Rabbinic Narrative: A Documentary Perspective: Forms, Types and Distribution of Narratives in the Mishnah, Tractate Abot, and the Tosefta

RABBINIC NARRATIVE: A DOCUMENTARY PERSPECTIVE VOLUME I

THE BRILL REFERENCE LIBRARY OF JUDAISM Editors J. NEUSNER (Bard College) — H. BASSER (Queens University) A.J. AVERY-PECK (College of the Holy Cross) — Wm.S. GREEN (University of Rochester) — G. STEMBERGER (University of Vienna) — I. GRUENWALD (Tel Aviv University) — M. GRUBER (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev) G.G. PORTON (University of Illinois) — J. FAUR (Bar Ilan University)

VOLUME 14

RABBINIC NARRATIVE: A DOCUMENTARY PERSPECTIVE Volume One: Forms, Types and Distribution of Narratives in the Mishnah, Tractate Abot and the Tosefta BY

JACOB NEUSNER

BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON 2003

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Neusner, Jacob, 1932Rabbinic narrative : a documentary perspective / by Jacob Neusner. v. cm. — (The Brill reference library of Judaism, ISSN 1566-1237 ; v. 14) Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: v. 1. Forms, types, and distribution of narratives in the Mishnah, Tractate Abot, and the Tosefta — v. 2. Forms, types and distribution of narratives in Sifra, Sifré to Numbers, and Sifré to Deuteronomy. ISBN 90-04-13023-3 (v. 1 : alk. paper) — ISBN 90-04-13034-9 (v. 2 : alk. paper) 1. Narration in rabbinical literature. 2. Rabbinical literature—History and criticism. 3. Mishnah—Criticism, Narrative. 4. Midrash—History and criticism. 5. Parables in rabbinical literature. I. Title. II. Series. BM496.9.N37N48 2003 296.1’2066–dc 21

2003050220

ISSN 1566-1237 ISBN 90 04 13023 3

© Copyright 2003 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

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CONTENTS Preface ...........................................................................................

ix

Introduction ..................................................................................

1

1. Pseudo-Narrative ................................................................... i. Portrayals of Conversations ................................................... ii. Portrayals of Halakhic Rules as Described Actions .............. iii. The Precedent/Case/Ruling ................................................ iv. Conclusion .............................................................................

25 26 32 43 46

part one narratives in the mishnah forms, types and distribution 2. Mishnah Seder Zeraim ............................................................ i. Tractate Berakhot .................................................................. ii. Tractate Pe"ah ........................................................................ iii. Tractate Dema#i" .................................................................... iv. Tractate Kilayim .................................................................... v. Tractate Shebi#it ..................................................................... vi. Tractate Terumot ................................................................... vii. Tractate Ma#asero .................................................................. viii. Tractate Ma#aser Sheni .......................................................... ix. Tractate Hallah ...................................................................... x. Tractate #Orlah ...................................................................... xi. Tractate Bikkurim .................................................................. xii. Summary ................................................................................

51 51 55 55 55 56 57 57 57 57 58 58 58

3. Mishnah Seder Moed .............................................................. i. Tractate Shabbat ................................................................... ii. Tractate Erubin ...................................................................... iii. Tractate Pesahim ................................................................... iv. Tractate Sheqalim .................................................................. v. Tractate Yoma ............................................................................

63 63 65 67 67 69

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vi. vii. viii. ix. x. xi. xii. xiii.

contents Tractate Sukkah ......................................................................... Tractate Besah ........................................................................... Tractate Rosh Hashanah ........................................................... Tractate Ta#anit ......................................................................... Tractate Megillah ...................................................................... Tractate Mo#ed Qatan ............................................................... Tractate Hagigah ....................................................................... Summary ....................................................................................

70 72 73 76 78 78 78 78

4. Mishnah Seder Nashim ................................................................ i. Tractate Yebamot ...................................................................... ii. Tractate Ketubot ........................................................................ iii. Tractate Nedarim ...................................................................... iv. Tractate Nazir ............................................................................ v. Tractate Sotah ............................................................................ vi. Tractate Gittin ........................................................................... vii. Tractate Qiddushin .................................................................... viii. Summary ....................................................................................

83 83 85 85 89 90 90 91 91

5. Mishnah Seder Neziqin ............................................................... 95 i. Tractate Baba Qamma .............................................................. 95 ii. Tractate Baba Mesia .................................................................. 96 iii. Tractate Baba Batra ................................................................... 98 iv. Tractate Sanhedrin .................................................................... 98 v. Tractate Makkot ........................................................................ 99 vi. Tractate Shebuot ....................................................................... 99 vii. Tractate #Eduyyot....................................................................... 99 viii. Tractate #Abodah Zarah .......................................................... 102 ix. Tractate Horayot ..................................................................... 104 x. Summary .................................................................................. 104 6. Mishnah Seder Qodoshim ......................................................... 107 i. Tractate Zebahim .................................................................... 107 ii. Tractate Menahot .................................................................... 107 iii. Tractate Hullin ........................................................................ 107 iv. Tractate Bekhorot .................................................................... 107 v. Tractate #Arakhin ..................................................................... 109 vi. Tractate Temurah .................................................................... 110 vii. Tractate Keritot ....................................................................... 110 viii. Tractate Me#ilah....................................................................... 111

contents ix. x. xi. xii.

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Tractate Tamid ........................................................................ 111 Tractate Middot ....................................................................... 111 Tractate Qinnim ...................................................................... 111 Summary .................................................................................. 111

7. Mishnah Seder Tohorot .......................................................... 113 i. Tractate Kelim ......................................................................... 113 ii. Tractate Ohalot ....................................................................... 113 iii. Tractate Nega"im ..................................................................... 114 iv. Tractate Parah ......................................................................... 114 v. Tractate Tohorot ...................................................................... 114 vi. Tractate Miqva"ot .................................................................... 114 vii. Tractate Niddah ....................................................................... 114 viii. Tractate Makhshirin ................................................................ 115 ix. Tractate Zabim ........................................................................ 116 x. Tractate Tebul Yom ................................................................. 116 xi. Tractate Yadayim ..................................................................... 116 xii. Tractate #Uqsin ........................................................................ 117 xiii. Summary .................................................................................. 117 part two Narratives in Tractate Abot 8. Tractate Abot .......................................................................... 121 part three narratives in the Tosefta: forms, types and distribution 9. Tosefta Seder Zeraim ............................................................... 125 i. Tractate Berakhot .................................................................... 126 ii. Tractate Pe"ah .......................................................................... 131 iii. Tractate Dema#i ....................................................................... 134 iv. Tractate Kilayim ...................................................................... 135 v. Tractate Shebi#it ....................................................................... 135 vi. Tractate Terumot ..................................................................... 136 vii. Tractate Ma#aserot ................................................................... 138 viii. Tractate Ma#aser Sheni ............................................................ 138 ix. Tractate Hallah ........................................................................ 139 x. Tractate #Orlah ........................................................................ 139 xi. Tractate Bikkurim .................................................................... 139

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xii. Summary .................................................................................. 139 10. Tosefta Seder Moed ............................................................... 145 i. Tractate Shabbat ..................................................................... 145 ii. Tractate Erubin ........................................................................ 150 iii. Tractate Pisha (Pesahim) .......................................................... 153 iv. Tractate Sheqalim .................................................................... 157 v. Tractate Kippurim (Yoma) ...................................................... 157 vi. Tractate Sukkah ....................................................................... 167 vii. Tractate Yom Tob (Besah) ....................................................... 172 viii. Tractate Rosh Hashanah ......................................................... 175 ix. Tractate Ta#aniyyot (Ta#anit) ................................................... 176 x. Tractate Megillah .................................................................... 179 xi. Tractate Mo#ed (Mo#ed Qatan) ............................................... 181 xii. Tractate Hagigah ..................................................................... 182 xiii. Summary .................................................................................. 186 11. Tosefta Seder Nashim ............................................................ 205 i. Tractate Yebamot .................................................................... 205 ii. Tractate Ketubot ...................................................................... 211 iii. Tractate Nedarim .................................................................... 213 iv. Tractate Nezirut (Nazir) .......................................................... 213 v. Tractate Sotah .......................................................................... 215 vi. Tractate Gittin ......................................................................... 220 vii. Tractate Qiddushin .................................................................. 221 viii. Summary .................................................................................. 221 12. Tosefta Seder Neziqin ........................................................... 231 i. Tractate Baba Qamma ............................................................ 231 ii. Tractate Baba Mesia ................................................................ 234 iii. Tractate Baba Batra ................................................................. 234 iv. Tractate Sanhedrin .................................................................. 234 v. Tractate Makkot ...................................................................... 237 vi. Tractate Shebuot ..................................................................... 237 vii. Tractate #Eduyyot..................................................................... 238 viii. Tractate #Abodah Zarah .......................................................... 238 ix. Tractate Horayot ..................................................................... 239 x. Summary .................................................................................. 240 13. Tosefta Seder Qodoshim ....................................................... 245

contents i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii. viii. ix.

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Tractate Zebahim .................................................................... 245 Tractate Menahot .................................................................... 245 Tractate Hullin ........................................................................ 246 Tractate Bekhorot .................................................................... 249 Tractate #Arakhin ..................................................................... 251 Tractate Temurah .................................................................... 251 Tractate Keritot ....................................................................... 251 Tractate Me#ilah....................................................................... 251 Summary .................................................................................. 251

14. Tosefta Seder Tohorot ......................................................... 253 i. Tractate Kelim ......................................................................... 253 ii. Tractate Ahilot (Ohalot) .......................................................... 257 iii. Tractate Nega#im ..................................................................... 262 iv. Tractate Parah ......................................................................... 262 v. Tractate Tohorot ...................................................................... 266 vi. Tractate Miqva"ot .................................................................... 267 vii. Tractate Niddah ....................................................................... 270 viii. Tractate Makhshirin ................................................................ 273 ix. Tractate Zabim ........................................................................ 273 x. Tractate Tebul Yom ................................................................. 273 xi. Tractate Yadayim ..................................................................... 273 xii. Tractate #Uqsin ........................................................................ 274 xiii. Summary .................................................................................. 274 15. The Mishnah and the Tosefta Described and Compared 281 i. Forms and Types of Narratives in the Mishnah: General Observations ............................................................................ 281 ii. Forms and Types of Narratives in the Tosefta: General Observations ............................................................................ 285 iii. Narratives in the Mishnah and the Tosefta Compared .......... 290 iv. The Successful Narratives Revisited: A Documentary Perspective on Rabbinic Narrative with special reference to the Mishnah and the Tosefta ............................................... 298 Bibliographical Appendix: Recent Studies of Rabbinic Narrative ................. 303 i. David Stern: Parables in Midrash. Narrative and Exegesis in Rabbinic Literature. .................................................................. 303 ii. Catherine Hezser: Form, Function, and Historical Significance of the Rabbinic Story in Yerushalmi Neziqin. ................. 308

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iii. Galit Hasan-Rokem: Web of Life. Folklore and Midrash in Rabbinic Literature. .................................................................. 311 Index of Subjects ............................................................................ 323 Index of Ancient Sources ............................................................... 326

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PREFACE Each Rabbinic document, from the Mishnah through the Bavli, defines itself by a unique combination of indicative traits of rhetoric, topic, and particular logic that governs its coherent discourse. We can easily identify compositions and composites distinctive or primary to a given document1 once we decipher those traits in that combination that characterize that document and no other. The reason is simple. Compositions and composites2 ordinarily signal their particular venues—the compilations where they belong—through their indicative traits, which comprehensive analysis readily identifies. But narratives in the same canonical compilations do not conform to the documentary indicators that govern in these compilations, respectively. They form an anomaly for the documentary reading of the Rabbinic canon of the formative age. In the present project, I address that anomaly. I ask about the types and forms of narratives and show that particular documents exhibit distinctive preferences among those types. Accordingly, this detailed, systematic classification of Rabbinic narrative supplies these facts concerning the classification of narratives and their regularities: (1) what are the types and forms of narrative in a given document? (2) how are these distinctive types and forms of narrative distributed across the canonical documents of the formative age, the first six centuries C.E.?3 I start with the Mishnah, tractate Abot, and Tosefta, and plan to proceed to other documents in due course. 1

Where the same composition or composite occurs in more than a single document, it is ordinarily possible to show that the composition or composite exhibits the formal traits of one document over others in which it occurs. But as I shall explain, narratives present an anomaly to the documentary hypothesis of Rabbinic writing. 2 For the distinction and its importance, see The Rules of Composition of the Talmud of Babylonia. The Cogency of the Bavli’s Composite. Atlanta, 1991: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. 3 The upshot of collecting and arranging that information concerns fundamental questions of the religion, literature, and history of Rabbinic Judaism as these are realized in its canon—the sole evidence of that Judaism. If this project accomplishes its goals, it will form the foundations of an anticipated successor, The Phenomenology of Rabbinic Narrative: Forms and Types.

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What is at issue, and what is at stake, in understanding the workings of narrative by documents?4 First, a simple mental experiment answers the question of what is at issue. If we are handed a piece of expository writing of any type except narratives and not told the source, we have solid grounds on which to assign that writing to a particular document, or at the very least, class of documents. That is because we know the several sets of documentary preferences of logical, rhetorical, and topical combinations, as I said. But faced with a narrative without markings as to documentary origin, we cannot now come to an informed guess as to its primary venue, because we do not yet know the documentary repertoire, e.g., the form of the ma#aseh (case/precedent, also merely “story” generically) characteristic of the Mishnah as against that preferred by the Tosefta, and so for other types of narrative, e.g., mashal/parable. Indeed, in Texts without Boundaries5 I have shown in a sample of eight documents that writing roughly classified as narrative6 in each of the eight settings ignores the otherwise-governing, documentary indicators and boundaries. In their various forms and types, narratives uniformly appear to violate documentary boundaries otherwise marked by topic-logic-rhetoric in a distinctive combination. That they do by exhibiting rhetorical and logical indicators not restricted to a given document or even group of documents. What is at stake, second, is more than whether or not we detect formal regularities. It is whether the narratives, formally beyond textual boundaries, respond to their own theological and Halakhic agenda. Specifically, in context do they represent a conceptually distinct component of the canonical documents in program as well as in form? Or do narratives find a place within the program of the 4 I simply do not address abstract and theoretical issues of narrative writing, for these do not pertain to this study. Whether this study pertains to them is not for me to say. I have found only mildly interesting the work of such literary critics of Rabbinic writing as Jeffrey Rubenstein, Yonah Frenkel, and others cited below. 5 Texts without Boundaries. Protocols of Non-Documentary Writing in the Rabbinic Canon. Lanham, 2002: University Press of America. Volume One. The Mishnah, Tractate Abot, and the Tosefta. Volume Two. Sifra and Sifré to Numbers. Volume Three. Sifré to Deuteronomy and Mekhilta Attributed to R. Ishmael. Volume Four. Leviticus Rabbah. 6 I do not claim to contribute to, or even engage with, the abstract theoretical literature of “narratology,” but deal only with concrete problems of the formative canon of Judaism, and that reticence makes defining matters a function of context, not abstract theory, hence the “roughly defined” of the text.

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respective documents in which they occur? That is one way of dealing with the anomaly, a way demanded by the interior logic of the documentary hypothesis. Why does it matter? The ultimate question facing those engaged by the phenomenology of the canonical writings is how we are to describe the formative-Rabbinic Judaic structure and system. At stake therefore is the history of the formation of that Judaism. The reason is simple. A theory on the way in which the documentary evidence took shape and how it accomplished its compilers’ goals is required for systematic description of that process. Therein we may discern the generative logic of formative-Rabbinic Judaism as the writing down of the system embodies that logic. Accordingly, the documentary hypothesis promises a theory of system-formation, a theory based on the formal evidence of regularities in the writing of the compositions and composites that comprise the constitutive documents of the system. And that brings us back to the urgency of addressing the anomaly presently embodied in narratives. So I undertake the investigation, in the context of the documents viewed as coherent constructions, of the order and regularity exhibited by narratives—if there is such a pattern. We come, then, to the concrete tasks of this monograph and its companions: what order, what regularity, in particular? I propose to identify the narrative types and forms and other indicative traits that shape out of random data a set of coherent classifications. I further assess the distribution, among the canonical compilations, of these types and forms. The outcome of this volume is simple. We shall differentiate narratives the formal traits of which indicate origin in the Mishnah (or in the Tosefta), as against those, the formal traits of which signal origin in the Tosefta (and not in the Mishnah). That result of the survey recorded here suffices to prove that narratives in the Mishnah and the Tosefta adhere to documentary requirements of the Mishnah and/or of the Tosefta respectively. Given the character of the Mishnah, we must find plausible that the document defines its preferences and uses for narratives as much as for all other media of discourse. Given what we know about the Tosefta, we cannot find astonishing that the document contains both Mishnah-like materials and compositions that do not conform to Mishnaic preferences on narrative form. That simple result of this systematic survey necessitates further exercises of documentary comparison and contrast in the use of narratives.

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What, exactly, do I mean in the context of the documentary theory by “narrative”? I spell out in the Introduction the answer to that question defined by the present context, which then excludes a variety of other perfectly valid and theoretically far more sophisticated readings of the same sources as narratives. Since a vast literature of aesthetics (literary theory broadly construed) on “narrativity” and “poetics” accumulates, focused on issues that do not pertain here, a clear delineation is required: what do I not mean when I speak of “narrative,” and in what context do I define the term? The Introduction answers that two-sided question of exclusion and inclusion. I seek a more objective, formal, positivist account of matters than theories of aesthetics (narrativity, poetics) provide.7 But for that functional definition I claim only congruence to the problem at hand: a particular anomaly of a determinate corpus of writings, not a general theory pertinent to writing in general. To recapitulate: what do I claim to prove in this part of the study? I state with heavy emphasis: Narratives form part of the documentary self-definition of the Mishnah and the Tosefta. The fulcrum of interpretation and analysis, for narrative as much as for all other kinds of canonical writing in formative Judaism, is the document. What I show here is that the narrative in the documents treated here does serve documentary purposes and does not ignore or disrupt them. The genre, the narrative, assumes a subordinated role within the programs of the several Rabbinic documents. And with what consequence? Again with emphasis:

7 One current instance of the aesthetic reading of Rabbinic narrative is Jeffrey L. Rubenstein, Talmudic Stories: Narrative Art, Composition, and Culture. (Baltimore, 1999: Johns Hopkins University Press) He “strives to recapture the meaning and literary impact that the stories would have had for their original authors and audiences,” so Eliezer Segal, review, Journal of American Academy of Religion (2001, 69:954). Other instances are Yonah Frenkel, Iyunim be#olamo haruhani shel sipur ha"agadah (Tel Aviv, 1981), and Ofra Meir, Hademuyot hapoalot besipure hatalmud vehamidrash (Jerusalem 1977), and her Sugyot bapoetikah shel sipure hazal (Tel Aviv, 1993). My reading of David Stern, Parables in Midrash. Narrative and Exegesis in Rabbinic Literature, Catherine Hezser, Form, Function, and Historical Significance of the Rabbinic Story in Yerushalmi Neziqin, and Galit Hasan-Rokem, Web of Life. Folklore and Midrash in Rabbinic Literature is reproduced in the Appendix. These represent a vast literature of literary-critical analysis, both classical and contemporary. The answers to the documentary questions of a formal, form-analytical character that I raise in this exercise do not present themselves in that literature, with which I do not intersect.

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It is therefore analytically meaningless to talk about “the Rabbinic narrative” or “the Rabbinic parable” or “the Aggadah” or “the Rabbinic folktale” or any comparable, generic category that ignores documentary boundaries. The principal, and primary, analytical initiative commences with the document— the traits of its narrative, parable, Aggadah, folktale, and other generic categories. We may then speak of the narrative or parable or ma#aseh in the Mishnah or the Tosefta or Sifra or one or another of the Talmuds, and only then ask how the narrative or parable or ma#aseh as represented by the one document compares, or contrasts, with that of another. In that proposition I part company from all those who as a matter of premise and presupposition have treated the Rabbinic corpus as uniform and asked about The Rabbinic Story, coming up with answers that claim to speak of everything but in fact represent only some few things, indeed, the document where they originate but not other documents (e.g., Lamentations Rabbah but not the Mishnah, to take a case in point). That process of comparison and contrast sheds light on the character of the several documents, their construction and larger context. And that is the heart of the matter. To show what is at stake, in the bibliographical appendix I present a sustained engagement with the three most important works in the English language published in the past decade, those of David Stern, Catherine Heszer, and Galit Hasan-Rokem. These are not the only readings in English, but they represent the approach of scholarship in that language-world. If I ignore most works in languages other than English, it is for two reasons. First, I know only few important books on Rabbinic narrative published in the past quarter-century in French or Spanish or Portuguese or Italian or Scandinavian (Swedish/Danish/Norwegian). In German there is the important exception in the work of C. Thoma, which approaches, along documentary lines that I have advocated, the study of parables.8 8 I owe thanks to Professor Guenter Stemberger, University of Vienna, for calling to my attention the four volume work: C. Thoma—S. Lauer, Die Gleichnisse der Rabbinen. Erster Teil: Pesiqta de-Rav Kahana (PesK), Bern 1986; C. Thoma—S. Lauer, Die Gleichnisse der Rabbinen II: Von der Erschaffung der Welt bis zum Tod Abrahams: Bereschit Rabba 1-63, Bern 1991; C. Thoma—H. Ernst, Die Gleichnisse der Rabbinen III: Von Isaak bis zum Schilfmeer: BerR 63-100; ShemR 1-22, Bern 1996; C. Thoma—H. Ernst, Die Gleichnisse der Rabbinen IV: Vom Lied des Mose bis zum Bundesbuch: ShemR 23-30, Bern 2001. Since David Stern in his study of the parables of a particular document insists that documentary lines mark no important differences among the phenomena of parables, I consulted him on his reading of Thoma, who sees such differences as

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Second, as to works in Hebrew, it is an established fact that, with important exceptions, represented here by Professor Galit HasanRokem, Israeli scholarship on Rabbinic Judaism ignores scholarship in languages other than Hebrew in general, and simply does not engage with the issues and methods of American scholarship in particular. It becomes increasingly difficult to understand most, though not all, Israeli work on ancient Judaism, such as it is, therefore, because it takes place in a realm of hermetic and private intellectual discourse. The governing elite of Israeli scholarship in the area treated here no longer seeks to engage with international scholarship. Writing and reading only or mainly in Hebrew, the principal players assume that scholars of Rabbinic Judaism have to read their work, but they do not have to reciprocate, in their view there being nothing to be learned from outsiders to their circle. A glance at the bibliographies of—in tits context—perfectly reputable work in Hebrew will show what has come about, which is the self-isolation of Israeli learning in Rabbinics. The self-ghettoized scholars read only what they agree with. Except for their collections and arrangements of information, e.g., variant readings of texts, they can now be dismissed as marginal because intellectually inert. As is always the case, I conduct my research in conversation with many colleagues and through diverse media, other peoples’ publications not the least of them. From some writings and counselors I learn what to do, from other writings, what not to do. I am especially thankful to those who, by telephone and e-mail, comment as the work unfolds in its successive drafts and changing results. Jacob Neusner Bard College significant, but he has not reviewed Thoma’s work and had no comment on it so far as I can discern.

introduction

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INTRODUCTION I Narratives, defined presently, violate the norms defined by the documentary components for the bulk of their contents. To understand why, we have to grasp the documentary character of the Rabbinic writings, from the Mishnah through the Bavli. Components of a common canon relate in three ways: autonomy, connection, continuity. Each canonical compilation in its indicative traits forms an autonomous statement, distinct from all others. But the markers of autonomy, the unique congeries of traits of topic, logic of coherent discourse, and rhetoric, all defined in a moment, do not form the sole measure of a piece of writing. Some documents intersect, and so are connected with others, e.g., the Mishnah and the Tosefta, or some of the Midrash-compilations, Leviticus Rabbah and Pesiqta deRab Kahana sharing entire composites.1 More to the point, what of continuity? Viewed theologically, all documents are continuous, start to finish. That is because all are animated by the same cogent theological system. All find a place in a single theological structure.2 But of the three relationships, autonomy predominates, hence the documentary hypothesis of the Rabbinic canon: though connected and intellectually continuous with all others, nonetheless each document is possessed of its own autonomy and integrity. What precisely do I mean by that? It is that through a unique combination of rhetorical, topical, and logical traits, each compilation defines itself as different from all the others. That is by a 1 But we can construct an argument to show that a composition is primary to Leviticus Rabbah and only subordinate in Pesiqta deRab Kahana, so too in the relationship of Pesiqta deRab Kahana and Pesiqta Rabbati, as in my From Tradition to Imitation. The Plan and Program of Pesiqta deRab Kahana and Pesiqta Rabbati. Atlanta, 1987: Scholars Press for Brown Judaic Studies. 2 I have specified what I conceive that system and structure to be in The Theology of the Oral Torah. Revealing the Justice of God. (Kingston and Montreal, 1999: McGill-Queen’s University Press and Ithaca, 1999: Cornell University Press), and in The Theology of the Halakhah. (Leiden, 2001: Brill. Brill Reference Library of Ancient Judaism).

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simple, formal criterion, excluding subjective judgment. A particular set of preferences among available modes of (1) rhetorical patterning governs the formalization of language used to express propositions. These formally-patterned sentences coalesce into cogent propositions in compositions or composites; the sentences cohere, one to the next, in accord with (2) a particular logic of cogent discourse among available modes of coherence, which are four: propositional, teleological, fixed-associative, or metapropositional, as I presently shall explain in detail.3 And each document takes up, among the entire range of possibilities, (3) a particular topic or problematic of its own, often but not always signified by a book of Scripture, e.g., Genesis, Leviticus, Lamentations. These three classifications of distinctive traits of rhetoric, topic, and logic combine to form that unique congeries, document by document, to which I have made reference4 In this context, accordingly, a “document” is comprised by writing readily differentiated from all other canonical compilations by its indicative rhetorical, topical, and logical program.5 No one claims that everything contained by a given document— the rhetorical patterns, principles of logical coherence, and topical program—is unique to that document, or that the canon is made up of utterly unrelated compilations. There are connections between and among documents. Some writing travels from and so connects one document to another—narrative being the primary, but not the sole, type. Documents overlap in their distinctive traits. More consequentially, sets of documents may share some indicative traits, e.g., rhetorical forms, as in the Rabbah-compilations, or logical principles, as in the Tannaite Midrash-compilations, or elements of a topical program common to two or more 3 I amplify this matter presently. These four logics of coherent discourse, summarized below, are spelled out in the context of the Rabbinic canon in The Making of the Mind of Judaism. Atlanta, 1987: Scholars Press for Brown Judaic Studies. 4 My summary of the documentary analysis, compilation by compilation, is in my Introduction to Rabbinic Literature. N.Y., 1994: Doubleday. The Doubleday Anchor Reference Library. Religious Book Club Selection, 1994. Paperback edition: 1999. 5 That is not to claim that documents come to closure at some one point; the variations in manuscript attestations are well known. But the manuscripts, however divergent, of a given document will replicate the distinctive documentary traits of that document. So by a “document” we must mean, any piece of writing that adheres to a unique program of logical, rhetorical, and topical traits.

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compilations. But two or more documents never share all three distinctive traits of rhetoric, logic, and topic. Take for instance the Rabbah-Midrash compilations, e.g., Genesis Rabbah and Song of Songs Rabbah. The Rabbah-Midrash-compilations are readily identified through their characteristic logic of coherent discourse, which in the aggregate is fixed associative, and in its components is propositional; and they generally share rhetorical forms. They differ in topical program. Each document6 differs from all others in one or another of the indicative traits. Topic serves as the best example. Thus, in the case just now given, the several Rabbah-documents utilize the logic of fixed association (“commentaries”), but only one of them concerns itself with the topic, Genesis, and not with (e.g.) Numbers or Song of Songs—and so throughout. But logic also serves. Thus, while Sifra and Leviticus Rabbah share the topic, Leviticus, the former appeals to the logic of fixed association and to the logic of metapropositional discourse, the other principally to that of propositional (syllogistic) discourse. The upshot is that there is no way to confuse a passage selected blindly from Sifra with one deriving from Leviticus Rabbah. So much for the norm, the documentary traits that define most of the contents of the canonical compilations. 7 This carries us to the writing that uniformly presents an anomaly, the narratives of various types and forms. However defined and classified, viewed all together, narratives persistently ignore the documentary traits of the compilations in which they occur. To state matters differently, the indicative traits that work for 6 I have to qualify this judgment. I do not think I have succeeded in identifying the indicative traits of Mekhilta Attributed to R. Ishmael. The whole does not cohere as do the other late antique canonical documents. My sense is that the several distinct tractates of the document have to be characterized, each in its own terms, rather than as components of a uniform document. But I have not done the work that is required to demonstrate that proposition. 7 The identification of narrative as the main non-documentary writing is proven for the eight sampled documents in Texs without Boundaries, cited in the next footnote, and it is employed for the analysis of Extra- and Non-Documentary Writing in the Canon of Formative Judaism. I. The Pointless Parallel: Hans-Jürgen Becker and the Myth of the Autonomous Tradition in Rabbinic Documents. II. Paltry Parallels. The Negligible Proportion and Peripheral Role of Free-Standing Compositions in Rabbinic Documents. III. Peripatetic Parallels. Binghamton, 2001: Global Publications. Academic Studies in the History of Judaism Series. Second edition, revised, of The Peripatetic Saying: The Problem of the Thrice-Told Tale in Talmudic Literature. Chico, 1985: Scholars Press for Brown Judaic Studies.

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documents viewed whole also work for all the principal types of writing of said documents—other than the narrative writing therein. By the criterion of any given document, narratives in that document do not conform to the document’s distinctive rhetorical pattern, logic of coherent discourse, or in the aggregate even the topical program! I know that that is so, on account of the results of the probe set forth in Texts without Boundaries.8 There I show for eight documents that narrative writing ignores the documentary boundaries of the canonical compilations surveyed therein. In that probe to begin with I identified several types of extra-documentary writing—that is, writing that in the context of the respective documents ignores the indicative traits otherwise predominant in those documents. Of the types of writing I identified as extra-documentary, narratives stand alone. However characterized, in context of a particular compilation they always ignore documentary indicators in rhetoric and logic of coherent discourse. Narratives, further, not uncommonly appear to be—if not indifferent to, then at least—topically asymmetrical in focus as well.9 II What, exactly, do I mean by “narrative”? I ask in an inclusive definition: whether a candidate for classification as “narrative,” forms a story with a lot of action, a story with a lot of dialogue but no described or even implicit action, a parable (mashal), a case or legal precedent (sometimes but not always marked ma#aseh, though that marker in some documents attaches to writing that is other than a case or legal precedent), or a narrative-setting for a fixed apophthegm—to name five kinds that readily present themselves to anyone who knows anything at all in the formative Rabbinic canon. So much for inclusion. How furthermore do 8

Texts without Boundaries. Protocols of Non-Documentary Writing in the Rabbinic Canon, Lanham, 2002: University Press of America. Volume One. The Mishnah,. Tractate Abot, and the Tosefta. Volume Two. Sifra and Sifré to Numbers. Volume Three. Sifré to Deuteronomy and Mekhilta Attributed to R. Ishmael Volume Four. Leviticus Rabbah. 9 For my eight cases I observed that narratives do not invariably limit themselves to the documentary topic that otherwise governs in context, though that result remains to be reviewed. It is a component of the problem I have not worked on.

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I accomplish with such a formal definition also the exclusion of all other kinds of writing that we find in the Rabbinic canon? What I require is an objective, formal, and positive criterion. It must embody a formal trait of mind that when operative defines narrative and when not excludes every other kind of writing. In other words, faced with what looks like a tale, fable, or story and a variety of other imponderables, I distinguish what looks like a story from a story, verisimilitude from authenticity. And on that same basis I exclude from the category “narrative” one composition while I include some other. Rather than relying on impressions, I choose an objective criterion for inclusion or exclusion. It is one that I have framed in an entirely other context, when I was working on other issues altogether. The indicative trait of mind I invoke to distinguish narrative from all other kinds of writing concerns the logic of coherent discourse, by which I mean, the linking of two or more sentences into a statement deemed to make sense. To understand the answer, readers will want to know the repertoire of logics of coherent discourse that all together serve the Rabbinic canon. They will want to be told how each is distinguished from the others. Only then will the logic of coherent discourse that by its very traits of mind is unique, in the Rabbinic-canonical context, to narrative and that never functions other than in narratives emerge. Now to the repertoire of logics and the one that uniquely marks narratives to the exclusion of all other types of compositions: when Rabbinic sages undertook to make a coherent statement out of discrete, completed thoughts, they could draw on one of four logics of coherent discourse by which two or more sentences are deemed to cohere and to constitute a statement of consequence and intelligibility. These are as follows: (1) the logic that imparts coherence to data to yield a coherence based on the teleology, or end-purpose, of all data, which is different from (2) the logic that imparts coherence to data to yield a proposition and generate a syllogism, which is different from (3) the logic that joins two or more statements together on purely formal grounds, and which also is different from (4) the logic that through the juxtaposition shows the structural coherence of two or more rules or cases, producing (in con-

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text) jurisprudence out of laws, laws out of cases, exemplary cases out of random coincidences. To explain: (1) Teleological Logic of Coherence. In this mode of thought we link fact to fact and also prove (ordinarily implicit) propositions by appeal to the purpose or goal or end—hence, “teleological”— that is implicit in the sequence of facts. Only at the end of the composite do all the pieces fall into place and does the consequence of the combination of this with that become apparent. Then the reason, first this, then that, emerges. So by invoking the word “teleology,” I mean to stress that the pieces of data cohere not by reason of their own traits but by appeal to a goal beyond themselves. How come the goal is signaled by the sequence of sentences? It is because the goal transcends and imposes order on all the distinct pieces of data. Here the reader does not know what the message really is until the end of the story. In teleological discourse the point is at the end, and not learned along the way. Stopping at any point before the end will demolish the construction and leave incoherent and senseless bits and pieces littering the path to nowhere. By contrast, as we shall see, in a propositional composition of a syllogistic character, each component is fully cogent in its own traits and terms, e.g., it may be constituted by an opinion that on its own bears a meaningful statement. So what characterizes and so defines narrative and no other type of Rabbinic writing is a trait of mind that sees purpose in the order of facts, first this, then that, therefore this led to that and explains it. The “logic”10 that makes sequence, movement, dialectics register so that “this” coheres to “that” may be roughly characterized: post hoc, ergo propter hoc: that happened in sequence after this, it therefore happened because of this. In more abstract language, the logic particular to narrative joins a sequence of statements of action or thought in such a way as to yield a cogent statement. By reason of their order the parts cohere into a whole that exceeds the sum of the parts. That order is taken to bear meaning and exhibit purpose or intention, and that logic I therefore call “teleological,” hence “the teleological logic of narrative.” Narrative logic therefore joins two or more facts to convey a proposition through the setting forth of happenings in a frame10 I put “logic” in quotation-marks here because of the dubious standing of the matter, as everyone recognizes. But then Aristotle produced natural philosophy but not the ordered history or intent and purpose that sustains unfolding stories.

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work of inevitability, in a sequence that makes a point, e.g., establishes not merely the facts of what happens, but the teleology, the purpose or goal of the order—that explains those facts. Then we speak not only of events—our naked facts, such as serve in philosophical logic of syllogism—but of their causal, consecutive relationships. We have a narrative formed by data when we claim to account for that relationship teleologically, in the purposive sequence and necessary order of the data that all together comprise happenings. To the exclusion of what alternatives? (2) Syllogistic or Propositional Logic. The next and in the Halakhic documents by far the most important logic of coherent discourse, is philosophical logic of proposition and syllogism. By it facts and reason yield syllogisms, e.g., two facts produce a third. So the parts are made to yield a sum greater than they. A way for conducting philosophical argument is the demonstration we know, in general, as Listenwissenschaft, that is, a way to classify and so establish a set of probative facts, which compel us to reach a given conclusion, one that transcends any and all of the facts. These probative facts may derive from the classification of data, all of which point in one direction and not in another. Then the traits of the individual bits of data register on their own, and, seen in any order but only all together, they yield a pattern, produce a generalization, demonstrate a principle. A catalogue of facts, for example, may be so composed that, through the regularities and indicative traits of the respective entries, the catalogue yields a proposition affecting more facts than are catalogued. In the Halakhah this may or may not be articulated, but it never has to be. In the Aggadah—in the Rabbahcompilations for example—it is ordinarily articulated, outset and end, in constructions of a syllogistic character. Accordingly, items are interchangeable. Therefore the order of the items rarely registers the besought proposition; the traits common to the items, in whatever sequence, make all the difference. A list of parallel items all together point to a simple conclusion; the conclusion may or may not be given at the end of the catalogue, but the catalogue—by definition—is pointed. All of the catalogued facts are taken to bear self-evident connections to one another, established by those pertinent shared traits implicit in the composition of the list, therefore also bearing meaning and pointing through the weight of evidence to an inescapable conclusion. The discrete facts

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then join together because of some trait common to them all. This is a mode of classification of facts to lead to an identification of what the facts have in common and—it goes without saying, an explanation of their meaning. These and other modes of philosophical argument are entirely familiar. How do the two logics of coherent discourse compare and contrast? Philosophical logic of coherence differs from the teleological logic characteristic of narrative for as already stressed in philosophical logic, the sequencing of the facts bears no part of the burden; we can produce our cases in any order with the same result. By contrast, in teleological logic the manufactured sequence establishes a moral that by reason of the position of the data in some way, rather than in some other, is always blatant. Here too, it hardly matters whether or not the generalization is stated in so many words. That is because the power of well-crafted narrative is so to order the components of the construction as to make unnecessary explicitly announcing the moral. So narrative sees cogency in the necessary order of events understood as causative. Purpose, therefore cause, takes the form of a story of what happened—once upon a time, someone did something with such-andsuch a consequence—because it had to happen. Whatever the form, whether invested with the aura of storytelling or not, the presence of teleological logic marks a composition as narrative, and the absence denies it that status. If, as we shall see, we are told in the form of a story about what happens in the Temple on various occasions, the tale of how rites are performed, we can invoke the formal issue: does the outcome become clear at the end, or is the sequence merely formal, a matter of a correct ordering of action, but not teleological—messagebearing, detail by detail in fixed array.11 These two classes of logic of coherent discourse, the philosophical and the teleological, by their nature constitute logics of a propositional order. But in the Rabbinic canon, many sentences or clauses or small groups of completed thoughts stand side by side but do not intersect in proposition or meaning at all. They are associated for purely formal reasons, thus, the logic of fixed association. 11 I follow Ithamar Gruenwald’s definition of ritual in his Rituals and Ritual Theory in Ancient Israel. He sees ritual as action, fixed and autonomous, without reference to the story that accompanies the action (myth).

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(3) The Logic of Fixed Association. The third logic of coherent discourse—and by far the most dominant logic in the Midrash-compilations—joins two or more discrete facts or sentences by joining them to a fixed, received text, ordinally prior and common to them both.12 The coherence derives from the fixed association defined by that received text. Then the two or more statements are deemed to cohere not in what they say in a shared program of thought but only in their intersection with that (prior) common text. This logic of coherent discourse sustains a commentary upon a privileged text, e.g., glosses of Scripture or the Mishnah. It is not propositional. The logic of fixed association is common in the Midrash-compilations but (on its own) rare in the Halakhic ones.13 How it differs from the philosophical and teleological logics corresponds to the difference between purposive, propositional discourse and the episodic recording of random thoughts deemed to cohere not at all or (which is the same thing) altogether subjectively. The one makes connections and draws conclusions, whether syllogistically or teleologically, and the other registers truths that yield nothing beyond themselves (and by reason of forming a component of the revealed Torah, are not expected to). A good model of the logical incoherence of a topical program— of how a sequence of sentences does not comprise a cogent paragraph—is supplied by Scripture itself. For example, consider the sequence that follows: If you see your fellow’s ass or ox fallen on the path, do not ignore it; you must help him raise it. A woman must not put on man’s apparel, nor shall a man wear woman’s clothing; for whoever does these things is hateful to the Lord your God. 12

But the “fixed text” need not be received Scripture. Pesiqta deRab Kahana takes as the fixed text the sequence of special Sabbaths through the liturgical year, and there are other bases for coherence of otherwise discrete sentences through appeal to a received text other than Scripture or liturgy too. But in the Rabbinic canon two or more propositions unrelated to one another may be joined into a coherent composite through Scripture more than through all other fixed texts put together. 13 The two Talmuds join large-scale propositional constructions together through a logic of fixed association dictated by the Mishnah or Scripture—thus utilizing two logics of coherent discourse, propositional and fixed associative. The Mishnah is uniformly propositional. Sifra and the two Sifrés are uniformly fixed-associative. There is no document that coheres only or mainly through the teleological logic of narrative.

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introduction If by the way you happen upon a bird’s nest…with fledglings or eggs and the mother sitting over the fledglings or on the eggs, do not take the mother together with her young… When you build a new house, you shall make a parapet for your roof… You shall not sow your vineyard with a second kind of seed…you shall not plow with an ox and an ass together; you shall not wear cloth combining wool and linen; You shall make tassels on the four corners of your garment… Deuteronomy 22:4-12

This miscellany yields no generalizations, no special order is required by the parts, and the details do not cohere; there is little more to be learned from the repertoire of rules than the rules themselves. If we changed the order of the components of the composite (“sentences”), we neither gain nor lose a scintilla of meaning or of cogency. Each entry is free-standing; there is no logic of coherent discourse that turns of the parts into a whole. The miscellaneous quality of the construction is blatant. In the Rabbinic context, there are structures that form the given for purposes of fixed association: books or large constituents of books of Scripture. We shall now see how the Rabbinic commentary deals with the parts without forming them into a whole: Sifré to Deuteronomy CCXXIX:IV 1. A. “if anyone should fall from it” (Dt. 22:8): B. [Since the verse reads, “if one who is falling should fall...,” we conclude that] this one [who falls] is worthy of falling. C. Nonetheless, merit is assigned to the meritorious, and guilt to the guilty. 2. A. “...from it:” B. and not into it. C. For if the public domain was ten handbreadths above and one fell from it into [the man’s roof], the householder is exempt. D. For it is said, “...from it:” and not into it. CCXXX:I 1. A. “You shall not sow your vineyard with a second kind of seed, [else the crop—from the seed you have sown—and the yield of the vineyard be sanctified [and may not be used]. You shall not plow with an ox and an ass together. You shall not wear cloth combining wool and linen]” (Dt. 22:9-11): B. Why do I require this statement? Is it not in any event said, “You shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed” (Lev. 19:19)?

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C. This teaches that whoever keeps two kinds of seeds in a vineyard, he violates two negative commandments. 2. A. I know only that the law pertains to a complete vineyard. How do I know that it applies even to a single vine which produces fruit? B. Scripture says, “vineyard”—under any circumstance. 3. A. How on the basis of Scripture do I know that the produce of mixed seeds in a vineyard is forbidden for any sort of benefit? B. Scripture here says, “...sanctified,” and elsewhere the same word occurs. C. Just as in that other context, the upshot is that no benefit or use is permitted, so “sanctified” here means that benefit or use is permitted.

There is no pretense that one fact plus one fact yields another fact; the exposition aims at episodic observations about one thing or another, not at a coherent construction, out of discrete data, of a cogent proposition transcending the data. The propositional, syllogistic logic of coherent discourse works for the parts, with a formal, fixed associative construct serving to hold the parts together. (4) Metapropositional Logic. The fourth mode of establishing connections between and among facts—completed whole units of thought (“sentences”) or composites of such whole units (“paragraphs”) undertakes the methodical analysis of many things in a single way. Stunning in its logical power, it proposes to pattern a great many cases to yield a uniform overarching principle. Nearly the whole of Sifra attains coherence through a single mode of analytical argument, and much of Sifré to Deuteronomy aims at showing that numerous cases or rules yield cogent propositions. Metapropositional logic characterizes both Halakhic and Aggadic discourse, the latter in its theological mode, e.g., numerous cases that yield a single proposition of a theological character, and that cohere only in that proposition common to them all. Here is a good example, drawn also from Sifré to Deuteronomy: Sifré to Deuteronomy CCXXVII:I 1. A. “If before you, along the road, you chance [upon a bird’s nest, in any tree or on the ground, with fledglings or eggs and the mother sitting over the fledglings or on the eggs, do not take the mother together with her young. Let the mother go and take only the young, in order that you may fare well and have a long life]” (Dt. 22:6-7): B. “…you chance:”

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C. excluding a case in which the one is ready at hand. A. [“…with fledglings or eggs:”] B. The smallest number of fledglings is two, and the smallest number of eggs is two. C. How on the basis of Scripture do I know that if there is only a single fledgling or a single egg, one is liable to send forth the mother? D. Scripture says, “nest”—under any circumstance. 3. A. Since it is said, “…in any tree or on the ground, with fledglings or eggs and the mother sitting over the fledglings or on the eggs,” B. might I suppose that I should then exclude the case of geese or chickens, which make their nest in an orchard? C. Scripture says, “...before you,” [under whatever circumstance]. 4. A. I know only that the law pertains to a case in private domain. How on the basis of Scripture do I know that it applies also in public domain? B. Scripture says, “...along the road.” 5. A. How on the basis of Scripture do I know that it applies to a nest in a tree? B. Scripture says, “...in any tree.” 6. A. And how do I know that it applies to a nest on the road? B. Scripture says, “...along the road.” 7. A. “…and the mother sitting over the fledglings or on the eggs:” B. Just as the fledglings can survive, so the eggs must be able to survive, C. thus excluding [Hammer:] eggs that are addled. D. Just as eggs have to have the dam [to keep them warm], so the fledglings are those that have to have their dam [to feed them], E. thus excluding those that can fly, since they do not have to have their dam. 8. A. “… and the mother sitting over the fledglings or on the eggs:” B. The law applies when the mother is sitting over them, thus excluding a case in which she is fluttering about. C. Might one then exclude a case in which her wings are touching the nest? D. Scripture says, “…and the mother sitting over the fledglings,” E. even if she is not with them. F. Might one suppose that in the case of an unclean bird sitting on the eggs of a clean bird, or a clean bird sitting on the eggs of an unclean bird, one should be obligated to send forth the mother? G. Scripture says, “…and the mother sitting over the fledglings or on the eggs,” H. requiring that both be of the same species. 2.

It would be difficult to find a better example of the authorship’s power of turning a case into a general law, applicable to a variety of cases. No. 1 begins the work of restriction, continued at No. 2. No. 3 then broadens the applicability of the rule, progress that

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goes forward through Nos. 4, 5, 6. No. 7 then proceeds to a further layer of amplification. Now we wish to define the conditions that make the case pertinent to the prevailing rule, thus No. 7, the eggs, No. 8, the location of the dam, the definition of the species, and so on. The sequence of inquiry, therefore, involves, first, restriction, then inclusion, finally, definition of pertinent classifications and categories—an orderly and well composed statement. Clearly, the propositional, metapropositional, and fixed associative logics never serve the purpose of narrative, since, at each point, we follow the unfolding data in sequences (where there is such a proposition), not only at the end. But at issue is not the formal positioning of the climactic constituent of a continuous construction, rather the kind of logic that renders the construction continuous, start to finish. To state the matter simply: we know narrative from all other kinds of compositions and composites in the Rabbinic canon by the logic that establishes coherence between and among the free-standing, discrete whole units of thought (“sentences”) of a given piece of writing. Then at every point, the question must present itself: how does the composition at hand impose coherence upon its components? What makes the composition a narrative, and, if a narrative, of what type? These are the questions concerning the phenomena and their classification that I present, item by item, to all candidates set forth by the canonical documents. III Having defined the trait—teleological logic—that must be present to validate classifying a piece of writing as “narrative,” let me turn to the question of relevance, to which I merely alluded in the Preface. Specifically, what makes it urgent to formulate a systematic phenomenology of Rabbinic narrative for the canon of late antiquity, from the Mishnah through the Bavli? The answer derives from the documentary hypothesis, which, as I have made clear, has yielded the fact that in documentary context narratives form a massive anomaly, demanding systematic inquiry. Any claim that the Rabbinic compilations constitute “documents’ as defined here must address the fact that the several documents contain more than random, and other than haphazard components of non-doc-

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umentary writing. Chief among compositions and composites that do not replicate the indicative traits otherwise (uniquely) characteristic of a given document are narratives, however we define “narrative.”14 From a form-analytical perspective the narrative—a piece of writing that coheres by reason of teleological logic, as against the three other types of logic of coherent discourse characteristic of the Rabbinic canon—is the only important one. The sizable sample—eight complete documents—surveyed in Texts without Boundaries has shown that narratives of various kinds, differentiated by form and function in diverse compositions and composites, always ignore the documentary traits that distinguish one Rabbinic compilation canon from another and each from all others in the formative canon. Most of the composites and the majority of the compositions that comprise a document will adhere to the document’s unique tripartite program. But when we ask about the compositions and composites of a given document that do not conform to the indicative traits that define that document, an interesting fact emerges. It is critical to the work undertaken here, and it requires exposition in its own terms. To specify that fact that underscores the singularity of narratives in the Rabbinic canon viewed jointly and severally, a principal distinction demands recognition. It is between extra-documentary and non-documentary writing—compositions and even large-scale composites.15 The urgency of distinguishing extra-documentary writing, which can accommodate compositions comparable in logic to those in hand, and non-documentary writing, which cannot, has now to be amplified, beginning with the definition of that distinction. By “extra-documentary” compositions and composites I mean those that violate the particular indicative traits of the document in which they occur, but that conform to the model of such traits nonetheless. These conflict in one or another of the three princi14 Those who do not perceive the formal order of the Rabbinic documents also do not grasp the anomalous character of the narrative, which does not exhibit traits particular to the respective documents, so far as my prior work has worked itself out. 15 The distinction between extra-documentary and non-documentary writing is spelled out in Making the Classics in Judaism: The Three Stages of Literary Formation. Atlanta, 1990: Scholars Press for Brown Judaic Studies.

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pal indicators governs writing in the document in which they occur. But they point toward a comparable document—as I just said, one in the same model, if with variation. For example, for late antiquity we have no Midrash-document devoted to Proverbs. So a sustained, systematic exegesis of a passage of Proverbs located in Song of Songs Rabbah or Pesiqta deRab Kahana would violate the documentary norms of those compilations. But the fragments we do would comprise a chunk of such a document in the model of the Midrash-documents we do have. That is, we do not have a Proverbs Rabbah in the formative canon. But we know what such a document would look like, since we have some of the required components.16 So by “extra-documentary” I mean, “beyond the range of the extant documents, but well within their model.” 17 Compositions and composites called “non-documentary,” by contrast, disregard the rules of documentary writing such as govern in each and all of the score of canonical compilations. They not only ignore the indicative traits of the documents in which they occur, but they in no way replicate for a fresh topic a known model of any extant document. So we have Midrash-compilations, if not for one scriptural book, then for another. But we have no canonical compilation of stories, e.g., lives of sages, on the one side,18 histories of Israel, on the other.19 So too there are elaborate stories of the false Messiah and the true one, and the like. But in the entire formative canon there is nothing remotely recording the life of the Messiah, beginning to end. Entire chapters in the lives of principal sages and their master-disciple circles, sustained stories about paradigmatic events in Israel’s history— none of these types of writing coalesces into coherent documents in the way in which the compositions and composites located in 16 The medieval compilers would collect the candidates for inclusion in a Proverbs Rabbah (and so throughout) in their Yalqutim and equivalent documents. But they were collectors and arrangers, not the creators of coherent documentary statements such as the late antique counterparts set forth. 17 This was pointed out by Herbert Basser, In the Margins of the Midrash. Atlanta, 1990: Scholars Press, pp. 16-18. 18 I deal with an aspect of this larger problem in Why No Gospels in Talmudic Judaism? Atlanta, 1988: Scholars Press for Brown Judaic Studies. Now: Lanham MD, 2001: University Press of America. Studies in Judaism series. 19 I explain that fact in The Presence of the Past, the Pastness of the Present. History, Time, and Paradigm in Rabbinic Judaism. Bethesda, 1996: CDL Press.

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the Mishnah or Genesis Rabbah or the Bavli (to name three disparate cases) do. By that criterion the non-documentary represent a kind of writing intended to stand on its own, not planned for a larger composite. That carries us to the perspective of the documentary hypothesis on narrative. IV What lends weight to the non-documentary writing comprised by the varieties of narratives in the extant canon, making me suspect that these are more than random accidents in a chaotic canonical process? I have shown far more than that narratives represent non-documentary writing. In Texts without Boundaries I found that narratives, however defined, uniquely constitute anomalies in every extant document. Narratives of one kind or another occur in all the canonical documents and constitute the non-documentary components of every document in the Rabbinic canon. At no point does a story, or a precedent, or a parable, among other types of narratives, conform to the indicative program of a given document. That is for two reasons, which complement one another. First, I cannot point to a single canonical compilation that encompasses within its definitive traits a set of rules on the kind of narratives that fit or do not fit the governing plan for the documentary writing therein. Second, the work not having been done, I cannot yet identify narrative conventions that function in one document but not in another—if any. And if there is none, I have yet to reckon with the implications of that fact for the history of Rabbinic Judaism, which defines the goal of the entire oeuvre. That fact defines the task before us, It is, through patient sifting of data, to find out whether some other set of conventions than documentary ones governed the narrative writing in the Rabbinic framework. Now form-analysis undertakes to identify the types, forms, and program of narratives. These questions govern: (1) Is it really so—as my completed probe suggests—that documentary boundaries do not function in this type of writing in the way in which they demarcate all other types of writing? (2) Do the narrative compositions truly comprise a distinct corpus of writing, and if so, under what auspices, for what purposes, and with what systemic consequences? These are distinct problems, one old, the other new, and only

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thorough and systematic inquiry of a form-analytical character can answer them. V Having defined what is at issue, let me now double back and specify the answers to the questions that confront us. These articulate what is at stake in solving the problem of regularity and order, determining the canonical status of narrative in the Rabbinic corpus of late antiquity. The answers track the questions, reproduced in italics, of religion, literature, and history, in line with the program of The Three Questions of Formative Judaism: History, Literature, and Religion.20 1. At stake for understanding the religious system of formative Rabbinic Judaism: Do anomalous or asymmetric compositions or composites attest to thought that takes place beyond the limits of the documents subject to the rules and symmetry of the canon? A corpus of extra-, including non-, documentary writing did find its way into the process of documentary composition and compilation. Of the three types of the identified extra-documentary writing—(1) exegesis of clumps of Scripture from books not accorded, by entire documents, systematic commentaries in the Rabbinic canon of late antiquity, (2) agglutination of topical miscellanies, and (3) narratives—the first two self-evidently cohere to the model of the canonical documents, though not to the particular program of any extant document. Hence they raise no questions of a documentary character, but rather confirm the definition of a conventional compilation. As large formal aggregates they cannot be differentiated from the documentary writing to which they correspond. I find no recurrent differences in the regnant conceptions of the anomalous writing that are asymmetrical or even jarring, let alone differences in contents. Narratives represent a question not yet addressed. I do not know at this point how to differentiate between narrative-writing and (the other) normative, canonical types of writing. Clearly, such differentiation can go forward only systematically and thoroughly. At this point, any claim that the narratives constitute a coherent sector of writing, with their own traits of rhetoric, logic, and 20

Leiden, 2002: Brill. The Brill Reference Library of Judaism.

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topic would be premature. (In the present context I mean by “topics” conceptions, detailed contents and propositions.) Why does it matter? People posit a “Judaism beyond the texts.” By that they mean to allege we have access to Judaic thought beyond the limits of the extant documents, knowledge that is a priori, on the one side, or that is represented in bits and pieces of writing that survive, out of context, in the Rabbinic documents. Here is a clear opportunity to investigate the qualities of normative-Judaic writings that originate outside of the documentary boundaries. So what about the “Judaism beyond the texts”—at least, that alleged Judaic structure and system to which the texts willy-nilly afford only occasional and fragmentary access? 2. At stake for discerning the literary qualities of the Rabbinic canon: Does non-documentary writing exhibit readily-discernible patterns of form and meaning as does documentary writing? If so, what are these patterns and how are we to classify and to interpret them? The question is readily unpacked. Extra-documentary writing is readily characterized within the limits of extant, documentary writing. For forms and patterns of the non-documentary writing, that is, the narrative compositions and composites, we do not know the answer. This part of the work supplies the beginnings of one, as we shall see in chapter fifteen. 3. At stake for the history of formative Rabbinic Judaism: At what point in the process that yielded the canonical writings as we know them did documentary considerations intervene, and what is the meaning of that intervention? When and under what circumstances did documentary considerations give way to writing utterly indifferent to its documentary venue? The historical question is framed in terms of sequences of activity and continuities and changes exhibited by those sequences. But the issue of analysis and the models of interpretation are framed atemporally, phenomenologically.21 They concern types of data and the inner “logic”—the definition of self-evidence and the givens—that generates them. We cannot describe the process, 21 I initially proposed to argue in Making the Classics in Judaism: The Three Stages of Literary Formation that documentary writing is consequent upon, and comes later than, pre-, extra-, and non-documentary writing, but that argument led nowhere and persuaded no one, in the end not even me. It was a false start, because I mistook difference in phenomena for difference in sequence, a fundamental error for phenomenology. That argument never found its way into my final formulation of matters.

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since there is no evidence that difference in traits signals sequences in temporal order. But in each formative-redactional context documentary writing clearly takes priority. In Making the Classics of Judaism I have already indicated my reasons for regarding the documentary project as the starting point for most of the writing encompassed by a given document. So for example at the point at which people determined to create a commentary to Sifra with specified indicative traits of form and program, writing conforming to that program of rhetorical, logical, and topical (here: propositional, problematic) traits got underway—then and not before. But we already know that documentary writing and writing comparable to documentary writing did not prevent non-documentary writing from going forward perhaps before, certainly alongside, and surely afterward; and the same names that occur in the one predominate in the other, as everyone knows. So, once more, to our starting point: the one important corpus of extra-documentary writing, the narratives of various kinds, venues, and indicative, definitive traits, remains to be considered. Narrative writing commonly bears a further, historical dimension, biography. Narratives focus on events involving named individuals, the larger number of them specific sages. Narrative writing therefore opens the opportunity to preserve traits of individuation, e.g., accounts of how a given master conducted himself. By its nature, focusing as it does on the actions of named individuals, narrative does preserve—if exemplary, still—otherthan-consensus conduct. The individual is singled out, so narrative sustains a labor of individuation that other forms of discourse do not. And, still more striking: we should not miss the simple reality, the topical program of narrative, as we shall see, does extend its range of interest to circles of the Israelite community that are comprised by “other-than-sages,” however that formidable constituent element of the world of Judaism be named. The perspective and viewpoint of not a few stories do not replicate the standard ones of sagacity. Indeed, a fair number of narratives explicitly invoke the exemplary conduct and virtue of “not-sages,” and these narratives, often in a Halakhic context but not of Halakhic content, represent the sole ambience in the Rabbinic writing for the representation of such persons and their values. And, I suspect time will tell, not all such persons, and not every value espoused by them,

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conformed to, or was otherwise preserved by, the results of documentary and extra-documentary writing. So if we are to find, within the Rabbinic canon, shards and remnants of a Judaic system acknowledged by the Rabbinic writers but outside of their framework, we shall find it among the diverse narratives. But in so stating, I have moved far beyond the range of established knowledge, which, as is clear, defines the need for systematic and detailed work of analytical classification. VI The program of the project hardly presents surprises. Beginning with the Mishnah, tractate Abot, and Tosefta, and continuing with other compilations in due course, I sort out narratives by documents: the distribution, by forms and types, of narratives, as the title of the volume indicates. In a later, companion-study, I hope to sort out narratives by their indicative traits, without regard to their documentary venue, e.g., the ma#aseh, the mashal, and so on. The phenomenology that results ought to provide information on a dual grid. It ought to permit perspective both (1) on the documentary unfolding of narratives (thus: religion, history) and (2) on repertoire of narratives without regard to documentary distribution (thus: literature).22 To produce coherent results for further analysis of the literature, history, and religion of nascent Rabbinic Judaism, at each point, I ask a uniform set of questions, thus imposing on the data a set of taxonomic considerations of a consistent order. In line with the important consideration just now introduced, I (1) establish my reason for regarding a pericope as “narrative” to begin with. I then (2) identify the source of the movement from one element of the tale to the next, indicating what imparts the dynamism and purpose (“teleology”) to the composition. Finally, in line with the purpose of this survey, I (3) ask each item to tell me how it is to be classified, meaning, what points of regularity and order it contains to justify linking it with other items of a formal22

It goes without saying that, as indicated in the Preface, I do not concern myself with the program of literary criticism or of aesthetics, which ask different sets of questions from those that animate this study. Where I learn something important from literary critics, I indicate in context.

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ly-comparable character: the taxonomic phenomenology of the narratives viewed as a whole. The nature of the work—a piece by piece examination of the evidence—requires that the phenomenological outcome take shape cumulatively. At this point it will not serve any purpose to define a rough-and-ready classification of narratives. Here is the set of questions, in the order that strikes me as logical and necessary, which, in the encounter with each item, I uniformly address. Then, at each point, I underscore the particular aspects of special interest that are at hand. 1. A piece of writing qualifies as a narrative because it attains coherence through the teleological logic of coherent discourse defined earlier. This commonly means that, at some point and in some articulated way, the narrative invokes a finite action, it records something that has happened, or it asks the reader to imagine a real-time, real-life event: On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The answer justifies my classifying the composition as a narrative. 2. The sequence of data, I have argued, is not random but determinative. The sequence conveys the purpose, in context, that each component is meant to serve. A narrative thus coheres by reason of a tension that is precipitated and resolved, a point that is proved by the narrative: thus: What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved? This question reinforces the foregoing. 3. The narratives fall into diverse categories, each with its own traits. These categories, defined by formal criteria, do not represent the outcome of taste and judgment and critical acumen, which I do not claim to possess, but only of a simple, material assessment of concrete features of the writing: How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple? What about compositions that by the criterion of teleological logic do not qualify as narratives but convey a narrative “tone” or impression, e.g., a sequence of actions and their outcomes, or a setting for a story that is not actually told, e.g., “they were walking along the way and he said to him…,” with no action but talk? Enough has been said to warrant a systematic discussion, at

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the very outset, of what I call “pseudo-narratives,” which is to say, compositions that adopt what looks like a narrative tone but cohere on some foundation other than the logic of teleology that, by definition, characterizes all narratives but no non-narrative compositions. In chapter one I point to three classifications of such writing and instantiate each. Then we turn to the survey that this project records. We begin with the data of the Mishnah and ask whether the document contains compositions or composites that qualify as narrative. Since the document is rich in exemplary precedents explicitly marked as ma#aseh, which renders “precedent/case,” we should anticipate many narratives. These I log in within the classification of pseudo-narratives. What is left? What we shall find is only a few odd narratives, each of them unique, and no protocol or pattern of narrative. We proceed to tractate Abot, then take up the Tosefta’s narratives. The outcome, in chapter fifteen, allows us to make some progress toward the announced goals of the project. There I identify the documentary preferences as to narrative that characterize the Mishnah, tractate Abot, and the Tosefta.23 VII Through the use of diverse margins, broad for the narrative, indented for the context, I indicate my views on the form-analytical data of a given composition. In that way I preserve the narrative in its larger context while signaling its formal limits. The visual signal permits us to see very clearly the way in which authentic narratives are distinguished from their documentary context—if they are to be so distinguished. 23 Clearly, at this stage we can say nothing about the types of narrative viewed in abstraction from the documents, e.g., in a canonical framework: “the Rabbinic narrative,” or “Talmudic stories” viewed without differentiation in their own framework or in documentary context, let alone “the Aggadic narrative,” as though all “Aggadah” formed an undifferentiated composition. The conclusions of the Preface pertain. But once the types of narratives of each canonical document, viewed on its own, have been collected and classified rigorously—explaining not only inclusion but exclusion—then work on “the Rabbinic narrative” or “Talmudic stories” or “the Aggadic narrative” will become analytically possible. As matters now stand, the premise of inquiry—documentary lines mean nothing—is untested by Rabbinic narratologists.

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In the shank of the exercise, chapters two through fourteen, I log in not only authentic narratives but those that, by the criteria that are spelled out in chapter one, I classify as pseudo-narratives. That is the only way to provide a complete survey of pertinent data.

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CHAPTER ONE

PSEUDO-NARRATIVE My definition of the logic of coherent discourse has to explain all cases uniformly: why this, not that? The presence of that logic classifies writing as a narrative, its absence signifies that writing that looks like a story in fact does not qualify as a narrative but, by reason of verisimilitude, as pseudo-narrative. In that connection I begin with three special problems, all involving described action. These bear resemblance to stories, the rhetoric corresponding to what generally characterizes narratives in Rabbinic context. But their principal parts do not cohere through the required logic of coherent discourse. They are (1) “conversations”1 (“he said to him… he said to him…”); (2) presentations of ritual conduct in the Temple (and in the court) (“he did this… he did that…”); and (3) the precedent or case, usually marked ma#aseh.2 The “conversations” construct a setting for what are, in fact, merely exchanges of principles or arguments: artificial dialogue, a pseudo-narrative setting for an analytical presentation. The presentations of ritual conduct in the Temple represent a particular type of writing restricted to a particular topic. They imitate the preference of Scripture, e.g., Leviticus 16, in presenting rituals through described action. The ma#aseh in the Mishnah follows a simple pattern: in such and such a place, thus and so took place, and Rabbi Y ruled 1 Quotation-marks signify the distinction between verbatim reports of conversations and fabrications of “conversations” out of surmise or convention, such as characterize nearly the whole of the Rabbinic canonical record of things people supposedly said to one another. In that record literary convention and artifice govern; there is nothing that remotely qualifies as a verbatim report of things really said, as a conversation that really took place on some one day in some determinate situation. 2 The distinction between a precedent and a unique case, lacking authority as a precedent, makes no difference in the contexts we survey, hence I avoid making a commitment as to how I classify the ma#aseh in the Mishnah. In the Tosefta the ma#aseh takes on further tasks in context, sometimes replicating the Mishnaic usage, some times going well beyond.

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in this wise). The Tosefta invokes the marker, ma#aseh, for other kinds of writing, some of which qualify as narrative. Let me now explain, in line with the indicative criterion, why I exclude three sorts of compositions that seem to, but do not, set forth a narrative. I deem each of these to constitute a pseudonarrative. In our detailed survey of the narratives of the Mishnah and the Tosefta, from the pseudo-narratives we gain perspective on the authentic narratives, their forms and proportions. I. Portrayals of Conversations First, let us take up a simple example of how a Halakhic composite is supplied with a setting: Mishnah-tractate Shabbat 1:4 A. These are some of the laws which they stated in the upper room of Hananiah b. Hezekiah b. Gurion when they went up to visit him. B. They took a vote, and the House of Shammai outnumbered the House of Hillel. C. And eighteen rules did they decree on that very day. 1:5 (1) A. The House of Shammai say, “They do not [on Friday afternoon] soak ink, dyestuffs, or vetches, unless there is sufficient time for them to be [fully] soaked while it is still day.” B. And the House of Hillel permit. 1:6 [II] A. The House of Shammai say, “They do not put bundles of [wet] flax into the oven, unless there is time for them to steam off while it is still day. B. “And [they do not put] wool into the cauldron, unless there is sufficient time for it to absorb the color [while it is still day].” C. And the House of Hillel permit. [III] D. The House of Shammai say, “They do not spread out nets for wild beasts, fowl, or fish, unless there is sufficient time for them to be caught while it is still day.” E. And the House of Hillel permit. 1:7 [IV] A. The House of Shammai say, “They do not sell [anything] to a gentile or bear a burden with him, B. “and they do not lift up a burden onto his back, C. “unless there is sufficient time for him to reach a nearby place [while it is still day].” D. And the House of Hillel permit.

A-C appear to tell a story of an incident, but in fact serve merely to provide the setting for a sequence of Halakhic rulings of a particular classification. A common example of the same phenomenon is the ma#aseh, to which we turn in section iii.

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Second, what about portrayals of conversations, e.g., debates or exchanges of opinion on rulings—implicit dialogue lacking all activity or movement, from a starting point to a conclusion? Do these register as narratives, since they describe the unfolding sequence, the action, of talk? Let me give a single example of a well-articulated description of a conversation: Mishnah-tractate Sotah 5:5 A. On that day did R. Joshua b. Hurqanos expound as follows: “Job served the Holy One, blessed be He, only out of love, B. “since it is said, ‘Though he slay me, yet will I wait for him’ (Job 13:15). C. “But still the matter is in doubt [as to whether it means], ‘I will wait for him,’ or ‘I will not wait for him.’ D. “Scripture states, ‘Until I die I will not put away mine integrity from me’ (Job. 27:5). E. “This teaches that he did what he did out of love.” F. Said R. Joshua, “Who will remove the dirt from your eyes, Rabban Yo-hanan b. Zakkai? For you used to expound for your entire life that Job served the Omnipresent only out of awe, G. “since it is said, ‘The man was perfect and upright and one who feared God and avoided evil’ (Job 1:8). H. “And now has not Joshua, the disciple of your disciple, taught that he did what he did out of love.”

We have the markings of narrative: a particular time or occasion (“on that day”), yielding an expectation of an unfolding order of events (“said R. Joshua”), leading to a climactic resolution—the realization of the teleological logic of coherent discourse. But a second look shows otherwise. What we have is merely an exposition of a theological position and the exegetical foundations therefor, situated within what I class as a pseudo-narrative setting. Pseudo-narrative creates the impression of a teleological construction but in fact merely provides a dramatic setting for a systematic exposition, a fabricated dialogue, for what is in fact a mere saying or ruling of law. What is at issue, then, is whether exchanges of opinion “he said to him… he said to him…” with or without accompanying detail) constitute narratives: can they be said to represent purposive sequences of facts to be classified as narrative? One may well claim that a report of an exchange of opinions represents “an event” recorded through dialogue, thus every Halakhic composition might be deemed the outcome of an event. To avoid such an infinite regress from the surface exchanges of opinion to an a priori

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transaction in (allegedly) actual time, a simple definition serves. That I have already said is what distinguishes narrative from all other forms and types of coherent discourse in the Rabbinic canon. It is that teleological logic that I set forth in the Introduction. And, in the case at hand, A-E cohere as a proposition, the details fitting together by reason of their propositional logic, and do not have to wait until H to attain cogency. Accordingly, I do not list as narratives the exchanges of opinion, e.g., colloquies, he said… they said to him… he said to them… A deed or an action of some kind has to be included, if only implicitly, to qualify as a narrative. Here are two examples of what in the present survey of the canon does not rise to the level of a narrative: M. Berakhot 4:2 4:2 A. R. Nehunia b. Haqqaneh would pray a short prayer upon entering the study house and upon leaving. B. They said to him, “What is the nature of this prayer?” C. He said to them, “Upon entering I pray that I will cause no offense. D. “And upon my exit I give thanks for my portion [in life].”

If we remove B and go from A to C-D, we change nothing of the meaning and sense of the composition. “He would do so and so,” the deed then being elaborated, is simply a primary statement expanded and explained. The burden of the composition rests not on the sequence of the statements but on the propositions thereof, and the intrusion of “they” by the criterion of the logics of coherent discourse explained at the outset does not mark the composition as a narrative. In the same category is the following colloquy: Mishnah-tractate Abodah Zarah 4:7 A. They asked sages in Rome, “If [God] is not in favor of idolatry, why does he not wipe it away?” B. They said to them, “If people worshipped something of which the world had no need, he certainly would wipe it away. C. “But lo, people worship the sun, moon, stars, and planets. D. “Now do you think he is going to wipe out his world because of idiots?” E. They said to them, “If so, let him destroy something of which the world has no need, and leave something which the world needs!” F. They said to them, “Then we should strengthen the hands of those who worship these [which would not be destroyed], for then they would say, ‘Now you know full well that they are gods, for lo, they were not wiped out!’”

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Apart from the setting (“… in Rome…”), the exchange of arguments contains no action; more to the point, each component is positioned by reason of its contents, that is, “If people worshipped…” must come where it does, followed by the objection, “But lo…” We do not have to wait until the final turning in the exposition. It is not a very intricate argument, and comparison with the dialogic art of Plato is hardly proportionate. But the notion that someone here is telling a story comparable to the stories with their beginning, middle, and end, their tension and resolution, their logic of coherent discourse does not pertain. The following colloquy serves, because it coheres only step by step, within the exchange of reasons for a given proposition. It is simply a theological dialogue that evokes a narrative setting but does not in any way depend for coherence on the end-point. It represents a convention of Halakhic exchange as well, as the following shows: Mishnah-Tractate Negaim 11:7 A. (1) A summer garment which has colored and white checks—(2) they spread from one [white] to another [white square]. B. They asked R. Eliezer, “And lo, it is a distinctive check?” C. He said to them, “I have not heard.” D. Said to him R. Judah b. Beterah, “May I teach concerning it?” E. He said to him, “If to confirm the words of sages, yes.” E He said to him, “Perhaps it will remain on it for two weeks, and that which stands on garments for two weeks is unclean.” G. He said to him, “You are a great sage, for you have confirmed the words of sages.” H. The spreading which is near —[it is a mark of uncleanness] in any measure at all. J. That which is distant—[signifies uncleanness only if it is] the size of a split bean. K. And that which returns— L. the size of a split bean.

Finally, let me give an example of a ma#aseh of a classical order—statement of a situation/event and a sage’s ruling thereon— joined to a formal debate, an exchange of reasons and criticism thereof. Neither component qualifies as a narrative: Tosefta-tractate Miqva"ot 1:16 A. An immersion-pool which was measured and found lacking—all the acts requiring cleanness which were carried out depending upon it B. whether this immersion-pool is in the private domain, or whether

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this immersion-pool is in the public domain—[Supply: are unclean.] C. R. Simeon says, “In the private domain, it is unclean. In the public domain, it is clean.”’ 1:17 A. Said R. Simeon, “M#SH B: The water-reservoir of Disqus in Yavneh was measured and found lacking. B. “And R. Tarfon did declare clean, and R. Aqiba unclean. C. “Said R. Tarfon, ‘Since this immersion-pool is in the assumption of being clean, it remains perpetually in this presumption of cleanness until it will be known for sure that it is made unclean.’ D. “Said R. Aqiba, ‘Since this immersion-pool is in the assumption of being unclean, it perpetually remains in the presumption of uncleanness un-til it will be known for sure that it is clean.’ 1:18 A. “Said R. Tarfon, ‘To what is the matter to be likened? To one who was standing and offering [a sacrifice] at the altar, and it became known that he is a son of a divorcee or the son of a Halusah— “‘for his service is valid.’ B. “Said R. Aqiba, ‘To what is the matter to be likened? “‘To one who was standing and offering [a sacrifice] at the altar, and it became known that he is disqualified by reason of a blemish— “‘for his service is invalid.’” 1:19 A. “Said R. Tarfon to him, ‘You draw an analogy to one who is blemished. I draw an analogy to the son of a divorcee or to the son of a Halusah. B. “‘Let us now see to what the matter is appropriately likened. C. “‘If it is analogous to a blemished priest, let us learn the law from the case of the blemished priest. If it is analogous to the son of a divorcée or to the son of a Halusah, let us learn the law from the case of the son of the divorcee or the son of a Halusah.’ 1:20 A. “R. Aqiba says, ‘The unfitness affecting an immersion-pool affects the immersion-pool itself, and the unfit aspect of the blemished priest affects the blemished priest himself. B. “‘But let not the case of the son of a divorcee or the son of a Halusah prove the matter, for his matter of unfitness depends upon others. C. “‘A ritual pool’s unfitness [depends] on one only, and the unfitness af a blemished priest [depends] on an individual only, but let not the son of a divorcee or the son of a Halusah prove the matter, for the unfitness of this one depends upon ancestry.’ D. “They took a vote concerning the case and declared it unclean. E. “Said R. Tarfon to R. Aqiba, ‘He who departs from you is like one who perishes.’”

T. Miq. 1:17A-B amplify T. Miq. 1:16 A, C. Then the protracted formal exchange, C-D, 1:18, 1:19 perfectly executes the requirement of a debate on a dispute, in precise balance throughout. There is no basis whatever for assuming that these highly formalized compositions mean to record events that actually happened;

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nor is there any interest in portraying a particular event on a determinate occasion. Here, again, the author of the passage has chosen the form of a dialogue, in which an exchange of opinions is set forth as a onetime argument. But what is at stake is the presentation of the Halakhah and the reasons for it, and in that exercise each component coheres, fore and aft, by reason of the substance of what is said and the reason that animates it. So to the main point: are “conversations” narratives? No, in no way do they qualify here. I eliminate from consideration as narrative writing the single most ubiquitous, often the most intellectually dynamic, type of writing in the Rabbinic canon: an exchange of opinion outside of the framework of supposed encounter or other (implicit) activity. A sequence comprised by “He said to him…,” “he said to him…” does not qualify as a narrative, e.g., the transcript of a conversation that took place in some one day and circumstance. Here the logic that operates is that of a simple syllogism: if this, then that, if not-this, then not-that. Each component of the composition stands on its own and links to the others through the substance of what is said, not the outcome of what is implicit. The two (or more) free-standing elements intersect in topic, not in the requirement that one element come before or after another. As I said earlier, in this case we do not have to wait to the end to make sense of the units of thought; each stands on its own. The point of intersection advances a pre-existing proposition or set of propositions. For the purpose of this study I therefore treat the formula, “he said to him,” as an indicator of the start and end of a component of a formal exposition of opinion pure and simple. The order of what is said does not convey the purpose of the composition. In other words, unless purpose, e.g., an implicit action to be validated or condemned, is clearly at issue, I take “he said to him…,” “he said to him…” to constitute paragraph-markers, indicators of the limits of completed discourse, and not the substantive signal of a conversation that took place at some one time. The context always signals the implicit presence of an event, that is, something that actually is alleged to have happened to precipitate. or to come about by reason of. an exchange of views, e.g., the meeting of two authorities at some one occasion, or the happening of a concrete transaction upon the consequences of which two authorities

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lay down rulings. Any other taxonomic principle will require our treating as “narrative” the entire dialogic corpus of the Rabbinic canon, meaning, the greater part of all documents. When we review tractate Abot in chapter eight, we see why this decision is necessary and wise.

II. Portrayals of Halakhic Rules as Described Actions Second, what about the compositions that describe in a story-telling tone the rites of the Temple (and of the court), e.g., what the priests did or do in such and such a connection. Numerous compositions in the Mishnah addressed to Temple procedures and activities record data in the language, “He did this… he did that…,” and on the surface these chapters in the life of the Temple cult take on the quality of narratives. So we are obliged to ask ourselves whether they qualify for the present study? These accounts of sequences of action in a given connection recall the manner in which Leviticus 16 tells the story of the rites of the Day of Atonement, “he shall do this, he shall do that….” When we turn from Scripture to the Mishnah, what shifts is the tense, from Scripture’s future at hand, to the continuous past, thus “How did [which sustains: how would] they do it?” in the Mishnah. The pertinent verses of Scripture are as follows. The Lord spoke to Moses after the death of the two sons of Aaron, when they drew near before the Lord and died, and the Lord said to Moses, “Tell Aaron your brother not to come at all times into the holy place within the veil, before the mercy seat which is upon the ark, lest he die; for I will appear in the cloud upon the mercy seat. But thus shall Aaron come into the holy place, with a young bull for a sin offering and a ram for a burnt offering. He shall put on the holy linen coat and shall have the linen breeches on his body, be girded with the linen girdle, and wear the linen turban; these are the holy garments. He shall bathe his body in water and then put them on. And he shall take from the congregation of the people of Israel two male goats for a sin offering and one ram for a burnt offering. “And Aaron shall offer the bull as a sin offering for himself and shall make atonement for himself and for his house. Then he shall take the two goats and set them before the Lord at the door of the tent of meeting; and Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats, one lot for the Lord and the other lot for Azazel. And Aaron shall present the goat on which the lot fell for the Lord and offer it as a sin offering; but the

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goat on which the lot fell for Azazel shall be presented alive before the Lord to make atonement over it, that it may be sent away into the wilderness to Azazel. “Aaron shall present the bull as a sin offering for himself and shall make atonement for himself and for his house; he shall kill the bull as a sin offering for himself. And he shall take a censer full of coals of fire from the altar before the Lord, and two handfuls of sweet incense beaten small; and he shall bring it within the veil and put the incense on the fire before the Lord, that the cloud of the incense may cover the mercy seat which is upon the testimony, lest he die. And he shall take some of the blood of the bill and sprinkle it with his finger on the front of the mercy seat and before the mercy seat he shall sprinkle the blood with his finger seven times. “Then he shall kill the goat of the sin offering which is for the people and bring its blood within the veil and do with its blood as he did with the blood of the bull, sprinkling it upon the mercy seat and before the mercy seat; thus he shall make atonement for the holy place, because of the uncleannesses of the people of Israel, and because of their transgressions, all their sins; and so he shall do for the tent of meeting, which abides with them in the midst of their uncleanness. There shall be no man in the tent of meeting when he enters to make atonement in the holy place until he comes out and has made atonement for himself and for his house and for all the assembly of Israel. Then he shall go out to the altar that is before the Lord and make atonement for it; and shall take some of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat and put it on the horns of the altar round about. And he shall sprinkle some of the blood upon it with his finger seven times and cleanse it and hallow it from the uncleanness of the people of Israel. “And when he has made an end of atonement for the holy place and the tent of meeting and the altar, he shall present the live goat; and Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat; and confess over him all the iniquities of the people of Israel, all their transgressions and all their sins; and he shall put them upon the head of the goat and send him away into the wilderness by the hand of a man who is in readiness. The goat shall bear all their iniquities upon him to a solitary land; and he shall let the goat go in the wilderness. “Then Aaron shall come into the tent of meeting and shall put off the linen garments which he put on when he went into the holy place and shall leave them there; and he shall bathe his body in water in a holy place and put on his garments and come forth and offer his burnt offering and the burnt offering of the people and make atonement for himself and for the people. And the fact of the sin offering he shall burn upon the altar. And he who lets the goat go to Azazel shall wash his clothes and bathe his body in water and afterward he may come into the camp. And the bull for the sin offering and the goat for the sin offering, whose blood was brought in to make atonement in the holy place, shall be carried forth outside the camp; their skin and their

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When the Halakhic exposition of the Mishnah and the Tosefta turns to Temple rites, it encompasses an account, told in the manner of a tale, of what was done in connection with that rite. That is to say, in addition to using the generalizing language of the Halakhah, the author describes the action of the priest in the manner of a narration. Before proceeding, let me give some instances of the use of language that describes sequential actions— first he did this, then he did that—and then return to the problem of whether these compositions quality as narratives within the working definition of this study. My first candidate sets forth the rite of reaping the barley sheaves used in the grain offering of the #omer on the opening day of Passover. Here we have a scripted language, a fixed exchange of formulas: Mishnah-tractate Menahot 6:3 A. How did they do it? B. Agents of the court go forth on the eve of [the afternoon before] the festival [of Passover]. C. And they make it into sheaves while it is still attached to the ground, so that it will be easy to reap. D. And all the villagers nearby gather together there [on the night after the first day of Passover], so that it will be reaped with great pomp. E. Once it gets dark [on the night of the sixteenth of Nisan], he says to them, “Has the sun set?” F. They say, “Yes.” G. “Has the sun set?” H. They say, “Yes.” I. “[With] this sickle?” J. They say, “Yes.” K. “[With] this sickle?” L. They say, “Yes.” M. “[With] this basket?” N. They say, “Yes.” O. “[With] this basket?” P. They say, “Yes.” Q. On the Sabbath, he says to them, “[Shall l reap on] this Sabbath?” R. They say, “Yes.” S. “[Shall I reap on] this Sabbath?” T. They say, “Yes.” U. “Shall I reap?”

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V. They say, “Reap.” W. “Shall I reap?” X. They say, “Reap”Y. three times for each and every matter. Z. And they say to him, “Yes, yes, yes.” AA. All of this [pomp] for what purpose? BB. Because of the Boethusians, for they maintain, “The reaping of the [barley for] the offering of the first sheaf of barley is not [done] at the conclusion of the festival.”

This account of the rite contains no prescriptive language of a Halakhic character. The upshot could readily be translated into the rhetoric of law, e.g., The agents of the court do thus and so…, without the colloquy that translates the law into a tale of how things were done. The effect is the same. The narrative is sustained by scripted language, fixed formulas that encase and encapsulate the activity. To show another case of a Temple rite described in terms of scripted language, I turn to the account of how the Sheqel-offering for the daily whole offering was taken up out of the Temple treasury: Mishnah-tractate Sheqalim 3:3-4 3:3 A. A member of the household of Rabban Gamaliel would go in and take his sheqel between his fingertips and throw it in front of the one who takes up the heave offering [of the sheqels, so as to make sure his coin would be used for the purchase of the public sacrifices]. B. And the one who takes up the heave offering intentionally pushes it into the basket. C. The one who takes up the heave offering does not do so until he says to them, “Shall l take up the heave offering?” And they say to him, “Take up heave offering, take up heave offering, take up heave offering,” three times. 3:4 A. He took up [heave offering] the first time and covered [the residue] with coverings. B. [He took up the heave offering] a second time and covered [the residue] with covers. C. But the third time he did not cover [it up]. D. [He covered the first two times], lest he forget and take up heave offering from those sheqels from which heave offering already had been taken. E. He took up the heave offering the first time in behalf of the Land of Israel, the second time in behalf of cities surrounding it, and the third time in behalf of Babylonia, Media, and the more distant communities.

What leads me to deem the descriptive language covering sequen-

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tial action as a problem of narrative? It is the contrast between presenting the Halakhic rule as a story, “he did this… he said that…,” and presenting it as an objective apodictic law of how things generally are done. That distinction emerges in the contrast between Mishnah-tractate Yoma 1:1 and 1:2, the former telling what they would do, the latter the rule governing the offering: Mishnah-tractate Yoma 1:1-3 1:1 A. Seven days before the Day of Atonement they set apart the high priest from his house to the councilors’ chamber B. And they [also] appoint another priest as his substitute, C. lest some cause of invalidation should overtake him. D. R. Judah says, “Also: they appoint another woman as a substitute for his wife, E. “lest his wife die. E “Since it says, And he shall make atonement for himself and for his house’ (Lev. 16:6). G. “His house—this refers to his wife.” H. They said to him, “If so, the matter is without limit.”

Now from what they did, we shift to prescriptive language of what the high priest does in his period of isolation in the councilors’ chamber, and the formulation is no longer what they did or do, but rather concerns the established pattern of activity: 1:2 A. All seven days he tosses the blood, offers up the incense, trims the lamp, and offers up the head and hind leg [of the daily whole offering], B. But on all other days, if he wanted to offer it up he offers it up. C. For a high priest offers up a portion at the head and takes a portion at the head [of the other priests].

The difference between M. 1:1 and M. 1:2 is recovered at M. 1:3, which contrasts once more with M. 1:2. The passage continues, at 1:3, in the descriptive-narrative language and tone of 1:1, with more scripted language conveying the sense that a particular drama is underway: 1:3 A. They handed over to him elders belonging to the court, and they read for him the prescribed rite of the day [of atonement]. B. And they say to him, “My lord, high priest, you read it with your own lips, C. “lest you have forgotten—or never [even] learned it to begin with.” D. On the eve of the Day of Atonement at dawn they set him up at the eastern gate and bring before him bullocks, rams, and sheep, E. so that he will be informed and familiar with the service.

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How does the rhetoric of the law differ from the rhetoric of the cited passages and its counterparts in other tractates? Here is how the law speaks: Mishnah-tractate Yoma 8:1-3 M. 8:1 On the Day of Atonement it is forbidden to eat, drink, bathe, put on any sort of oil, put on a sandal, or engage in sexual relations. But a king and a bride wash their faces. “And a woman who has given birth may put on her sandal,” the words of R. Eliezer. And sages prohibit. M. 8:2 He who eats a large date’s bulk [of food], inclusive of its pit—he who drinks the equivalent in liquids to a mouthful—is liable. All sorts of foods join together to form the volume of the date’s bulk, and all sorts of liquids join together to form the volume of a mouthful. He who eats and he who drinks—[these prohibited volumes] do not join together [to impose liability for eating or for drinking, respectively]. M. 8:3 [If] one ate and drank in a single act of inadvertence, he is liable only for a single sin-offering. [If] he ate and did a prohibited act of labor, he is liable for two sin-offerings. If he ate foods which are not suitable for eating, or drank liquids which are not suitable for drinking—[if] he drank brine or fish brine—he is exempt. As to children, they do not impose a fast on them on the Day of Atonement. But they educate them a year or two in advance, so that they will be used to doing the religious duties.

Now all focus on a singular event or pattern is set aside in favor of rules stated in general and abstract, indeterminate terms: how things are done, without regard to the particularities of occasion or circumstance. Clearly, the language of M. Yoma 1:1, 3 and its counterparts appears to tell the story of the rite in present tense, continuous action to be sure, but still a story. How do we differentiate cultic narratives from the narratives that come under study in this project, so that I call the former “pseudo-narratives”? The answer, given in the Introduction, appeals to the logic of coherent discourse that imparts coherence to the components of the construction(s) at hand. A further instance of highly scripted language is in the account of the presentation of firstfruits by the farmer to the Temple priest. The following is noteworthy for its formalization of speech on the pertinent occasion. Here is another case in which the sequence of actions is everything, the conclusion not serving to impose sense and coherence on the prior units, each of which is necessary on its own and in its particular point in the description:

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Mishnah-tractate Bikkurim 3:2-6 3:2 A. How do they bring the firstfruits up [to the Temple]? B. [The male inhabitants of] all the towns in the priestly course gather in the [main] town of the priestly course [M. Ta. 4:2], C. and they sleep [outside] in the open area of the town D. and they would not enter the houses [in the town, for fear of contracting corpse uncleanness]. E. And at dawn, the officer would say, F. “Arise, and let us go up to Zion, to [the house of] the Lord our God” (Jer. 31:6). 3:3 A. Those [who come] from nearby bring figs and grapes, B. but those [who come] from afar bring dried figs and raisins. C. And an ox walks before them, D. its horns overlaid with gold, E. and a wreath of olive [leaves] on its head. F. A flutist plays before them until they arrive near Jerusalem. G. [Once] they arrived near Jerusalem, they sent [a messenger] ahead of them [to announce their arrival], and they decorated their firstfruits. H. The high officers, chiefs, and treasurer [of the Temple] come out to meet them. I. According to the rank of the entrants, they would [determine which of these officials would] go out. J. And all the craftsmen of Jerusalem stand before them and greet them, [saying], K. “Brothers, men of such and such a place, you have come in peace.” 3:4 A. A flutist plays before them, until they reach the Temple mount. B. [Once] they reached the Temple mount, C. Even Agrippa the King puts the basket [of firstfruits] on his shoulder, and enters, [and goes forth] until he reaches the Temple court. D. [Once] he reached the Temple court, the Levites sang the song, E. “I will extol thee, 0 Lord, for thou hast drawn me up, and hast not let my foes rejoice over me” (Ps. 30:1). 3:5 A. The pigeons that [were] on top of the baskets were [sacrificed as] burnt offerings, B. but [the pigeons] which are in their hands are given [as a gift] to the priests. 3:6 A. While the basket is still on his shoulder, he recites [the entire confession of firstfruits, beginning] from the words “I declare this day to the Lord your God” (Dt. 26:3), B. [and proceeding] until he finishes the entire passage. C. R. Judah says, “[While the basket is on his shoulder, he recites only] up to [the second part of the confession, which begins with the words,] ‘A wandering Aramean was my father’ (Dt. 26:6).” D. “[Once] he [has] reached [the words] ‘A wandering Aramean was my father,’ E. he takes the basket down from his shoulder, and holds it by its rim, F. and a priest puts his hand beneath [the basket], and waves it [before the altar]—

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G. And [then the Israelite] recites [the second part of the confession, beginning] from [the words], ‘A wandering Aramean was my father,’ [and proceeding] until he finishes the entire passage.” H. And [then] he places [the basket] beside the altar, and he bows down and departs.

What we have is not a narrative but an account of how things are to be done in a formal-ritual transaction. That is why the logic of coherent discourse characteristic of narratives does not serve. Later on, in chapter fifteen, we shall see how in T. Ta. 3:7 the same topic, presentation of first-fruits, can be the subject of a highly successful and authentic narrative, conforming to the logic of coherent discourse that I have already set forth as the qualifying criterion for an authentic narrative. The logic registers a distinction that makes a huge difference in Rabbinic writing. A final example of conveying the Halakhah—how things are done generally, under all circumstances—in a narrative form corresponds to the account of Mishnah-tractate Yoma 1:1, 3: Mishnah-tractate Middot 1:2 A. The man in charge of the Temple mount would go around to every watch, and lighted torches were [flaring] before him. B. And to any watch which was not standing did the man in charge of the Temple mount say, “Peace be with you.” C. [If] it was obvious that he was sleeping, he beats him with his staff. D. And he had the right to burn his garment. E. And they say, “What is the noise in the courtyard?” E “It is the noise of a Levite being smitten, and his clothing being burned, for he went to sleep at his post.” G. R. Eliezer b. Jacob says, “One time they found my mother’s brother sleeping and burned his garment.”

Once more we find ourselves slipping from a general rule to the account of a case, an incident, a particular event. Readers may stipulate that where the Halakhic presentation takes up Temple rites and comparable events (the Sanhedrin’s procedures for example), the same narrative convention takes over. Now we return to our problem: do the components hold together only by reason of the goal of the narrative, or is there a principle of cogency deriving from sequence, so that each item on its own lays claim to its legitimate position in the whole, that is, do we have something akin to the logic of proposition (if not syllogism) that generally characterizes the presentation of the Halakhah and of the theological constructions of the Aggadah?

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The answer presents itself when we realize that the order of action is everything in the cultic narratives, and, as we shall see in the writing of Ithamar Gruenwald, that is a necessity for ritual. But then, by the definition that animates this work, the ritual accounts do not quality as narrative, but as pseudo-narrative. Let me explain. At stake in the utilization of the rhetoric of described action in Mishnah-tractate Yoma and its counterparts is the sequencing of the rite, and this is made explicit, for the Day of Atonement, in the following formulations of the Mishnah (in bold face type) and the Tosefta (in plain type): M. 5:7 The entire rite of the Day of Atonement stated in accord with its proper order—if [the high priest] did one part of the rite before its fellow—he has done nothing whatsoever. [If for instance] he took care of the blood of the goat before the blood of the bullock, let him go and sprinkle some of the blood of the goat after he has sprinkled the blood of the bullock. And if before he had completed the acts of placing the blood on the inner altar, the blood was poured out, let him bring other blood and go and sprinkle it to begin with on the inner altar [M. 5:3-4]. And so [is the rule] in the case of the sanctuary [M. 5:5], and so in the case of the golden altar [M. 5:5], for each of them constitutes an act of atonement unto itself [and need not be repeated]. R. Eleazar and R. Simeon say, “From the place at which he broke off, from there he begins once more.” T. 3:3 The entire rite of the Day of Atonement, stated in accord with its proper order—if one did one part of the rite before its fellow, he has done nothing whatsoever [M. Yoma 5:7A-B], except for taking out the ladle and fire-pan, for if he did one deed before its fellow, what he has done is done. T. 3:4 Said R. Judah, “Under what circumstances? In the case of deeds done inside, while the high priest is wearing white garments. But as to things done outside, while the high priest is wearing golden garments, even if he did one deed before its fellow, and repeated any one of all the rites, what he has done is done.” T. 3:5 [If] he put some of the placings of blood inside and then the blood was poured out, let him bring new blood and begin afresh inside. R. Eleazar and R. Simeon say, “He begins at the place at which he stopped” [cf. M. Yoma 5:7H]. [If] he completed the placings of blood inside and put some of the placings of blood outside and then the blood was poured out, let him bring fresh blood and begin at the beginning outside. R. Eleazar and R. Simeon say, “He begins at the place at which he stopped.” T. 3:6 [If] he finished the placings of blood on the veil outside

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and placed some of the placings on the altar and then the blood was poured out, let him bring fresh blood and begin at the beginning on the altar. R. Eleazar and R. Simeon say, “He begins at the place at which he stopped.” [If] he completed the placings of blood on the altar and then the blood was poured out, the placing of the blood into the foundation does not spoil the rite. And all of them [the beasts requiring burning] impart uncleanness to clothing and are burned in the place of ashes,” the words of R. Eleazar and R. Simeon. And sages say, “They do not impart uncleanness to clothing and are not burned in the place of the ashes, except for the very last one, which completes the service [of atonement].” T. 3:7 Said R. Yosé, “This is the sign: Whatever is taken from within to be placed without is taken as near as possible to the inner altar. And whatever is taken from without to be placed within is taken as near as possible to the inner altar.” [If] one put part of the blood of the bullock to be offered inside, outside, and some of the blood of the goat to be placed inside, outside, the ones placed inside go to his credit. But the ones placed outside do not go to his credit. If] he put part of the placings of blood inside, and then the blood was poured out, let fresh blood be brought, and let him begin, on the altar. If he put part of the placings of blood on the altar, and the blood was poured out, etc. [cf. M. Yoma 5:7D-E]. T. 3:8 “Even though he has not poured the blood on the foundation [M. Yoma 5:6B, C], he has carried out his obligation, as it is said, ‘And he will complete making atonement’ (Lev. 16:20). If he has made atonement, he has completed [the work],” the words of R. ‘Aqiba. R. Judah says, “If he has completed the work, then he has made atonement.”

Here we see the shift from the description of action (whether in the future, as in Leviticus 16, or in the past, as in the Mishnah) to the provision of the law in general, apodictic terms. But that is not a primary fact. Now what I think we have before us is the use of descriptive language (“he does this… he does that…”) to set forth the fixed, Halakhic rule (“he is to do this… he is to do that….” When it comes to specific actions that are repeated in a ritual context of Temple or court, scripted language and scripted actions embody the Halakhah at the critical turnings: what is supposed to be done, the particular action that is supposed to be taken. In the Mishnah and the Tosefta, described action to portray the Halakhah serves only in the presentation of the rites of the Temple (and their counterparts of the court). I shall now explain why described actions in the Temple context do not yield narrative within the definition given in the Introduction.

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The indicative fact is, the pseudo-narrative of sequenced actions that “he does… did… will do…” serves in the Halakhic documents, particularly the Mishnah, only for ritual, and mainly for the Temple’s rituals. This well-documented preference for the use of the language of description, in addition to the language of Halakhic prescription, for the particular purpose of embodying ritual behavior, is best explained by Ithamar Gruenwald, in his Rituals and Ritual Theory in Ancient Israel. Gruenwald addresses matters in this language, with what is important for my argument in italics: The study of rituals mostly concerns the particulars of what is done, how it is done, and the reason and purpose of doing as embedded in the very act of doing… rituals are performative “signs”… Each ritual consists of several sub-acts that configure rituals as sequentially structured events. They are spread out in time and in space. In other words, the doing of any rituals creates dynamics that turns complex structure into a process. …what makes the difference between a ritual and a non-ritual act.…The answer focussed on three factors: (1) the logic that shapes the internal structuring; (2) the dynamics that emerges from the sequencing of ritual acts; (3) and the mental process that activates intentionality. There is an inner logic that constitutes the structure of every ritual. Without that logic, the ritual statement becomes redundant. The specific manner in which the various parts become a coherent whole shows the manner in which every ritual becomes a compositional event. Whatever its shape, ritual always is a unique statement that exists in its own right. In our understanding here, doing the ritual in the right manner means allocating to it, as well as its various components, processual coherence. In this respect, rituals are analogous to verbal arguments. Reverse or displace any part in a certain argument, or drop it altogether, and the whole argument changes, or loses its communicative capacity.3

What is important here is the stress on the sequencing of ritual acts, the notion of ritual as process (“processual coherence”). He states my point of emphasis in so many words: “rituals are analogous to verbal arguments…” That strikes at the heart of the matter and removes the tales of how things were or are done in the Temple from consideration within the definition of narrative as defined by the quality of logic of coherent discourse. Indeed, Gruenwald captures the matter in the italicized por3 Ithamar Gruenwald, Rituals and Ritual Theory in Ancient Israel (Leiden, 2002: Brill. Brill’s Reference Library of Judaism series.

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tion of the cited passage. Within Gruenwald’s theory of matters, which I find compelling, we are able to explain the traits of the narrative-Halakhic protocol, right alongside the philosophicalHalakhic protocol, serves in particular in the context of Temple rites and activities. There is no myth that accompanies the verbal realization of the rite; it does not belong, and if present, is tacked on and scarcely intersects in detail (as with the Boethusians of Mishnah-tractate Menahot). The logic is established in the gesture that establishes a series, that is, three times repeated. More to the point, everything rests on the sequencing of ritual acts, which is the point of emphasis that can be conveyed only in the narrative medium selected in the cases at hand. If the sequence is the key, how else to convey it than say, first he did this, then he did that?! But, I repeat, the sequencing, step by step, violates the logic of teleology that signifies narrative and only narrative: not the sequence step by step but the goal and end of the whole impose coherence. That is precisely the opposite of the logic of ritual pseudo-narrative, by which every acted out component of the process belongs only where it is, takes on meaning and significance only in its proper position—and not from the telos of the whole. Gruenwald’s emphasis on ritual as process then provides us with the key to understanding the scripted exchanges that are portrayed in the Halakhah of the cult—alongside, I emphasize, the philosophical-expositional portrayal of that same Halakhic categoryformation. Within the definition given in the Introduction for the logic that always signals the presence of narrative, the absence of which invariably marks a piece of writing as something other than narrative, Gruenwald’s formulation of the traits of ritual discourse in the Halakhah validates treating the cited passages and their counterparts as other-than-narrative. Since in the Mishnah-Tosefta the use of descriptive language such as is cited above serves only Temple (and court) procedure, I am justified in omitting all such passages from my repertoire of candidates for analysis set forth in the Mishnah and the Tosefta. III. The Precedent/Case/Ruling Common in the Mishnah is the composition bearing the marker, ma#aseh, that reports a case or an action followed by a sage’s ruling.

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The form is X happened and Sage Y ruled; in the Mishnah it is ordinarily stripped down and involves a minimum of description. I present the pseudo-narrative of a precedent or case in its Halakhic context, indenting what is theoretical and emphasizing what supplies an example or a precedent of the law. A few examples will sustain the generalizations given presently. Mishnah-tractate Kilayim 4:9 A. He who plants his vineyard by [intervals of] sixteen amah, sixteen amah [in rows sixteen amot apart]—it is permitted to put seed into it [the area between the rows]. B. Said R. Judah, M#SH B: In Salmon one planted his vineyard by [intervals of] sixteen, sixteen amah, C. “and he would turn the foliage of two rows to one side and sow the cleared land. D. “And in the next year he would turn the foliage to another place [to the area which he had sown in the previous year] and sow the uncultivated land. E. “And the case came before sages and they permitted [his actions].” E R. Meir and R. Simeon say, “Even he who plants his vineyard by [intervals of] eight, eight amot—it is permitted [to put seed into the area between the rows].” Mishnah-tractate Shabbat 3:3-4 A. They do not put an egg beside a kettle [on the Sabbath] so that it will be cooked. B. And one should not crack it into [hot] wrappings. C. And R. Yose permits. D. And one should not bury it in sand or in road dirt so that it will be roasted. 3:4 A. M#SH S: The people of Tiberias brought a pipe of cold water through a spring of hot water. B. Sages said to them, “If [this was done] on the Sabbath, [the water] is in the status of hot water which has been heated on the Sabbath [itself]. C. “It is prohibited for use in washing and in drinking. D. “[If this was done] on the festival day, [the water] is in the status of hot water which has been heated on the festival day. E. “It is prohibited for use in washing, but permitted for use in drinking.” F A milliarum which is clear of ashes—they drink from it on the Sabbath. G. An antikhi [boiler], even though it is clear of ashes—they do not drink from it. Mishnah-tractate Pesahim 7:2 A. They do not roast the Passover offering either on a [metal] spit or on a grill.

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B. Said R. Sadoq, “Rabban Gamaliel said to Tabi his servant, ‘Go and roast the Passover offering for us on a grill.”’ C. [If] it touched the earthenware part of an oven, one should scale off that place [which has been roasted by the heat of the oven side]. D. [If] some of its gravy dripped on the earthenware and went back onto it, he must take some [of the meat] away from that place [and burn it]. E. [If] some of its gravy dripped on the flour, he must take a handful away from that place. Mishnah-tractate Yoma 6:3 A. He gave [the scapegoat] over to the one who was to lead it out. B. All are valid to lead it out. C. But high priests made it a practice of not letting Israelites lead it out. D. Said R. Yose, “M#SH W: Arsela led it out, and he was an Israelite.” Mishnah-tractate Qiddushin 2:7 A. He who betroths a woman and her daughter, B. or a woman and her sister, simultaneouslyC. they are not betrothed, D. WM#SH B: Five women, including two sisters, and one gathered figs, and they were theirs, but it was Seventh-Year produce. And [someone] said, “Lo, all of you are betrothed to me in virtue of this basket of fruit,” and one of them accepted the proposal in behalf of all of them — E. And sages ruled, “The sisters [in the group of five] are not betrothed.”

These items exemplify a common type of writing in the Halakhic compilations, starting with the Mishnah.4 As is clear, a convention of writing dictates how the precedent will be formulated, one that is not difficult to discern. It involves a simple, unadorned, statement of a fact: such and such was the case. Then an equally stripped down record of the Rabbinic ruling is required. Why do these not fall into the general classification of narratives? The reason is simple: when it comes to the logic of coherent discourse, the precedent holds together not by reason of what comes at the end, which imposes sense and meaning and preceding components of the composition, but the requirements of Halakhic exposition. That is, the action of the ma#aseh always makes sense by reason of the theoretical Halakhic context established in the exposition that surrounds and sustains it. So the ma#aseh in its Hala4 It remains to be seen whether the Mishnah, followed by the Tosefta, has its own form or rhetoric for the ma#aseh, different from that characteristic of the Talmuds.

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khic setting cannot be treated as an autonomous piece of writing, with its own logic of coherent discourse at all, but only as a subordinated and dependent component of a Halakhic, that is, it forms a component of a philosophical exposition. IV. Conclusion These are the three types of pseudo-narrative writings I find in the Mishnah, Abot, and the Tosefta.5 Neither (1) the pseudonarrative utilized in presenting contrasting positions, exchanges of rulings and reasons, as “dialogue,” a form of activity, nor (2) the pseudo-narrative utilized in presenting Temple rites and comparable transactions of the Sanhedrin, nor (3) the precedent-case (ma#aseh) qualifies. In all cases it is for the same reason. The teleological logic of coherent discourse does not function, and that (in the context of reports of Temple rituals) is for a very particular and concrete reason, which Gruenwald’s theory articulates. The Mishnaic narratives of cultic-Halakhah portray the sequence of actions to realize the ritual process, and that emphasis on the deeds in proper order, each essential where it is and in no other place, directly violates the teleological logic that tells us only at the end the point and purpose of the whole. Emphasis on process, on the integrity of each component of a composite in its place and order, appeals then to that logic of philosophy and syllogism generally characteristic of Halakhic discourse, and not to the purposive qualities of matters that imparts coherence to narrative in the Rabbinic canon. It does not suffice that that event or action is alleged actually to have been done at some particular time, whether the action is articulated or implicit. True, that particularity is necessary for the composition to have yielded a determinate outcome. If a composition sets forth an issue followed by, X said… Y said…, with “he said to him…,” “he said to him…,” signaling a “conversation,” that fact by itself does not form a determinative taxon. The reason is, if we changed the order of X and Y, controlling for clarity, we would change nothing about the outcome of the composite of declarative sentences. There is no teleology in play, no 5

Pseudo-narrative that we find in other documents will be dealt with in due course.

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sequence that signals purpose. We must not confuse verisimilitude with authenticity, and it is the governing logic that, in the context of Rabbinic Judaism, marks a piece of writing as narrative. In a piece of writing that coheres through the teleology established at the end, the order makes all the difference, and that imposes specificity on the arrangement of the components of the composition: By “narrative,” to repeat, I mean, an account of an event or an action that joins otherwise random data by appeal to an outcome, that is, teleologically—that alone.

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PART ONE

NARRATIVES IN THE MISHNAH: FORMS, TYPES AND DISTRIBUTION

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CHAPTER TWO

MISHNAH SEDER ZERAIM I. Tractate Berakhot Mishnah-tractate Berakhot 1:1 A. From what time do they recite the Shema# in the evening? B. From the hour that the priests [who had immersed after uncleanness and awaited sunset to complete the process of purification] enter [a state of cleanness, the sun having set, so as] to eat their heave offering— C. “until the end of the first watch,” the words of R. Eliezer. D. And sages say, “Until midnight.” E. Rabban Gamaliel says, “Until the rise of dawn.” F. M#SH: His sons came from the banquet hall. G. They said to him, “We have not recited the Shema#.” H. He said to them, “If the morning star has not yet risen, you are obligated to recite [the Shema#].” I. And not only [in] this [case], rather, all [commandments] which sages said [may be performed] until midnight, their religious duty to do them applies until the rise of the morning star. J. [For example], as to the offering of the fats and entrails—the religious duty to do them applies until the rise of the morning star. K. All [sacrifices] which are eaten for one day, their religious duty to do them applies until the rise of the morning star. L. If so why did sages say [that these actions may be performed only] until midnight? M. In order to keep a man far from sin.

The pseudo-narrative, M. Ber. 1:1F-H, consists of an incident, (1) the sons came home late and (2) consulted their father on whether it is still appropriate to recite the Shema#, and (3) his ruling that it is. The ruling repeats his abstract opinion, E, that the time for reciting the Shema# extends to dawn. The narrative is ignored at I-M, which carries forward the ruling of Gamaliel at E and at the end bears a mediating explanation of the positions of sages and Gamaliel. None of this qualifies as a narrative, since F-G cohere without H, though in context they require H. Of greater interest: we shall see in the ma#aseh-form a fair num-

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ber of rulings of Gamaliel and Hillel and others of the patriarchal house. The patriarchal house is distinctive in the preservation of its rulings in pseudo-narrative, rather than standard legal, form. No other sages or sets of sages compare, either in the Mishnah or in the Tosefta. The deeds of the patriarchs then are represented as norm-setting, models of proper conduct without translation into abstract legal rulings. Mishnah-tractate Berakhot 1:3 A. The House of Shammai say, “In the evening everyone should recline to recite the Shema#, and in the morning he should stand. B. “As it says, ‘When you lie down and when you rise up’ (Deut. 6:7).” C. And the House of Hillel say, “Everyone recites according to his usual manner. D. “As it says, ‘And as you walk by the way’ (ibid.).” E. “If so why does [the verse] say, ‘When you lie down and when you rise up’? F. “[It means, recite the Shema#] at the hour that people lie down [at night] and at the hour that people rise [in the morning].” G. Said R. Tarfon, “I was coming on the road and I reclined, so as to recite the Shema#, according to the words of the House of Shammai. And I placed myself in danger of [being attacked by] thugs.” H. They said to him, “You have only yourself to blame [for what might have befallen you], for you violated the ruling of the House of Hillel.”

H is comprehensible only in the Halakhic setting defined by AC. M. Ber. 1:3G-H record a first-person incident, what happened to Tarfon, and a comment on the part of the hearers. The autobiographical snippet yields the lesson that is drawn by “they.” G stands on its own, without H, and H is not necessary for the understanding of G. So the two elements cohere by reason of what is said in G, in the editorial context of A-C. On that basis, I classify the item as a pseudo-narrative. Mishnah-tractate Berakhot 2:5 2:5 A. A bridegroom is exempt from the recitation of the Shema# on the first night [after the wedding] until after the Sabbath [following the wedding], B. if he did not consummate [the marriage]. C. M#SH S: Rabban Gamaliel recited [the Shema#] on the first night of his marriage. D. Said to him [his students], “Did our master not teach us that a bridegroom is exempt from the recitation of the Shema# on the first night?” E. He said to them, “I cannot heed you to suspend from myself the kingdom of heaven [even] for one hour.”

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2:6 A. [Gamaliel] washed on the first night after the death of his wife. B. Said to him [his students], “Did not [our master] teach us that it is forbidden for a mourner to wash?” C. He said to them, “I am not like other men, I am frail.” 2:7 A. And when Tabi, his servant, died, [Gamaliel] received condolences on his account. B. Said to him [his students], “Did not [our master] teach us that one does not receive condolences for [the loss of] slaves?” C. He said to them, “Tabi my slave was not like other slaves. He was exacting.”

In three matters Gamaliel imposes upon himself a rule that does not apply to others. At each point there is an exchange, question/answer, thus M. 2:5D-E, 2:6B-C, 2:7B-C. Gamaliel sees himself as subject to a norm other than that which generally applies, and that is accepted. Each of the three events captures an action of Gamaliel that puzzles the disciples, then the students’ statement and his explanation—short and simple. So the formal pattern, repeated three times, involves a report of what Gamaliel did, M. 2:5C, M. 2:6A, and M. 2:7A, the question raised by the disciples, and his response thereto. The set involves diverse classifications of the Halakhah—reciting the Shema#, washing in the mourning period, receiving condolences for a slave—and what holds the stories together as a composite are the formal pattern, including the name of Gamaliel. In each case, the point of the narrative is reached only at the end: “I am different,” “Tabi is different.” That answers the question of the students and explains the data of the case. Without the climax of 2:5C/2:6C/2:7C, the three cases have no context, and the students’ question, at B, only articulates the context and focuses attention on what is to come. How to classify this triplet? The teleological logic of coherent discourse requires that all details cohere at the end. But the point that registers at the end is, “I am not like other men,” or “Tabi my slave is unlike other slaves,” and that does very little to supply coherence to the respective cases, let along impart cogency to them all. What we have is a report of Gamaliel’s conduct on three comparable occasions. That hardly qualifies as an authentic narrative. In fact we have little more than dramatized dialogue (“he said to him…he said to him…”). When in Chapter Three we come to M. R. H. 2:8-9 and M. Ta. 3:9-10, we shall see how the Mishnah frames an authentic, fully articulated narrative, and

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the contrast with the Mishnah’s mode of the ma#aseh will validate the classification, as pseudo-narrative, of the present complex. Mishnah-tractate Berakhot 5:5 5:5 A. One who prays and errs—it is a bad sign for him. B. And if he is a communal agent, [who prays on behalf of the whole congregation], it is a bad sign for them that appointed him. C. [This is on the principle that] a man’s agent is like [the man] himself. D. They said concerning R. Haninah b. Dosa, “When he would pray for the sick he would say ‘This one shall live’ or ‘This one shall die.”’ E. They said to him, “How do you know?” F. He said to them, “If my prayer is fluent, then I know that it is accepted [and the person will live]. G. “But if not, I know that it is rejected [and the person will die].”

The context is defined by the statement, “One who prays and errs—it is a bad sign for him,” amplified by the story of Hanina b. Dosa, which restates the same proposition in positive terms. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the tale? The report of Hanina’s power to predict the outcome of his prayer imparts coherence on all the details that precede, which, by themselves, do not form a cogent statement. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved? There is no action or event that is narrated; it is by implication that such and such happened, that Hanina said thus and so, and so forth. 3. How is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple? Once more, we have an allusion to a pattern, then the problem is articulated (“how do you know?”), and resolved. The narrative is implicit: when he would do such and so, he would say… Then it shifts into a colloquy: how do you know? Followed by an appropriate explanation of the action. Here the statement, M. 5:5D, stands on its own as the report of a deed. The question unpacks what is miraculous, and F-G spell it out. The climax comes at the end and imparts meaning to the prior components of the composition. Here too, we the item meets the criterion of logic of coherent discourse defined in the Introduction. The account represents more than a fabricated setting in which to cite a saying, F-G. Without D-E, F-G have no mean-

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ing; without F-G, D-E are incomprehensible. So the whole forms a tight composition. II. Tractate Pe"ah Mishnah-tractate Peah 2:5-6 2:5 A. One who sows his field with [only] one type [of seed], even if he harvests [the produce] in two lots B. designates one [portion of produce as] peah [from the entire crop]. C. If he sowed [his field] with two types [of seeds], even if he harvests [the produce] in only one lot, D. he designates two [separate portions of produce as] peah, [one from each type of produce]. E. He who sows his field with two types of wheat— F [if] he harvests [the wheat] in one lot, [he] designates one [portion of produce as] peah. G. [But if he harvests the wheat in] two lots, [he] designates two [portions of produce as] peah. 2:6 A. M#SH: R. Simeon of Mispah sowed [his field with two types of wheat]. B. [The matter came] before Rabban Gamaliel. So they went up to the Chamber of Hewn Stone, and asked [about the law regarding sowing two types of wheat in one field]. C. Said Nahum the Scribe, “I have received [the following ruling] from R. Miasha, who received [it] from his father, who received [it] from the Pairs, who received [it] from the Prophets, [who received] the law [given] to Moses on Sinai, regarding one who sows his field with two types of wheat: D. “If he harvests [the wheat] in one lot, he designates one [portion of produce as] peah. E. “If he harvests [the wheat] in two lots, he designates two [portions of produce as] peah.”

There is no point at which the teleological logic enters in. A-B serve C—E. Without A-B, C-E stand on their own. This is no narrative, merely a pseudo-narrative setting for a ruling. III. Tractate Dema#i": no narratives IV. Tractate Kilayim Mishnah-tractate Kilayim 4:9 A. He who plants his vineyard by [intervals of] sixteen amah, sixteen amah [in rows sixteen amot apart]—it is permitted to put seed into it [the area between the rows].

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B. Said R. Judah, M#SH B: In Salmon one planted his vineyard by [intervals of] sixteen, sixteen amah, C. “and he would turn the foliage of two rows to one side and sow the cleared land. D. “And in the next year he would turn the foliage to another place [to the area which he had sown in the previous year] and sow the uncultivated land. E. “And the case came before sages and they permitted [his actions].” E R. Meir and R. Simeon say, “Even he who plants his vineyard by [intervals of] eight, eight amot—it is permitted [to put seed into the area between the rows].”

The pseudo-narrative consists of the statement of a situation, BD, followed by a ruling, E. The situation is comprehensible without the ruling, such and so was done. B-D hold together without the sages’ ruling. On that basis I classify the ma#aseh as a pseudo-narrative. V. Tractate Shebi#it Mishnah-tractate Shebi#it 10:3 10:3 A. [A loan against which] a prosbol [has been written] is not cancelled [by the Sabbatical year]. B. This is one of the things that Hillel the Elder ordained. C. When he saw that people refrained from lending one another money [on the eve of the Sabbatical year] D. and [thereby] transgressed that which is written in the Torah, “Beware lest you harbor the base thought [.. and so you are mean to your kinsman and give him nothing” (Dt. 15:9)], E. Hillel ordained the prosbol [whereby the court, on behalf of the creditor, may collect unpaid debts otherwise cancelled by the Sabbatical year].

M. 10:3A defines the legal fiction, the origins of which are explained in the narrative, C—E. Once more the singular authority of the Patriarch, commencing with Hillel, registers in the story of what only the Patriarch can do. Within the analytical model operative here, we have an authentic narrative, as I shall now explain. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The data, C-D, take on meaning only at E: the problem Hillel perceived and how he resolved it. Here we have a narrative that is required to clarify what is said, not a fabricated, inert but dramatic setting for a say-

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ing. The description of Hillel’s action, E, resolves the tension provoked by C-D. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? C-D create a tension, expressed at D. The point of tension is resolved by the sage’s intervening and solving a problem outside the framework of the law that forbids collecting interest. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? The brief and simple narrative is constructed out of the description of a situation and how it is resolved by the sage’s intervention. VI. Tractate Terumot: no narratives VII. Tractate Ma#aserot: no narratives VIII. Tractate Ma#aser Sheni: no narratives IX. Tractate Hallah Mishnah-tractate Hallah 4:10-11 4:10 A. Nittai and Teqoan brought dough offering from Beitar [to the Land of Israel to give it to a priest], and [the priesthood] would not accept [it] from him. B. People from Alexandria brought their dough offering from Alexandria [to the Land of Israel to give it to a priest], and [the priesthood] would not accept [it] from them. C. People from Mount Sevoim brought their firstfruits [to Jerusalem to give to a priest] before Pentecost [too early (M. Bik. 1:3)], and [the priesthood] would not accept [the firstfruits] from them, D. because of the verse in the Torah, “[You shall keep...] the feast of harvest, of the first fruits of your labor” (Ex. 3:16). 4:11 A. The son of Antines brought firstborn [animals] up from Babylonia [to the Land of Israel to give to a priest], and [the priesthood] would not accept [them] from him. B. Joseph the priest brought the first of the wine and oil, [to the land of Israel to give to a priest], and [the priesthood] would not accept [it] from him. C. He even brought his children and the members of his household up [to Jerusalem] to celebrate Minor Passover [the festival on the fourteenth of Iyyar for those who were in a state of uncleanness on the fourteenth of

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Nisan, the date of Passover [Num. 7:3-11] in Jerusalem, and they sent him away, D. so that the matter would not be established as obligatory. E. Ariston brought his firstfruits from Apamea [to Jerusalem to give to a priest] and [the priesthood] accepted [the firstfruits] from him, F. because they said, “One who acquires [land] in Syria is like one who acquires [land] in the outskirts of Jerusalem.”

Ideally, we should ma#aseh at M. 4:10A, B, C-D, 4:11 A, B, E. But the absence of the marker changes nothing. M. 4:10 A, B, C-D, a triplet, matched by another at M. 4:11 A, B-D, E-F, each item reporting on an action and its resolution: a situation and how it is resolved, now by the priests, not the sages. The items are not tagged “ma#aseh,” but they do not differ formally or in logic of coherence from the ma#asim we have already noted. Now a form emerges, specifically where the marker-tag is missing. For without it, we can see what is required. The ma#aseh with or without the tag consists of a sentence or two describing an action or a situation that requires a ruling, followed by a ruling, without adornment, on the part of the pertinent authority, whether rabbi or priest. Each pseudo-narrative stands on its own, none refers to a broader Halakhic context, but all of them join together as examples of the priests’ exercise of their own discretion in receiving or declining to receive the offerings of the Israelites. X. Tractate #Orlah: no narratives XI. Tractate Bikkurim: no narratives XII. Summary We have distinguished between pseudo-narratives, lacking the marker of teleological logic, and narratives. In line with the problem outlined in the Introduction, the importance of that obvious observation is clear. The pseudo-narratives obviously serve the documentary program of the Mishnah and do not supply us with anomalies that require attention in this context. The pseudo-narratives are these: 1. Mishnah-tractate Berakhot 1:1: His sons came from the banquet hall. They said to him, “We have not recited the Shema” 2. Mishnah-tractate Berakhot 1:3: Said R. Tarfon, “I was coming on the

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road and I reclined, so as to recite the Shema#, according to the words of the House of Shammai. And I placed myself in danger of [being attacked by] thugs.” 3. Mishnah-tractate Peah 2:5-6:: R. Simeon of Mispah sowed [his field with two types of wheat. [The matter came] before Rabban Gamaliel. 4. Mishnah-tractate Kilayim 4:9: In Salmon one planted his vineyard by [intervals of] sixteen, sixteen amah, 5. Mishnah-tractate Hallah 4:10-11: Nittai and Teqoan brought dough offering from Beitar [to the Land of Israel to give it to a priest], and [the priesthood] would not accept [it] from him. People from Alexandria brought their dough offering from Alexandria [to the Land of Israel to give it to a priest], and [the priesthood] would not accept [it] from them.

All of these items find their place within a Halakhic framework and constitute concretizations of situations resolved by Halakhic rulings, ordinarily illustrating the workings of those rulings. They form details of the working out of the logic of propositional discourse, as I said in Chapter One. The authentic narratives of Mishnah Seder Zeraim uniformly describe a situation and specify the Halakhic ruling that governs. 1. M. Ber. 2:5: Gamaliel/bride groom/Shema# 2. M. Ber. 2:6: Gamaliel/mourning/washing 3. M. Ber. 2:7: Gamaliel/mourning/condolences for slave 4. M. Ber. 5:5: Hanina b. Dosa/how he knows when prayer will be answered 5. M. Shebi#it 10:3: Hillel/access to loans/prosbol

The difference between an authentic and a pseudo-narrative in the Mishnah here emerges as a rather fine one, but it serves in the present context. The distinction seems to make a difference principally where Gamaliel is involved; one can make a case for a Sitz-im-Leben in the Patriarchal setting (inclusive of Hillel). In Chapter Three, at M. R.H. 2:8-9 and M. Ta. 3:9-10, and in Chapter Five, at M. Ed. 5:6-7, we shall see far more remarkable exemplifications of narrative logic of teleology in articulated, affecting narratives: stories. What is important here is the unanticipated outcome: we now define for the Mishnah a fixed form, the ma#aseh, in two subdivisions, narrative and pseudo-narrative: an exceedingly economical description of a case + sages’ ruling thereon. Ordinarily, the form is generated by the Halakhic issue in context, but we have seen that with Gamaliel’s triplet, M. 2:5-7, the Halakhic context

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is not primary to the construction of the pericope. One way or the other, the ma#aseh-form set forth in Mishnah’s Division of Zeraim proves to be uniform and (controlling for the meager volume of evidence) we may claim as a matter of hypothesis that it is characteristic of the Mishnah. What can we say about the narrative- or pseudo-narrative form in documentary context? Both the authentic narratives and pseudonarratives, in proportion to the volume of Mishnah’s Division of Zeraim, are subordinate to the purposes of the Mishnah-composition in which they are situated. That is, the Halakhic context ordinarily (except for the Gamaliel-set) frames the narratives, and in most instances is required to make sense of the narratives. As just now noted, they follow a single form, described incident + ruling. But that stripped down characterization contains within itself indicative traits. First, the exposition of the described incident is simple—never complex; the presentation, second, is one-dimensional, limited to a laconic, economical account of the action a person took that requires classification or the situation that requires resolution. There is, third, no characterization, and, except for Gamaliel, also no character-differentiation, let alone development, no consideration of motive, no picture of details that amplify the incident or action, no sequence of action and response, but only the bare sequence: X did so and so with the following consequence. The context supplies the remainder of the information required for comprehension, meaning, the rules of narrative respond to and take for granted the documentary setting. Out of that setting none of the Halakhic narratives is fully comprehensible; none exemplifies much beyond itself. So the narratives of the ma#aseh-classification take for granted the Mishnaic-Halakhic context as much as the expository prose that defines their setting. Some further observations are in order. The Patriarchal names, Gamaliel and Hillel, are represented as Halakhic models, and in the narratives and pseudo-narratives no one sage corresponds. The Patriarchate can have represented its principals as Halakhic models and sources, through their very deeds, of authoritative law. But that explanation for the phenomenon competes with others. I do not know what to make of the omission of the signal, ma#aseh, from the priests’ cases, which otherwise conform to the precedent-form. One may imagine that the marker, ma#aseh, signals a sages’ precedent. That is because the Temple-ritual narra-

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tives considered in chapter one uniformly omit that formal indicator. Now to return to the problem introduced in the Preface and fully exposed in the Introduction. On the basis of the surveyed narratives, let me provisionally respond to the questions that animate this survey. 1. Do anomalous or asymmetric compositions or composites attest to thought that takes place beyond the limits of the documents subject to the rules and symmetry of the canon? At no point do we leave the limits of the Halakhic setting in which the narrative is situated. The principal purpose of the narrative is to show how an anomaly is resolved, or to illustrate how the Halakhah functions in everyday life, or to provide a precedent for a ruling. None of these entries carries us to some viewpoint outside of the Halakhic framework. In the narratives as authentic stories that we meet in chapter three, at M. R.H. 2:8-9 and M. Ta. 3:9-10, we shall see how a narrative finds its focus outside the limits of the Halakhic context altogether. By that criterion, nothing in this chapter registers as a weighty anomaly. 2. Does non-documentary writing exhibit readily-discernible patterns of form and meaning as does documentary writing? If so, what are these patterns and how are we to classify and to interpret them? The ma#aseh in the instances that do appear to meet the governing criterion for narratives conforms to the simplest possible pattern: statement of an action or situation followed by a ruling, or allusion to a Halakhic rule followed by an anomalous situation. 3. At what point in the process that yielded the canonical writings as we know them did documentary considerations intervene, and what is the meaning of that intervention? When and under what circumstances did documentary considerations give way to writing utterly indifferent to its documentary venue? I see no foundations for the hypothesis that in general the authentic narratives come prior to or separate from the formation of the law in its Mishnaic statement, that is, as abstract law, expressed in highly disciplined rhetorical forms.

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CHAPTER THREE

MISHNAH SEDER MOED I. Tractate Shabbat Mishnah-tractate Shabbat 1:4 A. These are some of the laws which they stated in the upper room of Hananiah b. Hezekiah b. Gurion when they went up to visit him. B. They took a vote, and the House of Shammai outnumbered the House of Hillel. C. And eighteen rules did they decree on that very day. 1:5 [I] A. The House of Shammai say, “They do not [on Friday afternoon] soak ink, dyestuffs, or vetches, unless there is sufficient time for them to be [fully] soaked while it is still day.” B. And the House of Hillel permit. 1:6 [II] A. The House of Shammai say, “They do not put bundles of [wet] flax into the oven, unless there is time for them to steam off while it is still day. B. “And [they do not put] wool into the cauldron, unless there is sufficient time for it to absorb the color [while it is still day].” C. And the House of Hillel permit. [III] D. The House of Shammai say, “They do not spread out nets for wild beasts, fowl, or fish, unless there is sufficient time for them to be caught while it is still day.” E. And the House of Hillel permit. 1:7 [IV] A. The House of Shammai say, “They do not sell [anything] to a gentile or bear a burden with him, B. “and they do not lift up a burden onto his back, C. “unless there is sufficient time for him to reach a nearby place [while it is still day].” D. And the House of Hillel permit.

The incident, A-C, scarcely qualifies as a narrative, since all that is set forth is the context in which various rules were adopted. The rules stand on their own and do not refer back to the setting. An allusion to an untold story does not qualify as an exemplary narrative. Mishnah-tractate Shabbat 3:3-4 A. They do not put an egg beside a kettle [on the Sabbath] so that it

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will be cooked. B. And one should not crack it into [hot] wrappings. C. And R. Yose permits. D. And one should not bury it in sand or in road dirt so that it will be roasted. 3:4 A. M#SH S: The people of Tiberias brought a pipe of cold water through a spring of hot water. B. Sages said to them, “If [this was done] on the Sabbath, [the water] is in the status of hot water which has been heated on the Sabbath [itself]. C. “It is prohibited for use in washing and in drinking. D. “[If this was done] on the festival day, [the water] is in the status of hot water which has been heated on the festival day. E. “It is prohibited for use in washing, but permitted for use in drinking.” F A milliarum which is clear of ashes—they drink from it on the Sabbath. G. An boiler, even though it is clear of ashes—they do not drink from it.

The form is standard: statement of a case plus a ruling. The pseudo-narrative, M. 3:4A, defines the problem that the ruling resolves. It forms the framework for a routine Halakhic ruling, nothing more. Mishnah-tractate Shabbat 16:8 16:8 A. A gentile who lit a candle— B. an Israelite may make use of its light. C. But [if he did so] for an Israelite, it is prohibited [to do so on the Sabbath]. D. [If a gentile] drew water to give water to his beast, an Israelite gives water to his beast after him. E. But [if he did so] for an Israelite, it is prohibited [to use it on the Sabbath]. E [If] a gentile made a gangway by which to come down from a ship, an Israelite goes down after him. G. But [if he did so] for an Israelite, it is prohibited [to use it on the Sabbath]. H. M#SH B: Rabban Gamaliel and elders were traveling by boat, and a gentile made a gangway by which to come down off the ship, and Rabban Gamaliel and sages went down by it.

The incident, H, forms a precedent and an illustration of the law, not a narrative in which the order of events or sequence of actions registers; here there is no such provision. Mishnah-tractate Shabbat 24:5 A. They abrogate vows on the Sabbath. B. And they receive questions concerning matters which are required

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for the Sabbath. C. They stop up a light hole. D. And they measure a piece of stuff and an immersion pool. E. M#SH S: In the time of the father of R. Sadoq and of Abba Saul b.Botnit, they stopped up the light hole with a pitcher and tied a pot with reed grass [to a stick] to know whether or not there was in the roofing an opening of a handbreadth square. F. And from their deed we learned that they stop up, measure, and tie up on the Sabbath.

Here is a precedent, not a narrative within the governing definition. II. Tractate Erubin Mishnah-tractate Erubin 4:1-2 4:1 A. He whom gentiles took forth [beyond the Sabbath limit], B. or an evil spirit, C. has only four cubits [in which to move about]. D. [If] they brought him back, it is as if he never went out. E. [If] they carried him to another town, F. or put him into a cattle pen or a cattle-fold, G. Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eleazar b. Azariah say, “He may walk about the entire area.” H. R. Joshua and R. Aqiba say, “He has only four cubits [in which to move about].” I. M#SH S: They came from Brindisi [Brundisiuml and their ship was sailing at sea. J. Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eleazar b. Azariah walked about the whole ship. K. R. Joshua and R. Aqiba did not move beyond four cubits. L. For they wanted to impose a strict ruling on themselves. 4:2 A. On one occasion [P#M ’HT] they did not enter the harbor until it had gotten dark [on Friday night] — B. They said to Rabban Gamaliel, “Is it all right for us to disembark?” C. He said to them, “It is all right, for beforehand I was watching, and we were within the Sabbath limit before it got dark.”

The two ma#asim, each in sequence bearing its conventional marker ((1) M#SH, (2) P#M ’HT), hardly qualify as narratives. The first of the two, M. 4:1I-L, illustrates the rulings of M. 4:1G, H; there is no progression toward a conclusion that makes the rest cohere. M. 4:1E-H, M. 4:1I-L are out of Halakhic context. The second of the two, M. 4:2, is tacked on and does not connect to the abstract Halakhah of M. 4:1A-H. The components form a pseudo-narrative that simply sets the stage for the ruling.

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Mishnah-tractate Erubin 6:1-2 M. 6:1 A. “He who dwells in the same courtyard with a gentile, B. “or with [an Israelite] who does not concede the validity of the fictive fusion meal — C. “lo, this one [the gentile or nonbeliever] restricts him [from using the courtyard],” the words of R. Meir. D. R. Eliezer b. Jacob says, “Under no circumstances does anyone prohibit [the believer in the fictive fusion meal to make use of the courtyard] unless two Israelites prohibit one another.” M. 6:2 A. Said Rabban Gamaliel, M#SH B: “A Sadducean lived with us in the same alleyway in Jerusalem. B. “And father said to us, ‘Make haste and bring all sorts of utensils into the alleyway before he brings out his and prohibits you [from carrying about in it]..’” C. R. Judah says it in another version, “Make haste and do all your needs in the alleyway before he brings out his utensils and prohibits you [from using it].”

Once more, the function of the ma#aseh is to provide a setting for the ruling. Without the ruling, M. 6:1, M. 6:2 is wholly out of context. Mishnah-tractate Erubin 8:7 A. A water channel which passes through a courtyard— B. they do not draw water from it on the Sabbath, C. unless they made for it a partition ten handbreadths high, D. at its entry point and at its exit point. E. R. Judah says, “The wall which is above it is regarded as a partition.” F. Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: From the water channel of Abel did they draw water at the instruction of the elders on the Sabbath. G. They said to him, “It was because it was not of the requisite size [and so did not constitute karmelit, neutral domain].”

The pattern, M. Er. 8:7A-D, E, F+G, case + ruling + exemplary incident, supplies yet another example of a pseudo-narrative, in which the context of a ruling is described by reference to an action that people would take. Mishnah-tractate Erubin 10:9 A. “A man should not stand in private domain and open [a door] in public domain, B. “in public domain and open a door in private domain, C. “unless he has made a partition ten handbreadths high,” the words of R. Meir. D. They said to him, M#SH B: In the poulterers’ market in Jerusalem they used to shut up their shops and leave the key in the window above the door.

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E. R. Yose says, “It was the market of the wool dealers.”

One more, the ma#aseh—M. Er. 10:9D—supplies a concretization of the Halakhic ruling and takes on meaning only in Halakhic context. Mishnah-tractate Erubin 10:10 A. A bolt with a knob on its end— B. R. Eleazar prohibits. C. And R. Yose permits. D. Said R. Eleazar, M#SH B: “In the synagogue in Tiberias they permitted [using it on the Sabbath], E. “until Rabban Gamaliel and elders came and prohibited it for them.” E R. Yose says, “They treated it as prohibited. Rabban Gamaliel and the elders came and permitted it for them.”

A situation is described, with the sages’ decision recorded, following the pattern of the ma#aseh as precedent. This embodiment of the Halakhic ma#aseh-form remains wholly within the Halakhic framework. III. Tractate Pesahim Mishnah-tractate Pesahim 7:2 A. They do not roast the Passover offering either on a [metal] spit or on a grill. B. Said R. Sadoq, “Rabban Gamaliel said to Tabi his servant, ‘Go and roast the Passover offering for us on a grill.”’ C. [If] it touched the earthenware part of an oven, one should scale off that place [which has been roasted by the heat of the oven side]. D. [If] some of its gravy dripped on the earthenware and went back onto it, he must take some [of the meat] away from that place [and burn it]. E. [If] some of its gravy dripped on the flour, he must take a handful away from that place.

Gamaliel’s action is recorded in a familiar pseudo-narrative pattern. IV. Tractate Sheqalim Mishnah-Tractate Sheqalim 6:1-2 A. (1) Thirteen shofar chests, (2) thirteen tables, [and] (3) thirteen acts of prostration were in the sanctuary.

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B. The members of the household of Rabban Gamaliel and the members of the household of R. Hananiah, Prefect of the Priests, would do fourteen prostrations. C. And where was the additional one? D. Toward the woodshed, E. for so did they have a tradition from their forebears that there the ark was stored away. 6:2 A. M#SH B: A priest was going about his business and saw that a block of the pavement was slightly different from the rest. B. He came and told his fellow. C. He did not finish telling [him] before he dropped dead. D. Then they knew without doubt that there the ark had been stored away.

The marker, ma#aseh, signals something quite different from a Halakhic case and ruling. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? Here is an authentic narrative, because D explains the details and sequence of A-C, and the entire sequence is required in precisely the order given or it loses meaning and context. Accordingly, M. 6:2D focuses and explains the prior data. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved? This question does not pertain here. The point of the narrative derives from its setting, M. Sheqalim 6:1E: the tradition as to the location of the ark, now substantiated in the story. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple? The narrative is realized in described action of the specified sequence. The action is (1) X noticed that… and reported it (2) but did not finish the report before… (3) from which fact the conclusion was drawn that… The third-party report thus records an observation and action and its result. There is no effort to fill out details; the narrative is realized in brief, unadorned statements of actions: he saw… he told… he died…, a necessary order. Despite the Halakhic context implicit at M. 6:1A-E, there is no pretense that a precedent is established. Accordingly, the effect is to illustrate and validate the descriptive language, M. 6:1A, B+C-E. So the narrative, in its context, functions as does a ma#aseh.

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V. Tractate Yoma Mishnah-tractate Yoma 2:1 -2 A. At first whoever wants to take up the ashes from the altar does so. B. And when they are many [who wanted to do so], they run up the ramp. C. And whoever gets there before his fellow, within four cubits of the altar, has acquired the right to do so. D. And if the two came at the same time, the one in charge says to them, “Choose up [by raising a finger].” E. And what do they put forth? F One or two. G. But they did not put out the thumb in the Temple. 2:2 A. M#SH S: There were two who got there at the same time, running up the ramp. B. And one shoved his fellow. C. And he [the other] fell and broke his foot. D. When the court saw that the matter was dangerous, they ordained that the right of clearing off the ashes from the altar should be apportioned only by lot.

1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? Like M. Sheq. 6:2, M. Yoma 2:2 serves to account for a Temple rule by appeal to a particular incident. Why did they not compete but choose up in the Temple? It was to avoid physical brawling by the priests in their eagerness to secure the rights of service and their emoluments. Then the incident, M. 2:2 (which the Tosefta will amplify and intensify!), is cited, and 2:2D explains the point of M. 2:2AC, which must adhere to the given order to make sense and to fit D. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved? The point of conflict is clear: how to avoid physical competition between priests. The dignity of the sacrificial service conflicts with the zeal of the priests. Choosing up resolves the matter. 3. How, in light of other, comparable pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple? Like the ma#aseh in general, here too the narrative is stripped down to its absolutely fundamental elements. A situation, an action, a result, thus A, B, C-D. There is no characterization, no individuation, no movement beyond the described transaction.

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Mishnah-tractate Yoma 6:3 A. He gave [the scapegoat] over to the one who was to lead it out. B. All are valid to lead it out. C. But high priests made it a practice of not letting Israelites lead it out. D. Said R. Yose, “M#SH W: Arsela led it out, and he was an Israelite.”

M. Yoma 6:3D does not qualify as a narrative, there being no sequence of actions that fit together in a teleological pattern. VI. Tractate Sukkah Mishnah-tractate Sukkah 2:1 A. He who sleeps under a bed in a Sukkah has not fulfilled his obligation. B. Said R. Judah, “We had the practice of sleeping under the bed before the elders, and they said nothing at all to us.” C. Said R. Simeon, “M#SH B: Tabi, Rabban Gamaliel’s slave, slept under the bed. D. “And Rabban Gamaliel said to the elders, ‘Do you see Tabi, my slave— he is a disciple of a sage, so he knows that slaves are exempt from keeping the commandment of dwelling in the Sukkah. That is why he is sleeping under the bed [rather than directly beneath the Sukkah-covering, which is what defines the Sukkah and renders it effective in fulfilling the commandment of dwelling in the Sukkah, that is, under its shade, during the festival].’ E. “Thus we learned that he who sleeps under bed has not fulfilled his obligation.”

As in the triplet of cases in Mishnah-tractate Berakhot 2:5-7, ma#aseh here marks no narrative but a pseudo-narrative, since E does not focus or order C-D. The narrative qualifies as a Halakhic precedent, pure and simple. Mishnah-tractate Sukkah 2:4-5 2:4 A. He who makes his Sukkah among trees, and the trees are its sides—it is valid. B. Agents engaged in a religious duty are exempt from the requirement of dwelling in a Sukkah. C. Sick folk and those who serve them are exempt from the requirement of dwelling in a Sukkah. D. [People] eat and drink in a random manner outside of a Sukkah. 2:5 A. M#SH W: They brought Rabban Yohanan b. Zakkai some cooked food to taste, and to Rabban Gamaliel two dates and a dipper of water. B. And they said, “Bring them up to the Sukkah.”

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C. And when they gave to R. Sadoq food less than an egg’s bulk, he took it in a cloth and ate it outside of the Sukkah and said no blessing after it.

The Halakhic ruling, M. 2:4D, is illustrated by M. 2:5A-B vs. C. That is, eating in a random manner outside of a Sukkah during the Festival is illustrated by Sadoq, who consumed less than the amount of food required to constitute a meal, while Yohanan b. Zakkai and Gamaliel reject the rule of M. 2:4D and eat even a random meal in the Sukkah. The described action does not rise to the status of a narrative, because there is no point at which the logic of teleology imposes coherence on the components. What illustrates the Halakhah does not qualify. That point distinguishes M. 2:4-5 from M. 2:1. Mishnah-tractate Sukkah 2:7 A. He whose head and the greater part of whose body are in the Sukkah, but whose table is in the house— B. the House of Shammai declare invalid. C. And the House of Hillel declare valid. D. Said the House of Hillel to the House of Shammai, “Was not the precedent so, that the elders of the House of Shammai and the elders of the House of Hillel went along to pay a sick call on R. Yohanan b. Hahorani, and they found him sitting with his head and the greater part of his body in the Sukkah, and his table in the house, and they said nothing at all to him!” E. Said the House of Shammai to them, “Is there proof from that story? But in point of fact they did say to him, ‘If this is how you act, you have never in your whole life fulfilled the religious requirement of dwelling in a Sukkah!”’

The ma#aseh, M. 2:7D-E, describes a situation, not a sequence of events with the order and connected stages clear only at the end, such as characterizes narrative. What was not said or done hardly qualifies. Mishnah-tractate Sukkah 2:8 2:8 A. Women, slaves, and minors are exempt from the religious requirement of dwelling in a Sukkah. B. A minor who can take care of himself is liable to the religious requirement of dwelling in a Sukkah. C. M#SH W: Shammai the Elder’s daughter-in-law gave birth, and he broke away some of the plaster and covered the hole with Sukkah roofing over her bed, on account of the infant.

The ma#aseh, M. 2:8C, takes on meaning only in the Halakhic context. There is no teleological logic that holds the details together otherwise.

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Mishnah-tractate Sukkah 3:8 A. “They bind up the lulab [now: palm branch, willow branch, and myrtle branch] only with [strands of] its own species,” the words of R. Judah. B. R. Meir says, “Even with a rope [it is permitted to bind up the lulab].” C. Said R. Meir, “M#SH B: The townsfolk of Jerusalem bound up their palm branches with gold threads.” D. They said to him, “But underneath they [in fact had] tied it up with [strands of] its own species.”

Once more, we have the description of a situation, not the account of a sequence of events and their relationship, such as narrative requires by the definition offered in the Introduction and amplified in chapter one. VII. Tractate Besah Mishnah-tractate Besah 3:2 3:2 A. Nets for trapping a wild beast, fowl, or fish, which one set on the eve of the festival day— B. one should not take [what is caught therein] out of them on the festival day, C. unless one knows for sure that [creatures caught in them] were trapped on the eve of the festival day. D. M#SH B: A gentile brought fish to Rabban Gamaliel, and he said, “They are permitted. But I do not want to accept them from him.”

The ma#aseh supplies an illustrative case in the Halakhic framework. Mishnah-tractate Besah 3:5 A. A domesticated beast which died-one should not move it from where it is located. B. M#SH W: They asked R. Tarfon about such a case and about a dough offering which had contracted uncleanness. So he went into the study house and asked. They told him, “One should not move them from where they are located.”

The pseudo-narrative presents a setting for a ruling, nothing more. Mishnah-tractate Besah 3:8 A. A person says to his fellow, “Fill up this utensil for me,” B. but not with a measure. C. R. Judah says, “If it was a utensil which served as a measure, he should not fill it up [either].” D. M#SH B: Abba Saul b. Botnit would fill up his measuring cups on the

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eve of a festival and hand them over to purchasers on the festival itself. E. Abba Saul says, “Also on the intermediate days of the festival one does so, F “because of the clearness of measure.” G. And sages say, “Also on an ordinary day one does so, because of the exactness of the measure [not filled in haste]. H. A person goes to a storekeeper whom he usually patronizes and says to him, “Give me onions and nuts by number.” I. For that is in any case how a householder counts out [these same things] in his own home.

An action described in a Halakhic setting does not qualify, on its own, as a narrative. VIII. Tractate Rosh Hashanah Mishnah-tractate Rosh Hashanah 1:5-6 1:5 A. Whether [the new moon] appeared clearly or did not appear clearly, B. they violate the [prohibitions of] the Sabbath on its account. C. R. Yose says, “If it appeared clearly, they do not violate the prohibitions of the Sabbath on its account.” 1:6 A. M#SH S: More than forty pairs of witnesses came forward. B. But R. Aqiba kept them back at Lud. C. Rabban Gamaliel said to him, “If you keep back the people, you will turn out to make them err in the future.”

The ma#aseh coheres only in line with M. 1:5, with the conflicting positions, M. 1:5A vs. B, C, replicated at M. M. 1:6C vs. 1:6AB. This is another Halakhic illustration, lacking the indicative qualities of a narrative. Mishnah-tractate Rosh Hashanah 1:7 1:7 A. A father and his son who saw the new moon should go [to give testimony]. B. It is not that they join together with one another [to provide adequate testimony], C. but so that, if one of them should turn out to be invalid [as a witness], the other may join with someone else [to make up the requisite number of witnesses]. D. R. Simeon says, “A father and his son, and all relatives, are valid to give testimony about the new moon.” E. Said R. Yose, “M#SH B: Tobiah, the physician, saw the new moon in Jerusalem—he, his son, and his freed slave. F. “And the priests accepted him and his son [as witnesses to the new moon], but they invalidated the testimony of his slave.

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G. “But when they came before the court, they accepted his [testimony] and that of his slave, but they invalidated that of his son.”

The ma#aseh settles the Halakhic dispute, and in no way appeals to the ultimate purpose and direction of the stages in the exposition for coherence. To this point we have found little of interest among the narratives and pseudo-narratives of the Mishnah, We now come to one of two striking and important, successful narratives—altogether anomalous in the Mishnaic context. Mishnah-tractate Rosh Hashanah 2:8-9 2:8 A. A picture of the shapes of the moon did Rabban Gamaliel have on a tablet and on the wall of his upper room, which he would show ordinary folk, saying, “Did you see it like this or like that?” B. M#SH S: Two witnesses came and said, “We saw it at dawn on the morning of the twenty-ninth] in the east and at eve in the west.” C. Said R. Yohanan b. Nuri, “They are false witnesses.” D. Now when they came to Yabneh, Rabban Gamaliel accepted their testimony [assuming they erred at dawn]. E. And furthermore two came along and said, “We saw it at its proper time, but on the night of the added day it did not appear [to the court].” F. Then Rabban Gamaliel accepted their testimony. G. Said R. Dosa b. Harkinas, “They are false witnesses. H. “How can they testify that a woman has given birth, when, on the very next day, her stomach is still up there between her teeth [for there was no new moon!]?” I. Said to him [Dosa] R. Joshua, “I can see your position [and affirm it over Gamaliel’s].” 2:9 A. Said to him {to Joshua] Rabban Gamaliel, “I decree that you come to me with your staff and purse on the Day of Atonement which is determined in accord with your reckoning [so publicly renouncing his ruling in favor of Gamaliel’s].” B. R. Aqiba went and found him troubled. C. He said to him, “I can provide grounds for showing that everything that Rabban Gamaliel has done is validly done, since it says, ‘These are the set feasts of the Lord, even holy convocations, which you shall proclaim’ (Lev. 23:4). Whether they are in their proper time or not in their proper time, I have no set feasts but these [which’ you shall proclaim’] [vs. M. 2:7D].” D. He came along to R. Dosa b. Harkinas. E. He [Dosa] said to him, “Now if we’re going to take issue with the court of Rabban Gamaliel, we have to take issue with every single court which has come into being from the time of Moses to the present day, since it says, ‘Then went up Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel’ (Ex. 24:9). Now why have the names of the elders not been given? To teach that every group of three [elders] who came into

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being as a court of Israel—lo, they are equivalent to the court of Moses himself.” F. [Joshua] took his staff with his purse in his hand and went along to Yabneh, to Rabban Gamaliel, on the Day of Atonement that is determined in accord with his [Gamaliel’s] reckoning. G. Rabban Gamaliel stood up and kissed him on his head and said to him, “Come in peace, my master and my disciple—My master in wisdom, and my disciple in accepting my rulings.”

At last we come to a fully realized instance of teleological logic, an authentic narrative, and one not provoked by the detail of a Halakhic rulings at that. Within the framework of narrative, we may classify what is before us as a free-standing, fully-executed story of a particular incident and its meaning. The flow of action and thought is dynamic, there is an element of suspense—we do not know how Joshua will respond to the challenge—and the conflict is articulated. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? At M. 2:9A-C the issue is clearly drawn, on the basis of the situation described at M. 2:8BI. The coherence of each component of the story to all others is established at F-G. The order of the components is dictated by the purpose of the narrative, realized at the end. So we have before us a fully coherent narrative within the teleological logic defined in the Introduction. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved? The conflict is between the authority of the sage and that of the patriarch. The patriarch exercises his authority despite the acknowledged, superior knowledge of the sage. But he does so in humility and with grace, acknowledging the sage’s mastery in wisdom, even while affirming his own authority over the sage, by the Torah’s own decree. I do not see how a more perfect execution of the narrative model before us can have been achieved. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple? As to formal qualities, the story is unitary, but divided into three clearly-demarcated units, the Halakhic dispute, M. 2:8B-H, a somewhat uncommonly elaborate account of a case. The conflict is introduced not with the case but with Joshua’s endorsement of the ruling contrary to Gamaliel’s,

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and Gamaliel’s exercise of his authority over the sage, M. 2:8IM. 2:9A. The conflict is resolved twice, at M. 2:9B-C, by Aqiba, in favor of Gamaliel, then at M. 2:9D-E, by Dosa b. Harkinas, with the same result. The resolution plays itself out at M. 2:9FG, and the whole holds together, despite the somewhat puzzling repetition of the sage’s (Aqiba’s, then Dosa’s) endorsement of Gamaliel’s action. The second is the more important, since it was Dosa, not Joshua, who originally rejected Gamaliel’s ruling in the case. The key there is Dosa’s explicit concession that in the end the action is taken by Gamaliel, “…everything that Rabban Gamaliel has done…,” whose decision binds the sages. So the entire story takes as its centerpiece the patriarch’s institutional hegemony even over sages’ correct reading of the law. IX. Tractate Ta#anit Mishnah-tractate Ta#anit 2:5 A. M#SH B: In the time of R. Halapta and R. Hananiah b. Teradion someone passed before the ark and completed the entire blessing, and they did not answer after him “Amen.”

This Halakhic record exhibits no qualities that require us to evaluate it as a narrative. It is not exactly a standard case report because no explicit ruling is given, rather an action not carried out is specified. It is the same thing. Mishnah-tractate Ta#anit 3:6 A. M#SH S: Elders went down from Jerusalem to their towns and decreed a fast because in Ashkelon there had appeared blight to the extent of [the area of] an oven’s mouth. B. And further: they decreed a fast because wolves had eaten two children in Transjordan. C. R. Yosé says, “Not because they had eaten anyone, but merely because they had made an appearance.”

The two case-reports yield no narrative that I can discern. These simply allude to events, they do not convey how they happened. Mishnah-tractate Ta#anit 3:9-10 3:9 A On account of every sort of public trouble—may it not happen—do they sound the shofar, B except for an excess of rain. C M#SH S: They said to Honi the Circle Drawer, “Pray for rain.” D He said to them, “Go and take in the clay ovens used for Passover, so

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that they not soften [in the rain which is coming.” E He prayed, but it did not rain. F What did he do? G He drew a circle and stood in the middle of it and said before Him, “Lord of the world! Your children have turned to me, for before you, I am like a member of the family. I swear by your great name—I’m simply not moving from here until you take pity on your children!” H It began to rain drop by drop. I He said, “This is not what I wanted, but rain for filling up cisterns, pits, and caverns.” J It began to rain violently. K He said, “This is not what I wanted, but rain of good will, blessing, and graciousness.” L Now it rained the right way, until the Israelites had to flee from Jerusalem up to the Temple Mount because of the rain. M Now they came and said to him, “Just as you prayed for it to rain, now pray for it to go away.” N He said to them, “Go, see whether the stone of those who stray has disappeared [under water].” 3:10 A Simeon b. Shatah said to him, “If you were not Honi, I should decree a ban of excommunication against you. But what am I going to do to you? For you importune before the Omnipresent, so he does what you want, like a son who importunes his father, so he does what he wants. B “Concerning you Scripture says, ‘Let you father and you mother be glad, and let her that bore you rejoice’” (Prov. 23:25). 3:11A If they were fasting. and it rained for them before sunrise, they should not complete the fast. B [If it rained] after sunrise, they should complete the day in fasting. C R. Eliezer says, “[If it rained] before noon. they should not complete the day in fasting. [If it rained] after noon, they should complete the day in fasting.” D WM#SH S: They decreed a fast in Lud. It rained before noon. R. Tarfon said to them, “Go, eat and drank and celebrate a festival.” So they arose and ate and drank and celebrated a festival day. Then they assembled it twilight and proclaimed the Great Hallel [that is. Ps. 136].

Here at M. 3:9-10B is another authentic narrative, truly perfect by the stated criterion, and one that is as successful as M. R.H. 2:8-9, exhibiting qualities in common. As before, here too, there is a strong forward movement, a building toward a climax, a point of tension and its resolution. M. 3:10D need not detain us. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The climactic conclusion, which unifies all the prior components of the narrative, comes at M. 3:10A+B, Simeon’s concession that Honi is espe-

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cially favored by God and therefore not subject to sages’ discipline or the court’s authority. The story illustrates M. 3:9A, not praying by reason of the calamity of an excess of rain, but the issue of the story is not that. The story in its own terms has then the task of displaying the special favor, as of a father to a child, shown by heaven, and that is accomplished by the triplet, G-I, JL, M-N, the whole leading directly to M. 3:10A+B, as I said. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved? The conflict engages Honi’s churlishness and petulance toward Heaven and sages’ responsibility to propitiate Heaven through acts of respect. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple? In construction, the triplet points toward a long and complex narrative, realized by described action and dialogue and fully exposed, without a single false step or excess detail. X. Tractate Megillah: no narratives XI. Tractate Mo#ed Qatan: no narratives XII. Tractate Hagigah: no narratives XIII. Summary The pseudo-narratives of Halakhic precedents are critical to the Mishnah’s presentation, but do not supply data for an account of the forms and types of Rabbinic narrative in the Mishnah. These are they: 1. Mishnah-tractate Shabbat 1:4: These are some of the laws which they stated in the upper room of Hananiah b. Hezekiah b. Gurion when they went up to visit him. They took a vote, and the House of Shammai outnumbered the House of Hillel. 2. Mishnah-tractate Shabbat 3:3-4: The people of Tiberias brought a pipe of cold water through a spring of hot water. 3. Mishnah-tractate Shabbat 16:8: Rabban Gamaliel and elders were traveling by boat, and a gentile made a gangway by which to come down off the ship, and Rabban Gamaliel and sages went down by it.

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4. Mishnah-tractate Shabbat 24:5: In the time of the father of R. Sadoq and of Abba Saul b.Botnit, they stopped up the light hole with a pitcher and tied a pot with reed grass [to a stick] to know whether or not there was in the roofing an opening of a handbreadth square. 5. Mishnah-tractate Erubin 4:1-2: They came from Brindisi [Brundisiuml and their ship was sailing at sea. Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eleazar b. Azariah walked about the whole ship R. Joshua and R. Aqiba did not move beyond four cubits. 6. Mishnah-tractate Erubin 6:1-2: Said Rabban Gamaliel, M#SH B: “A Sadducean lived with us in the same alleyway in Jerusalem. And father said to us, ‘Make haste and bring all sorts of utensils into the alleyway before he brings out his and prohibits you [from carrying about in it].’” 7. Mishnah-tractate Erubin 8:7: From the water channel of Abel did they draw water at the instruction of the elders on the Sabbath. 8. Mishnah-tractate Erubin 10:9: In the poulterers’ market in Jerusalem they used to shut up their shops and leave the key in the window above the door.” 9. Mishnah-tractate Erubin 10:10: In the synagogue in Tiberias they permitted [using it on the Sabbath], until Rabban Gamaliel and elders came and prohibited it for them. 10. Mishnah-tractate Pesahim 7:2: “Rabban Gamaliel said to Tabi his servant, ‘Go and roast the Passover offering for us on a grill.”’ 11. Mishnah-tractate Yoma 6:3: Arsela led it out, and he was an Israelite.” 12. M. Suk. 2:1: Said R. Simeon, M#SH B: Tabi, Rabban Gamaliel’s slave, slept under the bed. 13. Mishnah-tractate Sukkah 2:4-5: They brought Rabban Yohanan b. Zakkai some cooked food to taste, and to Rabban Gamaliel two dates and a dipper of water. And they said, “Bring them up to the Sukkah.” 14. Mishnah-tractate Sukkah 2:7: Was not the precedent so, that the elders of the House of Shammai and the elders of the House of Hillel went along to pay a sick call on R. Yohanan b. Hahorani, and they found him sitting with his head and the greater part of his body in the Sukkah, and his table in the house, and they said nothing at all to him. 15. Mishnah-tractate Sukkah 2:8: Shammai the Elder’s daughter-in-law gave birth, and he broke away some of the plaster and covered the hole with Sukkah roofing over her bed, on account of the infant. 16. Mishnah-tractate Sukkah 3:8: The townsfolk of Jerusalem bound up their palm branches with gold threads. 17. Mishnah-tractate Besah 3:2: A gentile brought fish to Rabban Gamaliel, and he said, “They are permitted. But I do not want to accept them from him.” 18. Mishnah-tractate Besah 3:8: Abba Saul b. Botnit would fill up his measuring cups on the eve of a festival and hand them over to purchasers on the festival itself. 19. Mishnah-tractate Rosh Hashanah 1:5-6: More than forty pairs of witnesses came forward. But R. Aqiba kept them back at Lud. 20. Mishnah-tractate Rosh Hashanah 1:7: Tobiah, the physician, saw the

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new moon in Jerusalem—he, his son, and his freed slave. And the priests accepted him and his son [as witnesses to the new moon], but they invalidated the testimony of his slave. 21. Mishnah-tractate Ta#anit 2:5: In the time of R. Halapta and R. Hananiah b. Teradion someone passed before the ark and completed the entire blessing, and they did not answer after him “Amen.”

The formal pattern is clear and requires no comment. The cases/ precedents involve no action and no tension; the purpose of such “narrative” as is present is to establish a situation, not describe an event or an action, and the function of the case/precedent is to illustrate the Halakhah in context. None of these items coheres by reason of a teleological logic. Here are the authentic narratives that we have identified in the present division of the Mishnah: 1. M. Sheq. 6:1: M#SH B: A priest was going about his business and saw that a block of the pavement was slightly different from the rest. 2. M. Yoma 2:2: M#SH S: There were two who got there at the same time, running up the ramp. 3. M. R.H. 2:8-9: M#SH S: Two witnesses came and said, “We saw it at dawn on the morning of the twenty-ninth] in the east and at eve in the west.” 4. M. Ta. 3:9-10: M#SH S: They said to Honi the Circle Drawer, “Pray for rain.”

M. Erub. 6:1 and M. Yoma 2:2 present no surprises. Both accommodate themselves to their Halakhic setting, and neither can stand outside of that setting. All incorporate a single action with a ruling. It is, as before, “X did so and so, with the following outcome.” M. R.H. 2:8-9 and M. Ta. 3:9-10 bear nothing in common with the Halakhic ma#asim, differing radically from the Halakhic pseudo-narratives of precedents, even though, in both cases, a Halakhic datum precipitates the narrative and is essential to its realization. Both present complex expositions, in three marked parts, with significant actors. The principal players stand forth as distinct personalities, not simply models of virtue or its opposite. The dialogue is not stereotype in either case. Most striking: these are not Halakhic, but political, narratives. Neither climaxes with a Halakhic ruling; both of them attend to the power-relationships of the Rabbinic community, the one involving the patriarch over the sage, the other, the sage over the wonder-worker. To these matters the Halakhic detail—proclaim-

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ing the New Year in error, sounding the shofar on account of an excess of rain—proves necessary but insufficient for the spinning out of the story, therefore ultimately marginal. Tension between persons dictates what is required for the realization of the narrative. In both stories there is a clear teleology, revealed only at the end: the story is so arranged as to prove that end-point. The conflict is integral to the goal, and how it is resolved forms the dramatic heart of the matter, yielding a characterization of each of the players: Joshua challenging the patriarch on the foundation of superior reason, the patriarch imposing a harsh penalty, Aqiba and Dosa, each for his own reason, supporting the authority of the patriarch even while dismissing the detail of his ruling, and the patriarch graciously accepting the sage’s submission. M. Ta. 3:910 follows the same model of a three-part account, the situation, the activity, the resolution. Now, on the basis of the surveyed narratives, let me respond to the questions that animate this survey. The answers come in two parts, first for the two conventional Halakhic narratives, M. Erub. 6:1, M. Yoma 2:2, then for the two truly (in the context of the Mishnah anomalous) narratives, M. R.H. 2:8-9 and M. Ta. 3:9-10; 1. Do anomalous or asymmetric compositions or composites attest to thought that takes place beyond the limits of the documents subject to the rules and symmetry of the canon? The two Halakhic ma#asim obviously are fully symmetrical with their respective Halakhic settings. The complex stories of Gamaliel and the sages, on the one side, and Honi and the sages, on the other, define a different situation. They concern the power-relationships within the institutional frameworks of rabbis in relationship to others, the patriarch, and the wonder-worker, respectively. But they attest to the Rabbinic viewpoint on Honi, and I am inclined to think, on Gamaliel as well, whose authority prevails even though his decision errs. In both cases the message is, greater force prevails, sometimes, over Rabbinic wisdom and learning. In both cases that is Heaven’s right to override sages’ knowledge. So no, the remarkable narratives of M. R.H. 2:8-9 and M. Ta. 3:9-10, about Honi and the sages, Gamaliel and the sages, respectively, set forth the perspective of the Rabbinic narrator and his politics. They attest to Rabbinic

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thought, which has coalesced and been realized in an other-thanconventional way. 2. Does non-documentary writing exhibit readily-discernible patterns of form and meaning as does documentary writing? If so, what are these patterns and how are we to classify and to interpret them? The two sets of narratives—Halakhic ma#asim, extra-Halakhic stories—are to be treated separately. The former adhere to the simple pattern discerned in Mishnah-Seder Zeraim: description of an action or a situation followed by a ruling. The two instances of fully-realized stories by themselves do not suffice to expose the presence of a fixed pattern. It suffices at this point to note both work out a three-part program, requiring some activity but no decisive action. But whether that signals a formal pattern cannot be established in a series of two. The stories are told through what is said, which forms the center of interest at M. R.H. 2:8-9, and Honi’s dialogue with the activity of nature, at M. Ta. 3:8-9. More than these two casual observations as to form are not justified by the sample before us. 3. At what point in the process that yielded the canonical writings as we know them did documentary considerations intervene, and what is the meaning of that intervention? When and under what circumstances did documentary considerations give way to writing utterly indifferent to its documentary venue? For the three conventional Halakhic ma#asim, the answer is clear: they form part of the larger Halakhic program of the Mishnah and carry out its goals. They must be regarded as integrated into the Mishnah’s documentary unfolding. I do not see even elementary components of an answer to these questions in the two anomalous stories. For the same reason— they form too small a sample—that they do not suggest preferences of form, they also do not point to activities of non-documentary writing beyond the Mishnah’s framework of Halakhic discourse. Nothing else in the Mishnah compares with these two remarkable items.

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CHAPTER FOUR

MISHNAH SEDER NASHIM

I. Tractate Yebamot Mishnah-tractate Yebamot 16:4 16:4A. [If ] he fell into a body of water, whether within sight of shore or not within sight of shore— B. his wife is prohibited [until the corpse turns up]. C. Said R. Meir, M#SH B: “A certain person fell into a large cistern, and came up [alive] after three days.” D. Said R. Yosé, M#SH B: “A blind man went down to immerse in a cave, and his guide went down after him, and they stayed [in the water] long enough to drown. E. “So [the sages] permitted their wives to marry.” F. WSWB M#SH B: “A certain man in Asya was let down by a rope into the sea, and they drew back up only his leg. G. “Sages said, ‘If [the recovered part included] from the knee and above, [his wife] may remarry. [If] the recovered part included only from the knee and below, she may not remarry.’” Mishnah-tractate Yebamot 16:6 A. They give testimony [about the identity of a corpse which they have seen] by the light of a candle or by the light of the moon. B. And they permit a woman to remarry on the evidence of an echo [which is heard to say that her husband has died]. C. M#SH B: A certain person stood on top of a mountain and said, “Mr. So-and-so, the son of So-and-so, of such-and-such a place, has died.” D. And they went but did not find anyone there. E. And they [nonetheless] permitted his wife to remarry. F. SWB M#SH B: In Salmon, a certain person said, “I am Mr. So-and-so, the son of Mr. So-and-so. A snake has bitten me, and lo, I am dying.” G. And they went, and while they did not recognize him, they permitted his wife to remarry.

The formally-standard ma#asim, M. 16:4 C, D-E, F-G, M. 16:6CFE, F-G, are classified not as narratives but as Halakhic compo-

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nents, precedents pure and simple. Each one is constructed of an economical description of a case or event, followed by sages’ ruling. Mishnah-tractate Yebamot 16:7 A. Said R. Aqiba, “When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, Nehemiah of Bet Deli came upon me. He said to me, ‘I heard that only R. Judah b. Baba permits a wife in the Land of Israel to remarry on the evidence of a single witness [to her husband’s death].’ B. “I stated to him, ‘That is indeed so.’ C. “He said to me, ‘Tell them in my name— D. “‘you know that the country is alive with ravaging bands— E. “‘I have a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder that: F. “‘They permit a wife to remarry on the testimony of a single witness [to her husband’s death].’ G. “And when I came and laid the matters out before Rabban Gamaliel, he was overjoyed at my report and said, “We now have found a pair for R. Judah b. Baba.’ H. “And in the same discourse Rabban Gamaliel recalled that men were slain at Tel Arza, and Rabban Gamaliel the Elder permitted their wives to remarry on the evidence of a single witness.” I. And they confirmed in the practice of permitting [the wife to] remarry (1) on the evidence of a single witness, (2) on the evidence of a slave, (3) on the evidence of a woman, (4) on the evidence of a slave girl. J. R. Eliezer and R. Joshua say, “They do not permit a woman to remarry on the evidence of a single witness.” K. R. Aqiba says, “Not on the evidence of a woman [vs. 3], nor on the evidence of a slave (2), nor on the evidence of a slave girl (4), nor on the evidence of relatives.” L. They said to him, M#SH B: “The Levites went to Soar, the date town, and one of them got sick on the road, and they left him in an inn. M. “And upon their return, they said to the inn hostess, ‘Where is our good buddy?’” N. “She said to them, ‘He died, and I buried him.’ O. “And they permitted his wife to remarry [on the strength of her evidence].” P. They said to him, “And should not a priest girl be equivalent to an inn hostess?” Q. He said to them, “When she [the priest girl] becomes an inn hostess [in the model of this one], she will be believed. R. “The inn hostess had produced for them his staff, his pouch, and the Torah scroll which he had had in hand.”

M. 16:7A-C form a pseudo-narrative setting for a Halakhic ruling, pure and simple. M. 16:7L-O, P-R, provide a precedent, which is subject to revision or reinterpretation. Formally the ma#asim are

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somewhat more elaborately articulated than is commonly the case. There is no issue of teleological logic here. II. Tractate Ketubot Mishnah-tractate Ketubot 1:10 A. Said R. Yose, M#SH B: “A girl went down to draw water from the well and was raped. B. “Ruled R. Yohanan b. Nuri, ‘If most of the men of the town marry off their daughters to the priesthood, lo, she may be married into the priesthood.”’

M. 1:10A sets forth an account of an event, subject to the sage’s ruling at B. Mishnah-tractate Ketubot 7:10 A. And these are the ones whom they force to put her away: (1) he who is afflicted with boils, or (2) who has a polypus, or (3) who collects [dog excrement], or (4) a coppersmith, or (5) a tanner— B. whether these [blemishes] were present before they were married or whether after they were married they made their appearance. C. And concerning all of them did R. Meir say, “Even though he made a condition with her [that the marriage is valid despite these blemishes], she still can claim, ‘I thought that I could take it. But now I find I cannot take it.”’ D. And sages say, “She takes it despite herself, except in the case of the one afflicted with boils, E. “because [in that case] she enervates him.” F. M#SH B: In Sidon there was a tanner who died, and he had a brother who was a tanner. G. Sages ruled, “She can claim, ‘Your brother I could take, but I can’t take you [as my levir].”’

Once more, we have a statement of a case, M. 7:10F, plus a ruling. III. Tractate Nedarim Mishnah-tractate Nedarim 5:6 A. He who is forbidden by vow from deriving benefit from his fellow and who has nothing to eat— B. he [the fellow] gives it [food] to someone else as a gift, and this one [prohibited by vow] is permitted [to make use of] it. C. M#SH B: There was someone in Bet Horon whose father was prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from him. D. And he [the man in Bet Horon] was marrying off his son, and he said to

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his fellow, “The courtyard and the banquet are given over to you as a gift. But they are before you only so that father may come and eat with us at the banquet.” E. The other party said, “Now if they really are mine, then lo, they are consecrated to heaven!” F. He said to him, “I didn’t give you what’s mine so you would consecrate it to Heaven!” G. He said to him, “You did not give me what’s yours except so that you and your father could eat and drink and make friends again, and so the sin [for violating the oath] could rest on his head!” H. Now the case came before sages. They ruled, “Any act of donation which is not so [given] that, if one sanctified it to Heaven, it is sanctified, is no act of donation.”

1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? If we consider the narrative on its own, not in the context of M. 5:6A-B, H. we have a free-standing story on improper motives in taking vows. Then the details of C, D, E, F, fall into place in consequence of G. We do not need H to make C-G cohere, and the exchanges of D-E, FG yield a progression to the stated climax at G. Hence M. 5:6CG may be regarded as an authentic narrative. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? The conflict and its resolution are fully realized in the unfolding of the narrative, as indicated above. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? There are three components of the narrative, C, which sets the stage, than D-E, F-G. It follows that before us is a tri-partite complex. Mishnah-tractate Nedarim 6:6 A. He who takes a vow not to eat meat is permitted to eat broth and meat sediment. B. And R. Judah prohibits [him from eating broth and meat sediment]. C. Said R. Judah, M#SH W: “R. Tarfon prohibited me from eating eggs which were roasted with it [meat].” D. They said to him, “And that is the point! Under what circumstances? When he will say, ‘This meat is prohibited to me.’ E. “For he who vows not to eat something which is mixed with something else, if there is sufficient [of the prohibited substance] to impart a flavor, is prohibited [from eating the mixture].”

The ma#aseh, C, serves as a precedent in law, and it does not un-

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fold in a set of components joined in a common purpose, such as teleological logic requires. Mishnah-tractate Nedarim 9:5 A. They unloose a man’s vow by reason of the wife’s marriage contract. B. M#SH B: A certain man vowed not to derive benefit from his wife. C. And her marriage contract called for a payment of four hundred denars. D. And he came before R. Aqiba, who required him to pay off her marriage contract. E. He said to him, “Rabbi, my father left [an estate worth] eight hundred denars, and my brother received four hundred, and I four hundred. Is it not enough for her if she collects two hundred and I keep two hundred?” F. R. Aqiba said to him, “Even if you have to sell the hair of your head, you still have to pay off her marriage contract.” G. He said to him, “Now if I had ever known that things were so, I should never have taken such a vow.” H. And R. Aqiba declared the vow to be not binding.

1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? Like M. Ned. 5:6, the present item coheres only by reason of its ultimate goal, which is the validity of the claim for releasing the vow based on “If I had known….” Then the stage is set by the definition, B-C+D, the claim, E, and the colloquy, F-H. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? I do not see the intersection of wills or the point of conflict; the story so unfolds as to illustrate its Halakhic context. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? It is correct to classify the composition as a narrative, not merely as a legal precedent, then I am inclined to find in the tri-partite unfolding of the account the example of a familiar division. Mishnah-tractate Nedarim 9:10 A. [If one said,] “Qonam if I marry that ugly Miss So-and-so,” and lo, she is beautiful, B. “... dark... ,” and lo, she is light, C. “... short... ,” and lo, she is tall, D. he is permitted [to marry] her, E. not because she was ugly and turned beautiful, dark and turned light, short and turned tall, but because the vow [to begin with] was based on erroneous facts.

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F, M#SH B: A certain man prohibited by vow that, from the daughter of his sister, he should derive benefit. G. And they brought her into the house of R. Ishmael and made her beautiful. H. Said to him R. Ishmael, “My son, did you ever take a vow about this lass?” I. He said to him, “Never!” J. And R. Ishmael declared his [vow] not binding. K. That moment R. Ishmael wept and said, “Israelite girls really are beautiful, but poverty makes them ugly.” L. And when R. Ishmael died, Israelite girls took up a lamentation, saying, “Israelite girls, weep over R. Ishmael.” M. And that is what [Scripture] says for Saul, “Israelite girls, weep for Saul [who clothed you in scarlet delicately, who put ornaments of gold upon your apparel]” (2 Sam. 1:24).

1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The composition differs from the conventional legal precedent or case because the point that imparts cogency emerges at the end, “Israelite girls really are…,” and that throws a fresh light on the situation prevailing at the outset. That is to say, without K, the climax, we have a perfectly standard precedent. The man took a vow that he would not marry his niece on his sister’s side, which was deemed particularly virtuous. Such and such was done, yielding the grounds for releasing the vow, which was then released. All that is a familiar mode, and the items hold together as precedents do. We know as the components make their appearance what they mean and where they are heading. But K (amplified at L-M) changes the picture. The teleological logic imposed at K then marks the composition as a narrative. One could speculate on a prior formulation, F-J, which is extended at K+L-M, but I classify the endproduct of whatever antecedent literary phases marked the unfolding of what we now have. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? K focuses the story, and now the tension is between the natural beauty of Israelite women and their looks by reason of poverty. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? The narrative is in three components, each autonomous of the others: the case, the

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ruling, the conclusion drawn from the facts of the case, not of the ruling, thus F-J, K, L-M.

IV. Tractate Nazir Mishnah-tractate Nazir 2:3 A. [If] they mixed a cup for someone, and he said, “Lo, I am a Nazir from it “, B. lo, this one is a Nazir. C. M#SH B: A woman was drunk, and they filled a cup for her, and she said, “Lo, I am a Nazirite from it.” D. Sages ruled, “She intended only to say, ‘Lo, it is unto me as a Qorban.’”

This is a precedent, pure and simple. Mishnah-tractate Nazir 3:6 A. He who [while overseas] took a vow to be a Nazir for a long spell and completed his spell as a Nazir, and afterward came to the Land [of Israel]— B. the House of Shammai say, “He is a Nazir for thirty days.” C. And the House of Hillel say, “He is a Nazir as from the very beginning.” D. M#SH B: Helene the Queen—her son went off to war, and she said, “If my son comes home from war whole and in one piece, I shall be a Nazir for seven years.” Indeed her son did come home from war, and she was a Nazir for seven years. E. Then at the end of the seven years she went up to the Land. The House of Hillel instructed her that she should be a Nazir for another seven years. F. Then at the end of the seven years she was made unclean. So she turned out to be a Nazir for twenty-one years. G. Said R. Judah, “She was a Nazir only fourteen years.”

Here we have the report of a case and sages’ ruling on it, not a narrative that is purposive and coherent by reason of its climax and conclusion. Mishnah-tractate Nazir 6:11 A. He in whose behalf one of the drops of blood has been properly tossed and who [then] was made unclean— B. R. Eliezer says, “He loses the whole [set of offerings already offered up].” C. And sages say, “Let him bring the rest of his offerings when he becomes clean.” D. They said to him, M#SH B: “In behalf of Miriam of Tadmor [Palmyra] one of the drops of blood was properly tossed, and they came and told her

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that her daughter was dying, and she found her dead.

E. “And sages said, ‘Let her bring the rest of her offerings when she will be clean.”’ Here is yet another report of a case and precedent. V. Tractate Sotah: no narratives VI. Tractate Gittin Mishnah-tractate Gittin 1:5 A. Any sort of writ on which there is a Samaritan witness is invalid, B. except for writs of divorce for women and writs of emancipation for slaves. C. M#SH S: They brought before Rabban Gamaliel in Kepar Otenai the writ of divorce of a woman, and the witnesses thereon were Samaritan witnesses, and he did declare it valid. D. All documents which are drawn up in gentile registries, even if their signatures are gentiles’, are valid,

The case illustrates the indicated rule. Mishnah-tractate Gittin 4:7 A. He who puts his wife away because she has a bad name should not take her back. B. [If he did so] because of a vow [which she had made], he should not take her back. C. R. Judah says, “[If it was on account of ] any sort of vow which is publicly known, he should not take her back. D. “But [if it was on account of] a vow which is not publicly known, he may take her back.” E. R. Meir says, “[If it is on account of] any sort of vow which requires the investigation of a sage [for its absolution], he should not take her back. F. “[If it is any sort of] vow which does not require the investigation of a sage, he may take her back.” G. Said R. Eleazar, “This latter case was prohibited only because of the former” H. Said R. Yose bar Judah, “M#SH B: In Sidon a man said to his wife, ‘Qonam if I do not divorce you,’ and he divorced her. I. “But sages permitted him to take her back, for the good order of the world.”

This is a case-report.

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Mishnah-tractate Gittin 6:6 A. He who had been cast into a pit and said, “Whoever hears his [my] voice—let him write a writ of divorce for his [my] wife”— B. lo, these should write and deliver it to her. C. A healthy man who said, “Write a writ of divorce for my wifeD. his intention was to tease her. E. M#SH B: A healthy man said, “Write a writ of divorce for my wife,” and then went up to the rooftop and fell over and died— F. said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, “Said sages, ‘If he fell because of his own action, lo, this is a writ of divorce. If the wind pushed him off, it is no writ of divorce.”

Here is another case report. Mishnah-tractate Gittin 7:5 A. “Lo, this is your writ of divorce on condition that you pay me two hundred zuz,” B. lo, this one is divorced, and she should pay the money. C. “... on condition that you pay me within thirty days from now,” if she paid him during the period of thirty days, she is divorced. D. And if not, she is not divorced. E. Said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, M#SH B: In Sidon there was a man who said to his wife, ‘Lo, this is your writ of divorce, on condition that you give me my cloak,’ but the cloak got lost. F. “Sages ruled, ‘Let her pay him its value.’”

M. 7:5C presents a case report. VII. Tractate Qiddushin Mishnah-tractate Qiddushin 2:7 A. He who betroths a woman and her daughter, B. or a woman and her sister, simultaneously C. they are not betrothed, D. WM#SH B: Five women, including two sisters, and one gathered figs, and they were theirs, but it was Seventh-Year produce. And [someone] said, “Lo, all of you are betrothed to me in virtue of this basket of fruit,” and one of them accepted the proposal in behalf of all of them — E. And sages ruled, “The sisters [in the group of five] are not betrothed.”

Here is nothing more than a precedent. VIII. Summary The pseudo-narratives are these:

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Mishnah-tractate Yebamot 16:4: A certain person fell into a large cistern, and came up [alive] after three days. A blind man went down to immerse in a cave, and his guide went down after him, and they stayed [in the water] long enough to drown. A certain man in Asya was let down by a rope into the sea, and they drew back up only his leg. 2. Mishnah-tractate Yebamot 16:6: A certain person stood on top of a mountain and said, “Mr. So-and-so, the son of So-and-so, of such-andsuch a place, has died.” And they went but did not find anyone there. And they [nonetheless] permitted his wife to remarry. In Salmon, a certain person said, “I am Mr. So-and-so, the son of Mr. So-and-so. A snake has bitten me, and lo, I am dying.” And they went, and while they did not recognize him, they permitted his wife to remarry. 3. Mishnah-tractate Yebamot 16:7: Said R. Aqiba, “When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, Nehemiah of Bet Deli came upon me. He said to me, ‘I heard that only R. Judah b. Baba permits a wife in the Land of Israel to remarry on the evidence of a single witness [to her husband’s death].’ The Levites went to Soar, the date-town, and one of them got sick on the road, and they left him in an inn. And upon their return, they said to the inn hostess, ‘Where is our good buddy?’” She said to them, ‘He died, and I buried him.’ And they permitted his wife to remarry [on the strength of her evidence].” 4. Mishnah-tractate Ketubot 1:10: Said R. Yose, M#SH B: “A girl went down to draw water from the well and was raped. 5. Mishnah-tractate Ketubot 7:10: In Sidon there was a tanner who died, and he had a brother who was a tanner Sages ruled, “She can claim, ‘Your brother I could take, but I can’t take you [as my levir].” 6. Mishnah-tractate Nedarim 6:6: R. Tarfon prohibited me from eating eggs which were roasted with it [meat].” 7. Mishnah-tractate Nazir 2:3: A woman was drunk, and they filled a cup for her, and she said, “Lo, I am a Nazirite from it. Sages ruled, “She intended only to say, ‘Lo, it is unto me as a Qorban.’” 8. Mishnah-tractate Nazir 3:6: Helene the Queen—her son went off to war, and she said, “If my son comes home from war whole and in one piece, I shall be a Nazir for seven years.” Indeed her son did come home from war, and she was a Nazir for seven years. 9. Mishnah-tractate Nazir 6:11: In behalf of Miriam of Tadmor [Palmyra] one of the drops of blood was properly tossed, and they came and told her that her daughter was dying, and she found her dead. 10. Mishnah-tractate Gittin 1:5: They brought before Rabban Gamaliel in Kepar Otenai the writ of divorce of a woman, and the witnesses thereon were Samaritan witnesses, and he did declare it valid. 11. Mishnah-tractate Gittin 4:7: “In Sidon a man said to his wife, ‘Qonam if I do not divorce you,’ and he divorced her. But sages permitted him to take her back, for the good order of the world.” 12. Mishnah-tractate Gittin 6:6: A healthy man said, “Write a writ of divorce for my wife,” and then went up to the rooftop and fell over and died—

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13. Mishnah-tractate Gittin 7:5 In Sidon there was a man who said to his wife, ‘Lo, this is your writ of divorce, on condition that you give me my cloak,’ but the cloak got lost. Sages ruled, ‘Let her pay him its value.’ 14. Mishnah-tractate Qiddushin 2:7: Five women, including two sisters, and one gathered figs, and they were theirs, but it was Seventh-Year produce. And [someone] said, “Lo, all of you are betrothed to me in virtue of this basket of fruit,” and one of them accepted the proposal in behalf of all of them.

I do not see how any of these items qualifies as a narrative. All of them prove integral to the Halakhic context, which governs their meaning and explains the inclusion of the details that are given and the exclusion of those many, many more that are omitted. Here are the authentic narratives that we have identified in the present division of the Mishnah: 1. 2. 3.

M. Ned. 5:6: There was someone in Bet Horon whose father was prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from him. M. Ned. 9:5: A certain man vowed not to derive benefit from his wife. And her marriage contract called for a payment of four hundred denars. M. Ned. 9:10: A certain man prohibited by vow that from the daughter of his sister he should derive benefit. And they brought her into the house of R. Ishmael and made her beautiful.

Each item reminds us of how fine a line is drawn between the pseudo-narrative of precedents or cases, and the authentic narrative marked by teleological logic. One may make a case for a contrary classification of all three of them. I err on the side of inclusion, for one can make a case that these items are simply more than commonly elaborated ma#asim. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, within the present reading, I respond to the questions that animate this survey: 1. Do anomalous or asymmetric compositions or composites attest to thought that takes place beyond the limits of the documents subject to the rules and symmetry of the canon? No, the three items fit well within the Halakhic context that is adorned by them. The issues that precipitate the story are Halakhic issues. 2. Does non-documentary writing exhibit readily-discernible patterns of form and meaning as does documentary writing? If so, what are these patterns and how are we to classify and to interpret them? I did note a tendency to unfold in three separate units of action and description. Otherwise I do not discern any clearly-delineated forms that govern. 3. At what point in the process that yielded the canonical writings as we know them did documentary considerations intervene, and what is the mean-

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ing of that intervention? When and under what circumstances did documentary considerations give way to writing utterly indifferent to its documentary venue? I do not see how the three items answer that question. It appears that the composition of the three narratives fits into the larger work of Mishnah-writing, even though they are anomalous. But the anomaly consists in the traits that distinguish these items from standard ma#asim, and those allegedly-differentiating traits not only are not formidable but do not vastly alter the basic presentation.

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CHAPTER FIVE

MISHNAH SEDER NEZIQIN I. Tractate Baba Qamma Mishnah-tractate Baba Qamma 8:6 A. He who boxes the ear of his fellow pays him a sela. B. R. Judah says in the name of R. Yosé the Galilean, “A maneh.” C. [If] he smacked him, he pays him two hundred zuz. D. [If] it is with the back of his hand, he pays him four hundred zuz. E. [If] he (1) tore at his ear, (2) pulled his hair, (3) spit, and the spit hit him, (4) pulled off his cloak, (5) pulled apart the hairdo of a woman in the marketplace, E he pays four hundred zuz. G. This is the governing principle: Everything is in accord with one’s station. H. Said R. Aqiba, “Even the poorest Israelites do they regard as gentle folk who have lost their fortunes. I. “For they are the children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.” J. M#SH B: Someone pulled apart the hairdo of a woman in the marketplace. K. She came before R. Aqiba, who required him to pay her four hundred zuz. L. He said to him, “Rabbi, give me time [to pay her off].” M. He gave him time. N. He caught her standing at the door of her courtyard and broke a jar of oil in front of her, containing no more than an issar’s worth of oil, She let down her hair and mopped up the oil and put her hand [with the oil] on her hair [so making use of that small quantity of oil]. O. Now he had set witnesses up against her. Then he came before R. Aqiba. P. He said to him, “Rabbi, to a woman such as this am I to pay off four hundred zuz?” Q. He said to him, “You have no claim whatsoever. R. “He who does injury to himself, even though he has no right to do so, is exempt. S. “But others who did injury to him are liable. T. “He who cuts down his own shoots, even though he has no right, is exempt. U. “Others who cut down his shoots are liable.”

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The story is so told as to illustrate the point of the ruling, R-U, which is, what someone does to himself is not subject to penalty, but what others do to that person is. That is why the claim, P, is rejected. The question is, does the ruling impart coherence to the narrative? I am inclined to think that it does, because without the ruling at the end, the details of the narrative are left suspended; they gain their point only at the end. That is why I classify the composition as a narrative within the criterion I have set forth here. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The details cohere by reason of R-U, and everything prior is set up to lead to that crystalclear ruling. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? The tension is embodied in the contrast drawn at the end, so here once more, the composition requires classification as stated. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? I see the same threepart construction that we have observed before, J-M, setting the stage, N-P, the action and the question, then Q-U, the response and the answer. The whole forms a remarkably coherent statement, each detail absolutely necessary to the realization of the purpose.

II. Tractate Baba Mesia Mishnah-tractate Baba Mesia 7:1 A. He who hires [day] workers and told them to start work early or to stay late— B. in a place in which they are accustomed not to start work early or not to stay late, C. he has no right to force them to do so. D. In a place in which they are accustomed to provide a meal, he must provide a meal. E. [In a place in which they are accustomed] to make do with a sweet, F. he provides it. G. Everything accords with the practice of the province. H. M#SH B: R. Yohanan b. Matya said to his son, “Go, hire workers for us.” I. He went and made an agreement with them for food [without further specification].

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J. Now when he came to his father, [the father] said to him, “My son, even if you should make for them a meal like one of Solomon in his day, you will not have carried out your obligation to them. K. “For they are children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. L. “But before they begin work, go and tell them, ‘[Work for us] on condition that you have a claim on me [as to food] only for a piece of bread and pulse alone.’” M. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “He had no need to specify that in so many words. N. “Everything [in any case] accords with the practice of the province.”

I am puzzled by the problem of classifying this item. It is not a precedent or example of the law set forth at A-G. Indeed, the gloss of M-N makes that explicit, since the point of the composite is at M. 7:1G: everything accords with local custom. That is not the issue of the ma#aseh. Rather, it registers the Aggadic, not the Halakhic, claim that Israelites are princes and are to be treated as such. That principle never affects the articulation of the Halakhah of the Mishnah, except here. But then how does the composition cohere? It is in three stages, H-I, J-K, and L. L resolves the question raised by J-K—what is to be done, the agreement having been erroneously framed? The upshot is simple. I do not see how L imposes coherence on the prior items, each of which demands its position exactly where it is. But if we do not have a narrative within the framework of my definition, we also do not have a composition that exemplifies the law at hand, as I said, which is that local custom prevails, whether or not made explicit. Mishnah-tractate Baba Mesia 8:8 A. He who rents out a house to his fellow for a yearB. [if] the year was intercalated [and received an extra month of Adar], C. it is intercalated to the advantage of the tenant. D. [If] he rented it to him by the month, E. [if] the year was intercalated, E it is intercalated to the advantage of the landlord. G. M#SH B: In Sepphoris a person hired a bathhouse from his fellow for twelve golden [denars] per year, at the rate of one golden denar per month [and the year was intercalated]. H. The case came before Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel and before R. Yosé. I. They ruled, “Let them divide the month added by the intercalation of the year.”

Here is a standard precedent, G+H-I.

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Mishnah-tractate Baba Batra 9:7 A. He who verbally divides his property [“by word of mouth”]— B. R. Eliezer says, “All the same are a healthy man and a man whose life is endangered— C. “property for which there is security is acquired through money, a document, and usucaption. D. “And that for which there is no security is acquired only through being drawn [into the possession of the one who acquires it].” E. They said to him, “M#SH B: The mother of the sons of Rokhel was sick and said, ‘Give my veil to my daughter,’ and it was worth twelve maneh. And she died, and the [sages] carried out her statement.” E He said to them, “As to the sons of Rokhel, may their mother bury them.” G. And sages [B. B.B. 156b: Eliezer] say, “If [he gave verbal instructions] on the Sabbath, his statement is confirmed, H. “because he is not able to write down [his will]. I. “But not [if it took place] on a weekday.” J. R. Joshua says, “If they have stated this rule for the Sabbath, all the more so that it applies on a weekday.”

This is a standard Halakhic precedent. IV. Tractate Sanhedrin Mishnah-tractate Sanhedrin 5:2 A. The more they expand the interrogation, the more is one to be praised. B. M#SH B: Ben Zakkai examined a witness as to the character of the stems of figs [under which the incident took place].

The stripped down ma#aseh presents no surprises. Mishnah-tractate Sanhedrin 7:2 A. The religious requirement of burning [is carried out as follows]: B. They would bury him in manure up to his armpits, and put a towel of hard material inside one of soft material, and wrap it around his neck. C. This [witness] pulls it to him from one side, and that [witness] pulls it to him at the other side, until he opens up his mouth. D. And one kindles a wick [B. San. 52a: a strip of lead] and throws it into his mouth, and it goes down into his bowels and burns his intestines. E. R. Judah says, “Also this one: if he died at their hands [through strangulation], they will not have carried out the religious requirement of

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burning [in the proper manner]. E “But: They open his mouth with tongs, against his will, kindle a wick, and throw it into his mouth, and it goes down into his bowels and burns his intestines.” G. Said R. Eleazar b. Sadoq, “M#SH B: The daughter of a priest committed adultery H. “And they put bundles of twigs around her and burned her.” I. They said to him, “It was because the court of that time was not expert [in the law].”

G-H present a routine ma#aseh. I turns the whole into a debate. V. Tractate Makkot: no narratives VI. Tractate Shebuot: no narratives VII. Tractate #Eduyyot The following important composite, M. Ed. 5:6-7, should first be treated in its parts. Mishnah-tractate #Eduyyot 5:6 A. Aqabiah b. Mehalalel gave testimony in four matters. B. They said to him, “Aqabiah, retract the four rulings which you laid down, and we shall make you patriarch of the court of Israel.” C. He said to them, “It is better for me to be called a fool my whole life but not be deemed a wicked person before the Omnipresent for even one minute, D. “so that people should not say, ‘Because he craved after high office, he retracted.”’

This is an exchange of statements, a recorded conversation. But the exchange, like the two at M. 5:7, makes sense only at the end, D forming the climax and point of cohesion of the prior materials. E. He would declare unclean residual hair [in a leprosy sign] and green blood [of a vaginal discharge]. E And sages declare clean. G. He would permit use of the wool which fell out in the case of a firstling which was blemished, and which one put away in a niche, and [which firstling] one afterward slaughtered. H. And sages prohibit. I. He would say, “They do not administer bitter water [to test the woman accused of adultery] in the case of a proselyte woman or in the case of a freed slave girl.” J. And sages say, “They do administer the test.”

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K. They said to him, M#SH B: “Karkemit, a freed slave girl, was in Jerusalem, and Shemaiah and Abtalion administered the bitter water to her.” L. He said to them, “They administered it to her to make her into an example.”

Here we have a standard ma#aseh. M. They excommunicated him, and he died while he was subject to the excommunication, so the court stoned his bier N. Said R. Judah, “God forbid that Aqabiah was excommunicated! O. “For the courtyard is never locked before any Israelite of the wisdom and fear of sin of a man like Aqabiah b. Mehalalel. P “But whom did they excommunicate? It was Eliezer b. Hanokh, who cast doubt on [the sages’ ruling about] the cleanness of hands. Q. “And when he died, the court sent and put a stone on his bier” R. This teaches that whoever is excommunicated and dies while he is subject to the excommunication—they stone his bier.

The incident, M, is subjected to analysis. It does not constitute a narrative. 5:7 A. When he was dying, he said to his son, “My son, retract in the four rulings that I have laid down.” B. He said to him, “And why do you retract now?” C. He said to him, “I heard the rulings in the name of the majority, and they heard them in the name of the majority, so I stood my ground on the tradition that I had heard, and they stood their ground on the tradition that they had heard. D. “But you for your part have heard the matter both in the name of an individual and in the name of the majority. E. “It is better to abandon the opinion of the individual and to hold with the opinion of the majority.” F. He said to him, “Father, give instructions concerning me to your colleagues.” G. He said to him, “I will give no instructions.” H. He said to him, “Is it possible that you have found some fault with me?” I. He said to him, “No. It is your deeds that will bring you near, or your deeds that will put you off [from the others].”

The two exchanges, A-E, F-I, record exchanges in which wise sayings, E, I, are encapsulated in dialogue given drama by the occasion, the death-scene. Nonetheless, the exchanges presuppose a dramatic scene, an event that is now narrated, and both E and I form the climax and impart cogency to the prior statements, which, on their own, do not resolve anything. On that basis I classify the composition as a narrative. In what follows, I speak of “the narrative” because M. Ed. 5:6A-

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D, 5:7A-E, F-I, form a triplet in a single model. The intruded composition does not change the picture one iota. The described situation and implicit activity and movement of thought serve as a setting for the three dialogues. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? At M. Ed. 5:6A-D, 5:7AE, F-I, Aqabiah’s integrity yields three striking exchanges: (1) “so that people should not say, Because he craved after high office, he retracted,” (2) “It is better to abandon the opinion of the individual and to hold with the opinion of the majority,” and (3) “It is your deeds that will bring you near, or your deeds that will put you off [from the others].” The single model that defines all three matched compositions yields three climactic moments, where the point of the preceding exchange is announced, and the whole falls into place. The narratives attain coherence in all three instances at that climactic statement. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? The tension is established in the temptation laid forth—“retract and we will make you patriarch,” “my son, retract…and why do you retract now?” and “give instructions concerning me…I will give no instructions.” In each case Aqabiah responds in integrity to the appeal of the son and the colleagues. It is the movement conveyed by that challenge and response that marks the complex as more than a mere setting for a saying. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? Once more, we find a composition executed by a triplet, but here the three parts hold together not because one flows into the next but because all three adhere to a single form, rigidly repeated. Mishnah-tractate Eduyyot 7:7 A. They gave testimony concerning the boards of bakers, that they are susceptible to uncleanness. B. For R. Eliezer declares [them] insusceptible. C. They gave testimony concerning an oven which one cut up into rings, between each ring of which one put sand, D. that it is susceptible to receive uncleanness. E. For R. Eliezer declares it insusceptible. E They gave testimony that they intercalate the year at any time in Adar.

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G. For they had said, “Only up to Purim.” H. They gave testimony that they intercalate the year conditionally. I. M#SH B: Rabban Gamaliel went to ask for permission from the government in Syria and he did not come back right away, so they intercalated the year on the condition that Rabban Gamaliel concur. J. And when he came back, he said, “I concur.” K. So the year turned out to be deemed to have been intercalated.

We have nothing more than a slightly elaborated ma#aseh. VIII. Tractate #Abodah Zarah Mishnah-tractate Abodah Zarah 3:7 1 A. There are three sorts of houses [so far as use as a shrine for idolatry is concerned]: B. (1) a house which was built to begin with for the purposes of idolatry—lo, this is prohibited. C. (2) [If] one stuccoed and decorated it for idolatry and renovated it, one removes the renovations. D. (3) [If] one brought an idol into it and took it out—lo, this is permitted. E. There are three sorts of stones: F. (1) a stone which one hewed to begin with for a pedestal—lo, this is forbidden. G. (2) [If] one plastered it and adorned it for an idol, and did something new to it— H. one may remove that which he made which is new. I. (3) [If] he set up an idol on [an existing] stone and then took it off, lo, this is permitted. J. There are three kinds of asherahs: K. (1) A tree which one planted to begin with for idolatry—lo, this is prohibited. L. (2) [If] he chopped it and trimmed it for idolatry, and it sprouted afresh, he may remove that which sprouted afresh. M. (3) [If] he set up an idol under it and then annulled it, lo, this is permitted, N. What is an asherah? Any tree under which is located an idol. O. R. Simeon says, “Any [tree] which people worship.” R M#SH: In Sidon there was a tree which people worshipped, and they found a pile of stones underneath it. Q. Said to them R. Simeon, “Investigate the character of this pile of stones.” R. They did investigate it and found an image on it. S. He said to them, “Since they are worshipping the image [and not the tree], let us permit them to make use of the tree [itself].”

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This is a conventional ma#aseh, slightly elaborated, and not a narrative in any sense. Mishnah-tractate Abodah Zarah 5:2 A. Libation wine which fell on grapes— B. one may rinse them off, and they are permitted. C. But if [the grapes] were split, they are prohibited. D. [If] it fell on figs or dates, if there is sufficient [libation wine absorbed] to impart a flavor [to them], they are forbidden. E. M#SH B: Boethus b. Zonen brought dried figs by ship, and a jar of libation wine broke open and dripped on them, and he asked sages, who permitted [the figs, once they had been rinsed]. E This is the governing principle: anything which bestows benefit through imparting a flavor is forbidden, and anything which does not bestow benefit through imparting a flavor is permitted— G. for example, vinegar [from libation wine] which falls on crushed beans.

Here is a routine case-report. Mishnah-tractate Abodah Zarah 3:4 A. Peroqlos b. Pelosepos asked Rabban Gamaliel in Akko, when he was washing in Aphrodite’s bathhouse, saying to him, “It is written in your Torah, ‘And there shall cleave nothing of a devoted thing to your hand’ (Dt. 13:18). How is it that you’re taking a bath in Aphrodite’s bathhouse?” B. He said to him, “They do not give answers in a bathhouse.” C. When he went out, he said to him, “I never came into her domain. She came into mine. They don’t say, ‘Let’s make a bathhouse as an ornament for Aphrodite.’ But they say, ‘Let’s make Aphrodite as an ornament for the bathhouse.’ D. “Another matter: Even if someone gave you a lot of money, you would never walk into your temple of idolatry naked or suffering a flux, nor would you piss in its presence. E. “Yet this thing is standing there at the head of the gutter and everybody pisses right in front of her.” F. It is said only, “... their gods” (Dt. 12:3)—that which one treats as a god is prohibited, but that which one treats not as a god is permitted.

This pseudo-narrative supplies a setting for an exchange of opinion and argument. Once we have left the bath house, A-B, the composition shifts from story-telling to a dialogue in which Gamaliel makes a speech—hardly realizing the teleological logic that characterizes a narrative. The contrast between this item and M. Ed. 5:6-7 shows the difference that the distinction makes.

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chapter five IX. Tractate Horayot: no narratives X. Summary

The pseudo-narratives are as follows: 1. Mishnah-tractate Baba Mesia 7:1: M#SH B: R. Yohanan b. Matya said to his son, “Go, hire workers for us.” 2. Mishnah-tractate Baba Mesia 8:8: In Sepphoris a person hired a bathhouse from his fellow for twelve golden [denars] per year, at the rate of one golden denar per month [and the year was intercalated]. 3. Mishnah-tractate Baba Batra 9:7: The mother of the sons of Rokhel was sick and said, ‘Give my veil to my daughter,’ and it was worth twelve maneh. And she died, and they carried out her statement. 4. Mishnah-tractate Sanhedrin 5:2: Ben Zakkai examined a witness as to the character of the stems of figs [under which the incident took place]. 5. Mishnah-tractate Sanhedrin 7:2: The daughter of a priest committed adultery And they put bundles of twigs around her and burned her. 6. M. Eduyyot 5:7K: Karkemit, a freed slave girl, was in Jerusalem, and Shemaiah and Abtalion administered the bitter water to her.” 7. Mishnah-tractate Eduyyot 7:7: Rabban Gamaliel went to ask for permission from the government in Syria and he did not come back right away, so they intercalated the year on the condition that Rabban Gamaliel concur. 8. Mishnah-tractate Abodah Zarah 3:7: In Sidon there was a tree which people worshipped, and they found a pile of stones underneath it. Said to them R. Simeon, “Investigate the character of this pile of stones.” 9. Mishnah-tractate Abodah Zarah 5:2: Boethus b. Zonen brought dried figs by ship, and a jar of libation wine broke open and dripped on them, and he asked sages, who permitted [the figs, once they had been rinsed]. 10. Mishnah-tractate Abodah Zarah 3:4: Peroqlos b. Pelosepos asked Rabban Gamaliel in Akko, when he was washing in Aphrodite’s bathhouse, saying to him, “It is written in your Torah, ‘And there shall cleave nothing of a devoted thing to your hand’ (Dt. 13:18). How is it that you’re taking a bath in Aphrodite’s bathhouse?”

Here are the authentic narratives that we have identified in the present division of the Mishnah: 1. Mishnah-tractate Baba Qamma 8:6: Someone pulled apart the hairdo of a woman in the marketplace. She came before R. Aqiba, who required him to pay her four hundred zuz. 2. Mishnah-tractate #Eduyyot 5:6-7: …(1) so that people should not say, Because he craved after high office, he retracted, (2) It is better to abandon the opinion of the individual and to hold with the opinion of the majority, and (3) It is your deeds which will bring you near, or your deeds which will put you off [from the others].

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Now, on the basis of the surveyed narratives, let me respond to the questions that animate this survey. 1. Do anomalous or asymmetric compositions or composites attest to thought that takes place beyond the limits of the documents subject to the rules and symmetry of the canon? Most of the candidates are precedents or cases, and they attest to the inner-Halakhic thought of the Mishnahcompositions in which they occur. 2. Does non-documentary writing exhibit readily-discernible patterns of form and meaning as does documentary writing? If so, what are these patterns and how are we to classify and to interpret them? I do see a persistent interest in a three-stage or a three-part exposition. 3. At what point in the process that yielded the canonical writings as we know them did documentary considerations intervene, and what is the meaning of that intervention? When and under what circumstances did documentary considerations give way to writing utterly indifferent to its documentary venue? We have two authentic narratives, M. B.Q. 8:6 and M. Ed. 5:67, and both prove integral to their setting. Neither requires us to stand outside the Rabbinic framework, in the way in which M. Ta. 3:9-10 and M. R.H. 2:8-9 do.

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CHAPTER SIX

MISHNAH SEDER QODOSHIM I. Tractate Zebahim: no narratives II. Tractate Menahot Mishnah-tractate Menahot 10:2 A. The requirement of the #omer is to bring it from [barley growing] nearby. B. [If] it [the crop] did not ripen near Jerusalem [in time for use on Nisan 16] [however,] they bring it from any place. C. M#SH S: It was brought from Gaggot Serifin, and [the grain for] the two loaves [Lev. 23:17] from the valley of En Sokher.

This is a standard precedent. III. Tractate Hullin: no narratives IV. Tractate Bekhorot Mishnah-tractate Bekhorot 4:4 A. He who was not an expert and examined the firstling, (and) which was slaughtered on his instructions— B. lo, this [firstling] is to be buried. C. And he [the amateur] pays from his own funds. D. [If] one [who was not an expert] judged a case, declaring the liable person to be free of liability, declaring the person free of liability to be liable, declaring what is clean to be unclean, declaring what is unclean to be clean— E. what he has done is done. F. And he pays from his own funds. G. But if he was an expert recognized by a court, he is free from the liability of paying. H. The womb of a cow was removed. And R. Tarfon had it [the cow] fed to the dogs.

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I. The case came before sages, and they declared it permitted. J. Said Todos, the Physician, “Neither a cow nor a pig leaves Alexandria without their ripping out its womb, so that it will not bear offspring.” K. Said R. Tarfon, “There goes your ass, Tarfon.” L. Said to him R. Aqiba, “Rabbi Tarfon, you are exempt, for you are an expert recognized by a court. M. “And an expert recognized by a court is free from the liability of paying.”

H-J form a standard pseudo-narrative, Tacked on, K-M do not add up to a narrative. Mishnah-tractate Bekhorot 5:3 A. He who slit the ear of the firstling— B. “Lo, this should never be slaughtered [by reason of a blemish],” the words of R. Eliezer. C. And sages say, “When another blemish will appear in it, it is slaughtered on its account.” D. M#SH B: An old ram, with its hair dangling—quaestor saw it. E. He said, “What sort of thing is this?” F. They said to him, “It is a firstling. And it is slaughtered only if there is a blemish on it.” G. He took a dagger and slit its ear. H. And the case came before sages, and they declared it permitted. I. He saw that they permitted [it] and went and tore the ears of other firstlings. J. And they declared [them] prohibited. K. One time children were playing in the field, and they tied the tails of lambs to one another. And the tail of one of them split off. And lo, it was a firstling. L. And the case came before sages, and they declared it permitted. M. They saw that they declared it permitted, and they went and tied together the tails of other firstlings. N. And they declared [them] prohibited. O. This is the general principle: Anything [done] deliberately—it is prohibited. And anything [done] unintentionally—it is permitted.

I see here two, somewhat augmented but still quite standard, ma#asim, D-J, K-N. Mishnah-tractate Bekhorot 6:6 A. [If] it has no testicles, B. or has only one testicle. C. R. Ishmael says, “If it has two pouches, it has two testicles. [If] it has only one pouch, it has only one testicle.” D. R. Aqiba says, “One sets it on its buttocks and squeezes: if there is a testicle there, it ultimately will descend.” E. M#SH S: One squeezed and it did not descend.

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E And it was slaughtered. And it [the testicle] was found cleaving to the groin. G. And R. Aqiba declared the beast permitted, and R. Yohanan b. Nuri prohibited [it].

This follows the usual form for the precedent/case. Mishnah-tractate Bekhorot 6:9 A. M#SH S: The lower jaw stretched beyond the upper one [ = M. 6:8H2]. B. And Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel consulted sages. C. And they said, “Lo, this is a blemish.” D. The ear of a kid which was doubled up— E. Sages said, “When it is all a single bone, it is a blemish. F. “And if it is not all a single bone, it is not a blemish.” G. R. Hananiah b. Gamaliel says, “The tail of a kid which is like that of a pig, H. “and that which does not have three links [vertebrae]I. “lo, this is a blemish.”

M. 6:9A-C presents no surprises. V. Tractate #Arakhin Mishnah-tractate Arakhin 5:1 A. He who says, “My weight is incumbent on me [as a pledge to the sanctuary]” pays his weight— B. if [he said], “Silver,” [then he pays) in silver; C. if [he said], “Gold,” [then he pays] in gold. D. M#SH B: The mother of Yirmatyah said, “The weight of my daughter is incumbent on me.” And she went up to Jerusalem, and weighed her [Yirmatyah], and paid her weight in gold. E. [He who says], “The weight of my hand is incumbent on me [as a pledge to the sanctuary]”— E R. Judah says, “He fills a jar with water and pokes it [his hand] in up to the elbow. And he weighs out the meat of an ass, with the sinews and bones. And he puts it [the ass meat] into it [the jar] until it [the jar] is filled up [with water]..” G. Said R. Yosé, “And how is it possible to treat as equivalent one kind of flesh and another, and one kind of bones and another? But: H. “They estimate the hand: how much is it likely to weigh?”

No surprise a D, an illustration of C. Mishnah-tractate Arakhin 8:1 A. He who sanctifies his field when the Jubilee is not [in force]— B. they say to him, “You declare first” [how much you wish to pay for the redemption of the field, since, when the Jubilee is not in force, the

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field is redeemed at market value, not at the fifty shekels for each homer’s area]. C. For the owner pays an added fifth. D. But no other man pays an added fifth [M. 7:2]. E. M#SH B: One man sanctified his field because of its poor quality. F. They said to him, “You declare first.” G. He said, “Lo, it is mine for an issar.” (H. Said R. Yosé, “This one said only, ‘For [the value of] an egg.’ For what is sanctified is redeemed by money or by something worth money.”) I. They said to him, “It’s yours!” J. He turned out to lose an issar, and his field was before him [still his].

The case varies the form, since I-J give the ruling in an odd way. But there are no surprises. VI. Tractate Temurah: no narratives VII. Tractate Keritot Mishnah-tractate Keritot 1:7 A. The woman who is subject to a doubt concerning [the appearance of] five fluxes, B. or the one who is subject to a doubt concerning five miscarriages C. brings a single offering. D. And she [then is deemed clean so that she] eats animal sacrifices. E. And the remainder [of the offerings, A, B] are not an obligation for her. F [If she is subject to] five confirmed miscarriages, G. or five confirmed fluxes, H. she brings a single offering. I. And she eats animal sacrifices. J. But the rest [of the offerings, the other four] remain as an obligation for her [to bring at some later time]—

K. M#SH S: A pair of birds in Jerusalem went up in price to a golden denar L. Said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, “By this sanctuary! I shall not rest tonight until they shall be at [silver] denars.” M. He entered the court and taught [the following law]: N. “The woman who is subject to five confirmed miscarriages [or] five confirmed fluxes brings a single offering. O. “And she eats animal sacrifices.

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P. “And the rest [of the offerings] do not remain as an obligation for her.” Q. And pairs of birds stood on that very day at a quarter-denar each [one one-hundredth of the former price]. The ma#aseh at K would ordinarily carry in its wake a description of sages’ response, e.g., “sages’ ruled” + N-Q, and that would serve the purpose. VIII. Tractate Me#ilah: no narratives IX. Tractate Tamid: no narratives X. Tractate Middot: no narratives XI. Tractate Qinnim: no narratives XII. Summary All the candidates are Halakhic ma#asim, some of them formally more conventional than others. None constitutes an authentic narrative. 1. M. Menahot 10:2 M#SH S: It was brought from Gaggot Serifin, and [the grain for] the two loaves [Lev. 23:17] from the valley of En Sokher. 2. M. Bekhorot 4:4: The womb of a cow was removed. And R. Tarfon had it [the cow] fed to the dogs. The case came before sages, and they declared it permitted. 3. Mishnah-tractate Bekhorot 5:3: An old ram, with its hair dangling— quaestor saw it He said, “What sort of thing is this?” They said to him, “It is a firstling. And it is slaughtered only if there is a blemish on it.” He took a dagger and slit its ear. And the case came before sages, and they declared it permitted. 4. Mishnah-tractate Bekhorot 6:6: One squeezed and it did not descend. And it was slaughtered. And it [the testicle] was found cleaving to the groin. 5. Mishnah-tractate Bekhorot 6:9 M#SH S: The lower jaw stretched beyond the upper one 6. Mishnah-tractate Arakhin 5:1 M#SH B: The mother of Yirmatyah said, “The weight of my daughter is incumbent on me.” And she went up to Jerusalem, and weighed her [Yirmatyah], and paid her weight in gold.

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7. Mishnah-tractate Arakhin 8:1 M#SH B: One man sanctified his field because of its poor quality. They said to him, “You declare first.” He said, “Lo, it is mine for an issar.” They said to him, “It’s yours!” 8. Mishnah-tractate Keritot 1:7: A pair of birds in Jerusalem went up in price to a golden denar Said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, “By this sanctuary! I shall not rest tonight until they shall be at [silver] denars.” He entered the court and taught [the following law]…”

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CHAPTER SEVEN

MISHNAH SEDER TOHOROT I. Tractate Kelim Mishnah-tractate Kelim 5:4 A. An oven which was heated from its outer sides, or which was heated without his [the owner’s] knowledge, or which was heated in the craftsman’s house, is susceptible to uncleanness. B. M#SH S: Fire broke out among the ovens of Kefar Signa, and the matter came to Yavneh, and Rabban Gamaliel declared them unclean.

This is a standard ma#aseh, following the established form. II. Tractate Ohalot Mishnah-tractate Ohalot 17:5 A. A field in which a tomb was lost, B. and in which one built a house and an upper room on top of it, C. if the door of the upper room was directly above the door of the house, the upper room is clean. And if not, the upper room is unclean. D. Dirt of a grave area and dirt from abroad which came in vegetables “join together to reach the measure of the seal of packing bags,” the words of R. Eliezer. E. And sages say, “[It is not joined together but conveys uncleanness] only if in one place is sufficient to serve as a seal of packing bags.” E Said R. Judah, “M#SH: Letters were coming from abroad to the sons of the high priests, and there was on them a seah or two seahs of seals, and sages were not scrupulous about them on account of uncleanness [adhering to dirt deriving from land of the gentiles, which may contain corpsematter].”

I see nothing here that requires comment.

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chapter seven III. Tractate Nega"im: no narratives IV. Tractate Parah: no narratives V. Tractate Tohorot: no narratives VI. Tractate Miqva"ot

Mishnah-tractate Miqva"ot 4:5 A. The trough which is [hewn] in the rock — B. (1) they do not draw water from it, C. (2) they do not mix [ashes of the red cow and water] in it, D. (3) they do not sprinkle from it, E. (4) it does not require a tightly stopped-up cover, E and (5) it does not spoil the immersion pool. G. [If] it was a [movable] utensil, and one [then] attached it [to the rock] with plaster— H. (1) they do draw in it, I. (2) they do mix in it, J. (3) they do sprinkle from it, K. (4) it does require a tightly stopped-up cover, L. and (5) it does spoil the immersion pool. M. [If] it was perforated below or on the side, and it cannot hold any amount of water—it is suitable. N. And how large a hole must there be [so it is no longer a utensil with a receptacle]? O. As large as the spout of a water-skin. P Said R. Judah b. Beterah, M#SH B: “A trough of Jehu was in Jerusalem, and it was perforated with a hole as large as the spout of a water-skin. 0. “And everything which required preparation in conditions of cleanness in Jerusalem was prepared depending upon it [for immersion]. R. “And the House of Shammai sent and broke it down [to remove it from the status of a utensil, for valid immersion-water cannot be collected in a utensil].” S. For the House of Shammai say, “Until the greater part of it will be broken down, [it is still regarded as a utensil].”

Here is another standard case-report. VII. Tractate Niddah Mishnah-tractate Niddah 8:2 A. And she blames it on any thing on which she can blame it: B. [if] she slaughtered a beast, a wild animal, or a bird, C. or if she was busy with [anything which causes] bloodstains,

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D. or if she sat down beside people who were engaged in them [anything that produces bloodstains]. E. [If] she killed a louse, F. lo, this one blames it on it. G. How much may she blame on it? H. R. Haninah b. Antigonos says, “Up to the size of the split bean.” I. And [it may be attributed to a louse] even though she did not kill it. And she blames it on her son or her husband. J. If there is a wound [covered by a scab] on her and it can open again and bleed she may blame it on that. 8:3 A. M#SH B: One woman came before R. Aqiba. She said to him, “I have seen a bloodstain.” B. He said to her, “Perhaps there was a wound on you?” C. She said to him, “Yes, but it has healed.” D. He said to her, “Perhaps it can open and bleed?” E. She said to him, “Yes.” F. And R. Aqiba declared her clean. G. His disciples did he see staring at one another He said to them, “Why is this matter hard in your eyes? For the sages stated the rule not to produce a strict ruling but to produce a lenient ruling, as it is said, ‘And if a woman have an issue and her issue in her flesh be blood’ (Lev. 15:19)—blood and not a stain.”

A-F form a standard ma#aseh, with some elaboration in dialogue. G is tacked on; A-F without G are fully realized. VIII. Tractate Makhshirin Mishnah-tractate Makhshirin 1:6 A. He who blows on lentils to test whether they are good— B. R. Simeon says, “They are not under the law, If water be put.” C. And sages say, “They are under the law, If water be put.” D. He who eats sesame with his [wet] finger— E. liquids which are on his hand— F. R. Simeon says, “They are not under the law, If water be put.” G. And sages say, “They are under the law, If water be put.” H. He who hides away his fruit in water because of the thieves— I. they are not under the law, If water be put. J. M#SH B: People in Jerusalem hid away their fig cakes in water because of the usurpers. K. And sages declared [them] clean for them. L. He who puts [floats] his fruit [along] in the stream of the river to bring them along with himself—they are not under the law, If water be put.

The form of the precedent is perfectly followed.

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Mishnah-tractate Makhshirin 3:4 A. He who sprinkles his house and put wheat into it, B. and they [the grains of wheat] became damp— C. if it is on account of the water, it is subject to the law, If water be put. D. And if it is on account of the rock floor, it is not under the law, If water be put. E. He who washes his clothing in a trough and put into it grains of wheat, and they grew moist, E if it [the moisture] is on account of the water, it is subject to the law, If water be put. G. And if it [the moisture] is on account of itself, it is not under the law, If water be put. H. He who dampens [wheat] with sand, lo, this is under the rule, If water be put. I. M#SH B: The people of Mahoz were dampening [wheat] in sand. J. Sages said to them, “If thus you have been doing, you have never prepared [food] in accord with the rules of cleanness in your entire lives.”

I see no narrative here. IX. Tractate Zabim: no narratives X. Tractate Tebul Yom: no narratives XI. Tractate Yadayim Mishnah-tractate Yadayim 3:1 A. He who pokes his hands into a house afflicted with a Nega— B. “his hands are in the first remove of uncleanness,” the words of R. Aqiba. C. And sages say, “His hands are in the second remove of uncleanness.” D. Whoever imparts uncleanness to clothing, when in contact [with them], imparts uncleanness to the hands— E. “So that they are in the first remove of uncleanness, the words of R. Aqiba. F. And sages say, “So that they are in the second remove of uncleanness.” G. Said they to R. Aqiba, “When do we find that the hands are in the first remove of uncleanness under any circumstances whatsoever?” H. He said to them, “And how is it possible for them to be in the first remove of uncleanness without his body’s [being] made unclean, outside of the present case?” I. “Food and utensils which have been made unclean by liquids impart

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uncleanness to the hands so that they are in the second remove of uncleanness,” the words of R. Joshua. J. And sages say, “That which is made unclean by a Father of Uncleanness imparts uncleanness to the hands. [That which has been made unclean] by an Offspring of Uncleanness does not impart uncleanness to the hands.” K. Said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, “M#SH B: A certain woman came before Father. L. “She said to him, ‘My hands entered the contained airspace of a clay utensil.’ M. “He said to her, ‘My daughter, By what had it been made unclean?’ [He thus wished to ascertain the remove of uncleanness that had affected the contained airspace of the clay utensil.] N. “But I did not hear what she said to him.” 0. Said sages, “The matter is clear. That which has been made unclean by a Father of Uncleanness imparts uncleanness to the hands. [That which has been made unclean] by an Offspring of Uncleanness does not impart uncleanness to the hands.”

Here is a standard ma#aseh. XII. Tractate #Uqsin: no narratives XIII. Summary The division contains no narratives. The pseudo-narratives/ma#asim are as follows: 1. Mishnah-tractate Kelim 5:4 M#SH S: Fire broke out among the ovens of Kefar Signa, and the matter came to Yavneh, and Rabban Gamaliel declared them unclean. 2. Mishnah-tractate Ohalot 17:5: Letters were coming from abroad to the sons of the high priests, and there was on them a seah or two seahs of seals, and sages were not scrupulous about them on account of uncleanness 3. Mishnah-tractate Miqva"ot 4:5 M#SH B: “A trough of Jehu was in Jerusalem, and it was perforated with a hole as large as the spout of a waterskin. 4. Mishnah-tractate Niddah 8:2: One woman came before R. Aqiba. She said to him, “I have seen a bloodstain.” 5. Mishnah-tractate Makhshirin 1:6: People in Jerusalem hid away their fig cakes in water because of the usurpers. 6. Mishnah-tractate Makhshirin 3:4: The people of Mahoz were dampening [wheat] in sand. 7. Mishnah-tractate Yadayim 3:1: Said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, “M#SH B: A certain woman came before Father. She said to him, ‘My hands

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This division yields very little for our study. Further discussion of the Mishnah’s narratives is in chapter fifteen.

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PART TWO

NARRATIVES IN TRACTATE ABOT

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CHAPTER EIGHT

TRACTATE ABOT Tractate Abot is attached to the Mishnah but stands distinct from it in rhetoric, topic, and logic of coherent discourse. It need not detain us, being a document utterly undifferent to the uses of narrative. There is a single pseudo-narrative, to be examined cursorily. Tractate Abot 2:6 A. Also: he saw a skull floating on the water and said to it, “Because you drowned others, they drowned you, and in the end those who drowned you will be drowned.”

This is a perfectly standard pseudo-narrative: a setting for a saying. To respond to the questions that animate this survey: in tractate Abot there are no anomalous or asymmetric compositions. A single topic governs, along with a uniform logic of coherent discourse (lists of names of authorities, except for a tacked-onchapter at the end), and a fairly cogent rhetoric. There is no nondocumentary writing in the shank of tractate Abot. What about the problem of this study: the anomaly presented to documentary form-analysis by narratives? It is the fact that, when it comes to narratives and pseudo-narratives, the compilers of tractate Abot found nothing of use or interest in the matter. That striking omission of narratives and pseudo-narratives, so promising for the Mishnah and the Tosefta, also represents a documentary choice particular to the compilers of that tractate. I do not know, and cannot imagine, why Abot’s compilers found no use for narratives of any kind. But the utter disinterest in adorning names with traits of personality or virtue characteristic of Abot does represent a choice that some authorities made—and that others, dealing with exactly the same materials, rejected. For the successors and continuators of tractate Abot in Abot deR. Natan did not concur with the original compilers’ decision. They accord-

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ed to the unadorned names of the lists in tractate Abot ample biographical narratives and extensive narrative amplifications of other kinds. Naked names acquire rich garments of characterization and personality, exemplifying, not merely pronouncing, virtue, in a series of highly developed narratives, both biographical and historical. When we reach Abot deR. Natan we shall see how extensive narratives of various kinds are formulated to augment tractate Abot.1 Then we shall see how one set of writers and compilers have made one choice, and how another set of the same made the opposite choice—the very center of the documentary hypothesis fully exposed. 1 Judaism and Story: The Evidence of The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan. Chicago, 1992: University of Chicago Press. Reprint: Binghamton, 2002: Global Publications, Classics in Judaic Studies series.

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PART THREE

NARRATIVES IN THE TOSEFTA: FORMS, TYPES AND DISTRIBUTION

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CHAPTER NINE

TOSEFTA SEDER ZERAIM The second foundation-document of the Halakhah, the Tosefta, now affords perspective on the narratives of the first, the Mishnah, that is, the first of our documentary perspectives on Rabbinic narrative. And what emerges confirms the documentary hypothesis, which insists that the rhetorical, logical, and topical programs of the canonical compilations are to be analyzed in accord with documentary boundaries—even when it comes to narratives. Since, as I said in the Preface and explained in the Introduction, narratives in the aggregate always ignore the rules of logic, topic, and rhetoric that otherwise govern in the respective documents, that is an important result. It shows that the documents exhibit preferences on narrative types and forms, though these preferences do not coincide in definition with those that pertain to the respective documents’ expository-propositional or exegetical components. In chapters nine through fourteen we shall see that, true to its character, the Tosefta both repeats the preference of the Mishnah for the form and use of the ma#aseh and also innovates. For, as everyone now knows, in the relationship to the Mishnah, the Tosefta contains three types of writing. These are (1) citation and gloss of the Mishnah, (2) autonomous exposition of the Halakhah in its own terms and framework, and (3) writing that amplifies the Mishnah’s rules but does not cite them verbatim. Hence—in line with the documentary hypothesis—we should anticipate that the Tosefta will both recapitulate the Mishnah’s usage and develop new forms and purposes for the ma#aseh. And that is precisely what we shall now witness in the survey of the narratives of the Tosefta. The Tosefta offers not only the now-familiar pseudo-narratives and case/precedent-ma#asim, but also forms of the ma#aseh entirely outside the range of the Mishnah’s repertoire. But like the Mishnah, the Tosefta contains only a handful of authentic stories comparable to those at M. R. H. 2:8-9 and M. Ta. 3:9-10—but in

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volume no more than in the Mishnah. Both foundation-documents of the Halakhah therefore exhibit a clear and unambiguous preference for one type of narrative or pseudo-narrative over all other types. And when compared and contrasted with one another, the two documents underscore each its own distinctiveness. That is, the Mishnah’s repertoire is shown particular to the Mishnah, and, in the context now explained, the Tosefta’s to the Tosefta. Now to the survey. I. Tractate Berakhot Tosefta-tractate Berakhot 1:4 A. M#SH B: R. Ishmael and R. Eleazar ben Azariah were staying in the same place. R. Ishmael was reclining and R. Eleazar ben Azariah was standing upright. When the time came to recite the Shema#. R. Ishmael arose and R. Eleazar ben Azariah reclined. B. Said to him R. Ishmael, “What is this, Eleazar?” C. He said to him, “Ishmael, my brother, they say to one, ‘Why is your beard grown long?’ and he says to them, ‘Let it serve [as a protest] against the destroyers.’ D. “[Just so] I who was standing reclined; and you who were reclining arose.” E. He [Ishmael] said to him, “You reclined to carry out the words of the House of Shammai, and I arose to carry out [the words of] the House of Hillel [M. Ber. 1:3].” F. Another version: “[I arose] so that the students should not remark and establish the law according to your words.”

The dramatization does not yield a narrative by the criterion in play here: an exercise in teleological logic. The dialogue is that of Halakhic discourse, an exchange of positions and reasons, not of a narrative in which details aim at a designated end-point. Tosefta-tractate Berakhot 2:11 J. The one who eulogizes and those who participate in the eulogy interrupt [their activity] to recite the Shema#, but do not interrupt to recite the Prayer. K. M#SH S: Our masters interrupted [a eulogy] to recite the Shema# and the Prayer.

The exemplary case does not quality as a narrative. Tosefta-tractate Berakhot 2:13 A. “One who has had a seminal discharge and who does not have [available a pool of] water in which to immerse himself— B. “behold, he may recite the Shema# [to himself], but not out loud

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C. “and he does not recite the benedictions either before it or after it],” the words of R. Meir. D. And sages say, “He may recite the Shema# out loud and recite the benedictions before it and after it” [cf. M. Ber. 2:3, 3:4]. E. Said R. Meir, “Once we were sitting in the house of study before R. Aqiba, and we were reciting the Shema# to ourselves [inaudibly] [in line with T. 2:13B], F. “because of a quaestor [Roman detective] standing at the doorway.” G. They said to him, “[A precedent from] a time of danger is not proof [that such a practice is proper].”

The precedent does not meet the operative criterion. Tosefta-tractate Berakhot 4:15 O. This is the general rule: P. [Regarding] any food that is [made from one] of the seven kinds [of produce] or a kind of bread stuff— Q. Rabban Gamaliel says, “One recites three benedictions [i.e., the full grace after meals] after [eating] it, R. and sages say, “[He recites] one benediction [viz., an abbreviated grace]” [cf. M. Ber. 6:8]. S. M#SH B: Rabban Gamaliel and the elders were seated at table in Jericho. T. They [attendants] brought before them dates [after they had finished the meal] and they ate them. U. R. Aqiba precipitously recited one [blessing] after [eating] them. V. Said to him Rabban Gamaliel, “Aqiba, why do you poke your head into disputes?” W. He [Aqiba] said to him, “Did you not teach us ‘One should follow the majority’? [cf. Exod. 23:2]” X. “Even though you rule one way and your fellows rule another way, the Halakhah follows the ruling of the majority.”

This item, S-X, a fine narrative indeed, is comparable to the Aqabiah-triplet at M. Ed., cited above. The details of the narrative come together in the climactic statement at the end. It is noteworthy that the motif of the Gamaliel-story at M. R. H. 2:89, the paramount status of the patriarch, Gamaliel, and of tradition over the subordinate standing of the sage, armed only with reason, recurs, but now with a different outcome. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The action of Aqiba, U, in accord with sages, R, is challenged at V and explained at WX. S-U qualify as a case/precedent. The addition of V-X shifts the focus from the text to the dramatic-narrative context, the sage’s display of rejection of Gamaliel’s ruling. Viewed as a unitary

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exposition, the composition in no way compares to the standard ma#aseh of the Mishnah, a case/precedent. To be sure, we cannot regard S-U as necessarily continued by V-X, because if we omitted V-X, S-U would remain completely coherent as a realization of the Halakhah. And V-X are not particular to S-U. The construction then aims at W-X, without which nothing prior coheres. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? In line with my reading, the key lies in Aqiba’s action, U, which is explained at W-X, thus a logically-authentic narrative. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? This is a precedent/ case that has been amplified and articulated, so that the Halakhic precipitant is rendered secondary, and the goal—“despite your ruling, the Halakhah follows the majority, meaning, the sages”— becomes primary and unifying. That the present represents a pointby-point response to M. R.H. 2:8-9 strikes me as plausible. Tosefta-tractate Berakhot 4:16-18 4:16 A. M#SH B: R. Tarfon was sitting in the shade of a dovecote on a Sabbath afternoon. B. They [the attendants] brought before him a pail of cool water. C. He said to his students, “One who drinks water to quench his thirst— what benediction does he recite?” [cf. M. Ber. 6:8] D. They said to him, “Teach us, our master.” E. He said to them, “’[Praised be Thou, O Lord,] Creator of creatures and their needs.’” F. He said to them, “May I inquire [into the meaning of Scripture]?” G. They said to him, “Teach us, our master.” H. He said to them, “Behold Scripture states, ‘Then they [Joseph’s brothers] sat to eat; and looking up they saw la caravan of Ishmaelites coming from Gilead, with their camels bearing gum, balm, and myrrh, on their way to carry it down to Egypt’ (Gen. 37:25). Now it is customary for Arabs to carry only foul-smelling skins with resin. I. “But [God saw to it that] they put that righteous man [Joseph] among [sweet-smelling and] desirable things. J. “And may we not reason a fortiori: if, when God is angry at the righteous, he has mercy on them, when he is disposed to be merciful, how much more so [does he have mercy on them]! 4:17 A. “Similarly, ‘They drew near and they carried them [the corpses of Nadab and Abihu] in their coats out of the camp’ (Lev. 10:5). B. “And may we not reason a fortiori: if, when God is angry at the righteous, [their treatment is] such, when he is disposed to be merciful, how

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much more so [is he mindful of their honor]! C. “Similarly, ‘The lion had not eaten the body [of the disobedient man of God from Judah] or torn the ass’ (I Kings 13:28). D. “And may we not reason a fortiori: if, when God is angry at the righteous, and he has mercy on them, when he is disposed to be merciful, how much more so [does he have mercy on them]!” E. He [Tarfon] said, “May I inquire [into the meaning of Scripture]?” F. They [his students] said to him, “Teach us, our master.” G. He said to them, “Why did Judah merit [that] the kingship [be assigned by God to his tribe]?” H. They said to him, “Because he confessed [in the incident] concerning Tamar” [cf. Gen 34:26]. 4:18 A. M#SH B: Four elders were sitting in the gatehouse of R. Joshua: Eleazar b. Matiah, Hananiah b. Kinai, Simeon b. Azzai, and Simeon the Yemenite, B. and they were busy studying that which R. Aqiba had taught them. [Said to them R. Aqiba]: C. “Why did Judah merit [that] the kingship [be assigned to his tribe]?” D. “Because he confessed [in the incident] concerning Tamar.” E. They themselves added [to the teaching]: ““What wise men have told, and their fathers have not hidden, to whom alone the land was given [and no stranger passed among them” (Job 15:18-19).” F. He [Tarfon] said to them, “And do we reward [people] for [their] transgressions? G. “Why, then, did Judah merit the kingship?” H. [They replied,] “Because he saved his brother [Joseph] from death, 1. “as Scripture states, ‘Then Judah said to his brothers, What profit [is it if we slay our brother and conceal his blood?’” (Gen. 37:26). J. He said to them, “It is sufficient that the rescue atoned for the sale [of their brother into slavery, but it does not merit a reward]. K. “Why, then, did Judah merit the kingship?” L. They said to him, “Because of his humility, M. “as Scripture states, ‘Now therefore, let your servant, I pray you, remain instead of the lad [as a slave to my lord; and let the lad go back with his brothers’ (Gen. 44:33). N. “Saul, too, merited the kingship only because of his humility, 0. “as Scripture states, ‘[Saul said to his servant who was with him, ‘Come, let us go back lest my father cease to care about the asses and become anxious about us’ (I Sam. 9:5). P. “He valued his servant equally with himself. Q. “But Samuel did not speak this way. Rather, [he said], ‘Your father has ceased to care about the asses and is anxious about you, saying, ‘ What shall I do about my son?’ (I Sam. 10:2). R. “[So, too,] when he [Saul] flees from [the mantle of] rulership what does Scripture state? S. “So they inquired again of the Lord, ‘Did the man come hither?’ and

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the Lord said, ‘Behold, he has hidden himself among the baggage’ (I Sam. 10:22).” T. He [Tarfon] said to them, “But he [Judah] served as a surety [for Joseph], and a surety ultimately is freed from his surety [so there is no great merit in this action]. U. “Why, then, did Judah merit the kingship?” V. They said to him, “Teach us, our master.” W. He said to them, “Because he sanctified the name of the Holy One, blessed be He, at the sea. X. “When the tribes came and stood at the sea, this one said, ‘I shall descend [first into the sea],’ and this one said, ‘I shall descend [first into the sea].’ The tribe of Judah took the initiative [lit., jumped] and descended first [into the sea] and [thereby] sanctified the name of God at the sea. Y. “And concerning that hour Scripture states, ‘Save me, O God! For the waters have come up to my neck. I sink in deep mire, where there is no foothold’ (Ps. 69:2-3 [= RSV 69:1—2])...’ Let not the flood sweep over me’ (ibid. 16). And Scripture states, ‘Judah became his sanctuary’ (Ps. 114:2). Judah sanctified the name of God at the sea. Therefore, ‘Israel is his dominion’ (ibid.).”

The two pseudo-narratives, T. Ber. 4:16-17 and the comparable version of T. Ber. 4:18, provide dramatic settings for expositions of propositions out of Scripture. Without the pseudo-narrative details, we have nothing other than exchanges of questions and answers; there is no pretense that the exposition of Judah’s career is intertwined with the narrative thereof. A study of the forms and types of Midrash-compositions will find here an important typification of a commonplace form: fabricated dialogic medium for setting forth an exegetical proposition. We shall encounter several more such dramatizations of discourse in the Tosefta, but I have not made the effort to log all of them into this repertoire, since they do not contribute to our picture of Rabbinic narrative in the Tosefta, only to the revision and formation of a particular rhetorical form of the exegetical sort. Tosefta-tractate Berakhot 5:1 A. “A man should not eat on the eve of the Sabbath from afternoon onwards, B. “so that he should be hungry at the start of the Sabbath,” the words of R. Judah. C. R. Yosé says, “He may continue to eat until it grows dark.” 5:2 A. M#SH B: Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel and R. Judah and R. Yosé were reclining [and eating] in Acre and the Sabbath began. B. Said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel to R. Yosé, “Rabbi, if it is your wish, we shall stop [eating, thus refraining in line with Judah’s opinion, A-B] on

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account of the [beginning of the] Sabbath.” C. He said to him, “Every day you prefer my opinion to Judah’s, and now you prefer Judah’s opinion to mine!? D. “‘Will you also assault the queen in my presence, in my own house’ (Esther 7:8)?” E. He said to him, “If so, then let us not stop, lest the law be established permanently [in accord with our actions].” F. They said [concerning this incident], “They did not move from there before the law was established according to R. Yosé’s [opinion].”

When we move beyond the Halakhah, A-B, to the intrusion, into the exposition, of other-than-Halakhic considerations, C-E, we see how a ma#aseh is transformed from a case/precedent to a narrative. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The issue is not defined by the particularity of the Halakhah, A-C, but by the conduct of the sages in sorting out conflicting rulings. Simeon b. Gamaliel’s courtesy does not obscure the outcome: Yosé insists that the sages conduct themselves in accord with his view, as they ordinarily do. The point of the narrative then is reached in E’s response to CD, and that is reinforced by F. So we have an authentic narrative, since everything coheres only in light of the outcome, E-F. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? As noted, at issue is how the sages’ conduct provides a decisive ruling on the mooted point of law. Yosé’s insistence prevails. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? This is no mere precedent/case but a narrative that addresses an issue of Halakhic procedure—establishing a precedent on a moot point of law— that transcends the case-study altogether. II. Tractate Pe’ah Tosefta-tractate Peah 3:8 A. He who cuts apart [small] bundles [of grain], which he [intends] in the future to bind into sheaves, B. and similarly, small bundles of garlic, or small bundles [containing both garlic and onions [i.e., produce which only later will be bound into full sheaves],

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C. these are not [subject to the restrictions of the forgotten sheaf (M. Peah 6:10B-C), [for they are not yet sheaves]. D. One who binds [his grain into sheaves in order to prevent damage caused by an approaching] fire, or [an overflowing] irrigation ditch— E. these [sheaves that he binds] are not [subject to the restrictions of] the forgotten sheaf, F. because [he intends] in the future to search [for them]. G. M’SH B: A certain righteous man forgot a sheaf in the middle of his field. He said to his son, “Go and offer in my behalf [the following offerings of thanks:] a bullock as a burnt-offering and a bullock as a whole-offering.” H. [His son] said to him, “Father, why do you rejoice [for performing] this commandment [i.e., the forgotten sheaf] more than all other commandments set forth in the Torah?” I. [The father] said to him, “The Omnipresent has given us all of the commandments mentioned in the Torah [such that we perform them intentionally. But this [one commandment] he gave to us [such that we perform it] unintentionally. For if anyone purposely performs [this commandment] before the Omnipresent, [i.e., he purposely left a sheaf in the field, but did not genuinely forget it], he has not performed this command-ment.” J. [He] said to him, “Lo, [Scripture] says, ‘When you reap the harvest of your field, and have forgotten a sheaf in the field, you shall not go back to get it, it shall be for the sojourner, the fatherless, and the widow’ (Deut. 24:19).’ Thus, Scripture sets forth a blessing [for the unintentional performance of the commandment]. K. “Is not the matter to be reasoned a minori ad majus? If one who did not intend to acquire merit [by performing the commandment], but nonetheless did acquire this merit is deemed as one who has acquired merit [by performing it], how much more should he who [in fact] intends to acquire merit [by performing the commandment], and does acquire this merit [be deemed to have acquired merit]! L. “Similarly, [Scripture states], ‘If anyone sins, doing any of the things which the Lord has commanded not to be done, though he does not know it, yet he is guilty and shall bear his iniquity. He shall bring to the priest a ram without blemish out of the flock, valued by you at a price of a guilt-offering, and the priest shall make atonement for him for the error which he commit-ted unintentionally, and he shall be forgiven’ (Lev. 5:17-18). M. “Is not this matter [also] to be reasoned a minori ad majus? If someone who did not intend to transgress, yet in fact does transgress is deemed to have sinned, how much more should he who intends to transgress and then does transgress [be deemed guilty of sinning]!”

The Halakhic setting, A-F, is null; at issue there is the sheaves that do not qualify as forgotten. But the point of the dramatized exposition, G-M, is the opposite: the farmer has forgotten a sheaf in the middle of his field, and it is certainly subject to the law. The point of the exposition is expressed in I, with a secondary

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development, J-M. The described action, G, then is amply accounted for, I-M, but the passage gains coherence through the proposition that is abundantly articulated: intentionality is set aside in this one commandment, which makes it unique. We should not ignore the eloquence of the exposition, its theological focus. But in no way can we classify the composition as a narrative; it is a dramatized exposition. Tosefta-tractate Peah 4:18 A. M#SH B: Monobases the king [of Adiabene] went and gave [to the poor [all of] his treasures during years of famine. B. His brothers sent [the following message] to him: C. “Your ancestors stored up treasures and increased the wealth [left for them by] their ancestors. But you went and gave away all of these treasures, both your own and those of your ancestors!” D. He replied to them, “My ancestors stored up treasures for this lower [world], but I [through giving charity] have stored up treasures for [the heavenly world] above, as it is stated [in Scripture], ‘Faithfulness will spring up from the ground below, and righteousness will look down from the sky’ (Ps. 85:11). E. “My ancestors stored up treasures [for the material world], where the [human] hand can reach, but I have stored up treasures [for the non-material world], where the [human] hand cannot reach, as it is stated [in Scripture], Righteousness] and justice are the foundation of your throne, steadfast love and faithfulness go before you” (Ps. 89:14). F. “My ancestors stored up treasures [of a type] that produce no [real] benefits but I have stored up treasures [of the sort that do produce benefits, as it is stated [in Scripture], ‘Tell the righteous that it shall be well with them, for they shall reap the benefits of their deeds.’ G. “My ancestors stored up treasures of money, but I have stored up treasures of souls as it is stated [in Scripture], ‘The fruit of the righteous is a tree of life, and a wise man saves the poor people’ (Prov. 11:30). H. “My ancestors stored up treasures [that eventually, after their deaths, would benefit only] others, but I have stored up treasures [that will benefit] myself [both in life and in death], as it is stated [in Scripture], It shall be a righteousness ]to you before the Lord your God (Deut. I. “My ancestors stored up treasures in this world, but I have stored up treasures for myself in the world-to-come, as it is stated [in Scripture] ‘Your righteousness shall go before you, land the glory of the Lord shall be your rear-guard]’ (Is. 58:8).”

Like the foregoing, the action, A, precipitates an exchange that fully exposes what is at stake in providing food for the poor. This in no way qualifies as a narrative, and the setting is dramatically rather thin even as a pseudo-narrative.

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Tosefta-tractate Dema#i 3:14 A. He who sends [produce], whether to an #am ha’ares or to a haber, must tithe [it before shipping it, so taking responsibility for the conduct of the other]. B. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “[If he sends] to an #am ha’ares, he must tithe. C. “[If he sends] to a haber, he must inform him [as to its status, whether tithed or not; the other will take responsibility properly to tithe]” [cf. M. Dem. 3:3E-G]. D. Said R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, “M#SH S: R. Yosé the student of Rabbi [Judah the Patriarch] sent me a large citron from Sepphoris and he said, ‘This came to me from Caesarea,’ E. “and I learned from [this remark] three things: F. “(1) First, that it was certainly untithed, G.“(2) and it was unclean, H.“(3) and that he had in his possession only this one, I. “for had he had in his possession another one, he would have separated tithes from it for this one.”

The law, A, B-C, is not exactly illustrated by Simeon’s case, D-I, which spells out an example of how the information as to status is conveyed. But the case/precedent, rather than illustrate the particular law, presents a conundrum for solution: if such and such is said or done, what is to be learned from the remark? How the lessons are derived from the incident is not articulated, except at H-I. Tosefta-tractate Dema#i 5:24 V. R. Simeon says, “[There are] three enactments with respect to Dema’i. W. “M#SH S: Our rabbis entered Samaritan towns along the road. They [Samaritans] brought vegetables before them. X. “R. Aqiba hastened to tithe them as certainly untithed produce. Y. “Said to him R. Gamaliel, ‘How are you so bold as to transgress the words of your colleagues, Z. “‘or who gave you permission to tithe?’ AA. “He [Aqiba] said to him, ‘And have I [thus] established a law in Israel [i.e., set a precedent]?’ BB. “‘I have [merely] tithed my own vegetables.’ CC. “He [Gamaliel] said to him, ‘Know that you have established a law in Israel by tithing your own vegetables.’ DD. “And when R. Gamaliel came among them [Samaritans], he declared their grain and their pulse to be Dema’i, and the rest of their produce to be certainly untithed. EE. “And when R. Simeon b. Gamaliel came back among them, he saw

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that matters were in disarray, and they declared all of their produce to be certainly untithed.”

The three enactments are X, Aqiba’s view that the produce of Samaritans is not tithed at all, Gamaliel’s view, DD, that it is partially tithed, and Simeon b. Gamaliel’s view, restoring Aqiba’s ruling. In that context, the pseudo-narrative provides a setting for a review of the Halakhic positions in sequence, first this, then that, finally the other, that is, three enactments in sequence, but no climax that imposes sense and coherence on the prior components of the composition. IV. Tractate Kilayim Tosefta-tractate Kilayim 1:3 A. In the district of Ariah they used to graft apple [-buds] onto Syrian pear [-trees] [cf. M. Kil. 1:4D(I)]. B. A certain student [once] found them [performing this grafting]. C. He said to them, “You are forbidden [to do this].” D. They went and cut them [i.e., the buds] off. E. And they came and inquired at Yavneh. F. They [i.e., the sages] said, “Well did that student say.” 1:4 G. In the irrigated fields of Sepphoris they used to graft crustaminum pear [-buds] onto pear [-trees] [cf. M. Kil. 1:4B(I)]. H. A certain student [once] found them [performing this grafting]. I. He said to them, “You are forbidden [to do this].” J. They went and cut them [i.e., the buds] off. K. And they came and inquired at Yavneh. L. They [i.e., the sages] said, “Whoever met you was none other than [one] of the students of the House of Shammai.”

The matched recorded rulings, B-C+D-F, H-I+J-L, record incidents but do not qualify as narratives in any way I can perceive. V. Tractate Shebi #it Tosefta-tractate Shebi#it 4:4 A. When is one permitted to buy arum in the year following the seventh year under any circumstances [i.e., even if the seller is suspected of not observing the laws of the seventh year]? B. R. Judah says, “Immediately” [M. Sheb. 5:5A-B]. C. R. Judah says, “M#SH B: We were in Ein Kusi and we ate arum at the conclusion of the Festival [Sukkot] in the year following the seventh year on the authority of R. Tarfon.”

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D. R. Yosé said to him, “Is that the evidence [for your ruling]? I was with you, and it happened after Passover!”

The alleged precedent for B at C is challenged at D. I do not see traits of narrative logic here. Tosefta-tractate Shebi#it 5:2 A. Heave-offering may not be imported from another country into the Land of Israel [M. Sheb. 6:6]. B. Said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, “In Acre I once saw Simeon b Kahana drinking wine in the status of heave-offering. C. “When he said, ‘This [wine] comes from Cilicia,’ they required him to drink [the wine] in a boat [i.e., he was not permitted to bring the produce into the Land of Israel].”

B-C illustrate A; lacking the signal, ma#aseh, the composition conforms in function and characteristic to the precedent/case of the Mishnah. VI. Tractate Terumot Tosefta-tractate Terumot 1:1 A. R. Judah says, “A deaf-mute who separated heave-offering—that which he has separated is [valid] heave-offering” [vs. M. Ter. 1:1A]. B. Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: The sons of R. Yohanan b. Gudgada were deafmutes, and in Jerusalem all of the foods requiring preparation in purity were prepared under their supervision.” C. They said to him, “Is that proof [that a deaf-mute may separate heaveofferings]? For foods requiring preparation in purity do not require [preparation with] intention and [therefore] may be prepared under the supervision of a deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor. [But] heave-offering and tithes require [separation with] intention [and therefore may not be separated by such individuals].” D. R. Isaac says in the name of R. Eleazar, “That which has been separated as heave-offering by a deaf-mute does not enter the status of unconse-crated food [even though it is not valid heave-offering] because it is a matter of doubt whether or not he has understanding.”

The precedent/case invoked by Judah, B, in illustration of his ruling, A, is rejected C as not pertinent. Tosefta-tractate Terumot 1:15 A. A gentile who separated heave-offering from [the produce of1 an Israelite, even with permission—that which he has separated is not valid heave-offering [M. Ter. 1:1E-G]. B. M#SH B: In Pegah an Israelite said to a gentile, “Separate the [requisite] heave-offering from [the produce of my threshing-floor,” and he separated

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it, and [afterwards] the heave-offering fell back [into the unconsecrated food still] on the threshing floor. C. The case came before Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel [for judgement], and he ruled, “Since a gentile separated the heave-offering [as an agent], it is not [valid] heave-offering [which was mixed with the produce on the threshing-floor. Therefore all of the produce remains in an untithed, unconsecrated status].” D. R. Isaac says, “A gentile who separated heave-offering from [the produce of] an Israelite, and the owners validated [it] at his side—that which he has separated is [valid] heave-offering.”

The case, B-C, illustrates the law, A. Tosefta-tractate Terumot 2:13 P. But R. Judah says, “A gentile’s vineyard in Syria is not subject to the laws of the fourth year.” Q. But sages say, “It is subject to the laws of the fourth year” [M. Ter. 3:9C-D]. R. Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: Segabion the head of the synagogue at Akhzib purchased a vineyard in its fourth year [of growth] from a gentile in Syria, and gave him payment. S. “Then he came and asked Rabban Gamaliel, who was passing from place to place [whether the produce of that field is liable to the restriction of the fourth year and should not have been purchased]. T. “He [Gamaliel] said to him, ‘Wait until we can dwell upon the law.’” [Since the story does not conclude with Gamaliel’s passing judgment, Judah assumes that the field was not held liable to the law of the fourth year.] U. The [sages] said to him [i.e., to Judah], “Is that evidence? He [Gamaliel] also sent a messenger to him [i.e., to Segabion] secretly [so as not to embarrass him, and said,] “That which you have done is done, but do not do it again.” [From this it is obvious that Gamaliel held the field to be liable to the restrictions of the fourth year.]

Judah’s case, R-T, supplies a precedent for Judah’s rule, P. Tosefta-tractate Terumot 3:4 A. R. Judah says, (I) “A man measures [the volume of] his untithed produce and brings it into his house, provided that he does not separate heave-offering according to a [fixed] measurement. (2) “A man weighs his untithed produce and brings it into his house, provided that he does not separate heave-offering according to [a fixed] weight (3) “A man counts his untithed produce and brings it into his house, provided that he does not separate heave-offering according to a [fixed] count” [cf. M. Ter. 1:7A-B]. B. R. Yosé b. R. Judah says, (1) “[He does] not [separate heave-offering] according to a measure [of volume], nor from that which has been measured; (2) “not according to weight, nor from that which has been weighed;

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(3) “not according to a count, nor from that which has been counted” [vs. M. Ter. 1:7A-B]. C. They said to him, “M#SH W: We were gathering figs behind your father, and he said to us, ‘Count them.”’ D. Said R. Simeon b. Eleazar, “M#SH B: A certain old man in Ardascus would weigh his basket when it was full and then weigh it again when it was empty [in order to ascertain the exact weight of his produce] and R. Meir would praise him.”

The first ma#aseh, C, supports Judah’s ruling, A3, and the second, D, supports A2. VII. Tractate Ma#aserot Tosefta-tractate Ma#aserot 2:1 A. Ass-drivers and householders who were traveling from place to place B. eat untithed produce in their possession and are exempt [from tithing it] C. until they reach the specific place [they have in mind] [cf. M. Ma. 2:3A-E]. D. Therefore, if a householder [at whose dwelling they arrive] designates a specific lodging-place for them— E. if they spend the night there, they are required to tithe [untithed produce in their possessions before eating it], F. and if not, they are exempt from tithing. G. M#SH: R. Joshua went to visit Rabban Yohanan b. Zakkai at Beror Hayil, and the townspeople brought figs out to them. They [i.e., those in Joshua’s party] said to him, “Must we tithe [the figs]?” H. He said to them, “If we are going to spend the night [here], [we are] required to tithe, and if not, [we] are exempt from tithing.”

The ma#aseh, G-H, illustrates E. VIII. Tractate Ma#aser Sheni Tosefta-tractate Ma#aser Sheni 5:15 A. When the Temple was destroyed, the first court said nothing about it [i.e., about changing the law requiring that fruit grown during the fourth year of a vineyard’s growth be brought to Jerusalem]. B. The later court decreed that this [fruit] be redeemed [even if grown close to the city wall of Jerusalem] [M. M.S. 5:2D]. 5:16 C. M#SH B: R. Eliezer owned a vineyard on the border of Kefar Tabri to the east of Lod and did not want to redeem [the yield of the vines’ fourth year of growth, but wanted to keep the produce itself until the time of removal when he would have to destroy it].

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D. His disciples said to him, “Rabbi, since [the court] decreed that this [fruit] is redeemed even if grown close to the city wall [of Jerusalem], you must redeem it.” E. R. Eliezer immediately harvested [the grapes] and redeemed them. F. And [as regards the fruit of] all other trees, [the law that governs] the yield of the tree’s fourth year [of growth] is like [the law] of second tithe.

The ma#aseh, C-E, shows the workings of the Halakhic ruling, B. IX. Tractate Hallah: no narratives X. Tractate #Orlah: no narratives XI. Tractate Bikkurim: no narratives XII. Summary Here are the pseudo-narratives that we have noted in this division: a. Standard Ma#asim/Cases/Precedents 1. Tosefta-tractate Berakhot 1:4: M#SH b: R. Ishmael and R. Eleazar ben Azariah were staying in the same place. R. Ishmael was reclining and R. Eleazar ben Azariah was standing upright. When the time came to recite the Shema#. R. Ishmael arose and R. Eleazar ben Azariah reclined. 2. Tosefta-tractate Berakhot 2:11: M#SH S: Our masters interrupted [a eulogy] to recite the Shema# and the Prayer. 3. Tosefta-tractate Berakhot 2:13: Said R. Meir, “Once we were sitting in the house of study before R. Aqiba, and we were reciting the Shema# to ourselves [inaudibly] because of a quaestor [Roman detective] was standing at the doorway.” 4. Tosefta-tractate Dema#i 3:14: Said R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, “M#SH S: R. Yosé the student of Rabbi [Judah the Patriarch] sent me a large citron from Sepphoris and he said, ‘This came to me from Caesarea,’ and I learned from [this remark] three things”. 5. Tosefta-tractate Dema#i 5:24: R. Simeon says, “[There are] three enactments with respect to Dema#i. M#SH S: Our rabbis entered Samaritan towns along the road. They [Samaritans] brought vegetables before them. 6. Tosefta-tractate Kilayim 1:3: In the district of Ariah they used to graft apple [-buds] onto Syrian pear [-trees] [cf. M. Kil. 1:4D(I)]. A certain student [once] found them [performing this grafting]. He said to them,

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chapter nine “You are forbidden [to do this].” They went and cut them [i.e., the buds] off. And they came and inquired at Yavneh. They [i.e., the sages] said, “Well did that student say.” Tosefta-tractate Shebi#it 4:4: R. Judah says, “M#SH B: We were in Ein Kusi and we ate arum at the conclusion of the Festival [Sukkot] in the year following the seventh year on the authority of R. Tarfon.” Tosefta-tractate Shebi#it 5:2: Said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, “In Acre I once saw Simeon b Kahana drinking wine in the status of heaveoffering. Tosefta-tractate Terumot 1:1: Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: The sons of R. Yohanan b. Gudgada were deaf-mutes, and in Jerusalem all of the foods requiring preparation in purity were prepared under their supervision.” Tosefta-tractate Terumot 1:15: M#SH B: In Pegah an Israelite said to a gentile, “Separate the [requisite] heave-offering from [the produce of my threshing-floor,” and he separated it, and [afterwards] the heaveoffering fell back [into the unconsecrated food still] on the threshing floor. The case came before Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel [for judgement], and he ruled, “Since a gentile separated the heave-offering [as an agent], it is not [valid] heave-offering [which was mixed with the produce on the threshing-floor. Therefore all of the produce remains in an untithed, unconsecrated status].” Tosefta-tractate Terumot 2:13: Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: Segabion the head of the synagogue at Akhzib purchased a vineyard in its fourth year [of growth] from a gentile in Syria, and gave him payment. Tosefta-tractate Terumot 3:4: M#SH W: We were gathering figs behind your father, and he said to us, ‘Count them.”’ Said R. Simeon b. Eleazar, “M#SH B: A certain old man in Ardascus would weigh his basket when it was full and then weigh it again when it was empty [in order to ascertain the exact weight of his produce] and R. Meir would praise him.” Tosefta-tractate Ma#aserot 2:1: M#SH: R. Joshua went to visit Rabban Yohanan b. Zakkai at Beror Hayil, and the townspeople brought figs out to them. They [i.e., those in Joshua’s party] said to him, “Must we tithe [the figs]?” Tosefta-tractate Ma#aser Sheni 5:15: M#SH B: R. Eliezer owned a vineyard on the border of Kefar Tabri to the east of Lod and did not want to redeem [the yield of the vines’ fourth year of growth, but wanted to keep the produce itself until the time of removal when he would have to destroy it].

b. Narrative Settings for the Exposition of Propositions 1. Tosefta-tractate Berakhot 4:16-18: R. Tarfon was sitting in the shade of a dovecote on a Sabbath afternoon. They [the attendants] brought before him a pail of cool water. He said to his students, “One who drinks water to quench his thirst—what benediction does he recite?”… “Why

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did Judah merit [that] the kingship [be assigned to his tribe]?” 2. Tosefta-tractate Peah 3:8: M#SH B: A certain righteous man forgot a sheaf in the middle of his field. He said to his son, “Go and offer in my behalf [the following offerings of thanks:] a bullock as a burnt-offering and a bullock as a whole-offering.” [His son] said to him, “Father, why do you rejoice [for performing] this commandment [i.e., the forgotten sheaf] more than all other commandments set forth in the Torah?” 3. Tosefta-tractate Peah 4:18: M#SH B: Monobases the king [of Adiabene] went and gave [to the poor [all of] his treasures during years of famine. His brothers sent [the following message] to him:

Here are the authentic narratives that we have identified in the present division of the Tosefta: 1. Tosefta-tractate Berakhot 4:15: Rabban Gamaliel and the elders were seated at table in Jericho. They [attendants] brought before them dates [after they had finished the meal] and they ate them. R. Aqiba precipitously recited one [blessing] after [eating] them. Said to him Rabban Gamaliel, “Aqiba, why do you poke your head into disputes?” 2. Tosefta-tractate Berakhot 5:2: M#SH B: Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel and R. Judah and R. Yosé were reclining [and eating] in Acre and the Sabbath began. Said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel to R. Yosé, “Rabbi, if it is your wish, we shall stop [eating, thus refraining in line with Judah’s opinion] on account of the [beginning of the] Sabbath.”

T. Ber. 4:15 shows us how a ma#aseh shades over into an authentic narrative and clearly distinguishes itself from the ma#aseh that serves as a case/precedent in a narrowly-Halakhic framework. T. Ber. 5:2 shows the same pattern. What is the upshot? The results show continuity with the Mishnah and the development, from the Mishnah, of a secondary form of the ma’aseh/precedent/case. Just as the Tosefta both carries forward, in a dependent relationship, the Mishnah’s materials, but also develops and even initiates, so when it comes to the ma#aseh, we find both more representations of the Mishnah’s form and type—every item indistinguishable from what we find in the Mishnah—and two new developments. Of the nineteen entries, fourteen are the familiar ma#aseh, well-documented in form and type in the Mishnah. Three are not narratives by the governing criterion of this study. More to the point, the authentic narratives—those two that cross the boundaries of Halakhic exposition pure and simple—represent a development of the ma#aseh as defined by the Mishnah. These items are not interchangeable with their Mishnaic and other-

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Toseftan Halakhic-narrative counterparts, the standard or revised ma#aseh. Were we to encounter items such as these, we should not regard them as interchangeable with those of the Mishnah. The narrowly-Halakhic ma#asim of the Tosefta, by contrast, indeed are formally interchangeable with those of the Mishnah. The three dialogic-dramatizations of expositions of theology or of the meaning of Scripture do not qualify as narratives and do not present us with non-documentary writing. Now, on the basis of the surveyed narratives, let me respond to the questions that animate this survey, those that focus on the non-documentary character of the narrative in the canonical documents of Rabbinic Judaism: 1. Do anomalous or asymmetric compositions or composites attest to thought that takes place beyond the limits of the documents subject to the rules and symmetry of the canon? The two authentic narratives—secondary expansions of Halakhic expositions—by definition fall wholly within the Halakhic framework; what marks them as distinct is their shading over into issues not particular to the Halakhic context. In that regard, the appeal to the authority of the patriarchal house (Gamaliel, Simeon, Hillel, Judah the Patriarch) and the preservation of the actions of that house as suitable precedents in the definition of the Halakhah do represent one Sitz-im-Leben for the precedent-form—but only in the indicated instances. That pronounced tendency is noteworthy, but does not pertain to our inquiry. 2. Does non-documentary writing exhibit readily-discernible patterns of form and meaning as does documentary writing? If so, what are these patterns and how are we to classify and to interpret them? The two identified items may be characterized as ma#aseh plus, that is, they represent the secondary development of the established and entirely familiar ma#aseh-form of the Mishnah. 3. At what point in the process that yielded the canonical writings as we know them did documentary considerations intervene, and what is the meaning of that intervention? When and under what circumstances did documentary considerations give way to writing utterly indifferent to its documentary venue? The sample before us does not sustain a response to this question, because the two anomalous entries are integral to the documentary formulation of the Halakhah in context. Stated simply: this question does not apply. The main point to be drawn from the evidence at hand is

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simple. Narratives, the single most important non-documentary writing in the Rabbinic canon, fit well into the documentary framework. That is shown both when we compare the Mishnah’s repertoire to the Tosefta’s, and when we consider the substance of the composition. The narratives and pseudo-narratives in no case contain some exotic perspective or deliver some anomalous message (except for those involving the patriarchal house, and they too fall entirely within the Halakhic boundaries). Any notion that the non-documentary writing within the documents opens the door to some other world than that of the normative sages finds no support in these results. From the viewpoint of the documentary hypothesis, this is how matters should emerge. And so, viewed within the sample at hand, admittedly a tiny one, they do.

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CHAPTER TEN

TOSEFTA SEDER MOED Now, as we shall see, the marker, ma#aseh, covers a diverse lot of compositions. I. Tractate Shabbat Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 1:12-13 1:12 A. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “Children prepare their chapters on Sabbath nights with the light of a lamp.” 1:13 A. Said R. Ishmael, “One time I read by the light of a lamp, and [forgetfully,] I wanted to tilt it [to get more oil on the wick]. B. “I said, ‘How great are the words of sages, who rule, ‘They do not read on Sabbath nights by the light of a lamp.’” C. R. Nathan says, “He [Ishmael] most certainly did tilt it. D. “And written on his notebook is the following: #Ishmael b. Elisha tilted a lamp on the Sabbath. E. “‘When the sanctuary will be rebuilt, he will bring a sin-offering.”’

I do not see how this item responds to the teleological logic that marks narrative. The snippet is a reminiscence, not a case/precedent, let alone a fully articulated narrative-story. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 2:4 A. They kindle [the Sabbath light] with the oil of colocynth and with naphtha. B. R. Simeon Shezuri says, “They kindle [the Sabbath light] with fishoil and with tar.” C. Sumkhos says, “With anything which exudes from flesh they do not kindle [the Sabbath lamp] except for the fish-oil” [M. Shab. 2:2E3]. D. R. Simeon b. Eleazar says, “Whatever exudes from a tree is not subject to the rule concerning a piece of cloth three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths; E. “they make use of it for sekhakh [covering for a Sukkah], F. “except for flax.” G. [If] one wrapped something with which they kindle [the Sabbath light] around something with which they do not kindle the Sabbath light, they do not kindle [the Sabbath light] therewith.

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H. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “The members of father’s house would wrap flax around a nut and would kindle [the Sabbath light] with it.” 2:5 A. Said R. Judah, “When we were staying in the upper room of Nitze’s house in Lud, they would pierce an egg-shell and fill it with oil and put it over the mouth of a lamp on the eve of the Sabbath at dusk, B. “so that it would continue to burn throughout the Sabbath night. C. “And elders were there, and not one of them said a thing” [M. Shab. 2:4A-C].

These, though lacking the usual marker, are two standard ma#asim/ precedents/cases, . 2:4H, T. 2:5A-C. The difference is, at T. 2:4H, there is no formal ruling; it is taken for granted that what was done in the patriarch’s house is normative; no confirmation by sages is called for. T. 2:5A-B corresponds, but T. 2:5C has no counterpart in the first of the two cases. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 3:3 A. A bath, the holes of which one stopped up on the eve of the Sabbath [to preserve the steam]— B. at the end of the Sabbath one may wash therein forthwith. C. [If] one stopped up the openings on the eve of the festival, one may go in on the festival itself and perspire, then go out and take a bath in cold water. D. Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: [In the case of] the bath of Bene Beraq they stopped up the openings on the eve of the festival. E. “And R. Aqiba and R. Eleazar b. #Azariah went in and perspired therein, then went out and took a bath in cold water. F. “But the hot water thereof was covered over with boards. G. “When transgressors became numerous, then went and prohibited the practice.”

The example of the sages, E, serves as a precedent to illustrate the law, A-C. The divergence from the standard ma#aseh form of the Mishnah is self-evident. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 3:4 A. “[On the Sabbath] they do not rinse the whole body either in hot water or in cold water,” the words of R. Meir. B. And R. Simeon permits [doing so]. C. R. Judah says, “[They may do so] in cold water, but not in hot water.” D. Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: In the case of Baitos b. Zonen they filled a dipper of cold water for him on the eve of the Sabbath and poured it on him on the Sabbath, so as to cool him off.”

The precedent illustrates the law, C. Here again, no sages’ ruling is then recorded.

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Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 5:11 A. Runners go out with their scarves [on their shoulders]. B. And they did not state this rule for runners alone, but any person [may do so]. C. But sages speak in terms of prevailing conditions [cf. M. Shab. 6:6, 9]. 5:12 A. Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: Hyrcanus, the son of R. Eliezer, went out in his scarf to the public domain. B. “But a thread was tied around his finger.” C. Sages said, “It was not necessary [for him to take that precaution].”

Here is yet another precedent/case, also lacking a sages’ ruling. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 5:13 A. Shepherds go out with their sackcloths. B. And they did not state this rule for the shepherds alone, but any person [may do so]. C. But sages speak in terms of prevailing conditions. D. Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: R. Tarfon went forth on Friday nights to the school-house, and they gave him a cloth, and he held on to it with both hands and went out in it to keep off the rain.”

The case, D, illustrates the law, C. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 7:16 A. They lead wine and oil through pipes before grooms and brides, B. and this is not deemed [prohibited as] one of “the ways of the Amorites.” C. M#SH B: Judah and Hillel, sons of Rabban Gamaliel, came to the town of Kabul. The people of the town led wine and oil through them in pipes [as a sign of honor].

The case, C, illustrates the rule, A. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 7:(17)18 A. They mark the death of kings by burning a pyre, and this is not deemed [prohibited as] one of “the ways of the Amorites,” B. since it says, “But you shall die in peace, and with the burnings of your fathers… so shall they burn for you” (Jer. 34:5). C. Just as they mark the death of kings by burning a pyre, so they mark the death of patriarchs by burning a pyre, D. but [they do not do so] not for ordinary folk. E. And what is it that they burn on the pyre on his account? F. His bed and the things he would use. G. M#SH S: Rabban Gamaliel the elder died, and Onqelos, the proselyte, burned a pyre for him of a value of more than seventy minahs.

G illustrates A. The ma#aseh lacks a ruling and is a one-time case;

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it exemplifies nothing beyond itself, the conduct with the patriarch being a unique instance. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 13:2 A. If they were written in translation into Aramaic [Targum] or in any language, they save them, and they put them into storage. B. Said R. Yosé, “‘M#SH S: R. Halafta went to Rabban Gamaliel in Tiberias and found him seated at the table of Yohanan b. Nezif. In his hand was the Scroll of Job in Targum, which he was reading. C. “Said to him R. Halafta, ‘I recall concerning Rabban Gamaliel the Elder, your grandfather, that he was sitting on the staircase going up to the Temple mount. They brought before him a Scroll of Job in Targum and he instructed his sons, ‘Put it away in storage under the course of stones.’ 13:3 A. “At that moment Rabban Gamaliel gave instructions to put it away in storage.” B. R. Yosé b. R. Judah says, “A mortar-trough he turned over on it.” C. Rabbi says, “There are two replies to this allegation: First, there was no mortar on the Temple mount. Second, Do they willfully and deliberately destroy such scrolls? D. “[But the practice is to] leave them in a neglected place and they rot on their own.”

The ma#aseh, T. Shab. 13:2B-C, 13:3A, serves as an illustration of the Halakhah, A. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 13:4 A. [If] they were written in paint, red ink, gum-ink, or calcanthum, they save them and store them away. B. As to scrolls containing blessings [e.g., amulets], even though they include the letters of the Divine Name and many citations of the Torah, they do not save them, but they are allowed to burn where they are. C. On this basis they have stated, “Those who write blessings are as if they burn the Torah.” D. M#SH B: A certain person would write blessings, and they told R Ishmael about him. R. Ishmael went to examine him. When he [Ishmael] was climbing the ladder, he [the writer] sensed his coming. He took the sheaf of blessings and put it into a dish of water. E. And in accord with the following statement did R. Ishmael address him, “The punishment for the latter deed is harder than that for the former.”

The ma#aseh illustrates the judgment, C, because it shows how in concrete terms how that is the case, but with water rather than with fire.

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Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 13:9 A. A gentile who came to put out a fire—they do not say to him, “Put it out,” or, “Do not put it out” [M. Shab. 16:6A-B]. B. M#SH A fire broke out in the courtyard of Joseph b. Simai of Sihin. The soldiers of the detachment in Sepphoris came to put it out, but he did not let them do so. A rain-cloud burst and put it out. C. Sages said, “It was not necessary [to behave in such a way].” D. Even so, after the Sabbath he sent each one of them a sela, and to their commander he sent fifty denars.

The ma#aseh shows what is not to be done: They do not give instructions at all. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 13:14 13:14 A. A boat coming from the sea—they do not disembark from it onto dry land [on the Sabbath], unless it lay within the Sabbath limit before dark. B. M#SH B: Rabban Gamaliel and elders were coming along in a ship and the [Sabbath] day became sanctified. C. They said to Rabban Gamaliel, “Is it all right for us to disembark?” D. He said to them, “I was taking note, and we were within the Sabbath limit before dark, but the boat went off course many times.” E. At that moment a gentile made a gangplank to disembark on it. F. They said to him, “May we disembark on it?” G. He said to them, “Since he did not make it in our presence [and therefore for our need], we are permitted to disembark by it,” so the elders embarked by it [M. Shab. 16:8H].

What we have is a precedent, B-D, for A: a case of a boat’s being within the Sabbath limit before dark. The next component of the ma#aseh, E-G, raises a separate Halakhic question but is integral to the expounded law. I cannot point to counterpart complexes in the Mishnah’s repertoire of ma#asim. It is not common for ma#aseh to signal a composite of related, but distinct cases/ precedents. Ordinarily, the form signaled by ma#aseh in Halakhic contexts, the Mishnah and the Tosefta, is a simple declarative sentence, such and such was done and…. The device of tacking on a cognate but distinct rule is rarely utilized. I do not log in the distinct precedent/case as a separate entry, even though its Halakhic principle is unrelated to the one that governs in the primary case/precedent, to which it is attached. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 15:8 A. “[If a woman] was married to a first husband who died, to a second who died, to a third she should not be wed,” the words of Rabbi.

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B. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “To a third she may be married, but to a fourth she should not be married.” C. [If] she produces males and they were circumcised and died—if the first was circumcised and died, the second and he died, the third may be circumcised, but the fourth should not be circumcised. D. M#SH B: Four sisters in Sepphoris: the son of the first was circumcised and died, the second, and he died, the third, and he died. The case came before sages, who ruled, “The fourth should not be circumcised.” E. Said R. Nathan, “When I was in Caesarea Mazaca in Cappadocia, there was one woman there who produced male children, who were circumcised and died. She circumcised the first and he died, the second, and he died. The third did she bring before me. F. “I examined him and saw that he was jaundiced. I looked at him, and I did not find even a drop of blood of circumcision. G. “They said to me, ‘Now what is the rule as to circumcising him?’ H. “I said to them, ‘Wait on him until blood enters into him.’ I. “They waited on him and circumcised him and he lived, and they called him, ‘Nathan the Babylonian,’ in my name.”

The two ma#asim, D, E-I, illustrate the same point of law, T. Shab. 15:8 C. Nathan’s statement is not necessary to accomplish the task of D, which it simply illustrates. Here is, then, another instance in which the Halakhic case/precedent is amplified and particularized; then it is not a case/precedent, but the personal testimony of a particular authority about a singular situation, tacked on to a generalized illustration of the law.

II. Tractate Erubin Tosefta-tractate Erubin 1:2 A. An alley-entry which has the shape of a doorway, even though it is wider than ten cubits, lo, it is not necessary to diminish it [M. Erub. I:ID]. B. R. Eliezer says, “The validation of an alley-entry is through sideposts” [cf. M. Erub. 1:2D]. C. M#SH B: R. Eliezer went to Joseph b. Peredah in Ublin. D. And he saw that he had an alley-entry with only a single sidepost. E. He said to him, “Make a second for it.” F. He said to him, “Do you instruct me to close it up?” G. He said to him, “Let it be closed up. On what basis do you spend the Sabbath in such wise [with an alley-entry having only a single sidepost]!”

The ma#aseh illustrates Eliezer’s position, B. It is certainly more

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elaborate than the usual case/precedent signaled by the marker, ma#aseh. Tosefta-tractate Erubin 3:17 E. This is the meaning of that which they have said: “ The poor man makes an #erub with his feet” [M. Erub.4:9A- B]. F. “All the same are the rich man and the poor man, G. “on condition that he should not go forth from town and say, ‘My place of Sabbath residence is in my place.’ H. “For they have permitted this procedure [M. Erub. 4:7-8] only for one who is going on a journey,” the words of R. Meir. I. R. Judah says, “All the same are the poor man and the rich man [M. Erub. 4:9D]. J. “He who goes forth from his town and said, ‘My place of Sabbath residence is where I am standing’—this is the very principle of the #erub. K. “But they permitted a householder to send his #erub with his son, slave, or agent, to make things easier for him.” L. Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: In the household of Mammal and in the household of Gurion in Rome, they would hand out dried figs to the poor in time of famine. M. “And the poor people of Shihin went out and made an #erub with their feet, so they could go into the other town and eat the figs once it got dark.”

The ma#aseh illustrates Judah’s opinion. Tosefta-tractate Erubin 4:16 J. [If one was going along and measuring, and someone came along to him and says, “Up to here is the Sabbath line,” [this informant] is believed. K. M#SH B: An old shepherd came before Rabbi and said to him, “I recall that the townsfolk of Migdal Geder would go down to Hammata, up to the outermost courtyard near the bridge.” L. And Rabbi permitted the townsfolk of Migdal to go down to Hammata up to the outermost courtyard, by the bridge. M. And Rabbi further permitted the townsfolk of Geder to go down to Hammata and to go up to Geder. N. But the townsfolk of Hammata did not go up to Geder.

The ma#aseh K-L, M-N, functions as a case/precedent and admirably illustrates J. Tosefta-tractate Erubin 5:6 -7 A. He who has five courtyards in a single town, B. if he made regular use of all of them, C. lo, this one prohibits all of them [if he failed to join in the #erub in the courtyards (M. Erub. 6:1)]. D. And if not, he prohibits only the place of his usual dwelling alone.

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5:7 A. Said Rabbi, “M#SH B: Ben Napha had five courtyards in Usha. And he prohibited only the place where he usually lived—that alone.”

T. 5:7A-B illustrates T. 5:6D. Tosefta-tractate Erubin 5:24 G. Utensils which were left for the Sabbath in the courtyard may be carried about in the courtyard. H. Those which [were left for the Sabbath] in the alleyway are prohibited. I. And R. Simeon permits. J. For so did R. Simeon say, “It is permitted to bring something in and to take something out from an alleyway to the courtyard, and from the courtyard to the roof, and from the roof to the shed. K. “For so long as they forgot and did not prepare a common #erub, all of them consist of a single domain.” L. Said Rabbi, “When I was studying Torah with R. Simeon in Teqo#a, we used to bring oil in an unguent from the courtyard to the roof, and from the roof to the shed, and from one shed to another shed, until we reached the spring. M. “And there we would wash ourselves [using the oil we had carried].” N. Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: In the time of the danger, we would bring a scroll of the Torah from the courtyard up to the roof, and from one roof to another, where we would read in the scroll.” O. They said to him, “One may not adduce proof from what was done in the time of the danger.”

Simeon’s position, J, is illustrated by L-M, N, though N at O is dismissed as a special case. Tosefta-tractate Erubin 6:1-2 A. The effecting of a partnership in an alleyway—how [do people prepare it] [M. Erub. 7:6A]? B. A man sets down a jar of wine, oil, grain, dried figs, or olives, C. whether belonging to him or to his fellow, D. and says, “Lo, this belongs to all the residents of the alleyway” [M. Erub. 7:6B]. E. [If that which was set down] belonged to them, he does not have to make an act of acquisition [in their behalf, since it already belongs to them]. F. [If that which he set down] was his, he raises it above the earth and says, “I have made acquisition for you and for all who will join you.” G. [If] people join them, he makes an act of acquisition but does not have to inform them [cf. M. Erub. 7:7]. 6:2 A. Said R. Judah, “M#SH W: We were dwelling in the courtyard of the house of Geludah in Lydda, and we were cooking a pot of lentils. B. “Then someone standing at the gate of the alleyway said, ‘I effect acquisition for you through the pot of lentils.”’

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The case, T. 6:2A-B, illustrates the rule, E-F. Tosefta-tractate Erubin 6:26 A. A water-channel which passes through a courtyard— B. they do not draw water from it on the Sabbath C. unless they made a partition for it ten handbreadths high at its point of entry and its point of exit [M. Erub. 8:7A-D]. D. [If] they made a partition for it at its point of entry but not at its point of exit, E. at its point of exit but not at its point of entry, F. they do not draw water from it on the Sabbath— G. unless they made for it a partition ten handbreadths high at its point of entry and its point of exit. H. [If] it was broad at one side and narrow at the other end, lo, this one should broaden the narrow part. I. And so do you rule in the case of sewers which flow along under houses and courtyards. J. R. Judah says, “Walls which are on top of them are deemed equivalent to a partition.” K. Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: A water-course came from Abel to Sepphoris, and we would draw water from it on the Sabbath at the instruction of sages.” L. They said to him, “It was because it was not ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths broad” [M. Erub. 8:7E-G].

The case, K, is offered as a concrete example of the Halakhah. III. Tractate Pisha (Pesahim) T. Pisha 2:15 A. M#SH B: Rabban Gamaliel was going along from Akko to Kezib. B. He found a loaf of cheap bread on the road. C. He said to his slave, Tabi, “Take the loaf.” D. He saw a gentile. He said to him, “Mabegai, take this loaf of bread.” E. R. Le’ii ran after him [and] said to him, “Who are you?” F. He said to him, “I come from one of these station-keepers’ villages.” G. He said to him, “What is your name?” H. He said to him, “Mabegai.” I. He said to him, “Now, did Rabban Gamaliel ever in your whole life meet you?” J. He said to him, “No.” K. On the basis of this event we learn that Rabban Gamaliel divined by the Holy Spirit. L. And from what he said we learn three things: M. We learn that the leaven of a gentile is permitted immediately after the Passover. N. And they do not pass by food [but pick it up].

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O. And they follow the status of the majority of those who travel the roads [in determining the character of the food]. 2:16 A. He came to Kezib. B. Someone came along and besought from him [absolution of] his vow. C. He said to this one who was with him, “Have we drunk so much as a quarter-log of Italian wine?” D. He said to him, “Yes.” E. He said to him, “If so, let him walk along with us until the effect of our wine has worn off.” F. And he went along with them until they came to the Ladder of Tyre. G. Once they got to the Ladder of Tyre, he got off the ass and wrapped himself in his cloak and sat down and declared his vow to be absolved. H. We learned many rules on that day. I. We learned that a quarter-log of wine causes drunkenness. J. And traveling wears down the effects of wine. K. And that they do not give a decision when they are drunk. L. And they do not absolve vows either while riding on an ass, while walking, or while standing, but only wrapped in a cloak and sitting down.

This is a beautifully-framed, balanced narrative, entirely authentic by the definition operative here. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The details of T. 2:15AJ come together at K, L-O. So the logic of coherence is teleological, each detail holding together with the others principally to effect the goal that is defined at the end. T. 2:16 follows the same pattern. A-G make sense in light of H-L. On the basis of the recurrent plan of details made to cohere through a lesson, I classify the two compositions as authentic narratives. But any of the distinct Halakhic rulings can have been rendered as a conventional ma#aseh/case/precedent. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? I take it the point of tension is the opacity of the several deeds, which then triggers the requirement for explanation. And that seems to me critical to the coherence of the whole: what Gamaliel did bears Halakhic meanings, which it is our task to decode. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? This represents a fine development of the simple Halakhic ma#aseh, that is, the precedent/case that illustrates the realized law. There is in the Mishnah no counterpart to this appealing presentation of the

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Halakhic ma#aseh. Now we have a sequence of actions, not prepared for by the formulation of a Halakhic rule, but rather interpreted at the end. Since the Mishnah has nothing that compares, we see how the form develops and becomes more complex and rich as new tasks are assigned to it. T. Pisha 3:11 A. R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq says, “Heave-offering is removed before the Sabbath, for the people who are allowed to eat it are few. B. “But unconsecrated food they remove on the Sabbath, for the people who are allowed to eat it are many” [M. Pes. 3:6E]. C. Said R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq, “One time we were in session before Rabban Gamaliel in the study-house in Lud. And Zonen, who was in charge, came along and said, ‘The time has come to burn the leaven.’ So father and I went along to the house of Rabban Gamaliel and we burned the leaven.”

This is a standard Halakhic ma#aseh. T. Pisha 3:20 A. How do they “leave over the corner of the field in the case of vegetables”? B. They would leave it over only in the case of turnip and porret, which are gathered at the same time. C. R. Yosé says, “Also in the case of cabbage.” D. Said R. Yosé, “M#SH B: The son of Ben Nebo-hayyon—his father [Nebohayyon] left over the corner of the field for turnips. He came and found the poor gathered at the gate of his garden [laden with vegetables]. E. “He said [to his sons], ‘My children, shall we not pay attention to the teachings of sages? Throw it from your hands.’ F. “So they threw it down, and he gave them [the poor] twice as much produce as [poor man’s] tithe in the form of that which had been tithed.” G. [Thus it was] not that he was grudging, but because he paid attention to the teachings of sages.

The Halakhic ma#aseh bears its own explanation, G. T. Pisha 4:13-14 A. One time the fourteenth of Nisan coincided with the Sabbath. B. They asked Hillel the Elder, “As to the Passover-sacrifice, does it override [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath?” C. He said to them, “Now do we have only a single Passover-sacrifice in the course of the year which overrides [the prohibitions] of the Sabbath? We have many more than three hundred Passover-sacrifices in the year, and they all override [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath.” D. All the people in the courtyard ganged up on him. E. He said to them, “The daily whole-offering is a public offering, and the Passover-sacrifice is a public offering. Just as the daily wholeoffering

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is a public offering and overrides [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath, so the Passover-sacrifice is a public offering [and] overrides [the prohibition of] the Sabbath.” 4:14 A. “Another matter: In connection with the daily wholeoffering, ‘Its season’ is stated (Num. 28:2), and in connection with the Passover, ‘Its season’ is stated (Num. 9:2). Just as the daily wholeoffering, in connection with which “Its season” is stated, overrides [the prohibitions] of the Sabbath, so the Passover-sacrifice is a public offering [and] overrides [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath. B. “And further there is an argument a fortiori: Now if the daily wholeoffering, on account of which people are not liable to extirpation, overrides [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath, the Passover-sacrifice, on account of which people are liable to extirpation—is it not logical that it should override [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath? C. “And furthermore: I have received a tradition from my masters that the Passover-sacrifice overrides [the prohibitions of the Sabbath]—and not [solely] the first Passover but the second Passover-sacrifice, and not [solely] the Passover-sacrifice of the community but the Passover-sacrifice of an individual.” D. They said to him, “What will happen with the people, who did not bring knives and Passover-lambs to the sanctuary?” E. He said to them, “Do not worry about them. The holy spirit rests upon them. If they are not prophets, they are disciples of prophets.” F. What did the Israelites do in that hour? G. He whose animal for the Passover-sacrifice was a lamb had hid it [the knife] in its wool. H. He whose animal for the Passover-sacrifice was a goat had tied it between its horns. I. So they had [in any event] brought both their knives and their Passoversacrifices to the sanctuary. J. And they sacrificed their Passover-sacrifices. K. On that very day they appointed Hillel to be patriarch, and he taught them laws of Passover.

What we have in this pseudo-narrative is two components, first, a dramatic setting for demonstrations of a logical order, T. 4:13C, E, T. 4:14A-C. Then comes the denouement, remaining well within the Halakhic-dialogical framework, D-J+K. This qualifies only as a dramatic framework for what adds up to a review of arguments on a given proposition. T. Pisha 4:15 A. One time Agrippa the king wanted to know the census of the population. B. He said to the priests, “Set aside for me the kidney of each and every Passover-sacrifice.”

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C. And they put aside for him 600,000 pairs of kidneys—twice the number of those who went forth from Egypt. D. You have not a single Passover-sacrifice on which were not numbered more than ten partners, E. excluding those who were unclean or who were away on a trip. F. On that very day the Israelites came up onto the Temple mount and it could not contain them all. G. And it was called “the crowded Passover.”

I do not know how to classify this item. It has no Halakhic charge, and I do not see how the details point to a particular goal in the end. It seems to me the essential components at A-C, at which the promise of A is realized: he wanted to know…he found out. Then the rest goes over the same ground but leads nowhere new. Because I do not know identify the indicative qualities, I omit this entry from my taxonomy of narratives, given below. T. Pisha 8:4 A. “A convert who converted between the two [observances of] Passover has to observe the second Passover,” the words of Rabbi. B. R. Nathan says, “He does not have to observe the second Passover, for he indeed was not obligated by the time of the first Passover.” C. [If] the Israelites will gain permission to build the Temple house [between the first and second Passover], an individual will prepare the second Passover, but the community will not observe the second Passover. D. R. Judah says, “Also: the community will observe the second Passover.” E. Said R. Judah, M#SH B: Hezekiah, king of Judah, forced the community to observe a second Passover, F. “as it is said, ‘For a multitude of the people, many of them from Ephraim, Manasseh, Issachar, and Zebulun, had not cleansed themselves, yet they ate the Passover otherwise than as prescribed’ (II Chron. 30:18).”

The ma#aseh, E-F, illustrates D. But the citation of a case/precedent supplied by Scripture has no counterpart in the Mishnah and opens the Halakhic exposition to a vast new range of available ma#asim. IV. Tractate Sheqalim: no narratives V. Tractate Kippurim (Yoma) Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 1:4 A. Why do they appoint another priest as his substitute?

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B. lest some cause of invalidation should overtake him [M. Yoma 1:1 B-C], C. so the other may take his place. D. R. Hananiah, Prefect of the Priests, says, “For that purpose the prefect was appointed: E. “[So that] in the case of a priest overtaken by some cause of invalidation, the other may take his place.” F. “[If the substitute should serve in his place], the high priest returns to the priesthood, and this one who served in his place is subject to all of the religious requirements of the high priesthood,” the words of R. Meir. G. R. Yosé says, “Even though they have said, ‘All the religious requirements of the high priesthood apply to him,’ he is valid neither as a high priest nor as an ordinary priest.” H. Said R. Yosé, “M#SH B: Joseph b. Elim of Sepphoris served in the place of the high priest for one hour. I. “And from that time onward he was not valid either as a high priest or as an ordinary priest. I. “When he went forth [from his high priesthood of one hour], he said to the king, ‘The bullock and ram that were offered today, to whom do they belong? Are they mine, or are they our high priest’s?’ K. “The king knew what to answer him. L. “He said to him ‘Now what’s going on, Son of Elim! It is not enough for you that you have served in the place of the high priest for one hour before Him who spoke and brought the world into being. But do you also want to take over the high priesthood for yourself?’ M. “At that moment Ben Elim realized that he had been separated from the priesthood.”

1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The story comes to its climax at L-M, which imposes its perspective on all that precedes and positions each detail. We have more than merely a dramatic setting for “he said to him… he said to him….” 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? At issue is the hubris of the high priest Joseph, his aspiration to transcend the honor accorded to him. That is made explicit at the end. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? The story announces its point, H-I, describes the action and dialogue that form provoke the narrative, I, and reaches its goal at L-M. It is fully real-

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ized and perfect for its plan: a tripartite construction with a beginning, middle, and end. Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 1:8 A. Why does he turn aside and weep [M. Yoma 1:5F]? B. Because it is necessary to impose an oath on him. C. And why do they turn aside and weep [M. Yoma l:5F]? D. Because they have to impose an oath on him. E. And why do they have to impose an oath on him? F. Because there already was the case of that certain Boethusian, who offered up the incense while he was still outside, and the cloud of incense went forth and frightened the entire house. G. For the Boethusian maintained that he should burn the incense while he is still outside, as it says, “And put the incense on the fire before the Lord, that the cloud of the incense may cover the mercy seat which is upon the testimony” (Lev. 16:13). H. Sages said to them, “Now has it not also been stated, ‘And put the incense on the fire before the Lord’? I. “From this it follows that whoever offers up incense offers up incense only inside. J. “If so, why is it said, ‘The cloud of the incense may cover’? K. “This teaches that he puts into it something which causes smoke to rise. L. “If therefore he did not put in something which makes smoke rise, he is liable to the death penalty.” M. Now when this Boethusian went forth, he said to his fathers, “In your entire lives you would [merely] expound the Scripture, but you never did the deed properly, until I arose and I went in and did it right.” N. They said to him, “Even though we do expound matters as you say, we do not do things in the way in which we expound them. We obey the words of sages. I shall be very much surprised at you if you live for very long.” 0. Not thirty days passed before they put him into his grave.

1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The goal is at N-O: the Boethusians have their schismatic opinions but obey the law as sages present it. To make that point, the action, F, and the explanation, G, commence the program; then the sages’ reading of the same verses of Scripture, H-L, form the centerpiece, with the conclusion at M-O imposing coherence on the whole. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? That is clear from the foregoing. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? The pattern, a beginning,

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middle, and end, is familiar, and the logic is as required. It is, then, a simple tale and a well focused one. Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 1:12 A. M#SH B: There were two who got there at the same time, running up the ramp. One shoved the other [M. Yoma 2:2A-B], within four cubits [of the altar]. The other then took out a knife and stabbed him in the heart. B. R. Sadoq came and stood on the steps of the porch and said, C. “Hear me, O brethren of the house of Israel! Lo, Scripture says, ‘If in the land which the Lord your God gives you to possess, any one is found slain, lying in the open country, and it is not known who killed him, then your elders and your judges shall come forth, and they shall measure the distance to the cities which are around him that is slain’ (Deut. 21:1-2). D. “Come so let us measure to find out for what area it is appropriate to bring the calf, for the sanctuary, or for the courts!” E. All of them moaned after his speech. F. And afterward the father of the youngster came to them, saying, “O brethren of ours! May I be your atonement. His [my] son is still writhing, so the knife has not yet been made unclean.” G. This teaches you that the uncleanness of a knife is more grievous to Israelites than murder. And so it says, “Moreover Manasseh shed very much innocent blood, till he had filled Jerusalem from one end to the other” (2 Kings 21:16). H. On this basis they have said, “Because of the sin of murder the Presence of God was raised up, and the sanctuary was made unclean.”

1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The Mishnah’s ma#aseh is augmented with Saddoq’s recrimination, C-D, and then the climactic response of the father of the deceased, who illustrates Saddoq’s comment, A-B, though cited from the Mishnah, are integral to the amplified narrative before us. Lest we miss the point, G-H articulates it. Viewed on its own, not as a complement to the Mishnah’s narrative, the story is fully realized and coherent, start to finish. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? The narrative charge comes in the contrast between concern for uncleanness of the Temple and the acceptance of the murder. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? Here the Tosefta has filled out the Mishnah’s ma#aseh and made it work. That is not a common phenomenon. The narrative leaves no doubt as to the lesson it wishes to convey.

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Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 1:13 H. An ox is offered by twenty-four priests, I. the head and the right hind leg [M. Yoma 2:7A-B]: two hold the right hind leg and bring it up to the altar; J. three hold the dish and offer it up on the altar. K. Under what circumstances? L. In the case of public offerings. M. But in the case of an individual’s offering, whoever wanted to offer it up offers it up [M. Yoma 2:4H-J]. 1:14 A. M#SH B: One of the sons of Martha, daughter of Boethus, could take two sides of an ox which cost one thousand zuz and walk with them heel to toe and bring them up onto the altar.

The ma#aseh illustrates the possibility of a single priest’s presenting the entire offering. It is no longer a case/example of a Halakhic ruling, but serves an altogether different purpose, one with no counterpart in the Mishnah. Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 1:21-22 A. In all it was worth thirty maneh [M. Yoma 3:7C]. B. These funds are taken from the sanctuary. C. If he wanted to add, he may add out of his own pocket [M. Yoma 3:7E]. D. M#SH B: Ishmael b. Phiabi’s mother made for him a tunic worth a hundred maneh. E. And he would stand and make offerings on the altar wearing it. 1:22 A. SWB M#SH B: Eleazar b. Harsom’s mother made for him a tunic for twenty thousand, and he would stand and make offerings on the altar while wearing it. B. But his brethren, the priests, called him down, C. because [it was so sheer that] he appeared naked while wearing it.

The two ma#asim, T. 1:21D-E, T. 1:22A-C, illustrate M. 3:7E=T. 1:21C. Here too we do not have Halakhic cases/examples but ancillary facts. That is, cases in which people added money out of their own pockets to adorn the Temple and its rites. Then come the indicated incidents. They are not asked to serve as precedents for the law, which is not challenged, but as mere cases congruent with the law. Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 2:4 A. All the gates which were there were covered with gold except for the Nicanor’s gates, B. for a miracle was done with them. C. There are those who say it is because their copper is bright. D. R. Eliezer b. Jacob says, “It was Corinthian bronze and shown like gold [“it is as pretty as gold”].”

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E. Now what is the miracle which was done with them? F. They say: When Nicanor was bringing them from Alexandria, in Egypt, a gale rose in the sea and threatened to drown them. They took one of them and tossed it into the sea, and they wanted to throw in the other but Nicanor would not let them. He said to them, “If you throw in the second one, throw me in with it.” He was distressed all the way to the wharf at Jaffa. Once they reached the wharf at Jaffa, the other door popped up from underneath the boat. G. And there are those who say one of the beasts of the sea swallowed it, and when Nicanor came to the wharf at Jaffa, it brought it up and tossed it onto land. H. And concerning it, it is explicitly stated in tradition, “The beams of our house are cedar, our rafters are pine” (Song of Songs 1:17).

1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? T, 2:7F responds to the question of T. 2:7E. The story is complete: the miracle was that the door floated along with the ship, and that conclusion also holds together the sequence of steps. The one thing that is jarring is, “If you throw in the second one, throw me in with it…,” which introduces a drama that is not realized. We should have anticipated, “the sea was calmed.” But rather, “he was distressed all the way….” So the event that precipitates telling the tale is the miracle of the second door. That defines the goal of the prior stages. But what happened to the first door, and how Nicanor’s imprecation not to throw in the door without throwing him in too, fit into the narrative are left unarticulated. So the narrative is flawed. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? It is a miracle story, I see no conflict of wills that is resolved. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? The formal quality that strikes me is brevity and simplicity. Indeed, the details are more than we require to make the point at the end, for reasons I have explained. Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 2:5-6 2:5 A. The members of the household of Garmu were experts in making Show Bread and they did not want to teach others [how to make it] [cf. M. Yoma 3:11B]. B. Sages sent and brought experts from Alexandria, in Egypt, who were expert in similar matters, but were not experts in removing it from the oven. C. The members of the house of Garmu would heat the oven on the out-

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side, and it [the loaf of bread] would be removed [on its own] on the inside. D. The experts from Alexandria did not do so. E. And some say this made it get moldy. F. And when the sages learned of the matter, they said, “The Holy One, blessed be he, created the world only for his own glory, as it is said, ‘Everyone that is called by my name and whom I have created for my glory’ (Is. 43: 7), [so we might as well pay the tariff].” G. They sent for them, and they did not come until they doubled their former salary. H. “They used to take a fee of twelve manehs every day, and now they went and took a fee of twenty-four,” the words of R. Meir. I. R. Judah says, “Twenty-four did they take every day, and now they went and took forty-eight manehs.” J. Said to them sages, “Now why were you unwilling to teach?” K. They said, “The members of father’s house knew that the Temple is destined for destruction, and they did not want to teach others how to do it, so that they should not be able to do it before an idol in the way in which they do it before the Omnipresent.” L. And on account of this next matter they are remembered with honor: M. For a piece of clean bread was never found in the hands of their sons and daughters under any circumstances, so that people might not say about them, “They are nourished from the Show Bread.” N. This was meant to carry out the following verse: “You shall be clean before the Lord and before Israel” (Num. 32:22). 2:6A. The members of the house of Abtinas were experts in preparing the incense for producing smoke [cf. M. Yoma 3:11C], and they did not want to teach others how to do so. B. Sages sent and brought experts from Alexandria, in Egypt, who knew how to concoct spices in much the same way. C. But they were not experts in making the smoke ascend [as well as the others]. D. The smoke coming from the incense of the house of Abtinas would ascend straight as a stick up to the beams, and afterward it scattered in all directions as it came down. E. That of the Alexandrians would scatter as it came down forthwith [not rising properly]. F. Now when the sages realized this, they said, “The Omnipresent has created the world only for his own glory, as it is said, ‘The Lord has made everything for his own purpose’ (Prov. 16:4).” G. Sages sent to them [the members of the house of Abtinas], but they declined to come until the sages doubled their wages. H. “They had been receiving twelve manehs every day, and now they went and got twenty-four,” the words of R. Meir. I. R. Judah says, “They had been getting twenty-four every day. Now they went and got forty-eight manehs.” J. Sages said to them, “Now why were you unwilling to teach [others]?”

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K. They said to them, “The members of father’s house knew that the Temple is destined for destruction, and they did not want to teach others their art, so that people would not burn incense before an idol in the same way in which they burn incense before the Omnipresent.” L. And in this [next] matter, they are remembered for good: A woman of their household never went out wearing perfume at any time, M. and not only so, but when they would marry into their household a woman from some other place, they made an agreement that she not put on perfume, N. so that people should not say, “Their women are putting on perfume made up from the preparation of the incense for the Temple.” 0. This they did to carry out the following verse, “And you shall be clear before the Lord and before Israel” (Num. 32:22).

Here are narratives—not marked by ma#aseh—that compete with M. R.H. 2:8-9 and M. Ta. 3:9-10 in the success of the narrator. There are characterization, individuation, movement. The source of tension and its resolution link the incident to the larger concerns of Israel beyond the destruction of the Temple, the whole cohering in that very matter. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The two stories, T. 2:5, the household of Garmu, and T. 2:6, the household of Abtinas, follow a single pattern. The focus is, Why were you unwilling to teach? The upshot is, it was an act of virtuous responsibility. The secondary virtue “remembered with honor” is not required to make the main narrative succeed. The coherence derives from the exact, commensurate match between the question, T. 2:5A, and the answer, K. So too in the next narrative, T. 2:6A raises the question, and T. 2:6K responds. So we have a perfect match and an exact realization of the narrative logic: all details work together in light of the goal to which each is directed in its turn. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? The sages have in mind the here-and-now of the Temple that they administer, and the two households take the longer view of matters. Lest we miss the point, the two households are characterized as meticulous in their honesty, not as money-grubbing at all. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? The tripartite construction seems to me to govern, T. 2:5A-G, J-K, and L-N, and

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so at T. 2:6. Then the add-on, L-O, is essential to the form. These are successful, well-crafted narratives, stories with a beginning, a middle, and an end. Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 2:7 A. Said R. Aqiba, “Simeon b. Luga told me, ‘A certain child of the sons of their sons and I were gathering grass in the field. Then I saw him laugh and cry. B. “‘I said to him, ‘Why did you cry?’ C. “‘He said to me, ‘Because of the glory of father’s house, which has gone into exile.’ D. “‘I said to him, ‘Then why did you laugh?’ E. “‘He said, ‘At the end of it all, in time to come, the Holy One, blessed be He, is going to make his descendants rejoice.’ F. “‘I said to him, ‘Why?’ [What did you see to make you think of this?] G. “‘He said to me, ‘A smoke-raiser’ in front of me [made me laugh].’ H. “‘I said to him, ‘Show it to me.’ I. “‘He said to me, ‘We are subject to an oath not to show it to anyone at all.’” J. Said R. Yohanan b. Nuri, “One time I was going along the way and an old man came across me and said to me, ‘I am a member of the house of Abtinas. K. “‘At the beginning, when the house of father was discreet, they would give their scrolls [containing the prescriptions for frankincense only] to one another. L. “‘Now take it, but be careful about it, since it is a scroll containing a recipe for spices.’ M. “And when I came and reported the matter before R. Aqiba, he said to me, ‘From now on it is forbidden to speak ill of these people again.’” N. On the basis of this story, Ben #Azzai said, “Yours will they give you, O. “by your own name will they call you, P. “in your place will they seat you. Q. “There is no forgetfulness before the Omnipresent. R. “No man can touch what is designated for his fellow.” T, 2:8 A. Agdis b. Levi knew a certain mode of singing, and he did not want to teach it to others [M. Yoma 3:11D]. B. Sages said to him, “Why did you not want to teach it to others?” C. He said to them, “The members of father’s house knew that the Temple was destined for destruction, and they did not want to teach their mode of singing to others, so that they should not sing before an idol the way in which they say [song] before the Omnipresent.” D. Ben Qamsar knew [the art] of writing, and did not want to teach anyone else [M. Yoma 3:11E]. E. They said to him, “Why do you not want to teach anyone else?” F. He remained silent. G. These others found an answer to what they said, but Ben Qamsar

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I see these free-standing compositions: T. 2:7A-I, T. 2:7J-M (glossed by N-R), T. 2:8A-C, T. 2:8D-F, the whole then glossed at G-K. Of these, I regard as a fully-successful narrative T. 2:7AL, with its clear focus on C/E, the present dismay, the coming joy, each element matched by its counterpart. Then an ideal realization would not have trailed off with F-I. J-M continues F-I’s theme, the discretion of the Temple craftsmen. I do see it as a fully realized composition on its own. It consists of two units, the conduct of the house of Abtinas, J-L, then Aqiba’s comment thereon, M. T. 2:8A-C follows the pattern established: secret craft, why not share, because the Temple is going to be destroyed. Now, recognizing these parts, can we find a composition that fits the governing, logical definition of a narrative? It is difficult to answer in the affirmative. T. 2:7A-I comes closest. But while we have a tripartite composition, A-C, D-E, F-I, what imparts cogency to the whole merely is the balance of A-C, D-E. F-I does not pertain. Hence what I find is dramatized dialogue, not a logicallyappropriate narrative. J-M, T. 2:8A-C, D-F carry forward the pattern. But, this analysis having been set forth, I can readily conceive a completely contrary reading of the composite, within the same criterion of narrative logic. Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 2:13 A. The outer one was looped up at the south, and the inner one at the north. He walks between them until he reaches the northern side. When he reaches the northern side, he turns around toward the south, walks along with the curtain at his left until he has reached the ark [M. Yoma 5: IJ-L]. B. When he reaches the ark, he then pushes the veil aside with his hips. C. And he placed the firepan between the two bars and he piled up the incense on the coals, so that the whole house was filled with smoke. He went out, going along by the way by which he went in. And he said a short prayer in the outer area. He did not prolong his prayer, so as not to frighten the Israelites [M. Yoma 5:1M-Q].

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D. M#SH B: A high priest took a long time. E. They said to him, “Why did you take a long time?” F. He said to them, “I was praying for you and for the sanctuary of your fathers that it not be destroyed.” G. They said to him, “No matter, you have no right to change the custom.”

The ma#aseh, D-G, glosses the Mishnah-passage, C. What we have is not a precedent or a case but a mere illustration. The signal, ma#aseh, now covers a variety of types of simple narratives, not only cases/precedents for a Halakhic exposition. Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 3:14 A. They asked R. Eliezer, “Lo, if the goat which is to be sent fell sick, what is the law as to carrying it?” B. He said to them, “Can he carry others?” C. “[If] the one who sends him fell sick, what is the law as to sending him with someone else?” D. He said to them, “Thus may you and I be in peace.” E. “[If] he pushed it down and it did not die, what is the law as to going down after it and killing it?” F. He said to them, “Thus be the fate of the enemies of the Omnipresent.” G. And sages say, “[If] it fell ill, he carries it. H. “[If] the one who sends it fell ill, one sends it with someone else.” I. “[If] one pushed it down and it did not die, one should go down after it and kill it.”

Here is a classical pseudo-narrative, a colloquy presented as an incident. So far as the construction coheres, it is in the quality of Eliezer’s answers: his insistence on not answering the questions in the framework in which they are asked. VI. Tractate Sukkah Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 1:1 A. A Sukkah which is taller than twenty cubits is invalid. B. R. Judah declares it valid [M. Suk. I:IA-B]. C. Said R. Judah, ‘M#SH B: Helene’s Sukkah was twenty cubits tall, and sages went in and out, when visiting her, and not one of them said a thing.” D. They said to him, “It was because she is a woman, and a woman is not liable to keep the commandment of dwelling in a Sukkah.” E. He said to them, “Now did she not have seven sons who are disciples of sages, and all of them were dwelling in that same Sukkah!”

The ma#aseh forms a standard case/precedent for the Tosefta, meaning, it records an exemplary incident. But it is not standard for the Mishnah, lacking as it does a ruling by sages or some

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explicit statement of the normative outcome. We many times note in the Tosefta this variation on the familiar form initiated in the Mishnah. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 1:7 A. “ They make a Sukkah-roofing with boards,” the words of R. Judah [M. Suk. 1:6A]. B. And sages prohibit, C. unless there is a space [covered by Sukkah-roofing] between one and the next equivalent to the breadth of one of the boards. D. Said R. Judah, ‘M#SH B: In the time of the danger we used to lean ladders together and make Sukkah-roofing on top of them out of boards and then sleep under them.” E. They said to him, “There is no proof from what people did in the time of the danger.” F. But all concur that, if a board is four handbreadths broad, there must be a distance between one and the next equivalent to the breadth of a board.

Once more, we have a case/precedent, nothing more. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 1:8 -9 A. A large courtyard which is surrounded by pillars—lo, the pillars are tantamount to sides [for a Sukkah] [cf. M. Suk. I:IOC]. B. One may make his fellow into the side of a Sukkah, so that he may eat, drink, and sleep in the Sukkah [formed with his fellow as one of the sides]. C. Not only so, but a person may lean a bed on its side and spread a sheet over it, D. so that the sunshine will not come either onto food or onto a corpse. E. Sages concur with R. Eliezer that they do not set up tents to begin with on the festival day, and, it goes without saying, on the Sabbath. F. And sages say, “They add [to them] on the Sabbath, and, it goes without saying, on the festival” [cf. T. Shab. 12:14]. 1:9 A. M#SH B: R. Eliezer was reclining in the Sukkah of Yohanan b. Ila’i’ in Caesarion. B. The sun shone into the Sukkah. C. He said to him, “What is the law as to spreading a sheet over it?” [cf. M. Suk. 1:3]. D. He said to him, “You have not got a single tribe in Israel which did not produce a prophet.” E. The sun shone half way into the Sukkah. F. He said to him, “What is the law as to spreading a sheet over it?” G. He said to him, “You have not got a single tribe in Israel which did not produce a judge. The tribes of Judah and Benjamin produced kings on the instruction of prophets.” H. The sun now shone all the way to the feet of R. Eliezer.

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I. He [Yohanan] took a sheet and spread it over the Sukkah. J. And R. Eliezer uncovered his feet and went on his way.

Like Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 3:14, we have a dramatization of a colloquy. The conclusion, I-J, does not articulately affect the order of cogency of the prior exchanges. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 2:1 A. Agents engaged in a religious duty are exempt from the requirement of dwelling in a Sukkah [M. Suk. 2:5], B. and [this is the case] even though they have said that it is not praiseworthy of a person to leave his home on the festival. C. M#SH B: R. Ila#i’ went to R. Eliezer in Lud. He [Eliezer] said to him [Ilai], “Now what’s going on, Ila#i’? Are you not among those who observe the festival? Have they not said that it is not praiseworthy of a person to leave his home on a festival? For it is said, ‘And you will rejoice on your festival’ (Deut. 16:14).”

Here is another instance of slightly-dramatized discourse, consisting of “he went to… he said to him….” Only here all we have is a situation on which Eliezer comments—not much even of a ma#aseh. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 2:2 A. Sick folk and those who serve them are exempt from the requirement of dwelling in a Sukkah [M. Suk. 2:4C], B. and [this is the case] not only of one who is seriously ill, C. but even if someone has a headache or a pain in the eye. D. Said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, “M#SH W: I had a pain in the eye in Caesarion, and R. Yosé b. Rabbi permitted me to sleep, along with my servant, outside of the Sukkah.” E. Said Rabbi, “When we were coming—I and R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq—to visit R. Yohanan b. Nuri in Bet Shearim, we would eat figs and grapes outside of the Sukkah” [cf. M. Suk. 2:4D]. F. And so did Rabbi say, “Any Sukkah which is not at least four by four cubits is invalid.” G. And sages say, “Even if it holds one’s head and the greater part of one’s body alone, it is valid” [cf. M. Suk. 2:7C]. 2:3 A. M#SH B: The Jerusalemites would let down their beds through the windows ten handbreadths high and covered over them with a Sukkah-roofing and slept under them [cf. M. Suk. 2:7C].

The three ma#asim, Y. Suk. 2:2D, E, and T. 2:3, do not qualify as narratives. But they also do not replicate the Mishnah-pattern of case + ruling. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 2:3 H. Said R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq, “When I was studying with Yohanan b. Hahorani [cf. M. Suk. 2:7D], I saw him eating a dry piece of bread, for it

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was a time of famine. So I came and told my father. I. “He said to me, ‘Here are some olives for him.’ J. “So I brought him some olives. K. “He took them and examined them and saw that they were wet. He said to me, ‘I’m not an olive-eater.’ L. “I came home and told my father. And he said to me, ‘Go, tell him, ‘It was from a perforated basket, in accord with the House of Hillel [and so the sap which exuded from them is not deemed to have rendered the olives susceptible to uncleanness], but the lees stopped it up [on which account the liquids collected and dampened the olives].”’ M. Now [this story tells] us that he ate his unconsecrated produce in a state of cultic cleanness. N. For even though he was one of the disciples of the House of Shammai, he obeyed only the teachings of the House of Hillel. O. Under all circumstances the law is in accord with the House of Hillel. P. To be sure, he who wants to impose a more strict rule on himself, to follow the law in accord with the opinion of the House of Shammai and in accord with the House of Hillel—concerning such a one, Scripture says, The fool walks in darkness (Qoh. 2:14). Q. He who holds by the lenient rulings of the House of Shammai and the lenient rulings of the House of Hillel is out-and-out evil. R. But if it is to be in accord with the teachings of the House of Sham-mai, then let it be in accord with both their lenient rulings and their strict rulings. S. And if it is to be in accord with the teachings of the House of Hillel, then let it be in accord with both their lenient rulings and their strict rulings.

1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? T. Suk. 2:3L clarifies all the prior action and imparts meaning to the whole. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? The action of the donee, in rejecting food in a time of famine, requires an explanation. It is implicit at L. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? The first component is H-J, the second, K, the third L, hence the familiar tripartite construction. I do not see how this set of materials in the hands of a Mishnah-author cannot have yielded a perfectly routine ma#aseh/case/precedent. It therefore strikes me as the development, toward a more conventional narrative, of the ma#aseh-form of the Mishnah.

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Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 2:9-10 2:9A. If one does not have a citron, he should not use a pomegranate, a quince, or any other sort of fruit. B. If [the four species] were wrinkled, they are valid. If they were dried up, they are invalid [cf. M. Suk. 3:1A, 2A, 3A, 5A]. C. R. Judah says, “If they were dried up, they are valid.” D. Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: The townsfolk of the villages would leave their lulabs to their children in time of need.” E. They said to him, “The time of need does not yield proof.” 2:10 A. A lulab [palm-branch, willow-branch, myrtle-branch], whether bound up or not bound up, is valid. B. R. Judah says, “One which is bound up is valid, and one which is not bound up is invalid.” C. One should not bind it up on the festival day. D. But one may take a shoot from it and bind it up. E. “They bind up the lulab only with that which is its own species,” the words of R. Judah. F. Said R. Meir, “M#SH B: The townsfolk of Jerusalem bound up their lulabs with gold threads.” G. They said to him, “Is there proof in that precedent? But underneath they tied it up with that which is its own species” [M. Suk. 3:8].

These two ma#asim, T. 2:9D, T. 2:10F, present standard Toseftastyle cases/precedents. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 3:1 A. The rite of the lulab overrides the prohibitions of the Sabbath at its [the festival of Sukkot’s] beginning [that is, when the Sabbath coincides with the first festival day of Sukkot], B. and the rite of the willow-branch at the end [when the seventh day’s rite of the willow-branch is to be done on the Sabbath]. C. M#SH W: The Boethusians piled up big boulders [on the willows which had been lined up around the altar] on the eve of the Sabbath. D. The common folk discovered them and came and dragged them away and took them out from underneath the boulders on the Sabbath. E. For the Boethusians do not concur that beating the willow-branches overrides the prohibitions of the Sabbath [cf. M. Suk. 4:6A]. F. The law of the willow-branch is a law revealed to Moses at Sinai [but not referred to in written Scripture]. G. Abba Saul says, “It is a matter of the written Torah, H. “since it says, And willow-branches grown by a brook (Lev. 23:4)— I. “a willow-branch for the lulab, and a willow-branch for the altar.” J. R. Eliezer b. Jacob says, “Thus did they say: ‘For him and you, O altar! For him and you, O altar!”’ [cf. M. Suk. 4:51].

Here is not quite a standard Halakhic ma#aseh, there being no indication of a sage’s participation. But the classification serves,

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since what we have here is nothing more than a case introduced in a Halakhic context as explanation for a ruling. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 4:4 A. M#SH B: Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel danced with eight flaming torches, and not one of them fell to the ground. B. Now when he would prostrate himself, he would put his finger on the ground, bow low, kiss [the ground], and forthwith straighten up.

I see no narrative here, but also no Halakhic precedent/case. How to classify this particular utilization of the marker, ma#aseh, eludes me. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 4:28 A The priestly watch of Bilgah always divided it in the south, and their ring was fixed, and their wall niche was blocked up [M. Suk. 5:8E], B. because of Miriam, daughter of Bilgah, who apostatized. C. She went off and married an officer at the Greek royal house. D. And when the gentiles went into the sanctuary, she came along and stamped on the altar, screaming at it, “Wolf, wolf! You have wiped out [devoured] the fortune of Israel and did not then stand up for them in the time of their trouble.” E. And some say it was because [the priestly watch of Bilgah] delayed in observing its priestly watch. F. So the watch of Yeshebab went in and served in its stead. G. Therefore, Bilgah always appears to be among the outgoing priestly watches [at the south, M. Suk. 5:8D], and Yeshebab always appears to be among the incoming priestly watches. H. Neighbors of the wicked normally receive no reward, I. except for Yeshebab, J. neighbor to Bilgah, who received a reward.

Like the foregoing, I do not know how to classify this item, because C-D refer to, but do not constitute, a narrative. They form a fragment of a narrative, an incident out of context. VII. Tractate Yom Tob (Besah) Tosefta-tractate Yom Tob (Besah) 2:6 A. They do not prepare food either for gentiles’ or for dogs’ consumption on the festival day. B. M#SH B: Simeon of Teman did not go out on the night of the festival to the school house. C. At dawn R. Judah b. Baba came upon him. He said to him, “Why did you not come last night to the school house” D. He said to him, “A certain religious duty came my way, so I went and

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did it. A gentile troop came to town, and they were afraid that they might make trouble for the townsfolk. So we prepared a calf for them and gave them food and drink and made a place for them to stay, so that they would not make trouble for the townsfolk.” E. He said to him, “1’ll be most surprised if the good you did is not lost in the damage you did. F. “For lo, they have said, ‘On the festival day they do not prepare food either for gentiles’ or for dogs’ consumption.”’

1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? E-F refer back to B-D and link the whole together. The narrative then coheres. Without B-C, and with D in the third person, such and such happened and the townsfolk did so-and-so, plus a ruling, e.g., “sages did not approve…,” would have yielded a perfectly routine example of a somewhat elaborate ma#aseh in the manner of the Mishnah. The Tosefta’s formulation has no counterpart in the Mishnah. On that basis, I regard the narrative as a development by the Tosefta of the Mishnah’s ma#aseh-form. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? The tension is expressed at B-C, with its attempted resolution at D, and its restoration at E-F. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? The tripartite construction is clear. What we have is not a mere case/precedent to exemplify the law, but a fully-exposed rationale for the law in its own terms. It certainly conforms to the Tosefta’s documentary task to amplify and complement and spell out the Mishnah’s rules, and here we see how the very forms paramount in the Mishnah are “toseftasized.” Tosefta-tractate Yom Tob (Besah) 2:11-13 A. They do not remove [the meat of an animal which has been slaughtered in such a way as not to damage the hide] on the festival. B. And they do not remove [the meat, as above] on an ordinary day in the case of a firstling or in the case of Holy Things which have been in-validated. C. And they do everything which has to be done in connection with circumcision. D. Matters not done in regard to it on the Sabbath do they do with regard to it on the festival: E. they crush cummin and mix wine and oil for it.

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F. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “But one may not tear up rags for covering the sore of the circumcision in the first instance [on the festival].” 2:12 A. The members of the household of Rabban Gamaliel did not put together a candlestick on the festival night [itself] [cf. M. Bes. 2:6C]. B. WM#SH B: Rabban Gamaliel and elders were reclining together when in Rome, and a candlestick fell down on the night of a festival. C. R. Aqiba got up and put it back together. D. Said to him Rabban Gamaliel, “Aqiba! What business do you have to poke your head into fights!” E. He said to him, “You yourself have taught us, ‘Follow the majority’ [Ex. 23:2]. Now, even though you prohibit and they permit, the law is in accord with the majority.” F. R. Judah says in the name of Rabban Gamaliel, “They handle the candlestick on the festival, but they do not put it together.” 2:13 A. The members of the household of Rabban Gamaliel would sweep between the couches on the festival [cf. M. Bes. 2:7B]. B. Said R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq, “Many times did we eat in the house of Rabban Gamaliel, and not once did I ever see them sweeping between the couches [after a meal]. C. “But they would spread out sheets on the eve of the festival, and when guests come in, they remove them.” D. They said to him, “If so, it is permitted to do the same even on the Sabbath.” 2:14 A. The members of the household of Rabban Gamaliel would put spices into an airtight vessel [used for burning them]. B. Said R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq, “Many times did we eat in the house of Rabban Gamaliel, and not once did I ever see them put spices into the spout. C. “But they make smoke into boxes on the eve of the festival. D. “Then, when guests come, they open them up.” E. They said to him, “If so, it is permitted to do the same even on the Sabbath.”

In a single model, the three ma#asim, T. 2:12B-E, 2:13A-D, 2:14BD, serve as cases/precedents. But once more, they are of a form favored by the Tosefta and only rarely utilized by the Mishnah: a story of an event, often in the first person or focused upon a single actor, lacking a sages’ formal ruling (which is readily surmised, to be sure). Tosefta-tractate Yom Tob (Besah) 2:16 A. The members of the household of Rabban Gamaliel would crush pepper in a pepper-mill [on the festival day] [cf. M. Bes. 2:8D]. B. Said R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq, “One time father was reclining before Rabban Gamaliel, and they brought before him wine-lees and vinegar-lees, and on them were crushed peppers, and father kept his hands off.

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C. “They said to him, ‘Don’t be concerned about them. They were crushed on the eve of the festival.”’

This is a case/precedent, standard by the Tosefta’s form, but somewhat awry by the Mishnah’s. “They said to him” in the Mishnah would have come to expression, “And sages ruled…,” with the explanation, C, turned into a condition.

VIII. Tractate Rosh Hashanah Tosefta-tractate Rosh Hashanah 1:15 A. At first they would accept testimony concerning the new moon from everybody [M. R.H. 2:1B]. B. One time the Boethusians hired two witnesses to come and fool the sages. C. For the Boethusians do not concede that Pentecost should come at any time except on the day following the Sabbath. D. One of them came along and gave his testimony and went his way. E. Then the second one said, “I was coming up at Ma#aleh Adumim, and I saw it crouching between two rocks, F. “its head looking like a calf, and its ears looking like a lamb, and its horns looking like a deer, and its tail lying between its thighs. G. “I saw it, I was astonished, and I fell backward. H. “And lo, [I found] two hundred zuz tied up for me in my purse.” I. They said to him, “The two hundred zuz are given over to you as a gift. The one who hired you will be laid out on the post. J. “Why did you get involved in this matter?” K. He said to them, “I heard that the Boethusians were planning to confuse sages. I said to myself, ‘It’s better that I should go and tell sages.”’

Here the marker ma#aseh is lacking, but its absence signals nothing I can discern, because its presence will have made no perceptible difference in the forming of the incident before us. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The initial statement, matched by the climax and conclusion makes the point that the actions of the false witnesses were suborned by the Boethusians, and that imparts cogency to all the prior components of the construction. Every detail then serves to register the main purpose of the narrative. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? This is made articulate at C.

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3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? The components break down into these three parts: B-C, D-H, and I-K. But they hold together to make the polemical point that the narrative is composed to demonstrate: good sectarians acknowledge sages’ authority, even while they adhere to their own private, even rational views. Tosefta-tractate Rosh Hashanah 1:16 1:16 A. If they do not recognize him, they send another/ witness with him [M. R.H. 2:1A], even on the Sabbath. B. M#SH B: R. Nehorai came with a witness on the Sabbath to Usha and gave testimony concerning him.

This is a standard case/precedent, setting the case, but lacking the articulated decision. But it is implicit and there is no doubt as to its contents. IX. Tractate Ta#aniyyot (Ta#anit) Tosefta-tractate Ta#aniyyot (Ta#anit) 2:4 A. Monday and Thursday are set aside for public fasts. B. On them courts are in session in the towns. C. On them people gather in synagogues and read [the Scriptures]. D. On them they interrupt for the reading of the Scroll of Esther. E. What is the difference between a public and a private fast? F. On a public fast they eat and drink while it is still day [but not after dark on the eve of the fast], which is not the case for the fast of an individual. G. On a public fast it is prohibited to do work, bathe, anoint, put on a sandal, or have sexual relations, which is not the case for an individual’s fast. H. On a public fast they gather in the synagogues and read the Scriptures, which is not the case for an individual’s fast. L On a public fast they bring the ark out into the street of the town, which is not the case for an individual’s fast. J. On a public fast they say twenty-four blessings, which is not the case for an individual’s fast. K. On a public fast the priests raise up their hands [in the priestly benediction] four times in the day, which is not the case for an individual’s fast. 1,. On a public fast they do not interrupt [the sequence of fasts] for festival days which are inscribed in the Fasting-scroll, which is not the case for an individual’s fast.

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2:5 A. M#SH W: They decreed a fast on Hanukkah in Lud [vs. M. Ta. 2:10]. B. They told R. Eliezer about it, and he got a haircut. C. They told R. Joshua about it, and he took a bath. D. R. Joshua said to them, “Now go and fast because you have called a fast [on such a day].” E. So long as Rabban Gamaliel was alive, the law followed his opinion [cf. M. Ta. 2:10B]. F. After Rabban Gamaliel’s death, R. Joshua wanted to nullify his opinion. G. R. Yohanan b. Nuri got up on his feet and said [Aramaic:] “It appears right to follow after the head of the body. So long as Rabban Gamaliel was alive, the law followed his opinion. Now that he has died, do you want to nullify his opinion” H. Said R. Joshua, “We shall listen to you. Let us now affirm the law in accord with the opinion of Rabban Gamaliel.” I. And nobody said a thing against his view.

The ma#aseh, T. 2:5A+D, hardly forms a standard precedent/case, because the conduct of the sages is not generalized. Joshua’s ruling is the key. Without B-C, his ruling would mark a conventional case-ruling. That is why I indent those entries and treat the ma#aseh as comprised by A+D. Tosefta-tractate Ta#aniyyot (Ta#anit) 2:13 A. M#SH B: To a certain pious man did they say, “Pray, so it will rain.” B. He prayed and it rained. C. They said to him, “Just as you have prayed so it would rain, now pray so the rain will go away.” D. He said to them, “Go and see if a man is standing on Keren Ofel [a high rock] and splashing his foot in the Qidron Brook. [Then] we shall pray that the rain will stop [cf. M. Ta. 3:8]. E. “Truly it is certain that the Omnipresent will never again bring a flood to the world, F. “for it is said, ‘There will never again be a flood’ (Gen. 9:11). G. “And it says, ‘For this is like the days of Noah to me: as I swore that the waters of Noah should no more go over the earth, so I have sworn that I will not be angry with you and will not rebuke you’ (Is. 54:9).”

What we have is a remnant, intelligible only in its Mishnaic context, to which explicit allusion is made at C, D. Hence I cannot classify this item without reference to its counterpart at M. Ta. 3:8. It is not a case/precedent. But I do not grasp how it coheres, since I see two components, A-B, and C-D, lacking the focus that should hold them together. This is too fragmentary to offer guidance. It appears to me an epitome of the Mishnah’s fully articulated narrative; or the latter spells out what is fully encompassed here. A theory that the Mishnah is prior to the Tosefta, or its

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version there is prior to its version here, would take the former view, a theory that the Tosefta is prior to the Mishnah, which serves as a mere epitome, would take the latter view. Whichever way one goes, I do not see the two as autonomous of one another. Tosefta-tractate Ta#aniyyot (Ta#anit) 3:7 A. What was the matter having to do with the families of the Pestle-Smugglers and the Fig-Pressers [M. Ta. 4:5H]? B. Now when the Greek kings set up border-guards on the roads, so that people should not go up to Jerusalem, just as Jeroboam the son of Nebat did, then, whoever was a suitable person and sin-fearing of that generation—what did he do? C. He would take up his first fruits and make a kind of basket and cover them with dried figs, D. and take the basket with the first-fruits and cover them with a kind of dried figs, E. and he would put them in a basket and take the basket and a pestle on his shoulder and go up. F. Now when he would come to that guard, [the guard] would say to him, “Where are you going?” G. He said to him, “To make these two rings of dried figs into cakes of pressed figs in that press over there, with this pestle which is on my shoulder.” H. Once he got by that guard, he would prepare a wreath for them and bring them up to Jerusalem. 3:8 A. What is the matter having to do with the family of Salmai the Netophathites [cf. I Chron. 2:54: “The sons of Salma: Bethlehem, the Netophathites”]? B. Now when the Greek kings set up guards on the roads so that the people should not go up to Jerusalem, just as Jeroboam the son of Nebat did, C. then whoever was a suitable and sin-fearing person of that generation would take two pieces of wood and make them into a kind of ladder and put it on his shoulder and go up. D. When he came to that guard, [the guard] said to him, “Where are you going?” E. “To fetch two pigeons from that dovecote over there, with this ladder on my shoulder.” F. Once he got by that guard, he would dismantle [the pieces of wood of the ladder] and bring them up to Jerusalem. G. Now because they were prepared to give up their lives for the Torah and for the commandments, therefore they found for themselves a good name and a good memorial forever. H. And concerning them Scripture says, “The memory of a righteous person is for a blessing” (Prov. 10:17). I. But concerning Jeroboam son of Nebat and his allies, Scripture says, “But the name of the wicked will rot” (Prov. 10:17).

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We have before us truly satisfying narratives, following a pattern and fully realized. In the context of the Tosefta, these form the counterpart to the fine narratives of M. R.H. 2:8-9 and M. Ta. 3:9-10. But while those items constitute the sole successful narratives of the Mishnah, these have counterparts throughout the Tosefta. In Chapter Fifteen we shall compare the Mishnah’s treatment of the rite, M. Bik. 3:2-6, to the Tosefta’s narrative of the same rite, T. Ta. 3:7, with, I think, productive results. There a pattern emerges that accounts for the character of the case at hand. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The two matched stories, T. 3:7B-H, and T. 3:8A-F, come to their climax at T. 3:8GH+I. That is what makes all the details flow together into a coherent statement. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? At issue is the pestlesmugglers’ and fig-pressers’ conduct in the face of adversity. They would dissimulate and get by the guards, bringing first fruits to Jerusalem, bringing the wood offering to the altar. The actions then respond to the prohibition of doing so. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? Each story is in two parts, T. 3:7B-E, the preparation of the produce, matched by T. 3:8A-C, then the encounter with the guard, T. 3:7F-H, T. 3:8DF. Then the shared third and climactic part completes the tripartite composition.

X. Tractate Megillah Tosefta-tractate Megillah 2:4 A. [If] he read it by night, he has not fulfilled his obligation. B. Said R. Yosé, M#SH B: R. Yohanan b. Nuri read it by night in Sepphoris.” C. They said to him, “What was done in the time of danger proves nothing.” 2:5 A. [If] one read it by heart [instead of from a written version], he has not carried out his obligation. B. Said R. Simeon b. Eleazar, “M#SH B: R. Meir went to Assya to intercalate the year, and he did not find there a Scroll of Esther written in Hebrew.

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C. “So he wrote one out from memory, and then he went and read [the Scroll of Esther] from it.” D. [If] one read it, whether standing or sitting or lying, E. whether one set up a translator [alongside], F. whether one [did not] say a blessing before it, but said a blessing after it, whether he said a blessing after it but did not say a blessing before it, whether he did not say a blessing either before it or after it, G. he has carried out his obligation. H. Said R. Simeon b. Eleazar, “‘ M#SH B: R. Meir read [the Scroll of Esther] in the synagogue in Tibe’on while sitting down, and the members of the synagogue were sitting down. I. “When he completed reading it, he gave it to another person, and [the other] said a blessing over it.”

I see three more or less standard ma#asim: case/precedents in each case, at T. 2:4B, T. 2:5B, and T. 2:5H-I. Tosefta-tractate Megillah 2:17 A. Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq purchased the synagogue of the Alexandrians which was located in Jerusalem, and he did exactly as he wanted with it. B. “They prohibited using such a building for secular purposes] only if the original name still applies to it.”

The ma#aseh as case/precedent poses no surprises. Tosefta-tractate Megillah 3:34 A. “Make known to Jerusalem her abominations” (Ez. 16:2) is read and translated [vs. M. Meg. 4:10H]. B. M#SH B: A certain party was reading before R. Eliezer, “Make known to Jerusalem her abominations.” C. He said to him, “Go out and proclaim your mother’s abominations” [cf. M. Meg. 4:10H]. D. The story of the Chariot do they read in public. 3:35 A. The story of Reuben is read and not translated [M. Meg. 4:1OA B. M#SH B: R. Hanina b. Gamaliel was reading in Kabul, “Reuben went and lay with Bilhah his father’s concubine” (Gen. 35:22). “and the sons of Jacob were twelve” (Gen.. 35:22). C. And he said to the translator, “Translate only the latter [part of the verse, but not the former part].”

The two ma#asim, T. 3:34B-C and T. 3:35 B-C, are standard case/ precedents by the Tosefta’s lights. But the Mishnah will have preferred a more generalizing formulation, e.g., of T. 3:34D and T. 3:35D. It is a small difference from the norm.

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XI. Tractate Mo’ed (Mo’ed Qatan) Tosefta-tractate Mo#ed (Mo#ed Qatan) 2:14 A. They take seats by the chair of gentiles [at which they do business] on the Sabbath. B. For in the beginning they ruled that they do not take seats by the chair of gentiles on the Sabbath, C. until R. Aqiba came and taught that they take seats by the chair of gentiles on the Sabbath. 2:15 A. WM#SH B: Rabban Gamaliel took a seat by the chair of gentiles on the Sabbath in Akko. B. They said to him, “They were not accustomed to take seats at the chair of gentiles on the Sabbath.” C. But he did not want to say, “You are permitted to do so.” D. So he got up and went on his way. E. M#SH B: Judah and Hillel, sons of Rabban Gamaliel, went in to take a bath in Kabul. F. They said to him, “They were not accustomed to have two brothers take a bath together.” G. They did not want to say, “You are permitted to do so.” H. So they went in and took a bath one after the other. 2:16 A. SWB M#SH B: Judah and Hillel, sons of Rabban Gamaliel would go out in golden slippers on the Sabbath in Biri. B. They said to them, “They were not accustomed to go out in golden slippers on the Sabbath.” C. They did not want to say to them, “You are permitted.” D. So they sent them along with their servants.

1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The three matched ma#asim, T. 2:15A-D, E-H, and T. 2:16A-D, all hold together by reason of a single policy: to honor local custom, even though the Halakhah permits what custom prohibits. And still more: the patriarch and his sons do not exercise their authority, though with the Halakhah behind them and the status of office sustaining them, they can have overridden local sensibilities. So the unifying message for all three concerns the patriarchate and its light and easy yoke. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? The issue is precipitated by the contrast between the conduct of the Rabbinic sages and the objection raised by the locals. It is resolved by the irenic conduct of the sages.

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3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? The anticipated three components of each story is, first, the conduct of the sage, second, the comment of the locals, and, third, the action of the sage, who did not wish to correct the wrong impression that prevailed of the requirements of the Halakhah. XII. Tractate Hagigah Tosefta-tractate Hagigah 2:1 A. They do not expound upon the laws of prohibited relationships [Lev. 18] before three persons, B. but they do expound them before two; C. or about the Works of Creation before two D. but they do expound them before one; E. or about the Chariot [Ez. 1] before one, unless he was a sage land understands of his own knowledge [M. Hag. 2:1A-B]. F. M#SH B: Rabban Yohanan b. Zakkai was riding on an ass, and R. Eleazar b. Arakh was driving the ass from behind G. He [Eleazar] said to him, “Rabbi, repeat for me a chapter of the works of the Chariot.” H. He said to him, “Have I not ruled for you to begin with that they do not repeat [the tradition] concerning the Chariot for an individual, unless he was a sage and understands of his own knowledge” I. He said to him, “Now may I lay matters out before you?” J. He said to him, “Say on.” K. R. Eleazar b. Arakh commenced and expounded concerning the works of the Chariot. L. Rabban Yohanan b. Zakkai got off his ass, wrapped himself in his cloak, and the two of them sat down on a rock under an olive tree, and [Eleazar] laid matters out before him. M. [Yohanan] got up and kissed him on his head and said to him “Blessed be the Lord, God of Israel, who gave to Abraham, our father, a son who knows how to understand and expound upon the glory of his father who is in heaven. N. “Some preach nicely but do not practice nicely, or practice nicely but do not preach nicely. 0. “Eleazar b. Arakh preaches nicely and practices nicely. P. “Happy are you, O Abraham, our father, for Eleazar b. Arakh has gone forth from your loins, Q. “who knows how to understand and expound upon the glory of his Father who is in heaven.” 2:2 A. R. Yosé b. Judah says, “R. Joshua laid matters out before Rabban Yohanan b. Zakkai.

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B. “R. Aqiba laid matters out before R. Joshua. C. “Hananiah b. Kinai laid matters out before R. Aqiba.”

This is a famous, much cited narrative. Its interest for our inquiry carries us only to the surface of the story; speculation on the doctrines and their character need not detain us. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The Halakhah is that one must not expound the works of the chariot except in the case of an unusually well qualified disciple. Eleazar b. Arakh undertakes such an exposition, and Yohanan approves the outcome. All the details cohere at the end, the question being answered affirmatively. The Tosefta concretizes the law of the Mishnah, and the purpose of its narrative is to show how the law applies. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? At issue, as noted, is whether Eleazar qualifies, and he does. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? First comes the challenge, then the action, finally the response, F-H, I-K, L-Q, a tripartite construction in which each part is required, and the positions of them all are dictated by the logical requirement of the narrative itself. All that is lacking is the center of the matter: what he actually said. That is the missing entry, between L and M. Tosefta-tractate Hagigah 2:3-6 A. Four entered the garden [Paradise]: Ben #Azzai, Ben Zoma, the Other [Elisha], and Aqiba. B. One gazed and perished, one gazed and was smitten, one gazed and cut down sprouts, and one went up whole and came down whole. C. Ben #Azzai gazed and perished. D. Concerning him Scripture says, “Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints” (Ps. 116:15). E. Ben Zoma gazed and was smitten. F. Concerning him Scripture says, “If you have found honey, eat only enough for you, lest you be sated with it and vomit it” (Prov. 25:16). G. Elisha gazed and cut down sprouts H. Concerning him Scripture says, “Let not your mouth lead you into sin” (Qoh. 5:5). 2:4 A. R. Aqiba went up whole and came down whole B. Concerning him Scripture says, “Draw me after you, let us make haste. The king has brought me into his chambers” (Song of Songs 1:4). 2:5 A. To what is the matter to be compared?

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T. 2:3A-H, 2:4 do not constitute narratives. I discern no teleology for the compositions, no point they wish to register in selecting and arranging data as they do. They describe something that has happened, but they do not report why what has been done or said matters. Like the prior item, they do not even hint at what has been said or done; implied is doctrine not articulated, activity not recorded. What is of particular interest is T. 2:5, the two-part Mashal, A-B, C-F. Here too I see no narrative in any conventional sense, simply a described situation, lacking all activity or purpose. (In Volume Two of this project, I shall compare the mashal, translated as parable, as a form utilized in diverse form and for various purposes from one document to the next. In that context the Mishnah’s and Tosefta’s meshalim will play their part.) The contrast with the following is then telling. Tosefta-tractate Hagigah 2:6 A. M#SH B: R. Joshua was walking in a piazza, and Ben Zoma was coming toward him. B. When he reached him, he did not greet him. C. He said to him, “From whence and whither, Ben Zoma?” D. He said to him, “I was concentrating upon the works of Creation, and there is not even a handbreadth [of distance] between the upper waters and the nether waters, E. “for it says, ‘The spirit of God was moving over the face of the waters’ (Gen. 1:2). F. “And it says, ‘Like an eagle that stirs up its nest that flutters over its young, spreading out its wings, catching them, bearing them on its pinions, so the Lord alone did lead him’ (Deut. 32:12). G. “Just as this eagle flutters above its nest, touching and not touching, so there is no more space between the upper waters and the nether waters than a handbreadth.” H. Said R. Joshua to his disciples, “Ben Zoma already is on the outside [among the sectarians].” I. The days were only a few before Ben Zoma disappeared

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Here is the sole point at which we are told what, in fact, constituted the doctrine subject to condemnation, D-G. But the narrative setting is integral to the exposition, not a mere formality of dramatized dialogue. 1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The purpose of the narrative is to explain the fate of Ben Zoma, H-I. That is the direction of the prior components of the construction. A-C form the prologue, D-G, the main event, and then H-I tie the whole together. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? At issue is what Ben Zoma said or did that accounted for his disappearance. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? The three components are clear as stated above. Tosefta-tractate Hagigah 2:11 A. M#SH B: Hillel the Elder laid on hands on a whole-offering in the courtyard [cf. M. Hag. 2:3B], and the disciples of Shammai ganged up on him. B. He said to them, “Go and see it, for it is a female, and I have to prepare it as sacrifices of peace-offerings. C. He put them off with a bunch of words, and they went their way. D. But the power of the House of Shammai forthwith became strong, and they wanted to decide the law permanently in accord with their opinion. E. Now there was present Baba b. Buta who was one of the disciples of the House of Shammai, but who acknowledged that the law is in accord with the opinions of the House of Hillel in every last detail. F. He went and brought the whole Qedar-flock and set them up right in the courtyard and announced, “Whoever is required to bring wholeofferings and peace-offerings—let him come and take a beast and lay on hands” [= M. Hag. 2:3B]. G. So [everybody] came along and took a beast and offering up wholeofferings, having laid on hands. H. On that very day the law was confirmed in accord with the opinion of the House of Hillel, I. and not a single person griped about it. Tosefta-tractate Hagigah 2:12 A. SWB M#SH B: Another disciple of the disciples of the House of Hillel laid hands on a whole-offering. B. One of the disciples of Shammai found him out. C. He said to him, “What’s this laying on of hands?!” D. He said to him, “What’s this shutting up?!”

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E. And he shut him up by force.

1. On what basis does the narrative attain coherence, e.g., what is the action or event that precipitates the telling of the tale? The narrative, T. 2:11A-I, explains how it came about that the Temple was conducted in accord with Hillel’s views, not Shammai’s. That purpose, H-I, is what lends cogency to the entire prior narrative. The construction is in these part: A-D, the challenge of the House of Shammai, by reason of Hillel’s dissimulation; then E-G, Baba b. Buta’s intervention and finally, H-I, the denouement—a smooth and systematic exposition. T. 2:12 reinforces the account to which it is attached. In context it makes the same point. 2. What point of conflict or intersection of wills accounts for the telling of the tale and how is the point of tension resolved tale? How the Shammaites took over, how they were driven out—these form the program of the two narratives. 3. How, in light of other, comparable, pieces of writing and the data that they yield, is the narrative classified, and what are its indicative formal qualities, e.g., long or short, complex or simple tale? The three-part construction is obvious. For T. 2:12 it is A, B-C, D-E. Tosefta-tractate Hagigah 2:13 A. Pentecost which coincided with a Monday or a Thursday or a Friday, or on any day of the week— B. the House of Shammai say, “The day of slaughter [for the offering] is on the next day.” C. And the House of Hillel say, “There is no [such thing as] a day of slaughter [but burnt-offerings brought as appearance-offerings are offered up on the festival day itself, except when Pentecost coincides with the Sabbath].” D. M#SH S: Alexa died in Lud, and the townsfolk gathered to make a lament for him [on the “day of slaughter”]. E. Said to them R. Tarfon, “Go away. People do not make a lamentation on a festival day” [vs. M. Hag. 2:4F].

The ma#aseh is a standard case/precedent, subject to variation to be sure. XIII. Summary Here are the pseudo-narratives I have identified. Later on, the entire list in hand, from the perspective of the Mishnah and its uniform definition of the ma#aseh, I differentiate the standard cases/ precedents from unconventional ones.

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a. Standard Ma#asim/Cases/Precedents 1. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 1:12-13: Said R. Ishmael, “One time I read by the light of a lamp, and [forgetfully,] I wanted to tilt it [to get more oil on the wick]. 2. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 2:4: Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “The members of father’s house would wrap flax around a nut and would kindle [the Sabbath light] with it.” 3. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 2:5: Said R. Judah, “When we were staying in the upper room of Nitze’s house in Lud, they would pierce an egg-shell and fill it with oil and put it over the mouth of a lamp on the eve of the Sabbath at dusk.” 4. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 3:3: Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: [In the case of] the bath of Bene Beraq they stopped up the openings on the eve of the festival.” 5. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 3:4: Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: In the case of Baitos b. Zonen they filled a dipper of cold water for him on the eve of the Sabbath and poured it on him on the Sabbath, so as to cool him off.” 6. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 5:12: Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: Hyrcanus, the son of R. Eliezer, went out in his scarf to the public domain.” 7. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 5:13: Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: R. Tarfon went forth on Friday nights to the school-house, and they gave him a cloth, and he held on to it with both hands and went out in it to keep off the rain.” 8. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 7:16: M#SH B: Judah and Hillel, sons of Rabban Gamaliel, came to the town of Kabul. The people of the town led wine and oil through them in pipes [as a sign of honor]. 9. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 7:(17)18: M#SH S: Rabban Gamaliel the elder died, and Onqelos, the proselyte, burned a pyre for him of a value of more than seventy minahs. 10. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 13:2: Said R. Yosé, “M#SH S: R. Halafta went to Rabban Gamaliel in Tiberias and found him seated at the table of Yohanan b. Nezif. In his hand was the Scroll of Job in Targum, which he was reading. 11. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 13:4: M#SH B: A certain person would write blessings, and they told R Ishmael about him. R. Ishmael went to examine him. When he [Ishmael] was climbing the ladder, he [the writer] sensed his coming. He took the sheaf of blessings and put it into a dish of water. 12. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 13:9: M#SH A fire broke out in the courtyard of Joseph b. Simai of Sihin. The soldiers of the detachment in Sepphoris came to put it out, but he did not let them do so. A rain-cloud burst and put it out. Sages said, “It was not necessary [to behave in such a way].” Even so, after the Sabbath he sent each one of them a sela, and to their commander he sent fifty denars.

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13. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 13:14: M#SH B: Rabban Gamaliel and el ders were coming along in a ship and the [Sabbath] day became sanctified. 14. Tosefta-tractate Shabbat 15:8: M#SH B: Four sisters in Sepphoris: the son of the first was circumcised and died, the second, and he died, the third, and he died. The case came before sages, who ruled, “The fourth should not be circumcised.” 15. Tosefta-tractate Erubin 1:2: M#SH B: R. Eliezer went to Joseph b. Peredah in Ublin. And he saw that he had an alley-entry with only a single sidepost. He said to him, “Make a second for it.” 16. Tosefta-tractate Erubin 3:17: Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: In the household of Mammal and in the household of Gurion in Rome, they would hand out dried figs to the poor in time of famine. 17. Tosefta-tractate Erubin 5:6–7: Said Rabbi, “M#SH B: Ben Napha had five courtyards in Usha. And he prohibited only the place where he usually lived—that alone.” 18. Tosefta-tractate Erubin 5:24: Said Rabbi, “When I was studying Torah with R. Simeon in Teqo#a, we used to bring oil in an unguent from the courtyard to the roof, and from the roof to the shed, and from one shed to another shed, until we reached the spring. And there we would wash ourselves [using the oil we had carried].” 19. Tosefta-tractate Erubin 6:1-2: Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: A watercourse came from Abel to Sepphoris, and we would draw water from it on the Sabbath at the instruction of sages.” 20. T. Pisha 3:11: Said R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq, “One time we were in session before Rabban Gamaliel in the study-house in Lud. And Zonen, who was in charge, came along and said, ‘The time has come to burn the leaven.’ So father and I went along to the house of Rabban Gamaliel and we burned the leaven.” 21. T. Pisha 3:20: Said R. Yosé, “M#SH B: The son of Ben Nebo-hayyon— his father [Nebo-hayyon] left over the corner of the field for turnips. He came and found the poor gathered at the gate of his garden [laden with vegetables]. He said [to his sons], ‘My children, shall we not pay attention to the teachings of sages?’ Throw it from your hands. So they threw it down, and he gave them [the poor] twice as much produce as [poor man’s] tithe in the form of that which had been tithed.” 22. T. Pisha 8:4: Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: Hezekiah, king of Judah, forced the community to observe a second Passover, as it is said”. 23. Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 1:13-14: M#SH B: One of the sons of Martha, daughter of Boethus, could take two sides of an ox which cost one thousand zuz and walk with them heel to toe and bring them up onto the altar. 24. Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 1:21-22: M#SH B: Ishmael b. Phiabi’s mother made for him a tunic worth a hundred maneh.. SWB M#SH B: Eleazar b. Harsom’s mother made for him a tunic for twenty thousand, and he would stand and make offerings on the altar while wearing it.

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25. Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 2:13: M#SH B: A high priest took a long time. They said to him, “Why did you take a long time?” He said to them, “I was praying for you and for the sanctuary of your fathers that it not be destroyed.” 26. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 1:1: Said R. Judah, ‘M#SH B: Helene’s Sukkah was twenty cubits tall, and sages went in and out, when visiting her, and not one of them said a thing.” 27. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 1:7: Said R. Judah, ‘M#SH B: In the time of the danger we used to lean ladders together and make Sukkah-roofing on top of them out of boards and then sleep under them.” 28. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 2:2-3: Said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, “M#SH W: I had a pain in the eye in Caesarion, and R. Yosé b. Rabbi permitted me to sleep, along with my servant, outside of the Sukkah.” Said Rabbi, “When we were coming—I and R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq—to visit R. Yohanan b. Nuri in Bet Shearim, we would eat figs and grapes outside of the Sukkah” [cf. M. Suk. 2:4D]. 29. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 2:2-3: M#SH B: The Jerusalemites would let down their beds through the windows ten handbreadths high and covered over them with a Sukkah-roofing and slept under them. 30. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 2:9-10: Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: The townsfolk of the villages would leave their lulabs to their children in time of need.” Said R. Meir, “M#SH B: The townsfolk of Jerusalem bound up their lulabs with gold threads.” 31. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 3:1: M#SH W: The Boethusians piled up big boulders [on the willows which had been lined up around the altar] on the eve of the Sabbath. The common folk discovered them and came and dragged them away and took them out from underneath the boulders on the Sabbath. 32. Tosefta-tractate Sukkah 4:4: M#SH B: Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel danced with eight flaming torches, and not one of them fell to the ground. 33. Tosefta-tractate Yom Tob (Besah) 2:11-13: WM#SH B: Rabban Gamaliel and elders were reclining together when in Rome, and a candlestick fell down on the night of a festival. R. Aqiba got up and put it back together. Said to him Rabban Gamaliel, “Aqiba! What business do you have to poke your head into fights!” Said R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq, “Many times did we eat in the house of Rabban Gamaliel, and not once did I ever see them sweeping between the couches [after a meal]., Said R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq, “Many times did we eat in the house of Rabban Gamaliel, and not once did I ever see them put spices into the spout. 34. Tosefta-tractate Yom Tob (Besah) 2:16: Said R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq, “One time father was reclining before Rabban Gamaliel, and they brought before him wine-lees and vinegar-lees, and on them were crushed peppers, and father kept his hands off. 35. Tosefta-tractate Rosh Hashanah 1:16: M#SH B: R. Nehorai came with a witness on the Sabbath to Usha and gave testimony concerning him.

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36. Tosefta-tractate Ta#aniyyot (Ta#anit) 2:4: M#SH W: They decreed a fast on Hanukkah in Lud [vs. M. Ta. 2:10]. They told R. Eliezer about it, and he got a haircut. They told R. Joshua about it, and he took a bath. 37. Tosefta-tractate Megillah 2:4: Said R. Yosé, M#SH B: R Yohanan b. Nuri read it by night in Sepphoris.” 38. Tosefta-tractate Megillah 2:4: Said R. Simeon b. Eleazar, “M#SH B: R. Meir went to Assya to intercalate the year, and he did not find there a Scroll of Esther written in Hebrew. 39. Tosefta-tractate Megillah 2:4: Said R. Simeon b. Eleazar, “M#SH B: R. Meir read [the Scroll of Esther] in the synagogue in Tibe’on while sitting down, and the members of the synagogue were sitting down. 40. Tosefta-tractate Megillah 2:17: Said R. Judah, “M#SH B: R. Eleazar b. R. Sadoq purchased the synagogue of the Alexandrians which was located in Jerusalem, and he did exactly as he wanted with it. 41. Tosefta-tractate Megillah 3:34: M#SH B: A certain party was reading before R. Eliezer, “Make known to Jerusalem her abominations.” He said to him, “Go out and proclaim your mother’s abominations” [cf. M. Meg. 4:10H]. 42. Tosefta-tractate Megillah 3:34: M#SH B: R. Hanina b. Gamaliel was reading in Kabul, “Reuben went and lay with Bilhah his father’s concubine” (Gen. 35:22). “and the sons of Jacob were twelve” (Gen.. 35:22). And he said to the translator, “Translate only the latter [part of the verse, but not the former part].” 43. Tosefta-tractate Mo#ed (Mo#ed Qatan) 2:15: Rabban Gamaliel took a seat by the chair of gentiles on the Sabbath in Akko. They said to him, “They were not accustomed to take seats at the chair of gentiles on the Sabbath.” But he did not want to say, “You are permitted to do so.” So he got up and went on his way. 44. Tosefta-tractate Hagigah 2:13: M#SH S: Alexa died in Lud, and the townsfolk gathered to make a lament for him [on the “day of slaughter”]. Said to them R. Tarfon, “Go away. People do not make a lamentation on a festival day”.

We should not miss the variety of forms and types of composition signaled by the single marker, ma#aseh. The Mishnah’s ma#asim proved uniform: the report of a case of a Halakhic character and how it was resolved. The type dictated its own form: a simple declarative sentence, unadorned and undeveloped by, e.g., dialogue. Here alongside the ma#aseh of the Mishnah-type and form, we find other types of composition to which the marker is attached, and not all of them are Halakhic at all. Let us now classify the ma#asim that we have identified in two gross categories, Mishnahtype, and other-than-Mishnah-type. That is justified by the documentary character of the Tosefta, partially concentric with the

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Mishnah, partially free-standing. From the two catalogues that follow I omit a few items that seem to me ambiguous and not so readily classified. The upshot is clear. Ma#asim of the Mishnah-type (Halakhic, no dialogue, focused on a legal problem, exemplified by a particular case shorn of all distinguishing traits of occasion; executed by a simple declarative sentence, without dialogue other than in the ruling on the case/ precedent, e.g., he said/sages said, and the like): 1. T. Shab. 3:3 2. T. Shab. 3:4 3. T. Shab. 15:8 [joined by an unconventional reprise involving a particular sage reporting on his own activity] 4. T. Erub. 5:6-7 5. T. Suk. 1:1 6. T. Suk. 2:3 7. T. Suk. 2:9-10 (2x) 8. T. R.H. 1:16 9. T. Meg. 2:17

As we should expect in a document that intersects in structure, program and topic with the Mishnah, the Tosefta does replicate the Mishnaic ma#aseh—but loosens its form and redefines its purpose, as we shall now see. The marker ma#aseh now signals a variety of types and forms, not only the stripped down, Halakhic type and form that predominates in the Mishnah. Ma#asim of Other-than-the-Mishnah-type (characterized item by item): 1. T. Shab. 1:12-13: first-person account of how the sage violated the normative law and responded. 2. T. Shab. 2:4: first person dialogue of how sages conducted themselves in the household of a principal authority. 3. T. Shab. 2:5: as above. 4. T. Shab. 5:12: practice of a sage, commented on. 5. T. Shab. 5:13: as above. 6. T. Shab. 7:16: local practice described, not objected to by sages. 7. T. Shab. 7:18: report of action of an individual in a particular case. 8. T. Shab. 13:2: report of an incident 9. T. Shab. 13:4: as above; account of what happened when the Halakhah was violated. 10. T. Shab. 13:9: protracted composition reporting a particular case, pertinent to the Halakhah but not conforming to its rule. 11. T. Shab. 13:14: dialogue lays out the circumstance of an action by a sage.

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12. T. Erub. 1:2: sage instructs on how to carry out the law, use of dialogue, not merely a described situation and a ruling. 13. T. Erub. 3:17: no Halakhic ruling set forth. 14. T. Erub. 5:24: when I was…we used to… 15. T. Erub. 6:1-2: as above. 16. T. Pisha 3:11: as above. 17. T. Pisha 3:20: protracted account of what was said and done, exemplary behavior that transcended the strict requirements of the Halakhah. 18. T. Pisha 8:4: the form of Judah’s report is standard, X did Y, but the source of the Halakhic precedent is highly unusual in this context: it is Scripture itself. This is the only case in Tosefta, so far as our sample indicates, in which the authority and active ruling of a Halakhic judgment derive from Scripture, not from the deed of a sage. 19. T. Kip. 21:13-14: this is not a Halakhic ruling at all, rather, a report of an unusual case. It is not often that ma#aseh marks what is exceptional, not what is ordinary and normative. 20. T. Kip. 1:21-22: as above. 21. T. Kip. 2:13: this is not a Halakhic ruling at all. 22. T. Suk. 1:7: first person account of what “we” sages used to do. 23. T. Suk. 2:2-3: “I had a pain in the eye and the sage permitted me…” 24. T. Suk. 3:1: narrative of how the common folk disposed of a Halakhic practice of sectarians. 25. T. Suk. 4:4: not a Halakhic entry. 26. T. Y.T. 2:11-13: reports on actions of “we”. 27. T. Y.T. 2:16: as above. 28. T. Ta. 2:4: actions of sages in response to a decision. 29. T. Ta. 2:4: action of sage in response to a circumstance. 30. T. Meg. 2:4: action of sage as a model. 31. T. Meg. 3:34: ad hoc decision of a sage in response to a particular case. 32. T. Meg. 3:34: as above. 33. T. Moed 2:15: action of individual sage in the context of local custom; particular, not general, Halakhic setting, 2 x. 34. T. Hag. 2:13: ruling of a sage in a particular circumstance.

As I see it, the Tosefta’s utilization of the signal, ma#aseh, enlarges the repertoire of possibilities associated with that indicator. How does the evidence yield that result? First, while the Mishnah ordinarily means by ma#aseh a case that signifies the state of the Halakhah, that is, an example of what is general and not what is particular to a circumstance or a named authority or the collegium of sages all together, in the Tosefta, the indicator very commonly alludes to a distinctive case, a special situation and precisely not one subject to generalization in and of itself. The first-person accounts of what “we” used to do in the household of such and such authority, or of what that au-

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thority permitted or forbade, contrast with the predominance of exemplary cases/precedents, autonomous of the particularities of circumstance. Defining the Halakhah as what applies in general to all circumstances, we may say, in the Tosefta the ma#aseh encompasses the particular, sometimes even the unique (the ruling of a given sage under very special conditions, e.g., when sages did not disrupt local custom). In a variety of cases, on which we have already remarked, the Tosefta concretizes and localizes the Mishnah’s general law.1 So the narrowly-Halakhic purpose served by the ma#aseh in the Mishnah now is joined by usages that the presentation of the Halakhah in its own terms and framework does not require. That generalization encompasses, too, the focus on particular cases of an other-than-exemplary character. In line with that extension of the signal beyond its original, Mishnaic discipline, second, we note the loosening of the form, matching the shift in the type. Now there is ample room for dialogue, secondary accounts of described action, the rhetoric of narrative, if not a fully realized, logically-teleological narrative. So too, we note cases in which ma#aseh marks a theological exposition, where the meaning of the law is spelled out, and a case in which Scripture itself is invoked as the source of a Halakhic fact (!), the ma#aseh-form being abandoned in favor of citation-rhetoric. The rhetoric of autobiographical narrative (“I had a pain in the eye and…”) has no common counterpart in the Mishnah’s ma#asim, any more than the Mishnah’s account of the circumstances of a ruling sustains the particularities that the Tosefta’s ma#aseh perfectly routinely records. Nor does the Mishnah’s ma#aseh ever, ever include the response or result of a ruling, such as the Tosef1 Whether we say, the Mishnah generalizes and then the Tosefta particularizes, or the Tosefta begins with a case, on which the Mishnah then generalizes, the phenomenon is the same. It does seem to me more likely that the Mishnah is prior to the Tosefta in time, because the Tosefta does cite verbatim passages that are original to the Mishnah and only secondary to the Tosefta. By that I mean, passages that conform to the formal and logical traits of the Mishnah in general seem to me primary to the Mishnah and secondary to the Tosefta. Passages that ignore the Mishnah’s fixed forms and are framed within the Tosefta’s looser ones would seem to me not primary to the Mishnah. That argument works itself out in the comparison of Leviticus Rabbah and Pesiqta deRab Kahana, where shared pisqa’ot can be shown to be primary to Leviticus Rabbah and secondary to Pesiqta deRab Kahana. But nothing in the present exercise depends upon the historical sequence of the documents, the Mishnah and the Tosefta. The phenomenological differences remain fixed, however they be temporally ordered.

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ta’s usage commonly encompasses. In all these aspects, as well as obvious ones not remarked upon, the ma#aseh in the Tosefta is readily distinguished, both as to type and as to form, from the counterpart in the Mishnah. That does not mean in a blind test, we could differentiate the Mishnah’s from the Tosefta’s ma#aseh, for the reason indicated above: the Tosefta not only affords a hearing to its distinctive types and forms of the ma#aseh, it also recapitulates, verbatim and otherwise, the Mishnah’s counterpart type and form. But handed a set of ma#asim both typical of, and different from, those in the Mishnah, we should have no difficulty whatsoever in picking out those that are primary to the Tosefta and alien to the Mishnah. Where there are differences from the Mishnah’s types and forms, there the Tosefta’s documentary program signals its presence. And that is how the Tosefta’s framers always define their plan: where they intersect with, but then part company from, the Mishnah: citation and gloss, then autonomous statement of their own. These same observations will be seen to pertain to the varieties of signals delivered by the marker, ma#aseh, in the other divisions of the document. b. Narrative Settings for the Exposition of Propositions 1. T. Pisha 4:13-14: One time the fourteenth of Nisan coincided with the Sabbath. They asked Hillel the Elder, “As to the Passover-sacrifice, does it override [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath? He said to them, “Now do we have only a single Passover-sacrifice in the course of the year which overrides [the prohibitions] of the Sabbath? We have many more than three hundred Passover-sacrifices in the year, and they all override [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath.” All the people in the courtyard ganged up on him. 2. Tosefta-tractate Kippurim (Yoma) 2:7: Said R. Aqiba, “Simeon b. Luga told me, ‘A certain child of the sons of their sons and I were gathering grass in the field’. Then I saw him laugh and cry. I said to him, ‘Why did you cry?’ He said to me, ‘Because of the glory of father’s house, which has gone into exile.’ I said to him, ‘T