Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies (Nato Sciences for Peace and Security)

NUCLEAR DOCTRINES AND STRATEGIES

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

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Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 44

ISSN 1874-6276

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies National Policies and International Security

Edited by

Mark Fitzpatrick Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK

Alexander Nikitin Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Russia

and

Sergey Oznobishchev Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments, Moscow, Russia

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines – National Policies and International Security Moscow, Russia 15–16 October 2007

© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-58603-897-7 Library of Congress Control Number: 2008933696 Publisher IOS Press Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the UK and Ireland Gazelle Books Services Ltd. White Cross Mills Hightown Lancaster LA1 4XS United Kingdom fax: +44 1524 63232 e-mail: [email protected]

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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Preface This book presents the results of the NATO-Russia Advanced Research Workshop “Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines: National policies and International Security,” held in Moscow on October 15–16, 2007. Co-directed by Dr. Sergey Oznobishchev, Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments (Moscow) and Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) and hosted by the International Federation for Peace and Conciliation, the workshop was sponsored by the NATO Science Programme. The workshop brought together policy experts and government officials from eleven nations and NATO for two days of exchanges on some of the most serious issues affecting national and global security. The topic of the workshop was chosen in view of the overarching importance that nuclear strategies and doctrines continued to play in the modern world and in relations among the leading states. This introduction provides a summary of the workshop and the main issues that were discussed throughout the two-day event. The nuclear doctrines of the recognized nuclear weapons states and the activities these policies entail – beginning with the acquisition and modernization of nuclear forces – inevitably influence the defense and foreign policies of those nations which are without nuclear weapons capabilities as well as the policies of those nations that are considered to be de facto nuclear weapons states. The present unstable balance between the “haves” and the “have-nots” is becoming increasingly shaky. Many representatives of the latter countries consider this division to be illegal, immoral and unresponsive to the demands of their national security. The declaratory aspects of nuclear doctrines and their provisions, which now even more than in the past do not exclude the use of nuclear weapons when the national security is considered to be in jeopardy, look extremely outdated in today’s globalized world, when most countries are pursuing close cooperative and partnership-like relations. The nuclear doctrines still support the notion that only nuclear weapons may serve as a “supreme guarantor” of military security, despite the situation in which nuclear deterrence cannot fulfill its role effectively, especially against rogue states, and in view of new threats and dangerous regimes. The non-declared “operational” aspect of nuclear doctrines, which, as a remnant of the old times of nuclear confrontation, still presupposes the presence of hundreds of nuclear targets on the territory of the opponent (primarily between Russian and American forces) serves as an additional destabilizing factor in relations between countries. Throughout the conference it was emphasized that the existing policies of national security and military doctrines do not reflect modern realities and that nuclear deterrence, which still comprises the essence of nuclear doctrines of the nuclear-weapons states, cannot effectively fulfill its assigned role, especially in view of the new common threats posed by non-state actors and dangerous regimes. As outlined in an introductory presentation by Dr. Alexander Nikitin, Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the acute problems to be discussed at the conference included the correlation between the declaratory and the “operational” aspects of the nuclear doctrines, the

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“first use” or “no first use” concepts in the nuclear policies of the nuclear weapons states, the launch on warning issue, the contemporary “crisis” concerning US plans for ballistic missile defense in Europe, and the present status of the nuclear arms control. The discussion of the first topic – on the new threats and challenges to international and national security and on the role of nuclear weapons under present conditions – focused on the situation of the nations that have nuclear weapons at their disposal. In addition to the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are considered to be de facto nuclear power. Beyond these states, about 20 other countries have the technological potential to develop nuclear weapons. Analyzing these issues, Dr. Alexander Khryapin, Senior Research Fellow from the Center for Military Strategic Studies, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, acknowledged that whether or not these countries would use their potential is dependent not only on the political will of their leaders, but on the security environment in the world and in their regions and on the degree to which the nuclear powers exercise self-restraint. Participants agreed that in contrast to the times of the Cold War, nuclear weapons are increasingly presented in official policy documents not as instruments of political containment but as combat weapons which may be physically used to deter the escalation of aggression executed even by conventional means. This situation was considered to be extremely dangerous. Many experts expressed their concern that the most mighty nuclear arsenals (of Russia and the USA) are still, as in times of the Cold War, aimed at each other. This factor, as well as the left-over disposition inherited from the Cold War period of regarding the partner as a potential “nuclear opponent” strongly impedes prospects for achieving true and effective partnership. An interesting and timely analysis was given by Dr. Harold Smith, Distinguished Professor at the Goldman School of Public Policy of the University of California, who presented a comparison of the Republican and Democratic Party policies towards nuclear weapons. His principal assessment was that differences between the parties are diminishing, as evidenced by the 4 January 2007 op-ed by Messrs. Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, which advocated steps toward “A world free of nuclear weapons.” Smith predicted that in matters nuclear, candidates from both sides will move toward multilateralism, legally binding treaties and international verification and enforcement; e.g. sanctions. Professor Vladimir Baranovsky emphasized the new factors connected with nuclear weapons: the appearance of highly accurate weapons, the lowered possibility of regional conflict being escalated to the global level, and the crisis of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. A number of experts commented that in fact non-proliferation policies are subordinate to the status of political relations, the level of confidence between states and their ability to work cooperatively to achieve common goals. The deficit of partnership in many aspects of interactions between countries was acknowledged. Dr. Edward Ifft, Adjunct Professor of Georgetown University, in analyzing several aspects of nuclear deterrence, acknowledged that this phenomenon still exists. Several participants emphasized that nuclear deterrence is no longer suitable in the situation of a declared partnership between the former adversaries (Russia and the USA, first of all), is not able to deter rogue states, poses a threat to international security, and is impotent to counter the most acute modern threats and challenges, particularly proliferation and terrorism.

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Discussing the issue of Russia and US military strategies Major General (ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin, the former director of the principal institute of the rocket forces, also paid attention to the contradictory character of the present nuclear doctrines. He also emphasized the issue of transparency of the nuclear programs which are not open to the public in only two of the Permanent Five: Russia and China. His assessment was that Russia in the coming future will support the level of 2000 nuclear warheads, taking the course of MIRVing the Topol-M warheads. The experts discussing this issue expressed their opinion that Russia and US are interested in a new arms control treaty which should be more transparent. At the same time the opinion was expressed that the proposed enlargement of the INF Treaty to the “global” level does not seem to be possible in the near future. In suggesting a cooperative approach to managing the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship, Dr. Lewis Dunn, Senior Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation, recommended that the USA should address Russian uncertainty about U.S. strategic intentions; that Russia should address U.S. uncertainties about Russia’s commitment to preventing proliferation; and that both should find ways to build habits of cooperation in countering a terrorist WMD attack. A vision of an alternative future US nuclear policy was presented by Joseph Cirincione, Senior Vice President for National Security and International Policy of the Center for American Progress. In a document signed by several authoritative US experts on the Democratic Party side, a vision of such policy was presented. In their view, deep reductions in US and Russian nuclear arsenals are achievable. This would pave the way for the other nuclear states to join such reductions. Dr. Victor Mizin, Counselor, Analytical Division of the Russian Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly, reinforced many of these suggestions in his analysis of how to cure the inherent defects of the NPT. At the same time the discussion of British and French nuclear doctrines indicated that joining in nuclear arms reductions is not necessarily on the agenda of both countries, particularly France. As was confirmed during the discussion of these issues, both countries go along the way of their own national oriented understanding of minimum deterrence. The discussion segued to a presentation by Michael Rühle, Head, Speechwriting and Senior Policy Advisor, Policy Planning Unit of the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, who gave his prognoses of the new NATO strategic concept which would appear rather soon. He paid attention to the fact that the situation in Europe concerning the providing of nuclear security is steadily improving and expressed the opinion that the nuclear doctrines of France, Great Britain and USA are developing in one direction towards the diminishing role of nuclear weapons in the whole defense doctrine. Dr. Jeremy Stocker, Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (London), assessed that the UK-USA relationship was of key importance in determining the UK’s nuclear stance and that while the Soviet threat has been replaced by a less threatening but more uncertain strategic environment, nuclear ties with the US remain as important as ever for the UK. Dr. Petr Romashkin, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, expressed his point of view that the nuclear doctrines of the UK and France, like that of the US, reveal a break from the doctrine and rhetoric of the defensive nuclear deterrence of the Cold War period and a shift to preemptive and coercive use of nuclear weapons.

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Special interest was devoted to the issues of Chinese nuclear preparations. Speaking on this topic, Dr. Jianqun Teng, Deputy Secretary General of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, emphasized that the term deterrence in connection with the national arsenal is not applicable to the understanding adopted among Chinese experts and politicians. He noted that China is not supposed to enlarge the number of warheads but would potentially go along the way of qualitative modernization. At present China consider the security situation around its borders to be the best in the last 50 years. Major General (ret) Pavel Zolotarev, Deputy Director of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies, agreed that Chinese nuclear strategy does not consider nuclear weapons to be battlefield armaments. China’s commitment not to use nuclear weapons first and its proposal to the other nuclear powers to undertake similar obligations deserve support. In analyzing Iran’s nuclear program, Fitzpatrick described the factors that lead to a conclusion that Iran’s nuclear program has a military dimension. Dr. Alexander Pikaev, Department Head of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations, presented the view that neither the sanctions nor the incentives employed by the international community to date have had any impact on Iran’s stance, primarily because Washington has undercut the value of the incentives offered. Representative of the Iranian Embassy in Moscow expressed confidence that Iran has neither the intention nor the capability to construct nuclear weapons and that “minor disputes” should not impede Iranian-IAEA cooperation. The example of North Korea was mostly treated as the successful case of cooperative efforts of the leading states. Dr. Jonathan D. Pollack, Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies at the US Naval War College assess the various strategies pursued to date to forestall North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons, and noted that none of them have yet achieved definitive results. Discussion focused on the loopholes in the nonproliferation regime when a country can benefit from all the privileges of being within the NPT regime and then withdraw without punishment. The existence of the suspected nuclear arsenal in Israel, and the creation of arsenals by India and Pakistan outside the limitations of the NPT at present pose even more challenges to the NPT regime. Dr. Yair Evron, Professor of International Relations at Tel Aviv University, assessed that while Israel’s ambiguous nuclear posture signals self restraint and caution, the policy has not in fact deterred armed violence against the state, and it was only a secondary factor in inducing Arab regimes to seek peace. Dr. Rajesh M. Basrur, associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University Singapore, explained that while India’s rapidly growing international profile has raised concerns about the potential expansion of its nuclear capabilities. Indian strategic culture is minimalistic, the product of decades of slow growth and a firmly grounded policy of non-deployment. Pakistan’s ambassador to Russia also stressed the minimum deterrence underpinning of his country’s nuclear forces. Some experts lamented that “third states” are being presented with new incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. For instance, for many countries the US military campaign in Iraq served as an additional proof that only nuclear weapons may provide real security. The comment was made, for example, that “if Saddam Hussein really had nuclear weapons at his disposal Washington would not dare to intervene.” Hence the acute need for creating “security conditions” and collective security systems, including nuclear-weapon-free zones, if possible, in the most uneasy regions of the world. In this respect, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Vadim Grechaninov, President of the Atlantic Rada of

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Ukraine, argued that Ukraine’s disarmament experience can serve as a positive example for the world today.

Acknowledgments The workshop directors appreciate the contributions to the discussion of all the participants, including those not named above. Credit is due the NATO officials and staff who lent support, particularly Fernando Carvalho Rodrigues, Programme Director for Human and Societal Dynamics of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, and Elizabeth Cowan, program assistant. Special gratitude is extended to Adelina Akhmentzyanova, Eugenia Andryushina, Eva Kharitonova, Oksana Novikova, Varvara Sinitsina, Yulia Starilova, and Bejanishvili Zurab for their contributions in Moscow toward the organization of the conference, and for their translation and editing of chapters of this book. We also wish to thank Erin Blankenship and Rachel Yemini in London for their skillful copy-editing and lay-out assistance in the preparation of this book. Above all, Alexander Nikitin deserves acknowledgment for inspiring the workshop and for providing strategic direction and organizational advice before, during and after the proceedings. Sergey Oznobishchev and Mark Fitzpatrick Workshop Co-Directors

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Contents Preface Sergey Oznobishchev and Mark Fitzpatrick

v

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World Alexander Khyrapin

1

A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation Harold Smith Understanding Deterrence Edward Ifft Cooperative Security Management: Toward a New Approach for Managing the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship Lewis A. Dunn Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy Joseph Cirincione The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects” of the Nonproliferation Regime Victor Mizin

7 16

25 30

39

NATO’s Future Nuclear Doctrine: Factors Shaping a Decision Michael Rűhle

58

British Nuclear Strategy Jeremy Stocker

64

Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective Petr Romashkin

70

A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy Jianqun Teng

79

Modern Nuclear Strategy of China Pavel Zolotarev

87

Iranian Nuclear Program – Peaceful or Military Goals? Mark Fitzpatrick

92

Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution Alexander Pikaev

99

Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program Jonathan D. Pollack

113

Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons Yair Evron

121

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India’s Nuclear Arsenal: Prospects for Enlargement Rajesh M. Basrur

129

Non-Nuclear Ukraine and Its Nuclear Security Vadim Grechaninov

138

The Present and the Future of Nuclear Doctrines Alexander Nikitin and Sergey Oznobishchev

144

Author Index

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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-1

1

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World Alexander KHYRAPIN1

Abstract. Deterrence policy was officially acknowledged as a constituent part of national policy after the advent of nuclear weapons and therein became a main instrument of military confrontation. The role of nuclear weapons as a means of deterring aggression will be preserved for the foreseeable future. Deterrence as the basis for strategic stability, however, may be endangered by various military developments, including by: the creation of the global anti ballistic missile system; attempts to reach strategic military dominance by re-equipping ballistic missiles with conventional warheads and retaining a nuclear potential; the possible lifting of restrictions on the deployment of weapons in outer space and the creation of military bases in zones of so-FDOOHG³YLWDOLQWHUHVWV´

The strategy of deterrence Throughout the centuries-old existence of the intergovernmental relations, the deterrence of aggression has been one of the key elements of DVWDWH¶VQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\ SROLF\  $W WKH VDPH WLPH ³GHWHUUHQFH SROLF\´ ZDV RIILFLDOO\ DFNQRZOHGJHG DV D FRQVWLWXHQWSDUWRIWKHVWDWH¶VQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\SROLF\RQO\ZKHQQXFOHDUZHDSRQVKDG been created and thus became a main instrument of military confrontation. The term ³GHWHUUHQFH´LWVHOIWRRNRQVSHFLDOVLJQLILFDQFHDVZHOODVLWZDVQRZQHZO\DWWDFKHGWR nuclear scenarios. In time nuclear deterrence became the basis for strategic deterrence of a potential aggressor from unleashing war. When understood as force containment, nuclear deterrence aims to convince the enemy that aggression lacks any prospects in view of the consequences that such military actions may entail. Hence the first key determinant of deterrence is the FDWHJRU\ RI ³LQWLPLGDWLRQ´ ZKLFK SUHVXSSRVHV WR IULJKWHQ WKH PLOLWDU\-political leadership of the potential aggressor state with the consequences of the retaliation. In WKLVOLJKWVRPHDQDO\VWVLQWHUSUHWWKHWHUP³GHWHUUHQFH´DV³GLVVXDVLRQWKURXJKIHDU´ The intimidation is based on the threat of retaliation, i.e. the guaranteed punishment of a certain scale. The implementation of the retaliation threat suggests that certain consequences for the aggressor state will follow. As the numerous examples of armed conflicts including both world wars show, consequences in a broad sense may be of various character and scale ± from moral-political deprecation and economic sanctions imposed by the international community, up to heavy territorial, economic and demographic losses including the disintegration of the state or significant limitation of its sovereignty. 1

Leading Research Fellow, Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces.

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A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World

The consequences of deterring the aggressor are usually associated with the FRQFHSWRI³GDPDJH´PDLQO\XQGHUVWRRGDVSK\VLFDOORVVHVRILQGXVWULDOGHPRJUDSKLF and military capacities that the aggressor would suffer as a result of the retaliatory actions of the opposite party. Since the very moment of its formulation the category of ³GDPDJH´ KDV EHHQ RYHUWO\ RU GLVFUHHWO\ DFNQRZOHGJHG E\ DOO H[SHUWV DV WKH EDVLV RI deterrence. At WKH VDPH WLPH RQO\ WKH GDPDJH ZKLFK LQ YLHZ RI WKH DJJUHVVRU¶V political-military leadership, implies losses incommensurable with the benefits can keep the adversary from direct military aggression. The level of inflicted damage which exceeds the level RI ³DFFHSWDELOLW\´ GHILQHG E\ WKH HQHP\ KLPVHOI LV FDOOHG ³GHWHUUHQWGDPDJH´LQWKHGHWHUUHQFHWKHRU\7KHXSSHUOLPLWRIWKHGHWHUUHQWGDPDJHLV ³XQDFFHSWDEOHGDPDJH´LQLWVFODVVLFDOPHDQLQJ 7KHUHIRUH WKH KLHUDUFKLFDO FKDLQ RI ³LQWLPLGDWLRQ ± retaliation threat ± FRQVHTXHQFHVGHWHUUHQWGDPDJH ´SURYLGHVWKHJURXQGIRUQXFOHDUGHWHUUHQFH

Nuclear deterrence in the world It should be emphasized that for over 60 years of its existence nuclear weaponry has played an important role in preventing regional and large-sale wars in the first place, as well as local conflicts between the nuclear powers and the coalitions they formed ± the resolution of such conflict situations as the Taiwan (1954 and 1958), Berlin (1961), and Cuban (1962) crises at the climax of the military-political and ideological confrontation between the two world systems being glaring examples. Fortunately, each of these crises ended peacefully and at the same time helped to create the mutual deterrence system and the conceptual framework of nuclear security. However, at that time more than 200 local wars and armed conflicts which included the direct participation of nuclear states were unleashed: for example, the USA and their NATO allies took part in the conflicts in Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq and the Soviet Union took part in the war in Afghanistan. This shows that the existence of nuclear weapons cannot deter all armed conflicts, let alone terrorist attacks. Therefore the main purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the escalation of conventional wars, meaning the development of local conflicts into regional, regional into large-scale, and large-scale into nuclear wars. Today there are five states which officially possess nuclear weapons de jure: Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France and China. India and Pakistan have acknowledged military nuclear programs. Israel neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons and North Korea has claimed to have obtained such weapons. According to the IAEA another 20 states possess the potential to create nuclear weapons but owing to different reasons have refrained from it so far. For some of them making the nuclear choice is only a question of political will, not of technological impediments. Countries have varying perspectives regarding their nuclear deterrent. The USA, Great Britain and France, as both nuclear powers and NATO member states, follow the coalition military strategy including nuclear strategy, though their national nuclear strategies diverge on certain positions. For example, NATO coalition strategy views QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DV WKH ³H[WUHPH LQVWUXPHQW´ ODVW UHVHUYH  ZKHUHDV $PHULFD¶V RZQ QXFOHDU VWUDWHJ\ GRHV QRW UHJDUG QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DV WKH ³H[WUHPH LQVWUXPHQW´ DV LW DLPVWR³FUHDWHWKHKLJKHVWSRVVLEOH XQFHUWDLQW\´DERXWWKHSRWHQWLDOSHULRGDQGVFDOHRI nuclear weapons use against the enemy.

A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World

3

Interestingly, in contrast to the Cold War period, based on its economic and military capacities the United States today has rather shifted its emphasis from nuclear ZHDSRQVDQGEURDGHQHGWKHQRWLRQRI³WULDG´7KLVLQFOXGHVFRQYHQWLRQDOVWULNHIRUFHV (high-precision weapons), the ABM system, and flexible infrastructure which guarantee a possible quick build-up of operatively deployed nuclear forces. That being said, the United States does not rule out the possibility of delivering pre-emptive nuclear strikes against the adversary states possessing weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological or nuclear). It should be noted that in accordance with the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (2002), both Russia and the United States are to reduce their strategic offensive arms by 2012 to 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads. With regard to these reductions, however, the American side has implied that the agreemHQW SHUWDLQV RQO\ ³RSHUDWLYHO\ GHSOR\HG´ QXFOHDU ZDUKHDGV WKXV reserving the opportunity to build up its nuclear forces at any time. Other nuclear states have their own views of nuclear weapons and deterrence. The Chinese military-political leadership sees its nuclear weapons as the basic instrument to deter any attempts of military force pressure upon the state. India and Pakistan regard their nuclear weapons not only as the means of defense policy in contemporary conditions, but also as an indicator of high-tech development and status in the international relations system. The history of the nuclear deterrence in intergovernmental relations supports the viewpoint of many states (primarily the developing countries) that nuclear weaponry is one of the most effective instruments to protect oneself from the aggression of a more developed adversary. It seems that this view on the role of nuclear weapons in the overall system of international relations and national security will last for a long time. Besides, GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV¶ LQWHUHVW LQ DFTXLULQJ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DQG PHDQV RI delivery has been heated by the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, cases which clearly showed them that no state outside of NATO can feel safe if in confrontation with the western powers. As a result there are a number of states which strive to possess nuclear weapons production technology as an effective instrument to deter a more powerful adversary even when the opposing parties have significantly asymmetric capacities. It should be stressed once again that there are approximately 20 states today which have the potential to develop nuclear weapons and this number will only grow. There are several reasons underlying the desire to possess nuclear weapons: Strengthening national (military) security; Enhancing national status and prestige; Protecting national freedom of action.

5XVVLD¶VSRVLWLRQ The position of the Russian Federation concerning the role of nuclear weapons in the international relations system is close to the viewpoints of other nuclear powers. In accordance with its military doctrine Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in retaliation against nuclear or any other WMD attack as well as in response to largescale conventional aggression if the situation is critical for the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies. The nuclear de-escalation of unleashed aggression is an extreme and forced measure and may be executed through nuclear strikes

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appropriate to the existing situation. The main aim of such strikes is to coerce the enemy to stop the war at the earliest possible stage. It should be stressed that Russia had further restrained its actions with the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT except for the cases when Russia, its allies or states with shared security responsibilities are attacked or if the aggression is launched in alliance with a nuclearweapon state. Russia steadily adheres to the principles set in the international agreements in the sphere of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. In particular Russia has completely fulfilled its commitments within the INF Treaty as well as the SORT Treaty. It is certain that by 2012 Russia will reach the quantitative level of nuclear warheads defined by the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty. However the treaty, which expires on December 5, 2009, does not provide any verificatioQPHFKDQLVPVDVLWLVDQ³DJUHHPHQWRILQWHQWLRQV´SHUVH:LWKWKLVLQPLQG it is necessary to carry on negotiations with the USA on a new agreement in the sphere of strategic weapons reduction that is supported by an effective verification mechanism. Such a new treaty should be legally binding and rest upon the basic principles of the SORT Treaty. It is necessary to stress once again that nuclear deterrence is based on the ides of assured possibility and capability to cause unacceptable (deterrent) damage to an aggressor through retaliation strikes of Russian forces, i.e. the threat of punishment which in fact keeps the potential enemy from attacking Russia and its allies for any rational political, military and economic reasons. The understanding of the disastrous consequences of the use of nuclear weaponry strengthens its role as a political instrument of prevention regional (large-scale) wars in the first place. However, nuclear weapons should be also viewed as the military means to destroy an enemy if the measures of deterrence turn out to be insufficient. Thus it seems that the main functions of nuclear weapons which determine its role and place in the strategic deterrence system are the following: Political function ± deterring the aggressor (state or coalition of states) from attempting to solve emerging differences by military means through the threat of inevitable punishment; Military function ± disruption or de-escalation of the unleashed aggression and decisive defeat of the enemy through the use of nuclear weapons. $IHZZRUGVDERXWWKHDWWHPSWVXQGHUWKHVORJDQRIµQXFOHDUULVNUHGXFWLRQ¶ZKLFK certain experts have been undertaking recently in order to revise the role of nuclear weapons in the Russian military security system, and hence change the essence of nuclear deterrence based on the threat of mutually assured destruction in the Russian$PHULFDQ³FHQWUDOQXFOHDUFRQIURQWDWLRQ´WKH PDLQGUDZEDFNRIVXFKDWWHPSWVLVWKDW they perceive nuclear deterrence as separate from strategic deterrence as it is. Suggested measures such as reducing the forces on duty, slowing down the build-up of high-alert elements of nuclear forces, and transparency about regions of SSBN patrolling can significantly increase the vulnerability of Russian nuclear forces against a sudden conventional, high-precision attack, especially considering the creation of the American global ABM system. After such a strike has been delivered, Russian nuclear forces may become incapable of fulfilling their tasks and thus fail to ensure 5XVVLD¶V nuclear deterrence capability. Therefore before the specific measures of nuclear risk reduction can be discussed it is necessary to address the whole spectrum of issues regarding the strategic deterrence maintenance, not only in the nuclear sphere but also

A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World

5

in the field of general-purpose forces where the USA, let alone NATO, has certain predominance. It seems that before the revision of the essence of nuclear deterrence and nuclear risk reductions can be discussed it is necessary to eliminate a whole complex of differences and problems in the system of international and bilateral security. In order to reduce nuclear risks several urgent measures should be taken, in particular the commitment to: Solve emerging international problems only through political-diplomatic measures on the basis of the corresponding UN Security Council resolutions. The use of military force should be regarded as an extreme measure which can only be sanctioned by the UN Security Council and include a peacekeeping part; Ban the deployment of nuclear weapons and its carriers on the territory of new NATO-members as well as the use of the nuclear infrastructure created in the former Soviet republics and the former members of the Warsaw Treaty; Prevent (prohibit) the deployment of strategic ABM attack systems outside the national territories of the states building them; Take measures aimed at the practical reduction of strategic offensive arms and OLTXLGDWLRQRIWKH³UHWXUQSRWHQWLDO´RQWhe common basis with the USA; Involve other nuclear powers into the common process of fulfillment Article 6 of the NPT through nuclear weapons reduction and comprehensive disarmament; Sign new interrelated international agreements in the sphere of strategic offensive (both nuclear and non-nuclear) and defensive systems, including the ABM systems; Prohibit any opportunity of arms deployment in outer space, to fix permanently the weapons-free status of outer space; and Restrict the creation and deployment of high-precision long-range conventional systems as well as weapons based on newly developed technology. 5XVVLDLVDOVRFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHQH[WJHQHUDWLRQ³PLQLDWXUH´ nuclear warheads and re-equipment of strategic nuclear carriers with conventional warheads. The claims that such means increase the effectiveness of the war against terrorism are based on one-sided evaluations and do not stand up to critical analysis. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the appearance of such weapons would lower the nuclear threshold and provoke the use of nuclear weapons. It should be also stressed that the role of nuclear weapons as the ultimate means of deterring aggression will hold out for a foreseeable perspective. However any steps attempting to restrict the potential capabilities oI RWKHU VWDWHV¶ VWUDWHJLF GHWHUUHQW systems would immediately lead to the collapse of the guaranteed security principles not only of the individual states but also of the whole world. In the first place such steps are as follows:

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A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World

Creation of the global ABM system which infringes upon the military security of other countries; Attempts to achieve military dominance in the sphere of strategic weapons by reequipping some of the ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads and building up capabilities for nuclear reconstitution; Attempts to lift any restrictions on the deployment of weapons in outer space; and &UHDWLRQRIPLOLWDU\EDVHVLQWKH]RQHVRIWKHVRFDOOHG³YLWDOLQWHUHVWV´ Hopefully this approach to solving global problems will exhaust itself in the near future as no global challenge can be solved outside a multilateral framework and without considering the interests of all parties. In conclusion ,as long as nuclear weaponry exists and the possibility of using it in order to achieve military-political aims persists, and in the absence of a collective security system with an effective verification mechanism, Russia will continue to regard its nuclear weapons as the chief factor of deterrence and essential to maintaining stability in the world.

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-7

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A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-proliferation Harold Smith

1

Abstract. The use of nuclear weapons by terrorists against urban targets is generally agreed to be the most formidable threat faced by the United States today. Yet, there is remarkably little discussion of the threat in the presidential campaigns, and for good reason: one doesn’t win elections by frightening the voters – better to concentrate on domestic issues such as the economy or medical insurance or ethanol. Nonetheless, the populace is entitled to know what the candidates intend to do to protect the country from so formidable a threat. Insight can be found by studying the writings of key advisors on the general issue and applying their thoughts to programs that must be considered by the next administration, whether Republican or Democrat. In this case, modernization of the nuclear arsenal and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty provide touchstones that separate the philosophical differences on these issues.

A Moving Target is Hard to Hit There is nothing like a long American presidential campaign, particularly as a divisive eight-year administration comes to an end, to show that Woody Allen was right: the future ain’t what it used to be.2 Following 9/11, the Bush Administration adapted a muscular, tightly controlled, unilateral approach to many areas, certainly to the area of non-proliferation. Over the years, however, the strong-man approach has steadily morphed into a more diplomatic, multi-lateral willingness to negotiate key areas of concern. For example, a few years ago North Korea was part of the “axis of evil” whose leader was a “tyrant”. This past year, however, Shapton in the New York Times, which has been no admirer of the Bush policy, summarized the approach to North Korea with a headline on October 8, “NK test – from regime collapse to multi-lateral negotiation”, and Steven Lee Myers, also of the Times, began an article on October 7, “Mr. Bush, who spent most of his presidency with a swaggering, go-it-alone style, has increasingly turned to China…”. Even more recently, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that Iran, also a member of the “axis of evil”, discontinued its nuclear weapon program in 2003. Evidently, Iran is no longer a proliferator of nuclear weapons, which is truly a major change in American policy on non-

1 Distinguished Visiting Scholar and Professor, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA; formerly Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Programs, 1993-1998 2 Attributed

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H. Smith / A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation

proliferation. One concludes that it is no easy matter to define a constant policy regarding non-proliferation in “[T]these most brisk and giddy-paced times”.3 If it is difficult to ascertain the changing positions of an incumbent administration, how much more so is the prediction of a policy of a dozen or so presidential candidates, all of whom are trying to avoid taking any position on any matter so far in advance of the actual election? Despite the cacophony, the answer is not as difficult as the question implies. First of all, the candidates are focused on domestic issues of interest to the primary election in the particular state at hand - Iowa at the time of this writing. Debate of foreign policy, including non-proliferation, is limited to the war in Iraq, a solution to the Palestinian problem, or the (now allegedly defunct) Iranian nuclear weapon program. All of these pale when compared to health care, immigration, trade balances, or farm policy, particularly in Iowa where ethanol – not a nuclear weapon – is the issue of choice. It is a near certainty that the candidates themselves, whether Republican or Democrat, will shed little light on their particular approach to nonproliferation.4

The Role of Advisors in Determining Non-Proliferation Policy The candidates may be evasive on such issues, but the advisors are certainly not, and it would not be unusual for a newly elected president to turn to respected and experienced (and published) advisors during the transition to and beginning of a new administration, much as President Bush supposedly relied on (now) Secretary Rice in forming his own foreign policy. The same could be said for most, perhaps all, of the recent presidents. If one wishes to gauge the policy of either party regarding a subject as arcane as nonproliferation, one should look to the published statements of presumably trusted advisors rather than statements of candidates themselves during an election campaign. One does not have to look far. Just as the candidates were beginning their campaigns at the beginning of 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an Op-ed with the strongest and most bipartisan statement on nuclear weapons that one can imagine. George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, experienced, respected, and trusted advisors, published an article entitled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”.5 It would be difficult to find four more qualified individuals to speak on the subject. Collectively, they represent both parties and have experience dating at least to the Reagan Administration as heads of the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, and the Senate Armed Services Committee. While one could question whether their position is a policy or a hope – as John Deutch6 and Harold Brown7 have 3

William Shakespeare, “Twelfth-Night” II, iv, 6. John Steinbruner and Nancy Gallagher provide an interesting twist to this conclusion. As a result of their polling of Russian and American citizens, they conclude “that if future U.S. and Russian leaders wanted to adopt cooperative nuclear risk reduction measures that match the changed circumstances of global security, their citizens would be favorably disposed.” Arms Control Today, January/February 2008. 5 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007. 6 Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” Wall Street Journal, 10 November 2007. Both are respected senior advisors although their impressive credentials are based primarily on Democratic administrations. 7 Harold Brown, “New Nuclear Realities,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2007-08. (Former Secretary of Defense) Brown takes a particularly strong position against Shultz, et. al, by noting that they have the proposition backwards. “[A] peaceful and orderly world is a prerequisite for the abolition of nuclear weapons”; not the other way around. 4

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done, their recommendations on how to proceed to a world without nuclear weapons represent a forthright statement of non-proliferation policy as it might apply to the next administration, whether Republican or Democrat. Furthermore, many of their recommendations, but not all, have been espoused by the Bush Administration, the notable exceptions being ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and elimination of “short-ranged nuclear weapons designed to be forward deployed”.8 There are, however, notable absences in their recommendations; namely, whether to proceed with deployment of a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and the possible need to modify the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the face of new weapon states beyond the P-5 as well as an American willingness to provide nuclear technology to India.9 In short, to the extent that the elected candidate is willing to follow the recommendations of such senior advisors, there will be considerable unanimity between the parties, but it will not be total. Partisan politics, despite the old adage, will not end at the water’s edge.10 In this regard, the Reliable Replacement Warhead and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty offer interesting contrasts between the parties.

The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) as a Touchstone The Bush Administration has made a strong case, using a clear-eyed analysis of the current American arsenal, for the design, development, and deployment of a new nuclear weapon, the RRW. Democratic members of Congress and their advisors are not against clear-eyed analysis, nor do they dispute the technical basis for the RRW concept, but they are strongly against proceeding to deployment at this time. The arguments for and against this program could well be a harbinger of the differences that will separate the parties regarding non-proliferation after the next president is inaugurated in January of 2009. Its omission in the bi-partisan opinion piece by Shultz, et al., underscores a possible significant difference regarding non-proliferation between the parties.11 The technical arguments; i.e., the facts The technical arguments in favor of deployment of the RRW, which are not in dispute, are similar to those associated with the common household decision to buy a new car even though the old car is operating satisfactorily. Significant improvements are possible, many of which will enhance non-proliferation (or operation, in the case of the current automobile): •

Reliability can be improved and, therefore, the size of the arsenal can be reduced.

8 Shultz et al. ,ibid. If the quoted statement were implemented, American nuclear weapons, under the control of NATO and based in Europe, would be eliminated, which has been an untouchable subject in American foreign policy for decades, despite Russian objections since the Warsaw Pact was dissolved and its weapons returned to Russia. 9 James E. Goodby, “Nuclear Nonproliferation’s Missing Link,” The Brookings Institution, Global Politics, 1 December 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/goodby/20061201.htm. 10 According to David Halberstam, the adage is nothing more than a myth: The Coldest Winter, America and the Korean War, page 171, Hyperion, 2007. 11 Shultz et. al. ,ibid.

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H. Smith / A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation

• •

•

•

Security of the new weapon can be enhanced; thereby further decreasing the likelihood that a stolen weapon could be detonated should it fall into the hands of terrorists. The new weapon will be certifiable without testing, an assertion that will surely be debated sometime in the future but not for the moment. It is presumed, although it is by no means certain, that the old weapons, the socalled legacy arsenal, will eventually require testing. Performance will not be enhanced. The Administration has gone to considerable effort to make this point. The RRW is a strict replacement; it does not add nuclear capability and, therefore, in the opinion of the administration should not be viewed as proliferation. Although not related to non-proliferation, it should be noted for completeness that the safety and manufacturability will be increased and, in the long run, costs will be reduced.

Although there is room for disagreement on these issues, they will not determine the outcome of the debate on deployment; they merely set the stage for the debate, much as a legal brief tries to establish the “facts of the matter” with a series of sentences beginning with “whereas”. The Bush position and, presumably, that of a succeeding Republican president The present Republican administration does not rest its case simply on the technical arguments; it goes further by noting that deployment of the RRW will have no effect with regard to proliferation on the players of interest: •

• • •

The established nuclear powers, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China, the so-called P-5, see their reliance on nuclear deterrence as unaffected by the modernity or lack thereof of the American stockpile. The same could be said for the more recent nuclear powers, who entered the scene following the 1967 signing of the NPT; viz., Israel, India, and Pakistan. Even those nations that may be on the threshold of recognition as nuclear powers, North Korea and Iran, will not based their decision to cross the threshold on whether the US modernizes its arsenal. Most importantly, the non-state players, the terrorists, who seemingly would not hesitate to explode a nuclear weapon to further their cause, do not have a nation to lose, and will not be deterred by the nuclear weapons of the nuclear powers – whether modernized or not.

In short, the current Republican position is that no one who counts in the nuclear world cares whether the US modernizes or not and, therefore, the decision should be limited to the technical and economic advantages to the US. Simply put, the international community is not a factor, and the country should get on with it.

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The presumed position of a Democratic president regarding RRW Except for the conclusion, most Democratic advisors agree with the administration’s arguments. Where they part company is the size and importance of the international audience watching to see if the new weapon is to be deployed. Rather than just the nuclear powers and non-state terrorists, the Democrats see a much larger audience composed of the vast majority of non-nuclear states that have conformed to the conditions of the NPT.12 These nations have decided against the development of nuclear weapons – indeed, some have cancelled such programs or, in the case of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, have returned their nuclear weapons to the country of origin. The Democrats argue that the broader audience did so for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the assumption that the United States and the other members of the P-5 would act in accordance with Article Six of the NPT; that they would, over time, reduce and, eventually, eliminate nuclear weapons. Deployment of RRW would, in the eyes of these conforming nations, suggest otherwise. They will conclude, according to the Democratic advisors, that the United States, contrary to the NPT, intends to have a nuclear arsenal for the indefinite future; i.e., that the vision of a road to eventual world-wide nuclear disarmament is a mirage and that, therefore, they should reconsider their obligations under the treaty. Proliferation would, presumably, follow. There are also practical matters, such as time and money, which should be considered in addition to the softer issue of international psychology. The question of money, that most practical of matters, is of course, always with us, but especially so at a time, or so the Democrats will argue, when federal deficits are both large and fastrising and when the (Democratically controlled) Congress cannot find a way to increase taxes – as witnessed by its inability to fund the changes in the Alternative Minimum Tax. As a result many programs will be postponed or curtailed by the next administration. RRW will be a prime target for such postponement, thereby avoiding the more contentious questions associated with proliferation of nuclear weapons. Fiscal conservativeness will be abetted, in this case, by the simple question: why now? By all accounts, the Stockpile Sustainment Program (SSP), while expensive but probably less so than the early years of RRW, is proceeding satisfactorily. The directors of the weapons laboratories (Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia) continue to certify that the present arsenal is safe, secure, and reliable. Furthermore, they see no need for nuclear testing at the present time and are sustained in this judgment by reviews by multi-disciplined, prestigious advisory boards such as the Defense Science Board and the JASONS. Even nature seems to be in agreement: the aging of plutonium, the central ingredient of American weapons, has been studied intensively and found to be surprisingly resilient.13 In short, there is no need for a deployment decision at this time; hence, the Democratic advisors are clear: postpone the deployment.

12

Raymond Jeanloz, “Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation,” Science 316, 1541 (2007) with supporting material, including an extensive bibliography, at www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full316/5831/1541/DCI 13 NNSA NEWS, “Studies Show Plutonium Degradation in U. S. Nuclear Weapons Will Not Effect Reliability Soon,” National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, Press Release on 29 November 2006

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The CTBT Adds a New Wrinkle; Viz., “Advise and Consent” of the Senate Whereas the RRW was conspicuous by its absence in the recommendations by Shultz, et al.,14 discussion of the CTBT merited one of the longest and most substantive paragraphs in the article, which suggests that there was little disagreement between the prestigious advisors who were drawn from both parties.15 The candidates, themselves, as is to be expected, have been relatively silent on ratification of the CTBT, or so the absence of reporting on the issue would have us believe.16 The conservative Republican senators are, however, another and important matter. They have resisted ratification since the Clinton Administration and have remained unmoved by either the report by General Shalikashvili in 200117 or that of the National Academy of Science in 2002.18 Because of its unique constitutional powers, the Senate, thereby, becomes a useful metric in seeking differences between the parties in foreign policy as it pertains to non-proliferation. Because one-third of the US Senate can reject ratification of a treaty, it really does not matter what the candidates think, let alone say, or what their advisors advise. Every candidate from both parties realizes that the conservative arm of the Senate will probably be able to block ratification, and therefore, there is little practical value in expending election potential or political capital on this issue. The CTBT will, as a result, probably remain in the Senate where there are stark differences among the members. These will have little impact on the presidential campaigns but are worth exploring for the insight they give into the philosophical differences between the parties regarding non-proliferation. In general, the differences can be characterized by the old metaphor of a glass half full or half empty. The Republican senators ask what’s to be gained by ratifying the treaty, and the Democrats ask what’s to be lost. Philosophically, the differences are similar to those that divided the house with respect to the RRW; i.e., the Republicans want to see tangible benefits and measure those benefits against risks and without regard to the opinions of the international community. The Democrats are not against risk/benefit analysis but want to consider less tangible benefits such as those sometimes captured by the (forever undefined) expression of “world opinion”. Some differences, such as the conservative fear that any treaty is an unacceptable invasion of national sovereignty or the liberal desire for international control or outright elimination of nuclear weapons can be set aside as debatable visions of the future, but other differences are more immediate, deserve scrutiny, and hopefully will be debated even though minority blockage seems the most likely outcome. These fall into the categories of [1] whether nuclear tests can be reliably detected, [2] if detected what can 14

Shultz et. al. ,ibid. The basis for the wide agreement is summarized in the comprehensive paper prepared by Professor Jeanloz for the second conference on "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons" held at Stanford University in October 2007, a meeting that resulted in a second Op-ed by the same authors in the WSJ on 15 January 2008, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World" 16 The strongest reporting on the matter has been by Zachary Hosford in Arms Control Today (December 2007) “The CTBT …has drawn little attention from the Republicans but widespread support from the Democratic candidates.” 17 J. M. Shalikashvili (2001) Letter to the President and Report on the Findings and Recommendations Concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/ctbt_report.html 18 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) (2002) Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 84 pp 15

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be done about the violation, and [3] what impact the absence of nuclear testing may have on the reliability of the future arsenals. Is the technology up to the task? Most Democratic senators were convinced in 1999 that the available systems were adequate to detect and verify underground nuclear explosions of any useful magnitude anywhere in the world, and the capability has improved markedly since that time. As Professor Jeanloz points out, seismic networks to be available by 2009 can detect accurately the time of release of energy as low as 0.1 – 0.5 KT with good geographical accuracy and can distinguish between explosions, earthquakes, and implosions such as collapse of a mine or the sinking of the Kursk. Furthermore, what seismic networks cannot do, namely distinguish between a nuclear explosion and a large conventional one, can be done through radiochemical means, which have been vastly improved since the first Soviet test was detected by analysis of airborne debris off the coast of China in 1949. In fact, the two approaches are nicely complementary: radiochemistry provides the requisite information about the type of explosion,19 nuclear or non-nuclear, but with poor resolution of time and place; seismic nets provide the opposite. To this must be added the enormous expansion and availability of satellite photography, both classified and unclassified, which makes any activity on the ground related to nuclear testing difficult to hide – especially if seismology provides the archival clue of when and where to look. In short, technology is up to the task; detection of a test of a nuclear weapon should be viewed by one and all as highly likely. So what? The problem, as seen from the Republican side of the aisle, is not whether a nuclear test can be detected. That’s granted, as is the intrinsic value of the intelligence gained from measuring various aspects of a nuclear test. The problem, rather, is what to do about the detected test, aside from the intelligence gained there from. The Republicans will cite the successful international detection of tests by India, Pakistan, and North Korea and will ask, rhetorically, what was the effect of the treaty, did the known ability to detect deter, or even impede, these nuclear programs; what actions were taken as a result of the detection; and given these most recent tests, what would deter future tests by the three countries or by other currently non-nuclear countries. In short, what benefits accrue to the United States or any established nation, for that matter, from a treaty that bans testing, when those who want to test, announce that they intend to test, test, and nothing happens? There are no consequences. The Republicans will call this “realism” and the Democrats will call it “cynicism”. They will counter that an international treaty, where verification is essentially guaranteed, provides a clear statement that the total number of nuclear weapons and the number of nations possessing weapons and that there should be no major improvements to weapons that exist. The argument will be the classic debate between school children where every “why” is answered with a “why not”? The question of “so what” will add rhetoric to the debate, but it will not add substance.

19

For example, a xenon-isotope anomaly, related to the North Korean test, was detected in Canada fifteen days after the event; see Jeanloz.

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Impact on established nuclear arsenals Of far more substance would be a debate on whether testing is essential to maintaining the reliability and safety of the American arsenal, which was designed for high performance (high yield to weight ratio) at a time when it was assumed that testing would continue indefinitely.20 The positions of the two parties, in this case, will show a difference in degree – not in kind. There is no serious doubt within the parties that, for the time being, the United States must maintain a reliable, safe, and secure nuclear arsenal, and any development that compromises its retaliatory nuclear threat must be addressed, and addressed urgently and with highest priority. Furthermore, both parties will agree that if testing is required to ensure the nuclear deterrent, so be it; the US will test. The difference will be in the desired sequencing of events leading the test. The Democrats will argue that the treaty specifically allows a states-party to withdraw from the (ratified) treaty if it judges that testing is necessary to its national interest. Hence, the Democratic call will be: ratify now and withdraw later, if necessary. The conservative Republican senators will not accept this. They will note that international political forces will be so strong and so varied and that the scientific need to test will be so arcane that no president will have the political courage or capital to withdraw from the treaty. Hence, the Republican call will be: do not ratify in order to preserve a real option to test – not a paper option that realistically cannot be exercised. Given the willingness of the present Bush Administration to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM treaty, the Democrats will have the better of the argument – but the Republicans will have the votes; i.e., the required number of votes to block ratification.

Conclusions The quiet debate on non-proliferation among the advisors of both parties, which is taking place far from the hustings and the candidates, and the recent willingness of the Bush Administration to seek international agreement through negotiation, including multi-lateral negotiation, suggests that the degree of difference regarding nonproliferation between the parties will be not be a major factor in the forthcoming presidential race. In forming policy, the Democrats will consider the broader international community, while the Republicans will rely more on maintaining a stronger, unilateral position, but the differences will be small, especially when compared to the early years of the present administration. Deployment of the Reliable Replacement Warhead serves as a touchstone for this prediction. As far as non-proliferation is concerned, the (presumably Democratically controlled) Congress and a Democratic president will consider the effect of deployment on the large majority of signers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty rather than just the present nuclear powers or terrorists. They will opt for postponement. A Republican president may take the narrower view and be in favor of deployment, but it is difficult 20 The automotive metaphor which was applied above to the case of the RRW will be extended during the debates to the arguments over the CTBT in the sense that high performance automobiles (and warheads) need more maintenance and testing than more ordinary cars (and warheads). The comparison is a useful pedagogical tool but its usefulness stops there. Cars that are used continually and nuclear warheads that (so far) have seen no use have very little in common.

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to see how the new president could convince the congress to provide the funds. In either case, however, consideration of non-proliferation will be secondary: the normal bureaucratic processes will prevail; i.e., the absence of urgency and fiscal reality will lead to the easy road of postponement. Debate regarding ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will bring out the same points as those made with regard to the RRW. Neither will spark debate among the candidates but each will receive significant attention from presidential advisors where the Democratic advisors will insist on the importance of international standing and the Republican advisors will look for (and fail to find) more tangible reasons. Both programs will languish in the coming administration, but for different reasons: RRW deployment is easily postponed and CTBT ratification will be blocked by a minority of the Senate. Should there be a nuclear 9/11, or if the public suddenly becomes convinced that there is a clear and present danger of nuclear terrorism, all bets are off. At that point, all aspects of proliferation of nuclear weapons will be center-stage, and the absence of presidential statements during the campaign, including the long range aspects of nonproliferation such as RRW and CTBT, will be overlooked. The world will have entered a new era.

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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-16

Understanding Deterrence Edward IFFT1 Abstract. Nuclear deterrence continues to be an important concept in international relations, despite the dramatic changes since the Cold War. As efforts are made to reduce the number of nuclear weapons to very low levels, with the ultimate goal of elimination, it is important to consider issues such as who is entitled to have nuclear deterrence, how nuclear deterrence operates at very low levels, the proper role of ABM defenses and how to strengthen nonproliferation norms by assuring the security of states without nuclear weapons. One path to resolving these difficult issues may be a greater reliance upon collective defenses by groups of states, using conventional arms.

Introduction Deterrence is a word used frequently in international relations. Even a casual consideration of its usage shows that there is no common understanding of what it means or how the concept operates. All the Nuclear Weapon States say that the primary purpose, perhaps the sole purpose, of their nuclear weapons is for deterrence. India and Pakistan say that deterrence is the goal of their programs. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry declared that “nuclear weapons will serve as a reliable war deterrent for protecting the supreme interests of the state and the security of the Korean nation from the U.S. threat of aggression.”2 If Iran decides to seek nuclear weapons, one can be sure that they will justify it on the basis of deterrence. They would also tell us that a major cause of their disastrous war with Iraq was the lack of a credible deterrent. Nor is the concept of deterrence static even within one country. In the U.S., we have gone from massive retaliation to assured destruction to flexible response to tailored deterrence, with other variations along the way. Similar evolutions have taken place in other countries. Almost any proposed major new strategic weapon system will be both supported and opposed on the basis of its supposed effect upon deterrence. A prominent recent example is the ABM system proposed for Poland and the Czech Republic. The U.S. believes it would strengthen deterrence, while the Russian Federation believes it would weaken it. Evidently, someone is confused! Perhaps the most straightforward explanation for the confusion is the failure to ask “deter whom from doing what?” In view of the fact that this is a large and complicated subject, and in view of the limited time available and the sophistication of the audience, I would like to use the format of posing eight fundamental questions about deterrence and attempting to sketch out what will be rather simplistic answers. My hope is that this may shed some light on 1 Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The views expressed are those of the author alone.

E. Ifft / Understanding Deterrence

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this important subject, or at least stimulate some useful discussion. Perhaps we can be guided by James Thurber’s observation that it is better to know some of the questions than to know all of the answers.

1. What is Deterrence? At the most basic level, deterrence, which comes from the Latin verb deterrere—to frighten—is convincing a person, group or state that the reaction to a contemplated course of action would result in a degree of pain or punishment that would exceed the expected benefit of such action. Seen in its most general terms, deterrence is clearly basic to law enforcement or the rearing of children. Deterrence could also be used, not to prevent an action, but to encourage one or to force the cessation of something. This could also be called “compellance” or even “coercion,” although the latter carries an emotional burden that makes rational discussion difficult. We are, of course, talking here about nuclear deterrence, although the concept is certainly relevant to discussions of other weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons. As an aside it might be noted that the word frequently used for deterrence in Russian, sderzhivaniye, carries a slightly different meaning than the English word.

2. Has Nuclear Deterrence Been Effective? Yes and no. Most scholars believe that nuclear deterrence kept the major powers from going to war against each other for 60 years. There is no reason to dispute this proposition, though it cannot be proven and history does not reveal its alternatives. On the other hand, numerous actions almost universally condemned by the international community have not been prevented. In some cases, this was almost certainly because the international community did not really attempt to apply credible and effective deterrence. In other cases, deterrence may have simply failed. An interesting example is found in the first Gulf War. It is believed by many that Saddam Hussein did not use chemical weapons because he was deterred by strong warnings from the U.S. However, it is frequently overlooked that he was also strongly warned not to set fire to the Kuwaiti oil fields, but did so anyway. In addition, he attacked Israel with ballistic missiles, in spite of Israel’s nuclear potential. In any case, without going into specific cases, one might observe that there have been instances in which luck, or good decisions by a handful of individuals, saved us from disaster, more than the operation of an abstract theory. The Cuban Missile Crisis might be one such example.

3. What is the Relationship between Deterrence and Assured Destruction? It is relevant here to recall Churchill’s memorable phrase, “Safety will be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation.” He correctly foresaw the implications of mutual deterrence between powerful and hostile powers armed with nuclear weapons. Elaborate theories of nuclear deterrence, which we need not explore here, were developed in an effort to impose some intellectual rigor on a confused and difficult situation. These efforts tended to be strong on mathematics, which we knew

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how to do well, but weak on psychology and politics. Elaborate computer simulations were carried out to attempt to predict how a nuclear war would develop, and how intrawar deterrence could be established. However, these almost always broke down after the initial nuclear exchange. In the real world, what resulted, in the name of deterrence, were grotesque levels of nuclear weapons in both the U.S. and Soviet Union. In an effort to answer the question, “How much is enough?” and to gain some control over the “mad momentum of the arms race,” Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara tried to quantify what levels of destruction would be sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from actions that would threaten the vital interests of the U.S. and its Allies. Various considerations led to the conclusion that the destruction of 30% of the population and three-fourths of the industry of the Soviet Union would be sufficient. The spirit of those times is further illustrated by the fact that, in the late 1960s, as we were preparing for the beginning of the SALT negotiations, we were told that, since the Soviet Union had “accepted” 20,000,000 deaths in World War II, much greater levels of destruction would be necessary for deterrence to be effective. That seemed absurd to me then and is, of course, even more so today. Similar calculations were presumably made by other Nuclear Weapon States. In the West, we referred approvingly to the policies of states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as Britain and France, as “deterrence of the strong by the weak.” That phrase now has a much more negative connotation in connection with asymmetric warfare. In the U.S., an effort was eventually made to make deterrence less horrific by emphasizing the targeting of military and economic assets, rather than population per se. However, calculations of what would be the actual effects of a nuclear exchange indicated that any feelings of moral superiority from the change were hard to justify. All along, the concept should have been called Mutual Assured Deterrence, but the unfortunate acronym MAD would have been the same. Certainly there were, and are, differences in how individual states view the roles of nuclear weapons and deterrence. There are experts at this Workshop from all the Nuclear Weapon States who can address the views and policies of their countries authoritatively.2 As far as NATO are concerned, previously it described nuclear weapons as “weapons of last resort” and the possibility of their use as “extremely remote.” The current NATO Strategic Concept, which dates from 1999, proclaims that nuclear weapons make a “unique contribution” and describes them as “essential to preserve peace.”3

4. Do We Still Have Assured Destruction Today? The answer must be a qualified “yes.” Of course, we have the benefits of de-targeting and far better relations, including greater openness and cooperation, among the states of NATO, the former Warsaw Pact and China. One could claim that there is no longer a “policy” of assured destruction. However, to claim, as some have done, that assured destruction no longer exists, is a dangerous illusion. A more realistic view is to consider assured destruction as an existential fact, rather than a policy. The only prudent assumption is that, if the survival of a state possessing nuclear weapons were at stake, and especially if it were attacked with nuclear weapons, it would respond with nuclear weapons, probably on a large scale. The simple fact is that, as long as large numbers of nuclear weapons exist, the threat of assured destruction hangs over us. As

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former Secretary of State Colin Powell testified to Congress, “You can’t entirely do away with what has been known as mutual assured destruction.”4 There are clearly moral objections to be made to the policy, and perhaps legal ones as well, flowing from the 1986 Advisory Opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice. However, it is difficult to say that mounting a credible threat to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor was or is wrong. What was wrong, in my view, was the failure to recognize that the levels of nuclear weapons created by the two superpowers were grossly in excess of what was necessary to do this. This was caused by lack of trust, lack of communication, the extreme use of worst-case assumptions and the lack of arms control agreements to regulate the competition. The unhealthy competition has finally been brought under control by the SALT, INF, START and Moscow (SORT) Treaties, but thousands of nuclear weapons remain, both deployed and non-deployed. Another result of the arms control process of the 1980s and 1990s was the realization that not only the size, but also the structure of strategic forces, has important effects upon stability and deterrence. While “freedom-to-mix” was recognized as important to allow for differences in the geo-political situation, along with historical factors, more sophisticated analysis showed that certain kinds of nuclear deterrent forces would be more stabilizing, or at least less destabilizing, than others. Thus, the U.S. concluded that placing relatively greater reliance upon more survivable systems, such as SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), mobile ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and bombers would be better for stability than relying upon fixed ICBMs, especially those with MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles). Similarly, systems which were slow-flying, and hence provided more warning time, such as bombers and cruise missiles, are less destabilizing than ballistic missiles, with their very short warning times. The U.S. devoted considerable effort in the START negotiations to trying to convince its Soviet partner of the wisdom of this view of deterrence, with some, though not complete, success. Perhaps the greatest achievement of this philosophy of deterrence was the agreement to a complete ban on ICBMs with MIRVs in the START II Treaty. Unfortunately, this Treaty never entered into force. Nevertheless, the trends in both U.S. and Russian force structures over the past 15 years do reflect this view of deterrence and stability.

5. Who is Entitled to Have Nuclear Deterrence? This awkward question is almost never asked, but is at the heart of the nuclear proliferation issue. One obvious answer could be the five Nuclear Weapon States, as defined by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, there would not be consensus on this point. Although each of the five would certainly assert its right to have nuclear deterrence, it is far from clear that each of the five would agree that the others have the right to deter it with nuclear weapons. The problem is that discussions of nuclear deterrence in any country will invariably deal with how deterrence works for that country, not how it might work to deter it. During the START negotiations, I sometimes heard from my colleagues on the U.S. Delegation the statement, “We are not trying to deter ourselves!” It is clear that both publics and policy makers are ambivalent about the subject. It would be quite easy to gain assent to the proposition that deterrence should be

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preserved. It would be quite another matter to gain acceptance of the idea that other countries should be allowed to maintain the capability to destroy us. The paradox is that these are simply two ways of stating the same question. If deterrence is legitimate and stabilizing, it would follow that countries should refrain from attempting to take away the deterrence of other Nuclear Weapon States. This is obviously a difficult proposition. It was the basic premise of the ABM Treaty, which is no longer with us. However, even in the ABM Treaty, there was always the feeling that the Treaty was simply recognizing a basic fact of the military situation between the US and USSR and the impossibility of an effective nationwide ABM defense. There was always the view, in some quarters, that this balance could and should be overturned as soon as technological developments permitted. This latter view was certainly at least part of the vision behind President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). What we have is a collision between the need to maintain deterrence and the fundamental right and basic instinct for self defense. We have never really solved this problem. The situation becomes even more delicate when considering the situation regarding India, Pakistan and Israel. Of course, the fact that India, Pakistan and Israel never joined the NPT puts them into a different category than North Korea and Iran, but the fundamental question of who has the right to deterrence against whom remains. This leads us to the next question.

6. What is the Difference between Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Blackmail? Much of the discussion around the dangers of nuclear proliferation seems to be crystallizing around the term “nuclear blackmail.” The best way to understand nuclear blackmail is to recognize that it is simply nuclear deterrence in the wrong hands. The term has become suddenly popular in recent years, especially in the aftermath of the first Gulf War. In an important speech at the National Defense University in Washington in 2001, President Bush declared, “The international community would have faced a very different situation had Hussein been able to blackmail with nuclear weapons.”5 President Putin, former President Chirac and former Prime Minister Blair have all used the term. In the context in which it is being used, it basically expresses the concern that the freedom of action of the Nuclear Weapon States would be curtailed if other states acquired nuclear weapons, or perhaps other weapons of mass destruction. The scenario frequently cited is that a Nuclear Weapon State will be unable to intervene in a regional conflict if one of the hostile parties to that conflict has nuclear weapons. While this is certainly a legitimate concern, it does not take much thought to conclude that an argument that proliferation is bad because it would limit the ability of Nuclear Weapon States to attack other states is not likely to be at all convincing to Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Framing the proliferation debate so that it focuses on whether individual states can intervene without risk in distant regional conflicts will clearly not turn out well. If anything, such arguments merely confirm the utility of nuclear weapons and raise the incentives for rogue states to acquire them. Such arguments also tend to undermine the credibility of the security guarantees and extended deterrence that are so important to nonproliferation.6 Furthermore, they imply that we would not defend our vital interests, thus weakening deterrence itself. We would be better served to stop talking about nuclear blackmail and return to the

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traditional arguments used in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for why it is in the best interests of all states to hold the line firmly on nuclear proliferation.

7. Can Terrorists be Deterred? The question of whether or not terrorists can be deterred has been discussed so extensively recently that there is little new to say. It has become commonplace to assert that terrorists cannot be deterred and therefore must be hunted down and eliminated at the source. There is, unfortunately, much truth to this. The concept of punishment as deterrence is difficult to apply to those who seek martyrdom or deranged fanatics who believe that terrorist acts can hasten the end of the world. At the same time, terrorists have to come from somewhere and states, and especially their leaders, can be held accountable for training camps and other preparations for terrorism which take place on their territory. The same is true for those who knowingly assist terrorist activities. After the experience of Afghanistan, regardless of how Iraq turns out, it is hard to believe that states would lightly welcome and shelter terrorists. Of course, in the case of failed states, or states unable to control their own territory, some action by the international community may be necessary. One should also recognize that denial can also be an effective counter, if not necessarily a deterrent, to terrorists. This could be brought about through cooperation in intelligence, missile defense, better regulation of the transfer of the tools of terrorism, effective management of the consequences of terrorist acts, and so on. More research on nuclear forensics, so that the source of nuclear materials used in an attack could be reliably determined would be very useful. As far as international law is concerned, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the International Convention against WMD Terrorism provide a good foundation upon which additional measures might be formulated.7

8. Can We Escape from Nuclear Deterrence and Assured Destruction? This is one of the crucial questions of our time. Real escape from under the sword of Damocles does not appear to be a realistic possibility as long as large numbers of nuclear weapons exist in the world. However, it should be possible to push the threat far into the background through deeper reductions and more enlightened policies. Over 20 years ago, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev put forward competing visions of a world free of nuclear weapons. Many people at the time, including myself, considered these proposals rather unrealistic, and perhaps even an impediment to more practical measures that were desperately needed. However, the goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons entirely has reemerged in quite responsible circles. In an article in the Wall Street Journal on January 4, 2007, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn—certainly not inexperienced or impractical men—advocated precisely this course.8 In an important speech in Washington in June, 2007, Margaret Beckett, then UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, declared that almost no one believes that the current numbers of nuclear warheads are necessary and called for further work to determine the requirements for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.9 Hans Blix has recently written that “There is no conceivable use for nuclear weapons and their deterrent effect is becoming increasingly ineffective. In

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regions where nuclear weapons might be a real basis for security, other measures, such as integration into the fabric of the international community, are likely to be more effective.”10 In the near term, a crucial question concerns what sort of a regime will replace the START Treaty, which is scheduled to expire in December, 2009. The Moscow Treaty of 2002, while usefully driving the START levels significantly lower, is clearly not the answer in the longer term, for reasons that are well known. A practical path toward very low levels of nuclear weapons may be through the gradual transformation of deployed nuclear forces into “virtual” nuclear forces. Under this concept, nuclear warheads would be separated from delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers), along with other measures to reduce the imminent threat and reduce the possibility of accident or miscalculation. On-site inspections and other transparency measures would assure that these measures were being carried out as agreed. Reconstitution would be possible as a safety net in the unlikely event that this became necessary. This concept has recently been given expression by respected scholars in both the U.S. and the Russian Federation.11 One could perhaps envision a sequential process involving five “D’s”: • • • • •

Declarations/Data Exchange De-targeting De-alerting Deactivation Disassembling/Dismantling

One would, of course, all the while be careful to preserve the most important “D”-deterrence. Our goal is certainly not to make the world safe for conventional war. Although we really do not know yet how to safely eliminate nuclear weapons entirely, we do need to think in greater detail about how deterrence could work as the levels approach zero. At some point, we would enter the realm of “minimum deterrence.” This undefined term has been in use for many years and generally refers to the minimum level of nuclear weapons that could still deter. Clearly what that level might be is dependent upon specific scenarios and the psychology and goals of those being deterred, but it is obviously far below current levels, or even those established by the Moscow Treaty. Anyone who has accepted the line of reasoning earlier in this paper will object that there will always be bad people and outlaw nations and groups that refuse to abide by international norms, and they must somehow be deterred. Weaker nations will especially demand that they be protected from stronger nations, if they are to give up nuclear aspirations. In order to achieve this, one can envision a system of positive and negative security assurances, supported by collective deterrence by conventional means. Although conventional weapons are more expensive than nuclear weapons for a given level of damage, groups of countries can inflict unacceptable damage without resort to nuclear weapons. Regional organizations, such as NATO, the EU and the AU come to mind. The most universal body that could threaten to inflict unacceptable damage is, of course, the United Nations itself. Conventional deterrence by collectives is more credible than nuclear deterrence, since the latter is quite properly constrained by very high thresholds and taboos. In addition, to the extent that one believes in blackmail, it would be much more difficult for an outlaw state to blackmail a large group of states than any individual state.

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Many recent examples demonstrate the consequences of the failure to apply credible deterrence, or to respond quickly and forcefully to flagrant violations of international norms. Although the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemptive/preventive war has been met with strong opposition, it is becoming clear that the international community does need to respond more quickly and more effectively to such outrages.

Conclusion Nuclear deterrence has been a fundamental factor in international relations for the entire lifetime of most of the people in this room. In recent years, the concept of nuclear deterrence has come under attack. It is said that nuclear deterrence: • • • • • • •

No longer exists Is no longer effective Is no longer necessary Is dangerous Is immoral Is inconsistent with our nonproliferation objectives Encourages irresponsible nations and organizations to acquire nuclear weapons

While there is some truth in each of these criticisms, in my view, they are too simplistic, at least as long as significant numbers of nuclear weapons exist. In retrospect, it is easy to see that the search for security led to deterrence, which led to nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence required the capability to inflict unacceptable damage, which was another name for assured destruction. With the spread of nuclear weapons, this became mutual assured destruction. Unfortunately, this led to levels and policies that were far beyond what was needed and were inconsistent with Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although this process did achieve its primary goal—the prevention of nuclear war—we were lucky to survive the process. Our task now should be to reduce nuclear weapons to very low levels, relying increasingly upon collective conventional forces for deterrence, gradually pushing nuclear deterrence into the background as a last resort. If this sounds like the New World Order, it probably is. If it sounds naïve, it probably has that flaw as well. Nevertheless, it does sound preferable to the world in which we have been living for the past 60 years.12 NOTES 1. 2.

3. 4.

Washington Post, October 4, 2006, p. 18. Recent discussions of the deterrent policies of all five Nuclear Weapon States can be found in Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues, Edited by Owen C. W. Price and Jenifer Mackby, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 2007. “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO Public Diplomacy Document SC99ENG0604, paragraph 46, Brussels, NATO. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 20, 2001.

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5.

Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University, Washington, D.C., May 1, 2001. 6. For a recent analysis of extended deterrence in the post-Cold War world, see Lewis A. Dunn, “Deterrence Today: Roles, Challenges and Responses,” IFRI Proliferation Paper No. 19, Security Studies Center of the French Institute of International Studies, Summer, 2007. 7. A further recent discussion of deterring terrorists is found in Daniel Byman, “US Counterterrorism Options: A Taxonomy,” Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 121-150. See also M. Elaine Bunn, “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” Strategic Forum No. 225, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, January, 2007. See also Dunn, op. cit. 8. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007. "The four authors elaborated their views in another article in the Wall Street Journal on January 15, 2008, as well as in a book entitled "Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons," edited by George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, published by the Hoover Institution and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (2008). 9. Margaret Beckett, Address to the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., June 25, 2007. 10. Hans Blix, “CTBT: Going the Last Mile to Banish Nuclear Testing,” CTBTO Spectrum, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (Vienna), July, 2007. 11. See, for example, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, What are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Nuclear Forces, Washington, D.C., Arms Control Association, April, 2005 (revised October, 2007). See also Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Transforming the U.S.-Russian Equation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 2006. 12. For a more detailed discussion of nuclear deterrence by the author, see Edward Ifft, “Deterrence, Blackmail, Friendly Persuasion,” Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 237-256, Routledge (London), September, 2007.

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-25

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Cooperative Security Management: Toward a New Approach for Managing the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship Lewis A. DUNN1

Abstract. U.S.-Russian strategic relations are approaching a turning point: a continued drift toward mutual suspicion, renewed military gamesmanship, and growing political-military confrontation or an opportunity provided by presidential elections in both countries to rethink and re-craft a non-adversarial relationship. 7RGD\¶V GULIW UHIOHFWV PDQ\ IDFWRUV SDVW PLVVWHSV GLIIHUHQFHV Rf interest and approach on specific issues; misperceptions; and the inherent difficulties of breaking free from the Cold War legacy. Among other issues on the agenda, action should be taken to address Russian uncertainty about U.S. strategic intentions; U.S. uncertainties about Russian commitment to preventing proliferation; and ways to build habits of cooperation in countering a terrorist WMD attack.

A Turning-Point: The U.S.-Russian strategic relationship is approaching a turning point. The next years may see a continued slow drift toward mutual suspicion, renewed military gamesmanship, and growing political-military confrontation ± but there also remains WLPH IRU D MRLQW HIIRUW WR ³UHZLQG WKH ILOP´ DQG VHHN DJDLQ WR PRYH WRZDUG WKDW QRQadversarial relaWLRQVKLS DIILUPHG E\ ERWK FRXQWULHV¶ OHDGHUV   7RGD\¶V GULIW LQ WKH opposite direction reflects many factors: past missteps; differences of interest and approach on specific issues; misperceptions; and the inherent difficulties of breaking free from the Cold War legacy. That said, the upcoming presidential elections in both countries offer one of those political points in time that can ± but need not ± provide an opportunity to rethink and re-craft the relationship.

The Principle of Cooperative Security Management Assuming a mutual interest in both Washington and Moscow to use that opportunity, one starting point would be to seek joint agreement on the principle that a cooperative security management approach should be the guiding concept for governing U.S.Russian strategic relations. As the phrase states, cooperative security management ZRXOGSDUWO\HQWDLODPXWXDOFRPPLWPHQWWRPDQDJHFRRSHUDWLYHO\ERWKVLGHV¶HYROYLQJ strategic choices ± ZLWKDQH\HRQHQKDQFLQJHDFKFRXQWU\¶VVHFXULW\DVZHOODVEroader 1 Senior Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation. The views herein are those of the author not necessarily those of Science Applications International Corporation or any of its sponsoring organizations.

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global stability. It would entail as well a commitment in practice to efforts to seek a mutual accommodation of interests, while containing any all-but-inevitable differences RILQWHUHVWRUSHUVSHFWLYH,WZRXOGDIILUPLQWXUQERWKFRXQWULHV¶UHDGiness to pursue cooperatively global strategic stability. With regard to means, cooperative security management would not rule out negotiated agreements (formal or informal, legally-binding or political). But it would encompass many other types of implementing activities (parallel unilateral actions and political understandings; exchanges of information and liaison personnel; joint political-military studies, planning, and operations; establishment of jointly-operated systems; and international reporting and monitoring). Most broadly, this concept of cooperative management could be used as well to govern other key global strategic relationships. In turn, it would provide a conceptual framework for broader great power cooperation to meet global stability challenges.

Dimensions of Strategic Stability Part of a cooperative security management approach would entail serious and sustained consultations to reach agreement on a shared vision of future global strategic stability ± and on the most pressing threats to stability. Even if some differences persisted, the very process would be valuable ± assuming a high-level mandate on both sides to work the issue in earnest. Strategic stability is a long used, if ill-defined concept. It also has many dimensions.2 IQWRGD\¶VZRUOGZKDWPD\EHWHUPHGSHDFHWLPHVWDELOLW\± ensuring that conflicting interests do not spillover to undermine the overall Russia-U.S. political relationship as well as the basis for cooperative actions to meet common security threats ± is taking on increasing importance. More traditional arms race stability also seems to once again be emerging as an issue. By contrast, given the extremely low probability of a military clash between the two countries, crisis stability appears less central to the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. But it could be an area in which the two sides would seek to cooperate to dampen crises in other regions. Two other dimensions of stability today also could figure in the type of consultations being suggested ± proliferation stability and anti-terrorism stability defined respectively in terms of containing the risks and dangers of runaway proliferation and of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. Three Illustrative Areas for Action: Agreement on a principle of cooperative security management and on a vision of global strategic stability, however, would only be a starting point. Implementation in practice would be critical ± both to rebuild confidence between Washington and Moscow and to work the critical challenges that could fuel the drift toward suspicion, gamesmanship, and political-military confrontation. The agenda would be a full one. Consider very briefly three examples taken from that broader agenda, examples that span the different dimensions of stability: Russian uncertainty about U.S. strategic intentions; U.S. uncertainties about Russian commitment to preventing proliferation; and building 2 The following breakdown of the different types of stability draws on conversations with Leonard Spector.

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habits of cooperation in countering a terrorist WMD attack with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. 5XVVLD¶V8QFHUWDLQW\DERXW866WUDWHJLF,QWHQWLRQV Increasingly, Russian officials and experts have voiced concern about U.S. strategic intentions. Their statements point toward an alleged U.S. pursuit of nuclear primacy based on a mix of lower-yield nuclear capabilities perceived being acquired, advanced conventional strike options, and deployment of missile defenses. Some persons warn that ultimately U.S. actions ± combined with Russian inactions ± will undermine 5XVVLD¶V QXFOHDU GHWHUrent capability. Isolated voices go so far as to warn of U.S. military threats to coerce Russia in one or another area. Cooperative security management would seek mutually acceptable approaches to lessen this strategic uncertainty. A full discussion exceeds the scope of this brief presentation. Suffice it to suggest some pathways to explore. First, the possibility should be examined of putting in place sustained give-andtake strategic consultations, at multiple levels. These consultations would build on and LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]H WKH UHFHQW ³WZR-plus-WZR´ PHHWLQJV EHWZHHQ WKH 6HFUHWDULHV RI State/Foreign Affairs and Defense. These meetings could be extended to include possible exchanges of liaison officers between the two militaries and defense establishments in appropriate locations Second, a renewed but expanded effort should be made to put in place a joint Early Warning Capability. As a start this could entail bringing into effect the now moribund 2000 agreement for shared early warning (the Joint Data Exchange Center). But shared early warning could go beyond that agreement to exchange national data to explore creation of a jointly operated early warning capability, thereby providing each country with direct real-time access to comparable warning imagery. This type of step would JR IDU WR GHDO ZLWK RQH XQGHUO\LQJ URRW RI 5XVVLDQ VWUDWHJLF XQFHUWDLQW\ 5XVVLD¶V eroded early warning capability. Third, cooperative alternatives to regulate future missile defense deployments need to be pursued ± from exploration of agreed deployment guidelines to actual pursuit of a joint U.S.-Russian global missile defense capability against proliferation threats. Finally, building on the preceding, steps could be taken to put in place a set of confidence-building, transparency, and constraint measures ± technical, political, and operational ± to accompany any U.S. deployment of longer-range conventional ballistic missiles. For that matter, such measures also would be appropriate to accompany any Russian deployment of longer-range conventional ballistic missiles should Russia eventually follow suit. 868QFHUWDLQW\DERXW5XVVLD¶V&RPPLWPHQWWR1RQ-Proliferation Today, it often is remarked wistfully that during the Cold War, preventing proliferation was the one area of sustained and successful strategic cooperation between Moscow and Washington. Within some parts of the U.S. strategic community, there is a SHULRGLFVSHFXODWLRQWKDWWRGD\¶VODFNRIQRQ-proliferation cooperation actually reflects a Russian belief that more proliferation would be good ± especially as a means to tiedown and impede a United States perceived to be seeking global hegemony. Russian policies toward Iran are cited as an example. So far, strategic dialogue alone has not been sufficient to put such doubts to rest, particularly in the wider American foreign policy and defense community. Even so,

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that dialogue on proliferation challenges is essential ± particularly if as in the Cold War era, it can become a genuine give-and-take process. What is even more necessary, however, is to find ways to rebuild strong habits of non-proliferation cooperation between Washington and Moscow. This includes cooperation on the tough cases. By way of illustration, in the specific case cited of Iran, Russia and the United States ± along with other great powers ± could take the lead in signaling to the Iranian leadership that should Iran break out of the Nonproliferation Treaty and acquire nuclear weapons, the great powers would respond cooperatively to ensure that Iran did not gain from the bomb. By so doing, they could yet shift the balance of internal debate in Iran where a key question remains whether Iran ultimately would make itself less not more VHFXUHE\³JRLQJDOOWKHZD\WRWKHERPE´ Building Habits of Cooperation in Countering Terrorist WMD Attacks Russia and the United States clearly share a strong common interest in countering terrorist attacks using WMD ± chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Most narrowly, each country has been the target of WMD threats or use: in 1995, Chechyan terrorists threatened the use of radiological weapons against Moscow; in 2001, an unknown individual or group mailed letters with anthrax to targeted Americans. Both countries support the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, are co-chairs of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and have cooperated under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to enhance protection against WMD terrorism. Cooperation in specific instances, however, has sometimes been more problematic ± as it was after the 2001 anthrax mailings (when the United States sought Russian expertise), or after the 2006 seizure by Georgian authorities of smuggled highly-enriched uranium (when it proved difficult to investigate the origins of the materials). From this perspective, a key challenge for cooperative security management would be to strengthen the habits of cooperation between Moscow and Washington ± and then more widely among the great powers ± to prevent, detect, disrupt, attribute, or respond to a terrorist WMD incident. Here, too, there are a variety of potential pathways to explore. By way of example, building on the Global Initiative, joint planning and exercises could be undertaken to enhance capabilities to detect, interdict, and otherwise prevent a successful terrorist WMD attack, from near-real time exchanges of warning intelligence to joint operational deployments. Closely related, emergency response and consequence management planning and exercises also could be begun. This could include assessment of possible on-call capabilities to provide joint support to a third country that requires assistance in assessing and rendering safe a terrorist device or in dealing with the consequences of an event. In the area of cooperative attribution of the sources of a terrorist WMD attack, discussions could focus on needed authorities and procedures that would enable cooperation to ensure that the perpetrator of a terrorist WMD attack (from the leaders to the aiders and abettors) will not be able to hide. Still another area would be consultations and planning for a coordinated response to a terrorist WMD event ± not least, on the one hand, to send the right global signal, and on the other hand, to leverage the shock of a terrorist WMD attack as a means to strengthen global counter-terrorist and non-proliferation activities.

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What Next 7RGD\¶VFKDOOHQJH LVWRUHYHUVH WKH GULIWWRZDUGSROLWLFDO-military confrontation in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. For the United States, reversing that drift will UHTXLUH DFNQRZOHGJLQJ WKDW WKH SDVW KDOI GHFDGH¶V SRVWXUH RI VWUDWHJLF ³ODLVVH]-IDLUH´ has not moved the U.S.-Russian relationship ahead successfully. But it will also require not simply aGRSWLQJ D ³EDFN WR WKH WUDGLWLRQDO DUPV FRQWURO IXWXUH´ ZD\ RI confronting stability challenges. For Russia, reversing the drift will require tempering WRGD\¶V³QHYHUDJDLQ´DVVHUWLYHQHVVDVZHOODVDFRPSDUDEOHUHDGLQHVVWRWKLQNDQHZRQ some issues. For both countries the stakes are high ± from strengthening stability in its many different variants through reinvigorated cooperation to deal with proliferation, WMD terrorism, and other global security challenges, to finally putting the Cold War legacy behind the two countries. The principle and practice of cooperative security management offer a possible way forward.

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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-30

Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy Joseph CIRINCIONE1 Abstract. Three trends are converging to increase prospects for a fundamental change in global nuclear policies: the failure of the existing U.S. national security strategy to stem the growing proliferation threats; a nearly simultaneous global change in executive leadership; and a developing consensus across ideological lines for a renewed commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Leading U.S. presidential candidates have endorsed nuclear disarmament and numerous experts and non-governmental organizations are developing comprehensive proposals, most prominently George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn. These campaigns have created political space for officials to embrace a more ambitious agenda than most previously had. There is a greater likelihood of historic change in global nuclear policy now than at any other moment in the past 15 years.

For the first time in fifty-six years, the United States will conduct a presidential election in 2008 that does not include a sitting president or vice-president. This greatly increases the possibility of changes in nuclear strategic policy, particularly if the candidate of the Democratic Party wins over the Republican Party candidate, as is now widely anticipated. New leadership in the White House is one of four trends that indicate a high probability of positive changes in global nonproliferation policies. The other three are: • • •

the growing recognition that the radical counter-proliferation policies promoted by neoconservatives and adopted by the Bush administration have failed; the opportunities presented by elections that are simultaneously installing new governments in most of the leading nations or the world—a rare global political realignment; and the campaigns begun by leading non-government groups, primarily in the United States but also in Europe, that are promoting policies to increase international nuclear security.

This paper briefly examines these trends, focusing on the elements likely to emerge in the next nuclear strategy of the United States.

1 President of the Ploughshares Fund. When this paper was prepared and presented he was Senior Fellow and Director for Nuclear Policy at the Center for American Progress, Washington, DC

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Policy Failure The progress made over the past twenty years in reducing arsenals of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, in reducing the number of states with nuclear weapons or weapons programs, and fortifying the nonproliferation regime with new tools and new barriers to the spread of nuclear weapons has been reversed in recent years. As a result, dangers have grown and there is now a distinct possibility of the collapse of much of the nonproliferation regime. The security strategies championed by Washington-based neoconservatives and formalized in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and the National Security Strategy of the United States have not produced the results they promised. Nearly all of the proliferation problems inherited by the Bush administration have grown worse over the past 7 years. Today, we face greater nuclear insecurity than during the 1990s, including the risk of a Middle East with several nuclear states; the possibility that Osama bin Laden will eventually get a nuclear weapon from insecure stockpiles in Russia, Pakistan or some other state; the probability that an upsurge in nuclear power programs would bring many more states to the brink of nuclear weapons capability; and the possibility that the flaws in command and control systems—including those exposed in the US system by the unauthorized August 2007 B-52 flight with 6 nuclear bombs—could result in the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The growing recognition that current approaches are counter-productive helps clear the field, providing space for policy alternatives, but does not, by itself, guarantee that more effective policies will be implemented.

New Leaders Prospects for policy change are increased by the period of political transition the world has now entered. By early 2009, four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia) will have new leaders. Other key states, including Iran and Israel, may as well. The UK and France have already made the switch, as have other major powers such as Japan, Germany and Italy. International organizations, too, will refresh their leadership, with a new Secretary-General now installed at the United Nations and possibly a new head of the International Atomic Energy Agency in two years. Rarely have the political stars re-aligned so dramatically. The photo of the G8 summit in 2009 will likely not have a single leader present at the 2006 summit save for Canada’s Prime Minister Harper. This is a unique opportunity to advance new policies that can dramatically reduce and even eliminate many of the dangers that have kept political leaders and security officials worried about a nuclear 9/11.

U.S. Nuclear Politics Several leading candidates for the presidency of the United States have already rushed to fill the policy vacuum, detailing sweeping proposals for nuclear security. Former Senator John Edwards promised in September 2007 that he would lead a charge for a “Global Compact” to eliminate nuclear weapons. Governor Bill Richardson (D.-NM)

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has given a similar pledge. Senator Barack Obama (D.-IL) has a plan to eliminate and secure all loose nuclear materials in his first term as president, effectively preventing nuclear terrorism. In an October 2007 speech he committed to the goal of a nuclearfree world, and endorsed a plan that included negotiating a verifiable global ban on the production of fissile materials, creating an international fuel bank to back up commercial fuel supplies, increasing funding for IAEA safeguards, negotiating dramatic reductions in US and Russian nuclear stockpiles, seeking a global ban on Intermediate-range missiles, and taking missiles off of hair-trigger alert. Senator Hillary Clinton (D.-NY) has promised similar presidential attention to preventing nuclear terror and shrinking global arsenals. Her article in November/December issue of Foreign Affairs, “Security and Opportunity for the Twenty-first Century,” offers the first details of her plan. Senator Clinton laments the lost opportunity of the failure to build upon profound international unity created after the 9/11 attacks. She promises that she will not let her opportunity slip away, pledging to negotiate an end to the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea; secure all loose nuclear materials in her first term; establish a nuclear fuel bank; negotiate an accord to verifiably reduce U.S. and Russian arsenals, and, significantly, to seek Senate approval of the CTBT by 2009, the tenth anniversary of the Senates’ initial rejection of the treaty. This last step, Senator Clinton says, “would enhance the United States’ credibility when demanding that other nations refrain from testing.” Summarizing this trend among the Democratic candidates, former National Security staff member Ivo Daldaar and former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum, two top advisors to Senator Obama, said in an October 5, 2007 op-ed: “Although successive administrations (at least until the current one) have mouthed the words affirming this objective, few have actually made this commitment an organizing principle of their nuclear weapons policies. That may be about to change….There is much that the United States can do to lift the dark nuclear shadow over the world. It can sharply reduce its nuclear stockpile to 1,000 weapons or less, if Russia agrees to go down to the same level. It can eliminate tactical nuclear weapons to underscore that it understands that a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, no matter its size, yield, range, or mode of delivery. It can agree never to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, and accept the need for intrusive verification if other states agree to end such production as well. It can commit never again to test a nuclear device, and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” It is not clear if Senator Clinton accepts this as an organizing principle. Interestingly, in her Foreign Affairs article, she redefines the Nuclear Free World initiative of George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn (detailed below), saying they “have called on the United States to ‘rekindle the vision,’ shared by every president from Dwight Eisenhower to Bill Clinton, of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.” Republican candidates have not yet addressed these issues in detail. However, in the US Congress there is some support for these new policies, as demonstrated by legislation (SR 1977) introduced by Senators Obama and Chuck Hagel (R-NE) that

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would authorized the policies detailed by Senator Obama in his speech, plus others. Most significantly the bill would continue: “…the United States moratorium on nuclear test explosions, initiating a bipartisan process to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, working to secure ratification by other key countries, and fully supporting United States commitments to fund the international monitoring system to help detect and deter possible nuclear explosions by other countries…” The legislation also specifically endorses “pursuing and concluding an agreement to verifiably halt the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.” There is conservative opposition to these measures in the Senate. In October, in reaction to an effort by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) to link production of the so-called “Reliable Replacement Warhead” to a sense of the Senate provision in the Defense Authorization bill that the CTBT should be ratified, Senator Jon Kyl (R.-AZ) organized a letter signed by 38 Senators opposing the provision. The principle reason given in the letter was that no hearings had been held on the CTBT since 1999, therefore it was impossible to declare that there was a “sense of the Senate” in favor of ratification. Republican presidential candidates are likely to keep their positions close to this conservative line. This underscores the urgent need for a thoughtful, nonpartisan review of the core issues involved with the test ban treaty, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and related issues. There are already bipartisan appeals for just such reviews in the U.S. House and Senate. Senators Diane Feinstein (D-CA) and Susan Collins (R-ME) introduced legislation (SR 1914, The Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Act of 2007) requiring that a comprehensive nuclear weapons policy and posture review be submitted to Congress by the administration (and prohibiting funding for any new nuclear warhead development until such reviews are completed). The legislation would require that the review examine “the role of nuclear forces in United States military strategy, planning and programming,” and the “policy requirements and objectives for the United States to maintain a safe, reliable and credible nuclear deterrence posture,” among other issues. There is similar legislation in the House, added to the Defense Authorization bill by the Chairwomen of the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D.-CA). It includes a provision creating an independent commission to examine U.S. nuclear policy. This year, there have been other bipartisan Congressional actions that generally had the effect of blocking production of new nuclear weapons and construction of new anti-missile bases in Europe, reducing funding for these anti-missile programs overall, and providing funding for an international fuel bank, and in general moving toward a more progressive national security posture.

Positive Policy Initiatives Non-government organizations are already working to provide policies the new executive could adopt. “With this leadership change,” former United Nations UnderSecretary-General of Disarmament Jayantha Dhanapala told a February conference in

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New York organized by the Center for American Progress and The Century Foundation, “it is for us in civil society to try to urge new perspectives and new opportunities for them to seize so that we all make the right choices at the right time.” Analysts at over a dozen institutes are perfecting proposals to reaffirm the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, ratify the nuclear test ban treaty, establish an international nuclear fuel bank, eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, move to zero deployed nuclear weapons and convene a global nuclear summit in 2009, among others. They are promoting their ideas in conferences, reports, testimony, blogs, interviews and film projects. Chief among them and propelling all of them, is the bipartisan appeal from Republicans George Shultz and Henry Kissinger and Democrats William Perry and Sam Nunn in their January 4, 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” Their campaign has already created political space for several leading officials to embrace a more ambitious agenda than they previously had. These four veteran cold warriors urged the United States to recommit to the vision of eliminating nuclear weapons and married their vision with a ten-point action plan including steep reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the end to the production of nuclear weapons material. The four sponsored a follow-up conference at the conservative Hoover Institute at Stanford University in October to advance this agenda. The group plans an international conference in winter 2008, and will soon announce a broad list of additional supporters of their elimination vision. The October conference demonstrated the sophisticated approach of this moderate, bipartisan group and the political support their efforts have garnered thus far. Nancy Reagan sent a personal letter of endorsement to the conference and California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger provided a dramatic statement of his support. Former Secretary George Shultz read the speech for the governor, who was prevented from attending as planned only by the state emergency of wild fires then raging in southern California. He said, in part: “The words that this audience knows so well, the words that President Kennedy spoke during the Cold War, have regained their urgency: ‘The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution.’ Here in California we still have levees that were built a hundred years ago. These levees are an imminent threat to the wellbeing of this state and its people. It would be only a matter of time before a disaster strikes. But we’re not waiting until such a disaster. We in California have taken action to protect our people and our economy from devastation. Neither can this nation nor the world wait to act until there is a nuclear disaster. I am so thankful for the work of George, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger Sam Nunn, Max Kampelman, Sid Drell and so many of you at this conference. You have a big vision, a vision as big as humanity—to free the world of nuclear weapons….I want to help. Let me know how I can use my power and influence as governor to further your vision. Because my heart is with you. My support is firm. My door is open.”

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Thus, for the first time since the initial efforts of the Truman administration in the 1940s, a movement to eliminate nuclear weapons has developed, not from the political left but from the moderate middle. This promises to give the movement a political importance and policy relevance that previous efforts, even the broad-based Nuclear Freeze Movement of the 1980s, have lacked. The goals of the new movement enjoy strong support from the traditional, nongovernmental arms control and nonproliferation organizations. More than a dozen leading U.S. arms control organizations have formed the Campaign for a Nuclear-Free World to coordinate their efforts. The New American Foundation hosts a bi-partisan Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative that seeks to forge a consensus on a new policy among former senior officials from both parties. The most ambitious effort is led by World Security Institute President Bruce Blair. His plan for a Compact to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons already enjoys the support of a bipartisan group of senior experts and former officials. The campaign includes organization of a World Summit to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons in 2010 that would endorse a new treaty calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons by a date certain. The organizing document for the Compact explains: “Three circumstances have converged to create an historic opportunity to achieve this goal: a dramatic shift among conservative leaders to the belief that nuclear weapons must be eliminated; increased public awareness and support, with 82% of Americans now favoring elimination; and an unprecedented changing of the guard, with four of the five original nuclear weapons states electing new leadership between 2007 and 2009. While time is limited to act before a nuclear catastrophe occurs, history has shown that the right idea at the right time can capture the public imagination and shift the public mindset – when that happens, political change that once seemed impossible becomes inevitable.”

Towards A Comprehensive New Policy The circumstances that may make it possible for the first time since the beginning of the Cold War to move decisively towards the elimination of nuclear weapons also make it possible to secure long-sought nuclear security goals, including deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, the entry into force of the CTBT and the negotiation of a FMCT. One of the best previews we have of what a new nuclear policy might look like in the next administration comes from the October 2007 report, “Reducing Nuclear Threats and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism,” by the National Security Advisory Group. The group includes over 30 senior experts and former officials, including Madeleine Albright, Graham Allison, Samuel Berger, Thomas Daschle, Robert Gallucci, William Perry, John Podesta, Susan Rice, John Shalikashvili, and this author. The report proposes a consensus strategy for reducing all the nuclear threats – one that takes seriously the mission of preventing a nuclear 9-11, stops new states from going nuclear, deters any state from launching a nuclear strike on America and restores American leadership to the broad network of nations willing to work towards reducing nuclear perils.

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It is fair to say that this report represents the moderate middle of a significant part the American foreign policy establishment at this point. It is a balancing of the more cautious position sought by some to protect against charges that they are weak on defense, and the more ambitious agendas of those who seek dramatic policy change. The 20-page report details what the endorsers believe is an effective, realistic strategy to realize a bipartisan agenda. Key findings include: •

•

•

•

•

•

•

For the foreseeable future, the U.S will have to maintain effective, reliable nuclear forces to deter adversaries, but deterrence can now be achieved at significantly lower force levels. By reducing the political and military salience of nuclear weapons, global support can be built for the tough actions needed to stop terrorists and hostile regimes from obtaining nuclear weapons. America and other nations can be protected from nuclear terrorism by accelerating the currently weak efforts to secure and eliminate bomb-making nuclear materials worldwide, to detect and interdict illicit shipments of such materials, and to develop nuclear forensic technologies that would hold states accountable if they knowingly assisted terrorists in acquiring or using nuclear weapons. The United States must mobilize the nations of the world to roll back North Korea’s nuclear program and head off an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. That will require increasing the financial and diplomatic pressures applied by the UN Security Council and by states outside the Council, as well as offering the positive incentive of normalized and economically beneficial relations with the U.S. The United States should develop a range of conventional weapons and operational concepts that would give the President credible and technically suitable options for dealing with any threat. This would reduce and eventually eliminate any need to resort to nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks. Given the widely-shared scientific judgment that U.S. nuclear weapons are reliable and safe, there is no urgency to proceed with any new warhead, included the “reliable replacement warhead” proposed by this administration, but questioned by the Congress. With North Korea and Iran actively seeking nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, the U.S. should pursue missile defenses. But the nation should not buy weapons that do not work. The government should continue a robust development effort and proceed with deployment only when warranted by the results of realistic test programs and the evolution of the threat. Plans to deploy new bases in Eastern Europe should be delayed until there has been a serious exploration with the NATO allies and Russia for a cooperative approach to missile defense that could help protect Europe, Russia, and the U.S. The tough verification agreements negotiated with the Russians by Ronald Reagan should not be allowed to expire in 2007. The United States should agree with the Russians to replace START I with a legally binding follow-on agreement that reduces nuclear forces significantly below the levels called for in the 2002 Moscow Treaty. The two sides should also agree to lower the current alert rates that keep thousands of nuclear warheads ready to launch

J. Cirincione / Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy

•

•

•

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within 15 minutes, reducing the risk that the weapons would be used by accident or misperception. A bipartisan effort should be pursued in the Senate to finally achieve the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that would make it illegal for any nation to test a nuclear weapon. With more nuclear tests than all the other nations combined, the United States does not need any more tests; nor should it want any other nation perfecting or developing weapons. The U.S. should restore its historic leadership role in building and strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including by strengthening the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency ability to verify strict compliance, reassuring allies that U.S. security assurances remain reliable, and joining with all other nuclear-weapon states in reaffirming their pledges to seek full nuclear disarmament. States embarking on or expanding nuclear power programs should be given incentives to forgo their own uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. The U.S. should work with the IAEA and other states on an arrangement to provide reliable assurances of nuclear fuel supply to states that do not have their own fuel cycle facilities.

Conclusion These reports and efforts are harbingers of a new policy moment. There is a greater chance to achieve dramatic, historic change in global nuclear policy in the next few years than at any other moment in the past 15 years. Those involved in these policy initiatives all believe that a world of increasing numbers of nuclear weapon states is not inevitable. Neither is a nuclear attack by terrorists. Both can be prevented, but only if their prevention becomes an overriding national priority and only with strong U.S. leadership in international arms control and nonproliferation efforts. The prospects of that developing over the next few years are already encouraging. The next president of the United States—whether Republican or Democrat—will likely have a decidedly different nonproliferation policy than the failed neoconservative strategy attempted over the past few years. There are already signs that other governments are willing to develop and promote new initiatives, such as the remarkable June 2007 speech by then-Foreign Minister Margaret Beckett at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference—by far the most dramatic reaffirmation of the goal of elimination of nuclear weapons yet delivered by any senior official in a nuclear-weapon state. This speech was approved by the incoming Prime Minister Gordon Brown and provided both vision and practicality. She said, in part: “When it comes to building this new impetus for global nuclear disarmament, I want the UK to be at the forefront of both the thinking and the practical work; to be, as it were, a disarmament laboratory. As far as new thinking goes, the International Institute of Strategic Studies is planning an in-depth study to help determine the requirements for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. We will participate in that study and provide funding for one of their workshops focusing on some of the crucial technical questions in this area. The study and subsequent

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workshops will offer a thorough and systematic analysis of what a commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons means in practice.” With this vision and this type of practical, detailed work, it is very possible that the policy deadlocks of the past few years can be broken. Achieving a world free of nuclear weapons is—as even the most ardent proponents admit—a daunting task. By marrying the vision to pragmatic steps, however, is should be possible to implement measures that can restore the lost momentum of previous years, concretely reduce the risks of nuclear terrorism, nuclear war and nuclear use, and rebuild the global consensus to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapon states and drastically reduce the arsenals of the current weapon states. As Minister Beckett said: “So my commitment to that vision, truly visionary in its day, of a world free of nuclear weapons is undimmed. And although we in this room may not see the end of that road, we can take those first further steps down it. For any generation that would be a noble calling. For ours, it is a duty.”

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-39

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The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian 9LHZRQKRZWR&XUHWKH³,QKHUHQW 'HIHFWV´RIWKH1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ5HJLPH Victor MIZIN1 Abstract. Due to a number of reasons, including the emerging crises in relations between Russia and the West, the urgency of global concerns regarding the proliferation of WMD and missiles appears to have diminished. But emergence of new threats brought back to life the key problem of global security: the survival of leading world powers. In the face of the new global security challenges, Russia and the West have revitalized the importance of non-proliferation. Still, the nonproliferation regime is suffering from intrinsic drawbacks and should be improved. Such improvement presupposes the close cooperation, or at least an accord, between the leading world powers as a core element.

Diminished sense of urgency Global concern regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles appears to have lost its sense of urgency in world politics lately. This was partly due to the emerging crises in relations between Russia and the West, as well as what can be termed the North-South divide, stemming from the political and diplomatic rifts in their respective foreign policy approaches. 2 New confrontations between the former Cold War rivals on almost every major issue became particularly evident after the G-8 summits in 2006-2007 and the landmark speech of President Putin at the 43 rd Munich Conference on Security Policy. Supported in certain European circles, these Russian WKHVHV RQ WKH FROODSVH RI WKH ³XQLSRODU ZRUOG´ IROORZHG E\ 0RVFRZ¶V FODLP IRU HQWLUHO\ HTXDO VWDWXV ZLWK WKH OHDGLQJ ZRUOG SRZHUV DQG LWV ³QHZ ZRUOG RUGHU´ concept seemed to have ruined all prospects for Russia actually joining the West - thus once again underlining the lingering gap in values between the two sides 3. Likewise, plans to create a kind of broad front of the states which would make meaningful efforts to stop WMD proliferation and strengthen international security and strategic stability including the arms control process seem rather bleak. 4 Still, even in the long-HVWDEOLVKHG VFHQDULR RI WKH ³ZDU RI DOO DJDLQVW DOO´ RQ WKH world arena, the issue of nonproliferation and its core element ± the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ± retain their importance. After all, 1

Counsellor, Analytical Division, Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly Andrew Kuchins, Vyacheslav Nikonov, and Dmitri Trenin, ³U.S.-Russian Relations: The Case for an 8SJUDGH´&DUQHJLH0RVFRZ&HQWHU5HSRUWJanuary 20,.2005 3 %UHW 6WHSKHQV ³/LWWOH 6ZHDW\ )LVW Why is Putin now getting tough on Iran?´ Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2007 4 The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; Secretary-General's remarks at Macalester College Convocation to inaugurate Institute for Global Citizenship , St. Paul, Minnesota, 22 April 2006, http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1999 2

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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

nonproliferation in fact relates to the key problem of global security- the survival of leading world powers, Russia and the West - in the face of new global security challenges. The current security situation is marked by the emergence of new threats the form of terrorist activities and the potential use of WMD by international Islamic IXQGDPHQWDOLVWVLQWKHLUILJKWDJDLQVWWKHµPDLQHQHPLHV¶± the so-FDOOHG³LQILGHO´:HVW and Russia, which prevent the former from attaining world dominance. 5 This SKHQRPHQRQLVODEHOHG³VXSHUWHUURULVP´E\VRPHH[SHUWV 6 Compared with other types of WMD and even subversive activities, nuclear weapons, obviously would be difficult to incorporate into the cannibalistic plans of the Islamists.7 But even the minor risk of the use of nuclear weapons, in view of their terrible destructive consequences, must be treated seriously. It is not accidental that President Putin referred to WMD proliferation as the main security threat of the 21st century.8 The advent of new actors possessing nuclear weapons in unstable regions, SDUWLFXODUO\UDGLFDO WHUURULVWJURXSVDQGLUUHVSRQVLEOHµURJXH¶VWDWHVKDVVXUSDVVHGWKH possibility of nuclear showdown between the members of the traditional nuclear SRZHUV µFOXE¶ DV WKH JUHDWHVW WKUHDW WRGD\ IRU WKH OHDGLQJ ZRUOG SRZHUV 7KLV VHW RI issues also presents the basis for the security dialogue between both East and West and North and South. Most probably it will continue to dominate the agenda in the sphere of defense and global security in the foreseeable future. In this respect, the developed countries still view the NPT of 1968 as the central, integral factor in maintaining peace and international stability. Russia, as the main successor of the USSR which was a founding member of the NPT at the very peak of WKH &ROG :DU DOVR VWLFNV WR WKLV VWDQFH 'HVSLWH DOO RI WKH GLIILFXOWLHV 0RVFRZ¶V approach is unambiguous. The Treaty, which comprises 189 member states today, has passed the test of time over its 30 year history. There is no obvious alternative to the NPT as a mechanism for containing the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthening international security on the global and regional levels. 9 In fact, there are no means for counteracting nuclear weapons¶SUROLIHUDWLRQWRGD\WKDWFRXOGEHPRUHVXFFHVVIXOWKDQ the NPT. Any other options that include the use of military force would be more costly, both in the financial and political aspects. The point is how to improve the NPT, increase its effectiveness and adjust this useful Cold War-era contraption to new realities.

5

'U .HQW +XJKHV %XWWV DQG 3URIHVVRU %HUW % 7XVVLQJ ³$GGUHVVLQJ The Conditions That Foster 7HUURULVP´8QLWHG6WDWHV$UP\:DU&ROOHJH6\PSRVLXP, Center for Strategic Leadership, CSL 1 Issue, U.S. Army War College , Volume 10-05, July 2005, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/10-05.pdf 6 Marvin J. Cetron, Terror 2000: The Future Face of Terrorism  (KXG 6SULQ]DN  ³7KH *UHDW 6XSHUWHUURULVP6FDUH´Foreign Policy, Fall 1998 7 ,$($'LUHFWRU*HQHUDO'U0RKDPHG(O%DUDGHL³1XFOHDU7HUURULVP,GHQWLI\LQJDQG&RPEDWLQJWKH Risks´International Conference on Nuclear Security: Global Directions for the Future , London, 16 March 2005, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n003.html 8 The BBC Interview with V. Putin, June 22, 2003, Novo-Ogarevo, http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2003/06/47510.shtml (Russian) 9 See /HZLV $ 'XQQ ³&RXQWHULQJ 3UROLIHUDWLRQ ,QVLJKWV IURP 3DVW µ¶:LQV /RVVHV DQG 'UDZV¶¶´ Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006

V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

41

Treaty successes Conceived in a period of optimism over ideas to prevent nuclear war, and promote arms control and peaceful coexistence of the two radically opposite social and political global systems, the NPT has proven, in general, to be a helpful instrument of international law. Taking into account the complex realities of the modern world, it has HVWDEOLVKHGDUDWKHUHIIHFWLYHOHJDOUHJLPHZKLFKFRQWUDU\WRWKHSHVVLPLVWV¶SURJQRVHV managed to prevent the emergence of dozens of new nuclear states in the world. On the whole, by the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, a certain level of international security had been reached through the enforcement of this Treaty. During this period almost 40 countries joined the NPT. Access to nuclear weapons was blocked for Iraq. Military nuclear programs were shut down in countries like Argentina, Brazil and South Africa. The authority of the nuclear nonproliferation regime had been growing steadily. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the termination of confrontation between the two antagonistic military-political blocks, the NPT gained particular significance. Newly independent nations ± Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan ± agreed to become non-nuclear states, abandoning the nuclear weapons they had inherited as breakaway parts of the former Soviet Union. Thus Russia became the only nuclear power and therefore the natural though informal political and military leader of the CIS countries. In the new phase after the end of the Cold War, the importance of the NPT grew significantly when it became the key instrument of sustaining stability in the chaotic world where no politico-military blocs existed. At the historic NPT 1995 Review Conference, the Treaty was indefinitely extended. A series of countries which had refused to join it earlier, including such nuclear powers as France and China, joined the Treaty in the years leading up to the review and extension conference.

Inherent defects Concurrent with the above-mentioned positive processes, the so-called built-in defects of the treaty appeared. They can be roughly grouped into philosophical, political and technological categories. The inherent shortcomings of the Treaty became particularly evident with the HPHUJHQFHRIWKH³SUREOHP´VWDWHVWKHQRWRULRXVµJURXSRIWKUHH¶LQFOXGLQJ,UDQ,UDT North Korea and, to some extent, Libya) which in fact circumvented the NPT-imposed constraints and covertly started to develop nuclear weapons. As India and Pakistan MRLQHG WKH ³QXFOHDU SRZHUV FOXE´ DQG 1RUWK .RUHD DQG ,UDQ SXUVXHG WKLV VWDWXV D critical point was reached. By the middle of the 1990s, it became obvious that the NPT could not become the panacea for the mushrooming spread of nuclear-weapon states that it had seemed to be in the 1970-80s. The Treaty failed to develop into a ³XQLYHUVDO´ WRRO HPEUDFLQJ DOO VWDWHV RI WKH ZRUOG ZKLOH WKH LQHIIHFWLYHQHVV RI international nonproliferation regimes was exposed. The main dilemma of the nonprolifeUDWLRQSDUDGLJPWKHNH\³SKLORVRSKLFDO´IODZYLVLEO\FDPHWRWKHIRUH 10

10

-RVHSK61\H³1377KH/RJLFRI,QHTXDOLW\´Foreign Policy, Summer 1985

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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

Philosophical flaws First, the NPT regime discriminates between states, placing them into two unequal groups ± µRIILFLDO¶ QXFOHDU SRZHUV ZKLFK FRQGXFWHG QXFOHDU WHVWV EHIRUH  DQG all others. It is thus the question of the discrepancy between the rights of the most developed and military-PLJKW\ ³ROG´ JUHDW SRZHUV SRVVHVVLQJ IRUPDO QXFOHDU VWDWXV within the NPT and new players, seeking the role of regional power centers, as well as UDGLFDO ³URJXH´ VWDWHV  7KRXJK DFFHSWHG LQ WKH WLPH RI WKH JOREDO FRQIURQWDWLRQ between two antagonist blocs with respective nuclear-weapons leaders, this formula is rejected by the developing countries today. Second, there are many states mainly within WKH ³DQWL-Imperialist, anti-JOREDOLVW´ EORF ZKLFK VWLOO YLHZ WKH 137 DV DQ LQWULQVLFDOO\ XQIDLU ³:HVWHUQ SOR\´ GHVLJQHG WR prevent them from developing nuclear weapons potentials and benefiting from nuclear energy unhindered. Most leaders of the developing countries find it difficult to concede that they are in fact compelled to forego these crucial assets of military might that are particularly significant in the regional balances of power. The motivation to acquire nuclear weapons as a means of promoting foreign policy and strategic military interests is considerably weakened but is not eliminated completely. The argument in favor of the strengthening of the nonproliferation regimes needs further theoretical development, especially after the conflicts in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and Iraq. It would be very difficult to persuade a regional leader of a developing country striving to build national defense capabilities to refrain from developing the weaponry that, in his perception, is the only definitive means of preventing the hypothetical aggression of great powers against his country (in the guise of a peacekeeping RSHUDWLRQRUD³KXPDQLWDULDQLQWHUYHQWLRQ´XQGHUWKH81IODJ  Political flaws Third, the NPT presumes that nuclear powers will assist non-nuclear states in mastering GRPHVWLFSHDFHIXOQXFOHDUWHFKQRORJ\LQUHWXUQIRUWKHLUUHMHFWLRQRIQXFOHDUZHDSRQV¶ GHYHORSPHQW +RZHYHU WKLV ³EDLW´ GRHV QRW DOZD\V ZRUN WRGD\ )RU VRPH ³URJXH´ VWDWHV QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV UHPDLQ DQ ³HQG LQ LWVHOI´ IDU PRUH DWtractive than peaceful technologies. Besides, the supply considerably exceeds the demand in the global markets of nuclear materials and technologies. Finally, among the political defects is the obvious fact that certain states including Russia and the USA, while being parties to the NPT, do not strictly comply with all its provisions (in particular, regarding the progress of disarmament and arms control talks and certain aspects of nuclear technology transfer). The remarkable nixing of decades of American nonproliferation policies by the US-India deal on peaceful use of nuclear energy that was declared in July 2005 by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister M. Singh, though sharply criticized by most nonproliferation and arms control ³]HDORWV´11 received unequivocal bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress, thus proving once again that economic interests tend to take precedence over nonproliferation objectives. Although some obstacles must be overcome to effectuate this sweeping agreement which has to be endorsed by the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group 11

See for example: Michael Krepon³Betting the Ranch on the US-India Nuclear Deal´June 5, 2006, ttp://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=297

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(NSG) before it can take effect, it is obvious that India was de facto recognized as a nuclear state even by the nonproliferation-conscious Washington. Technological flaws At the same time - and this LVWKHNH\³WHFKQRORJLFDO´GUDZEDFNRIWKH7UHDW\- several developing countries even ventured to start the development of nuclear weapons under the front of their membership and to profit from certain lacunas of the NPT. The point is that any state member FDQ FUHDWH DOPRVW FRPSOHWH SRWHQWLDO IRU QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV¶ production while staying within the NPT confines and formally observing its obligations ± this opportunity is historically built into the NPT. All this poses the problem of the NPT implementation and compliance anew± both on the basis of the traditional mechanisms of international law including the IAEA and the UN Security Council venues (which by no means are able to stop attempts to acquire WMD capabilities each time) and by military counter-proliferation operations WKDW DUH DOVR FULWLFL]HG DV XQLODWHUDO ³LPSHULDOLVW´ HVFDSDGHV DQG IUHTXHQWO\ SURYH themselves inefficient, as the Bush and Clinton administrations have demonstrated).

Differing priorities It seems that the flaws and legal gaps of the NPT are obvious even to non-specialists. However, possible ways of improving the situation and eliminating these inherent defects raise much controversy as a result of the conflicting approaches between the followers of the traditional political and diplomatic methods and the advocates of the non-RUWKRGR[ DSSURDFKHV IRFXVLQJ RQ WKH WKUHDW RI IRUFH RU DG KRF ³FORVHG-FLUFXLW´ deals for any specific case of the NPT violation. Not every state ± for example, Russia or some members of the EU ± considers nuclear non-proliferation the top priority. 12 In real life, double standards are used rather often in assessing the threat of proliferation ± WKHUHLVDNLQGRI³JRRG´DQG³EDG´ proliferation.13 The world ± TXLWH IDU IURP .DQWLDQ ³HWHUQDO SHDFH´ SLSH GUHDPV - is VWLOOGLYLGHGLQWRRSSRVLQJFDPSVZKHUHFHUWDLQIDLOHGVWDWHVILJKWLQJWKHODUJHQDWLRQV¶ KHJHPRQ\ DFW LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH +REEHVLDQ SULQFLSOH RI ³ZDU RI DOO DJDLQVW DOO´ spending almost the entirety of available resources on the arms race. Owing to its inborn imperfections, the NPT failed to prevent the development of covert nuclear ZHDSRQVSURJUDPVLQWKHFKDLQRI³DQWL-V\VWHPLF´VWDWHVZKLFKXVHGWREHWKHFOLHQWVRU allies of the Soviet Union and came to be rogue states later. Clash of systems Thus the essential problem is the clash of two broad concepts of ensuring international security and strategic stability in the extreme critical circumstances. On the one hand, there is the course on establishing dialogue, using political and diplomatic means, incremental strengthening of non-proliferation regimes and arms control mechanisms, HPSOR\LQJ WROHUDQW SHUVXDVLRQ DQG HQJDJLQJ IRUPHU DQG SUHVHQW ³URJXH´ VWDWHV LQ WKH 12

George Perkovich³7KH(QGRIWKH1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ5HJLPH"´Current History, November 2006 5LFKDUG 1 +DDVV ³,QGLD ,UDQ DQG WKH FDVH IRU GRXEOH VWDQGDUGV´ Daily Times, May 14, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10685/india_iran_and_the_case_for_double_standards.html 13

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international relations system as equal partners without demonizing them (for example, the traditional diplomatic rhetoric of Moscow that is shared by Beijing and most part of WKH³ROG´(XURSHQRZ 7KLVOLQHFDQEHWHQWDWLYHO\FDOOHGWKH³FDUURW´VWUDWHJ\ 7KLV ³SRVLWLYLVW´ DQG LQ PDQ\ UHVSHFWV LGHDOLVWLF DQG SURSDJDQGD-GULYHQ ³FDUURW´ modeOLVMX[WDSRVHGWRWKH³VWLFN´DSSURDFK± the policy pursued by a certain part of the conservative US elites. This new strategy is aimed at creating new mechanisms for SURWHFWLQJ $PHULFDQ LQWHUHVWV WKURXJK WKH UHYLVLRQ RI WKH RXWGDWHG ³
Nonproliferation provisions The problems with the NPT could be most visibly examined through the analysis of its specific articles. Articles I and II, which are the core of the Treaty, prohibit the transfer RI QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV IURP QXFOHDU VWDWHV WR ³DQ\ UHFLSLHQW ZKDWVRHYHU´ DQG EDQ QRQQXFOHDU VWDWHV IURP UHFHLYLQJ WKHP IURP ³DQ\ WUDQVIHURU ZKDWVRHYHU´ WKXV GHSULYLQJ them of any direct or indirect control over nuclear weapons. The wording of Article I FRQFHUQLQJWKHSURKLELWLRQWRWUDQVIHUQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDQGFRQWURORYHUWKHPWR³DQ\ UHFLSLHQW ZKDWVRHYHU´ LQFOXGLQJ QRW RQO\ QRQ-nuclear states but also individuals, separate groups, parties or organizations, has particular significance today. President 3XWLQ KDV UHSHDWHGO\ VWDWHG 5XVVLD¶V UHVROYH WR SUHYHQW WHUURULVWV RU WKRVH KDUERULQJ them from acquiring WMD and associated materials, equipment and technologies. In case terrorists get access to nuclear weapons and related technologies the strictest compliance with the Treaty by nuclear powers as well as the entire nuclear nonproliferation process would lose all the meaning and importance. 14 At the same time, the second part of Article I contains a provision which becomes obsolete today ± 3DUWRIWKH$UWLFOHREOLJHVRQO\WKHQXFOHDUVWDWHV³QRWLQDQ\ZD\WR assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such ZHDSRQV RU H[SORVLYH GHYLFHV´ 8QIRUWXQDWHO\ KRZHYHU D ³EODFN PDUNHW´ IRU VXFK technologies is operating today. It provides the opportunity to deliver and receive nuclear and other critical WMD-related materials and technologies, for example WKURXJK $4 .KDQ¶V LOOLFLW LQWHUQDWLRQDO QXFOHDU WUDGH QHWZRUN 15 Terrorists are also supported by a kind of international black market club of WMD-technology SUROLIHUDWLRQ VSRQVRUV ZKLFK LQFOXGHV WKH PHPEHUV RI WKH ³miserables¶ FOXE´ ± Pakistani, North Korean and Iranian and some other Asian and Middle-Eastern organizations which pose the main threat of dissemination of critical technologies in the world. Resolution 1540 adopted by the UN Security Council in April 2004 (for which Russia was one of the initiators) steers states toward preventing the acquisition of WMD and associated materials by non-state actors who seek to obtain them with 14

Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, (Times Books: 2004) David Albright and Corey Hinderstein ³7KH $4 .KDQ ,OOLFLW 1XFOHDU 7UDGH 1HWZRUN DQG Implications for NonproliferatioQ(IIRUWV´Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6, July 2006 15

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primarily terrorism-related goals. It is essential to develop effective multilateral cooperation in counteracting this danger.

Safeguards provision In the present international situation, Article III of the NPT, describing the set of IAEA safeguards, which by the cooperation of the states parties to the Treaty should ensure the verification and compliance with its provisions by non-nuclear states, acquires key importance. The IAEA safeguards are aimed at prevention or timely detection in case significant quantities of nuclear materials are diverted from peaceful nuclear activities to the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. The system of socalled comprehensive safeguards should have assured the peaceful nature of the nonnuclear states programs as an indispensable condition for the transfer of nuclear materials and technologies. Aimed at promoting cooperation in the sphere of peaceful atomic energy, the IAEA is practically the only regulatory mechanism of global control today which has played an important role in the strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. However, in the early 1990s the Agency had also failed to detect illicit nuclear programs. It is another question whether the IAEA can cope with the task of FRQWUROOLQJ KXQGUHGV RI QXFOHDU UHDFWRUV ZRUOGZLGH LI WKH ZLGHO\ GLVFXVVHG ³QXFOHDU UHQDLVVDQFH´LHWhe rapid development of peacefully oriented nuclear energy in many countries, actually takes place. After all, tens out of 189 countries of the world have not yet concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA during the 30year span of NPT enforcement. More than 90 states, including one and a half dozen states with substantial nuclear programs, have not signed or ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol. The largest nuclear powers ± the United States and Russia ± belong to this group as well. Earlier in 1981, doubting the effectiveness of this international organization, Israel was forced to launch a pre-emptive strike against the Iraqi nuclear research reactor ³2]LUDN´ZLWKRXWUHFHLYLQJDQ\LQWHUQDWLRQDOVDQFWLRQV The clandestine activities in countries like North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and South Africa required a more intrusive and stricter safeguards system. After it was GLVFRYHUHG WKDW 6DGGDP +XVVHLQ¶V UHJLPH LQ ,UDT LQIULQJHG XSRQ WKH 137 FRYHUWO\ trying to produce nuclear weapons, the IAEA safeguards system was strengthened by introducing special intrusive inspections at nuclear sites. They were aimed toward ensuring access of IAEA inspectors to all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle and comprehensive information about the nuclear activities of the state. This was fixed in the model Additional Protocol to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement approved by the IAEA in 1997 and signed by all nuclear states, which became a more secure instrument of transparency for national nuclear programs (IAEA document INFCIRC/540). Today, a growing number of states are on the way to accede to this document; the procedures set in the Protocol are being implemented in practice. Unfortunately, not all countries with significant nuclear activities have acceded to the Additional Protocol under the pretext of its infringement on the sovereign rights or disregard for arms control and nonproliferation priorities.

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Integrated safeguards The next step in strengthening the safeguards system should be the adoption of an integrated safeguards system based on an optimal combination of the Additional Protocol requirements and the previous safeguard system16. This measure aims at the most rational use of existing technical instruments of verification with an emphasis on tracking highly critical technologies and materials. It is devised to draw comprehensive conclusions regarding compliance by a state with its nonproliferation obligations, taking into account the entirety of its nuclear assets and relevant infrastructure. It is focused on the total nuclear activities of the state and presumes increased interaction between the Agency and the national system of nuclear accounting and control. However, it is clear that if such a system of thorough accounting for past programs is put in place, many states may be faced with serious and uncomfortable problems. Likewise, many nuclear powers including Russia are not ready to put all their nuclear sites including the military facilities under IAEA control. Verification Unfortunately, it must be admitted that the system which even nuclear powers are not ready to accept does not preclude all opportunities to conduct covert development of nuclear weapons and related research. In fact, the inspections are normally held only in order to detect the illegal activities at the nuclear sites and not in all possible venues throughout the country. However, covert nuclear activities may be conducted at various undisclosed underground sites, or duplicate or dispersed facilities as - in the case of Iran which signed the Additional Protocol in October 2003. Undisclosed facilities can be detected in theory, provided that exceptionally accurate intelligence is at hand, which most developed countries, with the possible exception of Israel, very often lack today. The complete destruction of such facilities and guaranteed nonrenewal of illicit WMD-related activities are viable only through the nation-devastating carpet bombing using nuclear weapons or next-generation earth-penetrators followed by an actual occupation of the noncompliant state and by an effective regime change with step-by-VWHS ³GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ´  6XFK FRQWURYHUVLDO UDGLFDO PHDVXUHV DUH UDWKHU problematic today in view of the stark fiascos in Iraq and Afghanistan where U.S. and NATO states have shown themselves to be completely unprepared for the daunting tasks of post-conflict rehabilitation and meaningful nation-building on the road to modernity and democracy. For this kind of operation, say, in Iran, the United States would have to deploy a 600,000-800,000-strong military contingent, with a strong grasp of the pitfalls of modern guerilla warfare and warped regional specifics necessary for winning hearts and minds in the predominantly hostile Islamic ambiance. It is obvious that although this option is highly questionable operationally and almost excluded on political grounds, other measures (for example, UN Security

16 2Q LQWHJUDWHG VDIHJXDUGV VHH  ,$($ 'LUHFWRU *HQHUDO 'U 0RKDPHG (O%DUDGHL ³6WDWHPHQW WR WKH 6\PSRVLXP RQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6DIHJXDUGV 9HULILFDWLRQ DQG 1XFOHDU 0DWHULDO 6HFXULW\´ 2FWREHU  1; DOVR  )ULW] 6FKPLGW ³137 ([SRUW &RQWURO DQG  WKH =DQJJHU &RPPLWWHH´ Nonproliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2000

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&RXQFLOVDQFWLRQVRU³VXUJLFDO´DLUVWULNHVDJDLQVWWKHGHWHFWHGQXFOHDUVLWHVRUHYHQWKH extensive system of on-site inspections throughout the problem country with the threat of use of force in case of refusal) cannot completely assure the full dismantlement or non-renewal of proscribed nuclear programs. Moreover, even the modern technical means of verification, including outer spacebased surveillance and intelligence data collection, do not provide the states (according to the unclassified information) with the full coverage and understanding of nuclear activities in such states as Iran or North Korea. Apart from strengthening international compliance mechanisms and unifying the UN Security Council on nonproliferation issues that currently divide its leading members, the use of ad hoc schemes based on regionally-linked solutions would seem to be more effective. Improving safeguards In the past, each major crisis has led to a major upgrade in the NPT safeguards. They should be further perfected and reinforced in their intrusiveness and scope, assuring WKDWWKHVSUHDGRIQXFOHDUWHFKQRORJLHV¶EHQHILWVGRHVQRWRSHQgates or create potential loopholes for the acquisition of nuclear weapons know-how - with no prejudice to the NPT-stipulated inalienable rights of member-states. New practically achievable and regionally-based opportunities must be pursued, if the formerl\KDELWXDOSUDFWLFHVRIGLVDUPDPHQWGLSORPDF\DUHQRWZRUNLQJLQRXUµSRVWpost-FROGZDU¶HQYLURQPHQW &XUUHQWO\WKH137UHJLPHZRUNVLQWZRRSHUDWLRQDO³WUDFNV´RU³SODQHV´7KHILUVW µSODQH¶- the traditional multilateral disarmament diplomacy avenue which is based on WKH 81 ,$($ DQG RWKHU JURXSV¶ DFWLYLWLHV FDQ KDUGO\ VROYH WKH DFXWH FRQWHPSRUDU\ problems of the NPT application. The second channel - regional or ad hoc solutions, used for example in the recent settlement around the North Korean nuclear entanglement - addresses the primary problem of the drives and stimuli urging states to seek nuclear weapon capabilities. Ideally, both tracks enhance and support each other. In practice, the first one is arguably idle and limited to useless declarations, resolutions and petitions lost on potential proliferators.

Internationalizing nuclear activities Placing all nuclear activities in the problem countries under the control of international nuclear-energy consortiums and incarnating the idea of an international nuclear fuel cycle (INFC) presents another solution. Such entities could include, for example apart from reemerging Russia - representatives from the EU, primarily France, Great Britain and Germany, as well as states within close proximity like China and South Korea, and possibly Japan in the case of the DPRK, and the Gulf states or India in the case of Iran. These initiatives could be based on the suggestion of suspending the transfer of enrichment technologies made by President George W. Bush at the session of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in February 2004 and the proposal made by Director General ElBaradei to create a web of international nuclear fuel cycle centers for providing services under the IAEA aegis.

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Past plans for the internationalization RI QXFOHDU WHFKQRORJLHV¶ GHYHORSPHQW OLNH Acheson-Lilienthal or Baruk Plans, President (LVHQKRZHU¶V ³$WRPV IRU 3HDFH´ DQG ³QXFOHDUVKDULQJ´LGHDVDOOIDLOHGIRUSROLWLFDOUHDVRQVLQWKHWXPXOWXRXVDQGVXVSLFLRXV environment of the Cold war. President Bush¶V LGHDV LQ  SURSRVLQJ WKDW WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO PDUNHW SURYLGH D guaranteed supply of fresh fuel to states that do not possess or pursue fuel cycle facilities, or his initiative of GNEP (based on some Russian ideas) envisioning enhanced production, meeting ecological concerns and enforcing nonproliferation now look more promising and garner significant, if muted, international support. 5XVVLDQ3UHVLGHQW3XWLQ¶VLQLWLDWLYHRI-DQXDU\WRFUHDWHDQXFOHDUIXHOF\FOH center in Russia as a prototype of future global infrastructure also has been met quite positively. President Putin confirmed that Russia is ready to build such an international center on its territory, while all the problems can be solved only within the framework of the broad internationaO FRRSHUDWLRQ  +H FODLPHG WKDW ³WKLV FRXOG EH D ORQJ-haul project LQYROYLQJ WKH SDUWLFLSDWLRQ RI VWDWHV SRVVHVVLQJ VLJQLILFDQW VXSSOLHV RI XUDQLXP IXHO´ Such centers could be built not only in Russia, but also in the nuclear states providing ³WKHXQGLVFULPLQDWLQJDFFHVVRIDOOLQWHUHVWHGSDUWLHV´ 17 Russian nuclear industry experts believe that if the implementation of this proposal is endorsed by the international community, it would, in the first place, ensure the development of atomic energy in the world with the strict observance of the nonproliferation regime. 18 According to the position of the former Federal Agency for the Atomic Energy of the RF (now recast into a government-run corporation) a uranium enrichment center in Russia and four or five such centers in the key regions of the world would be quite sufficient. As the head of the Agency (presently of the corporation), Sergey Kirienko, noted, it is necessary to complete several tasks including some on the international level. These are the establishment of a chain of international centers of uranium enrichment, as well as ones on the utilization (disposal) of spent nuclear fuel, and on nuclear-energy personnel training.19 The idea of ad hoc consortiums to run the nuclear complexes in each individual case implies an ideology underlying the initiative of creating international centers more comprehensively. Its crucial point is the involvement of the regional factor since nuclear ambitions of states are primarily spurred by their perception of real or alleged military threats, absence or insufficiency of security guarantees and persistent instability in a number of regions in the world. 20 Vested with extensive rights with the partial delegation of national sovereignty in establishing a kind of protectorate over nuclear programs of the relevant states, such consortiums could carry out all practical activities and research in the nuclear energy sphere in the problem states. Only small-scale pilot development programs under strict control could be allowed to save the feelings of national pride in indigenous societies. Certainly, in the beginning, not many countries will be ready to rescind INFC development rights and options. The basic argument in favor of such centers is based 17 $QVZHUVRI3UHVLGHQWRI5XVVLD93XWLQDWWKH³ELJSUHVV-FRQIHUHQFH´IRU5XVVLDQDQGIRUHLJQPDVVmedia, Moscow, January 31, 2006, http://g8russia.ru/news/20060131/1142061.html (Russian) 18 ³1XFOHDU ³5HQDLVVDQFH´ DQG WKH 1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ 5HJLPH´ *HQHUDOL]DWLRQ )HEUXDU\  http://www.rian.ru/review/20060209/43450514.html 19 Ibid. 20 *HUDOG 6WHLQEHUJ ³1RQ-3UROLIHUDWLRQ 7LPH IRU 5HJLRQDO $SSURDFKHV"´ Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 3, Summer 1994

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on the prohibitively high costs of the local pursuit of nuclear cycle capabilities in the dilapidated conditions in the third world. At the same time, artful PR should demonstrate the potential benefits and acquisitions in the case of entry into international cooperative schemes. In return for the partial surrender of national sovereignty, nuclear powers would stimulate the flow of novel technologies and Marshall-plan-level investments in the non-nuclear industries of developing countries. Such projects could serve as a hedge against arbitrary forceful actions of such countries as the USA, and at the same time ensure strict enforcement of the NPT and international nonproliferation norms. 21 $WWUDFWLYH ³VWLFNV DQG FDUURWV´ DQG HFRQRPLF DVVLVWDQFH SDFNDJHV VKRXOG IXUWKHU promote this type of system in the world and win support of national nuclear bureaucracies and politico-military elites. The development of an international fuel F\FOH FHQWHUV¶ ZHE FRXOG OHDG WR WKH FUHDWLRQ RI D QHZ LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQ assuring a guaranteed supply of nuclear services (most probably, under the IAEA aegis or linked to it). The problems surrounding this endeavor seem immense. Among them: How to enforce compliance? How to foster credibility and trust to this body? Is the IAEA powerful enough to substitute this new organization or itself for current individual national projects promoted by fiercely competing companies in the field of nuclear technology? Expected outcries from third world states that such plans border on re-introducing ³DSDUWKHLG´ LQ FLYLO QXFOHDU WHFKQRORJLHV FRXOG EH FKDOOHQJHG ZLWK DUJXPHQW WKDW extending INFC services to developing nations, primarily on a discount basis of relevant agreements, serves the far-reaching objectives of the sustained development paradigm. However, it is clear that these initiatives go beyond the traditional conceptual framework of the NPT ± foregoing nuclear-weapons programs in exchange for the right WRGHYHORSSHDFHIXODWRPLFHQHUJ\RQRQH¶VRZQZLWK,$($RYHUVLJKW

The right to peaceful nuclear energy Today, when developed countries make serious attempts to deny terrorists, their supporting regimes and international structures the access to WMD technologies, Article IV of the NPT which codifies the right of all the states party to the Treaty to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, gains paramount importance. Historically, the commitment of non-nuclear states not to create nuclear weapons in return for the assistance of nuclear powers in developing peaceful nuclear energy programs (thH VR FDOOHG ³QXFOHDU GHDO´  ZKLFK ZDV SURPRWHG E\ WKH GHYHORSLQJ countries and actively supported by the USSR, became a major incentive that ensured the acceptance of the very concept of the treaty by the third World. 21 About the possibility of creating such consortium for Iran see: Charles D. Ferguson and Victor Mizin, ³Russia can help resolve Iran crisis´ The Baltimore Sun , May 22, 2006; Victor Mizin and Brian Finlay, ³Pride or Prejudice: The Interplay of Domestic and Foreign Policy in Russia on the Iranian Nuclear 3URJUDP´ The Stimson Center Cooperative Nonproliferation Program, http://www.stimson.org/?SN=CT200611161136; *HRIIUH\ )RUGHQ DQG -RKQ 7KRPVRQ ³,UDQ DV D 3LRQHHU &DVH IRU 0XOWLODWHUDO 1XFOHDU $UUDQJHPHQWV´ 0,7 6HSWHPEHU   http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/Iran%20as%20a%20pioneer%20case%20for%20multilateral%20nuclear%20agr eements%20v2.pdf

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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

The balance between the rights and obligations of the NPT parties regarding the peaceful use of atomic energy is a rather contentious issue between the developed countries possessing nuclear technologies and the developing countries seeking to acquire them. These differences come to the fore at the NPT Review conferences and pose as an important theme in the bilateral contacts. This is all due to the fact that YDULRXV µSHDFHIXO¶ QXFOHDU WHFKQRORJLHV PD\ EH XVHG IRU WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI QXFOHDU weapons. It is still a theoretically unresolved issue whether all states should enjoy equal rights to participate in international affairs regardless of the nature of their political regime, level of development of democratic institutions, foreign policy specifics, H[LVWHQFH RI µFKHFNV DQG EDODQFHV¶ V\VWHP and operational transparency of governmental institutions. This concerns membership in international organizations including the UN as well as access to sophisticated technologies leading to the creation of nuclear weapons and other kinds of WMD and modern combat missiles. In SDUWLFXODU FDVHV WKH TXHVWLRQ LV ZKHWKHU GLFWDWRUVKLS RU µURJXH¶ WHUURULVW UHJLPHV - if Iran and North Korea are to be classified as such - have a right to develop peaceful nuclear programs or biotechnologies at all. Or they should be totally ostracized in a sort of international ghetto, even if not by the whole international community then, at least, by key world powers, thus systematically driving the regime-change and followup step-by-step national recovery and democratization? This approach is vehemently debunked by hordes of left-leaning and Third-World-obsessed experts asking why, in the times of sweeping globalization, the West and U.S. in particular should be anointed as the world judge and constable. However, a new core of world democracies and economic powerhouses is evidently forming that is bound to govern the global development and must be efficiently protected against loony terrorist infringements on its security. Even communist China, currently slated to take the leading global role of economic powerhouse that Britain played in the 18th century, will inevitably become truly democratic or face internal turmoil and painful confrontation with the West. Finally, this could lead to the substitution of this democratic core group to the now DOPRVW RSHUDWLRQDOO\ GHIXQFW 81 V\VWHP EDVHG RQ WKH DQDFKURQLVWLF ³
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and consulted on major issues, it would be hard for the Kremlin to resist such an offer. Nonproliferation and the fight against global terrorism could provide a natural avenue for achieving such entente cordiale. This could be sealed by a new meaningful legallybinding US-Russian agreement on further reductions of strategic offensive weapons (say, to the ceiling of 1,000, presently loathed by military planners in both states), limited collaboration on strategic defenses starting with confidence-building, transparency and reciprocal control measures, and a general outline of the new tenets RIVWUDWHJLFVWDELOLW\EDVHGRQWKHFRQFHSWRIDFRKHUHQWGRFWULQHIRUWKH³FROODERUDWLYH non-provocative, low-level nucleDUGHIHQVH´WREHHODERUDWHG Despite the generally shared vision of a democratic and stable international community comprised of equally empowered states, our world - this is the fact of life is divided into leading and non-essential states in terms of global influence. There exist two groups of states - QXFOHDU ³KDYHV´ DQG ³KDYH-QRWV´ &XUUHQWO\ LW LV LPSRVVLEOH WR assure equal rights for all states or non-state actors. The nuclear domain is dominated by a few states - donors of technology and fissile materials -USA, Russia, France, Canada and probably Japan with China and India arguably in the offing. Other players so far have limited chances to develop their indigenous nuclear technology potentials - thus depending on the group of nuclear ³SULQFLSDOV´

Regulating nuclear transfers At the same time, if forceful counter-proliferation actions which undoubtedly antagonize the world community are to be avoided, certain additional measures could be undertaken in order to strengthen Article IV of the NPT. 24 This could also supplement the right of non-nuclear states to the greatest possible access to nonmilitary nuclear technologies, which is stated in part II of the article. The key issue of discussion could be the further increase of effectiveness of the Additional Protocol so that the transfer of nuclear technologies and materials could be carried out only by the states which subscribe and strictly comply with it and any violators would be deprived of the right to develop peaceful nuclear programs. Another point could consist of a further strengthening of the safeguards system based on improved intelligence, as paragraph III of Article III states that safeguards should not hamper international cooperation. 25 At the same time, efforts to prevent nonnuclear states from acquiring access to critical technologies would be continued through the strengthening of international system of nuclear export control. In fact, another essential point could include a further increase of effectiveness of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee by the improvement of their control lists and guidance documents with the potential harmonization of their already

24 Lawrence Scheinman, ³$UWLFOH ,9 RI WKH 137 %DFNJURXQG 3UREOHPV´  3DSHU SUHSDUHG IRU WKH Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, June 7, 2004, http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No5.pdf 25 ³Nuclear Weapons, Energy, and Nonproliferation: Pressures on the Global Community, 41st &RQIHUHQFHRQWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVRIWKH1H[W'HFDGH´6SRQVRUHGE\WKH6WDQOH\)RXQGDWLRQ-XQH-21, 2006, Enchantment Resort, Sedona, Arizona, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/UNND06.pdf

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overlapping structures, and formally fixing their status as the international nuclear exports control system under the IAEA aegis.26 As to the efforts aimed at strengthening the international nonproliferation controls in the technological sphere, the Russian initiative concerning the development of proliferation-resistant nuclear cycle technologies proposed at the Millennium summit in 2000 should be noted. The first phase of the international project implementing the idea that was similar to the Russian initiative has already been completed under the IAEA auspices within the INPRO project (Task Force for Innovative Nuclear Reactor and Fuel Cycle). Apparently, cooperation this and similar projects (primarily, the program ³,QWHUQDWLRQDO )RUXP ± )RXUWK *HQHUDWLRQ´  DOORZV IRU WKH HODERUDWLRQ RI D FRPPRQ vision of the future development of atomic energy. In June 2004, Russia joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at the detection, prevention and suppression of illegal transactions and cross-boundary WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ LQFOXGLQJ WKH ³EODFN PDUNHW´ RI :0'-related materials and means of delivery using coercive inspections of sea, air and land transport and communications. Moscow views the PSI as a potentially useful mechanism of WMD counterproliferation consistent with the UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Russian naval forces participate in the MediterUDQHDQ LQ VXFK PDQHXYHUV DV ³$FWLYH (QGHDYRXU´ Nevertheless, this general concept of forceful interception of suspicious cargoes has many critics within Moscow government circles.

Disarmament obligations In contrast to the now outdated Article V on peaceful nuclear explosions (the USSR planned to use them for fire extinguishing), Article VI of the NPT is of fundamental importance for the whole structure of the Treaty today. Some of the formulation of the Article sounds nostalgically naïve as, for example, the requirement to carry on QHJRWLDWLRQV ³RQ D WUHDW\ RQ general and complete disarmament under strict and HIIHFWLYH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQWURO´  5XVVLDQ GLSORPDF\ SOD\V RXW WKLV $UWLFOH YHU\ skillfully underlining the fact that as opposed to the USA de facto obstruction, Moscow adheres to its commitment to observe the obligations undertaken in the nuclear disarmament sphere. 1HYHUWKHOHVV$UWLFOH9,LVFRPSOLHGZLWKRQO\FXUVRULO\ ZKLOHQXFOHDUZHDSRQV¶ reductions of the major nuclear powers have almost no relation to the NPT obligations. 7KXV WKH ³ 6WHSV´ DFWLRQ SODQ DGRSWHG E\ WKH  137 5HYLHZ &RQIHUHQFH LV widely ignored by the leading NWSs as an idealistic overly-demanding agenda imposed on them by the developing countries. Nuclear weapons and nuclear strikes planning are becoming more prominent in nuclear doctrines or military training of leading nuclear weapon states, as a tool to FRXQWHURUGLVVXDGH:0'SUROLIHUDWLRQRULWVXVHE\WKH³URJXHV´RUWHUURULVWHQWLWLHV At the same time, despite the criticism and concern on behalf of the developing countries or zealous Nonalignment movement members, the nuclear disarmament process is evolving successfully in general, as far as it is possible in the modern world. Besides, this article as it is does not demand immediate disarmament ± it only relies on the obligation to conduct negotiations that approximates the set goal bona fide. 26 Russian Federation and the Situation in the Sphere of Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Means of Their Delivery: Threats, Evaluations< Tasks and Ways of Solution, National report, http://www.government.ru/government/presscenter/new/2290e5589d7648a98063e532d70c6995.doc

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One of the significant steps in this direction is the ratification of Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty which foresees a mutual reduction of the overall quantity of strategic nuclear warheads by up to 1,700-2,200 units by December 31, 2012 ± which is about three times less than the level established by the START-1 Treaty. The process of destroying Russian and American deactivated ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, launchers, strategic atomic submarines and heavy bombers as well as tactical nuclear weapons is continuing successfully and incrementally and in accordance with the physical amortization. Since the early 1990s, Russia and the United States have reduced their strategic nuclear forces in warheads by 50% (and are to reduce by 60% by 2012); taking into consideration tactical nuclear weapons, the reduction of nuclear arsenals has reached 80%. :DVKLQJWRQ¶V SROLF\ DLPHG DW WKH FUHHSLQJ GLVPDQWOHPHQW RI WKH QXFOHDU GLVDUPDPHQWWUHDWLHV¶V\VWHPZDVVKDUSO\FULWLFL]HGE\PRVW81PHPEHUVSDUWLFXODUO\ E\WKHVWDWHVWKDWDUHSDUWLHVWRWKH137$VDFRQVHTXHQFHRI3UHVLGHQW%XVK¶VSROLFLHV such documents as the ABM Treaty, the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, START-2, the framework agreement on START-3, the agreement delineating the strategic and tactical ABM systems, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and other agreements have been buried. It is still unclear whether the US administration would actually extend the duration of START-1 which expires in 2009. On the other hand, Russian potential withdrawal from the INF and actual walk-out IURP WKH &)( 7UHDW\ ZRXOG SUREDEO\ XQGHUPLQH 0RVFRZ¶V DXWKRULW\ as a consistent proponent of arms control and suit American hardliners quite well. Moreover, this would demonstrate the adherence to the concept of eternizing nuclear deterrence what would lead to the further weakening of the NPT since such measures could be regarded as the violation of the spirit, if not the letter of nuclear powers obligations on nuclear disarmament stipulated in Article VI of the Treaty. Developing countries consider the development of new types of nuclear weapons, particularly the intention of the Bush administration to develop new types of low-yield nuclear weapons (to substitute for the tactical B-61 Mod.11 warhead) designed for the liquidation of terrorist formations and fight against groups and regimes proliferating WMD as a serious threat to the NPT viability. Russia is also reprimanded for her increasing emphasis on the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons as a deterrent of potential large-sale aggression under the pretext of OLQJHULQJ ZHDNQHVV RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V FRQYHQWLRQDO IRUFHs. The importance of nuclear weapons has been only growing recently and Russian doctrinal documents, military exercises and military building, as far as they can be assessed on the basis of open sources, are the evidence of it. Contrary to the expectations of international experts Russia does not intend to scrap tactical nuclear weapons or reduce its stockpiles in the near future ± once again referring to the NATO policies on these weapon systems. Both the United States and Russia continue working out new systems of nuclear weapons. Russia keeps on testing new strategic offensive arms systems elaborated as an asymmetric response to the USA ABM plans. All these facts reveal that the difference between nuclear and non-nuclear states will remain ± like the differences between the rich and poor, technologically developed and developing countries. Even the next wide±ranging agreement between Russia and WKH86RQIXUWKHUVWUDWHJLFZHDSRQV¶FXWVDQGFORVHUFRRSHUDWLRQRQVWUDWHJLFVWDELOLW\ issues might not allHYLDWHWKLVGLVFRQWHQWRIWKH³JOREDOSHULSKHU\´UHJDUGLQJWKHDFWXDO disarmament-oriented reticence of the leading nuclear nations.

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Steps outside the NPT So far, the threat of dumping other key arms control agreements as a result of nuclear powers politics has not been eliminated. For example, further strengthening of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could become possible only if it is ratified by the USA thus ensuring that such problem states as India, Pakistan and Israel join the Treaty. Up until now, it has been impossible to start negotiating about the elaboration of the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) owing to the strict positions of the US and China. It is unlikely that the nuclear disarmament program agreed at the NPT review conference in 2000 would induce nuclear powers to adhere to the new disarmament measures within the action plan for the13 steps in the foreseeable future. The creation of nuclear free zones envisaged in Article VII of the NPT provides an effective measure (including the purely psychological effect) of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It leads to the strengthening of regional and international security and the increase of mutual confidence. At the same time, after nuclear free zones had been established in Latin America (the Tlatelolko Agreement), South Pacific Ocean (the Rarotonga Agreement), Southeast Asia (the Bangkok Agreement) and in Africa (the Pelindaba Agreement) there is no progress in creating them in other regions of the world, such as the Middle East. Apparently, only the fact that the elaboration of the agreement on the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Central Asia has reached final phase can be regarded as a certain success in this direction. Russia had managed to set in Article 12 of this agreement the right to the transportation of nuclear weapons through the zone in case of threat to the security of the country or its allies as well as the invocation of the 1992 Collective Security Treaty signed by the CIS countries. Therefore three nuclear powers abstained from signing the Agreement. Russia also supports the endeavors of non-nuclear states parties to the NPT to receive legally obliging security guarantees that the nuclear powers would not use nuclear weapons against them and had already provided such guarantees to more than 100 states which joined the corresponding agreements on nuclear free zones. However, these guarantees are not in place so far and, as it is a question of national security of the states, they require mandatory anchoring in the international law including the binding resolutions of the UN Security Council. It is not even clear how much importance all WKHVH VDIHJXDUGV¶ GHFODUDWLRQV KDYH LQ WKH OLJKW RI QXFOHDU SROLFLHV RI WKH OHDGLQJ powers including RussLDLQSDUWLFXODUWKHLUUHDGLQHVVWRGHOLYHU³FRXQWHUWHUURULVW´SUHemptive strikes and launch force operations against the WMD threat which is rather a warning to certain developing countries not to follow the example of such problem states like North Korea. Though, according to Russia, the elaboration of international DJUHHPHQW RQ ³QHJDWLYH´ VHFXULW\ JXDUDQWHHV SUREDEO\ ZLWKLQ WKH IUDPHZRUN RI WKH Conference on Disarmament) had become impending long ago. However, such an agreement should also include the clauses concerning the cases in which nuclear weapons can be used in response to the large-scale aggression and must be applied only to those countries which strictly observe the WMD non-proliferation obligations.

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Withdrawal clause Article X of the NPT, which determines the conditions of withdrawal from the Treaty, acquires new relevance under modern conditions.27 It is obvious that member states should not apply this right selectively. Those states which break Article IV and intend to use nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes should be deprived of such a right. From the other side, those states which withdraw from the Treaty arbitrarily without holding any consultations should be deprived of the rights within Article IV and any cooperation with them at least in the nuclear sphere, if not in general, should be ceased with the possible dismantling of their already created facilities. At the present moment, the NPT does not provide any legal mechanism to regulate actions towards the states which arbitrarily decided to withdraw from the Treaty as was the case with North Korea. On the whole, the question of sanctions against states violating the NPT remains the most difficult problem of Treaty enforcement. Some of the experts propose to complicate the withdrawal procedures from the NPT thus impeding problem states like North Korea from freely walking away from the Treaty. Supposedly, the state should prove the feasibility of threat to its national interests and start intensive inspections within the IAEA framework in order to detect possible earlier violations. It is also proposed to prohibit the state withdrawing from the Treaty to use the materials, technologies and industrial capabilities it had received within the NPT and to leave them under the IAEA control. The UN Security Council is supposed to ensure compliance with these conditions and could impose sanctions including use of force against the state in case it refuses to allow IAEA inspections. All these proposals are very interesting and innovative. However, the experience of the political struggle around the Iranian nuclear program demonstrates that they can only become feasible if the international relations acquire new dimensions that the disarmament experts and leftist politicians so strive for. It is obvious that the implementation of these proposals requires unity both within the UN Security Council as well as between the developing and the developed countries within international organizations which is, deplorably, mostly impossible today. In this respect, the incremental steps based on the decisions in every single case seem more realistic. 0HDQZKLOHWKHUHDUHVWLOOSOHQW\RIUHDVRQVIRURSWLPLVP1RQHZ³URJXHV´KDYH HPHUJHGDIWHUWKH,UDQLDQRU1RUWK.RUHDQEUHDNRXWV´'RPLQR-theor\´SUHGLFWLRQVRI rolling weaponization in problem regions (with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, and many others getting nuclear weapons potentials) EHFDPHKLJKO\LPSUREDEOH$QGWKH³PRUHLVEHWWHU´FRQFHSWLQ QXFOHDUSUoliferation studies advocating the merits of the unbridled spread of regional nuclear-weapons states that had been promoted by some theorists in the early 1980s today stands out as an absurdly incorrect vision. 3UHVHQWO\ WKH 137 PHPEHUV DUH DOPRVW µIL[HG¶ ZLWKLQ WKH 7UHDW\ FRQILQHV DQG would hardly venture to withdraw from the Treaty without consequences. That is why no amendment or strengthening of the NPT Article X provisions on walkout rights of its members is necessary today. At the same time, the potential of the most daring ideas which can be implemented LQWKHQHZ³JROGHQDJH´VKRXOGEHXQGRXEWHGO\DFFXPXODWHG Today, it is almost impossible to take any measures against countries obviously violating the NPT (like Iran or the DPRK) because of the contradictory interests and practical absence of consensus in the UN Security Council and the IAEA Governing 27

George Bunn and John Rhinelander ³7KH 5LJKW WR :LWKGUDZ IURP WKH 137 $UWLFOH ; LV 1RW 8QFRQGLWLRQDO´Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 79, April/May 2005

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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

Board ± which significantly undermines the efficiency of the Treaty. It is essential to create a clear mechanism assuring that the IAEA has all the required competences to investigate violations of the NPT and immediately transfer the results of the inspections to the UN Security Council in order to take the appropriate actions provided in the UN &KDUWHU DQG &RXQFLO¶V UHVROXWLRQV  8QIRUWXQDWHO\ LW is a utopia as of yet, with the position of Russia being one of the reasons for it. Perhaps it would be advisable to hold an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the states which are party to the NPT to examine the withdrawal notification; however it is doubtful that any serious measures against the violators could be taken at such conference.

Looking for a breakthrough 7KH³LQFDQWDWLRQV´PDGHE\5XVVLDQH[SHUWVWKDWWKH7UHDW\LV³EHWWHUDOLYHWKDQGHDG´ can hardly solve the problem of the NPT efficiency. Up until now, Russia has not proposed any clear or feasible ideas of strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The adaptation of the Treaty to the new post-Cold War world and the reality after the 9/11 terrorist attacks require the amendments in Article VIII or something radically new as the extension of the NPT scope. Thus, the provisions of the safeguards Additional Protocol can become part of the NPT. At the same time it is clear that despite the legalistic plans of developing states or the pacifist ideas of developed countries proposed at international conferences, it is very hard to expect any serious progress in strengthening the NPT viability at international forums. In spite of the positive efforts of Russia and other nuclear powers in the nonproliferation and arms control sphere, there has been no visible breakthrough since 2000. The NPT Review Conference in 2005 thus turned out a complete failure. 28 Most probably, further nonproliferation efforts ± as well as the peacekeeping RSHUDWLRQV DQG KXPDQLWDULDQ LQWHUYHQWLRQV LQ WKH VLWXDWLRQ RI ³SDUDO\VLV´ RI WKH 81 Security Council ± would be focused on regional factors, particularly the activities of NATO and European Union and other regional organizations. In a sense, it can be observed already in the debate round the six-party talks on the non-nuclear status of 1RUWK.RUHDRUWKHGLSORPDWLFDFWLYLWLHVRIWKH³(8WURLND´LQFRRSHUDWLRQZLWK5XVVLD concerning the Iranian nuclear program. On the whole, radical reconfiguration of the NPT when all the nuclear energy services would be rendered through the above-mentioned system of global and regional consortiums on the international basis should not be discarded. Somehow, the latest developments round the DPRK nuclear program and the considered options of solving the Iranian nuclear problem shape the further evolution of the NPT after the end of the Cold War and the exposed failure of the multilateral diplomacy within its legalistic framework. Various options including counter-proliferation measures based on the ad hoc principle seem also possible. In general, the ways of improving the NPT can be grouped in several categories: strengthening the IAEA and safeguards system; implementing conscious exports 28

See three DUWLFOHV E\ 5HEHFFD -RKQVRQ ³Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed´ Disarmament Diplomacy,VVXH1R$XWXPQ³Looking Towards 2010: What does the Nonproliferation Regime Need?´, Disarmament Diplomacy 1R6SULQJDQG³Back from the Brink? The 2007 NPT PrepCom Report´ Disarmament Diplomacy No. 85, Summer 2007

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control policies; creating consortiums and concluding regional agreements; developing active counter-proliferation policies; further armaments reduction and preventing a new arms race. Notwithstanding the evident deficiencies the NPT remains an important element of international law and a measuring scale, in a sense, which allows for the determination of the degree of danger posed by nuclear programs of certain states and the organization of activities of the IAEA and other international institutions in the nuclear sphere. This scale only needs to be clearly calibrated ± ZLWKRXW WKH XVXDO ³SROLWLFDO FRUUHFWQHVV´RIWKH&ROG:DUSHULRG± in order to define the parameters of violation of the nonproliferation norms inevitably entailing international sanctions. All this presupposes the close cooperation or at least the accord between the leading powers of the world. The status and direction of Russian foreign policy in the 21st century would depend on how actively Russian leadership would be involved in the various global nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts, particularly in the nuclear and other WMD-related sphere.

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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-58

NATO’s Future Nuclear Doctrine: Factors Shaping a Decision Michael RŰHLE1 Abstract. NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit in 2009 is likely to launch the elaboration of a new Strategic Concept, to replace the 1999 document. The new Concept will have to reflect NATO’s more operational nature and its more global orientation. It may also feature new language on nuclear matters, reflecting both the new proliferation landscape and renewed arms control concerns. Despite fundamental changes in these areas, and subsequent modifications of the nuclear doctrines and postures of the US, Britain and France, the statements on NATO’s nuclear aspects are likely to remain conservative, with an emphasis on nuclear sharing and the maintenance of a small number of European-based tactical nuclear weapons.

Introduction: preparing for a new strategic concept In 2009, the year of NATO’s 60th anniversary, the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance are likely to task the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to draft a new Strategic Concept. Replacing the 1999 document, this new Strategic Concept would probably be published at the subsequent Summit, possibly in 2010. The new Strategic Concept will have to cover a lot of ground. In describing the new strategic environment, this document will have to put a much stronger emphasis on post-“9/11” developments: international terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and failed states. In addition, one can expect the document to say something about NATO’s potential role in cyber defence and energy security. In setting out the basic approaches to NATO’s missions and operations, the new document will also have to reflect the fact that, compared to the 1999 Strategic Concept, the range of NATO’s engagements has broadened further. It now includes combat in Afghanistan, peacekeeping in the Balkans, anti-terrorist naval operations in the Mediterranean, providing support for the African Union, training Iraqi security forces, and providing humanitarian relief after natural disasters. Moreover, NATO’s partnership policies, which featured prominently in the 1999 Concept, have also broadened significantly since then; they meanwhile include several Gulf States as well as new ties with countries from the Asia-Pacific region. In line with the need for a more comprehensive approach to crisis management, NATO’s links with other international institutions, notably the European Union and the United Nations, will have to be defined. And, last but not least, the new Strategic Concept will need to give specific guidance on the direction of NATO’s military transformation.

1

Head, Speechwriting and Senior Policy Advisor, Policy Planning Unit, NATO. Personal views only.

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The nuclear conundrum It is widely assumed that a new NATO Strategic Concept will also feature new language on the role of nuclear weapons. In the 1999 Concept, the approach to this issue was conservative: the document took note of the positive changes after end of the Cold War, and stressed that they had paved the way for huge cuts in NATO’s European-based nuclear forces. It also noted that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated were now “extremely remote.” 2 With respect to the rationale for NATO’s nuclear forces, however, the language was largely the same as that of the previous Strategic Concept from 1991. The conservatism of the 1999 Concept was not without reason. After all, statements on nuclear matters, very much like everything else in NATO, must be approved by all Allies (France constituting an exception in certain cases). Conservatism is thus an inherent feature, all the more so in areas that do not appear to require radical and/or imminent changes. Another factor that naturally tilts the balance in favour of conservatism is the multi-purpose nature of any NATO Strategic Concept: it not only seeks to explain NATO to a wider public, both inside and outside the NATO nations; it also provides strategic guidance for NATO’s military authorities (who then work out more detailed follow-on documents); and, above all, it serves to provide a snapshot of an intra-Alliance consensus on the key elements of NATO’s agenda. In other words, a Strategic Concept is as much about internal “housekeeping” as it is about public diplomacy. Thus, while public diplomacy requirements may suggest bold, far-reaching policy statements, the need for political consensus within an Alliance of sovereign nations will eventually compel the Allies to settle for the lowest common denominator. This is all the more true for sensitive nuclear matters. Still, the drafters of the next Strategic Concept might not get away quite so easily. The changes in the strategic environment since the publication of the 1999 Concept may prove to be too fundamental to allow for a simple cut-and-paste job. In 1999, when NATO was still a “Eurocentric” organisation, its nuclear pronouncements were justifiably influenced by an improving security situation in Europe. Today, however, such a focus would appear far too limited. With NATO acting outside of its traditional European perimeter, with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related technologies constituting a “second nuclear age”, and with the non-proliferation regime under threat from various directions, a mere repetition of the 1999 language on nuclear issues would fall short of current requirements. Worse, as the new Strategic Concept is likely to feature much new, forward-leaning language on many other parts of NATO’s agenda, a conservative approach would make the nuclear part of the new Concept stand out as “retro”, thereby inviting interpretations that the Allies were shying away from revisiting this part of their defence policy.

What Has Changed? Several issues stand out. The first is a further improvement of the security situation in Europe, which has lead to a further disentanglement of NATO’s nuclear weapons from 2

The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. of 23rd and 24th April 1999, para.64, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/p99-065e.htm (accessed on 6 December 2007).

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the conventional sphere. The absence of Cold War antagonisms and the overall military situation in Europe with respect to conventional forces make the logic of resorting to nuclear weapons to compensate for weaknesses in NATO’s conventional posture a rather hypothetical issue. Current disagreements between NATO Allies and Russia of the future of the CFE Treaty or on missile defence are not likely to change this positive picture. The second development is the proliferation of WMD and related technologies. Essentially a by-product of globalisation, this trend had been visible throughout the 1990s, yet it became a major international issue only in the late 1990s. Key events include the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in 1998; North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes and its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003; and the revelation of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which now threaten a nuclear domino effect in the Middle East. Moreover, the A. Q. Kahn nuclear supply network indicated that proliferation may exceedingly happen outside the classical NPT/interstate regime. Finally, the difficulties of establishing a strong sanctions regime against Iran and the US-India nuclear deal indicate that other considerations, such as economic and geopolitical interests, may ultimately override non-proliferation concerns.3 These developments have lead to the third factor of change: the crisis of nonproliferation and arms control. The non-proliferation optimism of the early 1990s has meanwhile been replaced by a deepening schism between the NWS and some NNWS. Differences between the NWS and many NNWS on whether to put the emphasis on compliance or disarmament (Art VI) have been exacerbated in the recent past. This has led to increased pressure on the NWS, notably from the NGO community, to rejuvenate the non-proliferation regime by undertaking major disarmament steps. As the new NATO Strategic Concept may be published in 2010, the year of the next NPT Review Conference, its language on nuclear matters, particularly on arms control, will be the subject of much public scrutiny. Finally, one might also add a more general recognition of the limits of nuclear deterrence. “9/11” and the rise of Al Qaida have re-focussed international attention away from classical scenarios of interstate conflict and towards non-state actors bent on inflicting mass casualties. Once religious fundamentalism is factored into the nuclear equation (witness the debate about a “Talibanisation” of Pakistan), the chances of erecting a stable, long-term mutual deterrence regime in a multinuclear world appear slim indeed. These doubts about the reliability of deterrence in new scenarios have also contributed to the return of missile defence, notably in the United States.

Reactions: Changes in US, British and French Nuclear Doctrines How would these changes in the security environment since the end of Cold War influence the language on NATO’s nuclear forces in a new Strategic Concept? Recent changes in the nuclear policies of the three Nuclear Weapons States in NATO – the US, the UK and France – might provide one part of the answer.4

3 See Michael Ru hle, Order and Disorder in the Second Nuclear Age, Internationale Politik (Transatlantic Edition), vol.7, no.4, 2006, pp.18-24. 4 See David S. Yost, New Approaches to Deterrence in Britain, France and the United States, International Affairs (Chatham House), vol.81, no.1, 2005, pp.83-114.

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Clearly, the arsenals and policies of these three nations differ substantially, reflecting the considerable differences in size, geography, culture, and self-perception, as well as different levels of political-strategic ambition of these countries. The US arsenal, in particular, stands out in many ways: its size trumps those of the two European Allies; its missions – notably to provide extended deterrence for NATO and other US allies – are far more ambitious; and the public debate about US nuclear strategy is far more lively, provocative and intellectually challenging than the debates on the UK and French deterrents, which are conducted within a much smaller strategic community. The US debate is also far more explicit, both in naming potential threats as well as in discussing specific employment options. Notwithstanding these differences, however, all three nations have affected changes in their nuclear policies that appear to follow roughly similar patterns. With a view to NATO’s future Strategic Concept, three elements of change are particularly noteworthy. First, a further reduction of the centrality of nuclear weapons for national security. This is most obvious in the case of the United States. International criticism of the Nuclear Posture Review (and the project of a new warhead for underground targets) has been vocal, yet it has obscured the fact that the trend towards a lesser reliance on nuclear weapons has not changed, let alone been reversed. The UK and France, given the smaller size of their arsenals, have far less leeway in this regard, as they have always stressed the eminently political function of their nuclear weapons. Yet both London and Paris have also stressed that the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons remains remote. Second, the need to make nuclear arsenals more flexible. This trend is as much a reflection of opportunities created by advancing technology as of strategic necessity. While critics have traditionally charged the development of high accuracy/low yield nuclear weapons as a dangerous desire to “conventionalise” nuclear war, the trend towards more selective employment options is fully in line with a view of nuclear weapons as predominantly political tools of war termination rather than “normal” warfighting instruments. Reducing self-deterrence and limiting damage in case deterrence fails are two more factors that make nuclear flexibility a value per se. Third, and perhaps most importantly, a more explicit link between nuclear deterrence and new and emerging threats: the use of biological and chemical weapons by an adversary, and, most recently, the deterrence of (or reprisals against) states that sponsor terrorism. These threats of nuclear retaliation against an attack with other weapons of mass destruction do not constitute a radical departure from past policy. The United States, for example, articulated threats of nuclear retaliation in response to chemical (and conventional) attacks during the Cold War in the NATO-Warsaw Pact context. By the same token, the UK and France (and Russia) have also long maintained that their nuclear arsenals were also intended to deter WMD other than nuclear. In recent years, however, Washington, London and Paris have been more explicit about the need to deter not just nuclear weapons, but also other WMD. The role of nuclear deterrence in the context of terrorism is largely a result of “9/11” and its aftermath. While there is widespread agreement that suicidal terrorist non-state actors cannot be deterred by threatening nuclear retaliation, states that sponsor them may well remain susceptible to nuclear threats. Hence, all three NATO NWS seem to agree that there is a role for nuclear deterrence. As then British Prime Minister Tony Blair put it in December 2006, “[i]t is true that our deterrent would not deter or prevent terrorists. But it is bound to have an impact on governments that might

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sponsor them.”5 For all these reasons, some analysts maintain that the policies of all three NATO NWS are, in fact, much more similar than the general discussion might suggest.6 Would these three elements – reduced reliance on nuclear weapons; more flexibility of remaining weapons; and a more explicit definition of the role of deterrence against other WMD and states sponsoring terrorism – find their way into a new NATO Strategic Concept? At first glance, it would seem logical to assume that a new document would indeed somehow have to amalgamate these developments. However, NATO’s nuclear doctrine cannot simply be derived by analysing the nuclear policies of the three NWS. After all, the large majority of NATO is made up of nations that have foresworn a nuclear status by signing the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). This fact will significantly influence the language of the future NATO Strategic Concept, regardless of doctrinal innovations in the US, the UK or France. It will also ensure that considerations of doctrine will be influenced by factors other than the question of what constitutes effective deterrence. At least since the London Declaration of July 1990, when NATO introduced the “last resort” formula as a political signal to the Soviet Union (to allow for a united Germany in NATO), NATO’s nuclear pronouncements must be seen as major political statements, where general political principles may ultimately be more important than explanations of specific military postures.

Some Enduring Principles Taking into account the changes in the international security environment, the adjustments in US, British and French nuclear policies, and the compromise nature of any Alliance document, this author would suggest that a new NATO Strategic Concept might contain the following elements: First, more explicit references to an emerging strategic environment characterised by the proliferation of WMD and delivery means. Since the 1999 Strategic Concept already covers a lot of ground, highlighting proliferation dangers and even non-state actors, this should not be too difficult to agree on. Moreover, the 2006 “Comprehensive Political Guidance” also contains strong wording to this effect. 7 It will be interesting to see, however, whether NATO Allies will also agree on more explicit language regarding the implications of this environment for their own nuclear deterrent posture – for example, whether nuclear weapons are given a specific role in deterring other kinds of WMD. Second, an endorsement of European-based US nuclear systems. The logic of maintaining a small number of highly secure US theatre nuclear weapons (TNW) in

5

Tony Blair, Parliamentary Statement on Trident, 4 December 2006, http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page10532.asp (accessed on 6 December 2007); see also The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of her Majesty, Cm 6994 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, December 2006), p.19, par.3-11. 6 See Bruno Tertrais, “A Comparison between US, UK and French Nuclear Policies and Doctrines,” Centred’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Cntre National De La Recherche Scientifique, March 2007, http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/archive/mars07/art_btpdf (accessed on 6 December 2007). 7 Comprehensive Political Guidance, endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006, http://nato.int/docu/basictxt/bo61129e.htm (accessed on 6 December 2007).

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several European NATO countries is likely to prevail. Ritualistic claims by the NGO community that this particular aspect of NATO’s sharing arrangements circumvents the NPT and thus should be abandoned, or that these systems no longer serve any militaryoperational purpose, will not prove convincing enough to effect major changes. To be sure, current fears about a further deterioration of the NPT regime may make such claims appear timely, and some NATO governments and parliamentarians may well be sympathetic to such views. However, the principle of Allied risk sharing (a principle that is currently under severe strain in Afghanistan) and not least the low number of remaining systems will ultimately trump arms control arguments – all the more so as the latter appear rather specious. If the past is any guide, no change of NATO’s nuclear doctrine or posture will enamour the arms control community, nor is a withdrawal of NATO sub-strategic nuclear forces likely to put pressure on Russia to do engage in TNW arms control. On the contrary, Russia is likely to argue that it has long completed the return of its TNW to its own territory and that, hence, the onus is on the US and NATO to do the same. Third, an endorsement of nuclear sharing arrangements. Nuclear sharing, as institutionalised in the Nuclear Planning Group and other bodies, enables non-nuclear Alliance members to have an active role in shaping the evolution of strategic policy. It allows for consultation and coordination in an unparalleled way and thus constitutes an important aspect of the very notion of “alliance”. Moreover, the non-proliferation aspects of US extended deterrence – conveniently ignored by the NGO community – may well be “rediscovered” once a nuclear armed Iran will lead to heightened fears of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.8 If such a “domino effect” were to occur, Europe, and notably Turkey, would be faced with a neighbourhood in which any conventional skirmish would carry the risk of nuclear escalation. The answer to the question of how to safeguard security in view of such a nuclearised neighbourhood without recourse to a national nuclear option might well be a reconfirmation of the US “nuclear umbrella”. In sum, despite arguments that US extended deterrence does not require Europeanbased nuclear systems, that the British and French nuclear deterrents would be sufficient, or that NATO should provide a major impulse for the rejuvenation of nuclear arms control, a new Strategic Concept is likely to reemphasise the sharing principle. For some observers, the above elements may confirm the risk that was mentioned at the outset of this paper, namely that the nuclear language of a new Strategic Concept would be overly conservative. However, in this author’s view, the basic principles of NATO’s nuclear doctrine are eminently sound and require very little change. What a new NATO Strategic Concept should primarily aim for is to provide a more cogent rationale for nuclear deterrence and risk-sharing in the 21st century. The Allies should resist the temptation of “balancing” strategy and arms control elements in the faint hope that this would make it acceptable to a broader audience. Instead, the language should be firm and unapologetic. Allies should make it clear that nuclear deterrence, as understood and implemented within the NATO framework, remains an intelligent way of dealing with the realities of the second nuclear age. 8 The “intangibles” of NATO’s sharing mechanisms also deserve mentioning even though they would probably never feature explicitly in a NATO document. A credible nuclear protection provided by the United States also serves to equalize the military-political status of individual Alliance members and thus facilitates political integration. In this author’s view, at least, the principles of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence help to play down the differences between European Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States, thus preventing weapons from becoming purely a means of national power and prestige.

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British Nuclear Strategy1 Jeremy STOCKER2

Abstract. In 2007 the British Government announced that the UK strategic nuclear deterrent is to be maintained until the 2050s, by which time Britain will have been a nuclear weapons state for almost a century. During the Cold War Britain need to deter the Soviet Union, but the UK's relationship with the United States was at least as important in determining the country's nuclear stance. Today the Soviet threat has been replaced by a less threatening but more uncertain strategic environment. Nuclear ties with the US remain as important as ever, and enable the UK to remain a nuclear power at modest cost.

The last three years have seen the re-emergence of an active public debate about nuclear weapons in Britain. The catalyst for this debate and subsequent Government policy was the need to decide on the renewal of the British nuclear deterrent capability over the next 20 years. As a result of decisions announced earlier this year, the UK will remain a small nuclear weapons state, a status enjoyed by the country for over half a century and now set to continue for another half-century. Britain was the first country to seriously investigate the use of atomic energy for military purposes, as early as 1940. Its efforts were soon subsumed into the much larger Anglo-$PHULFDQµ0DQKDWWDQ¶SURMHFWZKLFKOHGWRWKHERPEVGURSSHGRQ-DSDQ in 1945. After the abrupt termination of Anglo-American atomic cooperation the following year, the UK chose to pursue its own national programme. The first British GHYLFH ZDV GHWRQDWHG LQ 2FWREHU  DQG %ULWDLQ WKHUHE\ EHFDPH WKH ZRUOG¶V WKLUG nuclear weapons state. 7KURXJKRXW WKH &ROG :DU \HDUV %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU FDSDELOLW\ SHUIRUPHG D WULSOH SXUSRVH,WSURYLGHGWKHµXOWLPDWHJXDUDQWHH¶RI security in the face of a much larger, hostile and nuclear-armed superpower, the Soviet Union. It gave the UK some LQIOXHQFH DQG D KDELW RI FRRSHUDWLRQ ZLWK WKH UHDO µXOWLPDWH JXDUDQWHH¶ WKH 8QLWHG States. And nuclear weapons preserved some element of %ULWDLQ¶VIRUPHU*UHDW3RZHU status, a means of levelling the otherwise enormous and growing disparity in conventional military capability as compared to the two superpowers. One can argue that whilst in an operational sense the British nuclear deterrent was DLPHGDWWKH6RYLHW8QLRQVWUDWHJLFDOO\LWZDVDLPHGDW:DVKLQJWRQ7KDWLV%ULWDLQ¶V modest nuclear capability was designed to influence American, at least as much as 5XVVLDQEHKDYLRXU7KRXJK%ULWDLQUHWDLQHGDµPLQLPDO¶QXFOHDUGHWHUUHQWDVDKHdge against the failure (real or perceived) of the US nuclear guarantee of Europe, its main purpose was to exercise influence over the much larger American nuclear arsenal which provided the best basis of security for the UK. 1 This paper summarizes many of the argumentVSUHVHQWHGLQWKHDXWKRU¶VUHFHQWPRQRJUDSKThe United Kingdom and Nuclear Deterrence, Adelphi Paper 386 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, February 2007) 2 Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute

J. Stocker / British Nuclear Strategy

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7KHHVVHQFHRI%ULWDLQ¶VQXFOear policy has been a complex mix of independence, interdependence and dependence, all expressed in relation to the United States rather than the physical target of British nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union. Once the United States itself became vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear strike, the credibility of an American willingness to use, or threaten the use of, nuclear weapons on behalf of Europe became a matter of potential uncertainty. A British ability to strike the Soviet Union independently provided an insurance against the failure of an American promise WRGRVR,WDOVRSUHVHQWHGDµVHFRQGFHQWUHRIGHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJ¶WRFRPSOLFDWH5XVVLDQ calculations as Moscow would need to take British, as well as American, actions into account. +RZHYHU %ULWDLQ¶V PRGHst deterrent capability could be no substitute for the US QXFOHDU µXPEUHOOD¶%ULWDLQ¶VRZQQXFOHDU IRUFH ZDVWKHUHIRUHD ZD\RI VKRZLQJWKDW WKH 8. ZDV µSXOOLQJ LWV ZHLJKW¶ DQG WKDW LWV YLHZV DQG LQWHUHVWV VKRXOG EH WDNHQ LQWR account. Once the UK had independently demonstrated a nuclear capability (its bomber-delivered atomic weapons became operational in 1956) the US had an incentive to co-ordinate its own plans with its only nuclear-armed ally, and close Anglo-American nuclear cooperation was re-established in 1958. It has endured to this day. Interdependence with the United States also implied a growing dependence, as the UK could only ever be a junior partner in this relationship. This was not just a function of relative numbers. The resumption of nuclear cooperation has enabled Britain to develop its warheads at more modest cost and, perhaps more importantly, obtain American delivery systems. %ULWDLQ¶VH[SHULHQFHVLQFHWKHHDUO\VKDVFRQVLVWHQWO\GHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWIRUD small nuclear power acquisition of an adequate delivery system is at least as challenging as developing the warheads themselves. After several false starts, in 1963 the UK settled on the only delivery system which really satisfies the strategic requirements of a small, densely-populated island state ± the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Development of such a weapon was beyond British resources at the time, especially after the cancellation of British-developed land- and air-launched missiles.3 The US Administration of John F Kennedy agreed to supply the Polaris V\VWHPRQIDYRXUDEOHWHUPVDQGWKLVEHFDPHWKHEDVLVRIWKH8.¶VVWUDWHJLF deterrent in 1968. Polaris solved the problem of vulnerability to a pre-emptive strike, as to date no means of reliably detecting ballistic missile-firing submarines (SSBNs) whilst on patrol has been devised. The ballistic missile itself is much the most difficult delivery system to intercept once launched. But Polaris GLG QRW VROYH DOO %ULWDLQ¶V SUREOHPV LQ LWV asymmetric nuclear relationship with the Soviet Union. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system deployed around Moscow could not undermine the ability of US nuclear forces to devastate the Soviet Union, but it did pose a severe challenge for the much more modest (if technically sophisticated) British force. This became apparent even before Polaris entered service. The answer to this conundrum was the Chevaline Polaris Improvement Programme. Chevaline drew on some earlier American research and made extensive use of US test facilities, but was a unique British technical success. It substituted a complex system of decoys for one of Polaris¶VWKUHHZDUKHDGVDQGPHDQWWKDWHDFKRQH

3

Blue Streak and Blue Steel Mk2, respectively

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J. Stocker / British Nuclear Strategy

of the 16 missiles carried per submarine presented over 40 objects to the Moscow defence system, instead of just three. No other nuclear weapons state has, to date, deployed such a comprehensive system of missile defence countermeasures. Chevaline entered service in 1982, the same year that the British Government selected the Trident D5 missile as its eventual replacement. The latter entered service in the mid-1990s, purchased from the US under the same terms as the original Polaris Sales Agreement. It should be emphasised that while the UK is completely dependent upon the United States for the provision of the missiles, and benefits from some American assistance in relation to warheads and submarines, both the latter are designed and built in Britain. Most importantly, operational control of the British Trident force, including navigation and targeting, is in exclusively British hands. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union removed the single, over-ULGLQJ UDWLRQDOH IRU WKH H[LVWHQFH DQG RSHUDWLRQDO SRVWXUH RI %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU forces. Ironically, however, the Trident system, ordered during the Cold War, was just coming into service. Other than the unlikely option of complete nuclear abandonment no major decisions were required about the strategic deterrent. Several nuclear reductions were made, including the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons and the cancellation of an Anglo-French stand-off air-launched missile designed to perform µWKHDWUH¶QXFOHDUWDVNV%XWTrident itself, already largely paid for, was retained though with reduced numbers of missiles and warheads. By 1998 all other nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from service and for the first time since the 1950s Britain came to rely on a single nuclear delivery system. Subsequent reviews have resulted in further reductions so that the UK today has fewer operational warheads than at any time since the early 1960s. 7RGD\ %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU IRUFH LV WKH VPDOOHVW RI WKH ILYH 1XFOHDU :HDSRQ 6WDWHV (NWS) recognised by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). British nuclear weapons account for about 1.5% of the world's total stock of nuclear warheads. Four Vanguardclass submarines entered service between 1994 and 2001. Each can carry 16 Trident D5 SLBMs though usually deploy with fewer, probably about 12. Each missile can carry up to 12 Mk.4 re-entry vehicles (RVs) with a 100-kiloton (kt) warhead, though the British Government has stated that no more than 48 warheads are carried per boat. With the withdrawal from service of Britain's other nuclear systems, Trident was reconfigured in the 1990s to include a 'sub-strategic' role in addition to its main strategic task. Officially, this was achieved by varying the number of warheads carried per missile and introducing a reduced yield for some of the warheads. Though the Government will not publicly confirm further details, it is widely believed (and not officially contradicted) that 'sub-strategic' configured missiles carry a single warhead with a reduced yield in the range of 1-10 kt. As part of the British Government's review of future nuclear policy in early 2007 the term 'sub-strategic' was quietly dropped, recognising that any use, or threatened use, of nuclear weapons would be firmly Strategic with a capital 'S'. 4 Instead, flexibility in the number and yield of warheads provides more targeting options and, arguably, greater deterrence credibility in the face of 'limited' nuclear threats. Given that the newest of the Trident submarines entered service as recently as 2001, it came as a surprise to many when in 2003 the British Government announced that "...decisions on whether to replace Trident are not needed [in] this Parliament [ie 4 Michael Codner "Britain's Nuclear Deterrent: Keeping the Options Open" in RUSI Newsbrief Vol.25 No.8 August 2005 p.88

J. Stocker / British Nuclear Strategy

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the period 2001-2005] but are likely to be required in the next one".5 By the end of 2006 initial studies were complete and the Government announced that "...we have...decided to take the steps necessary to sustain a credible deterrent capability in the 2020s and beyond...We have...decided to maintain our nuclear deterrent by building a new class of submarines".6 After a short period of public consultation, in March 2007 the House of Commons voted to support Government policy. The need to make decisions on the future of the nuclear deterrent is driven by two factors. First, the submarines have a design life of 25 years which, for a range of technical reasons, can only sensibly be extended by a further five years. The first new boat will therefore be required in service by around 2022 (the clock starts ticking when the submarines are launched, rather than when they enter operational service). Design work therefore needs to start now. Secondly, the United States is undertaking a lifeextension programme for the Trident missile, which will keep it in service into the 2040s. If the UK wants to join this programme, a commitment is required in 2007. A further decision will be required in later years as to whether a new warhead will need to be designed, in which case the UK can be expected to cooperate with the US in the development of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), which does not require explosive testing. Nuclear weapons tests are now banned by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which the UK has ratified. All of this begs the question as to why, with the Cold War a fading memory, the British Government has committed some £15-20 billion over a 15-year period for the renewal of a submarine-based nuclear deterrent. Though this sum represents less than 0.25% of overall Government expenditure, it carries a significant opportunity cost in terms of the conventional military capabilities that might otherwise be funded. Part of the explanation lies in domestic politics. The ruling Labour Party adopted an antinuclear stance in the 1980s, a position which is widely believed to be a significant factor in Labour being out of power for 18 years. Though the now-governing party still contains many anti-nuclear MPs, the Party leadership would not want to risk repeating the unilateralist experiment, preferring a commitment to eventual, multilateral nuclear disarmament. But domestic political calculations come nowhere near fully explaining current British policy. Long-term strategic considerations dictate a retention of the 'minimal' nuclear GHWHUUHQW  'XULQJ WKH &ROG :DU %ULWDLQ¶V GHWHUUHQFH UHTXLUHPHQW ZDV H[SUHVVHG LQ WHUPV RI WKH µ0RVFRZ &ULWHULRQ¶  7KRXJK 0RVFRZ ZDV QHYHU Whe only target for British nuclear weapons, the ability to hit the Soviet capital was indicative of the scale of deterrent effect demanded. ,Q WRGD\¶V µ6HFRQG 1XFOHDU $JH¶ WKH 0RVFRZ &ULWHULRQ REYLRXVO\ QR ORQJHU applies. Nor does any other target suggest itself as a realistic substitute. Instead %ULWDLQ LV OHIW ZLWK ZKDW KDV EHHQ GHVFULEHG DV D µ7R :KRP LW 0D\ &RQFHUQ¶ requirement. The UK does not currently need to deter any defined state, but nuclear weapons remain salient and a specific threat could well re-emerge. The British Government puts it this way: ...the continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, mean that our minimum nuclear deterrent capability, currently 5 6

Cm 6041-I Delivering Security in a Changing World London: TYSO, December 2003 p.9 Cm 6994 The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent London: TSO, December 2006 p.7

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represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our security.7 Put another way, retention of the nuclear deterrent is a prudent hedge against an unknown and uncertain future. In particular, any decision to abandon nuclear weapons would quickly become, for all practical purposes, irrevocable. Should a future crisis or more gradual worsening of the international security scene warrant a reversal of policy and the re-creation of a nuclear weapons capability, it could never be achieved sufficiently quickly for it to be an adequate response to the changed conditions that made it necessary in the first place. This is especially so in terms of an adequate delivery system. Moreover, following a decision to abandon nuclear weapons, no British Government could take for granted a resumption of close Anglo-American cooperation. ,QWKHDEVHQFHRIDQREYLRXVQHHGWRGHWHUDKRVWLOHVXSHUSRZHU%ULWDLQ¶VQXFOHDU VWDQFHLVQRZPRUHRSDTXHRIWHQGHVFULEHGDVµVWXGLHGDPELJXLW\¶7KH*RYHUQPHQW says little about who might need to be deterred, and under what circumstances. It does say that We deliberately maintain ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent. We will not simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the circumstances in which we might consider the use of our nuclear capabilities.8 6XFFHVVLYH %ULWLVK *RYHUQPHQWV KDYH DOVR GHFOLQHG WR PDNH D µQR ILUVW XVH¶ declaration. This stems from two considerations. First, in the extreme circumstances in which the use of nuclear weapons might be considered, advance declarations of this W\SHKDYHOLWWOHLIDQ\FUHGLELOLW\7KH\DUHQRWLQRQHWHOOLQJSKUDVHµORDG-EHDULQJ¶ Such was certainly true, for example, of Soviet no first use statements during the Cold War. Second, such a declaratory policy could serve to encourage non-nuclear aggression, secure in the knowledge that a nuclear response would not be forthcoming. The UK has issued a Negative Security Assurance, which states that British nuclear weapons will not be used against a non-nuclear state provided it is not in DOOLDQFH ZLWK D QXFOHDU SRZHU  7KLV H[SODLQV IRU H[DPSOH ZK\ %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU capability had no role WRSOD\LQGHWHUULQJ$UJHQWLQDLQDKHDGRIWKHODWWHU¶VLQYDVLRQRI the Falkland Islands in 1982. Whilst the UK has a distinct national policy in relation to the retention and use of nuclear weapons, it is also signed-XS WR 1$72¶V QXFOHDU GRFWULQH  %ULWish nuclear IRUFHVDUHDOVRIRUPDOO\DVVLJQHGWR1$72H[FHSWµZKHUH+HU0DMHVW\¶VJRYHUQPHQW PD\GHFLGHWKDWVXSUHPHQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWVDUHDWVWDNH¶2IFRXUVHWKHXVHRIQXFOHDU weapons could only be contemplated under just these circumstances so assignment of the UK deterrent to NATO may be more formal than substantive. Nonetheless, Britain DFFHSWV1$72¶VSRVLWLRQZKLFKLVWKDWµWKHIXQGDPHQWDOSXUSRVHRIWKHQXFOHDUIRUFHV of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kiQGRIZDU¶9

7

Cm 6994 p.12 Cm 6994 p.18 9 NATO 7KH$OOLDQFH¶V6WUDWHJLF&RQFHSW Washington DC: NATO, April 1999 p.20 8

J. Stocker / British Nuclear Strategy

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This makes it clear that, re-HPSKDVLVLQJ WKH SRLQW DERXW µVWXGLHG DPELJXLW\¶ nuclear weapon deter more than just the use of other nuclear weapons. The µIHDUVRPHQHVV¶ RI QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV LQGXFHV FDXWLRQ DOO URXQG DQG DFWV DV D SRZHUIXO inhibition to the onset of hostilities between nuclear-armed states. It is often said that democracies do not fight each other. The same may be true of nuclear weapon states. The British approach to nuclear deterrence has always focussed exclusively on deterrence by punishment that is, the threat of a retaliation the costs of which would vastly out-weigh any possible gains from aggression. In the nuclear age, successive British governments have been deeply sceptical about the possibilities for deterrence by defence, the ability to ward off the initial blow rather than hit back in response. Whilst Britain was worried by Soviet missile defences, it never saw active defence as having much to offer the UK. The scale of the Cold War threat and the limited resources available to counter it made only a retaliatory posture feasible. In the face of threats that are much more limited (in terms of both numbers and sophistication), defences may be able to reinforce deterrence and serve to mitigate the consequences of deterrence failure. Britain is today much more sanguine about the strategic implications of American missile defence programmes, and even participates in some of them (for example, the use of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) at Fylingdales). But resource constraints continue to dictate that the UK is reluctant to spend any of its own defence budget on active missile defence, apart from some research programmes designed, as much as anything, to assess the efficacy of US developments. MentiRQVKRXOGDOVREHPDGHRIWKH8.¶VVWDQFHRQQRQ-proliferation. Britain is active in all arms control and non-proliferation forums and has unilaterally reduced its own nuclear forces to the bare minimum consistent with a credible deterrence capability. Like the other NPT nuclear weapons states, it pays lip service to the goal of eventual and complete nuclear disarmament. It is often alleged that retention of nuclear weapons is at odds with non-proliferation efforts, even hypocritical. But the 8.LVµDOORZHG¶QXFOHDU ZHDSRQVXQGHUWKHWHUPVRIWKH137DQGPRUH LPSRUWDQWO\ non-proliferation serves to reduce the number and scale of potential threats that might need to be deterred. The UK continues to see a role for nuclear weapons in preventing war and specifically in deterring the use of nuclear weapons and other WMD. Its own forces have been reduced to a single system with modest numbers of warheads. Britain is committed to extending the life of the Trident system into the middle years of the century, a time likely to look very different to today. The British nuclear posture is a good deal less clear-cut than during the Cold War, but Britain will remain, for the foreseeable future, a nuclear weapons state.

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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-70

Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: a Russian perspective Petr ROMASHKIN1

Abstract. Nuclear doctrines of the United Kingdom and France have their own specific features, but to a great extent reflect the national consent on principal issues. But in broader terms, the three allied nuclear powers ± France, the USA and the UK ± have in fact come out with a coordinated position which reveals a break from the doctrine and rhetoric of the defensive nuclear deterrence of the Cold War period and the shift to the doctrine of pre-emptive and coercive use of nuclear weapons. The position of these three states, at the same time, determines the outlook of NATO in this sphere.

First of all, it seems appropriate to review the history of nuclear weapons development in the UK and France, in order to improve our understanding of their contemporary nuclear doctrines. After the end of the World War II, the United Kingdom aimed at the closest nuclear cooperation with the USA which had been already been foreseen in the wartime agreements. In the November 1945 Washington summit in which the USA, Great Britain and Canada considered consigning the nuclear problem to the UN, the United States and %ULWDLQ VLJQHG D VHFUHW PHPRUDQGXP RQ ³IXOO DQG HIIHFWLYH´ QXFOHDU FRRSHUDtion. However, the USA later disavowed this document and in 1946, the US Congress adopted the McMahon Act, which prohibited the release of atomic technology to other nations. In the summer of 1945, British Prime Minister C. Attlee established a topsecret FRPPLWWHH ³-HKQ-´ ZKLFK ZDV UHVSRQVLEOH IRU SODQQLQJ DQG EXLOGLQJ WKH capacities for the development of an atomic bomb. Britain had developed the plutonium bomb and successfully tested it on October 3, 1952 on the Monte-Bello Islands in the Indian Ocean, which Australia lent the UK for this purpose. The bomb was detonated on a frigate. If the USA-USSR nuclear balance of power is taken as a starting point that determined Post-Cold War international relations and laid the basis for the, more-orless, completed political division of the world, then the answer to the question about the first nuclear proliferant-state raised above could be reconsidered. In this view, the UK may be regarded as the first serious violator of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It seems that one of the main motives which induced Britain to pursue nuclear weapons was the desire to remain a great power using all the advantages of victory in World War II. British nuclear weapons as well as American ones were developed, 1

Senior Research Fellow, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS

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within the NATO framework on the basis of common views on and interests in the key nuclear issues and not in compensation for any sense of vulnerability. In May 1957, the United Kingdom conducted its first hydrogen bomb test. Since 1961, the first US atomic submarines had been based in Scotland. Later on, the United States agreed to Britain conducting a series of nuclear tests on the American polygon in Nevada. The maximum quantity of UK warheads was 350 between 1975 and 1981. Currently, UK nuclear weaponry consists primarily of the American submarinelaunched ballistic missile Trident-II (D5) equipped with British Multiple Reentry 9HKLFOHV ZKLFK DUH GHSOR\HG RQ IRXU GRPHVWLFDOO\ PDQXIDFWXUHG 66%1V %ULWDLQ¶V nuclear capability is the smallest among other nuclear poZHUV¶DUVHQDOVHVWLPDWHGWREH some 185 warheads within the maritime component only whereas in the 1950s the United Kingdom possessed a whole triad of nuclear weapons. British nuclear capabilities were traditionally oriented in accordance with the US missile attack warning system. $V QRWHG DERYH %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU FDSDFLW\ FRQVLVWV RI IRXU QXFOHDU VXEPDULQHV with 12 Trident-II missiles per submarine. Thus the United Kingdom has 48 missiles with four warheads per missile. Each missile is armed with one to three warheads of 100 kiloton weight. The number of operationally available warheads is 160, with another 35 warheads in stock, bringing the total number of warheads to 185 units. All submarines have a dual subordination ±national and under the US ± and act according to the single plan. One of the four submarines is on patrol, while another two are at the base or in territorial waters and can be deployed relatively quickly. The fourth submarine is in repair. According to UK Foreign Office documents, Britain just like the USA is ready to review counter-proliferation instruments. On March 20, 2002 the Defense Minister VWDWHG WKDW ³%ULWDLQ LV UHDG\ WR XVH QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV WR SURWHFW LWV DUPHG IRUFHV IURP ZHDSRQVRIPDVVGHVWUXFWLRQ´ A 2003 British Defense White Paper stated that the nuclear deterrence potential of WKH 8. ³UHPDLQV WKH HVVHQWLDO HOHPHQW RI RXU VHFXULW\´  $FFRUGLQJ WR 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ hearings, the document also revealed plans to consider replacing the existing deterrent forces based on American Trident-II SLBMs. Although the four Vanguard class SSBNs can operate for another 20 years before their nominal retirement date, the British government must decide now if the ageing warheads are to be modernized or totally replaced. Submarines of this class could be also configured for use with nonnuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles or for special force operations. The United Kingdom is the only nuclear power which had openly assigned its 66%1VWR³VXEVWUDWHJLF PLVVLRQV´ $OWKRXJKUDWKHUOLPLWHGLQWKHVHOHFWLRQ of nuclear weapons, such missions should be powerful enough to convince an aggressor who had XQGHUHVWLPDWHGWKH%ULWDLQ¶VFDSDFLWLHVDQGDWWDFNHGLWWRVWRSDQDWWDFNDQGUHWUHDWRU encounter a destructive strategic strike. Similar to the US and Russian doctrines, the UK nuclear doctrine emphasizes the new role of deterrence or retaliation for attacks non-nuclear states employing chemical or biological weapons. 7KLV LGHD DSSHDUHG DIWHU WKH *XOI :DU LQ  ZKHQ WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH ³QHZ limited nuclear war´ZDVLQWURGXFHGILUVWLQWKHIRUPRI³WKHQXFOHDUUHWDOLDWLRQIRUD non-QXFOHDU :0' DWWDFN´ DQG WKHQ XQGHU WKH VORJDQ RI ³WKH OLPLWHG XVH RI QXFOHDU ZHDSRQVDJDLQVWDWHUURULVWRUWRWDOLWDULDQUHJLPHV´GUDIWQXFOHDUGRFWULQHRIWKH8QLWHG Kingdom).

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In 2002, in an Appendix to the Strategic Defense Review of 1998 the role of QXFOHDU ZHDSRQVLQGHWHUULQJ³WKHVWDWHVRIFRQFHUQDVZHOODVWHUURULVWRUJDQL]DWLRQV´ was expanded. The advocates of nuclear disarmament criticize the UK government for its position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The plan to build new facilities for the production of warheads violates Article VI of the Treaty and the ongoing active cooperation with the USA (including the intended prolongation of the Cooperation Agreement, joint research activities, participation in sub-critical tests and building the ABM system) violates Article I. The Labor Party position on the development of nuclear weapons and their possible use in substrategic missions (delivering limited strikes against non-nuclear states that are parties to the NPT) contradicts the Prime 0LQLVWHU¶V VWDWHPHQWV DERXW PRYLQJ DZD\ IURP QXFOHDU DQG RWKHU ZHDSRQV RI PDVV destruction and the implementation of practical initiatives in the nuclear disarmament sphere. Opponents oI%ULWDLQ¶VFRQWLQXHGUHOLDQFHRQQXFOHDUDUPVEHOLHYHWKDWWKURXJKRXW its 50-year history, British nuclear weaponry did not play any role in armed conflicts and the United Kingdom did not receive any advantages from possessing it. Therefore, if Britain gives up its nuclear weapons capability, its security would not decrease. They argue that London should declare that it would not develop new means of delivery after the operational life of the existing submarines expires. In 2006, the Defense Committee of the British Parliament decided to make radical changes in the UK strategic nuclear doctrine and stop the 24-hour patrolling of the nuclear submarines in international waters. The Committee also discussed the forthcoming replacement of the ageing Vanguard class submarines armed with the Trident-II ballistic missiles. The Labor government has considered various options for the modernization of nuclear strategic forces. One of the options entails the renewal of the nuclear submarine fleet. However, the costs may be as high as 25 billion pounds. According to officials, the costs may be less if the 24-KRXUDOHUWGXW\LVFDQFHOOHG³7KH&ROG:DULV RYHUDQG ZHGRQRWQHHGWRNHHSWKHVXEPDULQHVLQWKH:RUOG2FHDQDOOWKHWLPH´ ± claimed the head of the committee, J. Arbuthnot. However, the government hurried to reject this proposal. A representative of the Defense Ministry stated that 24-hour duty RIWKHQXFOHDUVXEPDULQHVLVHVVHQWLDOIRU³WKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKHVWDELOLW\LQWKHJOREDO VHFXULW\«:HFDQQRWEHVXUH how other states would react if our submarines are on the DOHUWVWDWXVRQO\ZKHQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOWHQVLRQLQWHQVLILHV´KHFODLPHG The UK naval forces possess four nuclear Vanguard class submarines armed with American SLBMs Trident-II. By 2023-2024, they should be removed from service. Currently, the government is considering what the new generation maritime component of the British nuclear weaponry may look like. Moreover, while previous UK policy limited the launching of nuclear strikes only against nuclear weapon states, current policy does not rule out the possibility of nuclear attacks against non-nuclear states which possess or are suspected of possessing other weapons of mass destruction. The policy also allows for nuclear attacks against states that pose a strategic threat.

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French nuclear forces The development of British nuclear weapons did not seriously influence the global balance of power. However, after France had joined the nuclear club, the level of strategic stability decreased as the confrontation between the USSR and the USA and Britain, transformed into a confrontation between the USSR and NATO. French scientists made a prominent contribution to the development of atomic science. After the end of World War II, France resumed research in nuclear energy and in the 1950s, began creating its own strategic nuclear weapons under President C. De Gaulle, who established the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) in 1945. F. JoliotCurie was the first chief of the Commissariat who managed the heavy-water reactor program launched in 1948. The final decision to develop strategic nuclear capabilities was made by the end of 1956 after the Suez crisis, when the French, British, and Israeli intervention in Egypt was stopped under the influence of the USSR and the USA. Officially, De Gaulle proposed the development of a French nuclear weapons capability in response to the XQUHOLDELOLW\ RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV DV D JXDUDQWRU RI )UDQFH¶V PLOLWDU\ VHFXULW\ particularly in light of the rising military-strategic tensions between the USA and the 8665'H*DXOOHZURWH³>GHSULYLQJ@)UDQFHRILWVRZQGHWHUUHQWIRUFHLILWLVFDSDEOH RIFUHDWLQJWKHPPHDQVWRLQFXUWKXQGHUZLWKRXWKDYLQJDOLJKWQLQJURG«7KLVZRXOG PHDQ WR UHO\ RQ WKH $PHULFDQ GHIHQVH FRPSOHWHO\« RQ WKeir politics in the foreign SURWHFWRUDWHDQGUHPDLQLQWKHXQFHUWDLQW\«'HILQLWHO\ZHGHVHUYHVRPHWKLQJEHWWHU´ Within NATO, France always occupied a unique position, somewhat distancing itself from the USA. When Paris had acquired its own atomic bomb in the early 1960s, the departure from NATO became a mere question of time. It happened in 1966 when General De Gaulle demonstratively made a step towards the Soviet Union and declared WKH GRFWULQH RI ³GHIHQVH RQ DOO D]LPXWKV´  7KLV PHDQW WKDW )UDQFH¶V VWUDWHgic forces were aimed not only eastward against the USSR (though mainly in this direction), but also towards the West. This annoyed Washington and, consequently, the French socialists who came to power in 1981 completely re-oriented French nuclear forces against the USSR. For a long time, France had ignored the calls to join the nuclear test ban treaty and to acknowledge the principle of non-first strike as China urged. As the disarmament process intensified under American and Soviet efforts at the end of the Cold War, it seemed that these principles had won. Almost all nuclear powers stopped nuclear tests and joined or declared their intentions to join the disarmament process (after the USA and Russia reduce their nuclear arsenals to comparable levels). But in 1998 the first thunder broke out: India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and almost officially joined the privileged nuclear club (Israel had joined it already in the mid 1970s). The suspicions that Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea and some other states were seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction was once again revived. Strictly speaking, such suspicion which turned out to be unfounded was used as the official pretext for the military operation of the USA and Britain against Iraq. It is interesting that Paris actively protested against this operation. But the new French nuclear doctrine shows that France itself would act according to the American scenario if necessary. )UDQFH¶VQHZGRFWULQHGHSDUWVIURPWKHSUHYLRXVSULQFLSOHRIGHWHUUHQFHDQG shifts WRZDUGWKHDFWLYHSROLF\RI³QXFOHDULQWLPLGDWLRQ´ZKLFKLPSOLHVDWOHDVWLQZRUGVWKH possibility of pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons.

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Another new and important idea in the French nuclear doctrine is the inclusion of China in the list of the targets of nuclear deterrence. Certainly it is a purely hypothetical scenario of the French General Staff, but it stresses the shifts in the global VWUDWHJLFEDODQFHRISRZHUDQGUHYHDOV)UDQFH¶VUHDFWLRQWRWKHP 5XVVLDLV QRORQJHU the first and foremost target for the French nuclear forces, having become almost an ally of France, NATO and the West overall. However, this fact did not prevent France from modernizing its nuclear doctrine and shifting to the concept of pre-emptive nuclear strikes. Thus the French nuclear forces were designed as self-sustainable and independent from NATO and aimed to ensure the possibility of nuclear strike in case the United States were unable to fulfill its allied commitments, or in case it were necessary for France to protect national interests that did not coincide with American interests. France conducted its first nuclear test in 1960 in the Sahara. ,Q FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI )UDQFH¶V ORQJ DWRPLF KLVWRU\ ZKLFK LPSOLHV GHHS NQRZOHGJH about the consequences of the development and use of nuclear weapons) as well as its withdrawal from the military operation of NATO while remaining a member of the Alliance as a political power, France can also be regarded as one of the first nuclear weapons proliferants. Thus, the creation of the French nuclear arsenals not only significantly expanded the territory of nuclear deployment in the world but also led to the emergence of the third world power capable of pursuing independent nuclear policy. France is guided by its own atomic, aviation, shipbuilding and rocket production industry. By the early 1960s the strategic line on the creation of the nuclear weapons KDG IRUPHG 2Q 1RYHPEHU   LQ 6WUDVERXUJ GH *DXOOH VWDWHG ³D JUHDW VWDWH without nuclear weapons while others possess them is not the master of its own GHVWLQ\´$QGVLQFHWKHQ³WKHQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHURIWKHVWUDWHJLFQXFOHDUIRUFHVKDGEHHQ QHYHUGRXEWHG´ In 1968, France tested its first hydrogen bomb. )UDQFH¶V RZQ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV FDSDELOLW\ KDV DOZD\V UHPDLQHG RQH RI WKH Pain instruments of maintaining a great power status, the symbol of its national independence and sovereignty. De Gaulle was not the only one who wrote about it - his successors, including two-term President Jacques. Chirac, agreed with him. While France did not possess such intellectual resources as the USA, it has created and continues to develop its own independent school of nuclear strategic thinking. 2QH RI )UDQFH¶V NH\ GRFWULQDO SULQFLSOHV RQ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV LV WR HQVXUH maximum freedom of choice in thHLUXVH)UDQFH¶VPLOLWDU\GRFWULQHGRHVQRWUXOHRXW pre-emptive nuclear strikes in certain situations. The number of the French warheads had reached its height ± 540 - in 1991-1992. 7KHLU VWUXFWXUH FRQVLVWHG RI WKH ³WULDG´  LQWHUPHGLDWH-range S-3 ballistic missiles deployed at the silo launchers on the Albion Plato, 6 Redoubtable type SSBNs and aircraft specially designed to use tactical nuclear weapons. However the SSBNs have always been main element of the strategic nuclear capabilities. )UDQFH¶V QXFlear forces are being modernized and at the same time reduced. In 1997, France possessed 450 warheads; at present, this number has been reduced to 348 units. Through the retirement of the whole land component (IRBMs were dismantled in 1998) the transition IURP WKH ³WULDG´ WR WKH ³G\DG´ VWUXFWXUH RI )UHQFK QXFOHDU armament was completed. The Redoubtable type submarines are being replaced with the series of four modern Triomphant-type SSBNs. Two of them are already operational, the third one was adopted in 2004, and the fourth submarine should be made operational in 2010 (armed with 16 SLBMs with new type MIRVs with the

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operational range of 5,300 km). The question of replacing these missiles with the new units armed with 6 warheads with the combat range of 10000 km in 2008 is also being considered. Guided missiles ASMP (Air-Sol-Moyenne-Portee or air-to-air guided missile) are operational in the French air and naval forces. The nuclear warhead has an explosive power of 300KT and the missile has a range of 300 km. Three squadrons of Mirage 2000N are prepared to deliver nuclear strikes. These guided missiles are deployed on the aircraft-FDUULHU ³&KDUOHV 'H *DXOOH´ IRU WKH DUPDPHQW RI WKH PRGHUQL]HG FDUULHUEDVHGDLUSODQHV³6XSHU(WHQGDUG´7KHQHZFUXLVHPLVVile ASMP-A which would have much larger range capacity and be armed with a new warhead, is being designed for the air and naval forces. There is a stable national consensus on nuclear issues which consolidates practically the whole political spectrum from the communists to the left parties. In 2003, France conducted a review of its nuclear doctrine. In January 2006, French President Jacques Chirac delineated the basic priorities of the national nuclear doctrine. These priorities included the struggle against terrorism, protection of the allies and maintaining a strategic delivery capability. President Chirac made this statement during his working visit to the naval base in the Brest region (in north-western France) where the nuclear-armed submarines and nuclear command FHQWHUDUHEDVHGDQGZKHUH)UDQFH¶VPLOLWDU\GRFWULQHZDVSUHVHQWHG During this visit, the President noted that the French nuclear forces were FRQILJXUHV IRU D UDSLG UHDFWLRQ VWUDWHJ\ ³+HDGV RI WKH VWDWHV WKDW PD\ XVH WHUURULVW methods against us, as well as all those who intend to use weapons of mass destruction in any form, must understand that they will be subjected to hard and adequate UHWDOLDWLRQIURPRXUVLGH7KHUHWDOLDWLRQFDQEHERWKFRQYHQWLRQDODQGXQFRQYHQWLRQDO´ claimed Chirac. Thus, for the first time the French president indicated the possibility RIXVLQJQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDJDLQVW³WHUURULVWVWDWHV´GHVSLWHKDYLQJUXOHGRXWWKLVRSWLRQ earlier. $WWKHVDPHWLPH&KLUDFVWDWHG³2QHVKRXOGQRWKRZHYHU\LHOGWRWKHWHPSWDWLRQ of restricting all defense and security-related considerations to this necessary fight DJDLQVW WHUURULVP 7KH IDFW WKDW D QHZ WKUHDW DSSHDUV GRHV QRW UHPRYH DOO RWKHUV « Our world is marked also by emerging assertions of power based on the possession of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Hence the temptation for certain States to DFTXLUHQXFOHDUSRZHUWKXVYLRODWLQJWUHDWLHV³ $QRWKHULQQRYDWLRQLQWKH)UHQFKGRFWULQHPHQWLRQHGE\&KLUDFZDVWKH³VWUDWHJLF IRUFHVIOH[LEOHUHDFWLRQ´WRH[WHUQDO threats. The President declared that starting from WKHVH FRQVLGHUDWLRQV )UDQFH KDG ³UHGXFHG LWV QXFOHDU ZDUKHDGV GHSOR\HG RQ VRPH RI WKHVXEPDULQHODXQFKHGPLVVLOHV´1RUPDOO\HDFK)UHQFKQXFOHDUVXEPDULQHFDUULHV missiles armed with 6 warheads per missile. &KLUDFVWUHVVHGWKDW)UDQFH¶VQXFOHDUIRUFHVVKRXOGEHSUHSDUHGWR³UHDFWIOH[LEO\´ to external threats. Up to now, the traditional French nuclear doctrine was based on the assumption of the total use of nuclear weapons which should guarantee the decisive VXSHULRULW\RYHUWKHHQHP\&KLUDF¶VVWDWHPHQWVLJQDOHGWKHGHSDUWXUHIURPWKLVSROLF\ thus opening broad opportunities of the punctuated use of WMD for the French armed IRUFHV ,Q IDFW WKH ILUVW VLJQV WKDW )UDQFH ZDV JLYLQJ XS LWV ³QXFOHDU GHWHUUHQFH´ GRFWULQHLQIDYRURIWKH³QXFOHDULQWLPLGDWLRQ´SULQFLSOHDSSHDUHGLQDXWXPQ At that time, the experts started to discuss the fact that the new French nuclear doctrine allowed the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the doctrine accounted not only for states that pose a direct strategic threat, but also those countries

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which France suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction. According to the nuclear doctrine, strikes should target WMD production facilities as well as training FDPSVDQGGLVSRVLWLRQEDVHVRIWHUURULVWV0LQLDWXUHQXFOHDUZHDSRQV³DWRPLFSDFNV´  that, according to some of the experts, until recently had been even more advanced in France than in the USA and Russia, should help the French armed forces to fulfill this difficult task. However, after the scandal with the never-found Iraqi weapons of mass destruction which had been used as the key pretext for unleashing the war against Saddam +XVVHLQ¶VUHJLPHLWLVLQDZD\DZNZDUGWRVSHDNDERXWSUH-emptive nuclear strikes. In WKLV YLHZ &KLUDF KDG SURPLVHG WR XVH ³XQFRQYHQWLRQDO´ PHDQV DJDLQVW WKRVH VWDWH OHDGHUVZKLFKXVH³WHUURULVWPHWKRGV´DJDLQVW)UDQFH7KLVLVDYHU\GDQJHURXVSURPLVH DV PRGHUQ WHUURULVWV XVXDOO\ GR QRW KDYH DQ\ ³KRPHODQG´ ,W LV E\ QR PHDQV DOZDys easy to determine the nationality of non-VWDWHDFWRUVRUPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\ZKLFK³VWDWH OHDGHUV´ WKH\ ZRUN IRU ,Q WKH JHQHUDO FRQWH[W RI WKH (XURSHDQ SROLF\ ZKLFK LV WUDGLWLRQDOO\ FDXWLRXV DQG ZHOO EDODQFHG &KLUDF¶V VWDWHPHQW VHHPV FOHDUO\ LOOconsidered. At the same time, it fits in perfectly with the loud rhetoric of the American ³KDZNV´± neoconservatives, preparing the public opinion for another big war against Iran this time. Certainly France would deliver no nuclear strikes against terrorists or DQ\ERG\ HOVH EXW &KLUDF¶V VWDWHPHQW GHPRQVWUDWHV SROLWLFDO VXSSRUW IRU WKH $PHULFDQ doctrine of pre-emptive strikes. Although France actively protested against the war in Iraq caused by the suspicions that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, the French nuclear doctrine after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 has been incrementally shifting from the deterrence principle to the active nuclear intimidation policy. 7DEOH)UDQFH¶VQXFOHDUIRUFHVGDWDIRU Type Deployed Year of Operational units deployment range, km Land-based aircraft: Mirage 2000N Carrier-based aircraft 6/%0Ɇ Total

Warhead number and explosive power ( kiloton) ɯ

Nuclear weapons stockpile 50

60

1988

2750

24

1978

650

ɯ

10

64

1996

6000

ɯ

288 348

In the foreseeable future, neither Britain nor France plan to create new strategic nuclear systems. However, taking into account the deep reduction of the Russian and 86 ³FHQWUDO´ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV SODQQHG LQ WKH IRUWKFRPLQJ \HDUV RWKHU QXFOHDU VWDWHV may maintain the aggregate potential that would be comparable with the arsenal of each leading nuclear power or even surpass it under certain conditions. This is determined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, according to which the process of reduction should be continued. $WWKHSUHVHQWPRPHQWWKHWRWDOQXPEHURI%ULWDLQ¶VDQG)UDQFH¶VQXFOHDUZHDSRQV is 533 warheads. When discussing the nuclear doctrines of the United Kingdom and France one cannot but compare these documents with the nuclear doctrine of the USA as their main NATO ally.

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Since autumn 2005, the world media has been discussing the evolution of the American nuclear doctrine. . The draft document was prepared by the Pentagon and posted on the internet in March 2005, but it attracted broad attention only in the beginning of September after it was reported in the Washington Post. After that, the document was removed from the US Department of Defense website. In other words, there was an obvious leakage of information. In the preamble of the document which outlined the basic principles of the doctrine, the aims of the nuclear deterrence were IRUPXODWHG LQ WKH IROORZLQJ ZD\  ³Strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision PDNLQJ´$QGIXUWKHURQ³The focus of US deterrence efforts is therefore to influence potential adversaries to withhold actions intended to hDUP86¶QDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV´2 Such an interpretation of deterrence is equal to the radical broadening of its goals and potential acts. National interests of the United States are not limited to security issues; they include economic, energy, ideological and other interests that, most likely, would be much more important for the USA than any hypothetical threats to national VHFXULW\7KHHPSKDVLVLVSODFHGRQWKH³LQGXFHPHQWWRUHIUDLQ´LHRQWKHSUH-emptive DQG ³GHFLVLYH´ LQIOXHQFH RQ WKH GHFLVLRQ-making process at the stage at which ³SRWHQWLDODGYHUVDULHV´IDUIURPKDYLQJFRPPLWWHGDQ\DFWLRQVSDUWLFXODUO\WKRVHWKDW would justify the use of nuclear weapons against them), did not even make any decision in this sphere. Neither international terrorism, nor weapons of mass destruction are mentioned in this part of the doctrine; however the document stresses, ³The US does not make positive statements defining the circumstances under which it would use nuclear weapons.´  $SSDUHQWO\ WKLV PHDQV WKDW QXFOHDr weapons can be used ± and/or the threat of use can be actively employed ± in situations that have nothing to do with military and political threats to American national security. According to the assessments of the London Times this is a radical shift after almost KDOI D FHQWXU\ RI WKH QXFOHDU LQWLPLGDWLRQ SULQFLSOH EDVHG RQ WKH LGHD RI ³PDVVLYH counter-VWULNH´ The necessity of the operation in Iraq was justified by the supposedly existing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction; the falsity of these explanations has been generally admitted both in London and Washington today. Therefore, the references to the WMD problem in the doctrine do not impress. Moreover, the fact that the WMD issue in particular was highlighted in British and American mass media reports about the new doctrine invites a, certain speculation. The key phrase of the document, as the Times writes, appears in the list of possible scenarios of the use of pre-emptive nuclear strike; WKHILUVWRQHDVVXPHVWKDWWKHDGYHUVDU\XVHVRU³LQWHQGVWRXVH´:0'0RVWOLNHO\WKH enemy would not inform us about his intentions and thus the final assessment and decision would be left up to Washington. 2Q 6HSWHPEHU   %ULWDLQ¶V 'HIHQVH 0LQLVWHU ' -RKQ 5HLG VWDWHG WKDW KLV country could be involved in a nuclear conflict in the near future and it is, therefore necessary to renew the nuclear weapons arsenal which guarantees the national security. According to the minister, the decision should be made in the next two to four years. Thus the three nuclear powers ± France, the USA and the UK ± have in fact come out with a coordinated position which reveals a break from the doctrine of defensive nuclear deterrence of the Cold War period and the shift to the doctrine of pre-emptive 2

US Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, 15 March 15, 2005 http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/JCS_JP3-12_05draft.pdf

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and coercive use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. The position of these three states determines the position of NATO on this issue even if no corresponding changes to the Alliance strategic doctrine have been made yet.

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-79

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$1HZ/RRNDW&KLQD¶V1XFOHDU3ROLF\ Jianqun TENG 1

Abstract. 5HOHDVH RI WKH  'HIHQVH :KLWH 3DSHU EURNH &KLQD¶V WUDGLWLRQDO silence and ambiguity regarding its nuclear policy and strategy, which continues to be founded on the principles of self-defensHDQGJOREDOEDODQFH&KLQD¶VHPSKDVLV on its commitment to a minimal deterrence capability shows that its nuclear forces DUHSULPDULO\DVWUDWHJLFSROLWLFDOWRRO7KHFRUHHOHPHQWVRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ are that nuclear weapons must be the last resort for China and it is the quality not quantity that plays the key role. Beijing is unlikely to change its non-first use nuclear policy in the future. The most important aspect of Chinese nuclear WUDQVSDUHQF\ LV D FOHDU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI &KLQD¶V DFWXDO SROLFies rather than its number of warheads.

A framework for nuclear policy Nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine are the three layers for a nuclear state to develop, plan, and use nuclear forces. Policy is the highest and dominant layer for achieving political, economic, and military goals through the development and future use of nuclear forces. The strategy level mainly deals with guidelines, constructions, and preparations for the future use of nuclear forces, while doctrine is the basic operational use of nuclear forces. Nuclear policy decisions depend on many elements, including the assessment of the current LQWHUQDWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQWWKHµJUDQG¶VWUDWHJ\RIDVWDWHIRU its development, the geopolitical situation of its neighborhood, as well as the social features and character of that state. Moreover, as part of assessing the nature of a country, it is important to have a good understanding of the country¶s history, culture, and philosophy of thinking. The subsequent nuclear doctrine will be in accordance with national nuclear policy and overall strategy.

&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ Since the country first tested its nuclear weapons in 1964, Chinese officials have been reluctant to talk about China¶s nuclear policy, either at home or abroad. In fact, the release of the China Defense 2006 White Paper in December of that year was the first time China announced its overall nuclear strategy, specifically as one of self-defense. Scholars and correspondents tend to conclude that such an announcement is part of &KLQD¶V national military transparency endeavors, which Beijing has been attempting for years. Nevertheless, several reasons can be given for China¶s traditional silence on its nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine:

1 Deputy Secretary General of China Arms Control and Disarmament, and also Director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Studies Centre of the China Institute for International Studies in Beijing. He served in the PLA for 25 years and demobilized as a colonel in 2004.

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China¶s traditional culture and philosophy is one of doing things quietly and avoiding extremism. Sensitivities involving nuclear use in the military sphere led officials and scholars to seek to avoid any criticism from the government over possible misinterpretation of policy. Before the 2006 announcement of the self-defense strategy, there had been no clear divisions among the three layers and thus no need to distinguish among them. Sometimes scholars LQWHUSUHWHG &KLQD¶s ³non-first use´ as its official nuclear policy, sometimes as a strategy, and sometimes even as a doctrine. Basically, ³non-first use´ is the only a declaratory nuclear policy for China; The small size of its nuclear arsenal led decision-makers to think that an ambiguous attitude towards its nuclear policy would be of greater international benefit to China. Ambiguity is always a meaningful way for a weak side to protect its security interests when facing strong counterparts; and The foundation of WKH35&¶V nuclear policy established by its first-generation leaders consolidated ground that later leaders could not change in a dramatic way. The more than 40-year-long rational tradition of ambiguity did not provide any incentives for state leaders to make any comprehensive changes of its nuclear policy.

Many Western scholars have studied &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU VWUDWHJ\ in recent years. 2 Some thought that before the 1980s China had no nuclear strategy and that its use of nuclear weapons would be based instead by its nuclear doctrines. Some have argued that limited technologies and economic resources were the key factors influencing &KLQD¶VDGRSWLRQRIDPLQLPXP deterrent strategy. However, others noted that during the 1980s some PLA research fellows published articles saying that China should upgrade the minimum deterrent VWUDWHJ\WRDµOLPLWHGUHWDOLDWLRQ¶VWUDWHJ\7KH\DUJXHG that with the development of high technologies and in order to protect the achievements accomplished through the reform and opening processes, China today could not absorb any massive attack on the mainland, a risk that would be heightened by escalating its own nuclear strategy. However, neither of these two schools of thought comprehensively reflects the true HVVHQFHRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLFy.

2

See, in particular John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford University Press, 1988; &KLQD¶V6WUDWHJLF 6HDSRZHUWKH 3ROLWLFVRI 0RGHrnization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford University Press, 19994; Xue Litai, (YROXWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V 1XFOHDU 6WUDWHJ\ in John Hopkins and Weixing He eds., Strategic Views from the Second Tier: the Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain and China, Transaction Publishers, 1995; Alastair Iain Johnston, &KLQD¶V1HZ2OG7KLQNLQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HFXULW\ Vol 20, No.3, Winter 1995/96, pp5-42; Lastair Iain Johnston, Prospect for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control, The China Quarterly, June 1996; Bate Gill and James Mulvenon, China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States ,; Bate Gill and Mark Stokes, the Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition too Credible Deterrence, in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang eds., WKH3HRSOH¶V/LEHUDWLRQ$UP\DV2UJDQL]DWLRQ5HIHUHQFHVolume v1.0, Rand, 2002.

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3ROLF\RULJLQVDQGIRXQGDWLRQRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ The basic framework of &KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ZDVODLGE\WKHILUVWJHQHUDWLRQleaders of the PRC. Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai were the two key players LQWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\:LWKKLVPDVWHU\RI&KLQHVHSKLORVRSK\ Chairman Mao in the late 1940s viewed atomic bombs DVµSDSHUWLJHUs¶VWUHVVLQJWKDW victory in war does not depend on one or two weapon systems. However, he was also quite familiar with the strength of an atomic bomb and pointed out that strategically one should despise it while tactically one should respect it. After the first nuclear test on Oct 16th&KLQDGHFODUHGWKDWµWKHJRYHUQPHQWKDGEHHQDOZD\VLQIDYRURID comprehensive and complete dismantlement of nuclear weapons. If this could be realized, China would not devHORS LWV QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV¶ 3 In 1970, Mao Zedong GHPRQVWUDWHG KLV XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH PHDQLQJ RI GHWHUUHQFH ZKHQ KH VDLG µLW LV possible that only the big powers could wage a global war with nuclear weapons, but they are not going to war because of atomiFERPEVWKH\KDYH¶$VIRU&KLQDKHVDLG µ2XU FRXQWU\ ZLOO PDNH D IHZ DWRPLF ERPEV LQ WKH IXWXUH ZKLFK GRHVQRWPHDQWKDWZHDUHJRLQJWRXVHWKHP«ZKDWZHDUHJRLQJWRGRLV WR WDNH LW DV D GHIHQVLYH ZHDSRQ«$WRPLF ERPEV FDQQRW EH GURSSHG causally, even when we have acquired atomic bombs, we should not drop WKHPFDXVDOO\DQGRWKHUZLVHDQ\FDXVDOXVHZLOOYLRODWHWKHODZ¶4 Premier Zhou Enlai additionally emphasized that nuclear weapons depended less on the quantity than the quality and variety of nuclear weapons. 5 Even the Chinese scientists who had been involved in the research and development of nuclear bombs thought that nuclear bombs could only be used as a political tool rather than for military leverage.6 Year in and year out, the successors of WKH35&¶VILUVWGHFLVLRQ-makers continued to carry on this policy. During a May 1978 meeting with the PLA Second Artillery Force leaders, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that &KLQD¶VSRVVHVVLRQRIQXFOHDUZHDSRQV ZDVMXVWWRVKRZ&KLQD¶VFDSDELOLW\µ\RXKDYHDQd I have; you want to destroy us and \RX ZLOO EH UHWDOLDWHG DJDLQVW D OLWWOH ELW¶ 7 President Jiang Zemin gave a further H[SODQDWLRQ RQ &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU SROLF\ during a meeting with the Second Artillery leaders where he explained that the purpose of developing strategic nuclear weapons was not an offensive but a defensive one. He argued that such capability provided China with a strong deterrent against other nuclear-weapons states from using such weapons against it, thus proving its defensive value. Moreover, he illustratively wrote: µenhance the construction of the strategic missile force to safeguard the motherland and PDLQWDLQ ZRUOG SHDFH¶8 This nuclear strategic thought shown by the declarations and UHPDUNVRI&KLQD¶VOHDGHUVUHIOHFWVDQGUHLQIRUFHVWKH FRUHHOHPHQWVRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDU 3

See WKH3HRSOH¶V'DLO\ Oct 17th, 1964. Selected Work of Mao Zedong on Diplomatic Affairs, p 541, p 453. 5 Selected Work of Zhou Enlai on Culture, p 661. 6 Some interviews by Ms Su Xiangli, a Chinese scholar, see $VVHVVPHQWRQ&KLQD¶V1XFOHDU6WUDWHJ\in the Li Genxin and Teng Jianqun eds., Annual Collection of Papers on International Arms Control and Disarmament: 20005, World Knowledge Press, p 215. 7 Interviews by Xin Hua News Agency correspondent with the Second Artillery leaders, 8 Ibid. 4

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policy: (1) nuclear weapons must be the last resort for China; (2) it is the quality not quantity that plays the key role. So, from the very beginning of attempting to make an atomic bomb, the PRC leaders were quite aware of its strategic role. In their opinions, an atomic bomb is more a political tool rather than a military weapon, with a basic objective of self-defense. China believed then, as it does now, that it should have such a weapon as a basic means for the defense of the country. It is based on these understandings and principles that China developed its nuclear force. The central objective is to maintain the minimum, effective self-GHIHQVH 7KDW LV WR VD\ WKH LQWHQW LV WKDW &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU IRUFH ZLOO survive a first nuclear strike from any country and will be able to retaliate in kind.

7KHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ 7KHUHDUHDWOHDVWWKUHHFKDUDFWHULVWLFDVSHFWVRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ 1. The non-first-use policy makes nuclear weapons a last resort in war. National policy holds that: µ&KLQDUHPDLQVILUPO\FRPPLWWHGWRWKHSROLF\RIQRILUVWXVHRIQXFOHDU weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear ZHDSRQV¶9 This policy depends on a number of factors, including: an understanding of nuclear ZHDSRQV E\ &KLQD¶V OHDGHUV FRQILGHQFH WKDW &KLQD¶V FRQYHQWLRQDO IRUFH LV VWURQJ HQRXJK DQ DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO VLWXDWLRQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V FXOWXUDO DQG philosophical traditions and socialist ideology. China encourages other countries to IROORZ VXLW µ&KLQD VWURQJO\ DSSHDOV WR WKH RWKHU QXFOHDU VWDWHV WR UHVSRQG WR &KLQD¶V initiative, immediately reach an agreement on a treaty on non-first use of nuclear weapons and unconditionally reach agreement on no-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear ZHDSRQV]RQHV¶10 In recent years, the non-first-use policy has been challenged by some Chinese scholars and officers who argue that in light of the economic development along the coastal areas and the development of sophisticated military technologies, fundamental changes in the style of modern warfare are justified, and that the non-first-use policy should therefore be changed. However, it seems unlikely that China will change its non-first-use policy for the following reasons: (1) It is a state policy which reflects Chinese philosophy and culture on warfare. Just as Sun Tzu wrote in his work Art of War, war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence 9

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2006, December 2006, Beijing. 10 3HRSOH¶V'DLO\-XO\th, 1996.

J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy

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it is too important an issue, with possible consequences too dire, to be neglected or de-structured from the non-first-use policy. To have a good understanding of China¶s nuclear policy, one must have a solid mastering of China¶s culture and history. (2) In the predictable future, there is slim possibility of a large-scale conventional war against China. According to government and scholarly assessments of the international situation in the coming years, China today enjoys its most favorable relations with world¶V big powers and its neighboring countries since the establishment of PRC. The war alert¶VWDWXVLV at its lowest level for years and this is expected to continue. (3) The PLA, which has been modernizing over the last twenty years, has the capability to defend the mainland from any invasion and prevent the separation of Taiwan, the chief security issue of the day. Since the early 1990s, the strategic guideline for national defense was shifted to focus on any crisis happening across the Taiwan Strait, which will absolutely not require a nuclear bomb. (4) Tactically speaking, changing its nuclear policy will would completely change the structure and deployment posture RI &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU IRUFH, which would cost billions of Chinese Yuan. For the 30 years since WKHFRXQWU\¶V openingup, the Chinese have been putting all their efforts into economic development and improving society; it seems unlikely that the government would pay the costs for such a large change in economic priorities as dropping the non-first-use policy would entail. 2. Maintain the minimum capability for self-defense. 7KHLQLWLDOGHYHORSPHQWRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUZHDSRQVFRPHVIURPWKHSUH-condition that the survival of the newborn socialist country depended on it. According to an Indian VFKRODUWKH\RXQJ3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRIChina had faced nuclear threats several times, both from the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, for example in the Korean War, over the Taiwan issue and &KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSURMHFWDQGWKH6LQR-Soviet border conflict from the 1950s to the 1970s. 11 The drive to go nuclear during the 1950s and 1960s can be understood as an effort to break up the nuclear blackmails from the two superpowers. $V 'HYLQ 7 +DJHUW\ SRLQWV RXW µ&KLQD¶V  QXFOHDU WHVW DQG VXEVHTXHQW ZHDSRQL]DWLRQ ZHUH URRWHG LQ %HLMLQJ¶V FRQFHUQ RYHU WKH 8nited States and later the 6RYLHW8QLRQDVWKUHDWHQLQJDGYHUVDU\¶12 6LQFHWKHODWHV&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUIRUFHKDVEHHQDVPDOORQHEXWLWLVHQRXJK for a second strike against any state which uses nuclear weapons against China. The justification for keeping a small arsenal is that China believes that even a small nuclear strike would create an unbearable disaster for the enemy. The level of retaliation capability maintained by China is lower than any other nuclear power in the world. Today, the Chinese gRYHUQPHQW VWLOO LQVLVWV RQ LWV µILYH QR¶V¶ principles on nuclear weapons development, further demonstrating its commitment to minimal capacity: (1) no competition with other nuclear powers; (2) no dependence on other nuclear powers; (3) no proliferation of nuclear weapons; (4) no deployment of nuclear weapons abroad; and 11

Jasjit Singh, Why Nuclear Weapons?, see Nuclear India, p 12-13. Devin T. Hagerty, the Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia, (London, 1998), p 72. 12

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(5) no nuclear alliance with any other countries. And as mentioned above, in 2006 the government announced clearly that its nuclear strategy was one of self-defense: µ&KLQD VQXFOHDr strategy is subject to the state's nuclear policy and military strategy. Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force. China's nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC). China exercises great restraint in developing its nuclear force. It has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country¶.13 3. China supports the process of nuclear disarmament and maintaining strategic stability among the nuclear weapons states. &KLQD¶VVWDQFHLVWKDWDOOQXFOHDUZHDSRQVVWDWHVVKRXOGUHGXFHWKH QXPEHURIQXFOHDU warheads until their eventual, complete abolishment. China pledges it will follow suit if the other nuclear countries destroy their nuclear weapons. This principle lends great value to the international efforts to maintain peace and stability through an arms control approach. China firmly supports the reactivation of arms control policies, advocating that all nuclear weapons states should genuinely undertake their obligations of disarmament as stipulated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation-Treaty. It has consistently stressed that the first step should be the conclusion of a treaty by all nuclear weapons states to commit to a no-first use policy, emphasizing that such an agreement would be a significant confidence-building measure among these states to put their subsequent actions on the right track. Stable relations among the nuclear states are of great importance to the peace and stability of the world. While it proclaimed self-defense in its recent White Paper, &KLQD¶V LQ-depth rationale for its nuclear policy is to keep stable relations among the nuclear weapons states. Non-first-XVHKDVEHHQDSLOODURI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\DQGLW VHUYHV &KLQD¶V IRUHPRVW VHFXULW\ LQWHUHVWV 7KXV LW DSSHDUV KLJKO\ LPSUREDEOH WKDW China will abandon it.

7KHIXWXUHWUHQGRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ The future trend RI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\KDVEHHQDKRW-topic at home and abroad in recent years. Some argue that China should expand its nuclear arsenals in order to meet national security requirements in the new era, which would mean a fundamental change RI&KLQD¶VSDst policy. In 1995, the Journal of International Security published a paper 13

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2006, December 2006, Beijing.

J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy

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that pointed out that since 1987 many papers had been published within China supporting a limited war-ILJKWLQJ FDSDELOLW\ RI &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU IRUFH UDWKHU WKDQ minimal deterrence. IQ WKH DXWKRU¶V RSLQLRQ WKHVH DUJXPHQWV DUH RQO\ VFKRODUV¶ personal views rather than official ones. In the foreseeable future, China is unlikely to alter its nuclear policy since there has been no change to date, since its inception, in the foundation of its nuclear strategy and forces. However, this does not preclude possible change in the future evolution of &KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\:LWKUHJDUGWRWKDWIXWXUHVHYHUDOWUHQGVGHVHUYHPHQWLRQKHUH (as personal observations of the author): 1. The issue of greater transparency in military matters, especially regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear transparency, has been a sensitive subject not only for China but also for other nuclear weapons states. However, some officials and analysts have narrowed the fundamental meaning of the term µWUDQVSDUHQF\¶ ,Q FRPSDULVRQ WR RWKHU QXFOHDU ZHDSRQ VWDWHV &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU transparency has been at the forefront of international attention. From its first test of nuclear bombs in the 1960s, China had declared its aforementioned three basic principles on the development and use of an atomic bomb: nonfirst use, no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, and support for nuclear disarmament. In additional moves towards more transparency, in October 2005 China opened the command post of the Second Artillery Force in Beijing to the then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld; and as described earlier, in December 2006 China announced its nuclear self-GHIHQVHVWUDWHJ\LQWKH&KLQD¶V'HIHQVH:KLWH3DSHU Actually, the Chinese government had been considering announcing its White Paper on nuclear issues over a number of years. This is an understandably difficult challenge, and the government has been trying to find the best way to explain its nuclear policy to the world and it will continue in these endeavors. Of critical note, however, is that the most important aspect RI &KLQHVH QXFOHDU WUDQVSDUHQF\ LV D FOHDU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI &KLQD¶V DFWXDO policies rather than its number of warheads. 2. Also in the future, China will continue the modernization of its nuclear arsenal to meet the new and changing security environment, for which there are several considerations. As official papers and academic journals confirm, China today is in its most secure position of the past 59 years. Its relations ZLWKWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJSRZHUVDUHVWDEOHDQGLWVUHODWLRQVZLWKQHLJKERULQJ countries are also favorable. However, the nuclear challenge is still there. Nuclear weapons states have continued to modernize their respective arsenals and also began to deploy missile defense systems, which has already altered the balance of power among them. Meanwhile, with the proliferation of nuclear technologies through licit and illicit means, more countries have acquired the technology to make nuclear bombs. For China, it is absolutely necessary to face these challenges. &KLQD¶VRZQPRGHUQL]DWLRQZLOOEHIRFXVHGRQWKHTXDOLW\UDWKHUWKDQWKH quantity of the nuclear bombs. Moreover, today the overriding task for Beijing is to build up a fairly developed and harmonious society, leaving few resources leftover for building up the nuclear arsenal. The purpose of the

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J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy

&KLQD¶V PRGHUQL]DWLRQ LV WR PHHW WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU D VWUDWHJ\ RI VHOIdefense. Modernization of its nuclear force has been continuing since the 1970s with the development of precision technologies and long-range delivery systems. For example, silo-based and liquid-engine nuclear weapons have been replaced by mobile and solid-engine systems. All such efforts are explained as a means to enhance the self-defense capabilities of the PLA. ,QOLJKWRIWKH&KLQD¶VIXWXUHHQHUJ\GHPDQGVPXFKPRUHHIIRUWZLOOEH put into the civilian use of nuclear technology in the coming 15 years. In fact the use of nuclear energy by the military has already led to civilian purposes. :KLOH DW WKH 35&¶V IRXQGLQJ &KLQD¶V OHDGHUV JDYH JUHDW SULRULW\ WR WKH military use of nuclear technology to address the nuclear threat posed by other states, civil nuclear energy use was also given attention. In 1950, China established its first institute on nuclear technology, though it was only in March 1985 that China launched its first nuclear power plant in Qinshan, which then began to produce commercial power in 1994. Now China operates several nuclear power plants. AFFRUGLQJWR &KLQD¶V 11th Five-Year Plan, over the next 15 years, the portion of nuclear power in total national electricity production will be increased from its current 1.7% to 4%, which to implement requires 2 reactors brought online every year for the coming 15 years. Compared to the nuclear energy use of developed countries such as France (around 80%), South Korea (around 40%), Japan (around 30%), the U.S. (around 20%), UK (around 20%), and Russia (around 17%), the use of nuclear technology in power production in China is still at a low level. To meet the demand for energy and to protect its environment, China will give great effort to the development of nuclear energy in the coming years.

Conclusion ,QFRQFOXVLRQ&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\LVWUDQVSDUHQW In recent years it has been under internal and external pressures to undertake some changes in a variety of and often opposing directions. However, as it considers the foundation of its nuclear policy to be sound, China does not judge such changes to be necessary and it is doubtful that they will happen in the foreseeable future.

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-87

87

Modern Nuclear Strategy of China Major General (ret) Pavel ZOLOTAREV1

Abstract. Chinese military policy, including nuclear strategy, should be considered not only in the context of the policy of the state as a whole but also in the context of this ancient FRXQWU\¶VFXOWXUH&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUVWUDWHJ\FRUUHVSRQGV to the conditions of the rising world order and this does not presuppose that China would give up the development of its nuclear forces. Still it should be stressed that Chinese nuclear strategy does not consider nuclear weapons to be battlefield DUPDPHQWV&KLQD¶VFRPPLWPHQWQRWWRXVHQXFOHDUZHDSRQVILUVWDQGLWVSURSRVDO to the other nuclear powers to undertake similar obligations deserve support.

Chinese military policy, including nuclear strategy, should be considered not only in the context of the policy of the state as a whole but also in the context of this ancient FRXQWU\¶VFXOWXUH:LWKRXWDQ\SDUWLFXODUH[DJJHUDWLRQLWFDQEHVWDWHGWKDWFRPSDUHG to other countries, China lives within a slightly different system. Attempts to analyze any aspect of Chinese policy from the viewpoint of Western culture may lead to inadequate conclusions. 7KH YHU\ QRWLRQ RI ³ZDU´ KDV FRPSOHWHO\ GLIIHUHQW PHDQLQJV LQ :HVWHUQ DQG Chinese culture. The course of history demonstrates how economics, politics and war are closely and constantly interconnected. Karl von Clausewitz articulated the relationship between politics and war most clearly ± ³ZDULVWKHFRQWLQXDWLRQRISROLF\ E\RWKHU PHDQV´ $V ZDULVWKH GHULYative of politics, it therefore follows the patterns inherent to politics itself. Already in the sixth century BC, Chinese military theorist, 6XQ7]XKDGQRWHGWKDW³ZDUIDUHLVWKHZD\RIGHFHSWLRQ´ Further on, however, Sun Tzu gave recommendations which reflected the specific FKDUDFWHURI&KLQHVHFXOWXUH³ZKHQFDSDEOHRIDWWDFNLQJIHLJQLQFDSDFLW\ZKHQXVLQJ our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near; hold out baits to entice the enemy; feign disorder, and crush him; if he is secure at all points, be prepared for him; if he is in superior strength, evade him; if your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him; pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant; if he is taking his ease, give him no rest; if his forces are united, separate them; attack KLPZKHUHKHLVXQSUHSDUHGDSSHDUZKHUH\RXDUHQRWH[SHFWHG´ But even more typical are the following views of the Chinese military wriWHU³,Q the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's UHVLVWDQFH ZLWKRXW ILJKWLQJ´  2QH RI WKH 5XVVLDQ PLOLWDU\ WKHRULVWV VNHSWLFDOO\ QRWHG

1

Deputy Director, Institute for USA and Canada Studies

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P. Zolotarev / Modern Nuclear Strategy of China

that Sun Tzu was a military leader who had not won a single battle. This statement reveals the significant difference in approaches to war and victory. While Sun Tzu was certainly a military writer of antiquity, it is worth UHPHPEHULQJWKHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVRI'HQJ;LDRSLQJZKLFKXQGHUOLH&KLQD¶VPRGHUQ PLOLWDU\ SROLF\ 7KHLU HVVHQFH LV DV IROORZV ³2EVHUYH FDOPO\  0DQDJH \RXU WDVNV evenly. Defend our position. Hide our might and wait when our time has come. Adhere to discreet position and never demand leadership´. In order to understand the foundation of the Chinese strategy, it seems appropriate to mention an analogy used by Russian military expert, Sergey Grinyaev. To illustrate the difference between Western and Eastern civilizations he compares two logic games popular in the West and in the East. Though both games had appeared in the east, the game of chess became more popular in the West, while the game of Go became popular in the East. One may assume that the logic of the chess game corresponds more to Western culture while the game of Go to Eastern culture. As is well known, chess implies the availability of the full set of pieces in the beginning of the game. Throughout the course of the game, the strength of both players diminishes with the mutual capture of pieces. Eventually the game is won by the player ZKRGHIHDWVWKHRSSRQHQW¶VNLQJ regardless of his own losses. In Go, the game starts with an empty board and strength is built up with the increase of control over the RSSRQHQW¶VVWRQHV2YHUWLPHSOD\HUVEHFRPHPRUHYXOQHUDEOHWRWKHLURZQPLVWDNHV DQG WKH SOD\HU ZKR PDQDJHV WR WDNH DGYDQWDJH RI KLV RSSRQHQW¶V PLVWDNHV ILUVW strengthens his position. The victory in Go goes to the player who establishes control over the larger part of the board; the more powerful the opponent, the more significant is the victory. From this comparison, the essence of Eastern strategy becomes more clear ± the pursuit of greater influence at minimal costs, not through annihilation of the enemy ZKLFK LQHYLWDEO\ HQWDLOV RQH¶V RZQ ORVVHV EXW DW WKH H[SHQVH RI WKH DGYHUVDU\¶V UHVRXUFHVE\XVLQJKLVPLVWDNHVIRURQH¶VRZQGHYHORSPHQW Not accidentally, China uses the Comprehensive National Power index (CNP) to assess the position of the country in the world and the Strategic Configuration of Power LQGH[6&3 LQLWVVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJ$SSDUHQWO\6&3LVXVHGWRFDOLEUDWHWKHFRXQWU\¶V power, including military power, in order to correspond proportionally to existing and SRWHQWLDO WKUHDWV  ,Q GRLQJ VR &KLQHVH OHDGHUV VHHN WR VOLJKWO\ XQGHUVWDWH &KLQD¶V capabilities and avoid confrontation in order to create the best possible conditions for further development. Following the major transformation of its armed forces, China stressed that the first decades of the new century would be peaceful and that military might would not be necessary for further economic development. The threats identified in the official Chinese documents are related to the dispute over Taiwan and potential inter-state conflicts in Tibet and the Xinjiang±Uyghur region. However, it seems that the most serious problems which may constrain the development of the country are connected with the securing of stable energy sources. &KLQD¶V GHSHQGHQFH RQ IRUHLJQ HQHUJ\ VXSSOLHV   FRQWLQXHV WR JURZ GHPDQGLQJ security guarantees for the deliveries from various regions of the world. In light of this FRQFHUQ WKH PRVW VWUDWHJLF XVH RI &KLQD¶V DUPHG IRUFHV would be to carry out joint local operations in different regions of the world. Therefore, the emphasis within the technical transformation is placed on bringing both of the country and the armed forces into the computer age. This process in its turn demands the development of space programs and ensuring security in outer space.

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7KHTXHVWLRQRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUVWUDWHJ\VKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[W of all these nuances of Chinese strategy and military policy. China possesses both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Chinese strategic nuclear forces include strategic missile forces, strategic aviation and a nuclear missile fleet. On January 1, 2007, the total number of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles was 244 units. Strategic missile forces are composed of 130 land-based ballistic missile launchers including 30 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM),18 launchers of Dong Feng-5F ICBMs, 6 launchers of Dong Feng-31 ICBMs, and 6 Dong-Feng-31A ICBM launchers. The number of Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missiles is significantly larger:103 IRBMs including 11 launchers of Dong Feng-4 IRBMs, 36 Dong Feng-21 IRBM launchers and 35 Dong Feng-21A IRBM launchers. All ICBMs and IRBMs are single RV missiles. Strategic aviation is composed of 120 Xian-6 bombers (Chinese modification of the soviet bomber Tu-16). Each bomber is outfitted to carry one nuclear B-5 air bomb ZLWK  PHJDWRQV RI H[SORVLYH SRZHU &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU PLVVLOH IOHHW FRQVLVWV RI RQH submarine with 12 single RV ballistic missiles (SLBM) Julang-1. The total stockpile of nuclear warheads and air-dropped gravity bombs is estimated at 240-280 weapons. Information concerning non-strategic nuclear capacity is restricted. There is, however, information known about the Chinese fighter ± the Xian-5 bomber with a 400 km operational range and nuclear bomb-load of one air bomb with 5-20 kilotons of explosive power. Besides this, strategic missile forces include missile brigades armed with operational-tactical missiles Dong Feng-11A, Dong Feng-15 and Dong Feng15A.Chinese land forces are also armed with short-range ballistic missiles; they may also possess nuclear artillery systems and nuclear land mines. The stockpile of B-4 nuclear air bombs is made up of 350 units; the number of warheads for operational-tactical missiles is 40. The total number of tactical nuclear weapons is estimated at 120 units. &RPSDUHGZLWKRWKHUQXFOHDUSRZHUV&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUIRUFHVDUHDWDORZFRPEDW readiness level owing to the technical shortcomings of the nuclear missile potential of the country. In assessing Chinese nuclear potential in relation to other states, it can be stated ZLWKFHUWDLQW\WKDW&KLQD¶VVWUDWHJLFQXFOHDUIRUFHVDUHLQFDSDEOHRIODXQFKLQJDVXGGHQ nuclear strike against states, such as Russia or the United States. Consequently, in a crisis with either of these countries (i.e. conventional war) China would have no alternative to launching a nuclear strike first ± that is, a pre-emptive strike. Otherwise, &KLQD¶VVWUDWHJLFPLVVLOHV forces could be destroyed with one conventional strike due to their high vulnerability. Therefore another conclusion follows ± the key thesis of Chinese nuclear doctrine concerning the non-first use of nuclear weapons is nothing more than a declaration. The principle of nuclear non-first use can be based only on the concept of a limited nuclear retaliatory strike. The concept rests on the operational status of nuclear forces which creates a real threat of inflicting unacceptable damage to the enemy through the retaliatory strike. It is presumed that, in this case, the enemy would abstain from using nuclear weapons or military actions of such scale that would force the use of nuclear ZHDSRQVLQWKHLQWHUHVWVRIRQH¶VRZQVHFXULW\ Nevertheless, it seems thDW&KLQD¶VFRPPLWPHQWQRWWRXVHQXFOHDUZHDSRQVILUVWLV by no means of a declarative character. On one hand the concept of limited retaliatory

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nuclear strike allows a country to maintain a strategic nuclear force structure commensurate with the economic capabilities of the country, without engaging in a QXFOHDU DUPV UDFH EHWZHHQ WKH OHDGLQJ QXFOHDU SRZHUV  2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG &KLQD¶V policy also allows it to feel confident in terms of ensuring national security. But this is not the crucial point. The use of nuclear weapons in warfare is an extreme measure; it is the last step in inflicting the maximum possible damage to the HQHP\LQVSLWHRIRQH¶VRZQWUHPHQGRXVORVVHV6XFKDQDSSURDFKHQWLUHO\FRQWUDGLFWV Chinese philosophy of war and victory. Chinese philosophy of war and the use of nuclear weapons are incompatible. The difference between China and other official nuclear states, whose nuclear policies do not exclude the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances, should be also stressed here. 5XVVLD¶V ³%DVLF 3URYLVLRQV of the Military Doctrine of the Russian )HGHUDWLRQ´ which was adopted in 1993, formulated the possible cases of first use of nuclear ZHDSRQV5XVVLD¶VSRVLWLRQ ZDVSDUWO\LQIOXHQFHGE\WKH 1$72DSSURDFK supported by the negative security assurances not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear states. It was also shaped by the collapse of the Soviet armed forces and the incomplete forming of Russian armed forces, with their limited capabilities to wage conventional war. The conditions of possible first use of nuclear weapons aimed to prevent the development of local conflict into a large-sale war. 5XVVLD¶ PLOLWDU\ GRFWULQH RI  SUDFWLFDOO\ UHSHDWHG WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI QXFOHDU weapons use formulated in 1993. The capabilities of Russian armed forces have not yet reached a level at which the possibility of a large-scale conventional war could be practically excluded. In 2001, the United States has not only changed its previous approach to nuclear weapons use but also broadened the conditions of its use as far to include pre-emptive strikes. US nuclear policy, in contrast to Russian policy, reflects a desire to strengthen American global supremacy. However, the similarity of Russian and American doctrines lies in the fact that they both accept the appropriateness of nuclear weapons possession, in contradiction to the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The prospects of nuclear disarmament in such a situation become impossible. At the same time, Chinese doctrinal provisions are in accordance with the NPT. $SSDUHQWO\ &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU VWUDWHJ\ FRUUHVSRQGV WR WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI WKH DULVLQJ world order in the best way. But this certainly does not mean that China would give up the development of its nuclear forces. First, the operation life of nuclear missiles is limited; replacement is inevitable. Obviously, improved modern armaments which correspond to the emerging conditions would be made operational. 6LQFH  &KLQD¶V VWUDWHJLF PLVVLOH forces have been, and are being, equipped with missile complexes armed with advanced solid propellant Dong Feng-21A IRBM (compared to the prototype IRBM Dong Feng-21, whose operational range had been increased by 1,000 km ± from 2,000 to 3,000 km). In 2003, the first mobile missile complex with solid propellant Dong Feng-31 ICBM (estimated range of 12,300 km) was made operational. The development of the new mobile IRBM Dong Feng-25, based on the Dong Feng-31,31A has been started. According to some evaluations, this new missile would consist of the first and second stages of ICBM Dong Feng-31,31A and have an operational range of 4,000 km. The first tests of Dong Feng-25 IRBM can be conducted in the end of this year or in the beginning of the next.

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The US development of the ABM system induced China to adopt the program of equipping its strategic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles capable of penetrating the ABM systems. The Dong Feng-5B with a nuclear cassette warhead has already been developed. Still, it should be stressed that Chinese nuclear strategy does not aim to make QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV LQWR WKH EDWWOHILHOG DUPDPHQWV &KLQD¶V FRPPLWPHQW QRW WR XVH nuclear weapons first and its proposal to other nuclear powers to undertake similar obligations deserve support. This provides a means for persuading other states to give up the drive to possess nuclear weapons. It is only in this case that the question of compliance with the NPT requirement concerning the prospect of comprehensive nuclear disarmament can be discussed with practical results.

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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-92

Iranian nuclear program ± peaceful or military goals?1 Mark FITZPATRICK2

Abstract. Iran has no known nuclear weapons or doctrine, other than an insistence on its right to sensitive fuel cycle technologies, which it asserts are for peaceful purposes. Yet THKUDQ¶VEHKDYLRUDQGWKHQDWXUHRILWVSURJUDPSURYLGHUHDVRQVWo conclude that the purpose is a nuclear weapons capability. The history of VDIHJXDUGV YLRODWLRQV DQG RI FKDQJLQJ VWRULHV LV RQH UHDVRQ WR GRXEW WKDW ,UDQ¶V answers to the IAEA work plan warrant early closure of the file. Other reasons for concern are the economic illogic of its enrichment effort and at least ten indicators of military involvement in the nuclear program.

If one were representing the Islamic Republic of Iran, one might protest why the WRSLFRI,UDQLVHYHQRQWKHDJHQGDDWDZRUNVKRSRQWKHVXEMHFWRI³QXFOHDUVWUDWHJLHV DQG GRFWULQHV´  ,UDQ KDV QR QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DQG QR QXFOHDU VWUDWHJ\ RU GRFWULQH± at least not any that are known to the world -- beyond an insistence on its right to the all QXFOHDU IXHO F\FOH WHFKQRORJLHV  ,UDQ¶V OHDGHUV UHSHDWHGO\ LQVLVW WKDW ,UDQ KDV QR intention to possess nuclear weapons and moreover has no need for them. Indeed, Iranians stress that their Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa against the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. And yet, much of the world does not believe it. It is useful to remind ourselves why, and to try WR XQGHUVWDQG ZKDW ,UDQ¶V UHDO QXFOHDU LQWHQWLRQV DQG VWUDWHJLHV DUH, so that we might better find the best way, collectively and nationally, to deal with this proliferation problem. Nobody outside the Iranian decision-making circle knows if Iran has made a decision to produce nuclear weapons. Indeed, this is not a choice Iran needs to make yet; an actual decision to build a nuclear weapon can be made later. What can be said with a high level of confidence, however, is that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapons capability. For this, there is plenty of evidence. It has been suggested that Iran just wants to be like Japan ± with a fissile material production capability for use only in peaceful purposes and a latent potential for military use if a nuclear deterrent were ever deemed necessary. But it is a highly misleading to compare Iran to Japan in this way. Critically, Japan did not seek uranium enrichment technology as a security hedge; at least there is no evidence to suggest this. -DSDQ¶VIXHOF\FOHSURJUDPKDVDVWURQJHFRQRPLFUDWLRQDOH'HYRLGRIVLJQLILFDQWRWKHU energy producing resources and fearful of the effects of oil price shocks as the third ODUJHVWJOREDORLOFRQVXPHU-DSDQ¶VHQHUJ\VHFXULW\GHSHQGVKHDYLO\RQQXFOHDUSRZHU 5RXJKO\RQHWKLUGRI-DSDQ¶VJURZLQJHOHFWULFLW\GHPDQGLVVXSSOLHGE\QXFOHDUHQHUJ\ Throughout its nuclear history, Japan has never been suspected of hiding aspects of its 1 2

Paper updated in March 2008 Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

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program, never violated its safeguards agreement, never refused to accept strengthened VDIHJXDUGVSURYLVLRQVDQGQHYHUUHIXVHGWRDQVZHULQVSHFWRUV¶TXHVWLRQVWRGHQ\ them DFFHVV RU WR LPSHGH WKHLU LQYHVWLJDWLRQV  -DSDQ¶V SURJUDP KDV EHHQ RQH RI FRPSOHWH transparency and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ,UDQ¶V FDVH LV EHHQ YHU\ GLIIHUHQW  ,WV KLVWRU\ RI GHFHSWLRQ DQG VDIHJXDUGV violations, the economic illogic of its enrichment program, and the many indications of military connections provide a good deal of evidence that a capability for nuclear weapons ± whether for deterrence or hegemonic purposes ± is its real intent.

Safeguards violations ,UDQ¶VFHQWULIXJHSURJUDPVWDUWHGLQ7KLVZDVDWDWLPHZKHQWKH86DQG8665 were making arms control deals to sharply reduce their nuclear arsenals. The concept that horizontal proliferation is directly linked to vertical proliferation or the failure of disarmament does not apply to the Iran case. In comparison with the nuclear weapons programs of most other countries, however, Iran was not on a fast track for most of this time. Twenty-three years later Iran is still at least a year away from being able to produce enough fissile material sufficient for a nuclear weapon. By contrast, it took Pakistan eleven years to be able to produce a bomb from the time A.Q. Khan stole enrichment technology from Europe. In the past few years, however Iran has TXLFNHQHG WKH SDFH  3UHVLGHQW $KPDGLQHMDG¶V ERDVW RQ  $SULO  WKDW ,UDQ KDV begun installing an additional 6,000 centrifuges to add to the 3,000 already in place at the underground enrichment plant at Natanz suggests that Iran is now speeding ahead as rapidly as possible. 7KHIXOOH[WHQWRI,UDQ¶VILVVLOHPDWHULDOSURGXFWLRQSURJUDPVGLGQRWFRPHWROLJKW until August 2002, when an exile group revealed the existence of the underground enrichment plant under construction at Natanz and a heavy water-moderated research reactor at Arak, the latter ideal for producing weapons grade plutonium. Western intelligence agencies knew about these facilities but had not provided the IAEA with specific information about them for fear of compromising intelligence sources. The facilities and the deception surrounding them turned the glare of international attention to focus on Iran. Iranian representatives protest that they had no legal requirement to notify the IAEA about these facilities anyway until six months before any nuclear material was introduced. This is legally correct insofar as Natanz is concerned. Unlike every other country with a nuclear program, Iran had not signed a subsidiary arrangement to its safeguards agreement requiring giving the IAEA advance notification of the construction of any new nuclear facility as soon as a construction decision is taken. Iran finally did sign the subsidiary agreement in 2003, but then they unsigned it in 2007 ± an action for which there is no precedent or legal justification. For many other aspects of its nuclear development programme, Iran did in fact have legal obligations to notify the IAEA. Under its NPT-required safeguards agreement, Iran was required to report the importation of nuclear material, experiments ZLWKLWDQGIDFLOLWLHVLQZKLFKLWZDVLQWURGXFHG,UDQ¶VIDLOXUHWRUHSRUWWKHLPSRUWDWLRQ of uranium compounds from China, and its facilities and experiments involving both enrichment and reprocessing at places including Kalaye Electric, were among the 14 different kinds of safeguards failures that IAEA Director General ElBaradei reported to the Board of Governors in November 2003. If there were one or two failures to report, one might give Iran the benefit of the doubt that it was only a technical failure. But

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benefit of the doubt is not warranted when the failures are systematic. It was this systematic pattern of serious safeguards violations that obliged the IAEA Board of Governors to report safeguards non-compliance to the UN Security Council, although this step was put off as long as Iran suspended its enrichment activity. When Iran EURNHWKHVXVSHQVLRQWKH%RDUGILQDOO\UHSRUWHG,UDQ¶VQRQ-compliance to the Security Council in September 2005. As a second reason for reporting to the Security Council, WKH %RDUG VHSDUDWHO\ IRXQG WKDW WKH DEVHQFH RI FRQILGHQFH WKDW ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes gave rise to questions regarding international peace and security that are within the competence of the Security Council. ,W LV ZRUWK UHPHPEHULQJ WKH ,$($¶V DWWHPSWV WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH WUXH SLFWXUH RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDP HYHU VLQFH WKH YLRODWLRQV ILUVW FDPH WR OLJKW LQ   ,Q WKH course of the IAEA investigations, Iran repeatedly changed its story whenever the IAEA came up with new information that contradicted the old story. Two examples DPRQJ PDQ\ VXIILFH WR PDNH WKH SRLQW   )LUVW ZKHQ ,UDQ¶V HQULFKPHQW program was disclosed in 2002, the government insisted that the technology development and all of the material and equipment was indigenous. When environmental sampling proved this to be false, Iran admitted that it obtained technology and components from a black market network, but it continued to repeatedly change its answers regarding the degree of cooperation and to this day doubts remain about the degree of foreign assistance, including whether Iran received the same set of nuclear weapons plans that the A.Q. Khan network sold to Libya and apparently offered to Iraq. A second example FRQFHUQV WKH ,$($¶V efforts to inspect the Kalaye Electric Company facilities on the outskirts of Tehran, where open sources alleged that enrichment work had taken place. When inspectors arrived in March 2003, authorities claimed they had done no enrichment work at Kalaye and could not find the keys to the workshop. Later, when inspectors arrived again in August that year, authorities produced the keys to a room that had been fully refurbished and repainted in the intervening months. Yet the inspectors could still find traces of contamination, causing Iran belatedly to acknowledge work there with contaminated machines. 7KLVSDWWHUQRIFKDQJLQJVWRULHVLVXVHIXOWRUHFDOOLQDVVHVVLQJ,UDQ¶VSURPLVHVLQ $XJXVWWRDQVZHURQFHDQGIRUDOOWKH,$($¶VRXWVWDQGLQJTXHVWLRQs, after which it insisted there would be no more answers. Past experience thus rightfully raised GRXEWVWKDW,UDQ¶VDQVZHUVWKLVWLPHZRXOGZDUUDQWHDUO\FORVXUHRIWKHQXFOHDUILOH$V it transpired, Dr. El Baradei had to report to the Board of Governors in February 2008 WKDW ,UDQ KDG UHIXVHG WR DQVZHU PRVW RI WKH DJHQF\¶V TXHVWLRQV DERXW DOOHJHG weaponisation studies (see below).

Economic illogic 7KHUHLVQRDSSDUHQWVRXQGHFRQRPLFUDWLRQDOHWR,UDQ¶VXUDQLXPHQULFKPHQWSURJUDP especially when it does not yet have even one power reactor on-line that requires fuel. When Bushehr and any future reactors are ready for operation, it will be far cheaper for Iran to import enriched uranium fuel, like most countries with nuclear power do. Of the twelve countries most dependent on nuclear energy, only one has its own enrichment capability. Russia has already offered life-time fuel for Bushehr, and other producers stand ready to provide fall-back fuel cycle services, if Iran eliminates the suspicions about its programme.

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The Iranians argue that they need to be self-sufficient in fuel production because they cannot trust any country to provide fuel. Having been the target of US-led sanctions ever since the 1979 revolution, Iranians distrust the intentions of the powerful QDWLRQVRIWKH ZRUOG7KH KLVWRU\RIEURNHQQXFOHDUGHDOVZLWKWKH :HVWDQG5XVVLD¶V delay on delivery to Bushehr until late 2007 proved their point, the Iranians say. However, one might ask why Russia delayed delivery of fuel to Bushehr. If Iran met contractual obligations and international non-proliferation mandates it would have no reason to fear fuel cut-off. This is a vicious cycle. Iranian behavior incited proliferation concern, so its fuel for Bushehr was delayed. This in turn caused Iran to protest more firmly that it needed to produce its own enriched uranium to protect its interests, no matter what the Security Council mandates to the contrary, which only intensifies the proliferation concern. If Iran stopped the activity that gives rise to the concerns, then this vicious cycle could be turned into a virtuous cycle. In any case, for both technical and contractual reasons, Iran cannot produce fuel for Bushehr. Enriched uranium fuel is not a generic product; it is tailor-made for the specifics of the reactor. Russia is not going to turn over the specifications or allow Iran to break the contract by producing its own fuel for Bushehr. 0RUHRYHU ,UDQ¶V OLPLWHG XUDQLXP UHVHUYHV PHDQV LW FDQQRW EH VHOI-sufficient in nuclear fuel production anyway. Iran will have to import uranium ore if it wants to produce its own fuel for the additional reactors it plans to build. In the meantime, however, Iran will be in a good position to strike a deal that would give it a guaranteed source of foreign fuel. Many different plans have been put forward for how to guarantee enriched uranium fuel to countries that have solid non-proliferation records, so that they never need to consider enriching uranium on their own. Notwithstanding the economic illogic, Iran argues that it will enrich uranium because it has a right to do so. It is argued that the nationalistic sentiment in support of the programme, in defensH RI ,UDQ¶V ULJKWV WR SHDFHIXO HQHUJ\ LV VR VWURQJ WKDW WKH government could not in any case forgo the right. In fact, however, Iran currently does not have the right to enrichment. The inalienable right to nuclear energy development mentioned in Article IV is conditioned on fulfillment of the non-proliferation conditions of the NPT, which Iran has demonstrably violated. Also, the UN Security Council created a new international law status for Iran last year when it mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that Iran must suspend its enrichment and reprocessing-related activity. This explains why IAEA Director General ElBaradei reportedly said recently that Iran has no right to enrichment. He was not, as has been implied, making some unfounded interpretation of his own; he was simply stating a fact of current international law.

Military involvement $W OHDVW WHQ LQGLFDWRUV RI PLOLWDU\ LQYROYHPHQW LQ YDULRXV DVSHFWV RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU program and of weapons intentions have come to light through IAEA reports or other reputable public sources. These indicators show military links to various phases of the fuel cycle, from mining to uranium conversion, centrifuge component production as well as procurement, along with administrative links. There is also evidence that suggests weaponization design work and testing.

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Together these indicators strongly suggest that, until 2003 at least, there was a coordinated military connection for purposes of exploring a nuclear weapons programme. As far as is known from unclassified sources, the trail stops in 2003, the date the last documents about explosives testing, missile re-entry vehicles and other damning evidence, was found on a computer hard drive turned over by an Iranian walkin at an American embassy. It is possible, of course, that the apparent weapons development and testing plans found on the computer were only feasibility studies that never left the drawing table. There is no confirmed evidence that development continued after 2003. In fact, the US National Intelligence Estimate released in December 2007 concluded that Iran stopped the explicit weaponisation work in 1RYHPEHU3UHVLGHQW3XWLQUHDIILUPHG5XVVLD¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKLVSRLQW2FWREHU  ZKHQ KH VDLG DIWHU PHHWLQJ )UHQFK 3UHVLGHQW 6DUNR]\ WKDW ³:H  GR QRW KDYH objective data that says Iran is trying to produce nuclear weaponV´  ,Q D QDUURZ definition, this is true. But this tapered statement overlooks the earlier evidence about intentions to produce a nuclear weapons capability. At least some of these questions were supposed to be cleared up in the course of WKH ,$($¶V GLVcussions with Iran under the terms of their work plan announced on August 21, 2007. In two of these areas ± circumstances regarding operation of the Gchine uranium mine and Polonium-210 experiments that have application in nuclear weapons designs ± the I$($ GHFODUHG WKDW ,UDQ¶V DQVZHUV ZHUH ³FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK LWV ILQGLQJV´,QWZRRWKHUDUHDV± the presence of highly enriched uranium contamination at a technical university in Tehran and procurement efforts by a former head of the Physics Research Centre at Lavisan-Shian of dual-use equipment useful in uranium conversion and enrichment work ± WKH ,$($ GHFODUHG WKDW ,UDQ¶V DQVZHUV ZHUH ³QRW LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH GDWD FXUUHQWO\ DYDLODEOH WR WKH DJHQF\´  7KLV ODWWHU SKUDVH indicates that the IAEA has a lower lHYHO RI FRQILGHQFH WKDW ,UDQ¶V DQVZHUV DUH FRPSOHWH,WPHDQVWKDWWKH,$($KDVQRWEHHQDEOH\HWWRYHULI\,UDQ¶VDQVZHUVDQG will continue to evaluate them against other information. With regard to the weaponisation studies documented in a computer hard drive turned over to a Western LQWHOOLJHQFHDJHQF\E\DQ,UDQLDQGHIHFWRULQ,UDQVDLGWKHHYLGHQFHZDVµEDVHOHVV DQGIDEULFDWHG¶DQGGHQLHGWKHH[LVWHQFHRUUROHRIVRPHRIWKHSHUVRQQHOQDPHGLQWKH documents. It is difficult to draw conclusions about the authenticity of the computer documents, EXWLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGDOWKRXJKFDXWLRXVO\UHIHUULQJWRWKHPDVWKHµDOOHJHG¶VWXGLHVWKH IAEA showed no hint that it suspected them to be a fabrication. Reporters from the Washington Post and the New York Times, who after the Iraq experience are cautious about uncritically accepting US intelligence claims, also seem to believe that the documents are credible. They note that US intelligence officials subjected the defector, who was not a member of an exile group, to a number of polygraphs and interviews and, based on the volume, consistency and technical nature of the drawings, concluded it was highly unlikely that the documents were fabricated. British, French and German intelligence agencies, with whom the information was shared, all concurred that it appeared authentic. In briefing to IAEA member state missions about the weaponisation studies on February 25, 2008, IAEA Deputy DG Olli Heinonen indicated that the IAEA had multiple sources of information. With regard to the studies themselves, it appears that more than one Western intelligence agency provided documents from the computer hard drive. In addition, the IAEA obtained information from other sources about the military organization structure it briefed to IAEA missions. The IAEA also obtained

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information from various sources about Iranian procurement activity that was consistent with the allegations of weaponisation studies. $PRQJ WKH GRFXPHQWV RQ WKH KDUG GULYH ZHUH VFKHPDWLFV IRU ,UDQ¶V 6KDKab-3 medium-range ballistic missile showing a series of attempts between 2001 and 2003 to redesign the size, weight and diameter of the nose cone ± or re-entry vehicle ± to accommodate a spherical object with the characteristics of a nuclear implosion weapon. Miniaturizing a nuclear weapon to be able to fit the dimensions of the Shahab-3 would not present an insurmountable challenge for Iran, particularly if it obtained design help through the black market, such as the nuclear weapons design that the A.Q. Khan network provided to Libya. The exact specifications of that design are not publicly available, other than that it had a mass of about 500 kilograms and a diameter of less WKDQDPHWHU7KHZDUKHDGRI&KLQD¶VHDUO\QXFOHDUWHVWVIURP2FWREHU which used the design sold to Libya, appear to have a diameter of between 80 and 90 cm. It is ZRUWK QRWLQJ WKDW WKH GLDPHWHU RI WKH QRVH FRQH RI ,UDQ¶V 6KDKDE-3M version VRPHWLPHVGHVFULEHGDVDµEDE\ERWWOH¶EHFDXVHRILWVVKDSH WKDWZDVWHVW-launched in 2004 also appears to be about 80-90 cm in diameter.

Looking ahead While waiting for the results of the IAEA-Iran work plan, the Security Council delayed imposing any further sanctions until March 2008, even though most of the conditions of the three previous Security Council mandates remained unfulfilled. The additional sanctions imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1803 will surely not be sufficient to persuade Iran to suspend its enrichment programme. This resolution only expanded the number of Iranian individuals and entities subject to the two previous sanctions resolutions without increasing the severity of the penalties. Maintaining the unanimity of the permanent members of the Council does send an important signal in GHPRQVWUDWLQJ ,UDQ¶V isolation. The most important aspect of UNSCR 1803 is that it gives the European Union and other states a basis individually to apply additional sanctions of their own. After each of the previous resolutions, the EU imposed its own tougher sanctions. Resolution 1803 calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. This clause could be a basis for the EU to stop transactions with these banks. Such financial sanctions will be the strongest pressure Iran faces. It is difficult to quantify the effect of such sanctions, however. In an 8 February 2008 speech, US Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert Kimmit said Iranian banNVKDG IRXQG ZD\VWRFLUFXPYHQW VDQFWLRQVDQG ³UHPDLQ XQGHWHFWHGDVWKH\ PRYH IXQGV WKURXJK WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ILQDQFLDO V\VWHP WR SD\ IRU WKH UHJLPH¶V LOOLFLW DFWLYLWLHV´ Even if Iran were to satisfactorily address all the questions and to honor its safeguards agreement, enrichment in Iran would still be a problem until through a sustained period of honesty and transparency Iran restored the credibility gap it created with its history of safeguards violations, obfuscation, weapons-related procurements and experiments, lack of cooperation with the IAEA, and military involvement. The proposal put to Iran in August 2005 by Britain, France and Germany (the E3) and repeated by the E3 plus China, Russia and US in June 2005 included a provision that the suspension of enrichment could be reconsidered in ten years. If transparency allowed the IAEA to be in a position to provide guarantees about the absence of

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undeclared activity, then an enrichment programme in Iran would pose fewer grounds for objection, even though it would still be far more reassuring to the world and economically better for Iran if it obtained all sensitive fuel cycle services from overseas. In conclusion, there is ample reason to be concerned about the intentions behind ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH It is good that Iran has foresworn nuclear weapons, but it remains very worrisome that it continues to develop the capability. To Iran¶VQHLJKERrs and to much of the rest of the world, there is little difference between having a capability and having the weapons. While there are ways to try to ensure that a latent capability does not become a weapons programme, they are far from perfect. The best option is to forego enrichment DQG UHSURFHVVLQJ WHFKQRORJLHV XQWLO FRQILGHQFH LV UHVWRUHG WKDW ,UDQ¶V LQWHntions are indeed peaceful, which is why the Board of Governors and the UN Security Council have demanded suspension. 7KH TXHVWLRQ SRVHG IRU WKLV WRSLF ZDV ZKHWKHU ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH KDV peaceful or military goals. The answer is both. Now the question is whether there will be a peaceful or military solution.

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-99

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Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution Alexander PIKAEV1

Abstract. Prospects for the resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem are still dim. 7KH GLVFORVXUH RI WKH VHFUHW ,UDQLDQ IDFLOLWLHV GHDOW D VHULRXV EORZ WR 7HKUDQ¶V assertions that it had not pursued any illegal nuclear activities. The present approach to the solution of the Iranian nuclear problem has little chance for success. The position of the world community towards the Iranian nuclear program can be characterized as the policy without a stick and carrot. Fortunately, in terms of technology, the Iranian nuclear program does not have the capability to FUHDWHDQXFOHDUZHDSRQVSURJUDPTXLFNO\HYHQLI,UDQ¶VOHDGHUVKLSKDGVHWWKLVDV its aim.

Prehistory Iran is one of the founding countries of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. It signed this document on February 2, 1970. According to the treaty, Tehran pledged to neither produce nor seek to acquire nuclear weapons by any means. On May 15, 1974, a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force. In accordance with this agreement the IAEA had been given access to facilities on Iranian territRU\UHODWHGWR,UDQ¶VSHDFHIXO atomic activities. The acceptance of these documents opened the way to international cooperation between Iran and some Western countries in the peaceful atomic energy sphere. In particular, with the assistance of the German business group Siemens, Tehran started building an atomic power plant in Bushehr. However, after the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 and a drastic deterioration of relations with the USA, Western companies were forced to stop cooperation with Iran in the sphere of the peaceful use of atomic energy. The construction of the Bushehr power plant was also frozen. At first the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran showed no interest in nuclear technologies. But in the late 1980s, as it became known later, Iran research and development activities continued in this sphere. It seems that this was caused by the Iranian-Iraqi war when Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran in defiance of its international commitments. This act received no serious condemnation by the international community, a factor which probably encouraged Tehran to launch its QXFOHDU SURJUDP ,Q YLRODWLRQ RI ,UDQ¶V  &RPSUHKHQVLYH 6DIHJXDUGV $JUHHPHQW however, Iran did not declare these activities and IAEA inspectors had no opportunity to verify they were in accord with the NPT requirements. 1

Department Head, Institute for World Economy and International Relations

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In the 1990s, Tehran significantly expanded the scale of its nuclear activities and in particular decided to resume construction of the Bushehr power plant. Afraid of tough reaction from the USA, including sanctions legislated by Congress, Western companies hesitated to render any assistance to Iran, and therefore the Iranian authorities asked Russia to finish building the Bushehr plant as well as to deliver and assemble all the necessary equipment. Iranians also wanted to buy equipment which was not related to the Bushehr project. 5XVVLDIRXQGQRJURXQGVIRUUHIXVLQJ,UDQ¶VUHTXHVWDVDWWKDWWLPHEHFDXVHQRWKLQJ was known about the secret nuclear activities of this country. From the legal viewpoint, Moscow in fact was required to assist Iran in the sphere of the development of peaceful atomic energy. This was the direct requirement of Article IV of the NPT, which obliged parties in possession of nuclear energy to share the technology with states parties to the treaty who did not yet enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy. Information about Russian-Iranian cooperation in the peaceful nuclear sphere caused concern in the United States, which feared that under cover of the Bushehr reactor construction, Iran would develop military nuclear technologies, prohibited by the NPT. Washington started to exert rather serious pressure on the Yeltsin administration in order to make it give up any nuclear cooperation with Iran. However, Moscow demonstrated unexpected persistence and managed to defend the Bushehr project. Still, Moscow was forced to refrain from the delivery to Tehran of certain technologies including uranium enrichment. As became known later, Iran purchased gas centrifuge uranium enrichment technology from other countries. Despite the 1995 deal with Moscow, the USA continued to follow Russian-Iranian contacts in the peaceful atomic sphere very attentively. Officially Washington opposed the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant although it kept from introducing sanctions against Russian companies and private persons participating in this project. At the same time, based on intelligence data including information received from Israeli intelligence services, Washington from time to time imposed sanctions against Russian companies which cooperated with Tehran on projects other than Bushehr. In doing so, the United States persuaded other countries, first of all Ukraine, not to cooperate with the Russian companies on Bushehr subcontracts. Sometimes this pressure yielded certain results. Under the pressure of their governments, subcontractors gave up projects and contracts had to be transferred to other companies. Certainly it complicated and even delayed the construction of the reactor. Washington was afraid that the irradiated nuclear fuel from the Bushehr power plant could be used to extract weapons-grade plutonium and to create an atomic bomb. The Russian side, in response, pointed out that according to Russian legislation Iran has no obligation to repatriate the spent fuel to Russia. As another argument, Russia cited :DVKLQJWRQ¶VUHIXVDOWRWDNHEDFNVSHQWQXFOHDUIXHORI$PHULFDQRULJLQIURPDZKROH number of countries including such near-nuclear states as Taiwan and South Korea. ,Q  5XVVLD¶V Oegislation was modified and repatriation of the spent nuclear fuel was permitted. After that, Moscow demanded that Tehran conclude a protocol on returning to Russia the spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor, upon threat of otherwise cutting off deliveries of fresh fuel. The absence of such deliveries would mean that Bushehr would never become operational. After many years of long and painful negotiations, the Iranian side accepted Russian terms and signed the corresponding protocol. It is interesting that in the dialogue with Russia, the United States had invariably refused to provide any concrete facts concerning Iranian illegal nuclear activities and

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about contacts between the Iranians and Russian companies. The USA was motivated by reluctance to disclose its sources of information. In fact it was most probably politically imprudent for the Americans to confess that they had received data from intelligence services of third countries. However, it is possible that Washington could have had other reasons for LW3UREDEO\LWZDVQRWWR:DVKLQJWRQ¶VDGYDQWDJHWRH[SRVH the information that Iran had started building the uranium enrichment facilities. Theoretically these facilities would allow Iran to develop nuclear explosive devices based on weapons-grade uranium instead of plutonium which could have been potentially extracted from the spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr power plant. The publication of this information would inevitably result in the decrease of the international pressure upon Russia aimed to induce it either to cease all activities on the Bushehr project or at least to achieve confirmation of the protocol with Iran on returning the spent nuclear fuel back to Russia. Only when the unwillingness to reveal this information became nearly absurd and the signing of the Russian-Iranian protocol on the spent fuel was inevitable, in August 2002 an Iranian exile group revealed the existence of Iranian uranium enrichment IDFLOLWLHV LQFOXGLQJ WKH XUDQLXP KH[DIOXRULGH ³\HOORZFDNH´  FRQYHUVLRQ SODQW DW Esfahan and the uranium enrichment centrifuges at Natanz. Soon an American nongovernmental organization published satellite photos of the facilities. It was also UHYHDOHG WKDW ,UDQ¶V FHQWULIXJHV KDG EHHQ PRVW SUREDEO\ DFTXLUHG WKURXJK WKH LOOHJDO nuclear black market network headed by the prominent Pakistani scientist - the creator RI WKH ,VODPDEDG¶V QXFOHDU ERPE - A.Q. Khan. This showed that contrary to longVWDQGLQJ$PHULFDQDQG,VUDHOLDOOHJDWLRQV,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPZDVGHYHORSLQJQRW due to Iranian contactVZLWK5XVVLDRUWKH%XVKHKUFRQWUDFWEXWWKURXJKWKH³VHFRQGDU\ SUROLIHUDWLRQ´OLQH± WKHQXFOHDU³EODFNPDUNHW´IHGE\GHOLYHULHVIURPWKHQHZQXFOHDU states.

The Diplomatic Process in 2003-2005 The disclosure of the secret Iranian facilities dealt a seULRXVEORZWR7HKUDQ¶VDVVHUWLRQV that it had not pursued any illegal nuclear activities. The construction of the abovementioned facilities and building of the heavy-water reactor in Arak as well as all previous experiments had not been declared to the IAEA as required under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement of 1974. The scandalous nature of these disclosures resulted in a rapid increase of international pressure aimed to induce the Iranian leadership to fairly cooperate with the IAEA and to lay bare all undeclared nuclear activities. However, it should be mentioned that the nature of these activities in itself apparently did not contradict Iranian obligations within the NPT. Only the fact that Tehran had not informed the IAEA about these activities could be viewed as an NPT violation. In fact, it contradicted the provisions of the 1974 agreement. $IWHU WKH SXEOLFDWLRQ RI WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ ,UDQ¶V LOOHJDO QXFOHDU DFWLYLWLHV WKH United States proceeded to build up political pressure upon the country, demanding that it not only come clean about all undeclared nuclear activities but also that it give up any uranium enrichment programs. In response, Tehran agreed to cooperate with the IAEA on uncovering its previous nuclear programs but categorically refused to suspend its uranium enrichment activities. According to Tehran, such activities were allowed within the NPT framework and were aimed toward creating national capacities for fuel

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production for atomic power plants. Many non-nuclear states, including :DVKLQJWRQ¶V close ally Japan, possess similar capacities. The British-$PHULFDQ LQYDVLRQ RI ,UDT DQG WKH UHPRYDO RI 6DGGDP +XVVHLQ¶V regime from power in March-April 2003 had temporarily changed the attitudes not only in Tehran but also in a number of the European capitals. Clearly frightened by the ease with which American troops occupied Baghdad, the Iranian leadership started sending signals to the USA and European countries which stated its readiness to seek a compromise on its nuclear program. Tehran signed the Protocol on returning the spent nuclear fuel to Russia and accepted the IAEA safeguards Additional Protocol. According to this document, the IAEA inspectors obtained the right to visit not only the facilities declared by Iran itself but also other facilities where they suspected of illegal QXFOHDU DFWLYLWLHV 7KLV VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQFUHDVHG WKH WUDQVSDUHQF\ RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU programs. At the same time Iran decided not to speed up the parliamentary ratification of this agreement, obviously trying to retain freedom of action for the future. Until ratification - the date of which had not even been specified - the agreement was to be implemented on a provisional basis. In 2003, Iran decided to take a step which was unprecedented in the whole history of Iranian-American relations since the victory of the Islamic revolution. It proposed to the United States to start direct consultations on Iraq, clearly counting on the significant improvement of relations with Washington in exchange for the cooperation of American occupation forces on behalf of the Shia groups who were significantly influenced by Iran. Moreover, Tehran agreed to discuss its nuclear program not only with the IAEA but also with some of the Western countries. In late 2003, informal contacts between the representatives of Iran on the one side and Germany, France and Britain on the other side started. In November 2004 these contacts resulted in the signing of the Paris agreement according to which Iran was obliged to provide clear and long-term JXDUDQWHHV RI WKH SHDFHIXO QDWXUH RI LWV QXFOHDU SURJUDP 8QWLO WKHVH ³REMHFWLYH JXDUDQWHHV´FRXOGEH DJUHHG XSRQ7HKUDQDVVXPHG YROXQWDU\REOLJDWLRQVWRFHDVHDOO uranium enrichment activity as well as radio-chemical plutonium reprocessing from spent nuclear fuel. In return, West European countries made it clear that they would be UHDG\WR³UHZDUG´,UDQLILWJDYHXSXUDQLXPHQULFKPHQWRQDSHUPDQHQWEDVLV The diplomatic initiative of France, Germany and Britain (the EU-3) was sparked by a whole series of reasons. First, Britain and France strove to return to the region east of Suez which they had been forced to leave in the late 1950s. Second, Germany and )UDQFH KDG DFFXPXODWHG VLJQLILFDQW LQYHVWPHQWV LQ ,UDQ¶V FLYLO HFRQRP\ DQG VKRZHG great interest in the oil and gas sector of the country. Third, they wished to smooth over the differences between Paris and Berlin on the one side and London on the other, which appeared during the British-American preparation of the military operation in Iraq. The preservation of differences could have negatively influenced relations within the European Union on the eve of its enlargement planned for 2004. Finally, all three countries wished to avoid another military operation which could have unpredictably influenced both transatlantic and internal European relations as well as contacts between the West and the whole Islamic world. Besides, Britain needed contacts with Iran as its occupational sector in Iraq was situated to the south of the country, mostly populated by Shias who had close relations with the Iranian co-religionists. It should be mentioned that the initiative of the EU-3 was taken very painfully by some European countries, in particular Italy which had its own interests in Iran. In order to keep unity within the European Union, the EU-3 was forced to agree to the

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participation of EU High Commissioner for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana in negotiations with Tehran. This extremely complicated the format of the negotiations, which in fact were transformed from four-party to five-party talks. Under such conditions, it was simply physically difficult for the five delegations assembled in a small room to discuss very delicate issues and achieve any progress. Moreover, the four European delegations clearly did not always manage to coordinate WKHLU SRVLWLRQV $QG WKH %UXVVHOV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV KDG WR WDNH LQWR FRQVLGHUDWLRQ WKH interests of the unrepresented EU countries interested in a change of the negotiation format rather than in the success of the talks. This hardly added any constructiveness to WKHSRVLWLRQRIWKH%UXVVHOV¶GHOHJDWLRQ In fact the negotiations were programmed for failure from the very beginning. Although the Iranian leadership had not formulated its interests very clearly, in exchange for the refusal from the uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing it obviously sought to receive promises from the USA not to change the political regime in Iran by military actions; to loosen, and ultimately, to lift American sanctions which ZHUH YHU\ SDLQIXO IRU WKH ,UDQLDQ HFRQRP\ DQG WR DFKLHYH :DVKLQJWRQ¶V DFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRI,UDQ¶VLPSRUWDQWUROHLQWKH*UHDW0LGGOH(DVWUHJLRQ$OOWKLV,UDQ could have attained only through talks with the United States, not with the European Union. In such circumstances the negotiations with the West European countries were of interest to Iran from two viewpoints: first, to gain time and remove the immediate threat of the American invasion (which seemed quite real to Tehran in 2003-early 2004); and secoQGWRXVHWKH(XURSHDQQHJRWLDWRUVDVD³EULGJH´WR:DVKLQJWRQ7KH European Union could have possibly interested Iran if it had proposed a far-reaching political and economic partnership with Tehran. However, the West European representatives turned out to be clearly unprepared for that in view of the weakness of WKHLUFRXQWULHV¶SRVLWLRQVLQWKHUHJLRQDVZHOODVWKHLQWHUQDOGLIIHUHQFHVDQGFRQVWDQW looking over their shoulders at the USA. Initially, Washington regarded the initiative of the three European countries with great suspicion. It seems that the right-wing conservative wing in the Bush administration sincerely thought that this initiative was an attempt by France and *HUPDQ\WR³VWHDO´WKHUHVXOWVRIWKH$PHULFDQPLOLWDU\YLFWRU\LQ,UDT$QG though this position did not become the dominant one, in 2003-2004 the United States preferred to move away from its European allies. It restricted itself to the tough anti-Iranian rhetoric and urged that the Iranian issue be taken up in the UN Security Council. However, XQGHUVWDQGLQJ,UDQ¶VLQWHUHVWLQWKHGLDORJXHZLWK:DVKLQJWRQDQGDOVRJLYLQJLQWRWKH pressure of the pro-American lobby in the EU, West European states made certain attempts to enlist the support of the United States. This was also facilitated by the gradual softening of the American position influenced by the course of events in Iraq, which were unfavorable for the USA. In March 2005, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice promised that if Tehran agreed to curb uranium enrichment and other related elements of its nuclear activities, Washington would not block Iran entering into the WTO and would lift its embargo on deliveries of equipment for American-manufactured civil airplanes to Iran. In turn, the West Europeans agreed to bring the Iranian issue into the UN Security Council in case Iran refused to make the demanded concessions. The March deal between the EU and USA most probably reflected a significant shift in the American position and obviously was regarded in Europe as a serious victory of the moderate wing in the Republican administration. However, Iran did not share these feelings. Obviously, Tehran was not prepared to change its almost only

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diplomatic trump card for the symbolic concession from the Americans. At the same time it VWLOOKDGFHUWDLQKRSHVIRUELJ³FDUURWV´IURPWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ2QWKH RQH hand, in March 2005 Iran threatened to terminate its unilateral moratorium on uranium enrichment and plutonium if the EU, in fulfillment of the Paris agreements, did not present in a written form the list of benefits which Iran could have in exchange for its FHVVDWLRQRIFHUWDLQDVSHFWVRILWVQXFOHDUSURJUDP2QWKHRWKHUKDQG5XVVLD¶V'HSXW\ Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Kislyak who visited Tehran in May 2005, managed to persuade the Iranian leadership not lift its moratorium until it received the proposals from the EU. Also in May, the Iranian leadership for the first time had clearly defined what it would like to receive from the European Union. In view of the US unpreparedness for a serious dialogue with Iran the latter simply could not agree to the idea of the complete cessation of uranium-enrichment activities, and made an intermediate proposal which included a number of limitations on Iranian nuclear activities under the conditions of unprecedented transparency. The so-FDOOHG³IRXU-VWDJHSODQ´SHUPLWWHG,UDQWRFDUU\RXW uranium conversion at the facility at Esfahan and the construction of 3,000 uraniumenrichment centrifuges at the facility in Natanz. Tehran promised the immediate placing of the enriched uranium into the fuel rods in order to make further enrichment to the weapons-grade level impossible. It guaranteed the permanent presence of the IAEA inspectors at both plants in Esfahan and Natanz and promised to agree to other transparency measures outside the framework of the Additional Protocol. The agreement itself had to be ratified and until ratification was completed ± was to be strictly observed. Finally, the Iranians committed themselves not to extract plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel. In return, Iran demanded the delivery of the light-water reactor for the atomic power plants; the provision of firm guarantees of the reactor fuel deliveries as the alternative for its own production; a loosening of export control procedures on advanced technologies; and ensured broader access of Iranian products to EU markets. Besides, the Iranian proposal called for the creation of joint commissions on strategic cooperation and defense issues, as well as for the adoption of a joint statement on the principle of relations between the EU and Iran. 7KH :HVW (XURSHDQ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV UHMHFWHG 7HKUDQ¶V SODQ ULJKW IURP WKH VWDUW 7KH\ KHOGWKH RSLQLRQWKDWD FHUWDLQ³UHGOLQH´ ZRXOGEH ,UDQ¶VFRPSOHWHFHVVDWLRQRI uranium enrichment. The diplomats from the EU were not prepared to agree with the idea of limited enrichment. Besides, they were required to make tangible concessions in exchange for the promise to keep from any future activities. It seems clear in retrospect that the :HVW (XURSHDQ UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH ³IRXU-stage SODQ´ ZDV D VHULRXV EOXQGHU 7KH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ UHIXVHG WR DFFHSW WKH ,UDQLDQ LGHD after the victory in the Iranian presidential elections in spring 2005 of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It was not difficult to predict that with such a leader Iran could altogether give up attempts to find a compromise. Especially as the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan were deteriorating, the Iranian leadership has less reason to fear the prospect of American regime-change intervention and some Iranian radicals used the persistent threat of US bombings as an argument to increase their own political influence. Further events unfolded according to the worst possible scenario. The European Union presented its proposals only on August 5, 2005, at the time of the ongoing governmental changes in Tehran when it was hard to expect any sensible answer from it. The EU-3 proposed to sign a long-term agreement consisting of the interconnected

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package of stimuli in the atomic energy sphere, technological cooperation and proposals in the economic and political sphere2. The central idea behind this package was the assurance of Iran that it would get access to international nuclear fuel services at market prices. The Europeans agreed to deliver a research reactor to Iran and committed themselves to cooperate with it in the nuclear security sphere. In the political and security sphere, the proposal of the three European states called for the strengthening of counterterrorism cooperation; implementation of joint programs in fighting against drug production and trafficking; and starting a dialogue between the EU and Iran on regional security issues. In the sphere of technological and HFRQRPLF FRRSHUDWLRQ WKH SURSRVDOV UHIHUUHG WR (8 VXSSRUW RI ,UDQ¶V entry into the WTO and proposed cooperation in various areas including scientific research, civil aviation, railway and sea transport, oil chemistry and communications. All these proposals were rather vague and clearly offered less than Iran had demanded in its 2005 plan. $WWKHVDPHWLPH,UDQKDGWRDFFHSWDOORIWKH:HVW¶VGHPDQGV7KHVHLQFOXGHGWKH legal obligation not to pursue any activities within the nuclear fuel cycle except for the construction and exploitation of the light-water reactor and research reactors (i.e. the complete termination of uranium enrichment); full cooperation with the IAEA in order to settle all the remaining issues concerning implementation of the 1974 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; ratification of the Additional Protocol before the end of 2005; legal obligation not to withdraw from the NPT and to bring all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; the return of spent fuel to the supplier; and cessation of the heavy-water reactor building in Arak. It is not surprising that the proposals of the EU-3 were met by the new Iranian leadership with an undisguised animosity and were completely rejected. On August 8, Iran made a decision on partial suspension of the unilateral moratorium on uranium enrichment. At the first stage, Tehran declared only its renewal of uranium-conversion activities in Esfahan, stating that it would keep from the exploitation of the pilot uranium-enrichment plant in Natanz. Besides, the IAEA inspectors continued to monitor both facilities. Nevertheless, the decision made in Tehran was interpreted as ,UDQ¶VFURVVLQJRIWKH³UHGOLQH´GUDZQE\WKH:HVW(XURSHDQGLSORPDWVDQGZDVWDNHQ badly in the European capitals. Already on August 9, the European Union decided to exacerbate the situation claiming its sXSSRUW IRU WKH LGHD RI UHSRUWLQJ ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU program to the UN Security Council. The next round of talks between Iran and the EU3EU-3 scheduled for the end of August was cancelled. In fact this meant the failure of the EU-3 mission. The format of negations on the Iranian nuclear program was radically changed.

Bringing the discussion of the Iranian record into the UN Security Council: late 2005 ± 2007 After the failure of negotiations in the EU-3 format, the focus of the international discussion shifted to the IAEA Board of Governors. The United States and, to the 2

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lesser degree, the EU countries demanded that the board should make a decision on moving the discussion of the Iranian issue into the UN Security Council. Obviously, under the conditions of a very restricted list of pressure instruments upon Iran, the Western states counted on the threat to bring the discussion within the UN Security Council to make Tehran show greater compliance in the talks. At the same time, the shift of focus to the IAEA implied the engagement of other players who did not quite share the Western position on the necessity of applying coercive measures against Iran. 7KH\ LQFOXGHG QRW RQO\ 5XVVLD DQG &KLQD WKH WUDGLWLRQDO SURSRQHQWV RI D ³VRIW OLQH´ towards Tehran, but also some influential developing countries like the South African Republic and Indonesia. The differences were also to be observed within the European Union as a number of states held the EU-3 responsible for the failure of negotiations, and demanded to continue the dialogue with Tehran, although in a different format. Thus in 2005 and in the early 2006 most countries were not prepared to sanction the transfer of the discussion of the Iranian record to the UN Security Council, but at the same time, in principle they did not object to the threat of such a transfer as an element of diplomatic bargaining with Iran. On September 27, 2005 on the wave of international indignation after the partial cancellation of the Iranian moratorium on uranium enrichment, the Board of Governors passed a resolution calling for reporting the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security Council, leaving open the date for this referral, (which happened in February 2006, as described below). Although Tehran had responded to this resolution rather sharply, it nevertheless continued its cooperation with the IAEA, assuming it was a better alternative to the UN Security Council discussion as a result of which it could be put under international sanctions. In November 2005, it even agreed to IAEA inspections at the military complex in Parchin, although the Agency traditionally restricted its activities strictly to the civil facilities. At the same time, the Iranians warned that if the Iranian issue was brought before the UN Security Council, they would not ratify the Additional Safeguards Agreement and cease its voluntary implementation. In November, the Iranian parliament adopted a resolution carrying out this threat. The results of voting in the Board of Governors on September 27 showed that the coPSURPLVHUHVROXWLRQZDVVXSSRUWHGE\WKHPDMRULW\RIWKH%RDUG¶VPHPEHUVRXW of 35) whereas the representatives from 13 countries including Russia and China turned it down. Thus, the Iranian pertinacity resulted in the fact that the majority of the BoaUG¶V PHPEHUV VXSSRUWHG WKH 86 DQG (8 KDUG OLQH 7KLV DOVR GHPRQVWUDWHG WR Moscow and Beijing that the possibility of bringing the Iranian issue into the UN Security Council was rather great and that most probably they would fail to prevent it. Under these circumstances, although potentially the possible UN economic sanctions could have threatened its extensive investment plans to a much greater degree as compared with Russia, China preferred to keep an expectant position leaving to Russia the initiative in attempting to unblock the Iranian knot. China restricted itself to rendering the diplomatic support to Moscow, obviously not wishing to exacerbate relations with the United States. Consequently Russia was forced to step into the diplomatic forefront, perfectly understanding that it was unable to solve this problem on its own. Moscow chose to advance in two directions. On the one hand, Moscow persuaded Iran to cooperate with the IAEA more actively so as to settle the issue concerning the violations of the 1974 Safeguards Agreement. If this problem could have been solved then the accusations against Tehran of violations of the international non-proliferation regime would be no ORQJHUUHOHYDQW$VLWZDVPHQWLRQHGDERYH,UDQ¶VXUDQLXPHQULFKPHQWDFWLYLW\GLGnot

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contravene any international norms. From the international law perspective the point was to make Iran agree to voluntary suspension in exchange for concessions on the part of third parties, first of all the United States. On the other hand, being aware of the importance of the enrichment issue both from the political perspective and in view of its real significance for non-proliferation, Russia made attempts to bring the positions of the EU and Tehran closely together WKURXJK³VLOHQWGLSORPDF\´WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQW7HKUDQ¶V³IRXU-VWDJHSODQ´SURSRVHGLQ May 2005. At the same time, there was an effective plan presented by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov on the creation of a joint Russian-Iranian uraniumenrichment factory which had little chance of being accepted by the Iranian side. 7KH SURMHFWZDVEDVHGRQWKHLGHDRIUHFRQFLOLQJ,UDQ¶VULJKWWRGHYHORSSHDFHIXO nuclear technologies including uranium enrichment with the elimination of the international concerns that Tehran would use peaceful technologies to produce weapons-grade uranium. As far as it is known the plan foresaw partial uranium conversion at the Esfahan plant. After that the extracted intermediate product would be sent to Russia where the final stage of the hexafluoride uranium production would be completed and its enrichment up to the reactor-grade could be carried out. The enriched uranium would be delivered to Iran and the spent nuclear fuel would return back to Russia. Obviously such a plan was unacceptable for the Iranian side which asserted that it needed its own fuel production in order to be independent from foreign suppliers. ,QLWLDOO\ ,YDQRY¶V SODQ ZDV UHMHFWHG E\ ,UDQ DQG RQO\ ZLWK WKH GHWHULRUDWLRQ RI WKH situation surrounding Iran did it begin to show interest. The plan, however, was never accepted. ,WLVQRWWREHUXOHGRXWWKDW5XVVLDXQGHUVWRRGWKHLPSODXVLELOLW\RI,YDQRY¶VSODQ and hoped that it could serve as a catalyst for the resumption of negotiations with the EU, thus removing from the agenda the undesirable issue of bringing the discussion of the Iranian issue to the United Nations. In late 2005, it seemed that the talks with Iran could be resumed. Apparently, the EU-3 recovered from the August shock and some other EU countries were inclined toward this idea. Probably by November the consensus within the European Union regarding the resumption of the talks had been UHDFKHGEXWWKLVWLPHWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVKRXOGEHFDUULHGRXWQRWLQWKH³(8-6RODQD´ format. The office of the High Representative on the CFSP had to be the only participant representing the whole European Union. Most likely it is also one of the reasons that in November, the IAEA Board of Governors decided not to pass another resolution on Iran, despite the anti-Iranian majority, so as to give time to settle the problem through the direct talks. In December, Iran and the European Union decided to resume the talks in January 2006. However, on January 3, 2006 Iran suddenly informed the IAEA that it had withdrawn from the unilateral moratorium and resumed uranium enrichment activity. 7KXVWKH ³UHGOLQH´GUDZQE\WKH(XURSHDQGLSORPDWV ZDVILQDOO\FURVVHG0RUHRYHU ,YDQRY¶V SODQ ZKLFK LPSOLHG 7HKUDQ¶V DEVWHQWLRQ QRW RQO\ IURP HQULFKPHQW EXW DOVR from the production of hexafluoride uranium was crossed out. In such circumstances, reporting the Iranian issue to the UN Security Council was practically inevitable. The motives of this unprovoked Iranian demarche remain unclear. It seems that the circles of the new president chose rude and aggressive rhetoric as an instrument of consolidating their internal political influence and snatching away the power remaining in the hands of the moderate conservatives who gathered round Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani. Besides, through the resumption of activity at the Esfahan plant, Iran

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apparently managed to produce a certain amount of hexafluoride uranium and thus Tehran obtained the materials for uranium enrichment that it previously had lacked. Certainly after such a decision, the negotiations between Iran and the European Union could not take place and their first round scheduled for January 2006 was cancelled. Foreign ministers of the EU-3 and Solana issued a sharp statement demanding an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors and submitting the Iranian problem to the UN Security Council. The extraordinary meeting of the *RYHUQRUV¶%RDUGZKLFKWRRNSODFHRQ)HEUXDU\SUDFWLFDOO\UHIHUUHGWKH,UDQLDQ file to the Security Council. The majority of the members (27 members of the Board) voted for this decision. Russia and China also supported this resolution only after KDYLQJDFKLHYHGWKH:HVW¶VFRQVHQWWKDWWKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO ZRXOG QRWFRQVLGHUWKH Iranian issue until the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors scheduled for early March had taken place. Moscow and Beijing tried to give Tehran one more chance to overcome the deadlock through negotiations. However, the attempts of the Russian diplomats to bring Iran back to the way of restraint were unsuccessful. Already on February 6 Tehran started the implementation of the threats to decrease the cooperation with the IAEA in case its nuclear program was submitted to the United Nations for discussion. Tehran declared the cessation of observance of the Additional Protocol with the IAEA as well as a number of other voluntary measures, and demanded to break the seals and boxes in those places except where required by the 1974 Safeguards Agreement. On February 15 Ahmadinejad declared that experimental uranium enrichment of a 10-centrifuge cascade had started in Natanz. On February 27, the IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei issued a regular report on cooperation with Iran concerning the clarification of unresolved questions regarding its past nuclear activities. He noted that a number of questions still remained XQUHVROYHG $ORQJ ZLWK ,UDQ¶V FRQIURQWDWLRQDO DFWLRQV LQ -DQXDU\-February, the report gave a green light for the discussion of the Iranian issue in the UN Security Council in March 2006. On March 29, the President of the Security Council made a statement reflecting the unanimous position of all 15 members of the Council. He urged Tehran to stop the uranium-enrichment activities and fulfill other requirements of the IAEA resolutions. This statement was not legally binding. Still, Iran continued to pursue its hard line. It rejected the statement of the UNSC 3UHVLGHQW DV YLRODWLQJ ,UDQ¶V ULJKW WR D SHDFHIXO DWRPLF SURJUDP 2Q $SULO  Ahmadinejad reported on new successes in uranium enrichment. He claimed that the Iranians had succeeded in enrichment uranium to the 3.5% level necessary for its use as reactor fuel. According to Ahmadinejad, a certain quantity of uranium had been enriched in the laboratory conditions on the 164 centrifuge cascade. Some observers expressed doubt of the truth of the Iranian statements. According to them, at that moment the Iranian scientists had not managed to solve all problems connected with the reprocessing of a sufficient quantity of uranium hexafluoride, or to coordinate the centrifuge cascades properly. In fact, bringing the discussion of the Iranian problem to the UN Security Council had complicated the position of the West. While the West had the anti-Iranian majority in the IAEA Board of Governors, Russia and China possessed the veto right in the Security Council. This required constant consultations with Moscow and Beijing and closer attention to their positions. In this respect, in early 2006 an informal mechanism of interaction between the leading powers on the Iranian problem was established. The related issues were discussed at the regular meeting of high-ranking officials from the United State, Russia, France, China, Germany and Britain. The emergence of this

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mechanism brought US representatives into the negotiations process on a permanent and regular basis and allowed for the elaboration of a unified position depriving Tehran of the opportunity to play on the differences between the leading global players. At the VDPH WLPH 0RVFRZ DQG %HLMLQJ ZKR SDUWLFLSDWHG DV IXOO PHPEHUV DW WKH VL[ VWDWHV¶ meetings, bore the responsibility for the joint decisions. $IWHU ,UDQ¶V UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH 81 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO VWDWHPHQW WKH JURXS RI VL[ decided to advance in three ways. First, the six countries started to discuss the new package of proposals for Iran in case it gave up its undesirable nuclear activities. This time the proposal would be presented on behalf of all six states. Thus, the Western countries declared their readiness to continue the negotiations process with Tehran. Second, the United States had to slightly change its position. On May 31, Secretary Rice claimed that Washington was ready to take part in the dialogue with Iran if the latter suspended its uranium-enrichment activity. In other words, for the first time the USA made it clear that it was ready for direct talks with Tehran which it had refused since 1980. Third, the Western countries prepared the full draft UN Security Council resolution which repeated the demands made by the IAEA and the Security Council President earlier. Though the resolution did not imply any concrete sanctions or deadlines for implementation, the adoption of this document for the first time legalized WKH GHPDQGV WR VWRS ,UDQ¶V XUDQLXP HQULFKPHQW DFWLYLW\ IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI WKH international law. Thus a separate international regime was established for Iran, overseeing specific restrictions in the sphere of the peaceful atomic activities. On June 6, the group of the six officially proposed to Iran to start negotiations on the package of measures providing them with certain preliminary conditions. Before talks started, Tehran was required to settle all the remaining issues with the IAEA concerning its past nuclear activities; to suspend all uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities for the period of the negotiations; and to resume the implementation of the Additional Safeguards Agreement. In exchange, it was offered guaranteed delivery of the light-water reactor and nuclear fuel both through the creation of the joint Russian-Iranian plant and through the deployment of five-year fuel supplies on Iranian territory under IAEA control. Unlike the EU proposals presented in August 2005, the proposal of the six countries allowed for the production of reactor fuel in Iran after international confidence in the peaceful purposes of the Iranian nuclear program was restored, i.e. in the indefinite future. The 2006 package looked weightier that the EU proposals made in August 2005 as it was supported by all leading world powers, including the United States. At the same time, the package included preliminary conditions that were not raised in the previous year; it also did not specify the benefits which Iran could receive in the broader economic and political context. Even the EU initiative earlier rejected by Iran as an insufficient one, proposed more clear directions of cooperation. Therefore, in fact, Tehran had to pay beforehand for the goods that were to be agreed upon. Besides, these goods looked far less attractive than those proposed a year ago. Taking advantage of the unspecified time constraints in the proposals of the six countries, Iran declared that it would take as long as was necessary in preparing its answer. At the same time, Russia urged Tehran to give a positive answer by the Saint Petersburg summit in the beginning of June. For this purpose Ahmadinejad was invited to the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in which Iran took part as an observer. However after the SCO summit Iran made a statement in which it promised to give its answer only in the end of August.

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Most probably, this provoked serious irritation in Moscow, and on July 12, the group of six countries made a statement that it considered Tehran to have failed to give any answer to its proposals. This meant that the way to the adoption of the first full Security Council resolution concerning the Iranian nuclear problem had been opened. 2Q -XO\   WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO DGRSWHG 5HVROXWLRQ  ZLWK  \HD¶V DQG  abstention (Qatar) which demanded Iran to cease all uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing works by August 31 under the IAEA control. Otherwise the GRFXPHQWWKUHDWHQHGWRWDNH³DSSURSULDWHDFWLRQ´DJDLQVW,UDQ It is unclear why the group of six which patiently tried to restore the negotiations process decided to adopt the statement of July 12 and the UNSCR 1696 even before Iran had presented its answer by the end of August. Probably it was an attempt to exert additional pressure upon Iran and make it give a positive answer to the June proposals. However, in practice these actions could not but provoke Tehran to further sharpen its statements as it was impossible for the Iranian leadership to demonstrate its weakness at this conjuncture. As would be expected by August 31 Iran did not cease its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activity. In its long-awaited answer, made as promised in the end of August, Tehran declared its consent to start negotiations but without any SUHOLPLQDU\FRQGLWLRQV,QIDFW WKLV PHDQWDQ,UDQLDQ ³QR´ ERWKWRWKH-XQHSURSRVDOV and the UN Resolution 1696. The adoption of Resolution 1696 had radically changed the international situation around the Iranian nuclear program. The refusal to implement this resolution meant that Iran was violating the norms of international law, as implementation of UN Security Council decisions is obligatory for all member-states of the organization. A separate restrictive international regime was being created around Iran, which banned Tehran from carrying out the peaceful nuclear activities allowed in all other countries. And, most importantly, Russia and China who tried to avoid tough measures against Tehran ZHUHIDFLQJDVHULRXVGLOHPPD(LWKHUWKH\KDGWRLJQRUH,UDQ¶VYLRODWLRQVRIWKH81 SC resolutions supported by Moscow and Beijing thus undermining themselves the authority of the institution within which China and Russia enjoyed exceptional rights; RUIRUWKHVDNHRIPDLQWDLQLQJWKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLO¶VVWDWXVDVWKHNH\LQWHUQDWLRQDO forum which decided the questions of international war and peace, both countries had to agree to adopt more and more tough resolutions against Iran thus undermining their own important regional and economic interests. Clearly, such a situation suited the United States quite well. Iran was put under increasingly heavy international pressure exerted through the UN as well, which HQMR\HG JUHDW DXWKRULW\ DPRQJ WKH GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV DQG (XURSHDQ DOOLHV ,UDQ¶V systematic violations of the Security Council resolutions allowed Washington to demand the adoption of more restrictive resolutions including those implying the use of military force. If the Security Council refused to adopt such resolutions the United States could still count on the broader international support for potential unilateral operation against Iran, in case America would seek to bypass the United Nations. The involvement of China and Russia in this process would prevent both countries from using the large Iranian resource for the attainment of regional and economic goals and would limit their influence in Iran and Asia. $OO WKHVH GLOHPPDV DSSHDUHG DOUHDG\ LQ DXWXPQ  ZKHQ WKH VL[ FRXQWULHV¶ JURXSZDVIRUFHGWRGLVFXVVWKHPHDVXUHVLQUHVSRQVHWR7HKUDQ¶VUHIXVDOWRLPSOHPHQW the 1696 Resolution. The USA and some European countries insisted on relatively harder measures whereas Russia and China supported a milder option though, for the

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sake of UN prestige, they were not contesting the necessity of such measures. After the many-month diplomatic marathon, on December 23 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The document banned the delivery of technology and equipment for uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing and construction of the heavy-water reactor to Iran. At the same time, the sanctions did not cover the Bushehr project. Iran was also allowed to import weapons and prohibited from exporting them. The sanctions were also imposed on certain persons in the Iranian politico-military leadership connected to the nuclear program. They were forbidden to go abroad and their foreign accounts had to be frozen.

Conclusions The present approach to the solution of the Iranian nuclear problem has few chances for success. This is determined both by the internal political situation in Iran and insufficiently balanced frameworks of the international approach to its solution. The situation in Iran is characterized by deep differences between the representatives of the clerical and secular elites. President Ahmadinejad, elected on the ZDYH RI WKH SHRSOH¶V GLVFRQWHQW, does not possess the full power and is forced to compete with the conservative clergy. For this purpose, he broadly uses radical rhetoric to strengthen his positions in the electoral sector that is loyal to the Islamic regime. In these conditions, the moderate conservatives who seek compromise on the nuclear program have a very limited freedom of maneuver and hesitate to openly oppose the SUHVLGHQW¶VWRXJKIRUHLJQSROLF\FRXUVH7KHRQJRLQJILJKWIRUSRZHUSUHYHQWVGLIIHUHQW factions within the Iranian leadership from achieving consent on various key issues including those aspects of the nuclear activities which arouse the international FRPPXQLW\¶VFRQFHUQ The international diplomatic situation around the Iranian nuclear program can be characterized as a policy without a stick or carrot. The sudden weakening of the American position in the world after the unsuccessful attempts to stabilize the situation in Iraq and, to the lesser degree, in Afghanistan, allows the Iranian leadership to doubt that Washington would decide to start another regime change operation. The limited air strikes may, on the contrary, encourage the population to consolidate around the present regime and therefore they should not be feared. It appears that Tehran also regards the comprehensive economic sanctions as unlikely. In the situation of high world prices on oil ± the main item of Iranian export ± the introduction of an oil embargo against Iran seems highly unlikely as well. Such a step would cause another increase in prices and could seriously undermine the economies of Western states who buy the main part of the imported oil from Iran. At the same time, the restrictive resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council have very little impact on the economy and everyday life in Iran. $V WR WKH ³FDUURWV´ WKH WHUPV SURSRVHG WR ,UDQ LQ LWV RZQ YLHZ KDG EHHQ LQVXIILFLHQWULJKWIURPWKHVWDUWDQGLQGXHFRXUVHEHFDPHHYHQZRUVH7HKUDQ¶VPDLQ demands can be fulfilled by the USA. However, the United States refuses to engage in a direct dialogue with Iranian leaders until they agree to accept the hardly accomplishable American preliminary conditions. Within the framework of the six FRXQWULHV¶JURXS:DVKLQJWRQDOVRPHWKRGLFDOO\GRHVHYHU\WKLQJSRVVLEOHWRUHGXFHWKH attractiveness of the stimuli articulated by the international community for Iran.

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Fortunately, from the technological aspect, the Iranian nuclear program does not KDYH WKH FDSDELOLW\ WR GHYHORS D QXFOHDU H[SORVLYH V\VWHP TXLFNO\ HYHQ LI ,UDQ¶V leadership has set this as its aim. According to the CIA assessments, Tehran would be able to create nuclear weapons in the beginning of the next decade. Thus there are still a couple of years for the leading global players to coordinate a more realistic policy on Iran.

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-113

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Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program Jonathan D. POLLACK1

Abstract. Over the course of 25 years, the U.S. and other states have employed IRXU VHSDUDWH VWUDWHJLHV WR SUHYHQW RU LQKLELW 1RUWK .RUHD¶V SXUVXLW RI D QXFOHDU weapons capability, none of which have yielded definitive success. The current efforts through the Six-Party Talks (also encompassing separate bilateral understandings between the United States and North Korea) seem likely to achieve measurable results, especially the cappLQJ RI 3\RQJ\DQJ¶V LQYHQWRU\ RI ILVVLOH material. But a host of larger issues remain unresolved, including the GLVPDQWOHPHQWRI1RUWK.RUHD¶VNQRZQQXFOHDr infrastructure and (in a more longWHUP VHQVH  WKH GLVSRVLWLRQ RI 1RUWK .RUHD¶V ZHDSRQV-related materials and technology, fissile material inventory, and any completed weapons.

1RUWK.RUHD¶VQXFOHDUZHDSRQVGHYHORSPHQWLVDPRQJWKHORQJHVWUXQQLQJGUDPDV LQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFV7KHILUVWVLJQVRI3\RQJ\DQJ¶VLQWHUHVWLQQXFOHDUZHDSRQVLn then-secret diplomatic exchanges) date from the early 1960s, and evidence of developing an indigenous nuclear infrastructure was first apparent in the mid-1980s. ,QLWLDOHIIRUWVWRLQKLELWRUSUHYHQWWKH1RUWK¶VQXFOHDUGHYHORSPHQWDOVRGDWHIURPWKH mid-1980s. The Six-Party Talks underway in Beijing constitute the fourth distinct strategy of the past two and a half decades to forestall nuclear weapons acquisition in the 'HPRFUDWLF3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI.RUHD (DPRK), and are thus the latest iteration in a long policy lineage. To date, none of these strategies have achieved definitive results. Though the current approach may yield measurable achievements in denuclearization, there is no assurance that it will provide a solution any more lasting than previous efforts. $QDO\VWV GLYHUJH ZLGHO\ LQ MXGJPHQWV DERXW WKH SXUSRVHV XQGHUO\LQJ WKH 1RUWK¶V pursuit of nuclear weapons. There are three predominant schools of thought. Depending on the favored interpretation, the effort to forestall nuclear weapons development in the DPRK has been a partial success, an outright failure, or an illusion. The first school argues that the DPRK has pursued nuclear weapons out of legitimate fears for its security, but that external powers have failed to provide sufficient inducements and assurances to convince the North to forego nuclear development. A second school of thought asserts that the major powers have not imposed enough costs and punishment on Pyongyang to compel the North to desist from nuclear development. A third VFKRRORIWKRXJKWYLHZVSXUVXLWRIFRPSUHKHQVLYHGHQXFOHDUL]DWLRQDVDIRRO¶V errand. In this latter view, pursuit of a nuclear capability reflects the deepest internal compulsions of the North Korean system, and is not a negotiable proposition, except

1

Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies, US Naval War College. All views in this paper are personal, and should not be attributed to the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the Naval War College.

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fRUWDFWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRUSUHFLVHEHQHILWVWKDWGRQRWLQKLELWWKHUHJLPH¶VORQJ-term nuclear goals. The choices facing policy makers, however, differ from mechanistic characterizations of North Korean behavior and intentions. No one disputes the determination of the DPRK leadership and technical personnel to pursue nuclear capabilities, all under acute international isolation and grievous internal privation. In WKLVUHVSHFWWKH1RUWK¶V nuclear history bears obvious FRPSDULVRQZLWK&KLQD¶VQXFOHDU wHDSRQV GHYHORSPHQW LQ WKH ODWH V DQG HDUO\ V  7KH '35.¶V ZHDSRQV program did not develop by accident or serendipity. But the impulses and strategies underlying the pursuit of nuclear weapons have shifted across the decades, thereby affecting policy options for forestalling realization of these goals. This essay will EULHIO\ UHYLHZ WKH 1RUWK¶V SXUVXLW RI QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DQG WKH HIIRUWV RI H[WHUQDO powers to inhibit or reverse this process. We will then assess ongoing possibilities in light of this nuclear history, and ask whether current efforts are likely to prove more successful than those in the past.

1RUWK.RUHD¶VSXUVXLWRIQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDQGIRUHLJQHIIRUWVDWUHYHUVDO The first evidence of DPRK interest in nuclear weapons dates (albeit secretly) from the early 1960s, though programmatic pursuit of these capabilities did not begin to emerge until the mid-1980s, following completion of the graphite moderated 5 MW (e) reactor at Yongbyon.2 Kim Il Sung presumably believed that the DPRK was entitled to possess advanced capabilities to gain notional equivalence with the major powers. Kim was no doubt mindful of U.S. nuclear weapons deployments on the Korean peninsula and of the subsequent disclosure of a covert nuclear weapons program in the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the 1970s. He may have anticipated or solicited direct nuclear assistance from the Soviet Union and from China, but neither state was prepared to LQFXUPDMRUULVNVWRDFFRPPRGDWHWKH1RUWK.RUHDQOHDGHU4XLWHDSDUWIURP.LP¶V fears of the United States, he likely believed that nuclear weapons were the best means to ensure that North Korea could not be controlled by any external power, including his Soviet and Chinese allies. Any meaningful prospect of a weapons capability presumed acquisition of civilian nuclear technologies that the Soviet Union was best able to provide. However, Soviet officials made major enhancement of civilian nuclear DVVLVWDQFHWRWKH1RUWKFRQWLQJHQWRQ3\RQJ\DQJ¶VUDWLILFDWLRQRIWKH1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ Treaty (NPT)0RVFRZ¶VRIIHURIFRQGLWLRQDODVVLVWDQFHZDVWKHILUVWDWWHPSWWRLQKLELW WKH 1RUWK¶V SRWHQWLDO QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV GHYHORSPHQW  8QGHU 6RYLHW SUHVVXUH 1RUWK Korea signed the NPT in 1985, though it took another seven years before the DPRK ratified safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).3 2 )RUVRPHLQLWLDOKLQWVIURPGLSORPDWLFDUFKLYHVVHH³&RQYHUVDWLRQEHWZHHQ6RYLHWAmbassador Vasily Moskovsky and NRUWK.RUHDQ)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU3DUN6XQJ&K¶RO´$XJXVWLQ%DOD]V6]DORQWDLDQG Sergey Radchenko, 1RUWK.RUHD¶V(IIRUWVWR$FTXLUH1XFOHDU7HFKQRORJ\DQG1XFOHDU:HDSRQV(YLGHQFH from Russian and Hungarian Archives (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #53, August 2006, p. 33. 3 See, in particular the essays by Georgiy Kaurov, Valery I. Denisov, and Alexander Zhebin in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov (eds.), The North Korean Nuclear Program-Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York and London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 15-20, 21-26, and 27-37, UHVSHFWLYHO\DQG5RODQG7LPHUEDHY³7KH,$($6DIHJXDUGV-Dµ&UDVK7HVW¶´LQ$OH[HLArbatov (ed.), At the Nuclear Threshold-The Lessons of North Korea and Iran for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), pp. 59-61.

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These agreements were in jeopardy almost from the time the ink was dry. In the ,$($¶VLQLWLDOYLVLWVWRWKH1RUWKLQWKHHDUO\V$JHQF\SHUVRQQHOZHUHQRWDEOHWR resolve major GLVFUHSDQFLHVLQWKH1RUWK¶VFODLPVUHODWHGWRWKHRSHUDWLRQRILWVJUDSKLWH moderated reactor and associated facilities. 4 The North refused to allow IAEA inspectors unrestricted access to various suspect sites, and in March 1993 Pyongyang announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. In response, the United States (having initially weighed highly coercive military options) developed a second denuclearization strategy, congruent with NPT goals but negotiated bilaterally with the DPRK. This led to a U.S.-North Korea accord (the Agreed Framework) that froze the 1RUWK¶V SOXWRQLXP-based weapons program for eight years, in exchange for various inducements and assistance provided by the United States and other parties, primarily the ROK and Japan.5 The Agreed Framework ultimately foundered and then collapsed in the fall of 2002, when the United States accused the North of undertaking a covert highly enriched uranium program, which if fully realized would have provided Pyongyang with an alternative source of fissile material, thereby enabling it to circumvent the constraints imposed under the Agreed Framework. The Bush Administration decided to halt its heavy fuel oil deliveries to the North, and announced suspension and ultimate cessation of plans to construct two replacement light water reactors (LWRs) under the auspices of the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). In response, the DPRK abruptly withdrew from the NPT and the IAEA; unsealed its frozen facilities; restarted its long-dormant reactor; and reprocessed the spent fuel rods that had been in storage at Yongbyon, thereby moving the North much closer to a realized weapons capability.6 ,QUHVSRQVHWRWKH1RUWK¶VDFWLRQVWKH%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQLQLWVILUVWWHUPRSWHG for a third strategy. The administration sought to raise the costs to the North for its weapons development, and to deny the North any presumptive claims to legitimacy as a negotiating partner outside the NPT. Washington demanded the complete, verifiable, irreversible dLVPDQWOHPHQW&9,' RIDOOWKH1RUWK¶VQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDFWLYLWLHVEHIRUH the United States would even consider proffering renewed assistance to the North. The United States also refused to agree to any bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang, though it did consent to trilateral discussions arranged under Chinese auspices in the VSULQJRI:LWK&KLQD¶VH[WHQVLYHLQYROYHPHQWDQGIDFLOLWDWLRQWKHVHSUHOLPLQDU\ discussions were then expanded into Six-Party Talks that opened in Beijing in the summer of 2003. However, for the next several years, these discussions were episodic, highly predictable, and singularly unproductive. They provided an arena for diplomatic interaction, but without undertaking meaningful negotiation. Unlike the Agreed Framework, the U.S. approach was no longer inducement-based, nor was there an authoritative bilateral channel for discussions between Washington and Pyongyang. 5DWKHUWKDQLQKLELWLQJWKH1RUWK¶s nuclear development, U.S. policy provided the DPRK with a rationale to justify its renewed pursuit of a weapons capability. As the Six-Party Talks proceeded fitfully and unproductively, North Korea steadily 4 For a detailed examination, see David Albright and KeviQ2¶1HLOOHGV Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 2000). 5 Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical-The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 6 -RQDWKDQ'3ROODFN³7KH8QLWHG6WDWHV1RUWK.RUHDDQGWKH(QGRIWKH$JUHHG)UDPHZRUN´ Naval War College Review, Vol. LVI, Number 3, Summer 2003, pp. 11-49; and Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question-A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

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augmented its inventory of fissile material and explicitly declared that it was moving WRZDUGD³SK\VLFDOGHWHUUHQW´Flaiming possession of nuclear weapons for the first time in February 2005. All six parties assented to an ³LQ SULQFLSOH´ DJUHHPHQW RQ denuclearization in September 2005, but a range of policy disputes and diplomatic impediments stalled any additional progress for well over a year.7 The North persisted ZLWKLWV ZHDSRQVGHYHORSPHQW FXOPLQDWLQJLQWKH '35.¶VILUVWQXFOHDU detonation in 2FWREHU   3\RQJ\DQJ¶V accumulation of separated plutonium was equally significant, since it provided the essential building blocks to operationalize a nuclear ZHDSRQV FDSDELOLW\   $ GHWDLOHG HIIRUW WR HVWLPDWH WKH 1RUWK¶V SOXWRQLXP LQYHQWRU\ SXEOLVKHGE\'DYLG$OEULJKWDQG3DXO%UDQQDQLQHDUO\ HVWLPDWHGWKH'35.¶V extant stockpile at between 46 and 64 kg, with between 28-50 kg in fully separated form and available for weapons fabrication. Depending on assumptions about the amount of fissile material required for weapons fabrication, Albright and Brannan concluded that the DPRK has sufficient separated plutonium for five to twelve ZHDSRQV  7KLV ZHDSRQV SRWHQWLDO ZDV DWWULEXWDEOH DOPRVW HQWLUHO\ WR WKH 1RUWK¶V breakout from the Agreed Framework constraints. 8 The fourth denuclearization strategy developed in the aftermath of the abject failure of the compellant apSURDFKSXUVXHGGXULQJ3UHVLGHQW%XVK¶VILUVWWHUPLQRIILFH Some U.S. officials (notably, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific $IIDLUV &KULVWRSKHU +LOO  DUJXHG WKDW FDSSLQJ WKH 1RUWK¶V H[WDQW SOXWRQLXP LQYHQWRU\ was more important than insisting on an immediate and unconditional end to all the 1RUWK¶V QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DFWLYLWLHV 7KH IRXUWK VWUDWHJ\ OHG WR WKH ILUVW PHDQLQJIXO negotiated breakthroughs since the Agreed Framework deliberations of 1993-94, building on the September 2005 agreement and signed by all participants in the Beijing WDONV LQ )HEUXDU\ DQG 2FWREHU   7KLV DSSURDFK DVVXPHG WKDW 1RUWK .RUHD¶V nuclear test was not an irrevocable decision. Rather, the fourth strategy posited that a step-by-step process would enable tKH 1RUWK¶V HIIRUWV WR EH VORZHG DQG XOWLPDWHO\ reversed.

Current approach and prospects The current approach nominally represents an agreement among all six parties, but the accords are also premised on bilateral understandings between the United States and the DPRK. Pyongyang had long sought such bilateral negotiations with the United States. Though reminiscent of the Agreed Framework, the outcomes to date have been different. Embedded bilateral negotiations have advanced a multilateral diplomatic process involving China, the ROK, Russia, and Japan as well as the United States and the DPRK. The regional negotiations are focused on the six-decade abnormality in the '35.¶VUHODWLRQVKLS with the United States, the ROK, and Japan, and the absence of a longer-term framework governing political and security relations on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. The essence of the recent agreements is 7 ³-RLQW6WDWHPHQWRIWKH)RXUWK5RXQGRIWKH6L[-3DUW\7DONV´%HLMLQJ6HSWHPEHU www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm. 8 'DYLG$OEULJKWDQG3DXO%UDQQDQ³7KH1RUWK.RUHDQ3OXWRQLXP6WRFN)HEUXDU\´ (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 20 February 2007). For a reassessment in OLJKWRIWKH1RUWK¶VUHSRUWHGGLVFORVXUHVWR86RIILFLDOVVHH'DYLG$OEULJKW3DXO%UDQQDQDQG-DFTXHOLQH 6KLUH³1RUWK.RUHD¶V3OXWRQLXP'HFODUDWLRQ$6WDUWLQJ3RLQWIRUDQ,QLWLDO9HULILFDWLRQ3URFHVV´ (Washington, DC: The Institute for Science and International Security, January 10, 2008).

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two-IROG  )LUVW WKHUH LV DQ ³DFWLRQ IRU DFWLRQ´ SURFHVV ZKHUHE\ WKH UHOHYDQW SDUWLHV (especially Washington and Pyongyang) undertake parallel steps as various milestones are met. These include the provision of heavy fuel oil to the North in conjunction with the DPRK first shuttering and then disabling the reactor, reprocessing facility, and fuel fabrication plant at Yongbyon, as well as Pyongyang providing a full accounting of its past and current nuclear activities.9 In exchange for these measures, the United States pledged various assurances and political measures in addition to various multilateral forms of economic compensation to the North. Separate working groups addressing 1RUWK .RUHD¶V HQGXULQJ HVWUDQJHPHQW IURP WKH RXWVLGH ZRUOG KDYH also been established, with these efforts moving forward as specified milestones in denuclearization proceed. Assuming that the fourth strategy is sustained, it fulfills various requirements that earlier approaches did not. The process is addressing three irreducible expectations in 1RUWK .RUHD¶V negotiations with the outside world, and especially with the United States: compensation, validation, and assurance. In addition to specific assistance such as heavy fuel oil shipments, the symbolic value of these agreements for the North VKRXOGQRWEHGLVFRXQWHG86SOHGJHVWR³EHJLQWKHSURFHVVRIUHPRYLQJWKH'35.¶V designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and advancing the process of terminating the DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH 7UDGLQJ ZLWK WKH (QHP\ $FW ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKH '35.´ DVVXPH intrinsic significance to Pyongyang, even if neither designation is related to the NoUWK¶V nuclear activities. At the same time, however, these accords obligate the DPRK to actions to which it KDG EHHQ SUHYLRXVO\ XQZLOOLQJ WR FRPPLW  7KH ³GHQXFOHDUL]DWLRQ DFWLRQ SODQ´ RI )HEUXDU\UHTXLUHGWKH 1RUWKWR³VKXWGRZQDQGVHDOIRUWKHSXUSose of eventual DEDQGRQPHQWWKHVLF@1RUWK

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leadership may have well have concluded that Yongbyon was a diminishing asset or even a liability; closing the facility may have been judged a prudent step that would in turn generate significant political, energy, and financial benefits for the DPRK. But Yongbyon remains WKH 1RUWK¶V RQO\ NQRZQ PHDQV WR SURGXFH ILVVLOH PDWHULDO IRU LWV weapons program. Shuttering, disabling and ultimately dismantling the facility would UHGXFHKLJKHUHQGHVWLPDWHVRIWKH1RUWK¶VSURVSHFWLYHQXFOHDUFDSDELOLWLHV 11 In an earlier publication, the author hypothesized three alternative nuclear scenarios to 2015, posed more in qualitative than in quantitative terms: (1) a largely V\PEROLFRU³SROLWLFDO´QXFOHDUIRUFH DQRSHUDWLRQDOO\RULHQWHGIRUFHZLWKDFUHGLEOH means of delivery; and (3) a deficient or failed effort to achieve an operational capability.12 A program capped at six to twelve weapons is smaller than what the North could achieve in the absence of binding, verifiable constraints on fissile material production. But it remains highly worrisome for regional security and in relation to non-proliferation objectives. To be sure, little is known or understood about how the DPRK views its deterrent options, or how it conceptualizes nuclear doctrine. It is entirely possible that Pyongyang has yet to give serious thought to this issue. But (as argued by Siegfried Hecker) it now VHHPV YLUWXDOO\ LQGLVSXWDEOH WKDW ³WKH '35. leadership has made the decision to permanently shut down plutonium production if the United States and the other four parties live up to their October 3, 2007 FRPPLWPHQWV´ 13 A political deterrent force (especially in the absence of additional nuclear tests) has inherent limits, and might under some conditions be valued less as a FRUHFRPSRQHQWLQWKH1RUWK¶VORQJHU-term national defense strategy. But even a fully implemented second phase action plan leaves wholly unaddressed the disposition of the 1RUWK¶VSOXWRQLXPLQYHQWRU\DQGRILWVDFWXDOQXFOHDUZHDSRQV The negotiating process has also entailed differences over the details of disablement and disclosure. Earlier hints from U.S. negotiators suggested that the North could undertake specific actions at Yongbyon to render these facilities inoperative and dysfunctional, perhaps permanently. More detailed technical assessments, presumably drawing from the evaluations and observations of U.S. personnel directly involved in the disablement process, suggest that it would take as ORQJ DV  PRQWKV ³WR UHVWDUW DOO IDFLOLWLHV´ DVVXPLQJ D GHFLVLRQ ZDV PDGH WR DJDLQ resume operations.14 This outcome falls short of irreversibility, though any effort by the DPRK to reverse course and restart the facility would entail major political and technical costs.15 Additional technical assessments by Siegfried Hecker (derived from multiple site visits) impart the highly complex technical and procedural issues accompanying the disablement process. In retrospect, the original target date of 31 December 2007 was in all likelihood an overly ambitious target, but such a goal does seem feasible by the end of 2008. 1RUWK .RUHD¶V REOLJDWLRQ WR provide ³D FRPSOHWH DQG DFFXUDWH GHFODUDWLRQ RI LWV nucleaUSURJUDPV´KDVSURYHQSDUWLFXODUO\QHWWOHVRPHDQG1RUWK.RUHDQGLVFORVXUHVRI Korea (DPRK), Pyongyang and the Nuclear &HQWHUDW
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WKH '35.¶V ILVVLOH PDWHULDO LQYHQWRU\ UHPDLQ WR EH YHULILHG  %XW the negotiating process continues to progress, albeit in fits and starts. In May 2008, the DPRK provided U.S. diplomats with approximately 18,000 pages of documentation on the operating records of the Yongbyon complex. These records dating from as early as 1986, when the reactor began operations. Once fully reviewed, these materials should HQDEOHPRUHVDWLVIDFWRU\UHFRQFLOLDWLRQRIYDULRXVHVWLPDWHVRIWKH'35.¶VWRWDOILVVLOH material production, including the claims provided by North Korean officials. 16 These data do not include physical samples from the Yongbyon facility upon which a more FRPSUHKHQVLYH HYDOXDWLRQ ZRXOG GHSHQG EXW WKH 1RUWK¶V DFWLRQV HQWDLO IDU IXOOHU provision of information than the DPRK has heretofore allowed. The United States has aOVR VRXJKW IXOO GLVFORVXUH DERXW WKH 1RUWK¶V SDVW QXFOHDU activities, including prior U.S. allegations about a covert uranium enrichment program that were the proximate cause for the breakdown of the Agreed Framework in late 2002. U.S. intelligence officials now seem far less confident in their judgments about these HDUOLHUDFWLYLWLHVZKLFKIRFXVKHDYLO\RQWKH1RUWK¶VDOOHJHGSXUFKDVHVRIPDWHULDOVDQG technologies through the A.Q. Khan network. After rounds of bilateral talks in Geneva, Singapore, and Pyongyang during early 2008, the United States and North Korea have reached agreement on a bifurcated disclosure process. These understandings appear to meet U.S. expectations that Pyongyang acknowledge its past exploration of enrichment options and separDWHDOOHJDWLRQVDERXW3\RQJ\DQJ¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI a nuclear reactor by Syria, destroyed in a Israeli air attack during September 2007. 17 Assuming satisfactory fulfillment of the phase two action plan, what happens next? The Six-Party accords of February and October 2007 make no reference either to QXFOHDUZHDSRQVRUWRWKHGLVSRVLWLRQRIWKH1RUWK¶VSOXWRQLXPLQYHQWRU\DQGDQ\RWKHU weapons-related technologies and materials. Prior diplomatic interactions with the North suggests that all parties should anticipate ±even in an optimistic scenario²a very protracted negotiation. The North will likely seek to determine the ultimate value that WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGRWKHUVDWWDFKWRWKHGHILQLWLYHHOLPLQDWLRQRIWKH1RUWK¶VZHDSRQV capabilities and weapons potential. Unlike the 1994 agreement, a new accord would presuppose a leveraged buyout, not a long-term rental. There is every reason to believe WKDW WKH 1RUWK¶V SULFH ZLOO EH IDU KLJKHU WKDQ DW WKH WLPH RI WKH QHJRWLDWLRQ RI WKH Agreed Framework. Is there a market-clearing price that North Korea would deem sufficient and the United States and others would consider acceptable? The answer is far from clear and (in all likelihood) has yet to be broached in any negotiations. Though Pyongyang has somewhat soft-pedaled its claims to status as a nuclear-armed state, these claims have not wholly disappeared. There have also been periodic reports that North Korean negotiators have told U.S. counterparts that the DPRK seeks a nuclear status from the United States not unlike what Washington has accorded India, which is demonstrably unacceptable to American negotiators. All senior U.S. policy makers, including President Bush, have repeatedly emphasized that full normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations presuppose a definitive end to the North Korean nuclear program. But even though North Korean expectations seem wholly unrealistic, they beg an additional issue: if the United States deems the market price demanded by the North for its nuclear commodities as excessive, does this imply a price that Washington is

16

Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, 10 May 2008. *OHQQ.HVVOHU³861.RUHD7R:RUN7RZDUG(QGLQJ:HDSRQV,PSDVVH´Washington Post, 12 March 2008; idem, ³1.RUHD$JUHHVWR%ORZ8S7RZHUDW,WV1XFOHDU)DFLOLW\´ibid., 2 May 2008. 17

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unprepared to pay? And if this should leave North Korea with an intact nuclear weapons capability, what then? To be sure, numerous statements from authoritative DPRK sources suggest a different long-term outcome. In the prevailing characterization of North Korean policy PDNHUV WKH WHVWLQJ RI D QXFOHDU GHYLFH ZDV VWULFWO\ D ³GHIHQVLYH FRXQWHUPHDVXUH´ North Korean officials have made repeated UHIHUHQFHWR.LP,O6XQJ¶Vsupposed dying wish for the North to forgo a nuclear weapons capability. The imprimatur on such instructions should not be discounted. But what meaning should be attached to Kim Il 6XQJ¶VVXpposed testament, and how could the United States test this proposition? North Korea repeateGO\DVVHUWVWKDW ³KRVWLOHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQWKH '35.DQGWKH 8QLWHG6WDWHV>DUH@WKH URRWFDXVH RIWKHQXFOHDULVVXH RQWKH.RUHDQSHQLQVXOD´,Q North Korean characterizations, the technical specifics of disabling or dismantlement are secondary to more fundamental political considerations between Washington and Pyongyang. 18 There is an explicit parallelism in the maximal expectations of the United States and North Korea. The United States insists that the North must make a ³VWUDWHJLFGHFLVLRQ´WRHOLPinate its nuclear weapons program; the North insists that the 8QLWHG 6WDWHV PXVW PDNH D ³VWUDWHJLF GHFLVLRQ´ WR FHDVH LWV ³KRVWLOH SROLF\´ ZLWKRXW which denuclearization will be impossible. These statements for the record may impart a longer term vision from the respective vantage points of both states. But they tell us little about how to get from here to there, and such statements are almost infinitely elastic. This leaves the two states free to test and explore, assuming that both are prepared to entertain serious discussions. The United States and the other participants in the Six-Party Talks have concluded that there is no credible alternative to negotiations with Pyongyang, if the extant nuclear dangers on the peninsula are to be capped, if not wholly eliminated. But are all parties able to conceptualize a denuclearized peninsula that can be negotiated with the current DPRK regime, one that has achieved a nuclear capability at such extraordinary cost over the decades? Are the U.S. and others seeking largely to buy time in the expectation of a longer-term transition to a different leadership that does not see its fundamental identity and security interests deriving from nuclear weapons? Or are there imaginable circumstances where Kim Jong Il would be prepared to definitively forgo the capabilities that he and others have pursued so single mindedly? Indeed, the LVVXHRIWKH1RUWK¶VYLDELOLW\DQGORQJ-term future hovers over this entire process. In the final analysis, all involved parties confront more question marks than answers, with all the attendant risks for the peace and well-being of the peninsula and of Northeast Asia and for the future of non-proliferation as a whole.

18 For a detailed exposition of this argument, consult Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis, Policy in Context-Negotiating with North Korea: 1992-2007 (Stanford: Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, January 2008).

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-121

121

Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons Yair EVRON1

Abstract. ,VUDHO¶VDPELJXRXVQXFOHDUSRVWXUHLVEDVLFDOO\DGLSORPDWLFILFWLRQEXW it signals self restraint and caution. The main purpose of the Israeli nuclear image has been deterrence; however, the policy has not in fact deterred armed violence against the state, and it was only a secondary factor in inducing Arab regimes to seek peace. The policy has not contributed significantly to regional stability, but nor has it been a major factor in fostering instability. Currently, the probability of situations requiring the actual exercise of Israeli nuclear deterrence is extremely low. Iranian nuclearization will create a very different strategic environment, but whether Israel will have to change its ambiguous posture as a result remains to be seen.

Main Characteristics of the Israeli Nuclear Posture 2 Perception of Existential Threat When Israel decided in the late 1950s on the development of a nuclear option, its leadership perceived a continued existential threat. In addition, learning from the outcomes of the Sinai Campaign (the Israeli part of the 1956 Suez campaign), the leadership concluded that Israel cannot translate military victories into political achievements. Israel therefore searched for a decisive deterrent against any future allout war. Ambiguous Posture3 Due to the particular manner in which the nuclear project developed, the American and international reactions, the internal opposition voiced by part of the Israeli political and strategic leadership, and concern about Arab reactions, Israel adopted an ambiguous nuclear posture. The ambiguity was not a calculated policy, but rather the result of a gradual development under these particular constraints. Ultimately, the ambiguous posture proved to be very successful in mitigating various counterproductive effects. Because of the volume of international news and data on the Israeli nuclear capability that has appeared over time, part of the opacity surrounding the project has been eroded. As a result, there are currently no doubts internationally concerning the existence of a capability comprising both the warheads and various delivery systems. However, official details about these capabilities are still not in the public domain. Currently, the ambiguous posture is basically a diplomatic fiction, in that Israel does not officially 1

Professor of International Relations and Tel Aviv University For studies of the Israeli nuclear posture see inter alia Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press). 3 Ibid., See also Yair Evron ,"Israel and the Atom: The Uses and Misuses of Ambiguity," Orbis, 1974. 2

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recognize the existence of its nuclear capability and refrains from providing official details about it. Israel also adheres to some basic understandings with the United States regarding its nuclear behavior. However, the posture of ambiguity is still an important one in several respects. There is considerable difference between an explicit nuclear doctrine (and declared deployment) and a posture of ambiguity. In addition, the posture of ambiguity also signals self restraint and caution. Tradition of Responsible Behavior Over the years, Israel has faced several very serious security challenges. While from time to time the nuclear factor was referred to implicitly, there was nevertheless a deliberate policy of avoidance of relying on explicit nuclear deterrent threats. The only time ± during the 1973 War, under conditions of great stress ± that the possibility of an explicit nuclear threat was raised in internal debate, the Israeli "kitchen Cabinet" rejected it.4 At the same time, continued efforts should be invested in "socializing" the Israeli leadership and public in the intricacies of nuclear affairs and the need for control and restraint. Avoidance of Nuclear Coercive Diplomacy One of the more dangerous uses of nuclear diplomacy (and historically in the superpowers' context, also not effective) is political coercion, namely, the use of nuclear threats in order to secure political objectives. Israel has avoided this tactic, and in fact, precisely because of its relative regional political isolation (which has gradually been changing) its ability to resort to nuclear coercion is inherently much more constrained than that of other regional powers. Effects on Deterrence ± A Brief Historical Account 5 The main purpose of the Israeli nuclear factor has been deterrence. However, an account of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict does not suggest that the nuclear image of Israel has indeed deterred armed violence against it. Of the five Arab-Israeli wars, (not counting the 1969-70 War of Attrition and the 2006 Lebanon War) two ± the 1973 War and the Lebanon war of 1982 ± took place after it could have been assumed by Arab leaders that Israel already had a nuclear capability. Since Israel initiated the 1982 Lebanon War, the relevant case of Israeli deterrence is the 1973 War. Generally speaking, the outbreak of the war demonstrated the failure of Israeli deterrence. It appears reasonable to assume that if Arab strategists made the "worst case analysis," they should have considered the possibility of an Israeli nuclear reaction. Whatever their analysis, the Israeli nuclear deterrent was not successful. Various observers and analysts have suggested that the image of an Israeli nuclear capability 4 Seymour Hersh in The Samson Option (Faber & Faber, 1991), claims that Israel decided on nuclear signaling in 1973 and this affected Egyptian behavior. I disagree with him. See Evron Israel's Nuclear Dilemma. 5 See Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land (Michigan University Press, 2006); Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma.

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did affect Egyptian and Syrian behavior during the war by inducing them to conduct a limited war. However, an analysis of the war 6 demonstrates that the Egyptian and Syrian strategic leaderships conducted a limited war because of their perception of Israel's conventional superiority and not because of concern about a possible Israeli nuclear capability. Since the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement of 1979, the absence of Arab-initiated wars against Israel has not been due to the existence of the Israeli nuclear deterrent but rather to: a lack of concerted Arab interest in initiating a general war (due to Egypt's and Jordan's lack of political interest therein); the political process between the sides; and Israel's conventional capabilities. While general wars were not launched against Israel, low-level violence (in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories) occurred on a large scale. However, nuclear deterrence is irrelevant to this level of war. This type of deterrence was also not relevant to the Iraqi launching of surface-to-surface missiles armed with conventional warheads against Israel in 1991.

Nuclear Weapons and the Peace Process It has been argued that Israel's nuclear image was a determining factor in inducing Arab regimes to seek peace with Israel. The evidence on that is not clear. The key to the peace process was the Israeli-Egyptian dialogue from 1977-79 culminating with the peace treaty. It appears that the two main factors that contributed to it from the Egyptian side were the Egyptian realization of Israel's military victory in 1973 (though after the initial Egyptian military success and difficult combat for both sides) and Israel's readiness to return the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty. Additional factors were the weakening of pan-Arabism, Egyptian willingness to reorient politically towards the US, and major Egyptian economic considerations. The nuclear factor might have played a role as well but most probably only as a secondary factor. The Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement of 1994 had nothing to do with Israel's nuclear capability. Israeli-Jordanian relations have long been characterized by the understandings of both states of some important shared or coincidental strategic interests. The actual formal peace came after a long period beginning in the mid 1970s of peaceful coexistence and even cooperation in various areas, and ultimately became possible with the beginning of the Oslo process. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process beginning in 1993 had nothing to do with Israel's nuclear capability. Notwithstanding the existence of Israel's nuclear capability, Syria has continuously refused to reach a peace agreement with Israel unless the latter agreed to return the Golan Heights to Syrian sovereignty. The political factor was thus the critical one in Syria's position vis-à-vis Israel. At the same time, Syria has refrained from initiating hostilities against Israel due to Israel's clear conventional superiority. Finally, it is likely that the existence of Israel's nuclear capability is an additional factor in various Arab leaderships' assessments of the costs/benefits involved in a continued conflict with Israel. It could also serve as one of the arguments by Arab leaders vis-à-vis extreme sectors within the populations calling for abrogation of peace agreements and the overall peace process. 6

Ibid.

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The previous discussion on deterrence and the peace process leads to the conclusion that Israel's nuclear posture has not contributed significantly to regional stability. It has neither deterred wars, nor has it ± by itself ± led to the peace process. In all, the basic and most fundamental regional developments occurred without any reference to the nuclear factor. Instability There is a series of arguments that Israel's nuclear developments contributed to regional instability. This relates primarily to two issues: further regional proliferation and the outbreak of wars. Nuclear proliferation One of the recurrent themes in the debate about the possible effects of proliferation has been the "chain reaction effect" namely, that states would "go nuclear" as a response to adversaries' nuclearization. Since Egypt was the leading foe of Israel until the 1970s, its expected reaction to Israel's nuclearization would have been a response in kind. In fact however, Egypt, out of a combination of rational reasons, declined to invest its efforts in a nuclear weapons project. The Iraqi nuclear effort might have been partly motivated by the Israeli capability, but probably more so by several other factors: hegemonic ambitions in the Gulf and the Middle East in general; the ongoing conflict with Iran, and a belief that nuclear development is a key to overall modernization and regional prestige. The Iranian nuclear effort is motivated by a mix of threat perceptions and aggressive foreign policy ambitions. The main security concerns that actually led to the project were the war with Iraq and concern about Iraqi nuclear developments. Following that was the concern as to American intentions. Altogether, Iran finds itself in an environment in which several nuclear powers operate: the US, Israel, Russia, and Pakistan. For Iran therefore, the Israeli nuclear capability is only part of a larger set of security concerns. In addition, the fundamentalist regime in Tehran pursues an aggressive foreign policy and clearly seeks a hegemonic position in the Gulf area and possibly beyond it. This account does not invalidate the general "chain reaction" argument. It does, however, suggest that it should always be considered within the specific historical context. Triggering War From the mid 1960s, the Israeli nuclear project became a subject of debate and concern in Egypt (and to a lesser extent in Syria). President Nasser raised the possibility of preventive war designed to destroy the Dimona complex. Several analyses of the 1967 crisis have suggested that one of the main reasons for the Egyptian escalatory moves was the desire to destroy Dimona, or to force Israel by diplomatic means to abandon the nuclear project. A recent study, Foxbats over Dimona,7 has even argued that the war was planned by the USSR with the main objective of destroying the Israeli nuclear

7

See G. Remez , E. Ginor, Foxbats over Dimona, Yale University Press, 2007. 

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project and that Soviet forces were deployed for an attack on Israel. If indeed this was the case, then Dimona caused a major crisis and, in turn, a war. However, a careful analysis of the crisis and its causes suggests that the roots of the crisis were very different: inter-Arab competition; the Egyptian desire to correct the results of the 1956 Sinai Campaign; escalation along the Israeli-Syrian border; and Egyptian defense commitments to Syria. 8 Moreover, although Dimona did concern Egypt, during the American-Egyptian diplomatic dialogue in 1965 on the Middle East arms race, the Egyptians did not raise the issue. (It was actually the American side that referred to it and tried to calm Egyptian concern about it). More significantly, in the diplomatic negotiations during the 1967 crisis itself, Egypt did not raise the Israeli nuclear development as one of the conditions for resolving the crisis. Finally, the evidence presented in Foxbats over Dimona is clearly not persuasive and far from substantiating its case. Thus, although Dimona caused concern in Egypt (and probably the USSR as well), the 1967 crisis did not result from it. Altogether, the Israeli nuclear project had only a relatively very limited impact on either stability or instability in the region. The logic of political and strategic developments was determined primarily by other factors.

Israel's Nuclear Doctrine Because of the official Israeli strategy of ambiguity, no nuclear strategic doctrine has ever been publicly articulated or presented. But indirect evidence, coupled with observations and speculation based on rational analysis, leads to several assumptions about it. General Deterrence The initial rationale for the nuclear development was deterrence of a general Arab conventional attack constituting an existential threat. To a certain extent, this posture could be defined analytically as part of a balance of power mechanism, but referring only to its deterrence dimension. General deterrence does not involve direct and specific deterrent threats. Specific (or immediate) Deterrence This refers to a range of possible specific crises threatening grave escalation. Theoretically, nuclear threats could deter escalation from one level to the other. Currently however, under conditions of Israeli conventional superiority, nuclear deterrence is not relevant to such situations. Indeed, Israel presently enjoys "escalation dominance" without invoking the nuclear component. Deterrence against other types of WMD It has been suggested that Israel's deterrent signals against the use of chemical (and possibly biological) agents during the Gulf War of 1991 implied the counter use of 8 The literature on the 1967 War is very extensive. See Michael Oren, Six Days of War, Oxford University Press, 2002.

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nuclear weapons, and this threat indeed deterred the said use. There is still a debate as to what extent an implied Israeli nuclear threat indeed deterred Iraq, 9 but a mode of this sort of Israeli deterrence has become widely perceived as part of the Israeli spectrum of nuclear deterrence options. There are, however, reasons why there should be a clearer distinction between the different types of WMD and they should not be converged in one package. The most obvious reason is that the respective effects of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are very different. There might be situations in which nuclear deterrence threats against the use of chemical and biological agents might therefore not be credible. In addition, under conditions of wider regional nuclear proliferation the threat to retaliate by nuclear weapons against the use of chemical and biological munitions might increase motivation for first nuclear strikes. Currently, the probability of situations requiring the actual exercise of Israeli nuclear deterrence is extremely low. On the political level, Egypt and Jordan have peaceful relations with Israel and most of the Arab countries (except possibly Syria) have no interest in initiating hostilities against Israel. Moreover, due to many developments, Israel maintains its conventional superiority over its potential adversaries. Against this background, general deterrence could be based primarily on conventional capabilities. Nuclear deterrence should be considered as an additional (but important) general safeguard against major adverse changes in regional politics.

Effects of Possible Iranian Nuclearization on Israel's Nuclear Ambiguity An assessment of the potential consequences of Iran becoming a nuclear power is, in the nature of things, a speculative effort with many uncertainties. Furthermore, there are difficulties in developing an analytical framework designed to assess the nature of an Israeli-Iranian nuclear relationship. A possible approach is to consider the main characteristics of the "central balance of nuclear deterrence" during the Cold War ± the only historical example of a relatively stable and long nuclear relationship ± and observe to what extent they affected stability. 10 Conditions contributing to stability can be divided into several subsets: historical circumstances in which nuclear weapons were introduced; political relations between adversaries; stability of societies; strategic doctrines; technical mechanisms; cognitive issues. Central among them ± SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ WKH VXSHUSRZHUV¶ FRQWH[W - have been: bipolarity; stability of regimes; gradual learning and socialization in the nature of nuclear affairs; second strike capabilities; efficient command and control systems; elaborate mechanisms for decision making in nuclear affairs and especially during crises; open channels of communications; arms control and various CSBM. Many of these conditions will not exist in a potential nuclear relationship between Israel and Iran, certainly not in the short or medium term. Measures to improve them could of course take place, but might take long periods of time. Problems might arise from potential instability in Iran (that might affect control of nuclear systems); lack of "socialization" in nuclear affairs in Iran (and to a certain extent in Israel); major 9 See Shai Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence: The Test of the Gulf War," 1991; Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma, op. cit 10 Such an analysis is presented in Yair EvrRQ³$Q,VUDHOL-Iranian Nuclear Relationship: Would it be 6WDEOH"´SXEOLFDWLRQIRUWKFRPLQJE\,1663UHVV 

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problems of command and control systems ± both their technical and human dimensions; lack of channels of communications; and lack of CSBM. As a result, there is a high likelihood of misperceptions regarding adversaries' steps in crisis situations and the danger of mistaken decisions. Because of these problems, a nuclear relationship would be far from stable. Another major issue is the possibility of further regional proliferation resulting from Iran becoming a nuclear power. While Israel's nuclear posture has been aimed at deterring major conventional attacks constituting an existential threat, Iranian nuclearization would refocus Israel's nuclear deterrent to the deterrence of Iranian use of nuclear weapons. A possible general conclusion from this is that Israel should develop a posture of escalation dominance in which nuclear deterrence is limited only to deterrence against adversarial use of nuclear weapons. Effects on the posture of ambiguity It could be argued that, were Iran to nuclearize, Israel should abandon its ambiguity and adopt an explicit nuclear posture for four reasons: first, to emphasize Israel's nuclear deterrent capability against Iranian nuclear threats; second, to develop an explicit doctrine delineating thresholds for nuclear response; third, in order to allow for an Israeli public debate concerning Israel's strategic doctrine and enhance Israel's "socialization" in nuclear affairs; finally, in order to strengthen the public's self confidence in Israel's deterrence credibility. What follows is a brief discussion of these points without providing a definite answer. First: in view of the long duration of the Israeli nuclear project and the estimates of various respected international research organizations, there could not be any doubt about Israel's extensive nuclear capability.11 The Iranian strategic leadership no doubt must realize that Israel could cause unacceptable damage to Iran, including total destruction of the regime even after an Iranian first strike. The second point has more merit. Communicating "red lines" for a nuclear response is important under some circumstances, and especially under conditions of specific (or immediate) deterrence, that is, nuclear behavior in times of specific impending crises or during them. This might inject a measure of certainty to deterrence. It might be of particular importance under conditions of an escalation between Israel and an adversary allied with Iran, namely, if Iran creates a situation of extended deterrence. There is a need for in-depth analyses and the weighting of various possible scenarios in order to formulate adequate responses for various nuclear challenges. It should be noted that especially under conditions of great stress, decision makers tend to rely on "standard operating procedures" that were formulated beforehand in shaping their response in general and particularly in crisis situations. Hence, they should work with a range of alternative strategic moves and their possible consequences. A possible counter argument might be that an important component of the success of deterrence depends precisely on an element of uncertainty. Moreover, decision makers prefer to have a range of options for response and not be tied down to specific ones, and this may not adversely affect the efficacy of deterrent threats. The need for "socialization" in nuclear affairs is very important. This refers both to a situation before Iranian nuclearization and much more so following it. The distinctions between deterrence and "war fighting" and the dangers involved in 11

See The Military Balance, (annual), the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

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tendencies towards preemption and first strikes should be considered and discussed. This however, does not necessarily entail a change in the posture of ambiguity. In conclusion, Iranian nuclearization will create a very different strategic environment for Israel. Whether Israel will have to change its ambiguous posture remains to be seen, but in any event, the Israeli nuclear deterrent will probably have to be refocused primarily on deterrence of the Iranian nuclear threat.

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-129

129

,QGLD¶V1XFOHDU$UVHQDO3URVSHFWVIRU Enlargement Rajesh M. BASRUR1

Abstract. ,QGLD¶VUDSLGO\JURZLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOSURILOHKDVUDLVHGFRQFHUQVDERXW the potential expansion of its nuclear capabilities, but such expectations are unfounded. Indian strategic culture is minimalistic, the product of decades of slow growth and a firmly grounded policy of non-deployment. Lack of doctrinal clarity about the requirements of minimum deterrence does provide space for expansion. A drive for nuclear enlargement could come from two sources: the military and the technical bureaucracy. But the former is under tight civilian control, while the latter is divided and lacks the kind of influence that will push policy-makers toward significant growth.

Nearly a decade after InGLD¶VQXFOHDUWHVWVWKHUHLVFRQVLGHUDEOHDPELJXLW\RYHUWKH IXWXUH RI LWV QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV SURJUDPPH 7KRXJK LWV RIILFLDO GRFWULQH LV ³PLQLPXP GHWHUUHQFH´QRWPXFKKDVEHHQVDLGDERXWZKDWWKLVPHDQVLQRSHUDWLRQDOWHUPV 2 The future direction of its nuclear arsenal will certainly not be inhibited by resource constraints. In January 2007, Goldman Sachs revised earlier estimates and projected accelerated growth, which would enable India to overtake Japan in GDP terms by about 2030 and the United States about a decade later.3 While such projections are not always dependable, the broad trend is confirmed by other studies. 4 Military spending can grow rapidly without necessitating a significant increase in expenditure as a share of national resources. Will India expand its nuclear armoury significantly? In the context of the still incomplete negotiating process following the India-US nuclear agreement of March 2006, critics have claimed that the import of nuclear fuel will enable India to divert its existing resources to produce more nuclear warheads, which will in turn generate an India-Pakistan arms race.5 Against this, it has been argued that

1 Associate Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore 2 For a detailed study of Indian nuclear doctrine, see Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and ,QGLD¶V1XFOHDU6HFXULW\ (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). 3 7XVKDU3RGGDUDQG(YD; Letter to Senators Lugar and Biden and Congressmen Hyde and Lantos signed by six nonproliferation experts, April 5, 2006, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington, DC .

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India already has the capacity to produce more warheads. 6 This paper attempts to assess the possibilities in light of Indian nuclear-strategic practice and thinking and the policy process. It shows that some growth will take place, but that this will, in all probability, not be very significant.

Nuclear Practice and Doctrine Practice ,Q RUGHU WR MXGJH ZKHUH ,QGLD¶V QXFOHDr programme is going, it is necessary to know where it is coming from. 7 A brief review of the slow process of its acquisition of nuclear weapons shows that it went through four stages. In the first stage, from 1947 to 1964, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru rejected the idea of obtaining nuclear weapons, but kept the door open to weapons development in case the need should arise. In the second stage, between 1964 and about 1989, nuclear weapons capability was unhurriedly attained ± and a successful test carried out in 1974 ± but no effort was made to build weapons. In the third stage, India became a covert nuclear power, producing a few warheads but making little or no effort to operationalize its capability. Finally, it came out of the closet in 1998, when it tested again and declared itself a nuclear weapons power. Thus was crystallized a strategic culture ± a pattern of thought and action ± that was minimalistic in its (reluctant) acceptance of nuclear strategy and incrementalist in acting upon it. Subsequent to its becoming a nuclear power, India has remained slow to operationalize its capability. Some four years after the 1998 tests, India announced in early 2003 the creation of a Nuclear Command Authority. This consists of a Political Council chaired by the Prime Minister which has the authority to command the use of nuclear weapons, and an Executive Council headed by the National Security Advisor which is tasked with implementation. A new tri-service Strategic Forces Command (SFC) under the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, was also created in January 2003, but funds were allotted to it only ten months later. 8 In mid-2004, the SFC still did not have adequate manpower or even its own headquarters. 9 Alternate command centres were announced in October 2003 EXW RIILFLDOV DGPLWWHG WKHUH ZHUH ³RQO\ DG KRF V\VWHPV LQ SODFH´10 The Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was set up in November 2001, but does not appear to have played a significant role in integrating the three main arms of the military. 11 A proposal in 2001 to create the position of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) lies unimplemented. Reasons for the delay include inter-service rivalry, resistance from the civilian bureaucracy, and, above all, residual suspicion of the military. The end result is that operational readiness for the complex and highly 6 Ashley J. Tellis, Atoms for War? U.S.-Indian &LYLOLDQ 1XFOHDU &RRSHUDWLRQ DQG ,QGLD¶V 1XFOHDU Arsenal (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 13-14. 7 Basrur, 0LQLPXP'HWHUUHQFHDQG,QGLD¶V1XFOHDU6HFXULW\, ch. 3. 8 -RV\ -RVHSK ³,QGLD V 1XFOHDU ,QIUDVWUXFWXUH 1HDUO\ 5HDG\´ Rediff.com, October 10, 2003 . 9 5DMDW3DQGLW³1XFOHDU)RUFH&KLHI6HWWR5HWLUH´Times of India, June 1, 2004 . 10 -RVHSK³,QGLD V1XFOHDU,QIUDVWUXFWXUH1HDUO\5HDG\´ 11 5DKXO %HGL ³$ &UHGLEOH 1XFOHDU 'HWHUUHQW"´ Frontline, March 29-April 11, 2003 . This was admitted as much by WKH&KLHIRI ,QWHJUDWHG'HIHQFH6WDII/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO36-RVKL6HH5+7DKLOLDQL³&DOOLQJIRr the Tri-6KDNWL6SLULW´Indian Express, October 28, 2004.

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specialized function of nuclear deterrence is limited. The underlying reason for this apparently lackadaisical approach is that the political leadership simply does not view nuclear weapons operationally, but tends to conceive of them as political instruments that are essentially unusable beyond their basic deterrence function. This conception of the deterrent is evident in other ways. After 1998, the government has announced and observed a moratorium on warhead testing. Though this means it has limited assurance as to the reliability of its warheads, the policy has been consistently supported by political leaders, military officials, the technical bureaucracy and strategic experts. There have been strong objections to the Henry J. Hyde Act (2006), under which the US Congress mandates an end to civilian nuclear cooperation if India tests. But critics in India have resisted the India-US deal not on military-strategic grounds but on political grounds, arguing that it is unacceptable for ,QGLD¶V WHVWLQJ RSWLRQV WR EH YLUWXDOO\ FORVHG SHUPDQHQWO\ E\ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV 0RUH remarkable is the fact that, despite three major crises with Pakistan in 1990, 1999 and 2001-02, India has not deployed its nuclear weapons. These are kept in non-deployed mode, with missiles and warheads unmated. The warheads themselves are unassembled, with the nuclear cores being stored separately. The overall picture, then, is of an approach to deterrence that is political rather than operational and does not give admittance to a need for large, usable forces. Doctrine While the practice of deterrence has been minimalist, the picture is less clear-cut with respect to doctrine. Official enunciations of doctrine have been few and far between. Although a Draft Nuclear Doctrine was publicly circulated in 1999, it was neither official nor clear in its direction as it tried ineffectively to satisfy the very diverse opinions of the members of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) who produced it.12 A laconic statement of doctrine appeared in January 2003, announcing OLWWOHPRUHWKDQFRPPLWPHQWWR1R)LUVW8VH1)8 WKHWKUHDWRI³PDVVLYH´UHWDOLDWLRQ against a first strike from nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and an abiding interest in arms control. 13 The most elaborate statement on doctrine was made in a newspaper interview in November 1999 by Jaswant Singh, then Minister for External Affairs.14 ,QWKLVKHKHOGWKDW³SDULW\LVQRWHVVHQWLDOIRUGHWHUUHQFH´WKDW,QGLDZLOOQRW engage in arms racLQJWKDWPLQLPXPGHWHUUHQFHLVRQO\DTXHVWLRQRI³DGHTXDF\´QRW numbers; that retaliation need not be instantaneous; that there is no need for Indian QXFOHDUIRUFHVWREHRQDOHUWWKDW³ZHGRQRWVHHQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDVZHDSRQVRIZDU ILJKWLQJ´DQGWKDWDWULDGLVQRWD³SUH-UHTXLVLWHIRUFUHGLELOLW\´ 2QWKHRWKHUKDQG6LQJKDOVRGHFODUHGWKDWWKHFRQFHSWRI³PLQLPXP´FDQQRWEHD ³IL[HGSK\VLFDOTXDQWLILFDWLRQ´EXWLVD³G\QDPLFFRQFHSW´WKDWLV³ILUPO\URRWHGLQWKH strategic environment, technologLFDO LPSHUDWLYHV DQG QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\ QHHGV«´ 7KLV perspective tends to keep the requirements of a minimum deterrent force open-ended. The difficulty is pervasive in Indian strategic thinking. The ubiquity of the term 12 +DUVK 9 3DQW ³,QGLD¶V 1XFOHDU 'RFWULQH DQG &RPPDQG 6WUXFWXUH ,PSOLFDWLRQV IRU &LYLO-Military 5HODWLRQVLQ,QGLD´Armed Forces and Society, 33, 2 (January 2007), p. 246. 13 ³7KH&DELQHW&RPPLWWHHRQ6HFXULW\5HYLHZV2SHUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRI,QGLD¶V1XFOHDU'RFWULQH´3UHVV Release, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, January 4, 2003 (accessed on Sep 30, 2007). 14 ³,QGLD1RWWR(QJDJHLQ$1XFOHDU$UPV5DFH-DVZDQW´,QWHUYLHZ Hindu, November 29, 1999, p. 1.

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³FUHGLEOH´LQGLVFXVVLRQVRQGRFWULQe, derived uncritically from American discourse, is deeply problematic. Its derivatives are of two kinds: material and psychological. The PDWHULDOKDVWRGRZLWKWKHNLQGVDQGQXPEHUVRIZHDSRQVUHTXLUHGWRREWDLQ³DVVXUHG second-VWULNH FDSDELOLW\´ 7KH PRst minimalist of deterrence thinkers base their thinking on this concept. The late K. Sundarji, perhaps the most articulate of early Indian thinkers on nuclear weapons, holds that credible deterrence must rest on a ³JXDUDQWHHG VHFRQG VWULNH´15 The logical extension of this requirement is that Indian IRUFHVPXVWEH³VXUYLYDEOH´-DVMLW6LQJKDQRWKHUOHDGLQJWKLQNHUDUJXHVVLPLODUO\WKDW survivability is an essential prerequisite for second strike capability.16 This brings in the QRWLRQRIEDODQFHWKH³G\QDPLFFRQFHSW´-DVZDQW6LQJKUHIHUVWR7KLVLQWXUQOHDGV to assuring survivability not only by protected and mobile basing of missiles, but also to ensuring that a wider variety of delivery vehicles is available. For maximum survivability, the submarine-launched ballistic missile becomes essential. 17 The same logic may be applied to warhead requirements. Thus, K. Subrahmanyam, the doyen of contemporary Indian deterrence thinkers, increases his estimate of the size of a minimum nuclear force for India from 60 (pre-1998) to 150 (post-1998) warheads without doctrinal justification.18 On the psychological aspect, credibility is indeed a problem if the adversary has to EH ³FRQYLQFHG´ RI RQH¶V DELOLW\ WR UHWDOLDWH LQ VXIILFLHQW QXPEHUV DQG ZLWK VXIILFLHQW power and accuracy. 19 Thus, the Draft Nuclear Doctrine places great emphasis on ³ZLOO´ DQG RQ FRPPXQLFDWLQJ WKDW ZLOO DVVHUWLQJ WKDW ³DQ\ DGYHUVDU\ PXVW NQRZ WKDW India FDQ DQG ZLOO UHWDOLDWH´ 20 Both the material and psychological aspects of credibility have no basis in the practice of deterrence in South Asia. For all its risks, deterrence worked through three South Asian crises without the active deployment of nuclear weapons, which remained recessed. No one quite knew what the capabilities of the two sides were except that they were limited and apparently lacking in the material EDVLVRI³FUHGLELOLW\´1RUEDUULQJWKHRFFDVLRQDOVLJQDOOLQJE\ZD\RIPLVVLOHWHVWVDQG oblique assertions of resolve, did much have to be done to convey the will to use them. Neither side deployed its weapons. The crises came and went without the nuclear shadow assuming concrete proportions. In short, there was a mismatch between practice and theory.

15 . 6XQGDUML ³,QGLD¶V 1XFOHDU :HDSRQV 3ROLF\´ LQ -¡UQ *HOVWDG DQG 2ODY 1M¡OVWDG HGV Nuclear Rivalry and International Order (Oslo: PRIO; & London, Thousand Oaks & New Delhi: Sage, 1996), p. 176. 16 -DVMLW 6LQJK ³$ 1XFOHDU 6WUDWHJ\ IRU ,QGLD´ LQ -DVMLW Singh, ed., Nuclear India (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), pp. 321-323. 17 &8GD\%KDVNDU³6WD\LQJRQ&RXUVH6XEV+DYH9LWDO5ROHLQ'HWHUUHQFH´Times of India, August 31, 2000, p. 10; Gurmeet Kanwal, Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2001), pp. 131-133; Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: the Realist Foundations of Strategy (Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 585-591; Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi, Thousand Oaks & London: Sage, 2000), pp. 224-227. 18 7KHILUVWUHFRPPHQGDWLRQLVLQ.6XEUDKPDQ\DP³1XFOHDU)RUFH'HVLJQDQG0LQLPXP'HWHUUHQFH 6WUDWHJ\ IRU ,QGLD´ LQ%KDUDW .DUQDG HG Future Imperilled (New Delhi: Viking, 1994); the second in K. 6XEUDKPDQ\DP³$&UHGLEOH'HWHUUHQW/RJLFRIWKH1XFOHDU'RFWULQH´Times of India, October 4, 1999. 19 Kanwal, Nuclear Defence, p. 133. 20 ³'UDIW5HSRUWRI1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\$GYLVRU\%RDUGRQ,QGLDQ1XFOHDU'RFWULQH´

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Implications 7KHIXWXUHVKDSHDQGVL]HRI,QGLD¶VDUVHQDOGHSHQGVRQKRZWKHFRQWUadiction between practice and theory will play out. The political leadership clearly has an extremely minimalist understanding of nuclear deterrence. On the other side, professional strategists base much of their rather inchoate thinking on concepts that are open to expansion. If the political leadership were to accept the thinking of the strategic community that credible and survivable forces are necessary, then we could see a shift toward a more operational conception of nuclear deterrence than has hitherto been the case. Critics have argued that by default political decision makers have allowed a PLOLWDUL]HGDSSURDFKWRQXFOHDUZHDSRQVWROHDGWKHZD\)RULQVWDQFHWKHOHDGHUVKLS¶V LQWHUHVW LQ ³OLPLWHG ZDU´ DIWHU WKH  FULVLV UHIOHFWHG PLOLWDU\ WKLQNLng on the feasibility of such a war to punish Pakistan for backing terrorists. 21 This tells us something about the conditions under which a dominant civilian leadership might adopt a militaristic outlook. On the other hand, the fact that Indian strategic practice during the crisis of 2001-02 remained highly cautious despite the rhetoric accompanying its massive mobilisation and threat to go to war tells us the lesson was quickly learned that a militarised approach does not really work. 22 Nonetheless, it is necessary to consider whether Indian leaders might depart from their minimalistic practice in conditions where risks are less serious. Might they permit WKH XQFRQWUROOHG H[SDQVLRQ RI ,QGLD¶V QXFOHDU DUVHQDO IRU UHDVRQV RWKHU WKDQ VHFXULW\" Scott Sagan has attributed security, domestic politics and prestige as three kinds of motivations for a state to go nuclear (or not). 23 One might usefully extend this analytical framework to asking why states might expand their nuclear capabilities beyond the requirements of deterrence. The security model is not very useful once deterrence has been obtained. Unfortunately, as observed earlier, many Indian strategic thinkers, like their counterparts elsewhere, do tend to espouse a redundant balance-ofSRZHU ORJLF ,I ,QGLD¶V security environment were to deteriorate, arguments for the expansion of its arsenal would almost certainly appear even though its own experience (and that of other nuclear rivals) shows that neither extensive capability nor demonstration of will is required for deterrence to operate. Yet, as we know, Indian policy-makers have adhered to minimalism at the worst of times, which is a source for optimism. The prestige/norms model is interesting and may apply. The fact that all the nuclear powers continue to retain significantly large arsenals in the post-Cold War era suggests that, though nobody is about to admit as much, there may be something to it. As symbols of modernity, power and status, they retain a certain appeal, particularly among their possessors, and India as an aspiring great power might be tempted to build an armoury commensurate with the big players. But this would involve a significant shift in the belief system of a leadership that, regardless of party affiliation, has displayed a consistent disinterest in making nuclear weapons the centrepiece of national security strategy. In this context, it is particularly significant that the most hardline of the major political parties, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which was at 21 0LFKDHO5\DQ.UDLJ³7KH3ROLWLFDODQG6WUDWHJLF,PSHUDWLYHVRI1XFOHDU'HWHUUHQFHLQ6RXWK$VLD´ India Review, 2, 1 (January 2003), pp. 1-48. 22 On Indian caution during the crisis of 2001-02, see Basrur, 0LQLPXP'HWHUUHQFHDQG,QGLD¶V1XFOHDU Security, ch. 4. 23 6FRWW ' 6DJDQ ³:K\ 'R 6WDWHV %XLOG 1XFOHDU :HDSRQV" 7KUHH 0RGHOV LQ 6HDUFK RI $ %RPE´ International Security, 21, 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 54-86.

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the helm of power when India-Pakistan relations were at their worst (1998-2004), remained disinclined to push for a proactive nuclear posture. It remains to discuss domestic politics as a potential driver of nuclear expansion. Here, an understanding of the policy process with respect to nuclear weapons is necessary. The Policy Process Policy-making on nuclear issues is not greatly institutionalised. In 2000, a Group of Ministers (GoM) was tasked to report on national security in order to begin restructuring the entire system.24 But implementation has been limited. It is generally known that the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSAB have not played a significant role in decision making.25 With political leaders showing little attention to the nitty gritty of doctrine and force posture, and the bureaucracy unfamiliar with the intricacies of doctrine, policy has drifted along without clear direction. The two major groups with an interest in nuclear weapons issues are the military and the strategic technocracy. Their inputs into the policy process might conceivably make a difference WRWKHSRWHQWLDOIRU,QGLD¶VQXFOHDUDUVHQDOWRJURZ The Military While the political leadership does not give much thought to nuclear weapons, the military does. Much of the strategic thinking in India is done by military officers, often after retirement.26 They are by no means ambitious or expansionist in their thinking, and most have cast their lot with minimum deterrence. But the discourse, as I have shown above, fails to create a minimalist basis for deterrence and leaves the door open to expansion. The nature of civil-military relations is crucial here. There is no question that the Indian military is firmly under civilian control. Yet the relationship is a peculiar one. The civil-PLOLWDU\³EDUJDLQ´ in India is one where the civilian leadership has maintained unchallenged authority, but has allowed the military to determine its needs with a high degree of autonomy. 27 This has created a broad problem of military effectiveness in the search for security which remains unresolved as the Indian Army has not always been able to respond appropriately to changing circumstances and needs.28 In short, the actual functioning of civil-military relations is such that nuclear doctrine and the acquisitions ensuing from it may continue to be guided by the requirements of the military. On the other hand, there is in-built restraint because the broader political consensus limits the extent to which operational necessities as perceived by the military can hold sway. The armed forces are themselves unlikely to have an enduring interest in weapons systems that will almost certainly not be used and 24 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Reforming the National Security System: Recommendations of the Group of Ministers, n.d. (accessed August 18, 2005) 25 '6K\DP%DEX³,QGLD¶V1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\&RXQFLO6WXFNLQWKH&UDGOH"´ Security Dialogue, 34, 2 (June 2003), pp. 215-230. 26 Among the notable writers are Gurmeet Kanwal (army), Raja Menon (navy), Vijai K. Nair (army), Jasjit Singh (air force), and K. Sundarji (army). 27 6XQLO 'DVJXSWD ³7KH ,QGLDQ $UP\ DQG WKH 3UREOHP RI 0LOLWDU\ &KDQJH´ LQ 6ZDUQD 5DMDJRSDODQ ed., Security and South Asia: Ideas, Institutions, and Initiatives (New Delhi: Routledge, 2006). 28 5DMHVK 0 %DVUXU ³,QGLD ,PEDODQFH XQGHU &LYLOLDQ &RQWURO´ LQ 7KRPDV %UXQHDX DQG +DUROG Trinkunas, eds., Global Determinants of Defense Reform (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

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DUHOLNHO\WRUHPDLQXQDUPHG8OWLPDWHO\WKHFLYLOLDQV¶GHVLUHWRPDLQWDLQWLJKWFRQWURO over nuclear weapons is likely to keep that system limited to what from their perspective would be manageable proportions. The Nuclear Technocracy 6RPHVFKRODUVKDYHDWWULEXWHGFRQVLGHUDEOHLQIOXHQFHWRD³VWUDWHJLFHQFODYH´FRQVLVWLQJ PDLQO\ RI DWRPLF HQHUJ\ WHFKQRFUDWV LQ LQIOXHQFLQJ ,QGLD¶V Quclearization.29 Much of the early focus was on the attainment of nuclear capability. In the aftermath of the 1998 tests, the bomb makers conceded that there was no more need to test. Though there has been occasional criticism from retired nuclear scientists, the atomic energy HVWDEOLVKPHQW DV D ZKROH KDV EHHQ VXSSRUWLYH RI WKH ,QGLDQ WHVW PRUDWRULXP ,QGLD¶V position on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) also favours a cut-off that would prohibit the future production of fissile material, which means it is not interested in keeping its option to produce more warheads open-ended.30 The nuclear scientists are no longer at the forefront of weapons policy. They have certainly played a prominent role in shaping the Indian position on the India-US nuclear deal, but that has involved no more than keeping Indian testing options open unless a universal regime is created to disallow them. There is no pressure for more or better bombs. The technical experts now pressing for expansion are the engineers of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and its subsidiaries, which are developing a range of nuclear, dual-use and conventional missiles. The Prithvi-I landbased short-range ballistic missile (150 km) has been inducted into the army, while air and sea versions are being developed. The medium-range Agni-I (700 km) and Agni-II (2000 km) are said to have been inducted as well, but their operational status is not certain.31 The Agni-III intermediate-range missile (3,000+ km) was first successfully tested in April 2007 and is expected to be ready for induction by 2010. 32 The BrahMos short-range cruise missile (290 km) is officially dubbed a conventional weapon, but is reported to have the potential to carry a small nuclear weapon. 33 This capability could be enlarged. While it has been inducted into the Army, air and naval versions are under development. A longer range cruise missile is also being developed. 34 It is reported that an extended-range (5,000 km) version of the Agni-III (possibly to be called Agni-IV) is also being developed.35 Also planned is the Nirbhay (1,000 km) medium-range missile for land, air and sea platforms. Testing is slated to begin by 2009, though the DRDO is still looking for engines. 36 8QGHU WKH ³6DJDULND´ SURJUDPPH D VXEParine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) of 800 km range has been tested thrice and a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is being developed, though readiness is not anticipated for 29

Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1998); George Perkovich, ,QGLD¶V1XFOHDU%RPE7KH,PSDFWRQ*OREDO3UROLIHUDWLRQ (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1999). 30 Siddharth VaradarajaQ³)LVVLOH0DWHULDO%DQ7DONV,QFKWRZDUGV&RQVHQVXV´Hindu, July 2, 2007. 31 5REHUW 6 1RUULV DQG +DQV 0 .ULVWHQVHQ ³,QGLD¶V 1XFOHDU )RUFHV ´ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 63, 4 (July/August 2007), p. 76. 32 ³'5'2&KLHI&RQILUPV%DOOLVWLF0LVVLOH5HDG\´Indian Express, July 8, 2007. 33 ³,QGLD 'HYHORSLQJ 6XEPDULQH /DXQFKHG %DOOLVWLF 0LVVLOHV´ International Herald Tribune, September 11, 2007. 34 <0DOOLNDUMXQ³'5'2%HJLQV:RUNRQ$JQL-,9´Hindu, August 9, 2007. 35 Ibid. 36 1HHODP 0DWKHZV ³,QGLa Plans to Test New Medium-5DQJH 0LVVLOH LQ ´ 1HZ.HUDODFRP September 24, 2007 .

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another three to four years. 37 In any case, the launch platform for missiles based undersea, the nuclear submarine envisaged under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project, is not expected to be ready till 2010 or 2012. 38 In an indication of still JUHDWHUDPELWLRQVWKH'5'2¶V9.6DUDVZDWVSHFXODWHGLQ$XJXVWWKDWWKHQHed might arise for a 10,000 km-range missile in the future.39 These expansive efforts might be taken with a pinch of salt. The only missile actually in operational readiness is the Prithvi-I, with which the Army is not happy on account of its inaccuracy and ³VHULRXV WHFKQRORJLFDO LVVXHV DIIHFWLQJ ODXQFK SUHSDUHGQHVV´40 The Agni-I and Agni-,,DUHDOVRVDLGWREH³ULVN\´RZLQJWRLQDGHTXDWH testing. 41 Thus, a mere adding up of claims emanating from the DRDO does not indicate a rapidly expanding cache of missiles. Given past experience with such forecasts, the expected dates of readiness may not be realistic. $ PRUH LPSRUWDQW TXHVWLRQ LV ZKHWKHU WKH WHFKQRFUDWV DUH WKH GULYHUV RI ,QGLD¶V nuclear weapons programme. While they have been influential in the past ± and it FHUWDLQO\ QHHGVWREHUHPHPEHUHGWKDW,QGLD¶VODVW3UHVLGHQW $EGXO.DODP ZDVIURP the DRDO and a national icon to boot ± that does not mean that they have a decisive role in policy-making. The patriarch of the Indian nuclear programme, Homi Bhabha, could not persuade Prime Minister Nehru to think seriously of weaponizing. 42 Indira Gandhi changed her decision to test in 1982 without consulting the so-FDOOHG³VWUDWHJLF HQFODYH´43 In 1995, Narasimha Rao rebuffed strong technocratic pressures to test. 44 In 1996, even the relatively weak Prime Minister Deve Gowda rejected the atomic energy WHFKQRFUDWV¶GHPDQGVIRUWHVWLQJ 45 It may also be noted that the scientists who played a powerful role in the lobbying that shaped the Indian stand on the India-US nuclear deal were from the virtually autonomous Department of Atomic Energy, whereas the engineers of the DRDO fall under the Ministry of Defence, which is controlled by the civil service. The missile makers are respected, but do not enjoy the same status or political influence as the bomb makers.

Conclusion While the analysis presented here shows that there is not much pressure for a VLJQLILFDQW H[SDQVLRQ RI ,QGLD¶V QXFOHDU DUVHQDO LW LV QHYHUWKHOHVV XVHIXO WR FRQVLGHU whether changes in threat perception might produce a different result. India does not perceive major strategic threats that would make the addition of more arrows to its nuclear quiver vital. The relationship with Pakistan has already tumbled through a series of crises and, like other nuclear rivalries in the past, has got down to the serious

37

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2007. 38

OQHUHSRUWLELG JLYHVWKHGDWHDV$QHDUOLHURQHVD\V5DMDW3DQGLW³1-Submarine May %H2SHUDWLRQDOE\´Times of India, March 18, 2007. 39 0DOOLNDUMXQ³'5'2%HJLQV:RUNRQ$JQL-,9´ 40 $PLWDY5DQMDQ³$UPHG)RUFHV:DLW$V6KRZSLHFH0LVVLOHV$UH8QJXLGHG:D\2II0DUN´Indian Express, November 13, 2006. 41 Ibid. 42 Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2000), pp. 88-89. 43 Ibid., 260-261. 44 Ibid., p. 393. 45 Ibid., p. 397.

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business of negotiating stability. 46 A renewed deterioration in relations is possible, but that does not translate into nuclear expansion. As a dissatisfied power, Pakistan has tended to take risks, but only at the level of low-intensity conflict.47 Its nuclear posture has been low-NH\ OLNH ,QGLD¶V 3ROLWLFDOO\ ,QGLD LV FOHDUO\ JURZLQJ RXW RI LWV RQFHK\SKHQDWHG UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK 3DNLVWDQ ZKLFK VKDUSO\ HURGHV WKH ODWWHU¶V RSWLRQV 7KH India-China relationship, despite a border dispute and a history of war, has been growing warmer over the past decade. Trade has accelerated rapidly from $5 billion in  WR RYHU  ELOOLRQ LQ  DQG &KLQD LV QRZ ,QGLD¶V ODUJHVW WUDGLQJ SDUWQHU 48 Besides, there are no fundamental problems between them since they have lived with their differences for four decades. The last major episode of tension occurred two decades ago when their armies confronted each other on the border, an event that passed off peacefully after negotiations.49 There are no other foreseeable threats. ,QVXPFXUUHQWWUHQGVLQ,QGLD¶VVHFXULW\HQYLURQPHQWGRQRWSURYLGHPXFKVFRSH IRU ,QGLD¶V ORQJ-established nuclear minimalism to be discarded. With neither the military nor the technocracy in a position to exert much influence, there is nothing UHVHPEOLQJD³PLOLWDU\-LQGXVWULDOFRPSOH[´WRFRQMXUHDQGSURSHOH[DJJHUDWHGVHFXULW\ requirements. The civilian leadership, content with basic capability, is not inclined to think operationally about nuclear weapons and therefore unlikely to tolerate the building of a large infrastructure which would inevitably give a bigger role to the military. Historically, India has been more inclined to keep its nuclear options open than to exercise them. The search for more extensive capabilities should be viewed in this respect.

46

For a detailed study of the India-Pakistan relationship in a comparative perspective, see Rajesh M. Basrur, 6RXWK $VLD¶V &ROG :DU 1XFOHDU :HDSRQV DQG &RQIOLFW LQ &RPSDUDWLYH 3HUVSHFWLYH (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). 47 2Q3DNLVWDQ¶VULVN-taking, see S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). 48 Sino-,QGLDQ 7UDGH *URZLQJ &RQFHUQ´ Hindu $XJXVW   &KLQD (PHUJHV ,QGLD¶V /DUJHVW 7UDGH3DUWQHU´India Post, March 24, 2008. 49 9 1DWDUDMDQ ³7KH 6XPGRURQJ &KX ,QFLGHQW´ %KDUDW 5DNVKDN 0RQLWRU  QR  1RYHPEHUDecember 2000), <www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-3/natarajan.html> (accessed October 1, 2007).

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Non-Nuclear Ukraine and Its Nuclear Security Lt. Gen. (ret.) Vadim GRECHANINOV1

Abstract. The catastrophic acts of terrorism against the USA in September 2001 FOHDUO\ GHPRQVWUDWHG WKH OLPLWV RI WKH 81¶V FDSDFLW\ RU HYHQ WKH DELOLWLHV RI WKH USA as the only global superpower to ensure international security. Like-minded middle-range powers, among which the Ukraine might be considered, can to a certain degree compensate for what the UN, the USA and Russia lack, and thereby PDNH D FRQWULEXWLRQ WRZDUGV VWDELOL]LQJ WKH ZRUOG VHFXULW\ VLWXDWLRQ  8NUDLQH¶V disarmament experience can serve as a positive example for the world today.

The security environment after the well-known September 2001 events in the USA has clearly demonstrated the limits of UN capabilities and even of the abilities of the USA as the only global superpower. At the same time, like-minded middle-range powers with similar intentions could, to a certain degree, compensate for what the UN, the USA and Russia are lacking, and create the conditions necessary for the stabilization of the security situation in the whole world. Characterizing Ukraine as among the group of the middle-range countries might raise questions from the point of view of relative power but we still insist on it, as Ukraine possessed the third-largest nuclear forces only ten years ago, which it managed to eliminate almost bloodlessly. This experience could help today in the sphere of DFKLHYLQJQXFOHDUDUPV¶OLPLWDWLRQDJUHHPHQWVZLWKPDQ\FRXQWULHV ,Q WRGD\¶V Ukraine, the process of forming the idea of national security and its necessity as an attribute of a mature political nation and a modern European state has not been completed yet. The insufficient attention given to this issue may be an inadmissible mistake. The formation of Ukrainian statehood had coincided with complex democratic transformations, the establishment of market economic relations, and the development of a new social structure with corresponding interests and values. These reforms advanced slowly, falling behind the social changes which resulted in the political fragmentation of Ukrainian society and its significant frustration. Thus, the extraordinary parliamentary elections of September 30 had shown a large percentage of WKHSRSXODWLRQ¶VPLVWUXVWLQWKHJRYHUQPHQW)RUWKHILUVWWLPH in the elections of the supreme legislative body, 2.9% of WKH HOHFWRUDWH FKRVH WKH ³DJDLQVW DOO´ RSWLRQ DQG voter turnout at the polling stations was only 62.51%. The internal situation in Ukraine is also characterized by the negative heritage of the enduring system crisis, uncompleted processes of economic transformation, as well as the social and political polarization of the society. Hereto it may be also mentioned that the absence of the clearly formulated long-WHUPDLPVRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQW 1

President of the Atlantic Rada of Ukraine

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hampers the consolidation of the society, and the formation and implementation of state policy.

Overcoming Inconsistencies There are certain approaches that the Ukrainian authorities renewed after the 6HSWHPEHU   HOHFWLRQV WR VWDUW ³UHSDLULQJ´ WKH VLWXDWLRQ LQ WKH FRXQWU\ 7KLV LV essential because LQWRGD\¶V8NUDLQHa permanent inconsistency of perspectives of the VWDWH¶VGHYHORSPHQWKDVH[LVWHGXQWLOQRZ,QDVLWXDWLRQLQZKLFKWKH3UHVLGHQWGHFODUHV pro-Western ways in alignment with the EU and NATO, while the Verchovna Rada is elaborating a new legislative act on the non-bloc status of Ukraine - all taking place under the tacit patronage of the Cabinet of Ministers - the assertion that all branches of SRZHU VKDUH XQDQLPRXV YLHZV RQ WKH VWUDWHJLF GLPHQVLRQ UHJDUGLQJ 8NUDLQH¶V IXWXUH outlook is, to put it mildly, highly unlikely. At the same time, within Ukrainian society itself, the processes of interest definition and reconciliation, as well as the formation of new social relations typical in the parliamentary democratic state, take place.

The Process of Ukrainian Nuclear Disarmament In the interests of analysis of the Ukrainian nuclear security problem, one should take a quick look at the 1990s, when Ukraine was, in fact, a nuclear state. Indeed, Ukraine as a Soviet republic played a significant role in creating the USSR nuclear-missile shield. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there remained 222 units of strategic weapons (warheads), including 176 ICBMs and 46 heavy bombers and the co-related nuclear equipment (approximately 2,000 nuclear warheads deployed on ICBMs, cruise missile and nuclear bombs for heavy bombers) on Ukrainian territory. Several hundred units of the tactical nuclear warheads were also left in Ukraine. 7KH QHZ 8NUDLQH ZKLFK KDG LQKHULWHG WKH ZRUOG¶V WKLUG-largest nuclear arsenal (after the USA and the Russian Federation) was confronted with the question of its future. The solution to this question became one of the top-priority tasks of the political leadership of the state. From the viewpoint of theory and practice of settling the situation concerning the possible use of strategic nuclear weapons which emerged at that time, it was necessary to resolve the military-political contradiction, which lay in the following. On the one hand, for technical reasons, Ukraine could realize this nuclear potential only with assistance and control from Russia. On the other hand, the political course which Ukraine had chosen prevented it from orienting strategic weapons against the countries ZKLFKKDGEHHQVHWDVWDUJHWVHDUOLHUE\5XVVLD8NUDLQH¶VSROLWLFDOFRXUVHKDGFKDQJHG and most importantly ± it became different from the Russian one. In this case, the politics had won and the military-technical side of the problem yielded to it. Another reason to dwell on WKLVSUREOHPVHSDUDWHO\LVWKDWWKHSURFHVVRI8NUDLQH¶V QXFOHDUGLVDUPDPHQWPD\EHLQVWUXFWLYHIRUWKHVROXWLRQRIVLPLODUSUREOHPVLQWRGD\¶V world. So it happened that in the 1990s the author was holding the post of Deputy Minister of Defense on Military Policy (there was such office in the newly established Ukrainian Ministry of Defense). Thus, the entire disarmament process, particularly its first stage, involved a direct participation. There were many interesting circumstances.

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Both Russia and the United States adopted various approaches towards the Ukrainian political and military leadership, including persuading Ukraine that disarmament was in its own interest. Everything was in play, including diplomacy, big money and many other promises - in particular the solution of the housing problem for the discharged military personnel -. The larger part of the promises had been fulfilled (meaning the official agreements, not the private deals here). The similarity between the circumstances of that time and the present situation in which there are ongoing negotiations in the world with those who do not want to disarm their nuclear potential or to stop testing, is connected by the fact that the Ukrainian leaders and even experts at that time repeatedly doubted whether disarmament was the right decision. The decision remains controversial as most people today, not only those under the Ukrainian authorities, consider the disarmament steps in Ukraine to have been a mistake. But we believe that the steps taken on nuclear weapons had been quite right!

Challenges to Ukrainian Security Despite all the difficulties of development, Ukraine is learning to be an independent state today and assesses the threats to its national security in the following way. First, there are the phenomena which are typical to many states, namely the struggle for energy resources, man-caused catastrophes, international and interreligious conflicts, terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime and corruption, illegal migration, human trafficking, demographic problems etc. A particular threat is the tendency toward consolidation of national and international criminal groups, and the integration of organized crime amongst nationalist and extremist groups. Second, the geopolitical position of Ukraine results in its high dependency on external influences which are of contradictory character and demand significant efforts for their harmonization. The main potential threats to Ukraine in the international arena stem from economic, political, cultural and informational pressure. The absence of public consent on the key strategic issues of public management and the consequential vulnerability to external pressure hampers the effective implementation of foreign and domestic policy of the state. The clash between certain political forces over national, linguistic and religious issues in combination with shortcomings in the principal administrative decisionmaking in the national security sphere (for example, failure to adopt a common political course of state development), and existing economic disparities in development between the Ukrainian regions, result in the unsafe tendencies of interregional tensions and the emergence of potential threats to the state integrity. 3ROLWLFDOJDPHVDURXQG³IHGHUDOLVP´ZKLFKKDGEHHQ realized in the course of the last two election campaigns were not inconsequential. These tendencies are not conducive to the coordinated operative actions of the governmental structures aimed at the weakening and neutralization of economic, political, technological and other security challenges. And though the Ukrainian nation preserves its identity, integrity and potential for further development, and the scale of the listed challenges has a definitive local character, it is very unsafe not to take into consideration the existing risks. As to the military risks and threats, the assessments conducted to date testify to the absence of a direct military threat to Ukraine in the form of broad aggression or the use

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of military-coercive measures against it by a single country or a coalition of states. At the same time, the potential sources of military threats include the radical Islamic movements trying to expand their influence in Ukraine, negative consequences of the potential claims of certain neighboring states, military conflicts near the Ukrainian borders, and the danger of terrorist attacks against Ukraine. Among these, as one might say, commonly acknowledged risks and threats to nuclear security, another distinctive feature of the situation in Ukraine should be emphasized. This is the attitude of the authorities and the society towards this problem ± the memory and consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. It may be noted that IAEA expert missions regularly visit the Chernobyl atomic power station. For example, the aim of the IAEA visit in August 2007 was connected not only with the physical security of the nuclear power plant but also with teaching and training the personnel to make the energy blocks of the power plant non-operational. It turned out that before the Chernobyl disaster, the questions of disabling the atomic power stations in Ukraine had not been studied; therefore the plant operators are pioneers in this sphere and the experience they gained is very important for other nuclear power stations. In parallel ZLWK WKHVH DFWLYLWLHV WKH GLIILFXOW SURFHVV RI UHEXLOGLQJ WKH ³8NU\WLH´ IDFLOLW\ as an environmentally safe system is being carried out. Thus, the administration of the station faces the difficult tasks of managing these processes as well as searching for the optimal administrative structure of the whole Chernobyl power station complex, taking into account the fact that the international projects on building the facilities for storage and utilization of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive materials remain unfinished here. ,QWRGD\¶VZRUOG8NUDLQHLVTXLWHQDWXUDOO\UHJDUGHGDVDQRQ-nuclear state which had joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) already in 1994. As is known, 8NUDLQH¶VQREOHGLVDUPDPHQWDFWGLGQRWSOD\DSRVLWLYHUROHLQZLQQLQJRYHUIROORZHUV Over the past years, the nuclear club has instead expanded. These and other circumstances connected with ensuring national security as well as simple populism contribute to the revival of attitudes VXSSRUWLQJ 8NUDLQH¶V UHWXUQ LQWR WKH QXFOHDU powers club. However, it should be stipulated that Ukraine had never been a member of this club. It seems that to put these proposals to a referendum allegedly with the aim RI PDWFKLQJ ³WKHDPELWLRQVRIWKHDXWKRULWLHV ZLWKWKHLQWHUHVWVRISHRSOH´ LVFORVH WR adventurism in politics.

State Control of the Nuclear Industry Can one think that in the non-nuclear Ukraine all norms of ensuring nuclear security are being observed? Although it is a word play, it seems that the question is put correctly. In 2006, the government made the long-awaited decision to consolidate all enterprises of the atomLFSRZHULQGXVWU\LQWRRQHEXVLQHVVJURXS³8NUDWRPSURP´7KH business group included almost all enterprises engaged in the creation of the nuclearfuel cycle or other activities in this field, as well as the research institutions of the atomic industry. TKH KHDG RI 8NUDWRPSURP EHFDPH WKH OHDGHU RI 8NUDLQH¶V DWRPLF power industry ± 11(*& ³(QHUJRDWRP´ 6XFK D GHFLVLRQ KDG EHHQ ORQJ-awaited by the experts; it proved that the Ukrainian government was finally taking this dangerous industry under the state control. At the same time, Russia invited Ukraine to take part in the project on international uranium enrichment in Angarsk. This raises the question: what does this have to do with Ukraine? Apparently, in this case, apart from the pure commercial profits, Russia

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as a member of the nuclear club plays the role of the non-proliferation controller over Ukraine. The analysis of the corresponding situation in Ukraine compared with the world rates, in which 73 companies run 450 nuclear reactors, is characterized by the following statistics. The Ukrainian Energoatom is the sixth-largest nuclear company in WKHZRUOG2Q8NUDLQH¶VWHUULWRU\DSDUWIURPWKHVDGO\NQRZQ&KHUQRE\OSRZHU plant, operate the Rovensk, South-Ukrainian, Khmelnitsky and Zaporozhye plants. Ukraine either possesses produced nuclear energy technologies or is capable of acquiring the necessary technologies in the shortest possible time as it has both the developed research-and-production base in this sphere and its own highly qualified specialists. Ukratomprom intends to attract investment for the development of the branch, primarily for the production of nuclear fuel cycle elements. Ukraine itself extracts uranium and is capable of enriching it on its own; however the quantity of this uranium is insufficient even to cover the needs of Energoatom. In order to increase the uranium extraction it is necessary to invest big money, and Ukraine intends both to increase the mining and to attract the financial resources. Ukraine plans to continue the construction of new nuclear power plants8NUDLQH¶V Energy Strategy determines that 20 new units should be built by 2030. That is, of course, very hard to believe.

Public Support for Nuclear Power In the conditions of a non-nuclear Ukraine, it makes sense to assess the formation of the public attitude towards nuclear energy within the context of ensuring the national security. The results of social research on the attitude of citizens toward the state and development of nuclear energy in Ukraine could have been better. Although 30% of respondents regard nuclear energy as the main source of electric energy in Ukraine at present and for the future, more than 50% are opposed to the building of new reactors and 40% think that the Ukrainian nuclear power plants are environmentally unsafe. The main drawback here is that more than 80% of the population has practically no information about the prospects and plans of atomic energy development. In light of the existing situation in which the programs of nuclear energy development in the nonnuclear states can advance only with the support of the population, it is essential that the public should participate in the decision-making concerning the construction of atomic power stations and feel certain that the nuclear technologies are under reliable control. To achieve this end, the informing of the people should be systematic, exhaustive and comprehensible. In discussing the role of the society and its understanding of the nuclear energy situation, it should be pointed out that one of the main reasons for the low public acceptance of nuclear energy as a reliable, cheap and environmentally safe source of energy is the deep-rooted fear of radioactivity ± radiophobia. It is a question of the H[FHVVLYH VRPHWLPHV DFXWH FKURQLF FKDUDFWHU RI SHRSOH¶V IHDU IRU WKHLU KHDOWK WKDW LV the consequence of the lack of knowledge and the misinformation regarding the affect of small doses of ionizing radiation. The epidemic of radiophobia is widely spread across the country. So far the science rarely challenged the deep-rooted dogmas which had become entrenched within public opinion over many years. At the same time, the radiology scientists take

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an active role in countering radiophobia and propose to improve education among the population and mass media on the impact of small dozes of radiation. Conclusions 1.

2.

3.

Due to various factors, Ukraine cannot yet be considered to be part of the group of like-minded middle-range powers with analogous intentions. +RZHYHU8NUDLQH¶VGLVDUPDPHQWH[SHULHQFHFDQEHXVHGfor positive purpose in the world today. Can Ukraine be regarded as a secure state as far as nuclear issues and the existing domestic and foreign problems are concerned, even taking into account the Chernobyl experience? Probably, it can! There are hopes that the new leaders who came to power after the extraordinary parliamentary elections will be able to ensure progress in Ukraine, both in the development of atomic energy and in ensuring nuclear security.

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The Present and the Future of Nuclear Doctrines Alexander NIKITIN and Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV1

Abstract. The nuclear doctrines and strategies of the nuclear weapons states remain mired in Cold War thinking and are based on a deterrence principle that is obsolete in the atmosphere of the declared partnership between Russia and the West. The provisions of these nuclear doctrines and strategies cannot provide an effective defense against modern threats and challenges, particularly, terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. In the face of these threats, a new level of cooperation between states is needed. This will be impossible to achieve without a broad and public cooperative discussion and at meeting of the minds among politicians and experts of the concerned countries concerning threat perceptions and the adequacy of nuclear strategies in the context of modern geopolitical realities.

Analysis of the existing nuclear doctrines and strategies reveals a number of systematic drawbacks. The nuclear doctrines in their present form remain mired in Cold War thinking, especially in that they are based on the principle of nuclear deterrence. The nuclear doctrines and strategies are still mostly aimed at countering \HVWHUGD\¶V WKUHDWV ± deterring former opponents -- at a time when new threats to national security are becoming dominant. As in Cold War times, the two largest nuclear arsenals remain aimed at each other and are constantly modernized in the USA and in Russia, the successor country of the Soviet Union. The paradox of this dichotomy is in the fact that the two sides view each other as the main potential threat despite partnership relations having been officially declared between Moscow and Washington. There are certain grounds on both sides for such a situation. One of the principle factors on the Russian side is the feeling that its concerns about some important aspects of Western policy were not taken into consideration. One of these concerns is clearly NATO enlargement, which has been considered by Russian experts and politicians from the very beginning as a Washington initiative. 5XVVLD¶V RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKLV SURFHVV ZDV QHYHU DGHTXDWHO\ DGGUHVVHG E\ 1$72 bureaucrats and Western leaders. All attempts by Russian representatives to start a serious discussion on these matters were answered by revived talking points (such as WKDW 1$72 HQODUJHPHQW PHDQV WKH ³HQODUJHPHQW RI GHPRFUDF\´ DQG WKDW LW LV QRW aimed against Russia and in no way threatens Russian national security interests). Receiving no positive answer to its concerns, Russia perceived this part of Western policy with great disquiet. It would not be an exaggeration to say that NATO expansion inflicted the most damage to Russian-Western relations.

1 Alexander Nikitin is Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of International Relations and President of the Russian Political Science Association. Sergey Oznobishchev is Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments.

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+HQFHLWLVQRWVWUDQJHWKDWLQWKH5XVVLDQ³&RQFHSWRI1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\´WKHOLVW RI ³SULQFLSOH WKUHDWV LQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO VSKHUH´ LQFOXGHV LQ WKLUG SODFH ³WKH strengthening of the military political blocks and unions, in the first place the NATO HQODUJHPHQWWRWKH(DVW´ 2 ,QWKH³0LOLWDU\'RFWULQH´RIWKH5ussian Federation, among WKH ³SULQFLSDO H[WHUQDO WKUHDWV´ OLVWHG RQH ILQGV LQ IRXUWK SRVLWLRQ WKH PHQDFH IURP 1$72 EHLQJ GHVFULEHG DV DQ ³HQODUJHPHQW RI PLOLWDU\ EORFNV DQG XQLWLHV ZLWK SUHMXGLFHWRWKHPLOLWDU\VHFXULW\RIWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ´ 3 Also it is not a coincidence that then-President Vladimir Putin, in his famous VSHHFKDWWKH0XQLFK&RQIHUHQFHLQ)HEUXDU\HPSKDVL]HGWKDW³1$72LVSXWWLQJ LWV IRUFHV DW WKH IRUHIURQW RI RXU VWDWH ERUGHUV´  +H DOVR VDLG ³WKH SURFHVV RI 1$72 enlargement has nothing to do with the modernization of the alliance itself and to the providing of security in Europe. Quite on the contrary ± this is the seriously provoking factor, diminishing the level of mutual confidence. And we have the fair right to ask candidly ± DJDLQVWZKRPLVWKLVHQODUJHPHQWPHDQW"´4 It is also not a coincidence that just a year later, on February 8, 2008, Putin returned to the same topic in his speech before the State Council, which was considered by many observers to be his political testament before the presidential election less than a month later. It is very illustrative that, in this address to the Russian political elite, Putin in rather decisive words again addressed the threat emerging from NATO, which KHGHVFULEHGDV³HQODUJLQJ EULQJLQJLWVPLOLWDU\LQIUDVWUXFWXUHFORVHUWRRXUERUGHUV´5 7KH SHUFHLYHG WKUHDW IURP WKH ³1$72 PLOLWDU\ EORFN´ DQG LWV PLOLWDU\ VWUDWHJ\ including its nuclear aspect, serve as one of the arguments in favor of preserving the Russian nuclear arsenal and deterrence strategy in a practically unchanged form. Of course, certain provisions of the NATO Strategic Concept are also taken into consideration. $QRWKHUVWURQJDUJXPHQWLQIDYRURINHHSLQJQXFOHDUGHWHUUHQFHLQWDFWLV5XVVLD¶V concern about its own national security in light of the US policies of striving for world leadership, interfering in the internal affairs of other states, and breaching international law. Moscow very decisively opposed the way Washington started the Iraq military campaign, for example. Among the Russian expert political community there was a widely held assuredness, witnessed at that time by the authors, that if it was going to be impossible WRUHWXUQWKH,UDTLVLWXDWLRQWRWKH³OHJDOILHOG´LHXQGHUWKHDXVSLFHVRIWKH81 WKen Russia would be unable to proceed in building partnership-like relations with the US.6 Although US activity in Iraq was legitimized when the UN gave it the status of an operation held under UN guidance, the Iraq case nevertheless served as a serious turning point in undermining the US-Russian partnership.

2 Concept of the National Security of the Russian Federation (approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 17, 1997, # 1300, in the edition of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of January 10, 2000, # 24), (http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/decree/2000_24_1.shtml). 3 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December of April 21, # 706), (http://www.mil.ru/articles/article3923.shtml). 4 President of Russia. Official Internet site. Presentation and Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. February 10, 2007. http://president.kremlin.ru/appears/2007/02/10/1737_type63374type63376type63377type63381type826 34_118097.shtml 5 President of Russia. Official Internet site. Presentation at the Enlarged Meeting of the State Council "On the Strategy of the Development of Russia towards the Year 2020" (as translated from Russian).. http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/02/159528.shtml 6 S. Oznobishchev, "Revenge for the Humiliation," Trud Newspaper, April 23, 2003.

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The factors of NATO expansion eastward and of the US ambition for world leadership, aggravated by its policy in Iraq with all the negative consequences for Russian interests, are frequently mentioned in Russian military security documents, and in the assessments of experts and politicians as being among the principle threats to national security. These arguments assuredly influence the Russian nuclear outlook. One of the examples is the provisions oI 5XVVLD¶V &RQFHSW RI 1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW\ The beginning of the document points out two concepts which contradict each other. One of them, which Russia definitely follows, is aimed at the creation of a multi-polar world. The other one, which no doubt was brought to life by Washington, is the attempt WR³FUHDWHDVWUXFWXUHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVEDVHGRQWKHLGHDRIGRPLQDWLRQLQWKH international community of developed Western countries with US leadership and reckoning upon one-sided solutions, primarily based on military force, to the key SUREOHPVRIZRUOGSROLF\FLUFXPYHQWLQJWKHIRXQGDWLRQDOQRUPVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´ 7 Not too much has changed since the time of the Cold War in the nuclear relations of the principle players. Moreover, most of the components of the well-developed security system vis-a-vis each other of the Cold War years remain untouched. Having in mind that the principle nuclear players are still Russia and US, a set of factors explaining this may be enumerated. The key actors of the bilateral character include: - Inertia of Cold War thinking ± preservation of the old stereotypes in judging WKHDFWLYLW\RIRQHDQRWKHUIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI³UHVLGXDOFRQIURQWDWLRQ´ - Inertia of approaches and strategic concepts, conditioned by the existence of WKH ³PLOLWDU\ PDFKLQH´ RI WKH &ROG :DU LQ WKH ILUVW SODFH RI WKH VWUDWHJLF nuclear potentials), which ensured the confrontation between the USA and the USSR, and of the West and the East, for the whole post-War period; - The residual and the new ³LGHRORJL]DWLRQ´ RI WKH ELODWHUDO UHODWLRQVKLS whereby any proposals and activity of the other side are invariably put under doubt and considered as challenging or threatening the interests of the other side; and - Serious differences in the perception of principle threats and challenges. On the Russian side, these factors include: - Perceptions of the activities of the US and the other Western countries which are considered by Moscow as targeting Russian interests (such as NATO enlargement and NATO military activity in Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia); - Perceptions of US actions aimed at promoting the idea of a uni-polar world, ignoring international law (examples include the war in Iraq and recognizing Kosovo sovereignty in 2007); - An evaluation by the overwhelming majority of the Russian political community and decision-makers that the US policy line is aimed at ³JHRSROLWLFDO ULYDOU\´ ZLWK 5XVVLD IRU LQVWDQFH :DVKLQJWRQ¶V DFWLYLWLHV LQ Central Asia and in the Caucasus); and - Perspectives of the US ballistic missile defense deployments in Europe. On the US side, the perceptions include factors relating to: - Uncertainty about the long-term stability of Russia; - Uncertainty about the democratic development of Russia; 7

&RQFHSWRIWKH1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\RIWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ«RSFLW

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Unpreparedness of the part of the American political elite to look upon Russia as a competitor that is growing stronger; and Perceptions of Moscow activity in the close-abroad as a revitalization of neoimperialistic policy.

These perceptions undermine the partnership that was declared between the Russian and US presidents. They also serve as a basis for preserving nuclear arsenals as status symbols and the means to provide an independent policy and means of last resort in time of war. The presence of nuclear arsenals and military doctrines tightly connected with them make the possibility of genuine partnership even less possible. The focus on nuclear deterrence, presupposed by the provisions of the doctrines, is drawing attention and resources away from countering the new threats and challenges, principally terrorism and proliferation. Deterrence is impotent against terrorists and their activity. The strongest country in the world ± the US -- could not avoid the most disastrous terrorist attack in history in its own territory. Nuclear deterrence, which VHUYHVDVDQ³LGHRORJLFDOEDVLV´RIPRGHUQQXFOHDUGRFWULQHVFDQQRWGHWHUDQGGRHVQRW ZRUN SURSHUO\ DJDLQVW ³URJXH VWDWHV´ ± authoritarian regimes posing a threat to international security. In turn, the existence of nuclear deterrence greatly increases mistrust and impedes a collective response to these challenges. Nuclear doctrines and strategies in their contemporary form do not encourage the nuclear states to fulfill their disarmament obligations as formally undertaken under Article IV of the NPT ± i.e. that the parties to the treaty undertake to pursue negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Moreover, the present crisis in US-Russian bilateral arms control is added to by almost full non-involvement of other principal nuclear powers in nuclear arms control. The absence of a clear-cut intention among the nuclear states to engage actively in negotiations on nuclear disarmament serves as a considerable argument for some nonnuclear countries to consider the perspective of acquiring nuclear weapons. Collective efforts to oppose nuclear proliferation are being undermined by the lack of confidence between the principle states-parties of this process. This deficit of confidence will be very difficult to overcome within the existing orientation of the contemporary nuclear strategies and doctrines. It is clear that the role of nuclear deterrence is dramatically diminishing, which SRVHVWKHTXHVWLRQRILWV³UDWLRQDO´DGHTXDF\WRWRGD\¶VUHDOLWLHV7RGHDOZLWKWKHQHZ geopolitical realities, a new level of partnership is demanded. The achievement of this goal is impeded by the mere philosophy of the policies based on nuclear deterrence. The only "rational" explanation left is that deterrence is still required by Russia and the West to serve as a last defense if worst-case scenarios begin to develop in the bilateral relationship. It is still a rather wide-spread argument in discussions among experts that "now Russian-American relations are going well, but no one may guarantee that they will not deteriorate in the future." This lingering dichotomy was never addressed by officials and was never seriously discussed at the intergovernmental level. The recent harsh reaction of Russian leaders, experts and the political community to the deployment of a US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in Europe serves as a clear-cut illustration that Russia and the US feel themselves to still be within the mode of nuclear deterrence. Despite all the American explanations, Russian authorities

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FRQVLGHU WKHVH GHSOR\PHQWV WR EH D GLUHFW WKUHDW RU DW OHDVW D FKDOOHQJH WR 5XVVLD¶V national deterrent potential. This is despite the fact that the Cold War ended twenty years ago and replaced by a declared partnership policy. This deterrence is still considered both in Moscow and Washington as part of the US-Russia strategic equilibrium. President Putin emphasized that the US European ABM system is "not simply a defensive system. This is part of the American system of nuclear weapons". Moreover the future limited ABM system was characterized as a "system of the American nuclear strategic complex" whose appearance, for Russia, is ³HTXDO WR WKH GHSOR\PHQW RI 3HUVKLQJ PLVVLOHV 7KH WKUHDW LV DEVROXWHO\ WKH VDPH 8 Senior Russian officials, including President Putin, have never recognized a bilateral "deterrence formula" in connection with the ABM system; instead they have emphasized that Russia for a long time already has had at its disposal effective systems to overcome the antimissile defense.9 There are some other worrisome features of the modern attitude to nuclear weapons: they are increasingly considered not as political instruments but as combat weapons. In the Russian Concept of National Security, the possibility to apply all forces and means, "including nuclear weapons" at the disposal of the Russian Federation, is presupposed in case of the necessity to rebuff, military aggression if "all other means to solve the crisis situation are exhausted and appear to be ineffective". 10 This presupposes in fact an acknowledgement of the feasibility to be the first to use nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear conflict. Another symptomatic acknowledgement is the declaration of the task "of providing deterrence in the interests of prevention of aggression of any scale". A similar vision has long been typical of the US official "nuclear documents". Another part of the same Russian document discusses the necessity of the Russian Federation having at its disposal "nuclear forces capable to inflict in a guaranteed way predetermined damage to any aggressor state or to a coalition of states under any conditions".11 This in its turn means an acknowledgement of the feasibility of a limited war, the mere impossibility of which for long time was being accepted by Soviet scientists. Again, similar provisions may be seen in American documents. The military-technical possibility of a limited strike is supported by the fact that Russia and the USA have at their disposal a still unknown number of tactical nuclear missiles. The limitation proposals of President George H. W. Bush and the "responsive steps and the counterproposals" of Presidents Michael Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin in 1991-1992 were made in the form of oral declarations and thus were never put on paper or formulated as an agreement. As a result, both sides now possess an additional unknown nuclear potential of tactical missiles and artillery shells. At the same time the presence of tactical nukes in the arsenals of the powers makes the use of nuclear weapons to be a more realistic prospect. This prospect will be even more real if Russian threats to abrogate the INF Treaty come true. One more worrisome feature of the present nuclear doctrines lies in the vision of military use. According to the analysis of prominent specialists to whom the practical 8 President of Russia. Official Internet site, Statement for the press and responses to the questions at the results of the Russian-Czech negotiations, April 27, 2007. Pershings were US medium-range nucleararmed missiles deployed in Europe in the time of the Cold War in 1983. (http://president.kremlin.ru/appears/2007/04/27/2055_type63377type63380_125771.shtml) 9 http://www.lenta.ru/russia/2001/12/13/putin1/ 10 &RQFHSWRIWKH1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\«RSFLW 11 Ibid.

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state of the "nuclear realities" is well-known, "although nuclear deterrence does not require the concept of launch-on-warning attacks, which has (nevertheless) been adopted by both the United States and Russia".12 A very peculiar proof that "launch-onwarning thinking" exists appeared in connection with the perceived threat by Moscow of the US plans to deploy the European-based ABM. General Yury Baluyevsky, chief of the Russian Armed Forces' General Staff, declared that the "launch of an American anti-missile may provoke a responsive intercontinental ballistic missile strike ". He said: "the configuration of the anti-missile itself, the trajectory and the direction of its flight is akin to the ICBM. Hence the false qualification made towards the launch of the antimissile from the territory of Poland may provoke a responsive strike" because "if Iran wanted to strike the USA, the antimissiles launched from Poland will fly in the direction of Russian territory". In this connection, General Baluyvsky acknowledged that Russia has an automated early warning system which qualifies missile launch in an automatic regime with minimal human participation.13 Hence, paradoxically, but in present nuclear doctrinal documents and rhetoric, one can see much more accentuation of nuclear weapons than during Cold War times. What changes in the nuclear doctrines and nuclear policies could be recommended to the main nuclear parties in order to provide more stability, predictability and move in the direction of a nuclear-weapon-free world? Such changes could be summarized as follows: x

x

x

x

x

The SORT agreement (as the only agreement in the strategic area which will remain valid after 2009) should clearly be made irreversible and extended in its time-frame, possibly by an additional protocol (otherwise the ceilings it imposes will formally cease after 2012). The system of START-I verification, inspections and data exchange measures should be extended as a package, at least for the period 2009-2012 (after the end of the START-I limit and until the end of the time frame of SORT). A further significant reduction of deployed strategic nuclear weapons should be planned down to a level comparable with the level of the three other established nuclear powers (at the level of hundreds, instead of the level of thousands) with some stringent deadlines. Withdrawn or decommissioned warheads and delivery systems should be destroyed, and the fate of accumulated reserve arsenals made subject to a VHSDUDWH OLQH RI QHJRWLDWLRQV DLPHG DW DQ ³H[FHVVLYH ZDUKHDGV HOLPLQDWLRQ´ agreement. All possible efforts should be made to prevent dissolution of the INF Treaty and the re-introduction into Russian and American arsenals of short- and intermediate-range nuclear (and conventional) missiles. Such a reintroduction would lead to the emergence of numerous regional misbalances and a heightening of stakes and risks in many regional conflicts. Among other

12 Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin. Beyond Nuclear Deterrence (Transforming the U.S. ± Russian Equation). Wash., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006. p. 108 [Arbatov was Deputy Chairman of the Committee of Defense in the State Duma ± Russian Parliament, General Dvorkin ± former Director of the 4th Institute of Strategic Forces ± auth.] 13 ³U.S. antimissile launch may provoke counterattack - army chief,´ Agency RIA-Novosti, December 15, 2007. (http://www.rian.ru/politics/foreign/20071215/92598395.html)

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x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

consequences, Russian potential withdrawal from the INF could lead to the reintroduction in Europe of large quantities of US sub-strategic weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons have only been withdrawn and reduced for now by unilateral measures. As a first step towards opening the line of negotiations on such weapons, initial declarations on general quantities and composition by types of tactical nuclear arsenals possessed by both sides should be extended. Transparency, even if only relative and partial, regarding the tactical nuclear weapons of the two major nuclear powers may have an important influence on the willingness and readiness of smaller and newer nuclear powers to enter in principle into arms control and limitation multilateral dialogue. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should enter into force as a critical way of preventing further vertical proliferation. This depends primarily on the decision of the United States to rescue the treaty. Efforts should be made to motivate India, Pakistan and North Korea to follow Israel in acceding to the CTBT. A Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) should be discussed and negotiated in a short time, as far as overproduction of weapons-grade fissile materials in the world is obvious and extremely dangerous in view of the risk of nuclear terrorism. Urgent conclusion of an FMCT may become a shared priority for Russia and the West exactly in the situation of new security concerns regarding the risk of nuclear terrorism. The smaller nuclear powers should also contribute to the disarmament agenda. 0RGHUQL]DWLRQRIQXFOHDUIRUFHV&KLQHVHIRUFHVUHQHZDORI³7ULGHQW´LQWKH UK, etc.) should be indefinitely postponed, although this only could be achieved through individual decisions of those nuclear powers and not imposed by major nuclear powers. Non-GHSOR\PHQW RI D FRXQWU\¶V RZQ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV EH\RQG LWV ERUGHUV on RWKHU FRXQWULHV¶ WHUULWRULHV VKRXOG EHFRPH D OHJDOO\ ELQGLQJ QRUP RI international relations. Only American nuclear forces are currently deployed outside national territory (in European NATO countries). Being insignificant in quantity for NATO strategic tasks, these residual American weapons on European soil create an unnecessary precedent for other official or de-facto nucleDUSRZHUVZKRPLJKWGHFLGHWR³VKDUH´WKHLUQXFOHDUZHDSRQVZLWKDOOLHV creating dangerous unbalances and de-facto proliferation. The nuclear powers should agree with no reservation to respect proposals for establishing nuclear=weapon-free zones, and commit to respect the zones already established. Reliance on nuclear weapons in national security strategies should be manifestly reduced. Nuclear weapons should be all de-alerted, and a strategy of launch-on-warning avoided. De-facto nuclear powers are also expected to contribute to the disarmament agenda, by acceding to relevant existing arms control treaties, by converting some arms control mechanisms (like INF) to multilateral agreements, by respecting the basic NPT constraints, and by stopping further nuclear modernization and plans for future development of nuclear weapons.

To clear the way to a new level of cooperation and partnership needed in the 21st century, the principle issues of nuclear strategy and the whole scope of factors formulating these strategies and the related documents should be urgently discussed.

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Such discussions should be undertaken on both an official and unofficial expert level and be executed cooperatively by the representatives of different states. The results of such discussions should be implemented in drastic changes to nuclear doctrines, strategies and practices, making them much more transparent and responsive to the demands of the modern world. Unfortunately it is difficult to expect a break-through to occur in this sphere in a period when the political leadership is being changed in Russia and the USA and when these elites still do not rule out the other side again becoming a potential adversary. However, a window of opportunity could be created if political leaders understand the seriousness of the world security problems and the obsolete character of the present nuclear arsenals and the nuclear doctrines furnishing them.

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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Author Index Basrur, R.M. Cirincione, J. Dunn, L.A. Evron, Y. Fitzpatrick, M. Grechaninov, V. Ifft, E. Khyrapin, A. Mizin, V. Nikitin, A.

129 30 25 121 v, 92 138 16 1 39 144

Oznobishchev, S. Pikaev, A. Pollack, J.D. Romashkin, P. Rűhle, M. Smith, H. Stocker, J. Teng, J. Zolotarev, P.

v, 144 99 113 70 58 7 64 79 87

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