTER X I THE STANDPOINT O F THE IDEAL It is strange that the m o s t c o m m o n l y accepted relationship between the thought o f Lange and that o f N i e t z s c h e - the conception o f the "standpoint o f the ideal" - is precisely o n e that is difficult t o establish. All that Lange says about the need for ideals and especially a new, stirring ideal for W e s t e r n civilization is presented in broad strokes and is difficult to relate specifically to the form o f N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophy. U n l i k e the detailed, often quite specific, notions that we have traced from Lange to N i e t z s c h e , the general c o n c e p t i o n o f a cultural ideal that L a n g e sketches provides a background against which we m a y examine N i e t z s c h e ' s positive, experimental concepts and ideals, but offers n o direct connecting links. Even though the influence o f Lange's idea o f the standpoint o f the ideal on N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking is speculative, it is based upon plausible similiarities in the manner in which N i e t z s c h e proposes his futuristic vision o f the transcendence o f the "human, all-too-human" and the way in which L a n g e believes ideals ought to function. Simply put, L a n g e prepares the blueprint and N i e t z s c h e builds the philosophic ediface. W e have already discussed h o w Lange's reflections fall neatly into t w o parts. O n the o n e hand, he sees the advance o f science as leading to an agnosticism about the ultimate constitutents o f actuality, sees that human knowledge is restricted to p h e n o m e n a alone, p h e n o m e n a that are constituted b y o u r "physico-psychical organization." H u m a n knowledge is an island in a sea o f possible knowledge, a highly selective, anthropomorphically c o l o r e d picture o f a 'reality' that exists for us alone. F r o m the standpoint o f scientific understanding, actuality is a fluctuating process o f b e c o m i n g , a dynamic multiplicity o f effects, a Relations-Welt

in which everything is interconnected.

W h a t lies b e y o n d the form-giving activities o f our senses and o u r thought is completely u n k n o w n . T h e exakte

Wissenschaften

give us o n l y a plurality o f

interpretations, valuable piecemeal knowledge and information. Science does not discover ' T r u t h . ' It is conventionalistic through and through, infiltrated b y a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c n o t i o n s , personifications, picturable entities and is built upon hypothetical assumptions. Lange describes the scientific interpretation o f actuality as c o l d and austere, as a constantly changing, relativistic realm in

The Standpoint of the Ideal

303

w h i c h there is n o certainty. T h e materialistic and mechanistic interpretation o f Wirklichkeit

obliterates personal, subjective experience, the world o f feelings,

religious and poetic sentiments o r , in effect, it relegates the qualitative w o r l d o f experience t o a realm o f fantasy and illusion. E v e n though Lange does n o t say it, he certainly suggests that the c o s m o s as revealed in the theories and experimental observations o f the scientists is a senseless, meaningless world. W h e n N i e t z s c h e speaks o f the nihilistic tendencies o f the sciences, he is articulating what is implicit in Lange's extensive analyses o f the scientific movements in the nineteenth century. T h e total effect o f the advance o f the scientific interpretation o f the c o s m o s is demythologizing. Unintentionally, the progressive advancement o f science has stripped away all o f the veils o f illusion that enable man to live and feel j o y and has revealed man as an insignificant particle in a vast, dynamic c o s m o s . W e are confronted with das öde und grausame

Antlitz

der N a t u r .

1

T h e second part o f Lange's Weltanschauung

is, in a sense, a consequence o f

the world-picture proffered in the sciences. H e sees, as U e b e r w e g does, the decline o f traditional religious beliefs and the desiccation o f ideals. T h e confluence o f the loss o f a previously all-pervasive religious belief and the rise o f science is bringing W e s t e r n civilization to the brink o f a crisis. I f w e add t o this the simultaneous rise o f an egoistic materialism that seeks m o n e y , material goods and profit as an end in itself, the situation o f W e s t e r n man is fraught with danger. Finally, w h e n w e l o o k at the emergence o f political factions that are radically opposed t o one another, w e realize that social earthquakes are o n the h o r i z o n . W h e n we consider that such observations were put forward as early as 1 8 6 6 , w e must credit Lange with remarkable foresight. W h a t is needed t o turn the tide, Lange believes, is a recrudescence o f powerful ideals in the form o f m y t h s . Vaihinger is correct in his judgment that Lange saw the value o f "appearances," the value o f "illusions" and the value o f " m y t h " for the elevation o f human sentiments, the infusion o f hope and the unification o f 2

culture. I t is clear that Lange's defense o f the standpoint o f the ideal was a variation o n a Kantian theme. F o r , K a n t ' s "ideals o f reason" were put forward as postulates that preserved G o d , freedom and immortality in the face o f the restriction o f positive knowledge to p h e n o m e n a alone. Lange's ideals are not, however, ideals o f reason, but, rather, figurative, poetic ideals, creations o f the imagination. H e saw, as N i e t z s c h e later did, the need for "illusion" in human life, the tendency o f the human mind to project b e y o n d what is " k n o w n " an

1

2

KGW, III 1, UB, III, 4. " . . . t h e grim and desolate face of nature." Vaihinger, op. cit., 341-342. For an interesting interpretation of the relation between Lange and Nietzsche on this point, see: Jörg Salaquarda, "Der Standpunkt des Ideals bei Lange und Nietzsche", Studi Tedeschi, XII, 1 (1979), 133-160.

304

The Standpoint of the Ideal

"imaginary w o r l d " that appealed to our feelings. T h e capacity to form ideals is the "free synthesis" o f the imagination that is not alien to the mode o f thinking 3

that gathers facts into a holistic science and the sciences into a system. T h e "creation o f the ideal" b y virtue o f "free synthesis" is not an arbitrary cognitive activity because the human mind tends to form a vision o f an aesthetic totality. T h e tendency to formulate a unified scientific t h e o r y is primarily an aesthetic tendency that, Lange believes, is frustrated b y the agnostic views o f scientists o f his time, as well as b y the fragmentation o f scientific knowledge itself, the multiplication o f methodologies in the exakte

Wissenschaften.

T h e latter

p h e n o m e n o n has been exacerbated b y time insofar as today there are multiple methods and interpretations not o n l y within a general scientific discipline, but within sub-divisions o f that discipline. Lange suggests that the need for a holistic Welt-Bild tung

p r o b a b l y cannot be satisfied b y science. Therefore,

must be joined to Wissenschaft

o f actuality. All comprehension o f the whole o r the Weltall, das Ganze

als Einheit,

Dich­

in order to construct a view o f the totality

follows ästhetische

Prinzipien.

all attempts to see

Such "aesthetic princi­

ples" lead us step b y step towards a holistic vision that is an I d e a l .

4

Metaphysical systems that claim to grasp the nature o f absolute reality are, Lange maintains, d o o m e d t o failure. Although it is admitted that man needs t o supplement

his comprehension o f actuality b y creating an Idealwelt,

this

poetic activity is not metaphysical in any traditional sense. T o bring "the w o r l d o f existence" (Welt (der

Welt

der Werte)

des Seienden)

in relation to "the world o f values"

requires "free p o e t r y , " the free creation o f " m y t h . "

5

Lange seeks support for his conception o f the importance o f aesthetically conceived ideals from Schiller's Reich

der Schatten.

Schiller is said to have

sought an elevation o f the spirit above actuality through poetic representation. H e substitutes for the Christian idea o f redemption an ästhetische

Erlösung,

an

"aesthetic redemption." Schiller proclaims that the divine is immanent in the w o r l d and is the essence o f the individual will: [der] göttliche das

wahre

Wesen

seines

eigenen

Willens.

Wille...

[ist]...

A l t h o u g h Lange recognizes the

Christian overtones in Schiller's poetic religion, he also sees that it is essen­ 6

tially a pagan ideal. Pursuing this theme, Lange argues that we must recognize the need for, and the p o w e r of, a "creative idea" that does n o t correspond t o historical o r scientific knowledge, but is not in conflict with them. T h e "world

3

4

5

6

Lange, op. cit., II, 981. Ibid., 986. The theme of the need for a new "mythical construction" in order to offset the spread of the "knowledge-drive" of the Wissenschaften and fill the void left by the critical philosophy of Kant runs though the Nachlass of 1872-73. KGW III 4, 5-120. Ibid, 988. Ibid., 989-990.

The Standpoint of the Ideal

o f ideas" should b e regarded als bildliche

Stellvertretung,

305 as "figurative rep­

resentation" o f the entire "truth." Such figurative "truths" are n o t true in any empirical o r scientific sense, but are actually expressions o f "value," just as truths held b y religions are not certainties, but expressions o f certain values. The

ultimate aim o f such figurative or poetic "truths"

7

is edification o r

inspiration. In times o f dire need, or in what Heidegger later calls "needy times," ein großes

Ideal

is required in order to negate "disintegrating e g o i s m "

and the "deadly chilliness o f the heart" that a purely scientific world-view m a y cause. Such an ideal appears as a stranger from a strange land, an ideal that demands the impossible and thereby "unhinges" conventional notions o f actuality. L a n g e insists upon a free expression o f such figurative ideas n o matter what the consequences in order to attain the emancipation o f the human spirit.

8

Perhaps w i t h o u t realizing it, Lange is here presenting a variation on a philosophic attitude that he earlier found in the writings o f J o h n T o l a n d . T o l a n d , in the eighteenth century, held that, like the ancients, philosophers should have t w o doctrines, one exoteric o r popular and the other esoteric. H e proclaimed that thinkers should speak out freely without fear o f punishment and let their views be refuted b y those w h o want t o do so. O n l y through the free, uninhibited expression o f thought can we ever approach truth. T o l a n d sought to establish a "new religion" that w o u l d be based upon "naturalistic principles." T h e esoteric teaching o f the thinker would be aimed at the "free spirits" w h o would comprise an elite cultus. pantheism in his Pantheistikon

T o l a n d proposed a kind o f

that precluded any transcendental divinity, but

taught that das All is a dynamic unity o f Geist

und Natur.

T o l a n d ' s under­

standing o f nature included the notions that there is no absolute rest, that m o t i o n is universal and that all entities interact with one another.

7

8

9

9

Ibid., 990-991. Ibid., 998-999. In an angry note Nietzsche denounces the "Zeitungs-Deutsch" and quotes from Lange's Geschichte. Lamenting the "current of materialism that runs through our modern civilization," Lange observes that: "Mit dem Lobe der Gegenwart verbindet sich der Cultus der Wirklichkeit. Das Ideale hat keinen Cours; was sich nicht naturwissenschaftlich und geschicht­ lich legitimiren kann, wird zum Untergang verurtheilt." GdM, II, 978. Calling Lange a "worthy animal," Nietzsche attacks German education and suggests that it stimulated the efforts of the "destroyers" of German culture - namely, Hegel, Wagner and Eugen Dühring. KGW VII 3 , 1 7 3 - 1 7 4 . What Nietzsche seems to be saying is that he agrees with Lange about the worship of the present and the "cult of actuality" and considers the three thinkers he cites as typical examples of this phenomenon. By implication, however, he also seems to suggest that cultural "ideals" that are not restrained by the discipline of science have been detrimental to German culture (i. e., in the case of Wagner and Hegel and Dühring). Ibid., I, 285-288.

306

The Standpoint of the Ideal

In

all likelihood, Lange is thinking

o f something

like the

"cult o f

illuminati" that T o l a n d proposed when he calls for the need for a " n e w religion" that will restore meaning to human existence. T h i s "religion" will not, as Christianity did, emphasize mortification, sinfulness, guilt, "fanatical asceticism", o r the "sacrifice o f independence." Lange hails F i c h t e ' s ideal o f the "transformation o f the human r a c e " and shares his hope that a new type o f men will arise in the future w h o will break the chains that have bound man for thousands o f years. F o r a new perfection and a new delight, F i c h t e maintains, we must

be willing to sacrifice. A neue

perfection that will transform the geistige

Vollkommenheit

Lebens

is possible, a

o f man. F i c h t e ' s vision o f a

glowing future requires the overcoming o f "individual self-will" for the sake o f "the ideal perfection" o f humanity. H e calls this optimistic hope the promise of a new "dawn" (Morgenröte). asserts that

"ideas

10

Caught up in F i c h t e ' s enthusiasm, Lange

and sacrifices"

m a y yet save the W e s t e r n world

and

transform it. T h e loss o f previously dominant religious ideals m a y be replaced, Lange

believes, b y

a naturalistic,

"ethical idealism."

A

philosophically

informed "new religion" that takes into account the discoveries o f the sciences m a y be able t o turn W e s t e r n civilization in a positive, inspiring direction. In his preface to the second edition o f his Geschichte, Essay

on Theism

Lange l o o k s to J . S. M i l l ' s

for a formulation o f what he believes is needed. Mill avers

that the inadequate and narrow life o f most men needs to be exalted to lofty hopes that are expressed imaginatively as long as these do n o t conflict with man's knowledge o f the world. In the sphere o f Wirklichkeit, thought"

the "morality o f

demands that we should cling not to vague Möglichkeiten,

but

should base o u r ideal o n "the greater probability." In constructing a new ideal, w e must gelten myth."

lassen Mythus,

als Mythus,

we must "allow validity t o m y t h , as

11

L a n g e ' s standpoint o f the ideal involves the deliberate projection o f an aesthetically conceived, imaginative, figurative "truth" as a m y t h that will have a decidedly religious coloration to it. H o w e v e r , this notion o f a n e w ideal or a new m y t h is not at all meant to replace the hard-won methodisch Empirie."

W h a t Lange proposes is the superimposition

strenge

o f an artistically

formed, philosophico-religious ethical ideal on the massive knowledge and accomplishments o f the exact sciences. I n fact, he stresses that technological progress, invention and discovery lie ahead for man and the "future

of

h u m a n i t y " will depend upon a great deal o f "serious l a b o r " that aims for the

10

11

12

Ibid., II, 992-994. Ibid., II, 450. Ibid., II, 1001.

307

The Standpoint of the Ideal

mastery o f natural forces.

13

A l t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e occasionally characterizes the

exploitation o f nature as h y b r i s ,

14

he also sees the humanization of, and mastery

of, nature as the task o f c o n t e m p o r a r y man, an engineering task that will require "rough w o r k . "

15

H e is n o m o r e anti-scientific than Lange is and, in

fact, sees the Wissenschaften the future: the Problem

as providing the groundwork for the p r o b l e m o f

vom Werte

and o f the Rangordnung

16

der Werte.

There

is a very definite awareness in N i e t z s c h e ' s thought o f the enormous p o w e r that the practical application o f scientific knowledge to the w o r l d has. Despite his c o n c e r n about the tendency towards a synthesis o f leveling social ideals, scientific t e c h n o l o g y and a one-sided emphasis upon practical knowledge, he sees t e c h n o l o g y as providing a sub-structure, a material foundation, that will support the superior type o f individuals he envisions in the pyramidal social structure he believes is best for all m e n .

17

W h a t G e o r g e Brandes called N i e t z s c h e ' s "aristocratic radicalism" seems to require the growth o f modern industrial society as a foundation for what might be called an extreme form o f meritocracy. Because o f the tendency t o associate N i e t z s c h e ' s social ideals with the N a z i ideology, the vast majority o f thinkers in the w o r l d are very suspicious o f anything that smacks o f the elitism that N i e t z s c h e embraces. A n d y e t his sketch o f the best form o f social organization is n o t actually sinister in intention. N i e t z s c h e accepted a form o f dialectical evolution and believed that it t o o k m a n y hundreds o f years t o form an authentic aristocracy. T h o s e today w h o believe that c o m m u n i s m , socialism o r a reformed o r modified capitalism under ostensible ' d e m o c r a t i c ' rule is the best of

all possible socio-political forms

should

not be t o o q u i c k t o

brand

N i e t z s c h e as an old-fashioned ideologue. F o r , he spoke in terms o f a thousand years.

Perhaps

Selbstaufgebung

history,

as

in

the

past,

will

display

that

process

of

that is typical o f growth and life and produce, in the future, a

social structure that is world-wide and not t o o dissimilar from N i e t z s c h e ' s cultural pyramid. T o b o r r o w N i e t z s c h e ' s tone for a m o m e n t , it must b e said that there is a great deal o f hypocrisy that underlies the rhetoric o f those w h o constantly praise the values o f universal egalitarianism, o f the basic sameness o f humanity, w h o grant a generous dispensation o f "rights" with n o c o n c o m i t ­ ant "duties." It is ironic to see a recent interpreter o f N i e t z s c h e criticize h i m for emphasizing the importance o f individual Erlebnis

13

14

15

Ibid., 984, 997. KGW, VI 2, GM, III, I X . Ibid., JGB, 14.

16

Ibid., GM, I, XVII.

17

KGW, VI 3, Der Antichrist, 57.

and for failing to recognize

308

The Standpoint of the Ideal

the value o f "institutionalization" as man's sole protection against arbitrari­ ness.

18

Such a veneration o f surviving institutions is only a concealed form o f

Hegelianism, what N i e t z s c h e criticized in his y o u t h as the "worship o f success." A r e institutions that have done little o r nothing t o encourage o r promote the perfectibility o f man really such sacrosanct entities? M o r e o v e r , o u r author chides N i e t z s c h e for failing to see that law, politics and e c o n o m y have a "dialectic" o f their own in which "immediate personal value j u d g m e n t s " are n o t relevant.

19

I t would seem that N i e t z s c h e , as anti-political thinker, saw

quite clearly that these institutional forces were responsible, to s o m e extent, for the decadence o f m o d e r n life, for the abuses and injustices (at times o n an international scale) that gave rise to the political forms that o u r critic o f N i e t z s c h e deplores. T h e "will to p o w e r " o f modern States, all modern States, manifests itself through the very institutional forms that N i e t z s c h e ' s critic accepts as supra-individual powers. T o seek to transform the social w o r l d without first transforming, disciplining and honing the sentiments, attitudes and values o f individuals, without giving individuals a meaningful telos

for

their lives, is a futile enterprize. W h a t N i e t z s c h e said over a hundred years ago is still true: what is lacking is a life-enhancing aim or goal. C e n t r a l t o Lange's proposal o f the creation o f new myths is an emphasis upon naturalistic values and a naturalistic ethics. Although an ethical ideal cannot be directly derived from the " i s , " it should be compatible with what we k n o w o f the natural world and man as a natural being. In this regard, Lange b o r r o w s K a n t ' s notion o f the "intelligible w o r l d , " but conceives o f it as a Welt der Dichtung.

18

19

T h e poetic representation o f an ethical ideal serves as a counter-

J.P.Stern, op. cit., 127. When Stern remarks that "Institutionalism" is "man's only protection against arbitrariness" and then insinuates that Nietzsche's philosophy was directly influential on Nazi ideology, he betrays a misunderstanding of recent history. The temporary success and rise to power of Nazism was attained by means of the manipulation of existing, "legitimate" institutions and was, in large part, made possible by, or generated by, legal and economic international "forces", as well as by the weakness and lack of direction of a "democratic Republic." Institutions, rather than being safeguards against tyranny, often produce the very conditions that breed social revolutions of all kinds. This was precisely Nietzsche's point in his early critique of the European bourgeoisie and what might be called "the industrial-military complex" of the 1870's. He blamed the rise of socialism on the abuses of the regnant, legitimate, institutionalized economic practices of the European capitalists. For all his poetic gifts, Nietzsche had a far better sense of history and historical forces than Stern or others give him credit for having. His predications about the twentieth century, unfortunately, proved to be more accurate than those of Karl Marx. Aside from predicting global conflicts that would be horrendous, he also saw that applied science or technology would have dramatic effects on the human world, the bourgeoisization of the "workers," the leveling effects of socialism and communism on culture, the tendency towards a "United States of Europe," the global scope of "grand politics", and much more. Ibid., 129.

The Standpoint of the Ideal

309

balance to the "pessimism" that springs from an exclusive acquaintance with actuality or what N i e t z s c h e later calls "ugly truths."

After K a n t , Lange

believes that the philosopher should be the "teacher o f the ideal." T h i s standpoint is connected with F e u e r b a c h ' s projection o f a new philosophy that will make man, and nature as the basis o f man, the universal and central object of philosophy. A n t h r o p o l o g y is the essence o f philosophy for Feuerbach as it will b e , in large measure, for N i e t z s c h e as well. A s we have seen, and as Heidegger emphasizes, in N i e t z s c h e ' s thought we never really get outside the circle o f a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m . Aside from this notion o f the centrality of man in philosophy, Lange attributes to Feuerbach a "categorical imperative" that, I believe, insinuated itself into N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking. T h e Feuerbachian imperative is: Begnüge mit

20

der gegebenen

Welt.

dich

I f w e turn this assertion around in our mind and

view it, as it were, at an angle, it is reminiscent o f one o f N i e t z s c h e ' s basic imperatives: bleibt

der Erde

21

treu.

T h a t there is some relationship between this

"imperative" and N i e t z s c h e ' s persistent emphasis upon "this w o r l d y " values and goals is suggested when w e superimpose

it upon some o f C z o l b e ' s

impassioned views. Lange mentions that C z o l b e ' s reflections are predomin­ antly ethical and are based upon the categorical imperative attributed

to

Feuerbach's implicit ethics. C z o l b e makes the exclusion o f a supersensuous realm o r a transcendental w o r l d a morally significant principle. It is contended that the soi-disant

" m o r a l needs" that arise from o u r dissatisfaction with our

earthly life should really be considered " i m m o r a l " (unmoralische),

that it is not

humility, but vanity, that leads man to imagine a "supersensuous w o r l d " and to raise himself above nature. C z o l b e traces the projection o f supersensuous ideas to die Unzufriedenheit

22

mit der Welt der Erscheinungen.

that N i e t z s c h e returns t o quite often: the other

world

T h i s is a theme o f perfection, the

transcendental w o r l d , is imagined because man is dissatisfied with the t e m p o ­ ral world, because o f disappointment, frustration o r suffering. Even C z o l b e ' s paradoxical assertion that morality is, in a sense, " i m m o r a l " is appropriated by N i e t z s c h e . F o r , in the Nacblass Spezialfall

der

Unmoralität.

23

he remarks that die Moral

selbst

ist ein

Although this is the kind o f assertion that

offends analytical philosophers, N i e t z s c h e is quite clear about what he means when he claims that morality is a special case o f " i m m o r a l i t y . " T h e apotheosis

20

21

22

23

Lange, op. cit., II,551. "Content yourself with the world given to you." This slogan is quoted by Nietzsche from GdM and is called the "ethical canon" of Materialism. HKG 3, 335. KGW, VI 1, AsZ, Vorrede, 3. That this exhortation, "remain faithful to the earth," is an ethical imperative is pretty clear, especially when it is also said that "To sin against the earth is now the most terrible thing." Lange, op. cit., II, 557. "... the dissatisfaction with the world of phenomena." KGW, VIII 3, 113. "...morality is a special case of immorality."

The Standpoint of the Ideal

310

of morality as the supreme value that is typical o f a great deal o f W e s t e r n thought implies the denigration o f actuality o r what actually happens. T h e imposition o f a morality o n a people is an act o f "will to p o w e r " usually o n the part o f the "exhausted and disinherited" w h o take their revenge o n others via morality. T h e projection o f morality as the supreme value is an act o f Wille Macht,

zur

an act that is, from a m o r a l point o f view, " i m m o r a l . " Insofar as any

morality wants to improve on nature, it is " i m m o r a l " in relation to natural development. N i e t z s c h e is not inconsistent in his espousal o f a naturalistic morality because it, t o o , is, like any morality, "a bit o f tyranny against "nature"."

24

It requires discipline, self-imposed limitations and the endeavor to

transform natural impulses into creative, affirmative virtu.

A morality that

does not seek t o destroy natural drives, but sublimates them, is o n e in which there is a Wiederherstellung

der Natur,

a "restoration o f nature."

25

Despite his

description o f himself as an "immoralist," N i e t z s c h e is not a moral nihilist insofar as his critique o f previous morality, as he admits, is motivated b y a " m o r a l " impulse and w o u l d n o t be possible without the previous valuation o f Redlichkeit

or " h o n e s t y . " I n his preface to the second edition o f

Morgenröte,

he expresses his aim, as he often does, in a formula with a Hegelian ring: die Selbstaufhebung

der

26

Moral.

T h e ideal o f a naturalistic ethics is reinforced in Lange's Geschichte

by

U e b e r w e g , C z o l b e and L a n g e himself. A t one point, Lange states that die ethischen

und ästhetischen

Ideen

27

are necessary products o f Naturkraft.

The

naturalistic orientation that N i e t z s c h e adopted was very m u c h in the air in nineteenth century G e r m a n y and was linked, b y Strauss and others, to a n e o pagan morality. H o w e v e r , it is C z o l b e ' s attitudes that seem to have impressed N i e t z s c h e quite deeply. F o r , he often adopts philosophical positions not as a result o f ratiocination o r empirical evidence, but as a consequence o f a subjective moral attitude. T h u s , for example, he says that he denies a super­ natural soul n o t o n the basis o f physiological evidence o r rational principles, but out o f das moralische

Pflichtgefühl

gegen

die naturalische

Weltordnung.

28

C z o l b e was skeptical about the "facts o f internal and external experience" and was decidedly anti-dogmatic. C z o l b e held that what we think o f as knowledge is fundamentally a set o f " h y p o t h e s e s , " some m o r e viable than others. T h i s skeptical orientation leads him to think primarily in terms o f value-orientations. In this regard, he is said

24

25

26

27

2S

KGW, VI 2, J G B , 188. KGW, VIII 3, 115. KGW, V 1, Vorrede. "... the self-suppression of morality." Lange, op. cit., II, 392. Ibid., II, 559. "... the moral feeling of duty towards the natural world-order."

311

The Standpoint of the Ideal

t o have admired Hölderlin's Hyperion

for its poetic pantheism and its glorifi­

cation o f the H e l l e n i c unification o f Geist

und Natur.

M o r e or less a conven­

tionalist in science, C z o l b e respected the methods o f the sciences and the discipline o f science, but believed that ultimate philosophical standpoints were expressions o f value and not " k n o w l e d g e " o r "truth." O n the slender thread o f " g o o d w i l l " , C z o l b e bases his rejection o f all supersensuous ideas, ideals or entities and adopts the imperative to content ourselves with this w o r l d , with the natural order. T h e hypothesis o f what he calls "sensationalism" is adopted n o t because alternative views are unwarranted, but because it enables us to form an understanding o f the relations o f phenomena. I n the final analysis, C z o l b e ' s philosophical orientation is adopted for ' m o r a l ' , in the sense o f practical, reasons. T h u s , for example, he says that B a c o n ' s exclusion o f the supersensuous brought about significant advances in philosophy and science. W h y , he wonders, should not new advances be made b y following the same principle? W i t h o u t calling it so, C z o l b e ' s approach to philosophy is entirely experimental and, in J a m e s ' sense, "pragmatic." T h a t is, a philosophical orientation is adopted for the sake o f the probable consequences for k n o w ­ ledge and life that we believe will follow from it once it is adopted.

29

Although

C z o l b e ' s philosophical views are only sketched in Lange's w o r k , there is little d o u b t that his general attitude towards the philosophical enterprize, as well as his appeal to " m o r a l reasons," helped to shape N i e t z s c h e ' s

provisional,

experimental approach to philosophy, as well as his own version o f 'sensation­ alism' and his strenuous

denial o f supersensuous

realities. A

naturalism

adopted for moral reasons is typical o f m a n y o f N i e t z s c h e ' s polemics against all those thinkers w h o seek the meaning and justification o f life and existence in a transcendental realm. The

entire discussion o f ethische

Materialismus

o r ethical

naturalism

includes a n u m b e r o f notions that are developed b y N i e t z s c h e . Lange and U e b e r w e g especially point to the possibility o f a "new faith" o r perhaps a "religion o f the future" that will expunge the negative, instinct-condemning principles o f Christianity and be based upon naturalistisch

und

anthropologisch

principles. U e b e r w e g , in particular, fuses an ethics based upon naturalistic principles and the need for a new vision for man, a neue

religiöse

Kraft

that will

be consistent with scientific principles and knowledge. H e suggests a reunifica­ tion o f " k n o w i n g , feeling and willing" that would be reflected in an ideal that w o u l d synthesize the theoretical, the ethical and the aesthetic. W h a t U e b e r w e g seems to have in mind essentially is a 'religion' that would involve a synthesis

29

Ibid., II, 552-560, 584-587, 962-965. The notes for 1867-68 include a reference to two of Henrich Czolbe's works: "neue Darstellung des Sensualismus Leipz. 1855" and "die Grenzen und der Ursprung der menschl. Erkenntniß." HKG, 3, 393.

The Standpoint of the Ideal

312

o f science and art. F o r support o f this ideal he appeals to G o e t h e ' s refrain: Wer Wissenschaft

und Kunst

besitzt/Der

habe

besitzt/Der

Religion!

hat Religion;/Wer

diese

beiden

nicht

30

All o f the programmatic notions that we've treated here are fused together in what L a n g e calls der Standpunkt his Geschichte

des Materialismus,

des Ideals.

T h r o u g h o u t the fourth part o f

Lange emphasizes, again and again, the need

for a n e w m y t h t o replace the traditional dogmas o f Christianity that are losing their p o w e r over man m o r e and m o r e . T h i s deliberately created mythical ideal is t o j o i n together Dichtung

und Wissenschaft

in an aesthetically stimulating

cosmic vision. Supplementing it is an ethics rooted in nature, a this-worldly ethics that emphasizes the "perfectibility" o f man, that is a holistic, aesthetic representation o f nature and man in nature. Lange mulls over U e b e r w e g ' s proposal o f eine

Religion

der Zukunft

and correctly sees that it is decidedly

post-Christian, that it is t o be a religion o f "reconciliation and j o y , " a religion of "cheerfulness" and one dedicated t o die Vollkommenheit Lebens.

des

diesseitigen

L a n g e seeks to modify U e b e r w e g ' s ideal b y stressing that the aesthetic

and ethical requirements that U e b e r w e g proposes w o u l d have to translate "religious forms into philosophical ideas." T h i s new, affirmative religion would not be naively optimistic and would n o t ignore the finstern

Schatten

that falls upon o u r life. C o n s p i c u o u s l y absent from this "religion o f the future," this "new faith", is G o d . In

a letter to L a n g e , U e b e r w e g emphasizes that it is quite clear that

religions contain a great deal that is anthropomorphic and has o n l y Gültiges.

A poetische

Vorstellung

poetisch

in a religious comprehension of actuality

must give a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m a "religious justification." Something, he c o n ­ tinues, that has Wirklichkeit

is "anthropomorphically represented." A strange

"materialist," U e b e r w e g strains to preserve, in some way, the idea o f G o d . U s i n g the analogy o f the internal states of man, U e b e r w e g extends a kind o f sensation and consciousness to all entities and ends with a kind o f materioidealism. U e b e r w e g leans, despite his ostensible 'materialism,' towards a definite panpsychism which deletes any absolute distinction between the organic and the inorganic. Inclined towards atheism because o f his denial o f a "personal G o d , " U e b e r w e g toyed with the notion o f a divinity, conceived o f in terms o f human analogy, that is immanent in the c o s m o s . T h e 'religion' he proposes, then, is a variation on Spinoza's philosophy. Lange associates the aspirations o f U e b e r w e g towards a post-Christian religion with J o h n Stuart Mill's definition o f religion as

Cited in Lange, op. cit., II, 968. "Who has science and art,/Has religion;/Who has no part in these,/Still has religion!"

The Standpoint of the Ideal

313

the strong and earnest direction of the emotions towards an ideal object, recognized as of the highest excellence, a n d . . . as paramount over all selfish objects of desire. 31

Lange immediately sees this as a poetic conception o f religion that is c o m p a t ­ ible with the demand for a new form o f religion that would eliminate the negative features o f the Christian faith. I f such a 'religion' is to be possible, Lange avers, the naturalistic and empirically minded thinkers should heed Schiller's dictum: " T a k e courage, then, in erring and in dreaming" - (Wage zu irren The

und zu

du

träumen.).

background

for the presentation

o f a new religion based upon

naturalistic principles and supplemented b y a naturalistic ethics is delineated by L a n g e in an interesting way. H e maintains that "truths" in the form o f what he calls "small change" o r in the form o f approximations and fragmentary pieces o f knowledge are provided b y the exact sciences and their precise m e t h o d s . H o w e v e r , such fragmentary present

truths are uninspiring

an aesthetic, poetic representation

and do

not

o f the whole o f nature. T h e

postulation o f a holistic vision o f the c o s m o s , like the central beliefs o f traditional religions, can only be said to convey "poetic truth." T h e idea o f the A b s o l u t e that is central to the philosophy o f H e g e l has the value o f an "image," o r m a y be understood as a Symbol

that points to something that is,

strictly speaking, u n k n o w n . W h a t is called a "full sense for actuality and verifiable a c c u r a c y " is not incompatible with poetic representation as long as the latter is understood as "truth" in a "figurative sense". Since language is the c o m m o n possession o f the people, we must make r o o m for "truth" in a figurative, mythical sense insofar as what the people c o m m o n l y accept as " t r u e " is what they believe

to be "true". Such figurative, poetic truths, then,

are n o t true in a strict sense because they bear no relation to knowledge o r to what is accepted as knowledge in the exakte

Wissenschaften.

W e must bear in

mind this distinction between truth in the empirical o r scientific sense and bildliche

Wahrheit.

T r u t h in reference to actuality not only does n o t coincide

with beauty, but is in direct opposition to it. Therefore, whoever puts forward a "truth" as a poetic representation o f the w h o l e does s o , o r ought to do so, with the knowledge that this ideal is "not true,"

but is an edifying

Vorstellung

that m a y raise man above the limits o f the senses. W i t h o u t some kind o f poetic vision, Lange believes, it is questionable whether there w o u l d be anything left t o m a k e life w o r t h w h i l e .

31

32

32

T h e ultimate values expressed in figurative, poetic

Cited in Lange, op. cit., II, 1007-1008. The citation is from J. S. Mill's Essays on Religion (1874). Lange, op. cit., II, 936, 938-939, 940-941. This two-fold conception of "truth" is generally accepted by Nietzsche insofar as he recognized the "value" of "little, unpretentious truths, which have been found by means of strict method." KGW, IV 3, MAM, I, 3. The appreciation of such "truths" is the mark of a "higher culture." "Es ist das Merkmal einer höhern Cultur, die

The Standpoint of the Ideal

314

o r aesthetic ' t r u t h ' are, in the final analysis, matters o f taste n o t for the individual alone, but for an entire Kultur.

(Geschmackssache)

T h e example that L a n g e

gives is instructive in light o f N i e t z s c h e ' s subsequent philosophical develop­ m e n t : the rationalists o f the eighteenth century embraced the general tendency o f the culture o f their age and projected the cultural ideal o f a "spiritual aristocracy"

(Geistesaristokratie).

33

T h e foundation o f the emerging naturalistic ethics is a new respect for the senses and for the b o d y . Lange cites with approval F e u e r b a c h ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f the self in Grundsatzen

der Philosophie

der Zukunft

(1849).

Ich bin ein wirkliches, ein sinnliches Wesen: der Leib gehört zu meinem Wesen; ja, der Leib in seiner Totalität ist mein Ich, mein Wesen selber. 34

It need hardly be said that this c o n c e p t i o n o f the "self" is virtually identical to N i e t z s c h e ' s assertions in Also

sprach

Zarathustra.

Against the "despisers o f the

b o d y " , he argues that " I am entirely b o d y . . . . B e h i n d y o u r thoughts

33

34

and

kleinen unscheinbaren Wahrheiten, welche mit strenger Methode gefunden wurden, höher zu schätzen, als die beglückenden und künstlerischen Zeitaltern und Menschen entstammen." Like Lange before him, Nietzsche calls the appreciation of, and valuation of, such unscheinbaren Wahrheiten a more männlich or "manly" attitude than that which only appreciates the "symbolical." On the other hand, following Lange, he still saw the value of, and importance of, figurative, poetic or experimental "truths" for culture and for life. Since Nietzsche consistently denies that there is any "Truth" in the sense of absolute truth or "Wahrheit-an-sich", his appeal to metaphorical "truth" is never a claim to metaphysical knowledge of some truth. Lange's reference in this context to language as the common possession of the people, that it is, as the recent fashion in philosophy declared, "ordinary language," was apparently spotted by Nietzsche's penetrating gaze. For, in Götzendämmerung, he remarks that Wofür wir Worte haben, darüber sind wir auch schon hinaus... Die Sprache, scheint es, ist nur für Durchschnitt­ liches, Mittleres, Mitteilsames erfunden." KGW, VI 3, G, I X , 26. "Whatever we have words for, we have already outgrown... Language, it seems, has been invented for the average, the middling, and the communicable." Ibid., II, 939. Aside from the suggestion of a "spiritual aristocracy," it should be mentioned that the belief that ultimate, valuational ideals are a "matter of taste" (Geschmackssache) is also shared by Nietzsche. He averred that ultimate values are a matter of Geschmack. [Werke, G O A , XII, 95 f.] This view does not entail that there is no disputation about tastes. On the contrary, the history of ultimate values or cultural ideals is a struggle (that may be compared with the ancient Greek agon) amongst conflicting "tastes." In Also sprach Zarathustra, life is pictured as striving to overcome itself and as seeking to create splendid temples that represent symbols of ultimate value. This "divine" striving against one another of ideals is encouraged. Life is said to need a conflict of values or ideals in order to ascend, in order to "overcome itself." KGW, VI 1, AsZ, II, "Von den Taranteln." Elsewhere, it is said that Moralität can only create and erect images of man, as art does. It cannot demonstrate its validity. Cf. Werke, GOA, X I , 216. In another place, it is held that aesthetische Urteile such as Geschmack lie at the basis of moralische Urteile. With emphasis, Nietzsche exclaims: "Reduktion der Moral auf Aesthetik!" KGW, V 2, 369. Ludwig Feuerbach, Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft, Leipzig, 1849, 81. Cited in Lange, op. cit., II, 523. "I am a real, a sensible being; the body is part of my being; nay, the body in its totality, is my ego, is itself my essence."

The Standpoint of the Ideal

315

f e e l i n g s . . . stands a mighty ruler, an u n k n o w n sage whose name is self. In y o u r b o d y he dwells; he is y o u r b o d y . "

35

W i t h the proviso that we understand

that the b o d y is conceived o f as comprised o f a plural c o m m u n i t y o f " s o u l s " or "wills to p o w e r , " N i e t z s c h e ' s equation o f the b o d y with the self is certainly reminiscent o f F e u e r b a c h ' s formulation. A l t h o u g h N i e t z s c h e digs beneath the surface o f Feuerbach's anthropology, he does adopt a naturalistic ethics, an ethics o f growth and development on the basis o f the centrality o f the senses and the b o d y . A s opposed t o what is considered a "decadent" morality that seeks to undermine instincts, repress or destroy passion and l o o k upon the b o d y as something to be despised, N i e t z s c h e praises instinctive vitality, strong, life-enhancing impulses

and

drives as signs o f physiological health. A morality o f strength is "natural", spontaneous and positive. It is a morality o f growth that encourages the o v e r c o m i n g o f resistances and prizes the "feeling o f p o w e r . " Paradigmatically, the naturalistic morality N i e t z s c h e proposes posits "excellence" or arete goal, virtù

as its

in the Renaissance style, positive, creative feelings uncontaminated

by the negativity o f "moralic acid." elsewhere the Gefühl

der Macht

36

T h a t N i e t z s c h e emphasizes here and

(the same feeling he earlier attributed to the

B r a h m i n s and to creative artists), makes it clear that he is thinking in terms o f an existential condition and not brute p o w e r over others. In merung,

Götzendäm-

N i e t z s c h e states his case simply and lucidly.

Man ist nur fruchtbar um den Preis, an Gegensätzen reich zu sein; man bleibt nur jung unter der Voraussetzung, daß die Seele nicht sich streckt, nicht nach Frieden begehrt... Jeder Naturalismus in der M o r a l . . . ist von einem Instinkte des Lebens beherrscht. Die widernatürliche M o r a l . . . wendet sich umgekehrt gerade gegen die Instinkte des Lebens. 37

Even though we have b e c o m e somewhat skeptical about the uninhibited expression o f the instinct o f life because o f the bizarre and destructive forms it often takes, we must r e m e m b e r that when N i e t z s c h e counsels a natural expression o f passion, feeling and instinct, he does so under the rubric o f Vergeistigung

o r "spiritualization" o f tendencies that, in their crude form,

express a "sick selfishness" and a failure o f self-control and self-mastery. T o act out every impulse o r "instinct" does n o t lead to wholeness, but, rather, to

35

36

37

KGW, VI 1, AsZ, I, "Von den Verächtern des Leibes." Cf. The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans., W. Kaufmann, New York, 1964, 146. KGW, VI 3, Der Antichrist, 2. Ibid., G, "Moral als Widernatur," 3, 4. "One is fruitful only at the price of being rich in antitheses; one remains young only on condition that the soul does not relax, does not long for peace... Every naturalism in morality... is dominated by an instinct of life Anti-natural morality . . . turns itself, on the contrary, against the instinct of life."

316

The Standpoint of the Ideal

disintegration; it betrays a complete lack o f a capacity for Sublimierung.

The

moral nihilist w h o appeals to N i e t z s c h e for justification of his pathology misunderstands him, refuses to see that the aim o f a naturalistic morality is growth, wholeness, integration, a controlled, dynamic equilibrium o f all the "urges" o f the self. F o r N i e t z s c h e , spiritual strength requires severity with oneself, an asceticism o f nature, need and instinct. K n o w l e d g e for such 38

individuals is itself an asceticism. T h e spiritualization o f instincts, drives o r urges is essential to N i e t z s c h e ' s ideal, an ideal that is more an aesthetic one or an ideal o f "health" than it is a morality in any traditional sense. In the healthy individual the Apollonian and the D i o n y s i a n tendencies are integrated. T h e strongest individuals, those w h o can live without absolutes, without extreme articles o f faith, without fanaticism, are the m o s t moderate (mäßig).

Such

individuals are tolerant o f chance, able to endure the senseless in life. T h e y are healthy enough to endure misfortune and are sure o f their p o w e r .

39

Such

" m o d e r a t e " individuals do not resemble the moral nihilist w h o is typically ruled b y instincts and passions, w h o acts out the confusion and turmoil and irrationality in himself, w h o , like the psychopathic personality, expresses the chaos o f nature without its order. A l t h o u g h Lange, U e b e r w e g and Strauss do not clarify in detail the ideal o f a naturalistic ethics, they probably served as stimulators o f the need

to

develope such an ethical standpoint. As is quite often the case with N i e t z s c h e , they propose a new moral ideal primarily in terms of its opposition

to

previously dominant conceptions o f morality or what they considered as antinatural moralities. U e b e r w e g , in particular, held that the Christian religion placed t o o m u c h emphasis upon grace and faith alone almost to the exclusion o f "self-conscious ethical action." H e deplores the encouragement o f "resigna­ t i o n " and he, along with Strauss, condemns the early Christian depreciation o f labor. Again, the emphasis upon a morality that is consonant with man's natural being and is opposed to what is considered the negative prohibitions and principles o f Christian morality is stronger than are the positive features o f this n e w moral ideal. O n a m u c h larger scale, N i e t z s c h e repeats this tendency insofar as his critique o f morality in general, and Christian morality in particular,

is more forceful and m o r e detailed than is his o w n

positive

" m o r a l i t y o f development." T h e clearest understanding o f what N i e t z s c h e is driving at is not so m u c h found in his evocative statements, but in his illustrative models: G o e t h e , "the R o m a n Caesar with the soul o f C h r i s t . " Even these illustrations o f an ideal type o f superior being do not give us an

38

39

Ibid., Der Antichrist, 57. Werke, GOA, XV, 186 f.

317

The Standpoint of the Ideal

understanding o f the full range of what may be called his p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the dialectical transformation o f the will to power in man. T o gain an accurate perspective o n the ideal that N i e t z s c h e projects, we would have to interrelate the hypothesis o f the will to power and the m y t h o f eternal recurrence and s h o w h o w they point to the conditions for the possibility of the

Übermensch.

T h e c o m p o s i t e portrait o f the new ideal for man that Lange, U e b e r w e g and others paint includes a naturalistic, post-Christian ethical ideal and a poetic, quasi-religious c o n c e p t i o n o f the whole or the "world-all". U e b e r w e g , as we have seen, hints at the need for a new conception o f divinity, a conception w h i c h , nonetheless, will have an anthropomorphic

meaning. A t one point,

U e b e r w e g cryptically remarks that a "world-soul" may be imagined as the "internal" form o f the natural, physical world. Lange expands o n this sugges­ tion and notes that what U e b e r w e g is looking for is die Existenz welches

sich dazu

schaffen

zu w e r d e n .

Weltanschauung

eignet, 4 0

in anthropomorpher

Auffassung

eines

zum

Gott

Wesens, umge­

A s Lange points out, U e b e r w e g never came up with a

that satisfied him. H o w e v e r , it is clear that he was looking for

a general c o n c e p t i o n o f reality that would include physical or natural actuality and psychic or geistige

Realität.

H i s religion o f the future has Spinozistic

overtones insofar as reality is conceived o f as having t w o aspects, the physical and the psychic, and insofar as it is conceived o f as a divinity immanent in nature.

W h a t is unusual

is his insistence that the immanent

divinity is

conceived in accordance with human analogy. Whereas U e b e r w e g is still engaged in metaphysical speculation, Lange argues that such general, i m ­ pressionistic ideas o f the totality o f all beings is akin to poetic or representa­ tional "truth." T h a t U e b e r w e g relies upon anthropomorpher

Auffassung

indi­

cates, to Lange, that his conception o f the real is necessarily mythological. Putting together the imaginative speculations he considers, Lange main­ tains that a n e w synthesis o f art, religion and philosophy may be able to reconcile the antagonism between inquiry and imagination, Wissenschaft Dichtung.

and

T h e standpoint o f the ideal requires a new m y t h that will synthesize

the "world o f actuality" disclosed in the sciences and the "world o f ideals." U n c o n s c i o u s l y , perhaps,

Lange suggests that the "being" that

would transform into an anthropomorphic " G o d " is eine Macht,

Ueberweg

a p o w e r that

acts upon us and is used b y us. In our c o m m e r c e with this power, Lange claims, we are dependent

upon experience and actuality.

41

Lange does not

complete the circle o f his thought in terms o f U e b e r w e g ' s suggestions. W h a t if w e conceived o f this Macht

40

41

in terms o f human analogy and as something like

Lange, op. cit., II, 965. " . . . the existence of a being suited to be transformed into a God in an anthropomorphic conception of it." Ibid., II, 985.

The Standpoint of the Ideal

318

an immanent divinity? W h a t if the "lust o f p o w e r " in man and in all living beings is but a single manifestation o f a universal striving for power, a "will to p o w e r " construed as analogous to human willing? Lange does not raise these questions; but N i e t z s c h e , following his lead, will. A s we have seen, Lange repeatedly argues that the only actuality that we are cognizant o f is a c o m p l e x system o f relations, a multiplicity o f "effects", a perpetual flux. This leads him to hold that Eine W i r k l i c h k e i t . . . wie der Mensch sie sich einbildet, und wie er sie ersehnt, wenn diese Einbildung erschüttert wird: ein absolut festes, von uns unabhängiges und d o c h von uns erkanntes Dasein - eine solche Wirklichkeit gibt es nicht und kann es nicht geben. 42

Despite the fact that this notion is tantamount t o Nietzsche's claim that we have n o knowledge

o f a "reality-in-itself," that there is n o

actuality, N i e t z s c h e is critical, in his Nachlass,

unchanging

o f Lange's assertion.

He

attributes to Lange a longing for an "absolute master", a desire to turn away from

"deceptions, changes" and

"unknowns"

that is characterized as an

idealistic yearning that reflects a slavish religious-moral standpoint. N i e t z s c h e unfairly charges that Lange takes no pride in the fact that man is active in this actuality and charges him with promoting an "idealism o f weakness."

43

Al­

though it is true that Lange does insist upon the need to project an ideal b e y o n d the confines o f the scientific understanding o f actuality, he accepts the flux, uncertainty and "perversities" o f the actual as courageously as N i e t z s c h e does. N i e t z s c h e ' s criticism o f Lange in this regard is unfair especially because he, t o o , believes that man requires an "ideal" that transcends a fluctuating empirical actuality. T h e loss o f a belief in " T r u t h " , the impossibility o f attaining an ideal conception o f reality that is not an "illusion" is seen as "tragic." Since N i e t z s c h e also sees the need for "the standpoint o f the ideal", his critique o f Lange in this context is unfair and

unfounded.

Lange does admit that the scientific view of actuality is not "after our o w n hearts", but adds that it is nonetheless the basis o f "our entire intellectual existence." Actuality is an endless process o f becoming, a realm o f universal impermanence. T h e " w o r l d " we apprehend through our senses and thought is a "subjective", constructive product of the psychophysical "organization" o f the species. Actuality is subject to a variety o f interpretations. Science gives us

42

43

Ibid., II, 982. "A reality as man imagines to himself and as he yearns for when this imagination is dispelled, an existence absolutely fixed and independent of us while yet known by us - such a reality does not exist and cannot exist." KGW VII 2, 90. Cp. J. Salaquarda, "Nietzsche und Lange," N.S., 7 (1978), 242. Salaquarda points out that the specific reference Nietzsche makes to the Geschichte indicates that he had in hand the edition of 1882. Ibid., 240n.

The Standpoint of the Ideal

319

"small c h a n g e " or fragmentary truths, but no " T r u t h . " Lange hesitates to say what N i e t z s c h e will dare to say: "there is no ' T r u t h ' " . Lange's c o n c e p t i o n o f the tentative, provisional, hypothetical nature o f genuine scientific knowledge, the restriction o f knowledge to fragmentary ' t r u t h s ' none o f which are absolute, virtually entails the notion that we cannot k n o w any universal, absolute truth. Empirical inquiry and scientific theory are pervaded b y conventionalist assumptions and can never lead us to a knowledge o f the ultimate constituents o f reality. Knowledge is restricted to selectively apprehended " p h e n o m e n a "

that are entirely conditioned b y our p h y s i o -

p s y c h i c organization. Since Lange believes that metaphysical speculation is in vain, we w o u l d have no access to any universal idea or value if it were not for the adoption o f the standpoint o f the ideal, the poetic, figurative projection o f 'truths' as m y t h s . T h e o n l y rationale for creating such mythical ideals is the presumed, valued effects that such ideals would have upon human life, the feelings, sentiments, needs and aspirations o f mankind. T h e standpoint o f the ideal is clearly a p r o t o t y p e o f the pragmatic conception o f the adoption o f an idea or ideal that is neither supported by, n o r negated b y , scientific k n o w ­ ledge, but which is put forward on the basis o f its presumed valuable effects in the long run. Religion, metaphysics and poetry ultimately project and defend certain cultural ideals that are extra-scientific. Such ideals are put forward in terms o f "free synthetic p o e t r y " and can only be considered "true" in a metaphorical, figurative or poetic sense. Ultimately, as N i e t z s c h e saw, the acceptance o f such an imaginative or poetic 'truth' is a matter o f belief, the belief

that something is true, not that it is k n o w n to be true.

die Werthschätzung „ich glaube, daß das und das so ist" als Wesen der „ W a h r ­ heit" . . . daß etwas für wahr gehalten werden m u ß , ist notwendig; nicht, daß etwas

wahr

44

ist.

If we synthesize all o f the elements in Lange's discussion o f a religion o f the future and an ethics r o o t e d in what is k n o w n o f nature and man's immanence in it, we have the blueprint for the direction o f N i e t z s c h e ' s experimental thinking. T h e three central ideas o f N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophy - the will to p o w e r , the eternal recurrence o f the same and the " o v e r m a n " - are, I believe, the myths that comprise N i e t z s c h e ' s ideal standpoint. E a c h of these mythical notions is developed with the aim of producing a new aesthetic interpretation o f the w h o l e . T h e scientific scaffolding for eternal recurrence and the will to p o w e r o r wills t o p o w e r is a deliberate attempt to build upon empirical evidence in the

44

KGW VIII 2, 16. "The valuation" 'I believe that this and that is so' as the essence of truth. . . . that something must be held to be true is necessary - not that something is true."

The Standpoint of the Ideal

320

w a y in which Lange said a new ideal must. T h a t there are a multiplicity o f wills to p o w e r underlying the effects o f entities that we observe is an interpretation, a metaphorical interpretation, o f biological data. T h e eternal recurrence is an " h y p o t h e s i s " that is based upon a force-point theory o f the natural world and o n the notion o f the probability o f a repetition o f the same if time is eternal and centers o f force are finite. A s we have seen, the way in which N i e t z s c h e treats this idea, despite its profound subjective meaning for him, is such that he posits it as a theoretical possibility. T h e genuine significance o f eternal recurrence is its meaning for those w h o accept it as if it were true and for those w h o m N i e t z s c h e believes will be crushed b y the idea. T h e emphasis upon living in such a way that we would will to have our life repeated eternally indicates its existential significance. H e is concerned with what gives the individual the "highest feeling," whether it be "striving," "tranquility"

or " o b e d i e n c e . " N i e t z s c h e asks only that we b e c o m e self-

conscious about what gives us the "highest feeling."

45

W e k n o w b y n o w that

this highest feeling is a "feeling o f power," a subjective intensification o f experience, the highest point of meditation. W h y does the acceptance o f the eternal recurrence o f the same as if it were true produce this höchste

Gefühl?

T h e answer to this question is a missing link in M a g n u s ' otherwise insightful analysis o f the meaning o f eternal recurrence. N i e t z s c h e directly relates the 46

idea to religion as a substitute for it. T h e idea o f eternal recurrence transforms the individual w h o accepts it as a poetic or figurative truth because it is the m o s t extreme form of fatalism, a nihilistic fatalism at that. T h i s idea generates in one w h o accepts it the highest degree o f energy, the m o s t intensification o f Existenz.

powerful

T h i s fatality does n o t c o m e from without as in

" T u r k i s h fatalism," but is something that we can shape, in part, through our o w n volitional activity. " I am fate," Nietzsche writes, and I, t o o , existence

from

all eternity."

47

"condition

This esoteric notion indicates that o u r belief in

the truth o f eternal recurrence will transform o u r lives and this implies that we are free to accept or reject it: hence, we are, in one sense, a "piece of fate" and, in another sense, we are creators o f our "fate." L i k e Kierkegaard, N i e t z s c h e presents us with paradoxes that intensify the pathos

o f existence and he intends, in his own way, to " j a c k up the price o f

existence." T h e m y t h o f eternal recurrence is designed to give "weightiness" to the inner life without being fanatical towards those do not accept such a thought. T h e loss o f religious faith combined with the negative effects o f a scientific understanding

45

46

47

KGW, V 2, 403. Werke, GOA, XII, 69. Ibid., 399.

o f man's place in nature has led man to see his

The Standpoint of the Ideal

321

existence as fleeting and insignificant. T h i s , in turn, produces

weakness,

lassitude, despair, a diminution o f striving o r a casual pursuit o f pleasure.

48

An

extreme, demanding, disciplinary idea is needed, N i e t z s c h e thinks, to inten­ sify existence and call forth the most intense affirmation o f life. T h e fire o f a nihilistic idea is used to burn out the pathos

o f nihilism. H e r e a philosophical

c o n c e p t i o n is given an esoteric meaning in a way in which spiritual practices and disciplines in religion are used in order to induce a desirable state o f being. W h a t moksha

is to the devout H i n d u or what satori

is to the Zen Buddhist, the

thought o f eternal recurrence is to N i e t z s c h e . T h e desired state o f being? T h e highest, m o s t intense, "feeling o f p o w e r . " T h e claim that N i e t z s c h e is not concerned with creating a new "religion"

49

is questionable. F o r , even though he denies he seeks disciples and charges the creators of religion with dishonesty, the evidence that his troika o f myths was designed for the sake o f a religious or quasi-religious ideal is substantial. Aside from the esoteric, existential significance of the thought o f eternal recurrence, the c o n c e p t i o n o f the Ü b e r m e n s c h has all the earmarks of a m y t h that has religious significance. T h e "overman" is the aim towards which we should strive, man should sacrifice himself for the sake o f the noblest, most superior kind o f being: the supra-man w h o is the "meaning o f the earth." Also Zarathustra

sprach

is religious in tone, in style, and in m o o d in an obvious way.

W h e n it is said that ,Einst nun aber lehrte

sagte

ich euch sagen:

man Gott, wenn 50

Übermensch' ,

man auf ferne

Meere

blickte;

N i e t z s c h e is as earnest as he can

be. T h a t the overman is intended as the replacement o f a G o d w h o has died is clearly affirmed: Gott starb:

nun wollen

wir-daß

der Übermensch

lebe.

51

Man

as a bridge t o , as a transition t o , the overman of the future, man called upon to m a k e sacrifices to that end, faith in man justified b y the redeeming nature o f the overman - this is m y t h o p o e t i c religion in a secular form. T h e admonition to "create b e y o n d ourselves" means primarily to create a being higher than ourselves, to project an ideal being as the Ziel o r "aim" o f o u r existence. Such an exhortation is religious in tone and is one that seems to entail a morality. T h e m y t h o f the overman is clearly an experimental ideal that is, at least, possible. T h e creation o f this ideal being is a poetic, aesthetic act, the w o r k o f a thinker as the poet o f ideals or D i c h t u n g e n .

5 2

J u s t as the poetic

imagination o f man created gods and a G o d o f love, so, t o o , is the overman an artistic creation. T h e significant difference between Nietzsche's religion of life

48

49

50

51 52

Ibid., 63. Kaufmann, op. cit., 115-118. KGW, VI 1, AsZ, II, "Auf den glückseligen Inseln." "When one looked upon distant seas one once said God; but now I have taught you to say, overman." Ibid., IV, "Vom höheren Menschen." Werke, GOA, X I I , 122, 124.

The Standpoint of the Ideal

322

and the overman and Christianity is that it proposes an immanent, temporal goal for man. T h i s is the overcoming o f religious alienation that Feuerbach described and, I believe, N i e t z s c h e after him. F o r , the following passage is almost a paraphrase o f Feuerbach's ideal o f the reclamation o f ultimate values. All die Schönheit und Erhabenheit, die wir den wirklichen und eingebildeten Dingen geliehen haben, will ich zurückfordern als Eigenthum und Erzeugniß des Menschen: als seine schönste Apologie. D e r Mensch als Dichter, als Denken, als G o t t , als Liebe, als M a c h t - : oh über seine königliche Freigebigkeit, mit der er die Dinge beschenkt hat, u m sich zu verarmen und sich elend zu fühlen! Das war bisher seine größte Selbstlosigkeit, daß er bewunderte und anbetete und sich zu verbergen w u ß t e , daß er es w a r , der das geschaffen hat, was er bewunderte. 53

Even though N i e t z s c h e does not share Feuerbach's optimistic faith in humanity

as it is and is opposed to his virtual deification o f the social 54

c o m m u n i t y , he does share his feelings about religious alienation. I n Das Wesen

des Christentums,

Feuerbach argues that G o d has been the repository o f

"the best powers o f humanity," powers that are lavished on a being that wants nothing. T h u s "does man sacrifice man to G o d ! "

55

In his writings, N i e t z s c h e

runs through F e u e r b a c h ' s cult o f humanity and criticizes it from the valuational standpoint o f the need to " o v e r c o m e man," to project as a goal for man the preparation for the arrival o f what will seem like a new "species" o f being. I f F e u e r b a c h deifies man and his essence, N i e t z s c h e deifies the

Übermensch.

L i k e a sculptor, N i e t z s c h e shapes and forms his idealized w o r k o f art. T h e overman is powerful, but restrained, intelligent, wise, creative, judicious, energetic, disciplined, austere, joyful, affirmative, a "synthetic", whole indi­ vidual w h o masters a host o f contradictory, antithetical tendencies in himself. H e is a man o f justice, a poet, a man o f knowledge, a hero, a scientist, a prophet, a leader.

56

W i t h each embellishment, N i e t z s c h e makes his superman

m o r e and m o r e a quixotic ideal. As if aware o f this hyperbolic idealization, N i e t z s c h e sometimes conceived o f this powerful

individual as moderate,

independent o f mind, able to live without m a n y articles o f faith, a u t o n o m o u s , spiritually strong. A s he modifies the requirements for

Übermenschlichkeit,

the ideal b e c o m e s m o r e meaningful because it is realizable.

53

54

55

56

KGW, VIII 2, 283. "All the beauty and sublimity with which we have invested real and imagined things, I will show to be the property and creation of man: as his most beautiful apology. Man as poet, as thinker, as god, as love, as power. Oh, the royal munificence with which he has lavished gifts upon things in order to impoverish himself and make himself feel wretched! Previously, this has been his greatest disinterestedness, that he admired and worship­ ped and knew how to conceal from himself that he was the one who created what he admired." Ludwig Feuerbach, Die Philosophie der Zukunft, Stuttgart, 1922, 91. "Man and man, the unity of J and Thou, is God." Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. G. Eliot, New York, 1957, 271-272.

Werke, GOA, XIV, 264.

The Standpoint of the Ideal

323

N i e t z s c h e accuses the G e r m a n s o f valuing power only in the form o f "harshness and cruelty" (even though we k n o w that the Germans have no m o n o p o l y on that attitude), with failing to see the " p o w e r in gentleness and quietness" or the " p o w e r in G o e t h e . "

57

I n such formulations, N i e t z s c h e seems

t o revert to his earlier veneration of "great men." B u t even this valuation o f greatness in man is a religious sentiment. In a note from 1875, he remarks that, w h e n he calls it anything at all, Meine Erzeugung

des G e n i u s .

58

Religion...

liegt in der Arbeit

für die

T h e poetic, quasi-religious significance o f the "over­

m a n " is recognized even as N i e t z s c h e proposes it as a " c o u n t e r m o v e m e n t " against the rise o f mass man. N o t i n g the tendency towards the reduction o f the type man in the utilitarian tendencies o f the modern s o c i o - e c o n o m i c world, as well as the previously mentioned " e c o n o m i c management o f the earth" that seems inevitable, he sees the need for a "reverse m o v e m e n t " towards "synthe­ t i c " men w h o will be the apex o f this new social pyramid and w h o will

justify

the utilitarian function o f m a n y individuals. H e calls his ideal a " m e t a p h o r " (Gleichniß):

the Ü b e r m e n s c h .

5 9

W i t h o u t belaboring the point any further, it is

quite clear that the cultural ideal of the "overman" is an aesthetically c o n ­ ceived, poetic, quasi-religious ideal, a " m y t h " that N i e t z s c h e believes is desperately needed to o v e r c o m e what he sees as the nihilistic leveling o f the type "man." B o t h the conception o f the overman and eternal recurrence are poetic " t r u t h s " o r myths that are designed to provide a new goal for man and to generate an ascending spirit in Western culture. O n e o f the most iconoclastic thinkers in the history o f Western thought is also the creator o f a new m y t h o l o g y or his version o f a "religion o f the future." M o s t o f what is affirmative and positive in N i e t z s c h e ' s philosophy is put forward from what Lange called der Standpunkt

des Ideals.

Even as N i e t z s c h e the man "goes

under," he dons the r o b e o f the creative law-giver, the creator o f values. A legitimate

question

remains: in

what

sense is this

religious? R e c e n t l y ,

J . P . Stern has spoken of N i e t z s c h e ' s "godless t h e o l o g y " and has criticized N i e t z s c h e for opening the d o o r to the abuse o f his ideal b y virtue o f his ambiguous "morality o f strenuousness" and his disdain for institutional re­ straints.

60

A l t h o u g h the phrase, "godless t h e o l o g y " , has an attractive, paradox­

ical ring to it, it is misleading. A s misleading as Stern's summary o f N i e t z s c h e ' s viewpoint. It is claimed that

57

Ibid., XI, 363.

58

KGW, IV 1, 122. "My religion . . . lies in the work for the production of genius." KGW, VIII 2, 128. Stern, op. cit, 95-124.

59

60

324

The Standpoint of the Ideal Based on the premise of a God-less world, the Superman embodies the enhance­ ment of man's untrammeled will to power under the quasi-religious dispensation of "the eternal recurrence of the same." 61

It is strange that someone w h o is sensitive to the nuances o f N i e t z s c h e ' s literary style is often insensitive to the nuances o f his thought.

Stern is

oblivious to the repeated emphasis in Nietzsche's writings o n the enhancement o f the Gefühl

der Macht.

Stern continually insinuates that N i e t z s c h e is

responsible for the ideology of National Socialism and the standpoint o f its "leader." In general, he avoids indications o f N i e t z s c h e ' s counsel o f restraint and moderation, discipline and self-control, as well as his condemnation o f "petty tyrants." Heidegger's conception of Eigentlichkeit

is repeatedly attri­

buted to N i e t z s c h e . Stern does not acknowledge that N i e t z s c h e did not create the "lust o f p o w e r " in man or human groups nor did he prescribe it as a " g o o d . " T h e Seihstaufhebung

o f a "lust of p o w e r " is absolutely central to

N i e t z s c h e ' s morality, a morality that is, as Stern says, a "morality o f strenuousness." Stern's charge that N i e t z s c h e ' s cultural ideal offers no protection against its abuse is one that can be made against any moral ideal. T h e Christian crusaders w h o slaughtered thousands of Muslims in their mosques, the leaders o f the F r e n c h revolution w h o killed in the name o f liberté, é g a l i t é did so out o f a spirit o f moral

fraternité

and

fervor. A n entire forest would have to be

sacrificed in order to print all o f the historical examples o f the abuse of, o r perversion of, a moral ideal. Stern's veneration for the forms that H e g e l thought

o f as the e m b o d i m e n t o f objektive

Geist

-

the legal and

social

institutions - have just as often been the instruments o f injustice and oppres­ sion, not to say cruelty, as they have been bulwarks against the intemperance o f fanatics. T h e oldest institutions in the Western world, the " C h r i s t i a n " institutions, did not fulfill the promise o f Christian morality. A n d , as K i e r ­ kegaard o n c e said, the social revolutions of socialism and c o m m u n i s m would never have arisen if the world had been truly Christian. W h e n what N i e t z s c h e

61

Ibid., 113. Stern is convinced that the idea of enhancing one's will to power entails only a striving for dominance over others. This is, of course, one manifestation of the Herrschsucht that Lange and Nietzsche find in man. If one reads Nietzsche carefully, especially where he speaks of accepting the thought of eternal recurrence, one sees that he specifically refers to a Gefühl der Macht. In his earliest notes, he associates this subjective feeling of power with spiritual disciplines. In Morgenröte, reference is made to the cultivation of the consciousness of power in those who already practice self-control and who become used to this feeling of power - e. g., in "Brahminism" or Hinduism. "Es giebt Recepte zum Gefühle der Macht, einmal für Solche, welche sich selber beherrschen können und welche bereits dadurch in einem Gefühle der Macht zu Hause sind . . . der ersten Gattung hat das Brahmanenthum Sorge getragen ..." KGW, V 1, M, 65. "There are certain precepts for attaining a feeling of power for those who are already used to the feeling of power and know how to control themselves... Brahminism has given its care to this first type of man."

The Standpoint of the Ideal

325

called the "tiger" within man breaks out, it often wears a moral and institu­ tional mask. A " G o d - l e s s t h e o l o g y " ? Perhaps. B u t N i e t z s c h e himself calls it a "theodi­ c y , " n o t in the sense o f a vindication o f the way o f G o d to the world and man, but a vindication or justification o f the world as it is. T h i s is a variation on a theological theme insofar as what seems to be meant is that an absolute Jasagen the

to life and the world is an affirmation of their sacred value in the face of suffering,

antagonisms

and

antithetical

character

of

their

nature.

62

N i e t z s c h e is aware o f the irony o f the outbreak in himself o f religious sentiments at unusual

times, aware that, in a circuitous fashion, he has

experimentally reintroduced divinity at the heart o f Wirklichkeit.

A n d all of

this b y way o f an elaborate construction o f a universal will to power that is, as we have seen, an interpretation based upon fictional notions, anthropomorph­ isms and purely hypothetical ideas such as the "soul-hypothesis." W h e t h e r we consider an interpretation o f the "inner" nature o f actuality as modeled upon human willing o r upon a dynamic theory o f nature that posits force-points that are, in turn, construed as if they were "will-points," we are clearly on the ground o f experimental, figurative, not to say mythical, thinking. T h e will to p o w e r as pathos

or nisus is clearly understood as a spiritual Tendenz.

I f there is

a hidden G o d in N i e t z s c h e ' s m y t h of the will to power, it is an immanent G o d , a creative and suffering G o d , G o d as a self-creating w o r k of art. T h e r e is a definite pantheistic tendency in N i e t z s c h e ' s later reflections, one that he recognizes. In the Nachlass

o f 1 8 8 7 , he writes:

Entfernen wir die höchste Güte aus dem Begriff Gottes. . . . Entfernen wir insgleichen die höchste W e i s h e i t . . . G o t t die höchste Macht - das genügt! Aus ihr folgt Alles, aus ihr folgt - „die Welt"! 63

If there is i r o n y in the suggestion that a divinity b e y o n d good and evil m a y be considered as the "highest p o w e r , " as that from which a " w o r l d " follows, I fail t o see it. A cryptic sentence fragment follows this passage that refers to something " s y m b o l i c " , something having a characteristic sign zeichen)

followed b y the Latin word, omnipotens.

(Erkennungs­

A l t h o u g h not m u c h can be

drawn from such a fragment, there is the hint that G o d , as "all-powerful," m a y serve as a s y m b o l . T h i s is not, o f course, an isolated passage in which a kind o f pantheism is suggested.

KGW, VIII 2, 134. A Pessimismus der Stärke is said to be a symptom of a "higher culture" that does not justify evils theologically. Ibid., 173-174. "Let us remove the highest goodness from God . . . Let us also remove the highest wisdom . . . God the highest power - that suffices! From it follows everything, from it follows - 'the world.'"

The Standpoint of the Ideal

326

O n e o f the most tantalizing passages that touches upon the theme of a form o f pantheism is found in the Nachlass

o f 1887. N i e t z s c h e wonders whether

morality makes a pantheistic affirmation o f all things possible. W h a t seems to be suggested here is that a moral attitude towards the world implies that something in actuality ought not to be present, that pantheism seems to be blocked b y the admission o f "moral evil" or " i m m o r a l i t y " in the world. O b v i o u s l y thinking o f his own philosophical standpoint, he says that perhaps nur der moralische

Gott überwunden.

B u t does the absence o f a moral G o d or

the presence o f a G o d conceived o f as "jenseits

von Gut und Böse" make sense?

Wäre ein Pantheismus in diesem Sinne möglich? Bringen wir die Zweckvorstellung aus dem Prozesse weg und bejahen wir trotzdem den Prozeß? 64

A l t h o u g h one must consider that the suggestion o f a mode of pantheism in w h i c h morality and purpose have been deleted is only put forward here as an experimental thought, it has been said that what N i e t z s c h e is saying is that G o d is present in every m o m e n t , that the attainment o f "the same" at every 65

m o m e n t is "a G o d b e y o n d good and evil." Even though this is an ingenious interpretation, it seems to clash with N i e t z s c h e ' s clearly stated view that G o d w o u l d be a " m o m e n t o f culmination", a culminating point o f Macht.

This

suggests, as N i e t z s c h e himself indicates, an ascending m o m e n t in a cosmic process that is not present at each m o m e n t . This is a fortiori

the case when this

apogee is a m o m e n t o f deification that is followed b y a descending condition that is "undeifying." O n the other hand, if temporality is eternalized in terms o f eternal recurrence, then each m o m e n t could be understood as an "eternal n o w . " T h e p r o b l e m here is that N i e t z s c h e quite often refers to the c o s m i c process as a dialectical movement with ascending and descending phases. I f this is the case, and if " G o d " is each m o m e n t o f "the same," then h o w and w h y is there any descending phase in the process? I f G o d is considered as the maximal expression o f power at every

moment,

then a descending pattern in

the c o s m i c process would be unintelligible. I f we shift from esoteric ' t h e o l o g y ' t o the existential emphasis upon the intensification of the pathos

of "Dionysian

affirmation," it may be that the supreme m o m e n t o f life-affirmation is itself deified o r is a " g o d - l i k e " Gefühl

der Macht.

F r o m this point o f view, we seem

t o be b a c k to the idea o f a kind o f existential m y s t i c i s m : the complete, joyful affirmation o f all life and Existenz be the experience

as if it were to be eternally repeated would

o f eternity in time and becoming. Deification, then, would

n o t be something that happens to an "event" o r a m o m e n t , but something that

64

65

WDB, III, 853. "Would a pantheism in this sense be possible? Can we remove purpose from the process and affirm the process nonetheless?" Stambaugh, op. cit., 101.

327

The Standpoint of the Ideal

must be willed. T h i s is clearly shown in the delineation o f the D i o n y s i a n affirmation o f existence that encompasses moments of great sorrow. F o r , the tragische

Mensch

is one w h o accounts existence sacred enough to justify

suffering; he is strong enough and "deifying enough" to be able to affirm the worst as well as the best m o m e n t s o f life.

66

Given the ecstatic tone o f this

characterization o f the D i o n y s i a n spirit, we are not surprised to see that precisely this attitude towards existence is described as die religiöse des Lebens,

des ganzen,

nicht

verleugneten

und halbirten

Lebens.

Bejahung 6 7

T h a t N i e t z s c h e is, in the form of creative myth and experimental thought, proposing a new 'religious' orientation is apparent. In doing so, he projects four basic mythical ideas: the idea o f eternal recurrence, the ideal o f the overman, the will t o power or the wills to p o w e r and D i o n y s i a n faith. In regard to the latter, this new faith is not the unrestrained D i o n y s i a n impulses that was described in Die Geburt

expression o f

der Tragödie.

R a t h e r , it

is an affirmative faith that has been purged o f the primitive impulses and passions in the sense that they have been transformed or self-suppressed. T h e energy, vitality and drive o f the crude and primitive D i o n y s i a n impulse is preserved, but the primordial irrational drive has been subjected t o "spirituali­ z a t i o n " (Vergeistigung).

F r o m the beginning, N i e t z s c h e sensed that the only

w a y out o f the labyrinth o f skepticism, relativity and nihilism was to follow the Ariadne's thread o f m y t h . In Jenseits

von Gut und Böse,

N i e t z s c h e calls himself the last disciple o f

D i o n y s u s . T h e poetic representation o f the D i o n y s i a n way of being is put forward as an experimental truth, as an ideal in the form o f a myth. This is 'religion' with a difference: it is a faith for the few, an aristocratic faith, a faith that, in place o f consolation, offers a strenuous, orientation

towards

life

and

existence that

demanding,

expresses the

challenging

tragic

N i e t z s c h e does not deny the value o f traditional religions for others

pathos. and, in

fact, encourages their perpetuation with one important proviso: they must never b e c o m e s o v e r e i g n .

68

O f course, the prevention o f this as long as the

multitude o f " c o m m o n m e n " dominate modern culture is difficult. H e r e is where N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking b e c o m e s , at times, derailed. F o r , if the majority o f human beings are as he describes them, h o w could he possibly, as he sometimes does, think that they would ever embrace his ideals, his counterm y t h o f eternal recurrence? Religion has been accepted, as N i e t z s c h e saw so

66

67

68

KGW, VIII 3, 58. Ibid. "The religious affirmation of life, the whole, life not denied in whole or in part." This Jasagen is invariably related to the joy that wills eternity (in Zarathustra) and to an immanent redemption, a "redemption from eternal flux." Werke, GOA, X I I , 369. KGW, VI 2, JGB, 61, 62.

The Standpoint of the Ideal

328

clearly, because it comforts, assuages, succors, protects and offers hope to men. A "religion" such as N i e t z s c h e ' s that offers uncertainty, that says yes to everything, even the m o s t terrible experiences or happenings, a "religion" that demands discipline in the face o f a meaningless c o s m o s and a meaningless c o s m i c process, a "religion" that denies a moral world-order,

would

be

anathema to the vast majority of human beings. M a n k i n d , as N i e t z s c h e said so often, does not want to face "ugly truths," does not want a "truth" that is terrible. T h e r e f o r e , the Dionysian m y t h must, in the final analysis, be offered to the few, to those w h o can live without a moral G o d , without a moral worldorder, without certainty and conviction, without the comfort of shared beliefs, without the security o f numbers, without the safety-net of consolation. It would take the courage, strength and daring o f an Ü b e r m e n s c h to accept the tragic, D i o n y s i a n c o s m i c vision he proffers. T h e deliberate creation of a new m y t h o l o g y is built upon N i e t z s c h e ' s experimental thought and is foreground to the dark background o f a sätzliche life.

69

Nihilismus

that was anticipated b y Nietzsche in his thought and in his

T h e D i o n y s i a n Jasagen

Judaeo-Christian

grund­

tradition,

is not only a countermovement against the but it is intended

as a last ditch attempt

to

o v e r c o m e nihilism. It overcomes nihilism by means o f a self-suppression of it, a Selbstaufhebung

o f theoretical and existential nihilism. T h i s is the razor's

edge over which one must crawl to attain Übermenschlichkeit.

That many

would not survive such a perilous journey is hardly surprising. T h e need for a new set o f myths was first suggested to N i e t z s c h e by Lange and U e b e r w e g and was expressed by N i e t z s c h e in his first published w o r k . F o r , there he expressed a view he never repudiated: that an authentic culture cannot arise o r flourish without myth. Ohne Mythus aber geht jede Kultur ihrer gesunden schöpferischen Naturkaft verlustig: erst ein mit Mythen umstellter Horizont schließt eine ganze Kulturbewe­ gung zur Einheit ab. 70

Culture conceived o f as the "unity o f artistic style in every expression o f a people's life" requires m y t h s . T h e problem is, as N i e t z s c h e saw, that all o f the forces in civilization, history, science and philosophy are demythologizing. N o t only that, but N i e t z s c h e himself contributes to this tendency b y his strenuous, myth-destroying philosophical activities. After spending a great deal o f his energy destroying the myths o f morality, T r u t h ,

knowledge,

scientific truth, and religion, N i e t z s c h e then seeks to create a new m y t h . O n the one hand, he clearly saw the need for illusions and, on the other hand, he

69

70

KGW, VIII 3, 288. KGW, III 1, GT, X X I I I . "Without myth, every culture has lost its healthy, natural, creative force: only a horizon ringed with myth can unify an entire culture."

329

The Standpoint of the Ideal

sought to tear away every veil o f illusion that man had previously created. T h e pathos

o f N i e t z s c h e ' s reflections is generated by the contradictory tension

produced b y the powerful desire to strip away all illusions and expose the most terrible truths and the equally powerful tendency to create illusions that make life and existence possible. O n the one hand, he tells us that Meine Philosophie - den Menschen aus dem Schein herauszuziehen auf jede Gefahr hin! Auch keine Furcht vor dem Zugrundegehen des Lebens! 71

O n the other hand, he insists that Der Wille zum Schein, zur Illusion, zur Täuschung, zum Werden und Wechseln ist tiefer, "metaphysischer" als der Wille zur Wahrheit, zur Wirklichkeit, zum Sein. 72

T h e r e is n o facile mediation of these t w o antithetical tendencies o f thought or 'will.' T h e tendency o f a probitive, critical Wissenschaft

is to uncover truths that

m a y be terrible, life-negating, dangerous and destructive. T h e tendency o f Kunst

o r Dichtung

is to create illusions, to enhance actuality b y means o f

aesthetic transformation o r "aesthetic" justification. N i e t z s c h e ' s C e n t a u r is a h y b r i d creature, a divided creature that wrestles with its antithetical tendencies and k n o w s no repose. After one has negated, criticized, and cut through every aesthetic mask, as N i e t z s c h e has, is it then possible to create a new m y t h ? T h o s e thinkers w h o believe that science and critical, analytical philosophy have hunted down and destroyed the m o s t illusive myths do not see that m y t h o p o e t i c images have not disappeared, but have only appeared in another domain. In o u r own immensely destructive century we have seen that m y t h often appears in political disguise. Even n o w , as many have grown suspicious of, o r cynical about, all political myths, the mythical instinct may only be slumbering, waiting to appear in yet another form. Intuitively, N i e t z s c h e quite early saw that the "metaphysics" that H e i d e g ­ ger falsely attributes to his poetic, creative and experimental myths was n o longer viable. In the 1870's he saw that the will to knowledge, especially in the sciences, has produced enormous gains and is m o r e and m o r e leading to a mastery o f nature. H o w e v e r , the knowledge-drive in the sciences is indiscrimi­ nate and dangerous insofar as it promotes practical knowledge at the expense o f artistic culture. Science must not be annihilated b y the philosopher, but it must be controlled. T h e optimistic laisser aller

of science entails a faith in its

beneficial consequences, in progress. B u t this belief in progress m a y be an

71

72

KGW, V 2, 518. "My philosophy - to draw men away from semblance, no matter what the danger! And no fear that life will perish." KGW, VIII 3, 18. "The will to semblance, to illusion, to deception, to becoming and change is deeper, more 'metaphysical,' than the will to truth, to actuality, to being."

330

The Standpoint of the Ideal

illusion because the scientific Weltanschauung

levels everything and creates a

"whirling game" o f fact upon fact and theory upon theory. A t the same time, Kant has sounded the death-knell of metaphysics. T h e s e two forces, the rise o f scientific understanding and epistemological skepticism, have created a "va­ c u u m . " Is it possible, Nietzsche wonders, to create a "religion" by giving birth t o " m y t h " ? R e m e m b e r i n g the lesson he learned from Lange, he observes that all philosophy seems able to do n o w is "to emphasize the Relativität anthropomorphische

Charakter

and

of all knowledge." T h e rise o f historical under­

standing and the natural sciences was necessary to lure man away from the bonds o f religious faith. B u t today, Nietzsche believes, it is necessary to balance and oppose the cumulative development o f knowledge with "art." In order to create an aesthetically conceived "religion," in order to awaken belief in a mythical creation in the vacuum left b y the destruction o f myth, this mythical construction would have to be in response to an extraordinary need. Traditional philosophy, as in the case o f Kant's Kritik

der reinen

Vernunft,

can

n o t help us in this regard because it is decidedly anti-mythical. H o w e v e r , N i e t z s c h e continues, a new kind o f "philosopher-artist" might be able to create a Kunstwerk

that would preserve an aesthetico-mythical understanding

of reality. A l t h o u g h scientific and philosophical " k n o w l e d g e " certainly has indisputable value, illusions have an equal value. F o r , illusions are necessary for life; "untruths" that are taken for "truths" are indispensable for life and a meaningful culture. T h e importance o f such hypothetical, mythical "truths" lies in their Wirkungen,

their "effects." Underlying the drive for "scientific"

truths and the need for religious, mythical or poetic "truths" is a

pathos.

P h i l o s o p h y itself can play a significant role in the creation o f new myths because it is b o t h Wissenschaft

and "artistic invention." P h i l o s o p h y as

kunst

o f the "mythical drive" and can, therefore,

is but a continuation

Dicht­

o v e r c o m e the negative effects of the growth o f scientific knowledge b y means o f its p o w e r to "create m y t h s . " T h e crying need for a new, inspiring myth is generated b y the loss o f religious faith and the unconscionable drive for scientific knowledge that leaves no illusion standing. Again

remembering

Lange's reflections, N i e t z s c h e notes that scientific knowledge is put in the 73

service o f the State and has b e c o m e a source for the nourishment o f egoism. I f this trend continues, disaster surely awaits Western civilization. T h r o u g h o u t these notes from the 1870's, one senses the long shadow o f Lange and sees clearly that Nietzsche's later philosophical ideals, the substance o f his positive thinking, were

intended as aesthetic myths, as 'religious' o r

quasi-religious images. W h e n a youthful N i e t z s c h e argues that indemonstrable

73

Werke, GOA, X , 27-56. Cp. KGW III 4, 5-136.

331

The Standpoint of the Ideal

philosophical reflections continue to have value because o f their

ästhetische 74

Wert and that even in the sciences "aesthetic considerations" prevail, he is but paraphrasing Lange. M a n y o f the insights and observations found in the early Nachlass

are

elaborated o n in the notes o f the late 1 8 8 0 ' s . A n d a substantial n u m b e r o f these are reflections upon ideas originally suggested b y Lange. T h u s , N i e t z s c h e refers to the a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c nature o f truth, the anthropomorphic nature o f scientific knowledge, the cul de sac that scientific theory finds itself in, the contrast between the quantitative world disclosed b y science and our world o f subjective qualities, the false attribution o f unity to entities that are "bearers o f properties," the view that our judgments o f relations are "anthropomorphically c o l o r e d " , the idea o f causality in nature as a subjective transference o f our o w n psychic experiences, the Darwinian negation o f purpose in nature, the presence o f "unconscious thinking" in perception, the absence o f "absolute k n o w l e d g e , " the perspectival knowledge of the world as "human," the attribu­ tion o f "sensation" to all entities, the diachronic development o f language, the advance o f human knowledge from the grossest anthropomorphism to m o r e refined forms, the two-fold meaning o f "truth," the infinite complexity o f actuality, the contrast between the subjective experience of psychic states o r acts (e. g., "willing") and the physiological processes that presumably deter­ mine these states, the presence in language of a logical structure that has developed over a long period ( = what I've called Lange's "structuralism"), the n o t i o n that the growth o f logic and logical interpretation limits the "field o f possible

k n o w l e d g e " (e. g., what was characterized as Lange's anticipation o f

logical positivism as a tendency of thought), and the belief that the essence o f truth, as aesthetically conceived ideal, lies in its

"effects."

75

Aside from demonstrating the profound impact that Lange's Geschichte Materialismus

des

had o n N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking, these early reflections shed i m p o r -

74

Ibid., 61. Cp. KGW III 4, 32.

75

Ibid., 65-150. In regard to this last point, it may be mentioned that when Nietzsche wrote these notes he thought of the "artist-philosopher" as a creator of, and a physician of, a Kultur that was to benefit all men, that would serve the needs of all men. The aristocratic radicalism (as Brandes called it) of his later years was the fruit of many bitter, painful years. The older he got, the more painful his physical and psychological sufferings became, the more his writings were either ignored or rejected, the more experience of man he had, the deeper became his contempt for the common man, for the Herdentiers Mensch. It must be admitted that, on a number of occasions, he forgets his own good advice. "Der Haß gegen die Mittelmäßigkeit ist eines Philosophen unwürdig... Gerade deshalb, weil er die Ausnahme ist, hat er die Regel in Schutz zu nehmen hat er allem Mittleren den guten Muth zu sich selber zu erhalten." KGW, VIII 2, 225-226. "Hatred against mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher . . . precisely because he is an exception, he has to take the rule under his protection; he has to hold all the mediocre in good heart."

The Standpoint of the Ideal

332

tant light on the project to create a new m y t h o l o g y that would not compete with the scientific Weltanschauung,

but would provide the foundation for a

n e w culture and recapture a sense o f purpose, direction and meaning that was being eroded b o t h b y philosophical skepticism and the loss o f religious faith, as well as b y the revelation o f a cold, austere, demythologized world b y the sciences. T h e philosopher, N i e t z s c h e tells us, appears in times o f great danger and, with the aid o f art, seeks to fill the place "vacated b y m y t h . " T h e positive, creative and experimental "truths" that were espoused b y N i e t z s c h e were not claims to metaphysical truth. T h e Wille zur Macht Langean inspired psychological

theory

(as distinguished from the

that man is basically motivated b y a

striving for p o w e r ) , the eternal recurrence of the same, the Übermensch m o r e accurately, the Übermenschen o f Jasagen Standpunkt Geburt

or,

o f the future, and the D i o n y s i a n religion

are all artfully constructed myths that are put forward from der des Ideals.

der Tragödie,

I f Lange had lived to read m o r e than N i e t z s c h e ' s Die he would have been astonished and astounded b y the

creative, m y t h - m a k i n g p o w e r o f his bold "disciple" and would have been pleased to see h o w very m u c h his creative and wayward "disciple" had learned from him. T h e parameters o f N i e t z s c h e ' s general philosophical project were set forth by

Lange. T h e so-called "positivistic" phase o f N i e t z s c h e ' s thinking, the

defense o f critical empiricism, the valuation o f unscheinbare

Wahrheiten,

was a

means o f undercutting previous metaphysical and aesthetic world-views. T h i s phase was part o f a dialectical plan insofar as, at the time of writing Die der

Tragödie,

Geburt

N i e t z s c h e no longer shared the " r o m a n t i c , " Schopenhauerian

metaphysics he presents in this w o r k . As he tells us, he practiced a kind o f Jesuitismus

when, in his "first period,"

posited it as the "foundation

he promoted Illusion 76

of culture."

and deliberately

F o l l o w i n g this, N i e t z s c h e then

reverses this Jesuitical tendency and uncovers a naked nihilism. W h e n he has cleared the board, he then creates his mythical interpretations, his new ideals, as a means o f giving purpose and direction to the select individuals w h o can tolerate the loss o f the previously dominant system o f values and take up the y o k e o f N i e t z s c h e ' s demanding,

aristocratic reversal o f previous

Repeating his formula from Die Geburt Als ästhetisches

76

77

Phänomen

der Tragödie,

ist uns das Dasein

immer

values.

he maintains that only noch

77

erträglich.

Werke, GOA, X I I , 212. KGW, V 2, FW, 107. At one point in his notes, Nietzsche claims that the ideal of the Übermensch and the natural morality of growth that accompanies this ideal must be established prior to the presentation of the thought of eternal return so that the latter is then erträglich or "endurable". Cf. Werke, G O A , XIV, 265. Tracy Strong emphasizes this assertion in his interpretation of the meaning of eternal recurrence. Cf. Strong, op. cit., 276-277. This approach

333

The Standpoint of the Ideal

A n aesthetically conceived "standpoint o f the ideal" is necessary in order to surpass the "insight into the general untruth and falsity o f things n o w given us b y s c i e n c e " : that is, the insight that error and delusion are conditions o f sentient and intelligent life. A n honest recognition o f the full implications o f science, as N i e t z s c h e understands them, a Redlichkeit, disgust o r suicide.

78

would

lead us to

It is o u r "good will to appearance" that enables us to

counteract such a tendency. Although N i e t z s c h e dramatically overreacts to what he considers the ultimate consequences o f the scientific Weltbild,

he has

understood Lange's dual standpoint very well indeed. T h e purely scientific picture

of

human

existence

and

actuality

strips

away

our

"aesthetic

humanities," o u r "valuations," our moralities, if we think it through. H o w ­ ever, as Lange suggested, the standpoint o f the ideal, the imaginative power o f Kunst

or Dichtung,

may lead man out o f the labyrinth o f skepticism, relativism

and nihilism. W h e t h e r Nietzsche's centaur, half-art and half-science, is a viable creation is the "dangerous perhaps," the gefährliche

Vielleicht.

to the idea of eternal return is not typical of Nietzsche's usual statements about it. It is more common for him to treat eternal return as redemptive, as a "disciplinary idea" that will test the courage and life-affirmation of an "overman." The thought of eternal return redeems existence and saves it from transitory dissolution. Despite its very real, fearful aspect, the thought of eternal return is viewed by Nietzsche as a "consolation." "... mein Trost ist, daß Alles was war ewig ist: - das Meer spült es wieder heraus." KGW, VIII 2, 285. 78

Ibid., 140.

Subject Index absolute paradox 271—272 acquisitiveness 227 f. adaptation 135, 159ff., 177 n, 179, 185 aesthetic redemption 304 aggressive behavior 162—163 agnosticism 6 , 1 2 , 1 7 , 2 0 , 91 f., 134,152, 195 ff. agon ("contest") 294, 314 n Alexandrine culture 116, 149, 150, 158, 225 anthropomorphic truth 117ff., 138,144,264, 294, 299, 331 anthropomorphische Natur ("anthropomorphic Nature") 180 anthropomorphism 6 , 2 2 , 9 5 , 1 0 3 , 1 0 5 , 1 1 2 — 1 5 5 , 2 4 1 , 2 4 4 , 2 4 5 , 2 4 6 f., 248, 259—260, 275, 295, 330 anti-Darwin 177n Apollonian order 88, 123, 148 appearance 69, 130 f. apparent world 56 f., 68—69, 130 a priori 198 ff. Arbiterfrage, Die 2, 185n, 282 aristocratic radicalism 307, 331 n ascetic priest 77—78 Assassins, the 78, 86—87, 88, 273—274 assimilation 120, 122, 138, 202, 220 atavism 158, 183 n "atomistic chaos" 151, 278 atoms, atomism 2 6 , 3 8 — 3 9 , 1 0 6 , 1 3 3 , 2 0 1 , 215, 225, 226 f., 238 attraction 167, 225, 241, 245 becoming 54—55, 58 f., 6 4 , 1 0 1 , 1 1 8 f., 129, 155, 232, 234, 265, 269, 270, 272 Being 5 0 , 5 2 , 5 8 , 6 0 , 6 4 , 1 2 9 , 2 6 8 — 2 6 9 , 270—271, 272 bifurcation of nature, the 125 body, the 9 8 , 1 7 0 — 1 7 1 , 1 7 2 , 1 7 4 — 1 7 5 , 2 0 4 f., 314—315 Brahminism 324 n Brahmins 77, 286 n, 315 brain-state 123 Buddhism, Buddhist 4 6 — 4 8 , 1 2 9 , 2 6 4 — 2 6 5 , 298 Buddhism, European form of 46—48, 272—273

capitalists 281 f., 308 n categorical imperative 309 categories of the understanding, the 107,114, 117, 195 ff. causality 105—106, 118f., 143, 207, 257 causality, myth of 110 causality of will 249, 257, 293 chaos 121, 122, 128, 214, 259 Chaos sive Natura ("Chaos or Nature") 121, 123, 251 Chladni sandfigures 95 n Christianity 3 , 4 5 , 5 6 , 70—89,163 n, 164,273, 281, 283, 306, 311—312, 313, 316—317, 324 Christian morality 3, 74 n, 75, 84—85 cogito 291—292 communication 190—191 communism 82, 283, 307, 308 n concept-formation 113—114 conditions of existence 160 f. consciousness 190 f. conservation of energy, the 35, 36, 40 conventionalism 6 , 1 0 2 , 1 0 5 , 1 1 0 — 1 1 1 , 233, 299 n, 302 cosmic systems 14—15 countermyth 46, 63, 269 cultural ideals 314 n culture 150 culture and myth 328 Darwinian 1 3 — 1 4 , 1 3 8 , 1 4 9 n, 156—194,223, 331 deanthropomorphic 131, 171, 223, 241, 243 decadence 51—52, 67, 73, 78, 185 deception 112—113, 178—179 Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, The 80—82 defensive behavior 162 deification 326—327 De Motu 236 dialectical process 194, 326 Ding ("thing") 1 1 8 , 1 3 4 , 1 6 8 , 2 0 1 f., 215, 219 f., 231 Ding an sich ("thing-in-itself") 3,11 n, 14, 92, 96, 113, 122, 195 ff., 217, 218 f., 250 Dionysian 50 n, 148, 182n, 265 Dionysian affirmation 268 f., 272, 326 ff.

Subject Index disciplinary idea 46, 184, 321, 333 n dissimulation 112—113, 156, 179 double-aspect theory 100, 254—255 dynamic quanta 242 f., 247 f. dynamic theory of nature 229 ff. dynamis 236, 298 dysteleology 176 ecclesiastical hierarchies 77, 84—85, 87—88, 273—274, 284 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 180 ego 106—107, HOn, 143,201 f., 2 1 5 , 2 2 9 , 2 3 8 , 271 egoism 15, 205, 276f., 281, 305, 330 Einzige und sein Eigenthum, Der 276, 277 n empiricism 145 f. empiricism, one-sided 95 Energie ("energy") 242, 244, 250, 259, 294 enlightened egoism 278, 280—281 entropy 43 n, 235 eros 266 errors a priori 199, 220 Essay on Theism 306 eternal recurrence, eternal return 19,25—50, 6 0 , 1 2 6 f., 1 4 8 , 1 8 4 , 2 6 5 — 2 6 6 , 2 6 8 , 3 3 2 , 333 n eternal recurrence, existential meaning of 44 ff., 268 f., 271—272, 320 evolution 135, 156ff. exact sciences 133, 141, 146 f., 275 excellence 315 existence, antithetical character of 294 existence, intensification of 320—321 existential imperative 32, 44 existential truths 221 exploitation 282 external conditions 180—181 Fable of the Bees 275—276 facts 145 f., 219, 299 facts of consciousness 170, 299 faculties 291 falsification 5 7 , 6 0 , 6 2 , 6 8 , 1 0 1 , 1 1 7 , 1 1 9 , 1 2 0 , 1 2 4 , 1 3 0 , 1 4 1 , 1 8 9 , 210, 2 1 2 — 2 1 3 , 2 1 6 , 2 2 1 , 231, 240, 248, 255, 256, 271, 295, 300n fatalism, 320 feeling 263—264, 320 feeling of power 48, 5 0 , 1 8 1 , 2 3 8 , 246, 2 6 6 — 2 6 7 , 2 7 2 , 2 8 6 n, 2 9 7 , 2 9 9 , 3 1 5 , 320—321, 324, 326 fictionalism 6—7, 15—17, 18, 110, 209 f., 236 fictions 102—103,108—109,167, 215,217, 218—219,220 f., 2 3 9 , 2 4 8 , 2 5 7 , 2 7 0 — 2 7 1 , 291

fitness 159, 163, 180, 183, 184, 193 fixations of type 159, 190 flux 125 f. flux ontology 90, 233 force, forces 1 0 8 , 1 3 3 , 1 7 3 , 1 7 5 , 205,206, 225, 228 f., 244 ff., 294—295 force-point-world, a 224—261 fragments of truth 154 Geburt der Tragödie, Die 2 3 , 6 2 , 9 1 — 9 2 , 1 1 2 , 115—116 Geisteswissenschaften 18 geometry 111 Gesammtlagen ("configurations") 40 f. God 29, 70—71, 7 8 — 7 9 , 2 3 8 , 2 4 4 , 2 5 7 , 2 6 4 , 267, 272, 287, 303, 312, 317, 321, 325, 326 God as power 317—318, 325, 326 Godless theology 323—325 Gorgias 144 gravity 226 n Grenzbegriff ("limit-concept") 217—218 Hegelian 27, 76, 8 3 , 9 9 , 1 0 2 , 1 6 6 , 1 8 4 — 1 8 5 , 281, 310 Hellenism 79—80 Herrschsucht ("lust of power") 85—87, 88 n, 260, 262—301, 324 heuristic value 103, 107, 110, 117 History of European Morals 80—82 History of the Assassins, The 86—87 honesty 310, 333 human beings, superior types of 166 Homer's Wettkampf 285, 286 n humanization 111, 112—155, 185—186,193, 241, 256, 295, 299 hybris 116, 148 hypocrisy 179 Ich-begriff ("I-concept") 106—107,168, 291—293 idealism 8, 57, 63, 167 ideal type 274 Idea of the Good 55—56, 71 identical cases 43, 127, 146, 214 f., 249 illusions 303 f., 329 immorality 309—310 individual, concept of 174 industrial capitalism 194 institutions 178—179, 308, 324 intellect 112—113, 115 intelligible character 209, 250 internal development 180 f. interpretation 109,136, 204f., 219,221, 227n, 255—256, 259, 260, 295—296, 299—300 "inverted Platonism" 56, 61 n

336

Subject Index

Jenseits von Gut und Böse 188 Jesuits 87, 274 Judaeo-Christian morality 163 n judgment 117, 120 Kantian 5 , 6 5 , 6 8 , 9 1 — 9 2 , 9 9 , 1 0 9 , 1 1 8 , 124, 130, 145, 195 ff., 2 3 1 , 2 5 0 , 2 9 1 , 3 0 3 Kant-Laplace hypothesis 28 Kapital, Das 15, 275 knowledge, theory of 6, 10ff., 51—69, 90—111, 112—155, 195—223, et passim Kraftcentren ("force-centers") 37ff., 134, 171, 173, 175, 204, 205, 226 f. Lagen ("states") 42 Lamarckian 138, 185 n language 108—109,110,113 f., 119,138—139, 1 5 7 , 1 8 7 , 1 8 8 f., 2 3 4 , 2 7 0 , 2 9 5 — 2 9 6 , 313—314 law of identity 127, 215—216 Laws of Manu 77, 182 n, 265 L'Homme Machine 139 limits of natural science, the 96, 98, 100, 132 linguistic signs 138—139, 144, 188 linguistic structuralism 188—189 logic 207 f., 215 f. logical positivism 145, 331 logical structure 221 Machtquanta ("power-quanta") 172—173, 175, 205, 232 n, 242 f., 247 f. materiale Idealismus ("materio-idealism") 8, 90—111 materialism 8, 20, 21, 57, 90 ff., 167, 235 mathematical projection of nature, the 212—213 matter, structure of 224 ff., 258 mechanistic materialism 1 4 3 , 1 6 7 , 1 7 2 , 1 8 6 , 224—225, 234, 271 metaphysical nihilism 60, 300 n metaphysical world 58, 60, 65, 79, 222 microperspective 204—205 mimicry 177—178, 179 monadology 171—172, 224 moral God, a 326, 328 morality 75 n, 286 n, 287, 314 n morality of growth 315 f. morality of pity 71, 287n morality of strenuousness 323—324 moral nihilist 316 Morphologie 168—169, 176, 258, 298 movement 237 music 234

myth 5 , 6 3 , 3 0 1 n, 303—304,306 f., 317f., 319, 321, 323, 328—329, 330, 332 mythical construction 304 n myth of the will to power, the 259, 325 myth of the future, the 301 n mythopoetic religion 321 f. nāmarūpa ("name and form") 47 natural egoism 278, 280—281 naturalistic ethics 308 f. natural selection 161,163 n, 164,176,180, 183 n, 194 nature-in-itself 136, 213 f. Naturwissenschaften ("natural sciences") 14, 17, et passim Nazarene type 76—77, 83 Nazi ideology 307, 308 n neutral monism 99, 254 "new religion" 305 f. nihilism 1 8 , 4 6 — 4 8 , 7 8 — 7 9 , 86, 88,150—151, 222, 268, 272 n, 274, 301 n, 332—333 nominalism 61, 139, 144 non-Euklidean space 134, 137, 212, 231 objective teleology 142—143, 238 objects of knowledge, constitution of 214 ontology 62, 90 ordinary language 61—62,189—190,192, 314n organisms 168 f. Origin of Species, The 159 n, 160—161, 177n panpsychism 175, 258 f., 289, 298 pantheism 325 f. paradigm shifts 277 n pathos 238, 254, 259, 263 f., 298, 325 Pathos der Wahrheit 54, 264 perception and knowledge, evolution of 125 f., 137f. personification 133 n, 153, 244 perspectivalism 7 , 1 3 7 , 1 4 1 , 2 0 4 f . , 2 1 0 , 2 2 7 n , 240, 255, 256, 260, 300 n perversion of moral ideals 324 phenomenalism 12, 21, 22, 56, 60, 97f., 197ff. phenomenology 7 , 9 9 , 1 0 0 , 1 0 7 , 1 0 9 , 1 1 0 , 111, 123, 170, 256 phenomenology of willing 297 Philosophia Naturalis 39, 227 Philosophical Investigations 189 philosophical psychology 109 f. physical reality 243 physics 124 f., 224—261 physiologism 140 physiology of the senses, the 91 ff., 123

Subject Index Platonism 51—69, 7 0 — 7 1 , 1 2 5 , 1 3 9 , 1 9 7 , 270—271 poetic truths 313 f. poetry and science 304 f., 312, 317 political economy 14—15, 275 f. potentiality 298 Potenz 126, 230, 236, 246, 264—265, 267 power 155,181 f., 2 3 6 , 2 4 5 , 2 4 6 — 2 4 7 , 2 6 2 ff., 317, 323 power, constellations of 242 f., 247f. power of capital 282 practical truths 147 pragmatic 1 1 5 — 1 1 6 , 1 3 8 , 1 4 7 , 1 4 8 , 1 5 6 n, 192, 210—211, 212, 223, 235, 311 pragmatic anthropology 149 pragmatism 6, 147, 149, 192 praxis, philosophy of 148 prediction of political conflicts and wars, the 151, 283, 303 prehension 264 primitive right 282 probability 146 f., 149 process theory 253 progress of man 166—167, 186 psychological phenomenology 102—103 psychology of willing, the 289 f. qualitative experience 254 f. quantity 256 Rangordnung ("order of rank") 143, 307 reality-in-itself 318 reductive materialism 91—93 Relations-Welt ("relations-world") 103,131, 135, 228, 251, 302 relativity, theory of 230—231 religion of the future 311 f. religious affirmation of life 327—328 religious alienation 322 repulsion 167, 225, 241, 245 repulsive forces 229 n ressentiment 71 return to nature 158, 164 Roman Caesars 182 sameness 252 Scholasticism 139 science 6—8,91 f., 1 1 5 , 1 2 0 , 1 2 3 , 1 2 4 f., 300 n, 301 n, 302 f., 329, 330—331, 332—333 scientific laws 202, 232 n scientism 148, 300 n, 301 n Sein und Zeit 107 Selbstaufhebung 74—75 n, 83, 8 8 , 1 0 2 , 1 4 4 , 272, 288, 307, 324, 328

337

Selbstaufhebung der Moral, die ("the self-sup­ pression of morality") 310 Selbstüberwindung ("self-overcoming") 148, 153 n, 182, 278, 280, 288 self 98, 107, 169—170, 172, 175, 314 selfishness 278 f., 315 self-observation 291 f. self-preservation 160 self-suppression of nihilism, the 48—50 semiotics 240—241, 242, 253, 255 senses, the 119f., 127f., 136, 238—239 sexuality 284—285 signs, theory of 239 skepticism 5—6, 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 8 , 91 f., 123, 330, 332 social atomism 278 social atoms 277 f. social Darwinism 182—183, 184, 277 social evolution 180 f. socialism 82, 151, 275, 281 f., 283, 307, 308 n social revolution 151 Sophists 52, 60—61, 62, 142, 144 sounds 198 Spannkraft ("tension") 236 species 159f., 163 n, 181 speech 192 Spinozistic 317 spiritualization 268 ff., 288—289, 315, 327 standpoint of the ideal, the 5 , 1 1 , 13 n, 15—16, 21—22,23 n, 6 3 , 1 0 2 , 1 4 8 , 1 8 6 , 2 2 3 , 302—333 striving 246—247, 267, 277, 295 striving for pre-eminence, the 227 f. structuralism 187, 190, 331 Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The 227 struggle for existence 135, 159 f., 223, 277 sub-atoms (Unteratomen) 4, 38—39, 225 ff., 228 f., 253 subject as multiplicity, the 171 f. subjective teleology 246—247 subject-predicate relation 108—109, 133 sublimation 268, 287 n, 288—289, 316 sublimation of cruelty 287 n substance 106 f., 200 f. superhuman human beings 153, 186 sympathy 278, 280 synthetic a priori judgments 210, 220

taste 129, 154, 314 technological power 193, 301 n, 306—307 teleology 14, 45, 135, 142—143, 156—194, 266 Tendenz 230, 236, 2 3 8 , 2 3 9 , 2 4 3 , 2 4 5 , 2 4 6 , 255, 263, 266 f., 293, 298—299, 325 theodicy 325 f. thing-in-itself 1 0 , 1 4 , 21, 56, 121, 122, 130, 217

338

Subject Index

three evils, the 288 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 110 tŗişnā 264—265 "true world" 51 ff., 121, 130 truth 113 f., 132, 141,146, 147,154—155, 197 f., 207 f., 2 0 9 , 2 1 2 , 2 2 0 — 2 2 1 , 2 2 2 , 2 5 9 , 272 n, 294, 300, 302, 305, 313 f., 318—319 Übermensch, Übermenschen 31, 32, 47, 63, 75n, 8 8 , 1 4 8 , 1 6 1 , 1 6 5 , 1 7 9 , 1 8 4 , 1 9 3 , 2 6 9 , 288, 321, 322—323, 332 Übermenschlichkeit 45, 75 n, 88, 127,270, 322, 328 Überwindung des Nihilismus ("overcoming of nihilism") 46, 89, 268—269, 272 n, 328 unconscious a priori 187 unconscious drives 284—285, 286 f. unity, concept of 167—168 unknown "third", the 104—105, 152, 236, 259 urges 246—247, 254, 265, 294, 299 useful fictions 17, 216 utilitarian values 192—193 valuation 5 8 — 5 9 , 1 2 7 , 1 6 4 , 299, 301 n, 310, 319 value-interpretations 299 n

Vernunft ("reason") 5 2 — 5 3 , 6 3 , 6 7 , 9 3 , 1 1 2 , 113, 120, 149 n, 238 vitalism 175 Werden-an-sich ("becoming-in-itself") 122 Wille zur Macht ("will to power") 2 1 , 2 9 , 4 7 — 4 8 , 5 0 , 5 9 , 6 3 , 6 7 , 6 8 , 70, 74 n, 75 n, 77—78, 8 7 — 8 8 , 9 0 , 1 0 8 , 1 2 2 , 1 2 8 , 1 3 1 , 142—143,144,152,160,164,174,175, 180—181,200,204, 209,220, 2 2 7 , 2 3 8 , 2 4 1 , 244 f., 246 f., 248,249 f., 260 n, 262—301, 310 willing 1 7 0 , 2 4 5 , 2 4 9 , 2 7 6 — 2 7 7 , 2 8 9 ff., 295, 296 f. "will" as fiction, the 296 will, critique of the concept of 289 ff. will-points 1 7 1 , 1 7 2 — 1 7 3 , 2 0 4 , 2 3 1 , 2 4 9 , 2 5 0 , 252, 254, 257, 259, 298, 325 will to nothingness 164, 268, 286 n will to truth, the 53, 60, 74 n, 294 Wirklichkeit ("actuality") 90 ff., 122—123, 127, 1 2 8 , 1 3 1 , 1 6 7 , 2 3 9 , 2 4 0 , 2 5 6 , 2 6 0 , 295 f., 299 n, 325 Wissenschaften 7, 18, 123, 150 n, 304 n, 307 workers 281 f. world of values, the 303 f.

Index of Names Alexander the Great 286 n Ampere, Andre Marie 226, 228 Anders, Anni 12 n Andler, Charles 47 Anselm 70 Aristotle 56, 60, 142, 143, 238, 247, 298 Augustine 52, 71 Austin, J . L . 189 Ayer, Alfred J . 208 Bacon, Francis 275, 311 Bagehot, Walter 183 Bain, Alexander 100 Bastian, Adolf 187 Berkeley, Bishop George 137, 236 Bernoulli, Carl 12 Blanqui, Louis A. 15, 19, 27, 28 Boscovich, Roger Joseph 8, 3 9 , 4 0 , 1 7 4 , 224 ff., 263 Brandes, Georg 307, 311 n Brentano, Franz 99 Broad, C . D . 36n Bruno, Giordano 258, 275 Burckhardt, Jacob 183 Callicles 144 Carey, Henry C. 15 Cauchy, A. L. 226, 228 Clark, Le Gros 123 n Clausius, Rudolf 43 n, 235 Cohen, Hermann 20, 203 n Comte, August 86, 284 Copernicus, Nicholas 226 n, 239, 301 n Czolbe, Henrich 28, 33 n, 8 0 , 1 5 2 , 2 3 5 , 299 n, 309f., 310 Dalton, John 133, 225 Danto, Arthur 32, 33 n, 57n, 109,163 n, 189, 248, 252 Darwin, Charles 14, 135, 156—194, 277 Deleuze, Gilles 268 Del Negro, Walter 12 n, 108 n Democritus 35 Descartes, Rene 106, 274—275, 291—292 Deussen, Paul 265 Dewey, John 211 n Dikaerchos 258

Dickopp 12 n Diderot, Denis 37 Dilthey, Wilhelm 18, 170, 274 Du Bois-Reymond, Emil 36, 96, 104,133, 232 n, 244, 245 Dühring, Karl Eugen 305 n Eddington, Sir Arthur 235 Emerson, Ralph Waldo 153 n Empedokles 14, 51, 53, 165, 176 Epicurus 18, 19, 26 Eudemus 30 Faraday, Michael 225, 226 Fechner, Gustav 38, 39 n, 174,176,180, 224, 226 Feuerbach, Ludwig 19, 309, 314—315, 322 Fichte, Johann G. 306 Förster-Nietzsche, Elisabeth 284 n Frenzel, Ivo 11 n Freud, Sigmund 284, 297 Fülop-Miller, René 274 Gast, Peter (Heinrich Köselitz) 39 n, 2 2 6 , 2 2 7 n Gay-Lussac, Joseph-Louis 225 Gersdorff, Carl von 10 n, 13, 21, 195, 279 Gibbon, Edward 3, 80—82 Gilman, S. L. 15 n Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 79,153 n, 168—169,171,173—175,176,258,263, 298, 312, 316, 325 Gomperz, Theodor 30 n Grimm, Ruediger H. 13n, 108n, 122n, 227n Haeckel, Ernst 169, 186, 225 Harris, Errol 124 n Hartmann, Eduard von 246 Hayman, Ronald 20 n, 41 n Hegel, Georg W. F . 48, 75 n, 80,143, 165,184, 225, 267, 289 n, 305 n, 313 Heidegger, Martin 16, 7 1 , 1 0 7 , 1 2 2 n, 141,212, 240,265,268—269,295,296,299,305,309, 324, 329 Heine, Heinrich 76—77, 83 Heisenberg, Werner 252 n, 253 Helmholtz, Hermann 9 4 — 9 5 , 1 3 4 , 1 3 7 , 2 3 1 , 258

340

Index of Names

Heraklitus 1 9 , 5 1 , 5 3 , 5 4 — 5 5 , 5 7 , 1 1 9 — 1 2 0 , 129 Herbart, Johann F. 258—259 Hobbes, Thomas 274, 275, 276 Hocks, E . 12n, 17n Hof stadter, Richard 177n Holbach, Baron Dietrich von 237 Hölderlin, Friedrich 80, 311 Hollingdale, R . J . 14, 21, 64 Hume, David 121 James, William 129, 147, 235, 300 n, 311 Jaspers, Karl 269 Jeans, Sir James 124, 235 Kant, Immanuel 3 — 4 , 1 6 — 1 7 , 2 0 , 2 1 , 36, 56, 6 5 , 6 6 , 6 8 , 9 6 f., 1 0 4 , 1 0 5 , 1 0 9 , 1 1 4 , 1 1 5 , 117,121,122,195—225,228,231,303, 304 n, 308, 309, 330 Kaufmann, Walter 32 n, 74 n, 75 n, 158 n, 244 n, 266, 287 n, 289 n Kepler, Johannes 275 Kierkegaard, Seren 4 5 , 7 0 , 7 3 , 7 5 , 1 8 4 , 2 2 1 , 266, 272, 320, 324 Kirk, G.S. 30 n Kleist, Heinrich von 92, 207 Kuhn, Thomas 227 Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste de 169, 176, 177n, 180 Lamettrie, Julien de 138 n, 139—141 Laplace, Pierre de 36 Lecky, William E . H . 3, 80—81 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 171—172,224, 230, 242—243, 258, 260 Lenin, Nikolai 94 Levi-Strauss, Claude 187 Lichtenberg, Georg Christoph 102,103—104, 291—292 Lichtenberger, Henri 28 n Lucretius Carus, Titus 15, 18, 19, 26—27, 33 Mach, Ernst 134, 224, 231, 299 n Magnus, Bernd 32 n, 33 n, 34 n, 41 f., 46,47, 59 n, 127, 269, 270, 286 n, 320 Mandeville, Bernard de 275—276 Marx, Karl 4, 15, 148, 180, 194, 275—276, 278 n, 279, 308 n Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 57, 101 Meyer, Lothar 38 Mill, John Stuart 86, 306, 312—313 Mittasch, Alwin 12n, 156—157n Moleschott, K. 93 Morgan, George 126 n Müller-Lauter, Wolf gang 175, 251, 294

Occam, William of 139 Paracelsus 275 Parmenides 271 Pascal, Blaise 72 Paul 72, 83, 84 Peirce, Charles Sanders 4, 132, 146, 149 n Plato 51 ff., 70, 142, 144 Poincaré, Henri 105 Popper, Sir Karl 8 Protagoras 61, 93, 196—197 Pythagoras 19, 30, 53 Raven, J . E . , 30 n Redtenbacher 108, 109 n, 229, 245 Riemann, Bernhard 137 Rohde, Erwin 300 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 158 Russell, Bertrand 34, 98 Salaquarda, Jörg l 0 n , 12n, 13n, 15n, 17n, 19, 2 0 , 2 3 , 3 9 n, 62 n, 157 n, 169 n, 185 n, 303 n, 318n Salter, W . M . 20 n, 153 n Schelling, Friedrich W . J . von 264 Schiller, Friedrich 20, 304, 313 Schopenhauer, Arthur 1 0 — 1 1 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 21, 25—26,33,73,91,92,113,135,211,265, 278, 296 Schlechta, Karl 12 n, 142 n Schweitzer, Albert 46 Simpson, George 177n Smith, Adam 275 n, 276 Socrates 51, 116, 142, 150 Spencer, Herbert 177n, 183 Spinoza, Baruch 100, 121, 266, 312 Spir, Afrikan 69 n, 216 Stack, George Joseph 13 n, 77 n Stambaugh, Joan 47, 272 n Stern, J . P . 41 n, 178n, 182n, 286 n, 323—324 Stirner, Max 276—277 Strauss, David 2 0 , 2 9 , 78, 79—80, 83, 84,310, 316 Strawson, Peter F. 198 Strong, Tracy 32 n, 127, 270 n, 332 n Suzuki, D . T . 264—265 Tacitus 81, 82 n Teichmüller, Gustav 69 n, 216 Tertullian 72, 81 Toland, John 305 Ueberweg, Friedrich 1 9 , 2 8 , 2 9 , 3 6 , 83,151, 154, 258, 283, 303, 310, 311—312, 316f.

Index of Names

341

Vaihinger, Hans 1 5 — 1 7 , 1 0 2 , 2 0 9 , 2 1 6 , 2 1 7 , 303 Voltaire 77, 220

Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1 0 5 , 1 0 8 , 1 1 0 , 1 3 9 , 1 8 9 , 190, 208 Wundt, Wilhelm 100

Wagner, Richard 178, 276, 305 n Wein, Hermann 291 n Whitehead, Alfred North 125, 263—264

Zarathustra 31, 33, 45, 56, 86 Zimmermann, R. 105, 208 Zöllner, Johann K . F . 104, 134, 152, 231