Linguistics and Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells (Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science, Series IV: Current Issues in Linguistic Theory)

LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY

AMSTERDAM STUDIES IN THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC SCIENCE General Editor E.F. KONRAD KOERNER (University of Ottawa)

Series IV - CURRENT ISSUES IN LINGUISTIC THEORY

Advisory Editorial Board Henning Andersen (Copenhagen); Raimo Anttila (Los Angeles) Thomas V.Gamkrelidze (Tbilisi); Hans-Heinrich Lieb (Berlin) J.Peter Maher (Chicago); Ernst Pulgram (Ann Arbor, Mich.) E.Wyn Roberts (Vancouver, B.C.); Danny Steinberg (Tokyo)

Volume 42

Adam Makkai and Alan K. Melby (eds.) Linguistics and Philosophy Essays in honor of Rulon S. Wells

LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RULON S.WELLS

Edited by

ADAM MAKKAI University of Illinois at Chicago and ALAN K. MELBY Brigham Young University

JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAM/PHILADELPHIA 1985

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: Linguistics and Philosophy. (Amsterdam studies in the theory and history of linguistic science. Series IV, Current issues in linguistic theory, ISSN 0304-0763; v. 42) Bibliography: p. 1. Linguistics -- Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Wells, Rulon. I. Makkai, Adam. II. Melby, Alan K. III. Wells, Rulon. IV. Series. P26.W45E8 1985 410 85-20099 ISBN 90-272-3536-8 (alk. paper) © Copyright 1985 - John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher.

Professor Rulon S. Wells

CONTENTS PREFACE

iii

WORKS OF RULON S. WELLS

vii

1. ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND GENERAL THEORETICAL ISSUES I n n a t e Capacity, K n o w - H o w a n d Use in L a n g u a g e 3 Robert A. H a l l , J r Language, Cognition and Linguistics Raimo A n t t i l a 11 Kuhnian P a r a d i g m s as Systems o f M a r k e d n e s s Conventions James D. McCawley 23 H i e r a r c h y i n Conceptual Space John Robert Ross 45 I m p e r f e c t M o d e l s a n d T h e i r Uses F r e d J. Damerau 55 Rask's L e c t u r e on t h e Philosophy o f L a n g u a g e W i l l i a m M. C h r i s t i e , Jr 77 Contrast John F o u g h t 85 II. PHONOLOGY Phonolgoical " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n " Stratificational Theories David G. Lockwood

i n Classical and 99

I I I . SYNTAX AND BEYOND G r a m m a t i c a l Phrases a n d Lexical Phrases André M a r t i n e t On Grammars o f Science Zeitig H a r r i s C o n s t i t u e n c y , Dependency a n d A p p l i c a t i v e S t r u c t u r e Sebastian Shaumyan S t r u c t u r e a n d F u n c t i o n in Syntactic Analysis: Rulon Wells As a P a l e o - S y n t h e s i z e r o f E u r o p e a n and American Syntax William J. Sullivan Come on Up Eldon G. L y t i e

127 139 149

205 223

Why "Junction" Theory Jill E. Peterson-Boogaard Generalization and Prediction of Syntactic Patterns In Junction Grammar Alan K. Melby 'Activity-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'-A Language That Can't Say 'I Burned It But It Didn't Burn' and One Than Can Yoshihiko Ikegami Positional Tendencies of English Relative Clauses As Evidence for Processing Strategies Gary D. Prideaux

241

253

265

305

IV. HISTORICAL AND TYPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS Knowledge of the Past C. F. Hockett Lexical Reconstruction and the Semantic History Hypothesis Isidore Dyen Hymonymy, Heteroclysis, and History in the Japanese Verb Roy Andrew Miller

317

343

.

393

V. ON DIACHRONIC AND SYNCHRONIC DERIVATION Some Characteristics of Back-Formation Henry M. Hoenigswald How to Become a Kwa Language Kay Williamson Where Do Exclamations Come From? Adam Makkai

ii

421 427 445

PREFACE BY THE EDITORS

Rulon S(eymour) Wells III was born in Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 30, 1919, the son of a Mormon family of pioneer stock. He was graduated f r o m the University of Utah with a B.A. degree in philosophy in 1939. After moving to the East Coast, he received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1942. His dissertation director was Willard van Orman Quine. His topic was "The Correspondence of Language to Fact". In 1945 Rulon m a r ­ ried the f o r m e r Miss Virginia Halcomb B e n n e t t ; they have two sons, Seymour and David. From 1942 to 1945 Rulon was employed at the University of Pennsylvania, first teaching Bengali for the Army Spe­ cialized Training Program (ASTP) and then Japanese for the Office of Strategic Services. In the summer of 1945 he accepted an invitation from Bernard Bloch, Chairman of Linguistics and editor of Language, to assist him in teaching Japanese for the ASTP at Yale, but this engagement t e r m i ­ nated not long a f t e r the end of the war with Japan. He had studied Sanskrit under W. Norman Brown at Pennsylva­ nia and continued at Yale under Franklin Edgerton; and the good offices of Professor Edgerton put him in touch with F. S. C Northrop and the Philosophy Department. He was appointed instructor in Philosophy in 1946, becoming assis­ t a n t professor in 1948. In 1 9 5 5 - 5 6 , when he was made t e n u r e d associate p r o ­ fessor, Philosophy also decided to share him with the L i n ­ guistics d e p a r t m e n t . In 1962, due to his already formidable international r e p u t a t i o n , he was made f u l l professor in both departments. He won the Bechtel Prize at Harvard University in 1940-41 and in 1941-42. In 1944-46 he was a Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies. In 1951-52 he was a Guggenheim & Morse Fellow. He held the prestigious Mahlon Powell lecturership at Indiana University in 1967. He is a member of the American Philosophical Association, the L i n ­ guistic Society of America (President in 1976), and the L i n ­ guistic Association of Canada and the United States. We will not go into his publications here as a separate section is

reserved date.

in

order

to

present

his

total

So much for the external history subject of the present Festschrift.

publication

of

the

life

list

of

to

the

But as all e x t e r n a l histories, retrievable f r o m various Who's Who-type publications, this e x t e r n a l history must be greatly expanded by the internal history of Rulon, the m a n , teacher, scholar, instigator of ideas, and f r i e n d . Perhaps the most striking fact of his life is t h a t during the height of the Bloomfieldian structuralist period, when "meaning" was a highly suspicious, even a dangerous t e r m , Rulon pioneered semantically oriented research not only in his own work but encouraged it in the work of his students as w e l l . In t r u e peripatetic fashion, clad with his o m n i p r e ­ sent scarfs against the cold winds of New Haven, he would walk with students asking him questions from the Hall of Graduate Studies to his office in Davenport College, the York Restaurant, or George and H a r r / s . He would gladly accept the invitation of a graduate student and spend eight to t e n hours discussing some intriguing topic of a disserta­ tion in progress, even if it meant missing his dinner. When most graduate thesis supervisors at Yale w e r e more or less neatly categorizable within t h e i r pigeon holes of specializa­ t i o n , Rulon would always have a number of bibliography slips in various pockets (once somebody counted f o u r t e e n in one lecture) t h a t would lead the seeker towards Carnap and symbolic logic if t h a t was what was missing in the student's background, or towards Aristotle and Peirce if t h a t seemed more necessary. He taught linguists how to think philosophi­ cally and he pointed out to philosophers what linguistics had done for their discipline. He predicted in the early sixties t h a t the discipline of linguistics would move significantly in the direction of Transformational-Generative Grammar. His interest in syntax, we must r e m e m b e r , goes back to "Immediate Constituents" published in Language in 1947. His breadth of vision allowed him, nevertheless, not only to t o l e r a t e but to encourage the f i r s t stratificational dissertation to be w r i t t e n at Yale under his own supervision in 1964-65, the height of the TGG wave in the USA.

iv

When he t a u g h t Linguistics at Yale (to u n d e r g r a d u a t e s and graduate s t u d e n t s ) , Rulon inculcated in his students a desire to read in the field f r e e l y and with informed c r i t i ­ cism r a t h e r than being labeled early as a follower of "x", '"y", or "z". His academic a t t i t u d e , in short, was c h a r a c t e r ­ ized by humanism and tolerance in an age when these v i r ­ tues w e r e conspicuously lacking in too many others. We learned from him as early as 1960 t h a t semantics and syn­ tax could be studied both independently, and in conjunction w i t h one another. This book, which was originally conceived in 1979 when Rulon t u r n e d 6 0 , was long in the making and goes to press only shortly a f t e r his 66th birthday. Some contributors r e w ­ rote e a r l i e r versions in the desire to reach p e r f e c t i o n - clearly an unrealistic goal In anyone's l i f e t i m e , but the desire was t h e r e ail the way from Port Harcort, Nigeria to Provo, Utah and many points in b e t w e e n . The two of us, having worked with this book, r e p r e s e n t , in a sense, the two poles in the life and career of Rulon 5. Wells: one of us coming from Europe and having studied at Yale, the other a computational linguist i n t e r e s t e d in formal theory and the computer, coming f r o m the place of Rulon's youth, Salt Lake City, Utah. We wish him good health and many more productive years both as a teacher and scholar.

Adam Makkai University of Illinois at Chicago Alan K. Melby Brigham Young University, Provo

ν

Works of Rulon S. Wells

WORKS OF RULON S. WELLS

1.

'The Pitch (1945):27-39.

Phonemes

of

English'

in

Language

2.

Review English,

3.

'Immediate Constituents' in Language 23 (1947):81-117; r e p r i n t e d in M. Joos ( e d . ) , Readings in Linguistics (1957) and elsewhere.

4.

'De Saussure's System of Linguistics' in Word 3 ( 1 9 4 7 ) : 1 - 3 1 ; r e p r i n t e d in M. Joos (ed.)/ Readings in Lin­ guistics (1957) and elsewhere.

5.

Review of Alexander B. Johnson ( e d . David Rynin), A Treatise on Language, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9 (1948):164-7.

of Kenneth L. Pike, The Intonation in Language 23 (1947):255-73.

of

21

American

6. 'Automatic Alternation' in Language 25 (1949):99-116. 7.

Review of A. Rosetti, Le mot; B e r t r a n d Russell, Human Knowledge; and Paul A. Schilpp ( e d . ) , The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, in Language 25 (1949):319-25.

8.

Review of Clarence I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation: Review of Metaphysics 2 (1949):99-115.

9.

'The existence (1949):1-20.

10.

of

facts'

in

Review

Articles 'Empiricism,' 'Charles S. Crowell-Collier s Encyclopedia (1950).

of

Peirce,'

Metaphysics

and

'Proof'

3

in

Works of Rulon S. Wells 11.

The State and Prospects of Semantics (41 pp., privately distributed by the Rockefeller Foundation), (1950).

12.

Colloquium on General Semantics at Yale University (with B. Blanshard and A. Korzybski), General Semantics Bulletin Nos. 1 and 2 , 55-63 (1950).

13.

Comment on article by Paul Weiss, in Lyman Bryson et al. (eds.), Perspectives on a Troubled Decade (1950):529-30.

14.

'Predicting Slips of the Tongue' in Yale Scientific Magazine 25 (3):9 ff. (1951); reprinted in Victoria Fromkin ( e d . ) , Speech Errors as Linguistic Evidence (The Hague: Mouton, 1973).

15.

Review of Recherches (1951):554-70.

16.

'Frege's Ontology' in Review of Metaphysics 4 (1951):537-73; r e p r i n t e d in E. D. Klemke ( e d . ) , Essays on Frege (Urbana: U. of Illinois Press, 1968).

17.

'Comment on (1952):124.

18.

Review of article by Alonzo Logic 17 (1952):133-4.

19.

'Secondary Derivation 29 (1953):237-41.

20.

'Archiving and Language Typology' in of American Linguistics 20 (1954):101-7.

21.

'Meaning and Use' in Word 10 (1954):235-50; r e p r i n t e d in Sol Saporta ( e d . ) , Psycholinguistics. A book of Readings (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1961).

22.

Reviews of articles by Hilary P u t n a m , Alonzo Church, Wilfrid Sellars, Arthur Pap, and Rudolf Carnap, in Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1955):293-7.

Francis

structurales

Raab'

from

viii

in

1949,

in

Review

Church,

Sanskrit

of

Language

Metaphysics

27

6

Journal of Symbolic

/-stems'

in

Language

International Journal

Works of Rulon S. Wells 23.

'Acronymy/ in Morris Halle ( e d . ) , For Roman Jakobson, (1956):662-7 in Adrienne and Keith Lehrer ( e d . ) , Theory of Meaning (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970):113-35.

24.

'Leibniz Today' 3 3 - 4 9 , 502-24.

25.

Brief notice of Sir David Ross ( e d . ) , (a) Aristotelis de anima and (b) Aristotelis Parva naturalia in Review of Meta­ physics 10 (1957):534-5.

26.

Brief notice of I. M. Bochenski, (O.P.) Formale Logik, and of William and M a r t h a Kneale, The Development of Logic in Review of Metaphysics 1 1 . (1957):343.

27.

'A Mathematical Approach to Meaning' nand de Saussure 15 (1957):117-36.

28.

'Is a S t r u c t u r a l T r e a t m e n t of Meaning Possible?' in Proceeding of the Eighth International Congress of Linguists (Oslo, August 1957):654-66.

29.

'Non-phonological Factors in Linguistic Change. A spec­ ulative e s s a / in Diego Catalan ( e d . ) , Miscelanea homenaie a André Martinet 2.269-83 (1958).

30.

Philosophy Mid-Century, (1958).

31.

Review of articles by George Berry, Frederic Young, Max Fisch, Jackson Cope, and Daniel Haskell, in Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 ( 1 9 5 9 ) : 2 0 9 - 1 1 .

32.

(with Robert S. Brumbaugh) 'The Plato Microfilm Project,' Yale University Library Gazette 34 (1960):313-20.

33.

'Nominal and Verbal Style' in Thomas A. Sebeok ( e d . ) , Aspects of Style: 197-200 (1960); r e p r i n t e d in Donald C. Freeman ( e d . ) , Linguistics and Literary Style (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1970).

in

Review

of

Metaphysics

in

10

(1956-57)

Cahiers

Ferdi­

of Language 1949-55 in Philosophy in the A Survey, ( e d . Raymond Klibansky) 2.139-45

ix

Works of Rulon S. Wells 34.

Untitled comment 190-91 (1960).

on

Meter

35.

Review of Willard V. Quine, Metaphysics 14 (1961):695-703.

36.

'A measure of Subjective Information' in Roman Jakobson (ed.), Proceedings of the 12th Symposium in Applied Mathematics, 237-44 (1961).

37.

(with Samuel Jay Keyser) The Common-Feature Method, Office of Naval Research, Contract SAR/Nonr 609 ( 1 6 ) , Technical Report No. 12, November 1961.

38.

'What has Linguistics Done f o r Philosophy 59, (1962):697-708.

39.

'Some Neglected Opportunities in Descriptive tics' in Anthropological Linguistics 5 (1963):38.

40.

'Is Frege's Concept of Function Valid?' in Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963):719-30; r e p r i n t e d in E. D. Klemke ( e d . ) , Essays on Frege (Urbana: U. of Illinois Press, 1968).

41.

'The True Nature of Peirce's Evolutioni in Edward  Moore and Richard S. Robin (eds.)/ Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Second Series (Amherst, Mass.: U. of Massachusetts Press, 1964:304-22).

42.

'Charles S. Peirce as an American' in Richard J. B e r n ­ stein ( e d . ) , Perspectives on Peirce (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1 9 6 5 ) : 1 3 - 4 1 .

43.

'Distinctively Human Semiotic' 6 (December 1967):103-24.

44.

(with Robert S. Brumbaugh) The Plato Manuscripts. Index (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

45.

Synchronics and Function, 1968. (Unpublished; a bound copy of the typescript, 113 pp., was given to Sterling Memorial Library (Yale University) and is catalogued as CCL/B67/ + W46/1968.) x

and

Metrics,

Word and Object,

in

Philosophy?'

Social

op.

cit.,

Review of

in Journal of

Science

Linguis­

Information

A New

Works of Rulon S. Wells

46.

'Innate Knowledge' in Sidney Philosophy (New York: New 1969):99-119.

47.

'Comprehension and Expression' Studies in Thought and Language Arizona Press, 1970):35-63.

48.

'Uniformitarianism in Linguistics' in ( e d . ) , Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Scribner's, 1973):423-31.

49.

'Lexicostatistics in the Regency ( e d . ) , Lexicostatistics in Genetic Mouton, 1973):118-21.

50.

Review of William J. Samarin, Tongues Angels, Religious Studies 9 (1973):503-6.

51.

'Phonemics in the Nineteenth Century' in Dell Hymes ( e d . ) , Studies in the History of Linguistics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974):434-53.

52.

'The Indispensible Word "now"' in Knowledge and (ed.) Action, B o b b s - M e r r i l l , 1975):207-35.

53.

'Deciphering in Linguistics: A Nineteenth Century e p i ­ sode' in Linguistic and Literary Studies in Honor of Archibald A. Hill I A. Jazayery e t a l , (eds.) Lisse: De Ridder 1976):407-12.

54.

'Metonymy and Misunderstanding' in Roger W. Cole ( e d . ) , Current Issues in Linguistic Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977):194-214.

55.

'Criteria for Semiosis' in Thomas Perfusion of Signs (Bloomington: Press, 1977):1-27.

56.

'Peirce's Notion (1977):197-208.

of

the

xi

Hook York

( e d . ) , Language and University Press,

in J. L. Cowan ( e d . ) , (Tucson: University of

Philip P. Wiener Vol. 4 (New York:

Period' in Isidore Dyen Linguistics (The Hague:

of

Men

and

Hector-Neri Castaneda, Reality (Indianapolis:

Symbol'

A. Sebeok (ed.) A Indiana University

in

Semiotica

10

Works of Rulon S. Wells 57.

'Semantics in a Linguistic Framework' in Wolfgang Wolck and Paul L. Garvin (eds.), The Fifth Lacus Forum (1978) (Columbia, South Carolina: Hornbeam Press, 1979):21-36.

58.

'Linguistics as a Science: The case of the comparative method' in Henry M. Hoenigswald ( e d . ) , The European Background of American Linguistics (Dordrecht, the N e t h ­ erlands: Foris Publications, 1979):23-61.

59.

'Thirdness and Linguistics' in Irmengard Rauch and Gerald Carr (eds.), The Signifying Animal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980):186-200.

60.

(with Robert S. Brumbaugh) 'Yale's Plato Project' to be published in E. Moutsopoulos ( e d . ) , Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the Philosophy of Greek Culture (Calamata, Greece, 20-25 September 1982).

61.

'Thought Without Language' in Kurt R. Jankowsky ( e d . ) , Scientific and Humanistic Dimensions of Language. Festschrift for Robert Lado on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday on May 31, 1985. (John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1985):387-396.

xii

I ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND GENERAL THEORETICAL ISSUES

INNATE CAPACITY, KNOW-HOW AND USE IN LANGUAGE

Robert A. Hall, Jr. Cornell University Ever since the publication of the "vulgata" of F e r d i ­ (1915), nand de Saussure's Cours de linguistique générale t h e r e has been continuing but unresolved debate over two of his k e y - t e r m s , LANGUE and PAROLE.' There seems to be general agreement t h a t this pair of words can be i n t e r ­ p r e t e d as r e f e r r i n g to one or both of two dichotomies: that of the social aspect of language versus the individual, and t h a t of the abstract system of a language versus its a c t u ­ alization in speech. 2 For us to take langue as r e f e r r i n g to some "system" existing outside of all the individuals in whose usage it is m a n i f e s t e d , we must assume t h a t t h e r e is such a thing as a "conscience collective", a "superorganic" of the type which Sapir (1917) demonstrated long ago t h a t t h e r e is no justification for hypothesizing. The only sense in which the langue/parole dichotomy can be of any use is that of the t o t a l system of linguistic p a t t e r n s existing in posse in any individual, as opposed to the partial manifestations t h e r e o f when the individual speaks or w r i t e s . 3 Equally confusing, and causing equally extensive and inconclusive debate, has been the pair of terms COMPETENCE and PERFORMANCE, introduced by A. N. Chomsky (1965 and later works). The similarity between this pair and the Saussurean langue/parole dichotomy has been repeatedly observed and commented o n , as well as the d i f f e r e n c e s . 4 Chomsky's insistence on competence as something intrinsic, belonging to "deep s t r u c t u r e " and innate' goes beyond Saussure's conception of langue as an abstraction. At the same t i m e , Chomskyan "competence" is a purely individual, in no wise social phenomenon, existing only in his "ideal speaker-listener".6

4

Hall: Innate Capacity, Know-How and Use

Both of these dichotomies seem to hint at certain valuable distinctions, and yet both are basically unsatisfac­ tory. This is because they are cast in the very w i d e - s p r e a d but essentially fallacious mold of binary oppositions, 7 and are based on the reification of abstractions. In this discus­ sion, I shall a t t e m p t a somewhat more extended distinction between t h r e e basic factors in human linguistic activity: ( i n n a t e ) capacity, " k n o w - h o w " , and use of language. Before coming to these t h r e e main points of the dis­ cussion, however, we must settle one m a t t e r which has stood in the way of a clear understanding of the whole problem of human language: the relation between its i n d i ­ vidual and its social aspects. On the one hand, language certainly is both an individual and a social phenomenon. On the other hand, neither Saussure's ascription of langue to a "conscience collective" nor Chomsk/s limitation of language to individual usage can be j u s t i f i e d . The paradox can be resolved by recognizing t h a t , as I have argued elsewhere at g r e a t e r length (Hall 1968a: ch. 2 ) , nothing collective (con­ scious, unconscious, activity, responsibility, g u i l t , etc.) exists outside of the individuals who compose a group. Yet no individual exists i n , by, or for h i m - or herself alone. Every human comes into the world as the product of two others, and the normal person lives in continual contact with many others, influenced by and influencing t h e m . (Turning John Donne's famous phrase a r o u n d , we can say "Every man is an island, appearing for a while out of the sea of time and then sinking back into it - but with many bridges leading to and f r o m other islands".) In language, the basic unit with which every human operates is his or her IDIOLECT. 8 The usage of every speech-community consists of what is common to its members' idiolects, its DIALECT, at which we arrive only by a process of abstraction based on observation of individuals* linguistic activity. That humans d i f f e r from other living beings especially in possessing the ability to learn and use language, and t h a t our species should t h e r e f o r e be t e r m e d not only homo sapiens, but especially homo loquens, is a commonplace. 9 This ability is one facet of our basic power of SYMBOLIZATION, of using one phenomenon (or r e f e r e n c e t h e r e t o ) to stand for another. It may not be exclusive to m a n k i n d , 1 0 but it is certainly most highly developed in humans. Its seat seems to

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

5

be in the b r a i n , but it is not certain in exactly which part or in which interconnections b e t w e e n parts; 1 1 nor is it known by which chromosomes it is t r a n s m i t t e d . Nevertheless, the capacity of learning and using a system of linguistic symbols seems to be d e f i n i t e l y h e r e d i t a r y and hence innate in normal humans. Only in this sense can Chomsky's insis­ tence on innateness be regarded as valid. Certainly, as linguists f o r over a century have not t i r e d of insisting, no particular linguistic structure is born into any human child. As the normal person grows up in a group of homines (and feminael ) loquentes, he or she exercises this innate capacity f o r learning languages, and builds up his or her idiolect by imitating others. This process involves not just random samples of imperfectly heard and understood speech, but (in many, probably most instances) also deliber­ a t e , intentional teaching on the p a r t of parents and o t h ers.12 Each speaker thereby internalizes in childhood at least one set of linguistic habits or b e h a v i o r - p a t t e r n s , his or her idiolect, and learns how to use it in communicating with others. This is his or her " k n o w - h o w " . No individual's idiolect is ever absolutely identical with any other's, but of course the members of any speech-community have extremely close similarity in t h e i r idiolects, which makes it possible f o r them to act "as if" they shared a langue which was common to the e n t i r e group. On the basis of naive abstraction, people build up in themselves a notion of what they and their f e l l o w - s p e a k e r s do or ought to do - w h a t I have elsewhere (Hall 1951) termed their "linguistic superego". That naive speakers should reify such an abstraction and consider "the language", "correct speech" and the like as having objective existence outside their own usage, is understandable. Not so excusable is the habit, w i d e - s p r e a d among linguists, of doing the same. An individual's idiolect has an objective existence, as a l a t e n t set of potentialities in his or her b r a i n . Every time he or she speaks or listens, some portion of this set of linguistic habits is called into play, e i t h e r actively (in speaking) or passively (in listening). This use of language corresponds, grosso modo, to Saussure's parole and Chomsky's performance, in the sense of individual language-activity. Observation of speakers' use of t h e i r linguistic resources is the only channel through which t h e i r p a t t e r n s can be s t u d ­ ied and their r e g u l a r i t i e s f o r m u l a t e d .

6

Hall: Innate Capacity, Know-How and Use

From this point of view, it is f u t i l e to deny, as some have done, the possibility of studying la parole or " p e r f o r m ­ ance" scientifically, or to insist t h a t only /a langue or "com­ petence" can be the object of linguistic analysis. It is only by observing the sounds people make when t a l k i n g , the combinations of those sounds (i.e. linguistic FORMS) which they use, and the correlations of these l a t t e r with r e a l - l i f e phenomena (i.e. the MEANING of the f o r m s ) , in individual instances of use, t h a t the linguist can obtain the primary data without which none of his work has any value. Phonet­ ics is t h e r e f o r e an essential part of linguistics, and the part most amenable to instrumental study and analysis. It is in the study of language-use t h a t techniques of linguistic f i e l d - w o r k and socio- and psycholinguistic observation are of course essential. Their place can be t a k e n only partially by t r a d i t i o n a l grammars, no m a t t e r how d e t a i l e d . For languages no longer spoken, we have to depend on philological analy­ ses, the more f i n e - g r a i n e d the b e t t e r ; but even these are best used when combined with a knowledge of humans' actual speech-behavior, 1 3 Further analysis of the p a t t e r n s of any dialect or l a n ­ guage must inevitably be based on abstractions derived from observation of actual speakers' linguistic activity in r e a l - l i f e situations. As long as we realize t h a t our abstractions and the systems we perceive in them are the results of our theoretical analysis, and as long as we abstain from reifying t h e m , well and good. 14 Linguistic analysis loses its value, however, when objective observation of human communicative activity is replaced by mere formal logic or mathematics. Logic has no relevance to the study of human language, and the only kinds of mathematics t h a t are applicable to linguistics are statistics and the calculation of probability. 1 5 Linguistic structure is to be deduced on the basis of p a t ­ t e r n s thus observed, not on t h a t of some a r b i t r a r i l y and aprioristically assumed "universais". As I have remarked elsewhere (Hall 1968b:203), the dichotomy of " s u r f a c e " v e r ­ sus "deep" structure is false. There exist only linguistic structure and the meanings (i.e. the correlations w i t h r e a l lite phenomena) associated t h e r e w i t h , of which " d e e p s t r u c ­ t u r e " is a clumsy pseudo-grammatical r e f o r m u l a t i o n . Such is the prestige of Saussure and Chomsky t h a t their misleading dichotomies of langue/parole and competence/

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

7

performance are likely to continue a f f l i c t i n g linguistics f o r a long time yet and to cause f u r t h e r waste of t i m e , e f f o r t , ink, and paper. The best way to avoid such waste is to stop talking about e i t h e r dichotomy; to look the facts of human linguistic activity in the f a c e ; and to recognize the exis­ tence of what I have t e r m e d INNATE CAPACITY, KNOW-HOW and USE of language - w h e t h e r under these or any other names.

ENDNOTES

1 For a discussion of the various i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of these terms, see the references given in Koerner (1973:233-262), and especially Spence (1957). Later discus­ sions of the langue/parole dichotomy have added little or nothing useful. The t i t l e of Gray (1977) is misleading, since the article does not deal with the Saussurean problem.

2

Cf. Wells (1947:15-16).

3

I include the activity of w r i t i n g here because every time a person w r i t e s , he or she is putting down a graphic representation of i n t e r n a l , f r e q u e n t l y suppressed speech; cf. my discussion in Hall (1979:95). 4 Ct. Koerner (1973:253-254). For critiques of Chomskyan "competence", cf. von R a f f l e r - E n g e l ( 1 9 7 0 ) , Kates ( 1 9 7 6 / 7 7 ) , and other r e f e r e n c e s given in Hall (1977:88).

5For discussion and criticism of the ness"-hypothesis, cf. Putnam (1967) and other given in Hall (1977:88-89).

"innatereferences

6

Ct. the illuminating observation of Faust (1970:46): "Chomsky's ideal s p e a k e r - l i s t e n e r is not in a speech-com­ munity at a l l . He is a lone individual completely surrounded by p e r f e c t speech-mirrors". 7

that

The late Henry Lee Smith Jr. was fond of emphasizing the w i d e - s p r e a d modern European and American habit

8

Hall: Innate Capacity, Know-How and Use

of setting up " e i t h e r - o r " binary oppositions view of phenomena. Cf. also Mikus (1977). 8

Cf. most recently ström (1980). 9 The best (1973:101-102).

the

current

excellent

falsifies

discussion

discussion

is

of

our

Hammar­

in

Hockett

10

For experiments with chimpanzees and other types of primates, cf. Hockett (1973:117, 156-157) and Peng (ed.) (1978). 11

Cf. Whitaker

12

Cf.

(1970).

especially Vorster

13 As I have a t t e m p t e d propos of runic w r i t i n g .

(1976). to

point

out

in

Hall

(1982),

à

14

As I suggested in Hall (1962).

15

Exemplified, for Joos and G. Herdan.

instance,

in the

work

of

the

late

M.

REFERENCES CITED

Chomsky, Avram Noam. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gray, Bennison. 1977. "Is t h e r e a science of parole?" Studies in Language 1.233-236. Hall, Robert Α., Jr. 1951. Idiolect and linguistic s u p e r - e g o . Studia Linguistica 5.21-27. Reprinted in Hall 1978. Lan­ guage, Literature and Life, 3 3 - 3 7 . Lake B l u f f , III.: Jupiter Press. . 1962. "Fact and fiction in grammatical analysis." Foundations of Language 1.337-345. . 1968a. An Essay on Language. Philadelphia: Chilton Books. . 1968b. "Some recent developments in American l i n ­ guistics." Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 70.192-227. Reprinted

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

9

in Hall 1976. American Linguistics 1925-1969: 62-87 Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. . 1977. "Some critiques of Chomskyan theory." N e u philologische M i t t e i l u n g e n 78.86-95. . 1979. "Once more: what is l i t e r a t u r e ? " Modern Lan­ guage Journal 6 3 . 9 1 - 9 8 . . 1982. The Kensington Rune-stone is Genuine. Columbia, SC: Hornbeam Press. Hammarström, U. Göran E. 1980. "Idiolekt." Lexikon der ger­ manistischen Linguistik2, 4 2 8 - 4 3 8 . Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. Hockett, Charles F. 1973. Man's Place in Nature. New York: McGraw-Hill. Kates, Carol Α. 1976/77. "A critique of Chomsky's theory of grammatical competence." Forum Linguisticum 1.15-24. Koerner, E. F. K. 1973. Ferdinand de Saussure: Origin and Development of His Linguistic Thought in Western Studies of Language. Braunschweig: Viehweg. Mikus, . F. 1977. "Le binarisme e s t - i l inhérent au l a n ­ gage?" Revue Beige de Philologie et d'Histoire 55.745-750. Putnam, Hilary. 1967. "The 'innateness' hypothesis and explanatory models in linguistics." Synthese 17.12-22. Peng, Fred .  ( e d . ) . 1978. Sign Language and Language Acquisition in Man and Ape: New Dimensions of Comparative Pedolinguistics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Sapir, Edward. 1917. "Do we need a superorganic?" American Anthropologist NS.19.441-447. Spence, N.  W. 1957. "A hardy p e r e n n i a l : the distinction of la langue and la parole." Archivum Linguisticum 9 . 1 - 2 7 . von R a f f l e r - E n g e l , Walburga. 1970. "Competence, a t e r m in search of a concept." Linguistique contemporaine (Hommage à Eric Buyssens), 271-285 Bruxelles: Université Libre, Institut de Sociologie. Vorster, Jan. 1975. "Mommy linguist: the case f o r m o t h erese." Lingua 37.281-312. Wells, Rulon S. 1947. "De Saussure's system of linguistics." Word 3 . 1 - 3 1 . Whitaker, H. A. 1970. A Model for Neurolinguistics. Colchester, England: University of Essex Language Centre (Occa­ sional Papers, no. 10).

LANGUAGE, COGNITION, AND LINGUISTICS

Raimo Anttila University of California at Los Angeles THE PROBLEM. One of the c u r r e n t "technical" t e r m s f r e e l y bandied about is cognitive. This catch-word gets strong support from the rise of a cognitive science, r e p r e ­ sented through interdisciplinary workshops, programs, and c e n t e r s , and it seems to be a central concept in psychology, linguistics, and even artificial intelligence. The obvious fashion aspect of the word may quite well camouflage the same emptiness as is o f t e n in ' s t r u c t u r a l ' , 'generative', or ' n a t u r a l ' and the like. Fashion seems to be clearer in Ger­ man, where the old Erkenntnis is being replaced by Kognition (although here the adjective kognitivisch gives an edge over erkenntnistheoretisch). Usage is strongest where 'generative' predominated e a r l i e r , and this is why I will concentrate here tor some preliminary explication for the history of the concept in recent times. This particular step in " c u r r e n t progress" is poorly understood by the majority of linguists, and perhaps others as w e l l . F u r t h e r reason for starting the analysis comes from the steady rise of semiotic and h e r m e neutic issues also in American linguistics. These aspects are necessary, but they are presented as 'post-generative' achievements. The t u r n i n g point was around 1976-78. In my experience the issues t u r n e d around the concepts of (denial of) analogy and associationism, semiotics, hermeneutics, cognition, and gestalt psychology. In the following I will show t h a t the t u r n i n g point was a r e t u r n to a t r a d i t i o n t h a t had been repudiated by the very persons who made this new progress.

ASSOCIATIONISM. Criticism by "outsiders" of the t r a n s ­ f o r m a t i o n a l - g e n e r a t i v e rationalism was t a k e n as a defense

12

Anttila: Language, Cognition, and

Linguistics

of empiricism, similarity, and association. This was of course t r u e , but such a defense was simply not permissible, although Esper (1973) had shown t h a t a viable theory must be based on both empiricism and association. Personally, my big e r r o r was an emphasis on similarity, when the d o m i n a t ­ ing school knew that identity is the real thing. F u r t h e r m o r e , similarity could not be formalized. Embarrassingly, similarity "does not f i t into associational theories because it r e p r e ­ sents a r e a l , inner connection between elements which does not reduce to mere contiguity" (Helson 1925:355 cf. 3 5 3 - 5 ) . What is associationism? Matson (1966:1) answers t h a t it is "an a t t e m p t to t r a n s l a t e the postulates and methods of Newtonian mechanics, as precisely as possible, into psycho­ logical t e r m s " (31). We need not concern ourselves with the many valuable aspects in the output of the associationists (e.g. Locke, Hume, the Mills), because the ultimate f r a m e is inadequate for perception and concept f o r m a t i o n , and thus cognition. I, among others, had t a k e n an explicit stand against associationism and N e w t o n , but for association. Accepting the viable parts of British empiricism does not entail embracing associationism. The rationalistic stance was not willing to perceive any f i n e r distinctions. GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY AND COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY. "Cog­ nitive psychology" was launched by James Ward (1843-1925) in 1886 expressly against associationism. "This had two points of g r e a t advantage over associationism. It emphasized the unity of human experience and behavior, as against discrete and isolated functions; it emphasized activity and adjustment, and found the evolutionary approach highly congenial" (Murphy 1950:172; read also f n . 46 for an excerpt from Brett's History of Psychology). This certainly sounds like a birth announcement of gestalt psychology (v. Ehrenfels' Ober Gestattqualitäten was four years away), and in f a c t , cognitive psychology is still o f t e n subdivided into g e s ­ t a l t and clinical psychology, or cognitive psychology is simply equated with gestalt psychology. These definitions are easily found in handbooks, and they make the disparagement of gestalt psychology by d e f e n d e r s of cognitive psychology a baffle. A criticism one sometimes finds in l i t e r a t u r e is t h a t the gestalt approach is good and solid, but "what is missing from gestalt psychology is an adequate t r e a t m e n t of com-

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

13

municative processes, especially language and other symbolic forms" ( B r i t t a n 1974:331-2). This is where "contemporary cognitive psychology has moved beyond these models by t a k ­ ing both culture and social structure into account in its discussion of internal structuring" (332). This is a hasty evaluation and does not cover the whole f i e l d ; it reminds one of the untrue statement that the gestaltists deal with vision only. Let us not f o r g e t t h a t v. Ehrenfels started with melody, and that Köhler was an accomplished acoustician. Köhler also studied value, not to speak of the word field investigators, who all brought the approach to language and meaning (the so-called "symbol f u n c t i o n " ) . As f o r recent times, Uhlan Slagle (e.g. 1974) has shown that meaning can be handled only in gestalt t e r m s , and this line of thinking is supported by Peter Maher (e.g. 1977) who adds the s i t u ­ ational or cultural aspect in a most explicit f o r m . 1 This line of a r g u m e n t is certainly most i m p o r t a n t , since it gives a direct link to semiotics and since it uses gestalt terminology f o r cognitive issues. Roback (1964) points out t h a t the propaganda against gestalt psychology is due to Boring (365). There is hardly psychology, any t r u t h in the r e p o r t e d death of gestalt because "to d a t e , t h e r e does not seem to be any other school to replace it ..." (366). Hanson (1958) lists "a f e w fundamental papers" in gestalt psychology and concludes: "Philosophy has no concern with f a c t , only with conceptual matters ...; but discussion of perception could not but be improved by the reading of these t w e n t y papers" (181). As for the question whether t h e r e still are competing schools of psychology, two positions are possible, if one just does not maintain t h a t t h e r e is a " m o d e r n " behavioristic psychol­ ogy reigning over the others: 1) " M o d e r n " psychology rests on a phenomenological-anthropological S t r u k t u r - and Ganzheits- psychologie, and the psychology without a soul is dead (W. E. Mühlmann, Homo creator 1962, quoted by Wellek 1970:239). 2) But if the behavioristic variety is not dead in t o t o , as it certainly is not in America, we get the following answer ( M e t z g e r 1973:837-838): There are essentially two such schools. One of them is American behaviorism and the Russian doctrine on the highest nervous activ­ ity which have much in common. The other is

14

Anttila: Language, Cognition, and Wertheimer's and Köhler's von Bertalanffy's theory which is largely in accord

Linguistics

Gestalt theory and of open systems with Gestalt theory

In the number of its advocates and followers, the second school is hardly more than a lost h a n d f u l , and one can hardly avoid the con­ formity pressure of the world-ruling first school. Nevertheless, everything goes f o r the second school, a n d , as in the search f o r t r u t h the principle of democratic majority does not hold, there is no doubt t h a t the f u t u r e will belong to it.

There are already distinct signs t h a t " m o d e r n " linguists are shifting t h a t way, generally as an extension of t r a n s ­ formational g r a m m a r , a gross historical injustice. Karlsson and Lehtonen (1977:2) acknowledge the revival of gestaltist notions in psycholinguistics, and r e f e r to the second chapter of Kess (1976) for more details. T h e r e , of course, one finds no help at a l l , just a similar r e f e r e n c e to Neisser (1967). So what does Neisser say? He takes gestalt psychology as analogous to s t r u c t u r a l linguistics, the highest f o r m of which would be Chomskyan transformational grammar! Although this line of passing the buck is typical, it is of course ridiculous. It is t r u e t h a t Chomsky is an " i n v e t e r a t e structuralist" (Lewis 1970:23), but u n f o r t u n a t e l y his whole system is aligned w i t h American behaviorism and American structural linguistics of a compatible kind (Itkonen 1978). This kind of structuralism does not provide a viable theory (see particularly M e r r e l l 1975). Remember t h a t the main t a r g e t s of Köhler's critiques w e r e behaviorism and i n t r o spectionism (not introspection!), which entails devising e l a b ­ orate techniques f o r excluding the environment from the observer. This way learning is cut o f f , and pure Dinge-ansich would appear (a direct parallel to underlying forms and innatism). 2 Viable structuralism must be linked with gestalt theory. The replacement of behaviorism by "cognitive psy­ chology" (Neisser 8 f f . ) is by no means so clear, particularly

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

15

as considerable machine-theory aspects remain in this modern substitute. Ward at least made his break under the auspices of Brentano's emphasis on experience, which was totally missing in transformational g r a m m a r , although it is being g r a f t e d into it now.

SEMIOTICS. The issue of cognition can be taken up f r o m a d i f f e r e n t angle, viz. Peirce's theory of signs. This is particulary important for linguistics, which is generally taken as a paragon of a sign system, whether followed through or not. Usually not. It remains a fact t h a t linguists t e n d to p r e f e r an anticognitive stance (whatever their t e r ­ minology seems to say). A handy introduction to Peirce's theory of cognition is achieved by combining Buchler (1939:3-23) and Buczyńska-Garewicz (1978). The gist of these is the following: Cognition and thought and knowledge are synonymous. Cognitions are d e t e r m i n e d by ( i n f e r r e d f r o m ) previous cognitions. Every cognition is judicative, i.e. even for every material quality of cognition t h e r e must be some possibility of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . There are rules of inference used in reasoning. The sign is a basic unit of cognition, and a theory of signs itself is a philosophical discipline which is able to explain and i n t e r p r e t the whole domain of human cognition, giving at the same time a viable methodology. Every thought is a sign, because every real sign must be i n t e r p r e t e d by another. This is how signs necessarily grow. The essential function of the sign is to i n t e r p r e t and to be i n t e r p r e t e d simultaneously, which makes i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a wave phenomenon in a "semantic" f i e l d , and a real creative power. As a sign, thought is by its n a t u r e an i n f e r e n c e , because it is dependent on some previous thought. Meaning is thus an ideal phenomenon as it must be formed by thought, not by subjective activity, and a p a r t from the e l e ­ ments of the natural empirical w o r l d . "The semiotical method is a kind of analytical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which explains the sense of accomplished cognition. However, it is a method of understanding r a t h e r than an a t t e m p t to rebuild knowledge f r o m the very beginning" (Buczynska-Garewicz 14).

16

Anttila: Language, Cognition, and Linguistics

But analysis is not the conceptually "higher" notion, because the plurality of signs is logically prior to a single sign. Totality (Ganzheit) is thus crucial behind the t e r m s , exactly as in gestalt psychology, cf. Buczynska-Garewicz (13):

The system of signs is logically prior to a single sign, and thought is a whole which determines its parts. This holistic view of cognition constitutes the principal aspect of semiotical epistemology. It contrasts with the idea of dissolving knowledge into simple data in order to reconstruct it f r o m such d a t a . All methodology of reconstruction ( t h e r e a r e d i f ­ f e r e n t types) takes f o r g r a n t e d the cognitive self-subsistence of simple ideas or impres­ sions. However, according to the theory of signs, t h e r e are no simple autonomous d a t a .

This should be enough to show t h a t much of the talk about cognitive issues by linguists who concentrate o n , or come f r o m , formalistic aspects is r a t h e r empty. Peirce's output was an elegant and convincing (if t h a t is ever pos­ sible) a r g u m e n t against Cartesian rationalism, and m e n t a l ism, both nurseries of current ( l a t e - c o m e r ) "cognitive" l i n ­ guistics. It is not noticed t h a t espousal of cognition totally r e f u t e s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar as a w i d e r theory. And another point should be singled out here: abstraction. It is an empty word in t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l and p o s t - t r a n s f o r m a ­ tional linguistics, because the primacy of perception in cog­ nition is not understood. Only a semiotic and gestalt approach can t r e a t it adequately. Both prescinding and hypostatic abstraction was b e t t e r understood in the t r a d i ­ tional philological and philosophical contexts of language, r a t h e r than in " m o d e r n " linguistics. In both kinds the c r u ­ cial momenta are the gestalt laws of p e r c e p t i o n , which a r e , f u r t h e r m o r e , much more adequate than the still occurring t e m p l a t e matchings of ( " m o d e r n " ) cognitive psychology. And finally, note how gestalt psychology and semiotics combine to give the f r a m e for supersign formation (Dörner 1977).

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

17

HERMENEUTICS. "The starting point f o r analysis is always some already existing knowledge and culture or already functioning language ..." (Buczyńska-Garewicz 4 ) . "First of a l l , continuity means t h a t there is no absolute starting point f o r cognition" ( 1 2 ) . "Every stopping place of thought is also a new starting point" (13). "We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we e n t e r upon the study of Philosophy' (5.Z56; 14). "The hypothesis we wish to propose is t h a t there are no epistemological u l t i mates" (Blackwell 1976:264). " I n giving an account of our knowledge, we should begin there in m i d - s t r e a m , carry out our analysis in various directions as best we can, and sus­ pend claims to epistemological ultimates. Let us designate this methodological rule as the 'Mid-Stream Principle"' (264). These quotations continue the i n t e r p r e t a n t corner of semiosis from the previous section, and add a plan f o r a proper philosophy of science against the static structuralism found w a n t i n g . This plan presents another strategy f o r h e r meneutics, and I give it for variety. Esa Itkonen has been explicating the issue in connection with metalinguistics and grammatical theory for years (e.g. 1978). The m a t t e r should be s e l f - e v i d e n t , i.e., linguistics is primarily a hermeneutic "science", in which agent's knowledge is more important than observer's knowledge. Note also t h a t this is the posi­ tion of modern physics: the observer is d r a w n into the observed. "Modern" linguistics, however, harks back to Newton, and fiercely indeed! This is the kind of structuralism Blackwell try to put to rest. This that Merrell and ("Newtonian") position is embarrassing to its holders (plain English might say incompetent). It seems to be the Greek t h a t is most objectionable, because the Latin translation of hermeneutics, interpretation, is much more acceptable. We are back among the i n t e r p r e t a n t s of the sign, p a r t of which is reaching understanding. This is the very essence of m e a n ­ ing, and expressly so phrased, e.g. by Kenneth Pike in America. You simply cannot have any meaning without i n t e r ­ p r e t a t i o n . Thus denial of hermeneutics denies linguistics itself, but this does not m a t t e r . One has one's job. I am of course back at my beginning. Also Matson ends up with hermeneutics having f i r s t emancipated from Newton

18

Anttila: Language, Cognition, and

Linguistics

and associationism. Hermeneutics combines gestalt psychology, e.g. Polanyi (1959:100-2).

naturally

with

MODERN COGNITIVE "PROGRESS". Apparently the majority of American linguists firmly believe in the P e t r i n e position, as Peter Maher has named it in this context: P e t e r had agreed at Antioch to require the converts to Christianity to "pass through the synagogue". T r u e to this principle only those who w e r e e a r l i e r Haeckeling linguistics are allowed to make advances in the cognitive domain. I.e., those who made a name for themselves through classical transformational grammar (the synagogue) are listened to by those who explicitly denied all cognitive issues prepounded by others against t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l - g e n e r a t i v e hegemony. This progress unit includes names like Ray Jackendoff, George Lakoff, Leonard Talmy, John Ross, and Paul Kiparsky. In 1976 Jackendoff defended a machine-theory idea t h a t a concept is a mental procedure like a computer p r o g r a m , within a f r a m e - w o r k of innatism, in which verbs (!) g e n e r ­ alized (!) t h e i r meanings across semantic fields; all this being allegedly d i f f e r e n t f r o m the classical metaphor. A positive aspect was the admission that n a t u r a l language cannot be completely f o r m a l i z e d , because t h e r e are no con­ ceptual primitives. This was indeed a nudge " t o w a r d v i a b i l ­ ity", but otherwise the a t t e m p t was a random defense of the old formalism. But in 1978 he makes another advance under the auspices of classical gestalt psychology, ostensive d e f i n i t i o n , and Wittgenstein's family resemblances, and s u g ­ gests t h a t non-verbal cognition should be sufficient to h a n ­ dle language as w e l l , and be the basis of conceptual s t r u c ­ t u r e . He concludes t h a t it remains to be seen if this program can be adapted to language, and caps it all with the statement that definitions are explications of uncon­ scious knowledge (UCLA guest lecture "Semantics and cogni­ t i o n " , Oct. 27. Apparently none in the audience realized the hermeneutic f i n a l e ; see also Jackendoff 1978). George Lakoff's "Linguistic gestalts" (1977) is another rediscovery of the gestalt t r a d i t i o n in which he is develop­ ing "a theory of gestalts on the basis of empirical e v i ­ dence" (247) (of course this is what was done right f r o m the beginning), but unlike Jackendoff, he expects to

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

19

generalize f r o m linguistic to nonlinguistic areas! He "would ultimately like to show (or see other people show) ... that thought, perception, the emotions, cognitive processing, motor activity, and language are ail organized in t e r m s of the same kind of structures ..." (246) which he calls ges­ talte. This has of course in principle been shown in the classical gestalt t r a d i t i o n , and in recent times particularly by Uhlan Slagle f o r linguistics. In short, we have another plea against reductionism and ultimate e l e m e n t s , and a plea f o r a holistic study of man. This is reinventing some more gunpowder. What is l e f t out is that this is a program of long-standing and w o r t h - w h i l e results. If you slip into the ditch (as transformational grammar knowingly d i d ) , the road is not your achievement, once you step back onto i t . 3 CONCLUSION. Already contained in Peirce's notion of the i n t e r p r e t a n t - f o r example, in the definition of an iconic sign as one which displays q u a l i ­ ties t h a t 'resemble those of [ i t s d e n o t a t u m ] and excite analogous sensations in the mind for which it is a likeness' t h e r e was a concession to the psychology of perception which points the way to t h a t synthesis of semiotics and gestalt psychology which is at present being under­ taken (White 1976:67). The year of the appearance of White's statement is the important one, but the synthesis was not a p p a r e n t t h e n , at least not in linguistics. The French structuralists, it is t r u e , had taken to gestaltist foundations, and a French school of semiotics did solidify in the 1960's, but this semiotics t u r n e d out to be r a t h e r specialized without general appeal. On the other hand, the recent rediscovery of gestalt theory has not included semiotic potentialities. In linguistics I have t r i e d to work t o w a r d the synthesis seen by White, but the response has not been particularly g r e a t by linguists. I am happy to n o t e , however, t h a t Dörner (1977) espouses a very similar combination from the psychological side. There are prospects for a g r e a t e r momentum now, but some of the ingredients are missing, or the combination is hastily put together under false history. Cognition is too important a t e r m to be emptied of meaning and historical justice.

20

Anttila: Language, Cognition, and

Linguistics

ENDNOTES

1

Other names one could add f r o m the t r a d i t i o n are Harald Weydt, Hans Hörmann, Dwight Bolinger; see Anttila 1977. My manifesto was thoroughly t a k e n up by Langhoff 1980, which is the most comprehensive modern gestalt t r e a t m e n t of a linguistic topic. 2 Thus gestalt theory is directly and strongly opposed to t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l - g e n e r a t i v e grammar. It cannot be given as a reasonable p a t c h - u p , it demolishes the p a t i e n t .

3

This group successfully avoids all the gestalt t r a d i t i o n s in linguistics, although occasional r e f e r e n c e s to Köhler and Koffka are included. The behaviorist-structuralist (including TG; see Itkonen 1978) way of thinking has also spread to in linguistics has Germany, where the gestalt t r a d i t i o n always been the strongest. But witness now (Forum . . . 1979:41): Man erkennt heute gerade in Deutschland nicht immer, dass die verschiedenen strukturalistischen Schulen auf der schmalen Basis der behavioristischen Psychologie b e r u h e n , d e r man im Interesse des For­ schungsgegenstandes Sprache die Erkenntnisse der Gestaltpsychologie entgegenhalten muss. Wenn sich diese Erkenntnis einmal allgemein durchsetzt, hat die Sprachwissenschaft in Deutschland wieder zu ihrer f r ü h e r e n Lehrmeistern zurückgefunden. I do not w a n t to document here f u r t h e r the history of this Sturmgruppe Fortschritt, but just note t h a t Kiparsky and Ross have refound analogy, and Lakoff also metaphor and experience. I have a t t e n d e d guest lectures by all during the t u r n i n g point years. But vocalized evidence for the P e t r i n e principle should be informative: After presenting a guest lecture at UCLA L. Talmy was told about Slagle's work in the a r e a . The response by the speaker: "Who does he think he is?" Clearly, Slagle had sinned in his own country without o f f i ­ cial authorization by the synagogue. He might not even know himself, not to speak of evading customs by importing f o r -

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells eign traditions. (For the Talmy 1977 and 1978.)

rough content

of

T a l m / s talk,

21 see

REFERENCES CITED

Anttila, Raimo. 1977. "Dynamic fields and linguistic s t r u c t u r e : a proposal f o r a Gestalt linguistics." Die Sprache 23. 1-10. Blackwell, Richard J. 1976. "A structuralist account of scien­ tific theories." IPQ 16.263-74. B r i t t a n , Arthur. 1974. "Systems, structures and conscious­ ness: the social psychology of meaning." The rules of the game (Teodor Shanin, e d . ) 3 2 2 - 4 6 . Tavistock Pub­ lishers. Buchler, Justus. 1939. Charles Peirce's Empiricism. London: Kegan Paul. Buczynska-Garewicz, Hanna. 1978. "Sign and continuity." Ars Semiotica 2.3-15. Dörner, Dietrich. 1977. "Superzeichen und kognitive Proz­ esse." Zeichenprozesse (Roland Posner and Hans-Peter Reinecke, eds.) 7 3 - 8 2 . Wiesbaden: Athenaion. Esper, Erwin A. 1973. Analogy and Association in Linguistics and Ppsychology. Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press. Forum des Hochschulverbandes. "Die Kleinen Fächer." 2nd e d . Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft. Vol. 1.173-6 (Heft 4 / 1 , April 1979), Vol. 2.37-42 ( H e f t 4 / 2 , Juli 1979). Bonn: Hochschulverband. Hanson, N.R. 1958. Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge: Univ. Press. Heison, Harry. 1925. "The psychology of Gestalt. " American Journal of Psychology 3 6 . 3 4 2 - 7 0 , 494-526; 37.25-62, 189-223 (1926). I t k o n e n , Esa. 1978. Grammatical theory and metascience." CILT 5. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Jackendoff, Ray. 1978. "An argument about the composition of conceptual s t r u c t u r e . " Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing 2.162-6. Univ. of Illinois at Urbana. Karlsson, Fred and Jaakko Lehtonen. 1977. Alkukahdennus. Pubi, of the Dept. of Finnish and General Linguistics of the Univ. of Turku 2.

22 Kess,

Anttila: Language, Cognition, and Linguistics

Joseph F. 1976. Psycholinguistics. New York: Academic Press. Lakoff, George. 1977. "Linguistic gestalts." Papers from the 13th regional meeting 2 3 6 - 8 7 . Chicago: CLS. Langhoff, Stephan. 1980. "Gestaltlinguistik." European Univer­ sity Studies. Reihe XXI Linguistik, Vol. 10. F r a n k f u r t / M ( B e r n , Cirencester UK): Lang. Lewis, Philip E. 1970. " M e r l e a u - P o n t y and the phenomenol­ ogy of language." Structuralism (J. Ehrmann, ed.), 9 - 3 1 . A 719. Garden City, NJ: Anchor Books. Maher, J. P e t e r . 1977. " P a p e r s on language theory and his­ tory I." CILT 3. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Matson, Floyd W. 1966. The Broken Image. A 506. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday. M e r r e l l , Floyd. 1975. "Structuralism and beyond: a critique of presuppositions." Diogenes 92.67-103. M e t z g e r , Wolfgang. 1973. "Do schools of psychology still exist? Unity through diversity." A Fs. for Ludwig von Berialanffy (William Gray and Nicholas D. Rizzo, eds.), Vol. 2. New York (London, Paris): Gordon Scientific Publishers. Murphy, Gardner. 1950. Historical Introduction to Modern Psychol­ ogy. Rev. e d . New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. Neisser, Ulric. 1967. Cognitive Psychology. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts. Polanyi, Michael. 1959. The Study of Man. Ρ 128. Chicago: University Press. Roback, A. A. 1964. A History of American Psychology. New rev. ed. CS 13. New York: Collier. Slagle, Uhlan Von. 1974. Language, Thought, and Perception: A Proposed Theory of Meaning. JL, Series maior 98. The Hague: Mouton. Talmy, Leonard. 1977. "Rubber-sheet cognition in language." Papers from the 13th regional meeting Chicago: CLS. . 1978. "The relation of grammar to cognition - a synopsis." Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing 2.14-24. Univ. of Illinois at Urbana. Wellek, Albert. 1970. Witz-Lyrik· Sprache. Munich and B e r n : Francke. White, John J. 1976. "The a r g u m e n t f o r a semiotic approach to shaped w r i t i n g : the case of Italian f u t u r i s t t y p o g ­ raphy." Visible Language 10.53-86.

KUHNIAN PARADIGMS AS SYSTEMS OF MARKEDNESS CONVENTIONS

James D. McCawley University of Chicago Thomas Kuhn's (1962) approach to scientific revolutions, normal science, and the other topics with which it deals is important because of the a t t e n t i o n t h a t it has given to the previously neglected fact t h a t science is carried out within communities and t h a t the paths along which science develops are heavily influenced by the ways in which those communi­ ties work. The principal failing of his work has been that his account of how the communities work has been grossly oversimplified. This paper takes the viewpoint that if one replaces simple oppositions like 'normal'/'deviant' by the richer system of distinctions t h a t becomes available if Kuhn's notion of 'paradigm' is r e i n t e r p r e t e d in terms of m a r k e d ­ ness, Kuhn's ideas provide a more realistic account of the dynamics of scientific communities than they have generally been thought to provide. In the f i r s t half of this p a p e r , I will present this revisionist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Kuhn's ideas in f a i r l y general t e r m s , and in the second half I will apply it to a case history in linguistics, namely the analyses of E n g ­ lish auxiliary verbs by t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammarians. I propose r e i n t e r p r e t i n g Kuhn's notion of the paradigm of a community as a specification of the respects in which behavior within t h a t community is perceived within the com­ munity as normal (= unmarked) or special (= marked). Membership in any kind of community, not just a scientific community, involves acceptance of the paradigm, in the sense of acceptance of the notion of markedness t h a t it defines. Note t h a t acceptance of those markedness conven­ tions does not carry with it a commitment to engaging in unmarked behavior and avoiding marked behavior. Just as, in linguistics, marked sounds, marked syntactic

24

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

constructions, etc. are not excluded but are merely 'more costly t h a n ' t h e i r unmarked c o u n t e r p a r t s , marked behavior in a community is not excluded but is available at a cost, whereas unmarked behavior is available without cost. For example, in most American communities, belief t h a t t h e r e is a god ( i n d e e d , belief t h a t t h e r e is a god of the sort t h a t listens to prayers, judges the souls of dead persons, etc.) is unmarked. This does not mean t h a t members of t h a t society all believe in a god or are kept from expressing beliefs to the contrary, but it does mean that members of that society t r e a t one another as believing in a god except when t h e r e is reason to impute a contrary belief to some­ one, and expressions of nonbelief in a god are expected to be accompanied by apologies and/or justifications. The same situation prevails in scientific communities. Within what I will call the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l community, 1 the belief t h a t a language can be i d e n t i f i e d with a set of sentences is unmarked; members of t h a t community are not obliged to believe t h a t proposition (and indeed, a large proportion of them do not believe i t ) , but they are obliged to o f f e r j u s ­ tification (or at least exculpation) when they express a contrary view, while they are not expected to o f f e r any justification for asserting (which they r a r e l y do) or saying something t h a t presupposes (which they do much more o f t e n ) that proposition. By examining publications internal to a scientific community and noting what propositions are presented without justifications and what ones are p r e ­ sented with at least minimal justification (e.g. a r e f e r e n c e to an e a r l i e r work in which justifications are claimed to be given), one can thus identify the propositions whose accep­ tance is unmarked in the given community. 2 For example, the length to which Akmajian, S t e e l e , and Wasow (1979) go in arguing t h a t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s must be allowed to change constituent s t r u c t u r e without changing word order points to the marked status within the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l community of acceptance of t h a t proposition. 3 The last paragraph should not mislead the reader into thinking t h a t a paradigm is merely a set of propositions whose acceptance is unmarked within a community. As Kuhn (1974) made abundantly clear, a paradigm has components of diverse types, not all of which r e l a t e to 'theories' or to acceptance of propositions. (Thus, it is a gross m i s r e p r e ­ sentation of Kuhn to identify a paradigm with a 'theory'.)

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

25

Among the components of a paradigm are policies about what questions deserve a t t e n t i o n , what kinds of answers to them deserve to be given serious consideration, and what standards of accuracy and thoroughness ought to be observed. Kuhn has discussed at length another component t h a t he calls 'exemplars': prestigious problem solutions that neophyte scientists are encouraged to model their own work a f t e r . Yet another component of paradigms, one to which Kuhn devotes little a t t e n t i o n but which plays a profound role in the dynamics of communities, is the ranking of goals. Linguists who share goals but do no't impose the same ranking on them are destined to get into disputes in which each accuses the other of throwing out the baby and keeping the bathwater: a d i f f e r e n c e in the ranking of goals amounts to a d i f f e r e n c e regarding which goal will be sacri­ ficed when it is not possible to achieve all the goals simul­ taneously. A celebrated dispute in linguistics that f i t s this description is the dispute over the phonemic level in the early 1960's, in which the opposing factions w e r e in sub­ stantial a g r e e m e n t t h a t it was desirable f o r phenomena to be described in f u l l e s t g e n e r a l i t y , that it was desirable f o r phonological units to have invariant phonetic realizations, t h a t it was desirable to keep the number of phonological units to a minimum, etc., but they disagreed over which of these goals should be sacrificed when cases arose in which they could not ail be met. 4 Since the dimensions t h a t play a role in a paradigm are largely independent of one another, marked activity on one dimension need not be marked on any of the other d i m e n ­ sions, i.e. when activity within a scientific community is not pristine 'normal science' ( t h a t is, completely u n m a r k e d ) , it need not be particularly abnormal from the communit/s vantage point, and its oddity can be localized to particular dimensions. We are thus in a position to oppose pristine 'normal science' to two very d i f f e r e n t things: 'marked sci­ ence', which is carried out by persons who accept the com­ munity's markedness conventions and pay costs in t e r m s of extra work justifying propositions t h a t they wish to use, and 'deviant science', carried out in defiance of the obliga­ tions to pay those costs. Note t h a t the status of particular work as 'deviant science' r a t h e r than as 'marked science' is not simply a m a t t e r of how much the authors' beliefs d i f f e r f r o m those t h a t are common within the community: rejection

26

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

of points that are without substance 5 makes scientific activity deviant if the rejection is not accompanied by j u s t i ­ fications, while acceptance of quite bizarre propositions can still be in the realm of marked r a t h e r than deviant science if even weak justifications are o f f e r e d . I t u r n now to a case history t h a t I will discuss in t e r m s of the above revisionist r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Kuhn's notion of 'paradigm', namely the various analyses of English auxiliary verbs that transformational grammarians have o f f e r e d , and the relation between those analyses and the paradigms of the communities within which they were offered. Chomsky (1957) presented the well-known and highly influential account of English auxiliaries that posits an underlying constituent t h a t contains the various auxiliar­ ies and verbal a f f i x e s , whose underlying constituency is given by the rule ( 1 ) : (1) AUX → Tense (Modal) (have - e n ) (be - i n g ) . The bulk of the syntactic phenomena in which auxiliaries participate are described in t e r m s of an underlying constit­ uent o r d e r in which the various verbal affixes precede the words on which they appear in surface s t r u c t u r e , by means of transformations t h a t apply prior to the application of a transformation ('Affix-hopping') t h a t attaches a t e n s e , -en, or -ing to an immediately following verb. This analysis ( h e n c e f o r t h , the 'AUX analysis') is of importance in the his­ tory of linguistics principally because of its status as an exemplar (in the sense of Kuhn 1970) in the transformational community. Transformational grammarians regularly pre­ sented the AUX analysis as an example of good linguistics and encouraged t h e i r students to model their syntactic analyses a f t e r it. The following characteristics of the AUX analysis, in p a r t i c u l a r , w e r e widely copied in early t r a n s ­ formational analyses and can be regarded as part of the paradigm of the transformational community in the early 1960's: (2) a. Primacy of morpheme order over constituent structure i. Morpheme order was regarded as the principal respect in which deep structures d i f f e r e d f r o m surface structures.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

Z7

ii. While constituent structure played an important role in the functioning of t r a n s ­ f o r m a t i o n s , higher priority was accorded to getting the morphemes in the right order in surface structure than to getting the constituent structure right, i.e. bizarre constituent structures were tolerated if they enabled one to get the morphemes in the right orders. iii. Transformations having the same e f f e c t on constituent order were assumed to be identical, e.g. there was a single 'affixhopping' transformation rather than, say, one rule for placement of tenses and a separate rule for placement of -en and -ing. iv. The e f f e c t of a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n on constit­ uent s t r u c t u r e was regarded as predictable f r o m its e f f e c t on morpheme order. v. Only continuous constituent structure was admitted; dependencies among non-contig­ uous items were expressed in terms of deep structures in which those items w e r e contiguous. 6 vi. Syntactic structures w e r e typically relatively 'flat', with a constituent typically having several immediate constituents and the o r d e r of the l a t t e r items serving to d i s t i n ­ guish t h e i r roles. b. Combinatoric restrictions were expressed only as rules f o r how elements combined in deep structure. c. Status of categories i The rules were formulated in terms of 'AUX'7 ad-hoc syntactic categories such as (which the linguist could create at will) and 'abbreviatory· devices such as paren­ theses and curly brackets. 8 ii. Categories had no internal structure and t h e i r names had no significance. d. While relative simplicity in the formulation of transformations was a d e s i d e r a t u m , highly com­ plex formulations of transformations were regarded as acceptable.

28

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

e. Morphology was assimilated to syntax: the same sorts of devices w e r e posited f o r getting the morphemes in the right order within the word as for g e t t i n g the words in the right order in the sentence. These characteristics of the 'AUX' analysis also charac­ terize virtually all the work done in transformational syntax until the mid 1960's. Only (d) and (cii) can be said to have lost t h e i r status as p a r t of the paradigm of the t r a n s f o r ­ mational community by the time of the w r i t i n g of the next work t h a t I will take u p , namely Ross (1969). From the completion of Rosenbaum ( 1 9 6 5 ) , a work whose importance in the history of transformational grammar is greatly u n d e r e s t i m a t e d , it became standard among transformational grammarians to develop analyses in which derivations g e n ­ erally involved a relatively large number of steps, but the formulations of the individual transformations w e r e g e n e r ­ ally f a i r l y simple, and transformations w e r e posited t h a t factored out of several syntactic constructions common f e a ­ t u r e s of the relationship b e t w e e n t h e i r deep and surface structures. Two other changes in the paradigm of the transformational community are also relevant to the discus­ sion of Ross (1969), namely the addition of a f a i r l y detailed conception of how derivational steps interact with one another and of the idea t h a t ' f e a t u r e s ' are desirable; 9 I have incorporated these observations into the following summary of points of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l paradigm of the late 1960's t h a t are relevant to the discussion of Ross's paper: (3) a - b . as in (2) c. i. as in ( 2 ) . ii. Category distinctions are drawn in p a r t in terms of binary features. The employment of f e a t u r e s in syntactic analysis is virtuous. d. Transformations are typically fairly simple, especially as regards the 'structural change'. There are many t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s t h a t are a p p l i ­ cable in a broad range of cases r a t h e r than just in one syntactic construction. e. as in ( 2 ) . f. The application of transformations to any d o ­ main is in accordance with a fixed ordering of the transformations: the application of trans-

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

29

formations to different domains conforms to the 'cyclic principie': application of transforma­ tions to any domain is prior to application of transformations to domains containing that domain; the domains to which transformations apply are the S's of deep s t r u c t u r e . The f i r s t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l analysis of English auxiliary verbs that d i f f e r e d in more than inconsequential details f r o m t h a t of Chomsky (1957) was t h a t of Ross ( 1 9 6 9 ) , in which each auxiliary verb was the main verb of a deep structure S t h a t had a sentential complement, tenses w e r e represented as f e a t u r e s on the verbs that bore t h e m , and the transformations t h a t in other derivations served to reduce embedded S's and VP's, namely Raising and E q u i - N P d e l e t i o n , w e r e also t r i g g e r e d by auxiliary verbs, so t h a t to a deep structure like (4a) was associated a surface s t r u c ­ t u r e like (4b):io

30

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

The only points in (3) from which Ross (1969) clearly deviated w e r e (aii) and ( c i ) . 1 1 Ross provided no account of the order in which auxiliary verbs occur or of t h e i r cooc­ currence with affixes but only argued t h a t the deep and surface constituent s t r u c t u r e s and the category assignments must be as in his analysis and not as in Chomsky's analysis, e.g. he pointed out t h a t the deletion and pronominalization of VP's works in t e r m s of the multiple VP's that his analysis recognizes, not the single VP t h a t Chomsky's analysis recog­ nizes. The types of structures and rules t h a t Ross posited w e r e exactly what was generally accepted among t r a n s f o r ­ mational grammarians, and almost all the arguments t h a t he gave for the constituent s t r u c t u r e and the categories t h a t f i g u r e d in his analysis w e r e of sorts t h a t transformational grammarians generally found a c c e p t a b l e , 1 2 but nonetheless his conclusions w e r e generally received with hostility among transformational grammarians. I conjecture t h a t the main reasons why this work t h a t in so many respects conformed to the standards of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l community was regarded as highly deviant within t h a t community are the following: (i) it reversed the standard priorities by a t t e n d ­ ing to categorization and constituent s t r u c t u r e while ignor­ ing morpheme order save for a b r i e f mention of the p r o b ­ lem in the final paragraph of the p a p e r 1 3 (by contrast, it was considered acceptable to a t t e n d to morpheme order and ignore constituent structure and categorization, as Chomsky (1957) had), (ii) it spurned the standard policy of relying on phrase structure rules as the primary device for expressing combinatoric restrictions, and (iii) it posited underlying S's ( i n d e e d , a g r e a t profusion of underlying S's) in cases other than those in which the descriptive practice of transformational grammarians generally admitted them. The cases in which t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammarians w e r e w i l l ­ ing to derive non-sentential surface constituents from structures involving embedded S's w e r e those where e i t h e r a surface f o r m with a f u l l embedded S was also available (as in the analysis of a tall man as involving an underlying relative clause, where an a l t e r n a t i v e f o r m with a f u l l r e l a ­ tive clause exists: a man who is tall) or a n o n - s e n t e n t i a l constituent contained items t h a t could make up a f u l l s e n ­ tence with a r e l a t e d meaning (as in the derivation of n o m inalizations like the invention of dynamite by Nobel from a While structure containing the S Nobel invented dynamite). transformational syntactic theory of the late 1960's did not

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells restrict the derivation of non-sentential constituents to this class of cases, the practise of mational grammarians did so restrict it. 1 4

31 surface transfor­

Not all of the discrepancies between Ross's analysis and Chomsky's constituted deviations of Ross's approach from the paradigm of the transformational community. Ross's t r e a t ­ ment of tenses not as separate deep structure constituents but as f e a t u r e s of verbs provoked no adverse reaction f r o m orthodox transformational grammarians. That detail of Ross's analysis appears to have been subjected to criticism only by persons sympathetic to Ross's general approach such as myself, not by adherents of the AUX analysis, a state of a f f a i r s that I think resulted f r o m the fact that 'in t r a n s ­ formational grammar you can get away with anything if you f o r m u l a t e it in f e a t u r e notation' (McCawley 1980a: 9 1 9 ) . Transformational grammarians have consistently observed laxer standards in evaluating the employment of f e a t u r e s than in evaluating the employment of any other putative component of rules or structures. That detail was one of the principal d i f f e r e n c e s not only between Ross's analysis and Chomsky's but also between Ross's analysis and the revision of it that I proposed in McCawley ( 1 9 7 1 ) , according to which tenses are independent deep s t r u c t u r e constituents r a t h e r than f e a t u r e s of verbs but are taken to be p r e d i c a t e s 1 5 of deep structure S's r a t h e r than to have a sui generis deep structure position as in Chomsky's analysis. This revision contributes significantly to the solution of the problem of accounting f o r the order of auxiliary verbs within an approach t h a t (like Ross's) has to do without a phrase s t r u c t u r e rule like ( 1 ) . It in f a c t goes beyond the AUX analysis in accounting f o r the o r d e r of auxiliary verbs, in that it provides not a mere s t a t e m e n t of the order in which they occur but indeed an explanation of why they occur in that order and not some o t h e r . 1 6 This revised version of Ross's analysis, however, found even less favor within the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l community than Ross's d i d , since f r o m the viewpoint of t h a t community it was even more deviant. I explicitly rejected much of ( 3 a , b, c, e) t h e r e . My explanation of why English allows the combina­ tions of auxiliary verbs t h a t it does involved a number of quite deviant points. For example, I accorded morphology an autonomy t h a t it did not have in orthodox transformational grammar when I argued t h a t it is f o r morphological rather

32

McCawley: Kuhnlan Paradigms and

Markedness

than syntactic reasons t h a t modal auxiliaries cannot follow other auxiliaries: modal auxiliaries in English (unlike Ger­ man) have only f i n i t e forms, and a modal t h a t was p r e ­ ceded by any other auxiliary verb would have to be put in a form ( i n f i n i t i v e , present participle, or past participle) that its morphology does not allow. Since this a t t r i b u t e s the impossibility of e.g. a sentence in which have is followed by must not to any restriction on how things may combine in deep structure but to the morphological demand imposed on must in virtue of its surface position, it involves also r e j e c ­ tion of (3b): a combinatorie restriction here is accounted for neither in t e r m s of deep structure nor by means of 'phrase structure rules'. In a d d i t i o n , my t r e a t m e n t involved an even g r e a t e r profusion of higher predicates and e x t r a S's than did Ross's original version. A full survey of analyses of English auxiliary verbs within the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l community would necessarily take up f a r more space than is available to me here. I will accordingly skip over such important works as Emonds (1970, 1976), Akmajian and Wasow (1975), Jackendoff (1977), Putlum and Wilson ( 1 9 7 7 ) , and Steele (1981) and comment briefly on Akmajian, S t e e l e , and Wasow ( 1 9 7 9 ) , a work t h a t presented an analysis of English auxiliaries t h a t d i f f e r e d radically f r o m the AUX analysis but whose authors w e r e engaging in only slightly marked science, not deviant sci­ ence. Akmajian, S t e e l e , and Wasow ( h e n c e f o r t h , ASW) adopt an analysis t h a t involves the surface constituent structure of Ross's analysis combined with a use of phrase structure rules to describe the cooccurrence possibilities of auxiliary verbs in a way t h a t has at least something in common with Chomsky's. They use a category label 'AUX', but do not mean the same by it as Chomsky meant by 'AUX': ASW's AUX con­ sists in deep structure of e i t h e r a modal auxiliary or a tense plus do, and a f t e r the application of their D o - r e ­ placement t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , which replaces do by any auxiliary verb t h a t immediately follows i t , consists of a tense and the f i r s t auxiliary verb (Chomsky's 'AUX' included all the auxiliary verbs, not just the f i r s t o n e ) . 1 7 They distinguish categories V3, V2, and V 1 , with V3 = (have) V2 and V1 = (be) V 1 , as in (5):

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

33

(5)

(deep s t r u c t u r e f o r Spanish, ASW, p. 22)

β/7/ could have been studying

Though ASW speak as if t h e i r V 3 , V 2 , V 1 conformed to the 'X-bar' conception of categories (with superscripts indicating the number of 'bars'), it does not f i t t h a t conception w e l l . As developed in Chomsky (1970) and Jackendoff (1977), the X-bar categories are supposed to exploit cross-categorial parallelisms (e.g. V 1 , N 1 , and A1 are to have parallel i n t e r ­ nal s t r u c t u r e , except t h a t the head is to be respectively a v e r b , a noun, or an adjective); however, t h e r e is nothing in the internal s t r u c t u r e of NP's whose role is remotely like that of the have or the be of ( 5 ) . Appearances to the con­ t r a r y , the 2 and 3 of ASW's analysis function not as bars in the X-bar category system but as a r b i t r a r y f e a t u r e s that distinguish t h r e e kinds of VP. Their analysis allows them to accept Ross's surface constituent structure (which has been widely rejected but never seriously disputed) while using p h r a s e - s t r u c t u r e rules to describe cooccurrence restrictions and at the same time avoiding multiple S's in the deep structures of 'simple' sentences. 1 8 As noted above, ASW o f f e r extensive arguments for their acceptance of a marked position on the issue of w h e t h e r transformations can a l t e r constituent s t r u c t u r e other than as a side e f f e c t of a change in constituent order. ASW's analysis seems to have been received favorably by those sympathetic to the AUX analysis and ASW portray t h e i r paper as a defense of Chomsky's general approach to auxiliaries, notwithstanding the quite substantial d i f f e r e n c e s between their analysis and Chomsky's.

34

McCawley:

Kuhnian

Paradigms and

Markedness

In this f r a g m e n t a r y and programmatic survey of how paradigms have influenced the f a t e of various proposed analyses of English auxiliary verbs, I have suggested t h a t the reception given to a l t e r n a t i v e s to a prestigious linguis­ tic analysis (one with the status of an exemplar) depends not so much on the e x t e n t to which it d i f f e r s f r o m t h a t analysis as on the e x t e n t to which the author pays costs that the community's paradigm assigns to the marked activ­ ity t h a t goes into the elaboration and justification of the a l t e r n a t i v e . identifying these costs and paying them is a simple m a t t e r where the marked activity is the acceptance of some proposition: the cost is acceptable arguments t h a t that proposition is t r u e , and one pays the cost by con­ structing such arguments. In cases where the marked activ­ ity consists in rejection of an accepted policy regarding goals or s t a n d a r d s , 1 9 t h e r e is generally no p r e d e t e r m i n e d price f o r the privilege of engaging in the activity. One can generally get away with a little bit of it by o f f e r i n g apolo­ gies of a sort (i.e. by begging an audience's indulgence for dealing with unconventional classes of data or reversing standard p r i o r i t i e s , e t c . ) , but one is in considerable danger of not receiving the audience's indulgence and being judged a crackpot by a t least p a r t of the audience. Paradoxically, while goals and standards are the parts of a paradigm f o r which a scientific community o f f e r s the most opposition to change, they are nonetheless highly changeable. Among the reasons for t h e i r changeability are (i) they are much more imperfectly learned by novices in the community than are theories and factual propositions and (ii) scientific communities normally have, and easily give rise t o , subcommunities t h a t have their own paradigms. Just as persons in general normally belong to several overlapping communities (e.g. a neighborhood, one's workmates, a church congregation, the clientele of a particular p u b ) , so too those engaged in research normally belong to several over­ lapping scientific communities. Being a member of, say, the Montague grammar community, in which relating syntactic structure to model-theoretic semantic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is a prime goal, does not prevent one from also being a member of a larger community of syntacticians in which such a goal either is not recognized at all or is accepted in a weakened form and assigned low priority. The institution t h a t contrib­ utes the most to the cohesiveness of large scientific com-

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

35

munities, namely open conferences, also contributes the most to the origination and growth of subcommunities of the larger community by enabling holders of unorthodox ideas to identify one another; and t h e r e are g u a r a n t e e d to be holders of unorthodox views on goals and standards in view of the i m p e r f e c t and haphazard way in which those parts of a paradigm are t r a n s m i t t e d . I have maintained (McCawley 1976) t h a t scientific revolutions most typically consist in the expansion of a subcommunity u n t i l , practically speaking, it coincides with the whole community. A more restricted kind of 'revolution' can also take place, in which a subcommunity remains recognizably a subcommunity but acquires the status of the source f o r expertise in a p a r t i c ­ ular subject a r e a , in which case those parts of the subcommunity's paradigm that relate specifically to t h a t area become parts of the larger community's paradigm. I will conclude with a b r i e f discussion of the point that goals, standards, and other non-propositional parts of a paradigm can never be chosen on a completely 'rational' basis. 2 0 The most t h a t one can say in support of a choice of goals, etc. f o r scientific activity is t h a t so far it has been productive enough to keep one satisfied. Such a j u d g e ­ ment rests on an inherently subjective evaluation (no m a t ­ t e r how impressive the results achieved by a scientific approach, the j u d g e m e n t t h a t they are sufficient grounds f o r satisfaction is subjective), carries no g u a r a n t e e that the claimed success will continue in the f u t u r e (scientists g e n ­ erally bet on approaches with what they judge to be good track records but have no grounds f o r certainty that the bet will pay o f f ) , and implies nothing about the possible achievements of a l t e r n a t i v e approaches (one has no reason to t r u s t anyone's guesses about the limitations of a l t e r n a ­ tive approaches t h a t have not in f a c t been developed very f a r ) . The diversity among subcommunities t h a t I see as an inevitable development within any large scientific community provides the larger community with a major asset: insurance t h a t the community will not march en masse down a blind alley. What I hope linguists will derive f r o m my discussion above of the relation of the various analyses to the t r a n s ­ formational community is an appreciation of the fact that the non-propositional components of paradigms influence profoundly how proposed analyses are received and t h a t an a t t e m p t to resolve disputes on a purely 'rational' basis is futile: the best that one can achieve is simply an

36

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

identification of the issues t h a t are implicated in the dis­ putes, which need not be the same issues t h a t the d i s p u ­ t a n t s see as i m p l i c a t e d . 2 1

ENDNOTES

1 By this t e r m , I r e f e r to the community of linguists that has evolved f r o m the group of transformational g r a m ­ marians who w e r e active at M.I.T. about 1960 (to cite the time and place at which any identifiable community of transformational grammarians can f i r s t be said to have existed), whose members typically trace t h e i r intellectual heritage to Chomsky's linguistic writings, read Linguistic Inquiry, regard the study of mathematical models as virtuous for a linguist (though not necessarily relevant to linguis­ tics), etc. Note t h a t the last sentence provides encyclopedic information about an existing community, not necessary or sufficient conditions f o r identifying members of t h a t com­ munity. Whether particular individuals belong to t h a t com­ munity is a question of sociology, not of linguistics. In p a r ­ ticular, acceptance of syntactic analyses that involve transformations is neither a necessary nor a sufficient con­ dition for membership in t h a t community. I use the word 'transformational' in the name as a makeshift, in the absence of any equally short but less misleading alternative name.

2

Note the restriction to publications internal to the com­ munity. Works t h a t are f o r e x t e r n a l consumption often present putative justifications of propositions t h a t would simply be t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d in works intended f o r con­ sumption within the community. 3

This proposition is one of several t h a t transformational grammarians commit themselves to by acceptance of the standard notations of transformational grammar: the s t a n ­ dard notation f o r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s expresses the 'structural change* as a change in word o r d e r , and thus if the notation expresses the e f f e c t of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n accurately, any change in constituent s t r u c t u r e must be a concomitant of a change in word order. The prevalence of such a belief is

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

37

probably the main reason why transformational grammarians have devoted remarkably little a t t e n t i o n to the study of 'derived constituent s t r u c t u r e ' . Reinhart (1976) appears to be the f i r s t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l study t h a t seriously raised the possibility t h a t transformations having the same e f f e c t on word o r d e r might d i f f e r in their e f f e c t s on constituent s t r u c t u r e . The arguments by which Reinhart shows t h a t extraposition of complements (as in ( i ) ) but not that of relative clauses (as in ( i i ) ) moves the embedded S into the VP could have been given in the late 1960's, except that no one then thought of asking the question. i. ii.

It surprised me that John quit. A man e n t e r e d who was wearing a top hat.

4

Wells (1963: 45) cites another dispute over what is baby and what is b a t h w a t e r : 'This explains how the contro­ versy could go on as it did between the advocates of phonetic and the advocates of phonemic transcription: each transcription had an advantage, and its advocates prized t h a t advantage more than they prized the advantage of the opposite transcription'. It is interesting to note that Bloomf i e l d (1962: sec. 4.66) gave an exact analog to Halle's (1959) a r g u m e n t against the classical phonemic level, except that whereas Halle concluded t h a t a phonemic level should be r e j e c t e d , Bloomfield concluded t h a t a phonemic distinction should be recognized b e t w e e n segments that did not con­ t r a s t , so t h a t the a l t e r n a t i o n between them could be t r e a t e d as a single morphophonemic rule r a t h e r than split between a morphophonemic rule applying in one class of cases and an allophonic rule applying in a complementary class of cases. 5The fact t h a t a belief lacks empirical consequences does not imply t h a t holding it has no consequences tor empirical investigations t h a t one carries out. Such beliefs can have, f o r example, profound e f f e c t s on what one regards as meaningful questions or as potentially acceptable answers to one's questions, and thus indirectly on what facts one examines in a t t e m p t i n g to answer one's questions; this point is made in Collingwood (1939). 6

See McCawiey (1982a) f o r arguments t h a t several syn­ tactic constructions in English have properties t h a t require the recognition of discontinuous constituents.

38

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

7

'AUX' shares with 'Ms.' the distinction of looking like an abbreviation but not really being an abbreviation of any­ thing. Note in particular t h a t 'AUX' does not mean 'auxiliary' or 'auxiliary verb': a sequence of auxiliary verbs such as may have been is no more an auxiliary verb than a sequence of adverbs such as in El Paso last week with a chainsaw is an adverb. 8

For critical discussion of the notion of 'abbreviatory' devices in t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l g r a m m a r , see McCawley (1974). 9

See below for the reason r a t h e r ridiculous way in (3cii).

why

I

put

this

point

in

a

10

l have omitted f r o m (4) some details of Ross's t r e e s that have little bearing on the issues under discussion, e.g. Ross t r e a t e d complement S's as f i t t i n g not into an ΓNP S] configuration, as in (4a) but r a t h e r into a deep structure ΓNP it S] configuration. The only noteworthy characteristic of Ross's acceptance of those it's in the present context is that it illustrates Ross's general acceptance of 'standard' transformational analyses at t h a t t i m e , even in cases w h e r e , as h e r e , they had little to recommend t h e m . 11

In other work t h a t Ross had done at t h a t t i m e , he had also deviated from ( b ) , e.g. Ross (1967) gives arguments that phenomena such as the word order of VP constituents in English r e q u i r e an account involving 'surface constraints', that is, combinatoric rules f o r surface structure. Even t h e r e , though, Ross r e t a i n e d a modified version of ( b ) , namely a policy t h a t combinatoric rules r e l a t e d primarily to deep s t r u c t u r e , specifically, t h a t t h e r e was a completo sys­ tem of combinatorie rules for deep structure (the 'base rules') and possibly also a partial system of combinatorie rules for Surface structure (the 'surface constraints'), but t h a t surface. constraints wore to be admitted only where t h e r e was no satisfactory account that avoided them, 12

An exception must be made for two arguments in ld phenomena in other which Ross used facts about parae languages as evidence for his analysis of English. Despite the frequency with which transformational grammation since the mid 1960's have claimed language universais as part of their subject m a t t e r , it was not until the late

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

39

1970's that they showed much willingness to use cross-linguistic comparisons as a means of distinguishing the universal components of phenomena f r o m the l a n g u a g e - p a r ­ ticular components. 13

ROSS'S words h e r e , 'the problem of insuring t h a t the verbs in (1) are embedded into [sic] one another in the right order' indicate t h a t he took the combinatorics of a u x ­ iliary verbs to be basically a m a t t e r of deep s t r u c t u r e , as demanded by the weakened f o r m of (2b) that Ross retained (cf. note 11); that assumption is rejected in the account of the order of auxiliaries given in McCawley (1971). 14

ln an important respect, this restriction on the posi­ ting of deep s t r u c t u r e S's conflicted with the goal of orthodox transformational grammarians of developing a 'maximally restrictive theory*. The more t h a t distinctions are drawn in t e r m s of e x t r a levels of embedding, the more t h a t the cyclic principle determines the interactions of the r e l e ­ vant transformations and the less t h a t ordering of t r a n s ­ formations can be a d i f f e r e n c e among grammars. For e x a m ­ ple, orthodox t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammarians must order the passive transformation before 'Negative placement' to exclude derivations of sentences like / while allowing for derivations of sentences like ii: i. *John didn't be investigated by the FBI. ii. John wasn't investigated by the FBI. Under an analysis in which not and tenses are higher p r e d i ­ cates, t h a t interaction of the transformations follows from the cyclic principle and thus r e q u i r e s no special stipulation. 15

In my 1971 p a p e r , I said 'verb' r a t h e r than ' p r e d i ­ cate', in accordance with the conception of syntactic c a t ­ egory t h a t I accepted at t h a t time but have subsequently r e j e c t e d . See McCawley (1982b) for arguments against t h a t conception of category and f o r exposition of an a l t e r n a t i v e conception in which syntactic categories are merely summar­ ies of factors having potential influence on an item's syn­ tactic behavior, including its logical category and the p a r t of speech of its head. 16

While Ross (1969) ignored Chomsky's account of the order of auxiliary verbs, McCawley (1971) mounted a f r o n t a l

40

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

attack on it. To my knowledge, the only mention of my paper in Chomsky's w r i t i n g s is a single sentence (Chomsky 1972: 160) t h a t cites 'McCawley's discussion of respects in which auxiliaries have a q u a n t i f i e r - l i k e structure' [sic] as support for the strained parallel that Chomsky draws between auxiliaries and d e t e r m i n e r s . 17While ASW do not t r e a t modal auxiliaries as verbs, they could do so by making quite minor changes in t h e i r rules. Pullum and Wilson (1977: 7 5 3 - 6 0 ) argue t h a t t h e r e is no n o n - a r b i t r a r y way of characterizing 'verb' t h a t will exclude modals while including all items t h a t are usually called verbs. 18 I strongly doubt the viability of ASW's mechanism for describing the distribution of auxiliary have and progressive be. ASW take contexts as d i f f e r i n g with regard to w h e t h e r a position is filled by S, by V3, by V 2 , or by V 1 ; for example, they account for the a p p a r e n t fact t h a t progressive be but not auxiliary have can head the complement of make by say­ ing that make t a k e s a V2 complement: i. We made Bill [V2 be working at 4 : 0 0 ] . iL *We made Bill [V2 have finished the job by 4:00]. However, t h e r e are contexts t h a t exclude have but r e q u i r e on other grounds t h a t a deep structure S be recognized, e.g. since the support f o r the existential there of /V is p r o ­ vided by be riots, an embedded S there are riots must be posited (with Raising breaking up the posited S): iii. *John sarted having e a t e n already by 6:00. iv. There s t a r t e d being riots. If one excludes have by saying t h a t start r e q u i r e s a V2 com­ plement, one prevents the complement f r o m being an S, and if one allows the complement to be an S, one must rely on something other than the category of the comple­ ment to exclude the have. Whatever device is used to exclude have from a sentential complement of start could presumably also be invoked to exclude it from a sentential complement of progressive be.

19

The point being made here applies equally well to deviant raising of standards as to deviant lowering of s t a n ­ dards. Note also t h a t lowering of standards may be a con­ comitant of a broadening of the class of data t h a t are considered. For example, Feyerabend (1975: 121-39) points

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

41

out t h a t , by the then c u r r e n t standards, Galileo's i n t r o d u c ­ tion of telescopic observations into the astronomical debate brought in data t h a t w e r e t a i n t e d by illusions and not open to the sources of correction t h a t w e r e available f o r other optical d a t a . 20 I disavow the common practise of using the t e r m ' r a ­ tional' the way t h a t racists use the t e r m 'white', t h a t is, of t r e a t i n g any activity as polluted if it is less than 100% r a t i o n a l . I r e g a r d it as dangerous self-deception for one to supply a supposed 'rational basis' f o r choices t h a t inherently involve n o n - r a t i o n a l components, such as the selections and ranking of goals.

21 Only a f t e r completing a d r a f t of this paper did I reread Rulon Wells' "Some neglected opportunities in descriptive linguistics", hazy memories of which popped into my mind while I was working on the paper. I am so struck with how much of "Some neglected opportunities" is r e l e ­ vant to points t h a t I make here t h a t I now wonder whether I unknowingly d r e w f r o m it several ideas t h a t I have d e v e l ­ oped in my work on linguistics and the history of linguistic ideas. For example, Prof. Wells' comments on the acceptance of the whole t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l 'package' because of the attractiveness of one component of it (Wells 1963: 49) are remarkably like what I said (McCawley 1982b) about the acceptance of Chomskyan 'extended standard theory' in the early 1970's. If it was f r o m "Some neglected opportunities" that I learned to judge linguistic ideas separately f r o m the packages t h a t they generally come as components o f , I owe Rulon Wells an expression of deep g r a t i t u d e , though I must hang my head in shame f o r having f a i l e d to learn it when I f i r s t read "Some neglected opportunities" in the mid 1960's.

REFERENCES CITED

Akmajian, Adrian, Susan S t e e l e , and Tom Wasow. 1979. "The category AUX in universal grammar." Linguistic Inquiry 10.1-64.

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Markedness

Akinajian, Adrian, and Tom Wasow. 1975. "The constituent structure of VP and AUX and the position of the verb b e . " Linguistic Analysis 1.205-45. Bloomfield, Leonard. 1962. The Menomini Language. New Maven: Yale University Press. Chomsky, Noam A. 1957. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: M o u ­ ton. 1970. "Remarks on nominalization." In R. Jacobs and P. Rosenbaum ( e d s . ) , Readings in English Transfor­ mational Grammar (Waltham: Ginn) 1 8 4 - 2 2 1 . 1972. "Some empirical issues in the theory of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar." In N. Chomsky, Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar 120-202. The Hague: Mouton. CoHingwood, R. J. 1939. Essay on Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Emonds, Joseph E. 1970. Root and Structure-preserving Transfor­ mations. MIT Ph.D. thesis. 1976. A Transformational Approach to English Syntax. New York: Academic Press. Feyerabend, Paul. 1975. Against Method. London: New Left Books. Halle, M o r r i s . 1959. The Sound Pattern of Russian. The Hague: Mouton. Jackendoff, Ray S. 1977. X-bar Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chi­ cago: University of Chicago Press. 1970. Postscript to 2nd Edition of Kuhn (1962). 1974. "Second thoughts on paradigms." In F. Suppe (ed.), The Structure of Scientific Theories. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press), 459-82. Reprinted in T. Kuhn, The Essential Tension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 293-319. McCawley, James D. 1971. "Tense and time r e f e r e n c e in English." In  Fillmore and D. T. Langendoen (eds.) Studies in Linguistic Semantics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), 9 6 - 1 1 3 . 1974. "Review of Chomsky and Halle, The Sound Pattern of English." International Journal of American Lin­ guistics 4 0 . 5 5 - 8 8 . 1976. "¡Madison Avenue, si, Pennsylvania Avenue, no!" In P. Reich (ed.), The Second LACUS Forum (Columbia, SC: Hornbeam Press), 17-28.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

43

1980a. "Review of Newmeyer, Linguistic Theory in America. " Lin gaieties 18. 9 1 1 - 3 0 . 1980b. " l e t t e r . · · Linguistics 18.1099-1104. 1982a. " Parentheticals and discontinuous constitu­ e n t structure." Linguistic Inquiry 13.91-106. 1982b. "The nonexistence of syntactic categories." In J. McCawley, Thirty Million Theories of Grammar 176-203. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pullum, 6 e o f f r e y , and Deirdre Wilson. 1977. "Autonomous syntax and the analysis of auxiliaries." Language 53.741-88. Reinhart, Tanya. 1976. The Syntactic Domain of Anaphora. MIT Ph. D. thesis. Rosenbaum, Peter S. 1965. The Syntax of English Predicate Complement Constructions. MIT Ph. D. thesis. Ross, John Robert. 1967. Constraints on Variables in Syntax. MIT Ph. D. thesis. 1969. "Auxiliaries as main verbs." Journal of Philo­ sophical Linguistics 1.77-102. S t e e l e , Susan. 1981. An Encyclopedia of AUX. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wells, Rulon S. 1963. "Some neglected opportunities in descriptive linguistics." Anthropological Linguistics 6.38-49.

A HIERARCHY IN CONCEPTUAL SPACE

John Robert Ross, M.I.T. and the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Institut f ü r Psycholinguistik George Lakoff and Mark Johnson show, in a recent book [ L a k o f f and Johnson ( 1 9 8 0 ) ] , how humans spatialize many concepts. That is, we speak of abstract things, such as health, quality, time and dominance, in terms of space. To talk of one thing in t e r m s of another is to make metaphor, to borrow a f r a m e . Lakoff and Johnson show how, f o r instance, emotions are r e l a t e d to the three-dimensional spatial f r a m e w o r k , in p a r t i c u l a r , to the most salient of the t h r e e dimensions, namely height. [An a r g u m e n t f o r the primacy of the vertical dimension is given in Cooper and Ross (1975)]. Four reflections of it are the fact that we say vertical and horizontal, not the reverse; the fact t h a t we say North, South, East and West [ t h a t is, the vertically relevant compass points must precede the horizontally oriented o n e s ] ; the fact t h a t we say the top right corner of the cube, not "the right top corner of the cube; and the fact t h a t we say high, wide and handsome, not *wide, high and handsome. To put it in the quasi-axio­ matic f o r m t h a t Lakoff and Johnson use, (1) a. b.

HAPPY IS UP Examples: His spirits rose/fell.

Alice is on Cloud 9/ down in the dumps. Tell Sam a joke - that'll give him a lift.

They suggest t h a t t h e r e is in this case, as in many others, a physical, experiential basis f o r ( 1 a ) , namely ( 2 ) :

46

Ross: Hierarchy in Conceptual Space

(2) When we are happy, we walk t a l l e r , stand more e r e c t , do not lower our gaze. When we are sad, we droop or slump. Three f u r t h e r examples of t h e i r s are in ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) , and (5). (3) a. b.

c.

MORE IS UP Examples: The number of whooping cranes in Kazakhistan went up/down (rose/fell). There is an overabundance /undersupply of electric can openers. Experiential basis: the more in a pile, the higher up the top will be.

(4) a. b.

HEALTHY IS UP You are in top shape/at the peak of health. Sandy fell sick. I came down with a cold. That virus really felled me. c. Experiential basis: when we are sick, we lie down. When plants are sick, they droop. (5) a. b.

c.

GOOD IS UP Examples: The quality of disco music in Monaco is on the rise/declining. The value of a liberal education is at an all-time high/low. Experiential basis: if we are happy and healthy and have more, we judge that as good. Since HAPPY and HEALTHY and MORE are UP, GOOD must also be.

Lakoff and Johnson show how certain values in our culture are consequences of some of these metaphors, t h a t these values are coherent with the metaphors. They state (p. 22) "MORE IS BETTER is coherent with MORE IS UP and GOOD IS UP. LESS IS BETTER would not be coherent with them". Though they do not state a formal scheme f o r inferences, it is clear t h a t t h e r e is one implicit in system. We might suggest (6) as a f i r s t approximation. (6) a.

such their

If t h e r e is a metaphor A IS X and another m e t a ­ phor  IS X, then we can f o r m a new metaphor (or

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

b.

possibly value, if metaphors) A 15 B. Formally, A IS X  IS X

values

are

different

47 from

A IS  However, t h e r e is a problem t h a t Lakoff and Johnson do not address: why do we say MORE IS BETTER, not *BETTER IS MORE? The scheme in (6) is symmetrical, so both of these could be deduced. The purpose of this note is to suggest that we need a t h i r d premise to add to (6) to make the conclusion follow. We need to be able to mark A and  with respect to their basicness, or with respect to t h e i r conceptual distance f r o m X. if A is more basic than  (I will w r i t e 'A -+ B' f o r this) then we can replace (6b) with ( 7 a ) , with (7b) being an i n s t a n t i ­ ation of it. (7) a. i. ii. iii.

A IS X  IS X A →-  A IS 

b. iii. iii.

MORE IS UP GOOD IS UP MORE - GOOD MORE IS GOOD

The question t h a t immediately arises is: can we establish inequalities like (7b iii)? suggest a f e w ways.

on what basis Below, I will

Since the basic "X" in all of the metaphors of Lakoff and Johnson t h a t I have discussed thus f a r is the primary spatial dimension, namely UP, let us say t h a t (8) A is more basic than  if A is more directly linked to space in experience than B, whether this linkage is causal, or per­ ceptual, or has some other basis. Some examples:

48

Ross: Hierarchy in Conceptual Space

(9) a. HEALTHY → HAPPY b. Experiential basis: SICK causes DOWN more directly than SAD causes DOWN. That is, it is easier to p r e ­ t e n d to be happy, and walk e r e c t , than it is to p r e ­ t e n d to be healthy. Thus health happiness. (10) a. b.

is more

immediately

linked to space than

is

MORE → HEALTHY Experiential basis: LESS causes DOWN even more directly than SICK causes DOWN. While we (some­ times) can, with a g r e a t e f f o r t of w i l l , OVERcome our f l u and get UP, pretending h e a l t h , t h e r e is no way for a stack of 5 plates to p r e t e n d to be t a l l e r than a stack of 10 plates. In other words, while HEALTH is [to an e x t e n t t h a t is little r e a l ­ ized in our medicine] dependent on mental a t t i ­ tudes, the HEIGHT of a pile of non-sentient objects is not.

Summing up, archy in (11).

then,

we

can

construct

the

partial

hier­

(11) UP → MORE → HEALTHY → HAPPY So f a r , the linkage has always been a causal one, with terms to the right in (11) causing t e r m s to the l e f t . Thus MORE causes UP, and HEALTHY causes UP (slightly less d i r e c t l y ) , and HAPPY causes UP the least directly of all. But so f a r , we have only linked UP other terms in (11). What happens when we the causal connections between the other more congruent with our view of the w o r l d , (12) a. b.

HEALTHY causes HAPPY happiness. J HAPPY causes HEALTHY health.]

[(Good)

causally to the t r y to establish terms? Which is (12a) or (12b)?

health

[Happiness

causes/brings causes /??brings

It seems s e l f - e v i d e n t t h a t (12a) is congruent with our view, while (12b) is not. Ours is a materialistic philosophy; we value t h a t which is tangible. There are a number of

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

49

uses of terms taken f r o m the realm of physical objects which have metaphorical uses f o r the realm of value j u d g e ­ ments: (13) a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h.

That is a solid a r g u m e n t . That matters. I have objective proof. What you say is not material f o r the issue discussing. They gave some flimsy excuse. Cadwallader is a real intellectual light-weight. The weight of her arguments is considerable. Heavy !

we

are

Let us examine the experientially valid causal connec­ tions between two more t e r m s in ( 1 4 ) , MORE and HAPPY. (14) a. b.

MORE causes HAPPY HAPPY causes MORE

Here it is even more clear which of these implications our culture favors - - (14a) is almost an axiom of a society in which materialistic concerns p r e d o m i n a t e ; (14b) is c e r ­ tainly not what the person in the s t r e e t would subscribe to. Thus it seems t h a t we have a curious asymmetry in the hierarchy in ( 1 4 ) , which I will r e p r e s e n t somewhat more abstractly as in (15). (15) UP → A1 → A2 → A3 → An The asymmetry can be seen in (16c) below: (16) a. b. 

For all Α., A. causes UP. For all Α i , Aj, if i < j in ( 1 5 ) , then A. causes UP more directly than A. causes UP. However, if i < j , then Aj causes A. is more c o n ­ g r u e n t with cultural beliefs and world view than is Aj causes Α..

At p r e s e n t , I do not understand well enough w h a t the implications of such hierarchies as (11) and (15) are to be able to explain why (16c) should exhibit such a puzzling reversal, but I will assume t e n t a t i v e l y in what follows t h a t

50

Ross: Hierarchy in Conceptual Space

it is correct, and make use of it to expand (11) by blending in a f e w more t e r m s . Let

us f i r s t

consider

BIG. Comparing

the

implications

in

(17), (17) a. b.

BIG causes UP [Size causes height] UP causes BIG [Height causes size]

we see t h a t (17a) is the correct one. For example, birds can be high u p , but not big. It would seem, t h e n , t h a t UP is to be i n t e r p r e t e d simply as a location. Maybe the basis f o r UP is t h a t shown in (18). (18) A point in space is UP if it is located above e y e - l e v e l . Whether or not (18) is t r u e , (17) would suggest t h a t BIG must be less basic than UP. What t h e n is the relationship of BIG to the next t e r m in ( 1 9 ) , namely MORE? Here it is harder to make a decision, but possibly the following considerations are r e l e v a n t . First of a l l , it seems to me t h a t of the two implications in ( 1 9 ) , (19) a.

MORE causes BIG

b.

BIG causes MORE

[The number of piates on the pile causes its tallness. ] [?? The tallness of that pile of plates causes the number of plates in it. ]

it is clear that (19a) is the correct one. From number, we can i n f e r size, but obviously not the r e v e r s e , because there are tall things, like t r e e s and t o w e r s , which are units. F u r t h e r m o r e , if it is correct to link the concept of basicness t h a t is r e l a t e d to space as in (8) with the type of c e n t r a l i t y t h a t Cooper and I w e r e studying the e f f e c t s of (cf. Cooper and Ross ( 1 9 7 5 ) ) , t h e n the following ordering asymmetries also argue t h a t MORE → BIG. (20) a. b.

Please ladders ?? Please ladders

tell me the number and size t h a t you need. t e l l me the size and number t h a t you need.

of

the

of

the

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells Note t h a t on order blanks, q u a n t i t y description, which l a t t e r includes size.

is to

51 the

left

of

(21)

In t e r m s of prenominai ordering in noun phrases, which Cooper and I argued is relevant to c e n t r a l i t y , the facts are very clear: (22) a. b.

many big cars. * * b i g many cars.

Finally, another reflection of the causal connection between number and size is the ordinariness of ( 2 3 a ) , as opposed to the strangeness of (23b). (23) a. b.

The more, the t a l l e r . ? The t a l l e r , the more.

All of these considerations lead correct relationship of these t h r e e (24).

me to think t h a t the t e r m s is as shown in

(2A) UP → MORE → BIG Presumably, BIG should be to the l e f t of HEALTHY, because of the ordering asymmetries in (25) and (26): (25) a. b.

a big healthy colt. ??a healthy big colt.

(26) a.

Brutus' size and health excellent lumberjack. ? Brutus' health and size excellent lumberjack.

b.

will

make

him

an

will

make

him

an

52

Ross: Hierarchy in Conceptual Space

Finally, it is clear t h a t size is directly spatial, while health is only i n f e r e n t i a l l y so. Thus we can conclude t h a t the t e r m s mentioned so f a r should be a r r a n g e d as shown in (27). (27) UP

-

MORE → BIG → HEALTHY → HAPPY

Two f u r t h e r pieces of evidence f o r HEALTHY → HAPPY, in addition to the directness of the causal link to space that was cited in ( 9 b ) , follow f r o m the asymmetries in (28) and ( 2 9 ) . (28) a. b.

a healthy, happy t w o - y e a r old. ? a happy, healthy t w o - y e a r old.

(29) a. b.

Health and happiness! ?? Happiness and health!

Since the relation '→' is t r a n s i t i v e , HAPPY, a prediction borne out by the asymmetries: (30) a. b.

we expect BIG → following ordering

a big happy family ? * a happy big family

I am g r a t e f u l to Rulon Wells, my f i r s t teacher of semantics, for showing me how someone could be both a linguist and a philosopher. He was doing work on meaning at a time w h e n , as a German linguist once said to me, in 1960, Americans w e r e bedeutungsfeindlich [= meaning - hos­ tile]. In my own recent work, I have come to f e e l , increas­ ingly, the importance of the study of meaning, not only within linguistics, but also as a bridge b e t w e e n us and related fields. So, for your pioneering the legitimizing of semantics, which contributed to making this paper possible, I thank you, Rulon.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

53

REFERENCES CITED

Cooper, William E. and John Robert Ross. 1975. "World order" in Functionalism: Proceedings of the Parasession on Functionalism, edited by Grossman e t a l , Chicago Linguistic Society, University of Chicago, Chicago, I l l i ­ nois. Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Uve By, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wells, Rulon. "Immediate constituents." Reprinted in M a r t i n Joos ( e d . ) , Readings in Linguistics.

IMPERFECT MODELS AND THEIR USES

Fred J. Damerau IBM Corporation Introduction A curious thing about linguistics over the last 25 years or so is the almost exclusive concentration of many of its leading practitioners on linguistic theory, to the exclusion of practically anything else. This certainly contrasts with the situation in most other areas of science, where a consider­ able amount of experimental work goes on along with t h e o ­ retical development. Moreover, linguistic theories go out of fashion with amazing speed, to the point where adherents of the leading schools of thought must have well-developed channels for monitoring ongoing research, since anything published in the normal journals is likely to be already obsolete. This, t o o , is in contrast to other fields of science, which seem, to the outsider at least, to change less rapidly (and less radically). In a d d i t i o n , theories in fields other than linguistics which are known to be wrong or incomplete in some respects are still in active use as models f o r r e a l ­ ity, so long as t h e i r defects a r e not p e r t i n e n t to the study at hand. As a somewhat extreme example, Euclidean plane geometry is still used as a world model by local surveyors, although it is well known to be a poor model of the cos­ mos. It appears to be less well known that linguistic models long since abandoned by theoreticians are still used by practically oriented researchers. Such uses, where known, t e n d to be dismissed as uninteresting or i r r e l e v a n t by a large body of linguists. While state of with how certainly

t h e r e are probably a number of reasons f o r this a f f a i r s , it appears t h a t the main one has to do linguists conceive the goals of their study. There has been a substantial shift over the years in

56

Damerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

thinking as to the nature of such goals. In Syntactic Structures (Chomsky, 1957:52), we f i n d "The point of view adopted here is t h a t it is unreasonable to demand of a l i n ­ guistic theory t h a t it provide anything more than a practical evaluation procedure for g r a m m a r s " , as contrasted to the structuralist search f o r discovery procedures. A c u r r e n t view is given in Chomsky (1980:2): "The task for linguistic theory is to discover the t r u e n a t u r e of the biological endowment t h a t specifies the general structure of the language f a c ­ ulty." Naturally, not every linguist subscribes to such a m b i ­ tious goals, and some t h a t did no longer do - "These goals w e r e based on assumptions t h a t seemed reasonable then to many people (including m e ) , but which with the hindsight of t w e n t y years of linguistics research now seem g r a t u i t o u s , or implausible, or downright wrongheaded. Among them is the assumption t h a t phrase structure rules and transformations are the right kinds of devices f o r characterizing linguistic rules." (Lakoff, 1978:274). Clearly, if one is interested in the n a t u r e of the language faculty, or any such global con­ c e r n , devices and theories which can be shown to be insuf­ ficiently p o w e r f u l , o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , overly g e n e r a l , are of little theoretical interest. However, not everyone is so ambitious. Some are concerned w i t h devising a w r i t i n g sys­ tem for a language with no w r i t t e n t r a d i t i o n , or teaching someone a new language, or, as will be discussed below, incorporating a linguistic capability in some sort of mechan­ ical device. For such uses, it may well be t h a t a model known to be imperfect for very general reasons is still suitable f o r the task at hand. The remainder of this paper illustrates the kinds of practical use to which linguistic theories have been p u t , mostly but not always by non-linguists. I concentrate on syntactic models and t h e o r i e s , although in some cases the work to be discussed will have a semantic component as w e l l . In a d d i t i o n , I limit the discussion to work which a t t e m p t s to provide a n a t u r a l language capability f o r a computer-based system, in p a r t because the n a t u r e of com­ putation r e q u i r e s that models be specified completely and exactly. (It is of course t r u e t h a t any model for a given computer can be t r a n s f o r m e d into a f i n i t e state model, because of the limited memory available to any real com­ p u t e r system. However, memories for existing computers are already so large t h a t this is only a theoretical possibility.)

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells Finite State

57

Models

A f i n i t e state model can be characterized by a machine with a defined set of internal states, a defined set of state-to-state transitions, and a d e f i n e d alphabet, one symbol of which is e m i t t e d at each state t r a n s i t i o n . If a probability measure is defined for the state transitions, we have a f i n i t e state Markov source. A Markov source for which the states are identified with the preceding  e m i t ­ ted symbols is a k-limited source, a n d , if the symbols are l e t t e r s or words of a language L, the source is said to g e n e r a t e  + 1 - o r d e r approximations of L ( M i l l e r and Chomsky, 1963:427). The f i r s t example of such a system was given by Shannon, a mathematician (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). It was discussed as a linguistic model (Hockett, 1955) and then more or less dismissed by linguists when the transformational movement began to take hold, following criticism by Chomsky and others ( M i l l e r and Chomsky, 1963, but see Damerau, 1971). The arguments adduced against the model had to do with the possibility of infinite center embedding, leading to unbounded dependencies, and with learnability by children of a model with many states. While counter arguments can be made, a more serious problem with the model has to do with its inability to characterize relationships which appear to be linguistic in character. That is, t h e r e is nothing intrinsic to the Markov model which explicates the relationship between actives and passives, for example. In g e n e r a l , it is hard to see how one would define a compact semantics on top of a syntax which provides as little structure as a Markov model. Although defining a formal semantics for a Markov model might be d i f f i c u l t , reflection reveals t h a t the states and transition probabilities of such a model are determined in part by semantic as well as syntactic restrictions. This f a c t , coupled with the reduction in the size of the state space which can be achieved by restricting the domain of discourse to some coherent domain, has made the Markov model one of the candidates for implementing computer systems which transcribe speech automatically. Two of the most successful speech recognition systems developed to date employ a Markov model as an integral part of the recognition system.

58

Damerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

In the early 1970's, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense f u n d e d a number of contractors to develop a speech understanding system capable of recognizing continuous speech from a vocabulary of 1000 words from more than one speaker. One of the contractors, Carnegie-Mellon University, developed a system called HARPY which met the goals laid out initially. No other system was able to do t h a t by the time of project t e r m i n a t i o n , although others f e l t t h a t they would have been able to if the time had been e x t e n d e d . This should not be taken to mean that the problem of automatic speech ARPA understanding has been solved; HARPY met the r e q u i r e m e n t s by severely constraining the task domain and the complexity of the language it was able to recognize. The developers of HARPY built a large f i n i t e state network incorporating all legal pronunciations of all the permissible sentences in their restricted language, and then found a best match between the incoming acoustic signal and a path through the network. The language which HARPY recognized had to do with retrieving documents from a file of news stories, e.g., "How many articles on psychology are there?" ( L o w e r r e , 1976). Many criticisms of the HARPY system have been made, some focusing on the choice of a Markov model r a t h e r than something more p o w e r f u l . However, it would appear t h a t the developers of HARPY, knowing the l i m i t a ­ tions of the model they chose to work w i t h , understood what was necessary to achieve the goals set f o r t h by ARPA. A large e f f o r t in speech recognition has been underway for some years at IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Labora­ tory. This project aims to develop a speech transcription device, i.e., an automated t y p e w r i t e r . This system has an acoustic processor, which produces a string of phonetic symbols, and a linguistic decoder, which r e q u i r e s a probabi­ listic model of the t e x t g e n e r a t o r , r e f e r r e d to as the l a n ­ guage model. To quote Jelinek et al. ( 1 9 8 0 ) , "Linguistics has not progressed to the point t h a t it can provide a use­ ful grammar for a sizable subset of English. In addition, the interest in linguistics has been in specifying the s e n ­ tences of a language but not t h e i r probabilities. Our approach has been to model the t e x t g e n e r a t o r as a Markov source, the p a r a m e t e r s of which are estimated from a large sample of text." The t e x t in this case is a corpus of about 1.5 million words in the domain of laser patents. The word error rate for the IBM system on the laser patent

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

5?

recognition task is just under 10 percent. An example of the results f r o m this system are given in Figure 1 , (Bahl, e t a l . , 1980, p. 874). The same system applied to the CMU task described previously has a word e r r o r r a t e of a p p r o x i -

Spoken: Suitable mounting means are a r t and are t h e r e f o r e not shown.

well

known

in

the

Decoded: Suitable mounting means are a r t and are t h e r e f o r e not shown.

well

known

in

the

Spoken: The above. Decoded: above.

The

maser

maser

action

that

results has been

explained

results as been

explained

action t h a t

Spoken: The particular reflective coatings on the mirrors may be silver or other suitable material f o r example dielectric coatings. Decoded: The particular reflective coatings on the mirrors may be silver ed or other suitable material for example by electric coating.

Examples of speech recognition using a Markov model (Trigram

approximation)

Figure 1

mately .1 percent. The d i f f e r e n c e in the e r r o r r a t e is accounted f o r by the inherently more d i f f i c u l t language used in the laser p a t e n t t e x t ; t h e r e are more possibilities as successors f o r each word in the laser p a t e n t t e x t than t h e r e are in the r e t r i e v a l language used in the CMU e x p e r ­ iment.

60

Damerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

One cannot know if speech recognition systems, when they become widely available, will employ probabilistic M a r ­ kov models as their linguistic component. Still, a model which was dismissed as uninteresting and i r r e l e v a n t more than t w e n t y years previous is still in use as a component in a major area of research. It is possible t h a t f i n i t e state models may yet be revived as a m a t t e r of interest to theoretically inclined linguists. An MIT master's thesis (Church 1980) has proposed t h a t a f i n i t e state machine, while demonstrably deficient as a model of linguistic competence, might serve as a p e r s p i ­ cuous model of linguistic performance. Church has designed a parser t h a t "approximates" competence by severely l i m i t ­ ing short t e r m memory (thereby restricting the device to a f i n i t e state machine). The parser encodes a competence model resembling the lexicalist position of Bresnan and Kaplan, e.g. Bresnan (1980). The i n t e n t was to design a parser which would " f a i l precisely where the idealizations require unrealistic resources" (Church, 1980:135). "Although there are many unsolved problems . . . we have d e m o n ­ strated plausibility for the underlying design which incorpo­ rates both performance (FS and determinism) and compe­ tence (Bresnan-Kaplan's lexical framework)" (Church, 1980:139).

Context-free

Models

In the late f i f t i e s and early sixties, in the course of defending his conception of linguistic theory, Chomsky a t t e m p t e d to formalize the models with which linguists w e r e then working. His formalization of the immediate constituent model was called a phrase structure grammar, and came in two v a r i e t i e s , context free and context sensitive. Postal (1964) made the strong claim t h a t , f o r the most p a r t , work done on immediate constituent analysis and on syntax in general was in fact capable of being modeled by a c o n t e x t - f r e e grammar. A number of linguists objected to t h a t c h a r a c t e r i ­ zation, e.g., (Harman 1963), but it was widely accepted. In a sense, such a characterization was u n f a i r , in t h a t the structuralists working within the immediate constituent model probably did not expect as much from immediate constituent analysis of a sentence as the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l ­ ists did. Thus, in discussing the sentences

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

61

"John is easy to please" (3) "John is eager to please" (4) Chomsky (1964:66) says "To achieve the level of descriptive adequacy, however, a grammar would have to assign struc­ t u r a l descriptions indicating that John in (3) is the direct object of please . . . , while in (4) it is the logical subject of please . . . A theory which does not allow structural descriptions of this sort cannot achieve the level of descriptive adequacy." Similarly, Postal (1964:137) says "A grammar has thus two tasks: it must e n u m e r a t e each s e n ­ tence and no nonsentence, and it must associate with each sentence a grammatical analysis which can provide the kind of grammatical information needed to explain examples of the types j u s t i l l u s t r a t e d , as well as many others. A g r a m ­ mar which g e n e r a t e s sentences without providing them with structural descriptions is of no real linguistic interest". Certainly it was not very clear in an I model how the two sentences cited by Chomsky w e r e to be r e l a t e d , but it is doubtful that the immediate constituent model was ever intended to provide that kind of information (although one can argue t h a t it should have). It is a more serious m a t t e r f o r c o n t e x t - f r e e models to be shown incapable of g e n e r a t i n g the set of grammatical sentences of a language. Postal (1964) argued t h a t a CF model f o r Mohawk is impossible. His a r g u m e n t in t h a t paper is d e f i c i e n t , although Langendoen (1977) has given a valid proof, providing the Mohawk facts are as claimed. The f a c t s , however, have been challenged by Pullum and Gazdar (1981). Assuming Langendoen and Postal are r i g h t , contextf r e e models are insufficient as a model f o r human language even in terms of the weakest r e q u i r e m e n t which can be made of a model. Theoretically o r i e n t e d linguists f o r the most p a r t abandoned work based on models which could be shown to be equivalent to a c o n t e x t - f r e e model f o r a con­ siderable period, although they are now coming back in vogue (see below). Once a g a i n , however, computer scientists and others interested in language have found uses f o r con­ t e x t - f r e e models. It happens t h a t the parsing problem, i.e., determining the constituent structure of a sentence given a g r a m m a r , is a computationally much more tractable problem for context-free grammars than determining sentence structure with respect to a transformational grammar, f o r example. C o n t e x t - f r e e parsing algorithms are well u n d e r -

62

Damerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

stood and known to have polynomial time complexity (in fact known to have a time complexity proportional to n-cubed, where η is the length of the input sentence). A g r e a t many experimental n a t u r a l language processing systems have been based on c o n t e x t - f r e e grammars. Three examples follow. Many feel t h a t computer-based systems should be of g r e a t assistance in certain kinds of teaching environments. One group of researchers ( B r o w n , et a l . , 1974) built a sys­ t e m called SOPHIE for teaching electronic troubleshooting by having a computer simulate a f a u l t e d circuit, r a t h e r than using expensive and fragile h a r d w a r e . To make this system easy to use, they a t t e m p t e d to provide a capability for s t u ­ dents to communicate with the machine by typing questions and comments in normal English. Because the domain of discourse was so r e s t r i c t e d , i.e., to the discussion of a s i n ­ gle circuit, they f e l t t h a t it would be possible to provide good coverage using a c o n t e x t - f r e e g r a m m a r , through the device of " . . . r e f i n i n g the usual syntactic categories such as noun phrase into relevant semantic/conceptual categories such as 'measurement'. . . . These and other considerations led us to build a highly e f f i c i e n t . . . c o n t e x t - f r e e parser which makes its predictions on the basis of semantic r a t h e r than syntactic categories." ( B r o w n , et a l . , 1974:24). "A point has now been reached in which (the system) handles nearly all sentences g e n e r a t e d by users who have had at least one prior session . . ." ( B r o w n , e t a l . 1974:26). The developers restricted the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of ambiguities which generally results from a large c o n t e x t - f r e e grammar by incorporating what amount to selectional restrictions into the names of the word classes. Staying within the confines of a contextf r e e grammar allowed them to use the e f f i c i e n t parsing techniques which have been developed f o r such grammars, and so limit t h e i r use of expensive computer t i m e . Examples of sentences understood by the system, i.e., sentences for which the system took appropriate action, are shown in Fig­ ure 2. The experiment as a whole was generally classed as successful. A very similar tack was t a k e n by another of the projects in speech recognition, this one called HEARSAY-!!. "Syntactic and semantic knowledge in SASS is supplied by a task-specific semantic t e m p l a t e g r a m m a r , which can be characterized as a c o n t e x t - f r e e grammar w i t h ambiguity and recursion p e r m i t t e d . The t e m p l a t e s (nonterminals) of the

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

63

What is the voltage across the base e m i t t e r junction of c u r r e n t limiting transistor?

the

What is the VBE of Q6? What is the voltage between node 1 and the positive t e r m i ­ nal of C6? In a working circuit what power r e f e r e n c e transistor?

is

the

output

voltage

of

the

T u r n up the voltage control. Suppose the BE junction of Q6 is shorted.

Examples of sentences which SOPHIE " u n d e r s t a n d s " , responds to appropriately.

i.e.,

Figure 2

grammar are sequences and categories representing sets of phrases in the task language. Although the grammar is a context-free grammar in f o r m , as are general English phrase structure grammars, there is an important d i f f e r ­ ence in the spirit in which this f o r m is used. A semantic template represents a set of semantically equivalent (or similar) phrases. In contrast, a nonterminal in a general phrase structure grammar represents a set of phrases which can have the same syntactic role (e.g. noun phrase) but are otherwise u n r e l a t e d . . . . Thus a semantic template g r a m ­ mar imposes considerably more constraint on the phrases it accepts." (Hayes-Roth, e t a l . , 1978:19). Since the problem addressed by this system was speech recognition, in which the correct sequence of words must be selected f r o m a large set of possibilities, it was particularly important to maximally limit the set of sequences to be recognized to those which w e r e reasonable within the domain. On the same task used f o r the HARPY system (see above) HEARSAY-II

64

Damerau: I m p e r f e c t Models and Their Uses

had an e r r o r task, 26%.

r a t e of 9%, and on a somewhat more

difficult

Because the c o n t e x t - f r e e parsing problem is very well understood, it is sometimes advantageous to restrict the problem domain, as above, or take some other action so as to be able to use these algorithms for sentence analysis in contexts t h a t might seem i n a p p r o p r i a t e . Hendrix et a l . , (1978) describe a system designed to let a decision maker, rather than a technician, query a data base by allowing the use of English instead of a s t r u c t u r e d query language. The data base had to do with naval m a t t e r s , and the system was to allow such queries as "What is the length of the Kennedy?". This is a larger domain than t h a t described e a r ­ lier for electronic trouble shooting, and r e q u i r e d more i n t e r p r e t i v e ability. The parser used is called LIFER. "LIFER application languages are specified by augmented c o n t e x t - f r e e grammars. Each rule in the grammar . . . includes a c o n t e x t - f r e e production, plus an arbitrarily complex response expression, which is the ' a u g m e n t a ­ tion'. Although a purely c o n t e x t - f r e e system would severely restrict the set of ( n o n f i n i t e ) languages that LIFER could accept, the use of augmentation gives LIFER the power of a Turing machine. . . . In other words, the class of languages for which LIFER was designed may be characterized as those allow­ ing much of t h e i r structure to be d e f i n e d by context-free rules but requiring occasional augmentation. It has been our experience t h a t much of the subset of English used f o r asking questions about a command and control data base falls in this class." (Hendrix et al. 1978:129). This strategy allows one to use a c o n t e x t - f r e e parser for most structure building, while allowing escape f r o m t h a t formalism for a d e f i n e d set of special cases. Such a s t r a t ­ egy is feasible largely because of the restricted domain of discourse. A portion of a user-machine dialogue is shown in Figure 3 , for an application language called LADDER. The grammar for this application has much of the flavor of the SOPHIE grammar, in t h a t the rules and categories are highly application specific. In the opinion of the authors, "... the evidence presented indicates clearly t h a t , for certain

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

65

<What is the c u r r e n t position of the Kennedy? >(position 6000n0300w date 7601171200) trying ellipsis: what is the c u r r e n t position of kitty hawk >(position 3700n01700e date 7601171200) l have 79 answers; do you w a n t to see them all? trying ellipsis: To what country does the fastest sub belong >(nat us ship Los Angeles mxspd 30.0)

Example dialogue (condensed) with the LADDER system

Figure 3

restricted applications, n a t u r a l language access to data bases has become a practical and practicable reality." ( H e n drix, e t a l . , 1978:142). The revival of theoretical interest in c o n t e x t - f r e e mod­ els in the last several years is indeed quite striking. A major proponent of this approach is Gerald Gazdar, in a series of largely unpublished papers (but see Gazdar (1980), Pullum and Gazdar (1981)). The basic idea of this approach is the notion of a meta-rule or rule schema, a device which allows one to express, in an economical way, a potentially unbounded set of c o n t e x t - f r e e rules. By use of such a device, it becomes possible to state the kinds of unbounded dependencies which cannot be stated in a simple contextf r e e g r a m m a r , and still have the resulting language con­ t e x t - f r e e . The advantages of such an approach are the general limitation on linguistic theory given by the r e s t r i c ­ tive formalism, and the possibility of parsing with contextf r e e parsing procedures. However, Gazdar's approach has not yet been thoroughly e x p l o r e d , and it is not clear how some of the problems of c o n t e x t - f r e e parsing, such as extensive

66

Damerau: I m p e r f e c t Models and Their Uses

structural ambiguity, will be avoided. Other linguists may not go quite so f a r as to restrict themselves e n t i r e l y t o a phrase structure formalism, but are assigning a much g r e a t e r role to t h a t portion of the g r a m m a r , e.g., Keenan (1980) and Bresnan (1980) as well as others.

Transformational

Grammar

Although there are many traditions of linguistic research being pursued in the United States and elsewhere, over the last t w e n t y years or so the dominant force in American linguistics has been t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar as inspired by Noam Chomsky. It is also obvious t h a t t r a n s f o r ­ mational grammar is not a unified discipline, but has many often incompatible schools. Chomsky's own position has changed sufficiently f r e q u e n t l y t h a t he is sometimes in competition with his e a r l i e r views as developed by his s t u ­ dents of the t i m e . Relatively f e w experimentally oriented research groups have worked directly within the t r a n s f o r ­ mational f r a m e w o r k , although a number have been i n f l u ­ enced by t h a t work. The work of Chomsky's t e a c h e r , Zellig Harris, has inspired one of the longest running projects in computer based linguistic research, viz., the Linguistic String Project at New York University (Sager, 1981). This group has built a very large transformational grammar within the Harris f r a m e w o r k , and has developed parsing procedures to analyze English sentences with respect to t h a t , grammar. The system includes a large dictionary, a c o n t e x t - f r e e wellcomponent, a restriction component which makes formedness checks on subtrees, and a transformational component. The system is designed to analyze narrative t e x t , isolate items of information and place them in a defined f o r m a t , and then answer questions from the f o r ­ matted data records. The system has been tested mainly with medical records, although it is not in principle restricted to any special domain. A complete description of the system, including the g r a m m a r , is found in Sager (1981). An example of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l analysis it p r o ­ duces is given in Figure 4 (Sager, 1981: 207).

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

67

The force with which an isolated h e a r t beats depends on the concentration of Ca in the medium which surrounds it. sentence I center endmark I I asr I verb subj obj I I I depend t - d e f in I I nstg t-pwhs obj ρ nstgo I I I I I force asr nstgo on t - d e f I I I verb subj nstf t-vn-act I I I I beat t - i n d e f host asr I =force I I I nstg t-apos-ven verb subj obj I I I I I heart t-passive concentrate nstg pn I I I asr Ca Ρ nstgo I I I verb subj obj obj in t - d e f I I I I I isolate 0 host pn nstg t-whs-n = heart I I I P_nstgo medium asr I I I from 0 verb subj obj I I I surround host nstgo = medium I nstg I it

Transformational analysis in the NYU program Figure 4

68

Damerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

One offshoot of Chomsky's version of transformational grammar was known as generative semantics. The essential theoretical idea was t h a t t h e r e was no level of deep s t r u c ­ t u r e distinct from semantic s t r u c t u r e . At the lowest level of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a sentence had a predicate with some n u m ­ ber of arguments defined f o r t h a t predicate. A l o n g - r u n ­ ning project at IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center, the Transformational Question Answering (TQA) system project, has constructed a very large transformational grammar within t h a t general t r a d i t i o n ( P l a t h , 1976). An example sentence with the underlying structure produced by this grammar is given in Figure 5. Along with a parsing procedure due to Petrick ( P e t r i c k , 1965) this grammar has been used to study the possibility of providing n a t u r a l l a n ­ guage query capabilities for relational data bases.

In one e x p e r i m e n t , the members of a city planning d e p a r t m e n t w e r e provided with such a system for accessing their basic land record files. This is a semantically richer domain than those mentioned above under context-free models. The range of constructions which can be parsed and provided with an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by the TQA system is wide. The aim in designing the grammar was t h a t if a construc­ t i o n , such as "relative clause", could be handled in one context, it could be handled in all contexts. This means t h a t a user does not have to keep in mind a list of exceptions as well as an understanding of allowable constructions. In the main, this goal was r e a l i z e d , and users had relatively little d i f f i c u l t y in staying w i t h i n the English subset that the system understood. Some examples of questions correctly answered by the system are given in Figure 6. Detailed results of the planning d e p a r t m e n t experiment are available in Damerau, (1981); the general conclusion was t h a t it appeared feasible to provide such a capability for a q u i t e n a t u r a l subset of English, assuming the domain of discourse for any one system was restricted to one relatively unified field at a t i m e . It was mentioned above t h a t transformational grammar has changed very drastically since Chomsky's early work. In f a c t , in the most recently published work of Chomsky, t h e r e is only one major movement t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , move alpha,

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

Where is Smythe's lot?

(BD LOCATED (THE ((LOT X5) (*BD OWN SMYTHE X5 BD*))) ((WH SOME) (PLACE X7)) BD) (S1 ( - PAST + WH + QUES + TOP) BD (V (+ ADJ + EN + LOC + TEMP + TW0AR6S) LOCATED) (NP (DET THE) (NOM (NOM (NOUN ( - HU + SG + PL + WBL) (V LOT) (INDEX ( - CONST + CINS) X5)) ) (Sl BD (V (+ OBJ + TEMP + POBJ) OWN) (NP (NOM (NOUN (+ HU + SG + UNKNOWN) (INDEX (+ CONST) SMYTHE))) ) (NP (+ OBJ) (NOM (NOUN ( - HU + SG + PL + WBL) (INDEX ( - CONST + CINS) X5))) ) BD ) ) ) (NP (+ AT + LOC) (NOM (V (+ ADJ + QUANT) WH SOME) (NOM (NOUN (+ SG - HU + PL) (V PLACE) (INDEX ( - CONST) X7)) ) ) ) BD)

Underlying ("deep")

structure in the TQA system.

Figure 5 where alpha ranges over phrasal categories. Constraints transformational application are provided by devices cal

69

70

Darnerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

What is the average assessed valuation houses in subplanning area 7.20?

of

the

two

family

How many nursing homes are t h e r e in Fisher Hill? What ft.?

parcels on

Greenacres Ave. have

more

than

10000

sq.

Who owns the vacant land in Hillair Circle? Where are the parcels than 3 dwelling units?

in the

Fisher

Hill assn. having

What is the average area of the parcels in the assn. in the R2 zone which have an LUC of 910? What is the parcel area of the f i r e

Battle

more

Hill

stations?

Examples of questions answered by the TQA system

Figure 6

filters, and semantic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is done on near surface structures. A parsing program f o r such a theory is described in Marcus (1980). Examples of sentences parsed by Marcus' program using a grammar f r a g m e n t w r i t t e n to exercise the parser and demonstrate its robustness are given in Figure 7. This program has a p p a r e n t l y not yet been used in an application like t e x t analysis or question answering.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

71

I told t h a t boy t h a t boys should do it. There seems to have been a meeting scheduled f o r

Friday.

The boy who you met scheduled the meeting. Who did Bob give the book? Who did you say t h a t Bill told? Who do you w a n t to give a book to tomorrow? Who did you promise to give the book to Sue tomorrow?

Sentences parsed by Marcus' parser

Figure 7

Conclusion The foregoing examples do not begin to cover the m u l ­ t i t u d e of n a t u r a l language processing systems which have been worked on over the last '25 years or so, nor do they cover any significant number of the linguistic theories and variants e x t a n t , although I believe the theoretical work described lies within the mainstream of linguistic theory. (For example, I have not discussed the extensive theoretical and computational l i t e r a t u r e on Augmented Transition N e t ­ works, ATNs). I simply w a n t e d to illustrate t h a t , depending on one's goals, it is possible to make good use of a theory and its constructs even though it is known to be deficient in some aspects. Moreover, old theories with attractive properties are seldom completely f o r g o t t e n . Sometimes a new insight can result in the rehabilitation of a theory which was thought to have a f a t a l e r r o r .

72

Damerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

lt can also be seen t h a t , as the projects described are ranked in increasing order of ambition, the complexity of the theory used to realize those ambitions rises also. T h e r e f o r e , these remarks should not be t a k e n to mean that one should not seek more comprehensive theories; on the contrary, c u r r e n t linguistic theory does not show us how to go about constructing the kind of n a t u r a l language u n d e r ­ standing capability that one would like computer systems to have. However, there are certain problems t h a t each of the models available to us can solve, and it is a mistake to dismiss a theory completely because it cannot explain all the phenomena one would like to explain. Solving an outstanding problem within the confines of an old theory might well be very useful to someone who has no compelling need to adopt a newer and probably more complicated model.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In preparing this p a p e r , I have b e n e f i t e d greatly from discussions with David Johnson, Stanley Petrick, Paul Postal and Warren Plath, all of whom made useful suggestions and clarifications. In a d d i t i o n , I owe a g r e a t deal to Rulon Wells, for his i n t e r e s t in computer models of linguistic theories at a time when such models w e r e not yet fashion­ able in d e p a r t m e n t s of linguistics.

ENDNOTE 1

Pullum (1984) indicates acceptance of t h a t Dutch, at least, is not a CF language.

an

argument

REFERENCES CITED

Bahl, L. R., R. Bakis, P. S. Cohen, A. 6. Cole, F., Jelinek, . L. Lewis, R. E. Mercer. " F u r t h e r Results on the Rec­ ognition of a Continuously Read Natural Corpus." in

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

73

Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, April 9 - 1 1 , Volume 3, IEEE, 1980, pp. 8 7 2 - 8 7 5 . Brown, John Seely and Richard R. B u r t o n . 1974. SOPHIE - "A pragmatic use of a r t i f i c i a l intelligence in CAI." in: Association for Computing Machinery. Annual Conference, 2 9 t h , San Diego, CA, November, 1974, Proceedings, Volume No. 2 , New York, NY: Association f o r Comput­ ing Machinery, 571-579. Bresnan, Joan 1980. "Polyadicity: p a r t I of a theory of lexi­ cal rules," in Lexical Grammar, Teun Hoekstra, Harry Van Der Hulst, and Michael Moorgat (eds.). Foris Publications, Dordrecht, 9 7 - 1 2 2 . Chomsky, Noam. 1957. Syntactic Structures. Mouton: The Hague. 1963. "Formal Properties of Grammars." In Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, II, R.D. Luce, R. Bush, and E. Galanter (eds.), New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 3 2 3 - 4 1 8 . 1964. " C u r r e n t issues in linguistic theory." In The Structure of Language, Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz (eds.), Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1964, pp. 5 0 - 1 1 8 . (1980). "On binding." Linguistic Inquiry 11:1 ( W i n t e r , 1980), 1-46. Church, Kenneth Ward 1980. "On memory limitations in n a t ­ ural language processing." Master of Science Thesis, MIT. Damerau, Fred J. 1971. Markov Models in Linguistic Theory. The Hague: Mouton. , Fred J. 1981. "Operating statistics f o r the t r a n s ­ formational question answering system." American Journal of Computational Linguistics 7:1 (January-March 1981). 3 0 - 4 2 . Gazdar, Gerald 1980. "A phrase s t r u c t u r e syntax f o r com­ Teun Hoekstra, parative clauses." In Lexical Grammar, Harry Van Der Huist, and Michael Moorgat (eds.). Dordrecht: Foris Publications. 9 7 - 1 2 2 . Harman, Gilbert H. 1963. "Generative grammars without transformational rules: a defense of phrase struc­ t u r e . " Language, 597-616. Hayes-Roth, Mostow, D. Jack, and Mark S. Fox. 1978. "Understanding speech in the HEARSAY-II system." in Speech Communication with Computers, Leonard Bloc ( e d . ) , Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 9 - 4 2 .

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Hendrix, Gary G.; Earl D. Sacerdoti, Daniel Sagalowicz, and Jonathan Slocum, 1978. "Developing a natural interface to complex data." ACM Transactions on Database Systems 3:2 (June 1978), 105-147. Hockett, Charles F. 1955. A Manual of Phonology. Memoir 11 of the International Journal of American linguistics, Baltimore, Maryland: Indiana University Publications in Anthropology and Linguistics. Jelinek, Fred, Robert L. Mercer, and Lalit R. Bahl, 1980. "Continuous speech recognition: statistical methods." In Handbook of Statistics, Volume 2, P. R. Krisnaiah (ed.), Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company (to appear). Keenan, Edward 1980. "Passive is phrasal not (sentential or lexical). In Lexical Grammar, Teun Hoekstra, Harry Van Der Hulst, and Michael Moorgat (eds.). Dordrecht: Foris Publications, Dordrecht, 181-213. Lakoff, George. 1978. "Some remarks on AI and linguistics." Cognitive Science 2:3 (July-September 1978), 267-275. Langendoen, D.T. 1977. "On the Inadequacy of Type-3 and Type-2 grammars for human languages." In Studies in Descriptive and Historical Unguistics: Festschrift for Winifred P. Lehmann. P.J. Hopper, ed., Amsterdam, Holland: Jogn Bennon 159-171. Lowerre, Bruce. 1976. "The HARPY speech recognition system." Ph.D. Dissertation, Dept. of Computer SCience, Pittsburgh, Pa.: Carnegie-Mellon University. Marcus, Mitchell P. 1980. A Theory of SyntactiC Recognition for Natural Languages. Cambridge, Massachusetts: the MIT Press. Miller, George A. and Noam Chomsky. 1963. "Finitary models of language users." in Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, II, R.D. Luce, R. Bush, and E. Galanter (eds.), New York, New York John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 419-422. Petrick, Stanley R. 1965. "A recognition procedure for transformational grammars." Ph.D. TheSiS, MIT. Plath, Warren J. 1976. "REQUEST: A natural language question-answering system:' IBM Journal of Research and Development, 20:4 (July, 1976), 326-335. Postal, Paul M. 1964. "Limitations of phrase structure grammars:· in The Structure of Language Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz (eds.), Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc. 137-151.

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Pullum, G e o f f r e y K. 1984 Syntactic and Semantic Parsability in Proceedings of Coling84, 2-6 July 1984, Stanford University, California, 112-122. Pullam, Geoffrey K. and Gazdar, Gerald. 1981. " N a t u r a l l a n ­ guages and context f r e e languages." Stanford Cognitive Science Group Report, June, 1981. Sager, Naomi. 1981. Naturai Language information Processing - A Computer Grammar of English and Its Applications. Read­ ing, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Com­ pany, Inc. Shannon, Claude E. and Weaver, Warren. 1949. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.

RASK'S LECTURE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

William M. Christie, Jr. University of Arizona One of the pleasures of studying the history of linguis­ tics with Rulon Wells was the opportunity to share in his delight in the discovery of minor and neglected episodes or sidelights on the main flow of the discipline. Receiving such mimeographed papers as his study of 'Lexicostatistics in the Regency Period' stimulated us to look f o r similar gems on our own and taught us t h a t the development of linguistics was f a r richer and f u l l e r than the usual histories would have us believe. In this spirit I would o f f e r here a little item t h a t shows a previously neglected side of Rasmus Rask. We all know, of course, t h a t Rask was strictly an historical and comparative linguist. Saussure was still not b o r n , and Whitney was still a child when Rask died. Even historical linguistics was still in its early s t a t e , not to reach its flowering until later in the century. Yet even at this early stage t h e r e w e r e some who w e r e thinking about more than the mechanical comparison of sounds, who w a n t e d to inves­ t i g a t e what was then called the philosophy of language. It was for such people t h a t Rask p r e p a r e d his notes f o r a lecture on this topic. The t e x t is to be found in Hjelmslev's edition of Rask's Udvalgte Afhandlinger, and it is immediately a p p a r e n t t h a t what we have is nothing more than an o u t ­ line sketch of what Rask w a n t e d to say. Recognizing this f a c t , his b r o t h e r , H.K. Rask, a t t e m p t e d to convert it into a finished product in his Samlede tildels forhen utrykte Afhandlinger (1836), but with less than happy results. I have r e t u r n e d here to the original t e x t , unfinished though it be. I have omitted the footnotes, which w e r e exclusively abbreviated reminders of illustrations Rask intended to use when he delivered the lecture. Otherwise I have l e f t the t e x t intact and t r a n s l a t e d it just as it stands. No date has been

78

Christie:

Rask on the Philosphy of

Language

d e t e r m i n e d for i t , and the t i t l e is provided by Hjelmslev. The text itself is quite clear, but a f e w comments are in o r d e r . In the f i r s t place it is r a t h e r odd t h a t Rask would be criticized for being too mechanical. He was, as Markey has noted in his introduction to the Old Norse Grammar1, essentially a g r a m m a r i a n , looking at systems and r e l a t i o n ­ ships. But it is very easy to mistake comparative linguistics for a mechanistic t r e a t m e n t . So much comparative work is based on phonologic correspondences t h a t it is easy to lose sight of the systems t h a t lie behind t h e m . Yet it is neces­ sary to keep those systems in view, for they, themselves, can be of considerable importance for historical reconstruc­ t i o n , as Saussure's Memoire makes plain. Rask did keep the system in view, and this lecture outlines his position on them. One point t h a t keeps appearing in the lecture and t h a t deserves a somewhat more extended comment is the m a t t e r of exposition. Clearly Rask believed t h a t one needed to do more than understand the phenomena and t h e i r relations. One must also find the 'correct (i.e. n a t u r a l ) form' for the exposition. This can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, one can see Rask saying here what Chomsky said a century and a q u a r t e r l a t e r , t h a t the proper goal of l i n ­ guistic theory is to provide an evaluation metric whereby one can decide which of two grammars is b e t t e r for a given corpus. On the other hand, something more seems to be involved here. He is concerned not just t h a t one must u n d e r s t a n d , comprehend, and distinguish (forstå, indse, dis­ tingvere); he is also concerned about the proper form for the s t a t e m e n t , the exposition (Fremsættelsen) of the g r a m ­ mar. One must not only choose the b e t t e r g r a m m a r , one must also present the grammar properly. This concern of Rask's finds a later echo in a comment t h a t Firth drops in the middle of his 'Synopsis of Linguistic Theory.'z 'Under otherwise equal circumstances one will p r e f e r that theory, which covers a larger field of phenomena, or which f r o m some points of view appears to be simpler' or as I should prefer clearer. This casually dropped comment, 'or as I should p r e f e r - - c l e a r e r , ' signals Firth's concern with the presentation of the g r a m m a r ; and Rask's concern with expo­ sition shows the same interest.

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79

The question now arises how one can d e t e r m i n e the correct f o r m f o r the exposition. The key word here is naturat. Clearly Rask believes not t h a t he is imposing a s t r u c ­ t u r e on language, but that he is discovering the natural system in a language. Those who remember the linguistic debates of the 50's will hear an echo of the old question whether structure is innate in speech or imposed by the linguist. For Rask, however, the m a t t e r goes f u r t h e r . A real philosophical linguistics, to be well grounded and correct, is based on a knowledge of all languages, or a t least the most important ones. And the highest achievement of philo­ sophical linguistics would be to discover the t r u e system in a language a n d , really more i m p o r t a n t , to know t h a t It is the t r u e one. Rask is searching here f o r some device, i n t u ­ itive or otherwise, that will tell one t h a t a particular a n a l ­ ysis is correct. And that device must be universally applica­ ble. We are moving here very close to a search for language universais, although Rask never quite takes that f i n a l step. My final comments concern the s t a t e m e n t of the object of the philosophy of language. When Rask says t h a t he wants to understand phenomena at the very deepest level, we are t e m p t e d to read our own terminology into the statement and view it as a precursor of deep s t r u c t u r e . These a r e , however, numerous ways of understanding phe­ nomena at deep levels. Deep structure is one possibility, but the deep grammar of systemics, to cite just one exam­ ple, is quite another. Rask does not make it clear just what he means by the very deepest level, but the fact that he has a separate statement f o r the relationships among the phenomena raises the distinct possibility t h a t his meaning is quite d i f f e r e n t from ours. However one may choose to express t h e m , relationships are what really define and Hjelmslev,  following describe linguistic phenomena, as Saussure, has made clear. Since relationships form the basis of what we know as synchronic linguistics, it becomes e n t i r e l y possible that by an understanding at the deepest level Rask meant primarily historical study. While t h e r e is certainly no necessity in adopting this position, its very possibility cautions us against reading too much 20th c e n ­ t u r y theory into a lecture t h a t , for all its striking moder­ nity, still must be understood in the context of its own age.

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Rask on the Philosphy of

Language

Text: A Lecture on the Philosophy of Language Rasmus Christian Rask Gentlemen: I must ask you to pardon a little digression today con­ cerning a m a t t e r which we ought to be clear about before we go deeper into the study of the old language, and almost before one independently begins any language study, namely what it is really t h a t one wants to study. I see in a piece in the Københavns Morgenpost t h a t , a f t e r some absurd praise, it is said t h a t I have only concerned myself with the mechanical in language and have never concerned myself with the philosophy of language. The mechanical in a language is the abc's, but not the investigation of the sound system. The system is much more the seed from which the whole vigorous t r e e has sprung up, and the investigation of it is the foundation of all t r u e linguistics. The mechanical in a language is the paradigms or e n d ­ ings, but by no means is it the investigation of the l a n ­ guage system and its exposition in the correct (i.e. n a t u r a l ) f o r m . This system is the organism in language, and the investigation of t h a t which is organic is the physiology of language or the philosophy of grammar. The mechanical is rules in syntax, f o r example t h a t when two substantives come t o g e t h e r and speak of d i f f e r e n t things, that one will always be put in the genitive which ends in - s in Danish and which owns or has the other. But it is not the investigation of the whole a r r a n g e m e n t of syntax in a language and the description of it in the cor­ rect o r d e r , which gives the r e a d e r a clear picture of the formation of sentences and the whole way of forming expressions in the language. Even less is it the theory of this investigation, or the investigation of the most correct form t o r its presentation. Likewise it is mechanical to mix colors and boil varnish, but not to paint a picture which in a thousand years will appeal to the viewer and delight him with its life and t r u t h .

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Likewise in metrics, the classification and names of the f e e t and the placement and n a t u r e of the rhyming l e t t e r s are mechanical. But the scholarly exposition of how one can at a glance take in the whole verse structure is philo­ sophic. (Likewise f o r rhetoric and poetics.) The mechanical is t h a t which one learns in school, but not the scholarly exposition of i t , still less the theory of the most correct f o r m f o r this exposition or the investiga­ tion of the t r u e organization of the language. On the con­ t r a r y , t h a t is the philosophy of language. And the object of this philosophy of language is to understand a t the very deepest level the phenomena that occur; to comprehend quite clearly the reciprocal relations in which these phenomena (endings, f o r m s , word combina­ tions, etc.) stand to each other and to know how to com­ bine this knowledge of various things so as to draw out new and yet certain results; to know how to distinguish d i f f e r e n t things that do not belong t o g e t h e r , and whose combination would lead to false conclusions. From this stand out etymology and criticism, which are correct and proper applications of linguistics. But all this application holds itself fixed to language, goes out f r o m it, t u r n s back to it, and receives f r o m it alone grasp and f i r m n e s s , use and w o r t h . For example, poetics presupposes metrics, which in t u r n presupposes f e e t and syllables. Rhet­ oric presupposes sentence composition (syntax), and the l a t ­ t e r presupposes morphology, which in t u r n presupposes pho­ nology. All this is built u p , one upon the other. This gives life and spirit to linguistics and is not mechanical, if knowledge of the f u n d a m e n t a l s is missing, the whole f o u n ­ dation is lacking and is not worth much more than a b r i l ­ liant soap bubble. If it goes outside language and e n t e r s the world of ideas, it is e i t h e r wild fantasy or an alien philosophical discipline. But this is what o f t e n happens to the linguistic speculations of those who lack f u n d a m e n t a l knowledge. Language is a natural object, and the science of l a n ­ guage resembles n a t u r a l history. It o f f e r s two objects for philosophical consideration: 1) the relations among the individual n a t u r a l items, i.e. the system; 2) the construction

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Language

of these items and what pertains to t h e m , i.e. physiology. That is not mechanical. On the contrary, the highest triumph of the application of philosophy in n a t u r e is when one can with its help discover the t r u e system in n a t u r e and know that it is the t r u e one. All other philosophy concerning n a t ­ ural history is either wild or u n f o u n d e d , or else a real philosophical branch of knowledge which lies outside n a t u r a l history, although the l a t t e r can be employed in it. T h e r e f o r e general or philosophical linguistics must also be drawn from real speech if it is not to become an empty figment of the imagination. And yet it is not w o r t h much because i t , to be well founded and correct, assumes t h a t one knows all languages, or at least most of t h e m , includ­ ing the most i m p o r t a n t , and t h a t the system in them was correctly s t a t e d . But t h a t is f a r f r o m being the case since the system is not t r u l y understood or properly described even in Greek or Latin or German. It can t h e r e f o r e scarcely become anything other than a patchwork; and since the individual materials do not hold, it becomes a mess. In addition to this manner of perceiving language structure and philosophizing over it as an object of e x p e r i ­ ence, t h e r e is another, apparently philosophical, which p r o ­ ceeds from the n a t u r e of the ideas which the language forms are made to express. Now since thoughts are every­ where the same, it appears t h a t this method must lead to a f i r m and immovable f o r m for the system in linguistics. But t h a t is by no means the case, and I would strongly w a r n the reader away from it. Thought is an infinitely f i n e , incorporeal, immaterial object, which is not easy to grasp, hold f i r m , and examine in such a way t h a t one can discover its absolutely correct f o r m . And in any case it is not thought and its forms but words, sounds, and their forms and relationships or combinations t h a t one should concern oneself with in linguistics.

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ENDNOTES

1

Rasmus Kristian Rask. 1976. A Grammar of the Icelandic or Old Norse Tongue, translated by Sir George Webb Dasent, new edition by T. L. Markey. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 2John Rupert Firth. 1951. "A Synopsis of Linguistic Theory, 1930-1955," Studies in Linguistic Analysis (Special vol­ ume of the Philological Society). Oxford: Blackwell's, 1-31. 3

Louis Hjelmslev. 1961. Prolegomena to guage, t r a n s l a t e d by Francis J. Whitfield. sity of Wisconsin Press, 23.

a Theory Madison:

of Lan­ Univer­

CONTRAST1

John Fought University of Pennsylvania Contrast is the foundation of modern linguistics: the notion of structure in language rests on it. Despite its importance, however, d i f f e r e n c e s of terminology, d e f i n i t i o n , and practice remain in the scholarly l i t e r a t u r e , receiving only occasional and inconclusive examination. This paper presents an unrestricted contrast r e l a t i o n , analyzes it into its components, and shows how some other varieties of contrast can be derived f r o m it by the addition of restrictions in one or another component.

Paradigmatic Contrast and its Components Consider a number of discourses observed in the speech of some individual, each recorded as an a r r a n g e m e n t of discrete elements of sound and meaning - - components or f e a t u r e s of expression and of content. The correlation of a given expression with a given content is the Saussurean sign r e l a t i o n ; a discourse or portion of discourse is made up of one or more such signs, each having arrangements of f e a ­ t u r e s on both planes. Compared, the arrangements of expression or content f e a t u r e s of two such signs may be partly or wholly d i f f e r e n t from each o t h e r , or they may be alike. If they d i f f e r on one plane or the other, the f e a ­ t u r e s by which they d i f f e r are said to be in opposition. Thus, the sign relation holds between expression elements and content elements; opposition is a relation between expression elements or content elements.

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Fought: Contrast

Two signs d i f f e r e n t from each other in both expression and content f e a t u r e s are said to be in contrast. 2 Note t h a t the relation between such signs is one of dual d i f f e r e n c e : t h e r e are oppositions of expression f e a t u r e s and of content features. Hjelmslev (1935) introduced the t e r m commutation for another dual relation between two linguistic signs, carefully making it n e u t r a l between expression d i f f e r e n c e (seen as correlated with a content d i f f e r e n c e ) and content d i f f e r ­ ence (seen as correlated with an expression d i f f e r e n c e ) . The commutation test is a substitution of f e a t u r e s on either plane, content or expression; it tests whether t h e r e is a correlated change of f e a t u r e s on the other plane. The d i f ­ ference on either or both planes may be partial or com­ p l e t e ; the most convenient commutation tests for analytical and pedagogical uses are those in which the tested items d i f f e r by a single f e a t u r e on one or both planes. These are equivalent to minimal contrasts, the type traditionally used in books and classrooms to introduce the notion of contrast to students, by means of pairs of monosyllabic, monomorphemic, monolexemic utterances in isolation f r o m any larger context: [ p i n ] 'pin' / [ b i n ] 'bin'. In this f o r m , as FischerJørgensen noted in her admirable paper on the commutation test ( 1 9 5 6 ) , it is very old indeed; she cited an example from the t w e l f t h century. Figure 1 summarizes these relationships: the sign r e l a ­ tion links a given expression with a given content; opposi­ tion is a d i f f e r e n c e of expression or of content between signs; contrast is a d i f f e r e n c e of expression and of content between signs; and commutation is a relation between oppositions of content and of expression of signs.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

Figure 1:

Sameness and

87

Terms and Relations

Identification

As Fischer-Jørgensen has r e p e a t e d l y emphasized, lin­ guistic elements having the same f e a t u r e s of substance are identified as the same; in some systems of linguistics, f e a ­ t u r e s of form are also adduced to establish i d e n t i t i e s , but substance, t h a t is, phonetic f e a t u r e s in the analysis of expression units, is the indispensable f o u n d a t i o n .  Accord­ ingly, the unrestricted contrast relation under construction here is based on elements identified as the same by virtue of having the same combination of properties. The salient relational p r o p e r t y of linguistic sameness t h e r e f o r e is reflexivity; the relation of the element to itself. Identification is the operation of asserting t h a t two distinct tokens are of the same type. Identification is perhaps most readily understood as the assignment of symbols for e l e ­ ments according to consistent principles. The same element (combination of relevant properties) is always assigned the same symbolic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and vice versa.

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Fought: Contrast

Linguistic sameness is generally considered an equiva­ lence r e l a t i o n , like numerical equality or logical identity. Equivalence relations are not only reflexive and symmetric, so that aRa, bRb, aRb, and bRa for all elements a and b in relation R; they are also transitive, so t h a t if aRb and bRc, then aRc, for any a, b, and  in R. That is, two elements equal to the same element are equal to each other. The assumption t h a t linguistic sameness is transitive causes no trouble so long as d i f f e r e n c e s among elements are either imperceptibly small or unmistakably l a r g e , but in a number of rather ordinary circumstances it is at odds with observation. A series of six or seven vowels ranging through the m i d - f r o n t unrounded zone, for example, may be such t h a t to the unaided ears of speakers and linguists alike any two neighboring vowels in the series are indistin­ guishable, whereas the f i r s t and the last are consistently d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by all. This kind of sameness is nontransitive; the relation so defined is technically not an equivalence r e l a t i o n , nor is it homogeneous. It belongs, in other words, with the indifference relations axiomatized over the years by utility theorists for dealing with p a t t e r n s of indifference or p r e f e r e n c e among alternatives. It is sobering to see how much more sophisticated is the study of such p a t t e r n s in economics and psychology than it is in linguistics. 4 To summarize, identification asserts t h a t two elements a r e , if not necessarily exactly identical, then at least indifferent as a l t e r n a t i v e s , and this relation is r e f l e x i v e , symmetric, and nontransitive. Opposition Sets and the Composition of Contrast Two linguistic forms partly d i f f e r e n t and partly alike in expression and content make up a minimum paradigm, the like portions on each plane forming a communis and each unique portion a propria, to use the widely accepted t e r m s introduced by Rulon Wells (1949). Minimally contrastive sets are a subclass of these paradigmatic contrasts in which each propria consists of a single f e a t u r e on one or both planes. The commutation test can be restated easily in these terms: substitute one propria f o r the other on either plane and t h e r e will be a change of propriae on the other.

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The operations of analysis and identification discussed so f a r , carried out on a corpus of discourses regarded as original d a t a , permit a condensed r e a r r a n g e m e n t of the corpus in the f o r m of a list of minimal opposition sets. Each set has an identifying communis, the environment of each member of the set of paradigmatically opposed propriae. To each pairing of the communis and a propria there corresponds a d i f f e r e n t a r r a n g e m e n t of elements on the other plane; in other words, each propria is abstracted f r o m a d i f f e r e n t sign. Each sign, and thus each propria abstracted f r o m one plane of i t , has a particular distribution describable in syn­ tactic, pragmatic, and sociolinguistic t e r m s . Each communis matched with a set of opposed propriae is d i f f e r e n t f r o m all the others in the list (and thus can serve as a convenient identifying label f o r the s e t ) ; some sets of opposed p r o p ­ riae may be the same as others in the list, but most will be d i f f e r e n t f r o m one another. Opposition is an i r r e f l e x i v e , symmetric, and transitive r e l a t i o n . No element is in opposition to itself. If one e l e ­ ment is in opposition to a second, then the second is in opposition to the f i r s t : if a/b then to/a. If one e l e m e n t is in opposition to a second, and that second to a t h i r d , then the f i r s t is in opposition to the t h i r d : if a/to and b/c, then a/c. Now consider lows: / _ət I / _əd /

two

fragments

p b t b

of

opposition

sets,

as

fol­

kg dk

From these two overlapping but incomplete opposition sets a complete set of stop oppositions can be built up by using identification and composition as indicated above. Two seg­ ments are common to both sets, and t h e r e f o r e may be i d e n t i f i e d , to = to, and  = . These identifications, and the generalizing power of composition fill in the gap: if b/t and b/d then t/d. Composition, t h e n , is the generalization of oppositions by transitivity, with the reflexive property bor­ rowed from identification (by substance) allowing a kind of summing process for filling the numerous 'accidental' gaps in particular opposition sets, as in the example just

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discussed. Of course, in this particular case, t h e r e are other opposition sets where the t/d opposition is shown directly, such as / tik / 'tick' and / dik / 'Dick'. But by using the reflexivity of i n d i f f e r e n c e and the transitivity of contrast together in this way, a complete inventory of e l e ­ ments in opposition can be constructed even though t h e r e may be no single opposition set t h a t contains them all. The same process of identification and composition could be used w i t h semantic elements t o o , given opposition sets to start with. Unrestricted paradigmatic contrast is thus defined by its component relations of signification and opposition, and these l a t t e r are used r e p e a t e d l y , with operations of i d e n t i ­ fication and composition, to build up the inventory of structural elements of a language, as r e p r e s e n t e d by some body of d a t a . Other v a r i e t i e s of contrast, as will be merely sketched h e r e , are derivable from the unrestricted relation by the addition of restrictions on identification or composition, or both. Restricted Varieties of Contrast A f e w examples of restricted contrast will be discussed b r i e f l y to suggest how others might also be compared within the system outlined here. In all of these, the restrictions are presented as f e a t u r e s of form to be added to the f e a ­ t u r e s of substance used in comparing elements f o r purposes of identification or d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . W. F. Twaddell (1935) proposed a system of phonology whose explicitness and consistency w e r e notably above the standard of the t i m e . The t r e a t m e n t of opposition given h e r e , in f a c t , owes much to t h a t monograph. Twaddell restricted the scope of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , however, mentioning Saussure as an a u t h o r i t y , allowing composition only among similarly ordered opposition sets, t h a t is, sets having exactly the same membership of opposed e l e m e n t s , which w e r e seg­ ments in his proposal. Each member segment of a given opposition set was called a microphoneme; each set of cor­ responding members of similarly ordered opposition sets

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71

made up what he called a macrophoneme. His aim in ending the process of composition with the macrophoneme was to establish a system based on opposition r a t h e r than on pho­ netic substance, respecting the Saussurean dictum that relations alone define linguistic elements. But like Saussure, Twaddell actually relied on both opposition relations and phonetic substance: the elements belonging to the opposi­ tion sets w e r e identified and ordered according to the d i f ­ f e r e n c e s among their phonetic properties. A look at Figure 2 will suggest how many macropnonemes are required by Twaddell's restrictions. The f i r s t t h r e e opposition sets are similarly o r d e r e d , thus each of the t h r e e / i / microphonemes may be assigned to the same macrophoneme. The last three lines are also similarly o r d e r e d , and those three / i / microphonemes also belong to a single macrophoneme. But the two / i / macrophonemes are d i f f e r e n t f r o m each o t h e r , and so it is f o r each of the other vowels found on all six lines of the Figure:

/ / / / / /

P_P P_k g_t b_t b_d t_t

/ / / / / /

e e e e e e

æ æ æ æ æ æ

   ə θ 

a a a a a a

  

Figure 2 Where identification is blocked in this system, neutralization is introduced: elements which would be r e g a r d e d as the same on the basis of substance alone, such as the six high f r o n t unrounded vowels above, are instead r e g a r d e d as d i f ­ f e r e n t because of their d i f f e r e n t relations to other e l e ­ ments, as are 7 in opposition to f o u r vowels' and 'i in opposition to five vowels', or in another f o r m u l a t i o n , 7 in opposition to ɔ' and 7 not in opposition to o'. The relational constraints implied by Twaddell's tion of the macrophoneme can be matched within the discussed here by requiring t h a t identification apply a o n e - t o - o n e basis, segment to segment, but r a t h e r a l l , opposition set to opposition set. That is, [ i ] is

defini­ system not on all-tonot to

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Fought: Contrast

be identified with [ i ] by reflexivity and substantive f e a t u r e s of this segment alone, but instead the set [ i / e æ ə a ɔ ] is to be identified with [ i '  æ ə a ɔ ] and not with [ i /  æ ə a ] , nor with any other combination of segments. Note also t h a t f e a t u r e s of phonetic substance play an appropriate role in this reconstruction, since the identification of the members of the opposition sets (the microphonemes) and t h e i r o r d e r ­ ing is based on them as it is in the original formulation of the system by Twaddell. Neutralization is doubtless most familiar in the f o r m given to it by Trubetzkoy ( 1 9 6 9 ) , where it is restricted to binary privative oppositions, t h a t is, to oppositions of two t e r m s (segments) whose phonetic d i f f e r e n c e is such t h a t one has a f e a t u r e the other lacks. In the position of n e u ­ t r a l i z a t i o n , it is the unmarked member of the pair, i.e., the one lacking the specified f e a t u r e , t h a t occurs, but this seg­ ment represents in such occurrences not ' i t s e l f but the pair of opposed segments. In this capacity, the unmarked segment represents an archiphoneme. To model this r e s t r i c ­ t i o n , and the notion of the archiphoneme, a specification of the position of neutralization must be added to the opposi­ tion sets, and the segments found in other sets in binary privative oppositions are matched pairwise in the positions of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n , as with German stops, initial [ p / t / k / b / d / g ] but [pb / t d / k g ] . Trubetzkoy's type of neutralization is different from Twaddell's in several particulars: it is restricted to certain types of opposition ( d e f i n e d p h o n e t i ­ cally), and it is positional r a t h e r than universal in scope; this positional restriction is also definable phonetically at least in p a r t . But both systems have in common the r e s t r i c ­ tion of identification in certain instances where a compari­ son of f e a t u r e s of substance alone would support it. The relational conditions of Firthian polysystemic lin­ guistics, like the similar r e q u i r e m e n t s of Chomskyan g e n e r a ­ tive phonology, can be modelled in much the same way within this system of restrictions on contrast. 5 In dealing with the phonological elements of both Firthian and Chomskyan linguistics, the grammatical category membership of each propria in a phonological opposition set may (or must) be added to the information on phonetic substance. Thus, f o r a Firthian analysis of the vowel systems of, say, the verbs, nouns, and affixes of some language, the

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relevant f e a t u r e s supporting identification of phoneticallylike vowels, mid f r o n t u n r o u n d e d , f o r example, might have to be supplemented with the category of f o r m where the particular vowel occurs. Opposition, t h e n , is not between vowels as such, but b e t w e e n vowels in comparable f o r m s , and identification is not of [e] with [e], but of [e]-in-a-verb with [e]-in-a-verb, [e]-in a noun with [ e ] - i n - a - n o u n , and so on: [ e y ] = [ev] [ e N ] = [ e N ] . in Chomskyan phonology one is said to label the brackets around f o r m s , but this is no d i f f e r e n t f r o m labelling all the segments. A restriction of a d i f f e r e n t character f r o m the f o r e g o ­ ing can be traced from Bloomfield's system of structuralism (1926, 1933) through a number of works by followers of his distributionist approach. In b r i e f , the restriction applies only on the plane of c o n t e n t , where it amounts to rejecting all identification. In chapters 5 and 9 of Language (1933), Bloomfield clearly expressed the acceptance of the f u n d a ­ mental notion of s t r u c t u r a l linguistics, the idea of significant difference, in the analysis of sound, but rejected it in the analysis of meaning (cf. 1933.78, 1 4 4 - 5 ) . Though each f o r m had a constant and specific meaning in his system, t h a t meaning was nevertheless unanalyzable. Sound, on the other hand, though also varying subtly and continuously, was nev­ ertheless to be viewed as s t r u c t u r e d into discrete elements. Thus, Bloomfield's contrast relation is not equivalent to commutation, since t h e r e are strictly speaking no elements on the plane of content, and t h e r e f o r e no oppositions t h e r e , only d i f f e r e n c e or sameness. Conclusion The reconstruction of opposition and contrast provided here gives an unrestricted variety of the contrast relation against which others found in the l i t e r a t u r e may be meas­ u r e d . Those b r i e f l y examined here r e q u i r e e i t h e r more information in the characterization of specific contrasts than does the unrestricted v a r i e t y , or they embody, as did Bloomfield's position, some inconsistency in the t r e a t m e n t of linguistic elements. Judgments of worthiness are not the point h e r e , however. What is o f f e r e d is not a means of justifying restrictions on contrast but r a t h e r a means of

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Fought: Contrast

representing d i f f e r e n t contrast relations in a consistent comparable way within an explicit analytical f r a m e w o r k .

and

Endnotes

1 This study belongs to a genre to which Rulon Wells has made many distinguished contributions; many of his histori­ cal and critical w r i t i n g s , and many hours of his teaching and advice, have helped shape my thinking about language and scholarship. This is only the most recent opportunity to express my g r a t i t u d e .

For their assistance in bringing my thoughts on contrast to t h e i r c u r r e n t state I also thank Lee Ann Draud, Henry Hiz, Henry Hoenigswald, Patti Price, and Marcia Wesler. Responsibility for the content of the paper, and still more, for omissions, rests with me. 2 Bloomfield (1933.77) gave such a d e f i n i t i o n of " d i s ­ tinctive d i f f e r e n c e s or contrasts, capable of distinguishing one meaning from a n o t h e r " , agreeing with Hjelmslev (1935) also in accepting both potential and actual signs as con­ trastive instead of accepting only actual ones and some form of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n . Twaddell (1935, pt.2) collected many kinds of definition of contrast; many, like Bloomfield's, made no distinction between opposition and contrast. This is the f a t a l flaw of Postal's (1968) 'reconstruction' of the con­ trast relation. For a c r i t i q u e , see Hymes and Fought (1981:212-7) and Starke (1972).

3 Fischer-Jørgensen (1949, 1952) made this point with special clarity, speaking f o r herself and Hjelmslev; she also used the t e r m 'identification' in the sense continued here. Trubetzkoy (1969) and Twaddell (1935) likewise conceded the primacy of phonetic identity.

4 Arrow (1963) is lucid and accessible. Stigler (1950) is a good account of the history of utility theory; Skala (1975) shows how formal it can be. His f i r s t chapter gives a useful

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axiomatization of indifference and preference relations. Luce (1956) is more limited on these. Suppes (1957) gives an introduction to the properties of relations that is superior to those of most manuals. His emphasis on the empirical content of relations is especially h e l p f u l . The usual t r e a t m e n t s , however, concentrate on equivalence r e l a ­ tions (transitive, unlike indifference) and orderings (asymmetric, like preference, but unlike opposition). Abernathy (1961) is an unusually careful a t t e m p t to t r e a t equivalence as a linguistic r e l a t i o n , but it does not solve any of the problems. 5See (1968).

Firth

(1948),

Robins (1953), and

Chomsky and

Halle

REFERENCES CITED

Abernathy, Robert. 1961. "The Problem of Linguistic Equiva­ lence." In Roman Jakobson, e d . , The Structure of Lan­ guage and its Mathematical Aspects. Proceedings of the Twelfth Symposium in Applied Mathematics, 95-8, held in New York City April 1 4 - 1 5 , 1960. Providence, RI: American Mathematical Society. Arrow, Kenneth. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values (2nd e d . ) . New York: John Wiley and Sons. Bloomfield, Leonard. 1926. "A Set of Postulates f o r the Sci­ ence of Language." Language. 2.153-64. . 1933. Language. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win­ ston. Chomsky, Noam, and Morris Halle. 1968. The Sound Pattern of English. New York: Harper and Row. F i r t h , John. 1948. "Sounds and Prosodies." Transactions of the Philological Society, 127-52. Fischer-Jørgensen, Eli. 1949. "Remarques sur les principes de l'analyse phonémique." Travaux du Cercle linguistique de Copenhague 5.214-34. . 1952. "On the Definition of Phoneme Categories on a Distributional Basis." Acta Linguistica 7.8-39. . 1956. "The Commutation Test and its Application to Phonemic Analysis." For Roman Jakobson, 140-51, The Hague: Mouton.

96

Fought: Contrast

Hjelmslev, Louis. 1935. "On the Principles of Phonematics." Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Pho­ netic Sciences, 49-54. London. Hymes, Dell, and John Fought. 1981. American Structuralism. Janua Linguarum, Series Maior 102. The Hague: Mouton. Luce, R. Duncan. 1956. "Semiorders and a Theory of Utility Discrimination." Econometrica 2 4 . 1 7 8 - 9 1 . Postal, Paul. 1968. Aspects of Phonological Theory. New York: Harper and Row. Robins, R. H. 1953. "The Phonology of the Nasalized Verbal Forms in Sudanese." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 15.138-45. Sapir, Edward. 1925. "Sound P a t t e r n s in Language." Language 1.37-51. . 1933. "La Réalité psychologique des phonèmes." Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique 30.247-65. de Saussure, Ferdinand. 1922. Cours de linguistique generale (2nd e d . ) . Paris. Skala, H. J. 1975. Non-Archimedean Utility Theory. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. S t a r k e , Paul. 1972. "On Characterizing Contrast." Language Sciences 22.17-20. Stigler, George. 1950. "The Development of Utility Theory." Journal of Political Economy 5 8 . 3 0 7 - 2 7 , 3 7 3 - 9 6 . Suppes, Patrick. 1957. Introduction to Logic. Princeton: Van Nostrand. T w a d d e l l , W. Freeman. 1935. On Defining the Phoneme. L a n ­ guage Monograph 16. Baltimore: Linguistic Society of America. Vache, Josef. 1966. The Linguistic School of Prague. loomington: Indiana University Press. Wells, Rulon. 1947. "De Saussure's system of Linguistics." Word 3 . 1 - 3 1 . . 1949. "Automatic Alternation." Language 25.99-116.

M PHONOLOGY

PHONOLOGICAL "NEUTRALIZATION" IN CLASSICAL AND STRATIFICATIONAL THEORIES*

David G. Lockwood Michigan State University

This paper distinguishes between the suspension--Praguian " n e u t r a l i z a t i o n " - - o f a contrast and the alternational discrepancy which has been t e r m e d "neutralization" by Lamb. The f o r m e r can be t r e a t e d within autonomous pho­ nology; the l a t t e r (which may be t e r m e d syncretization to dis­ tinguish it more clearly) involves the relation of autonomous phonology to a more abstract level. Two stratificational t r e a t m e n t s of suspension have been proposed. Lockwood showed in 1972 how it could be handled without the a r c h i phoneme (a concept so pejorated by Neo-Bloomfieldians); Sullivan proposed in 1975 a t r e a t m e n t substantially embrac­ ing the archiphoneme, though with some r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The l a t t e r approach is more economical than any direct translation of Praguian archiphonemic analysis into componential t e r m s , though the f o r m e r corresponds more exactly to one of several Praguian views. 1. 7ypes of Neutralization:

Suspension vs.

Syncretization.

The f i r s t point to note in a discussion of neutralization in phonology is t h a t the t e r m has been used by d i f f e r e n t linguists for distinct though o f t e n r e l a t e d phenomena. 1 In one sense, it r e f e r s to an environmentally conditioned absence of contrast 2 between otherwise contrasting units on a given level of abstraction in language s t r u c t u r e . The t e r m suspension may be proposed f o r this sort of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n , since the contrast present in some environments may be seen as suspended elsewhere. 3

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In another sense, promoted particularly by Lamb in connection with stratificational theory, the t e r m n e u t r a l i z a ­ tion has r e f e r r e d to a kind of discrepant relation between the units of two distinct but adjacent linguistic levels or s t r a t a . Neutralization in this sense is said to obtain when two or more units of one level show, e i t h e r always or sometimes, the same realization on the level below (i.e. on the level which is one step closer to expression). The t e r m syncretization is suggested as a distinct t e r m for this type of neutralization.* 1.1 Suspension. Suspension is the type of neutralization which received primary a t t e n t i o n in the w r i t i n g s of Trubetzkoy and others of the Prague School. A full d e f i n i t i o n of the t e r m ' n e u ­ t r a l i z a t i o n ' does not seem to occur in T r u b e t z k o / s major works on the subject, but a f a i r l y clear discussion in t e r m s of neutralizable oppositions gives a good idea of what is meant by it: There are phonic oppositions which are phonologically relevant only in certain phonic positions, since both members of the opposi­ tion are found only in these positions, while in other positions only one or the other member of the opposition occurs ...We call such oppositions neutralizable...5 It would not be f a i r , however, to a t t e m p t to abstract a definition of neutralization directly f r o m this q u o t a t i o n , since such a d e f i n i t i o n would be too restrictive in requiring only one or the other member of the opposition to occur in the position of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n . T r u b e t z k o / s f u r t h e r discus­ sions of the phenomenon show t h a t the sound occurring at positions of neutralization may be (1) always identical to one member, (2) identical to one or the other member depending on f u r t h e r conditions, or (3) identical to neither though related to both more closely than to any other sound in the language. (Cf. Trubetzkoy 1969:77-83) Taking these f u r t h e r facts into account, and using the t e r m contrast as suggested above, we can give the following definition:

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells PHONOLOGICAL SUSPENSION: The situation which sounds in phonemic contrast in one of positions are not contrastive in another of positions, whatever the manifestation the suspended range may happen to be.

101 in set set of

Two examples of suspension will be cited: 1) In Russian, the voicing of obstruents is contrastive before a vowel or a resonant (including / v / and its p a l a t a l ­ ized c o u n t e r p a r t / v , / ) , but it is suspended in f i n a l position or before an obstruent. Examples will be cited f o r the p a r ­ ticular contrasts / p / : / b / and / t / : / d / f r o m among the several contrastive pairs in the language. Contrast [ p a l ] 'fell' vs. [ b a l ] 'ball, dance', and [ t o r n ] 'volume' vs. [ d o m ] 'house'. Suspension: [ r á p ] 'slave', [ j ú p k e ] 'skirt'; and [ k o t ] 'tomcat', [ k l , ἑ t k Ə ] 'cage'. 2) In standard T h a i , the voicing and aspiration of stops is contrastive such t h a t t h e r e are t h r e e possibilities in i n i ­ tial position f o r the labial and apical stops: / p / , / b / , / p / ; /t/, / d / , / t /. Both these contrasts are suspended in final position, however, so t h a t only u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d voiceless, normally unreleased, stops occur. Contrast: [ p à i ] 'go' vs. [ b ä i ] ' l e a f vs. [ p āi] 'danger' and [ t ī : ] 'hit' vs. [ d ï : ] 'good' vs. [ t ï : ] ' t i m e , instance'. Suspension: [ s a p ] 'vocabulary' and [ h è t ] 'mushroom'. 6 1.2

Syncretization.

In discussing 'the realization of elements of one s t r a ­ tum by those of the next lower s t r a t u m , Lamb defined the type of neutralization here t e r m e d syncretization as the s i t u ­ ation in which 'two or more units have the same realization' (1964:213). As it applies more specifically to phonology, syn­ cretization usually r e f e r s to the relationship between con­ trasting units on a morphophonemic level of some sort and various realizations they may have on phonemic (i.e. an autonomous phonemic) level. Thus we can o f f e r the more precise d e f i n i t i o n : PHONOLOGICAL SYNCRETIZATION: The situation in which distinct morphophonemic units, or distinct combinations of such units, have

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Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n " identical realizations on the at least some environments.

phonemic

level

in

Two examples of this phenomenon will be cited:

1) In Russian, such contrasting pairs of morphophonemes as / / p / / and / / b / / , / / t / / and / / d / / have distinct realizations before vowels or resonants, but finally and before o b s t r u ­ ents they have a realization which will be predictably voiced or voiceless according to context, regardless of which morphophoneme they realize. Examples: Contrastive realization of contrasting morphophonemes: / / p a p a / / ' p a p a ' - - / p á p a / vs. / / b a b a / / 'country w o m a n ' - - / b a b a / and / / p o t a / / 'of s w e a t ' - - / p o t a / vs. / / g o d a / / 'of a y e a r ' - - / g o d a / . Syncretized voiced realization of contrasting morphophonemes: //pap zet I 'papas indeed (acc.)'--[pábžə] vs. //bab že// 'country women indeed ( a c c . ) ' - - [ b á b ž ə ] and / / p o t ž e / / 'sweat i n d e e d ' - - [ p d ž ə ] vs. //god ž e / / 'a year i n d e e d ' - - [g d ž ə ] . Syncretized voiceless realization of contrasting morphophonemes: / / p a p / / 'papas (acc.)' - - [ p a p ] vs. ł/bab/ł 'country women (acc.) - - [ b a p ] and / / p o t / / 'sweat' - - [p t ] vs. / / g o d / / 'year' - - [g t ] 7 2) In Polish t h e r e are t h r e e contrasting morphopho­ nemes which may be symbolized as / / a / / , / / æ / / , and / / c e / / . In one set of environments, / / æ / / has a realization syncretized with t h a t of / / a / / , while in another set of environments it has a realization syncretized with t h a t of / / œ / / . The r e a l i ­ zation syncretizing / / æ / / and / / c e / / is / e / , and it occurs when the / / æ / / is followed ( a f t e r intervening consonantal morphophonemes) by a morphophoneme / / J / / , which itself o f t e n a f f e c t s the realization of preceding consonants. The realization syncretizing / / æ / / and / / a / / occurs in other posi­ tions. Examples: Syncretization of / / a e / / and / / a / / : / / v j æ r a / / 'faith' - - / v j a r a / and / / k a s a / / 'cashier's window' — /kasa/ (cf. / / ś œ s t r a / / 'sister' - - / s o s t r a / ) . Syncretization of / / a e / / and //œ//: //vjaerJe// 'to f a i t h ' - - / v j e ž e / and / / ś œ s t r J e / / 'to a sister' - - / s e s t š e / (cf. / / k a s J e / / 'to a cashier's window' - /kase/.)

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1.3 Distinguishing Suspension from Syncretization. By the definitions stated in the above subsections, sus­ pension and syncretization are two d i f f e r e n t phenomena. For suspension, we must f i n d that elements which contrast in one set of environments f a i l to contrast in some other set of environments on the same layer of s t r u c t u r e . For syncretization, we must f i n d distinct elements on one layer of structure which in at least some cases have the same realization on the structural layer below. Thus both suspen­ sion and syncretization involve lack of contrast, but when t h e r e is suspension this lack is opposed to contrasts which occur in other positions, and when t h e r e is syncretization, it is opposed to the occurrence of contrasting realizates on a higher level. The use of the same t e r m for both phenomena has been aided by the fact t h a t many concrete situations involving one of these phenomena t u r n out to involve the other as w e l l . To show t h a t they really are distinct, how­ e v e r , it is only necessary to show t h a t some examples illus­ t r a t i n g one phenomenon cannot be used to illustrate the other. As it t u r n s o u t , while many of the most f r e q u e n t l y cited examples involve both suspension and syncretization at the same t i m e , t h e r e are still f a i r l y f r e q u e n t examples in which suspension occurs without syncretization, and others where syncretization occurs without suspension. All t h r e e possibilities with respect to the occurrence of suspension and syncretization can be i l l u s t r a t e d , as it h a p ­ pens, with the examples already cited in sections 1.1 and 1.2. The Thai data illustrates suspension without syncretiza­ tion. Although the contrasts of voicing and aspiration are suspended in final position as illustrated above, t h e r e is no syncretization because t h e r e is no need to identify any final /p/'s or / t / ' s with aspirates or voiced consonants morphophonemically. We can most simply consider them to be r e a l i z a ­ tions of / / p / / and //t// and we could speak of a suspension on the morphophonemic level as well as on the phonemic, but t h e r e would be no syncretization.

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The Polish example, on the other hand, illustrates the occurrence of syncretization without suspension. There are no environments at all in which //æ// has a separate r e a l i ­ zation from both / / a / / and / / c e / / . The phonemes / a / and / e / which serve to realize / / æ / / can in general contrast in just about any environment; they are in no case subject to sus­ pension. 8 As to the Russian examples cited as illustrations of both phenomena, it should be clear t h a t they are indeed related in a way which very commonly occurs: syncretization and suspension occur in the same examples and under the same environmental conditions. The morphophonemes //t// and / / d / / , for instance, have a syncretized realization in p r e ­ cisely those environments--final and before an obstruent-where their more usual realizations /t/ and /d/ cannot con­ t r a s t phonologically because of suspension. The g r e a t frequency of situations parallel to that illus­ t r a t e d for Russian, t h e n , is a major reason why e a r l i e r writers have failed to make an adequate distinction between suspension and syncretization. The fact t h a t s i t u ­ ations like those illustrated by the Thai and Polish data can also occur, however, makes it clearly necessary to d i s t i n ­ guish the two phenomena in t e r m s of definition and nomenclature. 2. Interpretations of Suspension Phenomena. The main topic of this paper is the sort of n e u t r a l i z a ­ tion t e r m e d suspension r a t h e r than syncretization. This is appropriate in a discussion of autonomous phonology, since suspension can be discussed wholly in t e r m s of an a u t o n o ­ mous phonological level, without considering the relationship of this level to a more abstract level as is r e q u i r e d in dis­ cussions of phonological syncretization. 2.1 Interpretations in the Prague School. In the classic l i t e r a t u r e of the Prague School from the 1930's, t h r e e distinct i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of suspension phenom­ ena are found. All t h r e e of these agree on the occurrence of phonological suspension, but they disagree on the a p p r o ­ priate phonological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of sounds occurring in

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positions where a given contrast is suspended. These three approaches, which may be t e r m e d the archiphonemic approach, the unmarked member approach, and the phonetic identification approach, will be taken up in the following paragraphs. 2.11 The Archiphonemic Approach. The archiphonemic approach is doubtless the one most readily associated with the Prague School by phonologists of other persuasions, because it is the one set f o r t h in T r u ­ betzkoy 1939, the Prague School work most o f t e n r e a d , ( e i t h e r in the original Grman, the French translation by Cantineau [Trubetzkoy 1 9 4 9 ] , or the English translation by Baltaxe [Trubetzkoy 1 9 6 9 ] ) . Essentially the archiphonemic approach works as follows: given a sound occurring in a position where a contrast X/Y is suspended, and which is phonetically similar to both X and Y, this sound is identified with neither X nor Y, but with a third e n t i t y , Z, which represents the phonetic p r o p ­ e r t i e s held in common by X and Y and excludes r e f e r e n c e to the properties by which they would contrast. This third e n t i t y Z is an archiphoneme, and as such is a subordinated e n t i t y r a t h e r than a f u l l - f l e d g e d member of the phonemic inventory. Thus if a voiced/voiceless contrast such as / t / vs. / d / is suspended in particular positions in a given language, the most closely related sounds to these occurring in the position of suspension will be phonologically i d e n t i f i e d with an element usually symbolized / T / , which incorporates all properties / t / and / d / have in common (e.g. closure and apicality in a typical case), but is unspecified f o r the p r o p ­ e r t y d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g contrastive / t / from / d / (e.g. voiceless­ ness vs. voicing in a typical case). The archiphoneme /T/, and similar ones for any similarly suspendable voiceless/ voiced pairs, may seem to complicate the description when viewed from the point of view of inventories. If each pho­ neme or archiphoneme symbol is viewed as standing f o r a complex of distinctive properties (or f e a t u r e s ) , however, the archiphonemic approach can be seen as achieving a degree of economy, since voicelessness or voicing would have to be symbolized only in those positions where it can have dis­ tinctive value, and the phonetic voicing, voicelessness, or intermediate quality of sounds in the position of n e u t r a l i ­ zation could be l e f t as m a t t e r s of automatic predictability.

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2.12 The Unmarked-Member

Approach.

The approach here t e r m e d 'unmarked-member' identifies all putative archiphonemes with one or the other member of the contrast which has been suspended, namely t h a t member which is considered unmarked. Like the archiphonemic approach, this view is also found in the w r i t i n g s of T r u ­ betzkoy, but not in those which have received primary a t t e n t i o n as representing his point of view. Trubetzkoy 1931, f o r example, states: In those positions where the correlative p r o p ­ e r t y of a phoneme loses its phonological sig­ nificance, this phoneme is i d e n t i f i e d with the unmarked member of the c o r r e l a t i o n , even if it is objectively identical with the marked member of the correlation (p. 9 8 ) . 9

With this approach, t h e n , any sound i d e n t i f i e d with / T / in the archiphonemic approach would be i d e n t i f i e d with / t / if this is u n m a r k e d , or with / d / if this is u n m a r k e d . 1 0 In this way, we will have only two inventory units by any count, but when / t / is unmarked its presence will not nec­ essarily mean t h a t no voicing is p r e s e n t , merely t h a t no distinctive voicing is present. The presence of / d / under the same circumstances will mean not only t h a t voicing is p r e s ­ e n t , but t h a t the voicing is distinctive in being potentially opposable to its absence in the position where it occurs. Thus the phone [ d ] will be an allophone of / d / where its voicing is distinctive, but an allophone of / t / where such voicing is predictable. This approach has a major advantage of the archipho­ nemic view while lacking the major shortcoming of t h a t l a t ­ t e r view. Like the archiphonemic approach, the u n m a r k e d member approach does not require the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a property such as voicing in positions where its presence is predictable, even though such presence may not be predic­ table in other definable positions. But unlike the archipho­ nemic approach, this alternative does not r e q u i r e the p r o ­ l i f e r a t i o n of the inventory with subordinate units, which indicate the non-distinctiveness of given properties. In our present example / t / , / d / , and archiphoneme / T / , the inven­ tory is reduced from 3 to 2. In other more complicated

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cases, as in some Russian examples pointed out by M a r t i n e t (1936:48), the reduction would be more, because under the archiphonemic approach t h e r e would actually have to be more archiphonemes than phonemes in a given r a n g e , where more than one correlative constrast is subject to suspension under d i f f e r e n t circumstances. 1 1 This approach permits a degree of overlap in assigning phones as allophones of particular phonemes, in t h a t a [ d ] would be assigned to unmarked / t / wherever its voicing is not distinctive, and to marked / d / where its voicing is dis­ tinctive. Such overlapping, however, is completely without ambiguity: one could always t e l l which phoneme is being realized by noting the environment in which the phone occurs, so t h a t t h e r e would never be an ambiguous assign­ ment in a given environment. The same is also t r u e of the archiphonemic approach, which would assign distinctively voiced [ d ] to / d / , distinctively voiceless [t] to / t / , and a [ d ] or [ t ] which is predictably voiced or voiceless in its given environment to the archiphoneme / T / . A potential difficulty with the unmarked-member approach, however, is t h a t it r e q u i r e s one to make a clear decision about the marked or unmarked status of a phono­ logical property. The general applicability of this approach, t h a t is, would assume t h a t t h e r e will always be a way of deciding on the marked or unmarked status of the members of any suspendable contrast. The archiphonemic approach, on the other hand, does not r e q u i r e such a decision in order to be applicable. The general outlines of the kind of theory needed to deal with the problem of deciding on the marked or unmarked status of a property have already been laid down by Trubetzkoy. He has suggested, for example, t h a t we can in general establish a notion of phonetic markedness by viewing as unmarked the type of articulation "whose production r e q u i r e s the least deviation from normal b r e a t h ­ ing" (1969:146). Phonological markedness, f u r t h e r m o r e , would be assumed to correspond to phonetic markedness except in cases w h e r e evidence in the language points to a d i f f e r e n t conclusion. This approach would allow facts of the individual language to be taken into account where they clearly point one way or another, and would allow one to fall back upon universal considerations in the absence of clear functional evidence. The approach outlined here would of course have to be elaborated in more detail before it could be

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considered as d e f i n i t i v e . For the p r e s e n t , it will suffice to point out the necessity of careful a t t e n t i o n to the c r i t e r i a for establishing marked and unmarked status if the unmarked member approach is to be adopted. 2.13 The Phonetic Identification Approach. According to Vachek's history of the Prague School, most Prague linguists never adhered to e i t h e r of the views dis­ cussed in the previous sections. Rather they i d e n t i f i e d a sound in a position of suspension with one or the other contrastive phoneme according to its actual phonetics, while 'not ignoring, at the same t i m e , the fact t h a t the phonolo­ gical opposition ... is ... neutralized' (1966:62). Transcriptionally, this approach seems no d i f f e r e n t f r o m that of the Neo-Bloomfieldian phonologists who refused to admit any suspension at all. It seems to d i f f e r only in t h a t the fact of suspension is admitted in the general theory, but the transcriptional system seems to be out of phase with the general theory in not reflecting its occurrence. The only way t h a t such a transcription can be brought into coherence with the recognition of the suspension would seem to be by the use of subsidiary symbols f o r indicating the occurrence of the suspension. One might, f o r example, set up a series of diacritic symbols for the suspension of each suspendable contrast in a language, and use these together with the phonetically identified major symbols. If a circumflex is used for the suspension of voicing, for instance, we would w r i t e / t / for [ t ] in a position where voicing is suspended, and /d/ for a [ d ] in a similar posi­ t i o n . A system along these general lines, though d i f f e r i n g in d e t a i l , was in fact proposed in Prague Circle 1931 f o r ' d e ­ tailed phonological transcription' designed to distinguish 'the positions in which both correlative phonemes can occur f r o m the positions where only one of the two correlative pho­ nemes is admitted.' 1 2 Even though the phonetic approach may have been widely adopted in the Prague School, it must in the end be dismissed as the least tenable of the t h r e e Praguian posi­ tions in view of its essential inconsistency. It may be seen as an unsuccessful synthesis of two points of view t h a t cannot in fact by coherently synthesized in t e r m s of a s i n -

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gle level: one emphasizing the suspension of contrasts, and another focusing on phonetic identification. A single t r a n ­ scription which a t t e m p t s to r e f l e c t both these viewpoints at once results in the recording of more distinctions than would be necessary in a transcription r e f l e c t i n g e i t h e r i n d i ­ vidual point of view. 13 A f u r t h e r disadvantage of the phonetic identification approach is t h a t it fails to give us any solution at all to the problem presented when the sound occurring in a posi­ tion of suspension is phonetically i n t e r m e d i a t e b e t w e e n the otherwise contrasting sounds. Take, f o r example, the vowels of such words as tier, tear, tour, and tore in r - f u l l American dialects, which can be seen as a suspending tense  close vs. lax  open contrast seen before most other consonants, as in teal vs. till, tale vs. tell, pool vs. pull, and pole vs. Paul. Here the archiphonemic approach would have no i d e n t i f i c a ­ tion problems at a l l , and the u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach would be faced only with the general question involving the decision as to which member is considered to be unmarked. 1 4 2.2 Suspension in Stratificational Phonology. 2.20 Historical Preliminaries. Initially, stratificational theory was an outgrowth of some of the more sophisticated Neo-Bloomfieldian work of the period centering around the 1950's. 15 In the course of the t h e o r / s development, however, it has been receptive to many ideas which originated in European schools of linguis­ tics, and has striven to develop a synthesis which incorpo­ r a t e s the best of several views while retaining a f u n d a ­ mental coherence of basic outlook. The most f u n d a m e n t a l of such ideas is undoubtedly the notion t h a t linguistic s t r u c ­ t u r e consists solely of relationships, which derives in p a r ­ ticular f r o m the glossematic theory of Louis Hjelmslev (1961) and can ultimately be traced back to Saussure's dictum t h a t 'in language t h e r e are only d i f f e r e n c e s ... without positive terms' (Saussure 1959:120). In phonology specifically, we find t h a t the s t r a t i f i c a ­ tional view has been receptive to the idea of suspension from the Prague School and the idea of prosodic analysis from the Firthian. The latter notion, of course, has

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Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n "

parallels in Neo-Bloomfieldian work especially in the long components of Harris (1944, 1951) and some aspects of the phonological I analysis proposed in Hockett 1955. Such t r e a t m e n t s , however, w e r e never accorded general accep­ tance by the Neo-Bloomfieldians except in t h e i r restricted application to classically suprasegmental phenomena such as stress, t o n e , and intonation. In accepting the suspendability of contrasts, s t r a t i f i c a tional phonology stands in particular contrast to the usual Neo-Bloomfieldian a t t i t u d e s , particularly those r e f l e c t e d in the classical papers of the 1940's. Hockett 1942, f o r e x a m ­ ple, f l a t l y states t h a t 'any talk of neutralization or cancel­ lation of archiphonemes confuses the facts without adding anything' ( 1 9 4 2 : 1 0 1 b - - i n Joos, 1 0 4 - 5 - - i n Makkai). 1 6 Similarly Harris (1944:2.2) criticizes the concepts of neutralization and the archiphoneme as 'not ... a productive method of description' on the grounds t h a t they handle only some of the positional limitations on the occurrence of phonemes and not others. The remainder of section 2.2 will be devoted to the presentation and comparison of two d i f f e r e n t approaches to the incorporation of suspension within stratificational pho­ nology. 2.21 Translations Approaches

of

the

Archiphonemic

and

Unmarked-Member

The f i r s t explicit discussion of suspension in connection with stratificational phonology is found in Lockwood 1972a, a paper originally p r e p a r e d in 1969 and cast in t e r m s of the model c u r r e n t at that t i m e . According to t h a t model, the autonomous phonemic level was r e p r e s e n t e d by c o n f i g u ­ rations of componential units t e r m e d hypophonemes, while the phonemes and phonons w e r e more abstract (cf. Lamb 1966). The major purpose of this 1972 paper was to show t h a t the suspension of contrasts could readily be r e p r e ­ sented in the stratificational system, and t h a t the s t r a t i f i ­ cational evaluation measure would p r e f e r solutions incorpo­ rating suspension to alternatives without it in the situations where the phenomenon was classically recognized. A f u r t h e r purpose of the paper was to point out t h a t the recognition of suspension provides one way out of the dilemma o r i g i -

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

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nally posed by Halle 1959 concerning the asymmetry of voicing alternations in Russian without the abandonment of the biuniqueness of autonomous phonology. 17 It further showed that stratificational phonology is most compatible with the u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach to suspension, and showed a formalized application of this approach f o r a hypothetical but typical case of voicing suspension. Let us compare the approach to suspension discussed in Lockwood 1972a with their antecedents in the Prague School. To f a c i l i t a t e the comparison, the discussion will focus on the various levels of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and their realizational interrelationships, and it will f u r t h e r m o r e be confined to Russian / t / and / d / and the suspension of the voicing contrast between them. 1 8 It assumes the relevance of three levels within phonology in the broad sense: Morphophonemic, Phonemic, and Phonetic. Terminological d i f f e r e n c e s involving d i f f e r e n t names f o r one or more of these in v a r i ­ ous versions of stratificational theory will be ignored. In these t e r m s , t h e n , the basic facts are as follows. 1)

The morphophonemes //t// and //d// may be distinguished in ail positions. For example, the prefixes //ot// and //pod// occur before vowels as in / / o t u č i / / 'to break (of something)'; //pod u č i / / 'to instruct'; before resonants as in / / o t r u b , i / 'to chip off', //pod r u b , i / / 'to hew'; before voice­ less obstruents as in / / o t skoči// 'to j u m p aside', //pod skoči// 'to j u m p , run up'; and before voiced obstruents as in //ot 'to b,iraj// 'to take away 4 , //pod b , i r a j / / pick up'.

2)

Phonetically [ t ] and [ d ] are distinguished as the phonetic realizations of //t// and //d// only before a vowel or before a resonant, including a plain or palatalized [v] at the end of a cluster of phonetic obstruents. Cf. the infinitive forms of the above examples: [Atvčít,], [pədvčít,], [ A t r v b , í t , ] , and [ p ə d r v b , í t , ] . In other positions, one finds either only [ t ] or only [ d ] according to f u r t h e r con-

3)

112

Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n " ditions: (a) finally or obstruent, only [t], [pətskač í t , ] ; (b) before e n t , only [ d ] [ a d b , l r á t , ] ,

before voiceless e.g. [atskačít,], a voiced o b s t r u ­ [pədb,lrát,].

Tables I and II summarize f o u r t r e a t m e n t s of this s i t u ­ ation using e i t h e r the archiphonemic or the u n m a r k e d - m e m ­ ber approach to suspension. Each table f u r t h e r presents two versions, the A version in terms of whole segments as in the Prague originals, and the  version using singulary Table I: The Archiphonemic Approach to Russian t / d . A. Segmental Approach: Prague

School

components as in stratificational

phonology.

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113

Table i l : The U n m a r k e d - M e m b e r Approach to Russian t/d A. Segmental Approach: Prague School

B. Componential Approach: Stratification

Interpretation

In the approach shown in Table I, the archiphoneme / T / of part A is identified with the simultaneous components / C 1 / 'closure' and /Ap/ 'apical' in part B. The full phonemes / t / and / d / of which / T / is the archiphoneme are d i f f e r e n t i ­ ated by the presence of an unvoicing component /Uv/ for / t / and a component /Vd/ 'voiced' in / d / . The postulation of two such mutually-exclusive components as /Uv/ and / V d / is the closest that stratificational theory can come to r e p r e s e n t a t ing the Praguian notion without the introduction of a d d i ­ tional theoretical apparatus such as would be needed f o r a fully binary (or even multinary) approach. The vertically a r r a n g e d suspension points in the phonetic representation show t h a t t h e r e may be other phonetic components present

114

Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n "

which a r e irrelevant to the present discussion, e.g. a com­ ponent indicating the passive point of articulation such as [ D t ] 'dental' or [Al] 'alveolar'. The u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach shown in Table II d i f ­ f e r s from t h a t of Table I only in failing to make a distinc­ tion between / t / and / T / . Componentially this is accomplished by eliminating the distinction between /Uv/ (unvoiced) and its absence. In this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n an apical stop not marked for voicing will nevertheless contain phonetic voicing if it is next to a voiced obstruent; in all other cases it will contain no phonetic voicing. 1 9 2.22 A Reinterpretation of the Archiphonemic Approach. Another explicit discussion of suspension in the s t r a t i f i cational l i t e r a t u r e occurs in Sullivan 1975. The t r e a t m e n t of Russian voicing suspension presented in t h a t paper has c e r ­ tain points in common with the approaches dealt with in the previous section, but it d i f f e r s from them in other respects. Sullivan's t r e a t m e n t was originally incorporated into his dis­ sertation ( 1 9 6 9 ) , but its relation to archiphonemic principles was not recognized until later. Sullivan's a l t e r n a t e approach is summarized in Table I I I , which is organized along the same lines as the componential parts of Tables I and I I . The following aspects of this approach need to be pointed out:

1) It will be noted t h a t two distinct levels are shown in the area reserved for morphophonemic representations. The higher (more abstract) of these is the morphonic, the usual stratificational equivalent of t r a d i t i o n a l morphophonemics. The lower shows a breakdown into sequential elements / T / and /Y/, the f o r m e r realizing e i t h e r //t// alone or //d// without its voicing, and the l a t t e r being Sullivan's symbol for the voicing e l e m e n t . Since / T / represents what / t / and / d / have in common, it is i d e n t i f i e d with the archiphoneme by Sullivan, and parallel t r e a t m e n t s are proposed f o r simi­ larly r e l a t e d pairs of voiced/voiceless obstruents.

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Table I I I : Sullivan's Modified Approach to Russian t / d .

2) The phonemic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n retains the sequential approach found on the lower of the morphophonemic levels. So the combination: |CI | | Ap| is the realization of the "archiphoneme"

/T/.

3) The phonetic representations d i f f e r only in the way in which the voicing of clusters is r e p r e s e n t e d , since it t r e a t s voicing as a prosodic element extending over the whole of a cluster instead of having a separate occurrence for each segment within it. In order to indicate f u r t h e r t h a t the phonetic voicing which occurs will be the r e a l i z a ­ tion of an element from the end of the cluster we w r i t e it in italics, (Vd), with a bar to indicate the e x t e n t of the prosodic element involved. This element will be the r e a l i z a ­ tion of a /Y/ f r o m the end of the whole cluster. 4) It is f u r t h e r shown will have zero realization environments.

on in

the the

phonemic final or

level t h a t /Y/ pre-obstruent

116

Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n "

Sullivan's basis for identifying the / T / of this t r e a t m e n t with the archiphoneme is primarily Trubetzkoy's d e f i n i t i o n (1969:79) 'the sum of distinctive properties t h a t two pho­ nemes have in common'. His /T/'s basically correspond to archiphonemes by this d e f i n i t i o n , though not by the other definition given elsewhere in the same book (1969:147) by which the archiphoneme function is filled by the unmarked member of the opposition in the position of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n . This d e f i n i t i o n can be met only in t e r m s of the lower level labeled 'PHONEMIC' in Table I I I , and for this reason Sullivan states t h a t the two Trubetzkoyan 'definitions should be understood as r e f e r r i n g to manifestations of the same p h e ­ nomenon on d i f f e r e n t levels of s t r u c t u r e ' (1975:481). One of these levels would be the lower Morphophonemic in the representation of Table I I I , and the other would be the Phonemic. It should thus be clear t h a t Sullivan's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the archiphoneme d i f f e r s from the more conventional one incorporated into Table I in t h a t an archiphoneme is taken to occur even in the absence of the suspension of contrast. Further comparison of these views is presented in the next section. 2.23 Comparison and Evaluation of the Stratification al Approaches. While this is not the place for a full technical discus­ sion of the detailed stratificational solutions involved, some remarks on the comparison and relative merits of the t h r e e solutions of Tables l ( B ) , ll(B) and III are in order. The g r e a t e r economy of the u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach of Table ll(B) over the archiphonemic approach of Table l(B) should be f a i r l y obvious without lengthy discussion. The u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach is also more generally in line with the singulary approach to phonological componency generally found in stratificational practice. Although it speaks of archiphonemes, Sullivan's approach actually corresponds more closely to the u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach than to the classical archiphonemic approach. It d i f f e r s f r o m the approach of Table l l ( B ) , in f a c t , in only two aspects:

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells 1) 2)

117

The prosodic treatment of phonetic voicing; The sequential treatment of the voicing element on the lower morphophonemic and phonemic levels (along with the r e c ­ ognition of the f o r m e r level for the p u r ­ pose of accounting for this d i f f e r e n c e ) .

With respect to the f i r s t point, the segmental t r e a t ­ ment of voice is by no means an essential characteristic of any of the views: the prosodic view could be incorporated in Table ll(B) (or l ( B ) , f o r t h a t m a t t e r ) without altering the rest of the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and much the same can be said for the use of a nonprosodic view in connection with Sulli­ van's t r e a t m e n t of the higher levels. In many ways the p r o ­ sodie view is more realistic for the phonetic level, as was previously suggested in Lockwood 1976.20 The second point seems to be somewhat more objec­ tionable from the point of view of phonetic realism. It involves the use of sequential order in the analysis of a realízate in which no such order prevails in the realization. postulation of such abstract On the other hand, the sequences may be j u s t i f i e d if it significantly simplifies our account of the facts. Linguists commonly posit n o n - p a t e n t sequences, for example in morphophonemic t r e a t m e n t s of such allegro phrases as /míšœ ə/ 'miss you' or / k ə n f y ú w ž ə / 'confuse you' in English. And in autonomous phonemics we o f t e n find reasons to regard u n i t a r y phonetic segments as phonemic sequences when it makes our analysis of them simpler and more symmetrical, as when we t r e a t the nuclei of ['b d n ] as phonemic sequences i n / b ə d ə n / . In the present case all t h a t can be given is an interim r e p o r t : no simpler t r e a t m e n t of the facts of Russian obstruent voicing has been o f f e r e d than t h a t formalized by Sullivan (1975:482). In p a r t i c u l a r , any a t t e m p t at a parallel formalized solution of the same data based on the approach to the morphophonemics and phonemics found in Table ll(B) is a t best two points more complex than Sullivan's according to the usually accepted evaluation procedure for s t r a t i f i c a tional descriptions (Lockwood 1972b:58-59).

118

Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n "

The interim n a t u r e of this conclusion results from two factors: 1) as in any such case of comparison, there remains a possibility that a b e t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e approach may e v e n t u ­ ally be discovered; 2) the stratificational evaluation meas­ u r e , though it is useful and has been quite durable and stable, is subject to revision, and such a revision might a f f e c t the comparison. For example, if the evaluation meas­ ure were revised so t h a t an ordered node counted more than the corresponding unordered one, the comparison might be a f f e c t e d . In the absence of such developments, however, we must conclude t h a t Sullivan's t r e a t m e n t is the most economical one k n o w n . 2 1

ENDNOTES *The original version of this paper was presented in the Symposium on Autonomous Phonemics at the Annual Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America (Chicago, December 2 9 - 3 0 , 1977). It is o f f e r e d here in view of Rulon Wells's long interest in the history of phonemic theory, r e f l e c t e d , for example in Wells 1974. Thanks are due to Ralph Vanderslice f o r the numerous useful editorial sugges­ tions on an e a r l i e r d r a f t . 1

This basic point was made in Lockwood ( 1 9 7 2 a ) , section 1 , and also mentioned in Lockwood (1972b:193). The discus­ sion in the present paper a t t e m p t s to elaborate and clarify what was said in those works, as well as to o f f e r some a l t e r n a t e terminological suggestions. 2

The t e r m contrast will be used here in its American sense, as the equivalent of the Prague School t e r m opposi­ tion, 3

ln Lockwood (1972a) the term Ρ-neutralization (for P r a g u e - n e u t r a l i z a t i o n ) was used. The a l t e r n a t e t e r m sus­ pension was suggested in passing in Lockwood (1972b:193). 4 S-Neutralization was suggested in Lockwood (1972a) ( f o r stratificational neutralization parallel to P - n e u t r a l i z a t i o n ) . The present t e r m recalls the t r a d i t i o n a l t e r m syncre­ tism, used in t r a d i t i o n a l grammar f o r a situation in which

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

119

more abstract grammatical categories happened to have the same r e a l i z a t i o n . The generalization of the l a t t e r t e r m was suggested by Hjelmslev (1961:87-93). 3 In the original (Trubetzkoy (1936:187), 'Es gibt L a u t g e ­ g e n s ä t z e , die nur in bestimmten Lautstellungen phonologisch relevant sind, weil nur in diesen Stellungen sowohl das eine wie das andere Oppositionsglied zugelassen w e r d e n , w ä h r e n d in den ubrigen Stellungen e n t w e d e r nur das e i n e , oder nur das andere Oppositionsglied vorkommt. . .Solche Gegensätze nennen wir aufhebbar. . . . '

6

Examples are from Haas and Subhanka (1945). In a d d i ­ tion the voicing contrast, but not t h a t of aspiration, is sus­ pended in various initial clusters. The aspiration contrast also applies to dorsal and (phonetically a f f r i c a t e d ) palatal stops, but these never have voiced c o u n t e r p a r t s . 7

Since d i f f e r e n t linguists have had d i f f e r e n t opinions on the phonemic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the syncretized r e a l i z a ­ tions in such cases, the syncretized examples have been cited in phonetic r a t h e r than phonemic transcription. These problems of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n will be r e t u r n e d to in section 2. 5 From a diachronic viewpoint, of course, the syncretization results f r o m a double diachronic suspension of the type which Hoenigswald (1960:95) t e r m e d 'split through m e r g e r , without residue'.

9

l n the original: 'In den S t e l l u n g e n , wo die korrelative Eigenschaft eines Phonems sein phonologische Gültigkeit v e r l i e r t , wird dieses Phonem mit dem merkmallosen Korrela­ tionsglied i d e n t i f i z i e r t , selbst wenn es objectiv mit dem merkmalhaltigen Korrelationsglied identisch ist.' The above translation was originally published in Lockwood 1972a:667. 10 The voiceless member of a voiceless/voiced phoneme pair is perhaps most f r e q u e n t l y u n m a r k e d , but in some cases the voiced may be unmarked instead, particularly if it is f u r t h e r characterized by laxness or lack of aspiration. William J. Sullivan (personal communication) has claimed t h a t d i f f e r e n t varieties of standard Polish d i f f e r in whether voiced or voiceless is t r e a t e d as marked. Toby G r i f f e n (1975) has also found reasons f o r t r e a t i n g voicing as unmarked in

120

Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n "

Welsh, where voiced resonants as well as opposed to aspirated voiceless c o u n t e r p a r t s .

obstruents

are

11

The example involves the f o u r Russian phonemes /χ/ (voiceless unpalatalized), (voiced unpalatalized), /t'/ (voiceless p a l a t a l i z e d ) , and / d ' / (voiced palatalized) ( M a r t i ­ net's symbols are used). In some positions, voicing contrasts are suspended but palatalization remains in f o r c e , and thus the voicing-neutral archiphonemes l\l and /TV are d i s t i n ­ guished. In other positions, palatalization contrasts a r e sus­ pended, but voicing is still distinctive, so we have the p a l a ­ t a l i z a t i o n - n e u t r a l archiphonemes / t / and / d / . Finally, in some positions both contrasts are n e u t r a l i z e d , resulting in the archiphoneme / T / , for which both voicing and palatalization are i r r e l e v a n t . 12 A S on page 324:'6 + Dans la transcription phonologique detaillée on distinguera les positions dans lesquelles des phonèmes c o r r é l a t i f s peuvent f i g u r e r l'un comme l'autre des positions ou n'est admissible que l'un des deux phonèmes corrélatifs'. See also M a r t i n e t 1936 f o r f u r t h e r discussion of the conflict between the archiphonemic approach as r e f l e c t e d in Trubetzkoy 1931 and the phonetic identification approach.

13

l f we w e r e to apply such a transcription to the Rus­ sian apical stops as discussed in footnote 1 1 , f o r example, one would have the potential of sixteen d i f f e r e n t units, taking into account the four phonetic items [ t ] , [ t ' ] , [ d ] , and [ d ' ] and t h e i r potential occurrence in positions with d i f f e r e n t numbers of voicing and palatalization contrasts: 1) both voicing and palatalization are distinctive; 2) voicing is distinctive, but palatalization is not; 3) palatalization is dis­ t i n c t i v e , but voicing is not; and 4) neither voicing nor p a l a ­ talization is distinctive. This compares with the four units needed in the u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach, and the nine ( f o u r f u l l phonemes and five archiphonemes) in the a r c h i ­ phonemic approach. 14

lt is interesting to note t h a t tagmemic theory, as set f o r t h in Pike 1967, speaks of an archiphoneme only when one finds 'a sound i n t e r m e d i a t e b e t w e e n the norms of two pho­ nemes, and within the same componential and congruent system as those norms but d i f f e r i n g only in the local e n v i -

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

121

ronment' (1967:300). Otherwise, this theory does not speak of the suspension or neutralization of phonemic contrasts, but r a t h e r 'a sound which is once seen to have the status of a phoneme at one place in the system is assumed to r e t a i n its phonemic status at other places in t h a t same sys­ t e m , even when in those places the contrastive c o u n t e r p a r t does not occur' (296). 15

See Lamb 1971 ( 1 5 - 1 7 ) for a b r i e f discussion of this background. Lamb has f r e q u e n t l y cited works by Hockett (e.g. 1947, 1954, 1955, 1958 and 1961) and T r a g e r (1955) as important Neo-Bloomfieldian influences on his own thought. The influence of transformational linguistics must also be recognized in the form of a general a g r e e m e n t about the linguistic relevance of what may, to give it a n e u t r a l des­ ignation, be t e r m e d non-patent structures in both phonologi­ cal and syntactic structures. (This t e r m was suggested in (Swadesh & Voegelin 1939) in r e f e r e n c e to morphophonemic abstractions.) Despite t h e i r f u n d a m e n t a l a g r e e m e n t on this point, stratificationalists generally disagree with t r a n s f o r ­ mationalists on other points concerning the relationships of p a t e n t and n o n - p a t e n t s t r u c t u r e s , including (1) the use of processes in relating the t w o , and (2) the importance of continued study of patternings on the p a t e n t levels of sur­ face syntax and autonomous phonology. The amount of over­ all disagreement today seems less than f o r m e r l y , however, as a result of gradual changes in the a t t i t u d e s of many transformationalists. 16

Hockett's later writings, however, reflect more sympathetic view of suspension. See, f o r Hockett 1951 and Hockett 1955, section 3232.

a much example,

17

Earlier discussion is in Lamb 1966, which proposed a d i f f e r e n t stratificational solution. Cf. Lamb and Vanderslice 1976 tor Lamb's later views. For a similar conclusion on the part of a transformational phonologist, see Johns 1969, and cf. the comment in Lockwood 1972a:651, n3. 18

Thus the f u r t h e r suspensions involving the palatalized counterparts of these phonemes and parallel phenomena involving obstruents ( a n d , for palatalization, resonants as w e l l ) will be l e f t aside.

122

Lockwood: Phonological

"Neutralization"

19

In all these approaches, it is taken f o r g r a n t e d t h a t voicelessness should be regarded phonetically as the absence of a p r o p e r t y , since voicelessness corresponds most directly to the state of the laryngeal mechanism in normal b r e a t h ­ ing. higher levels of the phonology, and t h a t a f o r m a t t e r m e d the 20There it was f u r t h e r suggested what prosodies are also relevant f o r higher levels of the phonology, and t h a t a f o r m a t t e r m e d the 'switch-matrix' may be the most a p p r o ­ priate one for phonetic representations in a stratificational model. 21

L a m b and Vanderslice 1976 present an analysis of the same Russian data equivalent to Sullivan's, though w i t h o u t explicit discussion of its relation to the archiphoneme.

REFERENCES CITED

G r i f f e n , Toby D. 1975. "On describing the cluster prosody." The First LACUS Forum, 140-147. Haas, Mary R. and H. R. Subhanka. 1945. Spoken Thai, vol. 1. New York: Holt. Halle, Morris. 1959. The Sound Pattern of Russian.The Hague: Mouton. Harris, Zellig S. 1944. "Simultaneous components in phonol­ ogy." Language 20.181-205. Reprinted in Joos 1957 (124-138) and in V. B. Makkai 1972 ( 1 1 5 - 1 3 5 ) . . 1951. Methods in Structural Linguistics. Chicago: U n i ­ versity of Chicago Press. (Paperback reissue under the t i t l e Structural Linguistics, Phoenix Books.) Hjelmslev, Louis. 1961. Prolegomena to a Theory of Language. Omkring Sprogteoriens Translated from the Danish Grundlægelse (Copenhagen, 1943) by Francis J. Whit­ f i e l d . 2nd Edition. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Hockett, Charles F. 1942. "A system of descriptive phonol­ ogy." Language 18.3-21. Reprinted in Joos 1957 ( 9 7 - 1 0 8 ) and in V. B. Makkai 1972 ( 9 9 - 1 1 2 ) . . 1947. "Problems of morphemic analysis." 23.321-343. Reprinted in Joos 1957 ( 2 2 9 - 2 4 2 ) .

Language

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

123

. 1951. "Review of Phonology as Functional Phonetics by Andre M a r t i n e t . " Language 27.333-342. Reprinted in V. B. Makkai 1972 ( 3 1 0 - 3 1 7 ) . . 1954. "Two models of grammatical description." Word 10.210-234. Reprinted in Joos 1957 ( 3 8 6 - 3 9 9 ) . . 1955. A Manual of Phonology. International Journal of American Linguistics, Memoir 1 1 . . 1958. A Course in Modern Linguistics. New York: Mac­ millan. .

1961. "Linguistic elements and their relations." Language 37.29-53. Hoenigswald, Henry M. 1960. Language Change and Linguistic Reconstruction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Johns, David A. 1969. "Phonemics and generative phonology." Papers from the Fifth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Lin­ guistic Society. 374-381. Reprinted in V. B. Makkai 1972. Joos, M a r t i n ( e d . ) . 1957. Readings in Linguistics. Washington, D. C.: American Council of Learned Societies. (Reis­ sued as Readings in Linguistics I, University of Chicago Press, 1966.) Lamb, Sydney M. 1964. "The sememic approach to structural semantics." American Anthropologist 66.3 (pt2) 57-58. Reprinted in Makkai and Lockwood 1973 ( 2 0 7 - 2 2 8 ) . . 1966. "Prolegomena to a theory of phonology." Lan­ guage 536-573. Reprinted in V. B. Makkai 1972 (606-633) and in Makkai and Lockwood ( 1 2 8 - 1 6 5 ) . . 1971. "The crooked path of progress in cognitive linguistics." Georgetown University Round Table ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 99-123. Reprinted in Makkai and Lockwood 1973 (12-33). Lamb, Sydney M. and Ralph Vanderslice. 1976. "On thrashing classical phonemics." The Second LACUS Forum, 154-163. Lockwood, David G. 1972a. " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n , biuniqueness, and stratificational phonology." In V. B. Makkai 1972 (646-669). . 1972b. Introduction to Stratificational Linguistics. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. . 1976. "Alternatives to matrix models in phonetics and phonology." The Second LACUS Forum, 141-153. M a k k a i , Adam and David G. Lockwood (eds.). 1973. Readings in Stratificational Linguistics. University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press.

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Makkai, Valerie Becker. 1972. Phonological Theory: Evolution and Current Practice. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Win­ ston. M a r t i n e t , André. 1936. "Neutralisation et archiphonème." Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague 6 . 4 6 - 5 7 . Pike, Kenneth L. 1967. Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior. The Hague: Mouton. Prague Circle. 1931. "Principes de transcription phonolo­ gique." Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague 4.323-326. Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1959. Course in General Linguistics, translation by Wade Baskin (Cours de linguistique 1916). New York: Philosophical générale, Paris, Library. Sullivan, William J. 1969. "A stratificational description of the phonology and inflectional morphology of Rus­ sian." Unpublished Dissertation, Yale University. U n i ­ versity Microfilms I n t e r n a t i o n a l Order No. 7 0 - 1 6 , 5 6 6 . . " A l t e r n a t i o n , t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , r e a l i z a t i o n , and s t r a t i ­ fication revisited." The First LACUS Forum, 472-522, 1975. Swadesh, Morris and C. F. Voegelin. 1939. "A problem in phonological a l t e r n a t i o n . " Language 15.1-10. Reprinted in Joos 1957 ( 8 8 - 9 2 ) . T r a g e r , George L. 1955. "French verb inflection." Language 31.511-529. Trubetzkoy, N. S. 1931. "Die phonologischen Systeme." Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague 4.96-116. . 1936. "Die Aufhebung der phonologischen Gegen­ sätze." Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague 6 , 2 9 - 4 5 . . 1939. "Grundzüge der Phonologie" (=Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague 7), 1939. . 1949. Principes de phonologie. Translation of T r u b e t z ­ koy 1939 by J. Cantineau. Paris: Librarie C. Klincksieck. . 1969. Principles of Phonology. Translation of T r u b e t z ­ koy 1939 by Christiane A. M. Baltaxe. Berkeley: U n i ­ versity of California Press. Vachek, Josef. 1966. The Linguistic School of Prague. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Wells, Rulon S. 1974. "Phonemics in the Nineteenth Century, 1876-1900." In Studies in the History of Linguistics: Tradi­ tions and Paradigms. (Dell Hymes, e d . ) , 4 3 4 - 5 3 . Bloom­ ington: Indiana University Press.

III SYNTAX AND BEYOND

GRAMMATICAL PHRASES AND LEXICAL PHRASES

by Andre M a r t i n e t Ecole pratique des hautes études Sorbonne, Paris There was a time when the exhaustive analysis of utterances into successive units, phonemes and morphemes, was deemed the first duty of the descriptivist. Is the current lack of interest in such problems due to the belief that they have received a totally satisfactory solution; or do people f e e l t h a t they have found a more satisfactory approach than the analytic one? It would seem t h a t the l a t t e r is the case, when we find t h a t the r e f e r e n c e to 'rules' is f a r more common than the mention of morphemes in c u r r e n t linguistic l i t e r a t u r e in America. One of the various reasons for this state of a f f a i r s may have been t h a t the post-Bloomfieldian conception of the morpheme blocked the road toward a satisfactory handling of the problems of syntax understood as the study of how significant units combine in order to convey i n f o r m a t i o n . If what is at issue is the identity of a relation such as the one which is r e f e r r e d to as 'genitive', it is perfectly imma­ t e r i a l whether it assumes the same form everywhere, or whether its form undergoes minor variations ( e . g . , Latin -is or -us) or major ones ( e . g . , Latin - i s , -us vs. -1). In Eng­ lish syntax, we want to operate with a single unit called 'plural' irrespective of the way plural is m a r k e d , by means of - s , - e n , or vowel mutation. It would seem t h a t , for many linguists, 'morpheme' implied a minimum of formal identity, that made the t e r m u n f i t for the designation of a u n i t , such as 'plural' or 'genitive', identified on the basis of its complementary distribution, but designated in r e f e r e n c e to its significant value. That is the reason why I rejected the t e r m and chose t h a t of 'monème' f o r the designation of

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the minimal significant unit irrespective of its formal avatars, even at the cost of its segmental n a t u r e as in French à + le > /  / , English deer + plural > deer. Unhampered by irrelevant formal considerations, the linguists who operate with monemes have proceeded, in m a t t e r s of linguistic description, without r e f e r e n c e e i t h e r to transformations or generation or to any 'deep structure'. It is t r u e t h a t they had, long b e f o r e , managed to d i s t i n ­ guish on all levels the linguistically relevant from the i r r e l ­ evant f e a t u r e s of speech events. They have established classes of monemes on the basis of like compatibilities, pointed out that a moneme can be t r a n s f e r r e d from one class to another, and t h a t some mutually compatible classes may e n t e r t a i n d i f f e r e n t relations, those which are t r a d i ­ tionally r e f e r r e d to as 'grammatical functions'. The marking of 'functions' is assumed either by the respective positions of the monemes involved, or by specific monemes, the connectives. The l a t t e r are identified as monemes whose appearance is conditioned by the presence of two units whose relation has to be specified. Distin­ guishing between connectives, w h e t h e r coordinators ( e . g . , and) or subordinators (e.g., with) and all other monemes is the f i r s t task of the descriptivist. Once minimal significant units have been identified by commutation, the question arises of whether and how they combine into larger units, w h e t h e r , for instance, we should r e t a i n such notions as 'word' and 'sentence'. Now, the most common reaction at this point is a conservative one, at least as f a r as 'word' is concerned. For most people involved, the question is not w h e t h e r , but how the notion of word can be vindicated. We are so used to conceiving of language as w r i t t e n t e x t s , with blanks between groups of l e t t e r s , that the very notion of operating with smaller sig­ nificant units is apt to make us dizzy and we cannot recover our balance unless our morphemes or monemes are d u t i f u l l y identified as segments of words. Yet it seems to be worth trying to investigate how minimal units actually combine in the flow of speech, when 'combining' does not r e f e r to formal accidents, but to the possibilities of moneme classes to coexist meaningfully.

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When faced with brushes, on the syntactic level, our task is no longer to f i n d a suitable formulation to account f o r the choice of / - i z / instead of / - z / , but to identify, by r e f e r e n c e to the context, / - i z / e i t h e r as the f o r m of a 'plural' moneme, compatible with a noun, or as the r e d u n ­ dant reminder of a so-called 'third person', compatible with a verb. If brushes is found just a f t e r the, it will be i d e n t i ­ f i e d as noun + 'plural'. Both 'definite article' and 'plural' will be ascribed to classes of nominal d e t e r m i n a n t s and placed on the same syntactic level, irrespective of the facts that the can be formally separated f r o m its head, as in the big brushes, whereas -es cannot and is t h e r e f o r e written immediately after brush without an intervening blank. Syntactically, it is perfectly i r r e l e v a n t whether we have two 'words', as in the brush, or one w o r d , as in brushes. Syntax is by no means the study of material com­ binations, but that of the compatibilities of moneme classes. This long preamble was indispensable before tackling the real subject of this paper, namely the two basically d i f f e r e n t types of phrases. In lay practice, the English word 'phrase' is very handy in r e f e r e n c e to - I am quoting Web­ ster - 'a sequence of two or more words a r r a n g e d in a grammatical construction and acting as a unit in the s e n ­ tence'. The lack of a suitable French equivalent probably induced Saussure to launch (or revive) the t e r m syntagme which he never really defined - it was not the fashion yet - but illustrated in several instances. Saussure's syntagmes correspond to phrases according to the definition given above, except that some of them are w r i t t e n without breaks between their significant components. In other t e r m s , some as relire, contremaître, indecoof Saussure's syntagmes, such rable are single 'words'. Moreover, some of Saussure's e x a m ­ ples are whole sentences, such as Dieu est bon. Thus Saussure, when he disregards word boundaries, goes beyond Webster's d e f i n i t i o n , a n d , if we refuse to dis­ tinguish, on the syntactic level, between the brush and brushes, we should probably not hesitate to call both of them 'phrases'. Yet, if we s t a r t f r o m Saussure's analysis, it will be preferable to use his t e r m and make bold to a n g l i ­ cize syntagme into syntagm.

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A possible definition of the Saussurian syntagm might be: 'a part of an utterance combining meaningful units t h a t are more closely r e l a t e d to each other than with the rest of the u t t e r a n c e , plus whatever connects it with t h a t rest? That would cover the Latin 'word' rosarum and its English equivalent 'of (the) roses', with the connectives, 'genitive' and of included, but also classroom and gold watch. It may not be superfluous to point out t h a t 'more closely', in the d e f i n i t i o n , does not r e f e r to any purely semantic r e l a t i o n , but to a syntactic one, implying f o r m and meaning, form consisting, in many cases, in contiguity, with or without supra-segmental additions. As an illustration we shall use the following sentence: He showed us a very beautiful picture by a famous Dutch master. If we are e n t i t l e d to consider it as part of a larger u t t e r ­ ance, the whole sentence may be called a syntagm; a very beautiful picture is one too, so is very beautiful a n d , also, a . . . picture where both very and a are more closely r e l a t e d to t h e i r respective heads, beautiful and picture, than to the rest. master, (by) a . . . Dutch Other syntagms are (by) a . . . master, (by) a famous Dutch master. It is worth pointing out t h a t not all the members of the syntagm need to be con­ tiguous, as shown by a . . . picture, (by) a .. . master. He showed us is not a syntagm since the syntactic r e l a ­ tions between he and showed, us and showed are no closer than t h a t between showed and picture, and the syntagm which includes both showed and picture is the whole sentence. In showed, the relation of 'past' to show d i f f e r s f r o m the one between show(ed) and its nominal or pronominal d e t e r ­ minations on two counts: 1 . 'past' is a n o n - d e t e r m i n a b l e d e t e r m i n a n t , 2. its relation to its head is a simple determination that does not entail the choice of a g r a m ­ matical function. Consequently, we may conceive of a syn­ t a g m , distinct from the sentence, combining the verbal head and its simple determinations such as tense or mood. Some readers may wonder why the connective should be included in the syntagm. What seems to call for this is not so much the desire not to split such Latin words as rosarum than the obvious fact t h a t t h e r e would be no need f o r a connective if t h e r e w e r e nothing to be connected with the rest of the sentence.

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So f a r , we have l e f t out two combinations of m e a n i n g ­ f u l units in which the units 'are more closely related to each other than with the rest', namely beautiful and famous, where each time the operation of commutation yields two units: beauti-ful

<--

beauti-fy

meaning-ful

fam-ous <—

fam-ed

moment-ous If we have delayed this p a r t of our analysis, it is not because we did not w a n t to go beyond the boundaries of words, since we have identified the single 'word' showed as a syntagm, but because beautiful and famous behave syntacti­ cally just like unanalyzable adjectives such as fair or brave and are f e l t , by the average speaker, to be semantically homogeneous. T h e r e f o r e , we cannot r e t a i n the same desig­ nation for such combinations as rosarum or of the roses which are made u p , hic et nunc, by the speaker who, depending on the experience he wants to communicate, will choose rosam instead of rosarum, 'with a rose' instead of 'of the roses', and f o r ready-made items like beautiful or famous. If we keep 'syntagm' as a designation of the f o r m e r , we need something d i f f e r e n t for the l a t t e r . According to its etymology, 'syntagm' designates a com­ plex of elements a r r a n g e d t o g e t h e r . The designation p r o ­ posed f o r ready-made groupings is 'syntherne', as it w e r e 'things placed together' with no suggestion of any p u r ­ poseful intervention. Inasmuch as it is found acceptable to use the t e r m 'phrase' for any combination of minimal sig­ nificant units, syntagms could be described as grammatical phrases and synthemes as lexical phrases. We have been r e f e r r i n g above to synthemes as readymade products, and this, of course, is t r u e in most cases. But such synthemes as compounds or derivatives must have been coined sometime in the past according to an existing p a t t e r n , and may be coined any t i m e , by any speaker, on

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the spur of the moment. T h e r e f o r e , previous existence cannot be retained as a criterion for determining whether a group of monemes is a syntagm or a syntheme. Actually, two conditions are needed for i n t e r p r e t i n g a complex as a syntheme: 1. Its components cannot receive any individ­ ual determination; 2. the syntheme must behave syntactically exactly like the units of a class of minimal significant units (monemes). The f i r s t condition eliminates the possibility of consid­ ering beautiful picture a syntheme, since, as we have seen, beautiful can be d e t e r m i n e d by very, and picture by some a r t i c l e ; black market is a syntheme because any a t t e m p t to determine black individually, normally as a j o k e , a u t o m a t i ­ cally restores the individuality of black and 'breaks' the syn­ theme. The second condition eliminates the possibility of con­ sidering showed a syntheme, which one might be t e m p t e d to do on account of the impossibility of determining the 'past' (-ed); it is clear t h a t showed, as a whole, does not behave syntactically like the units of the verbal class, since it c a n ­ not combine with tenses (*showed-ed). It could no doubt be argued t h a t , in the case of the syntheme black market, any d e t e r m i n a t i o n is t h a t of the whole complex and not t h a t of a single element like market, while d e t e r m i n a t i o n in connection with showed a f f e c t s showonly. In other words, when a d e t e r m i n a n t is added to a syntheme, it is the syntheme as a whole t h a t is the head, if it is added to a syntagm, only one moneme of the syn­ tagm is the head. It was pointed out above t h a t a syntagm is not neces­ sarily a single segment of an utterance ( e . g . , a . . . picture). The same applies to synthemes: pull down is undoubtedly a syntheme since any d e t e r m i n a t i o n a f f e c t s the whole; yet several d e t e r m i n a n t s can be inserted between the two monemes such as the 'past' (puli-ed down) or a nominal or pronominal object (pull it down).

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It could be objected t h a t everything that has been p r e ­ sented so f a r has traditionally been taken ca re of under the headings of derivation or composition. But this is not t r u e , because grammarians have been traditionally ham­ pered by considerations of pure f o r m , which are i r r e l e v a n t when what is at issue is the communication of experience. Yet, why should our conception of the grammatical structure of the language be a f f e c t e d when we observe t h a t , in he pulled down, -ed is inserted between pull and down, whereas nothing similar happens in the case of he put down, since we know that the same units are found in both sentences: third person masculine + 'past' + down, with j u s t put a l t e r ­ nating with pull? What counts is what we have called the compatibilities between the classes, the formal variations we come across, f r o m one context to another, being carefully stored, but automatically discounted a t a certain level. Operating with 'words' i.e., segments of w r i t t e n texts separated by blanks, has largely prevented identifying as lexical items such combinations as French machine à écrire, Spanish maquina de escribir, not to speak of agglutinations (Fr. figements), i.e., successions of monemes t h a t look like syntagms, but whose components have ceased to be d e t e r ­ minable individually. An amusing example is French avoir l'air 'to look'; w e r e it still a syntagm we would expect the elle a following adjective to 'agree' with the 'masculine' air: l'air gentil 'she looks nice'. Actually no one says t h a t , but e//e a l'air gentille with a g r e e m e n t with the 'feminine' subject elle, t r e a t i n g a l'air as a v e r b ; children are actually found to conjugate it as if there was a verb alairer: ce gâteau m'alairait bon. It is interesting to notice t h a t avoir un air, with the indefinite a r t i c l e , ceases to be a syntherne: elle avait un air conscient, with a g r e e m e n t of conscient with air. The existence of agglutinations may make it d i f f i c u l t to tell whether a complex is still a syntagm or already a syn­ therne. The formal c r i t e r i a we have found in the case of avoir l'air are not necessarily available everywhere. There are borderline cases where the d e t e r m i n a t i o n criterion may work one way with a speaker, another way with another. L a n ­ guages being constantly in a state of f l u x , such situations are unavoidable, but do not a f f e c t the necessity of mak­ ing a distinction between syntagms and synthemes.

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A f r e q u e n t objection to the notion of syntherne is t h a t it may be impossible to decide whether a segment, behaving syntactically as a single u n i t , is or is not analyzable into d i f f e r e n t monemes. What should we do with blackmail where black- may seem to contribute something to the meaning of the t e r m , but where -mail doesn't. What about the famous cranberry? But just strawberry would raise a problem. Should -fuse count as a moneme in confuse, refuse, perfuse in the face of conceive, receive, perceive, f r o m which a -ce/ve could be e x t r a c t e d , with  -- variant in conception, reception and perception? It could be argued t h a t no one except e t y m ­ ologists would be able to attach a meaning to -ceive or to -cep-. But some speakers might well f e e l that -fuse, in perfuse, is semantically connected with fuse, and t h a t even confuse might be akin. The answer is t h a t it is largely i m m a t e r i a l , f o r the success of communication, whether speakers and hearers agree in such m a t t e r s , because synthemes, just like m o n ­ emes, have d e f i n i t e r e f e r e n c e s which do not depend on the capacity or incapacity of each one of the interlocutors to analyze them. If, as we should, we disregard etymologists, the meaning of a t e r m is established by the identification of a r e f e r e n t (the banana -case) or by its occurrences in linguistic contexts (the democracy -case), but hardly on the basis of an analysis of its components. It might seem t h a t we need a cover t e r m for monemes and synthemes, since they really behave in the same way and what we say about monemes usually applies to synthemes as w e l l . But this being the case, it is just easier to say 'moneme', keeping in mind all the time t h a t this includes 'syntherne' whenever the possibility of an analysis is not being considered. Once the notion of syntherne is adopted and when we t r y to present the synthematics of a given language, we are t r u l y amazed by the constant role synthemes play in the daily use of any language. As soon as we w a n t to designate a new type of object or a specific i t e m , what we have at our disposal is a large but nevertheless limited number of monemes which we will have to combine in order to cover our communicative needs. A f i r s t designation may be a syntagmatic p r e s e n t a t i o n , but this cannot last because a spe­ cific type of object or specific item requires a specific d e s ­ ignation. At the start what is still a syntagm for others is a syntherne for the one who needs the t e r m , and if the

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designation is largely a d o p t e d , it will be used by all people concerned in such contexts as will make it a syntherne f o r everybody. We may also make use of a synthematic p a t t e r n which may or may not have been in the past a syntagmatic combination, but which is no longer identified as such, as, f o r instance, pickpocket, toothpick, or lawn-mower. Or we shall have recourse to derivation where ordinary monemes combine with others t h a t never appear outside of synthemes. Besides derivation, we f i n d confixation, where none of the monemes involved exist outside of synthemes: carnivore, f o r instance, is a confixative. A large p a r t of the vocabulary of contemporary l a n ­ guages consists of confixatives. B u t , in daily use, many of them are reduced to single monemes, telephone being clipped to phone. This is p a r t of a more general t r e n d , the r e d u c ­ tion of synthemes to monemes, through progressive pho­ netic agglutination (fellow < fē + lagi) or, more recently, the use of acronyms (UN, UNESCO), e i t h e r spelt or r e a d . Anthroponyms illustrate a case of p e r m a n e n t optional reduction adapted to circumstances: the f u l l name of a person is of course a syntherne normally consisting, in the United States, of a f i r s t , a middle, and a last name with the possible addition of junior or I I I . But within the family and among f r i e n d s only the f i r s t name is used, this being parallel to the use of phone in daily l i f e , telephone remaining the regular f o r m in official use. The names of thoroughfares are also, as a r u l e , syn­ themes: Broadway, Edgeware Road, Fifth Avenue. Here again a reduction to monemes is possible, as f o r instance, in Span­ ish speaking America where calle is normally l e f t out. But the elimination of street or avenue does not necessarily leave us with a single moneme: Whitehall in London, Insurgentes in Mexico City, Unter den Linden in Berlin. The realization of the p e r m a n e n t instability r e s u l t i n g , in all languages, f r o m synthematic processes can prove very disquieting f o r those who favor highly formalized linguistic presentations. They are t e m p t e d to disregard the commuta­ tive possibilities which have induced us to analyse beautiful In other t e r m s , they will t r e a t all into beauti- and -ful. synthemes as monemes, and it must be clear f r o m the very criteria we have been using f o r identifying synthemes that

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this can be consistently carried out. Only such linguists as have discovered the merits of a dynamic approach to l i n ­ guistic description will insist on including synthematics in a purely synchronic presentation of the grammar of a l a n ­ guage. École pratique des hautes e t u d e s , Sorbonne, 10, avenue de la Gare, 92330 Sceaux, France.

Paris,

and

REFERENCES CITED

To d a t e , the only complete t r e a t m e n t of the synthema­ tics of a language is t h a t of French by Jeanne MARTINET, in Andre MARTINET and others, Grammaire fonctionnelle du français, Paris, Didier, 1979, pp. 233-268. Earlier presentations by Andre MARTINET 'Syntagmes 2 , pp. 1-14.

et

synthèmes',

'Composition, derivation e t und Morphologie, Festschrift for 1968, pp. 144-149.

include:

La linguistique 3

(1967),

fasc.

monèmes', Wortbildung Syntax Hans Marchand, The Hague,

'Mot et synthèrne', Lingua 21 ( 1 9 6 8 ) , pp. 2 9 4 - 3 0 2 . These t h r e e articles are reproduced, together with an English abstract, in Studies in Functional Syntax, Munich, Fink, 1975, pp. 176-204 and 2 7 1 - 2 7 2 . By the same author: 'Synthematics', Studies presented fasc. 1 , pp. 11-14.

to Dr.

'La synthématique comme etude de Dilbilim, Istanbul, VI, 1 9 8 1 , pp. 8 4 - 9 8 .

Fowkes,

l'expansion

Word

31,

lexicale',

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137

Furthermore: Jacques Antione PIACENTINI, 'La création des synthèmes publicitaires et leur i n t é g r a t i o n dans le langage courant', La Linguistique, 17 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , fasc. 1 , pp. 4 9 - 7 6 . Daniele BECHEREL, 'A propos des solutions de remplace­ ment des anglicismes', La linguistique 17 (1981), fasc. 2, pp. 119-131.

ON GRAMMARS OF SCIENCE

Zellig Harris University of Pennsylvania The languages of sciences can be studied as sublanguages of natural language, in a way that shows what can be done with the distributional methods of linguistics, and t h a t also throws light on the s t r u c t u r e of science. Whatever else may be said about language, about its meaning and use, t h e r e is a directly observable structural property in t h a t , f i r s t , every occurrence of language is a linear combination of phonemes, and of words, with i n t o n a tional or other suprasegmental f e a t u r e s , a n d , second, t h a t certain combinations of these are found in occurrences of language and certain others are not. Grammatical properties which do not appear to be immediately combinatorial—above a l l , t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s - - a r e obtained as secondary properties of combinatorial s t r u c t u r e , specifically as equivalence r e l a ­ tions on them. (The t e r m "combinatorial" is used without its specific meaning in mathematics, in place of the somewhat a b e r r a n t linguistic use of the t e r m "distributional".) A language can be characterized by (a) which phoneme combinations, and especially what word combinations, are in it as against (b) those which are not. Between (a) and (b) lie combinations which are m a r g i n a l , i.e. about which no decision or agreement can be reached. It is not practicable to make this characterization by listing all the ( a ) , i.e. grammatical combinations; t h e r e f o r e we have recourse to statements of r e g u l a r i t i e s as to which kinds of combination are admitted and which are excluded. It is essential that these statements be as u n r e d u n d a n t as possible, e.g. t h a t they not state certain exclusions t w i c e , as cases of d i f f e r ­ ent regularities. The reason f o r this stems from the tact

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t h a t language has no outside metalanguage in which its structure can be described. Any statements which c h a r a c t e r ­ ize the words and s e n t e n c e - s t r u c t u r e s of a language have to be given in the same language (or in some other one) using already the same kinds of words and s e n t e n c e - s t r u c ­ t u r e s which have to be d e f i n e d . Hence the ultimate entities and operations cannot be defined externally but must be distinguished by their combinations in respect to each o t h e r , by the constraints which characterize their d e p a r t u r e s f r o m randomness. These constraints on combination observably exist in language, and are certainly related to the i n f o r m a ­ tion which language expresses. The redundancies inherent in these constraints thus characterize (or "predict*·) the u l t i ­ mate e n t i t i e s and operations. Hence any f u r t h e r r e d u n d a n ­ cies which are due to the way the grammar states the con­ straints will muddy the characterization: the grammar must predict the existing combinations on the basis of the fewest constraints possible. When this is done, it is found t h a t the sentences of a language can be predicted by a partial ordering ( r a t h e r than some linear combination) on words, the partial order being d e t e r m i n e d by the standing of the words in a single hierarchy of dependence. In a d d i t i o n , a discourse is charac­ t e r i z e d by t h e r e being some recurrence of families of these partial orderings. These structural (combinatorial) properties of language are accompanied by informational properties. The p a r t i a l l y - o r d e r e d dependence is called an " o p e r a t o r - a r ­ gument" relation and has the semantic e f f e c t t h a t the operator states a property ( e v e n t , act, etc.) of its a r g u ­ ments. The recurrence of sentences of a particular family has the semantic e f f e c t of discussing (as against merely announcing) the event or situation common to the sentences of t h a t family. When the combinatorial investigations are made in dis­ courses t h a t arise around a p a r t i c u l a r , relatively n a r r o w , subject matter, the grammatical description which is restricted to just these discourses d i f f e r s in important respects from the grammar of the whole language. In p a r ­ t i c u l a r , if the subject m a t t e r is in a w e l l - o r g a n i z e d science, the special grammar describes a sublanguage which is closed under the operations of the language; and the grammar is seen to r e f l e c t the objects and relations of the science. We

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find several classes of elementary arguments (roughly, nouns) each of which occurs only under a particular class of e l e m e n t a r y operators (roughly, verbs or adjectives). This is a situation which does not occur in a whole language, f o r t h e r e every e l e m e n t a r y operator (i.e. one whose arguments are e l e m e n t a r y , e.g. fall) can in principle occur on any e l e ­ mentary a r g u m e n t . The likelihoods f o r these operators (in the whole language) are d i f f e r e n t : under fails we can readily find stone and also word, and night, quite unlikely day (except perhaps to parallel night), and hardly at all vacuum. But one cannot exclude even Vacuum fell f r o m the language, and one cannot establish subclasses of nouns and of verbs such that only nouns of a given subclass can occur, in sentences of the language, under a verb of a stated subclass. In contrast, the exclusion of particular subclasses f r o m occurring with certain words is common in each p a r ­ ticular science. In immunological articles we can find Lymphocytes secrete antibody, Lymphocytes produce antibody, Plasma cells produce antibody, Plasma cells produce agglutinin, Plasma cells contain antibody, with  (lymphocytes, plasma cells) being f i r s t a r g u m e n t and A (antibody, agglutinin) second argument of V (contain, produce, secrete), but never the opposite o r d e r of arguments. In English as a whole, if someone said the opposite o r d e r , e.g. Antibody secretes lymphocytes we would say he is innocent of biochemistry but we could not say he is innocent of English g r a m m a r , or he is not speaking Eng­ lish. In immunological articles we find The tissue was inflamed, while The antibody was inflamed is excluded; but again the l a t t e r cannot be excluded f r o m English grammar. Thus each science language has e l e m e n t a r y operator classes which are restricted to occurring only on particular e l e m e n t a r y argument classes, whereas the whole language does not have such d e f i n i t e restrictions, only g r e a t d i f f e r ­ ences of likelihood. In the material in a science, certain words which are placed in the same class because they occur under the same operator have to be assigned to different subclasses because t h e r e are other operators under which one of the words occurs while another is excluded. For example, some immunological articles have (in their analyzed f o r m ) Lympho­ cytes contain antibody but they do not produce antibody. This would be represented by CVA but CV~A ( u s i n g ~ to indicate negation on the preceding symbol). Since this looks like a

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contradiction, and so is not a satisfactory r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , we set up two subclasses, V. (contain, and in the reverse direction is found in) and V (produce, form, synthesize) yielding CV A but CV~A. P ι Ρ In the elementary a r g u m e n t s , many subclasses (which are highly technical terms) are found to contain only one meaning. Some of the words in the subclass have d i f f e r e n t meanings in the science, but the d i f f e r e n c e is irrelevant to the particular article or to the particular research problem whose grammar is being investigated. An example is seen in antibody and agglutinin above. A more important case of syno­ nymy relative to the immediate s u b j e c t - m a t t e r is seen in many operator-classes, such as V above, where it seems as if many d i f f e r e n t words are members of a single subclass. In sciences such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, and much of biology, it is found t h a t the d i f f e r e n t operators which appear in the same class are synonymous in respect to t h e i r arguments in the science. That is to say, their meaning d i f f e r e n c e s in the whole language are not used in the science m a t e r i a l . For example, the d i f f e r e n c e s between synthesize and produce, which are r e f l e c t e d in t h e i r d i f f e r e n t arguments and f a r t h e r environments in English, do not apply in the immunology articles, where both verbs have the same arguments. The importance of this synonymity lies in the fact t h a t the open-endedness of the English vocabulary in science is only a p p a r e n t and not r e a l : an author can draw tor the Vp position upon any word t h a t even remotely means "to make"; but in so doing he is not using the p a r ­ ticular meaning of the w o r d , but merely using d i f f e r e n t phoneme sequences for the one e n t i t y Vp+ Hence the science is operating not with an open vocabulary, but with a small explicit set of word-classes and subclasses, many of which have only one member, i.e. do not have d i f f e r e n t members with d i f f e r e n t meanings and details of environment. The e f f e c t of this is t h a t we have f o r each small subscience a w e l l - d e f i n e d set of word-classes and subclasses, which constitute the vocabulary sufficient f o r stating the facts of t h a t subscience. These classes have been e s t a b ­ lished in respect to t h e i r o p e r a t o r - a r g u m e n t combinations (and secondarily in respect to t h e i r f a r t h e r e n v i r o n m e n t ) ; t h e r e f o r e their occurrences necessarily constitute sentences. These are the e l e m e n t a r y sentences of the science, which in

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addition to the operators and t h e i r arguments may have modifiers or local additions (all of which are ultimately derived f r o m secondary operators) attached to one or another of the main words of the sentence. Each e l e m e n ­ t a r y sentence in the subscience can t h e r e f o r e be w r i t t e n as a f o r m u l a in the fixed word classes and subclasses and modifiers of the science. For the moment we consider the formulas only as a normal f o r m f o r the sentences, enabling us to know where each item of information is to be f o u n d , and enabling us to compare sentences in a regular way, and the like. Ultimately one can consider the formulas to be the sentences of the science. The conjunctions which operate on pairs of e l e m e n t a r y sentences (or formulas) have not as yet been found to fall into a fixed vocabulary of subclasses with fixed constraints on their combinability with the sentences or with each other. So f a r , we can only say t h a t the conjunctions are used as in the language as a whole. If a special structure is found in the use of conjunctions in science, it would presumably be not unique to each science (and so part of the particular grammar of t h a t science), but r a t h e r common to a certain set of sciences and so belonging to the g r a m ­ mar of scientific discussion in g e n e r a l . There is, however, one field where the conjunctions are organized into speci­ fied subclasses with specified constraints, so t h a t they are as much part of the grammar of the science as are the sentences on which the conjunctions o p e r a t e . This case is mathematics, where t h e r e f o r e not only the possible sentence structures but also the possible sequences of them ( d e t e r ­ mined by the conjunctions on them) are w e l l - d e f i n e d , i.e. have w e l l - f o r m e d n e s s conditions. This last is seen in proof structure. In contrast, t h e r e is many a s u b j e c t - m a t t e r looser than the above-mentioned sciences which has a largely unstruc­ t u r e d open vocabulary of o p e r a t o r s , d r a w n f r o m the whole language and used in the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r in the same meanings they have in the whole language. Some of these fields, e.g. history, may lack a m o r e - o r - l e s s closed vocabu­ lary even in t h e i r nouns. Such openness of vocabulary may hold even for fields such as law which have a g r e a t amount of technical terminology, if it is found t h a t the full breadth of n a t u r a l language can be combined with the special t e r ­ minology. In all these open-vocabulary cases, it is not

144 possible to reduce all structure.

Harris: On Grammars of Science use a priori combinatorial sentences of the f i e l d to

grounds so as to formulas of fixed

To all this we have to add t h a t any sentence of the sublanguage, or conjunctional combination of sentences, can be an a r g u m e n t of a metalinguistic operator: e.g. It has been shown that lymphocytes contain antibody. Other metalinguistic operators have nouns (primitive arguments) of the sublan­ guage as their arguments: They studied lymphocytes. The metalinguistic operators and certain material attached to them are constructed according to the vocabulary and grammar of the language as a whole and do not accord with the sublanguage g r a m m a r , even though they are p a r t of the language of science. As an example of the language of a particular subscience, consider here the grammar of a set of articles, published in the course of some 35 years, on the question of which cell was the producer of antibody. On combinatorial grounds, it was found t h a t the articles contained the f o l ­ lowing word-classes: G (antigens), J (is iniected),  (animal or b o d y - p a r t ) , F (infection), U (move), T (tissue),  (cell), S (structures within c e l l ) , W (respond, with T, C, or S as subject), A (antibody), V (verbs with A subject and  or  indirect object),  (verbs with  subject and object, e.g. is called, develops into). These classes combined into just a f e w s e n t e n c e - s t r u c t u r e s , namely GJB (as in Antigen was injected subcutaneously), GUT (The antigen travelled to the lymph node) TW (The and GUC (The antigen was taken up by lymphocytes), lymph nodes were inflamed), CWT (Lymphoid cells leave the lymph nodes), CW (The lymphocytes disintegrate), SCW (The cytoplasm in the lymphocytes was broadened), AVC (Antibody is present in plasma cells), CYC (The plasma cells were derived from blast cells). Disregarding synonyms (e.g. nodes and glands, or is found in and is contained in), and words whose meaning d i f ­ ferences in the science are not relevant to the combinato­ rial possibilities (or results) in those articles (e.g. as among the various antigens here discussed), only a f e w of these classes contained subclasses whose combinations d i f f e r e d , in a d e t a i l , from each other. There is Ui (is arrested in), U (perishes in), in addition to U. There are almost 20 sub­ τ' (lymph nodes), etc.; and 7 of classes of T; T (blood), ; y (lymphocytes), z (plasma cells), etc.; and some 10 of

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η

S: S (cytoplasm), S (nucleus), e t c . . Of W there are some 15 subclasses, such as Wa (react), W (is in), Wp (multiply), c u W (change), W (mature), W (move), Wd (disintegrate), and several specific to particular S , such as We (eccentric) with Sn subject. Of A the main subclasses are Aa (substance) and Ap (protein); otherwise it is antibody or the equivalent. In V t h e r e is V (appears in), Vp (is produced in), V (passes through), V (is secreted from), V (is stored in). Y is, is same as, but c is develops (from, into). There are no relevant combinatorial d i f f e r e n c e s among the words within a subclass ( w r i t t e n as symbol with sub­ s c r i p t ) , or a class without subscript. Hence each subclass or subscriptless class symbol is j u s t one word in the vocabulary of this subscience. To these words, in the above sentences t r u c t u r e s , t h e r e a r e occasionally added modifiers (derived f r o m relative clauses, hence f r o m subordinate sentences) and local operators: e.g. aspectual local operators such as begin to, and negative ones such as fail to; negation and q u a n t i t y modifiers such as not, few, increased; prepositional operators such as from. There is a local operator which is important in this subscience have a role in, be capable of; and time modifiers (until the 7th day); and a f e w modifiers relevant f o r this f i e l d such as in vitro, mature, disintegrating, family. The sentences of the articles can be t r a n s f o r m e d , using a priori precisely stated t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , into a sequence of formulas each composed of some of the stated subclasses or classes, possibly carrying stated modifiers, organized into one of the sentence types listed above. These formulas are in many cases joined t o g e t h e r by means of conjunctions. One class of (largely synonymous) conjunctions is so restricted in its environment t h a t sentence pairs connected by it may be considered a single "macro-sentence" of the science. This is is followed by, thereafter, e t c . , symbolized here by colon which occurs between GJB or GUT (or GUC) and a following W or V or Y sentence. The J and U s e n ­ tences can be considered to r e p o r t the stimulus, and the  W, V, or  sentences the response. The macro-sentence formula is thus GJB: . . . U . . ; . . . W/V/Yc . . . (where ...X... indicates a sentence whose o p e r a t o r - - e . g . v e r b - - i s X), with ...U... being most o f t e n unmentioned and GJB: o f t e n zeroed.

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Finally, these sentences, and less f r e q u e n t l y individual words, of the science-language, o f t e n appear as arguments of operators which may loosely be called metalinguistic. There are several classes of these: e.g. Investigators (or a name) have suggested that followed by a science sentence; or We excised followed by a science word (e.g. the nodes). The validity of the analysis is shown not only by its being acceptable as a reasonable organization of the con­ t e n t of the articles, but also by the fact t h a t in those places where it is known t h a t the articles disagreed, or that new information or conclusions w e r e reached, the above structure of the formulas shows appropriate d i f f e r ­ ences. This in itself is evidence for the adequacy of the distributional method in linguistics in achieving a structure that conforms to the meanings of what is being talked about. One could of course argue t h a t the reality with which a science (or any other language use) is dealing is in g e n e r a l , or grossly, a continuous and continuously varying object which cannot be fully described by any system of discrete phonemes and words. But t h a t is a question for the science itself, r a t h e r than for its language. Each sci­ ence t h a t succeeds in describing or predicting something about the world does it with a use of language and m a t h e ­ matics, which consist essentially of discrete symbols. The methods mentioned above suffice to organize the words and sentences of scientific reports into a vocabulary and a f o r ­ mulaic sentence structure which are at each point in c o r r e ­ spondence with the information of the science and with changes in t h a t information. The grammar sketched above has t h r e e structurally sep­ a r a t e d components. One is the sentence (or macrosentence) types of the particular subscience, which may contain s e n ­ tences of a priori science as arguments or subordinate clauses. A second is the conjunctions, or hierarchies of con­ junctions, on sequences of science-language sentences (excluding, in the case above, the colon which is part of the science-language macrosentence), which may differ appreciably as among d i f f e r e n t types of sciences. Last is the "metalinguistic" material operating on sentences or words of the science-language; this material may d i f f e r only in secondary respects (e.g. in its verbs) as among d i f f e r e n t types of science.

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The conjunctions are particularly important because they may help in characterizing constructions which carry out f o r science some of the functions of proofs in mathematics. In the discussion section of articles it is seen t h a t statements of conclusions are in general preceded by a sequence of sentences of the science, which provide the grounds f o r the conclusion. The preceding sentences and the conclusion are of the same sentence types, and the sequence apparently has to satisfy certain special conditions as to which words may occur in a given word-class position in successive s e n ­ tences (e.g. as to having matched modifiers, or being clas­ s i f i e r - w o r d s ) . Given such a sequence, certain hierarchies of conjunctions may suffice (together with certain metalinguis­ tic operators) to assure that the last sentence of the sequence follows f r o m the preceding ones. The whole subject presented here can be looked at somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y . In the case of the immunology articles discussed above, it was found that when French articles in the field w e r e analyzed, the same word-classes and s e n ­ tence types appeared as in the English articles. The l a n ­ guage of each set of articles can be considered a sublan­ guage of its particular n a t u r a l language. But the language common to them a l l , consisting of the word subclass symbols (which suffice as a vocabulary) and their sentence types, is not a sublanguage of e i t h e r English or French. Instead, it can be looked upon as an independent linguistic system sufficient f o r articles in a particular research a r e a . As such, it has certain statable structural relations to the grammars of its prior sciences and of its immediately neighboring research areas ( e . g . , in this case, the t r a n s f e r of donor cells f r o m sensitized animals to others, in order to investigate immune response in the recipients); and it has various similarities to the grammars of other sciences. If we consider the grammars of various sciences in comparison to those of n a t u r a l languages and of m a t h e m a t ­ ics, we see certain common properties to a l l , and certain major and understandable differences among the three types of structures. The g r e a t e s t d i f f e r e n c e s between the science languages and n a t u r a l language are that the m e t a ­ language (in the technical sense) of a science language is outside the science language, whereas the metalanguage of a n a t u r a l language is necessarily in it. Because of this, all

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the word-classes of a natural language can be defined only in respect to a common co-occurrence r e q u i r e m e n t ( a r g u ­ m e n t - o p e r a t o r ) , while each word-class of a science-language can be defined (in English, etc., as metalanguage) as cooccurring with a r b i t r a r y other classes. Within this o v e r - a l l d i f f e r e n c e , the differences b e t w e e n grammars of sciences, or of d i f f e r e n t periods and problems within a single sci­ ence, f i t the differences in c o n t e n t - - t h a t is, the d i f f e r ­ ences in the constraints of r e a l i t y - - i n the various subjectmatters. More generally, the d i f f e r e n c e s between science languages, natural language, and mathematics f i t the d i f ­ ferent constraints of reality t h a t are involved in the sub­ j e c t - m a t t e r s of each of these. Thus the structure of g r a m ­ mars is seen to be r e l a t e d to the constraints of dealing with the real w o r l d , in ways reminiscent of the views of the Vienna positivists and even of some of the American pragmatists.

CONSTITUENCY, DEPENDENCY AND APPLICATIVE STRUCTURE

Sebastian Shaumyan Yale University 1. THE PROBLEM Recent discussions of Transformational Grammar have made it clear that this theory is too p o w e r f u l , t h a t is, it defines a class of possible grammars widely exceeding the class of possible human languages. A question arises: What must be done to constrain the power of Transformational Grammar? One solution is to restrict the class of possible transformations. Chomsky's recent Trace Theory may be viewed as an a t t e m p t at restricting the class of possible transformations to make Transformational Grammar more adequate for description of human languages (Chomsky, 1980). But one might also consider a more radical solution. We may t r y to revise the concept of formal grammar by posing the following question: Must t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s be a necessary component of an adequate formal grammar? To answer this question, I will now consider the m o t i ­ vation for transformational g r a m m a r s , which runs like this: Assume that the syntactic structure of a sentence should be represented by a constituency t r e e (called " p h r a s e - m a r k e r " ) or by equivalent labeled bracketing of a string of f o r m a ­ tives. Constituency representations of sentence structures are to be g e n e r a t e d by means of p h r a s e - s t r u c t u r e rules. But it can be shown t h a t p h r a s e - s t r u c t u r e rules are inade­ quate because t h e r e are many kinds of structure they e i t h e r represent awkwardly or cannot represent at ail. T h e r e f o r e , p h r a s e - s t r u c t u r e rules must be supplemented by more powerful rules which can t r a n s f o r m structures g e n e r ­ ated by p h r a s e - s t r u c t u r e rules into actual structures which need to be g e n e r a t e d . Rules of this type are called

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Structure

transformations. In this way we get two distinct levels of structural r e p r e s e n t a t i o n : 1) the level of structures g e n e r ­ ated by p h r a s e - s t r u c t u r e rules (called deep structures) and 2) the level of structures g e n e r a t e d by transformations (called surface structures). Therefore, Transformational Grammar has two components: 1) a p h r a s e - s t r u c t u r e compo­ nent and 2) a transformational component. In motivating the necessity of Transformational Gram­ mar, Chomsky assumes t h a t syntactic structures are best represented as t r e e s of constituency relations (or as c o r r e ­ sponding labeled bracketing) and does not give reasons for ignoring the alternative possibility - dependency r e p r e s e n ­ tations. There is a r g u m e n t a t i o n missing as to why constitu­ ency representations are superior to dependency r e p r e s e n ­ tations. But let us for a while overlook this omission and accept Chomsky's analysis of the inadequacies of the con­ stituency model. Granted t h a t we accept Chomsky's analysis of the i n a ­ dequacies of the constituency model (called also " i m m e d i ­ a t e - c o n s t i t u e n t model" or " p h r a s e - s t r u c t u r e m o d e l " ) , does it mean that we have to accept the assumption that a f o r ­ mal grammar must necessarily have a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l com­ ponent? I do not think so. The assumption t h a t a formal g r a m ­ mar must have a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l component is just one possibility to remedy the inadequacies of the constituency model. This assumption leads to new difficulties created by the excessive power of transformational formalisms which in their t u r n can be partially remedied by constraining the transformational component. But what if we take a more radical step and exclude from the assumptions underlying formal grammar the assumption t h a t formal grammar must have a t r a n s f o r m a ­ tional component? The history of sciences and mathematics shows that sig­ nificant progress has sometimes been achieved by imposing constraints on initial assumptions of a scientific or m a t h e ­ matical system. Thus, by eliminating Postulate V of Euclidian Geometry a new non-Euclidian Geometry was created. Another example of a constraint is the hypothesis of the

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impossibility of measuring simultaneously the exact position and the exact momentum of a physical particle - Heisen­ b e r g s Indeterminacy Principle. Such constraints have played a very large p a r t in the development of new f u n d a m e n t a l theories in physics. In the present paper I t r y to show t h a t it is possible to construct an insightful formal grammar from whose underlying assumptions the assumption about the t r a n s f o r ­ mational component is excluded on principle. In excluding the assumption of the necessity of transformations in f o r ­ mal grammar I was guided by the following ideas: 1) P r i n ­ ciple of Simplicity: all else being e q u a l , a formal system with a smaller number of assumptions is to be p r e f e r r e d to a formal system with a larger number of initial assump­ tions; 2) Principle of Heuristic Power of Constraints: con­ straints on various aspects of theoretical systems, in our case, the exclusion of the assumption of the necessity of transformations in formal grammars, may lead to novel sig­ nificant insights into the n a t u r e of reality. I will now explore the possibility of constructing an insightful n o n - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l formal grammar. In so doing I will have to take a fresh look at the notion of immediate constituents. The problem of immediate constituents is as actual today, as it was actual 36 years ago when Rulon Wells w r o t e his paper on this subject (Wells, 1947). 2. AN INTEGRATED REPRESENTATION OF SYNTACTIC STRUCTURE Comtemporary linguistic theory recognizes t h a t t h e r e are two models of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the syntactic structure of a sentence: constituency representation and dependency r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Constituency is a p a r t - w h o l e relation while dependency is a p a r t - p a r t relation of a DEPENDENT to its HEAD. The two diagrams in (1) show constituency and dependency representations of a sentence:

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Transformational t a t i o n while other representation.

Structure

Grammar uses constituency r e p r e s e n ­ grammatical theories favor dependency

There seems no likelihood of forming a consistent description of grammatical structure by a choice of only one of the two possible modes of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . It seems as though we must use sometimes constituency r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and sometimes dependency r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , while at times we must use e i t h e r . The situation is r a t h e r like t h a t in physics where the phenomena of light are explained by two theories which complement each other - the wave theory of light and the quantum theory of light. Separately neither of them fully explains the phenomena of light, but together they do. We are faced with a f u n d a m e n t a l problem: Is it possible to combine constituency r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and dependency r e p ­ resentation to form an i n t e g r a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of syntac­ tic structure? And if it is possible, will an i n t e g r a t e d r e p ­ resentation of syntactic s t r u c t u r e lead to new significant insights into linguistic reality? My answer to these questions is a f f i r m a t i v e . It is pos­ sible to f o r m an i n t e g r a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of syntactic structure which will lead to new significant insights into linguistic reality. I will t r y to show how this can be done. As a starting point f o r forming an i n t e g r a t e d r e p r e ­ sentation of syntactic structure I propose to consider the

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relation OPERATOR-OPERAND. The notions of the OPERATOR and the OPERAND are not unknown to linguists but the sig­ nificant implications of these notions f o r linguistic theory have never been properly understood. An OPERATOR is any kind of linguistic device which acts on one or more expressions called its OPERANDS to f o r m an expression called its RESULTANT. For example, in the English expression Peter likes beer the word likes is an operator that acts on its operands Peter and beer; in big deal the word big is an operator t h a t acts on its operand deal. An operator that has one operand is called a ONE-PLACE OPERATOR, an operator that has η operands is called an N-PLACE OPERATOR. Under this definition of the o p e r a t o r , instances of an operator do not have to be only concrete expressions like words or morphemes. So a predicate may be r e p r e s e n t e d by intonation. So in the sentence Fire! the intonation denotes an operator which acts on a t e r m to f o r m a sentence. Another example of an operator which is not a concrete expression is TRUNCATION. For instance gol 'is naked' in the Russian sentence Korol' gol 'the king is naked' is the r e s u l t ­ ant of the truncation of the suffix -yj in the word gol-yj 'naked'. Here the truncation serves as an operator which acts on the adjective gol-yj to form the predicate gol 'is naked'. Now we can introduce the generalized valence called the VALENCE OF AN OPERATOR.

concept

of

The VALENCE OF AN OPERATOR is d e f i n e d as the number of operands t h a t the operator can be combined w i t h . Accordingly, operators may be univalent, bivalent, t r i v a l e n t , etc. I call the valence of an operator the generalized con­ cept of valence since the ordinary concept of valence u s u ­ ally relates to predicates alone, and predicates are only a special class of operators.

the

Let us focus on the operation of the combination of operator with its operands. According to the definition

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Structure

of this operation in ordinary logic an n-place operator combines with its operands in steps. This definition t r e a t s all operands as if they have equally close connection with t h e i r o p e r a t o r . But usually an o p e r a t o r is more closely con­ nected with one operand than another. For example, a transitive verb is more closely connected with the object than with the subject. Thus, in the above example Peter likes beer the transitive predicate likes is more closely connected with beer than with Peter. To do justice to this phenomenon we must r e d e f i n e the combination of an -place operator with its operands as a series of binary operations: an n-place operator is applied to its f i r s t o p e r a n d , then the resultant to the second operand and so on. For example, any transitive predicate, which is a t w o - p l a c e operator, must be applied to the object, then the r e s u l t a n t to the subject. Thus, in the above example the transitive predicate likes must be applied f i r s t to beer, then to Peter: ((likes beer) Peter). The new binary operation called APPLICATION is used in combinatory logic. We can present a network of operators and operands on a diagram which I call an APPLICATIVE TREE. The s e n ­ tence in (1) may be r e p r e s e n t e d by the following applicative tree:

John

took

off his

hat

The applicative t r e e (2) d i f f e r s f r o m the respective constituency t r e e in t h a t operators are r e p r e s e n t e d by double lines and operands are r e p r e s e n t e d by single lines. An applicative tree presents relations operator-operand independently of the linear word o r d e r , as can be seen f r o m the following applicative t r e e s :

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

Probably,

Michael

Michael

probably

left

left

155

early.

early.

Applicative t r e e s (3) relational point of view.

and

(4)

are

equivalent

from

the

Any applicative t r e e may be replaced with an equivalent linear formula with brackets. In the linear n o t a t i o n , by a conventional r e g i m e n t a t i o n , an operator must precede its o p e r a n d , and both are put inside brackets. Here are the applicative t r e e s :

equivalent

linear

(5)

(((OFF TOOK) (HIS HAT)) JOHN)

(6)

(PROBABLY ((LEFT

formulae

of

the

above

EARLY) MICHAEL))

Formula (5) replaces applicative t r e e ( 2 ) . Formula (6) replaces applicative t r e e s (3) and (4) since it is invariant under the changes of word order. In a linear formula the brackets can be l e f t out in accordance with the principle of l e f t w a r d grouping. Applying this convention to the above linear formulae we get: (7)

((OFF TOOK) (HIS HAT)) JOHN

(8)

PROBABLY (( EARLY LEFT) MICHAEL)

An operator and to the resultant of

its operand are in p a r t - w h o l e relation the operator. T h e r e f o r e , a network of

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

operators and operands presented by an applicative at the same time a network of p a r t - w h o l e relations.

tree

is

On the other hand, a network of operators and o p e r ­ ands is also a network of heads and t h e i r dependents because, depending on the character of the resultant of an o p e r a t o r , e i t h e r the operator is head and its operand is dependent or, vice versa, the operator is dependent and its operand is head. It is possible to give a precise definition of the d e p e n ­ dency relation on the basis of the p a r t - w h o l e relation between an o p e r a t o r , its operand and the resultant of the operator. Definition of dependency: Let the expression X be a resultant of o p e r a ­ tor A applied to operand B. Either A is the head and  its dependent or  is the head and A its dependent: if expression X belongs in the same category as operand B, then  is the HEAD and A is its DEPENDENT; if e x p r e s ­ sion X belongs in a d i f f e r e n t category than B, then A is the HEAD and  is its DEPENDENT. If operand  is the head and operator A is its d e p e n d e n t , A is called the MODIFIER OF THE HEAD. If operator A is the head and operand  is its d e p e n d e n t , then  is called the COMPLEMENT OF THE HEAD. Example: in Bill bought new books the operator new is the modifier and operand books is its head because the r e s u l t ­ ant new books belongs in the same category as books (both are t e r m s ) ; operator bought is the head and operand (new books) is its complement because the resultant (bought (new boots)) belongs in a d i f f e r e n t category than (new books): bought (new books) is the head and operand Bill is its com­ plement because the resultant (bought (new books)) Bill belongs in a d i f f e r e n t category than Bill: the f o r m e r is a sentence and the l a t t e r is a t e r m . The concepts "head" and " d e p e n d e n t " given in the above d e f i n i t i o n are more general than those in dependency

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157

grammar. In dependency grammar dependency relations a r e defined only on the smallest constituents of a sentence, t h a t is on words, as can be seen f r o m ( 2 ) . But according to the above d e f i n i t i o n , both words and constituents larger than words may relate to each other as a head and its dependent. The foregoing is evidence t h a t constituency and d e p e n ­ dency are complementary aspects of applicative s t r u c t u r e . On the basis of the above analysis we may advance the f o l ­ lowing hypothesis: Every language possesses an applicative s t r u c ­ t u r e which is a network of operators and operands interconnected by part-whole and dependency relations. The grammar associated with this hypothesis I call APPLICATIVE GRAMMAR. The universal properties of applica­ tive structure constitute what I call the LINGUISTIC GENOTYPE. The hypothesis of applicative structure makes it possible to solve problems which present difficulties tor regular constituency and dependency models. 3. The Advantages of Applicative

Grammar

Applicative Grammar has the following advantages: 1. It makes it possible to give a rigorous definition of the dependency r e l a t i o n . Dependency is not a primitive con­ cept; it must be d e f i n e d . But dependency grammar is not able to give a satisfactory definition of this concept. Rich­ ard A. Hudson in his recent paper gives a t e n t a t i v e solution to the problem of defining dependency (Hudson, 1980: 188-191). Using the t e r m "modifier" as a synonym of the t e r m " d e p e n d e n t " , Hudson defines heads and modifiers in t e r m s of the concepts " f r a m e " and "slot". According to Hudson, any f i l l e r of a slot in a f r a m e is a modifier. But the concepts " f r a m e " and "slot" cannot be t a k e n as p r i m i ­ t i v e , e i t h e r ; they also have to be d e f i n e d . Rather than give a d e f i n i t i o n of these concepts, Hudson gives a list of heads and modifiers.

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

head

example

object

verb

likes(H)

subject prep. obj. adjective genitive determiner adverb r e l . clause comp, clause

verb preposition noun noun noun adjective noun comp. a d j .

John(M) drowned(H) in(H) London(M) b i g ( M ) hands(H) my(M) hands(H) t h e ( M ) end(H) v e r y ( M ) big(H) people(H) who think t h a t ( M ) bigger(H) than Mary was(M)

Any list of heads of these concepts.

and

modifiers

biscuits(M)

cannot

replace

a

definition

Applicative Grammar solves the problem of defining dependency. It gives a rigorous definition of heads and dependents and draws an important distinction between two kinds of dependents: modifiers and complements. 2. In current linguistic literature, constituency, or p a r t - w h o l e r e l a t i o n , is conflated with linear word order. But, as a m a t t e r of f a c t , constituency must be viewed as independent of linear word order. Applicative Grammar makes it possible to define constituency as independent of linearity. Constituency is defined in two steps. First we define immediate constituents and then give a definition of con­ stituents based on the d e f i n i t i o n of immediate constituents. Definition of IMMEDIATE CONSTITUENTS: If expression A is an o p e r a t o r , expression  is its operand and expression  is the r e s u l t ­ ant of the application of A to B, then expressions A and  are IMMEDIATE CONSTITUENTS OF EXPRESSION  Definition of CONSTITUENTS: If t h e r e exists a sequence ι t h a t i s ( f o r . . . a CONSTITUENT OF

of expressions X 1 , an immediate con, n n n - 1 ) , then x1. is

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Example. Every word W in any sentence S is its constituent because, f o r any sentence S, there exists a sequence of expressions x 1 , x 2 , ... , xn such t h a t W=x1, S=xn and x.is an immediate constituent o f T h u s , in the sentence presented in the applicative t r e e (4) the word left is a con­ s t i t u e n t of the sentence Michael probably left early because (left early), t h e r e exists a sequence of expressions: left, ((left early) Michael), (probably ((left early) Michael)). And every member of this sequence is a constituent of all m e m ­ bers which follow it. (In r e p r e s e n t i n g immediate c o n s t i t u ­ e n t s , we place, by convention, an operator before its o p e r ­ and.) 3. According to our d e f i n i t i o n of dependency, given operator A and operand B, A is the head and  is dependent, if A transposes  f r o m one category another. If an operator transposes its operand from category into a n o t h e r , I call the o p e r a t o r a TRANSPOSER the o p e r a n d , a TRANSPONEND: and the process I TRANSPOSITION.

an its into one and call

Examples of transposition in English: The operator of applied to the t e r m table transposes table f r o m the category of t e r m s into the category of modifiers of t e r m s . The operator is applied to table transposes table f r o m the c a t ­ egory of t e r m s into the category of predicates. The o p e r a ­ tor that applied to the sentence John left Paris yesterday transposes this sentence f r o m the category of sentences into the category of t e r m s (compare / know John and / know that John Left Paris yesterday). Neither constituency grammar nor dependency grammar have the means to handle transposition. But understanding the phenomenon of transposition is of paramount impor­ tance tor linguistic theory. This phenomenon has f a r - r e a c h ­ ing implications both in synchrony and diachrony. Now I consider transposition more closely. The concept "transposition" is d i f f e r e n t from the concept " t r a n s f o r m a ­ t i o n " as used in t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar. In t r a n s f o r m a ­ tional grammar the t e r m " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n " r e f e r s to o p e r a ­ tions which e f f e c t changes in pre-established structures through d e l e t i o n , substitution or p e r m u t a t i o n of constitu­ ents. Transpositions r e q u i r e no d e l e t i o n , substitution or

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Structure

permutation; they are purely relational operations t r a n s f e r r i n g expressions f r o m one category into another. It should be pointed out t h a t Applicative Grammar does not r e q u i r e transformations in the sense of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar. The concept "transposition" makes it possible to reveal important relations b e t w e e n syntactic functions and words having those functions. Word categories have a dual n a t u r e : on the one hand, they have some d e f i n i t e syntactic function. So nouns denote objects and at the same time function as t e r m s in a sentence; adjectives denote fixed properites and at the same time function as modifiers of t e r m s in a s e n ­ t e n c e ; verbs denote changing properties and at the same time function as predicates of sentences; adverbs denote properties of properties and at the same time function as modifiers of predicates in sentences. These a r e inherent syntactic functions of the word categories because these functions correlate with the lexical meanings of the word categories. Since words are transposed from one category into another, they are at the same time transposed f r o m one syntactic function into another. Thus we come up w i t h a classification of the syntactic functions in t e r m s of " p r i ­ mar/' and "secondary". Primary syntactic functions are inherent syntactic functions of the word categories. Secon­ dary syntactic functions are those which are acquired by words when they are transposed f r o m t h e i r basic category into some other category. Examples. The noun milk may function as a t e r m in a sentence, and this is its primary f u n c t i o n ; by applying the operator of we transpose this word into of milk and now it functions as a modifier of a t e r m , which is its secondary f u n c t i o n ; by applying the operator is to milk we get is milk which functions as a predicate of a sentence and this is another secondary function of milk. A sentence may also have a primary and secondary syn­ tactic f u n c t i o n . The primary function of a sentence is the function of being an independent unit of communication. Its secondary functions are functions of a t e r m or a modifier. When a sentence is transposed into a clause, it receives a

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells secondary f u n c t i o n . Compare, f o r know that John has left.

161

instance, / know John and /

The interplay of primary and secondary syntactic f u n c ­ tions of words is of f u n d a m e n t a l importance f o r diachrony: When a word A receives a secondary function in a certain syntactic environment, t h e r e is a universal tendency to replace word A by a word (or group of words)  f o r which this function is a primary function. Due to this tendency, nouns that have a secondary function of adverbs are replaced by adverbs ( f o r instance, Romance adverbs in -mente are ancient instrumentals); adjectives t h a t have a secondary function of t e r m s are replaced by nouns, etc. The phenomenon of transposition is crucial for the typological classification of languages of the world. For instance, the so-called inflexional languages (like Latin or Russian) and analytic languages (like English or French) have d i f f e r e n t types of transposers (flexions, on one hand, and prepositions, on the other hand). A classification of the languages of the world from the point of view of t r a n s p o ­ sition must answer the f u n d a m e n t a l question of universal grammar and language typology: In which way do languages d i f f e r with respect to transposers they use? The distinction of primary and secondary syntactic functions implies a view of syntactic processes which is d i f ­ f e r e n t from the view of syntactic processes advocated by Transformational Grammar. Transformational Grammar regards syntactic nominal groups as a result of the nominalization of sentences. In many instances this view is j u s t i f i e d . There a r e , however, instances when this view runs into difficulties. Consider, for example, the nominal structure ADJECTIVE + NOUN. The blue sky is not the result of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the sky is blue. In languages where the formal category of the adjec­ tive occurs, the primary syntactic function of the adjective is a t t r i b u t i v e and the secondary is predicative. As a m a t t e r of f a c t , f r o m the standpoint of d e r i v a t i o n , the nominal group is no less f u n d a m e n t a l than the s e n ­ tence. The nominal group is f u n d a m e n t a l f o r the syntactic contrast ADJECTIVE + NOUN and the sentence is f u n d a m e n t a l for the syntactic contrast NOUN + VERB. The syntactic

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Structure

contrast between the adjective and the noun, on the one hand, and between the noun and the v e r b , on the other hand, is based on the semiotic PRINCIPLE OF MAXIMUM DIFFERENTIATION. The nominal group is characteristic for the maximum d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between the noun and the adjec­ t i v e , and the sentence is characteristic for maximum d i f f e r ­ entiation between a noun and the verb. The syntactic con­ t r a s t between the noun and the adjective is neutralized in the predicative position, and the syntactic contrast between the noun and the verb is neutralized in the a t t r i b u t i v e position. This is why the sky is blue must be regarded as derived from the the blue sky r a t h e r than vice versa: is blue is a secondary function of blue. By contrast, the moon shines must be regarded as primary with respect to the shining moon: The participle shining is a secondary function of the verb shines. In accordance with the Principle of Maximum D i f f e r e n ­ tiation both the nominal groups and sentences are f u n d a ­ mental from the standpoint of the direction of derivation. Therefore, under some conditions, nominal groups are derived from sentences a n d , under other conditions, s e n ­ tences are derived f r o m nominal groups. 4. Let us consider the problem of word order univer­ sais. Constituency grammar does not provide the means for defining word order universais, while dependency grammar does. We may d e t e r m i n e the position of dependents with respect to their heads. Tesnière pointed out t h a t in some languages (which he called centrifugal) dependents t e n d to follow t h e i r heads: adjectives follow nouns, objects follow verbs, in prepositional phrases nouns follow prepositions, etc. (Tesniere: 1966: 3 2 - 3 3 ) . In other languages, which T e s ­ nière called centripetal, dependents tend to precede t h e i r heads. Many languages are not pure c e n t r i f u g a l or c e n ­ t r i p e t a l types: they are only mostly c e n t r i f u g a l or mostly centripetal. The relation head-dependent makes it possible to develop a calculus of logically possible types of word order provided we apply the concepts "head" and " d e p e n d e n t " not only to minimal constituents of a sentence, t h a t is, to words, but to any constituents. Without the generalized concepts "head" and " d e p e n d e n t " as they are defined on

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163

the basis of the relation " o p e r a t o r - o p e r a n d " , it would be d i f f i c u l t , if at all possible, to give an adequate definition of the linear order of word blocks such as, f o r instance, clauses in a complex sentence (compare, f o r example, / know that John left and That John left bothers me). As a m a t t e r of f a c t , the generalized concepts and " d e p e n d e n t " provided by Applicative Grammar both p a r t - p a r t relations and p a r t - w h o l e relations.

"head" involve

It is also helpful f o r the typology of word order to distinguish two types of dependents - modifiers and com­ plements - as is done in Applicative Grammar. In some l a n ­ guages which are not pure c e n t r i f u g a l or c e n t r i p e t a l , e i t h e r complements precede and modifiers follow t h e i r heads, or vice versa, complements follow and modifiers precede their heads. Applicative theory of word order is presented in Shaumyan, 1977. 5. Neither constituency g r a m m a r , nor dependency g r a m ­ mar provides the means f o r defining categories and syntac­ tic functions. Consider, f o r instance, the t r e a t m e n t of categories in constituency grammar. Constituency grammar uses unlabeled or labeled constituency t r e e s . In labeled constituency t r e e s constituents r e p r e s e n t e d by n o n - t e r m i n a l nodes are labeled by categorical symbols, such as S, NP, VP, Ν, V, A, Adv, etc. We get a list of categories which are not d e f i n e d . Dependency grammars also may have t r e e s with symbols used as labels of syntactic functions. But we get only a list of syntactic functions like subject, direct object, indirect object, etc. They are not d e f i n e d . In contrast to constituency and dependency grammars, Applicative Grammar has a formalism which provides the means for defining categories and syntactic functions. This formalism is presented in Sections 4 - 6 . Since Applicative Grammar succeeds in integrating two hitherto separate and independent models - constituency grammar and dependency grammar - into a single system, while preserving all t h e i r explanatory power, it has a good

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Shaumyan: Applicative

claim to be accepted separate models.

as

a

Structure

replacement

for

those

two

Constituency and dependency are two complementary facts of applicative s t r u c t u r e . It follows from the foregoing t h a t applicative s t r u c t u r e , as well as both its facets - con­ stituency structure and dependency structure - is a u t o n o ­ mous, that is, it is independent of its representation in linear sequences of words. In accordance with the autonomy of applicative s t r u c ­ t u r e , Applicative Grammar has two parts: genotype grammar and phenotype grammar. Genotype grammar studies applica­ tive structure itself, t h a t is, independently of its linear r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Phenotype grammar studies the mapping of applicative structure on linear expressions, t h a t is, it s t u d ­ ies applicative structure in t e r m s of its linear r e p r e s e n t a ­ tion. The important thing to notice is that phenotype g r a m ­ mar is based on genotype grammar. In Shaumyan, 1977, it has been shown t h a t linear word order cannot be a d e ­ quately defined in terms of concatenation. An adequate definition of linear words must be given in t e r m s of the generalized concepts "head" and " d e p e n d e n t " d e f i n e d , in t h e i r t u r n , in t e r m s of the notions of the operator and operand. The characterization of grammatical structure as an automonous entity independent of linear word order is not the only possible view of grammatical s t r u c t u r e . An a l t e r n a ­ tive view is represented by Transformational Grammar. Transformational Grammar conflates constituency structure with linear word o r d e r ; it regards linearity as an inherent property of constituency s t r u c t u r e . As a r e s u l t , t r a n s f o r m a ­ tions are stated in t e r m s of the linear word order of con­ s t i t u e n t s , which makes it necessary to f o r m u l a t e distinct rules of languages with d i f f e r e n t word order f o r what is the same phenomenon f r o m a relational point of view. By contrast, since Applicative Grammar defines constituency independently of linear word o r d e r , it is able to state sig­ nificant cross-linguistic generalizations in relational t e r m s , which makes it possible to f o r m u l a t e identical rules for cross-linguistically identical phenomena.

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As a n o n - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l linguistic theory, Applicative Grammar does not need e i t h e r the notion of deep structure or multiple levels of syntactic s t r u c t u r e . This is in accor­ dance with Occam's razor: Entitates non sunt multiplicanda prae­ ter necessitatem- e n t i t i e s should not be multiplied beyond necessity. 4. THE SYNTACTIC SYSTEM OF APPLICATIVE GRAMMAR The formalism of Applicative Grammar is r e l a t e d to the formalism of categorial grammars but at the same time t h e r e is an essential d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the two f o r m a l ­ isms. Y. B a r - H i l l e l , C. Gaifman and E. Shamir proved the f o r ­ mal equivalence of phrase structure grammars (immediate constituent grammars) and categorial grammars (see B a r Hillel, 1964). Since categorial grammars are equivalent to phrase structure grammars, categorial grammars are i n a d e ­ quate f o r the description of n a t u r a l languages in the same way as phrase structure grammars. To have a grammar t h a t could be adequate f o r the description of n a t u r a l languages, I unified categorial g r a m ­ mar and the system of the combinators of combinatory logic into an i n t e g r a t e d whole; the linguistic theory based on the resulting formalism I call Applicative Grammar. The relation of Applicative Grammar to categorial grammar is similar to the relation of Transformational Grammar to phrase s t r u c ­ t u r e grammar. Just as it would be a mistake to identify Transformational Grammar with phrase structure g r a m m a r , so it would be a mistake to identify Applicative Grammar with categorial grammar. I now t u r n to the formalism of Applicative A language, by d e f i n i t i o n , categories, of expressions:

must

have

1) t e r m s , or names of objects; 2) sentences; 3) o p e r a t o r s , t h a t is expressions which sions to form other expressions.

Grammar.

three

kinds,

combine

or

expres­

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

In Applicative Grammar operators are connected with one another by a network of formal definitions which e v e n ­ tually reach the ultimate d e f i n i e n t i a - t e r m and sentence. Let us t a k e , f o r instance, operators "one-place predicate" (p1), " t w o - p l a c e predicate" (p2), " t h r e e - p l a c e predicate" 5 Cp' ), and see how t h e i r definitions are i n t e r r e l a t e d with one another and with the ultimate d e f i n i e n t i a , the " s e n ­ tence" (s) and the " t e r m " (t). Consider the following example: showed showed Nancy showed Nancy pictures Jim showed Nancy pictures

-(p3) -(p2) -(p1) -(s)

The f i r s t expression showed is a t h r e e - p l a c e (or d i t r a n ­ sitive) predicate of category p 3 . Applying it to an e x p r e s ­ sion of category t produces showed Nancy, an expression of category p2, t h a t is a transitive predicate of the same c a t ­ egory as, f o r example, took. Applying showed Nancy to pictures produces showed Nancy pictures, an intransitive predicate of the same category p 1 , as, f o r example, took the book or walked. Applying showed Nancy pictures to Jim produces Jim showed Nancy pictures. By a category I mean a class of operators. For the sake of g e n e r a l i t y I conceive of sentences and t e r m s as z e r o place operators. This approach is convenient not only f r o m the formal point of view; it is empirically j u s t i f i e d , too. Thus, Jim waiks or Jim takes the book are equivalent to Latin impersonal ningit 'it snows' which is nothing but a zero-place predicate. The English t e r m the biind men is equivalent to the blind which is nothing but a zero-place a t t r i b u t e . Since I used the t e r m "category" only in the sense of a class of operators I will henceforth replace it by the t e r m "0-category". The combinatory properties of predicates be expressed in a series of definitions:

and terms

can

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167

The symbol s indicates identity by d e f i n i t i o n . The j u x ­ taposition of the 0-category symbols with the expression symbols indicates that a given expression belongs to a given category. The blanks b e t w e e n expressions are meant to divide them. The l e f t expression is applied to the right one. The above definitions r e a d : (1) Expression A of O-category s is identical by d e f i n i ­ tion with expression  of O-category p 1 applied to e x p r e s ­ sion  of O-category t. (2) Expression ß of 0-category p1 is identical by d e f i n i ­ tion with expression B' of 0-category p 2 applied to e x p r e s ­ sion C' of O-category t. (3) Expression B' of 0-category p 2 is identical by d e f i ­ nition with expression B" of 0-category p 3 applied to expression C" of O-category t. We face a conceptual problem: How to dispose of p 1 , p , p 3 by reducing them to the ultimate d e f i n i e n t i a s and t? 2

To solve this problem, tion of an O-category.

I will

construct

a formal

Consider an expression XY w h e r e X is an operator is its operand.

defini­

and Y

It is obvious t h a t if expression XY belongs to a certain category ν and expression Y belongs to a certain category u, expression X must belong to a category of expressions t h a t change expressions of category  into expressions of category v. Let us designate this category as Ouv where symbol designates "O-category". This formula reads: the category of operators f r o m  into v.

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Structure

We can f o r m u l a t e a rule for classifying the above expression XY; If X is in Ouv and  is in u, t h e n XY is in v. Now we can have a formal calculus of operators. We postulate certain primitive 0-categories c 1 , c 2 ,

...

We d e f i n e the formal concept of 0-category as follows: 1. Primitive O-categories 2. If ν O-category.

and



are

c1,

c2, . . .

are

0-categories,

0-categories. then

Ouv

is

an

Then we introduce notation f o r relation "belong t o " : yX. This formula reads: expression X belongs to category y. Next we diagram:

adopt the

above

rule

and

present

it as a t r e e

Here horizontal line is meant to indicate t h a t r e s u l t a n t v(XY) follows from application of operator X to operand Y. I w a n t to stress the relativity of the concepts " o p e r a n d " and " r e s u l t a n t " : all the t h r e e expressions X, Y, and XY are operators. But besides, Y is an operand and XY is r e s u l t a n t to X. Rule 0 reads: If expression X belongs to O-category Ouv, expression Y belongs to 0-category u, t h e n expression XY belongs to 0-category v. It should be noted t h a t formula Ouv could be presented in a d i f f e r e n t f o r m , say as (u-+v) if we adopted a conven­ tion t h a t the a r r o w designates "O-category". But the n o t a ­ tion with prefix is more convenient than the notation with infix — > , since the f o r m e r is bracketless, and the l a t t e r involves the use of brackets, as is the case with any m a t h ­ ematical notation using infixes instead of prefixes. Besides, the arrow might involve conceptual ambiguity, since usually this symbol does not designate abstract objects.

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We can deduce the following two rules f r o m the Rule 0:

This rule reads: if the r e s u l t a n t of the application of expression X to expression  belongs to 0-category u and expression  belongs to 0-category v, then expression X belongs to category Ovu. Rule 01 is a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d consequence of Rule 0 and the proof is obvious: let X belong to 0-category z t h e n , according to Rule 0 , since  belongs to 0-category v and  belongs to 0-category u, z must be identical with - v u . Rule 01 defines the 0-category of an operator of 0-categories of its operand and r e s u l t a n t .

in

terms

The reverse of Rule 01 is this:

This rule reads: If expression  is the r e s u l t a n t of the application of operator X to its operand , and X belongs to category Ouv, then  belongs to 0 - c a t e g o r y u and  belongs to 0-category v. The proof of Rule 02 is no less obvious: If expression  is constructed by Rule 0 , and operator X belongs to 0-category Ouv, then  must belong to 0 - c a t e g o r y u and  must belong to 0-category v. Rule 02 defines the 0-categories of an operand and a resultant in t e r m s of the 0-category of t h e i r operator.

of

Let us now t u r n to our problem. By applying Rule 01 to the above set of definitions we can define p 1 , p2, p 3 in t e r m s of ultimate d e f i n i e n t i a t and s. This is done in t h r e e steps: f i r s t , we d e f i n e p1 as Ots, then we d e f i n e p2 as otots and finally we d e f i n e p 3 as ototos. As a r e s u l t , we get a new set of definitions: (1') sA Ξ OtsB tC

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Shaumyan: Applicative (2') OtsBOtOtsB' (3') OtOtsB'

OtOWtsB"

Structure

tC' "

Reducing the definitions of aii 0-categories to their ultimate d e f i n i e n t i a makes it possible to clearly d e t e r m i n e to which O-categories given expressions must belong if they are to combine into categorially w e l l - f o r m e d expressions. As a m a t t e r of f a c t , Rule 0 formalizes the concept of catego­ rial w e l l - f o r m e d n e s s . I call an expression X categorially w e l l - f o r m e d constructed from expression Y 1 t . . . f Y by Rule 0.

if

it

is

η

We may construct applicative t r e e diagrams to r e p r e s e n t various categorial analyses of expressions. For example, a categorial analysis of the sentence Jim showed Nancy pictures may be r e p r e s e n t e d by the following applicative t r e e d i a ­ gram: OtOtOts OtOis Ots s

showed t Nancy (showed Nancy) t pictures ((showed Nancy) pictures) (((showed Nancy) pictures)

t Jim Jim)

Let us now apply the calculus of O-categories to other conceptual problems. We will be concerned with problems arising f r o m conceptual ambiguity and vagueness. It is obvi­ ous t h a t conceptual ambiguity and vagueness are highly disadvantageous for any science. The history of science abounds in examples where an increase in the conceptual clarity of a theory through careful clarifications and speci­ fications of meaning had significant influence on the p r o g ­ ress of science, as, f o r example, the emergence of the theory of special relativity depended on the recognition and subsequent reduction of conceptual ambiguity and vagueness within a particular domain. We will be able to construct precise definitions for syntactical concepts which e i t h e r are used undefined or whose definitions are of little avail because of t h e i r a m b i ­ guity and vagueness.

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I s t a r t with the d e f i n i t i o n of the syntactic system of Applicative Grammar. The syntactic system of Applicative Grammar is defined by six sorts of notions, as follows: (1) (2)

(3) (4) (5)

Primitive O-categories: t, s. Rules for constructing composite categories f r o m the primitives: (a) Primitive O-categories t, s are O-cate­ gories. (b) If χ and y are O-categories, then Oxy is an O-category. Expressions belonging to O-categories. Rules for constructing expressions: Rule 0, Rule 0 1 , Rule 02. Nine combinators (or combinatory operators): /, ,

(6)

 ,

W,

B,

L,

K,

Rules f o r applying combinators.

I will consider combinators below in Section 6.

and

rules f o r

applying

I introduce a f e w definitions. Definition 1. If expression  belongs to category θ, expression  belongs to category f and expression X belongs to category Ots, I call X a ONE-PLACE PREDICATE and call  a PRIMARY TERM. Definition 2. If expression  belongs to category Ots,  belongs to category t and expression expression X belongs to category OtOts, I call X a TWO-PLACE PREDICATE and call   SECONDARY TERM. Definition 3. If expression expression 

XY belongs to category OtOts, belongs to category f and

them

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

expression X belongs to category OtOtOts, I call X a THREE-PLACE PREDICATE and call   TERTIARY TERM. The opposition of a primary and a secondary t e r m con­ stitutes the NUCLEUS of a sentence. These t e r m s I call NUCLEAR. It follows from the Definitions 1-2 t h a t primary t e r m s occur both in the opposition PRIMARY TERM : SECONDARY TERM (with two-place predicates) and outside with opposi­ tion (with one-place predicates). T h e r e f o r e , the position with one-place predicate must be r e g a r d e d as the point of neutralization of the opposition PRIMARY TERM : SECONDARY TERM which is r e p r e s e n t e d by the primary t e r m in this position. The primary term is the neutral-negative (unmarked) member and the secondary t e r m is the positive (marked) member of this opposition. Definition 4. Let AB be a w e l l - f o r m e d expression. It follows f r o m Rule 01 t h a t A belongs to 0-category Oxy, B, to 0-category x, and AB, to 0-category y. Either A or  can be considered the main constituent of this expression called its HEAD: if χ Ξ , the head is B, and if χ φ , the head is A. If  is the head, A is called a MODIFIER OF THE HEAD. If A is the head,  is called a COMPLEMENT OF THE HEAD. The word "dependent" denotes modifiers and comple­ ments together. Example: the expression Bill bought new books is sented by the t r e e diagram:

repre­

Books is the head of (new books) and new is its modi­ f i e r ; bought is the head of (bought (new books)) and (new books) is its complement; (bought (new books)) is the head of ((bought (new books)) Bill) and Bill is its complement.

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173

Definition 5. A categorial symbol is called ADJOINED if it is introduced into the syntactic system by a definition of the form: z -Oxy, where z denotes an adjoined categorial symbol and Oxy denotes an O-category where χ and y are e i t h e r other adjoined categorial symbols or t, or 5. It follows f r o m this d e f i n i t i o n t h a t we can introduce adjoined categorial symbols only by stages. At the f i r s t stage we can define only f o u r adjoined categorial symbols for which a r b i t r a r y l e t t e r s may be used: a-Oit,

m=Oss,

pi=0ts9

c=Ost.

By substituting these adjoined categorial symbols tor t h e i r d e f i n i e n t i a used as components of complex categories, we can introduce new adjoined categorial symbols, for example: P2-0tp19

α=ΟρλρΛ.

By substituting new adjoined categorial symbols for t h e i r d e f i n i e n t i a used as components in more complex c a t ­ egories we can introduce f u r t h e r adjoined categorial sym­ bols, and so on. It is obvious t h a t any adjoined categorial symbol i n t r o ­ duced a t later stages can be d e f i n e d in t e r m s of the u l t i ­ mate d e f i n i e n t i a t and s by a series of definitions. I call this series of definitions a definitional reduction. Example of definitional pz=0tp2=0t0tp,

reduction:

=OWtOis.

The concept of adjoined categorial symbols and t h e i r definitional reduction is important because by introducing adjoined categorial symbols we can present the categorial system in a compact f o r m .

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Here is a table of adjoined some basic syntactic categories.

Adjoined Categorial Symbols

Definitional

categorial

=Ots =0tp1=0t0ts =0tp 2 =Qt0t0ts =Ott =0p1pi=00ts0ts

d'

=Qp 2 p 2 =Q0tp,0tpi=0Qt0ts0t0ts

Pi*i

=up 1 0p 2 =u0tsutp 1 =00ts0t0ts

Pi-1

=0piS=00tS5

p2+ ι = 0 p 2 p 3 = 0 0 t p 1 0 t p 2 = 0 0 t 0 t s 0 t 0 t p 1 = 00 tO tsO tO tOts

=0p2p,=00tp,0ts=00t0ts0ts

symbols

denoting

Reduction

p, p2 p3 a d

"

Structure

One-place predicate Two-place predicate Three-place predicate Modifier of a t e r m Modifier of a o n e place predicate Modifier of a t w o place predicate Operator increasing the valence of a o n e place predicate Operator decreasing the valence of a o n e place predicate Operator increasing the valence of a t w o place predicate Operator decreasing the valence of a t w o place predicate

We can introduce as many adjoined symbols as we need. I will close this section by suggesting an method of constructing applicative t r e e diagrams.

alternative

The above examples presented the construction of t r e e diagrams in accordance with a convention t h a t an operator must be placed before its operand and t h a t the t r e e d i a ­ gram must be constructed f r o m top to b o t t o m , starting with the smallest units.

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Sometimes, however, it is convenient to construct a t r e e diagram f r o m bottom u p , starting with a sentence. We take a sentence and t r e a t is as the bottom node of a t r e e d i a g r a m ; then we draw a horizontal line over the node, extract the operator f r o m the sentence and w r i t e the operator at the l e f t and the operand a t the right above the horizontal line. The same procedure is r e p e a t e d over new nodes f r o m l e f t to right until we reach the ultimate con­ stituents of the sentence. To illustrate how this is done, let us take the sentence Bill bought new books in the above example. We will construct an applicative t r e e diagram in steps. Our f i r s t step is to take the sentence, draw a horizon­ t a l line over i t , extract the operator f r o m it and f o r m two new nodes over the horizontal line:

Our second step is to apply this procedure nodes f r o m l e f t to right. We get

By applying the same procedure complete the construction:

There diagram.

is no

need

to

use

to

brackets

the

to the

new

nodes

in this type

As another example of a t r e e diagram bottom up I present the following t r e e sentence Jim showed Nancy pictures:

of

new

we

tree

constructed f r o m diagram f o r the

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

5. MORPHOLOGICAL REALIZATIONS OF SYNTACTIC CATEGORIES. Syntactic categories are classes of functional units. Functional units are formed by assigning to a word or a group of words certain syntactic functions. Every word t h a t belongs in one of the f o u r main word classes—a n o u n , a v e r b , an adjective, or an a d v e r b - - m a y have primary syntac­ tic functions and secondary syntactic functions. In t h e i r primary syntactic functions a noun is a t e r m , a verb is a p r e d i c a t e , an adjective is a modifier of a t e r m , an adverb is a modifier of a predicate. In t h e i r secondary syntactic functions a noun can be a p r e d i c a t e , a modifier of a t e r m or of a predicate; an adjective can be a t e r m , a predicate or a modifier of a predicate; a verb can be a t e r m , a modifier of a t e r m or of a p r e d i c a t e ; an adverb can be a modifier of a t e r m , a predicate or a t e r m . We may think of secondary syntactic functions of lexical classes as the transposition of one syntactic function into another: for example, we may think of the transposition of a predicate into a t e r m , into a modifier of a t e r m or of a predicate; we may think of the transposition of a modifier of a t e r m into a p r e d i c a t e , into a t e r m or into a modifier of a predicate. The syntactic system provides the means f o r transposing one syntactic function into another. For example, category OOitOts is a class of operators t h a t transpose a modifier of a t e r m into a one-place p r e d i c a t e , category OtOtt is a class of operators t h a t transpose a t e r m into a modifier of a t e r m . Sentences also can be transposed into d i f f e r e n t syn­ tactic functions: for example, category Ost is a class of operators t h a t transpose a sentence into a t e r m and so on. There are languages t h a t do not distinguish lexical classes, such as Chinese. We must abandon the t e r m s "verb" and " n o u n " when describing these languages. Still we can discover predicative and non-predicative functions in these languages just as in languages t h a t have lexical classes. They can be based on d i f f e r e n t modes of combinations of the expressions t h a t constitute one and the same lexical class.

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177

Functional units may be realized not only by single words t h a t belong in f o u r main lexical classes but by other morphological units, as w e l l : 1. A functional unit may be realized by a group of words: The weight of the snow on the roof caused the shed to coifapse. In this sentence the f i r s t t e r m is realized by the group the weight of the snow on the roof and the p r e d i c a t e , by the group caused to colt apse. 2. A functional unit may be realized by a morpheme t h a t constitutes a component of an incorporating complex. So, in Chukchee a lexical morpheme may be incorporated in a verb stem. This morpheme must be viewed as an optional affix which has a function of a t e r m denoting an object (Skorik, 1948). For example, such is the Chukchee lexical morpheme kora 'deer' incorporated in the verb kora-janratgat 'separated deer' in the sentence Jetynvyt korajanratgat 'The hosts separated the deer'. 3. A functional unit is realized by a morpheme which is a component of a verbal f o r m . There is no incorporation here because morphemes of this type are mandatory compo­ nents of verbal forms. For example, in Georgian the c o n j u ­ gation of transitive verbs involves the realization of a t e r m denoting a subject and a t e r m denoting an object: mo-kl-a 'he killed him', mo-kaf-i 'you killed him', mo-v-kai-i Ί killed him'. The realization of functional units by morphemes of incorporating complexes and morphemes constituting manda­ tory components of verbal forms is common in Paleoasiatic, Caucasian, Semitic, and Bantu languages. Functional units and morphological units which realize them constitute d i f f e r e n t levels of linguistic s t r u c t u r e which should strictly be distinguished f r o m each other. In accor­ dance w i t h this distinction we must distinguish two types of syntactic connections: 1) syntactic connections between functional units and 2) syntactic connections b e t w e e n units t h a t realize functional units. In c u r r e n t linguistic l i t e r a t u r e

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Structure

these two d i f f e r e n t types of connections are very o f t e n confounded with each other. Consider, f o r instance, such very common statements as: 1) The predicate agrees with the subject; 2) the predicate governs the object. In light of the foregoing, these statements are clearly incorrect. P r e d ­ icate, subject, object are functional units while a g r e e m e n t and government are formal connections between morpholo­ gical units. T h e r e f o r e , the correct statements will be, on the one hand: 1) the predicate has a subject relation with the t e r m , 2) the predicate has an object relation w i t h the t e r m ; a n d , on the other hand: 1) the verb agrees w i t h the noun, 2) the verb governs the noun. The syntactic connections between functional units are independent of the connections between the morphological units t h a t realize the functional units. The syntactic con­ nections between the functional units exist no m a t t e r how they are realized on the level of morphological units. The level of the functional units is universal, while the level of the morphological units t h a t realize the functional units is language-specific. The level of functional units I call the GENOTYPE LEVEL and the level of morphological units t h a t realize the functional units I call the PHENOTYPE LEVEL. In accordance with the distinction of these two levels we must distinguish two types of syntactic connections: genotype syn­ tactic connections and phenotype syntactic connections. Such notions as agreement and government clearly belong in the phenotype syntactic level. As was seid above, in some languages, tike Chinese, the distinction between functional units is based on the d i f f e r ­ ent modes of the combination of words. T h e r e f o r e , the rules of word order also belong in the phenotype syntactic level. The distinction of the genotype and phenotype levels is of paramount importance f o r linguistic theory because the universal rules of syntax are possible only in t e r m s of the genotype level, and without clear understanding of the u n i ­ versal rules we are unable to understand the languagespecific rules on the phenotype level.

are

The foregoing shows t h a t the minimal syntactic units functional units r a t h e r than morphemes or words. As a

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179

m a t t e r of f a c t , morphemes and words are morphological units r a t h e r than syntactic units. Constituency grammar and dependency grammar run into difficulties when they t r y to f o r m u l a t e universal rules of syntax, because it is the word t h a t they regard as a minimal syntactic unit. T r a n s f o r m a ­ tional Grammar has gone even f u r t h e r : it regards the mor­ pheme as a minimal syntactic unit. This is why in e a r l i e r transformational works morphology was eliminated alto­ gether. This approach was corrected in recent works on Transformational Grammar where the word is tacitly taken as a minimal syntactic unit r a t h e r than the morpheme. Still, the f u n d a m e n t a l d i f f i c u l t y remains: universal rules of syntax cannot be f o r m u l a t e d in t e r m s of operations on words. In order to set out the crucial significance of f u n c ­ tional units f o r syntacic theory, we need some expressive terminological device. On the analogy of the morpheme as a minimal morphological u n i t , I suggest to call the functional unit the 5YNTAXEME as a minimal syntactic unit.

6. COMBINATORS IN APPLICATIVE GRAMMAR

Let us t u r n to abstract operators t h a t , following Curry, I call combinatory (Curry and Feys, 1958).

H. B.

Combinator / is called the identificator. Let X be an expression. The result of applying / to X is identical with X, which is expressed by the definition /X = X. Combinator / may be i n t e r p r e t e d as an operator d e r i v ­ ing a synonymous expression IX f r o m a given expression X. For instance, the application of / to bore in She bore a child results in She gave birth to a child: I bore Ξ gave birth Other examples: / I I I

shouted = gave a shout looked = gave a look jumped s gave a jump slept = was asleep

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Identificator / also facilitates ations, as will be seen below.

Structure

some

purely

formal

oper­

Combinator R is called the p e r m u t a t o r . If R is a t w o place r e l a t i o n , CR is the converse relation connected with R by the d e f i n i t i o n : CRXY s RYX. The notion of converse relation can be used to explain passive constructions. The predicate in a passive construc­ tion may be conceived of as the converse of the predicate in the respective active construction. The converse of the predicate involves the exchange of positions between the primary t e r m and the secondary t e r m . (By a position I mean a node in the applicative t r e e diagram.) For example, was bought in This book was bought by Peter yesterday is the con­ verse of bought in Peter bought this book yesterday. And was bought involves the exchange of positions b e t w e e n Peter and this book : now this book is in the position of Peter and Peter is in the position of this book. Having a set of active predicates and a set of respec­ tive passive predicates we can produce active and passive constructions independently f r o m one another. Very o f t e n the t e r m denoting an agent is o m i t t e d . We may say This book was bought yesterday and so omit the t e r m denoting the a g e n t , t h a t is the transposed primary t e r m . In this case we hypothesize t h a t the converse predicate is applied to a zero second t e r m denoting an unspecified agent. It should be noted that in some languages, such as Arabic, the omission of the t e r m denoting an agent in pas­ sive constructions is mandatory. There is also the impersonal use of the passive with intransitive verbs, f o r example, German Es wird heute abend getanzt, 'It will be this evening danced', t h a t is, 'There will be dancing this evening'; Latin ugnabatur, 'it was fought', that is, 'there was fighting'. The German construction may include the underlying subject: Es wird heute abend von uns getanzt, literally 'It will be danced by us this evening'. Passivization of intransitive verbs must be conceived of as an operation on verbs with fictitious secondary terms. On this view passive intransitive verbs are the converses of the respective active transitive verbs. The postulation of f i c t i -

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181

tious objects in explaining the passivization of intransitive verbs is j u s t i f i e d by the f a c t t h a t the passive constructions with intransitive verbs have a s t r u c t u r e similar to passive constructions with transitive verbs. The theory of passive constructions must be viewed as a p a r t of the theory of valence. Within the f r a m e w o r k of applicative grammar the theory of valence is concerned with the folowing operations: 1) r e l a t i v i z a t i o n ; 2) d e r e l a t i v i z a t i o n ; 3) t r a n s r e l a t i v i z a t i o n . Relativization is an increase in the number of the relations which a predicate contracts with its t e r m s , t h a t is, an increase of the valence of a predicate. Derelativization is a decrease in the number of the r e l a ­ tions which a predicate contracts w i t h its t e r m s , t h a t is, a decrease of the valence of a predicate. Transrelativization is a change in the relational n a t u r e of a p r e d i c a t e , that is, the operation of getting the converse of a predicate. To provide means f o r constructing a complete theory of valence, Applicative Grammar has generalized the operation of conversion so as to apply it to n-place predicates. Appli­ cative Grammar uses a generalized p e r m u t a t o r k, which is d e f i n e d as follows. If R is an n-place r e l a t i o n , connected w i t h  by the d e f i n i t i o n : n

is a converse

relation

Here are t e r m s of the relation R and its c o n v e r s e T h e superscript index  shows the n u m ­ ber of the t e r m which p e r m u t a t e s w i t h the following t e r m , p e r m u t a t e s with , We get all possible con­ t h a t is versions of n-place relation Generalized permutatorpermits to introduce the notion of generalized passive. Under the rules of g e n e r a l ­ ized passive, passivization involves not only the conversion b e t w e e n the primary and the secondary t e r m s , but also the conversion b e t w e e n the primary and the t e r t i a r y terms which occurs in many languages. Applicative Grammar also has a complete set of o p e r a ­ t o r s decreasing or increasing the valence of predicates. For

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

example, o p e r a t o r i n c r e a s e s the valence of an intransitive v e r b , t h a t is, it changes an intransitive verb into a transitive v e r b ; o p e r a t o r d e c r e a s e s the valence of a transitive v e r b , t h a t is, it changes a transitive verb into a intransitive v e r b , etc. The theory of valence based on Applicative be presented elsewhere.

Grammar

will

Combinator w is called the duplicator. If  is a t w o place r e l a t i o n , WR is a one-place relation associated with the relation R by the d e f i n i t i o n The duplicator W can be i n t e r p r e t e d as the operator of c o r e f e r e n t i a l i t y . Let the f o r m u l a be i n t e r p r e t e d as John shaves himself then the f o r m u l a WP2T must be i n t e r ­ p r e t e d as John shaves. The t e r m Π is not deleted (or c a n ­ celled); the duplicator W involves the fusion of the t e r m T1 with its c o r e f e r e n t i a l c o u n t e r p a r t , the t e r m Γ. As a p a r t of the formula WP2T the t e r m Τ must be i n t e r p r e t e d both as a subject and a direct object: in John shaves, John is both the subject and the direct object of the predicate shaves. The combinator W may be generalized as combinator If is an n-place r e l a t i o n , is a relation one of whose terms is a result of the fusion of its c o r e f e r e n t i a l t e r m . i s connected with R by the d e f i n i t i o n η

The t e r m in the l e f t p a r t of the formula is result of the fusion of the two c o r e f e r e n t i a l t e r m s shown in the right part of the f o r m u l a .

the

By using the combinator Applicative Grammar p r o ­ vides formal means f o r presenting the analysis of the decrease of the valence of predicates involved by processes resulting from coreference. The combinator S is called the compositor. some one-place o p e r a t o r , and let the operand of ator F be the resultant of some other one-place having X as its o p e r a n d , which can be w r i t t e n as

Let F be the o p e r ­ operator G F(GX).

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By means of the combinator  we can obtain instead of two operators F and Θ one complex operator BFG which can be applied to X. The operator BFG is related to the o p e r a ­ F(GX). t o r s F and G by the definition BFGX = The complex predicate BFG is obtained as follows: f i r s t  is applied to F, as a result of which we get the o p e r a t o r BF which has the operator G as its operand. Then we apply BF to G and get the operator BFG, which has X as its operand. When we apply BFG to X we get the combination BFGX, which is identical by definition to the combination F(GX). It should be noted t h a t t h e r e are f o u r initial compo­ nents in the f i r s t combination: B, Ft Gt X and only two in the second: F and (GX). If we reconstruct the parentheses in the f i r s t combination according to the notational rule of association to the l e f t , it will have the f o r m : (((BF)G)X)t or ( i f we do not restore the o u t e r parentheses): ((BF)G)X. The compositor  can have d i f f e r e n t important inter­ pretations on the empirical level. One possible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is this: the compositor  may be thought of as an operator t h a t changes predicates with subordinate predicate clauses into the construction 'accusative+infinitive'. When we con­ sider the operation of the compositor, we must bear in mind t h a t subordinate object clauses can be formed not only by applying conjunctions ( f o r example, English that) to independent clauses and then applying predicates to the result of application, but also by directly applying p r e d i ­ cates to independent clauses (in which case the independent clause is considered to be one of the operands of the predicates). Following the first method f o r forming subordi­ nate object clauses we get in English, f o r example, s e n ­ tences with the conjunction that: I have known that he paints, and following the second method we get sentences without that (with the same meaning): / have known he paints. Let F be a two-place predicate P 2 which is i n t e r p r e t e d : have known. If we apply this predicate to the sentence P , T , we get (1)

2(1)

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

to which the predicate have known he paints may correspond. If we apply (1) to T' we get

(2)  2(1)T to which the sentence / have known he paints corresponds. Using the identities:

compositor,

we

can

get

the

following

two

(3) (A) The l e f t - h a n d p a r t of (3) corresponds to have known him to paint, and its r i g h t - h a n d p a r t to the sentence / have known he paints.

the phrase corresponds

The l e f t - h a n d p a r t of (4) corresponds to the sentence / have known him to paint and its r i g h t - h a n d p a r t corresponds to the sentence / have known he paints. The t e r m Τ in the l e f t - h a n d parts of (3) and (4) which corresponds to the pronoun him in the English sentences must be i n t e r p r e t e d as the fusion of the subject and the direct object: it is the direct object of P 2 and the subject of P , . On the level of the empirical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , in I have known him to paint the pronoun him is the direct object of have known and the subject of to paint. The combinator L will be called confluentor. Let F be a t w o - p l a c e operator with X as its f i r s t operand and the r e s u l t a n t of the one-place operator G, which also has X as its o p e r a n d , as its second operand. This can be w r i t t e n : FX(GX). If we apply L to F and LF to G, we get the complex one-place operator LFG, which is connected to the o p e r a t o r by the identity : LFGX s

FX(GX).

We see t h a t when we introduce the o p e r a t o r LFG, a fusion into a single operand takes place between the two identical operands to which operators F and G are applied.

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The confluentor can be i n t e r p r e t e d on the level, f o r instance, as an operator t h a t changes constructions with subordinate object clauses into constructions with structure 'accusative+infinitive'.

empirical causative causative

Let F be a causative predicate of Ca, the application of which to the t e r m Γ and the application of its r e s u l t a n t to the sentence (Ρ1T1) gives the complex s t r u c t u r e : (1T) which can be i n t e r p r e t e d orders the boy that the boy take a walk. By using the identities: (1) LCaPT Ξ (2) LCaPTT'

confluentor

we

can

get

the

following

two

CaT(PT) CaT(PT)T'

The phrase orders the boy to take a walk corresponds to the l e f t - h a n d p a r t of ( 1 ) , and the phrase orders the boy that the boy take a walk corresponds to its r i g h t - h a n d p a r t . The phrase Mother orders the boy to take a walk c o r r e ­ sponds to the l e f t - h a n d p a r t of (2) and the phrase Mother orders the boy that the boy take a walk corresponds to its right-hand part. The t e r m Τ in the l e f t - h a n d parts of (1) and (2) which corresponds to the noun boy in the English sentences must be i n t e r p r e t e d as the fusion of the direct object and the subject: it is the direct object of Ca and the subject of P. On the level of empirical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in Mother orders the boy to take a walk the noun boy is the direct object of Ca and the subject of P. On the level of empirical i n t e r p r e t a ­ tion in Mother orders the boy to take a walk the noun boy is the direct object of orders and the subject of to take a walk. The combinator  introduces a pleonastic o p e r a n d . If G is an n-place o p e r a t o r , the KG is an ( n + 1 ) - p l a c e operator connected with G by the d e f i n i t i o n : KGX G. By using identity:

'2

the

Ρ2Γ'Τ2.

combinator

K,

we

can

get

the

following

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

Let P 2 be a t w o - p l a c e predicate hate whose direct object is that man (T') and whose subject is / (Ύ 2 ). Let the application of the combinator  to P 2 be i n t e r p r e t e d as the introduction of the pleonastic object him (T) with the simultaneous stress on that man. Then we get That man, I hate him I hate that man. The combinator Cm makes an operator and an operand exchange t h e i r roles. Let F be a one-place operator with X as its operand. Then m F is an operator r e l a t e d to F by the d e f i n i t i o n Cm XF FX. Example: the redness of light

red light.

In the r i g h t - h a n d p a r t of this identity red (F) is an operator and light (X) is its operand. The application of the combinator m to X must be i n t e r p r e t e d in this case as a s t r u c t u r a l change which makes F and X exchange t h e i r roles: red becomes an operand (redness) and light becomes its operator (of light). The combinator by the indentity (1) C,

XY

Cm is connected

with

the

combinator



CIXY.

This identity is derived as follows: (2) , 

Y

l(YX)

I(I

YX)

I YX

C/ YX.

The identity (1) f a c i l i t a t e s the analysis of the exchange of roles b e t w e e n subjects and intransitive predicates. Con­ sider the sentence (1) PT and its possible

interpretation

(2) John works. The subject John and the predicate works cannot exchange t h e i r roles directly. But it can be done indirectly. Since Ρ IP we can change (1) into

(3) IPT.

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187

In (3) Ρ is an operand of /, which is the predicate of this sentence. Now Ρ must be i n t e r p r e t e d as a t e r m r a t h e r than a predicate, and / must be i n t e r p r e t e d as a copula which is the predicate of this sentence. We i n t e r p r e t (3) as (4) John does work. Applying  to / we get (5) / which must be i n t e r p r e t e d in our case as (6) Work is done by John. Thus we get the (7) John works There

are

identity

John does work two

combinators

Work is done by John. denoted

by

Greek

letters

and Let us consider Φ f i r s t . Let F be a two-place operator and let its f i r s t operand be the r e s u l t a n t of a one-place operator whose operand is X, and let its second operand be the resultant of a one-place operator whose operand is also X. This can be r e p r e s e n t e d by the formula (1) F(GX)

(H).

With the combinator Φ we g e t , instead of t h r e e o p e r ­ ators and X, a single complex operator ΦΡΘΗ, which can be applied directly to X. The operator FGH is connected with the operators F, G, H by the d e f i n i t i o n (2) ΦFGΗΧ

F(GX)

(HX).

The relationship between Φ and t w o - p l a c e operators the same as t h a t between 8 and one-place operators.

is

Let us now t u r n to the combinator Ψ. Let Ρ be a t w o - p l a c e operator with its f i r s t operand the r e s u l t a n t of a one-place operator D whose operand is X and with its sec­ ond operand the resultant of the same one-place operator

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Shaumyan: Applicative

D whose formula (3) F(DX)

operand

is

.

This

can

Structure be

represented

by

the

(DY).

With the combinator Ψ we get instead of the two operators F and D a single complex operator ΨΡΟ which is applied directly to X and . the operator ΨΡΟ is connected with the operators F and D by the definition (4) ΨΡΟΧΥ

F(DX)

(DY).

On the empirical level combinators Φ and Ψ may be i n t e r p r e t e d as operators used f o r the direct construction of conjoined structures w i t h o u t using the transformations of conjunction reduction. The identity (2) may be

interpreted

(5)John finished his work and went home work, and John went home F andt G  FGH combines operator.

finished his work, H these t h r e e operators

John finished his

went home, and into one complex

The identity (4) may be i n t e r p r e t e d as follows: (6)John and Peter like coffee likes coffee,

John likes coffee,

F-and, D-like coffee, X-John, Y-Peter, F and D into one complex operator.

and

FD

and Peter

combines

The combinators considered above constitute an open set which may be extended by adjoining new combinators if need be. 7. APPLICATIVE GRAMMAR AND THE UNIVERSALITY OF SUBJECTS The opposition primary term ; secondary term must be i n t e r p r e t e d as the opposition absolutive ; ergative in ergative languages and the opposition subject : direct object in accu­ sative languages (primary t e r m , as absolutive or subject, and secondary t e r m , as ergative or object).

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Applicative Grammar does not r e g a r d subject, direct object and indirect object as valid universal notions. The t r u l y universal notions are primary t e r m and secondary t e r m — t h e abstract concepts which are i n t e r p r e t e d as syn­ tactic functions 'absolutive' and 'ergative' in ergative l a n ­ guages and 'subject' and 'object' in accusative languages. (Syntactic functions 'absolutive' and 'ergative' must be dis­ tinguished f r o m the ergative and absolutive morphological case markers.) Space precludes a detailed substantiation of the claim t h a t subject and direct object are not universal notions and must be replaced on the universal level by the notions of the primary and the secondary t e r m . The detailed substan­ t i a t i o n is given in Shaumyan, 1982a and 1983b. In o r d e r to explain why this claim is j u s t i f i e d , here I consider solely the Keenan-Comrie Accessibility Heirarchy ( K e e n a n , Comrie, 1977). In an important study of relative clause formation strategy, Edward L. Keenan and Bernard Comrie established an Accessibility Hierarchy which characterizes the relative accessibility to relative clause formation of various members of a sentence. In t e r m s of the Accessibility Hierarchy they state universal constraints on relative clause formation. According to the Accessibility Hierarchy processes of relative clause formation are sensitive to the following hierarchy of grammatical relations: Subject > Direct object > indirect object > Oblique NP > > Possessor > Object of comparison w h e r e > means 'more accessible than'. The positions on the Accessibility Hierarchy are to be understood as specifying a set of possible relativizations t h a t a language may make: relativizations t h a t apply at some point of the hierarchy must apply at any higher point. The Accessibility Hierarchy predicts, f o r instance, t h a t t h e r e is no language which can relativize direct objects and not subjects or t h a t can relativize possessors and subjects, but not direct objects and oblique NPs. The Accessibility Hierarchy excludes the possibility of languages where subjects are less accessible to relativization

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Structure

than objects. Yet this is precisely the case with the Dyirbal and Mayan languages, if we identify ergatives with t r a n ­ sitive subjects and absolutives with intransitive subjects and direct objects, as is done in Relational Grammar (and Arc Pair Grammar). That is, these facts undermine the status of the Accessibility Hierarchy as a universal law. In his important study of ergativity gives this d e f i n i t i o n (Johnson, 1976: 2 ) :

David

E.

Johnson

A language is said to be absolutive/ergative (or simply, ergative) if some of its rules t r e a t <subjects of intransitive clauses (SUI)> and alike in some manner to the exclusion of <subjects of transitive clauses (SUT)>. In contrast, a language is said to be a nominative /accusative language if its rules identify <subjects of intransitive clauses> and <subjects of transitive clauses> as opposed to .

If we accept this d e f i n i t i o n of ergativity and apply it to Dyirbal and Mayan languages, we will see t h a t the data from these languages contravene the Accessibility Hierarchy. Dyirbal does not allow relativization on ergative sub­ jects; instead, the verb of the relative clause is intransitivized by adding the suffix - n a y , and the subject is put in the absolutive case (Dixon, 1972: 100). For instance, con­ sider the Dyirbal sentence (1) yabu ŋuma+ŋgu mother+ABS father+ERG 'Father saw mother'

buça+n see+PAST

In sentence (1) the ergative subject is marked by -ŋgu. In order to be embedded to another sentence as a relative clause, sentence (1) must be antipassivized and ergative ŋjuma+ŋgu replaced by absolutive ŋuma+ø We may get, for example, the sentence

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells (2)ŋuma+ father+ABS

[buçal+na+r)u+ see+ANTIPASS+REL+ABS

191

yabu+gu] mother+DAT

dur)gara+n y u see+PAST 'Father, who saw mother, was crying.'

The f e a t u r e s of Dyirbal under discussion here conform closely to those of Mayan grammar. So, in the languages of the Kanjobalan, Mamean and Quichean subgroups, ergative NPs may not as a rule be relativized (nor questioned or focused), while absolutive NPs can. In order for an ergative NP to undergo relativization, it must be converted into derived absolutive and the verb intransitivized through the addition of a special intransitivizing suffix. Here is an example of this process in Aguacatec (Larsen and Norman, 1979): (2) ja ø-ø-b'iy yaaj xan7n asp. 3sB-3sA-HIT MAN WOMAN 'the man hit the woman' (3)

a.

na7 m-ø-b'iy-oon xna7n WHO dep.asp.-3sB-HIT-suffix 'who hit the woman?'

WOMAN

b. ia ø-w-il yaaj ye m-ø-b'iy-oon xna7n asp. 3sB-1sA-SEE MAN THE dep.sap.-3sB-HIT-suffix WOMAN 'I saw the man who hit the woman' 

yaaj m-ø-b'iy-oon sna7n MAN dep.asp.-3sB-HIT-suffix WOMAN 'it was the man who hit the woman'

Here -oon is the intransitivizing suffix used to circum­ vent the constraints on extraction of ergatives (the t e r m extraction rules is a cover t e r m f o r relativization r u l e s , focus rules, WH-Question). We see t h a t the facts of Dyirbal and Mayan present strong evidence against the Accessibility

languages Hierarchy.

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

Does it mean that the Accessibility Hierarchy must be abandoned as a universal law? I do not think so. The t r o u ­ ble with the Accessibility Hierarchy is that it is f o r m u l a t e d as a universal law in non-universal t e r m s , such as subject, direct object, etc. To solve this d i f f i c u l t y , it is necessary to abandon non-universal concepts, such as subject and direct object, and replace them by t r u l y universal concepts. The key to the solution of this d i f f i c u l t y is provided by Applica­ tive Grammar. We must replace Applicative Hierarchy:

the

Accessibility

Hierarchy

by

the

Primary term > Secondary Term > Tertiary Term . . . The Applicative Hierarchy may be i n t e r p r e t e d as 1 ) Subject > Direct object > Indirect object > . . . in accusative languages, and as 2) Absolutive > Ergative > Indirect object > . . . in ergative

languages.

We see t h a t the Accessibility Hierarchy viewed as a u n i ­ versal law must be considered a particular instance of the Applicative Hierarchy, established on independent grounds.

8. A COMPARISON GRAMMAR

OF APPLICATIVE

GRAMMAR

AND

MONTAGUE

A complete presentation of applicative grammar was given in my book Structural Linguistics (in Russian) published in 1965 (Shaumyan, 1965; English t r a n s l a t i o n : Shaumyan, 1971). Five years l a t e r , in 1970, Richard Montague presented his grammar which uses a formalism similar to the f o r m a l ­ ism of applicative grammar. Montague's grammar captured the imagination of many linguists in this country and came into vogue under the name MONTAGUE GRAMMAR.

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Although the formalism of Montague grammar is similar to the formalism of applicative g r a m m a r , its conceptual apparatus is very d i f f e r e n t . The d i f f e r e n c e is crucial. Montague grammar is not a linguistic theory; r a t h e r it is a logical theory. Just as in any logical theory, t r u t h is the central notion in Montague g r a m m a r , while this notion is peripheral to any linguistic theory. Characterizing his theory, Montague w r o t e : I regard the construction of a theory of t r u t h - - o r r a t h e r , of the more general notion of the t r u t h under an a r b i t r a r y interpreta­ t i o n — a s the basic goal of serious syntax and semantics; and the developments emanating f r o m the Massachusetts Institute of Technol­ ogy o f f e r little promise towards t h a t end. ( M o n t a g u e , 1974: 188). It is clear f r o m this passage t h a t Montague understands syntax and semantics not in the linguistic sense but r a t h e r in the sense of logical syntax and logical semantics in the t r a d i t i o n of Carnap, Reichenbach, Quine and other logicians who studied language f r o m a logical point of view. In Montague grammar the meaning of a sentence is its t r u t h value. But f r o m a linguistic point of view, the t r u t h - v a l u e is i r r e l e v a n t to linguistic analysis (with the exception of peripheral cases when it is expressed by linguistic means). Logic deals with thought proper, but linguistics is interested only in communicated thought. A distinction between thought proper and communicated thought is crucial. A witness may say: "I saw John in the store this morning." But this may be a l i e , not the t r u t h . Signs have t h e i r own meaning, and this meaning may conflict with the thought of the speaker who uses the signs. As a m a t t e r of f a c t , fiction w r i t i n g is possible only because signs are n e u t r a l to t r u t h . For the purposes of logical analysis of language Montague grammar uses a complicated logical formalism including the formalism of intensional logic which is i r r e l e ­ vant f r o m a linguistic point of view. There is nothing wrong in constructing a logical theory of n a t u r a l languages. On the contrary, the study of n a t u r a l

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

languages from a logical point of view may provide new insights which can be of b e n e f i t to linguists. What is wrong with the logical grammar proposed by Montague is t h a t he regarded it as an a l t e r n a t i v e to linguistic theories proper, in p a r t i c u l a r , to g e n e r a t i v e - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar which Chomsky had been developing at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology since about 1955. In what follows I will argue t h a t the claim of Montague and his followers t h a t t h e i r logical grammar as a linguistic theory is unjustified. The basic goal of any serious linguistic theory must be the discovery of language universais. Montague called his grammar universal, but he understood the t e r m 'universal grammar' in a quite d i f f e r e n t sense than this t e r m is used by linguists. Montague used the t e r m 'universal' as synony­ mous with the t e r m 'general'. Accordingly, Montague used the t e r m 'universal grammar* to denote simply a m a t h e m a t i ­ cal description of language, since a mathematical description of language is much more general than a usual linguistic description. In this connection I would like to quote R. Thomason, a w e l l - k n o w n exponent of Montague g r a m m a r , who w r i t e s the following about its relation to the study of linguistic u n i ­ versais: Such universais have no interest f o r Monta­ gue. They are mentioned nowhere in his paper, nor does he ever suggest t h a t his work should be applied to topics such as the psychology of language acquistition. Where the t e r m "universal" appears in his w r i t i n g s , as in "Universal Grammar", the t i t l e of chapter 7, it has r e f e r e n c e to the mathematician's n a t u r a l tendency to generalize. A theory t h a t is intuitive and mathematically e l e g a n t , and t h a t comprehends all special cases of a c e r ­ t a i n topic, can be t e r m e d a universal theory of t h a t topic. In this sense topology is a u n i ­ versal theory of geometry, and Montague's theory of universal grammar is a universal theory of grammar. (Thomason, 1974: 3 ) .

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As a m a t t e r of f a c t , Montague grammar cannot be used as a universal grammar in the sense of linguistics because its rules are stated in t e r m s of the linear o r d e r of consti­ tuents. As was shown above, a grammar t h a t states its rules in t e r m s of linear order of constituents fails to provide crosslinguistically valid notions for f o r m u l a t i n g linguistic univer­ sais because it makes it necessary to f o r m u l a t e distinct rules f o r languages with d i f f e r e n t word order for phenom­ ena which could be considered identical in t e r m s of r e l a ­ tional rules. The syntax of a language in Montague grammar is a simultaneous recursive d e f i n i t i o n of all of the syntactic c a t ­ egories of a language. The formalism used f o r the recursive definitions is similar to the formalism used for the r e c u r ­ sive definitions of syntactic categories in applicative g r a m ­ mar. But t h e r e is a crucial d i f f e r e n c e between the lists of syntactic categories in both grammars. Let us compare these lists. Montague confines his list to the sytactic categories ( M o n t a g u e , 1974: 249):

following

eleven

1) 2) 3)

e, or a category of e n t i t y expressions. t, or a category of t r u t h - v a l u e expressions. $ N, or the category of intransitive verb phrases. Symbol IV is an abbreviation for symbol e/t which in t e r m s of applicative grammar must be interpreted as a category of operators (Montague's t e r m 'func­ tion' corresponds to the t e r m 'operator' in applica­ tive grammar) which, when applied to their o p e r ­ ands of category e, for an expression of category t, like run, walk, etc.

4)

T, an abbreviation of X/N, or the category of terms that consists of operators which, when applied to intransitive verbs, f o r m an expression of category X, like John, Mary, ninety, he. Montague uses the label ' t e r m ' to denote proper nouns and similar expressions. TV, as abbreviation f o r N/J, or the category of operators which, when applied to terms, form intransitive verbs.

5)

196 6)

7)

8) 9) 10) 11)

Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

IAV, an abbreviation for N/N/, or the category of operators which, when applied to intransitive verbs, form intransitive verbs. CN, an abbreviation for t//e, or the category of operators which, when applied to expressions of category t, form expressions of category e, like man, park, fish, etc. t/t, the category of sentence-modifying adverbs, like necessarily, etc. IAV/T, the category of IAV- making prepositions, like about, etc. N//T, the category of sentence-taking verb phrases, like believe that, assert that, etc. N//N, the category of /V- taking verb phrases, like try to, wish to, etc.

Double slashes (//) in some of the above names of c a t ­ egories are used to distinguish two types of the same c a t ­ egory, as for example, to distinguish between two types of the same predicate: t/e, or intransitive verbs, and t//e, or common nouns. This list of syntactic categories oriented towards purely logical analysis of a sentence conflicts with some w e l l - j u s t i ­ fied principles of linguistics. First, Montague considers intransitive verbs and common nouns two types of the same category of predicate. This conforms to the t r e a t m e n t of common nouns in logic but contravenes the t r e a t m e n t of common nouns in any linguis­ tic theory. From a linguistic standpoint, common nouns, as any nouns in g e n e r a l , are not primarily predicates. They are opposed to predicates as the operands of predicates, or in another terminology as arguments of predicates. Nouns can be used as predicates, but this is their secondary f u n c t i o n . By contrast, the primary function of a verb is to be a predicate and its secondary function is to be a noun. The phenomena of nominalization and predicativization are based precisely on the basic opposition of nouns and verbs in t h e i r primary functions and t h e i r capacity f o r exchange of t h e i r functions. By t r e a t i n g common nouns and intransitive verbs as predicates alike, Montague Grammar precludes the description of the processes of nominalization and predica­ tivization in natural languages; these processes do not make sense in the framework of this grammar.

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Logic does not distinguish b e t w e e n nouns and i n t r a n s i ­ tive verbs and lumps them together under the label ' p r e d i ­ cate·. This approach is consistent with a principle of logic according to which only variables can be arguments of a p r e d i c a t e , never nouns which are constants. This is one of the points where a logical and linguistic analysis of the sentence cannot be reconciled. Second, Montague considers proper nouns and similar expressions to be secondary predicates whose arguments are primary predicates — intransitive verbs. This approach is consistent with the type of logical semantics espoused by Montague but has nothing whatsoever to do with linguistics. T h i r d , Montague introduces a mysterious syntactic c a t ­ egory denoted by the symbol e and called entity. This c a t ­ egory is empty, entity means nothing. By introducing this empty category, Montague had in mind two things: f i r s t to justify the t r e a t m e n t of common nouns as predicates; sec­ ond, to use this category f o r a certain purpose in the semantical p a r t of his grammar. The use of this category in semantics will be discussed below. Here I will explain the use of this category in syntax. Montague utilizes the categorial calculus whose rules r e q u i r e that any predicate must have at least one a r g u ­ ment. In an ordinary logic arguments of predicates are individual constants and variables. But since Montague espouses a type of logical syntax without individual con­ stants and variables as arguments of predicates, he runs into d i f f i c u l t y with his calculus. To solve this d i f f i c u l t y , he introduced the empty category e which is used as an empty a r g u m e n t of predicates. And, as we shall see, the empty category is also helpful in the semantical part of Montague's grammar. Montague Grammar has seventeen syntactic rules for the f r a g m e n t of the English grammar he describes. As a m a t t e r of f a c t , most of these rules are concrete instances of one syntactic rule: If oc is of category 1 and 0 is of category 2 , Γ is of category 3 , where γ = F (  , ß ) .

then

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One reason t h a t Montague does not use this g e n e r a l ­ ized syntactic rule is t h a t he w a n t s to specify word order. Since d i f f e r e n t functions may involve d i f f e r e n t word o r d e r , d i f f e r e n t syntactic rules involving the operation of concat­ enation are f o r m u l a t e d to r e p r e s e n t d i f f e r e n t word order. The semantic part of Montague grammar consists of the rules of the translation of syntactic structures into s e n ­ tences in a particular formalized language of intensional logic; this process is followed by laying down the conditions for t r u t h of a sentence with respect to a given language. There is one-one correspondence between syntactic and semantic rules. The semantic categories of the intensional logic are called types. The role of the category e in semantics is explained as follows. In standard logical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n this category must denote individuals. Montague w a n t s to establish semantic parallelism between proper names and q u a n t i f i e r phrases, for instance, between expressions like John and every man in (1) (2)

John walks. Every man walks.

To establish this parallelism, one may t r y to construe the q u a n t i f i e r phrase as an individual and assign both the q u a n t i f i e r phrase and the proper name to category e, but it is questionable w h e t h e r the q u a n t i f i e r phrases should be construed as individuals. The standard logic approach is to t r e a t q u a n t i f i e r phrases as a kind of second order p r e d i ­ cates whose arguments are f i r s t order predicates. Montague has chosen to elevate proper names from the category e to the category T, t h a t is to t r e a t proper names not as i n d i ­ viduals but as a set of properties which are used as second order predicates with respect to f i r s t order predicates. In ordinary logical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the sentence (1) must be presented as (3)

Walks

(John).

But according to Montague's must be r e p r e s e n t e d as (4)

John

(walks).

interpretation,

this

sentence

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As a result of the elevation of proper names f r o m c a t ­ egory e to category T, category e becomes empty in seman­ tics, as it was in syntax. Montague's t r e a t m e n t of proper names and q u a n t i f i e r phrases may seem ingenious f r o m a logical point of view, but one wonders whether this approach is j u s t i f i e d from a linguistic standpoint. A linguistic explanation of the p a r a l ­ lelism b e t w e e n proper names and q u a n t i f i e r phrases must be based on an analysis of the structural properties of the sentences r a t h e r than on a logical analysis. Montague's semantics has nothing whatsoever to do with linguistic analysis of meaning. The central notion in this theory is the notion of the intensional logic. The intension of a sentence is defined as a function f r o m possible worlds to t r u t h values: to each possible world the function assigns the t r u t h value of the sentence in t h a t w o r l d . The t e r m 'possible world' means 'situation' or 'case' in everyday l a n ­ guage. In t e r m s of the notion 'possible world' we can define the meaning of some predicates, f o r instance, (5)

possible certain

true in some possible world true in all possible worlds.

There is no doubt t h a t a translation of expressions of a n a t u r a l language into intensional logic may be interesting from a logical standpoint, but one wonders w h e t h e r this translation may be viewed as an a l t e r n a t i v e to a linguistic analysis of meaning. Since the formalism of Montague Grammar is roughly equivalent to the formalism of an immediate constituent g r a m m a r , Montague Grammar encounters all the difficulties encountered by an ordinary immediate constituent grammar. Partee recently suggested to extend T h e r e f o r e , Barbara Montague Grammar in the same way as Chomsky extended the immediate constituent g r a m m a r , t h a t is to enrich it by a system of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . Now an ordinary Montague Grammar is going to be replaced by a Transformational Montague Grammar ( P a r t e e , 1975).

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I will not discuss Partee's contribution to Montague Grammar. Suffice it to say t h a t Partee suggests neither conceptual nor formal changes in it. What she provides is simply an addition of a f e w t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s t a k e n from the standard version of G e n e r a t i v e - T r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l Grammar. Partee's version of Montague Grammar combines all the limitations of ordinary Montague Grammar with the l i m i t a ­ tions of Generative-Transformational Grammar. Montague Grammar cannot be an a l t e r n a t i v e e i t h e r to Generative-Transformational Grammar or to any other l i n ­ guistic theory simply because Montague Grammar is not a linguistic theory. The case of Montague Grammar is an interesting illus­ t r a t i o n of the crucial role of ideas and concepts in con­ structing linguistic theory. The same mathematical calculus may be combined with very d i f f e r e n t conceptual systems which may be opposed to each other. The ideas and con­ cepts constitute the essence of a theory, not mathematical calculus. A mathematical calculus must be combined with an appropriate system of ideas and concepts. Otherwise, a mathematical calculus is more than worthless: it may do harm as an instrument of the promotion of the products of immature thinking.

9. CONCLUSIONS The conclusion to which this paper has led is t h a t it is possible to construct an insightful non-transformational grammar which solves the difficulties inherent in c o n s t i t u ­ ency and dependency grammars and leads to a successful picture of linguistic reality. The proposed n o n - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar which I call Applicative Grammar i n t e g r a t e s Constituency Grammar and Dependency Grammar into a single system based on the relations of the type 'operator : operand'. Applicative Gram­ mar is associated with the hypothesis t h a t every language possesses applicative structure which is a network of o p e r a ­ tors and operands interconnected by p a r t - w h o l e and d e p e n ­ dency relations. The universal properties of this network constitute the linguistic genotype.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells The integrated system has the following advantages over constituency grammar and grammar:

201 significant dependency

1. Dependency Grammar applies the concepts 'head' and 'dependent' only to minimal constituents of a sentence, t h a t is, to words, and takes these concepts as primitives. Appli­ cative Grammar proposes generalized concepts 'head' and 'dependent' which may be applied to any constituent of a sentence and defines these concepts on the basis of the relation operator ; operand. 2. Constituency Grammar conflates p a r t - w h o l e relations with linear order. Applicative Grammar defines constituency as independent of linearity. 3. Neither Constituency Grammar, nor Dependency Gram­ mar can handle the phenomenon of transposition. U n d e r ­ standing the synchronic and diachronic implications of this phenomenon is of paramount importance for linguistic theory. Applicative Grammar provides the necessary concep­ t u a l and formal apparatus f o r the study of transpositions. 4. Applicative Grammar contributes to a d e e p e r study of word o r d e r by providing the generalized concepts 'head' and 'dependent' and distinguishing b e t w e e n two kinds of d e p e n ­ dents — modifiers and complements. 5. Neither constituency g r a m m a r , nor dependency g r a m ­ mar provide means f o r defining categories and syntactic functions. Applicative Grammar does provide these means. 6. The formalism of Applicative Grammar includes a sys­ tem of combinators which are essential f o r the study of universal syntactic relations. Since Applicative Grammar integrates constituency g r a m ­ mar and dependency grammar into a single system while preserving all t h e i r explanatory power, t h e r e is good reason to accept it as a replacement of these two separate models. Applicative structure is an autonomous e n t i t y i n d e p e n ­ d e n t of its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in linear sequences of e x p r e s ­ sion. In accordance with the autonomy of applicative s t r u c -

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t u r e , Applicative Grammar consists of two parts: genotype grammar, which studies applicative structure in itself, i n d e ­ pendently of its linear r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and phenotype gram­ mar, which studies applicative structure in t e r m s of its l i n ­ ear representation. Statement of cross-linguistic generalizations in t e r m s of genotype grammar makes it possible to uncover identical structure underlying languageparticular constructions in d i f f e r e n t languages. In contrast to Dependency Grammar and Constituency Grammar (and Transformational Grammar) which regard the word (and sometimes, even the morpheme) as the minimal syntactic u n i t , the Applicative Grammar regards words, as well as morphemes, solely as morphological realizations of functional units. Functional units r a t h e r than words are t r u e minimal syntactic units. Linguistic theories which con­ sider the word to be the minimal syntactic unit run into difficulties when they t r y to f o r m u l a t e universal rules of syntax: these rules cannot be f o r m u l a t e d in t e r m s of o p e r ­ ations on words. Functional units belong in the genotype level and morphemes and words in the phenotype level in syntax. In order to set out the functional units as crucial notions f o r syntactic theory, I suggest to call them the SYNTAXEMES on the analogy of morphemes as minimal units of morphology. Cross-linguistic generalizations of terms of genotype grammar make it possible to come to grips with empirical problems other linguistic theories are unable to solve. Some of the most d i f f i c u l t problems arise f r o m the phenomenon of ergativity. Ergativity can be explained and understood properly only by relating the ergative system to a more abstract underlying system which is presented in Applicative Grammar. In p a r t i c u l a r , difficulties met by the Keenan-Comrie Accessibility Hierarchy are solved, which leads to a r e s t a t e m e n t of this important hypothesis in abstract t e r m s . Applicative Grammar calls for a serious overhaul of the c u r ­ r e n t views on language universais. In p a r t i c u l a r , subject, direct object, indirect object cannot be considered valid universal concepts and must be replaced by an abstract conceptual system, such as the system of primary, secondary and t e r t i a r y t e r m s . As a n o n - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l linguistic theory, Applicative Grammar does not need e i t h e r the notion of deep structure or multiple levels of syntactic s t r u c t u r e .

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REFERENCES CITED

B a r - H i l l e l , Yehoshua (1964). Language and Information. Chapter 8 (with C. Gaifman and E. Shamir): "On Categorical and Phrase Structure Grammars". Jerusalem: Academic Press. Chomsky, Noam (1980). Rules and Representations, New York: Columbia University Press. Curry, Haskell B. and Robert Feyes (1958). Combinatory Logic, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company. Dixon, R. M. W. (1972). The Dyirbal Language of North Queens­ land, Cambridge: University Press. Hudson, Richard A. (1980). "Constituency and Dependency", Linguistics 18, pp. 179-198. Johnson, D. E. (1976). "Ergativity and Universal Grammar". To appear in Studies in Relational Grammar, e d . by D. M. Perlmutter. Keenan, E. L. and B. Comrie (1977). "Noun Phrase Accessi­ bility and Universal Grammar", Linguistic Inquiry 8, pp. 63-99. Larsen, T. W. and W. M. Norman (1979). "Correlates of Ergativity in Mayan Grammar". Ergativity: Towards a Theory of Grammatical Relations, e d . by F. Plank, London and New York: Academic Press. M o n t a g u e , Richard (1970a). "English as Formal Language". In Linguaggi nella societa e tecnica, . Visentini et al. (eds.), M i l a n . (Chapter 6 in M o n t a g u e , 1974). M o n t a g u e , Richard (1970b). "Universal Grammar". Theoria 36, pp. 3 7 3 - 3 9 8 . (Chapter 7 in M o n t a g u e , 1974.) M o n t a g u e , Richard (1974). Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague, R. Thomason ( e d . ) . New Haven, Con­ necticut: Yale University Press. P a r t e e , Barbara (1975). " M o n t a g u e Grammar and T r a n s f o r ­ mational Grammar". Linguistic Inquiry 6, pp. 2 0 3 - 3 0 0 . Shaumyan, S. K. (1977). Applicational Grammar as a Semantic Theory of Natural Language, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Shaumyan, S. K. (1982a). "The Goals of Linguistic Theory and Applicative Grammar". The Eighth LACUS Forum 1981. Shaumyan, S. K. (1982b). "Ergativity and Universal Gram­ mar". To appear in Relational Typology e d . by F. Plank. Skorik, P. J. (1948). Očerki po sintaksisu čukotskogo jasyka: Inkorporacija, Leningrad.

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Thomason, Richmond H. (1974). " I n t r o d u c t i o n " . In M o n t a g u e , 1974. Wells, Rulon (1947). "Immediate Constituents". Language, vol. 23, pp. 8 1 - 1 1 7 .

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN SYNTACTIC ANALYSIS: RULON WELLS AS A PALEO-SYNTHESJZER OF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN SYNTAX'

William J. Sullivan University of Florida 0. INTRODUCTION 0.1 The state of the art In 1979, the Linguistics Department of the University of Wisconsin a t Milwaukee sponsored a con­ ference on contemporary theories of syntax. Representatives of t h i r t e e n d i f f e r e n t models of syntax (or language) p r e ­ sented their approaches to describing a set of sentences distributed by the conference organizers. The result was little short of chaotic, in spite of heroic e f f o r t s by Edith Moravcsik and Jessica Wirth to i n - , a d - , and conduce us into some semblance of order. Their hope was to lead us to some kind of understanding of each o t h e r , perhaps even to a kind of rapprochement. Personally, I gained some u n d e r ­ standing of the state of the a r t in syntactic studies today. I now think I know just how deep the existing gulf between models is, not only in d i f f e r e n t people's understanding of others' theories, but even in t h e i r understanding of the goals of those theories. As might be expected, American structuralist theories of syntax w e r e numerically dominant, expecially in t e r m s of Neo-Chomskyan v a r i a n t s , which are legion. But t h e r e w e r e also representatives of Neo-Praguian and Neo-Firthian functionalism, and though no textlinguists w e r e present, t h e r e was a tagmemicist and a stratificationalist. More important than the theories themselves, from my point of view, was the response to the presentations: Chomskyites commented on the details of other (Neo-)Chomskyan theories and functionalists did the same f o r the functional theories. Tagmemics was, in e f f e c t , dismissed without comment, and only J. R. Ross commented on my p r e s e n t a t i o n , to point out

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an e r r o r on one structural diagram. Some understanding of others' approaches was shown, but no understanding of others' goals surfaced. Stockwell's presentation of the o f f i ­ cial comparison between theories focused on aspects of the d i f f e r e n t models. Theoretical goals and the success of each researcher w e r e never mentioned. It is almost as if a d i f ­ ference in goals was unimaginable. Worse, their a p p r o p r i ­ ateness and the success in attaining them seems to be thought irrelevant. Yet, d i f f e r e n c e s in goals exist and divide linguists. Still, the conference organizers looked upon our mass confusion as the natural state of a period in which an orthodoxy is breaking up. Their question was whether we would see a search for a new orthodoxy or remain in a state of general f r a g m e n t a t i o n . Either way, they held out hope. Either way, I foresee continued troubles, because t h e r e is a basic blindness on both sides, in such a case, i n t e l l e c ­ tuals are prone to assume t h a t the proper course of action lies somewhere between both courses. In f a c t , here the proper course is to take both paths simultaneously. 0.2 The simultaneous approach The need to take both structural and functional paths simultaneously is clearly not s e l f - e v i ­ dent. The purpose of this essay is to outline the reasons that make the need f o r both approaches clear and to i d e n ­ t i f y the developments which led European linguists down one path and American linguists down another. My s k e p t i ­ cism concerning a re-combination of these two approaches is based on two facts. First, t h e r e are two theories available today which can do the job; neither shows signs of con­ quering the linguistic world. Second, an indication of the necessity for following both paths has been available for nearly f o r t y years, in the w r i t i n g s of Rulon Wells. Almost everybody r e a d , but almost nobody listened t h e n . Indications are t h a t this situation continues today. Hence, my s k e p t i ­ cism. I conclude this essay with a more personal retrospective on Mr. Wells and an indication of the rays of hope I see.

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1. THE ARCHITECTURE OF LANGUAGE 1.1 Language as a semiotic Language is used f o r many things, but most of them include a measure of communication between individuals, usually via sound. Language can thus be visualized as some mechanism between meaning and

Figure 1 sound, as in f i g u r e 1. Without knowing anything concrete about the mechanism, we can suggest t h a t language must be able to transmit information f r o m the meaning store to the mouth of one individual (encoding a message) and f r o m the e a r to the meaning store of another individual (decod­ ing a message). Transmitting messages is the semiotic f u n c ­ tion of language. The automatic consequence of the ability to transmit messages is the need f o r paths interconnecting the meaning plane with the sound plane, paths along which messages can pass. Without such paths, the transmission of messages into sound (or the reverse) could not occur. These paths are the semiotic relationships in language, w h a t Saussure called the sign relations. Clearly, any description of language must include a provision for semiotic relationships. 1.2 Language as a structure Now semiotic relations could potentially be random in n a t u r e and i n f i n i t e in number. However, it this w e r e t r u e , it would not be possible for six-year-olds to command the language ability they do com­ mand. Even mature native speakers would show a lack of

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control over much of the native language, if it w e r e com­ posed of an i n f i n i t e number of r a n d o m l y - a r r a n g e d semiotic relations. Nor would it be possible to w r i t e meaningful grammars. In short, the semiotic relations alone cannot explain the way children acquire language so rapidly, the way adults can understand almost all things said to t h e m , vocabulary aside, and the way grammar rules can be induced from observations of native speakers' speech p a t t e r n s . All these things a r g u e , conclusively, to my mind, t h a t language is heavily p a t t e r n e d . These p a t t e r n s are called structural r e l a ­ tions of language. They are located within the boundaries of language. That is, they are neither meaning nor sound, but must be abstracted from meaning and sound. They are r e l a t e d to meaning and sound via the semiotic relations. Thus, t h e i r existence and n a t u r e must be induced from the n a t u r e and p a t t e r n i n g visible in meaning and sound during the communication process. My two claims, t h a t structural relations must be abstracted from sound and meaning and t h a t they are wholly within language, are neither original nor unique. Bloomfield believed t h a t all significant linguistic generalizations must (ultimately) be inductive in n a t u r e . Jakobson believed that t h e r e is no such thing as surface structure in any language, t h a t all structure is abstract; we might question the level or degree of abstractness, but talking about deep versus surface structure in any language is simply beside the point. I f i n d no f a u l t with e i t h e r belief. 1.3 Elements of language Before continuing the above discus­ sion, it will be useful to consider its implications with regard to individual linguistic elements. Imagine a linguistic e l e m e n t , somewhere within language, r e p r e s e n t e d by the dot in f i g u r e 2. It may have up to four types of relations, represented by the arrows. The relations in the vertical plane a r e the semiotic relations; those in the horizontal plane are the s t r u c t u r a l . The vertical-horizontal orientation is itself insignificant. It serves merely to distinguish the two types of relations diagrammatically. The particular o r i ­ e n t a t i o n was chosen to symbolize the fact t h a t structural relations are within language, semiotic relations connect with the meaning and sound planes of f i g u r e 2.

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MEANING

Figure 2

Traditionally, the semiotic relations are f u r t h e r d i s t i n ­ guished by their orientations. That is, relations t o ( w a r d ) meaning are called 'functional relations', because they r e l a t e the element to its (semantic) f u n c t i o n . Similarly, relations to(ward) sound are called 'formal relations', because they r e l a t e the element to its characteristic pho­ netic f o r m . The structural relations do not d i f f e r in name. However, the element in question can be related to both larger and smaller s t r u c t u r e s , or, more accurately, to structures of g r e a t e r or lesser scope. The discussion to this point has been couched in g e n ­ e r a l t e r m s , but it is easy enough to give a specific e x a m ­ ple. Let us assume t h a t the language in question is Russian and the element in question is r e l a t e d to morphemic s t r u c ­ t u r e . Consider the following facts. There is a class of nouns like zená 'wife' which is always accented on the ending in the singular but on the stem in the p l u r a l : ž ny ' w i f e , η.pl.' The majority of nouns have fixed accent, e i t h e r on the stem or on the e n d i n g , and no nouns of the -a declension have stem accent in the singular and ending accent in the p l u r a l . Thus the a p p a r e n t accent shift may be seen as a mark of plurality affixed to the s t e m , in addition to the plural case endings. The f o u r relations of the linguistic element in question can now be specified. 1)The f o r m a l relation or semiotic has the shape of word accent.

relation

to

sound

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2) The functional relation or semiotic relation to meaning specifies plurality. 3)The relation to smaller structures is to the stem; in logical n a t u r e it is a simultaneous or unordered AND r e l a t i o n . 4 ) T h e relation to larger structures is to word and morphemic phrase structures. This is what lingustics elements look like, and these are the types of things linguistic analysis must take into con­ sideration, if a complete and i n t e g r a t e d description is desired. 1.4 Language as a structured semiotic Language t h e r e f o r e con­ sists of an interlocking network of relations like those shown in f i g u r e 2. Not all elements of language need to have all f o u r relationships. Any combination of t h r e e r e l a ­ tionships (two semiotic, one structural or two s t r u c t u r a l , one semiotic) can be exemplified. But such explication is beyond the scope of this study. It is important only t h a t the f o u r types of relations specified are ultimately necessary. The total significance and indeed the d e f i n i t i o n of each element is given not by its f o r m or meaning but by the sum of relationships it contracts, including both semiotic and structural relations. In short, the need f o r both semiotic and structural relations in linguistic description is clear. What is not clear is how and why the analytical situation arrived a t the c u r ­ r e n t state of schism. An explanation of this schism is the next step. II. SYNTACTIC STUDIES IN EUROPE 11.1 The origins The founder of modern descriptive linguistics is, of course, Ferdinand de Saussure. That Saussure c r e d ­ ited many of his ideas to Jan Baudouin de Courtenay is unimportant f o r our purposes, as is the fact t h a t some ideas we credit to Saussure w e r e also advanced, a p p a r e n t l y independently, by other European linguists of his t i m e . Baudouin de Courtenay published little t h a t was accessible to students of linguistics outside of Imperial Russia, so his direct influence was severely limited. Saussure's w e s t e r n European contemporaries contributed ideas singly, sometimes almost randomly, in the context of particular articles or

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books. This is not to deprecate these contributions, but to point out their separated appearance. Saussure contributed his ideas in the context of an i n t e g r a t e d system he had developed t o r linguistic description, a system he was t e a c h ­ ing students in his introductory Cours ete linguistique générale. At t h a t t i m e , most linguists taught linguistics only in the context of teaching something else (Sanskrit, I n d o - E u r o p e a n , or the l i k e ) , and considered historical linguistics the f u n d a ­ mental goal of linguistic research. That is, they did not teach descriptive linguistics as such. Saussure d i d , and his influence on his students and their students was enormous, reaching down even to the present day. 11.2 The development Saussure defined the f u n d a m e n t a l l i n ­ guistic element as the sign relation of the linguistic sign. The linguistic sign has a phonetic f o r m and a semantic meaning. The sign relation connects them. A glance at f i g ­ ure 2 will show that both phonetic f o r m and semantic meaning are outside of language. The sign relation of Saussure is within language and is at least analogous to what I call semiotic relations above. Saussure did not intend all or even most sign relations to be simplex or o n e - t o - o n e . In f a c t , he envisioned a complex of i n t e r r e l a t i o n s among signs. The Prague school, Saussurean linguists a l l , produced descriptions in which the functional relations f i g u r e most prominently. An idea of their complexity can be gotten f r o m the Schenker monograph I discuss below. Though Saussure discussed the a r b i t r a r y n a t u r e of the linguistic sign, he did not mean t h a t linguistic signs w e r e randomly scattered throughout language. He clearly believed in the reality of structural p a t t e r n i n g . Moreover, his postu­ lation of the pharyngeals in Indo-European was prompted by a s t r u c t u r a l observation (the CVC- n a t u r e of most roots). An exegesis of his writings is beyond my present scope, but I need only point to the work of his intellectual ((great) grand) children to show that the sign relations are p a t ­ t e r n e d inter se (e.g. Jakobson 1958 and Schenker 1964). In f a c t , Schenker 1964 is a particularly clear and detailed example of such a work. It will be useful to take a closer look at i t , to understand exactly what the c u r r e n t practice is in some Neo-Saussurean q u a r t e r s .

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II.3 An example of Neo-Saussureanism Schenker's study (1964: 13-14) of the Polish noun inflection begins with a summary description of the meanings of the six cases of Polish,

NOM Directionality Quantification Marginality

ACC +

GEN

DAT +

+ +

LOC

INS

+ +

+

Figure 3

reproduced here as f i g u r e 3. The "meaning" of the cases is precisely the sum of the functional relations of each case, including the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n these functional r e l a ­ tions. His chapter 1 contains an outline structural j u s t i f i c a ­ tion of the inventory of cases, the categories singular and p l u r a l , and the genders and declensional types. The rest of the monograph gives a detailed description of the cases in each of the declensional types, concentrating on the pho­ nemic forms of the cases and the p a t t e r n of syncretisms, wherein two or more cases are r e l a t e d to the same pho­ nemic f o r m . This is, in other words, a description of the formal relations of the cases. Schenker's description of the p e r t i n e n t semiotic relations is f a i r l y complete. His descrip­ tion of t h e i r structural relations is sketchy, an outline only. As one of Schenker's students, I can t e s t i f y t h a t his system of description has g r e a t pedagogical value: using his approach, I was able to memorize the Old Church Slavic nominal inflection in approximately f i f t e e n minutes. It is also theoretically sound, though I believe the functional relations deserve elaboration. Even so, it is a more com­ plete description of the case system of Polish than can be found anywhere else. I was also in the audience when Schenker presented an oral version of his study to the language and linguistic f a c ­ ulties a t Yale. At t h a t t i m e , the linguists w e r e almost e n t i r e l y structuralists, with one notable exception. At the end of the p r e s e n t a t i o n , when the floor was opened for questions, the f i r s t questioner said something like, "Very

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nice, but what's it all for?" Now Schenker's description focuses almost e n t i r e l y on the semiotic relations. It does not ignore the structural relations of these morphemes, but they are d e f i n i t e l y secondary, completely subordinated to the semiotic relations. The structuralist questioner recog­ nized this a t t e n t i o n to n o n - s t r u c t u r a l detail and simply could not imagine its relevance. The loss is his. 11.4 The European situation Interestingly enough, Schenker, though a graduate of Yale, was heavily influenced by Jakobson (Schenker 1964: p r e f a c e ) , and t h e r e f o r e produced a study f a i r l y typical of the European approach. Semiotic relations are the main i n t e r e s t . There is a spectrum of types, of course. Some European researchers, e.g. M. A. K. Halliday and Simon Dik, are more i n t e r e s t e d in structural considerations than is Schenker's description. Others, e.g. the textlinguistic g r o u p , seem to be less interested in structural relations, if anything. Nonetheless, in all cases the semiotic relations are c e n t r a l , the structural relations are secondary. This does not imply European homogeneity: Chomskyan linguistics is now making inroads into European faculties. However, the European Chomskyans I know are not adding Chomskyan structuralism to European functionalism. They are simply adopting the Chomskyan model in its place. S t i l l , the European p r e f e r e n c e f o r functionalism stands. Given this, it is necessary to see how the American situation differs. 111 SYNTACTIC STUDIES IN AMERICA 111.1 The origins Concerted linguistic studies in America received t h e i r modern impetus f r o m Franz Boas, an a n t h r o ­ pologist, around the t u r n of the century, the magic date being 1 9 1 1 , when he published his 8 4 - p a g e introduction to Languages. the Smithsonian's Handbook of American indian Although this is f o r t y years a f t e r Saussure began his public career with the Memoire, Saussure's influence in general linguistics had not yet reached America in any substantive fashion. His theory was t r a n s m i t t e d through his students, and until a compilation was published from student notes in 1916, it was not even available in the United States. By the

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time it was generally available, the anthropological to the study of language was f i r m l y in place here.

approach

Anthropologists study human behavior and c u l t u r e , seek­ ing the underlying p a t t e r n s which the behavior(s) conform t o . With the exception of symbolic anthropologists, they do not w o r r y overmuch about the meaning of particular acts. For the most p a r t , this is reasonable. Most human action is e i t h e r t r a n s p a r e n t in its motivation (eating b r e a k f a s t ) , or its motivation can only be speculated on (your "choice" of f r i e n d s ) . Some acts (voting) range f r o m one extreme to the other. In any case, worrying about the meaning of acts is f r u i t l e s s , because the semiotic relations are e i t h e r trivial or incomprehensible. However, it is possible to induce the structural relations underlying acts from observing what acts are p e r f o r m e d , co-occurrence restrictions on combina­ tions of acts, sequencing of acts, dependency relations between acts, etc. Thus the anthropologist concentrates on the structural relations, assumes t h e r e are semiotic r e l a ­ tions, accepts the trivial ones and ignores the rest. Since anthropologists wish to avoid philosophical speculation and be as scientific in t h e i r work as possible, this approach is not only reasonable, but it may be the only approach they can t a k e . Of course, this outline contains oversimplifications, some of which I r e c t i f y below. But it accurately represents the approach of American anthropologists during t h a t period. III.2 The development At f i r s t glance, an anthropological approach to language might seem to be unfeasible. L a n ­ guage is, a f t e r a l l , stored in the b r a i n , and it is clearly inaccessible to direct observation in its operation. However, Bloomfield 1933 showed t h a t language is accessible to anthropological-style analysis in a perfectly regular fashion according to the t e n e t s of (Watsonian) behaviorist psychol­ ogy. Here everything begins with a t t e n t i o n to speech acts. Structures are induced. Trivial semiotic relations are i d e n t i ­ f i e d (e.g. f o r lexical meaning or f o r function w o r d s ) , and other semiotic relations are assigned to "grammatical m e a n ­ ing" or, more recently, to " t e x t semantics". But the struc­ t u r a l relations are central and the semiotic relations are peripheral (cf. Bloch 1946 f o r Japanese or Nida 1960 for English).

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1113 Current Neo-Boasianism The paramount importance of structures remains throughout the transformational era. Both Harris's and Chomsky's transformational rules r e l a t e two structures. Chomsky's rules combine the concept of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n with that of markedness in t h e i r u n i - d i r e c tional application. The supposedly trivial semiotic relations are placed in the lexicon, and the t e x t semantics is to be d e t e r m i n e d by the as yet unspecified semantic i n t e r p r e t a ­ tion. In f a c t , Chomskyan linguistics is so clearly s t r u c ­ t u r a l ( i s t ) in its conception and presuppositions t h a t I am t e m p t e d to say that the much-publicized "revolution" of 1957 was merely an exercise in notational variance. 111.4 The American situation Whether Chomskyan syntax or Montague " g r a m m a r , " w h e t h e r "surface" or " d e e p " seman­ tic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , w h e t h e r with or without a " t r a c e , " syn­ tactic studies in America remain predominantly structural in n a t u r e . There are individuals like Susumo Kuno, who i n t r o ­ duce functional considerations into t h e i r primarily structural descriptions f o r limited purposes. There are some followers of Hudson's generative but n o n - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l version of systemic grammar and some who adhere to Halliday's more traditional brand of Firthian linguistics, but these groups are relatively f e w in number and low in influence. There are also two other groups, somewhat more numerous but almost totally lacking in influence with the linguistic e s t a b ­ lishment. I r e t u r n to these two groups in section V. S t i l l , in spite of these f e w dissenters, American orthodoxy remains solidly s t r u c t u r a l in o r i e n t a t i o n . IV. THE ECUMENICAL

IMPULSE

IV.1 The overall situation It is clear, f r o m the discussion in sections II and I I I , t h a t linguistics in 1983 is in a state of radical schism. This schism between functionalist and s t r u c ­ t u r a l i s t lies mainly but not e n t i r e l y along a continental division. Both continents have heretics and dissenters f l o a t ­ ing a r o u n d , but each side seems to have excommunicated the other. Harsh words have been spoken, and worse. A t t i tudinally, the situation is not unlike t h a t of the religious w a r s in early s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Europe.

At

I do not wish to give a picture the Wisconsin conference, J. R.

of u n r e m i t t i n g Ross made an

gloom. almost

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Sullivan: Structure and

Function

impassioned plea t h a t it is long past the time when we should have started listening to each other and expressed the hope that our spirit of interaction would continue. The problem is that people w e r e listening in Milwaukee, but o f t e n they were not hearing. There w e r e no comments as blunt as the one aimed at Schenker, but many comments w e r e totally beside the p o i n t - - a n y point the speaker was trying to make. Not t h a t t h e r e seemed to be any malicious intent: the commenter was just not hearing what the speaker was saying. This is a sad situation and suggests yet again t h a t education will not necessarily cure social ills. Worse, since 1947, the situation has been completely unnecessary. IV.2 Wells's contribution In 1947, Rulon Wells published two papers: "De Saussure's System of Linguistics" appeared in Word and "Immediate Constituents" appeared in Lanugage. Language was t h e n , as it remains today, the organ of s t r u c ­ t u r a l linguistics, though the view of what is structuralist is somewhat n a r r o w e r today than it was t h e n . Word was the outlet for the functionalists, w h e t h e r renegade Americans or refugee Europeans like Jakobson. One ecumenical soul appeared in both places. Wells (1947a: 1) presented Saussurean linguistics as derived from a " c a r e f u l internal collation of the Cours itself," while assuming t h a t Saussure's "thought (was) a synchronic self-contained system." Wells's t r e a t m e n t , like the man himself, is g e n t l e , probing, critical though n o n - j u d g e ­ m e n t a l , and illuminating. It clearly illustrates Saussure's semiotic interests and his concentration on functional con­ siderations. Saussure's book, the Cours de linguistique generale, is o f t e n d i f f i c u l t , perhaps because he did not w r i t e it, comment on the t e x t , or edit the final d r a f t . But Wells 1947a makes clear how much we owe to it and to Saussure. Wells 1947b is simply described. In i t , Wells (1947b: 186) defines the theoretical and heuristic basis f o r structural analysis: "We aim ... to replace by a u n i f i e d , systematic theory the heterogeneous and incomplete methods hitherto o f f e r e d for determining immediate constituents ... by the famous concept of patterning, applied r e p e a t e d l y and in div­ ers forms (emphasis supplied-WJS)." As this quotation shows,

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217

the American structuralists of that era (Wells cites several, particularly Zeitig Harris and Bernard Bloch), w e r e indeed interested in methodology, but not to the exclusion of theory. It also shows a concern with the structural relations ( p a t t e r n i n g ) t h a t can be adduced f r o m the occurrence of d i f f e r e n t phonetic forms. Typically structural in its outlook, the f i n a l phrase of the quotation presupposes phonetic forms as a means f o r inducting p a t t e r n s of s t r u c t u r e . It does not go into any consideration of functional relations; it merely assumes the trivial ones. Thus in one year, 1947, Rulon Wells walked both sides of the s t r e e t . Rulon Wells made it possible to r e u n i t e the European and American branches of linguistics. Rulon Wells made it possible f o r anyone to produce f u l l y adequate l i n ­ guistic descriptions, which would include both structural and semiotic relations. In short, Rulon Wells provided the e c u ­ menical basis f o r ending the schism in linguistics. Though the schism still exists today, the f a u l t is clearly not his. V. TWO RAYS OF HOPE V.1 Tagemics One branch of American structuralism was forced to consider the consequences of semiotic relations, as linguists of this school w e r e i n t e r e s t e d in Bible t r a n s l a ­ t i o n . Pike, Longacre, and t h e i r colleagues and students at the Summer Institute of Linguistics w e r e moved by the need to make the Bible available to speakers of f o r g o t t e n or unknown languages. Now translation involves decoding a t e x t in one language and encoding it in another. It is the same amount of work as paraphrasing a t e x t within a particular language, but it r e q u i r e s linguistic competence in both l a n ­ guages. Translation involves, as mentioned above, both the encoding and decoding processes. Thus, it must use the semiotic pathways. However, since it is limited only by the scope of the t e x t , translation needs the structural relations to provide a mechanism of workable size. Thus the t a g m e micists have had to supply both types of descriptions for the languages they work on. They walk both paths a t once, and are not participants in the schism.

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In f a c t , contemporary anthropologists are no longer disinterested in meaning. 2 The credit f o r this is due to Pike's emic/etic distinction, which led anthropologists to believe t h a t t h e r e a r e , in addition to trivial semiotic r e l a ­ tions, semiotic relations which emerge f r o m the s t r u c t u r e . Some even believe t h a t all n o n - t r i v i a l semiotic relations derive from the structural relations, though this violates Pike's thinking. Still, it is a p a r t i a l advance in anthropolo­ gists' thinking and shows the duality and utility of Pike's approach. V.2 Stratificationalism The other branch of American linguistics which provides a ray of hope emerged from the confluence of two lines of thinking. One, pioneered by H. A. Gleason, Jr., was also partially motivated by a need f o r Bible t r a n s ­ lation. That is, Gleason's genesis paralleled Pike's, up to a point. The other line of t h i n k i n g , pioneered by Sydney Lamb, arose from a combination of the influence of M a r y Haas, a structuralist and student of Sapir's, with t h a t of Louis Hjelmslev, via his t r a n s l a t o r , Francis J. Whitfield. From the one came the emphasis on elaborated structural r e l a ­ tions; f r o m the other both the acceptance of structure and the emphasis on elaborated semiotic relations. Where Lamb and Gleason both d i f f e r f r o m Pike is in the p a t t e r n i n g and elaboration of semiotic relations. In the stratificational view, the structural p a t t e r n s , called tactic p a t t e r n s , are stacked vertically, and are i n t e r r e l a t e d by semiotic p a t t e r n s called realizational relations. This is a result of Lamb and Gleason essaying descriptions which did not assume t h a t the majority of semiotic relations w e r e t r i v i a l , o n e - t o - o n e relations or simply emerged directly (and hence, trivially) f r o m the s t r u c t u r e . Without this assumption, the realizational relations show up as interlocking p a t t e r n s , complex yet describable in a logically s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d f a s h ­ ion. Stratificationalism is a very demanding theoretical f r a m e w o r k . A stratificational description r e q u i r e s t h a t the researcher do it a l l , and it takes time and practice to mas­ t e r this approach. It cannot be taught to students in a five-week introductory course. Perhaps f o r this reason, t h e r e are very f e w stratificationalists around. Even so, we have our share of linguists in Europe, though they generally have no more influence t h e r e than we have here.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

21?

Gleason sometimes agreed with and sometimes disagreed with guesses I made in my description in Sullivan 1980 (see Gleason 1980). Time may tell which, if e i t h e r , of us is right. However, he had one major criticism of my paper. He was dismayed t h a t I had presented stratificationalism as a structural theory, including only trivial semiotic/functional relations and finessing n o n - t r i v i a l ones. That was a calcu­ lated ploy on my p a r t , as I f e l t I could provide a b e t t e r description of the syntactic structure of English on one page than t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l - g e n e r a t i v e linguistics had provided in a q u a r t e r century. I could beat t h e m , so to speak, a t their (presumed) s t r e n g t h . And I believe I did. However, I also believe t h a t Gleason was correct, too. Stratificational theory is not only the structural theory par excellence, but the semiotic or functional theory par excel­ lence. As such, it realizes or provides the means to realize the best thinking that underlies both of Rulon Wells' 1947 articles. VI. MY DEBT TO RULON WELLS V M My academic debt At Yale in the fall of 1965, the i n t r o ­ ductory course in historical linguistics was begun by Bernard Bloch. A short while into the course, Bloch s u f f e r e d what was to be his final heart attack and was hospitalized. Rulon Wells stepped into the breach. During the rest of t h a t semester, a number of interchanges took place between the present w r i t e r ( S ) , then a f i r s t - t e r m g r a d u a t e student in the Slavic d e p a r t m e n t , and M r . Wells (W): S. Is this kind of change a split or a merger? W. Why or? Why not both? Later: S. What do you mean by saying such changes have a double e f f e c t on language? W. Well, t h e / r e changes in the sign (=semiotic, WJS) r e l a ­ tions, and they give rise to changes in the s t r u c t u r e . S. Isn't t h a t just two ways of saying the same thing? W. T h e / r e r e l a t e d , but t h e / r e certainly not the same.

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Sullivan: Structure and Function

Still

later:

S.

I don't know why  insists t h a t this must be the phoneme t. You can never establish a contrast in this environment. W. So what would you call it? S. It must be a morphophoneme. W. Don't you mean an archiphoneme? (See Sullivan 1974) Later yet: S. I don't understand why he comes to this conclusion. W. Instead of worrying about t h a t , r e - e x a m i n e the way he phrased his statement of the problem. S. (Re-examines it.) Oh, the conclusion is implicit in the hypothesis. W. Now ask why he stated the problem t h a t way. And so on. But you get the

picture.

VI.2 My personal debt In my two years of course-taking as a graduate student in the Slavic Department at Yale Univer­ sity, I managed to take only this one course from Rulon Wells. Scheduling conflicts and competing course r e q u i r e ­ ments severely limited the number of courses I was able to take f r o m the Linguistic Department offerings. Still, I accrued two personal debts to Mr. Wells in the course of this one semester. One personal debt I owe Rulon Wells is of a general order. He was one of two people (Alexander Schenker was the other) who urged me to enroll in Sydney Lamb's course in morphological analysis. This course was not r e q u i r e d of Slavic students, but the joint influence of Schenker and Wells made it imperative. Lamb's course showed me exactly how semiotic and structural relations could be catalogued, codified, i n t e g r a t e d , and reconciled with each other. About midway through this course, I became convinced t h a t Wells 1947a and b t o g e t h e r had a hook on the paths I should t a k e , and stratificationalism provided the instrument. The n a t u r e of my other personal debt to Rulon Wells is shown by the f i r s t and last interchanges r e p o r t e d in VI.1 Mr. Wells always insisted t h a t I look at the internal logic of

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

221

the question as well as a t the answer. Such a procedure is instructive in life in general and not just in linguistics. We are all used to people who do not know what the answer to a particular problem is. Wells' procedure makes it clear that many people who p r e t e n d to have the answer do not even know what the question is. Most instructive. In short, even when Rulon Wells did not have the answer to some problem, it was always clear that he understood the nature of the problem and had good ideas concerning that f o r m u l a t o n of the question which would point most directly toward the problem's resolution. Such clear vision is always to be envied and e m u l a t e d . For my p a r t , as one who took and takes advantage of his p e r c e p tiveness, I would like to thank Rulon Wells most sincerely f o r sharing it with me.

ENDNOTES 1

Obviously this p a p e r , like the book, is dedicated to Rulon Wells. However, I herewith acknowledge t h a t without Adam Makkai, it would not have been w r i t t e n . He issued the initial invitation to w r i t e it and kept a f t e r me until it was done. Most i m p o r t a n t , he it was who suggested the topic t h a t became my central thesis. 2 I am indebted to David Suggs and Kofi Akwabe-Ameyaw, graduate students in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Florida, f o r commenting on the section on anthropological methods and especially for pointing out this fact about Pike's contribution to anthropological research.

REFERENCES Bloch,

B e r n a r d . 1946. Syntax." In Joos 22.200-48.

"Studies in colloquial Japanese II: 1957, 154-85. Originally in Language

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Bloomfield, Leonard. 1933. Language. New York: Holt, & Winston.

Rinehart

Gieason, H. Α., Jr. 1980. Comments on William J. Sullivan's "Syntax and linguistic semantics in stratificational theory." In Current Syntactic Theories: Discussion papers f r o m the 1979 Milwaukee Syntax Conference, Michael Kac ( e d . ) , 118-33. Bloomington, Indiana: lULC. Jakobson, Roman. 1958. "Morfologiceskie nabljudenija nad slavjanskim skloneniem (Sostav russkix padeznyx form)." In American Contributions to the Fourth Interna­ tional Congress of Slavicists, Moscow, September, 1958, 127-56. The Hague: Mouton. Joos, M a r t i n ( e d . ) . 1957. Readings in Linguistics. versity of Chicago Press. Nida,

Chicago: U n i ­

Eugene A. 1960. A Synopsis of English Syntax. Oklahoma: Summer Institute of Linguistics.

Schenker, Alexander Mouton.

M.

1964.

Polish Declension.

Norman,

The

Hague:

Sullivan, William J. 1974. "The archiphoneme in s t r a t i f i c a ­ tional description." In Proceedings of the Xlth Interna­ tional Congress of Linguists, Luigi Heilmann (ed.), 2 8 7 - 9 9 . Bologna, Italy: Casa Editrice il Mulino. . 1980. "Syntax and linguistic semantics in s t r a t i f i c a ­ tional theory." In Syntax and semantics, vol. 13, E. Moravcsik and J. Wirth (eds.), 3 0 1 - 2 7 . New York: Aca­ demic Press. Wells, Rulon. 1947a. "De Saussure's system of linguistics." Joos 1957, 1-18. Originally in Word 3 . 1 - 3 1 . . 1947b. "Immediate constituents." In 186-207. Originally in Language 23.81-117.

Joos

In

1957,

COME ON UP

I.

Eldon G. Lytie Linguistics I n t e r n a t i o n a l , Inc. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

In a paper read at the 1979 LACUS Forum, I asserted t h a t it was possible, using the recursive facilities of Junc­ tion Rules ( J - R u l e s ) , to give plausible representations for such horrors as COME ON UP FROM OUT OF DOWN IN UNDER THERE (BY THE STAIRS) WHERE ... ( L y t l e , 1979, pp. 3 0 5 - 3 4 3 ) . The purpose of the present w r i t i n g is to describe how this is done. The representation to be given will be based on Junc­ tion Rule (J-Rule) schemata utilized to describe the s t r u c ­ t u r e of pragmatic data. Pragmatic data is i n t e r m e d i a t e between the basic data of the general information net and the lexical data utilized as the basis f o r w r i t i n g or speak­ ing. A general outline and description of data types in Junction Grammar is given in Lytle, 1979. See the bibliogra­ phy for additional r e f e r e n c e s . The general outline of the paper is as follows: We f i r s t discuss two J - r u l e generalizations made in Junction Grammar (JG) which are germane to the analysis of constit­ uent s t r u c t u r e . Next, some analytical diagnostics are p r e ­ sented to provide guidance in the use of these g e n e r a l i z a ­ tions. And, lastly, we undertake a JG-style immediate constituent analysis of the problem d a t a . In so doing, we pay homage in our own way to the memorable t r a d i t i o n of Wells (Wells, 1947).

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II. THE GENERALIZATIONS First, for adjunction (the junction type used to join objects to verbs and subjects to predicates), allowance is made to permit categories other than V (verb) to function as predicate nuclei. This has the consequence of making adjectival, adverbial, and prepositional modifiers structurally symmetrical with relative clauses. Thus, in JG one does not join adjectives, adverbs, and prepositional phrases directly to the element they modify. Rather, one f i r s t constructs an appropriate adjunction, i.e. a s t a t e m e n t t e m p l a t e , and then interjoins said t e m p l a t e to the head in the same fashion t h a t one would join a relative clause to its head. The r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t phrasal modifiers and clausal modifiers be structurally symmetrical is motiviated by semantic considera­ tions (See Lytle, 1 9 7 1 , pp. 1 0 2 - 1 2 2 ) . Generalizing adjunction to accommodate predicates of whatever nuclear category results in an expanded inventory of adjunctive node labels, as given in Figure 1.

STATEMENT LABELS PREDICATE LABELS PREDICATOR LABELS

Figure

SV PV V

SAj PAj Aj

SAv SP PAv PP Αν Ρ

1. Statements and predicates non-verbal nuclei

SN SN Ν

may

have

Node labels are abbreviated as follows: verb (V); adjective (Aj); adverb (Av); preposition ( P ) ; noun ( N ) ; predicate with verb nucleus (PV); predicate with adjective nucleus (PAj); predicate with adverb nucleus (PAv); predicate with p r e p o ­ sition nucleus ( P P ) ; predicate with noun nucleus ( P N ) ; statement with verb nucleus (SV); s t a t e m e n t with adjective nucleus (SAj); statement with adverb nucleus (SAv); s t a t e ­ ment w i t h preposition nucleus ( S P ) ; statement with noun nucleus (SN). These additional node labels e n t e r into other junction schemata f r e e l y , so t h a t , f o r example, adjectival and p r e p o ­ sitional statements may be introduced directly, without BE reduction, to account for expressions such as WHAT! ME SICK? or HOW FORTUNATE THAT THEY LEFT WHEN THEY DID!

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225

The generalization of adjunction described above is paralleled by an equally important generalization f o r subj u n c t i o n . The generalization in question centers on the r e f e r m e n t , a structural template which defines among its constituents a set of grammatical relations as important to modification and subordination as subject, predicator, object, and predicate are to predication. The foregoing italicized terms, of course, are the functional names given to adjoined elements within a s t a t e m e n t . Please observe that each such constituent also has a fixed location relative to other elements in the s t a t e m e n t t e m p l a t e . Similarly, the constituents of which the r e f e r m e n t is composed have been given their own specific functional names and occupy fixed locations within the r e f e r m e n t t e m p l a t e . In an expression such as THE FIVE YOUNG MEN THAT WE MET, THE is at Nm as the modalizer, FIVE is a t Nq as the quantifier, MEN is at Nc as the classifier, YOUNG is the nucleus of an adjectival s t a t e m e n t (SAj) interjoined to M E N , and THAT WE MET is a verbal s t a t e m e n t (SV) interjoined to Na, the aggregate (See Figure 2 ) . With regard to these interjoined modifiers, it is important to understand also t h a t the point a t which s t a t e ­ ments interjoin to the r e f e r m e n t is not a r b i t r a r y . Specific modifiers interjoin to the a g g r e g a t e ; generic modifiers interjoin to the classifier. This corresponds to the definition of junction operations within the r e f e r m e n t , whereby j u n c ­ tions to the classifier result in a subset, while junctions to the aggregate result in e n u m e r a t i o n of specific elements. To recapitulate, modalizer, quantifier, classifier, and aggregate are functional names f o r constituents of fixed location within the r e f e r m e n t , and are considered to be as indispensable to the explication of the structure of simple phrases as subject, predicate, predicator, and object are to the explication of s t a t e m e n t (propositional) s t r u c t u r e .

226

Lytie: Come on Up

Figure

2. The pragmatic noun phrase

structure

of

a

typical

Notice t h a t there is a direct correlation between such nominal forms as a r t i c l e , cardinal number, common noun, relative pronoun, etc., and the nodes in the r e f e r m e n t . We assume t h a t just as the nominative/accusative noun f o r m contrast is reflective of noun position within the statement t e m p l a t e , other familiar contrasts in noun form are r e f l e c ­ tive of noun position within the r e f e r m e n t t e m p l a t e . Recall that in dealing with adjunction we generalized the statement t e m p l a t e to allow predicate nuclei of w h a t ­ ever category. We now wish to make a parallel g e n e r a l i z a ­ tion for subjunction. The basic r e f e r m e n t t e m p l a t e will be allowed to occur f o r all categories. The reason for this is that we observe a variety of contrasts within each category which appear to be r e f e r m e n t based. More specifically, it seems plausible to regard clausal markers such as THAT and IF as instances of SVm, i.e. as modalizers (articles) for clauses. Similarly, if modal contrasts for person are r e f l e c t e d by nominal articles, it seems reasonable to expect predicate articles at PVm expressing contrasts f o r t e m p o r a l ­ ity (WILL, SHALL, and WOULD, perhaps), and verbal articles expressing contrasts f o r aspect at Vm (the "auxiliaries" BE and HAVE r e q u i r e explication). Why not even expect, say, articles for prepositional phrases at PPm? Notice the sym­ metry between THIS BOOK THAT I BOUGHT and THERE ON THE TABLE WHERE I PUT IT ( t h i s . . . t h a t / t h e r e . . . w h e r e ) .

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227

F u r t h e r m o r e , why should one assume that only nominals occur in connection with amounts? In an expression such as HE GREW SIX INCHES, f o r example, might not SIX INCHES be functioning at Vq ( q u a n t i f i e r of a verb)? And in an expres­ sion such as THEY CHEAT A LOT, might not A LOT be f u n c ­ tioning at PVq ( q u a n t i f i e r of a verbal predicate)? And in an expression such as HE IS TWENTY YEARS OLD, might not TWENTY YEARS be functioning at Ajq ( q u a n t i f i e r of an adjective)? We do not assume of course, that all the nodes in every r e f e r m e n t must be used in every case, any more than we assume t h a t every verb must have a direct object. potential We do postulate, however, that f u l l r e f e r m e n t does exist on every category, should the exigencies of dis­ course require it. Let us also assume t h a t r e f e r m e n t embedding is as essential to natural langauge recursion as statement embedding. In other words, let us assume t h a t r e f e r m e n t s may be embedded within other r e f e r m e n t s . For nominals, this will give us the facility to account f o r complex noun phrases such as WE THE PEOPLE, JOHN THE REVELATOR, and MY FRIEND THE HERMIT. For verbal predicates it will give us the facility for managing overlapping temporality such as we observe in THE PRESIDENT IS TO ARRIVE TOMORROW, or HE WILL HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. There a r e , of course, numerous possibilities for e m b e d ­ ding one r e f e r m e n t within a n o t h e r . . Since space will not permit elaboration on each embedding possibility and its syntacto-semantic correspondences, may it simply be stated for the purposes of this paper t h a t embeddings to the q u a n t i f i e r appear to involve complex amount specifications, e.g. ANOTHER TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND SACKS OF POTATOES; embeddings to the classifier appear to involve derivational processes, e.g. THE RAPID CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE BY WORKMEN; and embeddings to the aggregate appear to involve appositional/complementary processes, e.g. THE FACT THAT THEY SUCCEEDED, or WE THE PEOPLE. The expression we are laboring with in this paper appears to involve recursion via interjunction (relativization) and aggregate complementation, r a t h e r that recursive quantification or derivation.

228 III.

Lytie: Come on Up SOME DIAGNOSTICS

There are some useful diagnostics which may be brought to bear in sorting out adverbial/prepositional chains such as the one confronting us here. (D1) Appositives and/or complements are r e f erentially independent. Hence, the referment to which they are embedded can generally be removed without impairing t h e i r r e f e r e n c e . For example, THE FACT THAT THEY LEARNED SURPRISED can be shortened to THAT THEY LEARNED SURPRISED US.

US

(D2) Relativo modifiers, on the other hand, are more referentially dependent upon the r e f e r m e n t to which they are interjoined. Hence, the relative reading of THE FACT THAT THEY LEARNED SURPRISED US is lost when the expression is shortened: THAT THEY LEARNED SURPRISED US. Applying these diagnostics to the expressions BACK AT THE RANCH and AHEAD OF THE PACK, we note that AT THE RANCH can be isolated (THEY ARE AT THE RANCH), whereas OF THE PACK cannot be isolated (*THEY ARE OF THE PACK) without impairing the r e f e r e n c e of the prepositional phrase. Thus we conclude t h a t AT THE RANCH is a complement of BACK, Le. t h a t a PP r e f e r m e n t for AT THE RANCH is e m b e d ­ ded at the aggregate of the PAj r e f e r m e n t for BACK. See Figure 3.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

Figure

3.

Prepositional phrase a locative adjective

229

complementing

OF THE PACK, on the other hand, corresponds to a prepositional s t a t e m e n t interjoined to AHEAD. See Figure 4.

Figure

4.

Relative phrase adjective

modifying

locative

Another useful diagnostic is the following: (D3) Complementary and/or appositional con­ stituents share the same grammatical relations v i s - à - v i s neighboring constituents. Thus, in the expression MY FRIEND THE HERMIT DWELLS IN A CAVE, MY FRIEND and THE HERMIT a r e both individually and jointly subjects of DWELLS IN A CAVE. B u t , in the e x p r e s ­ sion, THEY HAVE INHABITED A CAVE, where one might r e a ­ sonably expect t h a t HAVE simply embeds INHABITED as a complementary verb r e f e r m e n t , we observe t h a t while A CAVE is the direct object of INHABITED, it is not the direct

230

Lytie: Come on Up

object of HAVE. Hence, we conclude t h a t HAVE INHABITED does not involve embedded verb r e f e r m e n t s . On the other hand, both HAVE and INHABITED share the same subject, suggesting the possibility t h a t HAVE INHABITED may involve embedded PV r e f e r m e n t s . One final diagnostic relevant to our purpose is a corol­ lary to our d e f i n i t i o n of subjunction to the aggregate as the enumeration of a specific element: (D4) Complements do not occur in a r e s t r i c ­ tive series. This simply means t h a t complements are by n a t u r e r e f e r e n tially unique and are t h e r e f o r e not restricted by modifiers. IV.

THE ANALYSIS

Having attended to preliminaries, we now proceed directly to the analysis of the problem sequence. First, t h e r e appear to be some ellipses which must be taken into account. These are indicated by the a n g l e - b r a c k e t e d item inserted into the problem string at two locations as depicted in (S1). (S1) COME ON UP FROM OUT OF DOWN IN UNDER THERE WHERE ... Aside f r o m the intuition t h a t these nominals are understood, the presence of COME in conjunction with FROM (OUT OF) imposes a syntacto-semantic r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a prepositional object identifying point of origin. The point of origin is then pinpointed as being UNDER a second location, which is subsequently identified via the THERE WHERE sequence. Consider now the THERE WHERE substring. We have already pointed out the symmetry between (T)HERE and nominal demonstratives. The interesting fact about (T)HERE is t h a t in its locative reading it actually seems to qualify r e t e r e n t i a l l y as a prepositional phrase modalizer (PPm). Notice, for example, t h a t in an expression such as IN NEW YORK, WHERE I WAS BORN, the relative link WHERE takes as its antecedent IN NEW YORK r a t h e r than just NEW YORK. And, if I ask WHERE ARE YOU?, the answer will be something like AT THE STORE, i.e. a prepositional phrase. Observe f u r t h e r

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

231

that while demonstrative pronouns are followed optionally by a common noun, locative (T)HERE is followed optionally by a prepositional phrase. THAT (BOOK) THERE (ON THE PORCH)

WHICH HE HAS WHERE HE IS

Since the referential scope of both (T)HE'RE and WHERE is equivalent to that of prepositional phrases, we opt to view the former as a demonstrative at PPm (the TH-form) and the latter as a relative pro-PP marking an interjunction to the PP referment at the aggregate (the WH -form). See Figure 5. PP

/~

PPm

There

*

/ PPa

/ PPq

""" PP

on 5.

*

'* P

Figure

P'Z. "

/ PP where

/"'" +

N

the porch

Referment for PORCH) WHERE

THERE

(ON

THE

Consider now the expression FROM OUT OF . Notice that FROM has as its covert object (COME FROM as its complement, then it would be possible to remove OUT in accordance with 01. But this is impossible (*FROM OF , as they do here. Or, if OF were a prepositional phrase interjoined to OUT, FROM and OF could not share as an object. OUT and OF in this instance

232

Lytie: Come on Up

seem to be more closely associated, somehow constituting a compound preposition. We are inclined to believe t h a t in this context FROM and OUT-OF are complementary prepositions. In accordance with D3, both share the same object (FROM/OUT-OF ). And, in accordance with D 1 , FROM can be removed without destroying the r e f e r e n c e of the superstring, as illustrated by S2. (S2) COME ON UP OUT-OF UNDER THERE WHERE ...

DOWN

IN

Compare the FROM OUT-OF situation with t h a t of the substring DOWN IN UNDER . While one might assume that this string of prepositions also entails the embedding of prepositional r e f e r m e n t s , the same diagnostic (D3) fails - the understood object is the object of UNDER, but not the object of IN or DOWN. Intuition aside, this conclusion follows from the observation t h a t the f i r s t involved simply cannot be simultaneously DOWN, IN, and UNDER the second . The fact that we have t h r e e serial prepositions in this case (DOWN IN UNDER), r a t h e r than t w o , also allows us to invoke (D4), which excludes the possibility of serial complements. Alternatively, we might postulate t h a t the PP for UNDER is embedded to a PP containing IN and an empty object node, while t h a t PP is in t u r n embedded to a similar PP for DOWN. However, in spite of the fact t h a t by this method we can account for IN and DOWN without requiring them to share an object with UNDER, we again run afoul of the non-serial criterion which we would expect to hold for complementary PP's. We observe, however, t h a t DOWN is o f t e n used as a classifier of other prepositional phrases, e.g. 'down by the river', r a t h e r than as a preposition. Since this does appear to be the function of DOWN in our problem s t r i n g , we set it up as parallel with BACK in BACK AT THE RANCH, as a n a ­ lyzed above (See Figure 3 ) . This done, we reduce the substring in question to IN UNDER .

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

233

This can be analyzed e i t h e r as one prepositional phrase modifying a n o t h e r , i.e. UNDER interjoined to IN , or as a compound preposition IN-UNOER . The l a t t e r possibility is suggested by the use of IN-UNOER f o r UNDER in some dialects of English. Since no other data is immediately available from the august native (anonymous) who f i r s t u t t e r e d the linguistic masterpiece we are a t t e m p t i n g to analyze, this question must remain u n r e ­ solved f o r now. Let us assume, however, f o r the purpose of our c u r r e n t analysis, that we have a compound preposition with its object, i.e. IN-UNDER . (There is a t r e e f o r it e i t h e r way, of course.) The internal structure of compound prepositions is not immediately obvious, although two possibilities suggest themselves: They may fused with an associative-subjunction ( ∂ ) in parallel with other compounds (e.g. 'understand', 'salesman', e t c . ) . Or, the f i r s t element of the compound may be modalizing the second. Since no criteria are available at this w r i t i n g to apply, we withhold f u r t h e r comment. The initial three constituents of the problem string (COME ON UP) we analyze as the verb COME and two i n t e r ­ joined restrictive particles. In summary, t h e n , the problem string may be subdivided as seen in S3: (S3) COME ON UP/ FROM OUT-OF / DOWN IN-UNDER / THERE WHERE ... The structure proposed is given in the linked J - t r e e s below. For the sake of graphic brevity, the linkages at the nominal nodes are indicated without showing the internal r e f e r m e n t structure involved (standard interjunctions to Na).

234

Lytie: Come on Up

Figure 6. S t r u c t u r e for COME ON UP

Figure

7.

Structure /1

for

FROM

OUT-OF

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

Figure

Figure

8.

9.

Structure for < PLACE >/2

Structure of WHERE ...

With this we conclude our method have been:

DOWN

THERE

the

(BY

analysis.

235

IN-UNDER

THE

The

STAIRS)

essentials

(1) To d i f f e r e n t i a t e between basic junction types (adjunction, subjunction, and conjunc­ tion); (2) To introduce distinct structural templates f o r each junction t y p e ;

of

236

Lytie: Come on Up (3) To generalize across the entire categories. (4) To provide for these templates.

these templates for use spectrum of constituent iteration

and

recursion

of

The r e s u l t , hopefully, is within reason and interesting at least as an a t t e m p t to explicate a fascinating linguistic phenomenon.

REFERENCES CITED

Billings, Floyd H. 1972. "Some proposals f o r ordering W e l l Formed Syntactic S t a t e m e n t s " . BYU Linguistics Sympo­ sium Proceedings. . 1974. "The Junction Grammar representa­ tion as a basis f o r g e n e r a t i n g German word order p a t ­ t e r n s " . M.A. Thesis, BYU. Bush, Charles D. 1973. Fundamentals of Junction Grammar. One semester u n d e r g r a d u a t e course in Junction Grammar. . 1973. "Synthesis without a computer". BYU Linguistics Symposium Proceedings. . 1974. "Structural passives and the mas­ sive-passive t r a n s f e r " . M.A. Thesis, BYU. DeSantis, Christopher  1980. "Towards the automatic selection of prepositions in the interactive computerassisted translation of English to French". M.A. Thesis, BYU. Ellsworth, Richard G. 1975. " M i n d and language: memory process and Junction Grammar t r a n s f e r theory". M.A. Thesis, BYU. Ellsworth, Richard German. 1977. "Psycholinguistic correlates and vertical syntactic cycles". Ph.D. Dissertation, Universtiy of Rochester, N.Y. Gessei, Brian A. 1974. "The formulation and computer a d a p ­ tation of synthesis grammars". M.A. Thesis, BYU. . 1974. "Lexical matching and agreement". BYU Linguistics Symposium Proceedings. Gibb, Daryl K. 1976. "Interactive analysis: A synergistic approach". Paper f o r COLING 76. International Confer­ ence on Computational Linguistics.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

237

Higgins, Seiko T. 1972. "A comparison of homogeneous and heterogeneous subjunction in Japanese and English·*. M.A. Thesis, BYU. Lee, Kenneth R. 1980. " E f f e c t of adjectives on the structure and function of a discourse n e t " . M.A. Thesis, BYU. Lee, Kwang Do. (1980). "A contrastive analysis between Korean and English relative clauses". M.A. Thesis, BYU. Luthy, Melvin. 1975. "Transformational Grammar and Junc­ tion Grammar: Contrasting metaphors". BYU Linguistics Symposium Proceedings. Lyt l e , Eldon G. 1974. A Grammar of Subordinate Structures in English. The Hague: Mouton & Co. . 1971. "Structural derivation in Russian". Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois (Champaign-Urbana). . 1973. "An analysis of non-verbal partici­ ples". BYU Linguistics Symposium Proceedings, 1973. . 1974. "A summary comparison of Junction Grammar and Transformational Grammar". BYU Linguis­ tics Symposium Proceedings. . 1975. "The evolution of junction gram­ mar". Junction Theory and Application, Vol. 1 , No. 1 , 1977. . 1976. "Junction Theory as a base for dynamic phonological representation". BYU Linguistics Symposium Proceedings. . 1977. "An overview of the Junction Gram­ mar theory of language". BYU Linguistics Symposium Proceedings. . 1979. "Junction Grammar: Theory and application", The Sixth Annual Lacus Forum. Columbia, S.C.: Hornbeam Press, Inc. Lytle, Eldon G. et al. 1975. "Junction Grammar as a base for n a t u r a l language processing". Paper f o r the American Journal of Computational Linguistics, (microfiche AJCL 26). Melby, Alan K. 1972. "A formalization of Junction Gram­ mar". BYU Linguistics Symposium Proceedings. . 1973. "Junction Grammar and machine t r a n s l a t i o n " . Paper For the International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Pisa, Italy, August 1973. . 1974. "Formulating and testing syntactic t r a n s f e r s " . M.A. Thesis, BYU.

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. 1974. "Some aspects of Junction Gram­ mar". Paper f o r the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Summer School Of Computational Linguistics. . 1976. "Pitch contour generation in speech synthesis: A Junction Grammar approach". Ph.D. Disser­ t a t i o n , BYU. . 1977. "The t o r t u ( r ) o u s path from sentence to junction t r e e " . BYU Linguistics Symposium Proceed­ ings. Melby, Alan K. et al. 1976. "Modifying f u n d a m e n t a l f r e ­ quency contours". Paper f o r the 90th Acoustical Society of America M e e t i n g . Melby, Alan K. et a l . 1976. "Evaluation of r u l e - g e n e r a t e d pitch contours". Paper for the 92nd Acoustical Society of America M e e t i n g . M e n g , Karl P. 1973). "Evaluating grammatical approaches by r e f e r e n c e to t h e i r notion of sentence". M.A. Thesis, BYU. M i l l e t , Ronald P. et al. 1976. "A pitch contour generating algorithm based on a Junction Grammar linguistic model". Paper for the 92nd Acoustical Society of Amer­ ica M e e t i n g . M i l l e t , Ronald P. e t a l . 1977. "The generation and e v a l u a ­ tion of r u l e - g e n e r a t e d pitch contours based on Junction Grammar". BYU Linguistics Symposium Proceedings. Olsen, Roydon S. 1972. "Junction Grammar: Its application to f o r e i g n language pedagogy". BYU Linguistics Symposium Proceedings. . 1973. "The effect of language trees in foreign language l e a r n i n g " . M.A. Thesis, BYU. Peterson, Jill E. 1978. "A Junction Grammar analysis of infinitives marked with TO". M.A. Thesis, BYU. Richardson, Stephen D. (1980). "A high-level t r a n s f e r l a n ­ guage for the BYU-TSI interactive translation system". M.A. Thesis, BYU. Scott, Larry M. 1972. "Analysis by resolution of syntactic f r a g m e n t s " . BYU Linguistics Symposium Proceedings. Seo, Sang Ok 1972. "A contrastive study of syntactic e r r o r s made by Koreans in w r i t t e n English". M.A. Thesis, BYU. Smith, Lance S. 1972. "The evolution of a computer model of automatic translation based on Junction Grammar". BYU Linguistics Symposium Proceedings. Suzuki, Kenji 1973. "Junction Grammar as applied to Japa­ nese synthesis". M.A. Thesis, BYU.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

239

Thompson, Brent R. 1973. "Three approaches to t r a n s l a t i o n " . BYU Linguistics Symposium Proceedings. T u t t l e , David M. and Roydon S. Olsen 1974. "The e f f e c t of a graphic and explicit r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on the acquisition of sentence generation skills in a f o r e i g n langauge". Paper f o r the AECT Convention. Wells, Rulon 1947. "Immediate constituents". Language 23:81-117.

WHY "JUNCTION" THEORY?

Jill E. Peterson-Boogaard Brigham Young University The question "Why 'Junction' Theory?" can be approached from two d i f f e r e n t directions. On the one hand, this question might be asking: Why did Junction Theory arise? The linguistic theories of the past and present ( a n d , no doubt, of the f u t u r e as well) are many and v a r i e d . Why, t h e n , was the need f e l t to develop yet another? On the other hand, the question could serve as an invitation to explore why "junctions" are such a vital part of this theory. What are junctions? What are their roles in language? Both aspects of the question "Why 'Junction' Theory?" are impor­ t a n t . Understanding both aspects will help to place Junction Theory in proper perspective within the field of linguistics. Junction Theory's Place in the Linguistic Community To say t h a t linguistic theories have been and still are many and varied is to state the obvious. Throughout the history of the study of language, t h e r e have been disagree­ ments about what language is, how it works, and what the best way to study it might be. Although space permits only an oversimplified view, a f e w quotes concerning several w e l l - k n o w n theories will serve to illustrate the variety. Proponents of Structuralism w e r e interested in i d e n t i ­ fying the components t h a t make up language. Saussure comments: It would be interesting from a practical v i e w ­ point to begin with units, to d e t e r m i n e what they are and to account f o r t h e i r diversity by classifying t h e m . . . . Next we would have to

242

Peterson-Boogaard: Why "Junction"

Theory?

classify the subuni s, then the larger units, etc. By determining in this way the elements that it manipulates, synchronic linguistics would completely fill its task. . . . 1 With the advent of Transformational Grammar (TG), the focus in the field of linguistics changed to an a t t e m p t to devise a grammar that could g e n e r a t e random correct s e n ­ tences without regard to context. Chomsky states: The fundamental aim in the linguistic analysis of a language L is to separate the g r a m m a t i ­ cal sequences . . . from the ungrammatical sequences. The grammar of L will thus be a device that g e n e r a t e s all of the grammatical sequences of L and none of the u n g r a m m a t i ­ cal ones. 2 In t i m e , some dissatisfaction with TG arose. Groups splin­ t e r e d o f f in a variety of directions. Many n o n - T G - r e l a t e d groups simply continued on t h e i r own courses. Each faction focused on whatever it deemed most important. One linguist associated with Stratificational Grammar, observing the rise and decline of Structuralism and the rise and decline of Transformational Grammar, proposed: . . . the time has come f o r another change in focus in linguistics, which is in some ways a g r e a t e r d e p a r t u r e from generativism than the l a t t e r was from descriptivism. This new focus may be called cognitive linguistics, and s t r a t i f i ­ cational theory is a t t e m p t i n g to provide the basis for a move in this direction. As the focus of descriptive linguistics was on items in the d a t a , and t h a t of generative linguistics has been on rules r e f l e c t i n g generalizations pertaining to the d a t a , t h a t of cognitive l i n ­ guistics must be on relationships representing the information in the speaker's b r a i n . 3 Yet another approach was t a k e n by Montague: I reject the assumption that an important theoretical difference exists b e t w e e n formal

Essays in Honor of Rulon 5. Wells

243

and n a t u r a l languages. . . . I regard the construction of a theory of t r u t h . . . as the basic goal of serious syntax and semantics; and the developments emanating from MIT o f f e r little promise towards that end. 4 These are but a f e w examples used to illustrate sity which has developed.

the

diver­

Perhaps because of this diversity, some unproductive a t t i t u d e s arose in the linguistic community. These were a t t i t u d e s like "We're right and you're wrong" or "I'm much more interested in what we're doing than in what you're doing". Jakobson relates how Bloomfield reacted to this atmosphere. "Both orally and in w r i t i n g he [Bloomfield] repeatedly expressed his aversion to any intolerance and he struggled against 'de­ nouncing all persons who disagree' with ones interest or opinion or 'who merely choose to talk about something else'." 5 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , in such an atmosphere, a linguist may feel t h a t he and his group (alone) are pursuing the "one t r u e way". Bloomfield comes out against this tendency as w e l l . The fact t h a t one, Bloomfield w r o t e , 'disa­ grees with others, including me, in methods and theories does not m a t t e r ; it would be deadly to have one accepted doctrine'. 6 Actually, trines".

it

is

healthy

and

acceptable

to

have

many

"doc­

In some ways, the task of linguists can be compared to the task of a cartographer mapping a certain piece of t e r ­ r a i n . For the cartographer, t h e r e is only one piece of t e r ­ r a i n , but t h e r e are many maps which could be made, depending upon the cartographer's i n t e r e s t . He might wish to do a road map, or a topographical map, or a rainfall map, or a population-density map. He may or may not be interested in where the cities a r e , where the county and state lines a r e , or where the railroad lines a r e . Each possi­ ble map would describe the same t e r r a i n . No one map

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Peterson-Boogaard: Why "Junction" Theory?

would be " t r u e r " f e r e n t emphasis.

than

any other.

Each would

have

a

dif­

Language is the t e r r a i n of the linguist. Each theory provides a d i f f e r e n t kind of map of the same t e r r a i n . Junction Theory, too, is one possible "map" of the " t e r r a i n " of language. Certainly it is not the only " m a p " ; it has a particular emphasis all its own. It charts an area of the " t e r r a i n " of language which has not yet been sufficiently explored by any other linguistic theory. The emphasis of Junction Theory is the realm of logical relationships between linguistic units. A strictly s u r f a c e - l e v e l analysis of language allows identification of certain types of units. Words can be isolated in the lexical string. Adjacent words can be grouped together to form phrases. Adjacent phrases can be grouped t o g e t h e r to form larger units. Such groupings of words and groups of words can be accom­ plished by simply inserting parentheses appropriately into the lexical s t r i n g , and then concatenating the groups together. Junction Theory, (along with many other approaches to language analysis), uses a t r e e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n which allows grouping of non-adjacent words and groups of words that are logically r e l a t e d . Such groupings of n o n - a d j a ­ cent units often cannot be accomplished using parentheses. In Junction Theory, r a t h e r than using only concatenation to relate all units, t h e r e are seven main types of relationships or "junctions". So in answer to the question "Why did Junction Theory arise?", it need only be said t h a t in the late 1960's Eldon Lytie noticed t h a t a number of interesting statements can be made in t e r m s of junctions and decided to develop a map of language based on junctions. Junction Theory proposes that there is much more to the r e l a t i o n ­ ships b e t w e e n linguistic units than mere ordering or con­ catenation. An article doesn't just precede a noun; it relates to it in a very specific way. An object doesn't just follow a v e r b ; it relates to it in a very specific way. By identifying the types of relationships t h a t occur between linguistic units, and examining the environments in which they occur, a b e t t e r overall understanding of language can be achieved. The notions symbolized by the junctions are sometimes parallel to concepts dealt with by t r a d i t i o n a l g r a m m a r , since

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245

both systems are attempting to describe the same phenomenon. Yet d e f i n i t e d i f f e r e n c e s exist. In traditional g r a m m a r , "predication" r e f e r s to the function of the main verb in a sentence or clause as it ties together the subject and object. 7 In Junction Theory, this is called " a d j u n c t i o n " . Traditionally, " d e r i v a t i o n " is the process of forming words f r o m bases by adding derivational suffixes. 8 In Junction Theory this is accomplished by "subjunction", and two types are recognized: explicit (where a lexical suffix is added to the base) and associative (where a similar change in m e a n ­ ing is accomplished without any explicit s u f f i x ) . The word "coordination" has been used to describe the joining of two or more words, phrases, or clauses t h a t are equivalent in morphological or grammatical construction. 9 The word " c o n ­ junction" is used in Junction Theory. "Modification" has long been studied. 1 0 Junction Theory calls it interjunction and identifies two types: explicit (where a modifier is used to identify what is being r e f e r r e d t o ) , and comparative (where a modifier is used to provide a comparison, f r o m which whatever is being r e f e r r e d to is calculated). In a d d i ­ t i o n , Junction Theory proposes the existence of "referm e n t s " , which contain information regarding q u a n t i t y and identity for all categories. Here is a summary of the c o r r e ­ spondences between traditional grammar and Junction Theory: Traditional Grammar

Junction Theory

predication

adjunction

derivation

subjunction (explicit and associative)

coordination

conjunction

modification

interjunction (explicit and comparative)

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Peterson-Boogaard: Why "Junction" Theory?

The similarities are many, but what is d i f f e r e n t between the two approaches is t h a t Junction Theory describes these phenomena in t e r m s of junction t r e e s , and a t t r i b u t e s to each junction a very specific operation. The uses of the various junctions will be described in more detail below. Adjunction Adjunction (symbolized by '+') is the operation by which objects are joined to verbs and prepositions to form p r e d i ­ cates ( e i t h e r verbal or prepositional predicates), and by which subjects are joined to predicates to form statements. In the sentence The red fox quickly jumped the fence into the yard. t h e r e are several instances of adjunction. For example:

These structures are built up of predicators (verbs, p r e p o ­ sitions, and ads (adjectives or adverbs)), and n o n - p r e d i c a tors (nouns), which, when combined, form predicates and statements of the category corresponding to the predicator core. The SV ( s t a t e m e n t with a verbal core) of (b) r e p r e ­ sents, of course, the main clause of the sentence, with the

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PV (predicate with a verbal core) of (a) as its predicate. The structures in (c) and ( f ) are SA's (statements with ad cores). The f i r s t is adverbial, describing the manner in which the PV took place. The second is adjectival, giving an a t t r i b u t e of the head noun. In (d) and (e) are structures parallel to (a) and (c) f o r the prepositional phrase. Thus it can be seen t h a t adjunction permeates every sentence that could be imagined ( o n e - w o r d f r a g m e n t s excluded). InterJunction By means of adjunction, some structures have been f o r m e d , but they do not f i t t o g e t h e r yet. Note t h a t in ( c ) , ( e ) , and ( f ) , the words corresponding to the subjects of these SX's (statements where X = A or Ρ in this case) are in parentheses. This notation is used because these s t a t e ­ ments are modifiers; they link into the structure of the main SV. This is where interjunction comes into play. The operation of interjunction involves the calculation of an intersection between sets. It is the process by which a r e f e r e n c e can be made as specific as a speaker might wish. An example will make the process clearer. In ( f ) , the subject of the SA can be thought of as anything t h a t could have the a t t r i b u t e red associated with i t , i.e., the set of red things. We only know t h a t a fox is intended because of the context of the sentence, not because of the structure itself at this point. In (b) is found the main clause r e f e r ­ ence to fox and it asserts t h a t one jumped the fence. I n t e r ­ junction takes the set of red things and intersects it with fox, resulting in the red fox. Using " $ " to r e p r e s e n t i n t e r ­ j u n c t i o n , the process could be illustrated as follows:

The same procedure of intersecting sets would be used to link together all the parts of the f i g u r e above, resulting in the following t r e e diagram:

248

Peterson-Boogaard: Why "Junction" Theory?

Relative clauses are also joined to t h e i r heads via j u n c t i o n , with the relative pronouns that, which, etc., ing the intersection.

intermark­

Sub junction Subjunction (symbolized by " * " ) corresponds to the t r a ­ ditional notion of derivation. It is the process whereby something of one category can take on the function of another category. For example, the PV įump the fence can be made into a noun or an adjective by means of subjunction. Jumping the fence was easy f o r the fox. The fox jumping the fence has killed a chicken.

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The nominalized PV could then function in a sentence where any noun could, and the adjectivalized PV could be used as if it w e r e a simple adjective. Nominalization the whole SV.

could also

affect

just

the

verb

itself,

or

the jumping of the fence by the fox the fact t h a t the fox jumped the fence

The use of subjunction given the f u l l subjunction schema:

N N N N

* * * *

SV PV V A

V V V V

* * * *

here

SV PV N A

are

A A A A

but a brief

* * * *

SV PV V N

part

of

250

Peterson-Boogaard: Why "Junction" Theory?

but space will not allow a full discussion of all the uses of subjunction.

possible

Other Junctions Hopefully, the discussions of the t h r e e junctions above have given the flavor of Junction Theory. The remaining junctions will be mentioned only briefly. Conjunction c o r r e ­ sponds quite closely to its t r a d i t i o n a l c o u n t e r p a r t ; any items of like category may be conjoined:

the fox and the hounds jumped and ran

red and brown quickly and quietly

Associative subjunction d i f f e r s f r o m (explicit) subjunction in is used to that no explicit grammatical marker (like -ing) mark the derivation; the intended meaning must be calcu­ lated by association; f o r example, the relation between the word wood and the word it modifies in each case:

wood fence wood box wood block

wood c u t t e r wood alcohol wood stove

Comparative interjunction d i f f e r s f r o m (explicit) i n t e r j u n c t i o n , in that a particular intersection of sets cannot neces­ sarily be calculated, but the sets can be compared and some conclusion reached based on the comparison.

more hounds than foxes as quick as a fox

Lastly, there is a special junction used to article and q u a n t i f i e r to a noun, to form what is " r e f e r m e n t " . Similar pieces of information r e l a t e d categories can also be joined via this junction r e f e r m e n t s of other categories.

join the called a to other to f o r m

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251

The two foxes . . . jumped the fence once.

Conclusion Using the junctions described above, consistent struc­ t u r e can be devised for practically all sentences which occur in the English language. Such a consistent diagraming framework has been one of the main goals in Junction Theory. While much work remains to be done on the more complex and subtle aspects of language, the most common­ ly-occurring phenomena are handled by a consistent f o u n ­ dation of junctions.

ENDNOTES

1

2

3

S a u s s u r e , as quoted in Newmeyer, p. 6. Chomsky, p. 13. Lockwood, p. 12.

4

Montague, p. 188.

5

Jakobson, p. 64.

6 lbid., p. 6 4 - 6 5 .

252

Peterson-Boogaard: Why "Junction" Theory? 7

8

9

MacLeish, p. 96. Ibid., p. 36. Ibid.,

10

ibid.,

p. 3 1 . p. 7 9 - 8 0 .

REFERENCES CITED

Chomsky, Noam. 1957. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton. Jakobson, Roman. 1980. The Framework of Language. Michigan Studies in the Humanities. Lockwood, David G. 1972. Introduction to Stratificational Linguis­ tics, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Lytle, Eldon. 1974. A Grammar of Subordinate Structures in Eng­ lish, The Hague, Mouton. MacLeish, Andrew. A Glossary of Grammar and Linguistics. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, Ind. M o n t a g u e , Richard. 1974. Formal Philosophy. Yale University Press. Newmeyer, Frederick J. 1980. Linguistic Theory in America: the First Quarter Century of Transformational Generative Gram­ mar. New York, Academic Press.

GENERALIZATION AND PREDICTION OF SYNTACTIC PATTERNS IN JUNCTION GRAMMAR

Alan K. Melby In Junction Grammar an a t t e m p t is made to organize the base rules into general p a t t e r n s . This approach has had the interesting result of allowing the prediction of new base rules f r o m the general p a t t e r n s . Such a process has long been part of scientific inquiry in a v a r i e t y of fields.

in Astronomy For long years, astronomers observed the movements of the planets among the stars. While they w e r e still working under the assumption t h a t the e a r t h was at the center of the universe, the data was very complex. But when they came to the conclusion that the sun was at a focus of an ellipse the data fell into place and a simple pattern e m e r g e d . The orbits of the planets could be described by using the equation for the ellipse with the sun at one focus. This generalization then described the orbits of all the then known planets. Once this followed. The astronomers, of the solar orbits of the mistaken for

in Chemistry

generalization was accepted, other discoveries planets beyond Saturn w e r e not yet known to but Uranus was soon recognized as a member system because its orbit was shaped like the other planets. ( B e f o r e this t i m e , it had been a star or a comet.)

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Melby:

Generalization and Prediction in J.G.

While astronomers were cataloguing stars, chemists w e r e cataloguing elements. They began in the midst of similar disarray. Slowly, order began to emerge. Then Mendeleev put all the pieces together in his periodic table of the e l e ­ ments. But there were gaps in his t a b l e , which caused some suspicion. Mendeleev, however, was unworried by these gaps. He predicted that the gaps indicated the existence of yet undiscovered elements. He even predicted the properties of the missing elements. As research techniques improved, the missing elements w e r e f o u n d , and took the places t h a t awaited them in the periodic table of the elements (Asimov, 1965).

In Linguistics Essentially the same process of observation, g e n e r a l i z a ­ t i o n , prediction, and testing has been used in the develop­ ment of Junction Grammar. We will use this process to explore some of the uses of i n t e r j u n c t i o n , one of the f u n ­ damental junctions proposed by the theory. Interjunction is the linguistic application of the notion of intersection. But before we can discuss intersection, we must f i r s t answer the question "The intersection of what?". In order to answer this question, we must digress into a brief discus­ sion of the categories of linguistic units t h a t are used in Junction Grammar. Junction Grammar proposes a set of predicators and non-predicators. Verbs, prepositions, and ads (adjectives and adverbs) are predicators. Nouns are non-predicators. P r e d i ­ cators are used to form predicates, and predicates together with their subjects f o r m statements. Below is a table show­ ing these categories, and the abbreviations which will be used for them throughout this paper.

Working with these categories, t h e n , and intersecting them in various ways, we shall proceed to explore the uses of interjunction in Junction Grammar, by observing some p e r t i ­ nent d a t a , making some generalizations from the d a t a , p r e ­ dicting some new combinations based on the generalizations, and testing those predictions.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells NonPredicator N noun

255

Predicators

V verb

Ρ preposition

A ad (adj. or adv.)

PV predicate with verbal core

PP predicate with prepositional core

PA predicate with ad core

SV statement with verbal core

SP statement with prepositional core

SA statement with ad core

Observing Interjunction The most o f t e n observed instance of interjunction is the relationship of a relative clause to its head. For e x a m pie. the sparrows which I saw The robin that f l e w away the girls who won the race the man whom they elected the neighbors whose parakeet my cat ate the present 0 you asked (0 = null

for

relative)

No m a t t e r which relative is used (which, t h a t , who, whom, whose, 0 ) , the relationship between the relative and its head is the same. It is the relationship of i n t e r j u n c t i o n , or intersection.

256

Melby:

Generalization and Prediction in J.G.

What then is being intersected? example above and explore it.

We

will

take

the

first

the sparrows which I saw If we look at the head without the r e l a t i v e , its r e f e r e n c e out of context is very broad. We could be talking about any sparrows in the whole w o r l d . On the other hand, if we look at the relative without its head and out of context, we could be talking about any thing in the whole world t h a t we have seen. By intersecting the two sets we narrow the scope of the r e f e r e n c e and specify more precisely what we are talking about. This is t e r m e d restrictive i n t e r j u n c t i o n , because both sets w e r e restricted due to the intersection which took place. There is also interjunction which is n o n - r e s t r i c t i v e . This happens when one or both sets are not restricted (made smaller). Consider these: Mary Ellen Jones, who is my mother the ice, which was cold From t h e s e , we make the following observations. Both Mary Ellen Jones and who represent one individual, so t h e i r scope is not r e s t r i c t e d . All ice is cold, so the scope of ice is not restricted by being intersected with the set of cold things.

Generalizing Interjunction We have now observed the simplest case of i n t e r j u n c ­ t i o n , where two nouns participate in the intersection. We could r e p r e s e n t this symbolically using the expression: N $ N where the f i r s t N represents the head noun, the second N represents the r e l a t i v e , and the dollar sign ($) represents the relation of interjunction between them ( e i t h e r kind), like this: N sparrows

$

Ν which

Ν man

$

N who

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells Since the relative can have various functions in dependent clause, it is also useful to incorporate information into the notation as w e l l . For example: N $ N/SV N $ N/PV N $ N/PP

257 the this

the robin t h a t f l e w away the sparrows which I saw the present you asked f o r

When an SV dominates the r e l a t i v e , it is functioning as the subject of the clause. Similarly, when a PV or a PP domi­ nates i t , it is functioning as the object of the verb or preposition. Since the function of the relative in the dependent clause does not influence the i n t e r j u n c t i o n , it could be proposed that other modifiers of nouns besides relative clauses are also interjoined to their heads. This would mean t h a t adjectives and prepositional phrases are also interjoined to their heads. This would yield the follow­ ing rules: N $ N/SA N $ N/SP

blue sky paintings in the

museum

Notice t h a t for the adjective, the notation used is not reflective of word order. There is no d i f f i c u l t y with this, though, since the relationship of interjunction remains the same. Predicting a New Type of Interjunction Now we will modify t h a t expression a l i t t l e . Suppose t h a t one of those N's could be something besides N, the f i r s t one, for example. This would result in the expression: X $ N X could be any of the categories mentioned e a r l i e r , so we could predict t h a t we would find sentences in which i n t e r ­ junction is used in ways which could be represented by expressions like these: V $ N A $ N

PV$N PP $ N

SV$N

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Melby:

Generalization and Prediction in J.G.

What do these expressions mean? They mean t h a t we take the same kind of noun relative as was used in the e a r l i e r examples, but we are going to intersect it with things which are not nouns. We can test this prediction by looking for uses of the noun relative which do not have a noun for a head. Consider these: V $ N/SV I sprained my ankle, which is a very painful action. A $ N/SV Rodney is sloppy, t a t e s his w i f e .

which

PV $ N/SV Sir Edmund Hillary requires courage.

is a

characteristic

climbed

PP $ N/SV He forgot his w a l l e t in the foolish place to leave it.

Mt.

store,

that

Everest,

which

was

irri­

which

a

very

SV $ N/PV Verl failed the exam, which I predicted. In each of these sentences, the word which r e f e r s back to something which is not a noun. It is used to r e f e r to the action sprained, the a t t r i b u t e sloppy, the predicate climbed Mt. Everest, the prepositional phrase in the store, and the whole sentence Verl failed the exam. Since the overlap is complete, and no restriction is possible, the junction is n o n - r e s t r i c t i v e . These correspond to the expressions sug­ gested above, so these sentences agree with the g e n e r a l i ­ zation and prediction which we made b e f o r e . A Second Generalization Now we will r e t u r n to our original observation: N $

N

An a l t e r n a t i v e egory: X $ X

is to allow two

non-nouns of the

same

cat­

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

259

We could generalize the p a t t e r n to X $ Y, where X and Y can be d i f f e r e n t and of any category. This is a serious o v e r - g e n e r a l i z a t i o n and leads to many false generalizations. The formula X $ X means that X could be any category, but that the category must be the same on both sides of the interjunction symbol. A Second Prediction Based on the above predict the following: PV $ PV V $ V

generalization,

we

might

want

to

PP $ PP A $ A

What would interjunctions like these be like? To interjoin two PV's would mean t h a t two predicates would have to overlap in t h e i r r e f e r e n c e the way a noun and a relative do. The same would be t r u e of verbs, prepositional phrases, or adjectives t h a t participated in an interjunction. They would have to overlap, or intersect. And how would the intersection be marked? None of the relatives like which, thai, who, etc. seem to function in this way. They seem to r e q u i r e t h a t a noun be involved. If such interjunctions as the proposed ones are m a r k e d , some other function word must be used. What word could it be? Upon looking for some examples t h a t might specifications, the following w e r e encountered:

fit

these

Paul sells insurance, like Richard. Joe peeled the apple like Jim the peach. My kite is on the roof, like your ball. Frank is t a l l , like Roger. In the f i r s t example, both Paul and Richard sell insurance. The PVs intersect. In the second, both Joe and Jim are peeling something. The verbs intersect. In the next, both toys are on the roof, so the prepositional phrases intersect. In the last, both people are t a l l ; the adjectives intersect. The predicted intersections occur, and like would seem to be the function word that is used to mark these intersections of categories other than noun.

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An On-going Process The same basic process has been used in Junction Grammar when dealing with other junctions as w e l l . Subj u n c t i o n , the junction involved with recategorization, is a prime example. As it was investigated, a scheme e m e r g e d , and gaps w e r e appropriately filled in. N N N V A A A V V V V

* * * * * * * * * * *

SV PV V A 5V PV V SV PV N A

the fact that he came surprised me writing books is d i f f i c u l t the breaking of rules will not be t o l e r a t e d richness close the door so that it wili stay warm the dog running down the street is lost instructive He sa id, 'I've been here before" you may go home now fossilize darken

Such correspondences as these played an important role the early development of Junction Grammar (Lytle, 1977).

in

Epilogue As a result of correspondences like t h e s e , Junction Grammar has incorporated many discoveries about language that have come by the process of observation, g e n e r a l i z a ­ t i o n , prediction, and t e s t i n g , somewhat like work in a s t r o n ­ omy, and chemistry. We began be observing how a relative clause r e l a t e s to the noun which is its head. From those initial observations, we f i r s t generalized to the proposal that the same type of relative clause could take other c a t ­ egories for its head. We predicted a f e w specific cases and found examples of them in n a t u r a l language. Beginning again from the initial observations, we generalized a second time and proposed other intersections. Again we made some predictions and again our predictions w e r e born out as we saw how the examples using like corresponded to these n o n noun intersections. Then we b r i e f l y looked at how the same process can be applied to another j u n c t i o n , specifically, subjunction. Other generalizations have and will be made, for this junction and f o r other junctions in the Junction Grammar system. From these generalizations, predictions can

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

261

be made. As this process continues, we look f o r w a r d to exploring the uses of additional base rules that can be derived from the small set of general syntactic p a t t e r n s . We may also gain additional insights f r o m the gaps that are likely to occur. Junction Grammar builds more directly on the work of Rulon Wells than on the Chomsky paradigm. Junction Gram­ mar does not distinguish a level of surface structure and a level of deep structure. It is largely a tool to assist humans who are analyzing sentences. Although the order of the e l e ­ ments of a Junction Grammar rule does not necessarily reflect surface word o r d e r , t h e r e is generally a direct cor­ respondence between a Junction Grammar representation and the sentence it is describing. It is hoped t h a t the g e n ­ eral patterns proposed by Junction Grammar are an a p p r o ­ priate extension of Wells' pioneering work.

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APPENDIX - Selected Diagrams

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263

REFERENCES CITED

Asimov, Issac. 1965. A Short History of Chemistry. Greenwood Press. Lytle, Eldon G. 1971. Structural Derivation in Russian. sertation: Indiana State University.

Westport: Ph.D. Dis­

264

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Generalization and Prediction in J.G.

. 1974. A Grammar of Subordinate Structures in Eng­ The Hague: Mouton & Co. . 1977. "The Evolution of Junction Grammar." Junction Theory and Application, vol. 1 , num. 1 , Fall, pp. 25-76. Massey F. R. S., Sir Harris. 1960. The New Age in Physics. New York: Basic Books, Inc. Richardson, Robert S. 1971. The Stars and Serendipity. New York: Pantheon Books. Wells, Rulon. 1947. "Immediate Constituents," Language, 23.81-117. lish.

'ACTIVITY'-'ACCOMPUSHMENT'-'ACHIEVEMENT' - - A LANGUAGE THAT CAN'T SAY Ί BURNED IT, BUT IT DIDN'T BURN' AND ONE THAT CAN

Yoshihiko Ikegami University of Tokyo 0. Zeno Vendler (Vendler: 1967), discussing 'verbs and times' distinguishes among f o u r types of verbs, which he t e r m s 'state', 'activity', 'accomplishment* and 'achievement'. The category 'state' is not directly relevant to our immedi­ ate purposes and we will concentrate on the l a t t e r t h r e e . The criteria o f f e r e d by Vendler f o r distinguishing among these types of verbs are distributional. The 'activity* verbs occur in f r a m e I, but not in f r a m e I I . The 'accomplishment' verbs, on the other hand, occur in f r a m e I I , but not in f r a m e I. I. I I.

How long did he ? How long did it take to

Vendler illustrates the point the cart and draw a circle.

with

? the

verbal

phrases, push

(1)

a) b)

How long did he push the cart? ?How long did it take him to push the c a r t ? 1

(2)

a) b)

*How long did he draw a circle? How long did it take him to draw a circle?

Vendler f u r t h e r distinguishes the 'achievement' verbs from the 'accomplishment' verbs. They behave alike distributionally with r e g a r d to f r a m e s I and I I . One of Vendler's examples is to reach the top. (3)

a)

*How long did he reach the top?

266

ikegami: b)

'Activity-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

How long did it take him to reach the top?

The 'accomplishment' verbs, however, can occur in f r a m e but the 'achievement' verbs do not. III.

III,

He was ing for an hour. (4) He was drawing a circle f o r an hour. (5) *He was reaching the top f o r an hour.

1. Preliminary Examples: Verbs r e f e r r i n g to a g o a l - d i ­ rected action 'to make a telephone call to a person' It was claimed a short time ago by a Japanese linguist that t h e r e is a semantic d i f f e r e n c e between the English and the Japanese verb r e f e r r i n g to an act of making a t e l e ­ phone call to a person. According to the claim, the (Ameri­ can) English expression to call a person means not only duly operating the machine; it also implies successfully having the other party on the line. The Japanese expression, in contrast, has no such implication. It is, t h e r e f o r e , p e r f e c t l y natural to say (6) in Japanese. (6)

John-ni d e n w a - o John-to t e l e p h o n e - o b j .

shita keredomo, rusu d a t t a . did though out was

'(I) called John, but he was out.' But the same, it expression (7): (7)

is claimed, does not apply to the

English

I called John, but he was out.

Now, making a telephone call to a person is a ' g o a l - d i ­ rected action', where the 'action' is p e r f o r m i n g necessary operations with the machine and the 'goal' getting the other party on the line. If the above claim concerning the English verb call is correct, it will mean t h a t the Japanese e x p r e s ­ sion focuses on the action, while the corresponding English expression semantically covers both the action and the achievement of the goal. As it t u r n s o u t , however, the claim is only h a l f - j u s t i ­ f i e d . What it says about the Japanese expression is correct, but a good many native speakers of English do not f i n d a

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

267

sentence like (7) anomalous. The dictionary definitions are not always explicit on this point. Thus the American Heritage Dictionary defines the relevant sense of the verb cali as 'to telephone (someone)*, while the Random House Dictionary has 'to telephone to'. Webster's Third International, on the other hand, is careful enough to mention the two possibilities: 'to communicate with or t r y to get in communication with (a person) by telephone', and the definition given in Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English is most helpful: 'to ( t r y to) telephone to (somebody).' One of the examples cited in the l a t t e r is I called him this morning, but he was out. Thus the evidence seems to indicate t h a t the English as well as the Japanese verb r e f e r r i n g to the act of making a telephone call does not have to imply success in getting the other party on the line. But the m a t t e r is not as simple as t h a t . Even if it is t r u e t h a t the English verb call does not imply the achieve­ ment of the goal just like its Japanese c o u n t e r p a r t , there still remain certain d i f f e r e n t behaviors to be accounted for. Bolinger (1977:224) is actually mentioning one of such cases when he points out t h a t (9) is u n n a t u r a l because the f i r s t sentence is understood to imply t h a t the call was success­ f u l , while the same implication can be repudiated if the statement is qualified as in (10) before it is finished. (9) *l called him yesterday. He wasn't in. (10) I called him yesterday but he wasn't in. In Japanese, the contrast between the sentences equivalent to (9) and (10) is not as clear as this. Naturally, the possi­ bility of the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t the call was successful is somewhat g r e a t e r in the equivalent of (9) than t h a t of ( 1 0 ) , but the d i f f e r e n c e is perhaps to be accounted for in t e r m s of conversational propriety in which the speaker is assumed to be o f f e r i n g relevant information with the least ambiguity. Another way of seeing the difference between the apparently corresponding English and Japanese expressions for 'making a telephone call to a person' is to check them against Vendler's aspectual scale of 'activity'-'accomplishment'-'achievement'. The English verb call, failing the f r a m e s I and I I I , while accepting i l , shows the behavior of an achievement verb.

268

Ikegami: •Activity-'Accomplishmenf-'Achievement'

(11) a) (12) a) (13) a)

*How long did you call John? How long did it take to call John? ?He was calling John f o r an hour. 2

In order to fill the f r a m e s I and I I ! , English has to use an expression like to speak on the phone (which is clearly an 'activity' type of expression). (11) a ) How long did you speak with John on the phone? (13) a') He was speaking with John on the phone for an hour. The corresponding Japanese expression denwa o suru, other hand, behaves in the following way: 3 (11) b)

John-ni John-to

nampun how many

shimashita did

(12) b)

John-ni John-to ni in

nampun how many minutes

John-ni John-to

denwa-o about t e l e p h o n e - o b j .

ka. question

denwa-o telephone-obj.

kakarimashita took

(13) b)

hodo minutes

on the

suru no do nominalizer hodo about

ka. question

ichijikan d e n w a - o one hour t e l e p h o n e - o b j .

shite doing

imashita. was

The Japanese expression can fill all of the three frames. (11b) and (13b) sound only very slightly odd, but not so much as to put a question mark (not to say an asterisk).

Essays in Honor of Rulon 5. Wells

269

They are quite n a t u r a l , f o r example, in a context in which the length of a telephone conversation over the international line is inquired about in order to know the charge. 4 The f a c t t h a t (12b) and (13b) are acceptable qualifies the Japanese expression as an 'accomplishment' v e r b , but the f a i r acceptability of (11b) and (13b) also suggests that the Japanese expression in question is situated closer to the 'activity* pole. It is f u r t h e r to be noted t h a t although (12a) and (12b) are both acceptable sentences, they are not i n t e r p r e t e d in the same way. The English sentence (12a) is not asking f o r the time r e q u i r e d before undertaking to dial the phone (a situation which might happen if a number of people are waiting in a line f o r their t u r n in f r o n t of a single public phone) but the time spent before getting John on the line. The semantic focus of the English verb call is thus clearly on the notion of achievement. With the apparently corresponding Japanese sentence ( 1 2 b ) , on the other hand, the f o r m e r is the primary sense and it is irrelevant w h e t h e r the other p a r t y actually answered the call or not. The focus of the Japanese expression denwa o su ru is thus on the notion of action r a t h e r than the achievement of the goal. Compare also the following sentences: (14) I was calling John when the doorbell r a n g . (15) I was trying to call John when the doorbell r a n g . (16) I was calling John up when the doorbell rang. Unless taken in an ingressive sense (i.e. 'was going to call John'), sentence (14) is judged as somewhere between 'possible' and 'a little strange' — another manifestation of the fact that the achievement sense of call does not go well with the durative sense of the progressive f o r m . (15) is all r i g h t , because the verb try adds the activity sense to the sentence. ( 1 6 ) , in contrast to ( 1 5 ) , has the achievement sense intensified because of the use of the particle up, hence a f u r t h e r decrease in acceptability (unless, again, t a k e n in an ingressive sense). These considerations seem to suggest again t h a t the Japanese expression denwa  sỏ is situated close to the 'activity' pole, while the English verb call places itself near the 'achievement' pole.

270

Ikegami:

'Activity'-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

There are still some more complications with the verb call. Consider the following sentences:

English

(17) I haven't called John yet. (18) I almost called John. If the English verb call is purely of the 'achievement' t y p e , (17) would very well imply t h a t t h e r e have been one or more unsuccessful a t t e m p t s to get in touch with John by phone. Actually, however, (17) is i n t e r p r e t e d as implying that no a t t e m p t of the kind has been made. In other words, (17) is virtually synonymous with (17'): (17')

I haven't t r i e d to call John yet.

(18) is also not usually interpreted as meaning, for example, t h a t a f t e r causing John's telephone to r i n g , I somehow did not w a i t until John answers the call. It will r a t h e r be associated with a situation in which I decided to call John but somehow changed my mind and did not even start dialing. (18) is again virtually synonymous with (18'): (18') I almost t r i e d to call John. Thus the evidence obtained f r o m (17) and (18) seems to suggest t h a t the meaning of the verb call is r a t h e r of the 'activity' type. What is the cause of this double-faced nature of the verb call? One point which is certainly relevant is t h a t the verb call semantically presupposes an 'agent'. To make a telephone call is an intentional act, in which the person who makes a call is behaving as an agent. Now the notion of ' a g e n t i v i t / does not go well with t h a t of 'achievement'. 'Agentivit/ is readily associated with 'activity', but the notion of 'achievement' contrasts with t h a t of 'activity', in t h a t it primarily focuses only on the final completive phase of a process, and when, therefore, the notion of 'achievement' is superimposed on t h a t of 'agentivity*, the l a t t e r naturally loses its force. This is clearly noticeable in to reach the top, a phrase with which Vendler illustrates 'achievement'. A person who reaches the top may very well have acted as an a g e n t , but the verb reach says nothing about the activity undergone. Similarly, take a typical achievement verb become as in sentence (19):

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

271

(19) John became a millionaire. Sentence (19) is unclear as to w h e t h e r John's becoming a millionaire was a result of his hard work (in which case John was an a g e n t ) or as a r e s u l t , say, of unexpectedly inheriting a huge amount of money (in which case John was a n o n - a g e n t ) . Become as an achievement verb neutralizes the contrast. It is this notion of agentivity which makes ambiguous the meaning of the otherwise achievement verb call. The notion of agentivity serves to pull the verb toward the activity pole on the 'activity-achievement' scale. Depending on the relative degree of the focus laid on e i t h e r activity or achievement, the meaning of the verb call seems to waver delicately f r o m context to context and also from person to person. 2. 'Achievement' as Lexico-semantic Category

an

Aspectual

Category

and

as

a

It will have been noticed t h a t in the discussion in section 1 the t e r m 'achievement' is used r a t h e r ambiguously between two senses. In one sense, it r e f e r s to one of the verbal categories defined by Vendler. The criteria for classification used by Vendler show t h a t what is being aimed at is an aspectual classification of the verbs. Thus his 'accomplishment', f o r example, corresponds to a certain extent to 'durative terminative' in such a traditional classification of aspect as Poutsma's (Poutsma: 1926:278ff.). Vendler's classification thus does not necessarily correlate with particular lexico-semantic properties of the verb. 5 The other sense in which the t e r m 'achievement' has been used is in relation to the notion of 'goal-directed action'. A goal-directed action is understood to involve two t e r m s , an 'action' and a 'goal', and t h e r e is a relation between the two such t h a t the f o r m e r is directed to the l a t t e r . A goal-directed action may or may not achieve its goal. Thus t h e r e are verbs which imply the achievement of the goal and verbs which do not. This second sense of 'achievement' is lexico-semantic.

272

Ikegaml:

'Activity-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

There is certain overlapping between the two senses of achievement, if we limit our consideration to verbs r e f e r r i n g to a g o a l - d i r e c t e d action. Quite n a t u r a l l y , those verbs which imply the achievement of the goal generally tend to be aspectually 'achievement' verbs. If the achievement or non-achievement of the goal is i r r e l e v a n t , the focus will be laid on the action or activity which precedes. If, on the other hand, the achievement of the goal is to be implied, the a t t e n t i o n will likely be t u r n e d to the final completive phase of the whole process. Thus, of the two verbs r e f e r r i n g to a g o a l - d i r e c t e d action 'making a telephone call to a person', the Japanese expression, as we have seen, does not imply the achievement of the goal and tends aspectually to be an activity verb; the English v e r b , on the other hand, seems to imply the achievement of the goal more strongly and behaves aspectually more like an achievement verb than its Japanese c o u n t e r p a r t . What we are going to do in the following is to show t h a t t h e r e is a systematic contrast between English and Japanese verbs r e f e r r i n g to a g o a l - d i r e c t e d action in t e r m s of the implication of achievement or non-achievement of the goal; we will then t r y to demonstrate t h a t this systematic contrast derives in fact from certain d e e p - s e a t e d typological characteristics of each language. 3.

Types of

Contrast

In comparing the corresponding English and Japanese verbs r e f e r r i n g to a g o a l - d i r e c t e d action in terms of achievement or non-achievement of the goal, four possibilities are foreseeable: I.

The achievement of the goal is implied both by the English and the Japanese verb.

I I.

The achievement of the goal is implied neither by the English verb nor by the Japanese verb.

I I I.

The achievement of the goal is implied by the English verb but not by the Japanese verb.

I V.

The achievement of the goal is implied by the Japanese verb but not by the English verb.

Essays in Honor of Rulon 5. Wells The f i r s t case is illustrated by 'killing'. If John killed M a r y , it is The English sentence (20) is clearly the corresponding Japanese sentence

273

the verbs r e f e r r i n g to implied t h a t M a r y died. contradictory, and so is (21):

(20)

*John killed Mary, but Mary didn't die.

(21)

*John-wa -o John-topic M a r y - o b j .

koroshita killed

keredomo, though

Mary-wa shinanakatta. Mary-topic didn't die

The second case is illustrated by the verbs r e f e r r i n g to 'inviting'. If John invited Mary, it is not implied t h a t Mary came. Neither the English sentence (22) nor its Japanese c o u n t e r p a r t (23) is contradictory. (22)

John invited Mary, but Mary didn't come.

(23)

John-wa John-topic

-o Mary-obj.

Mary-wa Mary-topic

konakatta. didn't come.

shotaishita keredomo, invited though

There are a good many pairs of verbs which belong to e i t h e r type I or type II. These verbs, however, are not our immediate concern. The third case is illustrated by the verbs r e f e r r i n g to 'burning'. The English sentence (24) is clearly contradictory: (24) *l burned i t , but it didn't

burn. 6

The corresponding Japanese sentence ( c i t e d , in accordance with the Japanese idiomatic way of saying things, with the 'omission' of the subject and the object) is quite n a t u r a l : (25)

moyashita keredo, burned though

moenakatta. didn't burn

274

Ikegami:

'Activity'-'Accomplishmenf-'Achievement*

The Japanese verb for 'burning a t h i n g ' , in other words, does not have to imply the achievement of the goal (i.e. the object being on f i r e ) . Its meaning may or may not imply achievement, depending on the context. Thus in the f i r s t half of sentence ( 2 5 ) , the transitive verb moeru r e f e r s simply to the act of trying to burn something, hence no semantic incongruity. It is to be noted t h a t the semantic discrepancy between the two languages exists only with regard to the transitive verbs. In the intransitive use, the verbs of the two languages agree in r e f e r r i n g to a state (i.e. being on f i r e ) resulting f r o m the action. Other examples of type III will be given shortly below, but before doing so, it must be pointed out t h a t so f a r as I can see, no example of type IV is f o u n d . Thus whenever there is semantic discrepancy between the corresponding English and the Japanese verb with regard to the achievement or non-achievement of the intended goal, it is always the English verb t h a t implies the achievement and It is invariably the Japanese verb t h a t does not imply the achievement. Further examples of type III are now given below. (26) a) b)

(27) a)

b)

*l boiled the w a t e r , but it didn't boil. wakashita keredo, boiled though

wakanakatta. didn't boil

*l cheated Mary, but didn't succeed (in cheating h e r ) . -o damashita M a r y - o b j . cheated

keredo, though

hikkakaranakatta. didn't get t r i c k e d . (28) a)

b)

*l classified the stamps, but no neat classification came out. kitte-o bunurishita stamps-obj. classified bunrui

dekinakatta.

keredo, though

kireini neatly

Essays in Honor of Rulon 5. Wells classify (29) a)

b)

could not.

* l counted how many there w e r e , but it was impossible to count. nannin iru ka how many be

kazueta counted

keredo though

kazoerarenakatta. couldn't count (30) a)

b)

*The child divided t e n by t h r e e , but it was impossible. kodomo-wa child-topic

ju-o ten-obj.

san-de three-with

watta divided

keredo w a r e n a k a t t a . though couldn't divide (31) a)

b)

*l dropped a bomb on the t a r g e t , but it didn't hit it. mokuhyo-ni bakudan-o t a r g e t - g o a l bomb-obj.

otoshita dropped

keredo, though

ataranakatta. didn't hit (32) a) b)

?l dried the dishes, but they are still w e t . 7 sara-o dish-obj.

kawakashita dried

keredo, though

mada still

nureteiru. is w e t (33) a) b)

(34) a)

*l floated the boat, but it didn't f l o a t . boto-o ukabeta b o a t - o b j . floated

keredo, though

ukabanakatta. didn't f l o a t .

?l gave the baby milk, but it didn't drink at all.

275

276

Ikegami: 'Activity'-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement' b)

akanbo-ni baby-goal

miruku-o milk-obj.

yatta gave

keredo though

nomanakatta. didn't drink. (35) a)

b)

?l helped Mary solve the problem, but she still couldn't solve it. -ga -nom.

mondai-o toku problem-obj. solve

 tetsudatteyatta obj. gave help (36) a) b)

keredo, though

no nominalizer tokenakatta, couldn't solve.

* l i n f l a t e d the balloon, but it didn't grow big. husen-o fukuramasita balloon-obj. i n f l a t e d

keredo, though

okiku big

naranakatta. didn't grow. (37) a) b)

*l kicked the man's shin, but missed it. sono otoko that man

no 's

sune-o shin-obj.

ketta kicked

keredo, though

ataranakatta. didn't hit. (3δ) a) b)

*l loosened the knot, but it was still tight. musubime-o yurumeta knot-obj. loosened

keredo, though

mada still

katakatta. tight was (39) a)

b)

* l measured the height of the m o u n t a i n , but didn't succeed. yama-no takasa-o mountain-pos. h e i g h t - o b j .

hakatta measured

keredo, though

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

Z77

wakaranakatta. didn't know (40) a)

b)

(41) a) b)

*l melted the f r o z e n food outdoors, but it didn't melt. reito-shokuhin-o tokashita frozen f o o d - o b j . melted

keredo, t o k e n a k a t t a , though didn't melt.

*l mixed oil and w a t e r , but they didn't mix. abura to oil and

mizu-o mazeta w a t e r - o b j . mixed

keredo, though

majiranakatta. didn't get mixed. (42) a)

?The f a r m e r milked the cow, but no milk came

out. b)

notu-wa ushi-no f a r m e r - t o p i c cow-pos. keredo, chichi-wa though milk-topic

(43) a) b)

(44) a) b)

chichi-o miik-obj.

shibotta squeezed

detekonakatta. didn't come out

*l peeled the skin, but it didn't come kawa-o skin-obj.

muita peeled

keredo, though

off.

mukenakatta. didn't peel off.

*l persuaded John to go, but he wouldn't go. John-o yuku-yoni John-obj. g o - t o

settokushita persuaded

keredo, though

ika n a k a t t a . go didn't. (45) a)

b)

?l photographed Mary with my camera, but no picture t u r n e d out. bokuno k a m e r a - d e my camera-with

Mary-no -of

shashi-o picture-obj.

278

Ikegami: 'Activity'-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement' totta keredo, took though

(46) a)

b)

utsutte taken

inakatta. wasn't

*l picked up the f a l l e n beads on the floor, but I couldn't pick them all up. yuka-ni ochiteiru floor-on fallen

garasudama-o beads-obj.

hirotta picked up

keredo, minna hiroenakatta. though all couldn't pick up (47) a) b)

(48) a)

b)

*l scooped the w a t e r , but it was impossible. mizu-o sujutta w a t e r - o b j . scooped

doro-mizu-o muddy w a t e r - o b j .

impossible

b) (50) a)

b)

dame impossible

datta. was

*l settled the muddy w a t e r , but it was impossible.

dame

(49) a)

keredo, though

chindensaseta settled

keredo, though

datta. was

*l stood an e g g , but it was impossible. tamago-o t a t e t a keredo, e g g - o b j . stood though

dame impossible

datta. was

*l stripped the bark f r o m the t r e e , but it didn't come off. ki-no kawa-o tree-pos. bark-obj.

muita stripped

keredo, though

mukenakatta. didn't come o f f (51) a) b)

?l tipped the w a i t e r , but he didn't accept. weta-ni chippu-o waiter-to tip-obj.

yatta gave

keredo, though

Essays in Honor of Rulon 5. Wells

279

uketoranakatta. didn't accept (52) a) b)

(53) a) b)

*l tricked Mary, but she was too clever. -o damashita M a r y - o b j . tricked

keredo, though

hikkakaranakatta. didn't get tricked.

*l woke Mary, but she was f a s t asleep. -o okoshita keredo, M a r y - o b j . woke though

gussuri fast

nemutteita. asleep was

Making sufficient allowances f o r the indeterminacy with which any problem related to meaning is inherently characterized, it is quite clear that there is a significant d i f f e r e n c e between the two languages. Japanese tends to focus on the action (or activity), while English has a tendency to concentrate on the achievement of the goal. 4.

Other Related Contrasts in Language

Before proceeding to consider what this systematic contrast between achievement and non-achievement means, it will be worthwhile pointing out t h a t this is by no means a peculiar isolated phenomenon observable only with a particular type of verbs and that contrasts comparable to this are found in various parts of the linguistic system. We will be discussing some of them below. 4.1 First, t h e r e is a similar kind of semantic contrast between the verbal phrase 'v. + at' and the corresponding ν . An example which immediately comes to mind is the phrase catch at in the w e l l - k n o w n proverb, 'A drowning man will catch at a straw.' Catch at a straw r e f e r s to an act without implying the achievement of the intended goal, while catch a straw will imply the achievement. (Very interestingly, the Japanese translation of this proverb has the verb corresponding to the transitive catch, thus showing once again the comparative weakness of g o a l - o r i e n t e d character of the Japanese verbs.) The same contrast is found with verbs like the following: shoot at a person - - shoot a person strike a t a person - - strike a person

280

Ikegaml:

'Activity'-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

hit at a person - - hit a person lash at a person - - lash a person slap at a person - - slap a person smash at a person - - smash a person punch at a person - - punch a person kick at a person - - kick a person bite at a person - - bite a person kiss at a person - - kiss a person The expressions of e i t h e r series can combine with try to (e.g. try to shoot at a person, try to shoot a person). The combination of try to with 'v + at', however, implies 'some obstacle or difficulty', according to the informant. The implication obviously comes from the fact t h a t in try to ν at, the undertaking of the action (rather than its completion with a full realization of the intended e f f e c t ) is held as the goal. Not all transitive verbs implying a possible eventual contact between the actor and the one acted upon allow the alternative 'v. + at' expression. Compare the following: *stroke at a person - - stroke a person *touch at a person - - touch a person (Touch here is understood as a non-metaphorical contact verb.) One way of accounting for the restriction on the choice of the p a t t e r n 'v + at' will be to say t h a t the verb implies a goal-achieving intention (which serves to shift the semantic focus t o w a r d the 'activity' pole). Stroke and touch lack this implication. But cf.: * b e a t at a person - - beat a person ?thrash at a person — thrash a person ??smite at a person - - smite a person These verbs do imply a goal-achieving i n t e n t i o n , but they do not behave in the same way as those discussed above. Perhaps beat d i f f e r s from the previous ones in implying repetition. Thrash does imply repetition, too, but the implication of randomness with which it is associated may make the combination with at easier. Smite is archaic and that will account f o r the u n c e r t a i n t y of the use. When it comes to the stage where the verb in question explicitly

Essays in Honor of Rulon 5. Wells means 'attacking', there 'v + at' construction.

is no possibility f o r

the

281 alternative

*attack at a person - - attack a person *assault at a person - - assault a person It is tempting to suspect t h a t the gaps in the 'v + at' column are filled by such periphrastic expressions like make an attack on a person and make an assault on a person. Actually, however, these latter expressions also imply achievement r a t h e r than non-achievement. The use of the preposition on instead of at may also be correlated with the achievement sense. With at, the entity in question is represented as a goal yet to be a t t a i n e d ; with on, it is represented as an object acted upon. (Cf. spit at/on. ) Similar following:

alternations

can be observed with verbs like

the

seize at something - - seize something grip at something - - grip something grasp at something - - grasp something grab at something - - grab something snatch at something — snatch something clutch at something - - clutch something catch at something - - catch something Verbs in the left column r e f e r to a goal-directed action without necessarily implying the achievement of the goal. Verbs in the right column, on the other hand, imply the achievement of the goal as a result of the action performed. In the case of the observed only partially:

following

verbs,

the

contrast

is

??scorn at a person - - scorn a person mock at a person - - mock a person ( l i t e r a r y ) ??flout at a person - - f l o u t a person *deride at a person - - deride a person *ridicule at a person - - ridicule a person For those verbs with which the a l t e r n a t i o n is possible, the 'v. + at' form suggests t h a t the person in question is less seriously a f f e c t e d .

282

Ikegami: 'Activlty'-'Accompfishment'-'Achievement'

There are intransitively with transitive uses. constitute one of

also certain verbs which are used the preposition at but which do not allow Verbs with the general sense of 'scoffing' such types.

sneer at a person - - *sneer a person j e e r at a person - - * j e e r a person scoff at a person - - *scoff a person Another type comprises 'shouting' or 'growling':

verbs

with

the

general

sense

of

shout at a person - - *shout a person cry at a person - - *cry a person scream at a person - - *scream a person yell at a person - - *yell a person shriek at a person - - *shriek a person roar at a person - - * r o a r a person bawl at a person - - *bawl a person growl at a person - - *growl a person thunder at a person - - * t h u n d e r a person groan at a person - - *groan a person moan a t a person - - *moan a person bellow at a person - - *bellow a person holler at a person - - *holler a person Some notion of attack or more weakly, directed action is still felt with these verbs, but the general lack of transitive uses seems to suggest t h a t the e f f e c t brought about is understood not to be very serious. In expressions like grumble at a person and whisper at a person, the notion of attack or directed action may still be slightly f e l t . 8 But beyond this point, the preposition selected will shift to to : e.g. whisper to a person. Even when the preposition at is selected, it no longer represents the goal to be attacked. It simply shows either a location or an occasion at which the action takes place: e.g. whisper at the ear, murmur at the bad treatment. Some verbs of motion can also collocate preposition at implying an intended attack: jump at something - - *jump something 9 leap at something — * l e a p something spring at something - - *spring something

with

the

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283

run at something - - * r u n something rush a t something - - *rush something d a r t at something - - * d a r t something gallop a t something - - *gallop something f l y at something - - * f l y something dive at something - - *dive something The informant's j u d g e m e n t of acceptability wavers with such expressions as dash at something and drive at something. The general tendency, however, seems to be that verbs r e f e r r i n g to a speedy (perhaps r a t h e r than intense) action co-occur with the preposition at. Cf. 'walk at something, 'swim at something, 'ride at something, 'row at something, 'crawl at something, 'trot at something, *amble at something. The survey we have made so f a r shows t h a t whenever t h e r e is a contrast (explicit or implicit) between V. + at' and *v ', the f o r m e r focuses on the action (directea to  certain goal) and the l a t t e r on the achievement of the goal (to which the action is d i r e c t e d ) . This contrast is quite parallel to the one we have discussed in relation to the Japanese and English verbs r e f e r r i n g to 'making a telephone call to a person'. The contrast b e t w e e n look at and see, discussed by Gruber (1967) also f i t s in here. The pair is rather uniquely constituted by two different verbs. Compare the following: (54)

I looked, but didn't see anything.

(55)

mita looked

keredo, though

mienakatta. didn't see

While English uses two d i f f e r e n t v e r b , Japanese employs two etymologically r e l a t e d verbs, miru 'look, see' and mieru 'can see, be visible'. 4.2 The 'implicative verbs' discussed by Karttunen (1971) constitute another case in which the contrast between achievement and non-achievement is relevant. An implicative verb is defined as one which implies the achievement of the goal specified by the infinitive following the verb. A non-implicative verb does not necessarily imply such achievement. Thus manage is an implicative verb, because (56a) implies (56b). Hope, on the other hand, is a non-implicative verb, because (57a) does not imply (57b).

284

(56a) (56b) (57a) (57b)

Ikegami:

John John John John

'Activity'-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

managed to solve the problem. solved the problem. hoped to solve the problem. solved the problem.

This parallel to the contrast we have observed between the corresponding English and Japanese verbs r e f e r r i n g to a goal-directed action: (58a) (58b) (59a)

I burned it. It burned. moyashia. burned (vt.)

(59b)

moeta. burned

(vi.)

As we have seen, (58a) necessarily imply (59b).

implies

(58b),

but

(59a)

does

not

It will be clear, however, that what we are interested in in this paper covers a much wider area than Karttunen's rather definitely demarcated 'implicative' and 'non-implicative' verbs. In the case of the l a t t e r , what is or is not implied is explicitly specified by the infinitive following the verb. Thus in manage to go and hope to go, the implication concerns 'going'. Most of the g o a l - d i r e c t e d action verbs t h a t we have discussed do not have such explicit specifications. In those ' e r g a t i v e - t y p e ' verbs which have the same form (or at least, the same basic f o r m ) in their transitive and intransitive uses, the relevant implication is explicit in a d i f f e r e n t way; t h a t is, what is or is not implied by the transitive verb is what is r e f e r r e d to by its corresponding intransitive verb. Thus burn something implies something burns. Similarly, boil, dry, float, etc. But besides these t h e r e remain a large number of verbs about which it is not always easy to specify in exact t e r m s what is implied. Take the verb cut, for example. Does it imply t h a t the object becomes separated because of having been cut? Will it suffice if some sort of incision is made on the surface of the object? Is the use of the verb appropriate even if the object has been found too solid f o r the cutting instrument to penetrate? Or a g a i n , as a more abstract case,

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consider the verb read. For an act to be called 'reading', will it be sufficient if one simply runs his eyes over the prints? Is the act to be accompanied with the utterance of appropriate sounds? Must one be able to understand what is w r i t t e n - - - a n d if so, e n t i r e l y or partially? Can one say t h a t one has read a book if one covers only a p a r t of it? Or must one cover the whole of it? These are areas characterized by a high degree of indeterminacy. 4.3 There certain 'dative According to synonymous: (60) a) b)

is next a semantic contrast observed among movement verbs' discussed by Green (1974). Green, sentences (60a) and (60b) are

Mary gave John an apple. Mary gave an apple to John.

Both sentences imply, unless some qualification is made to the contrary, the achievement of the goal, i.e. John's getting an apple. (61a) and (62b), however, are not synonymous: (61) a) b)

Mary taught John linguistics. Mary taught linguistics to John.

While (61a) implies that John mastered linguistics, (61b) does not. In other words, while (61a) implies the achievement of the goal, (61b) focuses on the activity with no r e f e r e n c e to the consequences. Similarly, (62a) implies the achievement, i.e. the dog saw the bone, but (62b) simply r e f e r s to the act: (62) a) (62) b)

John showed Fido a bone. John showed a bone to Fido.

Actually, however, not all native speakers agree with the semantic distinction Green makes. Sometimes the contextual factors seem to override the proposed distinction. Thus a sentence like (63) is not necessarily judged contradictory: (63)

Mary taught t h a t Japanese Sumo w r e s t l e r but he was hopeless.

English,

286

Ikegami:

'Activity-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

If, however, t h e r e ever is a semantic distinction such as suggested by Green, it will be just as stated by Green - - i.e. the indirect object construction implies successful achievement and the prepositional phrase construction r e f e r s primarily to a c t i o n - - - a n d not the other way around. An argument in support of this can be made in the following way. From a localist point of view, both the indirect object and the prepositional phrase with to are alike in representing the 'goal'. But while the prepositional phrase can be filled indiscriminately e i t h e r with an animate or an inanimate noun, the indirect object is primarily f o r an a n i m a t e , typically, human, noun (cf. Quirk e t al.:1972:7.21). This seems to suggest the following functional dichotomy : i.e. the noun in the prepositional phrase represents a mere location (even when it is an animate n o u n ) , while the noun in the form of the indirect object represents a 'beneficiary ', t h a t is, a person who is a f f e c t e d either favorably or adversely. In other words, the noun in the prepositional phrase represents something insentient, the noun in the form of the indirect object represents a sentient being. Hence it will be quite natural if the prepositional phrase construction is correlated with the 'non-achievement/no effect' or 'action-oriented' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , while the indirect object construction tends to be understood as implying the achievement of the goal. There is another point made by Green in this connection which is worth our special a t t e n t i o n . On the assumption that a semantic distinction as discussed above exists between the prepositional phrase and the indirect object construction, Green proceeds to point out t h a t an abstract subject can only cooccur with the latter construction (namely, the one which implies a successful achievement). (64) a) b)

Being criticized taught John criticism, *Being criticized taught criticism to John.

This d i f f e r e n c e in acceptability is well expected from our characterization of the prepositional phrase construction as action-oriented and the indirect object construction as achievement-oriented. The a c t i o n - o r i e n t e d construction is most compatible with an a n i m a t e , typically, human, noun functioning as an agent. Since, however, an abstract notion

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287

cannot be associated with the notion of agentivity, sentence like (64b) is inevitably f e l t incongruent.

a

4.4 Another related series of phenomena is the one that was much discussed in case g r a m m a r , namely, the semantic contrast between such expressions as spray paint on the wall and spray the wail with paint (Fillmore:1969, e t c . ) . The f o r m e r does not necessarily imply t h a t the whole of the wall is covered with p a i n t , while the l a t t e r does. To use Green's convenient t e r m s , the contrast is between 'partitive' and 'holistic' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . But it will easily be seen t h a t another way of characterizing the contrast is 'action-oriented' and 'achievement-oriented'. This contrast is found with a considerable number of verbs. cram clothes into a t r u n k — cram a t r u n k with clothes l i t t e r garbage around the place — l i t t e r the place with garbage load coal into the cart —

load the cart with coal

scatter gravel on the road — scatter the road with gravel set diamonds in a crown - -

set a crown with diamonds

settle immigrants in the area — s e t t l e the with sow corn in the f i e l d - -

area

immigrants

sow the f i e l d with corn

splash mud on the coat — splash the coat with mud spread b u t t e r on a piece of bread — spread a piece of bread with b u t t e r stick pins into the cushion — stick the cushion with pins The same contrast is observable with verbs standing in antonymic relations to those above: clear snow f r o m the path

--

clear the path of snow

288

Ikegami:

'Activity'-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

dispossess land from a person - - dispossess a person of the land prune superfluous branches f r o m the t r e e prune the t r e e of superfluous branches

--

The contrast between 'partitive' and 'holistic' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , however, seems to be much more b l u r r e d with these verbs r e f e r r i n g to deprivation. Among the verbs above, rob and strip are especially unclear in this respect. However, the implication is that in the case of the construction with the of- phrase, the thing taken away belongs to the victim in a more essential way and t h e r e f o r e the victim is a f f e c t e d in a more serious way than when the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is made in terms of the from- or off- phrase. Moreover, several verbs of this type allow only the construction with the ofphrase: îdeprive power from a person - - deprive a person of his power ?purge sin f r o m a person -purge a person of sin (literary) ?purify t r a i t o r s f r o m the state - - purify the state of traitors ?scour d i r t from the barn - - scour the barn of d i r t 1 0

According to the set of patterns for the semantic structure of the verb defined in Ikegami (1973, e t c . ) , the contrast between the expressions in the l e f t column and those in the right column above can be described as one between GIVE X TO Y and PROVIDE Y WITH X, on the one hand, and TAKE X FROM Y and DEPRIVE Y OF X, on the other. From a localist point of view, GIVE X TO Y and TAKE X FROM Y are essentially the p a t t e r n s based on the formulas f o r representing a 'change in locus', i.e. X GO TO Y and X GO FROM Y, and PROVIDE Y WITH X and DEPRIVE Y OF X are essentially the p a t t e r n s based on the formulas f o r representing a 'change in condition', i.e. Y BECOME WITH X and Y BECOME WITHOUT X. It will not be d i f f i c u l t to see that the semantic contrast between 'partitive* and 'holistic' derives ultimately from these basic formulas. In the formulas f o r the change in locus, Y is a location to which a motion is directed. The identity of Y is not at all a f f e c t e d

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by the change in locus undergone by X. In the formulas f o r the change in condition, Y e i t h e r comes to assume or loses the character X; i.e. Y changes itself e i t h e r f r o m being non~X to being X or f r o m being X to being non-X. By undergoing a change in condition, Y is thus a f f e c t e d in a more real sense than when a change in locus takes place in relation to it. It is also to be added t h a t the Japanese language has the left-column type of expressions but not the right-column type. In other words, it has only 'partitive' type of expressions. This is again quite in accordance with the general drift of not focusing on achievement in Japanese. In German, the prefix beis widely used to create verbs used in the 'holistic' type expressions (e.g. jemandem etwas raten - jemanden mit etwas beraten). In French, individual verbs mostly have p r e f e r e n c e s as to which construction they occur in (e.g. mettre du beurre sur le pain - 'mettre le pain avec du beurre t "priver quelque chose de quelqu'un - - priver quel'qu'un de quelque chose). Finally, it must be noted t h a t the distinction between 'partitive' and 'holistic' may be blurred under certain circumstances. This happens whenever it is not the case t h a t both the t e r m s X and Y r e p r e s e n t something optically perceptible and that Y is well delimited as to its range. To the e x t e n t t h a t these conditions are not f u l f i l l e d , the contrast between 'partitive' and 'holistic' tends to be neutralized. imprint footsteps on the snow - - imprint the snow with footsteps infuse enthusiasm into the players — infuse the players with enthusiasm The informant's reaction is t h a t both the right-column and the l e f t - c o l u m n expressions above are in the 'partitive' sense. In the f i r s t pair, the delimitation of the expanse of the snow is u n c e r t a i n ; in the l a t t e r , enthusiasm is not something perceptible. Hence it is d i f f i c u l t in either case to decide at what point in the process the change is 'completed'.

290

Ikegami:

'Activity'-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

The contrast between 'partitive' and 'holistic' to be b l u r r e d in a case like the following: present flowers to a person - -

seems also

present a person with flowers

According to Green (1974:87, note 1 ) , however, there is a semantic d i f f e r e n c e between the two expressions above such that the f o r m e r implies simply that something is o f f e r e d as a p r e s e n t , while the l a t t e r d e f i n i t e l y implies that somebody is intended as receiver of the present. If the suggested distinction is correct, this again means that the contrast between 'action-oriented' and 'achievement-oriented' is still valid f o r sentences f o r a case like the above. 4.5 The actional v e r b , whose underlying semantic p a t t e r n is DO X TO Y, may sometimes be t u r n e d into a causative verb with a semantic pattern roughly representable as CAUSE BY DOING X TO Y ( Y BECOME WITH X ) . Compare the following: (65) a) b) (66) a) b)

The The The The

cat licked the cat licked the mother rocked mother rocked

In the (b) sentences metaphorical sense.

plate. plate clean. her baby (in the cradle). her baby to sleep.

below,

the

verb

is

used

in

a

(66) a) A bee stung him. b) They stung him into action. (67) a) He pushed the car with all his power. b) He pushed her into m a r r i a g e . Clearly, we can here again apply the contrast between 'action-oriented' and 'achievement-oriented'. The (a) sentences focus on the action, while the (b) sentences imply the achievement of a certain goal (which may or may not be intended by the actor). A parallel contrast can be are themselves causative verbs: (67) a) b)

observed

with

John shamed Mary. John shamed Mary into running away.

verbs

which

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells (68) a) b) (69) a) b)

John John John John

291

startled Mary. startled Mary out of sleep. t e r r i f i e d Mary. t e r r i f i e d Mary into surrendering all she had

What we have here is the causativization of a causative verb at a higher level: i.e. CAUSE BY MAKING Y WITH X { Y BECOME WITH Z }. The verbs in (67) (69) are distinguished f r o m those in (66) - (67) by their capability of taking an abstract noun phrase as subject: (67') (68') (69')

This shamed Mary into running away. This startled Mary out of sleep. This t e r r i f i e d Mary into surrendering all she had.

The same construction is impossible with the verbs in (65) - (66) (unless perhaps they are used metaphorically and lose their actional sense)." 11 In other words, what sentences like (65b) and (66b) r e p r e s e n t is an action plus an achievement, while sentences like (67b) (69b) r e p r e s e n t nothing but an achievement. The l a t t e r are more purely causative verbs. An extreme case of this higher-level seen in examples like the following:

causativization

is

(70) a) I danced (with h e r ) , b) I danced her weary. (71) a) I laughed (at him). b) I laughed him into silence. (72) a) I sang (to the baby) b) I sang the baby to sleep. (73) a) She smiled (at the child). b) ?She smiled the child into obedience. (74) a) He talked to her. b) He talked her out of applying for the job. The verbs in question here are originally intransitive verbs and as such, do not necessarily have a clear notion of goal-directed action. These intransitive verbs are first transitivized (hence provided with the implication of a goal-directed action) and then causativized (hence provided with the implication of achievement of the goal). There is apparently a certain limit, however, to how f a r this use can be extended:

292

Ikegami:

(75) a) b) (76) a) b) (77) a) b) (78) a) b)

I *1 I *l I *l I *l

'ActivitZ-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

laughed myself into convulsions. laughed him into convulsions. raved myself hoarse, raved him hoarse. slept myself sober, slept him sober. sobbed myself asleep. sobbed him asleep.

In g e n e r a l , English seems to be going very f a r in allowing this construction. Some of the English sentences of this type cannot be t r a n s l a t e d literally even into such languages as German and French (e.g. *Ich habe sie müde getanzt, Je l'ai dansé fatiguée). In most of such cases, Japanese would have to use two d i f f e r e n t predicate verbs in translation (i.e. something like 'sing and make the baby fall asleep). 4.6 As a f u r t h e r example of r e l a t e d phenomena, contrast like the following will also be worth considering: (79) a) b)

a

John seized Bill's a r m . John seized Bill by the a r m .

Both (a) and (b) admit periphrasis by try to. This seems to suggest t h a t either sentence implies an achievement. The two sentences, however, behave d i f f e r e n t l y with regard to the possible insertion of the preposition at (discussed in 4.1): (80) a) b)

John seized at Bill's a r m . *John seized at Bill by the a r m .

We have already seen t h a t the construction 'v. + at' (in contrast to 'v ') focuses on the action r a t h e r than the achievement of the goal. The fact t h a t the (b) sentence is not compatible with the 'v + at' construction indicates t h a t it implies an achievement in a more serious sense than the (a) sentence. If we recall that the (b) sentence is commonest with a human noun as object, we will see t h a t the situation here is very similar to the a l t e r n a t i o n between

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Z93

the prepositional phrase construction and the indirect object construction (cf. 4.3). By being seized, Bill in the (b) sentence is represented as having been a f f e c t e d in a more real sense than Bill in the (a) sentence. In the f o r m e r , Bill is presented as a sentient being a f f e c t e d by John's act; in the l a t t e r , Bill's arm is presented as a location a t which Bill's act a f f e c t e d John.12 Compare f u r t h e r the following sentences: (81) a) b)

John snatched (at) Mary's bag. *John snatched ( a t ) Mary by the bag.

Mary's bag is not part of Mary's inalienable possession and Mary's person is not at all a f f e c t e d by having the bag she carries snatched away from her. 4.7 The final point I would like to r e f e r to is the semantic d i f f e r e n c e discussed by Riddle (1975) as correlated with the choice between that- clause and a c c u s a t i v e - w i t h - i n finitive as verb complement. (82) a) b) (83) a) b)

Jane Jane Jane Jane

r e p o r t e d that she was a liar, r e p o r t e d her to be a liar. asked t h a t she leave, asked her to leave.

According to Riddle, t h e r e is a d i f f e r e n c e between the (a) and (b) sentence in the degree to which the person represented as subject is involved in the act he or she is making; t h a t is, the (b) type expression implies a g r e a t e r degree of involvement than the (a) type expression. This can be rephrased as implying t h a t the other person is represented as more seriously a f f e c t e d by the subject's act in the (b) type expression than in the (a) type expression. The distinction pointed out by Riddle can profitably be applied to i n t e r p r e t i n g the structural change undergone by the English causative construction. The typical construction in Old English was ( 8 4 a ) ; in Modern English, (84b) is the typical one: (84) a) b)

Ic dide Þæ cume. I made him come.

294

Ikegami:

'Activity'-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

The Old English sentence can be paraphrased something like 'I acted in such a way t h a t he came' — where the control exercised by the causer over the other person ( r e p r e s e n t e d in the nominative) is not particularly strong. In the Modern English construction, the latter (represented as direct object) appears to be completely under the causer's control. 5. Conclusion - - - Factors contributing tivization of transitive verbs in Japanese

to the

intranst-

In sections 1-4, we have discussed the semantic properties of verbs r e f e r r i n g to a goal-directed action. It has been pointed out that individual verbs may d i f f e r in the emphasis they lay e i t h e r on the 'action' or the 'achievement' component and t h a t there is furthermore sometimes an interesting discrepancy in this respect between the apparently corresponding English and Japanese verbs. In section A, we have seen t h a t the contrast comparable to the one between 'action' and 'achievement' is functioning in various ways in other parts of the linguistic system. The contrast may be variously characterized in such terms as 'action' 'achievement', 'process' 'result', 'imperfective' - 'perfective', 'partitive' - 'holistic', 'partially affected/involved' - 'totally affected/involved', and so f o r t h , but clearly t h e r e is something in common to all these. Represented in terms of the localist theory, the f u n d a m e n t a l contrast here is that between TOWARD and TO. A g o a l - d i r e c t e d action proceeds toward a goal and may (or may not) eventually reach the goal. Such an action can be represented either in the aspect of its proceeding toward the goal or in the aspect of its getting to the goal. The former is 'imperfective', 'partitive' or 'action/process-orie n t e d ' ; the l a t t e r is 'perfective', 'holistic' or 'achievement/ r e s u l t - o r i e n t e d ' . A parallelism between motion and action as regards this contrast should again be recalled. It is assumed that the relation between the motion and the goal (to which the motion is directed) is parallel to the one between the action and the goal (to which the action is d i r e c t e d ) . Both the relations r e p r e s e n t 'transitivity' (cf. Anderson: 1971:11.2), or 'goal-direct-edness'. In the motional mode, a motion directed toward the goal is expected (unless something happens which hinders it) to get to the goal. This psychologically very n a t u r a l expectation is r e f l e c t e d in the loose way in which the preposition to is sometimes used. A sentence like the following is judged not at ail unusual:

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

(85)

295

John w e n t to his office at nine and arrived t h e r e at t e n .

What is intended is obviously 'toward', used, as it w e r e , in anticipation.

but

instead,

to

is

What parallels this in the actional mode will be that an action or a process started with a view to achieving a certain goal is expected actually to achieve its goal, and from what we have investigated so f a r , it appears that this tendency of i n t e r p r e t i n g an action this way is more strongly manifested in a language like English than one like Japanese. It will also have been seen from the preceding investigation t h a t the d i f f e r e n t degrees to which the action comes near to achieving the goal (or in other words, the different degrees to which the goal is a f f e c t e d ) are apparently correlated with the choice of d i f f e r e n t surface structures. The following scale can be posited: ( i ) V : T h e action remains with the actor and does not a f f e c t others. No goal (or object) is represented for the verb. (ii)V

+ Prepositional Phrase: The action affects the goal (or object) to which it is d i r e c t e d , but the e f f e c t on the l a t t e r is only p a r t i a l . The verb is followed by a directional preposition plus a noun phrase representing the goal or object of action.

(iii)V

+ Object: The action a f f e c t s the goal (or object) totally. The l a t t e r is r e p r e s e n t e d as direct object of the verb.

( i v ) V + Object + Prepositional Phrase: The action affects the goal (or object) totally and as a result of this the latter undergoes a change to a new state. The goal (or object) of the action is represented as direct object of the verb; it is then followed by a prepositional phrase in which the noun phrase represents the newly arrived state.

296

Ikegami: 'Activity'-·'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

The four stages on the scale above can also be considered as representing the d i f f e r e n t degrees to which the actor places the object of his action under his or her control. The degree of control is zero at stage (i) and at its maximum at stage (iv). English has a marked tendency of moving upward along this scale; the tendency is manifested in a number of instances in which an intransitive verb is made transitive and a (non-causative) transitive verb made causative. An extreme case in point in an expression like sing a baby to sleep ( 4 . 5 ) , in which we have a functional change of the verb starting at stage (i) and ending up at stage (iv). Seeing that such a drastic change does not occur to the same e x t e n t in languages like German and French, we may perhaps be allowed to assume that English is markedly oriented toward intensifying the actor's control of the object to which his action is d i r e c t e d . 5.1 In section 3 we have presented a number of examples in which the apparently corresponding English and Japanese verbs r e f e r r i n g to a goal-directed action do not behave in the same way in t e r m s of the contrast between 'action' and 'achievement of the goal'. The English verbs, we have seen, tend to focus on the 'achievement of the goal', while the Japanese verbs seem to lay emphasis on the action without special regard to the possible achievement of the goal. The marked orientation in English toward the intensification of the actor's control (i.e. a g e n t i v i t y ) , which we have noted in the preceding section, is certainly relevant to creating the contrast between the two languages. From the Japanese side, two points in particular are worth considering, one relating to the status of the subject and the object, and the other relating to the lack of contrast between ' d e f i n i t e ' and 'indefinite' in Japanese. A 'transitive' verb is by definition a verb which is followed by an object. In the case of a transitive verb r e f e r r i n g to a g o a l - d i r e c t e d action, the object of the verb r e f e r s to the goal to which the action is d i r e c t e d . In other words, the object of the verb represents something which is a f f e c t e d by the action. In English, the object is highly obligatory and will not be O m i t t e d ' except in a f e w strongly conditioned cases. In Japanese, on the other hand, the

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297

object is very often not made explicit a f t e r a transitive v e r b , being understood f r o m the context. The lack of the object has an e f f e c t of 'intransitivizing' the transitive verb ---that is, of tending to pull the verb f r o m stage (iii) down to stage (i) in the scale discussed above. (Pulled down to stage ( i ) , the originally transitive * * * to which the action is directed (or the object which is a f f e c t e d ) . ) This inevitably has an e f f e c t of weakening the meaning of the goal-directed action to that of a simple action. The focus will then be naturally shifted f r o m the goal to the action itself. That the optional n a t u r e of the object of a transitive verb in Japanese is relevant to the g r e a t e r focusing on the action than on the goal is seen by comparing the acceptability of a sentence involving an implied object with that of a sentence containing an explicit object. The following pair of sentences is a case in point: (86)

wakashita boiled

keredo, though

(87)

mizu-o water-obj.

wakashita boiled

Compare also the following (88) ??

wakanakatta. didn't boil keredo, though

wakanakatta. didn't boil

possibility:

yu-o wakashita w a r m w a t e r - o b j . boiled

keredo, w a k a n a k a t t a . though didn't boil

Sentence (86) does not make the object explicit. Sentence (87) has the object, mizu 'water' ('affected object') and sentence (88) has the object, yu 'warm w a t e r ' ('resultative object'). There is a gradual decrease in acćeptability as we go from (86) to ( 8 8 ) . Sentence ( 8 8 ) , which contains an object of r e s u l t - - - i n c i d e n t a l l y , this is the commoner way of saying 'to boil w a t e r ' in Japanese --does sound strange. Thus the decrease in acceptability correlates with the degree of explicitness with which the goal of the action is r e p r e s e n t e d . 5.2 With regard to the subject in Japanese, two points must be noted. One is t h a t the subject is, just like the object, not always obligatory in a Japanese sentence. This

298

Ikegami:

'Activity'-'Accompllshment'-'Achievement'

will certainly work against the actor intensifying the control he or she exercises over the object to which his or her action is directed --which is exactly opposite to what happens in English. Another point to be noted is t h a t the subject of a verb r e f e r r i n g to a goal-directed action (including causation) is normally animate — typically, h u m a n - - - i n Japanese and that the use of an abstract noun with a verb r e f e r r i n g to a g o a l - d i r e c t e d action in either of the following sentences is quite normal; t h e r e is nothing like personification in (89b): (89a) (89b)

Who made her do so? What made her do so?

The situation in Japanese is quite d i f f e r e n t . The Japanese sentence corresponding to (89a) is perfectly normal, but the one corresponding to (89b) is highly unidiomatic --an expression which might perhaps occur only in t r a n s l a t i o n . We have already seen t h a t the human noun focuses on the actional aspect of a g o a l - d i r e c t e d action, while the abstract noun as subject ( n a t u r a l l y incompatible with the notion of action) tends to concentrate on the achievement aspect of a g o a l - d i r e c t e d action. Japanese, favoring the human subject, on the one hand, and avoiding the abstract subject, on the other, helps to keep the actional component of a goal-directed action verb fully alive. In contrast, English, by allowing the abstract subject f r e e l y , prepares the way for the goal-directed action verbs to be causativized. 5.3 Another relevant factor to be considered is t h a t the Japanese nouns are not regularly marked for the contrast between 'definite' and 'indefinite'. That the contrast between 'definite' and 'indefinite' is closely correlated with t h a t between 'achievement' and 'non-achievement' is seen from the following English examples: (90) a) b) (91) a) b)

*John dried the dishes for Mary, but he didn't dry all the dishes. John dried dishes for Mary, but he didn't dry all the dishes. *John cleared the snow from the p a t h , but he didn't clear all the snow. John cleared snow from the p a t h , but he didn't

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

299

clear all the snow. In the (a) sentences, the presence of the d e f i n i t e article serves to delimit the extension of the object to be a f f e c t e d by the action --hence a clearer implication of achievement (unless the verb is marked in some way as ' i m p e r f e c t i v e ' ) . 1 3 Where such delimitation is not made as in the (b) sentences, the notion of achievement is naturally blurred. Since the Japanese nouns are not obligatorily marked for definiteness (nor for number, e i t h e r ) - - - w h i c h implies that their extension necessarily remains unclear — the possibility is always open t h a t they are understood in an indefinite sense and t h a t the notion of achievement, as applied to t h e m , is concomitantly b l u r r e d . 5.A What emerges from the discussion in 5.1 - 5.3 on the comparative behavior of the English and Japanese verbs is t h a t the image of the continuum (as contrasted with that of the Individuum with its discrete extension) predominates in Japanese. First, because of the lack of obligatory marking for number and definiteness, the Japanese noun tends to be b l u r r e d extensionally, i.e. it can be r e f e r r i n g to one and indefinite many at the same t i m e . This neutralization of one and many is exactly what characterizes a continuum. Second, because of a high degree of optionality of the subject and the object that go with the v e r b , the Japanese sentence is predominantly p r e d i c a t e - (or e v e n t ) - c e n t e r e d . It has its subject and object (words r e f e r r i n g to 'things') dissolved, as it w e r e , in it and the emerging picture is again a continuum (in which any Individuum that may be involved dissolves itself and loses its own identity). 5.5 Finally, it will be worth pointing out that the contrastive behavior of the English and Japanese verbs of action is very interestingly paralleled by that of the verbs of motion in the two languages. 1 4 Compare the following: (92) a) b)

John ran to the station. ?John-wa eki-e hashitta. John-topic s t a t i o n - t o ran

300

Ikegami:

(93) a) b)

'Activity-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

John swam to the shore. ?John-wa kishi-e oyoida. John-topic shore-to swam

While the English verbs of motion can generally combine with a goal-expression (thus implying a possible arrival at the goal), the corresponding Japanese verbs are quite as naturally used in the same way. In order to obtain a natural expression, the Japanese verb of motion has to be supported either by the verb iku 'go' or kuru 'come'. (92) b')

John-wa John-topic

eki-e station-to

(93) b')

John-wa John-topic

kishi-e shore-to

hashitte running

itta. went

oyoide swimming

kita. came

Alternatively, the postposition is to be replaced by either made 'as f a r as, till' or ni mukatte 'heading f o r , toward'. (92) b")

John-wa eki-made John-topic s t a t i o n - t i l l John-wa eki-ni John-topic s t a t i o n - t o

(93) b")

hashitta. ran mukatte hashitta. heading ran

John-wa kishi-made oyoida. John-topic shore-till swam John-wa kishi-e John-topic shore-to

mukatte heading

oyoida. swam.

One way of accounting for the behavior of the Japanese verb is to say t h a t it does not r e p r e s e n t a motion as something g o a l - r e a c h i n g , but r a t h e r as a process which may or may not lead to reaching the goal. Thus a parallelism in behavior between the verbs of motion and those of action is apparent:

verbs of motion:

English

Japanese

goal-reaching

process (not necessarily reaching the goal)

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells verbs of action:

goal-achieving

301

activity (not necessarily achieving the goal)

The contrast between the English and the Japanese verbs can now be summarized as the contrast between ' g o a l - o r i e n t e d ' and 'process-oriented'. After the discussion on the verbs of action, it is not difficult to guess the cause f o r the lack of goal-reaching implication of the Japanese verbs of motion. The optionality of the subject, on the one hand, serves to weaken the notion of agentivity, if any agent is involved. On the other hand, the prepositional phrase (referring to the goal) does not have to be obligatorily expressed, e i t h e r , and this will have an e f f e c t of weakening the notion of the goal being reached. The English verbs of motion, in contrast, are not a f f e c t e d by either of these factors. Their goal-reaching implication is r a t h e r quite consonant with the general tendency of English toward intensification of the notion of agentivity (so much so that it is often t u r n e d into causativity, as we have already seen). It is remarkable how certain language can a f f e c t the meaning subtle and delicate w a y . 1 5

typological f e a t u r e s of of the verb in a very

ENDNOTES

1The Vendler. out, the which it he made

judgement of sentence (1b) as 'odd' is due to But as Bolinger (private communications) points sentence makes perfect sense in a context in is presupposed that it must have taken time before up his mind to do the act.

2

unnatural

3

is

The sentence again would sound much less as an answer to 'How long was he calling John?'

For idiomatic reasons, 'how many minutes' substituted f o r 'how long' in the Japanese examples.

302

Ikegami: 'Activity'-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

Mt is of course possible to use here expression equivalent to speak on the phone.

a

Japanese

5 Thus the verb miss as in miss the target is an achievement verb (* How long did you miss the target? *He was missing the target for an hour {unless in a repetitive s e n s e } · How long did it take you to miss the target?), although in fact it means non-achievement of the goal intended. Neither is his classification to be correlated with syntactic properties of the verb. Thus to run as an intransitive verb is an activity v e r b , to wake, e i t h e r as transitive or intransitive, is an achievement verb, while to run a mile is an achievement expression. 6 As pointed out by Bolinger (private communications), the sentence would apply to a situation in which a piece of toast got c h a r r e d , but did not actually catch f i r e . But t h e n , the verb burn in the f i r s t half of the sentence is not r e f e r r i n g to a goal-directed action.

7

Bolinger (private communications) gave me a very interesting comment on sentence (32a): 'This is possible. Compare: "Who dried these dishes?" "I did." "Look--they're still wet!" The person responsible for drying the dishes is one sense of / dried. So here the English verb can match the Japanese, in focusing on activity r a t h e r than goal.' 8

| owe the following example whisper a t / * t o me! I can't hear you.' 9

l n a metaphorical use is possible. 10

Scour

sense

of

'to

to

Bolinger:

assault',

the

dirt off the barn sounds all right, though.

11

E.g., Anger stung him into action.

12

Compare the following sentences: John kissed the Queen's hand. John kissed the Queen on the hand.

'Don't

transitive

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

303

As an act of courtesy on a ceremonious occasion, the f o r m e r sentence will apply, but the l a t t e r would imply too much intimacy on John's p a r t . 13

Thus compare (91a) with 91a') below: (91) a') John was drying the dishes f o r Mary, but he hadn't dried all the dishes.

Here the imperfect aspect of definiteness of the noun phrase. 14

For the discussion Ikegami (1978).

of

the

the

verb

verbs

of

overrides

the

motion,

see

15 while it is apparently the case t h a t the English speakers feel the transitive verbs primary and the intransitive derivative, the relation b e t w e e n the two is exactly the other way around for the speakers of Japanese. Parallel to this is the notion of action. For the English speakers, action is f i r s t of all something g o a l - d i r e c t e d . For the Japanese speakers, the corresponding word suggests something undirectional --something perhaps closer to what is to be called 'activity '.

*This work is supported in part by a g r a n t from the Ministry of Education. The author is g r a t e f u l to Professor D. L. Bolinger for a number of interesting comments on an e a r l i e r version of the present paper.

REFERENCES CITED

Anderson, J. 1971. The Grammar of Case: Towards a Localistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bolinger, D. 1977. Meaning and Form. London: Longman. Fillmore, C. J. 1969. 'Toward a Modern Theory of Case'. In D. A. Reibel and S. A. Shane, eds., Modern Studies in English. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.

304

Ikegami:

'Activity'-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'

Green, G. 1974. Semantics and Syntactic Regularities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Gruber, J. 1967. 'Look and See'. Language 43. Ikegami, Y. 1973. 'A Set of Basic P a t t e r n s f o r the Semantic Structure of the Verb'. Linguistics 117. Ikegami, Y. 1978. 'How Universal is a Localist. Hypothesis? A Linguistic Contribution to the Study of "Semantic Styles" of Language'. Trier: Linguistic Agency, University of T r i e r . In R. Faucet, M. A. K. Halliday, S. M. Lamb and A. Makkai (Eds.). Semiotics of Culture and Language: 49-79 (Vol. I) Frances Pinter (Publishers) London and Dover, N. H. K a r t t u n e n , L. 1971. 'Implicative Verbs'. Language 47. Poutsma, H. 1926. A Grammar of Late Modern English. Part I I , Section II. Groningen: Noordhoff. Quirk, R. et al. 1972. A Grammar of Contemporary English. London: Longman. Riddle, E. 1975. 'Some Pragmatic Considerations on Complementizer Choice'. CLS 11. Vendler, Z. 1967. Linguistics and Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

POSITIONAL TENDENCIES OF ENGLISH RELATIVE CLAUSES AS EVIDENCE FOR PROCESSING STRATEGIES

Gary D. Prideaux University of Alberta In his pioneering paper 'Immediate c o n s t i t u e n t s / Rulon Wells (Wells, 1947) addressed a problem which was at the time central to grammatical analysis, namely the formulation of a methodology which would yield the 'proper' constituent structure analysis for sentences. 1 F u r t h e r m o r e , Wells m a i n ­ tained t h a t 'One of the prime functions of analysis into ICs is to reveal a formal d i f f e r e n c e correlated with the seman­ tic one.' Although the t h r e e and a half decades since the publication of Wells' paper have seen considerable progress t o w a r d establishing correct constituent structure analyses, the issue is still by no means s e t t l e d . The relationship between (surface) syntactic structure and semantic r e p r e ­ sentation has once again become a prominent issue. M o r e ­ over, a similar, although somewhat broader issue has also emerged - - t h a t of the psychological reality of the constit­ uent structures posited by the linguist. It has become com­ monplace to r e q u i r e t h a t syntactic representations be e v a l ­ uated against the structures which native speakers actually assign to sentences. I n d e e d , much of experimental psycholinguistics over the past two decades has been devoted to this issue in one guise or another. Within this research o r i e n t a t i o n , the present paper addresses one type of constituent s t r u c t u r e , the English relative clause, and raises two r e l a t e d questions: Is t h e r e a positional p r e f e r e n c e for relative clauses, and if so, what governs such a preference? The overall aim of the research r e p o r t e d h e r e , which is a small p a r t of an extensive series of studies dealing with the acquistion, comprehension, and production of relative clauses in several languages, is to

306

Prideaux: Positional Tendencies

garner evidence for the employment strategies in language processing.

of

certain

cognitive

Since English permits relative clause formation on NPs playing virtually any grammatical role, most linguistic descriptions focus on the syntactic properties of the s t r u c ­ t u r e s , while ignoring the question of whether or not t h e r e might be p r e f e r r e d sentential positions for NPs modified by relative clauses. It is usually claimed t h a t NPs modified by relative clauses can occur anywhere in a sentence, so long as the head NP meets the appropriate conditions. This view assumes t h a t t h e r e is no p r e f e r r e d position for relative clauses in English. The question arises, however, w h e t h e r the assumption of no p r e f e r r e d position is empirically j u s t i ­ f i e d , and in fact t h e r e is some reason to suspect t h a t it is not. In p a r t i c u l a r , a s e n t e n c e - f i n a l p r e f e r r e d position would follow from Slobin's (1973) ' a n t i - i n t e r r u p t i o n ' hypothesis, which states t h a t sentences containing subordinate clauses which i n t e r r u p t the main clause, such as ( 1 ) , should be more d i f f i c u l t to process than those whose subordinate clauses do not i n t e r r u p t the main clause, as ( 2 ) . (1) (2)

Some guys who had been drinking arrived late. Some guys arrived late who had been drinking.

In f a c t , sentences with extraposed clauses such as (2) t e n d to be more f r e q u e n t and are also usually judged as more acceptable than sentences with i n t e r r u p t i n g clauses, such as ( 1 ) . Moreover, empirical evidence from both l a n ­ guage comprehension and language acquisition lend support to the a n t i - i n t e r r u p t i o n hypothesis (cf. Clark & Clark, 1977; Prideaux, 1979; Sheldon, 1974; Slobin, 1973). The question to be addressed here is w h e t h e r or not such a principle is also operative in language production. Experimental studies in language production are n o t o r i ­ ously d i f f i c u l t to carry o u t , simply because subtle and com­ plex techniques are r e q u i r e d to elicit the kinds of i n f o r m a ­ tion the e x p e r i m e n t e r needs, while maintaining a n a t u r a l and non-contaminating environment. While it is simple to instruct subjects to produce sentences with relative clauses, a typical subject strategy under this condition is to focus a t t e n t i o n on the forms and ignore the usual functions of

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

307

such structures. In f a c t , I once t r i e d that technique by giving subjects a simple topic (ordering a meal) and instructing them to construct as many sentences as they could about t h a t topic in the space of five minutes, with the constraint that each sentence should contain a t least one relative clause. The obvious subject strategy should have been a n t i c i p a t e d , namely that subjects would t r y to get their relative clauses in as early as possible in each sentence. This resulted in a preponderance of relative clauses on subject NPs and very f e w elsewhere. What is needed in sentence production studies is some means to tap natural speech in a systematic way. One obvious way is to examine t e x t s , and especially those w r i t t e n materials which purport to r e p r e s e n t the spoken language. Novels with a large amount of dialogue are a n a t u r a l place to s t a r t . In the present study it was t h e r e f o r e decided that texts would be examined to determine if t h e r e w e r e any positional p r e f e r ­ ences f o r relative clauses. In addition to looking for positional tendencies, how­ e v e r , it was decided to t a b u l a t e , for each sentence con­ taining a relative clause, a considerable amount of syntactic i n f o r m a t i o n , including the grammatical function of the NP on which the relative clause was f o r m e d , the form and function of the relative pronoun, the sentence type, the voice of both the main and embedded clauses, and the d e f initeness of the NP on which the relative clause was f o r m e d . The properties tabulated can be found in Tables 1 and 2, which summarize some of the overall results. The next question was what texts should be used, and how many pages of each should be sampled. This decision is of necessity a r b i t r a r y : we w a n t e d to obtain as much data as possible within a practical time span and we also wanted a v a r i e t y of types of d a t a . It was decided to sample from two r a t h e r distinct works of fiction and from two works of n o n - f i c t i o n , varying in orientation and formality. The f i r s t novel sampled was Walter F. Murphy's The Vicar of Christ (Murphy, 1979), chosen because it is w r i t t e n in the f i r s t person and a t t e m p t s to r e p r e s e n t the direct speech of four d i f f e r e n t characters. Fifty pages w e r e sampled from the early part of the book (cited as VC(a) in the Tables), r e p ­ resenting the speech of a r e t i r e d Marine sergeant, and another 50 pages w e r e taken from a later part of the book

308

Prideaux: Positional Tendencies

(VC(b)), where the speaker is a r e t i r e d U.S. Supreme Court Justice. Interestingly, the language and structures employed by the two characters d i f f e r drastically, reflecting the author's skill in portraying the two men. In the one h u n ­ dred pages examined, every sentence containing a relative clause was analyzed. The second work of fiction examined was the The Empire Strikes Back (Glut, 1980), and 50 running pages of this book (ESB) w e r e also examined.

TABLE 1. Text

Type 0 Q

MAIN CLAUSE FREQUENCY DATA

Voice I n t e r . A P I

Modified NP Role Definite DO OP COMPDef Indef

NI S

VC(a) VC(b) E5B YL I

129 124 123 131 184

2 2 1 4 0

126 5 33 98 122 4 31 95 111 13 26 98 131 4 45 90 168 16 77 107

ỏỏ 39 58 29 31 50 34

34 27 31 49

45 53 46 92

= interrupted NI=non-interrupted 0P=object of a preposition C0MP=subject

TABLE 2. Text S

28 1 28 0 11 3 20 6 43 12

68 65 55 69 132

63 61 69 66 52

complement

RELATIVE CLAUSE FREQUENCY DATA

Role of RP DO OP X

VC (a)90 VC(b) 86 ESB 101 YL 97 I 107

12 18 13 8 9

12 17 9 12 22

Relative Pronoun who whomwhich t h a t Χ

26 52 9 36 30

0 5 1 1 11

0 2 6 11 94

β

Voice A Pt Pnt

38 5 62 123 8 0 34 11 22 119 5 2 46 8 54 98 14 12 31 9 47 121 12 2 8 18 23 155 22 7

X="other" (grammatical role or relative pronoun) Pt=truncated passive P n t = n o n - t r u n c a t e d passive

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

309

The two works of n o n - f i c t i o n selected w e r e You and the Law (YL), a Reader's Digest (1973) guide purporting to provide guidance in legal m a t t e r s , and a scholarly t e x t , An Introduc­ tion to Chaucer ( I  ) , (Hussey, Spearing, & Winney, 1965). Twenty-five running pages w e r e sampled f r o m each of these texts. The overall results of the frequency counts are p r e ­ sented in Tables 1 and 2. It is clear from Table 1 t h a t the vast majority of sentences containing relative clauses w e r e declaratives, with an overwhelming percentage of them in the active voice. Since the vast majority of relative clauses w e r e n o n - i n t e r r u p t i n g ( i . e . , in s e n t e n c e - f i n a l position), it is useful to examine the i n t e r r u p t i o n phenomenon somewhat more closely at this point. If a relative clause modifies a subject NP, it might be expected to be i n t e r r u p t i n g since an English subject NP is p r e v e r b a l , while a relative clause attached to any post-verbal NP might be either i n t e r r u p t i n g or n o n - i n t e r r u p t i n g , depending on the position of the mod­ ified NP.

TABLE 3.

INTERRUPTION AND DEFINITENESS

Text 5 Det I NI

VC(a) VC(b)

ESB YL I

8

11 15 23 32

3

FREQUENCIES

Function of Modified NP DO OP Indef Def Indef Def Indef I NI I NI I NI I NI I NI

5

6

1 8 9 3 7 6 2 15 10 2 0 0

2 12

5 1 1 1

12 11 15 29

1 1 0 2 0

23 9 18 5 19 2 14 2 17 11

27 22 31 21 52

COMP Def indef I NI I NI

4

8

2

3

1

0 1 2 7

16 20 20 24

1 0 0 0

8 7 6 5

0 9 0 6 0 2 1 3

6

However, the facts w e r e not so simple as this. In p a r t i c u ­ lar, some subject NPs w e r e found to have n o n - i n t e r r u p t i n g relative clauses, in cases like (2) above. The frequency data for interrupting and non-interrupting relative clauses, tabulated according to the grammatical role and d e f i n i t e ness of the modified NP, f o r each of the five texts, are presented in Table 3. It is clear t h a t there is a stronger tendency f o r relative clauses to be f o r m e d on non-subject

310

Prideaux: Positional Tendencies

NPs than on subject NPs, and Table 3 reveals a strong p r e f e r e n c e for n o n - i n t e r r u p t i n g relative clauses quite i n d e ­ pendent of the definiteness of the modified NP. Chi-square tests w e r e p e r f o r m e d on the i n t e r r u p t e d versus n o n - i n t e r ­ r u p t e d frequencies for each of the five sources, and in all cases the non-interrupting structures w e r e significantly more f r e q u e n t (p<.001) than i n t e r r u p t i n g ones (see Table 4 ) . However, t h e r e is no significant p r e f e r e n c e for a NP with a relative clause to be d e f i n i t e or i n d e f i n i t e , except in the case of the Introduction to Chaucer t e x t , in which t h e r e appears to be significant p r e f e r e n c e for d e f i n i t e NPs to be modified by relative clauses. ( X 2 ( 1 ) = 1 4 . 1 1 , p<.001). The data r e p r e s e n t e d in Table 3 lend strong support to the a n t i - i n t e r r u p t i o n hypothesis, not only for texts p u r p o r t ­ ing to r e p r e s e n t spoken English, but also f o r n o n - f i c t i o n . One surprising fact emerging from the t e x t counts is the strength of non-interruption even for relative clauses formed on subject NPs. In all the texts except f o r the Chaucer introduction, many subject NPs had n o n - i n t e r r u p t i n g relative clauses, especially on i n d e f i n i t e NPs. Such s t r u c ­ t u r e s w e r e in fact o f t e n there- structures in which the subject position was occupied by there and the nominal sub­ ject was positioned at the end of the sentence, as in (3) There was also some sign t h a t I couldn't read at all. (VC(a), p. 7) There w e r e also r a r e cases of d e f i n i t e subject NPs with non-interrupting relative clauses, usually instances of a final NP standing in apposition to the surface subject, as in (4) Two previous missions with the same object had been dispatched soon a f t e r Rich­ ard's succession, both of which Chaucer may have accompanied. ( I  , p. 7) It might of course be argued t h a t such NPs should not be characterized as subjects at all.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

TABLE 4.

INTERRUPTION X2 TESTS

Text

I

VC(a) VC(b) ESB YL I

33 31 26 46 52

***

311

NI

Chi-square

98 95 103 90 132

82.25*** 32.51*** 45.96*** 14.54*** 34.78***

p<.001

Nevertheless, it is interesting t h a t the therestructures, which in certain cases allow n o n - i n t e r r u p t i n g subject r e l a ­ tives, are limited to the subject, precisely that grammatical role which otherwise would not permit non-interrupting relatives. If t e x t counts are any indication of production strategies, the a n t i - i n t e r r u p t i o n hypothesis appears to have considerable salience in sentence production. The issue of definiteness has also been shown to play an important role in language use, especially in conjunction with the Given-New strategy, which states that Given i n f o r ­ mation, namely information known to both the speaker and addressee, is separated f r o m a n d , f o r English, typically precedes New information. There is a vast amount of empirical evidence f o r the Given-New strategy f r o m e x p e r i ­ mental psycholinguistics ( e . g . , Clark & Clark, 1977; Clark & Haviland, 1974; Smyth, Prideaux & Hogan, 1979). Givon (1979) has also o f f e r e d evidence f r o m text counts in its support. In p a r t i c u l a r , he noted that (p. 96) subject NPs are typically d e f i n i t e while direct object NPs are about equally divided among d e f i n î t e s and indefinites. Our t e x t counts support these conclusions, with significantly more definite than indefinite subjects (X2(1)=6.96, p < . 0 1 ) , and approximately equal d e f i n i t e and indefinite direct objects. Givon suggests t h a t the high f r e q u e n c y of d e f i n i t e subject NPs is governed by the f a c t that d e f i n î t e s are typically associated with Given i n f o r m a t i o n , and in English the grammatical subject is g e n ­ erally given. He f u r t h e r notes that there- structures are generally used to place New i n f o r m a t i o n , which might o t h -

312

Prideaux: Positional

Tendencies

erwise be subject, into a more normal place i n f o r m a t i o n , namely in a n o n - i n i t i a l position.

for

New

If a particular relative clause is used to introduce New i n f o r m a t i o n , the Given-New strategy will t e n d to place it in a final position, with the Given-New strategy bolstered by the a n t i - i n t e r r u p t i o n hypothesis. That is, the a n t i - i n t e r r u p ­ tion hypothesis can itself be viewed as a cognitive strategy which can work in tandem with other strategies. Pursuing the possibility that strategies can work t o g e t h e r , we can speculate along the following lines. If d e f i n i t e NPs are typically Given and indefinite NPs typically New, then in spite of the fact t h a t t h e r e w e r e approxi­ mately equal numbers of d e f i n i t e and indefinite NP direct objects in the t e x t s , one would still expect to find t h a t n o n - i n t e r r u p t e d indefinites significantly outnumber n o n - i n ­ t e r r u p t e d d e f i n î t e s . This follows from the fact t h a t if r e l a ­ tives are used to introduce New i n f o r m a t i o n , then by the Given-New strategy and by the a n t i - i n t e r r u p t i o n strategy, New relatives should be more o f t e n attached to indefinites than d e f i n î t e s and should be in final position. Only the data from the fiction sources (150 pages) o f f e r support for this speculation. In the fiction sources, t h e r e are significantly more indefinite direct objects with n o n - i n t e r r u p t i n g relative clauses than t h e r e are d e f i n i t e direct objects with n o n - i n ­ t e r r u p t i n g relative clauses (X 2 (1)=6.58, p<.02). The n o n - f i c ­ tion data do not lend support, and the most scholarly of the texts ( I  ) , actually shows a tendency to a large number of d e f i n i t e direct object NPs with n o n - i n t e r r u p t i n g relative clauses. Although there are many other interesting factors tucked away in these t e x t counts, one final item should be mentioned, and this concerns the frequency of various types of relative pronouns used in d i f f e r e n t texts. As can be seen from Table 2 , the most f r e q u e n t relative pronoun was that, with who running a close second. However, the absence of a relative pronoun ('Ø' in Table 2) was even more f r e q u e n t , in spite of the fact t h a t certain structural conditions must be met for the relative pronoun to be omitted. In VC(a), representing the speech of a M a r i n e , that and who w e r e both very common, while in VC(b), the elaborate speech of the r e t i r e d justice, a full spectrum of relative pronouns

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was employed. In f a c t , there is a striking similarity b e t w e e n VC(b) and the scholarly I, except that in the l a t t e r , the f o r m which appears an amazing 94 times. In summary, these data lend strong support to the anti-interruption hypothesis as well as providing limited support f o r the Given-New strategy. The most important result of this study, however, is the empirical establishment of pronounced positional tendencies which are governed by general discourse constraints. F u r t h e r m o r e , the syntactic tendencies favoring a s e n t e n c e - f i n a l p r e f e r r e d position f o r relative clauses and f o r indefinite over d e f i n i t e f i n a l direct objects with relative clauses strongly suggest t h a t those factors which play such important roles in language com­ prehension and acquisition, such as the Given-New and the n o n - i n t e r r u p t i o n strategies, are also involved in language production. The f a c t that such phenomena are manifest as tendencies and not as a l l - o r - n o t h i n g choices does not reduce their importance. In f a c t , the discourse tendencies r e f l e c t e d in constituent position p r e f e r e n c e s may well be more important than a r b i t r a r i l y postulated w o r d - o r d e r phe­ nomena associated with isolated sentences, simply because the f o r m e r r e f l e c t the operation of discourse constraints, which themselves f i n d a source in general cognitive p r i n c i ­ ples. The role of surface constituent s t r u c t u r e has emerged as a crucial factor in contemporary psycholinguistic research. Wells' early concern for the correct I analysis of sentences is still relevant today, for without an a p p r o p r i a t e constit­ uent structure analysis on which cognitive strategies can o p e r a t e , little progress could be made t o w a r d an u n d e r ­ standing of language acquisition, comprehension, or produc­ tion.

ENONOTES 1

This research was supported in p a r t by the Social Sci­ ences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Grant No. 55-2791. I am g r a t e f u l to Patricia J. Hunter for her c a r e ­ f u l tabulation of much of the data r e p o r t e d here.

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Prideaux: Positional Tendencies REFERENCES CITED

Clark, H. H., and E. V. Clark. 1977. Psychology and Language: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Clark, H. H., and S. E. Haviland. 1974. "Psychological p r o ­ (Ed.), cesses as linguistic explanation." In D. Cohen Explaining Linguistic Phenomena, Washington, D. C : Hemi­ sphere Press. Givon, T. On Understanding Grammar, New York: Academic Press. Glut, D. F. 1980. The Empire Strikes Back. New York: B a l l e n tine. Hussey, M., A. C S p e a r i n g , and J. Winney. 1965. An Introduction to Chaucer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Murphy, w. F. 1979. The Vicar of Christ. Toronto: Random House of Canada. Prideaux, G. D. 1979. "The acquisition of relative clauses: a functional analysis." Canadian Journal of Linguistics 24,25-40. Reader's Digest Association (Canada). 1973. You and the Law. M o n t r e a l : Reader's Digest Association (Canada), Ltd. Sheldon, A. 1974. "The role of parallel function in the acquisition of relative clauses in English." Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 13.272-281. Slobin, D. I. 1973. "Cognitive prerequisites for the develop­ ment of grammar." In  A. Ferguson & D. I. Slobin (Eds.), Studies in Child Language Development. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Smyth, R. H., G. D. Prideaux, and J. T. Hogan. 1979. "The e f f e c t of context on dative position." Lingua 4 7 . 2 7 - 4 2 . Wells, R. S. 1947. "Immediate constituents." Language 23.81-117.

IV HISTORICAL AND TYPOLOGICAL

LINGUISTICS

KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST

. F. Hockett ...historical thinking...is...based on the assump­ tion...that t h e r e is an internal or necessary con­ nexion between the events of a t i m e - s e r i e s such that one event leads necessarily to another and we can argue back from the second to the f i r s t . On this principle t h e r e is only one way in which the present state of things can have come into existence, and history is the analysis of the present in order to see what this process must have been. R. G. Collingwood 1 Our concern in this essay is the epistemology of history, especially the limitations on attainable knowledge of the past. For clarity we establish and shall maintain certain terminological distinctions. History is what has happened. The moiety of science devoted to the ascertainment of past states and events f r o m present evidence (which in the nature of things is all the evidence we can have) is not history but historiography. Historiography thus subsumes not only the endeavors of the academic historian but also the explorations of ethnographers and archaeologists, of histori­ cal linguists, of paleontologists, of geologists and cosmologists, and even of police detectives or of a chemist e x a m ­ ining yesterday's laboratory notes before beginning today's experiments. Anyone playing this sort of game is a historian while playing it. There is no convenient colloquial cover t e r m f o r the other basic aspect of science, the search for general or (relatively) timeless facts. Some confine the coverage of "science" to this, but t h a t is at best a w k w a r d , at worst

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a r r o g a n t . Windelband's coinage nomothetic, in contrast to idiographic for the characterization of the specific, is scarcely Whether these or colloquial, but we shall make it serve. 2 other terms be p r e f e r r e d , the interconnections between the two moieties are in a general way clear. Both must take o f t from current everyday reality, since t h a t is where we always are. The two i n t e r p e n e t r a t e in t h a t our u n d e r s t a n d ­ ing of what has happened is conditioned by our notion of how things can and do happen (this is the import of the first sentence of the passage from Collingwood); in t u r n , our generalizations necessarily derive not just from the observation of the moment but also from r e p o r t s , or memories, of earlier observations. Given this essay's goal, we must consider the n a t u r e of knowledge, and we must survey the possible kinds of his­ torical evidence and the methods of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the v a r i ­ ous kinds r e q u i r e . On knowledge, my assumption is a physicalist one: all historical knowledge is information (in the Shannonian sense 3 ) and thus subject to the physical constraints that apply to the transmission and storage of any sort of i n f o r ­ mation. 4 Nor may we suppose t h a t the constraints are sus­ pended for information being processed by a human mind, since that would r e n d e r the assumption f a i n e a n t . Beyond t h a t , to count as knowledge information must be t r u e and accessible. A lie told us in a language we know is accessible enough, and is i n f o r m a t i o n , but is not knowledge (though we may think it is). An ancient inscription that has not been deciphered may or may not be t r u e , but is not acces­ sible to us and is t h e r e f o r e not part of our k n o w l e d g e - until someone deciphers it. The boundary thus established between knowledge and " m e r e " information is fuzzy and i n d e f i n i t e , exactly as it should be. Historiography operates across the boundary, a t t e m p t i n g to convert " m e r e " i n f o r ­ mation into historical knowledge; the information that one hopes can be processed in this way is what is meant by historical evidence. An initial point of importance about every possible sort of historical evidence is t h a t , in addition to existing in the present (for t h e r e are no time machines), it must e n d u r e . Instantaneous observation is impossible. Evidence has to hold

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still long enough for an appropriate examination to be made, or else must move or change sedately, o r , if it moves f a s t , must go through a roughly repetitive cycle so that the r e c u r r e n t p a t t e r n of motion or change can be r e g i s t e r e d . In one or another of these ways, or possibly in some other fashion that I have overlooked, historical e v i ­ dence must be stable, 5 What does not have any sort of s t a ­ bility is a unique e v e n t , and no isolated e v e n t , no m a t t e r how accurately observed, permits any inference of any sort, either historical or nomothetic, so long as it remains unique. Imagine, f o r example, the impact of a solar eclipse on an isolated community which has neither memory nor legend of any such happening. We shall later encounter a more radical implication the stability of evidence, t u r n i n g on the physical n a t u r e information storage.

of of

A useful classification of evidence is into t h a t which derives, immediately or at some remove, from the observa­ tions of an eyewitness to an event or s t a t e , and that which does not. The f u r t h e r categorization of evidence of the first sort can be based on the complexity of the line of transmission from the eyewitness to the historian. Clearly the simplest case is that in which the historian was the eyewitness and relies on personal memory. Or the historian may elicit oral testimony from surviving participants in an event, thus exploiting the personal memories of the l a t t e r (Herodotus worked this way). Or accounts may reach the historian at second hand ("Joe was t h e r e and he told m e " ) , or at any imaginable f u r t h e r remove; if the remove is g r e a t and the links largely anonymous, we speak of "oral t r a d i ­ tion." But also, if at any point the line of transmission passes into a l i t e r a t e community, the information may be commit­ ted to w r i t i n g , and then t h e r e can be all manner of con­ versions between oral and w r i t t e n f o r m , or new copyings of old w r i t i n g s , and so on. Resort to w r i t i n g supplements or replaces internal storage (memory) by e x t e r n a l , and changes m a t t e r s radically because of two crucial d i f f e r e n c e s between these two types of information storage.

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The f i r s t d i f f e r e n c e is t h a t w r i t t e n records t e n d , by and large, to represent oral accounts more f a i t h f u l l y than does memory. To be s u r e , we can memorize a poem or a speech, and it is t r u e t h a t specialists in some societies p e r f o r m feats of verbatim memorization t h a t are u t t e r l y astounding to us lazy l i t e r a t i . But I think t h a t more nearly typical is our European-American way of handling jokes. We don't memorize a joke. We do tuck away certain crucial parts of the w o r d i n g , a change in which would pull or t e l ­ egraph the punch, but the rest we remember in situational rather than verbal t e r m s , and construct a suitable wording when we need it. Most oral t r a d i t i o n is probably like t h a t . The other d i f f e r e n c e between w r i t i n g and memory is that an internal record endures at most a l i f e t i m e , whereas an inscription or a manuscript may last for centuries or millennia before it has crumbled or faded beyond legibility. These two primary d i f f e r e n c e s combine interesting secondary consequences.

to

produce

two

The f i r s t consequence rests also on the w e l l - k n o w n fact that all human languages, by t h e i r very n a t u r e , are con­ stantly c h a n g i n g - - i n vocabulary, in g r a m m a r , in pronuncia­ tion. The successive recountings of an oral t r a d i t i o n tend to keep pace with the changing habits of speech, so that the historian normally receives a t r a d i t i o n in a "living" l a n ­ guage: that is, one in active use by some of the historian's contemporaries. But it is a commonplace to be confronted by w r i t t e n records in forms of speech no one has used for many generations, so that the most superficial u n d e r s t a n d ­ ing of them demands years of diligent study. Today we even have on hand a sizable stock of texts that no one in mod­ e r n times has yet managed to decipher. The other consequence t u r n s on the fact that the nois­ iest episodes in the transmission of a t r a d i t i o n are when it is being converted from one record ( i n t e r n a l or e x t e r n a l ) to another. The apprentice s t o r y - t e l l e r does not learn the narrative quite as his master has told it, and copyists make mistakes. Here, again, we must allow for some remarkable cases of precise w o r d - o f - m o u t h transmission; for example, that of the Vedas. 6 But those are surely the exception. Because w r i t t e n records a r e , by and large, more f a i t h f u l , more accurately copied, and more durable than memories,

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they can in e f f e c t shorten the line of transmission f r o m eyewitness to historian. In this sense, some e a r l i e r events are closer to us today than some more recent ones. The settlement of Hawaii began around A.D. 700; the story of the settlement was then passed down orally f o r some f i f t y generations before anyone who knew it acquired the t e c h ­ nology to w r i t e it down. The Greco-Persian Wars w e r e fought twelve hundred years e a r l i e r , around 500 B.C., but participants spoke directly to Herodotus, and Herodotus speaks almost directly to us. In t u r n i n g now toward the second f u n d a m e n t a l type of historical evidence, the sort in which eyewitnesses play no p a r t , let us f i r s t examine a f e w cases t h a t might be taken as borderline. What if the eyewitness is not human? Even human eyewitnesses are useless if they cannot in some fashion tell others what they have witnessed; and nonhuman animals cannot talk. But in some cases a dog and its keeper might understand each other so well t h a t the f o r m e r could convey an accurate report of a limited sort to the l a t t e r . Or sup­ pose a chimpanzee who has been t r a i n e d in American Sign Language is the sole witness to a m u r d e r - - o t h e r , of course, than the m u r d e r e r , who has good reason to keep quiet about i t . 7 That the testimony of such a witness would require sifting and checking of an unusual kind does not keep it from being testimony. In f a c t , "nonhuman animals cannot talk" was too brusque an assertion; it is t r u e only if we i n t e r p r e t "talk" in a narrowly literal and unprofitable sense. What if the "eyewitness" is a machine? A hidden camera records a bank robbery in which the bandits escape and everyone else is killed. When the police examine the d e v e l ­ oped f i l m , are they eyewitnesses to the event or are they merely studying evidence supplied by a mechanical e y e w i t ­ ness? A cloud chamber in a physics laboratory records the passage of a p a r t i c l e , and the physicist scrutinizes the pho­ tograph of the path. There is a d i f f e r e n c e between these two cases, in that a bank robbery can in principle have human eyewitnesses, even if in the particular case no use­ ful ones w e r e available a f t e r the f a c t , whereas it is physi­ cally impossible to perceive an e l e m e n t a r y particle with the

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unaided senses. But why must the senses be unaided? We could consider the cloud chamber to be a device for sensory prosthesis, something like eyeglasses, microscopes, and hearing aids, and t h a t would necessitate only a slight r e d e ­ finition of "observe." Perhaps one could also justifiably speak of the hidden camera in this alternative way. We should not strive to force these examples into the one category or the other. I think this is another genuinely fuzzy boundary, and t h a t some cases strike us as on the borderline because that is where they a r e . Quite d i f f e r e n t is the fact t h a t a single piece of s t u f f can be at one and the same time evidence of both principal sorts, in 1734 a golden drinking horn bearing a runic inscription was found near Gallehus in southern Denmark. 8 It is said to date from about A.D. 400. Though placed in a museum for safekeeping, in 1802 it was stolen and melted down tor the gold. The inscription had been carefully cop­ ied, so that the verbal evidence was not lost. Upon d e c i ­ pherment and translation it is revealed as a t r a d e m a r k , perhaps also an expression of pride of craftsmanship: " I , Fameguest of the Forest Clan, made the horn." But the exact size, shape, m a t e r i a l , and workmanship of the a r t i f a c t w e r e also historical evidence, from which, using t w e n t i e t h century techniques, we might have been able to make divers interesting inferences about the artisan and his times; and all those vanished. A special property of verbal evidence, which is the kind an eyewitness g e n e r a t e s , is t h a t the information has been subjected to an a r b i t r a r y coding (the semantic conventions of the eyewitness's language). To recover the information one must know, or discover, the code. In the case of our second g r e a t category of evidence t h e r e is no such encod­ ing. 9 The golden horn was itself evidence of its having been made; its size and shape w e r e evidence of its having been made in approximately t h a t size and shape (of course, one must allow for w e a r and t e a r ) . An event is o f t e n the coming together of a number of things, followed by t h e i r moving a p a r t , some of them more or less a l t e r e d by the contact or with scraps of others still adhering to t h e m . If we know what some of the things must have been like before they came t o g e t h e r , and if our evidence is what

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

they are like subsequently, we may be able to infer the nature of the contact. We have grounds for believing that gold does not come in the form of drinking horns unless wrestled into that shape by human action, so without the inscription on the horn we could still have inferred quite a lot. Again: here is a corpse with a knife wound, and here nearby is a knife that f i t s the wound, with fingerprints on it, and under the victim's fingernails are some shreds of cloth; elsewhere we f i n d fingers to match the fingerprints and torn garments to match the shreds; we infer not only what things and persons came together but also something of the details of their interaction. None of these bits of evidence, be it noted, has anything to do with observations made by participants in or bystanders at the event. Because human observers have been around only for a few tens of thousands of years and were until yesterday confined to a thin shell at Earth's surface, our second category of evidence is enormously more inclusive than the f i r s t . It is also very diverse, so that its interpretation requires a whole spectrum of specialists. Starting outwards (so to speak) from the documentary historians and f i e l d work ethnographers who deal with immediate observations and with verbal testimony, we come f i r s t to the archaeolo­ gists, whose evidence is the structure of the inactive noosphere: that is, that portion of our environment that has been reshaped by human action, especially those rich con­ centrations of human byproducts in the cesspools, grave­ yards, garbage dumps, slag heaps, trash piles, and aban­ doned buildings of the w o r l d . 1 0 The archaeologist's realm obviously overlaps those of the ethnographer and documen­ tary h i s t o r i a n - - f o r example, a vital part of our evidence f o r the building of roads by the Romans is the surviving Roman roads. In the other direction, the archaeologist gets entangled with the palaeontologist, whose special evidence is pieces of dead organisms and imprints of such pieces in other matter: the inactive biosphere, that portion of Earth that has been reshaped by the action of living forms. All the foregoing--all the foregoing, which means the documen­ tary investigation of human history along with the r e s t - - a r e branches of historical geology, whose evidence f o r the his­ tory of our planet is its current structure. The interplay is highlighted by the way the geologist dates strata partly from fossils and the palaeontologist dates fossils partly

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from s t r a t a ; the "partly" keeps this from being vitiated by circularity. And beyond geology is cosmology, which i n f e r s the history of the universe from its c u r r e n t l y observable structure and behavior.

Concern with a particular past state or event implies the maintenance of some sort of coordinate system for the location of events relative to one another in space and time. All human languages supply machinery of this sort, at least f o r a small neighborhood around the h e r e - n o w . All human communities engage in talk about the past and about the f u t u r e . Thus it would seem t h a t at least some r u d i ­ mentary "sense of history" is built into our basic n a t u r e as a species. We perceive the world in f o u r dimensions, not t h r e e . The "specious present," the world of immediate p e r ­ ceptual reality, involves time as well as space, for we know that the annoying itch and the relieving scratch are distinct though the one is not to the l e f t of, above, or behind the other, and we hear a melody (or a sentence) as a unit even as we recognize t h a t its notes (or words) occur in succession. How much of all this is t r u e of other animals is hard to say, but in view of recent findings (remember the e d u ­ cated apes) we should not be too sanguine about our sup­ posed species specificities. About d i f f e r e n c e s from one human culture to another we know a good deal more. Our ethnographic i n f o r m a t i o n , however incomplete in some respects, is rich enough to j u s ­ t i f y the assertion t h a t the drive towards an objective histo­ riography, the desire to know what has really happened in other than a restricted proximate past, is very r a r e . When we proclaim that we have t h a t drive in our own Western society, we mean only t h a t some people have i t , at least about some events, some of the t i m e . Every human commu­ nity has a degree of awareness of its antecedents, but the commonest situation is for memories and traditions to be spiced with imagination and twisted by wishful thinking and personal or subgroup i n t e r e s t , so t h a t the more remote a remembered past, or the more emotionally charged a recent

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e v e n t , the less accurate are the accounts of it. Literacy makes little difference in this, f o r oral deceit or distortion is as easily committed to w r i t i n g as oral honesty. We have no right to f a u l t people f o r that. If, f o r example, it is brought to our a t t e n t i o n t h a t the Menominee Indians used to bring up their children on stories of the exploits and mishaps of Big Rabbit, told as though they actually happened in a primeval past, our proper assessment is not that this was bad historiography but t h a t it was not The whole function of narration historiography at a l l . 1 1 and tradition was something else. In our culture we d i s t i n ­ guish in principle, if not always successfully in practice, between historiography and mythopoiesis. For the Menominee there was no such functioning contrast (there w e r e others, some of them quite alien to us). And not even we history buffs propose that literal historical t r u t h is the only kind. But an objective historiography does insist that t r u t h is more important than consequences. In detective stories the private eye sometimes warns a prospective client that if the eye takes the case the eye will see it through, even if the facts t u r n out to incriminate the client. Such a detective is the prototype of the t r u e historian. Just so, if we engage Darwin to investigate our ancestry, we cannot reject his findings merely because we deem it distasteful to be close kin to apes. 12 An objective historiography also insists that a hypothesis about the past must account for all the available evidence a n d , as we noted early in this essay, must be in agreement with our knowledge of how things happen. Those r e q u i r e ­ ments have been phrased in many d i f f e r e n t ways. For example, in the mid nineteenth century they constituted the essence of Lyell's principle of uniformitarianism in geology, as over against Cuvier's catastrophism which posited events in the past f o r which t h e r e was no p r e c e d e n t - - o r "postced e n t , " I suppose we should s a y - - i n our c u r r e n t experience. Another excellent exemplification of the r e q u i r e m e n t s is to be found in the comparative-reconstructive method of historical linguistics. This method is now almost two c e n t u ­ ries old, though not until the 1870s w e r e its principles e n t i r e l y clear, and even then they w e r e not set f o r t h so

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plainly as we can express them today. The field of historical linguistics is so specialized (though not, I think, esoteric) that its major method is probably the least widely u n d e r ­ stood of all techniques of historical i n f e r e n c e . That is r e g r e t t a b l e , since in it the necessary assumptions of histo­ riography are w r i t so large t h a t it can help us understand all other methods, as I shall now a t t e m p t to show.

The nomothetic basis for the comparative method of linguistics is (in p a r t ) as follows. In any human community the conventions of speech are constantly changing. All speakers introduce innovations, but the necessary use of the language for practical purposes serves constantly to recalibrate the habits of d i f f e r e n t individuals, so that everyone continues to be able to understand most of what anyone else says. If a community grows large and sprawling, so that people at its opposite edges have little direct con­ t a c t , neighbors continue to understand one another but the usages of nonneighbors can become divergent. And if a community splits into daughter communities out of touch with one another, then in the course of something between one and two thousand years the divergences are so g r e a t t h a t mutual intelligibility is gone. There are then two or more languages where before t h e r e was but one. English and German are a p e r f e c t example: they are obviously no longer the same language, but they are (and will always remain) related languages. The fact that two or more languages w e r e once the same language is o f t e n easily discernible, even under casual inspection, and in many cases where the connection would not be a p p a r e n t to a layman it can be demonstrated beyond all shadow of a doubt by the specialist. Any language, together with all languages r e l a t e d to i t , constitutes a fam­ ily of languages: for example, I n d o - E u r o p e a n . It is also con­ venient to speak of subfamilies: languages r e l a t e d more closely to one another than to others of the same more inclusive family. Thus Germanic is a subfamily of I n d o - E u r o ­ pean. If two languages are r e l a t e d , t h e r e are words in each that trace back in unbroken t r a d i t i o n to the same p r o t o ­ types in the single ancestral language. Such words are cog-

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nates. Obvious examples f r o m English and German are man and Mann, or wife and Weib, or out and aus, or, indeed, any of several thousand other such pairs. The single ancestral language is called the proto language; in this case, Proto Germanic. The comparative method takes off from information about the daughter languages and a t t e m p t s to i n f e r as much as possible about (that is, to " r e c o n s t r u c t " ) the proto language. The method proceeds by t r i a l and e r r o r . One assembles sets of what look like they might be cognates, formulates provisional ancestral prototypes, and checks for consistency. If certain sorts of discrepancies t u r n up, one adjusts and t r i e s again. There are two conditions that must be met if an a t t e m p t e d reconstruction is to be deemed successful -- and here comes the equivalent in historical linguistics of Lyell's uniformitarianism. One is t h a t the reconstructed words, and the grammatical and phonetic p a t t e r n s i n f e r r e d from t h e m , be not only in a general way like those of languages known through direct observation but also, specifically, similar to those of the daughter languages used for the reconstruc­ tion. This is the criterion of synchronic realism. The other, the canon of diachronic realismt is t h a t the kinds and mecha­ nisms of change r e q u i r e d for the implied line of develop­ ment of each daughter language from the ancestor be just those known or i n f e r r e d from direct observation and from reliable w r i t t e n records. Is t h a t enough? Might not the r e q u i r e m e n t s be equally well met by two apparently very d i f f e r e n t reconstructions, so t h a t we would have no way to choose between them? To be s u r e , t h e r e are numerous "holes" in reconstructions: m a t t e r s about which the uncertainty of the evidence must in all honesty be r e f l e c t e d by vagueness of s t a t e m e n t . But t h e r e is less of t h a t than one might expect. Voltaire was right in his day to characterize etymology as an enterprise in which the consonants count for little and the vowels for nothing at all. In our day t h a t is no longer so. We are able to rely on a crucial irreversibility in language change, discov­ e r e d by our n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y predecessors.

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Past

All historiographic methods rest on irreversibilities--a fact that must be discussed briefly before we can say more about the particular irreversibility just mentioned. If you are told t h a t , of two observations made one second a p a r t , one (which one not being specified) found the air pressure at both ends of a closed chamber the same, while the other found high pressure at one end and zero at the other, you have no trouble i n f e r r i n g which of these states came f i r s t . You have made a historical i n f e r e n c e , and you have based it on your knowledge of ( v i r t u a l ) i r r e v e r s i ­ bilities. True enough, the second law of thermodynamics is only a statistical g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , so t h a t it is not f l a t l y impossible f o r all the air in a chamber to rush suddenly to one e n d , but the probability of that event is extremely small, and you are surely right to make the more likely inference. The example is trivial because it is e x t r e m e , but t h a t also makes it clear. The r e f e r e n c e to the second law of thermodynamics is not out of place, f o r , as Blum says, it is Every historio­ entropy t h a t establishes "time's arrow." 1 3 graphic decision reduces to e l e m e n t a r y i n f e r e n t i a l acts like that described in the preceding p a r a g r a p h ; if it does not, it is not valid. In more general terms: t h e r e is evidence for two states of a f f a i r s (or e v e n t s ) , S1 and S2, separated in time but not in space. It is known t h a t one of these was succeeded by the o t h e r , but not which came f i r s t . Now S1 is of type Τ1 and S2 of type T 2 · It t h e r e is empirical e v i ­ dence t h a t type 1 can give way to type 7 2 , but t h a t the opposite order of succession is improbable, t h e n , obviously, it is i n f e r r e d t h a t S1 preceded S2; similarly in the converse case. Sometimes t h e r e is no such evidence, or the probabil­ ities are e v e n , or it is not clear to what types S1 and S 2 belong, so that no decision can be made. Or, if the prob­ abilities do not strongly favor one order or the other, the historical inference f o r the particular case is correspond­ ingly insecure. 1 4 A complete listing of historiographically useful i r r e v e r s i ­ bilities would be interesting --if feasible. It would have to include the following in addition to those already mentioned or due to be mentioned later in this essay: radioactive decay, the basis of radiocarbon and potassium-argon d a t i n g ;

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r a t e of accumulation of radioisotopes, which is the basis of dating by thermoluminescence in h i g h - f i r e d ceramic w a r e ; stratification (in general the lower s t r a t u m was laid down e a r l i e r ) ; organic growth ( t r e e rings); organic aging; racemization of isomers in organic m a t e r i a l ; the numbering by people of years or of r u l e r s — n o one r e f e r r e d to "King George the First" until there was a King George the Sec­ o n d - - ; a n d , on the grandest scale of a l l , the expansion of the universe, which is irreversible at least f o r our own multibillion-year e r a . 1 5

Turning back now towards historical linguistics, we must note t h a t it is not the only field in which t h e r e is a com­ parative method. There is a viable method of this type in the study of organic evolution, whereby one decides that a set of similar species are phylogenetically close and infers some of the properties of t h e i r common ancestor. The c r u ­ cial irreversibility here is t h a t of speciation: one species can become two, but—except possibly in the context of extremely recent sophisticated t i n k e r i n g in the a f f a i r s of other species by our o w n - - t w o species cannot become one. It is also t r u e that one language can split into two but that two cannot merge into one, and t h a t is a useful i r r e ­ versibility for historical linguistics. There is this d i f f e r e n c e : species cannot t r a d e genes, but languages can and do exchange words and p a t t e r n s . T h e r e f o r e , while a similarity between two species must be the result either of common inheritance (homology) or of parallel but independent development (analogy in the evolutionist's s e n s e 1 6 ) , a simi­ larity between two languages can be by virtue of common inheritance (cognation), parallel development ("accident"), or borrowing. Thus, although English plant and German Pflanze resemble each other in sound and meaning, they are not cognates; each was borrowed f r o m Latin. The fact of borrowing might seem to t h r e a t e n the f e a ­ sibility of the comparative method in linguistics, and, indeed, it makes trouble. Sometimes it is d i f f i c u l t or impossible to distinguish b e t w e e n similarities due to cogna­ tion and those due to borrowing, and whenever this dis­ tinction is b l u r r e d , so, in equal measure, are the results of the method.

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Past

But here another irreversibility comes to our aid: the one mentioned e a r l i e r , which has, so f a r as I know, no parallel in organic evolution or in human a f f a i r s outside of language. This is the irreversibility of sound shifts. Any l a n g u a g e — o r , b e t t e r , any d i a l e c t - - h a s , at any one t i m e , a stable sound system: a stock of contrasting speech sounds which have no meaning in themselves but which serve to keep words, and u t t e r a n c e s , a p a r t . Each language (or dialect) has its own sound system. The d i f f e r e n c e which in English serves to keep sing and thing a p a r t is alien to German; the d i f f e r e n c e which in German distinguishes Buch and buk is missing in English. The d i f f e r e n c e between Eng­ lish pin and bin recurs in German (Pein versus Bein), but in many languages is ignored completely. Stable a sound system is, or it could not p e r f o r m its function. But as time passes habits of pronunciation a l t e r somewhat, as do the correlated habits of h e a r i n g , and these gradual alterations can lead to a more or less sudden r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the system. Such a r e s t r u c t u r i n g is a sound shift. It a f f e c t s the pronunciation of some words, but the e f f e c t depends only on the older pronunciation of the words, not in any way on their meanings or t h e i r g r a m m a t ­ ical properties. For example, a sound shift in some dialect of English could coalesce t and ch before the vowel / (as in pin), so t h a t the words tin and chin would fall t o g e t h e r in pronunciation as chin, but leave t and ch distinct in other environments (so that tap and chap, for example, would be as d i f f e r e n t as b e f o r e ) . Such a shift would bother no one; we already have many sets of words that sound the same and that we t h e r e f o r e have to distinguish by context, and a few more would scarcely be noticed. But a sound shift could not coalesce t and ch in military t e r m s and leave them distinct in words having to do with love, or coalesce them in verbs and leave them distinct in nouns, because those proposed conditioning factors are semantic and g r a m ­ matical, not phonetic. It is t r u e that the pronunciation of words of a particular semantic or grammatical type is sometimes changed, but the mechanisms by which this hap­ pens seem to be totally d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of sound shifts. 17

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The irreversibility of a sound shift is all but obvious f r o m our example. The coalescence of e a r l i e r t and ch before i would modify the pronunciation of a large number of words that had nothing in common except a particular f e a t u r e of pronunciation; semantically and grammatically, the words would be scattered a t random through the vocab­ ulary. Now, in their use of language people are concerned primarily with meaning, r a r e l y paying much a t t e n t i o n to sound. In order f o r a community to undo the e f f e c t s of a sound shift, all its members would have to become etymolo­ gists and practical phoneticians. They would have to find out exactly which words now pronounced with chi w e r e f o r ­ merly ti words and which ones continue e a r l i e r chi words. They would have to r e l e a r n the pronunciation ti as we learn to pronounce unfamiliar sounds or combinations of sound in a f o r e i g n language. And then they would have to restore the ti pronunciation just in those words t h a t used to have it, constantly vigilant against slipping into chi where it doesn't belong, and against "overcorrecting" and restoring ti in a word that never had it. Even a single slip would mean that the reversal was not complete. Need I say more? Sound shifts help us to distinguish b e t w e e n cognation and borrowing in t h a t , if a f o r m is taken into a language at a certain t i m e , it is subject to all subsequent sound shifts in the history of the borrowing language but not, of course, to any that took place e a r l i e r . Since changes in d i f f e r e n t languages are largely i n d e p e n d e n t , it is g e n e r a l ­ ly-- though, unfortunately, not invariably--the case that forms r e l a t e d by more recent borrowing are more alike in sound than those related by e a r l i e r borrowing, and that forms r e l a t e d by borrowing are more similar in sound than those r e l a t e d by cognation. French charité and English charity, related by a borrowing f r o m French into English of perhaps 800 years ago, are certainly more similar than are French cher, chère 'dear' and its English cognate whore. Sound shifts are by no means the only mechanism of linguistic change; a f u l l exposition of the comparative method would r e q u i r e a survey of all the others, together with a description in detail of how languages function at any one time (to the e x t e n t to which t h a t is understood). But the g r e a t guiding principle, the crucial factor without which Voltaire would be right and reconstruction would be

332 but an shifts.

Hockett: Knowledge of the erudite

guessing

game,

is

the

Past nature

of

sound

If we conceive of comparative methods in general in strict analogy with the comparative method of historical l i n ­ guistics, we are led to the following: A reliable compara­ tive-reconstructive method can be established for a p a r t i c u ­ lar type of system if (I) the system persists relatively unmodified, or replicates itself more or less exactly, as time passes; (2) the mechanisms by which the system changes involve identifiable irreversibilities; (3) the system can split into daughter systems; (4) such a split is e f f e c ­ tively irreversible; and (5) similarities among daughter sys­ tems t h a t r e f l e c t common inheritance can be distinguished, to a statistically significant e x t e n t , f r o m similarities due to other factors. Under this strict i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I am not sure there are any possible comparative methods other than those already devised and in use: one in historical linguistics; one in biological phylogenetics, already mentioned; and one in t e x ­ tual criticism and the descent of manuscripts, which was worked out in the eighteenth century and was the model for the others. Could w e , for example, regard the various separate bodies of our solar system as "daughter" systems inheriting certain properties f r o m the ancestral "proto" system, the primordial solar cloud? Do we not in f a c t take the asteroids to be descendants of an ancestral planet t h a t f e l l a p a r t , and i n f e r what we can of the planet's properties from the properties of its surviving pieces? Or, in human a f f a i r s , given that the diverse forms of Christianity to be found in the world today are all derived ultimately from the primitive Christianity of two millennia ago, despite many accretions from other sources, can we dissect and compare the c u r r e n t forms in such a way as to achieve a reliable portrayal of their common ancestor? Rather than trying to answer these questions as they have just been posed, I think it is more useful to modify our succinct characterization of the comparative method in the direction of g r e a t e r generality.

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333

In starting a reconstructive enterprise, the linguist brings together seemingly u n r e l a t e d bits of data in the hope that they will in fact have something to do with one another. (Of course one is guided in this by previous experience; even so, the hope is o f t e n vain.) Each datum is an observable consequence of unobservable causes. The causes are unobservable because they lie in the past. There are various imaginable causes f o r each consequence, all compatible with the linguist's knowledge of how things hap­ pen; it is that nomothetic knowledge that specifies certain dependable irreversibilities. If the various data in fact have something to do with one another, then just one of the imaginable causes is the same f o r a l l ; if just one of the imaginable causes is the same f o r a l l , then the various data in f a c t have something to do with one another. That sole shared imaginable antecedent is then i n f e r r e d to have been the actual antecedent. Collingwood's aphoristic precis of historiography, with which we began this essay, has now been fleshed out. As described in the preceding p a r a g r a p h , the comparative method of linguistics becomes paradigmatic for all possible historiographie methods, and all historiography can be char­ acterized as reconstruction.

Now we have the framework needed for of the limitations of historical knowledge.

a

consideration

We need not deal separately with the fact t h a t the storage capacity of the human b r a i n , no m a t t e r how sup­ plemented by libraries, is f i n i t e , since under our physicalist assumption that t u r n s out to be but a corollary of a more basic constraint. There is the obvious limitation t h a t historiography must involve abridgment. An accurate icon of what has happened in the past would occupy as much space and time as the happenings themselves, and t h e r e is no room for it. An exact reduced-scale model is prohibited by graininess. There has to be deletion. Kroeber faced up to this by concluding that the historian's task is not to tell what has happened but not to tell what has not h a p p e n e d . 1 8 That tells the historian not to add anything, but not what should be left

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Hockett: Knowledge of the

Past

out. The l a t t e r is left to be decided by interest and by the n a t u r e of the evidence.

the

historian's

Next consider the limitation inherent in the n a t u r e of historical evidence. I asserted e a r l i e r t h a t historical e v i ­ dence is necessarily stable. Historical evidence is stored i n f o r m a t i o n , and information can be stored only by estab­ lishing a stability. 1 9 But t h a t can be t u r n e d around. Any stability is stored i n f o r m a t i o n , evidence of the events t h a t established it. The establishment of a stability involves the commitment of a certain amount of the s t u f f of the u n i ­ verse to doing nothing m u c h - - t o just sort of hanging around. To be sure, all stability is really only metastability: in the long run all records decay. Just the same, a com­ mitment to stability is mutually exclusive with active p a r t i ­ cipation in events. In order for all events, starting at a certain t i m e , to be recorded, it would be necessary for an increasing portion of s t u f f to be committed to stability, and before long there would be no uncommitted s t u f f l e f t to participate in events. Complete records would preclude events, and so preclude t h e r e being anything for t h e r e to be a record of. (It would also, of course, preclude there being any historians.) Such a world would which we are a p a r t .

be very d i f f e r e n t

In the real w o r l d , the incompleteness record is a physical necessity.

from

of

the

the

one

of

historical

In the real w o r l d , the historical record is a multiple palimpsest. All our talk of accurate icons and scale models was just nonsense. A painting of a scene, no m a t t e r how realistic, is neither icon nor scale model, because it is a two-dimensional projection of a three-dimensional original. Just so, our historical record is a t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l p r o ­ jection of the four-dimensional past. A b u i l t - i n source of infidelity in any such projection is the reduction of d i m e n ­ sionality. We need a f o r c e f u l reminder of this, because of the nature of human perception. Although the painting is two-dimensional, our t r a i n i n g and binocular vision force us to perceive it in d e p t h . Similarly, although the historical record has no time in i t , our "sense of history" compels us to perceive it not just as a being but as a becoming. The

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335

perception-in-time is unavoidable; it may be shallow or d e e p ; it may be f a n c i f u l , as in mythopoiesis, or as accurate as possible, as in historiography; but it cannot be e x t i r ­ pated. What the historian produces becomes p a r t of the his­ torical record. The proper purpose of the historian is to focus some portion of the projection so as to yield as sharp an image as possible. What portion? That brings us back to the m a t t e r of interest as a possible source of limitations on historical knowledge. It is a commonplace t h a t the historian's p e r ­ spective, like everyone else's, is conditioned by idiosyncratic experience and by cultural heritage. Discussions of this sometimes overlook the fact t h a t the very cultural process t h a t channels people's concerns and perceptions also leads them to work out new ways and views. Cultural transmis­ sion, like genetic transmission, is a biological mechanism of innovation as well as of continuity; it is creative as well as conservative. Consequently, limitations of this sort, though real enough, are not very durable. F u r t h e r m o r e , we have learned t h a t what one g e n e r a ­ t i o n , or the laity, views as trivial or boring can t u r n out in the next g e n e r a t i o n , or in the hands of e x p e r t s , to be of crucial historiographie importance. Even today, most e d u ­ cated people would regard such a m a t t e r as the pronuncia­ tion of words as unworthy of more than occasional p r e ­ scriptive or Sunday-supplement a t t e n t i o n ; yet it has t u r n e d out that just in t h a t particular frivolity lies the critical key to the comparative-reconstructive method of linguistics. On the other hand, the necessary incompleteness of the historical record must have an impact on what we can come to be interested i n - - o n what our culture can t e l l us to be interested in. We are products and parts of a physical u n i ­ verse in which only some events leave enduring traces. For us to have arisen and to exist in such a universe, it must be t h a t we can get along without any precise idiographic knowledge of those events of which precise idiographic knowledge is inherently u n a t t a i n a b l e .

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Past

I don't mean such events as the f a t e of the lost f i r s t British colony on Roanoke Island. We may never know t h a t f a t e , but it is in principle possible that decisive evidence lies somewhere awaiting discovery. Somewhat d i f f e r e n t are the details of an event which is known to have happened, and which is the kind of event whose details can in principle be observed, but of which it is d e f i n i t e l y known t h a t no evidence of the details has sur­ vived. Yesterday a f t e r n o o n at 3 P.M., E.D.T., an exact count could have been made of the leaves still clinging to the maple t r e e in f r o n t of my window; but it wasn't. Of espe­ cial significance here are those situations where our human purposes require the discarding of information: for example, when a deck of cards is shuffled before a hand of bridge or poker. To use Superman's X-ray vision or some mechani­ cal equivalent in order to know the order of the cards a f t e r the shuffle is to cheat. Somewhere beyond t h a t lie those events which are in principle unobservable in d e t a i l . If I spill a bowl of sugar, is it possible to have recorded the exact positions of all the grains in the bowl before the spill so t h a t , a f t e r w a r d s , they can ail be carefully picked up with t w e e z e r s and restored exactly to their f o r m e r positions? If I pour a spoonful of sugar into my c o f f e e , can any record be made of the exact sequence in which the g r a i n s - - o r the molecules--dissolve? Can one label a molecule without destroying it? Can one determine the exact number of cells in a particular human b r a i n , or the exact number of stars in our galaxy? As we contemplate smaller and smaller things, or more and more numerous aggregates, we pass eventually through a hazy boundary beyond which precise determinations are both impossible and u n i m p o r t a n t . One's f i r s t reaction to the examples in the preceding paragraph is likely to be t h a t , since they are u n i m p o r t a n t , it does not m a t t e r that they are impossible. But t h a t misses the point. They are unimportant BECAUSE they are impossible. We encounter here not cases in which our interest limits historical knowledge, but just the contrary: cases in which the b u i l t - i n limits of historical knowledge constrain our interest.

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Life r e s t s - - ł i t e r a l l y - - o n the nondistinctiveness of some differences: some sets of similar things must be f r e e l y interchangeable. This is a constraint that culture (and genes) cannot overrule. It is the basis of the phonemic principle in language, and of its analogs in other phases of human (and other animal and plant) conduct; as Schrödinger pointed out, it is why we are so much bigger than e l e m e n ­ t a r y particleszo; and it is probably also why we are so much slower than light. These are nomothetic facts about our place in n a t u r e ; the limitations of historical knowledge that we have now surveyed are their idiographic c o u n t e r p a r t .

NOTES AND REFERENCES

This essay was originally p r e p a r e d f o r a symposium on " I n t e l l e c t and imagination: The limits and presuppositions of intellectual inquiry," the papers subsequently to be p u b ­ lished in a certain j o u r n a l . I found some of the papers at the meeting superb, others d r e a d f u l , but I could not see t h e n , and still cannot see now, that any of them except my own had anything to do with the announced topic. The journal's editor had a d i f f e r e n t view, and chose to exclude this essay, along with one o t h e r , f r o m the published v e r ­ sion. Rereading the piece a f t e r a t h i r t y - m o n t h cooling-off period, I come to the conclusion that he was unable to understand it chiefly because it is w r i t t e n in s t r a i g h t f o r ­ w a r d English instead of in pseudo-learned j a r g o n . That is by way of explanation, certainly not of apology. I would not o f f e r brummagem to Rulon S. Wells, who deserves nothing but our deepest thoughts. I am glad the editor acted as he d i d , so t h a t I am now f r e e to use this material in the best possible way. Some passages in the essay have been lifted almost bodily f r o m e a r l i e r writings: Man's Place in Nature (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973); " I n f o r m a t i o n , Entropy, and the Epistemology of History," in The View from Language (Athens: Univer­ sity of Georgia Press, 1977), pp. 2 9 0 - 3 2 2 ; a review in Current

338

Hockett: Knowledge of the

Anthropology 18:1.84-91, 1977; " I n American Speech 53:4.243-313, 1978.

Search

Past of

Jove's

Brow,"

1

Robin George Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, I946), p. 110. That I f i n d it convenient to use certain words in senses d i f f e r e n t from Collingwood's implies no criticism. I do disagree, however, with his idea of a f u n d a m e n t a l opposition b e t w e e n "history" and " n a t u r e " (in his sense of the two words). 2

Wilhelm Windelband, Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft (I894; r e p r i n t e d in Präludien, vol. 2, 5th edition Tübingen I9I5, pp. 136-160). But I learned the t e r m s from the work of the psychologist Gordon W. Allport; see, for example, his Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York: Holt, I937), p. 22. 3

Claude L. Shannon, "The Mathematical Theory of Com­ munication," Bell System Technical Journal (July and August I948), r e p r i n t e d I949 by University of Illinois Press ( U r b a n a ) . See also my review in Language 29.69-93 ( I 9 5 3 ) , r e p r i n t e d with an important correction in The View from Language, pp. I9-52. 4

The relation between information and nomothetic knowledge is not clear. In my I977 article ("Information, Entropy, ...") it is proposed t h a t a phonograph disc's knowl­ edge is idiographic while that of the phonograph is nomo­ thetic. Maybe that is right, but it g e n e r a t e s some r a t h e r puzzling questions. 5

"Metastable" would be more accurate (as we shall later a d m i t ) , but also more a w k w a r d . On this see especially Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, I948), pp. 7 I - 7 3 . 6

Jay Jasanoff tells me t h a t at least 500 years must have elapsed between the date of composition of the latest Vedic hymns and the introduction (around 300 B.C.?) of w r i t i n g into India. It is not known when t h e r e a f t e r the hymns w e r e f i r s t w r i t t e n down, but w o r d - o f - m o u t h t r a n s ­ mission continued, and even today the a g r e e m e n t of d i f f e r ­ ent oral traditions is striking.

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7

The r e f e r e n c e here is primarily to Washoe, the female chimpanzee raised on American Sign Language f o r the Deaf by Beatrice T. and R. Allen Gardner; but since their work began many other research programs of similar type have been u n d e r t a k e n . For an excellent summary of the findings of this research through early 1968, and f u l l bibliography, see Jane H. Hill, "Apes and Language," Annual Review of Anthropology 7.89-112 (1968). 8 Eric Valentine Gordon, An Introduction to (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1927), pp. 166 and 240.

Old

Norse

9

This is not quite correct, since some items t h a t cannot be strictly classed as w r i t i n g nevertheless have had m n e ­ monic or record-keeping functions, by partly arbitrary semantic conventions: among others, the quipus of the Andes, the wampum belts of aboriginal northeastern North America, the tattooed insignia of status on the arms of Creek w a r r i o r s . 10

W . I . Vernadsky, "The Biosphere and the Noosphere," American Scientist 33.1-12 (1945). "Noosphere" was V e r n a d s k / s coinage to accompany Lamarck's "biosphere." Of course, the noosphere is e n t i r e l y included in the biosphere; and both have "active" parts (living organisms) as well as the inac­ tive products of the metabolism and actions of organisms. 11 Accordingly, when the historian examines a Menominee folk tale as historical evidence, the question asked is not "Is it t r u e ? " but "What does it mean?" Collingwood, f o l ­ lowing Vico, says just this (The Idea of History, p. 2 6 0 ) ; his counsel coincides exactly with the ethnographer's aim of ascertaining and describing the "inside view" of a commu­ nity: how the world is s t r u c t u r e d for its members by their c u l t u r e ; what d i f f e r e n c e s they heed; what d i f f e r e n c e s they ignore.

12

| wish this example w e r e a century out of d a t e . Sadly, it is not. Even scientific circles are full of cryptocreationists. 13

Harold F. Blum, Time's Arrow and Evolution, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I968).

3d

edition

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Hockett: Knowledge of the Past

14 The historiographic cruciality of irreversibilities would seem to me to be unarguable. Yet there are scholars who think Occam's razor suffices to guide us to the right answers. Isidore Dyen and David F. Aberle proposed this in Lexical Reconstruction: The Case of the Proto-Athapaskan Kinship System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I974), pp. I8, 298, 323, 345, and elsewhere. When I objected in a review, their response (Current Anthropology 18:2.364, I977) was to quote from a pair of mathematical biologists (Ezio Marchi and Robert I. C. Hansell, "Generalizations on the Parsimony Question in Evolution," Mathematical Biosciences I7.II, I973) who, I would say, judging f r o m the quoted passage, have simply fallen into the same e r r o r . My original judgment stands (Current Anthropology I8:l.90, I977): "Occam's razor has no real bearing on Tightness, only on style. ... t h e r e is no convincing empirical evidence t h a t human a f f a i r s , or any other phenomena in the universe, conform to anyone's p e r ­ sonal standards of neatness, elegance, or simplicity. The enterprise of science, forsooth, is in part just the opposite of t h a t : namely, to adjust our sense of neatness, elegance, and simplicity into congruence with the facts of the u n i ­ verse."

15

Whether the expansion grinds to a halt and gives way to a contraction some tens of billions of years hence, or goes on f o r e v e r , is a question t h a t cosmologists cannot yet answer. If it does reverse, presumably everything else, including the second law of thermodynamics, gets t u r n e d around too. I think the consequences for historiography would be r a t h e r drastic. 15 The very d i f f e r e n t technical meaning linguistics is of course i r r e l e v a n t here.

17

of

"analogy"

in

0 n e of the scandals of t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y scholarship is t h a t today, a full century a f t e r sound shifts w e r e f i r s t distinguished from language changes of other sorts and their special properties w e r e n o t e d , t h e r e are still c a r d carrying linguists who do not understand them or who believe they do not happen. To one of my generation it is disheartening to find t h a t all the objections to the classical theory, and all the alternatives f o r i t , proposed in such recent papers as William S.-Y. Wang's "Language Change: A Lexical Perspective" (Annual Review of Anthropology 8 . 3 5 3 - 3 7 2 ,

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1979) were fully outlined and disposed of in I927 by Leonard Bloomfield ("On Recent Work in General Linguistics," Modern Philology 25,211-230, esp. sec. 6 ) . In mitigation, however, it must be acknowledged, f i r s t , that the terminology for the argument has never been really clear, so that critics are led to the wrong answers because they ask the wrong questions, a n d , second, that although the external facts of the case seem to many of us to be established beyond all reasonable doubt, the cause of sound s h i f t s - - w h a t it is that brings them a b o u t — r e m a i n s obscure. 18

Alfred L. Kroeber, "History and Science ogy," American Anthropologist 37:4.539-569 (1935).

in

Anthropol­

19 This information-theoretical axiom is discussed in detail in my 1977 paper ( " I n f o r m a t i o n , Entropy, ...". There I specified that the storage of information requires the establishment of a stable spatial a r r a y of matter. But that turns out not to be sufficiently g e n e r a l . It misses the basis of the comparative method of linguistics ( r e g u l a r i t y of cor­ respondences between cognates in related languages). Moreover, the Olbers darkness of night is not a stability of m a t t e r ; the Hubble red shift is not; the Penzias-Wilson background radiation at wavelength 7.35 cm is not; but all these are crucial evidence f o r the history of the universe [ s e e , f o r example, Steven Weinberg, The First Three Minutes (New York: Basic Books, 1977)]. So in the present essay I have replaced " m a t t e r " by the more inclusive (and vaguer) term "stuff."

18

Erwin Schrödinger, University Press, 1947).

What is Life? (Cambridge:

Cambridge

LEXICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND THE SEMANTIC HISTORY HYPOTHESIS

Isidore Dyen Yale University It seems useful to review the considerations that lie at the basis of lexical reconstruction. In 1976 Aberle and I published a book e n t i t l e d Lexical Reconstruction: the Case of the Athapaskan Kinship System (abbreviated DA) which was intended to provide anthropologists (1) with a method to follow in reconstructing the kinship system of a p r o t o - l a n g u a g e ; (2) with an example of such a reconstruction; (3) with a method of dealing with the l a t e r developments of the o r i g i ­ nal kinship into those of daughter languages, and (4) with arguments for the superiority of the method presented over e a r l i e r methods t h a t proceeded from d i f f e r e n t assumptions. Since some linguists have engaged in lexical reconstruction and followed d i f f e r e n t procedures f r o m ours, and since certain criticisms of the results of applying our procedure have been raised, it seems desirable to present the a r g u ­ ments for the method t h a t Aberle and I followed, h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as the DA method, and to deal with the c r i t i ­ cisms. The intent is not to maintain t h a t the method is above criticism but r a t h e r to provide the understanding necessary for criticism leading to its improvement a n d , if necessary, eventual replacement. Lexical reconstruction is a procedure of drawing i n f e r ­ ences regarding the meanings of etyma (or proto-lexemes). One might think t h a t the t e r m "semantic reconstruction" is more a p p r o p r i a t e , but in fact it is not the meanings which are being reconstructed. Indeed it is not e v e n , in g e n e r a l , semantic distinctions t h a t are being reconstructed; on the whole we cannot hope to reconstruct any significant portion

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of the semantic distinctions of a p r o t o - l a n g u a g e , nor even to reconstruct the total semantic range of a lexeme except by chance. What lexical reconstruction can aim at is the a t t r i b u t i o n of a specified meaning to a specified recon­ structed lexical f o r m . The reconstruction of the phonemic sequence of a proto-lexeme is - - at least on the whole - a direct implication of phonemic reconstruction. The i n f e r ­ ence of a particular meaning or set of meanings (not nec­ essarily exhausting all its meanings) of a proto-lexeme is the peculiar domain of lexical reconstruction. The a t t r i b u ­ tion of meaning to a proto-lexeme completes its recon­ struction. Lexical reconstruction is regarded in the DA method as strictly dependent on (1) the subgrouping and (2) the sets of cognates. Differences in the subgrouping or in the cog­ nate sets can engender d i f f e r e n t lexical reconstructions. Lexical reconstruction thus enhances the importance of subgrouping. Although the l a t t e r cannot be regarded as neces­ sary to phonemic reconstruction, it is in general necessary to the reconstruction of every other aspect of the p r o t o language as well as its lexical aspect. Hockett is somewhat misleading when he says of the DA method (1977:86): "Of course it is just the comparative method of linguistics..." This somewhat deprecating view - Blust superficially at least -is expanded upon by (1980:207) who says t h a t the DA method "amounts to little more than a formalization of the comparative method in historical linguistics." To be precise, the DA method is a formalization of one procedure within the comparative method, that procedure which deals with the a t t r i b u t i o n of a meaning to a reconstructed morpheme or lexeme.

Judged from the reactions to it, the formalization is successful in capturing the spirit of the comparative method as it is generally conceived. It is however a novel f o r m a l i ­ zation since it d i f f e r s in f o r m from any e a r l i e r f o r m a l i z a ­ t i o n ; in f a c t , t h e r e might be some d i f f i c u l t y in finding even an a t t e m p t at such a formalization. In the absence of such an e a r l i e r formalization it is even somewhat d i f f i c u l t to determine whether the formalization was part of the com-

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mon tradition of the Neo-grammarians and their followers, for though many lexical inferences regarding the meaning of etyma would agree with the conclusions reached by our procedure, it is also t r u e t h a t many would not. If, in f a c t , a simple understanding of the comparative method would lead to the same results, then our formalization would be "mere". At the same time it is no minor complication in making this type of estimate t h a t t h e r e is no widely accepted d e f i ­ nition of the linguistic comparative method. The definition that I employ is given in Dyen 1969:508 as follows: "The comparative method (is) the procedure by which inferences about past idiolects, dialects, and languages are drawn from the systematically matching linguistic m e a n i n g - f o r m s of d i f ­ f e r e n t observable or recorded idiolects." In the DA method lexical reconstruction proceeds from a comparison of the meanings of cognates. Since cognates are systematically matching meaning-forms by virtue of having associable meanings and systematically corresponding phonemes, lexical reconstruction is an application of the comparative method. A procedure for a t t r i b u t i n g a meaning to a lexical item has not generally a t t r a c t e d the interest of comparatists. One need only examine the meanings in DA assigned to reconstructed lexical units to test w h e t h e r the procedure that we presented was in fact intuitively followed by all comparatists. It was no minor consideration in the development of the DA method t h a t the study and classification of kinship systems concerns itself in part with those kin to which the same t e r m is applied. It is t h e r e f o r e of g r e a t importance to assign a meaning to an etymon as accurately as possible. Our book was aimed at anthropologists who might not be so clear as to the implications of the comparative method for the reconstruction of f e a t u r e s of the e a r l i e r culture of a language family. Even protagonists of the importance of (genetic) comparative linguistics like Kroeber, Sapir, and Bloomfield, whose prestige a t t r a c t e d a receptive audience, had difficulty in influencing anthropologists who a t t e m p t e d to reconstruct e a r l i e r kinship systems as well as

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other cultural f e a t u r e s . Thus it is heartening to read Kenneth Maddock's comment (Blust 180:236) t h a t " a n t h r o p o l ­ ogists will establish a convincing genetic comparative method only if it includes genetic linguistics." A significant part of the discussion t h a t follows will concern the criticisms of the DA method and proposed mod­ ifications of lexical reconstruction made by Blust in his 1980 Article and his Reply (to comments) published in Current Anthropology (21.205-247) under the t i t l e "Early Austronesian Social Organization: the Evidence of Language." His Article o f f e r s a generally favorable a t t i t u d e toward the DA method and suggests a few modifications that he finds necessary, particularly to bolster his arguments from linguistic com­ parisons that Proto-Malayopolynesian social organization was characterized by prescriptive alliance. The gist of his a r g u ­ ment seems to be contained in the following: (1980:221) "....although some of the comparisons (e.g. laya) might be questioned individually, it is inconceivable t h a t the observa­ tions taken to support 'ma(n)tuqa 'MB/WF', '(dD)awa 'ZS/DH (ms)', laya 'FZS/ZH (ms)" and *aya 'FZ' could all be a product of convergent lexical or semantic innovation..." The m e a n ­ ings a t t r i b u t e d to these etyma thus constitute the main support of his argument. In order to follow his arguments one must be familiar with his subgrouping. I present it here because it is neces­ sary to be able to judge the merits in his reasoning in respect to determining the meaning of proto-lexemes regardless of one's view of his subgrouping. I do not accept his subgrouping, but intend to present his arguments as f a i r l y as I can. The relevant subgrouping t h a t Blust posits for the Aus­ tronesian family is as follows. Proto-Malayopolynesian (PMP) is a branch (or immediate subgroup) of Proto-Austronesian, the other branch or branches (the decision is l e f t i n d e t e r ­ minate) being Formosan families. P M P , which is the source of all non-Formosan languages, itself has t h r e e branches: Western Malayopolynesian (WMP: the MP languages of w e s t ­ ern Indonesia and the Philippines, including Chamorro, Palauan, Chamic, and Malagasy), Central Malayopolynesian (CMP: the MP languages of the Lesser Sundas f r o m Bimanese eastward and of the southern and central Moluccas,

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including the Sula Archipelago), and Eastern Malayopolynesian (EMP: the MP languages of South Halmahera-West New Guinea and Oceanic groups). The subgrouping that I find best differs in many respects from Blust's. The most p e r t i n e n t d i f f e r e n c e con­ cerns the relation between his WMP, his CMP, and the l a n ­ guages of his South Halmahera-West New Guinea subgroup. I regard these t h r e e as members, not necessarily coordinate, of a single subgroup, which I call Hesperonesian, as against Oceanic; arguments for this view are presented in Dyen 1978. This d i f f e r e n c e in subgrouping plays only a minor role in the discussion until the very end where the evidence for Blust's thesis is evaluated. In contrast to his generally favorable a t t i t u d e in his Article, Blust is sharply critical of the DA method in his Reply and raises a number of objections. These seem clearly to be a reaction to the comments of Aberle which a t t e m p t e d to clarify some of Blust's misunderstandings. My purpose here is chiefly to evaluate his criticisms and proposed mod­ ifications in lexical reconstruction r a t h e r than to evaluate his arguments for ascribing prescriptive alliance to PMP social organization. My interest here is e n t i r e l y in the l i n ­ guistic theory and methodology involved. It appears, however r e g r e t t a b l y , t h a t the considerations seem to undermine Blust's a r g u m e n t for a PMP prescriptive alliance seriously. Differences of Approach There are certain general and basic differences between the approach in the DA method to the relevant portion of linguistic science and Blust's. These d i f f e r e n c e s concern (1) the application of the comparative method, (2) rigor, and (3) the nature of a hypothesis. Of less impor­ t a n c e , but perhaps somewhat confusing, is t h a t he uses certain terms introduced and carefully d e f i n e d in DA, but with d i f f e r e n t definitions and without clear indications that he was aware of the g r e a t d i f f e r e n c e involved; the terms involved are inclusion, transfer, and candidate. Differences in the application of the comparative method are not surprising in view of the fact t h a t scholars

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d i f f e r on how to define t h a t method. Blust is suspicious of "rigor" as a r e q u i r e m e n t in lexical reconstruction (cf. 1980:244). Nevertheless linguistic comparatists have for over 100 years sought to introduce rigor into t h e i r procedures. It was their intent to exclude intuitive arguments as decisive. They could do this because they had arguments based on the law of regular phonetic change, 1 a law t h a t has all the a t t r i b u t e s of a physical law except one: since speech is subject to voluntary controls, the individual can introduce changes (analogico-semantic change, borrowing) which are not associable with the law of regular phonetic change. The drive t o w a r d rigor and the demand for it in any argument has characterized (genetic) comparative studies from the time of the Neo-grammarians who f i r s t drew on the law for their inferences, though they did not clearly distinguish the law as a theoretical conception from its methodological application. It is t h e i r insistence on rigor t h a t has distinguished the best works of the most respected scholars in Indo-European studies and raised t h e i r studies to t h e i r deserved p r e - e m i n e n c e in reconstructional linguistics and maintained them in their position as models for other fields. If Austronesian studies are already considered by some to be approaching the same eminence in comparative studies, it is because of the degree of rigor observed by Austronesian scholars. What is involved in rigor is the necessary relation between premise and conclusion and the demand t h a t the premise be a scientifically well-founded generalization, p r e f e r a b l y a theory, but permissibly also some generally accepted assumption or hypothesis. The law of regular pho­ netic change provides such a prerequisite generalization (I regard it as a theory) in the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of cognates. Certain probabilistic assumptions are also employed in the DA method; these will be detailed in the following discus­ sion. These assumptions about probabilities are stated g e n ­ erally and are strictly adhered to with the aim of achieving rigor. The advantage of having a rigorous argument is t h a t each step is explicit and can be followed and evaluated in terms of the procedure laid down. Since in general the actual inferences can not be checked by a well-controlled e x p e r i m e n t , it is only the rigor involved in the application of general formulations which are themselves supported by

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?

our best judgment as to the (relative) probabilities concerned t h a t allow the closest approximation to the a r g u ­ mentation based on the experimental method in the sciences where micro-experiments are possible. Explicitness by itself, though necessary, is insufficient since a procedure can be explicit and yet be unreasonable. Where rigor is abandoned in linguistics the propositions are n o n - g e n e r a l and intuitive. They may be suggestive and thus i n t e r e s t i n g , but can become u s e f u l , and in this sense scientific, only a f t e r their content has been f i t t e d with the rest of the science; it is this f i t t i n g that calls f o r rigor. It is common to claim t h a t hypotheses are intuitive (e.g. Blust 1980:244); this a t t r i b u t e is not a sufficient j u s t i f i c a ­ tion f o r acceptance and in any case can only be t r u e at inception. After a hypothesis has been f i t t e d together with the rest of a science, it can hardly be regarded as any longer purely i n t u i t i v e , and until it has been so f i t t e d , it can only be r e g a r d e d , like any " h u n c h " , as suggestive. But even more important is the r e q u i r e m e n t that a hypothesis, to be accepted, must explain the i n t e r r e l e v a n t data of its own domain in a way somehow superior to any other hypothesis, f o r otherwise it remains, at best, merely a competitive hypothesis; if it does not do as well as this, it can only be ignored (provisionally) in favor of another (provisionally) superior hypothesis. A hypothesis is merely a plausible explanation of some i n t e r r e l e v a n t set of d a t a , but wherever it is not the only one, it is only one of the p l a u ­ sible (i.e. possible) explanations. If the justification of a hypothesis in science was merely its f o r m a t i o n , there might be an endless list. Here the essential d i f f e r e n c e appears between (1) what is "possible" (sc. plausible), i.e. a possi­ bility, and (2) what among a set of possibilities can be assigned the highest probability. The hypothesis with the highest probability (by some measure) is taken to be the one most likely to r e p r e s e n t the actual event and is here called the inference. Among hypotheses it seems safe to say that inferences are the best premises f o r f u r t h e r a r g u ­ ments. In the view that a hypothesis is merely i n t u i t i v e , there is sometimes a confusion between the "possible" and what is likely because it is associated with a suitably strong

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probability. Thus, for example, one can find instances in which a list of "possible" innovations is cited as evidence for a subgrouping (e.g. Blust 1978b:213ff) as though the fact that they might be innovations bore on the issue of subgrouping when what is needed is the claim that these were at least most likely innovations. To be sure such an approach as is advocated here results in slower progress. At each step all alternative hypotheses must be calculated in terms of their respective likelihood of corresponding to the t r u e n a t u r e of the events and thus of having the best chances of surviving the chal­ lenge of additional relevant d a t a . The DA procedure is intended to produce, on the whole, inferences of this nature. The DA Method The aim of the DA method, like the main thrust of the comparative method, is to make inferences from agreements between daughter languages. In our particular case the basis of each inference is the semantic a g r e e m e n t of cog­ nates in the coordinate languages and subgroups t h a t con­ stitute the members of the highest order in a language family, i.e. in the branches of the p r o t o - l a n g u a g e . It is perhaps for this reason that the DA method has been char­ acterized as a formalization of the comparative method (cf. the evaluations of Hockett and Blust cited above). At the same time it appears to follow that to weaken this r e q u i r e m e n t for an inference is to step outside the com­ parative method as it applies to lexical reconstruction. Two lexemes, regardless of any language difference, are regarded as having a same meaning if they translate each other in some context. Such a same meaning is a homosemy. A homosemy consists of some number of homosemes which can presumably be d e t e r m i n e d universally by the consideration of the common elements in all homosemies, but no a t t e m p t to do so will be made here. Where a language or dialect d i f f e r e n c e is not con­ cerned, mutual "translatability" is mutual "substitutability" and is generally called synonymy. Words t h a t share a syno-

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nymy are synonyms. It is assumed that there are no p e r f e c t synonyms so that the homosemy of two words in the same language never exhausts the meanings of both words. 2 For the purposes of our discussion we shall use the t e r m homosemy f o r a shared meaning of words in related languages (principally to avoid the construction of additional terms) and synonymy f o r a shared meaning of words in the same dialect and/or language. The DA method breaks away from past approaches in centering the attention on lists of cognates for specified meanings. The idea of doing so grew naturally from Hoijer's tables of kinship terms (1956) for the Athapaskan languages which do just t h a t . In the DA method all words of a family of languages are regarded as being listed according to their d i f f e r e n t meanings respectively under all the d i f f e r e n t meanings t h a t t h e r e a r e ; just how " d i f f e r e n t " and "same" meanings are to be d e t e r m i n e d universally was regarded in DA as t e m p o ­ rarily suspended in order to exemplify how lexical recon­ struction would be accomplished in a limited semantic a r e a , the terminology of kinship, an area which has a t t r a c t e d a good deal of a t t e n t i o n among anthropologists. We believe however that our procedure o f f e r s a useful model for a much wider application in linguistics. In DA t h e r e f o r e the example was limited to the kinship terminology of the Athapaskan languages; kinship meanings constituted the restricted semantic realm over which lexical reconstruction was to be carried out. In principle, each particular meaning of the set of meanings is distinguished from any other by at least two of the languages in the family being considered. Since our interest is in the cog­ nates that appear with the same meaning, the preceding formulation can be modified without essential change to the r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t at least two of the languages distinguish the component or combination of components which is spe­ cific for (i.e. distinguishes) the particular kinship meaning. This r e q u i r e m e n t essentially characterizes Hoijer's tables of cognate sets (Hoijer 1956) for the meanings involved in Athapaskan kinship terminology.

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It is (?almost) a universal practice among comparatists to avoid a t t r i b u t i n g a word to a proto-language on the basis of a single witness regardless of the wealth of r e p ­ resentation supporting t h a t witness within its single branch; the t e r m witness is commonly used by comparatists for a set of cognates in just one branch of a p r o t o - l a n g u a g e . This restriction recommends itself strongly since the acceptance of single witnesses leads to the absurdity of imposing all words in all daughter languages on t h e i r respective p r o t o languages. The avoidance of single-witness attributions constitutes part of rigorous comparatism. Naturally such a restriction can not be regarded as restricting conjecture; nevertheless a conjecture based on a single-witness a t t r i b u t i o n is g e n e r ­ ally regarded as f r u i t l e s s . It is this practice of comparatists in regard to words (or lexemes) that suggests t h a t a similar practice might very well be applied to meanings, even though one must recognize that linguistic meanings do not behave exactly like linguistic forms. It is this practice which lies at the basis of the DA r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t the same meaning be found in a set (and thus in at least a pair) of cognates belonging to d i f f e r e n t branches of a p r o t o - l a n g u a g e . Where cognates do not share a meaning, the a t t r i b u t i o n of any meaning to the etymon of the cognates is conjectural and provides a weak premise, if any, for f u r t h e r argument. The formalization of this r e q u i r e m e n t lies in applying the t e r m candidate to such a requisite set of cognates, and for ease of discussion, to their etymon. In essence such a set of cognates constitutes a candidate set f o r gaining the meaning of their list for their etymon; similarly their etymon is a candidate f o r having the list meaning a t t r i b u t e d to it. If a candidate is the sole candidate in a meaning, it follows naturally t h a t t h a t meaning should be a t t r i b u t e d to its etymon. When a meaning list contains more than one candidate, the candidates are said to compete for the m e a n ­ ing of their list. One might dates in the

wish to t r e a t same manner

each of as sole

the competing candi­ candidates; each one

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could be regarded as representing a d i f f e r e n t dialect of the p r o t o - l a n g u a g e . Certain considerations make one hesi­ t a t e to do so. We must consider (1) the possibility t h a t they continue d i f f e r e n t etyma with overlapping meanings, that w e r e thus (partly) synonymous (as when a language o f f e r s a single t e r m f o r "older brother" and a separate single t e r m f o r " b r o t h e r " ) , so that an original synonymy might be indicated; and (2) the contrary possibility that the a p p e a r ­ ance of one or another candidate in the list is a result of independent convergent semantic changes in different daughter languages. In meaning lists a semantic change t h a t increases the range of a word's meaning results in the intrusion of a word from one meaning list into another; the word then would appear in two lists unless it lost one of these two positions by a separate semantic change. Such an intrusion is called a transfer in the DA method. This t e r m is intended to represent (1) the movement of a word into a new list without necessarily disappearing f r o m its original and/or (2) the status of the word in the new list it had e n t e r e d . The use of the t e r m " t r a n s f e r " in these two senses would then be analogous to the use of "borrowing" in linguistic change, though the actual process in a t r a n s f e r is recognized to be semantic change, say as defined and illustrated by Bloomfield (1933:425f.). The problem o f f e r e d by candidates with equal claims can be solved by allowing for synonymy in the p r o t o - l a n ­ guage. If the claims of two or more candidates on a list meaning are e q u a l , then in the absence of any other con­ sideration the list meaning can be assigned to both or ail such candidates. The synonymy t h a t is thus reconstructed is however inevitably p a r t i a l . Although t h e r e are no p e r f e c t synonyms in a language, in the sense of two words whose t o t a l range of meaning is the same, it is obvious t h a t t h e r e are synonymous usages of d i f f e r e n t words in the sense of t h e i r being semantically indistinguishable (at least f o r a particular meaning) in the same linguistic environment. If this w e r e d e n i e d , then there could be no synonymy of any kind. In principle a recon­ structed synonymy implies that each of the synonyms either

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had other meanings t h a t they distinguished [ e . g . (his) father, (his) dad, (his) papa, (his) old man] or belonged to d i f f e r e n t dialects. The claims of different candidates are not always e q u a l , since they can d i f f e r in the number of branches represented in the cognate set. The candidate with the smaller representation lends itself more easily to a hypothesis that its presence in the list is the result of independent t r a n s f e r s , i.e. separate t r a n s f e r s that occurred a f t e r the branches became independent. However if a c a n ­ didate was to be explained as having resulted from i n d e ­ pendent t r a n s f e r s , a source had to be sought in other lists from which the t r a n s f e r s could have o r i g i n a t e d . The notion of independent t r a n s f e r s of cognates (a type of convergence) is quite n a t u r a l and a recognition t h a t it occurs would recommend itself to most practicing comparatists. At the same time I must admit t h a t I cannot cite a recognized instance from Indo-European languages, though no doubt t h e r e are some. Allowing for such instances in the Athapaskan tables made it possible to reduce the amount of reconstructed synonymy. There would be no basis for suggesting a t r a n s f e r unless a cognate set occurred in two meaning lists. Thus any candidate that occurred in only one list could not be a t t r i b u t e d to t r a n s f e r s and t h e r e f o r e its etymon is immedi­ ately i n f e r r e d to have had the list meaning. F u r t h e r m o r e , if a cognate set was a candidate in two meaning lists, and r e p r e s e n t e d in exactly the same sub­ groups, a hypothesis of t r a n s f e r as an explanation for one of the candidates would not recommend itself (in the absence of other considerations) because then it would be d i f f i c u l t to decide which candidate was original and which resulted from t r a n s f e r . Even if such a cognate set was a competing candidate in one list and stood alone in another (i.e. was the sole [see above] candidate in the second list, thus suggesting the possibility t h a t the competing candidate resulted from t r a n s f e r ) , t h e r e would be the uncertainty as to whether the competing candidate did not continue a meaning t h a t made its etymon partly synonymous with that

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of its competitor in the proto-language. These considerations make it appear simplest to disregard the possibility of i n t e r p r e t i n g either of two equally represented candidates as resulting f r o m t r a n s f e r s . If on the other hand the number of branches in which the cognate set was r e p r e s e n t e d in two meaning lists d i f ­ f e r e d , it seemed reasonable to consider the possibility that the candidate with the weaker r e p r e s e n t a t i o n might be due to t r a n s f e r s . Inclusion The following definition of inclusion d i f f e r s only slightly in form from t h a t in DA ( 1 7 ) , but not at all in content: " I f candidates C1 and c 2 belong to the same cognate set (and thus occur in d i f f e r e n t meaning lists) and are represented in the same set of languages except t h a t C1 is represented in at least one more, c1 is said to include c 2 ." The chief function of the notion of inclusion is to promote the importance of non-inclusion (unincludedness). An unincluded candidate (with a minor exception detailed in DA), like a sole candidate, immediately gains the meaning of its list for its etymon. Sole

Competitive 2-member

3 - member

4 - member

M,

M2

M1

M2

M1

M2

M

M2

a2

a1

a2

a1

a2

a1

a2

L2

a1 

b

u

b

u

b

u

a2

L3

d

a2

u

a2

u

a2

u

a2

L4

a1

a2

a1

a2

a1

a2

f

e

a1 d

a2

L5

e

a1

a2

a1

a2

L6

h

g

f

e

d

c

a1

a2

L1

Table

1.

Types of Included

Candidates

L1, L 2 ... = coordinate language groups; M 1 ; M 2 = list meanings; a, b, c,... = d i f f e r e n t cognate sets; a cognates in M1 are labeled a1 and those in M 2 are labeled a 2 ; In each block (1) the candidate set a1 in M1 exemplifies the type of included candidate and its distribution is included in that

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Dyen: Lexical Reconstruction & S H Hypothesis

of candidate set a 2 to be unincluded.

in

M2

and

(2)

the

set

u is stipulated

We will now consider the case of a competitive included candidate represented in two or more branches. It seems obvious that the likelihood of independent transfers decreases as the number of t r a n s f e r s t h a t must be posited increases. Let us f i r s t take up the considerations t h a t appear in connection with the judgment of the probability of independent t r a n s f e r s . I personally would not find it objectionable if someone w e r e to claim t h a t the probability of two independent t r a n s f e r s must be very low since such an event demands (1) that the t r a n s f e r s involve a cognate pair and (2) t h a t the cognate pair must be t r a n s f e r r e d in two separate steps to the same new meaning list. On the other side one must consider the expectation t h a t in similarly structured (both formally and semantically) languages the independent occur­ rence of the same semantic change would be higher than normal, particularly in a restricted semantic set like the kinship terms. Such considerations justify the expectation t h a t two like independent t r a n s f e r s might have had a r e l a ­ tively higher frequency in our lists than might be normal in all semantic areas taken as a whole. Thus in such cases an inference was regularly drawn t h a t convergent transfers had occurred; to be sure t h e r e is the proviso t h a t no other relevant information is available, but this is the usual case in reconstruction. In my own judgment the probability of four i n d e p e n ­ dent t r a n s f e r s is negligible. Thus if a competitive included candidate appears in f o u r subgroups of highest o r d e r , it is declared in the DA method to have had the list meaning as well as the competitor whether t h a t be unincluded or one represented in four or more subgroups. The conclusion would then be that each of the successful candidates r e p ­ resented synonymous or dialectally d i f f e r e n t etyma. As for the case of a competitive included candidate in three subgroups I concluded t h a t comparatists might r e a ­ sonably be expected to divide on w h e t h e r the chances t h a t three independent t r a n s f e r s had occurred w e r e d i f f e r e n t

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells from or equal to those that common inheritance involved. Such cases w e r e t h e r e f o r e l e f t moot.

357 was

The treatment of competitive included candidates according to the number of subgroups represented in their cognate set is presented as an a r b i t r a r y decision in DA because there seemed to be no objective considerations that could be brought to bear except perhaps those that might arise f r o m some general view of tendencies in kinship sys­ tems. Since it was precisely our aim to develop such a g e n ­ eral view, we would have involved ourselves unnecessarily in a logical circularity to impose such a consideration at this point. There is more in DA t h a t concerns the inferences based on the candidates. For example t h e r e is the important p r o ­ vision that the various meanings which have been a t t r i b u t e d to the same etymon (because it was a successful candidate in d i f f e r e n t list meanings) should be added together to obtain the meaning of the etymon. But what has been given above is the essence of the m a t t e r . Examples of the various kinds of cognate set distributions and the inferences to be d r a w n from them can be found in DA. The principle of inclusion is obviously of some impor­ tance in lexical reconstruction since it helps in the evalua­ tion of competitive candidates. Aberle, who was most active in the application of the DA approach, characterizes this principle as " f u n d a m e n t a l to the approach" (Blust 1980:227). One can only conclude t h a t it played an important role in reducing the number of instances of reconstructed syno­ nymy. At the same time it is worth remembering that the study of Athapaskan took as a premise the six prime Athapaskan subgroups (of seven reached by lexicostatistical clas­ sification) which w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d in Hoijer's tables (DA 14). Earlier Approaches to Lexical

Reconstruction

It is interesting to consider the way in which meanings have been assigned to P r o t o - I n d o - E u r o p e a n etyma by such eminent scholars as Walde and Pokorny (1930: h e r e a f t e r WP) and Pokorny (1959). Their procedure was not essentially d i f f e r e n t from t h a t adopted by Dempwolff (1938) in his

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lexical reconstructions of Proto-Austronesian etyma. Most commonly the procedure followed by the Indo-Europeanists above and by Dempwoiff seems to agree with t h a t of DA in considering it of prime importance for assigning a meaning to an etymon that a sameness of meaning or homosemy appears between cognates belonging to members of d i f f e r ­ ent branches. We will r e f e r to such a homosemy as a "prime semantic a g r e e m e n t " (PSA). It will be seen t h a t a PSA is the basis of a candidate in the DA method since a candidate contains cognates t h a t both d i f f e r as to branch and appear in the same meaning list and thus share a same meaning. The Semantic History Hypothesis When t h e r e is not a PSA, t h a t is when no two cognates belonging to d i f f e r e n t immediate subgroups share a same meaning, the Indo-Europeanist scholars mentioned above and Dempwoiff operate with what can be called a "semantic history hypothesis" (SHH). They assign to the etymon a meaning which can reasonably be regarded as having given rise to the d i f f e r e n t meanings to be found in the associ­ ated cognates. Thus WP assigns the meaning 'cover' (1.506) to the etymon of Welsh parf-aes 'shield', Ice­ landic Hvarmr 'eyelid'. Similarly Dempwoiff assigns the meaning 'snail' to ku'ul (1938:85), the etymon of Tagalog kuhol 'snail', Javanese kol 'small plane', presumably under a hypothesis that the l a t t e r meaning arose because of the use of a snail-shell as a plane or through a resemblance of a plane to a snail-shell. The function of the SHH is to provide the semantic link between the etymon and its reflexes. The necessary relation between the SHH and the cognation is made obvious by a consideration of the difficulties t h a t would face the cogna­ tion if a reasonable SHH could not be constructed. Thus it goes without saying t h a t a SHH is also involved where lexi­ cal reconstruction is based on candidates. Experience has given us little basis for dealing with the probabilities involved in semantic change except to indicate t h a t a change of the meaning of a word to a similar and/or associable meaning is more likely than to a dissimilar and/or

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unassociable meaning and that a change of one semantic component is more likely than a change of many semantic components at once. However, once one adds the considera­ tion of the length of the time interval between the starting point in the proto-language and the e n d - p o i n t in the observed languages, which might span thousands of years, our control over the d i f f e r e n c e in probability between d i f ­ f e r e n t semantic changes by such a vague factor as " s i m i ­ larity of meaning" and even the more specific "semantic component" becomes very weak. This weakness was signal­ ized by Bloomfield (1933:436f.) who said: We can easily see today that a change in the m e a n ­ ing of a speech-form is merely the result of a change in the use of it and o t h e r , semantically related speech-forms. Earlier students, however, w e n t at this problem as if the speech-form w e r e a relatively permanent object to which the meaning was attached as a kind of changeable satellite. They hoped by studying the successive meanings of a s i n ­ gle form such as meat 'food', ' f l e s h - f o o d ' , to f i n d the reason f o r this change. This led them to classify semantic changes according to the logical relations that connect the successive meanings. They set up classes such as the following: Narrowing, ... Widen­ ing, .,. Metaphor, ... Metonymy ... Synecdoche, ... Hyperbole, ... Litotes, ... Degeneration ... Elevation ... (each of the preceding is accompanied by examples — I.D.). Collections of examples a r r a n g e d in classes like these are useful in showing us what changes are likely to occur. The meanings 'jaw', 'cheek', and 'chin' which we found in the cognates of our word chin [German Kinn 'chin', Gothic kinnus 'cheek', Sanskrit ' hanuh 'jaw' - Bloomfield 1933:425], are found to fluctuate in other cases such as t h a t of cheek from 'jaw' (Old English meaning) to the present meaning; ¡aw from French joue 'cheek', has changed in the opposite direction. Latin maxilla 'jaw' has shifted to 'cheek' in most modern dialects, as in Italian mascella . . . 'cheek' ...

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Dyen: Lexical Reconstruction & S H Hypothesis

Bloomfield's presentation favors the view that as a general rule the assignment of a higher probability to a particular direction of change as between particular m e a n ­ ings could hardly be based on past experience even though such an assignment might perhaps reasonably be made in special cases. Thus the inference in lexical reconstruction by which a particular meaning is a t t r i b u t e d to an etymon would have to be based e n t i r e l y or chiefly on independent agreement in the meanings of the etymon's reflexes r a t h e r than on a t t e m p t s to i n f e r the routes by which semantic d i f f e r e n c e s had arisen. It must always be kept in mind that our task is to i n f e r the semantic s t a r t i n g - p o i n t ; we can not allow ourselves to be t r a p p e d into thinking of our problem as though the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t is known. Another consideration is t h a t semantically similar but d i f f e r e n t t e r m s could have arisen f r o m proto-synonyms; languages do have synonyms. Consequently it is fallacious to argue t h a t a meaning held by one proto-lexeme could not have been held by another; this is the anti-synonymy fallacy. T h e r e f o r e , it seems desirable to seek a method which both (1) compares the chances t h a t one particular proto-lexeme rather than any other held a particular meaning wherever a d i f f e r e n c e in likelihood can be discerned among the p r o t o lexemes worth considering and (2) allows for the acceptance of more than one proto-lexeme wherever such a d i f f e r e n c e in likelihood can not be found among d i f f e r e n t p r o t o - l e x emes. The differences in "likelihood" spoken of here are based on "judgments of d i f f e r e n c e s " in probability. These are substitutes for t r u e probability measures, but are p r e ­ sumably reliable or presumed reliable when they constitute expert opinion. Such judgments are persuasive, however, only for scholars who accept the same basis of judgment. Differences in the basis of such judgments should t h e r e f o r e be examined with care. The absence of a law or laws governing semantic change makes it d i f f i c u l t to limit the length of the chain of semantic changes permissible in a SHH except for the caveat t h a t the plausibility of a SHH is dependent on an intuitively satisfactory relation between chain-length and the time

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interval between etymon and cognate. For just this reason the SHH, though necessary, is t r e a t e d as in general i n s u f f i ­ cient as a criterion f o r a cognate set that is relatively remote f r o m its etymon. In the absence of a PSA the criterion that is necessary is the generally recognized one of similarity of meaning or homeosemy (HES). For example it seems reasonable to claim a HES between "milk" and "whey", as in e f f e c t do Walde and Pokorny (1.503) who assign Old Indie kšira'milk' and Albanian hire 'whey' to PIE ksìro'milk, whey', perhaps because they are both "milk products". There is no homosemy between these two n o n - i n t e r t r a n s l a t a b l e meanings; the cognates are thus not homosemantic, but can easily be regarded as homeosemantic. In such a case the assignment of a particular single meaning to the etymon (to the extent t h a t it is not purely intuitive) can only be based on a sim­ plicity argument t h a t t h a t meaning r a t h e r than any other demanded the fewest semantic changes to reach the observed meanings. For example one might regard "milk" as a b e t t e r etymon meaning than "whey" and perhaps "milk product" as an equal to "milk". Since in general it is d i f f i ­ cult to measure (by size or number) the necessary links in a chain of changes, it is inevitably d i f f i c u l t to provide a hypothesis of a particular etymon meaning which can be regarded as b e t t e r than a conjecture where only homeosemy is involved. Thus one of the major d i f f e r e n c e s between an etymon meaning based on a PSA and one based on a HES is a d i f ­ ference in the particularity (vs. vagueness) of the a t t r i b ­ uted meaning. The PSA permits the a t t r i b u t i o n of a p a r t i c ­ ular meaning - - the meaning which constitutes the PSA - to the etymon, whereas the HES does not. At the same time even the PSA does not permit the inference of the e n t i r e range of meaning of the etymon and fails to do so in two ways. A PSA is only a semantic a g r e e m e n t between cognates and thus (1) can permit an inference of d i f f e r e n t meanings - - though it is w e l l - k n o w n t h a t it is common for words to have d i f f e r e n t meanings - - only if cognates agree in exhib­ iting d i f f e r e n t meanings, and (2) can permit the inference of only the range of meaning of the PSA, whereas it is not inconceivable, if not highly likely, t h a t the range of m e a n ­ ing of the etymon might have been w i d e r .

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Dyen: Lexical Reconstruction & S H Hypothesis

The kinds of d i f f e r e n c e s of meaning t h a t are r e f e r r e d to here are best understood in t e r m s of the continuity and discontinuity of the ranges of meaning associated with the same lexical f o r m . The meaning of the English lexical form tabte in r e f e r e n c e to an article of f u r n i t u r e is discontinuous with its meaning in r e f e r e n c e to an orderly collection of (say, mathematical) symbols. The d i f f e r e n t ranges of m e a n ­ ing are discontinuous because no reasonable transitional meanings (which are themselves not discontinuous) can be said to connect t h e m ; on the other hand the range of the meaning "article of f u r n i t u r e " and " o r d e r l y collection of symbols" can be said to be respectively continuous in the sense t h a t in each case such a transitional set can be found or constructed. Thus neither the PSA nor a HES permits the r e c o n ­ struction of the t o t a l i t y of a continuous range. On the other hand each PSA d e t e r m i n e s the existence of a c o n t i n ­ uous range (without bounding it) of the etymon meaning, whereas a HES can not be said to permit a decision whether the meaning a t t r i b u t e d to the etymon is continuous or discontinuous (though similar). It is thus doubly ambigu­ ous and t h e r e f o r e at best only a conjectural premise for further argument. The etymon meanings presented in the etymological dic­ tionaries for a cognation based on a HES (and not a PSA) can be classified into two types. In one type the etymon meaning is the same as the meaning of just one cognate and in the other it is not. An example of the f i r s t type is the assignment in WP (1.117) of the meaning ' k e r n e l , grain' to *et(en) on the basis of Greek étnos 'legume porridge', Middle Irish eitne ' k e r n e l ' , Scottish eite 'unhusked ear of corn', eitean ' k e r n e l , grain'. Similarly Dempwolff (85) assigns the meaning 'snail' to *ku'ul on the basis of Tagalog kuhoł 'snail' and Javanese koi 'small plane', the homeosemy p r e ­ sumably being found in a plane's resemblance to a snailshell or in the use of a snail-shell as a p l a n e , as suggested above. The type of etymon gloss which d i f f e r s from the m e a n ­ ing of any cognate can itself be subdivided into two sub­ types: (1) those in which the gloss is a single t e r m and (2)

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those in which more than one t e r m is used. An example of the f i r s t subtype is the assignment by WP (1.500) of the meaning 'what is wet' (Nasses) to *qlon- on the basis of Lithuanian klãnas 'puddle, pool' and Old Icelandic hland 'wine'. Similarly Dempwoiff (84) assigns the meaning ' h a r m ­ f u l insect' to *kuman on the basis of Malay kuman 'maggot* and Fiji kuma 'moth'. An example of the second subtype is the assignment in WP (1.67) of the meaning ' f l o w e r , herb' to 'andhos on the 'flower', ... basis of Old Indie ándhah 'herb', Greek Albanian ende 'calyx, bouquet of w i n e , joy, charm, ...' Simi­ larly Dempwoiff (113) assigns 'to d e p i l a t e , be bald' to 'palpal on the basis of Toba palpal 'be bald', Javanese papal 'to cut hair'. The f i r s t type above appears to imply t h a t the compa­ r a t i s i for some reason believes t h a t in t h a t particular case the likelihood is g r e a t e s t t h a t one of the cognates continues the original meaning. Presumably he has an intuition t h a t the SHH in which the other meanings have arisen is more likely than any other. In the f i r s t subtype of the second type above the single t e r m in the etymon gloss indicates a continuity of meaning from which the meanings of the cognates might have been reached by change. In the second subtype the t e r m s of the gloss establish e i t h e r a continuity or a set of similar dis­ continuities which could have been the starting point f r o m which the respective meanings of the cognates could have been reached by semantic change. When d i f f e r e n t terms are used in such a gloss, the ambiguity between continuity and discontinuity in the etymon meaning is most striking when the d i f f e r e n t t e r m s are closest to the d i f f e r e n t meanings of the cognates as in the example above. As we have seen, a homeosemy in the discontinuous meanings of a cognate set is necessary to a SHH. This SHH seems inescapably to entail the hypothesis t h a t the HES of a cognate set with discontinuous meanings reflects a p a r t of a continuous meaning of the etymon at some time in the past. If this w e r e not t r u e , then the criterial HES would have been erroneously applied in at least the sense t h a t its

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Dyen: Lexical Reconstruction & S H Hypothesis

relation to the cognation was accidental rather than essential. It follows t h a t the 5HH is constructed on the assumption that a single continuous meaning of . the etymon is implied by the criterial similarity in the meanings of a cognate set. We call this the continuity assumption. It is not to be u n d e r ­ stood as necessarily excluding the possibility of a t t r i b u t i n g discontinuous meanings based on homeosemy to an etymon, but r a t h e r as requiring t h a t distinguishable similarities are necessary for such an a t t r i b u t i o n . Thus when two or more meanings are assigned to an etymon in the absence of a PSA, they are taken to indicate a range of meaning within which the reconstructed HES is believed to f a l l . Only this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can reconcile the continuity assumption and at the same time avoid o n e - w i t ­ ness reconstructions. Furthermore since the continuity assumption does not specify the time in the past at which this unitary meaning was attached to the etymon, it follows t h a t the time need not have been t h a t of a particular proto-language. In e f f e c t then we are dealing with a type of inference t h a t bears an unmistakable resemblance to the type of inference t h a t characterizes phonological internal reconstruction. There the proposition is made t h a t an a l t e r n a t i o n between pho­ nemes of the same morpheme implies a stage at which the morpheme had a single phonemic shape, but the stage before this unity ended need not necessarily be identifiable with a particular p r o t o - l a n g u a g e . Thus t h e r e is the following f u n d a m e n t a l drawback to basing the assignment of a meaning to an etymon on a HES. The continuity assumption leaves the date of the e n d ­ ing of the continuity uncertain so t h a t t h a t date cannot be directly associated with the date of the p r o t o - l a n g u a g e . The continuity might have ended b e f o r e , d u r i n g , or a f t e r the time of the p r o t o - l a n g u a g e . Thus the meanings of the etymon might have been discontinuous, though homeosemantic, at the time of the p r o t o - l a n g u a g e . Lexical reconstruction in the DA method is not faced with this problem. Since a candidate is always based on a PSA, the i n f e r r e d meaning can be directly associated with

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells the proto-language; under proper circumstances discontinuous meanings can be i n f e r r e d .

365 even

Just as the PSA permits the a t t r i b u t i o n of its meaning to an etymon, the HES only permits the a t t r i b u t i o n of its content to the etymon. On this basis Blust would appear to have a t t r i b u t e d too specific a meaning to P r o t o - M a l a y o p o lynesian (PMP) mantuqa. He a t t r i b u t e s to this etymon p r e ­ cisely the two meanings 'mother's brother' and ' p a r e n t - i n law'. Each meaning is found in a separate branch of PMP: the first in Proto-Oceanic (PO) and the second in P r o t o Western-Malayopolynesian (PWMP). The two meanings seem to be clearly discontinuous with a HES something like ' r e l a ­ tive of parent's generation'. Thus the reconstruction of the etymon is j u s t i f i e d , but we can not be certain whether the original continuous meaning contained both the meanings that Blust i n f e r s , only one, or f o r that m a t t e r n e i t h e r ; the original meaning might have been a 'relative of parent's generation', d i f f e r e n t f r o m either of the two that by semantic change came to be the observed meanings. F u r ­ thermore other relatives of the parent's generation might have been contained in the original meaning without violat­ ing the continuity assumption on the one hand or making a one-witness reconstruction on the other; in f a c t relatives of other generations could also have been contained in the etymon meaning since the continuity assumption only requires that the a t t r i b u t e d meaning contain the HES and be continuous. What favors the restriction of the meaning to 'relative of parent's generation (or perhaps of an e a r l i e r g e n e r a ­ tion)' is the etymological connection b e t w e e n *ma(n)tuqa and *tuqa 'old'. The original meaning of *ma(n)tuqa might very well have been something like 'old one, old person, elder'. It seems quite evident t h a t the assignment to *mantuqa of precisely the meaning 'MB' and ' p a r e n t - i n - l a w ' is conjec­ t u r a l . Since the assignment of precisely these two meanings are crucial to Blust's thesis, his a r g u m e n t is t a i n t e d by the conjectural nature of the premise. A similar difficulty appears in Blust's t r e a t m e n t of the meanings of the cognates arising from PMP (dD)awa,

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though the m a t t e r is somewhat more complicated. Here too the a t t r i b u t e d meaning is crucial to his thesis. Cognates assignable to this etymon appear in Oceanic and New Guinea languages with the meanings 'sister's child' (ms) [=ZC ( m s ) ] and ' p a r e n t - i n - i a w / c h i l d - i n - l a w (recipr.)' and in Windesi (assigned by Blust to Oceanic) rewa ' d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w ' . There is also a Kambera (eastern Sumba) address t e r m dawa 'ZC (ms), BC (ws)' which seems surely to be cognate with the forms above. Of these Blust says: (1980:213f.) . . . we are confronted with two collections of f o r ­ mally comparable kinship t e r m s , one of which points to an early ( a t least P r o t o - E a s t e r n Malayopolynesian) [as evidenced by the Oceanic and New Guinea cog­ nates - I.D.] meaning 'chiid-in-law' and the other of which is a Central Malayo-Polynesian isolate meaning 'ZC (ms), BC (ws)'. But now the rhetorical question 'How do we reconcile these forms?' is superfluous, as a precedent which enables us to do so was e s t a b ­ lished with the reconstruction of PMP *ma(n)tuqa a precedent, moreover, which is independently sup­ ported by the present comparison. I thus posit PMP ... *(dD)awa 'Z5/DH (ms)'." In the absence of a Western Malayopolynesian cognate and in view of the possibility t h a t Central and Eastern Malayo­ polynesian perhaps form a single subgroup against Western reconstruction Malayopolynesian, Blust stipulates t h a t the may be assignable only to a P r o t o - C e n t r a l - E a s t Malayopo­ lynesian. The semantic assignment here can at best be regarded as only conjectural, if not purely a r b i t r a r y . Its model, *mantuqa, is strongly conjectural. Even the claim of a f i t between the two pairs of meanings seems to fail if we consider the agreement between Loinang, Soboyo dao, Balantak dawok ' b r o t h e r - i n - l a w ' . Since Soboyo (Sula Is., Indonesia) is generally assigned to the same subgroup as Kambera (Sumba), i.e. Blust's Central Malayopolynesian, and Loinang and Balantak (both E. Sulawesi, Indonesia) are generally assigned to the languages of Western Indonesia,

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i.e. Blust's Western Malayopolynesian, the cognate set now involves a PSA ' b r o t h e r - i n - l a w ' which must be a t t r i b u t e d to his PMP etymon, f o r this meaning appears in d i f f e r e n t branches of PMP. Thus not only was his i n f e r e n t i a l proce­ dure f a u l t y in the f i r s t place, but the new evidence from Loinang and Balantak seems to point to e r r o r in his con­ clusion. Benveniste's Methods and Lexical

Reconstruction

Benveniste is probably widely regarded to have d e m o n ­ strated (against opposition) a connection between the meanings of the root morphemes in Gothic niman 'to take' and Greek némõ 'to share, apportion' ( 1 . 8 2 f . ) ; he pointed to the second elements respectively in Gothic arbi-numja, Greek kleronomos '(inheritance receiving-) heir'. Since the a g r e e ­ ment between the respective final elements of the com­ pounds can be said to be intertranslatable only with some reservations, it can hardly be said to constitute a PSA of the root despite the fact t h a t Benveniste t r e a t s it as though that w e r e t r u e . At the same time it is not unlikely t h a t the agreement between the respective compound m e m ­ bers would induce a HES for the observer. In this sense Benveniste's argument provides an instance t h a t lies some­ where between a PSA and a HES and is thus somewhat stronger than the l a t t e r . Benveniste's aim was twofold: (1) to establish t h a t the Gothic and Greek roots are cognate and (2) to provide a basis for a t t r i b u t i n g the meaning 'to receive legally; to the etymon. He was clearly successful in the f i r s t aim. Without doubting the cognation, one can however reasonably doubt whether the assigned meaning, taken precisely as s t a t e d , was within the range of the P r o t o - I n d o - E u r o p e a n root. Benveniste, like other comparatists, also makes use of the SHH. For example (1.129) he concludes t h a t t h e r e was a P r o t o - I n d o - E u r o p e a n t e r m f o r 'price, value' r e p r e s e n t e d by Greek alphè' ' p r o f i t ' , Sanskrit argha- 'value, price', L i t h u a ­ nian alga 'salary'. Here the etymon meaning is the same as the Sanskrit cognate, which Benveniste seems here i n t u i ­ tively to regard as the most likely s t a r t i n g - p o i n t . This view would not be contradicted by the evidence of the Greek

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verb alphano 'win a p r i z e , make a profit' and the Sanskrit root arh- 'be worth'. One can see nevertheless t h a t the likelihood that the specified meaning was part of the range of the etymon would be enhanced if t h e r e w e r e more than a homeosemy between the meanings. In fact one might very well consider the objection t h a t the homeosemy itself has not been well accounted for in the assigned etymon m e a n ­ ing taken precisely. This is not to say t h a t Benveniste (1969) does not make use of the PSA; instances are strewn throughout his work and one may guess t h a t they form a solid f r a m e w o r k which permits him to speculate profitably. In dealing with his conclusions from comparing Austronesian kinship terms Blust claims (1980:208 f n . 6) "the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of the t e r m s have ... been worked out in considerable detail following the 'se­ mantic f i e l d ' approach described in Blust (1972) and most brilliantly exemplified by Benveniste (1973 [ t h e date of the t r a n s l a t i o n , see Bib!. -I.D.])." He continues immediately with the complimentary statement that "Dyen's discussion of t r a n s f e r and inclusion is mainly a formalization of this p r o ­ cedure of semantic reconstruction." The DA method deserves this compliment only in part - - to the extent that it f o r ­ malized lexical reconstruction by making it depend on c a n ­ didates. Blust's Suggested Additional

Procedures

Some of Blust's proposals can hardly be regarded as falling within the usual conclusions reached by the compar­ ative method. As a contribution to the methodology of l e x i ­ cal reconstruction he o f f e r s the criterion of "semantic f r a g m e n t a t i o n " , measured by an index of semantic uniformity. His definition of the l a t t e r is stated as follows (1980.241): "Comparisons in which the attested meanings are identical to their reconstructed meaning (e.g. PMP tau) are s e m a n t i cally uniform and hence have a high index. Other compari­ sons have an index which varies in proportion to t h e i r semantic diversity." Taken literally, the d e f i n i t i o n cannot be applied before the "reconstructed meaning" (i.e. the m e a n ­ ing of the reconstructed lexeme) has been determined and thus the criterion as stated is useless in determining the meaning of the reconstructed lexeme. The circularity in the

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definition can be avoided by a simple change so that the criterion consists of the degree of diversity (or homogene­ ity) among the meanings of cognates and contains no r e f ­ erence to the reconstructed meaning. The criterion of semantic f r a g m e n t a t i o n f o r Blust is clearly closely tied to (1) his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the semantic history of PMP qa(R)(t)a (1980:207, 2 4 1 , Blust 1972) and (2) his claim regarding the semantic history of PAN timuR to which he assigns the meaning 'southeast monsoon' (1980.207). These two examples are introduced by a criticism of the f a i l u r e of the DA procedure (1980:207) to provide f o r the possibility t h a t "a proto-lexeme might d i f f e r in meaning f r o m all of its reflexes." On the contrary such a possibility is provided f o r in DA because a proto-lexeme (1) could acquire some number of meanings by being a successful candidate in d i f f e r e n t meaning lists or (2) might fail to gain some meanings where it is a candidate because in those meanings it is included, so t h a t in these ways it could come to d i f f e r in meaning f r o m any of its reflexes. The " B e t t e r

Candidate"

In pursuit of d i f f e r e n t manners in which a p r o t o - l e x ­ eme might be shown to d i f f e r f r o m any of its reflexes Blust presents as his f i r s t instance the a r g u m e n t by which he concluded t h a t the meaning of *qa(R)(t)a was not either 'human being' or 'slave' on the grounds t h a t a " b e t t e r c a n ­ didate" is available f o r each of these meanings. The " b e t t e r candidate" f o r the meaning 'human being' is *tau which con­ sistently has this meaning, and the " b e t t e r candidate" f o r 'slave' ( a t least in Blust's article) is *qaDipen which similarly consistently has this meaning. Having thus eliminated these two meanings f r o m its r a n g e , he was able to conclude f r o m additional considerations that *qa(R)(t)a meant 'outsiders, alien people' in Blust 1972, a meaning which is also assigned to it in Blust 1980. The principle of the " b e t t e r candidate" d e t e r m i n e d by the semantic homogeneity of the reflexes led Blust to assign the meaning 'slave' in PMP to *qaDipen and not to *qa(R)(t)a regardless of the wider dis­ t r i b u t i o n of the l a t t e r in this meaning (see below). Blust apparently f i n a l l y realized the e r r o r in t r e a t i n g 'qaDipen in

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this way, for he omits any r e f e r e n c e to it in his final table on the subject (Table 10, 1980:241) e n t i t l e d : '"Inclusion Dia­ gram' of Proto-Austronesian and Proto-Malayo-Polynesian Candidates for the Meanings 'Person' and 'Slave'." Blust's experience here seems to argue for the use of meaning list tables and against reliance on homogeneity in cognate meanings to determine the " b e t t e r candidate" for a m e a n ­ ing. The principle of the " b e t t e r candidate" is used to assign a meaning to one etymon r a t h e r than another simply because its cognates show g r e a t e r homogeneity in meaning. This use is a clear instance of the "anti-synonymy fallacy" since it does not allow for the possibility t h a t another cog­ nate set with sufficient branch distribution and meaning agreement might r e f l e c t a proto-synonym. The principle of the "better candidate" is closely i n t e r r e l a t e d with Blust's use of the t e r m "inclusion", as well as the terms " t r a n s f e r " and " c a n d i d a t e " . It is impor­ t a n t to note that he uses these t e r m s in ways crucially d i f f e r e n t from what has been specified above. U n f o r t u n a t e l y he a t t r i b u t e s his use of inclusion to the DA method. In summarizing the DA method, he says (1980:206) "a candidate a is said to include a candidate b if the f a m i l y - t r e e node to which a is a t t r i b u t e d dominates t h a t to which b is attributed." Blust's d e f i n i t i o n of inclusion r e q u i r e s t h a t candidates a and b should belong to d i f f e r e n t cognate sets, since a s i n ­ gle cognate set cannot d i f f e r as to the nodes to which it is reconstructed. The DA method specifies t h a t inclusion is a relation between members of the same cognate set occur­ ring in d i f f e r e n t meaning lists. Blust later makes it explicit t h a t it was his u n d e r ­ standing of the DA method t h a t "inclusion" is a relation between d i f f e r e n t cognate sets in the same meaning list. This appears in his explanation of the appearance of the reflexes of *qa(R)(t)a in the meaning 'slave' as a result of semantic change presumably a f t e r competing with *qaDipen, the latter known only in just the meaning 'slave'. He reaches this conclusion despite the fact t h a t *qaDipen is

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r e f l e c t e d only in his Western Malayo-Polynesian subgroup (WMP) of his Malayo-Polynesian family, whereas *qa(R)(t)a is found with the meaning 'slave' both in his Western Malayo-Polynesian subgroup and in its coordinate Central Malayo-Polynesian subgroup (CMP). WMP languages are found chiefly in the Philippines and w e s t e r n Indonesia and CMP languages are found in eastern Indonesia. Blust presents the data as follows (1980.207): ... 'reflexes of *qa(R)(t)a are found in certain languages of the Philippines, Sulawesi, and eastern Indonesia in the meaning 'slave', while apparently cognate forms meaning 'human being' appear in Sumatra, Palau, and New Caledonia ... reflexes of * qaDipen apparently are confined to Western MalayoPolynesian languages - and hence in terms of our subgrouping assumptions ... are 'included' by reflexes of *qa(R)(t)a. Reflexes of *qa(R)(t)a in the meanings 'slave' and 'human being' (since this meaning accord­ ing to Blust must be assigned to *tau, a d i f f e r e n t reconstruction-I.D.) then involve t r a n s f e r s of meaning f r o m other terms (footnote 5 ) . Footnote 5 states (in p a r t ) : " I t is perhaps worth noting in this connection t h a t the t r a n s f e r of the meaning 'slave' in Western Malayo-Polynesian lan­ guages - contrary to Dyen's principle - is f r o m the included candidate *qaDipen, to the including candi­ d a t e , *qa(R)(t)a ..." Not only is Blust's use of "inclusion" strictly d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of DA, but his t e r m " t r a n s f e r " is also d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of DA, at least in the passage above. In the DA method the t e r m t r a n s f e r applies to the acquisition of a new meaning by a t e r m in a language without r e f e r e n c e to the association of that meaning with any other t e r m . The t e r m would consequently appear in a new meaning list. If another t e r m also held t h a t meaning, both t e r m s would now appear in t h a t list. The meaning could not be said to have been t r a n s f e r r e d from one word to another. Curiously enough the DA use of the t e r m " t r a n s f e r " is r e f l e c t e d (though not accurately) in Blust's summary of the

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DA method, for he says (1980:206): " T r a n s f e r r e f e r s to the reassignment of a r e t a i n e d t e r m from one category of meaning to another." Here he makes no r e f e r e n c e to "the source" of the meaning to which the t e r m is "reassigned". It is Blust's insistence on the source of the meaning 'slave* associated with the reflexes of *q a ( R ) ( t ) a that leads to absurdity. It goes without saying that a semantic change must occur within one language. It follows t h a t the meaning 'slave' could be " t r a n s f e r r e d " f r o m *qaDipen to *qa(R)(t)a only in a language in which both words w e r e present. Since it is stipulated t h a t of the two words only *qa(R)(t)a occurs with the meaning 'slave' in CMP (e.g. in Sumba ata), the only relevant language in which both words occur (unless the claim is made t h a t 'qaDipen [ w i t h o u t evidence] also occurred in CMP) is the proto-language immediately ances­ t r a l to WMP and CMP, i.e. Proto-Malayo-Polynesian. But if *qaDipen is attested in only WMP, its a t t r i b u t i o n to PMP would be from a single witness and could be justly regarded as ad hoc. Thus the w r i t e r has not only garbled the definitional system of the DA method in the process of a t t e m p t i n g to demonstrate its inadequacy, but in doing so has used a single-witness distribution to "explain" a m u l t i branch distribution, a line of a r g u m e n t t h a t hardly recom­ mends itself. When Aberle criticised Blust's misrepresentation of the DA t e r m "inclusion", the l a t t e r c o u n t e r - a t t a c k e d by saying (1980:239) that "Aberle's evident belief t h a t he and Dyen discovered the principle of inclusion is sure to surprise his­ torical linguists, who have been using it (in less f o r m a l i s t s guise) as basic equipment since the subgrouping concept f i r s t crystallized in the 19th century." If this proposition is t r u e , t h e r e seems to be hardly any way to make it jibe with his misrepresentation of the DA d e f i n i t i o n of " i n c l u ­ sion". In any case t h e r e is an important d i f f e r e n c e between discovery and formalization of which Blust does well to remind us. Formalization takes steps of reasoning from the area of intuitive leaps t h a t are d i f f i c u l t to follow and/or prove and reduces them to logical or probabilistic steps which can be judged both independently and together. Whether "inclusion" is a discovery or not is not really important. But it is a pity t h a t Blust does not cite any of the examples familiar to him f r o m 19th century scholars,

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells particularly if they are f r o m the Indo-European they would fill a gap I noted above.

373 field,

for

Another application of the term "better candidate" appears in Blust's treatment of PMP aya. He says (1980:216): "A number of Austronesian languages r e f l e c t a f o r m *aya with the meaning ' f a t h e r ' , while others have an a p p a r e n t cognate meaning 'mother' " , and presents a table showing the distribution of such words. The meaning 'moth­ er' is apparently PAN in view of Atayal y-aya 'mother', whereas the meaning 'father' can only be traced to PMP. However as Blust says (1980:216): "The g r e a t majority of Austronesian languages reflect *(t)-ama 'father', *(t)-ina 'mother'" so that these reconstructions must be given P r o to-Austronesian status. From this basis Blust proceeds as follows: " ... it is essential to keep in mind that b e t t e r candidates than *aya are available f o r both 'father' and 'mother'. But if * meant neither 'father' nor 'mother', what could it have meant?" One might have thought t h a t the simple answer t h a t the word meant both ' f a t h e r ' and 'mother', and thus 'parent' would suggest itself as the reconstruction at least for P M P , but this receives no mention. Having used the special a r g u ­ ment above f o r excluding the meanings 'father' and 'moth­ er', he proceeds to muster a number of cognates from v a r ­ ious subgroups t h a t can be i n t e r p r e t e d as supporting the meaning he finally assigns to *ayat namely 'FZ'. Perhaps the best among these are (1980:216) Manobo (Mindanao) aya-? 'aunt', Sika a?a 'FZ'; Motu lala (< "yaya) 'FZ, BC(ws)', Fiu ai?a ( - ? - u n - e x p l a i n e d ) 'FZ'. Among these is perhaps to be included Moa (lesser Sundas) y-ei-ni 'uncle'. The meanings of the other cognates t h a t Blust cites d i f f e r among t h e m ­ selves over a wide range. The only agreements among any of these is to be found in Pazeh (Formosa) ya-h 'el' and Bisaya Bukit (Borneo) i-aya-n 'eSb (vocative f o r m used only by males)'. The meaning Atayal (Formosa) meaning 'mother' aya regardless of be a t t r i b u t e d to

'mother' is found i n , among others, the cognate and WMP and CMP cognates. The must consequently be a t t r i b u t e d to PAN the fact t h a t the same meaning must also PAN (t-)ina. If the only subgroups of PAN

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are Formosan and non-Formosan, the distribution 'mother' cannot be included in any other.

of

*aya

The meaning 'father' is found associated with *aya in WMP and CMP cognates and *aya is t h e r e f o r e at best a candidate f o r t h a t meaning in PMP. Since the PMP d i s t r i ­ bution of *aya 'father' is unincluded, the meaning 'father* must have come to be a t t r i b u t e d to *aya in PMP at least dialectally. [The association of the meaning 'mother' w i t h •father' would seem more plausible if (1) the original meaning 'mother' was replaced by 'parent' by semantic change and then 'parent' was replaced by 'father' or (2) 'mother' was the only phase of an originally broader m e a n ­ ing, say 'parent', that persisted in a cognate distribution requisite for candidacy, the original meaning then becoming variously restricted in d i f f e r e n t PMP dialects and descen­ dants.] The meaning 'elder sister' could be a t t r i b u t e d to PAN aya on the basis of the Pazeh and Bisaya Bukit cognates (see above). If so, it would have to be added to 'mother', thus reaching 'mother, elder sister'. In PMP the words a t t r i b u t e d to the cognate set *aya 'FZ' seem to o f f e r correspondential problems in nearly every case and some may perhaps eventually be excluded. However if these difficulties are overcome, then the meaning 'FZ' among others must be a t t r i b u t e d to PMP ayat thus yielding the meanings ' M , FZ, e Z , F' or in simpler form ' p a r e n t , FZ, eZ'. Combination of

Differences

Blust's other instance of "semantic f r a g m e n t a t i o n " t h a t he claims necessitates an "index of semantic uniformity" concerns the meaning of *timuR. However the argument leading to the assignment of a meaning to *timuR d i f f e r s from t h a t regarding *qa(R)(t)a. The a r g u m e n t regarding the l a t t e r is based on the principle of the " b e t t e r c a n d i d a t e " , whereas in the case of 'timuR he seems to suggest t h a t the meaning of an etymon is to be d r a w n from the various components of the d i f f e r e n t meanings of members of the same cognate set. He says (1980:207):

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In other examples, the i n f e r r e d meaning of a lexical reconstruction exhibits what might be called 'semantic f r a g m e n t a t i o n ' in its reflexes - t h a t is, separation and d i f f e r e n t i a l r e t e n t i o n of the simpler components of an originally complex meaning. The forms *SabaRat and *timuR are reconstructed with the meanings 'northwest monsoon' and 'southeast monsoon' respec­ tively, but in a number of attested languages reflexes of these terms have come to be associated with the cardinal directions or have acquired other meanings. Even if the meaning 'southeast monsoon' *timuR, were not directly a t t e s t e d f o r reflexes of however, this meaning might still be i n f e r r e d f r o m the surviving meaning components i n , f o r example, Tagalog t'imog, Palauan dimes 'south, southwind', Malay timur 'east', Timugon M u r u t timug ' w a t e r ' , and Samoan timu ' r a i n / . A similar case in the domain of kinship will be encountered with the reconstruction of *ma(n)tuqa 'mother's b r o t h e r / w i f e ' s f a t h e r ' . The inference of 'southeast monsoon' escaped Dempwolff who gives 'Regenwind' as the meaning. It is hardly likely that many competent comparatists will agree with Blust that 'southeast monsoon' could be regarded as what must neces­ sarily be reconstructed; this meaning could hardly be more than a conjecture on the basis of the evidence he s t i p u ­ lates. Furthermore it is perhaps interesting to observe that the a t t r i b u t i o n of terms as specific as 'southeast monsoon' to *timuR and 'northwest monsoon' to "SabaRat would militate against assigning the PMP homeland to the northern h e m i ­ sphere. In this hemisphere the seasonal monsoons appear to be southwest and northeast. The t e r m s above seem to be more appropriate to a PMP homeland in the southern h e m i ­ sphere. It is thus d i f f i c u l t to see how Blust's notion of "semantic fragmentation" and the associated "index of semantic uniformity" can be regarded as a real contribution to lexical reconstruction. The notion t h a t Blust seems to be striving toward seems to be t h a t of the semantic history hypothesis (SHH), a necessary component of any cognation

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hypothesis, but one which must be regarded for the purposes of lexical reconstruction as a much less reliable and less specific hypothesis than the inference reached by the DA method. Blust's Criticisms of the DA Method Blust brings up two points t h a t need discussion: (1) the " g r a d i e n t of probability" (Blust's t e r m ) involved in the d i f ­ f e r e n t i a l t r e a t m e n t of included candidates according to the number of immediate subgroups in which they appear (1980:239) and (2) the "excessive" synonymy t h a t Blust claims results from the DA procedure. It is his belief t h a t this "excess" can be avoided by using his index of semantic uniformity (1980:241). The "Gradient of

Probability"

In regard to the " g r a d i e n t of probability" he sets out to argue that a g r e a t e r number than two or t h r e e i n d e ­ pendent t r a n s f e r s might be expected in some instances, though perhaps not in others; he does this however without specifying the kinds of meanings in which such a relatively larger number of t r a n s f e r s might be expected. He says (1980:239): Dyen departs from traditional linguistic thinking, however, in elevating the principle of inclusion to the position of a decision-making algorithm w i t h , so to speak, absolute power. Such a procedure makes sense only if all semantic innovations are equally motivated (or unmotivated) - t h a t is, if no factor other than chance bears on their occurrence. Given our present knowledge of semantics, can we be con­ f i d e n t that this assumption is justified? In the f i r s t place the basis of the DA method is mis­ represented here since in fact the algorithmic effect appears in the t r e a t m e n t of all candidates, not merely in the principle of inclusion. Whatever power the method has lies in its ability to produce plausible reconstructions which can then be regarded as based on the strongest inferences at every step. Secondly the DA method does not exclude the

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possibility of f o u r or more independent transfers from consideration, but concludes that such a hypothesis has a nearly negligible probability and can t h e r e f o r e be d i s r e ­ garded (DA 17); its likelihood can hardly approach that of the equally satisfactory, but simpler, hypothesis that a sin­ gle t r a n s f e r took place in a dialect of the p r o t o - l a n g u a g e . Thirdly, the DA method is not based on the (inevitably false) assumption that all semantic innovations are equally proba­ ble [=Blust's "equally motivated (or u n m o t i v a t e d ) " ] . No (a priori) assumption about the meaning of a proto-lexeme can be made without vicious circularity; consequently no d e t e r ­ mination of what is an innovation r a t h e r than an i n h e r i ­ tance - let alone consideration of any d i f f e r e n c e between the probabilities to be associated with particular innovations - can be made prior to the assignment of a meaning to an etymon. In any case there are two arguments that Blust employs to support his position t h a t more t r a n s f e r s than t h r e e are to be expected: (1) t h a t the factors involved in (independent) t r a n s f e r s and thus the probability of such events vary with the case and thus cannot be handled by the simple provision in the DA method (as above) and (2) t h a t an analogous procedure would lead to e r r o r in phono­ logical reconstruction (see below). Blust sets f o r t h a curious proposition in his attack the " g r a d i e n t of probability." He says (1980:240),

on

It should be obvious t h a t Dyen's gradient of p r o b ­ ability for convergent innovations in the case of Athapaskan cannot be a universal schema, since the number of convergent innovations to be expected from chance alone is a function of the number of witnesses compared (emphasis mine - I.D.). Setting aside for now the question of lower-level subgroups, t h e r e are approximately eight times as many languages in my data as in the Athapaskan rosters. Should w e , t h e n , consider 8 χ 2 = 16 independent t r a n s f e r s (i.e. con­ vergent innovations i.D.) in Austronesian 'not unreasonable to expect'?

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Blust has based his assumption on the total number of languages in the Austronesian and Athapaskan families despite the fact t h a t his basic statistic regarding conver­ gences was derived f r o m the six prime subgroups t r e a t e d in the Athapaskan reconstruction (see above). The question of subgroups can not be disregarded if a f a i r analogy w e r e being constructed, since what appears as two instances a f t e r subgrouping could r e f l e c t some larger number of agreements in the daughter languages. The analog of the six Athapaskan subgroups in Blust's subgrouping of Aus­ tronesian are the t h r e e subgroups of Malayopolynesian t h a t he proposes; the numbers t h a t he constructs are based on confusion and a r e , however w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d , misleading. Curiously enough, they are also i r r e l e v a n t . At f i r s t reading one might think t h a t Blust here is aiming at the claim t h a t the DA method must be f a u l t y because, if followed to its logical conclusion, it permits too many convergences. Such a presumption however would be quite clearly contrary to the implications of his phonological example (see below) which suggests r a t h e r t h a t the DA method is f a u l t y by allowing f o r too f e w convergences. It is my belief that the l a t t e r view represents Blust's main a i m , with the a p p a r e n t side-claim (contrary to the position I t a k e : see above) t h a t we can i n f e r a convergence even in a non-competitive a r r a n g e m e n t w h e r e , "given our knowledge of semantics", such a conclusion recommends itself. The assumption underlying lexical reconstruction, as it underlies the comparative method, is t h a t on the whole convergence, where it is not due to universal factors (such as onomatopoeia), appears in a small number of instances w h e r e v e r convergence in independent witnesses is only one of a large number of possible directions in linguistic change. There is a crux here since t h e r e are the following t h r e e choices in any given case of the semantic a g r e e m e n t of cognates regarding the relation b e t w e e n the likelihood of common inheritance on the one hand and t h a t of conver­ gence on the other: (1) common inheritance is more likely than convergence, (2) convergence is more likely than com­ mon inheritance, and (3) t h a t common inheritance and con-

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vergence are equally likely. The assumption that lies behind the DA method is t h a t in the absence of other knowledge including the absence of actual historical knowledge, the usual case - common inheritance is much more likely than convergence (if f o r the moment we disregard the case of inclusion). Neither of the other two choices seems to lead to a replicable procedure of lexical reconstruction. It is worth observing a t this point t h a t in the DA method inclusion is used as the basis of reconsidering a candidacy precisely because inclusion suggests that a con­ vergence might be involved. Inclusion is thus a f o r m of additional knowledge which might lead to a hypothesis of convergence. It is t h e r e f o r e a t the same time not a proper basis f o r calculating the number of expected convergences per language considered, the assumption basic to Blust's formulation above. Blust's Phonetic Analog To show t h a t this assumption regarding the relative likelihood of common inheritance and convergence will not result in acceptable conclusions, Blust (1918:239 f . ) con­ structs a hypothetical problem in phonetic reconstruction of the following type. Suppose we have a correspondence involving five coordinate subgroups, f o u r of which exhibit [ h ] whereas just one exhibits [ s ] . He argues t h a t from such a correspondence we would reconstruct a phonetic sibilant and not [ h ] despite the more numerous [ h ] correspon­ dences. I am inclined to agree w i t h Blust t h a t if such a correspondence w e r e to be discovered, his inference would not be unreasonable. Our experience gives us many instances of [ h ] < [ > ] and very f e w , if any, of [ s ] < C h ] . The relatively g r e a t e r frequency of [ s ] > [ h ] over [ h ] > [ s ] is p e r ­ haps so overwhelming t h a t , in the absence of another a l t e r n a t i v e , we might even be ready to accept as an i m p l i ­ cation of the hypothesis the undesirable conclusion t h a t four identical independent innovations had occurred, as he con­ cludes we must. It is obvious t h a t Blust's a r g u m e n t would be more chal­ lenging than it is if he could cite a real case. In the absence of an example, it might be t r u e t h a t t h e r e might not be such a case and t h a t none might ever be found.

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However, in any case, a not insignificant probability must also be assigned to the possibility t h a t the change of [ s ] to [h] had occurred in a dialect of the p r o t o - l a n g u a g e , whereas it had not so changed in another dialect; in t h a t case the four instances of [ h ] need not have been i n d e ­ p e n d e n t , but might have continued a dialectal f e a t u r e of the proto-language. Such a hypothesis would avoid the undesirable conclusion t h a t f o u r like independent events, a f o u r - w a y convergence, had occurred. In fact there is a celebrated correspondence in the history of the Indo-European languages which bears some resemblance to the problem t h a t Blust proposes. The c e n t u m - s a t e m division of the P r o t o - I n d o - E u r o p e a n dialects (cf. Bloomfield 1933:317) is generally accepted and depends on a correspondence between velar stops in one set of daughter languages and sibilants in the other set. It is also more or less generally agreed t h a t the phonemes w e r e at some e a r ­ lier stage palatal in articulation and - what is important were stops r a t h e r than sibilants. Here presumably the assignment of priority to the stop articulation over the sibilant articulation is the (? intuitive) notion t h a t a change from a stop to a sibilant is more likely than the reverse. In any case however both stop and sibilant articulations are a t t r i b u t e d to P r o t o - I n d o - E u r o p e a n though, to be s u r e , to d i f f e r e n t dialects. What is striking, but not accidentally so, is t h a t the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which assigns both the [ s ] and the [ h ] in Blust's hypothetical instance, and in the case of P r o t o - I n d o European both the velar and the sibilant articulations, to the p r o t o - l a n g u a g e , but to d i f f e r e n t dialects, is analogous to the DA assignment of a list meaning not only to an unincluded candidate, but also to an included candidate found in four or more subgroups. In lexical reconstruction the two successful candidates may r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n t dialectal developments within the proto-language in some cases, whereas in others they may r e f l e c t synonymy in the p r o t o language, a possibility for which a phonetic analog is not available. Thus the basis f o r using a (where a conclusive a r r a n g e m e n t

" g r a d i e n t of probability" such as non-inclusion or

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sole candidacy is not present) is t h e r e f o r e the absence of a law of semantic change such as might let us consider some­ thing more than the semantic a g r e e m e n t of cognates as d e t e r m i n i n g . The e f f e c t of this view is to make reasonable the assumption that over a long period of time any seman­ tic change is possible so that only a probabilistic approach provides a sensible attack; as it t u r n s o u t , such an approach is analogous to the way the comparative method is applied in the reconstruction of the phonetics of a p r o t o phoneme. "Excessive"

Synonymy

We now consider the criticism t h a t the DA procedure leads to excessive synonymy in reconstructed kinship terms. In any case excessive synonymy, even if it w e r e to be f o u n d , can not be a t t r i b u t e d to the DA t r e a t m e n t of inclu­ sion (i.e. included candidates), since inclusion can serve only to make a t w o - m e m b e r candidate ineligible to gain its list meaning and a t h r e e - m e m b e r candidate moot (see above). Thus the only e f f e c t of inclusion is to reduce the amount of reconstructed synonymy. Where Blust's Malayopolynesian is concerned, inclusion is of little importance. To be included a candidate must occur in one less subgroup than the including candidate (see d e f ­ inition of inclusion above). When only t h r e e immediate sub­ groups are being compared, as is the case in Blust's t r i ­ partite subgrouping of Malayopolynesian, an included candidate thus can have no more than two members. Since the elimination of an included candidate found in only two subgroups depends on competition with another candidate which itself r e q u i r e s being found in two subgroups, the automatic exclusion of a candidate because of being included generally r e q u i r e s a subgrouping with f o u r or more subgroups. Thus in a t r i p a r t i t e subgrouping inclusion can not in general serve even to reduce synonymy. Actually t h e r e f o r e it generally has no e f f e c t at all. The only exceptions to the statement above concerning the number of subgroups r e q u i r e d f o r the principle of inclusion to operate involve multiple e n t r i e s . Languages not i n f r e q u e n t l y exhibit competitive t e r m s f o r a meaning in such a way t h a t multiple e n t r i e s can not reasonably be

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avoided. Under such a circumstance less than four sub­ groups (i.e. three or even two) might be needed to exclude an included candidate. This would occur if the multiple e n t r i e s produced competing candidates, one of which was included. Blust thus wrongly a t t r i b u t e s excessive synonymy to the principle of inclusion. He assumes t h a t excessive synonymy is an undesirable outcome, but does not present a way of determining the minimum excessive amount. In fact there is no way of determining what is a tolerable amount of syno­ nymy f o r a proto-language any more than t h e r e is for an observable language. The only way an excessive amount of synonymy can accumulate is by e r r o r . The amount of synonymy t h a t can be t o l e r a t e d is the amount indicated by the candidates. Thus if t h e r e is a suspicion t h a t too many synonyms are accumulat­ ing in the use of the DA method, it is wise to reexamine the basic structure of the meaning lists f o r e r r o r s . If proper care has been observed, the i n f e r r e d synonymy is unavoidable, particularly in a t r i p a r t i t e subgrouping. There are however many ways of committing e r r o r s in drawing up the tables t h a t favor erroneous synonymy. The tables used in the DA method have essentially t h r e e factors: (1) the cognation, (2) the subgrouping, and (3) the meaning lists. We need not discuss the cognation since most experts will agree about the membership of most cognate sets. On the other hand it is obvious that (1) subgrouping is an area in which experts are commonly in disagreement and (2) d i f ­ ferences in subgrouping produce d i f f e r e n t amounts of syno­ nymy. Finally if the meaning lists do not distinguish all of the distinctions that recur in d i f f e r e n t d a u g h t e r subgroups, the probability of reconstructed synonymy is increased. Words that do not have the same meanings and t h e r e f o r e should have been put under d i f f e r e n t headings end up in the same list. Such a procedure promotes synonymy, but violates the principle t h a t words in the same list should not d i f f e r by a semantic component which is (1) found in more than one language or subgroup and (2) not assigned its own meaning

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list. Ignoring this recurrent component promotes reconstructional synonymy, whereas the successful candidacy of an etymon in d i f f e r e n t lists results in the addition of meanings which in t u r n may clarify its status within a reconstructed synonymy. In arguing t h a t the DA method produces excessive syno­ nymy Blust cites the inferences f o r Proto-Malayopolynesian ( P M P ) from the meaning lists for the cross sibling t e r m s 'B (ws)' and 'Z (ms)' respectively in Table (1980:240) e n t i t l e d : '"Inclusion Diagram' of Proto-Austronesian and P r o t o - M a l a y o Polynesian Candidates for the Meanings 'Male', 'Female', 'B (ws)', ' e j |Sb', and 'y| j Sb': Subgroups

F

a F(l) WMP (11-1) a,b CMP ( I I - 2 ) a,b EMP ( I I - 3 ) a

 (ws)

Z (ms)

e IISb yl ISb

   

d,e a,d,e,f,g a,d,e,f,g a,e

d,e c,d,e,h,i c,d,e,h,ì, c,e

d d d d

d,e e e e

 

d/e a,e,f,g

d/e c,e,h,i

d d

e e

Hence: PAN PMP

a a,b

a= *ma-Ruanay, b= 'laki, c= *baHi, etc., d= kaka, e= *Sua(n)ji, f= 'fiaRa, g= *anak ma-Ruanay, h= anak etc., i= be(t)aw.

baHi,

There is actually even g r e a t e r synonymy implied by Table 9 for PMP cross sibling t e r m s than Blust finds. He mysteriously failed to include d among the cross sibling synonyms listed under  (ws) and Z (ms) respectively. The f a i l u r e to do so results in an unexpressed implication t h a t though d occurred with these meanings in PAN and in daughter languages of P M P , it failed to appear in the intervening PMP with these meanings; such a hypothesis seems unnecessarily complicated f r o m a historical viewpoint and is actually internally inconsistent. It may be t h a t Blust ignored the instances in WMP and CMP of d in the m e a n ­ ings indicated on the grounds t h a t they w e r e included in the candidate d under e l I S b . At the same time he seems not to hesitate to use the appearance of d in WMP and

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Dyen: Lexical Reconstruction & S H Hypothesis

CMP to justify the assignment of the cross sibling meanings to d in PAN. Thus if the "principle of inclusion" is the basis of excluding d from PMP under the cross sibling t e r m reconstructions, the "principle" has been wrongly applied. Perhaps the exclusion of d from PMP was an oversight. Although the "excessive synonymy" t h a t Blust finds in the PMP cross sibling t e r m s can in no way be a t t r i b u t e d to the "principle of inclusion," t h e r e is some interest in (1) whether the synonymy is in fact excessive and (2) whether some of the synonymy (regardless of the issue as to whether it is excessive) is unavoidable, i.e. "necessary". It is worth mentioning t h a t although Blust does not hesitate to construct Table 9 as evidence t h a t the DA p r o ­ cedure leads to excessive synonymy, he readily apologizes for possible e r r o r s by indicating t h a t it only represents the facts "so f a r as I can judge" (1980:240). He has e a r l i e r presented a f a r more sweeping apology concerning all of his reconstructions in his admission (1980:208 f n . 6) t h a t the "method of presentation is necessarily less systematic" than in DA and that only "some 100 widespread Austronesian morphemes relating to the universe of kinship have now been collected. To discuss each of these in its systematic relations to the others would r e q u i r e for more space than is available and in all probability would yield little additional infor­ mation relevant to the major features of early Austronesian social organization (emphasis mine - I.D.)." One surmises t h a t his reluctance to be positive reflects the fact that the number of Austronesian languages is very large and the number of languages is very large and the number of languages in Blust's Malayopolynesian is very large. Furthermore not all of them are w e l l - s t u d i e d . It would be hard to believe t h a t Blust's information is so complete in its present form t h a t it forms a proper basis for a claim that the DA method produces excessive synonymy or fails in any other aspect. This is not to say that the DA procedure or its results are above criticism, but r a t h e r t h a t in this particular case it is d i f f i c u l t to see how the c r i t i ­ cism o f f e r e d can be regarded as w e l l - b a s e d , even if it w e r e to appear to imply the conclusion t h a t Blust reaches.

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By setting up Table 9 to show excessive synonymy w i t h ­ out citing the data base, Blust has made himself suspect of loading the dice, perhaps innocently. His f a i l u r e to control his material appears when he says (1980:240) " i t is clear that we must either permit synonymy in the P r o t o - M a l a y o Polynesian terms f o r cross-siblings (despite the fact that such a situation is unknown in attested terminologies)... (emphasis mine - I.D.)"; yet he himself has cited (1980:209) the Soboyo terms kaka 'eSb', ufi? 'ySb', naha 'B (ws)', foto 'Z (ms)'. These can hardly be understood otherwise than as meaning that Soboyo kaka is synonymous with naha f o r 'eB (ws)" and that ufi? is similarly synonymous with foto f o r 'yZ ( m s ) \ In the same way Ngaju exhibits the following sibling terms according to Blust (1980:209): aka 'eSb (of Ego)', kaka 'eSb (of others)', andi 'ySb', pahari ' l l Sb', nahe 'B (ws)', betau 'Z (ms)'.  pahari is synonymous with aka, kaka, and andi respectively wherever they apply to parallel siblings. F u r t h e r m o r e , aka, kaka are synonymous with nahe and betau respectively where 'eB (ws)' and 'eZ (ms)' respectively are concerned, and similarly andi is synonymous with nahe and betau respectively for 'yB (ws)' and 'yZ (ms)'. It is now not surprising to f i n d t h a t another part of the "excessive synonymy" Blust finds in PMP cross-sibling t e r m s can be a t t r i b u t e d to inconsistency in setting up the list meanings. Although Blust's categories are mutually exclusive, the subdivisions of xSb and I I Sb are not made in the same way. The situation seems to cry f o r a set of list meanings that are not only mutually exclusive but also consistent with each other, such as (to follow Blust's o r d e r ­ ing): 'eB (ws)', 'yB (ws)', 'eZ (ms)', 'yB (ms)', 'eZ (ws)', 'yZ (ws)'. Not only would the "excessive synonymy" that Blust sees be dissolved, but he would have avoided what look like actual e r r o r s in listing; even if *kaka and *Sua(n)jif which are listed under both 'B (ws)' and 'Z (ms)' without age dis­ t i n c t i o n , are to be found anywhere w i t h such meanings (i.e. "kaka 'older and younger cross sibling', *Sua(n)ii 'older and younger cross sibling'), only carelessness could have p r e ­ vented Blust f r o m separately listing the many instances in which they are not.

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Dyen: Lexical Reconstruction & S H Hypothesis

The Soboyo and Ngaju sibling t e r m s are not satisfacto­ rily represented in a table t h a t does not recognize the separate list meanings 'eB (ws)', 'eZ (ms) 1 , ' (ws)' and 'yZ (ms)'. Because such listings are not used, Blust inelegantly places Ngaju aka, kaka and Soboyo kaka under a heading which includes the meanings ' (ws)' and 'yZ (ms)' despite his own belief (1980:209 f n . 10) t h a t Soboyo kaka "is almost certainly restricted to parallel siblings"; similarly Ngaju andi and others like it have been placed under a heading t h a t includes the meanings 'eB (ws)' and 'eZ (ms)' (cf. 1980:209 where only the meaning 'ySb' is given). Once the new h e a d ­ ings have been established, some of the a p p a r e n t synonymy would disappear if f o r no other reason than t h a t *kaka would end up in Blust's PMP with the meaning 'eSb' and *Sua(n)ii with the meaning 'ySb', continuing these meanings respectively from PAN. The limitation of *kaka to 'older sibling' is pervasive. Presumably the a t t r i b u t i o n of the meaning 'older cross sibling' to "Suanji in addition to its widely represented meaning 'younger sibling' is Blust's consideration of the meaning this element has in compounds and derivatives. Derivative forms based on *Sua(n)ji with w i d e r meanings than 'ySb' such as Taroko mnswai 'brothers and sisters, all close relatives, esp. cousins', in Maranao pag-ari-a? 'friend, chum, pal', Singhi madis 'brother, (near) relatives', can hardly be regarded as relevant to the assignment of a meaning to the etymon *Sua(n)ii itself, which is widely attested in a large variety of languages in the meaning 'ySb'. As to what to do with the marginal meanings such as 'younger f r i e n d , etc.' t h a t might appear in the various l a n ­ guages, it is d i f f i c u l t to say at this time because here I would estimate the probability of convergence as notably higher than in the case of the central meanings; in any case we are not presented with the other candidates, if any, so as to d e t e r m i n e whether this candidate might be included in those meanings. It should be noted t h a t Blust seems less concerned with the precise homosemantism of the marginal meanings than of the central meanings. For example t h e r e is little q u e s ­ tion t h a t the meaning 'house' must be a t t r i b u t e d to *Rumaq (cf. 1980:211). It also appears in a number of languages

Essays in Honor ot Rulon S. Wells

387

with marginal meanings t h a t Blust i n t e r p r e t s as 'lineage'. But Blust does not make it clear that the varied meanings which he sums up as 'lineage' are close enough to each other to r e q u i r e the interence that he evidently wishes to reach. Such a decision is best made by an e x p e r t . It is ot some interest t h a t Blust has t a i l e d to note another provision ot the DA method. It provides t h a t a t t e r the successtul candidates are decided upon t o r each column, the meanings won by each t e r m should be added together. Thus in Blust's terms we would reach the tollowing PMP t e r m s and meanings: a b  d e t g h i

*ma-Ruanay - M a l e ,  (ws) *iaki - Male * baHi/ba-baHi/b-in-aHi/ba-b-in-in-aHi - Female, Z (ms) 'kaka - e | | Sb (to which should be added  (ws)) *Sua(n)ii -  ( w s ) , Z (ms), yl j Sb = xSB, yl I Sb * ñaRa -  (ws) *anak ma-Ruanay -  (ws) *anak baHi/ etc. - Z (ms) *be(()aw - Z (ms)

Thus despite the "excessive" synonymy t h a t is claimed tor the PMP cross sibling t e r m s , the synonymy tor some ot them is only p a r t i a l . We will now consider the possibility that some ot the "excessive" synonymy indicated in Blust's Table 9 might be due to an e r r o r in subgrouping. Such an e r r o r might lead us to regard as PMP what would otherwise be regarded as innovation. Blust subclassities his Malayopolynesian subgroup into t h r e e t u r t h e r subgroups - Western M P , Central M P , and Eastern MP. It WMP is recognized as being more closely r e l a t e d with CMP than with EMP (see below), we would t r e a t WMP-CMP as a single subgroup ot MP as against EMP. Under this subgrouping f and g under  (ws) and h and / under Z (ws) would occur only in one MP subgroup (i.e. the WMP-CMP subgroup) and would thus lack the nec­ essary evidence to have t h e i r respective etyma assigned to P M P , let alone have the meaning ot their respective lists a t t r i b u t e d to t h e m . This is one way in which the "excessive"

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Dyen: Lexical Reconstruction & S H Hypothesis

synonymy in the cross sibling t e r m s might be an a r t i f a c t . That this possibility should not have been ignored is i n d i ­ cated by Blust himself, who constructs Table 7 under the t i t l e "Reconstructional Consequences of Combining the Cen­ t r a l Malayo-Polynesian Languages with the Western (Propo­ sal 1) or the Eastern (Proposal 2 ) " (1980:238). In the t e x t he points out that I (Dyen) favor a primary subgroup resembling that in "Proposal 1 " ; it seems a little overdone for Blust to criticize a method t h a t I have proposed because "excessive'· synonymy results from a subgrouping f o r which he, not I, bears the responsibility. Conclusion Drawing inferences from semantic agreements or homosemies between cognates in d i f f e r e n t branches characterizes the DA method. Other methods of drawing inferences have been used before which not only did the same, but also drew inferences from semantic similarities or homeosemies between cognates in d i f f e r e n t branches. Such inferences are to be found in the work of Benveniste, Walde and Pokorny, and Dempwoltf among others, but are best regarded as instances of semantic history hypotheses. An inference drawn from a homeosemy is necessarily vaguer than one based on a homosemy. It is probably just such a notion as t h a t of a semantic history hypothesis t h a t Blust seems to have been aiming a t , but it is d i f f i c u l t to see how the notion of "semantic fragmentation" and the associated "index of semantic uniformity" can be useful in lexical reconstruction. The d i f f e r e n c e s in meaning t h a t cognates show can hardly be a sound basis f o r a t t r i b u t i n g a meaning to an etymon. The linguistic evidence t h a t Blust o f f e r s as critically supportive for the hypothesis of prescriptive alliance in PMP fails to be conclusive. The assignment of both the meanings 'MB' and the meaning ' p a r e n t - i n - l a w ' to *mantuqa fails because it is based on single-witness a t t r i b u t i o n s . The same f a t e would overtake the assignment of both the meaning 'sister's son' and 'daughter's husband (man speaking)' to *(dD)awa. Furthermore he reaches the assignment of the meaning 'FZ' to *aya by way of his " b e t t e r candidate" a r g u m e n t , but

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

389

there appears to be good reason to believe that the meaning assigned is too limited. The reconstructible mean­ ings of PMP aya appear to be 'parent, FZ, eZ'. Thus three of the four reconstructions that Blust regards as supportive of his thesis and least likely to be due to convergence are suspect. Only *laya 'FIS, ZH (ms)' is well supported, f o r it is based on Toba Batak (Sumatra, WMP) lae 'FZS, ZH (ms)' and Kambera (Sumba, CMP) layia 'FZS, ZH (ms), HZH (ws)'; here Toba Batak lae is taken to result by metathesis from an earlier *lea. The cogency of this evidence however depends on precisely the subgrouping that Blust has adopted which makes CMP coordinate with WMP. If these are taken instead to belong to the same subgroup as Oceanic, the weight of this argument is lost because the agreement becomes a single witness for PMP. A revision of the subgrouping could also affect the inferences in regard to *(dD)awa. If one disregards - as I do - Blust's EMP hypothesis and assigns his South-Halmahera-West-New-Guinea subgroup (which includes Windesi) to the same single subgroup in which his WMP and CMP are combined, the inferences regarding *(dD)awa are d i f f e r e n t , but seem not to change so as to strengthen the prescriptive alliance hypothesis. The meaning 'daughter-in-law' would be attributed to '(dD)awa from the agreement between Oceanic cognates meaning 'parent-in-law/child-in-law (recipr.)' and Windesi rewa 'daughter-in-law* (see above). Similarly the meaning '(address) sister's child (ms)' would also be a t t r i b ­ uted to *(dD)awa from the agreement between Oceanic cog­ nates meaning 'sister's child (ms)' and the Kambera cognate meaning '(address) ZC (ms), BC (ws)' (see above). Just how the inference of *(dD)awa 'daughter-in-law, (address) sis­ ter's child (ms)' stands in relation to Blust's thesis would probably depend on what else could be f i t t e d with it. It appears that a close examination of the linguistic support f o r Blust's thesis seems to expose serious flaws. The immediately preceding discussion illustrates one of the cardinal points in lexical reconstruction: the critical role of subgrouping in such inferences. This suggests strongly that such inferences should be advanced with cir­ cumspection before the relevant subgrouping hypotheses have ceased to be seriously controversial.

390

Dyen: Lexical Reconstruction & S H Hypothesis ENDNOTES 1

Cf. Dyen 1963:631f., 1969:499.

2 This belief can be f o r m u l a t e d as the law of dysonymy. No two words in a language have the same range of m e a n ­ ing; even words t h a t distinguish dialects by being mutually translatable d i f f e r to some degree in meaning when they are found in the speech of the same individual.

ABBREVIATIONS CMP DA EMP HES PAN PMP PSA

-

PSICAL -

SHH WMP

-

Central Malayopolynesian. see I. Dyen and D. Aberle. 1974. Eastern Malayopolynesian. homeosemy Proto-Austronesian. Proto-Maiayopolynesian prime semantic agreement (i.e. one between cognates belonging to different immediate subgroups). Papers of the Second International Conference of Austronesian Linguistics. Eds. S.A. Wurm and L. Carrington. Fase. 1. Pacific Linguistics  61. semantic history hypothesis Western Malayopolynesian

REFERENCES CITED

Be nveni ste, E. 1969. Le vocabulaire des institutions indoeuropeennes. 2 vols. Paris. Tr. by E. Palmer and pubi. 1973 as Indo-European Language and Society. Miami Linguis­ tics Series 12. Blust, R. Α. 1978. "Eastern Malayo-Polynesian: A subgrouping argument.·· PSICAL, 181-234. Blust, R. Α. 1980: "Early Austronesian social organization: the evidence of language." CA 21.205-247. [Abstract, p. 3 of Abstracts CA 2 1 , no. 2.]

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Dahl, 0. 1973, 1976. Proto-Austronesian. Lund. Dempwolff, 0. 1938. "Austronesisches Wörterverzeichnis." ZES Beiheft 19. Dyen, I. 1965. "A lexicostatistical classification of the Austronesian languages, UAL. Memoir 19. Dyen, I. 1971. "The Austronesian languages and Proto-Aus­ tronesian." Current Trends in Linguistics 8: Linguistics in Oceania, 5-54. Dyen, I. and D. Aberle. 1974. Lexical Reconstruction: The Case of the Proto-Athapaskan Kinship System. London. Dyen, I. 1978. "The position of the languages of Eastern Indonesia." PSICAL 2 3 5 - 9 . Hockett, Charles F. 1977. "Review of: I. Dyen and D. Aberle, The Case of the Proto-Athapaskan Kinship System. " CA 18.84-91. Milke, W. 1965. "Comparative notes on the Austronesian Languages of New Guinea." Lingua 14:330-48. Pokorny, J. 1959. Indogermanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch. Bern. Walde, A. and J. Pokorny. 1930. Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der indogermanischen Sprachen. Berlin and Leipzig.

HOMONYMY, HETEROCLYSIS, AND HISTORY IN THE JAPANESE VERB

Roy Andrew Miller University of Washington, S e a t t l e , WA 1. Six formally contrasting categories of inflectional morphology must be recognized for the Old Japanese ( O J ) 1 verb as a whole, even though only one of the nine classes that constitute the verb exhibits the full r e p e r t o i r e of six morphologically distinct forms. This is OJ verb class 6, to which however only two words belong, sin- 'die' and in- ' d e ­ p a r t ' ; and even these two verbs seem to be etymologically a somewhat late d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of what was originally a sin­ gle root, preOJ *s-in-, itself an example of the OJ 'movable s-' 2 in each of the other eight classes, the frequent occurrence of homophonous f o r m s , overtly identical in shape but clearly d i f f e r e n t in syntactic function and meaning, reduces the total of formally distinct forms in any one class to below the maximal six t h a t must, however, be recognized if we are to account for the inflectional morphology of the OJ verb as a whole. Together with this homonymy in the verb paradigms we have also to cope with a considerable amount of heteroclysis, so t h a t a given morphological e l e ­ ment appears at times to waver b a c k - a n d - f o r t h between several inflectional classes. In view of this homonymy on the one hand and this heteroclysis on the o t h e r , we might r e a ­ sonably expect that the OJ verb would provide a rich area for historical investigation; and we will not be disappointed in such expectation. The historical origins of much of this homonymy, and of a g r e a t deal of this heteroclysis also, are now sufficiently well understood so t h a t these phenomena may be made to provide convenient points of d e p a r t u r e for establishing a number of important events in the overall process of linguistic change, by means of which it is, in t u r n , possible to relate the OJ v e r b , f i r s t of all to the his-

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tory of the verb in the Tungusic languages, and then in a larger sense to the history of the r e l a t e d forms in the original Altaic linguistic unity. 3 2. The OJ verb embraces nine verb classes. The f i r s t five are major classes; most verbs in the language belong to one of these f i v e , and each of these five major classes has membership of a considerable number, i.e., of t h r e e or more verbs, ranging from thousands in class 1 , to ca. f i f ­ t e e n in class 5. The last four are minor classes, each of which has only one or at the most two members, as already described for class 6 above, which has only t w o , as does also class 7; and classes 8 and 9 have a single verb each. 3. The five major classes of the OJ verb f u r t h e r sub­ divide in terms of a major formal and semantic dichotomy into two categories, athematic and t h e m a t i c , to yield two athematic classes and f o u r thematic classes. The f i r s t of the athematic classes, numbered as class 1 in the set of n i n e , the one to which belonged the majority of the OJ verbs, has consonant-final roots, e.g., kǐlr- 'cut', töFor- 'pass through'. The other athematic class, numbered 5 in the set of n i n e , is the one with only ca. f i f t e e n members, all v o w e l - f i n a l roots in -ǐ or -/ (the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between these two vowels automatically d e t e r m i n e d by the preceding conso­ n a n t ) , e.g., wi- 'to be'. Comparison with r e l a t e d languages shows t h a t while this OJ a t h e m a t i c - t h e m a t i c dichotomy is of ultimate Altaic o r i g i n , the d i f f e r e n t descendant languages f r e q u e n t l y assigned a given inherited verb root to d i f f e r e n t portions of the dichotomy, with the result that uniform athematic-thematic membership can only r a r e l y be recovered throughout the history of all the languages. The OJ 1st thematic, class 2 verb saga- 'lower, let hang down' was inherited from a pA thematic "saga-, cf. Mo. sara- 'to milk'; the same verb was also inherited by Turkic, but here a widespread 'stem shortening' 4 rule obliterated the evidence for the original thematic vowel, yielding Tkc. say- 'to milk' (the root was apparently not inherited by Tungusic; Sol. saga- 'id.' and Ev. čaa- 'id.' are believed to be loans from M o . 5 ) . The original system was especially obscured by d e v e l ­ opments in Tungusic. This branch as a whole early in its prehistory apparently began to favor thematics over a t h e matics, with the ultimate result t h a t for the vast majority of the verbs common to all or most of the Tungusic I a n -

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guages we can only recover thematic originals; original Tungusic athematics, i.e., consonant-final verbs, are d i f f i c u l t lan­ to establish historically, even though the individual guages may on occasion preserve what overtly appear to be athematic forms. Thus, the athematic OJ kǐr'cut' c o r r e ­ sponds to the thematic pTg. "giri-, a t t e s t e d in (among many other f o r m s 6 ) Ma. giri-, Nan. geri-, Ev. gir-, Lam. ger- 'id.' But the originality of such OJ athematics as töFor- 'pass through' is demonstrated effectively by comparison with Mo. tuγul-, Tkc. topul- pA 'topứl- 'id.', as also is, even within Tungusic, the a n t i q u i t y of the OJ v o w e l - f i n a l athematic class 5, represented by OJ wi- 'to be,' corresponding exactly to pTg. *bi- 'id.', attested in M a . , 6o., Ev., Lam. bi- 'id.' It is almost ironic to note t h a t in one of the remarkably r a r e instances where the Tungusic branch has preserved a verb f o r which an athematic original may be recovered, pTg. 'eat', cf. Ma. ¡e-, imp. jefu, Nan., Ev., Lam. jeb- 'id.', *ǐabOJ has instead assigned its inheritance of this same root to the thematic category, in the f o r m of the OJ thematic class 2 verb taba- 'eat' (meanwhile, f u r t h e r comparison with the wider range of Altaic shows t h a t the Tungusic and OJ -to­ in all these forms is itself a secondary s t e m - f o r m a n t , onto pA ǐė- ' e a t ' 7 ) . At any r a t e , and as f a r as the semantics of this f e a t u r e of the verb was concerned, the three OJ t h e ­ matic classes, i.e., classes 2, 3, and 4 in the set of n i n e , w e r e essentially medio-passives. As such, they expressed actions undertaken by the subject or actor largely in r e l a ­ tion to his own b e n e f i t , or when the result of the action is to be viewed mainly in terms of its relationship to the subject or actor. Formally, class 2 verbs w e r e distinguished by the thematic vowel *a, class 3 by *o, and class 4 by *c/; but each of these underlying thematic vowels u n d e r w e n t changes in preOJ, so t h a t in the texts they already appear as OJ e' or e in class 2 (the d i f f e r e n c e conditioned by the consonant preceding), and as 7 in classes 3 and 4; n e v e r ­ theless, the original, and underlying, OJ thematic vowels may be recovered, both by i n t e r n a l - r e c o n s t r u c t i o n within Japanese itself, and also by means of comparison with cog­ nate forms in the r e l a t e d languages.» 4. The maximal six d i f f e r e n t , formally distinct i n f l e c ­ tional categories that must be recognized f o r the OJ verb are (giving, in t u r n , the designation to be used h e r e , its abbreviation, and its conventional name as used by Japanese

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grammarians): 1. Aorist, Aor., mizenkei; 2. Deverbal Noun, DvN., ren'yỏkei; 3. Indicative, Ind., shūshikei; 4. Adnominal, AdN., rentaikei; 5. Conditional, Cnd., izenkei; 6. Imperative, Imp., meireikei. Illustrating these six with the class 6 verb OJ sin- 'die', the only type of verb in which all six are f o r ­ mally d i f f e r e n t in t h e i r overt shapes, will make clear the semantic and syntactic categories involved in the system: 1. the Aor. is almost always a b o u n d - f o r m t h a t appears in the OJ texts underlying additional morphological layers, typically in negatives, e.g., sina-zu 'does not die', on sina-, the Aor. of sin- 'die'. But the semantics as well as the historical origin of these Aors. as a variety of inherited Nomen aoristi is clearest in a limited number of relic forms, which have survived as f r e e nouns (even though not all may be cited from OJ), e.g., nara 'a noise', to the verb nar- 'make a sound'; yara 'a doing, an act(ion)' to yar- 'to do'; and takara 'riches, w e a l t h , t r e a s u r e ' to the adjective root taka "(be) high, expensive.' 9 2. the DvN. is a f r e e - f o r m , appearing both as a noun in its own right (sini ' d e a t h , dying'), and in composition (sinikata 'a way of dying', ikǐsini 'life and death', with ikǐ, a DvN. from ik- 'to live'), including verbal f o r m a ­ tions (sinikaFěr'to die repeatedly'). 3. the Ind. is a f r e e f o r m , typically occurring as the f i n i t e verb concluding a major syntactic unit: ...sinu. '...(someone) dies'. 4. the AdN. is syntactically bound, typically appearing as an a t t r i b u t e to or modifier of a noun or other form t h a t in t u r n functions syntactically as the head of a quasi-adnominal construction, e.g., a grammatical particle: sinuru Fět'ó 'the man (Fěto) who dies, is dying; a dying man', sinuru wo ' d e a t h , dying (as d i r e c t - o b j e c t with wo)'. 5. the Cnd. is always bound, with several uses as the underlying element in f u r t h e r morpho­ logical layers, but typically (and hence the t e r m ) as the base of secondary conditionals: sinure-ba 'if one dies ...'. 6. the Imp. is a f r e e - f o r m in some of the verb classes, i.e., in classes 1 , 6 , 7 , and 9 , but bound (with yö f see 5.1 infra) in classes 2, 5, and 8; f u r t h e r , the Imp. does not occur ( f o r semantic reasons) in the medio-passive classes 3 and 4; it signifies commands or orders, hence the t e r m : sine 'die!'. Homonymy marks the system w h e n , e.g., class 1 verbs (of the type - 'to w r i t e ' ) have overtly identical Ind. and AdN. forms: Fǐtö kaku. 'the man w r i t e s ' , but kaku Fǐtö 'the man who w r i t e s , a w r i t i n g man...*. Heteroclysis is to be reckoned with w h e n , e.g., verbs of class 7 (the two members of which are ar- and wor- both 'to be') a p p a r e n t l y might be

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assigned to class 1 on the basis of their AdN. forms ( aru, woru), or when verbs of classes 2 , 3 , 4 , 6 , and 9 all apparently might be assigned to class 1 on the basis of Ind. forms (atu 'strike', uku ' r e c e i v e / e t c . ) , even their though in neither instance is it actually possible to collapse these classes upon one another because of the existence of still other divergent and contrasting forms. It is clear t h a t both these phenomena of morphological anomaly are i n t e r ­ r e l a t e d ; to explain the f o r m e r will also be to clarify the l a t t e r . Also clear is the way in which both, w h e t h e r taken together or separately, necessarily presuppose a considera­ ble course of historical change during the prehistory of the language. 5.1 In dealing with this evidence for historical change preserved in the OJ v e r b , it is necessary at the outset to recognize and distinguish between two varieties of homo­ nymy: proximate and remote. The f o r m e r is to be explained solely in terms of developments within preOJ; only the l a t ­ t e r is of ultimate concern for the e x t e r n a l history of the language. Proximate homonymy is seen, e.g., in a class 1 verb such as tor- 'take', where both the Cnd. and Imp. are tore. But other class 1 verbs, e.g., - ' w r i t e ' , have Cnd. kake' but Imp. kakě, thus showing t h a t in the Cnd., Imp. tore, proximate homonymy has resulted from the regular and completely predictable neutralization (or, levelling) of original ë and ě to e following - r - sometime in the history of preOJ (in our OJ w r i t t e n records, ë and ě are d i s t i n ­ guished only following -k-, - g - , - F - , -b-, and -m-, other­ wise the texts have the neutralized ef typically following zero, -s-, - z - , - f - , -d-, -n-, - y - , - r - , and - w - . 1 0 Hence homonymy of the variety Cnd., Imp. tore need not concern us f u r t h e r h e r e ; f u r t h e r m o r e , with this proximate homonymy and its origins understood, the Imp. as an inflectional c a t ­ egory of the OJ verb presents no important instances of remote homonymy requiring particular comment. We have e l s e w h e r e 1 1 already demonstrated the Tungusic origins of the standard OJ imperative -yö (to which corresponds the n o n - s t a n d a r d , 'Azuma' OJ -rö] suffixes seen in classes 2 , 5, and 8 Imps. Thus, in class 5, OJ wi-yo 'be!' corresponds in every detail of phonology, morphology, and etymology, with Udi be-Iē ' i d . ' ; 1 2 both w e r e formed e i t h e r directly onto the simple inherited stem *bi-, Tgs. bi-, OJ wi-, or perhaps onto this stem a f t e r it had e a r l i e r received the Tungusic

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reflex of the pA DvN. suffix * - / , 1 3 with * b / - / - > *bl > bi-, wi-, to which was then suffixed r e f l e x e s of pTg. *iə, appearing in the later languages, e.g., in Udi, in v o w e l harmony variants as -ja, je, -jo, but in standard OJ u n i ­ formly as yö. An important reason for suggesting this l a t t e r alternative is the formation of the Imp. in class 1 verbs, where the attested kakě 'write!' must represent preOJ *kaki-a according to the rules of vocalic contraction for p r e O J . 1 * Here we clearly have the preOJ DvN. *kaki (< *kak-i, appearing as kaki in the w r i t t e n records), with the same suffix *iə > * ja, so t h a t *kak-i-ja > kakě. But in the class 2 thematics, the preOJ reflex of this *ja was suffixed not to the DvN.but instead to the preOJ Aor., t h u s , *uka-iə > *ukain-ja > uk yö, as in the texts. The Imp. se yö 'do!' of the sole class 8 verb is also best explained as being based upon an underlying Aor., 'sira- > *si-a-iə > se yö (on the loss of - r - h e r e , cf. 5.2.1.2 infra), so also f o r class 6, *sin-ra> *sina-j& > sine 'die!'. Class 9 , with Imp. kö 'come!' f o r the single verb in this class, represents the extremely ancient employment of the plain, unsuffixed verbal root f o r Imp. common elsewhere throughout A l t a i c , 1 5 but in Japanese preserved only in this single, though i m p o r t a n t , verb. Thus, historical explanations in terms of formations and f o r m a t s inherited f r o m Altaic through Tungusic are a t hand f o r all the OJ Imps. 5.2 Essentially d i f f e r e n t , however, is the evidence for remote homonymy t h a t is forthcoming f r o m the OJ verb under the following categories: 1. Aor. homonymous with DvN. in classes 2 , 3 , 4 , and 5; 2. Ind. homonymous with AdN. in classes 2 and 5; 3. DvN. homonymous with Ind. in class 7. None of this homonymity can be explained in t e r m s of changes in preOJ, or by changes between the time of preOJ and the w r i t t e n records; it can only be clarified through comparison between OJ on the one hand, and the Altaic languages, in particular t h e i r Tungusic branch, on the other. 5.2.1. Aor. homonymous with DvN. in classes 2 , 3, 4, and 5. Here one must begin with the class 1 , consonant-final athematics, where the OJ Aor. was originally formed in preOJ by suffixing *-ra, the regular inherited Japanese reflex for the pTg. Nomen aoristi suffix * - r a , 1 6 while at

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the same time the DvN. was similarly the result of suffixing the reflex of the pA OvN.suffix · - / (already noted supra). In the Aor., simplification of C 1 C 2 consonant sequences as C1 was r e g u l a r ; and as a r e s u l t , w i t h , e.g., - ' w r i t e ' , we f i n d Aor. *kak-ra> kaka-, and DvN. *kak-ǐ > kakǐ. But in classes 2 , 3 , A, and 5, i.e., the thematics and the v o w e l stem class (this last functioning here as a type of pseudot h e m a t i c ) , the Aor. was not f o r m e d with the preOJ reflexes of pTg. *-ra f o r the Nomen a o r i s t i , but r a t h e r with the reflex f o r the pTg. Participium aoristi in * - r ī . 1 7 It is d i f f i ­ cult to establish a specific basis f o r this rule of morpholo­ gical substitution, but it must somehow have r e f l e c t e d a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n in the class-meaning of the preOJ athematics v i s - a - v i s the thematics; and whatever the reason behind i t , this r u l e , once e n f o r c e d , immediately resulted in the homonymy between Aor. and DvN. seen in these classes in the OJ w r i t t e n records. In b r i e f , the major sound-changes involved w e r e along the following lines: Class Z: OJ ata- 'strike against, make to impinge upon' (cognate with OTk. at- 'throw, f l i n g , shoot', with OTk. Aor. in - a - r - 1 5 ) ; OJ uka- 'accept, obey (commands, orders)' (cog­ nate with Mo. uqa- ' u n d e r s t a n d , comprehend,' OTk. uq- 'id.'): Aor.: * a t a - r i - > *ata-i> ate-; *uka-ri - > *uka-i - > -, and DvN.: *ata-i- > *atai- > ate; * uka-i- > *ukai- > -. Class 3: OJ örö- ' l e a r n , grow wiser f r o m ( u n f o r t u n a t e ) experience' (cognate with pA *gel 'to f e a r ' , 1 9 also r e p r e s e n t e d in T u n gusic, e.g., Ma. gele- 'to f e a r ' , e t c . 2 0 ) : Aor.: *körö-ri - > * k ö r ö - i - > *kör'ï- > köri-, and DvN.: *körö-i similarly d e v e l ­ oping to the köri- of the w r i t t e n records. Class A: OJ kutu'decay, rot' (cognate with pTg. 'kucu- 'id.', Ev. kut- 'to rot (of wood)*, etc., 2 1 Kor. kul·-) 'be bad ( w e a t h e r ) , r o t t e n ( m e a t ) ' ) : Aor.: "kutu-rl> "kutu-i- > *kutl - > kuti-, and DvN.: *kutu-i again similarly developing to the kuti- of the w r i t t e n pTg. records. Class 5: OJ wi- 'to be' (cognate with pA *-, bi- 'id.') needs little comment here: the developments w e r e the same as above ("wi-rl- > *wi-i- > wi- f o r Aor., *wi-i- > wi- f o r DvN.), and regular. 5.2.1.1 In understanding the course of developments sketched above, it is necessary to keep in mind two d i f f e r ­ ent sets of phonological change t h a t profoundly a f f e c t e d the course of preOJ. One of these sets is (again) proximate, i.e., it was solely a f e a t u r e of the i n t e r n a l history of Jap­ anese a f t e r the language had separated from the Tungusic branch of Altaic. This comprises the regular contraction of

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vowel sequences so that preOJ a-i > OJ ë f and both ö and u+i > 7, thus clarifying ate < *ata-i, köri < * köro-i, and kuti < *kutu-it so long as we remember t h a t , just as e' and ě, kept separate following, e.g., -k-, w e r e neutralized to e following, e.g., -t-, so also w e r e 7 and Ί neutralized to / following, e.g., - r - and -t-, and specifically in the OJ examples just cited. The other set is one t h a t governs the loss of " -  - in all the Aor. developments sketched above; thus it is r e m o t e , not proximate, and of prime importance for the history of the language, particularly for clarifying its relationship to Altaic through Tungusic. 5.2.1.2 Central to the various developments sketched imme­ diately supra is the Lautgesetz t h a t Menges has dubbed 'der typisch süd-tungusische - r - Verschleiss' 2 2 . This governed the t r e a t m e n t of original pTg. intervocalic *-r- in the later l a n ­ guages of the southern Tungusic domain, where *VIV s u r ­ vived generally intact, but *VrV became - / in Negidal, Oroči, Olča, and Nanai and zero in Udi, a language t h a t represents a transitional i n t e r m e d i a r y between Northern and Southern Tungusic. The -r-Verschleiss mostly operated i n d e ­ pendently of the quality and q u a n t i t y of the vowels in question, but t h e r e is little question t h a t it is most f r e ­ quently, and regularly, attested when *-rwas followed in the same derivational morpheme by * - / ( - ) , as in the e x a m ­ ples above. There also can be little question that the o p e r ­ ation of this same, typically Southern Tungusic - r-Verschleiss in the prehistory of the OJ verb provides one of the most striking bodies of evidence arguing in favor of the genetic relationship of Japanese to the other Altaic languages, in particular for its close relationship to the Southern sub­ group of Tungusic. The relationship of Korean to Altaic is also bolstered by this same phenomenon of Altaic phonology; a p a r a l l e l , and probably r e l a t e d change may be established for Old Korean, in illustration of which OKor. *nali > 'MKor. 'naį-h 'river' is one of several f r e q u e n t l y - c i t e d examples. 2 3 MKor. and NKor. have a single liquid phoneme f o r which we w r i t e /. These changes in OKor. have been employed to argue f o r a contrast between *r and */ in the prehistory of the language (so that *r > zero, but */ survived); but in the light of Altaic comparisons they testify r a t h e r f o r original distinctive v o w e l - l e n g t h , so t h a t OKor. *nail > MKor. n a / - , etc. At any r a t e , the original, i n h e r i t e d , Southern Tungusic -r-Verschleiss rule in its canonical f o r m , i.e., when the " - r -

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was before *-ī(-), was clearly operative in preOJ. For the class 5 verb meaning 'to b e / *a- plus e i t h e r -/ or *-r/ >ari(-), since the would equally have given ë - , but *ar-rirule did not operate a f t e r original C 1 C 2 , only intervocalically. And exactly p a r a l l e l , in formation and development, to the 0J forms are such developments as the Udì Nomen aoristi zèptêi < ǐ ä b - t ä r i , < j a b - 'eat*. 2 * And a closely asso­ ciated -g-Verschleiss (though t h a t t e r m seems not yet to have been employed in the l i t e r a t u r e ) also ruled occur­ rences of original *VgV, particularly when the second vowel was "-ǐ(-), with equally important consequences both f o r Tungusic generally and f o r the prehistory of 0J in p a r t i c u ­ lar, as we shall see infra, in 6. 5.2,2 Ind. homonymous with AdN. in classes 1 and 5. In order to understand how this particular and e n o r ­ mously significant area of homonymy arose, we must f i r s t establish, if only in broad o u t l i n e , the history of the forms that participate in i t , as a necessary preliminary step toward recovering the prehistory of the morphological f o r ­ mations that underlie this striking formal convergence of what have nevertheless remained semantically and syntacti­ cally distinct verb forms. 5.2.2.1 The Indicatives. In the syntax of the original Altaic linguistic unity, "Alle anderen V e r b a l f o r m e n , die in den verschiedenen altaischen Sprachen als prädikative Formen oder Tempusbildungen d i e n e n , d.h. die unseren Indikativ ausdrücken, sind geschichtlich und meistens auch begrifflich nur verschiedenartige verbale N o m i n a . " 2 5 Excepted f r o m this statement w e r e only the inherited Imps, and some optatives in * - s u . Otherwise, all Altaic verbs w e r e (and mostly still a r e ) nouns; and it is clear t h a t predication, in the original language, was almost exclusively n o m i n a l . 2 6 From Tungusic, OJ inherited a number of characteristic morphological f o r ­ mations by means of which DvNs., employed syntactically for this nominal predication, w e r e fashioned. In the most important of these formations, and the one t h a t underlies the Ind. category of the OJ v e r b , a DvN. was compounded with some f o r m of the reflex of pA and pTg. *b/- 'to be'. Apart from OJ, this formation is best preserved in the w e l l - k n o w n Manchu verbs in Ma. -m-bi, historically to be understood as DvNs. in *-n with suffixed b/- and assimilation * - n - b / - > -m-bi-.27 These provide the c i t a t i o n - f o r m s of the traditional Manchu dictionaries ( t e - ' t o sit' is e n t e r e d under

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tembi; gene- 'to go' under genembi; tuwa- to look ( a t ) ' under tuwambi, e t c . ) ; but the forms are also the imperfect indica­ tives of the most usual form of Manchu predication (thus, tembi 'sit, sits,' genembi 'go, goes,' tuwambi 'look, looks,' e t c . ) . This is the f o r m a t i o n - - e s s e n t i a l l y to be described as one of periphrasis, in which the indicative employed f o r predication consists of a compound of a verbal noun plus a form of the verb 'to b e ' - - t h a t was directly inherited by preOJ from its Tungusic heritage. But in the case of OJ, two important d i f f e r e n c e s separated it from the formation as otherwise and independently also inherited by Manchu. Unlike M a . , OJ did not use a verbal noun in *-n, and also (partially) unlike M a . , OJ did not use its direct reflex of pTg. *bi-, OJ wi-, in this f o r m a t i o n , but instead its reflex of the pA doubletform t h a t must also be reconstructed for this same v e r b , pA *bü-.28 It is not presently clear w h e t h e r * b ü - was originally some form of the verb in question possessing a specific morphological, semantic, resp. syntactic function or power, or whether it was merely a d o u b l e t - f o r m t h a t arose phonologically as the result of assimilation of the vowel of *bi- to the articulatory location of the initial. At any r a t e , both forms are extremely old, and both must be reckoned with in any account of subsequent developments in the later l a n ­ guages, including Japanese. OJ generally operated with wi< *bi-, but even so, a f e w r e l i c - f o r m s with OJ u < *wu < *bü- survived long enough to appear in early texts (where however they are OJ  because preOJ "w before  had already disappeared); an o f t e n - c i t e d (though hardly e d i f y ­ ing) example is OJ tukǐu '(she) impailed (her pudenda on a chopstick, to commit suicide)' where the formation is tukl, the DvN. in OJ -1 to OJ tuk- 'stab, impair plus  < *wu. 29 OJ tuk- is cognate with Ma. toko- 'to stab, to stick', but the Ma. form is thematic, < * tuk-u-, while the OJ is athematic. Nevertheless, the parallel in formations is striking: Ma. tokombi 'stab, stabs (imperf.)* is a verbal noun in "- plus bi- 'to be', while OJ tukǐu 'id.' is a verbal noun in "-/ plus "wu >  < *bü-. 3 0 Thus, for its inds., OJ inherited from preOJ the follow­ ing types of periphrastic, i.e., verbal n o u n - p l u s - ' t o be' f o r ­ mations in classes 1 , 2 , 3, 4, 6 , 8 , and 9: class 1: *kak+wu > kaku 'writes'; class 2: *ata+wu > atu 'strikes'; class 3: "körowu > köru 'learns from experience'; class 4: *kutu+wu > kutu 'rots'; class 6: *sin+wu > sinu 'dies'; class 8: *s(u)+wu > su 'does';

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class 9: *köwu > ku 'comes'. Since OJ t o l e r a t e d neither consonant sequences nor consonant+semi-vowel sequences nor multiple vowel-sequences (the tuklu f o r m cited above is, on this score, both a relic and an anomaly), all the phono­ logical assimilations and simplifications implied in the sketch j u s t given are readily understood as regular and automatic, and r e q u i r e no f u r t h e r discussion. This regular set of developments was i n t e r r u p t e d only in classes 5 and 7; but this will hardly be a surprise, when we recall the meanings of the verbs t h a t constitute these two classes, class 5, vw'to be', class 7 , ar- 'to be.' In both instances any periphras­ tic formation with " b ü - , or indeed with any other form of the original verb - 'to be', would have been semantically r e d u n d a n t , and hence was eschewed in the morphol­ ogy of the l a t e r , as also in the original languages. In class 7 t h e solution was an even simpler one: OJ ar- simply used as an indicative, its verbal noun in *-rī > OJ ari < *ar-rl predicative f o r m ; and indeed, this same form has remained intact in just t h a t shape and function in the subsequent history of the standard l i t e r a r y language. (The modern spo­ ken standard has analogically replaced it with the AdN. aru, but this is a very late shift.) In class 5, the solution was more complex. Here wī- f still properly eschewing a p e r i p h ­ rastic with itself, reached instead into the AdNs. for an analogic substitution, which it located t h e r e in the form of OJ wiru, to the history of which we must now t u r n . 5.2.2.2 The Adnominals. Meanwhile, in the syntax of the original Altaic linguistic unity, and in particular in t h a t portion of the same to which OJ was, in its t u r n , to be most closely r e l a t e d , a morphologically and at the same time a syntactically distinct f o r m a t i o n was employed for AdNs. One of the characteristic f e a t u r e s of the original language appears to have been its periphrastic employment, in syntax, of a secondary verb formation t h a t consisted of the root - 'to be' plus a suffixed morpheme *-ro. Lexically, this particular suffix marked the forms of the verb 'to be' with which it was employed as aorists; syntactically, these secondary formations * bi-ro, *bü-ro (and l a t e r , with v o w e l harmony, marked the verbal nouns to which they were in t u r n compounded as AdNs. The AdN. syntactic structures f o r m e d in this fashion had no category of voice in the original language, hence no distinctive categories of active or passive w e r e inherited anywhere in the later I a n -

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Japanese Verb

guages from this f e a t u r e , even though, when translating the descendant forms into an l.-E. language, one must generally introduce some such f e a t u r e . Thus, Ma. ¡etere niyalma 'the person who e a t s , a man who eats' is parallel to Ma. ¡etere saka 'fish, meat ( f i n e l y cut up, seasoned but r a w ) t h a t one e a t s , that is e a t e n ' . Both have the same AdN., įet'eat', cf. Ma. imp. jefu 'eat!', c i t a t i o n ere < *ǐeptere to *ǐäbf o r m įe-mbi; and both also are t r a n s l a t e d by, and etymologically parallel t o , 0J taburu Fito 'a manwho eats' and 0J taburu sakana 'fish t h a t is e a t e n , t h a t one eats' ( 0 J Fito 'man' sakana 'fish' (esp. as food)'). But in the original, as in the later languages, the collocation at issue was a simple voiceless aorist used in noun-head (as well as in other minor types of) modification; thus, in the examples above, the nouns niyalma and Fǐtö 'man' are modified by the AdN aorists jetere and taburu 'eat'. This characteristic construction of the original language appears to have been most elabo­ rately developed in Tungusic, particularly in the Southern Tungusic variety of t h a t branch of Altaic to which the 0J verb is most intimately r e l a t e d ; but while it is in So. Tgs. that the formation and its syntactic employment have l e f t their most striking traces, this does not mean t h a t e i t h e r the formal f e a t u r e or its syntactic function are by any means unknown to the rest of the Altaic domain. Indeed, it appears t h a t in the original language, o u t ­ side as well as inside the Tungusic sector, these inherited AdNs. had not only forms t h a t resulted from the suffixation of the morpheme *-ro just c i t e d , but also other forms with a r e l a t e d suffix *-ri t h a t also formed still other AdNs. These other AdNs. apparently had a d i f f e r e n c e in meaning f r o m those in *-ro, even though it is not presently possible to recover the details of this semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . Tracing their development is r e n d e r e d especially d i f f i c u l t by the accident t h a t , early in t h e i r history, these *-ri AdNs. appear to have f a l l e n together with the originally d i f f e r e n t verbal nouns from the Participium aoristi in *-ri. Once this f a l l i n g together had appreciably advanced, any original d i f f e r e n t i a ­ tion in form and function between the two sets of forms was soon obscured. Meanwhile, and to complicate even f u r t h e r the history of this portion of the verb morphology, several d i f f e r e n t factors, operating independently within Tgs., fortuitously led

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to the simultaneous obscuring of much of the remainder of the evidence l e f t behind by this AdN. suffix *-ro. In the main, these factors w e r e , in their t u r n , largely the result of the gradually more and more rigorous extension of vow­ el-harmony restrictions between roots (resp., stems, themes) and suffixes in Tungusic. That the gradual advance of the assimilatory p a t t e r n s known under the general rubric of "vowel harmony" should, in this way, tend more and more toward the obliteration of the identifying shapes of e a r l i e r , inherited morphological distinctions is hardly to be wondered a t ; the only wonder is that any traces at ail of the original system survived in a f o r m sufficiently intact to p e r m i t later historical identification. But f o r t u n a t e l y , a f e w did. The original Tgs. Nomen aoristi in *-ra was inherited as such by all the languages. Each of the later languages, early in its prehistory, enforced certain assimilatory changes upon the consonant initial of this morpheme when it came together with the final consonant of a root, s t e m , or theme (some of these, as they appear in OJ, have already been > kaka-, etc., noted above, thus with - ' w r i t e / *kak-racf. 5.2.1. supra; parallel changes are readily documented f r o m a range of Tgs. l a n g u a g e s 3 1 ) . But with the extension of vowel-harmony r e q u i r e m e n t s , the vowel of this morpheme also f e l l a victim to assimilatory d e f o r m a t i o n . Initially, vow­ el-harmony split *-ra into two d i f f e r e n t allomorphs, as r e p ­ r e s e n t e d , e.g., by the Ev. and Lam. back- and f r o n t - v a r i ­ ants -ra / - r e . 3 2 But the process, once set into motion, did not stop t h e r e ; and in M a . , we see how it was f u r t h e r extended until it resulted in t h r e e allomorphs, - r a , - r e , and -ro, distributed automatically albeit according to a r a t h e r involved p a t t e r n of vowel-harmony r e q u i r e m e n t s . 3 3 But with this development, the Ma. inheritance of the AdN. *ro morpheme effectively f e l l together with (or one might say, was contaminated w i t h ) the Ma. inheritance of the pTg. aorist *-ra - - which we will recall had e a r l i e r been severed into two vowel-harmony v a r i a n t s , to appear as Ma. -ra and - r e . This now meant that AdN. forms such as Ma. ¡etere, cited above, had become formally indistinguishable f r o m the Ma. Participium imperfecta f o r m s , even though the f o r m e r continued *-ro, and the l a t e r continued *-ra· f o r Ma. ala' r e p o r t / gene- 'go', and tokto- 'fix, settle,' both the AdNs. and the Participium imperfecti w e r e now alara, genere, and toktoro. The shape of all these suffixes was now e n t i r e l y

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determined by vowel-harmony; only their syntactic employment preserved even a trace of t h e i r original dis­ t i n c t i o n , not only in syntactic employment but also in overt morpheme shape. Fortunately, even though mostly we must operate in the reconstruction of Altaic generally and in t h a t of Tungusic particularly without the support of early w r i t t e n - r e c o r d s , in the specific case of the morphologically and syntactically distinct periphrastic formations involving *bi- / "bü- 'to be' t h a t are at issue h e r e , we do for once enjoy the enormous luxury of being able to document our postulations through early t e x t u a l evidence, both in Tungusic and in certain varieties of 0 J . The language of the Jurchen (à la rigueur ü r č e n , h e r e a f t e r Jr.) was an early variety of Southern Tungusic, close to both later Nanai and Manchu, and known to us from bilingual texts with Chinese phonetic and semantic glosses as early as the mid-15th century; we may most simply, if not completely accurately, regard and c a t ­ egorize Jr. as 'Old M a . ' " In our Jr. sources we find a number of documentary examples of this periphrastic adno­ minal construction involving forms of the verb 'to be,' even though by the time of these Jr. t e x t s the formation appears already to have been well along the way to its decline, i.e., no longer fully productive. Thus, Jr. aiiburo is adnominal to Jr. alma 'man' (cf. Ma. niyalma 'id.') in the syntactic s t r u c ­ t u r e Jr. aiiburo ñalma 'a man who is a sage; a wise m a n ' " ; but here Jr. abituro is to be analyzed as an adnominal in Jr. -buro < "bü-ro to the Jr. reflex of pA " a č - ' t r e a t g r a ­ ciously, bless with grace and favor' (cf. Mo. ači i 'favor, grace, r e q u i t a l , r e w a r d ' , ahila' t r e a t with benevolence'; Nan. ačeuri- 'to bless,' Ma. - 'be in harmony,' NTk. aci'take pity on,' OJ atu. 'profound (of royal f a v o r , a f f e c t i o n , e s t e e m ) ' ) . And the identical construction is attested in Jr. aiiburo / 'gracious ( i . e . , imperial) decree,' where aiiburo is adnominal to Jr. ǐi borrowed f r o m Chin. '(imperial) w i l l , d e c r e e * , 3 6 and similarly in Jr. aiiburo ( i . e . , imperial) birthday', adnominal to Jr. Ma. hacin 'various auspicious days'. 37

hačeftin

'gracious ' f ē t e ' , cf.

Fortunate also is the circumstance t h a t , in precise p a r ­ allel to these Jr. survivals in f o r m , f o r m a t i o n , sense, and grammatical f u n c t i o n , we f u r t h e r have a significant number of non-standard 'Azuma', OJ adnominals well attested in 0J

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w r i t t e n - r e c o r d s that show the same inherited periphrastic formations, moreover t h a t show them before the phonologi­ cal alterations transpired that somewhat obscure their origin in standard 0 J . Thus we have such important Azuma forms showing the original, inherited shape of the *-ro f o r m a n t as Az, 0J arŏ to standard 0J aru, yukŏ to yuku, kòso to kŏsu ( ' f i l t e r , p u r i f y ' ) , aFo to aFu, Fǐkŏ to Fǐku, etc. 3 8 Similarly significant f o r the documentary support that they provide f o r the present hypothesis of periphrasis are a number of Japanese relic formations t h a t f o r t u n a t e l y also survive pas­ sim in our t e x t - c o r p u s , as e.g. 0J sökǐwon tömö 'even (tomó) (I) have been made to be away f r o m though ( y o u ) ' , 3 9 where we have p r e s e r v e d , due to the archaizing, change-inhibiting contextuality of the metrical passage in which the expression is f o u n d , a periphrastic structure with 0J wori < wor- 'to be (anim.)' with the 0J reflex of pTg. *-rl, onto OJ sök- 'put, be a t a distance' (cognate with Mo. sot- 'tie up the horses ( a t a distance) to let them cool o f f , Tk„ sor'f- 'cool off', e t c . 4 0 ) . Thus do these a t t e s t e d forms support us in our overall conclusion, to the e f f e c t that in this particular area of the Japanese verb and its history, remote homonymy arose as the result of two d i f f e r e n t sets of developments involving changes transpiring in verbs involved in periphrastic structures with *bi- / bü 'to be', the two d i f f e r e n t sets being phonologically d e t e r m i n e d along a two-dimensional axis of b i f u r c a t i o n , according to the o r i g i ­ nal configuration of the root in question. In other words, with athematic (consonant-final) roots, the pattern of development was along the lines 'kak-buro > *kak-buru > *kak ru > *kakww > -, i.e., kaku, with the Ind. 'writes' com­ pletely homonymous to the AdN. '(who, t h a t ) w r i t e s ' , while in the case of thematic ( v o w e l - f i n a l ) roots, the p a t t e r n was instead along the lines 'köröburo > 'köröburu > "ỏ uru > köruru, etc., where the I n d . , köru < *köröbu, was in the attested stages of the languages f i n a l l y distinguished f r o m the AdN., köruru, as sketched. But it is important to recog­ nize that the apocope as well as the -r-Verschleiss (thus, in the f o r m e r sequence, '-uru> *uw u) are in neither instance e i t h e r sporadic or ad hoc f o r m u l a t i o n s ; r a t h e r they w e r e regular applications to the developments within Old Japa­ nese of phonological constraints elsewhere a t t e s t e d in the r e l a t e d languages, constraints that w e r e f u r t h e r distin­ guished within 0J by being rigidly d e t e r m i n e d according to internal Japanese s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e s , notably the dichotomy

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imposed by the athematic roots.

differentiation

between

thematic

and

5.2.3 DvN. homonymous with Ind. in class 7. Even though it is a unique member of its set, the sin­ gle OJ verb belonging to class 7 is in many ways one of the most important of all the words in the language when we a t t e m p t to reconstruct the history of the system as a whole. The verb in question is the one t h a t is to be a n a ­ lyzed, if we approach it solely in t e r m s of the internal OJ evidence, as OJ ar- 'to be (esp. of inaminates).' Surely no one would today question t h a t this word is genetically r e l a t e d to verbs of similar form and meaning in the other languages; but d i f f i c u l t and still largely unsolved problems r e m a i n , posed principally by the d i f f i c u l t and still largely unsolved questions involving the divergent vocalism of pMo. * å - 'id.' as against pTk. "är- 'id.' (which may however itself be secondary, < " ä - r - J . Comparing the Tkc. and OJ forms one would conclude t h a t we have here an original a t h e ­ matic, consonant-final root in inherited -r- (and either Mo. a or Tk. ä corresponds equally well with OJ a!); but the Mo. forms indicate instead an original v o w e l - r o o t with l a t e r secondary suffixation in the other languages. At the same t i m e , the vocalisations of the Mo. and Tkc. forms show t h a t the words in these languages can scarcely be directly cog­ nate with one another. For the p r e s e n t , suffice it to remark that Ramstedt long ago, with his customary combi­ nation of perception and almost instinctive insight, no doubt pointed in the right direction when he suggested t h a t , in all these words, we most likely must deal with the results of homonymy, culminating in a calamitous convergence of forms meaning 'to be' with words meaning 'not to b e / at an early stage in the history of all these languages, if not indeed in the original linguistic u n i t y . * 1 Not much has been done to follow up Ramstedf's suggestions along these lines in the years following; perhaps now it is time once more to t u r n to his early findings in the light of the evidence sub­ sequently uncovered, particularly from OJ. At any r a t e , and pending such f u r t h e r study, the OJ attested forms f o r this v e r b , with their stubborn resistance to the homonymy of Ind. and AdN. (OJ ari, Ind., but OJ aru, AdN.), are thrown into even more spectacular r e l i e f against the h i s t o r i c a l - l i n ­ guistic landscape by the f o r t u i t o u s homonymy of this verb's OJ DvN. ari < * ar-i, with its Ind., ari < *ar-rl.

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6. Space available f o r the present sketch precludes all but the merest introduction to one of the most potent sources f o r homonymy in the 0J v e r b , namely the regular loss of * - g - f r o m the inherited pTg. causative-reversal v e r b - s t e m derivative suffix *-giwhen t h a t suffix followed a vowel, thus * - a - g i - > *-ai> 0J  Even though such formations, distinct enough in pTg. and in p r e O J , tend to f a l l together with formations in inherited pTg. *rī in the language of the texts - - loss of *g f r o m *gi producing the same e n d - r e s u l t as loss of V f r o m *ri — it is sometimes possible to d i s t i n ­ guish one f r o m the o t h e r , e i t h e r on the basis of meaning, or f r o m evidence in the other languages, or, in a f e w lucky cases, by means of both. Thus, alongside the 0J class 1 "uruF-ra-, verb uruF- 'become w e t , damp,' with Aor. uruFa- < a word that precisely parallels and is cognate with Ev. ulap-, Lam. ufab- 'id.,' 0J also has a secondary derivative class 2 verb uruF- 'moisten, make w e t ' . At f i r s t glance the appearance of this eminently transitive verb in what is a f t e r alt the n o n - t r a n s i t i v e , medio-passive thematic class 2 of the 0J verb system might appear to be somewhat a n o ­ malous; but actually it is readily explained, since the class 2 verb has its Aor. as 0J uruF'ë- < *uruFa-i< *uruFagi-, with the pTg. causative-reversal morpheme *-gi-, a forma­ tion independently documented by Ev. ulap.kl 'moisten, make w e t / with Ev, -kias the regular reflex (with the velar unvoiced a f t e r the unvoiced stop of the stem) of pTg. m -gi-. 42 Similarly, 0J *ur- 'to ripen' appears only in the class 2 verb with its Aor. ỏ- < 'ỏ -gi-, a f o r m a t i o n with Olči. precise morphological parallels in Ma. uii-, Nan. uĭi-, ùli.iù-, Orok. ud'i-, Sol. irgi-, iggi-, Negd. Igi-, iggi-, Εν. irgi-, Lam. irge-, all meaning 'to raise, n u r t u r e , nourish;* but this unattested simplex 0J *ur- has its direct parallels in Ma. ỏ-, Nan. ỏ- 'get r i p e , be r i p e , be(come) done (of correspond 0J ỏ-, Ma. uii-, food).' 4 3 Thus to pTg. 'ürä.giNan. uĭi-, etc., while to pTg. ürä- would correspond 0J *r-, M a . ỏ-, Nan. ỏ-, etc. But without the happy c i r ­ cumstance of this variety of comparative evidence, we would be unable - - and this is t r u e of most other cases - - to be sure if a 0J f o r m of the type ỏ- r e s u l t e d , as does this one, f r o m *ura-gi-, or f r o m *ura-ri-, or simply f r o m *ura-i 7. Finally, some mention of the negatives in 0 J , in relation to the problems resulting f r o m homonymy, is called f o r , even if it must be even b r i e f e r . Menges has already called a t t e n t i o n to the existence of homonymous positive and n e g -

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ative verb forms in Nanai, as a result of sweeping apocope t h a t t r a n s p i r e d in the course of the history of Southern Tungusic, particularly damaging in its e f f e c t s upon verb formations t h a t , like the bulk of the OJ negatives, originally consisted of a head verb followed by various secondary derivatives of the inherited Verbum negativum, pTg. * ä - 'not to be.' 44 Menges has shown how, in these Nanai f o r m s , not only has the Verbum negativum found its place behind ( r a t h e r than b e f o r e ) the Nomen aoristi of the head v e r b , but the two have ended so closely fused together (eng ver­ schmilzt) that in more than one case we have as a result homonymy between negative and positive expressions: " e i n Form vom Typ [ N a n . ] oboaśi kann sowohl aus obo-r—e-śl 'nicht arbeitend' wie aus "· obo-ra-śī' 'wirklich, bestimmt, arbeitend' entstanden sein. Nur die syntaktischen Verhältniss geben h i e r - - a u s s e r dem Kontext—über die Bedeutung Auf­ schluss ... ,"45 Precisely the same Verschmelzung was respon­ sible, in OJ, for the generation of an apparently suppletive negative paradigm, in which - n - forms cross-over with - z forms most strangely, as the language w e n t about resolving conflict a f t e r conflict between suddenly homonymous n e g ­ a t i v e - and positive-verb structures. This it did along the following lines: (a) a p a r t from a f e w examples of the g e n ­ eral Tungusic, and Altaic, Verbum negativum followed by Head Verb formations, known from t e x t - r e l i c s such as OJ emisu-te 'did not see a n d , ' 4 6 the language mostly used instead (b) Head Verb followed by Verbum negativum f o r m a ­ tions, all involving the normal OJ inheritance of the pA, and pTg., Verbum negativum * ä - . In OJ as in Tungusic, any structure with this *a- always took its Head Verb in the Aor. But the forms t h a t resulted f r o m the implementation of this rule in Japanese led in t u r n to dangerous homo­ nymy; the form r e s u l t i n g , e.g., from a verb such as OJ aF'meet' was initially OJ aFasu < *aF-ra--as(Head Verb in Aor., plus the - s - stem of * a - ; , meaning 'not to m e e t / but soon easily confused with other non-negatives from this same verb involving o t h e r , non-negative - 5 - morphemes and t h e i r secondary derivatives. This intolerable homonymy was averted by f a v o r i n g , and eventually yielding paradigmatic monopoly t o , formations in which the Verbum negativum was not the simple - s - stem of " a - , but r a t h e r the p e r f e c t in -n of this same v e r b , a formation for which we have a b u n ­ dant documentation in the various languages, including e a r l y w r i t t e n - r e c o r d s of Jr. ešen, 47 < * ä - s ä - n . But in Japanese

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

411

these -η perfects were not added directly to the plain Aor., but r a t h e r to the -n present of the Aor. 48 This meant that OJ now had, rather than the potentially ambiguous, and dangerously homonomous, aFasu, the clearly negative and plainly unambiguous aFazu, a form t h a t was e i t h e r < •aF-ra-n—äsän or else < * a F - r a - - ä s ä n . We cannot choose between the two, since both sequences alike would, in the course of undergoing the Verschmelzung, eventually have resulted in the same OJ f o r m , with its plainly marked - z negative. Meanwhile, it was the -  - present of the Head Verb Aor. in apparent -ran, actually, as Menges has shown, *--, that in t u r n was abstracted to yield, eventually, not only the -  - members of the OJ suppletive -n-/-znegative paradigm, but also the n- initial f o r m s of the (historically, if not textually l a t e r ) nak- / nas- negative adjective p a r a ­ digm - - where the - s - forms still preserve vivid evidence f o r the - s - stem of the original pTg. * ä - Verbum n e g a t i vum. We have already mentioned Ramstedt's perspicacious t r e a t m e n t of the Altaic negatives in t e r m s of convergence, homonymy, and paradigmatic conflict and replacement; now t h a t we understand just how closely the otherwise puzzling OJ negative paradigm f i t s in with the circumstances that separately inclined Ramstedt toward these views, we are finally in a position to follow up his formulations in terms of the OJ evidence also, confident t h a t in so doing we will also be able f u r t h e r to clarify more of the prehistory of the other Altaic languages as well. The bulk of that impor­ t a n t work remains f o r the f u t u r e ; but one may hope that the present contribution has at least begun to clear away some of the undergrowth that until now has concealed even the approach toward a solution. If so, then it will not have been a wholly inappropriate way in which to honor the dis­ tinguished scholar, and f o r m e r colleague, to whom this v o l ­ ume is dedicated. 4 9

Abbreviations f o r Frequently Cited DTS-V. M. Nadeljaev et al., grad: 1969. DtS-J.

eds.

Literature

Drevnetjurkskij

slovar'.

Lenin­

Benzing. "Die tungusischen Sprachen. Versuch einer vergleichenden Grammatik," in Abhandlungen der geistesund sozial-wissenschaftlichen Klasse,

412

Miller: H, H and H in the Japanese Verb Akademie der Wissenschaften Mainz 11 (1955): 9 4 9 - 1 0 9 9 .

und

EAS-G. J. Ramstedt, ed. Pentti Aalto. altaische Sprachwissenschaft, Vols. 1952-57.

der

Literatur,

Einführung in die I, I I , III. Helsinki:

TMS-V. I. Tsintsius, et a l . , eds. S r a v n i t e l ' n y j slovar' t u n g u ­ Materiały k ėtimologičesso-man čžurskix jazykov, komu slovarju. 2 vols. Leningrad: 1975-77. VEWT-Martti Räsänen. Versuch eines etymologischen buchs der Türksprachen. Helsinki: 1969. VG-N.

Wörter­

Poppe. Vergleichende Grammatik der altaischen S p r a ­ chen, Teil 1 , Vergleichende Lautlehre. Wiesbaden: 1960.

ENDNOTES 1

0 J is the language of texts from the seventh and eighth centuries, preserved through the medium of Chinese characters used as phonograms. The OJ consonants w e r e k, g, s, z, t, d, n, F, b, m, , ỏ, and w; the vowels w e r e o, ö, plus t h r e e archiphonemes of a, 1, 7, u, e, e, vocalic neutralization /, e f  (on which see note 10 infra). For an introduction to this language, and its phonology, see R. A. M i l l e r , The Japanese Language (Chicago: 1967), pp. 3 1 - 3 5 , 1 7 2 - 2 0 2 , and the author's Japanese and the Other Altaic Languages (Chicago: 1971), passim. The Altaicist u n f a ­ miliar with the conventional transcription of OJ must be w a r n e d t h a t the vowel w r i t t e n OJ ö is not "the same as 'Altaic' Ö, " etc., the diacritics selected to distinguish the members of the sets OJ ĭ, ï, ŏ, ö, and ě,  , being byand-large a r b i t r a r i l y chosen marks t h a t should be read without r e f e r e n c e to their customary significance in Altaic linguistics. 2 This is a still insufficiently studied - - but surely not a sporadic - - OJ morphological phenomenon where a mor­ pheme appears sometimes w i t h , sometimes w i t h o u t , initial s - , thus OJ am ~ same 'rain'. This ' s - movable' was surely no Japanese innovation; it is observed - - though for equally

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

413

obscure reasons - - in such etymologies as that connecting Ma. sain 'good' with the reflexes of pTg. *aja in virtually all the other languages (e.g., Ev. aja, so also Neg., Oroch, Ud., all ultimately cog­ and Ulč-.; Sol., Orok. a/, Lam., Nan. aj), nate with pA 'sag'i - 'good,' (VG, pp. 2 9 , 6 1 , 137), cf. OJ sakĭ ' f o r t u n a t e , l u c k / , Mo. sajín < 'sagln 'good, healthy,' OTk. say 'healthy'. 3

For an introduction to the history of the Japanese v e r b , including the essential bibliographical r e f e r e n c e s , see R. A. M i l l e r , "Altaic origins of the Japanese verb classes," pp. 845-880 in Y. L, Arbeitman and Allan R. Bomhard, eds., Bono Homini Donum: Essays in Historical Linguistics, in Memory of J. Alexander Kerns (Amsterdam: 1981) ( h e r e a f t e r : "Altaic origins . . . " ) . For the history of the Tungusic v e r b , intimately associated as it is with the history of the Japa­ nese v e r b , this account is, in t u r n , deeply in debt to . . Menges, "Die tungusischen Sprachen," pp. 21-256 in B. Spuler, e d . , Handbuch der Orientalistik, Erste Abteilung, der Nahe und der M i t t l e r e Osten, Fünfte Band, Altaistik, D r i t t e r Abschnitt, Tungusologie (Leiden/Köln: 1968) ( h e r e a f t e r : "Die t g n . Sprachen"). This important contribution w i l l , if con­ sulted along with "Altaic origins ...," a f f o r d the reader with the necessary background and bibliography for studying the problem t r e a t e d in the present contribution. The r e a d e r less interested in specific linguistic data may also be served by the more popularized account in R. A. M i l l e r , Origins of the Japanese Language, Lectures in Japan during the Aca­ demic Year 1977-78 ( S e a t t l e : 1981), passim, but esp. pp. 77-85. 4

For the Altaic Stammverkürzung, independently described in 1958 by both Murayama and Ramstedt, see "Altaic origins ...," p. 862. b b 5|.e., they are so believed by TMS, 2.52 , and 2.375 ; but the question is f a r from s e t t l e d , and should be r e s t u d ied, as is t r u e of many of the TMS imputations of b o r r o w ­ ing. 6

Available

in TMS

1.153  -154 a .

7VG, pp. 2 7 , 106; on the 0J - b - , as evidence for e i t h e r "ancient heteroclisis ... or suffix," . . Menges, "Problems of Tungus Linguistics," Anthropos 73 (1978):393.

414

Miller: H, H and H in the Japanese Verb

8 See "Altaic origins ...," f o r the f i r s t a t t e m p t in the l i t e r a t u r e at a comprehensive account of the thematic vow­ els in OJ, particularly in comparison with the Tkc. reflexes of the same inherited Altaic morphological phenomenon.

9

l n OJ what is here called the 'adjective root' is a sub­ set of the noun, but one distinguished f r o m the bulk of the noun morphs in the language by participation in a number of verbal morphological situations. In the present c o n t r i b u ­ tion these adjective roots are distinguished by w r i t i n g . following the f o r m , e.g., taka. . 10 Each of the t h r e e sets of paired OJ vowels, (a) 1, 7 (b) ĕ,  () δ, ö was replaced by an archiphoneme of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n , here w r i t t e n , resp., for set ( a ) , /, f o r ( b ) , e, and for (  ) , o, following specific consonant inventories (including syllable-initial zero) for each set; but the i n v e n ­ tories w e r e slightly d i f f e r e n t f o r each set.

11

"Altaic origins ...," pp. 8 7 6 - 8 7 7 .

12

"Die

t g n . Sprachen," pp. 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 , 165.

13 0 n this *-i and its "ubiquitous role ... in morphology ... in all the languages, including Japanese," see "Altaic origins ...," pp. 8 6 4 - 8 6 5 .

14

B y these rules, original sequences of / followed by a w e r e regularly replaced by OJ ĕ, but original a followed by / was replaced by OJ  (the language did not t o l e r a t e sequences of two or more vowels). But then this OJ ĕ,  contrast was in its t u r n neutralized under certain circum­ stances, both being replaced by the archiphoneme OJ e f as explained in note 10 supra. 15

EAS,

16

2. 4 9 , p. 83.

K. H. Menges, "The Function and Origin of the T u n gus Tense in -ra," Language 19 (1943): Z 3 7 - Z 5 1 , is the classic t r e a t m e n t of this question; now almost four decades a f t e r its publication, this paper remains, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , a classic too o f t e n neglected.

Essays in Honor of Rulon 5. Wells 17

DtS,

415

135b' pp. 1076-1077; cf. 132, p. 1071, and pas­

sim. 18

DTS,

p. 6 5 b .

19

"Altaic origins ...," p. 8 5 9 , and the l i t e r a t u r e t h e r e , esp. DtS, 50a, p. 985, and VG, pp. 25, 106. a a 1.667 - 6 6 9 .

20

M a n y other Tungusic cognates in TMS,

21

iAgain, other Tungusic cognates in TMS, 1.441 b .

22

" D i e t g n . Sprachen," p. 157; and DtS, 59, p. 944 ff.

205;

cf.

cited

also,

ibid,

pp.

37,

23 Yj K i - m u n , Kogŏsa kaesŏl (Seoul: 1972), p. 70 ( t r a n s l a ­ tions in Fujimoto Yukio, Kankokugo no rekishi [Tokyo: 1 9 7 5 ] , p.85, and Bruno Lewin, Geschichte d e r koreanischen Sprache [Wiesbaden: 1 9 7 7 ] , p. 80. See also the discussion of these forms in L. R. Koncevič, "Priroda fonematičeskoj d l i t e l ' n o s t i glasnyx-monoftongov korejskogo jazyka, pp. 30-62 in Korejskij jazyk, Sbornik statej (Moscow: 1961), at p. 53.

24"

25

D i e t g n . Sprachen," p. 166; cf. ibid, p. 193.

EAS 2 , 5 2 , pp. 8 5 - 8 6 .

26

T h i s , of course, makes proper nonsense of the E n g ­ lish-General European-Translation based so-called "gram­ mars" that persist in t r e a t i n g Japanese and the other Altaic languages as representing "typical Subject-Object-Verb" syntactic systems, something t h a t they do not now and never d i d , for the simple reason t h a t , in a r e a l , and his­ torical sense, none of these languages really ever have or had any verbs. See R. A. M i l l e r , "Japanese, Altaic, and Indo-European," Journal of Indo-European Studies 7 (1979): 307-313. 27

K. H. Menges, Language 29 (1943):242: "Mandžu attaches to the 'present stem' (in Altaic terminology, to the nomen praesentis) in - the root  'existence, being' which may itself serve as the basis of an independent verb 'to exist, be'..." is the classic s t a t e m e n t , citing and building upon Bang's 1891 Etudes ouralo-alta'iques (cited ibid, p. 238, note 5 ) . Menges 1943 is cited in its t u r n by Benzing, DtS,

416

Miller: H, H and H in the Japanese Verb

136, p. 1077, but apparently not completely understood (see K. H. Menges, The Turkic Languages and Peoples, An I n t r o ­ duction to Turkic Studies [Wiesbaden: 1 9 6 8 ] , p. 137, with note). 28

And the form is so reconstructed, though only as such, and not as here as one of a doublet, by, e.g., VG, p. 112. 29

T h e text for this remarkable passage, which includes the critical OJ form w r i t t e n in phonograms so t h a t t h e r e is no question of its phonological configuration, is to be found in the e i g h t h - c e n t u r y historical work Nihon Shoki, at S(h)ujin 10, p. 247 in the edition of Sakamoto Tarō et a l . , Nihon Koten Bungaku T a i k e i , vol. 6 7 , Tokyo: 1967. It was t r a n s ­ lated by Aston as follows: "Hereupon Yamato-toto-hime no Mikoto looked up and had remorse. She flopped down on a seat and with a chopstick stabbed herself in the pudenda so that she died. She was buried at Oho-chi. T h e r e f o r e the men of that time called her tomb the Hashi no haka, The Chopstick Tomb" (Nihongi, Chronicles of Japan from the earliest times to A.D. 697 [London: 1 8 9 6 ] , vol. 1 , p. 159). 30

Further on significantly r e l a t e d and parallel periphrastics in Menges, Turkic Languages and Peoples, p. 145 f f . , and "Die t g n . Sprachen, " p. 89 ff. 31

"Die t g n . Sprachen," passim, has many significant parallel examples, among which initially one will wish to note particularly such cases as Lam. aw-ra-rn 'ich wasche mich/ but Lam. *od-ra-m > od-dam 'ich mache f e r t i g , ' and similarly *tät-rä-m > tėt-tėm 'ich ziehe mich a n / * ǐ ä b - r ä - m > 3èp-tèm 'ich e s s e / all exactly in line with the OJ develop­ ments (ibid, p. 9 9 ) . 32

33

" D i e t g n . Sprachen," p. 49 ( f o r Ev.), p. 99 (for

E. Haenisch, Mandschu-Grammatik, und 23 T e x t t a f e l n (Leipzig: 1961), p. 53.

Mit

Lam.).

Lesestücken

34 P o r Jr., the only recent scientific work is the epitome by K. H. Menges in "Die t g n . Sprachen," pp. 2 4 6 - 2 5 5 ; o t h ­ e r w i s e , the state of the a r t remains exactly where it was left by W. Grube, Die Sprache und Schrift der Jučen

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells (Leipzig: 1956).

1896,

with

several

modern

reprints,

35

Grube,

No. 273; see also TMS,

1.59  .

36

G r u b e , No. 864; see also TMS,

1.59 b .

37

Grube,

1.59 b ,

No. 867; see also TMS,

417 e.g.,

Taipei:

1.465.a

38

F u k u d a Yoshizuke, Nara jidai Azumanokuni hŏgen no kenkyū (Tokyo: 1965), p. 3 9 7 , and also his Appendix VII, p. 4 9 7 f f . The various forms cited appear in Fukuda at pp. 503, 517, 5 2 0 - 5 2 1 , 523, and 526. 39

Poem No. 55 in the historical t e x t Kojiki; t r a n s l a t e d D. Philippi, This Wine of Peace, This Wine of Laughter (New York: 1968), p. 2 9 , as his No. 30. 40

V G , p. 6 1 ; VEWT, p. 425 ; on the morphology of the forms, G. J. Ramstedt, " Z u r Verbstammbildungslehre der mongolisch-türkischen Sprachen," Journal de la Société F i n no-ougrienne 28:3 (1912): 5 6 - 5 7 . 41 G . J. Ramstedt, "Die Verneinung in den altaischen Sprachen, Eine semasiologische Studie," Mémoires de la Société Finno-ougrienne 52 (1924): 196-215.

42

DtS,

130r, p. 1070.

43 T h e suffix r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r study; cf. "Die t g n . Sprachen," pp. 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 .

44

bid,

pp. 2 3 6 - 2 3 7 .

45

|bid,

pp. 2 3 8 - 2 3 9 .

46

in

the

meantime,

R. A. M i l l e r , 'The Footprints of the Buddha', An Eighth-Century Old Japanese Poetic Sequence (New Haven: 1975), p. 102, to poem 3.4; cf. Japanese and the Other Altaic Languages, 2 7 2 - 2 7 4 . Like all other t e x t - o c c u r r e n c e s of the potentially ambiguous 0J - s - negatives < * ä - s - , this passage has routinely been emended by t r a d i t i o n a l scholar­ ship to read emizute, thus making it an unambiguously marked negative, even though the phonogram orthography of

418

Miller: H, H and H in the Japanese Verb

the passage makes such emendation impossible. OJ e - in such relic forms goes back to *äni-, a f o r m a t i o n in - / on an - n - stem of the Verbum negativum " a - (also inherited in the OKor. form underlying NKor. ani 'not'); loss of the medial • -  - from this f o r m , so t h a t * ä - / - > OJ e - , is also seen in Jr. eyitḫei, glossing Chin, bù-zèng 'is not, was not; never', Grube Nr. 476. OJ ani 'not* is most likely a loan from a now lost OKor. original. Early in its history in preOJ, this preposed Verbum negativum became - contaminated through homonymy with a portion of the paradigm of the verb OJ u'be able'; the resulting semantic conflation, along w i t h the homonymy of overt f o r m s , hastened the r e t r e a t of this c o n ­ struction from the language. 47

G r u b e , Nos. again represents the Jr. remains identifying these

710, 7 3 8 , 739; "Die t g n . Sprachen," p. 254 one of the f e w advances in the study of since Grube, f o r the f i r s t time correctly important inherited negatives.

48

Menges's identification of the historical morphology of these forms unlocks the way for f u t u r e progress in the study of all the r e l a t e d forms, particularly of the OJ n e g ­ atives; see "Die t g n . Sprachen," pp. 2 2 3 - 2 3 4 , and Anthropos 73 (1978): 392, for details. 49

The statements of section 7 are now b e t t e r read in the light of the more detailed comparative-historical analysis of these formations available in my more recent paper 'Altaic Connections of the Old Japanese Negatives', to appear in Central Asiatic Journal (1985) (note added in proof, 15. X. 1984).

ν ON DIACHRONIC AND SYNCHRONIC DERIVATION

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF BACK-FORMATION

Henry M. Hoenigswald University of Pennsylvania 1. The speaker who produces a discourse does so 'on the analogy' of other discourses in the language, t h a t is, through its generative machinery, unless he or she repeats it from m e m o r y - - a proviso which can be neither verified nor falsified and which may t h e r e f o r e be ignored. According to the dictionaries readable occurs in the record more than two centuries before unreadable; but one wonders how meaningful such information is and whether readable does not emerge from unreadable unread read reading believable unbelievable--orf b e t t e r , from all the discourses containing these and other items connected with one another by r u l e s - - j u s t as readily as unreadable does from readable etc. Only in cases where this a l l - r o u n d symmetry can be shown to be chrono­ logically secondary can we distinguish additive constructions from back-formations. 2. Networks of paradigmatic rules may of course be summarily represented by the much-discussed proportional f o r m u l a . Thus we w r i t e piano : pianos :: radio : radios, and since it happens to be known which of the two inventions came f i r s t , it is tempting to i n t e r p r e t the above proportion as a b r i e f description of the event whereby the first speaker or the f i r s t speakers constructed the plural of radio. The proportion is built on the recognition of twc morpheme classes with two morphemes each. The morphs appear to be piano-, radio-, -s 'pi.', and perhaps -ø 'sg'. The construction is additive. 3. There is, however, no more reason to be certain that radios must be later than radio-ø (though both are later than piano-s piano-ø) than t h e r e is to believe that

422

Hoenigswałd: Back-Formation

unreadable is necessarily--and not just accidentally—more recent than readable. The additive formulation which is the customary one, and which may, incidentally, well be unavoi­ dable in the majority of cases, here begs the question. To keep the discussion open we may at least agree t h a t a converse, subtractive proportion could describe the r e l a t i o n ­ ship just as w e l l . On the face of it this would amount to a simple transposition, pianos : piano :: radios ; X, X = radio. Yet, what precisely are the morphemes involved, and where is the subtraction? Clearly we must w r i t e pianos-0 : pianos-

: : radios-ø : r a d i o s - . Only if this is done MINU MINU* shall we have t r u l y founded the singular on the plural. Let us also note t h a t this operation gives us only an a p p a r e n t , not a formally valid morph boundary before the s. 4. We are not always without guidance as to which a r r a n g e m e n t of the members of a proportion is appropriate rover-to history. Consider wandering : wanderer : : roving ; to pick one of the presumably equivalent a r r a n g e m e n t s at random. As a m a t t e r of f a c t , it seems t h a t rover was bor­ rowed f r o m Low German in the 14th century or e a r l i e r . This borrowing, so we must assume, immediately established rove- as a 'huckle(berry)' morpheme, due to the accident of -er having the existing suffix -er 'agent' to fall in w i t h . Unlike huckleberry with its very d i f f e r e n t history ' rov-er g e n e r a t e d rov-ing rov-es rov-ed and indeed rove-0 itself, all of later a t t e s t a t i o n . In d e f e r e n c e to the primacy of rover we

, er MINUS :: rover-ø : r o v e r - Μ Ι Ν U S er (for rover) a n d , with an obvious extension, wanderer-ø : wandererer ing :: rover-θ : . , MINUS PLUS rover

may choose to w r i t e ,

-MINUS

er

PLUSing

(for

say, wanderer-ø :

roving)

wanderer-

·

5. These are back-formations in the sense t h a t a subtractive operation is involved, e i t h e r exclusively or in com­ bination with an additive one. Also, they happen to be instances of mere analogic creation r a t h e r than of the more complex but also more c l e a r - c u t process know as analogic change. Only where an analogic creation replaces another morphic construction within a paradigm do we properly speak of analogic change. The historical replacement r e l a ­ tionship guarantees identity of meaning or syntactic f u n c ­ tion b e t w e e n the replaced and the replacing i t e m ; the exchange is one between allomorphs (wax-en 'changed to' wax-ed, 'on the analogy of', say, wan-ed or tax-ed, as -ed replaced its co-allomorph -en).

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

423

6. There are certain typical case-histories in which it is a back-formation that functions as a replacement. One such is that of the w e l l - k n o w n adder which is explained as a 'wrong' analysis, on the p a r t of the speaker, of a nadder, my nadder . . . as an adder , mine adder .. . , since e tymologically the word began with -. It would be a distinct a d v a n ­ tage to be able to formalize such 'recuttings' by f i t t i n g them into the formalism outlined e a r l i e r . This can be done as follows. We express the proportion an apple : apple ; ; (a nadder-->) an adder : adder subtractively as anapple-0 ; anapp-MINUS.an ::· anadder-θ : a n a d d e r - M Į I N U S , a n · The allomorphs the play of which constitutes the analogic change are, then, a (in nadder), and its replacement ,_ -MINUS -MINGO (in adder), paired much like their additive counterparts en and ed in waxen / waxed. It is a gain that the boundary shift or recutting no longer needs to be recognized as a s e p a r a t e , ad-hoc step, since, as we have seen ( 3 , e n d ) , there is no legitimate room in the f i r s t place f o r a morph boundary inside the minuend in a subtractive f o r m u l a t i o n . That there is an alternative formulation of the additive kind f o r each synchronic s t a t e , preceding and following the change, and that these two formulations may d i f f e r with regard to the location of the boundary is another m a t t e r , though of course not an irrelevant one. 7. It remains to generalize somewhat. Let t h e r e be a pair of co-allomorphs, phonologically conditioned in their complementation, exhibiting the phonemic shapes / c / and / c d / (e.g., E. a and an), where / c / and / d / are particular strings of phonemic e n t i t i e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , let there be paradigmatic material as follows: ( / e / , / f / , / g / = additional ø-/f/ (e.g., an apple, apple), /c/-/dg/, strings) / c d / - / f / , ø3-/dg/S '9 (a nest, nest), / c / - / d e / , ø - / d e / (a nadder, nad­ der). This configuration brings it about that in the sequences /cdf/, / c d g / , / c d e / the location of the morph boundary cannot be d e t e r m i n e d f r o m the mere knowledge t h a t the morpheme { / c / ~ / c d / } is present; it can be d e t e r m i n e d only from other constructs in the paradigm such as ø - / f / (hence /cdf/ is / c d / - / f / ) but ø - / d g / (/cdg/ = / c / - / d g / ) . If, in a given case, a new ø - / e / is produced by a n a ­ logic change instead of ø - / d e / (adder instead of nadder), this is best f o r m a l i z e d , in keeping with 4 above, as /cdf/-0 where

: MINUS

/cdf// c d / :: / c d e / - 0 : , , MINUS ,, / c d / replaces its co-allomorPh

/cde/MINUS

MINUS .

/cd/,

424

Hoenigswald: Back-Formation ENDNOTES

1

BIoomfield

2

indicated section 4.

(1933) 408. by

'-'

or,

when

necessary,

by '-

' as

in

3

'Addition' a n d , particularly, 'subtraction' are imperfectly defined in this n o n - a r i t h m e t i c a l use. It is sufficient to remember that 'subtraction' is vacuous unless the minuend encloses the subtrahend to begin w i t h . 4

There are two segments in pianoø, namely pianos and s (or, with its o p e r a t o r , s). Their point of contact is at MINUS the right e n d , a f t e r the s. - Conventional orthography is used except where it would be ambiguous. 5The data are more complex Oxford Dictionary etc. (1966) s.v. 6

Op. cit.

f

s. v.

7

The distinction has been 154, 1 6 5 - 6 , and passim. 8

Here, / c / = E. /  / , lût E. / ǽ p ə l / , / g / = E. / e s t / .

-

made

since

(?)

Oertel

(1902)

Ε. / η / , / e / = Ε, / ǽ d ə r / , / f /

=

'More generally, /h/-/f/, /h/-/dg/, /h/-/e/, /h/-/de/, respectively, where / h / stands for any p e r m i t t e d morph ( s e q u e n c e ) - - e . g . / s e m / in some apple, e t c . - - i n c l u d i n g ø (as in apple). - Also, see following note. 10

Subtrahends are made to follow minuends in order to let them appear in the familiar arithmetical place. Since / h / may be ≠ ø, the expression ' / c ( d ) / ' should really read: MINUS Section 4. 'MINUS/C(d)/PLUS/h/'; CP·

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

425

REFERENCES CITED

Bloomfield, Leonard. 1933. Language. Holt. O e r t e l , Hanns. 1902. Lectures on the study of language. Yale. Oxford dictionary of English etymology ( e d . . . Onions et a l . ) . 1966 Oxford.

HOW TO BECOME A KWA LANGUAGE

Kay Williamson University of Port Harcourt,

Nigeria

1 Introduction

In Greenberg's 1963 classification of African languages, Kwa and Benue-Congo a r e co-ordinate branches of NigerCongo. To a g r e a t e x t e n t , Greenberg followed Westermann 1927 in listing the membership of the Kwa branch. In Westermann and Bryan 1952:90ff., the characteristics of Kwa languages a r e listed. The Eleme language, spoken to the south-east of Port Harcourt in the O k r i k a - T a i - E l e m e Local Government Area, conforms r a t h e r closely t o Westermann and Bryan's charac­ teristic phonological f e a t u r e s of a Kwa language, as seen in Table 1 .

Tabie 7. Phonological characteristics of Kwa languages compared with Eleme

Westermann and Bryan, 1.

1962

'In most of the Ianguages there appear to be seven vowel phonemes.' 'Vowel length is of secondary importance.'

Situation in Eteme /Ι e e

a

υ o /

Long vowels, Interpreted as / W / , relatively uncommon: /ètóó/ 'cocoyam'.

428

2. 3.

A.

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language 'Nasalized vowels are very common in sev­ eral languages.' 'In some languages ... vowel assimilation is so regular that one can speak of a t e n ­ dency to vowel h a r ­ mony.' 'Diphthongs are f r e ­ q u e n t , triphthongs also occur.' 'The labio-velars kp and gb are common.' 'Tone is of outstanding importance in all these languages.'

'Stress is of little importance...' 'Most Roots (Verb or Noun) are monosylla­ bic, consisting in CV.' 'Reduplication as a semantic and g r a m ­ matical element is common...'

5.

6.

'There are no t r u e Noun Classes. Rudimentary Noun Classes a r e , however, to be seen in many languages.' 'Nouns o f t e n have a vowel or nasal Prefix. This prefix is used to f o r m Nouns f r o m Verbs...'

/ e , o / do not normally occur in adjacent syllables to / ε / e i t h e r within roots or b e t w e e n prefix and root.

Vowel sequences are f a i r l y common: / gbaó/ 'dog', / m - b ĩ f 'nose'. Yes: / à k p u r ù / 'sack', / g b T / 'think'. High í/, low ì /, mid (unmarked) contrast: / n - s a / 'book', / - s a / ' f i r e ' , / -sï-sa/ 'mere/, / -sĩ-sa/ 'sand'. Yes. Monosyllabic CV roots com­ mon, though disyllabic ones also f a i r l y common: / d e / 'eat', / - k a n ĩ / 'firewood'. Reduplication common, though its s e m a n t i c / g r a m ­ matical function not clear: - t í - t ó 'work .', -n-ná 'earlier'. ò-bĩ 'native doctor', m-biè 'medicine'.

All nouns begin with V or N prefix: / è - b ó / 'head'. Nouns formed f r o m verbs by p r e f i x a t i o n : Je 'dance v.', è j e 'dance .'.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

429

Eleme thus conforms very closely to the characteristics of a Kwa language. Had it been found spoken in the west of Nigeria, isolated f r o m close relatives and adjacent to, say, Yoruba, there is little doubt it would immediately have been classified as Kwa. As a matter of f a c t , however, Eleme / è l é m e / has never been classified as Kwa. It was f i r s t r e p o r t e d by Wolff (1959), who noted its relationship to Khana / k a n à / and Gokana / g o k a n a / . Wolff (1964) classified them collectively as the Ogoni languages, forming part of the Benue-Congo branch of Niger-Congo, in line with Greenberg's 1963 classi­ fication of Ogoni (Kana) as part of the Cross River subbranch of Benue-Congo. The relationship of Eleme to Khana and Gokana is obvi­ ous and has never been questioned. Recent lexicostatistic counts by students of the University of Port Harcourt, checked by myself, show 57% relationship between Eleme and Khana, as opposed to 78% between Khana and Gokana. Khana and Gokana are very unlikely to be described as Kwa languages. While they have the same vowel inventory as Eleme, doubled vowels are f a r more common, particularly in Khana. Although monosyllabic roots are very common, many of them are of CVC s t r u c t u r e . Reduplication is hardly in evidence. Finally, nouns r a r e l y have p r e f i x e s , with the result that nouns and verbs o f t e n have the same structure and d i f f e r only in tone: Gokana zòb zob

Khana yèb yeb

Eleme Je e-je

dance v. dance n.

This example suggests t h a t the languages have d e v e ­ loped d i f f e r e n t phonological structures through two basic processes: 1. Loss of final consonants in Eleme Z. Loss of V or N prefixes in Khana and Gokana. 2. Loss of final consonants We detail,

shall with

now examine these additional data from

two processes in more Ogoi. Ogoi is spoken in

430

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language

Ban-Ogoi, consisting of the villages of Bala, Bontee, Kesari/T eegbaa, and Barabaa, and is not normally regarded as a separate language in the Ogoni group; the available data suggests, however, that it should be so regarded. Consonant phoneme are listed in Table 2.

inventories for the

Ogoni

languages

Table 2. Consonant phonemes of Ogon; languages

OGOI

ELEME

... IU

...

...

CI>

>I IU

IU IU

0 CI>

J:J :.0 Z .! .! /I)

fricative

-voice +voice stop -voice +voice sonorant -lateral +Iateral fricative-voice +voice stop -voice +voice sonorant

...

CI>

>

IU

f

IU

"0

... ... - ...... ~ .! J:J .2 IU

IU

<11 Q.

CI>

> .!

s

(h) ?

r

IU

s z kp P t gb b d w m r(,?) y I

b) After nasalized vowel: Ogoi, Khana, Gokana

IN r '" n IN n? IN n n

g

>

IU

C7\

k g

?

ky k gy g y

?

s

GOKANA

KHANA

a;

...... .2

f

z kp P t gb b d ml v

kp p t k kw gb b d g gw w ml y

...

<11 Q.

:.0 Z <11

f

z

...

IU

J:J

/I)

r

s

vowel: y .... y y .... y

,..,IU ... IU

0

IU

Realizations: a) Before nasalized Eleme w r Ogoi w r? Khana w Gokana v

CI>

/I) /I)

C7\

kp p t C k gb b d g w mr y

f

>I

N

IU

...

CI>

CI>

y y y y l)

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells ) Intervocalic, m o r p h e m e - i n t e r n a l : Khana, Gokana I →  Eleme appears to have an l/r contrast The situation in Ogoi is not clear. Gokana

b

→

431

in

this

position:

v

For the rest of the paper, a systematic phonetic t r a n s c r i p ­ tion showing the allophones listed above will be used. The only consonants and morpheme are:

which

occur

finally

in

the

syllable

Gokana [b I g m n η] Khana [b g m η] Eleme and Ogoi have only open syllables. The turn.

loss of

each

consonant

will

now

be

considered

in

Hyman (1983) regards the - i of Gokana as a m e a n i n g ­ less 'grade suffix'. It appears to take the underlying tone of the preceding root; thus it is H in 3 . 1 . In 3.2, when low tone would be expected, it is lost except in the f i r s t or second person singular of the simple habitual:  zovì 'you dance' (cf. 3.2.1 zòb).Khana this position but preserves the tone p a t t e r n :

has

lost

-i

in

 yeeb 'you dance' (cf. 3.2.1 yeb). Thus the tendency in Gokana and Khana is towards loss of final vowel, resulting in a CVC structure for verbs. In Ogoi *b weakens to [w] in 3.1.4, 3 . 2 . 1 , 3 . 4 . 1 ; this suggests that in the other cases it was e n t i r e l y lost i n t e r vocalically, a f t e r which V 2 assimilated completely to V1 Pos­ sibly, however, it was lost from final position with compen­ satory lengthening. In Eleme, the double vowel has been shortened in most (though not all) cases. The similarity of the nominals in 3.3 to the verbs gests t h a t they also originally ended in - i , while other vowels survive in 3.4.

sug­ final

432

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language

Tabte

3.

Reflexes

of *b as



2 Gokana

Khana

Ogoi

Eierne

3.1.1

roast, burn

3.1.2

tie

3.1.3

throw

3.1.4

fetch

3.1.5

gather

3.2.1

scatter

3.2.2

dance

3.2.3

dig, till

3.2.4

pin

3.2.5

steal

3.3.1

twenty

3.3.2

kernel

3.3.3

bundle

3.4.1

fish-hook

3.4.2

fern

(water)

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

Table 4.

Gokana Khana

433

Reflexes of 'm as 

Ogoi

Eierne

4.1,1

pound

4.1.2

bite

4.2.1

know

4.2.2

extinguish

4.2.3

old, e a r l i e r

4.3.1

tongue

4.3.2

stone

4.3.3

workn.

4.3.4

husband

4.3.5

life

4.3.6

meat

4.3.7

ancestral spirit

4.3.8

a market day

4.3.9

viper

4.1 is parallel to 3 . 1 . 4.2 shows t h a t when V 2 is an open vowel it is r e t a i n e d , and t h a t * m is lost only in Eleme, f r o m intervocalic position. 4.3 shows noun examples parallel to 3.3; no cases with f i n a l open vowels among nouns have been observed.

434

W i l l i a m s o n : How t o become a Kwa L a n g u a g e

Table 5. Reflexes of *l as 2

Khana Ogoi Gokana Khana (citation) ( p e r f e c t )

Eterne

5.1.1

boil (of soup)

5.1,2 5.1,3

marry (of man) sing

5.1,4

call

5.2,1

buy

5.2,2

sweep

5.3.1

cook

5.3,2

cut

5.3,3

remove

5.4.1

mat

5.4,2

goat

5.4,3

song

5.4,4 5.4,5

call, invitation wine palm

5.4,6

forest

* l is lost in Khana in t h e c i t a t i o n f o r m b e f o r e t h e - i s u f f i x (which becomes -ɛ a f t e r o p e n v o w e l s : 5.2, 5.3,3) b u t r e t a i n e d as [ r ] b e f o r e the o p e n v o w e l - a of t h e p e r f e c t s u f f i x . As b e f o r e , - i is r e t a i n e d in Gokana a f t e r high tone v e r b s , lost a f t e r low. Ogoi a n d Eleme seem t o v a r y b e t w e e n f o r m s w i t h t h e s u f f i x , in w h i c h case [ r ] is r e t a i n e d (5.2.2)

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

435

and forms without the s u f f i x , in which case [ r ] is lost (5.2.1). 5.4 suggests t h a t s t e m - f i n a l - i is lost in nouns in Gokana even when high. Table 6.

Gokana

6.1.1 6.1.2

Reflexes of *n as 2

Khana Khana (citation) ( p e r f e c t )

Ogoi

Eierne

pass by/thru break v.i. v.t.

6.2.2 6.2,3

refuse, reject give birth swallow

6.2.4

see

6.3.1

basket

6.3.2 6.3.3

person, corpse neck

6.3.4

child

6.3.5

town

6.3.6

voice

6.2.1

The reflexes of * n are exactly parallel to those of * 1 .

In Gokana, the - i suffix is r e t a i n e d in high and lost in low tone verbs, and in nouns, as with other consonants; *g is consistently r e t a i n e d . In Khana, f i n a l - i is lost in both verbs and nouns; * g is r e t a i n e d except in 7 . 3 . 1 , 7.3.4. *g is consistently r e t a i n e d in Ogoi and lost intervocalically in Eleme, while all f i n a l vowels are r e t a i n e d .

436

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language

Table 7. Reflexes of *g as  2 Gokana

Khana

Ogoi

Eierne

7.1.1

carve out

7.1.2

wash

7.1.3 7.2.1

announce, tell story mix

7.3.1

story

7.3,2

law

7.3,3

sibling

7.3.4

dog Table . Reflexes of *η as  Gokana

Khana

Ogoi

Eleme fry ant laugh economize, chop in pieces gather

From these tently retained vocalically.

examples, [ η ] appears to be most consis­ in Khana. When lost, it is always lost i n t e r -

3. Loss of noun prefixes All Eleme nouns begin with a prefix, which is a - , e - / ɛ - , Ò-/Ò-, or - (homorganic nasal). è - / ὲ - , ò-/ - are harmonic variants conditioned by the stem; è - / ò - are followed by i,

Essays in Honor of Rulon 5. Wells e, ο, υ, and ὲ-/ - by been recorded only with

e, -,

, à-,

a. Reduplicated or Ò-.

437 stems

have

The only noun prefix in Ogoi is Ń - , usually correspond­ ing to Ñ- in Eleme. Ogoi has reduplicated stems, normally corresponding to those in Eleme. The only noun prefix in Khana is é - / è - (tone same as that of s t e m ) , usually corresponding to a reduplicated stem in Ogoi and Eleme. Khana has no reduplicated stems. Gokana has no noun prefixes and no reduplicated stems. Table 9 shows non-reduplicated nouns with the various Eleme prefixes and their cognates in the other languages. Table 10 shows reduplicated stems. As neither Gokana nor Khana has reduplication, it appears to be a common innovation in Ogoi and Eleme. Two possible origins can be suggested for reduplication, perhaps re-inforcing each other: (a) That it is a plural f o r m a t i o n . The clearest evidence for this is the unique singular/plural pair: Ogoi

Eleme child children

Items such as 'breast', 'nail', 'fish-hook', and 'broom' (often conceived plurally in this area as 'broomstraws') can be e a s ­ ily explained this way, since t h e i r plural use is at least as common as t h e i r singular use. (b) That the reduplicated syllable d i - may be the old noun class prefix 5, Proto-Benue-Congo * l i - (De Wolf 1971), which has become f r o z e n to the stem and r e - i n t e r p r e t e d as r e d u ­ plication, whereupon a new prefix has been provided. This is likely for 'tongue' and 'rope', which are o f t e n found in this class. The e - of Khana would be a remnant of the same l i - prefix a f t e r loss of the consonant.

438

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language 7/ 9. Reflexes of noun prefixes Gokana

Khana

Ogoi

E leme

9 . 1 . *à 9.1.1

cooking pot

9.1.2

day

9.1.3

oil palm

9.1.4

eye

9.1.5

mother

9.1.6

name

9.1.7

tooth

9.2

*è-

9.2.1

t r e e , stick

9.2.2

(some)thing

9.2.3

cry(ing) (deverbal)

9.2.4

iron

9.2,5

louse

9.2,6

money

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells Gokana 9.3

Khana

Ogoi

439

E leme

*è-

9.3.1

bag

9.3.2

chief, king

9.3.3

crayfish

9.4

*ò-

94.1

faeces

9.4.2

egg

9.4.3

root

9.4.4

tail

9.4.5

antelope

9.5

*

9.5.1

hand, arm

9.5.2

ear

9.5.3

wife

9.5.4

glory, respect

9.5.5

matchet

9.5.6

fowl

9.5.7

God

440

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language

Gokana Khana

Ogoi

Eleme

9.6 *N9.6.1

ashes

9.6.Z

salt

9.6.3

water

9.6.4

wine

9.6.5

blood

9.6.6

elephant

9.6.7

food, yam

9.6.8

horn

9.6.9

oil

None of the Ogoni languages have i- or u - as a noun prefix. In Eleme, prefixes of loanwords with close vowels are changed to one of the possible prefixes of the l a n ­ guage; nouns which in the source language have no prefix are provided with è - / è - . In Khana, all prefix vowels are dropped from loanwords unless they can be i n t e r p r e t e d as e-, 4. Conclusion Gokana appears to be the most conservative of the Ogoni languages as regards final consonants; Eleme as regards noun prefixes. There is considerable evidence for C2 being lost i n t e r vocalically and some f o r it being lost when f i n a l . Hence in addition to stems of CV shape it is reasonable also to pos­ t u l a t e stems of CVCV shape as very common in the p r o t o language.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells / 10. Gokana

Khana

441

Reduplicated noun stems Ogoi

Eierne

0.1.1

breast

10.1.2

broom

1O.1.3

fish-hook

10.1.4

e a r t h , sand

10.1.5

mercy, grace

10.2.1

tongue

10.2.2

lie n.

10.2.3

nail

10.3.1

rope

10.3.2

youngest palm-frond

Prefixes w e r e originally of V- or N- shape, and possibly also of CV- shape; i.e. they probably had not only the t y p i ­ cal Kwa shape but also perhaps the common Benue-Congo CV- shape. The loss of the prefixes was probably helped by the f a c t t h a t t h e r e is no tonal contrast on p r e f i x e s ; all are low. A language them to CV(V), stem s t r u c t u r e ; CVC shape, like

which starts with CVCV stems and reduces like Eleme and Ogoi, produces a Kwa-type while a language which reduces them to a Gokana, looks quite u n - K w a .

A language which maintains its V- or N- noun prefixes, like Eleme, looks Kwa; while a language which loses its prefixes e n t i r e l y , like Gokana, looks very u n - K w a .

can

As very simple sound changes of the kind illustrated make f a i r l y closely r e l a t e d languages look d i f f e r e n t in

442

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language labte 11. Treatment of prefixes in loanwords Borrowing languages Khana

E leme

Source languages Igbo

Eastern 618 (English)

11.1.1

eagle

11.1.2

chair, table

11.1.3

box

11.1.4

African Star Apple

11.1.5

vulture

11.2.1

plate

11.2.2

mangrove

11.2.3

namesake

11.3.1

zinc

11.3.2

bottle

11.3.3

horse

11.4.1

(iron) nail

11.4.2

bucket

11.4.3

class

11.4.4

school

word structure, it is obvious that the characteristics of Kwa

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

443

languages cited by Westermann and Bryan are ·. quite superficial typological c r i t e r i a , which are not due to any common innovation and are t h e r e f o r e useless f o r genetic classification.

ENDNOTES * M y thanks to Mr. Nwinee B. Williamson for collecting the Ogoi data and checking Khana, and (partly) Gokana and Eleme d a t a ; M r . B. Anokari and Mr. S. N. Bakor (Gokana); Mr.  N. Kartay and Mr. I. 0. K. Eyi ( E l e m e ) ; Mr. John Wita (Ogoi); Nicholas Faraclas, for discussion and reading a d r a f t ; and to Larry Hyman f o r keeping me in touch with his Gokana work. 1

Khana monosyllabic verbs are basically p e r f e c t forms). Gokana monosyllabic verbs basically low or high. In both, verb tones verb f o r m . Ogoi and Eleme verbs are cited isolation. 2

Elements

of

compounds

are

separated

low or high (see are also cited as vary according to as they sound in

by

,

affixes

by

REFERENCES CITED DeWolf, P. P. 197. The Noun Class System of Proto-BenueCongo. The Hague: Mouton. Greenberg, J. H. 1963. Languages of Africa. The Hague: M o u ­ ton. Hyman, L. 1983. Distribution of Glottal Stop (GS) in Gokana. Preliminary version. Westermann, D. 1927. Die westlichen Sudansprachen. Berlin: De Gruyter. , and M. A. Bryan. 1952. Languages of West Africa. O.U.P. for International African I n s t i t u t e . Wolff, H. 1959. Niger Delta languages I: classification. Anthropological Linguistics 1:8.32-53. . 1964. Synopsis of the Ogoni languages. J' of African Languages 3 . 3 8 - 5 1 .

WHERE DO EXCLAMATIONS COME FROM?

Adam Makkai University of Illinois at Chicago 0. The Problem: Wow! Mankind has a universal habit which is, strangely, not much discussed in the l i t e r a t u r e . 1 It starts with every human being in early infancy and accompanies us through our lives. We all EXCLAIM. The occasion may be physical pain or sudden shock, like stubbing your toe in the door, or touching a hot iron. It may be f r u s t r a t i o n or anger: you forgot your car keys and have to hike back to the office to get them. It may be the sudden realization that you have been had. But it may be the overwhelming joy of a sudden recognition; the wave of pleasure at suddenly comprehend­ ing something that used to be a mystery. It can be the pleasure of seeing an old f r i e n d or a relative. It can be the mixture of joy and embarrassment: you understand something for the first t i m e , something that gives you g r e a t pleasure, yet at the same time you are mad at yourself because you think the recognition was long overdue. Why didn't I see this four or five years ago? A f r i e n d whom we like well enough but really consider not quite our equal in many ways, gets a sudden promotion, becomes famous, or wins the Irish sweepstakes: invariably we voice our feeling and pass a judgment on the situation. The u t t e r a n c e produced in most of these instances is not some sort of c e r e ­ bral peroration on the situation, but usually a spontaneous exclamation, phonologically well marked as such. To put it quite simply, the number of semantically, socially, and emotionally appropriate situations for me or the readers of these lines to exclaim is so g r e a t - - indeed we are in constant interaction - - that it is startling how

446

Makkai: Where do Exclamations Come From?

actually limited our reservoir of exclamations is. In this paper I will t r y to survey the most typical English exclama­ tions, compare them with others from languages I know, and then t r y to explain where these forms come f r o m . Since the t r e a t m e n t a t t e m p t e d here will be essentially a synchronic one, the phrase 'where do they come from?' is not to be i n t e r p r e t e d as a historical excursion which, no doubt about i t , must also be u n d e r t a k e n b u t , due to the immense size of the project, must remain a f u t u r e task. 1. One What

Word

Exclamations

from

the

Sublime

to

You

Know

The exclamations God!, Wow!, Zowiel, Bingol, Yeahl, 'Course!, etc., a f f i r m a t i v e and consentive semantically, s t a r t on the highest pitch level, say level 5, fall rapidly to a low level Z or 1 , and have a strongly f e l t a f f i r m a t i v e e f f e c t . Try exclaiming them with an interrogative intonation as God?, Zowie?, Wow?, Bingo?, Yeah?, and 'Course?, and the e f f o r t it takes to ask these as questions will clearly show t h a t they are all telescopic declarations. The point, of course, is, that one word exclamations can also be q u e s ­ tions, as in Me?, You?, Him?, Her?, Us?, Go?, Stay?, Pay?, Sleep? etc., all of which, whether personal pronouns or the overt predicates of sentences previously used in context and thus in memory between both hearer(s) and speaker(s) show surprise, indignation, unwillingness to believe what was heard and said or suggested, or a combination of them. The one word exclamation Why, being an interrogative normally spoken on a f a l l i n g , declarative intonation, can be exclaimed both with an interrogative and a declarative t e r m i n a l con­ t o u r , (Why? - - Why!) with the result t h a t they indicate d i f ­ f e r e n t semantic antecedents. Why??? which is angry, uptight, and argumentative (especially if elongated and loud) occurs in contexts where the speaker has been making or trying to make a point but has the feeling t h a t he isn't getting through, so he says why??? - - I'll tell you why! whereby he proceeds with his a r g u m e n t . The declaratively contoured Whyl(?) - - with an orthographic question mark but a pho­ nological falling exclamation mark - - does not r e f e r to information in memory or the subject just mentioned; qua exclamation it shows indignant curiosity or moral indignation plus disbelief. (Non-exclamatory why!(?) is, primarily, a non-biased, information-seeking speech act.)

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It thus seems that any personal name, lexeme for objects or actions which have been previously mentioned in context but which arouse the speaker's incredulity or indig­ n a t i o n , can occur as a one word interrogative exclamation, e.g., Car?, Gambling?, Arrested?, Drugs?, Escaped?, Psychic?, Already?, Gone?, Won?, Lost? - - the list is practically endless. Their grammatical description ('allocation' and 'provenience' in tandem) is best achieved by juxtaposition to their phonosemantically declarativeiy coded c o u n t e r p a r t s . We say Godi, Christi, Heavensl etc., as above, which are 'positive' on the surface, but can certainly be used on a whole scale of meanings ranging f r o m enthusiastic approval to forcefully disgusted condemnation -polar semantic opposites expressed by nothing 'grammatical' except the human voice, hence the t e r m PHONOSEMANTIC, and its inevitable correlate to be explained below, PHONOPSYCHOSEMANTIC. Any well t r a i n e d actor or actress can p e r f o r m the exclamations above so as to sound e c s t a t i ­ cally jubilant or lugubriously downcast, bored (accompanied by yawns into a telephone r e c e i v e r ) , resigned, pensive, or nervous and h u r r i e d . Next to these, however, we also use 'four l e t t e r words* in our exclaimings which, although all 'dirty' on the surface, can - - depending on the phonopsychosemantic interaction of the speaker and the hearer - be i n t e r p r e t e d as highly positive. Thus Shitl, Fuck!, Damn!, Helll - - the f o u r national favorites of post WW II America - - while ail almost certainly impossible as questions (*Shit?, *Fuck?, *Damn?, *Hell? - - except as THREATS against some­ one who j u s t u t t e r e d them whom we are about to scold very severely as if about 'to wash his mouth out with soap') and predominantly negative value-judgments in their semantics, can also function as exclamations of joyous s u r ­ prise, the congenial envy of a gambling or a drinking buddy mixed with admiration and tacit approval, etc. As outright anger and fully negative condemnations, these exclamations tend to be realized as shorter, f r o m highest to lowest falls on the loudest possible stress within the speaker's custom­ ary r a n g e ; as admixtures of solidarity, envy, and a d m i r a t i o n , as in the Army or around the poker t a b l e , they sound more elongated and the fall is not f r o m highest to lowest but f r o m mid to low. It is as if the speaker u t t e r i n g these forms is about to say a MITIGATING PHRASE a f t e r t h e m , such as you lucky devil, you lucky dog, you lucky sunovabitch, or you silver-tongued devil; perhaps, equally amiably, you crazy

448

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nut, you disgusting genius, etc. I personally overheard the following sentence offered as amazed and disbelieving praise from a graduate student of mathematics to a 13-year old: SHIllllÍT, why of COUrśe, you abso-LUTE-ly disGUSting. Miserable PROdigy! and the youngster couldn't have been more pleased. Maaaanl, the modern one word exclamation, is r a r e l y heard with an interrogative intonation, unless it is a CONVERSATION INITIATING ADDRESS between two previously unacquainted individuals. Thus Man? - - much shorter on the vowel than the declarative form -is heard when a stranger walks up to you at the bus stop asking for a light or a q u a r t e r ; it means something like 'I w a n t to talk to you' or 'may I engage you in conversation?'. The declarative, like most other declaratives, has the full phonopsychosemantic range of enthusiastic approval, acquiescence, a d m i r a t i o n , disgust, or ridicule, as the case may be; the most f r e q u e n t l y observed realization is a heavily breathed sigh of r e l i e f , or the emotive interjectional use quite simi­ lar to we//..., as in Maaan, I'm tellin' ya. . . (Cf. Well, I'm tellin' ya. . . ) where the vowels a r e , of course, quite d i f f e r e n t , but the o v e r - a l l structure is r a t h e r similar despite the appreciable nuances in phonopsychosemantics. (It goes w i t h ­ out saying t h a t the phonopsychosemantic nuances of these forms positively correlate with the sociolinguistic status of these forms. Thus Maaaan is f a r more intimate than welt or even wehhhhl; it is likelier to be heard from a younger Black male than from an older white male; if heard from a white f e m a l e , the odds are t h a t she is on the progressive and l e f t - f r o m - c e n t e r side of the political spectrum, e t c . 2 One word imperatives, such as Got, StayI, Sit!, Fetch!, Run!, Duck!, Eat!, etc., which, of course, can only be exclaimed interrogatively AS THREATS or ACTS OF VERBAL DEFIANCE, constitute a special class of exclamations whose n a t u r e qua exclamation is, by v i r t u e of our l o n g - s t a n d i n g acquaintance with imperatives, the least puzzling in the whole complex family. One intuitively - - and traditionally - expects a short, o n e - w o r d i m p e r a t i v e , to sound like an exclamation, though directors and actors r a r e l y miss an opportunity to exploit these f o r humor by having an actor 'say them nicely', as if 'begging' a dog to stay, sit, or f e t c h , as the case may be. If an extremely t i m i d , cowardly

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

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dog on a Walt Disney cartoorì should be commanded by his inept master beggingly Fehhhhhhtch , the dog could look back at him arid ask back: Fehhhhhtch???? meaning 'me, who can barely walk? You've gotta be kidding' - - in which case, because of the scenario's inner s t r u c t u r e , such an i n t e r r o ­ gatively coded o n e - w o r d imperative would not be e i t h e r a t h r e a t or an act of verbal d e f i a n c e , but an act of BEGGING FOR SYMPATHY. (The master has issued an obviously u n f u l fillable command and Snoopy Sr. appeals to him via the audience f o r a reprieve.) 2. No Kidding! Enter Syntax Complicated though o n e - w o r d exclamations are psychophonosemantically, they share a certain surface-simplicity. 2.1 Approval via Denial The most f r e q u e n t l y heard t w o - w o r d exclamation starts with the negative no and is thus predicated to a lexeme which is supposed to be negative, e.g., No shit!, No fooling!, No kidding! etc., where the forms shit, fooling, and kidding r e f e r to the 'undesirables' 'nonsense', 'double-talk', g e n e r ­ ally having to do with what I propose to call DISINFORMATION. Terms of intrinsically high esteem are nover heard n e g a t e d ; thus *No Christ!, *No God!, *No Heav­ ens/ simply don't occur e i t h e r in positively or negatively intended phonopsychosemantic coloring, whereas Godl, Christ! and Heavens!-without the no - - all occur both as short PRAYERS 'positive' coloring' or as short CURSES 'negative col­ oring'. This does not mean t h a t no and God, Christ, and Heavens never co-occur in construction; but if they do, the t h r e e ecclesiastical nouns are vocatives and the succeeding no negates a whole previously mentioned subject of w h a t ­ ever length from a short sentence to an e n t i r e discourse block or a novel. Thus we have God, no!, Christ, no! and Heavens, no! but these all function as f a i r l y specific denials of something t h a t has been said e i t h e r overtly, or suspected of the person u t t e r i n g t h e m . The likeliest situation to encounter this is listening to a person who is accused of a crime he did not commit. The likeliest statement to follow the vocative + negative structure would be something like How could you possibly think that I could do something like that? Less f r e q u e n t , but also possible is the emotional s u r f a c e -

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denial of bad news received over the telephone, such as the sudden illness or accident of a f r i e n d or relative: Christ, no! (I can't believe what you're saying... it can't POSSIBLY be true what you are saying. . . etc.) Obviously t h e n , one might think, we only deny ugly or harmful things, such as bodily refuse and the obfuscation of issues, whereas desirable entities - - as the above ecclesias­ tical t r i a d of nouns - - is never denied. The symmetry of the situation is distorted by the fact that no fooling!, no shit!, no kidding! can all function as enthusiastic exclamations of positive coloring as w e l l ; the expressions carry an admix­ t u r e of surprise in such instances. The slightly incredible news t h a t your spinster aunt Mathilda just won the Irish sweepstakes may be met with a variety of joyous and semiincredulous exclamations such as Wow!, Gosh!, Gee!,..... What about that?. . . . . etc., all the way to no kidding, no fool­ ing and no shit! - - depending, of course, on who you a r e , where you a r e , and who you are speaking to. A milder f o r m of these is the spreading no bull! which, like its fellows, can be used to encode a whole range of semantic a t t i t u d e s from scorn and disbelief to semi-incredulous admiration. This can never happen to no dice! however, which remains hermetically sealed in its tone of complote r e f u s a l . Try to praise or semi-credulously admiro someone by exclaiming no dice! at him! Your own eyes will throw the forbidding * to bar it from occurring. Z.Z Some Construction! The construction of exclamation some + N (riding the appropriate intonalional contour) is, once again, a constant challenge to the g r a m m a r i a n , playing h i d e - a n d - s e e k behind the phonopsychosemantic qualities of the human voice. Take the exclamation Some party! - - without f a i r l y specific stage instructions of what it is supposed to sound like, and tell what it means: I will contradict whatever you say until you have actually p e r f o r m e d it. Once I hear the exclamation on a high-fidelity tape recorder, chances are that 90 out of 100 others I should ask to listen and judge will agree with my finding. The human voice, like a most delicate musical instrument, can p e r f o r m the SIMULTANEOUS CODING of such semantically contradictory a t t i t u d e s as the highest degree of

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells admiration, mild astonishment, thoughtfulness, mild scorn, sharp u t t e r disdain or disgust.

fear ameliorated sarcasm, all the way

451 by to

The productivity of this kind of exclamation is very g r e a t and will allow, besides Some Presidentl, Some doctor!, Some Peace Treaty!, Some red herring! etc., such forms as Some God!, Some Christ!, and Some Heavensl ~- all potentially sarcastic as well as a w e - s t r u c k , contrasting sharply with the nonoccurrence of no in f r o n t of these very nouns. 2.3 What a What! What President, what God, what Peace Treaty contrast with what a President, what a God and what a Peace Treaty in t h a t the first set without the indefinite article is very hard to perform with a r e v e r e n t a t t i t u d e ; scorn and condemnation, however, leap out vigorously in these forms. The wh form carries with it a pseudo-declarative falling intonation con t o u r , but only if a is absent: What President? What God? What Peace Treaty? with interrogative intonation, are not cxclama­ tions but SPECIFYING-REITERATIVE INTERROGATIVES: God, President, and Peace T r e a t y w e r e already mentioned or are in 'memory', and the wh - question seeks f u r t h e r specifica­ tion as to which one of those possible was meant. No g e n u ­ ino exclamation is thus possible without the indefinite a r t i ­ cle. With it, as in the second set, once again ambiguity sets in, since What a President! etc., can be exclaimed imparting the highest degree of praise and admiration OR the lowest degree of contempt; in b e t w e e n , the accomplished actor will be able to p e r f o r m a whole range of psychophonosemantic a t t i t u d e s including measured appraisal in musing reminis­ cence, or the bird's eye perspective of an eye-witness of long ago: Teddy Roosevelt---what a President he was! Why, i mei him in person in the African jungle. . . / 2.4 Adjective Noun! Good Lord!, Good Heavens!, Good grief! are normal exclamations in American English, but the adjective great sounds n a t u r a l only with Heavens; thus we have Great Heav­ ensl but seldom, if ever, "Great Lord, and certainly no mGreat grief, which is a pity, because with it we lose the a l l i t e r a ­ tion of the / g r - / cluster. Notice, incidentally, the u t t e r

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unlikeliness, not to say complete impossibility, of someone's coming out with an exclamation such as "good shitl, 'great shit I, "good bull!, "great bull!, "good cow!, "groat cow!, "good Moses!, great Moses!, "good mackerel!, "groat mackerel! or "good smoke! and "great smoke! We are obviously facing some sort of subtle restriction on productivity h e r e , the nature of which has escaped the a t t e n t i o n of most investigators. If we t r y the adjective holy in f r o n t of these barred forms (or most of t h e m ) , wo f i n d a whole class of ready-made and highly f r e q u e n t exclamations: holy cowl, holy Moses!, holy smoke!, holy Mackerel!, a n d , alas, contrapuntally desecrating the set, holy shit! It is strange t h a t holy Heavens!, holy God! are relatively rare in English, since the holiness of both God arid Heavens seems r a t h e r beyond dispute; f u r t h e r m o r e German has heiliger Gott! and heiliger Himmel! to bear out our intuition of the collocability of these forms. The German forms cited can be used as much in the a w e - s t r u c k , sin­ cerely religious mode as behind the smirk of a mundane disbeliever indulging himself in profanity: heiliger Gott/Him­ mel, meine gute Frau, glauben Sie, dass ich ganz verrückt bin? 'Holy smoke, my good woman, do you think I am completely crazy?' and not '*Good Lord/Heavens my good woman...' etc. (Heavens, my good woman, . . . sounds acceptable in a 19th century Dickensian s e t t i n g ; f u r t h e r m o r e a clever play­ wright can always create an acceptable context for almost anything. My observation here regarding German versus English is that English seems to take 'God' and 'Heavens' more seriously than does German; as exclamations of scold­ ing someone, these sound archaic in 1984 especially in the USA.) The corresponding French forms sacre Dieu! and sacre ciel! are considered vulgarisms and curses despite the s u r ­ vival of sacré as 'saint, holy, consecrated' as in sacre coeur the 'Holy Heart (of Jesus)' and are usually rendered euphemistically as sacre bleu, par bleu, etc. Since both French and German use t h e i r equivalent for 'holy' in exclamations, one might expect t h a t the nouns they carry might be interchanged, but we have no such luck. The English holy class seems to be a closed set, all its own; no language I know will accept as equivalent translations (the forms Ger.) "heilige Kuh!, "heiliger Rauch!, "heilige Makrele!, "heiliger Moses! and "heilige Scheisse!; French t o l e r a t e s no l i t ­ eral translation into "sacrée vache!, "sacrée fume!, "sacrée merde! etc. Forcing English holy cow! and holy smoke! morpho-

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logically into Russian yields the impossibilities *sviataja korovat and 'sviatoi dymi which sound just as impossible to Russians as would the Hungarian *szent tehénl and *szent fust! We must, f o r the sake of completeness, add holy Toledo! to the American English set which makes no sense a t all in any of the languages considered so f a r . 2.4.1 How About Generating These? Good Grief! The reader will bear with may seem that we are taking Barn just to f i n d that we have as Hockett has insisted more pseudo-progress, too, is a kind shows with as much specificity that actually makes a blind alley

me f o r a brief detour. It a walk around Robin Hood's stood still all the while; yet than once (1968a, 1968b) of progress inasmuch as it as possible just what it is blind.

Let us t u r n the clock back mentally and imagine that we are in 1960. R. B. Lees who had recently reviewed Chomsky's Syntactic Structurée (1957) (Lees 1957), has just finished his Grammar of English Nominalizations (1960). Two bold young f o r e i g n e r s , let us call them Günther von Nebelmacher and Gottfried von Schweinemund, respectively, bring to his a t t e n t i o n a serious shortcoming of the book before it goes to press. Whereas Lees had discussed adjective + N combi­ nations in many senses, touching even on idioms and how they defy g e n e r a t i n g (cf. Makkai 1972: 165 et passim), he paid no a t t e n t i o n to exclamations: a most serious defect! Lees is t i r e d of the project and commissions Nebelmacher and Schweinemund to w r i t e an appendix to the book so as to incorporate exclamations, as long as they do it in the spirit of generative grammar. How do our f r i e n d s proceed? Enthralled with Lees' example of red cap, 'The WH The The The

cap is lying on its side. ===> + the cap is r e d . ===> cap which is red is lying on its side. ===> cap red is lying on its side. ===> red cap is lying on its side. ===>

[ B u t not * t h e redcap is lying on its side, f o r while cap is an inanimate noun, the compound with red and cap as head (the redcap) is an animate noun' (Lees 1960, Ch. I V ) ] , they

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write a series exclamations. A 1 2 3 4 5 6 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 6g  6 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 6g

of

transformational

rules

that

generate

The Noun WH Noun Be Adj = = > The Noun is Adj = = > The Noun Adj = = > The Adj Noun = = > Adj Noun ==> Lexicalization: The cow WH Cow Be Holy ==> The cow is holy ===> The cow holy ===> The holy cow ===> Holy cow ===> Exclamation Transformation (contour added): Holy cow! Lexicalization The smoke WH smoke be holy ==> The smoke is holy ==> The smoke holy = = > The holy smoke ==> Holy smoke = = > Exclamation Transformation Holy smoke!

It takes them 13 steps to g e n e r a t e holy cowl - - where the crucial one is, of course, 6 f , the Exclamation T r a n s f o r ­ mation. Controversy arises, as some authorities near MIT don't quite see when and where the ET is to be added, but Nebelmacher and Schweinemund insist t h a t it is post-lexical and comes from the phonology. The same operation is p e r ­ formed as in sets A and  on a number of nouns and they thus successfully g e n e r a t e the e n t i r e holy set, including Moses, Toledo, mackerel, and shit. The trouble is t h a t they also derive all sorts of 'exclamations' which are not com­ monly recognized in the c u l t u r e . They g e t , in f a c t , any adjective and any noun a f t e r lexicalization and 6 f , with the right intonation contours a d d e d , yielding an 'exclamation', such as "yellow rose!, "blue sweaterI, "holy tablel, "holy potato!, "holy gasoline!, "holy cat!, "good elephant, etc, and t h e r e is literally nothing to block these forms f r o m occurring.

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Ten years have passed, and Nebelmacher and Schweinemund, now disillusioned with early TG, join the ranks of the generative semanticists. This gives them a chance to r e t u r n to some e a r l i e r work and they once again t u r n their a t t e n ­ tions to the perplexing problem of English exclamations. Nebelmacher, who used to minor in comparative theology at the University of Leipzig, comes up with a semantic restric­ tion rule regarding the holy set. His arguiment runs as f o l ­ lows: It is no accident that the holy set is as restricted as it is. The reason is that the world's major religions are represented in it. The mackerel, a fish, represents Chris­ tianity. Christ was born in the Piscean Age and ι χ θ ν σ 'fish' spells Ι η σ ο ν σ Χριστοο θβον Υ ɩ ο σ Σωτηρ 'Jesus Christ, Son of God, Savior'. Smoke, obviously must r e f e r to Judaism: remember the story of Cain and Abel? But since Judaism is ancient and strong, it has two r e f e r e n c e s in case 'smoke' does not do it f o r you: Holy Moses is the obvious f o r m . Holy cow takes us to India: Brahmanism and Buddhism. Toledo in medieval Spain gained its r e p u t a t i o n via Moorish culture: Islam e n t e r s the holy set via Spain, a country also very strong on Catholicism. Most of these associations have gone unconscious in the modern age, but in our collective uncon­ scious we are all products of one or the other of these g r e a t world religions, hence the closed holy set. Everyone is impressed, and Nebelmacher is credited f o r inventing the 'holyness raising' transformation which takes its proper place next to standard 'raising', 'pruning', 'sluicing', f e e d i n g ' , and 'bleeding'. Schweinemund, f o r e v e r the devil's advocate in all m a t t e r s linguistic, finds an ugly f l y in the ointment: the piece de résistance is the f o r m holy shitI which seems to destroy the 'naturalness conditions' of the closed n a t u r e of the holy set. Excited negotiations get under way at M.I.T. and, lo and behold, a simple solution is f o u n d : the more general rule of 'holiness raising' operates beside a minor e p i - r u l e , known as the 'decanonization transformation' or 'defrocking', f o r short. Defrocking applies postcyclically a f t e r lexicalization which, in t u r n , can only apply a f t e r holiness raising. In other words f i r s t you raise holiness to see that the semantic naturalness condition applies; without it c e r ­ tain lexical items become exclamations which must be disal­ lowed. Once the holy set is g e n e r a t e d , the naturalness con­ dition must be kept, and so the unwelcome occurrence of shit in such a noble ecumenically ecclesiastical setting must be explained. Schweinemund argues t h a t the least holy and

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most reprehensible thing we know is our own human refuse which reminds us of decay and death or 'ashes to ashes, dust to dust' as it says in the Bible. It is, t h e r e f o r e , p s e u ­ do-holy, or quasi-holy, as it w e r e , precisely because it is not holy at a i l , while appearing in its surface structure to belong to the same set. Hence the holiness raised e a r l i e r must be erased by the epi-rule of decanonization or defrocking. Prestigious journals carry the new global insight and the set is now g e n e r a t e d as follows: A 1 The Noun WH Noun Be Adj ==> 2 3 4 5 6 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 7 7a 7b 7c 7d 7e 8 8a 9 10

The Noun is Adj ==> The Noun Adj = = > The Adj Noun ==> Adj Noun ="> Holiness Raising Christianity insertion ==> (Piscean Age) Judaism! insertion ==> (Cain and Abel) Judaism 2 insertion = = > (Ten Commandments) Brahmanism and Buddhism insertion ==> ( v e g e ­ t a r i a n i s m , bovines) Islam insertion == > (The Moorish Conquest, Ibero-Arabic c u l t u r e ) Lexicalization Christianity = = > mackerel Judaism! = = > smoke Judaism 2 ==> Moses Brahmanism and Buddhism = = > cow Islam ==> Toledo Decanonization (defrocking) Disgust ==> shit Exclamation Transformation (contour added from phonology) Output: holy mackerelI, holy smoke I, holy Moses!, holy cowl, holy Toledo!, holy shitl

In 20 steps or so, on one basic generative cycle f o l ­ lowed by t h r e e epicycles, Nebelmacher and Schweinemund are thus able to account for the w e l l - f o r m e d output given in step 10. (They don't mention what blocks holy terror f r o m becoming an exclamation.) The w r i t e r is anxious to emphasize t h a t this is, of course, mere speculation, and t h a t resemblance to any real work done by any real linguist in the USA or elsewhere is pure coincidence as no one would ever, under any

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circumstances, have gone to the detailed research into com­ parative religion and the theory of the unconscious which, I claim, alone made these derivations possible. I r e g r e t it that I was unable to o f f e r Holiness Raising and Defrocking e a r l i e r ; much f u t i l e labor could have been saved and tighter naturalness conditions would have been introduced in a controversial and emotionally loaded compartment of l i n ­ guistics, the transformational study of exclamations. 2.4.2

Oh, no! Enter Sociolinguistics and All Hell Breaks Loose

We are now in the sociolinguistic e r a . Patients in doc­ tors offices in poverty stricken neighborhoods are inter­ viewed and their utterances recorded and transcribed; d e p a r t m e n t store a t t e n d a n t s are asked how they pronounce whatever they say, etc. Nebelmacher and Schweinemund are a l e r t e d to the fact that in the dialect of Robin, Batman's helper in the popular television series 'Batman and Robin', the young assistant can register his admiration and surprise at Batman's heroic exploits by naming almost any noun a f t e r holy - - thus in the Batman and Robin dialect of North American English it is w e l l - f o r m e d to exclaim holy chairI, holy table!, holy window!, holy rope!, and the like, especially if these objects are somehow tied to a clever escape a r r a n g e d by Batman f o r an innocent victim. The floodgates of analogy are thus inadvertently opened and the Holiness Raising Transformation must be r e w r i t t e n so as to accommodate the [+Batman and Robin - N o r m a l ] e p i - f e a t u r e . Thus they create rule 7 f , right a f t e r Islam I n s e r t i o n , known as Batmanization. (Some disgruntled voices accusing the fearless dynamic duo that this is batty are soon silenced f r o m headquarters near the Charles River.) The trouble lies elsewhere. Batmanization happens to be ANALOGICALLY PRODUCTIVE, and the phenom­ enon spreads into popular parlance when the speakers aren't even Batman-wise as to what and why they are exclaiming about. Holy kangaroo!t Holy Income Tax!, Holy Watergate!, Holy Pot!, e t c . , appear on the scene, each living its own linguistic incarnation f o r as long as the population finds it useful and e n t e r t a i n i n g . It appears t h a t the 'holy set' is expandable in yet another interesting way. (I owe this observation to Dwight Bolinger who is, of course, not responsible f o r any other statement made in this paper.) Bolinger points out ( p e r ­ sonal communication), t h a t as long as the NP following holy

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is long, ponderous and somehow quasi-biblical, the adjective f o r m holy seems all right. Thus if someone explains Holy pil­ lars of Jerusalem! with heavy stress on PILIars and Jerusalem, saying it slowly, as if a w e - s t r u c k , the phrase is quite acceptable. I have also been o f f e r e d Holy jumping ¡ackrabbitsl by Eldon 6. Lytie. I am struck by the fact t h a t both e x a m ­ ples have a noun t h a t starts with / j / (¡ackrabbits, Jerusalem) and this forces me to think t h a t the old phrase Holy jumping Jehosaphat, an obvious euphemism on Holy jumping Jesus is at play here in the 'collective unconscious'. It is thus possible to 'create' a number of quasi-ecclesiastic exclamations of the sort: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8)

Holy Holy Holy Holy Holy Holy Holy Holy

walls of Jericho! jingle bells! Mormon Tabernacle! Black Stone of Mecca! Presidential jelly beans! Collected Poems of Chairman Mao! Watergate cover-up bullshit! Bridge of Chappaquiddick!

The reader is invited to create his/her own possible expansions of the 'holy'-set. Some will sound b e t t e r than others and if the r e a d e r has an interest in w r i t i n g a small dialog for two i n t e r a c t a n t s in a play, performing a scen­ ario, the 'holy'-set will make more sense or less sense in direct proportion to what has preceeded and what comes next. When I call the 'holy'set essentially closed, I n e v e r t h e ­ less state a fact about English which is well worth observ­ ing. The adi + n construction holy terror does not seem to yield itself to exclaiming despite the obvious presence of holy next to a word t h a t describes a mental-emotional state. Dennis the menace is a holy terror, Evil Knievel is a holy terror, John's old lady is hell on wheels on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays and in between she is a holy terror all accommodate holy terror as an idiomatic NP with the meaning Oppressive p e r ­ sonal presence' or something close to it. I have been unable as an exclamation from any native to get "holy terrori speaker, no m a t t e r what the narrative surrounding such a posited exclamation. It is simply not exclaimable; to cry holy shitl in a state of t e r r o r is much more likely than naming the t e r r o r itself. Maybe my imaginary character Schweine­ mund was onto something a f t e r all: it is certainly worth

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considering that the lexeme holy, realizing the sememe [holy, sacred] has some kind of a SEMANTIC COURT with expandable borders to accommodate new subjects who wish to immigrate into the kingdom. As all such 'immigrants', they must take certain eligibility tests ranging f r o m phonological criteria to the lexico-semantic and the morphosyntactic. 2.5 FAMOUS LAST WORDS! Enter longer Citations and Exit Syn­ tax We bid fond f a r e w e l l to Professors Nebelmacher and Schweinemund. They did t h e i r best; it wasn't really their f a u l t t h a t the paradigm they w e r e working in burst at the seams as soon as facts w e r e allowed to e n t e r ; in fact what happened was t h a t it t u r n e d out it was no paradigm at all! Having seen w h a t d i f f i c u l t i e s even the relatively simple Adj + N construction can land us i n , we would be well advised to give d i f f e r e n t accounts to the longer Adj + Adj ♦ N construction, as encountered in the famous famous last wordsl meaning something like 'watch out' what you said may t u r n out the opposite' f o r which, of course, English has a much older and b e t t e r established sememic idiom borrowed directly from Aesop, Don't count your chickens before they're hatched! These a r e , in a sense, paraphrases of one another, though of course not exact synonyms. We are confronted with the simple fact t h a t a longer c i t a t i o n , learned as one unit and f r e q u e n t l y not analyzed by speakers at a l l , can function as exclamations qua warnings, adages, proverbial summaries of folk wisdom, etc. In a small, politically troubled country in Eastern Europe such as Hungary, where I grew up, and where Shakespearian drama translation was a vigorous force in the development of the national language in the 19th century, quotations from a given Shakespeare play are o f t e n used as exclamations. 3 One of the most f r e q u e n t l y used ones is Something is rotten in the State of Denmark! meaning 'our gov­ e r n m e n t is up to no good again'. There is no available equivalent in American English; as a general approximation of the kind of exclamation t h a t this is, a kind of resigned humor of the gallows, one could cite the general O, oh! There we go again! which can, of course, be two separate exclamations or a double one used on the same occasion. At

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the end of A Midsummer Night's Dream when the artisans hold their performance for Oberon and Titania depicting the story of Pyarmus and Thisbe, a lion roars near a hedge to which Pyramus responds by saying Well roared, lion! In the classical translation of J. Arany, he gives Hungarian Helyes a bōgés, oroszlánl 'correct (is) the r o a r i n g , lion!' which has become a high frequency proverbial exclamation in Hungary. Everytime somebody silly says something pompous or unnec­ essary, the a t t e n d a n t grown-up or more knowledgeable person intones the Hungarian version of Well roared, lion! It is impossible to give the exact shade of meaning; I will call this kind of exclamation PHATIC CONDESCENSION in memory of Malinowski's t e r m 'phatic communion'. The above quote from Hamlet Something is rotten in the State of Denmark, by contrast, would be a case of PHATIC COMMISERATION. The exclamation which heads this section, Famous last words! is neither phatic condescension nor commiseration; it is a d i f f e r e n t kind of phatic act. It is a f r i e n d l y warning both to the interlocutor of the ego and to the ego's own self, comparable to the cultural phenomenon of 'knocking on wood' or as the British call it 'touching wood'. I will call it a PHATIC DISCLAIMER. 3. SOME THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS I think it should be reasonably clear a f t e r reading sec­ tions GOOD GRIEF! and OH NO! where our exclamations do NOT come f r o m . They do not come form nonexclamatory noun phrases, whether the 'underlying noun phrase' ( n o t h ­ ing, of course lies under anything else in linguistics, nor above or beside: things co-exist) was a single word or longer construction of the types discussed above. If, in order to say ouch! (cf. Hockett 1958: 201) I need a ' p e r f o r ­ mative deep structure' with a full NP and a full VP l a t e r to be deleted that says NP: I VP: Say onto you Dependent NP: OUCH! with everything deleted and only the ouch! r e t a i n e d , I will have spent more time on deriving the form than t h e r e was between my f i r s t shock of pain and my instantaneous exclamation of ouchl The performative deep structure analy­ sis is a red herring and should be held up to public r i d i ­ cule. Yet one cannot deny t h a t ouchl is something the speaking ego says to others or to himself. But we know this, as it is an intrinsic p a r t of our culture t h a t we

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address each other. We are not brainless robots constantly in need of reminding ourselves of what we do: I can say go( to my dog without saying to myself f i r s t "I am now saying to my dog 'GO'/" Our phatic behavior as humans, (in the sense of Malinowski) r e n d e r s it superfluous to 'derive' acts of a phatic n a t u r e , such as exclamations, f r o m f u l l sentences used elsewhere in the language. I would like to call the oucht type an AUTOPHATIC EXCLAMATION. It will be u t t e r e d , instantaneously and automatically, even if no one is around to overhear it. 3.1 EXCLAMATIONS AS A SPECIAL CASE OF IOIOMATICITY I believe t h a t exclamations, insofar as they a r e , to a very large e x t e n t , INSTITUTIONS IN A GIVEN CULTURE, are best viewed as a special case of idiomaticity. They qualify as such on several grounds. The meaning 'I am g r e a t l y s u r ­ prised with positive and/or negative overtones' is not logic­ ally deducible e i t h e r f r o m the holiness of cows, mackerels, Moses, smoke, or the blemish in the holy set; nor is the meaning 'beware of your bragging' f r o m Famous last wordsl This is not to deny t h a t these meanings are partly SUGGESTED by some subset of the semantic f e a t u r e s of the participant lexemes. More importantly, these exclamations are SET EXPRESSIONS which a person not f a m i l i a r with t h e m , even if he knows the grammar p e r f e c t l y , cannot make up at will. Problems arise, as we have seen, when such semantically opaque and closed sets suddenly become p r o ­ ductive, at least f o r awhile and at least in a certain sec­ tion of society, as we have seen in the case of Batman and Robin's rapidly expanding holy-set. There is, of course, no way to predict w h e t h e r this productivity will remain associ­ ated with h/y-words t h i r t y or f o r t y years f r o m now; the survival of the 'limited holy set', by contrast, seems r e l a ­ tively easy to f o r e s e e . But just by saying t h a t certain expressions are 'idio­ matic' we have not really accounted for their existence, t h e i r i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e , or t h e i r provenience. To explain the provenience of these forms could only be accomplished as a rigorous diachronic research project which would take years and is, painfully obviously, beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, certain t e n t a t i v e generalizations can be attempted:

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Mankind universally exclaims as part of its PHATIC BEHAVIOR. 2. Exclamations divide into basically two types: a. The ego identifies with the object of his phatic act ( p l e a s u r e , joy, etc.) b. The ego rejects the object of his phatic act ( p a i n , a n g e r , etc.) 3. This kind of phatic behavior antedates learned l e x i ­ cal and grammatical speech and starts in all human groups in the earliest infancy; it is co-ordinated with facial and bodily gestures (grimace and f r o w n , clenched fist for r e j e c t i o n , smile, cooing, etc., for joy and pleasure.) 4. The sensation of surprise, encountering the unex­ pected, factors out into the a. and the b. types (under 2) allowing a wide range of gradience between the two extremes. 5. The socially controlled logical lexico-grammatical speech which replaces the infant's arche-speech during and in the wake of primary socialization (roughly age 6), assigns certain previously used portions of the lexicon for the t r a d i t i o n a l encoding of both the identifying and the rejecting types of phatic acts. (The expression Holy Mary, mother of God has the same lexeme holy in it as does the exclam­ ation holy cow! which has the same lexeme cow in it as the sentence the farmer bought a new cow.) The selection of already existing lexical items for the tagging of positively or negatively colored exclama­ tions most probably proceeds along the lines of metaphorical extension (cf. Makkai 1975), but the 'rhyme or reason' of a particular choice seems a r b i t r a r y under synchronic investigation. 6.

7.

Thus the available lexico-grammatical apparatus is much too inadequate f o r the expressing of the flow of human emotions. This has a dual result: a. People create new exclamations by analogy. b. People mean more than one thing by the 'same' exclamation. 6b is regulated by PH0N0P5YCH0SEMANTICS.

4. PSYCHOPHONOSEMANTICS SPEECH

AND

MULTIPLE

CODING

IN

LIVE

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As the pioneering research of Iván Fónagy has convinc­ ingly shown (Fonagy 1976, 1983, and in press), the live human voice resists the tyranny of lexico-grammaticai c a t ­ egorizations and claims continual access to the symbolization process, as if every individual user of a language w e r e engaged in an ongoing battle to expand and modify the socially agreed upon meanings of the common lexeme stock. This tendency, of course, is more noticeable in the area of PSYCHOSEMEMES than in the areas of the COGNOSEMEMES and TECHNOSEMEMES (see Makkai 1983). Generally, psychosememes are the meanings of those lexemes which a child acquires during primary socialization, up to leaving the home f o r k i n d e r g a r t e n and/or the f i r s t g r a d e . Definitions of the lexeme stock are never verbal but ostensive, as no one ever needs a d e f i n i t i o n f o r daddy or mommy as 'male parent' and 'female parent'. They are hugged and they f e e d us, if things are normal; if n o t , they shout and hit us, etc. Thus the child acquires the meanings of these words uncon­ sciously; hence the t e r m psychosememes. Cognosememes are acquired in the grades through exposure to reading m a t e r i ­ als. Definitions are given verbally or by pictorial illustration. The names of animals, ranging f o r m ostrich to duck-billed platypus are such cognosememes, so are the terms anticipa­ tion, pledge, allegiance, etc., which must all be learned con­ sciously. Doggy and kitty cat in most homes are acquired psy­ chose memicaIIy: the c r e a t u r e s are simply members of the family. Technosememes are acquired as one acquires tools and their use; as t e r m s in the upper grades of high school, college, and g r a d u a t e school. The t e r m s phoneme, morphophoneme, syntax, and idiom are all technosememes. Psychophonosemantic multiple-coding primarily affects, t h e n , psychosememes, and the more emotionally colored lower ranges of our cognosememes, but doesn't seem to have much e f f e c t on medical discourse, the language of a well argued legal w r i t , a d e e d , or a technical treatise on formal linguistics. I have devoted a long essay (Makkai 1975b) to documenting how a theory of human language that fails to take multiple coding into account is bound to be a f a i l u r e . In t e r m s of the w r i t t e n language idioms, jokes, allusions, and t r a n s l a t i o n , ' l i t e r a t u r e ' , f o r short, c a n ­ not be accomplished if simultaneous multiple coding is not allowed. No known brand of Transformational Generative Grammar is capable of handling simulcoding to d a t e , hence its characterization as a f a i l u r e .

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The human voice, in p a r t i c u l a r , Fonagy argues, is as individual as our f i n g e r prints or our signature. Logical lexico-grammatical discourse about business, education, and politics, in short, civilization, has become possible because Homo sapiens accepted the necessity of an a r b i t r a r y code which is traditionally l e a r n e d . The ADULT and the PARENTAL ego state (comparable to the Freudian Ego and Superego, (cf. Makkai 1978) are particularly well suited to function via socially regulated lexicogrammatical norms. But the individu­ al's most c r e a t i v e , inner self, his CHILD (comparable to the Freudian Id) rebels against the lexicogrammatical norms and t r i e s to transcend them in every possible way. The socially most adjustable, even commercially successful, version of such rebellions may be t e r m e d POETRY. The poets e. e. cummings and Edgar Guest may have used a large number of identical lexemes and g r a m m a r , yet Edgar Guest remains a not very highly r e g a r d e d poet and e. e. cummings remains the century's linguistically most rebellious genius in modern American English. Their individual styles are unmistakable. T. S. Eliot and Ogden Nash may have used words and con­ structions t h a t w e r e common to both of them as speakers of English; yet Nash's charm and verbal playfulness is all his own and Eliot's greatness in the Four Quartets remains unparalleled and outdone perhaps only by Ezra Pound in the Cantos, In each case mentioned here an artist has used his CHILD, took his rebellious a t t i t u d e s , his playful inventive­ ness, and mapped t h a t into novel a r r a n g e m e n t s of the available lexicogrammatical patterns for consumption by other adults in the w r i t t e n medium. But not every one succeeds in translating his inner speech into socially valued a r t , whereas every human being appears to have this t r i p a r t i t i o n of the personality. The commonest manifestation of the inner child, t h e n , is through our voice and the meanings it adds to or subtracts from the socially accepted, standard average dictionary meanings of our lexicons. The human voice doesn't lie; just like preverbal children, it doesn't know how to tell a lie. Thus when the lexicogrammar forces it to say something it doesn't quite m e a n , the voice compensates f o r it by g r a f t ­ ing a private meaning onto the lexicogrammatically e x t a n t one at hand.

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Let us revisit, with this in mind, some of our examples discussed e a r l i e r in this paper. Let us take the example Good grief!, a popular exclamation in American English. Lexicogrammatically and logically, it is somewhat of a contra­ diction; grief has, usually, negative connotations such as 'sadness', 'sorrow', 'pain', 'loss', and 'mourning'; the lexeme good, on the other hand means 'not bad', 'joyous', ' f a v o r a ­ ble', 'advantageous f o r me', etc. Thus a grief that is good is hard to imagine and calls f o r some moral parable such as 'too much f u n is bad f o r you because you will become i r r e ­ sponsible; an occasional g r i e f , on the other hand, is good f o r you, because it will sober you and make you mature'. Obviously people when they exclaim Good grief! do not think about these m a t t e r s and j u s t use the ready-made phrase on t a p , since it is a convenient p r e - f a b , to use Bolinger's most f i t t i n g t e r m (1976). But this involves the ego in an e m o ­ tional contradiction: should he/she emphasize the 'good' part or the 'grief' p a r t of the exclamation? And so it happens that exclaiming Good grief! can be done both belly-achingly, self-pityingly, lugubriously, mournfully, pessimistically, d e f i ­ antly, and delightedly, happily, light-headedly, and optimis­ tically. (Due to Charlie Brown, whose favorite phrase it is, it is most o f t e n heard in a mood of crestfallenness and lack of self-confidence.) However it can be chuckled sarcas­ tically and unbelievingly, as if separating the syllables into GOO-OOD GRIE-IEF; or in mock-surprise upon seeing the very largest pumpkin on Halloween Day good GRIEFlll (eyes rolling in mock f e a r ) . The point of these quasi-descriptions and quasi-classifications here is t h a t private though the inner speech is, i t , too, comes in observable p a t t e r n s and these can be correlated with physically observable and recordable phonological contours. This is the essence of Ivan Fonagy's research into the functions of the live human voice. A highly t r a i n e d instrumental phonetician equally at home in E d i n ­ b u r g h , Ann Arbor, Stockholm, Vienna, Paris, and Budapest - c u r r e n t l y residing in Paris - ~ Fónagy, in his forthcoming book translated by myself, has succeeded in giving objec­ tively q u a n t i f i e d evaluations, 'emicizations of alios', in a way, of what major types of multiple coding there are in human languages. Most of his examples come from his native Hungarian but t h e r e are also many French, German, English and other examples as w e l l .

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The child, who thrives to r e t a i n the arche-language of itself developed prior to the acquisition of the lexicogrammatical norm of its family, survives under the diplomas of the grown up and in constant dialectical tension against the norm, creates new meanings by the thousands every day. We cannot dismiss this as the 'idiolect' of the individual since the idiolect itself is largely lexicogrammatical speech imbued and interwoven with the inflections of the inner voice. Thus the voice, a phonologically observable e v e n t , carries m e a n ­ ings into grammar and lexis, signalling directly unobservable but in e f f e c t clearly manifest psychological states. In other words the c a r r i e r is phonology, the content is semantics, and the source is the individual's emotional states. There is nothing mystical or 'mentalistic' about this; the average well t r a i n e d family physician knew it a hundred years ago and said to bewildered parents 'your son talks nicely but sounds and looks mean; have a word with him to see what's bothering him, and his head aches will go away.' Hence the t e r m PSYCHOPHONOSEMANTICS. Currently still unrecognized in America, the phenomena it promises to be able to t r e a t will encompass what is c u r r e n t l y relegated to the ill defined area of 'speech acts'. There is something Jakobsonian about it (amounting to his notion of Gesamtbe­ deutungen); the questions raised range from Saussure through Wells (1958) to HaUiday. American structuralists, by and large, tended to stay away from discussing inobserv­ ables and concentrated t h e i r energy on the careful display of overt d a t a . This was correct scientific behavior couched in modesty and i n t e g r i t y , but it also landed the profession in the turmoil of the Transformationalist-Generativist move­ ment which started in 1957. Transformationalists tend to call themselves 'mentalists', but have created some of the largest and most awkward taxonomies in the f i e l d — t a x o n o ­ mies of rules instead of taxonomies of facts. Section 2.4.1 of this paper o f f e r s a parody of t h e i r approach to the t r e a t m e n t of data. As the century progresses and previously incredible achievements of mankind, such as the manned lunar landing in July of 1969, become household conversa­ tion topics, we can e n t e r t a i n the vision of an objective c a t ­ aloguing of those facets of language which are not directly observable without falling pray to pseudo-mentalism which is, to use Talmy Givón's adroit phrase, 'structuralism w i t h a vengeance'. This paper is a modest a t t e m p t at answering Wells' question in 1958: Is a Structural Description of

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Semantics Possible? We have seen the pseudo results of the 25 years. Formal explicitness, although a v i r t u e , cannot account f o r n a t u r a l language use without a theory of con­ t e x t , t e n o r , and r e g i s t e r , as in Halliday (1978). The desired synthesis will be ecological linguistics, or EC0UNGU1STICS, f o r short. To understand and to practice EC0LIN6UISTIC5, one must approach the f i e l d with the peripathetic o p e n mindedness and tolerance I have experienced f o r the f i r s t time in my life at Yale University, when I f i r s t came into contact with Rulon S. Wells, to whom this paper and this e n t i r e volume is dedicated. Peripathetic open-mindedness is an a t t i t u d e that approaches all movements within linguistics with creative curiosity. As the f i r s t major American exponent of syntax through Immediate Constituents (Wells 1947), Wells has shown that a Harris-type structuralist approach to syn­ tax is certainly possible; f u r t h e r m o r e , it is reasonably clear t h a t the study of surface s t r u c t u r e will gain new recogni­ tion in all modes of theoretical linguistics. (Chomsky, f o r example, no longer seeks meaning e n t i r e l y in 'Deep Struc­ t u r e ' , much of meaning is now found in surface structure as well.) Since exclamations a r e , as we have seen, to a large e x t e n t idiomatic, we must recognize that live language is stored in chunks and units in memory beyond the size of the single word. Sometimes the meaning is t r a n s p a r e n t , sometimes it is opaque; in all cases t h e r e is something unpredictable e i t h e r about the semantics or about the con­ struction. We have learned from stratificational grammar (Makkai 1972) t h a t idioms are hard to g e n e r a t e and that the LEXEMIC and SEMEMIC STRATA of a n a t u r a l language o f f e r convenient places f o r the storage and retrieval of idioms. Yet it is clear t h a t idioms have both internal and external syntax; not to study t h a t in detail would be to ignore overt d a t a . Exclamation idioms in p a r t i c u l a r , however, ride on PHONOLOGICAL INTONATIONS which, invariably, CARRY MEANING. To understand exclamations, t h e n , we need all of the following: a)

Knowledge of the syntax of the u t t e r a n c e , both internal and e x t e r n a l . b) Knowledge of the morphologies involved. c) Knowledge of the appropriateness conditions for the exclamation; this involves

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Makkai: Where do Exclamations Come From? i)

d)

e) f)

g)

thorough familiarity with a theory of 'speech acts' or ii) a knowledge of the register and tenor of the explanation, and a iii) theory of context, which must be sociolinguistically and semiotically based. The meaning of the exclamation is of central importance, of course, both as a m a t t e r of lexicography (static v i e w ) , and syntactic operability (dynamic v i e w ) , but it rests on the phonological realization of the utterance - - see the role of intonation discussed above. Meaning through phonology is in its infancy in the United States, despite major advances made by scholars such as Dwight Bolinger; f u r t h e r m o r e , it involves the researcher in psycho-linguistics of the psychiatric-transactional type.

EC0LIN6UISTICS rests on these seven foundations. Fact, overt observation; introspection, study of context, syntax, semantics, morphology, and phonology are inextricably i n t e r ­ woven in the study of exclamations. Would Bloomfield have shied away from studying exclamations? It is u n f a i r to guess. He would have urged t h a t we needed much f a s t e r and b e t t e r access to much more and much b e t t e r classified information. But t h a t was in 1933, and this is half a c e n ­ t u r y later in 1984. Even the large capacity IBM computers of the '60-ies are outmoded; this is the age of the micro­ chip computer with the v i d e o - s c r e e n , easily available to all who need one. It is perhaps no accident that cognitive stratificational linguistics should be so closely tied with computer research through the work of Sydney M. Lamb: both Lamb and Halliday view human language as a large serniotic system in the last analysis. Wells' question of nearly 30 years ago, 'Is A S t r u c t u r a l T r e a t m e n t of Semantics Possible?' can now be answered with a more than t e n t a t i v e , cautious 'yes'. Oddly enough no single theoretical model can do the job; we need the synthesis of Tagmemics (with its -ernes and -alios, f i e l d , particle and wave modalities); Sys­ temic-Functional Grammar (Halliday's concept of Language as Social Serniotic)- Lamb's cognitive-stratificational theory via computer, and the classical theories of analogy, formation of neologisms, etc. Set theory and logic and t r a n s f o r m a ­ tional sentence derivation can also be shown to play a p a r t ,

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although a minor one, and o f t e n one that yields negative results. The systematization of all of these c u r r e n t s into a t r u l y viable ECOUNGUISTICS calls f o r rigor in logic and presupposes a philosopher thoroughly versed in all modes of modern linguistics. To put it briefly: it is a Wellsian task.

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1 For some historical insights see McDavid/Mancken 1963: 395, 6 2 9 , 6 7 7 , etc. The f o r m holy ¡umping Jesuel is cited as having vanished t o w a r d 1890. Bolinger (1975: 3 0 8 ) , one the best recent t e x t books on general linguistics, discusses exclamations in a chapter dealing with the origin of l a n ­ guage in connection with holophrasis. This is in essential agreement with Hockett's interesting but short t r e a t m e n t of exclamations in 1958: 201 where exclamations are t r e a t e d as 'minor types' of sentences, or 'fragments'. Hockett w r i t e s : 'Strong emotion, or its simulation, may produce exclamatory fragments: Ouchl Goodness graciousl The devil you say!' S t a n ­ dard discussions are available in various older traditionalist t r e a t m e n t s of English grammar. See also Wentworth and Flexner 1960: 264 under holy cow!, Boatner, Gates & Makkai 1975-77: 162 under the same e n t r y .

Several sources, especially McDavid/Mencken and Wentworth and Flexner t r e a t the holy set as euphemisms for Holy Jesus! This might have interesting consequences for section 2.4.1. Other, now extinct exclamations, perhaps still remembered by the older g e n e r e a t i o n such as ¡umpin' jimminie cricket! and ¡umpin' (holy] Jehosaphat! w e r e left unmentioned in this essentially synchronic t r e a t m e n t . 2 This situation may be changing as sentences such as Man, I'm telling you, I'm beat are more f r e q u e n t l y heard even among middle class white women in intellectual professions, such as teachers among themselves during coffee break, etc.

3

Hungary is by no means unique in having adopted Shakespeare as a national saint through l i t e r a t u r e . Shakes­ pearian proverbs have, of course, originated in British c u l ­ t u r e and w e r e exported with the dramatic output itself; many t r a n s l a t o r s knew what lines had become proverbial in the original English which a l e r t e d them to outdo themselves in t r a n s l a t i n g those particular lines. The same lines a r e , for those who read Shakespeare anyway, among the better known and more easily recognized ones. Generally speaking, however, in modern American English, unless one is in the company of l i t e r a t u r e majors or professors, one does not hear a g r e a t deal of Shakespearian quotation in commenting on instances of every day l i f e ; 'to be or not to be', and 'he

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shuffled off this mortal coil' have almost become forbidden as t r i t e . I have not once in 27 years in the USA encount e r e d a spontaneous comment f r o m any native American speaker about politics using 'something is r o t t e n in the State of Denmark' (not even during W a t e r g a t e ) , and I have never been able to observe 'well r o a r e d , lion!' f r o m an adult to an excessively vocal youngster. Accordingly, I t r y to use them myself in an a t t e m p t to f i n d out if they are at least recognized, which they f r e q u e n t l y a r e , though some­ times not. It is my understanding that even in Britain 'to exclaim in Shakespeare' is a generational phenomenon found more typical of older people and regarded as snobbery by most.

REFERENCES CITED Boatner, Maxine T u l l , John Edward Gates, and Adam Makkai (update e d i t o r ) . 1975. A Dictionary of American Idioms. Woodbury, N.Y.: Barron's Educational Series, second ed. 1977. Bolinger, Dwight. 1975. Aspects of Language. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Chomsky, Noam. 1957. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton. Fónagy, Iván. 1976. A költō hangja: öregség. Dallamfejtés. (The Voice of the Poet: Old Age. Introduction to MelodySemantics.) Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó. English t r a n s ­ lation of the above by A. Makkai, Budapest: Akadém­ iai kiadó, in press. . 1983. La vive voix, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Halliday, M. A. K. 1978. Language as Social Semiotic, London: Edward Arnold. Hockett, Charles F. 1958. A Course in Modern Linguistics. New York: MacMillan. Lees, Robert B. 1957. "Review of Chomsky 1957." Language. 33:375-408. . 1960. Grammar of English Nominalizations. Publication of Indiana University Research Center in Anthropology, Folklore and Linguistics No. 12 (IJAL XXVI, No. 2, II.). McDavid, Raven I. ( e d i t o r ) . 1963. The American Language. Abridged e d i t i o n , original by H. L, Mencken. New York: Knopf.

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Makkai: Where do Exclamations Come From?

Makkai, Adam. 1972. Idiom Structure in English. The Hague: Mouton. . 1975a. "The metaphorical origins of idiomaticity: rhyme or reason?" Georgetown University Working Papers on Languages and Linguistics No. 11 (R. J. Di P i e t r o , e d i t o r ) , 10-29. . 1975b. " S t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l solutions to unbridgeable gaps in the transformational-generative paradigm: translation, idiomaticity, and multiple coding." The Transformational-Generative Paradigm and Modern Linguistic Theory, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory. Vol. I (Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science) E. F. K. Koerner ( e d i t o r ) , Amster­ dam: John Benjamins, 3 6 - 8 5 . . 1978. "P.E.G.: Pragmo-Ecological Grammar: t o w a r d a new synthesis of linguistics and anthropology." Approaches to Languaget (Anthropological Issues) William  McCormack and Stephen A. W u r m , editors) The Hague: Mouton. Wells, Rulon S. "Immediate constituents" Language 23:81-117. . 1957. "Is a structural t r e a t m e n t of meaning possi­ ble?" Proceedings of the 8th International Congress of Lin­ guistics (Oslo: University of Oslo Press). W e n t w o r t h , Harold, and S t u a r t Berg Flexner. 1960. Dictionary of American Slang. New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell.