Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1912–1927
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Nevertheless, still and yet: Concessive cancellative discourse markers David M. Bell Ohio University, Linguistics Department, Gordy Hall 369, Athens, OH 45701, USA
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Article history: Received 1 October 2005 Received in revised form 14 December 2009 Accepted 16 December 2009
Using an 8 million-word corpus together with introspected examples, this paper examines the concessive cancellative discourse markers nevertheless,1 still and yet. In a sequence P – DMcancellative – Q, a cancellative marker provides an instruction as to what aspect of information in the form of a derivable assumption from the prior discourse, P, either globally or locally, is to be canceled by the current message Q. In a concessive relationship, this assumption is a potential consequence derivable from the prior discourse. A concessive cancellative marker both concedes the truth of the prior discourse and signals the cancellation of the potential consequence derivable from the prior discourse segment. The corpus yielded 254 tokens of nevertheless/nonetheless, 802 tokens of discourse marker yet and 262 tokens of discourse marker still.2 These markers are distinguished according to three interconnected criteria: variability of scope, speaker perspective, and degree of concession. Variability of scope refers to the range to which a marker signals the hearer/ analyst to search the previous discourse for a consequence of P that is canceled in Q. Nevertheless, still and yet constitute a cline of scope with nevertheless having the most limited scope and yet having the largest scope. Speaker perspective refers to whether the speaker perceives P from the perspective of Q, or Q from the perspective of P. The point of view of a speaker who uses still is located in Q, that of a speaker who uses yet is located in P, and the point of view of a user of nevertheless is neutral, neither located in P nor in Q. With regard to the degree of concession, nevertheless, still and yet are again considered in terms of a cline with nevertheless signaling the strongest degree of concession and yet the weakest. It is no coincidence that the clines of scope and concession are inversely related: the more vague the instruction carried by a concessive marker, the greater its ability to operate globally and conversely, the more detailed the instruction, the less its ability to operate globally. ß 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Discourse markers Cancellative discourse markers Concessive discourse markers Variability of scope Speaker perspective Degree of concession
1. Introduction Fraser has likened the effect of discourse markers to that of ‘‘discourse glue’’ (1990:385). Here I want to make another analogy between what I refer to as cancellative discourse markers and a set of carpenter’s tools, particularly those used for cutting and shaping wood. Just as planes, chisels and saws shape and cut wood in distinctive ways, cancellative discourse markers shape meaning by canceling or cutting away unintended speaker meanings. Dascal and Katriel (1977) provide a further analogy by likening the process of cancellation to the peeling away of layers of meaning as one would peel away and discard the layers of an onion. An utterance, according to Dascal and Katriel is made up of several layers of meaning ‘. . .ranging from the more to the less explicit, from an inner ‘‘core’’ of content to contextually conveyed implicatures via E-mail address:
[email protected]. My use of nevertheless includes its allomorph nonetheless. The figures here refer to occurrences of still and yet as discourse markers and exclude other non-marker occurrences of still and yet such as temporal adverbs, adjectives or nouns, etc. 1 2
0378-2166/$ – see front matter ß 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2009.12.010
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layers and sub-layers such as presuppositions, modality, illocutionary force and felicity conditions’’ (153). However, the notion that meaning is stratified in this way seems too rigid. It is not that our cutting tools uncover new and different layers of meaning but rather cut away unintended meanings as a whole rather than as layers. Planes, chisels and saws have dedicated uses as cutting tools, but at times they may serve other functions. At a pinch, a chisel might serve as a screwdriver and a screwdriver as a gouging device. Likewise, nevertheless, still, and yet have a core or dedicated use as cancellatives and this is what I am concerned with, although I acknowledge that they may at times be used for a different function. Furthermore, although planes, chisels, and saws can all be categorized as dedicated cutting tools, their cutting effects vary, as do the purposes to which they are put with regard to carpentry. Likewise, nevertheless, still and yet are core concessive cancellative markers but their cancellative effects vary as do the purposes they are put to in the facilitation of communication. Each of these marker’s special effects can be distinguished according to three broad interconnected criteria: variability of scope, speaker perspective and degree of concession. I have four main aims in this paper: (i) to describe the occurrence of nevertheless, still and yet in terms of particular spoken and written texts and genres though corpus-based research; (ii) to shed further light on how nevertheless, still, and yet operate as cancellatives in general; (iii) to show how the particular type of cancellation they signal can be best understood as concession; and (iv), by using corpus examples as well as constructed examples, I will attempt to show the subtle differences between these markers and the particular uses each marker is put to. I start by further discussing the theoretical framework of cancellation, the concept of concession, and the notions variability of scope, speaker perspective, and degree of concession. I then look at each marker in turn with regard to the common cancellative work they do and with regard to the individual properties which distinguish them from each other. Finally, I compare and contrast the three markers and speculate on why they are used in particular contexts. 2. Cancellation Studies in discourse markers have conventionally used the term contrastive to describe the group of markers which includes those markers under study here (Fraser, 1998; Rudolph, 1996). However, as Blakemore (2002) has argued, ‘‘contrast seems just too crude for capturing the contributions of any of these expressions’’ (54).3 Building on the work of Dascal and Katriel (1977) and Katriel and Dascal (1984), the concept of cancellation is an attempt to describe more precisely the kind of inferential work the hearer/analyst does in establishing and weakening previously held assumptions as the discourse unfolds. Cancellative markers like but, however, though, nevertheless, still and yet provide an instruction as to what aspect of information, derivable from the prior discourse, P, either globally or locally is to be canceled by the current message Q. An aspect of information is any piece of information, either explicit, or implicit in the form of an assumption or implication, which is derivable, though not necessarily derived, by the hearer from the prior discourse. (See Bell, 1998 for a fuller discussion of the notion of cancellative discourse markers.) (1)
I gave Jimmy tuna for dinner. But I forgot that he was allergic to fish.
(2)
I hope you’ll examine these cases on your own. The tour, however, continues at the next case on the left.
(3)
A:
We had a very nice lunch. I had an excellent lobster.
B:
Did you get to ask him about the money though?
(4)
It was raining heavily. Yet they played tennis.
(5)
I really don’t feel like going to work today. Still, it is Friday.
(6)
(A and B are discussing the merits of an actor for a part in a remake of Beau Geste.) A:
He speaks French.
B:
Nevertheless, he’s not tall enough.
In (1) but signals the cancellation of the positive and rather mundane action of feeding Jimmy; in (2) however signals speaker return to both the topic and direction of the tour and the cancellation of the focus on ‘‘these cases’’; in (3) though helps signal the change of topic in Q and the cancellation of the prior topic in P; in (4) yet signals that an assumption derivable from the ideational content of P, namely that the tennis match was postponed due to inclement weather, is canceled in Q; in (5) still seems to signal that P cancels or reduces somewhat the dismay on the part of the speaker at having to work that day by the reminder in Q that at least it is the last day of the work-week and so the situation is not as bad as the speaker thinks; and in (6) nevertheless signals that the illocutionary force of P as an argument in favor of choosing the actor because of his French proficiency is canceled by a counter argument in Q. As can be seen from these examples cancellation can operates on a range of aspects of discourse just as cutting tools can be used in a wide number of circumstances. The core feature of cancellation is that it cancels or cuts away assumptions about the discourse in a converse manner to the way that additives confirm and build onto assumptions about the discourse. Concessive cancellative markers are one type of cancellative marker as chisels are one type of cutting tool. 3 It may well be that the term ‘‘contrastive’’ is a more apt description of these markers in certain contexts (see Izutsu, 2008), but I would argue that ‘‘cancellative’’ is a better term to describe their overall core function in discourse.
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3. Concession Cancellative markers can be subdivided in terms of concession: yet, nevertheless and still can be described as [+ concessive] while but, however and though are [+/ concessive]. In other words, yet, nevertheless and still can be considered a subset of but, however and though. In the examples (1), (2) and (3) but, however and though are [ concessive] while in examples (4), (5) and (6) yet, still and nevertheless are [+ concessive]. Whereas but, however and though can be used in examples (4), (5) and (6), yet, still and nevertheless cannot be used in examples (1), (2) and (3). A concessive cancellative marker has two distinguishing properties. First, concessive cancellative markers signal the speaker’s acceptance of the truth or validity4 of the previous discourse segment.5 The following examples are restricted to a comparison of but and nevertheless. (7) (8)
A:
John’s in Paris at the moment
B:
But/*Nevertheless I’ve just seen him in Oxford Street.
A:
Ted’s so dumb
B:
But/Nevertheless he got an A- in Phonology
In (7) but signals B’s upcoming challenge to the truth of A’s assertion that John is in Paris. Nevertheless suggests the anomalous situation of acknowledging the truth of P while claiming the truth of Q. Clearly John cannot be in two places at once (unless B is claiming superhuman powers for John). In (8) nevertheless appears to signal speaker B’s acceptance of the truth of speaker A’s evaluation of Ted’s intelligence, whereas but is ambiguous as to speaker B’s acceptance of, or challenge to, the truth of speaker A’s assertion. Whereas but may be characterized as both [+] and [ ] concessive, nevertheless is clearly [+] concessive. Second, a cancellative concessive marker signals that an expectation in the form of an effect or consequence derivable either explicitly or implicitly from the previous discourse P is canceled in the upcoming message Q. (9) (10)
It was 95 8F. Nevertheless, Charles insisted on wearing a jacket, and it was all that I could do to stop him. (A is a police officer and K is a radio talk host) A:
I think we’d better have a talk, Kate.
K:
I’m on the air.
A:
Nevertheless
In (9), the expected effect of hot weather in P – the wearing of light clothing – is canceled in Q. In (10) the speaker’s refusal plus justification of a request in P, which is conventionally considered to bring about the effect of acceptance, is canceled in Q.6 4. Variability of scope, speaker perspective, and degree of concession Nevertheless, still and yet each create special effects. These special effects, derived from their individual semantic, syntactic and phonological properties, can be distinguished according to three broad interconnected criteria: (1) variability of scope, (2) speaker perspective and (3) degree of concession. Variability of scope refers to the extent to which a marker instructs the hearer/analyst to search the previous discourse or even go beyond the discourse to search their encyclopedic knowledge for a potential effect of P that is canceled in Q. The further back into the discourse a marker can reach, the greater its scope or globality. Limited or local scope is readily seen in markers that contain referential items, such as the demonstrative pronoun that as in the cancellative marker despite that, or the so in even so, which functions as a clausal substitute for an element in P. These referential items tend to limit their scope to more local discourse segments. Here, I argue that nevertheless, still and yet constitute a cline of scope with nevertheless having the most limited scope and yet having the largest scope. Nevertheless, still and yet can also be distinguished according to speaker perspective or point of view that the speaker takes with regard to P and Q. I find that the position of a speaker who uses still is located in Q, that of a speaker who uses yet is located in P, and the perspective of a user of nevertheless is neutral, neither located in P nor in Q. It is the location of speaker
4 This aspect of concession builds on Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson’s (2000) Cardinal Concessive Pattern, which is operationalized into a three-part interactive sequence. The first speaker makes some point (X), a second speaker acknowledges or concedes the validity of this point (X’) but then goes on to make a potentially contrasting statement (Y). A: (X)You’re drinking too much B: (X’) I know, (Y) but I have had a hard week 5 This acceptance of the truth of the prior message is more clearly indicated by the fuller form: It is never the less true that, from which the elliptical form nevertheless has been derived. 6 The distinction here between assumptions derived from the ideational content or illocutionary force of P is paralleled in more semantic and sentencedbased analyses of concession in terms of direct concessive and indirect concessive sentences (see Izutsu, 2008).
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perspective, which, I argue, explains the hint of speaker surprise signaled by the use of yet in (11) as opposed to nevertheless and still, and the softening effect of still in (5) repeated here as (12). (11)
The Japanese machine is lighter and cheaper. Nevertheless/Still/Yet, the American machine was preferred because of its speed.
(12)
I really don’t feel like going to work today. Still, it is Friday.
A third criterion by which nevertheless, still and yet can be distinguished is the degree of concession they embody. Here again, nevertheless, still and yet may be considered in terms of a cline with nevertheless signaling the strongest degree of concession and yet the weakest. The clines of scope and concession are seen to be inversely related. The vaguer the instruction with regard to concession carried by a concessive marker, the greater its ability to operate globally and conversely, the more detailed the instruction, the less its ability to operate globally.7 5. Data The data for this study come from both naturalistic (random and non-random) and introspected sources. The random sample of naturally occurring language consists of an eight and a half-million-word corpus made up of one million words each of academic writing, newspapers, and fiction, and five and a half million words of spoken English made up of MICASE (Michigan Corpus of Spoken Academic English), the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken English, Labov’s Classic Sociolinguistic Interviews and Switchboard. This corpus yielded 254 tokens of nevertheless (160 occurrences of nevertheless and 94 occurrences of nonetheless), 802 tokens of yet and 262 tokens of still. These occurrences also include combinations with other discourse markers most notably but nevertheless, but still, and and yet. Although such a small corpus cannot be said to be representative, it does suggest some broad trends: (1) yet is far more prevalent than nevertheless and still; nevertheless, still and yet tend to appear more in written than spoken text; nevertheless appears predominantly in academic texts; still appears more often in fiction and newspaper texts; and yet is strongly represented in all three written genres. With these broad trends as a guide, I now proceed to examine nevertheless, still and yet in turn, according to the criteria of scope, speaker perspective, and degree of concession. I then compare the three markers according to these three features. 6. Nevertheless According to Fraser (1998), nevertheless can be distinguished by two main features: (i) it exclusively targets in terms of contrast an indirect message or implication derivable from P and (ii) this implication must be expected. (13)
John is tall. *Nevertheless, Sam is short
(14)
He is very overweight. *Nevertheless, he speaks Italian
(15)
We started late. (Expected implication: We will arrive late.) Nevertheless, we arrived on time.
So, according to Fraser, the use of nevertheless in (14) is unacceptable because the contrast targets the direct message in P. The use of nevertheless in (15) is unacceptable because there is no expected implication derivable from P that Q could make a contrast with. On the other hand, nevertheless is acceptable in (16) because an expected implication can be derived from P. Further evidence that nevertheless works on the indirect message derivable from P rather than the direct message is provided by a comparison with despite that/in spite of that, with which nevertheless is often considered synonymous. Despite that/in spite of that can only function when the anaphoric referential that can be linked back to its explicit referent in the prior message, and that explicit referent or fact triggers an expected effect that is canceled in Q. (16)
The house was locked and shuttered. Nevertheless/Despite that, she managed to get in.
(17)
He thought he had lost his wallet. Nevertheless/*Despite that, it had fallen behind the desk.
(18)
(A and B are discussing the merits of an actor for a part in a remake of Beau Geste.) A:
He speaks French.
B:
Nevertheless/*Despite that, he’s not tall enough.
So in (16) referential that in Q can be linked back with the explicit propositional content of P – the house being locked and shuttered, and an expectation or indirect message derived from that fact – it would not be possible for anyone to get in. In (17) referential that is problematic as it appears to be referencing the subordinate clause in P giving the anomalous reading of despite losing his wallet, it had fallen behind the desk. In (18) despite that is unacceptable because it references the ideational content of P rather than its illocutionary force. These examples suggest that nevertheless has a wider scope than despite that, but, as we shall see, nevertheless like despite that is constrained by similar local restrictions in contrast with still and yet. 7
See the section below: ‘‘A Comparison Of Nevertheless, Still And Yet’’ for examples of the clines of scope and concession.
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Table 1 The discourse markers nevertheless, yet and still: number of tokens and tokens per million words in parentheses.
Academic Fiction Newspaper Micase Santa Barbara Labov Switchboard
Corpus size
Nevertheless
1,084,863 1,014,163 1,016,517 1,848,364 404,000 193,097 3,044,734
106 55 43 32 1 0 14
8,562,000
254 (29.7)
Still
(97.7) (54.2) (42.3) (17.3) (2.5)
24 84 75 22 6 4 47
(4.6)
Yet (22.1) (82.8) (73.8) (11.9) (14.8) (20.7) (15.4)
156 181 175 77 10 6 196
262 (30.6)
(143.8) (178.5) (172.1) (41.6) (24.7) (31.1) (64.4)
802 (93.8)
Examples (16), (17), and (18) also illustrate how the notion of an expected implication is complex. In (16) the expectation is derived from the ideational content of P in terms of shared encyclopedic knowledge that a locked and shuttered house is impenetrable. In (17) the expectation is not derived by the hearer/analyst, indeed the hearer/analyst would probably assume from P that that the wallet was not in fact lost. Rather the expectation here had been derived by the speaker such that the fact of finding the wallet in Q cancels the speaker’s real world expectation or, more appropriately, fear that the wallet was lost. Again in (18) the expectation is really that of the prior speaker that the argument put forward in P for selecting the proposed actor will prevail. Speaker B cancels or in this case defeats A’s argument by a counter argument. Blakemore (2002), working in a relevance theoretic framework, sees the triggering of an expectation or indirect message when nevertheless operates in a rhetorical context as ‘‘an assumption whose truth is an issue’’ (128). Blakemore describes this ‘issue’ as a question, posed explicitly or implicitly in the previous discourse. In example (19), taken from Blakemore (2002:125) the implicit question is whether a student should be excused from certain course requirements. (19)
A:
She’s had a very difficult time this semester
B:
Nevertheless, she should hand in at least some of the work
According to Blakemore, nevertheless signals speaker B’s acceptance of a particular answer to the question – should the student be excused? – by contradicting or eliminating Speaker A’s answer, which can be inferred from the previous segment. Blakemore contrasts the acceptability of nevertheless in (19) with its unacceptability in (20a) and the acceptability of but and however. (20)
[parent’s response to a hungry child’s request for food] There’s a pizza in the fridge a
But/However/*Nevertheless, leave some for tomorrow.
b
But/However/Nevertheless, I would rather you eat something healthy so I’ll make soup.
According to Blakemore, in (20a) P is relevant as an answer to the child’s request for food while Q ‘eliminates’ an assumption derivable from P that the child can eat all the pizza. Nevertheless, according to Blakemore, is not acceptable here because it cannot be interpreted as contradicting the answer communicated by P. In (20b) Nevertheless is acceptable because it contradicts the answer given in P – the child can eat pizza. Whereas, the notion of implicit or explicit questions posed in the previous discourse segment may be appropriate in the dialogic spoken examples, which Blakemore mainly uses, it is hard to see how these questions can easily be identified in monologic written texts, which as evidenced in Tables 1 and 2, constitute the majority of occurrences of nevertheless. What (20a and b) do illustrate is how concessive nevertheless is constrained in the type of cancellation it makes with respect to but and however. The data from the corpus provide further clues to the role of nevertheless. First, the great majority of occurrences of nevertheless – 204 tokens out of 254 – are in written rather than spoken texts, and the majority of occurrences are in academic rather than non-academic genres (see Tables 1 and 2). Second, there is a greater use of non-sentence initial
Table 2 Nevertheless in written discourse. Total
Inter
Intra
106 43 55
66 28 23
40 15 32
204
117
87
Intersentential
ACAD NEWS FICT
Intrasentential
Initial
Medial
Final
Initial
Med
Final
54 24 18
11 3 1
1 1 4
13 5 11
26 10 19
1 0 2
96
15
6
29
55
3
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Table 3 Nevertheless in academic writing (tokens per million words in parentheses). Journal
Words
Blood Sports Engineering Analytical Chemistry Applied Psycholinguistics Family Economics and Nutrition Review N. American Journal of Economic and Finance Sociology of Health and Illness Anthropoetics Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy History and Memory Philosophy and Rhetoric
Total
92,322 109,435 81,959 101,000 97,981 104,316 92,599 101,564 102,163 100,761 100,763
4 6 8 2 2 8 9 13 17 17 20
1,084,863
106
(42) (55) (98) (20) (20) (77) (97) (128) (166) (169) (198)
Inter
Intra
Initial
4 5 6 1 0 7 5 4 11 12 9
0 1 2 1 2 1 4 9 6 5 11
4 4 8 2 2 5 6 4 12 8 11
Medial 0 2 0 0 0 3 2 8 5 9 8
Final 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
64
42
66
37
3
The shaded area is intended to convey that these numbers are a subset of the area to the left of it.
nevertheless and intrasentential nevertheless in academic writing. The distribution of intersentential and intrasentential nevertheless in written discourse and the sentential and clausal position of nevertheless is summarized in Table 2. The large number of intrasentential occurrences together with the preference for medial position in intrasentential occurrences provides some evidence for the more limited scope of nevertheless compared with still and yet. (I return to this point later). For the most part, nevertheless occurs in initial position, but may also appear at other major constituency boundaries: post-subject NP, pre- and post-AUX and post-VP as in (21) below. And as well as making an intersentential connection nevertheless can also operate intrasententially in either paratactic or hypotactic sentences as in (22), (23) and (24). (21)
When Jack got to the house the front door was locked. a
Nevertheless he was able to get in.
b
He nevertheless was able to get in.
c
He was nevertheless able to get in.
d
He was able to get in nevertheless.
(22)
Overall, one might regard the model as a limited approximation that has, nevertheless, shown itself to be capable of useful prediction. (Sports Engineering)
(23)
Bloodied and dazed and with no one listening, the Invisible Man nevertheless gives his speech (Anthropoetics)
(24)
This sounds like an overdetermined fatalism inimical to the spirit of authentic Judaism, but nevertheless it is the conclusion drawn from family and collective experience (History and Memory)
It should also be noted that the syntactic privileges of nevertheless differ from those of however. Whereas however functions as a focus marker in non-initial position, especially post-Subject NP position, nevertheless does not. This would explain why however is inappropriate as a substitute for nevertheless in (21b) above. Whereas however has intonational prominence which indicates that the focused element in Q – the constituent which precedes however – cancels a similar element in P, nevertheless has no such intonational prominence.8 Also, however is not substitutable for the intrasentential occurrences of nevertheless in (23) and (24). If we look at the occurrences of nevertheless in academic writing according to journal discipline, there are two striking characteristics of the use of nevertheless in academic writing: the greater frequency of nevertheless in humanities journals and Q2 the greater use of intrasentential nevertheless in humanities journals (Table 3). Looking at the humanities journals as a whole, and here I include the Journal of Philosophy and Rhetoric, Anthropoetics, the Journal of History and Memory and the interdisciplinary Journal of Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, the averaged occurrence per million words is 165.4 as opposed to 58.4 for the social science and science journals. At the same time, humanities journals tended to favor greater intrasentential connections than non-humanities journals as well as greater occurrences of non-initial nevertheless. From the perspective of genre-analysis, Lewin et al. (2001) argue that in social science texts concessives tend to signal the act of pointing out gaps in the research. The most frequent concessive discourse markers they found were however and nevertheless. They found them most frequently occurring in the Introductions and Discussion section of an academic text. They found that ‘surprise’ conveyed by the use of a concessive operates primarily at the interpersonal or rhetorical level or where authors are evaluating their work or that of others, rather than at the ideational level (142). In my corpus of academic texts, nevertheless certainly operates more on the rhetorical level and occurs mainly with the interpretation of ideas, both the 8 For however to be appropriate here, the focused element he needs to be stressed, with the implication that he and not others managed to get in. The less intonationally prominent nevertheless is acceptable here and does not carry with it the implication that he succeeded while others did not.
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author’s and those of others, which tends to be more characteristic of the interpretive and analytical writing in the humanities. (25)
To be sure, Kant’s sublime disrupts the beautiful harmony between sense and the concepts and categories of the understanding. Nonetheless, Kant never doubted the sublime sovereignty of reason. (Philosophy and Rhetoric)
(26)
From this case, we are not able to infer whether the patient really felt empowered through the resource dialogue, although this was the intention of her doctor. Nevertheless, the story illustrates the experience and reflection of a doctor whose image of this woman changed substantially through an approach where strong points were encouraged. (Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy)
Given the emphasis on interpretation and analysis of ideas, it is probably not surprising that nevertheless appears in more densely packed intrasentential, medial positions, often together with other concessive conjunctions like if, although and but or in relative clauses. (27)
If Balzac hides his mimetic principle from immediate observation, he nevertheless gives us plenty of clues to uncover it. (Anthropoetics)
(28)
Heidegger absorbs the beautiful into a sublime that nevertheless resists a Romantic/Kantian closure. (Philosophy and Rhetoric).
So far we have seen that nevertheless is a concessive cancellative that has two main features. First, it signals that the upcoming message Q concedes the truth of P in terms of its ideational content or the validity of P in terms of its illocutionary force. Second, nevertheless signals that the upcoming message Q cancels an assumption or expected effect derivable from P either from encyclopedic knowledge of real world effects or from illocutionary intent. It can be glossed as despite the expected effect of P, Q prevails. Nevertheless appears far more frequently in written discourse than spoken discourse and more frequently in academic discourse, and especially in the kind of argumentative writing that characterizes humanities journals. In this kind of writing, nevertheless operates far more as an intrasentential connector and appears more often in medial position compared with other genres. In such writing, nevertheless both concedes the validity of previous arguments and at the same time signals the coexistence of new arguments presented by the author. There are further elements which distinguish nevertheless, namely its neutrality in terms of speaker perspective and its ability to signal a local rather than a global cancellation, but I will allow those issues of speaker perspective and scope to emerge in my discussion of still and yet. 7. Still In the discussion of nevertheless, occurrences of nevertheless in sentence initial, medial and final were all treated as instantiations of the discourse marker nevertheless. Occurrences of sentence initial, medial and final still cannot be treated in the same way and for this reason only appropriate occurrences of still in sentence-initial position have been counted as instantiations of discourse marker still. An immediate problem with discussing still as a discourse marker, what I will refer to as stillDM is to distinguish it from its function as a temporal adverb, what I will refer to as stillTA. Whereas stillDM would appear to be restricted to sentence-initial position, stillTA appears for the most part medially, although it can occur initially too. Compare the use of stillDM and stillTA in the following examples. (29)
I locked all the doors and windows a.
StillTA Ben managed to get in
b.
Ben stillTA managed to get in
c.
StillDM Ben managed to get in
In example (29a) stillTA suggests that Ben has managed to get in before and still manages to get in despite the locked doors and windows. In (29b) stillTA is ambiguous between an iterative meaning similar to (29a) and a non-iterative meaning. The iterative meaning suggests that in addition to getting in this time despite the locks, Ben had also got in on previous occasions, while the second non-iterative reading suggests only that Ben got in despite the locks. In the first iterative sense, it is behaving as a time adverbial by signaling the continuance of a previous action or condition. But in the second non-iterative sense, it is behaving like a discourse marker in that it signals that P cancels an expected effect, i.e. nobody could get in, derivable from P. In (29c) stillDM signals solely that an expected effect derivable from P is canceled in Q. In other words, stillTA contributes to the truth conditions of the proposition while stillDM does not.9
9 StillTA is often more clearly identifiable when the following verb is in the progressive aspect. ‘‘Now on Ilyisha’s last morning a wall of soot-dirt bodies lined the trench, pleading and screaming, driven to the edge by others behind them ten-thousand deep. Still they kept coming.’’ (Ariel’s Inferno - Zachary Ash).
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Table 4 Distribution of nevertheless and still. Occurrences per million words in parentheses. But still occurrences are a subset of still. Nevertheless Academic Fiction Newspaper Micase Santa Barbara Labov Switchboard
106 55 43 32 1 0 14
(97.7) (54.2) (42.3) (17.3) (2.5) (4.6)
254 (29.7)
Still 24 84 75 22 6 4 47
(But still) (22.1) (82.8) (73.8) (11.9) (14.8) (20.7) (15.4)
4 10 4 19 4 3 47
262 (30.6)
91
The shaded area is intended to convey that these numbers are a subset of the area to the left of it.
The problem of distinguishing between stillTA and stillDM is most acute where stillTA indicates the continuance of a condition rather than an action. Consider the following example taken from Greenbaum (1969:65) (30)
It is mediately and as a testimony that these acts are the redemptive acts of God. To that extent they cannot be compared directly with either the miracles or the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. a.
But they are nevertheless/stillTA the works of the attesting spirit.
b.
StillDM they are the works of the attesting spirit.
Greenbaum notes that ‘‘But they are still’’ can be paraphrased as But it remains true that they are, and that still in initial position in (30b) has no temporal meaning. However, it would appear that still in initial position still retains in some residual form its temporal meaning with regard to the persistence of a condition. Given the ambiguity of sentence internal still I have only counted those instances (i) where still occurs in initial position (or in combination with another marker such as but still), despite the apparent substitutability of nevertheless for still in (30a), and (ii) where initial still is clearly not acting as a time adverbial. On the face of it, still and nevertheless have a similar frequency of occurrence. However, there are marked differences in the distribution within the spoken and written genres. In written discourse, still occurs mainly in fiction and newspapers, and much less so in academic written texts. Nevertheless, on the other hand, as we have seen, occurs mainly in academic writing. In spoken discourse still occurred more often in casual conversation, as opposed to academic spoken discourse, whereas for nevertheless the opposite is true (Table 4). Several writers (Borkin, 1980; Crupi, 2004; Hirtle, 1977; Ko¨nig and Traugott, 1982) have suggested that still signals old information in Q. Comparing still with yet, Hirtle (1977) argues that in a P yet Q sequence. . . .the second element is seen as something different or new, as lying beyond the field of the first element. That is to say, where still characterizes the relationship as continuation in spite of an intervening element, yet specifies it as a movement from one element to another, from an already established position to a new one (42).10 I will discuss yet later. The pattern with regard to still – what I will call XPQ – is illustrated in examples (31) and (32). Discourse segment X establishes an action/condition, P introduces information which appears to challenge the continuance of that action/condition, while Q cancels any assumption derivable from P that the action/condition established in X would not be maintained, and reintegrates and restates the first segment (31)
X She had her pen out and was writing furiously on her napkin. P The napkin was a dark shade of blue, the same color as the ink. Steve looked over and could not see any of the words she wrote. Q Still, she scribbled furiously, as if she would be tested on it the next day. (Fiction)
(32)
X you got to be your child’s best friend I guess P even when they’re a teenager and they are kind of standoffish Q still you got to be their best friend because when they got problems who they gonna go to their friends that are dealing drugs or there parents? (Switchboard)
In (31) the intervening information in P suggests that given the color of the napkin and the color of the ink the writing would be unreadable and so the writer would cease such futile activity. Q cancels such an assumption by stating that the action reported in X continues in Q despite the intervening challenge in P. In (32) Q repeats the statement made in X – you got to be your child’s best friend despite the intervening challenge in P: – teenagers can be standoffish. 10 Borkin (1980) describes still as acting on the rhetorical structure of the discourse as a whole in a particular circumstance when (a) the general force of a section of text is in one direction, (b) the prior message runs counter to this direction, and when (c) the force of the current message is to counter the prior message but consistent with the main direction. Crupi (2004) argues that ‘‘still introduces information that is contrary to the most recent contextual assumptions but connected to information that has been presented at some earlier point in the text or to common knowledge already available to the reader’’ (120).
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The claim that still signals old information needs to be understood in terms of how Q is connected to previously established information and reiterates the continuance of that information. Consider the following longer extract from the New York Times automobile review of the Honda Accord. Erin is one of the Times editors that tested the car. (33)
X Although she likes the Accord’s overall package, P Erin has a few lingering doubts about our Honda. ‘‘I’m annoyed that you can only get side curtain airbags on EX V6 models. I feel certain that a lot of people will test-drive four-cylinder LX and EX models and find them more than adequate in terms of power and cabin amenities. Indeed, these are the volume-selling Accords with a significant number being purchased by families. That’s why it makes no sense to me that Honda isn’t giving these buyers the option of paying extra for full-length airbags that protect the heads of front and rear occupants. Q Still, the Accord’s top-notch performance in 40-mph offset crash testing by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety - it earned a ‘Good’ rating (the best possible) and ‘Best Pick’ standing - suggests that safety was certainly a priority for Honda. Maybe I’m the only one worrying.’’ (New York Times)
The specific information in Q about the Accord’s performance in crash testing is certainly new information in terms of the article but the rhetorical force of Q signaled by still is old information in that it reiterates Erin’s liking for the Accord established in X despite the intervening contrary evidence in P. Indeed, in the bulk of the XPQ occurrences, Q reiterated a rhetorical position rather than ideational content. And that rhetorical position in X may often be les explicit as in the following co-constructed example. (34)
A:
X you know to be at home because actually I had my grandmother with me from the time she was ninety two until she died at ninety seven
B:
um-hum see I think that’s wonderful
A:
P I went to work and she was at home alone some of the time Q but but still you know it was much better than being shipped
B:
uh-huh to a
A:
to a day care center
In (34) it is B who makes a positive assessment of A’s having the grandmother at home. P presents information – the grandmother was left alone while A went to work – which could potentially conflict with the position in X that it is ‘‘wonderful’’ that A has the grandmother at home. In Q the speaker cancels the implication in P that having the grandmother at home was not a good idea because she was left alone for long periods. At the same time Q makes explicit A’s position, hinted at in X, that it was a good idea to have the grandmother stay with A. However, the XPQ pattern, whether explicit as in (31), (32) and (33) or less so as in (34), is not the prevailing pattern exhibited by still in this corpus. Analogous to the omission of the first ‘‘hand’’ in the correlative on the one hand. . .on the other hand (Bell, 2004), most occurrences of still in this corpus implied the existence of a prior action or condition in X. However, whether explicit or implied, the idea that still signals the continuance of an action or condition in Q despite an intervening potential threat to its continuance, suggests that the speaker’s perspective or involvement11 is located in Q. In other words, the speaker considers the intervening information in P from the point of view of how the prior action/condition explicated or implied in X persists. The speaker involvement that still conveys may partially explain its relatively infrequent occurrence in academic writing compared with nevertheless, which, I will argue later, conveys no speaker perspective. Still may also be distinguished from nevertheless in terms of the degree of concession it signals. I noted earlier that concessive cancellative markers have two distinguishing properties: first, they signal the speaker’s acceptance of the truth or validity of the previous discourse segment, and second, they signal that an expectation or effect derivable from the previous discourse P is canceled in the upcoming message Q. Whereas still like nevertheless concedes the truth or validity of P, as in (7) and (8) repeated here as (35) and (36), there are occasions when still does not signal a derivable effect as in examples (37) and (38), where still is compared with nevertheless and the non-cancellative marker after all. (35) (36)
A:
John’s in Paris at the moment
B:
But/*Nevertheless/*Still, I’ve just seen him in Oxford Street.
A:
Ted’s so dumb
B:
But/Nevertheless/Still he got an A- in Phonology
(37)
It took Jim a long time to finish. But/Still/After all/?Nevertheless, he had a bad leg.
(38)
Grace is very good at basketball. But/Still/After all/?Nevertheless, she’s well over six feet tall.
In (35) still like nevertheless is unacceptable as it seems to accept the truth of A’s statement which is irreconcilable with B’s claim. In (36) still and nevertheless are acceptable because accepting the claim that Ted is dumb is not incompatible with him 11 Speaker involvement is the degree to which the speaker, based on speaker perspective, is implicitly involved in the construal of the connective relations (Pander Maat and Degand, 2001).
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D.M. Bell / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1912–1927 Table 5 Frequency of occurrence of nevertheless, still and yet in paragraph initial position in relation to total number of tokens in parentheses.
Still Nevertheless Yet
Academic
Newspapers
Fiction
Totals
0 (24) 4 (106) 14 (171)
31 (75) 12 (43) 40 (191)
22 (84) 4 (55) 15 (219)
53 (183) 20 (204) 69 (581)
getting an A- in Phonology. In (37) and (38) but, still and after all are synonymous with this is not surprising since. . .However, whereas after all signals a strengthening of the assessment in P, but and still signal a weakening of the assessment. In this sense, but and still signal the partial cancellation of the speaker’s commitment to the assessment whether implied in (37) or explicit in (38). In this way but and still are functioning in a similar way to the marker mind you (Bell, 2009), which often signals self-deprecation of the speaker in Q, which has the effect of weakening and even undermining the claim in P. Nevertheless is weird in these examples because, I would argue, the default interpretation of nevertheless is that it signals the cancellation of an assumption derived from the ideational rather than the rhetorical content of P. In the cases of (37) and (38), it is hard to know what assumptions could be derived from the ideational content in P that could be canceled by the information in Q that Grace is well over six feet tall. It is possible to understand nevertheless as signaling the cancellation of the rhetorical force of P as an assessment, although this would be easier to see across turns where speaker B disagrees with the assessment of speaker A rather than in monologic examples. A further way of distinguishing still and nevertheless is that they have what Mosegaard-Hansen (1997) calls ‘‘variable scope,’’ that is the ability to signal a global or local cancellation. I argue that for nevertheless, the hearer is to seek an assumption that Q cancels as closely to nevertheless as possible, while for still, there is no such injunction. Compare nevertheless and still in the following examples; in both examples, still is the original marker used. (39)
The club had been fine, not degrading in the least. It was nice to feel good about your body. She had felt proud of her breasts even though they hadn’t been any good for nursing. They were small but full, and they still pointed mostly to the ceiling when she lay down. Her areolas were a beautiful dark rose, not brown like some. And not a hair. Some of the waitresses actually had to pluck the hairs from their nipples. They said you got used to it, but just thinking about it made Martha cringe. Still/?Nevertheless, Martha hadn’t made much in tips and she hadn’t made any friends. (Fiction)
(40)
They’re not wrong, exactly; every kind of music successful enough to become a national craze gets so homogenized, ritualized and overdone that it’s a joke. The same fate spoiled calypso before folk and, years after that, heavy metal (as Mr. Guest knows from the classic music parody he starred in, Rob Reiner’s ‘‘This Is Spinal Tap’’). Still/?Nevertheless, there was more to the folk phenomenon of the 60’s than ‘‘A Mighty Wind,’’ which opens on Wednesday, suggests or satirizes. (New York Times)
I find nevertheless in these longer extracts awkward because the default instruction of nevertheless appears to be to search the immediately prior discourse segment for a property of P that would bring about an effect which is canceled in Q. In the case of (39), the immediately prior discourse segment is concerned with plucking the hairs from nipples and Martha’s reaction to such a practice. This segment appears to be parenthetical to the main direction of the paragraph as expressed in the first sentence that Martha had a good experience working at the club, which is canceled in Q. Likewise in (40), the immediately prior discourse segment is concerned with two examples of musical forms – calypso and heavy metal – that become ‘‘homogenized, ritualized and overdone’’. However, the main direction of the discourse, is a discussion of 60s folk music and whether it deserves the parody it gets in the movie, ‘‘A Mighty Wind.’’ The greater scope of still is able to cancel the apparent agreement of the author expressed in the first line, while nevertheless seems to direct the reader to search the immediate environment. A further effect of this variability of scope is that the instruction in nevertheless to search the immediately prior or local discourse tends to focus on an ideational property of P that is canceled by Q. The instruction in still, on the other hand, to search the wider prior discourse tends to focus on a rhetorical property of P that is canceled by Q. Evidence for the greater scope of still compared to nevertheless is suggested in Table 5 by the occurrence of paragraph initial still compared with paragraph initial nevertheless and yet. According to the overall totals for paragraph initial occurrences, one in approximately three instantiations of still are paragraph initial compared with one in every ten occurrences of nevertheless and one in every eight occurrences of yet. This evidence by itself is unconvincing, because I will later argue that yet has a greater scope than still despite its much less frequency of occurrence in paragraph initial position. However, the evidence of the frequency of paragraph initial still together with the examples discussed above do suggest a greater scope of still compared to nevertheless. So far I have examined still according to three main features. First, I looked at how still indicates speaker perspective or involvement. Still suggests that the speaker’s perspective is located in Q and that P is being examined in the light of Q. This is more clearly seen in an XPQ sequence, where Q consists of old information in the form of a restatement of the continuance of an action or condition established in X despite the intervening and contradictory information in P. However, I argued that the XPQ pattern was less frequent than a PQ pattern in which X is implied. In either case, still signals that the speaker’s perspective is located in Q. Second, still may be distinguished according to its position on a gradience of concession. Whereas
D.M. Bell / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1912–1927
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Table 6 Distribution of yet in written and spoken discourse. Genre
Total
Yet
And yet
Academic Fiction News Micase SB Switchboard Labov
156 181 175 77 10 197 6
131 122 142 8 0 23 0
20 55 32 58 5 121 3
8 5 48 3
Totals
802 (93.8)
426
294
66
(143.8) (178.5) (172.1) (41.6) (24.7) (31.1) (64.4)
But yet 1 1
X yet 4 3 1 3 5
16
still like nevertheless concedes the truth or validity of P there are occasions when still does not signal in Q the cancellation of an expectation or effect derivable from P. It was noted that still can signal the weakening of the speakers commitment to an assessment in P and that this cancellation often appeared in the form of self-deprecation. I further argued that the default reading of nevertheless is that it signals the cancellation of an assumption derived from the ideational rather than the rhetorical content of P whereas still may be understood as more often operating on the rhetorical level of cancellation. Support for such a claim was suggested by the third feature of still – variability of scope. I argued that the instruction in nevertheless is to search the immediately prior or local discourse, which tends to focus on an ideational property of P that is canceled by Q. The instruction in still, on the other hand, is to search the wider prior discourse, which tends to focus on a rhetorical property of P that is canceled by Q. 8. Yet Yet (93.8 tokens per million words) is far more frequent in both written and spoken genres than still (30.6) and nevertheless (29.7). Yet appears more often in written genres (164.8 tokens per million words) than spoken genres (40.6 tokens per million words), and more often in fiction (178.5) than newspapers (172.1) and academic writing (143.8) (Table 6). Like nevertheless and still, yet is far more likely to appear by itself in written genres while in spoken genres it is more likely to appear in combination with and or but. For example, in the Switchboard corpus, out of 196 tokens there were only 23 occurrences of yet alone, while there were 121 tokens of and yet, 48 tokens of but yet, and 5 occurrences of multiple marker compounds such as and yet at the same time, and but yet, and but yet on the other hand. In contrast, out of 156 tokens of yet in the academic corpus, there were only 25 occurrences of yet in combination with and or but. I have argued that yet, along with nevertheless and still, is a [+] concessive cancellative marker compared with but, however, and though, which may be [+/ ] concessive. This distinction is illustrated in the following examples with regard to yet and but. (41)
Alice went to the station early. But/?Yet the train was late.
(42)
I used to get out to hear a lot of live music, but/?yet I got married and then we had a child.
In (41) yet is unacceptable, because there appears to be no property of P from which an expected effect or consequence can be derived such that it is canceled in Q. A concessive reading of (41) would be that despite the fact that Alice went to the station, the train was late, which is clearly implausible.12 However, despite the lack of a concessive relationship between P and Q, but still signals a cancellative relationship. As I have argued, but may operate to cancel an aspect of information within the speaker’s context, or within the context of the person the speaker is speaking about, as well as the hearer’s context. So in a context in which Alice has gone to the station to meet a friend, Q can be understood as defeating in some way her plan by canceling her expectation or hope that the train would not be late. Again in (42) there is no concessive relationship between P and Q that would make the use of yet acceptable here.13 But, on the other hand, signals the cancellation of the state of going out to listen to music already implied by the use of used to. Although I have argued that yet, still and nevertheless are concessive cancellative markers, I have also argued that there is a gradience of concession with nevertheless being the most concessive and yet being the least. The evidence for this claim will emerge over the next few pages, but first, unlike nevertheless and still, yet is able to signal a symmetrical concessive relationship between P and Q. In other words, yet can signal not only despite P, Q but also P despite Q as illustrated in the following examples.
12 If Alice were a queen or some other dignitary whose importance would normally guarantee that the train would be on time, then (41) could be interpreted according to a concessive relationship. 13 A possible concessive reading of (42) could be paraphrased as despite the fact I got out to hear a lot of music, I got married and had a child. This is ambiguous between two readings: either the speaker finds it surprising that she should give up the opportunity to get out and hear live music in order to get married and have a child, or that she finds it difficult to hear live music and find a spouse at the same time.
D.M. Bell / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1912–1927
(43) (44) (45)
a
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It was raining. Yet/Nevertheless, Patty played tennis.
b
Patty played tennis. Yet/*Nevertheless, it was raining.
a
Nat had helped start the business. Yet/Nevertheless, she fired him.
b
She fired him. Yet/*Nevertheless, Nat had helped start the business.
a
She had no formal instruction in Hungarian before she arrived. Yet/Nevertheless, Pam became fluent in a matter of months
b
Pam became fluent in a matter of months. Yet/*Nevertheless she had had no formal instruction in Hungarian before she arrived.
A symmetrical concessive relationship between P and Q also allows for a further reading of (41). Now the relationship can be understood as P despite Q, and an appropriately [+ concessive] reading might be that Alice went to the station early despite the fact (and her knowledge of the fact) that the train was late. It was argued earlier that whereas still signals that a position already established in X either explicitly or implicitly is reiterated in Q despite the challenge in P thus locating speaker perspective in Q, yet locates the speaker’s perspective in P and views Q from the perspective of P. That is to say, a new position in Q is perceived from an already established position in P. The following spoken examples illustrate the speaker perspective signaled by yet. (46)
(47)
A
there was a crime here in Mckinney uh a rather heinous murder there was no um remorse shown by uh
B:
uh-huh
A:
at least one of the perpetrators and yet for whatever reason his crime was not considered a capital crime (Switchboard)
A:
yes I do believe that there is too much immigration now
B:
well- yeah a well yeah living in Texas especially I see it and- and
A:
well it’s not just that there are enough jobs for people here now
B:
no no it’s terrible
A:
and yet they’re letting more people in daily
B:
yeah from everywhere too not just from Mexico you know just everywhere (Switchboard)
In (46) speaker A views Q – it was not considered a capital crime from the established position in P – the perpetrators of a heinous crime showed no remorse. In (47) both A and B locate their position in P: too much immigration and not enough jobs and so are viewing Q: they’re letting more people in daily from the perspective of P. The notion of speaker perspective signaled by yet is further underlined by the element of speaker surprise that may sometimes be indicated by yet. In certain contexts, yet not only signals the cancellation in Q of an expected effect or consequence derivable from P, but that the speaker finds the cancellation in Q surprising and even puzzling. It has to be stressed that the key distinction here is that the speaker finds the concessive relationship surprising. The terms ‘‘surprising’’ and ‘‘unexpected’’ are often used interchangeably in the literature on concession (Quirk et al., 1985) but whereas an event in Q may be considered unexpected in the light of P from the perspective of the hearer, it may not be considered surprising from the speaker’ perspective. A phone call from my brother may be unexpected but not surprising. In other words, yet may indicate ‘‘propositional attitudes’’ rather than merely relations between facts. Consider the different nuances of meaning conveyed by nevertheless and still in contrast with yet. (48)
(49)
The Japanese machine is lighter and cheaper. a
Nevertheless, the American machine was preferred because of its speed
b
Still, the American machine was preferred because of its speed
c
Yet/And yet, the American machine was preferred because of its speed
It was three o’clock in the morning London time. a
Nevertheless, he called Simon and told him about the new baby.
b
Still, he called Simon and told him about the new baby.
c
Yet/And yet, he called Simon and told him about the new baby.
In (48), nevertheless, still, and yet each signal that some aspect of information derived from P – the assumption that the Japanese machine would be chosen – is about to be canceled in Q – despite the fact that the Japanese machine was lighter and cheaper, the American machine was preferred because of its speed. However, the use of yet and and yet in (48c) appears to signal surprise from the speaker’s perspective that the American machine was indeed preferred. In (49a) nevertheless does not in itself signal that the speaker finds the fact that he called Simon at three o’clock in the morning to tell him about the new baby surprising. After all, he might argue, it was perfectly understandable given his excitement. However, in (49c) yet/and yet
D.M. Bell / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1912–1927
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Table 7 A comparison of yet and nevertheless in written discourse according to inter- and intrasentential connections. Genre
Yet
Academic Fiction News Total
156 181 175 512
Nevertheless Inter
Intra
92 82 120 294
64 99 55 218
106 43 55 204
Inter
Intra
65 28 23 117
41 15 32 87
again seems to suggest that the speaker found that the act of calling Simon at three o’clock in the morning to tell him the news somewhat surprising.14 One of the effects of surprise is the creation of puzzlement or paradox, especially with the use of and yet, and especially in fiction. Consider how the following examples, all taken from fiction, suggest a conundrum, which even the speaker may not be able to resolve. (50)
He looked her full in the face, yet he didn’t see her.
(51)
I cannot help but feel that there is something important about this nothingness. It should represent a lack of hope, and yet I think that, somewhere, hope may yet be with me.
(52)
He dreaded the hysterical colours of spring and the unintelligence of grass. And yet, living things loved Benedikt.
(53)
They were experts in survival, and yet at the same time they were rank amateurs in recognizing the languid, solitary, untroubled moment.
(54)
None of us leapt up in the morning eager to pursue with colleagues the thread of yesterday’s investigation. And yet I looked forward to the work.
The sense of paradox conveyed by yet and and yet is further reinforced in these examples by parallel structure, repetition, the use of antonyms, and combination with markers such as at the same time and simultaneously. This sense of puzzlement and paradox is most often found in humanities journals. There were 116 occurrences of yet in humanities journals (286.4 tokens per million words) as opposed to 40 occurrences (58.6 tokens per million words) for social science and hard science journals. With regard to the scope of yet, I will argue that it is more global than still, but at that same time can function on a local level similar to nevertheless. At the local level, yet like nevertheless operates to make intrasentential connections as one would expect from a semi-coordinator (Table 7). However at the global level there are marked differences. In (55) below, where yet is the original marker, I would argue that nevertheless is awkward, because of its lack of global scope. If we look at the structure of this extract, we can identify a claim in P with two examples, P1 and P2 in support of the claim in P. Q also consists of two examples, which are intended to be set against the examples in P1 and P2. (55)
P
The odd thing about the current passion for re-enacting history is that living links with tradition are generally regarded with suspicion. P1Many people think lawyers should stop wearing wigs on the grounds that they are intimidating. P2Royal ceremonial is derided as futile and fuddy-duddy. Q1
Yet/?Nevertheless/?Still Romans celebrated the anniversary of Rome’s foundation last week by dressing up as ancient legionaries and marching through the city in spiked helmets. Q2And the world’s most modern nation, the United States, greets foreign statesmen visiting the White House with a parade of soldiers dressed in the 18thcentury uniforms of the American revolution. (Guardian) Nevertheless is inappropriate here because of the limited scope of its cancellation. Nevertheless picks out the nearest preceding or local segment as the source of its concession and cancellation. It is interesting to note that still also appears to be inappropriate here but the reasons seem to be less to do with scope than with restrictions due to speaker perspective and the presentation of new information in Q. In example (56) below, however, the scope of yet extends out of the text and cancels an assumption based on encyclopedic, non-textual knowledge. Such globality appears to be beyond the range of still. (56)
14
‘‘I don’t do a great deal of business in Greece,’’ Mr. Hosokawa said to Gen that night over drinks in the bar of the Athens Hilton. The bar was on top of the hotel and looked out over the Acropolis, and yet/*nevertheless/*still it seemed that the Acropolis, small and chalky in the distance, had been built there for just this reason, to provide a pleasant visual diversion for the drinking guests. (Fiction)
I find that and yet accentuates the possibility of speaker surprise even more than yet.
D.M. Bell / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1912–1927
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In (56) Q cancels an aspect of information derivable not from the text itself but from the reader’s encyclopedic knowledge of the world, namely that the Acropolis was built long before the Hilton Hotel, which overlooks it. Neither still nor nevertheless has this cancellative scope. Example (56) also illustrates a wide use of yet by the narrative voice in fiction to juxtapose description and fancy, reality and other worlds. Clearly here, the narrative voice is rooted in the reality of P viewing the fantasy world in Q. And at the same time, example (56) provides further evidence for the looser concessive instruction that yet signals in comparison to nevertheless and still. In summary, compared to nevertheless and still, yet is closest to but as a semi-coordinator, and it is this ability to connect clauses and sentences which may account for the far more frequent occurrence of yet. Furthermore, the ability of yet to signal a symmetrical concessive relationship between P and Q may also account for its greater occurrence due to its greater flexibility and so its looser concession. Yet also differs from nevertheless and still in that it suggests the speaker’s perspective toward the juxtaposition of P and Q is rooted in P and may in certain contexts suggest speaker surprise with regard to Q. This idea of surprise is often heightened, especially by the use of and yet, to one of paradox. And this sense of paradox was identified as a major factor in accounting for the occurrence of yet in argumentative written and spoken texts. Finally, it was also shown that yet has far greater scope than either still or nevertheless. 9. A comparison of nevertheless, still and yet Planes, chisels and saws can be categorized as cutting tools, but their cutting effects vary as do the purposes which they are put to with regard to carpentry. Likewise, nevertheless, still and yet are concessive cancellative markers but their cancellative effects vary as do the purposes they are put to in the facilitation of communication. I hope by now that I have shown that nevertheless, still and yet share the same core pragmatic instruction of cancellation, that is an aspect of information derivable from P is canceled in Q. I described the particular type of cancellation that nevertheless, still and yet signal as one of concession. In a concessive relationship, Q signals both an acceptance of P and at the same time a cancellation of an expected effect or consequence derivable from P. I then went on to show how each of these markers has particular syntactic and residual semantic features, which overlay the core pragmatic instruction of cancellation and interact with the discourse context to produce distinct effects. I distinguished each of these marker’s special effects according to three broad interconnected criteria: variability of scope, speaker perspective and degree of concession. Each marker’s common and special features can help explain their occurrence in particular discourse genres. Variability of scope refers to the extent to which a marker can direct the hearer/analyst to search the previous discourse or even go beyond the discourse to search their encyclopedic knowledge for a consequence of P that is canceled in Q. Nevertheless, still and yet constitute a cline of scope with yet having the largest scope and nevertheless having the most limited scope. I gave varied evidence in support of this claim. First, both naturally occurring and introspected examples suggest that nevertheless has a default instruction to search the local environment for an ideational effect in P that is canceled in Q. Nevertheless was compared with despite that, which has an even narrower scope than nevertheless. It was also suggested that the ability of nevertheless to appear in intrasentential and especially medial positions in written discourse was further evidence of its more local operation. I also argued that the greater occurrence of still in paragraph initial position was one more piece of evidence that suggested that nevertheless had a narrower scope. I give one more example of the greater globality of still in comparison to nevertheless, taken from an interview with the actress, Julia Louis-Dreyfus, star of the TV-sitcom, ‘‘Seinfeld,’’ which took place at Louis-Dreyfus’s parents’ home in the Washington, DC area. (57)
On the strength of her television success, Ms. Louis-Dreyfus has received her first major film role, in ‘‘North,’’ directed by Rob Reiner, which she describes as an adult fairy tale. (It is the film, parts of which are being shot in New Jersey, as well as visits with her mother and father, that brought her from Los Angeles.) Still/?Nevertheless, it is for ‘‘Seinfeld’’ and its wildly mundane brand of humor that she reserves most of her enthusiasm.
It is the parenthetic information about the location of the film and visits to her parents, which constitutes the immediate local discourse, which makes the use of nevertheless awkward here. The instruction in nevertheless to find an effect of P that is canceled in Q tends to direct the hearer first to the immediately prior or local discourse. And clearly it is difficult to find a property here which would normally exclude the possibility of Q. Still, on the other hand, instructs the hearer to focus on the persistence of Q in the face of intervening and possibly contradictory information and so draws the attention to more global than local concerns. In other words, because still signals an XPQ pattern, the hearer/analyst is sent further back into the text to find a prior condition or action either explicit or implicit that persists in Q despite the intervening effect of P. With regard to yet, I argued, using evidence such as example (56), that yet has the greatest scope in that Q is able to cancel an aspect of information derivable not from the text itself but from the reader’s encyclopedic knowledge of the world. In this way, yet is acting similar to but, which has the greatest scope of all cancellatives. We have also seen how nevertheless, still and yet can be distinguished according to the position or perspective that the speaker takes with regard to P and Q. The position of a speaker who uses still is located in Q, that of a speaker who uses yet is located in P, and the perspective of a user of nevertheless is neutral, neither located in P nor in Q. Still most often appears in an XPQ sequence where X suggests either explicitly or implicitly an existing condition or action, P a challenge to the continuance of that action or condition, and Q a reiteration of X despite P. So the speaker is viewing the intervening
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contradictory information in P from the perspective of Q. In this way, Q reiterates an old, already established position, which has been taken to be old information. Yet situates the speaker’s position in P and often signals the speaker’s surprise that Q cancels an expected effect of P. What is important here is that surprise is registered by the speaker rather than the hearer/analyst. That is to say, that such an attitude as to the relationship between P and Q is not so much derived from the inferential process itself but is part of the meaning of yet, which the speaker imposes on the relationship. With regard to nevertheless, it may well be that the hearer/analyst does find the relationship between P and Q surprising but the speaker remains neutral. In the following examples, the original cancellative marker has been omitted. I leave the choice of nevertheless, still, or yet to the reader. (58)
In this section, we present the measured data and discuss them within the Sauerbrey model, well aware that the latter will fail for viscoelastic films inducing high D values. XXXXX, this way of showing the data simplifies the data presentation, gives a qualitatively correct picture of the overall kinetics, and illustrates how the quantitative errors of this approach are corrected by the full modeling. (Analytical Chemistry)
(59)
As someone who has become accustomed to City’s famous inconsistencies during his 23 years at the Old Trafford helm, it must feel strange to know a challenge to United’s dominance may come from much nearer home than usual this term. XXXXX, relaxed and healthy at the start of another punishing season, Ferguson let his thoughts wander from United’s current base in Kuala Lumpur to the city they share with a team now in a very big hurry. (http://www.teamtalk.com/ football/)
If my analysis is correct, then the least controversial choice here would be nevertheless for both examples because nevertheless does not suggest a speaker perspective on the relationship of P and Q. Conversely, because still and yet can signal speaker perspective, they become more problematic choices. The original marker in these texts was actually still in example (58) and yet in example (59). One rationale for the choice of still in (58) is that it does exhibit an XPQ sequence: X announces the use of the Sauerbrey model, P points out the deficiencies of the model, and Q reiterates the commitment to the Sauerbrey model despite its deficiencies detailed in P. (59) is an example of a classic rhetorical device, especially prevalent in the introductions of newspaper articles, whereby P presents an expectation – Ferguson will find it strange talking about a rival team from the same city as his team – which is canceled in Q, signaling a transition to the main content of the article. Here, the speaker is located in P viewing the upcoming cancellation in Q. The third criterion by which nevertheless, still and yet can be distinguished is the degree of concession they embody. Here, nevertheless, still and yet may again be considered in terms of a cline with nevertheless signaling the strongest degree of concession and yet the weakest. There are several factors that contribute to this gradience. As we have seen, the symmetrical concessive relationship between P and Q that yet can signal and its proximity to but as a semi-coordinator are two factors that make the concessive relationship between P and Q less precise. As for still, we have seen that in certain contexts still signals in Q the partial cancellation of the speaker’s commitment to a claim in P. In such instances, whereas still is still operating as a cancellative, it is hard to see how it can be understood as a concessive. Finally as we have seen, nevertheless operates more on a local level and at this level it tends to reference an ideational rather than a rhetorical effect derivable from P. Compare the use of nevertheless, still, and yet in the following example taken from a second language student essay, cited by Borkin (1980), in which nevertheless was the original choice. (60)
In a Chinese family, the mother stays at home and does the housework. Yet/?Still/?Nevertheless, the situation in my family is completely different.
The fact that that nevertheless appears less appropriate here than yet, appears to be related to the more precise instruction that nevertheless signals for how P and Q are to be related. I have argued that that the default instruction of nevertheless is to search the immediately prior or local discourse segment for an ideational property of P which projects an expected effect in Q, which is in fact canceled by Q. Still also appears unacceptable here: the information in Q is new and it is difficult to understand P as indicating the persistence of an implicit prior condition. Yet is much vaguer in its instruction; the instruction is to search either P or Q, either locally or globally, and even outside the discourse itself, for a potential effect which is ultimately canceled in Q. A further factor that contributes to the degree of concession expressed by these markers is the degree to which they accept the truth or validity of P, or to put it another way, the degree to which Q can be said to coexist with rather than reject P. Consider the following examples and the extent to which Q rejects or coexists with P. (61)
A
Janet’s not here.
B1
But I just saw her in her office
B2
I just saw her in her office though
B3
Yet I just saw her in her office
B4
?Still, I just saw her in her office
B5
?Nevertheless, I just saw her in her office
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If we examine the extremes of this cline, it can be seen that whereas but in B1 can be heard as a challenge to the truth of P, i.e., A’s assertion that Janet is not there, nevertheless in B5 seems to suggest that B concedes the truth of P, but at the same time asserts Q, producing what appears to be an unacceptable relationship between P and Q. Yet, on the other hand, seems to suggest that P and Q can coexist, however paradoxical this might be. It is no coincidence that the cline of concession is related to the cline of scope. The vaguer the instruction carried by a concessive marker, the greater its ability to operate globally and conversely, the more detailed the instruction, the less its ability to operate globally. Given the common and special features of nevertheless, still and yet, we can begin to explain the particular discourse functions they are used for. As we have seen, yet is by far the most common of these concessive cancellatives both in written and spoken discourse. I have suggested that this is partly due to its function as a semi-coordinator, but may also be due to its vaguer concessive instruction and its greater scope. Yet is most prevalent in argumentative written and spoken discourse, especially in rendering paradox. Given the speaker perspectives conveyed by both yet and still, it is perhaps not surprising that the most occurrence of these markers in any one genre is that of fiction, especially in facilitating the way that the narrative voice comments on the relationship between discourse segments. However, unlike yet, the occurrence of still in academic written discourse is rare. It may be that an XPQ sequence characteristic of real time dialogic interactions is likely to be edited to a PQ sequence in written discourse, which may obviate the need to locate a speaker perspective in Q. Also, as examples (37) and (38) indicated, still can signal in certain contexts a weakening of the speaker’s commitment to a claim in P, a self-deprecation which is uncharacteristic of academic discourse. Finally, given the neutrality of nevertheless compared with still and yet, it is not surprising that it is less frequent in informal casual conversation and more frequent in academic discourse. This neutrality appears to be especially appreciated in science journals, where nevertheless is the second most frequent cancellative after however (Bell and Moran, 2008). 10. Conclusion In this paper I have examined a cluster of concessive cancellative discourse markers, which share a similar pragmatic instruction, but differ according to their varying semantic and syntactic properties. I have used a full range of data – random and non-random naturalistic data as well as constructed examples in order to illuminate their shared pragmatic instruction and their subtle differences. I have further attempted to show how their shared and different features help illuminate the discourse functions they most readily perform. In examining this cluster of discourse markers, I hope to have avoided both the pitfalls of taxonomies of discourse markers which tend to homogenize markers into broad functional categories and blur their individual differences and individual studies of markers which tend to overemphasize their uniqueness at the expense of how they share similar functions with other markers. I hope that my study of nevertheless, still and yet has successfully identified their common function as discourse tools in the same way that we are able to identify a set of carpentry tools according to their common function. I chose the analogy of cutting tools in order to illuminate the common function of nevertheless, still and yet as shapers of meaning in the way that they cut away unintended meanings. I called this process cancellation and the particular kind of cancellation that nevertheless, still and yet do as one of concession. But like cutting tools, cancellative concessive markers also have dedicated uses and I examined those individual differences according to the criteria of variability of scope, speaker perspective and degree of concession. In this way, I hope that when we use these markers we have a greater awareness of their shared and individual capacities as discourse tools in the same way that we understand the shared and special effects of planes, chisels, and saws. References Bell, David M., 1998. Cancellative discourse markers: a core/periphery approach. Pragmatics 8 (4), 515–542. Bell, David M., 2004. Correlative and non-correlative ‘‘on the other hand.’’ Journal of Pragmatics 36 (12), 2179–2184. Bell, David M., 2009. Mind You. Journal of Pragmatics 41 (5), 915–920. Bell, David M., Moran, Theresa E., 2008. Common and individual uses of additive and contrastive discourse markers in academic writing. Unpublished manuscript. Ohio University. Blakemore, Diane, 2002. Relevance and Linguistic Meaning. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Borkin, Ann, 1980. On some conjunctions signaling dissonance in written expository English. Studia Anglica Posnanensia 12, 47–59. Couper-Kuhlen, Elizabeth, Thompson, Sandra, 2000. Concessive patterns in conversation. In: Couper-Kuhlen, E., Kortmann, B. (Eds.), Cause, Condition, Concession, Contrast: Cognitive and Discourse Perspectives. Mouton de Guyter, Berlin, pp. 381–410. Crupi, Charlene D., 2004. But Still a Yet: The Quest For a Constant Semantic Value For English ‘‘Yet’’. Unpublished Ed Doc dissertation, Graduate School of Education, Rutgers University. Dascal, Marcelo, Katriel, Tamar, 1977. Between semantics and pragmatics: two types of ‘‘but’’ – Hebrew ‘‘aval’’ and ‘‘ela.’’ Theoretical Linguistics 4, 143–172. Fraser, Bruce, 1990. An approach to discourse markers in English. Journal of Pragmatics 14 (3), 383–395. Fraser, Bruce, 1998. Contrastive discourse markers in English. In: Jucker, A., Ziv, Y. (Eds.), Discourse Markers: Descriptions and Theory. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp. 301–326. Greenbaum, S., 1969. Studies in Adverbial Usage. University of Miami Press, Coral Gables, FL. Hirtle, Walter H., 1977. ‘‘Already,’’ ‘‘Still’’ and ‘‘Yet.’’ Archivum Linguisticum 8, 28–45. Izutsu, Mitsuko N., 2008. Contrast, concessive, and corrective: toward a comprehensive study of opposition relations. Journal of Pragmatics 40 (4), 646–675. Katriel, Tamar, Dascal, Marcelo, 1984. What do indicating devices indicate? Philosophy and Rhetoric 17 (1), 1–15. Ko¨nig, Ekkehard, Traugott, Elizabeth, 1982. Divergence and apparent convergence in the development of ‘‘yet’’ and ‘‘still.’’ Berkeley Linguistics Society 8, 170–180. Lewin, Beverly A, Fine, Jonathan, Young, Lynne, 2001. Expository Discourse: A Genre-based Approach to Social Science Research Texts. Continuum, London. Mosegaard-Hansen, Maj-Britt, 1997. Alors and donc in spoken French: a reanalysis. Journal of Pragmatics 28 (2), 153–188. Pander Maat, Henk, Degand, Liesbeth, 2001. Scaling causal relations and connectives in terms of Speaker Involvement. Cognitive Linguistics 12 (3), 211–245. Quirk, Randolph, et al., 1985. A comprehensive grammar of the English Language. Longman, London. Rudolph, Elisabeth, 1996. Contrast: Adversative and Concessive Expressions on Sentence and Text Level. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.
