Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics

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Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics In every democratic polity there exist individuals and groups who hold some but not all of the essential elements of citizenship. Scholars who study citizenship routinely reach for shared concepts and language to identify forms of political membership held by migrants, children, the disabled, and other groups of individuals who, for various reasons, are neither full citizens nor non-citizens. This book introduces the concept of semi-citizenship as a means of dramatically advancing debates about individuals who hold some, but not all, elements of full democratic citizenship. By analytically classifying the rights of citizenship and their various combinations, scholars can typologize semi-citizens and produce comparisons of different kinds of semi-citizenships and of semi-citizenships in different states. The book uses theoretical analysis, historical examples, and contemporary cases of semi-citizenship to illustrate how normative and governmental doctrines of citizenship converge and conflict, making semi-citizenship an enduring and inevitable part of democratic politics. Elizabeth F. Cohen is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. She holds a Ph.D. from Yale University. Her research interests focus on contemporary political theory, citizenship studies, and the politics of immigration. She has published articles in Citizenship Studies and the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. Her articles and essays address children’s citizenship, immigration, asylum, migration policy, same-sex marriage, the civil disabilities of felons and ex-felons, and citizenship in the European Union.

Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics

Elizabeth F. Cohen Syracuse University

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521768993 © Elizabeth F. Cohen 2009 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2009 ISBN-13

978-0-511-64180-0

eBook (NetLibrary)

ISBN-13

978-0-521-76899-3

Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

For Reggie Feiner Cohen and Ira J. Cohen, who bequeathed to me the ideas that families can be democratic, children are citizens, and acting like grown-ups isn’t necessarily the best way to live.

Contents

Acknowledgmentspage ix 1 Introduction1 2 The Myth of Full Citizenship13 3 An Introduction to Semi-Citizenship 59 4 Logics of Semi-Citizenship95 5 Semi-Citizenship and the Disaggregation of Autonomous Rights141 6 Semi-Citizenship and the Disaggregation of Relative Rights178 7 Conclusion204 Bibliography211 Index227

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Acknowledgments

The motivation for this book lies squarely in the biography of Chaim Feiner. My family’s citizenship is the enduring legacy of his determination, courage, and intelligence. I permanently record his name here, before all others, in triumphant defiance of anyone who has ever or will ever attempt to erase a human life. He persevered through the darkest years of modernity, resolutely confronting depravity and indifference. He transcended both with unwavering personal honor and cosmopolitanism, each of which he brought to bear on his political convictions and his relationships. I am in awe of his life and cherish his memory. For their role in helping me achieve my professional citizenship, I thank the members of my dissertation committee at Yale University: Rogers M. Smith, Ian Shapiro, John P. McCormick, and Bruce Ackerman. They instilled in me an appreciation for academic autonomy that I will carry with me well past the publication of this book. While I was at Yale, Robert Dahl, David Cameron, David Mayhew, and Peter Schuck also shared helpful feedback and congenial support. Mary Dietz read a section of the dissertation and provided incisive and constructive critiques that took the work on its own terms before those terms were easy to discern. Carol Swain offered intellectual engagement and stalwart professional encouragement early and often. Linda Bosniak and Jennifer Hochschild gave me astute commentary on a draft of this manuscript. Bryan S. Turner provided me with an opportunity to think about questions of governmentality. He also founded the field of citizenship studies, one of his many achievements that have reshaped scholarship in the social sciences.

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Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Lewis Bateman at Cambridge University Press for his support and willingness to take a chance on a brand new word. I also wish to thank Emily Spangler, who skillfully shepherded the manuscript through the editorial process. Two scrupulously thorough and thoughtful anonymous reviewers contributed immensely valuable insights. At several key points their suggestions transformed my thinking. In addition I am grateful for Peter R. Murray’s erudite editorial review. Finally, I would like to thank Donna Ching of ChingFoster Design for rendering the evocative cover design. Sections of this book benefited from presentations at Princeton University’s conference on Debating Immigration, at the Vanderbilt University Law School, and at the University of Wisconsin’s Political Theory Workshop and American Political Thought Series. Related material was also presented to members of Syracuse University’s Sawyer Law and Politics Program and Institute for the Study of the Judiciary, Politics, and the Media, both of which are the institutional brainchildren of Keith J. Bybee. In a singularly civic act, Suzanne Mettler, with support from Syracuse’s Department of Political Science and the Maxwell School Dean’s Office, founded a Manuscript Review Workshop at which a draft of this book was presented. For her commitment to this endeavor, Suzanne deserves copious credit, not just from me, but from the profession at large. For grant and research support I thank Yale University and Syracuse University, in particular, the Dean’s Office of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and the Alan K. Campbell Institute. My colleagues at the Maxwell School are truly remarkable. For their diverse contributions I wish to acknowledge: Kristi Andersen, Keith Bybee, Ken Baynes, Gavan Duffy, Fred Frohock, Vernon Greene, Tom Keck, Ralph Ketcham, Audie Klotz, Lily Ling, Robert McClure, Glyn Morgan, Mark Rupert, Hans Peter Schmitz, Jeffrey Stonecash, Laurence Thomas, and Stuart Thorson. Brian Taylor and Renee Denevers are unswervingly loyal colleagues and friends. Danny Hayes and Julie Gozan clarified my thinking on membership in important ways. I have also relied on the skill and good humor that Kelley Coleman and Bethany Walawender at the Campbell Institute, and Candy Brooks, Stacy Bunce, Jacquie Meyer, and Tess Slater in Syracuse’s Department of Political Science, bring to their work. While at Syracuse, I have learned a great deal from conversations with numerous talented students, some of whom also assisted with research

Acknowledgments

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for this book. Special thanks to: Saheli Datta, Havva Karakas-Keles, Lindsey Kingston, Jenn Kinney, John McClure, and Christopher Morley. Steven Dube and Cyril Ghosh invented a profession, editorial therapy, and provided this service to me with alacrity and gentle wit. Since we met at Yale, Janelle Wong, Dara Strolovitch, Jessica AllinaPisano, and Naomi Murakawa have regularly demonstrated to me how to unite one’s principles with one’s vocation. Paul Frymer is as committed a friend as he is a scholar. Lennie Feldman possesses a truly rare intellectual acumen, generosity, and unerring ethics. Casiano Hacker-Cordon exemplifies professional inclusiveness. Jolynn Parker, Mike Goode, Heidi Swarts, Sarah Pralle, Asthildur Bernhardsdottir, Dawn Wilson, Bob Wilson, Tom Perreault, Meredith Perreault, and Tod Rutherford supplied a steady stream of good cheer and good food. I have missed Emily and Bill Gottlieb, Jennifer Wang, and Bess O’Neill while I was sequestered at my desk. Cyril: The strength and grace of your character is a continual source of amazement to me. You have also forever erased the line between friend and family in my head and heart, for which I am profoundly grateful. Loving thanks also to Mobus Operandi and Co. and Misha and Maddie Ketzel. I am also lucky to call my aunt, Celia Epstein, a lifelong friend. I miss my uncle Gil and feel his absence keenly. Reggie Feiner Cohen and Ira J. Cohen are the two most intellectually lively, insightful, and intensely loyal individuals I could ever hope to know. I constantly marvel at the good fortune I had to join the lifelong conversation they began 41 years ago. RFC and IJC: you frequently remind me that we cannot choose our relatives. If we could, I would choose you.

1 Introduction

In November 1999, a  Cuban child named  Elian Gonzalez washed up on the shore of Florida after a harrowing journey from  Cuba that took the life of his mother. Over the next several months, members of his family and politicians in  Cuba and the  United States competed for custody of the boy, and hence to determine where he would live and what  country’s passport he would hold. As an unaccompanied minor, an undocumented immigrant, a  potential asylum seeker, and a  Cuban in the  United States,  Gonzalez embodied a number of important exceptions to immigration laws.1 Four months after the conflict was resolved, and Gonzalez was returned to  Cuba in his father’s custody, the 2000  U.S. presidential election took place. During what turned out to be a similarly unprecedented controversy, post-election investigations revealed that Florida’s voter rolls had systematically excluded ex-felons  who were entitled to vote, and who were disproportionately both African-American and registered Democrats.2 Florida, or even the  United States, is not exceptional in this; controversies over how, and to whom, rights are made available regularly erupt in all liberal  democratic states. Disputes over the rights of  Sarah Banet-Weiser, “Elian Gonzalez and ‘The Purpose of America’: Nation, Family, and the Child-Citizen,” American Quarterly 55(2) (2003): 149–178; and D.L. Dillman, “The Paradox of Discretion and the Case of Elian Gonzalez,” Public Organization Review 2(2) (2002): 165–185. 2  Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). See also Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen, “Punishment and Democracy: The Disenfranchisement of Nonincarcerated Felons in the United States,” Perspectives on Politics 2(3) (2004): 491–505, and Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen, “Democratic Contraction? The Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States,” American Sociological Review 67(6) (2002): 777–803. 1

1

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Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics

former  colonial subjects in the United Kingdom,  guestworkers in  France and  Germany, and  indigenous persons in  New Zealand illustrate the diverse and global nature of questions about who is a citizen and what rights and statuses citizenship confers. The statuses held by these groups do not fully conform to standard definitions of citizenship. Nonetheless, all of them have some of the political characteristics associated with citizenship. They hold some rights and receive political  recognition consistent with that accorded to citizens. This places them in political  categories between citizen and non-citizen. They are semi-citizens. Individually, these semi-citizenships appear to be exceptional, yet many such statuses appear and reappear in different countries and political eras. This book lays out a framework within which semi-citizenships might be identified, and it offers an argument about how and why these semi-citizenships are inevitably present, and continually produced, in liberal  democratic states. The concept of citizenship is ancient, and yet its meaning remains contested to this day.3 Consider the following inconsistencies woven into the history of political thought on citizenship.  A ristotle writes in The Politics, “But in most    constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a    constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all.”4 In The Social Contract,  Rousseau choreographs an elegant transformation of individuals’ wills into a citizenry.5  Kant’s Perpetual Peace describes “the principle of legal  equality for everyone (as citizens).”6 In Federalist  Number 10,  Madison speaks of “a chosen body of citizens.”7 Each of these political thinkers finds some way to explicitly posit the  equality of all citizens. Yet, each of the philosophers quoted above also notes elsewhere that there are many kinds of citizens. Some do so in the very same passages in which they trumpet the virtues of equal citizenship.  A ristotle organized citizens into occupational groups that generally corresponded  T he nature and import of citizenship as an essentially contested concept is discussed in Chapter 3. 4  A ristotle, The Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Book I, Chapter 12. 5  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Late Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 6  Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in Kant: Political Writings, ed. H. Reis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 99. 7  Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New York: Signet, 1961), 82; see also Ralf Dahrendorf, “Citizenship and Beyond,” Social Research 41(4) (1974): 673–701. 3

Introduction

3

to perceived abilities to self-govern.8  Rousseau chronicles different kinds of citizens in his model republic of Geneva.9  Kant delineates  rights of “hospitality” for  foreign guests.  James Madison wrote of “comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens.”10 This inconsistency between, on the one hand, the presumption that citizenship in any polity can and must have a single meaning, and on the other, the existence of various kinds and degrees of citizenship, is one that many intuitively recognize, although few systematically account for it in democratic or    liberal theories of citizenship.11 There exists a belief that a central function, perhaps the central function, of citizenship is to make members of a polity equal, and that it does so by fashioning a single, unitary political identity.  Judith Shklar and  Rogers M. Smith decry American tendencies to exclude, with the expectation that  equality ought to be realized and that this happens by offering equal citizenship to all members of a society.12 The  rights and duties that citizenship  8 References to classes of citizens, partial citizens, and non-citizens abound in The Politics. See, for example, Book VII, Parts 7–10. ���������������������������������������� Aristotle did not belong to the enfranchised class, but instead was a  metic: a  foreigner who by virtue of his non-Athenian blood would never have access to the panoply of rights and expectations associated with Athenian citizenship. Centuries later Isaiah Berlin would describe himself using the same word to capture his scattered affiliations as a Latvian immigrant living in  England with complicated attachments to Palestine. See Timothy Garton Ash, “A Genius for Friendship,” New York Review of Books 51(14) (2004): 22.  9 Indeed,  Giorgio Agamben asserts that “No author in France … has understood the true meaning of the term ‘citizen.’” Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 129. 10  Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” and Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers, 324. Dahrendorf (“Citizenship and Beyond”) draws the contrast between this and the phrase “a chosen body of citizens” quoted above. 11  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Some have made arguments about specific kinds of differentiations, but these arguments are not linked within a larger framework that recognizes relationships between different forms of  de jure exclusion. The best-developed bodies of work on  differentiated citizenship in political theory typically takes up cultural  minorities and gender  inequality. In one sense this literature is broader in scope than the subject of this book, as it takes up institutional remedies for social  exclusion. In another sense, it is also narrower in scope in that it does not offer a means by which all kinds of institutionally  unequal citizenship might be compared. See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.) 12  Judith Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); see also Thomas Janoski and Brian Gran, “Political Citizenship: Foundations of Rights,” in Handbook of Citizenship Studies, eds. Engin Isin and Bryan S. Turner (London: Sage, 2002), 13–52.

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Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics

comprises are intended to create an abstract core legal identity. In turn, this identity makes those who hold it equal, and thus identical, in the eyes of the law and the state. However differently placed it is that individuals may find themselves in private, citizenship provides people with a cloak to don in public in order to meet on level ground, as equals, to engage in collective politics. Conversely, the idea that “[a]s citizens, any two men are indistinguishable,” also carries with it costs that concern skeptics.13 Benjamin  Constant described fears of a homogenizing  liberal state that imposes a single identity on formerly diverse members, fears  James Scott echoes today.14 In either case, citizenship is marked as a privileged form of political membership. It defines a boundary of  inclusion within which liberal democracies claim to  institutionalize equality through the conferral of a public status upon all members. This has come to imply that citizenship ought to have one and only one meaning in a given polity. Liberal democratic states are expected to establish a single model of citizenship that is accessible through a routinized, and morally and ethically justified, set of rules and procedures. However, in  practice, citizenship has never been a unitary concept, nor can it even be neatly characterized as binary.15 All manner of exceptions to rules of  inclusion abound. Although these  differentiated forms of  Dahrendorf, “Citizenship and Beyond,” 674.  Benjamin Constant, “The Spirit of Conquest,” in Political Writings, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 15  Feminist  scholars have been at the forefront of innovative scholarship on citizenship. See Chantal Mouffe, “Feminism, Citizenship, and Radical Democratic Politics,” in Feminists Theorize the Political, eds. Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (New York: Routledge, 1992), 369–384; and Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, 2nd edition (New York: New York University Press, 2003). Also see Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Tomas Hammar, Democracy and the Nation State (London: Gower Publishing, 1990); Margaret R. Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham, NC: Duke, 1999); Engin F. Isin, Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Leonard C. Feldman, Citizens Without Shelter (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004); Peter Schuck, Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Binary thought itself may be conceptually suspect. Ian Shapiro’s recent work on the methodology of the social sciences eschews theoretical work aimed at producing “gross concepts” that lend themselves to reductive, dichotomous thought that: (a) “obscures the phenomena they purport to analyze” by (b) reducing “what are actually relational claims to claims about one or another of the terms in a relational argument.” (Ian Shapiro, The Flight From Reality in the Human Sciences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 14. See especially Chapter 5. 13

14

Introduction

5

citizenship16 have not gone unnoticed, more attention has been devoted to making claims about the justice or  injustice of such statuses than has been directed to cataloging forms of differentiation and exploring the full range of their sources.17 Thus the identification and comparison of different forms of citizenship have been largely eclipsed by normative claims about the nature of specific injustices related to semi-citizenship.18 In fact, so great is the interest in how to achieve equal citizenship, or in arguing for particular visions of equal citizenship, that many arguments about citizenship have neglected to fully interrogate whether it can be achieved, and, if not, how we can accommodate this fact within our larger philosophical frameworks. As yet, no analytic response has been forthcoming to those calls for advancing thought on  “differentiated citizenship” that invoke the need for a “grammar of political conduct” that includes a “political syntax” that “values difference, as built into the very fabric of the political project.”19 Historical and sociological calls for “a full theory of citizenship rights would account for these variations as well as broad trends,” also remain without an analytic reply.20 In order to develop such a language of citizenship, which can be used to discuss and analyze the statuses that exist between full and ­non-citizenship, this study moves discussions of political membership in two new directions. First, it offers a way to classify semi-citizenships in a manner that facilitates analytic comparison. I identify multiple forms of political membership that are associated with some, but not all, of the  democratic rights,  responsibilities, activities, and statuses available to citizens of a state, and I discuss how and why liberal  democratic states routinely instantiate such  categories of semi-citizenship. Second, this examination details how and why semi-citizenships come to exist and, more importantly, why they are inevitable. Chapter 2 surveys definitions of citizenship and defends a definition of citizenship that emphasizes the importance of rights as the means through which opportunities for political action are created and protected.  The phrase “differentiated citizenship” was coined by Young in Justice and the Politics of Difference. 17  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Notable exceptions to this exist. As discussed further in Chapter 2, Bosniak’s discussion of the disaggregation of  “status citizenship” and  normative models of citizenship takes up this subject in the context of the relationship of external and internal boundaries.  Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien. 18  The literature on  differentiated citizenship is surveyed in Chapter 3. 19  Ruth Lister, “Citizenship as Status and Practice,” Hypatia 12(4) (1997): 14. 20  Charles Tilly, “Where Do Rights Come From?” in Democracy, Revolution, and History, ed. Theda Skocpol (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), 71. 16

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Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics

Citizens have access to an intertwining set or “braid” of ­fundamental civil, political, and    social rights, along with rights of  nationality. Semicitizens are accorded only subsets of those rights. A semi-citizen may have some, but not all,  political rights. A semi-citizen may have no  political rights at all. Numerous configurations are conceivable. Because rights create political relationships it is crucial to states that they be able to  disaggregate bundles of rights.21 The unbundling of the braid of citizenship rights has the effect of shaping and managing populations whose diverse elements could not all be governed by a single set of rules. In the absence of this capacity, states would have to do things like immediately and fully enfranchise all immigrants, legally  disown responsibility for, or claims on, children, and disband  military courts. Rights not only come unbraided from each other, but each individual strand can fray. Types of  citizenship rights can become disaggregated from one another and from their own constituent parts. This suggests that citizenship rights are independent of, rather than  contingent upon, each other; that is, each right exists because it is valuable in itself, not because it makes the exercise of other rights possible. Such independence lends strength to citizenship because it allows some types of rights to be conferred on individuals even if they do not qualify for other rights. Under these conditions it is much less likely that an individual who does not meet the qualifications for full citizenship will be left completely rightless. However, this independence also makes semi-citizenship somewhat inevitable, as independently justified rights can be granted in differentiated bundles. Chapter 3 offers a framework within which we can analyze the plethora of potential semi-citizenships opened up by the nearly limitless set of possible  partial rights bundles that states can accord individuals and groups. In order to classify these possibilities in a way that facilitates discussion and comparison, this framework  classifies membership rights based on how we might  expect rights to be   bundled. Rights are either autonomous or relative.  Autonomous rights are rights that human beings need in virtually identical form in any political context.  Security of  person, rights of residence, freedom of thought and expression, and rights associated with very basic welfare are autonomous.  Relative rights obtain only in specific political contexts. The  right to vote or  property  rights are examples of  relative rights. They require specific political systems to make them  Language referring to collections of rights that compose citizenship as “bundles” recurs in work on citizenship. For a survey of some of this literature see Judith Lynn Failer, Who Qualifies for Rights? Homelessness, Mental Illness, Civil Commitment (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), especially Chapter 2.

21

Introduction

7

legible.22 The rights of semi-citizens vary along two dimensions: whether the relevant rights are relative or autonomous, and the respective strength of those  rights . This yields a 2×2 table that includes four classes of semicitizenship into which any individual or group who does not enjoy full rights of citizenship may be categorized. The four cells of this table would be:  strong autonomous rights and  weak relative rights,  strong autonomous rights and  strong relative rights,  weak autonomous rights and  strong relative rights, and  finally weak autonomous rights and  weak relative rights. The classes of semi-citizenship include recognizable  identity groups but are not themselves social identities.23 Rather, they are structural political classes whose sources and traits cannot be attributed solely to  ascriptive bias, economic  class conflict, or failings on the part of the individuals who hold them. Chapter 4 argues that the different doctrines that found citizenship in  liberal democratic states also lead inexorably to the creation of semi-citizenships. I ground this argument in the tensions within citizenship ideals that force compromises between the different doctrines that ground rights in  liberal democratic states. Liberal and democratic norms compete to define citizenship in ways that have been explored at length in debates between liberals,  communitarians, and  civic republicans.24 Few scholars have looked comprehensively at how citizenship is circumscribed by the triad composed of liberal norms, democratic norms, and the strictures imposed by governmental imperatives that motivate  administrative rationality.25 Treating  liberal norms, democratic norms, and governmental imperatives as three equal partners in the formation of citizenship sheds light on aspects of semi-citizenship that cannot be explained by  normative theory alone.  The problems of a population that is “illegible,” or inaccessible and incomprehensible to the state that governs it, is referred to by James C. Scott. Scott, drawing upon the work of Michel Foucault, details the terms on which practices of small, self-contained communities are both revealed and changed in ways that make them intelligible to outsiders, particularly the state. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). 23  As  Nancy Fraser’s analysis of problems of  recognition elucidates, social identity cannot serve as the only means through which we observe and discuss  inequality,  exclusion, and  disenfranchisement. Nancy Fraser, “Recognition Without Ethics?,” Theory, Culture & Society 18 (2–3) (2001): 21–42. 24  See Derek Heater, What is Citizenship? (Cambridge: Polity, 1999); Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory,” Ethics 104(2) (1994): 352–381; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World (New York and London: Routledge, 1990). Rogers Smith advances this debate in the American context by documenting how ascriptive Americanism conflicts with other doctrines of American citizenship (Smith, Civic Ideals). 25  One important exception is Feldman, Citizens Without Shelter. See especially Chapter 3. 22

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Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics

Rights are defended in different ways by each of the three ­competing doctrines of citizenship.  Liberalism, ethical norms associated with  democratic theory, and the  administrative rationality that marries these abstractions to the imperatives of practical politics have common lineages and overlap at points. Yet they also conflict with one another in ways that entail compromises. They all share some premises and yet they also come into conflict over how to realize membership.  Liberalism  confers rights on autonomous individuals, while democracies create boundaries supported by more ethically substantive requirements and qualities expected of members.26 Liberal and democratic norms are realized by institutions that must also contend with the demands of  sovereignty and of populations that can be irrational, illegible, or otherwise difficult to govern. The governmental imperatives created by diverse and constantly shifting populations require additional compromises on the part of liberal and democratic traditions. Recognizing  administrative rationality as a peer of  liberalism and  normative theories of citizenship is crucial because it draws the state into the picture, and yet also firmly establishes that semi-citizenship will persist even if the nation-state does not.  Administrative rationality may be the province of the state in contemporary politics, but it applies to any political institution charged with governing a population. Regardless of context, conflicts rooted in different understandings of who can and ought to be included in politics, to what degree, on what grounds, and under which conditions, will inevitably produce semi-citizenships. These can be observed by examining the political relationships formed or forestalled when rights are conferred on some people and not on others. Semi-citizenships result when these frictions intensify and the bundle of fundamental citizenship rights comes apart. Individuals who do not conform to the standards dictated by different doctrines of citizenship receive partial  bundles of rights. Semi-citizenships serve several key purposes in liberal democratic states. First, they reflect compromises between these theories that allow  Throughout the book, normative democratic theory and democratic politics are referred to as “ethical” and historically rooted to differentiate them from purely procedural applications of liberal principles. Democracy is “ethical” because it is produced by a demos that is the distinct, situated product of its own history. For a recent discussion of this distinction, see Jürgen Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy: Liberal, Republican, or Procedural” in Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley, Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 1999),135–144. Democratic norms are contrasted with liberal norms that ground rights in human traits that transcend any particular context.

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Introduction

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them to co-exist even when they contradict one another. Second, they order populations in ways that make them governable. Citizenship is far from the only form of categorization with which people organize themselves but is our oldest and most ubiquitous political category. While categorization is a contested notion within the social sciences because of its immense cognitive and affective weight for individuals and groups, it is vital for making people legible to the institutions that govern them. Finally, semi-citizenships create flexibility. Taken on their own, each understanding of citizenship implies more rigid demarcations between citizen and non-citizen than could ever be realized. As circumstances of all kinds evolve, the ongoing engagement of multiple doctrines of political membership permits change via the renegotiation of compromises and the shifting of persons from one order of semi-citizenship to another. Each of these three roles performed by semi-citizenship will be subject to a variety of normative defenses and critiques. The point is not that compromise, ordering, or flexibility is desirable or undesirable, but rather that each is necessary and inevitable. Only in light of this can useful judgments about particular compromises be made. To illustrate semi-citizenships and the processes that form them, this book also examines specific cases in which rights become disaggregated from each other, particularly in liberal democracies. Although groups with differentiated forms of membership are not unique to democracies,  liberal democratic states claim, and are credited with asserting, the most demanding standards of  inclusion and of  equality with self-rule. If three centuries of institutional and normative development have not wrought a single equal form of citizenship in any liberal  democratic state, such a goal may not be possible. By way of illustration, Chapter 5 analyzes an instance of an autonomous right, nationality, which is generally treated as a single right to which other rights of citizenship are closely bonded.27 Upon inspection, nationality turns out to have component parts that are distributed in uneven ways among the population of the  foreign-born. For instance, nationality typically entails the  right to live within the borders of, and the  right to travel freely within, a particular nation-state. In the case of the  foreign-born, these  rights are disaggregated by placing conditions on the circumstances and timing of residence and travel.  Temporary workers,  refugees, and economic  immigrants, among others, all have different  elements of rights associated with nationality. In turn, 27

 I argue that nationality is an autonomous right because it confers rights to residence and free movement that are essential not just within the state system as it is currently constituted, but in any political system.

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different civil, social, and  political rights attach to these various forms of partial nationality. This scatters  foreign-born persons all over the abovementioned table of semi-citizens. These statuses are permanent; while individuals may graduate to full citizenship, the presence of various types of  non-nationals is enduring. This is true because people remain mobile and changeable in various ways and because the logics of citizenship conflict with each other in predictable ways. The ­semi-citizenships that are created thus bear out the assertion made in Chapters 2 and 3 that, while semi-citizenships may represent the divisive nature of citizenship, they also represent a form of security .  Rightlessness occurs, but not as readily as it might have if a single, reductive logic of citizenship were to prevail.  Chapter 6 examines the disaggregation of  relative rights through two cases: children and gay and lesbian  citizenship. Like non-nationals, children are an enduring group within any population of any  liberal  democratic state. Unlike non-nationals, children’s rights are fairly cleanly split between the relative and the autonomous. Children have very strong  autonomous rights and very  weak relative rights. In contrast,  gay and lesbian individuals have both very strong autonomous and very  strong relative rights. But they are almost universally prohibited from concluding marriage  contracts that entitle them to the same protections that heterosexual couples enjoy. Gay and lesbian  semi-citizenship represents a test of the outer bounds of semi-citizenship and also indicates a model for thinking about how states can amend and edit citizenship rights in order to change the membership status of semi-citizens. At the same time it also reveals how compromises between the competing logics that ground citizenship can be very difficult to revise. In particular, offering additional forms of rights, as has been suggested by theorists of multiculturalism and public deliberation, among others, does not always suffice to form complete citizenship where semi-citizenship exists. Children cannot be offered the  franchise and  civil unions do not replace, or even  displace, marriage. Although the classifications of semi-citizenship presented in this book invite normative speculation, they are discussed here primarily as analytic tools. As such, they are justified not by the normative judgments to which they point, but rather the degree to which they accurately characterize a set of related political phenomena. Although they identify ways in which citizenship may disappoint our normative aspirations for membership in liberal democracies, they do not render final judgment regarding what is fair or unfair, or even what is justifiable within any given normative or political context. Semi-citizenships do reveal a great deal about

Introduction

11

what we can expect from political membership, given the foundations of ­citizenship and the constraints within which it operates. They also cast doubt on remedies that have been suggested for inequalities engendered by differentiations of citizenship, including both those rooted in the politics of  recognition and the politics of  redistribution. At the same time that semi-citizenships are not identities in search of  recognition, they also do not refer exclusively to classes of persons who require or can exercise types of rights they currently lack. Children cannot be transformed into full citizens and  childhood is an ongoing fact of political life. People cannot, and may not, wish to be naturalized directly upon immigrating. Statuses often characterized in entirely pejorative terms may carry  unacknowledged benefits. Barry Hindess makes the point that citizenship has not been sought, and has even been rejected, by various people throughout history and in a variety of contexts.28  Undocumented immigrants represent an example of a status overwhelmingly assumed to be entirely oppressive, except by a few powerful voices who have documented the desire and reasoning of some to remain undocumented.29 As statuses that can be either chosen or imposed, we can expect semi-citizenship statuses to persist, though the individuals who hold them may change. This underscores the importance of a framework for understanding semi-citizenship that is not predicated on norms that demand its elimination. If, as this book argues, semi-citizenship is inevitable, any discussion of the subject designed to conclude with a remedy will be hobbled by its own premise. Yet, despite the analytic emphasis  Barry Hindess, “Citizenship for All,” Citizenship Studies 8(3): 305–315.  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Susan Coutin documents the double-edged sword of illegality noting both the vulnerability of those without documentation and the fact that they are “free.” This freedom is symbolic and concrete, extending from abstract notions of Foucauldian discipline to specific exemptions from rules regarding movement, tax, and work. Susan Coutin, “Illegality, Borderlands, and the Space of Nonexistence,” in Globalization Under Construction, eds. Richard Warren Perry and Bill Maurer (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 171–202; see especially 184–192. For another discussion of the transformative potential of undocumentedness, see William Walters, “Acts of Demonstration: Mapping the Territory of (Non-)Citizenship,” in Acts of Citizenship, eds. Engin Isin and Greg M. Nielson (London and New York: Zed, 2008), 188–191; and Gotfried Engbersen, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Panopticon Europe: Residence Strategies of Illegal Immigrants,” in Controlling a New Migration World, eds. Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 223–246. Engbersen writes of undocumented persons in Europe using the status to their advantage, for example by selling illegal drugs using resources and strategies that would not be available to  documented immigrants or even full citizens.  Homelessness carries similarly liberating potential for some who choose and/or defend their right to inhabit public or non-traditional spaces. See Judith Lynn Failer, Who Qualifies for Rights? Homelessness, Mental Illness, Civil Commitment (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

28 29

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of this study, its subject does invite normative speculation. Indeed, if I am right that the differentiation of rights-based semi-citizenships in liberal democracies creates a complex set of analytical problems, then it is all the more certain that the same differentiations create a host of subtle problems that require and invite sophisticated normative reasoning and evaluation as well. I will speculate about possibilities for contributions that my analytical account of semi-citizenship can make to normative investigations in my concluding remarks. The tools offered in the chapters that follow can help focus this inquiry. In the final analysis, citizenship does not make a citizenry equal. In fact, it appears to institutionalize both difference and inequalities, albeit in sometimes unexpected ways. It also seems to do so in ways that do enforce forms of stability that offer mixed blessings. First, citizenship imposes burdens, often without the consent of those upon whom the burdens are imposed. Expectations for  self-representation and government,  material participation, and ethical conformity are considerable and can make unequal demands upon differently situated individuals, not all of whom seek either the rewards or the  benefits of citizenship. Second, and of broader relevance, is the fact that contemporary  practices of citizenship are as much, and possibly more, associated with forms of  security and predictability than with sameness and  equality. Semi-citizenship lends both flexibility and durability to more typical understandings of citizenship as a rigid ideal. It is important to acknowledge that semi-citizenship is inevitable, because it is otherwise tempting to focus on the individuals who hold semi-citizen statuses and to conclude that, because those specific people will “graduate” to full citizenship, the category they occupy will itself disappear. Immigrants naturalize, children mature, even  felons can be rehabilitated. However, whether or not any given individual, or even a whole group of semi-citizens, is awarded full citizenship, it remains the case that classes who do not have full citizenship are a permanent fixture of any  democratic state. Though the cases presented in this book are not encyclopedic, they point to the fact that we are perpetually creating politics in the midst of all kinds of semi-citizens. This means that a whole host of questions persist  regarding recognition of the  categories themselves and of the people who occupy them. As assiduously as we attend to injustices arising out of the circumstances of any particular person or group, we can never fully transcend the questions that revolve around the permanent presence of semi-citizenship. 

2 The Myth of Full Citizenship

I.  Introduction Citizenship is an essential element of  democracy and a universal feature of the  modern state. Scholars study citizenship laws to learn who is welcome in a society; they study the rights and  responsibilities of citizenship to learn how citizens are governed in democracies; and they study citizen behavior to learn how people govern themselves. All this presumes that we know what citizenship is and who has it. Yet who is, and is not, a citizen is often difficult to determine. Like a host of related political concepts, citizenship is both essential and essentially contested.1 While there exists a wealth of qualitative work examining specific elements of, and phenomena associated with, citizenship, there is little consensus on the meaning of the term. In the absence of any conceptual discipline, the term “citizenship” has come to mean many things to many people. This is a problem that results both from the type of investigations of citizenship that are 1

 On essentially  contested concepts see W.B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1956): 167–198; Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). More recently,  Ruth Lister and  Linda Bosniak both take citizenship to be an essentially  contested concept. Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 13–16; Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). Citizenship meets all of Gallie’s criteria for essentially contested concepts. It is a concept that implies achievement; it is internally complex; it can be described diversely and openly; it is often exemplified through reference to an authoritative, “original” permutation (interpretations of  Greek participatory politics) and yet there is open acknowledgement that contestation about the term persists; and finally, there is apparent progressive competition that has refined both debate about citizenship and the resources available to scholarship that relies on an understanding of citizenship, without making defining the concept central to its arguments.

13

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currently popular, and from formal obstacles to defining ­something like citizenship. Taken collectively, the contestations and impasses that persist in discussions of the concept of citizenship highlight the need to develop a theory of semi-citizenship, and simultaneously to point out ways to develop this theory. The second section of the chapter discusses three facets of disagreement about the notion of citizenship. The first of these is generated by contestation over where the authority to define citizenship is located. I argue against a normatively driven account of citizenship because of its tendency: a) to define citizenship according to what a given  normative theory argues it should be, rather than defining citizenship on the basis of how it actually exists; b) to define some parts of citizenship as  contingent on other parts, thus essentializing some elements of citizenship and deprioritizing others; and c) to treat semi-citizenships as exceptions, accidents, or the product of bias, rather than as inevitable.2 In Section III, I round out this discussion by arguing in favor of locating the authority to define citizenship outside the realm of solely  normative theory and within practices that draw on plural sources, including the politically relevant practices of states in their capacity as generators of rights that themselves constitute political relationships. This view avoids the conflation of political ideals with practices, and demands a broad view of the possible variables that might be included in a definition of citizenship. Section IV takes on a second confounding dilemma within discussions of citizenship: confusion and contestation over what kind of concept citizenship is. Citizenship is described in many terms that are associated, variously, with statuses, actions, institutions, and rights. I argue for a larger, broader understanding of citizenship as a tool of political categorization. Regarding citizenship in this manner leads to a further conclusion explored in Section V: namely, that citizenship is a gradient category. A gradient category is one that is defined by multiple and potentially shifting thresholds, rather than by a clear, hard line that delineates it and demarcates a dichotomous relationship between insiders and outsiders. Establishing that citizenship is a category composed of multiple elements, each of which can be accorded to people in full or in partial, gradiated bundles, clears the way to discuss disagreements involved in specifying these  A s has been recently noted, accidents and mistakes are not incidental, and accidents or mistakes involving citizenship can be intimately linked with deeply-held beliefs about membership. See Peter Nyers, “The Accidental Citizen: Acts of Sovereignty and (Un) making Citizenship,” Economy and Society 35(1) (2006): 22–41.

2

The Myth of Full Citizenship

15

elements. Section VI surveys discussions of how ­citizenship is ­conferred and of what it confers. Having located the authority to define citizenship in states, and having defended a view of citizenship as a gradient category, I then assert that the content of citizenship is defined first by the rights it confers. These rights form political relationships. A rights-based definition of citizenship provides a conceptually useful starting place for analyzing forms of membership that fall between citizenship and non-citizenship. Because this chapter establishes that the elements of citizenship cannot be  contingent upon each other, it might also be proposed that these rights – those that form the content of citizenship – can appear in different combinations, rather than solely as a single uniform status that is identical for each member of a polity. Such an idea contradicts norms that indicate that citizenship should be composed of a full set of rights; however, it is clearly borne out by numerous  existing practices. It is also the case that the flexibility such a view of citizenship implies may have normative advantages. These are addressed more fully in Chapter 3. The remaining section of this chapter, Section VII, uses the challenges posed to the citizenship literature in the first half of the chapter to shed light on how, and how well, these challenges can be met in a comprehensive fashion that is both elastic enough to acknowledge dilemmas of threshold, and expansive enough to refer to the broad spectrum of norms and substantive content incorporated into citizenship as it is actually instantiated. The normative, conceptual, and substantive challenges have each generated work acknowledging the dilemmas they pose, as well as nascent discussions of the implications of normative conflict, conceptual confusion, and contestation over the content of citizenship. Each of these contributions makes an advance over traditional accounts of citizenship, and yet each also fails to completely transcend the three problems of overly normative notions of authority, unitary thought, and contestation over content described in the first half of the chapter. I propose a theory of semi-citizenship that eschews the unitariness that often comes in the form of identifying only single forms of gradation (such as differential  social rights). Such a theory must also avoid the larger confusion generated by conflating norms with, or prioritizing them over, practices. The definition of citizenship, thus, has to be based on actual combinations of the elements of citizenship, rather than on normative aspirations for what citizenship ought to look like. Finally, the theory must also attend to questions of content in a thorough but efficient fashion. The first half of the chapter posits that states have special authority over citizenship by virtue of the relationships

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instantiated in the process of granting rights. While not universally accepted as complete, this view is widely held and yet remains unincorporated into any existing work that gestures in the direction of a theory of semi-citizenship. The reasons for this must then also be examined to fully lay a foundation for the framework within which semi-citizenship is described in Chapter 3.

II.  Authority over Citizenship: Normative and Non-Normative Who or what has the authority to define citizenship, and what kind of content does citizenship confer? Along with other essentially  contested concepts in politics, whose “use ranges confusingly between expressing an idea or ideal, and designating uncritically the actual arrangements currently supposed to embody that idea,” there is no single authority charged with defining citizenship.3 The answer to the above question, therefore, will affect how we go about according authority or legitimacy to competing claims about the meaning of citizenship. Many types of communities and organizations make different kinds of categorical distinctions both among its members and between members and ­non-members. What kinds of communities can generate citizenship, as opposed to other types of membership? Citizenship is political, but this says virtually nothing since some form of politics, even if it is rudimentary, seeps into all human communities. What all usages of citizenship seem to have in common is that they are generated by political communities that are intended to sustain a panoply of members’ activities through the  administration of laws. They are formally articulated, and the rules that describe and ground their authority justify themselves with reference to their members’ activities. One can be an employee of a corporation or a member of a family, but neither group generates citizenship. Narrowing down the range of possible citizenship-generating communities requires more than the application of intuition to politics. Someone or something must police the multiple boundaries of the category that is citizenship. In other words, we need to know who or what instantiates formal and legitimate  political categories. Normative theorists, citizenly action itself, and political bodies as diverse as constitutions and states all claim the authority to draw the  Hanna Pitkin, “Representation and Democracy: Uneasy Alliance,” Scandinavian Political Studies 27(3) (2004): 337. See also Pitkin, The Concept of Representation.

3

The Myth of Full Citizenship

17

categorical distinctions implied within various definitions of  citizenship. Both quantitative and qualitative analytic work done on citizenship often rests on normative assumptions about what citizenship ought to mean, which in turn implies assumptions about what norms mean to citizenship. Thus, scholars such as William Galston, Stephen Macedo, and Benjamin Barber have debated the degree to which citizenship is characterized by  specific virtues, actions, and ideals, while Robert Putnam and Theda Skocpol, among many others, have compiled statistics that chronicle the devaluation and disappearance of associative activity.4 Rogers Smith’s  Civic Ideals illustrates the profound hierarchies that  American public philosophies and public law have imposed upon citizens of  different races.5 The definitional authority cited most frequently in the citizenship literature is T. H. Marshall, who relies on civil, political and social rights, rather than associative activity or civic virtues, to define citizenship.6 Building on Marshall’s insights about social rights in particular,  Suzanne Mettler’s Dividing Citizens offers important insights into how social policy has constructed different and  unequal citizenships for  men and women in the  United States.7 On the other hand, scholars of international relations debate the meaning and possibility of  postnational and  cosmopolitan citizenship.8 Each of these uses of the term “citizen” carries a different set of implicit norms and, hence, different institutional expectations.

 B ob Edwards, Michael W. Foley, and Mario Diani, Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001); William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1984). Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003); and Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). 5  Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 6  T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development: Essays by T.H. Marshall (New York: Doubleday, 1965). 7  Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizens (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998). 8  Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens – The Seeley Lectures (London: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); and Yasemin Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 4

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Any definition of citizenship that posits rights, actions,  specific ­virtues, or some combination of the above is normatively driven if it makes the conception of what ought to be true of citizenship more central to the definition than anything that is true of citizenship as it actually exists in politics. This is true for both political and social theorists, as well as philosophers, even though each often produces divergent accounts of the norms at stake.9 Reliance on  normative theory to define citizenship is problematic on a number of levels. At the most general level, we know that defining any concept in primarily normative terms assures perpetual contestation of the term’s meaning.10 Because citizenship is manifested in a concrete fashion in the lives of nearly every person living in a polity, including those individuals whom  citizenship practices serve to exclude, it is experienced most immediately as a set of rules rather than as a lofty set of political norms. Excessive attention to what we wish or think citizenship ought to be is therefore somewhat of a luxury. Once imbued with normative and practical authority,  categories that describe citizens and non-citizens are institutionalized and take on more authority and legitimacy. Extrapolating what citizenship is from a notion of what citizenship ought to be has the   9 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Sociologists’ work on citizenship has traditionally been far more dominated by discussions of the extension of social rights and the right to work, whereas political scientists have only more recently begun to draw connections between  political participation and  social welfare. In turn, political theorists have focused a great deal of attention on the extension of the  franchise and  multicultural citizenship, rather than on either work or  social welfare. 10  William Connolly gives a finely grained analysis of the spectrum of normativity on which definitions can fall, indicating that contested ������������������������������������ political concepts such as ������� democracy can be more or less loosely based on norms. In so doing, he substantially erodes the dichotomy between the normative and descriptive, while retaining a place for reasoned debate to advance ongoing conceptual contests that will be different for different concepts; William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), see Chapter 1; on the role of reasoned debate, see especially page 40.  M argaret R. Somers makes this point with specific regard to contestation over citizenship. Margaret R. Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 22–25.  Somers argues for disposing of the distinction between ideal and material concepts of citizenship in order to see the relationships between the two. The approach of this study is more skeptical of the causal effects of norms than is  Somers, who cites  Judith Shklar as depicting the influence of norms on  practices of citizenship. Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship, 24, citing Judith Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). In arguing for a more analytical approach to citizenship, this chapter is not dismissing the import of norms or even the presence of some normative presuppositions in the analysis that follows. Rather, it is an attempt to offer a descriptive account of a phenomenon that will inform normative conclusions about citizenship and semi-citizenship.

The Myth of Full Citizenship

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tendency to produce misleading and sometimes troublesome ­conclusions. First, there is little consensus on norms within the communities responsible for assigning citizenship. If we were to say that citizenship ought to entail political actions of certain types, and some individuals whom we call “citizens” do not or cannot perform these actions, we would be forced to say that these individuals are not citizens. Almost any conceivable normative conception of membership will eventually be violated either by political exigency or hypocrisy, or likely by both. By definition, normatively driven notions of citizenship assume that norms have a singular power to justify who receives citizenship and what citizenship confers, and that those norms can be specified and applied. Susanne Rudolph’s discussion of the empirical  “imperialism of categories” elucidates how normative expectations can constrain and direct social science in ways that mask important events and processes.11 Ian Shapiro also comes to a similar conclusion in his discussion of Richard Posner’s descriptive and prescriptive functionalist accounts of the law, as well as in Posner’s own opinions.12 Rudolph describes the imperialism of  categories through which western universalism leads researchers to construct projects that force politics into conceptual frames that may be irrelevant to non-western contexts. She describes how understandings of development that had unfolded in a western context were assumed to be models for how development ought to transpire in all contexts. In her telling, social scientists’ development of  modernization theory has transformed a situated model of development into a universal model for development. What has occurred in one context is transformed into a set of expectations about what will or ought to happen in a different time and place. Brian Barry critiques a manifestation of this process in his discussion of multiculturalism policies that grow out of a belief that social diversity prescribes law and policy that replicate such diversity.13  Susanne Rudolph, “The Imperialism of Categories: Situating Knowledge in a Globalizing World,” Perspectives on Politics 3(1) (2005). Rudolph also cites her collaborative work with Lloyd Rudolph. See Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, “Surveys in India: Field Experience in Madras State,” Public Opinion Quarterly 22(3) (1958): 235– 244; The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); and The Regional Imperative: The Administration of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards South Asia under Presidents Johnson and Nixon (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980). 12  Ian Shapiro, The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). See Chapter 4. 13  Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), cited in Christian Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy,” The British Journal of Sociology 55(2) (2004): 239. 11

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What “is” in one realm is transformed into what “ought to be,” when such a relationship need not be drawn. Barry notes that: [B]ecause social science is always driven by the “moving light” of the cultural problems of the day (classically formulated by  Max Weber), there is a natural convergence between theoretical and practical themes and considerations. But both developments are also driven by their own domain-specific logic and dynamics … a pairing of theoretical and political developments reveals interesting parallels and refractions that a narrowly theory or policy focused discussion would miss.14

Normatively driven definitions of citizenship exemplify Christian  Joppke’s worry about drawing a relationship between theory and policy, and vice versa. In doing so, he offers a mirror image to the process that Rudolph and Barry describe, in which our understanding of what exists influences our understanding of what ought to be. Many existing  citizenship categories take  normative models of what political membership ought to be and transform them into statements of how citizenship is  actually experienced by all persons accorded the label “citizen.” For example, if citizenship is taken to refer to  active participation, this would exclude by definition anyone who is not engaged in the actions taken to be characteristic of a citizen, even if, in  practice, such persons are widely considered to be citizens by others, by the state, and by themselves. Even scholars who support treating citizenship as a  practice regard such a conclusion as suspect.  Ruth Lister pithily puts the relationship between status and action in its place: “To act as a citizen involves fulfilling the potential of that status. Those who do not fulfill that potential do not cease to be citizens.”15 These understandings do not necessarily represent actual rules that govern citizenship but, rather, the force of the norms behind them. As a result, they perpetuate both normative and empirical misunderstandings. For some scholars, what they think ought to define citizenship subtly becomes what they claim citizenship actually is. Rudolph only obliquely touches on, indeed almost elides, normative and historicist forms of categorical imperialism in her discussion of  Weberian “models of” vs. “models for.” The way in which western societies have become modern has been taken as the way other societies ought to modernize. Departure from these norms comes to identify various  Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy,” 239.  Ruth Lister, “Citizenship as Status and Practice” Hypatia 12(4) (1997): 10.  Lister speaks to the problem of making citizenship a status that is  contingent on  citizenship as a practice: “Uniting citizenship as a practice does not, however, mean that the former is conditional on the latter.”

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21

terms of failure. A historical reality is thus turned into a ­universal norm. In the case of citizenship the reverse process has occurred. A normative  philosophy of citizenship will justify a rule of membership based upon a set of principles that are linked to foundational norms and aspirations of the society to which the philosophy is being ascribed. Political institutions refer to this in describing and formally delineating a category of citizen. Yet this does not mean that they succeed in realizing the normative model on which they are based. In fact institutions regularly fail to realize norms. Nonetheless, this is not cause to proclaim the demise of citizenship.  Formal membership persists in spite of its normative shortcomings. Normative understandings and logics of citizenship can be, and are, influential, but they do not necessarily trump the power of the political institutions that govern citizenship.  Democratic theory that suggests that citizens make their citizenship through their actions exhibits a particularly influential and yet problematic normative presumption.16 This line of inquiry is premised on the notion that it is citizens themselves who determine the content of their membership through specific forms of voluntary political behavior.17 But engaging in acts of citizenship does not automatically impart citizenship, let alone recognition of that citizenship by peers or political institutions. Citizenship cannot be earned simply by acting as a citizen ought to, or as most citizens seem to. One may gain influence in doing so, but the content of citizenship neither begins nor ends with influence. This is confirmed by the etymological relatives of citizenship. As a verb, “citizenize” has consistently been associated with a bestowal: one cannot, simply by one’s actions, transform oneself into a citizen.18 The very fact of citizenship’s political nature requires that citizenship be recognized  Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham, NC: Duke, 1999) and R. M. LeBlanc, Bicycle Citizens: The Political World of the Japanese Housewife (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), cited in Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).  Ruth Lister discusses citizenship as  praxis, thus joining more radical versions of citizen-created citizenship with theories that prioritize the role of rights and the state in shaping citizenship. See Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, 2nd edition (New York: New York University Press, 2003), especially Chapter 8. 17   Ruth Lister, citing Doyal and Gough, notes that we must make a distinction between “simple autonomy as expressed through agency and ‘the higher degrees of critical autonomy which are entailed by  democratic participation in the political process at whatever level.’” Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, 39. See also Len Doyal and Ian Gough, A Theory of Human Needs (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 68. 18  James Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1978), Chapter 1. 16

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by whatever form legitimate authority takes in a community. Otherwise anyone, anywhere, could declare themselves to be a citizen. It is not even the case that  recognition on the part of one’s countrymen can bestow citizenship. Even in a socially  contractual arrangement, an authority must be designated to mediate claims of membership. A specifically designated authority must therefore confer the status in a routinized fashion. If an authority is accorded the power to make decisions about citizenship, then people who meet a set of requirements may expect to receive citizenship; but it is the bestowal and not the meeting of requirements that generates the change. This means that people who meet requirements can sometimes be denied citizenship. For example,  ex-felons who were entitled to be  reenfranchised were left off of voter rolls in Florida, as was revealed following the 2000 election debacle. Similarly, most countries empower an office to grant citizenship or citizenship-oriented statuses (like  green cards and  work visas) to people on a discretionary basis which bypasses traditional requirements.19 It is not even the case that these objections could be swept aside by referring to the state-mandated requirements of members. As a matter of course, liberal  democratic states impose only a  few duties on their citizens, many of which apply differently to different people (non-nationals, the very young, etc.) and the  duties they do impose are of varying degrees of substantive rigor.20 In addition to conflating what citizenship ought to be with what citizenship is, normatively driven definitions of citizenship are reductive in ways that, once put into  practice, are unrealistic and present risks associated with degrees of, and bases for,  exclusion that prove problematic. Many versions of  democratic theory boil their justifications

 Some argue that all decisions permitting or restricting the crossing of borders are the product of discretionary authority. Mark B. Salter, “When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Borders, Sovereignty, and Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies 12(4) (2008): 365–380. In the  United States, see The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 at 8 USC Section 1103(a). This gives the Attorney General broad powers of discretion regarding questions of immigration, asylum, deportation and many other matters of border control. See Chapter 5 of this work as well. 20  Peter H. Schuck, “Liberal Citizenship” in Handbook of Citizenship Studies, eds. Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner (London: Sage, 2002), 131–144. The payment of  taxes and  jury duty are among the most  demanding duties of citizenship common to liberal  democratic states, and these require little ongoing substantive engagement of citizens with one another, or with politics more generally. Few states even insist that citizens vote. Exceptions  include Australia, Belgium, and the Netherlands. (Lisa Hill, “Low Voter Turnout in the United States: Is Compulsory Voting a Viable Option?” Journal of Theoretical Politics 18(2) (2006): 207.) 19

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for ­citizenship down to liberal readings of  utilitarianism.21 Citizenship ultimately comes to be justified by the degree to which it yields a good that is itself fundamental to  democracy. More substantive understandings of the bases of rights that define citizenship more narrowly, such as those offered by  Edmund Burke, draw even more highly determined relationships between rights and the human communities that guarantee them.  Burke and his  communitarian progeny set high bars for membership, thus grounding democracies that are not liberal in character.22 For utilitarians, it is tempting to use the demands of  procedural democracy as a justification for the rights of citizenship to which people will be entitled.  Republican  theory similarly justifies rights based on even more wellspecified visions of the kinds of societies their exercise will achieve.  Within these justifications, social rights and many  civil rights exist for the purpose of facilitating specific forms or modes of  political participation.23 This reasoning effectively makes social and  civil rights of  citizenship contingent upon the effect they have on political rights. If a particular civil or  social right is irrelevant to the realization of political rights, then it cannot be justified. So, for example, the absence of  social welfare rights can keep people from exercising civil and  political rights. This is contingency that is internal to the bundled civil, political, social, and nationality rights of citizenship. The most common version of such contingency predicates social rights on their necessity for the exercise of civil or  political rights.24 Anyone without political or  civil rights would not need social rights.  Contingency can work in any direction. One could imagine a justification for political  rights of representation that predicates them on  property rights. In this version of  contingency, anyone who does not own property does not  need political rights. Regardless of which rights are considered contingent on which other rights, functional  See Ian Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 273. 22  Edmund Burke,  Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. L. G. Mitchell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998); and Jean Bethke Elshtain, Democracy on Trial (New York: Basic Books, 1995). 23  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� This kind of logic is often assumed or directly incorporated into concepts of citizenship. See Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the New World (New York and London: Routledge, 1990); Dawn Oliver and Derek Heater, The Foundations of Citizenship (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994). 24  See, for example, Joas Carlos Espada, Social Citizenship Rights (London: MacMillan Press, 1996), Chapter 7. 21

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 contingency between the  fundamental rights of citizenship reduces citizenship to only  those goods on which other rights are predicated. Citizenship becomes an inverted pyramid that balances the heavy weight of rights on their connections to a narrow subset of specific acts and  goods. Only the tip of that pyramid remains truly fundamental. There are two kinds of problem with a contingent understanding of citizenship in which some of the fundamental rights of citizenship are offered only to people who hold other fundamental rights of citizenship. First, it makes an empirical claim that is sometimes false. To some extent it may hold true that the instantiation or exercise of one right fulfills conditions necessary to exercise another right. However, this relationship need not be central to why a right is included in the pantheon of rights considered fundamental to citizenship. After all, there are relationships between all kinds of  rights and privileges that do not cause us to continually expand the boundaries of citizenship rights. It is also difficult to imagine that any relationship between a right and the corresponding good it produces is universal. Not all people provided with social rights of any kind become specific types of “good” or “effective” political participants. Plenty of people who do not have, or do not avail themselves of, social rights are good participants. Second, moral philosophers lodge convincing arguments that it is not only unrealistic to justify social rights on the basis of civil and most political rights, it is also unsustainable because  liberty rights cannot be reduced to  welfare rights, or vice versa.25 Civil and political rights free us from domination of various forms. But they do not entitle us to any particular set of positive freedoms. We are free to speak, but if paralyzing phobias prevent this, we cannot expect the state to redress our phobias or muteness on the basis of our  right to speech. This is a threshold problem, insofar as some  positive rights inevitably exist, e.g., roads on which we can travel to polling places. We just do not know where the line lies between a reasonable  positive right and an unreasonable  positive right, e.g., a chauffer and luxury automobile to transport us to a polling place. There is a deeper problem, however, than not knowing where the line between reasonable and unreasonable  positive rights is to be drawn. The larger problem is one that relates to the logic that makes the elements of citizenship contingent upon one another and that is, therefore, potentially reductive. There are those who make both historical and normative 25

 Tara Smith, “On Deriving Rights to Goods from Rights to Freedoms,” Law and Philosophy 11(3) (1992): 217–234.

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claims that the rights of citizenship are contingent on each other. Each of these claims is problematic. The historical claim can be attributed to T. H. Marshall’s account of social rights.26 This view supports the idea that the rights of citizenship have evolved in a temporally distinct, but conceptually linked,  fashion. Civil rights preceded political rights, which preceded social rights. In Marshall’s telling, there is a dependent relationship between types of rights. Social rights allow the exercise of civil and political rights that in turn ground support for the kinds of  equality embodied by social rights.27 The normative claim assumes that certain types of rights require other rights to guarantee that people will be able to exercise them.28 There is no reason to presume that the  practices of citizenship cannot, or do not, disaggregate  fundamental rights. It is also normatively dubious to create a dependent relationship  among rights that are all deemed fundamental. First, I address the practical claim that citizenship rights are not effected in a way that makes them  contingent upon one another. If citizenship  rights were contingent upon one another, then distinctions between rights would ultimately break down entirely. In fact, examples abound in which rights are unbundled and rebundled in packages that exclude one or more, but not necessarily all,  fundamental rights. For example, it is possible to give a person either the  right to vote or their  right to free  expression, without simultaneously protecting the other  T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development: Essays by T.H. Marshall (New York: Doubleday, 1965). 27  A standard telling of Marshall’s tale lodges a complaint with the evolutionary nature of his account. Desmond King and Jeremy Waldron identify and reject this complaint for its obvious superficiality. (See Desmond King and Jeremy Waldron, “Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the Defense of Welfare Provision,” British Journal of Political Science 18(4) (1988): 424.) If democracies somehow evolve away from granting certain rights, most obviously social rights (though recently many  democratic states grant weak rights associated with nationality to significant parts of their populations), we must then say that citizenship no longer comprises such rights. This is, as King and Waldron suggest, a weak argument since most social and political theorists recognize that the historical evolution of rights is the realization of fundamental understandings of  equality on which ideas of membership are predicated. It is less the case that a retraction of rights represents a redefinition of citizenship than it is the case that early or late iterations of citizenship that exclude one or more categories of rights are incomplete. 28   Habermas’s five-part classification of types of rights includes the following succinct description of this belief. His fifth category asserts, “Basic rights to the provision of living conditions that are socially, technologically, and ecologically safeguarded, insofar as the current circumstances make this necessary if citizens are to have equal opportunities to utilize the civil right listed in (1) through (4).” Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 123. 26

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right. It is even possible to justify such an action. We might say, for example, that  free expression endangers  security during times of war. It would be a wild exaggeration to say that this constitutes a violation of political rights such as  voting or  representation even though it is entirely reasonable that the squelching of public protest could affect how the  franchise is exercised . While Marshall notes that none of the three individual parts, which are integral to his definition of citizenship, is complete on its own, the very fact that each developed in historically distinct phases points to their practical separability. The durable presence of all kinds of semi-citizenships ratifies the fact that rights are not granted  contingent on other rights. Various groups have and will always hold some, but not all, rights of citizenship. The normative claims that support rights contingency are also problematic in that they lead toward regarding semi-citizenships as containing both oppressive and liberating potential. Contingency among citizenship rights makes citizenship perilously reductive. We may think the state has an obligation to fulfill specific human needs, including those associated with health and/or mental illness. However, predicating those obligations and their attendant rights on the degree to which they bolster/facilitate other elements of citizenship collapses an important distinction within our understanding of citizenship. If social rights are justified because they will ensure that people exercise their civil rights (for example, free political speech), and this turns out not to be the case (people with social rights remain silent), we have lost the ground upon which we can justify providing people with social rights. It is even the case that a negative statement, such as, “one cannot be guaranteed the  right to vote without social rights,” runs the same risk. If very hungry or sick people vote in high numbers, then there is no normative bite to the claim that people are entitled to social rights on the basis of their  right to vote. Similarly, a regime that deprives people of the  franchise, based on an evaluation of their  participation in public deliberations, would have a difficult time claiming democratic legitimacy. The dangers of making some rights contingent upon the possession or exercise of other rights hold true whether one speaks of  procedural or substantive understandings of  democracy .29 They also hold true in any  These claims do not entail that we reject justifications for different types of rights that have overlapping references to our most fundamental understandings of  human desert. So, for example, our explanations of how people come to deserve social rights and political rights may both be justifiable by virtue of a utility principle or on the basis of a particular understanding of the self. This does not contradict the fact that political rights only have force in specific contexts.

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direction. If we justify  democratic rights by the likelihood that they will enable a thriving, wealth-producing,  free market, we run the risk of undermining the bases of political freedom should they not produce wealth. An account of citizenship is problematic if even reasonable or unavoidable exclusion from one type of  fundamental right could leave an individual completely rightless. It also makes justifying rights outside the context of  democracy difficult, however  democracy is defined. If civil rights are justified by their political efficacy, we have no reason to think that such rights are worth protecting in a state with a corrupt electoral system. They will not be politically efficacious in such a system. It is undesirable to suggest that states with absent or weak democratic institutions have few or weak justifications for providing civil, social, or  nationality rights.  Contingency is undesirable regardless of which right is said to ground other rights . The  non-contingent nature of the elements of citizenship is demonstrated by the degree to which citizenship is defined and institutionalized in a diverse and dispersed manner. There is a fundamental uncertainty about what or who defines citizenship. For social scientists this is fodder for debate. For states this creates spaces within which semi-citizenships can form. Again, if one were to accept  Burke’s  critiques of liberalism, or if one were to envision states as seeking only to simplify and level populations into single, modal individuals, then the diffused definition of citizenship would seem unlikely. Yet, it remains the case that multiple sources of authority define and govern citizenship in any given democratic nation. One would imagine that  constitutions spell out the rights and  responsibilities associated with institutional membership. However, they are often silent on the subject of citizenship or in regard to elements contained within a definition of citizenship.30 The  U.S.  Constitution had remarkably little to say about the rights of citizens until the passage of the  Civil Rights amendments. These amendments make core civil rights available based upon  personhood, rather than the possession of formal nationality, and the  right to vote was also available to non-nationals until relatively recently .31 The language of universal  human rights encourages rights-conferring documents to refer to persons rather than citizens.  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� “Citizenship is a set of equal rights, and rights are in one respect chances, opportunities to make choices. It is commonplace today that such rights cannot be given by writing them into  constitutions and laws.” Ralf Dahrendorf, “Citizenship and Beyond” Social Research 41(4) (1974): 685. 31  Jamin B. Raskin, “Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional, and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 141(4) (1993). 30

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Many  European state constitutions refer to persons rather than citizens. This ambiguity within founding documents has the effect of delegating the task of dealing with the contradictions raised by the confrontation of theories of  equality and difference. Legislatures, judges, and even bureaucrats become responsible for defining what exactly citizenship consists of and, in some cases, who will receive it. For example, in  A nglo-American law, legal status comes to distinguish people with special conditions on their citizenship from those who are considered “normal” persons.32 The many layers that compose citizenship are controlled independently. With no authority for, or even authoritative definition of, citizenship, the diverse and independent processes through which it is created must also serve as the means for judging its fairness and legitimacy. To say that the fundamental rights of citizenship are not  contingent upon each other is not the same as saying that the rights of citizenship all refer to the same good, i.e., rational capacities. Chapter 4 explores at greater length the degree to which doctrines that articulate citizenship rights can have greater or lesser influence over the grounds upon which any right of citizenship is granted. Any given right, or even all rights, can have a distinct relationship to an external good such as rationality. Eschewing rights  contingency also does not entail rejecting external utilitarian or functionalist arguments that support specific  fundamental rights. However, the  non-contingency argument does point toward another conclusion: namely, that in addition to it being normatively problematic and substantively inaccurate to describe  fundamental rights as  contingent on one another, it is likely that there is disagreement in any given political context over the grounding for any given right or set of rights. Even formative acts, such as  constitution-writing and the demarcation of citizenries, may include normative arguments that converge on the fundamental nature of a given right, despite the fact that they do not ground that right in the same kinds of reasons. This yields all kinds of political ramifications,  Failer,  Who Qualifies for Rights?, 56–57. Failer notes that “… legal status has been, and surprisingly continues to be, the mechanism through which the law distinguishes between the various bundles of rights that attach to people based on their particular legal standing.” Thus, “legal status can be the basis for many legal rights,  duties, capacities, and incapacities. Only upon gaining the status of a committed  mentally ill person, for example, might a hospitalized schizophrenic have a legal right to treatment. Or, when a branch of the armed forces learns of the sexual orientation of some gay and lesbian members, it assigns them the status of a  homosexual – a status that denies them the legal capacity to serve.”  Failer’s point is consistent with Carl Schmitt’s observation (discussed in Chapter 4) that  sovereign power is identifiable by virtue of the fact that it decides on states of exception. Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1985).

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including – most relevantly to the subject of this study – very specific limits on, and opportunities for, the boundaries of citizenship. That citizenship cannot be defined exclusively by norms, or by citizens’ choices and actions, suggests that some political authority must identify which acts will be privileged as acts of citizenship, and whose performance of these acts will be regarded as citizenly.33 Regardless of what normative value we place on  civicness or political engagement, it remains the case that citizenship is not automatically available to anyone who behaves in the manner of a citizen.34 A political body must thus be officially designated as possessing the authority to grant, deny, and revoke citizenship. It is tempting to refer to  constitutions as combining normative and political authority in a way that positions them to define citizenship. This too turns out not to provide a fully satisfying account of how citizenship is defined.  Constitutions describe the rights of citizens and the terms upon which those rights and obligations are conferred, but they do not always do so systematically or precisely.35 Even when they do, they remain objects of interpretation rather than direct conduits to practice. It is common in  constitutions to see the phrase “persons governed” conflated with “citizens.” As indicated by even a cursory look at the  constitutions of western democratic nation-states, many nations use the words “citizen” and “person” nearly interchangeably, despite the fact that many of the persons directly governed by any given  constitution are not full citizens.36 This makes the text of  constitutions unreliable sources of ultimate authority on the meaning of citizenship, despite the fact that they are politically better-positioned than  normative theory to make important statements about norms of membership.

III.  Reasserting Authority to Define Citizenship The remaining likely source of authority in which we can ground citizenship is the state, in its capacity as executor of administrative  rationality.  For reasons I discuss in detail in Chapter 4, the political authority will usually be a state. 34  A frequently cited difficulty associated with defining citizenship is the degree to which the obligations of citizenship and political action bleed into each other. In fact, this is as much a conceptual hurdle as it is an academic failing. The word “citizenship” is frequently invoked to refer to any number of political activities for which there ought to be a distinct, commonly held political vocabulary. 35   Linda Bosniak’s work has discussed this attribute of the  United States Constitution. Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien, see especially Chapter 4. 36   T he Basic Law of Germany is a notable exception to this rule. 33

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Even as arguments about post-national citizenship are burgeoning, there remains agreement that the state is unique both in the degree to which it is recognized as legitimate, and in the degree to which it monopolizes control over the act of granting a uniquely significant and central form of political membership. The role of the state in defining citizenship is much debated and contested in the contemporary literature on membership. I take up this question in greater detail in Chapter 4, and I ultimately argue that, although states may not hold a perfect or perpetual monopoly on the authority to define the category of citizenship, they perform a special role in mediating among liberal and democratic norms, which are themselves sometimes in conflict, as well as among the imperatives of  governmentality. As  T. K. Oommen pithily puts it, “to dissociate citizenship from its very source – the state – is to render the notion irrelevant and meaningless.”37 Norms, in this view, do not drop out of the picture, but rather enter into conflict with one another and with demands of administrative  rationality. The gradience of thresholds within the larger category of citizenship is established in the process of resolving these conflicts. The individuals over whom states exercise authority enter into relationships with those states, and through those relationships citizenship is produced.38 States may, and do, refer to norms in policing the boundaries of citizenship; however, as the case studies of semi-citizenship illustrate, they often draw upon multiple sets of conflicting norms. The observation that states hold special authority over citizenship introduces into the categorical picture of citizenship an inevitably undemocratic element that offends partisans of normative definitions of citizenship within  democratic theory.  Self-determination and  democracy are inextricably linked.39 However, a category such as citizenship is not itself particularly self-determined, even though it grounds the creation of a  demos. The  demos may make or influence rules regarding who will qualify for citizenship, but it does not directly select members. Furthermore, as illustrated in the preceding section, membership is not necessarily available to anyone willing to adhere to basic democratic

 T. K. Oommen, Citizenship, Nationality, and Ethnicity: Reconciling Competing Identities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 228. 38  This is important to our definition of citizenship and will reemerge when we examine the range of arguments detailing the reconfiguration of citizenship in a global context. In the absence of a recognized political authority,  participation in global  civil society can no more constitute citizens than can  participation in local forms of  civil society. 39  Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 93. 37

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norms. A number of scholars make this point in various ways.40 Once we recognize that citizenship is defined by  practices associated with specific relationships of authority, rather than by an ideal concept of citizenship, it becomes evident not only that semi-citizenships are possible, but that they are likely.  Normative theory encourages unitary thinking about citizenship by positing a notion of the good that is fulfilled by, or through, citizenship. In the absence of a normative “least common denominator,” without which a state cannot claim to call members citizens, citizenship can take many forms even within the borders of a single nation-state.

IV.  What Kind of Concept Is Citizenship? In defiance of methodological injunctions to approach “concept stretching” with caution, the term citizenship is used indiscriminately to refer to vastly different groups both in comparative contexts and within nationstates. The result is that a word that ought to be a term of art, given its importance to social science, can generate no consensus regarding its proper meaning. Citizenship has been called a status, an activity, and a relationship, among many other referents. Distinguishing citizenship from related but distinct concepts, like nationality,  civicness, and membership, requires starting from the most abstract conceptual level and progressively moving to specific acts and statuses. Citizenship can refer to the actions of fully entitled members of democratic polities,  passport bearing “citizens” of authoritarian nation-states, and  children the world over, though the political standings of these individuals have virtually nothing in common.41 Parts of citizenship are also often taken to represent the whole, as often occurs when possession of a  passport, the  franchise, or even  social rights are conflated with citizenship. At times, citizenship appears so contested as to call into question its own existence. Yet without some concept of citizenship, much of what justifies liberal  democratic states in the first place, namely, the possibility of secure political membership that they hold out, becomes unintelligible.  See, for example, Peter Schuck and Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). See also Thomas Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional, and Social Democratic Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 41  The immense citizenship literature includes a number of thorough surveys of definitions of citizenship. A representative sample includes: Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, Chapter 6; Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives; and Handbook of Citizenship Studies, eds. Engin Isin and Bryan S. Turner (London: Sage, 2002). 40

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 Judith Shklar provides us with a good starting point for specifying what kind of concept citizenship might be in her discussion of the flawed history of American citizenship.  Shklar self-consciously chooses to use the word “standing” instead of “status” as a primary descriptor of citizenship.42  Shklar claims that status has pejorative associations with hierarchy that we ought to avoid invoking in association with citizenship. Chantal Mouffe also explicitly rejects the idea that citizenship is a status, instead arguing for seeing it as a “form of identification.”43 Each of these approaches implicitly embraces the notion that citizenship reduces stratification, rather than reordering existing strata or superimposing additional layers of hierarchy on already stratified political communities. As appealing as this notion is, there is much to recommend thinking of citizenship as a status.  Rogers Brubaker makes an equally deliberate but contrary choice to  Shklar’s in describing citizenship as a status.44 He attributes this to the fact that personal status was the decisive determinant of membership in pre-modern  G ermany.  Rainer Bauböck adds historical depth to this argument by marking the fact that citizenship became associated with status via the institutions of the Roman Empire that substituted law (and hence legal status) for the  participation that had attached persons to polities in Athens.45  Bauböck and  Brubaker privilege the way in which citizenship works (or comes to work) over the way in which  Shklar wishes it to work. As liberal democrats we may desire standing, but we find, both in comparison with less privileged members of our own community, and certainly with members of various other states, that our membership looks a great deal more like status than standing.  Shklar approaches citizenship with normative aspirations that  Brubaker might find overly optimistic in light of the historical narrative his study reveals.  Shklar has a problem with the hierarchical nature of status. But citizenships do create hierarchies, both between haves and have-nots, and within citizenries, as the notion of semi-citizenship implies.  Shklar wants to distinguish between standing and status – and ultimately to argue for understanding citizenship as standing rather than status. The distinction does not pay off in the way that  Shklar would have us believe. Etymologically, the suffix, “-ship,” implies  Shklar, American Citizenship, 2.  Chantal Mouffe, “Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community,” in Dimensions of Radical Democracy, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London and New York: Verso, 1995), 231. 44  Rogers Brubaker,  C itizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 62. 45  Rainer Bauböck, “Reinventing Urban Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies 7(2) (2003): 139. 42 43

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that citizenship is a state or, to use the close cousin of state rejected by Shklar, a  status. This ­status confers a type of standing upon individuals. Furthermore,  Shklar’s replacement of status with standing does not resolve quandaries related to  inequality: standing is inherently relative and can thus nonetheless create and reify hierarchies just as much as status can. Citizenship may neither begin nor end with status, but the two cannot be disentangled. A more institutionally driven approach resolves conceptual confusion by identifying citizenship as an institution through which the state manages its members on a number of different planes. But viewing citizenship in this manner, like viewing it as a status or standing, assumes it to be a condition that is experienced entirely passively, rather than one produced by the citizens who hold it. Another recent account interprets citizenship as “less an institution than [as] strategies governing processes of social change by shaping, and sometimes transforming citizens’ attributes, expectations and  practices.”46 This is a close cousin of the argument that citizenship is a  process or praxis through which individuals and groups are able to articulate claims via active engagement.47 At the risk of appearing to avoid specificity where it is required, one can cautiously claim that none of these arguments is without merit. But each is also missing part of the picture in that they don’t tell us what defines citizenship at an even more fundamental level. What all the above understandings of citizenship have in common is that they act to categorize. Whether it is action, individuals, offices, or relationships, citizenship classifies and distinguishes people from one another. Regardless of content, citizenship acts as a political category. It instantiates distinctions and organizes groups based on a set of qualities that are at least claimed to be relevant to one another and to a particular understanding of political membership. The qualities, qualifications, social meaning,  benefits, and boundaries are all subject to change. However, there is no point at which citizenship does not mark categorical distinctions. The fact that citizenship is a category ought to affect our expectations both of instantiations of citizenship and of its analyses.  Giovanni Procacci, “Governmentality and Citizenship,” in The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, eds. Kate Nash and Alan Scott (Malden: Polity Press, 2001), 342–351. 47  Carine Bachmann and Christian Staerklé, “The Meanings of Citizenship: From Status to Social Process.” Available at http://www.cimera.org/files/reports/rr1/chapter2.pdf; last accessed March 21, 2009; on praxis, see Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. 46

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Understanding citizenship as a category facilitates several important inferences, each of which bolsters the case for recognizing citizenship as comprising a family of forms of membership, rather than apprehending it as a single status or identity. That citizenship is at root a social and political category should not surprise historians of political thought.  Max Weber understood  categories as crucial to social closure of the very sort that is central to the function of citizenship.48 Without denying  Weber’s claims about social closure, it is evident that there will be points at which categorical closure is not, and cannot be, seamless. In fact,  Charles Tilly argues convincingly that most large-scale categorical boundaries are incomplete, or imperfect, and hence engender porous “frontiers” (either physical or metaphorical) at which blending and categorical hybridization occurs.49  Categories have the ability to mark distinctions, and yet they need not always be mutually exclusive. This knowledge does not exclude the claims of someone like  Rogers Brubaker, who demonstrates the fundamental nature of the relationship between citizenship and social control, or even  Weber, on whose thought  Brubaker draws.50 But it suggests that sometimes the end of control is best served by flexible means.

V.  What Kind of a Category Is Citizenship?  Since political categories can take many forms, identifying citizenship as a category is only a first step toward defining the concept. In specifying citizenship one is confronted with problems associated with the  Sorites Paradox. The  Sorites Paradox refers to the difficulty arising from any attempt to assign an exact point at which a definitional threshold has been met, particularly when the definition itself is not entirely precise. So, the point at which a collection of sand grains becomes a heap is perhaps impossible to identify, since one may be quite certain that neither a single grain, nor two, etc., etc., constitutes a heap, but just as certain that there are some heaps. In the same way, contestation might call into question whether citizenship means anything at all. The ambiguity associated with thresholds also points to the insufficiency of existing frameworks within which citizenship is understood. Citizenship contains within itself multiple thresholds. Not only is it not a single thing, it is also not dichotomous. Citizenship contains multiple components, each of which can be extended in degree. In either case, exceptions – which  Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 43.  Charles Tilly, Durable Inequality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 7. 50  Brubaker,  C itizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. 48 49

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are generated by the fact that thresholds shift – reaffirm the existence of  inclusion even if they do so by excluding.51 In other words, the fact that vast swaths of a population are at some points accorded “exceptional” forms of membership, by virtue of ambiguous thresholds for  full inclusion, does not in any way deny the  existence of inclusion itself – just as it is the case that we cannot conclude heaps do not exist simply because there is no precise point at which accumulating grains of sand become a heap. Such circumstances may even strengthen the confidence with which we can assert that full citizenship exists through negative references to the ways that some people fail to merit or exercise it. Using a unitary language of citizenship reifies the belief that semi-citizenships do not, ought not, and in some cases cannot exist. This makes aberrations difficult to see from either an academic or a practical perspective.  Other categories, such as the semi-citizenships on which this study centers, cease to exist in any explicit sense, or are discussed using less institutionally formal terms, such as “identities.” For instance, someone might be a  “gay American” or a  “legal alien,” but unitary definitions of citizenship only capture the fact that one is a citizen and the other is a non-citizen. This serves to bolster the assumption that norms of citizenship obtain, that they are meaningful and effective, and that they are possibly even authoritative. A variety of reasons could be offered to justify why we think the  gay person is a citizen and why we think the  legal alien is a non-citizen. One has a  passport while the other does not. One votes, the other does not. On the other hand, the “non-citizen” can marry a citizen in most states, while the “citizen” cannot, and from this fact flows a set of consequences that call into question who among the two is a citizen or a non-citizen.  Giorgio Agamben reminds us that, “man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion.”52 His discussion of “states of exception” takes note of the fact that the joining of  sovereignty and  biopolitics produces multiple thresholds for membership that in turn create partially overlapping circles of  inclusion and  exclusion.53 He cites Lanjunais’s words (as quoted in Sewall, “Le citoyen”), “Thus  children, the  insane,  minors,  women, those  Etienne Balibar makes this point in detailed fashion. See Etienne Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene (London and New York: Verso, 2002), especially Chapter 4, “What is a Border?” 52  Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel HellerRoazen (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 8. 53  Agamben, Homo Sacer, 38. 51

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c­ ondemned to a punishment either restricting political freedom or bringing disgrace [punition affliction ou inflammante] … will not be citizens.”54 Etienne Balibar also refers to the  “notion of minority” as extending to human beings who are subject to “protective authority of full citizens” and administered via provisions rooted in democratic principles that vest majorities with such powers  over minorities.55 He identifies “several different  types of aliens and alienness and several different modes of bordercrossing” in the case of post-war European camps alone.56 Citizenship is therefore a “gradient category.” It exists in gradations and has “degrees of membership and no clear boundaries.”57 There is a difference between a citizen and a non-citizen, but the line between the two cannot be traced to any one point of law, trait, or action. There are multiple points at which individuals can straddle the category by exhibiting some of the traits of citizenship, or receiving some of its rewards, without being entirely included. Seeing citizenship as gradiated thus argues strongly in favor of the notion that polities not only generate multiple forms of citizenship, but that it is inevitable that they do so. While there is a long-standing, and coherent, practical justification for individuals not having multiple attachments to separate nation-states, there is no corollary justification that indicates why states cannot grant multiple forms of citizenship.58 No practical imperative insists that nation-states generate only one kind of citizenship. Indeed much argues in favor of multiple forms of membership even when one takes into account the centrality of equal treatment before the law in liberal and  democratic theory.

VI.  The Elements of Citizenship There are multiple planes upon which gradations of citizenship can be described. Which are the specific thresholds that we need to pin down in order to define citizenship and semi-citizenships, what variables are in play, and how do they relate to one another? I have stipulated that citizenship is instantiated by states, which in turn channel norms and  Agamben, Homo Sacer, 30.  Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene, 151. 56  Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene, 80. 57  George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987), 12. 58  The prohibition on individuals holding multiple forms of membership can be traced back to Hobbes’s famous edict that “no man can obey two masters.” Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): Chapter XX. 54 55

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necessity in administering membership. The category of citizenship is relational, and it is instantiated through  practices that involve states and individuals. However, this still leaves open the question regarding what constitutes citizenship in the first place. Answering this question requires knowing more about the content of citizenship. Based on this, we want to know two further things. First, what rules are applied in order to confer citizenship upon individuals? Second, which properties are associated with citizenship? The first question addresses the characteristics required for someone to be considered a formal member of a polity. Answers to the latter query are meant to elaborate the content of citizenship, primarily by enumerating the rights,  privileges,  duties, and/ or activities associated with membership. The two are not unrelated: we can sometimes identify who is a citizen by looking at the distribution of, and  participation in, the content implied by the second question. Most relevant scholarship treats one or the other of these questions, but few works compare normative definitions of the content of citizenship with analyses of who actually can and ought to be a citizen. One contribution of this study is to make such comparisons explicit. Doing so exposes a gap between abstract work on the content of citizenship and the concrete incongruities that attend membership in  democratic states. Understanding the complexities of each of these questions, as well as the ways in which each affects the other, will help further illuminate why norms cannot ground definitions of citizenship, as well as outline the elements that do compose semi-citizenships. A.  Who Can Be a Citizen? Any definition of citizenship must provide a rationale for determining who is considered a citizen – who will be entitled to the content associated with membership. How one gains or loses citizenship is fundamental to defining that status, both for current and aspiring members. Again, focusing solely on norms provides a misleading or incomplete basis for understanding how citizenship is assigned. Disjunctions between abstract notions of  desert and the practical realities of how citizenship is awarded create one set of shifting thresholds that yield categorical gradience in the form of semi-citizenships. The gap is wide between the normative bases of rules regarding who is entitled to citizenship and actual policies of citizenship, but this is not entirely surprising given the social and economic pressures that often influence policymaking. These gaps

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encompass both the rules that assign and strip persons of citizenship, as well as the content that is conferred and denied by these rules. A central purpose of citizenship is to aid in making distinctions between members and non-members. Within the nation-state system the most significant tool for achieving this is nationality. Normative definitions of citizenship often begin from the basic question of whether nationality is best assigned through  jus soli (citizenship by residency),  jus sanguinis (citizenship by bloodline), or some combination of the two. These two principles govern not just who acquires what type of nationality when they are born, but also the range of choices open to adults who wish to change their status.  Rogers Brubaker addresses the different paths opened by these two forms of citizenship in his comparative work on citizenship in  France and  Germany.59 The force of  Brubaker’s study lies in his ability to demonstrate the relationship between nations’ identities and the forms of their citizenship laws. Whether it originates in primal myth or tangible goal, the form a community aspires to take will govern the rules of membership at least as strongly as the laws governing the conduct of members. However, because discussions of  jus soli and jus sanguinis focus on nationality, they do not get at the full range of issues crucial to the assignment of citizenship. A second normative debate central to the assignment question revolves around the principles of  desert and affected interest.60  Robert Dahl describes these two opposing means of defining the institution of citizenship as categorical and  contingent. The categorical principle states: “Every person subject to a government and its laws has an unqualified right to be a member of the  demos (i.e., a citizen).”61 The  contingent principle states that, “only persons who are qualified to govern, but all such persons, should be members of the  demos.”62 Both principles make a superficially convincing case for the corresponding types of citizenship. It is reasonable to think that a  democracy would not subject people to laws  Brubaker,  C itizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany.  On the latter concept, see Ian Shapiro, Democracy’s Place (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 235; also see Robert Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 35(1) (2007): 40–68. Goodin notes that very few studies of this topic move past Frederick Whelan’s statement on the topic. Frederick G. Whelan, “Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,” in Nomos XXV: Liberal Democracy, eds. J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 130–147. Goodin quotes  Robert Dahl, writing, “Strange as it may seem … . How to decide who legitimately make up ‘the people’ and hence are entitled to govern themselves … is a problem almost totally neglected by all the great political philosophers who write about  democracy.” 61  Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 124. 62  Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 124. 59

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of a state of which they are not citizens. On the other hand,  Dahl invokes the case of  children to illustrate a group who are routinely excluded from the  demos, due to their incompetence in political matters. This example disproves the categorical idea that every individual subject to the laws of a state is a full-fledged citizen of the polity. To resolve this conflict of values,  Dahl tests the validity of a “modified categorical principle” that states that “every adult subject to a government and its law must be presumed to be qualified as, and has an unqualified right to be, a member of the  demos.”63  Dahl resolves that  inclusion must be based upon the following criterion: “The  demos must include all adult members of the association except  transients and persons proved to be mentally  defective.”64 He therefore flags maturity, capacity, and a temporal relationship to the space associated with a given  demos as the most significant indicators of citizenship.  Dahl’s theory seems to raise more questions than it answers and offers a reminder of the problems inherent in defining the boundaries of a gradient category. Indeed, the modified categorical principle of membership invites disputes related to boundary and threshold. What is the line between  adulthood and  childhood? When does someone make the transition from being a  foreigner to being a subject of the laws, and therefore to being a citizen? If age is not a clear-cut criterion that demarcates when someone is qualified to govern, then why should birth – whether in the territory or to parents with citizenship – be seen as a less arbitrary criterion for citizenship? And once we have muddied the waters of nationality,  foreignness itself seems entirely arbitrary. Most liberal democracies do not automatically take away the citizenship rights of those who are mentally impaired or who are members of cults, yet  children and most  foreigners are treated differently by the states that govern them. Rationality is but one example of a quality that lends an ambiguity to a threshold for citizenship. Many others exist, including even what distinguishes a guest from someone who is a permanent subject of the law. B.  The Substantive Content Having illustrated some of the complexities associated with the assignment of citizenship, I will now further complicate the gradient treatment of citizenship by surveying different theories that address the  Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 127.  Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 129.

63

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question regarding the content of citizenship. In many ways, this section ­illustrates the problems already described: namely, that normativity in the study of citizenship tends to generate unitary understandings of citizenship that obscure the full range of actual and possible forms of political membership. Theoretical discussions of the content of citizenship may be divided into two general categories. The first view of the content of citizenship takes citizenship to be defined primarily by rights. States grant rights and thus define the expectations of citizens. In so doing, they give substance to the abstract notion of citizenship. The second view locates citizenship’s content in specific forms of political action. Individuals participating in the public sphere define the nature of citizenship through their fulfillment of specific  responsibilities.65 Although they diverge in their cataloging of what content is lodged in the category of political membership, each account shares a commitment to a normative vision of politics.  T he rights-centric approach emphasizes a social democratic vision of equality, whereas the latter,  civic republican view makes virtuous political action its focal point. This hampers both rightsor action-based approaches from recognizing gradience in either rights or action as anything other than an incomplete or failed realization of what citizenship ought to be. In the following discussions, I outline how each account closes out the possibility of gradience. I then use this as a springboard to argue for looking at gradience within a rights-based framework that locates the ultimate authority for defining citizenship not in the normative premise of equality, but within the state. This lays the foundation for the work of Chapter 3, which produces a framework within which gradience can be understood, and the thesis of Chapter 4, which examines how the state negotiates between norms and necessity in ways that produce semi-citizenships. 1.  Rights-Based Citizenship  Hannah Arendt famously referred to citizenship as “the right to have rights.”66 T. H. Marshall traces an evolutionary development of citizenship, expressed in terms of essential civil, political, and  social rights. Marshall charts the evolution of citizenship laws, which culminates, he argues, in the intertwining or “bundling” of civil, political, and, most recently, social rights. He begins from the premise that “there is a basic human equality  This is to be distinguished from the idea that citizens alone define what it means to be a member, insofar as it is presumed that citizens fulfill  responsibilities that are defined not by the individual, but by the collectivity. 66  Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Knopf, 2004). 65

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associated with … full membership of a community – or … of citizenship.” Marshall identifies three strains of citizenship that gradually came together in the post-Enlightenment era of political history: The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual free­dom – liberty of person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the  r ight to  own property and to conclude  valid contracts, and the  r ight to  justice … ( due process). … By the political elements I  mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. … By the social element I mean the whole range from the  r ight to a modicum of economic  welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.67

 According to Marshall, citizenship rights bonded to each other serially, as each developed in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. The three rights were also bonded to nationality – understood here to refer to the rights to remain within a territory and to move freely – a relationship that Marshall does not explore with the rigor that he reserves for civil, political, and social rights, and that has been called into question of late by postnationalists. The result of this bundling, in Marshall’s view, was that citizenship became a more democratic institution, rooted in equality borne of the interwoven protection of three originally disparate strands of  individual rights. Yet, in telling the story of citizenship as he does, Marshall presages citizenship’s gradience as well as the likely possibility that semi-citizenships will accompany citizenship even where citizenship is, on his terms, fully evolved. The most developed democratic citizenships knit Marshall’s three strands together. On its own, the idea that citizenship is composed of such a set of rights that are conferred by the state is consistent with what has been established thus far. But Marshall’s historical-analytic approach is accompanied by a strong normative thrust that is more problematic. Marshall is deeply committed to the idea that citizenship cannot be properly exercised until every citizen has a complete array of rights. He is particularly focused on social rights, the strand that he believed was just being wound into the braid of the first two at the time when he wrote. One is not a full member of society, in his view, if poverty or unmet basic needs restrict one’s choices or abilities. Citizenship by its very nature demands equality, and the state is charged with realizing

 Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, 78.

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that equality.68 Social democratic thinkers tend to view citizenship rights primarily as a means to  distribute goods to members of any given society.69 In other words, while historicist in method, Marshall’s account is ultimately driven by a commitment to the idea that citizenship is defined in normative terms of equality, and it drives, in turn, toward a unitary vision of citizenship. Marshall’s 1949 lecture, “Citizenship and Social Class,” marks the beginning of an era of citizenship studies heavily influenced by socialdemocratic norms of equality . One of the most prominent of the many critiques of Marshall’s account of citizenship is that it leaves something out.  M ichael Mann and  Bryan Turner have separately made arguments for adding economic citizenship to Marshall’s basic rights.  Bryan Turner, among others, has suggested that Marshall overlooked  cultural rights, which have become important to many citizens of diverse democracies.70 It has also been suggested that a  separate right to work be considered fundamental to citizenship, although Marshall folded  economic rights, including the  right to work, into his definition of  civil rights.71 One may easily imagine others advocating still  other categories, such as  environmental rights.72 These arguments, while damaging to Marshall’s claims that citizenship no longer evolves when social rights have been fully established, are not inconsistent with the spirit of his thinking. Neither is the related argument that Marshall was overly optimistic regarding how firmly entrenched social rights would become. In fact, since he published “Citizenship and Social Class,” there have been both massive improvements to, and retrenchments in, the social rights associated with democratic citizenship. What this suggests is that Marshall offers a convincing picture of the content of citizenship, but that he provides no mechanism with which we can think systematically about the fact  Marshall wrote,  “The basic human equality … has been clearly identified with the status of citizenship.” Class, Citizenship and Social Development, 77, see also 93. 69  See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap, 1971); and Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). Political sociologists take this position even more fervently than do political theorists. 70  See for example, Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Bryan S. Turner, “The Erosion of Citizenship,” British Journal of Sociology 52(2) (2001): 189–209; Maria Pia Lara, “Democracy and Cultural Rights: Is There a New State of Citizenship?,” Constellations 9(2) (2002): 207–220; and Maria Pia Lara, “Cultural Citizenship,” in Handbook of Citizenship Studies, eds. Engin Isin and Bryan S. Turner (London: Sage, 2002), 232–243. 71  Different understandings of civil rights are addressed in Chapter 3. 72  See, e.g., Elizabeth Jelin, “Towards a Global Environmental Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies 4(1) (2000): 47–63. 68

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that, at any point in history, many people in any democratic polity have neither an entirely complete nor an entirely incomplete  bundle of rights. In other words, Marshall provides an excellent starting point for thinking about citizenship’s gradience, even as his normative premises prevent him from actually offering such a theory . 2.  Civic Republican Theories of Citizenship  Classical approaches to the content of citizenship prioritize the activity of citizens over the actions of polities toward members. The very idea of the citizen can be traced back to  Aristotle’s version of political membership rooted in duty. In The Politics he writes, “the citizen whom we are seeking to define is a citizen in the strictest sense … and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of  justice and of offices.”73 In this phrasing, citizenship is distilled to a characteristic, though this characteristic is then linked to a set of activities that realize this characteristic. Individuals acting as virtuous and involved members of their political community become citizens through specific works associated with a good. As  Aristotle’s unitary language (“a characteristic”) suggests, he draws stark lines in his discussion of action between citizens and non-citizens.  Just like rights-based views, civic republican and  neo-republican theories of citizenship are normatively driven, too. And, just like the Marshallian view, there are ways in which these theories could lend themselves to a vision of citizenship as gradiated. Types of action could be disaggregated, and people who fulfill one or another of the requirements of full citizenship would occupy different loci on the gradient of semi-citizenship. However, the premise of civic republican accounts of citizenship is as unitary as the egalitarian social democratic premise of Marshallian and other rights-based approaches. They posit a notion of the good bound up in action that, because it is normatively desirable, marks partial fulfillment of the good, or partial capacity to fulfill the good, as a failure to achieve the good. Despite the potential disparity between norms of  equality and virtue-based norms, it is still the case that when the substantive vision of virtue that has been posited is not achieved, the political statuses that result can only be regarded as mistakes or failures, rather than residual statutes that necessarily accompany any definition of membership. This preserves a unitary divide between citizens and non-citizens.

 Aristotle, Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), Book III, Chapter 1.

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The more recent movement towards discursive models of ­citizenship grows in part out of active understandings of citizenship.  Jürgen Habermas’s work, both on citizenship and  national identity, as well as on the importance of  mutual recognition within the public sphere, has spearheaded efforts to look towards “communicative action” and  “deliberative democracy” as focal acts of citizenship.74 In a similar vein,  Seyla Benhabib urges us to nurture what she calls “democratic iterations” that invoke “complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which universalist rights claims and principles are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned, throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in the associations of  civil society.”75 Reciprocity between states and citizens is also of growing interest, and empirical studies, such as those by  Suzanne Mettler and Joe Soss, indicate that a measurable relationship can be identified between some social policies and the civic engagement of the objects of those policies.76 An extreme and applied notion of  desert is reflected in philosophies of citizenship that tend to be associated with  jus sanguinis. This dramatic version of republican citizenship, originating during the Romantic era, is a volkish form of ethnonationalist membership rule, a view constructed around formalized expectations of specific styles of  participation in civic life that cannot be achieved by individuals who are not very directly of that community.77 These themes are derived from interpretations of Herder’s and  Rousseau’s  philosophies, and more than one version treats cultural homogeneity and an ethnic ideal as the goal and function of a citizenship regime. In the contemporary context, this linking of virtue and  participation corresponds best to  jus sanguinis citizenship laws found in  Israel,  See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms; Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity” in Theorizing Citizenship, ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 1–19; Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). 75  Benhabib, The Rights of Others, 179. 76  Suzanne Mettler and Joe Soss, “The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy and Mass Citizenship,” Perspectives on Politics 2(1) (2004). 77  For a recent survey of contemporary thought on  republican citizenship, see Richard Dagger, “Republican Citizenship” in Handbook of Citizenship Studies, eds. Bryan Turner and Engin Isin (London: Sage, 2002), 145–156. For a thorough discussion of variants of  communitarian,  republican, and neo-republican norms of citizenship, see Herman van Gunsteren, “Four Conceptions of Citizenship” in The Condition of Citizenship, ed. Bart van Steenbergen (New York: Sage, 1994), 36–48. See also Damon Linker, “The Reluctant Pluralism of J. G. Herder,” Review of Politics 62(2) (2000): 267–293. 74

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 Japan, and, to a  lesser degree, Germany as well.78 However, it would be difficult to say that these laws – some of which are slowly being relaxed, most notably  Germany’s – and the spirit in which they are enforced constitute a definition of citizenship. And of course the conditions of cultural conformity that can produce such a citizenry have been the subject of intense scrutiny by political theorists.79 Even modified variants of  communitarian conceptions of citizenship that make modern, pluralist claims often advocate a “nostalgic return to the past.”80 3.  Rights vs. Virtue Just as the earlier section of this chapter argued in favor of locating authority for defining citizenship in the state, rather than in a normative ideal, an argument must now be made for choosing a way of defining the content of citizenship, so as to proceed with building a framework for understanding semi-citizenship. Both the existing rights- and civic virtue-based approaches lend themselves to a gradience that their respective normative bases prevent them from realizing. What remains, then, is to develop an argument identifying the thresholds that in turn define the contours of semi-citizenships. Although either the rights or the virtue approach could be reworked in ways that modify the role of norms to permit the recognition of gradience, the role assigned to the state earlier in the chapter argues in favor of an approach that prioritizes rights. Citizenship rights refer to relationships that are mediated by the state. For a number of reasons, the  practices that are central to creating citizenship refer to, and require the authority of, the state. In Polyarchy,  Robert Dahl describes an evolutionary process through which  democracy was institutionalized in “older and more stable  polyarchies through a liberalizing process that culminated in the extension of the  franchise.”81 The  right of  franchise

  G ermany seems a likely example, given its restrictive  jus sanguinis  naturalization policy. However, maintenance is a crucial component of any approach to citizenship, and once one has German citizenship, expectations of  civic participation are far less prevalent than in most ethno-nationalist polities. Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, “Citizenship and Stratification in an Ethnic Democracy,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 21(3) (1998): 408–427. 79  This is an immense literature that comprises several sub-categories. On  virtue see, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). 80  Gerald Delanty, “Communitarianism and Citizenship,” in Handbook of Citizenship Studies, eds. Engin Isin and Bryan S. Turner (London: Sage, 2002), 167. 81  Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 36. 78

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is central to  Dahl’s definition of both  polyarchy and  democracy.82 He describes other rights associated with  polyarchic citizenship as existing to bolster the  right of  franchise.  Civil rights are defined in such a way as to make them a set of means to the ends of formal  political participation.83  Dahl does not make much of the fact that  civil rights originated in part as  economic rights and, as such, defined an individual’s ability to participate in  civil society as well as the  demos. In some senses, the rights-based approach is preferable because of the weakness of the alternative. For an Aristotelian conception of politics to produce a contemporary definition of citizenship it needs to link in some way to the requirements mandated by states for membership. In other words, virtues and actions must be legal requirements in order to rise to the level of defining citizenship. Since the preceding section contained an argument against regarding all political activity as citizenship, the possibility of a participatory or civic understanding of citizenship is now limited to that which is in some way formally mandated. The contemporary revival of interest in citizenship studies coincided with the perceived failure of  liberalism to answer the powerful challenges offered by  communitarian and republican theorists of  democracy.  Communitarian, republican, and even  neo-Aristotelian theories of citizenship have moved in different directions, but all move away from what they commonly view as impoverished rights-centric understandings.84  M ichael Sandel set out a moderate “bottom-up” model that dominated  communitarian conceptions of citizenship for many years.85  Sandel conceptualizes community as a necessary precondition to any  social welfare arrangements that a  ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Here, I adopt ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Dahl’s distinction between ������������������������������������������� polyarchy and ��������������������������� democracy, though throughout the present work, where  Dahl would use  “polyarchy,” I use the term  “democracy” to remain consistent with other cited scholarship that predates or does not accept this distinction. 83  In his initial statement of “requirements for a  democracy among a large number of people,”  Dahl lists only civil rights such as expression and association, and omits civil rights pertaining to  equality or access to the economy. This is not to suggest that  Dahl implies these types of rights are irrelevant to mass  polyarchy, but he is setting up a theoretical model in which the civil and social rights that developed later in the history of most  polyarchies are not seen as essential to the  polyarchic nature of a regime. 84  Indeed, Martha Nussbaum’s neo-Aristotelian leanings have taken her all the way to a version of cosmopolitanism not embraced by  civic republicans. See Martha Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy” in Liberalism and the Good, eds. R. Bruce Douglas, Gerald M. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 203–252. 85  For a summary of the massive  liberal/communitarian debate, see Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 3–25. 82

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society deems worthwhile.  Sandel and other  communitarian theorists of citizenship find fault with liberal notions of universal  human rights because they conceive these rights in such an abstract fashion as to make them almost impossible to tie to “situated” human motivations.  Communitarians suggest that our real reasons for acting charitably or otherwise, ought to have little to do with any given definition of  justice, and everything to do with how we interact as deeply connected members of communities. Adding to  Sandel’s account, Mary Ann Glendon decries the clientalization of citizenship.86 Glendon suggests that emphases on rights have symbolically and substantively redefined the role of the citizen as a passive recipient of rights and  benefits, rather than as an active shaper of her own fate. Calls for more demanding requirements, such as those made by civic republican theorists of citizenship, are powerful. However, to some extent they serve to underscore the degree to which the state has been unable, or unwilling, to make political action central to requirements of citizenship, hence exemplifying the challenge posed to normative definitions of citizenship at the outset of the chapter. Fulfilling obligations to one another and toward the larger community happens within the context of laws that describe and justify our obligations and mandate the behavior that fulfills them. We may be civic in public and in the course of interacting in  civil society, but our most fundamental political claims on one another are both enumerated and enforced by bodies with the legitimate authority to do so.87 Thus, any definition of citizenship, in which a central role is played by activities that are not formally mandated by the state, relies on a normative ideal rather than a descriptive account of actual citizenships. Neo-republican variants of citizenship seek to integrate liberal conceptions of autonomy with classic notions of virtue, by considering citizenship to be an “office” that, among other things, demands loyalty  .88 If we filter the claims of “rights sceptics,” and of those who prioritize active citizenship, through the claims made earlier in the chapter, then the bolder of their assertions about the weaker weight of rights in relation to activities gives us cause for concern. Significant though the idea of civic engagement is,  civicness cannot be conflated with, or prioritized above, the institutional elements of citizenship. As stated earlier,  Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: Free Press, 1991). 87  Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society. 88  van Gunsteren, “Four Conceptions of Citizenship,” 46. 86

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a­ cting like a citizen cannot on its own make one a citizen. Definitions of citizenship that take it to be a  practice of individuals and groups pass too readily over these two conclusions.89 Nor is it the case that passive citizens will have their citizenship revoked. In turn, understandings of citizenship that treat it as a relationship elide the fact that it is really the rights of citizenship that are relational, and not citizenship itself.  Habermas himself makes the point that rights are in fact relationships. If rights are relationships, then citizenship refers to a set of relationships, but is not itself a relationship. Gradience has now been reasserted and further specified as referring to relationships. Citizenship is the formal category that denotes and constructs those relationships.90 Semi-citizenships are equally formal, if ill-recognized, members of the gradient category that is citizenship, and they can be identified based on the fact that they encompass some, but not all, of the relationships that compose full citizenship.

VII.  Existing Attempts to Theorize Semi-Citizenship At this point, what has been established is that citizenship is a gradient category containing multiple thresholds that are embodied by rights insofar as they ground relationships between individuals and states. To take this idea further, a framework for identifying semi-citizenships needs to take into account the full range of relationships within the category, as well as the ways in which they can be graded. Such a framework will need to  prioritize practice without denying the influence of norms or superimposing a single normative lens on the array of citizenships that can be, and are, produced by the  practice of citizenship. It will also need to account for the possibility of change over time. The belief that social science requires better specification and language to study and discuss citizenship has a substantial constituency, but this constituency has not yet reacted to this call in a systematic fashion. Recent theoretical work on partial or  differentiated citizenship suffers from three primary flaws, each of which has a correlate among the kinds of problems endemic in the larger debates about citizenship that were   M argaret Somers bridges the two approaches. Her theory takes citizenship to be an  institutional practice that incorporates rights. Margaret Somers, “Citizenship and Political Culture in the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community, and in the Transition to Democracy,” American Sociological Review 58(5) (1993): 587–620. 90  Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 88, quoted in Kenneth Baynes, “Rights as Critique and the Critique of Rights: Karl Marx, Wendy Brown, and the Social Function of Rights,” Political Theory 28(4) (2000): 460. 89

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discussed in the first half of this chapter. These include, first, a myopic definition of citizenship that focuses on only one of its elements, which element has itself been prioritized by a normatively driven account of citizenship. Second, such normative commitments preclude analysis of processes that don’t fit into that framework. Scholarship about citizenship that  preassigns normative desert to be the primary basis for  inclusion or  exclusion will miss certain things – for example, the ways in which states foster forms of threshold statuses out of sheer expedience, or  foster exclusions not produced by the norms under evaluation. Third, a few prominent efforts to theorize something along the lines of ­semi-citizenship approach the subject with the implicit assumption that there is one kind of citizen and multiple forms of  foreignness.  Regarding foreignness as diverse captures the critique that citizenship and non-citizenship do not exist in a dichotomous relationship. However, terming people who are partially excluded as  foreign or non-citizens disregards the degree to which these  diverse foreigners are also included in the citizenry (forcibly by assuming a tacit consent). While this error is less consequential than the first, it too implies a norm. It implies the norm of a single universal ideal of membership, divergence from which renders a  person foreign. These pieces of the puzzle point toward a more complete iteration of a theory of semi-citizenship. A.  Normative Lenses on Semi-Citizenship A theory of semi-citizenship must take into account normative and non-normative bases of categorical gradience as well as their interaction. Because  inequality and  exclusion are antithetical to the core commitments of liberal and  democratic theory, semi-citizenship is readily framed in normative terms and hence is studied through the lens of  justice.  I ris Marion Young’s notion of  differentiated citizenship is widely cited as uncovering injustices that occur at the nexus of rights-based distributive paradigms and social norms.91  Young takes the important step of pointing out that not all of those considered full citizens are treated as such, and she provides a framework within which one can reconceive the role of rights and distribution.  Young is committed to revealing  oppression and domination where they may not be obvious, and to suggesting ways in which  political philosophy and public  Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

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policy could better accommodate forms of difference that contribute to ­domination. But the inherently normative  cast of justice and injustice does not lend itself to discussions of types of partial citizenship that may be necessary, inevitable, or, as mentioned in the preceding section, even desirable. As I argue in greater detail in my discussion of social normative explanations of  unequal citizenship in Chapter 4, viewing  inequality as a product solely of the oppressive tendencies of dominant classes obscures the fact that states tend to make distinctions and create classes for reasons that cannot be fully articulated within normative language, particularly language that is crafted with the intent of revealing how dominant classes oppress and exclude. Institutions, particularly those associated with the  administrative state, can influence semi-citizenships in ways that do not simply reflect the interests and acts of the dominant class.  Young’s  differentiated citizenship captures an important aspect, but not the entire reality, of citizenship in contemporary  liberal-democratic states. Incorporating the non-normative foundations of semi-citizenships also underscores the degree to which semi-citizenships are inevitable and permanent products of any version of political membership that might be instituted in a  liberal democratic state. Even though people might belong to different  categories at different times, the  categories themselves remain potent. The specific political relationships that are identified as fundamental to citizenship are inclusive. They draw individuals into the ambit of the political community by offering  qualified benefits, by obligating them to do things like pay  taxes or fill out  census forms, through the exercise of power, such as that which shapes citizen behavior through qualifications for  welfare benefits, and by conferring nationality through birth.  Semi-citizenships cannot therefore be discussed solely from the perspective of exclusion. They are both inclusive and  exclusive.  Bonnie Honig’s Democracy and the Foreigner exemplifies the view that there exist many types of outsiders or  foreigners and only one type of citizen.92  Honig peppers her work with this assumption, most notably in her discussion of  Rousseau’s view of the threat of fractiousness brought about by  foreigners.93  I nclusion is understood to be unitary, even if  exclusion is not.  Exclusion is so poisonous that denial of any of the rights of citizenship transforms an individual into a  foreigner or a non-citizen. Only  Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). See also Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society. 93  Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner, 33. 92

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through  perfect inclusion can a person be deemed a citizen. Given that all people experience some  sort of exclusion at various points throughout their lives, envisioning  inclusion as simple, and  exclusion as complex and multifaceted, obscures important insights that might be gained from viewing various forms of  inclusion and  exclusion as semi-citizenship. Contemporary normative theorists who adopt  Honig’s approach appropriate an  understanding of equality that posits full citizenship as the only legitimate, desirable, or justifiable kind of membership. Absent this, one appears to become  foreign because examining only the nuances of  exclusion precludes a discussion of  partial inclusion. While these discussions may be about two sides of the same coin, it remains the case that heads and tails are different images. When we look at variations on  inclusion we see phenomena such as imposed  inclusion, both partial and complete.  Birthright nationality is an entirely imposed citizenship. Groups like the  Roma or  indigenous persons, who have atypical relationships with the  sovereign spaces they inhabit, and who therefore sometimes seek to avoid incorporation into nation-states, might prefer Marshallian citizenship without nationality, rather than what often looks like the reverse. These and other nuanced versions of  inclusion are lost in visions of citizenship that posit only one version of  inclusion. In this sense,  Honig replicates the flaws of both the rights- and  virtuebased accounts of citizenship. B.  Non-Normative Approaches to Semi-Citizenship In attempting to transcend the problem of unitariness without sacrificing coherence, other work that broaches semi-citizenship can end up myopically focused on one aspect of citizenship’s gradience. Citizenship can easily be taken for one of its elements, for example, nationality or  social rights.94 This is a by-product of the fact that much of the writing that is best positioned to make inroads into understanding semicitizenship studies citizenship as a phenomenon that relates primarily to immigration and  alien status. Thomas Hammar uses the felicitous term  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Veit Bader proposes a normative ��������������������������������������������������� framework of inclusion regimes but applies it primarily to questions of borders- and nationality-generated cultural difference. Veit Bader, “Citizenship and Exclusion: Radical Democratic, Community and Justice. Or, What is Wrong with Communitarianism?,” Political Theory 23(2) (1995): 211–246. Ewald Engelen references this as well in discussing  differentiated citizenship in the Netherlands. Ewald Engelen, “How to Combine Openness and Protection? Citizenship, Migration, and Welfare Regimes,” Politics and Society 31(4) (2003): 503–536. 

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 “denizens” to refer to  long-term resident non-nationals.95 Daiva Stasiulis refers to “hybrid citizens” who have partial combinations of rights, possibly in multiple states, that challenge both the individuals who hold such statuses and the states to which they partially belong or are subject.96 Stephen Castles and Alasdair Davidson contribute two refinements to Hammar’s  categories of “quasi-citizens” and  “margizens.”97  Margizens have even fewer protections than  denizens, who are in some ways more formally incorporated into the democratic polity in which they reside.98  Peter Schuck separately supplies the term “in-betweens,” which applies in a specifically American context to illegal  aliens who hold a form of citizenship rooted in a substantial body of rights made available by both the  U.S. Constitution and contemporary political circumstances.99  Schuck has also pointed out that there is one  constitutional jurisprudential provision for partial membership: that pertaining to conquered territories.100 However, it could hardly be said that this one case could be extended to demonstrate a  constitutional acceptance of varied citizenships. A policy-oriented approach identifies the process of civic stratification as primarily responsible for producing such statuses.101 Almost all of the above-mentioned contributions (excepting Balibar, who was mentioned earlier in the chapter) fail to conceive of ­citizenship beyond the somewhat narrow terms set by the immigration literature. As Castles and Davidson write, “the problem of  formal exclusion from citizenship applies above all to immigrants.”102 Ultimately, even  Agamben returns to a notion of  sovereignty that privileges  territoriality by focusing on the figure of the  refugee and the location of the camp, particularly as seen through  Arendt’s eyes, and suggests that it is the  refugee who forces

  95 Tomas Hammar, Democracy and the Nation State (London: Gower Publishing, 1990).   96 Daiva Stasiulis, “Hybrid Citizenship and What’s Left,” Citizenship Studies 8(3) (2004): 301.   97 Stephen Castles and Alistair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging (New York: Routledge, 2000), 94–96.   98 Castles and Davidson, Citizenship and Migration, 94–96.   99 Peter Schuck, Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 100  Peter Schuck, The Limits of Law: Essays on Democratic Governance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 27. 101  Elenore Kaufman, “Contemporary European Migrations in Europe, Civic Stratification and Migration,” Political Geography 21(8) (2002): 1035–1054; Lydia Morris, Managing Migration: Civic Stratification and Migrants’ Rights (London: Routledge, 2002). 102  Castles and Davidson, Citizenship and Migration, 10.

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us to question the distinction we make between persons and citizens.103 Yet, throughout history,  native-born residents have composed some of the largest classes excluded from full citizenship. The terms that  Agamben, Castles,  Davidson, Schuck, and Hammar employ to describe  resident aliens make a partially spurious distinction between the citizenship of nationals and non-nationals. They do not question whether a theory of partial citizenship should be circumscribed by the assumption that all people with nationality actually have full citizenship. This oversight means that their theories are not global enough to fully situate the citizenship of resident  aliens in the context of other full and partial citizenships. Recent work on  cosmopolitan citizenship replicates this focus on nationality.  Seyla Benhabib’s discussions of  cosmopolitan citizenship, particularly in the context of the EU, frame concerns of  exclusion and disaggregation both as a new phenomenon and as one that is a product of the interaction between contemporary migration patterns and evolving forms of postnational governance .104 This is unfortunate, insofar as it neglects the deep and important ways in which  foreignness, which she herself notes is produced and manifested within a population as much as it is at the borders of the nation-state, has disaggregated memberships in ancient, medieval, early modern, as well as contemporary polities. Semi-citizenships are neither new nor produced exclusively or even primarily by evolving understandings of borders, migration, and  sovereignty.105 As long as we privilege immigration in discussions of anomalies of citizenship, and simultaneously fail to recognize the ways in which  Agamben, Homo Sacer, 134.  Benhabib, The Rights of Others. 105  Benhabib, The Rights of Others, 210.  B enhabib’s treatment is particularly surprising since, as mentioned earlier, despite her framing of the problem as a contemporary one, she does note statuses such as those held by  Jews in the early American republic that did not conform to either citizen or immigrant models (Benhabib, The Rights of Others, 46). She also briefly seems to entertain the import of a taxonomy of semicitizen statuses that is not entirely a product of immigration. Some people do not “possess requisite identity criteria through which the people defines itself or because they choose to remain outsiders. These are the ‘aliens’ and ���������������������������� ‘foreigners’ amid the democratic people. Their status is distinct from that of second-class citizens such as  women and  workers, as well as from that of  slaves and tribal peoples. Their status is governed by mutual treaties among �������������������������������������������������������������� sovereign entities, as would be the case with official representatives of a state power upon the territory of the other; and as if they are civilians, and living among citizens for economic, religious, or other cultural reasons, their rights and claims exist in that murky space defined by respect for human rights on the one hand and by international customary law on the other. They are  refugees from religious ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� persecution, merchants and missionaries, migrants and adventurers, explorers and fortune seekers.” (Benhabib, The Rights of Others, 46–47). Yet, for reasons I have described, this isn’t really as global an understanding of  foreignness as we need 103

104

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s­ emi-citizenships – both those arising from immigration and from other forms of difference – are not new but nearly omnipresent in the politics of states and state-like organizations, we cannot fully or effectively theorize their shape, causes, or the ways in which they might be governed.  Linda Bosniak provides a tool for thinking about semi-citizenships in a way that is not myopically focused on nationality.106 Using  M ichael Walzer’s understanding of membership as her springboard,  B osniak describes  U.S. citizenship rights as a “divided construct” that allows “a range of distinguishable sorts of entitlements and protections that themselves afford forms of  ‘alien citizenship.’”107  B osniak cites  work on gender, including that of Nancy Cott, as well as a swath of scholarship on immigration, as having broached this subject.108  B osniak illustrates how  alienage in American  constitutional law treats rights and status – I am using “nationality” similarly to how she uses “status citizenship” – as “relatively autonomous.”109 In singling out nationality/ status  B osniak gives a rich account of how and why alien  citizenship comes to exist in the  United States. This leaves open the possibility of a systematic theory of forms of semi-citizenship without disaggregating other elements of citizenship from nationality. Thus, while  B osniak alludes to semi-citizenships held by persons with  “status citizenship,” her analysis of  U.S.  constitutional law does not discuss what forms they take, how they come about, or how they compare to those that revolve around the absence of  “status citizenship.” The avoidance of unitary presumptions must be balanced by some way of maintaining conceptual parsimony, if “semi-citizenship” theory is to be used for comparative analyses. Existing scholarship that has entirely avoided drawing a false dichotomy between non-national semicitizens and other kinds of semi-citizens demonstrates the challenge of being thorough and parsimonious. For instance,  T homas Janoski’s intricate and systematic enumeration of rights and  duties makes brief mention of  “‘subjects,’ i.e. internal non-citizens.”110  Janoski’s approach absorbs T. H. Marshall’s assumption of an evolutionary citizenship, and hence he treats this idea of  subjecthood as one that exists in various to fully capture semi-citizenship or create a typology of semi-citizenships that isn’t focused on border  crossings. 106  Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 107  Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien, 81. 108  Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien, 8n. 109  Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien, 85, 89. 110  Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society, 7, 242.

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states of movement toward a full citizenship. At the same time that this narrows the scope of his analysis, his understanding of citizenship does not focus on the relationship between states and membership status. This has the effect of spreading his categorical boundaries over a series of Venn diagrams, which in turn creates an almost limitless variety of potential semi-citizenships.111  Ralf Dahrendorf identifies (but does not develop) a like-minded and even broader approach when he writes, “The economic citizen, the citizen in uniform, the church of citizens, are born – all contradictions in terms and at the same time apparently inevitable consequences of the idea of citizenship.”112  Dahrendorf sees the process through which identity drives toward an evermore fractured citizenry as embodying “the paradox of the Complete Citizen.”113 He revisits  Habermas’s point that: As the state begins to interfere with the social order, however –  Marshall’s social rights of citizenship – “the generality of the norm as a principle cannot be sustained.” This means, among other things, that the ‘… relatively homogenous public of reasoning private individuals gives way to organized sectoral interests; the one public gives way to several publics; citizenship can no longer be thought of as generalized status enabling people to participate in the social and political process.’114

In equating democratization with the fracturing of the citizenry, when  democratic theory makes strong claims to require and achieve exactly the opposite,  Dahrendorf positions himself against difference theorists like  Young, as well as against early Enlightenment philosophers, such as  Benjamin Constant and  Edmund Burke, who express similar worries about the leveling effects that  liberal democracy engenders in the context of a large state.115 As Chapter 4 will argue, this inconsistency can be explained at least in part by the fact that it is not only  democratic theory, or  even normative theory more generally, that exercises influence over the process that forms citizenship and semi-citizenships.  Janoski and  Dahrendorf both accurately identify a tangle of thresholds within the category of citizenship. Each is rich in a different way, but  Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society, 13.  Dahrendorf, “Citizenship and Beyond,” 695. 113  Dahrendorf, “Citizenship and Beyond,” 697.  Dahrendorf writes, “There is a demand for specific rights of  workers, of students, of church members; and a denial of the right of the generalized public, including parliaments and law-enforcement agencies, to govern in these sectors.” 114  Dahrendorf, “Citizenship and Beyond,” 694–695. He cites Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand, 1962), 196. 115  Constant and Burke are discussed in Chapter 3. 111

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each also lacks the conceptual parsimony social scientists making broad ­comparisons might seek in a framework of semi-citizenship.116

VIII.  Conclusion Throughout this chapter, a basic understanding of citizenship has been carved out from the debates over what defines citizenship. Deprivileging normative understandings of what citizenship should be, in favor of the institutional realities created by states in their capacity as arbiters of  norms and practices, permits a broad view of what constitutes citizenship and of how its boundaries might in fact be blurred. Locating the content of citizenship in relationships instilled by rights further specifies the outlines of the category and its potentially gradient elements. Still, debate over the definition of citizenship will persist. It is tempting to point to disparate invocations of the term “citizenship” as evidence that the concept does not have substantive value beyond that associated with its rhetorical weight. One might respond to the ongoing nature of disputes about what citizenship means by concluding that anything so perpetually under revision, or so responsible for disagreement, has no meaning at all. W. B. Gallie’s explanation of “contested concepts” helps pull citizenship back from this precipice.117 Gallie offers a set of criteria by which one can both judge whether a concept is contested and evaluate what we can expect from such contestations. Contestation reveals the need for an attendant language that permits modification and variation within the concept. Indeed, Gallie’s own examples of contested concepts, which include art and religion, indicate that most contested concepts come to be accompanied by modifiers (performance art, polytheistic religion) as a means of refining debates about their meaning, as well as about the boundaries of the concepts themselves. In stating her rationale for writing The Concept of Representation, Hanna Pitkin underscores the need to specify and “make distinctions” with regard to essentially  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Other approaches to the disaggregation of citizenship offer equally important normative and theoretical insights, the complexity of which does not lend itself to the task of categorizing. This is particularly true of the very rich feminist literature on citizenship. Nira Yuval-Davis’s concept of multi-layered citizenship is one exemplar. See Nira Yuval-Davis, “The Multi-Layered Citizen,” International Journal of Feminist Politics 1(1) (1999): 119–136. 117   Ruth Lister and  Linda Bosniak both take citizenship to be an essentially contested concept. Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, 13–16. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” 167–198. 116

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 contested concepts such as  representation.118 The concept of citizenship needs conceptual counterparts in the same way that, as  Robert Dahl argues, the concept of  democracy needs  polyarchy.119 Such modifications of the concept of  democracy, as  Dahl favors, have been referred to as  “democracy with adjectives.”120 While disaggregation will not resolve conflict over whether citizenship should prioritize  participation or  virtue, it does refine the kinds of contestation that can occur by organizing disputes and pinning them down to matters of prioritization, rather than definition. It is hard to imagine anyone offering an entirely novel  definition of democracy at this late stage in the debate over the concept. However, which elements of a contested concept such as citizenship or  democracy are most significant, and how they can be identified and measured, requires consideration. This consideration is not, as some suggest, repetitious  “talking about democracy” or citizenship, for that matter.121 We have changed the nature of the contest if we can talk instead about the nature and relative merits of democracy with various adjectives. The same is true of citizenship. If social scientists are careless in their use of the term “citizenship,” it is partly because they lack a vocabulary that fully captures the range of related activities, offices, and statuses that are being elided by the word “citizenship.” A nuanced vocabulary of citizenship that includes semi-citizenships will improve the quality of contestation and make it more useful to a range of audiences. Between concept stretching and citizenship with “too many adjectives” lies a space for better specification of variations of citizenship. Based on the understanding of citizenship developed in this chapter, the following chapter offers a means for examining different kinds of citizenship that accommodates categorical gradience, normative and  Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 8.  Dahl, Polyarchy. 120  David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Research Note: Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” World Politics 49(3) (2007): 430–451. Collier and Levitsky identify how concepts can be honed without being “stretched.” Terms such as “semi-citizenship” are what they call “diminished subtypes” that “are a useful means to avoid conceptual stretching” by providing “differentation by creating new analytic categories” (441). In Collier, Hidalgo, and Maciuceanu’s view, adjectival innovation is of questionable value to conceptual contestation. David Collier, Fernando Daniel Hidalgo and Andra Olivia Maciuceanu, “Essentially Contested Concepts: Debates and Applications,” Journal of Political Ideologies 11(3) (2006): 223. This is in some sense true, but it undervalues the degree to which well-chosen adjectives can radically alter the subject of conceptual contestation and the importance of such transformation. 121  Collier et. al., “Essentially Contested Concepts,” 223. 118 119

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non-normative causes of semi-citizenship, and an inclusive approach to the content of citizenship. This framework will suggest a number of conclusions about the enduring presence of semi-citizenship, as well as its weaknesses and strengths, each of which I explore in greater detail in chapters that follow.

3 An Introduction to Semi-Citizenship

Hence, as is evident, there are different kinds of citizens.1

I.  Introduction Understanding semi-citizenship requires a framework that avoids reductiveness while still identifying distinctions among different kinds of citizens. It must rely on a complex and yet parsimonious set of criteria from which we can extract several, although not an infinite number of, varieties of semi-citizenships, and into which we can categorize various persons and groups that obviously hold different forms of semicitizenship. An effective method of classification will identify forms of semi-citizenship, facilitate comparisons across them, and shed light on the institutions and processes involved in governing semi-citizenships.1 Moving beyond criticism of overly unitary or narrowly normative understandings of citizenship requires a careful discussion of how citizenship becomes “unbundled” and an examination of exactly how the constitutive elements of citizenship appear in the absence of one or several of their counterparts. Doing this in turn entails addressing the implications of the second obstacle to defining citizenship that I noted in Chapter 2. That is, the difficulty associated with a gradient category that is susceptible to the Sorites Paradox . Both the content (the bundle of rights  that citizenship comprises) and the criteria (the bases upon which each right is awarded) involve imprecise thresholds; there is no single recipe for determining exactly which rights make up a type of citizenship, nor can we 1

  A  ristotle, The Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Book III, Chapter 5.

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identify exactly when someone is mature enough, intelligent enough, or well enough established in a territory to be called a citizen. This makes the project of distinguishing between types of semi-citizenship complex. Even if we agree to a set of elements that constitute the content of full citizenship, we need to decide how we mark the thresholds associated with each element. In this chapter, I offer such a framework by categorizing the core content of citizenship in a way that allows different combinations of essential rights in the thicker and thinner versions that characterize the range of existing and potential semi-citizenships. The framework invokes a distinction between rights that refer to goods  required by any person regardless of context (autonomous) and those that gain meaning in specific political contexts (relative). These two classes of rights can exist in combinations of stronger and weaker versions of each type. I argue in favor of using these criteria, rather than approaches that refer to justifications for the conferral or denial of rights, for reasons that draw upon the preceding chapter’s discussion of the reductive tendencies of normative arguments about citizenship. The causes of semi-citizenship, which I discuss at length in Chapter 4, should not be conflated with the statuses themselves. I compare a range of alternative means of classifying semi-citizenships in order to clarify the advantages of the framing. Finally, I survey some of the relevant insights offered by this framing of semi-citizenship. I broach the social scientific potential of making comparisons across different types of semi-citizenship. I also return to a discussion of the fact that normative theories  of citizenship and difference have generally tended to treat semi-citizenships as coextensive with social identities. Because semi-citizenships are analytic  categories rather than identities, many of the explanations of the origins of semi-citizenship that are offered by identity-centric theories are not entirely satisfying. This then raises the question I discuss in Chapter 4: How do semi-citizenships arise?

II.  Identifying Semi-Citizenships A framework of semi-citizenship must refer to multiple types of rights and thresholds within a framework that fully acknowledges the ambiguous and ever-evolving nature of citizenship. This is the only way to produce a more precise, multi-valenced language for describing citizenships. As the Sorites Paradox  indicates, threshold questions can never be entirely eliminated. This means that the most effective framework within which we can understand citizenship and semi-citizenship must do two things beyond simply marking the existence of multiple forms of citizenship. It must offer a persuasive set of reasons for acknowledging certain boundaries between

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 categories, and it must admit the movement between  categories that the thresholds permit. Representing categorical differentiation within the larger category of citizenship requires marking points at which it appears that the thresholds for various elements of citizenship have been met: that enough of one element or another of citizenship is present to constitute a form of semicitizenship. Plenty of people will meet some thresholds but not others, and not all of those people will be entirely without citizenship. To transcend these problems requires looking at the bases on which the elements of citizenship are unbundled, to see how the content of citizenship described in Chapter 2 can be deconstructed and analyzed. Once we have designated elements and identified a means for assigning thresholds, we can at least see the boundaries of these  categories, as well as what their members have in common by virtue of their categorical membership, despite the fact that they may occupy otherwise disparate social positions. Therefore, an unbundling of citizenship rights is necessary to identify semi-citizenships. There are several ways to approach unbundling citizenship rights. Some of these approaches attend to questions of content, namely the rights associated with citizenship. Others examine the justifications for the disaggregation of the elements of citizenship. I will return to the justifications for disaggregation in Section VII of this chapter, after I have supplied an overview of the framework for classifying ­semi-citizens. Content questions concern themselves with which rights are conferred upon, or denied to, individuals. These content-based questions about people’s rights have three facets. The first reveals the rights that are essential to citizenship anywhere and always. The second facet highlights the types or  categories of rights that some people have, which others are denied wholesale. Discussion of how the content of citizenship can be unbundled will indicate, first, what kinds of abstractions are required of a framework for categorizing the semi-citizenships that result from this unbundling. Second, it will indicate the best bases for making these abstractions. The third facet of content questions focuses attention on when groups and individuals have some, but not all, rights within  categories of rights. The first facet is a familiar subject to democratic theorists. Arguments about which  rights are fundamental to citizenship are necessary normative starting points in democratic  theory, as the discussion of T. H. Marshall’s work in the preceding chapter indicates. The fact that there is no perfect consensus regarding the catalog of citizens’ rights means that these discussions also produce justifications for developing a framework of semicitizenship that permits comparisons of persons whose options for full

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citizenship are different. For example, one might make the argument that all Americans are semi-citizens because they receive virtually no guarantee of  healthcare. Or one might apply this kind of question to a federal system, in which residents of one state/province receive rights that others do not. The Canadian provinces have established different ages of  majority, which has the effect of conferring a type of political citizenship upon residents in some provinces that their contemporaries in other provinces do not enjoy. We can also think about this kind of comparison intergenerationally, as the subject of  environmental citizenship or green citizenship encourages.2 Indeed, scholars who have developed the idea of  environmental citizenship routinely assert that “this concept acknowledges the  differentiated and multilayered character of citizenships based on an evolution of  rights (civil to political to social) within a national context and provides a categorization and typology that is too limited for contemporary realities.”3 However, finer brushstrokes are also needed to identify and classify semi-citizens within any given citizenry. It is not only important to know what the democratic bundle of  rights comprises, but also at which points each braided bundle is or becomes unbraided, and how each thread of the braid frays. Based on T. H. Marshall’s history, the fullest catalog of citizenship rights admits civil, political, and social  rights along with nationality, which I describe in greater detail in Chapter 5 as primarily including  rights of residence and free movement. Understanding unbundling requires knowing which rights are denied to which people within a population. Which rights don’t people have? Scrutiny of this “negative political space” has historically played an important role in the definition of modern citizenship.  Peter Sahlins notes in his history of droit d’aubaine that citizenship in  France was initially defined not by a set of rights, but rather by the absence of specific disabilities imposed on  foreigners.4  Sahlins focuses  Teena Gabrielson, “Green Citizenship: a Review and Critique,” Citizenship Studies 12(4) (2008): 439. 3  L iette Gilbert and Catherine Phillips, “Practices of Urban Environmental Citizenships,” Citizenship Studies 7(3) (2003): 313–330. Quoted in Gabrielson, “Green Citizenship,” 437. 4  Droit d’aubain deprived foreigners of the right to name heirs, as non-foreigners could, which prevented the former from bequeathing property after their death. Property acquired by foreigners reverted to the state upon their death. Droit d’aubain allowed the nascent French state to differentiate between citizens and non-citizens before such distinctions were either common or readily facilitated by legal and institutional practice. Peter Sahlins, Unnaturally French: Foreign Cities in the Old Regime and After (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 5. See also Charlotte C. Wells, Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). 2

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on the  right to bequeath  property in pre-democratic  France. However, the  franchise seems a more representative right in contemporary democratic politics.  Judith Shklar also describes early iterations of American semicitizenship that excluded  black Americans,  women, the  Irish, and others, in terms focused on the negative space created by large-scale  exclusions of members of the population from entire  categories of rights.5 For example, laws of  coverture that accorded political voice to  women’s fathers and husbands made  women semi-citizens. But any of the fundamental civil, political, social, or nationality  rights may be categorically denied to individuals or groups. Reasonable circumstances could conceivably demand that someone receive social  rights without full, or possibly any, political  rights, as is the case with residents of  U.S. territories, most notably  Puerto Rico and  Washington D.C., as well as with many mentally  ill persons. In each of these cases an entire category of rights –  political rights – is denied without necessarily depriving the individuals in question of all the other types of rights associated with citizenship. The braided bundle comes unbraided for these persons and groups. The individual threads that are braided together can each also fray independently of the other threads, leaving some people missing a few rights from any or all  categories. People can have some political  rights, some social  rights, some civil  rights and even some nationality  rights without losing all of each type. For example,  non-nationals ( foreignborn individuals who live in a country without naturalizing) in Sweden have some, but not all, of the political  rights that full citizens are accorded. They can vote in local but not national elections. Members of the  military in most democracies stand trial in military  courts, thus restricting some of their civil  rights while leaving others intact, e.g., the  right to form  contracts. An effective means for categorizing forms of semi-citizenship must account for both the unbundling of types of  rights from each other, and also the fraying of individual strands of the braided bundle.

III.  Abstracting the Braided Bundle of Democratic Rights The diverse content of citizenship discussed in Chapter 2, in combination with the multiple facets of disaggregation enumerated in the 5

 See Judith Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

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preceding section, make establishing  categories of semi-citizenships a complex exercise. This section of the chapter takes on the problem of how to organize the unravelling democratic bundle of  rights, so that the semi-citizenships produced by its unbundled forms can be described and compared to one another using a common language. The principle for organizing rights has to find a way to make distinctions among the types of rights associated with citizenship, distinctions that identify the most fundamental lines along which rights are disaggregated. This means it must do more than identify rights descriptively in the way that Marshall and other democratic theorists do, from  A ristotle to  Dahl. Descriptive accounts of rights will not advance the cause of comparison because, for example, the rights of a member of the  military and of a permanent  resident cannot be compared in their raw form. Members of the  military have different civil  rights that affect their entitlement to counsel and trial. Permanent  residents do not vote and are not represented. But what can we say about their citizenship in comparison to one another? To make useful comparisons, we need to know which qualities are common to the rights that each semi-citizen is missing, and/or how these rights are different from each other, as they pertain to citizenship. A.  Autonomous and Relative Rights  Citizenship rights are distinguished from other kinds of rights – for example, the  right to drive – by their fundamental relationship to the idea of political membership. This was established in Chapter 2, and holds true even for definitions of citizenship that were ultimately rejected, such as those that deemphasize membership in political communities in favor of seeing citizenship as membership in moral communities.  Charles Tilly offers a useful conceptual distinction that refers to two ways of thinking about rights from this perspective of membership.  Tilly’s basic definition of rights derives from Sen’s concept of entitlements.6 Entitlements are “enforceable claims on  goods, services, or protections by specific others.”7 “Rights exist when one party can effectively insist that another deliver  goods, services, or protections, and third parties will act to reinforce (or at least not hinder) their delivery. Such entitlements become citizenship rights

 A martya Sen, Poverty and Famine: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 7  Charles Tilly, “Where Do Rights Come From?” in Democracy, Revolution, and History, ed. Theda Skocpol (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), 56. 6

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when the object of the claims is a state or its agent, and the ­successful claimant qualifies by simple membership in a broad category of persons subject to the state’s jurisdiction.”8 Citizenship rights therefore invoke individuals, their relationships to each other, and their relationships to the agent that enforces those claims.  Tilly, citing Pierre Bourdieu, notes a difference among various types of  goods that we associate with citizenship. The distinction is between autonomous  goods and relative  goods.9 The value of autonomous  goods can be defined entirely independent of any particular social or political context. While not all autonomous and  relative goods are associated with corresponding rights, all  rights can be classified as either autonomous or relative. Rights to autonomous  goods entitle people to things they need under any circumstances. For example, the value of  healthcare is not defined by any relationship to a political system. It is valuable to everyone in every place. Relative  goods derive their meaning from their embeddedness in larger systems of value. Rights to relative  goods can reflect various, and variously compelling, conceptions of human interests, but they only obtain in specific contexts. They require that other conditions be met before their justifications gain force. For example, the  right to vote becomes meaningful within the political system, specifically 8 9

 Tilly, “Where Do Rights Come From?” 56–7.  Charles Tilly, Durable Inequality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 26.  T homas Janoski makes reference to a distinction similar to the autonomous/relative binary, which he terms active and passive rights. Thomas Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Ian Shapiro also identifies a split between “best” and “basic” interests that bears some similarity to the autonomous/ relative framing, although he does not develop it in an identical fashion. Ian Shapiro, Democratic Justice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 85–92.  Jürgen Habermas uses similar terms but in a diametrically opposed way. (Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 122–123.) He breaks down rights into five categories, the first four – equal liberties, political autonomy, legal protection, and  participation – he terms “absolute,” in comparison with the social rights (loosely construed) that he terms “relative” because they are keyed to the degree to which they enable or facilitate the exercise of the first four types of rights. I address this point later in this chapter. Despite a superficial similarity, it should be noted that the distinction between autonomous and relative rights is not identical to the distinction between the universal and the particular. Particularist rights are rooted more firmly in identities than relative rights. Most systems of relative rights that are relevant to this study, i.e., those that are associated with citizenship in a liberal  democracy, refer not to systems that ground identity but to systems of representative and often pluralist  democracy. The distinction could be construed as a matter of degree, but there are likely several very substantive degrees of separation between particularist rights and the relative rights ensconced in most democratic polities.

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the electoral system, in which the vote is cast. Outside of a  democracy, in either a benevolent or despotic dictatorship, a vote may be meaningless, and at the very least its meaning will be radically different than votes in participatory systems. Fulfilling a relative right therefore conditions the need that it meets in ways that fulfilling an autonomous  right does not. So, for example, what it means to say that a state has fulfilled its promise to represent a citizen will vary depending on what kind of representative democracy (proportional, descriptive, etc.) is in effect. Each of the citizenship rights described in Chapter 2 can be classified as either autonomous or relative. The core rights associated with nationality, specifically those that confer the  right to reside somewhere and move freely, are autonomous. The nation-state system is a universal, inescapable fact of political life that effectively deprives any human being who does not have a nationality of basic forms of  security. A basic  education of the sort that instills skills associated with communication and self-care is also autonomously valuable. Some civil  rights, for example, liberties of speech and thought, as well as the  right to form families (though not necessarily to marry), are autonomous. They have force on their own, regardless of context. Similarly,  rights to one’s bodily integrity, freedom from fear, and freedom from  persecution have a value that is autonomous from any given context. Despite the immediacy of their relevance to basic life-sustaining functions, the class of autonomous  rights can evolve, expand, and contract. As mentioned earlier, newly developing notions of environmental  justice may confer additional autonomous  rights on individuals, particularly as  goods like clean water or even fresh air become increasingly scarce and controlled by privately held companies.10 Even when particular circumstances create costs for people on whom autonomous  rights of citizenship are imposed, e.g., when nationality subsumes pre-existing forms of identity, failure to provide those rights also imposes high costs.11  On  environmental citizenship, see Bryan S. Turner, “The Erosion of Citizenship,” British Journal of Sociology 52(2) (2001): 204.  Turner characterizes  environmental citizenship as  postnational, a concept that I treat skeptically because of the role played by  states in the shaping and administration of the postnational citizen. 11  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Even amid claims of developing ���������������������������������������������������� postnational citizenship, individuals from non-member states living in the  European Union are vulnerable to a range of status-related threats from which member-state nationals are exempt. Despite extensive discussions of the ways in which the EU might address this set of dilemmas, no agreement has been reached. This points to the durable importance of nationality. See Yasemin Soysal, “Changing Citizenship in Europe: Remarks on Postnational Membership and the Nation-State,” in Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe, eds. David Cesarani and Mary Fulbrook (London: Routledge, 1996), 17–29, and Seyla Benhabib, 10

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Relative rights of citizenship assert a relationship of rights to  goods that are specified by the political  constitution of the  democracy in question. They refer to the broadest justifications that constitute the polity. Relative rights and the structures within which they are realized all refer to the larger justification for instantiating a  democracy in the first place, i.e., maximizing liberty or perpetuating a specific civic  republican political culture. This also means that they must take different but specific forms, depending on the  constitutional norms that justify the  democracy. As Ian Shapiro demonstrates, procedural democratic  rights are subordinate foundational  goods.12 They are not inherently good or valuable in the same way that  security, health, or even free thought are. It is possible to be at least a minimally functional political being without them, even if there is consensus that this life would be less desirable than one led with democratic  political rights. It is even conceivable that, depending on how  democracy is justified, an effective  paternalist regime could render classic democratic  rights of  participation irrelevant, while retaining other kinds of relative rights such as due  process. Finally, it is also the case that something like due  process can mean entirely different things in different contexts. In Marshall’s evolutionary sequence, the founding rights of citizenship – civil  rights of  contract and  property  rights – are relative. Contractual relationships are meaningful only within a specific larger context, typically that of a free  market.  Property itself, and hence any  rights that protect it, e.g., ownership and transfer, are similarly relative. As demonstrated later in Chapter 6, even  contracts that do not hold the market as their primary point of reference, such as the marriage  contract, still depend upon a number of social and political conventions for meaning. Civil  rights associated with due  process are similarly identified with specific institutional arrangements that categorize them as relative. What constitutes being able to make legal claims and receive a fair hearing will depend on the larger legal framework within which rules are enforced in a given polity. Marshallian political  rights are also relative rights. Their meanings are context-dependent, and they are justified by virtue of their relationship to specific political norms. The  rights to hold office, to be represented, and to participate in politics, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens – The Seeley Lectures (London: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 12  Ian Shapiro, “Three Ways to Be a Democrat,” Political Theory 22(1) (1994): 126, 135–136, 145–147.

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all require a fairly complex set of political structures and procedures to ­render them meaningful.  Representation, to take the example introduced earlier, can refer to a wide range of forms of political input. Different political systems will interpret the obligation to represent differently. What it means to be represented is itself contested, making the project of constituting an authentically representative polity fiendishly complicated. For example, political scientists often question which (proportional, descriptive, or plurality-based electoral systems) most faithfully  represents the will of individual citizens and constituent social groups. However, within a single political system, different forms of  representation position citizens differently in relation to one another. For example,  Puerto Ricans are not represented in the same way as citizens of the  U.S. mainland. Finally, insofar as they are included among citizenship rights,  cultural rights are also relative rights.13 What kinds of independence, and sometimes even  partial sovereignty, can be granted to  indigenous groups, national  minorities, or even racial  minorities, is entirely dependent on how the distinctive needs of the groups are locally constituted, their relationship to the larger polity and, in many cases, their social history. B.  Autonomous and Relative Rights in Citizenship Theory  T he qualities of autonomousness and relativeness provide an excellent starting point for building a framework of semi-citizenship because they divide rights into two very broad  categories, each of which could logically be expected to be bundled together. Unlike evolutionary accounts of rights, such as Marshall’s described in Chapter 2, or normative accounts of rights that justify some rights based on their usefulness to other rights, autonomous and relative rights seem likely to come in bundles because they are alike in very basic ways. Of all the kinds of bundling we might expect and be able to justify, we would be most likely to expect autonomous  rights to be bundled because they refer to our most universally held understandings of human need. It is difficult to imagine any coherent explanation for a doctrine that explicitly justifies health but not  physical security, whereas it is conceivably justifiable to confer  rights of residence,  healthcare, and basic  security upon people 13

 “Cultural citizenship concerns the maintenance and development of cultural lineage through  education, custom, language, and religion and the positive acknowledgment of difference in and by the mainstream.” (Toby Miller, “Introducing … Cultural Citizenship,” Social Text 69 19(4) (2001): 2.)

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who are not considered qualified for political  rights or even full  civil rights. This latter way of thinking is how  children are often accorded semi-citizenship in democratic polities. In turn, we might expect relative rights to be bundled with one another because they are integral to the political context in which they are grounded. Any given political system will have to produce justifications for  rights such as  representation,  contract, and due  process, in ways that are consistent with each other and with the founding principles of the polity. It is difficult to imagine a coherent set of justifications for offering a vote to individual citizens based upon their  right to  self-govern, but for simultaneously denying those same people the  right to conclude  contracts because they are not capable of understanding their own interests as well as someone else is. Autonomous and relative categorizations are also useful because they will identify whether some rights are  contingent upon other rights within political systems, as described in Chapter 2. This is significant because this study is premised upon the idea that rights are often not  contingent upon other rights. As Chapter 2 argued, rights are said to be  contingent when having one kind of right is predicated on having another kind of right. A fully  contingent approach to citizenship, of the sort described in Chapter 2, would link autonomous and relative rights within a framework that explains why people entitled to one type of rights become entitled to others. One example of fully  contingent thinking would dictate that possession of the autonomous  right of nationality entitles people to all other autonomous and relative rights. The reverse might also be true. Arguments can be made to the effect that democratic theory – in contrast with liberal individualism – does not ground any obligation to meet the autonomous needs of persons when those persons do not qualify for relative rights.  A ristotle’s Politics maps out a normative  theory in which the autonomous rights to reside and move freely are premised upon the possession of the relative right to participate in politics.14 The fact that autonomous and relative rights are justified in different ways does not imply that either kind of rights is prior to the other. In writing about active and passive  rights,  Janoski indicates that the two can in fact exist apart from one another. He writes, “With  passive rights alone, a beneficent dictator could rule with limited  legal rights and extensive  social rights in a  redistributive system

 Aristotle, The Politics.

14

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of income payments.”15 It is also important to note that the distinction between autonomous and relative rights is not a distinction of order. Autonomous rights are not being depicted as inherently more or less important than relative rights. It is simply the case that autonomous rights do not require particular political systems to render them intelligible. There may be orderings of rights, but this point need not be argued here. In fact, it would be a distraction to do so, because the notion of citizenship is premised upon the idea that there is a set of fundamental  rights that are all of equal, if qualitatively different, significance .

IV.  Autonomous Rights, Relative Rights, and Semi-Citizenship Every liberal  democracy offers its citizens and semi-citizens some version of a bundle of autonomous and relative rights. Each of these polities offers more than one version of the bundle. The differences between these different bundles amount to stronger and weaker versions of different types of rights. Distinguishing between types of semi-citizenship based on the strength and weakness of bundles of  rights will not be sufficiently precise or scientifically rigorous for some. An encyclopedic cataloging of every right of citizenship in every liberal  democracy would turn up significant disparities among the rights that even wellestablished liberal democratic  states consider fundamental. Though such comparisons would reveal important differences, I will not move in that direction here. The goal of this study is to describe an important set of distinctions that individual states inscribe upon their own citizenries. Accordingly I will now turn to the basic analytical tool for this endeavor, a means with which we can categorize semi-citizenships within existing citizenship regimes, a means that is parsimonious without being imprecise. As autonomous and relative rights have been defined, semi-citizens can be categorized as individuals bearing the four possible combinations of strong and weak autonomous and relative rights. To be sure, threshold problems and still finer forms of gradience continue to straddle the boxes in the table depicted in Figure 3.1. Strength and weakness are not scientifically precise designations. I have used “strong” to refer to bundles of  rights that lack very few rights. For example, this would classify lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered persons  (LGBTs) in  France as having strong autonomous and relative rights 15

 Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society, 9.

An Introduction to Semi-Citizenship First Order

: strong autonomous and strong relative rights

Second Order

: strong autonomous and weak relative rights

Third Order

: weak autonomous and strong relative rights

Fourth Order

: weak autonomous and weak relative rights

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Figure 3.1.  The Orders of Semi-Citizenship

because they lack only the  equal right of  marriage. By contrast,  children have very weak relative citizenship rights almost everywhere because they cannot vote, are not represented formally, and are not entitled to various civil  rights of due  process and expression. While this typology does not capture some of the finest gradations of semi-citizenship, it includes enough critical information about rights to make comparisons among differently situated semi-citizens whose statuses might never otherwise be recognized as comparable or even relevant to one another. It also facilitates a discussion of how and why these statuses are created, how and why they are reshaped, and what their normative implications are. One of the central purposes of this book is to situate semi-citizenship within the context of liberal and democratic norms as each  theory is invoked (or ignored) by state  practices. Though the autonomous/relative framework lends itself to a range of possible empirical case studies and comparisons that I broach below, this kind of empirical work is beyond the scope of this book. Empirical studies might demonstrate a need to refine Figure 3.1. This must be a call for further discussion and probing. What the arguments that follow from Figure 3.1 do offer is a case for pursuing such discussions among social scientists and theorists who want to enrich existing discussions of citizenship. Below, I will elaborate on how semi-citizens can be classified using this table before returning to the kinds of discussions that can be pursued with these classifications.

V.  Classifying Semi-Citizens The task that follows from having broken down semi-citizenship into the above four  categories involves reassigning those currently considered “atypical” citizens or  foreigners into their respective classifications. The examples presented in Figure 3.2 are not intended to be exhaustive but rather to canvass frequently discussed, problematic, or

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Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics Strong Relative

Weak Relative

Strong Autonomous

First-Order Semi-Citizens • LGBTs • Permanent residents • Refugees • Special political immigrants • Postcolonial subjects and residents of U.S. territories

Second-Order Semi-Citizens • Children • Felons (U.S.) • Members of the military

Weak Autonomous

Third-Order Semi-Citizens • European Union long-term residents • Cultural minorities

Fourth-Order Semi-Citizens • Roma • Undocumented persons • Guestworkers • Enemy combatants/enemy aliens • Temporarily protected status holders

Figure 3.2.  Semi-Citizens

conceptually interesting exemplars of semi-citizenship. Fourth-order semi-citizens are deprived of most autonomous and relative  rights of citizens. Undocumented  i mmigrants, persons subject to extraordinary  rendition, enemy  combatants, and  d isplaced/ stateless persons hold this status. In some circumstances,  Roma in Europe fall into the fourth order.16 Each of these groups has had their nationality – their  right to remain in their homeland and travel freely – curtailed. In addition, most are deprived of basic social and civil  r ights. Third-order semicitizens have weak autonomous rights but comparatively strong relative  rights. In most cases, this refers to people whose  rights of nationality are questionable but whose guest status accords them some civil  rights. The European Union Tampere Directive on the rights of Long Term  Residents, were it fully adopted, would accord third-order semicitizenship to non-transient  foreign-born residents from non-EU states.17  Guestworkers, temporary asylees, and other discretionary  g uests  This statement reflects a generalization for the sake of illustration. In fact, different members of the group to whom the label ������������������������������������������� “Roma” is ascribed may have different bundles of rights. Some may even hold a slightly weaker version of semi-citizenship than some stateless persons.  Roma who fear  persecution sometimes choose to evade the production of birth certificates for their  children. As one journalist has written of such  children, “They simply don’t exist.” (Dan McDougall, “Why Do They Hate Us?” The Observer: Comments and Features, August 17, 2008: 14.) 17  On the Tampere Council Directive on the rights of Long Term Residents, see http:// ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/immigration/residents/wai/fsj_immigration_residents_ en.htm; last accessed January 31, 2007. 16

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(see Chapter 5) are deprived of the  rights associated with nationality and  security of place, as well as (usually) most  social rights. Secondorder semi-citizens have strong autonomous rights and weak relative  rights.  Children and, in the United States,  ex-felons fall into this category.  Children hold nationality and have strong social citizenship, but little political standing or status. Their claims on the state and on those around them can almost always be reduced to  social rights.  Felons and ex-felons have modified political and sometimes  civil rights; their relationship to the state and to full citizens is defined by the absence of  political rights. Many members of the  m ilitary who do not receive the protection of civil  courts, and must be tried in military courts, also hold second-order semi-citizenship. It should be noted that in the case of second- and third-order semi-citizenships, there is variation in the degree to which the weak type of  rights – autonomous or relative, respectively – has been compromised. First-order semi-citizens come closest to full citizenship. They have strong relative and  autonomous rights and lack only a very few rights in either or both  categories.  G ay marriage prohibitions deprive  LGBT citizens of an important but relatively circumscribed civil right. Permanent  residents generally enjoy most of the rights of citizens. The fact that they have not naturalized, and do not have  passports issued by the country in which they reside, deprives them of some political  rights – in some places they do vote, though rarely in national elections – and, in some instances, a few of the  privileges associated with free movement .

VI.  Deploying the Framework to Analyze Citizenship and Semi-Citizenship The table of combinations of autonomous and relative rights of various strengths facilitates two kinds of political analysis that cannot be performed without it. The table helps reveal semi-citizenships that might otherwise go unnoticed. It also makes possible a range of measurements and comparisons of different semi-citizenships to each other and to full citizenship. Within this framework it is possible to classify the various groups with semi-citizenship in their respective niches, or alternatively, to place citizenships along a linear gradient that runs from weak to strong. The autonomous/relative framework for thinking about citizenship reveals forms of semi-citizenship that social norms and legal ambiguity disguise. Since semi-citizens are not acknowledged with a distinct status

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in any  democracy, semi-citizenship has a quality of invisibility even where specific forms of  exclusion receive attention. We may recognize that members of the  military do not enjoy the same  rights to due  process that full citizens do, but a universal language of semi-citizenship is required to connect the circumstances that they experience to their citizenship. In a state that has no official designation for partial citizens, semi-citizens are not recognized as anything but disparate, and disparately justified, exceptions to otherwise comprehensive rules about membership. This becomes apparent in almost any definition of democratic citizenship.  Robert Dahl makes exceptions for  children, the mentally  defective, and  transients.18  John Rawls famously presumed nation-states with mostly closed borders in A Theory of Justice.19 Treating ­semi-citizenships as occasional and exceptional, rather than as ever-present  categories whose membership may change, obscures basic insights about members of these classes. Once it is clear which category a given individual occupies, it is possible to judge how different their citizenship is from the standard of full citizenship within any given state. The “how different” question is one that flows naturally out of any discussion of difference.  I ris Young’s “five faces of  oppression” invite similar sorts of scrutiny, even as they make precise social scientific comparisons impossible.20 Before even filling in Figure 3.1, it is easy to vaguely intuit that the status of the  stateless is quite different from that held by a full citizen. But exactly how different it is, and who else appears alongside the  stateless, and who appears together with those on the other end of the continuum toward full citizenship, is surprising and important to both our normative self-understandings and to more immediately pressing political considerations. The framework can reveal whether a semi-citizen in one country would have an identical status in another, and in what ways her status might vary from country to country. For example, the permanent political  disenfranchisement of  felons is not a common phenomenon outside the  United States. It may also be the case that two people who have the same status in one country would be differently placed in another. A person with a French  passport and a person with a Canadian  passport will be similarly situated if they are both in the  United States. However, as a result of the  Schengen Agreement that allows  European Union citizens the  right to

 Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 129.  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 8. 20  Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 18 19

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move freely within the EU, they will be very differently placed if they are both in  Germany. Comparisons of semi-citizen  categories invite normative speculation regarding which rights ought truly to be rights of citizenship at all. For example, there is a great deal of debate over whether  social rights such as national health  insurance must be guaranteed by the state. If they must, then most Americans do not currently have full citizenship, though this may change in the foreseeable future. For the purposes of this analysis, it will be assumed that all established western democracies offer at least some members full citizenship. In addition to being flexible enough to accommodate variations among forms of citizenship in different contexts, the theory delineated here also does not preclude changes that invoke new rights, such as nascent rights to certain environmental conditions or even “biological citizenship.”21 Detailed discussion of whether currently non-existent rights and  responsibilities ought to become rights of citizenship sits more squarely in the realm of normative  theorizing about rights themselves, rather than in an analytic  theory of democratic politics, and I therefore do not attempt it here. A further comparison asks who, and how many people, in various countries end up in each quadrant of Figure 3.2. Should one wish it, this framework also permits comparisons of all different kinds of semi-citizenships across nation-states. The fuller set of  social rights institutionalized by EU countries yields a thicker autonomous citizenship than that available in the  United States. Immigration policies in  Australia have created proportionately high numbers of  stateless and undocumented persons. While I do not attempt to measure semi-citizenship statuses within or across nation-states, it is conceivable that work similar to that spawned by Gosta Esping-Anderson’s study of  social welfare  rights regimes could be accomplished on any or all of the quadrants of Figure 3.2.22 A final comparison that this framing of semi-citizenship permits has to do with the ways in which citizenship evolves and/or changes in any given nation. As previously mentioned, evolutionary accounts of citizenship often equate change in citizenship with greater inclusiveness or a broader scope of rights. Previously excluded groups become incorporated and new rights become institutionalized. However, changes in citizenship can, and  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Aihwa Ong underscores the growing movement for “health-based claims” for citizenship rights. Aihwa Ong, “Mutations in Citizenship,” Theory, Culture & Society 23(2–3): 504. Ong also cites Adriana Petryna, Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). 22  Gosta Esping-Anderson, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

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often do, include movement among different quadrants of the autonomous/ relative table that is actually regressive. New rules can exclude previously full citizens or exclude semi-citizens in new ways. The complicated changes that have accompanied the dissolution of the British Empire have disentitled previously entitled groups from various  rights of residence and free movement within the empire. Historical comparisons of semi-citizenships over time and space illuminate which forms of semi-citizenship are durable and which kinds of changes have occurred or are occurring. The following chapter will elaborate this important purpose of semi-citizenship from the perspective of the state: namely that it allows for changes to the membership of individuals for various reasons. It may be undesirable for a country to admit people as  guestworkers for various reasons, yet undocumented  workers comprise a large proportion of the population of  “illegal” aliens in most immigrant-receiving nations. As long as  visa expirations are not enforced, this amounts to a tacit  guestworker program. Contemporary  guestworker programs are also not unprecedented and, in fact, have lengthy roots, as I discuss in Chapter 5. Even in the  United States, where use of the phrase  “guestworker” is relatively recent, existing temporary worker programs were preceded by the like-minded  Bracero program. The people who held  Bracero  visas labored in inhumane circumstances and with diminished rights that in turn call to mind indentured  servitude.23 This suggests that an underclass of semi-citizen labor seems to be a durable part of the semicitizenry even as specific groups move in and out of this class. Patterns to changes in semi-citizenship may emerge once a categorical designation links groups who hold otherwise disparate social identities. The autonomous/relative framing is neither encyclopedic nor myopic. It restricts itself to looking at how rights combine and recombine, yet it attends to rights thoroughly. Although a rights-based definition of citizenship excludes some things that others might include in a definition of citizenship, it demands that discussions of semi-citizenship move beyond questions of nationality and  naturalization, or any other kind of reductive understanding of citizenship. Relative and autonomous  rights have not been placed in a hierarchy that would prioritize  exclusion from either kind of rights over the other. An assessment of strength and/or weakness simply compares the rights of the subject in relation to the full catalog of available rights. So the framework makes it difficult to impose a classification that misses forms of  exclusion. The  child is no more or  See Robert Morris, Government and Labor in Early America (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981).

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less obviously a semi-citizen than the immigrant, the  same-sex partner, or the resident of a territory who is not accorded  voting  rights.

VII.  Contributions of Autonomous/Relative Framing of Semi-Citizenship There are four features of the autonomous/relative framing of ­semi-citizenship that recommend it as a means for understanding and studying semi-citizenship, particularly in comparison to other approaches to the subject of gradience (or  differentiated citizenship, to use the language coined by Iris  Marion Young). First, this framework is broad in scope, and admits the existing consensus on a Marshallian cataloging of rights without precluding reference to other classifications of rights that depart from Marshall’s distinctions. Second, it efficiently classifies the large and diverse set of citizenship rights. Third, it reflects  practices, rather than theories, of citizenship. Finally, the autonomous/relative framing is structural: it yields a set of political identities rather than simply refracting existing  categories of social identity. Taken together, these strengths recommend this understanding of gradience as being flexible without sacrificing parsimony, and as simultaneously offering theoretical precision and abstraction. A.  Breadth of Scope The distinction between autonomous and relative  rights very comfortably accommodates many ways of thinking about citizenship, including the particularly influential Marshallian account of citizenship rights, as well as its most prominent critiques. Marshall’s three types of citizenship rights appear as either autonomous or relative  rights as do the rights that others have suggested adding to Marshall’s canon. It is important to remain compatible with the dominant idiom of citizenship rights because the larger discourse of rights can refocus any potential discussion of semi-citizenship around variables that, while important to the general subject of rights, are not central to membership  rights. For example, Wesley Hohfeld’s frequently cited distinction between rights, liberties, powers, and  privileges gives a taxonomy of rights and related concepts, but it has little to say about membership-specific  rights.24 Hohfeld is concerned about justifying  Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, ed. W. W. Cooke (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1919). One of the

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obligation, and his starting point is relationships that exist between two individuals. The debate over whether legal or moral  rights must correspond to  duties, and hence create claims and obligations between individuals, is intricate and important to making judgments about semi-citizenship. But none of the resolutions Hohfeld offers provides a way to think specifically about the rights of citizenship because the questions being asked in this debate depart from those that define citizenship in nation-states. It may even be the case that the moral bases of nation-state citizenship are poorly constructed, insofar as they do not tightly link to claims and obligations between individuals. But this is irrelevant to a discussion about how to identify and classify semi-citizenships since citizenship, even if it is morally fragile, remains a singularly important form of political membership. Hence neither Hohfeld’s ordering of rights, nor the responses this ordering engenders, does the kind of work that the distinction between autonomous and relative  rights accomplishes.25 B.  Parsimoniously Accounting for Stronger and Weaker Sets of Rights A second asset of the autonomous/relative framing lies in its ability to make qualitative distinctions and distinctions between stronger and weaker semi-citizenships without specifying so many semi-citizenships that it compromises the framework’s ability to categorize. To illustrate this it is helpful to consider other ways of depicting the unbundling of  citizenship rights. Semi-citizenships could hypothetically be depicted by arranging in a Venn diagram the elements of citizenship that Marshallian definitions take to be a tightly wound bundle. In the diagram in Figure 3.3, civil, political, social, and  nationality rights overlap at certain points and disaggregate from one another at other points. This depicts the unbundling of elements of citizenship and, in so doing, creates a range of groups of semi-citizens. The Venn diagram is appealing for a number of reasons. It avoids conflating semi-citizenships with normative readings of the motivations that spur their creation and focuses instead on the content of the actual statuses. It also accommodates and illustrates a number of potential forms of semi-citizenship best examples of work on citizenship rights that relies upon Hohfeld’s classification is Thomas Janoski’s Citizenship and Civil Society. 25   Janoski has been critiqued for relying on Hohfeld’s typology of rights for support which the typology cannot actually provide. See David Fagelson, “Citizenship and Civil Society,” Political Science Quarterly 114(1) (1999): 168–170.

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Social Rights

Political Rights

Civil Rights

Nationality Rights

Figure 3.3.  Marshallian Semi-Citizenships

based on the organizing principle that an individual can have some, but not all, types of rights.  Guestworkers, for instance, have a few civil and social  rights but no political  rights. They are not guaranteed any form of political  representation, and they have no access to the  franchise. However, the Venn diagram does not really represent stronger and weaker versions of citizenship. It ultimately paints a misleading picture for several reasons. Its circles are drawn with hard boundaries when in fact the thresholds of each are soft. As indicated above, individuals can have some, but not all, of a given type of right. This is true of  LGBTs, who are not permitted to marry, but who exercise other civil  rights such as free  speech and assembly. To solve the preceding problems within the confines of the Venn diagram would compromise its simplicity so severely as to limit its usefulness as a model for types of semi-citizenship. Doing so would produce a byzantine assortment of interconnected statuses. Ultimately each new case would require its own circle, thereby indefinitely adding new circles. It also would not get at threshold problems associated with any given type of right. Identifying what from each rights category (civil, political, social, and nationality) constitutes “enough” from the perspective of nation-state citizenship would add further complicating layers or dimensions that a Venn diagram cannot effectively accommodate. The more parsimonious distinction between autonomous and  relative rights consolidates the complex parts of the Venn diagram into  categories that we would expect to come in bundles. If citizenship is not an all-or-nothing venture, or if it is always in a process of evolving toward a final and complete status, we want to identify fault lines that refer not just to different types of rights, but specifically

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and only to those different types of rights that we would think are most likely to be bundled. Aside from Marshall’s historical evolutionary tale, in most theories we are given very little reason to justify why specific  civil rights (for example, speech and  contract) are more likely to be bundled together than, say, specific  civil rights and specific  political rights (for example, speech and the  franchise). There is also a highly contextual, almost arbitrary quality that comes with relying solely on such specific, historically situated categorizations of rights of citizenship.26  Michael Mann has detailed the fact that at least two of Marshall’s three types of rights “turn out to be heterogeneous … Citizenship perhaps has not been as singular a process as Marshall argues.”27  Mann defends a revision of Marshall’s framework into different and more complex subtypes. While some advocates of rethinking citizenship argue in favor of extending Marshall’s account of citizenship to include newly introduced rights, many of these new rights do not fit readily into Marshall’s three types of rights.  Ruth Lister, who supports and has made important contributions to the project of rethinking Marshallian notions of citizenship for the 21st century, observes that  “reproductive rights … can be seen both as an extension of the ­civil-political-social  rights triad and as inseparable from it.”28 Similarly, cultural  rights are sometimes classified along with immigration,  naturalization, and  asylum  rights as “membership  rights.”29 Why a cultural  right has to be a membership right, as opposed to a “conscience and choice” right, is not entirely clear. This might be because cultural  rights can refer to differentiated practices (for example, wearing the now emblematic headscarf in  France) as well as the needs that grow out of them (the  right to group  representation). Nonetheless, the possibility of seeing cultural  rights in two different ways exemplifies the problem of over-specifying the variables in a categorical framework of semi-citizenship. Within the autonomous/  Michael Mann, “Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship,” in States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology, ed. Michael Mann (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988). 27  Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power Volume Two: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States 1760–1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 19. In turn, others have critiqued his breakdown, suggesting further refinements to Marshall’s typology. See Anthony M. Rees, “T.H. Marshall and the Progress of Citizenship,” in Citizenship Today, eds. Martin Bulmer and Anthony M. Rees (London: UCL Press, Ltd., 1996), 12. 28  Ruth Lister, “Citizenship as Status and Practice,” Hypatia 12(4) (1997): 7. 29  Thomas Janoski and Brian Gran, “Political Citizenship: Foundations of Rights,” in Introduction to Citizenship Studies, eds. Bryan S. Turner and Engin Isin (London: Sage, 2002), 15. 26

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relative framing, the disagreement about the nature of ­cultural  rights is obviated because, regardless of whether they refer to membership  rights or  rights of conscience, they are classified as relative. They only gain meaning in a political context where one culture might need to assert such rights in the presence of another. Thus there is no slippage between  categories. Newly established rights such as reproductive freedom also need not be shoe-horned into Marshall’s triad.  Reproductive rights are autonomously valuable rights. An autonomous  good has universal meaning and import. A relative  good is coherent and meaningful in a specific context. All human beings require autonomous goods to survive regardless of their specific cultural or political environs. Relative goods are of varying importance but are accorded meaning by a set of structures that are not universal or perhaps even universally desired. In short, by marking the difference between context and universality as the crucial difference between kinds of rights, the autonomous/relative framing avoids a tangle of disagreements about grouping rights. The autonomous/relative framework also avoids overspecificity by describing gradient citizenship solely in terms of rights. Chapter 2 argued in favor of regarding rights as central to citizenship. However, rights do engender forms of political agency and action that are important to citizenship. We may want to classify them in a fashion similar to the way in which we classify rights-based differentiation.  Thomas Janoski produces a schematic of overlapping ovals that maps citizenship’s relationship to  civil society. As with the distinctions of degree mentioned in the preceding paragraph, these distinctions also produce thick descriptions rather than classifications with the potential to facilitate comparison.  Janoski’s schematic is encyclopedic to the point that, were it to be used to identify forms of semi-citizenship, it would allow an almost infinite number of these statuses. C.  Classification of the Substance of Citizenship A third contribution made by the relative/autonomous framing alternative also lies in its reliance on rights as a basis for disaggregation. The framework refers to what rights citizenship confers and thus refers to the ­substance of semi-citizenship. It is grounded in the rules that govern the lived experience of citizens and semi-citizens. A rights-based framework avoids conflating this substance with various kinds of ideas about citizenship that do not reflect the lived experience of citizens. Foremost among such ideas about citizenship are the justifications offered for according

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people citizenship rights, either in partial or complete bundles. (This was indicated above in Section II of this chapter, alongside a discussion of the ways in which the substance of citizenship might be unbundled.) By “justification” I mean arguments such as those made by  Robert Dahl regarding the traits or circumstances that qualify different individuals for various kinds of semi-citizenship.30 The justifications for existing thresholds at which we say that individuals “qualify” for various types of rights are not linked. Each rule that qualifies someone for citizenship – be it blood, merit, age or even affected interest – is associated with thresholds that are difficult to pinpoint, and that themselves are the subject of contestation between different doctrines and logics of citizenship. Logics of citizenship might refer to norms or various forms of political necessity that serve to identify which persons qualify for which types of citizenship. One could turn to liberal bases for  rights, democratic  theories of membership, or reason of  state to justify any given bundle of citizenship rights for a given set of individuals. Each type of theory can speak to the entire set of citizenship rights, but each type of theory is very likely to propose a different set of reasons for offering or denying the  right to any given person. Democratic  theory is an ethical discourse that treats both the boundaries and qualifications for  inclusion differently than does liberal  theory or reason of  state.  Dahl’s premise that affected interest can be a rule for determining citizenship is convincing only because he is essentially using citizenship and the  franchise interchangeably.31 While Chapter 2 defended a definition of citizenship that rests on rights rather than a more reciprocal or relational conception of political and even civic activity, it remains the case that the rights of citizenship extend beyond the  franchise, and the polity is bounded by more than that which defines the  demos. Justificatory premises for differentiations do stamp semi-citizenships with their imprint. However, they do not serve by themselves as a good means for disaggregating types of semi-citizenship from one another. The reasons for this are two-fold. The first is fairly straightforward. Justifications for  inclusion and  exclusion are not the same as actual  inclusion and  exclusion. A  democracy may enshrine a sense of  civicness in its  constitution and yet not exclude the politically apathetic from any element of citizenship. We cannot easily identify direct linkages with

 See discussion of Dahl in Chapter 2.  Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), see Chapter 9. See also Robert Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 35(1): 40–68.

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distinct logics of citizenship and the forms of semi-citizenship that they engender. Ideas matter to practice, but it would be difficult to assign a causal effect relating one normative  theory to a specific circumstance of  inclusion or  exclusion, particularly in the normatively diverse context of liberal democratic  states. There is likely to be very credible evidence that multiple sources contribute justifications for, to take one example, according  children social  rights but not political  rights. We may regard  children as not being capable of rational thought or we may regard them as incompletely schooled in democratic behaviors. Sorting through such reasoning and identifying the exact combination of norms that has a causal relationship with the  rights accorded to  children would be nearly impossible. Using any single justificatory scheme is likely to describe ­semicitizenships in ways that sacrifice analytical complexity in favor of theoretical coherence. Citizenship comprises a range of rights, each of which is bounded independently, and each of which has distinct meaning. Citizenship and various forms of semi-citizenship are therefore bestowed on people based on a multitude of thresholds, each of which will be regarded differently by different normative  theories as well as by political necessity. A legally competent adult national may be a full citizen in one country but not in another by virtue of that person’s IQ. Access to the  franchise can be bounded broadly, by according it to all rational individuals, or narrowly, by according it only to people steeped in a particular ethical tradition. A classification that refers solely to liberal or to democratic reasoning, or one that gives primacy to one over the other, will not attend to forms of semi-citizenship produced by inconsistent applications of the two, by contradictory norms, or by the intervention of political necessity in the world of norms. Complicating the diversity of norms that grounds rights is the fact that even within a single normative  theory about citizenship, multiple qualities or capacities will entitle people to different  rights in the democratic bundle. What entitles someone to the  civil rights of citizenship may, and likely will, be entirely independent of the quality that entitles them to political  rights. We see this in the case of  Puerto Ricans, who are clearly entitled to the former and have a very complicated relationship to the latter.32 To take a different example,  Jews in early modern Europe held a specific, precisely defined status in the societies that “hosted”  See Elizabeth F. Cohen, “Neither Seen nor Heard: Children’s Citizenship in Democracies,” Citizenship Studies 9(2) (2005): 221–240.

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them, which was often different from the status of migrants despite the fact that both groups look (to modern eyes) like  foreigners.33  Jews may have been  foreigners and outsiders, but because they lived in societies that believed them to have specific and distinct capacities, their ability to meet various thresholds of rights and status was distinguished from that of other  foreigners, and in some, but not all, respects they were also included.34 Semi-citizenships can conceivably be based on age, civic competency, racial hierarchy, or any number of other rationales that are in turn linked to the larger grounding and organization of political power itself. Determining the precise point at which someone is a competent voter, what the needs of differently situated persons are, or what constitutes substantive and effective  representation – these and any number of other thresholds are often difficult to pinpoint even within one system of reasoning.35 For example, in any given political context different interests will be affected in different ways, thus entitling people differentially. By virtue of its categorical nature, citizenship must both exclude and include. It therefore relies upon justifications that distinguish and discriminate. The types of distinctions and discriminations that are made characterize different forms of citizenship.  Jus sanguinis and  jus soli, for example, characterize different understandings of nationality. Divergent justifications also characterize semi-citizenships.  Felons are denied some civil  rights for different reasons than  LGBTs are denied others. Any understanding of citizenship that admits of the inevitability of ­semi-citizenship must account for different, often conflicting, justifications for the types of  exclusions and  inclusions made within any given population of citizens, as well as for the semi-citizen statuses they create. However effective these explanations are at justifying  exclusions  Benhabib, The Rights of Others, 28.  ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Immigration rules have almost always and everywhere accorded different and favorable statuses to groups who have special political import to their host societies. See Elizabeth F. Cohen, “Investigating the Logic of Inquiry of the Status of the Foreign Born,” Canadian American Research Series (2007): 25–28. 35  John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1958). Debates over descriptive  representation have preoccupied American political science whereas proportional  representation generates its own quandaries in parliamentary systems. See, e.g., Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Virginia Sapiro, “When are Interests Interesting?: The Problem of Political Representation of Women,” American Political Science Review 75(3) (1981): 701–716; Melissa Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 33

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and  inclusions, they do not explain such phenomena in a world where norms conflict with one another as well as with non-normative causes of these phenomena. No single form of reasoning about citizenship can fully capture the range of existing semi-citizenships given that people are excluded for reasons ranging from their rational capacities, to their relationships to ethical communities, to sheer political necessity. This is because each of these ways of viewing citizenship is competing with the others for dominance over all the elements of citizenship. Thus they can all contribute to any given form of semi-citizenship. This competition can yield forms of semi-citizenship not clearly attributable to one way of thinking. For example, the basis of a felon’s semi-citizenship in the  United States could be attributed simultaneously to reasons of  security, liberal norms of consent, and a form of  jus sanguinis that is facially neutral but that discriminates based on  race in practice. With no way to authoritatively decide which kind of reasoning, if any, takes precedence, it becomes impossible to use these justifications as a basis for classifying semi-citizenships. Semi-citizenship is unpredictable because there are competing justifications that do not map onto autonomous and  relative rights. Nonetheless, it is important to understand genealogies of semi-citizenship even if they themselves are not predictors of the kinds of statuses that states instantiate. These justifications and the conflicts between them are more fully explored in Chapter 4. D.  Structural Classifications A final contribution of the relative/autonomous framework lies in the fact that it is entirely structural. By “structural,” I mean that it depicts semi-citizenship as something that is different than, though affected by, social identity. Because identities are rooted in historicized contexts, analyses of citizenship refer to contingent traits such as  race,  gender, age, or nationality, rather than the more abstract status members hold in relation to the state. To use  Marx’s terms, each semi-citizenship is a “class-in-itself” (an sich) rather than a “class-for-itself” (für sich).36 A class-for-itself has “organized into a social entity and achieved consciousness of its social and political role in the course of its struggle.”37  See Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (New York: International Publishers, 1971): 173; Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (New York: International Publishers, 1963): 123–124. 37  Hal Draper, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution: Volume II: The Politics of Social Classes (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 41.

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Any unorganized, atomized class that is not self-conscious or a recognized social entity merits attention because it has characteristics that are “more than the sum of its individual atoms.”38 The prototypical class-in-itself is  Marx’s as-yet unorganized proletariat. The proletariat’s nature as a classin-itself is defined with reference to the position of its members in the economic structure, their effective rights and  duties within it. A person’s class is established by nothing but his objective place in the network of ownership relations, however difficult it may be to identify such a place neatly. His consciousness, culture, and politics do not enter the definition of his class position.39

Similarly, semi-citizenships are defined not with reference to social identities, culture, or political consciousness, but by a person’s position within a political structure (the state) and their effective rights within it. A shared absence of autonomous and/or relative  rights creates a very real structural class of people with a common experience of the state, if not the society, that they inhabit. Their social roles may diverge, but they share a status and a set of disabilities that together place them in a similar position in relation to each other, to other semi-citizens and citizens, and to the state. This shared structural position cannot be explained solely with reference to  ascription or the cultural-imperialist aspirations of dominant classes. The fact that recognizable identity  groups can and do occupy multiple cells of the relative/autonomous table indicates that semi-citizenship neither strips people of social identities nor does it fully transcend them. Semi-citizenships do not refer to or derive their force from reference to identities, even though identity  groups can be classified using the framework. The same semi-citizenship can be and is experienced by people whose social identities are different. Similarly, people whose social identities appear similar can have different semi-citizenships.40 The latter case is illustrated by the very different position of siblings, one of whom was born to undocumented parents just outside the border of the  United States, and one of whom was born just inside that border. The sibling born inside the border will automatically receive  U.S. nationality while  Draper, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, 40.  G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 73. 40  Alfred Schütz, “Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences,” in The Problem of Social Reality: Selected Papers: Volume One, ed. M.A. Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 62–63; and “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action,” in The Problem of Social Reality: Selected Papers: Volume One, ed. M. A. Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 6. 38 39

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her sister will not. Without ignoring the fact that the siblings may share a social identity, it remains important to have a language for identifying the difference in their experience of the state. To take an example that is broader in scale, people disenfranchised because of procedural irregularities, e.g., individuals qualified to naturalize who wait years in a long queue or  ex-felons who qualify for political  rights that are not reinstated, share a structural position that cannot be explained solely with reference to shared social identity.41 The tendency to understand semi-citizenship primarily from the perspective of social identity at the cost of a larger structural picture of citizenship is part of an ongoing discussion originated by modern political theorists who posited diverse social identities in opposition to unitary citizenship. This critique has been adopted and extended by critics of the contemporary social justice literature.  B enjamin Constant’s indictment of liberal citizenship offered an early iteration of the claim that social identities are diverse while political status is unitary. He suggests that citizenship strips people of organic human diversity that defines them and replaces it with a single, governable inhuman political identity: While  patriotism exists only by a vivid attachment to the interests, the way of life, the customs of some locality, our so-called patriots have declared war on all of these. They have dried up this natural source of  patriotism and have sought to replace it by a factitious passion for an abstract being, a general idea stripped of all that can engage the imagination and speak to the memory. To build their edifice, they began by grinding and reducing to dust the materials that they were to employ. Such was their apparent fear that a moral idea might be attached to their institutions, they came close to using numbers to designate their towns and provinces, as they used these to designate the legions and corps in their army.42

At the same time that citizenship imposes uniformity, however, it also transforms people into individuals in ways that erode commonly held identities.  Constant continues: The interests and memories that arise from local customs contain a germ of resistance that authority is reluctant to tolerate and that it is anxious to eradicate. It can deal more successfully with individuals; it rolls its heavy body effortlessly over them as if they were sand.43  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Slowdowns in paperwork processing regularly adversely affect those waiting for citizenship. See, for instance, Kirk Semple, “Immigrants Eager to Vote Sue to Hasten Citizenship,” The New York Times, July 16, 2008. 42  Benjamin Constant, “The Spirit of Conquest,” in Political Writings, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 74. 43  Constant, “The Spirit of Conquest,” 74. 41

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Variety is what constitutes organization; uniformity is mere mechanism. Variety is life; uniformity, death.44

 Edmund Burke expresses a similar fear that the break-up of ­prerevolutionary French localities into administratively convenient units would destroy the sentiments of loyalty, community, and identity that had been responsible for the constitution of “Frenchness” prior to the revolution.45 Several influential contemporary versions of critiques of the liberal  state also assert that  liberalism privileges the unitary insofar as it prioritizes  equality, and hence they oppose ostensibly unitary political status with more diverse social identities. Charles Taylor emphasizes the way in which  liberalism leaves people homogenous.46  G eorgio Agamben illustrates the processes within the state through which the claim is made that citizenship is a single role. He then demonstrates the falsity of this claim. In a tone that echoes  Constant’s description of how the state replaces organic local identities with a single citizenship,  Agamben describes the French Revolution as imposing a uniform status and title upon previously differentially situated  subjects: With the French  Revolution [subjects] acquire new meaning and decisive importance. Citizenship now does not simply identify a generic subjugation to royal authority or a determinate system of laws, nor does it simply embody (as Chalier maintained when he suggested to the convention on September 23, 1792) that the title of citizen be substituted for the traditional title monsieur or sieur in every public act. The new egalitarian principle; citizenship names the new status of life as origin and ground of  sovereignty and, therefore, literally identifies – to cite

 Constant, “The Spirit of Conquest,” 77. Constant is referring here to Enlightenment thinkers, particularly  Montesquieu (Books 29, 18) and Mirabeau in “L’ami des homes oy traite de la population.” 45  See Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in  F rance (New York: Penguin, 1968), especially 314–315. Of those skeptical of the transformative potential of the liberal  state,  M arx offers the most challenging critique in “On the Jewish Question.”  M arx suggests that rights as administered by liberal  states do not emancipate people so much as they contain the seeds of political  oppression that are billed as liberating.  M arx’s most radical conclusion is that it is not the unequal application of rights that truly disentitles people; rather, it is that the rights are rights to things such as  property and religion that themselves oppress. States cannot remedy the oppressive elements and tendencies of  civil society insofar as the “universal” rights they confer refer to the very practices that oppress their citizens. Rights to religion,  private property, etc., cannot emancipate universally because they entitle people to engage in practices from which particularity originates. 46  Charles Taylor, “Hegel, History, and Politics,” in Liberalism and Its Critics, ed. Michael Sandel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 193. 44

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Jean-Denis Languinais’s words to the convention – les membres du sovereign, “The members of the  sovereign.”47

 Both Wendy  Brown and  I ris Young also critique the liberal  state’s drive to abstract and link it with the role assigned to  rights in liberal  theory.  Brown suggests that the  Foucauldian “disciplinary power” produces social identities (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) that crosscut juridical identities based on abstract right. Thus, for example, the welfare  state’s production of welfare  subjects – themselves subdivided through the socially regulated  categories of motherhood, disability,  race, age and so forth – potentially produce political identity through these  categories, produce identities as these categories.48

Iris Young’s theory of differentiated citizenship makes a related, but potentially more systemizing, effort to suggest that liberal impartiality operates on three dimensions. It “denies particularities”; “masters or eliminates heterogeneity;” and “reduces plurality of moral subjects to one subjectivity.”49  Young argues that the liberal  state papers over inequalities generated via the  oppression of identity  groups by falsely asserting that the act of abstracting diverse individuals into citizens transforms their diversity into an identical public entity: the citizen. [T]he ideal of impartiality in moral  theory expressed a logic of detachment and dispassion that seeks to reduce differences to unity. The stances of detachment and dispassion that supposedly produce impartiality are attained only by abstracting from the particularities of situation, feeling, affiliation, and point of view.50

In turn,  Nancy Fraser argues in favor of “bivalent collectivities” that are formed via the dual influences of social norms and economic structures.51 Yet even this expanded understanding of structure fails to fully account for the independent influence of the state and the legal structures it generates. Recalling the example of the siblings born on different sides of a border efficiently captures forms of structural  inequality that even bivalence cannot.  Giorgi Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel HellerRoazen (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 129. 48  Wendy Brown, “Wounded Attachments,” Political Theory 21(3) (1993): 393. 49  Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 100. 50  Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 97. 51  Nancy Fraser, “From Redistribution to Recognition,” New Left Review 1, no. 212 (1995): 68–93; Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition (New York: Routledge, 1996). 47

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Each of these contemporary commentaries downplays or ignores the idea of class “an sich,” as it pertains to political structure; each deemphasizes the degree to which differentiation originates in administrative  rationality as expressed by the state,  replicating Constant’s assertion of unitary political identities opposing diverse, if sometimes unequal, social identities. On this point, Leonard Feldman critiques  Fraser’s reliance on the pairing of economic and social injustice effects citing the state as the third actor in a “trivalent framework.”52 Feldman argues that  Fraser’s framework’s “failure to thematize a specifically political form of injustice – political  exclusion – limits its ability to make sense of  justice struggles and is reflected in a similar blindness to the specificities of state power.”53  Iris Young has also criticized  Fraser’s adherence to the binary, arguing in favor of “plural[izing]  categories and understand[ing] them as differently related to particular social groups and issues.”54  Young accuses  Fraser of being “brazenly dichotomous” in spite of a professed commitment to “deconstruction,” and she argues that  Fraser’s “categorization appears to have no place for a third, political, aspect to social reality, concerning institutions and practices of law, citizenship, administration, and political  participation.”55 Yet  Young is herself mired in the very dichotomy that she has attacked.  Young tends to conflate the structural and social identity, thus sidelining the role of the state and reducing the term “structural identity” to the very binary she has accused  Fraser of inhabiting. In “Equality of Whom?”  Young makes a strong case for “assessing degrees of  inequality between groups … because it helps to identify structural inequalities.”56 In her characterization of what structural  inequality means she focuses on distinguishing the structural from individualist accounts of  inequality, and in so doing she opposes “the dangers of state tyranny” with  ascriptively defined groups, rather than joining the two on equal footing. The effects of  Young’s resistance to purely structural, non-normative reasoning become far more apparent once she applies her framework.  Young asserts that, “in making some of the most important judgments  Leonard C. Feldman, Citizens Without Shelter: Homelessness, Democracy and Political Exclusion (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004). See especially Chapter 3. 53  Feldman, Citizens Without Shelter, 85. 54  Iris Marion Young, “Unruly Categories: A Critique of Nancy Fraser’s Dual Systems Theory,” New Left Review I(223) (1997): 149. 55  Young, “Unruly Categories,” 150–151. 56  I ris Marion Young, “Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 9(1) (2001): 15. 52

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of  justice and injustice we must compare social groups such as  women, African  A mericans, migrants, or people with disabilities.”57 She offers an example rooted in Susan Okin’s work, in which interlocking social structures of family and economy, as well as cultural norms, shape choices and thus explain the unequal conditions of  women and their  children. Without such an account, it is difficult to describe  women’s unequal position as a matter of injustice.58

The state thus fades to the background in  Young’s interpretation of structure as well as in her examples of how to deploy structural analysis. Conflating social identity with a structural category such as ­semicitizenship, or using only identity  groups as reference points for identifying who is, or is not, a semi-citizen, is problematic for several reasons. First, relying on social identity makes it difficult to recognize semi-citizens who aren’t a part of identity  groups perceived as oppressed, disempowered, or underprivileged. While  Young’s defense of using social identity to answer questions about  inequality and  justice leaves little doubt that comparing the standing of social identity groups reveals structural inequalities, one is left wondering how we can be assured that inequalities experienced by groups without a recognizable social identity will be revealed . For example, it is hardly guaranteed, even if conceivable, that the lens of race , or any other social group  identity, would reveal the standing of disenfranchised  felons and ex-felons in the  United States. How are we to recognize the common experience in which the civil  right to a fair trial is compromised for members of the  military, enemy  combatants, and members of specific ethnic and religious groups when, of the three  categories, only one corresponds to a recognized social identity, and when each has an independent social status? This call for additional emphasis on political structures does not demand a move back toward overly individualist accounts of  justice. Instead, it offers the advantage of pointing out questions that investigations of the relative standing of identity  groups do not ask. This is especially true with regard to people whose standing and entitlement to a right or rights has not yet been recognized, as well as with people whose social identity itself has not been recognized. So, for example, it took generations to achieve public  recognition that  gay couples might expect the  right to marry, even though that  recognition was accompanied

 Young, “Equality of Whom?,” 6.  Young, “Equality of Whom?,” 11.

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by strong opposition. The very  recognition of the right marked a victory over ­structural  oppression. Much preceded that  recognition, namely the development of group consciousness. As desirable as group consciousness may be, if we rely on the development of group consciousness for the assertion of claims to rights that have not previously been asserted or claimed, people will fall through the cracks. If we work backwards, asking instead, “who cannot marry?” we see people whose group consciousness has not yet developed or encouraged the making of claims. Second, relying on social identity has the effect of making groups who share political statuses appear as if they are disparate because their social identities are, in fact, disparate, even though their structural identities are very similar.  Children and disenfranchised  felons have the same order of semi-citizenship. They occupy very different social statuses but neither receives a very robust set of civil or  political rights, neither can move entirely freely, and each has access to some important  social rights. They have important common experiences of the state. For different reasons,  homeless persons and  stateless individuals are both deprived of a  right to reside somewhere. Alternately, relying on social identity to structure the discovery and analysis of political status can make some people whose experience of the state is very different appear to have similar experiences. A  refugee and an undocumented person, each of whom comes from China, may look more similar from the perspective of social identity than from the point of view of their political structural identity. Normative work that is focused on social identities has additional weaknesses besides a tendency to overlook or misidentify semi-citizens who do not belong to recognized  identity groups with recognized claims. It often goes a step further and narrows the range of causes and effects of  oppression that we are able to recognize. Because social identity is often studied through normative lenses trained on conclusions about social justice, such study has been focused on reasons that citizenship bundles might be disaggregated, since the legitimacy/ justice of the reasons for disaggregating citizenships forms the basis for how we judge the actual statuses. If we are motivated to study  inequality because we are concerned about the presence of  sexism, for example, this will color the kinds of  inequality we see. (This also returns us to the discussion in Section II that rejected characterizing semi-citizenships based on the reasons that are used to justify  exclusion of the semi-citizen.) In using reasons for or causes of  oppression as a tool for identifying and categorizing who is oppressed, we become a little bit like drunks at the lamppost; looking at groups whose social standing we already recognize as oppressed

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fixes our eye on the effects of that oppressed social standing. While the importance cannot be overestimated of arguing about the effects, both singly and combined, of  race, class, and  gender, it is also true that political structures stemming from one’s standing as a member of a state must also be examined independent of these other variables. Otherwise, where we know to look for the causal effects of  racism, we may see only the causal effects of  racism, and not the whole gamut of political disabilities or privilege that citizenship and semi-citizenship confer. The person disenfranchised by a hanging chad may not have been the subject of any intentional campaign to exclude. However, the person has been deprived of their  political right to vote and to be represented. Mistakes are made without any malign intent.  Young does not explicitly set out to conflate the causes of differentiation with their products. Instead, her analysis accords a special role to identity as the fulcrum around which the sources and products of  oppression turn. This assigns responsibility to norms for the shape that differentiation takes, and identifies specific acts tied to dominant classes as contravening norms of  equality. The importance of developing and considering a structural approach to semi-citizenship will be underscored in Chapter 4, when normative doctrines of citizenship are contrasted with those stemming from administrative  rationality. Returning to the two critiques of liberal citizenship broached earlier: the state uses a single citizenship to strip people of organic forms of identity, while dominant classes use their social and political privilege to deprive subjugated groups of standing via the denial of  rights and other forms of  recognition. In this telling, the state wipes the slate clean, but it is the biases and interests of dominant classes that actively shape new memberships. However, if semi-citizenships are not identities, and if semi-citizen  categories include people for reasons that cannot be traced to their identity or to relationships between dominant and oppressed classes, then prioritizing normative explanations of semi-citizenship that are linked to identities produced by oppressive dominant classes is misleading and incomplete. This in turn demands a genealogy of semi-citizenships that admits, but does not limit itself to, social identity and the larger normative premises that prioritize identity as a lens for understanding the sources and products of gradient citizenship. This inquiry is the focus of Chapter 4.

VIII.  Conclusion As Chapter 2 made evident, simply defining the concept of citizenship itself amounts to a contentious and Sisyphean enterprise. The task

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demands an understanding of the relationship of different elements of membership that will explain why it is that  rights don’t stay bundled in the way that normative theorists wish they would and empirical scholars expect them to. The two core theses advanced in this chapter are the following: first, taken as a whole, citizenship rights are normatively  non-contingent upon one another. They do not depend on each other to justify their existence or for the degree to which they are made available to any given individual. Second, citizenship rights can be grouped in an ordered configuration of autonomous and  relative rights, each of which can exist in a strong and weak version. Such an ordering creates four types of semi-citizenship held by various groups and individuals. The groups and individuals that occupy any given quadrant may differ, but each quadrant of the table is durable. None is entirely empty at any given point in the history of a  democratic state. This then yields the ultimate conclusion that semi-citizenship is inevitable under any normative or political circumstances, though given groups and individuals can, at various times, move around, off, and onto the four-cell table or any of its proposed quadrants. The model of semi-citizenship offered by the autonomous/relative model has several important attributes that recommend its use. As is evident, the model avoids the most serious pitfalls that compromise existing unitary approaches to questions of citizenship. This is for several reasons. Although a rights-based definition of citizenship excludes some things that others might include in a definition of citizenship, it requires that discussions of semi-citizenship move beyond questions of nationality and  naturalization, or any other kind of reductive understanding of citizenship. It also clearly demonstrates the presence of differential membership generated by elements of citizenship that exist independently of one another. In focusing on which rights become disaggregated from one another, rather than focusing on norms or one specific right of citizenship (e.g., nationality), the autonomous/relative framework also allows a complex picture of both  inclusion and  exclusion. Nothing about the framework treats semi-citizenships as if they are, and can only be, the product of any specific norm or bias. This then raises the question of how semicitizenships do come into existence and what the role of norms is in producing them. Chapter 4 addresses the latter two questions, looking in greater detail at why semi-citizenship developed along the historical trajectory it did, culminating in the particular forms that are evident in contemporary liberal democracies.

4 Logics of Semi-Citizenship

He is a citizen in the fullest sense who shares in the honors of the state.1

I.  Introduction Semi-citizenship refers to different combinations and degrees of ­citizenship rights. Chapter 3 argued that a normative framework for ­identifying semi-citizenships would not identify semi-citizenships as they exist in politics. This leaves open the question of what actually produces semicitizenship. While Chapter 3 rejected relying upon the justifications (both normative and non-normative) for citizenships as a means of categorizing semi-citizenships, it left open the possibility that such justifications play an important role in the creation of semi-citizenships.  Normative theories, particularly democratic theories with their attendant reference to specific ethical traditions, and theories of universal liberal right, justify different boundaries around citizenries.  Administrative rationality, particularly that imposed by the state, also justifies the setting of boundaries around a citizenry.  Liberal democratic states draw upon all these justifications when making rules about who can be included and in what ways. The boundaries of citizenship are determined simultaneously by democratic and liberal norms as well as administrative  rationality. This means that to understand the existence of semi-citizenships, we need to understand not what it is that any particular doctrine of membership dictates, but instead what happens to citizenship at the intersection of different doctrines or logics of membership. As prefigured in Chapter 1, 1

 A ristotle, The Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Book III Chapter 5.

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semi-citizenships are not created at the margins of politics so much as they are formed at the seams that knit together the diverse fabric making up liberal  democratic states. The complexity of contemporary ­semi-citizenships is driven by the fact that they are shaped by multiple sets of overlapping norms and non-normative imperatives, each of which imposes a different set of considerations onto citizenship, and none of which can be  practiced in isolation. This chapter draws together the democratic, liberal, and administrative logics of membership – whose overlaps and conflicts result in contemporary citizenship and semi-citizenships – to illustrate the dynamics through which semi-citizenships are formed and the degree to which they represent neither faulty  applications of theories of membership, nor the machinations of exploitative classes and individuals, but, instead, political inevitability. To underscore this inevitability, the chapter traces the historical progenitors of semi-citizenship to affirm the depth of normative conflict and of conflict between norms and  administrative rationality. Even polities that claim normative and administrative homogeneity have produced conflicts between ethical norms, proto-liberal norms, and administrative  rationality. This makes it all the more predictable that the modern effort to join the ethical and moral under the administration of the state will produce semi-citizenships. In the next section, I discuss the impact of conjoining liberal norms with  democratic theory in the context of the nation-state. Because  democratic theory,  liberalism, and  administrative rationality all overlap at some points and are divergent at other points, none can fully dominate any set of membership practices, nor can any exist without the other two. This discussion indicates that manifestations of partial  inclusion and  exclusion are not just correctable flaws in normative doctrines, the product of bias held by dominant classes, or the result of poor administration. Rather than representing mistakes or bias, semi-citizenships are the institutional embodiments of compromises between conflicting logics of membership.  Democracy,  liberalism, and the various sorts of  administrative rationality each generate distinct rationales for membership that in turn assign different relative and  autonomous rights of citizenship to different people. Semi-citizenship is therefore both inevitable and vital to the functioning of liberal  democratic states. Semi-citizenships perform the crucially important function of adjudicating conflicts among different doctrines of membership in three specific ways. Semi-citizenships forge compromises when and where conflict between competing logics is direct and sustained. These compromises bring order to diverse populations with

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irregular boundaries, and they ensure flexibility where rigidity might compromise other important  political goods. Only practices of membership that do not make some fundamental elements of citizenship  contingent on other fundamental elements can accomplish this. The ongoing nature of these needs, and of the conflicts that generate them, does not imply that semi-citizenships are just. Nor will the groups and individuals that hold them be entirely predictable. This implies that semi-citizenships serve important and ever-present political purposes. These purposes become more fully apparent in the two following chapters (5 and 6), in which specific cases of unbundling of relative and autonomous  rights are examined. This chapter proceeds in six sections. Section II discusses the forebears of contemporary normative doctrines that ground citizenship, with attention to the fact that even when citizenship is  practiced in contexts that are doctrinally homogenous, as opposed to the contemporary political fusing of  democracy and  liberalism, elements of citizenship are typically unbundled and selectively applied to accommodate exceptions to rules and to govern persons affected by these exceptions. The third and fourth sections of the chapter illustrate how specific contradictions between liberal norms, democratic norms, and administrative doctrines of citizenship come to affect rules regarding the boundaries of a citizenry, as well as the content of citizenship for members. In the resolution of these contradictions, semi-citizenships are created. In Section V, I describe the purposes of these semi-citizenships in a context where doctrinal conflict is inevitable. Semi-citizenships serve as compromises between different doctrines of citizenship, they assist in ordering populations, and they permit flexibility over time and among differently situated parts of the population. Finally, in Section VI, I return to the idea that semi-citizenships are solely the outcome of the oppressive tendencies of dominant classes, and I indicate that, because doctrinal conflict will exist and require adjudication regardless of whether one class dominates another, the problem is both perennial and not attributable solely to specific hierarchies.

II.  Forebears of Semi-Citizenship T. H. Marshall’s frequently cited narrative about citizenship tells a story in which diverse norms come to cohere within the context of the state. He posits that citizenship evolves over time to become a more robust and tightly knit bundle. In Marshall’s telling, the autonomous  rights of

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citizenship are  contingent upon relative  rights in the sense that critical social  rights – Marshall does not focus on  rights of place and free movement – exist for the purpose of allowing people to fully realize their civil  rights, which in turn exist to support  rights of democratic  participation. In many senses, Marshall merely develops and extends a way of thinking about citizenship that pervades the larger universe of  normative theory from which his strand of  social democracy is pulled. The birth of liberal  philosophy during the Enlightenment was predicated on transcending legally entrenched political hierarchies in ways that are apparent, if differently so, in the tracts of  Locke,  Rousseau,  M ill, and  Montesquieu. In turn, these texts became references for nation-building exercises and  constitution writers who designed the institutions that would come to embody principles of egalitarian  inclusion. So it is unsurprising that, in Marshall’s narrative, specific social democratic norms gradually became incorporated into institutional realizations of membership. Yet not only has welfare retrenchment in the late twentieth century called this evolutionary account into question, but the very doctrinal confluence that Marshall described as evolving toward a unitary citizenship contains inherent contradictions. Although his history emphasizes only one combination of the moral and ethical norms that justify the distinct but mutually dependent arguments supporting  liberalism and democratic  theory, it joins two understandings of liberty that are sometimes contradictory. The liberal egalitarian and social democratic principles that Marshall cites are inextricably related, but the premises of each require compromises from the other that preclude the evolution he claimed citizenship had undergone. Marshall also omitted a developed picture of the pressures placed on social democratic versions of citizenship both by the state, and by international factors such as migration and large-scale displacement of populations. His conclusion presumes that citizens will have  full rights associated with territorial residence, and also that this will be tied to the evolving bundle of social, civil, and  political rights he describes.2 A longer snapshot of the evolution of citizenship – and ­semicitizenship – reveals discontinuities that Marshall does not explore and that are of immediate relevance to understanding how semi-citizenship develops and persists. Even acknowledging the gulf between current political circumstances and those of the ancient world, the simple fact that all  T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development: Essays by T.H. Marshall (New York: Doubleday, 1965).

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pre-modern and many modern societies have recognized, if not embraced, the ­inevitability of multiple forms of membership, should give pause to committed Marshallians and to others convinced that any specific normative  model of citizenship can be, and is, realized in the context of the state. It is a relatively novel conceit that political membership can and ought to attach to a single status defined by  normative theory and governed by institutions that realize these norms. That many of the variables that have been used to draw distinctions between classes of members remain potent – and in many cases legitimate – means that drawing distinctions only serves to underscore the importance of a theory of semi-citizenship, as well as highlighting a need to identify what factors distinguish modern semi-citizenship from its progenitors. Interrogating the forms of political membership, out of which modern citizenship evolves, illuminates the raw materials from which the nation-state has sculpted its own versions of membership, as well as which processes and conditions are distinct to modern semi-citizenship. The history of semi-citizenship that I introduce in the next subsection illustrates the degree to which no fundamental rights of citizenship have ever been entirely  contingent upon other fundamental rights of citizenship. It also illustrates the following three ways in which semicitizenship adjudicates between the conflicting imperatives of norms and administrative  rationality: 1. Semi-citizenships forge compromises between the sometimes inconsistent, but nonetheless related, logics that ground citizenship. 2. Semi-citizenship orders the population for the purpose of making it legible and governable. 3. Semi-citizenship allows polities the flexibility necessary to make changes both to the status of parts of the population, and to understandings of what it means to fulfill the demands of the normative foundation of the polity. The preceding list points to the confrontation of different norms with each other and with administrative  rationality. Each instance of the splintering of autonomous and  relative rights bundles accords dominance to one way of thinking while not completely disregarding other ways of thinking. This occurred with regularity even before Enlightenment thought explicitly joined the liberal and democratic norms that the  modern state embraces. Although modern semi-citizenships diverge from their historical counterparts, nascent iterations of liberal and democratic norms likewise conflicted with each other and with the administrative institutions of polities in ways that reveal semi-citizenship as virtually inevitable

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and, in some senses, also consistent over time and space. Certain types of semi-citizenship therefore seem likely to reappear regardless of how membership comes to be justified. A.  Greek Semi-Citizenship and Democratic Norms Long before the emergence of  liberalism, and even before it came to be administered by the  state, citizenship was a central institution of democratic politics. Examining ancient  Greek thought is useful in this regard for two reasons: (1) it makes claims to being more normatively homogeneous than modern forms of citizenship that join  liberalism and  democracy under the rubric of the state; (2) it is frequently referenced as the parent of modern democratic citizenship despite the fact that it predicates democratic norms on explicitly illiberal premises. Because of this connection between ancient and  contemporary politics, we can learn something about the inevitability of semi-citizenship, and in particular about what  democratic theory contributes to modern semi-citizenship, from instances of semi-citizenship that arise in the ancient Greek context. Expansive understandings of self-rule were regarded by ancient democratic  theory as incompatible with expansive criteria for membership. For many, full citizenship in the  Greek polis was therefore impossible. The fullest possible citizenship was only accessible to the highest strata of  Greeks. “To qualify as a citizen, the individual must be the  patriarch of a household or  oikos, in which the labor of  slaves and  women satisfied his needs and left him free to engage in political relationships with his equals.”3 Yet not all who failed to meet the qualifications for full citizenship were wholly excluded from membership, nor were they wholly excluded from either the relative or autonomous  rights conferred by ancient forms of citizenship, as fealty to ethically generated democratic understandings of the qualifications for citizenship would demand. Other forms of reasoning intervened.  Greeks and  non-Greeks who were not political peers of the fully empowered still had to be governed, and hence they had to be accorded some kind of political status. Elements of membership were dispersed in a variety of ways among a range of subtly differentiated groups. A number of statuses existed between, on the one hand, full members engaged in  self-government and  high military pursuits, and, on the other,  J. G. A. Pocock, “The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times,” in Theorizing Citizenship, ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1995), 32.

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those who could only perform the work of lower occupations, such as those that involved productive and reproductive functions.4 It is tempting to focus on the fact that these differentiations grant full political powers to some over others and, in so doing, to miss the complexity of these partial citizenships. In fact, these differentiations offered a richly varied set of autonomous and relative  rights, each of which could be disaggregated both internally and from the other types of rights made available by  Greek city-states. Generally four oppositions prevailed:  men–women;  citizen–foreigner; citizen–merchant; and citizen–craftsman.5 These oppositions did not correspond to political dichotomies. Instead, they formed a web composed of a range of variables, and they included a similarly diverse set of semi-citizenships. For example, geomoroi (farmers) were ineligible for political and religious posts, but they could attend the Assembly, while demiourgoi (artisans) could not.6  Foreignness itself was constituted in ways that belie the notion of dichotomous citizen–noncitizen relationships.  Xenos meant stranger but it did not refer to Greekness. Instead, barbaros was used to refer to  non-Greeks. In Sparta, some  metics (politically privileged  foreigners) could own  property and fight in the Spartan  military. They paid citizen-level  taxes and carried with them the promise of protection when they went abroad.7  T hese were semi-citizenships produced by differential relationships to both the ethical community and the territory within which they were formed, and they were couched in terms that were drawn from, and consistent with, the ethical origins of the democracy. Each of these statuses represents a different dispersion of the core autonomous and  relative rights of  Greek citizenship. The autonomous  right to permanent residence was disaggregated into more and less robust guarantees, as were the  relative rights to own  property and to  self-govern. The proliferation and explicit acknowledgment of semi-citizen statuses makes clear that the core elements of citizenship were not treated as  contingent upon each other in democratic communities. The patriarchal ethic justifying full membership on the basis of economic freedom accords respect to persons who have some, but not all, of the qualities of heads of households, such as farmers. This ethic also intersects with cosmopolitan and administrative rationales for according status to  non-Greeks. Neither lineage nor geography, nor even perceived/ascribed capacity, would  Pocock, “The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times.”  Engin Isin, Being Political (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 54. 6  Isin, Being Political, 80. 7  Isin, Being Political, 79. 4 5

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necessarily compel someone’s  complete political exclusion from elements of citizenship. Some people were entirely excluded, as is evidenced by the practice of slavery. But the fact that official political language existed to make subtle differentiations, such as those between  foreignness (barbaros) and  strangerhood (xenos), makes explicit the degree to which different versions of pre-liberal forms of democratic politics instantiated political variegation. The binary distinction between citizen and noncitizen – a distinction that one might infer is critical to the integrity of democracy  predicated on specific capacities of  self-governance – did not suffice in the practice of democratic politics in ancient  Greece. Instead, one can see evidence of the role of administrative  rationality and respect for  non-Greeks, particularly in the ways in which  categories were created and woven into Greek laws of membership. The important conclusion to draw from the examples above is that even in a context where politics is explicitly committed to fulfilling the norms generated within a specific ethical tradition, semi-citizenships produced by competing norms and administrative  rationality abound. Democracy is grounded in norms that need not admit partial citizenship. Yet the practices of the  Greeks indicate that they did indeed formally acknowledge semi-citizenships as statuses required by administrative  rationality. These statuses served to bring order to a population that was not homogenous and to ambiguities within the group potentially qualified for full membership. They also enabled change when new economic and political circumstances changed the population. Finally, they served to mediate between the founding norms of  democratic theory and the needs generated by administrative imperatives such as those generated by conquest and  migration. B.  Ancient Cosmopolitanism as Proto-Liberal  Not all ancient  normative theories of membership were generated with explicit reference to specific ethical communities. Stoicism offered a response to the hyper-localism and  exclusionary doctrines observed in other democratic theories generated and practiced in the ancient world. And in rival Sparta, distinguishing between different kinds of  foreignness enabled the admission of some  foreigners while maintaining connections between  m ilitary service, work,  property ownership, and political standing without rejecting ethical understanding of what ­citizenship required. Stoic philosophers theorized forms of what has been described as  cosmopolitan citizenship that recognized entitlement based on the common humanity of all. Stoicism is worthy of

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mention in this context because it manages to upend the parochial premises of ancient  democratic theory, and yet it still acknowledged that semi-citizenships are inevitable. While Stoicism is one progenitor of modern forms of cosmopolitanism, neither the ancient nor the contemporary version necessarily distills citizenship to a single universally held status. Stoicism seems to hold out the opposite promise to that offered by more ethically rooted  democracy. It suggests that relative  rights, which are rooted in context, can be made  contingent upon autonomous (noncontextual)  rights of space and free movement. Grounding affiliation in morality, rather than ethical  practices, suggests a conception of citizenship with the potential to transcend distinctions among citizens based on class,  sovereign boundaries, and even geography. However, this does not guarantee that the end result is an identical set of rights for all members of the human race. Stoicism relies primarily upon moral rather than ethical reasons to ground membership, but it does so in ways that nonetheless impose distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. Stoic cosmopolitanism based on reasoning winds up making distinctions between types of potential members, and basing those distinctions upon characteristics that do not map directly onto traditional understandings of either community membership or nationality. This fact is of immense significance because it belies both the postnationalist belief that  territoriality is the final frontier of differentiation within citizenship, and the liberal aspiration that some common human quality can eradicate political stratification. Differentiation seems to persist even when logos and morality govern membership. While the idea of morality-based membership would seem to draw stark lines between members and ­non-members, descriptions of the criteria used to distinguish members indicate otherwise: a huge range of contrary predicates … divide them. They naturally include rich, poor, free, slave … but also a whole battery of attributes less familiar as Stoic, e.g. … mild, quiet, orderly … canny, good at hitting the aim, good at seeing the right moment, quick to see what is appropriate, artless, uncomplicated, straightforward, unaffected, having the skill to be a king, a general, a politician, a householder and an acquirer of  property.8

Given this range of variables, it seems not only likely, but virtually inevitable, that membership would fall along a spectrum, rather than be 8

 Malcolm Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 95.

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divided into a dichotomous universe containing only friends and enemies. Indeed,  Stoics noted that it was unclear whether cities included Gods, and some viewed men “as not full but potential citizens, like  children.”9  Women,  slaves, and  foreigners were entitled to standing,  education, and rights, but not necessarily a status identical to that held by full male citizens based on assessments of their capacities. The idea of potentiality gives the impression of a fluid hierarchy in which one graduates to fuller citizenship based upon the development of political capacities. In this sense Stoicism seems to mark a departure from the more regimented semi-citizenships of Athenian and Spartan  Greece. Even if citizenship can be disaggregated, the semi-citizenship of a given individual might be transformed under the right circumstances. Yet Stoic citizenship does not ultimately provide a model of a unitary citizenship. The image of concentric circles of membership, which many associate with Stoicism, leads not to an eradication of the bases for strata of membership, but rather to a reorientation of those bases.10 Different variables create different semi-citizenships rather than a levelled single membership based on universal human qualities. Contemporary theorists of citizenship who have pointed to Stoicism as a philosophical model for modern cosmopolitanism might find it at odds with the most universalist conclusions they wish to reach.11 World citizenship is not universal citizenship since not all are capable of, willing to, or desire to, exercise their capacities of reasoned morality. Though it eschews tribalism and more arbitrary forms of  exclusion, Stoicism retains multiple thresholds for  participation,  recognition and, therefore, membership. Once ethical distinctions such as birthplace, parentage, or gender are introduced to cosmopolitanism, differentiations within the population take on political significance and require that the administration of membership order these distinctions. Through the variables of  foreignness and  gender, both administrative and contextually rooted ethical   9 Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City, 78. 10   Linda Bosniak uses the image of concentric circles in her discussion of citizenship. Her invocation differs from this description of ��������������������������������������������� Stoicism in that she weights the disaggregation of nationality (“status  citizenship”) over the disaggregation of other elements of citizenship. See Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 56–57. 11  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Martha Nussbaum has used Stoic ���������������������������������������������� philosophy as a basis for contemporary cosmopolitanism. See Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” in For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 3–20. See also “Kant and Cosmopolitanism,” in Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitanism, eds. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1997), 25–57.

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logics make their presence felt in Stoic philosophies of membership. The possibility of transforming one’s own citizenship by moving through the concentric circles of membership also does not void the effect of disaggregating the substance of citizenship into  nested spheres. As in contemporary models of citizenship, the permanent presence of the distinct spheres means that, even as individuals move through them, citizenship itself is not unitary. The membership of the circles may change, but the society whose citizenship they define is marked by the fact that there is always a group or groups who hold semi-citizenships with distinct rights accorded to them for distinct reasons. C.  Semi-Citizenship in the Roman Context Stoicism and  Greek democratic practices provide two contrasting ­versions of normatively driven conceptions of membership that, in practice, explicitly acknowledge semi-citizen  statuses. However, neither can speak very well to contemporary questions of citizenship because neither confronts the administrative challenges inherent in managing large and diverse populations within a large but bounded  sovereign territory. J. G. A.  Pocock has suggested that scholars of contemporary citizenship look to Roman citizenship in order to best understand the genealogy of liberal citizenship.  Pocock asserts that the “juristic” nature of Roman citizenship demonstrates its role as progenitor of modern liberal forms of membership.12 This quality makes comparisons between  Greek and Roman citizenships and semi-citizenships very telling. Despite the pronounced ethical orientation of the Athenian model, the semi-citizenships produced in  Rome were neither unfamiliar nor unprecedented.  Pocock notes that Roman legalism was cognizant of the ways in which the law of membership needed to accommodate the pluralism inherent in empire. He writes, “One tremendous strength that the Gaian, juristic, and liberal ideal of citizenship possesses is that it enables us to define an indefinite series of interactions between persons and things which may be restated as rights, used to define new persons as citizens and carried over into the world of liberal politics.”13 In other words, the  virtue of legalistic, proto-liberal citizenship is its ability to translate the inevitable plethora of relationships engendered by political and material circumstances into statuses defined by rights.  Pocock, “The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times.”  Pocock, “The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times,” 45.

12 13

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Romans invested heavily in the imposition of legal distinctions among inhabitants of their territories.14 They did so in ways that reflected complex, non-unitary differentiations based on blood, land, capacity, and social status that generated similarly complex political statuses. This was noted by Diderot, who observed that “in order to become a true Roman citizen, three things were necessary: to be domiciled in Rome, to be a member of one of the thirty-three tribes, and to be able to hold office in the Republic. Those who possessed certain rights of citizenship by concession and not birth were only, properly speaking, honorary citizens …”15 Further complicating Roman conceptions of citizenship was the fact that  foreigners among Romans exercised a range of rights based in jus gentium, as  Romans did when they were no longer protected by their citizenship. As Sherwin-White demonstrates, Rome included not only full citizens, but a range of members who bore varying degrees of rights. Neither autonomous   rights associated with residence and free movement, nor relative  rights (such as access to office and  representation), nor ethically generated distinctions (such as birth into an outsider family) were administered in a way that made citizenship unitary. Governing so many and such varied types of citizens was significantly more demanding in the context of the Roman Empire than it had been in the confines of  Greek city-states. To this end, the Romans developed and deployed a set of political tools that enabled distinctions in membership to be enforced consistently over a large, diverse, and geographically diffuse population. As  Pocock notes, these tools often took the form of laws that delineated the status of various members. The Romans also employed technologies to enforce their laws of membership, many of which remain effective tools for assessing entitlement and imposing order within a population. The most famous of these technologies was the  census, which predates the Romans, who employed it highly effectively, and served not simply as a means to  collect taxes and ensure  military service, but also as a tool for the enforcement of public morals.16 Censors were charged with assessing, categorizing, and imposing rules based upon their assessments and classifications.  Rousseau observed that what began as a means  A. N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973). 15  Denis Diderot, Political Writings, trans. & eds. John Hope Mason and Robert Wokler (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Pres, 1992), 14. 16  Hyman Alterman, Counting People: The Census in History (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969), 31–32. Hyman writes, “The Latin word for a sacrifice or a ceremony of purification is lustrum. This eventually came to be the word for a  census, and the act of enumeration was a lustration.” 14

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for distinguishing urban and rural Romans lost all such meaning when censors “arrogated to themselves the right of transferring citizens arbitrarily from one tribe to another …”17 In describing the cumulative effect of these extensions,  Michael Mann says that “gradations of nationality, citizenship, and tenure types became to a degree eroded.” In fact, while the association of such gradations with their justifications may have been blunted by the arbitrary nature of their enforcement, the distinctions themselves retain their force as long as they impose disabilities and confer  privileges differentially. It is hard to imagine that censors would have continued to bother engaging in this sort of subterfuge had the categorical differences not had any effect on those being differentiated from one another. Roman citizenship rules thus demonstrate the degree to which semicitizenships were necessary for the administration of the Republic, even though the latter’s gestures at administrative efficiency might appear themselves to privilege unitary distinctions between members and nonmembers. Indeed, as long as the system functioned, it served to enforce a fascinating range of political statuses that did not correspond neatly with either geographic or familiar social/identity divisions.18  Mann writes that “many of those now enslaved possessed a higher level of civilization than their conquerors. Slave professors, doctors, and state bureaucrats were now found in the West. Some of them effectively ran the central administration during the principate and early empire.”19 Not all  slaves were so exalted: many laboring  slaves were not even considered human, let alone citizens. Corresponding complications of occupational, and hence social and political, status occurred among  non-slaves. Whereas labor had been previously associated with slavery, many Roman owners of modest means were forced into labor despite their holding a social status superior to that of  slaves.20 As some have suggested has been true in the modern world, many of these newly disempowered Romans improved their lot via rewards offered for  military service.21  Jean Jacques Rousseau, “On Social Contract or Principles of Political Right,” in Rousseau’s Political Writings, eds. Alan Ritter and Julia Conway Bondanella, trans. Julia Conway Bondanella (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988), 156. 18  Michael Mann, Sources of Social Power: Volume I (Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 262. 19  Mann, Sources of Social Power: Volume I, 261. 20  In fact, such labor was necessary if production was to occur on the scale necessary to sustain growth. Mann, Sources of Social Power: Volume I, 261. 21  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ On modern iterations of such rewards for ����������������������������������������������� military service and their effects on citizenship, see Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens: The G. I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 17

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Each of the preceding illustrations indicates the ways in which norms intersect with each other and with the demands of administering unavoidably diverse populations, ultimately breaking apart unitary statuses. In place of single, unitary forms of citizenship, we see nascent forms of semi-citizenship that accord different sets of autonomous and relative  rights to people with various characteristics that disqualify them from holding full citizenship.  Foreigners,  women,  slaves, and other assorted lesser members of ancient society were not considered capable of the kind of political  equality entailed by  self-government. Yet to dismiss ancient polities as aristocratic autocracies masquerading in democratic garb would demand that we overlook the ways in which both the  Greeks and Romans were able to formulate subtle, gradient approaches to difference and  exclusion through institutionalizing forms of membership that do not conform to normatively reductive understandings of membership.  Equality is neither offered nor retracted with the flick of a switch. Interim extensions of elements of  equality are as meaningful for what they offer, and upon which bases they do so, as they are for what they deny, and why they do so. This applies as much today as it did in the ancient world, albeit in different ways. While some traits, for example  race and  gender, have been by and large discredited as a direct basis for formal  exclusion,  categories of persons with limits placed on their citizenship abound in contemporary democratic politics. Given that these are not new  categories, we can conclude that they exist not simply as temporary, or even uniquely modern, sociological byproducts of mobility, economy, and difference.  Greek ethical  democracy, Stoic norms of cosmopolitanism, and Roman juristic administrative practices are imperfect but nonetheless telling analogs to modern democratic, liberal, and administrative ­logics of membership. The prevalence of ancient semi-citizenships in the embodiment of each of these doctrines/contexts is a significant reminder that normative conceptions of membership can never exist in the absence of conflicting norms or the imperatives of administration. Ancient ­polities had ample justification and motivation to draw dichotomous distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. These justifications spanned both administrative  rationality, as is particularly evident in the case of Rome, and complex normative conflict, as exemplified by the ambivalence toward  foreigners in  Greek democratic politics. The embrace of  categories that straddled boundaries in the ancient world therefore represents a powerful endorsement of the idea that the sources of semicitizenship lie at the core of how political membership is generated.

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The section that follows examines how normative and ­administrative conflicts are incorporated into modern politics, thus generating modern and ultimately contemporary forms of semi-citizenship.

III.  Making Semi-Citizenship Modern: Normative and Administrative Conflict over Citizenship in Modern Politics As politics modernizes, citizenship and semi-citizenships become organized around three newly framed manifestations of tensions that were already apparent in ancient polities. This occurs within the context of equally novel political institutions and technologies. That there are three doctrines contesting the meaning of citizenship should not come as a complete surprise given the definition of citizenship rights asserted by Charles  Tilly and cited in Chapter 3.  Tilly identified a three-way relationship in which one party makes a claim on a second party, which claim a third party – usually, but not necessarily, the state – acts to “reinforce (or at least not hinder).”22 This suggests that within citizenship are contained the claims of individuals, the collective agreements produced by groups of claiming individuals, and agents who enforce these claims. Put differently, citizenship invokes the rational individual, the collectivity, and enforcing agents, each of which imposes separate (if sometimes partially overlapping) concerns on rules of membership. A set of normative tensions is generated by the attempt to join the ethical and the moral under the rubric of liberal  democracy. Enlightenment theorists bring together two related, but divergent, normative understandings of  equality that provide different bases for including and excluding people from citizenship, and which emphasize different sets of rights. In turn, the founders of the first modern nation-states used the works of  Montesquieu,  Rousseau, and their Enlightenment peers as references in the process of writing  constitutions and forming states. The consequences of this explicitly mixed normative  marriage cement ambitious standards for unitary citizenship while at the same time undermining the possibility of achieving unitary forms of membership. Chapter 2 raised the idea that semi-citizenships are produced in conflicts among these doctrines. Chapter 3 introduced the device of autonomous and relative  rights as a  Charles Tilly, “Where Do Rights Come From?” in Democracy, Revolution, and History, ed. Theda Skocpol (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), 56–57.

22

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means of describing the universe of possible citizenship rights without deferring to the definition and reasoning of any particular doctrine of citizenship. Because each normative tradition makes different claims on both autonomous and  relative rights, conflicts likely to produce semicitizenships extend both to the full range of the rights accorded to members by liberal democracies, and to the differing standards regarding the question of who is entitled to citizenship in each tradition. The form semi-citizenships come to take is distinguished not just by normative theorizing, but also by novel and newly powerful forms of administrative  rationality that had not been possible in pre-modern politics. Although administrative  rationality intersected with norms in the ancient world, the  modern state manages these conflicts in distinct ways. As discussed in Chapter 3, the state’s management of doctrinal conflict among norms and administrative  rationality thwarts the development of unitary citizenship. This prevents citizenship from becoming unitary and prevents some rights of citizenship from being predicated on others. Liberal democracies realize norms of citizenship within structures of politics administered by the  state. While the state does not stand entirely in opposition to normative  theory it cannot be entirely reconciled with one set of norms. In the next section, I will survey the normative conflicts generated within liberal and democratic understandings of membership. I then attend in greater detail to the way in which the administration of membership, and its realization in the context of the state, is itself a uniquely powerful player in the conflict. This sets up the fourth section of the chapter in which I discuss how practicalities of ordering increasingly diverse populations, maintaining flexibility in rapidly changing political circumstances, and striking compromises where conflict between these different logics is particularly acute, produce outcomes that accord different forms of semi-citizenship to different groups. A.  Normative Conflict over Citizenship The sources of tensions among the liberal and democratic  theories that ground citizenship are well-rehearsed at the most general level. Orthodox liberals will advocate extensive rights for individuals, while  democracy predicates citizenship on advancing a good.23 So, for example, a liberal  This conflict is played out in the debates between liberals and  communitarians. See Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, ed. Michael Sandel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).

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might be less inclined than a democrat to circumscribe the  demos to ensure that access to the  franchise is available only to persons who are steeped in the cultural traditions of the nation. While democratic  goods may entail people holding specific rights, and rights may entail a strong conception of the good, there is no consensus recognizing the priority of one over the other in any given debate. There is no set point at which the good must precede right or vice versa. In the absence of any formal ordering of the two principles, political practice will often pit one against the other. To refer to Isaiah Berlin’s terms, it is not possible to simultaneously maximize negative and positive liberty because positive liberties require restrictions on negative liberties. We can either let people determine what is in their best interests in any given circumstance or we can accord this power to some paternal body whose authority presumably derives from the state. Inconsistencies between norms of human  equality, difference, and political practices are bound to arise in any society, including relatively homogeneous ones. Carl Schmitt makes this point explicit in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy: The  equality of all persons as persons is not  democracy but a certain kind of  liberalism, not a state form but an individualistic-humanitarian ethic and Weltanschauung. Modern mass  democracy rests on the confused combination of both. Despite all the work on  Rousseau and despite the correct realization that  Rousseau stands at the beginning of modern  democracy, it still seems to have gone unnoticed that the  theory of the state set out in Du Contrat Social contains these two different elements incoherently next to each other. The façade is liberal: the state’s legitimacy is justified by a free  contract. But the subsequent depiction and the development of the central concept of the “general will,” demonstrates that a true state, according to  Rousseau, only exists where the people are so homogeneous that there is essentially unanimity. According to the Contrat Social there can be no parties in the state, no special interests, no religious differences, nothing that can divide persons, not even a public financial concern.24

 Democracy and  liberalism may share a philosophical heritage; they may even be cast as siblings by the Enlightenment philosophers who inspired political actors in the  United States and  France, among other places, to try and build polities around them. But they are also at odds with one another on the question of membership.  A nd, as the next section will argue, this is not the only political tension that disassembles the  Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1985), 13.

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bundled braid of autonomous and relative citizenship  rights into many separate strands and threads of semi-citizenship. For the purposes of this study it is most important to focus on how liberal and  democratic theory come into conflict over the terms assigning autonomous and relative  rights to people. A superficial glance at the  categories of autonomous and relative  rights might suggest that liberal norms govern autonomous rights while democratic norms govern relative  rights. Liberal neutrality presumes a degree of unsituatedness that seems compatible with unsituated rights.  Kantian and neo-Kantian theories of rights predicate the according of rights to individuals on capacities thought to be common to all persons. Autonomy, rational thought, and the formation of a conception of the good are qualities and activities that connect almost all people, regardless of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, or other ethical divisions. In turn, democratic norms might seem to govern relative  rights that are derived from structures specific to a particular context or regime. Democracies are specific arrangements of power that realize abstract concepts like  “representation” through means as varied as proportional  representation, presidential systems, and federal branches of government. What the  right to  representation will mean in each of these different institutional contexts is different. According to different normative doctrines, the authority to ground autonomous and relative  rights would be consistent with a “separate spheres” approach to different elements of citizenship.25 However, such an approach fails to fully resolve tensions among different doctrines of citizenship because in fact both liberal and democratic theories of  rights speak to a full range of autonomous and relative  rights. The full catalog of citizenship rights is grounded differently by liberal and democratic  theory. Liberal  theory contains extensive grounding for relative  rights such as the  franchise or  property ownership that are made legible in particular political systems. Similarly, democratic theorists have stridently defended autonomous rights such as those associated with  education and  healthcare. T. H. Marshall’s own work illustrates one instance of a deep conflict among norms of citizenship.26 As indicated in Chapter 2, Marshall’s evolutionary account acknowledges tradeoffs between specific relative  Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983). See the discussion of this in Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien. 26  See Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development, 122. For a contemporary discussion of the implications of this conflict for the disaggregation of citizenship, see Matthew B. Sparke, “A Neoliberal Nexus: Economy, Security and the Biopolitics of Citizenship on the Border,” Political Geography 25 (2006) 138–168: 155. 25

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civil and autonomous social  rights, even as his narrative describes the bundling of these  rights and anticipates that the bundle would become tighter as rights evolved over the course of the twentieth century. This conflict is embedded in the larger contradiction inherent in ethical commitments to substantive  equality and the claims of civil libertarians.27 Marshall directed attention to the fact that civil  rights guaranteeing  property ownership in capitalist systems could undermine support for social  welfare  rights. To translate Marshall’s language into the terms of autonomous and relative  rights: the norms that support the relative  right to  property in a capitalist system undermine those that support the autonomous right to a basic  education and minimal standards of healthcare. Irreconcilable doctrines of individualism (civil  rights) and welfare (social  rights) forge different political identities, or semi-citizenships .  T. K. Oommen explains the contradiction internal to Marshallian notions of citizenship in American politics in terms that underscore its origins in conflicting normative doctrines.  Oommen notes that American public philosophies of civil citizenship are overdeveloped in comparison to social and political elements.28 The Protestant work  ethic appears unchecked in understandings of citizenship that value self-reliance over social  welfare. This yields a significant contradiction between the individualist nature of civil  rights and the welfarist nature of social  rights. There is a sense in which, above all else, liberal citizens are characterized by expectations of the independence that is distinctive of rational  contracting individuals, more than they are defined by social insurance – the element with which Marshall hoped to counterbalance individualism. The converse is also true; a heavily social welfarist regime would have a hard time simultaneously defending individualist conceptions of citizenship.  Oommen is not alone in noting this conflict; Daniel Bell echoes his critique indicating, “Though capitalism and  democracy historically have arisen together, and have been commonly justified by philosophical  liberalism, there is nothing which makes it either theoretically or practically

 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Isaiah Berlin, drawing from Mill’s work on pluralism, addresses conflicts in the values implied by  liberalism and democracy, though Berlin speaks about them in terms of freedom rather than  exclusion. Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 118–172. 28  See T. K. Oommen, Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1997), especially 228–233. See also Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, “Civil Citizenship Against Social Citizenship? On the Ideology of Contract Versus Charity,” in The Condition of Citizenship, ed. Bart van Steenbergen (London: Sage, 1994), 90–107. 27

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necessary for the two to be yoked.”29  Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon frame the conflict between the relative  right of  contract and autonomous social  rights as a conflict between norms of  equality, solidarity, and  republican notions of  participation. In this formulation, a more individualist version of  liberalism pits egalitarianism against two versions of ethical doctrines of membership (solidarity and  republicanism).  Fraser and Gordon argue that  contract  rights trump social  rights in the  A merican context. As they tell it, “Only by reclassifying public assistance as  property and recasting recipients as independent contractors could their civil citizenship be maintained. Yet as some welfare  rights activists noted, these terms could not express a vision of full social citizenship.”30 In other words, only social  rights that could be shoehorned into the terms of  liberalism survived. It need not be peculiarly American to find these strands at odds with one another. In fact, it is difficult to imagine an ethos in which thick versions of both could comfortably coexist. As Chapter 3 indicated, normative conflict also occurs when different ways of thinking about a single right yield disparate understandings of entitlement. The boundaries of a citizenry are shaped simultaneously by democratic and liberal norms. We can find a justification for the  autonomous right to residence and free movement in liberal notions of autonomy that conflict with those grounded by ethically situated notions of a geographically contiguous  demos. Scholars such as Joseph  Carens argue persuasively that borders themselves are unjustifiable from a liberal standpoint.31 On the other hand, the classical roots and contemporary goals of  democracy point toward some sort of common culture and morality upon which a  demos draws, and which a  demos expects to elicit from the act of  self-governance.  Democracy inscribes boundaries on the citizenry – and hence on the  right to move freely in and out of the citizenry – that compromise the universalist aspirations of  liberalism because only members of a democratic polity are guaranteed liberal treatment. For a group of individuals to function as a  demos, they need to be able to clearly define who is a member and who is not. Democracies assign and protect individuals’ liberal  rights based on membership status. Members are entitled to protections that nonmembers are not. This leads even avowedly liberal theorists like John  Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 14. 30  Fraser and Gordon, “Civil Citizenship Against Social Citizenship?,” 103. 31  Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” Review of Politics 49(2) (1987): 251–273. 29

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 Rawls to insist on the pre­condition of a closed system throughout his work.32 Such closed systems avoid offering rationales for differentiating between members and non-members that are consistent with  liberal theories of entitlement based on human capacities for autonomous action. Citizenship becomes unbundled into semi-citizenships when, for example,  democratic theory  rights are framed in ways that exclude segments of the population, such as temporary  workers, that liberal  theory might regard as entitled to citizenship. Conflicts such as these produce semi-citizenships that would not exist if only one kind of normative logic held sway. If no normative conflict exists – for example, in the case of an individual who meets both moral and ethical standards for full membership – full citizenship is relatively simple to accord. However, normative conflict is widespread, and hence many forms of semicitizenship are produced.  The competing bases determining boundaries in  liberalism and  democracy have not been, and likely cannot be, fully reconciled in practice.33 Citizenship is acutely vulnerable to these conflicts. Not only do the two sets of norms provide different answers to questions about who may enter a polity under what circumstances, and with the benefit of which other autonomous and  relative rights of citizenship, but it is also not feasible to simply strike a compromise by adopting an expansive notion of citizenship. It is costly and often difficult to extend expansive rights to large numbers of people who are very different from one another. Conjoining commitment to  equality among a qualified and privileged citizenry with ever-expanding boundaries to that citizenry is materially impossible to effect. The costs are immediately evident. Equally important are the costs to the ethical standards imposed on citizenship by  democratic theory. Returning to  Dahl’s categorical and  contingent principles discussed in Chapter 2, the stronger one’s commitment to liberal tenets of human  equality, the less feasible it is for one to demand that citizenship impose substantive standards requiring that members demonstrate political knowledge, own land, or conduct themselves in certain ways. It is a continual struggle to reconcile these two ways of approaching membership. It therefore comes as no surprise that semi-citizenship finds its way into the rules of membership of newly developing and modernizing states.

 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 12.  See Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 43–45.

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IV.  Joining Norms and Practices of Political Administration Politics is not made by norms alone. In addition to  normative theory, citizenship is shaped by the requirements of administrative  rationality. Administrative  rationality exists in any political setting, and, as we saw first in the example of ancient citizenship, it interacts with norms with regard to both autonomous and relative  rights of citizenship. However, in modern politics administrative  rationality comes to be a pervasive force shaping citizenship, imposing its own imperatives, and bringing its own internal contradictions to equally fractious normative understandings of citizenship. Identifying and assessing the forms semi-citizenships take, as well as explaining how and why they do so, depends on a thorough and detailed picture of the interactions that take place when liberal norms, democratic  theory, and administrative  rationality collide in the context of the state. In the three following sub-sections I will outline the origins and logic of administrative  rationality as it pertains to citizenship. I will discuss the imposition of administrative  rationality over the boundaries and content of citizenship and contrast it to similar impositions by normative  theory. Drawing upon the assertion in Chapter 2 that the state plays a special role in defining citizenship, I will then turn to a discussion of the role of the state as the space in which conflict over the terms of citizenship plays out in order to demonstrate how semi­citizenships serve to adjudicate conflict between the normative and rational logics of citizenship.34 A.  The Logic of Administrative Rationality  Administrative rationality is rooted in what  Foucault terms a governmental approach to political authority.35  Foucault defines governmentality using three related criteria. “It is a preeminent form of power manifested through distinctive apparatuses and savoirs.”36 It is “the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit complex form of power which has as its target population, as its principle  The state as “cockpit” is an analogy elaborated later in the chapter that is drawn from the work of Daniel Bell. See Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. 35  On governmentality, see Michel Foucault, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 36  Foucault, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, 102–103. 34

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form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means ­apparatuses of  security.”37 Finally, it is “the process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of  justice of the Middle Ages transformed into the administrative  state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries gradually becomes governmentalized.”38 Governmentality brings scientific rationality to politics, creating a political rationality whose stated end is to secure and improve the circumstances of the population being governed. True to  Foucauldian form, governmentality addresses itself to questions of how politics can be conducted to ensure public health,  security, and stable power arrangements, among many things. As such, governmentality speaks to the same autonomous and relative  rights claimed by moral and ethical doctrines, but from a perspective that diverges from each of those doctrines at important points. Concerning the autonomous  right to free movement, for example, where a liberal might be concerned about unjustifiable constraints on individual liberty, and a democratic theorist might want to protect an ethically defined group from foreign influence, a governmental perspective would ask whether migrating individuals can be policed to prevent terrorist threats. Similarly, the relative right to a trial by jury of one’s peers might appear to a liberal as a question of  equality, to a democrat as a method of ensuring that a community’s standards of  justice are applied and perpetuated, and to the government as a means of creating a self-policing population. Just as  liberalism and democratic  theory need not necessarily always diverge, so too could governmentality overlap with either, or both, of these other doctrines of citizenship. However this overlap is imperfect at best and is never guaranteed . Two features of governmentality make it a particularly useful tool for the analysis of citizenship and semi-citizenship. First, governmentality is not posited by  Foucault as a mode of normative analysis. It has a liberal provenance (as does democratic  theory), but whereas justifications of autonomy and self-rule invoked by liberal theorists from  Locke through  Rawls are explicitly and fundamentally normative, governmentality is not intended to be used as a normative lens. Ideology and normative  theory do not govern citizenship, nor do they drop out of the picture.  Foucault, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, 102–103. Foucault’s most extensive elaboration of the ideas of population and governmentality is contained in lectures he gave at the Collège de France. Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, ed. Michel Senellart: trans Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2007). (See especially Lectures 1–3, pp. 1–86.) 38  Foucault, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, 102–103. 37

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Among other things, the fact that governmentality relies on tools and “ways of reasoning that are distinct from  patriarchialist models of the household and family,” models which “do not ultimately return to the rules of  sovereignty,” illustrates how governmentality both coexists and competes not only with reason of  state and state  sovereignty, but also with the central norms of moral autonomy and ethical community that guide liberal and democratic  theory.39  Nancy Fraser dissects the quandary of trying to read  Foucault as a normative thinker and concludes that he “brackets” the normative.40  Fraser goes on to indicate that this may be attributable to  Foucault’s apparent obliviousness to  Weberian social  theory, “with its careful distinctions between such notions as authority, force, violence, domination, and legitimation.”41  Fraser’s critique of  Foucault’s oversights is incisive and important. However the concept of governmentality retains a different cast than normative  theory that is explicitly predicated on defending specific notions of legitimacy, if for no other reason than that  Foucault offers no theoretical or empirical program for liberation or improvement. Governmentality is not posited as an analysis whose insights can yield liberation or human improvement. It therefore offers  Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London: Sage, 1999), 107. 40  Nancy Fraser, “Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions,” Praxis International 3 (1981): 275–276.  Fraser says that  Foucault does so vaguely so as to leave open the question of whether he wishes only to bracket specific liberal norms (“right, limit, ���������������������������������������������������������� sovereignty, ������������������������������������������� contract, and ��������������������������� oppression”) or all normative justificatory frameworks.  Fraser concludes that  Foucault “fails to appreciate the degree to which the normative is embedded in and infused throughout the whole of language at every level, and the degree to which, despite himself, his whole critique has to make use of modes of description, interpretation, and judgment formed within the modern Western normative tradition … I can only conclude that  Foucault’s work is normatively confused.” Fraser, “Foucault on Modern Power,” 284. 41  Fraser, “Foucault on Modern Power,” 286. Others have dissected  Foucault’s references to this family of concepts in ways that suggest greater analytical precision on his part than  Fraser credits him for. See Thomas Lemke,  “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique,” Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture, and Society 14(3) (2002): 53. Lemke cites “three types of power relations: strategic games between liberties, government, and domination,” and later writes that  Foucault reserves the term “domination” for “what we ordinarily call ‘power.’ Domination refers to those asymmetrical relationships of power in which the subordinated persons have little room for maneuver because their ‘margin of liberty is extremely limited’ … Technologies of government account for the systemization, stabilization and regulation of power relationships that may lead to a state of domination.” Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique,” 53, citing Michel Foucault “The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in The Final Foucault, eds. J. Bernauer and D. Rasmussen (Boston: MIT Press, 1988) 19, 12. 39

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a useful complement to explicitly normative  theories about the nature and form of citizenship. This point further grounds Chapter 3’s argument in favor of using structural  categories rather than social identities to study semi-citizenship. Returning to  I ris Young’s discussion provides a helpful illustration.  Young claims to offer a means for categorizing differentiation in various societies that is structural: I propose a four-fold categorization. Societies and institutions should be evaluated according to the patterns of distribution of resources and  goods they exhibit; but, no less important, they should be evaluated according to their division of labor, the way they organize decision-making power, and whether their cultural meanings enhance the self-respect and self-expression of all society’s members.

 I n this passage,  Young presumably intends to incorporate political structures by invoking the phrase “the way they organize decision-making power.” However once we have broken out democratic norms from governmental logic,  Young clearly has referred only to the effects of democratic procedures, and not to the larger set of concerns raised by administrative rationality. No reorganization of decision-making power can entirely obviate the set of concerns raised, for example, by questions of public health that affect core citizenship rights. If a hypothetical contagion is traced to a segment of a population whose temporary quarantine can contain and ultimately eradicate the contagion, well-organized decision-making power will not affect the  inequality this imposes on people’s citizenship. The second feature of governmentality crucial to the analysis of semicitizenship is that, although governmentality implicates processes that are associated with the state, it is analytically distinct from the state itself.42 This has important repercussions for the inevitable outcome that semi-citizenship will persist in postnational contexts. Government is not a tool of the state but rather, the state is “a tactic of government[ality].”43 The origins of governmentality precede the  modern state, and contemporary techniques of governmentality can be engaged by actors who are not agents of a state. It can be cast most pithily as a form of political rationality. This is important to note for reasons that affect predictions about citizenship in the future, as well as analyses of the past and present. Governmentality can and does outlive states. It invokes processes of political rationality directed at populations rather than territory. Because  Barry Hindess, “Bringing States Back In,” Citizenship Studies 4 (2006): 119.  Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique,” 58.

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of this focus, governmentality can be channeled through states and can also be extricated from the state so that it reappears in supernational and non-state institutions. So, the “appearance of new actors on the scene of government (e.g., nongovernmental organizations) that indicate fundamental transformations in statehood and a new relation between state and civil  society actors” spells a transformation, but not an end, to governmentality.44 Indeed,  Fraser writes in a discussion of the development of governmentality in the twentieth century, “the result was a form of governmentality that far transcended the bounds of the state even as it remained nationally bounded.”45  Fraser indicates that as this occurs, “the key is to identify the characteristic ordering mechanisms and political rationality of the emerging new mode of regulation.”46 Thus, should a consensus emerge that citizenship truly has become postnational, governmentality will remain a relevant mode of analysis. In fact, the shape that semi-citizenships take may prove to be useful indicators of how extensive such transformations of the state truly are.  Fraser believes that such evolution is a move from aspirations to “universality,” “standardization,” and “synchronization,” resulting ultimately in greater “segmentation.” Perhaps this portends more forms of semi-citizenship and semi-citizens in a postnational world.47 The persistence of governmentality means that conflicts between governmentality and normative  theories will continue to yield semi-citizenships even in a postnational world from which nation-states have been entirely erased. The requirements of administration may alter the groups who have semicitizenships, or the combinations of autonomous and  relative rights that they have, but the statuses will persist. People will continue to have different needs and capacities, and postnational political organizations are no more likely than states to be able to circumvent the requirement to impose conditions and thresholds on various rights. Administrative decisions about, for example, the age of  majority or the mobility of convicted criminals, will be made by an administrative body engaging in practices of governmentality, even if that body is entirely divorced from any state. It is not hard to imagine that some of these decisions will yield different results in an evolved institutional context. What is unimaginable is that administrative rationality will disappear under any circumstances.  Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique,” 58.  Nancy Fraser, “From Discipline to Flexibilization? Rereading Foucault in the Shadow of Globalization,” Constellations 10(2) (2003): 164. 46  Fraser, “From Discipline to Flexibilization?,” 167. 47  Fraser, “From Discipline to Flexibilization?,” 168–169. 44 45

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It is also at this point that the advantages of having divided rights into the autonomous and  relative categories are thrown into sharpest relief. Identifying rights as either necessary within a particular political system, or necessary regardless of context, ensures that semi-citizenships produced by successful postnational, transnational, or supernational political systems can be identified and compared with those that are the product of nation-states. Since there can be no political system that is free of norms or administrative rationality, competition between norms and administrative rationality over different kinds of rights will persist indefinitely. Different groups may be assigned different orders of semicitizenship, and the universe of imaginable rights may shift; however, the orders themselves will remain. B.  Boundaries in Administrative Rationality Just as liberal and democratic norms each bring notions of political boundaries to rules that confer and deny citizenship, administrative rationality also imposes its own characteristic boundaries-based distinctions between people. The administrative rationality characteristic of governmentality asserts power over its  subjects with different emphases than either moral or ethical  theories. Rather than emphasizing  demoi or identity  groups, governmentality takes as its object the population.48  Sovereignty is therefore defined primarily by dominion over a population, rather than simply over a geographic territory.  Foucault describes that population as a subject of government, and one that is distinct from both individuals and territory.49 A population of individuals simultaneously provides a government both with its greatest source of power and with its gravest potential threat. Therefore, the means through which a government manages its population are crucial to asserting governmentality. This requires the regulation of individuals through the threat of direct physical coercion implied by an omnipresent  police as well as  Stuart Elden, “Governmentality, Calculation, Territory,” Environment and Planning: Society and Space 25 (2007): 562. Elden writes, “Although it will have profound implications for the Western model, the notion of the pastoral has Eastern origins in Egypt, Assyria, and Mesopotamia, but especially in Hebrew understandings of the relation between god and man, where the power is over the flock rather than over the land.” He continues, “This power is exercised over each individual as much as over the flock as a whole.” 49  Foucault develops these ideas most extensively in Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, ed. Michel Senellart: trans Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2007). (See especially Lectures 1–3, pp. 1–86.) 48

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indirect, and even internalized, means of enforcing social norms.50 More to the immediate point, the politics of populations demands that political status render  subjects governable. This will occur both on all sides of boundaries and within populations. Indeed, the precise point of a border transforms, even if momentarily, the citizenship of anyone crossing or standing directly on it. Governmentality acts as an agent of the good of the population.51 What is in the interest of a population may encompass a vast array of policies associated with membership. In order to maintain its legitimacy as an arbiter of governmentality, any institution, including those associated with the state, must sustain ordered control of the populations whose interest it serves. However, in contrast to normative descriptions of  demoi, individuals, or even  sovereign boundaries, the very notion of a population is inherently ambiguous and changeable. Physical borders do not demarcate populations any more than do descriptive accounts of a  demos. At the outset, therefore, the logic of governmentality both depends on, and exists in tension with, moral and ethical norms of membership. It invokes a notion of the good, but it is simultaneously predicated on an expansive but vague notion of political power exercised over populations, rather than over clearly defined ethical communities, groups of rational individuals, or in some cases even  sovereign territory. The convergence of burgeoning capacities for the management of populations with normative philosophies  demanding equality implies that liberal doctrines of equal citizenship are not just in tension with ethical commitments that conflict with liberal autonomybased justifications for rights, but that they also face challenges to their understandings of  inclusion, as voiced in  Dahl’s more liberal categorical principle of membership.52 It can become difficult to tell not just when someone is qualified for citizenship, but also when someone is actually governed in a way that entitles them to standing. Populations may not have clear boundaries at all. Who is being governed, how much, and in what ways? From the perspective of administrative rationality, a guest may become a member of the population the minute she applies for a  visa, well before she crosses into the  sovereign borders of the concerned  Elizabeth F. Cohen, “Carved From the Inside Out: Immigration and America’s Public Philosophy of Citizenship,” in Debating Immigration, ed. Carol M. Swain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 32–45. 51  Foucault, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, 100. 52  As discussed in Chapter 2, the categorical principle of membership awards citizenship to anyone governed by the law of a polity. It is contrasted with the  contingent principle, in which citizenship is awarded to individuals who exhibit certain qualities deemed central to the polity in question. 50

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state, or before she could have interests characteristic of a member of the  demos. One might even conceive of transborder health and environmental threats as further blurring the boundaries of populations.53 Regardless of cause, those subject or not subject to administrative rationality do not correspond to a binary distinction that might warrant the application of a single title – in this case “citizen” – to all members. As shall become evident, semi-citizenships permit the varied sorts of  inclusion and  exclusion that diverse populations and administrative imperatives each require. In this telling, the state translates governmental logic into an administrative rationality tailored to address the traits of multifaceted populations. C.  Administrative Rationality and the Substance of Citizenship The status assigned to citizens must facilitate the enforcement of administrative rationality. Enforcement occurs through the policing of physical boundaries and also within populations. Because population is the source of immense political power (it is through populations that polities gain strength) and vulnerability (the destruction or exodus of a population will weaken a polity), the methods with which it is governed are of crucial significance. Governing a population requires physical coercion and coercive elements associated with  police and  military as well as indirect, and even internalized, means of enforcing social norms.54 Citizenship becomes the “institutional counterpart of rationality, not merely an idea but a reality, the crystallization of rationality into a social role.”55 And yet administrative notions of citizenship contain inconsistencies and internal contradictions just as normative ideals of citizenship were shown to. Semi-citizenship plays a pivotal role in effecting the administrative rationality that is characteristic of governmentality. Some members of populations are understood to be different from others even though they may be identified with the same label (“citizen”). We therefore come to expect that there will be a difference in the  membership of military personnel, the mentally  ill, and people who have no proof of identity, even if they are all called “citizens.” Governmental ordering of the population implies two conditions relevant to the creation of semi-citizenships. First, it prioritizes predictable forms of behavior. Second, it must digest differences within the population that  See Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham, NC: Duke, 1999). 54  Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 65–70. 55  Ralf Dahrendorf, “Citizenship and Beyond,” Social Text 41(4) (1974): 677. 53

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might be potential sources of friction and disorder. In practice, this brings a set of concerns to boundary  management that is not fully accounted for in either democratic or liberal  theory. Boundary  management is accomplished using means that are different from those that are dictated by normative  theory. Tools of  security, statistics, and public health accomplish this management. For example, rules regarding the employability and movement of people with contagious diseases or criminal records are instituted to ensure that contagion and the threat of violence are minimized and contained.56 Tools that organize knowledge about populations come to influence and exert authority over those populations via the imposition of categorical distinctions. Such categorical distinctions take into account a vast array of variables that extend beyond even the often expansive and relatively neat lines drawn by territorial  sovereignty, to say nothing of norms. In thinking about the relationship between boundary  management and governmentality, Aihwa Ong reminds us that the logic of governmentality entails that micro-processes associated with citizenship will inevitably generate an array of political  categories, each intended to elicit predictable behaviors and deploying circumstantially-targeted and effective methods.57 Citizenship and attendant forms of semi-citizenship make populations more legible and more readily organized, understood, and governed. In turn, citizens’ relationships to their citizenship are associated with  practices that make them evermore governable. To be included is to be controlled in specific ways. Through citizenship, self-disciplining activities and  participation in economically liberal civil  society are linked to practices and sciences of physical control. The government of a population layers “practical equivalences” over preexisting “hierarchical differentiation of orders of the people,” creating “a common abstract essence” from “parts [that] are not equivalent, but whose survival is dependent on relations among them.”58 In other words, to maintain citizenship as a practical equivalence, administrative rationality must serve to facilitate relations among non-equivalent individuals. Insofar as they are composed of exceptions to more general rules, semi-citizenships serve this purpose by maintaining the joint myths of full citizenship and non-citizenship while at the same time differentiating some citizens from others, partially drawing supposed non-citizens into  Bryan S. Turner, “The Enclave Society: Toward A Sociology of Immobility,” European Journal of Social Theory 10(2) (2007): 287–304. 57  Ong, Flexible Citizenship, 225. Aihwa Ong, Buddha is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 9, 15, 17, 283. 58  Bruce Curtis, “Foucault on Governmentality and Population: The Impossible Discovery,” Canadian Journal of Sociology 24(4) (2002): 508–509. 56

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the citizenry and partially pushing others out.59 We see this with regard to work: rules may demand that an older member of the population retire from a civil service position, while a  foreign person applies to join the population by promising to work on a temporary basis, while yet a third person cannot legally work for fear of being ejected (deported) from the population. Mitchell Dean’s description of how such exceptions figure into governmentality recalls the contradiction of unitary citizenship exposed in the preceding chapter: “The figure that emerges might be considered as an attempt to invent and install a form of citizenship that is compatible with the existence of  inequality and poverty in a community of equals.”60 The relationship between citizenship and the state warrants close exploration because semi-citizenship is integral to the  modern state and is also one of the state’s most powerful tools. In turn, the capacities of the state ensure that semi-citizenships reach deeply into the populations they govern, and that they do so in a durable if plastic fashion. To identify the combinations of relative and autonomous  rights composing existing orders of semi-citizenship we need to know how liberal, democratic, and administrative logics of citizenship interact with the political instruments of the state. In the section that follows I explore how states use semi-citizenships to adjudicate between liberal, democratic, and governmental doctrines.

V.  The Purposes of Semi-Citizenship in the Political Context of the State At this point in the chapter, it has been established that three doctrines of citizenships bring distinctive, though not always completely divergent, logics to bear on the autonomous and relative  rights conferred by citizenship. The state stands at the nexus of the rational bureaucratic and normative imperatives of politics. It marries vital elements of governmentality to each other and to the normative commitments upon which governmentality  Some have treated exceptions as the product of accidents and mistakes, using the two terms almost interchangeably. I would argue strenuously that exceptions may sometimes be cloaked in the language of mistake or accident, but that the three are different. All semi-citizens are, by definition, exceptional. However some people are designated as semi-citizens in predictable and explicit fashion while some people are partially excluded as the result of actual error. There is a difference between someone who is deprived of civil rights as a result of newly instituted restrictions on expression designed to fight a “war on terror” and someone whose immigration papers are destroyed in a fire or whose identity is confused with someone else’s. For a discussion of “accidents of citizenship,” see Peter Nyers, “The Accidental Citizen: Acts of Sovereignty and (Un) making Citizenship,” Economy and Society 35(1) (2006): 22–41. 60  Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 203. 59

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depends to justify its claim that it serves the good of the population. Carl Schmitt’s skepticism about the possibility of a single seamless citizenship is rooted in the inherent conflict between “two different elements”: the individualist universalist ethic of  liberalism, and the legitimizing principle of consent implied by  democracy. However, the passage cited earlier also indicates a role for the state in the conflict. Schmitt efficiently captures the fact that philosophical tension occurs in an institutional context: that of the state. On the one hand, he emphasizes the normative conflict between a liberal façade and an ethic demanding an impossible degree of homogeneity. On the other hand, he presents this conflict in a language that also does not lose sight of two crucial facts: this conflict plays out in the context of the state, and it engenders problems of administration that the state must address. It is the state that must adjudicate disputes between liberal, democratic, and administrative doctrines of membership, and it does so in the real world, without the luxury of arm’s-length distance enjoyed by normative theorists. As Daniel Bell puts it, the  state becomes “the cockpit of  politics.”61 National societies assume projects via group or communal instruments. In a tightly interwoven society, more decisions have to be made through politics and through planning. Yet both mechanisms, paradoxically, increase social conflict. Planning provides a specific locus of decision, as against the more impersonal and dispersed role of the market, and thus becomes a visible point at which pressures can be applied. Communal instruments – the effort to create a social choice out of the discordant dance of individual personal preferences – necessarily sharpen value conflicts.62

Bell goes on to highlight the problems imposed by the “relationship of technical and political decisions.”63 In his description, politics both precedes and upsets the rational. Among the instruments the  “state-as-cockpit” relies upon to navigate these confrontations are citizenship and the various semi-citizenships illustrated in Chapter 3. Gianfranco  Poggi describes the catalyst for this process: “A key instrumentality of this process is a new type of political relationship – citizenship – directly connecting the state with an increasingly wide portion of the population, which came to constitute a political community.”64 States require citizenship. They also  Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 364. 62  Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, 364. 63  Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, 364. 64  Gianfranco Poggi, The State, Its Nature, Development, and Prospects (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1990). 61

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require semi-citizenships because the act of classifying and awarding ­centrality to one class of people with a specific set of characteristics implies others with variously different characteristics will require their own classifications.65 Semi-citizenships are produced by states in adjudicating the conflict Bell described playing out within the relationship  Mann posits.  Mann goes so far as to describe the reflexive nature of politics using images of central and marginal citizens that implies a reflexive relationship between members and different kinds of  foreigners. He cites a “two-way relationship between center and territories.”66 It is the state that must actually govern large and diverse populations; hence the state must put into practice both liberal and democratic norms alongside governmental imperatives. Something has to manage the conflict that occurs when, for example, an accused person is not a good candidate for trial in a civil court. Whether that person is immature, mentally  ill, or accused of crimes involving secure information, there are conflicting claims being made by  liberalism, democratic norms, and administrative rationality as to what rights these individuals can legitimately claim. The state relies on semicitizenships to resolve these conflicts because semi-citizenships are both wide-reaching and flexible tools that can express different norms as well as the imperatives of governmentality. The immature person becomes a “minor,” the mentally unwell person becomes “incompetent,” and the  security threat becomes an “enemy  alien”: these and other semi-citizens hold a status that is produced by the state in response to the multiple, inconsistent thresholds internal to liberal and democratic standards for full membership, as well as the practical political requirements of managing the complicated politics of populations. The dynamics that create such  categories are extensive and complex, vertically linking individuals with distant offices and elements of politics, and horizontally linking social practices and manners with political norms and membership. From the perspective of any given normative or administrative logic, semi-citizenships represent departures or failures. However, from the

 Nevzat Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), see especially Chapter 1. Soguk cites Michel de Certeau specifically on the subject of categorization, and draws an important genealogical connection between  refugee and immigrant statuses that were refined in the twentieth century and the statuses of “vagrants, beggars, and gypsies” in the nineteenth century. Soguk, States and Strangers, 41. 66  Michael Mann, Sources of Social Power: Volume II (Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 59. 65

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perspective of states trying to reconcile conflicting logics, they represent solutions to deadlocks between competing priorities. Citizenship could not fulfill the role  Mann assigns it within the context of the state without semi-citizenships because semi-citizenships serve the three adjudicative purposes of semi-citizenship introduced earlier in the chapter and developed below. These include: effecting compromises between conflicting doctrines of citizenship, ordering the population, and creating flexibility. Below I discuss the nature of the compromises states must effect between conflicting normative and administrative logics of citizenship, and what these compromises accomplish, focusing particular attention on the need to order the population while maintaining political flexibility. A.  Effecting Compromises between Conflicting Logics The logics of citizenship cannot be permanently reconciled into a single, internally cohesive doctrine. Nor can they coexist in ways that accord each doctrine sole authority over a specific kind of rights, or even circumstance. Semi-citizenships forge compromises between the different and sometimes inconsistent logics of citizenship, and they apply these compromises to the equally diverse populations they govern. They do so by embodying exceptions to citizenship rules. These “statuses of exception” are created by urgent doctrinal conflict: points at which  liberalism,  ethical democracy, and administrative rationality do not dictate identical or compatible answers to the question of whether someone ought to be accorded citizenship. These conflicts require that exceptions – departures from rules – be granted within one or another doctrine. Liberal democratic  states depend on these departures from rules, or exceptions, to break impasses that arise when a boundary or  exclusion that one doctrine would dictate is contradicted by the action that another dictates. Different normative logics must be squared with one another and in turn must be accommodated by non-normative logic.  Rogers Smith’s  ascriptive Americanism coexists with  Louis Hartz’s Lockean liberalism and Gunnar  Myrdal’s takes on  Tocqueville’s liberal America, rather than below or above either of them.67 This is enabled by compromises in

 Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt Brace, 1955; Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction, 1944).

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which doctrines overlap at some points and carve out exceptions to each other where they diverge. Carefully calibrated compromises must constantly be struck between competing doctrines of citizenship with regard to all of the autonomous and  relative rights of citizenship because each doctrine confers both types of rights according to its own set of principles.  Liberalism and democratic norms and governmentality all speak to the autonomous  rights that all persons need, as well as to the relative  rights that pertain to membership in specific political systems. Semi-citizenships provide a means through which activities without inherently normative bases, such as those associated with order and  sovereignty, are reconciled with the liberal and democratic norms, which also often need to be made, if not consistent, then at least to function with each other. To see such conflicts and compromise play out in the work of a familiar theorist, revisit  Dahl’s discussion of how to accord the relative  rights associated with  self-governance in a liberal democratic  state.  Dahl describes a compromise that is struck between location, ability to  self-govern, and autonomy so as to define the  demos.  Dahl’s compromise accords the  franchise to any non-transient, mentally competent adult.68 Place is primarily non-normative – here governmental administrative rationality is at work – while judgments of ability often reflect ethical norms of democratic  theory, and autonomy privileges a liberal moral logic. One could imagine coming to a different compromise, for example, one in which transience is not regarded as disqualifying a person for the  franchise. In allowing non-national EU citizens to vote in the elections of the state in which they reside, regardless of whether they reside there permanently, the EU has in fact made a similar statement. Alternately, when  Dahl wrote, the question of felon  disenfranchisement had not penetrated American public consciousness in the way that it would come to following the 2000 election.69 The reader is left with a legitimate question as to whether  Dahl would consider the disqualification of  felons from  voting to be a serious violation of the liberal  equality principle or a fair response to persons who have broken the social  contract .  Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), see Chapter 9. 69  The definitive academic study of this subject was published in 2006. See Jeffrey Manza, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). At least one policy organization (The Sentencing Project) had issued a report on the subject prior to 2000; however, its own reports suggest that action followed on the heels of the 2000 debacle. See www.sentencingproject.org; last accessed July 31, 2008.

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Conflict over sets of rights is unavoidable. If the three logics of citizenship were actually a series of  nested circles of  inclusion, semicitizenship could be an entirely coherent and predictable layering of three parts.70 However there is no linear ideational progression neatly marking where one logic ends and another picks up. As the history of semi-citizenship in the first section of this chapter demonstrates, each of these traditions is related to the other three, even as they also diverge. Governmentality,  liberalism, and democratic norms all rely on some shared premises. Governmentality and  liberalism have a shared liberal heritage. Governmentality requires normative backing to justify itself as “good for the population.” Governmentality also asserts a scientific rationale for politics that is consistent with liberal conceptions of  equality that are rooted in the rational capacities of individuals. The scientific bent of governmentality is inclusive in ways that echo the  inclusiveness of liberalism, even though governmental  inclusion does not imply  justice. Governmentality may simply mean that people are included in statistical counts of a population that in turn are used to prevent public health crises, e.g., through compulsory inoculations, or civil unrest, e.g., through urban planning and attendant police  practices.  Liberalism can be similarly expansive, as was made evident by  Dahl’s explication of the principle of affected interest, which required the  inclusion of people regardless of territorial location, age, or other typical delimitations.71 As was noted earlier, the major variants of normative liberal  theory can all be interpreted as hostile to territorial boundaries that prevent the free movement of persons.  Liberalism and governmentality can therefore both be expansive and inclusive .  Demoi and states both create boundaries that an argument for liberal individual  rights does not. But they may not require the same kinds of divisions. Self-rule and territorial  sovereignty need not and do not always refer to coextensive boundaries. Rational capacities can in turn serve to  The idea of  nested citizenships has been invoked to refer to differential memberships created by federalism, particularly in the context of supranational political institutions. (Thomas Faist, “Social Citizenship in the European Union: Nested Membership,” Journal of Common Market Studies 39(1) (2001): 37–58. Rainer Bauböck, “Why European Citizenship? Normative Approaches to Supranational Union,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8(2) (2007): 452–488. 71   Dahl is not alone in noting that  liberalism can be hostile to  sovereign boundaries that exclude people from moving freely and participating in politics that affect them. See International Migration In and From Africa: Dimensions, Challenges and Prospects, eds. A. Adepoju and T. Hammar (Stockholm: Population, Human Resources and Development in Africa, 1996). 70

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justify a family of ethical norms that ground democratic  rights of self-rule even though some ethical traditions exclude people with rational capacities if they do not meet other standards. (For example, allowing norms of  jus sanguinis that prioritize blood relationships to determine who can access a set of rights, rather than allowing  jus soli to take precedence.) The semi-citizenship of  children exemplifies the way in which semicitizenship allows compromises required by the state in its capacity as arbiter of different doctrines of membership. As Chapter 6 details,  children are complicated subjects to govern within the context of a liberal  democracy for reasons that stem from their variably rational capacities and their atypical political needs. These facts are accommodated by a weak set of relative  rights and a strong set of autonomous  rights.  M inors do not vote or receive formal  representation in politics. From the point of view of the state, they are not political beings. Presuming that  children’s interests will be represented by their parents or guardians allows states to evade difficult questions about  which children may be capable of making political judgments, as well as what those capable of making these judgments may be entitled to. It also allows states to evade questions about what it is that all  children, regardless of their rational abilities, are entitled to expect from democratic politics. At the same time, states confer a very thick set of autonomous  rights on  children that both bind them to the polity (as in the case of legally assigned birthright  nationality), and protect a set of interests that exists, at least in part, outside of what their parents will represent to the polity (as in the case of most social  rights). Their semi-citizenship thus incorporates  children and sets them apart. They carry some parts of the legal identity of citizen and thus are legally recognized. Some of their potential claims on the polity are recognized on a basis that is somewhat abstract: the idea of a  minor discriminates on the basis of an ascribed trait supposedly linked to rational capacities. Without semi-citizenship, it would be impossible to forge a compromise between the imperative to govern  children politically – as opposed to leaving them entirely to the care of their parents, or no one – and the imperative to exclude them from politics until they exhibit the traits demanded by an ethical democratic doctrine of membership. Their semi-citizenship simultaneously asserts sameness and difference and forges an important compromise between administrative  rationality and normative  theory.72  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ In the case of ������������������������������������������������������������������������� children, democratic and liberal norms might both dictate their ������� exclusion, though in either case the age of  majority would prove a poor indicator of when a  child can meet rational or ethical standards for membership.

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B.  Ordering the Population Diverse logics of citizenship confront equally diverse populations. In addition to forging compromises among related but dissonant doctrines of citizenship, semi-citizenships are also vital to creating political order within populations that are inherently disorderly. The characteristics of a population will almost never conform to the expectations implied by any one of the doctrines of citizenship, and certainly could never conform to all of them at once. Ordering a population entails imposing rules on the contours of the population, not all elements of which will conform either to democratic norms regarding “affected interest,” capacities, or fit neatly within geographic borders. If there is to be citizenship, then there must also be semi-citizenships that assure states the opportunity to govern people who cannot be governed according to the expectations of full citizenship.  Hannah Arendt points out the degree to which  statelessness, which refers most specifically to the absence of nationality, poses a threat to states.  A rendt’s argument suggests that the  stateless person becomes irrational from the perspective of the state, and hence she is literally erased: non-persons by virtue of their status, or lack thereof.73 This is corrosive to political order both for states and for the individuals in question. Preventing this kind of political irrationality requires mediating statuses like semi-citizenships to include and exclude in the precisely calibrated way that unitary citizenship cannot. Semi-citizenships manage difference within the population that a state governs in ways that unitary citizenship could not. As the passage from  Dahrendorf cited earlier indicates, citizenship is the “crystallization of rationality into a social role.”74  Dahrendorf is right to link rationality and the social role of the citizen. Where he errs is in implying that the linkage of vastly divergent persons can be effected within a single status. Citizenship lends rationality to a population by creating multiple political statuses without which many differently situated people would be entirely excluded and illegible from the point of view of the state.  Gianfranco Poggi’s understanding of the state more precisely identifies the points at which semi-citizenship, rather than just citizenship, orders the citizenry.  Poggi relies on a five-part definition of the state. For  Poggi, depersonalization, formalization, integration, differentiation,  Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Knopf, 2004), 80.  Ralf Dahrendorf, “Citizenship and Beyond,” Social Research 41(4) (1974): 677. ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Foucault describes citizenship as the “professionalization” of the experience of ����� subjecthood. Foucault, The Foucault Effect, 123.

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and organization compose essential activities of the modern  state.75 Semi-citizenships fulfill a very specific set of functions that integrate and are integral to each of these five goals. They depersonalize by giving members a neutral status that does not reflect individual attributes or attachments. Semi-citizenships are sets of rights available to people with certain characteristics. As I elaborate below, they are not social identities. These differential  rights bundles are more abstract than social identities can be. Semi-citizenships also formalize people’s status by creating documentation and procedures for identifying citizens of various sorts and legitimizing their claims. For example, giving a person a  visa accords them a limited subset of the fuller and more permanent  rights to residence and free movement conferred by a  passport or legal nationality. This has the additional effect of organizing diverse subsets of a population with respect to each other and the state. Semi-citizenships further assist in the integration of those included in the population through various forms of policy and law that address what were described in the preceding section as “exceptional” persons and the statuses these persons are assigned. Semi-citizenships in the modern  state also assist in differentiating subtle variations in status and rights. To constitute a citizenry, a population must be ordered. To avoid the  A rendtian dilemma of the irrational non-person, semi-citizens must be integrated into the polity via the conferral of rights even though they do not in some way conform to the requirements of full citizens. Rights, as established in Chapter 2, are relationships. In this case, they are relationships between individuals and states. To deny a  right is not simply to deny someone a good or a resource. In the absence of a right or a set of rights that links the state with individuals in the population, the state need not acknowledge a particular relationship with a given individual. This pares part of an individual’s existence away from their political identity and in turn spares the state the task of governing that which is ungovernable, either because to do so would violate liberal norms, or because of practical constraints created by  constitutional democracy. It does so without landing either the state or the individuals it governs in the problematic position created by  A rendt’s  stateless person. The capacity to confer partial bundles of  rights ensures that states will be able to govern  children, adults with compromised rational capacities, transient persons, and others to whom general rules regarding the acquisition of citizenship do not apply. Semi-citizenship therefore cannot be regarded as simple  exclusion. 75

 Poggi, The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects, 95.

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It expresses difference in an institutional capacity. The state can recognize semi-citizens, and semi-citizens can recognize the state. By differentiating thusly, semi-citizenship is incorporative in the way that  Poggi describes as crucial to the functioning of the state. States can govern selectively by severing and/or imposing relationships selectively. To confer a right imposes a political relationship between an individual and a state. C.  Creating Flexibility In addition to creating compromises among diverse doctrines of citizenship and rationally ordering diverse populations, semi-citizenships also lend elasticity to doctrinal accord over the content of citizenship and the boundaries of citizenries. They allow states to make and subsequently remake choices about who is governed, and in what manner, by shifting individuals and groups between  categories of semi-citizenship. The presence of multiple  categories of membership is accompanied by the possibility for, and means through which, states can shift parts of the population between different forms of semi-citizenships in any number of directions. Unbundling  rights, or at least keeping this possibility alive by ensuring that rights are not treated as if they were predicated on each other, allows states the opportunity to move individuals and groups between citizenship  categories. For example, nationality and social  rights impose political relationships on  children before they can be granted full citizenship. These relationships become the grounds for shifting  children into full citizens as they reach the age of  majority.76 In the other direction, the creation of disabilities for people who break the law, i.e., denying the  franchise to convicted  felons, shifts a group of people out of full citizenship and into semi-citizenship. This means that, while semi-citizenship  categories are durable, their membership need not be. No group must necessarily occupy any given category. States set rules that determine who lands in which semi-citizenship quadrant. Referring back to Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3, people can be moved around among all four quadrants of the table, as well as on and off the table entirely. People whose rights are regularly renegotiated because they lack  constitutional protections of their fundamental  rights may find themselves shifted between  categories.77 They have none of the attributes of citizens. Regardless of the basis  Peter S. Schuck and Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). 77  For example, Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller makes the point that in America “gays and lesbians have seen their rights put to popular vote more often than any other  m inority 76

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upon which people become entitled to rights, the administering of rights accords  states specific forms of control over those individuals who receive them. In the contemporary  United States this has recently yielded, among many other things, the revival of enemy  alien law that allows the indefinite detention of terror suspects, and discretionary powers accorded to the Attorney General to permit recent  immigrants of  Cuban descent to jump immigration and even asylum  queues.78 The fact that the rights of citizenship are not  contingent also allows a state to revise and change its membership in more or less dramatic ways, without having to change the meaning or definition of citizenship. Members of the  military do not have due  process  rights equivalent to those of civilians; however, due  process remains among the core citizenship rights. This may or may not be just, but for the purposes of this argument, what is worth noting is that this can and does happen.  T he citizenry can be continually pruned from within, as well as by the longstanding  exclusions that keep some people from ever experiencing full  inclusion. Citizenship can extend  equality by what it confers on citizens, by determining whom it excludes from citizenship, and by determining the degree and manner of that  exclusion. Because each right instantiates a specific relationship between the state and an individual, their justifications can sever specific relationships without either necessarily excluding someone so fully that they become entirely rightless, or rendering any of the logics of citizenship fully impotent.

group; in forty-three incidents between the years 1977 and 1993, seventy-nine percent of these ballot measures were passed by what  M adison would have called “tyrannical” majorities opposed to civil rights for lesbians and gays.” Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller, The Limits to Union: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Civil Rights (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 18. 78  Discretion figures prominently in the creation and maintenance of semi-citizenships, a fact that is noted as disturbing to defenders of liberal citizenship. Leonard Feldman cites Judge D. Lowell Jensen’s decision in a case regarding  homelessness, where he writes that “status cannot be defined as a function of the discretionary acts of others.” Joyce v. San Francisco, 857. Feldman goes on to explain that “Beneath these contradictory gestures toward the social and governmental acts of creating and ending  homelessness lies a deeper anxiety that motivates the rejection of the idea of a status resulting from political relations and ‘discretionary acts’: tracing  homeless status back to the discretionary acts of the state would threaten the figure of the voluntaristic, liberal agent as the foundation of liberal society and liberal government. If discretionary acts of the state (such as funding decisions about public housing and decisions about urban redevelopment projects) lead to making people involuntarily  homeless, then the state, in punishing sleeping in public would be punishing people for becoming what the state has made them.” Leonard C. Feldman, Citizens Without Shelter (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004), 62.

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VI.  Alternative Explanations of Semi-Citizenship The fact that semi-citizenships serve purposes, none of which is ­automatically associated with specific forms of hierarchy, calls into question the idea that semi-citizenships can be explained solely through reference to bias held by dominant groups. The preceding discussion of the role played by semi-citizenships in effecting doctrinal compromises, ordering populations, and creating flexibility supports the related assertion that such statuses are not mistaken applications of normative  theories that, if rectified, would result in full  inclusion. The discussion of existing accounts of semi-citizenship in Chapter 2 emphasized two problems with accounts of citizenship and  exclusion that focus on the normative bases of each, to the exclusion of other factors. Liberal and democratic norms of citizenship cannot accommodate ambiguous thresholds of membership and offer unitary understandings of citizenship. There is no room for someone who is “somewhat rational” in  liberal theory, for example. As the preceding sections of this chapter elaborated, normative  theories of membership therefore cannot account for  exclusions that are produced by contradictions internal to these theories, let alone conflict between normative  theories and the political institutions charged with realizing them. This leaves unanswered the question of how unequal statuses are produced. If neither norms, nor the structures within which they are institutionalized, are responsible for instances in which unequal forms of membership are produced, then an explanation must be offered that shifts responsibility elsewhere. What remains, when abstract norms and institutions are exonerated, are explanations that assign responsibility to dominant individuals and classes that seek to assert power over threatening or less powerful individuals and classes. Individuals and classes whose interests and biases run contrary to equal citizenship are often, and sometimes accurately, seen as responsible for engendering hierarchy. This introduces a convenient appendage to normative  theories of citizenship that denies the inevitability of semi-citizenship by preserving the understanding that unitary memberships could be realized under the right circumstances. There exist several approaches to the general thesis that citizenship is primarily shaped by the beliefs of dominant classes who are able to control agendas in liberal democracies. One exposition of this view is presented by Michael Mann’s article “Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship.”79  Mann sharply 79

 Michael Mann, “Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship,” Sociology 21 (1987): 339–354.

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criticizes T.H. Marshall for, among other things, over-emphasizing and misunderstanding the nature of the “evolutionary Anglophile” model of citizenship. Rather than representing the future of citizenship,  Mann posits that the Anglophile is only one of several versions of a capitalist citizenship regime in which the dominant ruling class – a combination of the bourgeoisie and political/ military elite – subverts class  conflict through the careful manipulation of the elements of citizenship. However, as Bryan  Turner has subsequently pointed out,  Mann was so intent on a  Marxist interpretation of citizenship at the time that he failed to acknowledge how other forces, among them racial conflict, entered into the picture.80  Race,  gender, and  ethnicity have all served as justifications for greater and lesser degrees of  exclusion in all liberal democracies. The gap left by  Mann has been addressed in a variety of ways by a host of political and social theorists. Prominent among them is  Rogers M. Smith, whose book Civic Ideals traces the influence of America’s “multiple traditions” on the development of a citizenship that often excluded groups on the basis of  ascription.81 Feminist theorists have engaged in a like-minded set of debates about the ways in which  gender has served as a means for excluding  women from elements of citizenship.82 At their most skeptical, dominant class theorists assert that the  equality of those fully included must always be predicated on the economic, racial, and/or sexual  oppression of others. Dominant class  interest approaches to citizenship are not necessarily dependent on a faulty definition of citizenship. Indeed, they may be better positioned than any other to identify partial citizenships. But the framing they use treats semi-citizenships as if they are both the products of flawed norms/applications of norms, and as if excluded groups can be pasted back into full citizenship. However, they are all motivated by a normative critique of dominant class  interests that can obscure some of the ways in which states, independent of ideology, shape citizenship. This normative bent encourages scholars of citizenship to look at how the empowerment of oppressed classes, or conversely, the dismantling of illiberal laws, policies, and sometimes political regimes, can be expected to change the circumstances of citizenship and to eliminate or minimize partial and wholesale  exclusion. This in turn reinforces the idea that a single unitary citizenship  Bryan S. Turner, “Outline of a Theory of Citizenship,” British Journal of Sociology 24 (1990): 189–214. 81  Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 82  Yuval-Davis, “The Multi-Layered Citizen”; Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 80

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is both a normative ideal for membership toward which the  liberal state can evolve, and that the  exclusion of some people or groups from such a citizenship is only the result of the self-serving or otherwise malign intentions of a dominant ruling class. Without discrediting the idea that powerful social and economic class  interests influence the shape of citizenship and semi-citizenship, one of the conclusions of this chapter’s discussion of conflicting logics of citizenship is that a single, unitary form of citizenship cannot accommodate the diverse political statuses created when liberal, ethical, and administrative frameworks of membership collide. The imperatives involved in the creation of semi-citizenships would persist regardless of which, if any, identifiable classes are dominant.  Governmentality will perpetually require citizenship as a tool to make rational and governable those whom ruling political philosophies cannot govern: namely, parts of the population which do not, or are not, permitted to conform to expectations of full members even when those expectations are not described in ways that express social and economic class  interests. The most readily apparent of the dilemmas that dominant class explanations of semi-citizenship create is that such explanations imply that the ideal of  equality is unrealized because of flawed or incomplete applications of liberal principles.  Women and  m inorities can be “amended” into  constitutions and representative bodies that had not originally been inclusive, thus realizing liberal ideals. More recently, difference theorists have raised the possibility that  equality and diversity may be sufficiently at odds with one another as to pose a fundamental conflict to liberal norms as they have been institutionalized in post-enlightenment polities.83 At its most pessimistic, this suggests that the extension of liberal  rights to some will always rest on the  m isrecognition,  exclusion, and  exploitation of others, as a number of feminist and  M arxist theorists  assert. Our best hope is therefore to engage in dialogic acts geared toward ongoing expression and  recognition in the hope that such acts will themselves engender mutually transformative understandings, even as identities shift and create new needs for public deliberation and fresh identities in need of  recognition. However, this also seems to imply that if underlying forms of  exploitation and  m isrecognition were eradicated from both social and political life, regardless of their bases, it would be at least possible to offer equal citizenship to all members of a society. In other  See in particular Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988).

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words, semi-citizenship is the product of the competing interests and political understandings of groups, identities, classes, and individuals. In regarding dominant classes and ideologies as responsible for engendering semi-citizenship, proponents of this view fail to acknowledge the structural context provided by the  “state-as-cockpit,” or the ways in which associated institutions, absent even any of the political imperatives described by dominant class theorists, will require semicitizenships in order to effectively maintain themselves.

VII.  Conclusion An inscribed and differentially situated citizenry is not a contemporary or even a modern phenomenon. Yet particular qualities of ­semi-citizenship are directly linked to governmental logic that becomes manifest within the context of the state.  Administrative rationality exerts power, usually through the state, over populations. The  sovereign borders of states are relatively inflexible but do not always refer to the populations a state must or can effectively govern. Layered on top of this are norms of liberal  theory that emphasize rights that attach to individuals based on a conception of  personhood, regardless of whether these persons are similarly situated in relation to the state. Finally, democratic norms demand boundaries of an entirely different sort, most often those derived from ethical standards that depart from the very general idea of a population, physical borders, and inclusive moral conceptions of  personhood. In short, each of these ways of thinking about power depends on its own conception of citizenship which in turn makes citizenship simultaneously a commonly held and a contested concept. It should therefore come as no surprise that in balancing the demands made by each of these perspectives on political power, semi-citizenships are formed. The common ground of rights, and the relationships that rights instantiate, is divided by the kinds of relationships different forms of power require to maintain themselves. What remains is then to link these different relationships to the specific fissures that have been proposed as distinguishing forms of semicitizenship from one another and from full citizenship. In particular, this requires returning to the distinction between autonomous and  relative rights that compose the four quadrants of Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3. In the next two chapters (5 and 6), I examine several cases of semi-citizenship in order to flesh out more elaborately how these connections become manifest. I look closely at nationality, arguably the most universally

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understood autonomous right, to see how it is distributed/imposed in differential forms. I then look at several cases in which relative  rights are restricted in differential fashion. These cases include the case of  children’s citizenship and  LGBT citizenship. The former demonstrates the possibility of having semi-citizenship that is almost entirely autonomous.  Children have virtually no  relative rights. The second exemplifies an instance of a comparatively contained restriction. In most democracies and in most states in the United States,  LGBT citizens have virtually identical bundles of autonomous and relative  rights as other citizens, but they cannot marry. Though these cases are not by any means encyclopedic, they cover all four combinations of strong and weak relative and autonomous  rights. They indicate both how (what we generally take to be) a single right can be internally disaggregated, as well as how rights that constitute the entire citizenship bundle can be disaggregated from each other. Each case also demonstrates different manifestations of friction between the competing influences of states,  governmentality, norms of  liberalism, and norms of  democracy. What is ultimately revealed is a larger picture of citizenship in which fluidity is balanced with surprising forms of durability. Both are significant and have normative value and vulnerability that call into question whether existing arguments addressing  inclusion and  equality actually obtain.

5 Semi-Citizenship and the Disaggregation of Autonomous Rights

I.  Introduction  Autonomous rights, as defined in Chapter 2, are rights to  goods that do not derive their meaning from any specific political context. Unlike the good of representation,  for example, autonomous goods  are valuable outside of the context of any specific political system. Autonomous goods –  such as the    right to secure residence, free movement, basic welfare, family formation, and freedom of thought and speech – take very similar forms for all people in all contexts. In contrast,  rights to participate in a political process and more embedded civil  rights, such as those associated with  participation in the free  market, derive their meaning from the political context in which they are generated. Autonomous rights, as well as their relationship to relative  rights, can be justified in a number of different ways.  A Kantian liberal will argue that no one could legitimately be deprived of autonomous rights as long as they are rational and capable of self-rule. An ethical democratic theorist will argue that autonomous rights follow from one’s membership in a political community, which implies that connection to these communities and the meeting of those terms ground autonomous rights. In turn, the administrative  rationality of the state system dictates that relative  rights be accorded based on practical concerns of governing populations. Each of these positions has enough in common with either of the other two that they can coexist within single political systems. Yet, each contains the seeds of divergence that can lead to different conclusions about who is entitled to which rights, and under which circumstances. The confluence of conflicting doctrines of citizenship means that multiple doctrines are constantly competing to justify rights in any given 141

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polity. Such competition yields a splintering of any single kind of right into constitutive parts, which in turn are associated with different combinations of autonomous and relative  rights of citizenship. This chapter will demonstrate how the disaggregation of autonomous rights is in fact commonplace, long-standing, and inevitable. To illustrate these claims, and to connect them with the arguments that precede this chapter, it focuses on the autonomous  right of nationality. Nationality, though taken to be a single right, is frequently internally dissected into statuses that offer some, but not all, of its component parts (primarily  rights of residence and free movement). Nationality also comes unbundled from other autonomous and relative  rights. Nationality is often presumed to be a status that is linked to normatively grounded bases for  desert. These in turn ground the conferral of various relative  rights that are given meaning by the political systems within the  sovereign borders of the state in question, rendering citizenship a  contingently bundled package. In this thinking, different relationships to  sovereign borders yield different degrees of  desert that engender different relationships of responsibility on the part of the state. However, as forecast in Chapter 3, this assumption of  contingency is belied by practice. Autonomous rights of the sort that transcend context are not bundled together as we might expect, given their relationship to nearly universal understandings of human need. There is also no link between understandings of liberal and democratic norms of  desert that connect the bases for an individual’s right to be in a given place with their entitlement to various relative  rights associated with fuller membership in the polity. People who have anomalous relationships to the  rights of nationality do not all have the same order of semi-citizenship, even though most such people are immigrants. Instead, they end up scattered throughout all four quadrants of the table depicting different combinations of autonomous and relative  rights, alongside people with disparate social identities but similar forms of semi-citizenship. What triggers the conferral of various other rights upon the  foreign-born can only be understood as a set of compromises among liberal  theory, democratic norms, and administrative  rationality. Section II lays out a description of how we can understand nationality within the language of rights. Based on this understanding, Section III describes a number of possible statuses in which people are neither entirely included in, nor entirely excluded from, a given nationality. Such instances of partial nationality demonstrate how even that which is often taken to be a unitary right is disaggregated into stronger and weaker versions. This in turn illustrates breaks in links of  contingency that standard expectations

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of citizenship dictate join autonomous and relative  rights. It is not the case that every person who lacks full rights of residence and free movement is restricted in the same way, or that she has an identical concomitant set of limitations on her other autonomous and relative  rights. Thus, we see individuals with stronger and weaker versions of nationality, as well as individuals whose relative  rights do not track with what we would expect given their autonomous rights . Sections IV through VII describe points of conflict between logics grounding citizenship at which these statuses are produced. Beginning with general points about the conferral of rights to residence and free movement, doctrinal compromises consistently reappear throughout history in the form of similar semi-citizenship statuses, and across countries traditionally understood to embody discrete and distinct approaches to citizenship. Section VIII delves deeper into the reasoning behind the most prominent bases for according differential rights of residence and free movement to reveal a set of compromises among administrative  rationality,  liberalism, and democratic  theory. Section IX performs a similar kind of analysis on how these semi-citizenships engender order and rationalize the population by creating flexibility and allowing categorical change.  Before concluding, Section X looks at  postnational citizenship in order to indicate the durability of semi-citizenships rooted in differential rights of free movement and residence.

II.  Autonomous Rights of Nationality  A basic definition of nationality draws a congruent relationship between the nation and the state. Nation-states are defined by the enforcement of sovereign boundaries. Hannah  A rendt demonstrated the strength of looking at nationality this way by illuminating the failures of modern rights regimes in accommodating the needs of those who are excluded from holding any nationality.1 However, scholars who make claims about cultural nations note that states can contain within their boundaries a multiplicity of groups who share many characteristics with nations, some even making claims of partial sovereignty.2 Through the study of nationalist sentiments, even more institutionally diffuse groups have come to be

 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1979), 275. 2  S ee Anthony D. S. Smith, Nationalism (New York: New York University Press, 1979); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). See also Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983). 1

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thought of as nations.3 The experiences of national  minorities force some groups to constitute themselves as nations in opposition to dominant and often oppressive, or indifferent, majority social and political cultures. This opens up the definition of “nation” to include many geographically and institutionally diffuse groups that share certain identity traits. While the International Court of  Justice has shown some inclination to recognize affective ties as partly constitutive of nationality, 4 it has also been explicit about the fact that such ties are between individuals and states, not individuals and sub-state communities. Thus, scholars of international relations say nationality “ascribes a person to a determined human collectivity, which is characterized by its ‘stateness’ (sovereignty).”5 This is consistent with the approaches to nationality taken in the classic  political philosophy literature that attends to nationality in international relations.6 It is also consistent with the ways in which the legal status of nationality has been constructed by both national and international law. Most states have nationality laws or acts describing the terms on which nationality is bestowed by the state just as they would for any other autonomous right of  citizenship.7 Linking nationality to sovereign bodies helps us move toward a definition of nationality despite the notorious difficulties that have beset scholars attempting to define nations and  nationalism.8 From this legal perspective, nationality governs residence and movement.9  Nationality is therefore defined in large part by the fact that it ascribes to a group of people the  right to enter and/or to remain within the sovereign borders of a state. States’ efforts to “monopolize the legitimate means of movement” are in large part an effort to “define mutually exclusive groups of citizens.”10 The legal/territorial definition does not contradict claims that   3 Smith, Nationalism.   4 See the Nottebohm case, Liechtenstein v. Guatemala (Second Phase), International Court of Justice Reports, 1955.   5 Carlos Closa, “EU Citizenship at the 1996 IGC,” in Dual Nationality, Social Rights and Federal Citizenship in the United States and Europe, eds. Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil (New York: Berghahn, 2002), 297.   6 See J. B. Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law (London: Humphrey Milford, 1934).    7 See Ruth Donner, The Regulation of Nationality in International Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1994).   8 Anderson, Imagined Communities.   9 Tomas Hammar uses this thin understanding of nationality as a springboard for his own more circumscribed theory of  denizenship in Democracy and the Nation State, 2nd ed. (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990), 16. 10  John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 13.

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others might wish to make regarding identity and culture, but it does distinguish them conceptually. Furthermore, using the territorial definition of nationality would imply that it would yield few if any differentiations among nationals, since the variables at stake have been reduced to rights of residence within clearly demarcated sovereign borders. For the purposes at hand, nationality will be considered to refer to the formal legal status that is associated with the  right to enter and remain within the boundaries of a sovereign state according to rules set by that state. As such, it is an autonomous right.11 Most nationalities are assigned at birth either through a rule of  jus sanguinis or  jus soli.12 People who do not receive nationality as a  birthright, or who wish to change their nationality, must petition for the  right to naturalize, usually from within the boundaries of the state whose nationality they wish to receive. A very small minority will be rejected, and these stateless  persons will be forced to exist without a nationality.

III.  Disaggregating the Autonomous Right of Nationality One might predict that the demands of sovereignty would prevent states from toying with the binary  categories of national and non-national. Sovereignty itself would seem to demand that national and non-national   R ainer Bauböck’s delineation of human rights includes reference to nationality as a right. Rainer Bauböck, Transnational Citizenship: Membership and Rights in International Migration (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1994). Nira Yuval-Davis similarly recognizes the importance of nationality because it assigns the right to residence and free movement; Yuval-Davis, “The Multi-Layered Citizen.” There are important congruities between people deprived of rights associated with legal nationality and �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� homeless people whose legal and social circumstances conspire to deprive them of public or private spaces within which they can reside. Thus it is neither conceptually inaccurate nor an exaggeration to call people  displaced by natural disasters  “refugees.” Indeed, Temporary Protected  Status is sometimes accorded to such persons. Within a single state, economic and environmental emergencies can displace people in similar fashion, rendering them “internally  displaced.” 12  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ A description of birthright ������������������������������������������������������������ citizenship (which implies an ancient equivalent of nationality as well as the rights I have associated with citizenship) can be found as far back as  A ristotle’s Politics. He writes,  “But in practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom both the parents are citizens …” See Aristotle, The Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Book III, Chapter 2. In modern politics this is likely related to strictures put in place in early nations when waiting even a few days after birth to document nationality meant risking spoilage of evidence crucial to determining that status. Gérard Noiriel, “The Identification of the Citizen: The Birth of Republican Civil Status in  France,” in Documenting Individual Identity, eds. Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 28–48. 11

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remain distinct and unitary  categories. However, if defining and securing rights of residence and movement are the central purposes of nationality, it becomes immediately clear that nationality can be and is an internally disaggregated right.  Statelessness is actually just an extreme case of a much more common condition – that of being a member of a partially sovereign people.13 Both rights of movement and residence, as well as access to other autonomous and relative  rights of citizenship, are parceled out in a number of different ways to distinguish degrees of membership held by individuals who make up populations that are all in some way governed by a state. In practice, nationality is offered in degrees rather than as a wholesale right that is then associated with a unitary status. The bookend points of immigration – entry and  naturalization – provide a first glimpse at how the  right to nationality can be disaggregated. Entry documents bear out the ways in which the autonomous right to free movement is disaggregated at the border: “The modern compulsory identity documents for all (international) travelers … are intimately ­connected to the concept of distinct nation-states inhabited by citizens or  subjects equal before the law …”14 Sovereign states issue  passports to their nationals that entitle them to the largest set of rights of free movement . However,  rights of entrance and residence are associated not just with  passport-holding “full” nationals, but also with a number of individuals who are not officially recognized as citizens of a state. “License to move” can take numerous and varied forms that confer a potentially infinite array of limited rights to move across and to reside within a set of borders.15 Many people have what might, for efficiency’s sake, be termed temporary,  partial passports: learner’s permits, motorcycle licenses, or other documents of identification with limited access  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Observe that ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� sovereignty itself can be found in partial forms, as is the case with territories such as  P uerto Rico, the Virgin  Islands, or  Guam, and with partially  selfgoverning  indigenous populations in many democratic  states. 14  Andreas K. Fahrmeir, “Governments and Forgers: Passports in Nineteenth-Century Europe” in Individual Identity, eds. Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 219. In fact, the documents that came to represent one’s status in society during the era of nation-state formation are considered to have been integral in those formative processes. “The administrative formalities entailed by civil identification were in themselves a powerful factor in the process of national integration, not least because their ‘universality’ extended only as far as the limits of the territory over which the state exercised its  sovereignty.” Noiriel, “The Identification of the Citizen,” 46. 15  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Ronen Shamir aptly discusses “license to move” in the context of a larger argument about the means with which mobility is restricted within and by  g lobalization. Ronen Shamir, “Without Borders? Notes on Globalization as a Mobility Regime,” Sociological Theory 23(2) (2005): 201. 13

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and that expire quickly.16  T hese are visas,  work permits, and various other documents that give individuals the right to remain within a given territory despite their non-national status. Such documentation permits movement between states and residence within the borders of states for non-nationals. People who arrive with temporary  visas are not nationals; yet, in being granted the  right to enter a country they are granted a form of  recognition that contains elements of nationality.17  Visas aren’t  passports, but they are official state documents that govern the terms of movement across, and  residence within, sovereign borders. They also generally accord individuals a subset of rights and responsibilities commonly associated with citizenship – or semi-citizenship. Under certain circumstances, even the  recognition of undocumented  immigrants’ rights begins to look like a slender slice of nationality. Such documents distinguish among a plethora of administratively distinct  categories of semi-citizens that emerge out of an examination of non-standard relationships or forms of nationality. A person with a non-standard relationship to a given nationality may be in the process of acquiring a new nationality (in other words, on track to naturalize). They may be living temporarily, indefinitely, or permanently outside of the sovereign borders of the country whose nationality they do hold, and with or without the consent of the host country. Finally, they may hold no nationality at all, or may be exercising the rights of a  transnational citizenship without full membership in a member-state of the transnational organization of which they are a member, as in the case of non-EU member-state citizens who enter the EU. Included in the possible groups of persons who may have limited  rights of free movement and residence are: undocumented  immigrants;18 economic  immigrants;  guestworkers;  Only undocumented  immigrants have no claims to residence. In the United States,  amnesty programs give some undocumented persons potential claims to citizenshiptrack status. Furthermore, an extensive set of rights are available even to the undocumented in many  democratic states, which indicates a form of semi-citizenship that exists independent of claims to nationality. 17  An unusual acknowledgment of this fact appears in “The Compendium of the Pursuit of Divine Knowledge.” In the book, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif accuses the 9/11 hijackers of “betraying the enemy,” because they had been given U.S.  visas, which are a  “contract of protection.” Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, quoted in Lawrence Wright, “The Rebellion Within: An Al Qaeda Mastermind Questions Terrorism,” The New Yorker 7 June (2008): 47. 18  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Contestation over persons loosely categorized as “undocumented” or “illegal” indicates the degree to which more descriptively precise tools for identifying semi-citizens is needed. Peter Nyers identifies the “gray area” of what he terms ������������������ “non-status immigrants” as persons with rejected  refugee claims, no official identity documents, defunct sponsorship, expired  visas, or subject to unprecedented deportation. He writes, 16

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 refugees and other political migrants (such as persons with temporary protected  status);  stateless persons; permanent  residents; immigrants reuniting with family; long-term residents of states that have membership in transnational organizations like the EU; immigrants originating from countries having special relationships with the host country (post-colonial relationships may engender variations on nationality that involve different sets of rules regarding border crossing and citizenship rights, for example; Puerto  R icans have a very complex relationship with United  States nationality, and Puerto  R icans living in the  United States are further differentiated from those who do not live on the mainland19); officially recognized national  minorities, such as  indigenous peoples or groups such as Roma; and, finally, people with miscellaneous atypical circumstances of nationality such as enemy  combatants,  orphans, and abandoned  children, who cannot be placed with relatives in their country of origin.20 Under many circumstances, internally  displaced persons may also have limited rights that render them semi-citizens, and people accused or convicted of some crimes may also be prevented from moving freely.21 To the extent that no viable options are available for homeless  persons, they too could be regarded as having limitations placed on their rights to residence when they are forcibly removed from public spaces. “scholars have begun using terms such as ‘uncertain status’, ‘precarious status’, and ‘gradations of status’.” Peter Nyers, “No One Is Illegal Between City and Nation,” in Acts of Citizenship, eds. Engin F. Isin and Greg M. Nielson (London and New York: Zed Books, 2008), 165. 19  Perhaps the most complex cases of  postcolonial differential rights of residence have resulted from the multi-layered and multiple iterations of rules for residents of former British colonies. Different rules apply to persons from each former colony and vary depending on individual political status as well; see http://www.ips.gov.uk/passport/ apply-eligibility-am-i.asp; last accessed October 10, 2008. For example, the United Kingdom extended British citizenship in 1999 to residents of dependent territories after it disentitled them in 1981; see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/298408. stm; last accessed October 10, 2008. In 2002, a 30-year-old rule, which had rendered 35,000 overseas citizens stateless, was revoked, allowing those persons to enter the U.K. and enjoy citizenship. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2287701.stm; last accessed October 10, 2008. The case of  postcolonial relationships is one of many examples of groups that do not fit into Hammar’s category of  d enizen (discussed in Chapter 2), which one might initially suggest as a proxy for semi-citizen. 20  ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� I have chosen not to include dual ���������������������������������������������������������� nationals in this list. Although dual ������������������ nationality technically marks an anomalous relationship to nationality, it doesn’t place people in a position that alters either nationality radically. 21  Internally  displaced persons (IDPs) are a complicated case but generally qualify because they have been forcibly expelled from their home. IDPs are “forced migrants” who “never left their country,” or who “remain within their country.” William B. Wood, “Forced Migration: Local Conflicts and International Dilemmas,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84(4) (1994): 607–634.

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Each group of ostensible non-nationals, from the invisible ­undocumented worker to the person about to swear allegiance to their adoptive homeland and receive a new  passport, demonstrates an exception to generally accepted rules regarding nationality. Each is exercising some version of a right to residence. On one end of the continuum of nationality are people who aren’t welcome anywhere but are perpetually held within a nationstate’s borders pending the unlikely event they can be deported. On the other end are people who are fast-tracked to full citizenship because they hail from a country with a specific political relationship to the host country. Groups and individuals who occupy points in between are assigned a distinctive relationship to the sovereign borders they inhabit. Some may come and go as they please, participating in many forms of democratic politics. Others are restricted to remaining within the purview of an employer who has sponsored their temporary  residence. Still others are restricted to jail cells, as they await trials or deportations that may or may not prove feasible. The rights they do enjoy are granted and administered by the  states in which they reside.

IV.  Administrative Rationality and the Autonomous Right of Nationality The three doctrines of citizenship, liberal norms, democratic norms, and administrative  rationality, each award the right to reside and move freely in accordance with different priorities, and hence in varying combinations to different sets of people. As indicated in Chapter 4, administrative  rationality channels the governmental priority of control over populations. Some, but not all, boundaries of human populations correspond to the borders of sovereign states, although for much of modern history states have been primary agents of administrative  rationality. Administrative  rationality has at times entailed open policies of immigration and even immigrant recruitment, for example, when the demands of settling territory require expanding a population. At other points, the imperatives of  security or a shrinking economy can dictate foreclosing opportunities for  visas and permission to stay within a country’s borders.22 The various distinctions made between people with varying forms of aspirations and commitments to a given sovereign state are linked to imperatives of  governmentality.  Europe, for instance, followed the goal of “zero  immigration” until recently. See Randall Hansen, “The Free Economy and the Jacobin State, or How Europe Can Cope with the Coming Immigration Wave,” in Debating Immigration, ed. Carol M. Swain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 223.

22

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Forms of partial nationality can encourage certain types of migration in favor of others. For example, the need to maintain the workforce, or vulnerable sectors of the workforce, often drives governments to seek out people to enter the country if there is work that the  native-born population is either unable to or chooses not to do. Immigration has also been recommended as an antidote to the low or negative birth  rates of many western countries. Nationality is one of several powerful tools used by states to make legible and inscribe populations that might otherwise prove ill-defined and therefore ungovernable.23  Hannah Arendt describes nationality as the tool through which states take control of their populations.24 “Territorial closure against noncitizens serves vital and tangible state interests; it is essential to the modern territorial state and state-system. The same cannot be said for other modes of membership.”25 Nationality is a practical means for determining who can go where and under which (or whose) auspices. It organizes people within the state system. The claims of membership made by human populations that spread beyond sovereign physical borders, or those that are defined by historical ties, languages, or other national characteristics, can be sorted through based upon the rules that states deploy to enforce their sovereign domains. To the extent that postnational bodies administer  rights associated with movement and residence, much the same is true.26 

 The metaphor of legibility draws upon the work of  James Scott, while the idea of inscription is suggested by Shannon Stimson in her review of James Scott’s Seeing Like a State. Shannon Stimson, “Rethinking the State: Perspective on the Legibility and Production of Political Societies,” Political Theory 28(6) (2000): 822–834. Both metaphors are apt and evocative of the relationship between states and the statuses they assign members and would-be members. 24  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 275. 25  Rogers Brubaker,  C itizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 27. 26  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ The European ��������������������������������������������������������������������� Union is the primary exemplar of a postnational body that has superseded member-state rules regarding free movement. However the softening of such boundaries within the EU has been accompanied by the hardening of new borders that correspond to the Union itself. This “fortress Europe” exemplifies administrative  rationality’s resilience outside of the context of the state. See Etienne Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene (London and New York: Verso, 2002), especially Chapter 5. Long-Term Residents of European States receive their status from states although the category was created through the agreement of member states of the  European Union. On the derivative nature of  European Union citizenship, see Lydia Morris, “Globalization, Migration and the Nation-State: the Path to a Post-national Europe?” British Journal of Sociology 48(2) (1997): 192–209. 23

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V.  Moral and Ethical Norms and the Autonomous Right of Nationality In contrast to administrative  rationality, liberal and democratic theories deploy moral and/or ethical reasons for offering people the  right to residence and free movement. Liberal moral norms root distinctions in claims that can be organized by their relevance to political understandings of autonomy. The most unqualifiedly liberal understanding of the  right to move freely does not admit the legitimacy of borders.27  Liberalism recognizes the entitlement of all autonomous persons. If rights are attached to rational capacities, there is no justification for denying anyone residence or free movement even if they hail from a far-flung place, or are culturally and/or ideologically different from the existing population. Any democratic  theory will diverge from this to some degree, if only to root the right to residence and free movement in the existence of some kind of political collective. An even more divergent version of democratic  theory, associated with ethical norms, accords different  rights of residence and free movement to persons more or less able to fulfill specific roles identified by the ethical character of the  demos.  Rights of residence and free movement are conferred upon people who can or are likely to meet standards of democratic membership, whatever those may be. This demands distinguishing the culturally compatible from the incompatible, or designating some people as unable to fulfill the basic  responsibilities of a democratic citizen. States may also recraft opportunities for nationality to promote or protect ideologies integral to the foundation of the state.28 As is true with administrative  rationality, the problem of threshold issues raised in Chapter 2 reemerges; each of these forms of reasoning characterizes differently the thresholds that people must meet in order to qualify for citizenship. When joined, the resulting understandings of membership do not lend themselves to making binary distinctions. Capacities, either liberal/moral or democratic/ethical, cannot easily be pinned to precise definitions or even traits.29  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Joseph Carens has described this position from several perspectives within the liberal tradition. Joseph Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” The Review of Politics 49(2) (1987): 251–273. 28  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� For example, the United States has created a permanent exception to rules about immigration for people of  Cuban descent. 29  In fact,  Carens himself has called citizenship a threshold concept and argued that this ought to imply expansive membership in liberal  states. Joseph Carens, “Membership and Morality: Admission to Citizenship in Liberal Democratic States,” in Immigration and Citizenship in Europe and the United States, ed. R. W. Brubaker (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 31–50. See also Joseph Carens, “Democracy and 27

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 B ecause liberalism and  democracy are inextricably intertwined with each other and with administrative  rationality, conflict over the thresholds people must meet to acquire different elements of citizenship is inevitable. No single resolution to the question of which logic ought to take precedence in decisions regarding residence and free movement makes itself apparent. Different interpretations of political  right will yield different rules for awarding nationality. This makes the similarity of semi-citizenships associated with partial  rights of nationality, although they may be generated by seemingly disparate nation-states, all the more striking. Despite their different histories and different relationships to all three doctrines, most states end up creating very similar combinations of the  rights of nationality, often with very similar bases. The bases upon which nationality  rights become disaggregated are strikingly similar in countries that are often posited as having divergent approaches to immigration. They also track historically. In the next two sections (VI and VII), I illustrate how immigration  categories have been constructed to accommodate conflicts among liberal norms, democratic norms, and administrative  rationality. Section VI looks at the  ascription of nationality through the common lenses of  jus soli and  jus sanguinis, paying close attention to the fact that the two very different normative bearings of each rule nonetheless yields similar versions of partial nationality  rights both throughout history and in different countries. Section VII closely examines the specific divisions related to immigration, most notably  refuge and economic immigration. As is the case with  ascription, differently positioned nation-states continually reproduce similar statuses of partial nationality for the  foreign-born. In the course of examining these conflicts, different semi-citizenship statuses will emerge as representative of compromises brokered between conflicting logics.

VI.  Semi-Citizenship and Ascribed Rights of Nationality Rules regarding the  ascription of citizenship provide one means for examining long-standing forms of semi-citizenship derived from differential  rights of nationality as well as the compromises struck between conflicting logics of citizenship.  Jus soli and  jus sanguinis express disparate Respect for Difference: The Case of Fiji,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 25(3) (1992): 547–631.

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normative logics of citizenship.  France, in employing a law of  jus soli, the assignment of citizenship based upon place of birth, identifies itself as a liberal  state where citizenship is  assimilationist.  G ermany, on the other hand, assigns citizenship based upon the law of  jus sanguinis, the assignment of citizenship based upon blood lineage, thus expressing a closed and somewhat essentialized ethic of membership. As Rogers  Brubaker notes,  jus sanguinis both reflects and institutionalizes an ethnically defined nationhood that is absent or at least weaker in countries such as  France that practice the more normatively liberal  jus soli.  Belying Brubaker’s ideal typical understanding of the  ascription of nationality, however, are practices that acknowledge both the ambiguous thresholds inherent in each kind of reasoning (liberal, democratic, and administrative), as well as the validity of the other doctrines of citizenship. Christian  Joppke has demonstrated how these practices are embodied, demonstrating that neither  France nor  G ermany represents an absolutely pure case of any single  philosophy of citizenship or incorporation.30 Early in the history of the nation-state, administrative practices according  rights of residence and free movement, as well as other rights associated with these statuses, reflected more doctrinal compromise than  Brubaker’s use of  France and  G ermany as ideal types would  suggest. Upon closer examination, and remarkably, very similar “states of exception” or semi-citizenships based on  rights of partial nationality are replicated in supposedly disparate countries, despite their different dominant traditions. Liberal norms, ethical norms, and administrative  rationality can be seen in conflicts over  rights of nationality that generate compromises via semi-citizenships very early in the development of the state, on the one hand, and liberal democratic statehood, on the other.  Brubaker chronicles the ways in which  Prussian and German politics historically refer to types of membership as follows: native, resident, state-citizen (Staatsbürger), subject, and member of the state. At the top of the organizational structure is an über-type, Staatsangehörige, which denotes a general membership status. This is somewhat counterintuitive if we take the principle of  jus sanguinis to imply cut-and-dried distinctions between people whose bloodlines qualify them for membership and people whose bloodlines do not. On its own, this expression of an ethical standard (in this case, connection to a privileged lineage) for membership doesn’t 30

 Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

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seem to require interim statuses of membership.  Jus sanguinis posits blood as the determinant of qualification for membership. As a tool for distinguishing between members and non-members, it is precise. There is no reason to imagine that a German state would be more in need of, or friendly to, semi-citizenships than  Brubaker’s archetypical liberal  state,  France. French law also contained distinctions between different types of citizens.  France, the supposed paragon of liberal, inclusive citizenship law, recognized variants in membership from the outset.  France is often posited as representing a foil to the  Prussian model because, on the face of it, an ascribed “Frenchness” based on French blood matters so little to membership in  France, whereas in  Prussia citizenship literally flows from one’s blood. Yet, from the perspective of the burgeoning state, the two rules generate a remarkably similar set of membership  c ategories. “What mattered, as a determinant of one’s rights and obligations was not, in the first instance, that one was French or  foreign: it was that one ‘belonged’ to a seigneurie, or that one was a noble or a clergyman; or that one was a Protestant or a Jew; or that one was a member of a guild, university, religious foundation, or parlement.”31  Joppke makes an important point in saying that former imperial powers such as  Great Britain may understand rights differently than more isolationist countries such as the  United States.32 Yet, similar legal concepts associated with partial forms of nationality can be seen in both of these contexts. By the seventeenth century, there were a variety of statuses in  England that accorded their bearers varied rights. Some would-be immigrants to  England sought  denization, a process that transformed them into  British subjects with limited rights.  “Denization … bestowed only limited rights, making the  denizen a sort of halfway member who ranked above the  alien yet somewhat below the  native-born or naturalized subject.”33  Denization brought with it restricted civil  rights of  property ownership as well as various political disabilities. Select immigrants could also apply for parliamentary  naturalization, a status that brought  Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 36. Peter  Sahlins’s more recent work exhaustively documents the very important role of droit d’aubain (rights of  property bequeathal) in delineating citizenship status in early modern  France. See Peter Sahlins, Unnaturally French: Foreign Cities in the Old Regime and After (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). 32  Joppke, Immigration and the Nation State. See Chapter 4. 33  James Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 30, 66. 31

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a fuller membership with more complete rights.  Naturalization was as close as immigrants could come to full citizenship, but it too bore political disabilities.34  Denization and  naturalization each bear a remarkable resemblance to the contemporary  categories of permanent  resident and naturalized citizen. The civil disabilities associated with  property ownership, in the case of  denizens, have generally been replaced in the case of permanent  residents, but the political restrictions on them have remained.35  France and  Prussia/ G ermany have a long history of generating interim statuses with disabilities that partially include the very people they otherwise exclude. The rules governing how an émigré changed category was different in each state, as did some of the specific disabilities associated with permanent residence in contrast to full  rights of nationality, but the variants of  foreignness in each of these two countries were similar in the status they imparted and the disabilities these individuals shared. The reasons have varied for describing someone as  foreign, but the partial statuses such  foreignness confers are similar to one another. In fact, it seems remarkable that the tremendous political changes of the past three centuries have not radically overhauled the presence of basic distinctions between nationals, permanent  residents, and naturalized citizens. States continually seek to distinguish between people who are not welcome to enter their borders, those who are welcome to enter but not to participate as full citizens, and finally, those who are welcome to enter and participate in almost all activities associated with full membership.

VII.  Refuge and Economic Migration If we look more closely at the reasoning offered for permitting immigrants  different rights of residence and free movement, as well as other autonomous and relative  rights, we can see even more clearly how liberal norms, democratic norms, and administrative  rationality compete and force compromises in the form of semi-citizenships. Immigrants are most universally distinguished from one another based on the stated motivations for immigration, which in turn link to a normative ordering  Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870, 35, 66–67.   European Union citizenship has eliminated some of these distinctions for memberstate nationals. However, political disabilities are still placed upon non-member-state nationals in most European countries. The regularization of Third Country National Status and immigration policy has been forecast but remains hypothetical in many important respects.

34 35

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of  desert, but these distinctions are also governed by administrative ­ rationality. At the most general level, there exist two significant  categories of immigrants that most liberal  democratic states use to order the immigrant population. They separate  asylum seekers from all other would-be entrants, most of whom fall under the rubric of economic  immigrants. There is nothing about refuge and economic immigration that demands that these  categories should prevail as the primary way to differentiate among immigrants, nor does each logic of citizenship regard these  categories in the same way. For instance, administrative  rationality might understand, define, and prioritize  persecution differently from the ways in which liberal or democratic norms would: the former might regard the population of persons seeking work or economic opportunity as an economic resource/threat, while the latter two might respectively regard such a population as deserving of a  right to work or as culturally  foreign. These differences have to be resolved in order to make practicable policies for admitting or excluding the  foreign-born. Supporting the idea that multiple doctrines shape mobility is the fact that, in practice,  asylum seekers and economic  immigrants inherit very different statuses even after their requests to move between states have been accepted.36 Within each of the  categories of economic immigration and  asylum, several stronger and weaker versions of nationality and of other autonomous and relative  rights are created.  Notable among these are statuses that divide refugees and economic immigrant statuses into temporary and permanent statuses within each classification. Temporary asylees are separated out from refugees, just as temporary  workers are from fully entitled immigrants; each temporary status comes with a very different set of  rights of residence and free movement, as well as other rights, than is accorded by the permanent version of that status.  Seyla  Benhabib compares worker, refugee, temporary, and permanent statuses in the European  Union context.37 A similar, but not coextensive, survey of the rights of differently situated  foreign-born people in the 50 U.S. states offers insight into how the demise of welfare (as it used to be understood), and the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant  Responsibility Act in 1996, have shaped immigrants rights in

 In most countries, asylum seekers receive a range of  privileges not available to most other migrants. See Eleonore Kofman, “Contemporary European Migrations, Civic Stratification and Citizenship,” Political Geography 21(8) (2002): 1035–1054. 37  Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens – The Seeley Lectures (London: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 158–161. 36

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this country.38 While not identical, these studies display patterns indicating that along with the fact that nationality is disaggregated in similar fashion by democratic  states, these disaggregated nationalities are often accorded very similar bundles of various other autonomous and relative  rights. The rights of most  non-nationals are limited, and can be changed more readily and less consensually than can the rights of semi-citizens who retain a strong set of relative  rights, including those of  participation.39 Refugees and work  permit holders have various  privileges of residence along with  circumscribed rights of free movement and often hold partial bundles of other autonomous and relative  rights of citizenship in the United States and most European states. Even “undocumented”  immigrants have a few limited rights that pertain to the circumstances of their residence, as well as their social and civil opportunities.40  Temporary workers find themselves without political  rights, few social  rights, and weak civil  rights, according to European laws as well as U.S. law. By contrast, refugees are accorded far more robust sets of each type of right, with the exception of political  rights.41 A.  Asylum Political philosophers trace the origin of the idea of  asylum in modernity to  Grotius.42 In Europe,  asylum was written into the law far earlier than it was in the  United States. England enacted an  asylum law for victims of religious  persecution in 1708.43  France, too, established a legal principle  Wendy Zimmermann and Karen Tumlin, “Report: Patchwork Policies: State Assistance for Immigrants Under Welfare Reform,” (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1999). 39  In Europe, this is seen in debates regarding the status of Third Country Nationals. See Kofman, “Contemporary European Migrations, Civic Stratification and Citizenship.” 40  Right-wing political parties have made hay from supposedly generous programs for immigrants and asylum seekers in Europe and, to a lesser degree, the United States, while scholars such as Peter  S chuck have accused the United States of having similar trends that end up “devaluing” citizenship. Peter Schuck, “Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship,” in Immigration and Citizenship in Europe and the United States, 51–66. 41  Here  refugees does not refer to persons granted Temporary Protected  Status (TPS).  T PS does not accord the same rights as asylum does. See Robin Jacobson, “Characterizing Consent: Race, Citizenship, and the New Restrictionists,” Political Research Quarterly 59(4) (2006): 645–654; see also data available at http://www.fairus.org. 42  Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (Washington: M. W. Dunne, 1901). 43  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The law was revoked only four years later; however, the opening of asylum opportunities in British colonies obviated some of the need for ����������������������������� England to serve as a ����� refugee haven. See Atle Grahl-Madsen, “The European Tradition of Asylum and the Development of Refugee Law,” Journal of Peace Research 3(3) (1966): 279. 38

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of  asylum well before the twentieth century. In 1832, a series of French laws secured the  right of  asylum generally, as well as a special set of rights for those who sought  asylum in  France.44 Because immigration law in the United States was not nationalized until late in the nineteenth century, one must look to public discourse about immigration (and therefore  asylum), as well as to state law, to glean a sense of the politics and administration of immigration in colonial and early U.S. history.45 Immigration and  asylum were subjects of some contention early in U.S. history. One of the outcomes of this perpetual wrangle was a continuous strain of argument lasting from the nineteenth through the twentieth centuries that defended the conditional acceptance of immigrants who sought relief from oppressive political circumstances.46 Clearly refugees played a defining role in immigration during the colonial period.47 Thomas Paine wrote of the United States’ duty to accept persecuted Europeans in Common Sense.48 In his discussion of early American responses to debate over immigration,  Daniel Tichenor cites Thomas Jefferson’s proclamation that the United States ought to ­“consecrate a  Grahl-Madsen, “The European Tradition of Asylum and the Development of Refugee Law,” 280. 45  Events surrounding the Chinese Exclusion  Act lead many scholars to cite 1875 as the first point at which immigration law in the United States was nationalized. See Victor C. Romero, “Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of States in U.S. Immigration Policy: Devolution and Discrimination,” New York University Annual Survey of American Law 58 (2002): 378. Others (see Grahl-Madsen, “The European Tradition of Asylum and the Development of Refugee Law”) have cited the earlier 1804 Act that established a uniform law of  naturalization; however, the states retained a great deal of power to govern immigration in the wake of the passage of the 1804 Act. This might suggest that there was no immigration policy in the early years of the United States. However, this overlooks the fact that states crafted policies to be consistent with the few national standards that were imposed. This is structurally similar to circumstances in  G ermany, particularly prior to the influence of  European Union standards for member-state nationals, where Länder officials make decisions about asylum and work  permits that in effect governed immigration for many people. 46  For a discussion of the general conditions of acceptance, see Gerald Neuman, “The Lost Century of American Immigration Law,” Columbia Law Review 93(8) (1993): 1833–1901. Neuman identifies five basic variables associated with immigration restrictions and traces them through early U.S. history. 47  Michael J. Wishnie, “Immigrants and the Right to Petition,” New York University Law Review 78 (2003): 667. 48  Thomas Paine, Basic Writings of Thomas Paine: Common Sense, Rights of Man, Age of Reason (New York: Wiley Book Company, 1942). It should be noted that elsewhere Paine defended a notion of asylum that included economic  immigrants, a principle that was not consistent with the general usage of the term in Europe or the United States, and which did not become incorporated into U.S. asylum law once it was nationalized. See Cecil D. Eby, “America as ‘Asylum’: A Dual Image,” American Quarterly 14(3) (1962): 485. 44

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sanctuary for those whom the misrule of Europe may compel to seek happiness on other climes.”49 Yet Jefferson was opposed by factions that believed that many of those who sought  asylum would not  assimilate into American society. At the state level,  asylum was not only practiced as a matter of principle but also because  asylum seekers were perceived to be desirable settlers.50 As nationalization occurred,  asylum slowly became woven into the laws that shaped immigration. B.  Non-Refugee Immigrants  E conomic immigrants form the bulk of non-refugee immigration and are accorded different semi-citizen statuses than are refugees. As is the case with refugees, the history of temporary and permanent economic migrant status is longer than often recognized. Many scholars of immigration mark the post-war period as a turning point for the creation of administrative  categories that divide economic migrants into various differentiated legal classes.51 In some ways, this is an accurate assessment. Europe experienced very little non-European immigration until the latter half of the twentieth century. The creation of modern bureaucratic apparatuses to administer immigration is therefore a relatively recent phenomenon. However, this bureaucratic apparatus relies upon a set of categorizations and rationalizations that reach back several centuries. The trajectory of immigration into the United States and Europe reveals the lengthy history of these  categories. Prior to World War II, immigration laws in Europe were regarded not only as a means to control citizenship but also as a tool for retaining population.52 Exit was as much, if not more, of a concern than entry. Substantial labor migration into  France has been recorded since the late 1800s.53 Contrary to common assumptions, state surveillance of French borders and the individuals who crossed them to enter  France developed during  Daniel Tichenor, Dividing Lines (Princeton and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 55. 50  For example, see Warren R. Hofstra, “The Extention of his Majesties Dominions: The Virginia Backcountry and the Reconfiguration of Imperial Frontiers,” The Journal of American History 84(4) (1998): 1281–1312. 51  See for example, Tichenor, Dividing Lines. 52  Bryan S. Turner, “The Enclave Society: Towards a