Politics and process
Politics and process NEW ESSAYS IN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT
Edited by
GEOFFREY BRENNAN The Australian...
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Politics and process
Politics and process NEW ESSAYS IN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT
Edited by
GEOFFREY BRENNAN The Australian National University
and LOREN E. LOMASKY University of Minnesota, Duluth
The right of the University of Cambridge to print and sell all manner of books was granted by Henry VIII in 1534. The University has printed and published continuously since 1584.
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge New York Port Chester Melbourne Sydney
Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP 32 East 57th Street, New York, NY 10022, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia © Cambridge University Press 1989 First published 1989 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication
Data
Politics and process: new essays in democratic thought/edited by Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E. Lomasky. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 0-521-35043-3 1. Democracy. I. Brennan, H. Geoffrey, 1944Loren E. JC423.P566 1989 321.9-dcl9
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Politics and process: new essays in democratic thought 1. Democracy I. Brennan, Geoffrey Loren E. 321.8
II. Lomasky,
ISBN 0-521-35043-3 hard covers Transferred to digital printing 2004
. II. Lomasky,
89-517 CIP
Contents
Acknowledgments List of contributors Introduction Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E. Lomasky Chapter 1 The justification of democracy J. Roland Pennock Chapter 2 Large numbers, small costs: the uneasy foundations of democratic rule Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E. Lomasky Chapter 3 Evaluating the institutions of liberal democracy William Nelson Chapter 4 Democracy: the public choice approach Dennis C. Mueller Chapter 5 The democratic order and public choice Peter H. Aranson Chapter 6 Radical federalism: responsiveness, conflict, and efficiency David Osterfeld Chapter 7 Contractarian presuppositions and democratic governance James M. Buchanan Chapter 8 In quest of the social contract James S. Fishkin
page vii viii 1 11 42 60 78 97 149 174 183
vi
Contents
Chapter 9 Rationality and the justification of democracy Jules Coleman Chapter 10 The morality of democracy and the rule of law Shirley Robin Letwin
194
Index
235
221
Acknowledgments
This volume originated in a 1984 conference entitled "Individual Liberty and Democratic Order" held in Crystal City, Virginia. Earlier versions of several of the essays were originally presented there. We would be remiss not to thank the Liberty Fund for its support of that event - and, indeed, for its consistent promotion of scholarly inquiry into the nature of a society composed of free and responsible individuals. We also thank our research assistant, Kenneth Cust, and the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State University, for supplying ideal working conditions. Geoffrey Brennan Loren E. Lomasky
vn
Contributors
Peter H. Aranson Law and Economics Center Emory University Atlanta, GA 30322
Loren E. Lomasky Social Philosophy and Policy Center Bowling Green State University Bowling Green, OH 43403
H. Geoffrey Brennan Faculty of Economics Australian National University GPO Box 4 Canberra, ACT 2601 Australia
Dennis C. Mueller Department of Economics University of Maryland at College Park College Park, MD 20742
James M. Buchanan Center for the Study of Public Choice St. George's Hall George Mason University Fairfax, VA 22030 Jules Coleman Yale Law School 401 A Yale Station New Haven, CT 06520 James Fishkin Department of Government University of Texas Austin, TX 78712 Shirley Robin Letwin 3 Kent Terrace London North West 1 England vin
William Nelson Department of Philosophy University of Houston Houston, TX 77004 David Osterfeld Department of Political Science Box 896 Saint Joseph's College Rensselaer, IN 47978 J. Roland Pennock Department of Political Science Swarthmore University Swarthmore, PA 19081
Introduction Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E. Lomasky I Democracy, it may seem, has never been less in need of defense - or even evaluation. Gradually, over the past couple of centuries, it has passed into the catalog of universal virtues. We are all democrats now, differing at most only in the qualifier we prefer: "liberal," "workers','' or "people's." Anyone labeled "antidemocratic" or even "undemocratic" has been ostracized from the relevant community of normative discourse. Correspondingly, any urgings in favor of democracy are likely to strike the contemporary ear as platitudinous. Complacency, however, would be out of place. If "democracy" has become a "motherhood term," it runs the risk of all such: that it become emptied of meaning. If all regimes, whatever their institutional detail and political spirit, claim to be democratic - as virtually all do - then what, we may reasonably ask, is ^democratic? Is it not a fair bet that charges made in the past against democracy - or for democracy against other regimes - have been answered by mere changes in the meanings of words? What are the defining features of a democratic order? What exactly are the virtues that democracy is supposed to engender? And does democracy really succeed? In some ways it is important that such questions be asked precisely when the answers seem to be so widely taken for granted. Moreover, within contemporary political theory the situation is by no means as clear-cut as the popular imagination appears to have it. We can identify two seemingly antithetical but in fact complementary concerns about the justification of democratic theory: that democratic procedures fail to reflect the preferences of the enfranchised citizenry and that they succeed in so doing. Let us call the former of these concerns democratic opacity, the latter democratic transparency. The difficulty posed by opacity is apparent; that posed by transparency less so. In a sense, however, transparency is the more fundamental stumbling block. If the preferences revealed by polling are uninformed, malignant, or basically inconsistent with whatever conditions are taken to make for political legitimacy, then those defects will be transmitted to resultant policy. For example, an
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Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E. Lomasky
electoral majority can coalesce around a program through which its interests will be advanced via dispossession of a vulnerable minority. Only the most extreme democratic enthusiast will maintain that the fact that 50 percent plus one vote for such a program thereby sanitizes it. Unjust political orders are all too compatible with the putative general will. Social contract theory seeks to ground political legitimacy on the freely tendered consent of political actors. Democracies profess a similar allegiance to the foundational legitimating status of consent. Nonetheless, almost all important contemporary versions of social contract theory reject simple democratic majoritarianism as sufficient to establish legitimacy. Among these accounts, no work has been more influential than John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. Rawls goes beyond majoritarianism in two crucial respects: (1) The founding principles of the just regime are stylized as the product of unanimity among the contractors rather than simple or special majority; (2) contractors' preferences are filtered by a thick veil ofignorance that blocks all particularizing information, including knowledge of an individual's economic or social status, his natural endowments, and even an agent's conception of the good. Rawls maintains that unanimity behind a veil of ignorance elicits principles that are constitutive of a just regime. Minorities are doubly protected against predation by majorities: Since each individual exercises veto power, no agreement will be enacted unless it is of perceived benefit to all; because the contractors know only that they have interests but do not know what those interests are, they lack the capacity to bargain for differential advantage. Unanimity coupled with the veil generates justice as fairness. Since the publication in 1971 of A Theory of Justice there has emerged a vast literature in which its arguments have been subjected to scrutiny from every conceivable angle. It is unnecessary to review that literature here; our concern is not with the theoretical adequacy of the Rawlsian enterprise but rather with its highly qualified endorsement of democratic governance. Though a Rawlsian just regime is democratic, its foundations are not. That is, they are not a cumulation of the de facto preferences of a majority. Indeed, Rawls makes it abundantly clear that no reasonable facsimile of his two principles ofjustice would emerge from any ordinary procedure of citizens "voting their interests"; that is why the imposition of the veil of ignorance is central to his project. It follows that, for Rawls's contractarianism (and the numerous variants it has sired), the rationale for democratic rule is distinctly derivative. An electorate's various deliverances are always to be constrained by foundational principles that are not themselves the product of democratic choice. A similar appraisal of the derivative character of democratic institu-
Introduction
3
tions had been presented a decade previously by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in The Calculus of Consent. Like Rawls, Buchanan and Tullock reject majoritarianism as a basis for collective action, contending that nothing short of unanimity is acceptable at a constitutional level. They differ from Rawls, however, in depicting contractors with knowledge of who they are, what they want, and a tolerably clear idea of the means by which they might act to get it. But that difference is not as pivotal as it might at first seem. Buchanan and Tullock maintain that, because the effects of the operation of a set of rules is uncertain even in the present and more so over time, individuals will be largely unable at the level of constitutional choice to maneuver for direct political advantage. Unanimity and natural (as opposed to Rawlsian hypothetical) ignorance combine to establish the preconditions of mutually acceptable collective action. If the rule of unanimity were also employed at the postconstitutional level, such that each individual possessed an effective veto over every collective determination, exorbitant bargaining costs would ensue. Because rational contractors know this, and know also that collective action can provide to the community goods otherwise inaccessible, they will, at a constitutional level, endorse in-period decision procedures other than unanimity - and do so unanimously. Balloting thus emerges as an efficiency-enhancing device itself resting on a foundation that eschews majoritarianism. Even more noteworthy is the insistence by Buchanan and Tullock that the rule of simple majority is just one among an indefinite number of collective decision procedures that could reasonably be adopted. No special virtue resides in majorities, and no moral defect attaches to institutions that empower minorities to block policies viewed as inimical to their interests. If one takes "democracy" to be synonymous with "majority rule," The Calculus of Consent expresses no more than indifference toward democracy. Several of the contributors to this volume address concerns surrounding democratic transparency, among them Buchanan himself. He reiterates his prior insistence that the ultimate model of politics be contractarian and proceeds to develop a tripartite classification of political action: (1) enforcement of laws previously enacted, (2) collective provision of goods and services, and (3) constitutional alteration. Buchanan argues that conflation of these distinct activities comes at the price of social and intellectual confusion. Majoritarian determination has, he claims, no place at levels (1) and (3) and is by no means a unique solution to level (2) decisions. He labels the "electoral fallacy" the notion that, so long as democratic decision rules are guaranteed, anything goes. To the contrary,
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Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E. Lomasky
the first normative principle of contractarianism is that state authority be limited by law. Priority of the rule of law is also central to Shirley Letwin's argument. Periodic election of officeholders and open conduct of public affairs are, she maintains, necessary conditions for the existence of a genuinely democratic polity, but are not themselves sufficient. The indispensable basis of a free, democratic society is a system of law that is general, impersonal, and noninstrumental. Letwin derives this result from the telos of political association: peaceful resolution of disagreements over a domain in which indisputable knowledge is necessarily absent. Nonviolent resolution of problems of communal association requires authoritative law that does not dictate outcomes to be achieved but rather sets conditions within which individuals are at liberty to act to achieve whatever ends they happen to hold. Substantive disagreement is thereby resolved through procedural agreement. Law, so conceived, is fundamentally different from the commands of an omnipotent sovereign. Letwin's conclusion is that, paradoxical though it may seem, the morality of democracy assigns priority to the rule of law even over the democratic way of constituting a government. Between democracy without the rule of law or the rule of law minus democracy, she would opt for the latter. James Fishkin argues from within a contractarian framework but criticizes the models presented by Rawls and Buchanan and Tullock. Rawlsian thickly veiled contractors know too little to arrive at significant results; Buchanan and Tullock contractors know too much to establish unanimity as uniquely preferable for constitutional solution of the collective action problem. Fishkin claims that because our pretheoretical notions of impartiality and fairness can be modeled in a variety of nonequivalent ways, no single imaginary choice situation enjoys moral jurisdiction. Therefore, the Rawlsian original position is just one among many plausible ways in which one can hypothetically represent the derivation of political principles. Hypothetical contract is thus inconclusive, but a theory that takes its bearings from the actual preferences of individuals is vulnerable to transmission of unfair advantages present at the inception of bargaining. Fishkin suggests that the dilemma may be avoided by construing agreement as predicated on actual but refined preferences. He describes these as the political understandings of a culture insofar as they are filtered through a process of unmanipulated debate. Although the proposal requires further development, he contends that it affords prospects of a greater rapprochement between contractarianism and democracy than that which emerges from either Rawls or Buchanan and Tullock.
Introduction
5
William Nelson builds on a contractarian formulation introduced by T. M. Scanlon in which the ideal of unanimous agreement among all individuals is replaced by a conception of consent among all and only those motivated to find principles of free agreement. The alteration is significant, because it affords a filtering mechanism similar to that endorsed by Fishkin. On this account, not all preferences have equal moral weight. Specifically, those inconsistent with the aim of establishing principles of free, general agreement are inadmissible. Nelson proceeds to characterize representative democracy as a decision-making procedure in which policies are openly debated and adopted only when they can be defended by good arguments. Although there exists no guarantee that any particular system of democratic institutions will rigorously hew to the normative ideal of producing legislation that can be justified to everyone, democracy is attractive because it is a decision-making procedure predicated on public deliberation. It is worth noting that the proffered justification is procedural rather than substantive. No preordained set of propertyrightsis - or should be - beyond the purview of political adjustment. It is the democratic process itself, claims Nelson, rather than any list of alleged natural rights that has moral priority. Jules Coleman is more skeptical about the possibility of an adequate proceduralist justification of collective action. He is concerned to evaluate two common lines of justification for collective action - one that he describes as "contractarian," and the other as "procedural" (a third, termed "consequentialist," is mentioned but not discussed in any detail) - and to relate these lines of attempted justification to the rational-choice framework that they share. Coleman's discussion centers, in the proceduralist section, on social choice theorists, of whom he regards* William Riker as an archetype. Coleman's exemplary contractarian figures are Douglas Rae and Buchanan and Tullock. The nuanced discussion identifies several intriguing justificatory problems without attempting to draw a "bottom line" conclusion. We are left instead with guarded claims, and a strong sense that some lines of reasoning are more promising than others and deserve to be pursued. In Roland Pennock's essay wefinda synthetic statement of the considerations that weigh in justifying one form of political organization against others and Pennock's own characterization of what he terms "ideal democracy." He attempts to exhibit conceptual and psychological connections between institutions of liberal democracy and a rich conception of a human nature embracing both individualistic autonomy and the essentially social nature of the species. Because Pennock has written his essay in the light of others in the collection, he is able to address some of the issues
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that they raise - though, of course, his aim is not so much to provide a summary of others' positions as to meet some of the arguments presented. Because the chapter attempts to traverse the whole justificatory territory, it affords a very fitting leadoff to the volume. II The essays introduced in the preceding section tend to scrutinize democratic procedures from a perspective of transparency. That is, they are willing to assume, at least for purposes of argument, that vote tabulations more or less accurately reflect underlying preferences of the electorate. The basic issue these authors confront, therefore, is the adequacy of a political mechanism that translates into collective action a morally mixed lot of preferences. However, there exists alongside this strand of the critique of democracy another whose basic motif is examination of distortions contained within the translation mechanism itself. In the late eighteenth century, the Marquis de Condorcet demonstrated that there may be no equilibrium result in an electoral contest among more than two alternatives. In this century, related anomalies have multiplied exponentially. Within public-choice theory these results have coalesced into a wide-ranging and effective critique of democratic political institutions. Such criticism has not been overt in the sense that public-choice theory has rarely directly addressed the case for democratic as against other forms of political order. But public-choice theorists have had as a major part of their agenda the comparison of democratic decision-making processes with the decentralized decision-making processes characteristic of markets. The comparison has not exactly been flattering to the former. A little doctrinal history may be helpful here. Public-choice theory arose, at least in its modern guise, as an integral part of the economic theory of the state. The latter theory took as its point of departure the standard theories of welfare economics concerning the optimality of decentralized market institutions, theorems refined by Edgeworth, Pareto, Arrow, and Debreu from origins in Smith and Ricardo. The economists' theory of the state sought to argue a role for government, over and above the minimal one of establishing and maintaining the institutional fabric of the market, by developing a theory of market failure to set against the more traditional theory of market success. The resultant accounts of "public goods," "externalities," "consumption jointness," "natural monopoly," and the like were all elaborations and refinements of a single idea: that the independent, decentralized decision-making processes of the market did not always make possible the full appropriation of potential gains from exchange. Equivalently, individual action coordinated by
Introduction
7
the market mechanism could, under certain circumstances, give rise to outcomes that were valued less highly by all agents than was some other feasible outcome. Where those circumstances could be identified, a role for governmental action to correct for market failure was taken to be established. On this basis, the case was made for public provision of such goods as defense, law and order, pollution control, public health, and academic research, as well as intervention through subsidies and/or regulations in relation to a wide range of other activities such as education, housing, transportation, and communications. Indeed, the public role in "managing the macroeconomy" and even in determining the distribution of income could, it was argued, be articulated in generalized market failure terms. Implicit in all this, however, was the assumption that, where markets "failed," government was likely to do better. As a purely logical matter, however, market failure considerations are not sufficient to establish a case for government activity. Additionally required is a comparative assessment of alternative institutions, including an assessment of their respective inefficiencies. Thus, the economists' theory of the state remained incomplete until a systematic treatment of the normative properties of majoritarian/democratic decision making could be developed on all fours with the welfare economics of markets. Public-choice economics was that resultant theory. Two aspects of its ambitions should be emphasized. First, its explicit object was to overturn the so-called benevolent-despot model of politics that dominated welfare economics generally and public finance orthodoxy specifically. The notion that governments had the power and inclination to pursue the "public interest" was explicitly to be questioned. Any public-interestedness in political outcomes could not simply be assumed: It had to be proved - and proved in terms of essentially the same analytic method and by appeal to the same repertoire of underlying assumptions that economists had used to establish market failure. Anything else would be to load the dice. In particular - and this is the second matter that requires emphasis here agents in their political roles were to be endowed with precisely the same motivations as agents in their market roles. Specifically, since the assumption of self-interest was used in modeling individual behavior in markets (and in demonstrating the propensity of rational agents to freeride in the market provision of public goods), consistency demanded that the same assumption be made in modeling the behavior of politicians, voters, and bureaucrats. This importation of the self-interest assumption into political analysis has proved controversial - on both empirical and ethical grounds. The empirical dimensions of the argument are complex and need not occupy
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us here. The ethical argument is more relevant. The claim is that some sort of basic faith in political process - and political agents - is necessary if democratic order is to survive. Indeed, public-choice theorists are often charged with professing profoundly antidemocratic sentiments. There are two things to be said about such charges. Thefirstis that, on the face of things, these are strange arguments to bring in defense of democracy, since democracy, with its characteristic features of institutionalized opposition and competitive electoral constraints, might seem to be based on precisely the sort of appraisal of human nature that the self-interest assumption can be taken to embody. The second observation is, however, that the anxieties do seem justified: The main results in public-choice theory represent a major attack on the processes of democratic collective decision making. If public-choice theorists have had, as a major ambition, that of undermining naive faith in collective decisionmaking institutions, they appear to have been gloriously successful. In fact, it is not naive faith only that they have undermined - one wonders rather whether there is room for any faith in collective decision making at all Several of the contributors to this volume arefideists,others skeptics. Dennis Mueller assesses thirty years of public-choice theory as it bears on the related problems of preference revelation and rational abstentia. The former is the question, first raised by Samuelson, of how one can get individuals to volunteer accurate information concerning their preferences for public goods. The latter stems from the fact that a realistic balancing of narrowly self-interested inducements to participate in electoral contests against costs thereby incurred generates the conclusion that rational individuals will choose to abstain. Neither difficulty can be dismissed out of hand, but, suggests Mueller, each may be of more theoretical than practical concern. In part that is because there is reason to believe that individuals give greater scope when in the polling booth than when engaging in private activity to their ethical preferences. Mueller further claims that recent analytic developments in the literature of public choice strongly suggest that the propensity of social choice to yield disequilibrium outcomes was vastly overestimated by earlier authors. Democratic regimes can be expected to do a tolerably good job of giving effect to individuals' preferences and will do better yet if several reforms are instituted: more public provision of political information, a shift from singlemember districts to proportional representation, morefinelytuned preference revelation procedures. Peter Aranson draws rather different conclusions. He identifies four major problems besetting representative democracy. The first of these is the rational-abstention difficulty addressed by Mueller. It is closely akin
Introduction
9
to the second, rational ignorance. Even if an individual chooses to vote, it will rarely be in his economic interest to devote any significant quota of his resources to garnering the information that would make his ballot well informed. The third problem concerns the conditions making for electoral disequilibrium, as exhibited in the Condorcet result and its descendants. The last problem is the phenomenon of rent seeking: investment of resources by interested parties to secure the provision at public expense of essentially private goods. Aranson's overall appraisal will be unsettling to enthusiasts of democracy: Each of the four introduces serious distortions into collective choice procedures and, worse still, attempts to ameliorate some one of these will likely exacerbate others. Aranson does, however, cautiously endorse several reform measures, including the passage of a balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution and devolution of authorization for funding programs from the federal level to states and localities. The latter theme receives close examination by David Osterfeld. There has not been anything in traditional political theory that has insisted that democracies must be federally structured or indeed that has seen federalism as anything more than perhaps a useful adjunct to democratic institutions. Osterfeld's position is more "radical" (as his title suggests). His view is that the virtues of democratic institutions are to be seen in terms of the constraints they place on the behavior of politicians. However, these constraints are tenuous at best. Potentially of considerably greater effect on the behavior of officeholders than periodic voting with ballots is the ability of citizens to "vote with their feet." Even an absolute dictator will find his predations sharply checked by the circumstance of individuals who can easily "take their business elsewhere." This ability is enhanced when there exists a large number of small, accessible societies to which an individual can relocate. Accordingly, Osterfeld advances the strong proposition that federalism is a necessary articulation of the democratic ideal of rule by the people - more so even than are democratic institutions as standardly conceived. Brennan and Lomasky also accept the claim that regime size is an important political parameter, but for reasons different from those advanced by Osterfeld. They argue that a characteristic feature of electoral choice to which political theorists have been insufficiently attentive is the voter's indecisiveness. Whether - and how - one votes will almost never alter the outcome of an electoral contest in a populous jurisdiction. By way of contrast, individuals acting in their private capacities are routinely decisive: If they "vote with their dollars" for an item, they both get that item and bear the associated costs. Therefore, as a purely logical matter, political explanatory theories directly modeled on market behavior lack
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Geoffrey Brennan and Loren £. Lomasky
coherence. Like Mueller, Brennan and Lomasky contend that voter choice will involve a more significant appeal to ethical considerations than does consumer choice. However, they take this to be more of a mixed blessing than does Mueller, arguing that one traditional justification of democracy - namely that it is government by the people and thus reflects the public will - is basically misconceived and has to be radically recast if indeed it is to survive at all.
CHAPTER 1
The justification of democracy /. Roland Pennock
1
Political justification and metaethics
How does one go about justifying a form of political ideals and a form of government? Moral philosophers are broadly in agreement. Those who support anarchism are exceedingly scarce. Some form of democracy enjoys a wide degree of support, as does the ban on slavery. So also does the requirement that people who drive automobiles observe rules calculated to facilitate the movement of traffic and to protect the safety of those using the highways. Yet if one ventures into thefieldof metaethics, it soon becomes apparent that agreement on principles of political ethics by no means implies agreement on the method of arriving at, and substantiating, those principles. On that point the doctors are in sharp disagreement, and James Fishkin, for example, finds this discord disturbing. The first step for one who would justify a form of government, he believes, is to select the proper "moral decision procedure." Yet this is the very matter on which disagreement isrife.It is not just as a philosopher that this lack of agreement concerns him; he fears the practical consequences. From his own empirical studies he has concluded that the person in the street believes in moral absolutes. It follows, in Fishkin's view, that anything that casts doubt upon those absolutes and all that is derived from them tends to lose legitimacy, leading him to conclude that liberal democracy faces a "crisis of legitimacy."1 For several reasons Fishkin's argument is not persuasive. First, the 11
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cognitive dissonance that he assumes would disturb the person in the street and lead him or her to doubt the legitimacy of democracy assumes a degree of philosophical knowledge and sophistication that is quite unrealistic.2 Most people, I believe, are unaware of the differences, say, between consequentialists and deontologists and would not be much concerned if they were. Further, the argument, if it proves anything, proves too much. It is common for philosophers to argue that the metaethical theories of certain other philosophers are invalid, while being in agreement with these philosophers on many, often most, matters of practical ethics. That is to say, they concur as to conclusions but not as to supporting arguments. But why, then, are the commonly held moral concepts like truth telling, promise keeping, and avoidance of harm to innocent people not facing a similar crisis, for in these cases, too, philosophers, while concurring in the result, differ sharply regarding their first principles? Fishkin's overkill is self-destructive. More generally, are the political theories of philosophers determined by their metaethical theories? The evidence seems to support a negative answer to this query. Probably the most obvious example of common political conclusions (justifications) arrived at by theorists of differing ethical and metaethical persuasions is that of the justification of the coercive power of the state itself. Plato, Aristotle, Thrasymachus, Stoics, Epicureans, Church Fathers, St. Thomas, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Bentham, Hegel - the roster of philosophers of widely diverging ethical theories all in agreement on justifying the coercive political power of the state goes on and on.3 When we turn from the justification of coercive government to that of particular forms of government, much the same situation prevails. Thinkers as far removed from each other with respect to metaethical beliefs as Thomas Aquinas and Thomas Hobbes support monarchy, whereas the utilitarian J. S. Mill and the neo-Hegelian T. H. Green find common ground in liberal democracy. The same is true of deontologists like John Rawls and Alan Gewirth, on the one hand, and utilitarians like Mill and R. M. Hare, on the other. Incidentally, when it comes to questions of public policy, I do not claim that ethicists of all persuasions agree on such political issues as whether the state should permit women to have abortions at their discretion. What does seem to be true, however, is that they do not divide on this and other questions along the same lines that divide them with respect to ethical theory. If, as I have been arguing, political philosophers' conclusions about political ethics are not dictated by their metaethical principles, what does determine them? Some would say that they are determined by their envi-
The justification of democracy
13
ronment or their training, that insofar as they reflect rational processes at all, they are simply rationalizations. We need not decide to what extent this is true; I am concerned with what determines their rational thought.4 It is my belief that the kinds of disagreements among thinking people we are here concerned about, especially as they apply to the justification of forms of government, generally arise out of differences as to matters of fact - generally quite complicated matters of fact. For instance, the question may be whether a much more steeply graduated income tax will so retard investment that the incomes of members of the most disadvantaged class will be reduced.5 Another, and perhaps more important, complicated matter of fact has to do with human nature. Does political participation have the self-improving tendency that Mill supposed? If people enjoy the franchise, do they enjoy it? If they are denied it, do they suffer psychologically? Do people behave in the voting booth in the same way, vis-a-vis their self-interest, as they do in the marketplace? If they do, is this destructive of civic virtue? And so on. (It is worth noting that Fishkin's assumption, on which his conclusions depend, that the common person will be alienated by the discovery that philosophy does not give an unchallengeable justification for the form of government under which he is living, also rests upon a factual assumption, albeit one derived from survey data.) Again, let us look at some particular political theorists. Consider, for instance, the question of why the form of government Plato advocated in The Laws was quite different from that outlined in The Republic. It was not that his metaethics had changed. Rather it was that (either because of the differing purposes of the two works or because his own views of the facts had changed) the assumptions he made about human nature in The Laws were different from those he made in The Republic. In the earlier discussion about those who support coercive government, no anarchists were named; but a glance at the basis of their position is highly instructive. Contrary to the others, they believe that human nature is such that people can live together, whether communally or in highly individualistic fashion, without being reduced to a war of all against all. It is this belief about a factual matter - what humans are like or can be made to be like - that accounts for, or at least provides their justification for, their belief in the feasibility and desirability of anarchy. Even the Church Fathers, departing from the communistic ideal of primitive Christianity, came to the conclusion that the Fall made reliance on political institutions a necessity for checking selfishness and concupiscence. On examination, then, it appears that disagreements on matters involving political justification generally arise from differing views of the facts or divergent calculations of probable consequences. (The generality
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of this statement exceeds what can be proved in the available space, but I believe its validity will be evident to the informed reader, on reflection. In any case, as will be seen, my argument does not depend on its universality.) Even when, for instance, it appears that the argument is about the meaning of a key term, investigation generally reveals that it can be traced back to disagreement as to what will be the consequences of selecting this or that definition. Those who wish to define liberty narrowly, as absence of direct interference, tend to believe that, with a minimum of protection of life and property, the individual can do best for himself and for society by being left to his own devices; while those who would define this key concept in terms of enablements as well as protections doubt the validity of this factual proposition. Similarly, different concepts of equality can generally be reduced to divergent views of the facts. Some believe that legal equality is sufficient because the large amount of liberty it allows will so greatly increase production that even the least advantaged will be better off than they would be under another system. (This was Locke's belief, at least as far as concerned the move from primitive to more fully developed economies.) Others, unconvinced that this would be the case, believe that the relatively unchecked individual liberty would lead to gross inequalities of fortune that would themselves be unjust and, because of the power they gave to the rich, would result in exploitation of the weak. The important point is that utilitarians can logically take either position; and the same is true of Rawlsian deontologists. Godwin's utilitarianism led him to a far different position than that of Jeremy Bentham. Hegel's followers divided sharply between the Right and the Left. Robert Paul Wolff, a Kantian deontologist, supports anarchism, in opposition to Kant himself as well as to most other deontologists. How much these differences owe to disagreements of a factual order and how much to varying ethical intuitions is impossible to say, but each pair of contrasting political-theoretical conclusions grew out of the same metaethical theory. And if the same metaethical theory leads philosophers to opposing political-theoretical conclusions, and if the same political-theoretical conclusions are grounded by various philosophers on opposing metaethical theories, how can it be argued that a political philosopher's conclusions are dictated by his metaethical beliefs? Note that I say "dictated." Whether certain metaethical theories may predispose philosophers to accept one view of the facts of human nature rather than another is a different question from the one I have been discussing. It is logical connections with which I am concerned. Even regarding dispositions, however, it is worth noting that their common acceptance of radical individualism did not prevent Hobbes and Bentham from moving in opposite directions regarding the best form of govern-
The justification of democracy
15
ment. Moreover, a holistic view of society in earlier periods seemed to favor nondemocratic forms (e.g., Hegel), whereas in more recent times a similar outlook as to the nature of the individual and society inspires Marxian and many other collectivists. With these considerations in mind, let us turn to the question immediately at hand. In long-term perspective the justification of democracy seems less in need of discussion than ever before. Since the seventeenth century we have seen a complete reversal of attitudes toward this institution. As John Dunn has pointed out, even Leibniz, writing about the best form of government, declared that "today there is no principle so bad that it would not be better than to live in a democracy."6 Today one can scarcely find a government that does not claim to be a democracy, with or without some qualifier, such as "people's." It is a universal term of approval. The first problem in justifying democracy, then, is to define what it is we are seeking to justify. The general outline I shall follow, after dealing briefly with the definition of "democracy," is to discuss, in order, what I call "hybrid" justifications, my own justification of ideal democracy, an evaluation of formal democracy in the light of arguments that the linkage between it and the ideal is weak or nonexistent, and a conclusion. 2
Definition of democracy
The democracy I shall discuss is "political" democracy. It pertains to the government of a state, a polity. "Social democracy," "economic democracy," and the like are not my present concern. Democracy has two definitions, perhaps better conceived as two aspects of the same thing. First, it is a practice or method of government, a set of forms and procedures. Second, it relates to ends rather than means, to an ideal or set of ideals. When the person in the street is asked what he thinks about democracy, I daresay the former is what comes to his mind. He, I believe, has in mind a form of government in which major policy decisions are made by officeholders selected by periodic popular elections or by persons subject to the control of those so elected. These elections must be open to participation by all adult citizens, barring those who have been legally adjudged insane or (possibly) who have committed infamous crimes. Further, each voter has one, and only one, vote; and the person or issue receiving the most votes wins (except that for certain purposes more than a bare majority may be required).7 Refinements of this generally understood definition I shall abjure. Some would leave the definition of democracy at this point, insisting
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that democracy is a form of government having nothing to do with aims.8 But questions about what forms (fixed terms of office or not, for instance) and what procedures (absolute or qualified majority rule) are constantly arising; and the ensuing discussion is likely to take the form of an argument about what procedure is more "democratic." It is not a matter of what procedure more accuratelyfitsthe definition of "procedural democracy"; rather an appeal is being made to what that definition ought to be. We need, and in fact in common usage we assume, an "ideal" definition or aspect of democracy. This second concept refers to a government that not only is democratic in form and procedure but also has certain objectives or goals. It respects above all, equally, the autonomy and freedom (overlapping and integrally related concepts) of the individuals who comprise the state in question. Many things follow, including most of the rights included in our Bill of Rights; but I will not spell out this reasoning here. "Popular elections" plus "one person, one vote" implies majority rule in one sense - that of no rule over a majority by a minority - together with appropriate institutions to ensure that this requirement is met. (For instance, if votes are to be equal, they must not be coerced; voters must have freedom of expression and be free to organize; opponents of the party or parties in power must not be subject to arbitrary arrest; and so on.) The matter of extraordinary majorities is left open. Although I have ruled out social and economic democracy as part of the definition of democracy, I leave open the extent to which one or both is a necessary condition for its successful functioning, one that achieves some reasonable approximation to the ideal. It is implied in what has just been said, but it will do no harm to stress it, that what I am aiming to justify is liberal, constitutional democracy. I have no desire to justify every government that claims to be a democracy; nor do I attempt to justify government by the unconstrained rule of the majority. 3
Hybrid justifications Consent
One of the most venerable justifications, still frequently heard, is that democracy rests on the "consent of the governed." As a major support, however, it does not hold water and is seldom advanced by those who have given the matter much thought. I shall deal with it briefly, and largely by raising questions that seem to indicate its vulnerability, without detailing the answers. How is this consent to be expressed? By voting? If so, does a vote against those in office count as support for the regime, the form of government? If so, how can we answer the charge that it might indicate
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only that the voter was expressing a desire above all to defeat the program of this government, while actually opposing the form of government as well? Further, how many voters must freely express approval? A majority of those voting? Suppose only a minority of the enfranchised actually vote. Or suppose that in some way all are given an opportunity to vote for or against continuance of the democratic form of government, and only a plurality favors it, no majority favoring any particular form (which probably was the case, for instance, in Weimar Germany in its later days). Still further, does it matter how a minority is being treated, or whether many members of the minority feel sufficient opposition to the regime to resort to guerrilla warfare? The preceding neither fully explores the question of what constitutes free consent, nor denies that if I freely consent to something I incur an obligation. The most that could be said on the positive side of the original proposition, it appears, is that, other things being equal, a government that is clearly consented to by a majority, or at least a plurality, of eligible voters has a weak prima facie claim to the allegiance of all.9 Peaceful change Let us turn, then, to the more sophisticated and more plausible claim that democracy provides the only known method for achieving peaceful change, an idea often expressed by the statement that it substitutes ballots for bullets. Hayek espouses this position, saying that "it is the only convention we have yet discovered to make peaceful change possible."10 Hayek does not rely solely, for his defense of democracy, on the proposition quoted here. That statement was preceded in his text by the claim that "the true value of democracy is to serve as a sanitary precaution protecting us against an abuse of power."11 This much sounder proposition will be discussed later.12 That democracy does normally have the highly desirable effect of enabling peaceful change, at least in well-established democracies, is true and constitutes a strong argument for it. But the case of the Soviet Union, and even that of China, raises serious doubts about the contention that a free election is the only way to bring about a peaceful change of regime, although where the conditions for democracy prevail it is certainly the most likely one. Even countries lacking democratic institutions sometimes shift peaceably to democratic regimes, as in the cases of Spain and Portugal in recent times. Moreover, coups d' etat often involve little or no violence. Finally, civil wars break out in democracies, as our own case illustrates. Not only is the linkage between democracy and peaceful change less
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complete than Hayek would have it, but the argument also assumes that resort to violence to bring about change is always worse than any injustice or harm that might occur under democratic forms and procedures. To say the least, this assumption is highly questionable. In short, the argument provides some support for democracy, but it cannot claim to be a sufficient justification for it. Fairness The argument is sometimes made that democracy is justified because it is fair. But a fair procedure may yield bad results. It may be fair to treat preferences equally, but as Nelson remarks, not all preferences are good.13 From this fact one might conclude, as Nelson does, that the use of fair procedures cannot be a sufficient condition for a good government; but, if only because governmental procedures will not gain legitimacy unless they are seen to be just, procedural wwfairness would be a weighty negative consideration in the evaluation of any form of government. Belief in the fundamental fairness of a regime's forms and procedures goes a long way toward producing that emotional attachment without which no government is likely to endure in the face of inevitable vicissitudes. Not only this. It is right, within limits, that procedural fairness should command our loyalty to the resulting decisions regardless of their merits. Contrary to what has sometimes been argued, this is not paradoxical. Any decision arrived at by a fair procedure creates a prima facie obligation to obey it. That does not mean that the decision is right, but only that one ought to obey it ceteris paribus. If the decision is fundamentally wrong, if, for example, it commands me to kill an innocent person (in a civilian context), it may be my right, indeed my duty, to disobey it. What is a "fair" procedure depends upon the context. Flipping a coin is a fair means of settling some questions, but certainly not all. The determination of what procedure is fair in a given context entails an evaluation of the context, including the purposes in view. (Should a judge decide whether to sentence a person convicted of murder to death or to life imprisonment by flipping a coin?) The context by which the fairness of governmental procedures should be judged involves an evaluation of the ends to be achieved, including the recognition of fundamental rights. 4
The justification of "ideal" democracy
I call the justifications discussed in the preceding section "hybrid" because they combine justification of democratic ideals (ends) with that of democratic forms (means). The justification of democracy appears to me
The justification of democracy
19
to be a more manageable task if one separates the case for the democratic ideal from the argument for the institutions of formal democracy as the best way to realize that ideal. Let me consider first, then, the justification of the democratic ideal. Human nature The life and welfare of its inhabitants must be the starting point for the justification of democracy, as of any form of government. It exists for the good of humankind (that portion of humankind that falls within the state's jurisdiction); not humankind for the good of the state. What is this "humankind?" Certain minimum assumptions may be specified. They are, I believe, hardly controversial; but they are fundamental to the subsequent argument. Humans are rational animals. They can think inductively and deductively; they can conceptualize and formulate abstractions; they can envisage consequences, both by calculation and by reference to experience; they can deliberate, make choices and decisions, and act accordingly. The rational beings that can do these things are said to be "autonomous" or, more precisely, capable of autonomy in the absence of overriding coercion. Their actions respond to their desires, aversions, hopes, fears, goals, and the like, to their ideas, however formed, and to their determination, after some calculation and reflection, to act in a certain way. Action from this process of reasoning, as distinct from reflexive, thoughtless, or coerced behavior, is what I am calling "autonomous" - a widely accepted usage. If one wishes to say simply that one of the distinctive features of rational beings is that they act from reasons, that makes my point. How this fact relates to the philosophical controversy over free will and determinism need not concern us here. The democrat does not deny that human beings are subject to external causes; that would be absurd. The claim that humans are autonomous does mean that the processes enumerated above mediate the lines of causation that affect them and are typically transformed in the process. We speak of the result as an act of "will." Not only are human beings rational and capable of autonomous action; they are also moral, in the sense that they have the capacity and the tendency to develop ideas of the way they and others ought to behave - a morality, including a sense of justice, a belief in a kind of equality.14 Humans also have needs, psychological as well as physical. The former include psychological security, a sense of identity, and a desire for some control over events. For the last one in particular, they require freedom, just as they do for autonomy. For a sense of identity they also need a
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feeling of accomplishment through both competitive and cooperative activity. Finally, human beings are social animals. They achieve their self-consciousness and their sense of identity in, and because of, society. They are happy in society, other things being equal, and unhappy without it. Ostracism is a dreaded form of punishment. As an individual values his self, so he values these fundamental characteristics and strives for and values institutions that tend to preserve and promote them. At certain stages of societal development a minimum of physical security is the dominant need, for which a nearly absolute form of government may be a necessity. But when more favorable conditions prevail and when absolute government rules arbitrarily, oppressively, and in other ways contrary to the needs and desires inherent in human nature, claims for greater freedom and justice develop and usually eventuate in a struggle for their attainment.15 The demand for individual as well as group autonomy is at least implied at an early date, as is exemplified by such statements as those of Pericles (as recorded by Thucydides) and Col. Rainborough.16 It is upon these facts of human rationality, autonomy, and the other characteristics mentioned earlier that the democratic ideal is justified. For democrats they provide the starting place. The intervening linkage between these facts and the moral claim of right may be variously supplied by the will of God, self-evidence, intuition, contract, what rational persons would agree to, utility, or whatever. My own reasoning in making this move from fact to value will be set forth in the following paragraphs. The relation of ideal democracy to individualism Before dealing directly with the question of why we should place a high value on the democratic ideal, however, it will be helpful to say a word about its relation to individualism. Whether democracy as here defined is "individualistic" calls for consideration partly because individualism is today under attack and, even more, because addressing this question will cast further light upon the nature and justification of the democratic ideal. It is important to be extremely careful about the use of the term "individualism." Often it is identified with an atomistic concept of the individual with "economic" man or with Hobbesian "political" man. We need not become involved in a debate over the definition. We need consider only certain democratic propositions, without reference to whether they add up to something tagged "individualism." The first of these is that the democratic ideal places an extremely high value on the life and well-being of all individual human beings. It holds that no individual's life or wellbeing should be sacrificed for the sake of others, living or yet to be born,
The justification of democracy
21
without some powerful justification. (Some may hold that life, as contrasted with well-being, should never be sacrificed for the sake of others. Liberals are doubtless divided on this question, depending, for instance, on whether they would, under any circumstances, countenance capital punishment or compulsory military service; or on the question of whether cannibalism is justified when it is clearly the only alternative to the starvation of all who share their predicament.) In speaking of both life and well-being, I am embracing a continuum that extends from the loss of life through many intermediate points to some loss of liberty, enjoyment, or opportunity for the development of the self. (The last of these values, self-development, is one to which I shall return at a later stage.) It is also arguable {pace Rawls) that in considering what is a sufficient justification one must take account of the number of potential winners and losers as well as the likelihood that the consequences envisaged will actually occur. We are inevitably dealing here with matters of degree. The supreme value that democracy places on individual autonomy, thriving, and all that contributes to a person's well-being is fundamental. Without autonomy the individual is degraded. An individual capable of autonomous behavior, and aware of that fact, possesses something of great intrinsic value. It is good in and of itself. As one writer has aptly described it, following Brandt, it is like the rapturous joy of a child swinging. 17 (This is by no means to deny that it is also instrumental, making our lives "our own" and being conducive to self-esteem. Nor is it to deny that autonomy may be exercised in evil ways, even in ways so evil that the disvalue they cause exceeds their value.) Critics of liberal democracy sometimes attack its ideal of individual autonomy as nonexistent and unattainable, because the reigning ideology in a person's society determines his values, and any notion he may have of his own self-determination comes under the heading of "false-consciousness."18 A full rebuttal of this argument would take me far beyond the limits of this essay. The chief point to be noted, however, in addition to what has already been said about autonomy, is that the influence of conditioning factors is by no means denied, but that to hold that these factors eliminate all individual autonomy is a self-defeating argument, undermining the foundation of all rational discourse.19 It is also argued that liberal democratic theory errs in placing the individual at the center of its value system, on the ground that the individual is a creation of society. Liberal democratic theory holds that the value of society or of community is not a thing in itself apart from the individuals that compose the entity in question. Of course, any community has
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value for each of its members; and in fact the individual is in large measure what he is because he lives in society and because of the nature of the society in which he lives. The perceived value of his society may be an important part of a person's self. He may feel fulfilled in contributing to it; he may wish to "sacrifice" his own (narrowly conceived) interests for it. He may take an interest in its continuance and its quality beyond his own lifetime; but it is his interest. That is all that I mean. I call it "basic individualism," but the tag is unimportant. What is important is that the individual whose liberty, well-being, and further development are the objects of democracy's concern is the individual as he is - not the individual as he may have been at some prior period, and not an imagined, atomistic individual, untouched by those around him and unconcerned for their welfare. Finally, with respect to the individualism of the democratic ideal, the theory embodies a strong (but sometimes overstated) presumption in favor of each individual's judgment about what contributes to his wellbeing. Three reasons support this presumption. First, there is the old "shoe-pinches" argument: We can know our own feelings, our states of mind, our "well-being," indeed the way no one else can. Second, making choices contributes to our development and our sense of being real persons. (Of course, our decisions may prove to be mistaken, in which case they at least contribute to our education.) Third, democrats trust the individual because of a strong disirusX of what others will decide when they are in positions of unchecked power. It is important to note that all three of these aspects of individualism are related to, indeed are dependent upon, the most fundamental element of democratic theory: the rationality and autonomy of the individual, as defined earlier. Implications: liberty and equality Two of the most fundamental elements of the democratic credo are liberty and equality. Autonomy itself entails liberty, both political and civil, at the same time that in another sense itflowsfrom liberty. Without the capacity (liberty) to take purposive action, individuals could not be autonomous; but if outside forces prevent this capacity from being exercised - if those who have the capacity are coerced into making decisions they cannot feel are their own - their autonomy and freedom are diminished. This includes their freedom to decide that certain areas of their lives should be free of intrusion - in short, their privacy.20 In the absence of a large measure of liberty the capacity of the individual to develop his distinctively human capacities would be virtually nullified. J. R. Lucas has put it well:
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Freedom is a necessary condition of rationality, of action, of achievement. Not to be free is to be frustrated, impotent, futile. To be free is to be able to shape the future, to be able to translate one's ideals into reality, to actualize one's potentialities as a person. Not to be free is not to be responsible, not to be able to be responsive, not to be human. Freedom is a good, if anything is.21 Without liberty the high value placed on the individual would be a mockery. Equality. It is not just certain individuals or certain kinds or classes of individuals on which democracy sets the highest value; it is the individual person per se. Of course, this does not mean that all individuals must be treated alike. It does mean, however, that their dignity would be violated if they were treated unequally without justification, that is to say in a way that failed to show equal concern for their claims to liberty, justice, and well-being. In short, as rational beings capable of autonomous action and of indefinite self-development, they are entitled to equal consideration. Like should be treated alike, similars similarly. Discrimination is invidious unless it passes a severe test. The presumption is always against it and in favor of equality. I call this the principle of "presumptive equality." The equality of the vote, the hallmark of democracy, is so not only because it gives each citizen, equally, a substantive power with which to protect and advance his interests, but also, perhaps preeminently, because it symbolizes that equality of respect to which each individual is entitled. People who are denied political equality, symbolized by the vote, feel themselves second-class citizens and tend to be treated as such.22 Whether symbolic equality and equal suffrage are enough to meet the test of the democratic ideal or whether that ideal demands that each citizen's substantive political power be as nearly equal to that of every other citizen as is possible (requiring equality of resources) is a hotly contested point. If the consequence of such egalitarianism were to diminish production to the extent that even the least advantaged would be made worse off, it is doubtful whether anyone would support it as a requirement of the democratic ideal. At the other extreme, if the result were to make everyone better off, it would probably be a generally acceptable ideal, although this is less certain. Philosophers who hold that desert (perhaps measured by effort) should be rewarded might feel it unjust; so also might those who believe that relative equality is what counts, if in fact the gap between rich and poor were increased. In these hypothetical situations, what is at stake is not whether formal democracy is in principle justifiable; rather it is the extent to which the democratic ideal demands that it minimize economic inequality.
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J. Roland Pennock Caveats
Certain caveats are called for at this point. The theory defended here does not hold that human nature is fixed, the same everywhere and for all time, except within broad limits (e.g., limited altruism). Presumably, however, these broad limits are sufficient to avoid the "lapse into arbitrariness," that, it is alleged, "the deontological self is unable to avoid" because it admits of no "constitutive attachments," no "relativefixityof character" prior to the individual's freedom to construct his own moral principles.23 To be sure, it may come to pass that bioengineering will abolish even those limits, but I will not explore the problems with which that eventuality would present us. Also, basic individualism does not require either capitalism or the maximum use of the market, although it is arguable that these institutions are essential to the effective functioning of democracy or even to its preservation. It may also be contended that some of the same considerations that justify liberal democracy also support capitalism and maximum use of the market system; and this position may be used either to support the latter or to condemn liberal democracy. Neither conclusion follows as a matter of logic. These are matters to be settled by investigation, calculation, and experience. 5
Relation of formal to ideal democracy
The ideals of democracy arefine,it may be said, but what assurance do we have that the institutions of liberal democracy will be an effective vehicle for realizing them? Here we are inevitably involved in the calculation of probabilities rather than with proofs of necessary connection, or inevitabilities. I shall turn immediately to consideration of one of the most serious challenges that has been advanced against the proposition that democratic voting has or can have the desired result. Voting: crucial link between practice and ideal The most fundamental procedure of democracy is that of majority rule as defined earlier. The subject is the principal focus of other chapters in this volume; but it is so central to democracy and has been subjected to so much critical analysis that no justification of democracy worthy of the name can escape discussion of it, however condensed. A host of writers, beginning in the modern period with Duncan Black and Kenneth Arrow, have shown that majority rule, contrary to the assumptions of early and possibly many current democratic theorists, has been unable to solve the problem of aggregating preferences. This is a matter of logic.24
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It might seem to follow that the concept of ideal democracy cannot embody or justify this procedural principle as the normal method for determining all major policies,25 although - and this is extremely important - it would remain a crucial means for providing equal consideration for all persons and their preferences. But William Riker takes a different line. He concludes that (1) populism (the theory that all decisions should be made in accordance with unconstrained majority preference) is logically impossible, and (2) liberalism (and therefore liberal democracy) requires only that the negative vote of a majority may possibly (not necessarily) bring about the defeat of an official or policy of whom (or of which) they disapprove.26 I believe that more can be said for liberal democracy within the limitations Riker outlines. First, anyone who gives much thought to the effect of voting (actual or prospective) on Presidents Johnson and Nixon must have a clearer and more positive comprehension (from the point of view of linkage between public perception and political effect) of what the defeat of the abuse of power, or of what has come to be thought of as an evil policy, may mean. A second approach is to take another look at the effects of the instability to which majority rule - and perhaps any alternative voting system - is subject. How serious are the probable consequences? One answer appears to be that they may even be good. In the case of voting in a legislature, where the situation is most likely to be found, various practical constraints (rules, time, weariness, etc.) bring the matter to a halt, sooner or later. Where it stops may indeed be accidental or the result of manipulation. But, especially if one group of losers cares about the matter with an intensity that was not reflected in the outcome, this result need not be final. It may rather be the prelude to a period of persuasion, maneuvering, and regrouping that leads to an eventual modification or reversal of the original policy decision. The fact that this can and sometimes does happen gives support to the belief that the technical instability of rational decision making may in fact lead to support for long-run political stability.27 Another point may be even more persuasive. It is that legislation that was feared by certain groups often turns out not to be so harmful to them as they had anticipated. Possibly they had miscalculated; or the law may have been administered in such a way as to protect or foster their interests. In short, it is by no means clear that the logical possibility of cyclical majorities means that the use of majority rule to implement the democratic ideal need be destructive of the latter or of the stability of the regime that is committed to that ideal. A more fundamental approach, however, is to attack Riker's positivistic assumptions. Before considering this line of reasoning, I must make a
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few remarks about another and different attack, also coming from socialchoice theory. I refer to the arguments propounded by Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E. Lomasky in their essay in this volume (Chapter 2). Their argument is of a different order from that of most of what has been written on this aspect of the subject. They do not concentrate on the frustrating problem of the aggregation of preferences (as expressed by votes). Their chief concern relates to an earlier stage of the political process: behavior in the voting booth. This conduct, they argue, may be selfish, altruistic, or duty-bound, but the rational actor perceives it to be inconsequential. For this Schumpeterian conclusion they provide an elegant mathematical demonstration. It follows that the ballots cannot be assumed to represent deep convictions. Essentially, as Brennan and Lomasky put it, the problem with the elective process is the separation of cost from outcome. This position has great merit and, as the authors suggest, probably has more practical significance than the problem of cycling. Certain points, however, may be suggested by way of qualification or addition. First, making the economist's assumption of individualistic rational behavior, it is not in all situations true, even with a large number of voters, that, when it is a question of apportioning costs and benefits, the aggregation of votes leads to antisocial results. When the costs will obviously fall upon the beneficiaries, voters' calculations of costs and benefits will not lead them to the support of economically unjustified expenditures. In other words, when costs and benefits are both particularized and fall on the same group or groups, individualistic rationality does not lead to social irrationality. Whenever an activity is to be supported by user costs - as exemplified by toll roads and national parks if user fees cover the costs this situation prevails. Much special-district legislation also falls in this category.28 In many situations too the costs and benefits are both generalized. If they are spread more or less equally - expenditure for national and personal security is an example - it may again be true that voting is not biased against the general interest, or is only moderately so.29 My second point is simply to emphasize, perhaps to give greater weight to, a consideration that Brennan and Lomasky also take into account. The rational individualist (according to the "economic" mode of reasoning) would not vote. The probability of his vote determining the outcome is miniscule, much too small to equal the cost of taking the time to vote, let alone trying to learn enough about the candidates and issues to know how he should, by any standard, cast his ballot. Of course, not all individuals may consider these items "costs." In fact, many people do vote, for one reason or another. Many feel that they should'vote - that, as Brennan and Lomasky say, it is their "civic duty" to do so. And, I would hazard, they feel this way because they believe (perhaps because of the way they have
The justification of democracy
27
been brought up) that they should not behave in a manner that would be seriously harmful to society ifeveryone did likewise. This (Kantian, if you like) argument appears to me to have considerable effect both in leading people to vote and in determining how they should vote. It may be derivative of the "you-wouldn't-like-it-if-Johnny-did-that-to-you,would-you?" line of reasoning that most of us have encountered in our childhood. Or it may be that a sense of fairness, of not letting the side down, makes one feel a moral compulsion to vote one's convictions and one's known preferences, regardless of a recognition that it is a hopeless cause. In any case, however derived, common observation attests to the effectiveness of some kind of moral motivation. I offer this not only as a partial explanation of why people do vote but also as a qualification of the Brennan-Lomasky demonstration that "between altruism and malice, democratic procedures differentially favor the latter."30 Further, I would suggest that the economist's rationality, even as Brennan and Lomasky modify it, tends to omit or underrate an important segment of human behavior. And it does so in a way that also distinguishes between market behavior and voting behavior, but in the opposite direction from that of the economist's assumption. The ethical environment of public actions, including voting, is different from that of private actions - less so than I would like, but still, I believe, significantly so. Market theory holds that each person is out to get the most for the least; and we feel nothing wrong about behaving accordingly. Even socialists and communists in capitalist countries can and do justify their own market-type behavior as long as they are in a market society. On the other hand, not all the rhetoric in discussion about the commonwealth that is cast in terms of the public interest or welfare is fraudulent or hypocritical. Individuals in society do have concern for their society. Moreover, when it comes to outward-oriented, altruistic behavior, the public arena has a distinct advantage over the private one. Even in the private arena, many people respond to appeals to contribute of their substance to the welfare of others whose need is greater than their own. But one would expect their willingness to do this to be greater if they knew that others were going to do likewise rather than to be free riders on the contributions of the more public spirited. Thus, other things being equal, they would be more willing to vote for a public (governmental) grant that would cost them $ 100 than to make an equal private donation.31 What weight should be given to these qualitative considerations I am in no position to say. I wish primarily to call attention to them. My own belief is that they are of sufficient importance to blunt the edge of the Brennan-Lomasky knife, to prevent it from completely severing the linkage between voting and significant achievement of democratic ideals.
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In view of the fact that Brennan and Lomasky go on to maintain that, when decisions must be made collectively, voting may be the best procedure, since any alternative would give an advantage to "some self-serving elite,"32 this may be not so much a qualification of their argument as a reinforcement of one aspect of it.33 Now I return to the alternative line of reasoning I referred to before considering the Brennan-Lomasky thesis. This consists of a criticism of the positivism underlying Arrow's famous theorem. That theorem consists of a series of propositions each of which is claimed to be intuitively reasonable and essential to the majority-rule principle, but which taken together are logically incompatible. Hence, the "paradox of voting." One of these propositions, as interpreted by Amartya Sen, is the rule of Unrestricted Domain. In Sen's words, that rule reads, "Every logically possible set of individual orderings is included in the domain of the collective choice rule."34 As Sen points out, this rule is incompatible with "even minimal liberalism." Since Arrow's rules embody and rely upon the Pareto principle, it is that principle with which liberal values have been found to conflict.35 In short, that principle comes into conflict with such liberal democratic values as freedom of expression, freedom to organize political parties, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, and fair trial. It clashes with liberal democratic values because these provisions are essential to the protection and implementation of democracy itself. Not just freedom but equality would be endangered, for if these rights are not protected they may be permitted to some and denied to others. This points to Riker's conclusion that populist democracy (unrestricted majority rule) is a logical impossibility. Riker's reaction to this problem is to redefine liberalism in such a way as to make it compatible with at least part of what the liberal democrat wants, while at the same time jettisoning populist democracy. His unstated reason for taking this course is to preserve his purely positivistic method, refusing to make normative judgments, and relying on the Pareto principle in order to avoid the necessity of making interpersonal comparisons. Another possible way of treating the problem is to retain liberal democratic theory as previously understood and jettison both populism and positivism. One trouble with positivism arises out of its tendency to identify rationality with self-interested conduct.36 When, to avoid this unrealistic, selfdirected narrowness, all preferences, self-directed or other-directed, are included in the concept of rationality, it tends to lose all usefulness for either prediction or understanding, beyond what is available to common sense. This is especially true, if, contrary to usage, it includes among preferences duties, obligations, our sense of moral responsibility. It seems plausible on the basis of common experience, as was suggested earlier,
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that our marketplace behavior and our public behavior tend to be divided along these lines, with self-interest almost monopolizing the former, with goodly amounts of altruism and sense of duty prevailing in the latter. To this we may add the proposition that our sense of moral responsibility to the public is greatly enhanced if we feel ourselves a contributing part of the public.37 Jettisoning both populism and exclusive reliance on positivism may be arrived at in other ways, as their conflict with various liberal rights calls to mind. Liberal democratic theory and constitutionalist theory have always incorporated a (normative) theory ofrights.I will not now embark upon a justification either ofrightsin general or of the specific fundamentalrightsembodied in liberal democracy, except to note, importantly, that they may all be derived from the democratic ideal, from the individual's entitlement to autonomy, liberty, and equality. That the institutional counterpart (formal, procedural democracy) of the democratic ideal must include the assurance of theserightsis basic to its justification. They are as essential to equality as they are to liberty. The statement just made calls for this qualification: What in the final analysis is critical is the behavior of governments, not their institutional arrangements. The United Kingdom is a classic example of a government lacking a written constitution, with minimal institutional protections of liberal rights, that yet has maintained an enviable record of respecting liberal rights.38 In contrast, many regimes, democratic and otherwise, have admirable bills of rights but pay scant regard to them. All of this reminds us of Rousseau's assertion that the constitution that counts is the one that is written in the hearts of the citizens. Finally, in this connection, it might be argued that setting apart fundamental rights, giving them special protection from majorities, does not completely solve the problem. Other policy decisions would presumably still be made by majorities and thus be subject to the irrationality of the voting paradox. The first point made earlier (regarding positivism's tendency to rely on an assumption of narrowly self-interested behavior) spoke to this concern at least in some measure, but I believe more may be said. As has been shown by Miss Anscombe and is also stated by Riker, the problem of the voting paradox is not specific to any voting system or indeed to democracy. It applies even to a benevolent despot.39 This fact might seem to be a sufficient answer to the objection; but though it refutes a claim, on this ground, that any other form of government is superior to democracy, it fails to get to the heart of the matter. The voting paradox, since it points to a problem that characterizes any method for aggregating preferences by any form of government, does not invalidate the case for democracy; but neither does it validate it. For that we must look to other considerations. In part, that has already been done by reference to democ-
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racy's institutionalized protections of autonomy, liberty, and equal respect. Partly, too, Brennan and Lomasky's argument that any alternative to majority rule gives power to a self-interested elite is much to the point here. In part, still other reasons apply. They will be discussed in the next section. Other considerations Do democratic institutions in fact protect individual autonomy and liberty more effectively than do other types of political organization? In part, the answer is definitional. If the forms of democracy are a mere facade, existing on paper but not being put into effect, if, that is to say, they are not working institutions, they are not worthy of the name. We speak of countries with such institutions as democracies only in quotation marks, or as "so-called" democracies. Empirical evidence Beyond this, we can appeal to empirical evidence. Probably little more than common observation is needed. Is respect for individual liberty and political equality more widely experienced in countries that enjoy democracy as we have defined it, or among those that do not meet this test? But we can do better than this. Freedom House, a widely respected organization whose concern is announced by its title, monitors freedom throughout the world and publishes itsfindingsin Freedom at Issue. Some of its most recentfindingsare tabulated in the following fashion. One hundred and sixty-seven states are classified as to whether or not they have a political party system, and if so whether it is a one-party, dominant-party, or multiparty (competitive) system. Each is given a rating of from I to 7 with respect to "political rights" and likewise with respect to "civil rights." These states are then categorized as "free," "partly free," or "not free." These are rough summary terms used to cluster much finer gradations of "freedom." "Freedom" itself is a term that includes both "civil liberties" and "political rights," the latter defined to entail a "fully competitive electoral process" and clear rule by those elected. The factor of "political rights" is also graded so as to take account of the "effective equality of the process."40 Of the sixty-nine states with multiparty systems,fifty-sixare classified as "free" and thirteen as "partly free." Of the nineteen "dominant-party" system states, eighteen are partly free and one not free. The remaining seventy-nine states, either one-party or nonparty, include three that are free (Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Nauru, both nonparty, nonmilitary),
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31
twenty-four partly free (most of which fall in the nonparty category), and fifty-two nonfree.41 Causal relationship The correlation between the elements of liberal democratic institutions and the democratic ideal certainly suggests a strong linkage. But, it may be asked, are these institutions the causal factors, or are they merely reflections of the firm public regard for democratic ideals that characterizes the countries in question? Space does not permit even a summary of the work that has been done on this difficult question. It is notable, however, that where dominant groups of people have this respect for liberal ideals it is to the institutions of liberal democracy that they turn when attempting to embody their ideals in a framework that will effectively implement them. And they make use of them. Two striking instances in recent American history strongly suggest that an institution such as our Supreme Court may be particularly important for advancing democratic ideals. I refer to the Brown case, the culmination of a series of decisions leading up to it and serving to educate the country on the implications of democratic rule, which played a key role in the battle against racial segregation. My second instance, also a Supreme Court decision, is that of the establishment of the principle that legislative apportionment must give substance to the rule of one person, one vote.421 select these examples among many because in them the Court so clearly played a leading, not just a reflecting, role. Moreover, whatever one may think of certain recent judicial trends, a reversal of those two decisions and the changes they brought about is practically inconceivable. It will be noted that both of my examples involve the Supreme Court, an institution that is often said to be undemocratic. My selection was deliberate. These decisions demonstrate what no democrat should forget: that without institutions not themselves easily subjected to popular control, effective popular control may suffer.43 Legitimacy To be generally accepted as fair, just, or otherwise good, though not a sufficient justification for a governmental procedure, is nonetheless essential for it's justifiability. The idea that a majority rather than a minority should govern, in the circumstances appropriate for making a decision, provides major support for the acceptance as right - support for the legitimacy of - a regime adopting that principle. That this is so today derives partly from tradition and partly from what appears to most people to be
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intuitively obvious. Insofar as it is the latter it foreshadows the second point I would make: Rule by the majority, more precisely the denial of minority rule over a majority, constitutes a recognition, an acceptance, and an implementation of the individual's autonomy, of his equal right to exert that autonomy. A further consideration in this connection is that the process of voting and all the campaigning, debate, and so on that go with it - whether it be voting for representatives or voting in the representative body - permits and encourages the exercise of free speech and of cooperative activity aimed at the accomplishment of political purposes.44 It both provides an opportunity for the exercise of autonomy and does so in a situation that strengthens the linkage between that exercise and the realization of informed voter preferences. Voting that violated the equality principle would of course be contrary to the democratic ideal itself. Individual development It is true, then, that the liberal element in democracy insists on protections for the individual beyond that of the franchise. The vote is arguably the most important single protection the individual citizen of a democracy possesses; but it is not enough. Majorities may tyrannize. However, the franchise contributes to another virtue of democracy (although it does not monopolize this contribution): the development of the individual. Only as they develop their powers, their capacities, do individuals become self-respecting and happy. Here, as elsewhere, liberal democratic theory depends upon a theory of human nature. In this case, the element of human nature in question is what Rawls has called the "Aristotelian Principle."45 It holds that people enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities increasingly as the capacities are developed or become more complex. This principle has played an important role in all liberal democratic theory at least from the time of J. S. Mill.46 It plays that role in two different ways, one relating to the procedural aspect of democracy and the other to its ideal or substantive aspect. A few words about each are in order. The procedural aspect relates to the franchise. It is Mill's well-known argument and need not be treated at length here. In thinking about how to cast their ballots, citizens are compelled to exercise their intellectual faculties (and thus to develop them) and are at least encouraged to consider their personal interests in the context of the public interest, not just because this is what in theory they are supposed to do, but because their votes are more likely to be effective if they coincide with a general interest which a majority of voters are likely, by the same reasoning, to adopt.
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Against this line of argument it is often objected that, whatever may have been true in Mill's time, today the thought of being less than onehundred-millionth of a sovereign gives little encouragement to either thought or sympathy. Political apathy in the United States, as measured by nonvoting, appears to support this contention. However, even if only half of the eligible voters freely cast their ballots in competitive elections, that is a substantial improvement over the nondemocratic alternatives. Also, many citizens today are members of organizations that are to various degrees politically oriented. Insofar as they participate in the activities of these organizations, they are likely to experience the same kinds of effects that Mill attributed to the exercise of the franchise itself. Moreover, they will be bombarded by these organizations with arguments about how they should vote, write to their representatives, and so forth. The result is that these citizens will be encouraged to vote, for two reasons: (1) because they have more clearly articulated arguments for supporting certain policies and (2) because they have grounds to believe that they will not be a voice crying in the wilderness but will be joining in a cooperative endeavor with many others, an endeavor that is pleasurable in itself, while increasing the chances of success. Substantively, and perhaps more importantly, liberal democracy contributes to the development of the individual's capacities. Here I have in mind not just specific liberal rights, such as that of freedom of expression and association and therightto privacy, but also the general priority given to liberty - not an absolute priority, of course, but a presumption. Many specific rights, not normally enumerated in constitutions, fall under this heading: for instance, rights to choose a mate, to enter an occupation (subject to certain regulations), to move about freely, and to make enforceable contracts. Belief that these opportunities will, on balance, lead to personal development and not simply to romantic posturing or whimsical acting on impulse depends again on the Aristotelian Principle. Further, the development of complex capacities is normally enhanced by, if not completely dependent upon, being part of a cooperative, harmonious society. Thus, the socializing effect that Mill attributed to the franchise is also and perhaps more significantly produced by the substantive liberties fostered by democracy. Policy outcomes Not all, but most, of what has been written here about the arguments in favor of democracy relates directly to the individual. What about the society as a whole, the quality of governmental outputs? It would be wrong to make this contrast too sharp, for what harms or helps
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the one does likewise for the other; but it is worth emphasizing that, as political participation contributes to the intellectual and moral development of citizens, it tends to improve the quality of governmental output. What is valuable, to be sure, is not just any participation - for example, voting - but discussion, debate, organization for political purposes, and all that contributes both to the education of citizens concerning the issues surrounding policy decisions and to voter influence on policy. Something more than the Millean argument is relevant here something that does more than educate and broaden the sympathies of the individual. This is Rousseau's contention that when the individual is placed in a position where he must persuade others of therightfulnessof his cause, whatever it may be, he must appeal to a broad, general interest if he expects to gain a wide following. In fact, if his motive is simply concern for his reputation, the same logic applies - assuming in this as in the previous case that he is "clear-sighted."47 Nor is consideration of the general interest prompted only by the necessity for winning widespread support. Real concern for the welfare of a community or a state, either as a matter of morality or as one of sympathy, is a fact of life that any thinking person must recognize, while at the same time realizing that it is by no means universal and that it varies greatly in degree from one person to another. A related but distinct line of reasoning deriving from Rousseau is that arguments rationally related to a visible public welfare reinforce each other, whereas those that are fallacious, used to support differing private interests, tend to cancel each other out. No unifying force, such as concern for the general interest, serves to pull them together.48 Further support for the normal democratic use of the majority principle may be derived from probability theory. It requires the assumption that the average voter or legislator is more likely to berightthan wrong, as judged by the public interest. If we assume further that errors, ignorance, and self-interest are as likely, on the average, to influence his vote in one direction as the other, then even a modicum of knowledge, understanding, and concern for the public welfare will do the trick. (Clearly this assumption, if valid at all, as I believe it is, would apply only to the long run - and thus especially to constitution makers - not to each particular decision.) With a body of 100 individuals, each of whom is likely to be right (or more nearly right than wrong) 51 percent of the time, it follows that a 51 percent majority of the vote has a 51.99 percent chance of being right and a 60 percent majority will be right 69 percent of the time. With 10,000 voters, the probability of 51 percent being right rises to 99.97 percent!49
The justification of democracy 6
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In conclusion
My thesis has been that the democratic ideal is justified as an ideal and that democratic institutions (forms and procedures) are justified because they normally realize that ideal to a greater degree than would any known alternative form of government. (The ideal, of course, includes such conditions for its realization as the provision for peaceful change and the avoidance of extreme abuse of power.) The probability referred to assumes that the conditions for democracy (not discussed here) are reasonably approximated. This makes the justification of any particular regime contingent. The contingency relates to numerous economic, historical, and political-cultural considerations, which, taken together, normally determine whether a democratic regime can be sustained. Certain implications of these statements should be made explicit. Questions of judgment are inescapable. To what degree is respect for persons upheld? How complete is political equality? How probable is it that a change of form or procedure would improve the situation? It must be borne in mind, too, that our subject is the justification of democracy, a form of government and its ideal, not particular policies. And, finally, "justification" is not identical to "obligation to obey." One may be obligated to obey an unjust government, for instance, if the likely alternative would be even more unjust. These matters of contingency and probability are not matters for which the democrat need apologize. They would apply as well to the justification of most, if not all, human institutions. In addition to the Liberty Fund, which supported the conference from which this essay derives, I thank the editors of this volume as well as anonymous reviewers for Cambridge University Press for helpful criticisms. I owe a similar debt to John W. Chapman and Charles R. Beitz, both of whom made useful suggestions regarding an earlier version of this chapter. The opening section, "Political Theory and Metaethics," is reprinted almost verbatim by permission of New York University Press from my contribution to Justification in Ethics, Law, and Politics, NOMOS 28, pp. 291-6, edited by J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. Copyright © 1986 by New York University Press. Notes James Fishkin, "Liberal Theory and the Problem of Justification," in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Justification in Ethics, Law, and Politics, NOMOS 28 (New York: New York University Press, 1986), pp. 207-31. Hereafter I shall assume that "he" and its cognates are gender neutral, unless the context indicates otherwise.
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3
To be sure, the extent of political power they justify is not the same for each of these political philosophers, but the reason for these differences is other than their differing metaethical theories, as I shall point out in a moment. Incidentally, insofar as they are not the product of rational thought, they are presumably not susceptible to the kind of ratiocination that Fishkin fears will lead to severe problems of legitimacy. See Barry Holden, "Liberal Democracy and the Social Determination of Ideas," in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Liberal Democracy, NOMOS 25 (New York: New York University Press, 1979), chap. 12. This, of course, is a matter of the form of government only if the form in question is democratic and if it is assumed that democracy calls for a low degree of inequality of incomes. John Dunn, Western Political Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 3. This definition leaves open the possibility of direct as well as indirect democracy. I shall, however, confine my discussion to the latter, representative democracy, which is what we have and what is most frequently attacked. See F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (University of Chicago Press, 1979), vol. 3, p. xiii; also William Nelson, On Justifying Democracy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). For comprehensive treatments of this subject, see P. H. Partridge, Consent and Consensus (New York: Praeger, 1971); A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); and idem, "Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic Government," Georgia Law Review, 18 (1984): 791-819. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 3, p. 137. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 47-50. Nelson, On Justifying Democracy, p. 92. It should be recognized, however, that the denial of a preference does constitute a limitation of individual autonomy, even if it is justified by reference to the "real" or the long-run interests of the person whose autonomy is restricted or by consideration of the interests or rights of others, unless that person is voluntarily persuaded of its justification. Absolute autonomy is not a requisite of democracy or any other form of government. Its logical conclusion is anarchism. See Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), whose argument rests upon the strong (absolute) definition of autonomy (p. 40). In stating it as a fact that humans tend to develop a belief in a "kind" of equality, I am recognizing that, in Aristotle's terms, it may be either absolute ("numerical") or relative ("proportionate") and that in the case of the latter people differ as to the elements of the required proportionality. Obviously, this capsule history leaves much unsaid. It is not meant to
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imply, for instance, that political development is either linear or inevitable. Thucydides reports Pericles in his famous funeral oration as having made it a virtue of the Athenians that they valued their private as well as their public life and that they did not "feel called upon to be angry with [their] neighbour for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no positive penalty. But all this ease in our private relations," he continued, "does not make us lawless citizens." History ofthePeloponnesian War, revised Crawley translation (New York: Modern Library, 1982), p. 108. Col. Rainborough, in mid-seventeenth-century England, made it even clearer. "Every man that is to live under a government," he declared, "ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government," adding in his next speech that thisrightto political equality derived from the fact that "the main cause why Almighty God gave men reason, it was that they should make use of that reason, and that they should improve it for that end and purpose that God gave it them." Quoted from the Putney Debates in A. S. P. Woodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty (University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 53. Robert Young, "The Value of Autonomy," Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1982): 35-44 at 43. The concept abounds in Marxist literature. See, e.g., Karl Marx, The German Ideology, in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, pp. 136-137. It has been further developed and applied in the extensive literature of "critical theory." For a compelling treatment of this argument, see Barry Holden, "Liberal Democracy and the Social Determination of Ideas," in Pennock and Chapman, eds., Liberal Democracy, NOMOS 25, chap. 12. See Stephen Lukes, Individualism (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). In Chapter 9 Lukes deals with the right to privacy, tracing its origin in general back to the Epicureans and, later, the Romans and documenting its place in liberal theory back to the origins of European liberalism. It is true that it did not find an explicit place in U.S. constitutional law until recent times, but the famous article by Warren and Brandeis (Harvard Law Review, 4 [ 1890]: 193) derived thisrightfrom the more specific law of libel and the right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures, all adding up to a "right to be let alone." It is reflected also in the British principle that "a man's house is his castle." When the right was recognized (or federalized) by the Supreme Court in 1965, reliance was placed on a variety of arguments, including earlier Court dicta and the reference in the Ninth Amendment to certain unspecified "rights . . . retained by the people." J. R. Lucas, The Principles ofPolitics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 144. Bentham gave priority to this fundamental equality with the phrase "each to count for one and nobody for more than one" and Kant with
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the dictum that each should be treated as an end in himself and never as only a means. Both liberty and equality are treated more fully in my Democratic Political Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), chap. 2. Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 175-83. All of the quoted phrases are from page 180. With regard to the "broad limits" referred to in the text, see Jerome Kagan, The Nature of the Child (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 152. The works of Black and Arrow referred to are especially Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge University Press, 1958), and Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2d ed. (New York: Wiley, 1964). The literature, including the proofs, is admirably summarized in William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982). It must be recognized that much that is essential, but obvious, must be here left unsaid for lack of space. We are dealing with representative government, so of course majority opinion, even majority voting, does not directly determine policies. Also many important policies are set by appointed officials, adding another step to the process by which opinion is brought to bear on policy. These considerations, however, are quite different from those raised by the analysis of the logical problem of aggregating preferences. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism, pp. 239-46. Thus, he holds that the only /£/ca/constitutional restraint for democratic regimes is that of regular elections for those who determine major policies. He goes on to argue, however, that other restraints, including the Madisonian checks, are in practice necessary for the preservation of democracy (pp. 248-9). Various writers have taken issue with Riker, especially with his contention that the problems of vote aggregation defeat the claims of populists while the case for liberal democracy remains sound. Thus, Jules Coleman and John Ferejohn ("Democracy and Social Choice," Ethics, 97 [ 1986]: 6-25) argue that Riker's points against populism may have equal application to liberal democracy and conclude that we need "a fuller understanding of the likely performance of democratic institutions" (p. 25). Since my own position does not depend upon Riker's reasoning, fuller discussion of their arguments is not called for here. In the same symposium, Joshua Cohen is likewise concerned to defend populism, but he does so by redefining the term so that it admits the necessity of restraints upon majorities in a way that makes one wonder whether his "epistemic populism" might not be extended to include most if not all of liberal democracy (pp. 26-38). Albert Weale has written in a vein that, for present purposes, is similar to that of Coleman and Ferejohn. See his "Review Article: Social Choice Versus Populism? An Interpretation of
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31 32 33 34 35 36
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Riker's Political Theory," British Journal of Political Science, 14(1984): 369-85. Nicholas R. Miller, "Pluralism and Social Choice," American Political Science Review, 11 (1983): 734-47. How numerous and important are the cases that fall in this category I cannot say. It is also undoubtedly true, as Lomasky has suggested to me in his helpful editorial capacity, that frequently opportunity costs would fall on individuals other than the beneficiaries. At the least I believe it can be said that whenever costs, in the form of user fees or special taxes, can be substantially laid upon those who benefit from the project in question, the inequities that would otherwise be entailed by voting systems are modified. I have discussed this and related issues much more fully elsewhere. See Democratic Political Theory, chap. 9; "Another Legislative Typology," Journal of Politics, 41 (1979): 1205-13; and "The 'Pork Barrel' and Majority Rule: A Note," Journal of Politics, 32 (1970): 709-16. See Chapter 2. How much of a qualification it is I am unable to judge. Like them I would, in any case, wish to rely on such constitutional restraints as are embodied in the Bill of Rights (most, if not all, of which I believe can be defended as being essential for the enforcement of the democratic ideal) for identifying interests "too highly charged to be left to the vagaries of majoritarian decision making" (Chapter 2). Further, motivational differences between marketplace behavior and voting-booth behavior do not solely favor the former, in terms of consideration of the public interest. It is true, of course, that if, because of failure to look it up in Consumer's Research, or wherever, I buy a bad product, I am the one who pays the price, whereas if my candidate wins and turns out to have been a bad choice, the cost is widely spread. Thus, as Brennan and Lomasky argue, "voting tends to divorce preference from cost" (Chapter 2). The "other-things-equal" qualification is made to exclude such considerations as fear of adding to public deficits that they may consider to be already of dangerous proportions. See Chapter 2. If I am right, however, the statement that "between altruism and malice, democratic procedures differentially favor the latter" does call for qualification. (See Chapter 2.) Amartya Sen, "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, 78 (1970): 152-7, at 153. Ibid, p. 157. Russell Hardin's summary remarks on this point are of interest and accord with my argument: The argument of the logic of collective action is based on the strong assumption that individual actions are motivated by self-interest - or on the assumption of what I will commonly
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call narrow rationality, or, more briefly, rationality. Obviously, individual actions are motivated by concerns in addition to self-interest. But collective action for mutual benefit is, in an analogous sense, narrowly rational for a group or organization. Hence, it should not surprise us tofindthat many of those who want their collective interests to be served may weigh their own self-interests heavily, even too heavily to cooperate in serving their collective interests. (Collective Action [Baltimore Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982], pp. 9-10) Discussion of these ideas can be found, among other places, in Stanley I. Benn, "Problematic Rationality of Political Participation," in Peter Laslett and James Fishkin, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, 5 th ser. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), chap. 13, esp. sees. 2 and 3; and in Nelson, On Justifying Democracy, pp. 128-9. Howard Margolis has discussed an interesting way of dealing with altruistic behavior while remaining in the realm of positivist theory. Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality (Cambridge University Press, 1982). It is true, however, that the British government is experiencing increasing criticism at home for insufficient protection of these rights. See David G. Smith, "British Civil Liberties and the Law," Political Science Quarterly, 104 (1986): 637-60. See G. E. M. Anscombe, "On Frustration of the Majority's Will," Analysis, 36 (1976): 161-8, and William H. Riker, "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule," American Political Science Review, 74 (1980): 432-46. Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom, 1987," Freedom at Issue, no. 94 (January-February 1987): 19-34. "Effective equality" is measured by such factors as "extreme economic inequality," "illiteracy," and "intimidating violence" and also the "weakening of effective competition that is implied by the absence of periodic shifts in rule from one group or party to another." Further details regarding the classification and the methodology used can be found in the article. Ibid., p. 33. See Brown v. Board of Education ofTopeka, 1954, 347 U.S. 483; and Baker v. Can, 1962, 369 U.S. 186, which paved the way for subsequent decisions pronouncing and implementing the one-person, one-vote rule. I say not "easily" controlled because popular controls over the Court do exist. The Constitution may be amended, the Court may be brought to heel by cutting appropriations for its effective operation, and the president may "pack" it. The failure of the last attempt to do so reflected the Court's popular support. See Brian Barry, "Is Democracy Special?" in Laslett and Fishkin, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, pp. 155-96. Nelson makes essentially the same point in On Justifying Democracy, chap 7.
The justification of democracy 45 46 47 48 49
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John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 426-8. See Gerald F. Gaus, The Liberal Democratic Theory of Man (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), esp. chap. 4. The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, ed. C.E. Vaughan (Oxford: Blackwell Publisher, 1962), 1: 482. See Rousseau's discussion of the "pluses and minuses" (in the "will of all") that cancel one another, thus leaving the General Will as the "sum of the differences." The Social Contract, bk. 1, chap. 3. The calculations are taken from Brian Barry, "The Public Interest," in Anthony Quinton, ed., Political Philosophy (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 122.
CHAPTER 2
Large numbers, small costs: the uneasy foundation of democratic rule Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E. Lomasky
1
Introduction
During the fall of 1973, as Watergate lurched toward its denouement, automobiles along the eastern seaboard began to sprout bumper stickers proclaiming, "Nixon 49 - McGovern 1: Don't Blame Me. I'm From Massachusetts." This novel plea of innocence raises problems. If McGovern voters from Massachusetts (and the District of Columbia) merit exculpation from the Nixon reelection, who deserves blame? All voters from all other states? Nixon voters from all other states? Massachusetts voters who cast a ballot for Nixon? Does the fact that no one vote could have altered the outcome by the slightest degree and that this fact was known with a high degree of assurance before the election mean that no one bore any responsibility at all for the outcome? Ascribing praise or blame to individual electors may have little practical importance. (Although, if voters regard themselves as morally responsible for the quality of the vote they cast, moral considerations will weigh in determining how they vote.) What is decidedly nontrivial is the relation between voter responsibility and the justification of democratic governance. If there is something distinctive about rule that stems from democratic processes compared with that which is exercised by a nonelected elite, it may be said that in the former case the enfranchised populace bears direct responsibility for which candidates gain office and somewhat 42
Large numbers, small costs
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less direct responsibility for policies that are enacted. (If ballots include referenda questions, then responsibility for policy can also be direct.) Voters are responsible because they are not merely the passive recipients of decisions made on high but rather themselves bring about the outcomes that are attained.1 Implicit in this understanding of a democratic order is the conception of some parity between private action and collective action. An individual's responsibility for his private conduct rests on his ability to act voluntarily to produce intended results. To the extent that the collectivity can be satisfactorily viewed as itself a choice-making entity that selects "social outcomes" in essentially the same way as an individual chooses private outcomes, the parity is complete: Society intends certain outcomes and acts to bring them about. This organic model of the state currently enjoys much less popularity than it has in the past - an eclipse that we do not regret and will not attempt to reverse in this essay. Instead, we shall restrict our attention to the claims of the methodological individualist, one who treats individual human beings as the only authentic choice makers. The weak parity that a methodological individualist sees between private action and collective action involves a two-stage analysis of collective action. Each act of voting by an individual is construed as a private choice intended to increase the probability of the occurrence of a preferred outcome. To these items of individual choice is applied an aggregation rule which transforms the several expressions of preference into a collective choice of policy or candidate. Unless otherwise indicated, we shall assume that the aggregation rule being applied is majority rule. Certainly no other one has enjoyed as long a history of acceptance within democratic theory. Indeed, "democracy" and "majority rule" have acquired very much the same meaning within popular consciousness. It should be noted, however, that other aggregation rules can be devised and are in fact observed within democratic polities. Some require less than a majority - for example, simple plurality among three or more alternatives. Others, such as the complex rules for changing the U.S. Constitution, require more than a majority and that from more than one voting body. Majority rule may or may not have some distinctive and significant property,2 but it surely is not the only feasible aggregation rule for collective decision making. Our analysis is applicable to these other rules, provided that in each case they are taken to be devices for merging individual preferences into collective undertakings. We shall argue that there are grave - we believe insuperable difficulties confronting any attempt to base a justification for democratic procedures on their responsiveness to the preferences of the electorate.
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What people do in the voting booth is so unlike what they do in the marketplace (and in other arenas of uncoerced private action) that it is equivocal to call them both instances of "choice." It will be shown that the sense in which a voter who pulls the lever for A rather than the lever for B can be said to prefer A to B is very different from that in which a shopper who chooses product A rather than B or a worker who accepts employment A rather than B can be said to prefer A. Our analysis rests in part on phenomena that emerge when the number of voters is large, a situation that obtains in all democratic nation-states and in many of their political subunits. The difference the number of voters makes is developed in Section 2. More fundamental, however, than a large number of voters as such is the separation that occurs within the voting context, even when the electorate is relatively small, between expressing support for an outcome and bearing the costs, pecuniary and otherwise, of that outcome. We shall demonstrate that voting tends to divorce preference from cost. An elector is led to choose as if costs were largely absent or as if their incidence were otherwise than is in fact the case. Preference for outcome A when its costs can be shed is markedly different from choosing to bring about A and to bear its costs. It will be shown in Section 3 that what emerges through democratic procedures may not be the will of the majority, and may not have been desired by a single voter. Thus, justification of democracy as adherence to popular preference fails. The argument developed here differs significantly from those more familiar in economic analyses of collective choice. In the analysis of electoral outcomes there are two separable elements: The first is concerned with the calculus of the individual voters in deciding how their particular votes shall be cast; the second is concerned with the way in which individual votes are aggregated to yield an electoral "decision." The major focus in public-choice theory has been the second of these elements. Emphasis has been placed on the peculiarities of majority rule as an aggregation device - on how majority rule may fail to yield a stable equilibrium3 or on how it may involve outcomes that leave all voters worse off.4 We do not denigrate these results in any way. However, our focus is on the former element, and the considerations with which we are concerned arise independently of the aggregation rule employed. Although we restrict our attention to two-option/candidate elections under majority rule, the result can be generalized to other electoral situations. Our argument reveals a sharp contrast between action in private arenas, in which the individual can be presumed to act in order to bring about a desired outcome, and action in electoral contexts, in which case such a presumption is illegitimate. This result is more than a scrap of
Large numbers, small costs
45
theoretical fallout, curious to behold but not encountered in practice. Rather, it systematically distorts the results achieved by regimes and institutions grounded on democratic procedures. It is not claimed that there neither are nor can be valid reasons for resorting to decision making by ballot; in Section 4 we tentatively suggest what they might be. Democratic rule may be, over a wide range of situations, the least bad of several flawed alternatives. If that seems a lukewarm endorsement of democracy, so be it. 2
Large numbers
Consider an individual in a voting booth facing levers A and B. They may represent either policies, exactly one of which is to be adopted, or candidates, exactly one of whom is to gain office. In order to skirt interesting but not directly relevant questions concerning the nature of representation, we can assume that candidates stand for determinate policy packages,5 thus making the two cases identical. When the voter pulls the A lever, he thereby expresses support for A. Support for A can be expressed in numerous other ways: making speeches for A; wearing buttons saying "I like A"; donating money to the A campaign fund; praying in the privacy of one's bedroom that A will win. Note that each of these activities could go on in a regime in which choice between A and B was not democratic but rather determined by the decision of one person, the dictator. It is true that nondemocratic regimes are not noted for the tolerance with which diverse expressions of policy preference are met. This, however, is a contingent feature of such regimes. What may be held to be an essential distinguishing feature of democracy is that, whereas in the latter case the dictator brings about the outcome, under democratic rule each of the voters equally shares in bringing about the outcome. Let us return to our voter in the booth. Because he is a citizen of a democracy, not a dictatorship, his pulling lever A is to be construed as both expressing support for A and acting to bring about A. More precisely still, it is intentionally acting so as to bring about A. If all levers were unmarked, frequency of pulls could still be used as a decision procedure, but no one could be said to intend the outcome that emerged. A "voter" in such circumstances might have a fondness for pulling one lever rather than the other, but such fondness could not be rationally related to an attempt to bring about the desired outcome. When levers are identified, however, voters can act in order to produce results. That they can do so does not mean that they in fact do so. They might be motivated by pure lever preference, pulling the one that they do
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irrespective of its role in producing a particular outcome. This possibility may seem too far-fetched to merit any consideration as a realistic description of people's actual voting behavior. We believe that appraisal to be mistaken. Persons' voting behavior may have many explanations, but one that must usually have relatively little weight is the intention to produce a favored outcome. The larger the electorate, the less important a motivation to produce outcomes becomes.6 Consider an "electorate" of one person. His vote is certain to be decisive. If he cannot impose his choice on anyone else, he bears all the benefits as well as all the costs of his choice. This limiting case is equivalent to market transactions involving the purchase of purely private goods. The consumer who "votes" with his dollar to purchase pinto beans rather than lima beans secures the benefits of the former at the cost of one dollar's worth of lima beans forgone. Moreover, he is aware of the costbenefit alternatives that confront him and so can accurately be said to bring about the desired outcome intentionally. Now expand the electorate to three. If all votes are independent, and if the prior probability of each other voter choosing A is .5, then each voter has a .5 probability of being decisive. In those cases in which the other two split their vote (two of the four possible cases) his vote carries the decision; when the other two agree, his vote has no effect on the outcome. Generalizing to all cases of (2n + 1) voters, an individual's vote is decisive if and only if the other 2n voters are equally divided between A and B; otherwise it has no effect. If we let v,(A) and v,(B) stand, respectively, for the value placed on A by the rth voter and the value placed on B by the rth voter, then the payoff to the rth voter for a vote for A is Vt(A) — vt(B) 0
if he is decisive otherwise
His expected payoff R is R = h[Vi(A) -
Vi(B)]
where h is the probability that the other 2n voters will divide equally between A and B. Clearly, as the number of voters increases, h becomes smaller. The probability of a tie occurring is the number of ways in which 2n voters can be arrayed such that A receives exactly n votes, divided by the total number of ways in which 2n voters can be arrayed. This is h = 2nCJ22n
(1)
More generally, if the probability that a random voter will vote for A isp, the probability of a tie occurring is
Large numbers, small costs Py
47
(2)
Using Stirling's approximation for large number n, (2) becomes h
92/1+1/2
and when p = .5, the corresponding approximation to (1) is h = l/yfnn
(4)
Therefore, the expected payoff to voter i in casting a vote for A is =
(5)
V7Z7Z
In elections where the number of voters is large, h is small, and thus the expected payoff for a vote for A will be trivial except where A is intensely valued over B. For example, consider a voter choosing between candidates A and B in a gubernatorial election in which 1 million people vote. Suppose that the voter values A's election at 100 dollars; that is, if he were the sole determinant of who will become governor, he would pay up to 100 dollars to bring it about that A win. Substituting into (4), we find that h approximately equals 1/1253, and so from (5), R amounts to slightly less than 8 cents. If the primary motive for voting is simply to increase the likelihood of the preferred outcome, R will surely not compensate the voter for the time and trouble incurred in voting. Indeed, if the cost of voting is as little as 1 dollar, he will not vote unless vt(A) — ^(B) is greater than 1,250 dollars! If we make the realistic supposition that such intensity of preference is quite uncommon, it follows that any explanation of voting behavior as attempts to bring about preferred results is highly dubious.7 The extent to which persons are or are not concerned about the welfare of others has some bearing on the result. Someone for whom choice of policy matters only insofar as it affects himself directly may have a smaller stake in the outcome than someone whose concerns include the welfare of other persons. (It is also possible that other-regarding preferences may tend to cancel out self-interest, moving the voter closer to indifference.) If either altruism or malice runs high throughout the voting population, the attempt to bring about outcomes could be more relevant to voting behavior than the preceding calculations seem to indicate. However, those calculations considerably overstate for most cases the probability of an individual being the swing voter. Recall that they are based on the assumption that the prior probability of each of the other voters selecting A is precisely .5. Typically a random voter will not be
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equally likely to pick A as to pick B. Preelection polls, voting history, and other data can provide evidence that p deviates from .5. (Even the total absence of all such evidence does not constitute counterevidence for the judgment that/? = .5.) Let m stand for the expected majority for A (which can be positive, negative, or zero); then the prior probability of a random voter casting a ballot for A is
and the prior probability that he will vote for B is
Substituting (6) and (7) into (3) yields In
) \
In
or nn
(9)
where j is the expected proportionate majority for A, that is, m/2n. Even when j is very close to zero and (1 — j2) very close to unity, (1 — j2)n is very small when n is large. The somewhat involved mathematics are inserted simply to provide some of the analytic structure supporting a fact known intuitively by most voters: The chance of one's own vote being decisive in a large election is vanishingly small.8 This means that the expected payoff to a vote for A is also minute. Suppose again that the /th elector will vote only if the return to that vote is 1 dollar or greater. For an electorate of 1 million, if the expected proportionate majority to either side is only .005, he will not vote unless ^(A) - ^(B) is 340,000,000 dollars or greater; if; is .01, the figure becomes approximately (6.5X10 24 ) dollars. Since this sum is comfortably greater than the world's total product for the previous century, it seems safe to conclude that even a person of remarkably intense preferences will not be pulled into the voting booth by a realistic appraisal of the impact he can expect to have on the outcome. This is not intended to be a demonstration of psychological truths about voters. For all we know, it may be that some people do cast ballots in large elections in order to maximize their return. But if our figures are accurate within one or two orders of magnitude, and if voters are not
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49
uniformly prey to gross delusion about the efficacy of a single vote, the "natural" understanding of voting behavior as the deliberate attempt to bring about a preferred outcome cannot be assumed generally to obtain. Also, normative assertions to the effect that a person ought to vote because he thereby has a nonnegligible impact on political outcomes are either misinformed or duplicitous or both.9 Even without an extensive psychological examination of voters, there is some empirical evidence that desire to affect outcomes is not the only or primary motive for voting. For example, the result of the 1980 ReaganCarter presidential election was announced by all three of the major television networks well before the polls had closed on the West Coast. This early announcement was subsequently deplored in hundreds of editorial pages on the grounds that it discouraged voters in those states from casting a ballot. Why it should be supposed desirable that persons abandon the comforts of home in order to cast a vote that would not and could not affect the final outcome was not widely discussed in those pages. (Would it be equally salutary, one wonders, to reenact the election of 1928 so that new generations could provide their deliberative judgments concerning the respective merits of Herbert Hoover and Al Smith?) And though it was noted that voting lines thinned after the network announcement, what deserves more attention is why anyone at all remained to cast a ballot for the presidency. Given a conception of voting as an exercise in bringing about outcomes, such conduct is irrational to the point of perplexity. We maintain that voters are not predominantly irrational, and thus they vote as they do for reasons that have little to do with an intention to affect outcomes. Consider an analogous case: Jones sends the hospitalized Smith a "Get Well Quick" card. Jones may incur the cost of sending the card because he believes that Smith will thereby receive some therapeutic benefit and Jones values the expected benefit to Smith more than he does the out-of-pocket cost. This is a possible explanation - but an awfully far-fetched one. It remains so even if it turns out that there is some discernible benefit from receiving cards. Or consider the sports fan who goes to the stadium to cheer on his team. It is barely possible, but no more than that, that he does so in the belief that the marginal return to one more scream from the bleachers sufficiently enhances the probability of his team's winning to justify the time, energy, and money expended. We do not deny that the aggregate cheering of hometown fans influences the outcomes of some ballgames; that fact, however, does not explain the cheering. And though it is true that votes in the aggregate actually determine election results, it does not follow that individual voters act in order to bring about those results.
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The results heretofore obtained are essentially negative. We have not stated why persons vote for a candidate or policy, but have instead argued against one particular explanatory theory. It could be, and we suppose is, the case that there is no single reason underlying nearly all voting behavior. One factor that will receive more scrutiny in Section 3 is the expressive function of voting. Just as one expresses the desire that one's friend will recover from an illness or that one's team will win the game without explicitly aiming to bring about either result, so too can one's vote for A be a bona fide expression of support for A even in the knowledge that the effect on outcomes is miniscule. In addition we suspect that people vote in order to fulfill their civic duty, in order to be seen fulfilling their civic duty, to avoid pangs of guilt, to break the monotony of the day, because they judge that the consequences of everyone not voting would be disastrous and that this generalization test has moral force for them, in order to be able to say even if hooked up to a lie detector, "I voted for A, not that scallywag B," some combination of these, or still different reasons. It was lightheartedly suggested earlier that some voters might exhibit pure lever preference, that they vote as they do because of the location of the levers. Even that possibility is not as outlandish as it might first appear to be; political professionals maneuver to get their party's candidates put on the top row because they judge that this affords them a differential advantage. Where so many factors may be present, we have no wish to commit ourselves to some one positive theory of voting behavior. Nor does our argument require such commitment. It has been noted that justifications of democracy typically rest on some claim that democratic procedures afford the citizenry a choice of rulers and policies; the citizens are the ones who bring about political results. However, when the number of citizens is moderately large, this attempted justification collapses. Neither the electorate as a whole nor any single voter can be described as choosing an outcome. Choice is not the idle expression of a wish,10 but rather action intended to eventuate in an outcome. Because the probability that a single vote will alter the result is, for all practical purposes, zero, voting for A is not choosing A.11 That A is victorious does not mean that anyone chose it. Nor, as will be shown in Section 3, is the victory of A an especially reliable indicator that the majority of voters prefers A to B. 3
Small costs
The opportunity cost of a dollar spent on groceries or an hour devoted to listening to music is the next most highly valued use of the dollar or the hour forgone. Because acting to achieve ends is costly, it is senseless to
Large numbers, small costs
51
speak of an agent's preferences among alternatives without bringing in their relative costs to him. This truth applies equally to altruistic and selfish actions. One may wish in the abstract that some impoverished person had an extra dollar, but the cost of directly bringing about that state of affairs is one dollar of personal consumption forgone. That is why someone who thinks that the alleviation of poverty is desirable in principle might not do much of it himself. He prefers a dollar of his own consumption to a dollar of poverty relief. Of course, if the cost of a dollar's worth of poverty alleviation dropped to a dime, he might allocate his resources differently. Counterbalancing the gloomy fact that altruistic action is not free is the cheering reminder that indulging one's malice also imposes costs. Tracking down one's bete noire in order to stomp on his toes takes time and exposes one to retaliation. Hiring a mercenary toe stomper requires the outlay of cash. The bigoted storekeeper who refuses to trade with blacks thereby forgoes all economic benefits such trade would bring. Again, as the cost of malicious actions varies, so too do individuals' effective preferences for malice. A society's structure of law and punishment can in large measure be viewed as an attempt to raise the costs of malicious acts. Expressing support for an outcome can be much less costly than actually bringing about that outcome. Voicing pleasantries about the desirability of charity or muttering under one's breath imprecations concerning one's boss comes easier than giving away substantial sums or walking away from a lucrative job. In a democracy, one important way in which one can express support for an outcome is by voting for it. When the number of voters is even moderately large, voting is a low-cost way to give vent to sentiments that would, in other contexts, lie dormant. Consider a voter confronting the choice of whether to vote for or against a proposal involving his being taxed 100 dollars, the proceeds going to the poor. He will vote, let us suppose, as he prefers. It is a mistake" to conclude that, if he votes yes, he prefers the imposition of the tax to its nonimposition. All that can be concluded is that he prefers to vote for its imposition. The distinction is crucial. It hinges on the difference between the cost of a policy and the cost of voting for that policy. Again, numbers enter the analysis. In the limiting case, an electorate of one, a vote to be taxed is decisive. It brings about 100 dollars' worth of poor relief at the cost to the voter of 100 dollars. It is, of course, precisely equivalent to private charitable allocation.12 As the size of the electorate increases, the opportunity cost of a vote decreases. It is the probability of being the decisive voter multiplied by the amount of the tax. This will be a few cents when the electorate is even moderately large. Therefore, it is entirely illegitimate to conclude that a yes vote reveals a preference to
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have 100 dollars transferred to the poor; rather, it reveals a preference to express support for a policy where that expressive act comes virtually free of cost. Why would someone vote for such a policy unless he were genuinely willing to be taxed? Many of us subscribe in some measure to moral principles maintaining that those who are financially well off ought to transfer some appreciable part of their assets to the poor. For better or worse, most of us are loath to forgo attractive opportunities for private consumption. However, guilt at not acting on one's moral convictions is itself a psychic cost; it is not pleasant to recognize oneself as weak willed or a hypocrite. The collectivization of transfer decisions provides relief from cognitive dissonance. One can "do the moral thing" by voting with relative ease for a tax because the cost of that vote is trivial. This hypothesis has explanatory power in some surprising areas. Clergy, especially of the mainline Protestant denominations, have responded to increasing secularization by making fewer demands on the private behavior of their parishioners. On the other hand, they have eagerly embraced political solutions and political activism. We hold that this response is rational. A leader of enormous personal authority can demand with some success, "Give all you have to the poor!"; one with less authority, "Give ten percent of your annual income to the poor"; one whose authority is marginal, "Vote to be taxed ten percent for the poor." Suppose that everyone in an electorate were to cast a ballot motivated by such moral considerations.13 The result would be that each would provide 100 dollars of poor relief at the cost to himself of 100 dollars. By hypothesis, each would prefer instead to keep the money. The curious result is a multiperson Prisoner's Dilemma arrived at by democratic procedures. Each of the voters would be better off had he and all the others (or, under majority rule, half the others) voted no, but the dominant strategy for each is to vote yes. They are taxed, although no one prefers that result. The basic resemblance to the familiar Prisoner's Dilemma game can be indicated by appeal to Table 1. The complications arise because in the remote case of a tie (which occurs with a probability of at most 1/1250 in an election with 1 million voters) the "vote-against" strategy gives the higher return; but since this case is so remote, it has insufficient effect on the expected net benefit of "voting for" to be decisive. The net benefit of voting for the tax transfer project is q{\ - 0) + (( 11 -- q--7L)(101 q--7L) l / \ ylnn/ 100 {\-q)--===\-0.08 snn
- 100) + -^= (1 - 100) = 92 cents
Large numbers, small costs
53
Table 1. Returns to expressive voting Majority of others
Each voter Vote for project Vote against project
Vote for probability q
Vote against probability
Tie probability X/yfuh
1
101
1
0
100
100
Expected return
q+ 101 (1 -q)-\00/4nn 100(1 -q)
where q is the probability that a majority will vote for the project. In other words, the prospect of a tie can be ignored, and we can focus on the basic Prisoner's Dilemma interaction of the first two columns. Each voter will be led to vote for the project for a payoff of one dollar each; yet all would prefer the outcome whereby the project does not go ahead, in which case they receive a payoff of 100 dollars each (in taxes not collected). To the extent that the normative case for democracy rests on the claim that democratic procedures give force to the preferences of the people, or at least the majority of the people, this result undermines that case. Majority vote for A rather than B does not reveal majority preference for A rather than B. We believe this to be of more practical importance than some other anomalies of voting that theorists have uncovered. Cycling majorities may emerge more often in learned journals than they do in actual elections. By contrast, the separation of cost from outcome is a routine feature of elections with a large number of voters. If collective action were restricted to the provision of goods valued by all or most voters above the cost of their provision, this separation would be less important. However, modern democratic policies engage in extensive wealth transfers that are not homogeneously valued by most sectors of the citizenry. Majority rule cannot be assumed to reflect accurately majority preference for such policies. An enthusiast for democracy might, at this point, shift his ground. "All the better if voters vote more morally than they act! Political decision making will then produce morally better outcomes than would result if decisions were left to individuals acting in their private capacity." Leaving aside comment on the conception of morality presupposed by this remark, it is erroneous in its assumption that voting behavior unequivocally encourages the expression of altruistic sentiments. As was noted earlier, voting also renders malice cheaper. A German voter in 1933 who cast a ballot for Hitler was able to indulge his anti-Semitic proclivities at lower cost than he would have borne by organizing a pogrom.
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Table 2. Returns to voting for persecution A majority
a
Each
Vote for
Vote against
Vote for persecution Vote against persecution
-10* -15
10 5
Equilibrium outcome.
A Prisoner's Dilemma problem in expressing negative preferences exactly analogous to the one indicated earlier with respect to public philanthropy emerges. Let us suppose that the individual relishes the symbolic act of thumbing his electoral nose at the Jews while not in any way desiring their destruction, for either moral or instrumental reasons. Here (in Table 2) the dominant strategy for each voter is to vote for persecution, and the persecution outcome emerges. Yet the best outcome is one in which there is no persecution. Electoral decision making yields a payoff of — 10 to all voters, when each might have had a payoff of + 5. Or again, in the context of military engagement, each voter may wish to express his patriotism and his determination before the potential enemy, yet not at all desire an outcome in which he has to go to war. The dominant strategy (in Table 3) for each voter is to vote "expressively" for bellicose policies; the final outcome is that all vote for war, which no one wants. Because voting is essentially cost free, it is conducive to extremes of altruistic and malicious expression, both of which tend to be dampened by the cost structure of private undertakings. Even if there were an equal chance that malicious and altruistic inclinations might motivate individuals' votes, we might still be concerned to limit the political domain. A cautious maximin strategy calls for removing from the arena of direct democratic control high-risk decisions whereby the intrusion of malice could severely damage the interests of some group. This is exactly what is accomplished by constitutional limitations on the scope of majority rule. A bill of rights identifies certain interests as too highly charged to be left to the vagaries of majoritarian decision making. A maximin strategy is not the only reason for endorsing, when feasible, the privatization of choice. There is, in addition, presumptive reason to suspect that the extreme most favored by voting is malice. Voting altruistically is less costly than acting altruistically, but the return to it is lower. Because a vote is anonymous, the recipients of altruistic concern will be unable to identify and express gratitude toward their benefactors. If someone places value not only on helping other persons but also on having that
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55
Table 3. Returns to voting for aggression A majority
a
Each
For
Against
Vote for aggression Against
-80* -100
20 0
Equilibrium outcome.
altruistic deed acknowledged, he will receive a greater return from a dollar of direct giving than from incurring an equal expense through his vote. There is then at least some tendency for persons to channel their altruistic impulses into private transactions rather than through an impersonal governmental welfare program. The reverse is true for malice. Here anonymity is a benefit rather than a cost because it insulates one from the reproach of one's victim. Admittedly, the sadistic and the vengeful may not only desire to harm someone but also desire that their target know whence his harm comes. We believe this to be the exception: More people will vote for capital punishment than will volunteer for duty in thefiringsquad; many Germans noted with equanimity the disappearance of the Jewish population from their community without desiring to become more deeply involved in the machinations of the Third Reich. Between altruism and malice, democratic procedures differentially favor the latter.14 4
New foundations for democratic rule?
It may seem as if our argument is designed to be a categorical indictment of democratic governance. Not so. Our argument has rather been put forth as a corrective to adulatory treatments of democratic political processes that are blind to any blemish. Our object has been to expose proffered justifications of democracy that inaccurately represent the nature of the voting decision or the authority of electorally revealed "preferences." The critique should not, however, be oversold. It does suggest that, when decision making can be "privatized," outcomes will tend to reflect more accurately the relevant costs (and benefits) to individual agents. It also alerts us to the folly of relying too heavily on collective cures for collective ills - it is by no means obvious how the problems intrinsic to large-number voting can be solved by yet more large-number voting. But it does not indicate that, when collective decisions are to be made, nondemocratic procedures are to be preferred. The choice among possible
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political institutions is necessarily one among imperfect alternatives, and it seems likely that the determination of outcomes by aggregating votes will often be a preferable procedure to other options. One of the prime virtues of majority rule is precisely the obverse of the earlier argument. If the collectivity does not choose the emergent outcome, then equally no particular individual is producing a favored result. Unlike monarchy, dictatorship, or oligarchy, no one is situated so as to bend results in order to advance his own interests at the expense of others. If there is no way we can design institutions so that electoral outcomes reflect the interests of everyone, then, one might argue, it is better that the outcomes reflect the interests of no one than that they spin to the tune of some self-serving, self-styled elite. 15 This may seem like scant praise indeed. Democracy would have no stronger justification than would flipping a coin to select outcomes - a procedure that is equally free of corruption. We do not find this comparison particularly disturbing. Resorting to chance is not necessarily an irrational procedure: Athenian democracy used lots to fill various offices; random selection is currently used to select jurors and, until recently, was used to conscript American armies. One might be prepared to endorse it more extensively if one could be sure that the procedure were genuinely random (which it may not be if the options are selected by some agent with an interest in the outcomes). But voting processes have at least one advantage over random selection: They afford an opportunity for the expression of sentiments in the same forum that also leads to (unchosen) outcomes. Because many people do go to some trouble to vote in spite of the negligible probability that an individual vote will be decisive, it can be inferred that they value this expressive possibility. It is both tempting and easy to decry the egregiously limited political information that voters carry to the polls. It is true that the representative voter does not rival Walter Lippmann for political sagacity; however, the results achieved in Section 2 suggest that electors invest far more resources in securing political information than can be explained by the expected payoff to them of a better-informed vote. That indicates that expressive support evinced by voting is more highly valued as it is better informed. (Reverting to a previous analogy, the most vociferous baseball fans also tend to be the ones best informed about the makeup of the roster, batting averages, etc.) So outcomes that emerge through voting reflect more and better information than does decision by random selection. Moreover, although votes do not infallibly express preference over outcomes, it would be foolish to deny the existence of any association. People's natural affection for themselves leads them to regard favorably candidates and policies that further their own interests. Expressions of
Large numbers, small costs
57
support for such candidates and policies will tend to produce outcomes roughly congruent with those genuinely preferred - although frequent small deviations and occasional gross ones are to be expected under democratic procedures. Nonetheless, this fact undeniably suggests some support for outcomes democratically arrived at compared with those that result from random procedures. It should be noted in closing that voting is not the only arena in which valued expressive behavior concerning political matters can occur. The writing of this essay - and your reading it - are expressive activities engaged in outside the realm of collective choice and with no intention to alter outcomes. (We did not choose to write it on the basis of some calculation of the probability that it will produce our favored political arrangements multiplied by the value we place on those arrangements.) In a free society, there are many valued forms of political expression that do not carry the associated cost of gendarmes breaking down one's door. Uncoerced private choice is a path by which outcomes can emerge, and we have given some reasons for favoring it when both private choice and collective choice are possible. To be sure, private choice through market arrangements also suffers from imperfections. Most of the welfare economics of this century has been devoted to demonstrating "market failure" in which externalities and public goods intrude. In response, public-choice economics has emphasized that government is peopled not by perfectly benevolent saints but by individuals who, like the rest of us, engage in self-interested conduct. They have demonstrated that there exists "governmental failure" that corresponds to market failure. 16 Our essay, although it has nothing to say about the motivations of politicians and bureaucrats, is continuous with the public-choice critique. What we have tried to demonstrate is that familiar problems such as free riding, Prisoner's Dilemma, and undesired spillover effects are not only encountered in private choice; they are inextricably woven into the fabric of democratic decision making. Notes 1 2
3
A useful overview of normative and empirical democratic theory is that of J. Roland Pennock, Democratic Political Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979). The issue of which decision rule is appropriate and whether majority rule has any claim to uniqueness is addressed explicitly by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962). See, e.g., Duncan Black, The Theory ofCommittees and Election (Cambridge University Press, 1958), and William Riker, "Voting and the
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Summation of Preferences," American Political Science Review 55 (December 1961): 900-11. See Richard McKelvey, "Intransitivities in Multi-Dimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control," Journal of Economic Theory 12 (June 1976): 472-82, and Steven Slutsky, "A Voting Model for the Allocation of Public Goods: Existence of an Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory 14 (April 1977): 1027-81. Typically, campaigns do not make vividly clear the positions to which candidates subscribe; and the record of postelectionfidelityto campaign promises would not gladden the heart of Immanuel Kant. Moreoever, officeholders willfindthemselves confronting issues that could not have been anticipated during the campaign. For these and other reasons, voting for candidates is unlike voting for policy packages. These dissimilarities, to the extent that they affect our argument, tend to strengthen it. That political conventions go to the trouble of producing platforms and pundits learnedly upbraid candidates who do not sufficiently emphasize "the issues" may be taken as evidence that the legitimacy of democratic rule is tied to the ability of electorates to associate candidates with policies. If that cannot be done, elections look embarrassingly like the choice of to whom to cede one's political autonomy. For a large variety of situations in which the number of those involved is very large, one's own contribution to a desirable or undesirable state of affairs amounts to only a miniscule fraction of the totality. For example, whether or not I disable the catalytic converter on my car will have no perceptible effect on the city's pollution problem. However, it will have some slight effect. The voting case is different in that one's vote will either have zero effect (nearly all of the time) or substantial effect (rarely). Voting will be more nearly akin to pollution, world hunger relief, etc., for one who subscribes to a mandate theory of elections; i.e., the value of the victory of A is enhanced by each vote above a bare majority that A receives. We assume in our argument that there is no mandate effect. If, as seems reasonable, the supramajority mandate effect is very small compared with the threshold effect of casting the swing vote, a mandate theory will be susceptible to basically equivalent results. Two important treatments of the implications large numbers have for moral obligation are James Fishkin, The Limits ofObligrtion (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), and David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965). Virtually all modern "public-choice theory" (i.e., the application of economics to political theory) makes just this assumption. See Dennis Mueller, Public Choice (Cambridge University Press, 1979). Nonetheless, boosters of civic virtue often proclaim the insidiousness of this belief. While leafing through the October 1982 issue of the magazine United Airlines provides to its passengers, we found the following editorial comment by Richard J. Ferris, the airline's chairman and chief
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executive officer: "Why do so many Americans take for granted the right to vote? Perhaps it's because they are politically apathetic, distrustful of the system, unwilling to take the time, unbending in their belief that their vote can't possibly have an impact on the outcome of an election. How wrong and how wasteful. By voting, a person chooses leaders, endows them with power, and holds them accountable." We are heartened that great corporate executives can have such deep respect for the political power of the average voter. If it is important to persuade persons whose political undertakings are typically limited to trips to the polling places every two or four years that they nonetheless "matter," this might explain why such dubious normative assertions continue to surface. Aristotle agrees. See Nicomachean Ethics 111 lb 19-30. Bribing a large number of voters may have an appreciable chance of affecting outcomes. If democratic theory is grounded in the desirability of citizens being able to determine how they shall be governed, it ought to rank artful bribers much higher than simple voters. For charitable contributions deductible from one's taxable income, the cost of private transfers is less than the amount transferred. The supposition is admittedly unrealistic because it assumes an electorate composed entirely of net taxpayers with no net tax recipients. It is, however, instructive as an extreme case. One who craves realism may conceive of it as a plebiscite on foreign aid. This general line of reasoning is suggested by Gordon Tullock, "The Charity of the Uncharitable," Western Economic Journal 9 (December 1971): 579-92. This argument was suggested to us by a reading of the account of sympathy in Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Glasgow ed. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Classics, 1982), especially pp. 113-34. A Smithian moral psychology, although extremely congenial to this argument, is not presupposed by it. Since Adam Smith, it has been commonplace among economists to characterize the market as spontaneously generating an order that no one has chosen or intended. If our argument is correct, the same is true of outcomes that emerge from democratic procedures when the number of people involved is large. It does not, of course, follow that the two are equally efficient ways of allocating resources. See Mueller, Public Choice, for a useful survey of the public-choice literature.
CHAPTER 3
Evaluating the institutions of liberal democracy William Nelson
My topic is the evaluation of democracy. By "democracy" I mean representative government of the kind found in most countries in North America and Western Europe. It is not that I think this the only possible or only correct meaning of "democracy." It is a simplifying assumption, a stipulation. I make it simply because I believe that, for many people at least, it is the evaluation of this kind of government that is of interest, whether or not it is, by somebody's definition, real democracy, much less the only kind of government properly called "democratic." When we evaluate democracy, we are evaluating a system of institutionalized authority. The issue is one of institutional design. When we adopt political institutions - a legislative procedure, for example - we run ariskthat it will yield bad legislation. This will be true no matter what standard we use for assessing legislation, and it will be true of democratic as well as nondemocratic procedures. There is nothing magic about democratic procedures. This is not to say that democratic procedures have no advantage over others. We simply question what these advantages are and what disadvantages remain. Well worked out answers to these questions, relative to some specific kind of democratic system, should be of interest practically as well as theoretically, for, among other things, they can point the way toward desirable reforms. But it should be stressed that any answer presupposes some standard for the assessment of procedures. 60
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In what follows, I shall examine some common objections to democracy and then consider some possible arguments in its defense. In each case, I shall focus on the normative assumptions underlying the criticism or defense in question. The normative positions on which I shall concentrate are positions I associate with the public-choice literature and, especially, with the work of James Buchanan (esp. 1975 and Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). This work is marked by a concern both to respect the choices and preferences of individuals and to protect individual rights over person and property. I want to explore how these two concerns bear on the evaluation of democracy as well as how they are related to one another. It might be thought that the three are clearly consistent and even support each other, but I shall argue that the relations among them are far more complicated. For example, there is no guarantee that democratic procedures will respect property rights, and, indeed, they frequently do not. At the same time, however, when contrasted with the ideal of simply respecting the choices or preferences of individuals, both democratic institutions and property rights institutions have a great deal in common. The question for democratic theory, as for political theory generally, is how these conflicts are to be resolved. In the latter part of this essay, I describe an approach to normative theory and to problems of institutional design that provides, if not an answer to this question, at least a way to think about answering it. This approach embodies a kind of ideal of social and political relations, as does, I believe, the concern to respect individual choices and preferences. It differs from the latter in ways that I shall describe, but it does so without abandoning the basic humanistic individualism that seems to underlie it. More important, for my purposes here, it provides a way of characterizing what is good about democracy as well as a way of thinking about the flaws of the system as we know it. 1
Problems with democracy
Taking political institutions in the United States to be democratic, in line with the definition of democracy given at the beginning of this essay, there is much, or so it seems, that can be said in criticism of this form of government. There are, for one thing, both empirical and a priori reasons for thinking that legislation, the paradigmatic output of the political process, cannot be said to represent the will of the electorate. First, no one knows even how to define for any interesting range of cases "what society prefers" as opposed to what this or that person prefers. Moreover, even if we were simply to stipulate that what the people prefer refers to the outcome of the vote when people follow some particular voting
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procedure - like a majority procedure - the fact is that people frequently do not vote, perhaps because, given fairly innocuous assumptions, it seems that they have little or no reason to do so. Moreover, when they do vote, they may not vote for what they actually prefer, voting, instead, for what they prefer to vote for, which is not necessarily the same (see Chapter 2, this volume). When we turn from the vagaries of the aggregation of preferences to the outcomes of the political process, there is again much that seems objectionable from one perspective or another. It may be clearly desirable that government adopt efficient programs to prevent "market failures" - to promote the production of external economies and prevent external diseconomies. But no democratic government in fact limits itself to these activities. Instead, as it is sometimes put, governments are widely involved in the "public production of private goods": In some cases, people are compelled to provide others with goods of the kind that involve no significant externalities and could perfectly well be produced and sold in the market. In other cases, people are provided with special benefits (e.g., tariff protection, exclusive licenses) that are available only through government and that have the effect of redistributing income from consumers and unprotected businesses toward those receiving special protection. People invest substantial resources in an effort to secure special protections, and the net redistributive effects do not necessarily favor the needy (see Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock, 1980). This list of criticisms could be extended, but it is not my main purpose to raise specific objections to democracy. My point here is that each of these objections clearly presupposes some general normative assumptions about the proper functions of the state or about what it is that might make democracy a desirable form of government. Indeed, even the decision to investigate certain questions, like the question of whether there is a rational motive for voting, frequently depends on assumptions about the proper operation of democratic government. What are the normative assumptions underlying the criticisms of democratic institutions I have described? Obviously, there is no unique answer in the case of a hypothetical criticism that includes no explicit normative assumptions. But in the case of someone who objects to a democratic system on the ground that its decisions fail to reflect the preferences of the people, the likely underlying assumption is simply that collective decisions ought to reflect these preferences. Legislation ought, in general, to accord with the "will of the people." The second objection turns not on a failure of democratically chosen laws to reflect, in some sense, the people's preferences, but rather on the redistributive nature of much democratic legislation. Laws, or too many
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laws, impose burdens on some for the benefit of others. But it is more difficult to identify a plausible and suitably general principle that might underlie this objection. The critics who put it forward do not often propose positive theories of distributive justice. The law requires each of us to refrain from killing, maiming, or stealing from others. In doing so, it is providing, at public expense, goods that people could purchase for themselves in the market.1 These goods then lack one of the features that is thought to argue in favor of public provision. Furthermore, some people might prefer to have no such restrictions at all, or at least to have different restrictions. Perhaps they wish to live by theft and want to be free to take revenge on their enemies in their own way. Perhaps they prefer a world in which they can steal with relative impunity, even if their own goods will be less secure from theft. Perhaps they would like some of the benefits of stable arrangements, but not if anyone else benefits as well. Of course, in a world without restrictions, the general insecurity would result in low production and therefore in a more meager existence, even for thieves. But perhaps the material wants of these people are few. They are burdened for the sake of others both by being taxed to provide protection for others and by being coercively prevented from living as they wish. Yet many of us, I assume, would think this provision of (largely) private goods at public expense, this imposition of a burden on some for the benefit of others, to be entirely appropriate. We might, or might not, feel the same way about taxing some to provide welfare payments or education vouchers for the poor; and, of course, each of us can find numerous examples of the public provision of special benefits and subsidies to particular groups that seem to us totally without justification. For someone who shares opinions like these and who also objects to democratic institutions on the ground that they lead to the unjust imposition of burdens on some for the benefit of others, the problem is to provide a plausible, general account of which impositions are just and which unjust. One possibility, of course, is to turn directly to moral philosophy, and especially to the natural rights literature, assuming, perhaps, that it is legitimate to enforce naturalrightsbut that otherwise people are to be left free. But it is controversial what natural rights there are, if any. It is controversial whether property rights are included among natural rights, and, even if they are, what their content is. It is controversial, more generally, whether there are "positive" moral rights the state ought to respect along with "negative" rights against interference.2 Is there a way to avoid getting into these issues of moralrights?Can the issue be resolved on the basis of minimal assumptions that we can all agree upon? One possibility is to appeal solely to what people prefer. But that seems
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to be what got us into difficulty in the first place. The redistributive policies that seem objectionable are, after all, preferred by those who receive the benefits at the expense of others. But perhaps that simply means we ought to limit ourselves to what people can agree to unanimously. However, by that criterion, under the assumptions I have described, it will not be legitimate to enforce either property rights or rights of the person against bodily harm. The people I described who object to theserightsare not ordinary free riders: They do not favor protections for everyone while wanting to violate the rules themselves. They want protections for no one, realizing full well that they are giving up protections for themselves in the process. Perhaps it will be said that such people are rare and, in any case, that if there are such people, their opinions should not count in determining public policy.3 Perhaps so. But notice that, if we say this, we are also raising a question about the principle of popular sovereignty that seemed to underlie the first set of objections to democratic institutions. If some preferences are so idiosyncratic or antisocial that they should play no role in the choice of public policy, it is not a serious problem for modern democratic systems that they fail to legislate in accord with the preferences of the people. (The obvious question, of course, is how we decide in a principled way which preferences to rule out. 1 believe it is important to note that many contractualist or preferencecentered approaches to normative theory do implicitly limit the range of preferences they consider. The contractualist approach I shall suggest later does so explicitly.) 2
Defending democracy
I have discussed some objections to democracy and have raised questions about the normative principles that might be thought to underlie them. The defender of democracy would be in a much stronger position if he were able not only to cast doubt on the premises of its critics but also to give a persuasive account of its virtues. But here the defender might seem to be in no better position than the critics. One apparent virtue of democracy is that it is a system in which people are able to govern themselves in accordance with their own aims and desires. The first objection I considered, however, is that democracy fails to produce self-government; and the second objection is that government in accordance with the de facto desires and preferences of citizens may not be a good thing in any case. But if the point of democracy is not to collect preferences and produce legislation that somehow reflects them, what is its point? No doubt many people who believe in democracy do so without thinking seriously about it, and, no doubt also, people who continue to support
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it after some reflection do so for a variety of reasons. Perhaps one reason is that they think democracy tends to protect individual rights and liberties against the overwhelming power of the state. And perhaps this power seems especially dangerous when it is in the hands of self-righteous moralists out to do good or save souls at any cost. For people with this concern, it will seem liberating to insist that what matters is not abstract morality but rather individual interests and desires. This concern about the repressive implications of traditional religion and morality, combined with the influence of a naturalistic world view, is, I suspect, one of the main intellectual roots of nineteenth- and twentieth-century utilitarianism. It has also influenced the modern development of both democratic theory and the natural rights tradition. All three, in a sense, replace religious or metaphysical views of morality with a humanistic view in which people, their choices and desires, play the central role. But they do so in different ways. Whereas those in the utilitarian tradition seek to settle normative issues by appeal to the collective desires or preferences of individuals, defenders of individual rights seek to protect the aims and projects of individuals against interference from others with contrary aims. The utilitarian wants to ensure that everyone's preferences have some (potential) influence on every decision. The believer inrightsseeks some areas of conduct in which an individual's preferences are sovereign. The democrat offers yet another conception of how decision-making power can be distributed among people. But, to repeat, these conceptions are very different. Though I have presented these approaches to normative theory as if they were all responses to a kind of weak moral skepticism, none is, in fact, a skeptical position. Each, instead, is a positive, if somewhat schematic, account of a type of normative theory. But though these ideas have a common inspiration, none follows logically from the rejection of religious or metaphysical views of morality. Each is a distinct response, an interpretation, of a kind of humanistic individualism. They are not clearly consistent with one another, and they differ in kind. Utilitarianism, in many of its forms, is a direct account ofrightand wrong conduct, of what individuals should do or refrain from. Commitments to individual rights or to democracy are, at least in the first instance, commitments to certain assignments of decision-making authority: Belief in democracy is a belief that decisions are to be made, say, only by a vote of everyone; a belief in rights is the belief that, with regard to those things to which someone has a right, he and no one else is permitted to decide what is done with them. Now, it might be hoped that certain distributions of decision-making authority would automatically lead to outcomes that are best by some standard of what ought to be done. For example, it might be hoped that some system of property rights would result in the outcomes preferred
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under some utilitarian standard or that some democratic system would automatically result in decisions to protect some independently valued system of rights. And some of these hopes are maddeningly close to being realized. But not quite. Just as the idea that a democracy must respect property rights can conflict with the idea that it must respect preferences, utilitarian standards, respect for democracy, and respect for property rights sometimes conflict directly with one another. That is one reason that, within a tradition that takes a relatively hardheaded, humanistic, and secular approach to normative theory, there remain issues about the acceptability of the substantive views within the tradition. To accept any one of the alternatives I have described is, in effect, to reject the others. If each has some plausibility, then each also, just for that reason, lacks plausibility. And none of them is trivial, if only because to accept any one is to take a position not only on what people may do but also on what they may not do. Each involves limitations on liberty. Such limitations can be justified, but only if the principles giving rise to them can be justified. Since the alternatives mentioned are not the only responses to the abandonment of religious or metaphysical views of morality, and since none of them can plausibly claim to be the unique best response, none can be justified simply by a decision to give up such views. The idea that people's de facto preferences should in some way determine what is or is not done is one alternative to traditional views of morality, but it is not the only alternative. I wish to suggest and defend another one, specifically, a form of contractualism.4 This alternative is not so much a direct account of what is to be done or of how rights and authority ought to be assigned and distributed as an account of how answers to these questions should be assessed or justified. Thus, according to this form of contractualism, it is perfectly possible that people have and ought to have certain personal and property rights and that, in certain matters at least, their de facto preferences actually ought to govern. But within this approach, any such conclusion will be just that, a conclusion. Contractualism, as I understand it, focuses not merely on what satisfies preferences, but on what can be justified - specifically, on what can be justified to people. To defend some claim about what ought or ought not to be done, including claims about rights or other institutional specifications of authority, one must justify this claim to others or at least show that it could be so justified. And to justify such a claim to someone is to show, at a minimum, that it can be defended by reference to principles that he is prepared to accept freely. Clearly, there are difficulties with this idea as it stands. Different people will accept different principles, and some will refuse to accept any at all. But the idea admits of refinement. One well-known possibility, of course,
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is to appeal to a hypothetical contract situation so defined that unanimity is bound to result. There is much to be said for this approach, but it suffers from the difficulty that it obscures the connection between contractualism and the motives we, at least many of us, have to engage in normative inquiry in thefirstplace. We are likely to be concerned, after all, not with what hypothetical people could agree to, but with what we can accept; and we are concerned not with what we could justify to hypothetical people, but with what we can justify to our friends, our neighbors, and to people of goodwill generally. Again, however, it is a problem that different people will accept different principles and that some will not accept any. It is in part these concerns, I think, that prompt Scanlon (1982) to offer the following refinement of contractualism: "An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behavior which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement" (p. 110). He amplifies this on the next page by saying that someone's rejecting a principle would count as reasonable only if it were reasonable "given the aim of finding principles which could be the basis of informed, unforced general agreement." I do not want, and I suspect Scanlon does not want either, to take this specification of contractualism as being necessarily definitive. I am more interested in it as a general approach to moral or normative theorizing and, in particular, as an alternative to views that take the fundamental data of such theorizing to be de facto preferences. Two points seem to me significant here. First, moral justification is conceived as justification to others (or to their representatives) in terms of principles they could reasonably accept; but it is not assumed that justification must meet the objections of just anyone, regardless of his attitudes. We are not compelled to take any account of preferences or demands that cannot be reconciled with a fundamental aim offindingmutually agreeable general principles. Second, though it is possible that actual preferences are generally harmonious, it is likely that they are not, and so it is likely that agreement on principles will require prior agreement on a conception of the good - of the relative urgency or importance of different preferences (Scanlon, 1982, pp. 117,120; cf. Scanlon, 1975). Normative reasoning, normative argument, as I conceive it, has a political dimension in the sense in which politics involves not just disputes about how goods are to be divided among people withfixedtastes or values, but disputes about what tastes or values it is reasonable to adopt in the first place - given, of course, both an interest in living well (which is not necessarily identical to satisfying de facto preferences) and an interest in finding mutually agreeable principles of conduct. Moral reasoning is
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like politics where politics is concerned with the development of a shared view of the community's purpose. But nothing in this view assumes that the community's purpose will not turn out to be mainly the protection of individual liberty, personal and property rights, and individual opportunity and security. At the same time, what these rights are is as much a matter for moral/political adjudication as is the question of what we should do collectively given a fixed system of rights. In this respect, contractualism is undogmatic. It specifies an approach to moral reasoning more than a specific outcome. But it is unlike the view that takes unanimity among just any group of people to be necessary or sufficient to determine what is to be done. What people actually agree to and what people of goodwill could not reasonably reject may be different. The outcome of unanimous agreement may not be justifiable to each by reference to principles he could not reasonably reject. One advantage of this view of the nature of fundamental moral or normative reasoning is that it is fully compatible with a naturalistic world view. It involves no controversial religious or metaphysical assumptions. Instead, it views moral thinking as an extension of a natural, though not universal, human activity - the critical evaluation and justification of our own lives and plans and of the lives and plans of others. What it recognizes is that this process does not presuppose independent, preexisting standards, but rather that the standards themselves can evolve from the process. A second advantage of this view is that it is compatible with a plausible account of moral motivation. Some people believe that, if there is any such thing as morality, everyone will be moved by moral considerations. Moral principles, on this view, correspond to inescapable motives. No one is indifferent to morality. One possible consequence of this assumption about morality is moral skepticism: If morality must be universally compelling, and nothing is in fact so compelling, it follows that there is no morality. In my view, however, the problem is with the initial assumption. Though it is true that most people take at least some interest in morality, it is not true that everyone does. The account of morality as a kind of potential contract among actual people connects it with a motive many people actually have. In general, on this account, morality will be of interest to anyone who wishes to live openly and in good faith with others similarly motivated, who is concerned to be able to justify his conduct when justification is sought but who is also not indifferent to the way others act. Someone with these interests, who does not want to live by force and fraud and who is willing to deal with others by argument and persuasion, will naturally be interested in finding and living by standards he and others can freely accept as the standards to govern their relations.
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But, of course, not everyone has these interests, and so, though many have a natural concern for contractualist morality, not everyone does. What I propose is that we take this conception of normative inquiry as our starting point when evaluating actions, on the one hand, and principles and institutions, on the other. On this view, whether natural rights principles or some form of preference utilitarianism should be accepted depends on whether they can be rationally acceptable to persons with a shared interest in commonly acceptable standards of conduct. Similarly, whether political democracy is a reasonable solution to the problem of the design of political institutions depends on whether it is compatible with principles that could be universally accepted. 3
Designing political institutions
I have offered an abstract account of the nature of normative principles. It is an account of what such principles are about, of what purpose they serve. Principles that satisfy the conditions implicit in this account, like most other normative principles, will say how people are to behave. But, again like other normative principles, they will have implications about the proper design of institutions, about the assignment of rights and positions of authority, and about the procedures to be followed in making decisions. One such issue, assuming that we ought to have a system of laws, is whether some form of representative democracy should be adopted as the procedure for making and changing laws. In the context of most standard views of morality, or most standard normative perspectives, questions of institutional design, including questions about the specification of rights and authority, are problematic. The reason is that normative views tend to be concerned at least in part with what individuals ought to do or refrain from doing and with the attainment of certain outcomes or the avoidance of others. Yet when we assign rights, grant authority, or adopt a procedure, we commit ourselves not to certain decisions or outcomes but rather to the decision's being made by a certain person or in a certain way. These two kinds of concern - the concern with what is done and the concern with who does it or how it is done - almost always generate a tension within a theory. Of course, this tension is avoided if we adopt a simple enough theory: If our only principle is that people have certain rights, and if our principles say nothing about how or to what effect they are to be exercised, there is no tension. As far as the theory goes, our only concern is with respect for and perhaps enforcement of rights. Again, if our only principle is that, in making decisions, certain procedures are to be followed, we need simply institutionalize those procedures and follow them. There is no further ground
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for concern about the outcomes. But most people do not, on reflection, hold such simple normative theories. Nor does it seem very likely that contractualist principles will be so simple. According to contractualism, principles must be acceptable to everyone with an interest in shared standards as the basis for demands they will make on others and as the source of justifications for their own conduct. But what people care about, for the most part, is their capacity to attain their ends, to pursue their projects to a successful conclusion, and, in general, to live well. It does not follow that people would end up endorsing positive rights to things like this, for, given scarcity and conflicting aims, rights like a general right to live well are obviously problematic. At the same time, they would be wary of other, "negative" rights or assignments of authority to individuals or groups, since these operate by limiting the authority of others as much as by granting authority to some. They can stand in the way of a person's pursuit of his aims precisely by denying him the authority to do so. A system of property rights granting exclusive authority to individuals in certain matters is, in this respect, much like any alternative assignment of authority, including the assignment implicit in the adoption of a system of democratic voting. None of this means that people will not accept rights or acquiesce in authority. Though the rights of others restrict our own capacity to pursue our ends, and though the adoption of procedures for making joint decisions limits our own control over the outcomes, we nevertheless have reason to want such specifications of authority. Though the exclusive rights of others limit our own capacity to act, we are better off having some range of exclusive authority for ourselves than having no matters over which we exercise exclusive control. And where there is need for collective action, including action establishing or altering systems of rights and authority, there is a need for some decision-making procedure. The question is, What is a reasonable approach to the problem of assigningrightsand establishing procedures? More particularly, what is a reasonable approach for people concerned with their own needs and projects but also seeking standards of conduct they would willingly live by and which others could be expected to accept as well? Broadly speaking, I can see two interesting alternatives. The first I think of as roughly ruleutilitarian, though it also encompasses the kind of theory that Rawls has put forward. Recognizing the need for rights and procedures, but also concerned about their own access to basic goods, people might begin by specifying certain aggregative or distributive goals (or some combination of the two) and then employ these not only directly as a test for what to do but indirectly as a standard governing the design of institutions - the system of personal and property rights as well as the system of political
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rights and procedures for making collective decisions. The choice of a system of rights and procedures would then be determined by, or constrained by, the goals already selected. The relevant question would be how a given system of rights and procedures would affect the production and distribution of whatever goods people could come to agree on as basic and necessary. The second alternative is to reason directly from the underlying conception of the function of normative principles to a choice of procedures for making fundamental social decisions, including decisions regarding specific systems ofrightsand duties. If we think of normative principles as principles that would arise from a kind of search for mutually acceptable principles among well-meaning people, we could adopt institutions that force people to engage in a joint search for solutions to shared problems. What I called the rule-utilitarian approach to the justification of rights and procedures assumes that contractualism has produced an answer to the question of what principles people could accept, and it assumes that these principles require the attainment of some goal or goals. It evaluates rights and procedures in terms of the likelihood that they will yield those goals. Any such theory is likely to result in only a qualified endorsement of rights or procedures, for it is unlikely that any system of authority will automatically yield the desired results. It is well known, for example, that a standard system of property rights does not automatically yield outcomes on the Pareto frontier. It has, of course, been widely hoped that there is some political procedure that, when combined with afixedsystem ofrights,would automatically move us the rest of the way. But that hope too seems to be vain. Systems powerful enough to eliminate some externalities tend to produce new ones. The Pareto principle is, of course, only one conception of the goal society should achieve. Rawls (1971) defends an alternative principle requiring the maximization and more or less equal distribution of certain "primary goods" - liberties, opportunities, and income and wealth - and he argues, on the basis of these goals, for a system of constrained property rights and for a democratic legislature. However, by his basic principle, no particular system of property rights can be construed as final, since any system will need revision if an alternative would improve the distribution of primary goods in accordance with his basic principles. Therefore, one function of the democratic legislature must be to correct property institutions as necessary in light of more basic requirements. Now, it may be true that some democratic procedure is as effective as any other for making the appropriate changes and, more generally, is not contrary to the basic principles of justice, but it would take far more argument than Rawls devotes to the problem to show that this is so. And it is hard to imagine a
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demonstration that any combination of rights, administrative agencies, and legislature will be guaranteed always to produce results in line with Rawls's principles. The second line of argument I described provides a very different, though perhaps complementary, approach to the defense of democracy, both as a procedure for assigning and adjusting rights and as a procedure for coordinating behavior in other ways. According to this approach, procedures are not to be selected with some specific goals or substantive principles in mind. Instead, the choice is based on a conception of the purpose or function of normative principles. Principles are taken to operate as a standard for the evaluation of conduct by reference to which people with a shared interest in being able to justify and defend their actions (as well as an interest in their own individual good) can guide their choices. Thus, they are principles people could not reasonably reject, in light of their own concerns, given that they also have an interest in finding mutually acceptable principles. They are principles that would emerge, if any would, from a process of open discussion among well-meaning persons. But democracy can be viewed as a procedure for decision making in which proposals are subjected to open criticism and adopted only when they can be defended by cogent argument. Thus, democratic procedures correspond roughly to the procedures that would give rise to valid moral or normative principles as I have defined this idea. So in terms of the conception of morality I have described, there is a plausible, direct argument in favor of the institutions of political democracy. But it is not a conclusive argument for any specific institutionalization of democracy. Nor can we conclude from this argument, any more than we can on the basis of an argument from the Pareto criterion, from Rawls's principles, or from a natural rights perspective, that the outcome of the democratic process is immune from criticism. Valid normative principles are principles for the general regulation of conduct that no one can reasonably reject, given an interest in such principles. Ideally, I want to argue, a representative democracy will adopt policies consistent with such principles. It will adopt laws and policies, but only when they can be justified to everyone in terms of principles none can reject. A representative's job, on this view, is to protect the legitimate and rational interests of his constituents by exercising influence over which laws and policies are adopted. A representative stands between his own constituents and the representatives of other voters. He must formulate a conception of the interests he represents and seek to make a case that they are reasonable and legitimate interests. He must also be prepared to argue against the rationality or legitimacy of potentially conflicting claims articulated by others. There is no reason to assume that "judgmental
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harmony" will arise automatically. When the system operates at its best, political discussion will lead to the construction of a generally acceptable conception of rationality and legitimacy (see Scanlon, 1982, p. 117). In terms of such a conception, a representative will be able to justify his decisions both to his own constituents and to the representatives of others. The aim of democracy, insofar as it can be justified by this kind of argument, is not to meet every demand. It is not even to see to it that legislation reflects every demand to some extent. Logrolling compromises - something for everyone - are not what democracy, any more than morality, is all about. Some demands do not reflect morally legitimate claims; others conflict with more urgent demands; and some, though legitimate in themselves, will be met, and met more efficiently, by nongovernmental means. When one or another of these conditions obtains, it is the job of the legislator to make the case for saying no. I suggested earlier that this argument for democracy is complementary to the kind of argument I called "rule-utilitarian." One way in which they are complementary is that one could arrive at principles, perhaps like Rawls's, on the basis of a contractualist conception of morality. In that case, the question of which procedure should be selected could take two forms: Which procedure is most likely to legislate in accordance with these substantive principles, and which procedure is likely to produce legislation that can be justified to everyone in terms of mutually acceptable principles? Of course, the answers to these two questions might seem to diverge. In the context of the conception of morality developed here, however, any divergence will reflect as much on the substantive principles as on the procedures. The second of these questions is the more basic. Like institutions, substantive principles are derivative and stand in need of justification. 4
Recurring problems
I have proposed, on the basis of a certain assumption about the nature of normative principles, an argument in support of democratic procedures. What I have emphatically not done is to suggest that any specific democratic system is foolproof. I do not believe this any more than I believe that there is some system of rights the exercise of which, under any possible circumstances, will always produce desirable results. The only way to avoid these conclusions, I think, is to abandon the evaluation of institutional outcomes entirely. My aim has not been to offer necessarily a stronger justification of democracy than those offered by others, but to offer a different characterization of what it is about democracy that makes it valuable. One result is
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that what will count as a valid objection to democracy on my view is not the same as what will count on some others. It will not count as an objection, on my view, that democracy fails to provide protection for certain alleged rights or that it adopts laws or policies altering their scope or content. It will not count as an objection that the legislature adopts policies imposing burdens on some for the sake of others; and it will not count as an objection that the legislature leaves some preferences unsatisfied or that it frustrates others. The case for democracy does not depend on the idea that legislation should accord with the "will of the people," where the latter is understood as some function of the de facto preferences of individuals. Thus, it is no problem for democratic theory that there seems to be no ideal way to define that function. And since democracy is not viewed as a device that simply takes votes, assumed to represent preferences, amalgamates them, and yields a set of policies that reflect collective preferences, the fact that people frequently do not vote does not show that the system is not operating as it should. None of these things, at least, will automatically count as an objection. To argue that the system is not working as it should, because, for example, it imposes limits on rights or benefits, some at the expense of others, one will have to show that the unlimited rights are justified, or that the imposition of burdens on some for the sake of others was unjustified. To show that it is wrong to limit rights or impose burdens is to show that doing so would violate principles that no one could reasonably reject, given an interest infindingprinciples ofjustification mutually acceptable to everyone who is similarly motivated. In a democratic system, of course, this is a case that can be made politically. In a democratic system that is functioning as it should, moreover, the case will be effective. But, then, no system always functions as it should. Democracies sometimes impose burdens that cannot be justified, or fail to impose burdens that should be imposed. Or so I believe. In light of the conception of justification proposed here, what institutional reforms might be appropriate? One candidate for reform, obviously, is the voting rules. If only a majority is needed for passage of a bill, a stable majority coalition will be free to disregard the interests of a minority and so may impose burdens on them that cannot be justified to them in terms of principles they themselves would be willing to accept. Prima facie, then, there is much to be said for moving to a unanimity rule. On this rule, any bill would have to be justified to every representative. Yet there are also good objections to a unanimity rule. I assume that burdens should not be imposed or rights altered if the burdens or alterations cannot be justified to those who have to live with them. But I also assume that there are justifiable burdens and alterations of rights. Given human nature, how-
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ever, some will resist these burdens even when they are justified. We are notoriously blind to good arguments when our interests are at stake. And so it is risky to adopt a procedure that gives individuals or small groups something akin to veto power. It could be replied that I am being too cynical in assuming that people would refuse to acquiesce to well-justified limitations on their freedom. But if this is too cynical, it would also seem cynical to assume that a majority would ride roughshod over a minority without any consideration of what could be justified to members of the minority, especially in matters about which the minority had reason to care a great deal. And to the extent that this does happen, it would seem that there must be good reason to worry about the power of the unanimity rule to stand in the way of needed change. My argument for a representative democracy, making its decisions in the open under the scrutiny of a free press, is that this system will tend to constrain representatives not to adopt policies they cannot justify in terms of principles held by the general populace or at least justifiable to them. But this argument clearly makes assumptions about how people will respond to the opportunities and constraints the system offers them. It depends, for example, on the vigor of the press and of the politically active populace, but it depends even more on the attitudes of the legislators. It assumes they will be responsive to well-justified demands for change and that they will be unwilling to impose burdens on people unless they are prepared to produce plausible justifications. It assumes, if nothing else, that the glare of publicity will embarrass them into acting this way. If I were looking for institutional or procedural reforms, I would seek changes that would increase the pressure for more open and forthright discussion of proposals and alternatives and that would lead to a more thoroughgoing examination of their full implications. Every politician promises too much and demands too little, exaggerates the benefits of his programs while concealing their costs. And because hypocrisy is the tribute vice pays to virtue, they may thereby reveal some lingering concern for their capacity to justify what they do. But I am doubtful that there is much in the way of purely institutional reform that would compel a change. In my view, the principles we should act on and the standards we should strive to realize in our institutions are those that would come to be accepted by people freely choosing principles with certain goals in mind. Thus, normative standards are defined in terms of a kind of process, a process that is not unlike the democratic process, operating at its best. In spite of the connection between normative principles and processes, however, there is, in my view, no institutionalized procedure, no system of rights or assignment of authority, that will automatically channel us
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toward the correct outcomes. We do not have a case here of what Rawls (1971) calls "perfect procedural justice" (p. 85). The reason is that normative standards are defined as those that will result from a certain process among rational people with certain motives. It is thus no accident that I find myself, in discussing the pathology of democracy, concentrating on questions about the character and attitudes of legislators. A significant part of political theory has long been dominated by the example of microeconomics - by the idea that there is some system of institutions, some assignment of rights, that must automatically be exercised to good effect. If there were, its establishment and enforcement would be the sole aim of normative political theory. This is certainly part of the dream of constitutionalism. But I believe it is a dream that will not come true. This does not mean that the task of institutional design is unimportant or that it is not something that can be done either well or badly. But this task must always be undertaken against a background of assumptions about how people operating the institutions will behave. By the same token, the question of how people should behave must depend on assumptions about the institutions under which they live (see Nelson, 1985). There is no perfect system of rights, because there is no way to guarantee that people will exercise rights as they should. And there is no system of rights with no discretionary authority that is better than systems that give people substantial discretion. Or so I believe, in any case. It is easy to be dissatisfied both with institutions and with people. It is even easier to forget how much worse off we might be, in both respects, than we are. Notes Nozick (1974, ch. 2). Nozick imagines agreement among both buyers and sellers of protection as to what rights are to be protected. I believe, however, that, even without this agreement, a monopoly protective agency would arise in his state of nature, and the system of rights it accepted would be the system that was enforced. One might object to this on normative grounds, but not on the ground that it will not work. In saying that it is controversial what rights there are, I am not just making the standard point that liberals and conservatives disagree about the scope and extent of property rights. There are also genuinely disputed questions about the rights of fetuses and neonates, for example, and about the corresponding duties of pregnant women, parents, and physicians. People with extreme tastes or people who are thoroughly antisocial pose a problem for the unanimity rule just as "fanatics" pose a problem for R. M. Hare's (1963) account of moral argument in terms of universaliza-
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bility (pp. 159-85). As Hare sees it, moral argument simply breaks down in certain cases. His example is an argument with a racist who is genuinely prepared to accept racist values - even if he were to turn out to be a member of the despised race. But it might be replied that, as a matter of fact, everyone has his price. Everyone can be induced, at some price, to agree to a system of property rights. But then that system will reflect the eccentric, antisocial tastes of those who agree. The result of such an agreement is not a result that can reasonably be justified to those who have to live under it. The initial attractiveness of the unanimity criterion is just that it seems to promise results that everyone willfindagreeable. But we do not in fact, and I can think of no good reason why we should, allow ourselves to be held hostage to the extreme desires of others. For an alternative view, see Section 2. For more on the derivation of property rights by unanimous agreement see Buchanan (1975, ch. 2, and pp. 59-68) and Gibbard (1976). The idea here is similar to the idea proposed in Nelson (1980, ch. 6). My subsequent thinking has been much influenced by Scanlon (1982), and my presentation here largely follows his. References
Buchanan, James M., The Limits ofLiberty (University of Chicago Press, 1975). Buchanan, James M.; Tollison, Robert; and Tullock, Gordon, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College Station: Texas A & M, 1980). Buchanan, James M., and Tullock, Gordon, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations ofConstitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962). Gibbard, A., "Natural Property Rights," Nous, 10 (1976): 77-86. Hare, R. M., Freedom and Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). Nelson, William, On Justifying Democracy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). "Rights, Responsibilities and Redistribution," in Kenneth Kipnis and Diana Meyers, eds., Economic Justice: Private Rights and Public Responsibilities (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allenheld, 1985). Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). Scanlon, Thomas, "Preference and Urgency," Journal of Philosophy, 72 (November 1975): 655-69. "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge University Press, 1982).
CHAPTER 4
Democracy: the public choice approach Dennis C. Mueller
Whether a society composed of individuals with diverse interests can be organized successfully by democratic means has been a major issue of philosophical debate at least since the time of ancient Greek civilization. That an upstart discipline like public choice could resolve in thirty-five years issues that have been debated for twenty-five hundred would seem improbable, and I will not be so presumptuous as to claim that it has. But it has the potential to shed new light on old questions, and may already have succeeded to some extent in doing so. I shall in this essay examine certain parts of the public choice literature to see what it has to offer to this long debate. The chief assumption delineating the public choice approach is that political man and economic man are one and the same, each acting rationally in pursuit of his self-interest. They differ only with respect to the environments in which they act. Economic man encounters his fellow man in the marketplace, where they engage in mutually beneficial exchanges. Political man, either directly or through his representative, meets his fellow men in the assembly, where all engage simultaneously in what we call the "democratic process." That the different contexts in which economic and political man act can have important implications concerning the normative properties of the consequences of these acts has been an important part of the public choice literature ever since Buchanan (1954a)firstraised the issue some thirty-five years ago, and I shall return to it later. 78
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But the main attraction of the homo economicus assumption is not usually thought to be the insight it gives into normative questions. Economics has achieved what success it has through the use of this behavioral postulate as a positive science. It is the power to explain and predict actual human behavior by assuming individuals rationally pursue their own ends that has led to the rise of economics as a scientific discipline. So it is with the sister discipline of economics: public choice. Methodologically economics and public choice are one and the same. Hence, it is not surprising that much of the public choice literature is concerned with positive issues and thus has little or no bearing on the question at hand. But an understanding of the way democratic institutions actually function obviously is relevant to some extent in appraising their normative properties. We begin, therefore, by examining certain segments of the public choice literature that are particularly relevant to a normative evaluation of democracy. 1
Why democracy?
An important impetus to the development of public choice in the fifties and sixties was the significant contributions to public finance theory defining the concepts of public goods and externalities and analyzing their characteristics. This literature made crystal clear that there are certain goods whose physical properties are such that market exchange leads to an inefficient allocation of resources. All could be made better off if some institution could be found for providing public goods to all individuals collectively, for inducing individuals to modify the selfish pursuit of their own goals in order to take account of the unintended external effects of their actions on others. A testable implication of public goods-externality theory is that goods with certain characteristics should be purchased in cooperation with others, and other goods with identifiable characteristics of a private good nature will be left to the realm of individual choice in the market. To my knowledge these predictions of public goods theory have never been put to empirical test, perhaps because the validity of the predictions is obvious from casual observation. Thus, if one were to formulate a null hypothesis, that the probability of a good's being purchased collectively or privately is independent of its physical characteristics, and test it against the predictions of public goods theory using cross-section data from cities, states, and countries, one would reject the null hypothesis by a comfortable margin. Police protection is purchased invariably collectively, cups and saucers privately. Those goods that are provided collectively in some places and privately in others, like housing and education, are precisely
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the goods whose characteristics do not match closely the polar definitions of public and private goods, so-called mixed public-private goods, private goods with significant externalities. This seemingly trivial prediction of public goods-externality theory is fundamental to an understanding of democracy's normative properties. Not only does political man meet his fellow citizens in a different institutional setting than the marketplace, but the objects of his action, however selfish and private his motivation, are distinctly different in the public arena. But we get ahead of our story. Implicit in the assertion that all can be made better off through the collective purchase of a public good is the assumption that the costs of implementing the decision, the costs of running the institution that facilitates collective action, are less than the potential gains from obtaining the optimal amount of the public good. One of the contributions of public choice has been to point out the existence of these transaction costs of collective action and to delineate their nature. Once one recognizes that the institution of collective action involves costs, a natural question to ask, at least for the public choice scholar, is, Which institution minimizes these costs? What are the costs of different institutions? Posed thus, it would seem obvious that the least-cost institution need not be one that fits any generally accepted definition of democracy. A form of democratic institution might emerge as the most efficient mechanism for deciding collective consumption issues, but there is no a priori reason to limit consideration to democratic procedures or to presume that from a full menu of institutions for making collective choices the one(s) chosen will necessarily be the most democratic or even minimally democratic. Why, then, the almost exclusive attention of the public choice literature on democratic means for obtaining our collective ends? One answer is undoubtedly that we live in a country with democratic institutions, and it is useful to understand their properties even if these institutions should be judged to be nonoptimal by some efficiency criterion. But I think there is more to our preoccupation with democracy than simply its widespread existence in Western developed countries as a means for arriving at collective decisions. When Paul Samuelson (1954) concluded his article setting out the conditions for a Pareto-optimal allocation of public and private goods, he posed the question of how one can get individuals to volunteer the information about their preferences for the public good that is needed to achieve Pareto optimality. This "challenge" set out by Samuelson has directly or indirectly been the starting point for much research in public choice on the "preference revelation problem." The presumption has been without exception that an institution would be used in which individuals volunteered information on their preferences for the public good
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in analogy with the way the market elicits information on preferences for private goods. Thus, collective decisions for public goods would be based on the aggregation of information on individual preferences for public goods. From there, it is a quick but important jump to the conclusion that a democratic, that is, voting, procedure would be used to aggregate this information. I think the reason democratic procedures spring so immediately to mind as the appropriate mechanisms for gathering and aggregating information lies in the stronghold individualism has on our way of thinking in the United States and the United Kingdom and to various degrees in other developed Western democracies. Economics was spawned as a separate discipline in the Enlightenment and has been closely associated with the individualistic ideals of the Enlightenment ever since. It is not surprising that in borrowing the methodology of the economist, public choice has also absorbed its philosophic foundation based on individualism. But it must be stressed, as a normative argument in favor of democracy or a particular democratic institution, that individualism lies outside public choice. Being a public choice analyst does not force one to accept individualism as a personal or social philosophy, any more than being an individual necessitates that one adopt the public choice approach to the study of political institutions, however complementary this philosophy and methodology are. If this view is correct, a large fraction of the normative justification for democracy lies outside the realm of public choice theory in the individualist philosophy that has come down to us from the Enlightenment. This observation has two implications. First, the normative case for democracy, if one can be made, cannot rely on theorems and propositions derived within the public choicefieldalone. Implicit or explicit in the argument will be assumptions that rely on individualist ethics that come from outside thefield.Second, and perhaps more important, given the many negative, normative results public choice has produced, the individualist advocate of democracy may base his defense on the individualistic character of at least some forms of democratic procedure, without troubling with or worrying about its efficiency as an aggregating device. (Buchanan [1954b] made an analogous point in his early critique of Arrow's theorem.) Thus, at best public choice can offer but a partial defense and limited critique of the normative properties of democracy. But let us return to the positive public choice literature. 2
Why democratic participation?
The very nature of public goods that makes consumption by all efficient makes participation by any one individual in the democratic process irrational. If all consume, all should participate, but if all participate, any
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one voter is likely to have a negligible effect on the outcome, making his participation irrational. This point has been made by numerous writers in public choice and is related to Anthony Downs's (1957) rational-ignorance argument. Given that an individual's vote is unlikely to affect the outcome of an election, it is irrational for him to devote time becoming informed about the issues surrounding the election. Thus, public choice tells us that rational voters will not participate in elections when the number of voters is large and will not be well informed even if they do participate. Since millions of people do participate in elections each year, and millions of copies of newspapers and magazines with heavy coverage of political events are sold each day, as a positive theory of political participation, public choice would appear to be somewhat lacking in explanatory power. Either the fundamental postulate upon which the public choice approach rests - that is, voters do not behave rationally - is wrong, or if voters do behave rationally, something must be included in their utility-maximizing calculus beyond the probability that their wellinformed vote will affect the outcome, and their anticipated gain if it does. Not surprisingly, public choice scholars have chosen not to abandon the rationality postulate upon which their discipline rests, but have chosen to assume that voters purchase political information for its entertainment value and participate in the political process out of a sense of civic duty that makes the voter's benefit from participation stem from the act of participation itself, not from the consequence of that act for the outcome of the election. This method of "saving" the individual rationality assumption also makes it nonoperational. An individual who knowingly drives a car with inoperative brakes might be written off as a rational individual with an extreme taste for thrills. But if millions of people drive such cars, we must revise either our assumption that individuals behave rationally or our definition of what self-interested behavior entails. Or all behavior becomes rationally self-interested. An alternative way of explaining why people vote, despite the low probability of their vote affecting the outcome of the election, is to view voting as one of those acts each of us commits not because we anticipate an immediate reward satisfying our narrowly defined self-interests, but because we have been conditioned to behave in this way, because our voting improves the social welfare. Each of us has been taught from childhood that there are certain acts that, although to our benefit to commit in the short run, are wrongin that if everyone committed similar acts we would all be worse off. Every day, each of us routinely acts in ways that are irrational from a short-run, utility-maximizing perspective but help to maintain the social order in the long run (Buchanan, 1975; Taylor,
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1976). In a country that cherishes its political institutions, voting is regarded as one of those actions one "ought to do for the social good," even though it comes at some small sacrifice to the individual who votes. Treating voting as a conditioned response of individuals to being in a situation in which behavior beneficial to others in society is expected allows us to reconcile the act of voting with the egoistic portion of the rational-egoism postulate. The process of reward and punishment by which individuals are conditioned to behave in such seemingly unselfish ways as voting relies entirely upon the inherently hedonistic and selfish interests of individuals (Mueller, 1987). This explanation for the act of voting is also consistent with much of the additional evidence we have about voting. When pollsters ask citizens why they vote, they usually mention "civic duty" or some similar reason.1 These responses certainly suggest that voters do not anticipate some immediate personal gain from voting, but believe they "ought" to vote, just as they ought not to steal, because society is better off. Education levels are highly correlated with voting participation levels. Schools are one of society's most important institutions for social conditioning. The positive correlation between income and voting participation generally observed may also be a result of a positive correlation between income and social conditioning. Successful individuals have learned to live by and succeed within the rules. They do what is expected of them (Mueller, 1987). Treating voting as a conditioned response to being in a situation in which socially beneficial behavior is expected alters one's view as to the underlying motivation of the individual voter. The importance of voter motivation to the question of democracy's normative foundations has been raised by Brennan and Buchanan (1983) and Brennan and Lomasky (Chapter 2, this volume). Both essays build on the observation that, because the individual's vote has an infinitesimal probability of affecting the outcome of an election, the choice of party in the voting booth is a fundamentally different choice from the choice, say, of a new car in a dealer's showroom. In the latter setting the individual's choice of one model or brand of car over another, of a car over a boat, is decisive in bringing about the outcome. The full costs of the vote for a particular car in terms of forgone alternatives is consciously borne by the individual decision maker. When expressing a preference for a party or candidate at the polls, however, the individual votes without having to weigh the costs, since he knows his vote is not decisive. He reveals a preference to vote for candidate A over candidate B, but not necessarily a preference for the benefits of A's taking office at the expense of B's taking office, for the rational individual knows his vote does not result in this outcome. Both essays present examples suggesting that a voter may regard his expected
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utility from B's being elected as greater than that from A's election, but nevertheless vote for A because of the small satisfaction of expressing a preference to vote for A given that this expression of preference does not cause B's defeat. The logic of the argument is clear, but its implications for the normative foundations of democracy are not. The implicit assumption appears to be what I shall define as follows: Democratic participation axiom. The best decision is reached through a democratic process in which each individual votes as if he alone determined the social outcome. This axiom has a definite resonance with populist traditions of democratic rule in this country. But it should be noted that, even if fulfilled, the decision of a polity might be judged morally repugnant by some other ethical norm. To take an example of Brennan and Lomasky, if a majority of citizens is anti-Semitic, the outcome chosen under majority rule can be an anti-Semitic candidate or policy, even though, indeed precisely because, the democratic participation axiom is satisfied. The social choices of a polity that satisfies the democratic participation axiom are as good or bad, as defined by any other criterion, as the people who make up the polity. If we maintain the democratic participation axiom as a normative benchmark, then in what sense is this axiom likely to be violated as a result of the nondecisive character of an individual's vote? Consider a specific case, a national referendum of the kind the Swiss hold routinely, to consider a special tax to raise revenues to "save the whales" by launching more boats to police international treaties against killing whales. Individual J has a preference for or against this proposal based on his own concern for the whales and his share of the cost of protecting them. Let us say that he is personally against the proposal, caring little about whales. If he alone could decide the issue, he would turn down the proposal. But he alone cannot decide the issue, and upon stepping into the voting booth he knows that his vote is unlikely to affect the outcome. Therefore, as the Brennan-Buchanan-Lomasky argument goes, he may now vote for the proposal, and to the extent that he and other voters do behave in this way the normative foundations of democracy as captured by the democratic participation axiom are undermined. The obvious question is, Why, if he cares so little for the whales that he would not save them if he were free to do so, does he choose to vote for saving them in the secrecy of the voting booth, when he knows his vote will not count? One possible explanation, which is consistent with the earlier explanation of why the citizen votes in thefirstplace, is that he weighs the impact
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of the issue's passage not only on himself but on others. A "civic-minded" voter might vote for the proposal, although its passage would make him personally worse off, because he thinks others will be made better off by the proposal's passage. We might formalize this idea by saying that he envisages his having an equal probability of being any other individual in the community, of having that individual's tastes and income, and chooses the outcome that maximizes the expected utility of the community. Voting in this way the voter would be voting in the same way Buchanan and Tullock (1962) described the rational voter behaving at the constitutional stage. An alternative way to describe this behavior is to think of the voter the way Harsanyi (1955) does, as having two sets of preferences: selfish preferences that consider the effect of a decision upon himself alone, and ethical preferences that weigh in the probabilistic way just described the impact of the decision on all members of the community. With these two sets of preferences as possibilities we can consider the following decision matrix for our whale example: Matrix 1 Individual's ethical preferences dictate
Individual's selfish preferences dictate
Vote for
Vote against
Vote for
1
3
Vote against
2
4
The first point to be made is that with the exceptions of a vote against the proposal from square 1 and a vote for that from square 4, a vote for or against the proposal might be made by a rational voter who finds himself in any of the four positions and not violate the democratic participation axiom. In particular, a voter with preferences in square 2 might vote in favor of the proposal, even if he knows that he alone can decide the issue. Why? Because he also knows that it is an issue that affects all members of the community and thus might reason that the decision should be made considering its impact on all citizens, and not just upon himself. The possibility that one individual in a democracy would decide for the polity is sufficiently hypothetical that it is difficult to conceptualize this voter's decision calculus. But one might imagine a process in which each year one citizen is selected at random and allowed to make the decisions for the community (perhaps to save decision-making costs). Such a citizen might make decisions using his ethical preferences, because he decides for the
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entire community and because he knows that next year someone else will be making the community's decisions and he wants that person to feel compelled by the same moral imperative as he is to make decisions on everyone's behalf. By a similar process of reasoning a voter might vote in an election with many other voters using his ethical preferences rather than his selfish preferences, because he realizes he is voting on an issue affecting all members of the community and thus feels he ought to employ a different expected utility calculus than he does when buying a car, with the hope that others will do likewise. A vote in conflict with one's selfish preferences need not violate the democratic participation axiom and thus need not undermine the normative foundation for democracy this axiom provides. The most plausible situations in which an individual's vote may violate the democratic participation axiom are in boxes 2 and 3. An individual might decide against a proposal if it is left to him alone to decide, but vote for the proposal when he knows his vote will not change the outcome, thereby indulging his conscience by voting according to his ethical preferences, because he knows this conscience vote will not actually cost him anything. Some of the Brennan-Buchanan-Lomasky examples suggest this type of situation. But it is difficult to see how, if the democratic participation axiom is violated in this way, it undermines the normative case for democracy. The individual would then be acting qua voter in much the same way that Rawls (1971) says individuals ought to act behind the veil of ignorance, except that Rawls would not condone the equal probability-expected utility calculation interpretation of this behavior. Everyday voting outcomes would then have the same normative underpinning as Buchanan and Tullock claim for the constitution and Harsanyi claims for his additive social welfare function. If the democratic participation axiom were violated in this way, to my mind the normative case for democracy would be greatly strengthened. What would be weakened are the methodological foundations of public choice. If voters do vote using something like their ethical preferences, they vote more or less in the way the traditional "public interest" approach presumed voters and politicians acted. But much of the advance public choice claims to have made over the public interest approach is presumed to have come from the replacement of the public interest behavioral postulate by the selfish utility maximization hypothesis. Violations of the democratic participation axiom from squares 1 and 4 are much more difficult to rationalize. Certainly, if an individual thought that both he personally, and society collectively, would be better off if the proposal passed and would vote for the proposal if he could decide the issue alone, but voted against the proposal because his vote would not
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have much chance of changing the outcome, then the normative case for democracy based on individual participation is greatly weakened. But what would motivate someone to vote in this perverse way? True it would not cost much, but what would be the gain? I find such perverse voting behavior particularly difficult to fathom, if the reason voters go to the polls is because of the sense of civic duty described earlier in Prisoner's Dilemma, supergame terms. Would an individual who goes to the polls because he thinks everyone ought to vote knowingly vote in such a way that he thought both he and his fellow citizens would be made worse off? If the individual who votes out of a sense of civic duty does not vote for what he thinks to be his own selfish interest, I find it much more plausible to believe he votes for what he believes to be the social interest, that is, what Harsanyi called his ethical preferences.2 It is possible that an individual votes against a proposal that would make either himself or the community better off because he incorrectly evaluates the consequences of the proposal. Incorrect calculations of this sort are more likely with public decisions than with private ones because of the low probability of an individual's calculated vote affecting the outcome. We have again Downs's rational-ignorance argument. A sense of civic duty may be strong enough to carry the individual to the polls, but it may not induce him to gather much information about the issues upon which he will vote when he gets there. The rational-ignorance argument does, I think, seriously undercut the normative case for democracy. The fact that individuals vote in accordance with their preferences, selfish or ethical, does not make a very strong case for democratic rule, if these preferences are formed out of misconceptions of the consequences of the alternatives upon which citizens vote. But it is not an argument that says that individuals vote a different way, because of the small probability of their vote being decisive, than they would were this probability 1, given the information they gathered in formulating their preferences. Democratic participation makes as good a case for democracy as the quality of the participants, and this quality depends to an important degree on their knowledge of the consequences of the issues they decide. 3
What are the characteristics of the outcomes?
Suppose that none of the difficulties of the preceding section existed. Each voter was fully informed about every alternative. Each voted on the alternatives as if he alone would decide them. What then could we say about the characteristics of the outcomes under democracy? On this question public choice has had much to say. Starting with
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Arrow's (1951) famous essay, a steady stream of theorems has emerged proving that aggregate collective decisions do not satisfy the most rudimentary and innocuous normative axioms one might wish to impose. 3 These theorems are so general that they rule out all democratic procedures as possible candidates for the aggregation procedure. If this essay had been written fifteen years ago, it would have stopped at this pessimistic evaluation and then would have begun to examine the implications. But today one is able to sketch, if not paint, a much more optimistic picture of the possible normative consequences of at least some democratic aggregation procedures. It is important when discussing the normative properties of voting procedures to distinguish between committee procedures, that is, voting rules designed to reveal the preferences of those casting the votes as in a direct democracy, and representative democracy voting rules. In recent years several new voting rules have been developed for revealing voters' preferences on the issues to be decided. These demand-revealing processes elicit information about individual preferences for collective outcomes and build in strong incentives for the honest revelation of preferences.4 The outcomes are efficient in the same sense that competitive markets produce efficient outcomes; that is, they are Pareto optimal and/ or maximize the summation of consumer surpluses over all voters from collective action. Voting by veto asks each voter to propose a final outcome to the collective decision process and then to remove one proposal from the set containing all proposals plus the status quo. The remaining, winning issue has normative properties similar to those of majority rule, but the procedure is not troubled by cycling as majority rule is. 5 Point voting (each individual allocates a stock of fungible vote points across a set of issues in direct relation to his intensity of preferences over the issues) leads to social outcomes that maximize a weighted sum of individual utilities under the vote-point aggregation rule proposed by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). Although each of these procedures violates one or more of the Arrow axioms by necessity, the normative loss from discarding the axiom in question seems arguably more than offset by the other attractive properties of these procedures. Thus, these procedures and the growing family of new preference revelation procedures from which they are drawn represent an attractive theoretical alternative description of the potential of democracy to that which one obtains from the Arrow-theorem literature. Like the latter, these new procedures presume an informed electorate that participates in the democratic process in spite of the issues discussed in the preceding section. Given that these procedures place greater demands on
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the voter's time and/or intelligence than simple majority rule, as a normative underpinning for the potential of democratic rule, they represent an even more romantic view of the voter's capacity and motivation than implicit in classical democratic theory, in which majority rule is the presumed voting procedure. The problem of voter motivation is perhaps less severe if we think of these procedures as being employed not by the citizens themselves but by their representatives. The job of the representative is to be informed about the issues, and the incentive to be reelected might serve to induce responsible voting by representatives. The procedures are not so complicated that one cannot presume that elected representatives could not employ them. The normative properties of the procedures depend upon the relationship between the outcomes from the voting and the preferences of the citizens. To maintain these normative properties under a system of representative voting, a system of representation would have to be employed in which the preferences of the citizens were accurately mirrored by a committee of representatives. A system of proportional representation would be called for (Mueller, forthcoming, ch. 12). Proportional representation systems seek to select representatives whose voting will accurately reflect the preferences of the individual citizens in the proportions in which these preferences are found in the population. The goal is an accurate representation of preferences. An alternative interpretation of representative democracy is to view the goal of voting as the election of a government, a person or group of persons to govern the polity. Recent analyses of this form of representative government indicate that it too can have some attractive properties. An important assumption in the Arrow impossibility and cycling literatures is that voting is deterministic in the sense that the voter votes with probability 1 for that proposal or candidate promising the highest utility to him. Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) and Ledyard (1984) have argued that this assumption is unrealistic with respect to voting in a representative democracy, because candidates are unlikely to know with certainty all of the characteristics of each voter's utility function. They have replaced the deterministic voting assumption with a probabilistic voting assumption. The probability that a given voter votes for a particular candidate increases the closer the candidate's proposed platform is to the voter's most preferred platform. Deterministic voting models assume that voter choices gyrate schizophrenically as candidates move about competing for votes. A slight movement to the left loses voter A's vote, but wins B's and C's. Candidates seek to maximize their expected number of votes, and these in turn are simply
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the sum of the probabilities that each voter votes for the candidate. Define nu as the probability that voter / votes for candidate 1, and EV^ as one's expected vote. Then candidate 1 seeks to maximize
Under deterministic voting nu and n2i take the following step-function form: (2)
where Uu and U2i are /'s expected utilities under the platforms of 1 and 2, respectively. Probabilistic voting models replace (2) with the assumption that the probability functions are continuous in Uu and U2h that is,
nu =fi(Ulh £/2/),
& > 0,
- J f < 0.
(3)
One need not have much familiarity with mathematics to know that the task of finding a maximum for equation (1) will be much easier if the nu are smooth, continuous, concave functions than if they are discontinuous functions. The probabilistic voting assumption makes this substitution, and it lies at the heart of the difference between the two models' characteristics. The utility functions of each voter can be thought of as mountains with peaks at each voter's ideal point. The probabilistic voting assumption transforms these utility mountains into probability mountains, with the probability of any voter voting for a given candidate reaching a peak when the candidate takes a position at the voter's ideal point. Equation (1) aggregates these individual probability mountains into a single aggregate probability mountain. The competition for votes among candidates drives them to the peak of this mountain. That the positioning of the candidates at the peak of this mountain is an equilibrium can be established in a variety of ways. For example, the zero-sum nature of competition for votes, combined with the continuity assumptions on the nu and n2i (implying the continuity of EVj and EV2), can be relied upon to establish a Nash equilibrium (Coughlin and Nitzan, 1981). If the probability functions are strictly concave, the equilibrium is unique, with both candidates offering the same platforms.
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Moreover, the equilibrium social outcome that competition for votes produces is one at which a social welfare function defined over all voter utilities is maximized. In one of Coughlin and Nitzan's models it is the Nash social welfare function:
W=U{XU2X'
• -XUn.
(4)
In Ledyard's model it is Bentham's W=Ul + U2+- • -+Un.
(5)
Thus, rational, self-interested behavior on the part of voters and candidates in a competitive political process produces the same kind of social outcome in the public sector as rational self-interest and competition have been shown to yield in the private sector. The probabilistic voting models tell us that the necessity to compete for votes forces candidates to weigh the possible impact of each policy on the welfare of every citizen and propose those policies that maximize the aggregation of these individual utilities in a very specific sense. A better normative case for a competitive democratic process is, from the utilitarian perspective of public choice, difficult to imagine. Comforting as these results are, they underscore the importance of the issues raised in the preceding section. Political competition is seen as taking place over a well-defined issue space. Voters know and respond to the policy proposals of candidates; candidates choose policies based on the likelihood of each voter's support. Coughlin, Nitzan, and Ledyard have picked up Downs's model of political competition and written a new final chapter, one that gives the story a happy ending. But they have left rational ignorance out of the plot. One expects, and casual observation confirms, that candidates behave as Downs's rational-ignorance hypothesis implies. Issues are fuzzed over and debates are avoided; when they occur, the topics are discussed in generalities rather than specifics; candidates avoid taking positions for as long as possible. These predictions of a model of political competition with rational ignorance may be Downs's most lasting contribution to our understanding of the nature of representative democracy. But given the existence of a substantial amount of rational ignorance in the voting populace, it is not clear how much solace can be derived from the knowledge that candidate competition in platitudes maximizes an aggregation of voter utilities based on their misconceptions of candidate positions. The positive public choice literature isfilledwith studies showing that public bureaucracies are less efficient at providing services than the private sector when the two compete.6 Similarly, much government activity redistributes income from one group to another in ways that are
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difficult to rationalize on the basis of any normative theory of redistribution.7 Regulation frequently has perverse effects that differ from those claimed for it at the time the original legislation is debated.8 These and other examples of government waste and inefficiency reveal that many of the actual "outputs" of government are not those promised by candidates as they compete for votes, or envisaged by voters when they cast them. Rational ignorance allows a gigantic wedge to be driven between the winning candidate's platform in a competitive political process and the bundle of publicly provided goods and services that actually ensues. 4
What are the implications?
Throughout its short history, public choice has been plagued by two voting paradoxes: the paradox of why rational, self-interested individuals vote when the probability of their vote affecting the outcome is negligible, and the paradox that the aggregation of votes may lead to no determinate outcome. Recent research has gone a long way toward resolving the second paradox. The first remains. In my view there is far more empirical support for the nonparticipation prediction of public choice than many seem to think. Voting is but one dimension of political participation. Gathering information, contributing funds to candidates, canvassing door to door, and many other dimensions of participation are open to citizens. Participation rates in these more costly modes are far lower. The act of voting may be viewed as the conditioned response of an individual to being in a situation in which he feels that the long-run viability of democracy depends on citizen participation. To the extent that the normative case for democracy rests on participation in the democratic process by a large number of voters, a voter's belief that democracy is an institution worth preserving and his sense of political obligation go some distance toward sustaining democracy's normative foundation. The foreboding that the aggregation of individual preferences leads to outcomes that are less than the sum of the parts, promulgated for so many years by public choice theorists, is finally being dispelled. But even the new theoretical results do not promise that the whole will be any more than the sum of the parts. The question still to be answered is, How meaningful are the votes cast in one of the newly invented preference revelation schemes, or for candidates in a competitive election, as indicators of individual preferences for the outputs of the public sector? On this issue I share the concerns of Brennan, Buchanan, and Lomasky. Suppose we were to conclude that these votes tell us next to nothing about what an informed voter's preferences over public outputs would be.
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Elections tell us which candidates uninformed voters like, not what policies informed voters prefer. What then would be the implication? One possible implication is that we should leave fewer collective decisions to government and assign more to the private sector: less social insurance, more private insurance; fewer public tennis courts, more private tennis clubs. Though some movement in this direction is probably desirable, indeed has already begun in this country, there are definite limits to how far one can go toward privatizing the public sector. Privatizing the core of public outputs that onefindsin the public sector of almost every country, outputs with significant public good-externality attributes, would simply shift to the private sector the significant preference revelation costs with which the public sector so poorly deals. The dilemma of democratic participation is that the same characteristics of goods that make collective action necessary weaken an individual's incentive to participate in a democratic process that decides the quantity and quality dimensions of the goods. The greater the number of individuals who are affected by a good's provision, the more potentially there is to gain by providing the good collectively and the less incentive any one voter will have to participate in the collective decision. The commonality of wants that pulls people to the polity weakens the participatory bonds that hold a democracy together. Rather than discard democracy, one might try to reform it. If the rational ignorance of voters is democracy's major shortcoming, one could lower the costs of gathering information and raise the incentives to do so. The quality of outcomes from the democratic process is as pure a public good as one can imagine, and thus an active role for government in lowering the costs of obtaining information about political alternatives is defensible. In the United States an active role for government in providing political information has been eschewed, most likely out of fear that the government, or certain members thereof, would abuse the opportunity to bias the information on its behalf. In European countries the state owns at least one television network and often regulates the others. Public service broadcasting of political news and news about major social issues can be provided directly. The broadcasting of congressional debates over major issues would not seem to run the danger of the party or persons in office gaining unfair advantage. The Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN) has been televising live debates in the House of Representatives and other political activities like state caucuses. Initial viewer response suggests that politics is more interesting than soap operas and baseball for a significant fraction of the population (Reid, 1984). Were C-SPAN and state and local political broadcasting free, rather than shown only on pay television, a large number of voters might become regular
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followers of political issues. To reduce further the opportunity costs of watching these sorts of programs, one might set aside one night per week, or month, as citizen "participation" night, on which competing entertainment and sports programming would be barred from the other networks. Recourse to such action imposes obvious costs on society, but so does the provision of every other public good. If the quality of democratic decisions would be greatly increased by voters becoming better informed, then the cost of achieving this change would have to be borne in one way or another. The major disincentive to participation in the democratic process is the small probability that the participation will have an effect. This probability can be raised by decentralizing democratic decision making. In the sixties a neighborhood-government movement was afoot; efforts to strengthen our federalist institutions are pushed from time to time. In conjunction with bringing the decisions of government closer to the voter, one might enrich the voter's means of expression by adopting reforms like proportional representation, the Borda count procedure, or even one of the recently developed preference revelation procedures discussed earlier. These changes have costs and disadvantages also. My objective here is not to prescribe, but merely to indicate that options exist. Though it is easy to think of even fundamental political reforms and possible, but more difficult, to predict their consequences, it is nearly impossible to envisage how they could ever come about. The rational ignorance and inertia of citizens that lead to the need for reform stand in the way of its achievement. Those in the best position to lead a reform movement, leaders of government and business, have the least to gain from such a movement. Thus, the quality of outcomes under our democratic process seems destined to continue to deteriorate, until a point is eventually reached when a sufficient number of citizens will be sufficiently distressed to set aside their private pursuits long enough to participate in a fundamental restructuring of our political institutions. And, one may hope, a modern Jefferson and Paine, and later a Madison, will step forward to lead and guide the process. Notes 1 2
See, e.g., Ashenfelter and Kelley (1975) and references cited therein. Brennan and Lomasky describe voters as following fads and regard this as undermining the normative case for democracy. But I do not accept this argument, any more than I accept that consumers' tendency to follow fads in buying undermines the consumer sovereignty defense of the free market. Following a fad is an expression of preference and is presumably based on the belief that either the faddist or his fellow citi-
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zens will be made better off by the fad issue winning. Decision matrix 1 must hold whether we refer to post-fad preferences or pre-fad preferences, and the above arguments apply. An alternative interpretation of the fad argument is that voters are duped into following fads that will harm them or society, because they do not carefully consider the fad issue. But this is a different argument indeed, the rational-ignorance argument to which we now turn. For surveys of these results, see Sen (1976,1977) and Mueller (forthcoming, ch. 20). See Clarke (1971), Groves and Ledyard (1977), and Tideman and Tullock(1976). See Mueller (1978, 1984) and Moulin (1981). For surveys of this literature, see Orzechowski (1977) and Borcherding, Pommerehne, and Schneider (1982). Stigler (1970) and Aranson and Ordeshook (1981). Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), and Aranson and Ordeshook (1981). References
Aranson, P., and Ordeshook, P. "Regulation, Redistribution, and Public Choice," Public Choice 37 (1981): 69-100. Arrow, K. J. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley, 1951, rev. ed. 1963. Ashenfelter, O., and Kelley, S., Jr. "Determinants of Participation in Presidential Elections," Journal of Law and Economics 18 (December 1975): 695-733. Borcherding, T. E., Pommerehne, W. W., and Schneider, F. "Comparing the Efficiency of Private and Public Production: The Evidence from Five Countries," Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie 89 (1982): 127-56. Brennan, G., and Buchanan, J. M. "The Logic of the Levers," mimeo, George Mason University, July 1983. Buchanan, J. M. "Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets," Journal of Political Economy 62 (April 1954a): 114-23. "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market," Journal of Political Economy 62 (August 1954b): 334-43. The Limits ofLiberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. University of Chicago Press, 1975. Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, Gordon. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962. Clark, E. H. "Multipart Pricing of Public Goods," Public Choice 29 (Spring 1971): 17-33. Coughlin, P., and Nitzan, S. "Electoral Outcomes with Probabilistic Voting and Nash Social Welfare Maxima," Journal of Public Economics 15 (1981): 113-21. Downs, A. An Economic Theory ofDemocracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1957. Groves, T., and Ledyard, J. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the Tree Rider' Problem," Econometrica 45 (May 1977): 783-809. Harsanyi, John C. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal
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Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy 63 (August 1955): 309-21. Hylland, A., and Zeckhauser, R. "Selecting Public Goods Bundles with Preferences Unknown and Tax System Given," mimeo, Harvard University, 1979. Ledyard, J. "The Pure Theory of Large Two Candidate Elections," Public Choice 41 (1984): 7-41. Moulin, H. "Prudence and Sophistication in Voting Strategy," Journal of Economic Theory 24 (1981): 398-412. Mueller, D. C. "Voting by Veto," Journal of Public Economics 10 (August 1978): 57-75. "Voting by Veto and Majority Rule," in H. Hanusch, ed., Public Finance and the Quest for Efficiency, Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1984, pp. 69-85. "The Voting Paradox," in C. K. Rowley, ed., Democracy and Public Choice, Oxford: Blackwell Publisher, 1987, pp. 77-99. Public Choice II. Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. Orzechowski, W. "Economic Models of Bureaucracy: Survey, Extensions and Evidence," in T. E. Borcherding, ed., Budgets and Bureaucrats, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977, pp. 229-59. Peltzman, S. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics 19 (August 1976): 611-40. Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Reid, T. R. "Congress: Best Little Soap Opera on Cable," Washington Post, April 29, 1984. Samuelson, P. A. "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," Review of Economics and Statistics 36 (November 1954): 386-9. Sen, A. K. "Liberty, Unanimity and Rights," Economica 43 (August 1976): 217-45. "Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination," Econometrica 45 (January 1977): 53-89. Stigler, G. J. "Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution," Journal of Law and Economics 13 (April 1970): 1-10. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal ofEconomics and Management 2 (Spring 1971): 3-21. Taylor, M. J. Anarchy and Cooperation. New York: Wiley, 1976. Tideman, J. M., and Tullock, G. "A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices," Journal of Political Economy 84 (December 1976): 1145-59.
CHAPTER 5
The democratic order and public choice Peter H. Aranson
1
Individual preferences, institutions, and public choice
Before the development of public-choice theory, normative writing about the public sector in general, and about democratic politics in particular, belonged to one of two broad categories. First, many critics defended or decried some particular public policy as advancing or denying the achievement of a just society, as they defined it. Both history and contemporary political life provide ample evidence of this kind of critical writing. For example, in earlier days advocates for and against slavery, the gold standard, progressive taxation, labor-union cartels, economic planning, and international isolationism dominated political discourse. And each advocate framed his argument in terms of fulfilling some vision ofjustice. Today many of the issues seem different, but as contemporary writers argue for or against a woman'srightto have an abortion, a greater or lesser amount of income redistribution, or more or less government regulation of the private sector, the framing of argument in terms of justice, rights, and other deontological goals persists.1 Second, other writers attacked or defended not the policies of government, but its structure, its organic laws, and the basis of representation, but again in terms of preconceived notions of justice or rights. Surely, such arguments are as old as the state. Plato's Republic proposes a structure of governance in terms of anthropomorphic balance, by casting an 97
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analogy between just persons and just polities.2 John Stuart Mill held that proportional representation perfected the relationship between the elector and his agent, inter alia as a matter of right.3 In this century the debate continued, with some recapitulating the Millian argument 4 but others regarding proportional representation as a source of political instability. 5 Similar arguments focus on problems from expanding the franchise,6 reapportionment,7 and gerrymandering,8 to judicial review of legislative enactments9 and legislative delegation to administrative agencies.10 This second set of commentaries often resembles the first, in that advocates or opponents of structural change or the status quo frame their arguments (though not exclusively) in terms of justice, rights, and other deontological goals. There are notable exceptions, of course. Hobbes, for example, justified absolute monarchy to avoid "continuall feare, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."11 Not long ago opponents of malapportionment urged reform because, in their view, it would justifiably increase the material well-being of blacks and urban residents.12 And today writers such as Michelman, in considering governmental structures, argue against an economic interpretation of rights and for one grounded on goals, inter alia, of maximizing political participation.13 To cast the goal of the state in other terms, by this view, would deny human beings self-actualization through political participation and self-government, activities that Aristotle thought necessary for a claim to humanity. 14 Public-choice theory differs in at least four respects from these normative exercises about public policy and public institutions. First, publicchoice theory, even in its (conditionally) normative forms, remains largely a positive theory. That is, in borrowing its methodology from microeconomics, it takes people's preferences as given15 and seeks to explain and predict how people will act (and react) in the domains of politics and government, independent of the researcher's view of justice. Second, public-choice theory rests on a methodological individualism. This dependence implies, first, that the relevant actors are individual human beings themselves, and not groups, classes, nations, races, or collectivities. It implies, second, that the goals and preferences of individual human beings provide the animus for choice and action. Much publicchoice scholarship assumes that the functions that people maximize (the risk-adjusted goals they seek to achieve) involve economic outcomes that engage their narrowly defined self-interest. But this description need not hold true. Models incorporating (or claiming to find) ideological motives16 or other noneconomic or altruistic goals17 appear regularly in the professional literature. Yet no matter what the public-choice scholar asserts to be the chooser's preference ordering, the source of that ordering is
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the chooser himself, and not some incorporeal concept ofjustice or goodness, although such concepts might inform the chooser's preferences. Accordingly, public-choice theory relies on no disembodied standard by which to judge public policies, the outcomes of political and governmental processes. These outcomes public-choice scholars judge (when they do so) solely by the degree to which they satisfy the preferences and goals that individual human beings use to order them. Third, public-choice theory interprets alternative political and governmental structures as more or less perfect engines for converting individual preferences into public policies. These institutions need not hold value apart from the collective actions they partly determine. Of course, people may attach different values to alternative institutional arrangements, which are distinguishable from the public-policy outcomes that those arrangements might imply.18 And such values often seem to be the stuff out of which people construct debates about institutional legitimacy. But more often than not, the proponents of institutional change wish either to bring about a different set of public-policy outcomes or to select a different set of governors. Still, the possibility remains that judgments about institutions may seem independent ofjudgments about the outcomes that those institutions make possible, just as judgments about the outcomes themselves may not solely reflect economic considerations alone. Fourth, public-choice theory assesses institutions according to how well they satisfy individual (instrumental and noninstrumental) preferences, and not according to how well they satisfy some incorporeal view of justice or goodness, apart from the values and preferences that people hold themselves. Public-choice scholars, in their clearest modes of thought, apply standards such as Pareto optimality or technological efficiency to assess the outcomes of political and governmental institutions, not because they value these standards in and of themselves, but because these standards provide clearly defined (if not always unique) measures of how well a particular institutional arrangement converts individual preferences into public choices. Thisfinaldifference between public-choice analysis and other varieties of writing provides the point of departure for this essay; but more important, it describes public-choice theory's most seminal contributions to scholarly discourse about the democratic order. To put these contributions in proper perspective requires that we elaborate on the term "institution," on the nature of the comparisons that public-choice, comparative theories of institutions might offer, and on the choice of institutions themselves. First, by "institution" we mean the formal and informal, written or unwritten set of rules under which human interaction in general, and
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human exchange of all varieties in particular, might occur. A constitution describes the institution of government, its constituent parts (e.g., legislature, courts, and executive branch), their functions and relations, one to the other(s), the methods of officeholder selection, the qualifications, if any, that officeholders and members of the electorate must satisfy, and the institution's enumerated powers and process