QUINTILIAN Institutio Oratoria Book 2
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Quintilian Institutio Oratoria Book 2
Edited by TOBIAS REINHARDT and MICHAEL WINTERBOTTOM
OXFORD
U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS
OXfORD U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford 0 x 2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department o f the University o f Oxfoid. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland (2apeTown D a r e s Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hui^ary Italy Japan M a u d Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark o f Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Tobias Reinhardt and Michael Winterbottom 2006 The moral rights of the authors haw been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2006 All rights reserved No part o f this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, o r transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford Univeisity Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Quintilian. (Institutions oratoriae. Liber 2. English] Institutio oratorio. Book 2 / Quintilian; edited by Tobias Reinhardt and Michael Winterbottom. p. cm. Includes index. I S B N - 1 3 : 9 7 8 - 0 - 1 9 - 9 2 6 2 6 5 - 6 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0 - 1 9 - 9 2 6 2 6 5 - 9 (alk. paper) 1. Quintilian. Institutionisoratoriac. Liber 2. 2. Oratory-Early works to 1800. I. Reinhardt, Tobias. II. Winterbottom, Michael, 1934-DL Title. PA6649.B02 2006 808.5'l-dc22 Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddies Ltd., King's Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 0 - 1 9 - 9 2 6 2 6 5 - 9 1 3 5 7 9
978-0-19-926265-6 10
8 6 4 2
Preface This commentary, the first in English on the second book of Quintilian, began life as an Oxford thesis by MW, approved for a doctorate as long ago as 1970. It was TR's suggestion that it should at last be revised for publication. MW is primarily responsible for the Introduction Part I, the notes on chs. 1-13, and a number of the non-technical notes in chs. 14-21; TR for Part II of the Introduction, and the technical notes in chs. 14-21. But we have read and criticized each other's work at every stage, and revised our own accordingly. The whole book is the outcome of a happy and fruitful collaboration. The two halves of the work are, however, not completely consistent in the format of citation. We include a new Latin text, paragraphed with more attention than was MW's Oxford Classical Text of 1970, and incorporating changes argued for in the Commentary (for a list, see pp. li f.). There is no apparatus criticus. Variants of any import are cited and discussed in the Commentary; the OCT may be consulted for the rest. We have not thought it necessary to provide a translation, in view of the recent publication of D. A. Russell's monumental Loeb edition. Where our interpretation differs markedly from his, we argue for it in the Commentary, sometimes after consultation with him, and always at our peril. Donald Russell, an examiner of the original thesis, has been our main inspiration; he has read and commented on drafts of our work, and patiently advised us when we were puzzled. Doreen Innes too read the book in draft. Both have contributed far more to it than would appear from our references to them. We are also grateful to friends to whom we turned for advice on particular passages: Kathleen Coleman, Michael Frede, Arnd Kerkhecker, Harm Pinkster, Nicholas Purcell, and Antonio Stramaglia. Robin Nisbet and Peter Walsh lent or gave books. We are greatly indebted to Rolando Ferri for providing us with a photocopy of Ammendola's Italian commentary. We were fortunate to have Leofranc Holford-Strevens as our copy editor, and to profit from his learning and acumen. Hilary O'Shea, the OUP Classics editor, was, as always, warmly supportive. Finally, and most important, we thank our wives, Eva and Nicolette, for their patience and support throughout our work on this book.
Oxford; February 2006
TR MW
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Contents Abbreviations Introduction The Author and the Book Teaching Rhetoric Classroom Procedure (a) Listening (b) Writing (c) Reading Quintilian and Theon Defining Rhetoric Historical Context The Main Argument Sources Strategies Note on the Text Text
ix xxiii xxiii xxiv xxvi xxvi xxvii xxviii XXX
xxxiv xxxiv xxx vii xlii xlvi li 1
COMMENTARY Appendix: Parallel Passages in Sextus, Philodemus, and the Prolegomena
395
Index of Latin Words and Phrases Index of Greek Words and Phrases General Index
403 417 420
35
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Abbreviations Greek authors are normally cited as in LSJ, Classical Latin authors as in OLD, later Latin authors as in TLL; but some modifications have been introduced for the sake of clarity. For Quintilian editions and commentaries, see generally Winterbottom's OCT (1970), i, pp. xvi f. Periodicals are normally abbreviated as in L'Atinee philologique. All items cited in the introduction as well as all items cited more than once in the commentary are listed below; otherwise references are given ad loc. In the commentary, we give a full reference for articles of wider relevance to the question at issue, and an abbreviated reference to articles which are pertinent to a particular problem. Citation of Theon, Progymnasmata: where the Greek text is preserved, the first number is that of the page in the old edition by L. Spengel in Rtietores Graeci, ii (Leipzig, 1854), 59-130; the lines are those as printed in the 1997 Bude edition of M. Patillon and G. Bolognesi (whose lineation inevitably differs a little from Spengel's own); the pagereferencein brackets is that of the Bude itself, and it is added because the editors have reordered the exercises (see below, p. 76). After the end of the mutilated Greek text, the editors complete the book from the Armenian version, numbering the pages from 131 to 144. Here we do not cite line numbers, and give citations in the French translation. References to Philodemus' Rhet. are given by volume number, page and, where necessary, line number of Sudhaus's edition, as well as by page and line number of Longo Auricchio's edition where available; see also the Appendix (p. 395 n. 1). Italics are sometimes used in citations of Latin parallels to signal words that occur in the immediate context of the lemma, though not in the lemma itself. Adamietz Adams, Biiingualism Allen
J. Adamietz (ed.), M. F. Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae liber III (Munich, 1966) J. N. Adams, Bilingualism and the Latin Language (Cambridge, 2003) J. Allen, 'Failure and Expertise in the Ancient Conception of an Art', in T. Horowitz and A. I. Janis (eds.), Scientific Failure (Lanham, MD, 1994), 81-108
x
Alpers-Golz
Ammendola Annas
Appel von Amim, Dio Afifahl Astin Atherton Austin, 'Quintilian' Barnes
Barvvick
Bauman
Blank
Blank, Technicity
Blank, 'Versionen'
Abbreviations R. Alpers-Golz, Der Begriff ZKOTJOZ in der Stoa und seine Vorgeschichte (Hildesheim and New York, 1976) G. Ammendola (ed.), Af. Fabi Quintiliani Institutio Oratoria (Turin, 1928) J. Annas, 'Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property', in J. Barnes and M. Griffin (eds.), Philosophia Togata (Oxford, 1989), 151-73 B. Appel, Das Bildungs- und Erziehungsideal Quintilians (Donauworth, 1914; diss, phil.) H. von Amim, Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa (Berlin, 1898) G. Afifahl, Vergleich und Metapher bei Quintilian (Stuttgart, 1932) A. E. Astin, Cato the Censor (Oxford, 1978) C. Atherton, 'Hand over Fist: The Failure von Stoic Rhetoric', CQ2 38 (1988), 392-427 R. G. Austin, 'Quintilian on Painting and Statuary', CQ 38 (1944), 17-26 J. Barnes, 'Is Rhetoric an Art?', DARG Newsletter; 2/2 (Discourse Analysis Research Group, Univ. of Calgary, 1986), 2-22 K. Barwick, 'Das rednerische Bildungsideal Ciceros', Abhandlungen der Sachsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Philosophisch-historisdie Klasse, 53/3 (Berlin, 1963) R. A. Bauman, The Crimen Maiestatis in the Roman Republic and Augustan Principate (Johannesburg, 1970) D. Blank, Sextus Empiricus: Against the Grammarians (Oxford, 1998) D. Blank, 'Philodemus on the Technicity of Rhetoric', in D. Obbink (ed.), Philodemus and Poetry (Oxford, 1995), 178-88 D. Blank, 'Versionen oder Zwillinge? Zu den Handschriften der ersten Bucher von Philodems Rhetorik\ in G. W. Most (ed.), Editing Texts - Texte edieren (Gottingen, 1998), 123-40
Abbre\'iations Bonndl, Lexicon Bonner, Declamation
Bonner, Education Bornecque Brandstatter Brink
Brittain Brou wer Butts
Calboli Caminas
Campbell Clarke
Cole Colson
Cooper
Cope
xi
E. Bonnell (ed.), Lexicon Quintilianeum (Leipzig, 1834) S. F. Bonner, Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early Empire (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949) S. F. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome (London, 1977) H. Bornecque (trans.), Quintilien: Institution oratoire(4 vols., Paris, 1933-4) C. Brandstatter, De notion um 7toXitik6s et oo
toTris usu rhetorico (Leipzig, 1894) C. O. Brink, 'Quintilian's De causis corruptae eloquentiae and Tacitus' Dialogus de oratoribus\ CQ2 39 (1989), 472-503 C. Brittain, Philo ofLarissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics (Oxford, 2001) R. Brouwer, 'Sagehood and the Stoics', OSAPh 23 (2002), 181-224 J. R. Butts, 'The Progymnasmata ofTheon', Ph.D. thesis, Claremont (UMI, Ann Arbor, 1986) G. Calboli (ed.), Cornifici Rhetorica ad C. Herennium (Bologna, 2 1993) J. G. Caminas, Delator: una aproximacion al estudio del delator en las fuentes romanos (Santiago de Compostela, 1983) G. Campbell, Lucretius on Creation and Evolution (Oxford, 2003) M. L. Clarke, 'The Thesis in the Roman Schools of the Republic', CQ2 1 (1951), 159-66 T. Cole, The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (Baltimore and London, 1991) F. H. Colson (ed.), M. Fabii Quintiliani Institution is Oratoriae liber I (Cambridge, 1924) J. M. Cooper, 'Ethical-Political Theory in Aristotle's Rhetoric, in Furley-Nehamas, 193-210 E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric (London and Cambridge, 1867)
xii
Corsi
Courtney Courtney, Poets Cribiore Daremberg-Saglio
Decl. mai. Decl. miti.
De Falco Dingel
Dionisotti
Dover During Erler
Eucken
Abbreviations Marco Fabio Quintiliano, La formazione delVoratore, i: introduzione di M. Winterbottom, traduzione e note di S. Corsi (Milano, 1997) E Courtney, Archaic Latin Prose (Atlanta, 1999) E Courtney (ed.), The Fragmentary Latin Poets (Oxford, 1993) R. Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind (Princeton and London, 2001) C. Daremberg and E Saglio, Dictionnaire des antiquites grecques et romaines d'apres les textes et les monuments (5 vols., Paris, 1877-1919) L. Hakanson (ed.), Declamationes XIX maiores Quintiliano falso ascriptae (Stuttgart, 1982) M. Winterbottom (ed.), The Minor Declamations Ascribed to Quintilian (Berlin and New York, 1984) V. De Falco, Demade oratore (Naples, 1955) J. Dingel, Scholastica Materia: Untersuchungen zu den Declamationes minores und der Institutio Oratoria Quintilians (Berlin and New York, 1988) A. C. Dionisotti, 'From Ausonius' Schooldays? A Schoolbook and its Relatives', JRS 72 (1982), 83-125 K. J. Dover, Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968) I. During, Aristotle in the Biographical Tradition (Goteborg, 1957) M. Erler, 'Epicurus as deus mortalis: Homoiosis theoi and Epicurean SelfCultivation', in D. Frede and A. Laks (eds.), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology; its Background and Aftermath (Leiden, 2002), 159-81 C. Eucken, Isokrates (Berlin and New York, 1983)
Abbre\'iations Fairweather Fantham
Frede, Theodicy
Friedlander
Furley-Nehamas Gabler Gaunt
Gei gen mii Her Giannantoni Goldberg
Goujard Goulet Granatelli1
Granatelli2
xiii
J. Fairweather, Seneca die Elder (Cambridge, 1981) E. Fantham, Comparative Studies in Republican Latin Imagery (Toronto and Buffalo, 1972) D. Frede, 'Theodicy and Providential Care in Stoicism', in D. Frede and A. Laks (eds.), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (Leiden, Boston, and Cologne, 2002), 85-117 L. Friedlander, Roman Life and Manners under the Early Empire, trans. L. A. Magnus, 4 vols. (London, 1907-13) D. J. Furley and A. Nehamas (eds.), Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays (Princeton, 1994) X. Gabler, De elocutione M. Fabi Quintiliani (Borna-Leipzig, 1910) D. M. Gaunt, M. Fabii Quintiliani Institutio Oratoria: Selections from the Latin Text and Digests of the Intervening Material (Melbourne, London, and Toronto, 1952) P. Geigenmiiller, Quaestiones Dionysianae de vocabulis artis criticae (Leipzig, 1908) G. Giannantoni (ed.), Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae (Naples, 1990) S. M. Goldberg, 'Appreciating Aper: The Defence of Modernity in Tacitus' Dialogus de oratoribus, CQ2 49 (1999), 224-37 R. Goujard (ed.), Caton: De I'agriculture (Paris, 1975) R. Goulet, Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques (Paris, 1989- ) R. Granatelli, 'M. Fabio Quintiliano Institutio Oratoria 2, 1-10', Rhetorica, 13 (1995), 137-60 R. Granatelli, translation of book 2 in A. Pennacini (ed.), Quintiliano, Institutio Oratoria (Turin, 2001), i. 156-279
xiv
Grube Gudeman
Hammerstaedt Hand, Tursellinus Harrison Heerdegen
Heinimann Hellegouarc'h
Heumann-Seckel
H-Sz Hubbell
Hiilser Irwin
Jocelyn Jordan
Abbreviations G. M. A. Grube, 'Theodorus of Gadara', AJPh 80 (1959), 337-65 A. Gudeman (ed.), P. Cornelii Taciti Dialogus de Oratoribus (Leipzig and Berlin, 2 1914) J. Hammerstaedt, 'Der Schlussteil von Philodems drittem Buch iiber Rhetorik', CErcll (1992), 9-W7 F. Hand, Tursellinus seu De particulis Latinis commentarii, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1829-45) S. J. Harrison, 'Vergil on Kingship: The First Simile of the Aeneid, PCPhS 34 (1988), 55-9 F. Heerdegen, Untersuchungen zurlateinischen Semasiologie, iii: Ein lexikalisches Beispiel (Erlangen, 1881) F. Heinimann, 'Eine vorplatonische Theorie der T€Xvq\ MH 18 (1961), 105-30 J. Hellegouarc'h, Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la Republique (Paris, 21972) H. Heumann and E. Seckel, Handlexikon zu den Quellen des romischen Rechts (Graz, 10 1958) J. B. Hofmann and Anton Szantyr, Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik (Munich, 1965) H. M. Hubbell, 'The Rhetorica of Philodemus', Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, 23 (1920), 243-382 K. Hiilser (ed.), Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1987-8) T. H. Irwin, 'Stoic Naturalism and its Critics', in B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge, 2003), 345-64 H. D. Jocelyn, 'Vergilius Cacozelus (Donatus Vita Vergilii)', PLLS 2 (1979), 77-109 H. Jordan (ed.), M. Catonis praeter librum de re rustica quae extant (Leipzig, 1860)
Abbre\'iations Karadimas
Kaster1
Kaster2
Kennedy Kennedy, Art Kiderlin1
Kiderlin2
Kiderlin3 Kiderlin4
Kiderlin5
Kiderlin6
Kiderlin7
xv
D. Karadimas, Sextus Empiricus against Aelius Aristides: The Conflict between Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Second Century A.D. (Lund, 1996) R. A. Kaster (ed.), C. Suetonius Tranquillus, De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus (Oxford, 1995) R. A. Kaster, 'Controlling Reason: Declamation in Rhetorical Education at Rome', in Y. L. Too (ed.), Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity (Leiden, 2001), 317-37 G. A. Kennedy, 'The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer', AJPh 78 (1957), 23-35 G. A. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, 1963) M. Kiderlin, 'Zu Quintilianus', Neue Jahrbucherfur Philologie, 131 (1885), 113-38 M. Kiderlin, 'Kritische und exegetische Anmerkungen zu Quintilianus', Blatter fiir das bayerisdie Gymnasialwesen, 22 (1886), 1-19, 199-215, 349-77 M. Kiderlin, 'Zu Quintilianus', Neue Jahrbucherfur Philologie, 133 (1886), 200-202 M. Kiderlin, review of Meister's edition, Neue Philologische Rundschau, 1887, 87-91 [books 1 and 2]; XVodienschrift fur klassische Philologie, 1887, 43-9 [books 3 and 4]; Neue Philologische Rundschau, 1887, 134-8 [book 12] M. Kiderlin, 'Kritische Bemerkungen zum XII. Buche des Quintilianus', Zeitschrift fur die osterreichischen Gymnasien, 39 (1888), 385-414 M. Kiderlin, 'Zum ersten und zweiten Buche des Quintilianus', Neue Jahrbiicher fiir Philologie, 147 (1893), 69-78 M. Kiderlin, 'Altes und Neues zu den ersten drei Biichern des Quintilianus', Neue Jahrbiicher fiir Philologie, 147 (1893), 711-18
xvi
KideHin8
Krapinger
K-S
L.A.
Lausberg
Lebreton Leigh Lofstedt
Long, 'Harmonics' Long-Sedley L-P
LS LSJ
Mansfeld Mansfeld, Prolegomena
Abbreviations M. Kiderlin, 'Zum zweiten Buche von Quintilians Institutio Oratoria', Philologus, 6 (1893), 496-505 G. Krapinger, (QuintilianJ, Die Bienen des armen Mamies (Grofiere Dek lam a tione n, 13) (Cassino, 2005) R. Kiihner and C. Stegmann, Ausfuhrliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache: Satzlehre, 2 vols. (Leverkusen, 3 1955) F. Longo Auricchio (ed.),
Abbre\'iations Matthes Mayer, Aristonstudien May-Wisse Monfasani
Moreschini Morr
Natali
Nesselrath Neue-Wagener
Nicolai Norden, AK NP Nusser Obbink-Vander Waerdt
OCD OLD ORF
D. Matthes, 'Hermagoras von Temnos 19041955', Lustrum, 3 (1958), 58-214,262-78 A. Mayer, 'Aristonstudien', Philologus, Suppl. 11/4 (1910), 483-605 J. M. May and J. Wisse, Cicero: On the Ideal Orator (Oxford, 2001) J. Monfasani, 'Episodes of Anti-Quintilianism in the Italian Renaissance: Quarrels on the Orator as a vir bonus and Rhetoric as the scientia bene dicendi\ Rhetorica, 10 (1992), 119-38 C. Moreschini, 'Elio Aristide tra Retorica e Filosofia', ANRWll 34. 2 (1994), 1234-47 J. Morr, 'Poseidonios von Rhodos iiber Dichtung und Redekunst', VVS45 (1926), 47-63 C. Natali, 'Ars ed actus: il fine dell'arte retorica secondoQuintiliano', Rhetorica, 13 (1995), 161-78 H.-G. Nesselrath, Lukians Parasitendialog (Berlin and New York, 1985) F. Neue and C. Wagener, Formenlehre der lateinischen Spradie, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 3 1902-5) R. Nicolai, La storiografia nelVeducazione antica (Pisa, 1992) E. Norden, Die an tike Kunstprosa, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 5 1958) Der Neue Pauly: Enzyklopiidie der Antike (Stuttgart and Weimar, 1996-2003) O. Nusser, Alb ins Prolog und die Dialogtheorie des Platonismus (Stuttgart, 1991) D. Obbink and P. A. Vander Waerdt, 'Diogenes of Babylon: The Stoic Sage in the City of Fools', GRBS 32 (1991), 355-96 The Oxford Classical Dictionary (Oxford, 2 1970, 3 1996) Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford, 1968-82) H. Malcovati (ed.), Oratorum Romanorum fragmenta liberae rei publicae, 2 vols. (Turin, * 1976-9)
xviii
Otto, Sprichwdrter Overbeck
Patillon Petersmann
Petersmann, 'Bild'
Peterson
Proleg. Rabe, Handschriften Radermacher, Art. Scr. Radermacher, 'Schrift' RE Reichel Reitzenstein
Abbreviations A. Otto, Die Sprichwdrter und spridiwdrtlidien Redensarten der Ronier (Leipzig, 1890) J. Overbeck, Dieantiken Sdiriftquellen zur Geschichte der bildenden Kiinste bei den Griechen (Leipzig, 1868), cited by testimonium-numbers M. Patillon and G. Bolognesi (eds.), Aelius Theon: Progymnasmata (Paris, 1997) H. Petersmann, 'From Concrete to Abstract Thinking: the Development of Moral Concepts in Archaic Latin', in H. Rosen (ed.), Aspects of Latin: Papers from die Seventh International Colloquium on Latin Linguistics, Jerusalem, April 1993 (Innsbruck, 1996), 665-74 H. Petersmann, 'Bild und Gegenbild des vir bonus dicendiperitus in der romischen Literatur von ihren Anfangen bis in die friihe romische Kaiserzeit', in B. Czapla, T. Lehmann, and S. Li ell (eds.), Vir bonus dicendi peritus: Festschrift fur Alfons Weischezum 65. Geburtstag (Wiesbaden, 1997), 321-9 W. Peterson (ed.), M. Fabi Quintiliani Institution is Oratoriae liber decimus (Oxford, 1891) H. Rabe (ed.), Prolegomenon Sylloge (Leipzig, 1931) H. Rabe, 'Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften', RhM2 64 (1909), 539-90 L. Radermacher, Artium Scriptores: Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik (Vienna, 1951) L. Radermacher, 'Eine Schrift iiber den Redner als Quelle Ciceros und Quintilians', RhM2 54 (1899), 285-92 Real-Encyclopadie der dassischen Altertumswissenschaft (Stuttgart, 1893-1978) G. Reichel, Quaestiones Progym nasmaticae (Leipzig, 1909) R. Reitzenstein, Hellenistische Wundererzdhlungen (Leipzig, 1906)
Abbre\'iations Reuter
Riviere RLM Russell
Russell, Declamation Rutledge
Samuel Schanz Scholl Sedley, 'Origins'
Shackleton Bailey, Propertiana Smith, Dictionary Sohlberg Sparshott
Spengel
xix
A. Reuter, De Quintiliani libro qui fuit de cans is corruptae eloquentiae (Breslau, 1887) Y. Riviere, Les delateurs sous Vempire romain (Rome, 2002) K. Halm (ed.), Rhetores Latini m in ores (Leipzig, 1863) D. A. Russell (ed., trans.), Quintilian: The Orators Education, 5 vols. (Loeb Gassical Library; Cambridge, MA, and London, 2001); 'Donald Russell' refers to personal communications to the editors D. A. Russell, Greek Declamation (Cambridge, 1983) S. H. Rutledge, Imperial Inquisitions: Prosecutors and Informants from Tiberius to Domitian (London and New York, 2001) R. Samuel (ed.), Village Life and Labour (London, 1975) M. Schanz, 'Die Apollodoreer und die Theodoreer', Hermes, 25 (1890), 36-54 F. Scholl, 'Vir bonus dicendi peritus', RhM2 57 (1902), 312-14 D. N. Sedley, 'The Origins of Stoic God', in D. Frede and A. Laks (eds.), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology and its Aftermath (Leiden, 2002), 41-83 D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Propertiana (Cambridge, 1956) W. Smith, A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities (London, 1842) D. Sohlberg, 'Aelius Aristides und Diogenes von Babylon: Zur Geschichte des rednerischen Ideals', MH29 (1972), 177-200,256-77 F. E. Sparshott, 'Zeno on Art: Anatomy of a Definition', in J. M. Rist (ed.), The Stoics (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1978), 273-90 L. Spengel, 'Die Definition und Eintheilung der Rhetorik bei den Alten', RhM2 18 (1863), 481-526
xx
von Staden
Stramaglia1
Stramaglia2
Striker, 'Antipater'
Striker, 'Plato's Socrates'
Stroh
SVF Syme, Tacitus Tarrant Tarrant, Interpreters Thiele Throm TLL
Abbreviations H. von Staden, 'Character and Competence: Personal and Professional Conduct in Greek Medicine', in H. Flashar and J. Jouanna (eds.), Medicine et morale dans Vantiquite (Geneva, 1997), 157-210 A. Stramaglia, 'Fra "consumo" e "impegno": usi didattici della narrativa nel mondo antico', in O. Pecere and A. Stramaglia (eds.), La letteratura di consumo nel mondo greco-latino (Cassino, 1996), 97-166 A. Stramaglia, 'Amori impossibili: PKoln 250, le raccolte proginnasmatiche e la tradizione retorica deH'"amante di un ritratto" in B.-J. and J.-P. Schroder (eds.), Studium declamatorium: Untersuchungen zu den Schulubungen und Prunkreden von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit (Leipzig, 2003), 213-39 G. Striker, 'Antipater, or the Art of Living', in ead., Essays in Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge, 1996), 298-315 G. Striker, 'Plato's Socrates and the Stoics', in ead., Essays in Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge, 19%), 316-24 W. Stroh, 'Declamatio', in B.-J. and J.-P. Schroder (eds.), Studium declamatorium: Untersuchungen zu den Schulubungen und Prunkreden von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit (Leipzig, 2003), 5-34 Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, ed. J. von Arnim, 4 vols. (1903-24) R. Syme, Tacitus (2 vols., Oxford, 1958) H. Tarrant, Scepticism or Pla ton ism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy (Cambridge, 1985) H. Tarrant, Plato's First Interpreters (London, 2000) G. Thiele, Hermagoras (Strassburg, 1893) H. Throm, Die Thesis (Paderborn, 1932) Thesaurus Linguae Latinae (Leipzig, 1900- )
Abbre\'iations Tomalin Tosi
Valla
Varwig
Volkmann, Rhetorik
Walde-Hofmann
Watson Watt Webb
Wehrli Wilamowitz
Winterbottom1
Winterbottom2
Winterbottom3
Winterbottom'1
xxi
C. Tomalin, Samuel Pepys (London, 2002) R. Tosi, Dizionario delle sentenze latine e greche (Milan, 51992) Valla's glosses on the Institutio, cited from J. Fernandez Lopez, Retorica, humanismo y filologia: Quintiliano y Lorenzo Valla (Logrono, 1999) F. R. Varwig, Der rhetorische Naturbegrijf bei Quintilian (Heidelberg, 1977) R. Volkmann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Romer in systematischer Ubersicht (Leipzig, 21885) A. Walde and J. B. Hofmann, Lateinisches etymologisches Worterbuch, 3 vols. (Heidelberg, >1966) J. S. Watson, Quintilian's Institutes of Oratory (London, 1856) W. S. Watt, 'Notes on Quintilian', Grazer Beit rage, 15 (1988), 139-60 R. Webb, 'The Progymnasmata as Practice', in Y. L. Too (ed.), Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity (Leiden, 2001), 289316 F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles (10 vols., Basel and Stuttgart, 2 1967-9) U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 'Der Rhetor Aristeides', in Kleine Schriften, iii (1969), 426-53 M. Winterbottom, 'Some Problems in Quintilian Book Two', Philologus, 108 (1964), 119-27 M. Winterbottom, 'Quintilian and Declamation', in Hommages a Jean Cousin (Paris, n.d.), 225-35 M. Winterbottom, 'On Impulse', in D. Innes, H. Hine, and C. Pelling (eds.), Ethics and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday (Oxford, 1995), 313-22 M. Winterbottom, 'Cicero and the Middle Style', in J. Diggle, J. B. Hall, and H. D.
xxii
Winterbottom5
Winterbottom6 Winterbottom7 Wohrer
Abbreviations Jocelyn (eds.), Studies in Latin Literature and its Tradition in Honour of C. O. Brink, PCPhS suppl. 15 (1989), 125-31 M. Winterbottom, 'Quintilian the Moralist', in T. Albaladejo, E. Del Rio, and J. A. Caballero (eds.), Quintiliano: historia y actualidad dela retorica (Calahorra, 1998), 317-34 M. Winterbottom, Problems in Quintilian (BICS Suppl. 25, 1970) M. Winterbottom, 'Quintilian and the vir bonus\ JRS 54 (1964), 90-7 J. Wohrer, De A. Comelii Celsi Rhetorica (Vienna, 1903)
Introduction THE AUTHOR AND THE BOOK Marcus Fabius Quintilianus was born at Calahorra in northern Spain, around AD 35, but spent much of his life in Rome. He wrote his only surviving book, the Institutio Oratoria, after his retirement from practice as an advocate and from teaching rhetoric (n. on 2. 12. 12 iam pridem), and before the death of the emperor Domitian in 96; for the lost book De causis corruptae eloquentiae, see n. on 2. 4. 42 alio... libro. His talents had attracted imperial favour, leading to award of a public salary by Vespasian (d. 79), attainment of the ornamenta consularia, and employment as tutor to Domitian's greatnephews.1 One important structural principle of the Institutio is to follow the career of the orator from birth to retirement. Accordingly, Book 1 goes into considerable detail on the early stages of his education, at the school of the grammaticus, who taught literature with special reference to poetry. Book 2 begins with a chapter on the transition to the teacher of rhetoric {rhetor). The rhetorical training began with preliminary exercises (progymnasmata)2 that led up eventually to the practice of declamatio, the making of speeches on fictional forensic or deliberative themes. Quintilian discusses this early stage in 2. 2-9, the various progymnasmata being listed in 2. 4.3 The merits of declamation are weighed in 2. 10, but, after three chapters on the extent to which rules are necessary at all for the orator (11-13), Quintilian drops his chronological thread (see n. on 2. 10. 1 quarum antequam uiam ingredior) in favour of a magisterial survey of the rhetorical system which underpinned both declamation and the real-life oratory for which declamation was designed as training. This survey lasts until the end of Book 11. It takes in, along with a good deal more, the five traditional heads, of invention (the 1 F o r further details and bibliography, see esp. Raster 1 3 3 3 - 6 . 2 F o r information on the background and the main texts, see below, pp. 7 5 - 7 . There is an excellent and wide-ranging discussion in Webb. 3 W h e n Quintilian comes to the chapter on full declamation (2. 10), the transition is emphatic: in his primis operibus contrasts with suasorias iudicialesque materias, 'quarum antequam uiam ingredior, pauca mihi de ipsa declamandi ratione dicenda sunt'. Yet he several times uses dedamare and declamatio in connection with progymnasmata o r to cover both them and full declamation: see nn. on 2. 1. 3 ita... sciat, 2 . 2. 12 declamationis, 2. 5. 16 declamando, 2. 7 . 1 iis... aetatibus, and esp. the introductory n. to 2 . 6 . F o r his use o f the word dictio, see on 2 . 2 . 6. F o r the developing usage o f the word declamatio and its cognates, see Stroh.
xxiv
Introduction
devising of subject-matter: Books 4-6, arranged around the parts of the speech), arrangement (dispositio; Book 7), style (elocutio, Books 8-9), memory (11. 2) and delivery (actio; 11. 3). Only in Book 12 does Quintilian return to his orator, whose career ends in the retirement discussed in the final chapter, 12. 11. The first half of Book 2, then, concerns the teaching of rhetoric at school. But its second half (chs. 14-21) is an introduction to Quintilian's survey of rhetorical precept, and in some degree corresponds to the Prolegomena found at the start of many later Greek treatises on the art. We therefore offer separate introductions to these very different parts of the Book. Teaching Rhetoric '[The student] does not need to know much about the children—where they sat, what they learnt, how they were disciplined (or bribed) into obedience; nor will he be invited to inquire into the wider context which the child itself experienced—the interplay of family, work and home, or the way in which schooling helped to teach behaviour and inculcate sex and dass roles.' These words were written in 1975 by Ralph Samuel, in the course of an attack on current priorities of teachers and researchers in English history.'1 Quintilian was writing for students in Roman schools, their fathers, who will often have themselves been taught in the same way, and their teachers. He does not, accordingly, go out of his way to give the sort of information that Samuel desiderates; for his readers were well aware of it. But he often lets slip items of great interest in these areas; and at times he raises issues that will continue to be relevant so long as there are children to be taught and teachers to teach them.5 It is undeniable, however, that to a modern reader the education given by Quintilian sounds strange enough. He was not part of a system. If it is sometimes said that he held a public chair of rhetoric, funded by the emperor, that does not mean that he was anything remotely like a modern professor. 4 Samuel, p. xiii. 5 Three instances. 'Britain's brightest teachers should not have to take classes o f struggling pupils, the leader o f the country's top independent schools said last night, in remarks condemned as "outrageous" by state school heads' ( T h e Iitdependent, 5 Oct. 2004, p. 19); compare Quintilian's remarks in 2. 3. 'Parental power is anathema (sic] to good schooling' (headline o f an article by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown in The Independent, 7 Mar. 2 0 0 5 ) ; compare Quintilian 2. 7. 1. Nor is the place of morality in education forgotten, at least across the Atlantic: 'Taking up o n c e again the cause o f moral e d u c a t i o n . . . might be a key strategic m o v e in establishing for the residential elites a unique and marketable identity in contemporary American higher education' (Peter Gomes, quoted in The New York Review of Books, 2 4 Mar. 2005, p. 21).
The Author and the Book
xxv
And, unlike a modern teacher, he was a private entrepreneur, running a school to make a profit, and untrammelled by any regulation from above. There was no 'national curriculum', and no outside assessment. The rhetor did what he liked, answerable only to the fathers who paid him to provide their adolescent sons (not their daughters)6 with a secondary education, and who might withdraw them if they felt that they were not getting their money's worth. Equally strange today, he taught nothing but rhetoric. The boys learnt to speak in front of others, first simpler progymnasmata, then full declamationes. Quintilian may have been more insistent than others on the reading and close study of prose texts. But the core of this education was the spoken exercise; and what was learnt in this obsessive way at school stayed with the student for ever. The influence of declamation on post-Republican Latin (and later Greek) literature is acknowledged, though perhaps not always justly assessed.7 If we are not told in what kind of building Quintilians school was housed, we do gather that teaching was conducted in a single room (n. on 2. 2. 14 pueros adulescentibus permixtos sedere), and by himself in person, though he remarks on the employment of classroom assistants (n. on 2. 5. 3 adiutores).8 The age range is not made clear. A pupil (Quintilian thought) should enter the school when he was fit to be transferred from the school of the grammafiats (2. 1.7 cum poterit). He is equally vague about pupils' departure. We have to rely on other information to hazard the guess that pupils normally learnt rhetoric from 13 or 14 to 18. The range, in any case, was wide enough to present problems, for the single room contained both boys and young men; Quintilian made the age-groups sit separately (perhaps by years), and was well aware of the sexual tensions that could arise (2. 2. 14-15). Quintilian disapproved of corporal punishment at any age. But he often speaks, in a humane tone, of'correction' (n. on 2. 2. 7 acerbus). Pupils might be jollied along with attractive subject-matter and concessions on stylistic exuberance, but only while they were still comparatively young (2. 4. 4-8). There was some scope for individual attention (n. on 2. 5. 3 praeire). Prizes may not have been offered, but there was always the bait of showing off one's skills in speaking in front of the class or before regularly assembled larger audiences, including fathers (2. 7. 5 uelut praemio studii, with n.). F o r the education o f girls, see Bonner, Education, 2 7 - 8 (tutors), 1 3 5 - 6 (grammar schools). Bonner, Declamation, 1 4 9 - 6 7 is still authoritative. " Around 1650 the boys at St Paul's School, London, 'all 150 o f them, sat in one r o o m sixty feet l o n g . . .At one end sat the high master, John Langley, . . . a n d at the other the surmaster, although he spent more time walking about to supervise. There were eight classes, and the pupils were divided by achievement, not age' (Tomalin, ch. 2). Quintilian does not mention classes in Book 2 , but elsewhere see 1. 2. 2 3 - 4 (obscure) and 10. 5 . 21. 6 7
xxvi Introduction
Fathers indeed are always there in the background; they have, in Quintilian's account, been deeply interested in their sons' progress ever since birth, and the teacher is, as for Juvenal, in loco parentis (n. on 2. 2. 4 sumat...parentis... animum). In return, teachers might expect the affection of their pupils (2. 2. 8, 2. 9. 1). And they used their authority not merely to teach the syllabus but, consciously and unconsciously, to inculcate values. Quintilian wrote, and no doubt said, much that tended to the establishment of maleness. Effeminacy, in all departments, was frowned upon (n. on 2. 5. 9 uirilis tamen). The Institutio, though, went far beyond this. Quintilian's concept of the orator was deeply moral: the first part of uir bonus dicendi perituswas as important as the second. It was left to the advanced programme of Book 12, which concerned pupils who had left the rhetor's school, to suggest how a student might be trained to become a good man.9 But it had always been the job of the teacher, grammaticus and then rhetor, to do everything possible to inculcate it in practice (cf. e.g. 2. 2. 5 'let him talk much of the honourable and good; the more often he has admonished, the less often will he need to punish', and n. on 2. 4. 20 formatur).10 Classroom
Procedure
It is not easy to form a coherent view of exactly what went on from day to day in Quintilian's school.11 Details will be given at various points in the Commentary, but it may prove helpful to provide an overview here of what may have been the procedure in the teaching of progymnasmata. (fl) Listening Central to the teaching of the progymnasmatawas listening to the teacher. The master 'should himself say something, or rather much, every day for his hearers to take home with them' (2. 2. 8, with n.): in the fbnn, that is, of notes (com men tarii: 2. 11. 7 n.) to be studied and learned. An important part of such spoken teaching12 would be the provision of models (of varying 9
See Winterbottom* 3 2 1 - 2 .
See recently, on the inculcation o f values, Webb 3 0 3 - 5 (progymnasmata) and Raster 2 (declamation). 1 1 Let alone in other schools. We use some evidence from a work on preliminary rhetorical exercises by the Greek rhetor Theon (date uncertain), which shows striking similarities to Quintilian (below, pp. 7 6 - 7 ) . But Theon seems to presuppose the teaching not o f a class, but o f private pupils individually (note esp. pp. 1 0 2 - 3 : 'si le jeune h o m m e est intelligent... s'il Test s u p e r e r i e u r e m e n t . . w i t h the Bude n.). 1 2 For the possibility that certain papyri represent models o f progymnasmatic exercises composed by teachers, see the important remarks o f Stramaglia 1 , e.g. 109, and Stramaglia 2 225-32. 10
The Author and the Book
xxvii
fullness: see b), below) when a pupil was to write an exercise.13 The pupil was expected to imitate such models.14 This sort of thing goes back to the very roots of declamation: the speeches given by the Greek sophists when teaching their pupils. Isocrates, in a striking passage (13. 18), says that it is essential that a teacher should present himself as an example, napdSeiy^a, 'so that those who have received his imprint ( t o v s cKrvnaiOevTas) and are capable of imitating him may at once become more accomplished orators than the others' (for the metaphor see n. on 2. 2. 8 ipse... referant). Perhaps relevant here is the process described in a chapter of Theon (14) preserved only in Armenian, by which a pupil may come, by stages, to be able to recall (for example) every detail of the style, content, and structure of an oratorical composition that he has listened to. The point of this process of recollection, it emerges, is that the student should be able to reproduce what he has heard, not orally, but in writing. (b) Writing15 When a pupil was to write an exercise, the teacher (see 2. 6) might either (i) give a division, the headings recommended for the treatment of the theme set, and then develop them to some extent, with arguments and emotional passages, before a pupil set to work on the subject at all (i.e. he would give a model for at least some parts of the exercise in advance),16 or (ii) give advance hints of what might be said, but then let the pupil go to work, repairing any omissions after he had already given his speech and developing some passages in detail (i.e. he would give model extracts afterwards). Quintilian thought method (i) more appropriate for beginners, method (ii) for more advanced pupils. He was prepared eventually to permit a pupil to speak without any advance help at all (2. 6. 5-6). When the teacher had given the amount of guidance he thought appropriate, the pupil, it seems, excogitated and wrote out (2. 6. 3 'cogitationem.. .et 1 5 We should distinguish from this the dictation of totae materiae mentioned in 2. 4. 12 as a means o f correcting a pupil s defective written (not spoken: note 13 stilus) work. But even here the pupil was to imitate such a fair-copy and 'low it as his own'. 1 4 Here may lie the deepest root of 'declamatory* influence on Latin literature (cf. the remarks o f Webb 291, citing Theon 70. 2 4 - 9 [p. 15|). If the teacher favoured a particular style, it might show even at the progymnasmatic stage; it certainly would when he gave model declamations to older pupils (and a fortiori to public audiences for display and advertisement, at occasions o f the kind referred to in 11. 2. 39). That is why Quintilian insists that a teacher should be a Phoenix, 'tam eloquentia quam moribus praestantissimus' (2. 3. 12).
Not to be engaged in until the pupil was capable o f it: Theon 71. 2 (p. 16). This is presumably (one aspect o f ) what is referred to in 2. 5. 16 'declamabit... praeceptor ut sit exemplo suis auditoribus' (which may cover advanced declamation also). 15
xxviii
Introduction
stilum') an exercise of the same kind. The writing was crucial: 'I want narrations to be composed in writing, with all possible care' (2. 4. 15): and no doubt this applied no less to all the other preliminary exercises (cf. 2. 7. 2). Writing up an exercise avoided the dangers of thoughtless extemporization (2.4. 15 and 17).17 What happened then? Quintilian mentions the correction of a pupil's written effort, with provision of a complete fair copy if need be (2. 4. 10-14; cf. above, p. xxvii n. 13). In some schools, it seems, a student would learn by heart everything' he had written, and declaim it on fixed days (2. 7. 1). Quintilian is doubtful about that: it would be appropriate only for some really good effort (2. 7. 5). The implication of 2. 7. 1 ('iis de quibus nunc disserimus aetatibus') may be that he looked more favourably on such occasions when students were older. But none of this prevents us from supposing that the pupil might always, or sometimes, deliver in class an exercise he had written; the applause discouraged in 2. 4. 9-12 might presumably erupt on such occasions.18 In any case, 2. 7 stresses the desirability of pupils' learning passages of oratory and history by heart (for the part played by memorizing generally, see on 2. 7. 2 ediscere), as opposed to compositions of their own. (c) Reading Quintilian in 2. 5. 1 recommends a practice by which the rhetor provided his younger pupils with an exposition (enarratio) of prose texts, related to that which the grammaticus gave for poetry. In the school of the grammaticus, the teacher seems19 to have given a model reading of a passage, following which each pupil came up to the teacher's chair in turn to read the passage (of course aloud) himself (a practice rejected for the rhetorical school in 2. 5. 5). 20 Quintilian prefers to appoint one pupil as reader for a given occasion (2. 5.6). This 'reading' may have sometimes or always been in fact a recitation from memory; and diction and delivery were not forgotten. The wording of 2. 5. 7 (see n.) suggests that the exposition of the law caserelevantto the passage, and 1 7 In a similar vein, Q. will later ( 2 . 1 1 - 1 2 ) criticize adults who relied on improvisation rather than o n careful preparation. See below, p. 176 n. 20. 1 8 2. 7 . 1 is not lucidly phrased. But it does not seem to exclude the memorization and deliver)' in class o f at least s o m e exercises. 1 9 But the discussion in Bonner, Education, 2 2 5 - 6 largely deduces the practice o f the grammatici from what Quintilian says o f the rhetor's school in 2. 5. 2 0 Reading by the whole class in unison may be alluded to in Sen. S. 2. 13 and Macrobius, Saturnalia 1. 24. 5 (cited on 2. 5. 3 praeire). Note also, for the school o f the grammaticus, Quintilian 1 . 2 . 15 (with Colson's n . ) and Hentieneumata Celtis § § 3 7 - 9 (Dionisotti 100). This last and (for the school o f the rhetor) Juv. 7. 1 5 2 - 4 perhaps raise more questions than they settle; M W is very grateful to Antonio Stramaglia for drawing both passages to his attention and discussing them with him.
The Author and the Book xxix
by extension the rest of the enarratio, preceded this reading. Quintilian is only giving us the highlights of a system which his readers may have been familiar with from their days at the school of grammar, and we can only speculate. One possibility is as follows. The teacher dictated the passage to a group of pupils. They copied it down on their tablets or papyrus sheets, and took it away to study (and perhaps memorize) overnight. Next day, a reader is appointed and the exposition given.21 Finally, the pupil read or recited the passage. This is entirely conjectural. But a student listening to the reading would be able, on this hypothesis, to recognize the features that the teacher had pointed out, and understand better a passage that he might have found puzzling during his work at home the evening before. Comparable is the process by which we might read a portion of an unfamiliar classical text, then study a good commentary, and finally reread the text. Quintilian in 2. 5 leaves us to deduce that (as was surely inevitable) only selected passages from speeches were 'read' in this manner.22 When in 2. 5. 7-12 he speaks of the reading of an oratio, and of an exposition covering the whole speech from proem to epilogue, this is not to be taken literally. Rather, Quintilian must be giving general headings for such a commentary, from which the teacher would choose what was appropriate to the extract under discussion. Thus if (for example) the proem of Cicero's Pro Caeliowas being studied, the teacher would describe the circumstances of the case, discuss the tone of the passage, and show how it lays the basis for the argumentative strategy of the whole speech.23 Further, we may speculate that this reading would be tied in with the particular exercise currently being studied. Thus (to take the same example), if the exercise were the commonplace, and the subject pro amore (see 2. 4. 23), it would make sense for the class to read a portion of Pro Caelio.21 Quintilian did not think that this sort of enarratio of prose texts was suitable for the older students (2. 5. 1), and in any case he was not always able to employ it himself (2. 5. 2-3). But presumably passages for private 21 Bonner, Education, 2 2 5 envisages the grammaticus giving this in conjunction with his own initial reading. For Theon's practice, see above, n. 11, and n. on 2 . 5 . 5 non utique. 2 2 In 2 . 5. 24 lie is talking o f something different, the selection o f good passages from authors who were not consistently excellent. But note 2. 7. 2 , o n the memorization of passages from o r a t o r ) ' a n d history: separate, it seems, from the e>wrr<jrioprocess. 1. 11. 14 may show that such memorized passages were also recited in class; alternatively, Quintilian may there be speaking o f enarratio. 2 3 When Theon similarly talks in terms o f whole speeches in c h 13, he should presumably be understood in the same way. It m a y be observed that in ch. 2 he had given parallels to the various exercises that take the form of extracts from Plato, Herodotus, and the like. 2 4 Comparable is the recommendation in Theon 7 2 . 9 - 1 6 (p. 17): the pupil should write his exercise on a theme used by an ancient writer, and then read that parallel text.
xxx
Introduction
reading were regularly set or recommended to pupils (cf. 2. 2. 8, and see below, p. xxxiii).25 Reading, in private or in class, was, like a teacher's speeches, meant to be remembered and to provide models for imitation (10. 1. 19); and vital they were, for without lectionis exemption 'the whole effort will drift, with no one to steer it' (10. 1. 2).
Quintilian and Theon We argue in the introduction to 2. 4 that Quintilian had available to him, besides Theon (or something very like Theon), another simpler Greek source which was not unlike (say) Hermogenes, and which in particular followed in essentials the order of exercises that Theon altered but that despite him remained canonical. We can on this hypothesis hope to identify a traditional core of this part of the Institutio, Greek in origin, and observe how Quintilian has adapted that material for his own use. The order in which the exercises are treated in the various witnesses is discussed below, pp. 76-7. For our present purposes, two facts are of importance. 1. Quintilian treats all the exercises discussed by Theon except for Ethopoeia and Description, though he assigns three of them, Myth, Chria, and Gnome, to the grammaticus (1. 10). 2. Quintilian does not formally list and discuss what we shall call Theon's Techniques, already listed in an early passage in the Greek version of his book, but only discussed at length in the Armenian version, discovered last century and made generally available to classical scholars with the publication of the remarkable Bude edition as late as 1997.26 The significance of these two facts may now be considered. 1. The border dispute between grammatici and rhetores over the progymnasmata is discussed in Quintilian 2. 1 (see the introductory n. there). The grammatici at their most pleonectic claimed to teach all the exercises. Theon appears to regard them all as the province of the rhetor. Quintilian maintains a compromise position: Myth, Chria, and Gnome (and some others not mentioned by Theon) are so simple that they can appropriately be taught by the grammaticus; and they accordingly appear in 1. 10. 2-6. But equally he appears to think that two of Theon's exercises are inappropriate for treatment at the progymnasmatic stage. But that does not mean that he ignores them. On the contrary, he mentions Description (e Kpaois) in the course of 2.4, in 25 26
For 1. 11. 14 see above, p. xxix n. 2 2 . Granatelli 1 and even the notes to her translation show no knowledge o f this new evidence.
The Author and the Book xxxi
a digression on the style of Narration; significantly enough, he does so in order to warn against narrative that is either 'dry and jejune' or 'tortuous and revelling in those irrelevant Descriptions to which many are tempted by their wish to imitate the licence of poets' (3; transl. Russell). Even though he regarded fullness as preferable at this early stage to meagreness, Quintilian perhaps felt that it was best not to make a formal progymnasma of something that might easily be misused. Descriptions could find a place later on, though Quintilian nowhere lays much stress on them. Perhaps he felt some deepseated distaste for a feature that was essentially extra quaestioneni (11. 3. 164; cf. arcessitis in 2. 4. 3, translated above, and see n. on 2. 4. 3 descriptionibus). As for Ethopoeia (called by Quintilian Prosopopoeia), it is not mentioned until the discussion of deliberative oratory (including suasoria) in 3. 8 (see the n. on the difficult passage 2. 1. 2 sed... inrumpunt). 2. Theon's Techniques are not ignored either. They are not put on a strict level with the exercises by Theon, whose Bude editors called them 'exercices d'accompagnement'; for whereas the exercises were taught, one at a time and in succession, pupils were trained in the Techniques throughout the progymnasmatic stage. They are discussed successively in the 'new' Armenian chapters of Theon: Reading (ch. 13), Listening (ch. 14), Paraphrase (ch. 15), Elaboration (ch. 16), and Contradiction (ch. 17). Theon has already told us earlier that 'we shall use Reading, Listening, and Paraphrase from the start, but Elaboration and especially Contradiction only when we have achieved some £ ( 6 5 . 23-6: p. 9). Quintilian is well aware of these chapters, or some close relative of them. But he does not discuss them in 2. 4; not illogically, for they do not concern exercises of the kind discussed there. Instead, and without identifying them formally, he exploits the Techniques (so far as Book 2 is concerned) at various points in 2. 5-9. We have seen the stress laid on Reading in 2. 5 P That he there (3) remarks that 'the Greeks' practised the enarratio of prose texts that he himself favoured may be a sign of his use of Theon's book or something like it. For particular coincidences between Quintilian and Theon on this topic, see nn. on 5.6 adsuescant, 5. 7 exposita causa and inuentione, 5. 9 ratione eloquendi, 5. 18 qui legendi sint and 5. 21 durescere (also on 2. 2. 8 ipse aliquid.. .dicat quae... refera nt). So far as Listening is concerned, we refer to our earlier discussion of model speeches (above, pp. xxvi f.). Elaboration and Contradiction will crop up in the discussion below. 2 7 Note in that chapter the opposition of Thucydides and Herodotus in Theon (see on 2. with n.) on the danger o f imitation o f the old concerning Lysias (for the danger o f any single
Sallust and Livy ( 1 9 ) , reminiscent o f that o f 5 . 18 qui legendi sittt), and the stress (also in 19, orators alone, reminiscent o f Theon's warning model cf. also Quintilian 10. 2. 2 3 - 6 ) .
xxxii
Introduction
In 10. 5, the discussion of what is to be written by those striving for etjts, Quintilian starts with translation from Greek, but soon comes on to paraphrase (5). For Quintilian it is something to be applied to poetry, to Latin speeches in a spirit of emulation, even to one's own work. He remarks strikingly (8) that the exercise gives us the incentive to look very carefully at a piece of writing, 'not passing it over in casual reading', but weighing up its virtues. This, in fact, is a means of encouraging critical reading of texts. Quintilian had mentioned paraphrase in passing at 1. 9. 2, as something to be applied to a piece of poetry with the aim of abbreviation or ornamentation. This was appropriate at a very early stage of rhetorical education, so early that even Quintilian was happy to leave it to the grammaticus. And Suetonius too mentions it in this context (Gramm. 4. 5). Theon, on the other hand, as we have seen, thought it should be taught, as a Technique, from the start of the course in progymnasmata. Quintilian, who has not mentioned it in Book 2, now recommends it for a much older student. It is notable, too, that he associates with it the (thoroughly sophistic) exercise of'expanding what is by nature brief and amplifying the insignificant' (10. 5. 11; cf. 1. 9. 2); he may here be working into his system what Theon (c. 16) had called Elaboration. This treatment of Paraphrase gives us a clue to Quintilian's whole procedure in adapting Theon-type material. He does not regard the exercises listed in Theon as necessarily to be restricted to the early stages of the rhetors school (or even, in some cases, to that of the grammaticus). Instead, he is open to their use much later on. And this was still more true of Theon's Techniques. This indeed is the key to a good deal of Book 10. It is at the start of that book that Quintilian starts to speak of the pursuit of e£t?.28 He says at the opening of the book (10. 1. 1) that it is debatable what most contributes towards this quality: writing, reading (these two are paired at 10. 1. 8) or speaking. And the book contains, amongst other things, chapters on reading (1), writing (how to write, 3; what to write, 5), and the closely associated imitation (2). Amidst all this there is much to remind us both of Book 2 and of Theon. It is clear that Quintilian, entirely approving of the Greek's procedures, felt that they should be extended over a much longer timescale, perhaps even over a lifetime. 2« w h e n Theon (cited above, p. xxxi) says that 'we shall u s e . . .Elaboration and especially Contradiction only when we h a w achieved some it is not clear (as the Bude editors acknowledge: p. xxix nn. 4 5 - 6 ) at what stage this became true; but he is thinking o f some point within the period during which students were trained in progyttinasinata. But Quintilian indicates that / f t s needs to be established ( 1 0 . 1. 44 'confirmare facultatem dicendi', 10. 5. 1 'hexin parantibus') at a very late stage o f the rhetorical education, when the theoretical precepts have been mastered (10. 1. 1, 4 ) and the young man Is contemplating a career as an orator ( 1 0 . 1. 4 5 ) ; we should think o f him as having left school altogether (note 10. 5. 19, and cf. the next n.). But the process could go o n much longer; thus declamation was still useful for the 'complete orator, already famous in the forum' (10. 5. 14).
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The Techniques are now adapted to an older youth, who has cut himself adrift from the rhetorReading has become an entirely private activity, and the reader must now supply for himself the enarratio formerly supplied by the teacher.30 Listening (Quintilian uses the word auditio at 10. 1. 10 paired with reading; cf. 10. 1. 15, 16) is now attendance not at a model speech, but at a real-life oration. Correction, discussed in 10. 4, is neither the process described in 2. 4. 10-12 (cf. 2. 2. 7), where a kindly teacher points out errors in a pupils work, nor yet that seen in Theon ch. 17, the Contradiction that dares to find fault in a Demosthenes. Rather, it is the process of going over one's own work and giving it a final polish on the basis of one's mature judgement. But it is in the two chapters on Writing that the echoes of the second book are most obvious. One must write with all care and as much as possible (10. 3. 2; cf. 2.4. 15, and also 10. 7. 7, 28). Writing is a remedy against empty loquacity and words that are born only on the lips' (10. 3. 2; cf. 2. 4. 15 'the garrulity of extemporization'). Writing stores away treasures of words for future use (10. 3. 3; cf. 2. 7.4). As we read 10. 5, which (as we have seen) recommends paraphrase for a youth who has left school, we realize that we are being given a partial reprise of elements of Book 2. We are recommended to write Theses (with the comment that Cicero exercised himself on them even when he was a great man), and to employ the associated exercise of supporting and refuting them (10. 5. 11). Then come Commonplaces, again with a comment suggesting their utility not just for the youth who had left school but even for the mature: 'we know that orators wrote them out' (10. 5. 12, looking back to 2. 1. 11). And finally (10. 5. 14) declamation itself recurs, recommended specifically as something which, if properly exercised, will be of high use 'not just while one is growing up, but when one is the complete orator, already famous in the forum'. Quintilian is quick to warn that one can spend too long in the declamation school (10. 5. 17-8; cf. 12. 11. 15); but he is clear that declamation, like the simpler exercises that preceded it, continues to be of service as worth writing (and surely also sometimes speaking) right on into adult life. 2 9 Note how in 10. 2 . 1 9 - 2 1 one is advised to 'consult one's powers', for people are different and cannot d o everything; compare 2. 8 (to which Quintilian refers back in 10. 2. 20), where it is for the teacher to decide what each pupil is capable of. In 10. 2. 21 Quintilian summarizes the point: 4 |the teacher) guides and forms the minds o f others; it is harder to shape one's own nature'. 3 0 Thus ( 1 0 . 1. 22) a reader should be acquainted with the cases in connection with which the speeches he reads were spoken (cf. 2. 5. 7 'exposita causa'). Further, in 10. 2, the chapter o n imitation, Quintilian makes the point ( 2 7 ) that a model is t o be followed not just in vocabulary but in the whole conduct o f a speech; one needs to pay close attention to the strategies o f the speech and to its emotional effect; compare 2. 5 . 7 - 9 . The prolonged discussion o f H o m e r in 10. 1. 4 6 - 5 0 exemplifies, at the start o f Quintilian's reading-list, the sort o f things he hoped a reader would look for.
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Theon, then, or something much like Theon's book, is plundered by Quintilian much more widely than in Book 2. He finds the exercises that Theon listed for progymnasmatic purposes relevant far beyond that stage. Here, in fact, is a striking instance of a general rule stressed by Rafaella Cribiore: 'paideia... proceeded in a circular motion, by revisiting previous material' (Cribiore 187, looking back to p. 129).31
DEFINING RHETORIC In the second half of Inst. Or. Book 2 Quintilian develops his theoretical conception of rhetoric in careful interaction with earlier views on the matter. This conception is characterized by two views in particular: that rhetoric, for it to be deserving of that name, has to be technical, grounded in an elaborate system of rules and precepts, and that only a uir bonus, endowed with what tradition calls the four cardinal virtues, can be an orator in the full sense of the term. In ancient debates about rhetoric and oratory, this is a fairly extreme position, and a survey of certain aspects of the political and historical context in which Quintilian was writing the Institutio will help to clarify why he adopts it. This will be followed by a summary of the main argument in 2. 14-21, which is meant to tie in with the introductions to individual chapters in the commentary. We shall then briefly consider views similar to Quintilian's in the works of Aelius Aristides, which have given rise to suggestions that both writers draw on the same influence. At the end we shall survey some literary strategies which the author employs as he sets out his argument.
Historical Context It was a widely shared perception among Roman intellectuals of the second half of the first century AD that Roman oratory had declined since the days of Cicero, both with respect to its stylistic qualities—here the detrimental effects of declamation practice were cited, though these were set against a wider background of views on the decline of literary culture in general and oratory in particular—and with respect to the moral stature of the orators in 3 1 This section o f o u r Introduction may be compared with L - P i. 2 4 7 - 5 4 , a discussion which contains m u c h o f value, especially o n the way in which Cicero in deOratore 1. 1 4 9 - 5 9 (a passage that deeply influenced Quintilian's tenth book) raised some o f the progymnasmata to a higher level; but it is in o u r view open to criticism, and was written too early to be able to take into account the new evidence about Theon.
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question. In particular, a conception of rhetoric which, as is suggested by the Institutio and the almost contemporary Dialogusde Oratoribus by Tacitus, was very prominent at the time was that of a group of orators and teachers of rhetoric whom one might call the 'naturalists' (thus Winterbottom7 95). It was characterized by a complete rejection of rhetorical theory. The naturalists turned rhetoric into an art of improvisation, and it is no coincidence that Quintilian castigates them in 2. 11-12 (see the introductory notes to these chapters), before he embarks on delineating his alternative position (put differently, this contrast is instrumental in connecting the two halves of the book). However, there is a particular group of naturalists which is especially relevant (see p. 175 and Winterbottom7). The most famous orators of the time were delatores, professional accusers ('informers') of usually lowly origin who destroyed the lives of honourable men and their families out of greed and personal ambition (see Rutledge and Riviere). The delatores were relied on by the imperial court and could be seen as one of the instruments of enforcing monarchic power. And although this was not peculiar to them (see p. 184), their manner of speaking was of the naturalist type as described above (see p. 183). By contrast the Institutio demands that the orator be a good man, widely read and learned, be carefully trained in the technical rhetoric which forms the body of the work, and speak in a way which is, while making the inevitable concessions to the changes of taste, reminiscent of the developed style of Cicero. Various aspects of this scenario have recently been called into question, and since we shall presuppose its accuracy in the commentary, some of these objections need to be addressed here, and reasons given why we consider them not pertinent. First, there are historical studies of the role of the delatores in the Empire like Rutledge's which urge that delatores are misrepresented in modern scholarship. It is a valid point that in the Roman judicial system there was no formal office equivalent to a state prosecutor and that, while attacks for gain and fame on high-ranking individuals are what made the informers infamous (see also Bauman's study on the crimen maiestatis), these prosecutions are not representative of the role they had in the Roman state (for the broader role of the delatores see Caminas). And it is clear from the evidence gathered by Rutledge, especially his useful prosopographical survey (183-290), that informers did not typically act upon 'requests' issued by the princeps or his amid. Likewise, it is true that Roman society continued to require that a man made his mark in life even when the political circumstances had severely restricted the freedom to do so, and that the role of the informer in this sense too had an important social function. Rutledge also shows that our sources too often cite inferior motivation for a particular prosecution when inimicitiae, revenge, or pietas—all condoned and even
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respected reasons—would provide more plausible explanations. Finally, Rutledge is also right to point out that it can be demonstrated even from 'senatorial' sources that the senate was well capable of showing obsequious behaviour without being prompted by informers. It will be clear that one can happily concur with these observations, which are in any case worth bearing in mind, and at the same time be able to demonstrate from Tacitus and Quintilian that the two of them essentially agreed both in their judgements on the informers and in their assessment of their social and political role (see p. 184). But doubt has been cast on this last point too, e.g. by Goldberg with regard to Tacitus' Dialogus. Quintilian, who was writing while Domitian was still emperor, has few direct references to orators known to have been informers, and where he does make them, he tends to comment on points of style, sometimes favourably. It is in Tacitus' Dialogus, which is likely to have been written or at least published a few years after Domitian's death, that the connection between the delatores and naturalist rhetoric is more apparent. At the beginning of the Dialogus we hear that Maternus—who at the end seems to become Tacitus' mouthpiece in explaining the decline of oratory— wants to withdraw from public life and from public pleading, and instead become a poet. Against him Aper is set as the representative of contemporary rhetoric, hostile to theory and in favour of naturalist rhetoric.32 He praises the benefits of oratory, which for him include the opportunity to help other people, but also to gain financially and in terms of prestige. Aper cites two delatores, Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus, as shining examples of the positive effects of oratory (both were at the beginning of their careers in 69, the dramatic date of the dialogue).33 Both men gave up prosecuting early in their lives and enjoyed very successful political careers, but the way in which Maternus responds makes it necessary to assume that the readership was to construe them primarily as delatores: Maternus ignores Aper's arguments for the benefits of oratory and instead rejects public speaking as a profession completely in a marked backward reference to the two individuals (12. 2): 'lucrosae huius et sanguinantis eloquentiae usus recens et ex malis moribus natus atque, ut tu dicebas, in locum teli repertus' (referring back to 5. 6 and 5. 7 'accinctus'). For the readership to follow this sequence of events, namely that Maternus can simply ignore the positive effects of oratory (cf. 5. 5), it had to see Vibius and Marcellus primarily as delatores, not as self-made men who 3 2 Tac. Dial. 2. 2: 'Aper o m n i eruditione imbutus contemnebat potius litteras quam nesciebat, tamquam maiorem industriae et laboris gloriam habiturus si ingenium eius nullis alien arum artium adminiculis inniti uideretur." 3 3 Tac. Dial. 5. 7 and 8. 3. O n T. Clodius Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus see Rutledge 2 2 5 - 8 , 2 7 8 - 8 2 respectively.
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rose from humble beginnings against the odds. With this it is quite compatible that Tacitus' first readers may have taken Maternus' views with a pinch of salt, as well as noticed that, as a character and also as an interlocutor, Aper radiates an energy and positive aggression which is difficult to match for the other speakers. But that is due to Tacitus' insight that, in a way (cf. 1. 3), there is something to be said both for the views expressed in Maternus' closing speech and for Aper's (including those of his second speech), not to his having any doubts as to what to make of Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus. So we see why Quintilian feels a need to press the idea of the orator as a good man.
The Main Argument Chapters 2. 14-21 not only discuss in survey-form questions conventionally treated in connection with attempts to conceptualize rhetoric as a discipline, but also make a specific argument for Quintilians own conception of rhetoric in the process.3'1 It is argued here that the main steps of this argument are derived from Stoic doctrine which, however, has been modified in crucial respects.35 In that connection, one needs to be aware that in Quintilians day Stoicism was part of the mental habitus of an educated Roman. We contend that Quintilian, in setting out his argument, relies on this fact by occasionally expecting his readership to bring its knowledge of Stoic philosophy to the text (see below, section 'Strategies'). He chose this mode of presentation, one may assume, because, given Stoicism's reputation for being arcane and counterintuitive and given that the current vogue had it that philosophy was not needed to produce good oratory, it would not have served his purpose to overemphasize this influence. Chapters 2. 14-21 and the first two chapters of Book 12 frame the vast collection of rhetorical precepts which form the body of Inst. Or., to which 3 4 This entails that not all the chapters 2. 1 4 - 2 1 include arguments which go towards building up Quintilian's overall position. 2. 19 and 2. 2 1 , on whether nature o r teaching matters m o r e in rhetorical instruction and on the subject-matter o f rhetoric respectively, primarily represent material which is conventionally included in discussions o f the nature o f rhetoric. For the subject o f 2. 19 cf. e.g. Prolog, p. 50. 2 6 - 5 3 . 17; for the subject-matter of rhetoric see Rabe's index s.v. SXq. On the way in which Q.'s exposition and arrangement differs from other extant discussions o f rhetoric as a technical discipline, see the Appendix, pp. 3 9 5 - 7 . 3 5 As far as Book 2 and 12 are concerned, we would therefore see a deeper influence o f Stoicism than e.g. Atherton 4 2 3 : 'Quintilian's rhetorical education (like Cicero's) is directed to the formation of an ideal orator, the " R o m a n u m quendam sapientem" (12. 2. 6 - 7 ) who undoubtedly has some Stoic blood in his veins; but Quintilian seems to distance himself consciously from the Stoic model, while his appeals to support from the Stoa only on a few disputed points suggest independence elsewhere', and an influence which extends further than Natali assumes, who does not take into account that the Stoicizing argument continues in 2. 2 0 .
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they give meaning and purpose, and for which they above all provide justification. Chapter 2. 15 considers the finis of rhetoric, finis being sometimes used in the sense 'definition ( o p o ? ) , sometimes in the sense 'goal' ( r f ' A o ? ) . The ambiguity is harmless if one takes into account that many definitions of rhetoric which philosophers and rhetoricians produced over the centuries conform with a basic pattern: they classify rhetoric generically, for instance as an art (ars, re^in7) or as a science (scientia, imoTijixv}), and then add a second qualification which says what it is for or what it aims to do. In this way, discussing what someone has posited as rhetoric's goal means discussing a defining feature of rhetoric (cf. 2. 15. 38). Now there was a strong tradition from the sophists of the fifth century onwards of seeing 'persuasion' as the goal of rhetoric or for making it a defining feature of rhetoric, a notion encapsulated in the description of rhetoric as a vadovs Srifxiovpyos (Plat. Grg. 453 A 2, where Socrates is summarizing what Gorgias had said before). Quintilian pointedly rejects this; one of the arguments cited is that morally bad people can be persuasive too (2. 15. 3; and Quintilian stipulates that the title 'orator' be reserved for the uir bonus), another is that on this definition failure to persuade threatens the status of the orator as a craftsman and of oratory as an art: 'nam et ipse [sc. the rhetorician Apollodorus] oratorem fortunae subicit, ut, si non persuaserit, nomen suum retinere non possit' (2. 15. 12). Quintilian then reveals his favoured solution at the end of the chapter: according to him any embarrassment can be avoided if one posits bene dicere as the goal of rhetoric, and scientia bene dicendi as its definition (2. 15. 33-5). Quintilian makes it clear that this is a Stoic view, by citing wellknown Stoic philosophers as the creators of these formulae,36 yet in itself all this is neither self-explanatory nor obviously plausible. However, the background a reader would have to supply to make sense of these claims is clear enough. Any technical expertise a human being can have is seen as complex knowledge in the rexvirrjs, and calling rhetoric a scientia implies that it is a particularly stable body of knowledge. The force of bene dicere (ev Acyciv) is clear from Alex. Aphr. in Top. p. 1. 13-14 Wallies ( = fr. 57 Hiilser): [5c. 01 ano rfjs Zroa?] to . . . A€y€iv iv raj To. aArjBrj kcli ra 7Tpoar/Kovra A€y€u> efvat Ttdefxevoi. Quintilian will later (2.17. 22-5 with nn. ad loc.) elaborate what bene means for him in this context, thereby modifying the Stoic view, but here in 2. 15 he seems to stick with it and expects his readers to realize that, for otherwise they were bound to be puzzled by the second major claim of this chapter: that the uir bonus alone is capable of bene dicere (2. 15. 34): 'nam [5c. haec definitio, i.e. rhetorice est scientia bene dicendi] et orationis omnes uirtutes semel 3 6 That the definition is Stoic is certain; that the Stoics identified a formal goal of the art o f rhetoric is contentious (see p. 364).
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complectituret protinusetiam mores oratoris, cum bene dicerenon possit nisi bonus', where the cum is causal. In 2. 16 Quintilian considers the question whether rhetoric is useful. Those who make persuasion the goal of rhetoric would find it easy to make their case: they could argue that rhetoric is useful because it can be used to persuade an audience that an innocent man must not be convicted and in general that rhetoric, in virtue of being persuasive, can be employed for a variety of good causes, including the establishment of civilized societies (cf. e.g. the proem to Cic. Inv. 1). Quintilian has largely given away this line of argument in the previous chapter: while he of course maintains the view that rhetoric which does not persuade or has no hope of persuading is a pointless concept, he does not make persuasion a fonnal goal of rhetoric, on whose attainment its status as a technical discipline depends. One might therefore expect him to provide an argument why rhetoric as he conceives of it is useful. In fact, however, in 2. 16. 11 Quintilian refers back to the two points made in the previous chapter—that persuasion should not be a defining feature of rhetoric, and that only the uir bonus is capable of speaking well—and goes on to assert that, given these two points, one cannot but admit that rhetoric is useful. What follows is not obviously an argument for this assertion, for we are presented with a laus eloquentiae, on one level reminiscent of certain passages in Isocrates and of the proem of Cicero's Inv., which praises speech and, in another step, rhetoric as the clearest manifestation of human rationality, and as a wonderful thing to perfect and admire. It is only when one has read the rest of the book and the arguments for the view that rhetoric is a virtue in 2. 20 (clearly marked as constructed by philosophers) that it becomes possible to see why 2. 16. 12-19 hints at an alternative argument for the usefulness of rhetoric: in developing our rhetorical ability we follow nature, inasmuch as we consciously observe and follow nature's will, and because this is beneficial, rhetoric is useful. This too is a Stoicizing notion, alluding to the Stoic conception of the human good, 'following nature' or 'living according to nature', which amounts to the cultivation of virtue (see e.g. Irwin 346-9). At the same time, there is a contrast here with the naturalist position, in that Quintilian implicitly lays claim to a naturalist rhetoric too, but one that is grounded in a more complex and philosophical view of human nature. In 2. 17 Quintilian considers whether rhetoric is an art (ars, rexvrj); again a relevant alternative would be the naturalist view that it is a natural faculty which is merely developed by practice (uis, Swa^is). The chapter is structured in such a way that arguments against rhetoric's technicity which have been put forward are considered and rejected or refuted one after the other, and at the end (2. 17. 41) Quintilian names two definitions of an art which he
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accepts and which are immune against all the objections considered before: 'ars est potestas uia, id est ordine, efficiens' and 'ars constat ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem utilem uitae'; the second of these, assigned in the sources to the Stoic Zeno, has to be taken as the official definition. It is important to note that the definition is not an esoteric piece of learning but the standard definition of an art, widely accepted beyond the confines of the Stoic school (see n. on 2. 17. 41 ab omnibus fere probatus); and indeed it can be shown that Quintilian, as he discusses the various objections to the technicity of rhetoric in 2. 17, already relies on the definition to which he is to commit himself at the end of the chapter—and he can only do so because the definition is standard. Crucially, however, as Quintilian moves along in 2. 17, he stresses time and again that the claim that rhetoric is an art becomes unchallengeable if it is modified by the two claims made in 2. 15: that bene dicere is the goal of rhetoric, and that the uir bonus alone is capable of bene dicere. As to the definition itself, we provide a brief explanation of its elements and otherwise refer to the commentary on ch. 17. An art is made up from 'items of knowledge' (perceptiones), which are embodied in its precepts. To possess an art is to know these precepts and to be able to 'operate' them. These items of knowledge must be mutually coherent (consentientes) and organized (coexercitatae, sc. as opposed to disjointed bodies of knowledge). There should be no two precepts contradicting each other, and the precepts given must be true. An art has a goal {finis), and this goal must be good and useful. An art may be described in the abstract, as it were, as an ordered body of knowledge {avarrj^a in Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 2. 10) or as a disposition of the mind of the artist (Stadeois in Philod. Rhet. i. 69. 5 Sudhaus = p. 123. 5 L.A.); cf. 2. 18. 3 for ars in this second sense (with nn.). This second point leads on to 2. 20, concerned with the question whether rhetoric is a virtue, for it is easier to understand that rhetoric could ever be a virtue if we already conceive of it as a disposition of the mind of the orator. (It is fittingly at the beginning of this chapter, in 2. 20. 2, that the clearest reference to the activities of the delatores is made.) To follow Quintilian's argument here, we must take into account that for the Stoics virtue is knowledge, and in particular organized and complex knowledge, a view they took over from the early Platonic dialogues. In particular, operating rcx^-knowledge can be seen as very similar to virtuous action conceived in this sense (see the introduction to ch. 20 for further detail); one of the characterizations given for virtue by the Stoics is actually 'the art of living'. Quintilian then proposes to offer two types of arguments for the view that rhetoric is a virtue, philosophical and rhetorical ones; he accepts both sets and says the difference between them is primarily one of form and exposition. The philosophical arguments are given in 2. 20. 5-7. It is argued that, just as there
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is prndentia (povT)ais, one of the four cardinal virtues accepted by the Stoics) operating in the field of 'what should and should not be done', so there is prudentia operating in the field of'what should and should not be said'. This second kind of prudentia is then identified as rhetoric. So we are given an explanation why rhetoric itself can be conceived as a virtue, and it is made clear that this virtue is in some way subordinate to or a function of prudentia, hence establishing a link with one of the cardinal virtues. If we take this interim conclusion and read on to section 8, it appears that the perfect orator does not just have prudentia: he must also have the other cardinal virtues— and that means, have the relevant knowledge—as a necessary condition for his success: 'nam quid orator in laudando faciet nisi honestorum ac turpium peritus, aut in suadendo nisi utilitate perspecta, aut in iudiciis si iustitiae sit ignarus?' We believe that these considerations more than suggest to the reader that Quintilian means to adopt the Stoic doctrine of avraKoXovOia, i.e. the notion that having one virtue implies having all the others (on this doctrine see Long, 'Harmonics', 110-12). Therefore 2. 20 not only shows why rhetoric as envisaged by Quintilian is a virtue but also why it is to be had only by the uir bonus. Cicero has Antonius recount this doctrine of the mutual implication of virtues in de Orat. 1. 83, where the summary is concluded with the remark 'sed haec erat spinosa quaedam et exilis oratio longeque a nostris sensibus abhorrebat'. This appraisal may help explain the somewhat indirect way with which the view is alluded to by Quintilian. If we now read the first chapters of Book 12, it is striking that 'virtue is knowledge', the crucial tenet which grounds the argument of Book 2, is in evidence, e.g. 12. 1.3 'morally bad people lack prudentia and intellegentid (cf. 12. 1. 30), or 12. 1. 4, where it is confidently asserted: 'quod si neminem malum esse nisi stultum eundem non modo a sapientibus dicitur, sed uulgo quoque semper est creditum, certe nonfietumquam stultus orator', or 12. 2. 17, where the uir bonus is described as 'uirtutes ipsas inente com plexus'. Needless to say, this is not common usage: after all, common opinion would have it that one can be a morally bad man and supremely cunning at the same time. But we have no difficulty in finding parallels for the equation of stultus and malus in Stoic texts, e.g. Sen. Ben. 4. 26. 2 (and passim), Ep. 59. 17; Lact. Inst. 5.17.25-6,29 (SVFiii, fr. 298, under the heading 'mutua uirtutum coniunctio', i.e. avraKoXovdia): Denique, ut concludam disputationem, non posse eundem iustum esse ac stultum, eundem sapientem et iniustum, docet ipsa ratio. Qui enim stultus est, quid sit iustum ac bonum nescit et ideo semper peccat. Ducitur enim quasi captiuus a uitiis, nec resistere ullo modo potest, quia caret uirtute, quam nescit. Iustus ab omni peccato se abstinet; quod aliter facere non potest, quam si habcat recti prauique notitiam. Rectum autem discernere a prauo quis potest nisi sapiens? Ita fit ut numquam possit
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esse iustus, qui stultus est, neque sapiens qui fuerit iniustus factis dictisque per ignorantiam recti ac boni erratio.
Stultitia igitur est in
Sources Quintilian's overall position is sometimes described as neo-Ciceronianism. This is fair, especially if one believes that the somewhat unfavourable light in which Ciceronianism appears in Tacitus' Dial., in particular in the overdone and implausible contributions of Messalla, is actually a response to Quintilian rather than to Cicero. However, as we have seen, Quintilian's position in the theoretical chapters of Book 2 is that rhetoric is about bene dicere, and that only the uir bonus can do it, and here Quintilian is never further apart from Cicero (12 pr. 4 is a kind of acknowledgement of this fact). The main difference from Cicero's position consists in the integration of moral knowledge and Tf'xwj-knowledge (see May-Wisse 11-12); apart from that he talks about ideal eloquence and the ideal orator in terms which sound distinctly Platonic (Or. 9-10). This raises the question whether Quintilian's position was unique among ancient rhetoricians, and whether we can trace the influence to a particular individual within the Stoic school. On these questions important findings have been made by Sohlberg (but cf. earlier Radermacher, 'Schrift'). He observed that, if we assemble the numerous statements on the perfect orator which Aelius Aristides (born 117) makes in his substantial corpus of speeches, what we find looks remarkably similar to certain elements of Quintilian's conception of the orator perfectusr,37 and he argued that this points to a common Stoic source. We present some of the points of contact first. In his speech 'Yirep prjropiKrjs (Or. 45 Dindorf) he says that true rhetoric comprises all four cardinal virtues (p. 72 D.), that the orator must be a good man, intent on making other men good as well, ending with a general characterization (p. 98 D.): El yap Set avveAovra eiireovSev iariv aAAo prjTopiKrj rj povr)ois Xoyajv Svvafxtv -rrpooeiArjtfivia. (vs firj fxovov avros epSetv ra fie At lotci. aAAa kcli crepovs neideiv Quintilian 2. 20. 5. Later (p. 133 D.) he says: "Eotiv apa pTjTopiKrjs epyov kcli povciv opOoos kcli p,y) /jlovov avrov a 7TpaTTOVTa.aAAa kcli trepovs ircidovra a Set 7TparrtLV ttape^cadai, in its context reminiscent of the Stoic conception that dialectic and rhetoric have a role to play in correct thinking. Again (p. 144 D.) he says the perfect
3 7 One crucial difference between the two is, however, that in Aelius there is no single passage which makes a coherent case for his view. This limits the possibility of, for instance, comparisons between the two with a view to identifying innovations in Quintilian. Sohlberg tends to be ignored by the scholarship on Aelius Aristides, e.g. by Moreschini and Karadimas.
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orator is rarer than the Phoenix—which is what the Stoics say about the sage (e.g. SVFiii, fr. 658; Sen. Ep. mor. 42.1; see Brouwer 195-9); and at pp. 145-6 D. rt Srjra avrr) ye Kaff eavrrfv rj prjToptKrj Kai o pr/Tajp; eyo> fiev yap ovk aiTOKvrjaatfji av avai tovtov apiarov ctvai nepi Aoyovs ootis avrjp apiOTOs.38 He then (p. 146 D.) continues by saying that the status of the good man as perfect orator would not be under threat if the political circumstances leave him no option but to abstain from public appearance (since the speech is laid out as a response to Plato's anti-rhetorical arguments in the Gig., Aristidessays that this situation in particular would make it easy for the good man to counter Plato's claim that rhetoric was a form of flatter)' driven by greed). In Or. 46 dialectic is called a part of rhetoric (p. 350 D.), a claim which in a suitable context marks a particular understanding of rhetoric (Quintilian and other texts treat them as species of the same genus, e.g. 2. 20. 7). So much for mere points of contact. One might wonder whether it would not be possible to explain all this with the assumption that Aristides is deploying arguments against Plato which were originally put forward by Socrates in the Gorgias and the Phaedrns. It is indeed true that the main ideas of Aristides' defence of rhetoric can be traced back with varying degrees of accuracy to Plato, though not to a single passage. It is not easy to make a judgement here because the Stoics are very likely to have developed their views on rhetoric by elaborating and coherently organizing the arguments of precisely those Platonic passages to which Aristides might be referring on the alternative view. The matter is complicated further by Aristides' lack of interest in rigorous philosophical argument;39 the various elements of what we would take as the Stoic argument for rhetoric appear in his speeches in a more disjointed fashion than they do in Quintilian, and little effort is made to provide genuine arguments for the views held. Nor does it seem possible to argue that it is more economical to assume Aristides had access to a Stoic source, since he knew Plato's dialogues very well indeed, and the views of ultimately Platonic origin which we find in both Quintilian and him are obviously useful to him; so he might have excerpted them himself. In the end, it is perhaps nuances which matter, e.g. the prominence given to p6vqois in the passages quoted above cannot be properly accounted for through reference to Plato (where the connection of rhetoric with justice is more important, esp. in the Grg.)> while povr)ois is central to the way in which the Stoics accommodate rhetoric within their system; and the emphasis 5 8 Cf. Or. 47. 4 9 (p. 4 5 7 D.): kok tovtov rjp\eTO avSpa ayaOo i> ftvai Kai irepi A oyovs ayaOo v.
o
TrpeofivTepos Xeyeiv ore
tov
avrov eirj Kai
Wflamowitz's assessment ( 4 4 9 ) , 'um die philosophischen Lehren hat e r sich nie gekiimmert', is accurate, as a casual comparison with Sextus' Adv. Rhet. m a y confirm. 39
xliv
Introduction
laid on the fact that the lack of opportunity for the apioros avrjp to practise his orator)r in the public sphere would not impair his status (p. 146 D.) makes more sense in a Stoic context (see above and below).'10 Sohlberg suggested as common source for Quintilian and Aristides a particular individual: Diogenes of Babylon (C.240-151 BC), the scholarch of the Stoa who succeeded Zeno of Tarsus, himself successor to Chrysippus.'11 Diogenes was widely read: the Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, i (Florence, 1989), 38-40 lists over 105 identified passages from Diogenes in the Herculaneum papyri, and Cicero draws on him extensively (cf. e.g. Annas). We have quite a number of fragments from his flepi p-qropiK-qs (SVFiii, pp. 235-43), all of which come from Philodemus' Rhet:12 The most important fragment for our purpose (.SVTfr. 117 = Philod. Rhet. ii. 211) has been re-edited by Obbink-Vander Waerdt; we give their translation (p. 368): |gap of 6-8 words) that the statesman always fills all offices in the city [gap of 10-12 words) not only [gap of 2-3 words) prudence [gap of 2-3 words). And he is not only a good dialectician and grammarian and poet and orator, and perfect in method, having become good at all the arts, but also, in addition to (that kind of) practical utility, he shares in the government of cities, and not only with those inhabiting Athens or Lacedaemon. For among the foolish there exists no city, nor any law, but in the confederacy made up of gods and sages he is even truly called general and admiral, treasurer and collection agent, and he is said to administer the rest of the offices in like fashion, since the statesman must of necessity have knowledge of all these matters. But even so, one must point out | text breaks off). The similarities with both Aristides and Quintilian are conspicuous. There are, however, differences too, most prominently the stress on the sage's involvement with political life. We have seen above that Aristides goes out of his way to allow for the possibility of the occasional non-involvement of the Stoic orator.13 The normal expectation of the Stoic orator's involvement in political life is according to Obbink-Vander Waerdt predicated on an early conception of Stoic natural law whereby its sphere of influence is restricted to sages, i.e. there is a clear borderline between the sages living in their perfect world in which divine reason operates, and the world of the foolish, vividly 4 0 It seems unlikely to us that Aristides could h a w read Quintilian. 1 1 No complete edition of his fragments has appeared since von Arnim (SVFiii). O n him see the article in Goulet, and Obbink-Vander Waerdt. 4 2 T h e assignment to Diogenes ( m a d e by von Arnim) of items in this particular group o f fragments is, however, sometimes dubious. 4 * This point fits better with the assumption o f a Stoic source than with the alternative that Aristides had simply read Plato: for neither the Gorgias nor the Phaedriis suggests political involvement o f the orator in those sections where Socrates considers an alternative rhetoric, better than that practised in his day.
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xxx vii
characterized by Diogenes through the absence of community, society, and its institutions. There is no trace of such a conception of natural law in either Aristides or Quintilian (unsurprisingly, since for the practising orator this is a somewhat impractical assumption to make), and we also note that the close involvement with political life is less than prominent in Quintilian;44 this can probably be readily accounted for by the political circumstances of Rome in the late first century AD. We would thus suggest that on the evidence available, it may well be that Diogenes of Babylon was the source from which Quintilian and Aristides got their Stoicizing conception of rhetoric, taking into account the similarity of views and the apparent wide circulation of Diogenes' works. It would, however, be wrong to think that the central views on rhetoric as present in Quintilian 2. 14-21 and 12 on the one hand and Aristides on the other were peculiar to Diogenes within the Stoic school. Finally, the need to conceive of the master of a rexvrj as a morally good man was also felt in fields other than oratory, in particular medicine (Quintilian himself compares rhetoric and medicine on several occasions), and this may support the view that there are insufficient grounds for regarding Quintilian's position as influenced by Diogenes of Babylon in particular; that is not to say that he could not have read a treatise of his in which such views appeared(that is possible or even plausible), but rather that we cannot say Quintilian adopts Diogenes' position as distinct from that of other Stoics). Von Staden traces the development of analogous views in the field of medicine (157) 45 and points out the parallel with Cato's uir bonus dicendi peritus in Quintilian (164). Among his findings are, first, that a doctor's conduct in non-professional matters was an issue of wider interest, which is clear from the fact that primary evidence for relevant views comes not only from medical treatises (where experts in front of an audience of experts style themselves as they would like to be) but also from inscriptions displayed in public and legal texts (op. cit. 163), and second, that a difference between classical Greek and Roman attitudes can be observed: as far as the evidence goes, the emphasis on a combination of technical knowledge and skill and moral quality is much more prominent in late Hellenistic and Roman sources.46
** Cf., however, 12. 1. 26 and Winterbottom 5 323. 4 5 Von Staden 157: 'If a practitioner o f medicine displayed superb skill and exemplar)' devotion in the performance of all professional duties, did the Greeks consider the moral qualities exhibited in his non-professional o r private life relevant to evaluating whether he was a good doctor? Did they think that character, morality, and general conduct outside the professional sphere stand in a direct relation t o professional competence? And, in particular, are there significant differences between the classical, Hellenistic, and Roman responses to such questions?' Cf. the quotation from ps.-Soranus, p. 52.
xlvi
Introduction Strategies
We imagine that Quintilian had formed the view early in life that rhetoric should be grounded in rules and that an orator should be a good man, and it may well be that one day he came across a Stoic treatise which provided a coherent argument for what was for him up to this point not more than an instinctive conviction. He may then have decided to make this argument the backbone of his own exposition on the subject. At the same time he did not want to simply argue for a Stoic conception of rhetoric, because it was impractical for a practising orator and also because it would have won rhetoric as he conceived of it no supporters. So he had to devise strategies to make his perfect orator more palatable. One of these strategies, we argue, is the use Quintilian makes of Cato's famous dictum that the orator is (or should be) a uir bonus dicendi peritus. A first reference to this in Quintilian's time familiar sayingis in 1 pr. 9 'oratorem autem instituimus ilium perfectum, qui esse nisi uir bonus non potest, ideoque non dicendi modo eximiam in eo facultatem sed omnis animi uirtutes exigimus'. References to the uir bonus are then made throughout the main part of the work, before Quintilian's perfect orator is in 12. 1. 1 explicitly identified with the Catonian model: 'sit ergo nobis orator quem constituimus is qui a M. Catone finitur uir bonus dicendi peritus, uerum, id quod et ille posuit prius et ipsa natura potius ac maius est, utique uir bonus'. The definition is then referred to a number of times in book 12. Occurrences later than Quintilian are conveniently listed by Jordan.'17 To appreciate what Quintilian is doing with the phrase, we must try and establish what force and connotations it had when it was first coined, and how it was used in the subsequent period prior to Quintilian. The commonly held view that Cato did not express an old-fashioned Roman, pre-philosophical conception of a public speaker but virtually translated the Stoic dogma,'18 about which he learnt (as some of the proponents of this view suggest) in the context of the famous embassy of philosophers to Rome in 155 BC (of which Diogenes of Babylon was a member), is unsatisfactory. Surely the elder Cato could formulate such a view without being exposed to Stoic lectures, and it is unlikely that the statement in question was made as late as 155. But we do not need to rely on arguments from plausibility exclusively. Long ago Scholl pointed out that the 'definition' of the orator was to be set against the background of another fragment of Cato's preserved in Servius (see below). See also Monfasani. «« e.g. Radermacher, 'Schrift'; M o r r ; L - P i. 133; contra Schflll; Nesselrath 2 2 0 - 1 n. 5 0 2 suspends judgement. 47
Defining Rhetoric The question is whether the definition of the orator was meant and construed as Stoicizing from early on, so that it would be used in an argumentum ex auctoritate, or whether it was perceived as an expression of old-fashioned Roman virtue; in this second case Quintilian would have given his orator, despite his Stoic core, a distinctly Roman face. The parallel referred to above is Serv. in G. 1. 46 (fr. 6 Jordan): 'Cato in oratione ad filium "uir bonus est, Marce fill, colendi peritus, cuius ferramenta splendent".' The fragment is sometimes incorrectly referred to as a parallel definition of the farmer (so e.g. Goujard, p. xxviii). Unless we assume that Senilis misquotes Cato, we can observe (trivially) that uir bonusis the subject, and colendi peritus the complement; the relative clause is in its function equivalent to a second complement (the broader context, not quoted here, does not suggest otherwise). If anything is characterized here, it is uir bonus alone. This does show at least that we are not dealing with a characterization which someone other than Cato modelled on the better-known definition of the orator. If we knew that fr. 6 was earlier than the definition of the orator, then that would be useful, since it would make the similarity between the definition of the orator and the relevant Stoic fragments appear more coincidental. Unfortunately it is not possible to date the two sayings relative to each other. Now while bonus could mean 'morally good' in Cato's time (along with 'good' in other respects, 'fitting, noble, wealthy' and 'brave'; cf. WaldeHofmann and TLL s.v.), and while this is one factor in fr. 6 (we could compare passages from Cato's De agricultural which deal with agriculture and its role in character formation), this is surely not the prevalent aspect of the meaning (Mynors on G. 1. 46 tellingly comments: 'you can still tell a good farmer by the shine of his tools'). The adjective was capable of reflecting the value system of an aristocratic society, in which wealth, good fortune, competence, and moral goodness were not always dearly distinguished. And it seems more likely to us, given the similarity which does remain between the two sayings, that the sense of bonus in the definition of the orator is comparable.'19 In addition, while on the core idea expressed in the phrase there may be common ground between Cato and the Stoics, the larger doctrinal framework into which the tenet was integrated in Stoic doctrine cannot conceivably have appealed to Cato (and saying this does not amount to crediting him with a crude and simple anti-Greek attitude); so there is also some psychological implausibility in assuming Stoic influence on him at this particular point. * 9 Similarly Petersmann; Petersmann, 'Bild'. Courtney 51 comments on the preface o f Cato's De agriculfura ('et uirum b o n u m quom laudabant, ita laudabant, bonum agricolam bonumque c o l o n u m ' ) and C a t o fr. 6 Jordan: 'Note the differentiation in order between tiir bonus, uirum bonum, indicating membership o f a class, and bonum agricolam bonumque colonum, which specifies a quality/
xlviii
Introduction
Three passages in the period between Cato and Quintilian make reference to the uir bonis dicendi peritus. In de Orat. 2. 85 Cicero, without explicitly referring to Cato, has Antonius, who represents in Cicero a form of oratory that is grounded in practice and commonsense, set out his ideas about a good orator, which include telling a young man who is a uir bonus without having rhetorical prowess that he should find himself a different occupation.50 Seneca the Elder (Con. 1 pr. 8-9) castigates the loose morals of young men interested in rhetoric, and sets Cato against them as a counter-example, stylized as an oracle. From the younger Pliny (Ep. 4. 7. 4-5) we learn that Herennius Senecio branded the arch-delator Regulus a 'uir malus dicendi imperitus', which is interesting because it suggests that the Catonian dictum had already entered the critical discourse about the informers before Quintilian used it in the Institutio. In any event, none of these passages makes any suggestion that the definition was seen as an expression of Stoic thought. So we suggest that the phrase was—before Quintilian adopted it—perceived as a genuine instance of old-fashioned Roman uirtus, and that it was Quintilian who connected it with Stoicism in the sense that he made it an emblem for a Stoicizing conception of rhetoric.51 An analogy for appropriating a Roman authority figure is provided by 12. 1. 27, where Quintilian cites the famous inverted simile from Verg. A. 1. 148-56, in which Jupiter as he quells the storm incited by Juno is compared to a uir pietategrauis ac meritis. Harrison 55 rightly calls this 'a highly Roman role-model'. And whether Quintilian knew about the alleged correspondence with an incident in the life of the younger Cato (cf. Plut. Pomp. 44) or not, it would be perverse to suggest that this uir grauis has Stoic features. The simile, or so we argue, has a function similar to that of the formula from Cato: to allow readers to identify his perfect orator with an archetypal Roman figure of authority. A related attempt to avoid too overt a reliance on Stoicism can be seen in the use of Plato Quintilian makes, esp. in 2. 15. 24-32. It is in his discussion of Plato's views on rhetoric as set out in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus that Quintilian first elaborates on his view that only the virtuous, and in particular the just man, can be an orator. Instead of simply imposing a Stoic view on his readers, Quintilian develops it from his reading of Plato's dialogues, therefore being able to invoke Plato as an authority for certain aspects of
3 0 This sense o f uir bonus is put into context by passages in which Antonius emphasizes the need for the orator to present himself and his client as a good m a n (2. 1 8 4 , 2 . 2 0 6 , 2 . 211, 2. 231, 2 . 3 4 9 ) , and by his reference to the jury as good men (2. 198). 51 Differently Leigh 132, who finds Quintilian's use o f the uir bonus conception m o r e conventional.
Defining Rhetoric
xxx vii
his position.52 There is, it may be pointed out, no incompatibility between the role assigned to Cato by Quintilian (on our argument) and the use of Greek authorities here. While Quintilian appears to have been interested in taking the Stoic edge off his perfect orator and in representing his efforts as in line with Roman tradition in crucial respects, on the other hand he did not (nor could he reasonably) work towards a narrowly Roman conception of oratory. We end with some miscellaneous observations on literary technique. It has been established by Radermacher that Quintilian, Sextus Empiricus, and to a lesser degree Philodemus in his Rhet. draw on the same doxographical source on rhetoric (whether it is correct to see this source as a coherent and selfcontained text by an identifiable author rather than something more fluid is, however, a separate question); see the Appendix, which incorporates Radermacher's findings. We believe that Quintilian has rearranged this material in a major way so as to suit his argumentative purposes (see the introductory note to the Appendix). This is, however, less than obvious, for Quintilian takes some care in generating a narrative thread within the material as he has arranged it, creating a 'dialogue' between rhetoricians or philosophers where his source-material may well have provided nothing more than tenets in juxtaposition (see in particular the notes on 2. 15. 10 a quo non dissentit Theodectes, 2. 15. 12 atqui, 2. 15. 17 superiores, 2. 17. 1 transeamus.. .ad earn quaestionem quae sequitur). This technique is not unparalleled: similar observations could be made with regard to other writers who are dealing with a rich and complex doxographical tradition; thus some of the great ancient commentators on works by Aristotle can be found to stage controversies between philosophers who developed their views independently and centuries apart from each other. Another strategy, briefly referred to earlier, has to do with Quintilian writing on two levels, for the general reader, e.g. a pupil, on the one hand and for readers with a slightly broader education on the other. At times he may be found to be working on what one might call the principle of calculated unintelligibility, employing a notion or a tenet which would be lost on a reader who is just seeking basic instruction on a particular problem but which adds an integral step to a broader argument once a reader brings a somewhat wider expertise to the text (p. 273). For this technique of hinting at rather than expounding especially Stoic doctrine we might compare the works of Pliny the Younger, Quintilian's contemporary, and it is arguable that Seneca could adopt the essayistic manner of the Epistulae partly because he could 5 2 Aelius Aristides refers to Plato too o f course, and for similar views (cf. the passages cited and referred to above, pp. xlii f.), but his discussion is much less meticulous and scholarly than Quintilian's; however, this could be explained by his different style ofwriting (cf. p. xliii). Hence it is difficult to argue for a shared source from shared references to Plato.
l
Introduction
count on a certain degree of familiarity with Stoicism on the part of the audience. Finally, for all that has been said in this chapter, it should be clear that Quintilian is not consistently arguing in 2. 14-21 in a linear and sustained way; rather, he advances interrelated thoughts and arguments in a way which makes them acquire what force they have in synopsis only, once one has absorbed and pondered the whole (p. 279).
Note on the Text The text given here is a modified version of that printed in Winterbottom's OCT of 1970. The opportunity has been taken to repunctuate and in particular to reparagraph the text. A number of changes of wording are listed below. In this book the text is based on the two primary manuscripts, both of the ninth century: Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana E. 153 sup. (A) and Berne, Burgerbibliothek 351 (B). It is our view that all other manuscripts of Quintilian descend directly or indirectly from A or B, and that their only use in Book 2 is as a source of conjectures. For details, see the Latin preface to the OCT; for an English summary see L. D. Reynolds (ed.), Texts and Transmission (Oxford, 1983), 332-4. List of changes from OCT: 1. 2 prosopopoeias usque ad suasorias obelized 1. 4 historicorum criticorumque bracketed 1.8 at si rhetor for si rhetor 4. 3 lasciua for lasciuiat 4. 18 restruendi for destruendi 4. 28 diuersa for aduersa 4. 29 necesse uero for fnec uerof 4. 30 appareatque obelized 5. 2 nostrum obelized 6. 1 digerere for derigere 6. 5 praeuia for breuia 6. 7 expertos for expertas 9. 2 alacresque for alac res 10. 11 nam et in for nam et 12. 2 ilium uehementis impetus obelized 12.5 certa for cetera 12. 6 intenderint obelized 13.3 <si> collibus^brcollibus 13. 9 sit obelized 14. 2 quoque^br quoque 15.10 actor obelized 15. 30 <cum> scribere for scribere 16.5 his for iis 17.7 sero iam for sero
lii
17.14 17.30 17.34 19.2 20. 3 20.5 20. 8 21.8
Note on the Text Gryllo for Grylo restruere/or destruere effecit for efficit utrisque obelized acum is no longer obelized uirtus for uirtutis ac turpium for et turpium quia multiplicem for multiplicem
M. FABI QVINTILIANI INSTITVTIONIS ORATORIAE LIBER SECVNDVS 1. Teniiit consuetudo, quae cotidie magis inualescit, ut praeceptoribus eloquentiae, Latinis quidem semper, sed etiam Graecis interim, discipuli serius quam ratio postulat traderentur. Eius rei duplex causa est, quod et rhetores utiqiie nostri suas partis omiserunt et grammatici alienas occupauerunt. 2. Nam et illi dedamare modo et scientiam declamandi ac facultatem tradere officii sui ducunt, idque intra deliberatiuas iudicialisque materias (nam cetera ut professione sua minora despiciunt), et hi non satis credunt excepisse quae relicta erant (quo nomine gratia quoque iis habenda est), sed ad fprosopopoeias usque ad suasoriasf, in quibus onus dicendi uel maximum est, inrampunt. 3. Hinc ergo accidit ut quae alterius artis prima erant opera facta sint alterius nouissima, et aetas altioribus iam disdplinis debita in schola minore subsidat, ac rhetoricen apud grammaticos exerceat. Ita, quod est maxime ridiculum, non ante ad declamandi magistrum mittendus uidetur puer quam dedamare sciat. 4. Nos suum cuique professioni modum demus. Et grammatice, quam in Latinum transferentes 'litteraturam' uocauerunt, fines suos norit, praesertim tantum ab hac appellationis suae paupertate, intra quam primi illi constitere, prouecta (nam tenuis a fonte adsumptis [historicorum criticorumque] uiribus pleno iam satis alueo fluit, cum, praeter rationem recte loquendi non parum alioqui copiosam, prope omnium maxim arum artium scientiam amplexa sit), (5) et rhetorice, cui nomen uis eloquendi dedit, officia sua non detrectet, nec occupari gaudeat pertinentem ad se laborem; quae, dum opere cedit, iam paene possessione depulsa est. 6. Neque infitiabor aliquem ex his qui grammaticen profiteantur eo usque scientiae progredi posse, ut ad haec quoque tradenda sufficiat; sed aim id aget, rhetoris officio fungetur, non suo. 7. Nos porro quaerimus quando iis quae rhetorice praecipit percipiendis puer maturus esse uideatur; in quo quidem non id est aestimandum, cuius quisque sit aetatis, sed quantum in studiis iam efifecerit. Et ne diutius disseram quando sit rhetori tradendus, sic optime finiri credo: cum poterit. 8. Sed hoc
2
Institutionis Oratoriae
ipsum ex superiore pendet quaestione. Nam si grammatices munus usque ad suasorias prorogatum tardius rhetore opus est; at si rhetor prima officia operis sui non recusat, a narrationibus statim et laudandi uituperandique opusculis cura eius desideratur. 9. An ignoramus antiquis hoc fuisse ad augendam eloquentiam genus exercitationis, ut thesis dicerent et communes locos et cetera citra complexum rerum personarumque quibus uerae fictaeque controuersiae continentur? Ex quo palam est quam turpiter deserat earn partem rhetorices institutio quam et primam habuit et diu solam. 10. Quid autem est ex his de quibus supra dixi quod non cum in alia quae sunt rhetorum propria, turn certe in illud iudiciale causae genus incidat? An non in foro narrandum est? Qua in parte nescio an sit uel plurimum. 11. Non laus ac uituperatio certaminibus illis frequenter inseritur? Non communes loci, siue qui sunt in uitia derecti, quales legimus a Cicerone compositos, seu quibus quaestiones generaliter tractantur, quales sunt editi a Quinto quoque Hortensio, ut 'sitne paruis argumentis credendum' et 'pro testibus' et 'in testes', in mediis litium medullis uersantur? 12. Arma sunt haec quodam modo praeparanda semper, ut iis cum res poscet utaris. Quae qui pertinere ad orationem non putabit, is ne statuam quidem inchoari credet ciun eius membra fundentur. Neque hanc, ut aliqui putabunt, festinationem meam sic quisquam calumnietur tamquam eum qui sit rhetori traditus abducendum protinus a grammaticis putem. 13. Dabuntur illis turn quoque tempora sua, neque erit uerendum ne binis praeceptoribus oneretur puer. Non enim crescet sed diuidetur qui sub uno miscebatur labor, et erit sui quisque operis magister utilior. Quod adhuc optinent Graeci, a Latinis omissum est, et fieri uidetur excusate, quia sunt qui labori isti successerint. 2. Ergo cum ad eas in studiis uires peruenerit puer ut quae prima esse praecepta rhetorum diximus mente consequi possit, tradendus eius artis magistris erit. Quorum in primis inspici mores oportebit. 2. Quod ego non idcirco potissimum in hac parte tractare sum adgressus quia non in ceteris quoque doctoribus idem hoc examinandum quam diligentissime putem, sicut testatus sum libro priore, sed quod magis necessariam eius rei mentionem facit aetas ipsa discentium. 3. Nam et adulti fere pueri ad hos praeceptores transferuntur et apud eos iuuenes etiam facti perseuerant, ideoque maior adhibenda turn cura est, ut et teneriores annos ab iniuria sanctitas docentis custodiat et ferociores a licentia grauitas deterreat. 4. Neque uero sat est summam praestare abstinentiam, nisi disciplinae seueritate conuenientium quoque ad se mores adstrinxerit. Sumat igitur ante omnia parentis erga discipulos suos animum, ac succedere se in eorum locum a quibus sibi liberi tradantur existimet. 5. Ipse nec
Liber Seen nd us
3
habeat uitia nec ferat. Non austeritas eius tristis, non dissolutasitcomitas, ne inde odium, hinc contemptus oriatur. Plurimus ei de honesto ac bono sermo sit (nam quo saepius monuerit, hoc rarius castigabit); minime iracundus, nec tamen eorum quae emendanda erunt dissimulator; simplex in docendo, patiens laboris, adsiduus potius quam inmodicus. 6. Interrogantibus libenter respondeat, non interrogantes percontetur ultro. In laudandis discipulorum dictionibus nec malignus nec effusus, quia res altera taedium laboris, altera securitatem parit. 7. In emendando quae corrigenda erunt non acerbus minimeque contumeliosus; nam id quidem multos a proposito studendi fugat, quod quidam sic obiurgant quasi oderint. 8. Ipse aliquid, immo multa cotidie dicat quae secum auditores referant. Licet enim satis exemplorum ad imitandum ex lectione suppeditet, tamen uiua ilia (ut dicitur) uox alit plenius, praecipueque praeceptoris quem discipuli, si modo recte sunt instituti, et amant et uerentur. Vix autem did potest quanto libentius imitemur eos quibus fauemus. 9. Minime uero permittenda pueris, ut fit apud plerosque, adsurgendi exultandique in laudando licentia; quin etiam iuuenum modicum esse, cum audient, testimonium debet. Ita fiet ut ex iudicio praeceptoris discipulus pendeat, atque id se dixisse recte quod ab eo probabitur credat. 10. Ilia uero uitiosissima quae iam humanitas uocatur inuicem qualiacumque laudandi, cum est indecora et theatralis et seuere institutis scholis aliena, turn studiorum perniciosissima hostis; superuaaia enim uidentur cura ac labor parata quidquid effiiderint laude. 11. Vultum igitur praeceptoris intueri tam qui audiunt debent quam ipse qui dicit; ita enim probanda atque improbanda discernent. Sic stilo facultas continget, auditione iudicium. 12. At nunc proni atque succincti ad omnem clausulam non exsurgunt modo uerum etiam excurmnt et cum indecora exultatione condamant. Id mutuum est et ibi declamationis fortuna. Hinc tumor et uana de se persuasio, usque adeo ut illo condiscipulorum tumultu inflati, si parum a praeceptore laudentur, ipsi de illo male sentiant. 13. Sed se quoque praeceptores intente ac modeste audiri uelint; non enim iudicio discipulorum dicere debet magister, sed discipulus magistri. Quin, si fieri potest, intendendus animus in hoc quoque, ut perspiciat quae quisque et quomodo laudet, et placere quae bene dicet non suo magis quam eorum nomine delectetur qui recte iudicabunt. 14. Pueros adulescentibus permixtos sedere non placet mihi. Nam etiamsi uir talis qualem esse oportet studiis moribusque praepositum modestam habere potest etiam iuuentutem, tamen uel infirmitas a robustioribus separanda est, et carendum non solum crimine turpitudinis uerum etiam suspicione. 15. Haec notanda breuiter existimaui. Nam ut absit ab ultimis uitiis ipse ac schola ne praecipiendum quidem credo; ac si quis est qui flagitia manifesta in eligendo filii praeceptore non uitet, iam hinc sciat cetera quoque,
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Institutionis Oratoriae
quae ad utilitatem iuuentutis componere conamur, esse sibi hac parte omissa superuacua. 3. Ne illorum quidem persuasio silentio transeunda est, qui, etiam cum idoneos rhetori pueros putauerunt, non tamen continuo tradendos eminentissimo credunt, sed apud minores aliquamdiu detinent, tamquam instituendis artibus magis sit apta mediocritas praeceptoris cum ad intellectum atque imitationem facilior, turn ad suscipiendas elementorum molestias minus superba. 2. Qua in re mihi non arbitror diu laborandum ut ostendam quanto sit melius optimis inbui, quanta in eluendis quae semel insederint uitiis difficultas consequatur, cum geminatum onus succedentis premat, et quidem dedocendi grauius ac prius quam docendi; (3) propter quod Timotheum clarum in arte tibiarum ferimt duplices ab iis quos alius instituisset solitum exigere mercedes quam si rudes traderentur. Error tamen est in re duplex: unus, quod interim sufficere illos minores existimant et bono sane stomacho contenti sunt (4) (quae quamquam est ipsa reprensione digna securitas, tamen esset utcumque tolerabilis si eius modi praeceptores minus docerent, non peius), alter ille etiam frequentior, quod eos qui ampliorem dicendi faailtatem sint consecuti non putant ad minora descendere, idque interim fieri quia fastidiant praestare hanc inferioribus curam, interim quia omnino non possint. 5. Ego porro eum qui nolit in numero praecipientium non habeo, posse autem maxime, si uelit, optimum quemque contendo: primum quod eum qui eloquentia ceteris praestet ilia quoque per quae ad eloquentiam peruenitur diligentissime percepisse credibile est; (6) deinde quia plurimum in praecipiendo ualet ratio, quae doctissimo cuique plenissima est; postremo quia nemo sic in maioribus eminet ut eum minora deficiant, nisi forte Iouem quidem Phidias optime fecit, ilia autem quae in ornamentum operis eius accedunt alius melius elaborasset, aut orator loqui nesciet aut leuiores morbos curare non poterit praestantissimus medicus. 7. Quid ergo? non est quaedam eloquentia maior quam ut earn intellectu consequi puerilis infirmitas possit? Ego uero confiteor. Sed hunc disertum praeceptorem prudentem quoque et non ignarum docendi esse oportebit, summittentem se ad mensuram discentis, ut uelocissimus quoque, si forte iter cum paruolo faciat, det manum et gradum suum minuat nec procedat ultra quam comes possit. 8. Quid si plerumque accidit ut faciliora sint ad intellegendum et lucidiora multo quae a doctissimo quoque dicuntur? Nam et prima est eloquentiae uirtus perspicuitas, et, quo quis ingenio minus ualet, hoc se magis attollere et dilatare conatur, ut statura breues in digitos eriguntur et plura infirmi minantur. 9. Nam tumidos et corruptos et tinnulos et quocumque alio cacozeliae genere peccantes certum habeo non uirium sed
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infirmitatis uitio laborare, ut corpora non robore sed ualetudine inflantur, et recto itinere lassi plerumque deuertunt. Erit ergo etiam obscurior quo quisque deterior. 10. Non excidit mihi scripsisse me in libro priore, cum potiorem in scholis eruditionem esse quam domi dicerem, libentius se prima studia tenerosque profectus ad imitationem condiscipulorum, quae facilioresset, erigere; quod a quibusdam sic accipi potest tamquam haec quam nunc tueor sententia priori diuersa sit. 11. Id a me procul aberit. Namque ea causa uel maxima est cur optimo cuique praeceptori sit tradendus puer, quod apud eum discipuli quoque melius instituti aut dicent quod inutile non sit imitari, aut, si quid errauerint, statim corrigentur. At indoctus ille etiam probabit fortasse uitiosa et placere audientibus iudicio suo coget. 12. Sit ergo tam eloquentia quam moribus praestantissimus qui ad Phoenicis Homerici exemplum dicere ac facere doceat. 4. Hinc iam quas primas in docendo partis rhetorum putem tradere incipiam, dilata parumper ilia quae sola uulgo uocatur arte rhetorica; ac mihi oportunus maxime uidetur ingressus ab eo cuius aliquid simile apud grammaticos puer didicerit. 2. Et quia narrationum, excepta qua in causis utimur, tris accepimus species, fabulam, quae uersatur in tragoediis atque carminibus, non a ueritate modo sed etiam a forma ueritatis remota, argumentum, quod falsum sed uero simile comoediae fingunt, historiam, in qua est gestae rei expositio, grammaticis autem poeticas dedimus, apud rhetorem initium sit historica, tanto robustior quanto uerior. 3. Sed narrandi quidem quae nobis optima ratio uideatur turn demonstrabimus cum de iudiciali parte dicemus; interim admonere illud sat est, ut sit ea neque arida prorsus atque ieiuna (nam quid opus erat tantum studiis laboris inpendere si res nudas atque inornatas indicare satis uideretur?), neque rursus sinuosa et arcessitis descriptionibus, in quas plerique imitatione poeticae licentiae ducuntur, lasciua. 4. Vitium utrumque, peius tamen illud quod ex inopia quam quod ex copia uenit. Nam in pueris oratio perfecta nec exigi nec sperari potest; melior autem indoles laeta generosique conatus et uel plura iusto concipiens interim spiritus. 5. Nec umquam me in his discentis annis offend at si quid superfuerit. Quin ipsis doctoribus hoc esse curae uelim, ut teneras adhuc mentes more nutriaim mollius alant, et satiari uelut quodam iucundioris disciplinae lacte patiantur. Erit illud plenius interim corpus, quod mox adulta aetas adstringat. 6. Hinc spes roboris; maciem namque et infirmitatem in posterum minari solet protinus omnibus membris expressus infans. Audeat haec aetas plura et inueniat et inuentis gaudeat, sint licet ilia non satis sicca interim ac seuera. Facile remedium est ubertatis, sterilia nullo labore uincuntur. 7. Ilia mihi in pueris natura minimum spei dederit in qua
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ingeniiim iudicio praesumitur. Materiam esse primum uolo uel abundantiorem atque ultra quam oporteat fusam. Multum inde decoquent anni, multum ratio limabit, aliquid uelut usu ipso deteretur, sit modo unde excidi possit et quod exculpi; erit autem, si non ab initio tenuem nimium laminam duxerimus et quam caelatura altior rumpat. 8. Quod me de his aetatibus sentire minus mirabitur qui apud Ciceronem legerit: 'uolo enim se efferat in adulescente feainditas.' Quapropter in primis euitandus, et in pueris praecipue, magister aridus, non minus quam teneris adhuc plantis siccum et sine umore ullo solum. 9. Inde fiunt humiles statim et uelut terram spectantes, qui nihil supra cotidianum sennonem attollere audeant. Macies illis pro sanitate et iudicii loco infirmitas est, et, dum satis putant uitio carere, in id ipsum incidunt uitium, quod uirtutibus carent. Quare mihi ne maturitas quidem ipsa festinet, nec musta in lacu statim austera sint; sicet annos ferent et uetustate proficient. 10. Ne illud quidem quod admoneamus indignum est, ingenia puerorum nimia interim emendationis seueritate deficere; nam et desperant et dolent et nouissime oderunt et, quod maxime nocet, dum omnia timent nihil conantur. 11. Quod etiam rusticis notum est, qui frondibus teneris non putant adhibendam esse falcem, quia refbrmidare ferrum uidentur et nondum cicatricem pati posse. 12. Iucundus ergo turn maxime debet esse praeceptor, ut remedia, quae alioqui natura sunt aspera, molli manu leniantur: laudare aliqua, ferre quaedam, mutare etiam reddita cur id fiat ratione, inluminare interponendo aliquid sui. Nonnumquam hoc quoque erit utile, totas ipsum dictare materias, quas et imitetur puer et interim tamquam suas amet. 13. At si tam neglegens ei stilus fuerit ut emendationem non recipiat, expertus sum prodesse quotiens eandem materiam rursus a me retractatam scribere de integro iuberem: posse enim eum adhuc melius; quatenus nullo magis studia quam spe gaudent. 14. Aliter autem alia aetas emendanda est, et pro modo uirium et exigendum et corrigendum opus. Solebam ego dicere pueris aliquid ausis licentius aut laetius laudare illud me adhuc, uenturum tempus quo idem non permitterem; ita et ingenio gaudebant et iudicio non fallebantur. 15. Sed ut eo reuertar unde sum egressus, narrationes stilo componi quanta maxima possit adhibita diligentia uolo. Nam ut primo, aim sermo instituitur, dicere quae audierint utile est pueris ad loquendi facultatem, ideoque et retro agere expositionem et a media in utramque partem discurrere sane merito cogantur, sed ad gremium praeceptoris et dum <maiora> non possunt et dum res ac uerba conectere incipiunt, ut protinus memoriam firment, ita cum iam formam rectae atque emendatae orationis accipient, extemporalis garrulitas nec expectata cogitatio et uix surgendi mora cirailatoriae uere iactationis est. 16. Hinc parentium imperitorum inane gaudium, ipsis uero contempt us operis et inuerecunda frons et consuetudo pessime dicendi et
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malorum exercitatio et, quae magnos quoque profectus frequenter perdidit, adrogans de se persuasio innascitur. 17. Erit suum parandae facilitati tempus, nec a nobis neglegenter locus iste transibitur. Interim satis est si puer omni cura et summo, quantum ilia aetas capit, labore aliquid probabile scripserit; in hoc adsuescat, huius sibi rei naturam faciat. Ille demum in id quod quaerimus aut ei proximum poterit euadere qui ante discet recte dicere quam cito. 18. Narrationibus non inutiliter subiungitur opus restruendi confirmandique eas, quod avaaK€vr\ et KaraoKevri uocatur. Id porro non tantum in fabulosis et carmine traditis fieri potest, uerum etiam in ipsis annalium monumentis, ut, si quaeratur an sit credibile super caput Valeri pugnantis sedisse coruum, qui os oculosque hostis Galli rostro atque alis euerberaret, sit in utramque partem ingens ad dicendum materia, (19) aut de serpente, quo Scipio traditur genitus, et lupa Romuli et Egeria Numae; nam Graecis historiis plerumque poeticae similis licentia est. Saepe etiam quaeri solet de tempore, de loco, quo gesta res dicitur, nonnumquam de persona quoque, sicut Liuius frequentissime dubitat et alii ab aliis historici dissentiunt. 20. Inde paulatim ad maiora tendere incipiet, laudare claros uiros et uituperare improbos. Quod non simplicis utilitatis opus est. Namque et ingenium exercetur multiplici uariaque materia, et animus contemplatione recti prauique formatur, et multa inde cognitio rerum uenit exemplisque, quae sunt in omni genere causarum potentissima, iam turn instruit cum res poscet usurum. 21. Hinc ilia quoque exercitatio subit comparationis, uter melior uterue deterior; quae quamquam uersatur in ratione simili, tamen et duplicat materiam et uirtutum uitiorumque non tantum naturam sed etiam modum tractat. Verum de ordine laudis contraque, quoniam tertia haec rhetorices pars est, praecipiemus suo tempore. 22. Communes loci (de iis loquor quibus citra personas in ipsa uitia moris est perorare, ut in adulterum, aleatorem, petulantem) ex mediis sunt iudiciis et, si reum adicias, accusationes; quamquam hi quoque ab illo generali tractatu ad quasdam deduci species solent, ut si ponatur adulter caecus, aleator pauper, petulans senex. Habent autem nonnumquam etiam defensionem; (23) nam et pro luxuria et pro amore dicimus, et leno interim parasitusque defenditur sic ut non homini patrocinemur sed crimini. 24. Thesis autem quae sumuntur ex rerum comparatione (ut rusticane uita an urbana potior, iuris periti an militaris uiri laus maior) mire sunt ad exercitationem dicendi speciosae atque uberes. Quae uel ad suadendi officium uel etiam ad iudiciorum disceptationem iuuant plurimum; nam posterior ex praedictis locus in causa Murenae copiosissime a Cicerone tractatur. 25. Sunt et illae, paene totae ad deliberatiuum pertinentes genus: ducendane uxor, petendine sint magistratus; namque et hae personis modo adiectis suasoriae erunt.
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26. Solebant praeceptores mei neque inutili et nobis etiam iucundo genere exercitationis praeparare nos coniecturalibns causis cum quaerere atque exequi iuberent cur armata apud Lacedaemonios Venus et quid ita crederetur Cupido puer atque uolucer et sagittis ac face armatus et similia, in quibus scrutabamur uoluntatem, cuius in controuersiis frequens quaestio est; quod genus chriae uideri potest. 27. Nam locos quidem, quales sunt de testibus, semperne his credendum, et de argumentis, an habenda etiam paruis fides, adeo manifestum est ad forensis actiones pertinere ut quidam neque ignobiles in officiis ciuilibus scriptos eos memoriaeque diligentissime mandatos in promptu habuerint, ut, quotiens esset occasio, extemporales eorum dictiones his uelut emblematis exomarentur. 28. Quo quidem (neque enim eius rei iudicium dififerre sustineo) summam uidebantur mihi infirmitatem de se confiteri. Nam quid hi possint in causis, quarum uaria et noua semper est facies, proprium inuenire, quomodo propositis ex parte diuersa respondere, altercationibus uelociter occurrere, testem rogare, qui etiam in iis quae sunt communia et in plurimis causis tractantur uulgatissimos sensus uerbis nisi tanto ante praeparatis prosequi nequeant? 29. Necesse uero his, cum eadem iudiciis pluribus dicunt, aut fastidium moueant uelut frigidi et repositi cibi aut pudorem deprensa totiens audientium memoria infelix supellex, quae sicut apud pauperes ambitiosos pluribus et diuersis officiis conteratur: (30) cum eo quidem, quod uix ullus est tam communis locus qui possit cohaerere cum causa nisi aliquo propriae quaestionis uinculo copulatus. fAppareatquef eum non tam insertum quam adplicitum, (31) uel quod dissimilis est ceteris, uel quod plerumque adsumi etiam parum apte solet, non quia desideratur, sed quia paratus est, ut quidam sententiarum gratia uerbosissimos locos arcessunt, cum ex locis debeat nasci sententia. 32. Ita sunt autem speciosa haec et utilia si oriuntur ex causa; ceterum quamlibet pulchra elocutio, nisi ad uictoriam tendit, utique superuacua, sed interim etiam contraria est. Verum hactenus euagari satis fuerit. 33. Legum laus ac uituperatio iam maiores ac prope summis operibus sufifecturas uires desiderant. Quae quidem suasoriis an controuersiis magis accommodata sit exercitatio consuetudine et iure ciuitatium differt. Apud Graecos enim lator earum ad iudicem uocabatur, Romanis pro contione suadere ac dissuadere moris fiiit. Vtroque autem modo pauca de his et fere certa dicuntur. Nam et genera sunt tria sacri, publici, priuati iuris; (34) quae diuisio ad laudem magis spectat, si quis earn per gradus augeat, quod lex, quod publica, quod ad religionem deum comparata sit. Ea quidem de quibus quaeri solet communia omnibus. 35. Aut enim de iure dubitari potest eius qui rogat, ut de P. Clodi, qui non rite creatus tribunus arguebatur, aut de ipsius rogationis, quod est uarium, siue non trino forte nundino
Liber Seen nd us
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promulgata siue non idoneo die siue contra intercessionem uel auspicia aliudue quid quod legitimis obstet dicitur lata esse uel ferri, siue alicui manentium legum repugnare. 36. Sed haec ad illas primas exercitationes non pertinent; nam sunt eae citra complexum personarum temporum causarum. Reliqua eadem fere uero fictoque certamine huius modi tractantur; (37) nam uitium aut in uerbis aut in rebus est. In uerbis quaeritur satis significent an sit in iis aliquid ambiguum, in rebus, an lex sibi ipsa consentiat, an in praeteritum ferri debeat, an in singulos homines. Maxime uero commune est quaerere an sit honesta, an utilis. 38. Nec ignoro plures fieri a plerisque partes; sed nos iustum pium religiosum ceteraque his similia honesto complectimur. Iusti tamen species non simpliciter excuti solet. Aut enim de re ipsa quaeritur, ut dignane poena uel praemio sit, aut de modo praemii poenaeue, qui tam maior quam minor culpari potest. 39. Vtilitas quoque interim natura discernitur, interim tempore. Quaedam an optineri possint ambigi solet. Ne illud quidem ignorare oportet, leges aliquando totas, aliquando ex parte reprendi solere, cum exemplum rei utriusque nobis clans orationibus praebeatur. 40. Nec me fallit eas quoque leges esse quae non in perpetuum rogentur, sed de honoribus aut imperiis, qualis Manilia fuit, de qua Ciceronis oratio est. Sed de his nihil hoc loco praecipi potest; constant enim propria rerum de quibus agitur, non communi, qualitate. 41. His fere ueteres facultatem dicendi exercuerunt, adsumpta tamen a dialecticis argumentandi ratione. Nam fictas ad imitationem fori consiliorumque materias apud Graecos dicere circa Demetrium Phalerea institutum fere constat. 42. An ab ipso id genus exercitationis sit inuentum, ut alio quoque libro sum confessus, parum comperi; sed ne ii quidem qui hoc fortissime adfirmant ullo satis idoneo auctore nituntur. Latinos uero dicendi praeceptores extremis L. Crassi temporibus coepisse Cicero auctor est; quorum insignis maxime Plotius fuit. 5. Sed de ratione declamandi post paulo; interim, quia prima rhetorices rudimenta tractamus, non omittendum uidetur id quoque, ut moneam quantum sit conlaturus ad profectum discentium rhetor si, quem ad modum a grammaticis exigitur poetarum enarratio, ita ipse quoque historiae atque etiam magis orationum lectione susceptos a se discipulos instruxerit. Quod nos in paucis, quorum id aetas exigebat et parentes utile esse crediderant, seruauimus. 2. Ceterum sentientibus iam turn optima duae res impediment© fuerunt, quod et longa consuetudo aliter docendi fecerat legem, et robusti fere iuuenes nec hunc laborem desiderantes exemplum fnostrumf sequebantur. 3. Nec tamen, etiam si quid noui uel sero inuenissem, praecipere in posterum puderet; nunc uero scio id fieri apud Graecos, sed magis per
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Institutionis Oratoriae
adiutores, quia non uidentur tempore suffectura si legentibus singulis praeire semper ipsi uelint. 4. Et hercule praelectio quae in hoc adhibetur, ut facile atque distincte pueri scripta oculis sequantur, etiam ilia quae uim cuiusque uerbi, si quod minus usitatum incidat, docet, multum infra rhetoris officium existimanda est. 5. At demonstrare uirtutes uel, si quando ita incidat, uitia, id professionis eius atque promissi quo se magistrum eloquentiae pollicetur maxime proprium est, eo quidem ualidius quod non utique hunc laborem docentium postulo, ut ad gremium reuocatis cuius quisque eorum uelit libri lectione deseruiant. 6. Nam mihi cum facilius, turn etiam multo uidetur magis utile facto silentio unum aliquem (quod ipsum imperari per uices optimum est) constituere lectorem, ut protinus pronuntiationi quoque adsuescant, (7) turn, exposita causa in quam scripta legetur oratio (nam sic clarius quae dicentur intellegi poterunt), nihil otiosum pati quodque in inuentione quodque in elocutione adnotandiun erit: quae in prohoemio conciliandi iudicis ratio, quae narrandi lux breuitas fides, quod aliquando consilium et quam occulta calliditas (8) (namque ea sola in hoc arsest, quae intellegi nisi ab artifice non possit), quanta deinceps in diuidendo prudentia, quam subtilis et crebra argumentatio; quibus uiribus inspiret, qua iucunditate permulceat, quanta in maledictis asperitas, in iocis urbanitas; ut denique dominetur in adfectibus atque in pectora inrumpat animumque iudicum similem iis quae dicit efficiat; (9) turn, in ratione eloquendi, quod uerbum proprium ornatum sublime, ubi amplificatio laudanda, quae uirtus ei contraria, quid speciose tralatum, quae figura uerborum, quae leuis et quadrata, uirilis tamen compositio. 10. Ne id quidem inutile, etiam corruptas aliquando et uitiosas orationes, quas tamen plerique iudiciorum prauitate mirentur, legi palam, ostendique in his quam multa inpropria obscura tumida humilia sordida lasciua effeminata sint; quae non laudantur modo a plerisque, sed, quod est peius, propter hoc ipsum quod sunt praua laudantur. 11. Nam sermo rectus et secundum naturam enuntiatus nihil habere ex ingenio uidetur; ilia uero quae utcumque deflexa sunt tamquam exquisitiora miramur, non aliter quam distortis et quocumque modo prodigiosis corporibus apud quosdam maius est pretium quam iis quae nihil ex communis habitus bonis perdiderunt, (12) atque etiam qui specie capiuntur uulsis leuatisque et inustas comas acu comentibus et non suo colore nitidis plus esse formae putant quam possit tribuere incorrupta natura, ut pulchritudo corporis uenire uideatur ex malis morum. 13. Neque solum haec ipse debebit docere praeceptor, sed frequenter interrogare et iudicium discipulorum experiri. Sic audientibus securitas aberit nec quae dicentur superfluent aures; simul ad id perducentur qucxl ex hoc quaeritur, ut inueniant ipsi et intellegant (nam quid aliud agimus docendo eos quam ne semper docendi sint?)
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14. Hoc diligentiae genus ausim dicere plus conlaturum discentibus quam omnes omnium artes, quae iuuant sine dubio multum, sed latiore quadam comprensione per omnes quidem species rerum cotidie paene nascentium ire qui possunt? 15. Sicut de re militari quamquam sunt tradita quaedam praecepta communia, magis tamen proderit scire qua ducum quisque ratione in quali re tempore loco sit sapienter usus aut contra; nam in omnibus fere minus ualent praecepta quam experimenta. 16. An uero dedamabit quidem praeceptor ut sit exemplo suis auditoribus, non plus contulerint lecti Cicero aut Demosthenes? Corrigetur palam si quid in declamando discipulus errauerit, non potentius erit emendare orationem, quin immo etiam iucundius (aliena enim uitia reprendi quisque mauult quam sua)? 17. Nec deerant plura quae dicerem; sed neminem haec utilitas fi-igit, atque utinam tam non pigeat facere istud quam non displicebit. 18. Quod si potuerit optineri, non ita diffidlis supererit quaestio, qui legendi sint incipientibus. Nam quidam illos minores, quia facilior eorum intellectus uidebatur, probaueriuit, alii floridius genus, ut ad alenda primarum aetatium ingenia magis accommodatum. 19. Ego optimos quidem et statim et semper, sed tamen eorum candidissimum quemque et maxime expositum uelim, ut Liuium a pueris magis quam Sallustium (et hie historiae maior est auctor, ad quem tamen intellegendum iam profectu opus sit). 20. Cicero, ut mihi quidem uidetur, et iucundus incipientibus quoque et apertus est satis, nec prodesse tantum sed etiam amari potest; turn, quem ad modum Liuius praecipit, ut quisque erit Ciceroni simillimus. 21. Duo autem genera maxime cauenda pueris puto. Vnum, ne quis eos antiquitatis nimius admirator in Gracchorum Catonisque et aliorum similiumlectione durescere uelit; fient enim horridi atque ieiuni. Nam neque uim eorum adhuc intellectu consequentur et elocutione, quae turn sine dubio erat optima, sed nostris temporibus aliena est, contenti, quod est pessimum, similes sibi magnis uiris uidebimtur. 22. Alterum, quod huic diuersum est, ne recentis huius lasciuiae flosculis capti uoluptate praua deleniantur, ut praedulce illud genus et puerilibus ingeniis hoc gratius quo propius est adament. 23. Firmis autem iudiciis iamque extra periculum positis suaserim et antiquos legere (ex quibus si adsumatur solida ac uirilis ingenii uis deterso rudis saeculi squalore, turn noster hie cultus clarius enitescet) et nouos, quibus et ipsis multa uirtus adest. 24. Neque enim nos tarditatis natura damnauit, sed dicendi mutauimus genus et ultra nobis quam oportebat indulsimus; ita non tam ingenio illi nos superarunt quam proposito. Multa ergo licebit eligere, sed curandum erit ne iis quibus permixta sunt inquinentur. 25. Quosdam uero etiam quos totos imitari oporteat et fuisse nuper et nunc esse quidni libenter non concesserim modo uerum etiam contenderim? 26. Sed hi qui sint non cuiuscumque est pronuntiare. Tutius circa priores uel
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erratur, ideoque hanc nouorum distuli lectionem, ne imitatio iudicium antecederet. 6. Fuit etiam in hoc diuersum praecipientium propositum, quod eorum quidam materias quas discipulis ad dicendum dabant, non contend diuisione digerere, latius dicendo prosequebantur, nec solum probationibus implebant sed etiam adfectibus, (2) alii, aim primas modo lineas duxissent, post declamationes quid omisisset quisque tractabant, quosdam uero locos non minore cura quam cum ad dicendum ipsi surgerent excolebant. Vtile utrumque, et ideo neutrum ab altero separo; sed si facere tantum alterum necesse sit, plus proderit demonstrasse rectam protinus uiam quam reuocare ab errore iam lapsos, (3) primum quia emendationem auribus modo accipiunt, diuisionem uero ad cogitationem etiam et stilum perferunt, deinde quod libentius praecipientem audiunt quam reprehendentem. Si qui uero paulo sunt uiuaciores, in his praesertim moribus, etiam irasciuitur admonitioni et taciti repugnant. 4. Neque ideo tamen minus uitia aperte coarguenda sunt; habenda enim ratio ceterorum, qui recta esse quae praeceptor non emendauerit credent. Vtraque autem ratio miscenda est et ita tractanda ut ipsae res postulabunt. 5. Namque incipientibus danda erit uelut praeformata materia seamdum ariusque uires. At arm satis composuisse se ad exemplum iridebuntur, praeuia quaedam demonstranda uestigia, quae persecuti iam suis uiribus sine adminiculo progredi possint. 6. Nonnumquam credi sibi ipsos oportebit, ne mala consuetudine semper alienum laborem sequendi nihil per se conari et quaerere sciant. Quodsi satis prudenter dicenda uiderint, iam prope consummata fuerit praecipientis opera; si quid errauerint adhuc, erunt ad ducem reducendi. 7. Cui rei simile quiddam facientes aues cemimirs, quae teneris infirmisque fetibirs cibos ore suo conlatos partiuntur; at cum uisi sunt adulti, paulum egredi nidis et cirarmuolare sedem illam praecedentes ipsae docent, turn expertos uires libero caelo suaeque ipsorum fiduciae permittunt. 7. IUud ex consuetudine mutandum prorsus existimo in iis de quibus nunc disserimus aetatibus, ne omnia quae scripserint ediscant et certa, ut moris est, die dicant; quod quidem maxime patres exigunt, atque ita demum studere liberos suos si quam frequentissime declamauerint credirnt, cirm profeaus praecipue diligentia constet. 2. Nam ut scribere pueros plurimumque esse in hoc opere plane uelim, sic ediscere electos ex orationibus uel historiis alioue quo genere dignorum ea cura uoluminum locos multo magis suadeam. 3. Nam et exercebitur acrius memoria aliena compleaendo quam sua, et qui erunt in difficiliore hirius laboris genere uersati sine molestia quae ipsi composuerint iam familiaria animo suo adfigent, et adsuescent optimis,
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semperque habebunt intra se quod imitentur, et iam non sentientes formam orationis illam quam mente penitus acceperint expriment. 4. Abundabunt autem copia uerborum optimorum et compositione ac figuris iam non quaesitis sed sponte et ex reposito uelut thesauro se ofiferentibus. Accedit his et iucunda in sermone bene a quoque dictorum relatio et in causis utilis; nam et plus auctoritatis adferunt ea quae non praesentis gratia litis sunt comparata, et laudem saepe maiorem quam si nostra sint conciliant. 5. Aliquando tamen permittendum quae ipsi scripserint dicere, ut laboris sui fructum etiam ex ilia quae maxime petitur laude plurium capiant; uerum id quoque turn fieri oportebit cum aliquid commodius elimauerint, ut eo uelut praemio studii sui donentur ac se meruisse ut dicerent gaudeant. 8. Virtus praeceptoris haberi solet, nec inmerito, diligenter in iis quos erudiendos susceperit notare discrimina ingeniorum, et quo quemque natura maxime ferat scire. Nam est in hoc incredibilis quaedam uarietas, nec pauciores animorum paene quam corporum formae. 2. Quod intellegi etiam ex ipsis oratoribus potest, qui tantum inter se distant genere dicendi ut nemo sit alteri similis, quamuis plurimi se ad eorum quos probabant imitationem composuerint. 3. Vtile deinde plerisque uisum est ita quemque instituere ut propria naturae bona doctrina fouerent, et in id potissimum ingenia quo tenderent adiuuarentur: ut si quis palaestrae peritus, cum in aliquod plenum pueris gymnasium uenerit, expertus eorum omni modo corpus animumque discernat cui quisque certamini praeparandus sit, (4) ita praeceptorem eloquentiae, cum sagaciter fiierit intuitus cuius ingenium presso limatoque genere dicendi, cuius acri graui dulci aspero nitido urbano maxime gaudeat, ita se commodaturum singulis ut in eo quo quisque eminet prouehatur, (5) quod et adiuta cura natura magis eualescat et qui in diuersa ducatur neque in iis quibus minus aptus est satis possit efficere et ea in quae natus uidetur deserendo faciat infirmiora. 6. Quod mihi (libera enim uel contra receptas persuasiones rationem sequenti sententia est) in parte uerum uidetur. Nam proprietates ingeniorum dispicere prorsus necessarium est; (7) in his quoque certum studio rum facere dilectum nemo dissuaserit. Namque erit alius historiae magis idoneus, alius compositus ad carmen, alius utilis studio iuris, ut nonnulli rus fbrtasse mittendi. Sic discernet haec dicendi magister quomodo palaestricus ille cursorem faciet aut pugilem aut luctatorem aliudue quid ex iis quae sunt sacrorum certaminum. 8. Verum ei qui foro destinabitur non in unam partem aliquam sed in omnia quae sunt eius operis, etiam si qua difificiliora discenti uidebuntur, elaborandum est; nam et omnino superuacua erat doctrina si natura sufficeret. 9. An si quis ingenio corruptus ac tumidus, ut plerique sunt, incident, in hoc eum ire patiemur? Aridum atque ieiunum non alemus et
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quasi uestiemus? Nam si quaedam detrahere necessarium est, cur non sit adicere concessum? 10. Neque ego contra naturam pugno; non enim deserendum id bonum, si quod ingenitum est, existimo, sed augendum, addendumque qucxi cessat. 11. An uero clarissimus ille praeceptor Isocrates, quem non magis libri bene dixisse quam discipuli bene docuisse testantur, cum de Ephoro atque Theopompo sic iudicaret ut alteri frenis, alteri calcaribus opus esse diceret, aut in illo lentiore tarditatem aut in illo paene praecipiti concitationem adiuuandam docendo existimauit, cum alterum alterius natura miscendum arbitraretur? 12. Inbecillis tamen ingeniis sane sic obsequendum sit ut tantum in id quo uocat natura ducantur; ita enim quod solum possunt melius efficient. Si uero liberalior materia contigerit et in qua merito ad spem oratoris simus adgressi, nulla dicendi uirtus omittenda est. 13. Nam licet sit aliquam in partem pronior, ut necesse est, ceteris tamen non repugnabit, atque ea cura paria faciet iis in quibus eminebat, sicut ille, ne ab eodem exemplo recedamus, exercendi corpora peritus non, si docendum pancratiasten susceperit, pugno ferire uel calce tantum aut nexus modo atque in iis certos aliquos docebit, sed omnia quae sunt eius certaminis. Erit qui ex iis aliqua non possit: in id maxime quod poterit incumbet. 14. Nam sunt haec duo uitanda prorsus: uniirn, ne temptes quod effici non possit, alterum, ne ab eo quod quis optime facit in aliud cui minus est idoneus transferas. At si fiierit qui docebitur ille, quem adulescentes senem uidimus, Nicostratus, omnibus in eo docendi partibus similiter utetur, efficietque ilium, qualis hie fuit, luctando pugnandoque, quorum utroque certamine isdem diebus coronabatur, inuictum. 15. Et quanto id magis oratoris futuri magistro prouidendum erit! Non enim satis est dicere presse tantum aut subtiliter aut aspere, non magis quam phonasco acutis tantum aut mediis aut grauibus sonis aut horum etiam particulis excellere. Nam sicut cithara, ita oratio perfecta non est nisi ab imo ad summum omnibus intenta neruis consentiat. 9. Plura de officiis docentium locutus discipulos id unum interim moneo, ut praeceptores suos non minus quam ipsa studia anient, et parentes esse non quidem corporum sed mentium credant. 2. Multum haec pietas conferet studio; nam ita et libenter audient et dictis credent et esse similes concupiscent, in ipsos denique coetus scholarum laeti alacresque conuenient, emendati non irascentur, laudati gaudebunt, ut sint carissimi studio merebuntur. 3. Nam ut illorum officium est docere, sic horum praebere se dociles. Alioqui neutrum sine altero sufficit, et sicut hominis ortus ex utroque gignentium confertur, et frustra sparseris semina nisi ilia praemollitus fouerit sulcus, ita eloquentia coalescere nequit nisi sociata tradentis accipientisque concordia.
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10. In his primis operibus, quae non ipsa parua sunt sed maiorum quasi membra atque partes, bene instituto ac satis exercitato iam fere tempus adpetet adgrediendi suasorias iudicialesque materias. Quarum antequam uiam ingredior, pauca mihi de ipsa declamandi ratione dicenda sunt, quae quidem ut ex omnibus nouissime inuenta, ita multo est utilissima. 2. Nam et cuncta ilia de quibus diximus in se fere continet et ueritati proximam imaginem reddit, ideoque ita est celebrata ut plerisque uideretur ad formandam eloquentiam uel sola sufficere. Neque enim uirtus ulla perpetuae dumtaxat orationis reperiri potest quae non sit cum hac dicendi meditatione communis. 3. Eo quidem res ista culpa docentium reccidit ut inter praecipuas quae corrumperent eloquentiam causas licentia atque inscitia declamantium fuerit. Sed eo quod natura bonum est bene uti licet. 4. Sint ergo et ipsae materiae quae fingentur quam simillimae ueritati, et declamatio, in quantum maxime potest, imitetur eas actiones in quarum exercitationem reperta est. 5. Nam magos et pestilentiam et responsa et saeuiores tragicis nouercas aliaque magis adhuc fabulosa frustra inter sponsiones et interdicta quaeremus. Quid ergo? numquam haec supra fidem et poetica, ut uere dixerim, themata iuuenibus tractare permittamus, ut expatientur et gaudeant materia et quasi in corpus eant? 6. Erat optimum; sed certe sint grandia et tumida, non stulta etiam et acrioribus oculis intuenti ridicula, ut, si iam cedendum est, impleat se declamator aliquando, dum sciat, ut quadrupedes, cum uiridi pabulo distentae sunt, sanguinis detractione curantur et sic ad cibos uiribus conseruandis idoneos redeunt, ita sibi quoque tenuandas adipes, et quidquid urn oris corrupti contraxerit emittendum si esse sanus ac robustus uolet. 7. Alioqui tumor ille inanis primo cuiuscumque ueri operis conatu deprehendetur. Totum autem declamandi opus qui diuersum omni modo a forensibus causis existimant, hi profecto ne rationem quidem qua ista exercitatio inuenta sit peruident; (8) nam si foro non praeparat, aut scaenicae ostentationi aut furiosae uociferationi simillimum est. Quid enim attinet iudicem praeparare qui nullus est, narrare quod omnes sciant falsum, probationes adhibere causae de qua nemo sit pronuntiaturus? Et haec quidem otiosa tantum; adfici uero et ira uel luctu permoueri cuius est lubidrii nisi quibusdam pugnae simulacris ad uerum discrimen aciemque iustam consuescimus! 9. Nihil ergo inter forense genus dicendi atque hoc declamatorium intererit? Si profectus gratia dicimus, nihil. Vtinamque adici ad consuetudinem posset ut nominibus uteremur et perplexae magis et longioris aliquando actus controuersiae fingerentur et uerba in usu cotidiano posita minus timeremus et iocos inserere moris esset; quae nos, quamlibet per alia in scholis exercitati simus, tirones in foro inueniunt. 10. Si uero in ostentationem comparetur declamatio, sane paulum aliquid inclinare ad uoluptatem audientium
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debemus. 11. Nam et in iis actionibus quae in aliqua sine dubio ueritate uersantur, sed sunt ad popularem aptatae delectationem, quales legimus panegyricos totumque hoc demonstratiuum genus, permittitur adhibere plus cultus, omnemque artem, quae latere plerumque in iudiciis debet, non confiteri modo sed ostentare etiam hominibus in hoc aduocatis. 12. Quare declamatio, quoniam est iudiciorum consiliorumque imago, similis esse debet ueritati, quoniam autem aliquid in se habet epidicticon, nonnihil sibi nitoris adsumere. 13. Quod faciimt actores comici, qui neque ita prorsus ut nos uulgo loquimur pronuntiant, quod esset sine arte, neque procul tamen a natura recediuit, quo uitio periret imitatio, sed morem communis huius sermonis decore quodam scaenico exornant. 14. Sic quoque aliqua nos incommoda ex iis quas finxerimus materiis consequentur, in eo praecipue quod multa in iis rdincuntur incerta, quae sumimus ut uidetur, aetates facilitates liberi parentes, urbium ipsarum uires iura mores, alia his similia; (15) quin aliquando etiam argumenta ex ipsis positionum uitiis ducimus. Sed haec suo quoque loco. Quamuis enim omne propositum operis a nobis destinati eo spectet ut orator instituatur, tamen, ne quid studiosi requirant, etiam si quid erit quod ad scholas proprie pertineat in transitu non omittemus. 11. Iam hinc ergo nobis inchoanda est ea pars artis ex qua capere initium solent qui priora omiserunt; quamquam uideo quosdam in ipso statim limine obstaturos mihi, qui nihil egere eius modi praeceptis eloquentiam putent, sed natura sua et uulgari modo scholarum exercitatione contenti rideant etiam diligentiam nostram, exemplo magni quoque nominis professorum, quorum aliquis, ut opinor, interrogatus quid esset schema et noema, nescire se quidem, sed si ad rem pertineret esse in sua declamatione respondit; (2) alius, percontanti Theodoreus an Apollodoreus esset, 'ego' inquit 'parmularius'; nec sane potuit urbanius ex confessione inscitiae suae elabi. Porro hi, quia et beneficio ingenii praestantes sunt habiti et multa etiam memoria digna exclamauerunt, plurimos habent similes neglegentiae suae, paucissimos naturae. 3. Igitur impetu dicere se et uiribus uti gloriantur: neque enim opus esse probatione aut dispositione in rebus fictis, sed, cuius rei gratia plenum sit auditorium, sententiis grandibus, quarum optima quaeque a periculo petatur. 4. Quin etiam in cogitando nulla ratione adhibita aut tectum intuentes magnum aliquid quod ultro se offerat pluribus saepe diebus expectant, aut, murmure incerto uelut classico instincti, concitatissimum corporis motum non enuntiandis sed quaerendis uerbis accommodant. 5. Nonnulli certa sibi initia priusquam sensum inuenerint destinant, quibus aliquid diserti subiungendum sit, eaque diu secum ipsi clareque meditati, desperata conectendi facilitate, deserunt et ad alia deinceps atque inde alia non minus communia ac
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nota deuertunt. 6. Qui plurimum uidentur habere rationis non in causas tamen laborem suum sed in locos intendunt, atque in iis non corpori prospiciunt, sed abrupta quaedam, ut forte ad manum uenere, iaailantur. 7. Vnde fit ut dissoluta et ex diuersis congesta oratio cohaerere non possit, similisque sit commentariis puerorum in quos ea quae aliis dedamantibus laudata sunt regerunt. Magnas tamen sententias et res bonas (ita enim gloriari solent) elidunt: nam et barbari et serui; et, si hoc sat est, nulla est ratio dicendi. 12. Ne hoc quidem negauerim, sequi plerumque hanc opinionem, ut fortius dicere uideantur indocti, primum uitio male iudicantium, qui maiorem habere uim credunt ea quae non habent artem, ut effringere quam aperire, rumpere quam soluere, trahere quam ducere putant robustius. 2. Nam et gladiator qui armorum inscius in rixam ruit et luctator qui totius corporis nisu in id quod semel inuasit incumbit fortior ab his uocatur, cum interim et hie frequenter suis uiribus ipse prosternitur et fillum uehementis impetusf excipit aduersarii mollis articulus. 3. Sed sunt in hac parte quae imperitos etiam naturaliter fallant. Nam et diuisio, cum plurimum ualeat in causis, speciem uirium minuit, et rudia politis maiora et sparsa compositis numerosiora creduntur. 4. Est praeterea quaedam uirtutum uitiorumque uicinia, qua maledicus pro libero, temerarius pro forti, effiisus pro copioso accipitur. Maledicit autem ineruditus apertius et saepius uel cum periculo suscepti litigatoris, frequenter etiam suo; (5) adfert et ista res opinionem, quia libentissime homines audiunt ea quae dicere ipsi noluissent. Illud quoque alterum quod est in elocutione ipsa periculum minus uitat, conaturque perdite, unde euenit nonnumquam ut aliquid grande inueniat qui semper quaerit quod nimium est; uerum id et raro prouenit et certa uitia non pensat. 6. Propter hoc quoque interdum uidentur indocti cop iam habere maiorem, quod diciuit omnia, doctis est et electio et modus. His accedit quod a cura docendi quod fintenderintf recedunt; itaque illud quaestionum et argumentorum apud corrupta iudicia frigus euitant, nihilque aliud quam quod uel prauis uoluptatibus aures adsistentium permulceat quaerunt. 7. Sententiae quoque ipsae, quas solas petunt, magis eminent aim omnia circa illas sordida et abiecta sunt, ut lumina non inter umbras, quem ad modum Cicero dicit, sed plane in tenebris clariora sunt. Itaque ingeniosi uocentur, ut libet, dum tamen constet contumeliose sic laudari disertum. 8. Nihilo minus confitendum est etiam detrahere doctrinam aliquid, ut limam rudibus et cotes hebetibus et uino uetustatem, sed uitia detrahit, atque eo solo minus est quod litterae perpolierunt quo melius. 9. Verum hi pronuntiatione quoque famam dicendi fortius quaerunt; nam et clamant ubique et omnia leuata, ut ipsi uocant, manu emugiunt, multo discursu anhelitu, iactatione gestus, motu capitis furentes. 10. Iam
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collidere manus, terrae pedem incutere, femur pectus frontem caedere, mire ad pullatum circulum facit: cum ille eruditus, ut in oratione multa summittere uariare disponere, ita etiam in pronuntiando suum cuique eorum quae dicet colon accommodare actum sciat, et, si quid sit perpetua obseruatione dignum, modestus et esse et uideri malit. 11. At illi hanc uim appellant quae est potius uiolentia: cum interim non actores modo aliquos inuenias sed, quod est turpius, praeceptores etiam qui, breuem dicendi exercitationem consecuti, omissa ratione ut tulit impetus passim tumultuentur, eosque qui plus honoris litteris tribuerunt ineptos et ieiunos et tepidos et infirmos, ut quodque uerbum contumeliosissimum occurrit, appellent. 12. Verum illis quidem gratulemur sine labore, sine ratione, sine disciplina disertis; nos, quando et praecipiendi munus iam pridem deprecati sumus et in foro quoque dicendi, quia honestissimum finem putabamus desinere dum desideraremur, inquirendo scribendoque talia consolemur otium nostrum, quae futura usui bonae mentis iuuenibus arbitramur, nobis certe sunt uoluptati. 13. Nemo autem a me exigat id praeceptorum genus quod est a plerisque scriptoribus artium traditum, ut quasi quasdam leges inmutabili necessitate constrictas studiosis dicendi feram: utique prohoemium et id quale, proxima huic narratio, quae lex deinde narrandi, propositio post hanc uel, ut quibusdam placuit, excursio, turn certus ordo quaestionum, ceteraque quae, uelut si aliter facere fas non sit, quidam tamquam iussi secuntur. 2. Erat enim rhetorice res prorsus facilis ac parua si uno et breui praescripto contineretur; sed mutantur pleraque causis temporibus occasione necessitate. Atque ideo res in oratore praecipua consilium est, quia uarie et ad rerum momenta conuertitur. 3. Quid si enim praecipias imperatori, quotiens aciem instruet derigat frontem, cornua utrimque promoueat, equites pro cornibus locet? Erit haec quidem rectissima fortasse ratio quotiens licebit, sed mutabitur natura loci, si mons occurret, si flumen obstabit, < s i > collibus siluis asperitate alia prohibebitur. 4. Mutabit hostium genus, mutabit praesentis condicio discriminis: nunc acie derecta nunc cuneis, nunc auxiliis nunc legione pugnabitur, nonnumquam terga etiam dedisse simulata fuga proderit. 5. Ita prohoemium necessarium an superuacuum, breue an longius, ad iudicem omni sermone derecto an aliquando auerso per aliquam figuram dicendum sit, constricta an latius fusa narratio, continua an diuisa, recta an ordine permutato, causae docebunt, (6) itemque de quaestionum ordine, cum in eadem controuersia aliud alii parti prius quaeri frequenter expediat. Neque enim rogationibus plebisue scitis sancta sunt ista praecepta, sed hoc quidquid est utilitas excogitauit. 7. Non negabo autem sic utile esse plerumque, alioqui nec scriberem.
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Verum si eadem ilia nobis aliud suadebit utilitas, hanc relictis magistrorum auctoritatibus sequemur. 8. Equidem id maxime praecipiam ac 'repetens iterumque iterumque monebo', res duas in omni actu spectet orator, quid deceat, quid expediat. Expedit autem saepe mutare ex illo constituto traditoque ordine aliqua, et interim decet, ut in statuis atque picturis uidemus uariari habitus uultus status. 9. Nam recti quidem corporis uel minima gratia est; nempe enim aduersa fsitf facies et demissa bracchia et iuncti pedes et a summis ad ima rigens opus. Flexus ille et, ut sic dixerim, motus dat actum quendam et adfectum; ideo nec ad unum modum formatae manus et in uultu mille species. 10. Cursum habent quaedam et impetum, sedent alia uel incumbunt, nuda haec, ilia uelata sunt, quaedam mixta ex utroque. Quid tam distortum et elaboratum quam est ille discobolos Myronis? Si quis tamen ut parum rectum improbet opus, nonne ab intellectu artis afiierit, in qua uel praecipue laudabilis est ipsa ilia nouitas ac difficultas? 11. Quam quidem gratiam et delectationem adferunt figurae, quaeque in sensibus quaeque in uerbis sunt. Mutant enim aliquid a recto, atque hanc prae se uirtutem ferunt, quod a consuetudine uulgari recesserunt. 12. Habet in pictura speciem tota facies; Apelles tamen imaginem Antigoni latere tantum altero ostendit, ut amissi oculi deformitas lateret. Quid? non in oratione operienda sunt quaedam, siue ostendi non debent siue exprimi pro dignitate non possunt? 13. Vt fecit Timanthes, opinor, Cythnius in ea tabula qua Coloten Teium uicit. Nam cum in Iphigeniae immolatione pinxisset tristem Calchantem, tristiorem Vlixem, addidisset Menelao quem suramum poterat ars efficere maerorem, consumptis adfectibus non reperiens quo digne modo patris uultum posset exprimere, uelauit eius caput et suo cuique animo dedit aestimandum. 14. Nonne huic simile est illud Sallustianum: 'nam de Carthagine tacere satius puto quam parum dicere'? Propter quae mihi semper moris fuit quam minime alligare me ad praecepta quae xadoXiKa uocitant, id est, ut dicamus quomodo possumus, uniuersalia uel perpetualia; raro enim reperitur hoc genus, ut non labefactari parte aliqua et subrui possit. 15. Sed de his plenius suo quidque loco tractabimus; interim nolo se iuuenes satis instructos si quem ex iis qui breues plerumque circumferuntur artis libellum edidicerint et uelut decretis technicorum tutos putent. Multo labore, adsiduo studio, uaria exercitatione, plurimis experimentis, altissima prudentia, praesentissimo consilio constat ars dicendi. 16. Sed adiuuatur his quoque, si tamen rectam uiam, non unam orbitam monstrent, qua declinare qui crediderit nefas, patiatur necesse est illam per funes ingredientium tarditatem. Itaque et stratum militari labore iter saepe deserimus compendio ducti, et si rectum limitem rupti torrentibus
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pontes inciderint circumire cogemur, et si ianua tenebitur incendio per parietem exibimus. 17. Late fusum opus est et multiplex et prope cotidie nouum et de quo numquam dicta erunt omnia. Quae sint tamen tradita, quid ex his optimum, et si qua mutari adici detrahi melius uidebitur, dicere experiar. 14. 'Rhetoricen' in Latinum transferases turn 'oratoriam', turn 'oratricem' nominauerunt. Quos equidem non fraudauerim debita laude quod copiam Romani sermonis augere temptarint. Sed non omnia nos ducentes ex Graeco secuntur, sicut ne illos quidem quotiens utique suis uerbis signare nostra uoluerunt, (2) et haec interpretatio non minus dura est quam ilia Plauti 'essentia' et 'queentia'. Sed ne propria quidem; nam 'oratoria' sic effertur ut 'elocutoria', 'oratrix' ut 'elocutrix', ilia autem de qua loquimur rhetorice talis est qualis eloquentia. Nec dubie apud Graecos quoque duplicem intellectum habet (3) (namque uno modo fit adpositum—ars rhetorica, ut nauis piratica, altero nomen rei, qualis est philosophia, amicitia), nos ipsam nunc uolumus significare substantiam, ut grammatice 'litteratura' est, non 'litteratrix' quem ad modum 'oratrix', nec 'litteratoria' quem ad modum 'oratoria'. Verum id in rhetorice non fit. 4. Ne pugnemus igitur, cum praesertim plurimis alioqui Graecis sit utendum; nam certe et philosophos et musicos et geometras dicam, nec uim adferam nominibus his indecora in Latinum sermonem mutatione. Denique cum M. Tullius etiam ipsis librorum quos hac de re primum scripserat titulis Graeco nomine utatur, profecto non est uerendum ne temere uideamur oratori maximo de nomine artis suae credidisse. 5. Igitur rhetorice (iam enim sine metu cauillationis utemur hac appellatione) sic, ut opinor, optime diuidetur ut de arte, de artifice, de opere dicamus. Ars erit quae disciplina percipi debet: ea est bene dicendi scientia. Artifex est qui percepit hanc artem: id est orator, cuius est summa bene dicere. Opus, quod efificitur ab artifice: id est bona oratio. Haec omnia rursus diducuntur in species. Sed ilia sequentia suo loco; nunc quae de prima parte tractanda sunt ordiar. 15. Ante omnia, quid sit rhetorice. Quae finitur quidem uarie, sed quaestionem habet duplicem; aut enim de qualitate ipsius rei aut de comprensione uerborum dissensio est. Prima atque praecipua opinionum circa hoc differentia, quod alii malos quoque uiros posse oratores dici putant, alii, quorum nos sententiae accedimus, nomen hoc artemque de qua loquimur bonis demum tribui uolunt. 2. Eorum autem qui dicendi facultatem a maiore ac magis expetenda uitae laude secernunt, quidam rhetoricen uim tantum, quidam scientiam sed non
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uirtutem, quidam usum, quidam artem quidem sed a scientia et uirtute diiiuictam, quidam etiam prauitatem quandam artis, id est KaKorexviav, nominauerunt. 3. Hi fere aut in persuadendo aut in dicendo apte ad persuadendum positum orandi munus sunt arbitrati; id enim fieri potest ab eo quoque qui uir bonus non sit. Est igitur frequentissimus finis rhetoricen esse uim persuadendi. Quod ego uim appello, plerique potestatem, nonnulli facultatem uocant; quae res ne quid adferat ambiguitatis, uim dico 8vvafj.iv. 4. Haec opinio originem ab Isocrate, si tamen re uera ars quae circumfertur eius est, duxit. Qui cum longe sit a uoluntate infamantium oratoris officia, finem artis temere comprendit, dicens esse rhetoricen persuadendi opificem, id est 7T€i9ovs Srjmovpyos; neque enim mihi permiserim eadem uti declinatione qua Ennius M. Cethegum 'Suadae medullam' uocat. 5. Apud Platonem quoque Gorgias in libro qui nomine eius inscriptus est idem fere dicit, sed hanc Plato illius opinionem uult accipi, non suam. Cicero pluribus locis scripsit officium oratoris esse dicere adposite ad persuadendum, (6) in rhetoricis etiam, quos sine dubio ipse non probat, finem facit persuadere. Verum et pecunia persuadet et gratia et auctoritas dicentis et dignitas, postremo aspectus etiam ipse sine uoce, quo uel recordatio meritorum cuiusque uel facies aliqua miserabilis uel formae pulchritudo sententiam dictat. 7. Nam et Manium Aquilium defendens Antonius, cum scissa ueste cicatrices quas is pro patria pectore aduerso suscepisset ostendit, non orationis habuit fiduciam, sed oculis populi Romani uim attulit, quem illo ipso aspectu maxime motum in hoc, ut absolueret reum, creditum est; (8) Seruium quidem Galbam miseratione sola, qua non suos modo liberos paruolos in contione produxerat, sed Galli etiam Sulpici filium suis ipse manibus circumtulerat, elapsum esse aim aliorum monumentis, turn Catonis oratione testatum est; (9) et Phrynen non Hyperidis actione quamquam admirabili, sed conspectu corporis, quod ilia speciosissimum alioqui diducta nudauerat tunica, putant periculo liberatam. Quae si omnia persuadent, non est hie de quo locuti sumus idoneus finis. 10. Ideoque diligentiores sunt uisi sibi qui, cum de rhetorice idem sentirent, existimarunt earn uim dicendo persuadendi. Quem finem Gorgias in eodem de quo supra diximus libro uelut coactus a Socrate facit. A quo non dissentit Theodeaes, siue ipsius id opus est quod de rhetorice nomine eius inscribitur, siue, ut aeditum est, Aristotelis; in quo est finem esse rhetorices ducere homines dicendo in id quod factorf uelit. 11. Sed ne hoc quidem satis est comprehension; persuadent enim dicendo uel ducunt in id quod uolunt alii quoque, ut meretrices adulatores corruptores, at contra non persuadet semper orator: ut interim non sit proprius hie finis eius, interim sit communis cum iis qui ab oratore procul absunt. 12. Atqui non multum ab hoc fine
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abest Apollodorus, dicens iudicialis orationis primum et super omnia esse persuadere iudici et sententiam eius ducere in id quod uelit. Nam et ipse oratorem fortunae subicit, ut, si non persuaserit, nomen suum retinere non possit. 13. Quidam recesserunt ab euentu, sicut Aristoteles dicit: 'rhetorice est uis inueniendi omnia in oratione persuasibilia.' Qui finis et illud uitium de quo supra diximus habet, et insuper quod nihil nisi inuentionem complectitur, quae sine elocutione non est oratio. 14. Hermagorae, qui finem eius esse ait persuasibiliter dicere, et aliis qui eandem sententiam, non isdem tantum uerbis explicant ac finem esse demonstrant dicere quae oporteat omnia ad persuadendum, satis responsum est cum persuadere non tantum oratoris esse conuicimus. 15. Addita sunt his alia uarie. Quidam enim circa res omnes, quidam circa ciuiles modo uersari rhetoricen putauerunt; quorum uerius utrum sit, in eo loco qui huius quaestionis proprius est dicam. 16. Omnia subiecisse oratori uidetur Aristoteles cum dixit uim esse uidendi quid in quaque re possit esse persuasibile, et Iatrocles, qui non quidem adicit 'in quaque re', sed nihil excipiendo idem ostendit; uim enim uocat inueniendi quod sit in oratione persuasibile. Qui fines et ipsi solam complectuntur inuentionem. Quod uitium fugiens Eudorus uim putat inueniendi et eloquendi cum ornatu credibilia in omni oratione. 17. Sed cum eodem modo credibilia quo persuasibilia etiam non orator inueniat, adiciendo 'in omni oratione' magis quam superiores concedit scelera quoque suadentibus pulcherrimae rei nomen. 18. Gorgias apud Platonem suadendi se artificem in iudiciis et aliis coetibus esse ait, de iustis quoque et iniustis tractare; cui Socrates persuadendi, non docendi concedit facultatem. 19. Qui uero non omnia subiciebant oratori, sollicitius ac uerbosius, ut necesse erat, adhibuerunt discrimina. Quorum fuit Ariston, Critolai Peripatetici discipulus, cuius hie finis est: 'scientia uidendi et agendi in quaestionibus ciuilibus per orationem popularis persuasionis'. 20. Hie scientiam, quia Peripateticus est, non ut Stoici uirtutis loco ponit; popularem autem comprendendo persuasionem etiam contumeliosus est aduersus artem orandi, quam nihil putat doctis persuasuram. Illud de omnibus qui circa ciuiles demum quaestiones oratorem iudicant uersari dictum sit, excludi ab iis plurima oratoris officia, illam certe laudatiuam totam, quae est rhetorices pars tertia. 21. Cautius Theodorus Gadareus, ut iam ad eos ueniamus qui artem quidem esse earn, sed non uirtutem putauerunt. Ita enim dicit, ut ipsis eorum uerbis utar qui haec ex Graeco transtulerunt: 'ars inuentrix et iudicatrix et enuntiatrix, decente ornatu secundum mensionem, eius quod in quoque potest sumi persuasibile, in materia ciuili'. 22. Itemque Cornelius Celsus, qui finem rhetorices ait dicere persuasibiliter in dubia ciuili materia. Quibus sunt non dissimiles qui ab aliis traduntur, qualis est ille: 'uis uidendi
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et eloquendi de rebus ciuilibus subiectis sibi cum quadam persuasione et quodam corporis habitu et eorum quae dicet pronuntiatione'. 23. Mille alia, sed aut eadem aut ex isdem composita, quibus item cum de materia rhetorices dicendum erit respondebimus. Quidam earn neque uim neque scientiam neque artem putauerunt, sed Critolaus usum dicendi (nam hoc Tptftr} significat), Athenaeus fallendi artem. 24. Plerique autem, dum pauca ex Gorgia Platonis a prioribus imperite excerpta legere contend neque hoc totum neque alia eius uolumina euoluunt, in maximum errorem inciderunt, creduntque eum in hac esse opinione, ut rhetoricen non artem sed 'peritiam quandam gratiae ac uoluptatis' existimet, (25) et alio loco 'ciuilitatis particulae simulacrum' et quartam partem adulationis (quod duas partes ciuilitatis corpori adsignet, medicinam et quam interpretantur exercitatricem, duas animo, legalem atque iustitiam, adulationem autem medicinae uocet cocorum artificium, exercitatricis mangonum, qui colorem fuco et uerum robur inani sagina mentiantur, legalis cauillatricem, iustitiae rhetoricen). 26. Quae omnia sunt quidem scripta in hoc libro dictaque a Socrate, cuius persona uidetur Plato significare quid sentiat; sed alii sunt eius sermones ad coarguendos qui contra disputant compositi, quos eXeyKTtKous uocant, alii ad praecipiendum, qui 8oyfxariKoi appellantur. 27. Socrates autem seu Plato earn quidem quae turn exercebatur rhetoricen talem putat (nam et dicit his uerbis TOVTOV TOV rponov ov vp,€ts noAtTcveode), ueram autem et honestam intellegit; itaque disputatio ilia contra Gorgian ita cluditlin OVKOVV aray/07 TOV prjropiKov SIKCLIOV etvai, TOV 8C 8iKatov fiov\eo9ai 8Uaia 7TpaTT€iv. 28. Ad quod ille quidem conticescit, sed sermonem suscipit Polus iuuenili calore inconsideratior, contra quem ilia de simulacra et adulatione dicuntur. Turn Callicles adhuc concitatior, qui tamen ad hanc perducitur clausulam: roy /xcA ' AOVTCL op9d)s prjropiKov eoeaOai 8iKaiov apa 8ei etvai Kai €iTioTrjfxova roiv 8iKaL(xiv, ut appareat Platoni non rhetoricen uideri malum, sed earn ueram nisi iusto ac bono non contingere. 29. Adhuc autem in Phaedro manifestius facit hanc artem consummari citra iustitiae quoque scientiam non posse. (Cui opinioni nos quoque accedimus.) An aliter defensionem Socratis et eorum qui pro patria ceciderant laudem scripsisset? Quae certe sunt oratoris opera. 30. Sed in illud hominum genus quod facilitate dicendi male utebatur inuectus est. Nam et Socrates inhonestam sibi credidit orationem quam ei Lysias reo composuerat, et turn maxime <cum> scribere litigatoribus quae illi pro seipsi dicerent erat moris, atque ita iuri quo non licebat pro altera agere fraus adhibebatur. 31. Doctores quoque eius artis parum idonei Platoni uidebantur, qui rhetoricen a iustitia separarent et ueris credibilia praeferrent; nam id quoque dicit in Phaedra. 32. Consensisse autem illis superioribus uideri potest etiam Cornelius Celsus, cuius haec uerba sunt: orator simile tantum ueri petit', deinde paulo post non enim bona conscientia sed uictoria litigantis est
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praemium'. Quae si uera essent, pessimorum hominum foret haec tam perniciosa nocentissimis moribus dare instrumenta et nequitiam praeceptis adiuuare. Sed iHi rationem opinionis suae uiderint. 33. Nos autem ingressi formare perfectum oratorem, quem in primis esse uirum bonum uolumus, ad eos qui de hoc opere melius sentiunt reuertamur. Rhetoricen autem quidam eandem ciuilitatem esse iudicauerunt, Cicero scientiae ciuilis partem uocat (ciuilis autem scientia idem quod sapientia est), quidam eandem philosophiam, quorum est Isocrates. 34. Huic eius substantiae maxime conueniet finitio rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam. Nam et orationis omnes uirtutes semel complectitur et protinus etiam mores oratoris, cum bene dicere non possit nisi bonus. Idem ualet Chrysippi finis ille ductus a Cleanthe, 'scientia recte dicendi'. 35. Sunt plures eiusdem, sed ad alias quaestiones magis pertinent. Idem sentiret finis hoc modo comprensus: 'persuadere quod oporteat', nisi quod artem ad exitum alligat. 36. Bene Areus: 'dicere secundum uirtutem orationis'. Exdudunt a rhetorice malos et illi qui scientiam ciuilium officiorum earn putauerunt, si scientiam uirtutem iudicant, sed anguste intra ciuiles quaestiones coercent. Albucius non obscurus professor atque auctor scientiam bene dicendi esse consentit, sed exceptionibus peccat, adiciendo 'circa ciuiles quaestiones et credibiliter'; quarum iam utrique responsum est. 37. Probabilis et illi uoluntatis qui recte sentire et dicere rhetorices putauerunt. Hi sunt fere fines maxime inlustres et de quibus praecipue disputatur. Nam omnis quidem persequi neque attinet neque possum, aim prauum quoddam, ut arbitror, studium circa scriptores artium extiterit nihil isdem uerbis quae prior aliquis occupasset finiendi; quae ambitio proail aberit a me. 38. Dicam enim non utique quae inuenero, sed quae placebunt, sicut hoc: rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam, cum, reperto quod est optimum, qui quaerit aliud peius uelit. His adprobatis simul manifestum est illud quoque, quem finem uel quid summum et ultimum habeat rhetorice, quod reAo? dicitur, ad quod omnis ars tendit; nam si est ipsa bene dicendi scientia, finis eius et summum est bene dicere. 16. Sequitur quaestio an utilis rhetorice. Nam quidam uehementer in earn inuehi solent, et, quod sit indignissimum, in accusationem orationis utuntur orandi uiribus: (2) eloquentiam esse quae poenis eripiat scelestos, alius fraude damnentur interim boni, consilia ducantur in peius, nec seditiones modo turbaeque populares sed bella etiam inexpiabilia excitentur, cuius denique turn maximus sit usus cum pro falsis contra ueritatem ualet. 3. Nam et Socrati obiciunt comici docere eum quomodo peiorem causam
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meliorem faciat, et contra Tisian et Gorgian similia dicit polliceri Plato. 4. Et his adiciunt exempla Graeco rum Romanorumque, et enumerant qui, perniciosa non singulis tantum sed rebus etiam publicis usi eloquentia, turbauerint ciuitatium status uel euerterint; eoque et Lacedaemoniorum ciuitate expulsam, et Athenis quoque, ubi actor mouere adfectus uetabatur, uelut recisam orandi potestatem. 5. Quo quidem modo nec duces erunt utiles nec magistratus nec medicina nec denique ipsa sapientia; nam et dux Flaminius et Gracchi Saturnini Glauciae magistratus, et in medicis uenena et in his qui philosophorum nomine male utuntur grauissima nonnumquam flagitia deprehensa simt. 6. Cibos aspernemur: attulerunt saepe ualetudinis causas. Numquam tecta subeamus: super habitantes aliquando procumbunt. Non fabricetur militi gladius: potest uti eodem ferro latro. Quis nescit ignes aquas, sine quibus nulla sit uita, et, ne terrenis inmorer, solem lunamque, praecipua siderum, aliquando et nocere? 7. Num igitur negabitur deformem Pyrrhi pacem Caecus ille Appius dicendi uiribus diremisse? Aut non diuina M. Tulli eloquentia et contra leges agrarias popularis fuit et Catilinae fregit audaciam et supplicationes, qui maximus honor uictoribus bello ducibus datur, in toga meruit? 8. Non perterritos militum animos frequenter a metu reuocat oratio, et tot pugnandi pericula ineuntibus laudem uita potiorem esse persuadet? Neque uero me Lacedaemonii atque Athenienses magis mouerint quam populus Roman us, apud quem summa semper oratoribus dignitas fuit. 9. Equidem nec urbium conditores reor aliter effecturos fuisse ut uaga ilia multitudo coiret in populos nisi docta uoce commota, nec legum repertores sine summa ui orandi consecutos ut se ipsi homines ad seruitutem iuris adstringerent. 10. Quin ipsa uitae praecepta, etiam si natura sunt honesta, plus tamen ad formandas mentes ualent quotiens pulchritudinem rerum claritas orationis inluminat. Quare, etiam si in utramque partem ualent arma faciuidiae, non est tamen aecum id haberi malum quo bene uti licet. 11. Verum haec apud eos forsitan quaerantur qui summam rhetorices ad persuadendi uim rettulerunt. Si uero est bene dicendi scientia, quem nos finem sequimur, ut sit orator in primis uir bonus, utilem certe esse earn confitendum est. 12. Et hercule deus ille princeps, parens rerum fabricatorque mundi, nullo magis hominem separauit a ceteris, quae quidem mortalia essent, animalibus quam dicendi faailtate. 13. Nam corpora quidem magnitudine uiribus firmitate patientia uelocitate praestantiora in illis mutis uidemus, eadem minus egere adquisitae extrinsecus opis; nam et ingredi citius et pasci et tranare aquas citra docentem natura ipsa sciunt, (14) et pleraque contra frigus ex suo corpore uestiuntur et arma iis ingenita quaedam et ex obuio fere uictus, circa quae omnia multus ho minibus labor est. Rationem igitur nobis praecipuam dedit, eiusque nos socios esse cum dis inmortalibus
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uoluit. 15. Sed ipsa ratio neque tam nos iuuaret neque tam esset in nobis manifesta nisi quae coneepissemus mente prom ere etiam loquendo posse mus; quod magis deesse ceteris animalibus quam intellectum et cogitationem quandam uidemus. 16. Nam et mollire cubilia et nidos texere et educare fetus et excludere, quin etiam reponere in hiemem alimenta, opera quaedam nobis inimitabilia, qualia sunt cerarum ac mellis, efificere nonnullius fbrtasse rationis est. Sed, quia carent sermone quae id faciunt, muta atque inrationalia uocantur. 17. Denique homines quibus negata uox est quantulum adiuuat animus ille caelestis! Quare, si nihil a dis oratione melius accepimus, quid tam dignum cultu ac labore ducamus, aut in quo malimus praestare hominibus quam quo ipsi homines ceteris animalibus praestant? (18)—eo quidem magis quod nulla in parte plenius labor gratiam refert. Id adeo manifestum erit si cogitauerimus unde et quo usque iam prouecta sit orandi facultas; et adhuc augeri potest. 19. Nam ut omittam defendere amicos, regere consiliis senatum populum, exercitum in quae uelit ducere, quam sit utile conueniatque bono uiro: nonne pulchrum uel hoc ipsum est, ex communi intellectu uerbisque quibus utuntur omnes tantum adsequi laudis et gloriae ut non loqui et orare, sed, quod Pericli contigit, fulgere ac tonare uidearis? 17. Finis non erit si expatiari parte in hac et indulgere uoluptati uelim. Transeamus igitur ad earn quaestionem quae sequitur, an rhetorice ars sit. 2. Quod quidem adeo ex iis qui praecepta dicendi tradiderunt nemo dubitauit ut etiam ipsis librorum titulis testatum sit scriptos eos de arte rhetorica, Cicero uero etiam quae rhetorice uocetur esse artificiosam eloquentiam dicat. Quod non oratores tantum uindicarunt, ut studiis aliquid suis praestitisse uideantur, sed cum iis philosophi et Stoici et Peripatetici plerique consentiunt. 3. Ac me dubitasse confiteor an hanc partem quaestionis tractandam putarem; nam quis est adeo non ab eruditione modo sed a sensu remotus hominis ut fabricandi quidem et texendi et luto uasa ducendi artem putet, rhetoricen autem maximum ac pulcherrimum, ut supra diximus, opus in tam sublime fastigium existimet sine arte uenisse? 4. Equidem illos qui contra disputauerunt non tam id sensisse quod dicerent quam exercere ingenia materiae difificultate credo uoluisse, siait Polycraten, cum Busirim laudaret et Clytaemestram; quamquam is, quod his dissimile non esset, composuisse orationem quae est habita contra Socraten dicitur. 5. Quidam naturalem esse rhetoricen uolunt et tamen adiuuari exercitatione non diffitentur, ut in libris Ciceronis de oratore dicit Antonius obseruationem quandam esse, non artem. 6. Quod non ideo ut pro uero accipiamus est positum, sed ut Antoni persona seruetur, qui dissimulator artis fiiit; hanc autem opinionem habuisse Lysias uidetur. Cuius sententiae talis defensio est,
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quod indocti et barbari et serui, pro se cum locuntur, aliquid dicant simile principio, narrent, probent, reflitent et, quod uim habeat epilogi, deprecentur. 7. Deinde adiciunt illas uerborum cauillationes: nihil quod ex arte fiat ante artem fuisse; atqui dixisse homines pro se et in alios semper, doctores artis sero iam et circa Tisian et Coraca primum repertos; orationem igitur ante artem fuisse eoque artem non esse. 8. Nos porro quando coeperit huius rei doctrina non laboramus, quamquam apud Homerum etpraeceptorem Phoenicem cum agendi turn etiam loquendi, et oratores plures et omne in tribus ducibus orationis genus et certamina quoque proposita eloquentiae inter iuuenes inuenimus, quin in caelatura clipei Achillis et lites sunt et actores. 9. Illud enim admonere satis est, omnia quae ars consummauerit a natura initia duxisse: aut tollatur medicina, quae ex obseruatione salubrium atque his contrariorum reperta est et, ut quibusdam placet, tota constat experimentis (nam et uulnus deligauit aliquis antequam haec ars esset, et febrem quiete et abstinentia, non quia rationem uidebat, sed quia id ualetudo ipsa coegerat, mitigauit), (10) nec fabrica sit ars (casasenim primi illi sine arte fecerunt), nec musica (cantatur ac saltatur per omnis gentes aliquo modo). Ita, si rhetorice uocari debet sermo quicumque, fuisse earn antequam esset ars confitebor; (11) si uero non quisquis loquitur orator est, et turn non tamquam oratores loquebantur, necesse est oratorem factum arte nec ante artem fuisse fateantur. Quo illud quoque exduditur quod dicunt, non esse artis id quod faciat qui non didicerit, dicere autem homines et qui non didicerint. 12. Ad cuius rei confirmationem adfemnt Demaden remigem et Aeschinen hypocriten oratores fuisse. Falso; nam neque orator esse qui non didicit potest, et hos sero potius quam numquam didicisse quis dixerit, quamquam Aeschines ab initio sit uersatus in litteris, quas pater eius etiam docebat, Demaden neque non didicisse certum sit et continua dicendi exercitatio potuerit tantum quantuscumque postea fuit fecisse (nam id potentissimum discendi genus est). 13. Sed et praestantiorem si didicisset futurum fuisse dicere licet; neque enim orationes scribere est ausus, ut eum multum ualuisse in dicendo sciamus. 14. Aristoteles, ut solet, quaerendi gratia quaedam subtilitatis suae argumenta excogitauit in Gryllo; sed idem et de arte rhetorica tris libros scripsit, et in eorum primo non artem solum earn fatetur, sed ei particulam ciuilitatis sicut dialectices adsignat. 15. Multa Critolaus contra, multa Rhodius Athenodorus. Agnon quidem detraxit sibi inscriptione ipsa fidem, qua rhetorices accusationem professus est. Nam de Epicuro, qui disciplinas omnes fugit, nihil minor. 16. Hi complura dicunt, sed ex paucis locis ducta; itaque potentissimis eorum breuiter occurram, ne in infinitum quaestio euadat. 17. Prima iis argumentatio ex materia est. Omnis enim artes aiunt habere materiam (quod est uerum), rhetorices nullam esse propriam (quod esse falsum in sequentibus probabo).
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18. Altera est calumnia nullam artem falsis adsentiri opinionibus, quia constitui sine perceptione non possit, quae semper uera sit; rhetoricen adsentiri falsis; non esse igitur artem. 19. Ego rhetoricen nonnumquam dicere falsa pro ueris confitebor, sed non ideo in falsa quoque esse opinione concedam, quia longe diuersum est ipsi quid uideri et ut alii uideatur efficere. Nam et imperator falsis utitur saepe, ut Hannibal, cum inclusus a Fabio, sarmentis circum cornua boum deligatis incensisque, per noctem in aduersos montes agens armenta speciem hosti abeuntis exercitus dedit; sed ilium fefellit, ipse quid uerum esset non ignorauit. 20. Nec uero Theopompus Lacedaemonius, cum permutato cum uxore habitu e custodia ut mulier euasit, falsam de se opinionem habuit, sed custodibus praebuit. Item orator, cum falso utitur pro uero, scit esse falsum eoque se pro uero uti; non ergo falsam habet ipse opinionem, sed fallit alium. 21. Nec Cicero, cum se tenebras ofifudisse iudicibus in causa Cluenti gloriatus est, nihil ipse uidit, et pictor, aim ui artis suae efificit ut quaedam eminere in opere, quaedam recessisse credamus, ipse ea plana esse non nescit. 22. Aiunt etiam omnes artes habere finem aliquem proposition ad quem tendant, hunc modo nullum esse in rhetorice, modo non praestari eum qui promittatur. Mentiuntur; nos enim esse finem iam ostendimus et quis esset diximus, (23) et praestabit hunc semper orator (semper enim bene dicet). Firmum autem hoc quod opponitur aduersus eos fortasse sit qui persuadere finem putauerimt; noster orator arsque a nobis finita non sunt posita in euentu. Tendit quidem ad uictoriam qui dicit, sed cum bene dixit, etiam si non uincat, id quod arte continetur efifecit. 24. Nam et gubernator uult salua naue in portum peruenire, si tamen tempestate fuerit abreptus, non ideo minus erit gubernator, dicetque notum illud: 'dum clauum reaum teneam'; (25) et medicus sanitatem aegri petit, si tamen aut ualetudinis ui aut intemperantia aegri alioue quo casu summa non contingit, dum ipse omnia secundum rationem fecerit, medicinae fine non excidet. Ita oratori bene dixisse finis est. Nam est ars ea, ut post paulum clarius ostendemus, in actu posita, non in effectu. 26. Ita falsum erit illud quoque quod dicitur, artes scire quando sint finem consecutae, rhetoricen nescire; nam se quisque bene dicere intelleget. Vti etiam uitiis rhetoricen, quod ars nulla faciat, criminantur, quia et falsum dicat et adfectus moueat. 27. Quorum neutrum est turpe, cum ex bona ratione proficiscitur, ideoque nec uitium; nam et mendacium dicere etiam sapienti aliquando concessum est, et adfectus, si aliter ad aequitatem perduci iudex non poterit, necessario mouebit orator. Imperiti enim iudicant et qui frequenter in hoc ipsum fallendi sint, ne errent. 28. Nam si mihi sapientes iudices dentur, sapientium contiones atque omne consilium, nihil inuidia ualeat, nihil gratia, nihil opinio praesumpta falsique testes, perquam
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sit exiguiis eloquentiae locus et prope in sola delectatione ponatur. 29. Sin et audientium mobiles animi et tot malis obnoxia ueritas, arte pugnandum est et adhibenda quae prosunt; neque enim qui recta ilia depulsus est reduci ad earn nisi alio flexu potest. 30. Plurima uero ex hoc contra rhetoricen cauillatio est, quod ex utraque causae parte dicatur. Inde haec: nullam esse artem contrariam sibi, rhetoricen esse contrariam sibi; nullam artem restruere quod effecerit, accidere hoc rhetorices operi. Item aut dicenda earn docere aut non dicenda; ita uel per hoc non esse artem, quod non dicenda praecipiat, uel per hoc, quod, cum dicenda praeceperit, etiam contraria his doceat. 31. Quae omnia apparet de ea rhetorice dici quae sit a bono uiro atque ab ipsa uirtute seiuncta; alioqui ubi iniusta causa est, ibi rhetorice non est, adeo ut uix admirabili quodam casu possit accidere ut ex utraque parte orator, id est uir bonus, dicat. 32. Tamen quoniam hoc quoque in rerum naturam cadit, ut duos sapientes aliquando iustae causae in diuersum trahant, quando etiam pugnaturos eos inter se, si ratio ita duxerit, credunt, respondebo propositis, atque ita quidem ut appareat haec aduersus eos quoque frustra excogitata qui malis moribus nomen oratoris indulgent. 33. Nam rhetorice non est contraria sibi. Causa enim cum causa, non ilia secum ipsa componitur; nec, si pugnent inter se qui idem didicerunt, idcirco ars, quae utrique tradita est, non erit (alioqui nec armorum quia saepe gladiatores sub eodem magistro eruditi inter se componuntur, (34) nec gubernandi quia naualibus proeliis gubernator est gubernatori aduersus, nec imperatoria quia imperator cum imperatore contendit). Item non euertit opus rhetorice quod effecit. Neque enim positum a se argumentum soluit orator; sed ne rhetorice quidem, quia apud eos qui in persuadendo finem putant, aut si quis, ut dixi, casus duos inter se bonos uiros composuerit, ueri similia quaerentur; non autem, si quid est altero credibilius, id ei contrarium est quod fuit credibile. 35. Nam ut candido candidius et dulci dulcius non est aduersum, ita nec probabili probabilius. Neque praecipit umquam non dicenda nec dicendis contraria, sed quae in quaque causa dicenda sunt. 36. Non semper autem ei, etiamsi frequentissime, tuenda ueritas erit, sed aliquando exigit communis utilitas ut etiam falsa defendat. Ponuntur hae quoque in secundo Ciceronis de Oratore libro contradictiones: artem earum reriun esse quae sciantur; oratoris omnem actionem opinione, non scientia contineri, quia et apud eos dicat qui nesciant, et ipse dicat aliquando quod nesciat. 37. Ex his alterum, id est an sciat iudex de quo dicatur, nihil ad oratoris artem; alteri respondendum. 'Ars earum rerum est quae sciuntur'. Rhetorice ars est bene dicendi, bene autem dicere scit orator. 38. 'Sed nescit an uerum sit quod dicit.' Ne ii quidem qui ignem aut aquam aut quattuor elementa aut corpora insecabilia esse ex quibus res omnes initium duxerint tradunt, nec qui interualla siderum et mensuras solis ac
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terrae colligunt; disciplinam tamen suam artem uocant. Quodsi ratio efficit ut haec non opinari sed propter uim probationum scire uideantur, eadem ratio idem praestare oratori potest. 39. 'Sed an causa uera sit nescit.' Ne medicus quidem an dolorem capitis habeat qui hoc se pati dicet; curabit tamen tamquam id uerum sit, et erit ars medicina. Quid quod rhetorice non utique propositum habet semper uera dicendi, sed semper ueri similia? Scit autem esse ueri similia quae dicit. 40. Adiciunt his qui contra sentiunt quod saepe, quae in aliis litibus inpugnarunt actores causarum, eadem in aliis defendant. Quod non artis sed hominis est uitium. Haec sunt praecipua quae contra rhetoricen dicantur, alia et minora et tamen ex his fontibus deriuata. 41. Confirmatur autem esse artem earn breuiter. Nam siue, ut Cleanthes uoluit, ars est potestas uia, id est ordine, efficiens, esse certe uiam atque ordinem in bene dicendo nemo dubitauerit, siue ille ab omnibus fere probatus finis obseruatur, artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem utilem uitae, iam ostendimus nihil non horum in rhetorice inesse. 42. Quid quod et inspectione et exercitatione, ut artes ceterae, constat? Nec potest ars non esse si est ars dialectice (quod fere constat), cum ab ea specie magis quam genere differat. Sed nec ilia omittenda sunt: qua in re alius se inartificialiter, alius artificialiter gerat, in ea esse artem, et in eo quod qui didicerit melius faciat quam qui non didicerit esse artem. 43. Atqui non solum doctus indoctum sed etiam doctior doctum in rhetorices opere superabit, neque essent eius aliter tam multa praecepta tamque magni qui docerent. Idque cum omnibus confitendum est, turn nobis praecipue, qui rationem dicendi a bono uiro non separamus. 18. Cum sint autem artium aliae positae in inspectione, id est cognitione et aestimatione rerum, qualis est astrologia nullum exigens actum, sed ipso rei cuius studium habet intellectu contenta, quae deaiprjriKri uocatur, aliae in agendo, quarum in hoc finis est et ipso actu perficitur nihilque post actum operis relinquit, quae rrpaKTiKr) dicitur, qualis saltatio est, (2) aliae in effectu, quae operis quod oculis subicitur consummatione finem accipiunt, quam 7TOTJTiKTjv appellamus, qualis est pictura: fere iudicandum est rhetoricen in actu consistere; hoc enim quod est officii sui perficit; atque ita ab omnibus dictum est. 3. Mihi autem uidetur etiam ex illis ceteris artibus multum adsumere. Nam et potest aliquando ipsa per se inspectione esse contenta. Erit enim rhetorice in oratore etiam tacente, et si desierit agere uel proposito uel aliquo casu impeditus, non magis desinet esse orator quam medicus qui curandi fecerit finem. 4. Nam est aliquis ac nescio an maximus etiam ex secretis studiis fructus, ac turn pura uoluptas litterarum cum ab actu, id est
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opera, recesserunt et contemplatione sui fruuntur. 5. Sed effectiuae quoque aliquid simile scriptis orationibus uel historiis, quod ipsum opus in parte oratoria merito ponimus, consequetur. Si tamen una ex tribus artibus habenda sit, quia maximus eius usus actu continetur atque est in eo frequentissima, dicatur actiua uel administratiua; nam et hoc eiusdem rei nomen est. 19. Scio quaeri etiam naturane plus ad eloquentiam conferat an doctrina. Quod ad propositum quidem operis nostri nihil pertinet (neque enim consummatus orator nisi ex utroque fieri potest), plurimum tamen referre arbitror quam esse in hoc loco quaestionem uelimus. 2. Nam si parti utrilibet omnino alteram detrahas, natura etiam sine doctrina multum ualebit, doctrina nulla esse sine natura poterit. Sin ex pari coeant, in mediocribus quidem futrisquef maius adhuc naturae credam esse momentum, consummatos autem plus doctrinae debere quam naturae putabo; sicut terrae nullam fertilitatem habenti nihil optimus agricola profuerit, e terra uberi utile aliquid etiam nullo colente nascetur; at in solo feaindo plus alitor quam ipsa per se bonitas soli efificiet. 3. Et si Praxiteles signum aliquod ex molari lapide conatus esset exculpere, Parium marmor mallem rude; at si illud idem artifex expolisset, plus in manibus fuisset quam in marmore. Denique natura materia doctrinae est: haec fingit, ilia fingitur. Nihil ars sine materia, materiae etiam sine arte pretium est; ars summa materia optima melior. 20. Ilia quaestio est maior, ex mediis artibus, quae neque laudari per se nec uituperari possunt, sed utiles aut secus secundum mores utentium fiunt, habenda sit rhetorice, an sit, ut compluribus etiam philosophorum placet, uirtus. 2. Equidem illud quod in studiis dicendi plerique exercuerunt et exercent aut nullam artem, quae arexvia nominatur, puto (multos enim uideo sine ratione, sine litteris, qua uel impudentia uel fames duxit ruentes), aut malam quasi artem, quam KaKorexviav dicimus; nam et fuisse multos et esse nonnullos existimo qui facultatem dicendi ad hominum perniciem conuerterint. 3. Maratorexvia quoque est quaedam, id est superuacua artis imitatio, quae nihil sane neque boni neque mali habeat, sed uanum laborem, qualis illius fuit qui grana ciceris ex spatio distante missa in acum continuo et sine frustratione inserebat; quem cum spectasset Alexander, donasse dicitur eiusdem leguminis modio, quod quidem praemium fuit illo opere dignissimum. 4. His ego comparandos existimo qui in declamationibus, quas esse ueritati dissimillimas uolunt, aetatem multo studio ac labore consumunt. Verum haec quam instituere conamur et cuius imaginem animo concepimus, quae bono uiro conuenit quaeque est uere rhetorice, uirtus erit. 5. Quod philosophi quidem multis et acutis conclusionibus coDigunt, mihi uero etiam planiore hac proprieque nostra probatione uidetur esse perspicuum.
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Ab illis haec dicuntiir: Si consonare sibi in faciendis ac non faciendis uirtus est (quae pars eius prudentia uocatur), eadem in dicendis ac non dicendis erit. 6. Et si uirtutes sunt ad quas nobis, etiam antequam doceremur, initia quaedam ac semina sunt concessa natura, ut ad iustitiam, cuius rusticis quoque ac barbaris apparet aliqua imago, nos certe sic esse ab initio formatos ut possemus orare pro nobis, etiamsi non perfecte, tamen ut inessent quaedam, ut dixi, semina eius facultatis, manifestum est; (7) non eadem autem iis natura artibus est quae a uirtute sunt remotae. Itaque cum duo sint genera orationis, altera perpetua, quae rhetorice dicitur, altera concisa, quae dialectice (quas quidem Zenon adeo coniunxit ut hanc compressae in pugnum manus, illam explicatae diceret similem), etiam disputatrix uirtus erit: adeo de hac, quae speciosior atque apertior tanto est, nihil dubitabitur. 8. Sed plenius hoc idem atque apertius intueri ex ipsis operibus uolo. Nam quid orator in laudando faciet nisi honestorum ac turpium peritus, aut in suadendo nisi utilitate perspecta, aut in iudiciis si iustitiae sit ignarus? Quid? non fortitudinem postulat res eadem, cum saepe contra turbulentas populi minas, saepe cum periculosa potentium ofifensa, nonnumquam, ut iudicio Miloniano, inter circumfusa militum anna dicendum sit?—ut, si uirtus non est, ne perfecta quidem esse possit oratio. 9. Quod si ea in quoque animalium est uirtus qua praestat cetera uel pleraque, ut in leone impetus, in equo uelocitas, hominem porro ratione atque oratione excellere ceteris certum est, cur non tam in eloquentia quam in ratione uirtutem eius esse credamus, recteque hoc apud Ciceronem dixerit Crassus: est enim eloquentia una quaedam de summis uirtutibus,' et ipse Cicero sua persona cum ad Brutum in epistulis turn aliis etiam locis uirtutem earn appellet? 10. 'At prohoemium aliquando ac narrationem dicet malus homo et argumenta sic ut nihil sit in iis inquirendum.' Nam et latro pugnabit acriter, uirtus tamen erit fortitudo, et tormenta sine gemitu feret malus seruus, tolerantia tamen doloris laude sua non carebit. Multa fiunt eadem, sed aliter. Sufficiant igitur haec, quia de utilitate supra tractauimus. 2 1 . Materiam rhetorices quidam dixerunt esse orationem; qua in sententia ponitur apud Platonem Gorgias. Quae si ita accipitur ut sermo quacumque de re compositus dicatur oratio, non materia sed opus est, ut statuarii statua; nam et oratio efficitur arte sicut statua. Sin hac appellatione uerba ipsa significari putamus, nihil haec sine rerum substantia faciunt. Quidam argumenta persuasibilia; quae et ipsa in parte sunt operis et arte fiunt et materia egent. 2. Quidam ciuiles quaestiones; quorum opinio non qualitate sed modo errauit (est enim haec materia rhetorices, sed non sola). 3. Quidam, quia uirtus sit rhetorice, materiam eius totam uitam uocant. Alii, quia non
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omnium uirtutum materia sit tota uita, sed pleraeque earum uersentur in partibus, sicut iustitia fortitudo continentia propriis officiis et suo fine intelleguntur, rhetoricen quoque dicunt in una aliqua parte ponendam, eique locum in yOucr) negotialem adsignant, id est TrpayfxaTiKov. 4. Ego (neque id sine auctoribus) materiam esse rhetorices iudico omnes res quaecumque ei ad dicendum subiectae erunt. Nam Socrates apud Platonem dicere Gorgiae uidetur non in uerbis esse materiam sed in rebus, et in Phaedro palam non in iudiciis modo et contionibus sed in rebus etiam priuatis ac domesticis rhetoricen esse demonstrat; quo manifestum est hanc opinionem ipsius Platonis fuisse. 5. Et Cicero quodam loco materiam rhetorices uocat res quae subiectae sint ei, sed certas demum putat esse subiectas; alio uero de omnibus rebus oratori dicendum arbitratur, his quidem uerbis: 'quamquam uis oratoris professioque ipsa bene dicendi hoc suscipere ac polliceri uidetur, ut omni de re quaecumque sit proposita ornate ab eo copioseque dicatur.' 6. Atque adhuc alibi: 'uero enim oratori quae sunt in hominum uita, quandoquidem in ea uersatur orator atque ea est ei subiecta materies, omnia quaesita audita lecta disputata tractata agitata esse debent.' 7. Hanc autem quam nos materiam uocamus, id est res subiectas, quidam modo infinitam, modo non propriam rhetorices esse dixerunt, eamque artem circumcurrentem uocauerunt, quod in omni materia diceret. 8. Cum quibus mihi minima pugna est; nam de omni materia dicere earn fatentur, propriam habere materiam quia multiplicem habeat negant. Sed neque infinita est, etiamsi est multiplex (et aliae quoque artes minores habent multiplicem materiam, uelut architectonice— namque ea in omnibus quae sunt aedificio utilia uersatur—(9) et caelatura, quae auro argento aere ferro opera efficit; nam scalptura etiam lignum ebur marmor uitrum gemmas praeter ea quae supra dixi complectitur), (10) neque protinus non est materia rhetorices si in eadem uersatur et alius. Nam si quaeram quae sit materia statuarii, dicetur aes, si quaeram quae sit excusoris, id est fabricae eius quam Graeci x a ^ K € V T l K V v uocant, similiter aes esse respondeant; atqui plurimum statuis dififerunt uasa. 11. Nec medicina ideo non erit ars quia unctio et exercitatio cum palaestrica, ciborum uero qualitas etiam cum cocorum ei sit arte communis. 12. Quod uero de bono utili iusto disserere philosophiae officium esse dicunt, non obstat. Nam aim philosophum dicunt, hoc accipi uolunt uirum bonum. Quare igitur oratorem, quem a bono uiro non separo, in eadem materia uersari mirer? (13)—cum praesertim primo libro iam ostenderim philosophos omissam hanc ab oratoribus partem occupasse, quae rhetorices propria semper fiiisset, ut illi potius in nostra materia uersentur. Denique cum sit dialectices materia de rebus subieais disputare, sit autem dialectice oratio concisa, cur non eadem perpetuae quoque materia uideatur?
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14. Solet a qiiibusdam et illud opponi: omnium igitur artium peritus erit orator si de omnibus ei dicendum est. Possem hie Ciceronis respondere uerbis, apud quem hoc inuenio: 'mea quidem sententia nemo esse poterit omni laude cumulatus orator nisi erit omnium rerum magnarum atque artium scientiam consecutus.' Sed mihi satis est eius esse oratorem rei de qua dicet non inscium. 15. Neque enim omnis causas nouit, et debet posse de omnibus dicere. De quibus ergo dicet? De quibus didicit. Similiter de artibus quoque de quibus dicendum erit interim discet, et de quibus didicerit dicet. 16. Quid ergo? non faber de fabrica melius aut de musice musicus? Si nesciat orator quid sit de quo quaeratur, plane melius; nam et litigator rusticus inlitteratusque de causa sua melius quam orator qui nesciet quid in lite sit; sed accepta a musico, a fabro, sicut a litigatore, melius orator quam ipse qui docuerit. 17. Verum et faber, cum de fabrica, et musicus, cum de musica, si quid confirmationem desiderauerit, dicet; non erit quidem orator, sed faciet illud quasi orator, sicut, cum uulnus imperitus deligabit, non erit medicus, sed faciet ut medicus. 18. An huius modi res neque in laudem neque in deliberationem neque in iudicium ueniunt? Ergo cum de faciendo portu Ostiensi deliberatum est, non debuit dicere sententiam orator? Atqui opus erat ratione architectorum. 19. Liuores et tumores in corpore cruditatis an ueneni signa sint non tractat orator? At est id ex ratione medicinae. Circa mensuras et numeros non uersabitur? Dicamus has geometriae esse partes. Equidem omnia fere posse credo casu aliquo uenire in officium oratoris; quod si non accidet, non erunt ei subiecta. 20. Ita sic quoque recte diximus materiam rhetorices esse omnis res ad dicendum ei subiectas. Quod quidem probat etiam sermo communis; nam cum aliquid de quo dicamus accepimus, positam nobis esse materiam frequenter etiam praefatione testamur. 21. Gorgias quidem adeo rhetori de omnibus putauit esse dicendum ut se in auditoriis interrogari pateretur qua quisque de re uellet. Hermagoras quoque dicendo materiam esse in causa et in quaestionibus omnes res subiectas erat complexus. 22. Sed quaestiones si negat ad rhetoricen pertinere, dissentit a nobis. Si autem ad rhetoricen pertinent, ab hoc quoque adiuuamur; nihil est enim quod non in causam aut quaestionem cadat. 23. Aristoteles tris faciendo partes orationis, iudicialem deliberatiuam demonstratiuam, paene et ipse oratori subiecit omnia; nihil enim non in haec cadit. 24. Quaesitum a paucissimis et de instrumento est. Instrumentum uoco sine quo formari materia in id quod uelimus effici opus non possit. Verum hoc ego non artem credo egere, sed artificem. Neque enim scientia desiderat instrumentum, quae potest esse consummata etiam si nihil faciat, sed ille opifex, ut caelator caelum et pictor penicilla. Itaque haec in eum locum quo de oratore dicturi sum us differamus.
COMMENTARY The second book has no proem. The Institutio as a whole has one, and the MSS signal proems for Books 3, 4, and 6; editors rightly mark others for 5, 7, 8, and 12. Where such obvious markers are lacking, Q. may make the move to a new book clear at its start (9 cum sit proximo libro de tropis dictum, sequitur pertinens adfiguras... locus ipsa rei natura coniunctus superiori'; 11 'parata, sicut superiore libro continetur, facilitate scribendi'). 10 begins 'sed [!] haec eloquendi praecepta', referring back to Books 8-9. There is nothing like this in 2; but the transition is clearly marked at the end of Book 1. From 9. 4. 146 (cited below, p. 394, where ends of books are surveyed) it appears that that book was contained in a single papyrus roll (uolumen); and if that long book was, so doubtless were the others. But Q. clearly saw the Institutio as a structured whole; and he explains the structure to us at 1 pr. 21-2.
Chapter One Pupils are being sent to rhetores later than they should be (1), for rhetores think that their job is merely to teach declamation, while grammatici are intruding on the domain of rhetoric (2), with paradoxical results (3). The two professions should keep to their own limits: grammar has a vast territory already (4), and rhetoric should not give ground (5), even though some grammatici are quite capable of teaching the earlier stages of rhetoric (6). A child should move to the rhetor's school when he is capable of it (7); but that is bound up with the former question of the spheres of the two professions. In my view, a rhetors services are needed from the narrative and encomium exercises onwards (8). Further, thesis and commonplace, and all the other generalized exercises, were employed to train eloquence long ago, and rhetoric should hold on to them (9). What is more, the exercises I have specified, narrative, encomium, and commonplace, are entirely relevant to real-life oratory (10-12a). But all this does not mean I am recommending undue haste; for a while the pupil may properly be taught by both gramtnaticus and rhetor in tandem (12b—13). The chapter presents problems, but Q.'s own position is clear enough. He asserts that grammmatici are invading rhetorical territory, even to the extent of teaching suasoriae (for this, see n. on 2.1.2 sed... inrumpunt). But he is not
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so purist as to demand that they give up all interest in the preliminary rhetorical exercises, progymnasmata (we use this tenn for convenience, though Q. himself does not).1 For in 1. 9 he has assigned to them various 'dicendi primondia quibus aetatis nondum rhetorem capientis instituant [sc. grammatici]' (1), including the more elementary types of narrative. But of the more demanding progymnasmata he goes on to say (6): 'cetera maioris operis ac spiritus Latini rhetores relinquendo necessaria grammaticis fecerunt; Graeci magis operum suorum et onera et modum norunt': with the apparent implication that, while no rhetor, Greek-speaking or Latin-speaking, had ever claimed the earlier exercises, Latin teachers had (misguidedly) conceded the later ones to the grammaticus. It is these advanced progymnasmata that Q. wishes to claim for the rhetor, and these that he will discuss in 2. 4. At the end of 2. 1, however, a complication is introduced; for we are told of the custom of letting children do advanced grammatical and elementary rhetorical work at the same age, but under two different teachers, grammaticus and rhetor in tandem: a custom still found in Greek schools, but no longer in Latin. There must surely be some connection between this phenomenon and the discussion in §§1-3; 'quod adhuc optinent Graeci, a Latinis omissum est' (13) seems to recall 'Latinis quidem semper, sed etiam Graecis interim' (1), while the faint irony of 'fieri uidetur excusate' is reminiscent of 'quo nomine gratia quoque iis habenda est' (2). But Q. does not spell the connection out. If, then, we may put §§1-3 and 13 together, we obtain the following picture. In the past (there is no indication of dates), both in Greek and Latin schools, there had been some overlap at the transition between the schools of grammaticus and rhetor, easing an early transition from one to the other; and the rhetor accordingly had taught the bulk of the progymnasmata. But, at some point, the overlap fell out of use in all Latin and some Greek schools, and it became the fashion, again in all Latin and some Greek schools, to make the transition at a later age; accordingly, except in some Greek schools, the progymnasmata, elementary and more advanced alike, came to be taught by the grammaticus. Q.'s own view is that there should be a return to the former practice of both Greek and Latin schools: that is, an early transition, with overlap, and the teaching of the majority of the progymnasmata by the rhetor. Difficulties arise when we try to correlate what Q. says with the accounts given in two passages of Suetonius' De grammaticis et rhetoribus. In the first 1 Q. uses various phrases involving prim-: 2. 2. 1, 2. 4 . 1 and 3 6 , 2 . 5. 1; pritnae exercitationes in the third o f these passages might consciously represent the Greek word (which is found in the text o f Theon only at 61. 2 6 |p. 4 ] , though it presumably occurred in his title).
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(4. 4-6) Suetonius relates that 'ueteres grammatici' taught rhetoric as well as grammar; hence, when the professions divided out, 'posteriores... uel retinuisse uel instituisse [sc. feruntur]... quaedam genera meditationum ad eloquentiam praeparandam,.. .ne scilicet sicci omnino atque aridi pueri rhetoribus traderentur'. Suetonius gives four examples of such progymnasmata, but complains that the desidia and infantia of some grammatici has led to their being removed from the syllabus. Later on, discussing (past) rhetorical education at Rome, Suetonius asserts (25.4) that methods varied from teacher to teacher. He gives another, longer selection of preliminary exercises, and ends with the words 'donee sensim haec exoluerunt et ad controuersiam uentum est'. We need Suetonius' interpreters (Kaster ad loc., and earlier Clarke 165; contra, unconvincingly, Patillon, p. xii, with n. 18) to tell us that he means by this not that progymnasmata fell out of use altogether, but that they ceased to be taught by rhetores. And, putting the two passages together, we deduce that they had been taken over by the grammatici (or at least the less lazy among them). The chronology of these developments is unclear; but there is no substantial discrepancy between Q. and Suetonius (Kaster1 100, 271, 280). Indeed, Suetonius may be understood as providing valuable confirmation of the encroachment of which Q. complains so bitterly (Webb 296): as bitterly indeed as he elsewhere complains, and in similar language, about another vexed demarcation dispute, that between philosophy and rhetoric (see n.below on 1 suas partis omiserunt). Q. makes no systematic effort to elucidate the background to the development he deplores. Instead, he gives us, first, an impressionistic and tendentious sketch of the history of ypa/x/zart/oj (see on 4 appellation is): at the start it was a poor, 'slender' thing; later it came to embrace maximae artes. Secondly, he argues (9) from the origins of some of the exercises that they should be taught by the rhetor, for it was from them that the whole of rhetorical education took its rise. In both these passages, Q. is thinking not of Rome but of Greece. Kaster1 100 calls his account 'historically less well informed' than that of Suetonius; but, whether he is right or wrong in what he says, he is not here talking about the same things as the later writer. 1. 1 tenuit consuetudo... ut... traderentur: cf. 8. 5. 2 'consuetudo iam tenuit ut.. .uocaremus'. In both cases the meaning seems to be 'has taken hold, come to prevail' (note inualescit). OLD s.v. teneo, which ignores these passages, cites under 3d an interesting medical parallel from Celsus (5. 26. 34A 'si nondum plane tenet, sed adhuc incipit [sc. gangrena]'). The secondary sequence2 in both passages is striking (contrast 3 'accidit ut... facta sint'); 2 At Vegetius, Mil. 2. 8 . 1 'uetus. . . c o n s u e t u d o tenuit u t . . . promoueretur centurio', the modern custom has been described in what precedes.
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cf. 2. 10. 2 'ita est celebrata ut... uideretur', and K-S ii. 179: this sequence is regular where e.g. din is present (cf. here inualescit, which may act like diu). We are most grateful to Harm Pinkster for help with this sentence. inualescit: cf. Plin. Ep. 6. 2. 5 'increbruit passim et inualuit consuetudo'. The tense of deserat (9) confirms that the process was still continuing, though presumably only in the Greek schools, the Latin ones having all completed it. Latinis... Graecis: for this criticism of Latin rhetores cf. 1. 9. 6, as cited above, p. 36. Here and in 13, Q. apparently means by Graeci Greek teachers domiciled in Rome (and Italy generally?); cf. below, p. 120. We do not know what Greek teachers elsewhere did. But one forms the impression from the progymnasmatists that the exercises were to be taught as a set by the same person, presumably the rhetor (cf. in particular the passage of Nicolaus cited below on 2. 4. 1 aliquid simile). Thus Theon (who is called a ao^tar^? by the Suda) appears to be writing his book qua rhetor,; indeed, he may have gone on to write a rhetorical techne (see n.on 2. 4. 21 tertia.. .pars). In his introduction (59. 1-11 [p. 1]) we find a quite different complaint, that, whereas the old rhetores (orators rather than teachers, as always in Theon) thought it essential to have a grounding in philosophy, nowadays they rushed into action without any training whatever, let alone progymnasmata (cf. Lucian's ironical remarks at Rh. Pr. 14). interim: as often in Q. = interdum (OLD s.v. 4). Cf. 12. 10. 37 'non tamen alto semper feremur; nam et litora interim sequenda sunt'; Sen. Dial. 4. 21. 8 'timeat interim, uereatur semper. See below on 2. 3. 3 interim. quam ratio postulat: in effect = 'than is (in my view) reasonable'. For similar phrases, see TLL s.v. postulo 268. 79-83, esp. Cic. Har. 3 'longius... quam sapientis hominis cogitata ratio postulasset'. There is some contrast with consuetudo (see also n. on 2. 8.6 rationem), more explicit in 9.4. 59 'aliud ratio, aliud consuetudo poscet'; for this contrast in Charisius and the Elder Pliny see J. W. Beck, Philologus, NF 2 (1889), 261-3. duplex causa: the ground given up by the rhetores and that taken over by the grammatici not being coextensive (see 2). quod et: et, omitted by A, is essential; for the same correlation see 2 'et illi... et h i . . . ' and 4-5 'et grammatice . . . et rhetorice...\ utique: a favourite word in Q., and one whose exact sense is often difficult to pin down. A good deal might be said about Q.'s usage, but we restrict ourselves here to discussing together the instances in Book 2. For the vexed 2.14. 1, see n. there. (i) With a negative: so (a) 2. 5. 5 (here 'absolutely not', rather than 'not necessarily': see Colson on 1.8. 14); (b) in the phrase 'non utique .. .sed': so
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2.15. 38 {'not what [i.e. all] I find, but what I approve of'), 2. 17. 39 ('rhetoric's aim is not to say true things always but to say probable things always'). (ii) Positively: 'invariably', 'without exception', as in 2. 13. 1 (following inmutabili necessitate, cf. 4. 2.24 'an sit utique narratio prohoemio subicienda'; 4. 2. 32 'quia nec breuiter utique nec dilucide semper sit utile exponere'; 4. 2. 129); cf. 2.4. 32 ('utique superfluous, but interim actually harmful'). (iii) In the present passage, we seem to have to choose between 'ours especially' and 'at any rate ours'; and as it has just been intimated that all Latin, but not all Greek, rhetores have sold the pass, we should plump for the latter. The choice is often difficult (so e.g. at 1. 8.6,6. 2. 26, 9. 3. 74, 11. 3. 132, 147), but 'especially' seems highly plausible or certain at e.g. 4. 1. 53, 4. 3. 9, 4. 4. 2, 8. 3. 23, 'at any rate' at e.g. 9. 2. 93. suas partis omiserunt: for Afifahl 82 the metaphor in partis is from the stage, 'role'. But nothing points to anything so specific. The image is rather of an area in contention between rivals, as in the passages we cite in the next paragraph; for omitto in a military context see OLD s.v. 3. The plural may give some sense of 'aspects of their jobs' (cf. 2. 3. 15, 2. 4. 1); but it is appropriate for a region also (OLD s.v. pars 12a). We come here to the first example of echoes in this chapter of what Q. (in the wake of Cicero) has to say of another group of invaders of allegedly rhetorical ground, the philosophers: 1 pr. 17 'desertam... partem [cf. below, §9] oratoriae artis . . . occupauerunt (sc. philosophi]'; 1. 10. 11 'haec... pars, quae ab oratoribus relicta a philosophis est occupata; 2. 21. 13 'cum., .iam ostenderim philosophos omissam hanc ab oratoribus partem occupasse\ For further instances see on 2 inrumpunt, 5 possessione, 9 deserat earn partem. 1. 2 dedamare.. .despidunt: rhetores, that is, thought their task was solely to give model (and display) declamations and teach the theory and practice (Colson on 1 pr. 18) of declamation, furthermore restricting themselves to suasoriae and controversiae (for materia(e) thus cf. 2. 10. 1, 3. 4. 16,11. 1. 48; and generally n. on 2. 21. 20 positam... testamur). They looked down on 'the rest' as too trivial for them (cf. 1 pr. 4 'contemnentes tamquam parua quae prius discimus studia, siue non ad suum pertinere ojficium opinati.. 5 (cf. 21) 'minora ilia'; 2. 5.4 'infra rhetoris officium'). The parenthesis should (so Corsi's translation) be taken as commenting not on 'idque.. .materias' alone (for then one would, problematically, expect cetera to refer to the genus demonstratiuum), but, however awkwardly, on the whole of the sentence so far. cetera then refers, as the context demands, to the pre-declamation exercises; 'nam.. .despiciunt' is taken up, as Corsi remarks, by 'si... non recusat' in §8. The restriction itself is odd; if it implies that Q. thought that declamation should be extended to practice for epideictic oratory, he does not
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seem to have made such an innovation himself. It would seem, rather, that he is doing no more than emphasizing the narrowness of the field of the rhetores. professione: perhaps with some lingering verbal force ('too trivial to be compatible with the claims they make for themselves'), as more clearly in 2. 5. 5 'promissionis eius atque promissi quo se magistrum eloquentiae pollicetur', where see n. excepisse: 'took up', 'took over' (TLL s.v. excipio 1252. 41-54). quo nomine: similar expressions with words connoting thanks are commonly found. They are extensions of such usages as Cic. Att. 1. 16. 16 'Antonio tuo nomine gratias egi'; so e.g. Sen. Ep. 83. 3 'hoc nomine ago gratias senectuti'. quoque: 'id est insuper, hoc est non solum his non est... irascendum sed ultro gratiae habendae sunt' (Badius). sed... inrumpunt: these words raise an intricate problem. The crucial background is that the prosopopoeia (or ethopoeia: for the varying terminology see e.g. Lausberg, §§820-9; a crisp statement at Raster1 102), 'speech in character', normally featured among the progymnasmata (for the Greek theorists, see below, p. 76; Suet. Gram. 4. 5 includes it under the name adlocutio). It was something that might be treated at different levels of sophistication. Thus Theon can mention it in connection with the early exercise Myth (75. 17-18 [p. 34)); and when he comes on to give it separate discussion (c. 8), he talks (118. 1 [p. 73]) of his precepts as an introduction (eiaayojyq), with the implication that it would be much more complicated at a more advanced stage. Q. appears to have thought it too difficult to be treated at all among the progymnasmata. He nowhere spells this out, but merely omits mention of it in 2. 4. Later, he discusses speeches in character under the topic of deliberative oratory and its declamatory form, the suasoria. He there says (3. 8. 49) that they are dijficillimae, for in them 'ad relicum suasoriae laborem accedit etiam personae difficultas'; that is, they involved taking the role of a given character, as opposed to merely acting as an anonymous adviser. On the same lines, he adds (52) that he (ego marking his unusual approach) has put prosopopoeia under suasoriae 'quia nullo alio ab his quam persona distat'. His main interest therefore is in the kind of prosopopoeia that involved advising. He is well aware (53) that there were other kinds, not involving advice, which were commonly set for exercises on mythical and historical subjects. One example, 'Priami uerba apud Achillem', is exactly the sort of thing we find in the Greek progymnasmatists (see Adamietz ad loc.). But even these types Q. does not seem to think appropriate at the progymnasmatic stage; in discussing prosopopoeia here and not in 2. 4, he implies that he does not think any form of it an elementary exercise (contra Russell on 3. 8. 50). Rather, he regards pros-
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which 3. 8.49 (cited above) suggests should attach itself to prosopopoeias, not to the nearer suasorias. But we can escape this objection'1 by taking the clause with both nouns, the former to be understood as alluding to prosopopoeia as a progymnasmatic exercise, which is what, as we have seen, it normally was. The grammatici are then said to be going beyond what Q. regards as their proper limits by making prosopopoeia a progymnasma, and, worse still, by going on into the sphere of suasoria.5 Q. would then be talking in the terms employed by the grammatici themselves, and giving no hint of his later discussion of prosopopoeia under the head of suasoria. But Dr Holford-Strevens may be right to remark that this view requires reading <et> usque ad. There is genuine doubt what Q. meant to say at this point, and we have therefore obelized. usque a d . . . inrumpunt: cf. 8 'si grammatices munus usque ad suasorias prorogatur'. usque ad must mean the same in both passages, that is (contra Spalding on 8) up to and including (the treatment of)': not the usual sense, but note 1. 7. 14 'usque ad Accium et ultra', 'up to (and including) the time of Accius, and beyond', 8. 3. 62 'usque ad aures', 'so far as to enter the ears' (but not the mind). onus dicendi: used (in the plural) at 11. 3. 136 of the physical arduousness of oratory. inrumpunt: cf. Cic. de Orat. 3. 108 'qui in nostrum patrimonium inruperunt'. Cicero is there talking of the philosophers' usurpation of loci communes; these were part of the rhetorical territory now claimed by the grammatici, so that the two demarcation disputes here overlap. 1. 3 aetas: Q.'s favourite abstract for person; cf. e.g. 2. 2.14 'infirmitas';2. 3.1 'mediocritas praeceptoris'; 2. 3. 10 'prima studia tenerosque profectus', 'elementary students' (similarly 2. 2. 3 'teneriores annos'). At least in the case of aetas, however, there is nothing very individual about his usage: see various passages in TLL s.v. II B. 2, esp. Cic. Clu. 13. But from the pen of a teacher it has a pedagogical ring: 'age-group'. altioribus: cf. 8. 3. 2 artes altiores. Here 'higher' rather than 'deeper', as subsidat shows. iam: A's order (iam altioribus) might suggest that iam is to be taken with the comparative (as in e.g. 2. 4. 33; TLL s.v. iam 125. 12-84). But it is purely temporal (as in Liv. 27. 39. 7 'inter mitiora iam transibant hominum ingenia'), positioned as in 4 'pleno iam satis alueo'. 4 More drastically, one might think o f reading 'ad suasorias usque et prosopopoeias'. 5 W e find it artificial to see in sttasoriae a 'reference. . . t o advanced exercises like "proposal for a law"' (Loeb ad loc.); its natural reference is, here as in §8, t o the familiar deliberative exercise found in the Elder Seneca and discussed by Q. from 3. 8. 10.
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debita: TLL s.v. debeo 103. 25-105. 23 gives a melange of uses of the participle; here more or less = 'worthy of'. scholar used of the schools of philosophers, rhetores and grammatici, but not of the primary school (ludus); see e.g. Bonner, Education, 56. subsidat: 'stay behind, stay put'; cf. Cic. Fam. 6. 8. 2 'consilium petis quid sim tibi auctor, in Siciliane subsidas an . . . proficiscare'. But the verb also hints at the resulting loss of motivation (cf. 3. 8. 60 'saepius subsidere . . . impetum dicendi'), and the prefix is felt (see above on altioribus). ita... sciat: the clear implication of this sardonic remark is that to speak a progymnasma was (in some sense) to declaim. Cf. above, p. xxiii n. 3. 1. 4 nos: emphatic. Q. lays down the law alike to the pushy grammatici and conniving rhetores sniped at in mittendus uidetur. modum: cf. 1. 9. 6 'Graeci magis operum suorum et onera et modum norunt'; so 'fines suos norit' below (note 10. 7.6 'habebunt modum et finem'). quam... uocauerunt: the information is not given without point, for Q. is going to draw attention to the root meaning of ypap,p,aTiKrj, so long outdated. litteraturam: a word (used in 2. 14. 3) that never quite established itself in this sense; see TLL s.w. grammatica 2173. 19-2174. 6 and litteratura 1531. 28-52. Raster's discussion of the whole problematic terminology may be consulted (Kaster1 89-93, on Suet. Gram. 4. 1-3). Note esp. Varro, L fr. 107 Goetz-Scholl 'ars grammatica quae a nobis litteratura dicitur' (also his fr. 108, cited below on appellationis) and Sen. Ep. 88. 20 'prima ilia, ut antiqui uocabant, litteratura'. fines suos: cf. Sen. Ep. 88. 3, cited on appellationis below, praesertim: with a participle as at e.g. 11. 2. 38 (add to TLL s.v. 865.63-71). ab hac... prouecta: cf. 2. 16. 18 'unde... iam prouecta sit orandi facultas'. appellationis: cf. Varro, L fr. 108 Goetz-Scholl 'ipso nomine profiteri se litteras clamat [sc. grammatice], unde etiam Latine litteratura dicitur'. Q., wishing to ait the profession down to size, chooses the narrowest possible interpretation of ypa/x/xara (the ambivalence could be maliciously exploited: see Kaster1 88-9). His account turns into an ahistorical (ibid. 99-100) chronological sequence the sort of distinction between meanings of the word ypamxaTiKr) that is found in Sextus, Adv. Gramm. 44-6: primi illi, by which Q. will intend the pioneers of ancient Greece, stayed with the root meaning at its slimmest; then there was a striking advance in scope. Compare (and contrast) Sen. Ep. 88. 3 'grammatice circa curam sermonis uersatur, et, si latius euagari uult, circa historias, iam ut longissime fines suos proferat, circa carmina'. paupertate: used of the limitations of the Latin language in 8. 3. 33 and 12. 10. 34; here of the scant pretensions of early grammar. Its slender means
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(cf. tenuis below; tenuitas could be made a complaint even against the developed profession, as 1. 4. 5 shows) are played off against later riches (note copiosam below). intra quam...constitere: 'to which they confined themselves'; cf. 1. 5. 7, 3. 1. 1, 3. 4. 13; OLD s.v. consisto 3c, citing Gels. 1 pr. 66 ne isti quidem ipsi intra suam professionem consistere ullo modo possunt'; add Decl. min. 279. 14 'maledictum.. .quod intra uerba constitit'. For the perfect in -ere, see E. B. Lease, CR 13 (1899), 251-3; note the clausula -tere prouecta. adsumptis: with the common implication of external aid (note 7. 4. 7 'adsumptis extrinsecus auxiliis'). For this verb with uires see e.g. Ov. Met. 13. 886. historicorum criticorumque: so A; B has poetarum historicorunique, though poetarum has been added above the line by a second hand which by no means always purveys the truth. We shall argue for the deletion of the genitives, and start by expounding the resulting sentence (with whose juxtaposed adverbial phrases we may compare 2. 6. 5 'iam suis uiribus sine adminiculo progredi'). In the absence of the genitives it falls to 'cum... amplexa sit' to add flesh to what is put only vaguely in 'tenuis.. .fluit'. The river of ypapuxaTiK-q as it trickles from its source is but slight (Sen. Oed. 42 'tenuis Ismenos fluit', Lact. Inst. 3. 1. 6 'de tenui fbnte admodum exilis emanat [sc. oratio]'): this is the 'poor' phase at which the art is concerned only with letters in the narrowest sense, reading and writing. Then new strength is taken on, and the river now flows brimming between its banks (Ov. Met. 1. 343 'plenos capit alueus amnis'; also 9. 4. 7 'totis uiribus fluit'): the picture is attractive, but satis reminds us that the stream has been flooding over recently and needs embankments (observe 9. 4. 118 'satis plena uel nimium'). The 'new strength' is first provided by the ratio reete loquendi (cf. 1. 4. 1-2), no mean thing in any case (for alioqui thus cf. 2. 15. 9; OLD s.v. 2a). But more is to come: the greatest arts, particularly of course poetry (1.4. 2 again), but also 'ceteris artibus quibus instituendos priusquam rhetori tradantur pueros existimo' (1. 10. 1), music and 'geometry'. Q., then, has been alluding to what the grammaticus professes to teach. That does not include history (see our next paragraph), or prose literature in general,6 which are after all not 'arts' as poetry is; grammatici would need to study them to help them with their enarratio poetarum, but they did not teach them (so Colson on Q. 1. 4. 4 'nec poetas legisse satis est [sc. grammaticis]: excutiendum omne scriptorum genus, non propter historias modo, sed uerba'; Bonner, Education, 218); this is how we should understand Dionysius Thrax' definition of 0 However, for papyrus evidence o f reading o f Isocrates' Cyprian orations in the school o f the grammaticus, see Cribiore 2 0 3 - 4 .
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ypa^aTiKr/ as 'an cfjcneipia for the most part of what is said in poets and ovyypa€is' (Sextus, Adv. Gramm. 57; cf. Varro fr. 107 Goetz-Schiill, where ars grammatica is defined as 'scientia... <eorum> quae a poetis historicis oratoribusque dicuntur'), and perhaps also Isid. Etym. 1.41.2 'haec disciplina [sc. historia] ad grammaticam pertinet, quia quidquid dignum memoria est litteris mandatur' (see generally Nicolai 186-97). We may now return to the vexed genitives. They are odd in themselves: 'assumptis historicorum criticorumque uiribus' (to take one version) would have to mean 'with strength added by the introduction of enarratio historiae and iudicium into the syllabus'. But they present other grave problems, long ago pointed out by Kiderlin3 200-1. It would seem from the MS evidence that we could at least be sure of historicorum, but oddly it is this word that presents the main difficulty. What has history to do with the teaching of the grammaticus? The historiae that concerned him were not 'history', but something much more like 'background information' (see 1. 2. 14, 1. 4.4 and 1. 8. 18-20, with Colson's n.on the last passage; Sen. Ep. 88. 3, cited above on appellationis; Juv. 7. 231), of course including some history, but by no means restricted to it. It is in this context that enarratio poetarum can be called historice (1. 9. 1); but historicorum could not allude to this. The only way in which what we mean by history would come even into the over-inflated grammatical syllabus of which Q. has been complaining is the teaching of historica narratio (2. 4. 2, where Q. claims it back for the rhetor). And when, in 2. 5. 1, Q. recommends enarratio of history (and oratory) by the rhetor; we are not given the impression that this is something that has been usurped by grammatici from rhetores; rather it sounds like something hitherto little taught by anyone, at least in Latin schools. But even granting that grammatici taught history, why is there no mention, in particular, of oratory (see Varro cited above)? For historicus cannot, like avyypaevs, mean 'writer of prose'. In this light, oratorum, t's correction of criticorum (on which he stumbled only because the first hand had written the nonsensical oriticorum) becomes attractive; it is certainly more called for than is criticorum.7 If any genitives were desirable here, we might perhaps settle for the composite reading poetarum historicorum oratorum (see Winterbottom6 69; Q.'s usage seems not to allow the addition of -que to the third element, though Cicero's would): precisely the words that a learned glossator might have imported from Varro (Doreen Innes acutely remarks that all three are alluded to in 3. 8.49, arguably the source of the possible gloss in 2). But any genitives at all 7 KpiriKTf was certainly part o f the remit o f a grammaticus: Brink on Hor. Ep. 2. 1. 51 (pp. 4 1 4 - 1 9 ) ; but that could not make criticorum (a word Q. does not use elsewhere) a proper companion for historicorum here.
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intrude on and muddy a sentence that is perfectly formed already, and mention of history and oratory in this context of the grammatical syllabus is misguided. pleno iam satis alueo: the word-order (for which cf. 11. 3. 55 'et longus et plenus et clarus satis spiritus') is mannered, perhaps to bring out the contrast with tenuis, perhaps because of a poetic allusion (Donald Russell, pointing to the glyconic). 1. 5 et rhetorice... non detrectet: picking up 'et grammatice... norit' (4). For non with a jussive subj., see e.g. 2. 16. 6 'non fabricetur militi gladius' (K-S i. 192). But if it were not for et...et one would expect nec rhetorice (K-S i. 192-3). cui nomen . . . dedit: cf. Cic. Orat. 61 'sed et Graece ab eloquendo prjraip et Latine eloquens dictus est'. Q. again argues from etymology. While ypannariKir) has gone far beyond the implications of its 'poor' name, rhetoric, whose name is wide to start with, has weakened itself by shirking its duties, uis: = 8vvap.is (2. 15. 3 'uim dico 8vvap.iv); OLD s.v. uis 14b. officia sua non detrectet: so 12. 7. 3 'non detractauerunt hanc officii partem'; Dig. 26. 7. 39. 6 'non uidetur leuis culpa contra iuris auctoritatem mandatum tutelae officium detrectare'. opere cedit: cf. 10. 1. 35 'optima sui operis parte cesserunt', where Peterson cites Cic. Mil. 75 'nisi sibi hortorum possessione cessissent'. possessione: cf. 12. 2. 5, Cic. de Orat. 3. 108 'de nostra possessione depuls? (both concerning invasion by philosophy). depulsa est: with abl. as in e.g. 2. 17. 29; K-S i. 366. 1. 6 haec quoque: everything up to and including suasoriae. We may compare the early practice in Rome by which grammatici taught rhetoric in addition (above, p. 37): Suet. Gram. 4. 4 (with Kaster's n., adding Greek evidence). Note also later cases: Gramm. 7. 2 (Antonius Gnipho), 10. 2 (Ateius Philologus, 'inter grammaticos rhetorem, inter rhetores grammaticum'); Nicolai 197-215. sed cum...non suo: i.e. this does not justify extension of the fines of ypapLpaTiKr}. 1. 7 nos porro quaerimus... uideatur: Q. turns to a new quaestio (for porro cf. n. on the word in 2. 3. 5), which turns out to be intimately linked with the previous one. The emphatic nos reminds us of his personal view: however capable some grammatici may be (6), grammaticus and rhetor have their own sharply distinguished spheres of activity, and so the age of transition needs to be determined. rhetorice: even more strikingly personalized in 2. 17. 26.
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non i d . . . poterit: the same principle is invoked at 12. 6. 1 (cf. also Decl mai. 3. 5 'sed neque te militaris aetas fefellit, cuius certissima mensura est posse fortiter facere...). The epigrammatic cum poterit is elaborated at the start of the next chapter. For Roman practice, see 2. 2. 3 'adulti fere pueri ad hos praeceptores transfemntur' (with n.); Bonner, Education, 137 (by the age of fifteen; Cicero's son was with a rhetor at eleven or twelve: Q. fr. 3. 3. 4). finiri: 'specified'; OLDs.v.finio 5a, citing Ov. Fast. 5.65-6 'finitaque certis | legibus est aetas unde petatur honor'. 1. 8 usque ad suasorias: see 2 'sed.. .inmmpunt', with n. Were it not for that passage, one would here take usque exclusively and assume that the grammatici had usurped all the progymnasmata but stopped short of declamation proper. Gesner rightly rejected the gloss that follows in A: 'quae sunt apud rhetorem materiae inter rudimenta dicendi.' The fact is correct enough (see Tac. Dial. 35. 4, cited in the n. just mentioned). at: Q.'s practice (see Bonnell, Lexicon, s.v. s/V/3) suggests that B is wrong to omit the particle. At 2. 6. 6, however, where quodsi and si are not parallel, A seems wrong to add at. operis sui: Q. continues to insist on the correct boundary between rhetor and grammaticus. a narrationibus statim e t . . . opusculis: cf. 1.6. 25 'a primis statim positionibus'; the usage is not properly covered in OLD s.v. (2). Q. mentions the two exercises with which he begins the course outlined in ch. 4, narrative and encomium (no doubt ignoring anaskeue and kataskeue as being for him subordinate to narrative (2. 4. 18). opusculis: the diminutive (cf., perhaps, narratiunculasin 1. 9. 6) signals the elementary nature of these exercises. This word is not found elsewhere in Q. 1. 9 antiquis: the reference of antiqui and antiquitas in Q. must always depend on the context. Note e.g. 2. 5. 21 (Gracchi, Cato); 3. 6.62 (old writers of artes); 9. 3. 16 (Terence). Peterson on 10. 1. 40 remarks: 'In general he uses veteres or antiqui in contradistinction to those who were to him novi, i.e. the writers of the post-Augustan period: including in the former Cicero himself as well as his predecessors.' But no more precise rule can be given; and it is important for the understanding of the present passage that Q. also uses antiqui of Greeks; cf. e.g. 3. 4. 1 (Aristotle), ad augendam eloquentiam: so 1. 11. 13. genus exercitationis: so 2.4. 26 and 42, 10. 5.4, 10.6. 5, 11. 3. 29; Petr. 2. 5. thesis: Q. discusses the exercise below in 2. 4. 24-5, where see nn. Cf. 12. 2. 25 'Peripatetici studio... se quodam oratorio iactant; nam thesis dicere exercitationis gratia fere est ab iis institutum'. This ensures that the reference (like that of ueteres in 2. 4. 41) is to the Greek past (a possibility raised but not
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refuted by Clarice 160). For Peripatetic interest in thesis, see e.g. Kroll on Cic. Orat. 46, citing esp. D.L. 5. 3 (Aristotle), Theon 69. 1-3 (p. 13): 'one may take examples of exercise in theses from Aristotle and Theophrastus; there are many books of theirs so entitled.' communes locos: see 2. 4. 27-32. The reference is again to Greece: see 3. 1. 12 (treated by Protagoras and Gorgias), with Adamietz's n.; the information derives from Aristotle (Cic. Brut. 46). et cetera: Halm thought of deleting. The proposal is tempting, for it is really only these two exercises that could strictly be said always to be untrammelled by 'circumstances and persons', especially persons (for a particular problem with the exercise involving proposal of a law, see n.on 2. 4. 33 legum laus et uituperatio). But it is clear from 2. 4. 36 that Q. did in fact regard progymnasmata as in principle non-particular, cetera therefore will mean 'the rest of the progymnasmata, and 'citra... continentur' will have to refer rather loosely to exercises not based on cases (vnoOeoeis), real or declamatory. Further, we know from 2.4.41 (where see n.) that Q. thought that 'in general' {fere) the exercises discussed in ch. 4 were those used by the ueteresbefore (he seems to say) the introduction of declamation 'proper' in the late fourth century BC, and he is therefore consistent in implying in our passage that the exercises were all very old (for the development of the syllabus, see below, pp. 75-6). We should not take it that cetera is not meant to include narrative and encomium just because they have been mentioned already in 8. A quite separate phase of the argument starts at an (see the summary above, p. 35): though it is true that in 'ex his de quibus supra dixi' (10) Q. will lump together the exercises he has named in both sections. citra complexum... continentur: cf. 2.4. 36, 3. 5. 7, and esp. 5. 10. 53 'citra complexum personarum ceterorumque ex quibus fit causa', which ensures that in our passage the relative clause is to be taken with rerum personarumque, not with cetera. Q. means the 7T€pioTaois, the particular circumstances that distinguished v-rroQeais from deois (3. 5. 5, 7). For citra = sine (not well served by OLD) cf. e.g. 2. 16. 13, 12. 6. 4 (parallel to sine); TLL s.v. 1204. 33-1205. 50. uerae fictaeque controuersiae: from 10. 2. 12 and many other passages (see Tac. Dial 31. 1 with Gudeman ad loc.) it is clear that the contrast is between actual cases, where the materia was uera ('real'), and declamations, where it was ficta, adsimilata, and the like. Thus a ficta controuersia was merely scholastic (cf. 7. 3.30), while a uera controuersia was an actual legal case (note 7. 1.64 'singulas lites controuersiasque'). There might, however, be scholastic debate of a uera controuersia (6. 4. 21, cf. 10. 5. 20). See further on 2. 10. 2 ueritati; also 2.4. 36 'uero fictoque certamine [see below on 11 certaminibus]'.
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continentur: 'are based on', as in e.g. 3. 5. 11 'eas Ocoeis...quae personis causisque contineantur'; Bonnell, Lexicon, s.v. contineo 8. ex quo... solam: summing up the argument of 9: rhetoric should hold on to the territory it first carved out for itself, pal am est: cf. 11. 3. 168; OLD s.v. palam 2b. deserat earn partem: cf. 1 pr. 17 cited on p. 39, reminding us again of the frontier dispute with philosophy. quam et primam habuit et diu solam: see 2. 4. 41 and nn. Q. envisages Greek rhetorical education as arising from sophistic and philosophical exercises, surviving as progymnasmata, on which (from the time of Demetrius of Phaleron) declamation 'proper' supervened. No doubt this was elaborated in his lost De causis corruptae eloquentiae (alluded to in 2.4. 42 'alio... libro', on which see n.). R. Giingerich, AAHG 26 (1973), 192 conjectured 'prima... sola'. The basis of his argument is that 'sicher kann er [der Relativsatz quam... solam) so nicht auf die historische Entwicklung der Rhetorik gehen, die Quintilian gut kennt'; but Q. is talking not of the history of rhetoric but of the history of rhetores. 1. 10 quid autem... incidat: Q. turns to another phase of his argument. The exercises specified above (i.e. in 8-9), narrative, encomium, thesis, and commonplace, are entirely relevant to the crucial, forensic aspect of the orator's activity. This point is established in 10-11, where the exercises are taken in the same order, though thesis is oddly omitted (not to mention cetera). Q. naturally comes back to the same point later when discussing all the progymnasmata in 2. 4. We may compare Theon, who in his first chapter goes through the exercises commenting on their utility in the real world; typically he says (of narrative and myth): 'everything we do in forensic U7rode acts [i.e. particular as opposed to general questions] is here too' (60. 9-10 [p. 2]). Thus, of thesis (above, §9), Theon remarks that it only needs to be filled out with circumstances to become hypothesis (61. 6-13 [p. 3]), and so relevant to oratory. cum... turn certe: only (it seems) here and in seven passages of Cicero, almost all late. As e.g. Brut. 232 'cum omnibus turn certe mihi notissimae' shows, the sense of certe is 'in particular'. in...genus incidat: cf. (more technically) 3. 4. 15 'species in haec tria incident genera'. qua in parte... uel plurimum: 'in this department [i.e. narratio] indeed perhaps the greatest importance lies.' Cf. 7. 7. 8 'plurimum tamen est in hoc, utrum...', 11. 2. 1 'estque in ea non dubie plurimum'; and see n. on 2. 7. 2 plurimum. For the importance of narratio, see Cic. Part. 31 'narratio est rerum explicatio et quaedam quasi sedes et fundamentum constituendae fidei'.
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1.11 certaminibus: as usual in Q. of real' contests in the courts (e.g. 5.12.22); cf. Gk. ayaWs. communes loci... uersantur: commonplaces are 'of obvious utility' as exercises, according to Theon 60. 19-22 (p. 2), in view of the way orators exploit them (see nn.on 2. 4. 22-3, 27). For the two types cf. 2. 4. 22 'de iis loquor quibus citra personas in ipsa uitia moris est perorare', 2.4. 27 'locos... quales sunt de testibus.. derecti: derigo 'was probably the only genuine ancient form' (Munro on Lucr. 6. 823; cf. 711 s.v. dirigo (!) 1233. 33-46). In the MSS of Q., A (like the related b) shows a decided preference for di-, perhaps a reflection of its generally interpolated nature; the instance at 2. 6. 1 (where A and B agree on di-) is probably corrupt (see n.). quales legimus a Cicerone compositos: the clause would be an improbable way of referring to loci communes in Cicero's published speeches. It might mean 'read in a collection by Cicero' (parallel to the lost work of Hortensius mentioned below); cf. perhaps 5. 7. 6 'quod... et permixtum defensioni legimus in orationibus plurimis et separatim editum'. This would involve the assumption that Q. had himself read a book of Ciceronian loci in uitia that do not survive and of which there is no other mention (unless, as Valla thought, in Parad. 5 'genus exercitationum earum quibus uti consueui cum ea quae dicuntur in scholis OeTixtos ad nostrum hoc oratorium transfero dicendi genus'); it is true that Cicero compiled a volume of (philosophical) proems (Att. 16. 6. 4), but hardly for publication. We favour Spalding's alternative view that Q. means: 'read (i.e. in another author) to have been composed by Cicero.' Compare in that case 10. 5. 12 'turn loci communes, quos etiam scriptos ab oratoribus scimus' (not, then, read by Q.). quaestiones generaliter tractantur: cf. 2. 4. 22 'illo generali tractatu', 3. 5. 9 'hae [sc. quaestiones]... quas infinitas uoco et generales appellantur'; 5. 7. 35 'generalem alterum [sc. tractatum]... specialem alterum Quinto quoque Hortensio: there is no other reference to this work of his (ORF 311), though this type of compilation is referred to in 2. 4. 27 and 10. 5. 12 (just cited). Subtle interpretations have been suggested to explain quoque; but Q. is merely saying that Hortensius, as well as his great rival, concerned himself with the publication of loci. ut... testes: such questions are referred to later at 2. 4. 27, 3. 5. 10, 5. 13. 57; Theon 69. 14-17 (cf. 4) (p. 13) classifies them as SeriKa K€d\aia. As to witnesses in particular, the whole chapter 5. 7 is relevant (esp. 3-4); see also Cic. de Orat. 2. 118 (with the context; also 135), Part. 49 'de toto genere testium quam id sit infirmum saepe dicendum est'; further refs. in L-P on Cic. de Orat. 2. 116. paruis: the passage (with 2. 4. 27) should be added to TLL s.v. parvus 565. 29.
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medullis: a (not strictly paralleled) vivid way of stressing the crucial part played by these loci; cf. 2. 4. 22 (in the same context) 'ex mediis sunt iudiciis', Cic. de Orat. 2. 318 'ex ipsis uisceribus causae' (with L-P ad loc.). With the alliterative phrase cf. esp. Ov. Met. 10. 492 'mediaque manente medulla' (the play may be felt, wrongly, to be etymological). 1. 12 arma: cf. 12. 5.1 'haec arma habere ad man urn'; and see n. on 2. 16. 10 arma facundiae. quodam modo: as often softening the metaphor. praeparanda: the weapons are not just to be 'in promptu habenda' (7. 10. 14; cf. 8 pr. 28) but always in preparation, 'on the whetstone*. utaris: utare (A) would be a form unparalleled in Q.: see E. R. Lease, CR 13 (1899), 253, and cf. 11. 3. 14. putabit: like putabo in 5. 12. 19 ('I shan't bring myself to believe'), statuam: for Q.'s rich use of imagery from statuary, see Afifahl 54-6 (in our book see esp. 2. 3. 6, 2. 13. 8-10); wider illustration of artistic analog)' in J. Brzoska, De can one decern oratorum Atticorum quaestiones (diss. Breslau, 1883), 81-101. Valla noted: 'de statua metallica loquitur quod opus fusorium est, non sculptile.' fundentur: 'are being cast'; cf. 7 pr. 2 'neque enim quamquam fiisis omnibus membris statua sit nisi conlocetur'. festinationem: as often of undue haste (so e.g. 1.4. 22; also 2. 4. 9 festinet), here in wishing the rhetor to take over a narrationibus statim (8). calumnietur: 'misrepresent'. For the construction with sic... tam quam cf. 2. 3. 10 'a quibusdam sic accipi potest tamquam...'; cf. also 9. 4. 53 'ideoque reprehenditur.. .tamquam... alliget'; K-S ii. 456. traditus: tradendus A (no doubt affected by abducendum). It is true that in 2. 2. 1 Q. speaks of the handing over of the child. But that section does not follow on 2. 1. 13 chronologically; it merely recapitulates the conclusions of 2. 1. And traditus has special point: given that a boy has been handed over to the rhetor; the question still remains whether he is at once to be taken away from the grammaticus. abducendum: cf. Cic. de Orat. 2. 40 'hos a te discipulos abducerem'. 1. 13 tempora sua: cf. (to some extent) 2. 4. 17 'erit suum parandae facilitati tempus'. binis: 'pro duobus' (Valla); but the two teachers are thought of as working as a pair (OLD s.v. bini 2a; H-Sz 212). quod... omissum est: the reference here to the difference between the practice of Latin and Greek schools seems to look back closurally to the first section of the chapter, and to expand on the information given there: see above, p. 36. omissum est picks up semper (as well as omiserunt) in 1; and
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in view of interim there, adhuc optinent must be read to imply 'still [to a large extent] maintain'. fieri... excusate: cf. Plin. Ep. 9. 21. 3 'quod... excusatius facies'. Spalding asked (hypercritically) 'potestne dici fieri aliquid, cum omittitur?' but cf. 2. 3. 4, where 'idque interim fieri' has a similar negative reference. uidetur: used, as at the end of 3, to mark a widely held view of which Q. disapproves. The excuse, which he regards as lame, is that others (i.e. the grammatici) have taken over what the rhetores were doing when they were operating in parallel with the grammatici. One naturally assumes that this labor was the task of teaching the more advanced progymnasmata.
Chapter Two A boy, then, should be sent to the school of the rhetor when he is mature enough to cope with the first progymnasmata taught there (1). In choosing a teacher, it is essential to be sure of his character and his ability to impose his authority: something that is particularly important when pupils are at this age (2-4a). He must be like a father, firm but not grim, praising where praise is due, correcting kindly, and giving speeches as examplars (4b-8). In class, only older pupils should be allowed to applaud each other's efforts, and that with restraint. Students should build up judgement by paying careful attention to what the teacher approves (9-11). Current practices are harmful (12). The teacher should expect an attentive hearing for his own speeches, and he should watch how his pupils react (13). Boys and youths should not be seated together, and (of course) there must be no kind of immoral behaviour (14-15). In this chapter Q. writes with his customary high seriousness of the character to be looked for in choosing a rhetor. He would have approved of, and may have inspired, the advice given by his old pupil Pliny to Corellia Hispulla: 'iam circumspiciendus rhetor Latinus, cuius scholae seueritas, pudor, in primis castitas constet' (Ep. 3. 3. 3; see also 2. 18, 4. 13. 3-11). The commentary will provide parallels from Quintilian himself and from the discussion in ps.Plutarch's De liberis educandis (Plu. Moralia 1 A-14 C, henceforward in this chapter '[Plu.]'). For parallels in the field of medicine see Hp. Medic, (ii. 31012 Loeb); ps.-Soranus (Rose, Anecdota Graeca, ii. 245): 'Perspiciamus autem qualem oporteat esse medicum. Sit ergo moribus clemens et modestus cum debita honestate, nec desit ei sanctitas, nec sit superbus . . . Sit etiam modestus moribus, ut utraeque res conueniant sibi simul, quantum possibile est, et artis perfectio et bonitas morum'; cf. 2. 3. 12. For the problems (caused both by
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pupils and teachers) to which Q. is reacting, see esp. Petr. 3. 2-4, Sen. Ep. 88. 2 'professores turpissimos', Tac. Dial. 29. 3-4 (all passages where bias should be allowed for); Bonner, Education, 104-6; and generally Winterbottom5 317-34. 2. 1 diximus: Q. alludes to his argument in 2. 1 (to which see our introduction) that rhetores should teach the bulk of the progymnasmata, starting as soon as a pupil is ready to cope with them. 2. 2 libro priore: 1. 2. 5 'praeceptorem eligere sanctissimum quemque, cuius rei praecipua prudentibus cura est,... licet' (cf. 1. 3. 17). It was vital to avoid such a man as Q. Remmius Palaemon, who was, according to Suet. Gram. 23. 2, 'infamis omnibus uitiis, palamque et Tiberio et mox Claudio praedicantibus nemini minus institutionem puerorum uel iuuenum committendam' (for the possibility that he taught Q., see Kaster1 230). aetas ipsa: cf. Plin. Ep. 3. 3. 4: 'adulescenti [a handsome one].. .cui in hoc lubrico aetatis non praeceptor modo sed custos etiam rectorque quaerendus est'; [Plu.] 12 B for the possible miscreancies. Q. talks interestingly of the physical vulnerability of adolescence in 11.3. 28-9. 2. 3 adulti fere pueri... iuuenes: for their arrival as pueri, cf. Suet. Gram. 4. 5. Isidore (Etym. 11. 2. 3) was to make pueritia last 'usque ad quartumdecimum annum', which ties in well enough with the normal age of transition to the rhetor (see n.on 2. 1. 7 non id... poterit); cf. Gaius, Inst. 1. 196: those who define puberty by age 'eum puberem esse existimant '. iuuenes etiam facti implies that one did not become a iuuenis all at once, but grew into the part. As boys might not leave school till they were eighteen (the unsupported assertion of Bonner, Education, 137), there was an awkward age-range (see 2. 4. 4-5 for the different requirements of pueri and adulta aetas; Sen. Con. 3 pr. 15 'pueri fere aut iuuenes scholas frequentant'; Tac. Dial. 33. 2 'iuuenes iam et forum ingressuri' being trained at school), granted that a single room had to do for them all (see below, on 14 pueros adulescentibus permixtos sedere). It is thus only an approximation when Q. says in 10. 5. 1 that his first book is devoted to pueri, the second to robusti (for whom see below on 14 infirmitas). Q. does not in these chapters distinguish sharply between adulescens and iuuenis, and he would no doubt have been hard put to it to define the terms by age. Nor is he unusual in this respect: note e.g. the censorial edict cited in Suet. Rhet. 25. 2 '...ad quos iuuentus in ludum conueniat;... ibi homines adulescentulos dies totos desidere'; and generally B. Axelson, Melanges...
Commentary
54
offerts a Jules Marouzeau (Paris, 1948), 7-17; P. K. Marshall, CPh 58 (1963), 143-9 at 145. perseuerant: 'continue'; OLD s.v. perseuero 4a. maior: than with younger children; [Plu.] 12 B agrees: Se'ov... nXeiio TOJV fJL€ipCLKlU)V 7TOlflodcLl T7]V €l)AdfietCLV KO.I (f>vX(lKr)V rj T(x)V nOLlSlDV. teneriores annos: another abstract (n. on 2. 1.3 aetas); cf. 1. 10. 34 teneris aetatibus. iniuria: TLL s.v. 1670. 67-1671. 15 (with examples mostly concerning sexual assault on women); 11. 1. 84 (cf. 53). sanctitas docentis: cf. 1. 2. 5 'praeceptorem... sanctissimum', taking the place of the sanctus parens of Juv. 7. 209 (cited on 4 sumat... parentis... animum). ferociores: probably sc. annos. Cf. Sal. Cat. 38. 1 'adulescentes... quibus aetas animusque ferox erat', and esp. Cic. Sen. 33 'infirmitas puerorum et ferocitas iuuenum'; Isid. Diff. 1. 213 'ferox iuuentus dicitur'. The quality ('high spirits') is not in itself bad, but can lead to bad. grauitas: the attribute of the amicus recommended for a child in 1. 2. 5. 2. 4 sat: the shorter form is found (according to PHI) 15 times in Q., always with following est? of the 113 cases of satis, thirty precede est. summam... abstinentiam: cf. Cic. Att. 5. 9. 1 'summa modestia et summa abstinentia' (where Shackleton Bailey translates 'propriety'), suam (A) is tempting, but quoque sufficiently underlines the point: the teacher must control both himself and his pupils. Q. continues (as with licentia in 3) to think especially of sexual misconduct. disciplinae seueritate: so Tac. Dial. 29. 4 (cf. 28. 3 'seueritate ac disciplina'); cf. 1. 2. 5 'eligere... disciplinam quae maxime seuera fuerit licet'. ad se: to be taken with conuenientium. The verb is again used of going to school at 2. 9. 2. adstrinxerit: 'tightly restrain'; cf. Cic. Brut. 40 'disciplina Lacaedaemoniorum astricta legibus', Att. 10. 6. 2 'uellem suscepisses iuuenem regendum; pater enim nimis indulgens quicquid ego astrinxi relaxat'; V. Max. 2. 10. 8 'astricti continentia mores'. sumat... parentis... animum: cf. Hor. Ep. 2. 2. 110 'cum tabulis animum censoris sumet honesti'; rather differently at 9. 2. 80 ('put oneself in the position of'). The comparison is crucial in a society where the father's responsibilities for education were so embedded in tradition (Bonner, Education, 10-19; note 1. 1. 1 'igitur nato filio pater spem de illo primum quam optimam capiat'); if a child was not kept at home to be taught (and Q. needed 8
Cf. Ferri on [Sen.] Oct. 4 4 7 for the practice o f Senecan tragedy.
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to argue this case in 1. 2), it was essential to find a teacher who would be as careful of his welfare as the father, and fit to 'take over from him' (OLD s.v. succedo 5b). He should, indeed, be 'nobis (fathers, pupils, or both?] familiariter amicus' (1. 2. 15). And children should reciprocate: 'praeceptores suos .. .anient et parentes esse non quidem corporum sed mentium credant' (2. 9. 1; also 8 below). Hence Juvenal's well-known 'qui praeceptorem sancti uoluere parentis | esse loco' (7. 209-10, with Mayor's n.; cf. 239 [of the grammaticus] 'pater ipsius coetirs'). For parallels in Libanius, see Cribiore 113-14. A. Kappelmacher, 'Studia Juvenaliana', Dissertationes philologicae Vindobonenses, 7 (1903), ch. 3 thought that Juvenal might have been a pupil of Q.'s; more sceptically, Colson, p. xv with n.6. Q. shows every sign of living up to his own precept; see e.g. 7. 3. 30 and 12. 11.5, both cited on 2. 12. 12 bonae mentis iuuenibus. 2. 5 non austeritas eius tristis: cf. Sen. Dial. 3. 20. 2 'tantumque abest... quantum.. .ab austeritate tristitia, a seueritate crudelitas'; Q. 12. 10. 80 (stylistic) 'seuera non tristia,.. .iucunda non dissoluta\ The noun is apparently not elsewhere used of the strictness of a teacher (of paedagogi once in Ambrose: see TLL s.v. 1557. 53); but for the adj. note Cic. Orationum deperditarum fragmenta, fr. xiv. 20 Scholl (p. 447) 'Quid arm hoc homine nobis tam tristi ac seuero? Non possirnt hi mores ferre hunc tam austerum et tam uehementem magistruni (of Clodius, represented as criticizing the morals of April visitors to Baiae). austeritas here is much like grauitas in §3 (Cic. Pis. 71 'austerior et grairior'). dissoluta: 'lax'; cf. (of ex-philosophy students) 12. 3. 12 'in publico tristes, domi dissoluti'. comitas: not incompatible with seueritas (Cic. Brut. 148 on Crassus and Scaevola). odium., .contemptus: these feature in psychological generalizations at 4. 1. 14 'humiles abiectosque contemptus et turpes ac nocentes odium [sc. sequitur]', 12. 8. 14. castigabit: could cover both reprimand and corporal punishment; the latter was perhaps administered even in schools of rhetoric (see Mayor on Juv. 1. 15; Cribiore 71-2), but note 1. 3. 15. minime iracundus: it is easy enough to supply sit here, but in 6-7 'nec malignus nec effitsus' and 'non acerbus minimeque contirmeliosus' float free (see n.on 2. 13. 1 prohoemium). dissimulator: not thus elsewhere (unless at Tac. Hist. 2. 56. 2, where it might imply concealment, as in 2. 17. 6 below), of someone who pretends not to notice something. For the verb in this sense (OLD s.v. 3; also s.v. dissimulatio 3), see e.g. Sen. Dial. 4. 33. 1 'saepe autem satius fuit
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Commentary
dissimulare [sc. iniuriam] quam ulcisci'. For 2. 17. 6 'dissimulator artis' see n. there. simplex: 'straightforward', covering generous openness (so Spalding) and clarity (Gesner: 'qui ambages omnes atque anfractus evitet, nihil astute reticeat, et candide aperteque omnia pandat'). Reflecting on his own Institutio, Q. writes at 12. 11. 8: 'conscius sum mihi... quaeque antea scierim quaeque operis huiusce gratia potuerim inquirere candide me atque simpliciter in notitiam eorum, si qui forte cognoscere uoluissent, protulisse.' He would wish any rhetor to be able to say the same. patiens laboris: so of the strong lungs needed by the orator in 1 pr. 27. adsiduus potius quam inmodicus: for adsiduus cf. 1. 3. 14: corporal punishment is not necessary 'si adsiduus studiorum exactor adstiterit', i.e. if someone is always there [cf. 1. 1. 11, 1. 2. 5], sitting or standing, requiring work. In the present passage the contrast with inmodicus suggests a different sense: the teacher should be persistent in his own labours (Cic. de Orat. 2. 162 gives a diverting picture of teachers who are 'adsiduis, uno opere eandem incudem diem noctemque tundentibus'), without taking it to extremes. For inmodicus applied to labor see TLL s.v. immodicus 486. 1-2. It is not often used of a person who goes beyond the modus; note however 9. 3. 74: 'Gorgias in hoc [i.e. use of word-play] inmodicus'. The whole phrase then enlarges on and qualifies patiens laboris (so Ammendola). 2. 6 interrogantibus: more on questions in class at 2. 5. 13. dictionibus: a very wide word (L-P on Cic. de Orat. 1. 22; note Tac. Dial. 34. 2), which could cover any kind of speech. Here it does not mean 'declamations' (nor does it at 2. 4. 27; see also n. on 2. 4. 12 totas... materias), though that would be in question here for the more advanced pupils; the term is presumably chosen to include spoken progymasmata. malignus.. .effusus: 'niggardly' and 'lavish' with praise; transferred from meanness concerning material objects (thus PI. Bac. 401 contrasts malignus and largus), and its opposite (Cic. Cael. 13 'quis in largitione effusior?'; and see below, 2. 12. 4). For the transferred senses cf. for malignus perhaps Hor. Carm. 2. 16. 39-40 'malignum... uulgus'; and for effusus Petr. 48. 7 'efifusissimis... laudationibus'. For the importance of praising the young, see 5. 12. 22 (also 5.13. 44). We learn from 2.11. 7 that passages praised by the teacher in a pupil's speeches might be copied down by his peers. securitatem: 'complacency' (cf. Tac. Dial. 35. 3 'pari securitate et dicant et audiantur', of young people in the schools), that might lead to reduced effort (Sen. Ben. 5. 12. 2 'securitatem ac segnitiam'); the state is one in which not enough aira is being applied (cf. in this book 2. 3. 4,2. 5. 13). Excessive praise might also lead to conceit: [Plu.] 9A.
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2. 7 non acerb us: sharpness is also deprecated in a teacher at an earlier stage: 'nec sum adeo aetatium inprudens ut instandum protinus teneris acerbe putenV (1.1. 20). For further humane remarks on correcting pupils, see below, 2. 4. 10-14; 2. 5. 16; 2. 6. 3-4; 2. 9. 2. fugat: Q. may be thinking of Hor. Ars 474 'indoctum doctumque fugat recitator acerbus]\ but only vaguely, if at all, as the different sense of acerbus shows. obiurgant: cf. Cic. Amic. 89 (on advising friends) 'monitio acerbitate,... obiurgatio contumelia careat'. quasi oderint: it is implied that the teacher should love his pupils (like a father: see on 4 above), just as he should be loved in turn (below, §8). 2. 8 ipse aliquid.. .dicat quae.. .referant: for the rhetor's own contributions, cf. 2. 4. 12 'nonnumquam hoc quoque erit utile, totas interim dictare materias, quas et imitetur puer...'; 2. 5. 16 'declamabit.. .praeceptor ut sit exemplo suis auditoribus', 2. 6. 1 'quidam materias quas discipulis ad dicendum dabant... latius dicendo prosequebantur', 2. 6. 5 'incipientibus danda erit uelut praeformata materia secundum cuiusque uires. At cum satis composuisse se ad exemplum uidebuntur...'. All these passages, like the present one, refer to the provision by the rhetor of fair copies, which the pupils will imitate (this is of course to be distinguished from full formal declamations by the teacher, of which we get a glimpse at 11. 2. 39). We already knew of this practice (in progymnasmata) from the Greek text of Theon, who at 70. 32-71. 1 (p. 15) interestingly says that the teacher should compose avaoKevas rtvas Kal KaraoKevag for the young to recite (avayyeiAai), to give them a pattern for imitation. But further light has been thrown on the topic by the newly published Annenian supplement. Theon followed up his treatment of the progymnasmata by chapters on Reading and Listening (chs. 13-14: 134-9 [pp. 102-7], with discussion in Patillon, pp. xcviii-civ; something had already been known of Listening (aKpoaois) from the Greek text [61. 33-62. 10: p. 4]). The latter involved, if the Bude editors are right in their interpretation, the 'production orale d'un texte devant des auditeurs' (p. cii), a text which the pupil was then to imitate in writing. Theon does not express himself very dearly, at least in the French translation from the Armenian, but the text involved would seem to have been limited to 'auteurs reputes et confirmes', and it is stressed that the pupil was not to be allowed a free choice (139 [p. 107]); it is implied that the text was not necessarily oratorical (138 [p. 106]). It is not easy to square what Theon says with the remarks of his editors, who equate the 'production orale' with other kinds of aKpoaots of which we know, and comment (p. ciii): 'l'essentiel de telles lemons, lorsque le maitre est un orateur-rheteur, est
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Commentary
constitue par une declamation (also p. civ: 'rien n'interdit de penser qu'ils pouvaient aller entendre des declamations'). Be that as it may, Q. certainly envisages the teacher speaking a dictio, which the pupil takes away to imitate in writing, apparently in his own time (preparatory to speaking it in class; see on 2. 4. 15 stilo componi). And this was to happen cotidie, just as Theon recommended: 62. 9-10 (p. 4) for the writing, corresponding to the daily Listening (139 [p. 107]).9 Hence in what follows Q. can contrast models provided by reading (here privatereadingby the pupil: not the type of reading discussed in Theon ch. 13, for which see below, p. 121) with those given viva voce by the teacher. Such provision of models by the rhetor was nothing new; the fifth-century sophists taught in the same way, and Isocrates, in a striking passage (13. 18) cited by Patillon, pp. xxi f., says that it is essential that a teacher should make himself a napdSeiyfia, 'so that those who have received his imprint (€KTVTTOJ84VT€S) and are capable of imitating him may at once become more accomplished orators than the others'. That terminology continues into Theon: cf. Theon 61. 32-3 (p. 4) rv7rovp,€vot yap TTJV ^VYRIV and KOXCJV 7TapaS€iyfiaTa>v KaXXiara Kai fiifx-qaofieda', 70. 35—71. 1 (p. 15) onojs TV7Tajd€VT€s Kara rifv €K€iv(uv ayojyrjv p,tp,r)oao9a(. SwrjOoiioiv, and perhaps (from the Armenian) 137 (p. 105) 'lorsque quelqu'un admire ce qu'il y a de bon chez tous et entreprend d'y conformer sa pensee, du fait qu'il existe en lui une sorte de matrice du discours, que chacun peut modeler d'apres sa propre n a t u r e . S e e further n. on 2. 7. 3 et... expriment, Webb 290 with n. 1, 300. secum... referant: i.e. in their notebooks (see n. on 2. 11.7 commentariis); cf. Tac. Dial. 20.4 'referre domum aliquid inlustre et dignum memoria'. When Seneca says 'qui ad philosophum uenit, cotidie aliquid secum boni ferat' (Ep. 108. 4), he is speaking metaphorically (though he mentions writing-tablets in 6). licet... plenius: a different emphasis in 2. 5.16, where Q. is arguing for the desirability of reading Cicero and Demosthenes. suppeditet: probably intransitive (despite the Loeb), as in 1. 1. 31, 1. 12. 14. ut dicitur: calling attention to a cliche. The phrase is documented in Otto, Sprichworter, 378; it no mi ally occurs, as here, where the living voice is being contrasted favourably with other means of communication.
9
C o m p a r e the practice of t h e young Cicero, ' c o t i d i e . . . et scribens et legens et commentans',
as well as listening to the orators o f the day
(Brut.
305).
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si modo recte sunt instituti: we should observe the tense here. Parallel passages at 2. 3. 11 ('apud eum [sc. praeceptorem] discipuli quoque melius instituti') and 2. 10. 1 ('in his primis operibus .. .bene instituto') both imply a completed school training, which is not in question here. Q. may then be thinking rather of the good earlier influences (family, paedagogus, grammaticus) that have formed the boys' character ('bien eleves' Bornecque); cf. Cic. Brut. 239 'M'. Glabrionem bene institutum aui Scaeuolae diligentia'; Amm. Marc. 29. 2. 12 'recte institutis ne cum inimicorum quidem incommodis in delicta conuenit ruere uoluntaria'. et amant et uerentur: cf. 2. 9. 1 'praeceptores suos .. .anient [sc. discipuli]'. For the distinction between the two verbs, see Cic. Q. fr. 1. 3. 3 'et amabat ut fratrem et iam ut maiorem fratrem uerebatur'. quanto libentius... fauemus: cf. 2. 9. 2; contrast 10. 1. 126 'amabant autem eum [sc. Senecam] magis quam imitabantur'. 2. 9 adsurgendi: in other contexts a mark of respect (e.g. Cic. Pis. 26). exsurgunt in 12 means the same thing, and is opposed to running forward. exultandique: cf. 12 'cum indecora exultatione' (see n.). Q. seems to mean physical leaping (Plin. Ep. 7. 24. 7 'in theatrum cursitabant, exultabant plaudebant'; TLL s.v. exsulto 1947. 44-7), though with a strong flavour of the extended sense of 'rejoice', in triumph at the success of their classmate: cf. Ov. Met 6. 283 'exulta uictrixque inimica triumpha'. licentia: Q. may remember Cic. Off. 1. 103 'pueris non omnem ludendi licentiam damus'. testimonium: cf. Ciceronian phrases like 'testimonium.. .laudum suarum' (Cic. Amic. 98); the word (not well treated in OLD s.v. 3) came virtually to equal laus (already Cic. Ac. 2. 3 'priuabo ilium potius debito testimonio quam id cum mea laude communicem'), no doubt partly because of the frequency of laudator)' testimonials in court; see A. H. J. Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time (London, 1901), 489-91. Cf. 3. 1. 22 'curae testimonium meruisse contentus'. ita fiet... credat: cf. n.on 2. 4. 14 iudicio non fallebantur. 2. 10 ilia... humanitas: these words should be taken together (cf. 12. 1. 24 'haec quae uulgo dicitur bonitas'), 'what is now called humanitas', defined by laudandi. licentia in §9 seems too far away to be easily understood, despite TLL s.v. humanitas 3079. 22-4. humanitas: used here in the sense rejected by Gel. 13. 17. 1 'beneuolentiam erga omnis homines promiscam', with the emphasis on promiscam. One might translate 'good manners', 'good form'. Tacitus is similarly scathing of
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Commentary
another use of the word: 'idque apud imperitos humanitas uocabatur, cum pars seruitutis esset' (Agr. 21. 2). inuicem qualiacumque laudandi: 7. 2. 19 'qui inuicem accusent' illustrates the Silver usage where inter se would have been written earlier (K-S i. 617). In our passage the object 'qualiacumque' complicates the construction, but cf. 11. 3. 168 'quas inuicem Demosthenes atque Aeschines exprobrant'. theatralis: worthy of behaviour in the not (highly regarded) theatre, where claqueurs organized applause (Goodyear on Tac. Ann. 1. 16. 3 'dux olim theatralium operarum', adding Cic. Sest 115). Cf. Plin. Ep. 2. 14. 13 'theatris quoque ['even for theatres'] indecora laudatio', of 'howled' applause in the courts. hostis: of a (feminine) abstract, as in 12. 1. 2 'facultatem dicendi sociam scelerum, aduersam innocentiae, hostem ueritatis'. uidentur: B's uidetur is not quite impossible (it would have been very open to officious correction), superuacua then being feminine sing., agreeing only with cura (K-S i. 46, citing Tac. Ann. 12. 65. 2 'conuictam Messalinam et Silium'). effuderint: not meant to be very complimentary. Q. uses the verb of unprepared speech at 10. 3. 17, 10. 7. 7, and 11. 2. 39 (grandiloquently, even satirically, at 11. 3. 158); note also Petr. 124. 2 'ingenti uolubilitate uerborum effudisset'. 2. 11 uultum igitur... dicit: Q. returns to the point he was making at the end of 9 ('ex iudicio praeceptoris discipulus pendeat'); but he now extends it to the students listening to the boy speaking. ita enim... discernent. sic... iudicium: s/, not sic (P), is transmitted. If it were right, one might think it picked up ita (as at e.g. 2. 7. 1). But that produces no good sense; and in any case it is natural to take ita enim as looking back to what has preceded (as at e.g. 2. 8. 12). In that case, si would have to be equivalent to si quidem. That would necessitate the awkward move of taking stilofacultas continget as a fxev clause, with auditione iudicium taking all the weight; 'if, as is the case, while facultas comes as a result of writing, judgement comes as a result of listening'. But the future tense is then unexpected. This last objection also applies if 'si... iudicium' is punctuated as a separate sentence; it is overcome by Russell's <et> si (reported in the OCT), but a conditional clause seems in any case inappropriate. We are therefore thrown back on sic: 'in this way, ability will come through writing, judgement by listening.' sic is not to be taken as parallel to ita (this is not, pace Spalding, a case of variation); for, while 'ita... discernent' comments almost parenthetically on 'uultum... dicit', sic introduces a comment on the whole of
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'uultum... discernent': Q. concisely summarizes the benefits of disciplined dictio in class for both speaker and audience. stilo... iudicium: the writing is that done by the pupil (ipse qui dicit) in preparing the speech (the cura ac labor of 10; for stilus thus cf. 2. 4. 15,10.6. 1) that he will recite in class, while the listening is naturally the role of the other pupils (qui audiunt). It is odd that there is no mention of the speaking of the exercise, as opposed to its writing. Clarity is not helped by the vagueness of facultas, a word normally defined by a genitive. What 'faculty' is in question here? One would think that writing improved merely the ability to write (cf. 10. 3. 10 'cum facultas ilia contigerif). These problems would be alleviated if we made some addition, e.g. stilo <et dictione>: writing the exercise and then speaking it improves the student's ability (in declamation), and listening to him promotes judgement in the hearers. But this would spoil the crisp epigram; and crispness sometimes leads to obscurity. continget: with abl. as in e.g. 1. 1. 33 'donee exercitatione contingat emendata uelocitas'. iudicium: cf. 10. 1. 17 'in lectione certius iudicium, quod audienti frequenter aut suus cuique fauor aut ille laudantium clamor extorquet' (of 'real' oratory). There even established iudicium can be swayed by audience reaction, and reading is a surer way of judging a speech. Here, where iudicium is still being formed (cf. 9 'ex iudicio praeceptoris discipulus pendeat', 13), Q. tries to remove the disadvantages of auditio by recommending the discouragement of wild applause in school: only a hope, as 'at nunc. shows. 2. 12 proni: 'bending forward' ready to rush forth (like a runner on the blocks: cf. Ov. Met. 10. 652-3 'cum carcere pronus uterque | emicat'); there is no metaphor here, despite Afifahl 115. succincti: this is metaphorical: 'girt up' and ready for the dash (Mart. 12. 24. 7 'suceinctus... cursor'). Both this and proni make one expect not exsurgunt but a verb meaning that the students await the clausula; the chronology is telescoped. a d . . . dausulam: to be taken with exsurgunt (cf. 11. 3. 135 'plerosque (sc. speakers] ...ad singulas clausulas sententiarum uideo adsurgentis'); the rhythm of atque (preferred here to ac for this reason) succincti marks the end of the colon. Q. is talking not of what moderns call 'clausulae', that is rhythmical endings to sentences, but of endings generally (though no doubt rhythm would also often be on show); see 8. 5. 13-14 (with Russell's n.), where Q. complains that 'nunc aliud uolunt, ut omnis locus, omnis sensus in fine sermonis feriat aurem. Turpe autem... ducunt respirare ullo loco qui addamationem non petierit'. Long before, note Cic. Orat. 168
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'condones saepe exclamare uidi cum apte uerba cecidissent' (more specifically of rhythmical endings); and much later cf. Jerome, Ep. 52. 4 (cited by Norden, AK 281 n. 1). Audiences might even anticipate the ending: see Russell on 'Longinus' 41. 2. indecora: cf. Plin. Ep. 2. 14. 13, cited above on 10 dieatralis. exultatione: again probably of physical leaping (see on 9 exultandique). In Pers. 1. 82 'trossulus exultat tibi per subsellia leuis' the verb more certainly goes beyond the physical ('ecstasies of motion' Conington); see J. C. Bramble, Persius and the Programmatic Satire (Cambridge, 1974), 44 n. 1. Jahn ad loc. cited Plu. Moralia 4 1 c at Kpaxryal Kai ot dopufioi xai ra 777^Sr}/xara TOJV 7rap6vT(ov (startling the inexperienced listener out of his wits). Add Suet. Nero 24. 1 'exultationes succlamationesque populi'. conclamant: the general topic of applause in declamation schools is fully treated by Norden, AK 274-5. In the courts the practice might be encouraged by the use of hired claques (Plin. Ep. 2. 14. 4-14, with an anecdote of Q.'s); for Seneca's views on applause in philosophy classes see Ep. 52. 9-14. id mutuum est: apparently to be classified under TLL s.v. mutuus 1738. 29-34; the pupils do each other a reciprocal service (Dig. 19. 5. 5. 4 'mutuum officium praestamus'), thereby determining the success of a declamation. declamationis: the deplorable behaviour described here was presumably liable to occur whether a progymnasma or a full declamation was being spoken (note the mention of both pueri and iuuenes in 9); for dedamatio used of the former, see above, p. xxiii n. 3. tumor: here of undue pride: cf. 1. 2. 18 'mens... tumescit inani persuasione\ uana de se persuasio: cf. 2. 4. 16 'adrogans de se persuasio'. again of spoiled students; Decl. min. 314. 17 'uana .. .persuasio'. inflati: the same metaphor as in tumor (Cic. Tusc. 3. 19 'inflatus et tumens animus'); Liv. 24. 6. 8 'inflatus adsentationibus'. 2. 13 se quoque: i.e. as well as the young speakers discussed since 9. There should be no wild applause for the teacher either, for he is not interested in knowing their opinion of his performance: his is the only judgement that matters. iudicio: 'in conformity with the taste [OLD s.v. iudicium 11a; not well served by TLL] of...'; cf. 10. 1. 130 'uelles eum suo ingenio dixisse, alieno iudicio'. et placere quae bene dicet... delectetur: the construction is: 'et delectetur < e a > placere [sc. discipulis] quae bene dicet.' If his pupils express approval
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of him, he should take satisfaction (not from any applause he may receive, and) not for his own sake, but for his pupils' sake, because of his awareness that he has instilled in them the right judgement that enables them to recognize the good things in his dictiones. It becomes clear that the whole paragraph is united by the interconnected themes of praise (that given by pupils to each other and to their teacher, and by him to them) and iudicium (theirs and his). 2. 14 pueros adulescentibus permixtos sedere: cf. Tac. Dial. 35. 3 'pueri inter pueros et adulescentuli inter adulescentulos'; Philostratus, VS 604, where at Produs' declamations naiSes sit separated from p,eipdxia by the boys' 7rai8ayaryoi. Q. implies that all the teaching took place in a single large room. studiis moribusque: the two went closely together in Q.'s mind: see on 2. 3. 12 eloquentia... moribus, and Winterbottom5 320-2. Cf. Juv. 7. 237 (of the grammaticus) 'exigite ut mores teneros ceu pollice ducat'; Floras, Vergilius orator an poeta 3. 7 (p. 187 Rossbach, p. 214 Malcovati2) 'quam imperatorium, quam regium est sedere a suggestu praecipentem bo nos mores et sacrarum studia litterarum'; and (cited by Valla on 2. 3. 12) Cod. lust. 10. 53(52). 7 'magistros studiorum doctoresque excellere oportet moribus primum, deinde facundia'. The mention of studia prepares the way for the discussion of the teacher's intellectual qualities in 2. 3. modestam habere potest etiam iuuentutem: i.e. he may be able to keep even older boys (as opposed to pueri) from acting as their testosterone levels would prompt them. OLD s.v. habeo 15c provides no good parallel, nor does even the very mixed bag in TLL s.v. 2424. 42-73; it may be that the verb is as colourless here as at 2. 11.2 'plurimos habent similes neglegentiae suae'. The phrase then becomes equivalent to moderari (so Ammendola); that verb is avoided by Q., but cf. Sen. Con. 1. 8. 8 'esse adulescentem... patri et moderandum et continendum'. uel: the translators ignore the word, and indeed it is not clear what it could imply. It seems possible that we should read uel <sic>y 'even if they can be controlled without separate seating'; cf. e.g. Man. 2. 413-14 'mascula se paribus uel sic, diuersa suorum | respondent generi', glossed by Housman 'quamquam aduersis fulgent contraria signis' (from 410). Donald Russell suggests to us that Q. may be distinguishing the wimps from the toughs among the iuuenes, but the parallels cited in the next note make this unlikely (and uel would remain odd). infirmitas: another abstract (n. on 2. 1. 3 aetas), here for itifirmi, in the interests of variation; cf. 2. 3. 7 puerilis infirmitas. The iuuenes are the
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robustiores (cf. 2. 5. 2), with firmins aetatis robur (1. 8.6; cf. n. on 2. 5. 23 firmis iudiciis), contrasted with pueri at 1. 8. 12 (as in Tac. Dial. 35.4); similarly in 3 teneriores annos and ferociores (sc. annos) are contrasted. carendum... suspicione: the early editors already saw the echo of Caesars famous dictum on his wife: 'meos tam suspicione quam crimine iudico carere oportere' (Suet. Jul. 74. 2). crimen and suspicio are naturally often linked (e.g. Cic. de Orat. 2. 330) or contrasted (Cic. Mil. 96). 2. 15 notanda: 'merely mention', as in 1. 5. 17. nam ut...credo: the movement is similar to that in 4. 2. 60 'nam id quidem, ne qua contraria... dicamus, si cui praecipiendum est, is reliqua frustra docetur'; cf. 11. 3. 13 'sed nos de eo nunc loquamur cui non frustra praecipitur' (also 1 pr. 26). absit ab: cf. Cic. S. Rosa 56 'quamquam abest a culpa, suspicione tamen non caret. ultimis uitiis: cf. Juv. 2. 34, without the homosexual implication of our passage (for which cf. 1.3. 17: probra arising from corporal punishment). For the Wees of which Q. is thinking (esp. criticized in teachers of younger boys), see Suet. Gram. 23. 2 (cited on 2. 2. 2 libro priore), with Raster's n.Q. is not meaning to differentiate between the turpitudo he has just mentioned and the ultima uitia. si quis est... uitet: [Plu.] 4 C-F complains that there were fathers who took little trouble in choosing teachers for their sons; contrast the care taken by Horace's (S. 1. 6. 81-4). flagitia: a danger for children taught at home as well as at school (1.2. 4). iam hinc sciat: 'let him be aware, from now on,...'; cf. Col. 4. 24. 1 'in annum sequentem quam laetissimas iam hinc eligat materias'. Cf. the tone of Liv. 8. 7. 7 'uisne... congredi mecum, ut nostro duorum iam hinc euentu cematur quantum eques Latinus Romano praestet?', 40. 35. 14 'ego iam hinc praedico... me exercitu eo qui nunc est rem publicam administraturum'. Elsewhere in Q. iam hinc is used where transitions are being signalled (so 2. 11. 1, 3. 1. 1, 8. 3. 40, and 10. 3. 4, where see Peterson's acute n.), 'now', 'starting from here'; hinc iam is used thus in 2. 4. 1 (see n.). ad utilitatem iuuentutis: for the purpose and envisaged audience of the Institutio, see Winterbottom in Corsi 10-13 (at p. 12: 'Quintiliano muta il suo destinatario in funzione del contesto'). conamur: the verb is employed not so much modestly (as in 2. 20. 4), as with the implication that Q.'s efforts would be wasted if parents took no trouble in choosing a rhetor. hac parte omissa: if the father neglects this aspect of his duty (see on 2. 1. 1 suas partis omiserunt).
Chapter Three Some think that boys should be sent initially to a second-rate rhetor (1). But that can lead to the forming of habits that prove hard to unlearn (2-3a). The motive behind the practice is, beside a ccrtain casualness, a feeling that more accomplished speakers lack either the will or the ability to teach beginners (3b-4). Both contentions are flawed (5-6). Further, afirst-rateteacher will consciously adapt himself to a boy's inexperience (7), and he will be lucid where a weaker rhetor is inflated and obscure (8-9). What I said in Book One about imitating fellow-pupils is consistent with my present contention, for the best teacher will have the best pupils (10-11). Thus, the rhetor should be outstanding in eloquence as well as in morality (12). The final section makes it clear that this chapter forms a pair with 2. 2, where it was contended that the rhetor to whom our pupil is sent must be morally impeccable. Now Q. argues that he must also be first-rate technically (even a grammaticus should be eloquent: 1. 4. 5). The starter is not to be fobbed off with anything less, but must go straight to one of the praestantissimi praeceptores (like Q.) desiderated at 1.1. 10. As in 2. 2, Q. is advising a father faced with the problem of how best to educate his son. 3. 1 ne illorumquidem... putauerunt:'not.. .ofthose [fathers) either' (cf. similar transitions at 4. 2.125 'ne illud quidem praeteribo', 6. 1. 37,10. 7. 28); OLD s.v. ne1 6b. Q., embarking on a discussion of fathers who 'pueros... apud minores... detinent' (the verb is used in 12. 11. 14 of teachers holding back pupils for their own reasons), looks back to his remarks in 2. 1 on the frequent delay in moving children to the school of the rhetor in thefirstplace; hence the tone of etiam cum: 'even when they have [at last] come to the conclusion that a boy is fit for the move'. tamquam.. .superba: explaining why some fathers think inferior rhetores more appropriate in the early stages. The emphasis falls on cum.. .facilior (taken up specifically at 7) and turn... superba (cf. below 4 quia fastidiant, answered briefly and cuttingly at the start of 5). For minores at an earlier stage see 1.2. 10. mediocritas praeceptoris: characteristically (see n. on 2. 1. 3 aetas), for mediocris pracceptor. 3. 2 optimis inbui: similarly of the young pupil who will benefit from early reading of the great epic poets (1. 8. 5, where Colson remarks that inbuere is
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used 'in its regular sense of first impressions'). In 1. 1 . 5 (where a similar conclusion is drawn: 'non adsuescat ergo., .sermoni qui dediscendussit') the young mind ('rudibus animis'; cf. below 3 'rudes', 1. 1. 36 'animo rudi', 1. 8. 4 cited below, 1. 11. 2 'mentem.. .teneram adhuc et rudem inficiunt [sc.uitia]') is implicitly compared both to a newly made container that will retain the first flavour it receives ('inbuas ' Hagenbuch; ' imbuas' would give better rhythm) and to a woollen garment before dyeing ('nec lanarum colores... elui possunt'). In our passage, what follows suggests that steeping is in question. For insidere thus cf. 1. 1. 11 'nec insidere [sc. dicta uitiose] illi sinat', 1. 6. 44 'si quid uitiose multis insederit', and esp., in a related context, 1. 8. 4 'tenerae mentes tracturaeque altius quidquid rudibus et omnium ignaris insederit', where the 'dye' is sucked deep inside; Sen. Dial. 6. 1. 7). Here the verb suggests the effect of some agent causing a stain that cannot be washed out; cf. Cic. Man. 7 'ilia macula.. .quae penitus iam insedit...in populi Romani nomine', Sest. 63 'ilia in re publica macula... maneret, quam nemo iam posset eluere'. For semel cf. Enn. Ann. 476 Skutsch 'quom illud quo iam semel est imbuta ueneno', perhaps imitated by Hor. Ep. 1. 2. 69-70. geminatum onus: 'causing to unlearn', followed by 'teaching [properly]'; Q. proceeds (with a confirming anecdote) to assert that the former is the more burdensome (12 pr. 1 'onus .. .quanto me premi ferens sentio') to those who take over (cf. 2. 1. 13 'qui labori isti successerint'), and is prior,; not only in time but especially in importance (12. 11. 11 'id quod prius quodque maius est'). For the idea cf. 2. 6. 2. 3. 3 Timotheum: the story (which has the tone of a chria) does not occur elsewhere. Spalding rightly identified Timotheus with the aulete of Lucian's Harmonides, where note §1: Hannonides, a Theban, was Timotheus' pupil; Timotheus once won a victory TOV o/xaW/zou [the better-known citharode and poet from Miletus: RE 9] oot -rr oir/oavTos to pe \os. In view of the aulete's connection with Alexander the Great (Ath. 538 F, cf. 565 A), he must have been a younger contemporary of his namesake. clariun in arte: cf. 3. 6. 64 'Hippocrates clarus arte medicinae' (for in, 1. 6. 35 'darum... in litteris'). duplices... quam: cf. Plin. Nat. 19. 9 'ideo duplex quam ceteris pretium>; K-S ii. 460. duplex below is a casual repetition. duplex: unus...(4) alter: cf. 9. 4. 121, where duplex obseruatio [= duae obseruationes} is defined by clauses starting altera... altera (also 9. 2. 66, with Reid's n.on Cic. Ac. 1. 19 'ratio triplex: una... altera... tertia'). The error afflicts fathers who misjudge the situation in two different ways.
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interim: 'for the time being' (as at 2. 4. 5); but it is difficult to rule out the alternative 'sometimes' (so below in 4; 2. 1. 1 n.), picked up by ille etiam frequentior (cf. 4. 5. 20 'interim... nonnumquam... saepe...'). bono sane stomacho: cf. 6. 3. 93 (of jokes) 'lenta et, ut sic dixerim, boni stomachi'; Martial 12 pr. 'aduersus quod difficile est habere cotidie bonum stomachum'. The expression fwohl volkstiimlich': Otto, Sprichworter, 332) alludes to a stomach that has no trouble digesting (Cels. 1. 2. 9 'secunda mensa bono stomacho nihil nocet, in inbecillo coacescit'). Its fortunate owner in consequence has the gift of good temper and tolerance (cf. the remark of Cicero reported at 6. 3. 112), that leads in the present case to a deplorable couldn't-care-less attitude (4 'ipsa reprensione digna securitas', i.e. quite apart from the bad effect on the child involved). The intensifying sane (Hor. Ep. 2. 2. 132 'bonus sane uicinus') points the irony. The phrase should not be taken with contend, which is here absolute (Cic. Brut. 134 'non modo contentus esses, sed melius non quaereres'). 3. 4 utcumque: 'one way or another'; for parallels see Winterbottom's n. on Decl. min. 278. 11, adding Sidonius, Ep. 7. 14. 2 'esse asperum, utcumque tolerabile tameii (cited by H-Sz 635, and misunderstood by Anderson). The word is used in another sense in 2. 5. 11. Q.'s usage deserves investigation. descendere: the minora being seen as 'infra rhetoris officium' (2. 5. 4); so below, inferioribus (neuter). Such imputed intellectual snobbery is taken up in the first alleged reason (where note fasti diant cf. 1. 4. 6 'ne quis... tamquam parua fastidiat grammatices elementa'; 12. 9. 7 'illo fastidio... non agendi causas minores).Cf. Cic. Q. Rose. 31 'quo quisque est sollertior et ingeniosior, hoc docet iracundius et laboriosius; quod enim ipse celeriter arripuit, id cum tarde percipi uidet discruciatur' (note stomacho in what precedes). 3. 5 porro: apparently adversative, as in e.g. 2. 17. 8 nos porro (but not 2. 1. 7 nos porro): see Gabler 38, referring to J. P. Krebs and J. H. Schmalz, Antibarbarus der lateinischen Sprache, 2 vols. (Basel, 7 1905-7), ii. 325 (not properly covered in OLD). See rather differently Hand, Tursellinus, iv. 485 (who finds the usage only in Q.): 'utitur.. .hac formula turn, quum suam sententiam cum quadam confidentia et gravitate effert'. eum qui nolit: cf. 1.4. 23 'si quis et didicerit satis et (quod non minus deesse interim solet) uoluerit docere quae didicit'; 10. 5. 19 'quod non est infiniti operis si docere sciant et uelint (sc. praeceptores]'. in numero... habeo: 'count among', as in 10. 1. 118. 3. 6 nisi forte... elaborasset: quidem and autem act here like Greek /xev and it is the two clauses taken together that constitute the 'absurd idea' (OLD s.v. nisi 2b) that is being rejected (for an analogous use see 2. 17. 3; see also
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5. 11.34 'haec uherius quoque procedere solent' (also Decl. min. 321.4,323. 14). On Q.'s Wanderbilder Afifahl comments (p. 71) that they aie 'bei den Romern sehr selten. Um so auffallender ist es daher, daft Q. solche Bilder in grofierer Zahl verwendet hat' (though his remarks at 12. 10. 78 hardly suggest that he was much acquainted with mountains). Afifahl cites a parallel from Lucian, Pro imaginibus 13: it is for the taller oftwo walkers to adapt to the other by stooping (cf. summittentem se ad mensuram'). 3. 8 quid si: adding a further point, as in 9. 2. 83, Cic. Fin. 2. 105. perspicuitas: described as summa uirtus in 1. 6. 41 (cf. 8. 2. 22: part of prima uirtus; another is mentioned at 8. 3. 41). The idea goes back at least to Aristotle (Rhet. T2, 1404 b l-2), and Theophrastus made clarity one of his four virtues of style: J. Stroux, De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi (Leipzig, 1912), esp. ch. 2; Lausberg, §§528-37. quis: as often in Q. after a relative: Bonnell, Lexicon, 749-50; Tac. Hist. 3. 58. 2 'quanto quis clarior, minus fidus'; OLD s.v. quis2 lb. ingenio minus ualet: cf. Cic. Quinct. 4 (as cited at 11. 1. 19) 'quod ingenio minus possum, subsidium mihi diligentia comparaui'. s e . . . attollere: cf. Sen. Con. 7 pr. 5 'modo nimis se attollit, modo nimis se deprimit'; Plin. Ep. 9. 26. 2 'debet... orator erigi attolli, interdum etiam efferuescere ecferri' (also 5. 17. 2). The word, like dilatare (8. 4. 14), was used by Q. as an equivalent for augere and amplificare in their stylistic senses (cf. 8.6. 68; also 2. 4. 9, with n.). In our passage too Q. is of course thinking of stylistic inflation; but the reflexive, and the following simile, make one think of the physical sense also, and Spalding's suggestion of a covert allusion to the fable of the frog (Phaed. 1. 24: note 5 latior, for narrative based on Aesop's fables, taught by the grammaticus, see 1. 9. 2) is not absurd. in digitos eriguntur: cf. 11. 3. 120 'in unguis eriguntur' (also 125 'summis digitis'). Afifahl 11 aptly cites Sen. Ep. 111.3 '[philosophus] non exsurgit in plantas nec summis ambulat digitis eorum more qui mendacio staturam adiuuant longioresque quam sunt uideri uolunt'. Just as we have seen that the simile reflects back on what precedes it, so the simile itself can be felt to apply to oratorical circumstances as well as more widely; cf. Sen. Suas. 2. 17 (of a declaimer) 'insistens summis digitis—sic enim solebat, quo grandior fieret'. Similarly, plura infirmi minantur (Curt. 7.4. 13: the Bactrians say 'canem timidum uehementius latrare quam mordere') might glance at 'weak' speakers (below 9 'infirmitatis uitio', Tac. Dial. 19. 1 'infirmitate ingenii'; note 2. 12. 4 'maledicit... ineruditus apertius et saepius'). 3. 9 tumidos: of bombastic speakers at e.g. 10. 2. 16 'pro grandibus tumidi'; and for the style itself e.g. 8. 3. 18 'fitque corruptum quia in piano tumet'; 12. 10. 73 'corruptum dicendi genus, quod... inmodico tumore turgescit';
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12. 10. 80 'grandia non tumida'. 2. 8. 9 'ingenio corruptus ac tumid us' alludes to the cast of mind (cf. 2. 2. 12 tumor, with n.; 11. 1. 50 'tumidum ac sui iactantem'; and esp. 12. 10. 16-17, where Asianic style is associated with the character of the Asian race, 'tumidior.. .atque iactantior') that might lead to such excesses. Cf. Afifahl 25; Norden, AK 298 (which in effect provides a commentary on our whole passage), adding Liv. 45. 23. 16 (spoken by a Rhodian) 'non negauerim et totam Asiae regionem inaniora parere ingenia, et nostrorum tumidioiem sermonem esse'. Fairweather, in a section on ' Vitiosa: some general terms denoting bad taste' (pp. 214-27), illustrates from well beyond her author; and see her General Index s.v. tumidus. For Gk. oyxog used in both approval and disapproval, see Geigenmiiller 108-9. corruptos: 'debased'. Q. uses the adjective liberally of those exponents of the new non-Ciceronian style who were his particular bugbear, and of the style itself; note e.g. 2. 5. 10 'corruptas... et uitiosas'; 8 pr. 17 'Asiani aut quocumque alio genere corrupti'; 10. 1. 125 'dum corruptum et omnibus uitiis fractum dicendi genus [exemplified by Seneca] reuocare ad seueriora iudicia contendo'; 10. 1. 129 (of Seneca) 'in eloquendo corrupta pleraque, atque eo perniciosissima quod abundant dulcibus uitiis'; 10. 2. 16 'pro... laetis corrupti'; and passages cited above on tumidos. Such parallels help to give an indication of the content of Q.'s lost treatise De causis corruptae eloquentiae (for his allusions to it, see Reuter, ch. 1; Brink), 'quare nemo ex corruptis dicat me inimicum esse culte dicentibus' (8. 3. 7) epitomizes his objection to the 'debased': they took the virtue of cultus too far. Particularly revealing is 8. 3. 57 (part of the discussion of cacozelia): 'corrupta oratio in uerbis maxime inpropriis, redundantibus, compressione obscura [cf. 6. 5. 2], compositione fracta, uocum similium aut ambiguarum puerili captatione consistit.' The usage (which of course has strong moral overtones) goes much further back: note Cic. Brut 202 'cauenda est presso... oratori inopia et ieunitas, amplo autem inflatum et corruptum orationis genus'; and often in the Elder Seneca (Fairweather, General Index s.v. corruptus). In our book note the list of vices (2. 5. 10) to be pointed out to pupils in corruptae orationes. tinnulos: a contemptuous word; cf. Tac. Dial. 26. 1 'tinnitus Gallionis', Fronto, p. 154. 5 van den Hout2 'neque ita cordaces... neque ita tinnulas [sc. sententias]'. The allusion, according to Norden, AK 290-1, is to the debased rhythmical tendencies of the day: 'er tadelt vor allem die Vergewaltigung der Wortstellung dem Rhythm us zuliebe, und zwar eines ganz weichlichen und weibischen Rhythmus, der auf das Ohr keinen andern Eindruck mache, als das Klingeln von Schellen und Glockchen.' But what exactly is the sound alluded to? tinn- words are predominantly connected with the 'ringing' noise of brass instruments (Cat. 64. 262 'tereti tenuis tinnitus aere ciebant'; note Q. 11. 3. 31 'sonis homines ut aera tinnitu dinoscimus', and see Austin's n. on
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12. 10. 31 'ny iucundam et in fine praecipue quasi tinnientem') like cymbala and sistra (cf. Q. 9. 4. 66 [of runs of short syllables] sonum reddant paene puerilium crepitaculorum'). Bells, of course, were called tintinnabula (PI. Trin. 1004 'tinnit tintinnabulum'), and were made of brass; but tinnulus in literary contexts would not point unambiguously to them. The use of KOJSIOV in 'Longinus' 23. 4 hardly helps; perhaps we should rather compare KporaXov (note Philostr. VA 8. 6, where a hypothetical sophist is imagined KporaXov 8IKT)V KTVTT<1)V RRJ YXDJTRY) and think, as Philostratus there did, not of rhythm (at least in the sense apparently intended by Norden) but of Gorgianic figures (Klangmittel). cacozeliae: 'bad taste'; cf. 8. 3. 56 'Cacozelon, id est mala adfectatio, per omne dicendi genus peccat, nam et tumida et pusilla et praedulcia et abiuidantia et exultantia sub idem nomen cadunt. Denique cacozelon uocatur quidquid est ultra uirtutem' (cf. 8. 6. 73, where the fault is associated with hyperbole). See Norden, AK 69 n. 1, citing esp. Diomedes, GL i. 451 Keil 'Cacozelia est per affectationem decoris corrupta sententia, cum eo ipso dedecoretur oratio quo illam uoluit auctor omare [cf. Q. 8. 3. 56 'ingenium... specie boni fallitur'; cf. Rhet. Her. 4. 15 'specie grauitatis falluntur nec perspicere possunt orationis tumorem']. Haec fit aut nimio cultu aut nimio tumore [cf. Q. 12. 10. 73, cited on tumidos above].' Like corruptus, the word came to be applied especially to the 'new' style: thus Suet. Aug. 86. 2 (perhaps employing the language of his own day) 'cacozelos et antiquarios, ut diuerso genere uitiosos,.. .spreuit', with Maecenas given as an instance of a cacozelus. As quocumque alio genere implies, the word could cover a whole range of vices; cf. 8. 3. 56, cited above; Sen. Suas. 7. 11 'dixit enim sententiam cacozeliae genere humillimo et sordidissimo' (also Con. 9. 1. 15); Donatus, Vita Vergilii 44 (V. as 1 nouae cacozeliae repertorem'); and Demetrius, Eloc. 186, where RAT KOIVW OVOPLAN means 'that broad term' (Innes). See generally Jocelyn, esp. 77-109, oddly saying (p. 82 with n. 144) that Q. here 'seems to divide the cacozeli according to the triple ranking of styles'; Brink 479-80; Fairweather, General Index, s.v. cacozelia. non uirium sed infirmitatis uitio laborare: there is a slight paradox here, rather as in 10. 1. 62 copiae uitium est. For the turn of phrase cf. 8. 2. 4 inproprii uitio laborabit. inflantur: for medical uses see TLL s.v. itiflo 1466. 22-82; Gk. olSeiv (see LSJ s.v. II, adding 'Longinus' 3. 1). Q. will be thinking of worse afflictions than flatulence, like dropsy (Isid. Etym. 4. 7. 23 'humor subcutaneus cum inflatione turgente et anhelitu foetido'). Afifahl 8 rightly compares 'Longinus' 3.4 KaKot Se oyKoi Kai im aajfidriov Kai Xoyajv ot \avvoi (see Russell's n., which prints an interesting parallel passage from Philo): mention of the vSpajmKos follows. Again (see on 8 in digitos eriguntur) simile recalls comparandum,
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for inflatus, like tumidus (and by the same metaphor), is commonly used to mean 'bombastic' (e.g. 12. 10. 16; Cic. Brut. 202, cited above on corruptos; Tac. Dial. 18. 4 inflatus et tumens, with Gudeman ad loc.; Afifahl 127). For another simile involving swelling, see 2. 10. 6. Ammendola appositely cited Sen. Dial. 3. 20. 1 'non est enim ilia [sc. ira] magnitudo: tumor est; nec corporibus copia uitiosi umoris intentis morbus incrementum est sed pestilens abundantia'. lassi: it is generally those suffering from tiredness, another uitium infirmitatis, who turn off the direct route; recto itinere goes with deuertunt rather than with lassi (for the abl. cf. Plin. Pan. 52. 7 'deuertere uia cogebantur'; note also 2. 17. 29 'recta uia depulsus', 4. 2. 104 'recto itinere depulsi', 4. 3. 14 'a recto itinere declinet'). Q. is interested in the strategies of travel (Afifahl 69-72; in Greek Doreen Innes points out the resemblance of Demetrius, Eloc. 47 to Q. 4. 5. 22), and several other passages are comparable with this one. At 2. 13. 16 'stratum militari labore iter saepe deserimus compendio ducti' represents a proper reponse to circumstances: the main road is less appropriate than the short cut (similarly, just before that, disapproval for those who point out 'unam orbitam... qua declinare qui crediderit nefas, patiatur necesse est illam per fiines ingredientium tarditatem'). But in three other places to turn off is the less preferable option in which one 'takes refuge': (a) 9. 2. 78 'rectum genus adprobari nisi maximis uiribus non potest; haec deuerticula et anfractus suffugia sunt infirmitatis, ut qui cursu parum ualent, flexu eludant', the result of weakness; (b) 10. 1. 29 (of poetry) 'non semper uti propriis possit, sed depulsa recta uia necessario ad eloquendi quaedam deuerticula confiigiat', forced on one by circumstances; (c) 12. 3. 11 'qui, taedio laboris quem ferre tendentibus ad eloquentiam necesse est, confugerint ad haec deuerticula desidiae', chosen out of weariness. What are these deuerticula? In (a) and (b) they are byways (Gromatici Veteres, p. 370 Lachmann 'hoc est diuersae ac diuisae uiae'), but in (c) the)' must be places at which to stop and laze about: the legal hacks used as an illustration are not on the move, but happily settled in their comfortable jobs ('quorum solam facilitatem sequebantur'); cf. PI. Capt. 522-3 'neque deprecatio perfidiis meis nec male factis fuga est, | nec confidentiae usquam hospitium est nec deuerticulum dolis' (relevant to TLL s.v. deverticulum 854. 70-7). In our passage the tired travellers who turn off the direct road are probably (as the passage of Cicero cited below suggests) attracted by agreeable accommodation (see TLL s.v. deverto 855. 40-1 'i.q. deflectere de via, saepissime hospitii quaerendi causa', and for a second corresponding noun Priscian, GL iii. 514. 26 Keil 'deuersorium... dicitur locus in quo deuertimus') rather than alluring byways; but their diversion is in any case culpable, as the whole context ensures.
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As with inflantur above (see n.), translation into the literary mode is relevant; these lax stylists turn aside from the sermo rectus (2. 5. 11, where 'quae utcumque deflexa sunt' follows), as, apparently, at 2. 11. 5 'ad alia deinceps atque inde alia non minus communia ac nota deuertunt'. Indeed Q. may well be influenced by the metaphor of Cic. de Orat. 2. 234 (Antonius speaks) 'defessus iam labore atque itinere disputationis meae requiescam in Caesaris sermone quasi in aliquo peropportuno deuersorio', on which see Fantham 154-5, comparing e.g. Liv. 9. 17. 1 'ut plus iusto ab rerum ordine dedinarem uarietatibusque distinguendo opere et legentibus uelut deuerticula amoena et requiem animo meo quaererem'; Doreen Innes adds D.H. Dem. 32 waTaycuya? rjScias. . . Kal repifieis €rjiX€povs. ergo: Q. draws the conclusion from his discussion since the start of 8: the best speakers are the clearest, and the worse a speaker, the more obscure he is. etiam implies 'as well as less worth understanding'. 3. 10 in libro priore: 1.2. 26 'Sed sicut finniores in litteris profectus alit aemulatio, incipientibus atque adhuc teneris condiscipulorum quam praeceptoris iucundior hoc ipso quod facilior imitatio est. Vix enim se prima elementa ad spem tollere effingendae quam summam putant eloquentiae audebunt; proxima amplectuntur magis'. 3. 11 a me procul aberit: 'will prove on examination to be far removed from my intention'; the phrase is a variation on something like 'procul absit [12. 10. 12] ut haec sententia priori diuersa esse uideatur'. For the future cf. 2. 20. 4 'uirtus erit' (also n. on 2. 14. 2 effertur); it is like that in Juv. 1. 126 'noli uexare, quiescet' (see Courtney's n. and Kenney on Ov. Ep. 16. 186). The phrase (not registered at OLD s.v. absum 12) recurs at 2. 15. 37, but there aberit is a normal future, as the following dicam shows. ea causa. ..puer: we now see a reason for the placing of this apparently trivial point at the end of the chapter: the best qualified teacher is above all to be chosen just because his pupils will reflect (quoque) the excellence of their master by performing well, or at least be put right if they do not—and at once (an important point: cf. 1. 1. 11 'corrigat protinus', 1. 3. 13). Thus the inevitable imitatio condiscipulorum will do no harm, even though the better the teacher, the more reluctant the pupil might be to try to imitate him. etiam probabit: the inferior teacher will not merely not correct faults (cf. 2. 6. 4), but actually give his approval to them; and it is what a master approves that forms the iudicium of his pupils: see 2. 2. 9 'id se dixisse recte quod ab eo probabitur credat', 11 'probanda atque improbanda discernent' (also 1.2. 21 [of a child educated at school] 'audiet multa cotidie probari, multa corrigi'). This allusion back to ch. 2 helps to prepare for the summary in §12.
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3. 12 sit ergo... doceat: summarizing the argument of chs. 2-3. eloquentia... moribus: cf. 2. 2. 14 'studiis moribusque'. For tam... quam..., see H-Sz 590: 'das erste Glied... betont'; so here: 'no less in eloquence than [as we have seen] in character. Thus in Q. 8. 2. 8 (gold and silver no less than [the previously mentioned] bronze), 8. 3. 15 (ornament as well as lucidity, discussed in 8. 2); also 1. 7. 28, 10. 2. 15. Phoenicis Homerici: Iliad 9. 442—3 rovveKa fx€ 7rpoer)K€ 8i8aoK€fj£vai raSe iravra, | fjivdojv T€ prjrrjp' epLtvat nprjKTrjpd re epyajv. These famous words (used in three interrelated passages of Proleg. [pp. 23, 66, 91] to show that Homer knew the word pr/Tajp) are alluded to again in 2. 17. 8 (where see n.). Cf. Cic. de Orat. 3. 57 'idem erant uiuendi praeceptores atque dicendi, ut ille apud Ho me rum Phoenix, qui se a Peleo patre Achilli iuueni comitem esse datum dicit ad bellum, ut ilium efificeret oratorem ue r bo rum actoremque rerum' (with L-P ad loc.; also Q. 12. 2. 6, with Austin's n.). [Plu.] MoraIia4 B recommends that a paedagogus should have a vats like Phoenix'.
Chapter Four Now for the progymnasmata: the rhetor may appropriately start with 'historical' narrative, 'poetic' narratives having been conceded to the grammaticus ( 1 - 2 ) . Narrative technique will be discussed later; meanwhile, note that the style of narration should avoid extremes (3-4a). [ Digressions on pedagogic principles: (IA) Some excess is desirable in the young; they should be fed on soft food that makes them plump for the moment (4b—5): a promising sign (6). Their 'metal' is better too thick than too thin; and Cicero advised 'fertility' in a youth (7-8a). Accordingly, the teacher should not be dry: that makes for cowed and unadventurous pupils ( 8 b - 9 ) . Too harsh criticism of young pupils, like too early pruning, is counterproductive (10-11). One should be tactful in one's comments on their work, and sometimes provide them with complete fair copies (12). Hopeless work should be returned for rewriting, with words o f encouragement (13). Correction should vary with the age and capacity o f the student (14). (IB) Pupils should grow accustomed to writing their exercises with care. This is no time for extempore garrulity (15), which only encourages bad habits (16); at this stage, careful composition is the key (17).) Back to the exercises: anaskeue and
kataskeue (18-19); praise and abuse of well-known persons (20), and comparison of
them (21); commonplaces, (a) attacking or defending the vicious (22-3); theses (24-5); explanation o f myths (26); commonplaces, (b) on witnesses and the like (27). (Another digression (II), on the practice o f introducing commonplaces into a speech readymade and with no thought for coherence: (A) An orator who relies on commonplaces cannot possibly face up to the emergencies o f life in court (28). (B) Such commonplaces disgust and shame a speaker (29). (C) Almost every commonplace has to be attached to the context by an <embarrassing> link (30a). {d) A commonplace < a s a
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whole> looks like an attachment (30b), either because (a) it is different from what surrounds it, or because (/3) it is dragged in, just as some introduce a wordy passage merely for the sake o f an epigram (31). But victory, not pretty style, should be our goal (32).] Final exercise: praise atui denunciation of laws. This is relevant to deliberative or forensic oratory according to the political circumstances envisaged. But in any case (leaving aside the threefold division o f law, which is more concerned with praise), there are a few fixed topics (33-4). Some are not appropriate to the generalized progymnasmata (35-36a). The rest concern content or wording, the right and the expedient, which may be sub-divided (36b-39a). Some footnotes on laws (39b-40). Appendix: the invention of declamation (41—42a); the Latin rhetores (42b).
Q. relieves the dryness of his precepts for the preliminary exercises by introducing two major digressions. The first (LA.), on the need for teachers to be sympathetic to stylistic exuberance in their young pupils, arises from remarks on narrative style, but is clearly relevant much more widely (note the very parallel discussion concerning declamation at 2. 10. 5-6; see n. on 2. 10.6 grandia et tumid a); and the subsequent stress (IB) on the importance of practising written composition, still nominally under the head of narrative, recurs in 10. 5, where Q., referring back (1) to the discussion of the syllabus laid down in the first two books, and stressing its importance as providing 'quae praecipue scribenda sint hexin parantibus', goes on to pick out several progymnasmata before coming in 14 to declamation proper (see above, p. xxxiii). Similady, the second digression (II), on the danger of failing to integrate commonplaces like that de testibus into a speech, applies to loci more generally. As for the exercises themselves, Q., like Theon (see Patillon, pp. xviiif.) in particular (but note also Nicolaus 5. 11-18, taken up under each exercise), is much concerned to stress their utility in real-life oratory (see n. on 2. 1. 10 quid autem... incidat). They are indeed of crucial importance in the syllabus, and may be argued to have had more effect on nonoratorical literature than the later more technical parts of the rhetorical education. Q. has told us in 2. 1 . 9 that the exercises of thesis and commonplace et cetera (see n.) went back to the time of the antiqui (slightly modified in 2.4.41), and the canon of progymnasmata will have built itself up on the basis of known sophistic practices. Commonplace is asserted by Q. himself to derive from the sophists, thesis from the Peripatetics (2. 1.9 nn.). Anaskeue/ kataskeue has its roots in Protagorean views on disputation in utramque partem (Granatelli1 154; note also the anonymous Dissoi Logoi). Exercises in praise and blame were already practised by Gorgias (Cic. Brut. 47). Narrative exercise happens to be first mentioned only in the early first century BC, but in related texts (Cic. Inv. 1. 27 'delectationis causa non inutili cum exercitatione dicitur et scribitur', Rhet. Her. 1.12 and 13) that may well reproduce a much
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earlier source. Two decades later than Q., Suetonius mentions some of the exercises,10 but does not seem to know of a fixed list; see Raster's exemplary nn.on Gram. 4. 5 and Rhet. 25. 4 (the second passage is highly problematic: see above, p. 37). But that a canon already existed in Q.'s time is suggested by consideration of the order in which he discusses them as compared with that employed by the Greek progymnasmatists of the empire, one of whom, Theon, may pre-date Q. Twelve exercises are found in Aphthonius, Hermogenes, and Nicolaus, in the following order: 1. Myth. 2. Narrative. 3. Chria. 4. Gnome. 5. Anaskeue and kataskelie. 6. Commonplace. 7. Encomium/Abuse. 8. Comparison. 9. Ethopoeia/Prosopopoeia. 10. Description. 11. Thesis. 12. Law. All but two (4 and 5; for the latter see below on 2. 4. 18 avaoKevr) et KaraoKevq) are found in the Greek version of Theon, and they come in the same order. Q. (1. 9 and 2. 4) omits 9 and 10; his order is similar, except in the earliest exercises (to which he adds others not in the Greek canon), though 6 follows 8 (for the division of the discussion of commonplace into two, one preceding thesis and one following it, see n. on 22 de iis loquor.. .perorare); his order is 1 4 3 2 5 7 8 6 11 12. The Armenian version of Theon, like the Greek, omits 4 and 5 but its order is very different: 3 1 2 6 10 9 7 8 11 12. That this order is Theon's 'primitive' one is shown especially by a crucial passage in both versions of the opening chapter of Theon (64. 28-65. 26 [pp. 8-9]). Since O. P. Hoppichler, De Theone Hermogene Aphthonioque progymnasmatum scriptoribus (diss. Wtirzburg, 1884), 47, it has been generally agreed that the order seen in the Greek version of Theon is the result of perhaps quite late interference designed to bring it into line with subsequent progymnasmatists. But we can go further: we need also to take into account the evidence of Q., who follows what is in essentials the 'Greek' order, and who indeed, once he has dealt with narrative, has no known Latin source. That order must therefore have been that of a Greek source earlier than Quintilian; for we should not presumably wish to think of the later Greek progymnasmists as being influenced by Quintilian. It therefore seems possible that Theon set himself to change the order of the exercises as they had come down to him from Hellenistic times, but that his innovation was not accepted; similarly I. H. Henderson, A&A 37 (1991), 90. In view of the very striking parallels (some of the most important outside 2. 4) linking Q. and Theon, it seems highly probable that Q. had read Theon; so I. Lana, Quintiliano, il Sublime e gli esercizi preparatori di Elio Teone (Turin, 1951), 108-51; Butts 3-6; and above, 10
To use the notation adopted below, he treats 9 under grammar, and under rhetoric 3 1 2 7
11 5. He also mentions other exercises, outside the c a n o n . F o r his problemata quod... potest.
see n. on 2. 4. 2 6
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pp. xxx-xxxiv.11 It seems likely, then, that he read him in his 'primitive' state, but was not persuaded of the virtues of Theon's new arrangement of the exercises. He does not, after all, accept other Theonian complexities, like the elaborate interweaving of anaskeue and kataskeue into the other exercises (see n. on 18 avaoKevrj et KaraoKevr)). Our assumption, then, is that he had available to him, besides Theon, another simpler Greek source that was not unlike (say) Hermogenes, and that in particular followed in essentials the order that Theon changed but that remained canonical. This hypothesis will also explain the agreements between Q. and the later theoreticians against Theon, which go beyond the ordering. Theon is clear why he ordered the exercises as he did: 'the easiest come before the more difficult' (65. 11 [p. 8]). Even before that, he has remarked that the chria is placed first because it is 'short and easy to remember' (64. 2930 [p. 8]); and his recommendations for reading orators and historians are guided by the same principle (134 [p. 102] and 136 [p. 104]). It is of course an obvious enough principle, and Q. observes it too, without, as we have seen, following Theon's own order. Thus the exercises he is happy to leave to the grammaticus (1 4 3 2a [i.e. the easier narratives]) are contrasted with 'cetera maioris operis ac spiritus' (1.9. 6). When he comes on to those others in 2.4, we find several comments on his ordering: thus historical narrative is robustior (but see n. on that word in 2); passing to encomium (20), he remarks that the pupil 'ad maiora tendere incipiet'; and coming to the final exercise he says (33) that 'legum laus ac uituperatio iam maiores ac prope summis operibus suffecturas uires desiderant'. Where he seems to be diverging from the order found in his source, he may be guided by the same principle (see nn.on 20 paulatim... incipiet and 22 de iis loquor... perorare). We have not thought it necessary to rehearse ever)' detail of the Greek parallels to Q.'s precepts. The most significant are with Theon; we have made much use of the notes and introductory material in the Bude edition of 1997, edited by M. Patillon and G. Bolognesi; for our method of citation, see above, p. ix. We normally refer to the later theoreticians, Hermogenes (doubtless spurious; cited by page and line from H. Rabe'sTeubner of Hermogenes, 1913), Aphthonius(ed. H. Rabe, 1926), andNicolaus (ed. J. Felten, 1913), only where they have something new and interesting to contribute. For further detail see e.g. Lausberg, §§1107-39 and Raster1. Generally, see Kroll, RE Suppl. VII s.v. Rhetorik, 1118-19; Reichel; the RE articles on Aphthonios (1), Hermogenes (22), Nikolaos (21), and Theon (5), the last two (by W. Stegemann) particularly authoritative; and, recently, the excellent overview by Webb. 1 1 M . Heath, GRBS 4 3 ( 2 0 0 2 / 3 ) , 1 2 9 - 6 0 argues for a much later date. In that case, we should have to assume that Q. had read some very similar forerunner.
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4. 1. This section, together with 2, forms a paragraph; ingressus picks up 'primas.. .partis', and 'et q u i a . ( n o t i c e the connective) explains how narratives provide the smooth transition between the schools of grammaticus and rhetor implied in 'ac mihi... didicerit'. But no sooner has this topic been laid down when (3) Q. refuses to go into technical details now (conversely Rhet. Her. 1. 12-16 discusses narrative as part of a judicial speech, with two references to the progymnasma, in 12 and 13); instead he gives brief advice on the correct style for narrative that leads into the first of the digressions discussed above (unde sum egressus at 15 in fact marks only the transition between digressions IA and IB). Narratives are only mentioned again when Q. turns to the next exercise at 18. hinc iam: marking (so at 8 pr. 13), a stage in the structure of the book, as iam hinc several times does (see on 2. 2. 15). putem: the personal note is explained by the division of opinion about the role to be played by the grammaticus in teaching the progymnasmata, for which see the introductory n. to 2. 1 (above, pp. 35-7). As Q. goes on to say in the next section, he has assigned some of the narrative exercises to the grammaticus, the rest, and the bulk of the progymnasmata, he reserved for the rhetor. It was perhaps the result of the common slippage in favour of the grammaticus that (as we are now told) the ars rhetorica was uulgo thought to begin after the preliminary exercises: a view not shared by Q. (note e.g. 2. 1. 3 ' u t . . . rhetoricen [alluding here to the progymnasmata] apud grammaticos exerceat'). dilata: to 2. 11. 1, though see n. there on iam hinc: aliquid simile: referring back to 1.9. 2 and 1. 9. 6, cited below and discussed on 2 dedimus. Nicolaus 5. 19-6. 7 analogously starts his book with myth as being easier and nearer the poetry from which students were passing on to rhetoric (for the implications of this, see above on 2. 1. 1 Latinis... Graecis). 4. 2 narrationum: for this exercise see Lausberg, §§1111-16, adding Suet. Rhet. 25. 4. tris... species: we do not discuss here the complicated question of the division of narratio, the problems of which are raised less by our passage than by Rhet. Her. 1. 12-13 (see Caplan and Calboli ad loc.) and Cic. Inv. 1. 27. Q., like them, separates off (excepta) narratio as used in the courts, but he cuts through their complexities by seeming to put the three other types on a level with judicial narrative. This move is made more explicitly by Hermogenes 4. 16-19 (cf. Nicolaus 12. 17-19), where four €i8r) StrfyrmaTo^ are listed: fXvdlKOV, 7TXaOfMCLTlKOV [= Spa/AdTIKOv], tOTOpiKOV, TToXlTLKOV [= tStiOTt/COy]; but in other respects Q. follows the Latin sources closely. The last of Hermogenes' four types is of course Q.'s 'qua in causis utimur'; for the others see below. For
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the threefold division see, outside the progymnasmatists, Sextus, Adv. Gramm. 252 (henceforth in this chapter 'Sextus'): Asclepiades' division of the 'historical' part of grammar (discussed in Blank's commentary, 266-70: he thinks it derived from the rhetorical division of narration), and esp. 263-4, again Asclepiadean: ra iaropovpieva divided into laropia, /xu#o
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must fall under fabula as defined in our passage; yet it is by no means certain that Q. is there thinking of a poetic version of Aesop (see e.g. Bonner, Education, 254-6). (b) 1. 9. 6 'narratiunculas a poetis celebratas notitiae causa, non eloquentiae tractandas puto'. It must be admitted that this is very obscurely phrased (for recent discussion see T. Viljamaa, 'From Grammar to Rhetoric: First Exercises in Composition according to Quintilian, Inst. 1,9', Arctos, 22 [1988], 189-91). But it seems to mean not that pupils were not themselves made to narrate such stories, but that the purpose of 'poetic' narrative was, in Q.'s view, not primarily rhetorical but 'grammatical'; if the emphasis had been on the rhetorical aspect, he would presumably have wished to claim it too for the rhetor. Colson (ad loc.) then seems to be wrong in saying that 'narrative composition based on mythology or literary fiction seems therefore to have been considered unsuitable to either school by Q.' The passages in Book 1 are not altogether consistent with what is said in 2. 4. 2: tragedy and 'poems' + comedy ( = poetic narratives) here does not neatly correspond to Aesop + 'poets' there. It looks as though, in writing 1. 9, Q. distinguished broadly between /xuflo? and n-Aaa/xa, but did not properly take into account the details of the division he was to employ in 2. 4. 2. robustior: 'robustior dicitur, quatenus robustiorem adulescentem decet' (Spalding; cf. n. on 2. 2. 14 infirmitas). That, though perceptive, seems to strain the word, although it cannot be ruled out that this sense is present. More plausibly, however, the image is from food: this form of narrative is more nutritious. Cf. Cels. 2. 18. 7 'quo maius quodque animal, eo robustior ex eo cibus est' (this meaning is ensured by the explanation at 2. 18. 2 'ualentissimum uoco in quo plurimum alimenti est'; similarly ualens in 2. 18. 13— note 'robustis apta ualidissima [sc. materia] est'—and ualidus in Petr. 130. 7 'cibis ualidioribus pastus'); so of poetry in Pers. 5. 5-6 'quantas robusti carminis ofifas | ingeris'. For Q.'s food imagery, see Afifahl 26-31 (e.g. 2. 4. 5; also 2. 5. 18 alenda, cf. 8 pr. 2). 4. 3 parte: sc. rhetorices (cf. 3. 3. 14). Q. reserves his main discussion of narrative to the long chapter 4. 2. In e.g. Rhet. Her. the precepts can follow at once; but Q.'s chronological structure, which takes the student from cradle to grave, means that he has to divide up his treatment between Books 1, 2, and 4. u t . . . neque.. .neque rursus: K-S ii. 211. rursus marks the antithesis between the two clauses; cf. 1. 10. 2, Cic. Off. 2. 2 'nec me angoribus dedidi... nec rursum indignis... uoluptatibus'. ea: i.e. narratio, easily understood from the context, rather than pars narrationis (as Afifahl 121). As ' illud admonere sat est' implies, Q. is making preliminary remarks about narrative style and content that might themselves
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have been held over; they will apply to narrative generally. In fact, he talks of narrative style in several other places (cf. above on parte): in 1. 9. 2 'narrare sermone puro [cf. 4. 2. 118 'debet esse quam purissimus sermo'] et nihil se supra modum extollente' and (at length) in 4. 2. 36-65 (its 'virtues', significantly discussed fully by the progymnasmatist Theon 79. 20-85. 28 [pp. 40-8]), and esp. 4. 2. 116-24; note also 10. 1. 31 (history avoids the narrandi taedium by use of less obvious words and freer figures). Parallels with 4. 2 are noted below. arida... ieiuna: linked again at 2. 8. 9 (of a student), 3 . 1 . 3 (of style of exposition), 12. 10. 13 (of Cicero!); Sen. Ep. 75. 3 (wording). Both words are favourites with Q.: for aridus( Afifahl 121; TLL s.v. 568. 75-569. 28) e.g. 2.4. 8 (master); for ieiunus (Afifahl 26; TLL s.v. 251. 65-252. 4) e.g. 2. 5. 21 (of archaizers, cf. 10. 2. 17), 2. 12. 11, 8. 3. 49 (oratio; opp. to copiosus). See also n. on 6 sicca, and generally Fantham 172-3. erat: idiomatically for esset (K-S i. 171). Cf. e.g. 2. 8. 8 'superuacua erat doctrina si natura sufficeret' (cf. 1. 4. 22 'quod... monere superuacuum erat nisi... plerique . . . inciperent'); 2. 10. 6 'erat optimum' (with n.); 2. 13. 2 'erat... facilis ac parua s i . . . contineretur' (cf. 1. 2.6 'facile erat... remedium', without a conditional clause); 4. 1. 11 'stultum erat monere, nisi fieret'; 4. 1. 24 'in quo uitii nihil erat, nisi in uniuersum id praeciperet'. nudas atque inornatas: paired at Rhel Her. 4. 69, Cic. de Orat. 2. 341 (breuitas). For nudus cf. esp. 6. 1. 25 'nudae tantum res', 8. 6. 41 'nuda.. .et uelut incompta oratio'; Afifahl 31. The adjective is used of traditio in 3. 1. 2 as 'ieiuna atque arida' is a section later, and accompanies ieiunus at 6. 2. 7 (cf. Cic. de Orat. 1.218). For inomatus(TLLs.v. 1762. 74-1763. 6) cf. esp. 4. 2. 46, cited in the next n. Add 4. 2. 116 'narrationem.. .omni qua potest gratia et uenere exornandam puto'. For clothing metaphors see Afifahl 31-3; Fantham, Index IV s.v. clothing. indicare: here with the implication (neglected in OLD s.v. indico1 and even TLLs.v. 1. indico) 'merely point out', 'give a summary account of' (Gaius, Inst. 3. 54 'omnia iura quasi per indicem tetigisse'). Cf. 4. 2. 46 'quantum opus est autem non ita solum accipi uolo, quantum ad indicandum sufficit, quia non inornata debet esse breuitas' (also 37, 110); 4. 2. 75 'narrauit accusator, neque ita ut quae essent acta tantum indicaret, sed adiecit inuidiam, rem uerbis exasperauit'; and esp. 12. 10.43 'cui si res modo indicare satis esset, nihil ultra uerborum proprietatem elaboraret'. But the word can be used neutrally (as in 4. 2. 1). sinuosa: 'tortuous'. Gel. 14. 2. 13 'multiiugae et sinuosae quaestionis' (cf. also 12. 5. 6 'dicturum.. .sinuosius atque sollertius') is less revealing than D.H. Dem. 4, where Isocrates is said to have cultivated a type of period 'which follows a broad and leisurely course like a meandering river, with many curves
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and inlets' (noXXovs ayi<6jvas... eyKoXiri^opLevrjv, transl. Usher; also 19 KeKoXniofxeva); with which cf. Plin. Nat. 5. 113 (the Maeander) 'ita sinuosus flexibus ut saepe credatur reuerti'; Sil. 15. 621-2 'cumatas sinuosis flexibus amnis | obliquat ripas'. Similarly 10. 5. 12 (of exercises) 'haec recta tantum et in nullos flexus recedentia' (cf. 5. 13. 2), contrasted with 'illis plures excursus recipientibus'. For rivers in literary critical language see e.g. Fantham, Index IV s.v. arcessitis: 'dragged in'; cf. arcessunt in 31 below. The participle often carries a tone of disapproval: TLL s.v. arcesso 454. 11-22. descriptionibus: €Kpdoets, on which see Norden, AK 285-6 (emphasizing their poetic character: cf. poeticae licentiae below); for a taste of the vast bibliography, see J. Eisner in S. J. Harrison (ed.), A Companion to Latin Literature (Blackwell, 2005), 318. Descriptions were in forensic oratory likely to concern places (4. 3. 12, 9. 2. 44, 11. 3. 164; for poetic T07T0ypaiai, see Brink on Hor. Ars 16), though Q. quotes a descriptio of a drunk from a narrative by Caelius (4. 2. 123); and the temptation to vary the tone by including them in narrative might be considerable. A descriptio was one means of digression (4. 3. 12), against whose introduction into narrative Q. warns in 4. 2. 104. It is significant that Q. does not include the progymn as ma that trained for this (above, p. 76). Others omitted it too (Hermogenes 23. 15-19), because it was covered under other headings, including narrative (note Nicolaus 70. 2-6); but Q. may well have felt some distaste for descriptions; note [D.H.] Rh. 372. 4-10 Usener-Radermacher: frequent descriptions are an error in declamation, resulting from the mistaken desire to rival poetry and history ('the result of a case does not hang on describing a storm'). poeticae licentiae: cf. below 19 (mythology), 4. 1. 58 (choice of words; similarly 10. 5. 4 'uerba poetica libertate audaciora'); TLL s.v. licentia 1356. 17-19 (note also Cic. de Orat. 3. 153, Orat. 68); Brink on Hor. Ars 9-10, adding Strabo 1.2.17. Poetic influence on prose is a well-known feature of the Silver Age (contemporary with Q. note Tac. Dial. 20. 5 'exigitur... iam ab oratore etiam poeticus decor'). Q. tended to deprecate it (he warns against 'figurae... illae poeticae' specifically in narrative at 4. 2. 118), for he was clear that each genre had its own tone: 'sua cuique proposito lex, suus decor est' (10. 2. 22); note 10. 1. 28 'meminerimus... non per omnia poetas esse oratori sequendos, nec libertate uerbonim nec licentia figurarum'. lasciua: early editors rightly corrected the MSS lasciui at (lasciuiat B2; there is no place for at, as the very similar 12. 10. 13 'falsum utrumque: sit tamen...' shows). The shape of the sentence clearly demands an adjective paired with sinuosa to correspond with 'arida . . . atque ieiuna' in the first nec clause. The verb (arising, perhaps, from a misunderstood correction of lasciui to lasciua) would give an inelegant anacoluthon, admittedly somewhat
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masked by the intervening parenthesis. Both verb and adjective (TLL s.v. lascivio 983. 1-31; lascivus 985. 73-986. 33; also s.v. lascivia 981. 37-58: Q. 2. 5. 22, 10. 1. 43) are commonly used in connection with both poetry and rhetoric; in Q., note esp. 9. 4. 6 'licentia lasciuientium' (of rhythms almost as bad as galliambics), 12. 10. 73 'dicendi genus quod aut uerborum licentia exultat aut puerilibus sententiolis lasciuit...', and 2. 5. 10 'lasciua effeminata', in a list of undesirable attributes. For the accompanying abl. we can at least compare 12. 10. 73, just cited. 4. 4 inopia: naturally often contrasted with copia; e.g. Publ. Sent. 418 'mala est inopia ex copia quae nascitur'. Of stylistic poverty, cf. Cic. Brut. 202 'cauenda est presso illi oratori inopia et ieiunitas, 285 'ieiunitatem et siccitatem et inopiam'. This is the uitium that lurks behind the plain style, just as copia can go too far (8. 6. 16 'copia quoque modum egressa uitiosa est'). Note the similar presuppositions behind 10. 1. 62 (Stesichorus) 'redundat atque effunditur, quod ut est reprehendendum, ita copiae uitium est'; Sen. Con. 9. 2. 26 'tamen in his, etiamsi minus est insaniae, minus spei est; illi qui tument, illi qui abundantia laborant, plus habent furoris, sed plus et corporis; semper autem ad sanitatem procliuius est quod potest detractione curari; illi succurri non potest qui simul et insanit et deficit'. nam.. .spiritus: Q. widens his judgement on narrative style into a general discussion of what should be looked for in a student. A new paragraph might be marked here. exigi... sperari: cf. Cic. Brut 17 'ego uero et exspectabo ea quae polliceris nec exigam'. indoles laeta: so Gel. 19. 9. 1 'adulescens... laetae indolis'. The metaphor (as in Plin. Ep. 9. 33. 1 'isto laetissimo altissimo planeque poetico ingenio') derives from the primary agricultural sense of the adjective (8 pr. 23 'laeto gramine'): a better bet (i.e. than one lacking such qualities) is a boy with 'a rich, fertile talent'. He will be capable of producing work that is itself laetum (12. 10. 80 'laeta, non luxuriosa'; TLL s.v. laetus 884. 84-885. 22), even if he might go too far (14 'pueris aliquid ausis licentius aut laetius'); and no doubt he would be 'cheerful' too (2. 9. 2). generosique conatus: possibly 'gen. of quality defining indoles' (Gaunt), in which case see n. on 2. 10. 5 supra fidem. If it is plural, cf. 8. 5. 29 'paruis conatibus'. The adjective connotes a noble loftiness, as in 1 pr. 24 'concidunt quidquid est in oratione generosius'; 1. 2. 30 '[animus] quo generosior celsiorque est'; Petr. 118.3 'generosior spiritus\ Note Cic. Amic. 29 'humilem... et minime generosum... ortum amicitiae' (cf. Q. 8. 5. 32 'nihil probantes nisi planum et humile et sine conatii). These promising students 'aim high'. That also requires spiritus, 'mental energy', 'hochstrebender, kiihner Sinn' (Afifahl
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18); cf. 1. 2. 29 'adicio praeceptores ipsos non idem mentis ac spiritus in dicendo posse concipere singulis tantum praesentibus'; 1. 8. 5 'sublimitate heroi carminis animus adsurgatet ex magnitudine rerum spiritum ducat'; 1. 9. 6 'cetera maioris operis ac spiritus'. 4. 5 ipsis: not only should children aim high, their teachers should encourage them in this. A's added quoque is superfluous. nutricum: cf. Cic. de Orat. 2. 162 (in another metaphor of feeding), with L-P's n., citing Fantham 150; Afifahl 53. For food imagery, see on 2. 4. 2 rob ust i or. mollius: i.e. molliore cibo (Cels. 3. 23. 3 'molles et faciles cibi'; the usage deserved a place in OLD), like that on which the 'corpora... tenerd (1.1. 22) of babies are fed. satiari: filled full (as at 10. 1. 58), but presumably not to excess (as at 9. 3. 5). iucundioris: cf. 10. 1.31 lalere oratorem quodam uberi [ moueri G; moIli P] iucundoque suco'. lacte: an obvious metaphor, especially favoured by Christian writers (TLL s.v. lac 818. 45-82). The lactea ubertas of Livy (10. 1. 32) was just the diet for children at this stage (see n. on 2. 5. 19 candidissimum). erit.. .corpus: the metaphor continues: a body treated like this {illud) will for a time be rather plump (Hor. Ep. 1. 7. 31 'pleno... corpore', of the fed fox; Cels. 1. 10. 3 'si plenius corpus est'). See n.on 2. 10. 5 in corpus eant, and cf. Sen. Con. 9. 2. 26, cited on 4 inopia. adstringat: the subjunctive is perhaps potential, perhaps jussive, perhaps final. For the sense, 'slim down', cf. 8 pr. 19 (cited below on 6 omnibus membris expressus), 8. 3. 10 (of a horse) 'adstricta ilia'. Hence of expressing something briefly 3.4.4 'rem tam late fusam tam breuiter adstrinxerint' (OLD s.v. astringo 11a; note also 2. 13. 5 'constricta an latius fiisa narratio'). The metaphor in 10. 4. 1 'luxuriantia adstringere' (for luxurio of plants, see OLD s.v. la; L-P on Cic. de Orat. 2. 96) might be from tying back vine shoots: cf. Col. 5. 6. 17 'quicquid frondis enatum fiierit,... aut ferro amputare aut adstringere'; or just 'limit'. 4. 6 maciem: in Q. only here (in effect literally) and in 9 (metaphorically: see n.), again with infirmitas in the vicinity. Cf. Cic. Phil. 7. 12 'At qua imbecillitate, qua macie! Sed animi uiris corporis infirmitas non retardauit.' omnibus membris expressus: at 8 pr. 19 'adstricta et lacertis expressa sunt' is used of healthy (and therefore slim) bodies in which the muscles show, cf. 8. 3. 10 'athleta cuius lacertos exercitatio expressit', 'made to show', and Tac. Germ. 17. 1 'ueste... stricta et singulos artus exprimente', 'throwing into relief' (also perhaps Tertullian, Apolog. 40. 15 'ieiuniis aridi et omni
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continentia expressi'); note too 1 pr. 24 'ossa detegnnt, quae ut esse et adstringi neruis suis debent, sic corpore operienda sunt'.12 Men. Rh. p. 345. 32 suggests comparing a mountainous region to a strong man vevpois 8i€tX7]fx[jL€m), translated by Russell-Wilson 'showing prominent muscles'. Our phrase should then mean 'with every limb showing', the skeleton, as it were, too obviously apparent through the skin, i.e. very thin (so Spalding: 'ubi artus singuli apparent, neque pingui carne amiciuntur'). Q. means not so much limbs as the underlying bones (a similar inaccuracy at 5. 12. 6 '[argumenta] plus habebunt decoris si non nudos et uelut came spoliatos artus ostenderint'): cf. (metaphorically) Tac. Dial. 21. 8 'oratio... in qua non eminent uenae nec ossa numerantur' (with Mayer's n.), Petr. 118. 5 'ne sententiae emineant extra corpus orationis expressae'. This gives the right sense: Q. is saying that plump babies promise best; a baby who was not 'fully formed in every limb' (Butler) would surely give cause for concern, protinus, in effect 'at birth', does not (unless Q. is being illogical) imply that even a plump baby eventually becomes omnibus expressus membris. audeat: jingling with gaudeat, striking too are inuentis taking up inueniat (so 8 pr. 27 'dum inueniunt et dum inuenta ponderant') and the alliteration of the second part of the sentence; there is some miming of the recommended stylistic elan. inueniat: the pupil should be encouraged to make imaginative moves of his own, as at 2. 5. 13 'ut inueniant ipsP; cf. 8. 5. 22 (on sententiae) 'plerique minimis [mimicis Hey) etiam inuentiiinculis gaudenf. sicca: 'dry' (rather than 'dried up') style (contrast 3 arida... ieiuna, with n.; Fantham 173 n. 33: in Cicero a term of 'relative praise') may be virtuous or vicious, according to context. Here it is by implication virtuous. Contrast 11. 1. 32 (on to TTpe-nov) 'in iuuenibus etiam uberiora paulo et paene periclitantia [cf. audeat in our passage] feruntur, at in isdem siccum et sollicitum et contractum dicendi propositum plerumque adfectatione ipsa seueritatis inuisum est'; Tac. Dial. 21.7 'durus et siccus'; Gel. 14. 1. 32 'sicca et incondita et propemodum ieiuna oratione'; so too siccitas in Cic. Brut. 285, cited on 2. 4. 4 inopia. Too dry orators lack vital juices: 12. 10. 14 'aridi et exsuci et exsangues' (cf. Rhet. Her. 4. 16 'aridum et exsangue genus orationis, quod non alienum est exile nominari'). seuera: the metaphor is now from character, seueritas is a virtue, in style (8. 3. 13, 9.4. 63; Gk. avorrjpos) as in life, but one that borders on vices: note 12. 10. 80 'seuera non tristia' (cf. Cic. Brut. 113 'in quodam tristi et seuero 1 2 Relevant will be expressio — 'projection' (Vitr. 4. 4. 4 'eminentes expressiones', 7. 3. 10 ' p r o m i n e n t e s . . . expressiones'), to which some uses o f exprimo and expressus in connection with works o f art will correspond (cf., tantalizingly, Brink o n Hor. Ars 33).
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genere dicendi uersatus est', where the first adjective affects our reading of the second). ubertatis: Julius Victor, citing this passage (p. 444. 34 Halm = p. 101. 11 Giomini-Celentano), gives the dative. The parallel at 11. 2. 49 'ne hoc quidem infirmae memoriae remedium est' cannot settle the question. sterilia: by variation for sterilitas. The word coheres well with ubertatis, for both have agricultural overtones; note the explicit simile in 8. 3. 75 'ut terrain cultu, sic animum disciplinis meliorem uberioremque fieri', and also 1 pr. 26 'ei cui deerit ingenium non magis haec scripta sint quam de agrorum cultu sterilibus terris'. uincuntur: 'are got over'; cf. 11. 3. 12 'corporis etiam potest esse aliqua tanta deformitas ut nulla arte uincatur'. 4. 7 ilia... praesumitur: cf. the similar phrase at 1.3. 2, 'non dabit mihi spem bonae indolis qui...', where, however, the simple future means 'will never give so long as he is out for laughs', dederit here is perfective, 'will cause me to form a very low expectation', 'will create a very poor impression', cf. e.g. 10. 1. 85 'apud nos Vergilius auspicatissimum dederit exordium'. We are indebted to Dr Holford-Strevens for advising us on this matter and helping us with the wording of this note. praesumitur: 'is forestalled by'; see Peterson's careful n. on 10. 5. 4. Judgement (of course in itself desirable: n. on 2. 2. 11 stilo.. .iudicium; 2. 4. 9 'illis... iudicii loco infirmitas est') takes control before talent has had a chance to spread itself. Conversely 2. 5. 26 'ne imitatio iudicium antecederet'. materiam: here of the indoles of the child, thought of as raw material in the hands of the teacher who will shape him (apparently overlooked by TLL); so 2. 8. 12 'si... liberalior materia contigerit et in qua merito ad spem oratoris simus adgressi'. The idea is put more abstractly in 2. 19. 3 'natura materia doctrinae est: haec fingit, ilia fingitur'. The word (like, perhaps, fusam too: see nn. below) prepares for (or inspires) the metallurgical metaphor that follows); note 2. 21. 24 'instrumentum uoco sine quo formari materia in id quod uelimus effici opus non possit' (also 2. 21. 10); Macrobius, Sat. 7. 13. 12 'imprimebatur... sculptura materiae anuli, seu exferroseu ex auro foret'. Cic. de Orat 2. 88 (cited on 8) uses a viticultural metaphor, where materies = 'stock'. uel abundantiorem: 'even over-endowed with talent'; exact parallels may lack (in 12. 2. 28 'quae potest materia teperiri ad grauiter copioseque dicendum magis abundans quam de irirtute... ?', materia means 'subject-matter'), but cf. Cic. de Orat. 3. 59 'cum ipsi doctrina et ingeniis abundarent', Sen. Con. 1 pr. 23 'cum ingenium quidem eius et hac dote abundauerit'. Q.'s wording is doubtless influenced by the richness of the style in which such a talent would express itself; cf. e.g. 12. 10. 18 'neque Asiane sunt abundantes'.
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ultra quam oporteat fusam: again rather awkward with this noun. There may be some hint at metal-working (see above on materiam, and n. on 2. 1. 12 fundentur), or alternatively to the waxing of clay negatives in the making of bronzes; modern literature on hollow-casting is collected in A. J. D'Angour, 'Ad unguent, AJPh 120 (1999), 411-27, at 423 n. 32. Q. seems to mean a talent that goes too far' (fusus combines with late at e.g. 2. 13. 17), or conceivably one that is 'squandered' (OLD s.v. fundo 8). Q. again (see previous n.) adapts his wording to the resulting style; cf. e.g. 9. 4. 138 'in locis ac descriptionibus fusiac fluentes [sumus]', Afifahl 134. decoquent: the metaphor is not from cooking (Spalding; Afifahl 30); instead the word (as Spalding half admits) heralds the elaborate metallurgical image. Smelting removed the dross in metal: Liv. 32. 2. 2 '[argentum from Carthage] quia probum non esse quaestores renuntiauerant experientibusque pars quarta decocta erat'; Hil. In psalmos 65. 20 (CSEL xxii. 262. 4-5) 'examinandi argenti ilia sola ratio est, ut sordes quae ex prima terrae materie adhaeserint decoquantur'. fundo is also used of smelting (Lucan 6. 404-5 'fudit et argentum flammis aurumque moneta | fregit et inmensis coxit fornacibus aera'), and fusam above may have suggested the whole metaphor. limabit: cf. 2. 12. 8 'confitendum est etiam detrahere doctrinam aliquid, ut limam rudibus ...'. In the present passage, the image is (still) from metalwork, limae being used to file down metal and gems. usu: completing covert allusion to the familiar triad (2. 19 n.): anni represents (the growth dictated by) vois, ratio r e ^ ^ , and usus fxeXerr}. deteretur: perfectly coherent with the metalwork imager)': cf. Plin. Nat. 27. 10 'eadem uis esset in morte quae cotibus in ferri acie deterenda', 33. 60 '[aurum] minimum usus detent'. The following verbs, however, are normally used of carving wood or stone (TLL s.v. excido 1242. 59-76; s.v. exsculpo 1832. 15-30, e.g. Q. 2. 19. 3). But excidere seems to be used of silverwork at Plin. Nat 33. 139, and scalptura can be used of working metal as well as stone (see 2. 21. 9). And it would be strange if sentences so self-consciously connected ('sit modo.. .erit autem...') contained divergent metaphors. laminam duxerimus: cf. Plin. Nat. 33. 128 'lamnas duci...non nisi ex optimo [sc. argento] posse creditum', 'only the best silver is capable of being beaten out into plates' (Rackham). For tenuem (here predicative) see ibid. 21. 5 'e lamina tenui', 34. 94 (of copper) 'tenuatur in lamnas'. caelatura: normally applied to metals (a list at 2. 21. 9). 4. 8 apud Ciceronem: de Orat. 2. 88. The whole section (for which see Fantham 145-6) is relevant, and Q. has been writing a variation on it: ... Sulpicium... adulescentulum audiui,... oratione autem celeri et concitata, quod erat ingeni, et uerbis efTeruescentibus et paulo nimium redundantibus, quod erat
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aetatis. Non sum aspcrnatus; uolo enim se efferat in adulescente fecunditas. Nam facilius, sicut in uitibus, reuocantur ea quae se nimium profuderunt quam, si nihil ualet materies, noua sarmenta cultura excitantur. Item uolo esse in adulescente unde aliquid amputem; non enim potest in eo sucus esse diuturnus, quod nimis celeriter est maturitatem [see below, §9] exsecutus. fecunditas: 'fertility' (transl. May-Wisse), preparing or inspiring the metaphor that follows. Cicero wants the mind to run riot; likewise Q. ('uel plura iusto concipiens.. .spiritus', 4). aridus: the reference is in the first instance to the teacher's style; cf. Sen. Con. 1 pr. 22 'Marullum rhetorem, hominem satis aridum, paucissima belle sed non uulgato genere dicentem'. The word is one of a nexus documented in nn. above on 3 arida... ieiuna and 6 sicca. But the way in which the precept against undue severity follows (from 10) suggests that these dry old sticks have an unattractive character too; note OLD s.v. aridus 7 'niggardly' (here perhaps in praise for the pupil); contrast the desired 'iucundus . . . praeceptor' of 12. Yet equally the agricultural analogy, which has glanced over the chapter so far, is strongly present: the student/plant will only thrive if the master/soil is not too dry. teneris adhuc: like the minds to which they are being compared (5). 4. 9 humiles: cf. 8. 5. 32 'nihil probantes nisi planum et humile et sine conatu', quoted on 4 generosique conatus; such students are too cowed to try (cf. 10): 'serpit humi tutus nimium' (Hor. Ars 28, with Brink's n.). They are like stunted or at least low-growing plants; cf. Cic. Tusc. 5. 37 'ea quae sunt humiliora neque se tollere a terra altius possunt'; TLL s.v. humilis 3104. 25-42. terram spectantes: an orator mimes humilitas'icapite] deiecto' (11. 3. 69). These cowed pupils 'keep their heads down', like beasts rather than humans (Mayor collects many passages on Juv. 15. 147). In the agricultural analogy, they resemble unassertive plants (Plin. Nat. 22. 82 'iasine . . . in terra repens'), or ones bowed down by the weather (Verg. A. 9.436-7 'lassoue papauera collo | demisere caput pluuia cum forte grauantur'). nihil... attollere: cf. 1. 2. 31 'pudet supra modum sermonis attolli', 1. 9. 2 'sermone puro et nihil se supra modum extollente'; and n. on 2. 3. 8 se... attollere. In our passage, if the text is sound, nihil must be accusative, not (as Colson suggested on 1. 2. 31) adverbial, cotidianus sermo would naturally need heightening in prose of any pretensions; it too is 'humble' (11. 1 . 6 ) .
macies... infirmitas est: Q. makes his point with elegant chiasmus and variation, though iudicii blurs the metaphor. The simile of 6 'maciem... et infirmitatem' (see n. on maciem) now becomes metaphor; cf. 12. 10. 15
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'hi sunt enim qui suae inbeeillitati sanitatis appellationem, quae est maxime contraria, opt en da nt'; Tac. Dial. 21. 1 'quique alii in eodem ualetudinario haec ossa et hanc maciem probant', 23. 3 'illam ipsam quam iactant sanitatem non firmitate sed ieiunio consequiuitur' (and in 4, literally now, 'prope abest ab infirmitate in quo sola sanitas laudator'), with the commentators. The imagery from bodily health (cf. also on 2. 3. 9 inflantur) echoes that used of Atticists during the controversy of the late Republic; for Cicero himself, see the convenient list in Douglas's edition of Cic. Brut., p. xliii. That list also includes ieiunitas (cf. 2.4. 3), inopia (2.4.4), limatus (2. 8.4), pressus(2. 8.4), son us (cf. 2. 4. 9), siccus (2. 4. 6), and subtilis (cf. 2. 8. 15). infirmitas: in Tac. Dial. 23. 4, cited above, the word means 'ill-health'; in our passage Q. perhaps thinks rather (or as well) of the 'feebleness' that prevents these students from spreading their wings. Q. forgets that he has told us that infirmitas can lead to cacozelia (2. 3. 9). satis... carere: cf. again Tac. Dial. 23. 4 (literal) 'parum est aegrum non esse', where Gudeman 95 compares [Plu.] Moralia 7 A: just as the body should be not only vyieivov but also CVCKTIKOV, speech should be OVK avooov fiovov dAAti KOLI evpojorov. satis putant: cf. 11. 3. 11, cited below, p. 185; also 12 pr. 4 'satis habet [ OLD s.v. satis 4] dicere*. uitio carere: prima uirtus(8.3.41), but not the only one. Cf. Plin. Ep. 9. 26.1 'nihil peccat nisi quod nihil peccat'. in id ipsum... uitium: not very logically put; in avoiding faults, they fall into one. mihi: ethic dative (K-S i. 323-4), as in 1. 11. 14, 12. 2. 31 (also 1. 2. 1 'nobis'), all with jussive subjunctives (as in Liv. pr. 9). ne maturitas... festinet: cf. 6 pr. 10 'obseruatum fere est celerius occidere festinatam maturitatem'; even more gloomily, Sen. Ep. 39. 4 'ad maturitatem non peruenit nimia fecund itas\ Both ne... quidem and ipsa stress the point that even the entirely desirable goal of maturity is not to be reached too quickly. festinet: 'i. propere efificiatur' (TLL s.v. festino 618. 6); see on 2. 1. 12 festinationem. nec.. .proficient: maturitas (of wine e.g. Col. 1. 6. 20), together with Cic. de Orat. 2. 88, cited on 8 apud Ciceronem, sparks off a short vinous metaphor. Cic. Brut. 288 (where 'maturior... et mitior' will look back to the metaphor) uses the image of style: 'censuerim et nouam istam quasi de musto ac lacu feruidam orationem fiigiendam nec illam praedaram Thucydidi nimis ueterem tamquam Anicianam notam persequendam' (with what precedes in 287); and Q. may well be glancing at the frothy exuberance of youthful
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expression: cf. 12. 6. 4 on Cicero's early excesses, 'quae... deferuisse tempore et annis liquata iam senior idem fatetur [Orat. 107]'. musta in lacu: must, the unfermented juice, ran away, after the grapes were trodden and pressed, into cisterns: Isid. Etym. 15. 6. 8 'lacus dictus quia ibi decurrit frugum [v./. uuarum] liquor' (cf. 20. 14. 12). For details, see Smith, Dictionary 976, s.v. torculum; Daremberg-Saglio, iii. 2. 904-5 s.v. lacas, v. 360-2 s.v. torcular, D. Flach, Romische Agrargeschichte (Munich, 1990), 282. austera: the mot juste for dry wine: TLL s.v. austerus 1558. 65 fif. (of must, Plin. Nat. 14. 85). Q. means that if the wine is sweet in the early stages, it will go on over the years to reach the desired flavour, a pleasant dryness to judge by Cic. de Orat. 3. 103 'ita sit nobis igitur ornatus et suauis orator...ut suauitatem habeat austeram et solidam, non dulcem atque decoctam' (also Brut. 288 'mitior'). statim implies that the wine will eventually and inevitably become drier, though the process could be taken too far: Cic. Brut. 287 'nimia uetustas nec habet earn quam quaerimus suauitatem nec est iam sane tolerabilis'; still, very old wine did have its admirers: Sen. Ep. 63. 5 'in uino nimis ueteri ipsa nos amaritudo delectat'. Must, on the other hand, was normally sweet (Verg. G. 1. 295 'dulcis'). But wines differed (note Plin. Nat. 14. 30), so that Ariston could use a quite different simile (Sen. Ep. 36. 3): 'aiebat malle se adulescentem tristem quam hilarem et amabilem turbae, uinum enim bonum fieri quod recens durum et asperum uisum est; non pati aetatem quod in dolio (another receptacle for must] placuit'. A variation of the theme, relating to fruit, is in Gellius 13. 2: once when Accius was staying with Pacuvius, already an old man, and read his tragedy Atreus to him, Pacuvius remarked that it showed, apart from positive qualities, a certain harshness and bitterness; Accius replied that this made him hopeful for his future work, since (13. 2. 5) 'quod in pomis est, itidem... esse aiunt in ingeniis; quae dura et acerba nascuntur, post fiunt mitia et iucunda'. For the literal and metaphorical meanings of suauis and dulcis, primarily in Cicero, see A. H. Mamoojee, Phoenix, 35 (1981), 220-36. et annos ferent et uetustate proficient: cf. Cic. Amic: 67 'uina quae uetustatem ferunt'; Macrobius, Sat 2. 3. 2 (citing Cicero) 'bene... aetatem fert [sc. Falernum hoc]'. Q. says metaphorically, of successful authors, that they 'uetustatem pertulerunt' (10. 1.40), and he hopes his students will eventually do that too, or at least that they 'will improve' with time (cf. 2. 12. 8, where uetustas removes uitia from wine). For proficio of plants and the like, see TLL s.v. 1698. 17-37, missing our passage, but citing Origen on Matt. 22:1-14 [x. 651 Klostermann-Benz] 'uua... acerba intellegitur malitia eius qui... pennanet in id ipsum, aim deberet ad maturitatem proficere dulcem et ofiferre uirtutis alicuius manducabilem botrionem'. For the abl. with this verb, cf. Col. 3. 20. 1 'id quod umore proficit'; also Q. 1.6. 11 'uetustate exoleuerat'.
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4.10 ne illud... deficere: cf. n. on 2. 2. 7 non acerbus, and esp. Theon 72.4-7 (p. 17) F) 8e 8iop6coots€OTiv <€7TiTr]8€ta> [not needed?] OVK an dp^-QS ndvra TO. ap.apTrjfi.aTa nepiaipovoa. aXX oXiya Kat pdXiora TO. npo8rjXa. on OJS pr) aOvpuos o veos 8 tare dels 8vocXm OTOS els ra pera ravra yevqrat. deficere: 'grow discouraged'. Cf. the locution ammo deficit aliquis (e.g. Caes. Gal. 7. 30. 1); for the absolute use, cf. Cic. Att. 1. 16. 9 'ne una plaga accepta patres conscripti conciderent, ne deficerent'. 4. 11 qui frondibus.. .posse: compare the metaphor at 12. 6. 2 'ut neque praepropere destringatur inmatura frons...', correctly interpreted by Austin. Our passage is inspired by Verg. G. 2. 362-70 (consult Mynors and Thomas ad loc.), where note esp. 'Ac dum prima nouis adolescit frondibus aetas, | parcendum teneris, et... | ipsa acie nondum falcis temptanda [sc. uitis]... | Inde ubi iam ualidis amplexae stirpibus ulmos | exierint, turn stringe comas, turn bracchia tonde | (ante reformidant ferrum),...'. reformidant personifies the vine (imitated by Col. 5. 6. 9 [an elm] 'primo biennio ferri reformidat ictum'; and note his absolute use (OLD s.v. reformido 3b) meaning 'shrink from growth'), thus making Q.'s analog)' even more natural. Q. knows his Second Georgic well (see Colson on 1. 3. 5), and cicatricem (again used by the technical writers: TLL s.v. cicatrix 1047. 72-82) might be inspired by line 379. 4. 12 iucundus: as opposed to seuerus (9. 4. 120). turn maxime: 'particularly at that stage'. remedia... leniantur: for the nexus of words cf. 4. 3. 10 'si quid erit asperum, praemolliemus'; 6. 3. 87 'ab asperioribus ad leniora deflectitur'. molli manu is the gentle touch; cf. 11. 1. 70 (of Cicero) 'quam molli... articulo tractauit Catonem!' (see n.on 2. 12. 2 mollis articulus), Cic. Att 2. 1. 6 'me quodam modo molli bracchio de Pompei familiaritate obiurgas'. Such criticism might be of a pupil's oral effort, conducted in the presence of his fellows, when it would be kind of the master to pull his punches. But at least in the next section Q. is thinking of the (private?) correction of written work. laudare: presumably sc. debet. inluminare: give the passage new lustre and life ('brighten up': M. F. Moor, CR 36 [1922], 90); cf. 2. 16. 10 'pulchritudinem rerum claritas orationis inluminat' (with n.), 12. 10. 36 'oratio tralationum nitore inluminanda' (perhaps inspired by Cic. de Orat 3. 170). 'Elucidate' (Afifahl 129; TLL s.v. illumino 392. 20-8) is not to the point. totas... materias: cf. 10. 5. 21 'iuuenis quem praeceptor coegerit... per totas ire materias', where the contrast is with the treatment of a few attractive passages. Here it is with aliquid sui (hence B's order of words has the edge: ipsum totas A). In the other passage Q. is explicitly talking of declamation
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proper; here he presumably (as in 2.6.1) means exercises' (see n. on 2. 21. 20 positam ... testamur) according to the stage reached; cf. n. on 2. 2. 6 dictionibus. For the provision of fair copies, see n. on 2. 2. 8 ipse aliquid... dicat quae... refer ant interim: probably 'for the moment', until he can produce ones as good for himself (note puer), rather than the somewhat discouraging 'sometimes' (Loeb). Donald Russell suggests a third possibility, 'at the same time', i.e. in the course of imitating. tamquam suas amet: cf. 10. 1. 130 'si non omnia sua amasset', 10. 3. 7, 12; 10. 4. 2; Cic. Tusc. 5. 63 'te tua, me delectant mea'. 4. 13 stilus: the boy's written work; cf. 6. 1. 42 'qui a stilo non recedunt' of those who do not depart from a written text. recipiat: 'admit of'; so Decl. miti. 271. 2 'iam praeterit crimen nec emendationem recipit' (of a son's offence). rursus... retractatam: no fault is to be found with the verb in this sense (Cic. Mur. 54 'ille locus..., perpurgatus ab eis qui ante me dixerunt, a m e . . . retractandus'), and as the superfluity is idiomatic (below, 28 'ante praeparatis' with n.; cf. perhaps 1. 1. 25 'retro agant rursus'; K-S ii. 575; Lofstedt, ii. 178) we should not prefer A's tractatam. iuberem: perhaps iterative subjunctive (cf. 6. 1. 40 'quotiens respexisset patronus'; K-S ii. 206-7), quite apart from the oratio obliqua. posse enim... melius: a verb of saying is understood from iuberem. For enim cf. e.g. 2. 11.3; Cic. Off. 3. 100 'reddi captiuos negauit esse utile; illos enim adulescentes esse...'. adhuc melius: sc. scribere. quatenus: purely causal, as in e.g. 6. 2. 12 (K-S ii. 384). As the mood of gaudent and the sense both show, the clause is not part of the orat. obi.; Q. adds a general comment on the principle behind his precept. nullo magis... quam: cf. 2. 16. 12 'deus... nullo magis hominem separauit a ceteris... quam...' (also 5. 14. 14 'epichirema... nullo differt a syllogismis nisi quod ...'); OLD s.v. null us 2c. 4. 14 ausis: cf. 6 'audeat haec aetas plura'. licentius: 'too free'; normally licentia is just wrong (note 3), but some degree of it is tolerable at this age, when Q. has been arguing for a sympathetic laxity. laetius: 'too florid'; see on 4 indoles laeta. adhuc: contrasting with the future participle; see TLL s.v. adhuc655. 50-75, e.g. Plin. Ep. 1. 20. 24 'haec est adhuc sententia mea, quam mutabo si dissenseris tu'.
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ingenio... iudicio: cf. 7 'ingenium iudicio praesumitur', and also the contrast in 10. 1. 130 'uelles eum suo ingenio dixisse, alieno iudicio'. gaudebant: cf. 6 'inuentis gaudeat'. iudicio non fallebantur: the formation of a student's iudicium is of prime importance (cf. n. on 2. 2. 13 et placere quae bene dicet... delectetur), and the iudicium of the good teacher is his best model: 'ita fiet ut ex iudicio praeceptoris discipulus pendeat, atque id se dixisse recte quod ab eo probabitur credat' (2. 2. 9). In this instance he is being tactfully told that the teacher's favourable judgement ('laudare illud me adhuc') should not be taken as final. 4. 15 eo: i.e. to the treatment of narrative, abandoned in 4. But another digression will soon follow (see the introduction to 2. 4, above p. 75, and introductory n. on 1). egressus: digressus A, the more usual word; but cf. Cic. Leg. 2. 7 'ad earn partem sermonis ex qua egressi sumus reuertamur', Off. 2. 77 'eo unde egressa [v./. di-] est referat se oratio'. Q. varies between the two prefixes, for both verb and nouns (-gressus, -gressio). stilo componi: the writing (for the phrase cf. 3. 9. 9, 10. 5. 20) that must precede the speaking of the exercise; extempore dictiones are not to be encouraged. This is part of the sequence that began with a model dictio of the master (see n.on 2. 2. 8 ipse aliquid.. .dicat quae... referant). Cf. above, pp. xxvi f. ut...ita: the particles 'werden auch zur Bezeichnung eines Gegensatzes gebraucht ( = zwar .. aber, aber doch)' (K-S ii. 451); cf. 2. 10. 1, 10. 3. 28. Q. asserts that, when children are learning to talk, they should be encouraged to express themselves unselfconsciously; but at this later stage they need to prepare their little speeches and not extemporize like street-perfonners. dicere quae audierint: 'repeat what they have heard', with no pause for thought. At the later stage, the pupil reproduces in writing what he has heard from his master before speaking his own dictio. retro agere expositionem: 'reverse' (cf. 12. 2. 10) the order of a story told by the child which he is encouraged to practise in this peculiar way. Odd though it sounds, this method of teaching how to talk (or at least to improve one's talking) is parallel to the technique of teaching letters described at 1. 1. 25 ('retro agant rursus [sc. litteras] et uaria permutatione turbent'); our passage is not exploited by Bonner, Education, who indeed does not mention learning to talk at all,13 perhaps thinking, not unreasonably, that children do not need to be systematically taught to do what comes so naturally. Theon 86. 9-87. 12 (pp. 48-9) recommends the same technique 13
There is a m o m e n t a r y mention at Cribiore 171.
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for the practice of progymnasmatic narratio, pedantically listing different ways of changing the order. But Q. cannot be talking of that stage here. discurrere: suggesting the haste and lack of care forgivable at this stage (cf. Sen. Con. 2. 2. 9 'sine certo ordine per locos discurrebat'), contrasted with the diligentia needed later cogantur: not 'coniunctiuus... praecipientis scriptoris' (Spalding), but the concessive subjunctive found in 2. 8. 12 'Inbecillis.. .ingeniis sane sic obsequendum sit ut...Si uero...' (where see n.), 2. 20. 3 'quae nihil sane... habeat, sed...', and e.g. 12. 1. 23 'concedamus sane..., tamen ...'; OLD s.v. sane 8a. sed: picking up sane, they may reasonably be made to behave like this, but only at this early stage. ad gremium praeceptoris: TLL s.v. 2. gremium 2321. 48-9 seems to be correct in glossing 'quasi protegente et ductante [sic] pr'. The child sits on his teacher's (his nurse's? that of his paedagogus?) lap to be taught, or at least at his knees (Watson), so young is he. Cf. 1. 1. 24 'fingamus... Alexandrum dari nobis, impositum gremio dignum tanta cura infantem' (itself problematic, but perhaps best taken as by Russell), 1. 2.1 'sed nobis... puer et exire de gremio et discere serio incipiat'; for 2. 5. 5 'ad gremimil reuocatis' see n. there. <maiora>: some such addition is needed; cf. 1.11. 14 'et haec dum infirma aetas maiora non capiet'. For a similar expression see 2. 8. 13 'erit qui ex iis aliqua non possit'. The traditional stopgap, aliud, which goes back to Philander, is not convincing. res ac uerba conectere: fitting words to objects would be an even earlier stage, and we take it that Q. is talking rather of fitting facts into a consecutive narrative and words into a coherent pattern; cf. 11. 2. 2 'rerum ac uerborum contextum sequi'. protinus: cf. 1. 11. 14 'ut protinus pronuntiationem uocem memoriam exerceat'. In these two passages and some others (e.g. 1. 1. 35, 2. 5.6,2. 15. 34, 4. 2. 29, 5.13. 26; Hand, Tursellinus, iv. 625; Bonnell, Lexicon, s.v. I a gives a list that needs correction and expansion; OLD s.v. 4), the word appears to be equivalent to simul The usage, which may be unique to Q., is perhaps related to the logical sense (OLD s.v. 5) seen in e.g. 2. 21. 10. In the present passage, 'right from the start' is not satisfactory, because the training of memory, though of the highest importance at the early stage (1. 1. 36), is not the primary purpose of the exercises described, which is to build up loquendi facultas. cum iam... accipient: we return to the later stage, when the students are in the process of picking up the 'pattern of correct oratio during the preliminary exercises assigned by Q. to the rhetor, at 2. 7. 3 that process is marked as
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complete by the difference of tense: 'formam [see n. on et... expriment] orationis illam quam mente penitus acceperint expriment' (cf. 10. 5. 19 'iuuenis qui rationem inueniendi eloquendique... acceperit'). In 1. 5. 1 we are told that oratio should have three virtues, 'ut emendata, ut dilucida, ut ornata sit' (cf. 11.3. 30). Q. immediately goes on to assign teaching of the 'emendate loquendi regulam' to the gramniaticus (so at 1. 6. 20 'recta locutio' = opdo€7T€ia). That was also presumably the aim of whoever inculcated the loquendi facultatem' mentioned earlier in our section. But at the later stage the rhetor is concerned not with correct 'talking' (sertno) but with correct 'speaking' (oratio; cf. n.on 2. 3. 6 loqui). rectae: confirming the correctness of emendata oratio; the word is not used as in either 9. 2. 79 or 10. 5. 8 (see also 2. 5. 11 'sermo rectus', with n. on rectus), but cf. 10. 1. 44 'rectum dicendi genus', 89. Similarly below, 17 'ante discet recte dicere quam cito'. accipient: the future must be continuative or inchoative; cf. perhaps 1.11. 14 'haec dum infirma aetas maiora non capiet; ceterum cum legere orationes oportebit, cum uirtutes earum iam s e n t i e t . . I t seems to be used from the viewpoint of one looking forward from the earlier stage of education: 'when (much later) they will now be...'; for cum iam with the future cf. 11. 3. 159 'cum iam incipiendum erit', and perhaps 12. 11.7 'cum iam secretus .. .conlocarit et sentiet...'. The future does, however, seem to clash with est, and one wonders if Q. wrote accipiunt. garrulitas: well glossed by its first preserved use, Ov. Met. 5. 677-8 'nunc quoque in alitibus facundia prisca remansit | raucaque garrulitas studiumque immane loquendi'. Q. is kinder to extemporization in 10. 7 (1 'maximus... studiorum fructus est'); but he stresses there that it only comes with long practice, 'nec quisquam tantum fidat ingenio ut id sibi speret incipienti statim posse contingere' (18). And without the discipline of writing it has unhappy results even for an adult: 'inanem modo loquacitatem [cf. also 10. 5. 22] dabit et uerba in labris nascentia' (10. 3. 2). Cicero (de Orat. 1. 149-50), who also sees writing as crucial, complains that those who speak extempore 'linguae celeritatem incitant uerborumque frequentia delectantur'. [Plu.] Moralia 6 c-7 A also dwells on the dangers of extempore speech (fxaraioXoytas rrjs eoxdrrjg OLITIOV), especially for the young, though he regards mental preparation (see below), not writing, as the vital factor. cogitatio: oKe'ifrts ([Plu.] Moralia 6 c), 'preparation without writing', is discussed in 10. 6; Q. (again in the wake of Cic. de Orat. 1. 150) regards it as a half-way station between writing a speech (10. 3) and extemporizing it, 'inter scribendi laborem externporalemque fortunam' (10. 6. 1). Like extemporization, it cannot be mastered quickly (10. 6. 2-3, referred back to
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in 10. 7. 18). In our passage, Q. means something less elaborate: the pupil does not stop to think. At this age, writing is the key to success. uix...mora: the words go together (not cited by OLD s.v. uix 2b; K-S 1. 219-220). The habit is criticized in maturer dedaimers, whom (10. 7. 21) 'peruersa ducit ambitio ut exposita controuersia protinus dicere uelint'; cf. Fairweather 233-4, and add Gel. 9. 15. 9. For Greek extemporization see Russell, Declamation, 79-81, and n.on 2. 21. 21 Gorgias... uellet. circulatoriae: characteristic of those who attract an impromptu circle of listeners in the street (Ammendola compares Gk. oxAaytoyos); cf. 10. 1 . 8 'nobis... copia cum iudicio paranda est, uim orandi, non circulatoriam uolubilitatem spectantibus', with Peterson ad loc., citing e.g. Sen. Ep. 40. 3 'istam uim dicendi rapidam atque abundantem aptiorem esse circulanti quam agenti rem magnam ac seriam docentique'. uere: probably to be taken with the adjective; cf. e.g. 11. 1. 35 'uir duilis uereque sapiens', OLD s.v. lb. iactationis: 'showing off'. Q. disliked iactatio in several manifestations: see e.g. 1. 5. 11,4. 3. 2, 11. 1. 25; for his comments on this vice, and others related to it, see Winterbottom's introduction at Corsi 14-15. 4. 16 parentium: for their keenness to see their little dears perform, see 2. 7. 1 with n. on patres. contemptus operis: cf. esp. 12.6. 2 'inde [i.e. from starting one's oratorical career too young] et contemptus operis innascitnr et fundamenta iaciuntur impudentiae'. inuerecunda frons: a person's brow being regarded as an indicator of his character. Cf. Val. Max. 8. 2. 2 'nummos... quos... fronte inuerecunda... captauerat' ('shamelessly'); Q. 12. 5. 4 'optima est... emendatio uerecundiae ['shyness'] fiducia et quamlibet inbecilla frons [i.e. one that blushed too readily] magna consdentia sustinetur'. malorum: of course rhetorical vices. For the gen. cf. Cic. Cat 2. 9 'stuprorum et scelerum exercitatione adsuefactus'. de se persuasio: cf. n. on 2. 2. 12 uana de se persuasio. 4. 17 erit.. .tempus: cf. Caes. Gal. 3. 4. 1 'ut iis rebus... admini strand is tempus daretur'. In our passage erit suum is equivalent to dabitur (note also 2. 1. 13 'dabuntur illis turn quoque tempora sua'), facilitatis (given by the corrector of A) is not needed. n e c . . . transibitur: referring forward to the discussion of extempore eloquence in 10. 7. sum mo., .la bore: as the digression (IB) nears its end, Q. recalls its start ('quanta maxima possit adhibita diligentia', 15). Similarly, the emphatic scripserit picks up stilo. probabile looks further back, to the need for the
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teacher to show generous approval of any good work (2. 2. 6; also 2. 2. 9 probabitur, contrast 2. 3. 11 'indoctus ille etiam probabit fortasse uitiosa'), though that has been reinforced in 12. hoc: accusative (Liv. 24. 5. 9 'inde a puero in omnia familiaria iura adsuetum'). naturam faciat: cf. Cic. Fin. 5. 74 consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici' (ND 2. 152 is different). See Colson on 1. 2. 8 'fit ex his consuetudo, inde natura'; Otto, Sprichwdrter, 90-1, adding, for secunda natura, Grillius, Comm. in Cic. Rhet. p. 26. 89-90 Jakobi. The Greek proverb is given by Julian, Misopogon 353 A as edos Sevrepr} 4>vats; to Otto's refs. add D.H. Comp. 25 (p. 134. 19-20 Usener-Radermacher). Cf. also 2. 5. 2 'longa consuetudo... fecerat legem' (with n. on consuetudo). Watt 143 suggested the addition of morem before naturam, asking pertinently: 'how does one construe the genitives huius reiV One might think rather of adding consuetudine (cf. the passages just cited); for the genitive of the thing to which one becomes accustomed cf. e.g. 1. 3. 11 'ne [remissiones]... faciant... otii consuetudinem nimiae', and above 'consuetudo pessime dicendi' (16). The matter is complicated by the variants. A has sibi rei, perhaps discouraging to any such addition, but B's rei sibi might admit 'huius rei sibi' or 'huius rei sibi '. For the order cf. 9. 2. 37 (from Livy) 'magnas opes sibi magnumque nomen facere', 12. 10. 61 'et ripas sibi faciat'. Contrast 5. 14. 31 'ac sibi uiam, si quando non acceperit, faciat', where sibi is quite emphatic and faciat pointed. ille.. .cito: an epigrammatic summary provides closure of the digression. The qualified optimism of this exhortation is characteristic: cf. 12. 11. 30 'aut euademus in summum aut certe multos infra nos uidebimus' (Q.'s last words before the final address to his friend Marcus Vitorius). recte recalls rectae in 15 ('correct'), cito apparently refers to the Wee described in 'nec expectata cogitatio et uix surgendi mora' (15), rather than to speaking too fast (though see the Senecan passage cited on 15 circulatoriae). 4. 18 restruendi: as Russell was the first to see, B's reading is correct (destruendi A); cf. 2. 17. 30 (restituere B; destruere A, but the first letter has been corrected), 10. 5.12 (restructio b [here a primary MS]; destructio B). The words in de- are obviously more familiar to scribes, and are indeed (in our sense) transmitted without variant at 3. 9. 5, 5. 7. 36, and 7. 3. 19. Outside Q., Russell compared Stat. Theb. 10. 878-9 'tabulataque saeuus | restruit (v./. destruit)'; PHI knows no other parallel. Q. is our first witness to both re- or de- in this sense, but later de- naturally established itself. For the prefix re- in this destructive sense, see OLD s.v. re- 'reversal of a previous process': thus e.g. resigno, resuo, retexo.
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avaoK€vrj et KaraoKcvrj: defined by Hermogenes 11. 2-3: dvaoKevrj eortv avarpoTTT] TOV TrpoTtOevTos TTpdypiaTos, KciTaoKevr) 8E rovvavrtov fiefiaiauois; Lausberg, §1122. Theon (see Patillon, pp. xciii-xcvii) does not, likeQ. and the later progymnasmatists, give them a section of their own, but instead introduces them under each of the 'disputable exercises', chria, myth, narrative, thesis, and law (see in summary 65. 18-23 [pp. 8-9]); he remarks on how near this exercise comes to a case in court (78. 11-13 [p. 38], referring back to 60. 6-10 [p. 2]). Q. from now on diverges from known Latin sources (see above, p. 76), though cf. Suet. Rhet 25. 4 'saepe fabulis fidem firmare aut demere, quod genus.. .dvaoKevds et KaraoKevds Graeci uocant', with Raster's n.). He will return to the exercise when discussing the acquisition of facility at a later stage (10. 5. 12), there speaking of its application to general statements, sententiae. fabulosis et carmine traditis: see on 2 fabulam... remota-, Q. seems again (see n. on 2 poeticas) to be combining fabula and argumentum in one phrase, while annates represent historical narrative; for the juxtaposition of poetry and annals, cf. Cic. Rab. Post. 43 '[uera laus] quae non poetarum carminibus, non annalium monumentis celebratur...'. porro appears to be almost equivalent to enim (OLD s.v. porro 6b 'explaining or enlarging upon a point'); Q., who has restricted the rhetors remit to historical narrative (2), now remarks that dvaoKevq and KaraoKcvrj can be applied to stories found in history, not just to those found in myth, and his implication may be that this exercise should be confined, or largely restricted, to history. But he blurs the distinction by giving examples not from 'real' history but from quasi-mythical stories found in the Roman annalists; cf. 'Nicolaus' in Rh. Gr. i. 287-8: the tale ofCandaules in Herodotus. For the practice of the Greek progymnasmatists, see below on in utramquepartem. credibile: naturally the main line of attack (Hermogenes 11. 8 dvaoKcvdocis.. .CK TOV dmddvov; Patillon, p. xcv). Naturally too, judicial narrative needed to be believable (4. 2. 31). super caput: in galea, as Livy has it in his version (7. 26. 3-5). He at least seems unperturbed by the probability of this story. os oculosque: as in Livy; cf. also Cic. Phil. 8. 20 (where uerberauit happens to follow), Verg. A. 8. 152. alis euerberaret: a new and vivid addition to Livy's story, perhaps prompted, so P. Hardie, Cosmos and Imperium (Oxford, 1986), 151 n. 78, by Virgil's wording in a related scene in A. 12. 861-6 (note 866 'clipeumque euerberat alis'); Eutropius 2. 6. 3 has 'alis et unguibus Galli oculos uerberauit'. in utramque partem: cf. Hermogenes' doctrine (differing from Theon's) that neither dvaaKcvq nor kclraoKevrj should be practised on myth, but only on TOJV €<J> EKARCPA rrjv CMXEIPIQOIV Sexofxeviov (11. 4-7); cf. also Aphthonius
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10. 11-12 and 13. 22-3. Yet all but one of Hermogenes' examples are taken (like Aphthonius' single one) from the area of myth. Similarly, Suet. Rhet. 25.4, cited above on avaoKevq et KaraaKewq, associates the exercise with myth; Nicolaus 31. 9-10 mentions a (standard) mythical topic (to TTcpl Advr)s eirovv 8iriy>7/xa, apparently corrupt; also 33. 3), but also (31. 22-32. 5; 32. 14-18) real-life oratory (Demosthenes, Timocr.). 4. 19 aut de serpente: apparently understand si quaeratur, while the force of de extends to 'lupa... et Egeria'. For the story see Liv. 26. 19. 7 ('famam in Alexandra magno prius uolgatam, et uanitate et fabula parem'); Gel. 6. 1. 1-5. lupa Romuli et Egeria Numae: Liv. 1. 4. 6-7 (with a suggested rationalization), 19. 5 (simulat; also 1. 21. 3 uelut). The genitives are elliptical, for brevity. nam: elliptically, as at 2. 17. 15 'nam de Epicuro...', and in the passage of Sallust cited at 2. 13. 14: 'I don't need to give Greek examples, for...'. plerumque is thus emphatic. For this usage, see Bonnell, Lexicon, s.v. e; OLD s.v. 5. See also nn.on 2. 4. 27 nam and 2. 21. 9 nam scalptura. licentia: see n. above on 3 poeticae licentiae. For the sentiment see Juv. 10. 174-5 'quidquid Graecia mendax | audet in historia'. Mayor ad loc. gives many interesting parallels, including Q. 10. 1. 74 (on Clitarchus). The joke attributed to Atticus in Cic. Brut. 42 ('concessum est rhetoribus ementiri in historiis, ut aliquid dicere possint argutius') has nothing to do with rhetorical historians. For the convergence of poetry and history see 10. 1. 31 '[historia] est.. .proxima poetis, et quodam modo carmen solutum est'; Norden, AK 91-3; A. J. Woodman, Rhetoric in Classical Historiography (London and Sydney, 1988), 98-101. de tempore... persona: Theon 94. 10-11 (p. 59) recommends discussion of 7Tp6oa>7TOV npaypa TOTTOS \povos rponos atria. Liuius: much in Q.'s mind in this section; he was (2. 5. 19) good reading for pueri. Livy's 'doubts' (see e.g. 1. 3. 2) seem to be meant (by Q.) to extend to time and place as well as person. 4. 20 paulatim... incipiet: even in this discussion of progymnasmata, Q. preserves the forward movement of his book, as the envisaged student gradually becomes older. He seems to be delaying his source's treatment of commonplace (see above, p. 76), perhaps because he judged it more difficult than encomium. incipiet: the pupil has to be understood as subject; cf. K-S i. 6-7. laudare... uituperare: the verbs seem to be in a kind of apposition to maiora rather than to be governed by incipiet For the exercise see Suet. Rhet. 25. 4 'uiros illustres laudare uel uituperare' (with Kaster ad loc.), Theon 109. 19-112. 21 (pp. 74-8) {eyKupuov and ifioyos); Lausberg, §1129.
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Commentary
Like the associated exercise of comparison, it was obviously good training for ever)' kind of real-life oratory (cf. 3. 4. 11 'Isocrates in omni genere inesse laudem ac uituperationem existimauit'). Q. mentions only the usefulness of exempla; but Nicolaus 48. 4-16 regards practice of encomium as generally useful for all kinds of orator)', citing Isocrates' Panegyricus and the De corona. formatur: as often of moral moulding (2. 16. 10 'ad formandas mentes'; 12. 2. 27 'moribus... formandis'). The thought, so characteristic of Q. (Winterbottom5 320-1), finds parallels in the Greek progymnasmatists, almost entirely in connection with the more elementary exercises: thus Theon on chriae (60. 17-19 [p. 2]), and Hermogenes (1. 3-5) on myth (note esp. anaXous ovras [sc. TOVS WOU?] a(iovot TTXarrets; T. Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds (Cambridge, 1998), 120-51 ('Maxims and Morals'). It is here that such moral training could have its widest effect, for, as Morgan shows (summary, p. 203) to judge from papyri few advanced beyond these early exercises. For an even earlier stage, note Bonner, Education, 173-5. See further above, p. xxvi n. 10. multa... cognitio rerum... potentissima: cf. 10. 1. 34 'est et alius ex historiis usus...ex cognitione rerum exemplorumque, quibus in primis instructus [cf. also 12. 11. 22] esse debet orator; nec omnia testimonia expectet a litigatore, sed pleraque ex uetustate diligenter sibi cognita sumat, hoc potentiora [cf. also 10. 1. 15] quod ea sola criminibits odii et gratia uacant'. For exempla from history, see L-P on Cic. de Orat. 1. 40; for Greek, Doreen Innes compares D.H. Pomp. 6 (final words). iam turn: the words would ordinarily refer explicitly to the past, as in e.g. 2. 5. 2. Here presumably: 'already at that stage I am discussing, it equips with examples the student who will later be able to use them as necessary.' 4. 21 hinc: again (cf. 18 non inutiliter subiungitur) Q. comments on the connection between the previous exercise and the one'coming up' (cf. 10. 3.5). comparationis: ovyKpLois, dealt with in Theon 112. 23-115. 12 (pp. 78-82); Lausberg, §1130. Theon too (like the later progymnasmatists) makes the exercise follow on praise, and he concentrates on comparison in that context; but he has already made it clear in 60. 31-61. 6 (p. 3) that it had far wider relevance. Similarly, Hermogenes remarks that it can also be applied in commonplace (18. 16-17); and below, §24, Q. applies it to thesis. The exercise is discussed by F. Focke in Hermes, 58 (1923), 331-2; he goes on to make the link with Plutarch's comparisons (p. 332; see C. Pelling, Plutarch and History (Swansea, 2002), 349-63) and to discuss comparison in encomium generally (pp. 332-9; note Cic. de Orat 2. 348). uter: depending on the verbal force in comparationis (Cic. Off. 1. 152 .. comparatio, de duobus honestis utnim honestius'). Q. thinks of compar isons of pairs of people, just as he had talked of praise of persons; but Theon
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(112. 24-5 [p. 78]) discusses comparisons irpoadniriov re KOLI I T p a y p L d r o j v , just as he had appended praise of inanimate things in 112. 16-19 (p. 78). duplicat: cf. e.g. Nicolaus 60. 4 SurXovveoTiv €VTav9aeyKojp,tov; also Theon 61. 2-4 (p. 3), with Patillon's n. 20. contraque: i.e. uituperationis. For similar locutions (OLD s.v. contra 10b) cf. 3. 7. 2 'laudare testem uel contra'; 5. 13. 57 'laudamus aut contra' (also 2. 5. 15). tertia... pars: epideictic, sometimes called encomiastic (3. 4. 12), detailed precepts for which follow in 3. 7. Q. envisages teaching on this topic both at the elementary and at the advanced level. Similarly, Theon (61. 20-9 [pp. 3-4], with Patillon, pp. lxxiv f.), defends the inclusion (discussed again, in different terms, by Nicolaus 47. 12-48. 18) among the (non-particular) progymnasmata of one of the main divisions of hypothesis (i.e. rhetoric in its particularized form) by saying that he is influenced by school practice to give the easier parts of the doctrine here, while deferring the more precise TcxvoXoyia to the appropriate place.1*' The mention in our passage of 'the third part of rhetoric' may therefore be pointed. 4. 22 communes loci: Hermogenes 11. 21-12. 5: irpoaayopevop.evos S e KOIVOS T07T0S.
avtjyoiv 8lOTl
e^ei
D.pp.OTT€l
rov
6p.oXcyyovp.evov
/ c t t t t t 7 t ( z l ' t o ? p€V
o
ronos
7rpdyp.arog lepOGvXoV.
o ...
KOIVOS Aeyerai
l>7T€p 7TCLVTOS S e
apioreoos; Lausberg, 126-8. Whereas Hermogenes' exercise is a step on the way to declamation rather than real life, Q. goes on to make clear the connection with the realities of the court (so Nicolaus 46. 20-2: 'It is obvious to everyone that commonplace promises practice for legal oratory'); though see below on ponatur. Q. returns to the topic in 10. 5. 12. de iis loquor... perorare: Q. differentiates these from the loci of 27 below (cf. n. on 2. 1. 11 communes loci... uersantur). He may have split up the two types, placing theses between them, because he wished to grade the exercises in order of sophistication or attractiveness, and felt that the loci e.g. de testibus called for maturer students. citra personas: cf. on 2. 1. 9 citra complexum... continentur, Plin. Ep. 1.10. 7 '[Euphrates] insectatur uitia, non homines'; Theon 106. 23-7 (p. 62), differentiating commonplace from encomium in that no specified persons are involved. i n . . . uitia... perorare: cf. 11. 1. 61 'in matrem perorandum'; Sen. Ep. 108. 13 'aim Attalum audirem in uitia... perorantem'; as in the parallels just cited, there is no reference to the peroration: TLL s.v. peroro I A. 14
T h e i m p r e s s i o n is given that he p r o p o s e s himself t o w r i t e a p r o p e r Ars rhetorica,
Aelius T h e o n o f A l e x a n d r i a is ( o n one p u n c t u a t i o n o f the Suda)
as indeed
said t o h a v e d o n e . Again, the
closing w o r d s o f t h e b o o k ( 1 4 4 |p. 112|) m i g h t seem t o look f o r w a r d t o a rlx>'»?: 'Tels sont d o n e les exercices qu'il c o n v i e n t d e pratiquer avant d ' a b o r d e r la cause.'
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Commentary
adulterum, aleatorem, petulantem: cf. 5. 10. 20 'locos appello non, ut uulgo nunc intelleguntur, in luxuriem et adulterium et similia...'; so Rh. Gr. vii. 503. 16-7 KOIVOV TOTTOV KARA /xoi^cta?. In our passage, too, one would expect instances of vices rather than of the vicious. But Q. means 'the adulterer etc. as a type' (cf. Hermogenes' Kara ttgyros... UpoovXov); as he (or a dose colleague) says in Decl. min. 244. 5 'communis est locus aduersus adulteros omnes, proprius aduersum hos adulteros'. Note Cic. de Orat. 3. 106 '[loci communes] quorum partim habent uitiorum et peccatorum acrem... incusationem,.. .ut in depeculatorem, in proditorem, in parricidam'; also Sen. Con. 2. 1. 25 'in diuitias dixit, non in diuitem'. mediis... iudiciis: cf. on 2. 1. 11 medullis. si reum adicias: cf. 25 'personis modo adiectis'; Theon 106. 15-22 (p. 62). For the opposite process, working back from particular cases to the underlying questions, see 10. 5. 13. hi quoque... solent: i.e. even the generalized loci 'in adulterum' etc. can be 'brought down' to something more specific. For deduci cf. 5. 10. 61 'genere in speciem [note the singular] deducto'; also Fortunatianus, Ars rhet. 2. 10 (p. 107. 20 Halm) 'deductione generis ad speciem'. Note also TLL s.v. descendo 651. 38-52, e.g. Serv. on A. 11. 599, adding Q. 7. 1. 23. See n. on 2. 14. 5 diducuntur in species. ponatur: pono is the normal term for the setting of the theme of a controversia (e.g. 2. 21. 20, where see n. on positam... testamur, 3. 8. 53, 4. 2. 28, and some of the passages assembled in Bonnell, Lexicon, s.v. IV; OLD s.v. 15b [defective]); see on 2. 10. 15 positionum. Here the verb is used analogously of the setting of a progymnasma theme. adulter... senex: cf. the corrupt 7. 1. 28. Theon 106. 11-15 (p. 62) (cf. 109. 12-18 [p. 66]) talks of loci which are ov\ anXoi, like the one 'against a general who is a traitor', but this terminology is attacked by Nicolaus 39. 4-17. habent... defensionem: commonplaces of this kind, normally directed against vices, can sometimes even {etiam) involve their being defended. Theon 106. 9-10 (p. 62) mentions loci in favour of benefactors, like killers of tyrants (cf. also Nicolaus 36. 16-18, with further discussion later in that chapter), but not these rather paradoxical defences, reminiscent of Gorgias' encomium of Helen and similar sophistic products (cf. 2. 17. 4). 4. 23 nam et pro luxuria et pro amore dicimus: Q. gives first two examples of loci in favour of vices. He may be thinking of free-standing loci, of loci included in declamations or forensic speeches, or of both. In any case, he doubtless has in mind passages in Cicero's defence of Caelius; see Austin on
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Cael. 39-42, adding Lys. 24. 17 (cf. Q. 6. 2. 15 'ueniam petere adulescentiae, defendere amores'). As Spalding points out, Cicero (29) twits the accuser with use of commonplaces 'in rem, in uitia, in mores, in tempo ra', and asks the jury not to apply them to the defendant. luxuria: here of course the extravagance (often with a marked sexual element) of the debauchee, who frequently appears in declamation (e.g. Sen. Con. 2. 6, 3. 1, 3. 3; note Theon 106. 8-9 [p. 62]: a commonplace Kara. . .OLOOJTOV), not the general luxury of the day, constantly deplored in the schools (see Winterbottom on Ded. min. 301. 10). et leno... crimini: Q. now moves to speak unequivocally of declamations (rather than forensic speeches) including commonplaces: we sometimes speak on behalf of a leno or a parasitus in such a way as to defend not the man but the way of life that is held against him. It would hardly be possible to do this without also defending the man (as taking on his case of course demanded), and Q. is writing epigrammatically rather than precisely. He means that within such a speech one may sometimes abstract from the case (contrast 22 'si reum adicias') and speak of the defendant as a member of a group for which something can, surprisingly enough, be said. leno... parasitusque: mentioned together at 11. 3. 74 and 178 (cf. Decl. mai. 9. 10). Being a leno could in itself be the object of a charge (cf. 5. 10. 47), but it might also be made a reproach against someone faced with or involved in some other charge (cf. Sen. Con. 10. 1. 13); crimen could cover either (OLD s.v. 1 and 2a). Being a parasite presumably was not an offence, only a matter for reproach, employable e.g. in the sort of fictional case alluded to at 4. 2. 95-6. 4. 24 thesis: Hermogenes (cf. Theon 120. 13-18 [p. 82]) reports the definition rrjv 0€oiv ctvai e-TriaKeijfiv nvos 7rpdypLaros 6etopovfjL€vov dpLotopovaav nda-qs ISiKrjs nepiaTaaeoig (24. 2—4); it differs from commonplace OTI o fiev TOKOS eariv ofxoXoyovfxevov npaypLaTos avt;r)ois, -q 8e Ocats dpLta^7]Tov[j.€vov 7TPDYPLA.Tos £r)TR)ots (25. 13-15); see Lausberg, §§1134-8, adding Suet. Rhet. 25. 4 'quaedam... ad usum communis uitae instituta turn utilia et necessaria turn perniciosa et superuacanea ostendere,.. .quod genus Oeoeis... Graeci uocant', with Raster's n. Hermogenes 25. 16-20 (differently Theon 128. 5-7 [p. 94]) distinguishes (a) a simple type, e.g. should one marry, and (b) a double, e.g. should one be an athlete rather than a farmer. As Q. deals at first only with the double variety, 'theses.. .quae sumuntur' in effect means 'those theses that are taken'; in 25 he turns to the simple variety. It would be tedious to illustrate the topics Q. mentions exhaustively. For town and country life, see Winterbottom on Decl. min. 298. For lawyer and soldier, Q. himself gives the obvious example (Cic. Mur. 22). For marriage, see
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Commentary
3. 5. 8 (with Adamietz ad loc.); Decl. min. 257. 5 'et hoc dicerem si quaereretur hoc iudicio an mihi aliqua ducenda esset' (with what follows); Theon 121. 10 (p. 83), and the later progymnasmatists. For political ambition, see Theon 123. 8 (p. 86) 'whether the Wise Man will go into polities', worked out in what follows; also Cic. de Orat. 3. 112, Part 66. The theorists (Lausberg, §1134) distinguish two main types of thesis, practical and philosophical. Q. mentions only the former, presumably thinking the latter too difficult at this stage, or agreeing with Nicolaus (76. 20-2) that it is those concerned with philosophy who ra>v <j>voiKdiv Siaipeoeojv (fipOVTlOVOlV.
For a wider perspective on thesis, see the discussion in 3. 5. 5-11: 'Item conuenit quaestiones esse aut infinitas aut finitas. Infinitae sunt quae remotis personis et temporibus et locis ceterisque similibus in utramque partem tractantur, quod Graeci Oe'oiv dicunt' (5), as opposed to vnodeoeis, which are 'finitae .. .ex complexu rerum personarum temporum ceterorumque' (7). The examples given when Q. returns to thesis as an exercise in 10. 5. 13 look back to 3. 5. 8-11, not to our present passage. mire: with the adjectives (cf. 6. 3. 42). exercitationem: exercitationesK If the singular needed defence, 12. 2. 20 'ad exercitationem dicendi... uberior would provide it. Q. returns to the exercise in 10. 5. 11: 'in hoc [sc. developing facility] optime facient infinitae quaestiones, quas uocari thesis diximus, quibus Cicero iam princeps in re publica exerceri solebat.' speciosae: cf. 11. 3. 84 'cum speciosius quid uberiusque dicendum est'. suadendi officium: deliberative oratory, including school suasoriae,; cf. 3.8.6 '[pars deliberatiua] officiis constat duobus suadendi ac dissuadendi'. Theon 120. 22-3 (p. 83) associates commonplace with the SiKaorripiov, thesis with the eKKXrjoia (deliberative oratory) and aKpoaois (which presumably includes declamation; see n.on 2. 2. 8 ipse aliquid.. .dicat quae... refer ant). Nicolaus thinks thesis deliberative with encomiastic headings (esp. 73. 6-9). iudiciorum disceptationem: so A; iudicium disceptationemque B. The reference is clearly to judicial oratory, but the wording raises difficulties. For A's reading, cf. Cic. de Orat. 1. 22 'earn partem dicendi quae in forensibus disceptationibus iudiciorum aut deliberationum uersaretur' ('that part of oratory which is involved with disputes before the courts and in deliberative assemblies' May-Wisse), with the parallels given by L-P ad loc. In our passage the singular disceptationem seems awkward (and not fully defended by de Orat. 3. 111 'quae in ciuitate et forensi disceptatione uersantur'): 'discussion of law cases', 'discussion in the courts'? On the other hand, the parallels for B's (less rhythmical) reading (Cic. Cluent. 88,90,96; Fam. 5. 2. 8) are not exact, as
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only one case is being alluded to, whereas we need a reference to law cases in general. Still, even in that sense the locution seems possible, and it may have been chosen to give variety of construction. nam., .tractatur: Q. illustrates only the less obvious of the two practical applications of theses. 4. 25 sunt et illae... genus: Q. makes two separate points: there is another type of thesis (the single type: see on 24 thesis), and this type (unlike the first) is almost always relevant to deliberative oratory alone. Hence our comma after illae. namque... erunt: Q. explains why this kind of thesis is connected with the genus deliberatiuum: as soon as particular persons are added to the topic, the result is (not anything to do with controversiae or forensic oratory but) a suasoria-, this again (see on 24 suadendi officium) includes both declamation and real-life oratory. Cf. 3. 5. 8 'infinita est "an uxor ducenda" (cf. Bonner, Declamation, 3-4), finita "an Catoni ducenda", ideoque esse suasoria potest' (with Adamietz). et haepoints the parallel with loci communes, which become accusations si reum adicias (22); et is then not strictly logical, but if we omit it (so B) hae is left with little raison d'etre. petendine sint magistratus: similar to 'an res publica administranda' (cf. Bonner, Declamation, 4) at 3. 5. 8, where a particularizing case is again illustrated. 4. 26 coniecturalibus causis: cf. Rhet. Her. 1. 18 'coniecturalis [sc. constitutio] est cum de facto controuersia est' (Gk. aro^aa/xo?); Lausberg, §85. Q. again stresses the practical utility of the exercise, whether for declamation (see Dingel 69-88) or for oratory; controuersiis will cover both (cf. 2. 1. 9 'uerae fictaeque controuersiae', with n.). cur... similia: for such queries Reitzenstein 168 compared the opening of epigrams like AP 7. 422 (for aroxaoajpeda cf. coniecturalibus here); cf. also questions of ritual raised in Callimachus' Aitia (e.g. fr. 3 Pfeiffer, where the editor comments: 'prima poetae (somniantis) quaestio de causa sacrificii Gratiis sine tibiis et coronis in Paro insula oblati'). cur armata... Venus: for the fact, see Paus. 3. 15. 10; there was another such statue on Acrocorinth (Paus. 2. 5. 1, also mentioning a Cupid with bow); see further Granatelli2 854. The question was also asked, and answered, by Lactantius (D/v. Inst. 1. 20. 29-32: Sparta), and by the Greek epigrammatists, e.g. AP 16. 173, 176; 9. 320 is mysterious: see Gow-Page's helpful nn.in The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams (Cambridge, 1965), ii. 334-5. quid... armatus: this exercise clearly lies behind Prop. 2. 12 (see Butler and Barber's n.); cf. esp. Isid. Etym. 8. 11. 80 (on C u p i d ) . . ideo alatus pingitur, quia nihil amantibus leuius, nihil mutabilius inuenitur. Puer pingitur quia
106
Commentary
stultus est et inrationabilis amor. Sagittam et facem tenere fingitur, sagittam quia amor cor uulnerat, facem quia inflammat'. Reitzenstein 167-8 traces the discussion of Cupid's wings through different genres (cf. also Ferri on [Sen.] Oct. 557-8); for art, Granatelli2 854. ita: 'in the way that it is'; K-S ii. 499. scrutabamur uoluntatem... est: Q. now makes it clear why such questions were of relevance to rhetoric; answering them required examination of people's motives, and that was part of the pattern of argumentation prescribed for conjectural cases. One major division of conjectural cases was the question an uoluerit (7. 2. 44), and this could be called uoluntas (Lausberg, §156); under this head came investigation of motives for actions (7. 2. 35; cf. also 7. 1. 62 qua mente, 7. 2. 3 quae causa facti). In at least the first of the questions mentioned by Q. in our passage what is at issue is not the attribution of motives familiar in court, but speculation about the intentions of an artist (Patillon, p. x n. 9 compares for this Nicolaus 69. 4-11; see also p. xv n. 27). quod... potest: for chriae see 1. 9. 3-5 with Colson's nn.; Lausberg, §§1117-20 ('an instructive, short anecdote'). Scholars have found it difficult to see how Q.'s examples here could be described as even a kind of chria; for they do not fall into any of the categories mentioned in 1.9. 4-5, even if they are recast to avoid the interrogative form. It is true that the statement of the causa (ama) was one of the key elements in treatment of a chria (1. 9. 3 'subiectis dictorum rationibus'); but that is not enough to justify the phrase. Patillon (p. x n. 9) connects with the 'practical' chriae of 98. 31-2 (p. 21); cf. Q. 1.9. 5. But that is not the same thing. Russell comments: 'Because it involves discussing and justifying an authoritative opinion'; but these mythological 'beliefs' are hardly that. R. Volkmann, Animadversiones criticae in nonnullos veterum scriptorum de praeexercitamentis rhetoricis locos (Jauraviae [Jauer, now Jawor], 1869), 1 (also Volkmann, Rhetor ik, 35 n. 1) emended chriae to diesis, but the exercise seems no more that than the other. Radermacher's deletion of the phrase is probably the best solution, though observe a similar comment at 6. 1. 20 ('quod est unum repetitionis genus'; and uideri potest is common in Q.); it might, too, seem to interrupt the movement from 'uoluntatem, cuius in controuersiis frequens quaestio est' to 'nam locos... manifestum est ad forensis actiones pertinere'. We doubt if Q.'s usage of potest uideri would support the idea (Granatelli2 855) that he mentions the notion in disapproval; and even if he did we should still like to know why others thought on these lines. Indeed, even those who delete the phrase are faced with that problem. If deletion is accepted, we still need to confront the question of what the exercise is, and why Q. places it where he does. Reitzenstein 167-8 argued that
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the discussion of Cupid's wings began life as an anaskeue; and Reichel 123 observed that according to Theon 95. 8-11 (p. 60) the refutation of a myth should involve not only destructive criticism but an explanation 'where such a story originated'. But if Q. thought of his exercise like that, he should have placed it after §19. Perhaps the truth is that he did not feel it fitted in anywhere (it is not found at all in the Greek progymnasmatists), and so appended it as a kind of footnote; Volkmann's suggestion that the exercise corresponds to Suetonius' problemata (Gram. 4. 5) deserves consideration. The structure of this part of the chapter is in any case loose; Q. reverts to commonplaces in 27 (see n. on nam), and appends a long digression before going on to the last exercise. 4. 27 nam: Bonnell, Lexicon, s.v. £: 'adj. q u i d e m, ubi saepius transitum modo facit', citing e.g. 10. 1. 50 (OLD s.v. 4; for the frequent transitional nam without quidem, cf. 41 below, 2. 21. 9, Bonnell, s.v. jS). It is not always easy to distinguish this use from cases (Bonnell's category e) where (as in 2. 4. 19) nam signals a suppression: thus here one might supply: 'I don't need to stress the utility of loci like those de testibus, f o r . I n any case there is reference back to the other kind of commonplace, discussed separately in 22-3, and especially to its relevance to the forum ('ex mediis... iudiciis'), a note also sounded in 26. de testibus... habuerint: see the parallel argument in 2. 1. 11 (with nn.ad loc.), showing that Q. here by quidam means people like Hortensius. in officiis ciuilibus: 'in public life', perhaps with particular reference to the courts (Peterson on 10. 3. 11); cf. 2. 15. 36 (more technical), with n. memoriaeque.. .mandatos: cf. 11. 2. 1 'quasdam copias, quibus abundare quasque in promptu semper habere debet orator, eadem ilia uis [sc. memoria] praesentat'. dictiones: see n.on 2. 2. 6 dictionibus. emblematis: the abl. as in Cic. Ver. 4. 37 'scaphia cum emblematis' (NeueWagener, i. 440). The simile is taken from the raised decoration on a cup or other artefact (Valla cited Servius on A. 5. 536 'impressa signa,...id est emblemata'), or, better, from the separately produced panel set into a mosaic pavement, as in the Lucilian fragment at e.g. Cic. de Orat. 3. 171; the loci 'stand out' from the speech, and seem hardly to be an integral part of it. 4. 28 neque... differre sustineo: Q. acknowledges the arrival of the digression; he will sign it off at the end of 32. The topic could have been delayed till 10. 7. fades: so in 12. 6.4 'alia ueri discriminis fades'. For its constant variety, see n. on 2. 13. 17 cotidie nouum.
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Commentary
proprium: opposed to communia below; so in 5 pr. 5 'quae in commune ad omnis quaestiones pertinent' contrasts with 'quae in quoque causae genere propria sunt'. propositis... respondere: cf. 2. 17. 32. ex parte diuersa: A reads aduersa, but diuersa is supported by 5. 13. 12 'resoluere ex parte diuersa dicta'; cf. Decl min. 269.11 'scio dici simile aliquid etiam ex parte diuersa' (343. 2 is different; it may be significant that these are the only instances given by PHI, which provides none at all for ex parte aduersa). altercationibus... occurrere, testem rogare: cf. 6. 3. 4 'multa et in altercationibus et interrogandis testibus [cf. 6. 3. 46].. .dixit facete [sc. Cicero]' (an altercatio in the senate is reported, with relish, in Cic. Att. 1. 16. 8 and 10); 10. 1. 35 [philosophers] 'altercationibus atque interrogationibus oratorem futurum optime praeparant' (with Peterson's n.); 12. 3. 3 'quid fiet [i.e. to a speaker without knowledge of the law] in altercatione, ubi occurrendum continuo.. .est' (with Austin's n.). Precepts for altercatio are given in 6. 4; for the interrogation of witnesses see 5. 7. 26-32. uelociter makes an important point; cf. 6.4. 8 altercatio requires 'ingenio ueloci ac mobili, animo praesenti et acri'. uulgatissimos: 'commonest' (add to OLD s.v. uulgatus 4), but with some sense of disapproval, 'cliche-ridden' (OLD 3), as perhaps in Decl. mai. 6. 7 'nam ilia quidem uulgatissima orbitatis uox est'. ante praeparatis: cf. n.on 13 rursus... retractatam; cf. Tac. Dial. 18. 2 'ante praedixero', where Gudeman lists many parallels. 4. 29. This perplexing section was discussed by Winterbottom1 126, supplemented by Winterbottom6 69-70. The opening words are wrongly transmitted as nec uero. Valla corrected to necesse est, refined by Zumpt to necesse uero; Kiderlin's objection (Kiderlin5 398 n. 1) that Q. did not use necesse without the copulative is perhaps countered by 7. 2.48 (see also Lucr. 3. 543, with Kenney's n.). We have printed Zumpt's conjecture merely as a stop-gap, not being convinced of the aptness of uero (one wonders about namque to replace nec uero), and feeling that the whole of 29 is in need of overhaul. Comparing the similar passage 9. 4. 113 'nonne ergo refrigeretur sic [sc. as the result of over-carefi.il patterning of words] calor et impetus pereat...?', we suggest (exempli gratia): 'haec nonne [or 'nonne haec'] iis [i.e. the speakers], cum eadem pluribus iudiciis dicunt, aut fastidium moueant uelut frigidi et repositi cibi [perhaps not now nom. plur. but gen. sing.; cf. Cic. Inv. I. 25] aut pudorem deprensa [now neut. plur.] totiens audientium memoria. What follows can then be hived off as a parenthetic exclamation; for the subjunctive conteratur cf. e.g. Cic. Cael. 63 'o magnam uim ueritatis, quae.. .defendat', K-S ii. 292.
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few possessions on many different occasions (the officia will be those imposed by the host-guest relationship: TLL s.v. officium 519. 51-3) and as a result wear them out (there maybe a glance at contritus, 'hackneyed': OLD s.v. contero 4d). Afifahl 104 compares PI. Ale. 1, 113 E 8 oKevapiiovKaTaT€TpqjLpL€vojv. It maybe more than coincidence that just below (114 A 7: cited by Afifahl 103 to illustrate fastidium in our passage) Socrates talks of the delicacy (rpvas) that finds it displeasing to taste the same Aoyo?. 4. 30 cum eo quidem, quod: cf. (without quidem) 10. 7. 13 (with Peterson's n.), 12. 10. 47 (with Austin's). The exact implications of the phrase vary with the context (K-S ii. 272); here it is much like aecedit quod. uix... copulatus: Kiderlin6 75-6 claimed that it cannot be Q.'s point that 'je allgemeiner eine erorterung ist, desto besser kann sie mit einem falle zusammenhangen'; but it is precisely Q.'s contention that an absolutely general locus on e.g. avarice would fit into a context where such a locus was required with no need for any adaptation at all. But in fact almost no commonplace is so 'common' (i.e. so all-purpose) that it could be put into a speech without at least some words to fit it into the context. And, Q. seems to imply, such a link passage helps to make a locus 'stick out like a sore thumb'. (We are indebted here especially to the help of Donald Russell.) tam communis.. .qui: K-S ii. 298. aliquo... uinculo: 'some link arising out of the particular question' (Russell). This strange phrase seems to be a substitute for 'propriae quaestioni aliquo uinculo'. For the tendency to replace datives by genitives, see E. Lofstedt, Late Latin (Oslo, 1959), 126-7; Shackleton Bailey, Propertiana, 222, citing Liv. 10. 13. 14 'uinculumque ingens immodicae cupiditatis iniectum est'. fappareatquef: Q. now moves (see Summary, p. 75) to a new objection to the use of ready-made loci: they are obvious 'attachments', for two different reasons that follow ('uel quod... uel quod'). Radermacher may be right to suggest a lacuna, for the objection to the use of a link (uinculum) between locus and context has not been more than hinted at. That objection would seem to be that the link would be all too naively transparent to the listener (cf. perhaps the mention of 'commissuris..., ut in opere male iuncto, hiantibus' in 12. 9. 17, more fully cited below in the next n.). What now follows concerns not the link but the whole locus, though there is a connection between these topics: the link makes the locus look 'attached', and the locus in any case is obviously attached because... The right sense is therefore given by Russell's translation: 'and even so it would be obvious that...'; but that asks a lot of the Latin. Spalding suggested (on 10. 3. 16)
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'appareat alioqui'; perhaps 'appareat que', even then [cf. e.g. 1. 5. 42]'. insertum... adplicitum: even an insertion would be 'obvious' (cf. 8. 5. 28 'adferunt lumen clauus et purpurae loco insertae'; Hor. Ars 15-16, with Brink's n.) and lack real coherence with the context: 4. 3. 15-16 [loci 'de luxuria, de auaritia, de religione, de officiis', here thought of as digressions] 'cum sunt argumentis subiecta similium rerum, quia cohaerent egredi non uidentur; sed plurima sunt quae rebus nihil secum cohaerentibus inseruntur...'; and esp. 12. 9. 17 'inuiti... recedunt a praeparatis et tota actione respiciunt requinintque num aliquid ex illis interuelli atque ex tempore dicendis inseri possit; quod si fiat non cohaeret, nec commissuris modo, ut in opere male iuncto, hiantibus sed ipsa coloris inaequalitate [cf. dissimilis in our passage] detegitur'. But even more glaringly obvious is something 'attached', like 'uites arboribus adplicitae' (1. 2. 26; for the practice see Mynors on Verg. G. 2. 221). Cf. generally Cic. de Orat. 3. 106 '[loci] proprii causarum et inhaerentes in earum neruis esse debent'. 4. 31 paratus: 'to hand'. Cf. of loci Cic. de Orat. 2. 118, Tac. Dial. 31. 5; cf. 4. 3. 16 'alia sic praeparata adferimus'. u t . . . sententia: Q. continues to write with less than his usual clarity. It would be strange in this context if locos meant anything other than 'commonplaces'; and sententiae would seem to be epigrams (discussed in 8. 5). Some speakers, on this interpretation, drag in (cf. above, n. on 3 arcessitis) lengthy commonplaces for the sake of the epigrams to which they give rise, whereas an epigram should arise naturally (rather as in 4. 1. 54 'non compositum domi sed ibi atque ex re natum') from commonplaces. Q. talks in the same breath of loci = commonplaces and sententiae in 5. 13. 42 (note also 5. 13. 31, cited below on 32 haec) and 11. 1.49; cf. also Tac. Dial. 22. 2 and perhaps 20. 4. But this is not without problems. An epigram may still arise naturally from a commonplace even if that commonplace has been dragged in. Further, 'ut.. .sententia' does not provide an illustration of the way in which commonplaces are dragged in just because they are 'to hand'. An alternative, to which we rather incline, is to suppose (however casual the writing) that locos means 'passages' in a speech (cf. e.g. 1. 11. 12 and the similar 2. 7. 2 'electos ex orationibus... locos'; also nn.on 2. 6. 2 locos, 2. 11. 6 uidentur) brought in merely for the sake of the epigrams they contain; uerbosissimos may support this interpretation, 'ut... sententia' would then be not an illustration of the way in which commonplaces are introduced without integration, but a parallel to it. A compromise position is taken by Russell, who makes it a parallel ('similarly'), while taking locos to mean commonplaces.
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4. 32 haec: a vague neuter, apparently covering both15 commonplace and epigram, to which what follows applies equally: both will combine utile and dulce (cf. 2. 7. 4 'iucunda... utilis') only if they are arise out of the case in hand. Cf. 7. 1.41 'plerique eloquentiae famam adfectantes contenti sunt locis speciosis modo uel nihil ad probationem conferentibus' (note also 5. 13. 31 'quod accidit praecipue cupidis sententiarum, ut ducti occasione dicendi non respiciant quid dixerint, dum locum praesentem, non totam causam intuentur'); but in our passage Q. seems to say that such things will only count as speciosa if they are relevant. One could escape this by taking speciosa haec as the subject, et utilia as the predicate: much better sense, but awkward Latin. ad uictoriam tendit: as the speaker must (within limits: cf. n.on 2. 15. 32 uictoria litigantis est praemium). utique.. .interim: see n.on 2. 1. 1 utique. PHI gives no exact parallel, but note Cels. pr. 51 'non utique.. .sed saepius. superuacua... contraria: cf. Sen. Con. 3 pr. 12 'non minus deuito superuacua dicere quam contraria'. euagari: the digression began in 28. 4. 33 legum laus ac uituperatio: for praise of a law cf. 7. 1. 47, Decl. min. 308. 3 (with Winterbottom's n.), 320. 3; for praise of Law at a generalized level, see Antiphon 6. 2-6, printed side by side with 5. 14, 87-9 in Radermacher, Art. Scr. 76-8. The Greek progymnasmatists, however, talk (Lausberg, §1139) not of praise and blame (note, however, Nicolaus 78. 15-19: the exercise is primarily forensic, but is akin to deliberative oratory, and also in some degree to panegyric, Kado €7raivovvT€s rj ifieyovres rj Kvpovv rj aKovpovv €6eXop.€v)y but of the recommendation of a law to a legislative body (see further below on apud Graecos... uocabatur). In practice this makes little difference. For all its Roman colouring, Q.'s discussion (33-40) is based on the headings found in the Greek progymnasmatists; he starts (33) with an open recognition of the deliberative aspect of the exercise; and he only mentions praise again in 34. In two places (36, 40) Q. makes remarks that call in question the very basis of this progymnasma. What is it doing in a series of exercises that are meant to be general, not particular (so below, §36; cf. 2. 1. 9, with n.on et cetera)? Theon seems unconcerned. At 61. 13-15 (p. 3) he says that accusation and defence of laws is 'not the least part of a hypothesis'; but this is part of a series of commendatory remarks on the utility of the progymnasmata as a training for real-life oratory. Later theoreticians faced up to the problem. Hermogenes (26. 11-19), though he appears reluctant to admit this exercise at all (it may 1 5 But it may be noted that the way in which 'oriuntur ex causa' takes up 'ex l o c i s . . . nasci' (blurred by the parenthesis in the Loeb translation) ties the remark especially to epigram.
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be significant that Libanius does not give models for it: the one example in the corpus, viii. 568-71 Forster, is spurious; the law discussed is comparable with that in Aphthonius), quotes 'some' as distinguishing 'during a financial crisis a law is proposed that offices should be put on sale' (particular) from the same without the first clause (general). A little more subtly, Aphthonius (46. 20-47. 6), again citing 'some', recognizes that there are some, but not all, elements of hypothesis here. His example is of a law ordering the death of an adulterer taken in the act, with no further details given (cf. Lysias' first speech). (Another approach would have been to say that not all the progymnasmatic exercises were generalized: one cannot, for example, praise Achilles without taking account of a host of circumstances associated with that famous name.) Q. solves, or evades, the difficulty by dividing the points 'common to all laws' (34): those in the first group (35) are irrelevant to the elementary exercises (though some even of these appear in the Greek lists), while those in the second (36-40) are relevant both to real and to fictional cases. iam maiores... uires: looking back to 20 'inde paulatim ad maiora tendere incipiet'; Q. (like the Greek rhetoridans) places the exerdse last of all, conscious of its (Roman) complexities. As the next sentence shows, he continues to be aware of the need to relate an exercise to the declamation (and ultimately real-life oratory) to come. apud Graecos... uocabatur: this may refer to the Athenian custom of regularly appointing nomothetai (boards, not as Q. implies individuals) to consider changes in the laws, and make final decisions on them (D. M. MacDowell in OCD3, s.v.); 'the procedure resembled an ordinary trial by jury' (id. in OCD2 s.v.). Others (e.g. Russell) more convindngly connect Q.'s statement with the yparj napavofjauv, brought against the proposer of a law that was contrary to an existing law, or in general 'unsuitable' (Mac3 Dowell in OCD , s.v. graphe paranomon); here again there would have been a large body of judges. It is certainly cases arising from this graphe that gave rise to the speeches of Demosthenes (Timocr., Aristocr,., Lept.) used by Theon 69. 18-21 (pp. 13-14) to illustrate vopnov avaaK€vr)\ but the speech of Lysias also mentioned there was connected by Sauppe with the nomothetai (see Butts 180 n. 34). Cf. in any case Dingel 109-10: in the Decl. min. cases involving discussion of laws (or rogationes) are a 'Sonderform der controversia (so called in 261. 1; contrast 255. 1, cited below on suadere ac dissuadere). It may well be that the Roman Q. was no better informed on these matters than Greek theoreticians writing long after such institutions had passed away. The intelligent Theon 128. 28-129. 8 (p. 95) first talks generally of the e^eraats of laws, then distinguishes between laws being proposed, which receive SoKifxaoia, and laws already enacted: 'disputes arise between ot
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SiKa&nevoi that aim not at annulment of the laws, but at their interpretation on each side to the best advantage.' Theon is interested in the avaaKcvr) and K(lTaOK€Vr) of laws, and hence concentrates on the first of these situations, the proposal of new laws, which 'we either accuse and confute or defend and establish' (cf. 61. 13-15 [p. 3]). Nicolaus too distinguishes (78. 10-12) the proposal of new laws, involving eioriyrjots and avriXoyia, from the examination of old ones, involving Karrjyopta and anoXoyia. Hermogenes talks confusedly of vopuuv 9 e acts Kal Karrjyoptat (26. 12-13), Aphthonius more sensibly of avvrfyopia Kal Karrjyopia voptov redevros (47. 7).
suadere ac dissuadere: the Roman Republican (note fuit) custom of advocating a law before a oontio, for which see F. Millar's remarkable book The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (Ann Arbor, 1998), passim, would be mimicked by a sort of (pre-)suasoria in the schools. Cf. Decl. min. 255. 1 (the theme ends 'fert quidam legem ne recipiantur' [sc. transfugae]) 'proxime ad suasorias accedit hoc genus; nam et suasoriarum et [del. Ritter] legis suasio et dissuasio est' (Dr Holford-Strevens suggests deletion of the first rather than the second et). utroque autem... (34) omnibus: the progress of thought in 33-4 seems to be as follows (excellent discussion by Kiderlin2 210-11): Praise and dispraise of a law may take the form either of a controversia or of a suasoria. But in either case there are only a few fixed things to say. (This might appear to need qualification,) for there is a further division, into three types of law. But this division is in fact only of limited importance: it is useful rather for praise (than in any other way of advocating a law). The questions that arise (i.e. points that allow something to be said on both sides, as opposed to the tripartite division, which is useful largely for praise) are applicable to all types of law (that is, the tripartite division is not here relevant). So (after all that) we return with 'ea quidem...' to the simple picture with which we started ('pauca.. .et fere certa'). nam: introducing the whole o f ' n a m . . . comparata sit'; Q. explains (see the summary of the argument above) why the division into three types of ius does not (despite appearances) affect the general statement that has just preceded. et genera sunt tria: editors have often wished to delete et, but we regard it as pointed in stressing that laws, in addition to differing in the way they are made, also differ in kind. As to the tripartite division, Q. shows in the next sentence ('quod lex, quod publica, quod ad religionem deum') that he was aware that ius sacrum was normally regarded as part of ius publicum (R. G. Nisbet on Cic. Dom. 136); similarly, in Cic. Dom. 32 ius reipublicae (cf. 33 iure publico) is set alongside ius religionis. Valla commented: 'Melior hec diuisio quam est ilia in Diggestis [sic] \ referring to e.g. Dig. 1. 1.4.
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4. 34 quae diuisio ad laudem magis spectat: in Decl. min. 274. 1 (partly cited in the next n.) we are told that the distinction between public and private law may be made use of in a comparison of two laws (for which see Winterbottom's n., adding Hermogenes, Stat. 87. 2-9; comment in Rh. Gr. iv. 828. 15-829. 3 and vii. 662. 2-22); but that too is a matter of praise (cf. 21 above). per gradus augeat: the figure is 'gradatio, quae dicitur /cAi/xa£' (9. 3. 54). Public law is a step above (mere) law, while ius sacrum is 'higher' than other aspects of ius publicum (see above on 33 et genera sunt tria); cf. also 7. 7. 7 'haec fere quaeruntur: utra lex potentior, ad deos pertineat an ad homines [cf. Grillius, Comm. in Cic. Rhet: p. 78. 74-5 Jakobi '(quae lex) causam hominum contineat, quae deorum'], rem publicum an priuatos...' (the first alternative in each case being 'more powerful'), Decl. min. 274. 1 'quaeri solet an priuata altera, altera publica sit'. 4. 35 iure...eius qui rogat: with a glance at the constitutional formula found in e.g. Cic. Phil. 1. 26 'consules populum iure rogauerunt'. P. Clodi: see Cic. Dom. 34-8, where the orator says it is clear that Clodius 'non fuisse tribunum plebis, hodie esse patricium'. The crux was Clodius' adoption, which Cicero denied to be legal: 'dixi apud pontifices istam adoptionem... contra omne pontificum ius factum...; qua sublata intellegis totum tribunatum tuum concidisse.' A religious law being in question (Dom. 36, 38), Q. punctiliously uses rite (in Cicero's speeches only certain at Dom. 134 and Har. 23, each time with clear religious implications). For the background, see W. J. Tatum, The Patrician Tribune (Chapel Hill and London, 1999), 104-8; and for Cicero's argument W. Stroh in J. Powell and J. Paterson (eds.), Cicero the Advocate (Oxford, 2004), 346-50. trino... nundino: 'the reference is to the minimum interval between the promulgation of a bill and the meeting of the assembly that voted on it': R. G. Nisbet on Dom. 41 (cf. 45); Macrobius, Sat. 1. 16. 35 'unde etiam mos tractus ut leges trinundino die promulgarentur'. A nundinum being the eight-day interval between one market-day and the next, voting could take place no sooner than twenty-five days after promulgation; see A. Kirsopp Michels, The Calendar of the Roman Republic (Princeton, 1967), 203. tritium nundinum was originally a genitive plural, whose first recorded appearance as a neuter singular is at Liv. 3. 35. 1; see Ogilvie ad loc. and O. Primavesi in C. Neumeister (ed.), Antike Texte in Forsdiung und Schule (Frankfurt, 1993), 123-45, at 144. non idoneo die: i.e. on a dies nefastus. There seems no parallel for the phrase, though cf. Cels. 2. 8.40 'non idonea temporal We begin to understand lata from this point; indeed strictly it should be understood with promulgata
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too, the objection in that case being that a law was being or had been proposed without having been published in advance for the correct period, auspicia: Q. may continue to think of the De domo (39-40). legitimis: 'pro solennibus', as Spalding remarks, comparing Nep. Phoc. 4. 2 'legitimis quibusdam confectis' (add Sen. Con. 6. 5). Q.'s phrase is more or less equivalent to Cicero's 'legitimum aliquod impedimentum' (Agr: 2. 24). manentium legum: i.e. (as Spalding saw) the laws not abrogated by the passing of the new law. repugnare: cf. Ar. Rtiet. A\5, 1375 b 8-9 (transl. Rhys Roberts) 'or perhaps that the law in question contradicts [eVavrt'o?] some other highly-esteemed law, or even contradicts itself (cf. 37 'an lex sibi ipsa consentiat'); Hermogenes 27. 4-5 (vofupov, with the example 'it is contrary to the old laws'; cf. Theon 132 [p. 100]). For leges contrariaesee 7. 7. Cf. also Decl. min. 254.9 'at enim contra legem rogatio est' (add 261. 4, 339. 3-4). 4. 36 sed haec . . . causarum: see nn. on 2.1.9 et cetera, 2.4. 33 legum laus ac uituperatio. reliqua: the points so far mentioned apply only to real oratory; but those to be discussed next come up for treatment in much the same form (for eadem fere cf. Caes. Gall. 6. 17. 2 'de his eandem fere quam reliquae gentes habent opinionem') both in real life and in the schools (cf. 2. 1. 9 'uerae fictaeque controuersiae', with n.); cf. Aphthonius 47. 12: 'you will work it out with the headings used in reality [rj 77pay/xart^].' huius modi restricts the remark to the criticism of laws. Q.'s headings have some overlap with those of Theon and the later rhetoricians (see nn. below); and Theon's overlap in turn with his headings for the establishment/confutation of chria, fable, and narrative, as the table in Butts 243 shows. 4. 37 quaeritur satis significent: A has an satis, but see H-Sz 544, OLD s.v. an2 7a. For satis significare, cf. e.g. 6. 2. 12 'proprie tamen mihi huius nominis exprimenda natura est, quatenus appellatione ipsa non satis significari uidetur'. The intransitive use is not easily paralleled, but note Cic. Tusc. 2. 46 'utor, ut quam maxime significem, pluribus [sc. nominibus]', glossed by Dougan 'significanter loquar' (cf. Decl. min. 261. 2, cited in the next n.). ambiguum: 'being clearly enough expressed' could in itself be opposed to either obscurum (cf. Decl. min. 261. 2 'primum incusamus legem non satis significanter scriptam et multa obscura in se habentem') or ambiguum; cf. 7. 10. 2 'aliud est enim obscurum ius, aliud ambiguum' (cf. 7. 5. 5 of scriptum). Our passage, however, directs us towards the latter, though there may not in this context be much practical difference. Theon's treatment of the heading EX TOV aoaovs covers a wide range of verbal flaws (129. 13-
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131 [pp. 95-9]), overlapping a good deal with Q.'s discussion of ambiguity in 7. 9, and including a flaw which Q. reasonably classified under res (see the next n.). sibi ipsa consentiat: see Aristotle cited on 35 repugnarc, cf. Theon 131 (p. 99), under the head of aoaes (why not under v-rrevavTiovl). in praeteritum: retrospectively'; cf. 9. 2. 20, Sen. Con. 10. 5. 16 'nam decretum in futurum factum est, non in praeteritum'. in singulos homines: Cic. Dom. 43 'uetant leges sacratae, uetant XII tabulae leges priuatis hominibus inrogari; id est enim priuilegium' (with R. G. Nisbet ad loc., and also on Dom. 26); cf. Decl. min. 254. 2 'an rogationem ferre oporteat ad singulos pertinentem' (cf. 7-8), 339. 3, 5-6. commune: picking up communia omnibus in 34. honesta... utilis: these are naturally the major heads of deliberative oratory (3. 8. 22). For both cf. Ded. min. 255. 1 'dicet is qui legem feret non esse honestum recipere transfiigas, nihil prodesse' (taken up in 3-7). For the latter, Decl. Min. 253. 3 'rogationem fero utilem ciuitati', 261.6 'his adiciamus quod etiam inutilis est [sc. lex]'. Hermogenes 27. 1-2 has to ov^epov, putting alongside it, however, not t o KCLXOV but t o SIKOLIOV (and also t o vpe'v-ov), which Q. will make a part of honestum (38). 4. 38 nec ignoro.. .complectimur: Q. typically (e.g. 4. 2. 2 'in qua sciens transcurram subtiles nimium diuisiones quorundam plura eius genera faciendum') tries to reduce the complications; but he reintroduces them (equally typically: note 5. 10. 90, 5. 11. 30) by going on in §§38-9 to divide both honestum (dwelling on the subdivision iustum) and utile. iustum pium religiosum: cf. 3. 8. 26 'fas iustum pium aecum, mansuetum quoque... subici possunt honestati'. iustum is Hermogenes' SIKCLIOV (27. 1; cf. Theon 132 [p. 100]). iusti... solet: species is probably singular (though A's solent is possible), as better suited to simpliciter. 'the species iustum (of the genus honestum) is not normally discussed under a single heading.' simpliciter: apparently 'in one way only', rather as in 8. 2. 1 'proprietas ipsa non simpliciter accipitur'. re: the action against which the law is directed. dignane.. .poenaeue: cf. Theon 133 (p. 101), under the head not of dSiKov but of a£ia; also Nicolaus 77. 6-8. 4. 39 quoque: here too a subdivision is needed, after all. natura.. .tempore: cf. the more normal contrast in 12. 1. 41 'quaedam iusta natura, condicione temporum inutilia'. For tempus cf. 3. 8. 35 'est utilitatis... in tempore quaestio: "expedit, sed non nunc"'; Hermogenes 27. 8: 'it is harmful both now and for the future'.
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optineri: 'be enforced'; cf. perhaps 11. 2. 45 'id... a pueris ['from childhood'] optinendum'; Cic. Tusc. 5. 118 'ilia lex quae in Graecorum conuiuiis obtinetur', Part. 130 'quae autem scripta non sunt, ea aut consuetudine aut conuentis hominum et quasi consensu obtinentur' (also n. on 2. 5. 18 optineri). So Ded. min. 261. 5 'sed ne seruari quidem potest [sc. lex]'; this is Theon's Bvvarov (131-2 [pp. 99-100]). Spalding cites Dem. 24. 68. ex parte: cf. 7. 1.49 'quaeramus ergo num infirmari in aliquam partem lex possit'. exemplum: 'it is not clear what Q. has in mind' (Russell). 4. 40 Manilia: the lex of 66 BC conferring on Pompey wide powers in the east, supported by Cicero in his Pro lege Manilia. constant.. .qualitate: on the principle stated at 36, a law made for a particular occasion cannot be treated in a (generalized) progymnasma. Theon indeed defines a law as being OVK eis riva \povov atfxupiafxevov (128. 28 [p. 95]); limitation in time characterizes a decree (134 [p. 102]). For the background see Patillon n.458, though, as Dr Holford-Strevens remarks, he does not mention the relevance here of the distinction between vop.os and ifjr/V 8IKOLVIKU)V KCLI AVFX^OVXEVTIKUIV... Xoyajv. circa Demetrium Phalerea: fr. 126 Fortenbaugh-Schiitrumpf, also fr. 182 in Wehrli, vol. iv (with n.on p. 84). For his oratory, see 10. 1. 33 and esp. 80, with Peterson's n. His dates are uncertain, but he was bom before 344 BC. circa is surely intended by Q. to mean 'around the time of' (as at 2. 17. 7; cf. Austin on 12. 10. 6), whatever a hypothetical Greek source may have intended (see Russell, Declamation, 19; his first chapter gives a brief and lucid account of the early history of declamation). institution: cf. 12. 2. 25, cited on 2. 1.9 diesis.
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4. 42 alio... libro: Q.'s lost book De causis corruptae eloquentiae (nn. on 2. 1. 9 quam et primam habuit et diu solam, 2. 3. 9 corruptos). Reuter 8 makes the fair deduction that the book contained at least a summary sketch of the history of declamation. It would not be rash to suppose further that this formed part of a discourse on the decline of oratory, in which Demetrius was supposed to have played a part (10. 1. 80); subtle discussion in K. Heldmann, An tike Theorien iiber Entwidclung und Verfall der Redekunst (Munich, 1982), 98-122, esp. 119-20. Q. is not saying anything very different from Philostratus, who in VS 481 distinguished a first philosophical' sophistic, founded by Gorgias, from a second, using particular themes, founded by Aeschines (d. C.322 BC). idoneo auctore nituntur: cf. 1. 4. 20; TLL s.v. i done us 234. 18-20; 5. 11. 1 'rerum gestarum auctoritate nituntur'. The words are picked up by auctor below: Q. may not know exactly when Greek declamation started, but he has the best possible authority for telling us when it started in Latin. coepisse: sc. to use declamation in the Greek manner. Even if the verb is being used absolutely (cf. perhaps 2. 17. 8), 'began (teaching)', the implication must still be that Plotius started declamation in Latin at Rome. We are not helped by the reference to Cicero. If Q. is thinking of de Orat. 3. 93 (and 'extremis L. Crassi temporibus' seems to point that way: the dialogue is set not long before Crassus' death), he is misremembering it: all Cicero says there is that 'etiam Latini.. .hoc biennio magistri extiterunt', the rhetores expelled by Crassus in 92 BC. There may then be an allusion to a lost passage. One might think of the letter from Cicero to M. Titinius drawn on in Suet. Rhet. 26. 1: note esp. 'equidem memoria teneo pueris nobis primum Latine docere coepisse Plotium quendam'; but if Cicero had gone on to mention declamation, Suetonius would no doubt have told us so. Q. presumably then deduced for himself that because Plotius was the first Latin rhetor; he was also the first to institute Latin declamation. That deduction was probably correct; whether Suetonius would have agreed with it is not made clear by his slovenly remarks in Rhet 25. 4 (cited above, p. 37). Plotius: see 11. 3. 143 (a book on gestus); Sen. Con. 2 pr. 5 ('primus omnium Latinus rhetor'); Suet. Rhet. 26, with Raster's nn.As Q. is making a chronological point and no other, we fortunately do not need to enter here into the vexed details of the expulsion of the Latin rhetores, for which see e.g. Kaster on Suet. Rhet. 26. 1, L-P on de Orat 3. 93-4 (pp. 304-5), with further bibliography, to which add the bracing paper of M. T. Luzzatto, StudStor 43 (2002), 301-46. P. Smiraglia, AFLN 5 (1955), 164-5, disposed of earlier attempts to connect our passage with Tac. Dial. 35. 1.
Chapter Five But I am still dealing with the early stages of a rhetorical education, and it remains to stress the merits of a rhetor reading prose texts with his pupils in class, just as a grammaticus reads poetry with his. I sometimes did this myself, (1) though I came up against obstacles (2). It is no novelty, for Greek schools provide such teaching, though it is often left to assistants (3). And indeed elementary exposition of texts is beneath a rhetor (4). But it is part of his job to point out their virtues (and faults); he should appoint a reader by turns, explain the context of the case, and systematically give instruction in the content, tone and style of the speech in question (5-9). It is helpful even to treat faulty speeches in this way, so that attention may be drawn to the vicious elements that are so often regarded as praiseworthy (10): compare the way in which people who are deformed or excessively made up sometimes receive undue admiration (11-12). The teacher will find ways of stretching his pupils in this process (13). Such close reading of prose texts is more useful than study of any handbook (14); an analogy can be drawn from the art of war (15). Cicero is a better model than a teacher's declamation, and to criticize a set text is more pleasant than to cavil at a pupil's effort (16). The point is obvious (17). Once it is accepted, laying down what authors should be read at this stage is easy enough: the best, but the most accessible of them (18-20). Two categories should be avoided by younger students, the ancients and the very recent (21-2). Both may be read later (23), and the moderns are different rather than inferior. There is much room for (careful) choice. (24). Some writers, past and present, may be studied in their entirety (25). But caution is necessary, and prudence points towards the reading of earlier authors at this stage (26). This is the only explicit evidence for the enarratio of prose texts by Latin.16 We have seen that Greek grammatici normally studied but did not expound such texts (see on 2.1. 4 historicorum criticorumque). We now learn that prose texts were (sometimes?) expounded apud Graecos (meaning, apparently, 'in the (Roman) schools of Greek rhetores [cf. 2. 1. 1 and 2. 1. 13], rather than 'in Greece'), and that Q. himself had occasionally followed suit. The procedure is to be distinguished from the practice, recommended early in Theon (65. 30-66. 2 [p. 9]), of providing pupils, at the progymnasmatic stage, with models chosen from prose texts for individual exercises; but it is documented later in Theon, in the newly published chapter (13) on Reading (134-7 1 0 Dr Holfond-Strevens points out that T. Castricius is portrayed by Gellius as criticizing passages o f Sallust (2. 27) and C. Gracchus (11. 13). T h e first section o f the latter chapter in particular suggests a classroom scene akin to Theon's Reading.
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[pp. 102-5]; see Patillon, pp. xcviii-c, and above, n.on 2. 2. 8 ipse aliquid... dicat quae... referant). 'Reading' was to be practised parallel with the progymnasmata, and right from the beginning (cf. 65. 23-4 [p. 9]), with texts of graded difficulty chosen from the Greek orators. It was to be conducted in a loud voice, clearly that of the pupil, who was also learning the elements of delivery by this means. He was told in advance the type and aim of the speech being read, and (apparently after the reading) given as much instruction in its argument and style as was appropriate to his intelligence. And, as he was expected to throw himself into the role of the orator, the more he knew about the speaker's character and circumstances the better. Historians were read and analysed in parallel ways. Much of this finds its counterpart in our chapter, as the commentary will show. Q., for his part, speaks of such enarratio as if it were only appropriate to younger pupils (1-2), though to modern ears the sort of analysis mentioned in §§7-9 sounds desirable at any age; it is in any case a more advanced version of what a grammaticus was advised to do in teaching poetry (1.8. 17). Equally, the reading recommended at §18 is for 'beginners' (cf. 20, and 21 pueris, opposed to the fir mis iudiciis of 23). §§18-26, however, presumably refer not merely to the authors to be read aloud and commented on in class, but to private reading too (cf. the memorization of oratory and history recommended at 2. 7. 2). They thus build on the discussion of reading in the school of the grammaticus at 1. 8. 5-12, while looking forward (26 distuli) to the comprehensive list for older students given at 10. 1. 46-131, covering both prose and poetry. The list in Book 10 will include 'new' authors; but it is striking that the pre-Ciceronian prose authors will not be mentioned there, despite the remarks in 2. 5. 23 (see further in n. there on firmis iudiciis). It should be remembered that Q.'s positive recommendations (Livy, Cicero, those most like Cicero) are polemical in an age when Cicero could be thought outmoded (Tac. Dial. 22-23. 1), while his omission of Seneca at this stage might have been controversial at least at an earlier period, when 'solus hie fere in manibirs adulescentium fuit' (10. 1. 125; boys adored him: 10. 1. 130). 5. 1 post paulo: A's reading has been corrected to post paulunr, cf. the very similar phrase at 9.4. 19 (also 2. 17. 25, 11. 3. 148). But Q. writes post paulo at 9. 1. 14 (B, and perhaps A before correction to paulo post) and 9. 2. 43 (he has six instances of paulo post, including 2. 15. 32); S. Lundstrom, Abhinc und Ante (Lund, 1961), 84. The correlation with interim helps to clarify the structure of the book, playing the same role as similar phrases in the Minor Declamations (see Winterbottom, Decl. min., p. xvi, and n.on 249. 2). Q. emphasizes that he is still concerned with the progymnasmatic stage.
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poetarum enarratio: one of the two major tasks of the grammaticus (1. 4. 2). historiae: just as a move from grammaticus to rhetor brought an advance from poetica to historica narratio (2. 4. 2). aetas: i.e. if they came to him early enough: a rare occurrence because of the intrusion of grammatici into rhetorical territory (2. 1). 5. 2 iam turn: Q. 'had the right idea' back in the past when he was an active teacher; now, in retirement, he publishes his advice. Cf. (in a grander context) 12. 1. 25 'optima sentientem optimeque dicentem'. consuetudo: with a glance at legal terminology; cf. 'consuetudine... ius esse putatur id quod uoluntate omnium sine lege uetustas comprobarit' (Cic. Inv. 2. 67), Heumann-Seckel s.v. 1 d. Rather similarly, consuetudo 'makes' natura (2. 4. 17); Otto, Sprichwdrter„ 91 cites Publ. Syr. 201 Meyer'grauissimum est imperium consuetudinis'. robusti.. .sequebantur: this second obstacle seems (see Loeb) to result from the predominance in the class of older boys, too old to need such enarratio and already following the teacher's dictiones as models (the singular exemplum is unexpected). If this is correct, Q. expresses himself obscurely; and it is not clear why the younger pupils could not have been given the enarratio separately. The words 'nec . . . desiderantes' might rather suggest that the difficulty was caused by the older boys wishing to follow suit when they were too old for this kind ofexercise (a possibility also mentioned in Russell's n.). But this seems to strain the words impossibly. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, HSPh 87 (1983), 218, accepting this sense (and comparing K-S i. 121 for the imperfect), proposed the deletion of nostrum, but that seems to leave exemplum far too unspecific. One expects some such qualification as puerorum (or a negative phrase starting non, 'not appropriate for them', like non s hum. But this seems an odd way of saying that the older pupils wanted to be taught like the younger ones; and in any case one feels that Q. would have been capable of outfacing such rebels. Further, as Dr Holford-Strevens remarks, it is psychologically improbable that the older boys would have wished to do 'kids' stuff': 'Is something missing (to the effect that, being left out of the lesson, they played up in class; as a result few teachers followed my example)?' 5. 3 nunc... Graecos: perhaps an allusion to Q.'s knowledge of Theon or a Greek handbook resembling his; see above, p. 76 with n. 11. adiutores: apart from (perhaps) the antescholanus of Petr. 81.1, there seems to be no other evidence of the use of assistants in Roman schools of rhetoric, as opposed to those of grammatici (as in Cic. Fam. 9. 18. 4, where hypodidascalos is apparently unparalleled in this sense). See Colson, p. xiv n. 8; Bonner, Education, 133; Dionisotti 111 (subductor); K. Vossing, Schule und
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Bildung im Nordafrika der r&mischen Kaiserzeit (Brussels, 1997), 354 with n. 1229 (a reference we owe to Antonio Stramaglia). praeire: Q. uses the language of the grammatical praelectio, where the master 'went in first', reading a poetical text aloud before expounding it and (note esp. 1. 8. 13) asking the pupils questions about it: hence 1. 2. 12 'lectio... non omnis nec semper praeeunte uel interpretante eget'. The pupils then read the text aloud themselves: cf. 1. 8. 1-3; Macrobius, Sat 1. 24. 5 'qualiter eos [sc. uersus] pueri magistris praelegentibus canebamus'. legentibus singulis (for the dat. cf. Cic. Mil. 3) shows that the aim was to give each pupil individual attention, something that was, one assumes, even more important in the schools of the grammatici (hence their employment of assistants: see previous n.; observe 10. 5. 22 on restricting the size of classes, referring back to 1. 2. 15, which would naturally be taken to refer to the school of the grammaticus); see below on 5 non utique, and also nn. on 2. 6. 5 praeformata, 2. 6. 7 cibos...partiuntur, and the introduction to 2. 8. 5. 4 et hercule: as in 2. 16. 12 and five other places in Q., helping to affirm the truth of what precedes: Hand, Tursellinus, iii. 56; similarly et certe at 1. 11. 17. In our passage the affirmation will be countered by 'at...' below. praelectio: the term is taken over from the parallel activity in the school of the grammaticus; for the noun see 1.2. 15, for the verb 1. 5. 11, 1. 8. 8 and 13. The words are not common (in Q.'s period, only Mart. 1. 35. 2 and 8. 3. 15, Florus, Vergilius orator an poeta 3. 7 [p. 187 Rossbach, p. 214 Malcovati2]; a little later, Suet. Gram. 1. 2, where see Raster's n.), and we lack a straightforward account of the procedure: to such an extent that Bonner, Education, 225-6 makes our (progymnasmatic) passage the primary evidence. But the distinction made in 'quae in hoc... etiam ilia quae...' does seem to be meant to correspond to the grammaticus twin tasks of reading aloud and expounding (see 1.2.12, cited above on 3 praeire), both seen as inferior to a role that is appropriate to a rhetor, of pointing out the stylistic virtues and vices of a passage. ut facile... sequantur: Q. assumes a scene in which both teacher and pupil have a text before them, the pupil perhaps having earlier had it dictated to him; the student follows in his copy what he hears read by the master (here surely is an instance of silent reading), distincte is normally used of clear expression, in speech or writing; here there is perhaps the implication that a young reader needs to acquire the ability to distinguish one word from another in the continuous and unpunctuated text, just as in Lucr. 4 . 554-5 ('necessest uerba quoque ipsa | plane exaudiri discernique articulatim') the listener must be able to sort out words in the mass of continuous sound that reaches his ear.
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etiam ilia... docet: cf. 1.8.15, where the interpretation of glossemata ('id est uoces minus usitatas) is made an important part of a grammaticus praelectio. 5. 5 incidat: cf. 10. 2. 15 'in magnis quoque auctoribus incidunt aliqua uitiosa'. The word is casually repeated from the previous section. atque.. .pollicetur: drawing out the implications of the word profession note also 1. 4. 2 'professio... promittit', 1. 9. 1 'professio pollicetur' (cf. 2. 21. 5, citing Cicero), 12. 11. 14 'pollicentur [sc. praeceptores]'. eo quidem ualidius quod: the more emphatically is it proprium because . . . We know no exact parallel for this locution, but cf. Phaed. 4 epil. 9 'quanto poetae sunt molesti ualidius'. non utique: strongly negative (see on 2. 1. 1 utique). Q. emphasizes that he is not asking a rhetor to give each pupil individual help in reading any book the pupil chooses. Spalding thought such a notion hard to accept; but that individual attention was practicable is shown by the last words of §3, where the implication is that with the help of adiutores such help could be, and perhaps normally was, given. (Theon, for whom see above, p. 121, assumed that enarratio of prose texts was something to be conducted between master and one pupil; but he seems to think of this as happening in a private 'tutorial'.) It may be valid to deduce (as Bonner, Education, 225 seems to do) that a grammaticus would, or might, have acted in the same way; though presumably he would have hoped that his class would be at roughly the same level of ability and so could be given at any rate the preliminary reading in common. If there is any absurdity in Q.'s picture, it will lie in the idea that a boy could choose any text he liked (cf., it seems, Theon 139 [p. 107]); the teacher would need to decide what was appropriate to each pupil. ad gremium reuocatis: see on 2.4. 15 adgremium praeceptoris. The point of reuocatis is that such treatment is a return to the childish procedures of the grammar school. Similarly, deseruiant points out the shame involved for the teacher. 5. 6 magis utile: explained by ' u t . . . adsuescant'. facto: true passive, despite LS s.v. silentium I A: the master imposes silence, perhaps by a gesture (Sen. Con. 9. 4. 19 'surrexit Sabinus et silentium manu fecit'; cf. also Tac. Hist. 3. 20. 1 'Antonius... ubi aspectu et auctoritate silentium fecerat'). constituere lectorem: cf. Cic. C/w. 140 'recitatoribus constitutis'. Libanius, Ep. 1066. 2 (Cribiore 227) appears to talk of a young man who is chosen as the viTOKpirrjs . . . rots Spdpaai at an avdyvcoois. protinus: 'at the same time' (n. on 2.4.15 protinus) as serving the purposes of the class; quoque reinforces the adverb, as does etiam at 2. 15. 34. Reading even to the grammaticus allowed practice in delivery (1. 8. 1-3).
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adsuescant: the plural is used by a natural anacoluthon to cover not only the unus aliquis mentioned but others similarly appointed, by turns, on other occasions. For reading combined with practice in delivery, see Theon 135 (p. 103); Patillon (n. 510) suggests that this shows that the pupil read from a book supported on a lectern; but it is possible that Theon is here thinking, as at 137 (p. 105), of recitation from memory (see below on 2. 7. 2 ediscere). 5. 7 exposita causa: cf. Theon 134 (p. 102) on reading: 'apres quoi (i.e. more general remarks] on exposera le sujet'; also 10. 1. 22, where analysis of a speech at a more advanced stage is being discussed: 'illud uero utilissimum, nosse eas causas quarum orationes in manus sumpserimus'. The whole context shows that Q. is talking of published speeches read aloud, if only in excerpted form (see above, p. xxix), by the pupils. in quam scripta legetur oratio: the implication of the future tense is perhaps that the exposition preceded the reading, though the detailed commentary may have followed it; see above, pp. xxviii f. Q. concentrates on speeches, and does not mention history again until 19; cf. 1 'historiae atque etiam magis orationum lectione'. nihil otiosum pati: 'lit. "leave nothing in peace"—i.e. "comment on everything" ' (Gaunt). Cf. Sail. Jug. 66. 1 'nihil intactum neque quietum pati'. Our passage is not well treated at TLL s.v. otiosus 1172. 83. quodque.. .quodque: cf. e.g. 1. 8. 16, 2. 13. 11; K-S ii. 35. inuentione: dealt with down to the end of 8, after which in ratione eloquendi signals the turn to elocutio. For other passages similarly hung on the parts of a speech see 2. 10. 8, 2. 13. 1, 2. 13. 5-6, 2. 17. 6, 10. 1. 48-50, 11. 1. 6, 11. 3. 161-74; but the important parallel is 10. 2. 27 (what to look for in speeches one wishes to imitate). Relevant also is 1. 8. 16-17 (what a grammaticus points out in his praelectio). In Theon's account of reading at 135 (p. 103), both 'contenu' and 'expression' are covered. conciliandi iudicis: the winning of the judges' goodwill is a prime aim of the proem: 4. 1. 6-33 (esp., for this verb, 16, 23, 26); Lausberg, §§273-9. lux breuitas fides: corresponding to the Isocratean uirtutes narrationis (Lausberg, §§294-5) listed at 4. 2. 31: 'lucidam breuem ueri similem', where Q. comments: 'neque enim refert an pro lucida perspicuam, pro ueri simili probabilem credibilemue dicamus'. For lux thus ('Klarheit, Aufklarung': Afifahl 128) cf. esp. 4. 5. 22 (of partitio) 'plurimum orationi lucis... confert. Neque enim solum id efficit, ut clariora fiant quae dicuntur...'; Philostratus, VS510 oar)V€ias ... dis iv TO) A oyoj. It is more normally used of brilliance of expression (TLL s.v. 1915. 77-1916. 11). consilium: not (as in the similar passage at 10. 2. 27 'quod consilium, quae dispositio') the strategy that should inform a whole speech (for which see
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n. on 2. 13. 2 consilium), but, as the addition of occulta calliditas shows, something more like 'artifice' (cf. 12. 9. 5 'artes quidem et consilia lateant et quidquid si deprenditur perit', 12. 8. 6 'consilium et colores adiciunt'), as 'sometimes' needed in narrative: one always needs a plan, but not always a plot. Q. is still concerned with narrative, in connection with which he remarks with approval on the arte occulta of a passage in the pro Milone (4. 2. 58). Though he warns against omnis calliditatis suspicio (4. 2. 126), it is the audience's detection of such cunning that he deprecates (note 12. 9. 5 cited above; Ov. Ars 2. 313 'si latet ars, prodest; adfert deprensa pudorem'); hence quam occulta, hence too the comment that follows at the start of 8. For dissimulatio artis generally, see Calboli on Rhet Her. 4. 10, adding Q. 2. 10. 11 (where see n.on latere... debet), Sen. Con. 7 pr. 3. 5. 8 nisi ab artifice: cf. Plin. Ep. 1. 10. 4 'ut... de pictore scalptore fictore nisi artifex iudicare [sc. non potest]'. Some, less subtle, aspects of oratory could be judged by a layman: see the discussion in Cic. Brut. 183-200. in diuidendo: i.e. in the structuring of the speech that may be manifested in a formal partitio (for which see 4. 5; Lausberg, §347). crebra: cf. 4. 5. 25 'subtilius et copiosius diuisisse'. Q. seems to mean arguments that come abundantly, thick and fast: cf. Plin. Ep. 1. 20. 22 (glossing Homer) 'illam orationem similem niuibus hibernis, id est crebram et adsiduam sed et largam'. quibus... efficiat: Q. abandons the parts of a speech and turns to more general qualities, as in 10. 2. 27 'quanta in adfectibus omnis generis mouendis scientia' follows 'quae uis probandi ac refellendi'. But, as in that passage, mention of emotional appeal provides some residual allusion to the remaining part, the epilogue: note 'quibus uiribus inspiret' and especially 'ut denique... efficiat' below. inspiret: sc. orator. It is natural to suppose that, like permulceat, the verb understands the audience as object, 'how vigorously he inspires his audience [with emotions]'; but the passions stirred are the normal object, as in 12. 10. 62 'hie [sc. orator] iram, hie misericordiam inspirabit' (parallels in TLL s.v. inspiro 1961. 38-52). In the only other relevant use in Q., 5. 14. 32 'non inspiret? non augeat? [sc. eloquentia]', the object is apparently rather the topic under discussion. But it does not seem impossible that the verb is in our passage intransitive, 'with what power he is inspired' (cf. the literal use, 'breath deeply', illustrated in OLD s.v. inspiro 1). The lexica cite Sen. Con. 2 pr. 2 'quotiens inciderat aliqua materia quae conuicium saeculi reciperet, inspirabat [sc. Fabianus] magno magis quam acri animo', where the verb is perhaps best taken as intransitive rather than as understanding materiam.
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permulceat: if inspiret is taken to mean 'stir', we shall be tempted to understand its counterpart as meaning 'soothe, calm down' (orators needed to be able to do both: e.g. 6.1. 11 'concitare adfectus et componere'); this sense is not found in Q., but cf. e.g. Liv. 7.40. 1 (of irae). Q. does use the verb, once, in the sense 'give sensual pleasure to' at 2.12.6 (of titillation of the ears; cf. e.g. Cic. Orat. 163), and this may be what is intended here. TLL s.v. perm ulceo 1571. 2-25 cites Cassiodorus, In psalm. 140. 2 [ CC98, p. 1262 ] (a text known to draw on Quintilian) 'odorantes se delectabili iucunditatepermulcet [sc. incensum]", as well as Cic. de Orat. 2. 315 'eum qui audit permulcere atque allicere' (of the process of conciliatio in the proem). maledictis: cf. Cic. Plane. 33 'maledicta... aspere et ferociter et libere dicta'. Q. is not keen on such abuse (note e.g. 7. 2. 34, advice taken in Ded. min. 333. 8), but it must be remembered that he is here suggesting lines of analysis, not making recommendations. denique: the list doses, but there is also a hint at the peroratio of a speech, when the orator is in full emotional control of his audience. dominetur: cf. 8 pr. 7: the adfectus 'lord it' throughout a speech, but especially at the beginning and end (note also 6. 2. 4). The skilled orator has absolute control over them (cf. Cic. Quinct 94 (in capite fbrtunisque hominum... dominentur'), and hence over the audience who feel them (cf. Fronto, p. 122. 11-12 van den Hout2 'eloquentia uestra imperat, eloquentia [suppl. Winterbottom] mentibus dominatur'). inrumpat: the orator bursts into the hearts of his hearers (Stat. Theh. 10. 341 [to Phoebus] 'saepe hanc dignare inrumpere mentem') as the emotions he arouses do (3. 5. 2 'adfectibus qui... quocumque inruperunt plurimum ualent'). similem... efficiat: a striking idea. More usual is the notion that an orator's frame of mind is transferred to the hearer: 6. 2. 27 'simus ipsi similes eorum qui uere patiuntur adfectibus, et a tali animo proficiscatur oratio qualem facere iudici uolet' (see L-P on Cic. de Orat. 2. 189); note also 1.2. 30, 11. 1.2. 5.9 ratione eloquendi: we pass to elocutio( for the periphrasis cf. 12. 10. 27), beginning with words, the 'proper', e.g. those neither specially coined nor metaphorical (8. 3. 24), the 'ornate' (e.g. 10. 1. 6 '[uerba] aliis alia aut magis propria aut magis ornata', with Peterson's n.), and (climax!) the 'lofty' (e.g. 8. 3. 18 '[uerbum] sublime nitidumque'). Cf. with this section Theon 135 (p. 103): 'Mais il connaitra aussi les styles de l'expression et comment un certain omement les utilise avec beaute et convenance. Notre expose sera sur ce point plus approfondi.' amplificatio: precepts are given in 8. 4; Lausberg, §§401-6.
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quae uirtus ei contraria: Q. employs a periphrasis, though he knows minutio as the counterpart to amplificatio (4. 3. 15; for the verb see 8. 4. 1 'amplificandi uel minuendi', 9. 2. 3). Donald Russell very attractively suggests ubi uirtus, pointing out that neither 'what quality contrary to amplification is to be praised?' nor 'what is the praiseworthy quality which is opposed to amplification?' is satisfactory. Compare, however, quae figura below: 'what figure [is being used in a particular passage].' Similarly, perhaps, here: the teacher will point out what technique, the opposite of amplification, is being used well in the passage under analysis, uirtus can then mean, as it should, 'good quality' (perhaps compare 1.8. 17 'quae in oeconomia uirtus'); this is a list of good features of a speech (as emerges from 10). speciose: complimentary, as in 9. 4. 14. We return for a moment to words (8. 3. 24 'uerba propria ficta tralata'). leuis et quadrata.. .compositio: the positioning (ouvdeois) of words should be 'smooth' (10. 1. 52 [of Hesiod] 'leuitas... uerborum et compositions probabilis'; Geigenmtiller 82-3) and 'squared off', with no rough edges. For this metaphor from building (or carpentry) cf. Cic. Orat. 197 'quadrandae orationis industria' and de Orat 3. 175 'earn coniunctionem ['an extended sequence of words'] sicuti uersum numerose cadere et quadrate [lit. 'form a square'] et perfici uolumus': there associated with rhythmic effects at the clausula. But in our passage, as in 9. 4. 60 and 69, Q. is doubtless thinking of compositio uerborum in a wider context. uirilis tamen: though quadrata is inoffensive enough (especially as there might be some hint of the sense 'squarely built': OLD s.v. quadratus 4a), Q. retreats hastily from any unfavourable connotation in leuis, which might carry implications of effeminacy (8. 3. 6 'effeminatam leuitatem'; Ov. Ars 3. 437 'femina quid faciat, cum uir sit leuior ipsa', Pers. 1. 82 'trossulus.. .leuis'; and see below on 12 uulsis leuatisque). He is much concerned with maintaining 'masculinity' of style; see esp. the remarkable passage at 5.12. 17-21 (note e.g. 18 'nos habitum ipsum orationis uirilem et illam uim stricte robusteque dicendi tenera quadam elocutionis cute operimus, et, dum leuia sint ac nitida, quantum ualeant nihil interesse arbitramur'). This is in the tradition of moralizing criticism as seen e.g. in Seneca: Ep. 46. 2 'compositio uirilis et sancta', 114. 22 'oratio... robusta, fortis, uirilis'; Q., we recall, warmed to Seneca as an 'egregius . . . uitiorum insectator' (10. 1. 129), if not as a stylist. 5. 10 corruptas... et uitiosas: cf. 12. 10. 73 'uitiosum et corruptum dicendi genus'; see on 2. 3. 9 corruptos. palam: in class, as at 16. inpropria.. .effeminata: Q. (listing adjectives that sometimes apply exclusively to words, sometimes either to words or to style in general) sets up some
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deflexa: 'deviant'; see passages cited above on rectus. The context makes it easy to supply a recto sermone: a qualifying prepositional phrase is normal. exquisitiora: cf. 4. 2. 36 'uerbis.. .exquisitis et ab usu remotis'. The word suggests a rich and rare quality; see TLL s.v. exquiro 1821. 46-59, citing e.g. Cic. Brut. 321 'exquisitius et minime uulgare orationis genus'. distortis e t . . . prodi gio sis corporibus: cf. 8 pr. 33 '[orationem] admirabilem non sic quomodo prodigia miramur> (also 1. 1. 2 'hebetes... non magis secundum naturam hominis eduntur quam prodigiosa corpora et monstris insignia'). Spalding well cited Ded. min. 298. 12 'Habent hoc quoque deliciae diuitum malum, quaerere omnia contra naturam. Gratus est ille debilitate; ille ipsa infelicitate distorti corporis placet'. Q. thinks of the slave market (note pretium), where Augustus at least (Suet. Aug. 83) 'pumilos atque distortos . . . ut ludibria naturae ...abhorrebat'; cf. Plu. Moralia 520 c: in Rome some people take no account of beauty in boys for sale but 'haunt the prodigy market': 7repi rrjv TOJV repdrajv dyopdv dvCLOTpeovTOLL, with examples, such as the 'ostrich-headed'. If we decode, Q. is mocking admirers of writers who purposely aim at ugly effects. Such writers are characterized in Sen. Ep. 114. 13-16, where, among other exponents of corrupt style, they are contrasted with purveyors of the excessive cultus which Q. will go on to talk of in the next section: 'alter se plus iusto colit, alter plus iusto neglegit'. Thus the one type 'praefractam et asperam [compositionem] probant; disturbant de industria si quid placidius effluxit', while at the other extreme 'quorirndam non est compositio, modulatio est; adeo blanditur et molliter labitur'. The rest of the letter shows that extreme examples of the two manners were the Sallustian L. Arruntius on the one hand and Maecenas on the other; for the latter cf. Tac. Dial. 26. 1 'calamistros Maecenatis', with Gudeman ad loc., reminiscent of Q.'s language in the next section. The moral of Seneca's famous letter is that style reflects character and manners (so too Q. 11. 1. 30 'profert.. .mores plerumque oratio'), and in our passage of Q. (compare 12 'uulsis leuatisque' with Seneca [21] 'quod uides istos sequi qui aut uellunt barbam aut interuellunt') there is perhaps some reflection on the character of these misguided stylists and their admirers. Q. was able to use the imagery of the slave market to express his feelings about the 'pretty' style too: see 5. 12. 17-19, where the craze for castrated exoleti (Sen. Con. 10.4. 17: great men 'contra naturam diuitias suas exercent') is equated with the enthusiasm for effeminacy of style. On the 'Verkehrung der Natur', see generally Norden, AK 279-80. communis habitus: 'the normal human condition'; cf. Sal. Hist. 2.62 'communem habitumtransgressus' ('of above average height and build': McGushin; differently Funari). For bona with such agenitive, cf. 1 pr. 13'eloquentiaebonis male uti', 27 'bona... ingenii studiique' (see also n.on 2. 8. 3 naturae; and
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'malis morum' below in 12, with n.). It is unlikely that the reading of (the often interpolated) A, ex communi habitu boni (where boni would have to be taken with nihil), should be preferred to this idiomatic phrase. 5. 12 atque etiam: 'and, what is more, even...'. Q. now turns from those who positively like ugliness to those who imagine they have regard for beauty; in fact, however, they have a mistaken concept of it, for they restrict it to effects produced artificially. capiuntur: 'are allured by surface appearances' (in Q.'s own view; cf. 22 capti), or (in the view of the people he is criticizing) 'are captivated by beauty' (thus, below, they think the)' see forma in the artificial). uulsis leuatisque: depilation (criticized in 1. 6. 44, along with waving of the hair) resulting in the smooth skin deplored in men (see on 9 uirilis tamen). Cf. 5. 9. 14 'corpus uulsum, fractum incessum, uestem muliebrem dixerit mollis et parum uiri signa'; 8 pr. 19 'eadem [sc. corpora] si quis uulsa atque fucata muliebriter comat, foedissima sint ipso formae labore'; Cic. Orationum deperditarum fragmenta, fr. xiv. 22 Scholl (p. 448) 'tu . . . quem decet muliebris ornatus, quem incessus psaltriae, qui effeminare uultum, attenuare uocem, leuare corpus potes'; Sen. Con. 1 pr. 10 'ite nunc et in istis uulsis atque expolitis et nusquam nisi in libidine uiris quaerite oratores'; Mayor and Courtney on Juv. 8. 114-15. inustas: treated with the curling tongs, as (figuratively) in Cic. Brut 262 'calamistris inurere' (cf., of Plato, D.H. Comp. epit. 25 [192. 11-13 UsenerRadermacher] TOVS eaurov SiaAoyovs KTCVI^OJV Kal FIOOTPV)(I£ojv Kal navra TPOTTOV ava-rrXeKajv). For the practice see Ov. Am. 1. 14. 25-6, 29-30 'quam se praebuerunt [sc. comae] ferro patienter et igni, | ut fieret torto nexilis orbe sinus!... | uim procul hinc remoue: non est qui debeat uri; | erudit admotas ipse capillus aeus.' There (despite OLD s.v. acus 2b) acus is the hair-pin, sufficient in Ovid's view to dress (OLDs.v. comola, citing e.g. Q. 12. 10. 47, where see Austin's n.) the girl's hair: singeing was not needed, for the hair would curl naturally if pinned in the required waves (Mart. 14. 24. 2 'figat acus tortas sustineatque comas'). In our passage, however, curling-iron and pinning are both employed. non suo colore: cf. 8.3. 6, cited in the next n. (add 8 pr. 19 'fucata'; also 2.15.25 'coloremfuco... mentiantur', of slave-dealers). Cf.Cic. Or. 79 (of the plain style) 'fucati... medicamenta candoris et ruboris omnia repellentur' (mention of calamistri has preceded); Ov. Ars 3. 164 'et melior uero quaeritur arte color'; Petr. 63. 10 'baro ille ... numquam coloris sui fuit' (after being bewitched). nitidis: such persons have the wrong kind of glow, not that resulting from healthy youth (Ov. Ars 3. 74 'et perit, in nitido qui fuit ore, color'; OLDs.v. nitidus 3), but that artificially produced by cosmetics (8. 3. 6 'sed hie
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ornatus... uirilis... sit nec effeminatam leuitatem et fiico ementitum colorem amet: sanguine et uiribus niteat'; Ov. Med. 51-2 'die age, cum teneros somnus dimiserit artus, | Candida quo possint ora nitere modo').
incorrupta: imspoiled by artifice. This second metaphor, as the parallels from Ovid have shown, is reminiscent of the topic as treated, wearisomely enough, in elegy; cf. e.g. Prop. 1. 2 (note 1, 5-6 'quid iuuat... | naturaeque decus mercato perdere cultu, | nec sinere in propriis membra nitere bonis?' In Greek, note D. H. Isoc. 3 'he is as inferior to Lysias in this quality as a body that is a hotch-potch of applied cosmetics is inferior to one which has natural beauty' (transl. Usher). malis morum: malis moribus A, again (see on 11 communis habitus) spoiling a choicer expression, which Q. prefers for its formal parallelism with pulchritudo corporis. 5. 13 ipse: Q. means that the pupils must (as in the praelectio of the school of the grammaticus: 1. 8. 13) be drawn in too; for the rhetor asking questions cf. 2. 2. 6. superfluent: the expected sense is 'vorbeifliessen' (Afifahl 120); but there seems no parallel for this verb in the sense of praeterfluere (so 11. 2. 1 'frustraque docemur si quidquid audimus praeterfluat', as a result of poor memory; cf. Cic. Balb. 4 'orationi quae non praeteruecta sit auris uestras, sed in animis omnium penitus insederit', de Orat. 2. 109 '[definitio] in mentem iudicis intrare non potest: ante enim praeterlabitur quam percepta est'); nor is it elsewhere found used transitively. Q. seems to be confusing the idea of the information going by unheeded with that of it going in but being rejected ('in at one ear and out at the other': Russell). The image is much clearer at 1. 2. 28 'ut uascula oris angusti swperfusam umoris copiam respuunt, sensim autem influentibus uel etiam instillatis complentur, sic animi puerorum quantum excipere possint uidendum est'. Cf. also n.on 2. 6. 3 auribus modo accipiunt. inueniant: see n.on 2. 4. 6 inueniat. n a m . . . sint: cf. 2. 6. 5 \ . . uestigia, quae persecuti iam suis uiribus sine adminiculo progredi possint', 10. 1. 15 'cum eo qui discit perductus est, ut intellegere ea sine demonstrante et sequi iam suis uiribus possit'. 5. 14 hoc diligentiae genus: the whole process of careful study of prose (esp. oratorical) texts that has been advocated since 1. It is favourably compared with concentration on textbooks (for artes see Colson's perhaps over-scrupulous n.on 1 pr. 24) and their generalized rules: a target for Q.'s criticism in 2.13 (e.g. 14). He evinces a typically Roman distaste for too much (Greek) theorizing: cf. Cic. de Orat. 1. 15 'usus .. .qui omnium magistrorum
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praecepta superaret'; in the same vein Q. 12. 2. 30 'quantum enim Graeci praeceptis ualent, tantum Romani, quod est maius, exemplis'. latiore quadam comprensione: not a causal ablative, 'by reason of' (Gaunt) their too large range, which does not account for quadam, but a modal one, with ire. 'how can artes take some wider sweep than in fact they do, so as to cover all... ?' This sense of compre(he)nsio seems to be unparalleled, though it arises easily enough from one connotation of the slippery verb comprehendo, 'cover', 'include': see TLL s.v. 2153. 28-43, citing e.g. Luc. 3. 309 'comprensa est Latiis quaecumque annalibus aetas'. For the verbal force of comprehensio (and more generally) see n. on 2. 15. 1 comprensione uerborum. per omnes.. .qui possunt: cf. 4. 1. 43 'hae [sc. actiones], cum oriantur ex causis, quarum species consequi omnes non possumus, nisi generaliter comprenduntur [in a different sense from that mentioned above] in infinitum sunt extrahendae'; 5. 10. 100 'probationum.. .quas neque generatim tradere sat est... neque per singulas species exequi patitur natura rerum' (cf. 6. 3. 35); 7 pr. 4 'si certa aliqua uia tradi in omnis materias ullo modo posset, non tam paucis contigisset [sc. diuisio]. Sed cum infinitae litium formae fiierint futuraeque sint, et tot saeculis nulla reperta sit causa quae esset tota alteri similis.. cotidie: cf. 2. 13. 17 '[rhetorice] late fusum opus est et multiplex et prope cotidie nouum', with n. paene: qualifying the preceding word (contrast the order of prope cotidie in the passage just cited), as in 9. 4. 73 'totum paene principium': in both cases perhaps so placed for rhythmical reasons. 5. 15 de re militari: for military metaphors in Q. see Afifahl 88-93 (e.g. 2. 13. 3-4); we have not seen I. Mastrorosa, 'Similitudini, metafore e lessico militari nella trattatistica retorica latina: Cicerone e Quintiliano' in S. Sconocchia and L. Toneatto (eds.), Lingue tecnichedelgreco edel latino III, Atti del III Seminario internazionale sulla letteratura scientifica e tecnica greca e latina (Bologna, 2000), 277-310. The despised Celsus (mediocri uir ingenio) published precepts on war (12. 11. 24). Sallust represents Marius mocking consuls who, late in the day, pored over Graecorum militaria praecepta (Jug. 85.12); cf. Cic. De or. 2. 75-6. See generally NP s.v. Poliorketik. praecepta... experimenta: according to 12. 6. 7, the two could come happily together. Note also 6. 2. 25 'quae... non aliquo tradente sed experimento meo ac natura ipsa duce accepi'. Experience needed to be learned from (11. 2. 33) and its lessons trusted (4. 2. 86, 11. 2. 17). 5. 16 an uero... Demosthenes: for the idiomatic double question see K-S ii. 169 (adding Luc. 8. 269-71, Decl. mai. 13. 19); the structure of such sentences is clearer in Greek, where pev (note quidem here) and Se' can be
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employed; cf. e.g. Lucian, Rh. Pr. 4. Q. argues: it is agreed that there is point in a teacher's declaiming (for which see introductory n. to 2. 6); a fortiori there is even more point in the reading of Cicero and Demosthenes (see also n. on 2. 2. 8 licet.. .plenius). Similarly in the next sentence, where we should understand an before corrigetur. contulerint: for the plural with disjunctive subject see K-S i. 48. The future perfect is due to lecti, the conferring being contemporaneous with the reading, not subsequent as if Q. had written conferent. We are indebted to Dr Holford-Strevens for his advice on this passage and for his help with the wording of this note. declamando: perhaps covering both progymnasmata and full declamation; see above, p. xxiii n. 3. orationem: strongly and favourably contrasted with in declamando, just as Cicero aut Demosthenes out-trumped the mere praeceptor. By 'correction' of a (published) oration Q. will mean the sort of critical analysis of a faulty speech recommended above in §10. Theon's chapter on Contradiction (143-4 [pp. 111-12]) extends this severe treatment to classic texts like Demosthenes, but with much more emphasis on content and argument. Similarly, Cic. de Orat. 1. 158 'scriptores . . . exercitationis causa... corrigendi uituperandi refellendi'. Conversely, in 72. 15-16 (p. 17) Theon remarks that if the young are told to write on subjects previously treated by some ancient, and then find they have done less well than the old text, they would be consoled to have the ancients as their correctors (StopOajras €\oiev avrovs TOVS naXaious). quin immo: 'a mannerism of the age' (Austin on 12. 11. 27). PHI adds to Austin's examples a large number of instances from the Elder Pliny and esp. the Digest. iucundius: opposed to potentius as dulce to utile (note 17 utilitas; cf. 2. 7. 4 'iucunda.. .utilis'). 5. 17 deerant: for this imperfect (characteristic of Cicero's letters) see K-S i. 157. haec utilitas: = utilitas huius rei-, K-S i. 64-5. atque utinam... displicebit: a clumsily phrased remark, though quite in Q.'s manner (cf. 10. 2. 15 'utinam tam bona imitantes dicerent melius quam mala peiits dicunt'); Gesner's 'quam non' would give more snap; cf. 3. 1. 6 'nemo non didicisse mauult quam discere'. The epigram rounds off the paragraph on the utility of reading prose authors in class, and the section should not be separated from it, as in the Loeb. 5. 18 optineri: 'if this point can be carried' (OLD s.v. obtineo 11, though parallels for the passive seem to lack), or even 'put into practice' (cf. 2. 4. 39 optineri with n.).
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non ita difficilis: cf. 7. 1. 41 'unam... controuersiam, non ita sane difficilem aut nouam'; OLD s.v. ita 13b. ita is normally used thus with words expressing size, etc.; so 11. 3. 46 'non ita magnae uocis declinationes'. qui legendi sint: while Q. will recommend Livy rather than Sallust for the youngest {pueri: doubtless with the implication that Sallust could be read by older pupils), together with Cicero, so Theon mentions first (134 [p. 102]) orators, in ascending order of difficulty (Isocrates, then Hyperides and Aeschines, finally Demosthenes), later (136 [p. 104]) historians: Herodotus, with his 'style d'une grande simplicite', then Theopompus and Xenophon, Philistus and Ephorus, and finally Thucydides, whose obscurity Theon goes on to mention. The correspondence of Livy to Herodotus, and of Sallust to Thucydides, is apparent (see further on 19). nam.. .probauerunt: a similar argument in connection with the selection of teachers is similarly refuted in 2. 3 (note esp. 1 'tamquam... magis sit apta mediocritas praeceptoris cum ad intellectum atque imitationem facilior...', 2 'quanto sit melius optimis inbui'). minores, as opposed to the optimi preferred by Q., might be defended as a reminiscence of that parallel passage (2. 3. 1 'apud minores aliquamdiu detinent', 2. 3. 3). E. R. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages (London, 1953), 465 n. 53 glosses 'i.e., authors of less value' (though TLL s.v. parvus 566. 62-77 offers no parallel for such a plural of lesser writers as a class). But it is not true that lesser orators are necessarily easier to understand than greater. Hence the desirability of a replacement such as exiliores (Doreen Innes), tenuiores (Donald Russell) or ieiuniores, any of which would also set up the expected contrast with floridius genus below. Such a change may also be thought to account for Q.'s illos, which lacks point with minores (contrast its perfect suitability at 2. 3. 3), but with e.g. ieiuniores would gesture at the well-known (e.g. Atticist) exponents of a plainer style. floridius: floridum is used of the middle type of oratory at 12. 10. 58 (see Austin's n.); Geigenmliller 80-2 (Gk. avB^pos); TLL s.v,floridus 925. 72-926.5. The adjective is not always meant to be complimentary (Sen. Ep. 114. 16 '[sententiae] floridae.. .et nimis dulces'), but note8. 3.74 'sublimem floridam iucundam mirabilem [sc. orationem]'. In our passage the word does not, as the text stands, contrast with minores, who might befloweryas well as inferior; but it might imply some edging towards the genus corruptum, which 'casuris si leuiter excutiantur flosculis nitet' (12.10. 73; for flosculi see n. on 22 below). alenda: for the metaphor see on 2. 4. 2 robustior. Cf. esp. Theon 61. 30-1 (p. 4): reading, according to Apollonius Rhodius, is Tpo^i] Xegetos. 5. 19 optimos: cf. 10. 1. 20 'diu non nisi optimus quisque et qui credentem sibi minime fallat legendus est'.
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candidissimum: 'intelligitur... h(oc) l(oco) non tam animus scriptoris quam dicendi genus, quod nihil oblique significet, sed omnia liquido exponat, quale tamen nonnisi ab animo etiam simplici proficiscatur' (Spalding). The adjective is applied to Herodotus at 10. 1. 73 (where see Peterson's n.), and cf. 10. 1. 101 (on his Roman counterpart Livy) 'mirae iucunditatis clarissimique candoris'. Sen. Suas. 6. 22 'ut est natura candidissimus omnium magnorum ingeniorum aestimator T. Liuius' draws attention to the moral side of this quality. Livy had 'lactea ubertas' (10. 1. 32), which made him appropriate for nourishing the young (and giving pleasure too). Spalding well cites Sen. Con. 7 pr. 2 (on Albucius) 'sententiae, quas optime Pollio Asinius albas uocabat, simplices, apertae, nihil occultum nihil insperatum adferentes, sed uocales et splendidae'. expositum: 'accessible' (cf. apertns in 20), 'easily intelligible' (cf. intellegendum below); cf. Gel. 3. 2. 14 'non exposite atque aperte, sed . . . recondita... significatione' (also Plin. Ep. 3. 3. 6 'dicendi facultas aperta et exposita'). The adjective seems unparalleled of a person, or his work, in a stylistic context, but it coheres well with the moral side of candidissimum. cf. Stat. Silv. 5. 3. 246 'quid referam expositos seruato pondere mores?': his father's character was on the surface, open to public view (OLD s.v. expositus 2). Q. uses the word in 10. 5. 11 to mean 'trite' (cf. Juv. 7. 54), but that can hardly be the sense here. uelim: understand (or add: Watt, ZPE 121 (1998), 69) legi. Q. is writing carelessly, or else his text is corrupt, et statim et semper is not restricted to childhood reading, but that is in question from sed tamen on; the essential a pueris therefore comes oddly late. Watt also suggested the transposition of a pueris (then = 'from childhood') to follow statim, comparing 11. 2.41 'pueri statim... quam plurima ediscant'; but that is to mar a fine alliterative phrase. One feels that both a pueris and legi are needed in the uelim clause. et hie: if et is not corrupt, it is best defended as by H. Meyer, who glossed 'et (ut aliud de S. addam)'. Halm's etsi hic(etsi Spalding) is possible, but one feels the sense would be better served by hie enim (or etenim hie. Q. twice uses etenim in his own person), if not merely hie. maior est auctor: i.e. he commands more auctoritas, is 'fide dignior' (Spalding, comparing Claudian 15 (In Gildonem). 499 'certa fides caeli, sed maior Honorius auctor'), Livy being judged deficient in that respect (10. 1. 32; contrast Tac. Ann. 4. 34. 3 'eloquentiae ac fidei praeclarus in primis'). We are also reminded of illos minores (18). For the phrase cf. 1. 5. 39 'maximos auctores', 9. 4. 16 'magnus auctor' (also 2. 15. 36 'non obscurus.. .auctor'); and for auctor generally, Colson on Ep. Tryph. 1. For the greatness of Sallust see Mart. 14. 191. 2 'primus Romana Crispus in historia', and many other testimonia collected in the Teubner text of A. Kurfess, pp. xxii-xxxi; Syme, Tacitus, 202, and Sallust (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964), 292.
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intellegendum: the obscurity of Sallust gave cause for complaint (10. 2. 17, Suet. Gram. 10. 6; note also 8. 3. 82), perhaps partly because he was linked in critics' minds (note 10. 1. 101, 10. 2. 17) with the much more difficult (and intelligent) Thucydides, partly because the ancients had the mature Histories fully available to them. 5. 20 quoque: i.e. as well as to advanced students and mature readers; or 'even for beginners' (cf. 8. 2. 23 'dilucida et neglegenter quoque audientibus aperta'). apertus: 'easy to understand' (unlike Sallust). apertus combines with iucundus as apertior does with speciosior at 2. 20. 7 (see n.). The word is not often used of writers (Afifahl 132), as opposed to their productions (e.g. 8. 2. 23, just cited); but cf. 10. 1. 119 (Trachalus). Liuius: see 10. 1. 39 'breuitas ilia., .quae est apud Liuium in epistula ad filium scripta, legendos Demosthenen atque Ciceronem, turn ita ut quisque esset Demostheni et Ciceroni simillimus'; M. Schanz and C. Hosius, Geschichte der romisehen Literatur, ii (Munich, 11935), 299. 5. 21 genera: the phrase is rather awkwardly taken up by 'ne ...', which would follow better on words of the sense 'boys should be warned of two things'. Our punctuation is adopted for ease of reading, but it wrongly (as unum here, and alterum in 22, show) implies that the ne clauses are free-standing prohibitions (as in Russell's transl.). Of the two 'types' (contrasted again at 10. 1. 43), Q. if anything (see 26) prefers the ancients to the moderns: 'si necesse sit, ueterem ilium horrorem dicendi malim quam istam nouam licentiam' (8. 5. 34). They had much to contribute (1.8.8; note also 10. 1. 40, adding consoling words on the noui), with a 'sanctitas... et uirilitas' that contrasted with modern deliciae (1.8. 9). And there were already signs (note 10. 1. 43 'quidam solos ueteres legendos putant', 12. 10.42; Tac. Dial. 23. 2) of the coming archaizing reaction against modern excesses; see generally Norden, AK 256-7. nimius admirator: cf. 6. 3. 3 'nimius risus adfectator'; Plaut. Capt 275 'nimius captator' (not commented on by Lindsay). Even nimium amator at 10. 1. 88 is unusual, though cf. Gel. 11. 8. 4 nimium nugator. Gracchorum Catonisque: linked at e.g. 8. 5. 33,12. 10. 45, Plin. Ep. 1. 20.4. The testimonia and fragments are assembled in ORF, nos. 8 (Cato; see also Astin, ch. 7, esp. 140-1), 34 (Ti. Gracchus), 48 (C. Gracchus). durescere: become wooden like the ancients (TLL s.v. durus 2309. 72-84, e.g. Cic. Brut. 117 [of Q. Aelius Tubero] 'oratione durus incultus horridus; Tac. Dial. 21.7 [of Asinius Pollio] 'adeo durus et siccus est'), though the verb is not attested elsewhere in this stylistic sense. Theon (137 [p. 105]) expresses similar worries: e.g. those who imitate Lysias only 'sont indigents, faibles et sans grace'.
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horridi: cf. e.g. 12. 10. 10 genera dicendi condicione tempo rum horridiora', exemplified by Cato and the Gracchi amongst others; TLL s.v. horridus 2993. 60-83, citing e.g. Cic. Brut. 68 'antiquior est huius [sc. Catonis] sermo et quaedam horridiora uerba'. Note 8. 5. 34, cited on genera above, ieiuni: see on 2. 4. 3 arida... ieiuna. uim: admired in Cato (Liv. 39. 40. 4 'tanta uis animi ingeniique', though not in connection with his oratory) and in C. Gracchus (e.g. Cic. Har. 41 'quo ingenio, qua eloquentia, quanta ui, quanta grauitate dicendi!'; also Tac. Dial. 26. 1 'C. Gracchi impetum'). quae turn., .est: similarly, Cicero adds 'ita enim turn loquebantur' to the remark cited above (on horridi) from Brut. 68. On stylistic judgements' being contingent upon time, see Tac. Dial. 18. 2, 19. 2 (both spoken by Aper). quod est pessimum: attaching itself to what follows; see Winterbottom's n. on Decl. min. 259. 2, adding Plin. Ep. 5. 17. 4. similes... uidebuntur: on the dangers of selective imitation of the ancients cf. 10. 2. 17 'ideoque qui horrideatque incomposite quidlibet illud frigidum et inane extulerunt, antiquis se pares credunt'; also 5. 14. 32 'se antiquis per hoc similes uocant'. 5. 22 recentis huius lasciuiae: cf. 10. 1. 43 'alios recens haec lasciuia deliciaeque [cf. 1. 8. 9] et omnia ad uoluptatem multitudinis imperitae composita delectant'; Tac. Dial. 26. 2 'ne uirilis quidem cultus est quo plerique temporum nostrorum actores ita utuntur ut lasciuia uerborum et leuitate sententiarum et licentia compositions histrionales modos exprimant'; n. on 2. 4. 3 lasciua; Norden, AK 286. flosculis: cf. 12. 10. 73 '[corruptum dicendi genus] aut uerborum licentia exultat aut puerilibus sententiolis lasciuit.. .aut casuris si leuiter excutiantur [cf. Cic. Off. 2.43 'tamquam flosculi decidunt'] flosculis nitet', showing that the metaphor could still live. Suchflowerypassages (cf. 12. 10. 13 'nimiis floribus'; see also on \Sfloridius), like loci communes, were all too easily detachable from their context (Cic. Sest. 119, Sen. Ep. 33. 1 and 7, Q. 10. 5. 23; the Scholia on Horace (conveniently cited in TLL s.v. flosculus 938. 29-31) use the word when glossing Ars 15-16 'purpureus... pannus'), and cultivated for their own sake. uoluptate praua deleniantur: cf. 2. 12. 6 'quod uel prauis uoluptatibus aures adsistentium permulceat'. The verb is used in its more sinister sense (OLD s.v. delenio 2), as in 5. 8. 1 'ii qui traduntur a poetis... Sirenum cantu deliniti uoluptatem saluti praetulisse'; note too Sen. Con. 9 pr. 1 'sententiis . . . audientes delenire contentus est' (contrast proofs, which 'minimum habent floris'). praedulce: praedulcia are among the elements making up cacozelon at 8. 3. 56. For the connotation of excessive sweetness (not always present in
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the literal uses of the adjective), cf. Sen. Suas. 7. 12 'solebat dulces sententias dicere, frequentius tamen praedulces et infractas', where dulcis is as usual favourable (even in 10. 1. 129 'dulcibus uitiis', of Seneca). Spalding compares Petronius' 'mellitos uerborum globulos' (1.3). propius: nearer to the boys' hearts, to their natural inclinations at that age (cf. 12. 10. 73 'puerilibus sententiolis'), rather than to their period (10. 1. 88 'propiores alii', Tac. Dial. 18. 1 'propiorem nobis'). We recall that pueri as well as adulescentes used to admire Seneca (10. 1. 130, 125). The lexica seem to ignore this passage, but for the adjective see OLD s.v. propior 3b 'nearer (to one's heart)', citing e.g. Ter. Haut. 987-8 'dum nulla alia delectatio [sc. fuit] quae propior esset'. For another striking use of the adverb, see 10. 1.91 'quem praesidentes studiis deae propius audirent?' adament: the verb is very strong; cf. Sen. Ep. 71. 5 'si... uirtutem adamaueris (amare enim parum est)', Reid on Cic. Fin. 1. 69. 5. 23 firmis... iudiciis: i.e. the adulescentes, contrasting with pueris in 21 (see on 2. 2. 14 infirmitas; 1. 8. 5 firmiore iudicio seems similarly to draw a contrast within the school of the grammaticus). Though Q. tells us here that the older orators are suitable reading at this later stage (so apparently 1. 8. 8-12, with Colson's n.), he will not recommend any predecessor of Cicero in his list at 10. 1. 105-22; but he does there name some recent speakers, carefully selected no doubt (he on principle does not mention the distinguished living: 122 'sunt enim summa hodie quibus inlustratur forum ingenia'). As for other prose genres, he mentions no one earlier than Sallust (101); and of Seneca he affirms (131), in language recalling our passage, that he is 'iam robustis et seueriore genere satis firmatis legendus', adding characteristically 'uel ideo quod exercere potest utrimque iudicium' (cf. below, 26 'ne imitatio iudicium antecederet'). solida: 'sturdy'; cf. 10. 1.2 'solida atque robusta... eloquentia'. uirilis: see above on 9 uirilis tamen and 21 genera. ingenii: the ancients excelling in this rather than in ars (so Ov. Trist. 2. 424 'Ennius ingenio maximus, arte rudis'), which lacked in that rude saeculum (cf. 12. 11. 23, of Cato's time). squalore: cf. Tac. Dial. 20. 5 'non Acci aut Pacuui ueterno inquinatus', with Gudeman ad loc. (pp. 338-9). noster hie cultus... enitescet: Q. can hardly say that, when the dirt is wiped off, the underlying brightness of the ancient text will shine forth (Sil. 4. 12-13 'detersa rubigine saeuus | induitur ferro splendor'). Instead, he claims that modern ornament (for cultus cf. n. on that word in 2. 10. 11) will shine out the more brilliantly when combined with vigour acquired from the ancients; there will be an effect of contrast, though not as stark as that of 2. 12. 7,
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where 'sententiae... magis eminent cum omnia circa illas sordida et abiecta sunt'. In a similar way, he prescribes at 12. 10. 79: 'habeat... nitor ille cultum uirilem', the best of both worlds. For enitescet Tac. Dial. 20. 4 'siue locus exquisito et poetico cultu enituit'. multa uirtus: thus even Seneca is conceded his virtues: 10. 1. 128 'multae . . . et magnae uirtutes', 131 'multa... probanda in eo, multa etiam admiranda sunt'. 5. 24 neque enim... proposito: the progress of thought is:'Nature has not made us a generation of dullards. What has happened is that we have made stylistic changes that have been too self-indulgent. If earlier writers were superior, it was not in native talent but in their principles.' Q. has dismissed the idea that most people suffer from tarditate ingenii (1. 1. 1); now he sticks up for his times in the same spirit in which he says at 10. 2. 8: 'nisi forte nostra potissimum tempora damnamus huius infelicitatis, ut nunc demum nihil crescat' (though this is a general sentiment, not tied to his own time alone). Similarly his pupil Pliny (Ep. 6. 21. 1 'Sum ex iis qui mirer antiquos, non tamen (ut quidam) temporum nostrorum ingenia despicio. Neque enim quasi lassa et effeta natura nihil iam laudabile parit') and Tacitus (Ann. 3. 55. 5 'nec omnia apud priores meliora, sed nostra quoque aetas multa laudis et artium imitanda posteris tulit'). Pessimism about literature at this period is discussed in Harry Caplan, Of Eloquence (Ithaca, NY, 1970), 160-95. nobis... indulsimus: cf. 8. 3. 1 'ornatum, in quo...sibi indulget orator'; 10. 1. 24 'indulgent ingeniorum suorum uoluptati'; 10. 1. 98 'Ouidi Medea uidetur mihi ostendere quantum ille uir praestare potuerit si ingenio suo imperare quam indulgere maluisset'. For the reflexive dative cf. TLL s.v. indulgeo 1251. 2-11, normally of course of moral self-indulgence. Similarly, proposition (Gk. -npoaLpeois), here meaning a consistently and consciously pursued stylistic goal (11. 1. 32 'siccum et sollicitum et contractum dicendi propositum'), is often used of a chosen way of life (OLD s.v. 2a). As so often in this chapter, moral judgements lurk behind stylistic; the virile, plain-speaking, and plainly dressed ancients contrast with modern effeminates. For, as Seneca's Letter 114 taught, style reflects character (see above on 11 distortiset... prodigiosis corporibus). multa.. .eligere: Q. seems to be thinking of the excerpting of modern writers for classroom study: note 'fuisse nuper et nunc esse' in 25. inquinentur: contamination of the good by the surrounding bad (4. 2. 102). 5. 25 totos: contrasting with the excerpting just mentioned. 5.26 tutius.. .erratur: i.e. it is safer even to make mistakes in the company of earlier writers; cf. 1. 6. 2 'et uel error honestus est magnos
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duces sequentibus', where, as here, uel marks the slight paradox (note Apul. Fl. 16 [p. 24. 14 Helm) 'tuti errores'; also 12 pr. 4 'uelut tutioris audentiae est temptare quibus paratior uenia est'). It only seems possible to make sense of Quintilian's prescriptions in 21-6 by assuming that by priores he means Cicero and Livy, favoured in 19-20; they can be read even by pueri (19). Ancients and moderns can be added to the syllabus at a later stage (23), a delay which is referred to (in the case of the noui) here by distuli. iudicium: it would be fatal to try to write like e.g. Seneca before being mature enough to judge where his faults lie; see above on 23 firtnis... iudiciis.
Chapter Six Rhetores differ in their methods of guiding pupils when they give speeches; some [Aj not merely provide a division but fill it out quite elaborately, while others [B] give an advance outline and correct afterwards any errors their pupils make (l-2a). If a choice has to bc made, the former approach is better (2b), especially as modern students tend to resent criticism (3). But mistakes do need to be corrected. Best then to vary the approach (4), giving more help to beginners and less later on (5); in the end pupils can be given a chance to work independently (6). This is how we see birds training their young (7). At first sight, Q. might appear to be moving on from the preliminary exercises to full declamation. But that move is made, and very clearly, only at 2. 10. 1. declamationes (2) must therefore refer to (spoken) progymnasmata (cf. p. xxiii n. 3). These exercises, no less than declamations, at least sometimes called for 'division', that is the laying out in advance by the teacher of the heads to be covered (see below); this is exemplified in Theon's treatment of his exercises (note esp. 125. 22-4 [p. 90] e'pe 8-q -ntipaOcjpcv Kai TCJV 0€COPRJTLKCIIV riva StcAetV £K TCJV avT(X)v TOTTCJV oppcjpevoi), and described by him generally in 71. 1-72. 3 (pp. 16-17), a passage beginning viTayopevreov .. . avrois
rrjv ra^iv TCJV K€
For prohationes and adfectus, see n. on 1 implebant. The titles given to chapters (and sometimes parts of chapters, for our numbered chapters are only a modem construct) in both branches of the manuscript tradition are doubtless not original, and may reflect fourthcentury editorial work on the Institutio. Accordingly, we normally do not comment on them. In 2. 6 however, the title 'De diuisione et parenchiresi' is of some interest. What is meant by diuisio is clear from the use of the term in connection with full declamation. It was the statement, in skeleton form ('diuisio paene hoc proprium habet, ostendere ossa et neruos controuersiae':
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Decl. min. 270. 2), of the structure of the arguments to be used in the declamation, where the bones would be covered with flesh (see further n. on 1 implebant); it customarily listed the quaestiones that needed to be discussed. The details of the process are discussed in Book 7 (7 pr. 4 'totus hie liber seruiat diuisioni'), which applies to any case, real or declamatory. Quite unfamiliar, however, is parenchiresis. The Latin form is found only here. The Greek, napeyxciprjois, is twice found with the sense 'interference'; cf. also G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford, 1961), s.v. One instance is in Cic. Att. 15.4. 3, of Atticus' proposal that Cicero should write a speech on a theme already treated by Brutus. There seems no reason to suppose (contra TLL s.v. parenchiresis 352. 17) that there is in Cicero's letter any play on a technical sense. As for our heading, it seems to reflect use of the word, much later than Q., to characterize, in a hostile tone of voice, the way in which some rhetores went well beyond the provision of a plain division when setting their pupils a theme (so C. Ritter in his edn. of the Minor Declamations, pp. ivf.). This distinction (if it is rightly made) between diuisio and parenchiresis does not seem to correspond neatly with the two methods discussed in this chapter. The first of these (A) indeed involves a division, and is referred to briefly as diuisio in 3; yet it goes well beyond it in a way that might be thought 'interfering'. The second (B), on the other hand, referred to as emendatio in 3, focuses on what happened after the pupil had given his declamation; quite what is meant by primae lineae in 2 is unclear (see n.), but it presumably did not involve a formal division. As we have seen, this chapter concerns the teaching of progymnasmata. We cannot know whether the methods it describes were used, or found parallels, in the teaching of advanced declamation, though that has been assumed, without discussion, by scholars seeking to explain the differing treatments seen in the collection of Minor Declamations (see the editions of Ritter, pp. ivf., and Winterbottom, pp. xi, 449).17 That question cannot be pursued further here; but two other declamatory collections may be briefly mentioned. (a) 'Divisions' form part of the title of the elder Seneca's collection. But the declaimers reported by Seneca were public showmen, not teachers, and the practice of Porcius Latro in announcing in advance the questions he proposed to raise was probably unusual. 'It would seem that the divisions which Seneca attributes to other declaimers may be the result of his own
17
There is comparable variety of method in the passages o f the Institutio where Q. gives
advice on the treatment of declamation themes: see W i n t e r b o t t o m 2 2 2 6 - 7 .
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analysis of their arguments' (Winterbottom, The Elder Seneca, Loeb, pp. xviif., with further details; cf. Fairweather 32, 152-65). Again, in Sen. Con. 7 pr. 1 we are told that Albucius 'raro totam controuersiam implebat: non posses dicere diuisionem esse, non posses dedamationem; tamquam declamationi multum deerat, tamquam diuisioni multum supererat'. He may thus have produced results resembling those of method A. But he did not have any pedagogic motives for this practice; he was merely a disorganized performer. (b) In the Greek collection of Sopatros (Aiatpccris Z-qr-qpiarajv, Diuisio Quaestionum), however, we see something more relevant to what Q. is talking of here. 'At varying lengths, [Sopatros] provides the headings according to which no less than 82 fictional cases. ..were to be argued, often illustrating with extracts of oratio recta declamation.'18 That is, in effect, Q.'s method A, though we cannot know exactly how the interplay of sermo and dedamatio would have been managed in school. 6. 1 fuit: it is not clear to what point in the past Q. is referring; perhaps generally to what things were like when he was still teaching. etiam: alluding, it seems, to the divergent views on prose enarratio hinted at in 2. 5. 1-3. materias: see n. on 2. 4. 12 totas... materias. Note 10. 5. 22, where materias diuidereprobably means 'to give [merely] a division' as opposed to speaking a complete declamation (so Bonner, Education, 322; contra, Russell ad loc.). non contenti: ambiguous. But as this method is briefly alluded to in 3 as diuisio, Q. must mean that it involved both the giving of a formal division and the working up of selected passages; not that a division was dispensed with when such working up took place. digerere: in support of Francius' old conjecture (approved by Dittmann at TLL s.v. dirigo 1233. 73-4; note also Lambinus' emendation at Cic. Part. 75, and the variant at Vegetius, Mil. 3. 23. 2), cf. esp. 11. 2. 37 'nam qui recte diuiserit, numquam poterit in rerum ordine errare; certa sunt enim non solum in digerendis quaestionibus sed etiam in exequendis'. If derigere (for the prefix, see on 2. 1. 11 derecti) is retained, the sense would be 'steer, guide' (cf. 2 'demonstrasse.. .uiam'), but that would be more suitable with the pupils themselves as object. prosequebantur: 'developed'; cf. 4. 1. 43. exequendis in 11. 2. 37 (just cited) means the same. Ifone has to choose, latiusgoes rather with dicendo (cf. 3. 5.15) than with prosequebantur (though cf. 5. 8. 2).
1 8 Doreen Innes and Michael Winterbottom, Sopatros the Rhetor (BICS London, 1988), 2.
Supplement 4 8 ;
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implebant: cf. (dedamation) Sen. Con. 7 pr. 1, cited above, p. 143; (oratory) Q. 6. 1. 12 'quaedam.. .quae illic [sc. in exordio] ostendere sat est, in peroratione implenda sunt magis', and esp. 4. 2. 110 'quod exponebat et ratione [like 'probationibus' here] fecit credibile et adfectu quoque impleuit'. The process of turning the division into a fully argued case is likened to clothing bones with flesh (Decl. min. 270. 2 'Nam sine his [sc. ossibus et neruis controuersiae] ...caro ipsa per se quid sit intellegitis. Sed in declamatione uestienda sunt haec', with Winterbottom's n.; cf. e.g. Q. 5. 12. 6 'argument a . . . plus habebimt decoris si non nudos et uelut came spoliatos artus ostenderint'), or to raising a structure on a foundation (Sen. Con. 1 pr. 21 'hoc fundamentum superstructis tot et tantis molibus obruebatur', varying the image of 'nuda... membra' just before). For the twin roles of proof and emotion in oratory see esp. 6. 2. 5 'probationes.. .efftciant sane ut causam nostram meliorem esse iudices putent, adfectus praestant ut etiam uelint'. Neither would be relevant to all the early exercises. But Theon mentions enix€ipr)^ara in his discussions of narration, thesis, and commonplace (and even myth and chria) (see Patillon's Index Verboriun); and see esp. the passage cited above, p. 141 from 71. 2-3 (p. 16). For emotion, note Theon 109. 2-11 (pp. 65-6): commonplace, 128. 11 (p. 94): thesis (also 117. 33-4 [p. 73]: prosopopoeia). 6. 2 primas... lineas: cf. 4. 2. 120 'non ut consumantur adfectus sed ut tamen uelut primis lineis designentur'. For diixissent see TLL s.v. linea 1437. 82-3. As this method (B) is referred to as emendatio in 3 and contrasted with diuisio, one has to assume that this 'basic outline' (Loeb) did not include a formal division. But if it did not, it is unclear what it did contain. locos: probably 'passages' (see on 2. 4. 31 ut... sententia) rather than 'commonplaces' (see Winterbottom on Decl. min. 316. 7). neutrum... separo: Q. means that he does not wish to differentiate between the usefulness of the two methods. There is some glance, however, at a more literal sense: he does not want to stop rhetores using both methods; the two would be separated if one were singled out, but Q. wishes them to be combined (4 miscenda). demonstrasse rectam... uiam: cf. 7. 10. 15 'uia demonstrari potest'; Decl. min. 247. 1 (in a Sermo) 'demonstranda uobis est uia'; Cic. de Orat. 1. 203 'itinera ipsa ita putaui esse demonstranda, non ut ipse dux essem,...sed ut commonstrarem tantum uiam'; Lucian, Hist. Conscr. 35 vnoSet&tv oSou? nvas opQas; Afifahl 69. For rectam uiam, 'the right road', see the next n., and n.on 2. 13. 16 rectam uiam. For the tense, see n. on 2. 13. 4 dedisse. reuocare: cf. Sen. Dial. 3. 14. 3 'Quanto humanius.. .illos [sc. peccantes] non persequi sed reuocare! Errantem per agros ignorantia uiae melius est ad
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rectum iter admouere quam expellere'; Lactantius, Div. Inst. 1. 1.21 (moral) 'ab errore...ad rectiorem uiam reuocandi' (also Q. 10. 1. 125); OLD s.v. reuoco 8a (meaning not well conveyed). lapsos: cf. 4. 2. 71 'errore lapsum' (also 8. 6. 7). But the image of the 'right way' persists: cf. Sen. Dial. 7. 1. 1 'si uia lapsus est' (and also the tightropewalkers in the passage of Lucian cited on 2. 13. 16 per funes ingredientium). For the principle underlying this sentence cf. 2. 3. 2-3. 6. 3 emendationem... diuisionem: the words stand for methods B and A respectively (while below praecipientem and reprehendenteni refer to A and B respectively). For the implications, see nn. on 1 non contenti and 2 primas... tineas. auribus modo accipiunt: so 8. 3. 62 'usque ad aures ualet', contrasted with 'oculis mentis ostendi', 12. 2. 17 'aurium tenus' contrasted with 'mente complexus'. In our passage, the correction does not 'get through' to the mind (10. 3. 28 'nihil eorum quae oculis uel auribus incursant ad animum perueniet'; cf. also 2. 5.13 'quae dicentur superfluent aures' with n.), whereas a division forces the pupil into thought (and writing). cogitationem.. .et stilum: thinking the exercise out at home on the basis of the master's hints and then writing it down, to be learned and performed in class. In 10. 6. 1 cogitatio is treated separately (see on 2. 4. 15 cogitatio), as something of great value when writing was not possible. But of course when it was possible, as in the schools (and Q. has been insistent on the necessity for it: see 2. 2. 11, 2. 4. 15; also below, 2. 7. 2), cogitatio would inevitably precede. perferunt: the students 'carry through' to fruition a process initated by their teacher; cf. perhaps Plin. Nat. 16.110 '[semen] ad maturitatem perferre'. OLD s.v. perfero 3 understands a little differently: 'extend, carry on'. uiuaciores: over-lively'. An unusual usage; Spalding could find no better parallel than SHA Aur. 4. 1 'a prima aetate ingenio uiuacissimus'. in his... moribus: Q. has reached the age at which the young seem hopelessly ill-behaved; for his views on much younger children see 1. 2. 6-8 (their elders' fault). His pupil Pliny (Ep. 8. 23. 2-3) can sound the same note: 'Ramm hoc [respect for their elders] in adulescentibus nostris. Nam quotus quisque uel aetati alterius uel auctoritati ut minor cedit?' (at least Junius Avitus 'ita me diligebat, ita uerebatur ut me quasi fbrmatore morum, me quasi magistro uteretur'); cf. the crusty Messala on the rhetorical schools (Tac. Dial. 35. 3 'nam in loco nihil reuerentiae est') irascuntur admonitioni: cf. Hor. Ars 163 '[iuuenis] monitoribus asper'. Contrast 2. 9. 2 'emendati non irascentur'. Juvenal (7. 213) even speaks of physical assaults on a teacher; see further Cribiore 156-7.
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taciti repugnant: for the adjective thus predicatively cf. 7. 3. 15 'tacitus dissentiet'; the verb is again used absolutely at 8 pr. 5. 6. 4 aperte coarguenda: for the rest (ceterornm) to hear (cf. 6. 3. 73 redarguitnus... aperte); so corrigetur palam at 2. 5. 16. habenda... ratio: cf. Cic. Off 1. 139 'habenda ratio non sua solum sed etiam aliorum'. For the idea, see n. on 2. 3. 11 etiam probabit. 6. 5 namque... possint: method A will be more appropriate for beginners, method B later on. praeformata: cf. 5. 14. 31 (of learning to write) 'uelut praeformatas infantibus litteras persequentium' (for the practice see 1. 1. 27, 10. 2. 2). Q. means that the teacher works up the exercise in advance, leaving the pupils to fill in details, secundum cuiusque uires interestingly suggests the possibility of some individual attention even at this stage (see on 2. 5. 3 praeire)-, but 1. 2. 13 seems to guarantee that the division was (usually?) spoken to the class as a whole. composuisse se ad exemplum: cf. 2. 8. 2 'se ad eorum quos probabant imitationem composuerint', 5. 12. 22; TLL s.v. compono 2120. 53-72. praeuia: B's breuia seems inappropriate for footprints; Watt's suggestion at H. D. Jocelyn (ed.), lTria Lustra' (Liverpool Classical Papers, 3; Liverpool, 1993), 315 that the two should be divorced by reading 'breuia quaedam demonstranda, uestigia quae...' seems artificial, especially as the reading of A is so tempting; it is true that it is only the result of a correction (the first hand having no doubt read breuia also), but it does not look like a piece of ninth-century ingenuity so much as a piece of genuine tradition, perhaps preserved in the margin of A's exemplar; the words are easily confused in a capital script. It is true that praeuius is not attested in prose before Cyprian, but the sense is perfect; the footprints are to be pointed out, leading in the right direction (cf. 2 'demonstrasse rectam.. .uiam'; see again the passage of Lucian cited on 2. 13. 16 per funes ingredientium), for the pupils to follow (persecute cf. Cic. de Orat. 1. 105 'cuius uestigia persequi cupiunt'; also, with sequi, 1. 1. 27, of learning to write, Liv. 3. 17. 6, Suet. Gram. 20. 3); cf. Ov. Ars 2. 57-8 'ego praeuius ibo: | sit tua cura sequi; me duce tutus eris', Met. 11. 65 'nunc praecedentem sequitur, nunc praeuius anteit'. iam suis uiribus sine adminiculo progredi: Afifahl 34 thought that the previous help is seen as a supporting stick that is no longer needed now that the pupil is being pointed along a clear track; but adminiculum does not seem to be used so specifically, and sticks are for the old, not the young. For the idea, cf. esp. 10. 1. 15, cited above on 2. 5. 13 'nam quid aliud agimus docendo eos quam ne semper docendi sint?'
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6. 6 credi sibi ipsos: cf. Sen. Ep. 10. 1 'audeo te tibi credere'. prope consummata fuerit: if the verb form is not just an imperial equivalent for consummata erit, then it may be meant to make a reference to an action or process rather than a state, i.e. Q. would be saying that the teacher has done virtually everything he had to do rather than that there was hardly anything more for him to do. We are indebted to Dr Holford-Strevens for clarifying our minds on this passage and for his help with the wording of this note. si quid: at si quid A; but see n. on 2. 1.8 at. adhuc: 'still', i.e. after the students have been tested by being left to themselves; see TLL s.v. adhuc 661. 39-55; poorly treated at OLD s.v. 3c. 6. 7 aues: Libanius, Ep. 43 calls his students VCOTTOI who may choose to fly off elsewhere (Cribiore 221). For bird similes see Afifahl 106, citing e.g. Ov. Met. 8. 213-15 'uelut ales, ab alto | quae teneram prolem produxit in aera nido, | hortaturque sequi..(whence V. Fl. 7. 375-9); add Claudian 7 pr. 1-14 and (for the wording) esp. Mont. poet. 1. 2-4 (Courtney, Poets, 330) 'iam tristis hirundo | argutis reditura cibos inmittere nidis | incipit et molli partitos ore ministrat'. Q. finds parallels for method A (the incipientes of 5 are teneri [cf. 2. 2. 3] and infirmi [cf. 2. 2.14]), method B (the teachers go first', perhaps supporting praeuia at 5), and the leaving of pupils to their own devices ('suae ipsorum fiduciae' corresponding to 6 'nonnumquam credi sibi ipsos oportebit'), a more final break in the case of the birds, for the pupils may have to be recalled to their dux. cibos... partiuntur: besides Montanus, cited in the previous n., cf. Sen. Ep. 66. 26 'aues ex aequo partiuntur cibos' (to their chicks). Q. perhaps again (n. on 5 praeformata) hints at attention to individual students. praecedentes: cf. Cic. ND 2. 129 (of gallinae auesque reliquae) 'cum autem pulli pinnulis uti possunt, turn uolatus eorum matres prosequuntur'. expertos: the MSS have expertas, cf. Sen. Dial. 2. 3. 4 'cum dubiae sint uires inexpertae'. The personalized abstract is quite in Q.'s manner, but Spalding's point that suae ipsorum fiduciae goes better with the active participle tips the scale in favour of his conjecture expertos; for the active he might have compared 10. 1. 109 'in quo totas uires suas eloquentia experiretur'.. libero caelo: cf. esp. Cic. Tusc. 5. 38 '[natura uoluit] alias uolucres caelo frui libero'. suaeque ipsorum: cf. K-S i. 245-6.
Chapter Seven Fathers should not be allowed to insist that their sons learn everything they write by heart, and then recite it on regular open days (1). Far better that students learn select passages of oratory or history (2). This will train their memories, and give them an internalized pattern for imitation (3). Hence a store of words andfigures,and also of fine sayings that will give pleasure and be of practical use (4). Pupils may be allowed to declaim their own compositions, but only as a reward for especially good work (5). Though this short chapter moves on to a new subject, the practice of pupils' reciting their work regularly before an audience, it reinforces familiar themes: the importance of writing, the value of becoming familiar with select passages of oratory and history and accumulating exempla from them, the need to train the memory. 7. 1 prorsus: to be taken with existimo, 'I am quite sure', rather than (as Russell) with mutandum; there are a number of cases of the locution in Cicero, e.g. Fin. 1. 23 'fieri potest ut errem; sed ita prorsus existimo'. iis.. .aetatibus: apparently the younger among a rhetors pupils (note pueros at 2). In that case, declamauerint below refers strictly to the speaking not of full declamations but of progymnasmatic exercises (above, p. xxiii n. 3); but what Q. says was true at the later stage too (see on patresbelow), ne... dicant: for the ambiguity of this clause see above, p. xxviii n. 18. certa... die: cf. 10. 5. 21 'consuetudo classium certis diebus audiendarum'; Juv. 7. 160-1 'iuueni, cuius mihi sexta | quaque die miserum dirus caput Hannibal implet'—nor was the pupil necessarily any happier, to judge from Jerome, adv. Ruf. 1. 30 (Sources chretiennes 303, p. 82), reporting nightmares in which 'mihi uideor... comatulus et sumpta toga ante rhetorem controuersiolam declamare'. It is not quite clear whether it is to these occasions in particular that Q. refers in 1. 2. 23, when he describes his own teachers' practice of grouping pupils in classes: 'ordinem dicendi secundum uires ingenii dabant, et ita superiore loco quisque declamabat ut praecedere profectu uidebantur'; see Colson ad loc., Bonner, Education, 134. patres: their (bad) influence has been noticed earlier (2. 3. 1, 3). For their interest in their sons' declamation displays, and potential presence at them, see 10. 5. 21 (just after the words cited above) 'persuasio patrum numerantium potius dedamationes [so here 'quam frequentissime'] quam aestimantium';
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Pers. 3. 45-7 'grandia si nollem morituri uerba Catonis | dicere non sano multum laudanda magistro, | quae pater adductis sudans audiret amicis'; Juv. 7. 165-6 (following on the allusion to a declamation on Hannibal cited above) 'quid do | ut totiens ilium pater audiat?' (alluding to much practice beforehand in class). For general criticism of fathers see Petr. 4. 1-3, Suet. Gram. 9. 3, with Kaster ad loc. (Orbilius was already complaining about them). cum: 'whereas in fact', as in 2. 8. 11. constet: 'depends on'; cf. 2. 13. 15 'multo labore, adsiduo studio... constat ars dicendi'; OLD s.v. consto 4. 7. 2 plurimum: perhaps adverbial, as Russell translates; but 2. 1. 10 'qua in parte nescio an sit uel plurimum' (see n. on qua in parte... uel plurimum) suggests that it, not pueros, is subject of esse. plane uelim: so 6. 3. 30 plane nolo. According to PHI, these locutions, together with plane uolo, occur elsewhere only in Cicero (7 of the 8 cases in letters). ediscere: Q. has already in 1. 11. 14 (referring forward to the time 'cum legere orationes oportebit', i.e in the rhetors school; but the passage is not quite clear: cf. above, p. xxix n. 22) advised the learning of parts of speeches ('ediscere.. .electa ex iis'); cf. also 10. 1. 105 'cum Demosthenen in primis legendum uel ediscendum potius putem'. There is nothing new about the idea (though learning poetry by heart was more attractive, at least for the young; e.g. 1. 1. 36, cited below on 3 exercebitur... memoria, and Cic. de Orat. 1. 246): note Cic. Brut. 127 [C. Galba] 'qui tanto in honore pueris nobis erat ut eum etiam edisceremus', Q. fr. 3. 1. 11: pueri omnes learning a speech of Cicero's. Q. would not have approved of the students described in Sen. Con. 3 pr. 15: 'quo tamen uno modo possunt praeferunt [sc. Cestium Ciceroni]; huius enim declamationes ediscunt, illius orationes non legunt'. The practice is also known from Theon (65. 30-66. 1 [p. 9]): 'the teacher should select good examples of each exercise from the old texts and make the young persons learn them by heart [cKiiav9aveivX\ and at the end of his chapter on reading he envisages the pupil also reciting, apparently by heart (see Patillon's n. 535 [on p. 167], and above, n.on 2. 5. 6 adsuescant). electos... locos: the learning of these is apparently to be distinguished from the process of enarratio described in 2. 5; cf. above, p. 121. multo magis: i.e. than to learn off one's own compositions. 7. 3 exercebitur... memoria: cf. 1. 1. 36 'dicta clarorum uirorum et electos ex poetis maxime (namque eorum cognitio paruis gratior est) locos ediscere inter lusum licet. Nam et maxime necessaria est oratori... memoria; et ea praecipue firmatur atque alitur exercitatione', 1. 11. 14 'ediscere etiam electa ex iis
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[sc. orationibus] cogat et ea dicere stantem clare et quem ad modum agere oportebit, ut protinus pronuntiationem uocem [cf. 11. 3. 25] memoriam exerceat'. Q. gives his precepts on memorizing in 11.2 (note esp. 40 'si quis ...unam...a me artem memoriae quaerat, exercitatio est et labor: multa ediscere ... potentissimum est', 41 'pueri... quam plurima ediscant'). aliena.. .quam sua: at Cic. de Orat. 1. 157 Crassus recommends both: 'exercenda est... memoria ediscendis ad uerbum quam plurimis et nostris scriptis et alienis.' Q. elsewhere (11. 2. 39) makes the point that prose is more difficult to memorize than poetry (so already Arist. Rhet. I~9, 1409 b 6-7). animo.. .adfigent: so 11.2. 18. optimis: cf. 10.1. 59 'dum adsequimur illam firmam... facilitatem, optimis adsuescendum est'. Q. follows up the recommendation of 2. 5. 19: 'ego optimos quidem et statim et semper' (and note optimorum in 4 below). e t . . . expriment: they will unconsciously (cf. 9. 4. 52) reproduce the pattern of speaking that they have taken (cf. 2. 4. 15 'cum iam formam rectae atque emendatae orationis accipient') deep into their minds (cf. 12. 1. 25 'artis penitus mente complexum'). 'formam... acceperint' puts in grander terms the earlier 'habebunt intra se quod imitentur'; for exprimere thus see TLL s.v. exprimo 1791. 46-58, citing Sen. Dial. 2. 17. 2 and Decl. mai. 2. 19, in both of which passages it varies imitari. formam therefore is here a 'model', not specifically 'the style [of the speech they have absorbed]' (Russell), but a general pattern of good practice in prose; so TLL s.v. forma 1085. 17-81, citing our passage. Cf. also 1.6. 16 'non .. .Analogia demissa caelo formam loquendi dedit', and esp. 10. 6. 3 'facienda multo stilo forma est quae nos etiam cogitantis sequatur'. The Greek equivalent is iSea, or perhaps TV-TTOS (LSJ s.v. VII. 1, IX. 1): see passages of Theon cited in n.on 2. 2. 8 ipse aliquid... dicat quae... referant. 7. 4 abundabunt. ..copia: pleonastic, as in 10. 5. 3, 12. 4. 1. optimorum: almost all words are 'best' somewhere (10. 1.9); Q. means that wide acquaintance with good texts will train us to have a feel for which word best suits a given context. iam: signals the improvement made by such training, non quaesitis: cf. (of compositio) 9. 4. 147 'dissimulatio curae praecipua, ut numeri spontefluxisse, non arcessiti [see n.on 2. 4. 3 arcessitis] et coacti esse uideantur', following Cic. Orat. 219 'ut numerus non quaesitus sed ipse secutus esse uideatur'; and generally 12. 10. 79 'fructus [the fruits of one's labours] inlaborati offerunt sese et omnia sponte proueniunt' (cf. 11. 2. 5 of memory: 'admirari naturam subit, tot res... reddere se et oflferre, nec tantum requirentibus sed sponte interim'). Conversely 7. 1. 25 'non oportet igitur
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offerentibus se contentum esse: quaere aliquid ultra', 10. 3. 5 'quaeramus optima nec protinus offerentibus se gaud earn us'. ex reposito udut thesauro: a hoard put away for later use (cf. 2. 16. 16 'reponere in hiemem alimenta'); note 10. 1. 2: the well-prepared orator 'uelut clausis thesauris incubabit' (cf. 10. 3. 3). The metaphor is often used of memory (Afifahl 76): 'neque inmerito thesaurus hie eloquentiae dicitur' (11.2. 1). accedit.. .utilis: cf. 1. 1. 36, cited above on 3 exercebitur... memoria. Relating such sayings was both a social and a professional asset: iucunda contrasts with utilis (cf. 1. 8.11-12, cited below on nam), sermone with causis, sermo having its frequent connotation of conversation as opposed to formal oratio (here represented by causis), as in 12. 9. 21 'non magis umquam in causis oratio quam in rebus cotidianis ac domesticis sermo deficiet'; 12. 10. 43 'aliam quandam uidetur habere naturam sermo uulgaris, aliam uiri eloquentis oratio'; Rhet Her. 3. 23 'sermo est oratio remissa et finitima cotidianae locutioni' (see also n.on 2. 3. 6 loqui). n a m . . . conciliant: the sentence chiastically explains first the use, then the pleasure (or at least the praise won). For similar considerations applied to exempla see 12. 4; note also 1. 8. 10-12 'credamus summis oratoribus, qui ueterum poemata uel ad fidem causarum uel ad ornamentum eloquentiae adsumunt [orators quote poetry] summa non eruditionis modo gratia sed etiam iucunditatis.. .Quibus accedit non mediocris utilitas, cum sententiis eorum uelut quibusdam testimoniis quae proposuere confirment.' 7. 5 laboris sui fructum: cf. 6 pr. 2. etiam: quite apart from the satisfaction of doing well. Cf. 10. 7. 17 'adeo pretium omnia spectant ut eloquentia quoque, quamquam plurimum habeat in se uoluptatis, maxime tamen praesenti fructu laudis opinionisque ducatur. plurium: far superior to plurimum (A): 'laus plurium contingit dedamanti sua; nonnisi utiius magistri, scribenti tantum' (Spalding). The audience is larger because on these special occasions parents and friends (might) attend too. id quoque: 'even this', qualifying the concession (aliquando). turn., .cum: 'only when .. commodius: adverb; not much more than 'better, more satisfactorily' (cf. 1. 9. 3 'quod opus, etiam consummatis professoribus difficile, qui commode tractauerit cuicumque discendo sufficiet'). The comparative seems to imply 'than usual', or perhaps 'than other pupils'. elimauerint: 'polished up'; the compound is found in this literary sense only at Cic. Att. 16. 7. 3 'uelim c^oAto^ aliquod elimes'; it is to be preferred for its very rareness to limauerint (B), in itself unexceptionable (TLL s.v. 1. limo
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1421. 81-1422. 15); see Reid on Cic. Ac 2. 66 'ad tenue elimatas', where limatas is a variant. uelut praemio studii sui: cf. 10. 7.1 'maximus uero studiorum fructus est et uelut fprimus qui dam pliusf [apparently two variants, both wrong] longi laboris ex tempore dicendi facultas', where our passage (neglected in TLLs.v. praemium 719. 40-53) supports the old conjecturepraemiunr, uelut (much more explicable in Liv. 42. 37.9, Plin. Ep. 4.11. 13) may hint at a covert image, perhaps of military rewards. Q.'s language does not suggest that more tangible prizes were normally awarded in rhetorical schools, though the practice is attested in the school of the grammaticus Verrius Flaccus (Suet. Gram. 17. 1); note, for the school of the grammaticus, Augustine, Conf. 1. 17. 27 'proponebatur enim mihi negotium animae meae satis inquietum praemio laudiset dedecoris uel plagamm metu, ut dicerem uerba Iunonis irascentis et dolentis quod non posset Italia Teucrorum auertereregem'.Q. speaks of prizes for young children at 1. 1. 20.
Chapter Eight Teachers are rightly held to need to be able to observe differences between their pupils. Minds vary as much as bodies (1), as we can tell from the great variety among orators (2). The common policy is therefore to encourage natural tendencies; as a physicaltraining instructor tries to establish what sport a pupil is most apt for (3), so the rhetor should (it is generally agreed) ensure that a pupil follows the style he is best suited to (4), for (rt) nature thrives with nurturing, and (b) a student diverted from his own bent cannot do himself justice (5). But this seems to me right only in part. It is certainly necessary to perceive differences (6), and pupils should be directed towards the right genre (again compare the case of sport) (7). But a budding orator cannot afford to over-specialize (8); nor can we allow faulty styles to go uncorrected (9). That does not mean one shouldfightagainst nature: but Isocrates was rightly not content to let Ephorus go without the spur, or Theopompus without the curb (10-11). Of course we have to temper the wind to weaker pupils, but better ones should be taught every virtue of style (12). So (again) in sport (13): if someone cannot manage everything, the key principles are not to make him attempt the impossible, and not to divert him away from what he does best; but an all-rounder like Nicostratus will be given an all-round training (14). How much more should we take such care in educating an orator, who needs to master the full range of his art, like a singer. Perfect oratory, like a lyre, needs to be in tune throughout the scale (15). Q. argues, with a positively Greek (Afifahl 38); 19 abundance of illustration from training in sports, that, though it is important to be aware of differences 19
We h a w not seen O. Grodde, Sport bei Qitintilian (Hildesheim, 1997).
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in the natural talents and inclinations of pupils, specialization can be taken too far. Weaker students may be allowed to stick to what they do best; the future orator needs to be an all-rounder, and to be trained accordingly. The whole chapter shows that (ideally at least) attention was given to individual pupils (see n. on 2. 5. 3 praeire). Q. reacts to a passage (itself somewhat inconsequential) of Cicero's De oratore( 3. 34-6; see the summary in L-P iv. 146), where Crassus remarks that the almost infinite variety of orators and styles might give rise to the view that no one way of training them could be devised. This is not so: 'diligentissimeque hoc est eis qui instituunt aliquos atque erudiunt uidendum, quo sua quemque natura maxime ferre uideatur.' He gives the example of Isocrates, who treated Ephorus and Theopompus differently, without trying to obliterate the difference in their natural talents. There is a similar progress of thought in Brut. 204. Our chapter is also so reminiscent of Lucian's Quomodo historia conscribenda sit [in this chapter referred to as 'Lucian'], 34-6 (art and nature, sporting and musical analogies; note that Nicostratus is mentioned earlier, in §9) that it would not surprise if the two went back to some common Greek source; see on 12 liberalior materia. Q. is much concerned with the age-old question of the relative importance of natura and ars; for details, see n. on 2. 19. 8. 1 notare discrimina ingeniorum: see (for an earlier stage) 1. 3. 1-7. nec pauciores.. .formae: cf. 12. 10. 10 'in oratione uero si species intueri uelis, totidem paene reperias ingeniorum quot corporum formas'. Cf. Plin. Nat. 7. 8 on the variety of human faces ('nullas duas in tot milibus hominum indiscretas effigies existere'); note also Q. 10. 2. 10: even Nature finds it difficult to produce exact replicas. 8. 2 ipsis: reminding us that orators are after all our main concern here. Q. 12. 10. 20-6 (following Cic. Brut. 285) stresses the differences between orators all classed as 'Attic'. composuerint: see n.on 2. 6. 5 composuisse se ad exemplum. 8. 3 deinde: 'consequently' (Russell), as the context demands, though the word does not seem to be used in this sense; one expects inde (e.g. 2. 4. 9). naturae: better taken with bona (n. on 2. 5. 11 communis habitus) than with propria (as in 2. 5. 5). Cf. 10. 2. 20 (a passage that refers back to ours) 'nam is et adiuuare debet quae in quoque eorum [the students] inuenit bona. fouerent... adiuuarentur: editors have changed one or the other to bring the voices into line with each other. The variation does not seem offensive, and Q. may have been avoiding the rhymes fouerentur/adiuuarentur and tenderent/adiu uarent.
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palaestrae: Q. is fond of allusions to the palaestra (Afifahl 39-40, citing 5. 10.121,10.1. 79,12. 2. 12); he continues them below in §§7 and 13. For the increasing popularity of this Greek institution in the Roman world, see the sketch in Friedlander, ii. 122-6. Q. does not personally disapprove of it so long as it does not take up too much time (1. 11. 15), but he builds on Ciceronian foundations, which in turn reflect Cicero's extensive familiarity with Greek rhetorical theory' (Fantham 141; cf. Afifahl 39 n.2); to the Greek material add Lucian 35, D. Chr. 18. 21 (along with painting). peritus: this expert becomes in 7 palaestricus tiler, cf. 12. 2. 12 palaestrici doctores. 'The words [gymnasia and palaestrae] were... used by the Romans as synonymous' (Smith, Dictionary, 698). Hence this person, who goes into the gymnasium (3) and picks those suitable for each kind of contest (3, 7), is far more than a wrestling trainer (note 13 'ille... exercendi corpora peritus'); so too, one imagines, the palaestrici sophisticated enough to give a future speaker training in gesture (1. 11. 16). Lucian 35 uses yiyxraa-nj? of someone who might train an Olympic victor like Polydamas of Skotussa. discernat: 'judge', by drawing the appropriate distinctions; for the construction see TLL s.v. discerno 1305. 14-21. In §7 the verb is used with the accusative haec, 'will make these distinctions'. 8. 4 praeceptorem... commodaturum: orat. obi. loosely following on 'utile . . . uisum est... instituere' above. sagaciter... intuitus: cf. Suet. Tib. 57. 1 '[saeua ac lenta natura Tiberii] quam Theodorus Gadareus rhetoricae praeceptor... perspexisse primus sagaciter.. .uisus est'. presso... urbano: the list is not systematically organized or exhaustive (cf. n. on 15 presse... subtiliter... aspere). It finds room for adjectives often used of the plain (presso limatoque [linked at 11. 1. 31, suitable for the older orator]; see the list in Douglas's edn. of Cic. Brut., p. xliii, referred to in our n. on 2. 4. 9 macies... infirmitas est), grand (graui; again see Douglas's list) and middle (nitido and dulci [Cic. Orat. 42]) styles; cf. 10. 1. 44, where pressa and nitidi signal plain and middle. But the others cut across the three-style scheme: acri (cf. 5. 13. 25 acri et uehementi), aspero (normally used, see TLL s.v. asper 810. 46-76, in reference to harsh words or compositio, but here presumably of bitterness of language, as in Cic. Att. 2. 6. 2), and urbano (not perhaps elsewhere used of genus dicendi or ora tier, but note Cic. Brut. 273 'perurbana.. .oratio'). As in 15, then, Q. is listing qualities of speech rather than styles (so Doreen Innes). se commodaturum: the parallel passage in Cic. de Orat. 3. 35 ('cum ad cuiusque naturam institutio doctoris accommodaretur') strongly suggests that the meaning must be 'adapt himself'. This is a typical instance of Silver
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use of simple for compound verb; see OLDs.v. commodo 5, and in Q. 9. 4. 135 'pedibus .. .ad hanc naturam commodatis [accommodates P]', 11. 3. 93 'gestus instantior, principio et narrationi non commodatus [accommodatus P]', 11. 3. 110 'ad haec commodanda [accommodanda b] manus est'; but not, despite OLD, 6. 3. 14 'oratoria urbanitas rara, ...ad hanc consuetudine commodata' (see Winterbottom6 106). 8. 5 cura: the trouble taken by the teacher, in effect doctrina, ars: cf. 6. 2. 3 'ingeni uena... doctrina.. .adiuta\ 11. 3. 11 'natura cura iuuetur. For the verb cf. also 3 adiuuarentur, 11 adiuuandam; 2. 17. 5; Cic. de Orat. 3. 125, Brut. 111. eualescat: cf. Sen. Ep. 94. 31 '[indoles naturalis] adiuta praeceptis eualescit'. in diuersa: in a similar context, Seneca writes (Ep. 13. 15) 'non in diuersum te a natura tua ducimus: natus es ad ista quae dicimus; eo magis bonum tuum auge et exorna'. There, 'in the opposite direction' (as Russell translates in our passage), or perhaps 'in a different direction', is appropriate. In our passage one feels there could be point in the plural: a pupil may find himself led off on several different, but equally false, stylistic trails (note 'in iis just below; 8 'non in unam partem aliquam sed in omnia quae sunt eius operis'), rather than be allowed to cultivate his preferred style. But the difference between singular and plural in this phrase may not be of significance. Note e.g. 2. 17. 32 'duos sapientes.. .iustae causae in diuersum trahant' ('in [two] opposite directions'); Cels. 8. 10. ID: successively 'duobus eget, qui in diuersa contendant' ('in [two] opposite directions') and 'per plures in diuersa ducenda sunt' ('in [several] different directions'); and at Sen. Nat. 1. 1. 10 we are told that 'nulla... nox est qua non plurimae [sc. stellae] ire et in diuersum uideantur abduci', where each star looks to be going off 'on a different course'. in quae natus uidetur: LS (s.v. nascor B 2 a 8) calls natus in poetic (contrast ad ista in the first passage of Seneca cited in the last n.). There are some not quite parallel cases in prose: OLD s.v. nascor 14a, adding Decl. min. 296. 7 'homo in adulationem natus'. 8. 6 rationem: Q. follows reason (e.g. 3. 6. 29) even though the usual view (3. 7. 23 'publice recepta persuasio') is different; compare the contrast of ratio and consuetudo discussed on 2. 1. 1 quam ratio postulate 8. 7 in his quoque: translators ignore quoque, and questionably take in his (sc. proprietatibus) to mean 'on the basis of these'. Rather: 'in the case of these (pupils) too', i.e. as well as those aiming at a career in sport, whose trainers similarly look at the proprietates ingeniorum (see 3). But the expression remains awkward, and there may be corruption.
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certum: 'definite'. compositus ad: dearly meaning much the same as idoneus -f dat.: the pupil is 'made' for poetry. Cf. the parallel passage 10. 2. 20: 'in libro secundo [our passage] credidi non ea sola docenda esse ad quae quemque discipulorum natura compositum uideret'. It is not easy to identify properly relevant parallels, but TLL s.v. compono 2131. 29-31 cites Col. 3. 10. 9 'uidemus... pedes ad gressum compositos, bracchia ad complexum', Apul. PI. 1. 14 'sensus...ad ea quae sunt sensibilia apte composita natura intellegentiam cognatam tenent'. utilis studio iuris: Q. continues to vary his expression; cf. (more elliptically) Hor. C. 1. 12. 42 'utilem bello', Juv. 14. 71-2 'utilis agris, | utilis et bellorum et pacis rebus agendis'. ut: 'just as (conversely)'. The word was deleted by H. Meyer; but Q. may be using it to mark off the group of bright students from the dullards. rus: i.e. to help supervise the family estate in the country (OLD s.v. 3a). Q. thinks in terms of a father making arrangements for his sons, bright and not so bright. Such despatch to the country might be used as a punishment: see Cic. S. Rose. 42, where Erucius is pictured saying that Sex. Roscius 'hunc [one of his sons] in praedia rustica relegarat' (with Landgraf's n.; cf. also 43 'relegationis ac supplici gratia'); but, as Cicero goes on to say, this treatment was not necessarily an insult. Cic. de Orat. 1. 126 tells us of Apollonius of Alabanda's brisk way with 'eos quos iudicabat non posse oratores euadere' (note also 1. 130, 2. 85). discernet haec: see on 3 discemat palaestricus ille: see on 3 peritus. The word is a noun at 1. 11. 15 (despite TLL s.v. 100. 79-80), and perhaps here too. sacrorum certaminum: the primary reference is doubtless to the Capitolia (cf. 3. 7. 4 'laudes Capitolini Iouis, perpetua sacri certaminis materia'; Suet. Dom. 4. 4 'instituit [Domitianus].. .quinquennale certamen Capitolino Ioui triplex, musicum equestre gymnicum'), but the plural (cf. 9. 4. 11) may extend the reference to other games founded by Roman emperors (Friedlander, ii. 118-20) or to the Greek games on which they were modelled. For the gymnica in the Capitolia see Friedlander, iv. 266-7; aliudue quid would mean e.g. the pankration (below, §13) and gymnastics. 8. 8 elaborandum est: here unusually constructed with in + acc. (so 12.1. 31 in haec elaboremus) rather than in + abl. (TLL s.v. elaboro 318. 76-319. 21). erat: see n. on 2. 4. 3 erat 8. 9 corruptus ac tumidus: see nn. on 2. 3. 9 corruptos and tumidos. Such a pupil has gifts that lend themselves naturally to 'Asianism'. hoc in effect refers to KCLKo^Xia (cf. 8.6. 73 'nec alia uia magis in cacozelian itur). The treatment
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is not specified, though it is hinted at in quaedam detrahere below (see also 2. 4. 4-8). in hoc...ire: 'go on in that direction'; perhaps a colloquial expression (Spalding compared 2. 10. 5 in corpus eant). aridum atque ieiunum: see on 2. 4. 3 arida... ieiuna. alemus suits this image well enough, but uestiemus (not well paralleled, though cf. Cic. deOrat. 2. 123 'cum ego hunc oratorem... aluero..., tradam eum Crasso et uestiendum et ornandum'; Fantham 171) would better suit a 'bare' orator (Cic. de Orat. 1. 218 'quoniam dicendi facultas non debeat esse ieiuna atque nuda'). quasi perhaps marks consciousness of the blurred metaphor, adicere: so in the parallel passage 10. 2. 20. 8. 10 deserendum: cf. 5 'ea in quae natus uidetur [cf. 'ingenitum' in our passage] deserendo faciat infirmiora'; the word coheres with pugno. deterendum (so A after corn), though it might be thought to contrast better with augendum, would be a violent change of image. augendum: exactly balancing deserendum (sc. id bonum); addendum goes only with quod cessat. For the sense cf. Theon 72. 16-22 (pp. 17-18) (since we are not all naturally suited to everything) nctpareov ra fxev vou
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concitationem: a quality of Caesar (10. 1. 114). cum: 'whereas in f a c t . a s in 2. 7. 1. miscendum: cf. Cic. de Orat. 3. 36 'neque eos similes effecit inter se, sed tantum alteri adfinxit, de altero limauit, ut id conformaret in utroque quod utriusque natura pateretur'. 8. 12 inbecillis: imbecillibus A after corr. (cf. the correction at 5. 12. 4). But there is little doubt that Q. always used the second-declension forms (NeueWagener, ii. 164). For these weaker brethren, see 10. 2. 19 'quaedam sunt imitabilia quibus aut infirmitas naturae non sufficiat aut diuersitas repugnet', with examples (taken up, despite Russell's translation, by 21 'ne ille quidem doctor... in eo [neuter].. .cui naturam obstare uiderit laborabit'). sit: changed to est by Watt 143; he remarked that 'no doubt sit could be defended': best, we think, by comparison with other cases of the subj. with sane (see n.on 2. 4. 15 cogantur). liberalior materia: for the noun see on 2. 4. 7 materianv, 12. 9. 7 provides only an apparent parallel, liberalior (the passage is neglected in TLL) seems to mean 'nobler, better quality' (OLD s.v. liberalis 3). There may well be some connection with Lucian's vnoOeatv (see LSI s.v. vnoOcois IV. 4) €vva in the same sort of context (35); and there could be a glance at artes liberates. ad spem.. .adgressi: the phrase seems strictly unparalleled, though Burman compared Cic. Fam. 12. 25. 2 'quo die primum in spem libertatis ingressus sum'. Cf. also Plin. Ep. 6. 1. 1 'quo... prop ius accesseris ad spem fruendi'; Sen. Ben. 2. 25. 1. nulla.. .est: i.e. the teacher should not cater only for the special uirtus or uirtutes fitting the student by nature. 8. 13 pronior: cf. OLD s.v. pronus 6a; often of proneness to a fault, but cf. e.g. Sen. Ep. 95. 37 'illos in bonum pronos' (note the following 'hos inbecilliores adiuuabif), and (presumably) Suet. Ner. 52 'ad poeticam pronus'. pancratiasten: for the pankration see REs.v. (Jiithner); it combined boxing and wrestling (Plu. Moralia 638 d, Philostr. Gymn. 11). pugno... calce: for punching and kicking in this event, see E. N. Gardiner, JHS 26 (1906), 8-9. nexus: 'holds', a technical term in wrestling (OLD s.v. nexus3 5b; Daremberg-Saglio, iii. 1340-7, s.v. lueta). Sen. Ben. 7. 1. 4 makes a different (inconsistent) point: 'magnus luctator est, non qui omnes numeros nexusque perdidicit... sed qui in uno se aut altero bene ac diligenter exercuit.' erit... incumbet: the paratactic futures replace a conditional sentence (H-Sz 657). We come now to an average type, who is neither 'weak' (12) nor a star like Nicostratus (14), but who can do most things asked of him. The two principles that are stated at the start of 14 apply to him.
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incumbet: concentrate', as in 6. 2. 7 'hue... incumbat orator'. There is perhaps some glance at the use of the word in connection with wrestling (2. 12. 2). The variant in A (componet) is unaccountable. 8. 14 ne temptes... possit: a Greek axiom (4. 5. 17); cf. also 6. 5. 2. cui: ad quod A, equally properly (e.g. 1. 11. 12). Nicostratus: for this Olympic double-victor (AD 37) see Paus. 5. 21. 11 (pankration and wrestling); RE s.n. Nikostratos 11. The mention of him at Tac. Dial. 10. 5 seems quite independent (despite Giingerich ad loc.); for Lucian 9 see above, p. 153. pugnandoque: can hardly mean anything other than 'boxing' (note 7 pugilem aut luctatorem; OLD s.v. pugno 2b). But there was no Latin verb corresponding to -nayxparid^etv. quorum utroque certamine: for quorum utroque certaminum. For the ablative of the event cf. CIL vi. 33992 'gymnico agone saepius coronatus'. isdem diebus: the plural raises a problem, perhaps the result of Q.'s insufficient mastery of sporting detail. Nothing is more certain than that pankration, boxing, and wrestling were all contested on the same day of the Olympic festival (E. N. Gardiner, Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals (London, 1910), 199); and though Pausanias (5. 21. 9-11) only explicitly asserts that Straton's victories took place on the same day, he seems to imply it of the others in his list. But isdem diebus may just mean 'at the same festival'. Historians favour the phrase, but give little away by it: Woodman and Martin on Tac. Ann. 3. 72. 1. 8. 15 presse... subtiliter... aspere: cf. 8. 3. 40 'dicere... abundanter an presse, aspere an leuiter, magnifice an subtiliter'. It might seem odd, in view of the following division of sounds into acuti, medii, and graues, that Q. does not pick these adverbs more systematically; both pressus and subtilis are associated with the plain style (see n. on 4 presso... urbano and Douglas's list cited there), while aspere has no such specific link with any style (see again on 4). But Q. is again (as in 4) listing qualities of speech, non magis: taking up non (as in 3. 6. 21). phonasco: the first recorded use of the word in Latin. For the role of voice trainers in oratory see 11. 3. 19 (also 22); generally, RE s.v. phonaskoi (J. Schmidt). acutis... mediis... grauibus sonis: cf. 5. 10. 125 'grauis, acutos, mediosque horum sonos', 11. 3. 64 '[uox] recta et inter acutum sonum et grauem media'. Comparison is more appropriately made between the voice and the strings of a cithara in e.g. Cic. de Orat. 3. 216 'uoces ut chordae sunt intentae'. But note 12. 10. 68, where variety of styles and variety of sounds in music are compared.
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particulis: even more limited sections of the register; much more technically put in 12. 10. 68 (see Austin ad loc.). ab imo ad summum: cf. 11. 3. 15 'ab ima [sc. uoce] ad summam ac retro sunt multi gradus'. intenta neruis: cf. 11. 3. 63 'at in certamine erecta totis uiribus et uelut omnibus neruis intenditur [sc. uox]'. In our passage especially omnibus is very emphatic. consentiat: the verb does not seem to be used elsewhere of musical harmony; the technical term is concinere (TLL s.v. concino 52. 67-53. 8), which would not cohere well here with oratio.
Chapter Nine Pupils should love their teachers (1). If they do, they will be happier in their work and glad to come to school (2). Teacher and pupil have their respective duties, and only harmony between them will produce the required results (3).
Q., turning to advice for pupils, still emphasizes the interplay of duties between teacher and student. For the Institutio as 'a De officiis in miniature', see Winterbottom's introduction to Corsi 23. 9. 1 officiis: officio A, equally acceptable (cf. 8. 5. 35, with a plural genitive), interim: apparently with no particular forward reference, praeceptores... ament: this is only to repeat the sentiments of 2. 2. 8. parentes... credant: just as teachers have been told (2. 2. 4) to think of their pupils as their children. 9. 2 similes: cf. 2. 2. 8 'uix... dici potest quanto libentius imitemur eos quibus fauemus'. coetus: cf. Juv. 7. 239 'pater ipsius coetus' (grammaticus); also Liv. 1. 18. 2 'iuuenum aemulantium studia coetus' (of philosophers' pupils). laeti alacresque: cf. e.g. Cic. Mur. 49 'Catilinam... alacrem atque laetum', Tac. Dial. 23. 4 'fortem et laetum et alacrem uolo' (Gudeman gives further parallels ad loc.). The rhythm speaks for-que, omitted by B. But for such pairs in asyndeton, see Winterbottom6 70-1, supplemented by his n. on Decl. min. 254. 15; note below 2. 16. 6 ignes aquas; and see n. on 2. 16. 19 regere... ducere. The usage is found at all periods: see e.g. H. D. Jocelyn, The Tragedies of Ennius (Cambridge, 1967), 175; Nisbet on Cic. Pis. 59 flagrat ardet (add Cic. Fin. 5.62 pudorem constantiam); W. Kroll, Giotto, 15 (1927), 281 (Sallust); E. Norden, DeMinucii Felicis aetateetgenere dicendi(Greifswald, 1897), 31-5,
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esp. 34 n. 1, seeming to underestimate Q.'s use; M. Bonnet, Le Latin de Gregoire de Tours (Paris, 1890), 713. emendati non irascentur: cf. 2. 6. 3 'etiam irascuntur admonitioni' (emendationem has preceded). laudati gaudebunt: for reactions to praise from teachers see 2. 2. 6, 12. 9. 3 gignentium: of both parents together (TLL s.v. gigno 1982. 24-57). confertur: it is not easy to classify this use; but both parents contribute' to the result (OLD s.v. confero 10); the prefix is strongly felt. praemollitus: unparalleled of furrows (for a figurative use, see 4. 3. 10). Note however Col. Arb. 4. 4 sulcum... fodito mollemque reddito', Gaudian 17 (Panegyricus dictus Mallio Theodoro consult). 177 'duras sulcis mollire nouales'. By using an analogy with the birth of a man, Q. incautiously opens the door to sexual resonances hereabouts (cf. Apul. poet. 7. 17 (Courtney, Poets, 398) 'arentque sulcos molles aruo uenerio'; J. N. Adams, The Latin Sexual Vocabulary (London, 1982), 83-4 on sulcus, with Index 3, s. agricultural imagery), indeed positively sounds a note of incest: the parent (teacher) and his child (pupil) are partners in the act that produces eloquence. coalescere: strike root, thrive'. The agricultural metaphor continues; cf. Col. 2.6.4, 3. 5. 2 '[semina] celerius in ubertate coalescunt'; OLD s.v. coalesco 4a. But the sense 'to be formed by coalescence' (ibid. 3) is not forgotten; so 1. 5. 65 [of compound words] 'e duobus quasi corporibus coalescunt'. sociata: agreeing with abl. concordia, as 5. 10. 124 shows: 'ut cantus uocis plurimum iuuat sociata neruorum concordia'.
Chapter Ten After the progymnasmata the pupil proceeds to suasoriae and controversiae. But first I must say a little about declamation generally. It is highly useful (1), for, as well as containing all the features I have spoken o f already, it comes very close to real-life speaking, and has therefore been thought to be the sole requisite for a rhetorical training (2). Thanks to teachers it has become a prime cause o f the corruption o f eloquence; but something that is good in itself can be employed well (3). < 1 will show how this might come about. > Themes should be made as realistic as possible ( 4 ) — there is no room for fanciful material in court. You may say: Arc we then to permit no improbable themes, so that the young people may enjoy themselves? (5) Better not. But if themes must be tumid, they should not be foolish too. Adeclaimer who fattens himself up must realize that one day he will, like a sick animal being bled, have to take off weight again (6), if he does not wish to fall at the first hurdle in court. Those who think the whole business of declamation has no connection with the courtroom do
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not see the reason why it was invented in the first place (7). There is no point in all this pretending to persuade and to be feeling emotion if it is not practice for the real thing (8). Well, you may ask: Is there then to be no difference between the one and the other? None, if we are looking only to the advantage o f the pupil. It would be a good idea, in fact, if declamatory practice were adapted in various ways to bring it closer to the courtroom (9). But if declamation is to be used for display purposes, we must make some concessions to the pleasure of the audience (10), as in the case o f panegyric oratory (11). Hence qua image o f law cases, declamation should be realistic; but qua something with an epideictic element, it should take on a certain gloss (12). (Compare comic actors: they do not say their parts as we speak in real life, but neither do they go too far from nature; instead, they give their speech a kind of beauty appropriate to the stage (13).) And even then disadvantages produced by practising on fictional themes will dog us; but o f that, more later (my whok purpose is to train an orator, but I am prepared to include in passing matters related only to the schools) (14-15).
Q. proceeds to discuss the raison d'etre of declamation. He agrees with its critics Seneca the Elder, Petronius, perhaps Tacitus—see the excellent discussion in Bonner, Declamation, ch. 4, and, most recently, N. Homke, Gesetzt den Fall, ein Geist erscheint (Heidelberg, 2002), 45-82—that as practised in his time it was an important cause of the decline of eloquence; and the use of the word corrumpere (3) hints strongly that this was one of the main contentions of the lost De can sis corruptae eloquentiae (Reuter 24-6; Brink 474-9). But he does not go as far as Messala in Tacitus' Dialogus, who felt that the practice was both pointless and beyond reform. On the contrary, he starts from the firm pronouncement that it is utilissima (1). It is (he thinks) the teachers who are at fault, not declamation itself. The whole thing was designed as a practice for the courts, and every attempt should be made to make it more realistic. Yet declamation had something of the epideictic about it (Cic. Orat 37-42 is influential here), and the audience could not be forgotten, or the pupils either, for whose pleasure Q. feels a humane concern (as in 2. 4. 4-8). Throughout the chapter we feel the tension between these considerations; and in the last section Q. is honest enough to admit that, though his primary aim is to train an orator, his readers might be more interested in the training of the declaimer. In part, this was a result of historical circumstances: there was little place for serious deliberative oratory in the Senate under the Empire, despite the brave words of 3. 8. 70. Q. could do nothing about that. What he could do was to try to neutralize the damage done to future orators by pointing out where school and court differed (see n. on 2. 10. 2 imaginem), and where declamation was having a bad effect on oratorical practice: see Winterbottom2 228, pointing to 4. 3. 2 (digression), 8. 3. 76 (similes), 11. 3. 57 ('singing' a speech), and 11. 3. 103 (gesture).
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10. 1 primis operibus: the progymnasmata. atque partes: explaining membra; cf. the more daring phrase in Sen. Ep. 21. 6 'quicumque membra ac partes alienae potentiae fuerant'. The preliminary exercises were 'building blocks' for declamation and for real-life oratory, as Q. often stressed during his discussion of them in 2. 4 (see the introduction to that chapter); hence declamation 'cuncta ilia de quibus diximus in se fere continet' (2). suasorias: doubtless an adjective here, as in 11. 1. 48; cf. also n.on 2. 1.2 sed... inrumpunt. quarum antequam uiam ingredior: Q. makes it sound as if he will go on to deal systematically with the two types of declamation. In fact, he does not do so, though suasoriae are not neglected in 3. 8, and there are frequent allusions to eontroversiae throughout the Institutio. pauca... dicenda sunt: a discussion promised at 2. 5. 1. ipsa: signalling the general nature of the coming discussion. u t . . . ita: see n. on 2. 4. 15 ut... ita. nouissime: 'last of all' (Austin on 12 pr. 3). For the historical development, at least as envisaged by Q., see 2. 4. 41-2, with nn. Q. contrasts the exercises now classed as progymnasmata, which in germ went back to Gorgias and the other sophists, and declamation 'proper', which arose in the time of Demetrius of Phaleron. utilissima: cf. 10. 5. 14 'declamationes..., si modo sunt ad ueritatem accommodatae et orationibus similes,. ..sunt utilissimae' both in youth and later too. 10. 2 ueritati: as in 4 and 12 of the 'real life' of the lawcourt as opposed to the 'fiction' of the schools (6.1.43 'ex scholis haec uitia . . . ; non admittit hoc idem ueritas'). Cf. 10. 5. 14 cited in the previous n.; 5. 12. 22 'adulescens... componat se ad imitationem ueritatis'; Cic. deOrat. 1. 149 'causa aliqua posita, consimili causarum eamm quae in forum deferuntur, dicatis quam maxime ad ueritatem accommodate' (with L-P ad loc.); Tac. Dial. 31. 1 'non ut in rhetorum scholis declamarent nec ut fictis nec ullo modo ad ueritatem accedentibus controuersiis linguam modo et uocem exercerent...'; [D.H.] Rh. 372. 1-2 Usener-Radermacher npos dX-qQciav prjropcveiv; Geigenmiiller 61; and see nn.on 2. 1. 9 uerae fictaeque controuersiae, 2. 10. 8 uerum discrimen. imaginem: the word is taken up in 12 below; cf. 5. 12. 17 'declamationes... olim iam ab ilia uera imagine orandi recesserunt'. When in 12. 11. 15 Q. says that declamation as a long-term pursuit (as opposed to a refreshing pastime for the established orator: 10. 5. 14) is a waste of time ('tantum laboris in rebus falsis consumere'; cf. 2. 20. 4), 'cum satis sit modico tempore
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imaginem ueri discriminis et dicendi leges comperisse', he is favouring doing the school exercises in imitation of the real thing, and learning the rules of rhetoric. The 'image' of reality (resulting from the attempt to imitate: see 4) was inevitably inferior to the 'original' (10. 2. 11 'quidquid alteri simile est necesse est minus sit eo quod imitatur, ut...imago facie... 12 Quo fit ut minus sanguinis ac uirium declamationes habeant quam orationes, quod in illis uera, in his adsimulata materia est'), but developments in declamatory practice had widened the gap (cf. 5. 12. 17 cited above). There were of course genuine connections between school and forum: see Winterbottom2 228-9, citing 7. 4. 11, 7. 6. 1, 9. 2. 73-4, 11. 1. 82; note Decl min. 338. 5 'scholastica controuersia complectitur quidquid in foro fieri potest'. But (ibid. 229) Q. had to take care to tell his pupils where they differed, 'ne aliter quam dicturi sunt exerceri uelint et in desuescendis morentur' (3. 8. 70); cf. 4. 1. 3-4 (exordium; cf. [D.H.] Rh. 367. 23-368. 2 Usener-Radermacher), 4. 2. 28-30 (narrative), 4. 2. 97 (colours), 4. 2. 128 (repeated narrative), 5. 13. 42-6 (objections; see also n. on 2. 10. 14 sumimus), 7. 1. 37 (order of speakers), 7. 3. 20 (definitions); add [D.H.] Rh. 370. 13-17 and 371. 22-372. 2 UsenerRadermacher. reddit: cf. 11. 3. 68 (Demosthenes practising in front of a mirror) 'quamuis fulgor ille sinistras imagines reddat'. est celebrata: 'has become popular' (verb not adjective, despite OLD s.v. celebratus 4c), though with secondary sequence (cf. on 2. 1. 1 tenuit consuetudo... ut... traderentur); cf. (again of declamation) Sen. Con. 1 pr. 12 'nam et studium ipsum nuper celebrari coepit'. plerisque: including those 'natura sua et uulgari modo scholarum exercitatione contend' (2. 11. 1). perpetuae... orationis: rhetoric as opposed to dialectic (oratio concisa: 2. 20. 7, where see n.). Q. means that dialectic, so far as orators need it, cannot be taught in the declamation schools but requires a separate discipline; cf. 2. 4. 41 'his [i.e. with progymnasmata] fere ueteres facultatem dicendi exercuerunt, adsumpta tamen a dialecticis argumentandi ratione'. meditatione: Gk. fieXerrj. Cf. 4. 2. 29 'cum sit declamatio forensium actionum meditatio', Tac. Dial. 33. 5 (with Gudeman ad loc.); meditari is used in a related way at 10. 3. 30. 10. 3 quidem: not adversative (as Russell's translation might suggest), but looking forward to sed. reccidit u t . . . fuerit: cf. Cic. Ver. 5. 163 'hucine tandem haec omnia reciderunt ut ciuis Romanus . . . caederetur?' (with secondary sequence). licentia... dedamantium: cf. 8. 3. 76 'quod... genus . . . dedamatoria maxime licentia corruptum est'; Petr. 2. 2 (addressed to a rhetor) 'primi omnium
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eloquentiam perdidistis'. 'Those declaiming' seems chosen to cover pupils as well as teachers. eo quod., .licet: cf. 2. 16. 10 'non est.. .aecum id haberi malum quo bene uti licet'. 10. 4 et ipsae: et can hardly correlate with et declamatio below, but should be taken as reinforcing ipsae. 'even the very themes that are invented' should be as near reality as possible, fingentur and ueritati contrast sharply: cf. 2. 1. 9 'uerae fictaeque controuersiae', Hor. Ars 338 'ficta uoluptatis causa sint proxima ueris'; and see n. on 2 ueritati. Q. may, or may not, imply that some subjects were not invented, but came straight from actual cases (cf. Suet. Rhet. 25. 5; note also 6. 4. 21). ueritati: ueritatis A. The dative is supported by 12 below, and by 10. 5. 21, where the teacher forces the pupil to be 'quam simillimum... ueritati'. Conversely, Tac. Dial. 35. 4 'materiae abhorrenti a ueritate'. In 2. 20. 4 Q. says that some declaimers waste their lives on declamations 'quas esse ueritati dissimillimas uolunt'. in quantum maxime potest: cf. e.g. Sen. Ep. 124. 23 'in quantum potest plurimum crescere'. But maxime is apparently (PHI) unique in this collocation in CL. imitetur.. .reperta est: another view in Sen. Con. 10 pr. 12 'nihil est indecentius quam ubi scholasticus forum quod non nouit imitatur' (commenting on a dedaimer who affected an orator's delivery). actiones: cf. 4. 2. 29, cited on 2 meditatione. 10. 5 nam... quaeremus: Q. agrees with the strictures of Petronius (1. 3 'ego adulescentulos existimo in scholis stultissimos fieri, quia nihil ex his quae in usu habemus aut audiiuit aut uident, sed piratas cum catenis in litore stantes, sed tyrannos edicta scribentes... sed responsa in pestilentiam data . . . ' ) and Messala in Tacitus' Dialogus (35. 5 'tyrannicidamm praemia aut uitiatarum electiones aut pestilentiae remedia aut incesta matrum aut quidquid in schola cotidie agitur, in foro uel raro uel numquam') on the unreality of the characters and situations dealt with in declamation. But we should not be too sharp with Q. for making use of such material in his own practice (see e.g. 7. 8. 3, as well as, probably, the Minor Declamations), for he will in the next section state the need to make concessions to youthful taste; see the sensible remarks of G. Fleiter, De minoribus quae sub nomine Quintiliani feruntur declamationibus (diss. Miinster, 1890), 12. magos: it would appear from 7. 3. 7 that 'an carmina magorum uenefidum' might be a question raised even in the courts; note Tac. Ann. 4. 22. 3 'Numantina..., accusata iniecisse carminibus et ueneficiis uecordiam marito, insons iudicatur' (cf. Juv. 6. 610-11, with Courtney's n.), not to speak of the
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bizarre circumstances treated in Apuleius' Apologia. As for declamation, Decl. mai. 10 concerns a father who called in a magus when his wife started dreaming of her lost son; add, in Greek, Libanius, Decl. 41; Philostr. VS 619 (for the sophist Adrianos' interest in ra TOIV FXAYAJV R}9R) see VS 590). pestilentiam et responsa: see Winterbottomon Decl. min. 323 theme (adding Calp. Flacc. 19), where the two are as usual connected (cf. Petronius cited above). nouercas: stock declamation characters; see Austin on 12. 1. 2 (citing Jerome, Ep. 54. 15 'omnes comoediae et mimographi et communes rhetorum loci in nouercam saeuissimam declamabunt'), Winterbottom on Decl. min. 246. 2. Virg. G. 2. 128 'pocula si quando saeuae infecere nouercae' (see Mynors ad loc.) thinks of the tragic variety, such as Phaedra; cf. Ennodius, Diet. 15. 8 (p. 177. 7 Vogel) 'nomen tragicum'. sponsiones et interdicta: cf. 12. 10. 70 'de interdictis ac sponsionibus' (with Austins n.); also 7. 5. 3 'in sponsionibus quae ex interdictis fiunt'. An interdict is again the type of a dull legal topic in Tac. Dial. 37.4. Cf. also Cic. Orat. 102 'tota mihi causa pro Caecina de uerbis interdicti fuit', making the plain style appropriate (so Q. 4. 2. 61 'quid... de . . . interdictis habere loci potest supra modum se tollens oratio?'); there would, apart from anything else, be a stylistic gulf between the two kinds of topic. supra fidem: i.e. fabulosa (cf. 2. 4. 2); cf. Decl. mai. 10. 1 'supra fidem infelix'. The linking of the adverbial phrase with the adj. poetica is cited by Douglas and Henry on the not very similar Cic. Tusc. 5. 5 'tibi nos... nunc penitus totosque tradimus'. More comparable are 2.4. 8 'siccum et sine umore ullo solum', and esp. 8. 5. 32 'nihil probantes nisi planum et humile et sine conatu'. Comparable also are cases where an adjective is coupled with a genitive phrase as at 2. 4. 4 'indoles laeta generosique conatus', 2. 10. 9 'perplexae magis et longioris .. .actus controuersiae', 8 pr. 19 'corpora sana et integri sanguinis', 11. 3. 67 'tacens opus et habitus semper eiusdem'. ut uere dixerim: not a common phrase, but cf. Plin. Nat. 25. 16. themata: cf. 4. 2. 28 'certa quaedam ponuntur [see n.on 2. 4. 22 ponatur] (quae themata dicimus)', 7. 1. 4 'certa sunt et pauca et ante declamationem exponuntur, quae themata Graeci uocant, Cicero proposita'; Bonner, Declamation, 51. defia is perhaps not found in this sense in Greek texts (not at D.L. 7. 78, despite LSJ s.v. Ill.a). For the caique positio see on 15 below. expatientur: 'go beyond the usual limits', 'spread themselves' (cf. 2. 17. 1 'expatiari. ..et indulgere uoluptatialso 4. 3. 4, in connection with digression); the usage seems unique to Q. For the pleasure taken by youth in such experimentation, cf. 2. 4. 6 'audeat haec aetas plura et inueniat et inuentis gaudeat' (that passage is much in Q.'s mind here: see n. below on 6 grandia et tumid a).
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in corpus eant: run to fat', paving the way for the body metaphor used in 6; cf. n. on 2. 4. 5 erit... corpus. A strict parallel is lacking, but cf. Mela 3. 64 'priusquam annis aut aegritudine in maciem eant'; Cels. 7. 3. 4 'cibi potionesque corpori faciundo aptae' (following 'cum caro producatur'); also n. on 2. 8. 9 in hoc... ire. 10. 6 erat: erit A; but cf. 7. 1. 34 'optimum erat negare, sed non potest', 11. 2. 33 'ediscere... optimum erat, si non subirent...'; these, with Hor. S. 2. 1. 7, are the only exact parallels given by PHI, though note 6 pr. 3 'optimum fuit'. See n. on 2. 4. 3 erat grandia et tumida: the words are not well-matched. The former is normally commendatory (contra H. Bardon, Le vocabulaire de la critique litteraire chez Seneque le Rheteur (Paris, 1940), 34; so too, despite Bardon, at Sen. Ep. 114. 11), though it can be used contemptuously (TLL s.v. grandis 2186. 37-49), while turnidus expresses disapproval (see esp. 8. 3.18 and 56; also n. on 2. 3.9 tumidos); hence the two can directly contrast, as at 10. 2. 16 'fiimt... pro grandibus tumidi', 12. 10. 80. tumor; indeed, is the fault that attends the uirtus of grandness when it goes too far (see Rhet. Her. 4. 15, cited on umoris corrupti below). It may be that grandia should be placed in mental inverted commas, as the sort of word that some dedaimers would use (see n. on 2. 11. 3 grandibus), or regarded as corrupt (Doreen Innes attractively thinks of praegrandia, but parallels lack). Otherwise we seem forced to translate 'let them be grand, e\'en swollen, but not also...'. The general argument, that the young maybe allowed to put on weight for the moment, but will have to slim later, is precisely that of 2. 4. 4-8 (cf. 14): note esp. 'uel plura iusto' (4), 'erit illud plenius interim corpus, quod mox adulta aetas adstringat' (5), 'materiam esse primum uolo uel abundantiorem' (7). si iam cedendum est: for si iam, see K-S ii. 428. The clause specifies the reservation implied in certe: 'if a concession must be made.' Emphasis falls on aliquando (note its position; it answers numquam in 5) and on 'dum sciat...'. impleat se: i.e. sit tumidus. The declaimer is to 'fill himself full' (Cels. 1.2. 10 'si quis interdiu se impleuit'), thereby, perhaps, 'fattening himself' (Cels. 1. 3. 14 'tenuis... homo implere se debet'). uiridi pabulo: cf. e.g. Col. 5. 12. 1,6. 3. 2; Palladius, Devet. med. 50. 3 (good for a fever). distentae: cf. Sen. Dial. 4. 20. 2 'ne dbis quidem implendi sunt [sc. pueri]: distendentur enim corpora et animi cum corpore tumescent'; Palladius, De vet. med. 6. 3 'inflatio uentris' (of oxen). sanguinis detractione: for the phrase cf. Palladius, De vet. med. 6. 7; Cels. 2. 9. 2 (humans).
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umoris corrupti: cf. Sen. Ep. 78. 8. contraho, too, is correct medical vocabulary (scattered in TLL s.v. contraho 759. 45-84, citing Cels. 4. 2. 9 'genus [sc. of head disease] quod umorem in caput contrahit'). This corrupt humour is to be got rid of just like bad blood (Cels. 2. 10. 2 'sanguis emittitur'; Palladius, De vet med. 6. 6) if health is to ensue (8 pr. 19 'corpora sana et integri sanguinis'). Throughout this passage, Q. plays with words that had found their place in rhetorical criticism: thus implere (n. on 2. 6.1 implebant), corruptus, san us, and robust us; for adipes cf. Cic. Orat. 25 'adipatae [v./. adipale] dictionis genus'. Note in particular Rhet. Her. 4. 15 'Nam graui figurae ['style'], quae laudanda est, propinqua est ea quae fiigienda.. .Nam ita ut corporis bonam habitudinem tumor imitatur saepe, item grauis oratio saepe inperitis uidetur ea quae turget et inflata est.' 10. 7 tumor: the medical language continues, but the sentence as a whole returns to the literal. inanis: the swelling contains nothing solid; cf. Serenus, Liber medicinalis 216 'si tumor insolitus typho se toilet inani'; note also Sen. Dial. 3. 17.4 'habet (sc. ira] ...non solidum rob ur sed uanum tumorem'. In rhetorical mode, cf. 12. 10. 16 'inflati... et inanes' (of the Asianists); and see nn.on 2. 3.9 tumidos and inflantur. primo...ueri operis conatu: cf. Suet. Ner. 12. 2 'Icarus primo statim conatu.. .decidit'; for the genitive cf. Cic. Phil. 10. 24 'ad conatum exercitus comparandi'. The uerum opus is the uerum discrimen of 8. deprehendetur: 'found out' (cf. 2. 4. 29) by reality. The abject failure of declaimers confronted with the courtroom is a familiar topic; see below, 9 'quae nos... tirones in foro inueniunt•'; Winterbottom2 228, with n. 36, citing e.g. 10. 5. 18, 12. 6. 5; Sen. Con. 3 pr. 13, 9 pr. 3 and 5; Petr. 1. 2; Tac. Dial. 35. 5. totum... existimant: Q. now turns to a new class of opponents, those who denied any connection between declamation and the courts, and so would not be persuaded by Q.'s views on the limiting of unreal elements in declamatory practice. These people approved of declamation for declamation's sake, as an epideixis with no practical results. Q. replies that they fail to appreciate the whole rationale of the exercise, and that, if declamation is not a preparation for the courts, its aping of legal practice is merely absurd (which it is not on Q.'s own view). ne rationem quidem... peruident: apart from their general lack of perception, they 'fail even to see the reason' why declamation was invented. 10. 8 si foro non praeparat: cf. 5. 13. 44 'exercitationibus quae foro praeparant'; also 9. 2. 81 'in eo quomodo declametur positum est etiam quomodo agatur'.
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scaenicae ostentationi... furiosae uoaferationi: gibes that might (Q. argues) be levelled at declamatory practice if it had no practical purpose. But Q. elsewhere himself uses similar language of (faulty) declamation. For the first phrase, cf. 10. 7. 21 (of dedaimers asking for a word to begin from) quod est... friuolum ac scaenicum', 4. 3. 2 (of slick transitions) 'ostentatione dedamatoria' (note Bonner, Declamation, 72 on the Elder Seneca's habit of contrasting ostentatio and exercitaticr, one instance is cited in the n. on ostentationem at 10 below). As for the second, shouting was all too prevalent in declamation: see n. on 2. 11. 2 exclamauerunt, 2. 12. 9 'clamant ubiqiie' (also 9 'furentes'); 3. 8. 59 (in suasoriae) 'cur initio furioso [fiiriose Regius] sit exclamandum non intellego'; 11. 3. 45 (more general) 'ne dicamus omnia clamose, quod insanum est'; Petr. 1. 1 'num alio genere furiarum declamatores inquietantur, qui clamant...' (cf. 3. 2 'aim insanientibus furere'). The habit also affected real-life oratory: 4. 2. 37 'nec sibi diserti uidentur nisi omnia tumultu [see n.on 2. 12. 11 tumultuentur] et uociferatione concusserint'; Sen. Ep. 75. 2 'etiam si disputarem, nec supploderem pedem nec manum iactarem nec attollerem uocem, sed ista oratoribus reliquissem'. Nor was the custom restricted to the present or to Rome. Earlier, note Crassus' complaint (Cic. de Orat. 3. 136) about modem speakers who think 'eloquentiam... in damore et in uerborum cursu positam'; the type is exemplified by C. Fimbria {Brut. 233). For Greece, see Lucian, Rh. Pr. 15, satirically recommending porjv oti neyioTrjv. And the noise made by the speaker was matched by the clamours of the audience (4. 2. 37, 7. 1. 44, 12. 8. 3, 12. 9. 8). praeparare: with this allusion to the proem (cf. 4. 1. 50 'tris... praeparandi iudicis partes'), Q. starts to take us, as he did at 2. 5. 7-8, through the partes orationis; but as there the epilogue is referred to only covertly ('adfici uero et ira uel luctu permoueri'). nullus est: 'does not exist'. Cf. e.g. 2. 17. 22, 10. 7. 6; K-S i. 824. probationes: cf. 2. 11. 3 'neque enim opus esse probatione . . . in rebus fictis', the assertion there of Q.'s opponents, while here he is agreeing—but for the crudal fact that declamation trains for the courts. otiosa tantum: merely time-wasting, not, like what follows, positively absurd. adfici: 'feel adfectus', absol., as in 6. 1. 7 'philosophos.. .apud quos uitii loco est adfici'. 'ira et luctu [cf. 6. 2. 26, cited in the next n.] permoueri' then specifies. One might prefer B's permouere (to pretend to feel or to arouse emotion), if the ablatives were natural thus. Q. was not averse from using declamation to train pupils in emotional oratory: cf. 4. 2.128, 7. 1.15,11.1. 55 ('finguntur adfectus'; also 6. 2. 36). And, following Cicero (see L-P on de Orat. 2. 189), he thought that an orator must feel emotion himself before he could
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arouse it in others: 'summa... circa mouendos adfectus in hoc posita est, ut moueamur ipsi' (6. 2. 26). cuius est ludibrii: apparently unparalleled; an ethic dative is used at 6. 1.45 in a related context. Cf. generally 6. 2. 26 'et luctus et irae et indignationis aliquando etiam ridicula fuerit imitatio. pugnae simulacris: Q. echoes Verg. A. 5. 585 'pugnaeque cient simulacra sub arm is' (the lusus Troiae). Rhetorical students prepared for the battle of the courts (5. 12. 22 'forensium certaminum pugnam'; 5. 13. 59 'haec praecipiunt qui ipsi non dicunt in foro, ut artes a securis otiosisque compositae ipsa pugnae necessitate turbentur'; Mayor on Juv. 7. 173; Fantham 158) by a pretence of fighting: cf. 5. 12. 17 'declamationes quibus ad pugnam forensem uelut praepilatis exerceri solebamus' (note the tense). So in 10. 5. 17 'adulescentes non debent nimium in falsa rerum imagine [cf. 2. 10. 2) detineri et inanibus simulacris... adsuefacere [adsuescere Zumpt}' ('forensibus certaminibus exercitatos' has preceded, and 'uera discrimina' will follow). The idea is worked out in more detail in Paneg. Lat. 9 (4). 2. 3-4. uerum discrimen: cf. (besides 10. 5. 17) 12. 6. 4, 12. 11. 15; n. on 2. 1.9 uerae fictaeque controuersiac, Sen. Con. 9 pr. 4 'non est autem utilis exercitatio nisi quae operi simillima est in quod exercet; itaque durior solet esse uero certamine' (leading on to a parallel with gladiators and sportsmen). In Greek notice Philod. Rhet. i. 41. 8-13 = p. 77. 8-13 L. A.: 'the sophists provide nothing systematic in their declamations that would help one learn how to proceed in real contests' (rrjs iv rots aXrjOivois ayatoi Svvdfxcojs); so several times in D.H. (Geigenmiiller 60). aciemque iustam: cf. Cic. de Orat. 1. 147 'in foro tamquam in acie' (also 157 'aciem forensem'), Paneg. Lat: 9 (4). 2. 3 'hanc aciem fori'. For iustam see OLD s.v. iustus 7b, citing Liv. 10. 14. 8. consuescimus: the construction with ad seems unparalleled. 10. 9 si profectus... nihil: the preferred answer, like erat optimum in 6; but again Q. will have to make concessions (10 'si uero...'). ut nominibus uteremur: Dr Holford-Strevens remarks: 'Even the use of fictitious names would make the declamation more realistic (cf. in reverse the anti-naturalistic abandonment of names in 1920s' Expression ism us) and encourage the dedaimer to give his characters more flesh and blood. And if they were Roman names (even M. Titiusand Q. Seius) they might concentrate the mind even of the teacher who set the topic on what Romans, rather than Sophistopolites, might be expected to say and do.' Bonner (Declamation, 80 n. 3) commented: 'I think Quintilian probably meant names of actual persons, and that this would have tended to define the very vague stock characterization of the themes.' Q. can hardly have had living persons in mind. As for dead ones,
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names were used in some controversiae (and most suasoriae, though, as forense above shows, Q. is not thinking of those at this point)—those founded on historical or pseudo-historical circumstances (cf. Philostratus, VS 482 ray is ovo^ia vnoQioeis). In this connection, compare the way in which such declamations (for which see Russell, Declamation, ch. 6) might involve 'the individualization of general plasmata (p. 120: cf. his remark on p. 106 that 'sometimes the mere addition of names turns [imaginary themes] into a sort of rudimentary historical fiction'). perplexae... fingerentur: this would bring them closer to reality (cf. 4. 1. 62 '[causae] perplexae'): 7. 1. 4 'erat mihi curae in controuersiis forensibus [i.e. real cases] nosse omnia quae in causa uersarentur; nam in schola certa sunt et pauca. longioris... actus: for the wording cf. 6. 3. 43. uerba.. .timeremus: cf. 8. 2.17 'communem loquendi morem reformidant' (leading to obscure periphrasis; note also 8. 2. 2); 8. 3. 23 'nunc utique, cum haec exercitatio procul a ueritate seiuncta laboret incredibili uerborum fastidio ac sibi magnam partem sermonis absciderit'; Sen. Con. 4 pr. 9 'quaedam [sc. uerba].. .scholae quasi obscena refugiunt, nec, si qua sordidiora sunt aut ex cotidiano usu repetita, possunt pati'. Conversely, the declaimer Albucius brought in 'res.. .omnium sordidissimas' just to avoid being thought to be a scholasticus (Con. 7 pr. 3-4; cf. Suet. Rhet. 30. 2). For fear of departing too far from ordinary speech, cf. 1. 6. 28 '[ueriloquium] ipse Cicero qui finxit reformidat'; 8. 3. 31 'at ueteres ne "expectorat" quidem timuerunt'. iocos: cf. 6. 3. 15 (discussing the possibility of training in humour) 'nihil... uetabat et componi materias in hoc idoneas, ut controuersiae permixtis salibus fingerentur'. Seneca, on the other hand, seems to disapprove of the witticisms of Asilius Sabinus: 'quomodo posset ab illo obtineri ne in declamationibus iocaretur qui iocabatur in miseriis ac periculis suis . . . ?' (Con. 9. 4. 21). tirones: 'beginners'; cf. Sen. Con. 3 pr. 13 'ille primum in foro uerba facturus tiro dictus est'; Cic. Div. Caec. 41 'hominem non aetate sed usu forensi atque exercitatione tironem'. After the metaphors of §8, we feel the military sense, 'raw recruit' (OLD s.v. tiro la). For the embarrassment commonly experienced by newcomers to the courts, see on 7 deprehendetur. inueniunt: a striking active construction of a verb which is normally passive in this sense (OLD s.v. inuenio 5d and TLL s.v. invenio 139. 84-140.11, neither mentioning our passage), as the similar deprehendetur is at §7. The corrector of A may have been influenced by this in changing (impossibly) to inuenimur. 10. 10 si uero.. .dedamatio: countering 'si profectus gratia dicimus' in 9. Q. polarizes alternatives that turn out, in the summary in 12 ('quoniam... quoniam autem...'), to be two sides of the same coin.
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ostentationem: the object of epideictic, a word which (3. 4. 13) 'non tam demonstrations uim habere quam ostentationis uidetur'; cf. (less friendly) 4. 3. 2 'ostentatione dedamatoria' (cf. above, 8 'scaenicae ostentationi' in declamation); Sen. Con. 9 pr. 1 'Montanus Votienus adeo numquam ostentationis declamauit causa ut ne exercitationis quidem dedamauerit'. comparetur: in effect, 'intended' for display. Cf. 10. 1. 28 (of poetry) 'genus ostentationi comparatum'; Cic. Orat. 208 'orationem generis eius quod esset ad delectationem comparatum'; for in cf. 5. 8. 2 'cetera... in auxilium atque ornamentum argumentorum comparantur'. As Donald Russell suggests to us, the (remote) subjunctive (contrast dicimus in 9) seems to be chosen to reflect Q.'s view that this alternative is less desirable than the other. paulum aliquid: 'a little' (1. 1. 8 'paulum aliquid.. .progressi' is not quite parallel; but cf. 11. 3. 94 'paulum inclinatus', of physical movement) rather than 'a little while' (12. 3.12). PHI's nine instances of paulum aliquid include four from Q. indinare ad uoluptatem... debemus: inclamare ad uoluntatem... demus B. Despite Spalding's vigorous defence, inclamare is impossible: noise is not a marker of epideictic oratory, uoluptatem is ensured by delectationem in 11, and though the rhythm given by demus is enticing, and perhaps also its mood, the sentence can hardly be rewritten to preserve it. On the other hand, inclinare ad uoluptatem seems strictly unparalleled; it should be classified under OLD s.v. inclino 9c rather than 10a. 10. 11 et in iis... cultus: Q. argues that even in 'real-life' demonstrative oratory extra cultus is appropriate; equally, if not more so, is this true of declamation under its epideictic aspect. B omits in, perhaps rightly; iis actionibus would then be dative with permittitur, and actiones would be understood as subject of the infinitives (cf. 12, where dedamatio is said 'nonnihil sibi nitoris adsumere'). sine dubio: correlating with sed, as in e.g. 2. 5. 14; see also n.on 2. 15. 6 quos... probat. delectationem: cf. 11. 1. 48 'illud iam diximus [8. 3. 11], quanto plus nitoris et cw/fmsdemonstrative materiae, ut ad delectationem audientium compositae,.. .permittant'; Cic. Orat. 37 (of the genus cmSeiKTiKov) 'quasi ad inspiciendum delectationis causa comparatum'; D.H. Dem. 44 [of npos ra? 7Tavrjy vpeis Kai a^oAa? avppeovres o^Aot ] a.7raTr)s opeyovrai xai tfjvxayojyias. So Q. will say of modern, cormpted declamations that they are 'ad solam compositae uoluptatem' (5. 12. 17; cf. Montanus at Sen. Con. 9 pr. 1 'qui declamationem parat, scribit non ut uincat sed ut placeat', with what follows).
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legimus: with allusion to the Greek display oratory of the past. Thus Isocrates' Panegyricus was never delivered, and exemplified Aristotle's Aegis ypau
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nitoris: OLD s.v. nitor 4b; see on 11 cultus. For the adj. nitidus(OLDs.v. 7a) see on 2. 8. 4 presso... urbano. For both, Afifahl 130; Fantham 172. 10. 13 sine arte: cf. 11. 3. 102 'ille urgentis orationem gestus, uulgaris magis quam ex arte'. morem communis huius sermonis: as 'ut nos uulgo loquimur pronuntiant' shows, Q. is talking not of the kind of words we customarily use (cf. 8. 2. 24 'planiora et communia magis uerba'), but of the way we utter them. At 2. 21. 20 sermo communis is 'ordinary language'. See generally R. Miiller, Sprachbewufitsein und Sprachvariation im lateinischen Schrifttum der Antike (Munich, 2001), 215-17. 10. 14 sic quoque: Kai OVTOJS (as in e.g. 10. 1. 131), i.e. even if declamation is conducted as Q. has been advocating. sumimus: i.e. assume to suit our convenience (ut uidetur = ut liber, cf. Cic. Fam. 16. 20). Cf. 7. 2. 54 'ilia scholarum consuetudo ituris in forum potest nocere, quod omnia quae in themate non sunt pro nobis ducimus (56) in epilogis quidam quibus uolunt liberos parentes nutrices accommodant'; also 5. 13. 42 'uberes loci popularesque sententiae nascuntur materiam dicendi nobis quod uolumus ducentibus', 6. 1. 43 'ex scholis haec uitia, in quibus omnia libere fingimus, et inpune, quia pro facto est quidquid uoluimusr, non admittit hoc idem ueritas'; Sen. Con. 9 pr. 2 'aduersarios quamuis fatuos fingunt: respondent illis et quae uolunt et cum uolunt[D.H.] Rh. 372. 16-21 Usener-Radermacher (descriptions). In real life, however, 'si quid tibi ipse sumas, probandum est' (12. 6. 5). 10. 15 positionum: the positio was the 04pa (see on 5 themata), what was positum (see on 2. 4. 22 ponatur) as the theme of a declamation; cf. 7. 4. 40, Sen. Con. 10. 1. 12. As to their uitia, Q. seems to be thinking of inconsistencies, improbabilities, or gaps in a theme. Thus (Bonner, Declamation, 51) in Sen. Con. 1. 2. 14 Latro argues that a girl is not a virgin: 'aiebat Apollodoreis quidem placere fixa esse themata et tuta, sed hie non repugnare controuersiam huic suspicioni.' suo quoque loco: for this attraction, found also at 4. 2. 62, see K-S i. 645, citing esp. Var. R. 1. 22. 6 (add Grillius, Comm. in Cic. Rhet 50. 11-12 Jakobi 'suo quoque componi ordine'; see also Lofstedt, ii. 113-14). suo quaeque loco (A corn, B) is entirely possible (Cic. Brut. 139, 209; Col. 12. 3. 3), but less choice; note also 2. 13. 15 'sed de his plenius suo quidque loco tractabitur'. Q. refers forward to 7. 2. 54-6 (some extracts were cited above on 14 sumimus), but the uitia positionum do not recur. operis... destinati: so 12 pr. 1 (where see Austin's n.). Q. alludes to the title of his book.
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orator: i.e. a good deal more than a declaimer. Q.'s point is that despite this priority he will not hesitate to bring in matter relevant to the schools alone. Hence etiam, i.e. over and above the avowed topic of the book. For examples of such material, see Winterbottom2 229-31.
Chapter Eleven Before I proceed to the rules o f rhetoric 'proper', I must confront those who think precept is not necessary (la): an attitude summed up in two anecdotes ( l b - 2 a ) . Such people rely on natural talent alone (2b), boast of their 'impulse' and 'vigour', and regard epigram as more important than organization (3). Even their preparation lacks method (4). Some decide in advance on a particular beginning, but then abandon it and resort to banality (5). Others are concerned not for the whole, but for parts; they throw out abrupt remarks (6), making their speeches resemble the notebooks o f children. O f course they do sometimes come up with good things, but then so do barbarians and slaves (7).
This is the first of two chapters (their separation is perhaps unfortunate) in which Q. reacts to misguided persons who dismiss rhetorical precept as unnecessary. In just the same way 'Longinus' had begun (or was to begin) his treatise with a discussion of'whether there is in fact an art of sublimity. Some people think it is a complete mistake to reduce things like this to technical rules. Greatness, the argument runs, is a natural product, and does not come by teaching' (2. 1, transl. Russell; and see his n.). In effect, like 'Longinus', Q. is taking part in the age-old controversy about the relative importance of art and nature (practice coming, for Q., a less important third) in the formation of a great writer. This dispute will be touched on more abstractly in 2. 19; in 2. 11-12 it takes on a personal note. Cicero had written, dispassionately enough (Fin. 4. 10): 'Quod etsi ingeniis magnis praediti quidam dicendi copiam sine ratione consequuntur, ars tamen est dux certior quam natura. Aliud est enim poetamm more uerba fundere, aliud ea quae dicas ratione et arte distinguere' (see also Ardi. 15). And Antonius and Crassus in de Oratore (L-P i. 210) represent the opposing sides without becoming too heated. Q., however, finds himself growing sarcastic, even angry, with contemporaries: whom, regrettably, he is too polite to name. The last section of this pair of chapters (2. 12. 12) leaves the impression that Q., now retired, has yielded them the field. In 2. 11 he concerns himself entirely with rival rhetores, who think declamation is training enough and do not underpin it, as Q. did, with a foundation of systematized rules. Thus his examples in 1-2 are both of 'professors' (one
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of whom specifically mentions 'his declamation). And when words are put into Q.'s opponents' mouths in 3, they claim that there is no need for probatio or dispositio in the fictional world of the schools, and that the halls are packed with people who come to revel in their epigrams. In Q.'s characterization, these people (the 'naturalists')20 are gifted speakers who can strike off good phrases (2, 7); but they lack method, ratio (7; cf. 4 and 6). It would be interesting to know how large a group of fellow-teachers Q. has in mind; he seems to be talking throughout of the 'best' of this bunch, not of the many who aped them without possessing their talent (2), though he does mark off sub-groups (5 nonnulli, 6 'qui plurimum rationis uidentur habere'). It is remarkable that he spends so much time on their methods of preparation (4-5; we hear much more of their public behaviour in 2. 12). His satirical picture sounds as if it might be drawn from life; indeed it is striking that he can know, or pretend to know, so much about what must have been private activities. At all events, even his compliments are double-edged (2 sunthabiti;; 7: barbarians and slaves can do as much). The rivalries and bitternesses of the teaching world come through clearly: note 'rideant... diligentiam nostram' (1), and the abusive words in 2. 12. 11, perhaps, as Spalding thought, applied personally to Q. (cf. 7. 1. 43 'illi eloquentes, quibusque nos circa lites raras sollicitiores ridiculi uidemur'). And there may well have been fathers who did not think that drilling in the sfafws-system was worth the extra money charged by a Quintilian. The next chapter, indeed, will confirm that sceptidsm over the value of doctrina was widespread: not all will have gone along with Q.'s confident assertion (2. 17. 43): 'non solum doctus indoctum sed etiam doctior doctum in rhetorices opere superabit, neque essent eius aliter tam multa praecepta tamque magni qui docerent.' 11.1 iam hinc: marking a stage in the design of the book (see n. on 2. 2.15 iam hinc sciat). But this is really a false start, and the real Ars Rhetorica does not begin until 2. 14. 1, and in one sense not until 3. 1. 1. qui priora omiserunt: cf. 1 pr. 4 'ceteri fere qui artem orandi litteris tradiderunt ita sunt exorsi quasi perfectis omni alio genere doctrinae summam fin eloquentiaef manum imponerent'. in ipso statim limine: for limen of the opening of a book, cf. Mart. 8 pr. 'in ipso libelli huius limine'; hitherto we have been in the uestibulum (cf. 1. 5. 7 'uestibulum modo artis huius ingressus'; also 9. 4. 10 'in aure uelut quodam uestibulo statim offendit'). For the entrance to a Roman house, see Gel. 16. 5. 3 'C. Aelius Gallus... uestibulum esse dicit non in ipsis aedibus neque partem 2 0 The)' are akin to the Greek rhetores satirized in Lucian's Rhetorum Praeceptor (note esp. 2 0 ) . But they represent in an extreme form a class o f ' i m p r o v i s e d known to Greek rhetoric since (at least) the fourth century bc Alcidamas (note Philostratus, V S 4 8 2 ) .
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aedium, sed locum ante ianuam domus uacuum'. The limen was (part of) the ianua at the back of the uestibulum, and was guarded by the ianitor (Ov. Fast. 1. 137 'sedens primi.. .prope limina tecti'). At 8 pr. 18 'occurram enim necesse est et uelut in uestibulo protinus adprehensuris hanc confessionem meam resistam...' (cf. Liv. 30. 12. 11 'intranti uestibulum in ipso limine Sophoniba... occurrit'), Q. promises robust counter-measures against those attacking his house. uulgari: 'ordinary' (cf. Cic. de Orat. 3. 188 'in uulgari ista disciplina'), implying that these teachers (like those in 2. 12. 11 'breuem dicendi exercitationem consecuti') relied on declamation alone (cf. 2. 10. 2) without imparting the rules of rhetoric that should underlie them. There is a dear allusion (spoilt by B's modo et) to the normal triad (2.19 n.), ars (represented by praecepta), natura, and exercitatia modo: 'merely', backing up contend, as in 8. 6. 2 'haec modo.. .adnotasse contend'. For the 'iiberfliissiges modo' see B. Axelson, Kleine Schriften zur lateinischen Philologie, ed. A. Onnerfors and C. Schaar (Stockholm, 1987), 107-8. etiam: they go so far as to laugh; cf. n.on 2. 21. 20 etiam. quoque: perhaps merely reinforcing exemplo (the professors, like their followers, make fun of precept); alternatively, emphasizing magni (Peterson, liv): 'professors, even distinguished ones'. professorum: rhetores; cf. 2. 15. 36 (Albucius), 10. 5. 18 ('M. Pordo Latroni, qui primus clari no min is professor fuit'); Suet. Rhet. 25. 6. ut opinor: hardly more than a clearing of the throat before the telling of the story; for more subtle uses see n. on 2. 13. 13 opinor. schema et noema: cf. 9. 1. 1 'ad figuras (quae schemata Graece uocantur)', 8. 5. 12 'est et quod appellatur a nouis noema... sed hoc nomine donarunt ea quae non dicunt uerum intellegi uolunt'. noema is far less common than schema, and the incongruous pair was perhaps chosen for its mocking rhyme by a questioner who knew what kind of a reply would be forthcoming. nescire... respondit: when Albucius came to grief in court by using a figure, and cried 'ista ratione schemata de rerum natura tolluntur', his opponent replied: 'tollantur; poterimus sine illis uiuere' (Sen. Con. 7 pr. 7; cf. Q. 9. 2. 95). 11.2 Theodoreus an Apollodoreus: Apollodorus of Pergamum, the future teacher of Augustus (for his career, see the important paper of M. T. Luzzatto, Studi classici e orientali 47 [ 2000], 37-70; on him generally see Brzoska in RE s.n. 64), held that rules were there to be kept to, and that rhetoric was a matter of almost scientific rigidity (Sen. Con. 1.2. 14 'themata fixa et tuta'), while Theodorus of Gadara, who taught Tiberius, was less given to a normative
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rhetoric, emphasizing instead the need for a flexible system which allows for adjustments to particular situations; he also seems to have made a point of being original in his terminology even in cases where the substance of his doctrine does not seem different from what other rhetoricians taught (on him see Stegemann in RE s.n. 39, and Grube 337-65). The two, on whom see also the introduction to ch. 13, were 'diuersarum sectarum uelut duces' (5. 13. 59); for them and their followers see also 3.1. 17-18 (partly cited in n. on 2. 15.12 Apollodorus), and generally Apollodori Pergameni ac Theodori Gadarei testimonia et fragtnenta, ed. R. Granatelli (Rome, 1991), reviewed by Winterbottom in CR44 [ 1994], 203-4, and G. Forte, 'Apollodorei eTeodorei', Rendiconti delVAccademia di Ardieologia, Lettere e Belle Arti di Napoli 48 (1973), 77-93. 'ego': Russell attractively emended to a question, 'egone?'. Cf. e.g. Cic. Leg. 2. 32 'ATTICVS Hac tu de re quaero quid sentias. MARCVS. Egone? Diuinationem... esse sentio'; K-S ii. 508. parmularius: for the word, see Suet. Dom. 10. 1. A adds sum, perhaps rightly. The professor shows his contempt for all rhetorical sects (cf. 3. 1. 18 'ad morem certas in philosophia sectas sequendi'; cf. 5. 13. 59) by declaring a quite different allegiance, to the type of gladiator armed in the Thracian manner with a small almost square shield (parm[ulja) and short curved sword (M. Junkelmann in E. Kcihne and C. Ewigleben, Gladiators and Caesars (London, 2000), 51-7; Kathleen Coleman kindly supplied this reference).21 One recalls Messala's comment (Tac. Dial. 29. 3-4) on the craze for gladiators in the schools, an enthusiasm extending to the teachers: 'Quos alios adulescentulorum sermones excipimus si quando auditoria intrauimus? Ne praeceptores quidem ullas crebriores cum auditoribus suis fabulas habent'; and earlier the rhetor Cestius could easily summon up the name of the Thracian gladiator Fusius (Sen. Con. 3 pr. 16). inscitiae: lack of knowledge, in this context of rhetorical detail, as at 3. 6.1; cf. Cic. de Orat. 1. 99 'earum rerum quae quasi in arte traduntur inscitia' (with L-P ad loc.). elabi: TLL s.v. elabor 317. 29-41. The verb is often used (ibid. 317. 42-50) of getting off a charge (2. 15. 8; cf. 3. 6. 83 'elabendi ex crimine', 6. 3. 10 '...risu sunt et oportuno ioco elapsi eaque urbanitate tota est inuidia criminis dissoluta'). praestantes: cf. 12. 1. 25 'uirum cum ingenii natura praestantem, turn uero tot pulcherrimas artis penitus mente complexum', where the second clause is not applicable to the speakers criticized here. 21 If it were true that 'i gladiatori Traci combattevono piu col solo valore naturale che con i mezzi suggeriti dall'arte' (Ammendola), the reply would gain in point. There may be an allusion to the idea of orator)' as a weapon (see n. o n 2. 16. 10 arma facundiae), though this rhetor was not (in all probability) a practising orator.
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exdamauerunt: not merely 'remarked' (cf. Russell); such persons exclaimed, even shouted, under the influence of their inspiration (see n. on 2. 10. 8 scaenicae ostentationi. ..furiosae uociferationi), just as 'lugentes utique in recenti dolore disertissime quaedam exclamare uideantur' (6. 2. 26). It is not clear how TLL s.v. exclamare 1267. 60 can so confidently comment: 'notione clamandi abolita'. habent: rather as in 2. 2. 14 'modestam habere potest etiam iuuentutem', where see n. paucissimos naturae: apparently not ironical; Q. is talking of the best of a bunch he regards as bad (above, p. 176), not least in their influence over less talented speakers. 11.3 igitur: because they rely on their superior natural gifts, impetu: see Winterbottom3 313 (with n. 2): 'a speaker needed drive, the onward movement that would carry the audience with him; and, with it, force' (for which see below on uiribus). uiribus: 'vigour' (OLD s.v. w/s 22b, citing 10. 1. 97, 10. 2. 12, 12. 10. 11); linked with impetus at 6. 2. 10, 12. 2. 11 'mouere etiam ac delectare audientis debet orator, ad quod impetu quoque ac uiribus et decore est opus'. This is not the same as w/s (12. 10. 11 'uimCaesaris... uires Africani'), but can hardly be unrelated to it; note Cic. Orat. 229 'ut aliter in ea [sc. oratione] nec impetus ullus nec uis esse possit', and the way in which at 12. 2. 11 Q. proceeds with a comparison to the uis of a river. neque enim... esse: the orat. obi. gives the content of the boast. For enim see n. on 2.4. 13 posse enim... melius. probatione: not (these people argued) needed in dedamation because where there is no lis proof is superfluous; conversely 'lis nulla est cui probatione opus non sit' (5 pr. 5); cf. 2. 10. 8 'quid... attinet... probationes adhibere causae de qua nemo sit pronuntiaturus' (with n. on probationes); Sen. Con. 9 pr. 1 '[qui declamationem parat] argumentationes, quia molestae sunt et minimum habent floris, relinquit'. For avoidance of argument in court, see 2. 12. 6 with n.on frigus. cuius rei gratia: for the popularity of epigram in declamation, cf. 5. 13. 42; see further n.on 2. 12. 7 quas solaspetunt. auditorium: the declamation hall (cf. 2. 21. 21); opposed to the forum in 10. 1. 36. grandibus: again (n. on 2. 10. 6 grandia et tumida) a favourable term, for this is still the naturalist declaimer's opinion being reported (contrast Q.'s own voice at 2. 12. 5). Cf. 7 'magnas... sententias'. a periculo: cf. 10. 1. 121 'tanta in quibusdam ex periculo petitis significantia' (also 7. 1. 44 'sententiae... praecipites', 8. 6. 11 'audaci et proxime
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periailum tralatione' [cf. Demetrius, Eloc. 80], 11. 1. 32 'uberiora paulo et paene periclitantia feruntur'). For 'danger' in oratory, see most elaborately Plin. Ep. 9. 26; Geigenmiiller 99; discussion in Kroll's n. on Cic. Orat. 98, Norden, AK 281-3. 11.4 quin etiam in cogitando: we now move to Q.'s own, satirical, view of these people, etiam is probably not to be merged into quin, but (cf. e.g. 2. 2. 9 and 3.1.5) taken closely with cogitando: even in their preparation (see on 2.4.15 cogitatio, 2. 6. 3 cogitationem... et stilum) they have no method. tectum intuentes: waiting for inspiration from on high; cf. 10. 3. 15 'si non resupini spectantesque tectum et cogitationem murmure agitantes expectauerimus quid obueniat...'; differently Juv. 1. 56 'doctus spectare lacunar' (a posture not recommended for the orator in 11.3. 160). uelut classico: the murmur (rather muted compared with the real thing: Sen. Thy. 574 'murmur graue dassicorum') serves as a spur to action. enuntiandis... uerbis: this would be the normal aim of bodily movement: 'corporis decens et accommodatus orationi motus' (11. 3. 29). 11. 5 sensum: apparently the general 'idea' of the declamation (OLD s.v. sensus 9a). destinant: 'fix on' (OLD s.v. destino 4a). TLL s.v. destino 758. 67-8 misclassifies the passage, for 'quibus. ..sit' is not an indirect question governed by the verb; rather, the subjunctive expresses the purpose of the decision (well got over by Russell). diu . . . meditati: practising first 'to themselves' (Cic. Off. 1. 144 'si qui, cum causam sit acturus, in itinere aut in ambulatione secum ipse meditetur', opp. to in conuiuio), then out loud: cf. Cels. 1. 8. 1 'legere clare debet', Pers. 2. 8-9 'haec clare et ut audiat hospes; | ilia sibi introrsum et sub lingua murmurat:.. deserunt: with some sense of leaving the prescribed route (2. 13. 16 'iter saepe deserimus'). This image continues in deuertunt (see on 2. 3. 9 lassi), which probably means not 'digress' (as OLD s.v. deuerto 2b) so much as 'get diverted', 'turn aside'. communia ac nota: paired as at 11. 3. 71. The substitutes, like the original notion, are banal. Q. is probably not thinking specifically of commonplaces in the technical sense, though they too could be hard to fit into the context of a speech (2.4.30-1). 11. 6 uidentur: emphatic: their method is only apparent, and we are not told in what it consisted. Despite it, they concentrate on individual passages (and/or commonplaces: for the ambiguity see on 2. 4. 31 ut... sententia) rather than on the (whole) case.
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corpori: not the body of the speech (as in 3. 11. 23 'corpus orationis in parua momenta diducendo', similar to D. H. Pomp. 3 [p. 238. 8-9 UsenerRadermacher]; cf. Longinus, Ars rhet. p. 188. 20 Hammer t o a t o / x a T-rjs Xetjeios; Fantham 165-6 for an idea going back to Plato), but the body of a passage (or commonplace) within it: even that is not seen as a whole, but consists of a series of random and disjointed remarks. Cf. 7. 10. 16 'neque enim partium est demum dispositio, sed in his ipsis primus aliquis sensus et secundus et tertius; qui non modo ut sint ordine conlocati laborandum est, sed ut inter se uincti atque ita cohaerentes ne commissura perluceat: corpus sit, non membra. abrupta: cf. 3. 8. 58 'principia abrupta' (also 4. 2. 45 'ilia Sallustiana... breuitas et abruptum sermonis genus'): OLD s.v. abruptus 3a. The metaphor is revivified by the following words: bits of stone or the like are broken away (TLL s.v. abrumpo 139. 67-70, very rare) as they come to hand (12. 5. 1 'haec arma habere ad manum'; Liv. 38. 21. 6 'saxis, nec modicis ut quae non praeparassent sed quod cuique temere trepidanti ad manum uenisset') and hurled like weapons. iaculantur: cf. 11.3.120 'sententias uibrantis digitisiaculantur' (cf. 9. 2. 79), showing that the image may be suggested by the violence of the accompanying gestures. 11.7 dissoluta: 'disjointed'; cf. 8. 6. 62 'dissoluta et hians oratio' (as a result of unsympathetic word-order). ex diuersis congesta: cf. 10. 3. 17 'rebus temere congestis'; 9. 3. 48 'congeruntur et diuersa'. Doreen Innes compares Demetrius, Eloc. 12 O€oa)P€vfx€vots in aAArjAots ra KOJACI eoiKev KCII CTTcpptfxevois KCII OVK €\ovatv avvSeoiv.
commentariis: so even of Cicero's Inv.: 'sunt enim uelut regestae in hos commentarios quos adulescens deduxerat ['composed'] scholae' (3. 6. 59). These seem to be the only cases of regero meaning 'take down', though note the later use of regesta, 'catalogue' (LS s.v. regero I B); in Agen. agrim. p. 44 Thulin 'hoc exempli causa regerendum existimaui' (compared by OLD s.v. 4c), the meaning is 'mention, register'. Once noted, such gems would be taken off home; see n. on 2. 2. 8 'multa cotidie dicat [sc. rhetor] quae secum auditores referant'. But in our passage the striking passages are ones complimented by the teacher in pupils' dictiones. magnas: cf. on 3 grandibus. The adjective seems to be used rather colloquially; this is perhaps the language of the schools, for we are again (gloriari solent echoes gloriantur in 3) hearing the naturalists' own claims. In that case, Q. says magnum aliquid (4) with point. bonas: cf. 8. 5. 32 'sententia bona'; 2. 2. 13 'quae bene dicet'. But with res there could again be a colloquial touch (note OLD s.v. bonus 1 lb).
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elidunt: 'emit with violence', according to OLD s.v. elido 3a, with the comment: 'i.e. ill-knit speeches capable only of "flashes" of eloquence.' elidere is certainly used literally of thunder and lightning (Ov. Met. 6. 696 'elisi nubibus ignes'), but hardly often enough to ensure that metaphor here. Another (equally unobvious) possibility would be sparks struck from flint (Plin. Nat. 11. 214 'ut ignis elidatur uelut e silice'). The violence, in any case, is appropriate to these strong speakers (3 'se.. .uiribus uti gloriantur'). Q. employs the word in 11. 3. 51 of the voice cracking under strain, and there are parallels for its use in connection with unnatural or forced sound; but that does not seem to be in question here, despite TLL s.v. elido 371. 14-15. nam: in effect explaining tamen: despite everything, they produce good things, < understandably enough,> for.. .Alternatively, we may, with Spalding, understand fateor, he compared 2. 20. 10, where nam answers an objection ('at...'). barbari et serui: types of the uninstructed. Cf. 2. 17. 6 'quod indocti et barbari et serui, pro se cum locuntur, aliquid dicant simile principio...'; 4. 2.69 'cum etiam serui nostri de peccatis suis mollius loquantur'; 8. 3. 2 'inuentio cum impends saepe communis' (cf. Plin. Ep. 3. 13. 3 'inuenire praeclare, enuntiare magnifice interdum etiam barbari solent, disponeie apte, figurare uarie nisi eruditis negatum est'); Grillius, Comm. in Cic. Rhet. p. 2. 32-40 Jakobi (a slave is represented as using coniectura arguments); A.-M. Guillemin, Pline et la vie litteraire de son temps [Paris, 1929], 62-3); also 2. 20. 6, where barbari are linked with rastici (see n.), and the interesting passage in 3.2.4 on oratory among the nomads. For the opportunities open to slaves, see Russell on 'Longinus' 44.4 (SovXov 8e p,r)8eva ylvcoQai p-qropa).
Chapter Twelve It remains true that it is often thought that the untrained speak more forcibly. A. This is an error of judgement on the part of critics (l),and analogies show why (2). But the uninitiated make this error because (ft) they do not appreciate e.g. the effect of division (3); (b) vices and virtues can come very close: (a) abuse is mistaken for free speech, and the untrained indulge freely in it (4)—and anyway people like to listen to invective that they would not venture on themselves (5a); (jS) daring is mistaken for courage, but, though striving for the excessive may sometimes lead to a good saying, that happens only rarely (5b); (y) diffuseness is mistaken for copiousness: the untrained say everything, the trained exercise choice (6a); (c) the untrained do not trouble to prove their points and aim solely at pleasure (6b), and (d) their epigrams show up better against a dark background (7a). Well, let them be called
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'talented', so long as it is understood that this is no compliment (7b). (Of course, training does remove some elements, but only things that are best done without (8).) B. Further, unlike the educated, these people themselves strive for the reputation of being forcible, by their delivery (9-10). But such 'force' is more like violence. People like this abandon all pretence at method, while abusing the organized for being cold and feeble (11). Still, we may congratulate them on finding eloquence come so easily; as for me, I have retired and am writing this book to console my leisure (12). This difficult chapter is scrappy and casually written. The summary above suggests one way of analysing its structure. Under A we are given a series of four points (the second sub-divided into three) illustrating the way in which the bad judgement of others tends to lead to the view that the untrained speak more 'strongly'; the male iudicantes of §1 are the same as the imperiti of §3, whose misconceptions are listed in §§3-7a. The last two points are not strictly relevant to the topic of the chapter (see Commentary), but merely contribute to the unflattering picture of the indocti. There follows the apparently clo sural remark 'itaque.. .disertum'; but this is at once followed by a concession, immediately withdrawn, again in a closural tone of voice (8). B starts with an assertion that the untrained themselves court a reputation for 'strength' of speech by extravagances of delivery (9-10), but in §11 we return to general criticism of the methods of the indocti. §12, echoing §7 but looking forward to the rest of the book, proves to be a genuine closure. The chapter, then, continues the theme of that preceding it, with further invective against Q.'s 'naturalist' rivals (e.g. their lack of ratio: 11,12). But the focus is now (at least most of the time) on one aspect of'naturalist' eloquence, its reputation for force. In this chapter, unlike the last, the target extends beyond teachers to speakers in court (4 'cum periculo suscepti litigatoris', 6 'apud corrupta iudicia', 10 'pullatum circulum', 11 'actores'); and much of what is said could be directed against either group. Winterbottom7 argued that here, and in some other passages of the Institutio (esp. 2. 20. 2, 4. 1. 22, 12. 7. 3), Q. has in mind the eloquence of at least some of the delatores who were of such sinister importance in the courts, and to some extent in the system of government, at certain periods of the early Empire, including the time of Domitian. The prize exhibit is M. Aquillius Regulus, as portrayed in the letters of Pliny: a man who relied on inspiration, not education: 'imbecillum latus, os confusum, haesitans lingua, tardissima inuentio, memoria nulla [defects then in three of the partes rhetorices listed in 3. 3. 1], nihil denique praeter ingenium insanum; et tamen eo impudentia (cf. 2. 20. 2] ipsoque illo furore [cf. n. on 2. 12. 9 fiirentes] peruenit, ut orator habeatur' (Plin. Ep. 4. 7. 4). He approved of the eloquence of 'our age', and scorned imitators of Cicero (ibid. 1. 5. 11). He was characterized by u is (Plin. Ep. 4. 7. 1-3; cf. Q. 2. 11. 3, 2. 12. 11); and he revelled in abuse (Plin. Ep. 1. 5. 2-3;
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cf. Q. 2. 12. 4). Aper in Tacitus' Dialogns, a 'purified' version of Regulus (Syrne, Tacitus, 109), was an orator 'ingenio potius et ui naturae quam institutione et litteris' (2. 1), ready to criticize Cicero (22) and stand up for modern eloquence, impatient with long speeches and rhetorical precept (19. 3). Whatever the relationship between the Dialogns and the Institutio, Tacitus can hardly have been writing without some glance at Quintilian. And when he provided words for the delator Suillius to speak to Seneca (Ann. 13. 42. 3 'simul studiis inertibus et iuuenum imperitiae suetum liuere iis qui uiuidam et incorruptam eloquentiam tuendis [!] ciuibus exercerent'), he might have been writing one side of an imaginary conversation between Regulus and Quintilian. If there is any substance in these conjectures, they must affect our judgement not only of 2. 12 but of the academic-soiuiding discussions that follow in 2. 15-21, not to speak of the insistence (especially in 12. 1-2) that an orator must be a good man. In a system where delatorial eloquence was of importance, Q. has ever)r reason to stress the desirability not only of more rhetorical training than a Regulus thought necessary, but also of a training with a moral basis. The naturalists whom Q. saw 'sine ratione, sine litteris, qua uel impudentia uel fames duxit ruentes' (2. 20. 2), let alone the many 'qui facultatem dicendi ad hominum perniciem conuerterint', sound all too like Tacitus' archtypal delator, Hispo, who 'egens ignotus inquies... dedit exemplum quod secuti ex pauperibus diuites, ex contemptis metuendi perniciem aliis ac postremum sibi inuenere' (Ann. 1. 74. 2). In the Dialogus, Tacitus makes Aper and Maternus differ on the virtues of two prominent delatores, Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus (see above, pp. xxxvi f.); Q. would have agreed with Maternus that such eloquence was stained in blood (12. 2 'lucrosae huius et sanguinantis eloquentiae'). Less sinister than the delator-naturalists are others who came by a different route to rate natura above ars. We hear in 12.10.40-2 of quidam who 'nullam esse naturalem putant eloquentiam nisi quae sit cotidiano sermoni simillima': a belief that led them to reject (for example) periphrasis and metaphor, and to prize the oldest orators as having spoken 'maxime secundum naturam'. A similar group (quosdam), more relevant to 2. 12, consisted of those 'qui curam omnem compositions [i.e. word-ordering] excludant, atque ilium horridum sermonem, ut forte fluxerit, modo magis naturalem, modo etiam magis uirilem esse contendant' (9. 4. 3). It is clear from Q.'s reply that they thought something incompositum to be 'stronger' (fortius) than the 'uinctum et bene conlocatum' (9. 4. 6; note also 6 uim, 7 uires, ualeat, 13 uis, 14 uis). Equally relevant to our chapter is a passage on delivery in 11.3. 10-11: 'Sunt tamen qui rudem illam et qualem impetus cuiusque animi tulit actionem iudicent fortiorem et solam uiris dignam, sed non alii fere quam qui etiam in
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dicendo curam et artem et nitorem et quidqiiid studio paratur ut adfectata et parum naturalia solent improbare, uel qui uerborum atque ipsius etiam soni rusticitate.. .imitationem antiquitatis adfectant. Verum illi persuasione sua fruantur, qui hominibus ut sint oratores satis putant nasci: nostra labori dent ueniam, qui nihil credimus esse perfect um nisi ubi natura cura iuuetur' (the ironically polite tone of this last sentence is very reminiscent of 2. 12. 7 and 12). The last two passages suggest that part of the heat shown by Q. in 2. 12 is the result of criticism that taking trouble over art reflected (however metaphorically) on one's manhood. Just as he himself (see on 2. 5. 9 uirilis tameri) promoted a virile eloquence in an age that he felt tended stylistically towards the effeminate, so he may have been vulnerable to attack from those less enthusiastic about taking trouble over style. Q.'s replies to these critics shows a consistent attitude towards natura. In 12. 10. 43-4 he argues (see also n. on 2. 5. 11 rectus) that an orator cannot avoid going beyond everyday language, but that in doing so he is only using 'his... ad iu tori is quae sunt ab eadem nobis concessa natura'; and he ends with an epigram: 'ita quo quisque plus efficit dicendo, hoc magis secundam naturam eloquentiae dicit.' In 43 he refers back to 9. 4. 3-5, where he argued in similar fashion for a more nuanced view of nature than his opponents allowed: 'id est maxime naturale quod fieri natura optime patitur.' natura thus defined to Q.'s liking, he is able himself to point it out as a dux to the student (so 4. 5. 3, 5. 10. 101, 7. 1. 40; cf. 8. 3. 71 'naturam intueamur, hanc sequamur'). The notion of nature in Q. is the subject of Varwig, reviewed without enthusiasm by Winterbottom in CR2 28 (1978), 158. 12. 1 ne hoc quidem negauerim: 'I should not deny this either [that is, any more than that such people do strike off good phrases].' sequi.. .ut: parallels show clearly that the ut clause is to be taken (contra Russell's translation) as explaining hanc opinionenr. see 2.15.24, 3. 3. 11,4.1. 28 and 9.4. 87 (and also, with ea opinione, 5. 10. 2; haec opinio can of course look back, where it is not explained by an ut clause: see e.g. 2. 17. 6, 12. 10. 27); uideantur corresponds to existimet in the first of these parallels. What then is the subject of sequi? Conceivably opinionenr. 'in general there follows [that is, from the naturalists' success in this respect] the view that the untrained ...'. But plerumque seems to lack point, and one expects sequi to be transitive, as in 6.3.105 and 112,9.1.15. One therefore has tochoose between takingthe subject to be same as that of elidunt in the preceding section (plerumque remaining unsatisfactory), or emending (as Stephen of Rouen already did) to plerosque. fortius: 'more strongly, vigorously.' Cf. 11. 3. 10 (fully cited above, p. 184) 'actionem... fortiorem et solam uiris dignam'; also 8. 2. 21 'ingeniosa haec et
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fortia et ex ancipiti diserta creduntur. So Cic. de Orat. 1. 231 'orationem... fortem et uirilem', 3. 32 genus hoc... forte, uehemens, commotum in agendo', and esp. 2. 183 'non... semper fortis oratio quaeritur, sed saepe placida summissa lenis' (further passages cited by L-P ad locc.); Sen. Ep. 114. 22 'oratio...robusta, fortis, uirilis'; TLL s.v. fortis 1156. 54-1157. 12; OLD s.v. fortiter 2b. fortis is of course multi-faceted; in 4 it means 'brave'. primum: if the structure suggested above (p. 183) is correct, this is not taken up till 9 'uerum hi pronuntiatione quoque.. effringere: often used of breaking open doors, as in PI. Stick. 327 'ean gratia fores ecfringis?' rumpere... soluere: Q. may think of the Gordian knot; cf. Curt. 3. 1. 16 'qui inexplicabile uinculum soluisset... (18) gladio... ruptis omnibus loris'. Note also Sen. Ep. 22. 3 'illud existimo, leni eundum uia, ut quod male inplicuisti soluas potius quam abrumpas' (cf. Plin. Ep. 2. 8. 2). trahere... ducere: cf. Sen. Ep. 107. 11 (translating Cleanthes) 'ducunt uolentem fata, nolentem trahunt'. 12.2 nam... articulus: the preceding infinitives were selected in such a way that in each pair a forcible verb was followed, without comment, by a 'quieter' and more reasonable alternative. We are now given two more complex instances, where the disadvantages of force are spelled out. rixam: Spalding could find no gladiatorial parallel, but none is necessary; Q. uses the word to indicate the disorderly nature of a fight in which at least one of the combatants was inscius armorum. Similarly the verb rixor is used contemptuously of wrestling in Sen. Dial. 10. 12. 2 'qui in ceromate... sectator puerorum rixantium sedet'; cf. also Tac. Dial. 26. 4, cited below on prosternitur. ruit adds to the picture of uncontrolled violence. cum interim: for this use 'cui vis inest concessiva.. .iuxta temporalem' (Gabler 68), cf. e.g. 10. 1. I l l (Cicero carries all before him) 'cum interim haec omnia... fluunt inlaborata'; K-S ii. 341. See also n. below on 11 cum interim. prosternitur: cf. Tac. Dial. 26. 4 (of Cassius Severus) 'studio feriendi plerumque deiectus, non pugnat sed rixatur. For being overthrown by one's own weight, see passages assembled by Shackleton Bailey, Propertiana, 139, including Ov. Tr. 2. 86 'ipsa suoque eadem pondere tracta ruunt' (of structures); cf. also Hor. Carm. 3. 4. 65 'uis consili expers mole ruit sua' (with Nisbet-Rudd). ilium uehementis impetus: it seems unlikely that this could mean 'him of the vehement onrush'. Hakanson does not tolerate 'illas [sc. apes] maiorum pectorum' at Decl. mai. 13. 17. One might compare phrases like Petr. 49. 7 'ego crudelissimae seueritatis' and Plin. Ep. 2. 1. 9 'me huius aetatis', cited by
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H-Sz 70. But H-Sz do not give parallels with ille; and Q. 9.4. 144 'ilia maximi laboris' is not comparable (see K-S i. 418). In any case the fact that ilium here is correlated with hie seems a decisive objection. If Badius' illius is right, uehementis [read then, for clarity, uehementes*.) impetus becomes plural: cf. Cic. Tusc. 4. 43 'in hostem... uehementiores iratorum impetus'; Caes. Gal. 1.52.4'Germani... impetusgladiorumexceperunt', Civ. 1.58.1 'Massilienses... nostros eludebant impetusque eorum excipiebant'. But it must be admitted that the corresponding in rixam ruit makes the singular far more natural; better, then, illius uehementem impetum?). mollis articulus: see the parallels cited on 2. 4. 12 remedia... leniantur, esp. the metaphorical use at 11. 1. 70 (of Cicero) 'quam molli... articulo tractauit Catonem!' Peterson (on 10. 5. 16 'durescat articulus') explains here 'of the gladiator handling his sword with flexible fingers' (for their importance in sword-play see Sen. Ben. 2. 6. 1); a 'supple parry' (Russell) suffices to meet the rude assault. 12. 3 sed . . . fall ant: the progress of thought is: The untrained are thought stronger than the trained; the fallacies in this view may be seen from analogies, but the unskilled listener is all too prone to misjudgement of a speech. These imperiti are themselves indocti, and accordingly think indocti speakers stronger; it takes doctrina in a hearer to appreciate the doctrina of a speaker; cf. 2. 5. 8 'ea sola in hoc ars est, quae intellegi nisi ab artifice non possit', and Cicero's subtle and extended discussion in Brut. 183-200. in hac parte: 'in our field' (Russell), bringing us back to rhetoric, etiam naturaliter: 'naturally enough', as perhaps in 3. 8. 40 (Col. 3. 6. 4 is different). fallant: 'mislead' (cf. 9. 1. 24 'fallit parum diligenter intuentes quod...'), with some glance at 'escape the notice of' (Gk. Aavddveiv): TLL 189. 43-53, citing e.g. 4. 2. 59, Plin. Ep. 7. 9. 2 'quae legentem fefellissent, transferentem fugere non possunt'. diuisio: Q. means not the sort of classroom division discussed in 2. 6, but the structuring of a court-room speech which may be made obvious by a formal partitio (see on 2. 5. 8 in diuidendo); the partitio may itself be called diuisio (see TLL s.v. divisio 1630. 41-51), as in 4. 5. 24. ualeat: the burden of Q.'s discussion of partitio in 4. 5 (see e.g. 22) is that it adds to the lucidity of a speech. speciem: stressed: the speech is only apparently weakened (to the imperitus observer) by partitio; in fact, it draws strength from it. nam.. .creduntur: the transmitted text causes problems. The et following nam may either (a) mean 'even': 'even division, for all its great importance in legal speeches,..(division would then, as Doreen Innes
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suggests to us, be highlighted as a particularly important marker of a speech by a doctus orator), or (b) correlate with the two cases of et later in the sentence, (a) is essential if we read ut rudia later in the sentence (see below), optional otherwise. But (b) is what Q.'s usage, at least in Book 2, strongly suggests, nam et may certainly mean 'for even (also)' where no further et follows (e.g. 2. 17. 19; 2. 21. 1, 16); but where a second et (or more) follows, correlation is regular (e.g. 2. 16. 5, 13-14, 16). In either case, ' et rudia... creduntur' has to be taken as providing two further instances of cases where unskilled critics are misled by appearances in unskilled oratory. This is unproblematic so far as rudia politis maiora is concerned: 'unelaborated works are thought greater [so of a person in 2. 5. 19] than ones that are polished.' Cf. 9. 4. 17 'ilia rudibus et incompositis similia', of Lysias (also 10. 1. 66 'rudis... et incompositus' of Aeschylus; and literally in 8 below, 'detrahere. ..aliquid, ut limam rudibus'); politus is not thus used by Q., but cf. Plin. Ep. 7. 13. 2 of an epistula. But what can sparsa compositis numerosiora mean? The antithesis is familiar enough; note the pairing of incompositus and sparsus in Curt. 3. 11. 14, Liv. 21. 52. 10, and Plin. Ep. 10. 39. 4. But what is being talked of, and what is to be made of numerosiora? We might suppose that Q. is referring to arguments: in 5. 7. 18 he recommends the bringing together of scattered arguments ('sparsa plerumque colligimus argumenta'); numerosiora would then have the meaning 'more numerous' (the comparative plural is very rare in this sense; for the positive e.g. 6. 3. 36). But the implied componereargumenta, 'to bring arguments together', is hardly admissible. Alternatively, the meaning might be taken to be: '[words?] are thought more rhythmical when scattered than when subject to ordering [compositioY; but only a very imperitus judge could think that, and in any case spargere and componere uerba do not seem to be used to mean to (fail to) arrange words rhythmically. In the apparatus to the OCT of 1970, Winterbottom suggested the replacement of et rudia by ut rudia (now read by Russell). The following phrases then become analogies from outside oratory, like 'ut effringere quam aperire' etc. in 1. This produces a new but still good sense for rudia politis maiora, which can now be understood in artistic terms. The (mistaken) belief would be that of those who favour primitive art (note 12. 10. 3 ilia prope rudia of early painting, preferred to maximi auctores by judges regarded by Q. as misguided; on this matter contrast Cic. de Orat. 3. 98 with Orat. 169, and see E. Gombrich, JWI29 (1966), 24-38), or (maybe) just think stones more impressive to look at (TLL s.v. magnus 134. 52-71) when unworked than when polished. Note 2. 19. 3 'Pariiun marmor mallem rude' followed by 'expolisset'; 9. 4. 27 'saxorum rudium' (also 8. 6. 63 'lapidum inpolitorum'); cf. also Cic. de Orat. 3. 185 'rudis et impolita [sc. loquacitas]'; Gel. 15. 11.3 'temporibus
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nimis rudibus necdum Graeca disciplina expolitis'. And sparsa compositis numerosiora would now become clear: things scattered around look more numerous than when they are arranged. All the same, this emendation should be rejected, for only sparsa compositis numerosiora provides a proper analogy for division; rudia politis maiora is a different matter. We seem therefore to be thrown back upon et rudia; but numerosiora remains a stumbling block. Indeed it presents a problem not so far touched upon: in a context where there is so much emphasis on force and vigour, it coheres badly with ualeat, uirium, and (to some extent) maiora. It may be that, as in 6 (where see n. on propter hoc), Q. drifts from force to copia, though the phrase would be an odd way of making the point. But it would seem preferable to replace numerosiora with neruosiora (Meiser made a parallel change at Tac. Dial. 25. 4, and has won general acceptance). The word is not transmittedin Q.,but cf. Cic. Bri/f. 121 'quisAristoteleneruosior... ?', Off.3.106 'neruosius qui ista disserunt'; and note esp. Orat. 229 'tantumque abest ut (quod ii qui hoc... non sunt assecuti solent dicere) enerueturoratio compositione uerborum, ut aliter in ea nec impetus ullus nec uis esse possit', which Q. himself might have written, confuting his own opponents in theirown terms. This last parallel might seem to suggest that Q., thus emended, would be thinking of compositio (and note 9. 4. 6,'fortius... qui incompositum potest esse quam uinctum et bene conlocatum?'); but we have seen that there are difficulties with that. Rather, sparsa and composita would be used widely of disorganized and organized speaking in general. Note 1 pr. 8 'omnia... composition et quantum nos poterimus elaborata'; Cic. de Orat. 1. 50 'compositam orationem et ornatam et artificio quodam et expolitione distinctam'; Liv. 7. 2. 7 '[uersum] incompositum temere ac rudem alternis iaciebant'. 12. 4 uirtutum uitiorumque uicinia: a familiar topic, documented by L. Radermacher, WS 38 (1916), 72-80 (traced back to Plato and Aristotle). In Q. see esp. 3. 7. 25 (with Adamietz's n., adding Q. 1.5. 5, 10. 2. 16), where we are told that Celsus made too much of the idea (W. Kroll, RhM2 73 (1920), 268). Parallels could be multiplied; note e.g. Sen. Con. 7 pr. 5, Juv. 14. 109 (with Mayor's n.), Sen. Ep. 45. 7 (cited in nn. below), Demetrius, Eloc. 114. Radermacher, art. cit. 76 n. 6 called this 'eine Einlage..., die Quintilian in einen anderen Zusammenhang macht'. But Q. introduces it here to explain why the critic is misled. The three examples, the indoctus as maledicus, temerarius, and effusus, are illustrated in 4b-6a; and in each case the unwary critic mistakes a vice for a virtue. maledicus pro libero: maledicit below applies this to the oratorical context, but the contrast in itself can of course be taken more generally (as in 5. 13. 26). For (desirable) freedom of speech in oratory, cf. 9. 2. 3 'qui adfectus erunt...
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concitati detracta uoce libera et efifrenatiore ...?'; less friendly 6. 2.16 ('cupidi maledicendi aut adfectatores libertatis'). temerarius pro forti: here applied to orators; for temeritas in oratory see 12.9.13 (cited onper/cw/obelow), while forti (here rather meaning 'courageous') is the keynote of our chapter. More generally, this is one of the examples that goes back to Aristotle (Rhet. A9, 1367b2 TOV Opaovv avSpeiov); cf. 3. 7. 25 'pro temerario fortem' (also 10. 2. 16,12. 10. 80; add 9. 3. 65); Rhet. Her. 3. 6 'quam ille fortitudinem nominarit, earn nos gladiatoriam et inconsideratam appellabimus temeritatem'; Cic. Part. 81 'fortitudinem audacia imitatur'; Sen. Ep. 45. 7 'temeritas sub titulo fortitudinis latet'; Nicolaus 53. 1-2 t o . . . Opdaog avSpeiav Kai €i>\fw)(iav [/caAowrt?]. effusus pro copioso: another example that in its general sense goes back to Aristotle, loc. cit. ( r o v aoajrov eXtvdc'piov); cf. 3. 7. 25 'pro... prodigo liber alem', 8. 6. 36 'pro luxuria liberalitas dicitur'; Cic. Part. 81 'liberalitatem effusio... imitatur'. For the oratorical senses, in question here, see, for effusus 10. 5. 4 'effiisa substringere' (and note 3. 8. 58 'effusiorem, ut ipsi uocant, cultum adfectauerunt [sc. declamatores]'), TLL s.v. ejfiindo 225. 49-61; and for copiosus 12. 5. 5 'habuit oratores aetas nostra copiosiores'; TLL s.v. 914. 47-71. The two did not have to be in opposition, as Plin. Ep. 8. 6. 2 (of a senatus consultum) shows. accipitur: cf. Sen. Ep. 45. 7 'pro cauto timidus accipitur'. maledicit: for abuse in court see 12. 9. 8-9, 13 (cited on periculo below); it occurred even in declamation: 3. 8. 69 'contra sentientibus inhumane conuiciantur [sc. quidam declamatores]'; [D.H.] Rh. 368. 11-15 UsenerRadermacher. autem: maledicit autem picks up maledicus; cf. 2. 13. 6-7 ' . . . utilitas excogitauit. Non negabo autem sic utile esse...', 4. 2. 45-6 '"quantum opus est et quantum satis est." Quantum opus est a u t e m . . 1 0 . 2. 8 'ut... nihil crescat: nihil autem crescit', 12. 10. 38 'ut optime possum us: possumus autem..(perhaps also 2. 13. 8 'quid expediat. Expedit autem...'); similar is the use of autem discussed in K-S ii. 93 (4b). In our passage the particle launches us on the working out of all three instances of the vicinity of virtue and vice. periculo: cf. 12. 9. 13 'Frequenter etiam species libertatis deducere ad temeritatem solet, non causis modo sed ipsis quoque qui dixerunt periculosam;...Nam quae fortia dum dicuntur uidebantur, stulta aim laeserunt uocantur' (also 9 'petulantiam patroni litigator luit'). Compare also 6. 4. 10 'quare bonus altercator uitio iracundiae careat; nullus enim rationi magis obstat adfectus', and what follows. suscepti: as in 11. 1. 74 ('reos susciperet') and 12. 1.40, a verb often applied to the taking on of cases (OLD s.v. suscipio 8c, e.g. Q. 12. 7. 6 'susceptam...
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litem') is used of the taking on of a client. OLD classifies this usage, by a perhaps artificial separation, under 5a, along with 2. 5. 1 'susceptos a se discipulos' and 2. 8. 1 'iis quos erudiendos susceperit'. 12. 5 et ista res: ista res refers back (as in 5. 10. 123, 6.1. 45): 'abuse also(?) makes people think well [opinio of good reputation, as in 12. 9. 4] of its exponents, because...', et is problematic (as well as what?), and is oddly placed if this sense is right. One wonders about emending to etiam ('further, abuse...'); v. TLL s.v. 935. 42-67. In any case, this is a subsidiary point to the main (though not explicitly stated) one: the maledicus is thought liber, and is hence admired for his forcefulness, and he attracts admiration for saying what others do not dare to utter. quoque: marking the move to the second error caused by the uirtutum uitiorumque uicinia. alterum.. .periculum: the other being the danger to clients mentioned in §4. Q. looks back to 2. 11. 3 'sententiis grandibus, quarum optima quaeque a periculo petatur' (part of the boasts of the indocti): the ineruditus positively courts this stylistic danger, in his search for an epigram. Again the relevance to the chapter is not brought out explicitly: the misled critic thinks this a piece of bravery, on the principle temerarius pro forti. perdite: exceedingly rare in CL with verbs of action, and hardly more common with verbs of feeling (TLL s.v. perdo 1277. 30-55). But the meaning is clear enough: the indoctus 'tries desperately hard'. Cic. Att. 9. 2a. 2 'se gerere... perdite' is a little different ('as a desperado' Shackleton Bailey). Nor is conor used absolutely {TLL s.v. 346. 52-347. 16: in many of these instances an infinitive is easily supplied) with an adverb at all common; but cf. Cic. Phil. 12. 7 'urbi fortissime conanti'. prouenit: OLD s.v. prouenio 4c; choicer than B's euenit, which is doubtless a reminiscence of euenit above (combined with raro at 9. 3. 72, 11. 1. 14). certa: 'undoubted faults' (Watson). The advantages are rare and a matter of chance, the disadvantages beyond question (OLD s.v. certus 6a, e.g. Sail. Cat. 4 1 . 2 'pro incerta spe certa praemia'). A's cetera invites the question 'apart from what?' But editors have usually preferred it, and it may, rather loosely, give the meaning: 'does not make up for the rest of what they say, full of uitia as it is'. 12. 6 propter hoc: looking forward to quod. We now come to the illustration of the third error made by critics because of the vicinity of virtues and vices: they mistake for copia the effusiveness of the indocti in pouring everything out (cf. Cic. de Orat. 3. 175 'ille rudis incondite fundit quantum potest'). Q. has strayed somewhat from the key idea of the chapter, the alleged 'strength' of these orators.
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his accedit... quaerunt: another subsidiary point: as in 5 (see n. on et ista res) Q. remarks on the popularity accruing to such speakers as a result of their slovenly practices. quod fintenderintf: 'their assertion'; for this sense see TLL s.v. intendo 2117. 25-30. The parallels cited there (which include Q. 5. 11. 43) show that the present indicative is normal in such phrases, and Francius (ap. Burman) suggested intendunt. Dr Holford-Strevens suggests the indirect question quid intend erint. quaestionum: the issues raised by the case, as in 2. 13. 1; see 3. 11. 2 'in iudiciali.. .materia dupliciter accipienda est [sc. quaestio]: altero modo quo dicimus multas quaestiones habere controuersiam, quo etiam minores omnis complectimur, altero quo significamus summam illam in qua causa uertitur'. corrupta: not bribed, merely subject to the bad taste of the day. frigus: cf. 4. 3. 2 'ne, si... narrationis gracilitati coniuncta argumentorum pugnacitas fiierit, dilatis diutius [leg. dulcius?] dicendi uoluptatibus oratio refrigescat', 5. 8. 1, and other passages cited by Norden, AK 274. Argument was of course even less welcome in the schools: see on 2. 11.3 probatione. quod... permulceat: quo...permulceant B. The variant is not impossible, but A's text avoids the double ablative; cf. also 11. 3. 60 'sunt... qui... hac ubique audiendi quod aures mulceat uoluptate ducantur'. For the verb cf. n. on 2. 5. 8 permulceat; and for prauis uoluptatibus 2. 5. 22. adsistentium: contrasted with indices at 9. 2. 76; they formed the corona around the court (see below on 10 circulum). These speakers, significantly, direct their efforts at the bystanders rather than the judges. 12. 7 ipsae: seems to look back to 5. Q. adds another footnote that has little relevance to the topic of the chapter. quas solas petunt: epigrams were what filled the declamation hall (2. 11. 3). But the craze went far wider: see 1. 8. 9 'plerisque nouorum.. .qui omnium operum solam uirtutem sententias putauenint', 8. 5. 25 'duae sunt diuersae opiniones, aliorum sententias solas paenesectantium, aliorum omnino damnantium', 8. 5. 30 'solas captanti sententias'; Norden, AK 280-5. eminent: 'stand out', as though in relief (but see further on 2. 17. 21 efficit utquaedam eminere..., quaedam recessisse credamus). Cf. 8. 5. 26 'nec pictura in qua nihil circumlitum est ['where there is no background painted in'] eminet' (also 11. 3. 46 'eminentiora'); Cic. Ac. 2. 20 'in umbris et in eminentia'; Plin. Nat. 35. 131 '[Antidotus] lumen et umbras custodiit atque ut eminerent e tabulis picturae maxime curauit'. For the application to epigrams, see Petr. 118. 5 'praeterea curandum est ne sententiae emineant extra corpus orationis expressae, sed intexto uestibus colore niteant' (cf. 8. 5. 29).
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sordida et abiecta: the adjectives are coupled at Sen. Ep. 37. 4, Tac. Ann. 13. 46. 2 (the adverbs at Tac. Dial. 8. 3). quem ad modum... dariora sunt: the simile is appropriate, as sententiae could be called lumina (e.g. 8. 5. 2, 12. 10. 49). The allusion to Cicero is usually taken to refer to de Orat. 3.101 'habeat... ilia... summa laus umbram aliquam et recessum, quo magis id quod erit inluminatum extare atque eminere uideatur' (cf. also Plin. Ep. 3. 13. 4 'in pictura lumen non alia res magis quam umbra commendat'; also Q. 12. 10. 4: Zeuxis discovered 'luminum umbrarumque.. .rationem'). The alternative is to suppose that Q. is quoting a lost work (Granatelli2 871; but she is wrong to say that quemadmodum... dicit refers to the whole of the context).22 in tenebris: a common locution (e.g. 12. 10. 76). B's inter tenebras (for which cf. in CL only Tac. Ann. 2. 82. 4) is the result of the preceding inter umbras (itself only found in CL in this sense in Stat. SUv. 1. 6. 87). For the distinction, cf. Sen. Ep. 94. 20 'a tenebris primum ad umbrosa procede'. The idea is given a new twist in 8. 5. 29 'quare licet haec et nitere et aliquatenus extare uideantur, tamen.. .lumina ilia non flammae sed scintillis inter fumum emicantibus similia dixeris (quae ne apparent quidem ubi tota lucet oratio, ut in sole sidera ipsa desinunt cerni)'. ingeniosi: the naturalists, it seems, liked to call themselves this (cf. on 9 leuata... manu). The word is of course in itself complimentary; and it normally remains that even when natural talent is combined with lack of ars: thus 10. 1. 40 'ingeniosis quidem sed arte carentibus' (of the old authors; cf. 1. 8. 8 'plus ingenio quam arte ualuerunt', Ov. Tr. 2. 424 'Ennius ingenio maximus, arte rudis'); Sen. Suas. 6. 27 'homo ingeniosus magis quam eruditus'. It is only an 'insult' (contumeliose) in the view of someone like Quintilian who is convinced that natura is not enough to make an orator; Martial agreed, to judge from 7. 9 'cum sexaginta numeret Cascellius annos, | ingeniosus homo est: quando disertus erit?' disertum: here clearly used favourably, as in the passage of Martial just cited, though the word can be contrasted with eloquens (Cic. de Orat. 1. 94, with L-P) and orator{1. 10. 8); it is used ironically in 12 below. Cf. n. on 2. 3. 7 disertum. 12. 8 etiam detrahere:'does remove'. limam rudibus: cf. Hor. S. 1. 10. 63-6 'fiierit limatior idem | quam rudis'. For limam cf. n. on 2. 4. 7 limabit. For rudibus cf. n. on 3 nam... creduntur. uetustatem: cf. n. on 2. 4. 9 austera.
22
It is relevant that Q. echoes de Orat. Book 3 elsewhere in this chapter (see on 6 propter
hoc).
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litterae: used disingenuously, as in §11 (also 2. 20. 2). What these people lacked was not necessarily literary culture but the sort of rhetorical expertise taught by Q. perpolierunt: only here in Q., but common in Cicero. 12. 9 uerum: we move (see above, p. 183) from criticism of misguided judges (1 male iudicantium) to an area in which the indoctiare said themselves to seek a reputation for 'strong' oratory; fortius brings back on to the rails a chapter that has not always kept to the point. clamant: see on 2. 10. 8 scaenicae ostentationi. ..furiosae uociferationi. leuata.. .manu: ut ipsi uocant seems to suggest that this was the precise phrase used by such dedaimers (more of their language at 3. 8. 58, introduced by the same formula, and perhaps too ingeniosi at §7 above); in 11.3. 119 (cf. 120), where we hear more of the gesture, Q. says sublata man u. The singular in any case is notable. Raising one hand (as also in Decl. min. 281. 3) would apparently be no different from raising both (so normally, e.g. Sen. Con. 7.1.25 'manibus leuatis') as an accompaniment of prayer or supplication (TIL s.v. manus 343. 64-344. 57); but what the naturalists meant by the gesture, or why they boasted of it, is not known. emugiunt: cited elsewhere only from Aetna 295 'longas emugit bucina uoces', but cf. Fronto, p. 49. 20-1 van den Hout2 '[oratores ueteres] omnes . . . mugiunt uel stridunt potius'. discursu: cf. Plin. Ep. 2. 19. 2 'dicentis gestus, incessus, discursus etiam'; Q. 11. 3. 126 'discursare.. .et satagere ineptissimum', glossed by 6. 3. 54 'Afer... Manlium Suram multum in agendo discursantem salientem, manus iactantem, togam deicientem et reponentem, non agere dixit sed satagere'. anhelitu: see 11. 3. 55-6 for a satirical account of puffing orators, iactatione gestus: A reads gestu, but the genitive gives better balance; and cf. 11.1. 51' iactantior gestus'. Cf. also 10. 7.26 'motum corporis, qui et ipse... excitat oratorem et iactatione manus [cf. 10. 3. 21], pedis supplosione... hortatur'. furentes: cf. n. on 2. 10. 8 scaenicae ostentationi... furiosae uociferationi. The participle (despite the implication of the Loeb translation) is best taken with all the preceding ablatives. 12. 10 collidere manus: the normal term was complodere (so 11. 3. 123, cited on femur below); but see Sen. Nat. 2. 28. 1 'auersas inter se manus collide, non plaudent'. pedem incutere: for the action see 10. 7. 26, quoted on 9 iactatione gestus, and 11. 3. 128, where too frequent pedis supplosio is criticized. The phrase itself lacks a parallel, but for the use of feet in emotive oratory see TLL s.v. pes
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1902. 67-74; add Cic. Brut. 141, 278; de Orat. 3. 220; and in Greek Eusebius, cited on femur below. femur: cf. 11. 3. 123 'Femur ferire, quod Athenis primus fecisse creditur Cleon, et usitatum est et indignantes decet et excitat auditorem. Idque in Calidio Cicero desiderat [Brut. 278]: "non frons" inquit "percussa, non femur." Quamquam, si licet, de fronte dissentio: nam etiam complodere manus scaenicum est et pectus caedere.' Cf. also PI. True. 601 (signs of anger) 'dentibus frendit, icit femur', Rhet. Her. 3. 27 'feminis plangore', Sen. Dial. 3. 19.4 (effects of anger) 'femur pectusque percutere'; Lucian, Rh. Pr. 19 o nr)pos 7TaTaooeoda} (from a fine satirical passage on oratorical excesses); Philostr. VS 519 ('to rouse himself and his hearers'); Eusebius, HE 7. 30. 9 7Tatcov TC rfj \€lpi
T
° v wpov
Kal TO firjua aparTcov
TOIS
nooiv.
mire.. .facit: 'works wonders'; cf. Scrib. Larg. 214 'ad furunculos mire facit', and (without ad) 11. 3. 171 and 173. Cf. also 5. 13. 57 'alii [sc. loci] ad comparationem... feciunt'. There is some colloquial flavour (cf. J. B. Hofmann, La lingua d'uso latina [Bologna, 2 1985], 336, 339). pullatum: cf. 6. 4. 6 (of inferior advocates) 'imperitis ac saepe pullatae turbae'; cf. Plin. Ep. 7. 17. 9 'sordidos pullatosque', Suet. Aug. 40. 5 'uisa... pro contione pullatorum turba'. Both passages are significant for the disdain felt by those wearing white togas for the dowdier (cf. Calp. Eel. 7. 26-7 'pulla sordida ueste |... turba', as opposed to the 'niuei... tribuni' of 29). circulum: very unusually (uniquely?) here meaning not a group of people meeting casually (as in 6. 3. 105; 12. 10. 74 'illi per forum atque aggerem circuli', with mention of the obviously different 'corona uulgi' just below), but the corona of (not highly regarded) bystanders in court; cf. Cic. Fin. 4. 74 'aliquid etiam coronae datum' (of the Murena trial, when, according to Cicero, even the judges were imperiti); Sen. Dial. 10. 20. 2 'imperitae coronae adsensiones captantem'; Plin. Ep. 7. 17. 9 'utique si latior scaena et corona diffusion nam illos quoque sordidos pullatosque reueremur' (note in 8 'cum multis uel indoctis'). summittere uariare disponere: cf. 11. 1. 45 'sitque nonnumquam summittenda et contrahenda oratio, ne iudex earn uel intellegere uel capere non possit'; 9. 2. 5 'quae [sc. various kinds of figure of thought] cum adesse debent, turn disponenda atque uarianda sunt'. The indocti, on the other hand, had no sense of organization or coherence (2. 11.3 'neque enim opus esse., .dispositione in rebus fictis', §6 'non corpori prospiciunt', §7 'ut dissoluta... oratio cohaerere non possit' ), and tended to keep things at an unvaried fever pitch. colori: 'tone', as in e.g. 12. 10. 71 'non unus color prohoemii [etc.].. .seruabitur'; see Austin on 12. 1. 33 and 12. 9. 17; M. B. Roller in T. O. Sloane, Encyclopedia of Rhetoric (Oxford, 2001), 115-19.
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accommodare actum: cf. 11. 3. 89 'gestus ad sensus magis quam ad uerba accommodatus'. Contrast indocti at practice in 2. 11. 4: 'concitatissimum corporis motum non enuntiandis sed quaerendis uerbis accommcxlant.' For actus = actio, 'delivery', see TILs.v. actus450.48-59 (wrongly including 2. 13. 8 and 9, where see nn.). perpetua obseruatione dignum: for Q. few rules were thus worthy (2. 13, esp. 14). At 8. 3.11 obseruatione dignius means 'more worthy of attention'; for the meaning 'observance' (of rules etc.) cf. 11. 1. 54 'tam secura obseruatio artium', and perhaps 1. 5. 29. For the wording cf. Plin. Nat 31. 43 'nihil... in his perpetuae obsemationis iudicabitur', 17. 19 'nec arbitror perpetuum quicquam in hoc praecipi posse'. modestus: 'seemly'; cf. 11. 3. 159 'gestu quam modestissimo'. et esse et uideri: cf. Cic. de Orat 2. 228 'omnium grauissimum et seuerissimum et esse et uideri,... id mihi uix ferendum uidebatur'. 12.11 uim... uiolentia: another instance of virtues and vices as neighbours (4). A parallel has not emerged, no doubt because uis itself is so often pejorative. The two can be coupled, as in PI. Rud. 839, Var. L 5. 70. cum interim: see n. on the locution at 2 above. Here, with potential subj. (as in 4. 2. 37 'cum interim... nescias'), 'yet you may find'. breuem... consecuti: cf. 2. 11. 1 'uulgari modo scholarum exercitatione contend', apparently the same people. These too bid farewell to method (cf. 2. 11.4 'nulla ratione adhibita'), and are happy to be carried along by impetus (cf. 2. 11.3; for the phrase Sen. Ben. 7. 8. 2 'prout impetus tulit'). passim: they are 'all over the place'; cf. 7. 10. 6 'passim et ut quidque in mentem ueniet miscuerit'; Sen. Nat 2. 48. 2 'quae inspicienda sint in fulgure passim et uage dicunt, cum possint sic diuidere ...'; TLL s.v. 613. 66-614. 16. Cf. also Cic. de Orat. 2. 32 'cum plerique temere ac nulla ratione causas in fbro dicant', where L-P compare Arist. Rhet Al, 1354a6 (ei/07); add Isoc. 12. 24 rots eiKrj Kai. (ftoprtKivs Kai \v&r)v o TI a.v eneXOrj Aeyovaiv.
tumultuentur: cf. 7 pr. 3 'oratio carens hac uirtute [sc. ordine] tumultuetur necesse est'; 10. 7. 12 (after talk of the need for ratio) 'mihi ne dicere quidem uidetur nisi qui disposite ornate copiose dicit, sed tumultuari'. In our passage too Q. thinks especially of lack of organization (note passim), but the uproar of the speeches is also hinted at (4. 2. 37 'nec sibi diserti uidentur nisi omnia tumultu et uociferatione concusserint'). ineptos: Q. retorts this word on foot-stamping ranters at 11. 3. 128. ineptus (interestingly discussed in Cic. de Orat 2. 17-18) is a general word of mild abuse (applied e.g. to philosophers: Sen. Ep. 76.4), and this should encourage us to consider if the following adjectives are to be taken in a wider than merely stylistic sense.
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ieiunos: see on 2. 4. 3 arida... ieiuna. One wonders if there could be an uncomplimentary wider sense corresponding to Eng. 'starveling': the rich pickings went to less pedantic rhetores. tepidos: presumably much like frigidus, 'flat' or 'insipid' stylistically (Gk. ifrvxpos): cf. Gel. 13. 25. 7 'uideturne tibi...M. Cicero duobus uerbis idem... significantibus itiepte et frigide esse usus?', and see Douglas on Cic. Brut. 236; Afifahl 123; TLL s.v. frigidus 1329. 82-1330. 9 and 1330. 23-51. tepidus is hardly attested in this sense, but see Fortunatianus, Ars rhet. 3. 9 (p. 126.8 Halm)'/icao)quod [sc. genus] estcontrarium?tepidumacdissolutum et iielut enerue'; cf. Tac. Dial. 21. 6 'eiusdem lentitudinis ac teporis libros'. In Augustine, Conf 8. 27 'tepidissime hoc dicebat', the point (as perhaps in Cic. Brut. 178 'lentus in dicendo et paene frigidus') is the lack of vigour in tone of voice, and that would not be irrelevant here, in view of the contrast with the fevered delivery of the indocti. Despite these flimsy parallels, B's trepidos is not a serious contender. Beyond the stylistic level, the insult might reflect scom for the passionless (sexless?) character thought to lie behind the cool oratory of the docti: Ov. Ars 2.445 'tepidamque recalface mentem', and perhaps Rem. 1 'saepe tepent alii iuuenes, ego semper amaui', with Henderson's n.; also Fortunatianus' uelut enerue (cited above). Similarly, frigidus can describe a cold fish: TLL s.v. 1329. 55-82, including some instances reflecting on sexual prowess. infirmos: weaklings as opposed to the 'strong' indocti. The application of this adjective in a literary context to persons seems to be confined to Q.: cf. 6. 1. 44 'infirmus actor' (following 'si nil efficit tepet'), and also 10. 1. 74, of Philistus as weaker than Thucydides (at 4. 1. 8 infirmos may well mean 'unwell'); but of inanimate things see e.g. 6. 2. 7 (without emotional appeal) 'cetera nuda ieiuna infirma ingrata sunt'. ut quodque... occurrit: these abusive speakers (cf. 4) leave their insults as well as their mots (2. 11. 6 'ut forte ad manum uenere') to chance inspiration. 12. 12 illis quidem... nos: Q., perhaps sore (above, p. 185) from his dealings with such people, contrasts his scholarly and principled labours with their distaste for hard work and reason. He is glad to be retired, and to leave them to practise their kind of 'eloquence' in both school and court. disertis: see on 7 disertum. Here the word is ironical (like the congratulation). iam pridem: for Q.'s retirement, see 1 pr. 1 'post impetratam studiis meis quietem' (not a lucid phrase). The interval was perhaps not very wide; but (J. Adamietz, ANRWii. 32. 4, 2245-9) the usual view that Q. retired around 90 is no more than conjecture. The book will, however, have appeared before the death of Domitian in 96.
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deprecati sumus: 'asked for relief from'. TLL s.v. deprecor 599. 35-40 does not distinguish between this passage (for which there seems no proper parallel) and e.g. Suet. Aug. 52 'dictaturam... deprecatus est': Augustus had never held this title, while Q. (it seems) had to tender a polite resignation from a salaried post given him by Domitian's father. He did not, of course, need to resign from work in the forum; and the turn of phrase here may be meant to fudge this point, rather than to suggest a time-gap (as Russell, i. 2 suggests). finem: again of retirement in 1 pr. 22, 2. 18. 3, and (in the valedictory chapter) 12. 11. 1. desinere dum desideraremur: cf. Sen. Con. 1. 8. 3 'optimus uirtutis finis est, antequam deficias desinere', an echo of which is found in someone's remark (Q. 12. 11. 3) that Domitius Afer preferred 'deficere quam desinere'. Q. had sat at Afer's feet, and will have heeded this chastening example. inquirendo: Q. uses the verb in the same connection at 12. 11.8. consolemur: cf. Mart. 12 pr. 'nedum in hac prouinciali solitudine, ubi, nisi etiam intemperanter studemus, et sine solacio et sine excusatione secessimus'. bonae mentis iuuenibus: for bona mens see 12. 1.42 and 12. 7. 3. Here Q. is thinking not just of young men 'saniori in arte oratoria iudicio' (Spalding), but of those in particular who showed signs of growing up into uiri boni: those, that is, who had the moral qualities essential, in Q.'s view, to the true orator, boni iuuenes appear in 1 pr. 7, 3.6.64 ('in eo praesertim opere quod ad bonorum iuuenum aliquam utilitatem componimus') and 6 pr. 1 ('si qua ex nobis ad iuuenes bonos peruenire posset utilitas'); Q. thinks of them as an important part of the audience of the book (see Winterbottom in Corsi 12), as its last words, very similar in tone to our passage, show: \ . . praecepta dicendi..., quorum cognitio studiosis iuuenibus si non magnam utilitatem adferet, at certe, quod magis petimus, bonam uoluntatem' (12. 11.31). Three of these passages mention utilitas, j ust as here Q. hopes his work will be of use to the young; add 7. 1. 54 'ad utilitatem me submitto discentium'. Note too 12.11.5, where optimi iuuenes will throng the house of the retired orator: 'hos ille formabit quasi eloquentiae parens'; also 7. 3. 30 .adulescentibus meis (meos enim semper adulescentes putabo)'. uoluptati: cf. 1. 4. 5, where Q. says that grammar is 'necessaria pueris, iucunda senibus, dulcis secretorum comes' (hence perhaps the detailed treatment he gives to the topic); 12. 11. 5 (of the retired orator) 'amore quodam operis'. Retirement was the perfect time for scholarship: 12. 11.4 'neque enim minores eum cum id fecerit studiorum fructus prosequentur:.. .eloquentiae componet a r t e m . . ( c f . 2. 18. 4 'est aliquis ac nescio an maximus etiam ex secretis studiis fructus'; 12. 6. 4: contrast of secreta studia and the bright light of the forum).
Chapter Thirteen Do not expect from me any unbreakable rules, e.g. on the parts of a speech (1): much depends on circumstances, and a great part of the art is strategy (2). So too with war (3-4). The individual case will dictate the way each part of the speech is to be handled (5-6a), for expediency is theorder of the day, and expediency will decide if rules need to be broken (6b-7). My view is that there are two key principles, what is fitting and what is expedient. The latter often urgesflexibility,and sometimes the former does too, as we see from (a) statuary and (b) painting (8). (rt) The sculptor should avoid producing a work that looks stiff (9), and may even turn out something as disconcerting as Myron's Discobolos (10). This finds a literary analogy in figures (11). (b) The painter may reject full-face treatment, as Apelles did to hide a blemish in Ant igonus (12a); so too an orator may cover over what should not or cannot be expressed (12b). That was done in art by Timanthes (13); compare afigureof Sallust's (14a). This is why / have always steered clear of general rules, for exceptions often arise (14b). Young people should not think themselves safe behind a wall of precept. The art depends on many other factors (15); rules should merely show the right direction, and the direct route may have to be diverged from, as on real journeys (16). Rhetoric is a many-sided thing; but I will try to expound the traditional rules, with any adjustments I think appropriate (17). In this chapter Q. puts forward one of his key principles (pressed also in the very comparable 7. 10, with its analogies from art and warfare), that rhetoric cannot be confined in a straitjacket of general precept (note already 2. 5. 14). Expediency (he begins by asserting) dictates the rules we can usefully formulate, and if expediency demands that they should be neglected in a particular case, its demand must be heeded. The inflexibility in writers of artes which Q. criticizes here lies especially in their treatment of the parts of a speech, and because of this emphasis it can safely be said that 'dieser Standpunkt ist der Theodoreische' (Schanz 53). For it was over the parts of a speech that Theodorean stress on xaipos and Apollodorean rigidity joined battle most crucially, or at least are best attested (see Grube, esp. 343 and 351). There are striking parallels between Q. and the Anon(ymus Seguierianus),23 the main source of our knowledge of the dispute between the two factions (for which
2 5 Cited here by section from Spengel's Rhetores Graeci, i. 2 (ed. C. Hammer, 1894), 3 5 2 - 9 8 ; see also the recent editions by M . R. DUtsand G. A. Kennedy (Leiden, 1997) and b y M . Patillon, Anonyme de Seguier: Art du discours politique (Paris, 2005).
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see n.on 2. 11. 2 Theodoreus an Apollodoreus). It is matter for speculation what source Q. and Anon, ultimately had in common. It should be stressed that Anon, and Q. agree not only on the need for flexibility in dealing with the parts of a speech, but on the theory that lies behind this. Anon., reporting the objections of Alexander son of Numenius to the rigidity of people 'like the Apollodoreans', says (31) that such people wrongly treat rhetoric as though it were an i-marr/nr) with infallible rules (dcujprifjLaTa) and 'of a single nature', whereas it is in fact a t4\w)* whose rules 'are adapted to the circumstances (rrpos TOVS Kaipovs)\ ' We say,' Anon, proceeds (32), 'that at different times we come across different matters; consequently our art is adapted to what is useful (xpr/aipLov) in the prevailing circumstances; if it is expedient, one must speak a proem, if it is not, one must leave it out. Things left out at the right moment (evKaipajs) will do no harm.' And in other contexts Anon, points out the need to adapt the rules in accordance with what is expedient or useful (117, 123, 133; cf. 138 7TpOS TOV Katpov to)v 7TpayfiaTU)v).
For all that, we must beware of assuming that Q. is reproducing some Theodorean source. For one thing, as Grube emphasizes, we do not know how far Theodorus took his dislike of rigid rules; on the other, the emphasis on the importance of Kaipos is found widely elsewhere (a mixed bag in G. Kowalski, Eos, 31 (1928), 162-4). Particularly significant is a passage of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Comp. 12: 45. 12-17 Usener-Radermacher; see also Geigenmtiller 70), where he traces discussion of it back to Gorgias, but asserts that an ars on the subject is impossible: ov8" €\€l 4>^aiv 7rpdyfia els KadoXiK-qv Kat evrexvop rtva TrepiXrjifiiv rreoeiv; that is to apply to Kaipos itself the doctrine that to look for general rules is in principle misguided. Further, Q.'s standpoint, which is worded to appeal to Roman common-sense and pragmatism (note esp. the comparison with military tactics at 3-4), has much in common with that of Antonius in Cicero's de Oratorc, thus on theparts of the speech Cicero makes Antonius stress the need for judgement (note e.g. 2. 307-8, with appeal to the indicium and prudentia of the orator; and see n. below on 2 consilium), well before Theodorus wrote. Q.'s discussion of the parts of speech is full of language reminiscent of Theodorus, as the commentary on the present chapter will document; and similar things may be found elsewhere, for instance in the discussion of compositio (9. 4. 117 'quaedam... tradi arte non possunt num in quern [sc. casum] transeamus ex quo praecipi potest?... num praescriptum eius rei ullum est?'; also 133 'non quia negem hoc fautf bene esse compositum, sed quia legem hanc esse componendi in omnibus principiis recusem'). But he explicitly differs from Theodorus on the virtues of narration (see on 5 constricta), and on one aspect of the proem (4. 1. 23). He once criticizes
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the opposed rigidities of Apollodorus and Theodorus with the comment, 'tamquam perierit haec ratio media et nihil cum ipsius causae utilitate sit deliberandum' (5. 13. 59). Such unworldly professors, he remarks, do not speak in the forum, and their precepts are found wanting in the battles of the courts; we should always remember that Q. himself was advocate as well as rhetor. As a result, and because of his Ciceronian roots, he may well be more flexible than any of the rhetoricians he had read. The present chapter starts from utilitas. But a new theme is unexpectedly introduced at 8, where two important criteria are solemnly proclaimed, quid deceat, quid expediat': and 9-14a show how what is fitting, too, can sometimes counsel divergence from the rules. The argument is founded on arts, first sculpture (9-10), then painting (12-13); and the application to rhetoric comes in only by way of analog)' (11, 12b + 14a). Q. takes one of his examples from a discussion of decorum in Cicero's Orator, but the other two seem to evince an interest in Greek art for its own sake. 13. 1 nemo., .feram: Q. has argued vehemently against those who reject rules; now he reassures us: his own will be less dogmatic than those of other writers. plerisque: noteworthy: it does not sound as if Q. has only Apollodorus and his followers in his sights. quasdam leges: Q. often uses the analogy of laws, frequently seen as tying a speaker down: 4. 1. 62, 4. 2. 84, 4. 5. 3 (cited below on propositio), 5. 10. 101 'uelut adstricti certis legum uinculis', 8 pr. 2 'ad certas quasdam dicendi leges alligati'; in Greek cf. Theon 74. 30-1 (p. 33) OVK del 8£ XPV Kaddnep •qvayKaofxemi nvi iiTcodat vopxp. Cicero had used this language esp. in connection with rhythm (e.g. de Orat. 3. 176 'ut uerba neque adligata sint quasi certa aliqua lege uersus ...'). Q. calls such slavish obedience to rules a superstitio at 4.1.64 (cited below on 5 auersoper.. .fignram), 4. 2. 85 (cited below on 5 recta an ordine permutato); similarly 5. 13.60 'omnes fere qui legem dicendi quasi quaedam mysteria tradiderunt, certis... nos praeceptis alligauerunt'. The word superstitio significantly recurs in 12. 2. 26 (cited below on 16 nefas; leges follows) of those bound (constricti) uncritically to one philosophical sect. constrictas: see (as well as 12. 2. 26) Cic. Flacc. 15 'psephismata... non iure iurando constricta'; Tusc. 2. 5 (of rigid philosophers) 'necessitate constricti'; Liv. 4. 13. 11 'constricti legibus' (opposed to a man 'libero exsolutoque legum uinclis'). Cf. 2. 16. 9 'ut se ipsi homines ad seruitutem iuris adstringerent', with n. feram: with allusion to the technical sense (OLD s.v. fero 28a). utique: 'invariably' (see n. on the word in 2. 1. 1, and esp. 4. 2. 24, on the position of the narration), extending in spirit, if not in grammar, to all the
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Commentary
parts to be mentioned below, though, when Anon. 26 tells us that the Apollodoreans 'say that none of the parts of a speech is to be omitted', he adds 'but especially not the proem'. Q. illustrates the rigidity he means by reference to (a) the order of the parts of a speech (proxima, post hanc, turn) and (b) the rules for composing those parts (id quale and quae lex deinde, where deinde implies that the technographer lays down first that the narrative must be present and at this point in the speech, then how one should compose it). It is in connection with proem and narrative that we can be most confident that Q. is in general taking the Theodorean part against the Apollodoreans (above, p. 199). As to the proem, Q. (see n.on 5 prohoemium) and Anon. (21-5) insist that it is not always necessary, as the Apollodoreans claimed (Anon. 26-9; Schanz 43-4). On the narratio (Schanz, 40-2), Q. agreed with the Theodoreans: (a) that it was not always necessary (4. 2. 4-23; cf. 7. 10. 11 'ubi omnino non exponendum'; add the throwaway remark in Theon 76. 15-16 [p. 36), Sen. Con. 2. 1. 36, and Anon. 116-23, answering the Apollodorean case reported in 113-15); and (b) that it did not, if included, necessarily have to follow the proem (4. 2. 24-30, where note the Theodorean language of 25 'hoc... interim mutat condicio causarum', 26 'quod fiet utiliter...'; cf. Anon. 124-31). For the identity and order of the parts of a speech see 3.9. 1-5. Q. takes us through some of them again in 5-6, and more fully in 7. 10. 11-12, emphasizing the need for flexibility; for similar passages, see n.on 2. 5. 7 inuentione. prohoemium: Spalding commented on the free-floating nominatives, comparing 2. 2. 5, where see n. on minime iracundus. id quale: for the points at issue see on 5 below. The Apollodoreans (Anon. 28) recognized only one of the usual three (4.1. 5) functions of the proem, the winning of goodwill; but Q. (4. 1. 50-1) felt that the sub-divisions they made within that head re-introduced the others: 'Q.'s criticism seems to be directed against the organization of their teaching rather than its essence' (Russell). lex... narrandi: for flexibility in composing the narratio (the subject of the long chapter 4. 2) see esp. 4. 2. 83-7 (esp. 84 'neque enim est una lex defensionis certumque praescriptum: pro re, pro tempore intuenda quae prosint'); cf. 103, on the suggestions that follow there: 'pleraque sunt frequentissime custodienda, immo numquam nisi ratio coegerit mutanda.' For the particular points in dispute, see on 5 below. propositio: discussed in 4.4 (note 2 'ea non semper uti necesse est'). It may be added that in the treatment of partitio in 4. 5, there are similar hints of controversy, e.g. 1 'quidam utendum semper putant'; 3 'ne illos quidem
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probauerim qui partitionem uetant ultra tris propositiones extendere;... hoc tamen numero uelut lege non est alliganda, cum possit causa pluris desiderare'. ut quibusdam placuit: see 4. 3. 1; much of that chapter is concerned with the desirability and position of the digression. certus ordo quaestionum: cf. below 6; see also the discussion of the order of quaestiones and loci in 7. 10. 5-8, esp. '(7) Hoc est quod scriptor demonstrare non possit nisi certa definitaque materia (8) Praeceptoris est in alio atque alio genere cotidie ostendere quis ordo sit rerum'. Similarly Theon 125. 24-7 (p. 90) on the order of TOTTOI in a thesis: it depends on the particular 7TpofiAr}iia. fas: cf. 8. 3. 36, 10. 2. 9. To accept such an imperative would be to subject oneself to superstitio (see on 1 quasdani leges). Cf. also 16 nefas, with n. 13. 2 erat: see on 2. 4. 3 erat. praescripto: cf. 4. 2. 84, cited on 1 lex... narrandi; also deplored in 9.4. 117, Cic. Orat. 36. contineretur: cf. 4. 2. 116 'id... exemplis magis quam praeceptis ullis continetur'. consilium: discussed in 6. 5 (where the distinction from iudicium is explained); cf. esp. 11 'Illud dicere satis habeo, nihil esse . . . in orando... prius consilio, frustraque sine eo tradi ceteras artis... Aptare etiam orationem locis temporibus personis est eiusdem uirtutis'. Cicero had shown the way (de Orat. 2. 330): 'quando utendum sit aut non sit narratione, id est consilii.' conuertitur: the subject appears to be consilium (in effect the orator with judgement), which alters in accordance with (cf. Cic. Amic. 93 'qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac uoluntatem sed etiam uultum atque nutum conuertitur') the way things 'move'. Cf. 8. 3. 13 'ubi maxima rerum momenta uersantur' ('at great turning points in events'; cf. Liv. 3. 27. 7 'puncto saepe temporis maximarum rerum momenta uerti'; Q. 6. 3. 9 is rather different); Liv. 27. 9. 1 'adeo ex paruis saepe magnarum momenta rerum pendent'; Sen. Dial. 5. 21.1 'bellum cuius maxima momenta in occasionibus sunt'. The word is tricky to deal with. TLLs.v. momentum 1393. 79-1394. 1 seems relevant; but these examples from Q. do not appear in the article at all. 13. 3 praecipias: the verb governs the three following subjunctives: TLL s.v. praecipio 448. 54-63. imperatori: cf. the military analogy in 7. 10. 13 'haec est uelut imperatoria uirtus', viz. to react to different circumstances with different dispositions (exemplified in some detail); and generally see n.on 2. 5. 15 de re militari. aciem instruet: cf. Vegetius, Mil. 3. 14. 4 'acies dicitur exercitus instructi frons quae aduersum hostem spectat'.
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derigat frontem: cf. 5. 13. 11 'derecta fronte pugnandum'. The meaning is hardly different from that of derigere aciem in Caes. Gal. 6. 8. 5 'signa ad hostem conuerti aciemque derigi iubet'. promoueat: frequently used of troop movements: TLL s.v. promoveo 1895. 13-31. equites pro cornibus locet: their regular position; cf. Vegetius, Mil 2. 15. 1 'equites locantur in cornibus', 3. 16. 1 'constructa acie peditum equites ponuntur in cornibus'; Li v. 1. 37. 3 '[equites] utrimque ab cornibus positos'. For pro cornibus see e.g. Liv. 23. 29. 5, Tac. Ann. 14. 34. 2. mutabitur: Francius' mutabit gives correspondence with the two further instances in 4. But the three verbs would not even so be in strict anaphora, and the whole complex is less cluttered, and easier to punctuate, if we keep the passive. occurret: cf. Vegetius, Mil. 3. 6. 32 'ne aestate aquae penuria obsit euntibus, ne hieme difficiles aut inuiae occurrant paludes'. < s i > : best added (ed. Aid.) to introduce the third longer element of the tricolon. 1.2. 14 ('si de loquendi ratione disserat, si quaestiones explicet, historias exponat, poemata enarret') is not parallel, but cf. 12. 11. 13, where a third ut is omitted, perhaps by accident. asperitate: cf. 12. 9. 2: asperi colles encountered by armies. For asperitas of difficult terrain see TLL s.v. 821. 48-73; often of hills, perhaps not of forests, though see s.v. asper 808. 32-809. 10, citing Plin. Nat. 6. 19 'solitudines saltuosis conuallibus asperas'; in Verg. A. 11. 902 'deserit obsessos colles, nemora aspera linquit' aspera is usually taken as 'wild', but we might understand it to refer to the difficulty of the terrain which Turnus is rashly abandoning. prohibebitur: the subject is perhaps ratio (as it is for mutabitur above), but better imperator, easily enough understood considering that it is he rather than his plan that is confronted with the mountain and river just mentioned. 13. 4 mutabit: sc. rationem. acie derecta: cf. e.g. Liv. 34. 28. 6; also n. on 3 derigat frontem. cuneis: wedge-shaped formations; see Vegetius, Mil. 3. 19. 5 'cuneus dicitur multitudo peditum, quae iuncta cum acie primo angustior deinde latior procedit et aduersariorum ordines rumpit'. For the ablative cf. Liv. 39. 31. 3 'cuneo institit pugnare'. dedisse: the perfect infinitive may here carry a genuine reference to the past (cf. the discussion in K-S i. 134; further references in Nisbet and Rudd's n. on Hor. C. 3. 18. 15-16); a perfect infinitive is contrasted with a present, again governed by proderit, at 2. 6. 2 'plus proderit demonstrasse rectam protinus uiam quam reuocare ab errore iam lapsos'. For instances with satis, see 2. 1. 2
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excepisse, and other passages cited by K-S. Note also 1. 1. 34 paenitebit curasse. For 2. 17. 25 dixisse see n. there. simulata fuga: TLL s.v. fuga 1470. 24-8. proderit: introducing the concept of utUitas. 13. 5 ita: Q. sets off (as in 1) on a stroll through the parts of speech, significantly again (see above on 1 utique) showing particular interest in proem and narrative. prohoemium: for its necessity or otherwise, see 4. 1. 72 'Haec de prohoemio, quotiens erit eius usus. Non semper autem est; nam et superuacuum aliquando est...'; 7. 10. 11 'ubi adsumendum prohoemium, ubi omittendum'; Cic. de Orat. 2. 320-1 (Aristotelian). For its length, see 4. 1. 62 'modus autem principii pro causa; nam breue simplices, longius perplexae... desiderant'. derecto: cf. 4. 1. 68 'derecto ad Ciceronem... principio' (in the Sallustian invective). auerso per.. .figuram: cf. 4. 1. 63 'sermonem a persona iudicis auersum (a7TooTpor) dicitur)' (cf. 9. 2. 38); also 4. 2. 103 (some banned it from narratio). In 4. 1 Q. proceeds (63-8) to discuss its desirability in the proem, in terms that strongly recall our chapter: note esp. 'quidam in totum a prohoemio summouent... (64)... Quod si accidat, quo iure aut qua tanta superstitione prohibeamur dare per hanc figuram sententiae uires? (65) Neque enim istud scriptores artium quia non liceat sed quia non putent utile uetant. Ita, si uincet utilitas, propter eandem causam facere debebimus propter quam uetamur [cf. 2. 13. 7].' After naming other figures in 69, he goes on: 'Non tamen haec, quia possunt bene aliquando fieri, passim facienda sunt, sed quotiens praeceptum uicerit ratio [showing that not only apostrophe was outlawed by some]'. We cannot be sure that it was the Apollodoreans who banned figures from the proem in this way (see Anon. 19 for moderate figures in proem compared with epilogue), but Q. certainly answers in a Theodorean way. constricta: more or less = concisa, but with more emphasis on the compactness of the result; cf. Sen. Ep. 76. 26 'haec quamuis latins exsecutus essem priore epistula, constrinxi et breuiter percucurri', and n.on 2. 4. 5 adstringat. The participle is not used adjectivally in this sense again until much later (TLL s.v. constringo 546. 20-7). Brevity is one of the traditional virtues of narrative (discussion in 4. 2.40-51). The Theodoreans, true to their principles, omitted both it and lucidity 'quia nec breuiter utique nec dilucide semper sit utile exponere' (4. 2. 32), retaining only plausibility (Anon. 103, giving a different and perhaps inconsistent reason; cf. Nicolaus 14. 4-7). Q. is not a signed up Theodorean here.
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latius fusa: cf. e.g. 17 'late fusum opus'; 3. 4. 4 'rem tarn late fusam tarn breuiter adstrinxerinf; 10. 5. 11 'fundere quae natura contracta sunt' (with Peterson ad loc.). continua an diuisa: continuity is normal (4. 2. 79 'narratio est probationis continua propositio'), but division may take place e.g. because of the intermingling of proofs (4. 2. 82 'quid prohibet, si id utile est causae,.. .diuidere narrationem et probationes subiungere partibus'); cf. 7. 10. 11 'ubi utendum expositione continua, ubi partita'; D.H. Is. 14 and 15; Lausberg, §292. This was another point of dispute between Apollodoreans and Theodoreans: see Anon. 132-3 (Schanz 47); note the qualification in 4. 2. 82, just cited (ay fj xP€^a Anon.). Similarly in 4. 2. 101: 'miscenda sit an separanda narratio cum ipsa causae condicione deliberandum est'. recta an ordine permutato: ordine permutato does not imply complete reversal (cf. Loeb), any more than it does in Lucr. 1. 827. For the ordering of narrative, see 4. 2. 83-7, reflecting scholarly dispute: '(83) Namque ne iis quidem accedo qui semper eo putant ordine quo quid actum sit esse narrandum, sed eo malo narrare quo expedit....(84) [cited on 1 lex...narrandi]... (85) Nec saepius narrare duxerim nefas [cf. below, §16]... amends est enim superstitione praeceptorum contra rationem causae trahi (86) Me . . . fecisse hoc in foro quotiens desiderabat utilitas... scio'; 7. 10. 11 'ubi ab initiis incipiendum, ubi more Homerico a mediis uel ultimis'. 13. 6 quaestionum ordine: cf. n.on 1 certus ordo quaestionum. cum in eadem... expediat: not only will the order vary from case to case: even within the same case the different sides may be well advised to follow different orders; cf. 7. 1. 2-3. rogationibus plebisue scitis: a variation on lex (I) and praescriptum (2); see also on 15 decretis. The meanings of the words are discussed in Gel. 10. 20. hoc quidquid est: for this depreciative phrase cf. 6. 3. 11. The change to the singular is a little disconcerting. 13. 7 non negabo.. .plerumque: rather vaguely put; Q. means that conformity to the rules is on the whole expedient, utile of course picking up utilitas (for autem thus, see on that word in 2. 12. 4). alioqui nec: for the locution cf. 5. 10. 119 'haec non idcirco dico quod inutilem horum locorum.. .cognitionem putem, alioqui nec tradidissem', 10. 3. 7 'omnia enim nostra dum nascuntur placent, alioqui nec scriberentur' (with Peterson's n.);24D/g. 18. 2. 4. 3, 45. 1. 38. 25. Cf. 2. 17. 27 'neutrum est turpe,.. .ideoque nec uitium' (with n.); 2. 17. 35 'ita nec probabili probabilius' (with n.). 24
But in 2. 17. 33 the nec following alioqui correlates with two further cases o f nec.
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uerum... sequemur: cf. 4. 1. 65, cited on 5 auersoper. ..figuram. Compare the argument of Cic. Leg. 1. 42: 'ita fit ut nulla sit omnino iustitia, si neque natura est, eaque quae propter utilitatem constituitur utilitate ilia conuellitur.' magistrorum auctoritatibus: i.e. 'the views of professors whom we regard as authorities'; for auctores see further on 2. 5. 19 niaior est auctor. For the plural cf. e.g. Cic. ND 3.9 'Mihi enim unum sat erat, ita nobis maiores nostros tradidisse. Sed tu auctoritates contemnis'; Plin. Ep. 1. 20. 4 'hie ille mecum auctoritatibus agit ac mihi... orationes Lysiae ostentat'. 13. 8 equidem:'my rule is...'. Q. looks back to 'id praeceptorum genus.. in 1; his precept will be flexible. praecipiam... monebo: it is difficult to know how to punctuate these words: how far does Q. think he is citing Verg. A. 3. 436 'praedicam et repetens iterumque iterumque monebo'? One supposes, with Spalding, that he deliberately changed praedicam to suit his own context; and he did not have to concern himself with the position of inverted commas. Q. in any case, according to the investigations of C. N. Cole, CR 20 (1906), 47-51, 'not infrequently' cited Latin poets from memory. iterumque iterumque: so the oldest MSS of Virgil. According to Mynors' app. crit., many of the ninth-century witnesses give iterum iterumque (commented on as early as Bede [GL vii. 253. 29-31 Keil], and occurring also in the MS of Julius Victor, p. 445. 37 Halm = p. 102. 22-3 Giomini-Celentano). A of Q. reads this also, perhaps as a result of this current variant in the parent text. The same variants affect A. 2. 770, where one of the capital MSS joins later witnesses in the unmetrical version, and MS N of Stat. Theb. 9. 355, 10. 133. in omni actu: 'in all he does'; cf. e.g. Sen. Ep. 120. 10 'idem erat semper et in omni actu par sibi'. deceat... expediat: for the relation between them see 11.1. 8-9, concluding 'quotiens... pugnabunt, ipsam utilitatem uincet quod decet'. In the present case, Q. goes on to say, both countenance flexibility, 'expedit a u t e m . . ( c f . n. on 2. 12. 4 autem) summarizes what has preceded; 'et interim decet' is the bridge to a new topic (above, p. 201). ordine: Q. seems to mean the order of parts of the speech (see on 1 utique); it is striking that this is for him, as apparently for the Theodoreans, the most important aspect in which rigidity is to be deprecated. But he has also mentioned in this chapter the order of questions (1, 6) and order within narrative (5). It is therefore possible that he is referring more generally to the whole scheme of precepts, with their sub-divisions. statuis atque picturis: for Q. as an art critic see Austin, 'Quintilian' and comm. on 12. 10. 1-9.
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habitus: 'bearing', 'posture', as in two other lists of this kind: 6. 1. 14 'uultu habitu aspectu moueri solet [sc. ira]', 11. 3. 2 'adfectus omnes languescant necesse est, nisi uoce, uultu, totius prope habitu corporis inardescunt' (also 11. 3. 119, in an interpolation); note too 2. 15. 22 'cum., .quodam corporis habitu' (in a definition of rhetoric), 9. 1. 13 (cited below on 11 Jigurae... sunt), 11. 3. 67 'pictura, tacens opus et habitus semper eiusdem' (as opposed to things in movement, like that provided by gesture and expression), status will then mean specifically 'stance' (cf. 11. 3. 124 'in pedibus obseruantur status et incessus'; also 1. 11. 16, 11. 3. 159; cf. Nisbet and Rudd on Hor. C. 3. 4. 54), not anything more general (note 11. 3. 89 'effingere status quosdam et quidquid dicet ostendere': 'attitudes' Russell). Spalding seems then to be right, pace Russell, to deny that habitus in our passage means 'dress' (as in e.g. 2. 17. 20), though that would be relevant to 10 and perhaps 13. 13. 9 nempe enim: cf. 8 pr. 6, 12. 10. 46 (cj.). Q. provides three of seven CL instances, six of them from precisely the same period (Pliny, Tacitus; but also Paulus the jurisconsult, second to third century). Hand, Tursellinus, iv. 165 commented: 'recentiores scriptores, Quintilianus, Plinius composuerunt vocabula nempe enim ita, ut alterum utrum videretur abesse posse: sed nempe argumentation! addit afifirmandi vim.' sit: why subjunctive? The corrector of A, regarding it as jussive, emended nempe to neque; but the highly idiomatic nempe can hardly be wrong. Radermacher, adding a colon after pedes and then writing 'erit [or est] a summis', made it part of a kind of conditional complex (for which cf. 9.4.14); Watt 143, varying this, tried 'aduersa si facies... pedes, est a summis'. K-S ii. 122, though citing Radermacher's text, takes sit as potential, which looks out of place after 'gratia est'. Other possibilities are to read Jit (but this perhaps goes less well with the succeeding participles), est, or sic: for the omission of a copulative, cf. below 9 'ideo... manus... et species'; for s/cthus see LS s.v. I.B. 2 'on this condition, if this be done, etc.' (cf. 4. 1. 24). We have obelized. flexus ille... motus: ut sic dixerim (out of 23 instances given by PHI, 8 are in Q., and 4, perhaps significantly, in Decl. min.) shows that Q. felt flexus to be a less daring expression than motum. flexus can = 'the act of curving' (as in Tertullian, Spect. 10. 8 'de gestu et corporis flexu'), but it must here mean merely '(represented) curve' (OLD s.v. flexus2 3a), as opposed to the impression of movement, ille is used vividly, as though we really uidemus. actum quendam: quendam apologizes similarly (see the previous n.): this is only an impression of action; analogously in metaphor: 'rebus sensu carentibus actum quendam et animos damus, qualis est "pontem indignatur Araxes"' (8. 6. 11). Note too 9. 2. 4 'motus est., .orationis atque actus, quibus detractis iacet et uelut agitante corpus spiritu caret'.
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adfectum: like animos in 8. 6. 11, just cited. B's factum is impossible, nec ad unum modum formatae: Q. alludes to the gestures made with the hands; cf. 11. 3. 88 'ut si.. .citharoedum fbrmatis ad modum percutientis neruos manibus ostendas', 97 'sic formatam Ciceronis manum cum diceret.. species: of facial expression also in a simile at 9. 3. 101 'oratio habet rectam quandam uelut faciem, quae ut stupere inmobili rigore non debebit, ita saepius in ea quam natura dedit specie continenda est.' 13. 10 cursum habent: shorthand for 'are represented running'. There is probably no connection with the late idiom discussed by E. Lcifstedt, Philologischer Kommentar zur Peregrinatio Aetheriae, 147 (note Peregr. 18. 2'decurrit habens impetum [sc. Eufrates]'). elaboratum: cf. Cic. Verr. 4. 126 'Silanionis opus tam perfectum, tam elegans, tam elaboratum' (see on 2. 3. 6 elaborasset); but in our passage the word conveys a touch of disapproval, as in 12. 10. 40 'nihilque arcessiti et elaborati requirente'. discobolos Myronis: the fifth-century-BO sculptor Myron is mentioned in 12. 10. 7; see Austin ad loc. for the famous Discobolos (Overbeck 544-5), mentioned by Plin. Nat. 34. 57 and described by Lucian, Philops. 18 (stooping, turning away, crouching); a copy is illustrated in J. Boardman (ed.), The Oxford History of Classical Art (Oxford, 1993), 96 (discussion pp. 94-5). afuerit: the sense, whether the form is future perfect indicative or perfect subjunctive, is 'thereby prove himself not to have acquired an understanding of the art' (almost 'to have been absent when understanding of the art was being distributed'). We are indebted to Dr Holford-Strevens for his help with the wording of this note. ipsa ilia: A gives ilia ipsa (this order in 6. 3. 4). Halm (app. crit. to 1. 1. 18) wrote: 'solet Quint, dicere hie ipse, is ipse, sed aeque constanter ipse ille.' Cf. n. on 2. 15. 7 illo ipso. nouitas: cf. (on one use of figured speeches) 9. 2. 66 'ipsa nouitate ac uarietate magis quam si relatio sit recta delectat'. Q.'s comment here is strikingly enlightened. 13. 11 figurae.. .sunt: for the two types cf. 9. 1. 18 'in sensu et in uerbis', 1. 8. 16 lquaeque lexeos quaeque dianoeas uocantur'; Lausberg, §§602-3. For the doubled -que see on 2. 5. 7 quodque.. .quodque. The comparison with figures here is influenced by the analog)' seen between them and the body: see 9. 1. 10-11 'nam duobus modis dicitur [sc. figura]: uno qualiscumque forma sententiae, sicut in corporibus, quibus, quoquo modo sunt composita, utique habitus est aliquis: altero, quo proprie schema dicitur, in sensu uel sermone aliqua a uulgari et simplici specie cum ratione mutatio, sicut nos
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sedemus, incumbimus, respicimus'; 9. 1. 13 'sed si habitus quidam et quasi gestus sic appellandi sunt, id demum hoc loco accipi schema oportebit quod sit a simplici... dicendi modo poetice uel oratorie mutatuni; Lausberg, §600 'Unadorned speech is compared to the expressionless position of a body at rest... or perhaps to an ancient statue, whereas the figura (the schema) is the bodily position of the person or the statue deviating from that position of rest', recto in the next sentence therefore picks up the use of the word of sculpted bodies in 9 and 10. recto: 'direct expression', as opposed to figured: see n. on 2. 5. 11 rectus, adding 9. 2. 5, 45, 79 'si persona obstaret rectae orationi,.. .decurrebant ad schemata'; 10. 5. 8 'hoc oratio recta, illud figura declinata commendat' (also 6. 1. 2).
recesserunt: cf. 9. 2. 1 'iis sententiarum figuris.. .quae ab illo simplici modo indicandi recedunt'. 13. 12 speciem: here of beauty (contrast 9 'in uultu mille species'). Apelles: the fourth-eentury-BC painter, highly praised at 12. 10. 6 ('ingenio et gratia . . . praestantissimus'), where see Austin's n. For the Antigonus (Overbeck 1882-4), see Plin. Nat 35. 90 'pinxit et Antigoni regis imaginem altero lumine orbam, primus excogitata ratione uitia condendi; obliquam namque fecit, ut quod deerat corpori picturae deesse potius uideretur, tantumque earn partem e facie ostendit quam totam poterat ostendere\ Austin on 12. 10. 1-9 comments that '[Q.'s] art-criticism has a clear affinity with that of Pliny', and that he 'would probably have had access' to his book; if he did not read the Nat., he seems to have had its artistic source before him (see also below on 13 nam ... aestimandum). latere tantum altero: there is no need for altero, conjectured by Meister; cf. e.g. Col. 4. 29. 9 'eaque rasura ita deducitur ut medullam contingat uno latere, atque altero paulo ultra corticem destringatur'. deformitas: for other aspects of Antigonus' ugliness, see Sen. Dial. 5. 22. 4. operienda: cf. 8. 6. 59 'quotiens dictu deformia operit [sc. circumitus]'. siue... siue... possunt: the first alternative looks back (ostendi picking up ostendit), the second forward to the example ofTimanthes (13 digne picking up pro dignitate). Q. discusses in 8. 4. 4-5 a passage of Cicero (Verr. 5. 170) where words eventually fail: the verbal equivalent ofTimanthes' picture. 13. 13 Timanthes: late-fifth-century-BC painter; G. Lippold in RE s.n. 1. For this picture, Overbeck 1734-9; E. Pfuhl, Malerei und Zeichnung der Griechen (Munich, 1923), ii. 696-7, with illustration no. 638. Euripides' play LA (e.g. 1550) has long been recognized as the inspiration of the picture; see A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, The Dramatic Festivals of Athens (Oxford, 2 1968), 172.
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opinor: it was Spalding's view that this word is meant to throw doubt on Cythnius; but Lippold was no doubt right to regard it as relating to the name of the painter of the picture. In describing it Cicero did not give the name (Cic. Orat. 74 'pictor ille'), and nor did Valerius Maximus, as so often following Cicero (8. 11 ext. 6 'ille alter aeque nobilis pictor', i.e. as famous as Euphranor). But Pliny did (Nat. 35. 73), and, as we have seen (above on 12 Apelles), Q. probably knew either him or his source (indeed the phrasing here—see below on nam...aestimandum—seems to prove that he had read Pliny's own words; for another possible source, see on Coloten below). In that case, the uncertainty must be a pretence. Q. is not normally coy about his knowledge of art, which he parades not only here but in 12. 10. 1-9. He may well be following Cicero's use of the verb (cf. ut arbitror in 11. 1. 59) 'to diminish the suggestion of pedantry or affectation in displays of exact or recondite knowledge'; see Douglas on Brut. 58, where Landgraf on S. Rose. 46 and W. Kroll, Studien zum Verstandnis der romischen Literatur (Stuttgart, 1924), 290 with n. 16 might have been cited; add e.g. Scaur. 4 'in quo, ut opinor, Socrates.. .permulta disputat', Parad. 8 'sapientem ilium, Biantem ut opinor', Hort. fr. 52 Grilli 'Thales, ut opinor, primus'; and elsewhere Sen. Con. 10. 5. 27 'Zeuxin, ut puto'. Q. discusses this sort of thing at 9. 2. 61-2, citing Verr. 4. 5; for Greek, note W. Schmid, Der Atticism us, ii (Stuttgart, 1889), 290 (Aristides). Alternatively, Q., following a passage of Cicero, is being modest or cautious in adding a detail Cicero had not mentioned. Coloten: for this painter see Lippold in RE s.n. Kolotes 4, who can add no detail to our passage. For this sort of artistic competition cf. e.g. the contest between Parrhasios and Timanthes (Plin. Nat. 35. 72; cf. Ael. VH 9. 11). Austin, 'Quintilian', 22 remarks that the mention of a contest suggests the influence of the anecdotal Duris of Samos; cf. K. Jex-Blake and E. Sellers, The Elder Pliny's Chapters on the History of Art (London, 1896), pp. lxiv f. Certainly Q. had access to some lost source here. n a m . . . aestimandum: clearly drawing primarily on Cic. Orat. 74 (discussing decor) 'si denique pictor ille uidit, cum immolanda Iphigenia tristis Calchas esset, maestior Vlixes, maereret Menelaus, obuoluendum caput Agamemnonis esse, quoniam sum mum ilium luctum penicillo non posset imitari'; but note also Val. Max. 8. 11 ext. 6 'Quid? ille alter nobilis pictor, luctuosum immolatae Iphigeniae sacrificium referens, aim Calchantem tristem, maestum Vlixem, lamentantem Menelaum circa aram statuisset, caput Agamemnonis inuoluendo nonne summi maeroris acerbitatem arte non posse exprimiconfessus est? Itaque pictura eius haruspicis et amici et fratris lacrimis madet, patris fletum spectantis [leg. spectantium?] adfectu aestimandum reliquit', Plin. Nat. 35. 73 'eius [sc. Timanthis].. .est Iphigenia oratorum laudibus celebrata, qua stante ad aras peritura cum maestos pinxisset omnes
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praecipueque patruum, et tristitiae omnem imaginem consumpsisset, patris ipsius uultum uelauit quem digne non poterat ostendere.' Q. seems to have been aware of all three texts, including, interestingly enough, Valerius', though J. Cousin, Etudes sur Quintilien (Paris, 1936), i. 328 exaggerates the similarity of Q. 6. 3. 10 to Valerius 5. 1 ext. 3. For his final words see below on dedit aestimandum. addidisset: in Plin. Nat. 35. 108 '[Nicomachus] Vlixi primus addidit pilleum', the painter adds to a pre-existing conception of how Ulysses should be painted (cf. Q. 12. 10. 8 [of Polyclitus] 'ut humanae formae decorem addiderit supra uerum'; note also 12. 10. 4 'Zeuxis atque Parrhasius .. .plurimum arti addiderunt'), while here Timanthes adds a detail to a picture in progress: cf. perhaps Ov. Ep. 13. 155-6 'plus est quam quod uideatur imago: | adde sonum cerae, Protesilaus erit'). For other uses of the verb in connection with art, cf. Ov. Met. 10. 518, Man. 3. 26-9 'facile est... | auroque atque ebori dears addere [from Virg. Aen. 1. 592], cum rudis ipsa | materies niteat'. consumptis adfectibus: cf. 4. 2. 120 'tristia miserabiliter dicere licebit, non ut consumantirr adfectus sed ut tamen uelut primis lineis designentur'. dedit aestimandum: gave what? Sense, and the parallel in Valerius (cited above on nam... aestimandum), point to maerorem or the like, though the run of the sentence would suggest the hardly possible caput or uultum. Q. seems to have known the Valerian passage (note too 9. 2. 25 'aliqua ipsis iudicibus relinquimus aestimandd; but also Grillius, Comm. in Rhet. Cic. p. 1.17 Jakobi), and varied it unsuccessfully. 13. 14 illud Sallustianum: so 1. 3. 13 'illud Vergilianum'. Q. cites words from Jug. 19. 2 transmitted to us as 'nam de Carthagine silere melius puto quam parum dicere'. For the figure involved, see n.on 2. 4. 19 nam. propter quae: successive treatment of quod expedit and quod decet has shown the desirability of not laying down immutable rules. alligare: cf. 5. 13. 60 and 8 pr. 2, both cited above on 1 quasdam leges. KaOoXiKa: used in 8. 5. 7 of sententiae of (allegedly) universal validity (see Fortunatianus, cited below on ut dicamus quomodo possumus). Similarly Cic. Att. 14. 20. 3 'accipe a me, mi Attice, KOLOOXIKOV OeiLprj^xa earum rerum in quibus satis exercitati sumus', 'a general rule'. Among Greek texts note esp. D.H. Comp. 12, cited above, p. 200, and to LSJ's passages add Nicolaus 53. 18-19 Kavova ... KadoXiKov.
uocitant: uocant B. uocitare recurs in Q. only at 1. 7. 28. ut dicamus quomodo possumus: with a wry glance at the limitations of Latin abstract vocabulary. Elsewhere Q. uses uniuersalis without apology (3. 5. 5,12 of quaestiones; also 1.9. 3 and 8. 5. 3 uox); it appears in Plin. Ep. 10.65. 2, but not apparently again until much later, perpetualis is not found in this
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sense until Fortunatianus, Ars rhet. 3. 8 (p. 125. 21 Halm) 'generalibus egressionibus et sententiis perpetua libus' (see above); but note (as well as 2. 12. 10 'perpetua obseruatione dignum') Cels. 1 pr. 63 'perpetua praecepta'. Seneca had already used generalis of rules (Ep. 94. 31, 35), while Quintilian himself uses communis (2. 5. 15, 11. 3. 180). 13. 15 sed... tractabimus: 'a general reference to the many places in which Q., discussing some rule . . . , will show that experience must often temper the rigidity of theory' (Russell). The passages from Book 4 on proem and narrative cited above (on 5) make good examples. circumferuntur: cf. 2. 15. 4 (the alleged ars of Isocrates); Plin. Ep. 2. 5. 12 (books of principia). decretis: used to translate philosophical 86yp,ara in Cic. Ac. 2. 27 (see Reid ad loc.); note Sen. Ep. 95. 9 'adice nunc quod artes quoque pleraeque . . . habent decreta sua, non tantum praecepta'. But in our passage the flavour may be administrative (see on 6 rogationibus plebisue scitis). technicorum: the noun, later employed in Greek esp. of gram matici (cf. also PI. Phdr. 273 E, where the adj. is used of competence nepi X6yOJV), recurs in Gel. 17. 5. 3 'rhetoricus quidam sophista,... ex istis acutulis et minutis doctoribus qui TCXVIKOL appellantur'; A. Vardi, ZPE 137 (2001), 42 n. 4 says that the word 'seems to connote basic learning and dogmatic use of technical rules'. In our passage, Q. appears to be using it as an equivalent to the much commoner word Taxvoypafoi, artium scriptores, as 'Augustine' does in three passages of his De Rhetorica (pp. 138. 20; 142. 17; 147. 30 Halm). tutos: in effect the participle of tueri used passively, as in 12. 4. 2 'haec [sc. exempla].. .aut uetustatis fide tuta sunt aut...'. For the sense, cf. 8 pr. 2 'si haec sola didicerunt satis se ad eloquentiam instructos arbitrantur'. multo labore... dicendi: Q. emphasizes other aspects of the art, culminating in a key concept of this chapter (see on 2), consilium, before returning to rules in 16 'his quoque [sc. decretis]'. The words ars dicendi may therefore be provocative: precepts are subordinate. One recalls that Q. himself is not writing an ars rhetorica but an Institutio. experimentis: see n. on 2. 5. 15 praecepta... experimenta. altissima: cf. Val. Max. 7. 2 ext. 7 'altioris . . . prudentiae'. praesentissimo: see TLL s.v. praesens 843. 30-2. constat: cf. n.on 2. 7. 1 constet. 13. 16 rectam uiam: apparently 'the right direction, line', as opposed (see TLL s.v. orbita 921. 33-9) to the single fixed track laid down rigidly by some authors (compare Eng. 'get into a rut'); contrast rectum limitem below, 'the direct road', as opposed to a diversion, circumire; cf. 4. 2. 104 (of a digression) 'uelut recto itinere depulsi'; 4. 3. 14 'cum tot modis a recto itinere declinet
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oratio' (again concerning digression); 10. 1. 29 'depulsa recta uia' (and resorting to deuerticula: see on 2. 3.9 lassi); Ov. Met. 7.782-4 'nec limite callida recto | in spatiumque fiigit, sed decipit ora sequentis | et redit in gyrum'. Such expressions are not always easy to categorize, for Roman roads tended to be straight, not just direct, and, as such, they were the 'right' way to go. Note 1. 6. 22 'Recta ['correct'?] est haec uia: quis negat? Sed adiacet et mollior et magis trita', alongside 3. 6. 83 'si non statim rectissima linea tensa [i.e. very straight], facilior tamen et apertior uia' (at 10. 7. 16 the recta uia is clearly a straight road); 2.6. 2 'demonstrasse rectam... uiam', with n.; 2. 17.29 'neque enim qui recta uia depulsus est reduci ad earn nisi alio flexu potest', the right road; 12. 2.27 'rectissimamque ad uirtutem uiam deliget', the most direct, but also the most correct, road. qua: Badius wrote qua, to conform with 4. 3. 14, cited in the previous n. Note however Curt. 5. 8. 5 'declinauit uia militari'. nefas: see n.on 1 fas (also on quasdam leges). Cf. esp. 4. 2. 85 (cited on 5 recta an ordine permutato); 12. 2. 26 '[philosophi] qui uelut sacramento rogati uel etiam superstitione constricti nefas ducunt a suscepta semel persuasione discedere: oratori uero nihil est necesse in cuiusquam iurare leges'. per funes ingredientium: an analog)' used in Plin. Ep. 9. 26. 3 ('per funem in summa nituntur') for the courting of danger in oratory; Hor. Ep. 2. 1. 210— 11 'ille per extentum funem mihi posse uidetur | ire poeta' focuses rather on the difficulty (Otto, Sprichwdrter, 151). In our passage, of course, neither danger nor difficulty is in question: the slowness is caused by self-induced anxiety about keeping to the rules (rather similarly 5. 10. 123 'infinitam... tarditatem'). Cf. Lucian, Rh. pr. 9, where the teacher points out the footprints of Demosthenes and others and says to his pupil: 'You will have the good fortune to wed Lady Rhetoric if you travel in these footsteps [cf. 2. 6. 5 'praeuia... uestigia', with n.] like those who walk on ropes; but if you turn off course even a little or step out of line or let your weight tilt you to one side, you will fall off the direct road (rrjs opdrjs 68ov) that leads you to the marriage.' For tightrope-walkers see the remarkable collection of passages in Mayor's n.on Juv. 14. 272; helpful references in TLL s.v. funambulus, incuding Daremberg-Saglio, ii. 1361-3. itaque... cogemur: Q. gives two different scenarios involving road travel: 1) Leaving a circuitous road in favour of a short cut; Nicholas Purcell, to whom we are greatly indebted for his help with this passage, remarks that 'this might happen when a highway climbs in zigzags to make wagon transport possible, while the bends are short-circuited by footpaths'. He also suggests an alternative case, 'when it goes round a mountainous or otherwise difficult area, because cutting the straight route would be impossible or prohibitively expensive, though anyone travelling on foot or with pack-animals would
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continue to take more direct routes through the middle' (but see next n.). 2) Leaving a direct road when it is temporarily blocked. stratum militari labore iter: Q. is not using a circumlocution for uia militarist which by this time did not necessarily connote a road built by soldiers; see R. Rebuffat, Latomus 46 (1987), 52-67; M. Rathmann, Untersuchungen zu den Reichsstrafien in den westlichen Provinzen des Imperium Romanian (Mainz, 2003), esp. 31-9. His point seems to rest on the heavily engineered nature of a road built in difficult territory. compendio ducti: the short cut is tempting and potentially delusory (cf. 3. 8. 3 'utilitatis specie ducti', 8. 2. 17 'ducti specie nitoris circumeunf\ not, at least primarily, as in Verg. Aen. 1. 401 'qua te ducit uia'). Contrast 4. 2. 46, where Q. remarks that an 'amoenum ac molle iter'—not, one supposes, a 'Roman road'—'etiamsi est spatii amplioris, minus fatigat quam durum aridumque compendium'; and note, much later on, Virg. Maro Gramm. Epist. 3 (pp. 39-40 Lofstedt) 'sicut... uia quidem regia et publica una est, quae ad metropolitanam ducat urbem, multas tamen ex se procedentes habet semitulas, quae quidem ipsae ad eandem perueniunt urbem (nam si duo fquolibetf unum iter ingressi fiierint et unus eorum per latam et publicam uiam pergere distinauerit, alter uero semitulam quasi compendiosiorem gradi malluerit, nihilominus tamen in eadem urbe conueniunt)...' (to be added to Winterbottom's remarks at BICS 25 (1978), 156). rectum limitem: see on rectam uiam above. inciderint: TLL s.v. 2 incido 909. 47-52 gives some late parallels. Halm's interciderint is highly plausible; cf. Flor. 2. 18. 6 'interciso Herculaneae uiae limite' (also Q. 7. 4. 14 '[miles] dicit se fluminibus interclusum'). tenebitur: in effect 'blocked', as in Luc. 5. 135-6 'in immensas cineres abiere cauemas | et Phoebi tenuere uiam'; also Verg. A. 2. 505 'tenent Danai qua deficit ignis'. per parietem exibimus: this nonchalant solution does not say much for the solidity of Roman house walls. TLL s.v. paries 389. 30-44 has a fine list of passages where walls are dug through etc. 'fere fiirandi uel adulterandi causa'. 13. 17 cotidie nouum: because cases vary so much (2. 4. 28 'causis quarum uaria et noua semper est facies'; 2. 5.14 'omnes... species rerum cotidie paene nascentium'): they are 'uariae atque multiplices' (4 pr. 6; cf. 4. 1. 26; 5. 7. 24; 10. 5. 10 'ilia multiplici personarum causarum temporum locorum dictorum factorum diuersitate'). quae... experiar: cf. 1 pr. 2: 'ut mihi si non inueniendi noua, at certe iudicandi de ueteribus iniungere laborem non iniuste uiderentur [sc. quidam]'. Q., having cast doubt on the validity of rules, ends his preliminaries with a statement of his policy in expounding them.
Chapter Fourteen Latin renderings of rhetorice have been suggested (oratoria, orcitrix), but such translation is not always a success (1), and these two words are not only harsh but also inexact, for they are adjectival in form, and we need a noun. It is true that the Greek pTjTopiKtj is itself ambiguous (2) (for it may be epithet or noun), whereas what we want is an unambiguous noun. But there is no Latin word available to translate prjTopiKrj in the way that litteratura translates ypafifiariK^ (3). So let there be no dispute [about accepting rhetorice]; after all, we commonly use Greek words (e.g. philosophus), and Cicero called hisfirstwork on the subject libri rhetorici(4). My book henceforward will be divided under three heads: art, artist, product (5). The Greeks had long ago named the major arts, and the Romans often used the Greek terms rather than substitute a more or less clumsy Latin coinage. Q. accordingly favoured the noun grammatics even though the respectable litteratura had long existed (see n. on 2. 1. 4 litteraturam, and 3 below). This is in the tradition of a remark of Cicero (Fin. 3. 5) 'quamquam ea uerba quibus instituto ueterum utimur pro Latinis, ut ipsa philosophia, ut rhetorica, dialectica, grammatica, geometria, musica, quamquam Latine ea dici poterant, tamen, quoniam usu percepta sunt, nostra ducamus' (similarly Ac. 1. 25).25 As that passage shows, Cicero did not object to rhetorica, with its Latinized suffix, as a noun. Q., however, argues (not quite pellucidly) in this chapter (1-4) that, even though prjropiK-q is ambiguous in Greek between noun and adjective, it is the best that can be done in the absence of a proper Latin nominal equivalent. He means, though he does not say, that he approves the use not of the Greek word itself but of the transliteration rhetorice (acc. cen, gen. -ces; for the ablative, see n. on §3 id in rhetorice non fit). His own practice confonns with this recommendation. He also employs the adjective rhetoricus, with its Latin suffix, though he uses the locution ars rhetorica only in §3 below; elsewhere wefindinstead thefollyLatin ars orandi( 1 pr. 4,2.15. 20, 9.4. 3), ars oratoria (e.g. 1 pr. 5), and ars orandi (1 pr. 4). Similarly he uses the noun dialectice and adj. dialecticus (see n. on 2. 17. 14 ei... adsignat); he does, however, use musica as a noun (e.g. 2. 17. 10, 2. 21. 17), despite his 2 5 Q. offers disputatrix as an alternative t o dialectica in 12. 2 . 13; for geometria there are only paraphrases, and the evidence is late (Cassiod. Inst. 2.6.1 = p. 150. 2 0 Mynors terrae dimensio)\ we have found no renderings for musica.
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teachers'disapproval (8. 3. 34), though much less often than musice (common in Book 1). 14. 1 rhetoricen: the way in which the word is placed first here is an instance of Q.'s propensity to structure his text through quasi-titles (cf. 2. 4. 22 communes loci, 2. 8. 1 uirtus pracceptor is; cf. 2. 4. 24, 2. 4. 33). Latinum: on terms and phrases used to refer to the Latin language see T. Fogen, Patrii sermonis egestas (Munich and Leipzig, 2000), 51-60; Latinum is unemphatic (as opposed to Latinitas, which means 'good Latin'), sermo Roman us below identifies Rome as the centre of the Latin-speaking community but is here merely used for variation. The phrase lingua Romano, which one would expect to mean 'Latin as it is spoken in Rome', is attested from the early Empire in the sense 'Latin language', but while the notion 'Latin as spoken in Rome' is in evidence from Plautus onwards through Cicero and Ciceronians like Q. (8. 1. 3), it seems to have faded in the late Republic and early Empire, and there is no secure instance of the phrase lingua Romana in this sense (oratio Romana in 8. 1. 3 comes close, but there Romana is predicative); on all this see J. N. Adams, 'Romanitas and the Latin language', CQ2 53 (2003), 191-7. oratoriam.. .oratricem: the former word caught on in the fourth century (TLL s.v. oratorius 902. 20-42, citing both nominal and adjectival uses); the latter appears of the art only in this chapter (TLL s.v. orator 900. 81-901. 2), though Q. has no prejudice against formations in -trix (e.g. 2. 20. 7 disputatrix). As will appear, Q. regarded each of the two as an adjective, understanding ars, not a noun. See generally J. C. Rolfe, 'Die Ellipse von ars', ALL 10 (1896-8), 229-46. nominauerunt: for the unexpressed subject ('writers of earlier handbooks, scholars') cf. 5. 13. 16 'id quoque (obscurum uocant) quod...'; contrast 2. 15. 2 'quidam [five times] ...nominauerunt'). We do not know who Q. is referring to; the perfect tense may suggest that the writers in question were experimenting, and their coinages not widely used; contrast uocant in 2. 15. 3. quos equidem: equidem contrasts Q. with those who coined these words ('I for my part'), but also looks forward to sed. Similarly 6. 2. 3 'quos equidem non contemno, sed...'; cf. Verg. A. 9. 207-10 'equidem de te nil tale uerebar,... sed...'; TLL s.v. 721. 78-722. 4. The word-order is due to the attraction of equidem by a pronoun in the vicinity; J. B. Solodow, The Latin particle 'quidem' (University Park, PA, 1978), at 37-8. quod... temptarint: explaining debita. The subjunctive, which surprised Spalding, is perhaps influenced by the mood of fraudauerim (for which see K-S i. 177; Gabler 63); but it may well be causal (K-S ii. 384-5).
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copiam Romani sermonis: cf. Lucretius' famous phrase patrii sermonis egestas (1. 832; 3. 260), aimed specifically at the absence of technical vocabulary. ducentes ex Graeco: cf. 1.6. 37 'ex Graeco... duci', but 1.6. 13 'a Graeco ductum' {a B; A omits the preposition). For parallels in other authors see TLL s.v. duco 2153. 38-2154. 53. secuntur: picking up a different sense of ducere. we may give a lead, but the words (and ideas: omnia, and nostra below, widen the reference) do not follow willingly (Hor. Ars 311 'uerbaque prouisam rem non inuita sequentur'; OLD s.v. sequor 8b). They have to be dragged, kicking and screaming, into Latin (note 4 'nec uim adferam'). sicut... uoluerunt: utique does produce good sense if it is given a restrictive meaning here,26 but because of its position it is unlikely to restrict quotiens. 'At least whenever' would require utique quotiens, cf. 12. 10. 29, where it means 'especially whenever', and is not encouraged by B's suis utique. (Neither utique quotiens nor quotiens utique is paralleled in PHI.) Rather, utique restricts the following suis uerbis: 'whenever the Greeks have wished nostra signare, at least by use of Greek words'; for utique thus placed (before nostri) cf. 2. 1. 1 with n. The main area where Latin terms were translated into Greek ones is the technical language of Roman administrative, legal, and military institutions. Q. cannot be thinking of transliterations like 8ou£ (Eus. HE 9. 5. 2) and KovaioTojp (IG Rom. 3. 238). He must be thinking either of new derivations from existing Greek terms which have been given a new meaning (cf. VTTCLTOS, from which are derived vnareia consulatus, VTTCLTIKOS consularis, avOvrraros proconsul) or of new compounds formed on Roman models (y€vpo7Toi6s pontifex; ayKuXo-irovs 8ipos sella curulis). Naturally, Roman official language is an area which required inventiveness on the part of Greek-speakers; in other areas (like rhetorical terminology) this need was virtually non-existent. For all these words see H. J. Mason, Greek Terms for Roman Institutions: A Lexicon and Analysis (Toronto, 1974); I.-M. CervenkaEhrenstrasser, Lexikon der lateinischen Lehnwdrter in den griechischsprachigen dokumentarischen Texten Agyptens (Vienna, 1996- ), whose first fascicle includes an extensive bibliography; earlier D. Magie, De Romanorum iurispublici sacrique uocabulis sollemnibus in Graecum sermonem conuersis (Leipzig, 1905). Perhaps the tense of uoluerunt is meant to bring out the fact that the set of Greek terms for Roman administrative and military institutions had been virtually complete since the establishment of the Empire. With 'suis uerbis signare nostra' cf. 1. 5. 58 'sicut illi (the Greeks] a nobis nonnumquam mutuantur' sc. when there is no suitable Greek word. 26
This restriction w o u l d n o t be expressed by quotieitscwnqite
(Watt 143).
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14. 2 interpretatio: 'translation, as in 5. 10. 8 'pistis appellant, quod etiam si propria interpretatione dicere fidem p o s s u m u s . . G a i u s , Inst. 3. 93 'ilia uerborum obligatio, DARI SPONDES? SPONDHO, adeo propria ciuium Romano mm est, ut ne quidem in Graecum sermonem per interpretationem proprie transferri possit'; OLD s.v. 5. dura: cf. 8. 3. 33, cited in the next n. At 4 below Q. speaks of'indecora in Latinum sermonem mutatione', showing that to -rrpeirov is involved. Plauti 'essentia': the texts relevant to the name are: 3. 6. 23:'ovatav\ quam Plautus essentiam uocat (neque sane aliud est eius nomen Latinum).' 8. 3. 33: 'Multa ex Graeco formata noua, ac plurima a Sergio Flauio [so A; B is not available here], quorum dura quaedam admodum uidentur, ut [quae] "ens" et "essentia".' Sen. Ep. 58. 6: 'cupio, si fieri potest, propitiis auribus tuis "essentiam" [so Muretus; quid sentiam MSS] dicere... Ciceronem auctorem huius uerbi habeo, puto locupletem; si recentiorem [sc. user of the word essentia than Cicero] quaeris, Fabianum, disertum et elegantem.' Calcidius ad Tim. 35 A 1-4 p. 78. 2-3 Waszink (where Cicero translates ovaia as 'natura'): 'Docet [sc. Plato] nos substantiam siue, ut Cicero dicit, essentiam duplicem esse, unam indiuiduam, alteram per corpora diuiduam.' Sidonius Apollinaris c. 14, prefatory letter (p. 314. 4-8 Mohr): 'Lecturus es hie etiam nouum uerbum, id est essentiam; sed scias hoc ipsum dixisse Ciceronem; nam essentiam nec non et indoloriam nominauit, addens: "licet enim nouis rebus noua nomina imponere"; et recte dixit.' On the most natural reading of the present passage and 3. 6. 23, Q. thought that (i) 'Plautus' used the word essentia and (ii) coined it. However, 8. 3. 33 clearly implies that 'Sergius Flavius' coined it. The most economical solution to this problem—which is independent of the problem raised by the Seneca, Calcidius, and Sidonius passages—is to emend to 'Sergius Plautus' in 8. 3. 33; this was first suggested by D. Detlefeen, Uber einige Quellenschriftsteller des Plinius (Gliickstadt, 1881), 5, cf. K. Barwick, 'Quintilians Stellung zu dem Problem sprachlicher Neuschopfiingen', Philologus, 91 (1936-7), 89-113, at 97-8 and Adamietz 123-4 on 3.6. 23. This seems plausible given that we know of a Stoic Plautus from Quintilian himself (10. 1. 124), that Fronto contrasts stylistically—and for sobriety—a Stoic Sergius with another Stoic, Seneca (p. 154. 3-13 van den Hout2), and that [Apul.] Tlepi eppL-qveias 1 p. 190. 4-8 Moreschini attributes a Latin equivalent for the Stoic notion of a proposition to a Sergius (a^iaj^jLa/irpoTaais = effatum). Note also that in the gensSergia the cognomen 'Plautus' is attested early (cf. the C. Sergius Plautus mentioned in Liv. 31.4.4 and 31. 6. 2). The chronological order of 10. 1. 123-4 suggests that Plautus wrote in the mid-first century AD, and it is possible that he was a source
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for Pliny the Elder (see his Index Auctorum to bks. 2 and 18, where a Sergius Plautus is mentioned). The real problem is caused by the information provided by Seneca, Calcidius, and Sidonius that Cicero used the word essentia. (That Fabianus used it around the middle of the first century AD does not in itself cast doubt on the assignment to Plautus, both because of the inferred date of Fabianus and because Seneca's point is that essentia is to be found in good writers. He may well have left out Plautus because he did not count him among these; cf. the Frontonian passage quoted above.) That Cicero did use essentia is beyond reasonable doubt: Muretus' emendation essentiam for the manuscripts' quid sentiam in the Senecan passage quoted above seems in itself unimpeachable. And it seems implausible that Calcidius should read Seneca, although it cannot be ruled out. However, the evidence from Sidonius Apollinaris' letter to Polemius prefixed to the epithalamium (poem xiv), quoted above, is problematic. The quotation conspicuously resembles Cic. ND 1. 44 'sunt enim rebus nouis noua ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse npoXrjifjiv appellauit, quam antea nemo eo uerbo nominarat' (cf. Fin. 3. 3, 3. 10). There, however, both Latin terms in question are not mentioned. Further, when we look at Cicero's treatises and the division of subject-matter in them, it is not obvious how the two terms could occur in the same passage (they belong to different areas of philosophy). Indoloria, incidentally, is not to be found in the Cicero texts we have either (on the word see TLL s.v. 1223. 23-32); Madvig on Cic. Fin. 2. 11 has doubts about Cicero's using indoloria at all, but as an experiment it seems a possibility. On balance, we should assume that Sidonius draws on some kind of glossary, in which odd technical terms were collected, perhaps with the ND quotation (for that is apparently what it is) attached. All this means that with Sidonius we are even more in the dark than with the others as to where he got his information from. But since it seems clear that Cicero used essentia, we can continue with the discrepancy between Seneca and Quintilian. In order to sustain what has been said above we have to assume that (i) Q. did not know that Cicero had used the word and (ii) that he had not read Seneca's letter. The latter is entirely possible, given Q.'s general view of Seneca. For Q. not to know that Cicero had used the word, we have to assume that the latter used it at a place that was out-of-the-way for Quintilian but less so for other writers; three possibilities come to mind: (i) one of the lost books of the Academica, (ii) one of the lost passages of the Timaeus translation (17 A 5, 20 A 2, 37 E 5, 52 c 4), or (iii) a letter of Cicero which has not come down to us. As to the Timaeus translation, Cicero certainly did not translate ovota as essentia at any of the places where his translation is available, and given what Calcidius tells us in the passage quoted above, we might expect a hint that Cicero used
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essentia at another place in the same work, i.e. his Timaeus, if he had done so. An inconsistent use of the term in Tim. also seems unlikely on independent grounds. We thus turn to the first possibility. In general, references to Cicero's philosophical works in Q. are rather sparse (see pp. 423-4 in vol. v of the Loeb), which suggests that he knew them less well than his other works. Plasberg, in the rarely used editio maior of the Academica (Leipzig, 1908), gives for the second part of the Ac. 2 parallels which may be reminiscences of the Academicus IV, the book of the second edition of the Academica which corresponded to this section of the Ac. 2. On Ac. 2. 118 'Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo sempiternum' Plasberg writes: 'Hinc fbrtasse Seneca epist. 58, 6: cupio... essentiam dicere... Ciceronem auctorem huius uerbi habeo... quo modo dicetur ovala, res necessaria, natura continens fundamentum omnium?' See also the notes below on 5 cauillationis, and on 2. 21. 1 nihil...sine rerum substantiafaciunt. queentia: the other texts relevant to this word are 8. 3. 33 (cited in the previous n.) and Priscian in GL iii. 456. 21-2 'excipitur [i.e. from the rule that verbs in -eo form their present participles in -ens] eo et queo, quae euphoniae causa iens pro eens et quiens pro queens faciunt'. In our passage, queentia is entirely satisfactory (Svvapis alongside ovoia). In 8. 3. 33 (see Winterbottom6 138) it is tempting to substitute queentia for quae ens; otherwise it seems best to follow Regius in deleting quae, leaving ens as appropriate enough company for essentia. Against Halm's queens is the testimony of Priscian. The result is to attribute three coinages to Plautus—essentia, queentia, and ens; but that there were plurima is attested by 8. 3. 33, and there is no reason why Q. should have felt doubt about only two. ens according to Priscian was used by Caesar; but then essentia was used by Cicero. ne propria quidem: the translation is not just harsh, it does not even get the exact meaning over 'properly' (cf. the parallels given above on interpretatio), in the sense, as Q. goes on to explain, that oratoria and oratrix are adjectives, and so should not be used to translate a noun like eloquentia. propria is not used in its familiar sense (for uerba propria see on 2. 5. 9 ratione eloquendi); for the sense here cf. OLD s.v. proprius 5. effertur: 'is formed' (Gk. eK€perai: see LSJ s.v. €K€pa) II. 10b); cf. 9. 3. 7; TLL s.v effero 144. 28-81. B's efferetur might perhaps be defended as implying 'will prove, on examination, to be formed'; see n. on 2. 3. 11 a me procul aberit. elocutoria.. .elocutrix: these adjectives are not attested elsewhere; Q. doubtless coined them to make his contrast with the noun eloquentia, just as he will coin litteratrix and litteratoria to make a point in 3 below. ilia... rhetorice: i.e. 'rhetoric as we are using it'—as a noun, ilia is used like inverted commas here.
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Commentary
talis est qualis: the same sort of word, i.e. a noun. Cf. Spalding: 'ejusmodi est nomen, quod, si reddere velim, reddere debeam simili ei forma, quae est in eloquentia, ut ergo [s/c] dicatur orantia.' nec dubie... (3) amicitia: for the argument see the summary above, p. 216. It is true that there is some lack of cogency: Q. accepts the ambiguous rhetorice even though he has rejected oratoria and oratrix for presenting precisely the same ambiguity. But at least rhetorice avoids the need for any dura interpretatio: a consideration to which he will return in 4 ('indecora in Latinum sermonem mutatione'). nec dubie: used in the same concessive sense at 3.4. 1. We have punctuated what follows to show that, as in that parallel passage, uerum introduces the reply to the concession, and to make it clear that nos... substantiam (note the asyndeton) is parallel to, but contrasts with, nec dubie... habet. quoque: some such supplement seems essential to make Q.'s point, that in Greek prjropiKri is ambiguous between noun and adjective (though we might prefer to say that it is always an adjective) just as he has told us oratoria and oratrix are. If the supplement is not made, we seem to be left with the implication that prjropiK-q is ambiguous in Greek as well as in Latin. But we have not been told that it is ambiguous in Latin (if that makes any sense), and one would expect rather the statement that it is ambiguous in Latin as well as in Greek. In any case, Q. would seem from §4 to regard rhetorice as a Greek word even in its Latin garb. intellectum: 'meaning', cf. e.g. 1. 5. 2 (and OLD s.v. 5) and the similar use of vovs (LSI s.v. III). 14. 3 adpositum: cf. 8. 6. 40 'eiriOerov, quod recte dicimus adpositum', and elsewhere in Q., to whom the noun is apparently unique (TLL s.v. appono 303. 80-304. 2). ars rhetorica, ut nauis piratica: Q. gives first (though, for his readers' sake in Latin) appositional p-qTopiK-q in the phrase most relevant, then a parallel (hence ut is indispensable, despite its omission in B) from another area. The parallel had to involve an adjective in -/CMS, with inevitable Greek connections; but Q. means it to be familiar Latin (cf. e.g. Liv. 34. 32. 18; whereas vavs 7T€tp(iTIKT) is not attested), as familiar as the comforting philosophia and amicitia. He avoids complicating matters by mentioning that piratica could be used as a noun (as he himself does in 3. 8. 44; his teachers still had doubts, according to 8. 3. 34). ut grammatice.. .oratoria: i.e. just as in translating ypapumTiKr} we want a noun litteratura, not an adjective, whether in -oria or -trix. From the suffix - trix female agent nouns are formed too, but that is not the issue here, litteratura: see n. on 2. 1. 4 litteraturam.
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id in rhetorice non fit: Spalding: 'in rhetorice, vocabulo Graeco, non tarn apta fit versio Latina, quam in altero grammatics? (e.g. oratura was impossible). We can mentally supply inverted commas around rhetorice here (and translate 'as in the case of the word rfietorice), i.e. Q. can be seen as switching code so as momentarily to imitate Greek speakers. As in 2. 15. 10 'de rhetorice', 2. 15. 36 'a rhetorice', 3. 5. 3 'in rhetorice' (cf. 1. 10. 18 'in musice'), the ending -e corresponds to -rj (this correspondence is conventional, see Adams, Bilingualism, 474-6), and the Greek dative is used as a stand-in for the Latin ablative (on this over-extension of the dative, see ibid. 498-9). 14. 4 philosophos et musicos et geometras: all words, in fact, that have already occurred in book 1 (philosophus e.g. in 1.1.23; the other two in 1.10.4). (It no longer matters what kind of words they are, adjectives or nouns; they are just meant to be instances of Greek words.) Apologies of Latin writers for Greek terminology are frequent (another instance from Q. is in 1. 6. 16);27 but Q.'s point here is that the overriding principle is to use nota uerba, and if these happen to be Greek words, so be it. nec uim adferam: see above on 1 secuntur. For this (strong) locution, cf. (literally) 1. 10. 32 ('pudicae domui'), 5. 14. 22 'uitae .. .ut hostis', OLD s.v. affero 9b; metaphorically 2.15.7 'Antonius... oculis populi Romani uim attulit' (cf. 8. 3. 5 'ferrum adfert oculis terroris aliquid'), 5. 13. 57 'communes loci... magnam uim animis iudicum adferunt', 8 pr. 21 'inuentis uim adferimus'. nominibus his: for this inversion cf. 2. 17. 1 in parte hac and TLL s.v. hie 2739. 33-48. The order hac de re below is normal enough. scripserat: the pluperfect seems to be used from the standpoint of Cicero after he disclaimed Inv. (see on 2. 15. 6 quos... probat) and wrote the later rhetorical works. Graeco nomine: the De Inventione was known to Q. as libri rhetorici (cf. 2. 15. 6). It was also known as Rhetorica; cf. J. Tolkiehn, 'Der Titel der rhetorischen Jugendschrift Ciceros', BPhXV 1918, 1196-1200. See also n. on 2. 17. 2 Cicero uero etiam... dicat 14. 5 igitur rhetorice: Q., after giving a resounding closure (note denique) to the discussion of terminology, uses his chosen word at the head of a new topic. What had been in effect a Greek word in inverted commas in §1 is now given citizen rights. cauillationis: as often, of hair-splitting over words (cf. 10. 7. 14 'infelix ilia uerbomm cauillatio'). According to Sen. Ep. 111.1, Cicero used it to translate oo
224
Commentary
wit [see L-P ad loc.]; is Seneca again referring to the first edition of the Academica, in particular to the passage which corresponded to Ac. 2. 75 ' . . . Stilbonem Diodorum Alexinum, quorum sunt contorta et aculeata quaedam sophismata (sic enim appellantur fallaces conclusiunculae)'? Cf. n. on 2. 14. 2 Plauti. arte...artifice... opere: the division is alluded to in 12. 10. 1 as the diuisio prima: ars is dealt with up to the end of Bk. 11, artifex in Bk. 12. 1-9, and opus in 12. 10. Horace's Ars Poetica can be viewed as organized according to a similar basic division, that of ars and artifex (on Norden's analysis of the structure, 1-294 is concerned with ars, 295-476 with the artifex); the issue is a contentious one, see the survey of opinions in N. Rudd, Horace, Epistles Book II and Epistle to the Pisones ('Ars Poetica*) (Cambridge, 1989), 21-5 and the much more elaborate treatment in C. O. Brink, Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles (Cambridge, 1963), at 20-40 and 244-71. Brink suggests plausibly that both the bipartite and the tripartite division were elementary principles of organization of Hellenistic handbooks not just on poetic theory. It will be clear that 2. 15-21 elaborates and formulates justifications for formal rhetoric which Q. could easily leave unexpressed in most circumstances: the body of the work simply deals with ars. And it is clear from 1 pr. 22 (which was, to judge from the description in Bk. 12 of the present passage as the prima diuisio, written at the time Q. had completed the whole work) that on another level Q. would regard the tripartite division as of no more than formal importance. For on the evidence of that passage, Q. saw his book as an orthodox ars, preceded, unusually (1 pr. 3-4), by remarks on earlier stages of education (2. 11. 1; 3. 1. 1) and by the quaestiones of 2. 15-21, and followed by a discussion, even fuller than Cicero's, of the perfect orator in person; this is compatible with the use of the tripartite division in the present passage if we accept that it represents an element of Theoriebildung which Quintilian found useful for the argument he wanted to make, but whose irrelevance to the actual practice he acknowledged. ea est bene dicendi scientia: the definition established in 2. 15, culminating in §38. percepit: 'artifex est ille, qui iam percepit, discipulus qui cum maxime percipit': Spalding, commenting on the variant percipit (A); cf. 1. 10. 34 'prodesse earn [sc. geometriam] non, ut ceteras artis, cum perceptae sint sed cum discatur existimant'. cuius est summa bene dicere: the reXos, intimately associated with the definition just foreshadowed, and tied in with it at 2. 15. 38. The Greek term is successively explained there by 'summum et ultimum' and 'finis... et summum'. summa is employed in a very similar way (cf. OLD s.v. 7a) at 2. 16. 11 (where see n. on 'eos qui... rettulerunt'); for 2. 17. 25 see ad loc.
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bona oratio: ambiguous between 'a good speech' and 'good speaking' in general (for which cf. 12. 10. 1 'oratio pluresque eius formae', at the start of the discussion of the opus; the translators there tend to be too restrictive), the product of the uir bonus dicendi peritus (12. 1. 1: the definition of the orator given at the start of discussion of the artifex). The phrase, which does not recur in Q., is employed here to parallel bene dicendi and bene dicere. An individual speech might be 'good' by ordinary standards, but defective from an ethical standpoint; thus (11. 1. 11) Socrates judged Lysias' speech in his defence a 'defensionem.. .bonam quidem, sed parum sibi conuenientem' (Q. proceeds to mention the 'bene dicendi finem'). In an inconspicuous way, Q. is beginning his argument here by introducing good speech as the result of the science of speaking well (cf. 2. 15. 26) being applied by the good man (see p. xlii). diducuntur in species: on the use of diducere of partition and division, where the notion of setting things apart is prevalent, see TLL s.v. 1019. 63-1020. 3; for the slightly different deducere see n.on 2. 4. 22 hi quoque... solent.
Chapter Fifteen We have to examine what rhetoric is. There are (1) those who do not link rhetoric and morality and who assign no moral import to the words rhetorice and orator [the diuisio in 2 introduces further distinctions within this group, thus laying out the course of the chapter down to 32; see p. 232); almost all o f them believe that the main purpose o f rhetoric is to achieve persuasion (3). Among them, there are (1. 1) those who regard rhetoric as a uis, an ars, or a scientia, but in each case without a moral implication and without considering rhetoric a uirtus: 3-23. Cicero too connected rhetoric with persuasion, and he saw that rhetoric, if at all, aims at persuasion through speech ( 6 - 9 ) , although even this is too broad (11). Moreover, if persuasion is a crucial feature o f rhetoric, the orator who fails to persuade forfeits his name (12). Within this class, various other qualifications, mostly relating to the scope of rhetoric, have been made; they, however, do not go to the core o f the matter (13-23). And ( 1 . 2 ) there are those who give it a lower and sometimes downright negative status as usus, KaKOTexfiu. etc.: 23-32. In a number o f cases, such views stem from a misreading o f Platonic dialogues, which on a more sophisticated interpretation support the opposite view. Finally, after 32 come (2) those definitions which give a moral dimension to rhetoric. Some identify rhetoric with another discipline, politics or philosophy (33-4). My preferred definition is the 'science o f speaking well', which is Stoic in origin (34, 38).
Commentary
226
The present chapter considers the question quid sit rhetorice by reviewing either definitions of rhetoric which have been offered by rhetoricians and philosophers or statements of the goal of rhetoric (re'Ao? formulae), which Q. evidently considers as also representing (or suggesting) an answer to the question. At the end of the chapter he states what he considers an adequate answer, and the discussion of views leading up to that point is clearly structured in such a way as to enhance the plausibility of his favoured solution. In a nutshell, Q.'s position is that the goal of rhetoric is bene dicere ('to speak well') as opposed to persuadere, on the grounds that the latter is morally neutral in the sense that persuasion can be brought about by bad people and for bad purposes; cf. 11. 1. 11 'quo uel solo patet non persuadendi sed bene dicendi finem in oratore seruandum, aim interim persuadere defonne sit'. Q.'s view that definitions and reAo? formulae both in principle qualify as answers to the question manifests itself in the use of the term finis in two senses in the body of the chapter (and beyond), 'definition' and 'goal' (reAo?).28 Q. does not seem to see a problem in this ambiguity, apparently on the grounds that a Te'Ao? maybe inferred from a definition; conversely, naming it may be an economical way to refer to a definition. This integral relationship of the two concepts is pointed out at the end of the chapter, in §38; a few sections earlier (34), where Q. finally reveals his position, he once uses finitio in contradistinction to finis, which shows that he could bring added focus to the discussion if he considered it necessary (on both passages see nn.). This view of the relationship between definition and re'Aos is not Q.'s invention: provided it is agreed that all rc'xvai are the same in type, that is, that they function in the same way qua ordered bodies of knowledge, one can distinguish r€yyo.i with reference to their subject-matter or with reference to their re'Ao?.29 Moreover, we have a criterion at our disposal for establishing the sense of finis at issue in a given passage (not stated explicitly by Q., but see n. on 38 nam... dicere). The criterion is that definitions and reX-q both typically have a particular lingustic form: definitions are built around a noun or noun phrase which 28
T h e m e a n i n g ' d e f i n i t i o n ' is first f o u n d in Q . (and n o t m u c h in use later, t h o u g h n o t e Apul.
Socr. 13 'ut fine c o m p r e h e n d a m ' , very reminiscent o f Q.'s language; b u t it is n o t a coinage his, as is s h o w n b y 5. 10. 5 4 ' . . . ex finitione seu fine; n a m u t r o q u e m o d o traditnr'):
of
TLL s.v. 7 9 5 .
2 7 - 3 9 ; finis in t h e sense 'goal' f r o m Cic. Inv. 1 . 6 o n w a r d s ( T L L s.v. 7 9 5 . 4 9 ) . See also n. o n 3 4 finitio 29
below. F o r a hierarchy o f r i y y a i — w h i c h involves distinguishing r e x v a i from o n e a n o t h e r — s e e
Galen, Protr. 5 Kaibel; cf. Thras.
v. 8 5 9 . 5 - 7 Kiihn: TO TC'AOS O Aoyo? ifcvpioKct
KpirijfHov airdvTOii' RUTi> Kara ras T e x a s ' 1} y a p roc ouoraots
dirdoi/s
Kavova re
r e ^ i ' i j ? TY/V dp\V''
xal
cvrevOcv
etXrj
1. 1 8 8
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227
usually gives some initial generic categorization of the definiendum (e.g. scientia bene dicendi) and continues with qualifications (adjectival attributes or gerunds in the genitive), while the central element of a reXos is an infinitive (this applies in Latin as well as Greek). This can be paralleled from other texts, notably Sextus' Adv. Rhet., which uses the same syntactical markers as Q.: a opos takes the form 'is x?, where xis a noun (e.g. 2), while a reXos takes the form 'is x!, where x is an infinitive (e.g. 61). (Indeed, his whole discussion separates off consideration of opoi from consideration of re'Xr). When, in the course of his reX-q discussion, he cites a opos, it is because it has its rcAo? embedded in it [62].) Both Q. and Sextus have and use the resources to mark the difference between opoi and reXrj syntactically, which suggests that, when Q. called formulations of both kinds fines, he saw no problem in this practice (see again n. on 38 nam... dicere); but there is no denying that the use of finis in two senses is a source of confusion for the modern reader, esp. in 21-2 (witness also the entry in the TLL s.v. finis 795. 65-6). 3 0 Next, the question of sources, which must be considered in two stages, first from a general point of view, and then in the light of some features of the structure of the chapter. Since Q. in this chapter argues towards a Stoic definition of rhetoric, demolishing rival definitions in the process, Ludwig Radermacher suggested that a Stoic source, i.e. a doxographical survey of definitions of rhetoric appraised and criticized from a Stoic point of view, was the basis of Q.'s discussion, and he thought it was possible to put a name to it too: Diogenes of Babylon, who, as we know, had made detailed pronouncements on rhetoric (see SVF iii. 235-43 and pp. xliv f. of our Introduction). A certain degree of overlap with Sextus' Adv. Rhet. seemed to support this view, since Sextus is well known to have 'used' Stoic sources and to have submitted them to sceptical scrutiny. But this last point, while fair in general, does not universally apply to the books Adv. Math, (for instance, Adv. Gramm.), and if 3o We offer a full list of instances o f finis in Q. ( D — definition, G = goal, using the syntactical test where necessary): 2. 15. 3 D; 2. 1 5 . 4 D (?); (2. 15. 5 officium (with infinitive)!; 2 . 15. 6 G; 2. 1 5 . 9 D (if the reference back is t o 3 ) ; 2 . 1 5 . 1 0 D ; 2 . 15. 10 G; 2. 15. 11 G (for it apparently picks up Theodectes'formulation, and is itself picked up in 12); 2. 15. 12 G; 2. 15. 13 D; 2. 15. 14 G ; 2. 15. 14 G; 2. 15. 16 D (fities alluding to two uis definitions); 2. 15. 19 D; 2 . 15. 22 G; 2 . 15. 2 2 dissimiles sc. fines, where the following example ('uis uidendi et e l o q u e n d i . . . ' ) makes it clear that the meaning is 'definitions'; 2 . 15. 34 D (following finitio); 2 . 15. 35 G; 2. 15. 3 7 summarizing all the fines that h a w preceded (see n.); 2. 15. 38 G; 2. 15. 38 G; 2 . 16. 11 D; (from here onwards occurrences o f finis are m u c h less controversial] 2. 17. 2 2 G ('ad quem tendant'); 2. 17. 2 3 G; 2. 17. 2 5 G ( o f medicine); 2. 17. 2 5 G; 2. 17. 2 6 G; 2. 17. 34 G ('qui in persuadendo finem putant'); 2. 17. 41 D ( o f arsr. 'ars constat e x . . . ' ) ; 2. 17. 41 G ('ad finem utUemuitae'within the definition); 2. 18. 1 G ; 2 . 21. 3 G ; 3 . 5. 1 2 G ( ' s i t n e uirtus finis?'); 3. 8. 42 G ('suasoris finis est utilitas'); 5. 10. 5 4 D ('finitione seu fine'); 5. 11. 3 4 G; 5. 11. 35 G; 7. 3. 2 0 D (alongside finitio); 7. 3. 25 D; 8. 3. 11 G ('ad solum finem laudis et gloriae tendat'); 11. 1. 11 G (apparently); 12. 9. 6 G ('finem praestabit').
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Commentary
one sets out in a table how much overlap there is between Q. and Sextus in the section which is 2.15 in Q. (see the Appendix), it emerges that, while there are numerous points of contact, the differences in arrangement are so profound that the assumption of a shared Stoic source loses any explanatory value, and that it is more appropriate to the facts to think of a shared doxographical source, drawn up by a rhetorician, and much supplemented by Q. from elsewhere (this will be argued for in detail in the notes, e.g. 5; see again the Appendix). The presence of similar discussions (cf. e.g. pp. 53. 18-57. 21, 64. 11-66. 4, 103. 6-105. 13, 164. 8-166. 14) in the Prolegomena edited by Rabe (none of them, however, close enough to our passage here to make an inquiry into a 'shared source' in the narrow sense an interesting endeavour) demonstrates in principle the existence of such texts (if proof was needed); it can also be shown that the collections of material on which the Prolegomena (and Q.) draw were organized on the same principles as the tradition of the Placita philosophorum (cf. e.g. the question types— t o et eon, t o rt' ion, t o OTTOLOV TI ion KCLI t o Sta TL ionv—in Proleg. p. 1. 2-3). 31 Furthermore, Diogenes of Babylon, while interested in political philosophy and rhetoric, no longer appears as great an innovator as he once did, at least in the field of rhetoric. We also have to note that, while Q.'s position may be informed by a single Stoic source, the exposition of his argument is highly unlikely to depend on it in its structure and arrangement. This will become clear if we consider some details of the structure of the passage as set out above. Q. does not proceed chronologically. Within the section dubbed 1. 1 in the summary above Q. to some extent (see also nn.on 2) conforms to the uis-scientia-ars framework, but not rigorously (often he only gives the t€Ao?). More importantly, we have a growth from the simple persuasion definition (3), which becomes more complex as it is adapted to meet more and more objections. This part stops at §14, where we turn to a new sort of elaboration of the persuasion-centred definition: according to the scope given to rhetoric by the various definers (15 'addita sunt his alia uarie...'). In §§15-18 we have those who think rhetoric is concerned with every subject; in §§19-22 those who limit it to ciuiles quaestiones. These paragraphs complete the survey of opinions but are not designed to further undermine 'persuasion' as a defining feature of rhetoric. Returning to the question of Q.'s source we can now observe that it would be very unusual for Diogenes of Babylon or indeed any Stoic of the Hellenistic period to arrange a discussion in this manner, simply because Stoics did not advance arguments in this 'doxographic' sort of way; they did not believe, as 31
52-5.
This w a s first p o i n t e d o u t by Rabe, ' H a n d s c h r i f t e n . See further Mansfeld,
Prolegoitiem,
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e.g. the Peripatetics did, that something could be gained by reviewing the commonly held opinions on a given subject. A rhetorician by contrast might well impose some kind of order on a collection of material, but would not normally arrange it in such a way as to arrive by elimination at a Stoic position; this is, as far as we can see, uniquely Q.'s view. We add some miscellaneous points. First, 'definition' is a somewhat vague term. Not all those cited here had the same standards of defining (see also n. on 35 sunt plures.. .pertinent). At least one definition discussed in this chapter is composed from a section of a Platonic dialogue (and is therefore neither a definition that was 'given' nor one that was held by a historical individual of the same name as the character in the dialogue). Moreover, Granatelli2 845-7 observes that the section includes a number of 'typedefinitions', which cast a view held simultaneously by a number of different individuals or ascribed to them by Q. in the standard form of a definition.32 Second, it is possible that for the material from which this chapter is constructed Q. was indebted to Celsus (see Wohrer 135, as well as our nn. on 2. 15. 22, and 32 Cornelius Celsus, 17. 23 tendit quidem... qui dicit, 17. 25 oratori bene dixisse finis est); but for Celsus rhetoric was morally neutral, and he will have given a briefer treatment of definitions of rhetoric, and what he did provide will have been arranged on different principles. But he could well be the source of many of the translations of Greek definitions (that by Theodorus of Gadara in §21 is a special case, however, because there was apparently a Latin translation of his re^n?—or of one of his re^vou).33 The interpretation of Plato's Grg. will surely be indebted to earlier treatments, given the canonical status the dialogue had as a text on rhetoric, but it does so much to support Q.'s argument for the position he ultimately commits himself to that here too we have to assume a fair degree of independence (see pp. 238-9 and n. on 22 persuasibiliter). Earlier discussions of this section include Spengel (still very useful) and Cope; L-P i. 131-7 and 190-4 should also be consulted. 15. 1 quid sit: sc. quaeritur (cf. 3. 6. 77 'quaeritur quid sit actio'; 3. 8. 33; 5. 10. 54) or tractandum est (cf. 2. 14. 5 fin.). rhetorice: the word argued for in 2. 14. 1-4. finitur: the verb was not used by Cicero in the sense of'define', first attested in Vitruvius 2. 1. 8 'finire... terminationibus eius (sc. architecturae) species', then occasionally in technical prose (Cels. 1 pr. 57) and Seneca (Ep. 89. 5). Semantic extension under the influence of opt&iv seems likely. 3 2 See n n . o n 3 estigitur... persuadendi, oporteat, 36 ciuiliwti officiorum.
34 rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam, 35
idem...
T h e very fact that it is a special case precludes the argument that the highlighting o f the use o f someone else's translation in §21 suggests independence elsewhere; but see also n . o n 12 Apollodorus. 35
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Commentary
quidem: in its conventional use, correlating with sed(pcv... 8e) and giving emphasis to finitur: 'while there are many definitions of rhetoric, the question is basically a twofold one'. quaestionem habet duplicem: for the expression, cf. 7. 2. 8. Q. is not simply saying that a twofold question is being raised by the subject-matter. Rather, he makes a comment on the debate that is on his view going on in his source material. aut enim... dissensio est: definitions vary, but underlying them are two problems, different in kind and importance: what sort of thing is rhetoric? and (when that is determined) how should a definition of it be phrased? The first is crucial; the second is unnecessarily complicated by people keen to produce a new statement of an old position. Q. is thus saying that some of the manifold differences in the definitions of rhetoric are due to real differences of opinion, others to disagreements about wording. He will be relying on this distinction below, e.g. when he declares different definitions to be identical in substance; in 37 the desire to be original is cited as one possible motivation for casting an old idea in unusual language (see also 14). qualitas ipsius rei and comprensio uerborum are not organizing principles for this chapter in the sense that they give a diuisio. comprensione uerborum: 'expression in words'. The uses of compre(he)ndere and compre(he)nsio (for the variations in spelling see Winterbottom6 58) as technical terms, in the first instance in connection with definitions and defining, but also more generally, merit a survey. If we consider the natural translation of passages bearing on definitions, defining, and related matters, we seem to find one main meaning, viz. 'put into words', 'express', with the noun 'expression' (cf. OLD s.v. comprehendo 10a): so 2. 15. 4 'finem artis temere comprendit, dicens . . ; 2. 15. 35 'finis hoc modo comprensus'; 7. 3. 18 'si quando firme comprehendi potent breui complexu uerborum finitio'; Sen. De vita beata 4. 1 'potest aliter quoque definiri bonum nostrum, id est eadem sententia non isdem comprendi uerbis', cf. Q. 2. 15. 1 'aut de qualitate ipsius rei aut de comprensione uerborum dissensio' (our passage) and 5. 10. 61 'diligentem finitionis comprensionem'; Cic. Att. 12. 21. 1 'uerbis... pluribus rem eandem comprehenderat', so 7. 3. 12 (as emended by MW): 'quae [finitiones] idem sentiunt non isdem uerbis comprehendantur' (in what follows at least the opposition of 'sensu non pugnant' and 'comprehensione dissentiant' is certain). 2. 15. 11 ('sed ne hoc quidem satis est comprehensum') will then mean: 'even by this definition not enough is expressed' (cf. Sen. Clem. 2. 3. 1 'ne una finitio parum rem comprehendat'). Note also 12. 2. 19 'cum sint multa propriis breuibusque comprensionibus finienda', 'defined in "proper" and brief terms' (cf. Decl. min. 247. 2 'hoc finitione comprehendendum est'). For a slight
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extension, note 2. 15. 20 'popularem... comprendendo persuasionem', 'by expressing the persuasion as being of the people', i.e. 'specifying popular persuasion' (but 'including', cf. OLD s.v. 7e, is tempting there; cf. e.g. 3. 4. 5, 3. 6. 28; Decl. min. 249. 8 'nec lex utique ullo scripto hoc comprehendit, ut.. 'the law does not include the specific provision that...'). In some of these cases the root meaning of the word—'to grasp, to seize'— can arguably be felt, and the nomen actionis formed from the verb can exhibit some verbal force too, as is common in nouns of this formation. In the case of the verb this is occasionally brought out by suitable adverbs like temere in 2. 15. 4, while in the case of the noun verbal force may be brought out by adjectives qualifying the noun (diligens in 5. 10. 61). Unsurprisingly, these qualifications tend to come from a limited number of semantic fields; the frequency of breuiter is striking, though: there is some sense of encapsulation in words. In the present passage, the contrast with qualitas ipsius rei suggests that the phrase comprensio uerborum means 'expression in words', but literally 'the grasping by means of the words' (uerborum is subjective genitive; passages like Sen. De uita beata 4. 1 cited above show that the verbal phrase is 'uerbis rem comprendere'), that is, the way in which one grasps the res ipsa (about which in itself there is no disagreement under this second quaestio) with the words. In 2. 15. 11 (quoted above; and see n. ad loc.), there might seem to be a connotation of 'scope' (Ammendola sees that in the present passage and translates 'estensione delle parole'). Q. says that a definition is too wide and that it sometimes does not apply, but the fact that both these ideas are covered by comprehensum suggests otherwise, and the notion of expressing something in words can be invoked to explain other instances where scope might be an issue (e.g. 5. 10. 61, cited above): if a definition includes too few restrictions, it covers too many things. In 12. 2.13, 'dialectic useful in finitiones and comprehensiones\ comprehensio means 'notion' or 'concept' (/mi-dA^ts), cf. Cic. Fin. 3. 17; concepts and definitions (which articulate them) are a subject of inquiry for epistemology, which the Stoics treated under the heading 'dialectic'. For compre(he)nsio in the sense of 'periodic sentence' cf. e.g. 9. 4. 115, cf. OLD s.v. 4a. prima atque praecipua: alliteratively paired e.g. at Tac. Dial. 32. 5; cf. also 10. 2. 1. opinionum... differentia: differentia opinionum is implicitly contrasted with differentia uerborum, on the distinction just made. sententiae accedimus: accedere (cf. 29) has an official tone ('to concur'), see TLL s.v. 262. 53-67 and Stockert on Plaut. Aul. 383. bonis demum: see 33 uirum bonum with n.
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Commentary
15. 2. Q. begins by discussing those conceptions of rhetoric which do not imply a necessary connection between morality and rhetoric. The list of topics given broadly indicates the structure of the section: 3-18 uis, 19-20 scientia sed non uirtus, 21-2 ars a scientia et uirtute diiuncta (but 22 includes a Mis-definition), 23 usus (misplaced in the summary) and Kaxorcxvia (cf. Athenaeus in 23). Rhetorical and philosophical thinking had produced numerous generic categorizations of rhetoric, and the passage provides a survey of them, as well as a first approach to the question how these relate to morality. Thus uis and usus are neutral categories, with no inbuilt claim about the morality of the orator; from Plato onwards, terms of similar import, esp. 8vvapas and efxneipia, are used to emphasize the irrationality of rhetoric (whereas an art is accountable in the sense that it puts one in a position to name reasons and causes; see Blank, pp. xxii-xxiv). Ars!rexvr) can be used in a neutral way, e.g. by rhetoricians who want rhetoric to be an art but not a virtue, but since an art—on the common understanding of the term—was something that was beneficial, one can already see how the idea of morality might come in (a rexw) of> say, witchcraft would have been inconceivable). But in a Stoic context, where virtue itself may be conceived as similar in structure and function to an art (see e.g. Striker, 'Antipater'), its presence in an orator is linked to that person's morality; scientia (crrioTripLr)) can be used in a neutral way, e.g. by later Peripatetics (it is not the position of Ar. Rhet.; see note on 19 Ariston), but is tied to morality for the Stoics (cf. 20), and for Q. too. On rhetoric as a virtue see ch. 20 with commentary. autem: without contrasting function here, cf. OLD s.v. 5a: 'now'. dicendi facultatem: it is Q.'s position that strictly speaking rhetoric is only present in the uir bonus. At the same time, he of course does not want to deny that there are persuasive speakers who are untrained, or evil. Therefore, he needs an expression which denotes the faculty of persuasive speech in this neutral way: facultas dicendi. Cf. 2. 20. 2 'nam et fuisse multos et esse nonnullos existimo qui facultatem dicendi ad hominum perniciem conuerterint'. Cicero has no need for this conceptual distinction; he uses the phrase in the straightforward sense of'eloquence' (e.g. de Orat. 1. 84). uim: cf. 3 8vvafj,tv. For rhetoric as the capacity (as opposed to rexvq) of speaking, taken in an abstract sense, but necessarily residing in an individual, cf. Ar. Rhet. 46, 1362b22 8vvapus TOV Ac'yetv; this is not in itself a technical philosophical use (ibid. 1362 b 28-9 Ar. says he has been giving widely accepted views; and cf. LSJ s.v. II. 1). (Contrast .41, 1355b26-7, where Ar. is setting out his own views: &JTOJ 8rj prjTopiKrj 8vvapus nepi eKaarov TOV Oeajprjoai TO iv8exd^vovrnOavov;see also Kirwan on Met. Al 1). Cf. Cic. Ac. 1. 32 oratoria uis dicendi, where, however, no contrast with rhetoric as an art is implied.
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8vvap,is does occasionally occur in Greek definitions of rhetoric, cf. e.g. Sopater's definition of rhetoric as Sum/xi? XoyiK-q iv 7rpdyp.ATI TTOXITLK<1) (Proleg. p. 217. 14-15). On the 8vvap.is of rhetoric as something that can be used well or ill see Rh. Gr. iv. 25. 11-12. On the use of uis to render 8vvap.is see A. Ernout, Vis-vires-vis', £P/i3 28 (1954), 165-97, at 176-7. usum: corresponding to iixireipia or Tpifiri (cf. e.g. Plat. Grg. 463 b 4 with Dodds ad loc.). KaKOTcxviav: an art deliberately aiming at evil ends (see 2. 20. 2, with our n.). This is perfectly compatible with rhetoric's being as systematic as a proper rex^rj (see ibid.); Barnes 9 gives black magic as an example. 15. 3 hi fere: 'these people, generally speaking...', cf. OLD s.v. fere 3a; contrast 1 pr. 4 'ceteri fere...'. apte ad persuadendum: means no more than 'in a manner calculated to persuade', and is equivalent to persuasibiliter (below, §§14 and 22); there is no allusion to decorum, despite Gudeman on Tac. Dial. 30. 5 (see also Leg. 1. 63). Similar are accommodate/adposite ad persuadendum (see below on 5 Cicero... (6) persuadere). orandi: of the verbs meaning 'speak in public', orare is the one which is most emotive. The word in all its meanings was felt to be archaic in Cicero's time, and as such both formal and heightened (see Heerdegen, who surveys the uses oforareand the development of its meaning over time). Cicero uses it frequently in the meaning 'to request' in the religious formula oro atque obsecro. The phrase causam orare 'to plead a cause' is only once attested in Cicero (Quinct 43; for litem orare cf. de Orat. 2. 43, Off. 3. 43). The verb first occurs in a related sense in Lex XII, tab. 1. 6 (see M. Crawford, Roman Statutes (London, 1966), ii. 592-6); cf. Paul. Fest p. 218. 6-8 'orare antiquos dixisse pro agere, testimonio sunt et oratores', which gives a sense of how later writers interpreted early occurrences of the word. Among Silver Latin writers orare regained some currency, maintaining its emotive force; see Heerdegen 66-75. Heerdegen goes on to discuss instances in Q. on pp. 76-9, arguing for the view that, whereas orare is normally emotive in Silver Latin writers, in Q. it is primarily used in the sense 'to speak in a manner informed by rhetorical theory' (e.g. 3. 3. 1 'omnis autem orandi ratio, ut plurimi maximique auctores tradiderunt, quinque partibus constat'). However, if orare were primarily used to refer to technical rhetoric in Q., this would not in itself be incompatible with his employing it emotively, given his conception of rhetoric. In fact, there are numerous instances of an emotive use of orare without a suggestion that technical rhetoric is at issue (e.g. 2. 16. 1 'orandi uiribus'; 10. 1. 76; 12. 11. 30). dicere would have been unsuitable here also because of the earlier in dicendo. See also n.on 2. 14. 1 rhetoricen.
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Commentary
munus: given the occasional lack of clarity on the meaning of finis (re'Ao? or opo?; see the introductory note on this ch.), one wonders about the meaning of munus. But it is here used in the non-technical sense of'function' (Russell), and serves to bring the technical finis below into relief; the implicit contrast is between a loose understanding of what public speech is supposed to do and a full-blown theoretical conception. In its meaning munus here is therefore very close to summa in 2. 16.11 (see n. on eos qui... rettulerunt). It cannot stand in for epyov here as used in Ar. Rhet. A1, 1355b 10-14, which is translated as ojficium in §5 (see n.on ojficium.. .(6) finem), although it must mean much the same (see our note on 6 etiam, and cf. 2. 1. 8 grammatiees munus). id enim... sit: this explains why Q. puts these writers on rhetoric (hi) with those 'qui dicendi facultatem a . . . laude secernunt'. It also works towards setting up the contrast with Q.'s preferred goal of rhetoric, bene dicere, which is to be achieved by good men only (see the introductory note to c. 20). finis: 'definition'. est igitur... persuadendi: Granatelli" ad loc. rightly says this is only a definition-type, not to be attributed to any particular author; see p. 229 n. 32. For other 'types' see nn. on 34 rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam, 35 idem... oporteat, 36 ciuilium ojficiorum. 8vvafj.iv: cf. n.on 2 uim above. 15. 4 haec opinio: sc. the view that rhetoric is a uis persuadendi. si tamen: = si modo (as in 9. 2. 55); K-S ii. 429 (12b). re uera: the scholarly discussion on a TCXv11] by Isocrates isreviewed,and the question resolved, by K. Barwick, 'Das Problem der isokrateischen Techne', Philologus, 107 (1963), 43-60. The ars Q. is referring to here (about which Cicero had heard but which he had not seen; cf. Cic. Inv. 2. 7) is indeed highly unlikely to be Isocratean, for given Q.'s use of the term ars, it must be a technical handbook, and it is unlikely—in the light of chronology and the emergence of the earliest rhetorical handbooks, and more so given Isocrates' views on rhetorical theory (cf. Or. 13. 14-8, 15. 180-92)—that Isocrates wrote such a handbook. Nevertheless, there is evidence for Isocratean re^mi/artes (note the plural) which is not obviously open to scepticism; cf. Radermacher, Art. Scr. 155 (fr. 14), 156 (fr. 16). This evidence is readily explained by the observation that in the late fifth and early fourth century the term re^r? could be used to denote a model speech, from which novices were to infer what a speech should look like (K. Reinhardt, cit. Barwick 47; Cole 80-2). Later, the use of Tc'xvr) = technical manual came to prevail, which lead to misinterpretation of the texts which speak of Isocratean rexvat. Nor would the plural create suspicion, for in the later Hellenistic period re^cu came to be used in the sense of 'technical manual in more than one book' (cf. the references to
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Ar. Rhet. as r^vai in Dion. Hal., Ad Amm. 1-2 and Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 8). Cope 29 suggests that Sextus' notice in Adv. Rhet. 62 (VaoK-parrj? r]oi [xrjSiv dXXo imTrjSeveiv TOVS prjropas rj €nioTrip,r)v netdovs) may be taken from the pseudo-Isocratean rex^rj, but it seems certain that that work used the actual words naOovs Syniovpyos, which Sextus seems to have regarded as Platonic in origin (2). circumfertur: cf. n.on 2. 13. 15 circumferuntur. longe sit: cf. 8 pr. 3 'ab eloquentia longissime fuerint' (also 1. 6. 34); TLL s.v. longns 1647. 56-62. finem... comprendit: cf. 5. 10. 61 'Illud quoque differens uocant, cum genere in species deducto species ipsa discernitur. Animal genus, mortale species, terrenum uel bipes differens; nondum enim proprium est, sed iam differt a marino uel quadrupede: quod non tam ad argumentum pertinet quam ad diligentem finitionis comprensionem.' There finitio clearly means 'definition'; for comprensio 'expression, grasping, seizing', qualified by diligens (analogous to temere here), see n.on 1 comprensione uerborum.The parallel does tell in favour of the meaning 'definition'; that is also the sense of the immediately preceding instance of finis (2.15.3), but'goal' is that of the next instance (2.15. 6). We should, however, note that issues of proper expression may arise in connection with re'Aos-formulae too; so it is not in itself compelling to carry over the sense 'definition' for finis from 5.10.61 just because we find comprendere here used in a manner analogous to comprensio there. If finis meant 'goal' here, then the idea would have to be that a finis is implied by the phrase persuadendi opifex. tt€i6ovs Br)p.iovpyos: Plato probably coined the expression himself (Dodds on Grg. 453a2 points out that the personification is typically Platonic). For other (fanciful) attributions see Radermacher, Art. Scr. 30 (e.g. Amm. Marc. 30. 4. 3 says it is Tisias', 'with Gorgias' assent'). mihi permiserim: cf. 1.4. 3; Sen. Con. 1. 2. 22 'hoc... uitium aiebat Scaurus a Graecis dedamatoribus tractum, qui nihil non et permiserint sibi et impetrauerint'. declinatione: 'coinage' (Russell). The word is used widely in grammatical contexts (TLL s.v. II. B. 3-4); so too the verb (TLL s.v. declino C.b). For our sense, cf. 8. 6. 32 'uix ilia, quae 77^77-0117/xeW uocant, quae ex uocibus in usum receptis quocumque modo declinantur nobis per mittimus, qualia sunt "sullaturit" [from Sulla]'; so here suada is 'made' from suadeo. Ennius M. Cethegum 'Suadae medullam' uocat: Ann. 304-8 Skutsch 'additur orator Cornelius suauiloquenti | ore Cethegus Marcus... |... is dictus popularibus ollis | qui turn uiuebant homines atque aeuom agitabant | flos delibatus populi Suadaeque medulla'. The primary source is Brut. 57-60, where Cicero comments: a> quam uocant Graeci, cuius effector est orator [!],
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Commentary
hanc Suadam appellauit Ennuis.' For full modern commentary see Skutsch ad loc., Powell on Cic. Sen. 50. There is no other evidence for the oratory of Cethegus (consul 204 BC). Ammianus,likeQ., avoided the coinage, translating 'suasionis opifex' (30.4. 3), while Horace used Suadela for the goddess (Ep. 1. 6. 38). medulla means 'inmost part' (OLDs.v. 2a) and hence 'essence' (OLDs.v. 5); see also R. B. Onians, The Origins of European Thought (Cambridge,21954), 149-51. Q. cites the desire to avoid suada as the reason why he translates persuadendi, but that does not explain why he did not use persuasio (cf. 19). 15. 5 apud Platonem... suam: in a number of texts we find a complex definition of p-qropiK-fi with the phrase neidovs 8r)n,iovpyos as its core element which has been constructed from the exchange between Gorgias and Socrates in Grg. This definition is in the background of Q.'s argument in these sections. Fairly early in the Hellenistic era readers of Plato's dialogues started to assemble definitions from the texts, as is clear from the pseudo-Platonic Definitiones, essentially a collection of definitions generated in this way (a definition of p-qropiKr), however, is not included there). These definitions arguably go back to the early Academy; see H. G. Ingenkamp, Untersuchungen zu den pseudo-platonischen Definitional (Wiesbaden, 1967), and the survey in H. Flashar, Die Philosophic der Antike, iii: Altere Akademie—Aristoteles— Peripatos (Basel, 1983), 123 and 146. Given this origin of the practice, it is natural for the definitions thus drawn up to be assigned to Plato in the first instance, but reflective readers of the dialogues were of course aware of the fact that an argument apparently advanced by Socrates against an opponent did not necessarily reflect Plato's (or Socrates' views), because the ad hominem character of many of the arguments in the dialogues was taken into account or because Plato was read as a sceptic not intent on promoting doctrines anyway (see the commentary on §§24-8); for the history of the latter way of reading Plato see M. Bonazzi, Academici e Platonici: il dibattito antico sullo scetticismo di Platone (Milan, 2003). In a fragment of the Neoplatonist Plutarchus (fourth-fifth century AD; RE xxi/1 [1951] s.n., cols. 962-75), preserved in Proleg. p. 217. 4, we find this definition (the bracketed references give the origin of the various elements in Grg.): prjropiKrj ion Tiyy^ nepl Aoyou? to Kvpos €\ovoa [450 e 6, 451 A 6] 7T€i0ovs 8r)puovpyos [453 E 4, 454 A 2, 454 E 9] iv TTOAITIKOIS Aoyots [cf. 452 E 4] 7T€pt rravros rov irporeOevros 7TtoT€vriKrjs koli ov 8t8aoKa\tKrjs [455 A 1] (see
H. Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker [Berlin, 3 1912], ii. 241). Plutarchus attributed this definition to Gorgias himself, perhaps appreciating that Gorgias makes a much more substantial contribution to the advancement of the argument than Polus makes in his exchange with Socrates or that, while Socrates leads the discussion, he makes a point of having Gorgias
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confirm that he is not misrepresenting his views (e.g. 452 E 9-453 A 2). But generally this definition, and others like it, became in the rhetorical tradition attached to the name of Plato (sometimes, however, it was anonymous, e.g. Proleg. p. 278. 1 aAAot). We find essentially this definition discussed in Sextus, Adv. Rhet 2-5 and Proleg. p. 190. In Sextus we are told that Plato ioiKev.. AnoBiSovai this definition; its various stages are justified, in particular Sta Xoyajv on the grounds that many other things besides words persuade, e.g. beauty; the examples of Helen and Phryne are given to prove this last point. In Proleg. p. 190 the definition is directly attributed to Plato. 01 rov opov TTpoiaTapLcvoi —its supporters (not Plato himself)—are then said to justify the various stages on precisely the same lines as in Sextus, with the same examples. The whole section is summed up OVTCJS PCCV o ocxftos FlXdrajv (but this refers mainly to the definition itself rather than to the argument for it: it is the definition which the Proleg. goes on to criticize). Radermacher thought it possible to infer what the common source of Q. and Sextus looked like; he suggested it was 'ein Buch, das wahrscheinlich von stoischem Standpunkte aus geschrieben war und die verschiedenen Definitionen der Rhetorik kritisch beleuchtete' ('Studien zur Geschichte der griechischen Rhetorik', RhM2 52 (1897-8), 412-24, at 416-17). This seems hard to reconcile with the evidence: Sextus quotes the 'Platonic' definition in a context which sets out dogmatic views (as opposed to submitting dogmatic views to sceptical scrutiny); riXoooa>v anoSooeis napariOe p,€voi is his description of the process (1). Similarly in Proleg. the supporters of the definition, later to be criticized, are given a chance to state their case. Evidently what is common to Sextus and Proleg. (and to Q.) is not the method of refutation but the exposition of its various stages of the Platonic definition; and the cases of Helen and Phryne are not used to overthrow but to support one aspect of the definition. The ultimate common source of Sextus, the Proleg., and Q. is then one that put forward and supported the definition and, with or without ambiguity, attributed it to Plato. We might call it a doxographical source on definitions of rhetoric, compiled by a rhetorician rather than a philosopher (this is of course quite compatible with philosophical doxographical material on rhetoric being used in other sections of Adv. Rhet.). The topic would be discussed as a matter of course in all attacks on or defences of rhetoric (so probably Philod. Rhet. ii. 184). No doubt among these attacks and defences there are sources common to Sextus and Q. that explain further resemblances between the two and perhaps more directly explain the parallel discussion of the 'Platonic' definition. If these other sources were not put together by philosophers with an agenda of their own but were actually, as suggested above, doxographical texts on rhetoric
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compiled by rhetoricians, it would not be surprising if some of these other sources were available also to the author of the Proleg. However, given the way in which such traditions accumulate and develop over time, stating this does not imply that there was a coherent and extended text which Q., Sextus, and the Proleg. followed. In any case, these observations may help in understanding the present chapter of Q. One of its primary purposes was to deny that Plato ever thought rhetoric was a matter of mere persuasion, i.e. independent from the orator's morality. Q. implies that only careless reading of the Grg. (cf. also §24) could lead one to think this; the TTetOovs hypuovpyos definition originated with Isocrates, and if Gorgias said something like that in Plato {idem fere, which is disingenuous: Gorgias said, at the suggestion of Socrates, precisely that), Plato intends that to be taken as Gorgias' view, not his own (the same argument is used in Proleg. p. 191. 9 by another critic of the definition: ov8i yap viTO
TOV
nXarcovog ioriv o opos, aAX (Ls ano
TOV
Fopyiov
TOVTOV
€ior)V€yK€i>). The argument was obvious, and does not in itself prove that Q.'s refutation has a common source with the Proleg., despite Radermacher loc. cit., cf. Proleg. p. lxii. The parallels from Sextus and the rest throw light too on §§6-9. Q. argues that a definition which does not restrict the 'persuasion' element is unsatisfactory: 'et pecunia persuadet et gratia... etc.'. To give it a chance of being an 'ideoneus finis' (9) one must add 'uim dicendo persuadendi'. The cases of M'. Aquilius, Servius Galba, and Phryne show that other things besides words persuade. Q. is doing precisely the same as Sextus—he is showing why a definition turning on persuasion must include dicendo, 8ia Aoyojv. The fact that Q. proposes to reject the whole definition is for the moment irrelevant. It is incorrect to say (Radermacher in Sudhaus's edition of Philod. Rhet., suppl. p. xxii) that Q. 'das 8ia Xoyojv in der Gorgiasdefinition unterdriickt'. He merely delays it until 10 to provide a logical development. Sextus gives the definition in full at the beginning, and then explains it bit by bit. Q. starts with the barest bones, and builds it up in the face of objections. Some further general issues arise from the sentence under discussion. The nature of the source material on rhetoric, touched upon above already, will receive further discussion elsewhere (see the introductory note to ch. 17), as it needs consideration in a broader context, e.g. our knowledge of the sources Sextus Empiricus relied on in his attacks on the various fields of learning and expertise. Another issue is the different approaches to reading Platonic dialogues; on this see the commentary on §§24-8. A final point, connected with the last one, concerns the role the Grg. plays within the argument of 2. 14-21. If it is accepted that the argument for rhetoric's status as an art and
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a virtue is of Stoic provenance (see pp. xxxvii fif.), then it is clear that pointing out that the Grg. makes a necessary connection between true rhetoric and virtue diverts attention from this fact (see ibid. p. xlviii). However, that the Stoic position on rhetoric could be backed up by a reference to the Grg. is not necessarily Q.'s own idea: given what else we know about Stoics developing their doctrines in close interaction with Platonic dialogues, e.g. in the area of physics where the Tim. was important but esp. in the field of ethics (see Striker, 'Plato's Socrates', esp. 317-18 on Grg.), it seems very plausible that the Stoic idea of rhetoric is in crucial respects derived from the Gtg.: that the orator should 'know' what is good and just can be derived from 459 c-461 c (on which see also Olymp. in Grg. p. 56. 14 flf. Westerink), that he wants to make his fellow citizens as good as possible from 513 E-514 A (cf. Obbink-Vander Waerdt). This likely debt may have been made explicit in the sources on Stoic rhetoric which represented the basis of Q.'s knowledge on the matter. Gorgias... idem fere dicit: 453 A 2-7 Socr.: Xe'ycis oTinciOovs Brjpuovpyos €OTIV rj prjropiKrj ...rj €\€IS 71 ^yeiv erri rrXcov...; Gorg.: ovSapdis, a> Zaixpares, dXXd pot 8OK€IS ixavais opi^eoBac
eartv yap TOVTO TO K€dXaiov avrrjs.
Cicero...(6) persuadere: pluribus locis is a little casual. Cicero only asserts this to be the officium of rhetoric in the libri rhetorici (for the title see n. on 2. 14. 4 Graeco nomine), viz. at Inv. 1. 6 'officium . . . eius facultatis uidetur esse dicere adposite ad persuasionem', where he adds 'finis persuadere dictione'. In de Orat. 1. 138 one of the banal precepts learnt by Crassus is that 'oratoris officium esse dicere ad persuadendum accommodate' (in effect a cross-reference to Inv.); and this is picked up by Antonius in 1. 260. Comparable is Ac. 1. 32 'oratoria uis dicendi..., explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae'. Cf. above on 3 apte ad persuadendum. officium... (6) finem: in Inv. 1.6a distinction is drawn between officium and finis: 'officium... uidetur esse dicere adposite ad persuasionem; finis persuadere dictione'. This is the Aristotelian distinction between the epyov and the re'Xos of rhetoric; cf. Ar. Rhet. A\, 1355 b 10-14 . . . Kai OTL OV TO 7T€iaai €pr/OV avrrjs, dXXdro tSctv ra inrdpxovra ntOava nepi eKaorov, KaOdnep Kai ev rais aXXais T€\vais rrdoais ( o u S e yap larptKrjs t o vyia -rroirjoai, dXXd pe'xP1 ivSexcrat, p€\pi TOVTOV TTpoayayeiv COTIV yap Kai TOVS dbwdrovs ptraXafieiv vyieias opens depamvoai KaXais). Aristotle is here considering that rhetoric may not always persuade, just as other arts may not always achieve their goals, and he therefore makes a distinction between the ultimate goal of an art (re'Xos) and its normal occupation (epyov), which consists in working towards that goal to the best of one's ability (see Alpers-Golz 67; and n. on 11 at contra non persuadet semper orator, 19 Ariston, and nn. on 2. 17. 22-5.
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15. 6 etiam: 'furthermore'.34 Cicero (says Q.) in Inv. (1. 6, just cited) not only made persuasion an integral part of the 'duty' of rhetoric, but went so far as to assert that persuasion is its end (he went on to distinguish thus: 'in officio quid fieri, in fine quid effici conueniat consideratur'), thus coming uncomfortably close to positions disapproved by Q. above. But by writing 'dicere adposite ad persuadendum', and by specifying diction e, Cicero in fact evaded the objection that Q. brings up in 6-9. The fact is that, as Kiderlin2 351-2 saw, this whole sentence is out of place here; it would have been to the point in 10. Q. only makes it appear relevant to what immediately follows it by omitting, consciously or unconsciously, the restriction dictione. quos... probat: for Cicero's disclaimer see de Orat. 1. 5 ('incohata ac rudia'). Q. often mentions it (Adamietzon 3. 1. 20). sine dubio ('admittedly', or 'of course'?) concedes that Q.'s implied criticism of Cicero is overtaken by his own (ipse) later valuation of Inv. For a different use of sine dubio, see n. on 2. 10. 11.
uerum... uoce: Q. puts forward an objection to all persuasion-definitions that do not specify the use of speech. Cf. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 2, remarking that Plato perhaps made Gorgias qualify neidovg 8r)p,tovpyos with 8id Xoyajv precisely because 'there are many things apart from speech that work persuasion on men', KaOdirep nAovros KCLI 8O£CL KCLI F)8ovr) KCLI K&AAOS. Q. covers three of Sextus' headings in the same order: money, gratia et auctoritas et dignitas = 8o{;a, beauty. pecunia: the proverb quoted in Eur. Med. 964-5 (cf. Tosi 609)— 7T€i0€iv 8aipa
KCLI
Oeovs Aoyos' |
x/juctoj
8e Kpetoaojv pcvpiajv Aoycuv
jSporoi?
—shows how ingrained the idea was. gratia: 'influence', see OLD s.v. 5c. Cf. 4. 1. 11 'eloquentiam.. .et gratiam (sc. patroni].. .timere', 5. 2. 3 'de gratia quae testes corruperit'. See also Hellegouarc'h 202-8. aspectus... sine uoce: cf. 6. 1. 26 'miserorum, quorum etiam mwfwsaspectus lacrimas mouet'; Pub. Sent. 169 Meyer 'formosa facies muta commendatio est'. quo: sc. aspectu, 'by means of which'. More loosely 8 'miseratione... qua... produxerat'. recordatio meritorum... facies aliqua miserabilis... formae pulchritudo: Spalding points out that the examples in 7 take up the three topics in the same order. s
* Q.'s point w o u l d be m a d e m o r e clearly if the parenthesis ' q u o s . . . n o n p r o b a t ' did n o t
intervene, giving t h e sense 'actually m a d e p e r s u a s i o n the end'. H e n c e Kiderlin e m e n d e d t o (Kiderlin" 3 5 1 - 2 ) ; cf. the Loeb's 'however'.
tamen
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sententiam dictat: 'prescribes how the juryman is to vote/the judge is to decide.' Cf. OLD s.w. dicto 3a, citing Plin. Ep. 2. 11. 22 (of an opinion given in the senate) 'sententia quam ipse dictauerat', and sententia 4b and 5. 15. 7 et Maniuin Aquilium: correlating with 9 'et Phrynen'. 8 'Seruium quidem Galbam' is out of line, but hardly corrupt. Manium Aquilium defendens Antonius: Manius Aquilius was brought to trial for extortion in 98 BC; see ORF, pp. 227-9. Cf. Ver. 5. 3 'arripuit M'. Aquilium.. .tunicamque eius a pectoreabscidit, ut cicatrices populus Romanus iudicesque aspicerent aduerso corpore exceptas.' The case is mentioned in Cic. de Orat. 2. 124 and 194-5, where it is instrumental in forwarding Antonius' exposition of the doctrine of fjdos and iraQos (see L-P ad locc.); Cicero's point at the latter passage is not that Antonius manages to persuade the jury without uttering a word, but that the indignation he reveals through his action made the audience side with his view. See also M. Leigh, 'Wounding and Popular Rhetoric at Rome', BICS 39 (1995), 195-212, esp. 205-6. scissa ueste... ostendit: cf. Liv. 3. 58. 8 (another courtroom scene) 'scissa ueste tergum laceratum uirgis ostendit'. pectore aduerso: cf. Liv. 2. 23. 4 'ipse testes honestarum... pugnarum cicatrices aduerso pectore ostentabat', 45. 39. 16 'insigne corpus honestis cicatricibus, omnibus aduerso corpore exceptis, habeo'; Cic. de Orat. 2. 124 'iudicibus cicatrices aduersas... ostendere'. suscepisset: cf. 6. 1.21 'periclitantem...commendat dignitas. ..et susceptae bello cicatrices... et merita maiorum.' The subjunctive is best explained as reflecting what Antonius had said. non orationis habuit fiduciam: cf. Caes. Civ. 2. 37. 1 'tantam habebat suarum rerum fiduciam'. uim attulit: cf. n.on 2. 14. 4 nec uim adferam. illo ipso: in view of B's omission of ipso and Q.'s normal practice (see n. on 2. 13. 10 ipsa ilia), Winterbottom6 71 suggested the order ipso illo; cf. 1. 1. 18 (where B has illo ipso) and 12. 9. 9 (where A is lacking). 15. 8 Seruium... Galbam... elapsum esse... testatum est: in 149 the tribune L. Scribonius Libo proposed the establishment of a special court to try Ser. Sulpicius Galba (REs.n. Sulpicius 58; cos. 144) for his activities in Spain; see E. S. Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149-78 B.C. (Cambridge, MA, 1968), 12-13. Cato spoke for the law (ORF, pp. 79-80; Astin 11213), but Galba evaded prosecution, parading, besides his own children, a pupillus, the orphaned son of his relation C. Sulpicius Galus (RE s.n. Sulpicius 66). Q. draws on Cic. Brut. 89-90 (esp. 'cum suos pueros turn C. Gali etiam filium flens commendabat'), de Orat. 1. 227-8. For Galba's use of emotional effects, see also Brut. 82 'is princeps ex Latinis ilia oratorum propria...
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tractauit,...ut miserationibus . . . uteretur'. That they resulted in Galba's escape on this occasion cannot have been said in Cato's speech; he will have presumably added the information when he published the oration in the Origines (de Orat. 1. 227, Brut. 89). Q. has drawn a false conclusion from de Orat. 1. 228 quod item apud Catonem scriptum esse uideo: nisi pueris et lacrimis usus esset, poenas eum daturum fuisse', Brut. 90 'sicut idem scriptum reliquit Cato\ miseratione: for the active sense 'arousal of pity' see Brut. 82 (cited above) and TLL s.v. 1112. 84-1113. 17 (A, b). qua: see on 6 quo. paruolos: the diminutive has emotional overtones; see Austin on Verg. A. 4. 328 and J. S. Th. Hanssen, Latin Diminutives: A Semantic Study (Bergen, 1951), 36-7 and 52 (and the index s.v. paruulus). in contione produxerat: in contionem producere is the technical phrase for the summoning of a person to speak at a public meeting (Nisbet on Cic. Pis. 14; cf. TLL s.v. produco 1634. 19-38, where only some of the passages cited concern contiones); but that is of course not in question here. Galba made a show of the children 'before a public meeting' (or in the course of a speech to such a meeting),35 and B's ablative (contionem A), favoured by its rhythm, seems entirely appropriate. For the verb used similarly of exhibiting in court, cf. 6. 1. 30 (on emotional effects) 'producere ipsos qui periclitentur squalidos atque defbrmes et liberos eorum' (also 11. 3. 174 'pueros attollere, propinquos producere, uestes laniare'). Galli... Sulpici: for the inverted order cf. e.g. Woodman-Martin on Tac. Ann. 3. 21. 3 'Rufus Heluius'. aliorum monumentis: 'written information supplied by others.' Q. thinks of Cicero's two accounts (see above). testatum est: for this passive form, cf. 2. 17. 2, 8 pr. 20; OLD s.v. testor 2a. 15. 9 Phrynen: the famous hetaira, allegedly model for Praxiteles' Kvihia Apo8irr) and Apelles' yApo8irr) avabvopLcvr) (Ath. 13. 590 F-591 A). For the story at issue here see esp. A. Raubitschek in RExx/1 s.n. Phryne, cols. 906-7; G. Kowalski, 'De Phrynes pectore nudato', Eos 42 (1947) [i], 50-62; J. Engels, Studien zur politischen Biographic des Hypereides (Munich, 1989), 65-7; C. Cooper, 'Hyperides and the Trial of Phryne; Phoenix, 49 (1995), 303-18; and P. Rosenmeyer in A. Lardinois and L. McClure, Making Silence Speak: Women's Voices in Greek Literature and Society (Princeton, 2001), 243-60. Q.'s version is like that found in Sextus and the Rh. Gr. (Adv. Rhet. 4; Proleg. p. 64.
y
3 5 Cf. Cic. Pis. 14 'productus in contionem' followed by 'senatum consul in contione condemnas?'; Dom. 4 0 'tu M. Bibulum in c o n t i o n e m . . . p r o d u x i s t i ; . . . idemque in contione dixit...'.
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16; p. 173. 9; p. 190. 19; Rh. Gr. iv. 415; v. 285; vii/1. 335 and 338) rather than that found in Athenaeus 591 E and [Plut.] Vit X oratt 849 E, in which it was Hyperides who stripped off the xtrawtWoe. There is no point in discussing the truth of the story (see esp. Cooper on this; Q.'s putant suggests he had his doubts; the comic poet Posidippus in Athen. 591 E (fr. 13 Kassel-Austin] mentions the trial but not the stripping); it was in all probability modified down the years, splitting into a sensational story about Hyperides (Athenaeus and Ps.-Plutarch, relying on biographical material), and a rhetorical-philosophical locus on the power of beauty to persuade (in which it was best for Phryne to do the stripping: it was she who persuaded, ipsa sine uoce). On this see esp. L. Radermacher in BPhW 1907, 303. The argumentative point Q. is making is contested in Alciphron, Ep. 4. 4, where Bacchis tells Phryne: .. .fjL7)8e rots Aeyovot aoi on, el fjcrj rov xirouvtaKov 7Tepippri£afjL€vr) rd p,aardpia StKOLOTais ineSei^as, ov8iv o pr/raip dxfaeA€i, ireidov. Kalydp avro TOVTO iva iv Kaiptp yevrjTat aot -q £K€IVOV TTapea\€ avvryyopia. A Latin version (by TOIS
Messala) of Hyperides' defence speech was in circulation and known to Q. (1. 5. 61,10.5.2). quamquam: used like a particle; see K-S ii. 444. corporis: other versions (e.g. Alciphron, cited above) laid stress on the fact that it was with her breasts that Phryne persuaded (see the passages collected in Cooper, loc. cit. 313); L. K. Valckenaer, Callimachi Fragmenta (Leiden, 1799), 195-6 wanted to emend to aspectu pectoris here. Q., however, was merely being slightly evasive (and is probably not implying that Phryne took all her clothes off). alioqui: i.e. even before this further revelation (the word supports the reading corporis); see also n. on 2. 1. 4 historicorum criticorunique. diducta: deducta (implied by A) is possible. The variants are common in parallel passages, where, however, context may point to a downward movement, as in Ov. Am. 1. 7. 47-8 aut tunicam a summa deducere [diducere Kenney, sed uid. McKeown] turpiter ora | ad mediam', Met. 3. 480 'summa uestem deduxit ab ora', 6. 404-5 'suas a pectore postquam | deduxit uestes'; Juv. 13. 132-3 uestem deducere [diducere Clausen] summam | contentus'). But di- is more graphic and violent, and that prefix is preferable here, as in e.g. Ov. Met. 13. 264-5 ' . . adspicite en!" uestemque manu diduxit et "haec sunt | pectora semper" ait "uestris exercita rebus"', Calp. Eel. 3. 30 'diduxi tunicas et pectora nuda cecidi'. non est hie de quo locuti sumus idoneus finis: we take the reference to be to 3, where finis meant definition (the definition there did not make it clear by which means the art of rhetoric is said to persuade). The finis is not appropriate because it is too wide. See below n. on 10 finem... facit.
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Commentary
15. 10. Q. continues his efforts to deny that 'persuasion' can be a meaningful distinguishing feature of rhetoric, in a re'Ao? formula or in a definition, by taking on those who disarm the objection that not only the spoken word can be persuasive by adding a qualification 'through speech'. He retorts that there are many instances of persuasive speaking outside 'rhetorical contexts'; on how pertinent this objection is see the notes on 11. In any case, Q. is moving towards his intended conclusion by elimination: that the re'Ao? of rhetoric is bene dicere. de rhetorice: see n. on 2. 14. 3 id in rhetorice non fit. uim dicendo persuadendi: another 'type' definition; see n. on 3 est igitur... persuadendi. finem... facit: that uim dicendo persuadendi is being picked up (quem finem being by normal attraction = quod finem) makes it clear that finis means 'definition' as it did at the end of 9 (cf. also the introductory note to this chapter about the criterion for distinguishing definitions and reAo?-formulae). At Grg. 452 E, to which reference is made here, Gorgias, having been pressed by Socrates, finally tries to give a general characterization of rhetoric intended to meet the standards of definition Socrates is applying. When in 452 E Gorgias says that he is Srjfxiovpr/og of the fieyiarov ayaOov— to TTeiOeiv... olov T etvai rots Xoyois ... StKaaras, this could have been read by Q. as outlining a reAo? rather than giving a definition, but then he also knew that Socrates was interested in the definition of rhetoric. The only potential awkwardness then comes from finis at the end of this section being used in the sense 'goal, aim'—but there too the syntactical criterion provides clarity, finem facit persuadere in 6 is simply not a parallel. a quo non dissentit Theodectes: it may be Q.'s view that Theodectes actually formed his views in the light of the Grg.; otherwise this is an attempt to provide the discussion of definitions with a narrative thread. Another ref. to Theodectes (alongside Aristotle) is in 1. 4. 18. Theodectes: both Theodectes (4. 2. 63, cf. 1. 4. 18; Cic. Or. 172, 194, 218; Dion. Hal. Comp. 2 and elsewhere) and Aristotle {Rhet. ad Alex. 142l b 2; Anon. Seg. 208 D.-K.; Val. Max. 8. 14. ext. 3) are named by ancient sources as the authors of the handbook in question. Modern scholarship on the matter includes F. Solmsen, Hermes, 47 (1932), 144-51 with RE s.n. Theodektes 1), col. 1729^34; K. Barwick, Philologus, 111 (1967), 47-55; M. Weissenberger, NP 12/1 (2002), 310-12. in quo est... esse: for the construction, cf. Cic. Tusc. 1. 3 'est in Originibus solitos esse...canere conuiuas'; K-S i. 695. ducere.. .uelit: in the next section Q. objects to this re,Ao? that e.g. prostitutes do precisely that. But actor (A) seems to rule out such an objection, if it means a 'speaker', i.e. in court; and that is the meaning one expects, not a
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vague 'doer, agent' (OLDs.v. 2). B's auctor is no improvement; Kiderlin2 354 defends it as meaning 'Ratgeber', but that is too restricted (though note §17 suadentibus); and what Greek word would it translate? The simplest solution (suggested in the app. crit. of the OCT) would be to delete, freeing dicendo from the specialized sense 'pleading (in court)', which it only has if suitably marked (cf. e.g. Cic. de Orat. 3. 80 and Or. 113, where it is used in contradistinction with other types of discourse), and leaving rhetorice (or is qui dicit) as the subject to be understood with uelit (just as alii quoque is subject of uoluntin the corresponding phrase in 11); cf. 12 'ducere in id quod uelit', with n. (also a related problem in 2. 16. 19, where see n. on uelit). If Q. has supplied, or inherited, a subject like actor without noticing that this spoils his (doubtless inherited) argument against Theodectes, he is being very careless. Note also 5. 7. 28, where the subject of uolunt is understood from the preceding interrogationes. 15. 11 ne hoc quidem satis est comprehensum: the meaning of the phrase is determined by the fact that it is intended to describe on a general level the two faults identified in this section (see n. on 1 comprensione uerborum). These two faults are identified by 'interim... interim' in the wf-clause below: that the re'Ao?-formula is not 'appropriate' or 'fitting' because an orator can fail to persuade, and that it is too wide because people who are not orators may persuade by speech too. For hoc abl. cf. Apul. Socr. 13 'ut fine comprehendam'. dicendo: for this word to pick up dicendo in 10 (see n. on 10 ducere... uelit) and give good sense, dicere cannot here mean 'to plead in court'. corruptores: 'seducers' (TLL s.v. corruptor 1068. 26-60), not 'bribers', who, as Spalding pointed out, do not persuade by speech. at contra non persuadet semper orator: a second objection to Theodectes: 'the orator does not always succeed in persuading'. This fits in well with 12. We take it that finis in the next clause means reXos (the word has had this meaning since 'in quo est finem...', and has it again in 12); but even if Q. was confusingly shifting to finis = opos in the next clause, this would not affect the basic interpretation, for we may say that the opos 'rhetorice (orator) est id quod (is qui) persuadet dicendo' (understanding persuadet as 'succeeding in persuading') is refuted by a case of an orator's failing to persuade. It is readily explicable why the claim 'the rtAo? of rhetoric is to persuade in speech' is seen as incompatible with the fact that an orator does not always succeed in persuading. The notion in the background is rhetoric's status as an art in the technical sense of the term: observation of its rules should invariably lead to success. (A convenient collection of passages relating to this particular aspect of rexvr) is in Nesselrath 178-82. Q. himself in 2. 17. 22-5 discusses attacks on
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Commentary
rhetoric which turn on this issue; see nn. there.) If it does not always lead to success, then rhetoric is not an art, and consequently there are no orators in the technical sense. Two solutions to this problem are possible for someone who wants to sustain rhetoric's status as a REXv*i- one can devise a notion of an art which accommodates occasional failure in one way or another. Aristotle responds to the objection that some disciplines presumed to be arts produce occasional failure in Top. A3, 101b8—10 ovre yap o prjroptKos ex navTos rponov 7T€iaei ovff o larpiKos vyidaei. aAA* iav TCJV IV8EX°ll*va>v fXTjSev 7Tapa\t7rr), IKCIVOJS avrov €X€LV TVV in tor i]per] v <j>T]oopL€v, where eVtcmj/ATj is not used in contradistinction to T^Xv7}- This is also the thinking behind assigning to rhetoric the status of a 'stochastic art' (Allen 86-90; and the notes on 2. 17. 22-5). Alternatively one can adjust the re'Ao? of an art in such a way that it can be achieved under all circumstances. Since Q. wanted to operate a strong notion of re^n; so as to be able to argue that rhetoric is also a virtue and only to be possessed by the uir bonus, he had to take the second route, making 'speaking well' the goal of rhetoric. ut interim... interim...: Q. points out, chiastically, the two undesirable results of Theodectes' phrasing: his finis does not fit the case (taking up 'at contra.. .orator'), and it is over-inclusive (taking up 'persuadent enim... corruptores'). For proprius/communis of finis cf. RLM 138. 21-2 (the issue is, somewhat confusingly, the definition of the ojficium of the orator 'negant quippe proprium finem esse oratoris officii persuadere'). 15. 12 atqui: despite the two problems apparent in the Theodectean formulation, Apollodorus only altered it in such a way as to avoid the first (by including mention of judicial oratory and the judge), while still falling foul of the second (note 'et ipse' below). Q. is probably not suggesting that Apollodorus responded to Theodectes; rather, he is providing a narrative thread. fine: = reAos. For fine refers to finem in 10; and both the infinitive of the formula and the genitive of iudicialis orationis fit with this. Apollodorus: cf. 3. 1. 17-18 'Apollodorus Pergamenus qui praeceptor Apolloniae Caesaris Augusti fuit... Apollodori praecepta magis ex discipulis cognoscas, quorum diligentissimus in tradendo fuit Latine C. Valgius, Graece Atticus. Nam ipsius sola uidetur ars edita ad Matium, quia ceteras missa ad Domitium epistula non agnoscit'. Q. quotes from Apollodorus' own Greek work (e.g. 3.6. 35) and from Valgius' translation (3. 5.17). For A. rhetoric had rules which applied universally (see n.on 2. 11.2 Theodoreus an Apollodoreus), and it was confined to forensic oratory (cf. 3. 1.1). Thus here 'iudicialis orationis' does not imply that A. had other views on the branches of oratory: he merely did not recognize other branches. It has been said that the absence
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of any phrase like KARA TO IVSEXOPCEVOV is significant of the contrast with Theodorus (Schanz 50 n. 2; Brzoska in RE s.n. Apollodorus 64, col. 2890). But this view relies on the assumption that eius quod in quoque potest sumi persuasibile in Theodorus' definition in 21 corresponds to «-ard to evSexofjLfvov, which is far from clear. In any case, KARA TO IV8EX°T used in these definitions not to express any lack of rigidity in the attitude of the definers but to counter such objections as that made by Q. here to Apollodorus, i.e. one would introduce such phrases to maintain a strong notion of technicity. super omnia: cf. 12. 9. 12 'super omnia perit ilia... modestia', and (with complement) Plin. Nat. 18. 189 'super omnia est bifera uite bis anno uindemiare'. Similarly Q. 10. 1.3 'dicere ante omnia est'. uelit: see n. on 10 ducere... uel it; here the subject may be iudicialis oratio understood from what precedes. Alternatively, this may be a case of a thirdperson verb derived from a 'general' infinitive (e.g. Cic. de Orat. 1. 30 'neque uero mihi quicquam... praestabilius uidetur quam posse dicendo tenere hominum mentis,... impellere quo uelit'; K-S i. 17); see Spalding, who cites Sextus 79, where the subject is expressed (ot Aeyovres); also 84. Cf. 22 dicet, and see nn. on 2. 16. 3 faciat, 2. 16. 19 uelit. ut s i . . . non possit: this finis results in an orator forfeiting his (very valued) name if he fails to persuade on a single occasion; cf. RLM p. 138. 13-17. JL£VOV
15. 13 recesserunt ab euentu: i.e. have avoided wording that implied any need for the successful outcome (cf. 8. 3. 12) of cases pleaded by the orator. For the verb, cf. e.g. Cic. Att. 12. 4. 2 'si ab omni uoluntate... recedam iJjiXaisque uelim grauitatem... eius laudare', 'keep clear of talk of his whole political outlook and choose simply to praise his grauitas\ Cf. 2. 17. 22-5 with nn. for a similar way of conceptualizing the goal of rhetoric independently of the outcome; but Q.'s discussion here and elsewhere in the present chapter, e.g. in 16, does not engage with (indeed reveals no knowledge of) the issues raised there. Aristoteles dicit: the passage is discussed in detail by Winterbottom6 71-2. We only give a short summary, adding some new points. The reference here is usually connected with Rhet.Al. 1355b 26-7 €OTOJ 8-q -q PQTOPIK-q Swapis N€PL CKCLOTOV TOV Oeajprjoai TO ivSexopcevov mOavov, which is, however, much more carefully translated in §16 below (see n.; et ipsi in 16 seems to ensure that the two definitions attributed to Ar. are not regarded by Q. as being the same). There are three possible explanations for the divergence: (i) Q. is here citing a passage quite other than that in the Rhet. (e.g. from the Gryllos, a possibility considered by Granatelli2 880). (ii) Q. or his manuscripts may be wrong in attributing this definition to Ar. at all. (iii) We could be dealing
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Commentary
with a definition which was originally drawn from 1355 b 26-7 but then modified' by the rhetorical tradition (which retained the attribution to Ar.). In Proleg. we find p. 29. 7—9 p-qTopin-q ion 8vvap,is rexvixr) TOV nept CKCLOTOV iv8exop,€vov 7nOavov Xoyov, which corresponds to what wefindhere
in Q. except for the addition of Texyiicq, while in p. 54. 19-20 we find ion 8vvap,is TOV nept exaorov evSe^o/Ltevov mBavov (closer to the original Rhet. passage, though deajprjoai is omitted); again in p. 103. 12-4 and 172.8 there are hybrids. I n all four cases the definition is assigned to Aristotle; see also Granatelli2 879-80 on the evidence from the Rh. Gr. While the third explanation appears to us as the most plausible one, it remains odd that Q. should include both definitions; MW (in the OCT) therefore suggested changing A ris to teles i n § 13 to qu i. persuasibilia: the adjective (Gk. mOavos) is cited by TLL only from this book of Q. (also 16, 17,21; 21. 1) and one passage of the Vulgate. The adverb is even rarer: 2. 15. 14 and 22 (from Celsus, who according to Wohrer 135-6 coined the word). qui finis: here 'definition'. illud uitium de quo supra diximus: i.e. the first of the two diagnosed in Theodectes' formulation, that 'persuadent.. .dicendo... alii quoque' (11). But in oratione, taken to mean 'in formal speech', might seem to be added to evade that fault. One might therefore consider deleting the words, which have no counterpart in Aristotle. An additional argument for deletion would be that speech is the final product, not the area in which invention is undertaken, or the subject-matter to which invention is applied. PQROPLKTJ
15. 14 Hermagorae: for this mid-second-century BC rhetorician from Temnos, see Adamietz on 3. 1. 16; D. Matthes, Hermagorae Temnitae Testimonia et Fragmenta (Leipzig, 1962); M. Heath, CQ2 44 (1994), 114-29; Brittain, ch. 7. His crucial contribution to 5fas/5-theory is marked by frequent references in Q., esp. in Book 3. On the basis of our passage (fr. 2 Matthes) and other evidence (fr. 3-5), Thiele 22-3 reconstructed his complete definition of rhetoric thus: rj p-qropiKri COTIfrvvapusirepl Xoyov irpayp-arevovoa. riXos exovoa t o Xiyeiv TT€IOTII«X)S, ooov ifi iavrfj. But Q. suppresses details not relevant to his point here. Differently M. Heath, 'Hermagoras: Transmission and Attribution', Philologns, 146 (2002), 287-98, at 296-7, discussing the evidence of the Rh. Gr.; see also Matthes 122. For Hermagoras' position on the materia of rhetoric, see 2. 21. 21-2 with n. In Adv. Rhet. 62 Sextus says something quite different on the epyov of rhetoric according to Hermagoras. finem... persuasibiliter dicere: finis means 'goal' here, as is clear from the infinitive construction, eius: that is, rhetorices.
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persuasibiliter: see n.on 13 persuasibilia. eandem...non isdem tantum uerbis: cf. above, §1 on the tendency of rhetoricians to vary the wording of definitions. For tantum ('only not in the same words') see Winterbottom6 72. P. K. Marshall, AJPh 95 (1974), 81 objected that our passage differs from parallels adduced there in being negative; but non isdem is the equivalent of mutatis in 3. 6. 34 'plurimi deinceps, mutatis tantum no minibus', finem: 'goal'. cum... conuicimus: in 6-11. For the verb, cf. 12. 1. 41 'nisi ea non esse facta conuicerimus'; OLD s.v conuinco 4b. 15. 15 addita sunt... uarie: from here until 20 Q. continues to discuss definitions which specify persuasion, but he now focuses attention on the scope of rhetoric implied or stated in them. circa... uersari: a locution esp. favoured by Q. (in our book, 2. 15. 20, 2. 21. 9); elsewhere e.g. Sen. Ep. 88. 3 'grammatice circa curam sermonis uersatur'; TLL s.v. circa 1090. 23-9. Contrast Cic. Inv. 1. 7, e.g. 'materiam artis earn dicimus in qua omnia ars... uersatur'. ciuiles: TTOXITIKCL (^rrj/xara). 'Probleme, die RROXIS und TTOXtrat betreffen' (Throm 92), not issues concerning the ordinary man (which TTOXLTIKOS and ciuilisy cf. Suet. Gram. 10. 7, could in principle mean, too); these would include legal issues affecting private individuals (for the noXis provides the framework for such legal disputes). The contrast was primarily with the type of abstract question philosophers concern themselves with (for the use of the term 9eois in the sense 'topic for philosophical discussion' prior to Hermagoras cf. e.g. Chrysippus' book title Oe'oeis XoyiKai, D.L. 7.189 = SVFii, fr. 13). To this type of question Hermagoras made at least a nominal and implicit claim by identifying the TTOXITIKOV ^rrj/xa as the subject area of rhetoric, and dividing it into 'general questions' (deoeis) and 'particular questions' (unodeoeis) (Cic. Inv. 1. 8 = fr. 6a Matthes; 2. 21. 21-2 = fr. 6c Matthes); cf. Posidonius' attack on Hermagoras Plut. Pomp. 42. 5 ( = fr. 43 EdelsteinKidd = test. 5 Matthes) and Cicero's criticism in Cic. Inv. 1. 7-8, both directed against the inclusion of the 'general question' within the realm of rhetoric (it is, however, unlikely that Hermagoras made serious efforts to act on this farreaching claim). On all these matters see also Matthes 121-33 (esp. 123 n. 3). For the contrast with omnes res cf. 2. 21. 2 and various passages in Philod. Rhet. (esp. i. 202). See also n.on 36 ciuilium officiorum below. 15. 16 subiecisse: Q. (following Cic. Inv. 1. 7 '[Gor^ias] infinitam... huic artificio materiam subicere uidetur') uses the active verb several times in connection with the 'assignment' of materia to the sphere of rhetoric (cf. 19; 2. 21. 23; 3. 1. 1). OLD s.v. subicio classifies under 7 'to put under
250
Commentary
(a category, head, etc.)'; but there is more than a touch of 5 ' . . . put... under the control of. The passive is even more common: cf. below, §22, and often in 2. 21, where see n. on 4 subiectae. Aristoteles... dixit: here the ref. is clearly to Rhet. A2, 1355b26-7 quoted on 13 Aristoteles dicit (cf. also Top. Z12, 149b25); on the status of the definition, i.e. that it can genuinely be seen as 'Aristotle's view' (as opposed to being an evSogov put up for discussion), see G. W. Most, 'The Uses of endoxa: Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Rhetoric', in Furley-Nehemas 167-90, at 17980. On Svvafjug and its Latin rendering uis see n. on 2 uim. Iatrodes: unidentifiable rhetorician (Kroll, RE Suppl. vi [1935], 126), mentioned only here and at 3. 6. 44 (his view on the number of generales status); in both passages A gives the more familiar name Patrocles. fines: 'definitions', referring back to the two uis definitions earlier in the section. et ipsi: i.e. like that attributed to Aristotle in 13, where see n. Eudorus: the definition fits with what we know of Eudorus, for whom see RE s. n. (10), cols. 915-16; H. Dorrie, 'Der Platoniker Eudoros von Alexandria', Hermes 79 (1944), 25-39; J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London, 1977), 115-35 and the article by Dillon in Goulet, iii. 290-3; P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, ii (Berlin and New York, 1984), 509-27; fragments collected by C. Mazzarelli, RFN 77 (1985), 197-209 and 535-55; literature is listed by L. Deitz, 'Bibliographie du platonisme imperial anterieur a Plotin: 1926-1986', ANRW II. 36. 1 (1987), 124-82, at 148. Flourishing around 25 bc, he is the earliest representative of what has come to be called Middle Platonism, similar in outlook and approach to Antiochos of Ascalon. Our passage may be a fragment of the 8iaip€ois TOV KARA tXooo<{>tav Xoyov, characterized by Stob. Eel. ii, p. 42. 7-13 W-H asfiifiXiovagtoKTrjrov, iv tXoooiav Xoyov, t o fxev iariv avrov r)9iKoi>, t o 8i vaiKov, to 8i
XoyiKov, where rhetoric would have figured under to XoyiKov. A, again trivializing (see above on Iatrocles), gives the more familiar Theodorus. That name can hardly be right. The well-known rhetorician (see on 2. 11. 2 Theodoreus an Apollodoreus) is given a different definition in 21 (where he is identified as Gadareus). And if this is some other Theodorus, one would expect Q. to tell us which (as he specifies the Byzantine at 3. 1. 11, the Gadarene following at §17). More worrying is the evidence of Nicolaos, Progymn. p. 2. 12-14 Felten Aio8a>pos < 8i > OVTOJ' prjTopiKij ion 8vvap.is evperiKr) KOLI epfjurjvevTtKr)
p,€Ta Koop,ov to)v iv8€xofjL€vojv 7Ti9avd)v iv 7TOLVTI Xoyoi. Felten there emends
to 0e68a)pos, on the basis of our passage. But Aio8(upos is supported not only by the Scholia to Aphthonius at Rh. Gr. ii. 7. 21 Walz, where a common
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source is probably in question, but also by Doxopater at ii. 104. 26 Walz, which looks to be independent (the same definition appears without attribution in Proleg. p. 14. 13-15). The most economical solution is to read Diodorus in Q., as L. Spengel suggested, TEXNQN ZYNArQTHsive Artium Scriptores (Stuttgart, 1828), 102-3 and 224. Spengel retracted his emendation later, RhM2 18 (1863), 521 n. 18, on the grounds that the two definitions are not in fact the same, credibilia rendering in his view not rd vidavd but rd eiKora. But the coincidence would be extravagant. Q. certainly means to call attention to the (marginal) difference between credibilia andpersuasibilia(d. n. on 2. 17. 35 probabili probabiliusfora shift between probabileand credibile)m,but he could have been using someone else's Latin translation of this definition (see p. 229) and not realized that the original Greek was in fact T
Commentary
252
'rhetoricen.. .maximum ac pulcherrimum, ut supra diximus, opus', where see n.), or perhaps, given non orator above, 'orator' (cf. 2. 15. 12). 15. 18 Gorgias.. .facultatem: 454 b 5-7 TaiSrrj?
TOIVVV
rrjs neiOovs Ae'yco
(sc. rrjv prjTopiKrjv etvai rexirqv) ... rrjs iv rot? SiKaorrjptois Kai iv rot? aXXoig
o ^ A o t ? . . . /cat 7T€pl TOVTOJV a e c m St Kind T€ /cat a S t / c a . For Socrates' riposte see 454 E 9-10 f) prjTopiKrj apa.. .neiOovs S-qpuovpyos eartv moTcvTtKrjs a A A* ov 818a GKaXiKrjs. artificem here looks back to Srjpuovpyos in 454 A 5. d e . . . tractare: on tractare de see OLD s.v. 9c. On word-for-word translation (deiustiset iniustis) see J. G. F. Powell, 'Cicero'sTranslations from Greek', in id. (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher (Oxford, 1995), 273-300, at 277 and 282.
15. 19 qui uero... oratori: as opposed to the quidam who 'circa res omnes . . . uersari rhetoricen putauerunt'. discrimina: 'distinctions', discrimina adhibere seems to be unparalleled. This could be a use related to the technical philosophical term differentia (cf. 7. 3. 3), meaning 'qualifications' or 'limitations'. Ariston: it is widely agreed that there were two Peripatetic philosophers by the name of Ariston, one from Keos and probably Lycon's successor as scholarch of the Peripatos (see Wehrli, vol. vi; NP s.n. 3; RE s.n. 52), the other perhaps from Kos (Strabo 14. 658, but the reference is vague), and a pupil of Critolaus (Wehrli, vol. x; NP s.n. 5; RE s.n. 53). The latter is the one referred to here.36 Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 61 says: KAI'Apiorouv... OKOTTOV pJv €KK€iadat (ftrjaiv avrfj [prjTopiiqj] rrjv 7reidai, re'Ao? Se to rv\eiv rrjs neidovs.
This suggests that Ariston's attitude to rhetoric was an ambiguous one, i.e. less straightforwardly hostile than that of his teacher Critolaus (below, §23), because the distinction between Te'Ao? and OKOTTOS,firstmade by early Stoics, is, when it is applied to technical disciplines like rhetoric and medicine, used to maintain the status of a technical discipline in the face of occasional failure (see Alpers-Golz 62-5; and n.on 2. 17. 25 summa). Cf. e.g. [Galen], Introductio seu medicus, xiv. 688 Ktihn: a
TOLVUV del evepyei,
erepov
yap
aXXo r t Tvyxdvei ovv
Kai
€OTI
rt
iartv
TTapa
ravrd
eon
rj re^frj
TavTrjv,
rri Kai
awiaravTa *Tepov
ri/ie'Aet
Kai
avTOv, ovSe TO TC'XOS a u r ^ s Xeyerat, Kv^epv-QTTKTF
Kai TO^tKrj
avrrjv, ov TO. UTTO TOVTWV aTroTeXovpeva.
TO TCXOS avrrjs. OVK del
TOVTO
ov yap
avv
avrfj
eterait TOVTO E^ET.
Sto pe\pi
PV
dXXd OKOTTOS, OTUV Se TV\JJ, TeXos. OVTIOS
OVK drro
TUIV TeXtuv
opt^ovTai.
ov yap
s 6 That there were two seems certain, given Plutarch's statement that an Ariston preceded Critolaus as the head ofthe school (Plut. de exil. 605 b), and Sextus' reference to an Ariston as a pupil o f Critolaus (Adv. Rhet 61 o KpiroXdov yvwptfios, which corresponds to Q.'s Critolai Peripatetici discipulusi see LSJ s.v. yvojptfios I. 3b; and note the order in Philod. Rhet. ii. 198: KptraXduj Kai Vlpt (oram).
del
Chapter Thirteen TOVTOV
Tiryxdvovotv, dXX
TrepiyivatvTai.
/cat
253
Si uiv evepyouatv, iva rutv reXutv
Q. says nothing to alter this impression: contumeliosus may be a gloss of his own, easily explained because Ariston would still be likely to have shown disdain for rhetoric practised by people other than philosophers, and there may be no insult intended in popularis ( = Srj/zooio? or Sr^o-nxo?—see next note—not, probably, OXXIKOS, which would be uulgaris, pace Mayer, Aristonstudien, 520). D.L. 7. 163 has a list of works assigned to Ariston of Chios, the pupil of Zeno of Kition, which includes a work 77750s TOVS prfropas; the communis opinio is that through a confusion of names the list was credited to the wrong Ariston by D.L. or his sources.37 Of the two Peripatetics called Ariston, the younger is the more likely candidate, given the very scanty, but conceivably anti-rhetorical fragments on him which Wehrli has drawn from Philodemus' Rhet. There is no clear and independent evidence that the older Ariston (or for that matter Peripatetics contemporary with him) ever pronounced on rhetoric. For a crisp summary of the younger Ariston's position in the quarrel between rhetoricians and philosophers in the second century BC see Brittain 308. scientia...persuasionis: discussed by Thiele 191-4; his conjectural Greek version was: i7Tiarrip.y] decoprjTiKr) Kai irpaKTiKr) iv ^-qTr/fiaai TTOAITLKOIS Sia 8fioatas 7Tctdovs Aoyov. Both this and Q.'s Latin sound extraordinary (Winterbottom6 72). It may be that Q. (or his source; p. 229) misunderstood a formulation in which the words Srjiiooias (or better, as Donald Russell remarks, SrjfxoTtKijs) neidovs were governed not by A oyov but by dctoprjTiKr) (LSJ s.v. OeojprjTiKos 1) Kai -npaKTix-f) (LSJ s.v. tt panriKos 3). For the lack of an object to go with uidendi et agendicf. n. on 22 uis...pronuntiatione. Given our scant knowledge it is difficult to say what points Ariston wanted to make in giving this definition, so any attempts at explaining it have to be conjectural. Even if there are good reasons to doubt that Q. has correctly made out what the polemical edge of the definition is (see nn.on the next paragraph), the assumption that it has one is not unreasonable. If the Ariston in question is Critolaus' pupil, then it is plausible to assume that, after a period when the school was downright hostile to rhetoric, any move back towards an acceptance of rhetoric would be qualified. We can make two further assumptions: (i) Ariston will have developed his views with reference to Aristotle's Rhet. (and, up to a point, related treatises of the Organon), so we can turn to them for guidance. The availability of these works can hardly be a matter of doubt; see J. Barnes, 'Roman Aristotle', in id. and M. Griffin (eds.) 3 7 A. M. Ioppolo, Aristone di Chio e lo stoicismo antico (Naples, 1980), 4 7 - 5 0 defends the ascription to Ariston the Stoic.
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Commentary
Philosophia Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at Rome (Oxford, 1997), 1-69; (ii) Ariston surely meant to define rhetoric as it should be like', as opposed to rhetoric as commonly practised by the rhetorical schools of his time. It does seem striking that rhetoric is a scientia for Ariston; for Aristotle as well as later Peripatetics, e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias, it is a REXYR), not an €7TiorrifjiT] (Ar. argues for this view in the first paragraph of Rhet.-, his reasoning is set out by Cooper at 193 n. 2). In its strong sense, an EMORR/PIR) is for Aristotle an axiomatized system, i.e. 'the body of truth that each defines is to be exhibited as a sequence of theorems inferred from a few basic postulates or axioms. And axiomatization is to be formalized: that is to say, its sentences are to be formulated within a well-defined language, and its arguments are to proceed according to a precisely and explicitly specified set of logical rules' (J. Barnes, Aristotle: Posterior Analytics (Oxford, 21994), p. xiii). A science is not detached from 'reality' (Met. R 1, 1003a21-2 eanv £MOTR)PLR) TIS FJ BEAT PEL TO ov fj ov KCII TO. TovTip viRDPXOVTA KAFF CIVTO), but—unlike a T€)(vrj—it has no practical goal beyond the accumulation of truths relating to its particular area. Now it is clear that 'science' in this strong sense cannot possibly be applicable to rhetoric: its realm is to ivSexop-evov dAXcos €X€lv (c^ Rhet. A2, 1357a24 and 35-6). And where Aristotle uses eViar^/xij in contradistinction to rC'XVR), the context is usually such that it is difficult to make a connection with rhetoric (relevant passages are collected in Bekker's index s.v. reVrj, 759 a 21-2; see esp. An. Post. B\9, l O F B ^ with Barnes ad loc.). However, Aristotle occasionally uses the dicolon €7RIOTRJP,AI KCII REXVAI in Rhet. when structural features common to both are at issue (see Kassel's edition, index s.v. emorripLr}), which suggests there may be a level of description on which enioTr/pLT] could be applied to rhetoric. Aristotle says in A2, 1358a24-6 that the rhetorician may sometimes unwittingly leave the realm of rhetoric when, in his search for premisses for enthymemes, he hits upon a proposition which is actually a first principle of an fVtarrJ/xr;; in that moment, we are told, the rhetorician is actually involved with the eVtar^/xr; to which this principle belongs, and no longer with dialectic and rhetoric. This does suggest that some of the analytical processes to be carried out in operating the art of rhetoric—in this case, invention of arguments—are in part responsible for the overlap between €7Tiorrjp.ai and re^cu; but it still seems a long way from this to making rhetoric itself an eVtcrrrj/Arj. Ariston may well have played up these features of rhetoric; certainly scientia uidendisuggests this too, cf. the Met. passage quoted above (deaipei). In taking this view, Ariston would merely have been exploiting certain tensions already present in Rhet.: on the one hand a fascination for the persuasive powers of rhetoric and appreciation of its potential value as an analytical tool (if properly carried out), and on the other a clear disdain for the discipline,
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based on how it 'actually' manifests itself in the world around us. That Ariston's definition nevertheless reveals an eagerness to compete with standard rhetoric in the ordinary contexts of public speaking—as opposed to being a detached, philosophical, epideictic rhetoric—is of course in the Aristotelian spirit too. 15. 20 hie . . . ponit: for the discussion of whether rhetoric is a virtue see ch. 20. Cf. Cic. de Orat. 3. 65: '[Stoici] soli ex omnibus eloquentiam uirtutem ac sapientiam esse dixerunt' (where L-P comment on 'die Ironie, die den ganzen Passus durchzieht'). Q. is not saying that Ariston, being a Peripatetic, regarded rhetoric (to be mentally supplied on this reading) as a science, not, like the Stoics, as a virtue; rather, it means that Ariston, being a Peripatetic, did not count (as the Stoics do) knowledge as a virtue. popularem autem... contumeliosus est: i.e. '(Ariston's position on non-virtuous knowledge is understandable, for he is a Peripatetic), but (it is not to be bome that) by specifying [see on 1 comprensione uerborum) persuasion of the people he positively [etiam] insults...'. Quite apart from the question whether popularis or rather its Greek equivalents can carry the intended insult, it is, as pointed out above (n. on 19 scientia.. .persuasionis), unlikely that Ariston bothered to define the type of rhetoric he despised. contumeliosus... aduersus: more usually with in (as at 10. 7. 21), but cf. Decl. min. 265. 3 (though there aduersus goes more closely with audax); also Gaius, Inst. 1. 141 'admonendi sum us aduersus eos... nihil nobis contumeliose facere licere'. artem orandi: see nn.on 2. 14. 1 rhetoricen and 2. 15. 3 orandi. nihil: perhaps adverbial = non, perhaps object of persuasuram. illud: looking forward to 'excludi... officia'; the asyndeton marks a new point. omnibus qui... iudicant uersari: these included Ariston (19) and Hermagoras (n. on 15 ciuiles); we assume that the latter came first (see the arguments in Brittain 307-8). exdudi... totam: Sopatros brought the same argument against 'the school of Hermagoras': et 8c ptova ra TTOXITIKO. ^rr/yxara ipet r) prjToptKr) OVK earat ptepos avrfjs to 7ravrjyvptKov (Rh. Gr. v. 16. 23-5 = Hermagoras fr. 5c Matthes). Brandstatter 201-2, showed that the primary use of KOXITIKOS from Aristotle onwards (see esp. Rhet. B18.1391b18) was to cover the yeVo? OVFJTFIOVXFVTTKOV and BIKCLVIKOV; and one would expect Hermagoras to have concurred; and in any case epideictic had no ^rjrrjpta. (Hermagoras did not think in these terms: see Matthes 81 n. 1, 87, 98. Rh. Gr. v. 16. 21-5 mentions thetfr-qfjLaargument too.) But even if the genre of epideictic was excluded,
Commentary
256
there was still room for epideictic elements within judicial and deliberative oratory: cf. 3. 4. 11, 16. pars tertia: 'a third' (cf. Liv. 34. 9. 6), making this a significant omission. 15.21 cautius: looking back to sollicitiusin 19. Q. writes cautiusbecause the many elements of Theodorus' definition suggest great care to appropriately grasp the definiendum; for it is unlikely that Q. put the hostile slant which he detected in Ariston's definition down to carelessness. Hence we assume that no comparison with Ariston or with omnes is implied. Theodorus Gadareus: see esp. 3. 1. 17-18 and nn.on 11.2 Theodoreus an Apollodoreus and 2. 15. 12 Apollodorus, as well as the introduction to c. 13. ars... ciuili: in 5.10. 54 Q. distinguishes two types of definition. In the first type, 'uniuersum uerbis complectimur', i.e. a generic classification is given (though distinguishing features may of course be added); Q. provides the example rhetorice est bene dicendi scientia'. To this type in essence belong almost all the definitions cited in 2. 15 (but note the anonymous definition in 22, and to some extent Eudorus' in 16). For the second type, 'per partes', Q. gives the example 'rhetorice est inueniendi recte et disponendi et eloquendi cum firma memoria et cum dignitate actionis scientia'. That definition (which Q. apparently constructed ad hoc)3* covers all the five partes of rhetoric that he accepted (3. 3. 1): inuentio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, actio. Theodorus' complicated definition starts off as though it were of this second type, but of Q.'s five partes it alludes only to inuentio and elocutio; it does, however, imply recognition of a sixth pars, iudicium, rejected by Q. in 3. 3. 6-7 (and not attributed to the 'Theodoreans' in 3. 3. 8). It then, however, takes a new direction by highlighting two important aspects of elocutio; finally, like many definitions discussed earlier, it takes up a position on the scope of rhetoric and the place of persuasion in it. Russell ad loc. suggests as the Greek original: Te'xvrj evpeTtKr) Kai KpiriK-rj Kai
ATRAYYEXTIKTJ pera
7rp€7rovTos
Koapov
Kara
perpov
TOV ev
CKAOTIP
For the problems see nn. below. enuntiatrix: cf. 7. 3. 12 '[rhetorice est scientia] "bene inueniendi et "bene enuntiandi"', supporting the Renaissance conjecture here (nuntiatrix MSS); cf. also Plin. Ep. 3.13. 3 'inuenire praeclare, enuntiare magnifice'. TLL s.v. 621. 76, perhaps inspired by Spengel 492, suggests ippiqvevTiKr) as the Greek term (cf. Nicolaos cited on 16 Eudorus; the Latin counterpart there is eloquendi); for Russell's aTrayyeXriKr} cf. t o airayyeXr IKOV, 'power of expressing', in Arr. Epict. 2. 23. 2. All three adjectives in -trix govern eius (cf. the same passage of Nicolaos; Winterbottom6 72). evSexopevov
mdavov
ev npaypiaTi
TTOAITIKOJ.
3 8 Though cf. Aristides, In Platonem 382 farapeveiv is TO ra Seorra e£eupfu> Kai rafai Kai ra irpeirovra anoSovvai fiera Koopov Kai hvi'dfieios.
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decente ornatu: the phrase alludes to two of Theophrastus' four uirtutes elocutionis, TO -npe-nov and KaraoKevq (see Cic. Or. 79 = fr. 684 Fortenbaugh; and see n. on 2. 3. 8 perspicuitas). As to the adjective, there is a good chance that Q. wrote decenti; that form is not much found (see, however, Sen. Thy. 945), but then nor is decente (Mart. Cap. 328, 586). It may be noted that abl. recente is occasionally attested in prose (e.g. Plin. Nat. 23. 61), though recenti is far more common (e.g. Q. 6. 2. 26). secundum mensionem: there can be no doubt that this obscure phrase is to be taken by itself, not with eius... persuasibile; see Winterbottom6 72. Of the Greek equivalents discussed there, Kara p,€Tpov (Gesner) remains the most plausible candidate (cf. the Loeb). A possibility not considered by Winterbottom6 is Kara Xoyov (Thiele 196 suggested this, without further argument). The word Aoyo? can technically denote a relation between two quantities (Bekker in his index to Ar., 437 a 40- b 32), which is similar to proportion in the technical sense (relation between four quantities). 15. 22 itemque: marking the fact that Celsus, like Theodorus, thought rhetoric an art but not a virtue. The TC'XOS given below shows that he was among the persuaders'; see further below, §32. Cornelius Celsus: RE s.n. Cornelius 82; NP s.n. Celsus no. 7; Adamietz on 3. 1. 21. His encyclopaedic work, written under Tiberius, included a book on rhetoric, often drawn on (with no great enthusiasm) by Q. This is fr. rhet. 1 in Marx's edition (1915). For Wohrer's views on Celsus' importance as a source for our chapter, see above, p. 229; for our passage, see Wohrer 134-5. finem: goal'. Q. does not cite the whole definition, but taking it for granted that Celsus called rhetoric an art, gives the reXos to show that he too was among the 'persuaders'. Here in particular one feels that the easy switch between the meanings 'goal' and 'definition' (cf. 19) suggests that Q. did not see a problem in the ambiguity. This passage too may be cited in support of the view that Q. may have thought that we can distinguish various artes from one another by classifying them generically as an art and then adding further distinctions in the shape of TCXOS-formulae, persuasibiliter: cf. n.on 13 persuasibilia. dubia: the word presumably implies that Celsus consciously excluded epideictic (see n. on 20 excludi... totam). quibus... pronuntiatione: non dissimiles glosses over the fact that the anonymous definition cited, though like those of Theodorus and Celsus in its mention of persuasion and res ciuiles, is unlike them in treating rhetoric as a uis, not an art. 'ut iam ad eos qui... putauerunt' in §21 has therefore been forgotten. This makes it hard to know what exactly Q. means by saying of the
258
Commentary
mille alia of 23 that they were 'the same or made up out of the same elements' (Loeb). dissimiles: sc. fines in the sense of'definitions'. That the reader has mentally to supply fines in a meaning different from that in which it last occurred indicates that Q. either was not fully alive to the ambiguity of the term or else saw no problem in it. uis... pronuntiatione: the definition in effect covers three of the partes of rhetoric (cf. n.on 21 ars... ciuili), inuentio, elocutio and actio, uidendi harks back to the Aristotelian formulation Bvvapus. . .TOO deioprjoat TO evSexofxevov mOavov (cf. 16 'uim esse uidendi', and nn. on 19 scientia... persuasionis and on 13 Aristoteles dicit), but it looks unhappy with no expressed object. There is, however, no object in §19 either (see n. on scientia... persuasionis). dicet: cf. n.on 12 uelit. 15. 23 item... respondebimus: item implies 'in addition to the rebuttal given in the present chapter', i.e. at §20, where Q. has objected to definitions that restrict rhetoric to ciuiles quaestiones. He reverts to this point in his chapter on materia, 2. 21 (see 2). Critolaus: head of the Peripatetic school in the second century BC (REs. n. 3); for a pupil see 19. For his anti-rhetorical stance see 2. 17. 15, and the fragments collected by Wehrli (this is his fr. 26); see Brittain's index s.n. 'Critolaus', Reinhardt on Topica §§79-86. usum dicendi (nam hoc rpijSij significat): cf. 10. 7. 11 'usus quidam irrationalis quam Graeci dXoyov rpiprfv uocant'. Cf. Plato, Phaedr. 260 E for the contrast with r€xvr)-> Grg- 501 A for the equation with ip.ir€ipia (Dodds ad loc.: 'The cook remembers that these ingredients produced a "nice" dish last time, but has no notion why'); cf. Apul. PI. 2. 8: rhetoric as 'usus nulla ratione collectus—sic enim dXoyov rpifirjv elocuti sumus'. 'Mit den Stichwortern der platonischen Diskussion nimmt Kritolaos offenbar die ganze Thematik derselben auf' (Wehrli). See also Nesselrath 200-5 on 'Nicht-Techne'; F. Olivier, De Critolao Peripatetico (Berlin, 1895; diss, phil.), 49. To describe a field of expertise as clearly delineated as that of a r€x^V> usus had to undergo a semantic loan shift modelled on rpifir). Athenaeus fallendi artem: for Athenaeus see RE s.n. 21. Cf. 3. 1. 16 (where see Adamietz's n.) 'cui [sc. Hermagorae] maxime par atque aemulus uidetur Athenaeus fiiisse' (which does not much help with his dating); Q. also draws upon him at 3. 3. 13, 3. 5. 5 and 3. 6. 47. As in the case of Hermagoras (see on 14 Hermagorae), though more seriously, there is conflict between Q. and Sextus, for the latter's report (Adv. Rhet. 62) that *A0rjvaios • - • Xoycjv 8vvap.iv ttpooayopevei rrjv prjropiKrjv OToxa^ofjLcvrjv rrjs
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is incompatible with Q.'s placing of Athenaus under those who thought rhetoric 'neque uim neque scientiam neque artem'. How is this difficulty to be resolved? (a) Thiele 185 thought that both attributions are true, but that Athenaeus spoke of ars fallendi only in jest. (b) This Athenaeus may be different from Sextus' (cf. Kennedy, Art, 321 n. 89): a counsel of despair.39 (c) Brzoska (in RE) here emended to Athenodorus, who appears at 2. 17. 5; but why should that rhetor be specified as Rhodius only in the second passage? (d) Spalding thought that 'indignabundus noster' himself traduced Athenaeus' definition ('duriora usurpavit vocabula'); but it is not clear why he should have reserved his anger for this particular persuasion-definition. More likely, perhaps, (e), Q. repeats a source's unfriendly comment on a definition whose wording he did not himself know (so Cope 29: 'Athenaeus' fallendi ars may be meant for an interpretation of the art of persuasion). The Greek may have been KaKOT€\via (on which cf. 2. 20. 2, with our n.). 40 The passage should in any case caution us against assuming simpliciter that Sextus and Q. rely on a single common souce (see above, p. 227 and below, p. 395). TCJV AKOVOVTOIIV 7T€I0OVS
15. 24 plerique autem... inciderunt: autem seems to exclude Critolaus and Ariston (despite Wehrli 70, 84), for Q. is distinguishing from them others in the group of those who thought rhetoric neither uis nor scientia nor ars. The reference is quite uncertain; Q. may be thinking primarily of rhetoricians rather than philosophers. More important is that Q. uses them as a device to confront the main perceived enemy of rhetoric, Plato. He argues in §§24-31 (cf. the argument of §5 above) that Plato had been grievously misrepresented (and not only for what he wrote in Gorgias: alia uolumina prepares for the mention of Phaedrus in §§29 and 31).'" The passage (together with a contemptuous footnote on Celsus in §32) makes an effective close to the
39
T h i s is a separate issue f r o m the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r the Athenaeus o f o u r passage is t h e s a m e
a s that o f 3. 1. 16. 40
Q . m a y have h i m s e l f translated this a s ars fallendi,
n o t suspecting that this w o u l d expose
h i m t o Spalding's a s t o n i s h m e n t that A t h e n a e u s could b e classed as o n e o f those who d i d n o t think r h e t o r i c a n a r t . D o n a l d Russell suggests t o us that artem might be deleted, leaving
fallendi
t o b e g o v e r n e d b y us urn. 41
Q . d o e s n o t m e n t i o n Laws 9 2 7 d - 9 3 8 c o n persuasion in a d v o c a c y . In a r g u i n g that t h o s e
w h o read t h e Grg. as a n t i - r h e t o r i c a l m i s u n d e r s t o o d Plato Q . is different from m o s t ' r h e t o r i c a l ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f this text. It is the s t a n d a r d view o f t h e Proleg.
that the Grg. is a n assault o n
r h e t o r i c straightforwardly revealing its a u t h o r ' s a n t i - r h e t o r i c a l attitude, a n d only o c c a s i o n a l l y is it a s s u m e d that it is a n t i - r h e t o r i c a l for the sake o f the a r g u m e n t (e.g. p. 1 2 0 . 2 3 - 1 2 1 . 2 : Plato tried t o practise t h e weaker Aoyos). Aelius Aristides, who engages with Grg. intensively in Or. 2 - 4 , is in line with t h e s t a n d a r d view o f the Proleg., a n d even w h e r e his a r g u m e n t s for rhetoric derive f r o m the Grg. itself, he believes he has found Plato o u t r a t h e r t h a n has revealed his t r u e a t t i t u d e ( O r . 2 . 4 3 8 - 4 2 , 4 4 6 ) . It is the philosophers who p r i o r t o Q. identified a p r o - r h e t o r i c a l t h r e a d in t h e Grg. (see Brittain 3 2 2 ) .
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Commentary
discussion of opponents of rhetoric, before Q. turns to those 'qui de hoc opere melius sentiunt' (33). excerpta: excerpting for private purposes is mentioned at e.g. Cic. Inv. 2.4, Plin. Ep. 3. 5. 10 (his uncle), 6. 20. 5; TIL s.v. excerpo 1227. 77-1228. 21. But Q. is here talking of published extracts from Plato, which for some provided a substitute for reading the real thing (the practice was far from confined to this author). Note the warning of Seneca (Ep. 33. 5): 'depone istam spem, posse te summatim degustare ingenia maximorum uirorum: tota tibi inspicienda sunt, tota tractanda.' The tradition of epitomizing Plato's works started with an epitome of the Laws undertaken by Aristotle (mentioned in D.L. 5. 21); see I. Opelt, 'Epitome', RAC 5 (1962), 944-73, esp. 950-2 on excerpts from philosophical texts. hoc totum: sc. uolumen. existimet: Grg. 462 c 6-7 (Polus): rivos ifx-ntipia; Socrates: nvos Kai r)8ovrjs airepryaaias. Kiderlin8 500-1, to supply a translation for anepyaotas and to remove the difficulty of the phrase 'peritia gratiae', wanted to insert 'excitandae' or 'efficiendae' before 'existimet'. But this spoils the triple cretic clausula; Q. is not translating Plato—it is merely an allusion, and word-for-word correspondence is not necessary; finally, if Suet. Tib. 67. 2 can write 'existimant quidam praescisse haec eum peritia fiiturorum [sc. prouidendorum]', we can do without the gerundive here. 15. 25 ciuilitatis particulae simulacrum: 463 D 1-2 eonv yap rj p-qropiKT) TOV ipov Xoyov 7ToAiTiKrjs popLov eiScoXov. Apul. PI. 2. 8 and Amm. Marc. 30. 4. 3 (who both talk without nuance of 'Plato') give umbram for CISOJAOV; but simulacrum (OLD s.v. 5a, though the meaning given there— 'sham appearance of an action—is too narrow) properly gets over the force of the Greek word: rhetoric is a 'mere image', i.e. derivative from and inferior to what it is an image of. These passages, together with 33 below and 2. 17. 14, are the only witnesses to ciuilitas = TTOXITLKV}. quartam partem adulationis: so too Amm. Marc. loc. cit. This is not a translation of Plato (cf., however, 466 A 6 KoXaKetas.. .p,opiov), but a deduction from the passage 463 A 6-465 D 9. quod... rhetoricen: quod loosely attaches a parenthetic explanation of the words just cited (it is only the words simulacrum and adulatio that are picked up in §28), based esp. on Grg. 464 b 6-8, 465 c 2-5; modern readers may consult Dodds's diagram in his commentary, p. 226. Q. is here summarizing a passage where Plato had used -1/07 adjectives with T€X**I understood, with the possible exception of two passages, 464 b 8, on which see Dodds's n., and 465 c 5, where hiKaioavvr) and SiKaoTiKr/ are variants: the balance of probability must surely lie with the latter. Where he can, Q. uses Latin nouns to represent Kara
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these words: thus medicina, iustitia (twice, possibly influenced by his text of Plato), cocorum artificium (not nrs!),42 mangonum (sc. artificium), rhetorice (whose credentials had been established in 2. 14. 1-4). Where he cannot, we must assume his adjectival equivalents to be intended as (virtual) nouns: exercitatrix, legalis, and cauillatrix (note the couplings 'medicinam et exercitatricem', 'legalem atque iustitiam'). The odd one out here is the strange legalis, but it is unsatisfactory to understand pars at either occurrence. interpretantur: perhaps showing that Q. relied on, or at least had available, a translation of the dialogue. exercitatricem: a hapax = yvfjcvaoTiKr). legalem: coined to translate vocoderiK-q. Similarly Apul. PI. 2.9 'haec eadem (sc. ciuilitas] utilitati animae procurat duobus modis; altera namque legalis est, iuridicialis [supporting SixaariKr] in Plato] altera'.13 mangonum: Q. [or the author of the posited translation] more Romano substitutes their 'expertise' for Plato's /co/x/xom/oj, 'art of embellishment', which at least also dealt in colours (465 B 4). Apuleius [PI. 2. 9) retains the (ars) unguentaria, but some of what he says of it is oddly reminiscent of our passage: 'non modo utilitatem corporum minuit, sed robur etiam uiresque frangit et uerum colorem ad desidiam sanguinis mutat.' qui... mentiantur: cf. Sen. Ep. 80. 9 'mangones, quidquid est quod displiceat, id aliquo lenocinio abscondunt'. The practice was so familiar that it led Pliny the Elder to coin mangonico (note esp. Nat. 23. 26 for a juice that 'inlinitus... laetiore quodam colore et cutis teneritate mangonicat corpora'), and mangonium. Pliny also attests to the fattening-up of slaves by mangones, who smeared the whole body with terebinth resin 'ad gracilitam emendandam... capacioraque ciborum facienda corpora' (Nat. 24. 35). For mentiantur (the subjunctive is due to virtual oratio obliqua; Q. is reproducing 465 B 4-5 oxr/naoiv.. .a7rarwaa), cf. 8. 3. 6 'fuco ementitum colorem' (also 12. 10. 76, with Verg. Eel. 4. 42). cauillatricem: = oo<J>ioTtKr). The word is found elsewhere only in 7. 3. 14, where it is noun enough to be accompanied by an adjective (arguta). See n. on 2. 14. 5 cauillation is. 15. 26. In this section Q. relies on a division of the Platonic corpus by character of the dialogues, which is similar to, though not identical with, divisions we find in Sextus, P.H. 1. 221, Albin. Prol. 3, Gal. PHP 2. 3. 9-10 De Lacy = 2. 179 Miiller, Procl. in Parm. 631. A philological study of the passage in Albinus is Niisser 101-68. The motivation and evident rationale of the 4 2 C £ Grg. 4 6 5 a 2 - 3 : cooker)' seems to be a r i x ^ l (cf- 2. 21. 11 and n. on ciborum... communis), but is really, according to Socrates, only a matter o f eniretpia Kai r/x/iij; cf. 4 6 5 a 2 - 7 . 4 3 O n e might therefore consider reading ' a l t e r o . . . altero'.
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Commentary
divisions is well characterized by Tarrant, Interpreters, 77. It is in D.L.'s discussion of the division of dialogues that a name is put to the author of the whole construct (3. 56): Thrasyllus, court philosopher of the emperor Tiberius. A collection of his fragments is in H. Tarrant, Thrasyllan Platonism (Ithaca and London, 1993), 215-49; see also J. Mansfeld, Prolegomena, 58-107. Given the similarities but also the differences between Q. and D.L., it is perhaps more likely that Q. and D.L., i.e. Thrasyllos, relied on the same earlier ideas in drawing up their division than that Q. relates a revised version of Thrasyllus' division. Moreover, the fact that what we might call a philosophical need for such a unified interpretation of Plato arose as early as the first half of the first century BC (before Thrasyllus, that is) supports this view. See also A. A. Long, 'Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy', CQ2 38 (1988), 150-71, sketching the background against which models for reading Plato's dialogues would have been developed. The divisions used by Q. and D.L. are similar in the following respects: on the most general level, the dialogues are divided into those which expound doctrine, i.e. views held by Plato, and hence are meant to instruct, and those which put an interlocutor's views to the test (in D.L. the former are called ixf>TjyrjTiKol SidXoyot, the latter £ q r r j T i K o i , stressing the aspect of inquiry). Q. is operating with this distinction in our passage in order to show that Plato may advance arguments in the persona (cf. -npooojirov, D.L. 3. 52; quoted below on cuius persona... sentiat) of Socrates—in this case, arguments against rhetoric—without endorsing them; connected with that, both Q. and D.L. rely on the notion that Plato, whatever he has Socrates say against rhetoric, nevertheless understands that there is 'true' rhetoric too (intellegit in 27, 7repi
In D.L. these subdivisions are then pursued further, on the side of the expositor)' dialogues according to subject-matter and the tripartite division of philosophy, in the other category according to the strategy pursued by Socrates within the dialogue (the different goals are intellectual training and the demolition of an opponent). It is conceivable that this scheme may in application turn out rather Procrustean, given that the same dialogue may have expository and 'refiitative' sections. Indeed, Q.'s handling of the main division shows that he is prepared to take the categories as different modes of discourse which may coexist in the same work, and it may well be the case that to handle the division in this way was not his idea; as Tarrant, Interpreters, 79-80, points out, a dialogue like the Theaetetuspositively invites this moreflexiblehandling. Perhaps the division was originally created as an interpretative tool for reading dialogues, not as a scheme to classify them all—or the classification is merely meant to broadly categorize the dialogues; either way, Q. may have known that the division was not meant to classify dialogues in a rigid way.
311
Commentary
divisions is well characterized by Tarrant, Interpreters, 77. It is in D.L.'s discussion of the division of dialogues that a name is put to the author of the whole construct (3. 56): Thrasyllus, court philosopher of the emperor Tiberius. A collection of his fragments is in H. Tarrant, Thrasyllan Platonism (Ithaca and London, 1993), 215-49; see also J. Mansfeld, Prolegomena, 58-107. Given the similarities but also the differences between Q. and D.L., it is perhaps more likely that Q. and D.L., i.e. Thrasyllos, relied on the same earlier ideas in drawing up their division than that Q. relates a revised version of Thrasyllus' division. Moreover, the fact that what we might call a philosophical need for such a unified interpretation of Plato arose as early as the first half of the first century BC (before Thrasyllus, that is) supports this view. See also A. A. Long, 'Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy', CQ2 38 (1988), 150-71, sketching the background against which models for reading Plato's dialogues would have been developed. The divisions used by Q. and D.L. are similar in the following respects: on the most general level, the dialogues are divided into those which expound doctrine, i.e. views held by Plato, and hence are meant to instruct, and those which put an interlocutor's views to the test (in D.L. the former are called ixftrjyrjTiKol SidXoyot, the latter £ q r r j T i K o i , stressing the aspect of inquiry). Q. is operating with this distinction in our passage in order to show that Plato may advance arguments in the persona (cf. -npooojirov, D.L. 3. 52; quoted below on cuius persona... sentiat) of Socrates—in this case, arguments against rhetoric—without endorsing them; connected with that, both Q. and D.L. rely on the notion that Plato, whatever he has Socrates say against rhetoric, nevertheless understands that there is 'true' rhetoric too (intellegit in 27, 7repi
In D.L. these subdivisions are then pursued further, on the side of the expositor)' dialogues according to subject-matter and the tripartite division of philosophy, in the other category according to the strategy pursued by Socrates within the dialogue (the different goals are intellectual training and the demolition of an opponent). It is conceivable that this scheme may in application turn out rather Procrustean, given that the same dialogue may have expository and 'refiitative'sections. Indeed, Q.'s handling of the main division shows that he is prepared to take the categories as different modes of discourse which may coexist in the same work, and it may well be the case that to handle the division in this way was not his idea; as Tarrant, Interpreters, 79-80, points out, a dialogue like the Theaetetuspositively invites this more flexible handling. Perhaps the division was originally created as an interpretative tool for reading dialogues, not as a scheme to classify them all—or the classification is merely meant to broadly categorize the dialogues; either way, Q. may have known that the division was not meant to classify dialogues in a rigid way.
264
Commentary
that id should replace the difficult et (cf. 31). With et the statement is inferential. ueram... intellegit: 'he has an understanding of true and honourable rhetoric' (Russell), i.e. he can see it before his mind's eye. It is easy to see why Q. finds this position appealing: like Plato, he sees no good orators around himself, i.e. no great speakers who are uiri boni, but that does not make them inconceivable for him (cf. n. on 28 ut... contingerebelow; and 10. 1. 122). For this use of intellegere cf. Cic. ND 3. 38 'qualem autem deum intellegere nos possumus nulla uirtute praeditum'. Q. may be alluding to Platonic ideas here, inspired by Cicero; cf. Or. 9 'perfectae eloquentiae speciem animo uidemus'. On the text see Winterbottom6 73. disputatio: cf. 5. 14. 27 'dialogis... et dialecticis disputationibus'. ita: 460 c 1-2. This passage is relevant to the text of Plato, where scholars have wished to delete or transpose the words which immediately follow Q.'s citation. Dodds, ad loc. argues that '[Q.'s] use of cluditur does swggcsf that c3 OvSenoTc—5 Nat was missing from his text'. But even if these words are removed, a vital step in the argument (ovbenoTc apafiovA-qotraio prjropiKos aSiKetv) still follows. We should therefore take cluditur to mean something like 'has as its upshot' (cf. n. on 28 ad hanc perducitur clausulam). 15. 28 ad quod., .conticescit: cf. 6. 1. 42 'conticescunt ad hos casus', apparently the sole parallel for conticescere ad. Russell: 'this silences Gorgias'. This sentence, not cluditur, is the real argument for treating Q. as evidence for Plato's text, as Donald Russell points out to us. iuuenili calore inconsideratior: cf. e.g. Sen. Con. 7. 7. 13 'sciebam esse acrem adulescentem, fortem, sed inconsideratum, temerarium' (also Decl. min. 323. 6 'concitati.. .ac temerarii iuuenis motus est animus'). Youth was the time for hot-headedness (Arist. Rhet. B12; note 1389M9 BidOeppoi), and 'Polus is spluttering with indignation and anacolutha' (Shorey, quoted by Dodds on Grg. 461 B 4-C). ilia... dicuntur: as cited in §25. simulacro: see n. on 25 ciuilitatis particulae simulacrum. concitatior: cf. 11. 3. 146 'calori concitationique'. ad hanc perducitur clausulam: the quotation is from 508 c 1-2. It is the 'conclusion' to which Socrates leads Callicles, not the actual end of their argument (indeed the words come in the course of a long speech by Socrates); cf. n. on 27 ita. For the verbcf. 5. 7. 17 'ex pluribus deinde quae confessus erit eo perducetur ut quod dicere non uult negare non possit', describing the interrogation of a witness. Later in that chapter (28) Q. explicitly points to the parallel withSocraticelenchus: 'si quod... exemplumad imitationem demonstrandum
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sit, solum est quod ex dialogis Socraticorum maximeque Platonis duci potest: in quibus adeo scitae sunt interrogationes ut, cum plerisque bene respondeatur, res tamen ad id quod uolunt efificere perueniat.' No precise parallel for clausula used thus presents itself; Q. clearly recalls27 'disputatio ilia... cluditur' (cf. Col. 3. 19. 3 'antequam disputationi clausulam imponamus'). TOV fieXXovra ... MKOUOV: the words are quoted by Syrianus (in Hermogenem commentaria, ii), p. 4. 14-15 Rabe, again to prove that Plato despite appearances was in favour of 'true' rhetoric (rrjs ooipovos prjroptKijs). Q. and Syrianus could have referred to the Politicus, where (303 E 10-304 A 2) Plato speaks of oar) fiaoiAiKr) KOIVIOVOVOCL p-qropeia, 7T€i9ovoa TO SIKOLIOV. ovvStaKvfiepva ra? iv rat? noXeot npd^eis.
u t . . . contingere: 'so that it is clear that for Plato it is not rhetoric [i.e. perse] that seems an evil, rather [he thinks] that in its genuine form [cf. opdojs] it cannot fall to anyone but a just and good man.' The sentence changes direction a little (Kiderlin8 502), but there is no need for change. Volkmann, Rhetorik, 5, cites Rh. Gr. vii. 25 and vi. 58, where Plato's attitude to rhetoric is presented in the same way: Plato rejected rhetoric as taught and used in his day, but did conceive of a true rhetoric as the philosopher would practise it. Cf. also the Academic philosopher Charmadas' pronouncements on rhetoric in Cic. de Orat., which stand there in the broader context of an account of a supervised reading of Grg. (1. 84): '...sed cum maxime tamen hoc significabat, eos, qui rhetores nominarentur et qui dicendi praecepta traderent, nihil plane tenere neque posse quemquam facultatem dicendi adsequi dicendi, nisi qui philosophorum inuenta didicisset' (on the passage see Tarrant 38-40). This shows that a qualifiedly pro-rhetorical interpretation of the Grg. was attempted by Academic philosophers towards the end of the second century BG We can be fairly certain that no such interpretations were proposed by Academics before Charmadas, since the Academy had been, so far as we know, strictly hostile to rhetoric since the fourth century. There is little direct evidence for engagement with the Grg. during the Hellenistic period, cf. Dodds's edition pp. 62-6; we do, however, have scanty information on Epicureans writing works directed against it; see D. Obbink, Philodemus on Piety (Oxford, 1996), 379-89. 15. 29 in Phaedro: 259 E-274 B (esp. 269 c-272 B). Spalding is right in observing that there is no explicit statement that an orator must be StVaio?, but this is doubtless implied (e.g. in 272 D). consummari: 'to be brought to perfection'; for the use of the verb in connection with the perfection of the soul and virtue in particular see TLL s.v. 599. 69-600.4 (of people), 600. 4-28 (of things). Cf. the use of (scientiam)
266
Commentary
consummare in 2. 21. 24, and the slightly different use of the expression artem consummare in 3. 9. 9. cui opinioni... accedimus: as in 1, Q. anticipates statement of his own position; he will elaborate on this particular point in 12. 2 (note §§17,31). On aceedere cf. n. on 1 sententiae accedimus. an aliter...scripsisset: a conditional clause is understood—but of what content? Apparently Q. means that Plato would not have written oratorical' works on subjects so free from any possible moral objection if he had not been convinced that there was a place for a 'true' rhetoric, deployed by someone (like himself) good and just. Q.'s rhetorical question then is an argument in favour of Plato's general position as he has analysed it; it looks back over 'cui... accedimus' to the opinio with which Q. agrees, as expressed in the clausula of the Callides argument and in the Phaedrus.*M A parallel for this use of an aliter introducing a question inviting a negative answer, but with the nisi-dause expressed, is Cic. Fat. 27 'an aliter haec enuntiatio uera esse non potest, "capiet Numantiam Scipio", nisi ex aeternitate causa causam serens hoc erit effectura?'; cf. OLD s.v. aliter 6c. quae.. .opera: already in antiquity doubts were expressed about the Apology. Cf. D.H. Dem. 23: Plato's one forensic speech, which 'never saw even the threshold of a law-court or an open assembly, but was written for another purpose and belongs to the category neither of oratory nor of dialogue' (transl. Usher); W. Schmid and O. Stahlin, Geschichtedergriechischen Literatur (Munich , 1940), i/3. 243 n. 5; and generally T. Meyer, Platons Apologie (Stuttgart, 1962). The Menexenus (237 B-249 C) is an equally dubious contender as a lawcourt piece, though D.H. Dem. 23 took it seriously, calling it a noXITIKOS Aoyo?; see e.g. H. Leisegang, RExx/2 (1954), s.n. Plato, cols. 2417-19. A convenient list of ancient references to the work is collected by Russell on 'Longinus' 12. 2. In general see S. Tsitsiridis, Platons Menexenos (Stuttgart, 1998). 15. 30 facilitate... utebatur: facilitas is here similar to facultas (for which see n.on 2 dicendi facultatem), but perhaps with more colour of 'fluency'. There is nothing inherently pejorative in the expression; facilitas was one of the maxima in an orator (10. 2. 12). nam et Socrates... composuerat: et implies that Socrates, as well as Plato, disapproved of contemporary rhetoric, as is shown by his refusal to use the speech that Lysias had written for him (cf. D.L. 2.40; Granatelli observes on our passage that Socrates would not have approved of the 'escamotage' involved in using a logographer's speech). The story recurs in 11. 1. 11 (Socrates thought the speech 'bonam quidem, sed parum sibi conuenientem'). Q. will have ** There is no break at the start o f § 2 9 , despite the Loeb.
Chapter Seventeen
267
known it especially from the fuller version in Cic. de Orat. 1. 231, where see L-P's n.; other references are collected in T. Thalheim's ed. maior of Lysias (Leipzig, 1901), 370. No hint of Lysias' role is given by the allusions put into Socrates' mouth at Ap. 38 D 6-8 and Grg. 522 D 7-9. A speech attributed to Lysias seems to have circulated in antiquity (which, as Dover 192 suggests, may have given rise to the story in de Orat. 1. 231); see r o n Aelius Aristides p. 320. 1-4. (cf. Giannantoni, 1 c 135) and p. 480.28481.2 Dindorf. et turn maxime... erat moris: Q. means that what Socrates was objecting to was the content of Lysias' speech, not the fact that Lysias had written it for him, that being a normal Athenian practice (see e.g. Kennedy, Art, 126-9). Though the argument is clear, the expression is not. For et we might expect an adversative, and the point of maxime is obscure. We therefore emend to et turn maxime <cum>', 'had composed, and that at a time when...'; cf. Cic. Parad. 29 'ergo ego semper ciuis, et turn maxime cum meam salutem senatus exteris nationibus ut ciuis optimi commendabat' (also Rhet. Her. 3. 40, Cels. 3. 6. 1). iuri... agere: Q. may be turning an established custom into a rule of law: see A. R. W. Harrison, The Law of Athens: Procedure (Oxford, 1971), 156 with n. 7. Contra, e.g. J. A. Crook, Legal Advocacy in the Roman World (London, 1995), 31 with n.5; and earlier Kunst, RE s.v. Logographen 2, cols. 1027-8. 15. 31 doctores quoque: i.e as well as the practising orators of 30 ('illud hominum genus...'). ueris credibilia praeferrent: this notion, brought to the fore in 259 E-261 A and 272 B-274 B, frames the second part of Plato's Phaedrus (concerned with contemporary rhetoric and the extent to which it falls short of ideal rhetoric as conceived by Plato). It represents Plato's basic charge against rhetoric: that it is concerned with commonly held views and takes them as the sphere within which it operates, thus never stepping outside the realm of opinion and asking, for instance, whether justice is anything other than the assorted views Athenian citizens hold on the matter. Likewise, in the sphere of the particular, conventional rhetoric is—see next note—always predisposed to taking a line which is plausible given commonly held views about the generic classes individuals or individual actions belong with, rather than one which is grounded in an accurate representation of actualities. in Phaedro: 267 A 5—7 Tetatav SE Fopyiav re idoofiev evSeiv, oi npo TOIV aAr)9oiv ra €IK6TOL etSov d>s ripajrea pdXXov. Cf. also 272 E 2—3, and the anecdote (allegedly from Tisias' writings) in 273 B 2-C 4. References to Tisias' instruction on TO CIKOS are collected in Radermacher, Art. Scr.; see also W. Siiss, Ethos: Studien zur alteren griechischen Rhetorik (Leipzig and Berlin,
268
Commentary
1910), 2-17; F. Solmsen, Antiphonstudien (Berlin, 1931), 47-63; T. A. Schmitz, 'Plausibility in the Greek Orators', AJPh 121 (2000), 47-77. 15. 32 illis superioribus: cf. n. on 17 superiores. Here the meaning is clearly 'those earlier authorities' (like Ti si as); OLD s.v. superior 4b. The mention of fifth-century rhetoricians sparks off this footnote on Celsus (see n.on 24 plerique autem... in cider unt), who can be seen as the fairly recent representative of a long bad tradition, in opposing which Q. now has the support, as he imagines, of Plato. Cornelius Celsus: fr. rhet. 2 Marx (see n.on 22 Cornelius Celsus). For these views of Celsus cf. Julius Severianus 3 (p. 356. 8-10 Halm; p. 73 Castelli Montanari) 'in ceteris fere studiis uerum quaeritur, finis autem oratoriae uirtutis est uerisimilia dixisse uel tantum contendisse, quantum res passa sit ad uictoriam'. For the relation of Julius Severianus and Celsus see L. Radermacher, RE s.n. Iulius 481, col. 805-11, with references to earlier discussions, including W. Schafer, Quaestiones Rhetoricae (Bonn, 1913; diss, phil.), esp. 46f., where Celsus pr. 39 is compared for the idea of uictoria (the context, however, is very different), as well as Castelli Montanari's edition, 47-58. bona conscientia: cf. 6. 1. 33, 9. 2. 93; the phrase is first attested in Seneca, uictoria litigantis est praemium: Q. of course thought victory important (5. 8. 1 'propter quam dicitur uictoria'; cf. also 2. 4. 32); but morality was more important still: 'tendit quidem ad uictoriam qui dicit, sed cum bene dixit, etiam si non uincat, id quod arte continetur effecit' (2. 17. 23). quae... adiuuare: Q. proceeds to react sharply to Celsus' brutally frank formulation, in which he may have found the very mention of a praemium of any sort provocative (note 12. 7.3 'accusatoriam uitam uiuere et ad deferendos reos praemio duci proximum latrocinio est'). His language is heightened by the ethical topic and by the desire to give closure to the long section on his opponents before he turns to his own view (////... nos...). Note the superlatives pessimorum and nocentissimis; for mores metonymically = homines, see TLL s.v. 1 mos 1524. 41-51, citing also 2. 17. 32 (cf. nn.on 2. 1. 3 aetas and 2. 2. 14 infirm ita s); and the final words, 'nequitiam praeceptis adiuuare', strive for epigrammatic grandeur. nocentissimis moribus dare instrumental cf. 12. 1. 1 'si uis ilia dicendi malitiam instruxerit, nihil sit publicis priuatisque rebusperniciosiuseloquentia, nosque ipsi.. .pessime mereamur de rebus humanis si latroni comparamus haec arma, non militi' (Austin's nn. compare Cic. de Orat. 3. 55, where 'furentibus quaedam arma dederimus' itself looks back to Plato: see L-P ad loc.). rationem opinionis suae: cf. Gel. 14. 3. 8 'quae igitur est opinionis istius ratio?'; D. 22. 1. 2 pr. ratio means 'justification' here (so Russell), not 'reasoning'. Cf. OLD s.v. ratio 5a.
Chapter S e v e n t e e n
269
uiderint: cf. 8. 3. 39 'quod uiderint qui... Ego..Ov. Ars. 2. 371 'uiderit Atrides; Helenen ego crimine soluo'. Palmer on Ov. Ep. 12. 211 cites further parallels, commenting: 'this phrase is used when the speaker throws the responsibility of a course of conduct on another, while, we may add, often expressing his own opinion in contrast. Cf. K-S i. 149. 15. 33 uirum bonum: the Greek 'behind' the tag uir bonus is o oo6s or o G7Tov8aios (see SVFvol. iv, index s.v. ao^os and onovSaios), in the sense that many of the arguments Q. cites in support of his rhetoric grounded in morality were devised to describe the Stoic sage. But instead of using sapiens, which would immediately have disqualified his views in contemporary discussion (see p. xlvi), Q. recontextualizes Cato's saying of the uir bonus dicendi peritus (cf. esp. 1 pr. 9 'oratorem autem instituimus ilium perfectum, qui esse nisi uir bonus non potest, ideoque non dicendi modo eximiam in eo faailtatem sed omnis animi uirtutes exigimus', and 12. 1. 1 with Austin's n.), thus giving his heavily Stoicized perfect orator a distinctly Roman look. reuertamur: Q. has so far done little more than mention this group (1), though he has in effect argued that Plato should be classed with it (28-9). rhetoricen... iudicauerunt: for the idiom, cf. 5. 11. 39 'qui nullam adulterant non eandem esse ueneficam dixit'; Cic. de Orat. 3. 143 'quem [sc. oratorem] si patiimtur eundem esse philosophum'; some of the passages cited in TLL s.v. idem 191. 27-67; and K-S i. 627. The construction is not normally used as an alternative to idem ac or idem qui (note the different phrasing of'ciuilis... scientia idem quod sapientia est' below). Rather, it is used to assign a quality to a subject already mentioned (cf. the two examples cited). Thus the sentence should mean 'rhetoric is also polities'. However, what the sense seems to require here is 'rhetoric is the same as polities', because the overall context is concerned with defining rhetoric (or identifying defining features of it) rather than with establishing how rhetoric is connected with or encroaches on other subjects. Q. now moves on to assessments of rhetoric which integrate it with fields of expertise like politics and philosophy. These stand—at least in the context of idealizing academic discussion—in high regard, so that 'association' with them can help to make plausible Q.'s promotion of rhetoric to something that is much more than a useful commodity in suitable contexts or a ladder for the social climber. In EN 1181a 12—19 Ar. criticizes the sophists for teaching as noXiTtKrj something that is so trivial and impoverished that they can call it the same as or even inferior to prjTopiKrj, which was much what Gorgias said in the dialogue, and what Isocrates held (Or. 15. 80-3); in doing this, Ar. continues, they completely ignore how difficult devising good laws and implementing
Commentary
270
them is. The figure of the legislator is central to Aristotle's conception of TTOXTRIKTI; this is clear especially from EN A9,1099b2<W2 and A13,1102a7-12 (the divergence of this use of 'politician' from conventional use is acknowledged in Z8,114lb23—9); see M. Schofield in M. Schofield and C. Rowe (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge, 2000), 310-20. As to the connection with rhetoric, Aristotle thought that it was strictly speaking not a unified art in the sense that its precepts were 'rhetorical' alone, but that it drew on two other fields of knowledge, dialectic (concerned with formal techniques of argument) and ethics so broadly conceived that it would properly be called TTOXITIKT] (Rhet. A2,1356a25-7 wore
ovpfialvet
rrjs nepi
rrfv py]TopiK7)v
r a -qOr) TTpaypLareias,
otov
Trapaves
rjv SiKaiov
eon
TI rrjs
StaXeKTiKijs
npooayopevetv
efvai
Kai
iToXtriKr/v;
see
Cooper 200); so when Aristotle subordinates rhetoric to philosophy in EN A2, 1094 b 2-3, he simplifies to the point of being misleading. In Plato's dialogues, at least in those which take a positive stance on rhetoric, we do, however, find rhetoric 'subordinated' to politics as he conceives of it. The dispute continued throughout the Hellenistic era, partly fuelled by the presence of philosophical schools which took very dim views of both rhetoric and politics; see M. Schofield in Schofield/Rowe (op. cit.), 435-56 on Epicurean and Stoic political thought, (and J. Moles, ibid. 423-32 on 'the Cynics and polities'). In Philod. Rhet. ii. 239-40 the problem ei f) prjTopiKri Kai TTOXITIKV) eonv is discussed; cf. Cicero's protest in INV. 1. 6 'ab eis qui earn [sc. ciuilem scientiam] putant omnem rhetoris ui et artificio contineri magnopere dissentimus'), though mainly from the restricted viewpoint of whether a rhetorical education makes one into a politician; on Inv. 1. 6 see Norden, AK i. 7 n. 2. Q. clearly thinks of ciuilitas as having a broader, more profound sense (cf. also Cic. de Orat. 3. 109), though it is not certain that anyone who identified rhetoric and iroXmK-q was using the word in this way. (The reference is certainly to this long-standing discussion rather than to the later development by which TroXniK-q came to mean prjTopiKr), a use perhaps not found before Aristides, according to Brandstatter). Cicero., .uocat: Inv. 1. 6 'quare hanc oratoriam facultatem in eo genere ponemus, ut earn ciuilis scientiae partem esse dicamus'. ciuilis... sapientia: while Inv. 1. 6 is similar to Q. in that there some connection is made (or rather implied) between morality and rhetoric, the passage is of course different in respect of how strong this connection is made out to be (surely none of the authorities cited or alluded to would have classed rhetoric itself as a virtue, which is the cornerstone of Q.'s argument; see the commentary on ch. 20). Q. is quite happy not to pause long enough to point
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271
this out. And, as Donald Russell points out to us, it is puzzling that Q. thought Cic. actually identified ciuilis scientia with sapientia. quidam... Isocrates: Isocrates called the rhetoric he practised i\oooia, e.g. Or. 4. 10 rrjv nepi TOVS Aoyovs i\oooiav (cf. Epist. 6. 8). This disposes of B's philosophiae (sc. partem). Q. will be be thinking of Isocrates' speeches rather than the rexy*) attributed to him (see 4). Isocrates' views are perhaps best explained (cf. e.g. Eucken, passim) as a critical response to Platonic philosophy with its lofty metaphysics and the notion of virtue-knowledge on the one hand, and the anodyne and stereotypical teachings of the professional rhetoricians on the other. Isocrates thought that young men should be able to express themselves adequately and skilfully, and should be driven by a healthy sense of ambition, grounded in an understanding of glory which ties it to traditional, common sense' morality. All this is to be seen against the background of the cultural pessimism and even scepticism present in the more intellectual strands of the sophistic movement. If this picture is reasonably accurate, then it is clear that—however much Q. may make of Isocrates equating' rhetoric and philosophy—the latter cannot really be cited in support of Q.'s views. 15. 34 huic... finitio: with the unwieldy 'huic eius substantiae' cf. Decl. min. 328. 12 'irascor quidem huic eius pertinaciae', Sen. Ben. 2. 3. 3 'huic eius animo numquam parem gratiam referam'), and there is no need (with B) to omit eius. The reference must certainly be to the ova la of rhetoric (eius) as implied by Isocrates' identification of it with philosophy (see on §33 above; also Winterbottom6 73). The next sentence then explains why the definition propounded fits rhetoric's philosophical nature so well (the reason being that bene introduces an evaluative element that can cover the orator's morals as well as his technical efficiency). For this to become a plausible move, one needs to appreciate the overall train of thought in §§33-4: philosophers and statesmen are conventionally held to be people with a conscience, so an indirect reference to them creates some background for the view that the perfect orator is a good man. huic in the sentence under discussion clearly invites the reader to make the appropriate connection. Otherwise one might think that it was not altogether obvious how as bland a phrase as 'the science of speaking well' could carry a complex conception of rhetoric: through what comes before the reader is invited to fill bene with content (see nn. below). finitio: after what has been said about the potential confusion arising from Q.'s use of finis in two senses, one is surprised to find the unambiguous finitio here, which could have been used alongside finis = re\os (but see below). In any case, it seems no coincidence that finitio and substantia occur together
272
Commentary
here (definitions do not just reveal what words mean, they grasp the essence of a thing designated by a word; cf. 1 'qualitate ipsius rei'). In expressing himself in this way, Q. makes it clear that he has finally cut through the variety of different fines that have been offered, and that we are now given a definitive answer. Perhaps finitio was saved to be able to have this highlighting function. But while it is clear here, a distinction between finitio = definition and finis = 'goal' would have been unsatisfactory as an overall solution. Where the two appear together, it is as rivals for the sense 'definition' (5. 10. 54 and 7. 3. 20). In fact finitio is normally used for this sense elsewhere than in 2. 15, and almost exclusively in connection with the status finitiuus (but note 7. 3. 20 and 25). rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam: another 'type' definition (so Granatelli2 ad loc.); see p. 229 n. 32. This turns out to be the formulation favoured by Q. (38). Kiderlin1 123-4, finding it awkward that no author is named, inserted 'Cleanthis' after 'substantiae' above; but in that case Q. would hardly have needed to point out that Chrysippus' definition was 'derived' (cf. 4 'haec opinio originem ab Isocrate... duxit') from Cleanthes'. Q. may be intentionally vague. For Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 6 attributes the wording €7TIOTTJFIAQ TOV ev Xeyetv both to Xenocrates (fr. 13 Heinze = fr. 90 Isnardi Parente) and to ol ano rfjs Zroas tXoooot (no name either in D.L. 7. 42; one Stoic who can be specified is Panaetius' pupil Mnesarchus: Cic. de Orat. 1. 83). We shall discuss later (see the introductory note to ch. 20) why eTTtar-qpaq rather than re'xviq figures in the definition. Sextus remarks, more or less correctly, that, while Xenocrates used the word 'in the old way' to mean the same as rexvq, the Stoics meant by it something present only in the sage: they took eTTtar-qpnq to entail the possession of firm KaraXiqifjeis. As to the import of ev, we must turn first to Alex. Aphr. in Arist. Top. p. 1. 11-12 = fr. 57 Hiilser: (the Stoics) to 8e ed A eyetv ev TW ra aX-qdrj Kai ra vpoa-qKovra A eyetv elvat TtOepevot, then for further elucidation—one might ask on what grounds speaking the truth is speaking well—to SVF iii, fr. 16. 16-19 (Stob. Eel. ii, p. 77. 16 W-H): there we learn that living well means living according to nature in the sense that by acting virtuously, i.e. in accordance with right reason, we implement the rationality that is characteristic of nature. We can apply this notion to rhetoric, which is (like dialectic) a virtue: e6 Xe'yetv is one way of living according to nature. These issues will be pursued further when Q. continues his work on this particular aspect of the argument for the kind of rhetoric he advertises (see the commentary on 2. 16. 11-19, and the introductory note to the chapter). On the Peripatetic conception of a science see n. on 19 scientia... persuasionis.
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273
semel complectitur: cf. 11. 1. 66 ut semel plura complectar'. It strengthens the prefix in the verb (for which cf. above, §13). For the point made—that bene dicere is to encapsulate all the virtues—see the previous note (and p. xxxviii). protinus: 'at the same time'; cf. nn. on the word at 2. 4. 15, 2. 5. 6. bonus: for the omission of uir, cf. e.g. 12. 1.8 'malus atque iniquus'; see P. Hirt, Substantivierungdes Adjektivums bei Quintilian (Berlin, 1890), 18 with n. 1. We would take this sentence as a clear instance that Q. is relying on his readership to bring their knowledge of Stoic philosophy to bear on his text. For while, within the context of Stoic doctrine, it makes eminent sense to say that only the good man can speak well, this claim is counterintuitive from the perspective of common sense. Chrysippi: of Soloi, third scholarch of the Stoa. For his fragments on rhetoric see SVF ii, pp. 95-110.; see also Hiilser, i. 56-65. On Chrysippus' treatises on the matter see Cic. Fin. 4. 7 'quamquam scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes, Chrysippus etiam, sed sic ut si quis obmutescere concupierit nihil aliud legere debeat'; D.L. 7. 202, where four books nept rijs prjropiKrjs 7rpos AtooKoupibrjv are recorded. On Stoic rhetoric in general, and Chrysippus' in particular, see Atherton and p. xxxvii. In Plut. De Sto. rep. 1047 A a different Chrysippean definition of rhetoric seems to be given: rrfv p-qTopiKrjv opt^erai T€\vr]v nepi fKoafxov kcll eiprjfxevov Xoyov rd^iv (see on
this R. Volkmann, Rhetorik, 10 n. 4); 45 the passage has been bracketed by some scholars, presumably because it is so different from the 'standard definition' (although there is a genuine problem of transmission here too), but 35 tells us that there were further definitions available in the works of Chrysippus. In general, it is not unusual to find multiple definitions of the same thing in Stoic contexts; some items had on the Stoic view to be defined on more than one level of description, and there is a historical dimension to this which accounts for definitions being adjusted in the face of criticism; see O. Rieth, Grnndbegriffe der stoischen Ethik (Berfin, 1933). Cf. SVF i, fr. 491 (Cleanthes); ii, fr. 292 (Chrysippus). ductus a Cleanthe: on Kiderlin's view (see above on rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiani) this implies that Cleanthes wrote ev Xc'yeiv, Chrysippus opduts Xeyeiv (which need not simply mean that Chrysippus wanted to make plainer the ethical content of the definition: the Stoics had strong views on what was 'correct speech', see Atherton 410-15). As the text stands we cannot know (and find it difficult to guess) what Cleanthes wrote.
45
ChernissintheLoeb reads . . .
-nepl Koaptov (Xylander) elpofie'vov Xoyov koi
r a f i r , translating
'an art concerned with the order or arrangement o f continuous speech'; see also his note (b).
Commentary
274
Cleanthe: o f Assos, second scholarch o f the Stoa (D.L. vii. 1 6 8 - 7 8 ) . H e was considered the teacher o f Chrysippus (D.L. vii. 1 7 9 ) . See further the entry o n h i m in Goulet ii. 4 0 6 - 1 5 . T h i s passage, and Cic. Fin. 4 . 7 quoted above, are the only rhetorical fragments o f Cleanthes given b y SVF i, frr. 4 9 1 - 2 . 15. 3 5 sunt p l u r e s . . . pertinent: see n. on 3 4 Chrysippi.
V o l k m a n n (loc. cit.
ibid.) wrote: ' S o ist das (sc. the Plutarch definition] nicht sowohl eine Definition der Rhetorik an sich, als mit Bezug a u f ihre Hauptquelle', by which he probably means a definitio
by partitio
(cf. 5. 10. 54, Cic. Top. 2 8
with Reinhardt ad loc.) as opposed to a definition that gave the substantia
of
rhetoric (see p. 2 2 9 ) . T h i s is presumably the sort o f thing meant by ad alias quaestiones magis pertinent' (contrast Spalding o n
ad alias quaestiones':
' n o n ad hanc, utrum soli viro b o n o t r i b u e n d u m eloquentia?'). i d e m . . . oporteat: another 'type' definition (Granatelli 2 ad loc.); see p. 2 2 9 n. 32. Q . n o w answers an obvious o b j e c t i o n — t h a t an element stating or implying a moral requirement can be introduced even into a persuasiontype definition, i.e. oporteat
= 'morally ought'. His answer is that even such a
definition is subject to the c o m m o n flaw o f persuasion definitions: that success is made a criterion o f the field o f expertise in question being an art o r t h e expert an artist ( 1 2 - 1 3 ) . In fact, however, n o one seems to have taken such a line, and this explains the m o o d and tense o f sentiret.
it is
counterfactual ( W i n t e r b o t t o m 6 73). Q . is not just making up possible definitions to refute ('qui foret labor infinitus': Spalding); rather, there is a special point in suggesting and overthrowing this one. sentiret: 'would mean', cf. OLDs.x.
9, citing Gel. 13. 2 5 . 1 3 'tribus uocabulis
idem sentientibus dixit'. Q.'s point is that this definition could be classed with the bene dicendi
scientia
type were it not for a fatal flaw.
finis h o c m o d o c o m p r e n s u s : Q.'s return to finis
makes finitio in 3 4 stand
out (see n. there); for comprensus see n.on 1 comprensione uerborum. nisi q u o d a r t e m . . .alligat: so persuadere
means 'to succeed in persuading'.
15. 3 6 Areus: this is probably Areus Didymus, with w h o m Augustus was intimate (Suet. Aug. 8 9 ) . In 3. 1. 16 Areus is classed chronologically with e.g. Caecilius and Dion. Hal., which would chronologically fit with acquaintance with Augustus. Areus Didymus had Stoic leanings, see H . v o n A m i m , RE ii/1 ( 1 8 9 5 ) , s.n. Areios 12, col. 6 2 6 ; the context here is Stoic, and the definition we get here would fit that school too (see 7. 3. 12). u i r t u t e m orationis: a subjective genitive would m a k e the moralistic element disappear; a defining genitive ( ' t h e virtue which is speech') seems u n i n telligible, and oratio
can mean 'rhetoric' only in the sense o f ' o r a t o r y ' (as in
'X's rhetoric was impressive'), cf. OLD s.v. 9; in order to preserve the m o r a l istic slant o f the definition within the b o u n d s o f Latinity, one would have to
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275
translate 'the virtue inherent in speech', i.e. the virtue (itself an integral part o f the mental make-up o f the speaker) as it is implemented
in speech.
This,
however, seems impossible to square with any Greek equivalent o f
uirtus
orationis; apery Xoyov and similar phrases, notably aperr) Xegecos, mean
Virtue of language o r style', and tend to be free o f moral import (cf. e.g. Ar.
Rhet. ny
1404 b 37 n
TOV PXJTOPIKOV
Xoyov apcri7; Strab. 1. 2. 6 = Posidonius
fr. 4 Theiler (not in Edelstein-Kidd); Rh. Gr. viii. 56. 18 [Sopat. A a t p c a t ? ] ) . Is it possible that Areus had something like Sallust, De deis
10. 1.5dperrj
Xoyovp,ev povr}oisy Ovpov
et
mundo
avSpeia, eiridvpias 8e oajpoovvr]
in mind when he defined rhetoric, and that Q . (or whoever translated Areus' definition) misunderstood him? Despite the Platonist
overtones
o f the passage (less o f a problem in a period o f syncretism like the first century AD), it would be a meaningful thing to say for Areus that rhetoric is speaking in accordance with the aperrj Xoyov in this sense, given that the Stoics make rhetoric a subvirtue o f povr)ots (see n n . o n 2. 20. 5 - 6 ) . a rhetorice: i.e. prjropiKr] (dat.); see n. on 2. 14. 3 id in rhetorice ciuilium officiorum:
TOJV TTOXITLK&V.
non fit
See n. on 15 ciuiles. For a vaguer use o f
eiuilia officia, see 2 . 4 . 27, with n. Another 'type' definition (Granatelli 2 ad loc., and see p. 2 2 9 with n. 32). si scientiam uirtutem iudicant: as the Stoics did (n. on 20 hie...
ponit).
anguste: 9 . 1 . 14 'id ipsum anguste [id] Zoilus terminauit ['defined']' (also 7. 4. 40). intra c i u i l e s . . . coercent is meant to define the way in which the def. is too narrowly phrased. Cf. Tac. Ann.
1. 11 'consilium coercendi intra
terminos imperii' (with Heubner on Hist. 2. 18. 1). See also 2. 1. 4 n. on
intra quam constitere.
Albucius: C. Albucius Silus, well-known rhetor (Sen. Con. 7 pr., Suet.
Gram.
30, with Kaster 1 3 1 3 - 1 6 ) . Q. draws on his otherwise unknown theoretical writings at 3. 3. 4 and 3. 6. 6 2 .
auctor: see n.on 2. 5. 19 maior est auctor.
exceptionibus: a legal term, see OLD s.v. 2 'a limiting clause or proviso in a law, agreement, etc.'; cf. 6. 3. 104. i a m . . . responsum est: 15 (in fact referring forward to ch. 2 1 ) , 17. 15. 37 recte sentire et dicere: cf. above 34 'scientia recte dicendi' and n. o n correctness. Thinking and speaking go together because dialectic (and rhetoric is its sister science) is thought o f as ensuring the correct thinking which underlies correct utterances; see Pap. Here. 1020 ( = fr. 88 Hiilser; the text in SVF vol. ii, fr. 131 is inferior). Spengel 492, commenting on our passage, rightly says: 'Die Stoiker glaubten wohl mit ihrem eu Xeyeiv beides zu umfassen'. Rare exceptions to the rule o f truthful speaking were, however,
Commentary
276
made; whether we take this to be Stoic doctrine depends entirely on our interpretation o f 12. 1. 38, see Atherton 424. fines:
although the genitive rhetorices
and the infinitives
sentire/dicere
precede, Q. must be referring back to all the fines that came before; this suggests that finis is meant to be ambiguous here. p r a u u m . . . s t u d i u m . . .finiendi: for similar complaints in Q . cf. 3. 3. 8 'cupidi nouitatis', 3. 6. 22 s t u d i u m . . .diuersa tradendi', 3. 11. 21 'haec adfectata s u b t i l i t a s . . . ambitiose
laboret', 8. 3. 63 'non equidem in omnis earn
particulas secabo, quarum ambitiose
a quibusdam numerus augetur'. This is
in Q.'s mouth a Roman protest against Greek complications (cf. Calboli on Rhet.
Her. 1. 1; Winterbottom in Corsi i. 1 4 - 1 5 ) ; but note e.g. Ar.
Rhet.
r 13, 1414 b l5—18 (looking back to PI. Phdr. 267 c 2), the exchange between Socrates and Hippias KOLIVOV TI
in X.
Mem.
4. 4. 6 (Hippias
boasts
neipaifxai
A EYE tv aei), and Philodemus' gibe (Rhet. Suppl. p. 6. 1 8 - 9 Sudhaus;
p. 15. 2 8 - 3 1 L.A.) about those who discover viroSeiyfidraiv erepoTrjTas for the fun o f it,
to
nXovoiov
TOJV
xpiofxevajv €7TIatvovoas.
procul aberit a me: cf. n. on 2. 3. 11 a me proeul aberit. 15. 38 non . . . quae inuenero, sed quae placebunt: cf. 1 pr. 2 'ut mihi si non
inueniendi noua, at certe iudicandi de ueteribus iniungere laborem non iniuste uideientur'. r e p e r t o . . . peius uelit: cf. 10. 5. 5 'optimis oceupatis imus necesse sit esse deterius'. With reperto
quidquid aliter dixer-
understand eor. cf. K - S i. 773,
citing e.g. Curt. 3. 1. 24 'adsumptis qui ex Macedonia nuper aduenerant'. finem: see the introduction to the present chapter, the other notes on this
section, and that on 2. 14. 5 cuius est summa bene dicere. For a closely matching phrase cf. Cic. Fin. 2. 5 'finem siue extremum siue ultimum'; also 1. 29 'quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum'. ad q u o d . . . tendit: cf. 2. 17. 22 'aiunt enim omnes artes habere
finem
aliquem propositum ad quem tendant'; Lucr. 6. 2 6 - 7 'exposuitque b o n u m summum
quo tendimus omnes | quid fbret.'
n a m . . .dicere: a clear example of the different linguistic form o f a opos and a reXos (see the introduction to the chapter). Opposed to the which is identified unambiguously as 'goal' by uel summum above (and et summum
et
finis,
ultimum
below), is rhetoric's essence as expressed in the
formula 'scientia bene dicendi' (cf. 1 'qualitate ipsius rei'). It seems inconceivable that Q. could have written like this and at the same time seen the potential confusion arising from the use o f finis in two different s e n s e s — which may suggest that he saw no problem in the ambiguity, on the grounds that for him there is an intimate conceptual connection between reXos and definition.
Chapter Sixteen Now for the question, Is rhetoric useful? Some attack it (1) as productive of many ills, and as most of use when it stands for falsehood against truth (2) (note the accusations o f the comic poets against Socrates) (3). They adduce examples, Greek and Roman (4). But on this basis many classes o f people and things could be dismissed as bad ( 5 6). For all that, there can be no denying that eloquence has often been employed for good (7-9); indeed it can add force to moral precept. So, even if it may be used for evil purposes, that does not make it bad in itself (10). In any case, this whole dispute may be left to those who see rhetoric merely in terms of persuasion; on our view the orator is a good man [sc. who cannot do harm), and rhetoric is the science o f speaking well; rhetoric as we define it can only be useful (11). Indeed God's gift of speech is what most distinguishes man from other creatures (12). Animals have many physical advantages over men (13—14a). That is why God gave men Reason (14b). But Reason would be of less use if it were not accompanied by speech (15). Some things animals do (not all imitable by men) may suggest they have a share in reason; it is because they lack speech that they are called irrational (16). Finally, men who are denied speech can benefit little from their intellect. Therefore, nothing can be more worthy o f being cultivated than rhetoric (17). It is a branch of study that has grown in stature, and may grow further still, which suggests that its cultivation brings rewards (18). Quite apart from the appropriateness to a good man o f the tasks it can perform, it is remarkable that out o f words used by everybody the most splendid oratory can be fashioned (19). W i t h i n the broader scheme o f 2. 1 4 - 2 1 , this chapter has two main functions: it refutes those who think that rhetoric is dangerous and, in providing a laus eloquentiae,
hints at the way in which Q . conceives o f it as useful. It also
provides s o m e relief between the rather dry chapters 15 and 17 (cf. 2. 17. 1). T h e usefulness o f self-consciously persuasive speech and the training which goes with it was discussed from the fifth century BC onwards, the
first
elaborate text on the matter being Ar. Rhet. A\, 1 3 5 5 a 2 1 — b 7 . It is facile to see the issue as one m o r e or less coherent theme which is present throughout the classical period o f rhetoric. Differences between classical authors, reflecting their different attitudes to rhetoric and their different objectives in discussing the issue, are frequently ignored. T h e y do, however, exist, as may b e demonstrated by c o m p a r i n g Aristotle's purpose in the passage quoted and Quintilian's here. Aristotle is thus summarized by Russell (ii. 3 7 0 n. 1): '[Aristotle] argues ( 1 ) that we need rhetoric to avoid the reproach o f letting
278
Commentary
a g o o d cause fail; ( 2 ) that "scientific" p r o o f does not convince everybody; ( 3 ) that we need to k n o w how to refute opposing arguments, and o n l y dialectic and rhetoric can help us here; ( 4 ) that it is right to acquire skill to defend ourselves by speech even more than by physical strength.' It is implied by ( 4 ) that rhetoric is a neutral skill, open to misuse, and it is argued that its positive potential, which coexists with the negative one, justifies its existence; this ties in well with the point made in ( 3 ) , that an important feature o f rhetoric is its providing ( o r being) a faculty o f analysis, which likewise is not a good o r bad thing in itself. In ( 2 ) the ambiguity o f the term useful' b e c o m e s apparent, for it is used in a sense less prominent in m o s t other discussions, viz. as opposed to useless, whereas normally (e.g. in Q . ) the contrast is with 'detrimental': 4 6 scientific p r o o f and rhetorical p r o o f modelled o n it may simply fail to persuade, despite being valid and arguing to a true conclusion, and hence achieve n o positive goal, and it is characteristic o f rhetorical argument that it is persuasive. W e thus see that for Aristotle usefulness is tied to persuasiveness, and that persuasion is the goal o f rhetoric (a view which Q . pointedly refuses to accept, cf. 2. 15). Given that, Q.'s position is m o r e difficult, and he is operating under c o n straints which did n o t apply for Aristotle. First, as we have seen, the n o t i o n o f persuasion would normally be central t o a plausible argument for the usefulness o f rhetoric. S o the task for Q . is t o maintain the usefulness o f rhetoric without relying, o r relying primarily, o n this notion. Second, what is at stake for Q . but not for Aristotle when the usefulness o f rhetoric is discussed is its technicity. For both on the original, Sophistic understanding o f rexvq (i.e. a skill devised by humans in the process o f evolution and as a means to deal with the adversities o f primitive life) and o n the Stoic argument underlying Q.'s discussion in 2. 1 4 - 2 1 , a craft had to b e useful to deserve the name; b o t h a skill designed to achieve a bad end and a knack only occasionally reaching its goal would not qualify. Conversely, if rhetoric can be used for bad purposes, it has been found not to b e a r e x ^ - B y arranging the discussion as he does (discussing utility here and technicity in 2. 17), Q . gives the impression that the utility and the technicity o f a craft were separate issues; this up to a point helps his case, for despite explicitly acknowledging this connection in 2. 1 7 . 4 1 , he may have found particular difficulty in arguing plausibly for it. O n what grounds, then, does Q . claim that rhetoric is useful? W e believe that Q . gives two ( c o m p a t i b l e ) answers. T h e first one, given at the end o f the survey o f arguments for and against rhetoric's usefulness from its effects,
T h e adjective imitilis is ambiguous (see OLD s.v. 2 and 4 ) , as are s o m e of its Greek equivalents (so avoje\r)s, see LSJ s.v. 1 and 2; axpycrros, up to a point; ax/njotfios means 'useless' only).
Chapter Seventeen
279
amounts to defining the problem out of existence: if the orator is a uir bonus, he can do nothing harmful when speaking in public, hence rhetoric as practised by him cannot be but useful. On this reading the laus eloquentiae which occupies the second half of the chapter is not closely related to the theme of usefulness and amounts to a divertimento before the discussion becomes technical again in 2. 17. The second answer makes the laus eloquentiae more relevant to Q.'s overall argument, by assuming that he drew on the rhetorical tradition of laudes eloquentiae on the one hand, but selected this material and slightly skewed it in such a way as to hint at a Stoicizing conception of rhetoric's usefulness. (We believe that this second interpretation becomes plausible if one takes a synoptic view of 2. 15-21 in its entirety.) Since the influence from rhetorical laudes eloquentiae is uncontroversial and obvious, we begin by describing the Stoicizing features of the section, and for that purpose it may be helpful to ask first why rhetoric could be useful on the Stoic view, and then to trace similar ideas in our chapter. After that we will survey the various laudes eloquentiae which arguably exercise an influence on our passage. Maintaining a position originally brought to prominence by the sophists of the fifth century BC but developed further by Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics saw a craft primarily as something that enabled humans to find and sustain their natural position in the world, and to function as they are designed to. For them a craft is a coherent body of knowledge, i.e. an ordered system of tfaraArjj/rfi?, which itself is integrated with other systems of knowledge whose make-up is similar in kind, including moral virtue; only KaraXrufiets can lead to right statements and actions predicated on them, which in turn are necessary for a happy life; rhetoric thus ultimately, like moral virtue, to which it is linked, contributes to evSatnovia. Against this background rhetoric, the sister-discipline of dialectic, is useful in two ways: it is conducive to the well-orderedness of the speaker's soul, thereby enabling us to live in accordance with nature, and it removes irrationality, which involves wrong perceptions, from the world around us, hence aligning the world we live in with the divine order. Q. of course would have found no favour with his contemporaries had he said this in exactly this way, but these ideas are, or so we argue, hinted at in 1-19. However, certain features give the passage a Stoic tinge which must have been instantly recognizable to the contemporary readership (see nn. below): that there is a first god, the father of all things (12); that there is an equivalence of nature and the creator god's actions, and that animal behaviour is both natural (13-14) and 'rational' (16); that using the faculty of speech for rhetorical purposes amounts to a op/wm? (on this conception in Platonic, Epicurean, and Stoic contexts see Erler; it is conveyed by the lightning and thunder of Pericles' speech in 19); and that perfecting the
280
Commentary
faculty of speech amounts for humans to living in accordance with nature (17), whose rational working we may observe in animal behaviour (16-17). A number of earlier texts show resemblances with our passage: Isocrates, Or. 3. 1-9 on the role of Aoyo? in the development and running of civilized society (cf. 15. 253-7 [Antid.], which is almost identical; 4. 28-50 [ Paneg.] on the beginnings of Attic and Hellenic culture); the 'craftsman myth' in Plato's Protagoras, good for detail on the different devices with which nature has equipped the various species (see also W. Nestles commentary [Stuttgart, 8 1978] ad loc. for further references, as well as his appendix on the myth [pp. 58-61], which provides important literary parallels for the theme) but otherwise arguing towards a rather different conclusion (aiScu? and StV*? as the divine gifts which complete human progress towards civilization); the protreptic to the study of animals in Aristotle's Depart anim. A5, overlapping with our passage in the emphasis on the teleological organization of the world; the prooemium of Cicero's Inv., and a number of passages in his de Orat., esp. 1. 30-4 (see L-P ad loc.); and his ND 2. 121-68 (with Pease's commentary), which argues for Stoic theology and for the existence of divine providence from the general well-orderedness of the universe, the world, the animal kingdom, and the human race with all its faculties and skills, including rhetoric (see below). A later text which draws on the myth in the Protagoras and on the Isocrates passages, and interestingly so in a context related to Q.'s argument (see p. 259 n. 41), is Aelius Aristides, Or. 2. 394-9, on which see J. Wissmann, 'Zur Rezeption des "Protagoras-Mythos" durch Aelius Aristides', Philologus, 143 (1999), 135-47. 17 On the face of it Isocrates is closest to our passage: speech is presented as a natural faculty of humans, its development amounts to a perfection of the human being (Or. 3. 5), the orator is a good man (Or. 3. 7), and speech is inextricably linked to thinking in that the latter is perceived as the mind's debate with itself (3. 8). But there are differences too: the goodness of the orator is quite different in kind from the intellectualized morality the Stoics (and Q.) promote; there is little emphasis on the connection between speech and rationality (to view thinking as the mind's rhetorical debate with itself is quite different); there is no correspondence between nature and the influence of a creator god, and no suggestion that rationality is pervasive in the animal kingdom (instead the animals are merely presented as well-equipped for the struggle for life). The section in Cic. ND is also worth comparing, because of its general similarity and a number of verbal reminiscences (see below), which suggest that Q. actually had it in mind when he composed our passage. 4 7 There is a survey o f laitdes eloquentiae in H. K. Schulte, Untersucliungen oniamsche Bildungsideal (Frankfurt, 1935), 9 - 5 8 .
iiber das cicer-
Chapter Seventeen
281
Rhetoric is treated in 2. 148-9. The faculty of speech, which can be developed into eloquence, is there as in our passage presented as a gift nature has endowed us with (nature is identified with the creator god in 2. 87-8); its role in the world is described thus: quae primum [sc. domina rerum, uis eloquendi] efficit ut ea quae ignoramus discere et ea quae scimus alios docere possimus; deinde hac cohortamur hac persuademus, hac consolamur afflictos hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hac gestientes conprimimus hac cupiditates iracundiasque restinguimus, haec nos iuris legum urbium societate deuinxit, haec a uita inmani et fera segregauit.' (That persuasion is mentioned here should not trouble us; it is not of course the case that the Stoics—and Q. in 2. 14-21—positively do not want rhetoric to be persuasive.) Relevant for the present purpose is the emphasis on rhetoric's role in implementing order and rationality, and quelling its opposites. The issue of usefulness also receives a carefully balanced treatment in Tacitus' Dial., written either shortly before or, perhaps more probably, shortly after the Institutio: in Aper's first speech usefulness is one of the four headings under which rhetoric is discussed, and Aper adds (5. 7): 'plura de utilitate non dico, cui parti minime contra dicturum Maternum meum arbitror. Crucially, for Aper the usefulness seems to consist primarily in the beneficial effects on one's own career: a shadow is cast on the use rhetoric has in defending other people, e.g. friends (5. 5-6), by mention of the delator Eprius Marcellus, and the use he made of rhetoric when he clashed with Helvidius Priscus (5. 7). Maternus (in 40. 4) then points out the harmful effects rhetoric had on the Roman state as a whole. Given that Q. is not very explicit about how his conception of rhetoric was formed with the delatores of the first century AD in mind, the Dial, helps us understand why Q. saw the need to make his conviction that rhetoric is useful tie in with his claim that the perfect orator had to be a uir bonus (see section II. 1 of the general introduction, and the introductory notes to chs. 11 and 12). The utility of rhetoric exercised many philosophers in the Hellenistic period (cf. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 27-43; von Arnim, Dio, 87-114; Barwick 25; and Brittain 298-312), and it was certainly philosophers who made the most pertinent attacks on the technicity of rhetoric, which is a connected issue (cf. Sextus 26, and the introductory note on ch. 17). However, in the present chapter Q. does not make a point of disagreeing with philosophers, and rather seems to set up the declaimers in particular as his opponents at the beginning of the chapter; see §§1-4 nn. That the theme was not neglected in the declamation schools is clear from Decl. min. 268. 16-20 (with MW's nn.); also Val. Max. 8. 9 on the uis eloquentiae. The topic easily enabled the dedaimer to enlarge on the praises of reason and speech.
282
Commentary
16. 1. The section down to 4 begins with a general reference to quidam; the reference to the forces of rhetoric used against it as well as the somewhat mechanical run through arguments against rhetoric's usefulness in oratio obliqua suggest that Q. has declaimers in particular in mind. The comic poets and Plato in 3 are then cited as instances of a particular line of argument ('cuius... ueritatem ualet' in 2 fin.). In 4 the discussion returns to the general level of the quidam. inuehi:TLLs.v. 132. 1 'praevalet notio maledicendi'; cf. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 43 Toaavra.. .ev KaraSpofjLrjs fxepei Aeyerai rrepi prjropiKrjs.
sit: the parallels for this 'parenthetic' subjunctive in Q. are 4. 2. 39 'deinde, quod sit monstro simile, placet actio, causa non intellegitur', 12.11. 3'alii, quod indignum uideatur,riderent, alii erubescerent' (for 2.17.4'is, quod his dissimile non esset, composuisse orationem... dicitur', seen, there); add Decl. min. 278.8 and299.3,Dcd. mai. 13.19. K-S ii. 308-9 distinguishes various types; Q. seems, unusually, to employ this subjunctive to soften an assertion that might otherwise seem overstated. Watt 159 expressed doubts about the whole construction, and favoured Halm's est here; but the passages defend each other. in accusationem orationis utuntur orandi uiribus: though Q. may not have philosophers particularly in mind (see above on quidam), this epigram recalls a stock criticism of Plato, voiced e.g. by Crassus in Cic. de Orat. 1. 47 'mihi in oratoribus inridendis ipse [Plato in Grg.] esse orator summus uidebatur' (adapted by Tac. Dial. 24. 1 on Aper and the antiqui: 'quanto... ingenio ac spiritu . . . ab ipsis mutuatus est per quae mox ipsos incesseret!'; Prol. p. 121. 7. Milton gave the idea a new twist in De idea Platonica 37-8 'iam iam poetas urbis exules tuae | reuocabis, ipse fabulator maximus'. orationis: why the shift from rhetorice to oratio* Q. may simply be striving for variation, or for epigrammatic expression (orationis... orandi). Alternatively, rhetorice above is rhetoric in the full sense, which Q. endorses and for whose usefulness he argues in the present chapter, oratio is a neutral term, applied to persuasive speaking as commonly practised. orandi uiribus: the heightened language of the indirect speech of 2 illustrates the uires. uires is primarily physical power and retains this connotation in many occurrences. On Q.'s use of orare see n. on 2. 15. 3 orandi. 16. 2 eripiat: TLL s.v. eripio 795. 10-43. Note esp. Decl. min. 268. 18 (an orator is addressed) 'eripuisti periculo reum: unde scio an nocentem?'; also 6. 1. 35 'quo L. Murenam Cicero accusantibus darissimis uiris eripuisse praecipue uidetur'. scelestos: a heightened and emotive word (cf. Vretska on Sal. Cat. 51. 32: 'scelestus mag wohl archaisch-sakralen Beiklang gehabt haben'; and Petersmann 672).
Chapter Seventeen
283
cuius fraude damnentur interim boni: cf. (again) Decl. min. 268. 18 'damnatus est aliquis accusante te: unde scio an eloquentiae uitium sit?' For fraude cf. M. Kaser, Das romische Privatrecht, i (Munich, 1971), 250: 'Fraus legi facta heifit in der alten Zeit, die alle Normen nach dem typischen Wortsinn auslegt, jede bewuSte Verletzung eines Verbotsgesetzes, wobei die Verietzungsabsicht unterstellt wind. Seit der jiingeren Republik versteht man unter dem Ausdruck nicht nur die bewufite Verletzung des Wortlauts, sondern besonders auch die Umgehung des Gesetzes, die seinen Wortlaut einhalt, aber seinem Sinn zuvviderhandelt.' Oratory is of course a prime instrument to commit the particular transgressions mentioned. Note that fraus here covers everything down to wars. consilia ducantur in peius: we turn to deliberative oratory (as in Decl. min. 268. 19). in peius is standard even in sentences where there is a neuter plural noun (1. 1. 5 'nam bona facile mutantur in peius'). As to the point being made, Q.'s perfect orator is of course not affected by this type of criticism; cf. 12. 1. 26 'regenda senatus consilia et popularis error ad meliora ducendus'. In 27 Q. points the contrast still further by quoting Verg. A. 1. 151 on the power of the orator to check popular 'seditio' (in Virgil, however, there is no emphasis that the good man appearing is an orator; on the passage see Harrison). seditiones.. .turbaeque populares: cf. Decl. min. 268. 19 'nonne grauissimas seditiones, nonne turbidissimas contiones eloquentissimus quisque habuit?' bella... inexpiabilia: B's inexpugnabilia is impossible (for the corruption see Walters' app. crit. at Liv. 2.17.2); 5. 10.44 is no parallel. It is civil wars that cannot be expiated (compare the connection made between oratory and civil war at the end of Tac. Dial.). For the phrase see TLL s.v. inexpiabilis 1325. 65-71, citing e.g. Liv. 4. 35. 8, where the tribune who 'ruat caecus in certamina' is the sort of speaker whom Q. himself would have deplored, inexpiabilis is another emotive word. turn maximus sit usus cum... ualet: cf. Plat. Grg. 480 E-481 B (note 481 B 1—2 €774 r a TotavTo. €fxoiy€ 8ok€i. . .7) prjToptKr) xpyaip-°s
cfvat). For
maximus
usus cf. 2. 18. 5. ualet: F. Meister, Philologus, 18 (1862), 516 proposed ualeat. This would spoil the double cretic clausula (a more important consideration than usual in such a declamatory passage). For similar indicatives in temporal clauses in oratio obliqua even in Cicero, see Lebreton 369; H-Sz 548 point out that they become more frequent as archaisms in Sallust, Curtius, and Tacitus. 16. 3 nam et: et probably correlates with et contra below (cf. 8. 6. 20), though the sense 'even Socrates' is tempting (cf. n. below on 7 et...fuit).
284
Commentary
Socrati obiciunt... docere eum: for this construction of the word see OLD s.v. obicio, citing e.g. Cic. Att. 1. 16. 10 'obicit mihi me ad Baias fuisse'. comici: of course with primary reference to Aristophanes' Clouds—see esp. 98-9, 112-15, 882-5; though as Spalding points out other comic poets were involved (see Sen. Dial. 7. 27. 2); so comici does have genuine plural force. Equally, Socrates was not the only thinker to incur the charge; indeed he was classed with sophists who positively asserted their job was to do this (in Cic. Brut. 30 Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Protagoras, and many others are said to have been men who 'docere se profitebantur... quemadmodum causa inferior— ita enim loquebantur—dicendo fieri superior posset'). See the material collected by K. J. Dover in his edition of Clouds (Oxford, 1968), pp. xxxii-lvii. faciat: cf. n.on 2. 15. 12 uel it. et contra... Plato: a counter-charge (Plato representing Socrates). The reference is to Phdr. 267 A 6 - 8 Tcioiav Si Topyiav re iaoopiev evSeiv ot 7rpo TCJV dXrjdcjv rd eiKora e?Sov (vs rt/xrjrea fxdXXov, rd re ai5 ap-iKpa ficydXa Kai rd ficydXa ap.iKpd aiv€o6ai TTOIOVOIV Sid pojpn]v Xoyov. The
charge is not quite the same as that against Socrates: hence similia. For Isocrates' defence against the charge see Or. 15. 15-16.
16. 4 exempla Graecorum Romanorumque: cf. Rhet Her. 2. 44 for those 'qui rhetoricam uituperant propter alieuius oratoris uituperandam uitam'; and Cic. de Orat. 1. 38 (note 'si uelim et nostrae ciuitatis exemplis uti et aliarum', paralleling the genitive here), with L-P i. 114. perniciosa: cf. 2. 15. 32. For the accompanying dative cf. 3. 7. 21; TLL s.v perniciosus 1590. 26-44. ciuitatium status: cf. 11. 1. 85 'statum ciuitatis'; for the meaning 'arrangement, constitution, order' see OLD s.v. status2 8a. The whole phrase is put into the plural, as in the closely related Decl. min. 268. 19, where (note 'populi Romani statum'), as here, we move on to examples of individual 'states'. Lacedaemoniorum ciuitate expulsam: we should apparently understand eloquentiam from above rather than orandi potestatem from below. A gives a before Lacedaemoniorum, but this is a late usage (judging by the examples referred to at TLL s.v. expello 1638. 37-9); for the plain abl. cf. e.g. Tac. Dial. 32.4 'eloquentiam uelut expulsam regno suo', Sen. Nat. 4b. 13. 9 'ungentarios Lacedaemonii urbe expulemnt'. The story that eloquence was actually banned at Sparta recurs quite frequently. See esp. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 20-1: o puiv KprjriKos vopLodir-qs €ip£as inifiaiveiv rrjs vr/oov TOUS iv Xoyois dXa^ovevoafxivovs, o Si ZiTapTtdrrjs AvKoOpyos ... TOV avrov rots ZnapTidTats vopiov
clorjyrioaTo. Plutarch (apop. Lac. 226 D) speaks of a ^evrjXaoia applied to sophists; consistent with this, but perhaps somewhat dubious, Chamaeleon fr. 35 Wehrli ( = Athenaeus 611 A ) : eiKoruis o3v noXXal TCOV -noXecjv Kal
Chapter Seventeen fidXtora
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£v ToisXoyots
vptdiv
Kai epiSas Kai TOVS aKaipovs iXeyxovs, where verbal cleverness is presented as too Athenian to be condoned in Sparta. In Plut. Lyc. 9 the general lack of money in Sparta is cited as the reason why teachers of rhetoric stay away. The Spartan hostility to rhetoric was used as backing for the argument that appears in Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 24: et ptrj rds Texyos eKfidXXovotv at woAe*?, €K^€^Xi]Kaot 8e rrjv pqTopiKqv. OVK av etrj rdiv TCXVOJV r/ pt]ToptKr\, and comes up again in Philod. Rhet. i. 14 fr. 5 = p. 31. 5-11 LA. (where the Romans too are said to get along well without rhetoric). But it is not clear how far the story corresponds with fact, and how far it is merely a rationalization of the notorious Spartan inability at oratory, put most pungently byThucydides 4. 84. 2 (^v ov8e dSvvarosy cos AaKeSatptovtos, etnetv, about Brasidas), and taken back even to Homer's Menelaus by Cic. Brut. 50. There just were no Spartan orators, as is stressed e.g. by Veil. Pat. 1. 18. 2, Tac. Dial. 40. 3. Athenis... ubi actor mouere adfectus uetabatur: Q. seems to have thought that there was such a legal restriction in Athenian lawcourts in general; cf. 6. 1. 7 'Athenis adfectus mouere etiam per praeconem prohibebatur orator, with 10. 1. 107 'et fortasse epilogos illi [sc. Demostheni] mos ciuitatis abstulerit', on which see Peterson ad loc.; 12. 10. 26 'ita nunc si quis ad eas Demosthenis uirtutes quas ille summus orator habuit etiam earn quae defuisse ei siue ipsius natura seu lege ciuitatis uidentur adiecerit, ut adfectus concitatius moueat, audiam dicentem "non fecit hoc Demosthenes"?' (see Austin's commentary). Spalding ad loc. rightly suggested that Q. erroneously extended the scope of the restriction; it applied to the Areopagus only, as is clear from Aristotle's Rhet. Al. 1354318-24 and 1355a 1—2 (which refers back to the first passage). In the Areopagus the rule was directed not against emotional oratory as such but against -neptaaoXoyla generally (etjto TOV 7rpdypLaros Xcyetv e.g. in Lycurgits Leoc. 13, cf. the first passage from Ar. above); the procedure is described in some detail by Lucian, Anacharsis 19 (cf. more briefly Hermot. 64, and Lys. 3.46 on the herald who intervened in cases of speaking €^to TOV 7TpdyptaTos). Some of the relevant texts are discussed in J. F. Cronin, 'The Athenian Juror and Emotional Pleas', CJ 34 (1938-9), 471-9. (f>iXoTtp,i as
16. 5 quo quidem modo: 'on this basis', with quidem giving emphasis to quo. The reductio ad absurdum that follows can be elaborately paralleled, e.g. Arist. Rhet. AlA355h2-6 et & oTt pteydXafiXdijjeievav o ^pai/xtdStKOJS rrj Totavrr) 8vvdpt€t Tutv Xoycui', TOVTO ye KOIVOV ioTt Kara navraiv row dyaOcjv 7TXT}V dperrjs..., otov toxvos vytetas ITXOVTOV aTparryyias (cf. the argument at Plat. Grg. 456 c 7-457 c 3); Isoc. Or. 15. 252 (cf. X. Mem. 1. 2. 27); Man. 4. 756 'cura nocet, cessare iuuat, medicina malorum | dat causas, laeduntque cibi
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parcuntque uenena'. Also Proleg. p. 183. 7-9 TOVTOJ rcu Aoyoj ( = quo... modo) fxeXXoifxev Kai avrov TOV 6eov Karrfyopeiv ano TCJV OKr}7TT<XIV Kai Kepavvaiv Kai
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16. 6. This section approaches declamatory style in contrast with the Ciceronian fullness of the chapter generally: note how three times a brief ironical recommendation, couched in the subjunctive, is given its supposed motivation in a separate, longer sentence; and observe the asyndeton of ignes aquas. attulerunt saepe ualetudinis causas: cf. Man. 4. 76 (making a different point) 'laeduntque cibi parcuntque uenena'. tecta subeamus: cf. Caes. B.G. 1. 37. 7 qui inter annos XIV tectum non subissent.' procumbunt: cf. Ov. Pont. 1. 9.13-14 'cum domus ingenti subito mea lapsa ruina | concidit in domini procubuitque caput.' fabricetur... gladius: cf. 3. 2.2 'nisi quis dicet etiam gladium fabricatum ab eo prius qui ferrum in tutelam sui quam qui in perniciem alterius compararit.' latro: again contrasted with miles at 12. 1. 1 (cited on 2. 15. 32 nocentissimis moribus dare instrumenta); note esp. Grillius, Comm. in Cic. Rhet. p. 5. 120-2 Jakobi 'nam nec hoc fugiendus est gladius, quia eo latro frequenter occidit, cum eo patriam uir fbrtis saepe defendat.' Cf. also Ov. Trist. 2.271-2 'et latro et cautus praecingitur ense uiator; | ille sed insidias, hie sibi portat opem'; Ovid, arguing the thesis that 'nil prodest quod non laedere possit idem' (266), also covers fire and medicine, before culminating in eloquence. ignes aquas: for ignis and aqua as elemental necessities of life, see OLD s.v. aqua 5h; and cf. e.g. Democritus B172, B173 DK; [Plut.] aqua an ignis 955 F. The plurals seem to connote instances of fire, when lit intentionally by human hand, together with rain (OLD s.v. aqua 2a). The two are coupled in asyndeton (see n.on 2. 9. 2 laeti alacresque); contrast below 'solem lunamque'. ne terrenis inmorer: as opposed to things above the earth (OLD s.v. terr en us 5, citing Gel. 14. 1. 3 'quoniam uiderent terrena quaedam caelestium rerum sensu... moueri'). For the dative cf. OLD s.v. immoror 2. Gabler 48 n. 1 suggests that Q. is quoting from tragedy; the tone is certainly heightened. siderum: probably 'heavenly bodies' (Loeb; OLD s.v. sidus 1), rather than specifically 'planets' (as OLD s.v. 2a). 16. 7 igitur: the argument is unbroken: agreed that eloquence, like other things, can have unfortunate results, it cannot be denied that it has often proved of great service. pacem... diremisse: cf. Cic. Cael. 34 (Appius addresses Claudia) 'ideone ego pacem Pyrrhi diremi ut t u . . . ' (Q. quotes from this section in 9. 4. 104). The texts in connexion with this event (e.g. Cic. Brut. 55 'quod senatum iamiam indinatum a Pyrrhi pace reuocauerit') may be conveniently studied in ORFpp. 1-4. The incident is a classic exemplum and frequently referred to
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Commentary
(see e.g. Plut. Pyrrh. 19; Cic. Brut. 61 and Sen. 16, with Powell ad loc. for further references). A speech by Appius on the subject was extant in Cicero's day; on its authenticity see the discussion by Skutsch on Enn. Ann. 199-200 (pp. 360-1). Appius' eloquence is more generally testified to in Livy 10. 19.6. diuina M. Tulli eloquentia: Cicero being 'ille diuinus orator' (4. 3. 13). e t . . . fuit: no doubt correlating with 'et... fregit... et... meruit', though the sense 'even' would be entirely appropriate (cf. n. on 3 nam et). Q.'s main point is the idea of being popularis against the people's will. Cf. Cic. Amic 96 'itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est'; Agr. 1. 23-4; Livy 2.41. 7 'popularis iam esse dissuasor et intercessor legis agrariae coeperat'; Plin. Nat. 7. 117 'te [i.e. Cicero] dicente legem agrariam, hoc est alimenta sua, abdicarunt tribus'. And see Cic. de Orat 3. 138 for a switch between popularis in the political sense (i.e. political in terms of late-republican politics, despite the application to fifth-centuryAthens) and a more general sense (cf. OLD s.v. 5 and 6): 'Quid Pericles? de cuius ui dicendi sic accepimus, ut, cum contra uoluntatem Atheniensium loqueretur pro salute patriae seuerius, tamen id ipsum, quod ille contra popularis homines diceret, populare omnibus et iucundum uideretur', echoed in Val. Max. 8. 9 ext. 2 'cumque aduersus uoluntatem populi loqueretur [sc. Pericles], iucunda nihilo minus et popularis eius uox erat.' popularis: Q .'s brief reference here reflects the battle over the use of the term; cf. Cic. Agr. 2.63, where Cicero admits that on the one hand an agrarian law was in itself popularis ('hoc populare legis agrariae nomen'), while warning on the other against the assumption that, 'si qui agros populo Romano pollicentur' (Agr. 2. 10), they must therefore be populares; cf. R. Seager, 'Cicero and the Word popularis, CQ2 22 (1972), 328-38, at 332 n. 5. The term is 'defined' in Sest. 96: 'alteri se popularis, alteri optimates et haberi et esse uoluerunt. qui ea quae faciebant quaeque dicebant multitudini iucunda uolebant esse, populares, qui autem ita se gerebant ut sua consilia optimo cuique probarent, optimates habebantur...'; see Seager, loc. cit. 328-9, who comments: 'The polemical character of this definition is already clear in the contrast between multitudo—almost a term of disparagement in its own right—and optimus quisque.' fregit audaciam: an echo of Cicero himself: Phil. 13. 29 'contudi et fregi... exsultantis praedonis audaciam'. et supplicationes... in toga meruit: a supplieatio is a public festivity, held for expiation or in gratitude for overcoming a grave danger to the state, recommended by the quindeeimuiri saeris faeiundis, the pontifiees, or the haruspieesy and approved by the senate. Held for a saviour of the state in toga, i.e. without recourse to military action, it was a unique honour; see
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Cic. Suit. 85 'cui uni togato supplicationem decreuerit [senatus]' (with Berry's n.). Q. is thus either plain wrong in using the plural here, or it is affected by the plural of uictoribus. As a military honour a supplicatio was won by Cicero in 50 (see Fam. 15. 5; Att. 7.1. 7); maximus honor, however, is something of an exaggeration, as these letters show. See further L. Halkin, La supplication d'action de graces chez les Romains (1953); G. Freyburger, 'Supplication grecque et supplication romaine', Latomus, 47 (1988), 501-25. 16. 8 non perterritos... persuadet: Q. elaborates on the importance of oratory in war at 12. 1. 28 (cf. 1. 10. 47). It early became a standard feature of historical works; see e.g. R. Leimbach, Militarische Musterrhetorik: eine Untersuchungzu den Feldherrenreden des Thukydides (Stuttgart, 1985). a metu reuocat: cf. (moregenerally) Gorgias, Hel. 8 Xoyos... Svvarcit ... KOLI ofiov 7ravoat. For the expression, cf. Ov. Tr. 2. 557 'utinam reuoces animum paulisper ab ira'. laudem uita potiorem: cf. e.g. Sal. Cat. 20. 9 'nonne emori per uirtutem praestat quam uitam miseram atque inhonestam, ubi alienae superbiae ludibrio fueris, per dedecus amittere?'; Hist. 1. 55. 15 'estne uiris relicui aliud quam soluere iniuriam aut mori per uirtutem?' Lacedaemonii atque Athenienses: referring to the counter-examples in 4. mouerint: perfect subjunctive in its potential use (so Ammendola), probably not future perfect, emphasizing the outcome rather than the process as the present-stem future would do. apud quem.. .dignitas: cf. Tac. Dial. 5. 4 'studium quo non aliud in ciuitate nostra... ad dignitatem amplius' (elaborated in 7-8). For the dignitas accorded to eloquence itself, see e.g. Cic. Off. 2. 66 'huic [sc. eloquentiae] ergo a maioribus nostris est in toga dignitatis principatus datus' (similarly Orat. 141, where see Knoll's n.); de Orat. 1. 13-14 stresses the perpetual enthusiasm for oratory at Rome. 16. 9 nec urbium conditores.. .commota: Cicero had been emphatic on the importance of eloquence in civilizing men and subjecting them to the rule of law (de Orat. 1. 33 'quae uis alia potuit aut dispersos homines unum in locum congregare aut a fera agrestique uita ad hunc humanum cultum ciuilemque deducere aut iam constitutis ciuitatibus leges iudicia iura describes?', with L-P ad loc.; the earliest parallel in Cic. is of course Inv. 1. 2). In general, the motif of wise men who brought civilization to primitive humans was familiar; Posidonius identified these with philosophers (fr. 284 EdelsteinKidd = Sen. Ep. 90). In 3. 2. 4 Q. gives a different account of the origin of civilization, incompatible with the present one: 'cum sint adhuc quaedam uagae et sine urbibus ac sine legibus gentes, et tamen qui sunt in iis nati et legationibus fungantur et accusent aliqua atque defendant et denique alium
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alio melius loqui credant'. The reference to nomadic people helps explain (but not remove) the contradiction: in 3. 2. 1-2 Q. establishes rhetoric as a gift humans are endowed with by nature, so that seeing its actual origin in founders of cities and legislators would appear to be an artificial restriction to certain individuals. reor: Q. regarded this word as a 'tolerable' archaism (8. 3. 26), though he does not use it elsewhere except in the participle. For its earlier fortunes, see W. D. Lebek, Verba Prisca (Gottingen, 1970), 31; Tacitus predictably preferred it to puto (J. N. Adams, BICS 20 [1973], 136). docta uoce: practised (not of course formally taught) eloquence was essential for early speakers engaged in so heroic a task; Q. presumably imagined that they relied on the natural eloquence out of which rhetoric later grew (cf. 3. 2. 3). As for early lawgivers, they required summa uis orandi: their task was even harder, to make men agree to be 'slaves' of law. legum repertores: that is, the original devisers of the laws. The word is first to be found in Lucretius (3. 1036), where 'repertores... doctrinarum' mean philosophers. Cf. also Verg. A. 7. 772 'repertorem medicinae'. It is arguable that the word means evperris in all three cases, i.e. is meant to recall the Greek word and notion. ad seruitutem iuris adstringerent: cf. 7. 3. 16 'seruitus .. .ad certa se uerba adstringendi'; Decl. min. 306. 10 'non tamen hoc natura recipit, ut tam graui seruitute iuris obstrinxerit rem publicam qui legem dicebat'; TLL s.v. astringo 963. 55-67; and nn.on 2. 13. 1 quasdam leges and constrictas. Observe the different emphases of Lucretius' description of the advent of law (5. 1143-7): 'Inde magistratum partim docuere creare | iuraque constituere, ut uellent legibus uti. | Nam genus humanum, defessum uicolere aeuum, | ex inimicitiis languebat: quo magis ipsum | sponte sua cecidit sub leges artaque iura'; there is no mention of rhetoric, and man consented out of weariness with the rule of force. 16. 10 quin ipsa uitae praecepta... inluminat: a climax (cf. 5 'ipsa sapientia')—even philosophy benefits from good exposition. Cf. 12. 11. 4 'puldierrimis uitae praeceptis dignum os dabit'. The notion is Platonic, via Cicero; see Cic. ND 2. 20, discussed by M. Schofield, 'The Syllogisms of Zeno of Citium', Phronesis, 28 (1983), 3 1 ^ . etiam si natura sunt honesta: cf. 12. 2. 27'moribus.. .formandis [see on 2. 4. 20 formatur] quam honestissima praecepta... deliget'. natura: vo€t, as opposed to being polished by Te^y]pulchritudinem rerum: cf. OLD s.v. pulchritudo d, citing Cic. Fin. 2.49 (of ho nestum), Off. 2. 37 (of uirtus).
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claritas orationis inluminat: Q. is not talking of perspicuitas (despite TLL s.v. claritas 1268. 71-3), but of the vividness (cf. 8. 3. 70, in connection with ivdpyeia) and brilliance'19 of language that 'brings lustre' to a potentially unexciting subject; see n.on 2. 4. 12 inluminare. arma facundiae: the phrase recurs at Symmachus, Ep. 7. 9. Cf. Q. 12. 1. 1 (cited on 2. 15. 32 nocentissimis moribus dare instrumenta, where see n.). Cf. e.g. Cic. Inv. 1. 1 'ita sese armat eloquentia ut non oppugnare commoda patriae, sed pro his propugnare possit' (on which Grillius p. 15. 171-3 Jakobi comments: 'Bene arma dicit eloquentiam, ut ipsam mediam significet [see the next n.]. Armis enim et bene uti possumus et male'); Plin. Ep. 3. 9. 21 'putaretne debere me, si quam haberem in dicendo facultatem, in iugulum innocentis quasi telum aliquod intendere?', Apul. Flor. 20 'tertia [sc. creterra] rhetoris eloquentia armat'. Tacitus notably expoits the metaphor in the Dialogus (see Mayer on 5. 5 armatns). For further examples see Afifahl 84. non est tamen... quo bene uti licet: cf. 2. 10. 3. Q.'s summary looks esp. to 5-6. For the presuppositions behind the argument, cf. Grillius p. 5. 109-28 Jakobi 'Alia sunt aperte bona et alia sunt aperte mala et alia media Media neque semper declinanda neque semper sequenda. Ex temporibus et causis mala sunt aut bona, ut gladius, uenenum Haec quae media sunt, utrum sequamur quia habent in se bona, an fugiamus quia habent in se mala? Non, sed require si uideris plus esse boni quam mali, uita si uideris plus esse mali quam boni Non negat [sc. Cicero] multa incommoda per rhetoricam ad rem publicam uenisse, sed plus boni prouenisse quam mali.' In a loose way, these distinctions seem informed by the Stoic doctrine of d8tdopa, things indifferent between good and bad; the main texts are collected and explained in Long-Sedley, section 58. Cf. Sen. Nat. 5. 18. 5 (of the winds) 'sed non ideo non sunt ista natura bona, si uitio male utentium nocent' (cf. 15 'si beneficia naturae utentium prauitate perpendimus, nihil non nostro malo accepimus'); Ep. 120. 3 'hoc unum dicam, nihil nobis uideri quo quis et male uti potest'; Proleg. p. 12. 19, cited on 2. 20. 1 'mediis artibus'. For Q., the techniques of rhetoric are, like swords, morally neutral (Plat. Grg. 457 A 2-4 ov8e -q Texvr) [of wrestling and the like] ovre atria ovre 7Tovr}pa ... dXX ol pci) xpaj/xfyoi.. . opO<x)S. o avros 8rj Aoyos Kat nepirijs prjTopiKrjs). They may be misused by the bad man. But in the hands of the orator, by definition a good man, they cannot do harm. Nor, again by definition, can the art of rhetoric. For Q., as he will say in the next section, this settles the question, an utilis rhetorice, the la us eloquentiae which occupies 4 9 C £ Fortunatianus 3. 5 (p. 123. 1 3 - 4 H a l m ) 'quae sunt uerba splendida? quae natura sua nitida sunt, quae copulata facilius daritatem suam ostendunt'. Q. speaks o f clara uerba at 8.3.18.
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the rest of the chapter then praises rhetoric, and in doing that suggests why and how it is useful (see pp. 279-80). 16. 11. See end of previous n. uerum haec: as pointed out above, if one refuses to make persuasion the goal of rhetoric (and defines the orator as a good man), rhetoric becomes insulated from the charge of being employable for bad purposes, and it becomes undeniable that it is useful. The corollary of this is that an argument why it is useful must turn on considerations other than persuasion. eos qui... rettulerunt: those, that is, who 'fere aut in persuadendo aut in dicendo apte ad persuadendum positum orandi munus sunt arbitrati; id enim fieri potest ab eo quoque qui uir bonus non sit' (2. 15. 3). They typically talked in terms of uis (or the like) rather than ars (ibid.). Q. talks in re'Ao? language (see n.on 2. 14. 5 cuius est summa bene dicere), although summa seems here to mean something slightly less technical ('what rhetoric comes to, what it adds up to'; cf. OLD s.v. 7a 'the general purpose or tendency'). That in 2. 14. 5 (see n. there) summa is exactly equivalent to finis = reXos is clear if we compare 2. 15. 38. In 2. 17. 25 (see n.on summa) summa forms a contrast with finis; the two terms there render the antithesis of GKOTTOS and re\os. For the sense at issue here cf. Varro, R. 1.2. 12 'docete nos, agricultura quam summam habeat, utilitatemne an uoluptatem an utrumque'; agriculture has certain concrete aims, making large harvests of good quality or whatever, but beyond that there was a question to be asked. Slightly differently Sen. Ben. 2. 15.1 'cum summa amicitiae sit amicum sibi aequare': amicumsibi aequare is not the concrete aim of friendship; rather, it is the most important thing in friendship. rettulerunt: apparently parallel to 8. 6. 17 'poetis, qui.. .omnia ad uoluptatem referunt'; these persons judge rhetoric by the standard of effectiveness in persuasion (OLD s.v. refero 10; but note also 1 lb 'trace back, apply'). quem nos finem sequimur: '[rhetorice] est bene dicendi scientia' is phrased as a definition (above, p. 272), and on the surface the verb means 'adopt', 'adhere to' (OLD s.v. sequor 12b). But in our context 'the goal / follow' is seductive (cf. 2. 15. 38 'quem finem uel quid summum et ultimum habeat rhetorice, quod reXos dicitur'). The interrelationship of definition and aim, mirrored in the potential ambiguity of finis, is here very clear (see the introduction toch. 15). confitendum est: Q. uses a verb with forensic (see Heumann-Seckel s.v.) or dialectical overtones (interlocutors in Plato often find themselves having to 'confess' [with shame] that Socrates is right), and understandably so: he is now moving on to an argument which must appear somewhat unworldly to
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his readers and certainly to his opponents, so he is keen to stress that it follows naturally from views they would find acceptable. 16. 12 deus ille princeps: cf. Cic. Rep. 6. 26 'hunc mundum [sc. regit] ille princeps deus' (cf. 6. 13 'illi principi deo qui omnem mundum regit'). parens rerum: cf. e.g. D.L. 7. 147 ( = SVFii, fr. 1021 = Long-Sedley 54A): [the Stoics hold] 9eov.. . etvat £q>ov dOdvarov, AoyiKov, reXetov Kai voepov ev evSatpovia, KaKov navros aveiri^eKTOv, npovorjTiKOv Koopov re Kai TCJV iv Koapco p,rj el vat pevrot dv9 pcono popov. etvat 8e <.av>rov prjv 8-qptovpyov toiv OXCJV Kai atoirep narepa navTcuv, KOIVCJS re Kai TO puepos avrov TO StrjKov Sta TrdvTajv, o rroXXais Trpoarpyopiats npoaovopdi^eTai Kara ra? Svvdpets, which illustrates why 'nature', 'God', and the names of the Olympian gods can be used interchangeably; Cic. Tim. 12 'deus hunc mundum... procreauit' (cf. 6 'parentem huius uniuersitatis'); 40 'deus qui omnia genuit fatur haec: "...quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum, haec sunt indissoluta'V For nature as endowing men with Aoyo? cf. 12. 1. 2 (cited on separauit a ceteris below), where she is said to have been 'parens non nouerca'. There is of course no contradiction in seeing nature as coextensive with divine arrangement or a divine being; cf. the first two lines of Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus (Stob. Eel. i, p. 25. 3-5 W-H = SVFi. 537 = Long-Sedley 54 I): KVSIOT ddavdrajv, TTOX ucLvvpe nay K pares aiet. | Zev voeojs dpxnyye. vopov per a ndvra Kvfiepvdiv. On the Stoic conception of God and its Academic origins see Sedley, 'Origins'; M. J. White, 'Stoic Natural Philosophy (Physics and Cosmology', in B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge, 2003), 124-52; K. Algra, 'Stoic Theology', ibid. 153-78. fabricatorque mundi: Srjptovpyos in D.L. 7. 147 (cited in the previous n.); cf. TLL s.v. fabricator 17. 19-62 'latiore sensu de cuiuslibet rei conditore, maxime de creatore (deo)', citing e.g. Ov. Met. 1. 57 'mundi fabricator*, Cic. Tim. 6 'fabricator huius tanti operis' (i.e. the universe). For a historical survey of the development of the concept see F. Solmsen, 'Nature as a Craftsman in Greek Thought', in Kleine Schriften, i (Hildesheim, 1968), 332-55. nullo magis.. . q u a m . . . : for the construction cf. n. on 2. 4. 13 nullo magis ...quam... separauit a ceteris... animalibus: again of speech 12. 1. 2 'in eo quod praecipue indulsisse homini uidetur [sc. rerum natura] quoque nos a ceteris animalibus separasse' (for the phrase cf. Juv. 15. 142 'separat hoc [nominative, viz. sympathy] nos | a grege mutorum'). Cf., of reason more generally, Cic. Fin. 2. 45 'hoc uno plurimum a bestiis dififerunt'; Cornutus, Epidromae p. 20. 18—21 Lang rvyxdvet 8e o Eppijs o Aoyo? <x)vy ov aireoTeiXav ITpos r)pas e£ ovpavov ol deoi, povov TOV dv9pa>7Tov TCJV eiri yqs (^CJCJV XoytKov nofqaavres. o
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napa rdXXa e^ox^rarov etxov avroi. For the notion of reason and language as god's first gifts to men see Collard on Eur. Suppl. 203-4. quae quidem mortalia essent: the qualification (which is not added to the same phrase at 12. 1. 2, cited in the previous n., and contributes nothing to the argument here) implies the existence of animalia inmortalia (cf. Sen. Ep. 58. 14; note also Q. 7. 3. 3 'si finias equum,... genus est animal, species mortale, differens inrationale'). These are (or at least include) the gods (with whom men alone among animalia share ratio: cf. 14, Sen. Ep. 124. 13-14); the idea is omnipresent in Stoic theology (see e.g. D.L 7.147, cited above on parens rerum). See e.g. Frede, Theodicy, 101-2. essent: the subjunctive is puzzling. Ammendola sees a consecutive clause here ('il congiuntivo si spiega per il senso limitativo della proposizione relativa: quegli animali almeno che fossero mortali'), but a restriction is already expressed by quidem. Alternatively, essent means 'which were to be' and expresses the purpose of the creator at the moment of creation. 16. 13 corpora... uidemus: the contrast of superior bodily accomplishments in some animals with man's mental ability goes back a long way: Eur. Aiolos fr. 27; Ion of Chios, Phoenix fr. 38 (Nauck2, p. 739); Plat. Prot. 321 c-322 A ; ISOC. Or. 15. 253 rot? . . . yap aXXois ... ovSev TCJV £qjojv 8iaepofx€v. aAAa 7TOXX(LV Kai TOJ ra^fiKat RRJ PCOFIRJ... KaraSeearepoi Tvyxdvoftev orres (for some bodily advantages of men, see Xen. Mem. 1. 4. 11-12). The link with Q. is as usual Cicero; see esp. Inv. 1.5, Off. 1. 50. Cf. also e.g. Sen. Ep. 76. 9-10 ('ualet... uelox est'), 124. 22-3 ('uires... uelocitatem') and Ben. 2. 29. 1 ('magnitudine'); [Plut.] De lib. ed. 5 E (where it is naiSeia which T
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nam e t . . . (14) labor est: Q. gives two sets of three examples of animals' self-sufficiency; they can perform certain physical actions without any teaching, and clothing, protection and food are available to them without any labor on their (or anyone else's) part. The sets, though different, are closely related, and the older strong punctuation (still in Halm) after sciunt is inappropriate. ingredi c it ius: 'run' (Russell). This has nothing to do with 'uelocitate praestantiora' above, and citius has no true comparative force: young animals (unlike human babies) can soon after birth move 'pretty fast'. Cf. Deel. min. 306. 22 'nam ferarum pecudumque fetibus est statim ingressus' (the declaimer adds 'et ad libera impetus': cf. next n.). Ammendola takes the phrase to mean that young animals can walk earlier than humans. citra docentem natura sua: cf. Cic. ND 2. 128 'eaque [i.e. animals] quae paulo ante nata sunt sine magistro duce natura mammas adpetunt'. 16. 14 pleraque contra frigus... uestiuntur: put mythologically in Plat. Prot. 321 A 3—6 (of Epimetheus) 7rpos ra? €K zhos copas evfxdpeiav ip,r)xavaTO dp.i€vvvs aura NVKVALS re 6pt£iv Kai arepeots Seppiaoiv, IKOLVOIS dfivvai X€tp,diva, SwcLTois Se Kal /cau/xara; cf. Cic. ND 2. 121 (note 'aliae uillis uestitae'; cf. OLD s.v. uestio 2a), Plin. Nat. 7. 2. ex suo corpore: ex is either used instrumentally (TLL s.v. 1111. 52-1112. 77, not citing our passage, but giving (late) examples with verbs of covering), i.e. 'by means of their own bodies', (cf. n.on 19 ex communi intellectu) or (more conventionally) indicates the direction of the growth, 'with resources from their own bodies', i.e. growing feathers or fur or scales, which might be thought to arise from the body rather than be part of it. arma... ingenita: cf., of animals, Cic. ND 2. 121 'uidemus... alias esse cornibus armatas', 127 'cernimus ut contra uim et metum suis se armis quaeque defendat' (with Pease ad locc.). Burman aptly cited Ov. Met. 10. 546 'neue feras quibus arma dedit Natura lacesse' (cf. 540 'armatosque unguibus ursos'). ex obuio: TLL s.v. obvius 322. 37-8 cites a single late parallel. Animals generally find food readily available. Cf. Sen. Ep. 90. 18, of the days when men shared the 'facilem actum uitae' given by nature to animals: 'tecta tegimentaque et fomenta corporum et cibi et quae nunc ingens negotium facta sunt obuia erant et gratuita et opera leui parabilia'. circa quae...labor est: see the collection of references relating to the characteristics of early humans in Campbell 339-41. rationem: Aoyo? as Reason in general. Its relationship to Aoyos as speech (oratio) is stated in what follows, where it is argued that speech is a better mark of what separates man from beast than the intellectual aspect of reason: as indeed Q. had assumed at 12.
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igitur.. .dedit: i.e. to make up for the physical deficiencies of man, God (the subject is understood from 12) gave him compensating advantages. For the gift of reason, cf. e.g. Cic. Parad. 13 'cum tibi siue deus siue...rerum omnium natura dederit animum, quo nihil est praestantius neque diuinius'; see also n. on 12 separauit a ceteris... animalibus. On the closely related gift of speech, see n. below on 17 si nihil... melius accepimus. socios... cum dis: cf. Cic. Leg. 1. 23 'est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius eaque est et in homineet indeo, prima ho mini cum deo rationis societas', Fin. 5. 38 'ratione..., qua nihil est in homine diuinius' (cf. Parad. 13, cited on rationem above; ND 1. 37, attributed to Cleanthes); Sen. Ep. 92. 27 'ratio... dis hominibusque communis est: haec in illis consummata est, in nobis consummabilis'; Galen, Protr. 3 7TOJS o5v OVK aloxpov.
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('parit et incubat et educat') and Plin. Nat. 10. 152 (where exdudere follows for variation), but there would be no point here in pairing the two verbs in the same sense. reponere in hiemem: cf. Verg. G. 3. 403 (of men laying up cheese) 'parco sale contingunt hiemique reponunt'; Caes. Gal. 4. 29. 4 'frumentum... in hiemem prouisum non erat'. Lactantius, Inst. 3. 10 detects prouidentia in animals that 'sibi prospiciunt in futurum et cibos reponunt.' opera quaedam nobis inimitabilia: the phrase of course refers forward only, and there is asyndeton. Cf. 1. 10. 7 'et muta animalia mellis ilium inimitabilem humanae rationi saporem uario florum ac sucorum genere perficiunt'; Sen. Ep. 121. 22 adds spiders ('nulli mortalium imitabilis ilia aranei textura'). For Bienenlob, see Decl. mai. 13. 16 (note 'hoc tamen efficere consequi imitari non potuit [sc. humana sollertia]'), with Krapinger 71 n. 17 and 142 n. 368. nonnullius fortasse rationis est: see above on 15 intellectum. Lactantius (Inst. 3. 10. 3), after the words cited above on reponere in hiemem, said of animals: 'rationis quoque signa in multis deprehenduntur, nam quando utilia sibi appetunt, mala cauent, pericula uitant, latibula sibi parant,... profecto aliquid intellegunt'; and as for bees, they had 'perfecta prudentia'. He wrote in a long tradition that saw elements of reason in animals. For the Stoic background, see SVFii, frr. 708-37, including the famous fragment (726; cf. 727) on dogs' knowing logic, for which see B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford, 1985), 80. Cicero avoided the word ratio in connection with animal behaviour (for ND 1. 128 see Pease ad loc.), but he gives much relevant information in ND 2. 120-5. According to Virgil (G. 4. 220-1) the remarkable behaviour of bees led some to assert 'esse apibus partem diuinae mentis et haustus | aetherios' (contrast 1. 415-16, where a similar explanation for the weather forecasts of birds is rejected: 'haud... quia sit diuinitus illis | ingenium aut rerum fato prudentia maior'). muta atque inrationalia: in effect 'not just dumb but lacking in reason too'. A has inrationabilia. The evidence of the MSS elsewhere is as follows: 7. 3. 3 and 24 -a/is A (def. B); 8. 6. 13 -alis A, -abtiis (in effect) B; 10. 7. 11 -abilis B (def. A). The shorter form, corresponding to rationalis (on which the MSS do not differ), is probably what Q. consistently wrote. 16.17 ho minibus quibus negata uox est: the dumb, who (Q. implies) are in no position to exploit their reason, and are reduced to a state hardly superior to that of dumb animals. animus ille caelestis: the paragraph has emphasized the idea that it was god who gave man Reason (14) and its all-important component, Speech (11; cf. the next sentence in 17); man's mind is accordingly part of, or related to, the
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divine mind. Cf. 1. 1. 1 'unde origo animi caelestis creditor' (deduced from mental activity's being specific to mankind); 12. 2. 29; Cic. Sen. 77 (with Powell's n.). Similarly Cic. Tusc. 1. 65 'animus diuinus'. si nihil a dis oratione melius accepimus: cf. esp. 12. 11. 30 'ipsam igitur orandi maiestatem qua nihil di inmortales melius homini dederunt... toto animo petamus', where the divine origin of the gift of speech is again used to support an exhortation to study rhetoric. Parallel passages attribute the gift to prouidentia (1. 10. 7 'nihil praestantius'; cf. 12. 1.2 'prouidentiae munera') or rerum natura (12. 1.2 'praecipue'); but this is not, in this Stoic language, to say anything different. For the divine gift of reason generally see nn. on 14 igitur... dedit and socios... cum dis. quid tam dignum... praestant: Q. echoes Cic. de Orat. 1. 33 'quam ob rem quis hoc non iure miretur summeque in eo elaborandum esse arbitretur, ut, quo uno homines maxime bestiis praestent, in hoc hominibus ipsis antecellat?' To the parallels cited by L-P add Sid. Ap. Ep. 4. 17. 2 'experiere per dies quanto antecellunt beluis homines, tanto anteferri rusticis institutes'; Poggio used the idea in his exultant letter to Guarino (1.5) about the discovery of a complete MS of Q. Unlike Cicero, who is speaking in praise of eloquence generally, Q. is implicitly making an argumentative point here: rhetoric is useful because it is an expression of human nature at its most complete. 16. 18 nulla in parte: virtually = nusquam (cf. [Cic.] Sal. 18 'nulla in parte castris apti nisi licentia uitiorum et cupiditate rerum nouarum'). A's arte restricts the phrase unduly (so Spalding). The vague use of pars is quite in Q.'s manner (see Austin on 12. 11. 11). plenius... gratiam refert: 'pays off better'; cf. 12. 11. 29 'opere pulcherrimo [sc. rhetoric], alius tractatus atque ipsa possessio plenissimam studiis gratiam refert'. id adeo manifestum erit s i . . . : for id adeo see TLL s.v. adeo 615. 25-45. In such passages as Cic. Cluent. 80 'id adeo sic cognoscite' or Sen. Ep. 94. 10 'id adeo sic disce', sic looks forward to a separate sentence, whereas in our passage the elaboration is, unusually, contained in a conditional clause. unde et quo usque...: et adhuc augeri potest: Q. wishes us to be impressed by the progress eloquence has made since its humble beginnings, which he sketches in 3. 2. He there moves without a break from rhetorices origo (1) to initium orandi (4), and in our passage too he may also be thinking of the development of rhetorical precept which runs parallel to the development of oratory (for which see 3. 1. 8-21; so too in ypa/x/xan/o;: 2. 1. 4 'tantum ab hac appellationis suae paupertate...prouecta'). 50 As to the future, s o Note also 2 . 17. 3 for the fastigium reached by rhetorice, there meaning in effect 'oratory' (see n. ad loc.).
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he is, as ever, an optimist (see n.on 2. 5. 24 neque enim.. .proposito). For him, there are no constraints on the emergence of an orator perfectus so far as human ability is concerned: 1 pr. 20 'est certe aliquid consummata eloquentia, neque ad earn peruenire natura humani ingenii prohibet'. What was crucial was the labor; and the ambition to excel, as 1 pr. 20 proceeds to say (cf. 12. 11. 30); these passages are very similar in their hortatory intent. adhuc augeri:rtd/wc means 'still' here, cf. OLD s.v. 3a ('w. ref. to a process that continues, though a cessation might have been expected or is imminent'; e.g. Ov. Pont. 4. 5. 31 'uiuit adhuc'); Ammendola likewise took it to mean 'still' but explained the use of adhuc as analogous to that with comparatives (OLDs.v. 7b), on the grounds that there is an 'idea comparativa implicita' in augeri. 16. 19 nam: apparently a reason for the assertion made in §§17-18 that striving for excellence in eloquence is a way for human beings to perfect God's gift (and themselves). regere consiliis senatum populum, exercitum in quae uelit ducere: the articulation is problematic. Of the parallels in Q., 1 pr. 10 'regere consiliis urbes' does not help; but 12. 1. 26 'regenda senatus consilia et popularis error ad meliora ducendus' can be adduced in support of taking populum with ducere. While it might seem harsh to break up senatum populum, asyndeton in this pair seems unparalleled (for Q.'s general fondness for such asyndeton, cf. n. on 2. 9. 2 laeti alacresque).51 But Tac. Dial. 36. 5 'cum et populum et senatum consilio et auctoritate regerent' strongly supports the punctuation we accept, while also serving to remind us how dated Q.'s notion is. In the background of our passage is Cic. de Orat. 1. 30 'neque uero mihi quicquam... praestabilius uidetur quam posse dicendo tenere hominum mentis, adlicere uoluntates, impellere quo uelit, unde autem uelit deducere (31) quid enim est.. .tarn potens tamque magnificum quam populi motus, iudicum religiones, senatus grauitatem unius oratione conuerti?'; for a further echo of this passage, see below on nonne puldirum.. .gloriae. uelit: the subject is perhaps vague ('an orator'), rather than to be supplied from bono uiro (see previous n.); cf. nn. on similar phrases in 2. 15. 10 ducere... uelit, 12 uelit. Those passages, which like ours are in oratio obliqua, support A's subjunctive against B's uult, whose rhythm is also inferior. sit utile conueniatque bono uiro: the two clauses should (contrast the Loeb) perhaps be kept separate, and bono uiro taken only with conueniat 5 1 One might further consider deleting exercitum, as Dr Holford-Strevens suggests to us, o n the grounds that armies follow orders rather than being persuaded; but then there are instances where persuasion may have been required: e.g. Sulla's march on Rome, Pompey's address to his troops in Caes. Civ. 3. 86.
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(for the phrase cf. 2. 20. 4, 6. 1. 7, 10. 5. 13). utile recalls the topic of the chapter at its close and appeals to 'Roman' attitudes (cf. Aper in Tac. Dial. 5. 5, where emphasis is placed on defence of friends and self). With this Q. combines appeal to his own moralizing standpoint; cf. 12. 1. 26-8, on the role of the uir bonus in (successively) judicial, political, and military oratory. nonne pulchrum... gloriae: the first words lead us to expect further assertion of 'normal' values to follow (cf. Tac. Dial. 36. 8 'disertum haberi pulchrum et gloriosum.. .habebatur'). Q. does indeed close on the laus and gloria achievable by the orator (cf. Tac. Dial. 7. 3 'quid? fama et laus cuius artis cum oratorum gloria comparanda est?'), but he strikes a rhetors note in linking them with the fact that an orator is able (of course thanks to his rhetorical training) to exploit materials available to everyone. Q. recalled de Orat. 1. 31 'quid enim est...tam admirabile quam ex infinita multitudine hominum existere unum qui id quod omnibus natura sit datum uel solus uel cum perpaucis facere possit?', and perhaps also 3. 177 'non enim sunt alia sermonis, alia contentionis uerba, neque ex alio genere ad usum cotidianum, alio ad scaenam pompamque sumuntur, sed ea nos cum iacentia sustulimus e medio, sicut mollissimam ceram ad nostrum arbitrium formamus et fingimus'. ex communi intellectu: 'by means of [cf. n. on 14 ex suo corpore] mental qualities all men share' (cf. 2. 5. 11 'communis habitus'). For communis intellectus, apparently found in CL only in Q., cf. 3. 8. 3 (plur., and used more pejoratively), 5. 10. 18 'positum in communi omnium intellectu'. loqui: orators do sometimes 'talk' (cf. n.on 2. 3. 6 loqui); but Q. mentions this here largely to fill out the phrase, on which fulgere ac tonare will improve. fulgere ac tonare: Aristophanes, Ach. 530-1: ivdevOev opyfi riepiKXcrjs ovXvp,mos | -qoTpaiTT' efipovTa £uv€KVKa rrjv 'EXXdSa, translated in Cic. Or.
29 by 'fulgere, tonare, permiscere Graeciam'; cf. Pliny's variation in Ep. 1. 20. 19 'tonat, fiilgurat, omnia denique perturbat ac miscet', and also Q. 12. 10. 24 'Periclea... quem fiilminibus [cf. 12. 10. 65] et caelesti fragori comparant comici [cf. 12. 2. 22, with Austin's n.] dum illi conuiciantur'. On lightning and thunder as symbols of political and rhetorical power, in themselves and associated with Pericles, see Olson on Ach. 530-1. On Pericles as Zeus, see Cratin. fr. 73. 1-2, 118, 258; Telecl. fr. 18; and J. Schwarze, Die Beurteilung des Perikles durch die attische Komodie und ihre historische und historiographische Bedeutung (Munich, 1971), index s.v. 'Zeus-Perikles'. fulgere: fulgurare A. The verbs mean the same thing (compare the passages of Cicero and Pliny cited in the previous n.). Choice here is difficult; but Q. may have preferred to avoid pairing two infinitives in -are in this prominent place.
Chapter Seventeen I now turn to the question, Is rhetoric an art? (1). That it is, the very titles of books on the subject confirm, and Cicero identifies it with 'artful' eloquence. Philosophers agree (2). If e.g. weaving is thought to be an art, it is incredible that eloquence should have developed so far without art (3). Such an assertion is as paradoxical as Polycrates' encomia of Busiris and Clytemnestra (his alleged accusation of Socrates is no less paradoxical) (4). (a) Some, like Antonius in de Oratoreand Lysias, say that rhetoric is a matter of nature and practice only (5-6a). This position is defended by the argument | a) that even the untrained make speeches that show the parts distinguished by rhetoricians (6b). Again, it is argued (0) that men have always spoken in their own defence and against others, while rhetoric only started to be taught in the time of Tisias and Corax. Speech, then, preceded art, and so is not an art (7). It is irrelevant to my position when teaching of rhetoric began (though wefindin Homer mention both of training in oratory and of public speaking) (8). For all I need to reply [to both a and £ j is that everything that art perfected took its rise from nature. If that were not so, similar arguments could be used to show that medicine (9), building, and music are not arts. Not all speech can be called rhetoric (10), nor every speaker an orator (I la). This also refutes the argument | y) that something that can be done without learning is not a matter of art, whereas even those who have not learnt can make speeches: e.g. Demades and Aeschines (1 lb-12a). But one who has not learnt is no orator, and in any case both these speakers did in some sense 'learn' (12b), though Demades would be more eminent if he had been properly trained and so had gained the confidence to publish his speeches (13). (b) Aristotle in his Gryllus produced subtle arguments against the technicity of rhetoric (but his Rhetoric shows that he did not accept them) (14), and others have taken the same view (15). I shall answer their main contentions briefly (16). (a) 'Rhetoric has no subject-matter of its own.' I shall disprove this later (sc. in ch. 21) (17). (0) 'No art assents to false propositions, as rhetoric does' (18). Rhetoric sometimes utters falsehoods, but it is not itself misled, as is shown by various kinds of examples (19-21). (y) 'All arts have a goal; but rhetoric either has none, or fails to achieve it.' But rhetoric does have a goal (to speak well), and a true orator will always achieve it (22-3a). The argument may hold against those who regard the goal of rhetoric as to persuade, but in my view the orator and his art are not tied to success. An orator strives for victory, but even if he fails to win, he has done what his art demands so long as he has spoken well. (23b). So too in steersmanship and medicine (24-5a). So the orator's goal is to have spoken well, and his art does not depend on the outcome of a case (25b). Equally, it is untrue that rhetoric does not know when it has attained its goal (26a) [this is an appendix to thefinissection beginning at §22, not
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foreshadowed there). (S) 'Rhetoric employs vices, for it tells untruths and arouses emotions' (26b). But both these things are allowable, when the motive is good. Even a wise man may at times tell lies, and emotional appeal may be the only resort for a speaker faced with ignorant judges (27). If audiences were wise men, there would be little room for eloquence at all, but that is far from being the case (28-9). (e) Orators speak on both sides of a case. Hence various objections: (i) 'Rhetoric contradicts itself.' (ii) 'It destroys its own product.' (iii) A dilemma arising from its teaching both what is to bc said and what is not (30). But these objections are obviously relevant only to bad men (31). Still, it can happen that two good men are on different sides, and I will provide answers that cover even non-moral rhetoric (32). [The answers are given as follows: (i) 33-4a; (ii) 34b-35a; (iii) 35b-36a.) ( 0 Further objections are raised in Cicero's de Oratore: rhetoric is restricted to opinion, not knowledge, (i) The orator's audience do not know what is being spoken of, and (ii) he himself sometimes talks of what he does not know (36b). Only (ii) needs an answer. The orator knows how to speak well (37), and he knows what he is talking of as much as those who identify the elements that make up the world or measure sun and earth (38). He may not know whether his cause is true, but then a doctor does not know if his patient really has a headache. If an orator always says things that are only probable, he at least knows that they are probable (39). (77) Orators are sometimes inconsistent in what they say in different cases; but that is a fault in them, not in the art (40). But that rhetoric is an art may be shown briefly, for rhetoric conforms with two different definitions of the word ars (41), and passes further tests (42-3). In this chapter Q. reviews the ancient debate on whether rhetoric is an art,52 rebutting arguments against the technicity of rhetoric, and finally gives an affinnative answer and a definition of an art, supposedly withstanding all the counterarguments (2. 17. 41, see nn.below): '...artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem utilem uitae.' This approach implies that from the beginning the reader has to have a vague idea what Q.'s position is, i.e. against the background of what conception of rhetoric he issues these rebuttals. It comes, then, as no surprise, and indeed 5 2 A fiercely contested issue in the Hellenistic era, which should be seen together with related debates about the technicity o f medicine or grammar. For rhetoric the primary texts are Cic. deOrat. 1. 9 1 - 1 1 2 , Philod. Rhet. 2 - i. 1 3 - 1 4 6 Sudhaus; Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 1 0 - 5 9 ; and Inst. Or. 2 . 17. Important items o f modern scholarship on the notion o f rex*' 1 ) and its historical development are the Introduction in Blank; Nesselrath 1 2 3 - 2 3 9 ; and eariier M. Isnardi Parente, Techne: momenti del pensiero greco da Platone ad Epiatro (Florence, 1966); Barnes, which combines an analysis o f the main reference texts for rhetoric (placing special emphasis on Sextus) with an independent appraisal o f how one might today, but in the terms of the ancient discussion, answer the question; L - P i. 1 9 0 - 4 , who discuss the related section in Cic. de Orat. ( 1 . 9 1 - 1 1 2 ) and draw on Inst. Or. 2 . 1 7 for comparison; on Philodemus generally see Hubbell (esp. 2 5 2 - 7 on rhetoric) and Blank, Technicity, Atherton on the conceptualization o f rhetoric within the Stoic school. O n medicine see Th. Compere, Die Apologie der Heilknnst: eine griechisclie Sophistenrede des fiotften vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts (Leipzig, 2 1 9 1 0 ) and J. Laskaris, The Art is Long: On the Sacred Disease and the Scientific Tradition (Leiden, 2002). On texts related to 2. 17. 4 1 - 3 , i.e. surveys o f definitions possibly drawing o n similar sources, see Mansfeld and Sparshott.
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confirms an impression one would form simply on the basis of Q.'s method, that he stresses in 2. 17. 41 that this is a universally accepted definition as opposed to one accepted by one particular sect of thinkers only. This is accurate (cf. e.g. Mansfield), in the sense that most of the people believing in the existence of rt^rat at all would have accepted this definition, including the Stoics, which is, however, not the same as to say that within this group everyone would have assigned rexvai the same role, or would have postulated the same kind and degree of integration with other views that might be held. Three issues need to be dealt with here rather than in the commentary itself. The first is the role this chapter plays in Q.'s overall argument for rhetoric as it is practised by the perfect orator. Technical rhetoric is based on rules and precepts, the alternative model being naturalist rhetoric, which operates without a fixed framework of rules and relies on intuition instead (see introductory nn. on 2. 11 and 2. 12). It is central to Q.'s position that the orator's mastery of the precepts of technical rhetoric and his morality are linked to each other because of a fundamental affinity between rhetoric qua art, and virtue: both are ultimately grounded in items of knowledge (perceptiones) which are consentientes and coexercitatae (for an art this is demonstrated in the present chapter, for virtue and the virtue of rhetoric in particular cf. 2. 20. 5 with nn.). What the present chapter is supposed to do is to review various lines of argument designed to undermine the technicity of rhetoric, in particular the very fact that it operates on such rules, and to refute them all.53 In a way, two of the most prominent arguments to be levelled against rhetoric as an art—that it aims at persuasion, which it does not always achieve, and that therefore it is not an art, and that it can serve and does in fact serve evil purposes, and hence is not useful and not an art—have already been dealt with in chs. 15 and 16 (see the Appendix for the structure of Q.'s discussion compared to that of the parallel texts). However, a secondary objective of the present chapter is to add a qualification to what was said in 2. 15, with a view to partially reclaiming 'persuasion' as a relevant objective if not formal goal of rhetoric (see §§22-5). In order to be consistent, Q. rejects attempts to maintain the technicity of rhetoric which involve retaining persuasion as its re'Xos but lowering the standards of what an art must achieve: on this view, rhetoric, seen as a 'stochastic art' (see ibid, nn.), would retain the status of an art despite its failure to achieve persuasion under all circumstances. Q. cannot accept this, since it makes it very difficult to maintain the 5 5 The place o f the present chapter within the overall argument may be illustrated by a s u m m a r y o f 2 . 1 4 - 2 1 : 14 the term which will be used is rhetor ice; 15 rlietorice is defined as bene dicendi sciential 16 it is therefore useful; 17 what is more it is an art, 18 and primarily an active art, 19 and in the last resort it contributes more than natural talent; 2 0 what is more, it is a virtue; 21 thus properly understood, the art o f rhetoric c a n be applied t o all subjects.
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connection between rhetoric and morality he is envisaging; but in §§22-5 he does effectively say that bene dicere, in his view the goal of rhetoric, involves doing all in one's power to speak persuasively, and in saying this he relies on a conceptual distinction created in connection with stochastic arts. However, in putting forward this view, he seems to have sacrificed Stoic orthodoxy to common sense: none of the evidence we have from elsewhere on what the Stoics meant by ev Aeyeiv suggests this interpretation (see n. on 2. 15. 34 rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam). Second, there is the issue of the sources for this chapter (cf. the commentary on ch. 15 and the Appendix). Radennacher claimed in the supplement to Sudhaus' edition of Philod. Rhet: (Leipzig, 1895), pp. ix-xxvi) that substantial agreements between Sextus, Adv. Rhet., Philod. Rhet., and our chapter can only be explained by assuming (i) a common source and in particular (ii) a text directed against the Stoic conception of rhetoric, written by the Peripatetic scholarch Critolaus (for whom see 2. 15. 23 with n.). The latter hypothesis was based on the observation that the definition of t4\}»?> quoted above from Q., and present in Philod. and Sextus too, is frequently called Stoic in the sources. So Radermacher assumed that a text citing a Stoic definition of rhetoric and offering arguments against rhetoric's technicity can only be described as someone's attack on the Stoic conception of rhetoric, and the occasional occurrence of Critolaus' name as one who put forward, used, or endorsed this or that argument suggested to him the author of the source. This second hypothesis never met with strong approval (for criticism of details of Radermacher's case see esp. von Arnim, Dio, 90 n. 1; Wehrli, x. 69-73, in the best modern summary on Critolaus, expresses disapproval but does not give reasons), but more recently Barnes has been more specific, pointing out that it fails to take into account 'the long history of the dispute and also the important part played in it by the Academics' (n. 8), and hence was too simple as an explanation. Now Radermacher's tables arguably demonstrate that all three texts draw on a common stock of material. There is, however, no reason to assume a source in the fonn of a single text with an identifiable author: comparison with what is known about the evolution of the doxographical tradition, for which see e.g. J. Mansfeld and D. T. Runia, Aetiana: The Method and the Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, i (Leiden, 19%), shows that such agreements may have more complex reasons. We take it that this is what is implied by Barnes's reference to the 'long history of the dispute'. His point about the 'role of the Academics' is fair too: Critolaus is only one of several philosophers whose views are mentioned (there are also general references to the 'Academics'), and it seems arbitrary to name him as the author of the source (assuming that made sense in itself). Further, as Q. says (see above), the definition of T€\vr], while accepted by the Stoics, was
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accepted by many others too; so the test for Radermacher s view that the Stoic conception of rhetoric was under attack in the shared source has to consist in checking whether the anti-technical arguments on which the texts agree are specifically directed against Stoic views (see p. 227). It can be easily demonstrated from the evidence as Radermacher himself presents it that this is not the case: his cluster b1 (Sextus 13, Philod. ii. 125, Q. 2. 17. 22; see the Appendix) covers the argument that rhetoric is not an art because it does not always reach its target. Sextus and Philodemus presuppose that the goal of rhetoric is persuasion, Q. notes with satisfaction that his goal of rhetoric— Aeyeiv—insulates rhetoric from this charge. If the common source material was directed against a Stoic conception of rhetoric, persuasion should not appear as the goal of rhetoric at all. Radermacher's cluster b2 (Sextus 16, Philod. ii. 71, 97, Q. 2. 17. 11; see the Appendix) offers the argument that there are successful speakers who were never trained, so rhetoric is not an art. This is evidently directed at conventional school rhetoric. The same is true of cluster c 1 , which is the argument that cities retain useful craftsmen and expel charlatans (Sextus 20, Philod. i. 14 fr. v = p. 31 L.A. (cf. i. 16 fr. ix), Q. 2. 16.4; see the Appendix); since there is good evidence for the expulsion of teachers of rhetoric from a number of cities, rhetoric is not an art.5'1 So the shared material behind the three texts was a survey of arguments against rhetoric as conventionally practised, which included, among other material, pronouncements by philosophers (we cannot rule out that arguments for rhetoric's technicity were included there too). We regard it as more likely that a rhetorician should draw up such a source than a philosopher,55 but nothing depends on this. Third, the section (2. 17. 5-13) concerned with the notion that rhetoric is natural requires a general word of introduction. The character Antonius from Cicero's de Orat. is introduced as the main representative of this view in §5, not quite correctly (see nn.on the section). The arguments for this view are: (a) from the product, i.e. the speech itself: uneducated people, when they have to speak in public, inevitably produce a speech that can be analysed in terms of the partes orationis (6), so the divisions of rhetoric merely provide fancy names for something one does anyway in suitable situations; (/?) from historical evidence: there were speakers before formal instruction in rhetoric emerged in Sicily in the early fifth century BC (§7, referred to as cauiUationes).
5 4 By the same token, we cannot agree with the suggestion o f L - P i. 1 9 2 - 3 that the shared source was an attack on a Stoic conception o f rhetoric not by Critolaus, but by the Academic philosopher Charmadas. 5 5 This would be compatible with the possibility (which is impossible t o verify) that Aristotle's lost Gryllus is one o f the works o n which the shared source drew; see n. on 14 Gryllo.
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Commentary
Q. immediately (8) dismisses the notion that it was relevant when formal rhetorical instruction began, but cites (in a praeteritio) evidence from Homer that rhetoric was already taught when the Iliad was composed. He then engages with both arguments: first, he challenges the systematic consideration underlying the historical argument (/?), i.e. that nothing based on an art or produced by it can have existed before the art (9), on the grounds that art only perfects things which have their origin in nature (cf. 2. 16. 11-19, esp. 17); for rhetoric that means that one should not call the beginnings of public speaking oratory in the technical sense, just as, Q. argues, e.g. the beginning of attempts at curing illnesses are not yet full-fledged medicine. This consideration is then (in the second half of 11) also used to disarm argument (a). Q. then (12) moves on to famous orators who supposedly did not enjoy any rhetorical training, turning the tables on the detractors of rhetoric by arguing that their very prowess suggests that they did receive training, and that even if they did not, they would have been even better had they had it. What is now curious is that, while we can find parallels for these considerations e.g. in the Prolegomena or Philodemus, they tend to appear not as arguments for the positive view that rhetoric is natural, but rather argue negatively to the conclusion that rhetoric (i.e. technical rhetoric) does not exist (see the nn. on the section). One explanation for this state of affairs may be that the naturalists, Q.'s declared enemy in the Inst. Or. (cf. 2. 11-12 above), by definition do not entertain a neatly defined conception of rhetoric which Q. could make a show of refuting. He therefore has to, as it were, delineate their position for them (drawing on the rhetorical tradition) before he can go about attacking it. Ultimately, Q. defines the naturalist objection to formal rhetoric out of existence (see n.on 10 si rhetorice... 11 fateantur below); for him proper rhetoric simply does presuppose formal training. 17. 1 finis non erit si...uelim: cf. 8. 5. 25 'sed finis non erit si singulas corruptorum persequar formas: illud potius quod est magis necessarium.' expatiari.. .et indulgere uoluptati: cf. n. on 2. 10. 5 expatientur. Q. has been able to 'spread himself in ch. 16 and write in a style calculated to give pleasure both to himself (note 10. 1. 24) and to his readers (cf. 12. 10. 22). Now we must (after a stirring introduction in 2-4) return to the grindstone, with a topic that will, like that of Book 3, be 'minimae legentibus... uoluptati' (3. 1.2). parte in hac: for B's uncommon order cf. 4. 2. 32 'parte in una', 12. 2. 15 'parte in aliqua' (aliqua in parti b), Liv. 26. 46. 2 'parte in alia' (doubted by some edd.), TLL s.v. in 805. 27-31. A's in parte hac, though probably a trivialization, is paralleled exactly in a similar context at 1. 3. 17 'non morabor
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in parte hac: nimium est quod intellegitur'; for such postposition of hie see TLL s.v. 2739. 33-41. transeamus... ad earn quaestionem quae sequitur: Q.'s formulation suggests that his treatment follows an order which is natural or established through tradition; in fact, the parallel evidence suggests that to treat the goal of rhetoric (2. 15, partially) and the utility of rhetoric (2. 16) before the question whether rhetoric is an art is unusual. See the introductory note to the Appendix on the organization of Q.'s exposition. 17. 2 titulis: i.e. their titles included the words ars (or r^n?); see n. on 2. 15. 4 re uera. Cicero uero etiam... dicat: Inv. 1. 6 'Ciuilis quaedam ratio est, quae multis et magnis ex rebus constat. Eius quaedam magna et ampla pars est artificiosa eloquentia, quam rhetoricam uocant'. uero marks the contrast between those who mentioned 'art' in their titles, and Cicero's explicit statement that rhetoric was eloquence made 'artful', etiam cannot imply that Cicero made this statement as well as calling his work an ars, for he did not (see n. on 2. 14.4 Graeco nomine). It may mark the positive nature of his assertion ('Cicero went so far as to say...'); or it may be corrupt (note etiam just above). A reads ea, and Halm's earn (anticipated in the Renaissance, and accepted by Russell) is tempting. But if this is right, Q. would be making Cicero say: 'the eloquence which is called rhetoric is artificiosa.' quod... uindicarunt: i.e. have made the claim that rhetoric is an art (Ammendola: 'pretendono... che la retorica sia un'arte'). uindicare = 'to claim, sc. in an argument' is not recorded in the OLD. Comparable is 1.5. 26 'quod [a rule of accentuation] tamen in aduerbiis... uindicant' (cf. §13). Different is 12. 2. 9 'utinamque sit tempus quo perfectus aliquis.. .orator hanc artem [sc. philosophiam].. .uindicet sibi. oratores: the word must here cover rhetores (indeed them especially) as well as practising orators; cf. Reid's n.on Cic. Ac. 1. 5 (comparing Orat. 61,113), and n. below on 3 rhetor icen autem... uenisse. u t . . . uideantur: Spalding's n. well brings out the point of this rather compressed (and illogical) clause: 'tu ita intellege: si soli oratores hoc vindicassent, possent videri suis studiis indulsisse.' Philosophers could have no such ulterior motive. For the phrasing, cf. Sen. Con. 1.8. 14 'qui dixit semel tantum militare se uelle ut aliquid uideretur rei publicae supra legem praestitisse' ('done the state some service'). Stoici: for the Stoic view on rhetoric see the general introduction, pp. xxxvii-xlii. On the incongmity that the Stoics considered rhetoric to be an art, but classed it as a science (fVicrrrj/ATj) in the definition Q. accepts, see the introductory note on ch. 20.
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Commentary
Peripatetici: following Aristotle, for whose views see §14. There is no evidence for Stoics who positively did not regard rhetoric as an art, so plerique is probably meant to go with Peripatetici only (so also L-P i. 193). As far as they are concerned, it is a necessary qualification, as some Peripatetics (certainly Critolaus: 15) conducted a vigorous campaign against rhetoric's being an art. See also the introduction (ch. 3) of Reinhardt's commentary on Cic. Top., where evidence is provided that that work's primary source is a Peripatetic theory of rhetoric which classed rhetoric as a stochastic art. Overall the inclusion of the Peripatetics here is fair, and the school's position under Critolaus must appear as an inconsequential interlude. 17. 3 quaestionis: i.e. 'quae de ipsa rhetorices substantia quaeruntur' (1 pr. 21), the topic of 2. 14-21 as a whole. a sensu remotus hominis: for the phrasing cf. 3. 11. 24 'stultus atque ab omni prorsus usu dicendi remotus'. The sensus hominis is the way an ordinary human being would react, as in Sen. Ep. 85. 29 'iste uero dolet (sensum enim hominis nulla exuit uirtus)'. It is genuinely fitting, appropriate, and natural for humans to acknowledge the technicity of rhetoric (cf. 2. 16. 11-19). See n. below on maximum... opus. fabricandi: 'building' (Loeb). Cf. 10 below 'nec fabrica sit ars (casas enim primi illi sine arte fecerunt)'; for architecture as an art, see Vitr. 1. 1. 1. It is difficult to be quite sure what kind of 'fashioning' is intended here. The verb is often used of working in wood or metal (thus 2. 16. 6, 9. 3. 6, 10. 3. 18; cf. 2. 20. 10 for fabrica = ^aA/ceim/of), and that might be in question here, given that Q. continues with fairly specific and, one might think, minor crafts, hence arguing a fortiori for rhetoric's status as a re^in/. luto.. .ducendi: A gives e luto, probably by conjecture (note Vitr. 2. 3. 1 'non enim de harenoso neque calculoso luto...sunt ducendi [sc. lateres]'); but cf. 10. 5. 9 'eadem cera aliae aliaeque formae duci solent', Verg. A. 7. 634 'lento ducunt argento', Apul. Fl. 7 'solus earn [sc. effigiem] Polycletus aere duceret' (contrast Plin. Nat. 7. 125 'ne quis ipsum alius... quam Lysippus ex aere duceret'). putet: sc., somewhat awkwardly, esse. rhetoricen autem... uenisse: for the phrasing, cf. 12. 11. 26 'poesis ab Homero et Vergilio tantum fastigium accepit et eloquentia a Demosthene atque Cicerone' (also 12. 1. 20). Very similar is the stress in 2. 16. 18 on the enormous progress made by eloquence; and indeed rhetorice in our passage must mean 'oratory' or 'eloquence', not the technical discipline (note 'sine arte'), rhetorice in Q. normally denotes the technical discipline. In 2. 15.17 the pulcherrima res is rhetoric the technical discipline (one might think that there 'eloquence' is possible too, but the context is a discussion of
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elements of a definition of rhetoric); contrast 2. 17. 10 'si rhetorice uocari debet sermo quicumque' (Q. disagrees but acknowledges the possibility). For this argument from design, cf. Philod. Rhet. suppl. p. 23. 5-7 = p. 83. 16-21 L.A. (ojaTTcp ISojv dyaXfJca KCLAOV €inais av x^pls A oyov T4\vr)S epyov etvai, rov avrov rponov cpcts IGTOPRJOAS rd TCJV TTOALTLKOJV epya (i.e. nonepideictic speeches). Given that the presence of re^n? manifests itself in order and rational design, we may also compare arguments for the existence of God or divine providence from the arrangement of the KOOHOS (e.g. Cic. ND 2. 12-15 = 54C Long-Sedley). maximum ac pulcherrimum, ut supra diximus, opus: supra refers generally to the praise of Aoyo? in 2. 16. 12-19 or specifically to 2. 15. 17 (see n. on concedit... pulcherrimae rei nomen). But eloquence is called 'rerum pulcherrima' in 1. 12. 16 (cf. also 2. 15. 17 'pulcherrimae rei', where, however, rhetoric seems to be thus referred to, see n. on 3 rhetoricen autem... uenisse above; 12. 1. 32). For 'pulcherrimum opus' cf. 10. 3. 4, 12. 1. 4, 12. 11. 1 and 29. For 'maximum ac pulcherrimum' cf. 12. 2. 27. 17. 4 non . . . sensisse quod dicerent: 'did not mean what they said' (Russell); cf. 5. 12. 20 'ut sentioenim, dicam', and (perhaps not a coincidence) the words of Antonius (de Orat. 2. 40) cited below on 6 sed ut... artisfuit). exercere ingenia: with the depreciatory note (contrast 2. 4. 20) seen e.g. at Decl. min. 316. 7 (with Winterbottom's n.). materiae difficultate: cf. 10. 5. 8 'utilissima est exercitationi [leg. -tis] difficultas'; 11. 2. 42 'difficiliora... debent esse quae exercent quo sit leuius ipsum illud in quod exercent'. Polycraten, cum Busirim56 laudaret et Clytaemestram: referred to again in 3. 1. 11 as the author of a re^r/. A sophist contemporary with Isocrates, he concentrated on trivial as well as paradoxical themes (e.g. Arist. Rhet. B 24, 140 l b 15—16 mentions a speech €IS TOVS p,vs, Alex. nepiaovs)'j on this subgenre of encomiastic oratory see A. S. Pease, 'Things without Honour', CPh 21 (1926), 27-42, esp. 36-8; Laurent Pernod, La rhetorique de I'eloge dans le monde greco-latin (Paris, 1993), ii. 532-46. Polycrates' lack of the proper rhetorical seriousness (at least Demetrius saw the joke: Eloc. 120 enai£ev yap) exposed him to the heavy reproofs of Isocrates (e.g. Or. 11. 48) and later Philodemus (Rhet. i. 216. 18-25 oi prjropiKol ooioTai BovoeiptSas Kai rioXixMixovs Kat TOIOVTOVS . . . iyK(jj[xid£ovT€S . . . woAAou? elvai novrjpovs 7rpoTp€7TovTai). His encomium of Busiris, likewise paradoxical, was answered by Isocrates (Or. 11 which is presented as a letter to P.). From this rejoinder and its useful VTTodeots something can be learnt of the substance of P.'s jeu 56
O n the form o f t h e accusative, w h i c h is far f r o m c e r t a i n , see W i n t e r b o t t o m 6 4 9 .
310
Commentary
d'esprit. The encomium of Clytemnestra, however, does not seem to be alluded to elsewhere (not, as Spalding thought, in Demetrius Eloc. 120, where, whatever the reading, it is P.'s trivial themes—fiiKpa /xeyaAou?—that are in question), except probably by Philod. Rhet. i. 217 -npoKplvovTes ev rats ovp.fiArio€oiv nrjveAoTrrjs KAvraipLrjOTpav. . . a^avi^ovoi rag aperas raiv dyadcjv (see Radermacher, Art. Scr. 130, 230). Cf. Zoilus' encomium of Polyphemus (Radermacher, Art. Scr. 200). On Polycrates generally see N. Livingstone, A Commentary on Isocrates' Busiris (Leiden, 2001), 28-40, and Eucken 172-207. The texts connected with Polycrates can be conveniently studied in Radermacher, Art. Scr. 128-32. cum Busirim laudaret: Spalding excellently points out the joke at Verg. G. 3. 5 'inlaudati... Busiridis' (missed by Mynors, Thomas). quamquam... dicitur: cf. the viroOeois to Isocrates' Or. 11 auTo? yap eoriv o napaaxdiv TOV Aoyov rijs Karrjyopias ZJouKpaTovs rot? irepl HVVTOV Kal MeA-qrov iva KarrjyoprjOels a-noOavtThe implication of this, and of the mood of Q.'s est habita, is that Polycrates' speech was written for Anytos and spoken by him in court. According to D.L. 2. 39 Favorinus (fr. 3 Mensching) argued that the preserved speech was inauthentic on the grounds that it included a reference to the restoration of the Long Walls. Certainly, as that project was not undertaken before 393 BC, the speech, in this form, cannot have been delivered at the trial in 399 (though it could have been revised later for publication). The possibility remains that it was meant to be taken as a serious contribution to the political debate, rather than as a sophist's exercise in paradox; Weifienberger, NP s.n. Polykrates no. 3, col. 70 leaves the matter open. The rest of Polycrates' known output may support paradox (so also Livingstone, cited above, p. 36); but it is worth mention that D.H. Is. 20 alludes to 'real' speeches by Polycrates. To turn to Q.'s own position: his general point is to contrast (quamquam) Polycrates' paradoxical encomia with the alleged fact that he wrote the (serious) speech against Socrates that was delivered in court. In the clause 'quod his dissimile non esset (est A)', Q. comments that to speak against Socrates was as paradoxical as to defend Busiris. It is then not crucial to decide on the textual point. But esset can be defended as a parenthetic subjunctive (see on 2. 16. 1 sit), here in secondary sequence, or as meaning 'would, if the story is true, be'; it is not likely (pace the Loeb n.) that the subjunctive is meant to imply that the comment is part of the story reported by Q. est, on the other hand, may well be a trivialization. 17. 5. On §§5-13 see also the introduction to the present chapter. quidam...non diffitentur: these critics rely mainly on uois backed by ip,7T€ipia, and they reject re^r^ altogether in the sense that on their view the
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accumulated insights gained by observation do not add up to an ordered body of knowledge from which it is possible to generate accounts of rhetoric's successes and failures. For a similar school in the field of medicine see n. on 9 ut quibusdam placet... experimentis below. dicit Antonius obseruationem quandam esse, non artem: Q. (as also in 6) glosses over the complexities of the dialogue (see L-P i. 193, who point out that Antonius should not come in this group). At de Orat. 2. 232 (where see L-P) Crassus says: 'quasi uero...horum ipsorum [sc. matters of wit], de quibus Antonius iam diu loquitur, ars ulla sit. obseruatio quaedam est, ut ipse dixit, earum rerum quae in dicendo ualent.' This refers back to Antonius's far more nuanced remarks in 2. 32, culminating in the words 'ergo id qui in toto genere fecerit [sc. "noted" what makes some speakers better than others], is si non plane artem, at quasi artem quandam inuenerit'; while at 1. 146 Crassus has remarked on such 'noting' (he uses the word obseruare, as he had at 1. 109), and concluded 'sic esse non eloquentiam ex artificio sed artificium ex eloquentia natum'. Thus both Antonius and Crassus agree on the role of obseruatio in the formulation of rhetorical precept.57 But then so did Cicero himself (Or. 183: 'notatio naturae et animaduersio peperit artem'), and everyone who assumed the existence of r ^ r a t : rhetoric was considered descriptive as much as prescriptive. For Q., see. 3. 2, esp. 2-3 'Initium ergo dicendi dedit natura, initium artis obseruatio. Homines enim sicut in medicina, aim uiderent alia salubria, alia insalubria [see below 9], ex obseruatione eorum effecerunt artem, ita cum in dicendo alia utilia, alia inutilia deprenderent, notarunt ea ad imitandum uitandunique' (with Adamietz ad loc.). In the Greek rhetorical tradition, rraparripTfois is the word used in contexts where rhetoric is classed as a 'mere matter of observation' (see Proleg. p. 70. 27, where €[J.7T€IPIA is dXoyos RPIFIR) £K 7TAPAT7}pr)A€a>s ytvofievrj); when the empirical foundation of the KaraXruf/eis which make up a rexy*! is concerned, the term does not normally appear. Cf. Ar. Met. 1.981a5—7 (where pit a . . . viToX-qifiis is the uniform body of knowledge ipLTreipia has generated from the (fxitvopteva) ytyverat 82 rexvi] orav €K noXXaiv rrjs ipLneipias IVI'ORJFIATOJV pita KOLOOXOV yevrjrat ircpi TOJV OPIOIOJV VTROXIQIJJIS; similarly All. Post. B19.100a5; Rhet. AA, 1359 b 30-2. 17. 6 non ideo ut pro uero accipiamus: for the phrasing cf. 9. 2. 33 'pro uanis accipiantur, quia uera non sunt'. Q. seems to mean that we should not 57
Similarly Q. suppresses the feet that in the de Oratore
Crassus n o less t h a n A n t o n i u s thinks
that r h e t o r i c c a n n o t strictly speaking be c o u n t e d an arsi n o t e 1. 108 ( C r a s s u s ) 'si ars ita definitur, ut paulo a n t e [1. 9 2 | e x p o s u i t A n t o n i u s , ex rebus penitus perspectis p l a n e q u e c o g n i t i s . . . n o n m i h i u i d e t u r ars o r a t o r i s esse ulla'. T h e precepts o b t a i n e d b y obseruatio m i g h t b e t h o u g h t m e r e l y a n artis similtudo
are a n o t h e r matter, a n d
( 1 0 9 ) . A n t o n i u s agrees ( 1 1 0 ) : t h o u g h a r t in this sense
is n o t t o b e o v e r e m p h a s i z e d , it is n o t t o b e dismissed.
312
Commentary
take this as being true in the sense of being Cicero's own real view; similarly at 2. 15. 5 (see n.on apud PI a ton em... suam): he has denied that views given to Gorgias in the dialogue of that name were shared by Plato. Cf. Cic. Fam. 7. 32. 2 'pugna, si me amas,... nisi... cetera quae sunt a me in secundo libra de oratore per Antoni [sic] personam disputata de ridiculis €VT€\va et arguta apparebunt, ut sacramento contendas mea non esse'. sed ut...artis fuit: Q. maintains that Antonius is given this view in accordance with his character as one who pretended not to know the rules of rhetoric. Again (see above on 5 dicit Antonius... artem) he ignores complications in the dialogue. Quite apart from the fact that Antonius and Crassus do not much differ on this point (see again the note just referred to), Antonius is made to give up his 'pretence' at 2. 40 ('nunc... uideor debere non tam pugnare tecum quam quid ipse sentiam dicere': cf. Q.'s words in 4 above). For an excellent brief statement of Cicero's treatment of Antonius and Crassus, see May-Wisse 16. dissimulator: see n. on the same word at 2. 2. 5. Here the sense is that Antonius pretended not to have art that he in fact possessed (cf. Ov. Ars 3. 210 'ars faciem dissimulata iuuat'). Q. regards this as a fact (fuit); but what he based his conviction on is not certain. 12. 9. 5 'ueteribus quidem etiam dissimulare eloquentiam fuit moris [cf. 4. 1. 9], idque M. Antonius praecipit, quo plus dicentibus fidei minusque suspectae aduocatorum insidiae forent' suggests that he drew on Antonius' libellus on rhetoric (fragments collected in ORF, 236-7; add Q. 3. 1.19); and he is able to quote from the book at 3.6. 44. Austin ad loc. refers 12.9. 5 to the report of Antonius' views in de Orat. 2. 4, a related but not identical sentiment. hanc .. .uidetur: Spalding objected to this sentence on two main grounds, (i) Because of its suddenness and its introduction by autem rather than etiam. It is, however, no more sudden than most notes inserted into an ancient text because footnotes were not available; and Q. has an axe to grind with Lysias (see below). The point of autem is surely that, while Cicero did not himself assert that rhetoric was an obseruatio, not an ars, Lysias did hold this view sua persona, uidetur seems not to cast doubt on the fact, but to hint at Q.'s surprise that so heretical a view was held by so canonical an orator, (ii) Because there is no other indication in extant literature that Lysias disbelieved at any time in the technicity of rhetoric—this would be the best argument against the deletion of the words as a gloss, as proposed by F. Schneidewin, Philologus, 10 (1855), 355—except perhaps Cic. Brut. 48: 'sed potest aliter accipi iste locus'. In fact, however, unless we accept a series of unlikely emendations, Cicero does say there plainly enough that just as Isocrates began by denying there was an ars dicendi and acted as a logographos, but later went completely over to the composition of artes (it is immaterial here what exactly this
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implies), so (conversely) Lysias at first asserted that there was an ars dicendi, but later became a logographos and 'artem remouisse', 'dispensed with art'. As Cicero got this information from (the school of) Aristotle (see further A. E. Douglas, Latomus, 14 [1955], 536-9), we cannot lightly ignore it. (That Aristotle should have presented Lysias in this way—accepting the technicity of rhetoric and then backtracking on it—is certainly consistent with the picture which emerges from the representation of the history of rhetoric down to the middle of the fourth century BC in the Rhetorica: that the way towards this culminating point was by no means a gradus ad Parnassum, but rather a case of 'two steps forward, one step back'. See J. Brunschwig, 'Rhetorique et dialectique', in Furley-Nehamas 91-4.) Our text shows us Q. agreeing, though reluctantly, with Cicero; it is not to be altered. It is possible that we have a further reference to the topic in Philod. Rhet. ii. 122 Kai Xiyovoi TOV !'IooKpdrrjv amOdvojs
KCLI TOV Fopytav 8i
KOLI TOV Avoiav
A e y e r a i KOLI DSWATCUS,
inei&i)
opoXoyeiv T€\viTai
OVK €%€iv
iniOTr)p,"qv.
r e inrjyyeXXovTo
etvat
KCLI
nXdrcovi Fopyias. Whether or not Lysias at any stage held a naturalist view of rhetoric,58 he may well have been admired by the naturalists, of whom Q. says at 12.10.40 'quidam nullam esse naturalem putant eloquentiam nisi quae sit cotidiano sermoni simillima,.. .contento promere animi uoluntatem nihilque arcessiti et elaborati requirente'. This strongly recalls what Q. says of Lysias in 10. 1. 78 (where he is clearly putting the best face possible on an orator he on the whole dislikes): 'Lysias... subtilis atque elegans et quo nihil, si oratori satis sit docere, quaeras perfectius; nihil enim est inane, nihil arcessitum.' defensio: cf. n. on 2. 11. 7 barbari et serui. Also Proleg. p. 268. 20-2 d€cupovp.€v yap dvSpanoSa fidpfiapa ndvros ap,otpa Xoyov inaivovvras dXXr/Xovs Kai if/eyovras Kai anoXoyovpivovs Kai KarrjyopovvTas. Against this the author of the Proleg. argues that rhetoric is not a natural characteristic of man generally. Slaves may seem to be employing it, but that is not real rhetoric (cf. also Grillius, Comm. in Cic. Rhet. p. 2 Jakobi). Rhetoric is seen as the prerogative of the citizen, and is thus not granted to individuals who are non-members of that class for one reason or another (note 'Longinus' 44. 4, with Russell's n.). How to explain the prowess of untrained, humble speakers then? Ti ovv prjropiKr) iv rep Koivtp (common speech) vXrjs rd£iv ini)(€i: speech is the material on which art works (Proleg. p. 269. 3). This will basically be Q.'s answer too; for the refutation of 9-10 is applicable to this defensio as 8t8d^€iv
M
dXXovs,
KaOdncp
KCII napa
W e c a n u n d e r s t a n d h o w this view m i g h t be
formed
o n the basis o f his
speeches;
m o d e r n s t o o are t e m p t e d t o talk a b o u t , e.g., 'die nahezu perfekt kaschierte Suggestivitiit seiner s c h e i n b a r s o aufrichtig-kunstlosen narrationes'
( M . Weifienberger, N P s . n . Lysias n o . 1, 6 0 0 ) .
314
Commentary
well as to the cauillationes of 7.59 Note too 11 quo illud quoque excluditur', referring to the succeeding argument, which is basically the same as that here, although a new set of proofs is adduced and refuted in 12-13). Q. finds it easy to argue in this way since he lays more stress than others on rhetoric being in accordance with nature (see 2. 16. 11-17, and n. below on 9 omnia duxisse); contrast Proleg. pp. 3. 9-4. 19, where arguments against the existence of rhetoric on the grounds that rjv rj prjropiKr) ore OVK fjv (essentially the same notion, but with reference to historical facts rather than untrained speakers) are countered with the Aristotelian distinction between Svvapus and ivepyeia. aliquid dicant... deprecentur: Q. alludes briefly to the standard parts of a speech (cf. n. on 2. 5. 7 inuentione). A point he could have made is that these can simply be seen as a descriptive framework; see n. on 5 dicit Antonius obseruationem quandam esse, non artem. Hence they, or something like them (note simile, uim), can be seen in the productions of the unsophisticated. Cf. the way in which Homer is analysed in terms of the parts of a speech in 10. 1. 48-50 (see below on 8 et oratores plu res... actores). et, quod uim habeat epilogi, deprecentur: for the phrasing cf. 4. 2. 26 'hae quoque quaestiones uim prohoemii optinebant'. deprecatio is a plea for mercy 'cum fatebimur nos peccasse... et tamen ignosci nobis postulabimus' (Rhet. Her. 2. 25). It was naturally closely associated (cf. 9. 1. 25), with appeal for pity, a main head of the epilogue. The mood of habeat may be due to its being part of the sententiae defensio reported by Q.; alternatively, it may be a parenthetic subjunctive like those discussed at 2. 16. 1 sit. 17. 7 cauillationes: cauillationes (for the plural see n. on 10 si rhetorice... 11 fateantur below) corresponds to ao^iapara; the subjective genitive uerborum does not mean more that this is 'mere verbal trickery' (cf. Proleg. 3. 6-7, preceding the argument against the existence of rhetoric cited above on 6 defensio: 4>tpe TOVS £K€IVOJV Aoyovs irpoOevres rd iv avrois acxfyiapara SicXe'yZojpev); however, we can compare Aristotle, who divides sophistical refutations on the most general level into those napd ri)v Aif-w and those efjaj rrjs Xe&ojs (SE 4, 165 b 23-4); cf. 2. 14. 5 n. on cauillationis. The argument that follows is another aspect of the naturalist view. Rhetoric is something that is inborn in men; they have always attacked others and defended themselves in speech. But rhetorical doctrine came later, at the time of Co rax and Tisias; oratio then came before ars, and cannot be the result of it. Philod. (Rhet. suppl. p. 6 . 7 - 1 1 ; p. 15. 2 - 1 0 L . A . ) dismisses the a r g u m e n t in this way: eyaj fiff yap ot^iai Siori tea v Aoyox irore ireifteii' avv\tup-q&Q rwas ISiatras, aAA' ov\, ort ye fieXreiov ratv TEYX'ENTUV, earai 8e8ei\OJI, ovSe KARA TO iSioi' rov Aeyetv ovSe ITVKVOI' ovrws 59
tVetVoi ('I think that, even if it is c o n c e d e d that s o m e non-specialists s o m e t i m e s p e r s u a d e by s p e e c h , he will n o t h a w s h o w n that t h e y do it better t h a n t h e trained, o r in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r o f speaking, o r frequently, as the)' d o ' ) .
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Q. says he could answer this by saying that rhetorical teaching in fact is preCorax and Tisias; that it already appears in Homer; and so, by implication, that one could argue that not only have people always defended and attacked in speech, but rhetoric has existed and been taught since time immemorial. But he rejects this line because he has a better refutation, applicable to any version of the argument (i.e. wherever it fixed the beginning of rhetoric): that there was (and is) a natural rhetoric that is 'completed' by art (cf. 3. 2. 1: Proleg. p. 171. 19—20: TOV Acyeiv rj vois atria, TOV 8e a5 Ae'yeiv rj pijTopiKrj). This is precisely the argument of Proleg. pp. 268-9 (see on 6 defensio)y and Kennedy 25 is wrong to contrast that with Q. Any differences between the two accounts are due to the fact that the Prolegomena have a historical interest and want to establish when the teaching of rhetoric began, while Q. argues from the standpoint of a defender of rhetoric against the claim that it is not an art. nihil quod ex arte fiat ante artem fuisse: cf. 10 below and Proleg. p. 3. 9-13 ^JV . . . RJ PTJTOPIKRJ ore OVK fjv €i 8i OVK tfv, ov8i yeyovev, €K>
TCJV pr) OVTOJV ooa ye Kara
dvOpionovs
atqui... semper: cf. Proleg. p. 14. 9-10:
inei
ov8iv
KTOJV OVTOJV
yiverai. jjv rj prjTopiK-q ay oi5 avdpajnoi
For the argument cf. Philod. Rhet. i. 27 = p. 57. 6 - 1 0 L.A.: irpo TOV KaTafiXrjBrjvai ra? rexyas (i.e. before rhetorical handbooks were composed) fic'Xreiov eprjTopcvov. ifi ots 8e ovveorrjoav x^ipov (an even more exaggerated view). Philodemus, like Q. in 9, replied (i. 28) that rouro* pev yap m> rpomp Kai rrjv rroirjTiKrjv KOI rrjv larpiKrjv Kai 77oAAas aAAas OVK etvai T€\vas Xeycopicv (1. 28 = p. 57. 30-4 L.A.; see also Sudhaus's suppl. pp. 15-16; cf. Proleg. p. 3. 20-1). Cf. also ii. 110: aAA' on npo
yeyovaaiv
€a\aTov
8e Kara pixpov
avveredrj
T(x)V OOif>lOTlK<xiV T€XVoXoyi(x)V fjoav Xoyiopor etvai
dOerei
yap
els T€\vr)v.
TToXlTlKol prjTOp€S,
OU^i rOUTO 7TpOS TOV
o«5ro? o Aoyo? ovre TO rrjv noXiTiKrjv prjTopiKrjv rexvrjv
. ..
sero iam: B omits iam. sero means 'late in the day' (not, pace Spalding, 'too late'); cf. 6. 3. 103, where the word is again explained in an added clause. Spalding did not recall the locution sero iam, but PHI registers it at Cic. Orat. 155 (and perhaps Cluent. 31), Liv. 23. 44. 1, Decl. mai. 9. 7 (with a past tense; cf. Petr. 7. 4 'iam sero.. .intellexi'). For the lateness of rhetoric among the arts, see Cic. Brut 26, Q. 12 pr. 3. circa: see n. on 2. 4. 41 circa Demetrium Phalarea. Tisian et Coraca: cf. 3. 1. 8 'artium... scriptores antiquissimi Corax et Tisias Siculi'. The texts on these shadowy fifth-century figures are collected by Radermacher, Art. Scr. 28-35, and more recently discussed by T. Cole, 'Who was Corax?', ICS 16 (1991), 65-84 (with an extensive bibliography), under whose scrutiny virtually the whole biographical tradition about the pair crumbles, including the view that these are two individuals (rather than a Tisias nicknamed 'the crow'). But since the ancient sources, including Q. and
316
Commentary
Cicero, take the accounts that were current to be historically accurate, Cole's in themselves convincing arguments have no bearing on the interpretation of Q. The argument that rhetoric came into being with the (two) Sicilian(s) is paralleled e.g. in Proleg. pp. 24. 5-27. 10. 17. 8 nos... actores: for the argument, see the summary, above, p. 301. nos porro: cf. n.on 2. 3. 5 porro. laboramus: A has laboramus exquirere, with equally good rhythm. The infinitive is unexceptionable (TLL s.v. laboro 801. 82-802. 17; note Catul. 67. 17 'nemo quaerit nec scire laborat'). But the indirect question is highly idiomatic (esp. with a negative; see TLL 803. 33-44). praeceptorem Phoenicem cum agendi turn etiam loquendi: see on 2. 3.12 Phoenieis Homerici. The passage {II. 9. 443) is often employed in the Proleg. (e.g. p. 23), but usually to show that Homer knew of the word p-qrajp. The combination of instruction in morals and oratory is in itself attractive to Q. (and Cicero; see 12. 2. 6). et oratores plures... actores: granted that what Q. is trying to show is that (one might argue that) there was 'huius rei doctrina' as early as Homer (to which Phoenix is relevant), it is unclear why he continues like this. If we reject the assumption that he is merely begging the question, then his point must be that (a) the many oratores in Homer,60 (b) his awareness of different kinds of oratorical style, and his mention (c) of competitions in oratory and (d) of lawsuits are inconceivable in a context where speaking was not taught. None of the considerations Q. adduces is cogent. As to (b), it would be easy to riposte that it was obseruatio of such differences between orators that led later to the theory of the three styles (see n. on 6 aliquid dicant... deprecentur); (c) might have appeared faintly plausible to contemporaries given the modern practice of competition in declamation; (d) might be thought to derive some force in the present context from the reference to Corax and Tisias, for their pioneering teaching of rhetoric was said to have been motivated by the lawsuits following the fall of the Sicilian tyrants (so the Aristotelian account reported in Cic. Brut. 46). Q. is not doing much more than alluding to passages which were or might be used in arguing for indications of rhetoric in Homer; note 3. 1. 8, where, before mention of Corax and Tisias, he writes: 'primus post eos quos poetae tradiderunt mouisse aliqua circa rhetoricen Empedodes dicitur'. Similarly in 10. 1. 46-50, after saying of Homer that he 'omnibus eloquentiae partibus exemplum et ortum dedit', he shows how the poet can be discussed under rhetorical heads61 without asserting that he was 60 Radermacher, Art. Scr. 3 - 6 collects more o r less serious ancient references to 'heroum rhetorice'. 61
Cf. the procedure o f the ps-Plutarchean De uita et poesi Horneri (Radermacher 10).
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conscious of them (note 48 'legem prohoemiorum non dico seruauit sed constituit'). omne.. .genus: cf. Iliad3. 221-3 (Odysseus); 1. 247-9 (Nestor); 3. 213-15 (Menelaus). The three heroes were seen as exponents of the three styles, grand, middle and plain; cf. 12.10. 64, Gel. 6. 14. 7 'sed ea ipsa genera dicendi iam antiquitus tradita ab Homero sunt tria in tribus: magnificum in Vlixe et ubertum, subtile in Menelao et cohibitum, mixtum moderatumque in Nestore'. For discussion and further references see Kennedy 26-9, and Radermacher, Art. Scr. 6-8. An objection to the argument seems to appear in Philod. Rhet. ii. 71, where oratory among the heroes is closely linked with the ability of the modern uneducated man to speak (cf. illud quoque in 11). certamina... act ores: cf. Iliad 15. 283-4 dyoprj 8E £ navpoi Axaiojv \ VIKOJV, OTTTTOT€ Kovpoi eptaaeiav nepi p,V9AJV; 18. 497-508 (shield of Achilles). 17. 9 enim: explaining non laboramus (8). omnia quae ars consummauerit a natura initia duxisse: for the phrasing, cf. 3. 5. 1 'facultas orandi consummatur natura arte exercitatione', Cic. Inv. 2. 65 'initium.. .eius [sc. iuris] ab natura ductum uidetur'. For the concept, cf. 2. 19 Introduction; see also n. on 2. 15. 29 consummari. aut: 'otherwise'; OLD s.v. 7, citing e.g. 1. 12. 5-6. medicina... reperta est: cf. 3. 2. 3 (cited on 5 dicit Antonius obseruationem quandam esse, non artem). Cf. Celsus pr. 32-5 (contentions of the empiricists), esp. 35 'Haec similiaque cum cotidie inciderent, diligentes homines notasse quae plerumque melius responderent; deinde aegrotantibus ea praecipere coepisse. Sic medicinam ortam, subinde aliorum salute, aliorum interim perniciosa discernentem a salutaribus.' ut quibusdam placet, tota constat experimentis: parallel to the dispute in rhetoric, there was a division between empirical and rational doctors. The former thought that unassisted experience could give rise to medical expertise and did not believe, as the rationalists did, that doctors could gain any knowledge of the underlying causes of disease. On the views of the empirical school, see R. Walzer, Galen on Medical Experience (Oxford, 1944); K. Deichgraber, Die griechische Empirikerschule (Berlin and Zurich, 2 1965); V. Nutton, 'Empiriker', NP iii (1997), 1016-18; Allen 103-6. Q.'s language is again reminiscent of the proem of Celsus, De medicina; note esp. 10 (copied by Valla into the margin of his MS of Q.): 'post quos [i.e. those who "rerum quoque naturae sibi cognitionem uindicarunt"] Serapion, primus omnium nihil hanc rationalem disciplinam pertinere ad medicinam professus, in usu tantum et experimentis earn posuit'. It is entirely possible that Celsus used the analog)' of medicine and rhetoric in his own De rhetorica, and influenced this passage of Q.
318
Commentary
uulnus deligauit: as in 2. 21. 17 used as an obvious example of a simple medical procedure (cf. also 4. 2. 84; Cels. 5. 26. 24A). febrem quiete et abstinentia... mitigauit: Cels. pr. 33-5 (see above on medicina... reperta est) uses the example of the discovery and 'noting' of the benefits of regulation of food in illness. In 3.4. 2-18 he gives advice on the amount of food to be taken at various stages of a fever (note 4 'abstinendus a cibo primis diebus est'). He links quies and abstinentia at e.g. 3. 2. 5, 4. 12. 4. For mitigauit cf. Plin. Ep. 1. 12. 9 'increuerat ualetudo, quam temperantia mitigare temptauit'; the verb is common in medical texts (TLL s.v. mitigo 1151. 19-51). non quia rationem uidebat: he did not see the underlying cause, as a rationalist doctor would have claimed to do (see above on ut quibusdam placet, tota constat experimentis); cf. Cels. pr. 36, where ratio and experientia are contrasted (note also 65 'exterae gentes, cum subtilem medicinae rationem non nouerint, communia tantum uident'). Q. uses the indicative for a rejected reason (uidebat), as he does in 2. 4. 31. In both cases the explanation given in K-S ii. 385-7 (that indicative is used when the causal relevance of an undisputed fact is denied, cf. e.g. Cic. Leg. 2. 31 'neque uero hoc, quia sum ipse augur, ita sentio, sed quia sic existimare nos est necesse') does not fit. 17. 10 casas: used in 9.4.4 of early buildings (as opposed to domus; cf. Vitr. 2. 1. 7); so also Lucr. 5. 1011. Vitr. 2. 1 describes the developments leading to the art of building using 'empirical' language: note esp. 2 'obseruantes aliena tecta', 7 'obseruationibus studiorum e uagantibus iudiciis et incertis ad certas symmetriariun perduxerunt rationes'; cf. also Sen. Ep. 90. 9-10. primi illi: cf. 8. 3. 36 'illi rudes homines primique'. cantatur ac saltatur: for the former impersonal use cf. Plin. Ep. 7. 4. 9, Apul. Met. 5. 15; the latter seems to be unparalleled in CL. aliquo modo: though without art. ita: = itaque, marking the conclusion of the argument (OLD s.v. 5b, with meagre illustration). si rhetorice... 11 fateantur: Q. resolves in his own favour two related questions: (a) that concerning 'indocti et barbari et serui' (6) and (/J) that concerning formal speech before Corax and Tisias (cf. the plural cauillationes in §7). The basis of the answer to both is contained in 9-10: rhetoric, like other arts, is rooted in things that men have always been able to do naturally. But that (Q. now makes clear) does not mean that any utterance (see n. on 2. 5. 11 sermo; and for loquitur and loquebantur below, cf. n. on 2. 3. 6 loqui) can be called rhetorice or that any speaker is an orator. In effect, he is defining the problem out of existence: rhetorice and orator, as he uses the words, cannot
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cover speeches by speakers who have, by reason of their circumstances or period, not been formally trained. And, it transpires, the same considerations can be used to refute another (illud quoque) related objection to the technicity of rhetoric (lib). The whole passage §§5-13 is a continuous argument, and is best printed as a single paragraph. confitebor: cf. 19 'confitebor.. .concedam...'; Kuhner on Cic. Tusc. 1. 35 arbitrabimur. 'saepe enim apud Ciceronem futurum... vices sustinet praesentis, ubi Graeci optativo c. av uti solent.' 17. 11 non quisquis loquitur orator est: looking esp. to point (a) (see previous n.on 10 si rhetorice. ..11 fateantur), while the next clause looks to point (j9). Similarly oratorem factum arte' looks primarily to (a), while 'nec ante artem fuisse' looks to (/J). From the clause under discussion alone one might conclude that loqui means 'to speak in a recognizably untrained way, to chat' here, but 'et turn... loquebantur' shows that it is used indiscriminately of speaking (the orators too engage in loqui). illud quoque: for this new argument, that the untrained too can make speeches, cf. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 16 eincp re ivSexerai yeveoOai pr/Topa per) pL€Taa\6vTa ye iKavo)S ArjpidSov pt/jriop, avTtos
rfjs pr)TopiKr}s Kai Kara
TC)(vr)s, OVK av €ir} TIS T€\vr) pr}roptKrj.
rponov
7rap€iAr)api€v
pirj
KOJ7rr}AaTr)s yap
Philod. Rhet. ii. 97 Ataxivrfs
p-qropeveiv oa(os yap
/xcraa^ovra
tov opioAoyeiTai
Aeyet ort
( c f . ii. 1 2 5 vots . . . KaTevorjOr)
ivSex^rai
pr)TopiKrjsy
ArjpidSrjs
TO rrjs rex^rjs
apioros
cos
yeyovevat
OVK epiadev. epyov
8e
Kai 7T€pl
cos 8'
dnoreXeiv,
€7T€i ovyKcxioprjTai rivag a8i8d.KTios A e y e i v ) . If we trust Sudhaus' restorations here, Critolaus employed the argument (ii. 98 Kpir6\a[os OVK a7rap]re[i]rai; the name seems certain enough, but this part of Rhet. has not yet been re-edited; see also §15 below). This, as argued in the introduction (p. 304), does not mean that he invented it (nor is this suggested by the verb which Sudhaus has supplied); Hubbell 371-2, thought that a similar argument could equally well prove from Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 20 that Clitomachus and Charmadas were responsible (simply because they are mentioned as 'arguing in this way'), but this can be rejected on independent grounds: they are given in a forward reference there (the argument presently under consideration appears in §18; that at least Charmadas did, however, attack on these lines is clear from Cic. de Orat. 1. 91). 62 As the argument further on shows, Philodemus rejected this view on the basis of the definition of art, which insisted on certainty of results (ii. 98, cf. ii. 71 t o 8y eiKofioAeiv OVK opOofioAet TTXY)V ei ITOV aiTavlios). The definition of
62
See the introduction to this chapter for a general discussion o f the underlying source(s).
320
Commentary
art presupposed in Philod., Sextus, and Q. is largely the same.63 So the question arises why Q. does not use the same refutation as Philod emus.6'1 A possible answer might be this: Q. is (and has been since 2. 15) relying on two related notions of technical rhetoric, a simpler one (rhetoric as the result of training and grounded in rules and precepts) and a more complex one (rhetoric in the described sense, but inextricably linked to moral virtue), and he is switching between them as it suits his argument. When he cited evidence for 'rhetoric' from Homer in §8, he was surely not hoping to uncover his orator perfectus there; likewise, when considering people like Demades and Aeschines in 12, he would not want them to be instances of his perfect orator (Demades had a bad reputation; see Thalheim in RE iv [1901], 2703-4; for Aeschines see below on 12 'Aeschinen hypocriten'). Rather, they are orators in the less loaded sense, and to say that they 'always achieve their goal' (which would have to be bene dicere then) cannot be in Q.'s interest. exduditur: 'is refuted' (cf. Eng. 'is ruled out of court'). Cf. Cic. Tuli 31 'opprimitur et excluditur omnis tua defensio', Grillius, Comm. in Cic. Rhet. p. 32.67-8 Jakobi 'ecce excludit ilium [sc. Tullius Platonem] dicendo (also p. 32. 69-70), and some of the examples cited by TLL s.v. excludo 1270. 7-50. dicere... didicerint: 'there are men who can make speeches without having learned' (Loeb). The meaning is ensured by the context, but the expression is strange. It would seem that Q. makes the paranomasia dicere/didicerint (cf. 2. 21. 15, with n.) substitute for the correspondence of prjropcveiv and pr)TopiK7} (see Sextus cited above). The presence of homines (contrast plain qui non d id ice rit above) is unaccountable. 17. 12 Demaden remigem: this example is used in the same context certainly by Sextus and presumably by Philodemus (see n.on 11 ill mi quoque); cf. De Falco 13-14. Demades (less specifically a vavrrjs in Proleg. p. 66. 14; so too Suda s.n.) gave rise to the proverb ano Kw-nqg im firjpa (Paroem. Graec. ii, p. 303; Syrianus in Hermogenem ii. 3 Rabe). For Demades' self-made success see below on continua dicendi exercitatio. Aeschinen hypocriten: Philodemus linked Aeschines with Demades (see n. on 11 iUud quoque); Sextus simply says there were 'very many others' like Demades. For Aeschines as an actor, see Dem. 18, e.g. §313: /xyrj/xow/ooraro?, 6 3 O n both Sudhaus' and Longo Auricchio's reconstruction o f the papyrus (i. 7 0 S. = p. 123. 1 4 - 1 5 L.A.), Philodemus did not make his definition cover both stochastic and other arts, but excluded the former; Barnes 7 restores the text so as to cover both. 44 Philodemus loc. cit. refers to Aeschines and Demades as Q. does, so the divergence between him and Q. is to be seen against the background o f an otherwise close similarity.
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(with the excellent commentary of Wankel ad loc.), and the vitae of Aeschines. Like Demades, he was regarded as a self-made orator (for his lack of education see [Plut.] Vit. XOr. 840 F); cf. the story in the vitae (Martin i, p. 4) that when asked to teach rhetoric in Rhodes he refused, etnovra p,r)8y avrov etSevat. For his 'natural' eloquence see Caecilius fr. 126a Ofenloch [his ISea TOV Xoyov] eortv... a r e ^ o j pcev Kat 7Tpo7T€rr)s vTTOKpirrjs aptoros,
Kai €vx€pu)S
em
rpaytKos
TO XotSopetv
e^ayopevr],
€\ovaa
vo€ojs Kat
pLeXcrrjs.
GeoKptvrjs
[ c f . Q . 2 . 12. 4 ] atoxpais
he r t eixftves
Kat evayojyov,
Kat d.7Tp€7T<x)S prjropt
Kat olov
av yevotro
TLVI €K
hypocriten: Q. uses the Greek word instead of histrio (see e.g. 10. 5. 6) also at 11. 3. 7 (only otherwise in CL at Suet. Nero 24. 1). falso: nam: cf. Cic. Off. 3. 74, Nep. Ale. 9. 2. neque orator esse... potest: no one can be called orator who has not 'learnt'. Q. has moved from the position taken in §11 that an orator must have been made by ars-, the slippery nature of Q.'s use of the verb discere in this passage is apparent from the nn. below on quamquam... genus est and 13 sed... sciamus. But he is arguing in his opponents' terms. hos... dixerit: Q., not disputing that Demades and Aeschines were orators, asserts accordingly that 'one may say' (for quis dixerit cf. 3. 3. 13; K-S i. 634) that they both did 'learn' in the end. Cf. Val. Max. 8. 7 ext. 8 'Socraten... constat aetate prouectum fidibus tractandis operam dare coepisse, satius iudicantem eius artis usum sero quam numquam percipere' ('better late than never'). quamquam.. .genus est: Q. now proceeds to qualify the assumption that they had not learnt earlier, dealing chiastically with Aeschines first because he has more to say about Demades. In Aeschines' case the learning at least extended to that picked up in the school of a grammaticus; as for Demades, he may have 'learnt' (the kind of training is not specified), and (even if he did not) he could have learnt enough by practice, the best form of learning. quas pater eius etiam docebat: 'which his father actually taught'; cf. Dem. 18. 258, 19. 281. At (Plut.) Vit X Or. 840 u Aeschines is said himself to have taught ypaptptara with his father (cf. Philod. Rhet. ii. 172 optotajs Aioxtvrjs ecus fjv {moKpiT-qs Kat ypaptptartKos €7revr}Tevev). ab initio: 'from early on in his life'; contrast 2. 20. 6 'ab initio formatos', where the process is traced back to (as we should say) our genes. Demaden neque... certum sit: for these doubts see De Falco 91-2. Q. concedes their validity in 13 ('si didicisset'). continua dicendi exercitatio: cf. 1 pr. 27. Cf. fr. lix De Falco=Stobaeus, Eel. iii. 655 W—H: Ar)p,d8r]s epojT-qdcis TIS avrov StbdoKaXos yeyovojs etrj "TO TUJV YA9R)vata)v" €i] "firjpa". His fr. lxx = [Max. Conf.] Loci communes 1 7 (Migne PG 9 1 . 8 2 8 a ) , which makes Demades say that three things are needed
Commentary
322
in education, vois peXcrt) xpwos ( r e x b e i n g notably omitted), is only doubtfully attributable to the orator. tantum quantuscumque fuit: this is not meant slightingly; in the absence of any written production (cf. also Cic. Brut 36 'is cuius nulla exstant scripta Demades'), Q. is in genuine doubt about Demades' quality (cf. Q.'s remark about himself at 6. 2. 36 'ipse, quantuscumque sum aut fui': one cannot judge one's own abilities); hence his omission from the 'canon' in 10. 1. But at 12. 10. 49 (cited below on 13 sed... sciamus) Q. links Demades with Pericles as in agendo clarissimi); and note 13 'et praestantiorem'. nam id potentissimum discendi genus est: cf. 11. 2. 36: 'excepta, quae potentissima est, exercitatione'. Q. here makes (or comes close to making) the perilous concession that an orator might do without ars so long as he had had enough practice, combined no doubt with some natural talent (see above on Aeschinen hypocriten and tantus quantuscumque fuit); yet in his discussion of the relative importance of ars and natura in 2. 19 he will not mention exercitatio at all. 17. 13 sed .. .sciamus: 'on the other hand, one can say that he would have been even more outstanding if he had learnt; for he never ventured to write down his speeches, though we know he delivered them with great effect' (Russell, slightly adapted). As Spalding saw, this is a concessive ut (K-S ii. 249 n. 3); Halm's cum is unnecessary, though it would be more readily understood, didicisset must here mean 'formally learnt' (like didicisse in 12; cf. n.on 12 neque orator esse. ..potest); it was such training that would have given Demades the confidence and ability to write down his speeches (see below). The passage has been found difficult (see Winterbottom1 124),65 but it should (as Ammendola observed) be seen in the light of 12. 10. 49, where Q. reports the view that 'aliam esse dicendi rationem, aliam scribendi putauerunt, ideoque in agendo clarissimos quosdam nihil posteritati mansurisque mox litteris reliquisse, ut Peridem, ut Demaden'. If Demades had 'learnt', he would have acquired the ratio scribendi (one recalls the emphasis on writing in Quintilian's system). This would have given him the confidence to publish his speeches, and that in turn would have enabled us to judge him 'even more outstanding' than we can do on the basis of reports of the spoken speeches (note 12. 10. 54 'aut eos [sc. Demosthenes and Cicero] praestantissimos oratores alia re quam scriptis cognoscimus?'). It may be added that, if he had been trained, Demades would also have learnt how to improve his speeches by preparing them in advance, a process that might involve at least «
Corsi connects with 4 2 - 3 : those who leam are better than those who don't.
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some memorization of a written text (10. 7. 29 'scribendum ergo quotiens licebit'; cf. 30 for Cicero's practice).66 As it was, he had to rely on his extempore powers (for which see Plut. Dem. 10, where note iravres ajfjLoXoyovv rrj vaci xpaifxevov avtKrjTov etvai). For Q.'s views on writing and extemporization, see n.on 2. 4. 15 garrulitas. On this passage and the issue of speeches assigned to Demades see also I. Worthington, 'The Context of [Demades] On the Twelve Years, CQ2 41 (1991), 90-5, esp. 90-1. ut eum multum ualuisse in dicendo sciamus: dicendo contrasts sharply with seribere. For Demades' powers, see Cic. Or. 90 (wit); Demetrius, Eloe. 282-6 (Seivorqs); Plut. Dem. 10; Diod. Sic. 17. 15. 5 (Seivorrjs rov Xoyov). 17. 14 Aristotdes... adsignat: Q. is more alive than most ancient readers to the ambiguities of Aristotle's position; contrast Cicero's interestingly different assessment of Aristotle's writings on rhetoric 'ille eadem acie mentis... haec quoque aspexit quae ad dicendi artem, quam ille despiciebat [cf. Off. 1. 4 'contempsit'], pertinebant' (de Orat. 2. 160). Note the comment of Atherton 419: 'Aristotle's attitude to rhetoric is a curious mixture of contempt and sophistication' (citing evidence from the Rhet.), and May-Wisse 165 n. 124: 'the notion of Aristotle's contempt for rhetoric probably derived from the tradition about the hostility between him and Isocrates'. ut solet... excogitauit: Q. is talking of Aristotle's dialogues 'of scientific discussion', where, according to Jaeger's view in Aristotle (Oxford, 1948), 28, he 'set speech against speech, thus reproducing the actual life of research in the later Academy'; this assessment is based not on actual fragments, which are very scanty indeed, but on references to the dialogues like Cic. de Orat. 3. 80: 'qui Aristotelio more de omnibus rebus in utramque partem possit dicere et in omni causa duas contrarias orationes .. .explicare', or Att. 13. 19. 4, where he calls Aristotelian those dialogues in which Aristotle appears as a character and conducts the discussion (this is the only conceivable basis for the claim that the dialogues provided a glimpse of the 'life of research of the later Academy'). A survey of what little we know about the content and structure of Aristotle's dialogues is in H. Flashar (ed.), Die Philosophic der Antike, iii (Basel and Stuttgart, 1983), 281-5. subtilitatis suae argumenta: a rather awkward phrase, less natural than Plin. Nat. 18. 335 'Aristoteles, uir immensae subtilitatis'. Ancient verdicts on Aristotle are collected by During 353-65 (positive) and 373-84 (negative). in Gryllo: Rose collects the exiguous fragments of this lost dialogue in his Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta Aristotelis (Leipzig, 1886), 75-6, 66
his
We see from this passage how writing in preparation assisted writing up later. Cicero had could be worked u p for publication.
commentaru, which
Commentary
324
to which add D.L. 5. 22, which gives the (not necessarily original) title as rpvXXos
rj nepl
p-qTopiK-qs.67
We do not know what, if anything, the dialogue was meant to prove, or whether Q. misrepresents it. For discussions see F. Solmsen, Die Entwicklung der A ristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik (Berlin, 1929), 196-229; Throm 57 n. 1; V. Buchheit, Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon (Munich, 1960), 110-16 with 234-5; Kennedy, Art, 83; M. Lossau, 'Der aristotelische Gryllos antilogisch', Philologus, 118 (1974), 12-21. Solmsen thought that Aristotle, in a spirit of perversity, was trying to show that rhetoric was not an ars. (He lays stress on excogitauity though this is probably quite neutral; cf. Cic. de Orat. 2. 160.) It seems most likely, however, given what we hear about the general nature of Aristotelian dialogues, that the dialogue gave both sides of the question 'Is rhetoric an art?', 'quaerendi gratia' as Q. says; this is also the line taken by Lossau, who cites evidence for the Peripatetic practice in utramque partem dicendi in the spirit of inquiry (similarly Granatelli2 892, on a pars destruens which may have been matched by a pars construens). It may well, then, have included (some of) the basic stock of material around which Q.'s, Philodemus', and Sextus' main source was built (so also Barnes 4). Q. (note sed) implies that the dialogue was unfavourable to rhetoric; but he probably did not have first-hand knowledge of the book. It does not seem to have been observed in connection with this passage that Grillius, Comm. in Cic. Rhet. p. 2.41-47 Jakobi says: 'Aristoteles autem dicebat esse artem, sed malam, quia contra ueritatem nititur et studio defensionis fidem ueritatis impugnat. Et dabat Aristoteles argumenta et exempla uerissima. Nam in Ariopago, ubi erant seuerissimi iudices, stabant praecones et non permittebant prooemia dicere oratoribus aut epilogos aut locos communes, ne per hoc obscuritatem ueritas pateretur.' Aristotle does not say all this in Riiet. Al, 1354a23, to which Jakobi refers the allusion, and it is not quite impossible that he took this line in the Gryllos, if only to construct one side of an argument on either side. It would be interesting to know where Grillius' knowledge about the procedure originated from, e.g. about the praecones (Q. 6. 1. 7?). Cf. n.on 2. 16. 4 Athenis... ubi actor mouere adfectus uetabatur. 6 7 Q. 3. 1. 13 ( o n Gorgias as teacher o f Isocrates) is also confidently attributed to the Gryllos by Ross in his Aristotelis fragmenta selecta (Oxford, 1955). Another possibility is the ouvayusyr) retf'wK so P. Teichert, De fontibus Quintiliairi rhetoricis (diss. Braunsberg, 1884), 2 2 . Aristotle made a celebrated attack on Isocrates (the material on which is collected and discussed in Diiring 2 9 9 - 3 1 4 ) , and it may be that his teacher's name was mentioned in that connection; for such an attack the Gryllos would be the better place, since the ovvaytuyr) was, on the evidence we h a w , factual not polemical. Nevertheless, 3. 1. 13 is at best only a possible fragment of the dialogue.
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Gryllo: so B; As grippo implies the spelling gryllo. Cf. Solmsen, op. cit. 197 n. 2: TpvAo? scheint die eigentlich attische gewesen zu sein'. Solmsen may have consulted F. Bechtel, Diehistorisdien Personennamen des Griechisdien bis zur Kaiserzeit (Halle, 1917), which lists a rpGXos but no rpvXAos. LSI s.v. o ypvXos 'pig, porker', which is likely to be the origin of the personal name,68 says that 'later' the word was spelt ypvXXos. However, in the volumes of LGPN published so far, there is only one man called /puAos (Chalcis 332/1 BC), but seven called TpuAAos-, including three in vol. ii (Attica), the latter from the fifth and fourth centuries BC. de arte rhetorica: the title is of course stressed (cf. 2). fatetur: Rhet. Al, 1354 a 6-13, analysed by Cooper 193 n. 2. e i . . . adsignat: Rhet. A2, 1356a25 avp.fiaiv€t rrjv prjropiKrjv otov 7rapav€s TI rrjs SiaXeKTiKrjs elvai KOL rrjs nepi. rd rjBv] npayp,ar€iag, ijv SIKCLIOV £OTI 7rpooayopeveiv noXiTiKrjV, 30—1 €OTI yap fiopiov TI rrjs 8iaX€KTIKR}s Kai 6p.otajp,a. These passages ensure that the MS reading dialecticis is wrong; the form of the corruption suggests strongly that Q. wrote dialectices rather than dialecticae, in accordance with the rule stated on p. 216 above; an exception is 3. 4. 10 (where Meister emended to -ices), while 1. 10. 37 is ambiguous. 17. 15 Critolaus: fr. 25 Wehrli. On Critolaus and his role in the debate see nn.on 2. 15. 19 Ariston and 23 Critolaus. Philod. Rhet. ii. 102 speaks of Critolaus' vpos TOVS p-qropas
O n the a p o t r o p a i c use o f n e g a t i v e - s o u n d i n g personal n a m e s (which were later h a n d e d
d o w n as t o k e n s w i t h o u t a t t e n t i o n t o their original m e a n i n g ) see O . M a s s o n ,
Selecta
(Geneva, 2 0 0 0 ) , at 2 6 3 .
Onoitiastica Graeca
326
Commentary
reference to Epicurus, and surely an Academic is in place here, given the school's substantial contribution to the debate (see the introduction to this chapter). Nor is it likely that in so great a confusion of Aristons (2. 15. 19 n.) Q. would have named one without further identification; and corruption to a less familiar name is unlikely. detraxit sibi... fidem: cf. 5. 7. 4 'ad detrahendam illis fidem'; TLL s.v. detraho 827. 14-8. inscriptione ipsa, qua... professus est: whatever the exact title (Radermacher, Art. Scr. 23, in a learned note on writers attacking arts, suggested KaT-qyopia pyTopiKris; perhaps merely Kara rrjs prjropiK-qg), it is not altogether obvious how its avowed anti-rhetoric stance 'diminished his credibility'. Ammendola ad loc. comments: 'Naturalmente una tale dichirazione doveva pregiudicare senz'altro la serieta e la validita degli argomenti.' nam de Epicuro... nihil miror: for mirari de, cf. TLL s.v. miror 1066. 7-16. For nihil used adverbially in Q. see Bonnell; for nam used in a non-causal way to introduce praeteritiones see K-S ii. 118-19. For the content cf. 12. 2. 24 'Epicurus.. .qui fiigere omnem disciplinam nauigatione quam uelocissima iubet'. Here too there is an allusion to Epicurus' saying natSeiav iraaav, fxaievye rd/cariou apafxevos (fr. 163 Us. = D.L. 10. 6; see Reid on Cic. Fin. 1. 26). Epicurus certainly thought rhetoric undesirable (because it was an integral part of the ambition-driven lifestyle he rejected) and indeed impossible to teach (see esp. fr. 55 vois .. .rf Karopdovaa A oyovs. T€\vr] ovSefi ta). H. Usener, Epicurea (Leipzig, 1887), 109-14 collected the fragments of the Fie pi prjToptKijs; see also Blank 320; bibliography in D. Obbink, Philodemus and Poetry (New York and Oxford, 1995), 276-7. On the Epicurean contribution to the overall debate on rhetoric (which is less than conspicuous in Q., Sextus, and the Proleg., see Barnes 4 (with nn.) and D. Blank, 'Atomist Rhetoric in Philodemus', CErc 33 (2003), 69-100. It is striking that Epicurus' own style (there is a useful collection of ancient statements in Usener, Epicurea, 88-90; for a modern appraisal see Norden, AK i. 123-5) was not sternly criticized; see e.g. Cic. Fin. 1.15. Epicurus had nothing to offer for the practising orator (Cic. Brut. 131); this is Q.'s objection to him. 17. 16ne...euadat: cf. TLL s.v. infinitus 1430. 81-1431. 27, citing e.g. Plin. Nat. 17. 243 'ne in infinitum abeamus'. 17. 17 rhetorices... probabo: the objection, as appears in 2. 21. 7-11 ('in sequentibus'), was not that rhetoric had no subject-matter, but that it had none exclusive to itself; in this fashion one could argue that everything rhetoric could teach about arguments derives from logic, and everything it has to say about emotions from ethics. See Philod. Rhet. ii. 124 RJ£(OJOC (who?)
Chapter Seventeen rraaav €7Tiorr]pLr]v €X€iv 18Lav vXr)v irepl rjv orpe'ferai, €7T€ipaTO SeiKvueiv ou8e .
327 rr/v 8e prjropixrjv
17. 18 altera est calumnia.. .artem: several issues need attention in this section: what exactly the argument against the technicity of rhetoric is, what Q.'s rebuttal is, whether it is actually relevant to the calumnia in question, and whether we find the same or merely related arguments in Philodemus and Sextus. The terminology in which this argument is couched presupposes acquaintance with the definition of re^r; given in §41 (see the notes there; and below on perceptio, arguably a technical term which did not need a gloss by Q. to be intelligible). While it is true that this definition was Stoic doctrine, it was accepted beyond the confines of the Stoic school, and the argument which Q. seeks to refute is clearly meant as a general attack on rhetoric as opposed to one on a specifically Stoic position (this can be inferred from the mere existence of similar arguments in Sextus and Philodemus). Stoic teachings about what a TCXv1) is> how it operates, and also how perception and rational thought can be understood evidently form part of the shared cultural background of Q.'s readership. We begin with a brief account of regular Tcx^based reasoning and then consider in what way rhetoric, on the argument considered and rejected by Q., is different; after that the evidence from Sextus and Philodemus will be considered. A rixy-q is an organized system of items of knowledge which cohere with each other, which have propositional content and are true. These items of knowledge ultimately derive from perception, but that is not the main point of the argument here. A doctor is someone who has acquired this rexvir] a s the result of private study, teaching, and experience, and the re^y) has become a mental disposition of his, a 8id6eois (so Philod. Rhet i. 69). An individual precept, i.e. one of the items of knowledge which make up the art, might be '(If the patient has a fever,) bring it down by wrapping cloths soaked in cold water around her calves.' A doctor would approach a patient, perceive certain symptoms correctly, match these perceptions to the relevant items of knowledge which constitute the rexvq and then act on these perceptions according to the rex^n by treating the patient in a certain way (if she had fever, he would wrap soaked cloths around her calves); if medicine really was an art, there should be no error, and the treatment should produce an effect. Rhetoric, if it was an art, would work on the same principle. However, on the argument considered by Q. rhetoric commits an error when the orator makes statements which are false (here statements are on a par with the doctor's actions). The calumnia is, as it were, a backward reasoning from the observation that orators do in fact say things which are false: for someone to act in accordance with the art of rhetoric and lie, the
Commentary
328
items of knowledge which make up the re^n? of rhetoric69 must themselves be false. And since the items of knowledge which make up an art—KaraXrufjeis, perceptiones—are impressions which have been assented to, i.e. that is how they came about at some stage, through observation of successful actions originally attempted on a trial-and-error basis (it does not matter whether the orator developed such a KaTaXrpjtts himself or acquired it through learning, for it must have come about in this way at some stage),70 this state of affairs is described as 'falsis opinionibus adsentiri\71 The reason why Q. uses the noun opinio in this phrase is that he needs a term for 'item of knowledge' which (unlike a perceptio) does not have built into it the notion of truth; it is an untechnical, ordinary-language notion (and has nothing to do with the Stoic concept of 86$a). Q.'s reply will be considered in a moment; before that we introduce the first of the two supposed parallels.72 In Adv. Rhet. 10-12 Sextus quotes the definition of T€x l which Q. too adopts (which is worth noting, given that Q. relies on the definition without formally introducing it), and goes on to say: vr
rj Se ptJTOpiKlJ
OVK €OT ( OUOTTJFIA €K K,
U)S TTUpilOTTjOOfie I' OVK tip
yap ijjev&u>v OVK etot KaTaXr/ifieis, (JjevSrj Be ion ra Xeyopeva TT}S prjTopiKrjs etvat OeioprfparUy rotavra ovra " O U T C D TrapaTretoreov T O W StKaordg" Kai "opyrjv KtvrjTeov rj e ' A e o r " Kai "potato avvr/yoprfTeov rj UpoovXcu"' < o t * > ip<j>atvet TO KaOrfKitv OVTU) T O O ? StKaorag rrapaTreiOetv Kai opyrjv rj eXeov Ktvetv- "mep OVK ioriv a\r)0rj, Kai 8ta TOVTO aKardXiprTa. ov TOIVVV avrtov etotv at KaraX-^fieiS' to prjTOpiKrj.
TUiv
awetaepxerai
TO prj8c
rrjv pijTopiKrjv
v ~ d t v .
Rhetoric advances falsehoods and hence does not fit the definition of rex™) because one cannot have a KardXiqifiis of if/ev8rjy which agrees with Q.'s calumnia. But Sextus continues that precepts like 'one ought to cheat the 69
W i t h coitstitui w e c a n c o m p a r e f o r m u l a t i o n s which suggest that (i) a n a r t is c o m p l e x , i.e.
c o m p r i s e s m a n y precepts w h i c h m a y h a v e been a c c u m u l a t e d over t i m e , a n d that (ii) it is o r g a n i z e d , i.e. t h e precepts are interrelated; both ideas are present (chiastically) in SVF fr. 56: T/^I'IJ- avcrrrjp.a yap IJI' Kai a9poiop.a 70
KaTaXifpis.
T h e t e r m perceptio
ii,
karaXrppfojv.
T h e c l a u s e ' q u a e s e m p e r uera sit' m a r k s the technical use o f perceptio
in the sense o f
had b e e n established by C i c e r o a s the s t a n d a r d r e n d e r i n g o f
KardXrpfjis; see Fill 3 . 17 in particular, b u t it o c c u r s twice in Inv. and o n c e in Rhet. Her. before its first a p p e a r a n c e in the technical Stoic sense o f KaraX-qipn in Ac. 1. 4 5 ; it was rarely used after C i c e r o (see TLL s . v . ) — w h i c h increases the likelihood that readers w o u l d c o n n e c t it with h i m — a n d o c c u r s twice o n l y in Q., here and in 4 1 ; o n its use in Cic. see H . - J . H a r t u n g , Ciceros bei der Ubersetzunggriechischer 71
philosophischer
Termini
Methode
( H a m b u r g , 1 9 7 0 ) , index s.v.
T h a t 'falsis o p i n i o n i b u s assentiri' is equated with telling falsehoods in § 1 9 pins d o w n t h e
m e a n i n g o f the p h r a s e 72
T h e r e is a s t r o n g prima facie plausibility for a g r e e m e n t with Sextus, given that there t h e
a r g u m e n t i m m e d i a t e l y following the supposed c o u n t e r p a r t t o o u r a r g u m e n t here is arguably v e r y similar t o the o n e Q. considers in § § 2 2 - 5 ; s o t h e b r o a d e r q u e s t i o n o f a s h a r e d s o u r c e is a t stake here t o o .
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jury in such-and-such a way' declare the duty of thus misleading the judges (i.e. a moral ought'), and this is not true according to Sextus.73 The argument which follows then makes it clear that the objection was to the 'falsehood' of the na payyeXfxara of rhetoric if they are taken as moral imperatives. Barnes 13 has argued that this is to mistake the imperative of the instructor for a moral imperative: 'If a chess master says: "You ought to move your bishop to KR3," it is wholly impertinent to reply: "That is false—I have no duty to move the bishop there; indeed, I have no duty to play chess at all".' However, Sextus was not quite unaware of this: in 12 he lists some of the precepts of rhetoric like 'this is the way one ought to burgle a house', and then comments favSrj yap ion ravra, Kai OVT€ KaOr/Kovra OUTC Oeajprf/iara. That ipcvBrj is elaborated on in this way—we take the Kat to be explicative—makes it seem unlikely that Sextus simply failed to see a distinction between the moral and the technical 'ought'; rather, he feels entitled to merge the two categories because he has chosen precepts encouraging morally reprehensible behaviour. (This is not justified either, but it is different from mere confusion of two senses of 'ought'.) We return to Q. and to his rebuttal of the calumnia, in order to answer the question whether the latter is the same argument as the one brought forward by Sextus. Q. says the orator does not assent to false opiniones since he is not himself deceived, even if he tells a lie. In the absence of examples similar to those in Sextus and given that Q.'s other, non-rhetorical examples are straightforward cases of misleading behaviour, this suggests that he is thinking of factual untruths as opposed to what Sextus would take (not without misunderstanding, as we have seen) as morally reprehensible untruths. To give an example, if according to the first Hermagorean OTAOIS an orator counters the charge 'X has committed the murder of Y' by saying, against his better judgement as far as truth is concerned, 'X has not committed the murder of Y' because he thinks he can convince the jury of this, then he would put forward a lie (and the calumnia does have a point on the reasoning reconstructed above). Is Q.'s rejoinder actually sufficient to maintain the technicity of rhetoric in the face of the counter-argument? If we assume that Q.'s orator, uir bonus that he is, would lie for a good cause only, then first the harmony of his soul which is the virtue of rhetoric (see the commentary on ch. 20) would not be impaired by this, given that he knows the truth himself, and he would, as it were, trade local disorder (that is what a lie would amount to) for achieving global order, e.g. the acquittal of an innocent and just man (this kind of consideration was invoked, as we recall, in the argument for rhetoric's usefulness in 2. 16. 11-19). Q. and Sextus share the 73
See also the mangled argument in Philod. Rhet. suppl. 12-13.
330
Commentary
assumption that the items of knowledge which make up rhetoric include false ones; on Q.'s argument they seem to be false for a different reason; the difference between the arguments is likely to be due to the fact that they have fitted out the same skeleton of an argument with different examples, suitable to their respective argumentative needs (rhetoric as wielded by a good man is a worse target from Sextus' point of view than the rhetoric of scoundrels). Sextus' argument as it stands is similar to the argument in §26 below, which, however, does not argue from the mechanism of the art. Parallels in Philodemus do not require detailed discussion. At Rhet. i. 22 Philodemus refers to an argument that most theorems (deajp-qpara) of other arts were true, but those of rhetoric were false, and therefore rhetoric was no art; he retorts with a reductio ad absurdum: if that were true, then philosophy, medicine, and music would not be arts either. In Rhet. ii. 90 he records the argument that orators ov p,d\\ov... airaTtooiv rj diTaTUJVTai, and at ii. 88 (cf. 89) an answer to this. The details of the argument are ludicrous, and bear no relation to Q. except for the general contrast of deceiving and deception. See §26 for a similar argument, with our n.on uti... uitiis rhetoricen... criminantur. 17.19 dicere falsa pro ueris: for the circumstances where this is permissible see §27 and n. quid: cf. 3. 8. 25 'ubi constat quid fieri non posse'; K-S i. 634. nam et imperator.. .21 non nescit: the passage is elaborately structured, and its structure marked. At the beginning there is {a) a parallel generality between the orator and the general ('nam et imperator... saepe'), an example is provided ('ut Hannibal.. .dedit'), and a conclusion appended ('sed ilium fefellit, ipse quid uerum esset non ignorauit'). There follows (b) a new instance (but not of a general; contrast the Loeb 'generals also'): 'nec uero Theopompus.. .praebuit', with embedded conclusion: '(nec) falsam de se opinionem habuit, sed custodibus praebuit'. Then we (c) return to the orator: 'item orator... fallit alium'. The conclusion here ('non ergo falsam habet ipse opinionem, sed fallit alium') picks up that to the Hannibal case, and one might think that the series was over, with ring composition (in which case ita would be natural here rather than item). But then we get (d) a new instance, concerning Cicero (the conclusion 'nihil ipse uidit' again looks back to the Hannibal case), and another (e) from painting, a quite different field (see n. below on 21 pictor... nescit for a suggestion why it is included here), with the conclusion 'ipse ea plana esse non nescit'). The recurrent ipse binds (a), (d), and (e) together. The double negatives (non ignorauit; non nihil uidit; non nescit) (again) bind (a), (d), and (e) together. And (b) and (c) are closely bound by nec [(c) non} falsam opinionem habuit [(c) habet} sed.
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Hannibal., .dedit: Q. abbreviates Liv. 22. 16. 5-17. 3. Cf. also Fron. Str. 1. 5. 28, Appian, Hann. 14-15. boum: so B; bouum A. Cf. TLL s.v. bos 2135. 23-78. 17. 20 Theopompus.. .euasit: for this story about the late eighth-century Spartan king, see Polyaenus 8. 34. permutato: the verb is again used of changing clothes in 3. 7. 6. opinionem... praebuit: related uses are collected in TLL s.v. 389. 29-41, the closest parallel being Caes. Gal. 3. 17. 6 'tantam.. .opinionem timoris praebuit'. item... alium: see n. on 19 nam et imperator... 21 non nescit. orator., .fallit alium: cf. Gel. 11. 11. 1 (from Nigidius Figulus): 'Inter mendacium dicere et mentiri distat. Qui mentitur, ipse non fallitur, alterum fallere conatur: qui mendacium dicit, ipse fallitur' and SVF iii, fr. 554 = Stob. Eel. ii. 7, p. 111. 10-17 W-H. Cf. also the cynical remark of Servius on Aen. 9. 134 'in arte rhetorica tunc nobis conceditur uti mendacio, cum redarguere nullus potest'. For further detail see n. below on 27 mendacium dicere et sapienti... concessum est. 17. 21 nec Cicero... nihil ipse uidit: see n.on 19 nam et imperator.. .21 non nescit for the structure of this passage. For the phrasing cf. 10. 1. 70 'nec nihil profecto uiderunt'. cum se tenebras... gloriatus est: parallels, literal and metaphorical, for tenebras ojfudisse may be found scattered in TLL s.v. offundo 531. 67-532. 17. Jerome, Ep. 50. 2. 2 'nam s i . . . iactasset manum, uerba tornasset, tenebras ilico ante oculos iudicibus offiidisset' may reflect our passage; so H. Hagendahl, Latin Fathers and die Classics (Goteborg, 1958), 160. As to the boast, no extant passage of Cicero can be pointed to (it is fr. inc. 17 Miiller). J. Humbert, 'Comment Cicero n mystifia les juges de Cluentius', REL 16 (1938), 275-96, comparing it with the quotation from the correspondence with Brutus (fr. ep. VII. 10 Watt) at 8. 6. 20 (cf. 55) 'populo imposuimus' (though the following words 'et oratores uisi sumus' do not fit well), and with Q.'s remark at 11. 1. 21 about Cicero's tendency to boast of his prowess in his private correspondence, deduced, plausibly, that it too came in a letter, less securely that the letter was addressed to Brutus. Two further passages are relevant, {a) Julius Rufinianus 13 (RLM 42. 19-20) .ut pro Cluentio fecit Cicero, in qua oratione tenebras se offudisse iactauit iudicibus Cluentianis'. Rufinianus goes on to cite four passages from the speech; these are not intended to throw light on the boast, though in the first Cicero remarks that he will keep to prosecutors' divisio 'ut omnes intellegant nihil me nec subterfugere uoluisse reticendo nec obscurare dicendo'. Rufinianus seems to draw on Q. elsewhere, and it may be
Commentary
332
unnecessary to posit a common source; A. Schafer, Quaestiones Rhetoricae (Bonn, 1913), 46-8 thought of Celsus. (b) Plut. Cic. 25 (ignored by Humbert) Movvarta) . . . TTOTC avvrjyoprjoas, a>? ancxftvydjv rrjv StKTjv €K€tvos £8t(I)K€V eraipov avrov Zafiivov, o u r o u Aeyerai Trpo-ntoeiv VTT opyrjs o KiKcpoov COOT ei7T€iv yap €K€tvr)v, (L Movvarie, rrjv 8LKT)V aneiftvyes Sta oeavrov, OVK IPLOV -rroXv OKOTOS IV (FMJTI TUJ SiKaorrjpiai 7REPIXEOLVTOS'" on which see RExvi/1 (1933), s.n. Munatius no. 1 and iA/2 (1920), s.n. Sabinus no. 1. It seems unlikely, in view of Cic. Fam. 7. 2. 2-3, that Plutarch is wrong to connect the boast with the case of Munatius (Plancus Bursa). Thus either Cicero made the same claim twice, or Q. is wrong to connect a single claim with the Cluentius case. Assuming that the boast was made about the Cluentiana, C. J. Classen, 'Cicero Pro Cluentio 1-11 im Licht der rhetorischen Theorie und Praxis', RUM1 108 (1965), 139 has a suggestion what in particular Cic. was talking about (but see also 112-13 n. 35); William Ramsay, in William Smith (ed.), A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology; 3 vols. (London, 1844-9), i. 807 (s.n. Cluentius), refers the claim to the fallacious reasoning at §64 [a reference owed to Dr Holford-Strevens]. pictor.. .nescit: we do not expect a further illustration from outside the realm of oratory (see n. on 19 nam et imperator. ..21 non nescit); it may be that the mention of tenebrae in the Cicero example caused Q. to think of pictorial illusion; see 2. 12. 7 and the next n. efficit7*1 ut quaedam eminere..., quaedam recessisse credamus: cf. 8. 5. 29 (metaphorical) 'eminentium et planorum gratiam perdunt'. The choice of the word recessisse supports Russell's translation 'some objects are in the foreground and others in the background'. But the technique alluded to is easily confused, and may often be identical, with that by which deployment of light and shade make some objects stand out as though in relief; note Cic. de Orat. 3. 101 *umbram aliquam et recession, quo magis id quod erit inluminatum extare atque eminere uideatur', and other passages cited on 2. 12. 7 eminent and quem ad modum... clariora sunt. recessisse: the tense is carefully chosen. We think that some parts of the picture have (previously) 'withdrawn', leaving others now foregrounded. For the word (corresponding to recessus in the passage of Cic. just quoted), cf. Plin. Ep. 3. 6. 2 (of a lifelike statue) 'pendent lacerti, papillae iacent, uenter recessit' (again the perfect). 17. 22 aiunt... mentiuntur: for the weak sense of mentiri (i.e. falli, errare) see TLL s.v. mentior 780. 9. Material on the view that an art must have a reXos 74
eJfecit(B)
is defensible, b u t the present c o r r e s p o n d s t o
iititur above.
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and that, if it is to retain that label, failure is impossible, is collected and arranged in chronological order by Nesselrath 173-8 and 178-82 respectively. Both views were commonly held. In the parallel texts cf. e.g. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 13-15: €7t€t Trdaa T£XVR!
T)
TOV
(1)9
1
PRJTOPIKRJV, eiTrtp
7rai>
iorrjKOS e ^ c t t o TCXOS #cat t r a y tov, TUS (j>iXoao(f>ta KUI ypappaTiK-q, e\'0/t€l'0l', KuO&ITCp IClTpi KTj T6 K(ll K vfie pVTfT IKY) , t>6 JJOD KUI TTjV e'ort re'^n/, t o erepov TOVTUJV eTrayyeXXeoOat. OUTe Se eartjKOS exei TCXOS (ouSe yap act 7repiyiveTai rre/it] rrjs TUIV dvriSl KU)V vtKijSy aAA' 7to£
TO TToXl) to>
o t £ eTepov
pev 7TpOTiOerai o pr/Tiop
TO TTOXU itepevov, ivtmjaev,
(ire
eirel
Sid rravrog
ttas
erepov
pr/Twp ras
eTepov
eavrut
Se e^UKoXoOovv ovyxpivopevos
e-Trixetprjaeis
e\ei
reXos)
ovre
TTOXXUKIS eXet^Orj
TOV (lis pdXXov
TJ
avTOV SIOXVOVTOS
(and for more elaborate discussion of the 'end' of rhetoric see 60-71); Philod. Riiet. ii. 105 with 125 eXeyero naaa Texyv) TIR/xdveiv del TOV reAou? rj Kara TO IrXetoTov. R) Se pr)TopiKr) puqSeTepov yevovs pieTex^tv... (but) aTravlios Tvyxdvetv. (Clearly both Sextus and Philodemus do allow for occasional failure; that this is best explained as a lowering of the requirements for technicity for argument's sake will become clear from evidence cited below.) However, since the results which certain supposed Te'xvai (medicine and navigation are typical instances) produced evidently included occasional failure, there was a need to devise a conception of Te'xvrj which accommodated that very possibility. These arts are called oToxaoTtKai Texvai in Hellenistic debate, but the term (if not the adjective) goes back to Plato, who in Phileb. 55 E-66 D applies the verb aroxd^eadai to practical, i.e. nonmathematical, expertises (on the early history of the term see Alpers-Golz 168 n. 300). The occasional failure of these arts was put down to their subjectmatter and external factors (e.g. the success of a navigator does not depend on his skill alone; cf. Blank 135). But to speak of 'the notion of a stochastic art' conceals the fact that there were competing views on the subject. Two arguably prominent ones can be extracted from a passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias' Quaestiones, in I. Bruns, Supplementum Aristotelicnm, ii/2 (Berlin, 1892); the first of these is plausibly categorized by von Arnim as a Stoic fragment (SVF iii, fr. 19 init., which should be compared for its improved text over Bruns's edition), the second is likely to represent the (or a) Peripatetic view (this is suggested by the terminology', see below). The two passages are: (i) II. 61. 4—6:
eiTutv
OTOXUOTLKUIV T^XVUIV TCXOS eivat
7 r o t e i v TTPOS TO TOV t T p o K e i p e v o v Tvyxdvetv, T€V£OVT(II
re'Aou? Tat?
ov
OTO^aOTt/cat?
TIS
Ae'yoi t o
TTCUS OV\ op.ota»j
TUIV TexvuiVy
TTUVTU T<1 Trap'
KUI avrat
TOV
auras"
oiKelov
334
Commentary
(ii) II. 61. 23-8 (introduced as an alternative view by Alex. Aphr.): tj rc'Ao? pev «at ravrais t o rvxeiv TOVTOV OV \dptv iravra ra rap aura? TToirjoui, Sid rov TTUVTU ra Trap aurfi? TTOirjaai, epyov Se tStov AVTCUV TO TTUVTU TU Trup aurri? Trpos TO TV\eiv TOV TTpoKeipevov Troirjaut TUI FIR/ povov TOVTO uptcetv t t / j o ? t o TOV TrpoKeipevov Tv\eiv, uXXu Setv KUI (IXXwv Ttvutvy a OVK COTIV eirl TTJ TE\vrj. The problem of how to accommodate occasional failure of an art is addressed in different ways by these two passages: in (i) the suggestion is that one should revise the TCXOS from 'reaching the goal', e.g. airing patients in the case of medicine, to 'doing everything in one's power to reach the goal'; if the doctor has done everything he could to heal the patient in compliance with the rules of medicine, then neither he nor medicine as an art has failed if the patient dies; in (ii), by contrast, the suggestion is to retain the actual reaching of the goal as reXos, but to introduce the notion of the epyov of the craftsman or of the craft, which then consists in doing everything in one's power to achieve the reXos in accordance with the rules of the craft (on this view actually reaching the goal is no longer a conditio sine qua non for the technicity of the art, since the failure is blamed on external factors interfering with the completion of the act carried out in accordance with the rules of the art). The difference between the two views may seem almost negligible, but it does create a different background to explanations of how stochastic arts operate (on the use of these two conceptions in ethics see Striker, 'Antipater', 306-11). What suggests that the second view is a Peripatetic view is the occurrence of the term epyov, which can be paralleled with an analogous explanatory context in Ar. Rhet. Al, 1355b10—13.. . ov TO TICICCLI epyov avrrjs, (iAAa to ISeiv rd virdpxovTa mdavd nepl eKaarov. KaOdnep Kai iv rats dXXais €T0Ll Texvais ndaais (ovSe yap iarpiKrjs to vytd noirjaai, aAAa p^XP1 °$ £v&£X i pcc'xpi TOVTOV 7rpoayayeiv); cf. Top. A3, 101 b 5-10. Alternative to epyov and not restricted to Peripatetic contexts is the term OKOTTOS, which is in keeping with the image of archery implied by oroxdCeodai; see Alpers-Golz 66-8. Given that Q. has made bene dicere his reXos of rhetoric in 2. 15, it is natural that the position he adopts in the present chapter is close to the one in evidence in passage (i) above. (Allen 86-7 finds the view expressed in passage (ii) in our section here, which is incorrect.) What Q. does now is to maintain bene dicere as the t c ' A o ? of rhetoric (23 'noster orator arsque a nobis finita non sunt posita in euentu' and 25 'ita oratori bene dixisse finis est'), but to interpret bene dicere in such a way that it amounts to 'doing everything in one's power to speak persuasively' (23 'tendit...'). By linking bene dicere and persuadere in this way, he seems to depart from Stoic orthodoxy, according to which ei5 Acyeo' is t
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common sense understanding of rhetoric. Passages elsewhere, however, do confirm that in case of a conflict the priorities between bene dicere and persuadere are clear (11. 1. 11 'quo uel solo patet non persuadendi sed bene dicendi finem in oratore seruandum, aim interim persuadere deforme sit'). habere... propositum: cf. Cic. Fin. 5. 26 'omnem naturam... idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut...'; TLL s.v. propono 2066. 26-33 (but some of the cases cited may concern the noun propositum). nullum esse: cf. n. on 2. 10. 8 nullus est. praestari: cf. 12.9.6 'finem... hunc praestabit orator, ut uideatur optimam causam optime egisse' (mistranslated by Austin ad loc.). The locution seems to be otherwise unparalleled (but note Sen. Ben. 7. 14. 3 'efifectum praestare', in a similar context); the finis is seen as a promise to be fulfilled (cf. Sen. Ep. 85. 32 'artes ministrae sunt, praestare debent quod promittunt'). The allusion is to the 'promise' to persuade (see 23). iam ostendimus: in 2. 15. 38 ('bene dicere'). 17. 23 et praestabit: et (omitted by B) is needed to link the two parts of Q.'s rebuttal: there is a finis, and the orator will always achieve it. firmum... aduersus: Tac. Hist. 2. 82: 'firmus aduersus . . . largitionem'. For firmus of the strength of a valid argument cf. Cic. Rose. Com. 37: 'firmissimum et grauissimum argumentum'; and often of argumentatio in the Rhet. Her. (e.g. 2. 47). eos.. .qui.. .putauerunt: refuted in 2. 15, where Q. dealt with definitions involving persuasion (note esp. 11-13). fortasse (if Q. is weighing his words) adds a crucial if inconspicuous restriction: Q.'s arguments would lose their force against those who availed themselves of the notion of a stochastic art, since they—if they hold the view expressed in passage (ii) in n. on 22 aiunt... mentiuntur above—would maintain that persuasion is the goal of rhetoric and yet would not see its technicity compromised by the occasional or even frequent failure to persuade. This is why it is not certain that the arguments under consideration would have force against those who make persuasion the goal. Q., it would thus appear, was well aware that the arguments he is using below to once again make the case for his reXos were originally meant to support the reXos 'persuasion' against the charge that persuasion was not always achieved; see n.on 24 et gubernator uult... below. non sunt posita in euentu: cf. 2. 15. 13 'quidam recesserunt ab euentu', i.e. those who, while including persuasion in their definition, did not insist on its attainment. tendit quidem... qui dicit: a concession to e.g. Celsus (see n. below on 25 o ratorib en edixissefinis est), who saw victory as the praemium (see n. on 2.15. 32
Commentary
336
Cornelius Celsus); but for Q. it is to be striven for only within the limits of the overriding requirement to speak bene. 17. 24 et gubernator uult.. .25 et medicus... petit: that Q. adapts arguments originally meant to support the view that certain technical disciplines are stochastic crafts is suggested by Alex. Aphr. in Arist. Top. 32. 26-33. 7 Wallies: OUTCUJ Se
Te\viov. ov
TO
ear at
€X^L
KCLL €7TI LUTPLKRJS
TOV T e yap larpov
ouioar
el yap
Kal o tar
TOVTO
pos OVK
TTJS
TIS
tar pos-
eiJTUXtus Tiva TrpooeveyKavres
T€ KTTL KVFIEPWJTTKRJS
Xeyot epyov
oto^ovot yap
avrois,
laTpiKrjs fi or] Oct as fj pr) orjpetiooei
o auTO?
Srj Xoyos Kal
KAL TTUCHJUV TU)V
epyov t o IRAVTA rd ivSexopeva eivai
TOV
tarpou,
TTOXXUKIS KCLI
Kal oi) aui^ovaiv
Kal
rtvas Kap
o t a v pei^ovrj
opotios
DXX
o avtarpos tarpos
oi dvlarpol
oi larpot,
vrroTreoeiv ptlBiov-
eirt prjToptKrjs re /cat
OTOX
-Toirjaat -rpds TO auioai,
Kal em
VOVTUS,
t o tuiOos
KvfiepvrjTtKrjs.
SiaXeKTiKrjs.
For Q. the technicity of rhetoric is not in doubt: the goal of rhetoric is 'bene dicere' (25), and the notion of 'doing all in one's power to speak persuasively' is used to partially fill that phrase with content. Seneca too links navigation and medicine (Ep. 85. 36); see n. below on dum clauum rectum ten earn. salua... peruenire: cf. 12. 11. 4 (metaphorical) 'in portum integra naue perueniet'. tempestate... abreptus: cf. Liv. 29. 27. 14 'abreptam tempestate ab Africa classem'. dum clauum rectum teneam: Ennius, Ann. 508 Skutsch (whose n. should be consulted); Isidore, Orig. 19. 2. 12 quotes the full line as 'ut clauum rectum teneam nauemque gubernem'. For the Greek proverb underlying Ennius' phrase (op9dv TOV vavv), see Cic. Quint, fr. 1.2. 13 (with Watt's apparatus), Otto, Sprichwdrter,; 85-6. Q.'s point is that the steersman fulfils his function perfectly if he does what his art prescribes: i.e. to keep the rudder straight ahead and steer the ship on (Sen. Dial. 6. 6. 3: 'ille uel in naufragio laudandus quem obruit mare clauuum tenentem et obnixum'). This is ensured by Sen. Ep. 85. 30-7, where the parallel of steersman and sapiens is elaborately discussed; note esp. 'qui hoc potuit dicere "Neptune, numquam hanc nauem nisi rectam" arti satis fecit: tempestas non opus gubernatoris imped it, sed successum' (33), opus corresponding to the now familiar epyov (see n. above on et gubernator uult... 25 et medicus... petit and on 22 aiunt... mentiuntur). In the letter moral agency is compared to exercising craft knowledge, in particular the art of seafaring (as frequently in antiquity; references and scholarship in Fowler's commentary on the opening lines of Lucretius' De rerum natura Book 2) and the art of steersmanship as a metaphor for virtue; as stated above, some Stoics held virtue not simply to
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be an art (cf. Philo, Leg. Alleg. 1. 56 = SVF iii, fr. 202 oXov yap TOVfiioviori T€x ) V d-perrf) but a stochastic art in particular (see Striker, 'Antipater', 30611). It is clear from Sen. Ep. 85 that Stoics and Peripatetics conducted debates about the respective conceptions of virtue within the framework of seafaring imagery. Q. and Seneca, as will be clear, mutatis mutandis agree in their responses to the charges against rhetoric and seafaring (to leave the wider issue in Seneca aside) inasmuch as neither sees the technicity of an art compromised by occasional failure, as long as the rules of the art have been followed to the best of the artist's ability. vif
17. 25 et medicus: see first n. on 24. aegri petit: aegro promittit A, well picking up promittatur (22); cf. too Celsus pr. 1 'sic sanitatem aegris medicina promittit'. But B's reading is correct; it forms a better counterpart to 'uult... peruenire', and, more importantly, coheres with the next sentence (see n. on summa). intemperantia: perhaps esp. in eating and drinking; cf. TLL s.v. 2167. 14-34, with examples from medical writers (note Cels. 1. 2. 8 'si qua intemperantia subest, tutior est in potione quam in esca'). summa: what the doctor is aiming for (petit, cf. OLD s.v. 3a), his OKOTTOS (health), not his overall t4Ao?, called finis in the next sentence, it being Q.'s whole point that, even if, in a particular case, a doctor does not succeed in bringing about health, he does not thereby fail to reach his rcAo? (good doctoring), provided that he has acted according to the rules (secundum rationem) that constitute the art of medicine. Q. avoided the ambiguity of the word summa in his parallel argument about rhetoric at 23 ('tendit... ad uictoriam qui dicit, sed cum bene dixit, etiam si non uincat, id quod arte continetur effecit'). Spalding suggested the deletion of summa, so that sanitas then, rather awkwardly, became the subject; but there is no need for any change. For the contrast between OKOKOS and re'Xos (summa and finis) at issue her see SVF i, fr. 554, and Alpers-Golz 62-6; also our n. on 2. 15. 19 Ariston. On the uses of summa see n. on 2. 16. 11 eos qui... rettulerunt. contingit.. .fecerit.. .excidet: in view of the parallel words in 24, 'si... fuerit abreptus, non minus erit gubernator', one expects neither contingit (A, B after correction) nor contigit (B's original reading, supported by the rhythm, as at 6. 3. 26 and 12. 9. 8), but contigerit. Equally, 'dum... fecerit' corresponds to the Ennian 'dum... teneam'; fecerit is perfect subjunctive, used in the absence of a future perfect subjunctive (see K-S ii. 181-2). For excido used thus, see OLD s.v. 6a. oratori bene dixisse finis est: the tense of the infinitive carries a genuine reference to the past (cf. n. on 2. 13. 4 dedisse; contrast the more general 'finis... est bene dicere' at 2. 15. 38): an orator has achieved his re'Xos if he is
338
Commentary
conscious when a case is over, and whatever its outcome, that he has spoken well (contrast 26 'se quisque bene dicere intelleget'); cf. 23 'cum bene dixit... id quod arte continetur effecit [efficit A, wrongly]'. For the tense, cf. Julius Severianus 3 (RLM 356. 8-10, p. 73 Castelli Montanari) 'finis autem oratoriae uirtutis est uerisimilia dixisse, uel tantum contendisse, quantum res passa sit, ad uictoriam [cf. 23 'tendit...ad uictoriam' above]', which is likely to be Celsan; see e.g. R. Reitzenstein, 'Literarhistorische Kleinigkeiten', Philologus, 57 (1898), 42-63, at 54; and n. on 2. 15. 32 Cornelius Celsus. If so, it suggests either that Celsus considered rhetoric to be a stochastic art, or (more likely) that he was one of those rhetoricians who did not make it a requirement that rhetoric actually achieved persuasion but did so without much theoretical underpinning (see n. on 2. 15. 13 recesserunt ab euentu). post paulum.. .ostendemus: at 2. 18. 1-2, where see nn. 17. 26 illud quoque... nescire: see our summary of the chapter. uti...uitiis rhetoricen... criminantur: this argument is not unlike that in Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 11-12, already discussed (n. on 18 altera est calumnia.. .artem), which can be taken as confirmation that in §18 a different argument is at issue:75 no art would contain 'untrue' precepts such as "ourco 7Tapa7T€ioT€ov rovg St/aiara?" xat "opy-qv Kivqreov rj eAeov"—which parallel 'falsum dicat' and 'adfectus moueat' (see §18 n. for the sense in which these precepts were considered 'untrue'). The argument can be paralleled from Stoic sources, but the rejection of undue playing on the audience's emotions was not peculiar to them, as we shall see; on Stoic disapproval of adfectus generally see SVFiii. 108-10, e.g. Lact. De ira 17 on opyr/, Sen. Clem. 2. 4 on eAeo? (where misericordia is presented as a vice). For adfectus as vicious, cf. 5 pr. 1 'namque... adfectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant, primum quia uitium esset omnis animi pertirrbatio, deinde quia iudicem a ueritate depelli misericordia gratia ira similibusque non oporteret' (cf. Ar. Rhet. A1, 1354a24); 6. 1. 7 'philosophos minus miror, apud quos uitii loco est adfici, nec boni moris uidetur sic a uero iudicem auerti, nec conuenire bono uiro uitiis uti'; 11. 1. 33 'philosophiam.. .ostentantibus parum decori sunt plerique orationis ornatus maximeque ex adfectibus, quos illi uitia dicunt'.
7 5 Q.'s argument in § 1 8 is related to the argument here in that it too assumes that the art o f rhetoric includes 'false' precepts, but in § 1 8 this is seen primarily as a flaw in the workings o f the art, i.e. as something which compromises it qua mechanism, whereas here the false precepts compromise rhetoric morally (the argument here is therefore similar to Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 1 0 - 1 2 ) .
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17. 27 cum ex bona ratione proficiscitur: cf. 6. 1. 33 'deorum... inuocatio uelut ex bona conscientia profecta'. On the principle that a deed should be judged in terms of its motivation (bona ratio) and its contribution towards the common good (communis utilitas), see Winterbottom5 324-5, who also points out that the theme is important in the De Officiis, where it is introduced in 1.31 (see Dyck ad loc.), i.e. in the section where Cicero is working from Panaetius; interestingly, it is taken up again and elaborated on in Off. 3 (3. 24, 3. 40-2), where Cicero is no longer relying on Jlcpl TOV KaOr/KOVTOS. ideoque nec: cf. Sen. Dial. 12. 11.7 'ideoque nec exulare umquam potest'; there are a number of parallels in the Digest (e.g. 4. 5. 3. 1). Cf. n. on 2. 13. 7 alioqui nec. mendacium dicere etiam sapienti.. .concessum est: for a discussion of this perennial problem see esp. 12. 1. 38-9 with Austin's note; to the parallels add Plat. Rep. 331 c (quoted in Proleg. p. 298. 25); Epict. 4. 6. 33; Gel. 11. 11 (cited above 20 n.). A survey of opinions on the matter is also in P. A. Brunt, 'Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations', JRS 64 (1974), 1-20, at 8-10. For the Stoic position—that the wise man may lie in emergencies—see SVFiii, fr. 513 and 554 (fr. 89 Hiilser = Stob. Eel. ii. 7, p. 111. 10-21 W-H, where a distinction between TO iftevSos Aeyeiv and to ifievheodai is drawn); ii, fr. 132; Atherton 423 offers some explanation on the basis of what Q. says here. An earlier text which explores the compatibility of moral goodness and lying is Plato's Hippias Minor, given that the Stoics often developed their philosophical positions starting from Platonic dialogues, it is entirely possible that their views on lying were informed by the discussion there. More cynical (or pragmatic) practitioners were unworried of course: 'rhetori concessum est sententiis uti falsis audacibus uersutis subdolis captiosis, si ueri modo similes sint et possint mouendos hominum animos qualicumqiie astu inrepere' (Gel. 1. 6. 4). See also Serv. in Aen. 9. 134 (cited on 20 orator.. .fallit alium above). For rhetoric as 'mendacio nixa' cf. Cic. de Orat. 2. 30, but the issue alluded to there is rather that of 2. 17. 18. ad aequitatem perduci: cf. 11. 1. 76 'perducendus .. .omni modo iudex ad irae pudorem'. necessario: contrasted with concessum est (so 4. 2. 85 'non concessum modo sed aliquando etiam necessarium'). For the idea, cf. 6. 1.7 (following the words cited on 26 uti...uitiis rhetoricen... criminantur) 'necessarios tamen adfectus fatebuntur si aliter optineri uera et iusta et in commune profutura non possint'. imperiti... iudicant: cf. 12. 10. 53 (from a passage cited further below) 'cum uero iudex detur aut populus aut ex populo laturique sententiam indocti saepius atque interim rustici' (cf. 4. 2. 45)—somewhat mysterious; see Winterbottom, BICS 44 (2000), 177—Sen. Ep. 40. 8 (warning against
340
Commentary
excessive speed of delivery): quemadmodum enim iudex subsequi poterit aliquando etiam imperitus et rudis?' Such deficiencies did not prevent orators from flattering their audiences by assuming that they were 'docti'; see e.g. Cic. Mur. 60 'quoniam non est nobis haec oratio habenda aut in imperita multitudine aut in aliquo conuentu agrestium' (on which Cicero comments in Fin. 4. 74 'apud imperitos (!) turn ilia dicta sunt'; see also Nisbet on Pis. 68). in hoc... fallendi sint, ne errent: with conscious paradox, for falli and errare are often associated (e.g. Cic. Off. 1. 94). There is perhaps a similar effect at Sen. Ep. 54. 5 'in hoc enim, mi Lucili, nisi fallor, erramus...'. 17. 28 si mihi sapientes iudices dentur: cf. 12. 10. 52 'Quod si mihi des consilium iudicum sapientium, perquam multa recidam ex orationibus non Ciceronis modo sed etiam... Demosthenis. Neque enim adfectus omnino mouendi erunt nec aures delectatione mulcendae...: proprie et significanter rem indicare, probationes colligere satis est.' Austin ad loc. misses the parallel from Tac. Dial. 41. 4 'quid...opus est...multis apud populum contionibus cum de republica non imperiti et multi deliberent sed sapientissimus et unus'. sapientium condones et omne consilium: Q. widens the scope of his criticism of (Roman) audiences, to popular assemblies and all kinds of deliberative body; cf. 3. 8. 2 'Et est haec ratio uerissima [i.e. the assumption that honestas and utilitas coincide], si consilium contingat semper bonorum atque sapientium. Verum apud imperitos, apud quos frequenter dicenda sententia est, populumque praecipue, qui ex pluribus constat indoctis, discemenda sunt haec et secundum communes magis intellectus loquendum'. In both passages, Q. tactfully fails to mention the senate (note 12. 11. 1 'in iudiciis consiliis contionibus senatu'), whom Cicero sharply contrasted with the people; cf. Pis. 68 (in the senate) 'non apud indoctos sed . . . in hominum eruditissimorum et humanissimorum coetu loquor' (also Part. Or. 90, on deliberative oratory: there are two types of men, 'alterum indoctum et agreste... alterum humanum et politum", each requiring its own rhetorical treatment), and esp. de Orat. 2. 333-4 'Atque haec in senatu minore apparatu agenda sunt; sapiens enim est consilium multisque aliis dicendi relinquendus locus, uitanda etiam ingenii ostentationis suspicio. Contio capit omnem uim orationis et grauitatem uarietatemque desiderat' (with L-P's n.). When it suited him, Cicero could find Roman popular assemblies admirable, at least in contrast to Greek; see F. Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (Ann Arbor, 1998), 219-21. (The locus classicus on the behaviour of a Greek audience is Cleon's speech in Thuc. 3. 37-40.) The whole context of Tac. Dial. 41.4 cited in the previous n. (with Mayer's nn.) but especially the reference to contiones(cf. also populum in 3. 8. 2 just quoted) serves to highlight the extent
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to which Q.'s argument anachronistically presupposes the situation of the Republic. opinio praesumpta: TLL s.v. praesumo 967. 52-4; rather differently, Sen. Dial. 6. 7. 4 'imbecillum inpatientemque reddit praesumpta opinio de non timendis terribilis'. perquam sit exiguus... locus: cf. 12. 10. 52, cited above on si mihi sapientes indices dentur, where note 'perquam raro'. Q. uses perquam seven times, six times in the way documented at TLL s.v. 1659. 13-34 ('quo indicatur quantitas, amplitudo, frequentia sim.'), which compares for our locution Val. Max. 6. 2. 10 'materiam.. .perquam exiguam'. et prope... ponatur: there is some conflict with 12. 10. 52, where we are told that before a jury of sapientes there would be no need for soothing delectatia 17. 29 sin: sc. sunt, giving the actual situation, contrasted with the hypothesis of'si., .dentur' (28). It is only this contrast of moods that enables us to translate here: 'if, as is the case'. audientium: covering all the types of audience implied in 27-8. mobiles animi: cf. Cic. Fam. 5. 2. 10 'nec in te .. .animo fui mob iii sed ita stabili ut.. .'The hearers' liability to being 'moved' will in turn help the orator who plays on their adfectus. arte pugnandum est: for oratory as a battle, cf. e.g. 9. 3. 102 'ubi... atrocitate inuidia miseratione pugnandum est'. That sort of emotional appeal, taught as part of the ars rhetorica, will be what Q. was thinking of in particular when he wrote arte. neque enim... potest: for 'recta uia depulsus' cf. 10. 1. 29, and nn. on 2. 3.9 lassi and 2. 13. 16 rectam uiam; a second 'swerve' (cf. 9. 2. 78) is needed to get back on track. Cf. 5.13. 2 'inde recta fere... est actio; hinc mille flexus et artes desiderantur'. 17. 30 plurima... dicatur: cf. Marcus Aurelius in Fronto, p. 68. 11-13 van den Hout2: 'scribam autem alterutram partem, nam eadem de re diuersa tueri numquam prorsus ita dormiet Aristo uti permittat'. Considerations similar to those rehearsed by Q. here are offered by Antonius in Cic. de Orat. 2. 30, in order to support the view that rhetoric consists in facultas rather than ars. For Aristotle's pragmatic answer to this problem see RJiet. A\, 1355 a 29-33 en ravavrta Set Svvaadai neiOeiv, Kaddrrep Kai ev rots avXXoyiapois. ov\ orrais ap6repa npaTTiopiev (ou yap 8ei ra avXa neideiv). aAX iva prjre XavOdvrj TTOJS €\ei, Kai oTRIAS aXXov \pojpevov p,7] SiKaicus rois Xdyois avroi Xveiv e\cop,ev.
nullam.. .sibi: for similar arguments cf. Sextus, Adv. Rhet 47 (rrjs
prjTopiKrjs
evavrtiov avviarapevrjs Xoyojv), 66-8.
Commentary
342
restruere: undo'; cf. n. on 2. 4. 18
restraendi.
i t e m . . . doceat: Kiderlin" 3 6 5 - 6 , pointing to what follows, and to the terms o f Q.'s retort in 35, emended to 'item aut dicenda < e t contraria d i c e n d i s > 7 6 earn docere aut n o n dicenda'. But this spoils the snap o f the d i l e m m a in 30; as to 3 5 , ' n e q u e praecipit u m q u a m non dicenda' denies ' n o n esse artem quod n o n dicenda praecipiat', while 'nec dicendis contraria' denies 'quod, c u m dicenda praeceperit, etiam contraria his doceat'. 17. 31 alioqui: 'on any o t h e r assumption' ( L o e b ) , with particular allusion to Q.'s o w n morally based definition o f rhetoric. I n what follows, Q . c o m e s down firmly in favour o f the view that the o r a t o r will not normally take on 'unjust' causes. In 12. 7 . 4 - 7 (referring back to 12. 1. 3 9 - 4 4 ) he gives advice on how t o c h o o s e one's cases; in writing such passages, he has Cic. Off. 2. 4 9 - 5 1 m u c h in mind. 17. 3 2 hoc q u o q u e . . . cadit, u t . . . : this is the kind o f admirabilis (cf. Ded.
mai. 1 . 1 1 ) almost ruled out in §31. F o r the phrasing, cf. Decl.
casus min.
2 5 2 . 2 'neque e n i m in rerum n a t u r a m cadit u t . . . ' , with W i n t e r b o t t o m ' s n. q u a n d o etiam p u g n a t u r o s . . . credunt: etiam pugnare
marks the extreme case;
is not now being used metaphorically (contrast 2 9 , and again 3 3 ) .
O n e would expect the allusion t o be to Stoics, though for ( s o m e o f ) them only avXot were subject to enmities ( S V F iii, frr. 6 2 5 - 6 ) . Russell notes ad loc.: ' S t o i c i s m recognized patriotic duties, and so it is conceivable that two Wise M e n might find themselves in opposing armies.' And Q . may b e thinking o f the sort o f d i l e m m a caused by civil war. si ratio ita duxerit: the verb looks to b e intransitive ( n o t e ita; 'se la ragione lo vorra C o r s i ) , as in 5. 13. 5 5 'quae ratio et ultra ducit'; but in favour o f ' i f reason led them to this' ( L o e b ) cf., in a related context, 1 2 . 1 . 34 'si quando e u m a d defensionem n o c e n t i u m ratio duxerit'. a t q u e ita q u i d e m . . . indulgent: Q . will reply to the c h a i s e s in such a way as to show them t o b e false even when rhetoric is taken in a n o n - m o r a l sense; he is not, that is, content to sweep the problem under the carpet as he did in §31 ( ' q u a e . . . seiuncta'). T h e promise is fulfilled especially obviously in § 3 4 , where Q . explicitly says that his argument works b o t h for g o o d m e n and for those w h o regard persuasion as their objective. n o m e n . . . indulgent: for the construction cf. OLD s.v. indulgeo
5, TLL s.v.
1253. 19 seq. ( p o s t - C i c e r o ) ; o u r passage is at 1254. 9 - 1 0 . T h e n a m e was not to be bestowed lightly: 'proditorem transfugam praeuaricatorem
donabimus
oratoris illo sacro n o m i n e ? ' ( 1 2 . 1. 2 4 ) . 7 4 In Kiderlin7 714 he prefers the order 'et dicendis contraria' as better explaining the omission after contraria.
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indulgent: indulgeant (A) could be explained as being the verb of a subordinate clause in oratio obliqua. 17. 33 causa... componitur: cf. 7. 2. 22 'totam causam nostram cum tota aduersarii causa componimus' (of comparison), and esp. Cic. Caei 22 'res cum re, causa aim causa, ratio cum ratione pugnabit' (with Austin's n.). In our passage too there will be talk of fighting (pugnent), and componitur hints at the pairing off of gladiators for combat (OLD s.v. compono 3b), an allusion brought out into the open in 'quia... componuntur' below. nec si pugnent.. .didicerunt: another way in which rhetoric might be argued to contradict itself. When Q. comes to his parallels, the idea of 'an art imparted to both' is most rigorously illustrated by the case of gladiators trained under the same master, less so by the case of steersmen and generals, for they would presumably often not have been formally taught at all. armorum: sc. ars; cf. Liv. 2. 46. 4 (also Cic. de Orat. 2. 84 'ars... ludicra armorum'). sub eodem magistro eruditi: cf. Suet. Jul. 26. 3 'tirones [i.e. novice gladiators] neque in ludo neque per lanistas sed... per equites Romanos atque etiam per senatores armorum peritos erudiebat'. The normal word for a trainer of gladiators is indeed lanista; but Cicero uses magister in S. Rose. 17 (partly for variety, but see also Landgraf ad loc. on the motif of surpassing one's master): 'hie autem nuper se ad eum lanistam contulit, quique ante hanc pugnam tiro esset... facile ipsum magistrum scelere audaciaque superauit'. 17. 34 naualibus proeliis: cf. TLL s.v. proelium 1654. 47-8 (also 1650. 17-20 of staged sea-fights); for the ablative ibid. 1656. 34-44. imperatoria: a final piece of variation after armorum and gubernandi (Q. may not have felt able to venture on gubernatoria: TLL s.v. gubernatorius 2349. 18-19 cites from the Latin Origen 'gubernator est qui didicit gubernatoriam', i.e. Kv^epvrjTiKrjv). There seems to be no proper parallel for ars imperatoria in this sense (TLL s.v. ars 664. 80-665. 1); cf. Cic. de Orat. 1. 210 'ars imperatoris'. euertit: corresponding to restruere at 30. The word is specifically used of refutation (7. 2. 12 'euerso quo defendimur relicum est quo premimur'; TLL s.v. everto 1032. 76-1033. 10), as well as of the destruaion of physical opera (ibid. 1030. 24-79). eflfecit: efficit AB. The perfect is supported by 30 'nullam artem restruere quod effecerit', and gives superior rhythm. positum a se argumentum: a se is stressed. For the verb, cf. 5. 12. 6 'quaedam argumenta ponere satis non est: adiuuanda sunt'; Cic. de Orat. 2. 214 'sicut argumentum, simul atque positum est, arripitur'; TLL s.v.
Commentary
344
argumentum 545. 76-8. The Greek counterpart is nde'vat (for its use of propositions or arguments see Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus s.v. riOevai no. 3). soluit: Au€T (LSJ S.V. XVOJ 4d). An exact parallel is not forthcoming, but cf. 5. 13. 13 'singula quaeque [sc. argumenta] dissolueris'. sed . . . credibile: i.e. nor does rhetoric either [contradict itself], for whether it is two amoral speakers who are pitted against each other or two good men (true orators), there is no contradiction between their arguments: they are only ueri similia on both sides, and plausibilities cannot be contraria to each other. The claim 'euertit opus rhetorice quod effecit' can be taken in two ways, (i) An orator puts up an argument and then himself refutes it. Q. denies that this happens at all. (ii) Rhetoric itself puts up and refutes its own arguments, in the sense that A, a rhetorically trained orator, refutes an argument put up by B, another rhetorically trained orator. Q. answers that, though this does indeed happen, it does not prove that rhetoric contradicts itself. For As argument is not contrary to that of B. Neither A nor B is doing more than putting forward a probable argument, and all that can be said is that one is more probable than the other. Q. has taken over a view that Cicero argued for philosophy, that nothing is more than probable (Tusc. 2. 5 'nos qui sequimur probabilia nec ultra quam id quod ueri simile occurrit progredi possumus'; for ueri simile as a trademark term for Academic rhetoric, see Brittain 319-42 andT. Reinhardt, 'Rhetoric in the Fourth Academy', CQ2 50 (2000), 531-47). But the application of this to rhetoric (here and at §39) should be problematic for Q., who will very soon speak unabashedly of ueritas (§36; cf. e.g. 12. 1.45 'non aliter autem ueri similia quam uera et confirmantur et refelluntur').77 The Stoic doctrine, of course, was more rigorous; cf. e.g. Zeno on the need to hear just one speech in a trial {SVF i, fr. 78 = Plut. De Sto. Rep. 1034 E): t r p o s TOV EITTOVRA ' ptjSi TOLOUTUJ Tivi
Seure'pou
Xnyco
Xeyovrog-
Trepas
p.rj&£ VTRRJKOVOE KXrjOeis OVK aKovoreov
apa
8IKT)V
xptvpevos' yap rj
8iKaoijs etV
to
fyrovpevov
vnriKovoas
TOV Sevrepov
rptv ap.cu pvOov
o Zrjvtav,
(IKOVOTJS" avreXeyev
(ITRE^EI^EV o t t p o r e p o s EITTLUV, OVK (LKOVAREOV TOV ereperioev
CIT OVK (lTreSei^er TJTOC
5'
opoiov
arrE'Sei£EV
yap
rj OVK
tvs ei
aWSeiner
Xeyovros.
ut dixi: referring to the possibility left (just) open by 'uix admirabili quodam casu' in 31. contrarium: returning to the terminology of §30. The replies to two charges, 'nullam esse artem contrariam sibi' and 'nullam artem restruere quod effecerit', have become interwoven. 77
Superficially similar passages elsewhere are in fact c o n c e r n e d with different p r o b l e m s ; thus
in Inv. 1. 9 a n d 1. 4 7 C i c e r o says that the o r a t o r tries t o invent t r u e a n d plausible a r g u m e n t s , a n d in Ac. 2.7
( ' a u t u e r u m sit a u t ad id q u a m p r o x i m e a c c e d a t ' ) the issue is that sceptics a i m at t r u t h
a n d plausibility w h e n devising a r g u m e n t s and yet end up s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t .
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17. 35 nam u t . . . aduersum: we know no parallel for the examples, and it is not made plain exactly how they illustrate Q.'s claim (see n. above on sed... eredibile). The point seems to be that two propositions which are fo mi ally incompatible (e.g. 'the accused is guilty' and 'the accused is not guilty') are not actually contrary to each other if they are both merely plausible to a different degree, 'just as' two different shades of white are not contrary to each other. aduersum: varying eontrarium; cf. OLD s.v. aduersus111a. ita nec: cf. Sen. Dial. 4. 15. 4 'ut seruire non possunt, ita nec imperare'; n. on 2. 13. 7 alioqui nec. probabili probabilius: varying 'credibilius... eredibile' (34), which in turn varies uerisimilia. For a shift between eredibile and persuasibile see n.on 2. 15. 16 Eudorus. neque praecipit... dicenda sunt: cf. n. on 30 item... doeeat. 17. 36 non semper... defendat: a rather defensive footnote to this section, not replying to any of the specific charges brought in §30, and dropping the language of ueri similia (cf. n. on 34 sed... eredibile). Q. seems to revert to the concerns of §31 about the selection of cases; strictly speaking, rhetoric is not present where the case is unjust, and it will normally defend the truth—but not always.78 The appeal to communis utilitas (see also n.on 27 cum ex bona ratione proficiscitur) is echoed in the fuller discussion of these matters in 12. 1 (37 'asperiora quaedam adhuc dictu si communis utilitas exegerit facere conceditur; ne hoc quidem nudum est intuendum, qualem causam uir bonus, sed etiam quare et qua mente defendat', 43; cf. also 3. 7. 25 'quod [i.e. calling the foolhardy brave, etc.] quidem orator, id est uir bonus, numquam faciet, nisi forte communi utilitate ducetur'; the phrase is frequent in Cicero, from Inv. 1. 68 on). ei: i.e. rhetoric. B omits the word, but it supplies a subject for defendat. ponuntur... contradictiones: these objections to the technicity of rhetoric are 'put on the table' by Cic. (or rather 'Antonius' in de Orat. 2. 30, reported more or less accurately); OLD s.v. pono 15b provides some half-parallels. In 5. 13. 42 (cf. Sen. Suas. 2. 17) the phrase is used of a dedaimer posing an imagined objection. On the subject itself see the introduction to ch. 17, L-P ii. 220-2 (and i. 190-4). The contradictiones (this covers 'artem earum rerum... nesciat') amount to the following: art is concerned with things that are known (the claim), but any forensic speech is a matter not of knowing but of opining, because (rt) the orator speaks before an audience who does not know, and (b) he sometimes 7 8 Q. might have added the sensible point he makes (as an objection to which he tacitly assents) in § 3 9 that the o r a t o r cannot know that his cause is true.
346
Commentary
himself says things he does not know. Q. in §37 brushes aside reason (b), and returns to reason (a). He first, however, cites the claim, fallaciously proving that rhetoric qualifies as an art on that criterion. Then he turns to reason (a), but in citing it changes his target from 'an orator sometimes says things he does not know' to 'he does not know if what he says is true' (38), and again to 'he does not know if his case is true' (39a). These two reformulations of (a) are introduced as imaginary objections reminiscent of diatribe. In 39b ('quid quod... similia') Antonius is a reference point only in the sense that Q. is responding to the unstated background considerations of Antonius' argument. In 40 Q. returns to close interaction with de Orat. 2. 30, but there the issue is no longer rhetoric's relation to knowledge. artem.. .nesciat: cf. the contention of Charmadas at de Orat. 1. 92 artem uero negabat esse ullam, nisi quae cognitis penitusque perspectis et in unum exitum spectantibus et numquam fallentibus rebus [cf. Q. below at §41 j contineretur; haec autem omnia quae tractarentur ab oratoribus dubia esse et incerta, quoniam et dicerentur ab iis qui omnia ea non plane tenerent et audirentur ab iis quibus non scientia esset tradenda sed exigui temporis aut falsa aut certe obscura opinio. Crassus replies at 1. 107-9 that this was only a question of terminology; on a less rigorous definition of art, rhetoric clearly qualified. This is reminiscent of Plat. Theaet. 200 D-201 C, where Socrates proves the non-identity of knowledge and true judgement with reference to a courtroom situation. In 201 BC he argues that .. what happened at the scene of the crime can only be known by an eyewitness. Obviously, no amount of teaching could put the members of the jury in the same position as an eyewitness who saw what happened with his own eyes'; so Burnyeat ad loc. See also id. and J. Barnes, 'Socrates and the Jury: Paradoxes in Plato's Distinction between Knowledge and True Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. vol. 54 (1980), 173-91 and 193-206 respectively. It would of course be fitting for the Academic Charmadas to use an argument from the Theaet. omnem actionem: naoa ITpa£is (Wilkins; cf. L-P); but Russell seems right to translate 'entire pleading' (note 'dicat... dicat' in the explanation that follows). aliquando: added by Q. to blunt the edge of Antonius' assertion ('ea dicimus quae nescimus ipsi'). 17. 37 ars... orator: one cannot help feeling that Q. has run out of patience here, earum reram in 'ars earum rerum quae sciuntur' must refer to the subject-matter of rhetoric (and of course that is necessary to pick up the thread from above), but bene dicere is not rhetoric's subject-matter
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in Q. 79 Put differently, there is fallacy here in that scire is used in two different senses in 'sciuntur' (are known) and 'scit' ('knows' in the sense 'is able to'). autem here means 'and' (so the Loeb): 'rhetorice est ars bene dicendi' is preparatory in that it does not yet counter the charge, 'bene... orator' is the actual rejoinder. The difference in status between the two clauses is marked by autem; cf. K-S ii. 93 on the use of autem to mark the minor premiss of syllogisms. One might say the conclusion ('rhetoric says what it knows') has been omitted here. 17. 38 'sed nescit... dicit': the objections here and in §39 go beyond what Antonius explicitly said in de Oratore. qui ignem... tradunt: cf. 3. 3. 13 'alioqui tantum initia erunt, ut mundi uel umor uel ignis uel materia uel corpora insecabilia'. The references are (of course) respectively to Heraclitus; Thales; Empedocles; and the Atomists. Q. has now switched back to talking about knowledge of the subject-matter. corpora insecabilia: the only occurrence of the term in this technical sense prior to Q. is Vitr. 2. 2. 1 'atomos quas nostri insecabilia corpora, nonnulli [e.g. Cicero] indiuidua uocitauerunt'. One wonders who is meant by nostri. By the middle of the first century BC there was an apparently quite substantial body of popular Epicurean prose texts in circulation (see C. J. Castner, Prosopography of Roman Epicureans from die Second Century B.C. to the Second Century A.D. (Frankfurt, 1988), s.nn. Amafinius, Catius, Rabirius), which Cicero criticizes for their linguistic ineptness (Ac. 1. 5-6; cf. Fam. 15. 19. 2). corpora insecabilia may have occurred there. qui... colligunt: the reference is to such astronomers as Aristarchus of Samos (who wrote a treatise TTepl /icycBcLv Kai a7ToaTr}p,aT(ov r/Xtov Kai oc\-qvr)s, which is extant); on him see M. Folkerts, NPi (1996), 1089-90. interualla siderum: cf. Cic. Tusc. 5. 10 'studioseque ab iis [the preSocratics] siderum magnitudines interualla cursus anquirebantur et cuncta caelestia'; Sen. Ep. 88. 13 'o egregiam artem\... interualla siderum dicis, nihil est quod in mensuram tuam non cadat'; Augustin. Conf. 10. 25. These passages, including ours, probably refer to the distances between the sidera rather than (as in Plin. Nat. 2. 83; cf. Aristarchus' title) to their distances from the earth; see Cic. Div. 2. 91 'reliqua uero tria interualla infinita et immensa, a Sole ad Martis, inde ad Iouis, ab eo ad Saturni stellam'. For this kind of genitive cf. Suet. Dom. 19 'ut omnes [sc. sagittae] per interualla digitorum innocue euaderent'; OLD s.v. interuallum la. colligunt: 'reckon'; cf. Vitr. 1. 6. 11 'sunt autem nonnulli qui negant Erastosthenem potuisse ueram mensuram orbis terrae colligere', Plin. Nat. 79
Intriguingly, though, Sextus considers if eS
Xeyctv could
be the
v\i) o f rhetoric
in 4 8 - 5 9 .
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Commentary
6. 205 'abunde orbe terrae extra intra indicato, colligenda in artum mensura aequorum uidetur'. But in such abstruse calculations the meaning 'infer' hovers (cf. Ammendola on the present passage, and 5. 14. 32 'indubitata colligunt'); note 'propter uim probationum' below. Quite different is 1. 10. 39 'quorum loco rum extremae lineae eandem mensuram colligunt'. 17. 39 dolorem capitis: cf. 5. 10. 82. non utique... sed: see n. on 2. 1. 1 utique. 'Not necessarily' (Loeb) weakens a strong (note the repeated semper) statement: rhetoric does not (the objector asserts) aim at always saying what is true, but at always saying what is probable. propositum habet... dicendi: cf. TLL s.v. propono 2071. 40-51, esp. 45-7. ueri similia: cf. n.on 34 sed... credibile and Cic. Off. 2. 51 (written from a practical point of view): 'iudicis est semper in causis uerum sequi, patroni nonnumquam ueri simile, etiam si minus sit uerum, defendere.' scit... dicit: seit is emphatic; like Socrates, rhetoric knows that it does not know. For this retort, cf. 20 'cum falso utitur pro uero, scit esse falsum'. 17. 40 adiciunt.. .quod... defendant: this further point in fact also derives from de Orat 2. 30 ('nos contrarias saepe causas dicimus...ut uterque nostrum eadem de re alias aliud defendat, cum plus uno uerum esse non possit'); it might be thought to go better in the context of the allegedly selfcontradictory nature of rhetoric (30-6). For such inconsistencies of behaviour, see 11. 1. 73-4, referring to the Cluentius case (note Clu. 138-9). For the construction cf. 12. 2. 25; TLL s.v. adicio 672. 54-68. alia et minora: Sudhaus (ap. Radermacher) wrongly wished to delete et. There are two reasons for ignoring these other arguments: they are trivial in themselves, and they are cognate to arguments already refuted, tamen implies that though themselves minora they are connected with praecipua. For et... et tamen see K-S ii. 34. ex his fontibus deriuata: Afifahl 121 compared Hor. Carm. 3. 6. 19 'hoc fonte deriuata clades'. 16 'hi complura dicunt, sed ex paucis locis ducta' is closely parallel. Q. by dealing with the few main points {loci, fontes) has managed to avoid the trivial detail {complura, minora); for this use of fons (as a metaphor for a type of argument) cf. Cic. deOrat. 2. 141 'argumentorum fontes' (cf. 2. 117, with L-P ad loc.). 17. 41. For the main texts on rhetoric as an art and secondary literature see the introduction to this chapter. confirmatur.. .inesse: this is not so much a proof as the drawing of a conclusion from premisses Q. has established (or claims to have established) earlier on. Thus the re'Ao? of rhetoric was arrived at by elimination in 2. 15. 38,
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that rhetoric is grounded in perceptiones is the outcome of 38-9, that these cohere with each other is clear from 33-6, and the usefulness of rhetoric is established in 2.16. 11-19. (Hence A's ostendemus cannot be right, as was seen by Kiderlin" 366-7, who identifies the earlier passages.) The reverse operation can be found in Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 10-42, where Sextus first cites the definition accepted by Q. here, then states that, while KaraArpjitis are always true, many of rhetoric's precepts are false, and concludes that rhetoric does not exist (with this cf. Cic. Ac. 2. 22 and Reid's notes for the argument that perceptiones must be true if there are to be artes). Cf. Hermogenes, TJepl ardoeajv ad in it. together with Syrianus ad loc. (Syrian i in Hermogenem comment aria ii. 6-8 Rabe), who shows that Hermogenes is there fitting (€apfxo^€i) the common definition of re^vr; to rhetoric; see the material from Olympiodorus to be cited below. ut Cleanthes uoluit... efficiens: Zeno's successor as the head of the Stoic school in c. 3 B.C. (see n.on 2. 15. 34). The definition is also attributed to Cleanthes by Olympiodorus in Grg. p. 69. 26-7 Westerink: KXedvBrjs TOIVVV Aeyei on "re^inj eoriv 68co rravra dvvovoa". Olympiodorus continues by saying that Chrysippus realized that Cleanthes' definition was too wide (70. 1—3): odev o Xpvoimros ITpooOels TO "/xera (ftavTaotaiv" etnev on "re'^Jj eonv e£is o8o) npoiovoa /xerri avTaoidjv\ According to David, Prol. philos. pp. 43. 30-44. '5 Busse (CAG XVIII. 2 = fr. 393A Hiilser), Cleanthes' definition applied to vots too, where the term is understood to cover not just the vois of individual rational beings, and Chrysippus' addition narrowed down its scope in the following way: Te^vT) Se iortv rj TLOV KaOoXov yvtoais perA Xoyov, rj re\vrj COTIV e£is oSu> fiaSt^ouoa perd (ftavraatas"' Kal yap 77 rexvrj res Kal yvu>ais eOTiv, riAAu Kal oSut fiaSi^ec irdvra yap Kara rd£tv TToiei. "pera avTaaias" Se iTpoOKeiTat Sid rrjv ifivaiv Kal yap rj vats eaTtv (e\ei yap TO etvai ev rois exovotv avrrjv, oTov ev dvOpajTTiUy ev AiOioy ev £uAo>) Kal oSutfiaSl^ei(/card yap TU£IV irpoepxeTai), aAA' ov per a <j>avraoias uiairep rj Texvrf Kal yap O Texvtrijs Kexpijpei'ns TUJ Xoyw, r/viKa fiovXeTai Ti Troirjoaiy TTporepov SiaTimoi ev eavTui o fiouXerat irotrjoai Kal eiO* O U T O J ? diToreXei avro, 17 Se <j>uois ovSev TOIOVTOV iroier ovSe yap TrpoSiaTvrroi ev eavrr} o fiouXerai KaraaKevdaai. That Chrysippus' modification of Cleanthes' definition was made on the grounds that it applied both to vois and to Tc'xvr) is up to a point confirmed by Sextus, Adv. Math 7. 373 (SVF vol. ii, fr. 56 = [part of] fr. 260 Hiilser), from which it is clear that 'according to Chrysippus the presence of presentations in the soul is a necessary condition for the acquisition and practice of techne (Mansfeld 58). Mansfeld also comments on the general similarity of Olympiodorus and Q. here (both set out Stoic definitions of Te'xvrj and apply
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them to rhetoric), and concludes from this (ibid., 60): 'These samples (Quintilian's text being the earliest) suffice to show that the context in which these definitions were cited is traditional, viz. a discussion of techne in general in relation to a specific discipline... It is clear too that these definitions tend to appear in clusters.' This seems an entirely appropriate assessment, but if we consider—see previous note—how Q. structures the chapter so as to be able to conclude with these two definitions of rhetoric, then it will be clear that 2. 17 is very much a unity of his own making. The Schol. on Dionysius Thrax, however, (p. 118. 14-16 Hilgard = see SVF vol. i, fr. 72) gave a very similar definition to Zeno: co? SrjAot ael o Zr/vcov, Xeyouv "rexvT] iorlv ££is oBoTronqTiKr)", roureart BC oBov Kai peOoBov iroiovod
TI. Olympiodorus, however, assigns the 'standard' definition to Zeno (in fact, he is the only source to connect Zeno's name with it: p. 70. 7 W.). This leads some to question the attribution to Zeno in the scholia (von Arnim in particular), but, as M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa: Geschichte einer Bexvegung, ii (Gottingen, 4 1972), 36 pointed out, Z.'s view on nature (Cic. ND 2. 57 'Zeno igitur naturam ita definit ut earn dicat ignem esse artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem uia'; cf. D.L. 7. 156) seems to confirm the attribution to Zeno. Multiple definitions, however, are not uncommon in Stoic contexts. potestas: apparently translating Bvvafxis rather than Small terminological variations would not be surprising, but it is also possible that Q. thought potestas was the better translation here; see Sparshott 282-3, who offers this consideration (not, however, his favoured solution): It is possible that he thought it really was a better translation than of hexis in this context, because with the different slant Chrysippus has introduced it seems reasonable to say that clairvoyance (mantike—Chrysippus' example of a hexis, which surely must mean in this context the gift of second sight rather than the professional practice of the skilled interpreter of omens) is a gift or a capacity rather than a tendency, and the same might go for Chrysippus' other examples, a hot temper or a weak head for akohol. These can indeed be seen as temperamental weaknesses, deficiencies in normal powers, rather than dispositions to act. uia, id est ordine: the juncture seems unparalleled (though cf. Ter. Han. 706 'immo ut recta uia rem narret ordine omnem'). uia combines with ratione (Sandys on Cic. Or. 10) to mean 'methodically'; note also 'artificio et uia' (Cic. Fin. 4. 10). For the Greek background see Cope on Arist. Rhet. A1, 1354a8 68a> noieiv. The same idea is expressed in Philodemus' definition of art (Rhet. suppl. p. 35) by earrjKorco? Kai fiefiaiojs ouBe aroxaaTiKcos (text
uncertain in the last colon; Barnes 7 restores to 17 re oroxaoTiKdis). Opposed to the methodical approach is procedure by trial and error, eiKrj (Arist. Rhet. ibid.; Sen. Ep. 29. 3 'non est ars quae ad effectum casu uenit'); cf. Cic. Brut. 46
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'nam antea neminem solitum uia nec arte... dicere'; D. H. Comp. 25 680O re Kai T€)(vr)s xcopts iTTirrjhcvovTOJV. efficiens: used absolutely (not cited at TLL s.v. ejficio 178. 25-35); A's 'uiam id est ordinem' is the result of someone not not taking this point. Contrast the Greek iravra avvovoa. This appears to be the only Latin version of the definition. nemo dubitauerit: a favourite locution of Q.'s (according to PHI found seven times in Inst., twice in Decl. min.; otherwise only in Dig., three times). The verb will be perfect subjunctive (of the dixerim type: H-Sz 332), not future perfect = perfective future (for which cf. n. on 2. 4. 7 ilia...). ab omnibus fere probatus: this is most probably accurate even for the Hellenistic period, see Nesselrath 148-9 and M. Heath, Hermogenes: On Issues (Oxford, 1995), 61; for the Stoics see SVF i, fr. 73; to whose references add Ps.-Soranus in V. Rose, Anecdota Graeca, ii (Berlin, 1864), 247. It is a fortiori true for the imperial period; see the material collected by Nesselrath 149-50. The Greek is (Olymp. in Grg. p. 70. 7-9 W. andfrequentlyelsewhere; cf. SVFi, fr. 73; fr. 392-414 Hiilser): rixvr] iarl avarqpa €K KaraXrufteajv ouyyeyvpvaopi vwv 7rpos rt reAos evxprjoTov TOJV iv TOJ j3t'a> (a frequent variation is the simple n - below on uitae). For two versions of this dative, i.e. €vxpVaTOV TV definition in Cicero see Cic. de Orat. 1. 92 and 1. 108, with L-P i. 191. perceptionibus: the 'items of knowledge' which represent the laws and precepts of an art. See esp. Cic. Fin. 3. 17 'rerum autem cognitiones, quas uel comprehensiones uel perceptiones uel... /caraA^et? appellemus licet'. For the meaning of the term see the texts collected in section 41 Long-Sedley; M. Frede, 'Stoic epistemology', in K. Algra etal. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1999), 295-322. A's praeceptionibus would = (if anything) npoXruf/eis (cf. TLL s.v. praeceptio 421. 10-31), which are not in point here. consentientibus: representing avarr)p,a, see Barnes 5-6. But the prefix in constare is relevant too. coexercitatis: coined as a translation of ovyy€yvp.vaop.€vois (cf. Cicero's more elegant rendering in ND 2. 147-8 'quanta uero ilia sunt, quae uos Academici infirmatis et tollitis, quod et sensibus et animo ea quae extra sunt percipimus atque conprendimus; exquibus conlatis inter se et conparatis artes quoque efificimus partim ad usum uitae partim ad oblectationem necessarias'; Reid's n.on Ac. 2. 22 'ars... constat'); see Barnes 6. uitae: of course governed by utilem. The dative suggests but does not prove that Q.'s Greek material read evxprjorov r<£ fiicp (as e.g. Rh. Gr. v. 18. 7-8) rather than €vxpvaTOV T<*>v eV m> /?ioj (which would be awkward but not impossible to render in Latin). The only attempt to explain what the genitive phrase t&v iv tojfiiipexactly means in the case of rhetoric is in the Scholia
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on Hermogenes Flept
(Rh. Gr. iv. 45. 5-6) iv ravrat 8i KOLI irepl a \ 