Reactions To Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914

REACTIONS T O IRIS H NATIONALIS M

1865 - 191 4

REACTIONS T O IRIS H NATIONALISM

WITH A N INTRODUCTIO N B Y ALAN O'DA Y

THE H A M B L E D O N PRES S LONDON AN

D RONCEVERT

E

Published b y The Hambledon Press , 198 7 102 Gloucester Avenue , London NW 1 8HX (U.K.) 309 Greenbrie r Avenue , Ronceverte , West Virginia 24970 (U.S.A.) ISBN 0 907628 8 5 0 © Th e contributors 198 7 All rights held b y Irish Historical Studies are reserved The publishers ar e grateful to th e editor s o f all the journals i n which these essay s fust appeare d fo r permission t o reproduce the m here . In particular, the y wis h to express their gratitud e t o Irish Historical Studies, the origina l sourc e of seven contributions herein .

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Reactions to Iris h nationalism , 1865-1914 . 1. Ireland - Histor y - 1837-190 1 2. Ireland - Histor y - 1901-191 0 3. Ireland - Histor y - 1910-192 1 I. O'Day, Ala n 941.5081 DA95 7 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Reactions to Iris h nationalism, 1865-1914. Includes bibliographical reference s and index . 1. Ireland - Politic s an d government - 1837-1901 . 2. Nationalism - Irelan d - History . 3. Ireland - Politic s and government - 1901-1910 . 4. Ireland - Politic s and government - 1910-1921 . 5. Home rule (Ireland ) 6. Ireland - Histor y - Autonom y an d independence movements. 7 . Irish question . I. O'Day, Ala n DA957.R43 198 7 941.50 8 87-100 Printed an d Bound in Great Britain by WBC (Printers) and WB C (Bookbinders), Maesteg

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

vii

List of Contributors i

x

Introduction by Alan O'Day

xi

1 Symbol s of Irish Nationalism Peter Alter

1

2 Patriotis m a s Pastime: Th e Appeal of Fenianis m in the Mid-1860s 2 R. V. Comerford

1

3 Irelan

d an d the Ballo t Act of 187 2 3 Michael Hurst

3

4 Th

e Political Mobilization of Iris h Farmer s 6 Samuel Clark

1

5 Th

e Tenants' Movement t o Captur e th e Irish Poor Law Boards, 1877-1 886 7 William L. Feingold

6 Th

e I.R.B . and th e Beginning s of the Gaeli c

Athletic Associatio n 9 W.F. Mandle

1 Cardina l Cullen and the National Association o f Ireland 11 Patrick J. Corish 8 Th

e Early Respons e o f the Iris h Catholi c Clerg y to th e Co-operativ e Movement 16 Liam Kennedy

9 Th

e Roma n Catholi c Churc h i n Ireland, 1898-191 8 18 David W. Miller

10 J.S

. Mill and the Iris h Question : Reform , an d th e Integrity o f the Empire , 1865-187 0 20 E.D. Steele

9

5

7

7 7

5

11 Th

e Irish Question an d Libera l Politics, 1886-189 4 23 D.A. Earner

12 Hom e Rule, Radicalism, and the Libera l Party, 1886-1895 25 Thomas William Heyck 13 Roseber y and Ireland, 1898-1903 : A Reappraisal 28 David W. Gutzke 14 Iris

h Home-Rule Finance: A Neglected Dimension of the Iris h Question, 1910-191 4 29

Patricia Jalland

7

9 5

7

15 Lor

d Randolp h Churchill and Home Rule 31 R.E. Quinault

16 Th

e Ulster Liberal Unionists and Loca l Government Reform, 1885-189 8 34 Catherine B. Shannon

7

17 Th

e Southern Iris h Unionists, the Iris h Question , and Britis h Politics, 1906-191 4 36 P.J. Buckland

5

Index 39

9

3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The articles reprinted her e firs t appeared in the followin g places and are reprinted b y the kin d permissio n o f the origina l publishers . 1 Studia

Hibernica, 14(1974) , pp. 104-23 .

2 Irish

Historical Studies, xxii, no. 8 7 (1981), pp. 239-50 .

3 Historical

Journal, vii i (1965), pp. 326-52 .

4 Canadian Review of Sociology an d A n thropology, 12(1975) , pp. 483-99 . 5 Albion, 6 Irish

1 (1975), pp. 216-31. Historical Studies, xx, no. 8 0 (1977), pp. 418-38.

7 Reportorium 8 Irish

Novum, 3 (1961-2) , pp. 13-61 .

Historical Studies, xxi, no. 8 1 (1978), pp. 55-74 .

9 Eire-Ireland,

iii (1968), pp. 75-91 .

10 Historical

Journal, xii i (1970), pp. 419-50 .

11 Historical

Journal, xi i (1969), pp. 51 1 -32.

12 Journal

of British Studies, xiii (1974), pp. 66-91 .

13 Bulletin o f th e Institute o f Historical Research, liii (1980), pp. 89-98 . 14 Irish

Historical Studies, xxiii , no. 9 1 (1983), pp . 233-53 .

15 Irish

Historical Studies, xxi, no. 8 4 (1981), pp. 377-403 .

16 Irish

Historical Studies, xviii, no. 7 1 (1973), pp. 407-23 .

17 Irish

Historical Studies, xv, no. 5 9 (1967), pp. 228-55 .

NOTES O N CONTRIBUTOR S Peter Alter, Deput y Directo r o f the Germa n Historica l Institute , London an d Professor o f Modern History a t th e Universit y of Cologne (Wes t Germany) . Patrick Buckland , Reader in History, Universit y of Liverpool . Samuel Clark , Associate Professo r o f Sociology , Universit y of Western Ontario (Canada) . R.V. Comerford, Lecturer in History, S t Patrick's College , Maynooth (Ireland) . Fr Patrick Corish , Professo r o f Modern History, S t Patrick's College , Maynooth (Ireland). William Feingol d taugh t Histor y a t Bellevu e College (Nebraska, U.S.A.) until his death. David W. Gutzke, Assistan t Professor o f History, Southwes t Missour i State Universit y (U.S.A.). D.A. Hamer, Professor o f History , Victoria Universit y of Wellington (New Zealand). T.W. Heyck, Professor o f History , Northwester n University (Illinois, U.S.A.). Michael Hurst, Fello w o f S t John's College, Oxford. Patricia Jalland , Lecture r in History, Murdock University (Australia) . Liam Kennedy, Lecturer i n Social an d Economi c History , Th e Queen's Universit y o f Belfast . William F. Mandle, Head o f the Schoo l of Libera l Studies , Canberra College of Advance d Education (Australia) . David W. Miller, Professor of History , Carnegie-Mello n University (Pennsylvania, U.S.A.). Alan O'Day , Senio r Lecture r i n History, Polytechni c o f North London. Roland Quinault , Senio r Lecture r in History, Polytechni c o f Nort h London. Catherine Shannon , Professor o f History, Westfiel d Stat e Universit y (Massachusetts, U.S.A.). E.D. Steele , Senio r Lecture r i n History, Universit y o f Leeds .

FOR MARGARET PATRICIA PURCEL L

INTRODUCTION ALAN O'DAY From the mid-1860s to 1914 the Irish problem was frequently the prime issue in British politics. Quantativel y it absorbed more time and energy than an y other question . Ther e was little about Ireland which wa s not aired at length in the press, in Parliament and at the dinner tables of the British politica l elite. Fenianis m obsessed British minds at the beginning of the period whil e at the end it seemed all too possibl e that Irish home rule would spark off the largest civil disruption in the British Isle s since the seventeenth century. Throughout th e late Victorian and Edwardian eras Irelan d neve r drifte d fa r fro m politica l consciousness . Th e importance of the Irish question in modern British history is undeniable. It remains a staple of schools and university history syllabuses. For many William Gladstone' s lon g career , mos t o f which ha d littl e connectio n with Ireland, was bound up with his mission to pacify th e Emerald Isle. Charles Stewar t Parnell , th e Protestan t nationalis t wh o guide d a n essentially Catholic movement s o triumphantly, has inspired the best in poetry and the worst of Hollywood. Th e Irish problem, understandably, has continued to excite interest and passion beyond any other issue of the time. Its ramifications are with us even today. Failure to resolve the Irish problem by 1914 left a bitter legacy and was a major factor in giving birth to the contemporary Northern Ireland violence. That the Irish question played so considerable a part in later nineteenth and earl y twentiet h centur y Britai n i s a t initia l glanc e ver y curious . Ireland was a small, relatively poor backwater on the fringe of the British Isles and western Europe. It possessed few significant resource s and had little intrinsic importance. Scotlan d and Wales, lands of infinitely mor e value to Britain, attracted little concern by comparison though both had grievances an d aspirations similar to those in Ireland. Moreover, neithe r the industrial workers of Britain's cities or the agricultural classes of the countryside wer e give n th e consideratio n devote d t o th e humbles t o f Ireland's Catholic peasantry. Ireland's centralit y is explicable in thre e principle ways. First , ther e was a range of outstandin g Iris h grievances which publi c opinion ha d been educated to understand demanded attention if the Catholics of the country were to consent freel y to be part of a unified kingdom. Certai n issues, then , wer e ripe for legislation. Secondly, a movement emerge d which was able to galvanise the Catholic masses. It also proved effectiv e in keepin g Irelan d t o th e for e i n Britis h lif e ove r a n extende d time .

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Finally, matter s of principle were raised in the Irish question pushing it beyond bein g merel y a se t o f remedie s fo r a particula r problem . Potentially, th e whol e o f th e Britis h Empir e wa s effecte d b y wha t happened i n Ireland. Indifferenc e to Irish claim s wa s impossible - th e stakes were too high. Not surprisingly , a n impressive academi c literature has been spawne d by th e Iris h problem. I n recent year s new evidence , fres h perspective s and demandin g reinterpretation s hav e illuminate d th e field . Worth y contributions hav e com e fro m scholar s workin g i n a numbe r o f countries. Many important articles have been published in a considerable number o f academi c journals an d hav e appeare d over mor e tha n tw o decades. Som e o f thi s scattere d materia l i s relativel y inaccessible . Reactions t o Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914 i s th e firs t attemp t t o brin g together a selectio n o f journa l article s t o mak e the m mor e readil y available. The volum e concentrate s o n th e natur e an d developmen t o f nationalism an d the reactions o f British leader s and Irishjunionists to it . Those pieces included have been chosen for their quality, relevance to the book's theme , ho w the y fi t th e tim e scal e and out o f a wish t o have a variety o f methodologie s an d approache s represented . Eac h articl e i s reprinted withou t alteratio n exceptin g mino r typographica l emendations. Clearly , th e volum e i s no t a narrativ e o f Anglo-Iris h relations durin g th e perio d bu t offer s specifi c treatmen t i n dept h o f certain issues . Th e firs t hal f (nin e articles ) examine s aspect s o f nationalism while responses to it form th e subject of the second portio n (eight essays) . N o pretens e o f a valu e judgmen t abou t article s no t included is implied. Peter Alter's genera l investigatio n o f the neglected topi c of nationa l symbols open s th e volume . Contro l an d manipulatio n o f nationa l symbols was , h e shows , a n ingredien t i n th e formul a fo r th e legitimatization an d dominance o f one strand of nationalism. Hi s piece draws attentio n t o paralle l development s i n Continenta l countrie s showing tha t Irish nationalism di d not functio n i n a vacuum but was an integral par t of broad developments . Nationalism , h e reminds us , wa s not a plant left to grow wild but one carefully cultivated. A central part of his analysis concerns the way the Irish party, which dominate d politic s from th e 1870 s t o 1914 , adopte d an d create d symbol s lik e th e flag , anthem, festivals , monument s and nomenclature for public places for its own purposes . Man y o f th e symbol s prove d t o b e exclusiv e t o th e Catholic communit y thus tending t o increase the distinction in Irish life between th e majorit y an d Protestants. Symbols , then , contribute d t o splits in Ireland as well as helping fortify th e nationalists. His stimulating article originall y appeare d in a limited circulatio n journal an d remain s one of the few of the author's writings available in English. If symbol s hav e bee n neglected , Fenian s canno t be sai d to hav e

Introduction

xiii

endured a similar fate. R . V. Comerford's succinc t contribution looks at an ol d them e fro m a different angle . Wherea s it ha s bee n usua l to se e Fenians a s intensel y committe d revolutionaries aimin g t o moun t a n armed struggle. Vincent Comerford places the movement i n the context of the social history of the British Isles. He notes that the young men who participated i n thi s secre t oath-boun d societ y frequentl y engage d i n flagrant publi c displays - an apparent paradox he explains by arguing that Fenianism possesse d a n organizationa l apparatu s whic h provide d members wit h a sense of personal fulfilment throug h identifying with a group of peers in autonomous social activities. It was an alternative form of recreation to that sponsored and supervised by the clergy. Fenianism , he suggests, was for some a means to assert independence from famil y and priests. I t should be seen, he argues, as a section of the story of th e rise in public leisure and participants as fairly typical mid-Victorians. His analysis give s a framewor k fo r understandin g apparen t problem s o f Fenianism lik e wh y i t expande d an d contracte d s o swiftl y an d ho w members were able to participate simultaneously in other organizations which compete d wit h an d wer e hostil e t o revolutionar y ideas . H e enhances a n appreciatio n o f wh y s o man y clergyme n wer e abl e t o condemn Fenianism but no t it s individual members. His is, above all, a severe slap at the myth of the bold Fenia n men fighting a single-handed battle for Ireland's freedom. He pushes the discussion past the bounds of politics and into the realm of social psychology. Expansion of nationalism coincide d wit h the growth of democracy. I t has been obvious that the more democracy Ireland received the stronger grip nationalis m exerted . I n particular , historian s tende d t o se e tw o pieces of legislation durin g th e period - th e Ballot Ac t of 1872 and the Franchise an d Redistrictio n Act s o f 1884-8 5 - a s key factor s i n th e sweeping nationalis t tide . Michae l Hurs t ha s deflate d th e firs t assumption an d subsequen t writer s hav e cast doub t o n th e secon d a s well. H e demonstrate s tha t hom e rul e candidate s wer e regularl y successful a t the polls prior to the implementation o f the secret ballot . Why the n was it necessary and what, i f any, effec t di d the ballot have? His response to the former is that the ballot had been necessary for th e maintenance o f la w an d orde r a t elections , no t fo r th e sak e o f Iris h freedom. T o the second, h e answers that the Act served mainly to giv e protection t o unionis t elector s i n predominantl y Catholi c districts . Nationalism, h e observes , di d no t requir e institutiona l tinkerin g t o triumph bu t succeede d becaus e o f it s ow n appeal , organizatio n an d leadership. Wit h th e allianc e o f Liberals , priest s an d tenant-righ t supporters collapsin g whe n th e ja m prove d to o thin , nationalis t politicians were positioned t o fil l the void. Thi s article, now mor e than twenty year s old , ha s give n a hoard o f historian s caus e to paus e and reconsider man y tim e honoure d an d comfortabl e assumption s abou t Anglo-Irish politics .

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Samuel Clark' s articl e on th e lan d wa r i s complementary t o tha t of Michael Hurst . He , too , examine s a long accepte d truis m an d find s i t wanting. Fo r lon g historian s hav e accepte d tha t th e disconten t arising from th e agricultural crisis of the late 1870s was a decisive chapter in the rise of nationalism. A s a transatlantic sociologist, Samue l Clark imposes a differen t visio n o n th e assume d relationshi p betwee n disconten t an d nationalism. H e observe s tha t disconten t ha d existe d i n the past. What had change d b y th e lat e 1870 s wa s tha t ther e wa s no w a politica l movement capable of mobilizing disconten t into an effective instrument. He sees the new situation as being the outcome of structural shifts in Irish life an d it s economy . Th e growt h o f literacy , sprea d o f railway s and integration o f rural inhabitants in commercia l transaction s bridge d th e gulf betwee n agraria n an d urba n communities . Modernizatio n ha d enabled the emergence of a cooperative relationship between farmers and shopkeepers wit h th e consequence that the peasant masses were open t o the organizatio n by , an d leadershi p o f urba n politicians . Al l tha t wa s essential was an occasion to bring the two element s together i n a political movement. I n the land crisis a match touched combustibl e material . His treatment ca n b e see n t o affir m tha t th e ris e o f a n efficien t nationa l movement wa s not a chapter o f accidents o r th e outcom e of a series of errors and misjudgments of British politicians . Nationalism conveye d a varied and complex message. A t local level in Ireland i t often spel t a means b y whic h Catholi c notable s coul d elevat e their status . Willia m Feingold , wh o unfortunatel y die d prematurely , concentrates o n th e us e o f nationalis m a s a force fo r democraticizin g a key local institution, th e Poor Law Boards. Hi s analysi s of the electiv e element o f the Boards reveals that by the mid-1880s in about half of the country, particularl y in the south an d west, th e previous dominanc e o f the Ascendancy had been broken. I n its place, local self-government b y the Catholic nationalist tenantry was a reality. This rapid transition was a consequence o f th e polarizatio n o f Iris h life . Nationalis m provide d a motif for the seizure of local power. Poo r Law Boards i n many part s of the country became organs of the prosperous farmers, shopkeepers an d the risin g professiona l classes . William Feingol d note s tha t loca l self government di d not begi n wit h th e Act of 1898 an d by the n a Catholi c elite ha d gaine d valuabl e experience and established itsel f ready fo r th e day whe n furthe r democratizatio n woul d mak e additiona l advance s possible. Hi s treatment ha s three significan t ramification s - h e show s how th e nationalist caus e was interpretated locally; why loca l notables remained intensel y loya l t o th e Iris h part y afte r 1891 ; an d wh y Protestants, particularl y in heavily Catholic districts, feared democracy. William Mandle' s tracin g of the early origins of the most successful of institutions t o sprin g fro m th e cultura l revival , th e Gaeli c Athleti c Association, take s the study of nationalism in another direction . I n many parts o f centra l an d easter n Europ e cultura l nationalis m proceede d

Introduction x

v

political organization. The obverse was true in Ireland. As a consequence of political nationalism certai n forms of Gaelic culture were revive d or invented from the middle of the 1880s. Despit e being a minority concern at al l points, cultura l nationalism exercised significan t influenc e i n th e years immediatel y proceedin g th e war . I n Irelan d nearl y al l forms o f public expression becam e tied t o the nationalist movement. A t issue in the Gaeli c Athleti c Associatio n wa s just whic h stran d o f nationalis m would contro l sports . Ther e was , a s Vincent Comerfor d observed , a pool of young men yearning for fraternal association of the sort supplied by the G. A. A. Moreover, it s rise corresponded with the development of sports club s i n Britai n an d elsewhere . Contro l o f th e G.A.A . wa s regarded a s vital and hotly contested . Fenian s won th e battle but a t the cost of opening wounds an d intensifying a rift in the national ranks. Th e article is a pertinent reminde r tha t though Fenianis m had been eclipsed by th e home rulers, its spirit was alive and, in certain conditions, coul d muster a n impressive following. Furthermore , th e ethos of the G.A.A. tended to be hostile to Protestants creating an additional barrier between the minority an d majority. Refusal o f the G.A.A. to allow policemen or soldiers t o joi n o r member s t o engag e i n so-calle d foreig n sport s differentiated th e social experiences of Irish young men . Onc e agai n we can se e tha t nationalis m ha d man y manifestations , no t al l followin g along the same path. The next three articles examine the intimate links between religion and nationalism. Unlik e i n some part s of Europe, the y wer e inseparabl e in Ireland. N o nationa l movement coul d flourish against the opposition o f the Churc h but , o n th e othe r hand , cleric s ha d t o b e sensitiv e t o th e feelings an d aspiration s o f thei r flock . Thi s symbiosi s o f cleric s an d political leader s wa s eviden t i n th e ver y meetin g plac e o f s o man y popular movements - churchyard s after Sunda y Mass. Only the Church possessed a durable institutional fabric situated in every Catholic parish. Relations betwee n th e clerg y an d nationa l spokesme n wer e frequentl y delicate, eve n strained , but neithe r coul d functio n withou t referenc e t o the other. Father Patric k Corish' s essa y look s a t th e creatio n o f th e Nationa l Association of Ireland by Cardinal Cullen in response to the Fenian threat of mid-1860s. His article, by far the longest included, was first published in a short-lived, limite d circulation journal and has not been accessible to many people. His treatment shows the central importance of Paul Cullen and how Fenianis m induced him to enter more directl y into politics and to work with Gladstonian Liberalism. Cullen's reluctan t emergence int o politics wa s a significan t ste p becaus e h e an d th e Associatio n lai d th e foundation fo r a constitutional organization and helped channel popular politics into form s acceptable to both Church an d State. Cullen ha d the wisdom t o se e that politica l Catholicis m coul d no t see k only religiou s reforms such as Disestablishment o f the Church of Ireland but had to link

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these t o economi c an d politica l demands . I f the Nationa l Association enjoyed onl y a brie f tenure , it s polic y an d approac h survive d a s th e corner-stone o f the dominant stran d of nationalism to 1914 . The co-operativ e movemen t i n Irelan d poses a n enigma. I t failed t o develop s o swiftly o r firml y a s in man y part s of Europe. I n theory it s purpose wa s purel y th e economi c bettermen t o f Iris h farmers . I n practice, a s Liam Kennedy's penetrating study shows, th e very shirking of politic s an d its non-denominational characte r restricted growt h i n a community where nearly every vital aspect of life took on a political and religious colouration . A t first, many priests were suspicious of the new movement an d gave it little or onl y circumscribe d endorsement . The y were worried abou t the Protestant and unionist leadership and also about the potential impact on local traders, many of whom gave generously to Church funds, i n provincial Ireland. Certainly, thi s article underlines the influence o f th e Churc h i n ever y corne r o f th e Catholi c community . Only whe n th e organizers of the co-operative movemen t secure d local clerical support could it thrive. David Miller' s essay completes the portion of the book devoted to the growth o f nationalism . H e draw s attentio n t o th e natur e o f th e Iris h Church, it s internal divisions, ho w sensitiv e the clerical leaders were t o grass roots opinion , an d the balance which ha d to be maintained b y an institution poise d betwee n th e State , th e Vatica n and th e people . Th e British Stat e wa s a constan t proble m fo r churchmen . Westminste r politicians wer e alway s selectiv e i n thei r consideratio n o f Iris h ecclesiastics. Moreover , Britis h government s wer e seldo m sh y abou t appeals to Rome against Irish ecclesiastics or reluctant to exploit internal clerical divisions . Davi d Mille r als o note s th e considerabl e sympath y Irish-Ireland ideas enjoyed in the clerical ranks. Its stress upon creating a Catholic rathe r tha n a pluralis t Iris h societ y receive d a goo d dea l o f encouragement fro m som e clerics , a facto r tendin g t o increas e misunderstanding betwee n th e tw o religiou s communitie s i n th e country. Hi s analysi s show s tha t th e clerica l leadershi p helpe d shap e nationalism whil e being, a t the same time, a reflector of wider tensions within th e Catholic community . Togethe r the three articles on religio n and politics widen understanding of the interaction between Churc h and people i n th e nationalis t movement , a featur e distinguishin g Irelan d from muc h Continental experience . Responses t o nationalis m too k man y forms . E.D . Steele' s reassessment o f Joh n Stuar t Mill , a ma n wh o exerte d a profoun d influence on British ideas about Ireland, introduces discussion of a major personality an d reveal s the limit s t o Englis h reformers ' sympath y fo r Ireland. Mill , a s he demonstrates , coul d identif y significan t defect s in how Irelan d was managed by Britain. Yet, Mill's vision was clouded by dislike o f Catholicis m an d als o b y hi s genera l complacenc y abou t th e

Introduction

xvii

superiority of Britain's political and social institutions. He notes that Mill was a patriot and convinced imperialist, bot h affectin g ho w h e viewe d Irish aspirations . I f reformer s lik e Mil l displaye d reservation s abou t nationalist hopes , i t is scarcely surprising that so many other intellectua l and politica l leader s showe d les s enthusias m fo r Iris h claims . Ho w i n such a n atmosphere coul d Irishme n fee l anythin g bu t underprivilege d outsiders in the British State ? The articl e raises important point s abou t Mill; it is also a valuable indicator of the crucial significance of ideas and attitudes in shaping political reactions. , A t one level the Irish problem wa s a contest of competing idea s but at another i t was shaped by specific British politica l considerations . D.A . Hamer's pioneerin g articl e sough t t o plac e th e debat e o n hom e rul e between the mid-1880s and 1894 in the context of how Gladstone viewe d the need s o f th e Libera l party . H e argue s tha t th e Libera l chie f ha d become concerne d abou t th e splinterin g of th e part y into sub-group s pursuing separat e ends . Wha t Gladston e believe d wa s essentia l fo r restoration of cohesion wa s concentration on a single cause. Irish hom e rule, he argues, fitted Gladstone's requiremen t becaus e it was timely an d contained thos e element s o f Libera l principle s necessar y t o unit e th e party. Gladstone' s desir e fo r a singl e caus e conflicte d wit h Josep h Chamberlain's programme approac h to Libera l politics. Fo r Gladstone an advantag e of hom e rul e wa s tha t i t woul d enabl e hi m t o subdu e Chamberlain an d reassert control over th e party. After 188 6 home rul e had an additional virtue being a convenient excuse for Liberal weakness. His treatment places the evolution o f the Irish problem squarel y within the perimete r o f Libera l part y consideration s an d no t a s th e simpl e outcome of nationalist pressure or tactics. Employment o f statistica l and compute r method s i s stil l relatively novel in studies of the Irish question. T. W. Heyck, using such methods, provides a riposte t o D.A . Hamer' s theme . I n contrast , he assert s that home rul e rathe r tha n imposin g singl e issu e politic s o n Liberal s facilitated party dominance b y Radicalism with its wide ranging packag e of reforms . Righ t win g Liberal s deserted ove r hom e rul e leavin g th e party in the hands of Radicals who, i f fewer i n number i n the House o f Commons afte r 1886 , nevertheles s made up a far higher proportio n o f Gladstonian M.P.s . A s a consequence eve n Gladston e wa s oblige d t o accept a more progressive platfor m for his party. He counters those wh o have suggested that the eventual decline of Liberalism can be traced to the home rule commitment with a n insistence tha t it was due mainly t o the nature of the party itself. The tw o articles , in fact, shar e a good deal of common groun d bu t provid e differin g an d interesting perspective s on how Liberalis m responded t o the nationalist challenge. After Gladston e retired in 1894 hom e rul e occupied a less prominen t place in the Liberal programme. Onl y in 1910 did it once again emerge as a priority . Lor d Rosebery , i n particular, ha s been see n a s steering th e

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party awa y from th e home rul e commitment. Davi d Gutzk e reassesses Rosebery's role. H e stresses the divisions an d doubts o f Liberals on the Irish problem, th e widespread absenc e of conviction o n home rule, and the impac t o f John Redmond' s demand s i n th e lat e 90 s in hardenin g resistence in the party. Roseber y wa s not so much initiatin g a s reflecting generally held Liberal opinion. Patricia Jalland's investigatio n o f th e financia l section s o f th e hom e rule bill of 1912 explores a neglected but major subject. In addition to the specific point s raised , sh e provide s a n insigh t int o Libera l attitude s towards Irelan d an d nationalis t politicians . Th e bill , lik e it s tw o predecessors, containe d embarassin g flaws. It was virtually the same as the 1893 proposal which, in turn, wa s very similar to the 1886 bill. In the intervening years the difficulties o f merging principles of devolution an d imperial authority , an d o f insurin g Irelan d o f adequat e source s o f revenue withou t a Dubli n Parliamen t havin g t o impos e vas t ne w taxation, wer e no t resolved . I n 1912 , a s she notes, Liberal s did not lack for adequat e advic e o n th e financia l aspec t bu t th e Cabine t chos e t o ignore the recommendations of the experts it had commissioned t o study the matter . I n the end the fiscal section s of the bill wer e the preserve of Herbert Samue l with other s takin g little interest. Hi s scheme increased the difficulties , no t leas t i n failin g t o allo w fo r separat e provisio n fo r Ulster. Iris h representative s wer e allowe d littl e voic e an d oblige d t o accept wha t Liberal s offere d o r ris k rejectio n o f home rule altogether . She shows that once more mistrust of Irish M.P.s was a factor in the way legislation wa s devised - a not entirely happy beginning fo r a supposed conciliatory bill . Th e bill , an d particularly the fiscal provisions, offere d an eas y target o r unionis t critic s an d rendere d resolutio n o f the Ulste r question even more treacherous. Her article, in common with others, is a valuable increment to the literature of British history as well as to Anglo Irish affairs . The Conservative party has had a bad press over Ireland. No doubt the generous whiff of anti-Irish sentimen t emanatin g from s o many Torie s has made them appear an impediment to resolving tensions over Ireland. Possibly n o singl e Conservative has been so damned as Lord Randolph Churchill, wh o i f man y writer s ar e t o b e believed , playe d a n unscrupulous game and inflamed Ulster in 1886. Roland Quinault argues that Churchil l ha s bee n misjudged . Lor d Randolp h h e see s a s a n enlightened unionis t wh o wa s consisten t i n hi s attitudes . B y carefu l analysis of Churchill's speeches, a n underused resource of many leaders, he lays out evidenc e for his case. Churchill's experience in Ireland in the late 1870 s whe n hi s father wa s Viceroy mad e him a convinced unionis t reformer. He believed the union could only survive if Ireland was treated equally. Also , th e articl e places the Ulster campaig n in 1886 i n context pointing ou t that Churchill's vigorou s suppor t for the Protestants in the province ha d it s origin s i n famil y connection s wit h th e region . Hi s

Introduction

xix

treatment illustrate s tha t ideology , persona l predilection , kinshi p an d other connection s wer e important factor s in shapin g a man's stanc e in British politics . Enlightened unionis m wa s no t exclusiv e t o Churchill . Catherin e Shannon examines the role of Ulster's liberal unionists in securing those reforms, includin g elective loca l government, which they hoped woul d undermine th e home rul e demand. Opponent s o f nationalism wished to secure economic cure s which the y believed essentia l to ste m disconten t with th e union . Afte r 1895 , sh e suggests , th e situatio n wa s mor e favourable to Tory sponsored reform . A Chief Secretary who had access to th e highest Conservativ e council s pushed for major Irish legislation. His thrust was aided by liberal unionists in Ulster who saw reform as the last hope . Certainl y ther e ca n be no doub t tha t nationalis m sparked a constructive respons e fro m certai n Torie s wh o migh t no t hav e give n Ireland muc h though t otherwise . Patrick Buckland' s examination o f southern Irish unionist activity in the year s immediatel y proceedin g th e wa r conclude s th e volume . I t would be fair to say that his work on unionists in the south of the country has created an appreciation o f a group which had not commanded muc h respect from historians. Though souther n unionists were few in number they were able to exercise immense influence. They held vital seats in the House o f Lord s an d som e sa t fo r parliamentar y constituencies on th e mainland. A number of British M.P.s owed their election to the support of souther n unionists . But , thre e additiona l factor s wer e probabl y decisive - souther n unionists were able to present their cause in a form acceptable t o Tor y opinion ; the y ha d acces s t o th e elit e o f th e Conservative party ; an d ther e wa s no t a n alternativ e unifyin g issu e available to the British Right. He argues that had there not been souther n unionists, a Conservativ e compromis e o n hom e rul e whic h woul d exclude Ulste r was possible. I t was, h e believes, th e southern unionist s who mad e resolutio n o f th e Iris h proble m impossibl e befor e 1914 . Patrick Buckland's stres s upon the role of social proximity and access in political decision makin g is a major them e in interpreting the course of pre-1914 British politics . Historical writing is never definitive. Changed perspectives and ne w evidence mean s tha t practitioner s of th e ar t ar e constantl y reassessing others work an d revising their own. Th e articles included in the volume represent an attempt by the authors to advance historical scholarship. In turn som e o f their views hav e been an d will continu e t o be challenge d and modified . No r ca n it be pretended that the pieces selected cover all the possibilities fo r topics in Anglo-Irish relations . Each, however, doe s in a significant way inform us of an aspect of Irish problem. It may be that republication i n collecte d for m wil l rekindl e interes t i n some , dra w attention to those which have been overlooked, an d stimulate the field as a whole .

1 SYMBOLS OF IRIS H NATIONALISM PETER ALTER The significanc e of symbols as factors of political integratio n ha s received much attention from researcher s of nationalism and nationstates i n recen t years. 1 The pioneering wor k o f the historia n Perc y Ernst Schram m o n medieva l 'Herrschaftszeiche n un d Staatssym bolik'2 gave, in particular, th e impetus for a history and investigation of moder n stat e sign s an d nationa l symbols . I n hi s conclusio n Schramm makes the point that modern nationa l symbols , in contrast to medieva l symbols with their dee p root s in the spfier e o f religion , are nothin g bu t th e resul t o f 'consciou s act s whic h tak e int o con sideration th e psychological reaction of all classes of the community . . ., which—i f necessary—us e a biase d historica l account'. 3 Whe n one considers the role which political symbols played i n influencing the masses during the totalitarian regime s of the period betwee n the world wars , the n thi s observatio n o f Schram m i s certainly correct . But th e questio n remain s a s t o th e exten t t o whic h Schramm' s observation ca n als o be applie d t o nationa l symbol s which , fo r th e most part , cam e int o existenc e in Europ e an d Americ a durin g th e nineteenth century. In other words : were these national symbols also manipulated fro m abov e a s calculated creation s fo r influencin g the masses? A recen t stud y has answere d thi s questio n negatively. 4 Whil e the fascist movement s ha d create d consciousl y an d accordin g t o pla n a symbol cult for guidin g and influencin g the masses 5 examples take n l See, for example, th e followin g works: K . Loewenstein , 'Th e Influenc e o f Symbols on Polities', i n Introduction to Politics (ed. R. V. Peel and J. S. Roucek, New York 1946) 62-84; K. Loewenstein, 'Betrachtungen iibe r politischen Symbolismus', i n Gegenwartsprobleme de s internationalen Rechts un d de r Rechtsphilosophie. Festschrift fu r Rudolf Laun (Hamburg 1953 ) 559-77; Th. Schieder , 'Th e German Kaiserreic h fro m 187 1 a s a Nation-State' , i n T . D . William s (ed.) , Historical Studies viii (Dubli n 1969); E . Fehrenbach , 'Ober di e Bedeutung der politischen Symbole im Nationalstaat', in Historische Zeitschrift 213 (1971) 296-357. 2 P. E . Schramm , Herrschaftszeichen un d Staatssymbolik. Beitrage z u ihrer Ge'chichte vom dritten bi s zum sechzehnten Jahrhundert, 3 vols . (Stuttgar t 1954-6). 3 Ibid., iii, 1063 . 4 Fehrenbach, esp . 352 , 356.

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to Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914

from th e history of European nationalism demonstrate that nationa l symbols in almost al l cases originated fro m the spontaneous reactio n of th e peopl e i n a revolutionar y situation , an d tha t i t wa s ofte n possible t o justif y the m late r a s having been derived from nationa l tradition an d history. 6 Quit e obviously , ther e i s a complicate d underlying procedur e i n the course o f which the spontaneit y o f the people plays just as important a role as the propaganda b y a government o r a politica l organizatio n an d it s promotio n o f certai n symbols which usually follows later. 7 This paper, a sort of case study, deal s with the origin and applica tion of national symbols in Ireland—a country with one of the most active an d efficien t Europea n nationa l movement s in th e 19t h an d early 20t h centuries . It concentrate s on the political symbol s of the Irish Parliamentar y Party , symbol s whic h wer e primaril y part y symbols and no t symbol s of the Iris h nation. Yet it is legitimate to equate the symbol s of the Parliamentar y Party—as a result of their widespread dissemination, their exclusiveness, and their recognition— with the national symbol s of Ireland i n the period fro m abou t 187 5 to 1916 . Th e symbol s o f th e Parliamentar y Part y wer e th e Iris h national symbols for the five decades of the Home Rule Movement. The analysi s of the symbol s o f the Iris h Parliamentar y Party wil l be concerned wit h three questions : 1 . Which symbols had the party , the mos t importan t representativ e o f Iris h nationalis m befor e independence, at thei r disposal?; 2. Under which historical circumstances di d th e symbol s o f th e part y com e int o existence? ; 3 . T o what exten t di d the symbol s of the party promot e politica l integra tion amon g the Irish people? I

In muc h th e sam e wa y a s sinc e th e beginnin g o f th e 1880 s Nationalists, i.e . follower s o f th e Parliamentar y Party , penetrate d 5 See Loewenstein , 'Influence' , 71 : 'Th e histor y o f th e revolutionar y perio d since th e firs t Worl d Wa r reveal s clearl y th e unspontaneous , artificial , manu factured, an d abov e al l scientifi c characte r o f processe s an d technique s o f political symbolism.' 6 Here Fehrenbac h (302-3 , 356-7 ) differentiate s th e thesi s o f Carlto n Haye s according t o whic h nationa l symbol s hav e develope d fro m th e secularizin g o f religious cults—a process which repeats itself i n all nations and at the same time explains th e universalit y o f the nation-stat e symbolis m (Essays o n Nationalism (New York 1926 , reissue d 1966 ) 103 , 107-9 , 117) . 7 The histor y o f th e Marseillaise, the firs t nationa l anthem , an d th e Frenc h tricolour ar e classic examples of this process (cf. Fehrenbach, 303-5) .

Symbols of Irish Nationalism

^

into Iris h loca l administratio n an d th e Board s o f Guardians 8 a process o f 'nationalization ' too k plac e o n th e leve l o f politica l symbols wit h the creatio n o f th e Hom e Rul e Movement . I n Iris h as i n othe r Europea n nationa l movements , well-know n symbol s received a nationa l meanin g an d ne w symbol s wer e created . Th e national history , i n particular , becam e th e sourc e fo r nationa l symbols, especiall y th e perio d o f Henr y Gratta n an d th e Unite d Irishmen, of Daniel O'Connell, th e Young Irelanders, an d the early Fenian movement. From amon g the comparatively large number of symbolic forms used since about 187 5 only the most important ones will be discussed here: the flag of the Party, its anthem, the 'national festivals' whic h th e Part y espoused , th e O'Connel l monumen t i n Dublin, and the phenomenon of a national nomenclature for streets, squares, and bridges . THE FLA G

The gree n flag with o r withou t a golde n har p wa s undoubtedly the mos t popula r symbo l o f th e Hom e Rul e Movement . Report s in th e Iris h newspaper s o f that perio d sho w that th e flag was conspicuous at any nationalist meeting or demonstration. At demonstrations o f th e Nationa l League , th e organizatio n o f th e Part y i n Ireland sinc e 1882, or of the Party itself it was carried b y the crowd and th e speaker' s platform s were decorated wit h it. At visit s of the Irish members of parliament an d especially o f the Party's chairman Charles S . Parnell, occasion s whic h ofte n too k o n th e characte r of public festivals,9 th e population decorate d th e streets with the green flag. Durin g th e Dubli n Nationa l Exhibition , organize d b y th e Nationalists in August 1882, it commanded the city,10 and during the visit o f th e Princ e o f Wale s t o Irelan d i n th e sprin g o f 188 5 th e green fla g wa s displaye d i n competitio n wit h th e Unio n Fla g in man y place s a s a n expressio n o f nationa l sentiment. 11 Afte r the foundin g o f th e Iris h Volunteer s i n 191 3 i t wa s th e fla g o f this semi-militar y organizatio n whic h wa s closel y connecte d wit h 8

See my book, Die irische Nationalbewegung zwischen Par lamentun d Revolution. De r konstitutionelle Nationalisms i n Irland 1880-1918 (Miinchen-Wie n 1971) 127-37. 9 See e.g. th e newspape r report s o n Parnell's visits to Cor k (Cork Examiner, 3/10/1881, and 23/1/1885). 10 Freeman's Journal (hencefort h FJ), 16/8/1882 . 11 Cf. th e repor t o n th e arriva l o f th e Princ e o f Wale s a t Dubli n i n Cork Examiner (hencefort h CE) , 9/4/1885 .

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the Parliamentar y Part y fo r a perio d o f time. 12 An d whe n Joh n Redmond, th e Party' s chairma n fro m 1900 , in th e autum n of 1915 visited th e Europea n Front , Iris h soldier s parade d i n front o f him with 'the green flag of Ireland'.13 But then, in the aftermath of 1916 , the green flag disappeared an d the tricolour flag of green, white and orange emerge d a s th e nationa l fla g o f th e Iris h Fre e State , a n interesting process o f change which will be discussed further below. The terminology of the contemporary Irish press and the literature of th e Parliamentar y Part y leave s n o doub t tha t fro m abou t th e end of the 1870 s the Irish population identifie d th e green flag of the Party wit h th e nationa l fla g o f Ireland . I t wa s designate d a s 'the National banner', 'the National standard' , 'the national colours' , 'the Iris h nationa l flag ' o r 'Nationalis t flag' or simpl y as 'the Iris h flag'.14 By these designations and the use of the green flag as a symbol of th e Parliamentar y Part y th e fact ca n becom e obscure d tha t th e green flag was not a creation o f the Party, but was recognized much earlier a s a symbo l of Ireland an d o f Irish nationality . Th e Youn g Irelanders use d i t a s wel l a s th e Fenian s whos e gree n fla g ofte n showed the harp i n the middle o f a sunburst. 15 Indeed th e flag was used since the end of the 18t h century by Irish nationalists. It i s not fully clear whether it was first used by Henry Grattan aroun d 178 0 or by the United Irishmen around 1798. 16 The motivation for the selection o f the gree n colou r i s not clear . Unti l th e middl e o f the 18t h century blue , 'S t Patrick' s Blue' , wa s th e colou r associate d wit h Ireland.17 Presumably green was selected in analogy with the shamrock which around 170 0 became the emblem of the Catholic Irish in reaction t o the anti-Catholic laws of William (III) o f Orange and his

12

See J. Carty , Ireland from th e Great Famine to th e Treaty (1851-1921). A documentary record (Dublin 1951) 111, and F. X. Martin (ed.), Th e Irish Volunteers 1913-15. Recollections and Documents (Dublin 1963 ) 130 . 13 D. Gwynn , Th e Life o f John Redmond (London 1932 ) 453 . "See United Ireland (hencefort h UI) , 12/12/1885 , 6/10/1883 , 8/2/1885 ; CE , 3/10/1881; FJ , 7/8/1880 , an d M . MacDonagh , Th e Home Rule Movement (Dublin and London 1920 ) 263 . 15 See D . Ryan . Th e Fenian Chief. A Biography o f James Stephens (Dubli n 1967) 260, and O . Snoddy, 'Fenia n Flags', in Th e Irish Sword 8 (1967) 1. 16 Cf. Encyclopedia o f Ireland (Dublin 1968 ) 17 1 ('The Constitution: National Symbols'). 17 Ibid., 171, and S . Leslie, Th e Irish Tangle (Londo n n.d. ) 6 4 ('A Note on th e Irish Flag') -

Symbols of Irish Nationalism 5

successors on the British throne.18 This motivation seems probable in view o f th e fac t tha t durin g the 19t h century, especially in Ulster , green was generally recognized as the colour of Catholic Ireland which was identified wit h nationalist Ireland . I n th e tricolou r o f the Irish Republic, too , gree n i s t o symboliz e th e Catholi c portio n o f th e population.19 It is obvious that the reasons for the change from blue to green as Ireland's national colour, which seems to have taken place at th e beginnin g o f th e 18t h century , stil l requir e a mor e exac t examination. Since th e Unite d Irishme n th e flag was combined wit h the harp , the oldest heraldic symbol of Ireland and fro m it s origins a dynastic symbol. Th e proble m o f continuit y i n Iris h symbolis m cannot b e dealt with in detail here, bu t i t would surely be a rewarding task t o trace the history of the harp as a symbol since its first appearance and to show more specifically its connection with medieval Irish symbolism. I t i s quite certain , however , that th e heraldi c us e o f the har p can b e trace d bac k int o th e 16t h century . Durin g th e reig n o f Henry VIII , wh o proclaime d himsel f kin g o f Irelan d i n 1541 , th e harp appeared o n coinage for the first time, and since 1603 , with the accession o f James I to the throne, it is also to be found in the Royal Standard a s als o i n th e fla g o f th e Confederatio n o f Kilkenny. 20 These officia l use s o f th e har p a s symbo l o f Irelan d fin d thei r continuation i n th e 19t h century : fo r example , th e standar d o f the Lor d Lieutenan t show s th e Unio n Fla g wit h a golde n har p on a blu e shield i n th e centre. 21 After 1801 , in th e Roya l Standar d the harp continue s to appear i n the third quarter. 22 The harp, there fore, i s th e onl y Iris h symbo l o f th e 19t h centur y wit h a twofol d function: i t serve s a s dynasti c symbo l and a t th e sam e tim e a s a symbol of constitutional nationalism. Although th e Unio n Flag , sinc e 1801 , containe d a n Iris h symbol with the incorporation o f the Cross of St Patrick it was not accepte d 18

Cf. G.-D . Zimmermann , Songs o f Irish Rebellion. Political Street Ballads and Rebel Songs 1780-1900 (Dubli n 1967 ) 43 . Accordin g t o th e legen d S t Patrick explaine d th e natur e o f th e Hol y Trinit y t o th e Iris h b y usin g th e shamrock. 19 Encyclopedia o f Ireland, 171 , and G . Campbel l an d J . O . Evans , Th e Book of Flags (Londo n 5 1965) 20. 20 Leslie, 64 . According t o Campbel l an d Evan s (8 ) the har p a s th e heraldi c symbol o f Ireland had bee n chose n b y Henry VIII . 21 E. MacGeorge , Flags: Some account of their history (Londo n 1881 ) 71 . Cf . also the Arms o f the Republi c o f Ireland. 22 Campbell an d Evans , 9.

6R

eactions to Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914

in Irelan d durin g th e Unio n a s a fla g o f unity , representin g th e entire nation, which it, strictly speaking, originally was not intended to be, 23 but a s the flag of a definite portio n o f the population. 24 The exhibition of the Unio n Flag meant , especially in the secon d half of the 19th century, the expression of Unionist and Protestant sentiment. The increasin g gravit y o f th e interna l conflic t i n Irelan d betwee n Nationalist Catholic s an d Protestan t Unionist s since the turn o f the century, i n particular , cause d th e Unio n Fla g t o los e al l powe r o f integration i n th e sens e of the concep t o f a mor e or les s politically homogeneous Unite d Kingdom . I t wa s regarded , instead , a s th e symbol fo r a politica l attitud e whic h was diametrically oppose d t o the nationalis m of the vast majorit y o f the Irish population. THE ANTHE M

With muc h mor e justificatio n tha n i n th e cas e o f th e fla g th e unofficial Iris h 'nationa l anthem ' fro m 188 0 until 1916 , 'Go d sav e Ireland', ca n b e viewe d a s a creatio n o f th e Parliamentar y Party . The author o f this song , which was sung t o th e melod y o f a the n well-known America n march, wa s Timoth y D . Sullivan , edito r o f the famous Iris h pape r Th e Nation?* Alon g with 'God save Ireland' he published a series of popular song s with subjects taken from Iris h history whic h caused hi m t o b e th e mos t widel y know n Irish poe t of this type of song in the second half of the 19th century.26 He was the man who , accordin g t o a nationalis t clergyman , 'gav e t o th e Iris h nation th e nationa l watchword , th e symbo l o f thei r hope s an d aspirations'.27 'God save Ireland' originated from a n episode in the history of the Fenian movement . The song praises revolutionary nationalism, an d according t o Owe n D. Edward s brough t 'man y t o a n unconsciou s acceptance o f the justifiability of insurrection'. 28 In it s four ballad 23

Ibid., 17: 'When the present desig n was made official i n 1801, it was ordered to b e flown on al l Hi s Majesty' s forts , castles , etc.—an d no t b y His Majesty' s subjects." Cf. also E. M . C . Barraclough, Flags of th e World (Londo n an d Ne w York 2 1965) 43. 24 Leslie 65 . 25 T. D.'Sullivan (1827-1914) , Lor d Mayo r o f Dublin i n 188 6 an d 1887 , M P since 1880 . 26 Cf. Zimmermann, 60, note 4, and P. S. O'Hegarty, A history of Ireland under th e Union, 1801-1922 (London 1952 ) 411. 27 CE, 31/1/1885 . 28 O. D. Edward s et al. , Celtic Nationalism (London 1968 ) 173 . For th e tex t see Zimmermann, 266-7 , and P . Rose , Th e Manchester Martyrs. Th e story o f a Fenian tragedy (Londo n 1970 ) 130 .

Symbols of Irish Nationalism 7 like verse s the executio n of the thre e Fenian s Willia m Philip Allen, Michael Larkin , an d Michae l O'Brie n b y th e Britis h i s described . The so-calle d Mancheste r Martyr s ha d bee n foun d guilty of killing a policema n i n 186 7 in the attemp t t o fre e Fenian s fro m a priso n van.29 Thei r las t word s fro m th e scaffol d wer e use d severa l day s later b y T. D. Sulliva n as the titl e for hi s song which, according to him, within a very short time had sprea d al l over Ireland and forced into the background the most popular national songs until that time, 'A Natio n onc e again ' writte n b y th e Youn g Irelande r Thoma s Davis, and 'The Wearing of the Green', a song which had originated around 1800. 30 A t abou t 187 5 'God sav e Ireland ' wa s alread y th e national son g o f the Hom e Rulers, 31 and i n th e nationalis t pres s o f the 1880 s it is unequivocally designated 'th e anthem', 'th e Nationa l Anthem', or 'the Irish nationa l Anthem'. 32 The Annual Register also recognized thi s qualit y of 'God sav e Ireland',33 and eve n the Roya l Irish Constabular y describe d Sulliva n a s 'th e autho r o f wha t i s known a s th e "Iris h Nationa l Anthem".' 34 Nex t t o th e gree n flag 'God save Ireland' was the best known and mos t popular symbo l of the Parliamentary Party . The song was sung until 191 6 at every occasion o n which the Irish gathered, n o matter wha t the reason, no t onl y in Ireland bu t als o in America an d othe r Iris h settlement s abroad. 35 Unti l 1916 , which represents a definite brea k in the history of Irish political symbolism still t o b e discussed , politica l an d socia l gathering s wer e concluded with th e singin g o f 'Go d sav e Ireland'. Victorie s o f nationalis t candidates i n parliamentar y o r municipa l elections wer e celebrated with demonstration s an d th e singin g of the 'nationa l anthem'. 36 A t demonstrations an d meeting s o f th e Nationa l Leagu e 'Go d sav e Ireland' belonge d alon g wit h th e gree n fla g t o th e self-eviden t 29 For th e details see P. Rose, op. cit., and E. R. Norman, The Catholic church and Ireland i n the age of rebellion 1859-1873 (London 1965) 119-26. 30 As t o th e origi n o f th e son g which was publishe d on 7 Dec. 186 7 in Th e Nation cf . T. D. Sullivan , Recollections of troubled times in Irish politics (Dublin 1905) 177-80. 31 Cf. F . H . O'Donnell , A History o f th e Irish parliamentary party, i (London 1910) 137. 32 Cf. UI, 1/12/1883, 1/3/1884, 5/12/1886; CE, 13/4/1885 , 24/11/1885. 33 Annual Register 1887 , 201. 34 State Paper Office , Dublin , Police Report s 1886-1915 : List o f Nationalist Members of Parliament an d detailed Biographical Notes, 1887. 35 Cf. Sullivan , 179; O'Hegarty, 457 , and T . P . O'Connor , Th e Parnell movement with a sketch of Irish parties from 1843 (London 21886) 202. 36 See, for instance, UI 5/12/1886 , and C E 30/11/1885.

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requisites. The evictio n o f tenants by the Roya l Irish Constabular y was accompanie d b y th e crow d o f spectator s wit h th e singin g of 'God sav e Ireland ' an d othe r 'popula r songs'. 37 Demonstration s against th e Britis h government included the singing of 'the anthem' in front of the gates of Dublin Castle, 38 the seat of the Irish executive, or during the visit of the Prince of Wales in Ireland. Bu t when at the arrival of the Prince at Mallow the band struck up 'God save Ireland' the nationalis t pres s spok e o f 'occurrence s . . . o f deplorabl e character' becaus e suc h a receptio n lacke d th e 'respectfu l reserv e and neutrality ' whic h Parnel l ha d recommended. 39 Moreover , th e words 'Go d sav e Ireland' wer e used a s th e nationalis t rallyin g cry which appeare d o n poster s an d i n newspape r advertisement s of the National League . The y coul d b e foun d o n banner s an d flag s an d with the m nationalis t speaker s conclude d thei r speeches . Sinc e th e 1880s, i n Irelan d an d i n Iris h circle s abroad , bu t als o amon g th e Irish Member s o f Parliamen t i n Westminster , 'Go d sav e Ireland ' replaced 'Go d sav e th e Queen ' a s a toas t i n orde r constantl y t o demonstrate tha t Ireland di d not recognize the forced Union of 1801. THE NATIONA L FESTIVAL S

The execution s o f th e thre e Fenian s o n 2 3 Novembe r 186 7 a t Salford Prison , Manchester , le d t o on e o f th e tw o Iris h nationa l holidays a t tha t time . Alon g wit h th e traditiona l festiva l o f S t Patrick's Da y th e 23r d o f November wa s used b y th e Nationalist s to commemorat e th e Mancheste r Martyr s wh o wer e glorifie d by th e populac e an d th e Parliamentar y Party, 40 because—a s described i n th e nationalis t terminology—the y ha d sacrifice d their live s fo r Iris h freedo m 'wit h th e praye r o n thei r lip s o f "Go d save Ireland".'41 Accordin g t o th e report s i n th e newspaper s an d the polic e files both holiday s were celebrated wit h larg e participa tion o f the populatio n wel l into th e 1890s, 42 while the stat e celebra tions an d anniversarie s were ignored b y th e Iris h Nationalist s an d 37

UI, 20/8/1881 . Ibid., 19/8/1882 . 39 CE, 14/4/1885 . Cf . also Annual Register 1885 , 198-9 . 40 Cf. K . Loewenstei n ('Influence' , 76) : 'Th e greates t emotiona l valu e i s attached t o martyr s wh o have suffere d persecutio n o r died fo r th e "cause". N o revolutionary movemen t passe s up th e opportunity t o make use of a convenient martyrology. Where martyr s d o not exis t they ar e invented or made.' 41 John Redmon d i n Cork (CE, 22/11/1882) . 42 Cf.e .g . Stat e Pape r Office , Dublin , Crim e Branc h Special , Divisiona l Commissioners' Report s (S. W. Division), Repor t o f Dec. 1894 . 38

Symbols of Irish Nationalism 9 often use d for counter-demonstrations i n the for m of rallies and th e displaying of national symbols. 43 The manne r i n whic h th e two memoria l day s o f the Nationalist s were celebrated show s certain differences . Th e memoria l da y o f th e Manchester Martyrs wa s celebrated in the 1880s , just as earlier, with torchlight procession s i n mos t o f th e provincia l town s an d large r villages which usually ended in the cemetery where memorial crosses were erecte d fo r th e execute d an d memoria l speeche s wer e held . Green an d blac k flag s wer e carrie d b y th e crowd . I n th e citie s memorial masse s wer e hel d i n th e churche s i n additio n t o th e pro cessions an d speeches. 44 Whe n publi c demonstration s occasionall y were cancelle d as , fo r example , i n Cor k i n 188 5 at leas t som e sor t of celebratio n too k plac e i n a n assembly-hal l i n th e town. 45 Th e processions an d celebration s wer e usuall y organize d b y th e loca l branches o f th e Nationa l League . Th e direc t participatio n o f th e Party wa s les s evident, an d n o centra l celebratio n wa s hel d t o complement th e loca l gatherings. Such a central celebratio n o f the Parliamentary Part y formed th e high point o f St Patrick's Day , th e 'national festival', whic h was not a festival inspired by the Party because the custom to celebrate i t was much olde r but which was given a political accen t b y it. This celebration took place in London, necessitated by the session of the House of Commons. Almos t alway s al l th e Iris h Member s o f Parliamen t participated in it. Parnell o r one of the other leading representative s of the Party made a political speech in which the national aims of the Party wer e dealt with. 46 In Irelan d processions , masses , and celebra tions too k place , bu t generall y the y di d no t attai n th e proportio n and larg e participation o f the populatio n a s was to b e observe d o n the memoria l da y fo r th e Mancheste r Martyrs . Thes e gathering s exhausted themselve s by and larg e i n the demonstration o f nationa l 43 On th e occasio n of th e coronatio n o f Georg e V the Part y declared: 'Eve r since the foundatio n of the Unite d Irish Part y unde r the leadershi p o f Parnell , it ha s bee n th e settle d practice and rul e o f th e part y t o stan d aloo f fro m al l Royal o r imperia l festivities o r ceremonies , participatio n i n whic h migh t b e taken a s a proo f tha t Irelan d wa s satisfie d wit h o r acquiesce d willingly i n th e system unde r which , sinc e th e Union , sh e had bee n compelled t o live ' (L . G . Redmond-Howard, John Redmond. Th e ma n an d th e demand (Londo n 2 1912) 248). "Examples: UI, 25/11/1882 and 1/12/1883 . Cf. also the numerous 'Ballads of the Manchester Martyrs' which originated in the time to come (printed in Rose, op. cit . 129-135). 45 CE, 25/11/1885 . 46 Cf. e.g. CE, 18/3/1882 , 18/3/1885 , 18/3/1886.

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symbols,47 especially the shamroc k whic h was also recognize d a s a 'national emblem'. 48 Th e shamroc k wa s 'th e emble m o f fait h an d nationality',49 thus indicating that on St Patrick's Day national an d religious feelings were united i n a remarkable way . The Party whic h conceived itsel f as th e representativ e of th e entire Iris h peopl e sa w this clai m ofte n threatene d b y th e one-side d accentuatio n o f th e sectarian element on St Patrick's Day. Parnell, for example, deemed himself oblige d in 188 6 to writ e an ope n lette r offerin g ' a wor d of advice and warning'. In this letter h e wrote: 'It is at all times desir able that we should do nothing at any time to excite the irritation of the Orang e sectio n o f ou r countrymen.' 50 Suc h a dange r existe d especially i n Ulste r wit h its stron g Protestant-Unionist population . THE O'CONNEL L MONUMEN T

The clos e interlockin g o f th e nationa l an d th e sectaria n elemen t which became apparent a t St Patrick's Day celebrations can also be seen in its early stages in the erection of th e monumenta l statu e fo r Daniel O'Connel l i n Dublin. Th e preparations fo r the erection of a 'National Monument' for the 'Liberator', that is to say for the man who ha d wo n Catholi c emancipation , no t fo r th e ma n wh o ha d demanded repea l o f th e Union , wer e underway since 1862 . Bu t i t needed th e effort s o f th e Parliamentar y Part y t o achiev e th e completion o f the statue on the occasion of the 100t h anniversary of the day Grattan's Parliament was constituted whic h had proclaimed 'the birth o f Irish freedom'. 51 The initiative t o buil d a monumen t for Danie l O'Connel l i n th e centre o f th e cit y whic h wa s t o b e finance d b y th e Iris h peopl e emanated fro m th e the n proprieto r o f th e Freeman's Journal, Si r John Gray. 52 ' A Nationa l Monument' , a s wa s resolve d b y th e O'Connell Monument Committee which was founded o n 1 3 October 1862, representin g Dubli n libera l citizen s an d Catholi c clergymen , 'to commemorate th e service s of O'Connell a s the advocate o f civil and religiou s liberty, and a s the emancipator o f the Catholic peopl e 47

Occasionally portrait s o f leadin g MP s wer e borne i n th e procession s (se e e.g. CE, 18/3/1882) . 48 CE, 18/3/1885 . "Ibid., 18/3/1882. 50 Ibid., 16/3/1886. 51 UI, 19/8/1882. 52 J. O'Hanlo n (ed.) , Report o f th e O'Connell Monument Committee (Dubli n 1888) xii.

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of this realm, ma y be erected i n the metropolis o f his native land'. 53 This resolution mad e plain that O'ConnelF s work for th e repea l of the Union was being ignored by the committee members. This veiling of the historical reality did not remain without contradiction alread y in 1862 : th e archbisho p o f Tuam , Joh n MacHale , pointe d t o th e inadmissibility of the manipulation of historical trut h by 'honouring the Emancipato r onl y an d ignorin g th e Repealer'. 54 Th e curiou s cleavage of the historical figure of Daniel O'Connel l wa s a phenomenon which could be observed until Parnell's time : the picture of the Liberator, restin g o n hi s wor k fo r Catholi c emancipation , over shadowed tha t o f th e Nationalis t an d Repealer . I t wa s not unti l Parnell becam e th e chairma n o f th e Parliamentar y Part y tha t a reversal of this interpretation wa s achieved. No w the part y tried t o overcome th e oneside d emphasi s o n the emancipation aspec t i n the political career of O'Connell by emphasizing his universal significance for Iris h nationalism . The work on the memorial dragged ou t over almost twenty years. The generou s contribution s b y the Iris h peopl e mad e possibl e th e laying of the foundation-stone in August 1864, 55 but thereafte r the work came to a standstill for a couple of years. The planned unveiling of the monument on the occasion o f O'ConnelFs 100t h birthday ha d to b e postponed. No t unti l 187 9 did th e wor k continu e a t a mor e rapid pace. 56 I n th e sprin g o f 188 2 the Committe e decided, under the pressur e o f th e Dubli n Lor d Mayo r Charle s Dawson , t o hav e the unveiling take place in conjunction with the National Exhibitio n inspired b y Dawso n an d othe r Nationalists, 57 whic h wa s t o serv e the 'encouragemen t o f Irish , i n preferenc e t o Britis h an d foreig n manufacture'.58 Th e Exhibition wa s opened o n 1 5 August 1882 , in a large settin g but withou t the participatio n o f representatives of the Irish government. 53 T. 51

D. Sullivan , A. M . Sullivan. A memoir (Dublin 1885) 88. Ibid. 55 O'Hanlon, xlii.—I n th e perio d fro m 2 2 Sept . 1862 , when the firs t cal l fo r contributions wa s publishe d i n Th e Freeman's Journal, unti l 3 0 Oct. 1865 , th e Irish peopl e collecte d th e larg e su m o f almos t 10,00 0 Poun d Sterlin g whic h consisted largely of very small contributions (cf. the subscription lists in O'Hanlon 1-146 an d 149) . Unfortunatel y the subscriptio n list s d o no t contai n th e socia l status of the contributors. If they had, they would have been a valuable source on the social structur e o f the national movement . 56 Cf. FJ, 21/6/1880 . 57 O'Hanlon, Ixvii. 58 Quoted in M. McCarthy, Th e Irish revolution (Edinburgh and Londo n 1912 ) 189. Fo r th e history leading to the exhibition: Annual Register 1882, 192-3 .

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In contras t t o 1862 , th e speeche s whic h wer e hel d durin g th e unveiling o f th e Nationa l Monumen t i n th e presenc e o f numerous provincial mayors , town commissioners, aldermen , the bishops an d clergy, the Irish Member s of Parliament, th e trades, an d the delegations fro m al l parts o f the country, 59 mak e evident a definit e shif t in accent. O n this occasion again one was reminded that th e monument was erected 'in honour of O'Connell, th e Liberator o f his own people from penal chains",60 but in the speeches of Parnell and other speakers the attempt is obvious to place the emphasis, with a glimpse at th e 100t h anniversar y of th e firs t independen t Iris h parliament , on th e genera l meanin g o f O'Connel l a s a n Iris h nationalist. 61 'I n 1882, shal l w e forge t th e drea m o f Grattan' , th e Lor d Mayo r Charles Dawso n asked , 'th e first and the last love of O'Connell, th e desire of the nation—our native legislature?'62 And Parnell declared: The mos t endearin g monumen t that w e can erec t t o O'Connel l i s to striv e t o gai n th e end s to whic h h e devote d hi s great life.' 63 I n this vei n the nationalis t newspaper s commented, too , s o Th e Cork Examiner, whe n i t wrote : Th e O'Connel l Monumen t . . . i s the symbol of the desire for legislativ e independence which is as stron g today i n th e hear t o f the people a s it wa s in th e palmiest hour s o f the Repeal Association.'64 Behind thes e effort s t o creat e a sor t o f O'Connel l myt h th e unmistakable idea becomes apparent of making O'Connell the symbol of Iris h nationalit y an d Iris h aspiration s fo r autonomy . Th e Dublin monument is the most important expression of this intention, but it finds its continuation in the process of naming streets, squares, and bridges after O'Connell , a procedure which runs parallel to the penetration of Nationalists into the organizations of the Irish local administration.65 O'CONNELL STREET , DUBLI N The name of O'Connell was to integrate the Irish nation and help to accomplish the identification of all Irishmen with the demands of 59 60

See FJ and CE, 16/8/1882, and O'Hanlon, Ixxii. See E. D . Gra y as speake r o f th e O'Connel l Monumen t Committe e (FJ , 16/8/1882). 61 Cf. th e speeche s o f Parnell , Dawson, and O'Hanlo n (FJ , 16/8/1882 ; UI , 19/8/1882). 62 FJ, 16/8/1882 . 63 Ibid. 64 CE, 16/8/1882. 65 Compare with my book: Die irische Nationalbewegung, 127-37 .

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the Parliamentary Party. Bu t the question remains as to what extent the Part y wa s consciou s o f th e proble m o f suc h a national educational ventur e becaus e th e integrationa l effec t o f th e nam e 0'Cornell was limited to the Catholic Irish alon e whil e the Protest ants must have felt exclude d from the outset. The Protestant portion of th e population , especiall y i n Ulster , bu t als o i n Dublin , coul d hardly b e stirre d b y th e nam e o f O'Connel l becaus e hi s name , i n spite o f al l the Party' s attempt s t o mak e hi m a centra l symbo l of national identification , stood foremos t fo r th e emancipatio n o f th e Catholics. The anti-nationalist Protestants, for this reason , oppose d the advancemen t o f a n O'Connel l myth . A goo d exampl e o f th e limited power of integration o f the name of O'Connell can be found in th e stubbor n resistanc e o f th e wealth y Protestan t citizen s o f Dublin wh o persistently refused t o accep t th e renaming of the most important street of the city, which was named after a Lord Lieutenant of the 18t h century, from Sackville Street to O'Connell Street. This renamin g wa s concluded b y the Dubli n Corporatio n wit h a considerable majorit y i n Decembe r 188 4 with th e explanatio n that 'the names of the thoroughfares of the chief cities of a nation shoul d be suc h a s t o recal l event s i n it s histor y an d progres s deservin g commendation'.66 Some of the influential residents o f the stree t ha d recourse t o th e courts against this decision becaus e from thei r viewpoint th e renamin g 'woul d caus e the m inconvenience , an d con siderable injur y an d los s o f business'. 67 Thi s somewha t superficial argumentation was upheld by the courts, 68 so that th e street had n o generally accepted name for over thirty years: the Nationalists named it O 'Connell Street,69 whereas the Protestant citizens and the Unionists held ont o Sackville Street. 70 While, for example , the Party gav e the address of the Hibernia n Ban k where the y had a n accoun t i n thei r papers a s O'Connell Street th e ban k continue d t o us e the designa tion Sackville Street o n thei r commercia l papers. 71 Simila r doubl e designations o f the stree t o n othe r occasion s ca n be found in larg e numbers. Henceforth, the designation of the street as either Sackville Street o r O'Connell Street wa s abl e t o giv e information as t o th e political attitud e o f individual Irishmen. Stil l in 191 6 the Unionist s 66 67

UI, 13/12/1884. Se e also Annual Register 1884 , 47 (Chronicle) . CE, 9/1/1885. 68 J. Harvey, Dublin. A study i n environment (London an d New York 1949 ) 37. 69 Cf. CE, 17/10/1885: 'O'Connel l Street , Dublin—th e ne w name . .. is , by the way, now almost generally adopted.' 70 Cf. McCarthy , Irish revolution, 364. 71 See J. F. X . O'Brien Papers, MS. 9236 (National Librar y o f Ireland).

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continued t o spea k o f Sackville Street just a s the y hel d o n t o th e designation Carlisle Bridge fo r th e bridg e whic h crosse s th e Liffe y at the lower end of O'Cornell Street. The renaming of the bridge as O'Connell Bridge ha d bee n conclude d b y th e Dubli n Corporatio n under th e Lor d Mayo r E . D . Gra y i n th e earl y summe r o f 188 0 when th e ol d bridge , als o named after a Lord Lieutenant , ha d been replaced b y a new construction.72 In thi s case, too , th e Nationalist s met with resistance. The refusal o f the Dublin Port and Docks Board to remov e the ol d tablets wit h the inscription Carlisle Bridge coul d not b e overcom e unti l afte r a n inquir y o f th e Iris h M P an d late r Lord Mayor Charle s Dawson in the House of Commons.73 The proces s o f 'nationalization ' o n th e leve l o f nomenclature , here mor e o r les s allusivel y described, too k place , i n conjunctio n with th e progressiv e chang e o f th e majoritie s in th e tow n council s all over Ireland i n the 1880s . The old names of streets and squares , especially whe n the y carrie d a definit e Englis h designation , wer e replaced b y 'national ' designations . I n Dublin , i n additio n t o O'Connell Street, numerou s mino r street s wer e given the name s of figures from Iris h history. 74 In th e provincial town s bridges, streets, and square s were named first of all after Parnel l and O'Connell. Th e process o f 'nationalization ' wa s extende d i n Dubli n als o t o th e designing o f th e cit y flag , an d th e accompanyin g circumstance s should b e mentione d her e becaus e they give , i n a ver y picturesque manner, som e o f th e atmospher e i n whic h th e conflic t betwee n Nationalists an d Unionists took place at that time. Because, in 1885, the Lord Mayo r o f Dublin had publicly declared that he would haul down th e cit y flag from th e Mansio n Hous e a t th e impendin g visit of the Prince of Wales, the flag was carried off by students of Trinity College wit h th e intentio n o f preventin g its demonstrativ e haulin g down by the Nationalists an d o f carrying it instead in procession a t the entrance o f the Prince int o th e city. 75 The disappearance o f the old flag, which showed three white castles on a blue background, was now use d b y th e nationalis t Corporatio n fo r designin g a ne w flag because, afte r som e perplexity , accordin g t o th e Annual Register 72 Cf. FJ, 21/6/1880; McCarthy, Irish revolution, 280, and O'Hanlon , Ixvi . The official renamin g took place on 6 Aug. 1880 . 73 FJ, 10/8/1880 . 74 Cf. McCarthy, 364: 'The titles of the Dublin streets illustrate the continuous loyalty of its Corporation t o the English connection until the arrival of Parnell, being almost a complete index to the Lord Lieutenants.' 75 Annual Register 1885 , 197, and CE , 25/3/1885 .

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they cam e t o th e conclusio n tha t 'ou t o f evil comet h good'. 76 Th e new fla g wa s ' a combinatio n o f Nationa l an d civi c emblem s b y exhibiting a harp o n a gree n ground, an d displayin g in on e quarte r three white castles'. 77

II The type s o f symbol s deal t wit h her e possesse d b y an d larg e unrestricted validit y unti l th e Easte r Rising . Som e olde r symbol s began to earn new meaning from th e turn of the century, such as the favourite son g o f th e Sin n Fei n movemen t 'A Natio n onc e again' , but tha t was simpl y a margina l phenomeno n in the year s befor e 1916.78 How strong and unbroken the attraction o f the Party symbols still were is demonstrated b y the exampl e o f the Irish labou r move ment whos e semi-militar y organization, th e Citize n Army , hoiste d in a ceremony, whic h ha s bee n th e sourc e o f much discussion sinc e then, th e green flag with the harp as 'the sacred emble m of Ireland's unconquered soul ' o n to p o f Liberty Hall , th e headquarter s o f th e Irish Transport and General Workers ' Union, just a week before the Rising.79 With th e Rising of 1916 a break too k place i n national symbolis m which wa s mos t visibl y manifeste d i n th e nationa l fla g an d th e anthem whic h th e youn g Irish natio n accepted . Th e demis e o f th e Parliamentary Part y stand s in direc t paralle l to the just as rapidl y diminishing powe r o f it s symbols . Th e gree n fla g an d 'Go d sav e Ireland' began to be discredited a s symbols of constitutional nation alism and , instead , th e symbol s of revolutionary nationalism gaine d popularity a s th e majorit y o f th e Iris h peopl e identifie d itsel f wit h the political aim s of the Easter revolutionaries. 80 The use of symbols made apparen t tha t th e occurrence s o f 191 6 initiate d a ne w epoc h in Irish histor y muc h in the sam e way as the Union o f 1801 and th e Famine o f 1845- 8 did. Both th e nationa l fla g an d th e nationa l anthe m o f present-da y Ireland deriv e origin s directl y fro m th e Rising . A t firs t i t stil l 76

Annual Register 1885 , 197. FJ, 27/5/1885 . Cf. also Annual Register 1885 , 197-8, and UI , 30/5/1885. 78 Cf. M. Freund, 'Die Nationalhymnen der Irlander', in Die Neueren Sprachen 27 (1919-20 ) 46. 79 Irish Times, 17/4/1916 , and D . Ryan , Th e Rising. The Complete Story o f Easter Week (Dubli n 4 1966) 76 . Cf . als o C . D . Graves , Th e Life an d Times o f James Connolly (Londo n 1961 ) 323, and R . M . Fox , Green Banners. Th e Story of th e Irish Struggle (Londo n 1938) 191. 80 Cf. An Bhratach Ndisiunta (The National Flag) (Bail e atha Cliath n.d.) 7. 77

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appeared a s if the revolutionarie s would take ove r the ol d symbols because o n the roo f o f the thei r headquarters , th e Dubli n Genera l Post Office , a gree n fla g wit h th e har p wa s hoiste d nex t t o the republica n tricolou r althoug h wit h th e inscriptio n 'Iris h Republic'.81 Even 'God save Ireland' was sung by the revolutionaries during Easte r week. 82 Bu t afte r th e failur e o f th e Risin g an d th e subsequent executions of the leading revolutionaries the tricolour and The Soldier' s Song ' became more and more popular as symbols of the rebellion . 'Tricolou r badges' , i t i s sai d i n a n eyewitnes s report from th e autum n o f 1916 , 'wer e wor n o n coats , caps , an d hats ; songs wer e whistle d an d sung . "Th e Soldier' s Song " bega n t o b e known; soon one could hear it in the streets.' 83 The republica n tricolour , a revolutionar y symbo l an d unequi vocally modelle d afte r th e Frenc h example , consists o f the colour s green, white and orang e whereby the gree n is said t o represen t th e Catholic an d th e orang e th e Protestan t sectio n o f th e populatio n while th e whit e i s t o stan d fo r ' a lastin g truce ' betwee n th e tw o denominations.84 The origin of the tricolour is generally dated to the year 184 8 when it was presented by a delegation of Young Irelanders to the citizens of Dublin after their return from Paris where they had conveyed th e congratulation s o f th e Iris h peopl e t o th e newl y established republica n governmen t i n France. 85 Bu t i t mus t b e doubted whethe r th e Iris h tricolou r i s a creatio n o f th e Youn g Irelanders because it can be proved that it was used earlier. Documentary evidenc e indicate s tha t th e tricolou r wa s know n a s earl y a s 1830,86 an d Michae l Toibi n offer s convincin g evidenc e tha t th e tricolour was displayed by the insurgents, at least in county Wexford, 81

Cf. the eyewitness reports i n R. McHug b (ed.) , Dublin 1916 (London 1966 ) 68, 87, 126 , 159 . 82 Zimmermann, 68. 83 Quoted i n McHugh , 139-40 . Cf . als o L . O Broin , Th e Chief Secretary. Augustine Birrell in Ireland (London 1969) 190. The tricolour had been used as the national flag since then, but its official recognitio n a s such was first anchored in the constitution o f 193 7 (Art. 7) , cf. An Bhratach, 7. 84 Encyclopedia o f Ireland, 111. Cf. als o Campbel l an d Evans , 20 . Accordin g to th e Protestan t interpretatio n th e orang e i s derived fro m Willia m o f Orange , King of England sinc e 1689 . 85 T. F. O'Sullivan , Th e Young Irelanders (Trale e 1944 ) 78, 81, 200, and J. D . O'Donnell, How Ireland i s governed (Dublin 1965 ) 15 0 (Appendix F : 'Histor y of th e Nationa l Flag' , (150-52) . Se e also R . Kee , Th e Green Flag. A history o f Irish nationalism (London 1972 ) 265. 86 P. O'Connor , 'Th e Nationa l Flag' , i n A n Consantoir. Th e Irish Defence Journal 6 (1946) 141.

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as early as 1798. 87 Sinc e then it wa s looked upo n a s the symbo l of revolution an d afte r it s short emergenc e in 184 8 it appeared t o find wide acceptance firs t a t th e beginning o f the twentieth century as a symbol no w frequentl y use d b y th e Sin n Fei n movemen t and — since 1913—b y th e Iris h Volunteer s whic h unde r th e influenc e o f Sinn Fei n ha d split from th e National Volunteers closel y associated with the Parliamentary Party. 88 The ne w nationa l anthem , Th e Soldier' s Song' , wa s muc h younger. It s historica l origi n a s a marc h an d revolutionar y son g shows definite parallels to the origin of the Marseillaise** Although 'The Soldier' s Song ' ha d alread y com e int o existenc e i n 190 7 an d had bee n publishe d i n Irish Freedom, th e journal o f th e I.R.B. , i n September 1912, 90 the song was known before 1916 only as a marching son g o f the Iris h Volunteer s and th e Citize n Army. 91 As, however, numerou s Volunteer s an d member s o f th e Citize n Arm y belonged to the revolutionaries i t became popular wit h the insurrection, so that by the end of 1916 it was 'the de facto Nationa l Anthem of Ireland'. 92 I n Jul y 192 6 'Th e Soldier' s Song ' wa s mad e th e official nationa l anthe m o f th e Iris h Fre e Stat e b y governmen t decree.93

Ill This surve y o f Iris h nationa l symbol s betwee n 187 5 an d 192 1 allows for som e concluding remarks : It emerge s fro m th e enumeratio n o f Iris h symbol s tha t durin g the period i n which the Parliamentary Part y wa s the country's most important nationa l organizatio n Irelan d alread y possesse d th e entire serie s o f symbol s which wer e t o b e foun d i n al l Europea n nation-states with an astonishing similarity of form an d use. Almost forty year s before the achievemen t of national independence all th e 87

'Enniscorthy and th e National Flag', in Th e Past 1 (1964) 145 , 148 . Encyclopedia o f Ireland, 171 , an d O'Donnell , 151 . Som e document s whic h give evidence to the use of the tricolour by the Fenians, especially after 1867 , can be found i n Snoddy, 'Fenian Flags', 9. 89 For th e origin o f the Marseillaise cf . Fehrenbach, 303-9. 90 Zimmermann, 68; S. de Burca, Th e Soldier's Song (Dublin 1957 ) 52-5, and P. Kearney , Th e Soldier's Song an d other poems (Dublin 1928) . Th e tex t wa s written by Peadar Kearne y (1883-1942 ) an d the melody by Patrick Heene y (1881 1911). Bot h were members of the Gaelic League . 91 De Burca, 54, and O'Donnell , 153 . 92 De Burca, 55 , and O'Donnell , 153. 93 Encyclopedia o f Ireland, 172 ; O'Donnell, 153 , and P. Nettl, National Anthems (New York 2 1967) 106 . 88

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typical symbols of the nation-state can be found in Ireland, especiall y the fou r well-know n basic element s o f nationa l symbolis m created by th e Frenc h Revolution : th e nationa l flag , 'nationalism' s chie f symbol of faith and central object of worship',94 the national anthem which replace d th e traditiona l roya l hym n or , a t least , move d into a competitive situation with it, the national holiday as 'nationalism's holy day ' accordin g t o th e thesi s o f Carlto n Haye s o f 'nationalis m as a religion', 95 an d lastl y th e nationa l monumen t fro m whic h — as Th . Nipperde y rightl y stresses 96—a constant initiativ e t o wi n and strengthe n th e nationa l identit y shoul d emanate . Th e detaile d reports in the contemporary Irish press of the national agitation an d national gatherings in Ireland clearly demonstrate that these symbols play an important, bu t muc h disregarded rol e in the history of Iris h nationalism and that they , analogously to the circumstances in other national movements , receive d a meanin g a s factor s o f politica l integration which can hardly be overestimated even though the y are very difficult t o measure . The exampl e o f Irelan d demonstrate s tha t nationa l symbol s are no t static , a t leas t no t i n th e politicall y instabl e perio d o f a national awakenin g whic h usuall y stretche s ove r severa l decades , but that they are, t o a certain degree, capabl e of change. Establishe d national symbol s can, under certain circumstances, even be replaced by othe r nationa l symbols . Traditiona l nationa l symbol s lose thei r political integratin g forc e an d thei r credibilit y especiall y when th e national programm e for which they stand loses its persuasive power and i s replace d b y a differen t programme. 97 I n th e cas e o f Ireland investigated here this means more tangibly that certain symbols were identified quit e unmistakably wit h th e Parliamentar y Part y an d it s politics. Whe n afte r th e Easte r Risin g revolutionar y nationalis m superseded constitutiona l nationalism ne w form s o f symbol s wer e the logica l resul t which, at th e outset , compete d wit h those o f constitutional nationalis m an d finall y superimpose d themselves . Th e favourable prerequisit e fo r suc h a proces s o f supersessio n i s a revolutionary situation , bu t i t ca n als o b e observe d ver y clearl y in 94

Hayes, Essays o n nationalism, 107. Ibid., 108. Th. Nipperdey, 'Nationalidee und Nationaldenkma l in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert', in Historische Zeitschrift 206 (1968) 582. 97 This confirms Loewenstein' s statemen t 'that n o majo r politica l revolution has eve r bee n accomplished without a chang e in th e se t o f politica l symbols' ('Influence', 80). 95 96

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Ireland how this process had already gradually started around the turn of the century. Those symbols were excepted from th e process which more o r les s di d no t stan d immediatel y fo r a definit e patter n o f Irish nationalism . Severa l 'superior' nationa l symbols , suc h a s th e harp, the colour green , St Patrick's Day, an d the shamrock, retaine d their significanc e i n the Fre e Stat e while at the same time 'God save Ireland', th e gree n flag with the harp , o r th e memoria l day fo r th e Manchester Martyr s disappeare d almos t completely . I t wa s no t until th e conclusio n o f th e national-revolutionar y proces s tha t th e symbols consolidated. Then , dynami c and revolutionar y symbols— according t o the classification of Karl Loewenstein 98—became static and traditional symbols . There is, after all , no example in the history of Europea n nationa l movement s fo r a replacemen t o f nationa l symbols afte r th e achievemen t of nationa l independenc e without a simultaneous and fundamenta l political upheaval . The Iris h nationa l symbol s ca n b e divide d int o tw o categories . On th e on e hand , ther e ar e symbol s which hav e lon g possesse d a national meanin g an d whic h wer e take n u p b y th e Parliamentar y Party, wer e changed, give n other meanings , and utilised to convey a particular interpretatio n o f the history of the country. To this group belonged the green flag, the shamrock, and St Patrick's Day. Included in this group must be also those symbols whose spontaneous creation can stil l b e trace d bac k i n detai l an d whic h wer e taken ove r a t a later tim e b y constitutiona l nationalis m (e.g . 'Go d sav e Ireland' , the memorial day for the Manchester Martyrs) . After th e turn of the century, for the revolutionary line of Irish nationalism, the procedure of taking over already known symbols can be similarly demonstrated by tracing the history of the Irish tricolour an d the national anthe m of the Fre e State. I n addition , an d thi s is the secon d category, there are several symbols in Ireland which, for the most part, can be looked upon as proper creations of constitutional nationalism. These symbols were knowingl y composed an d propagate d b y th e Parliamentar y Party. The y are th e expressio n of a n attemp t t o plac e ne w symbols at th e servic e o f a certai n nationa l idea . I n thi s categor y w e may count th e effort s o f th e Part y t o creat e a n O'Connel l myth , th e renaming o f streets , bridges , an d square s afte r figure s fro m Iris h history, the creation o f a new city flag for Dubli n as well as, though with som e qualifie d limitations , the erectio n of the O'Connel l Monument i n Dubli n an d simila r monuments in othe r part s o f th e 98

Ibid., 67.

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country." I n an y event , her e on e ca n recogniz e rudimentaril y th e predecessors an d transitions to the later use of symbols in totalitaria n states. I t would be a rewarding undertaking of historical researc h t o illuminate mor e closely , wit h th e us e o f comparativ e methods , th e creation an d th e histor y o f these symbol s of European nationalis m which are perhaps les s the resul t of the spontaneou s reactio n o f th e populace tha n th e consequence of propaganda fro m above .

99 It would be worthwhile to investigate the erection o f th e Parnell Monumen t in Dublin . Th e movemen t fo r thi s monumen t go t unde r wa y in th e autum n o f 1898 on the initiative of the Parliamentary Party . Th e foundation-stone wa s laid a year later, and the monument was unveiled in 1911. Some useful information on its erectio n ca n b e foun d in : Souvenir of th e Unveiling o f th e Parnell National Monument. Dublin, 1st October, 1911 (Dublin 1911) .

2

PATRIOTISM A S PASTIME: THE APPEA L O F FENIANISM I N THE MID-1860 s R. V. COMERFORD

There i s general acceptance in recent writings that fenianism i n its heyday — which i s to say the middle 1860s — was espoused predominantl y by members of lower-ranking social and occupational groups. It is not difficult t o assemble supporting references and text s from well-place d contemporary observers. T. D. Sulliva n writing privately to Thomas D'Arc y McGe e in 186 2 described the active but stil l anonymous organisation subsequently known as the 'I.R.B.' or the 'fenians ' a s drawing the bulk of its membership from among 'shopkeepers' assistants i n our citie s and chie f towns who hav e a littl e smattering — often a very littl e indee d — o f education' , an d fro m 'th e ver y poores t an d mos t ignorant people'. 1 By 1865 the term 'fenianism ' wa s in extensive use and th e thing itsel f wa s receiving widespread attention. Writing his diary for 2 6 June that year, W. J. O'Neill Daunt expressed the opinion that in his part of County Cork those implicated in fenian activitie s were 'country lads' and 'town shopboys'.2 A t th e sam e time , the mountin g pile o f constabular y report s fro m around th e countr y provide d mor e an d mor e reference s to th e infectio n of specific categories b y fenianism: in one area, shopboys, artisans, servants and reduced farmers ; i n another , 'youn g me n o f th e labourin g clas s an d als o mechanics o r tradesme n suc h a s tailors , nailors , shoemakers' ; elsewhere , subordinate employee s on the railway. Less specifically, an alarmed detective visiting th e Thurle s are a reporte d tha t th e 'lowe r orders ' thereabout s wer e fenians virtuall y t o a man. 3 Cardina l Culle n believed tha t th e fenian s wer e mostly impoverishe d tradesmen. 4 John O'Leary , on e o f th e I.R.B . leaders , concede d th e genera l point , however reluctantly , in hi s published recollections. 5 I n private O'Leary was , apparently, more blunt. Returning to prison from a court appearance, after he had bee n arreste d wit h mos t o f th e othe r fenia n leader s in Septembe r 1865 , O'Leary commente d t o hi s companio n i n th e polic e van , Thoma s Clark e Luby, o n th e socia l compositio n o f thei r movement , expressin g 'Sullivan t o D'Arc y McGee , 1 8 Feb. 186 2 (Ottawa, Publi c Archive s o f Canada, MG27. 1.E9) . Journal o f W . J. O'Neil l Daunt , 2 6 June 186 5 (N.L.I., M S 3041). 'Constabulary reports , 3 0 Aug., 1 and 6 Sept., 2 5 Oct. 1865 (S.P.O. , fenian polic e reports, 1864-5 , nos. 208, 214, 223, 239). All S.P.O. records referred t o i n this article belong to th e 'fenia n papers ' sectio n o f th e 'polic e an d crime ' division . 4 Cullen t o Tobia s Kirby , 8 Mar. 1867 (P. J. Corish , 'Iris h College , Rome : Kirb y papers; guid e t o materia l o f publi c an d politica l interest, 1862-83 ' i n Arch. Hib., xxx (1972), p . 55), 5 John O'Leary, Recollections of fenians an d fenianism ( 2 vols, London, 1896), ii, 239.

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disappointment tha t thei r men 'belonged so much to the riff-raff. O r so Luby reminded hi m man y years later. 6 Scientific-minded curiosit y for mor e precis e and accurat e informatio n led to Dubli n Castl e official s bein g requeste d earl y i n 187 0 to establis h o n a statistical basi s wha t wer e 'the classes amongs t whic h fenianism prevailed'. 7 There wa s t o han d amon g th e record s o f th e government' s handlin g o f fenianism a particularl y good sourc e fo r th e informatio n sought, namely the three volume s of 'Habea s corpus suspensio n act , abstract s o f cases, 1866-8' . The arres t o f th e fenia n leadershi p i n 186 5 had lef t th e movemen t largel y unharmed, and with the escape of the chief conspirator, Jame s Stephens , fro m Richmond Jai l i n Novembe r th e government' s coup ha d com e t o appea r totally ineffective. Mor e drastic measures were needed. In February 1866anac t was passe d suspendin g the applicatio n o f habea s corpu s i n Irelan d s o tha t persons could be lawfully arrested and held by the authorities on warrant of the lord lieutenant. 8 This enable d the polic e to arres t an d detai n known fenians, especially those against whom they did not have evidence of a kind that would support a criminal prosecution. Just ove r eleven hundred were arrested under the term s o f th e act , th e grea t majorit y o f the m i n 186 6 and 186 7 and th e remainder i n 1868 . I n Dubli n Castle , wher e the y wer e referre d t o a s th e 'H.C.S.A. prisoners', abstracts from the information filed on each of them were compiled in two volumes with an alphabetical index in a third.9 Excluded were most o f those fenian s take n before th e courts , suc h a s the movement' s small middle-class intellectual elite (the majority of whom were arrested in 1865) and the prominent Irish-American military men captured after the attempted rising of Marc h 1867 . That onl y served t o mak e th e lis t more representativ e of th e generality o f fenians . So di d th e exclusio n of serving members o f the crow n forces, a marginal and not very typical element in fenianism whose importance has been exaggerated becaus e John Devoy wa s involved with them. The H.C.S.A . lis t provide s a mor e satisfactor y sampl e tha n another , an d superficially mor e attractive , Dubli n Castl e source , 'Fenianism : inde x o f names, 1866-71" ° Tha t include s virtuall y everyon e suspecte d o f politica l disaffection durin g the period, some o f them stron g opponent s o f fenianism such a s A . M . Sulliva n an d Joh n Martin . Th e superiorit y o f th e H.C.S.A . sample is supported b y the decision o f contemporary Castl e officials to choose it in January 1870.11 The tas k o f analysi s wa s undertake n b y Rober t Anderson , a lawye r intimately acquainte d wit h the government's anti-fenia n campaigns an d with 6

T. C. Luby's recollections of the Irish People, communicated to John O'Leary, 189 2 (N.L.I., M S 333 ) (hereafter cite d a s Luby , M S 333). 7 William Neilson Hancock to th e chief secretary, 3 Jan. 187 0 (S.P.O., 'F' papers , 5477R). "Habeas Corpu s Suspensio n (Ireland ) Act, 29 & 30 Vic., c. 1. 'Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, abstracts of cases, 1866-8 (S.P.O., police and crime records, fenia n papers). 10 In S.P.O. , police an d crim e records, fenian papers. "However, th e genuinel y fenia n elemen t i n th e mor e comprehensiv e lis t i s sufficiently stron g for analysis to show up the same general patterns, even if they are less decisive; se e Samue l Clark , Th e social origins o f th e Irish land wa r (Princeton, 1979) , p. 203.

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the archives they had produced. Amon g the items recorded o n each H.C.S.A. prisoner's fil e wa s his occupation, usually , it seems, as given by himself after arrest.12 Anderson wa s able to satisf y himsel f about th e occupation o r statu s of eac h o f 108 6 prisoners . ( A scrupulou s researche r workin g now o n th e surviving evidence might exclude a few score of these from consideration bu t without significant effect o n subsequent calculations.) Almost 500 of his total Anderson classifie d a s 'tradesmen , artisans , millworkers , etc'. As they were designated onl y b y th e trad e i n whic h the y worke d ('tailor' , 'shoemaker' , 'nailor', etc) , ther e wa s n o wa y o f distinguishin g between proprietor s an d wage earners , bu t everythin g known abou t the m suggest s tha t the y wer e predominantly th e latter . I n an y case , thei r numbe r constitute s impressiv e evidence for the social bias in the composition of the movement. The addition of 2 3 bakers t o thi s category — which seems logical thoug h the y are liste d separately b y Anderso n fo r n o obviou s reaso n — brings th e tota l of skilled workers t o 52 0 (47.8 pe r cent) . Thi s figur e i s so impressiv e tha t hi s othe r findings serv e largely as commentar y on it . Townsmen o f th e labourin g class , includin g 1 9 porters, accoun t fo r 6 9 arrests (6.4 per cent) suggesting that fenianism drew its main strength from the lower classes but not the lowest. Occupations t o which young men of humble origins migh t aspir e o n th e basi s o f a n affinit y fo r th e 'thre e Rs ' an d goo d character reference s account for a significant 9.1 per cent of the arrests (made up o f 5x 7 'clerks and commercia l assistants', 2 9 'national school masters ' an d 13 'school teachers an d tutors') . Thes e wer e people i n a social and economic position comparabl e wit h tha t o f th e artisans . Here , too , shoul d b e note d Anderson's categor y o f 'sho p assistant s an d shopkeepers ' sons ' totalling 39 (3.6 pe r cent) . Shopkeepers (52) and publicans (37 ) amount togethe r t o 8.2 per cent of the total, a quit e hig h figur e for thi s grou p i n relatio n t o it s overal l size . Th e contrast wit h th e representatio n o f farmer s is striking: from thi s large an d prominent secto r o f th e populatio n onl y 3 9 actual farmer s and 2 1 farmers' sons ar e include d (5. 5 pe r cent) . Agricultura l labourers totalle d 5 8 (5.3 pe r cent). Self-confessed veterans of the United States army (47) together with exmembers o f he r majesty' s arm y an d nav y (21) an d dismisse d o r pensione d constabulary (7 ) constitute 6. 9 per cen t o f th e arrests . A numbe r o f othe r occupations ar e represente d bu t non e accounts for more tha n 1 per cent and their combined total comes to just over 6 per cent. 13 Whatever contemporaries ma y have thought of them, there is no doubt that a significant proportio n of the rank an d file was sufficiently prosperous to have money t o spen d o n leisure . According to John Devo y ninet y per cent of the thousand or so Dublin fenian s under the command o f one Mathew O'Neill, a 12

'Summary o f th e occupation s o f th e prisoner s i n custod y unde r th e lor d lieu tenant's warrant', 1 2 Jan. 187 0 (S.P.O., 'F' papers , 5477R). The date is that of compilation: th e las t o f the H.C.S.A . prisoners had bee n release d b y late 1868 . 13 A sample of 523 H.C.S.A. prisoner s is subjected to a series of interesting analyses in H . H . van de r Wusten , lers verzet tegen de staatkundige eenheidder Rritse eilanden, 1800-1921: een politiek-geografische studie van integratie- en desintegratieprocessen (Amsterdam, 1977) , p p 84-99 . I n particula r D r va n de r Wuste n demonstrates , b y reference t o th e occupationa l statistic s i n th e 186 1 census , th e grea t under representation of farmers an d of labourers of all kinds and the over-representation o f the trades , schoolteacher s an d publicans .

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builder, earne d thirt y shilling s per week. 14 An d eve n i f w e mus t trea t al l Devoy's statistic s wit h caution , ther e i s n o gainsayin g th e evidenc e hi s statement provide s concernin g th e comparative prosperity of many fenians . Further evidenc e come s fro m Lub y wh o foun d tha t a s a gentlema n i n straitened circumstance s h e wa s unabl e to hol d his own financiall y wit h th e smart young wage-earners who filled th e fenian ranks in Dublin. Accordingly he wa s muc h relieve d t o b e abl e t o pas s a grea t par t o f th e burde n o f maintaining regular social contact wit h them on to Joseph Denieffe , wh o was employed a t th e tim e a t a goo d salar y a s a foreman-cutte r in a merchant tailoring house . 'S o h e coul d no w mee t an d associat e wit h youth s like m y recruits a s ofte n a s h e like d o n equa l pecuniar y terms , incurrin g n o humiliating obligations.' 15 Fenianism in the mid-1860s appealed, then , predominantly to 'respectable' wage earner s an d som e o f the urba n lower-middl e class. The higher-middle and professional classes who had bee n so prominent — with the artisans — in Young Ireland days gave virtually no support. Mor e striking still, the farming population, tha t mos t importan t elemen t in post-famine Ireland, remained almost totall y aloof. Th e fenian newspaper, the Irish People, took the line that the 'people ' — as opposed t o th e middl e classe s an d gentr y — had a near monopoly o f altruistic patriotism.16 This was an implicit acknowledgement of the limite d appeal o f the I.R.B. , but i t is not o f much use as an explanation. Certainly James Stephens did not inten d to have his following confined to the lower ranks of Irish society. He had canvassed support a t every level.17 How is the bias of the response to be explained? Unlike thos e i n th e upper-middl e class , mos t o f th e peopl e attracte d t o fenianism ha d n o direc t acces s t o parliamentar y politics . Neither , however, had mos t farmers , an d eve n thos e wh o ha d ca n hav e gaine d bu t littl e satisfaction fro m i t betwee n 185 2 and 1868 . The perio d o f mos t spectacula r movement int o the fenian ranks, 1863-6 , coincided wit h years of particularly high emigration, 18 and i t is reasonable t o postulate a connection betwee n the two trends. However , the principa l Iris h economic crisis of the period wa s in agriculture an d primaril y affecte d thos e wh o showe d leas t interes t i n fenianism.19 I n short , purel y political o r economi c factor s cannot , alon e o r together, satisfactorily explai n the appea l o f the I.R.B . at this time. We must consider also the socia l rol e of the organisation . The age structure o f the H.C.S.A. prisoners provide s a suggestive start on this subject . Th e age s o f 74 6 of the m ar e recorde d i n the index . They rang e from 1 5 to 70 , but the arithmetic mean was very much nearer the lower figure, just 2 7 years in fact. Altogether 8 7 per cent were aged under 36. 20 In selecting "Irish Freedom, Mar . 1913 . T. C. Luby's recollections o f early fenia n events, communicated t o John O'Leary, 1890-92 (N.L.I., M S 331 ) (hereafte r cite d a s Luby , M S 331) . I6 lrish People, 5 Dec. 1863 , 2 3 Jan. 1864 . 17 Desmond Ryan , Th e fenian chief: a biography o f James Stephens (Dubli n an d Sydney, 1967) , ch s 7-15 ; Luby , M S 331 . 18 W. E . Vaugha n an d A . J. Fitzpatrick , Irish historical statistics: population, 18211971 (Dublin, 1978) , p . 261 . "See J . S . Donnelly , Jr , 'Th e Iris h agricultura l depressio n o f 1859-64 ' i n Irish Economic an d Social History, ii i (1976), p p 33-54 . 2 °'Habeas Corpus Suspensio n Act , abstract s o f cases, 1866-8 ' (S.P.O.). 15

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suspects fo r arres t th e authoritie s ar e unlikel y t o hav e bee n undul y biase d towards youth , an d s o thes e figure s sho w fenianis m a s a youn g men' s movement. 'After a whil e the secret par t of the business was wearing away and we were making ourselves known prett y freely t o one another.' Thus wrot e John Dal y of Limeric k recalling after a n interva l of nearl y fort y years hi s experience of fenianism befor e 1867. 21 Muc h contemporary evidenc e exists to sho w tha t a great proportion o f the brotherhood departe d at an early stage from Stephens's blueprint for a perfect secret societ y organised int o independent cells with the individual membe r bein g know n onl y t o hi s immediat e superior . Whe n i n 1859 Stephen s arrange d fo r America n drill-master s t o com e ove r fo r th e purpose o f instructin g the fenian s he was implicitl y abandonin g th e cellula r system; even i n Stephens's imaginatio n me n coul d no t dril l together without knowing one another. However , h e still obviously intended the I.R.B. to keep itself wel l hidde n fro m al l outsiders . So , dril l was t o b e conducte d wit h al l possible secrecy . Joh n Dal y recalle d tha t h e and hi s friends initiall y learne d drill in the fields at night , but tha t after a while they began boldly to hold their exercises o n Sundays. 22 Stephens's lieutenan t Thomas Clark e Lub y visitin g Carrick-on-Sui r with another office r durin g a tou r o f inspectio n i n 186 0 fel t calle d upo n t o remonstrate wit h local leader s fo r apparen t lac k of progress. Next day as the visitors were boarding a car for Clonmel ' a crowd of the boys' in military order marched int o view , determine d t o impres s th e visitor s wit h a spectacula r farewell. Lub y was greatl y relieved that th e car move d of f at once, fo r he had no desir e t o receiv e suc h a potentiall y embarrassin g compliment. 23 Wha t interests u s her e i s th e evidenc e tha t i n on e o f th e stronghold s o f th e organisation fenian s wer e accustome d t o marchin g and considere d i t prope r to mak e a publi c displa y o f thei r prowess . Undoubtedly th e same 'boys ' were involved when, on a Sunday morning in October of the same year, a group of 'about fifty person s mostl y of the class of shop-assistants an d tradesmen ' arrived in the village of Kilmoganny, County Kilkenny, from Carrick-on-Suir , travellin g on a convoy of eight horse -drawn vehicles wit h gree n ribbon s i n thei r coats , an d t o th e accompanimen t o f a drum an d som e musica l instruments. 24 Whe n challenge d b y a constabular y officer the y explaine d tha t the y wer e o n thei r wa y t o engag e group s fro m Kilkenny cit y an d Calla n i n a cricke t match . The y the n proceede d t o Dunnamaggin an d dul y met up with the other contingents . A n unconvincing pretence o f playin g cricke t wa s pu t u p fo r a shor t while , to b e followe d b y some hour s o f convivia l conversatio n betwee n th e member s o f al l thre e groups. There were conflicting reports as to whether the conviviality occurre d inside o r outsid e a publi c house . O n th e wa y hom e th e Carric k me n wer e shouting slogan s o f stron g politica l import. 25 There is no doubt tha t thi s was a fenia n outing. A hostile local newspaper comment o n th e episod e wa s heade d 'Suppose d politica l meetin g a t 2

^Irish Freedom, Feb . 1912 . Ibid. "Luby, M S 331 . ^Irishman, 2 0 Oct. 1860 . 25 Ibid. 22

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Dunnamaggin' an d remarked , pointedly , tha t i n th e Carric k distric t th e Phoenix Societ y (unde r whic h name th e I.R.B . wa s firs t uncovere d b y th e police late in 1858 ) was well known to have many supporters, an d that 'instead of dyin g awa y i t ha s bee n nurture d an d carefull y propagated'. 26 A gathering held at Dunnamaggin i n October 186 4 (again under the guise of a cricke t match ) was reported i n advance to Dublin Castl e by Pierce Nagle, a well-placed informer , who indicate d tha t i t was a totally fenian project.27 On this occasio n contingent s cam e fro m Carrick-on-Suir , Kilkenny , Callan , Clonmel an d Mullinahone , al l stron g fenia n bases. 28 Car s wer e use d fo r transport; th e traveller s wer e sustaine d b y fif e an d dru m music ; ribbons , neckbands an d hatband s o f green wer e much i n evidence, while many gree n boughs wer e carried. A t their meeting place the excursionists began a cricket match bu t mos t o f the m soo n los t interes t and scattere d aroun d th e fiel d i n groups. Th e highpoin t o f thei r da y wa s a picni c meal o f whic h abou t fou r hundred o f the m partook . A s they ate they were clearly distinguishable from an eve n large r numbe r o f local s wh o flocke d t o th e fiel d attracte d b y th e excitement. Th e vigilan t constabular y note d th e prominen t par t playe d b y individuals know n t o the m — and t o u s — as loca l fenia n leaders. 29 What are we to mak e of such demonstrations by an allegedly secret society ? They were not alone contrary t o officia l I.R.B . policy, but they contributed i n no wa y t o th e achievemen t of the organisation's suppose d ai m o f preparing secretly fo r arme d rebellion : i n fac t the y were mos t likel y t o dissipat e effor t and invit e unwelcom e attention . Fenianis m ha d bee n converte d t o a socia l purpose for which it had no t bee n intended . It was providing young men with a foru m fo r fraternal association an d communa l self-expression, even t o th e detriment o f it s formal conspirationa l objective . The interna l history of the I.R.B . down toMarch 186 7 is largely the story of James Stephens' s struggl e t o kee p th e movemen t under hi s control an d t o prevent i t from metamorphosin g int o a loos e networ k of autonomous socia l clubs wit h stron g bu t vaguely-define d nationalist inspiration. Tha t wa s th e direction i n which the inclinations of a number of leading fenians tended. This was especiall y tru e o f Jeremia h O'Donova n Rossa . Indee d hi s Phoeni x Society, founde d in Skibbereen i n 1856 , should be seen as the precursor not of the silen t arm y tha t Jame s Stephen s hope d t o establis h but o f the mean s of social expression for smart young artisans and clerks which, to a large extent, Stephens's organisatio n actuall y became. 30 Th e arres t o f Ross a an d othe r 'Phoenix' men in West Cork an d Kerr y in December 1858 , some months after their movemen t ha d bee n absorbe d int o th e I.R.B . b y Stephens , ma y hav e been mad e possibl e partl y because o f th e habi t of opennes s encourage d b y Rossa himself . I f so, the fact made littl e impression on him , for some month s after hi s releas e i n Jul y 185 9 h e wa s makin g public statements o n nationa l organisations. 31 H e directe d a numbe r o f publi c demonstration s i n 1863 , including one (i n support o f the Polis h rebellion of that year) that involve d a large bod y o f me n i n militar y arra y an d wit h flag s an d lighte d torche s ^Kilkenny Moderator, quote d i n Irishman, 2 0 Oct. 1860 . "Police report , 2 4 Sept. 186 4 (S.P.O., fenia n polic e reports , 1864-5 , no . 68) . 28 Constabulary report , 3 Oct. 186 4 (ibid. , no . 66) . 29 Ibid. 30 See Sea n 6 Luing , 6 Donnabhdin Rosa I (Dublin , 1969) , p p 81-2 . "Irishman, 5 Jan. 1860 .

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7

marching through Skibbereen in defiance of six magistrates.32 The demonstra tion ma y no t hav e bee n compose d entirel y o f fenians , bu t ever y availabl e fenian unde r Rossa' s influence was involved. Is it any wonde r tha t Stephen s later in the year grasped th e opportunity to remove Rossa from Skibbereen to Dublin b y makin g hi m busines s manage r o f hi s newly-founde d weekl y th e Irish People! In Dublin Rossa was under supervision but unrepentant. Stephens's absence in Americ a i n early summe r 186 4 provided the opportunity fo r the Corkman to displa y hi s organisational talent s once more . Th e occasion h e chose was a public celebratio n fo r th e rededicatio n o f a catholic church in Kilkenny city on 22 May. Followin g arrangements mad e by Rossa and John Haltigan, con tingents o f fenian s travelle d o n th e variou s specia l excursio n train s t o Kilkenny an d joine d wit h loca l member s o f th e brotherhoo d t o for m a separate and flamboyan t sectio n o f the procession to the church. A few highspirited Dublin fenians attempted to uncouple the last carriage of their homebound trai n —jus t fo r a laug h amon g th e boys. 33 But the most typica l outdoor manifestation o f fenian camaraderie was drill and marching . Certainly , eve n th e mos t circumspec t programm e o f dril l meetings would risk occasional discover y by a vigilant police force. However, the larg e numbe r of cases notice d b y the constabular y i n 186 4 and 186 5 can only b e explained b y th e fac t that man y fenia n group s fel t an d behave d no t merely lik e part o f a secre t arm y bu t a s clique s of youn g me n discoverin g personal identit y an d achievemen t i n grou p display. 34 O n a fe w occasion s enough evidenc e wa s availabl e t o justify charge s i n court. 35 Afte r on e suc h case ha d resulte d i n a number of convictions the Irish People remarked tha t 'surely there is a time and a place for all things, and midday marching before a police barrac k i s neither rational a s to tim e or place'. 36 At al l times the Irish People sough t t o inculcat e silence, patience an d circumspection . I n a parti cularly strikin g fligh t o f fanc y a leadin g articl e declare d tha t 'Irishmen ' (clearly meanin g th e fenians ) 'coul d now , lik e th e peopl e i n th e street s o f Warsaw, se e thei r brethre n sho t dow n an d remai n sternl y silen t til l th e moment an d opportunit y o f vengeanc e woul d arrive'. 37 Tha t wa s a vai n hankering afte r th e disciplin e of th e idea l secre t society . Camaraderie inculcate d self-esteem and undermined traditional deference. Pierce Nagle, when asked b y the police in 1864 if the I.R.B. had any password s or signs , replie d tha t i t ha d not . 'But' , h e continued, the members often kno w each other in general by wearing their beard, and at the same time they mee t each other by a stern look, and if met by the same they are ninety-nine out o f a hundred fenians ; fo r a stern loo k in the eye will cause a man wh o is not up t o this mark to look some other way. The general exception to this are the [gentry]38 and government officer s an d thes e th e fenian s kno w wel l t o avoid. 32

6 Liiing , 6 Donnabhdin Rosa I, p p 132-7 . "Luby, MS 333; Irishman, 28 May 1864 ; John Devoy, Recollections of an Irish rebel (New York , 1929) , p p 50-5 1 (wher e th e dat e is wrongly give n a s 1 5 Aug.). "Constabulary report s (S.P.O., fenia n polic e reports, 1864-5 , passim) . ^Irishman, 2 0 Feb., 1 9 Mar. 1864 , 9 Sept. 1865 . ^Irishman, 2 6 Mar. 1864 . 31

38

Irish People, 1 2 Mar. 1864 .

In th e M S copy i n which Nagle's reply survives the word here is 'sentry' but th e sense suggests it i s a transcriber' s error.

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to Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914

A fenian, Nagle explained, will not Salute a nobleman o r a clergyman, even if he happens t o know him, unless he also happens to be in some way subject to him. All of this is done in conscious imitatio n of the 'yankee' fashion, 'as far as can b e by those who neve r wer e in yankee-land'. And Nagl e added anothe r interesting qualification : 'i n out-of-the-wa y rura l district s thi s rul e wil l no t hold good, but in towns and cities it is correct'.39 In May 1865 Superintenden t Ryan o f the Dubli n polic e pu t o n recor d anothe r repor t i n the same vein : I am informed that at present nearly all the drapers' assistants in Dublin have assumed an ai r o f careles s independenc e tha t render s the m almos t unmanageabl e b y thei r employers, who are grown quite timid and almost afraid to rebuke them. In many cases they openl y expres s thei r politica l sentiment s an d thei r mind s see m imbue d wit h revolutionary an d democrati c ideas. 40

An officer o n special duty in Kilkenny some months later reported tha t a great number o f me n i n the cit y were fenians and tha t the y had ' a lot of swagger' about them. 41 Fenianism, then, appealed most strongly to sections of the population tha t were read y fo r a n organisation tha t woul d provid e member s with a sense of personal fulfilmen t throug h identifying with a group of their peers in autonomous social activities . So it flourished in Dublin and in many of the towns and villages o f Leinste r an d Munster , amon g youn g me n wh o ver y ofte n wer e already i n contac t wit h on e anothe r throug h thei r employmen t bu t ha d previously lacked any specific pretext for fraternisation in their free time. The rural population fo r the most part was not yet ready for advance in this sphere. Fenianism provided townsme n an d villagers with a vehicle for more rapi d and visible progress i n a direction i n which the trend of the times was drawing them in any case. The 1860 s witnessed in Britain a notable rise in public leisure activity o n th e par t o f workin g men , an d th e progressiv e developmen t o f recreational institutions (railway excursions, brass bands, an d the music hall, to mention a few) that responde d t o the felt requirements of ordinary peopl e rather than to 'what benevolent superiors thought was their need and ought to be their interest'. 42 Much work remains to b e done on the extent and pace of Irish participation in this development, but fenianism is certainly a significant part o f th e story . If fenianism filled a social vacuum, as suggested here, it follows that a movement with less radical nationalist objectives, or no nationalist objectives at all, could just as easily have satisfied thi s social need . O n the other hand , al l the evidence suggests that in the mid-nineteenth century any popular organisatio n among Iris h catholic s whatever its initial o r nomina l purpose wa s likely t o become a vehicle for nationalist feeling, more or les s quickly depending on its degree o f popularity. In Dubli n cit y i n th e 1860 s th e I.R.B . wa s no t th e onl y societ y offerin g working me n th e opportunit y o f sel f expression and independenc e throug h association. Ther e was also a flourishing collection of'trade associations' co 39

Police report , 1 9 Aug. 186 4 (S.P.O., fenian polic e reports, 1864-5 , no . 44A) . Police report , 8 May 186 5 (ibid., no . 157) . 41 Police report , 2 1 Sept. 186 5 (ibid., no . 203) . 42 Geoffrey Best , Mid-Victorian Britain, 1851-70 (2n d ed., London , 1979) , p. 220 . 40

Patriotism as Pastime 2

9

operating loosely from 186 3 under the umbrella of the United Trades Association.43 The trades — as they were generally referred to — provided fraternity, a certai n amoun t of conspiracy, and, o n suitable occasions, pageantry , with the member s o f each association , bedecked wit h badges , marchin g in orde r behind their own bands and banners.44 All of this was the very stuff of popula r nationalism. I n 186 4 Pierc e Nagle , unde r circumstance s that encourage d exaggeration, estimated tha t fifty-five per cent of the members of the Dublin trades wer e fenians. 45 Give n th e overla p o f socia l functions , a n overla p o f membership wa s not surprising , but the I.R.B. did not dominate the trades . Fr Mathew's temperanc e campaign i n the years 1839-45 provided an earlier example o f ho w a movemen t wit h a specifically 'moral ' objectiv e could b e drawn irretrievabl y int o nationalis t politics. 46 A small revival of that movement in Cork city and county in 1863 gave rise to excursions and displays by St Finbarr's temperance band (wearing green and gold caps) and public meetings that wer e 'mor e politica l tha n temperance'. 47 Interestingly , th e Phoeni x Society, i n its first stage, enjoined teetotalis m o n its members. 48 Charles J . Kickham always felt tha t fenianis m and temperanc e went hand in hand. The wish being father of the thought, he wrote enthusiastically about the improved sobriety noticeable among young men where the Irish People was most read.49 A commo n pledg e o f teetotalis m coul d certainl y consolidate th e fraterna l spirit, bu t s o als o coul d th e convivialit y of the publi c house. Indeed , mos t fenian business , especiall y recruitmen t an d initiatio n o f ne w members , appears to have been conducted i n public houses. The pub provided excellent cover, but to see fenian recourse t o the pub as a merely accidental matter of convenience would be to miss the point: public house conviviality was part of the ver y fabric of fenianism. Th e vitality of fenianism an d th e risin g sales of liquor wer e both product s o f a modest prosperity. 50 Not surprisingly , i n vie w of it s social dimension , fenianis m is frequently mentioned i n contemporary source s i n connection wit h games and popula r pastimes; wha t is surprising is the wide range of activities involved. References to cricket we have already seen. The constabulary reported from west Cork in the autumn of 1858 that suspected Phoenix Society organisers were constantly travelling the country engaged in coursing — 'a good means of meeting young fellows'.51 An American fenian officer o n one occasion reviewed the Limerick city I.R.B. on the local racecourse, wher e they were assembled in small groups "Irishman, 1 2 Dec. 1863 . "Irishman, 1 6 Nov. 1861 ; Breanda n Ma c Gioll a Choille , 'Dubli n trade s i n pro cession, 1864 ' i n Saothar: Journal of th e Irish Labour History Society, i , no . 1 (May 1975), p p 18-30 . 45 Police report, 1 9 Aug. 186 4 (S.P.O., fenian police reports, 1864-5 , no . 44A. ) 46 See Elizabeth Malcolm, 'Temperance and Iris h nationalism' in F. S. L. Lyons and R. A. J. Hawkin s (eds), Ireland under the union: varieties of tension (Oxford, 1980) , pp 75-7. A1 Irishman,2 9 Aug., 2 6 Sept. 1863 . "Statement of Robert Cusack, undated (S.P.O., Reports on secret societies, 1857-9). 49 Irish People, 1 7 June 1865 . 50 See J. J. Lee, 'Money and beer in Ireland, 1790-1875 ' inEcon. Hist. Rev., 2nd series, xix(1966),pp!83-7. ''Constabulary reports, Bantry , 24 Sept. and 25 Oct. 1859(S.P.O. , Reports on secret societies, 1857-9) .

3 0 Reactions

to Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914

posing as sightseers inspecting the jumps.52 After a number of convictions for illegal drillin g i n th e vicinit y o f Cork cit y ha d inculcate d th e need fo r som e caution, i t wa s notice d tha t suspec t group s o f youn g me n meetin g nea r Glanmire carrie d a football wit h which they played whenever a stranger was approaching nea r enoug h t o observ e thei r activities. 53 A polic e rai d o n a Dublin premise s wher e fenians had been meetin g in large numbers at evening times, uncovere d evidenc e o f swordstic k play , gymnastic s an d boxing. 54 Commenting o n a hint that footrac e meeting s near Millstreet , County Cork , were bein g organise d fo r fenia n purposes , a senio r constabular y office r declared sweepingl y tha t h e wa s 'quit e confiden t tha t thos e person s goin g through th e countr y as strollin g players, and mos t of those attending races, football an d cricke t matches, etc., ar e connected wit h fenianism'.55 When the Mullinahone fenians went on a Sunday outing in the summer of 186 3 some of them occupie d themselve s a t 'leapin g an d stonethrowing' . Other s too k t o dancing 'all the dances ... except waltzing and the polka' with a group of local girls.56 (This is one of the very few references t o female participation i n fenian social activit y that I have com e across. ) Clearly the fenians used sport as a cover for other business, but as in the case of the public house there was also a stronger link . For fenianis m in its social aspect wa s filling in many Iris h town s an d village s th e function whic h in the mid-nineteenth century organised spor t wa s beginning to perform in various European countries . Thi s particular aspec t of fenianism was grasped in 186 5 by a County Cor k aristocrat , Lor d Fermoy , whose insight was sharpened by his fear of imminent political an d social upheaval. H e declared that one of the reasons fo r the progress o f the dreaded organisatio n wa s 'the want of amusement o r rationa l employmen t o f their leisure hours experience d b y the young shopmen an d suc h lik e of th e country towns. We have no nationa l gam e or sport, an d cricke t doe s no t see m t o g o dow n well , and consequentl y i n a country tow n ther e i s no resor t fo r th e youn g shopman o r artisa n bu t th e public house.' 57 He had got to the heart of the matter, even if he was seeing it the wrong way round: any nominally sporting alternative to fenianism would also have been a vehicle of nationalist feelin g and propaganda, s o that the end result, fro m Lor d Fermoy' s poin t o f view , woul d no t hav e bee n greatl y improved. Most o f those wh o exercise d 'socia l control ' durin g th e decade s after the famine — clergymen , landlords , magistrates , policeme n — discourage d organised popula r spor t i n the interests of peace and public order. At least as early a s 185 8 thi s polic y wa s criticise d fro m a nationalis t viewpoin t b y a leader-writer in the Irishman who lamented especially the neglect of hurling.58 When h e went on to advocat e th e establishment of an organisation base d o n 52

'Irish Freedom, Feb . 1912 .

"Constabulary report , 1 3 June 186 5 (S.P.O., Fenian police reports, 1864-5, no. 179) . 54 Police report, 2 Dec. 186 4 (S.P.O., fenia n polic e reports, 1864-5 , no . 87) . "Constabulary report, 4 Nov. 196 6 (S.P.O., 'F ' papers , F142 3 and F3192) . ^Irishman, 1 1 July 1863 . For a convincing evocation of a Cork fenian Sunday afternoon se e Maura Murphy , 'The working classes of nineteenth-century Cork' i n Cork Hist. Soc. Jn., Ixx x (1980) , p. 48 . "Lord Fermo y to Lor d Palmerston , 1 Sept. 186 5 (Broadlands, Palmerston papers, GC/GR 2577 ) (used b y permissio n of the Broadland s Trust). 58 'Irishman, 2 Oct. 1858 .

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1

parish club s fo r th e fosterin g o f nativ e pastime s he was advocating a speci fically Irish version of what was already coming to pass in British sport, and he was anticipating th e Gaeli c Athletic Associatio n o f a quarter centur y later . The Irish People of 1 5 October 186 4 carried a leading article — anonymous, but i n the unmistakable style of C. J. Kickha m — under the title of'National sports'. Thi s mad e th e cas e i n defence of thos e popula r pastimes , 'hurling , football and even dancing', that were being discouraged b y the authorities. If a score or two of young men and women mee t on Sunday afternoon , Kickha m complained, they were likely to be interrupted by magistrates an d policemen . If the y the n refuse d t o disperse they were harrassed, names bein g take n an d tenant farmers getting the hint next day from the bailiffs t o keep their sons at home. Kickha m rejected th e pretexts offered t o justify thi s regime — 'respect for th e sabbat h an d fea r o f vic e an d immorality ' — an d affirme d th e determination of youth to have its fling: 'our fathers and grandfathers hurled and leape d an d danced , an d w e cannot se e why we should no t d o the same'. However, editoria l polic y called fo r th e inculcatio n o f secrecy , and accord ingly Kickha m continue d hi s article with an exhortation tha t sports meeting s should no t b e turne d int o politica l demonstrations . Ther e wa s no need , h e declared, for any public demonstrations whatsoever. But there is no mistaking where his heart was, just as there is no doubting how faithfully hi s evocation of the recreationa l aspec t o f fenianism reflecte d the feeling s of a great man y of the ran k an d file . The particular susceptibility of farmers and their sons to external social discipline partly explains their lack of support for fenianism in the 1860s . By the same token , th e declin e i n th e socia l influenc e o f Iris h landlords a s a con sequence o f th e lan d wa r mus t hav e ha d a bearin g on th e ris e of the Gaelic Athletic Association late r i n the century. Farmers' son s could now beard th e gentry a s boldly a s artisan s o r tow n shopboys . The catholic clergy were even more concerned with social control than were the landlords. The full intensity of clerical opposition to fenianism in the 1860 s can only be understood i n terms of a struggle to maintain the dominance of the parish priest over certain areas of parochial life. 59 By endeavouring to institute new mode s o f socia l intercours e — o r perhap s eve n t o reviv e old one s — socialising fenian s disturbe d al l guardian s o f th e statu s quo . The catholic church made no concerted effort t o satisfy th e social need that fenianism wa s meeting : th e ecclesiastica l attitud e wa s predominantl y defensive. Th e only widespread organisation unde r church auspices offerin g young me n th e opportunit y o f socia l expressio n wa s th e Catholi c Youn g Men's Society . It ha d com e into existence in Limerick city in 184 9 under the guidance o f th e Reveren d Dr Richar d O'Brien, later dean o f Limerick. 60 In subsequent years it spread widely, if unevenly, throughout Ireland and among Irish communitie s in Britain . Branches held regula r meetings , marched i n formation wit h banners to church on Sundays, and arranged lectures, soirees and amateu r theatricals. 61 Ostensibly , the C.Y.M.S . wa s a resolutel y non59 R. V . Comerford , Charles J . Kickham: a study i n Irish nationalism and literature (Dublin, 1979) , pp 68-9 . ^Irishman, 5 Feb . 1859 . 6l Constabulary report , 8 Dec . 185 8 (S.P.O. , report s o n secre t societies , 1857-9) ; Irishman, 2 8 Dec . 1861 , 2 4 Jan. 1863 , 2 5 Mar . 1865 .

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political organisatio n an d it s regulation s actuall y outlawe d discussio n o f political topics. 62 However , a s w e hav e seen , socia l organisatio n tende d t o drift int o nationalis t expression an d th e C.Y.M.S . wa s no exception . When John Mallon , a futur e detectiv e chief, came t o Dubli n i n November 185 8 to work i n th e Castle , h e was impelled, as a serious-minded youn g catholic, t o join the C.Y.M.S. However, he soon found that hi s fellow members tended to let their conversation 'drif t upo n dangerou s politica l lines', and i n fairness to them and to himself he felt obliged to resign. 63 Dr O'Brien was himself a highly politicised pries t an d i n 186 8 h e wa s t o launc h a celebrate d declaratio n i n favour o f repeal. 64 The workin g of his society's ba n on politics can be judged from th e following words of a branch secretary to a speaker being engaged for a lecture : You wil l o f course know ho w to combine the avoidance of all party politics, to which our society is pledged, with the healthy and manly national tone which we have steadily tried t o impres s on al l our proceedings. 65

As early as Novembe r 185 8 O'Brien issue d a circular to all branches o f his organisation warnin g against secret societies. That is a good indication that he had receive d reports of member s havin g been tempted. 66 When six suspected Phoenix Society men (fenians) were arrested i n Callan, County Kilkenny, two months later , fiv e wer e found t o b e member s o f th e Catholi c Youn g Men's Society.67 The society did not present the church with a safe alternative to the I.R.B. On th e contrary, th e occasions for fraternisation that i t provided, and many o f the attitude s an d practice s tha t i t fostered, serve d onl y to mak e its members mor e susceptibl e t o fenianism. The I.R.B . i n the mid-1860 s spread politica l idea s and mad e preparation s for a n expecte d rising . However , th e militar y preparations prove d les s than thorough an d th e exten t t o whic h republica n theor y (a s distinc t fro m nationalist feeling ) wa s successfull y propagated ma y hav e bee n equall y un spectacular. I t is doubtful if truly doctrinaire republicans were more numerous in Irelan d tha n i n contemporary England . An d i t would be difficult t o prov e that Queen Victori a was more unpopular in Ireland in the 1860 s than sh e was elsewhere in the United Kingdom before Disraeli rescued her from retirement. However strongl y the y may have repudiated allegianc e to th e queen i n their initiation oath, the fenians we have been looking at here were from the point of view o f socia l histor y easil y recognisabl e an d fairl y typica l mid-Victorians .

^Nation, 2 8 Feb. 1863 . 63 F. M . Bussy , Irish conspiracies: recollections o f John Mallon (the great Irish detective) an d other reminiscences (London, ,1910), p. 17 . 64 Thornley, Isaac Butt, p . 56 . 65 J. MacCarth y t o J . P . Leonard , 2 5 Aug . 186 2 (N.L.I., Leonar d papers , M S 10,505). "Irishman, 2 0 Nov. 1858 . 61 Irishman,8 , 1 5 Jan. 1859 .

3 IRELAND AND THE BALLOT ACT OF 1872 * MICHAEL HURST IT is almost a commonplace nowaday s that th e passin g o f the Ballo t Ac t of 1872 revolutionize d Iris h politics . Si r Rober t Enso r i s quit e categorical ; 'But wher e th e ac t ha d revolutionar y consequences, whic h it s author s ha d neither foresee n no r intended , wa s i n Ireland.' 1 Th e authorit y quote d i s Charles Stewar t Parnell , wh o had insisted: ' Hitherto the Irish voter, power less against the intimidatio n o f his social superiors, ha d returned member s to one o r othe r o f the tw o Englis h parliamentar y parties' an d no w wit h secre t voting 'nee d d o s o n o longer'. 2 B y way of conclusion Enso r goe s s o far a s to reflect : 'tha t bu t fo r th e undesigne d gif t o f thi s act , th e whol e o f hi s meteoric career , with it s profoun d reaction s upo n Englis h histor y fo r hal f a century, might never have occurred'.3 Elsewhere he attributed the emergence of the classic Irish party to agricultural depressio n an d Parnell's magneti c leadership, though without in any way specifically retracting the ballot point.4 Barry O'Brien explaine d the circumstance s of Parnell's placin g so much faith i n it: In 187 2 Parnell.. .returned to Avondale. Vote by ballot had just been extended to Ireland. The measur e drew Parnell's attention once more to politics. H e thought it was of greater practical importance than either the Iris h Church Act or the Land Act, for it emancipated the voters . 'Now' , he said, 'something can be done if ful l advantage wil l b e take n o f this Ballo t Act. ' Hi s sympathie s ha d gon e ou t t o th e Fenians afte r th e Mancheste r executions. Bu t h e di d no t se e how Fenianism was practically to be worked. The Ballo t Act first suggested to him a mode of practical operation. The Iris h voter wa s now a free man . H e coul d sen d who m h e like d t o Parliament. H e was master of the situation. A n independent Irish party, free fro m the touc h o f Englis h influence , wa s th e thin g wanted , an d thi s part y coul d b e elected under the Ballo t Act. 5 Respect fo r thi s vie w is severel y undermined when O'Brie n goe s ou t o f his way t o stres s tha t Parnel l was 'utterl y ignoran t o f political affairs i n 1872' . ' His whole stock of information about Ireland ' bein g ' limited t o the histor y of th e "Mancheste r Martyrs'" , absolut e relianc e upo n an y opinion offere d would b e foolhardy . Admittedly , h e stuc k to th e poin t eightee n year s late r before th e Specia l Commission. Still , that in itself does not prove experience had borne ou t his hunch. Publi c me n are all too fond of sticking to nostrum s * Th e electio n result s used in this article are drawn from F. H. MacCalmont, Parliamentary Poll Book (1911 ed.). 1 Si r R. C. K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914, p. 24. 2 Ibid . 3 Ibid . 4 Si r R . C. K. Ensor, ' Some Politica l an d Economi c Interaction s i n Late r Victoria n England', Transactions o f th e Royal Historical Society (1949) , pp. 24-5 . 5 R . Barr y O'Brien, Th e Life o f Charles Stewart Parnell, i, 56

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in the fac e o f evidence they choos e to ignore, an d the ne w model Irish party had bee n going long enough for its leader to affor d romanti c notions as to it s origins. Moreover , the ' Independent Opposition ' movemen t of th e 'fiftie s had give n him the ide a fo r this party , an d his failure to see that it had suc ceeded withou t secre t ballo t wa s scarcel y a sig n o f havin g though t th e matter through. 6 No less a person than J. L. Hammond subscribe d t o what may be termed the Parnel l line, and Mrs O'Shea , John Morle y and E. Strauss di d likewise. 7 Even ver y recent writers like W . B. Gwyn, H . J. Hanham, L . J. McCaffrey , C. C. O'Brien, C . O'Leary, D . Thornley an d J . H. Whyte ten d t o swallow it o r ignor e th e proble m altogether. 8 Som e o f th e earlie r commentator s thought rathe r differently , generall y contentin g themselve s wit h modes t statements of what was undoubtedly true—that broadl y speaking, ' A workman or a tenant could no longer be punished becaus e he did not vote according to the will of his employer or landlord'; 9 that under the secre t ballot tenants 6

Ibid . pp . 7 2 and 229. J . L . Hammon d ignore s th e questio n i n Gladstone an d th e Irish Nation, bu t se e J. L . Hammond an d M . R. D. Foot , Gladstone an d Liberalism, pp. 123-4 . Se e als o Katherin e O'Shea (Mr s Parnell) , Charles Stewart Parnell, i, 128 ; John Morley , Life o f Gladstone, n , 370; and E . Strauss, Irish Nationalism and British Democracy, pp. 184-5 . 8 W . B . Gwyn, Democracy an d th e Cost o f Politics, p . 133 , assume s Iris h nationalis m needed th e protectio n of the secre t ballot. H . J . Hanham, Elections and Party Management: Politics in the Time of Disraeli and Gladstone, mentions the pre-Ballo t Act successes of Home Rule, yet seems to accep t Parnell's assessmen t bot h i n the introduction, a t p. xiv, and in th e main text , pp. 182-3 . L . J. McCaffre y in ['Hom e Rul e an d the Genera l Electio n of 1874 in Ireland',] I[rish] Historical] S[tudies], ix , make s n o mentio n o f th e Ballo t Ac t excep t i n dealing wit h th e actua l event s o f 1874 , althoug h th e development s i n th e year s fro m 187 0 have bee n give n almos t si x pages (se e pp . 190-6) . Agai n i n hi s ['Iris h Federalis m i n th e 1870*8: A Stud y i n Conservativ e Nationalism',] Transactions o f the] A[merican] P[hilosophical] S[ociety], ne w series , LII , part 6 , bold claim s ar e made for th e effect s o f the Ac t o n the 187 4 election , pp . 17-23 . Fo r th e perio d fro m 187 0 to th e electio n ther e i s one casua l mention of the secre t ballot on p. 12 . C . C. O'Brien, Parnell and his Party, 1880-1890, p. 34, places great stres s o n the importance of secret voting, claiming the nationalist elector s had no real confidenc e in the syste m in 1874 . I f thi s wer e true the Hom e Rul e success o f that yea r demonstrated th e superfluit y of the secre t ballot. I f not, th e argument abou t confidenc e i n it leading t o th e chang e in th e socia l complexio n o f Home Rul e member s fall s t o th e ground . C. O'Leary , Th e Elimination of Corrupt Practices i n British Elections, 1868-1911, doe s no t discuss th e issue . D . Thornley, ['Th e Iris h Conservative s an d Hom e Rule , 1869-1873', ] I\rish Historical] S\tudies], II , has n o mentio n o f the secre t ballo t excep t a s part o f Libera l policy i n th e Monagha n by-electio n o f 187 1 (se e p . 213) . Hi s ne w Isaac Butt [and Home Rule] show s scan t consistenc y o n th e point . O n p . 2 7 h e claim s th e secre t ballo t helpe d radically t o alte r th e natur e o f th e Iris h representation . Presumably , becaus e numerou s electors acquire d a ne w securit y an d fel t abl e t o promot e an d suppor t candidate s o f les s elevated socia l positio n an d mor e radica l views . Clearly , thi s i s th e Parnel l interpretation . Later, o n p . 13 3 h e expresse s no preference between the Parnel l vie w and the on e claimin g the secrec y woul d guar d agains t mo b rule . Stil l further on , a t p . 205 , h e appear s t o com e closer than anyone else to the heart o f the matter. Commentin g o n the differin g expectation s from th e Act , h e says : 'Some , perhap s wises t o f all , expecte d matter s t o remai n muc h a s they wer e before. ' J . H. Whyte, ['Th e Influenc e o f th e Catholi c Clerg y o n Election s i n Nineteenth-Century Ireland', ] E[nglish] Historical] R\eview] (1960) , onl y mention s secre t ballot o n p . 25 6 i n connexio n wit h allegation s o f feigne d illiterac y durin g th e Parnellit e versus Anti-Parnellite rows of the 1890*3 . 9 Si r Jame s O'Connor , History o f Ireland, 170,8-10,24, u, 32. 7

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'voted fo r landlord s wh o wer e Hom e Rulers ' an d 'agains t other s wh o were not'; 10 an d tha t ther e wa s still a loophole, for 'Som e landlords , knowing or strongly suspecting , tha t their tenants woul d vot e for a candidate distastefu l to the ruling caste, have prohibited them from votin g at all, under the ancient penalty o f landlord displeasure'. 11 No r woul d anyon e wish t o quarre l wit h O'Neill Daunt' s statement : 'O f th e multitud e o f tenants expelle d fro m thei r holdings i t i s commonl y believe d tha t a larg e numbe r hav e bee n punishe d by evictio n fo r votin g a t election s agains t th e wil l of their landlords.' 12 Bu t the crucia l questio n i s not th e endin g o r extent o f evictions for politica l acts . It i s whether a secret ballo t was necessary fo r th e emergenc e of a fully inde pendent Iris h party , an d i f not , wh y not ? Or , i n othe r words , di d th e ac t revolutionize Irish politics , an d i f not, wha t did ? This can be answered b y examining th e cours e o f Irish politics fro m bot h a short - an d a long-term viewpoin t relativ e to 1872 . Fro m a short term , t o see the effect s o f Fenian an d Federalis t current s o n affair s jus t prio r t o an d after th e passing o f the Ballo t Act. Fro m a long term, t o judge o f the genera l nature of the political behaviour of the Iris h popular party at the constituency level. O f the former, it will be shown that 'th e movement' for a fundamenta l change i n th e constitutiona l relationshi p betwee n Grea t Britai n an d Irelan d ' spread rapidly by one of the sures t tests which can be applied to any political movement—the tes t o f elections' , befor e th e vot e becam e secret. 13 O f th e latter, that ' In Ireland . . . notwithstanding th e terrible an d frequent exercis e of landlord power, it was not so easy to drive electors like swine to the market' because o f thei r stron g 'spiri t o f constitutiona l independence' ; an d tha t 'They hav e mor e frequentl y voted , i n proportio n t o thei r numbers , i n accordance with their politica l preferences'. 14 Because development s from th e Fenia n risin g o f 186 7 t o th e onse t o f th e agricultural depressio n i n 187 7 lef t n o ver y grea t impac t upo n th e Britis h scene i t i s al l too ofte n assume d to hav e been 'almost , fo r Ireland , a period of cal m betwee n storms'. 15 Rathe r wa s i t a perio d o f stor m betwee n tw o hurricanes. A false sense o f security aros e in Britain eve n before Gladstone' s victory a t th e poll s lat e i n 1868 . I t spran g fro m a consciousnes s o f goo d intentions a t a tim e whe n Ireland' s nationa l movemen t appeare d t o hav e suffered a n irreparable reverse . Speakin g a t Bristol, Lor d Stanle y describe d the Iris h proble m a s 'one which I suppos e at the presen t momen t i s hardly ever absent fro m th e min d o f any person who takes part i n publi c affairs... ' and again 'supposing' , went o n to say 'there never was a time when English men o f al l partie s an d al l classe s wer e mor e anxiou s t o giv e al l reasonabl e 10

F . H . O'Donnell , A History o f th e Irish Parliamentary Party, I , 92. O'Neil l Daunt , Eighty-Five Years o f Irish History, p . 151 . Ibid . p . 150 . 13 Ibid . p. 151 . 14 Ibid . 15 Bernar d Holland , Th e Life o f th e Duke o f Devonshire, 1833-1908, i , 84 . 11

12

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satisfaction to Irish demands, and even, as far as can be done without national injury, t o humou r th e feeling s an d prejudice s o f th e Iris h people'. 16 Th e impressive showin g of the Libera l part y i n Irelan d a t th e genera l electio n seemed t o confir m tha t al l migh t ye t b e well . Th e specia l circumstance s contributing t o i t wer e nevertheless o f a kind unlikely to b e repeated . Th e ecclesiastical an d agraria n legislation abou t t o b e delivere d would , when in operation, destro y the ver y common ground the prospec t o f its comin g had created. Catholi c priesthoo d an d Tenan t Righter s alik e might, an d indee d did, find the 'jam ' to o thin. Th e Churc h Disestablishmen t Ac t of 1869 and the Lan d Ac t o f 187 0 actuall y di d littl e t o en d th e religiou s an d agraria n aspects of the Irish question. O n the contrary the education and land ownership issue s wer e the mor e starkl y delineated. 17 The n again , Fenianis m an d the 'Independen t Opposition ' nationalis m would not agai n surfe r fro m th e same disadvantages, i f the Catholi c Churc h decide d agains t a n al l out effor t for Whi g Liberalism . Th e forme r migh t hav e to be tolerated b y the priests , and the latte r would stand a good chance of receiving their positive help and encouragement. Howeve r much the hierarch y might hat e the Fenians , the y could no t b e anathematize d ou t o f existence. I f thei r leader s were release d from prison , election s would possibly appea l to them a s a channel for tough political action . Leadershi p o f the ope n nationa l movement would then b e in question and the priests would have to look to their laurels. 18 Event s were also likel y t o benefi t th e gentle r nationa l groups . Al l i n all , unqualifie d support fo r Liberalis m amon g the priesthoo d woul d ten d t o lesse n sharpl y on bot h idealisti c an d materialisti c grounds , excep t fo r certai n older , con servative-minded sections . A t bes t th e Liberal s coul d hop e fo r a divide d Catholic hierarchy and clergy; at worst, virtual desertion . What Georg e Borro w wrote of Anglo-Welsh relation s applie d with vastly added forc e t o Anglo-Irish . 'Th e Englis h hav e forgo t tha t the y eve r con quered the Welsh, but som e ages will elapse before the Welsh forget that th e English hav e conquere d them.' 19 Fo r Lowe 20 t o maintai n tha t Fenianis m should b e lef t ou t o f sight i n discussin g th e Iris h questio n an d had n o con nexion wit h th e Churc h o r Lan d issue s wa s sheer stupidity. 21 Socia l an d 16

Annual Register, 1868, p . 3 . Thoug h hopes of what might come from Gladstone in the way of educational concessions kept som e o f th e Catholi c hierarch y an d thei r priest s behin d officia l Liberalis m wel l int o 1873, thoughts of attacking the Liberal s on educational policy were voiced durin g the 186 8 General Election . Th e Galway Vindicator (1 2 Aug . 1868 ) contended that immediatel y dis establishment was passed Iris h Catholi c members 'woul d ver y probably find themselves in opposition t o th e Libera l part y o n the subjec t o f education' (Thornley , Isaac Butt, p. 33) . How Gladstone could eve r have thought his first Land Act would solve Irish agrarian problems is difficult to understand. 18 W . Bence Jones in hi s A Life's Work i n Ireland, p . 64 , believed th e priest s had neve r before ha d 'so hard a game to play'. 19 Georg e Borrow, Wild Wales, p . 293 . 20 Si r Robert Lowe, Chancellor of the Exchequer, later is t Viscount Sherbroke . 21 Annual Register, 1868, p . 51 . 17

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economic disconten t fe d th e fire s o f nationa l grievance . A Fenia n leade r spoke th e truth when claimin g tha t The suppressio n of the rising in 186 7 and the imprisonmen t of our peopl e did no t damp ou r energie s a bit. W e kept workin g awa y just the sam e a s ever, wit h this difference, tha t w e had thousand s of sympathisers in 187 0 wh o would not touc h us at all in 1865 . I n fac t we had a stronger hold on the country after th e rising than we had before. 22 The motiv e forc e came , accordin g t o th e vetera n 'Independen t Brigade ' leader, Georg e Henr y Moore , fro m th e conviction which had been ' gradually growing upwards—fro m th e starvin g t o th e needy , fro m th e need y t o th e struggling classes , fro m th e strugglin g classe s t o al l above , thos e wh o ar e still lef t i n Ireland—tha t th e Governmen t unde r whic h we live is a very ba d Government fo r ou r country'. 23 Whethe r o r no t th e actua l proces s wen t exactly lik e that , ther e i s n o doub t o f Fenianism' s havin g 'entere d int o th e hearts o f the people'. 24 A n all-importan t par t o f its significance , especiall y in relatio n to event s prio r t o th e agricultura l depression , wa s the absenc e of any great leader . It germinate d almos t simultaneousl y in differen t part s o f Irelan d an d sprea d silently fro m on e centr e t o another... . But Fenianis m wa s democratic ; i t wa s organised by shopboys and artisans with no help or encouragement from th e leaders of publi c opinion . Th e bishop s an d priest s used ever y effort , mora l an d spiritual , to defeat it , bu t their influence had waned during the years they had supported th e traitors an d the y foun d thei r counsels produce d n o effect . Th e Youn g Irelander s and th e Constitutionalist s opposed the physical force party , bu t thei r position was difficult, an d whe n som e o f th e Fenian s were arrested , they wer e denounce d a s 'Felon Setters'. 25 The sentimen t flourishe d amon g larg e section s o f th e population , elector s and non-electors . S o ofte n i n histor y there mus t com e a chain o f events t o exploit suc h revolutionar y feelings for practical ends . Her e th e releas e poin t for thi s purpos e was provided by the Constitutionalists . Not al l th e member s o f Parliamen t calle d Libera l i n 1868 , no r th e me n supporting them , coul d be regarde d a s firm adherents o f Gladstone. Other s were onl y conditionally so. Whilst tru e that th e Catholi c clergy had exerte d themselves wit h grea t succes s t o exclud e 'nationalis t deviationists ' fro m Liberal candidatures , exception s ha d bee n made . Fo r exampl e J. T. Hind s might suffe r a t their hand s i n Count y Meath, bu t th e sam e did no t appl y to G. H. Moore in County Mayo. Within the province of Tuam, under Archbishop MacHale, Catholicis m carrie d it s nationa l feeling s mor e o n th e left . Aide d by the clergy, Moore demonstrated somethin g crucia l to the true appreciatio n of th e rol e o f th e Ballo t Act . Withou t professiona l agents , withou t th e ex 22

R . Barry O'Brien, op . cit. p . 64. M . G . Moore, A n Irish Gentleman: George Henry Moore, p. 361 . 24 Ibid . p . 320. 25 Ibid .

23

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penditure o f money, 'wit h nothin g t o rely upon bu t th e inspirin g influenc e of th e clergy , actin g unde r th e inspiratio n o f th e greates t Irishme n i n th e world (D r MacHale) an d th e pluc k an d resolutio n of the people , w e made our adversaries pass under the Caudine Forks before the day of nomination'.26 Blake, th e Whi g candidate , withdrew ; s o formidabl e ha d th e nationalis t Liberals proved. Moore' s basic aim had been t o settle the questio n whethe r 'one lor d shal l driv e a hundred huma n soul s to th e hustings , anothe r fifty, another a score; whether thi s or that squire shal l call twenty o r ten o r five as good me n a s himself, his voters , an d sen d the m u p wit h hi s bran d o n their back to vote for an omadhaun a t his bidding'. 27 A n unopposed retur n alon g with a Conservative might see m a confused answe r to receive. I n fac t i t was not. Moor e ha d n o runnin g mat e an d drov e th e othe r 'popular ' candidat e from th e field. The electorat e wa s narrow, yet the Conservativ e got in really because n o on e els e wa s there t o sto p him . H e wa s a reli c o f what Moor e termed th e 'tw o donkey' 28 syste m whereb y eac h Unite d Kingdo m part y had a seat eac h to avoi d a contest. Count y May o was at once a warning and a promise. S o too, was County Cor k where M. Downing , a man o f Moore' s outlook, go t in . I n bot h place s th e clerg y ha d side d wit h th e successfu l candidates. A warning to th e Liberal s an d a promise to th e nationalists . A promise gaine d under a system o f open voting and a narrow franchise. Th e direction o f politics coul d be changed when such a release of ' popular' senti ment wa s prove d possible . Naturally , th e Fenian s wer e no t slo w t o se e elections a s a means of hitting a t the Britis h and soo n took action . Eleven month s later, in October 1869 , the newly formed Amnesty Association hel d a two hundred thousan d stron g gatherin g a t Cabra , nea r Dublin . In th e chai r wa s its President, Isaa c Butt, Conservativ e criti c of the Ascen dancy an d a prominent lawyer . The releas e o f Fenia n prisoner s wa s at thi s time the mai n Fenian interest , thoug h th e ecclesiastica l an d prospective land legislation o f the Libera l part y owed its official adoptio n to the dread in which they wer e held . Meeting s on a nationwide scal e pushe d th e prisoners ' cas e right t o th e fore . Lan d price s might ris e fro m a s low as ten years ' purchase to twenty-si x o r eve n twenty-seven; 29 trade an d agricultur e generally might show a n upward trend; only twenty-four ou t o f eleven hundred arreste d fo r treasonable practice s might have been genuin e occupier s of land;30 and at th e top o f Catholic societ y nationalis m might appear moribund, but alread y contrary force s wer e stirring . Th e ol d 'Orange ' versu s 'Green ' quarre l wa s of course inherent i n the 'unmeasure d violence'31 against the Church of Ireland at Libera l electio n meetings , and , ironicall y enough , reform s aime d a t th e Ascendancy had th e unexpecte d effec t o f pushing an important sectio n of the 'Orange' part y int o th e 'Green ' cam p o n th e questio n o f self-government. 26 28 30

Ibid . P. 334.

Ibid . p. 325 . 2 Ibid . p. 38 . 3

27 Ibid. P. 323. 9

1

Ear l Grey , Ireland, p . 41. Ibid . p. 82.

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During 186 9 move s wer e mad e toward s th e foundatio n o f a Hom e Rul e organization—moves whic h wer e t o culminat e i n th e famou s Bilto n Hote l meeting in Ma y o f the nex t year . When Bisho p Moriarty o f Kerry wrote to William Monsell , i n Marc h 1868 , claimin g tha t 'Th e mind s o f th e Iris h people ar e in the hands o f the Irish priests',32 he was badly out of date. Ha d he bee n correct , however , i t woul d not , a s we hav e seen , necessaril y hav e secured th e Libera l part y o r th e Union . Chicheste r Fortescu e himsel f admitted, a t almos t th e sam e date , tha t 'th e revolutionar y movemen t was more formidable' 33 tha n i n th e past , ye t seeme d fundamentall y a t on e with Moriarty i n his optimism a s to the future. ' The forces of law and order were much greater ' an d include d th e Catholi c clerg y an d thos e o f thei r fait h 'connected wit h the land , the mercantile , professiona l and almos t the whole middle class'. 34 What h e faile d t o appreciat e was that th e pat h o f constitu tional revolution , pursue d throug h elections , woul d mak e th e Fenian s 'anxious t o follo w th e ne w movemen t carefully' 35 an d tha t sympath y fo r sufferers i n th e nationa l cause would cause a man lik e But t t o prais e them . 'A peopl e wh o hav e renounce d thei r allegiance ' an d kne w 'n o patriotis m except hatre d fo r thei r rulers' 36 wa s not t o b e wo n t o 'Unionism ' b y half hearted reforms , especiall y wit h 'th e habea s corpu s ac t stil l i n suspensio n and the gaols full fro m the Fenian rising'.37 When habeas corpus was restored in the following year, outrages increased fivefold. Such was the backgroun d to th e victory o f th e Fenian , O'Donova n Rossa in th e Tipperar y by-electio n o f Novembe r 1869 . Fa r fro m waitin g for th e release of prisoners, th e erstwhile revolutionarie s ra n a convict fo r Parliament . A man who had spen t most o f th e summe r o f that year with hi s hands tied behind hi s back. Hi s election horrifie d th e Britis h press. Al l the newspapers expressed astonishmen t tha t Irelan d wa s no t completel y satisfie d wit h th e 'generosity' o f th e propose d legislation . Th e Times bewaile d th e resul t a s betokening 'th e reviva l o f the Fenia n spiri t i n Ireland , withou t an y visibl e cause o r favourin g circumstances'. 38 Quit e baffled , i t resigne d itsel f t o th e whole disappointing business being 'just on e of those Irish paradoxes , which Englishmen fin d i t hard to understand'. 39 Moore , alread y thinking of taking the Fenia n oath , sa w the even t a s useless—because Ross a wa s disqualified from sitting—excep t a s th e shado w 'comin g event s cas t befor e them'. 40 What a shadow it was! Late r Lor d Hartingto n wa s to clai m 'the Iris h voter was th e las t perso n wh o wa s expecte d t o hav e an y influenc e ove r hi s ow n 32 J . H. Whyte, [ ' Select Document s XVIII . Bisho p Moriart y o n Disestablishmen t an d the Union , 1868',] I[rish] Historical] S[tudies], x , 195 . Gladston e Papers. B.M . Add . MS . 44152, fos. 98-113. 33 4 Hansard , 3r d series, cxc, 1594 . 3 Ibid . 35 R . Barry O'Brien , op . cit . p . 64. 36 J . H. Whyte, I.H.S. p . 198 . 37 D . Thornley, I.H.S. p. 200 . 38 M . G. Moore, op . cit . p . 359 ; Th e Times, 28 Nov. 1869 . 39 0 M . G. Moore, op . cit. p . 359 . 4 Ibid . p. 362 .

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vote, an d tha t i t wa s a struggle , betwee n th e landlor d an d th e priest , wh o should tak e him to the poll'. 41 Well her e was a marked exception. Landlor d and pries t ha d togethe r faile d t o defea t Rossa , faile d o n a narrow franchis e exercised unde r a system o f open voting. 42 Ha d no t Parnel l an d thos e wh o thought o r thin k lik e hi m forgotte n Tipperar y a s the y forgo t tha t othe r radical county—Mayo ? The contes t i s worth a more detaile d examination. The Libera l candidat e was a well known an d popula r barrister , name d D . C . Heron, selecte d b y a joint meetin g o f layme n an d Catholi c priests . H e himsel f wa s a Catholic . Late in the day, Rossa was put up by his friends as a ' protest agains t Whigger y to rally the Fenians'.43 ' To the amazement of the Loyalists' 44 he was elected by 113 1 vote s t o 1030 , a patheti c Conservativ e receivin g a paltry 12 . Th e poll wa s approximatel y 2 3 per cent . A very lo w figur e indeed , considerin g the priest s ha d bee n activ e fo r Hero n an d tha t o n pollin g da y 'th e usua l priest-led cavalcade s o f voter s wer e t o b e see n goin g int o th e fiv e pollin g towns'.45 J . H. Whyte find s ther e wer e som e 'goo d excuses.. . for th e clerical defeat o n this occasion'. 46 H e argues that 'Rossa' s candidature cam e as such a complete surprise that n o previous arrangements ha d been made on Heron's behalf'. 47 Surely , however , the ver y latenes s o f Rossa' s appearance put hi s followers at an even graver disadvantage an d the very privileged socia l position o f th e priest s woul d enabl e the m t o overcom e th e surpris e wit h rapidity? Th e argumen t that , a s Hero n assure d everybody , h e woul d b e elected whateve r th e vote—Rossa bein g ineligibl e t o sit—th e priest s di d no t exert themselve s unduly , is too muc h to swallow . Apar t fro m the lac k of proof, i s it really feasible t o suppose the clerg y would risk public humiliation at th e hand s o f the feare d an d hate d Fenian s o n th e promis e o f their ma n creeping int o th e Hous e o f Common s o n a technicality? If anything , Hero n had suc h advantage s a s generall y weighe d i n Iris h election s o f th e 'sixtie s firmly on hi s side . Ove r uo o voter s sa w fit to flout the landlord s an d th e priests an d brav e th e consequences . I t wa s most interestin g to o tha t thei r action won a t least the qualifie d approval of a priest-lover like Moore . To anticipat e a littl e s o a s to complet e th e picture—whe n Hero n prove d wrong an d a secon d by-electio n too k plac e i n th e followin g February , th e priests lef t n o ston e unturned . Althoug h the pol l rose b y som e 1 0 per cen t and Heron , running for a secon d time, got in, the majority was a mere 4 votes scored agains t a divide d Fenia n camp . Ove r 160 0 voter s showe d tha t th e priests wer e no t universall y recognized a s 'the min d o f the Iris h people'. 48 41

Bernar d Holland , op . cit . p . 93. Convincin g evidence that a secre t ballo t wa s not necessar y fo r a chang e i n th e typ e of parliamentary representative . 43 4 R . Barry O'Brien , op. cit . p . 64 , n. i . 4 Ibid . 45 J . H. Whyte, E.H.R. p. 253 . 46 Ibid . 47 Ibid. 48 J . H. Whyte, I.H.S. p . 195 . 42

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Kickham, th e Fenian , declare d h e would neve r si t i n th e 'Englis h Parlia ment' 49 an d ye t los t b y s o few against a fully prepare d opponent . Man y of his own side di d no t approv e hi s standing an d hel d tha t the y ough t t o hav e rested conten t wit h Rossa' s demonstration . Despit e th e pulpi t an d the pres s the 'popular' groups in Irish politics were soon showing a strong indispositio n to bein g tie d t o th e Gladstonia n juggernaut. Ther e appeare d i n on e count y at least enough hardy material for the creation of an uncompromising national party. Th e acciden t o f a by-election ha d shown it . Withou t a n extreme can didate th e strengt h o f extremism coul d no t hav e been revealed . Why ha d th e firs t Tipperar y electio n als o been th e firs t shoc k t o th e new Liberal 'ascendancy' ? Eleve n mor e by-election s ha d precede d it , te n goin g to th e Liberal s an d on e t o th e Conservatives—a n exac t repea t performanc e of th e Genera l Election . N o attemp t ha d bee n mad e b y eithe r Libera l nationalists, th e emergin g Home Rul e Conservative s o r Fenians to queer the pitch. S o fa r a s th e Conservativ e sea t wa s concerne d ther e wa s nothin g surprising i n this. Count y Antrim , a s an Orange stronghold, wa s hardly th e place t o figh t fo r thes e causes . Eve n th e orthodo x Liberal s mad e a poo r showing. Moreover , Augus t 186 9 wa s rather prematur e for muc h actio n b y any disruptiv e force . Th e sam e applie d t o al l but on e o f the Libera l seats , the exceptio n bein g Waterfor d City , fough t on e wee k befor e Tipperary . No fewe r tha n eigh t Liberal s wer e returne d unopposed . O f these , si x had had t o resubmi t themselve s t o thei r constituencie s afte r receivin g govern mental appointments . Th e remainin g two stoo d i n seat s wher e th e Genera l Election retur n ha d bee n declare d voi d o n petition . A t Youga l in Ma y th e Liberal retaine d th e sea t agains t a Conservativ e i n anothe r electio n brough t on b y th e sam e cause ; whil e in Waterfor d tw o Liberal s fough t eac h other . This last is the onl y vacancy where trouble might have arisen, bu t Waterford was no t Tipperary . Th e force s o f loyalis m an d th e Catholi c clerg y wer e exceedingly stron g an d th e necessar y knot o f loca l Fenia n activist s wa s no t forthcoming, o r di d no t choos e to chanc e its arm. A t the sam e time Liberal nationalism and Conservative Home Rule had not yet decided to take electoral action. Hard o n Rossa' s victor y cam e a n attemp t b y a n ol d campaigner , Joh n Martin, to end Whig supremacy in County Longford. Althoug h much more of a constitutional politician than Rossa , he foun d himsel f persona non grata with the local priests. No t only had an exclusively clerical meeting nominate d 'a youthfu l whig', 50 Reginal d Greville-Nugent, a s the officia l Libera l candidate, bu t th e clerg y regarde d Marti n a s a n ancien t adversar y o f th e grea t Daniel O'Connell . Bu t the lac k of any helpfu l link s with th e clerg y di d no t prove a n absolut e liability . Ripple s o f loca l resentmen t agains t allege d 49 50

R . Barry O'Brien , op . cit . p . 64 , n. i . J . H. Whyte, E.H.R. p . 253 .

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'clerical dictation ' ove r th e choic e o f Greville-Nugen t le d a group o f th e laity unde r a Catholi c provisio n merchant , Jame s Murtagh , int o puttin g Martin up. Naturally , ripple s alon e were not enough to break up the Libera l control and he was beaten by 147 8 to 411 votes, on a poll of some 67 per cent . The by-electio n had come when the Catholi c Churc h wa s still satisfied wit h the government . N o groups o f the younge r priests ha d the n decide d t o act against it, an d n o members of the hierarch y were actively encouraging them to d o so. Marti n wa s too lef t win g a nationalist t o creat e a temptation, bu t his vot e alarme d their bisho p an d a t th e secon d by-election , followin g th e unseating o f Greville-Nugent o n petition, the clerg y were instructed t o tak e no lead . Encouragemen t of Fenian-tainted nationalis m by seemin g to over play thei r statu s ha d t o b e stoppe d forthwith . 41 1 me n openl y challenging their lea d were 411 too many. 51 On 1 9 Ma y 187 0 the Hom e Governmen t Associatio n wa s founded at th e Bilton Hotel , Dublin . Immediatel y beforehan d th e Fenian s promise d a t least benevolen t neutralit y toward s th e 'ope n movement'. 52 Event s i n that year, before and after that crucial day, pointed to the resuscitation of constitutional and the strengthening o f unconstitutional nationalism . Enso r regarde d the 187 0 Land Ac t as establishing a reign of peace in Irelan d destroye d only by th e adven t o f agraria n distress , bu t Isaa c Butt' s addres s i n th e Bilto n Hotel an d the earlie r meetin g o f his Tenant League wer e unequivocal sign s to th e contrar y on the constitutiona l level . An d Hartingto n hi t th e nai l on the head about direct action in 1871:' No one but a fool could have supposed that the disestablishmen t o f a Church, or the alteratio n of the positio n o f the stronger tenant s b y th e Ac t o f 187 0 woul d preven t villag e ruffian s fro m committing outrages' , thoug h 'thi s wa s no argumen t agains t th e intrinsi c merit of that legislation'. 53 That the Liberals feared what was afoot in Ireland is ampl y proved b y th e passin g o f a Peac e Preservatio n Act. 54 Ribbonis m was active against men like Moore, not to speak of the less ' Green' landlords. At firs t th e Hom e Governmen t Associatio n had i n i t mor e Protestant Con servatives, smartin g unde r th e impac t o f disestablishment an d th e prospec t of change s in th e lan d system , than Catholi c nationalists, Libera l o r other wise. Within a matter of months the tendenc y was clearly the othe r wa y and continued so , bu t wha t prove d o f vita l importanc e fo r th e futur e wa s th e failure t o build up numerou s branches all over the country . Th e Association aimed a t unitin g me n o n on e issue—Hom e Rule . It s compositio n pu t a n accompanying programm e o n Tenan t Right , educatio n an d amnest y righ t out o f court. This meant each group of nationalists in the constituencie s had 51

Ibid . R . Barry O'Brien , op . cit . p . 65 , n. i . Fo r a discussion o f an allege d compac t betwee n Butt and the Fenians , see Thornley, Isaac Butt, pp. 87-8 . Fo r many Home Rule was Repeal in disguis e (W . Bence Jones , op . cit . p . 61) . 63 Bernar d Holland , op . cit . p . 87 . 84 Ibid . 52

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to fen d fo r itself . A t first , thi s wa s a blessin g fro m a genuin e nationalis t viewpoint, fo r i t mean t tha t priest s an d othe r Libera l nationalist s wer e no t kept ou t o f loca l organization s a s disillusionmen t wit h Gladstone' s govern ment mounted . Thei r distrus t o f an d dislik e fo r th e Associatio n laste d t o some extent until its transformation into the Home Rule League in December 1873, althoug h th e Universit y Educatio n crisi s ha d don e muc h t o destro y any hostilit y base d o n positiv e friendshi p fo r orthodo x Britis h Liberalism . The disadvantag e o f incomplete coverag e was scarcely felt so long as electoral activity wa s restricte d t o by-elections , i n whic h outsid e hel p coul d b e im provised. Late r th e lac k o f read y mean s fo r copin g wit h a sna p Genera l Election wa s t o ir k th e Hom e Rul e League . Ther e wa s insufficien t tim e between it s foundatio n an d th e 187 4 dissolution t o repai r previou s neglect . For th e Conservativ e latter-da y nationalist s an early extension o f Association activity migh t hav e proved a n advantage. Onc e enthusias m go t going, how ever, nothin g woul d hav e sol d the m to the Catholics . But t himsel f was different. H e ha d cease d t o b e a Conservative save o n externa l affairs . Th e nationalist elemen t riske d associatio n wit h th e Conservative s t o furthe r th e Home Rule, or Federalist, cause . The cours e of events justified thei r conduct , not leas t becaus e of the flexibility in the constituencies . Of the eight by-election s held in 1870 , seven occurred before the formation of th e Federalis t committee . I t canno t b e stresse d to o much tha t th e tren d of th e election s depended greatl y upo n whethe r o r no t a local cadre o f acti vists in the nationalist cause happened t o have come together i n the particular constituencies affected , o r whethe r o r no t outsid e interferenc e b y othe r nationalists looke d lik e payin g dividends . I f th e electorat e ha d n o Hom e Rule candidate i t coul d no t ous t th e British-linke d parties . I f th e electorat e had a Home Rule r whos e bona fides it suspecte d th e Liberal s tende d t o ge t the benefi t o f th e doubt . Tipperar y wa s a Libera l gain , bu t a remarkable tribute t o la y nationalist strength ; Mallo w a narrow victory for th e Libera l over th e Conservative ; Queen' s Count y a n unoppose d Libera l retur n an d Dublin University a n unopposed Conservative one. Longfor d and Waterford City were fought b y men soo n to be associated wit h th e Hom e Governmen t Association, but wo n by the Liberals . May o kept up the Moor e tradition b y returning a Hom e Rule r unopposed , th e firs t gai n fo r a constitutionalis t nationalist. Dubli n Cit y polle d tw o months afte r th e Bilto n Hotel meeting . The Liberal s gained the seat from the Conservatives, there being no orthodox candidate on their behalf . The sam e Home Rule r as had conteste d Longford fared badl y here. Both Longfor d an d Dubli n Cit y showe d th e essentia l futilit y o f the ne w ' Orange' an d the growing strengt h o f the ' Green' Hom e Rul e movement. The Catholi c electorate preferre d Liberal s an d mil d refor m t o th e service s of those whose very Home Rul e opinions had bee n adopte d to try an d brin g to an end the existin g trends towards the things the masse s of the sout h and

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west ha d lon g crave d for . Hom e Rul e propagand a b y Majo r Kno x i n th e Irish Times during the Mallow by-election cut no ice for E. R. King Harman, contesting Longfor d a s a Conservative-Liberal , o r Hom e Ruler . No r di d other effort s b y sundr y Conservativ e Hom e Rulers , no t eve n th e statemen t by a Protestant clergyma n that the Queen's crow n should be thrown int o the River Boyne. 55 Whilst cautious , th e priesthoo d openl y condemne d him , as did the Libera l press , includin g th e Freeman's Journal, whic h deplore d 'th e insidious attempt made to seduce them from thei r allegianc e to their countr y and dra g them int o th e mir e o f Toryism'. 56 Hi s defea t b y G . F. GrevilleNugent, brothe r o f Reginald , decisiv e thoug h i t was , could no t b e viewe d with muc h pleasure in Liberal o r clerica l circles. 121 7 to 93 2 was a lot less impressive tha n 147 8 t o 411 . O f cours e Kin g Harma n had som e orthodox Conservative votes , bu t i t was certainly no t without significanc e that Long ford wa s a count y wher e th e Conservative s wer e ver y weak , an d tha t a n 'Orange' landlor d ha d persuade d mor e tha n doubl e th e numbe r o f voters in a predominantly Catholi c constituency t o support him than had supported a ' Green' nationalist the year before. Som e Catholics at least were prepared to snu b their priest s openl y by voting for a Home Rule r whatever his pedigree. No r ha d an y effor t bee n spare d b y eithe r side . Th e pol l wa s 77 per cent. Still , Kin g Harma n ha d bee n standin g o n hi s head . 'Green ' Hom e Rule was the rea l beneficiary. Dublin provide d som e bris k electioneering . Si r Domini c Corrigan , th e Liberal candidate , had narrowl y missed electio n in 1868 . When full y backed by Whig s an d nationalist s togethe r h e polle d 5379 . Hi s fello w Liberal , Jonathan Pim , was elected wit h 558 6 and the top man , the Conservative , Sir A. E. Guinness, receive d 5587 . I n th e by-electio n Corriga n score d onl y 4468 agains t Kin g Harman' s 3444 . Th e Dublin Evening Mail admitte d tha t 'the Liberal s ha d rejected ' th e latte r 'a s a Tory' an d 'the Torie s for their part disowne d hi m a s subversive'. 57 Certainly , a s in Longf ord, som e Con servatives had not disowned him and the 'Orange ' Home Rulers had quite a following i n Dublin , bu t allowin g for these things , 344 4 votes was quite a n achievement an d the drop of about 100 0 in the Libera l vote at a time when a demonstration o f strengt h mus t hav e bee n highl y desire d no t withou t im portance for the future . Thi s was the first by-election since the launchin g of the Home Rul e programme and the government neede d a knock-out victory . In fac t thei r succes s wa s rathe r hollow . Voting for Kin g Harma n require d real moral courage in 'patriot ' electors . Apar t from th e materia l risks to b e run there was the danger o f being branded a 'Tory' for lending countenanc e to an ' Orange' landlord. That so many did it testified to the inherent strength of th e Hom e Rul e appea l unde r eve n s o unattractiv e a guise . Tha t suc h 55

D . Thornley, I.H.S. p. 203 ; M. G. Moore, op. cit. p. 355 . D . Thornley, I.H.S. p . 209 ; Freeman's Journal, 1 5 April, 1 2 May, 1870. 67 Ibid . 56

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success a s this landlord ha d was mainly due to his being a means to an end cannot be overstressed . To com e withi n 8 o f winnin g Waterfor d Cit y an d t o carr y May o un opposed, bot h wit h no-nonsens e nationalist candidates—these were the rea l triumphs o f the sentiment s late r t o sustai n Parnell . Individua l nationalist s could achieve a great deal simply by putting up their colours. Larg e portion s of th e electorat e an d eve n larger proportions of the non-elector s welcomed them with open arms. P . J. Smyth had fought Waterford back in February . George Brown e wa s returne d fo r May o jus t on e wee k befor e th e Bilto n Hotel meeting . I t therefor e me t wit h on e membe r o f Parliamen t electe d under the banner to be espoused, besides William Shaw of Bandon and Philip Callan jo f Dundal k wh o ha d bee n returne d a s Liberal s an d coul d no t b e absolutely sur e of re-election. The Catholi c priests loathe d all Conservatives , but were beginning to regret their long flirtation with the Liberals, o r rather, very man y of them were . Th e obviou s beneficiaries from th e chang e would be the old nationalists, Liberal nationalists and tamed Fenians. The combination between thos e experience d manipulator s o f votes—the priests—and th e spontaneous nationalis m o f masse s wa s agai n withi n sight . Unde r skilfu l leadership it had scant need of secret voting to flay the landlords of' Unionist' persuasion. Unde r n o leadership a t all , o r scarcel y any , it coul d get a long way, eve n whe n imperfectl y formed. Whi g priest s wer e t o b e taugh t tha t they at least wer e not 'the mind' of the Irish 'people'. The nex t year the Hom e Rul e movemen t spread muc h more rapidly and the initiative passing to its hands was never again lost. Ribbonis m had taken over in some parts o f the countr y when direct actio n Fenianism petere d out . A cro p o f agraria n outrage s i n Count y Westmeath an d 'neighbourin g dis tricts' eventuall y obliged th e government t o suspen d Habea s Corpu s there. 'Experience show s that' suc h crime s 'coul d no t b e sufficientl y deal t wit h under th e ordinar y law , reinforce d thoug h i t wa s by th e provision s o f th e Peace Preservatio n Act . I t wa s impossibl e t o obtai n evidenc e o r secur e convictions agains t th e evil-doers.' 68 Indeed , s o serious di d thing s becom e that the Cabinet asked Parliament to appoint a Select Committee to ' inquire secretly' into 'the nature, extent and effect o f a certain unlawful combinatio n and confederacy' . O n th e strengt h o f it s findings , Hartingto n spok e o f a n 'intolerable stat e o f terrorism, base d upo n murder 59 an d reluctantl y introduced th e Bil l fo r dispensin g wit h Habea s Corpus . I n Augus t a highl y unfortunate clas h broke out in Phoenix Park between the polic e and a large crowd of nationalists whic h had defied the forbidding of an amnesty meeting. With th e Princ e o f Wales and Prince Arthur staying at Viceregal Lodge th e whole affair too k on a particularly sinister character. Th e subsequen t releas e of th e Fenia n prisoners still 'confine d t o English dungeons' 60 seemed like a 58 59

Bernar d Holland , op. cit. p . 84. Ibid . p. 88 . «

° Ibid. p. 89.

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surrender t o violence, and did little o r nothing to appease nationalism, while alarming loyalists . Whe n Lor d Dufferi n defende d th e releas e o f certai n Fenian prisoner s in March , declare d Fenianis m ha d faile d an d claime d that Ireland wa s ' in a condition o f peac e and political tranquillit y fro m on e end of the countr y to the other', 61 he was either thinkin g wishfully , or relying on the forc e o f the Peac e Preservatio n Act . Gladston e wa s busy a t th e year' s end pooh-poohin g trouble . Speakin g a t Aberdee n h e defende d the Unio n with considerabl e warmt h an d smugness , designatin g Universit y Educatio n the onl y remainin g Iris h grievance . Parliamen t ha d t o se t itsel f righ t wit h the nationa l conscience , bu t h e refuse d t o admi t that Irelan d wa s not going to b e conciliated . I n hi s conceit , littl e di d h e realis e wha t smal l effec t hi s refusing t o do 'this or that' was going to have for some time upon the Irish scene.62 Seven by-election s wen t o n agains t thi s background . Hom e Ruler s won four, th e Conservative s two and the Liberal s just one . With such results th e non-nationalist priest s an d Liberal s ha d seriousl y t o conside r whethe r support for the Home Rule cause might not be essential for the ful l maintenanc e of spiritua l an d socia l influenc e i n th e on e cas e an d politica l an d socia l in fluence in the other. A t the same time the nature of Home Rule support, th e role of the old nationalists an d the behaviour o f Butt disguste d th e ' Orange' Home Rulers . When the leade r o f the Hom e Governmen t Association spoke out constantl y fo r Tenan t Righ t an d stat e maintenanc e o f denominationa l education thei r worl d seeme d o n th e edg e o f destruction . I n th e firs t o f the by-elections—Count y Meath—Joh n Marti n o f Longfor d fam e bea t G. Plunkett b y 1140 to 684 on a 50 per cent poll. A s in Longford the Libera l had bee n underwritte n b y the priesthoo d befor e Martin's appearanc e upo n the scene, but this time no firm front was maintained agains t him . Evidentl y the spontaneou s feeling s of the majorit y of the electorate wer e strong enoug h to preven t an y spiritua l blitzkrieg , albei t Plunket t wa s bot h Whi g an d Catholic, whil e Marti n wa s a n Ulste r Presbyteria n an d sometim e edito r o f the Irish Felonl Fo r wha t th e Freeman terme d a n 'improvise d raid' 63 th e vote wa s extremely impressive , an d thi s i t admitted . 'Th e Meat h electio n is a great fact. I t ma y eventuate i n nothing important , bu t eve n should i t be so, it is still a great fact. I t may , however, prov e to be the beginnin g o f the end.'64 Lik e i n Tipperar y an d Mayo , bu t unlik e th e secon d Longfor d an d Dublin elections , Meat h gav e no openings fo r anti-Hom e Rul e propagand a based o n anti-Conservatism . Th e discomfitur e of Whigger y wa s ther e fo r all to see, and, in the words of the Nation, it looked as though ' Henceforth th e spell-word o f self-rule must b e the "Open Sesame" to the constituencies'. 65 61

Si r Alfre d Lyall , Th e Life o f th e Marquis o f Dufferin an d Ava, I, 187 . Annual Register, 1871, p . 105 . 83 D . Thornley, I.H.S. p. 211; Freeman's Journal, z Jan. 1871. 64 D . Thornley, I.H.S. p . 211; Freeman's Journal, 6 Jan. 1871. 66 D . Thornley , I.H.S. p . 211 ; Th e Nation, 6 Jan. 1871. 62

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The nex t fou r election s were unopposed. A t Newr y the Liberal s ran n o candidate an d allowe d the Conservative , Viscount Newry , to gai n a seat fo r his party . I n Count y Limeric k th e Liberal s retaine d th e seat , wit h a n un opposed return . Willia m Monsel l ha d jus t bee n mad e Postmaster-Genera l and evidently no one on the nationalist side felt confident of his being disposed of a s was the unfortunat e Vesey Fitzgerald i n Clar e back in 1828 . Certainl y the priests woul d have fought har d for him, and there were, of course, always the government's educatio n plan s t o bear in mind. To o much antagonizin g might no t pay , and failur e t o brin g of f 'a n improvise d raid ' woul d hav e boomeranged har d o n a n u p an d comin g cause . Februar y sa w Mitchel l Henry returned for Galway with a programme of ' denominational education , "the dignit y an d independenc e o f th e Pope" , an d hom e government'. 66 Although he did not join the Hom e Government Association until 1873 , and supported th e governmen t ove r the Westmeat h inquir y there i s no doubt of his nationalism . Curiousl y enoug h i t wa s i n Westmeat h wher e th e nex t vacancy arose. Agai n Home Rule, represented by P. J. Smyth, had a victory. The ne w member o f Parliament combine d a n impeccable nationalis t recor d with a n unerrin g suppor t fo r th e politica l policie s o f the Catholi c Churc h and ha d receive d th e blessing , howeve r reluctant , o f the loca l ecclesiastical arm. Th e bisho p tol d a disappointed Whi g aspiran t fo r this favou r tha t h e and his priests had been ' afraid t o oppose the popular feelin g that would be evoked' ha d Smyt h no t bee n sponsored . H e adde d tha t i n Meat h suc h priests a s ha d give n stron g suppor t t o Plunket t wer e no w awar e o f 'a n antagonism' between themselves an d their flocks. 67 Nevertheless , allowance s must b e mad e fo r th e circumstance s unde r whic h thes e statement s were made. Wherea s Cardina l Culle n deplore d th e Meat h result , Archbisho p MacHale ha d welcome d it . Th e younge r an d les s ^officially favoure d priest s had man y genuin e nationalist s i n thei r rank s an d ther e i s n o reaso n fo r supposing th e countie s o f Meath an d Westmeat h wer e exceptiona l and ha d none residen t withi n thei r borders . Popula r pressur e doubtles s serve d a s an excuse for them t o brav e the displeasur e o f their superiors , and anyway , what coul d a superio r sa y agains t championin g Hom e Rul e whe n h e wa s himself trimming before its mighty wind to avoid upsetting 'popula r feeling'? Besides th e shif t i n clerica l polic y occasione d b y suc h feeling , ther e i s th e force of intimidation from belo w to consider. I n Westmeat h it was obviously quite considerabl e an d far outweighed an y terrors landlor d retaliatio n migh t have. I f anything a loyal tenant rathe r than a disloyal one had to look out for himself unde r the open voting system. I n 1870 , Moore had pointed out that ' the utterance of disaffection i n Ireland is no longer treason , i t is the expres sion o f th e long-considere d an d mature d judgment o f the whol e nation'. 68 66

D . Thornley , I.H.S. p . 212 ; Freeman's Journal, 1 0 Feb. 1871 . D . Thornley , I.H.S. p . 212 ; J. A. Dease to W. Monsell, 1 4 and 1 5 June 1871 , Monsell 8 Prs. Nat . Lib. Ire. MS. 8317. 6 M . G. Moore, op. cit. p. 361 . 67

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In 187 1 tha t utteranc e o f disaffectio n di d no t alway s have t o g o a s far a s individual declarations in contested elections . The general will was sometimes keeping the non-Home Rul e landlords at home an d bringin g of f unopposed returns o f leading agents of constitutional protest . If furthe r proo f of current trend s ha d been needed, it was more than pro vided by the Count y Monaghan contest . While pressures were being exerted on Butt himself to contest the seat, a Conservative Home Ruler, John Madden , backed b y a numbe r o f prominen t 'Orange ' an d 'Green * Hom e Rulers , came forward . Hi s supporter s appeale d t o Protestant s no t t o vot e Conservative and to Catholics not to support the Liberal, on e H. O. Lewis, 'wh o had alread y addresse d th e count y fo r th e ballot , denominationa l education and the defence of the Pope '.69 Immediately , the Catholic Liberal nationalists were u p i n arms . No t fo r Madde n th e fat e o f Kin g Harman—h e neve r reached th e poll . Th e ke y fac t t o understandin g the inheren t weaknes s of ' Orange' Home Rule was that once Madden withdrew and Butt came forward to sav e the day , the priests , mos t Liberal s and the Freeman straightwa y left Lewis in the lurch. The fight was finally directly between Leslie, the orthodox Conservative an d Butt . Th e forme r won . The figure s wer e 2521 an d 152 8 and the poll was just ove r 73 per cent . No t a surprising resul t fo r that par tially Protestant county, yet a firm demonstration of nationalist strength an d the tru e nature of Irish nationalism , openly given and score d o n a restricted franchise. But t concentrate d o n Tenan t Right . Nevertheless , Hom e Rul e was no t hidde n fro m view . Ther e wa s n o gatherin g i n o f vote s b y fals e pretences. Nor wer e an y punches pulle d i n his successful bi d fo r the representatio n of Limeric k Cit y tw o month s later . Righ t fro m th e star t h e spok e ou t fo r 'a Catholi c Universit y an d denominationa l education , i n additio n t o hi s well-known radica l view s on Tenant Right'. 70 Th e 'Orange ' Hom e Ruler s might bewai l th e adulteratio n o f thei r cause , 'her e b y a n Ultramontane , there b y a Fenian ally', 71 but i n tha t so-calle d adulteratio n la y the hear t of popular Iris h nationalism . Howeve r muc h hi s programm e was disliked b y 'the Quality' , it s fea r o f 'th e Quantity ' gav e Butt a n unopposed retur n t o Westminster. With two new recruits from the Liberal members of Parliament —John Maguir e o f Cor k Cit y an d McCarth y Downin g of Count y Cork — there were as the year closed 9 Home Rulers among the 10 3 representatives of Ireland. During th e firs t month s o f 187 2 excitemen t continue d to.mount . I n Britain seriou s doubts had arisen ' as to that ne w era of peace and goodwill' in Irelan d 'which Mr Gladstone had foretold a s a response to the legislative 69

D . Thornley , I.H.S. p . 213 ; Th e Nation, 1 5 Jul y 1871 . D . Thornley , I.H.S. p . 214 ; Th e Irish Times, 5 Sept. 1871 . 71 D . Thornley , I.H.S., Dublin Evening Mail, 1 2 Sept . 1871 . W . Bence Jone s (op . cit . p. 62 ) alleges 'sympath y wit h Fenianism , an d nothin g else ' wa s the 'tru e characteristic ' of the Limeric k Cit y by-election . 70

Ireland and the Ballot Act of 1872 49 benefits whic h h e ha d bee n sheddin g upo n her'. 72 Whi g Liberalism , whic h 'thanks to the support of the clergy had hitherto been the dominant policy'73 there, was suffering a rapid decline . Elector s and non-elector s were together making it perfectly plain that' Home Rul e had a great hol d upon the mass of the Irish people'.74 Later, nationalists o f the new model party were to regar d men of the Mitchel l Henry an d P. J. Smyt h stam p wit h som e hostility, but , as one of them pu t it , at the time when Home Rule was still in its dawn, the election of Mr P . J. Smyth and th e electio n of Mr Mitchel l Henry were hailed with jubilation as proof of the amount of vitality in the country . The electio n of Mr John Martin for Meat h and of M r But t himself fo r Limerick gave fresh impetu s to th e advancin g movement, which now began to be regarded with equal enthusiasm in Ireland and indignation in England. 75 He migh t hav e adde d th e victorie s o f Captai n Nola n i n Galwa y an d o f R. P. Blennerhassett in Kerry, the last startling contributions to Irish electoral history i n the years before th e secre t ballot . They too k plac e agains t a backgroun d o f risin g prosperity , eve n i n th e west of the country, an d showed ho w little the ' political chimeras' had ' been dispelled b y recen t legislation'. 76 Bot h provid e classi c evidenc e o n the mis conceptions o f th e Parnel l schoo l a s t o th e necessit y o f th e secre t ballot . Galway wa s a n instanc e o f th e landlord s versus th e rest , wit h a n orthodox Conservative a s the 'unionist ' aspirant . Mr Justice Keogh, i n one of the less abusive parts o f his judgement o n the subsequent petition , denounce d the election as 'the most astonishing attempt at ecclesiastica l tyrann y whic h th e whol e histor y o f priestl y intoleranc e afforded'.77 Naturally, this cannot be regarded as anything other than a ludicrous exaggeration . Ye t ther e i s no denyin g that , fro m th e archbisho p of Tuam down to the meanest curate, the Catholic clergy excelled themselve s in zea l for Nolan . They would have preferred him to Henr y a t the previous by-election becaus e of hi s stron g view s o n th e tempora l restoratio n o f th e pope. Ye t the simple ' Orange' versus ' Green' battl e really determined their basic positio n fo r them, and the outloo k an d initiativ e o f MacHale mad e it a remarkably activ e one . Indeed , ha d h e bee n primat e o f Ireland , Parnel l might wel l hav e foun d hi s par t i n th e country' s histor y muc h smaller than it turne d ou t t o be . A s a landlord who had o f his ow n free wil l ' submitted to an arbitration award which restored a number of his evicted tenants to their holdings',78 Nola n wa s anathema t o mos t o f his class . Man y a Whig land 72

Lad y Gwendoli n Cecil , Life o f Robert, Marquis o f Salisbury, II , 38 . L. Paul-Dubois, Contemporary Ireland, Introduction by T. M. Kettle, M.P., p. 79. 74 J. McCarthy, M.P., Ireland Since the Union, p. 216. 75 Ibid . 76 Annual Register, 1872, p. n. 77 Ibid . p. 80. 78 D . Thornley, I.H.S. p . 216 .

73

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owner therefore found himsel f supportin g E . le Poer Trench , the Conserva tive. Lan d bulke d large in the contest , joining with nationalism an d religio n to creat e th e violen t emotional force necessar y to blast th e contro l landlord s almost invariably tried t o exercise over the way in which their tenant s voted . The resul t woul d sho w beyond doub t whethe r th e 'popular ' sid e coul d use this force to best advantage. The resul t was: Nolan 2823, le Poer Trench 658; almost a 70 per cent poll. Ha d all the remaining 30 per cent voted Conserva tive, Nola n would still have won. Kerry wa s a much mor e complicate d affair . There , th e Hom e Rule r was a Protestant an d his Whig opponen t a Catholic. Unlik e Galway , it was not under the jurisdiction o f MacHale an d the loca l bishop wa s none other tha n Moriarty, a n enthusiastic Whig. Th e clerg y were badly split an d the Fenia n contribution a good deal beyond the 'benevolen t neutrality' promised befor e the Bilto n Hote l meeting , as , o f course , i t ha d bee n a t by-election s i n th e previous year a s well. Moriart y wa s to se e at firs t han d th e involvemen t of his younger clergy with a nationalist movement' tainted with the revolutionary spirit'.79 Fou r years before he told William Monsell: 'The clergy will preach against rebellion o n account of the evil s it will bring on the people, but I am sure that their almos t unanimous opinion is, that i f there was a fair chanc e of success, i t woul d b e lawful , na y "dulc e e t decorum".' 80 Now , wit h 'th e whole constitution. . .in thei r hands', 81 the masse s wer e usin g i t 'fo r thei r own purposes'. 82 Give n the possibilit y o f a revolution in slow motion, their priests tende d mor e and more to preach it . Reporting thre e week s before th e pollin g took place, Lor d Kenmar e tol d Hartington: ' I feel confiden t that, althoug h the fight will be a very tough one indeed, w e shall win . Blennerhassett' s agent s openl y confess that the y rel y on mo b intimidation an d that ou r voter s will be afrai d t o com e to the Poll . Their mob s ar e aggressively Fenian . W e shall hav e to take every precaution to ensur e protectio n o f voters.' 83 Bisho p Moriart y ha d abandone d th e optimism of 1868 and was especially worried about denominational education. He poure d ou t his thoughts, thi s time t o Hartington: 'We are in for a very hard figh t i n Kerry . Al l territoria l influenc e a t on e side , a foolis h peopl e led astray by a bad pres s o n the other.' 84 Ho w different fro m th e ol d claim that th e priest s ra n extensivel y rea d newspaper s an d 'th e peopl e rea d n o other' !85 H e continued: Your Lordship's speech at Knighton has increased our difficulty. Priest s who were with m e i n advocatin g M r Dease' s return hav e bee n turne d over . The y d o no t 79

Th e word s are Cardinal Cullen's. Se e J. H . Whyte, I.H.S. p. 194 . Ibid . p. 198 . 2 M . G. Moore, op. cit. p . 362 . 8 Ibid . 83 Lor d Kenmar e to Lord Hartington , 1 4 Jan. 1872 , Devonshire Papers 340. 483. 84 Th e Bisho p o f Kerry (Moriarty ) to Lor d Hartington , 10 Jan. 1872 , Devonshire Papers 340. 482. 85 J . H. Whyte, I.H.S. p. 195 . 80

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complain o f the polic y yo u enunciate , bu t o f the insul t you r expressio n conveys . They neve r aske d tha t th e educatio n o f Irelan d shoul d b e hande d ove r t o them . When the landlords an d parsons refused or neglected t o cooperate wit h the Nationa l Board, th e priest s a t grea t persona l sacrific e built th e school s o f three provinces . Your speec h wil l mak e som e an d confir m man y Hom e Rulers . I d o no t kno w whether i t is possible for your Lordshi p to say anything i n explanation. 86

It was, but confusion became only the worse confounded. A letter of Harrington's attempted to smooth down the priests, but repeated that ' the demands of the Catholic Bishops' were 'such as Parliament could not grant'.87 Moriarty felt it s publication 'would prejudice the election contest' 88 further. Meanwhile the bisho p had felt constraine d to address a 'solemn warning' to the electors. 'Yo u do not always know your friends,' h e admonished. Stand b y a Legislature whic h ha s given t o your propert y a security and prosperit y which your fathers never hoped f o r . .. farmers of Kerry, beware! I t is not the place of Parliament which these agitator s so much desire to change. I t i s the representa tion o f the countr y which doe s no t pleas e them. I f yo u give them thei r way , you will have household suffrage , an d then manhoo d suffrage ; an d then your labourers and servan t boys, and th e journeymen of your towns, will choose your representa tives and become your masters, an d then—.

As deliberate a piece of oligarchical self-esteem a s any Whig ever gave voice to; and it ended with the assurance that in her present state of disunion, selfgovernment would bring only 'a war of faction and class' t o Ireland. 89 A n attempt by John Bright to aid Dease by a letter denouncin g Home Rule only got him ridiculed i n the Irishman a s 'our fat friend', 'politicall y narrow and politically selfish— a socia l revolutionist, and no t a statesman'. 90 A charge coming ill from tha t quarter. It was hardly surprising that Blennerhassett's agents relied on intimidation. As demonstrated , the mo b wa s the mos t effectiv e answe r t o landlor d pres sures, especiall y wher e th e clerg y was divided . That a fai r electio n did no t ensue doe s nothin g to prov e the 'popular ' sid e neede d a secret ballot. O n the contrary , their opponents seemed to nee d it mor e in th e fac e o f priest cum-Fenian counter attack. Request s for military protection were, as always, from wha t ironicall y had no w becom e the anti-popula r side . Th e nigh t of Kerry wa s almost franti c wit h anxiety lest a gunboat should not b e sen t t o Valentia an d Kenmar e implored Hartington to se e troops 'should b e in th e county a week before ' polling , a s ' The intimidatio n is tremendous and their presence woul d giv e confidence'. 91 H e deeme d it absolutel y essentia l 'that it shoul d becom e well-known tha t th e voter s wil l b e ampl y protected'. 92 86 Th e Bisho p o f Kerry (Moriarty ) to Lor d Hartington , 1 0 Jan. 1872 , Devonshir e Papers 340. 482 . 87 Ibid . 1 9 Jan . 1872 , Devonshir e Papers 340 . 484 . 88 Ibid . 89 0 Annual Register, 1872, p. 12 . 9 Ibid . p. 13 . 91 Lor d Kenmar e to Lor d Hartington , 2 7 Jan. 1872 , Devonshir e Papers 340 . 487 . 92 Ibid .

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Whiggery wa s in ver y lo w water indee d whe n th e Whi g lor d lieutenan t of the on e county i n Irelan d wher e his party outstrippe d th e Conservative s in its following amon g the landowner s had to admi t 'th e intimidatio n an d th e terror* coming from an independent lef t was ' almost incredible'.93 Naturally , many electors could not be evicted for voting Home Rule, and they knew it.94 But socia l unpleasantness o f high intensit y coul d b e heape d upo n them b y revengeful landlords . Moreover , whil e tru e tha t non-elector s di d no t vote , their activit y during the election coul d still be duly noted and acted on after wards. Intimidatio n was a highly necessary part of the ris e of a fully effectiv e Irish party, just as in British industry militant trade unionism proved essential to th e creatio n o f extensive Labour representation . Perhap s on e of its mos t effective achievement s wa s i n causin g Whig , o r rathe r landlor d finance s t o reach breakin g point . I n thi s particula r election , Deas e ha d bee n chose n because of his financial resources . ' Castlerosse an d he' were said to be able 'to stan d th e sho t whic h n o on e else, certainl y of the natives , wa s prepared to do'. 95 'Th e shot' was estimated a s likely to be £1500, it finally exceeded £6000, a sum not easily t o be found. Apar t fro m th e transport costs arisin g out of getting voters to the poll, 96 there was the question of bribery. I t looked as thoug h th e landlord s jus t coul d no t rais e enoug h t o mak e me n brav e Fenian violence . Violenc e whic h wa s no t simpl y a matte r o f a fe w week s before an d durin g the election , bu t somethin g likel y t o prov e dangerou s i n the months after it was over, and the 4000 soldiers were no longer there. An d this raises the adde d poin t tha t military protectio n coul d bu t b e temporary , however genuin e th e need . Larg e number s coul d no t b e give n constan t personal protectio n a d infinitum. Whe n sentimen t an d safet y coincide d t o favour th e 'popular ' cause , ver y larg e sum s indee d wer e neede d fo r bribes. Kerry showe d that a large sum just wa s not enough . Ye t how could bigge r ones eve r b e raised , an d ho w coul d a party a s poor a s the Liberal s figh t a whole countr y o n that basis? Whe n Parnel l acquired mone y h e was able t o dispense wit h 'th e Independen t gentlemen , wh o woul d no t b e certai n t o take orders'. 97 H e ha d no t neede d i t t o thro w ou t th e opponent s o f Home Rule.98 A resul t givin g Blennerhasset t 223 7 vote s an d Deas e 139 8 derive d fro m conditions rathe r different fro m thos e obtaining in Galway. With the transfer 93

Ibid . Becaus e o f th e natur e o f their lan d tenure . O f course , landlord s with lon g memories might later declin e to renew leases. Non-elector s also stood to lose if noticed as part of th e anti-landlord campaign. The fac t o f their not havin g votes would not necessaril y mean their contribution to landlords' discomfiture ha d not been significant . 95 Lor d Kenmar e to Lor d Hartington , 27 Jan. 1872 , Devonshir e Papers 340 . 487 . 96 Th e Whig s hired a special train for the purpos e (Annual Register, 1872, p. 14) . 97 W . B. Gwyn, op . cit . p . 135 . 98 Blennerhasset t had money, but other s had done as well without it. Nevertheless , Lord Kenmare was right to count the fac t a Home Rule advantage in Kerry, however exaggerate d his view that it supplie d ' the onl y thing wanting for the ful l developmen t o f their (i.e . th e Home Rulers') mischief' . 94

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of priestl y favou r an d influenc e t o th e 'popular ' sid e incomplete , th e hig h Liberal vot e di d no t necessaril y represen t a marke d degre e o f successfu l landlord pressure , thoug h som e ther e undoubtedl y was. Curiousl y enough the issu e was considered doubtfu l til l the last , 'whe n great pressure was put on, and the popular excitement increased a s the non-electors sa w the preparations whic h wer e mad e fo r bringin g M r Dease' s friend s t o th e pol l unde r military escort'. 99 Kenmar e declare d tha t a s fa r a s h e kne w 'nothing.. . could be better than the arrangements made by the Government fo r the protection o f the voters; ther e was', he believed, 'ample force i n the county'. 100 The new s o f Nolan's victor y probabl y mad e u p an y deficiency i n th e loca l propaganda and had 'some effect upo n the wavering and timid voters. Som e were emboldened t o oppos e th e wishe s o f their landlords , an d other s feare d to encounte r th e resentmen t o f the people , wh o were lashed int o a state of frenzy b y th e incessan t appeal s o f th e Home-Rul e orators . Th e polling , however, wa s carried on without an y of the riotin g whic h brough t disgrac e upon many former election s in the South' 101—a sure sign Kenmare' s assess ment o f the militar y was correct. Severa l priests actuall y led i n thei r flock s to vote for Blennerhassett . The pol l wa s 66 per cen t an d som e Whigs wer e left daze d b y the siz e of the Hom e Rule majority becaus e of the announcement s as to th e numbe r of pledged supporter s mad e b y Dease' s committee , heade d b y Si r Jame s O'Connell. Ver y sensibly they dre w the conclusio n that som e had been persuaded no t to vote, and others to break their promises , bu t rathe r disingenu ously put i t all down to genuine fear o f 'the indignation of the multitude'. 102 That men had seize d a t an excuse fo r abstention or desertion doe s not see m to have crossed their minds . Kenmar e said, 'ever y considerabl e landlord'103 came ou t for Dease . Anothe r accoun t tha t ' The influenc e of the landlord s was not al l thrown int o th e scale , fo r severa l owners of property, includin g some Conservatives , wer e favourabl e t o M r Blennerhassett , o r remaine d neutral, a position which in a contest o f this kind is favourable to the popula r candidate'.104 Th e tw o ar e consistent i f all the 'popularists ' an d neutralist s were smal l men , and , anyway, unpromise d vote s coul d no t desert . Th e collapse of much of the landlords ' hold itself entailed the breakin g of a multitude o f promises. This was where using popular pressure a s an excuse came in. Som e examples of what happened have been recorded, for example: Mr Denn y ha d appointed seve n o'cloc k i n the mornin g t o meet eight y tenant s a t a certain cross-road an d come int o Trale e with them to vote fo r Mr Dease . H e was there at the time named wit h a strong escort, but there were no tenants, and he had 99

Annual Register, 1872, p. 14 . Lor d Kenmar e to Lor d Hartington, 1 3 Feb . 1872 , Devonshir e Paper s 340 . 494. 101 Annual Register, 1872, p. 14 .

100

102 108

104

Ibid . p. 15 . Lor d Kenmare to Lord Hartington, 1 3 Feb. 1872, Devonshire Papers 340. 494. Annual Register, 1872, p . 15 .

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to return alone; for the Rev . Eugene O'Sullivan, P.P. of Spa had made an appointment wit h the m fo r the sam e hou r t o mee t hi m a t anothe r plac e an d vot e fo r M r Blennerhassett. A contingent , numberin g 20 0 electors fro m Castleisland , Brosna , and othe r adjoinin g parishes , cam e i n abou t twelv e o'clock , accompanie d b y a band, an d vote d i n a bod y fo r M r Blennerhassett . They ha d bee n canvasse d b y their landlord , the Hon. Mr Wynne , for Mr Dease , and dinner had bee n provided for them ; but a t a signal they rose almost t o a man an d lef t him , after handin g a written refusal to vote as he desired. Onl y eighteen of the party voted for Mr Dease . It i s reported that the mo b wrecked hi s house at night, and that he was obliged t o secrete himself t o escape personal violence. 105 So secre t di d th e populac e wis h thei r vot e t o be ; s o impossibl e wa s i t to ru n a n independen t Iris h part y withou t th e secre t ballot ! Evidenc e of a mor e negativ e kind cam e fro m Lenagh , wher e 'none o f Vintney' s tenants wer e abl e t o vote'. 106 Smal l wonde r tha t Moriart y ha d aske d fo r cavalry.107 The worth y bishop had eve n had faith i n the weathe r as a general damper on proceedings, 108 but th e Hom e Rul e enthusias m prove d a stronger force . Kenmare stresse d that : 'I n recountin g th e cause s o f Dease' s failur e (an d 'no possibl e loca l candidat e woul d hav e conciliate d th e sam e amoun t o f support')109 I mus t no t omi t t o mentio n th e fascinatio n exercise d b y th e Home Rul e cry ove r ever y class o f the communit y sav e the landlords' , an d went on: I believ e that the idea entertained of its meaning is revolutionary, that it means the transfer o f powe r an d propert y fro m th e presen t holder s an d a severanc e o f th e British connection . Unde r th e circumstances , th e electio n wa s carried b y a vast amount of intimidatio n applie d in ever y conceivabl e form , guide d fro m Dublin , through th e instrumentalit y of itineran t orators , loca l an d importe d Fenians ('spreading', a s Moriarty phrase d it , 'terro r amongs t th e farmer s an d raisin g th e hopes o f th e terroris t boys'), 110 th e whol e popula r pres s an d th e unsurpasse d energy o f a powerfu l sectio n o f the priests , who combine d t o fa n th e Hom e Rul e sentiment into a frenzy. 111 Compared with such events the gain scored for Home Rule at Wexford Tow n in Apri l an d anothe r Libera l victor y a t Mallow—bot h significant—passe d scarcely noticed, an d th e Ballo t Act cam e into force o n 1 8 July.112 Betwee n the 186 8 General Election an d then eight Hom e Rulers had won by-elections . 105

Ibid . Lor d Kenmar e t o Lord Hartington, Feb. 1872 , Devonshir e Paper s 340 . 493. Bernar d Holland, op. cit. p . 92 ; The Bisho p o f Kerry (Moriarty) to Lor d Hartington , i Feb . 1872 , Devonshir e Papers 340 . 491. 108 Ibid . 109 Lor d Kenmar e to Lord Hartington , 1 3 Feb. 1872 , Devonshire Papers 340 . 494. 110 Th e Bisho p of Kerry (Moriarty) to Lord Hartington , i Feb . 1872 , Devonshir e Papers 340. 491. 111 Lor d Kenmar e to Lord Hartington , 1 3 Feb. 1872 , Devonshire Papers 340. 494. 112 I t was to expire on 31 Dec. 1880 , unless extended by Parliament. I t was, but remaine d subject t o renewal until 1918 , when it acquired permanency. 106 107

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Petitions ha d bee n lodge d agains t th e victor s o f Galwa y an d Kerry , on e with a notoriou s success , bu t wha t wa s more , th e genera l conduc t o f th e elections ha d finally convinced the governmen t i t shoul d sponso r the secre t ballot. O n purely partisan grounds the Liberal s seemed to have little to gain or lose in Ireland fro m the change . Qu a government they longed for law and order. Troops were not only unsatisfactory from a practical angle . They were also a severe embarrassmen t t o an y British administration , especiall y on e of the left. Hartingto n pointed ou t to Kenmar e over Kerry that it was ' essential that, i n makin g suc h extraordinar y an d exceptiona l preparation s fo r a n election, w e should b e abl e to show , if called upon, that w e have only done what was necessary in order to preserve freedom o f election, and that nothing has bee n don e i n th e interes t o f either party'. 113 Th e smoothe r runnin g of elections wa s Gladstone' s mai n aim , an d reassure d abou t th e prospect s of increased priestly influence, he was relieved to find an answer. No t that othe r powerful factor s di d no t weig h wit h him , Irelan d jus t happene d t o b e th e most pressing . Hom e Ruler s ha d demande d th e secre t ballot , bu t s o ha d many Iris h Liberals , an d onl y on e o f the m vote d agains t it . Ideally , o f course, abolitio n was the bes t guarante e that landlor d pressure s woul d end . Nevertheless, despit e patche s her e an d there , th e Hom e Rul e movemen t had in general already put pai d to them. In Novembe r Londonderr y City , the firs t Iris h contes t sinc e the Act was passed, wa s a Conservativ e gain . A smal l Hom e Rul e vot e spli t th e lef t forces, an d the Libera l Solicitor-Genera l for Ireland suffered publi c humiliation. Almos t a month late r J . P. Ronayne won Cork City i n a straight fight with a Conservative—another Libera l sea t los t withou t a s much a s a toke n resistance, an d Ronayn e ' a ragin g Fenian'. 114 187 3 ha d bu t on e conteste d by-election—in Count y Tyrone . Count y Armag h an d Lisbur n returne d Conservatives, an d Countie s Roscommo n an d Waterfor d Liberals ; fa r fro m dramatic sequel s t o wha t Parnel l though t a significant new-found freedom . Subsequent event s were to prove there was more in the last two than met the eye. A sittin g membe r o f Roscommon , Th e O'Cono r Don , ha d already , along with Kenelm Digby, Queen's County, and Sir Rowland Blannerhassett, Galway City, subscribe d t o the Home Rul e line during th e year since Kerry . Only th e las t actuall y joine d th e Hom e Governmen t Associatio n an d th e other tw o remaine d nominall y Liberals . Th e ne w member fo r Roscommo n was i n exactl y th e sam e position , bein g a Hom e Rule , Tenan t Righ t an d denominational educatio n supporter . Dow n i n Waterfor d th e ne w member was also a fellow-traveller; s o was his colleague , Si r J. Esmonde , who stoo d as an open Home Ruler in 1874. Fo r one reason or another—sincere nationalism, tackin g befor e th e win d an d a Catholicis m enrage d b y Gladstone' s University Bil l amon g them—man y a Libera l membe r o f Parliamen t wa s 113 111

Lor d Hartingto n t o Lord Kenmare , 28 Jan. 1872 , Devonshir e Papers 340 . 488 . Frederic k Clay to Lord Hartington, 14 Nov. 1872 , Devonshire Papers 340. 512 .

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reconsidering his position vis-d-vis Hom e Rule . Mathe w D'Arc y o f County Wexford was the last one individually to approve of it.115 Bigge r things were about to happen. O n 21 November the Home Rule League, an unequivocally 'Green' nationalis t body , wa s formed . But t ha d take n th e initiativ e i n throwing of f the embarrassment s o f the Hom e Governmen t Associatio n fo r good and all. Twenty-five member s o f Parliament wer e founder members, 116 the majority bein g Liberal. Admittedly , the 'green' had its pale patches, yet the masse s foun d i n the m bette r expressio n o f thei r nationa l aspiration s than an y men sinc e th e en d o f th e Repea l movement . I t i s vain to argu e that secre t votin g ha d don e al l this. Th e sign s tha t i t would happe n were unmistakable befor e Jul y 187 2 an d hav e bee n demonstrate d t o hav e bee n such. County Tyron e was the key as to where th e Ballo t Act would chang e th e shape of politics, so long as the electorate remained narrow. I n the by-electio n there, wit h a predominantly Protestant electorate , J. E. Macartney, a Tenant Right Conservative , faile d b y a mere 36 votes (3139 to 3103) to gain the sea t from th e orthodo x Conservative . I n 186 8 bot h Conservative s ha d bee n unopposed. Th e usua l champion s o f Tenant Righ t i n Ulste r wer e Radica l Liberals. Armag h an d Lisbur n wer e difficul t proposition s an d ther e ha d not bee n tim e fo r preparations t o b e made. A champion happene d t o be at hand in Tyrone an d cut down the delay in attacking the landlords. Th e 186 9 by-election an d 187 4 Genera l Electio n figure s fo r Antri m hav e onl y t o b e compared fo r the forc e o f this point t o b e appreciated . Wherea s i n th e by election th e Conservativ e majorit y ha d bee n 329 4 on a 67- 5 pe r cen t poll , in 187 4 it was 13 3 on a somewhat highe r one. Exactly how much highe r i s difficult t o determin e becaus e there wer e three candidate s for two seats, bu t as both Conservative s receive d abou t th e sam e numbe r o f votes ther e must have been a rise of roughly 5 per cent. While the Liberal vote almost doubled , the Conservative fell by 1200. This upsurge of Radicalism was but a n instance of the tren d throughou t almost the whol e of Ulster. Hom e Rul e had beate n the Whig s o n it s ow n steam befor e th e Ballo t Act. Only by joining i n th e stream were most of them able to save themselves before as well as after 1872 . Yet Ulster Radicalis m had needed secrecy of voting to flourish. Why? I n a n area enjoyin g Ulste r Tenan t Righ t a sturdy independenc e i n votin g habit s might hav e bee n expected . Th e answe r probabl y lie s i n th e lac k o f an y supreme emotiona l rallying cries amon g the tenan t farmer s to comba t socia l pressures. Neithe r nationalis m no r Catholicis m sparke d the m off , excep t into bitte r hostility . A 'unionism ' an d Protestantis m hel d i n commo n with th e aristocrac y an d gentr y worke d very much t o th e advantag e o f th e 115 Mathe w D'Arcy was not member for County Waterford a s stated by L. J. McCaffrey , T.A.P.S. p. 14 118 For a list of the twenty-five, see L. J. McCaffrey, I.H.S. Appendix A. A list of Irish members of Parliament wh o contested thei r seats as Home Rulers in 187 4 can be foun d i n Appendix B .

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latter. Solidarit y mean t 'follo w th e leader ' an d mos t o f th e leader s wer e Conservative.117 In fac e o f al l th e evidence , Parnell's assessmen t o f th e likel y effec t o f th e secret ballo t canno t b e upheld fo r the year s whic h sa w the beginning s o f the Home Rul e movement . Wit h o r withou t th e hel p o f the hierarchy , with o r without th e hel p o f priests , an d even i n fac e o f a strong clerica l opposition , large section s o f the Catholi c Iris h ha d show n the spiri t behin d independen t opposition. I n fac e o f their enthusias m th e landlor d interest ha d avoide d or been beaten i n open battle. Secre t ballo t had been needed for the maintenanc e of la w an d order , no t fo r th e sak e of Iris h freedom . An d i n th e lon g run , before 1868 and after 1873, now did the 'spirit of constitutional independence >118 show itself amon g the Catholi c Irish ? Generally speaking, i t showed itself fairly strongl y in the earlie r periods and exceedingly so in the later ones. Before 186 8 th e basi c faul t i n th e Iris h nationa l movement s would appea r to hav e bee n a t th e top . An y peopl e need s leading . Wit h nothin g t o tur n to excep t local authority, i t wil l become politically malleable and concerne d with it s own petty parochia l squabbles. Thi s happened to the Catholi c Iris h before 1826 . The n th e priesthoo d forme d a bridg e betwee n th e Catholi c middle-class nationalist s an d th e masses . Landlord s foun d themselve s openly deserted by their tenants, wh o turned to other more liberal Protestant s of property, prepared to champion Catholic Emancipation. A t the beginning, a suppl y o f rich Libera l Protestant s wa s absolutel y essential t o th e Catholi c cause, fo r despit e hi s famou s victory i n Count y Clare, 119 O'Connel l wa s no more abl e to take his seat than O'Donova n Ross a forty years later. Tha t very victory depende d a lot o n O'Connell' s persona l authority ; had h e no t stoo d fewer voter s woul d hav e take n risk s fo r thei r cause . Indeed , th e whol e Emancipation an d Repeal movements drew a n enormous amount of strengt h from hi s directin g hand . I t wa s a trul y remarkabl e thing that i n a countr y so curse d wit h lan d hunge r voter s defie d th e preponderantl y 'unionist ' landowning class with s o much tenacity. Th e Lichfiel d Hous e Compac t an d elections fought han d in hand with th e Whig s naturall y blurred the nationa l cause, bu t a new movement was emerging just as the famine virtually crushe d the capacit y fo r self-assertion . Within fou r years the 'Independen t Brigade ' idea wa s a reality . A quarte r o f a centur y ha d see n th e emergenc e o f th e first' Christia n Democratic ' party in the world, and its eventual failure under the impac t o f calamity and the fleshpots . I t sa w the recreatio n of that part y in th e 'Brigade ' an d a second failur e unde r th e impac t o f hierarchical dis pleasure an d th e fleshpots . Wha t ca n th e ordinar y vote r do , whe n lackin g money, h e ha s to rel y on a church leadershi p that give s up th e struggl e an d 117

Th e admissio n o f the mor e dependen t labourer s t o th e franchis e in 188 4 di d muc h t o restore Conservativ e fortune s i n th e regio n a t th e Genera l Electio n of 1885 . 118 Se e n. 14 . 119 I n 1828 . Thu s provin g th e formidabl e 'underswel l i n th e Iris h people ' (W . E. H. Lecky, Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland, 11 , 101) .

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representatives wh o choos e t o brea k their pledges ? Befor e th e abolitio n of the propert y qualificatio n for member s o f Parliamen t i n 185 8 mer e lac k of funds was not the only problem. Smal l wonder that a period of demoralization set in. The unconstitutiona l spiri t o f independence revive d first , and , i n the lat e 'fifties an d earl y 'sixties, nationalis t Irishme n cam e t o regar d Fenianis m a s their prim e hope. The constitutio n seeme d to have failed the m an d for many years the Liberal s benefite d fro m th e effort s o f the toug h an d toughe r me n (and women). 120 Evidenc e taken i n inquiries ove r the 186 8 General Electio n revealed thei r ful l importance . Firs t th e genuin e survivin g remnant s o f the 'Brigade', le d b y Moore , an d the n th e Hom e Governmen t Associatio n changed al l this. How , ha s bee n explained . Throug h al l these vicissitude s the widt h o f the franchis e was often a factor, bu t neve r th e prim e one . Th e will t o wi n mor e tha n survive d th e Iris h Count y Franchis e Ac t o f 1829 . Nationalism wa s revivin g befor e th e extensio n o f the count y vot e i n 1850 . Home Rul e grew up o n the basi s o f that law , as the Refor m Ac t of 1868 had little impact i n a country wit h s o few borough seats. 121 S o long a s Catholi c or nationalist Protestant voter s were on the register i n any number th e ' spirit of constitutiona l independence ' thrive d whe n wel l led . Individua l priest s there ha d alway s been o n th e nationa l side , eve n a t it s lowes t points, bu t it wa s Parnell's goo d fortune to inheri t a popular movemen t backe d b y th e Church. Throug h th e powe r an d exampl e o f th e la y leaders th e hierarch y itself bega n t o wor k fo r th e nationalis t cause . I n 187 4 th e transferenc e of support wa s nearly complete. Nationalis m ha d a reasonable leadershi p an d scored heavil y in the Genera l Election . But t ha d boaste d Hom e Rul e could win eight y seat s a t th e nex t Genera l Electio n a t a tim e whe n i t looke d as though i t would b e fough t o n a n ope n votin g system. 122 A s things turne d out i t di d no t excee d sixty , perhap s becaus e o f the strai n put upo n a n embryonic centra l organizatio n b y a sudden dissolution . I f th e electorat e ha d no faith i n the Ballo t Act as a means of preserving thei r secret s an d yet tha t faith wa s necessary for the defea t o f rampant landlordism , thos e holdin g th e Parnell view have some explaining t o do. 123 Moreover , i f the electorat e dis believed in the Act' s efficacy i n 187 4 and believe d in 1880 , why was so little ground gaine d b y Hom e Rul e i n th e Genera l Electio n o f th e latte r year ? 120

Fo r th e activitie s o f the wome n i n th e Kerr y by-election , se e Annual Register, 1872, P. 121 ISBernar d Holland' s clai m i n hi s biograph y o f Devonshir e (i , 91 ) that th e extensio n of the urban franchise in 1867 ' gave birth to a new democratic movement in Ireland' is palpable nonsense, and, i n any case, the Iris h Secon d Refor m Ac t was passed in 1868 . It s provision s were scarcely far-reaching . I n boroug h constituencies the ne w law laid dow n £4 instead of £8 a s the poo r rate qualificatio n fo r the franchise . A s under the kindred Britis h legislation, lodgers wer e give n th e vot e subjec t t o certai n tim e an d tenanc y conditions . Th e count y qualification remaine d unchanged. The ratin g had to be £12 or above. 122 Se e L. J. McCaffrey , T.A.P.S. p. 13 . 128 Se e the comment s on the view s of C. C. O'Brien in n. 8.

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They also forget tha t a national movement cannot be completely clandestine. Men nee d mor e tha n th e secre t vot e to hid e thei r politics . Th e us e o f th e illiteracy claus e must in some cases have been an attempt t o avoid the dange r of bein g dubbe d a 'landlord' s man'. 124 Boycottin g was scarcel y a secre t occupation. I n short , th e Ballo t Act wa s a mino r matter i n th e histor y o f Irish nationalism! 125 Ver y ofte n i t wa s a protectio n t o th e unionis t elements.126 What the n mad e th e ne w mode l Iris h party ? Mos t importan t wa s th e 'spirit o f constitutiona l independence ' prevalen t amongs t th e nationalis t Irish. Thi s spirit wa s fierce against the parliamentar y party elected in 1874 , many month s befor e th e agricultura l depressio n began . The n ther e wa s a leader—Parnell—the firs t reall y outstanding layman since O'Connell . Ad d to these the supply of American money and the friendshi p of the churc h and all th e essentia l ingredient s ar e there. I t migh t b e argued th e priest s wer e not absolutel y necessary, but withou t them the movemen t would have been short o f educate d me n i n th e constituenc y partie s durin g th e firs t years . Agrarian distres s merel y accelerate d th e 'But t Mus t Go ' campaign , i t di d not creat e it . A wide r franchis e simpl y gaine d a fe w seat s an d increase d majorities. Bu t as for the part y it was made, like Butt's, o n the 185 0 statute. The count y constituencies wer e its backbone . Historical myth s ar e s o eas y t o launc h int o a thin g s o permeate d wit h emotion as the Irish question. Destroyin g them is never an easy proposition. This particular myth about the Ballot Act does the Irish nationalists less than justice, though , o f course , i t make s the Britis h appea r 'bloody , bas e an d brutal'. Shoul d no t the picture be corrected, no t only for the sak e of truth, but fo r th e sak e of Irish self-esteem ? 124 Th e tw o main school s of thought o n this are well represented b y John Morley , op . cit . in, 254 , an d Th e Liberal Unionist, no . 19 , where J. Gordo n McCullag h ha d a n article calle d 'Parnellism an d Illiteracy' . Bernar d Hollan d claims : 'I t was , probably , on e effec t o f th e substitution o f voting by ballot that in Ireland th e secret power of the priest and of the masked secular intimidato r prevaile d ove r th e terror s o f th e landlord . I n an y cas e thes e election s made i t eviden t that futur e Iris h governments might have t o dea l wit h somethin g differen t either fro m occasional Fenia n risings o r from chroni c subterranea n anarchy ' (op . cit . p . 93) . On the other hand, the Committee on the secret ballot wa s convinced b y the Catholic Bishop of Limerick that ' if secret elections were introduced no priest could bring pressure to bear on a penitent t o make him say in the confessiona l how he voted: and not only that: if a peniten t told a priest i n confession how he had voted , nothing an d nobod y could mak e the pries t tel l it t o anyone else' (Stanley Hyland , Curiosities from Parliament, p. 185) . 126 Fo r an interesting corroboratio n o f the main argument o f this article, se e the ne w novel Thy Tears Might Cease, by M. Farrell , a t pp. 87-8 . Whethe r righ t o r wrong i t bear s ou t yet again th e trut h o f W. S . Trench's assertio n i n Th e Realities of Irish Life (a t p . 343 ) tha t a country electio n i n Irelan d wa s the 'mos t odious of all odious calamities'. 126 Hom e Rul e by-election losse s during th e 1874-8 0 parliament, lik e the one in Cork City in 1876 , also went t o show how unimportant th e Ballo t Act was. When ther e was zest Hom e Rule won . Whe n ther e wa s not, i t migh t o r migh t not iwin . Thes e criteri a applie d befor e and afte r th e Ac t came into operation .

4

THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF IRIS H FARMER S SAMUEL CLARK

This pape r seek s t o explain why an agrarian rebellio n brok e ou t i n Ireland in the late nineteent h century. Although the level of discontent in rural Ireland was certainly high when the rebellion brok e out, such a situation was not unprecedented. Disconten t ha d been just as intense at earlier points in time (most notably during the first half of the nineteent h century) without similar political conse quences. I n order t o understan d why it was i n the lat e nineteent h century that Iris h rura l tenant s rebelled, we have to recognize that in the decades preceding the rebellion there had developed a new set of social conditions that facilitated rural political mobilization. Without exhausting the subject, the author suggests that these conditions consisted o f leadership provided by the nationalist movement and an organizational base, provided by a number of structures, among which special emphasis is given to the cooperative relationshi p that emerged in the postfamine period betwee n rural tenants and a segment of the town population. The study gives support to the mobilization rather than to the discontent thesis for the study of social protest . In th e lat e nineteent h century , Iris h tenan t farmers rebelle d agains t thei r landlords. They took par t i n mas s demonstrations , refuse d t o pay thei r normal rents , resiste d evictions , and in other ways challenged the existing system of land tenure . It wa s no t th e firs t tim e the y had fought wit h thei r landlords, but i t was th e first time that the contest too k on the proportions of a large-scal e rebellion . Previously , agraria n protest i n Irelan d ha d bee n eithe r limite d t o a

small segmen t o f th e rura l populatio n or , i f inclusive o f man y tenants , a t a low , almos t passive, leve l o f participation . I n th e lat e nineteenth century, however, a large and broad sector o f th e farmin g population actively par ticipated i n a revol t agains t th e lan d system . The revol t is popularly known among the Irish as the 'Land War.' The agitatio n bega n i n the sprin g of 187 9 in the western province of Connaught, the poorest

* A shorter version of this paper was presented a t a session of the Eighty-First Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Montreal , 27 August 1973

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and mos t economicall y backwar d o f th e fou r Irish provinces . It quickl y sprea d t o othe r re gions, and b y 188 0 the onl y par t of Irelan d int o which i t ha d no t successfull y penetrate d wa s the provinc e of Ulster. Initially, the aims of the movement wer e t o reduce rent s an d to prevent evictions, bu t graduall y tenant s cam e t o de mand tha t the government abolish the landlord system entirel y an d undertak e to financ e th e transfer of land holdings to their occupiers. Th e agitation rage d of f an d o n fo r tw o decades , reaching its peaks in 1879-82, in the lat e i88os , and finally in 1898-1902 . Although the first of a series o f legislativ e measure s tha t effectivel y assured the transfer of land to occupiers was not passed unti f 1903 , th e earlies t o f thes e thre e periods wa s nevertheles s th e mos t tumultuou s and th e mos t eventfu l phase o f the Lan d War . For mos t o f the perio d betwee n 187 9 and 188 2 Irish tenants were organized in a large political association know n as th e Lan d League , unde r whose guidanc e a greate r numbe r of rura l in habitants actively engaged i n political agitation than at any other tim e in Irish history. THEORETICAL APPROACHE S T O REBELLION

In thi s paper I shall try t o explain why the Iris h Land Wa r broke out whe n i t did. I n doing so , I shall mak e a n effort t o utiliz e theories o f socia l protest develope d b y socia l scientists . Fo r th e kind o f proble m wit h whic h I a m concerned , two distinctl y differen t theoretica l approache s are available . Th e first , whic h I shal l cal l th e discontent thesis, says tha t socia l protes t oc curs whe n ther e i s a n increas e i n popula r dis satisfaction wit h some aspec t of existing social arrangements. Researcher s wh o lea n toward s this vie w hav e concentrate d thei r energie s o n explaining wh y an d whe n thi s kind o f dissatisfaction experiences such an increase. The second approach , th e mobilization thesis, say s that socia l protes t occur s whe n ne w politica l resources ar e bein g mobilized . Researcher s who prefe r thi s approac h hav e concentrate d their efforts o n identifying factors that facilitat e political mobilization . Of the two, the discontent thesi s has been th e more popular . Probabl y mos t student s o f political unrest conside r disconten t t o be the primal cause o f rebelliou s behaviour . The y typicall y begin with the 'common-sense assumption' that 'political turmoi l i s th e consequenc e o f socia l discontent' (Feierabend , e t al., 1969:634) . And

it i s possibl e t o fin d book s o n 'wh y me n rebel ' that contribut e primaril y t o ou r understandin g of what make s them angry (Gurr, 1970 ; Da vies. 1970). Indeed , the study of discontent has been going o n s o long , an d ha s bee n pursue d wit h such energy , tha t w e ca n clai m considerabl e sophistication i n ou r understandin g o f it . Th e principal refinemen t tha t has bee n mad e i s th e realization that discontent is as much a function of people' s expectation s a s o f thei r objectiv e situation. Thus , i t i s ver y rar e toda y t o fin d social scientist s explainin g rebellions simpl y in terms of absolute level o f deprivation. But i t is quite commo n t o fin d the m attributin g rebel lions to a gap between the expectation s people hold and their actual achievements. The intellectua l origins o f this approach ca n be trace d t o scholarl y giant s suc h a s d e Toc queville an d Durkheim . Both me n sough t t o explain socia l unres t a s a functio n o f risin g expectations (de Tocqueville, 1888: especially, 152; Durkheim , 1951:246-7) . I n recen t years , the most celebrated formulation of the theory of rising expectation s i s Jame s Davies ' j-curve . Da vies (1962 and 1969 ) ha s argue d that revolutions are mos t likely to occur when a prolonged period o f objectiv e economi c an d socia l de velopment i s followed b y a period o f sharp re versal. Thi s reversal, eve n i f it does no t brin g people t o thei r forme r lo w levels , ca n creat e tremendous dissatisfactio n becaus e expecta tions acquire d durin g th e prosperit y ar e dis appointed. Othe r recen t writer s hav e argue d that a ga p betwee n expectation s an d achieve ments can be produced unde r a variety o f con ditions, rangin g fro m risin g prosperit y t o de clining prosperit y (Geschwender , 1968 ; Gurr , 1970:46-56). The secon d theoretical approac h differ s from the above by treating rebellion as a function of the mobilizatio n o f politica l resources . Socia l unrest occurs , i t is argued, whe n the powe r o f established politica l group s i s challenge d b y new politica l collectivities. Carrie d t o th e ex treme, th e mobilizatio n thesi s state s tha t dis content i s always presen t in sufficient intensity to caus e rebellion , bu t onl y doe s s o whe n th e discontented ar e mobilized . No t surprisingly , few of those who stress mobilization have made the argument in this extreme form. They almos t always allow tha t a n increase i n discontent ca n significantly rais e th e probabilit y o f socia l unrest. Bu t the y frequentl y assert , t o quot e Charles Tilly , tha t 'me n gro w angr y fa r mor e often tha n the y rebel ' (1970:144 ; se e als o

The Political Mobilization of Irish Farmers Snyder an d Tilly , 1972) . Thus , i f we wan t t o understand wh y the y rebel , an d whe n the y may b e expected t o do so. we should consider other factor s beside s discontent , and , mor e specifically, w e shoul d direc t ou r attentio n t o those factors tha t ten d t o facilitate their mobilization. It i s rathe r difficul t t o indicat e precisely th e intellectual origins of the mobilizatio n thesis. It can perhap s bes t b e trace d t o Mar x and mor e recently t o Ral f Dahrendor f (1959) . Bu t ther e has bee n considerabl e disagreement , amon g students o f mobilization, over what social con ditions underli e this process. Indeed , ther e ar e those wh o explai n mobilizatio n in a wa y tha t comes prett y clos e t o a disconten t argument . For example , som e writer s relat e mobilization to ne w politica l expectations, whos e ris e the y trace t o suc h thing s as th e evolutio n of mor e egalitarian concept s o f citizenshi p (Ortega , 1961; Mannheim , 1940:44-9 : Bendix , 1964) . Other writer s argu e tha t politica l mobilizatio n occurs whe n individual s see k t o overcom e th e rootlessness an d alienatio n o f mas s societ y (Kornhauser, 1959) . And stil l others lin k politi cal mobilization to any se t of changes tha t ten d to brea k dow n ol d pattern s o f behaviou r an d make peopl e availabl e fo r ne w pattern s (Deutsch, 1961) . Ye t ther e i s a t leas t on e lin e of reasonin g i n th e mobilizatio n thesi s tha t contrasts sharpl y wit h th e disconten t thesis . The tw o approache s diffe r mos t whe n stu dents o f mobilizatio n stres s th e importanc e fo r rebellions o f a source o f leadership (Ober schall. 1973:119 ) an d a n organizational hase (Pinard, 1968 : Tilly , 1969:35-41 ; Oberschall , 1973:102-45)We ca n briefl y revie w som e o f th e reason s that hav e been given for emphasizing thes e variables. On e o f th e foremos t justification s fo r stressing th e importanc e o f a source of leadership is that discontente d group s generally hav e a scarcity of persons with the skills, experience, and economi c securit y necessar y t o lea d a revolt against establishe d institutions . As a result, the leadershi p fo r rebellion s ofte n come s fro m strata outside , o r at least margina l to, the strat a from whic h th e mai n suppor t i s drawn . I t i s usually crucia l t o th e probabilit y o f rebellio n that ther e b e availabl e som e externa l grou p o f persons wh o no t onl y possess leadership skill s but ar e also willing to tak e u p the cause of the discontented group and are able to establish th e social connection s wit h thi s grou p tha t ar e re quired t o provide it with leadership.

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The importanc e o f a n organizationa l base i s derived, at leas t i n part, fro m th e necessit y fo r channels o f communicatio n amon g potentia l supporters o f a rebellion , an d betwee n thes e supporters an d th e leadership . A n organiza tional bas e is also important i n so fa r as i t pro vides a networ k o f cooperativ e relationship s that can effectively serv e t o motivate people t o support a rebellion. An organizational base may consist o f communal bonds founde d o n tie s of kinship, community, tribe, or region , o r i t may consist o f associationa l bond s founde d o n oc cupational, religious , political , economic , o r other special-interest groups . The mobilization thesis (at least th e versio n I am describing) con tends that the probabilit y of rebellion i s greater if organizationa l bond s o f thi s kin d exist , i t these bond s ar e strong , an d i f the y ar e sufficiently independen t o f establishe d i n s t i t u tions tha t the y can b e adapted t o serv e the p u rposes of rebellion. It shoul d be mad e clear that th e mobilizatio n thesis does not in any wa y deny that discontent is a necessar y conditio n fo r socia l protest. N o one dispute s th e fac t that , i n order t o explai n rebellions, w e hav e t o exp lain why peopl e get ' angry. Sinc e thi s i s wha t th e disconten t the orists hav e bee n tryin g to do , i t would see m t o be a relativel y simpl e matte r fo r student s o f rebellion t o combin e th e tw o approache s int o one comprehensiv e theory . Doubtless , i f w e were merel y intereste d i n enumeratin g the so cial condition s that underlie protest, th e diffei ences betwee n th e disconten t thesi s an d th e mobilization thesi s woul d caus e n o problem . We woul d simpl y lis t bot h disconten t an d mobilization as necessar y conditions . But most students o f rebellio n ar e les s intereste d i n a comprehensive lis t o f condition s fo r protes t than they are in explaining why rebellions occu r in certain place s and at certain times . Why does social orde r occasionally brea k down ? Wh y do people challeng e governments , rulin g classes , and eve n socia l system s tha t the y did not challenge before ? Face d wit h these questions , it is more difficul t t o integrat e the discontent thesis and th e mobilizatio n thesis. Inevitably, discontent theorist s will acknowledge the importanc e of mobilizatio n bu t wil l explai n th e timin g o f rebellions i n term s o f increase d discontent , while mobilizatio n theorist s wil l acknowledg e the importanc e o f disconten t bu t wil l explai n the timing of rebellions i n terms of mobilization. It i s unlikely, therefore, tha t a genuin e integration o f these approaches i s imminent . 1 cer-

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tainly shal l no t see k t o integrat e the m i n thi s paper. M y objective i s a mor e limite d one: t o assess th e relativ e usefulnes s o f th e tw o theories for explaining the timing of one particular rebellion. In doing so, I shall make a special effort t o put the discontent thesis to a test more severe than it is normally required to withstand. Too often discontent theorist s are satisfied with demonstrating th e presenc e o f a hig h leve l o f discontent a t th e poin t in time that a rebellio n breaks out . The y suppos e tha t i f they explai n this high level of discontent they have ipso facto explained th e rebellion . Fo r example , Davie s (1962 an d 1969 ) believe s tha t h e ha s provide d empirical support for his theory by showing that various revolt s h e ha s studie d wer e im mediately preceded b y conditions that conform to hi s j-curve. Ye t h e present s almos t n o evi dence to refute th e hypothesis that similar conditions ma y hav e existe d i n earlie r period s without revolutionar y consequences . Simi larly, the Feierabend s (1969 ) believ e that the y have explained politica l unrest during the transitional stage towards modernization simpl y by explaining why such a transition might generate discontent. Lik e Davies , they conside r i t un necessary t o demonstrat e tha t disconten t wa s actually absent whe n and where political unres t did not occur. They assum e that whenever discontent i s intens e it wil l inevitabl y make itself noticed b y generating instabilit y in the politica l system. However , if one use s a muc h broade r historical focu s t o stud y rebellions , on e ofte n finds evidence suggestin g tha t assumption s o f this kind are unwarranted. In the course o f this paper, I shall try to evaluate the two theoretica l approaches outlined above, not just by examining socia l condition s in the year s immediately prior to the Land War, but also by examining, in a necessarily genera l way , social conditions in Ireland during the entire nineteenth century. ORIGINS O F TH E IRIS H LAN D WA R

Let m e begin, then, with some preliminar y observations o n th e structur e o f Iris h societ y i n the early nineteent h century . In order to understand why an agrarian rebellio n coul d occu r at all i n Ireland , w e mus t be awar e o f the socia l cleavages tha t plague d th e countr y i n thi s period. Ther e are three tha t ar e critical fo r our purposes. First , there existed a belligerent rela tionship betwee n landlord s an d tenants . Iris h landlords wer e notoriousl y ba d landlords . A high rate of absenteeism wa s probably th e most

common charg e levelle d against them , bu t this shortcoming wa s merel y on e aspec t o f thei r general failure to perform services i n return for the rents they collected. They did not, as a rule, make improvement s t o their land , no r did they provide buildings, fences, an d so on. This wa s normally lef t u p to th e tenan t wh o wa s rarel y compensated fo r th e improvement s h e ha d made i f and whe n hi s tenancy terminated . T o make matters worse, th e frequency with which tenancies terminated increase d dramatically i n the firs t hal f of the nineteent h century . Land lords began to take step s t o reduce the number of small tenants o n their land because the y believed thes e tenants were economically ineffi cient an d because man y small tenants wer e s o poor the y were often no t able to pay their rent . Although i t i s impossible t o specif y th e exac t date a t which relationships between Iris h landlords and tenants degenerated int o conflict, it is clear that with the close of the Napoleonic Wars in 181 5 thei r relationship s too k a tur n fo r th e worse, an d tha t b y th e thir d decad e o f th e nineteenth centur y a fierc e struggl e ha d de veloped betwee n th e tw o groups . Landlord s fought t o collect rent s and to evict tenants who were no t paying , whil e tenant s resiste d pay ments and, above all, resisted evictions. The secon d socia l cleavag e wa s a religious one. Fo r several centurie s Irelan d had been religiously stratified , wit h persons of the Protes tant fait h enjoyin g higher statu s tha n thos e o f the Catholic faith. Thi s differenc e in status had been a source of conflict i n the eighteenth cen tury, but it became fa r more contentiou s i n the early nineteent h centur y whe n tw o Catholi c elites ros e t o challeng e th e supremac y o f th e Protestant establishment . These tw o Catholi c elites were the Catholic clergy and the Catholic urban middl e class. The significanc e o f this religious cleavage, fro m ou r point of view, is that eventually i t create d a situatio n i n whic h a source of leadershi p becam e availabl e for an agrarian movement . The thir d social cleavag e wa s between tow n and country. Historically this cleavage could be traced to the fact that Irish towns were largel y the creatio n o f foreigners, firs t th e Dane s an d then the English. But in the eighteenth century a significant growt h i n trade and domestic industry led to the development of many strong relationships betwee n townspeopl e an d countr y people. It was actually the tremendous expan sion in population an d th e industria l decline of the early nineteenth century that brought abou t

The Political Mobilization of Irish Farmers a separatio n o f the two , especiall y i n wester n districts an d especiall y fo r the lowe r orders of the population . I n th e Irelan d o f th e earl y nineteenth century , a vas t numbe r of rura l inhabitants were s o poor that they lived barely at a subsistenc e leve l an d enjoye d few , i f any , stable economi c relationship s wit h people living in towns an d cities. The significanc e of this particular cleavag e was not that i t contribute d to an agrarian rebellio n i n Ireland bu t that for a period o f time it helped preven t one . It was the first of these cleavages, of course, that wa s responsibl e for rura l discontent . Th e underlying hostility existin g betwee n landlord s and tenants insure d tha t agriculture adversitie s would invariabl y b e accompanie d b y a n in crease in dissatisfaction wit h the lan d system . Both crop failures and a decline i n agricultural prices subjecte d a tenant to greater deprivation; they also threatened hi s ability to pay his rent, thus encouraging landlord s to evict. Later in the century, i t was precisel y thi s kin d of situation that precipitated th e Land War . The Lan d War began during an agricultural depression brought on by crop failures and aggravated by a collapse of butter prices and lo w cattle prices. This de pression followe d a prosperous perio d for Irish agriculture - in fact, the most prosperous period since the Napoleonic Wars. Thus, in one sens e at least , the timin g of the Lan d Wa r conforms remarkably well to Da vies' j-curve of rising and falling satisfactions . Indeed , w e hav e goo d reason t o believ e tha t expectation s no t onl y rose before the Land War but actually rose to an unrealistic level . Durin g the prosperity , many small farmers got themselves heavily into debt, confident tha t th e future woul d bring even better economic returns . When the exact opposit e course of events ensued, not a few farmers were left i n serious financial straits. I n 1880 , a n au thority on Iris h agriculture, testifyin g before a Royal Commission, described how the prosperity ha d raise d th e expectations of farmers an d had enticed the m into debt: "People have bee n from a variet y o f remot e cause s deficien t i n thrift. The n cam e th e grea t boun d o f moder n prosperity. Th e growt h o f wealt h le d t o th e establishment o f a great many banks; the banks gave money on easy terms to shopkeepers, and then the shopkeepers, as it were, forced a sys tem of credit upon the small farmers; and all of a sudden tha t ha s collapsed. Tha t collapse took place last year" (House of Commons, 18813:89). Thus, i f the questio n w e ar e askin g is what social condition s precipitate d th e Lan d War ,

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the -mos t reasonabl e answe r i s tha t i t wa s primarily the agricultural depression of the late 18705. This depressio n raise d th e leve l of discontent b y disappointin g expectations create d during the previous period. By studying discontent, we are able to explain why the Lan d War began i n 1879. Focusing on discontent also enables u s to explai n broa d regiona l variation s in the strengt h o f the agitation. Th e agitatio n no t only originate d bu t als o generall y remaine d strongest i n Connaught, th e poores t regio n o f the countr y an d the hardes t hi t by the depres sion. However, a far more important question cannot be answered b y focusing on levels of discontent. Studyin g discontent doe s not tel l us why Irish tenants rebelle d agains t thei r landlords in the late nineteenth century whereas no comparable rebellio n ha d eve r occurre d before . In creased disconten t ma y explain why the Lan d War broke out in the particular year that it did, but i t does no t explai n why i t broke ou t i n th e particular period tha t i t did. After all, hostility between landlord s and their tenants was hardly a ne w development . There wa s just a s muc h discontent in many earlier periods. It wa s especially before and durin g the great famine tha t rura l discontent was intense . Th e country wa s the n plague d by overpopulation, by frequen t cro p failures , an d b y on e lon g deflationary perio d lastin g fro m 181 3 t o 1836 . These condition s regularly aggravate d distress among tenants; they did so in a number of ways, but mos t of all by makin g rents difficul t t o pa y and by increasing the number of evictions. Disappointments cause d b y unfulfille d risin g ex pectations, howeve r infuriating , coul d neve r provoke an Irish tenant as much as the possibility o f losing his holdin g could. Prefamin e tenants ma y hav e ha d modes t wants , bu t the y were, i f nothing else, determined t o hol d ont o their land . The y coul d becom e uncontrollabl y discontented whe n thi s righ t wa s threatened . Although good statistical evidenc e i s not available, i t is clear from all we know that afte r th e close of the Napoleonic War s an d i n the earl y 18208, the 18308 , and above all during the great famine, tenant s wer e ejecte d i n number s tha t make th e eviction s o f 1879-8 2 look lik e minor relocations b y comparison . G . Locke r Lamp son (1907:208) reports a claim tha t ther e were 150,000 evictions in a five-year period fro m 183 9 to 1843. However, he fails to give his source and truly reliabl e statistics ar e availabl e only fro m the yea r 1849 . Ye t i t is worth notin g that there

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were 16,68 6 evictions (23 per 10,00 0 persons) in 1849, whil e there wer e onl y 123 8 eviction s ( 2 per 10,000persons) in 1879, and only 2iio(4per 10,000 persons) i n 1880 , th e firs t tw o year s o f the Lan d War (House of Commons, i88ib) . An additiona l sourc e o f disconten t amon g prefamine tenant s wer e tithes , tha t is , taxe s paid t o th e establishe d Protestan t church . These taxes fel l o n Catholi c a s wel l as Protes tant tenant s and wer e pai d either i n kind, by a fixed annual paymen t based o n acreage , o r b y 'view' of the crops, i n which case th e tithe varied accordin g t o th e output . A commo n ar rangement was the payment of io/-an Irish acre for whea t an d potatoe s an d 7/-t o 8/ - for oat s (Macintyre, 1965:170) . In the earl y i82o s som e effort wa s mad e t o refor m an d regulariz e th e collection o f tithe s an d furthe r legislativ e changes wer e mad e i n the i83os ; bu t th e bur den o f payment,remained . Prefamine tenant s regarde d th e collectio n of tithes a s another evil of the lan d system, alon g with rents and evictions. They fought against all three i n mob s an d i n gangs tha t terrorize d th e rural society . This violence neve r assumed th e rebellious proportions of the Lan d War sinc e it was sporadic , disorganized , and locall y based . There was little coordination betwee n one gang and anothe r an d only a limited number of per sons actuall y participated (Lewis, 1836:190-3 , 213). Nevertheless, th e violenc e did reflec t th e prevailing dissatisfaction wit h the lan d system . It enjoye d widesprea d sympath y amon g th e lower order s o f th e rura l populatio n (Lewis , 1836:193-201, 250-3) . Th e fac t tha t i t wa s a n almost permanen t featur e o f th e societ y in duced th e governmen t to pas s o r reenact , be tween 180 0 and th e grea t famine , n o les s tha n thirty-five coercion acts directed a t Ireland and , in mos t cases , directed specificall y a t rural unrest i n Irelan d (Lampson , 1907:637-638) . Whatever w e ca n sa y about tenant s who too k part i n the Lan d War, w e cannot sa y that the y were angrier than their ancestors had ever been. This i s especially true fo r those i n Connaught. For generations , peasant s i n Connaugh t ha d suffered greate r hardship s tha n thos e i n other regions. Bu t until the Lan d Wa r they ha d bee n the mos t politicall y passive . Why , then , di d they rebel in the late nineteenth century ? I would suggest that this question can only be answered b y understanding how Irish peasant s acquired a greate r capacit y t o mobiliz e thei r

political resources. Withou t going into great detail, I shall now outlin e th e majo r factors tha t I believe mus t b e considere d i n orde r t o ap preciate how this change came to pass . First, w e wan t t o kno w wh y ther e wa s n o large-scale agraria n rebellio n i n the prefamin e period. I n searchin g fo r a reason , w e ar e im mediately struc k b y th e natur e o f hostilitie s within th e tenan t populatio n a t thi s time . Th e agrarian violence referre d t o above was actually inflicted b y tenants on one anothe r rathe r than on the land-owning class (Lewis , 1836:119-20 , 223). A numbe r o f factors contribute d t o thi s internal strife among tenants but by far the most significant wa s th e extensiv e system o f subletting land. Mos t tenant s di d not rent thei r holdings directly fro m a landowne r bu t mor e ofte n from a landlor d wh o wa s als o a tenan t (Freeman, 1957:21-23) . Th e prefamin e tenant population consiste d of a variety o f social clas ses, on e o f the larges t bein g a 'cottier ' class . Members o f this clas s hel d smal l plots o f land and pai d their ren t i n labour, usuall y to a larg e farmer. The result o f this subletting syste m was that th e hostilit y felt b y aggrieve d tenant s to wards their landlords wa s actuall y hostility towards othe r tenants . I t also mean t tha t thos e who suble t lan d wer e a s muc h afrai d o f th e threat fro m belo w a s o f th e oppressio n fro m above. I n prefamin e Ireland , ther e wer e many tenants who coul d identif y their interest s wit h neither the tenan t clas s no r th e landlor d clas s because the y were , i n fact, member s o f both . Under these circumstances, i t is not surprisin g that agraria n disconten t wa s spen t i n warfar e among tenants themselves. Also helpful for understanding the absence o f an agrarian rebellion i n the prefamine perio d is the recognitio n tha t prefamin e tenants ha d n o adequate sourc e o f political leadership. Larg e farmers wer e no t sufficientl y numerou s tha t they coul d provid e politica l leadership fo r th e tenant population . Mor e decisiv e stil l wa s th e fact tha t larg e farmer s di d no t hav e th e sam e economic interests as the majority o f rural ten ants; they were foremost among those caught in the position of being both landlords and tenants. Outside th e tenan t population , ther e existe d some ver y obviou s source s o f leadership , namely, th e Catholi c clerg y an d th e Catholi c urban middle class. Elements within both wer e politically organize d an d wer e challengin g th e supremacy o f th e Protestan t establishment . Many Catholi c clergyme n wer e becomin g in creasingly involve d in politics o n an individual

The Political Mobilization of Irish Farmers basis; the y wer e als o involve d throug h th e Church hierarchy , whic h wa s beginnin g t o campaign activel y to eliminate the las t vestige s of political discrimination against Catholic s and to undermin e th e establishe d positio n o f th e Protestant Churc h of Ireland. By th e Catholi c urba n middl e clas s 1 mean primarily those Catholics engaged in mercantile and professiona l occupation s i n citie s an d i n large towns . Becaus e thi s class wa s closely associated wit h Catholic landowners, it would be useful t o includ e the latte r i n th e sam e socia l group. Catholi c landowners , however , wer e small i n number a s a result of Protestant domination o f landownership . Thus , th e secula r Catholic elit e wa s largel y urban . I t wa s fro m this stratu m tha t suppor t wa s draw n fo r a number o f Catholi c politica l organization s in the prefamin e period, al l of whic h were le d by Daniel O'Connell: (i) the Catholic Associatio n of the 18208 , whic h sough t th e 'emancipation ' of Catholics , tha t is , thei r righ t t o hol d hig h judicial and politica l posts including the right t o sit in Parliament; (2) the Iris h Party , which represented Iris h Catholi c interest s i n parliament in th e 1830 8 and 18408 ; and (3 ) the Repea l As sociation of the 18408 , a nationalist organizatio n which sough t a greater amoun t o f politica l autonomy for Ireland. However, neithe r th e Catholi c clerg y no r these middle-clas s Catholi c organization s pro vided leadershi p fo r a tenan t movement . The y did, i t is true, muste r peasan t suppor t fo r their own politica l ventures, an d th e fac t tha t the y were abl e t o do s o is a furthe r indicatio n of the intensity o f socia l disconten t i n th e prefamine rural population , but the peasant s wer e merely used b y th e Catholi c elite s fo r thei r ow n pur poses. They obtained n o benefits and were pas sive rathe r tha n active participants. They wer e rounded u p b y th e clerg y an d brough t to mas s meetings. The y wer e spellboun d b y O'Con nell's charisma . The y wer e induce d t o believ e that great benefits would result. Yet in a manner that i s perhap s analogou s t o follower s o f mil lenarian movements , the y wer e le d t o expec t

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that these benefits would be miraculousl y delivered t o them rathe r than won through their own hard efforts. I n no sense were they organized t o help themselves. 1 This is , o f course , no t surprising . Th e Catholic elite s wer e a s afrai d a s anyon e of th e revolutionary consequence s tha t grass-root s organization woul d ultimatel y hav e had . I n addition, a large segment withi n the Catholic elite had no satisfactory way of making contact with the rura l population . This wa s no t tru e o f th e Catholic clergy , bu t i t wa s tru e o f mos t members o f th e Catholi c urba n middl e class . I t i s here that the socia l cleavag e betwee n tow n and country become s relevant. Since most rura l inhabitants wer e to o poo r t o engag e directl y in commercial transactions, social bonds between town and country were weak , and onl y a minority i n th e rura l populatio n were availabl e for direct politica l organizatio n b y urba n groups . Consequently, inasmuc h as th e politicall y organized segment s o f th e Catholi c middle clas s were largel y urban , they wer e a t a seriou s disadvantage whe n the y sough t t o mobiliz e rura l inhabitants at th e grass-roots level . Thus, even if the y ha d bee n willin g to organiz e tenant s t o help themselves, the y coul d onl y hav e don e s o in those area s tha t enjoyed relativel y close con tact wit h urba n society. I t i s significan t tha t o n the on e occasio n (befor e th e Lan d War ) when some Catholi c politicians did take an interest in leading a tenan t movement , thei r succes s wa s limited mainl y to areas of the country that were situated clos e t o Dubli n an d wher e a compara tively larg e shar e o f th e rura l populatio n wa s engaged i n commercia l transactions . Th e movement t o whic h I a m referrin g mad e it s appearance i n th e closin g year s o f th e grea t famine. I t wa s supporte d b y a n associatio n called th e Tenan t League , founde d largel y by nationalists wh o ha d formerl y belonged t o th e Repeal Association. Th e cor e of the leadership came fro m a radica l factio n tha t ha d broke n from th e Repea l movemen t an d were known a s the Youn g Irelanders. But the movemen t was a complete failure , realizin g none of its goals an d

i Th e only possible exception to this statement was the Tithe War of the early 1830$ . The impetu s for this movement came from Catholi c clergymen and large farmers. I t sought the abolition of tithes paid to the established Protestant church. Eve n in this case, however, only peasants in a small number of eastern counties were active, and they opposed tithes using their traditional violent methods with little direct leadership from th e elites. There was no local organizational structure to which large numbers of tenants could belong. The outcome of the tithe agitation was not the abolition of tithes but their conversion into rent-charges. This meant that landowners were obliged to collect the tithe as part of their rent but were permitted to retain 25 per cent as compensation for their trouble. Hardly a victory for tenants. For historical accounts of this movement, and the others mentioned above, see Reynolds (1954), Macintyre (1965), Nowlan (1965), and Maher(i95i).

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only briefl y mobilizin g a smal l number of tenants i n the easter n counties . I t wa s noticeabl y least successfu l in remot e areas , especiall y i n Connaught. 2 What happene d i n th e interva l between th e great famin e an d th e Lan d Wa r wa s tha t thi s cleavage betwee n rura l and urba n Irelan d wa s bridged. I t was bridged partl y b y a tremendou s advancement i n the literac y rate, partl y by th e construction o f a national railwa y system , bu t most o f all by a n increas e i n the proportio n o f rural inhabitant s engaged i n commercial trans actions. This extension pf commercial transac tions too k th e for m o f a shif t fro m tillag e t o pasture and an increase i n livestock. As price s in Englan d soared fo r livestock, the cattl e an d sheep population in Ireland rose from approximately fou r millio n i n 184 1 t o approximatel y eight millio n i n the lat e 18705 , despit e a shar p decline i n the numbe r of rural tenants ove r th e same perio d (Hous e o f Commons , 184 3 an d 1877). The sale of this livestock brought a larger segment o f th e rura l populatio n int o a cas h economy; more concretely, it brought them into towns. They came to town to sell their livestock at fair s an d t o patroniz e shop s an d publi c houses. This was even tru e of small farmers i n the west of Ireland, who specialized in breeding and selling young cattle. As 1 shal l sugges t later , thes e socia l an d economic change s ha d a numbe r o f conse quences that eventually contributed t o the political mobilization of Irish farmers. In this paper, I shal l focus primaril y on th e on e tha t m y re search t o date has led me to regard a s the mos t critical: the rise in social importanc e of a small business class consisting mainly of shopkeepers and publicans . Som e indicatio n o f thei r ne w importance in the postfamine period i s afforded by examinin g their numbers . Whil e th e tota l population of Ireland was declining rapidly, the number of shopkeepers and publicans remained fairly constant . Unfortunately , it is impossible to say exactly ho w many there were, since the 1881 censu s doe s no t provid e a separat e classification fo r trader s an d busines s pro prietors. I t does, however , provid e a separate category called 'persons working and dealing in food an d lodgings, ' nearl y al l o f who m wer e

shopkeepers an d publicans, though, of course, only a portion of all shopkeepers are covered by this group. I n 1841 , ther e was one person in this category for every 16 6 persons i n the country; in 1881, there was one for every 78 persons in the country . The chang e wa s less strikin g in Connaught, but i n view of the smalle r number and siz e o f towns i n that province , i t was stil l substantial: i n 184 1 on e perso n fel l int o thi s category fo r ever y 24 6 persons i n Connaught , while in 1881 , there was on e fo r every 17 5 persons (Hous e o f Commons , 1843 , i882b , an d 18823). The significanc e of this smal l business clas s (except i n large towns an d i n cities ) la y i n th e cooperative relationshi p that mos t o f its members had with farmers. There was, first of all, a kinship bond . Mos t townsme n ha d relative s who wer e farmers . Indeed , o f a sampl e o f seventy-five traders and business proprietors in one wester n district , n o les s tha n 4 0 per cen t were actually farmers' sons. 3 Second, ther e was a commercial bond; shopkeepers an d publican s came t o depen d almost entirely o n th e farmin g populatio n for customers, whil e farmers cam e t o depen d o n thes e shopkeepers an d publican s t o provid e credit . Although not altogethe r uncommon before th e famine, it was between th e famine and the Lan d War tha t th e muc h debated credi t syste m became fully develope d i n Ireland. Th e essentia l feature o f thi s syste m wa s tha t farmer s re mained perpetually i n debt t o one or two shop keepers wit h who m the y kep t a runnin g account. Such a system undoubtedly generated a certain amoun t of strain and, i n some cases , i t led to serious conflict. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases, its far more important effect wa s that it encouraged a stable relationship between a particular farmer and a particular shopkeepe r and s o contributed to the development of a social tie between th e two. As a rule, the terms of credit were not extortionate, and the amount of credit given, especiall y i n hard times , was lib eral, sometime s 'beyon d al l conception' (Congested District s Board , 1898:381) . Fo r mos t small farmer s th e securitie s the y ha d t o offe r were s o limite d tha t their shopkeeper wa s th e only person willin g to give them the credit they

2 Thi s conclusion i s based on accounts of the Tenant League's activities provided b y its leaders, particularly Duffy (1886) , and also on what is known about wher e most of the League's branches wer e located (Whyte, 1958:6). 3 Th e sample consisted o f all traders and business proprietor s whose marriage s wer e registered in the superintendent registrar district of Roscommon between 186 4 and 188 0 (Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages).

The Political Mobilization of Irish Farmers needed to carr y o n the operation o f their farm s (House o f Commons, 1914:76) . The poin t is not that ther e develope d a perfectl y harmoniou s economic relationshi p betwee n shopkeeper s and farmer s bu t tha t ther e develope d a cooperative relationship base d on thei r mutual interdependenc e. Finally, i t shoul d b e note d tha t shopkeeper s and publican s becam e th e principa l sources of information i n the rura l community ; the y were receivers an d transmitter s o f anything from trivial gossi p to new s o f majo r consequence , no t only because they were in contact with farmers, but also because they enjoyed relativel y greater contact wit h the larger society. 4 Another importan t developmen t i n the post famine perio d was the reorientatio n of politica l groups draw n fro m th e Catholi c urba n middl e class. Althoug h technicall y this class coul d b e defined s o a s t o includ e townsmen , politicall y organized group s i n th e Catholi c populatio n were t o b e foun d onl y i n som e o f th e large r towns an d wer e primaril y concentrate d i n cities, particularly Dublin. Over a period o f time (actually commencin g i n th e earl y 1840 8 with the Repea l Association ) many member s o f th e Catholic urba n middle class became involved in a nationalist movement (or, more precisely , two nationalist movements ) seekin g a large r meas ure of political independence fro m England . I n principle, nationalis t leaders wer e unwillin g t o espouse popula r grievances5 and for a long time this principl e kept the m fro m tryin g to provide tenants wit h leadership. Fo r this they neede d a broader bas e of support tha n the Catholic urban middle class . Wha t i s essentia l t o recogniz e is that the y coul d no t ge t thi s additiona l suppor t from th e lande d uppe r class, largel y a s a resul t of the religiou s cleavage t o which reference ha s already bee n made . Althoug h there wa s som e increase i n the numbe r of Catholi c landowners during th e postfamin e period , th e majorit y o f

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landowners wer e stil l Protestant . An d Protes tants wer e separate d fro m Catholics , no t onl y by religiou s bigotr y an d difference s i n socia l status, bu t als o b y a conflic t o f interests . Be cause the y constitute d a numerica l minority , Protestants believe d tha t thei r socia l positio n depended o n th e preservatio n o f th e Britis h connection. For these reason s a political alliance betwee n members of the Catholic urban middl e class and members o f th e mostl y Protestan t landownin g class prove d impossible . Actually, some effor t was made t o form suc h an alliance. In the earl y 18708, the mor e moderat e factio n i n the nation alist movemen t (th e so-calle d constitutionalis t faction) endeavoure d t o attrac t bot h Catholi c and Protestan t landowner s t o th e nationalis t cause (McCaffrey , 1962) . However , th e effor t failed, an d it s failure , togethe r wit h th e over all weaknes s o f th e nationalis t movemen t owing to it s lack o f rural support, le d som e na tionalist politician s t o argu e tha t the y shoul d adopt a progra m tha t would appeal t o agraria n interests. The initiativ e wa s take n b y a grou p o f Fe nians, th e nam e usuall y give n t o th e extrem e faction i n th e nationalis t movement . I n November o f 1878 , Joh n Devoy , th e mos t influential Fenia n i n America, sen t a no w fam ous telegram to C.S. Parnell , the leader of a new aggressive grou p withi n th e constitutionalis t faction. I n thi s telegra m Devo y propose d a n alliance betwee n th e Fenian s an d thes e mor e aggressive constitutionalists . H e specifie d tha t one o f the term s of thi s allianc e woul d b e tha t the ne w movemen t embark o n vigorou s agitation of the lan d question (Nation, 1 6 November 1878:6). I n th e followin g year , Michae l Davitt, an associat e o f Devoy , persuade d a handfu l of Fenians t o hel p hi m organiz e a serie s o f mas s meetings amon g farmer s i n Connaught . These meetings were hel d i n the sprin g and summe r of

4 Thi s specia l relationshi p between tow n an d countr y survive d long after the perio d w e are discussing . When Arensberg and Kimba l (1968) studied the wes t o f Irelan d i n the 1930 8 they found tha t the bond betwee n farmer s and townsmen was still strong and they argued that the credit system contributed to maintaining this relationship . I ndeed. Arensberg ha s claimed that the credit system, far from being evidence of a conflict between shopkeeper s and farmers , i s actually evidence o f a close socia l tie. Fora shopkeeper t o foreclose, o r for a farmer to clear hi s debt, would b e a declaration o f intent to terminate their friendship. Thus, accordin g to Arensberg. the credit system function s a s a symbol of t h e i r personal bond (Arensberg, 1968:155-9). Whether or not one accept s A rensnerg's argument, it is clear that the credit system did increase the mutual interdependence o f shopkeeper s and farmers . Arensberg and K i m b a l yls o found tha t townsmen provide d crucial centres fo r local social interaction. As Arensberg has w r i t t e n : 'Th e sho p and th e pub wa s an d i s the countryman's metropolitan club ' f Arensberg, 1968:161 i. 5 T h i s v as tru e o f b n i h th e mod e rale an d (h e e x t r e me wmg> > o f the nationalis t movement , although th e extreme wing was ta r riio' e L j x p l i c l ' V; - Vli.n-.i y ( j v ^ X ).

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1879. Parnell , who wa s trying to rejuvenat e th e constitutionalist win g o f th e movement , wa s induced t o spea k a t som e o f th e meetings . Gradually h e to o becam e involve d in th e pro test. Unde r Parnell, the agitation wa s extende d beyond th e border s o f Connaught , an d a na tional association called the Irish National Lan d League wa s formed . Th e executiv e o f thi s association consisted entirel y of nationalists, both Fenian an d constitutionalist . Nationalist politicians als o spok e quit e regularly at rallies, large numbers o f whic h wer e hel d throughou t th e period o f agitation . Finally , nationalist politi cians provide d farmer s wit h a ban d o f par liamentary candidate s wh o ra n almos t exclu sively o n a tenant-righ t platfor m an d en deavoured to present the tenants' case in parliament. 6 A carefu l study o f the Lan d Wa r reveal s that nationalist politician s could no t hav e provide d the leadershi p they did i f a segmen t of the tow n population had not been available and willin g to bridge th e ga p betwee n th e nationalis t move ment, whic h wa s largel y urban , an d th e rura l population. I n a n earlie i pape r (Clark , 1971) , i was abl e t o sho w that , althoug h th e Lan d Wa r was fough t mainl y b y farmers , i t wa s fough t with th e assistanc e o f townsme n Som e meas ure o f the latter' s contribution is provided by an analysis o f arrest s mad e i n 1X81- 2 whe n th e government suspende d habea s corpus . Th e Protection oi ' Person an d Propert y Act o f i«SX i was passe d fo r th e specifi c purpose of suppressing the lan d agitation ; under it- provision s 955 persons wer e arreste d an d detaine d withou t trial. Occupational data ar e availabl e fo r 84 5 of them. Townsme n wer e overrepresente d i n the list o f arrest s relativ e t o thei r numbe r i n th e society. Indeed , th e commercia l and industria l sector wa s th e onl y occupationa l secto r sub stantially overrepresented Thi s wa s especiall y true i n Connaught : 35. 5 pe r cen t o f th e 26 8 suspects arrested i n Connaught belonge d to th e commercial an d industria l secto r whil e onl y 15.4 pe r cen t o f th e mal e labou r force i n Con naught belonge d to thi s sector . B y wa y o f con trast. 60. 1 pe r cen t o f thos e arreste d i n Con naught belonge d t o th e agricultura l sector , while a large r percentage . 75. 5 pe r cent , be longed t o thi s secto r i n th e mal e labou r force . The correspondin g percentages for the country

as a whole were 36. 8 pe r cen t (o f the suspects ) and 31. 7 per cen t (o f the mal e labou r force ) fo r the commercia l an d industria l sector, an d 57. 8 per cen t (o f the suspects ) an d 57. 4 pe r cen t (of the male labour force) for the agricultural sector (Irish Crime s Records , 1881 ; Hous e o f Com mons. i882aan d i882b) . Information o n th e particula r functio n tha t townsmen performed i s more difficult t o obtain , but ther e ar e a t leas t tw o generalization s tha t can b e mad e wit h som e degre e o f confidence . First, it is clear tha t initially townsmen acte d a s contacts fo r nationalis t politicians . B y thi s I mean tha t i t wa s t o townsmen , mor e tha n t o farmers, tha t nationalist politicians went i n th e first fe w month s of th e agitatio n i n an effor t t o reach th e farmin g populatio n an d t o ge t a movement going . T o b e mor e concrete , i f we examine i n detai l th e earl y meeting s i n Con naught promote d b y Davit t an d hi s Fenia n as sociates, w e find that thes e meeting s wer e or gani/. d with the hel p of local groups consisting of bot h farmer s an d townsme n bu t mostl y o f townsmen (Clark, 1971:458-462). I h e secon d generalizatio n tha t ca n b e mad e i - tha t townsme n were willin g t o instigat e act s oi violence , but they did not, as a rule, engage in violence themselves . I n orde r t o explai n this phenomenon, it is necessary t o outline the main techniques o f agitatio n employed b y th e Lan d League. Thei r attac k o n th e lan d syste m con sisted o f an effective combination o f violent and nonviolent activities . Th e mos t noteworth y nonviolent activitie s wer e mas s meeting s an d boycotts. Mas s meeting s were used to mobilize support fo r th e movemen t an d t o articulat e its goals; boycott s wer e use d t o punis h people fo r violating Land Leagu e rule s or for opposing the League. I n addition , bot h mas s meeting s an d boycotts provided a means, indeed the principal means, o f pointin g the finger at enemie s o f th e League. Th e mos t commo n t o b e labelle d as enemies were: ( i ) land agents, bailiffs , an d pro cess servers an d (2) 'landgrabbers,' tha t is. persons wh o too k lan d fro m whic h th e previou s tenant ha d bee n evicted . Bu t almos t anyon e who di d no t suppor t th e Leagu e coul d b e de clared a n enemy , an d i t was b y denouncin g an individual a t mas s meeting s o r b y issuin g a boycott agains t hi m tha t thes e declaration s were made . I n thi s wa y nonviolen t agitatio n

6 Thes e statements can he verified by examining the two major historica l accounts o f the agitation: Davitt (1904: chapters n-i8)an d Palme r (1940: chapters 6-8). Se e also Moody (1949) .

The Political Mobilization of Irish Farmers

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TABLE 1 PERCENTAGE O F SUSPECT S ARRESTE D FOR NONVIOLEN T ACTIVITIE S UNDE R TH E PROTECTIO N O F PERSON AN D PROPERT Y ACT , 1881 , B Y OCCUPATIO N

Occupation Farmers Farmers' son s Other agricultural Traders an d business proprietors Shopworkers an d clerk s Innkeepers an d publican s Artisans an d nonfar m labourers Unspecified labourer s Newspaper editor s an d correspondents Total

Percentage suspected of nonviolent crime

Total number of arrests

66.1 46.5 31.4

324 131 16

80.8 75.0 80.9

94 28 68

41.9 14.4

86 35

92.9 61.0

14 796

NOTE: Nonviolen t crimes consist o f a variet y of activitie s such a s makin g seditious speeches, issuing threatening letter s or notices , an d participatin g in illega l meeting s as wel l a s othe r kind s of nonviolen t intimidation, suc h a s boycotting . I hav e omitte d from thi s table occupations contributin g less tha n 1.5 pe r cen t t o th e tota l arrests . Wheneve r an individual' s activitie s included both violen t an d nonviolen t activities, h e wa s coded accordin g t o whicheve r seemed t o b e th e primary reaso n fo r hi s arrest . This table has been adapted fro m Table 4 in my paper (Clark , 1971) . The source i s Irish Crimes Records, 1881 . provided directio n fo r those wh o sough t t o oppose the lan d system throug h violence . Many , if not most , violen t attacks wer e mad e o n peopl e who ha d bee n cite d a t a mas s meetin g o r wer e being boycotted. Thus , under the Land League , agrarian violenc e wa s n o longe r disorganize d and sporadic , a s i t ha d bee n i n th e prefarnin e period, bu t instea d wa s a coordinate d par t o f a m u c h broade r assaul t o n th e lan d system . What evidenc e w e hav e suggest s t h a t t o w n s m e n wer e p r i m a r i l y activ e i n n o n v i o l e n t a c t i v i t i e s . Tabl e i i s based o n th e lis t o f arrest s made u n d e r the Protectio n o f Perso n an d Prop erty Act . 1881 . Fo r eac h occupationa l group, it gives the percentag e wh o wer e arrested o n sus picion o f h a v i n g committe d nonviolen t crimes. Most tow n occupation s ar e d i s t i n c t l y overrep resented. Fo r e x a m p l e . 80. 8 pe r cen t o f th e traders an d busines s proprietor s wer e arreste d for n o n v i o l e n t a c t i v i t i es whil e a m u c h smalle r percentage, 61. 0 per cent , o f all arrests were fo r activities of t h is k i n d . Shopworker s an d clerks , innkeepers an d publicans , an d newspape r editors and correspondent s ar e similar!' , hig h in the percentag e t h e y contribute d to n o n v i o l e n t

activities. The onl y town occupation s that wer e relatively lo w wer e artisan s an d nonfar m labourers a s wel l a s unspecifie d labourer s (that is labourers fo r whom i t was no t known whethe r they were farm o r nonfarm workers). 7 This findin g i s consisten t wit h th e conclu sions t o w h i c h the a u t h o r came as a result o f an intensive stud y o f th e Lan d Leagu e i n tw o localities i n Connaught , th e Castlebar , an d Roscommon districts . For thes e districts, I wa s able to form a subjective impression of the functions townsme n performed . B y carefull y reading issue s o f the Connan^ht Telegraph an d th e Ro.fcommon Journal I became familiar wit h th e major personalitie s i n th e movemen t i n thes e two areas . I n both , townsme n functione d a s local leaders . The y organize d demonstrations , solicited suppor t fro m nationalist s i n Dublin , identified enemie s o f th e movement , an d eve n went int o the countryside to instruct farmers o n how t o organiz e a Lan d Leagu e branch . Al t h o u g h no t th e firs t branche s t o b e formall y constituted, th e Lan d Leagu e branches in these towns were the mos t importan t in theirdistricts. In Roscommon , th e tow n branc h wa s mad e th e

7 M y earlier paper (Clark, 1971 ) gives a more detailed analysis of the list of arrests under the Protection of Person and Propert y Act. Some of the problem s encountered i n analysing these data are also discussed.

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central branch in an official manne r by including delegates fro m th e countrysid e (Roscommon Journal, 1 8 December i88o:2). 8 Townsmen, o f course , wer e no t involve d in every aspec t o f the movement . W e shoul d not , therefore, overlook certai n postfamine change s that ma y hav e contribute d t o th e capacit y o f rural tenant s t o for m thei r own organizationa l base. Perhap s th e mos t importan t chang e wa s the increas e i n siz e o f holdings . Between 184 1 and 1876 , th e media n size o f agricultura l hold ings in Ireland rose from 12. 8 acres to 18. 5 acres (House o f Commons , 184 3 an d 1877). ' A s a result, a large r proportio n o f th e agricultural labour forc e cam e t o b e mad e u p o f economically independen t farmers . A s mentione d above, mos t rura l tenant s i n th e prefamin e period wer e cottiers . The y wer e extremel y poor, live d o n smal l plot s o f land , an d wer e employed b y farmers . Th e combine d effec t o f the great famin e and postfamine emigration was to greatly reduc e th e size of this class. Tenant s who live d primaril y off their own holding s (and did no t hav e t o rel y o n additiona l outside em ployment) now becam e th e larges t singl e occupational group engaged i n agriculture, comprising almos t hal f o f th e agricultura l population. The censu s commissioner s reserve d th e terms 'farmer' an d 'grazier ' fo r economicall y independent tenant s of this kind, and th e number of persons enumerate d as farmers or graziers ros e from 25. 4 pe r cen t o f th e agricultura l labou r force i n 184 1 to 44.3 per cent in 1881. The statistics for Connaught are 22. 0 per cen t in 184 1 and 51.5 percent in 1881 (House of Commons, 1843, i882b and 18823) . I t i s likely tha t thi s develop ment alone would have had the effect o f producing a more sophisticated and politicall y enlight ened tenant population. In addition , it i s reasonabl e t o assum e tha t

greater literacy , th e constructio n o f railways , and the growth i n the proportio n of tenants en gaged i n commercia l transaction s mus t hav e broadened th e rang e o f contact s enjoye d b y rural inhabitant s i n mor e way s tha n simpl y through the intermediation of townsmen. These developments probabl y increase d th e leve l o f social interactio n amon g tenant s themselve s and i n doing s o ma y hav e strengthene d tenan t solidarity, especiall y sinc e ther e wa s als o a n enormous declin e i n th e practic e o f subletting land. The practice , i t is true, could still be found but, a s a resul t o f th e drasti c decreas e i n th e number of cottiers, i t was much less common i n the postfamine period fo r tenants t o sublet their holdings fro m othe r tenants . I n thi s way , a major source o f class hostility within the tenan t population ha d bee n partially , i f no t entirely , eliminated. If thes e change s i n postfamin e rura l societ y had the politica l consequences I am speculatin g they ma y hav e had , w e shoul d b e abl e t o ob serve som e concret e manifestatio n o f a n in creased organizationa l capacit y amon g tenant s themselves. By far the most noticeable manifes tation wa s th e emergenc e o f a smal l grou p o f politically organize d larg e farmers . I n th e lat e i86os and i n the 18708 , severa l doze n farmers ' clubs wer e establishe d i n som e souther n an d eastern counties . Thei r member s wer e tenants with extremel y larg e holding s of grazin g land . One o f the mos t activ e clubs , an d th e on e fo r which the most information is available, was the Limerick an d Clar e Farmers ' Club , whos e members wer e prou d t o admi t tha t the y wer e 'big graziers ' (Limerick Reporter, 1 8 Jun e 1878:3). Despit e thi s class affiliation , th e members o f thes e club s foun d tha t thei r interest s were consisten t wit h thos e o f mos t farmers . They sough t t o promot e reform s o f th e lan d

8 Th e har d core of active Lan d Leaguer s i n Roscommon consiste d o f a half-dozen townsmen , wh o were well known to authorities and were regarded a s responsible for activities often carried out by others (Roscommon Journal, 5 February 1881:1) . Townsmen i n Roscommon were especiall y activ e in boycotts, sometime s trying boycott victims in Land Leagu e courts held in the offices of the Roscommon Messenger (Roscommon Journal, 19 March 1881:2). For examples of townsmen i n the Roscommon distric t helping farmers organize Lan d Leagu e branches, se e Roscommon Journal ( 4 September 1880:2 ) and Nation ( 2 October 1880:13) . In Castlebar, townsmen assisted Davit t in the early month s of the agitation (Clark, 1971:460 ) and also organized th e first large demonstration in that district (Connaught Telegraph, 2 0 September 1879:5) . Their Land Leagu e branc h wa s clearly the mos t importan t in the district, assisting tenants who were bein g prosecuted o r evicted and issuin g speaking invitations, on behalf of the district, to prominent nationalists. See, fo r example. Connaught Telegraph (20 March 1880:4 ; 25 September 1880:3 ; 30 October 1880:2 , and 6 November 1880:4) . 9 Thes e medians have been computed from grouped data. They actuall y refer to the median size of holdings over two acre s in 184 1 and over one acre in 1886 . The 184 1 data hav e been correcte d accordin g to Bourke(i96s ) in order t o compensate fo r errors mad e b y the census takers and discussed i n detail by Bourke. This correctio n simply entails doubling the media n for the 184 1 data.

The Political Mobilization of Irish Farmers system, specificall y to persuad e parliamen t t o pass legislation that would provide tenants with greater securit y o f tenure. Thei r main method of attack wa s t o becom e involve d i n the con stitutionalist wing of the nationalist movement. During the earl y 1870 5 the y trie d t o persuad e this movement to take up their cause. The effort was onl y partl y successfu l becaus e th e con stitutionalists, as we already know, were at this time als o solicitin g th e suppor t o f th e lande d upper class. The farmers ' club s playe d n o par t what soever i n th e initia l organizatio n o f th e lan d agitation i n Connaught since there were almos t no clubs to be found in that province. Neverthe less, they provided a crucial organizational bas e for th e Lan d War . A s earl y a s Januar y 1879 , four month s befor e Davit t bega n t o organiz e meetings in Connaught, some club s were hold ing lan d demonstrations ; b y Jun e mos t club s were holding frequent meeting s as word sprea d that agitation wa s building in the west (Nation, 18 January 1879:6 ; 2 5 January 1879:3 ; 2 1 June 1879:7). I t ha s alread y bee n mentione d that , under Parnell, the agitation sprea d beyon d th e borders o f Connaught . Thi s fea t wa s greatl y assisted b y th e bas e provide d b y the farmers ' clubs. Indeed, on e of the mai n political advantages Parnel l ha d ove r Davit t wa s a close r affiliation wit h thes e club s a s a resul t o f th e earlier involvemen t o f th e club s i n th e con stitutionalist wing of the nationalist movement. When Parnel l founded the Irish National Lan d League i n October 1879 , h e wa s aide d b y th e farmers' clubs , many members of which can be found amon g th e lis t o f names comprisin g th e founding committe e o f th e Lan d Leagu e (Committee member s a t firs t meetin g o f th e Irish National Land League) . One other organizationa l base tha t deserve s mention is the Catholic Church. The participation o f man y loca l clergyme n i n th e Lan d League i s wel l known. To b e sure , ther e ar e some seriou s objection s tha t coul d b e raise d against placing a great deal of emphasis on their role. First , their participation suffered fro m se vere limitations. Catholic clergymen were constrained b y th e institutio n t o whic h they be longed. Especiall y durin g th e Lan d Leagu e phase o f the Lan d War , man y members of the Church hierarch y wer e no t i n suppor t o f th e agitation. Thus , th e leve l o f clerical participa tion that was permitted varied greatly from re gion to regio n depending on the attitude of the local bisho p o r archbishop . Secondly , on e

73

might argue that, in so far as the clergy did assist the agitation, there was nothing very new about this role. Catholi c clergymen had always been the politica l leaders o f their parishes an d had , even i n th e prefamin e period , organize d th e tenant populatio n i n politica l struggles , mos t notably i n th e emancipatio n campaig n o f th e late 18208 . However, as was pointed out above, in these prefamine movement s tenant s wer e no t actu ally organize d a t th e grass-root s level ; the y were merel y mustere d a s politica l suppor t fo r movements tha t promoted th e interest s o f the Church and of the Catholic urba n middle class. Furthermore, althoug h the bond betwee n loca l clergymen an d thei r parishioner s ha d alway s been strong , recen t historica l researc h ha s shown that in the prefamine period th e Catholic Church wa s relativel y disorganized ; mos t Catholic clergyme n wer e person s o f little education an d som e o f questionabl e morals ; an d considerable conflic t existe d betwee n clergy men and their parishioners, especiall y over the question o f clerica l due s (Larkin , 1972) . Th e same research ha s demonstrated that in the decade o r s o before th e famine , an d i n the post famine period , th e Catholi c Churc h becam e wealthier and better organized; the morals and education of the clergy improved; the priest t o population ratio rose; the contributions o f Irish Catholics to buildin g religious edifices becam e larger; and , mos t importan t o f all , th e forma l religiosity o f Irish Catholics increased greatly . Thus ther e i s every reaso n t o believ e tha t the bond betwee n Catholi c priest s an d thei r parishioners, although always strong, was even stronger i n the postfamine period, an d that the quality of leadership that clergymen were capable of providing was vastly improved. In any case, it is possible to establish beyond a doubt that in many areas Catholi c clergymen did make a significant contributio n to the agitation. Especiall y afte r Parnel l too k ove r th e leadership, man y clergymen , and a fe w arch bishops and bishops, wer e active supporters of the tenants ' cause . Fo r example , 1 3 of th e 5 7 members of the Lan d League' s foundin g com mittee wer e Catholi c clergyme n (Committe e members a t firs t meeting of the Iris h National Land League) . I n addition , researc h o n rura l branches discloses that clergymen were energetic i n these local bodies. Man y branches were , in fact , established at meeting s held in chapel yards afte r mass , and the geographica l uni t on which many rural branches were based was the

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Catholic parish . A further indication of the rol e of clergymen in local branche s i s provided b y a still extan t collectio n o f report s sen t b y branches t o the central executive i n Dublin. Of a sample of 11 5 branches, 32. 2 per cen t submitted report s tha t wer e signe d b y a t leas t on e clergyman actin g as president , vice-president , or secretary of the branch (Iris h National Lan d League Papers) . Clearly , i f ther e wer e som e districts i n whic h th e clerg y remaine d aloo f from th e agitation , there wer e man y other s i n which the y di d not . Th e rol e playe d b y th e clergy, therefore , ca n hardl y b e dismisse d a s inconsequential. Although I hav e discusse d severa l differen t organizational bases , i t ha s no t bee n m y pur pose t o provid e th e reade r wit h a conclusiv e statement o f ho w Iris h farmer s go t politically organized. Suc h a statement, alon g wit h an assessment o f the relativ e importance o f the various factor s tha t contribute d t o thei r mobiliza tion, wil l hav e t o awai t furthe r research . M y intention ha s bee n simpl y to demonstrat e tha t there is sufficient evidenc e t o support th e claim that, in one form or another, a stronger organi zational base was present i n the late nineteenth century than in the prefamine period. DISCUSSION The questio n I have been askin g in this paper is why th e firs t large-scal e agraria n rebellio n i n Ireland broke out in the late nineteenth century. I have tried to argue that the best answer is that, in the postfamine period, Irish tenants acquire d a sourc e o f leadershi p an d a n organizationa l base. Unquestionably the leadership came from the nationalis t movement . Th e organizationa l base appears to have ha d a number o f sources, but fo r th e tim e bein g i t i s probabl y wises t t o stress th e specia l relationshi p tha t evolve d i n the postfamin e perio d betwee n rura l tenant s and townsmen . Althoug h disconten t wa s cer tainly a necessary condition fo r the Iris h Lan d War, studyin g variations in the leve l of discon tent contribute s littl e t o ou r understandin g o f why Iris h tenant s rebelle d agains t thei r land lords i n the lat e nineteenth century on a greate r scale than they had ever rebelled before . While broad similaritie s with other rebellions can b e noted, w e shoul d be ver y carefu l abou t drawing conclusion s fro m th e Iris h Lan d Wa r and applyin g them t o socia l unres t i n general . The factor s that determine when men will rebe l depend on the structural conditions present i n a

particular case. One structura l conditio n i n Ireland, the social cleavage betwee n landlord s and tenants, determine d tha t a n agraria n rebellio n would mos t likel y erup t durin g a n agricultura l depression whe n landlord-tenan t hostilit y wa s at a peak. Depression s mad e i t difficult fo r tenants t o pay their rents an d s o encouraged landlords t o evict . I n othe r societies , eve n othe r peasant societies , disconten t will , of course, b e generated i n a differen t way an d may , a s a re sult, hav e quit e differen t consequences . Similarly, th e sourc e o f leadershi p tha t ultimately became availabl e t o Iris h tenant s wa s a direct function o f the particula r relationshi p tha t ex isted in Ireland between majo r social elites . Th e urban middl e class wa s force d t o all y with th e tenant population , rather tha n wit h th e lande d class, becaus e o f religious divisions in the soci ety. I f Catholic s i n Irelan d ha d manage d t o break int o the rank s o f the lande d clas s t o th e same exten t tha t the y ha d succeeded i n break ing int o urba n society , a politica l allianc e be tween th e lande d elit e an d urba n elite s ma y have materialize d and Iris h tenants ma y neve r have obtaine d satisfactor y politica l leadership . Finally, increase d contac t betwee n tow n an d country only facilitated an agrarian rebellio n in Ireland becaus e th e potentia l source of leadership fo r tenant s wa s largel y urban . Again , i n other peasan t societies , unde r differen t struc tural conditions , increase d contac t betwee n town an d country could have tremendously different consequences .. Even th e importanc e o f mobilizatio n itsel f depends o n certai n conditions . I t i s not alway s true tha t factor s facilitatin g mobilizatio n ar e better predictor s o f when people will rebel tha n are factors enhancing discontent. I n the case we have bee n examining , mobilizatio n wa s mor e important becaus e a hig h leve l o f disconten t was presen t o n numerou s occasions , wherea s the capacit y for mobilization was not . I n othe r societies, particularl y i n industrialize d soci eties, th e situatio n ma y b e th e reverse . A s Dahrendorf (1959 ) suggests , onc e industria l classes hav e bee n full y formed , peopl e ma y possess the capacit y for political mobilization, but the y ma y become discontente d onl y occa sionally. Unde r suc h circumstances , studyin g discontent would , indeed, b e a bette r wa y o f predicting when they will rebel . However, durin g the transitio n fro m nonin dustrial t o industria l societ y th e condition s fo r mobilization ar e certainl y as importan t a s ar e those causin g discontent, perhaps mor e impor -

The Political Mobilization of Irish Farmers tant. On e ma y observe , a s th e Feierabend s have, that political unres t i s relatively commo n during thi s transitional phas e of modernization . Many socia l scientist s hav e bee n quic k t o ex plain this finding by arguing that modernizatio n raises expectations to a n unrealisti c leve l i n its early stage s (Ridker , 1962 ; Feierabend , e t al., 1969). Other s hav e explaine d th e relationshi p by statin g tha t modernizatio n breaks dow n th e traditional mechanism s o f social solidarit y tha t hold traditiona l societie s togethe r (Durkheim, 1933; Hauser , 1963) . Stil l a thir d possibilit y is that modernizatio n promote s socia l protes t b y increasing social communicatio n an d coopera tion amon g the discontente d an d b y producin g new middle-class group s tha t are in a position to provide th e lowe r classes wit h political leader ship. Le t u s assume , fo r the sak e o f argument, that modernization does indeed have this effect. If it could also be shown that discontent is often just a s intens e before modernizatio n as durin g the initia l stage s o f modernization , the n w e would b e force d t o conclud e tha t th e associa tion betwee n earl y modernizatio n and socia l protest i s primaril y a consequenc e o f th e facilities fo r mobilizatio n tha t modernizatio n can bring to already discontented people. Whatever is true in general, this is the conclusion t o whic h I hav e bee n le d i n m y offe r ts t o account fo r the Iris h Lan d War . Althoug h Iris h rural tenant s certainl y experienced a rise i n expectations durin g th e postfamin e period , th e social change s tha t raise d thei r expectation s also enhance d thei r capacit y fo r mobilization. But thei r increased expectation s di d not , eve n when disappointed, generate greate r disconten t than the y ha d eve r fel t before . I n orde r t o un derstand why Irish farmers rebelled in the late nineteenth century , on e mus t g o beyon d th e immediate conditions tha t precipitated their rebellion and d o mor e tha n just explai n why they were angry . On e mus t explai n ho w the y wer e mobilized. REFERENCES*

Arensberg, C.M . 1968 Th e Iris h Countryman. New York : Natural Histor y Pres s Arensberg, C.M. , andS.T. Kimba l 1968 Famil y and Communit y in Ireland. Cambridge. Mass.: Harvar d Universit y Pres s Bendix, Reinhar d

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1964 Natio n Buildin g and Citizenship . New York: Wiley Bourke, P.M . Austin 1965 'Th e agricultural statistics of the 184 1 Census o f Ireland: a critical review.' Economic Histor y Review. Second serie s 18:376-91 Clark, Samuel 1971 'Th e social compositio n o f the Lan d League.' Iris h Historica l Studies 17:447-69 Congested District s Boar d 1898 Bas e Lin e Report s o f Inspectors fo r Con gested Districts Board , 1892-8 . Trinity College Librar y Dahrendorf, Ral f 1959 Clas s an d Class Conflic t in Industrial Soc iety. Stanford California : Stanford University Press Da vies, James C . 1962 'Towar d a theory o f revolution.' American Sociological Revie w 27:5-19. 1969 'Th e J-curve of rising and declinin g satisfactions as a cause of some great revolutions and a contained rebellion. ' In H.D . Graham an d T.R. Gur r (eds.), The His tory o f Violence in America. Ne w York : Bantam 1970 (Ed. ) When Men Revolt -And Why . New York: Fre e Press Davitt, Michael 1904 Th e Fal l of Feudalis m i n Ireland. Ne w York Deutsch, Karl , W. 1961 'Socia l mobilization and politica l development.' American Politica l Scienc e Review 55:493-513 Duffy, C.G . 1886 Th e Leagu e o f North and South. Londo n Durkheim, Emile 1933 Th e Divisio n of Labour i n Society. Translated by George Simpson. New York : Free Press 1951 Suicide : A Study in Sociology. Translate d by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson. Ne w York : Fre e Press Feierabend, Iv o K., Rosalin d L. Feierabend . and Bett y A Nesvol d 1969 'Socia l change an d politica l violence: cross-national patterns.' In H.D. Graha m and T.R. Gurr (eds.), The Histor y of Violence in America. New York : Banta m Freeman, T.W .

* Reference s t o newspapers ar e given in full i n the text and ar e no t repeate d here .

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1957 Pre-Famin e Ireland: A Study in Historica l Geography. Manchester : Mancheste r University Press Geschwender, James , A. 1968 'Exploration s in the theory o f social movements and revolutions.' Socia l Forces 47:127-35 Gurr, T.R . 1970 Wh y Men Rebel. Princeton, N.J. : Prince ton University Press Hauser, Phili p 1963 'Th e social, economic an d technologica l problems of rapid urbanization.' In Bert Hoselitz and Wilbert Moore (eds.), Industrialization and Society. The Hague : Mouton House o f Commons 1843 Repor t o f the Commissioners Appointe d to Take the Census of Ireland for the Year 1841 (504): xxiv 1877 Agricultura l Statistics of Ireland for th e Year 187 6 [c 1749] : Ixxxv 1881 a Minute s of Evidence Taken Befor e He r Majesty's Commissioner s on Agriculture [c 2778-!]: xv i88ib Retur n ... of Evictions Which Have Come to the Knowledge of the Con stabulary in Each of the Years Fro m 184 9 to 1880(185) : Ixxvii 18823 Censu s of Ireland, 1881: Parti... Vol.iv, Province of Connaught [c 3268]: Ixxix i882b Censu s of Ireland, 1881: Part n , General Report [c 3365]: Ixxvi 1914 Repor t of the Departmenta l Committe e on Agricultural Credit in Ireland [Cd 7375]: xii i Kornhauser, William 1959 Th e Politic s of Mass Society. New York : Free Pres s Lampson, G. Locke r 1907 A Consideration of the Stat e of Ireland in the Nineteenth Century. London: Con stable Larkin, Emmet 1972 'Th e devotional revolution in Ireland, 1850-75.' The American Historical Review 77:625-5 2 Lewis, G.C. 1836 O n Loca l Disturbance s in Ireland, and on the Irish Church Question. Londo n McCaffrey, L.J . 1962 'Iris h federalism in the i87o's : a study in conservative nationalism.' Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Serie s 52. pt. 6

Macintyre, Angu s 1965 Th e Liberator: Daniel O'Connell an d the Irish Party, 1830-1847. New York: Mac Millan Maher, J. 1951 'Th e repeal movemen t and the land ques tion.' Bulleti n of the Irish Committee on Historical Sciences , No. 63 Mannheim, Karl 1940 Ma n and Society i n an Age of Reconstruction. New York: Harcourt , Brace and World Moody, T.W . 1949 'Th e new departure i n Irish politics , 1878-9.' In H.A. Cronne , T.W . Moody , and D.B. Quinn (eds), Essay s in British and Irish History in honour of James Eadie Todd. London: F . Muller 1968 'Th e Fenian movemen t i n Irish history.' In T.W. Mood y (ed.) , The Fenia n Move ment. Cork: Mercie r Press Nowlan, Kevin, B. 1965 Th e Politic s of Repeal: A Study in the Relations Between Grea t Britai n and Ireland, 1841-50. London: Routledg e an d Kegan Paul Oberschall, Anthony 1973 Socia l Conflict and Social Movements . Englewood Cliffs , N.J. : Prentice Hall Ortega Y Gasset, Jos e 1961 Th e Revol t of the Masses. London: Unwin Book s Palmer, N.D . 1940 Th e Iris h Land Leagu e Crisis . New Haven: Yale University Press Pinard, Maurice 1968 'Mas s society and political movements: a new formulation.' Th e American Journal of Sociology 73:682-9 0 Reynolds, James 1954 Th e Catholi c Emancipation Crisis in Ireland, 1823-1829 . New Haven : Yal e University Press Ridker, R.G. 1962 'Disconten t and economic growth.' Economic Developmen t and Cultural Change 11:1-1 5 Snyder, David, and Charles Tilly 1972 'Hardshi p and collective violence.' American Sociological Revie w 37:520-3 2 Tilly, Charles 1969 'Collectiv e violence in European perspec tive.' In H.D. Graham and T.R. Gur r (eds.), The Histor y of Violence in America. New York : Bantam

The Political Mobilization of Irish Farmers 1970 'Th e changing place of collective violence.' In Melvin Richter(ed.), Essays in Theory an d History: An Approach to the Social Sciences . Cambridg e Mass.: Har vard Universit y Pres s Tocqueville, Alexis de 1888 Th e State of Society in France Before th e Revolution of 1879. Translated by Henry Reeve. London : John Murray Whyte,J.H. 1958 Th e Independent Iris h Party. Oxford: Oxford Universit y Press

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Manuscript sources Committee members at first meeting of the Irish National Lan d League, 21 October 1879 . Na tional Librar y of Ireland, MS 9281 Irish Crimes Records, 1881 . State Paper Offic e Irish National Land League Papers. Nationa l Library of Ireland Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages . Custom Hous e

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THE TENANTS' MOVEMEN T TO CAPTURE THE IRIS H POOR LA W BOARDS, 1877-1886 * WILLIAM L. FEINGOLD There i s a well-establishe d notio n amon g Iris h an d Britis h historians tha t loca l self-governmen t bega n i n Irelan d i n 1898 , when th e Loca l Governmen t Ac t create d th e syste m o f electiv e county council s to replac e th e ol d gran d jur y syste m i n th e govern ment o f th e counties . Th e gran d juries , i t i s well-known , wer e in struments o f th e Iris h "lande d interest"—th e gentr y an d aristocracy—whose dominance ove r thes e bodies was protected b y a rigid syste m o f propert y qualification s an d appointin g procedure s that admitte d onl y trustworth y landowners t o th e jury seats. 1 Sinc e only th e jurie s wer e empowere d t o lev y an d expen d th e count y ta x known a s th e "cess, " the y wer e therefor e als o abl e t o dominat e th e lesser count y authorities , th e count y an d baronia l presentmen t sessions, throug h contro l o f the purse . Whe n th e 189 8 ac t abolishe d this aristocrati c syste m an d replace d i t wit h a ne w syste m o f representative count y an d distric t councils , th e resul t wa s a de facto transfer o f powe r i n loca l governmen t fro m th e ol d landownin g class t o th e peasantry . Thi s view , whic h wa s firs t promote d b y th e founders o f th e 189 8 act , ha s bee n repeate d b y numerou s historians since then , an d fo r lac k o f evidenc e t o th e contrar y i t prevail s today. 2 Willian O'Brien , th e nationalis t M.P . and edito r of the Parnellit e newspaper United Ireland, migh t wel l hav e dispute d thi s vie w i f he were aliv e today. A s a practicing politicia n wh o understoo d wel l th e This articl e is base d o n th e author' s doctoral dissertation , "The Iris h Board s o f Poor La w Guardians , 1872- 1 886: A Revolutio n in Loca l Government, " Universit y of Chicago, 1974 . A differen t versio n o f th e articl e was presente d t o th e Midwes t Con ference o n Britis h Studies , Universit y o f Minnesota , October 26-27 , 1974 . Map s b y David M . Thorndike , Departmen t of Geography , Bellevu e College , Nebraska . 'A goo d brie f descriptio n of th e constitutio n and function s o f th e gran d juries, boards o f guardians , an d othe r loca l government bodies i n Irelan d toward th e en d o f the nineteent h centur y ma y b e foun d i n Willia m F . Bailey , Local an d Centralised Government i n Ireland, (London , 1888) . 2 For th e classi c statemen t see Ernes t Barker , Ireland i n th e Last Fifty Years, 1866-1916, (Oxford , 1917) , p . 22 .

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ways i n which powe r can b e exercised, he wa s more incline d t o loo k at th e practica l operation s o f publi c bodie s rathe r tha n thei r con stitutions t o determin e whic h part y hel d th e rea l power . I n hi s Recollections, whic h wer e publishe d i n 1905 , O'Brie n reminisced about th e turbulen t years of th e grea t "lan d war " o f 1879-188 2 and recalled how , i n 1882 , that histori c struggle between Irish landlord and tenan t fo r contro l o f the soi l focuse d fo r a time in a struggle for control o f th e Iris h board s o f guardians , the 16 3 bodie s whic h ad ministered th e Iris h poo r la w i n the localities. 3 Constitutionally, the boards wer e a hybri d betwee n electiv e an d appointiv e bodies . Hal f of thei r member s wer e elected , i n annua l elections , b y th e ratepaying public, which included al l owners of property an d al l occupiers whos e holding s wer e value d abov e £4 . Th e poo r la w fran chise, whic h wa s a t th e tim e th e mos t libera l franchis e o f an y governmental institutio n i n Ireland , qualifie d ove r 500,00 0 peopl e to vot e i n poo r la w elections. 4 Th e othe r hal f o f th e membershi p were ex-offici o appointee s wh o wer e drawn , a s stipulate d b y law , from th e highest-rate d justice s o f th e peac e presidin g i n th e coun ties. These provision s mad e fo r a n interestin g social admixtur e at the boards. Sinc e th e highest-rate d justice s wer e almos t invariabl y aristocrats o r countr y gentlemen , the ex-officio s were al l landlord s of varyin g stature . Th e electe d members , o n th e othe r side , wer e almost al l me n withou t property ; tenan t farmer s mostly , bu t als o shopkeepers an d publicans , and a substantial number of "landlords ' men"—land agent s an d bailiffs. 5 Mos t o f the elected guardian s were tenants o f on e o r anothe r o f th e ex-officios . Eac h board , i n short , was a microcos m o f the surroundin g community , but wit h the land lords raise d t o a leve l o f numerica l equality in spit e o f thei r smal l minority i n th e community . This composition , whic h wa s peculia r to th e board s of guardian s i n Ireland , containe d a n inheren t poten tial fo r politica l conflict , especiall y i n th e mids t o f a lan d war . At th e tim e o f th e poo r la w electio n mentione d b y O'Brie n th e land wa r ha d bee n i n progres s fo r thre e years . Onl y a fe w month s earlier th e governmen t had enacte d th e firs t trul y effective lan d act , which grante d th e Iris h tenantr y wha t amounte d t o a partnershi p 'William O'Brien , Recollections, (Ne w York , 1905) , p . 413 . Great Britain . Parliamentar y Papers (Commons), 1874 , vol . 5 6 (Account s an d Papers, no . 253) . "Retur n fro m eac h Poo r La w Unio n i n Ireland , o f th e numbe r o f persons entitle d t o vot e i n eac h suc h unio n fo r Poo r La w Guardians..., " p . 927 . s For th e socia l compositio n o f the board s i n the 1870 s se e chapters 1 and 2 of th e author's dissertation , Supra. 4

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status i n th e lan d tenure . Althoug h thi s ac t migh t hav e bee n ex pected t o cal m th e agitation , its salutar y effects wer e negate d b y a second act , a coercio n act , whic h ha d bee n enacte d a s a punitiv e corollary t o th e lan d ac t t o enabl e th e governmen t t o impriso n suspected agitator s withou t trial . A t th e tim e o f th e poo r la w elec tions i n March , 188 2 abou t 80 0 suspect s wer e o r ha d bee n i n prison, mos t o f the m loca l an d nationa l leader s o f th e tenan t organization, th e Lan d League. 6 Charle s Stewar t Parnell , th e president o f th e Leagu e an d leade r o f th e Hom e Rul e Part y i n parliament, wa s i n Kilmainha m jai l togethe r wit h mos t o f hi s party aides. Th e Catholi c tenantr y were i n a defiant mood, an d som e kin d of anti-governmen t demonstration seeme d t o b e i n order . Bu t fro m which quarte r woul d i t come , wit h al l o f th e leader s i n prison ? I t came, O'Brie n tell s us , i n th e poo r la w election , fo r whe n th e elec tions wer e hel d durin g the las t wee k o f March , "a s i f by one universal impuls e th e countr y rose...swep t th e landlord s for m thei r ol d ascendancy a t th e Poo r La w Boards , an d pu t th e mos t advance d o f suspects i n thei r places." 7 If O'Brie n wa s right , an d th e landlord s ha d bee n "swept " fro m their "ol d ascendancy, " i t woul d appea r tha t a revolutio n o f sort s occurred i n tha t election , a transfe r o f powe r fro m landlor d t o tenant i n a very importan t loca l governmen t institution . If that wer e so, the n wha t i s to b e mad e o f the clai m tha t th e Loca l Governmen t Act o f 189 8 initiate d loca l self-government ? Obviously, th e answe r would depen d upo n wha t on e accept s a s th e definitio n o f loca l government befor e 1898 . Unfortunately , little notice ha s been take n of th e board s o f guardian s i n tha t respect , althoug h the y wer e im portant rival s t o th e gran d jurie s throughou t th e las t hal f o f th e nineteenth century . Befor e th e enactmen t o f th e Iris h poo r la w i n 1838, loca l governmen t i n Irelan d wa s share d b y th e Municipa l corporations i n th e citie s an d th e gran d jurie s i n th e rura l districts . The poo r la w act created th e board s of guardian s t o administe r th e workhouse syste m establishe d unde r th e sam e act , empowere d th e boards to lev y a separate poo r relie f ta x known a s the poor rate , and superimposed ove r th e existin g count y administratio n a n entirel y new administrativ e structur e base d o n th e territoria l uni t o f th e poor la w union . Eac h o f th e 13 0 union s (16 3 afte r a redrawin g o f the boundarie s i n 1847 ) wa s administere d b y a boar d o f guardians . A Sam Clark , "Th e Socia l Compositio n o f th e Lan d League, " Irish Historical Studies, 1 7 (Septembe r 1971) , pp . 451-57 . 7 William O ' Brien , Recollections, p . 413 .

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The board s wer e responsibl e t o a five-ma n Poo r La w Commissio n which answere d t o parliamen t throug h th e Chie f Secretar y fo r Ireland. I n 187 2 thi s commissio n wa s converte d int o th e Loca l Government Boar d i n a mov e tha t wa s designe d t o increas e th e ef ficiency o f loca l governmen t i n Ireland . Th e board s o f guardian s were th e chief administrativ e win g of the Loca l Government Board , and thei r activitie s wer e carefull y supervised b y a talented grou p o f local governmen t inspectors. 8 Beginning wit h th e Grea t Famin e o f 1845-184 7 th e gran d juries underwent a rapi d decline , a s parliament , appreciatin g th e valu e of the board s a s a n efficien t administrativ e networ k tha t wa s mor e amenable t o it s contro l tha n th e juries , assigne d th e poo r la w ad ministration a grea t man y ne w responsiblitie s i n area s othe r tha n poor relief . B y 187 2 thes e responsiblitie s include d suc h divers e functions a s the operation of the dispensary system ; cattle , food , an d workshop inspection ; vaccination ; th e fostering-ou t an d educatio n of orphane d children ; emigratio n assistance ; an d dog-catching ; a s well a s relate d function s suc h a s th e registratio n o f eligibl e voters , and th e hiring , firing, an d pensionin g o f personne l unde r thei r con trol. Th e bureaucrac y fo r whic h the y wer e responsibl e include d workhouse master s an d assistants , doctor s an d nurses , cooks , teachers, inspectors , an d clerk s o f variou s kinds , an d thei r patronage extende d als o t o th e givin g out o f contracts fo r foo d an d fuel, medicines , ambulances , an d publi c work s project s relatin g t o health an d welfare . Thei r taxin g power s expande d accordingly . Beginning wit h a n annua l budget o f about £200,000 , the guardians ' expenditures ros e b y 187 2 t o £668,000 , an d b y 189 0 t o £1,099,000. The 189 0 figure represented abou t thirty-six percent o f the tota l loca l governmen t revenu e tha t year , a s compare d wit h thirty-nine percen t fo r th e gran d jurie s an d twenty-fiv e percen t fo r the municipa l an d tow n authorities. 9 These fact s an d figure s demonstrat e tha t fiscall y an d func tionally th e board s o f guardians were a n institutio n of at leas t equa l importance to th e gran d juries, and growin g in importanc e when the Local Governmen t Act o f 189 8 abolishe d th e juries and subsume d the board s a s committee s of th e ne w urba n an d rura l distric t coun s

An excellen t short discussio n o f th e board s o f guardians' histor y an d function s t o about 188 0 ma y b e foun d i n Richar d O'Shaughnessy , "Loca l Governmen t an d Taxation i n Ireland, " i n J . W . Probyn , ed. . Local Government an d Taxation i n th e United Kingdom, (London , 1882) . y T.W. Grimshaw , Facts an d Figures about Ireland (Dublin , 1893) , p . 49 .

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cils. Whethe r th e board s wer e technicall y representativ e bodie s would b e difficul t t o say , because o f th e appointiv e element in their constitution. Bu t fo r politica l purposes the y mus t certainly be con sidered representativ e bodie s i f i t coul d b e show n tha t th e electiv e element possesse d th e actua l powe r prio r t o 1898 . Th e consti tutional makeu p o f th e board s i n thi s cas e i s o f littl e hel p i n defining th e politica l reality. How the n woul d on e tes t O'Brien' s clai m abou t th e landlords ' ascendancy bein g swep t away ? Ca n politica l ascendanc y b e measured fo r bodie s o f me n i n 16 3 localitie s sprea d ou t ove r th e whole o f Ireland ? O n th e fac e o f it , th e problem s woul d appea r t o be insuperable—amon g others , th e proble m o f definin g "ascen dancy" an d findin g way s t o identif y it , whe n th e individual s in volved ar e obscur e person s abou t who m littl e if any documentation has survived . Quantit y i s als o a factor , sinc e th e averag e boar d membership numbere d about fifty—twenty-fiv e eac h o f electe d an d ex-officio guardians—an d th e annua l numbe r o f guardian s i n th e system a s a whol e wa s abou t 7,300.' ° Fortunately , th e proble m i s simplified greatl y b y th e existenc e o n eac h boar d o f thre e officers , who wer e electe d b y th e boar d member s an d who , b y th e ver y fac t of thei r election , ma y b e take n t o reflec t th e preference s o f th e majority o f th e board . Th e officer s wer e a chairman , a vice chairman, an d a deput y vice-chairman , who were , i n effect , alter nate chairme n empowere d t o occup y th e chai r i n th e orde r men tioned wheneve r th e holde r o f a highe r offic e wa s absent . A s post s of hono r an d power , thes e office s wer e naturall y give n ou t t o th e most influentia l member s o f th e board . Bu t th e politica l conditio n of Ireland , divide d a s i t wa s between tw o conflictin g socia l classes , was suc h tha t th e measur e o f a candidate' s influenc e was base d no t so muc h o n hi s administrativ e qualifications as o n hi s statur e a s a landlord o r a tenant . Sinc e thi s poin t i s importan t t o th e presen t study, i t wil l requir e som e elaboration . The electio n mentione d by O'Brien wa s not a n isolate d incident . It wa s a singl e episod e i n a broa d tenants ' movemen t durin g th e 1870s an d 1880 s t o gai n contro l o f al l representativ e positions that were ope n t o tenants . On th e parliamentar y level the attac k wa s led by th e Hom e Rul e party , firs t unde r th e leadershi p o f Isaa c Butt , '"Great Britain . Parliamentar y Papers (Commons), 1884 , vol . 6 8 (Account s and Papers, no . 335) . "Return o f th e numbe r o f attendance s of Poo r La w G uardians at th e board meeting s o f eac h Poo r La w Unio n i n Ireland , i n th e yea r ende d 25t h Marc h 1884, pp . 55-59 .

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then unde r Parnell , Butt succeeded i n winnin g fifty-nine ou t o f th e hundred Iris h constituencie s for th e part y i n th e genera l electio n o f 1874; Parnell , whose postur e wa s mor e defian t an d therefor e mor e popular, raise d thi s numbe r t o a clea n swee p o f th e Iris h con stituencies outside o f th e Protestan t center s i n Ulster , i n the genera l election o f 1885 . T o accomplis h thi s feat , Parnel l constructed , bet ween 188 2 an d 1885 , th e Nationa l League , a politica l machin e o f uprecedented complexit y an d effectiveness , whos e branche s num bered ove r 1,20 0 a t th e tim e o f the 188 5 election. 11 Report s i n th e press indicat e tha t a simila r movemen t develope d i n th e municipalities an d towns , le d b y nationalist s who wer e determine d to unsea t th e Liberal s an d Conservative s wh o ha d bee n entrenche d in th e seat s o f th e urba n bodie s fo r decades. 12 The sam e movemen t extende d t o th e board s o f guardians, which were politicall y muc h mor e importan t t o th e nationalist s tha n th e urban authorities , sinc e the y extende d ove r bot h urba n an d rura l districts, ha d a grea t dea l mor e patronag e a t thei r disposal , an d were, i n th e rura l districts , th e onl y publi c bodie s wit h a represen tative element . A s earl y a s 1872 , attempt s wer e mad e b y poo r la w guardians connecte d wit h th e nationalis t an d lan d refor m movements i n th e union s of Roscommo n an d Kilmallock , t o unsea t the ex-offici o officers o f thei r boards . I n bot h case s th e office s ha d been hel d b y ex-officio s sinc e th e foundin g o f th e poo r law.' 3 Th e Kilmallock nationalist s succeeded , an d th e ex-officio s neve r agai n won a n offic e a t th e board ; th e Roscommoner s faile d becaus e the y did no t ye t hav e sufficien t suppor t amon g th e electorat e t o wi n th e number o f seat s necessar y fo r a clea r majority . Nevertheless , th e Roscommon proceeding s cam e t o th e attentio n o f the edito r o f th e Nation, th e widel y circulate d nationalis t journal , wh o urge d nationalists i n othe r union s t o emulat e th e Roscommo n patriots . Such a movement , th e edito r suggested , woul d permi t th e nationalists t o us e th e poo r la w election s t o publiciz e thei r cause , while electora l victorie s woul d demonstrat e t o th e governmen t th e extent o f nationalis t suppor t i n th e country . Th e electora l cam paigns woul d als o giv e the branche s o f th e Hom e Rul e Associatio n an opportunit y t o develo p thei r politica l skill s between parliamen tary elections. 14 "Conor Cruis e O'Brien , Parnell an d Hi s Party, 1880-1890, (Oxford , 1957) , pp . 127-132. 12 See, fo r example , Freeman's Journal, Apri l 12 , 1880 . ^Roscommon Journal, Ma y 25 , 1872 ; Limerick Chronicle, Apri l 6 , 1972 . ^Nation, Augus t 15 , 1874 .

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This suggestio n wa s no t take n u p immediately , excep t i n a fe w unions wher e tenan t politica l organization s were especiall y active. These isolate d attack s wer e no t expande d t o th e leve l of a national movement unti l after th e flareu p o f agitatio n i n th e Wes t o f Irelan d in 1879 , an d th e foundin g o f th e Lan d Leagu e i n Novembe r tha t year. Fo r th e nex t seve n year s th e loca l branche s o f th e Lan d League an d it s successor , th e Nationa l League , focuse d thei r at tention o n th e poo r la w election s eac h Marc h i n a concerte d driv e to captur e fo r th e tenants , firs t th e electe d seats , the n th e offices , o f the board s i n thei r unions . I n 188 1 Parnel l len t hi s enormou s prestige t o th e movemen t b y publishin g a n ope n lette r i n th e Freeman's Journal jus t befor e th e poo r la w election , urgin g th e Land Leagu e branche s t o "se e tha t al l exertion s are mad e t o secur e the retur n o f Land Leagu e candidate s a s poo r la w guardians, and t o drive fro m offic e th e agents , bailiffs , an d landlor d nominee s wh o have hithert o bee n allowe d t o fil l thes e importan t posts." 15 Whenever Leaguer s of a unio n manage d t o secur e a majorit y of the electe d seats , the y immediatel y challenge d th e ex-officio s fo r control o f th e boar d office s a t th e firs t meetin g o f th e ne w board . Their tas k wa s ofte n simplifie d by th e fac t tha t th e ex-offici o rank s were fille d wit h absente e landowner s who ofte n live d outside o f th e union an d rarel y attended meetings . Even wit h this handicap the exofficios pu t u p stron g resistance . The y coul d usuall y count o n th e support o f a fe w of th e electe d guardian s an d wer e abl e t o increas e their ow n numbers , a t leas t fo r th e singl e electio n meeting , b y calling i n absentee s residin g i n distan t places . Th e strategie s o f th e tenant party , an d th e name s o f th e party' s nominees , wer e usuall y decided a t a meetin g o f the loca l Leagu e branch . I n som e cases , a s for exampl e i n th e Roscommo n unio n i n 1881 , nominatin g con ventions wer e calle d t o selec t th e popula r nominees . Thes e maneouverings on bot h side s wer e covere d i n the loca l an d national press wit h a zea l tha t wa s normall y typica l o f parliamentar y elections, an d th e measur e o f succes s wa s th e exten t t o whic h th e on e party o r th e othe r wa s abl e t o plac e it s candidates i n all three , o r a t least two , o f th e boar d offices . Sometime s th e majorit y party , a s a gesture o f conciliation , allowe d th e minorit y members t o nam e on e of th e officers , usuall y a ma n acceptabl e t o th e majorit y side. 16 ^Freeman's Journal, Marc h 1 , 1881 . l6 These election s ar e discusse d extensivel y for eac h yea r i n th e author' s disser tation, Supra, Prologue-Chap . 5 .

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Because th e rol e o f th e office s i n th e rivalr y was crucial , the of fice-holders ar e a n excellen t sourc e fo r identifyin g part y ascen dancy. An d becaus e the partie s were divided along clear socia l line s (allowing fo r a smal l numbe r o f landowner s and tenant s wh o wer e associated wit h th e opposit e side) , th e landholdin g statu s o f th e of ficers—whether the y wer e owner s o r tenants—ca n be take n a s an indication o f thei r party affiliations . I t woul d no t b e inappropriat e t o assume, therefore , tha t th e proportio n o f owner s t o tenant s i n th e offices o f a given board, o r al l board s take n together , shoul d yiel d a fairly accurat e inde x o f th e relativ e strengt h o f eithe r side . I f suc h an approac h wer e valid , on e woul d expec t t o fin d a ver y hig h per centage o f landowner s in th e boar d office s i n som e yea r befor e th e opening o f th e lan d war , an d a similarl y hig h percentag e o f tenant s after 1882 , assumin g tha t O'Brien' s analysi s wa s correct . In orde r t o tes t thi s hypothesis I surveyed th e 489 me n who held the boar d office s i n 1 877, a year which I judged t o b e representative of condition s durin g the year s just befor e th e lan d war , to ascertai n whether eac h wa s a landowne r or a tenant-occupier . I the n di d th e same fo r eac h yea r fro m 1879-1886 , th e pea k year s o f the lan d wa r and Parnellit e agitation . Th e name s an d addresse s o f th e officer s were obtaine d fro m th e annua l edition s o f Thorn's Directory o f Ireland.^1 Th e landholdin g data wa s derived fro m tw o source s use d in combination : th e 187 6 parliamentar y pape r know n a s th e "Domesday Book," 18 whic h liste d al l person s ownin g mor e tha n one acr e o f lan d i n Ireland ; an d th e lan d valuatio n record s o f th e period, whic h gav e th e name s o f th e occupie r an d immediat e lesso r of ever y holdin g i n Ireland. 1 9 Al l person s show n i n th e valuatio n records a s occupiers wh o di d no t appea r a s the immediat e lessor o r in th e "Domesda y Book " a s a n owner , wer e classifie d a s tenants . About fiftee n t o twenty-fiv e percen t o f each annua l group wer e per sons whose name s di d no t appea r i n either th e "Domesday Book" or the valuatio n records . Bu t o n close r scrutin y thes e me n wer e discovered t o b e justice s o f th e peac e liste d i n th e Thorn's list s o f magistrates. Thei r omissio n fro m th e landholdin g records a t firs t presented a perplexin g problem , unti l I discovere d th e probabl e reason fo r thei r omission : man y justices o f th e peac e wer e son s o f 17 First publishe d under th e titl e of Thoms's Irish Almanac and Official Directory ( D u b l i n , 1844 - ) . '"Great Britain . Parliamentar y Papers (Commons), 1876 , vol . 8 0 (Account s an d Papers). C . 1492 . "Retur n o t Owner s o t Land , of one acr e an d upward s i n the severa l counties, countie s o f cities , an d countie s o f town s i n Ireland.... " |y Valuation Records , Genera l Valuatio n Office , Dublin .

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aristocrats an d gentr y wh o reside d o n thei r fathers ' estate s bu t di d not hol d titl e t o lan d i n thei r ow n right . Sinc e the y neithe r owne d nor occupie d a separat e holding , the y woul d no t hav e appeare d i n either o f th e referenc e document s used . T o plac e thi s group i n wit h the tenants , o r eve n t o omi t the m fro m th e statistics , woul d hav e un duly biase d th e result s s o a s t o giv e th e appearanc e o f les s lan downer representatio n tha n wa s actuall y th e case , sinc e thes e justices wer e member s o f landownin g families . Therefor e fo r th e purposes o f analysis , thes e unidentifie d justice s wer e place d i n th e category o f landowners . No w t o th e result s o f th e survey . The 187 7 statistic s completel y supporte d O'Brien' s statemen t regarding th e "landlords ' ol d ascendancy. " Tha t yea r 8 7 percen t o f the 48 9 office s wer e occupie d b y landowners . Withi n th e thre e of ficers classe s the y ha d a virtual monopoly o f th e tw o highe r offices, with 9 9 percen t o f th e chairmanship s (161 ou t o f 163) , an d 9 3 per cent o f th e vice-chairmanship s (152 ou t o f 163) . O f th e 5 9 tenant s in th e 187 7 group , al l bu t thirtee n wer e i n th e lowes t office , th e deputy vice-chairmanships . Yet eve n i n tha t offic e landowner s held 69 percen t o f th e seats . I f thi s prevalenc e o f landowner s i n th e of fices ma y be take n a s a measur e of their influenc e a t th e boards , on e would hav e t o conclud e tha t th e term "ascendancy " was appropriate for th e landowners ' positio n befor e th e lan d war . The percentage s fo r 1879-188 6 revea l a dramati c declin e o f th e landlords influence , bu t no t a s complet e a declin e a s O'Brien' s statement implied . Th e percentage s o f tenant s i n al l thre e office s combined ar e plotte d fo r thes e year s o n th e grap h i n Fig . 1 . Th e graph show s clearl y tha t th e tenan t gain s di d no t occu r entirel y i n 1882, bu t wer e sprea d ove r th e seven-yea r period . Th e greates t period o f absolut e chang e cam e i n 1879-1882 , whe n seve n percen t of th e office s change d hand s eac h year . Thes e tenan t incursion s were undoubtedl y a produc t o f th e highl y volatil e political climate and stron g anti-landlor d feeling s tha t wer e generate d b y th e lan d war an d th e organize d activitie s of th e Lan d League . Th e coercio n act, a s has alread y bee n mentioned , wa s the principa l motivatio n i n the 188 2 election . Th e movemen t suffere d a declin e i n 1883 , probably becaus e o f Parnel l s deliberate attempts , followin g th e so called Kilmainha m Treat y o f Apri l 1882 , to ste m th e revolutionar y tide and redirec t th e agitation towar d th e constitutiona l struggl e fo r Home Rule . Throughout 188 3 the Parnellite s were busy building u p the politica l machin e i n preparatio n fo r th e nex t genera l election , and mos t o f thei r activitie s were carrie d o n behind-the-scenes . The

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Fig. 1 . Tenan t increase s i n board s o f guardians offices , 1879-188 6

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resurgence o f tenan t offic e capture s resume d i n 188 4 an d carrie d through t o 1 886. Thes e ne w gain s were probabl y connected wit h th e revival o f organize d politica l activit y i n th e localitie s unde r th e newly-formed branche s o f th e Nationa l League . Bu t th e 188 6 elec tion wa s undoubtedl y influenced als o b y th e Parnellit e swee p o f th e Irish constituencie s i n th e genera l election , whic h too k plac e onl y three month s earlier . 188 6 was by far th e bes t yea r fo r the tenant s in the board s of guardians elections . Althoug h th e absolut e increas e of tenant officership s wa s onl y si x percen t th e relative increas e wa s much large r tha n th e seve n percen t o f the earl y years , becaus e ther e were man y fewe r office s remainin g t o b e captured . A secon d significan t fact t o emerg e fro m th e surve y i s tha t th e tenants ha d possessio n o f onl y hal f o f th e office s b y 1886 . Fo r reasons o f methodologica l consistency , th e surve y wa s no t carrie d beyond 1886. 20 However , ther e i s good reaso n t o believ e tha t 188 6 was th e las t yea r o f an y substantia l increase s i n tenan t of ficeholdings. Afte r tha t electio n th e pres s los t interes t i n th e poo r law elections , an d th e Nationa l Leagu e turne d it s attentio n t o th e renewal o f th e lan d wa r i n th e "Pla n o f Campaign. " Eve n a cursor y glance a t th e listing s o f boar d officer s i n Thorn's fo r th e nex t fiv e years reveal s fe w change s i n thos e office s tha t wer e hel d b y land owners i n 1886 . Man y o f the ex-officio s wh o occupie d thos e office s were stil l i n offic e i n 1898 , whe n th e board s wer e brough t int o th e new count y governmen t an d th e ex-offici o elemen t wa s abolishe d altogether. Therefore , th e 188 6 statistic s probabl y represen t clos e to th e su m tota l o f th e office r changes . Th e fina l balanc e shee t shows tha t hal f o f th e tota l office s wer e hel d b y tenant s an d hal f b y landowners, wit h tenant s occupyin g thirty-fiv e percen t o f th e chair manships, forty-eigh t percen t o f th e vice-chairmanships , an d sixty nine percen t o f th e deput y vice-chairmanships . It woul d b e a n exaggeratio n t o sa y that th e tenantry , with hal f of the offices , ha d completel y destroye d th e ascendanc y o f th e land lords at th e poo r la w boards. Clearly , th e landlord s retaine d a good 2"Atter 188 6 th e lan d ac t o f 188 1 an d th e Lan d Purchas e "Ashbourne " Ac t o f 1885 bega n t o hav e a n increasin g effec t o n lan d tenur e relationships , as larg e n u mbers o f tenant-occupier s bega n t o tak e over th e titl e t o thei r holdings and themselve s became owners . Thu s th e distinctio n betwee n owner and tenant , which wa s usefu l fo r the earlie r year s a s a wa y o f distinguishin g betwee n th e tw o group s politically , became les s useful . I n othe r words , th e fac t tha t a ma n wa s a landowne r di d no t necessarily signif y tha t h e wa s als o a membe r o f th e ol d lande d interest . Fo r thi s reason, I though t it bes t t o terminat e th e surve y i n 1886 , rathe r tha n ru n th e ris k o f distorting th e dat a b y th e introductio n o f a ne w variable .

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Fig. 2

91

Fig. 3

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deal o f thei r influence . Bu t ho w stron g wa s th e influenc e the y di d retain? Doe s th e fift y percen t figur e represen t a compromis e i n which bot h side s agree d t o shar e powe r equally ? Or doe s i t signif y that th e landlords ' ascendanc y stil l prevaile d a t abou t hal f o f th e boards, whil e th e tenant s wer e ascendan t i n th e othe r half ? A possible answe r i s suggeste d b y th e manne r i n whic h th e office s were allocated o n a union-by-union basis. Th e map s i n Figs. 2 and 3 show ho w th e office s wer e distribute d betwee n landowner s an d tenants in 187 7 an d 1886 . In bot h maps , union s or group s of unions having respectivel y thre e landownin g officers , tw o landowners , on e landowner, an d n o landowner s (o r thre e tenants) , ar e show n i n various shade s fro m whit e to black . Fo r descriptiv e purposes thes e groups o f union s ar e designate d respectivel y a s "conservative, " "moderate-conservative," "moderate-radical, " an d "radical. " Fig. 2 illustrate s quit e clearl y th e patter n o f landlor d domi nation o f office s tha t wa s describe d i n th e analysi s for 1877 . Tha t year al l o f the boards i n Irelan d bu t si x were i n the conservativ e o r moderate-conservative categories , meanin g that mos t o f the tenant s who hel d a n offic e wer e o n board s wher e th e tw o othe r officer s were landowners . Th e si x boards wit h tenan t majoritie s wer e i n th e unions o f Kilmallock , Co . Limerick , an d Castletown , Co . Cor k (radical); an d Scarif f an d Corofin , Co . Clare ; Inishowin , Co . Donegal, an d Newtownards , Co . Dow n (moderate-radical) . Man y of th e moderate-conservativ e (two-landowner ) board s wer e con centrated i n th e southwester n regio n whic h containe d th e bul k o f the radica l an d moderate-radica l boards . Thi s suggest s a less conservative tendenc y amon g th e guardian s i n thi s regio n eve n a t that earl y date . The 188 6 ma p (Fig . 3) , illustrates the dramati c change tha t ha d occurred i n th e interim , but als o reveal s tha t th e change s followed some distinctiv e regiona l patterns . Mos t o f the board s i n the coun ties sout h o f a lin e draw n fro m Wicklo w t o Galwa y wer e o n th e radical sid e o f th e spectrum , excep t fo r a smal l stri p alon g th e southern coas t o f Cor k whic h remaine d conservativ e o r moderate conservative. Th e board s i n th e southwes t whic h wer e moderate conservative i n 187 7 wer e no w completel y dominate d b y th e tenants. Tw o othe r area s o f radica l concentratio n i n 188 6 wer e i n the norther n Midlands— a regio n stretchin g westwar d fro m th e eas t coast o f Lout h t o Longford—an d alon g th e wes t coas t o f Irelan d from Donega l t o Galway . Bu t i n between th e southern an d norther n radical area s wa s a conservativ e cente r whic h embrace d larg e por -

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lions o f th e countie s o f Dublin , Wicklow , Carlow , Queen s an d Kings. Th e souther n coas t o f Cor k aroun d Cor k cit y wa s also con servative. Bu t th e mos t conspicuousl y conservativ e regio n wa s th e far north , whic h incorporate d al l o f Ulste r wit h th e exceptio n o f a few union s o n th e peripheries . The existenc e o f thes e distinctiv e pattern s t o a larg e exten t proves th e validit y o f usin g th e landownin g an d tenan t officer s t o determine part y influence . If th e decisio n o f th e guardian s t o elec t one, o r two , o r thre e tenant s wa s arbitrary, the n w e would expec t t o find th e radica l an d conservativ e union s distribute d randoml y throughout th e country . Th e fac t tha t the y wer e groupe d i n distinc t pockets of three-landowne r an d three-tenan t unions , an d tha t thes e pockets wer e i n mos t place s separate d b y "buffer " area s o f two landowner an d two-tenan t unions , suggest s tha t th e numbe r o f owners o r tenant s holdin g offic e o n a boar d wa s determine d b y a conscious politica l decision . I t i s unlikely , in othe r words , tha t th e guardians o f a numbe r o f adjacen t union s woul d elec t t o hav e th e same numbe r of owner s o r tenant s i n thei r offices , unles s the number i n itsel f wa s i n som e wa y significant . W e ma y therefor e assum e that th e union s with thre e tenan t officer s wer e controlled entirel y by that elemen t whic h represente d th e tenan t electorate , wherea s th e three landowne r union s wer e stil l dominate d b y th e propertie d classes. W e ca n b e les s certai n abou t th e moderat e "buffer " unions, but ma y conjecture wit h a fai r amoun t of assuranc e tha t th e number of owner s o r tenant s wa s als o significan t there . Sinc e thes e union s were o n th e peripher y o f th e extrem e areas , th e majorit y part y probably ha d a smalle r majorit y an d ha d t o compromis e wit h th e opposition party . N o doub t th e dominan t party i n thes e union s was the part y whic h hel d tw o o f th e offices . We ma y conclud e fro m thes e map s tha t th e fift y percen t figur e for 188 6 di d no t represen t a compromis e i n th e distributio n o f power, bu t represented , rather , a n ascendan t influenc e exercised b y landlords an d tenant s i n separate territoria l regions. I n the northern third o f Ireland , an d i n tw o region s o f th e south , th e "landlords ' ascendancy" stil l prevailed . Bu t throughou t mos t o f th e souther n two-thirds o f th e country—a n are a comprisin g abou t hal f o f territorial Ireland—thi s ascendanc y wa s broke n an d loca l self government b y th e tenantr y wa s a reality . Thi s bein g th e case , th e Local Governmen t Ac t o f 189 8 di d not , a s i s commonly supposed , initiate loca l self-governmen t i n Ireland . I t onl y complete d a democratizing process which had alread y begu n withou t any chang e in th e laws .

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The developmen t o f representativ e loca l governmen t in Irelan d was a slo w proces s whic h ha d begu n i n th e 1830 s wit h th e Municipal Corporations Ac t and th e Iris h poo r la w act. Althoug h i t took sixt y mor e year s fo r th e proces s t o b e complete d legally , th e Irish tenantr y i n th e interi m gaine d a valuabl e educatio n i n loca l self-government i n th e urba n bodie s an d board s o f guardians . B y the tim e th e count y council s wer e establishe d i n 189 8 ther e wa s a plentiful suppl y o f experience d administrator s an d politician s among th e tenantr y wh o wer e read y t o ste p i n t o th e ne w count y seats withou t an y los s o f continuity . I t i s i n thi s context , a s a n educational experienc e fo r the tenantry , tha t th e movemen t t o cap ture th e board s o f guardian s i s mos t significant . Fro m thi s ex perience the y gaine d valuabl e lesson s i n th e operatio n o f th e political proces s and th e techniques o f managing public institutions. Most o f all, they could no t hel p bu t gai n a respect fo r constitutiona l action, whic h the y carrie d wit h the m int o th e ne w Irish stat e afte r 1921. Therefore , th e conflict s i n the boar d room s i n the 1880 s may be regarde d a s a significan t episod e i n th e politica l apprenticeshi p of th e Iris h people .

6

THE I.R.B . AND THE BEGINNING S O F THE GAELI C ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION

T

W.F. MANDLE

he G.A.A . wa s founded as a consequence of an article , ' A word about Iris h athletics' , tha t appeare d i n United Ireland o n i i Octobe r 1884 . Th e writer , almos t certainl y Michae l Cusack , a Dubli n teacher , bewaile d th e fac t tha t traditiona l Iris h game s ha d been abandone d becaus e o f Englis h rule : ' the hate d an d hithert o dominant rac e drov e th e Iris h peopl e fro m thei r trystin g place s a t the cross-road s an d hurling-field s bac k t o thei r cabins' ; th e Iris h ha d become effete , pursuin g fripperie s an d fashion , or , i f the y stil l prac tised athletics , did s o unde r th e contro l o f a n alie n Englis h Amateu r Athletic Associatio n wher e th e mai n objectiv e wa s t o degrad e th e Irish b y forcin g the m t o compet e in , an d b e defeate d at , sport s un familiar t o them . Th e remed y wa s for ' the Iris h peopl e t o tak e th e management o f thei r game s int o thei r ow n hand s V Cusack wa s the n age d thirty-seven . H e wa s th e principa l o f a coaching academ y i n Gardiner' s Plac e tha t specialise d i n crammin g candidates fo r th e civi l service . H e habituall y wore a bi g blac k hat , knee-breeches, an d carrie d a blackthorn stick . James Joyc e caugh t the tone o f his appearance an d vocabular y in hi s portrait o f the Citize n in Ulysses. H e wa s repute d t o hav e bee n a fenia n i n hi s yout h an d h e was a n almos t exaggeratedl y romanti c nationalis t a s hi s accoun t o f how an d wh y h e ha d com e t o tak e u p th e caus e o f Iris h athletic s shows. H e state d tha t i n a drea m th e assorte d shade s o f Wolfe Tone, Napper Tandy , Thoma s Davis , Kickham , ' Speranza' an d Famin e had com e t o him, bravin g ' leering fiends' . Finall y Thoma s Meaghe r ' darted u p fro m th e Missour i o n a ra y o f th e mornin g sta r an d fiercely asked wha t ha d becom e o f Irish hurlin g ? ' Cusack , ashamed at th e answer s he would have had t o give, then swore to Mother Erin , another o f th e shade s i n attendance , that ' I'll tak e hol d o f th e first caman tha t come s my way , cal l th e boy s together, mak e a beginning, 1

Research for thi s articl e coul d no t hav e bee n undertake n without the assistanc e o f the Australia n Research Grants Commission . I a m als o indebted t o Professo r Olive r MacDonag h fo r hi s hel p an d advice .

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and ask the avid people to join us'. 2 There wa s a prompt response to his ' word'. Th e followin g issue o f United Ireland carrie d a lette r fro m Maurice Davin, a noted member of a noted athletic family, welcoming Gusack's cal l an d suggestin g th e earl y drawing-u p o f officia l rule s for the distinctively Irish game s and sports. 3 Cusac k replied the next week suggesting a meetin g o f intereste d person s a t Thurles , Count y Tipperary, on i November. 4 At 2 p.m. o n that Saturda y eigh t me n me t a t Mis s Hayes' s Hote l and founde d th e Gaeli c Athletic Association fo r * the preservatio n an d cultivation o f national pastimes' . Davin, on e of the eight , wa s elected president, an d Cusac k on e o f th e thre e honorar y secretaries , whil e Croke, Davit t an d Parnel l wer e invited to becom e patrons. 5 I t migh t have seemed pretentiou s fo r eight men , arme d thoug h the y were with nearly sixt y apologie s fo r absence, 6 t o hav e approache d thre e suc h august figures , an d wha t i s more , t o hav e thei r approache s recipro cated, bu t th e rapi d sprea d o f the G.A.A . justifie d suc h pretensions . The unwritte n memoirs of Cusack and th e unpublishe d records of the I.R.B. migh t als o tel l u s th e reason , fo r amon g th e eigh t wa s a suspiciously hig h proportio n o f fenians. This wa s no t surprisin g a s fenian s ha d recentl y bee n tryin g t o organise Iris h game s i n Dubli n an d elsewhere . Ther e ha d bee n meetings o f I.R.B. men P. N . Fitzgerald , P . J. Hoctor , John Mento n 2

See David Greene , ' Michael Cusack an d th e Rise of the G.A.A.' in Conor Cruis e O'Brie n (ed.) , Th e shaping o f modern Ireland (London , 1960), p . 77 , Sixty glorious years o f th e G.A.A. (Dublin , 1947) , p p 9-10 , T. F . O'Sullivan , Story o f th e G.A.A. (Dublin, 1916) , p. 3 , James Joyce, Ulysses (London, 1960), pp 380—448, P. J. (Devlin, Our native games (Dublin, [1935]) , P P 7 > l6 ~l83 United Ireland (hencefort h 17.7.} , 1 8 Oct . 1884 . Se e Pa t Davin , Recollections o f a veteran Irish athlete (Dublin , [1939]) , p p 40-4 2 fo r the achievement s o f hi s brothe r Maurice , describe d a s a 'bi g reach y man', si x feet tall , fiftee n ston e i n weight , an d forty-seve n inche s acros s the chest . A t on e tim e i n th e 1870 5 h e hel d th e world' s recor d fo r th e hammer throw . Se e 6 0 years, p . 8 . 4 U.L, 2 5 Oct . 1884 . 5 There is a report of the meeting in Freeman's Journal (henceforth F./.), 3 Nov . 1884 . Se e als o S . P . O'Ceallaigh , History o f th e Limerick G.A.A. from th e earliest times t o th e present day, Par t I , 1884-190 8 (Tralee, 1937) , p p 29-3 0 an d O'Sullivan , G.A.A., p. 7 . Davit t sen t a n apology for his absence together with his acceptance of the invitation , see Cork Examiner, 3 Nov. 1884 . Crok e an d Parnel l als o accepted, se e £7.7. , 27 Dec . 188 4 6 James Hurley , ' The founder s o f the Gaelic Athletic Association ' in Capuchin Annual, 1960 , p . 197 .

The I.R.B. and the Gaelic Athletics Association 97 and Jame s Bolan d a t Blackrock , Count y Dublin , earlie r i n 188 4 t o consider th e formatio n o f a nationalis t athleti c movement , an d i n August a deputatio n consistin g o f Cusac k an d I.R.B . members J . P . McCarthy, John Sweeney , P. J. Kell y an d James Lynam calle d upo n the nationalis t Bisho p Dugga n o f Clonfer t t o obtai n hi s patronag e of a Gaeli c athleti c association. H e declined , suggestin g the y consul t th e younger Archbisho p Croke. 7 The eigh t wh o met a t Thurle s (th e figur e generall y give n i s seven, but i t seems likel y tha t th e presenc e o f F. R. Moloney , a noted fenian , was conceale d a t th e tim e fo r fea r o f bringin g suspicio n upo n th e Association) wer e Cusack , Davin , Joh n Wys e Powe r ( a Dubli n journalist the n ' with th e extrem e sectio n o f th e Iris h nationalists') , John McKa y ( a Cor k journalist) , J . K . Bracke n ( a Templemore , County Tipperary , stonemaso n an d I.R.B . man) , P . J . Rya n ( a solicitor o f Thurles) , S t Georg e McCarth y ( a membe r o f th e R.I.C . stationed a t Templemor e who , his real purpos e perhap s accomplished , took n o furthe r par t i n th e organisatio n — h e late r playe d Rugb y football fo r Ireland) , an d Moloney. 8 The principle s an d meanin g o f the G.A.A . hav e bee n th e subjec t of fleetin g i f favourabl e historica l comment, 9 mos t seein g i t a s a populist precurso r o f th e Gaeli c League , founde d i n 1893 . But i t ha d its ow n raisons d'etre. First , i t wa s intensel y Anglophobic . Cusac k called rugb y footbal l c a denationalisin g plagu e [carrying ] o n throug h winter the wor k of ruin that cricke t was doing throug h th e summer', 10 and United Ireland saw English games as * the demoralising and prostrating tid e tha t i s rushin g u p t o ou r door s throug h th e ill concealed sewer s which ar e th e home s o f vil e an d treacherou s thing s that wor k during th e night'. 11 Archbishop Croke' s lette r o f acceptance 7

G.A.A Golde n Jubile e Supplemen t Irish Press, 1 4 Apr . 1934 , p p 44, 56 ; Mark Tierney, Croke o f Cashel (Dublin , 19/6), p p 192-3 . 8 For Wys e Powe r se e S.P.O. , Crim e Branc h Specia l (hencefort h C.B.S.) 11207/8 ; fo r McKa y se e R . Smith , Decades o f glory (Dublin , 1966), p . 15 ; fo r Bracke n se e S.P.O., C.B.S. , 12844/ 5 and Andre w Boyle , Poor dear Brendan (London, 1974) , p p 19-20 ; fo r Rya n an d McCarth y see 6 0 Glorious years, p. 10 ; fo r Molone y see S.P.O., C.B.S. , 126/8 . 9 See, e.g., F. S . L. Lyons , Ireland since th e famine (Londo n rev. ed. , 1972,) p p 225-7 ; Olive r MacDonagh , Ireland {Ne w Jersey , ne w ed . (1977), p p 72-3 , an d C. Cruise O'Brien, ' 1891-1916 ' i n idem. Shaping, 1 PP 'S?10 Brendan MacLua , Th e steadfast rule: a history o f th e G.A.A. ban (Dublin, 1967) , p . 96 . 11 3 Jan. 1885 . This could have bee n written by Cusack, but Willia m O'Brien, th e editor's , styl e wa s no t dissimilar .

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which becam e a manifest o o f th e G.A.A . wa s bitterl y anti-Englis h and flamboyantl y pro-Irish . Al l thing s English—fashion , accent , literature, music , dancing , mannerisms , game s an d pastimes—wer e attacked, al l thing s Irish , thos e 'rac y o f the soil / wer e praised. 12 The timin g o f the G.A.A.' s foundatio n reflected fears tha t th e new organised sport s o f th e lat e nineteent h centur y would , i f directe d from Englan d an d integrated int o a United Kingdo m pattern, furthe r weaken distinctiv e Iris h culture . Associatio n footbal l had com e unde r the control , i n 1880 , o f a n Iris h Footbal l Association , modelle d o n the Englis h F.A. , an d usin g it s laws. Rugb y footbal l in Irelan d gre w up i n the i86o s around a Trinity College , Dublin, club which formed the Iris h Footbal l Unio n i n 187 4 wit h anothe r Dubli n club , th e Wanderers, whic h had bee n founde d b y a n Englis h ex-publi c schoolboy.13 Ther e wa s als o a clas s elemen t i n th e movement . Cusack himself wa s particularl y kee n t o exten d spor t t o th e workers, 14 an d Davin spok e o f th e nee d fo r game s * especially fo r th e humbl e an d hard-working who seem now to be born into no other inheritance than an everlastin g roun d o f labour'. 13 Given such attitudes, th e G.A.A. could hardly avoid being political. As th e Irishman pu t it , ' if an y tw o purpose s shoul d g o togethe r they ought , t o b e politic s an d athletics . A politica l peopl e w e mus t be; th e exigencie s of ou r situatio n forc e u s int o perpetua l wa r wit h England . . . ou r politic s bein g essentiall y nationa l s o should ou r athletics V 6 Within a few months o f its foundation th e G.A.A . wa s at wa r o n the athletic s fron t i n a struggl e whic h demonstrate d it s nationalis t principles. Despit e th e fac t tha t probabl y onl y on e meetin g unde r G.A.A. auspice s ha d bee n hel d befor e Januar y 1885, " an d tha t n o 12 13

U.I., 27 Dec. 1884 .

It was not until 188 1 that the Dublin an d th e independently formed Belfast club s (th e firs t i n 1868 ) combine d t o for m th e Iris h unio n tha t drew it s rule s an d it s opponent s fro m th e res t o f th e Unite d Kingdom , see W. J. Morgan and Geoffrey Nicholson, Report on rugby (London, 1959), p p 97-8 . 14 See, e.g., F.J., 3 Sept. 1885 . 15 '(Hurley Founders' , p . 205 ; 6 0 Glorious years, p. 13 ; U.L, 1 8 Apr . 1885. 16 Quoted i n O'Sullivan , G.A.A., p 12 . 17 At Tuomes , Count y Cork , se e F.J., 1 9 Nov . 1884 . Thi s meetin g consisted o f foo t race s only . Th e firs t majo r meetin g di d no t tak e plac e until Ma y 188 5 a t Blarney , Count y Cork , se e F.J., 4 Ma y 188 5 an d th e first footbal l gam e wa s a t Callan , Count y Kilkenny , earl y i n February , see 6 0 Glorious years, p. 14 .

The I.R.B. and th e Gaelic Athletics Association 9

9

G.A.A. rule s fo r football , hurling , o r athletic s wer e publishe d unti l February i885, 18 thos e the n i n charg e o f Iris h athletic s recognise d a threat. Ther e was no Iris h Amateu r Athletic Association at the time, 19 but step s wer e speedily take n t o for m on e once the G.A.A . committee announced o n 1 7 Januar y 188 5 that , afte r S t Patrick' s day , n o athlete woul d b e allowe d t o compet e a t a G.A.A . meetin g i f h e competed elsewher e unde r othe r rules. 20. Fiv e day s late r th e Iris h Cycling Associatio n me t an d on e delegat e calle d fo r cyclist s to unit e with other Irish athletes * to quash the G.A.A.'.21 Within a couple of day s o f thi s appeal , a meetin g o f representative s o f athletics' , harriers', cyclists' , an d footballers ' club s wa s hel d i n Dubli n an d arranged fo r a furthe r meetin g t o for m a n Iris h Athleti c Association on 2 1 February. 22 Cusack turne d u p t o thi s meetin g an d becam e a t onc e th e centr e of a storm. Davin ha d writte n a letter asking that Cusac k b e permitte d to attend , bu t h e spurne d th e courtesy . H e woul d no t ris k betrayin g the G.A.A. , h e said . H e the n refuse d t o b e accounte d anothe r delegate from th e G.A.A. , McKay an d F . O'Crowley, th e association' s official handicapper, 23 bein g alread y ther e i n tha t capacity . Finall y he chos e t o remai n a s a membe r o f th e press . Eventuall y th e repre sentatives o f th e twent y club s presen t wen t o n t o for m a n Iris h Amateur Athletic Association. 24 Th e tw o rival association s no w bega n a struggl e tha t laste d fo r jus t ove r a year , unti l Apri l 1886 , whe n i t had become clea r that , far from bein g ' quashed', the G.A.A. , whic h had o n its side all the advantages accruin g t o an organisatio n avowedl y nationalist, ostentatiousl y Irish , and, crucially , church-supported , wa s by far th e stronger o f the two . The first test of strength came on Sunday 17 June 1885, at Tralee. The Count y Kerr y Athleti c an d Cricke t Clu b ha d advertise d a 18

See U.I., 7 Feb. 1885 for first football and hurling r ules, 14 Feb. for weight-throwing , an d 2 1 Feb . fo r jumping . 19 Lyons, Ireland, p 22 5 suggests tha t there was, bu t h e seem s to be in error, fo r th e foundatio n meetin g wa s no t hel d unti l 2 1 Feb . 1885 , see below . 20 21 22

U.I., 2 4 Jan. 1885 . Thi s wa s the beginnin g of the famou s ' ban'. F./., 23 Jan. 1885 . F./., 29 Jan. 1885 . 23 O'Crowley wa s a n Advance d I.R.B . se e S.P.O . C.B.S . 126/8 , Return o f Advance d I.R.B. s an d F.B. s wh o attende d Thurle s G.A.A . Convention, etc. (hencefort h * Return ') . 24 F./., 24 Feb. 1885 ; U.I., 2 8 Feb. 1885 ; 60 Glorious years, pp 13-14 . The G.A.A.' s representative s opposed th e decision .

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meeting unde r I.A.A.A . rule s t o b e hel d o n tha t date . Th e G.A.A . organised a rival meeting invitin g Irishme n ' to choos e betwee n Iris h and foreig n laws '.25 The I.R.B. , led by an ol d fenian, Willia m Moor e Stack, playe d its part, a s did th e clergy , a loca l priest , F r McMahon , opening th e meetin g wit h a clai m that th e G.A.A.' s existence showe d that th e * soul had com e back to Irelan d ' . Specia l trains and carriage s brought spectator s an d competitor s fro m al l ove r th e south-wes t o f Ireland, and whil e between te n an d fifteen thousand person s watched over 45 0 athlete s competin g unde r G.A.A . rules , a fe w hundred i n a nearby fiel d attende d th e disastrousl y out-face d I.A.A.A . meeting. 26 Nothing thereafte r tha t summe r coul d hal t th e rapi d progres s o f th e G.A.A. O n 1 1 Jul y United Ireland announce d that it could no longer carry report s o f al l G.A.A . meeting s becaus e the y ha d grow n to o numerous, an d o n 8 Augus t th e Freeman's Journal bega n printin g lengthy list s o f prospectiv e meetings . Th e clerg y joine d wit h th e National Leagu e an d even , probably , unknowingly , wit h th e I.R.B. , as at Tralee, in fostering th e growt h o f the organisation . It wa s note d i n Apri l 188 5 tha t si x priest s wer e o n th e Gort , County Galway , committe e an d i n Septembe r tha t th e clerg y wer e present i n larg e number s a t th e Ashford , Count y Wicklow , sports. At Queenstown Fathe r Murph y becam e presiden t o f th e G.A.A . clu b and clerica l suppor t wa s reportedl y stron g i n Drogheda . Th e firs t school t o hav e a G.A.A . clu b was the Carmelit e colleg e a t Terenure , County Dublin , whic h forme d on e i n Octobe r 1885 . Th e Nationa l League an d th e Lan d Leagu e wer e particularl y activ e i n Kerry. 27 By August 188 5 Cusac k claime d tha t the G.A.A. ha d ' hundreds' of clubs , bu t a t th e conventio n o f March 188 6 onl y sixty-eigh t club s had pai d affiliatio n fees , no t i n itsel f a totall y definitiv e indicatio n o f numbers, but on e that suggests Cusack' s figure was an exaggeration. 28 The I.A.A.A. , whic h claime d i t ha d twenty-nin e club s b y th e sam e month,29 attempte d t o counte r thi s surg e o f suppor t b y imposin g a counter-ban t o becom e effectiv e o n i Septembe r i885, 30 bu t th e spectacle o f th e Iris h athletic s worl d s o divide d move d Crok e t o 25

U.I., 3 0 May an d 1 3 June 1885 . ™U.I.f 27 June 1885; O'Sullivan, G.A.A., p. 22; T. S. O'Sullivan papers (N.L.I . M S 15385) . 27 £/./., 4 Apr., 29 Aug., 26 Sept., and 1 7 Oct. 1885 ; F./., i Jun e and 26 Oct. 1885; O'Sullivan, G.A.A., pp 18, 22; 'PF' (Patrick Foley), Kerry's football story (Tralee, 1945), p. 31. 28 F.J., 6 Aug. 188 5 and i Mar . 1886 ; U.I., 6 Mar. 1886 . 29 F./V 2 9 Mar. 1886 . 80 F./., 1 9 Aug. 1885.

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1

suggest ' toleration' i n a lette r t o th e first annua l conventio n o f the G.A.A., hel d o n 3 1 Octobe r a t Thurles; 31 an d afte r a disput e ove r an I.A.A.A . proposa l fo r amalgamation, whic h the G.A.A. indignantly rejected,32 th e ban s wer e lifted b y th e G.A.A . i n Februar y 1886 , an d by the I.A.A.A. in March. 33 One o f the major issue s in the contest ha d been accusations that the G.A.A. had to o close a link with the national movement. N o matte r ho w muc h th e G.A.A . denie d thes e accusa tions, callin g the m ' as vile a productio n a s has ever bee n evolve d ',34 it wa s a charg e tha t ha d substance , a s th e evidenc e showed, an d a s such statement s as ' the Gaeli c Athleti c Associatio n i s not a politica l association althoug h i t i s a thoroughl y nationa l one S35 faile d t o refute. Th e ver y names of the club s spoke of the natur e of the associa tion. Ther e wer e man y Youn g Irelands , ther e wa s a n Erin' s Hope , a Bra y Emmet's , a Dubli n Kickham's , an d ther e wer e club s named after Biggar , Davit t an d Parnell. 36 The gree n flag with th e gol d har p floated ove r G.A.A . sport s meetings, 37 an d th e whol e associatio n revelled i n it s link s wit h a specificall y Iris h tradition . The G.A.A . fro m th e star t too k grea t pain s t o emphasis e th e distinctiveness an d th e lon g histor y o f Iris h game s an d sports . Iris h football wa s claime d t o hav e separat e origin s fro m th e Anglo-Saxo n versions. Hurling was traced bac k to the day s of Cuchulain and vested with legendar y grandeur , an d Iris h athletic s wer e sai d t o b e coeva l in origi n wit h thos e o f Greece . A s United Ireland pu t i t o n 5 Septembe r 1885 , th e G.A.A.' s 'idea l Irelan d wa s dotte d al l ove r with miniatur e armie s o f hurlers , bowlers , jumpers , weight-throwers , merry dancer s and joyous singers '. The nationalis t an d politica l implication o f such attitude s engage d the increasing attention o f Dublin Castl e an d i t i s t o it s record s tha t we ow e muc h o f th e evidenc e o f th e I.R.B.' s successfu l attemp t t o make th e G.A.A . it s own . Th e proble m o f usin g suc h evidenc e i s apparent, bu t th e publi c recor d o f events , a s detaile d i n th e press , confirms th e polic e analysis . Moreove r th e genera l impressio n t o b e gained fro m th e reports , bot h a t th e loca l an d centra l level , i s of 31

F.J., 2 Nov. 188 5 an d U.I., 7 Nov. 1885 . F.J., 5 and 8 Dec. 188 5 an d 9 Mar . 1886 . 83 F.J., i an d 2 9 Mar. 1886 ; U.L, 6 Mar. 1886 . 34 U.L, 1 5 Nov. 1884 . 85 O'Sullivan, G.A.A, p 23 . 36 Carbery'' (P. D. Mehigan), Gaelic football (Dublin, 1941), p. 89; O'Ceallaigh, Limerick, p 35 ; U.L, 6 Mar . an d 1 1 Nov . 1886 . 87 U.I., 2 6 Sept. 1885 . 32

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matter-of-fact reportag e rathe r tha n o f hysterica l paranoia . Fina l judgment mus t res t wit h th e reade r a s h e watche s th e stor y unfold . In nineteenth-centur y Ireland, n o organisatio n suc h a s the G.A.A . could avoi d a politica l dimension . A s a Dubli n Castl e repor t pu t it , early i n 1888 , ' the questio n wa s not whethe r th e associatio n wa s a political one , bu t onl y t o wha t particula r sectio n o f Iris h nationa l politics i t coul d b e annexe d 5 .38 Th e advantage s t o whateve r sectio n did anne x th e G.A.A . ha d rapidl y becom e obviou s a s th e associatio n grew in strength durin g 1885 . From th e very outset, some had regarde d the G.A.A . a s a creatur e o f th e I.R.B . Inspecto r Water s wen t s o fa r as t o stat e tha t th e G.A.A . ha d bee n founde d b y th e I.R.B . H e ex plained tha t th e succes s o f th e Lan d League , followe d b y tha t o f Parnell an d th e Nationa l League , ha d spli t th e ' old fenian ' move ment int o thos e wh o ' more o r les s honestl y supporte d th e polic y of Parnell, an d accepte d hom e rul e a s a settlemen t of the Iris h question ' and thos e ' who retaine d thei r origina l determinatio n t o b e satisfie d with nothin g les s tha n absolut e independence' . This latte r party , acceptin g the genera l assurance tha t hom e rule , a s denned b y th e othe r section , woul d becom e a n accomplishe d fact , cas t around fo r a means whereby they could in such an even t be in a positio n to contro l an d direc t the Iris h executive to thei r ow n ends; an d wit h this object, th e ide a suggeste d itsel f o f combinin g the muscula r youth of th e country int o a n organisation , drilled an d discipline d t o for m a physica l power capabl e o f over-awin g [sic] an d coercin g th e hom e rul e govern ment o f th e future . The moderate s and th e clergy , either throug h ignorance , o r confidence that the y coul d kee p th e I.R.B . i n check , supporte d th e ne w association.39 The I.R.B . influenc e i n th e executiv e o f th e G.A.A . wa s main tained at the elections to office a t th e 188 5 convention. Davi n remaine d president, Cusack , McKa y an d Wys e Powe r secretaries . Th e vice presidents wer e Bracken , J. E . Kenned y (a n 'advance d I.R.B . man 340 from Cork) , J . F . Murphy , J . Stewar t an d W . Barry . F . O'Crowle y remained officia l handicapper . Ther e wer e therefor e fiv e fenian s o n the ten-ma n executive . During the yea r Murphy , McKa y an d Cusac k left th e executive . Cusack' s goin g was , inevitably , th e stormiest . His extreme statements ha d hampere d negotiation s wit h th e I.A.A.A . 38

' The political aspect o f the Gaeli c Athleti c Associatio n i n Irelan d ', P.R.O. C.O . 904/16 . - 89 Inspector A. W. Waters, n Nov . 1887 , i n S.P.O. , G.B.S . 126/8 . 4! " Return ' , loc . cit.

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In Januar y 1886 , a t quit e a delicat e stag e i n th e discussion , h e ha d publicly calle d i t a ' ranting, impotent , Wes t Britis h abortio n ', 41 an d the previou s Jun e h e ha d successfull y sue d it s president , J . Dunbar , for libel. 42 The n i n Marc h 1886 , a s a resul t o f th e Freeman's Journal delaying the report of a speech of Croke's on the topic of amalgamation, Cusac k ha d writte n a fier y lette r t o Crok e declarin g that h e woul d ' face out ' bot h hi m an d th e Freeman. Crok e angril y replied tha t i t wa s he wh o ha d requeste d th e Freeman t o dela y pub lication o f his speech s o that h e migh t ve t it s text. H e adde d tha t ' if Mr Michae l Cusac k i s allowed t o pla y th e dictato r i n [th e G.A.A.'s ] counsels, t o ru n a reckles s til t wit h impunit y an d withou t rebuke ' then he , Croke , coul d no t continu e a s patron. 43 H e wa s i n troubl e again i n June , bein g rebuke d b y th e executiv e fo r criticisin g th e Dublin Grocers ' Assistant s clu b fo r appointin g it s ow n an d no t th e G.A.A.'s officia l handicapper. 44 Then , i n July , Wys e Powe r sen t a letter o f complain t to Davi n abou t Cusack' s secretaria l incompetence . A specia l meetin g wa s a t onc e calle d fo r Sunday , 4 July , an d i n Bavin's absence , Fran k Molone y too k th e chair . Cusack' s rathe r pathetic effort s t o defen d himself (h e too k a shea f o f letters an d posta l orders, som e o f them , o n late r evidence , reveale d t o hav e bee n un cashable becaus e the y wer e seve n month s old , fro m hi s pocke t t o demonstrate hi s master y o f th e correspondence ) failed , an d h e wa s expelled fro m hi s positio n b y 4 7 vote s t o i3. 45 Cusack' s tempestuou s behaviour ha d finall y persuade d hi s colleague s o f th e necessit y to b e rid o f him; a s he sa w i t h e wa s bein g persecuted. The I.R.B . confirme d it s utilisatio n o f th e G.A.A . i n Septembe r 1886. Joh n O'Lear y wa s invite d t o becom e th e fourt h patro n o f th e Association, an d i t wa s decide d t o se t u p committee s t o organis e memorials t o C. J. Kickha m wh o had die d i n i882. 10 A t th e elections to offic e a t th e 188 6 annua l conventio n held a t Thurle s o n 1 5 November th e T.R.B . virtuall y too k ove r th e executive . The conventio n o f 1887 ha s generall y bee n see n a s th e on e i n whic h th e I.R.B . mad e it s bid fo r powe r i n th e G.A.A.,' 7 bu t examinatio n o f th e me n wh o wer e 41

F.y., 9 Jan . 1886 . F./., 5 J"» e 1885 . ' 1S F./-. 9 . 19 , 2 0 an d 2 3 Mar . 1886 . H F./ V 5 an d 7 Jun e 1886 . "F./., 5 July 1886, 3 and 4 April 1889, f/-7-> IO JulY l88646 F.J., 3 0 Sept. 1886 . !T Sec , e.g. , Greene , ' Cusack ', p . 8 3 an d Nichola s Mason , Football ! (London. 1974) , p . 81 . 42

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elected i n 188 6 bear s ou t th e trut h o f a n I.R.B . leader' s remark s t o a polic e agen t i n Novembe r 188 7 tha t th e priest s wh o ha d com e t o oppose th e I.R.B . wer e c about a yea r to o lat e '.48 Davi n remaine d president, bu t th e ne w vice-presidents were Bracken, Kennedy , P . T . Hoctor an d Fran k Moloney . Patric k Hocto r wa s fro m Limerick , a great frien d o f a leadin g I.R.B . man , P . N . Fitzgerald , an d a ver y active worker on behal f o f the brotherhood. 49 Th e ne w treasure r wa s Patrick Hasset t o f Ahane , Co . Limerick , a n advance d I.R.B . man. , and the fou r secretarie s were all members of the I.R.B.—Wys e Power, Tom Riorda n o r O'Riorda n o f Cork , J . B . O'Reill y o f Dublin , an d James Butle r o f Thurles. 50 F . B . Dinee n replace d O'Crowle y a s official handicapper . Th e I.R.B . triump h wa s rounde d of f b y O'Leary's acceptanc e o f th e pos t o f patron. Jus t a s th e initia l choic e of Croke , Davit t an d Parnel l a s patrons reflecte d th e balanc e withi n the orthodo x nationalis t force s a t it s inception , th e additio n o f Joh n O'Leary showe d ho w th e balanc e wa s tilting afte r onl y tw o year s of existence. Following thi s conventio n the I.R.B. , almos t wholl y in contro l of the centr e o f the G.A.A. , bega n it s effort s t o exten d that contro l int o the provinces . O n 2 7 Februar y 188 7 th e ne w executive s me t a t Wynn's Hote l i n Dublin . Davi n wa s unabl e t o b e presen t an d th e chair was taken b y Bracken. Every one o f the other s present wa s also a membe r o f th e I.R.B.—Kennedy , Hoctor , Dineen , Hassett , Wys e Power, O'Reill y an d O'Riordan , togethe r wit h thre e coopte d members, Anthony Mackey , P . J . O'Keeff e an d P . C . Kelly. 51 Th e meeting made a numbe r of rulings that unde r the term s of article 1 4 of th e constitutio n wer e completel y illegal . Member s o f th e Roya l Irish Constabular y were banne d fro m competin g at G.A.A . meetings; county committee s ha d t o sanctio n al l propose d meeting s and , mos t importantly, hencefort h al l member s o f th e executiv e wer e t o b e 48

F. B. Dineen speakin g t o Const. O'Reilly, se e S.P.O., C.B.S., 126/8 . For Hocto r se e S.P.O. , C.B.S . 1128/ 8 an d P.R.O. , C.O . 904/17/351. 50 For ^ Hassett an d O'Riorda n se e 'Return' , loc.cit ; fo r O'Reill y S.P.O., C.B.S. , Repor t o f distric t inspector , crim e special , o n secre t societies (hencefort h S.S.) , Norther n division , Sept . 1887 ; fo r Butle r see S.P.O., C.B.E. , 9500/ 8 an d 9692/8 , an d Gaelic Athlete, 1 0 Jul y 1915 . 51 For Mackey , I.R.B . count y centre fo r Limerick , se e S.P.O., C.B.S . 9000/8 an d P.R.O. , C.O . 904/18/713 ; fo r O'Keeffe , count y centr e fo r Kilkenny, se e S.P.O., C.B.S . 5404/ 8 an d P.R.O. , C.O . 904/18/821 ; fo r P. C . Kell y (no t t o b e confuse d wit h P . J . Kelly , als o o f Galway ) see S.P.O., C.B.S . 5528/ 8 and P.R.O., C.O. 904/18/647 . 49

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ex officio member s o f al l count y committees wit h power s t o vote . I n other word s th e I.R.B . ascendanc y a t th e centr e coul d b e extende d if necessary an d a t wil l to an y provincia l par t o f the organisation. 52 Davin, whe n sen t a cop y o f thes e ne w rules , wa s horrified , an d protested a t an executive meeting hel d i n Limerick o n Easter Monday , ii April . Hi s protests wer e unavailing, an d s o on 1 8 Apri l h e sent i n a lette r o f resignation . H e late r explaine d tha t h e fel t h e ha d tw o courses open to him, either t o cal l for a special conventio n wit h all the political dissension s it woul d arouse, o r t o resig n an d * see how thing s went o n *.53 At anothe r ' packed' executiv e meeting hel d a t Limeric k on 2 8 May , hi s resignatio n wa s considere d an d accepted . Th e presidency la y vacant an d th e I.R.B . monopolise d th e executive . During th e summe r th e ne w executiv e strov e bot h t o exer t it s authority an d to demonstrate it s adherence to the more extreme bran d of Iris h nationalism . I t di d this , in sporting terms , by tryin g to dictat e to tw o leadin g Dubli n athleti c clubs , th e Grocers ' Assistant s an d that o f th e Freeman's Journal, wh o shoul d handica p thei r majo r meetings. Bu t th e issu e ranged furthe r an d wa s seen t o rang e further than on e o f athletics pure an d simple . On 2 8 Ma y th e executiv e ' proclaimed' th e Grocers ' Assistant s meeting se t dow n fo r 1 0 July . Th e ful l Count y Dubli n committe e responded o n 8 Jul y wit h a critica l attac k o n th e ne w executive. Such vexatiou s an d tyrannica l readin g o f th e rule s a s th e centra l com mittee hav e adopte d the y believ e wil l d o mor e har m t o th e G.A.A . tha n all th e coercio n act s coul d possibl y do , an d the y trus t tha t befor e i t i s too lat e thos e wh o hav e th e carryin g ou t o f th e rule s wil l giv e a mor e liberal interpretatio n o f the m . .. as i f no t district s tha t ar e thoroughl y Gaelic wil l b e foun d floatin g th e fla g o f th e I.A.A.A. 84 The meetin g wen t ahead , despit e a hai l o f posters, distribute d b y supporters o f th e executive , whic h underline d th e politica l realitie s of the dispute: The Gaeli c Athleti c Association . Nationalists o f Dublin ! Down wit h dissension ! Discountenanc e disunion ! Suppor t no t th e would-be wrecker s o f th e G.A.A. ! Dow n wit h th e me n wh o woul d dis grace the association tha t has for its patrons the tried, true, and illustriou s Irishmen—Archbishop Croke , G . S . Parnell , Michae l Davitt , an d Joh n O'Leary. 52

O'Sullivan, G.A.A., p. 43 . F./., 2 Nov. 1887 . "F./., 9 Jul y 1887 . 53

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Who ar e thos e me n wh o tr y t o prov e that Irishme n are no t worth y of self-government ? The Grocers ' Assistants Sport s Committee. Do no t b y your presenc e a t thei r meetin g commit a n ac t o f treaso n to Ireland . God Sav e Ireland. 55 The succes s o f th e meeting , despit e th e executive' s warnings , emboldened th e Freeman's Journal athleti c club , conveno r o f th e largest regula r athletic s meetin g i n Ireland , se t dow n i n 188 7 fo r 10 September , t o announc e it s intentio n o f bypassin g th e officia l handicapper. O n th e da y tha t decisio n wa s announced , 3 July , th e executive, meetin g a t Limeric k Junction , too k th e extrem e ste p o f expelling th e Grocers ' Assistant s clu b fro m th e G.A.A. , expellin g al l members o f th e Count y Dubli n committe e wh o ha d supporte d th e club, an d suspendin g fo r thre e month s al l athlete s wh o ha d take n part i n the meeting. The chairman , Hoctor, said tha t a n attac k upon ' the national feeling of the country' was being made. All those present at thi s meetin g wer e I.R.B . men—Hoctor , Kennedy , Bracken , Moloney, Frewen , Dinee n an d O'Riordan—who , a s well as imposing suspensions an d expulsions, claime d that the G.A.A . was Ireland's first home rul e association , an d criticise d Dubli n fo r its sneers at ' gentlemen, no matte r ho w estimable , fro m remot e district s '.56 The campaig n wa s stepped u p a s the dat e o f the sport s meetin g neared. O n 3 Septembe r Th e Gael, th e G.A.A.' s officia l newspape r edited b y Hoctor, carrie d a n announcement ' proclaiming' the meeting an d threatenin g suspensio n fro m th e G.A.A . o f al l competitor s and eve n spectator s wh o chose to sho w ' their preferenc e for a half day's pleasur e t o th e exclusio n o f tha t spiri t o f tru e nationa l in dependence '. An editorial called for action on behalf o f 'two hundred thousand true-hearte d Irishmen ' agains t a wea k minded , dissentient clique, actin g unde r th e contro l o f the wors t for m o f the Wes t Britis h element. On th e on e side is independence; o n th e other , treacher y '.57 Matters ha d clearl y gon e fa r beyon d th e questio n o f wh o shoul d b e handicapper at the sports. The meeting took place successfully, claime d the Freeman's Journal o f 1 2 September , perhap s inevitably , bu t th e police ha d som e reservations. 55 Irish Times, 1 1 Jul y 1887 . 50 F.J., 9 , 2 3 an d 2 7 Jul y 1887 57

. Cuttings from Th e Gael (n o copie s of whic h appea r t o hav e survived) i n S.P.O., C.B.S . 126/8 .

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Although th e sport s wer e ver y wel l attende d b y th e respectabl e classes , they were I believe o n the whole a failure i n a monetary poin t of view . . . The stan d an d enclosure s wer e n o doub t extremel y wel l rilled , bu t fre e passes t o thos e place s wer e ver y freel y given , an d eve n M r E . D . Gra y M.P. brough t larg e number s int o th e ground s o n several occasion s . . . without payin g . . . The fenian elemen t wa s completely absent , an d there were very few of the artisa n an d labourin g classe s present.58

The disput e had prove d bitter enough for Croke to try to intervene late i n July . H e sai d tha t whe n th e G.A.A . wa s founded h e feare d three things : drink , th e ' desecration o f th e Sabbath' , an d ' bad blood'. Thos e fear s ha d prove d largel y groundless , bu t no w a ne w danger, that o f ' dictation', ha d arise n t o caus e ' unseemly squabbl e or contentio n '. 59 Hi s statemen t le d t o suggestion s tha t h e shoul d b e called upo n to mediate, but The Gael snubbed him: ' we do not want one or all o f our patron s a s judges. We want the m to remain i n thei r high an d dignifie d position o f honou r '.60 In private , abou t thi s time , Crok e wa s als o displayin g sign s o f disquiet. I n conversatio n wit h * a f enian' h e wa s reporte d a s sayin g ' The countr y is in a wors e state tha n eve r I remembe r it' . He had confidence onl y in Parnel l an d whe n ' the fenian ' sai d t o him, ' we will ge t nothin g fro m Englan d bu t b y forc e o f arms ' Grok e replie d * I hop e yo u wil l neve r hav e anythin g t o d o wit h th e lik e '.61 During th e autumn , a s the tim e fo r th e conventio n neared, ther e was mounting criticism. A South Tipperar y an d Limeric k conventio n resolved t o oppos e th e re-electio n o f Bracke n an d Molone y i n November, i n Wexfor d a conventio n condemne d ' Bracken an d al l those scoundrels', and a t Clonmel , Go. Tipperary, a meeting called for the restitutio n o f Davin a s president. But no t al l opinio n wa s critical . At a Cor k meetin g Davi n wa s called ' a renegade' , an d hi s name, together wit h tha t o f th e Freeman an d o f th e Celtic Times, wa s hissed. A meeting o f the expelle d Dubli n clubs , held o n 4 November, indicated t o what extent the athletic s aspec t o f the disput e wa s merely a symbo l o f deepe r discord . Th e meetin g resolve d t o deprecat e ' in the stronges t possibl e manne r an y actio n tendin g t o bring the Gaeli c Athletic Association into conflic t wit h the Iris h nationa l movement 5.62 58

Report o f Sup t Reddy , D.M.P. , 1 3 Sept . 188 7 i n S.P.O. , G.B.S . 126/8. 59 F.J., 2 6 July 1887 . 60 Quoted i n O'Sullivan , G.A.A., p. 46 . 61 S.P.O., C.B.S. , S.S. , South-eas t division , Aug . 1887 . 62 F./., 10 , 17 , 2 4 an d 3 1 Oct. , 5 an d 7 Nov . 1887 ; O'Sullivan , G.A.A., p. 46.

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The event s o f th e yea r ha d no t escape d th e attentio n o f Dubli n Castle. Th e result s o f the G.A.A . election s o f Novembe r 1886 , whe n so many familiar names appeared i n new, sporting roles , caused police interest i n th e associatio n t o quicken . I t foun d muc h t o b e disturbe d about. I n Glar e * a goo d opportunit y o f a general communicatio n o f all the leading conspirator s i n the county ' was afforded b y the sudden growth o f th e G.A.A. , whic h existe d t o ' enable leadin g member s of the I.R.B. to consult together' and to recruit young men who marched to an d fro m thei r game s i n militar y orde r an d wer e defian t t o th e police.63 Fro m Tipperar y cam e report s o f P. N . Fitzgeral d travellin g through th e count y in May , ostensibl y as a commercia l travelle r bu t carrying n o samples . H e wa s accompanie d b y J . E . Kennedy , an d after the y ha d lef t a loca l I.R.B . ma n tol d a polic e agen t tha t th e G.A.A. woul d be ' a useful thin g to keep us together . .. if our organi sation wa s failin g '.64 B y Jun e th e polic e feare d tha t th e extremist s were erodin g * the goo d influenc e o f th e priest s an d tha t th e growt h in th e G.A.A . wa s hardl y t o b e accounte d for b y a sudde n lov e of athletics \65 By th e summer the G.A.A . wa s well enough organise d i n Clar e t o be abl e t o ' take ove r a s the leadin g nationalis t organisation ' i f th e National Leagu e wer e proclaime d (a s i t wa s i n August). 66 P . J . Mclnerney, a n I.R.B . ma n wit h suspecte d connection s wit h th e Invincibles,67 wa s running th e G.A.A . fro m Enni s a s ' a cloa k unde r which meeting s o f the dangerou s character s ca n tak e plac e wheneve r the Nationa l Leagu e ma y b e suppresse d 5 .68 Som e doubt s wer e none theless being expresse d a s to exactly how loya l was the G.A.A . t o th e National League, 69 bu t th e constan t activit y o f th e I.R.B . i n th e association w^t s no t i n question . Dinee n an d O'Reill y wer e bus y recruiting an d organisin g G.A.A . club s throughou t Louth , an d b y October th e movemen t wa s spreading int o Armag h an d Mona^ha n with larg e crowd s attending the matches. 70 I n Queen' s Count y I.R.B . 63

S.P.O., C.B.S. , Divisiona l commissioners ' an d count y inspectors ' monthly repor t (hencefort h monthly report ) south-wester n division , Mar . 1887. 04 S.P.O., C.B.S. , S.S. , south-east , Ma y 1887 . 65 Ibid., June 1887 . 66 S.P.O., C.B.S. , monthl y report , south-west , Jun e 1887 . 67 S.P.O., C.B.S . 12.24/8. ' 08 S.P.O., C.B.S. , monthl y report , western , Aug . 1887 . 69 E.g. S.P.O. , C.B.S. , SS. , south-eas t Jul y 188 7 an d monthl y report , western, Jul y 1887 . 70 S.P.O., C.B.S. , SS. , northern , Sept . an d Oct . 1887 .

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' orders' ha d com e throug h i n Jul y t o star t twenty-on e G.A.A . branches, an d i n th e wes t eac h I.R.B . centr e wa s reporte d t o hav e received instruction s t o atten d al l loca l hurlin g matche s i n orde r t o recruit youn g me n t o th e Brotherhood. 71 Police reports onl y confirmed what the public prints demonstrated; that th e G.A.A . wa s becoming a political organisatio n o f a particula r cast, i n whic h athletic s playe d onl y a mino r role . Ther e woul d b e much t o discus s a t th e convention . c Wait til l November! ' ha d bee n a cr y a s earl y a s July, 72 an d b y Novembe r th e topic s fo r discussio n had multiplied . Th e association' s ex-presiden t ha d condemne d th e executive o n th e ev e of the convention , expressing fear s fo r th e safet y of delegate s in th e prospectiv e overcrowding at Thurles; 73 Archbisho p Croke ha d bee n snubbed ; the Count y Dublin committe e and almos t all the city' s clubs had bee n expelled ; an d throug h th e countr y ther e had bee n expression s o f disquiet. The I.R.B. , awar e tha t a conflic t wa s in th e offing , lai d it s plan s to ensur e that th e conventio n woul d affor d suppor t t o th e executive . There were by now over 600 clubs in the G.A.A. , eac h with the righ t to sen d tw o delegate s t o th e convention ; henc e th e fear s o f Davi n and others . Th e ver y numbe r o f clubs , man y o f recen t foundation , gave a n opportunit y t o ri g th e conventio n tha t th e I.R.B . di d no t neglect. Afterwards , a parish pries t fro m Roscrea , Count y Tipperary , complained tha t me n no t know n in hi s district ha d represente d club s that di d no t exist. 74 Fro m Tipperar y i t wa s claime d tha t ther e wer e no suc h club s a s Nenag h Castle , Ferryglass , Cloughprio r o r Drominagh, ye t ' delegates' fro m the m wer e a t th e convention , an d a Templemore club, which sent n o delegates, was surprised t o discover that tw o me n ha d represente d i t a t th e convention . A delegat e fro m Wexford, a n I.R.B . man , Georg e Keegan , wh o wa s electe d t o th e executive, ha d neve r eve n bee n seen a t a matc h i n th e county. 75 A n anonymous lette r fro m Cor k explaine d ho w thing s ha d bee n don e there. There ar e abou t 2 0 clubs i n th e city , man y o f who m coul d no t affor d the cos t o f sendin g delegate s t o th e convention . The y were , however, relieved of all anxiety on this hand by gentlemen fro m tw o 'philanthropic * 71

S.P.O., C.B.S. , SS. , south-east, July 1887 ; monthl y report , western, Sept. 1887 . 72 F.J., 1 3 July 1887 . 78 F.J., 2 Nov. 1887. 74 F./., 29 Nov. 1887 . 75 F./V 1 7 Nov . 1887 ; fo r Keega n se e Return, loc.cit

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eac tions to Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914

societies i n th e cit y volunteerin g t o represen t the m gratis . Th e club s readily consented , and handed ove r their admission cards . . .; tw o other gentlemen . . . represented a hurling club that doe s not exist. . ,76 Non-existent clubs , unknow n delegate s an d prox y representatio n demonstrate th e reprehensibl e sophisticatio n o f th e I.R.B . The brotherhoo d mad e othe r preparations . O n i November , eigh t days before the conventio n was due to meet, a select meeting of county centres an d other s wa s held a t Limeric k ' to arrang e fo r th e Thurle s Convention t o suppor t th e executive , an d exclud e al l bu t I.R.B . men } .77 On th e ev e of the conventio n Hocto r and Fitzgeral d ('walkin g very fas t her e an d ther e quit e pal e wit h anxiety' ) reache d Thurles , and th e nex t mornin g me t thei r allie s a s they arrive d a t th e station . From ther e they moved into the streets of Thurles throug h which fro m time t o tim e contingents of delegates fro m countr y club s ' marched i n perfect militar y orde r '. 78 Between seve n an d eigh t hundre d delegate s cramme d themselve s into th e smal l Cour t Hous e wher e th e conventio n wa s t o b e held . At 1.3 0 p.m. , ami d muc h nois e an d confusion , th e meetin g opene d and Alderma n Morga n o f Cor k (an d o f th e I.R.B.) 79 propose d Fitzgerald a s chairman. Hocto r seconded , bu t ami d a stor m o f cheering an d hissin g F r Scanlan , a Tipperar y priest , propose d a Majo r O'Kelly. Fitzgerald , wh o ha d take n up , withou t an y apparen t justifi cation, th e positio n o f chairman o n th e benc h wher e the executiv e sat, ruled th e nominatio n ou t o f order becaus e O'Kelly ha d bee n expelled from th e G.A.A . A s delegates hooted , shoute d an d whistle d from th e gallery an d floo r o f th e Cour t House , F r Scanla n crie d ou t ' it wil l give a ver y questionabl e appearanc e t o th e outside publi c i f M r P . N. Fitzgerald is elected to the chair'. There were shouts of ' he suffere d for Irelan d ' , and insults were hurled a t the many priest s in the gathering. At one stage i n th e noisy confusio n that followed , Fr Scanla n an d a grou p o f priests advance d toward s th e benc h an d somethin g lik e a free figh t developed , stick s bein g raise d an d collar s grabbed . Hocto r then leap t ont o a tabl e an d bega n a n impassione d defenc e o f Fitzgerald: 76 77

F.J., 1 9 Nov . 1887. Imp. Bourchie r t o Capt . Slacke , 5 Dec . 188 7 i n S.P.O. , C.B.S . 126/8. 78 Reports o f Const . O'Halloran , Acting-Sgt . Murph y an d Const . McNulty in ibid. 79 Ibid.

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I com e today t o th e rescu e o f an Irishma n who ha s bee n insulte d i n th e most gros s an d slanderou s manner, for no other reason tha n that h e ' has run th e outlaw' s bol d career ' (cheers) . I t i s a n outrag e o n Iris h freedo m and a disgrac e t o Irelan d (cheers ) tha t th e peopl e o f Irelan d wil l no t forget fo r centurie s to come. Fitzgerald's histor y justifie d suc h controversy . H e wa s a Cor k publican, late r a commercia l traveller , i n 188 7 age d thirty-nine . H e was th e leadin g I.R.B . organise r fo r th e sout h o f Ireland , a membe r of it s suprem e counci l an d a clos e frien d o f bot h Kickha m an d O'Leary. Suspicion s o f violen t conduc t surrounde d him , Davit t ha d suspected hi m o f placin g bomb s unde r hi s (Davitt's ) platfor m a t a Sligo meeting , an d h e wa s trie d bu t acquitte d o f participatio n i n th e Crossmolina conspiracy. 80 After Hoctor' s speec h hostilit y t o th e priest s mounte d an d Fitz gerald threatened , ' we wil l hav e t o mak e i t roug h i f thi s goe s on . A voice—Roug h w e wil l mak e i t (cheers)' . Separat e altercation s an d shouting matche s wer e going o n all ove r th e hall , table s collapse d an d pressmen fle d fo r cove r clutchin g thei r notebooks . A semblanc e o f order bein g restored , Fitzgeral d threate n t o remov e Scanla n an d tol d him tha t hi s priest' s clot h wa s n o protection . A s Scanla n continue d to argu e tha t Fitzgeral d wa s illegally i n th e chair , h e wa s assaile d b y cries of ' Balfour's pensioner' . So finally, at abou t a quarte r to three , he marche d ou t o f th e Cour t House , t o b e followe d b y abou t tw o hundred supporters . Outside, F r Scanla n tol d the m ' the associatio n was being mad e a fenian organisatio n fo r th e purpos e o f puttin g dow n th e Nationa l League '. H e wen t o n : ' Goodness know s w e hav e enemie s enoug h without fightin g agains t ourselves , but I ca n tel l yo u tha t thes e me n are goin g i n fo r breakin g u p th e Nationa l League , an d w e mus t pu t them dow n '.81 The meetin g the n surge d int o th e market-plac e wher e Scanlan announced , to cheer s for Parnell , tha t a ne w athleti c associa tion, whic h woul d suppor t th e Nationa l League , woul d b e formed . He an d hi s follower s continue d o n t o Hayes' s Hotel , cheere d b y local townspeople , t o for m thi s ne w body . Scanla n too k th e chai r and th e meetin g becam e a politica l rall y o n behal f o f O'Brie n an d the Nationa l League . Ther e wa s muc h tal k o f th e bon d betwee n priests an d people , an d Crok e wa s uphel d a s a symbo l o f Iris h 80

S.P.O., C.B.S . 5786/8 ; P.R.O. , C.O . 904/17/251-2 ; Willia m O'Brien an d Desmon d Rya n (eds) , Devoy's post-bag iSyi-igsS, vol . ii (Dublin, 1953) , p 22 ; F.].} 7 Oct. 1907 . 81 F./V 1 0 Nov. 1887 .

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freedom. A motio n tha t h e b e requeste d t o becom e a patro n o f th e new associatio n wa s propose d b y F r Moloney , anothe r pries t fro m Tipperary, and seconded by , of all people, J . K . Bracken. Bracken's change o f heart, i f it wer e genuine, fo r h e wa s observe d consulting wit h leadin g fenian s befor e h e lef t th e Cour t House , wa s apparently du e to a denunciation b y his local priest that he was c worse than a protestant , o r eve n a n atheist' . Possibl y fo r religiou s reasons , possibly becaus e h e fel t hi s business migh t suffer—h e was , afte r al l a monumental mason—h e bega n t o moderat e hi s ways, thu s incurrin g the wrat h o f local fenian s who unsuccessfull y lay i n wai t fo r hi m on e night. Kenned y wa s anothe r surprisin g attende r a t Hayes' s Hotel , there, s o he said, becaus e ' if he openl y side d wit h P . N . Fitzgerald' s faction h e would . . . have suffered severel y in his business position '. 82 Back i n th e Cour t House , th e conventio n prope r continued . O'Riordan rea d hi s secretary's report , an d th e meetin g the n passe d to th e electio n o f officers . Hocto r an d J . C . For d o f Cor k propose d Edmond Bennet t o f Count y Clar e a s president . Bennet t wa s i n th e words of the police, ' a broken dow n farmer of bad character . H e was a '6 7 fenian. He is a bad lot 5.83 Originally Fitzgeral d himsel f had con templated standing , bu t h e was so taken abac k by the fierceness of the opposition t o hi m tha t h e chos e t o pu t forwar d a les s controversia l figure. He ' never though t thing s woul d becom e s o hot a t th e con vention . . . never dream t tha t th e priests woul d com e s o boldly t o confront hi m '. At one point h e exclaimed, " By G— th e whole thing will bus t an d w e will all b e destroyed . Yo u ma y loo k for a shower of informers no w fro m thos e fellow s "5.84 Th e I.R.B . wa s no t allowe d to get away wit h the easy election o f a puppet. Maurice Davin's nam e was put forward , an d amid ver y grea t confusio n a sho w o f hand s wa s taken . I t wa s no w growing dark ; th e ai r wa s mos t oppressiv e an d warm ; som e o f th e delegates wer e smoking , a fe w wer e disputing . Th e debris o f wha t ha d been onc e th e pett y session s clerk's des k wa s strewn abou t i n fron t o f th e reporters.

The sho w o f hand s prove d indecisive , despit e som e o f Bennett' s supporters raisin g two . A n attemp t t o divid e th e stil l crampe d hous e proving equall y indecisive , afte r a hurrie d discussio n o n the platfor m 82

Reports of Acting-Sgt. Murphy and Inspr . Waters in S.P.O., C.B.S. 126/8. 83 Minute o f Inspr . Turne r t o Const . O'Halloran' s report , loc.cit . 84 Inspr. Bourchie r t o Capt . Slacke , 1 1 Nov . 188 7 i n S.P.O. , C.B.S . 126/8.

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Fitzgerald propose d tha t supporter s o f eac h candidat e pas s ou t int o the courtyar d throug h separat e door s t o b e counted . Ther e followed a cunnin g comedy. At first, only Davin's supporters' doo r wa s opened, and ou t the y poure d int o th e yard . Then , suddenly , i t wa s shoute d that onl y Bennett' s supporter s wer e t o g o outside . A s th e Davinite s tried t o get back int o the Cour t House , the y found thei r wa y blocked and onl y a proportion o f them wer e able to d o so. The doo r wa s then locked, an d i n the gloom, fo r it was now five o'clock, al l those outside the building , Bennet t supporter s an d exclude d Davinite s alike , wer e counted a s voting for Bennett, those inside for Davin. Despite protest s the resul t wa s the n declare d a s 31 6 fo r Bennett , 21 0 fo r Davin. 85 After that , thing s ra n fairl y smoothl y fo r th e I.R.B . Hocto r wa s elected a vice-president , a s wa s Hogan . Patric k O'Brie n o f Nenag h and Willia m Tro y o f Fermoy, County Cor k were also elected a s vicepresidents.86 Anothe r clutc h o f I.R.B. men , D r Jeremia h Nally , R . J . Frewen, P . J . O'Keeff e an d Georg e Keega n wer e electe d committee men, and thre e more I.R.B. members became secretaries—O'Riordan, O'Reilly an d Jame s Weldo n o f Drogheda. 87 F . B . Dinee n wa s re elected a s officia l handicapper , t o b e assiste d b y P . O'She a o f th e intensely nationalisti c Kickha m club , Dublin . J . A . Bradley , a journalist fro m th e Cork Examiner, a ma n withou t any known I.R.B. connections, became records secretary. Their contro l confirmed , th e I.R.B . indulge d i n a fe w delicat e finesses, one o f which was to cos t them dear . The y rescinde d the rule by whic h executive members were ex officio member s of count y committees, an d the y abandone d th e on e which declared tha t th e officia l handicapper shoul d officiat e a t al l larg e meetings . The y the n sub stituted fo r th e rul e tha t th e associatio n shoul d no t approv e an y political movemen t on e tha t th e associatio n shoul d b e non-political . This las t decisio n cause d th e trouble . I t wa s move d fro m th e floor , with what artific e i t is impossible to say, that a resolution of sympathy should b e carrie d i n favou r o f Willia m O'Brien . Ther e coul d hav e been n o shrewde r choic e o f name. O'Brie n wa s a t th e tim e i n Tulla more jail , ' pale an d delicate' , refusin g t o wea r priso n clothe s there because o f the coercio n act , hi s nationalism, an d hi s advocac y o f th e Plan o f Campaign . H e wa s also , o f course , a leadin g membe r o f th e National League . T o th e motion Bennet t said: ' we are afte r passin g a resolution , not to take par t i n politics, an d I rul e such a motion out 85

F.J., 1 0 an d 1 5 Nov . 1887 . For O'Brie n se e Fr . Scanlan' s denunciatio n i n F.]., 1 0 an d 1 5 Nov. 1887 ; fo r Tro y se e S.P.O., C.B.S. , SS. , south-west , Sept . 1888 . 87 For Weldo n se e S.P.O., C.B.S . 5403/8 . 86

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of order' . Those in th e Cour t Hous e wer e not ye t s o quiescent a s t o accept that . There were crie s o f ' we'd di e for O'Brien ' an d counter cries of ' you're ou t o f order' a s the propose r declare d tha t h e would move anywa y 'tha t w e tende r t o tha t pur e soule d patriot , Wm . O'Brien, our heartfelt sympathy in his present tryin g positio n '. There was mor e shoutin g an d Bennet t resolve d th e disput e b y leavin g th e chair, thu s closin g th e meeting . I t wa s then seve n o'clock. Reactions tha t nigh t t o th e day' s event s wer e varied . Sergean t Collins reporte d tha t one I.R.B. man told him : ' they were proud the priests were put out ; tha t th e Clu b wa s composed of fenians, and no t of rotte n nationalists , an d i f the priest s ha d lef t lon g ag o they would have less trouble in organisin g thei r me n '.8S ' Bendigo', a n informer, accompanied Hocto r t o th e pos t offic e an d sa w him sen d a telegra m to John Torley o f Glasgow whic h rea d ' victory al l along th e line '.89 As for th e priests , mos t o f them left Thurle s soon afte r th e meetin g a t Hayes's Hote l ha d ended . The y fel t tha t 'the y ha d th e hones t hurlers . . . and left th e tail end of a fenian society behind the m in the Court House' . Fro m no w o n it wa s likely tha t th e G.A.A . woul d be attacked c from ever y alta r '.90 Fitzgeral d himsel f ha d bee n disturbe d by th e vehemenc e of the priests ' oppositio n an d i t wa s rumoured that some o f his colleague s i n th e I.R.B . leadershi p fel t tha t h e ha d bee n * too hast y an d outspoke n '.91 Hoctor's exultant telegram was premature, fo r th e real struggle had yet to b e joined. A s one delegate sa t in th e train that was taking hi m that nigh t fro m Thurles , h e wa s goade d b y Constabl e Reill y fro m Naas wh o pose d a s a Fitzgeraldite . Th e delegat e finall y turne d o n him: ' I cam e her e t o suppor t th e priest s agains t fenianism , an d puppies lik e yo u wh o com e fro m Dubli n an d elsewher e spreadin g it .. . I'l l d o my best t o stop it , as I kno w well what i t is , an d wha t the resul t o f i t wa s t o a firs t cousi n o f mine, wh o die d sufferin g b v the wor k o f suc h ruffians , an d th e priest s ar e wel l awar e o f what' s going o n too, an d wil l and mus t stop it. 92 And, for a time, they did stop it. Archbishop Croke gave his support to a reconstruction convention that met on 4 January 188 8 at Thurles . Of th e eight y delegates wh o met there , elected b y county convention s 88

Bourchier t o Slacke , 1 4 Nov . 188 7 i n S.P.O. , C.B.S. , 126/8 . Torley wa s th e Scottis h representativ e o n th e suprem e counci l o f the I.R.B. , se e S.P.O., C.B.S . 533/ 8 an d 5757/8 ; Bourchie r t o Slacke , 5 Dec. 1887 , loc.cit . 90 Report o f Const. O'Halloran , loc.cit. 01 Bourchier to Slacke, 5 Dec. 1887 , loc.cit. 92 Report o f Acting-Sgt . Murphy , loc.cit . 89

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on th e basi s o f th e numbe r o f club s in th e county , onl y eightee n ca n definitely b e identifie d a s member s o f th e I.R.B. , althoug h it s votin g strength seem s t o hav e bee n close r t o thirty . During the ofte n storm y meetin g P. N. Fitzgeral d gav e ven t to prophecy. Durin g th e votin g fo r official s whe n th e nominatio n fo r records secretary produced a glut of names (amon g them Balfou r fro m James Lynam) , and a row, Fitzgeral d proteste d agains t ' the unseemly nature' of some of the nominations an d adde d : He had th e proofs in his hand tha t the conventio n wa s ' rigged ' (crie s of ' no, no') . Stil l the y wer e al l Gaels , an d thoug h the y migh t b e beaten , still, perhap s i n twelv e montn s o r tw o year s the y migh t ris e again . M r Dundon (Limerick)—No , sir. 93 Mr Fitzgerald— I don't lik e thes e drunke n interruption s (crie s o f 'withdraw '). No doub t al l convention s ar e rigge d b y caucuses , stil l i f w e wer e in a majorit y we would no t trampl e o n the righ t o f a minority . Mr Dundon—Wh o i s * we ? ' (crie s of ' order '). 94

Whoever ' we' were , they justified Fitzgerald' s optimism . Determine d work throughou t 188 8 an d a n increasin g tendenc y on th e par t o f th e local clerg y t o discourag e participatio n i n th e G.A.A . enable d th e I.R.B. t o regai n ful l contro l a t th e 2 3 Januar y 188 9 convention . They wer e never again t o relinquish it. The increasin g hostilit y o f the hierarchy and the priesthood, which mounted to a climax during 189 1 when th e G.A.A . strongly supporte d Parnell , serve d onl y t o diminis h the numerical strength of the association. I n 188 9 there were 777 clubs affiliated t o th e G.A.A . I n 189 0 ther e wer e 810 , o f which 19 1 wer e controlled by th e clergy , 497 by th e I.R.B., an d 12 2 wer e unattached. The respectiv e membership s wer e abou t 9,000 , 26,000 , an d 5,000 . By 189 1 there were only 66 ' clerical' clubs and 273 I.R.B. ones, with a tota l membership o f about i5,7oo. 95 A s debate grew les s rancorou s and th e politica l climat e les s hars h th e lon g dorman t G.A.A . bega n again t o sti r an d a s it di d s o left n o on e in an y doub t a s to wher e it s allegiance lay . T o explai n ho w an d wh y th e I.R.B . cam e s o earl y to hol d such a strong plac e i n the counsel s of the G.A.A . has been th e purpose o f this study. The patter n se t was not t o change. 96 93

F./.3 5 Jan. 1888 . Ibid. 95 S.P.O., G.B.S . 296/ 8 and 464/8; P.R.O., G.O. , 904/16 . 96 An essa y b y th e author , ' Sport a s politics : th e Gaeli c Athleti c Association 1884-1916' , forthcomin g (1978 ) i n Michae l McKerna n an d Richard Cashma n (eds) , Sport an d history (Brisbane ) deal s i n mor e detail wit h event s covere d i n thi s epilogue . 94

7

CARDINAL CULLEN AND THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF IRELAN D PATRICK J. CORISH

IN TH E followin g page s I hav e trie d t o trac e th e stor y o f a n almost forgotten movement i n Irish history . Th e stor y o f the decad e after 186 0 ha s bee n writte n almos t entirel y i n term s o f Fenianism , but i n fac t tha t sam e decad e sa w the ris e o f a constitutiona l move ment, th e Nationa l Association of Ireland , whic h prepare d th e wa y for th e firs t considerabl e legislativ e achievement s fo r mor e tha n thirty years . I n a sense, th e time s were propitious fo r such a move ment, fo r Iris h aspiration s coul d coun t o n a measur e o f genuin e sympathy an d suppor t fro m th e risin g Libera l part y i n England . On th e othe r hand , the urgen t necessit y o f providing som e effectiv e alternative t o th e Fenia n movemen t mean t tha t th e Iris h part y ha d to b e buil t u p ove r th e fou r difficul t year s befor e Gladstone' s firs t government cam e into office , a period o f such uncertai n allegiances in th e Hous e o f Common s tha t n o governmen t commande d a majority sufficientl y fir m t o contemplat e seriousl y th e introductio n of controversia l Iris h legislation . I hav e confined thi s stud y t o these fou r difficul t year s between the foundation o f th e Nationa l Associatio n a t th e en d o f 186 4 an d Gladstone's takin g offic e a t th e en d o f 1868 . Betwee n these limits , I hav e felt i t necessary to go into matters in some considerable detail, for th e problem s ar e comple x an d largel y unexplored. Th e Fenia n question is , naturally , ever-presen t durin g these years , an d mus t have it s part i n thi s story , i f only because i t wa s the spu r whic h led to the foundatio n of the Nationa l Association, and mad e its founders determined tha t i n spit e o f difficultie s i t mus t succeed . A s fa r a s possible, however, I have tried to confine any discussion of Fenianism to what is necessary as a background t o understanding the histor y of the Nationa l Association. The poin t of greatest interest in this history is probably that which concerns th e politica l opinion s o f Cardina l Cullen. 1 Culle n ha d come from Rom e to Ireland convinced that a Catholic bishop should not directl y concer n himsel f wit h party-politics . Fiftee n years ' experience o f Iris h problem s le d hi m t o modif y tha t opinion . I n the developmen t o f th e Nationa l Associatio n hi s ow n politica l J Created Cardinal-pries t of S . Pietr o i n Montori o a t th e consistor y of 2 2 Jun e 1866.

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opinions emerg e rathe r clearly , and , perhap s surprisingl y t o peopl e who ma y hav e judged the m solel y i n term s o f his uncompromising opposition t o Fenianism , the y wer e not , i n an y accepte d sens e o f the word , conservative. In regar d t o sources , th e newspaper s are , o f course , essentia l t o any study of the period. I have based my work here on the Freeman's Journal* whic h contain s the fulles t report s o f th e progres s o f th e National Associatio n ; othe r newspaper s ar e use d t o supplemen t it on particular issues. Th e newspapers , o f course, d o not provide the whole stor y ; especiall y for th e judgmen t o f motive s behin d men' s public action s i t i s essentia l t o hav e acces s t o thei r privat e corres pondence. Her e I a m unde r a great debt i n particula r to th e Iris h hierarchy an d t o Mgr . Herlihy , recto r o f the Iris h College , Rome , for permissio n t o consul t th e Kirb y correspondenc e i n th e Colleg e archives ; 3 t o hi s Grac e th e archbisho p o f Dubli n fo r permissio n to consul t materia l i n th e Dubli n diocesa n archives, 4 an d t o thos e who helpe d m e there , especiall y Mgr. O'Rega n an d Fr . Kingston ; and t o Professor Dudley Edwards, who put a t my disposal his note s on th e Mannin g correspondenc e i n th e archive s o f the Oblate s o f St. Charles , Bayswater. 5 I

The yea r 186 0 saw the affair s o f Catholic Ireland in a disorganized and depresse d state . I n th e previou s decade , th e Tenan t Leagu e had planne d t o sen d a n Iris h part y t o Westminste r t o pursu e a policy o f complete independence in oppositio n t o an y English part y which should not commit itself to satisfactory legislation for Ireland . The af m wa s a bold one in the circumstance s of the time , an d it ha d not succeeded . Th e Catholi c clerg y ha d taken a prominent par t i n the organizatio n of the Tenan t League , and it s failure ha d lef t the m a legac y o f division s an d recriminations . Amon g th e people , th e failure t o establis h a politica l party devote d effectivel y t o betterin g conditions in Ireland inevitably nurtured the belief that nothing could be expecte d fro m constitutiona l methods . I t seeme d utterl y im possible t o reconstruc t a unite d politica l party , an d i n thes e circumstances th e Fenia n programm e o f arme d revolutio n coul d appear mor e effectiv e tha n i t eve r reall y was. The division s amon g th e Catholi c clerg y enable d th e Torie s t o increase their representatio n steadily , bot h i n by-elections an d in the general electio n of 1857. 6 Relation s between tfr e Catholic s and th e 2 Cited 3

a s FJ . This grea t collectio n o f correspondenc e betwee n Mgr . Kirby , recto r o f th e Irish College , Rome , an d nearl y al l th e Iris h bishop s an d a numbe r o f priests , can run t o 50 0 letters a year. Th e letter s ar e arranged chronologically , and fo r thi s period thos e o f each yea r ar e numbered independently , s o that a reference t o th e number an d dat e o f a lette r identifie s i t fully . 4 Cited as DDA . 5 Cited a s Bayswater, OSC . "Whyte, Th e Independent Irish Party, pp . 16 9 ff . O n th e much-exaggerate d effect o f the synoda l legislatio n o f 185 0 and 185 4 on " priests i n politics " see the

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Whigs, severel y straine d sinc e th e Ecclesiastica l Titk s Bill , erupte d into bitter an d ope n warfar e a s a result o f developments i n Ital y i n 1859 an d 1860 , particularl y becaus e o f Lor d Joh n Russell' s out spoken diplomati c despatc h o f 2 7 Octobe r 1860 , i n whic h h e ha d proclaimed tha t th e government s o f th e Pop e an d th e kingdo m o f Sicily provided so ill for the welfare of their people that their subject s looked t o thei r overthro w a s a necessar y preliminar y t o an y im provement.7 Politically , th e despatc h shocke d ever y conservative i n Europe ; th e Iris h Catholic s wer e as deeply shocked a s any, thoug h the chie f menac e the y sa w in th e declaratio n aros e fro m th e threa t it containe d t o th e Pope' s positio n a s a religiou s leader . Thoug h it wa s easy , o n th e politica l level , t o mak e th e obviou s commen t that Lor d John' s concer n coul d hav e foun d example s o f really ba d government nearer home, th e onl y people who could pres s th e poin t without an y inhibition s wer e th e Fenians . There can be little doub t tha t a n important facto r contributin g t o the grea t increase i n Fenia n recruitin g i n Ireland , especiall y afte r the funera l o f Terence Belle w MacManu s i n Novembe r 1861 , was the widespread conviction that no action in parliament could possibl y induce an y government, Whi g o r Tory, t o giv e serious attentio n t o the problem s o f Ireland, no r coul d anyon e seriously believ e tha t th e Irish member s had eithe r th e qualit y o r the cohesio n t o suppl y th e necessary stimulus . Th e Repea l agitation ha d dwindle d int o th e National League , which , a s even it s leader , Joh n Martin , admitted , was makin g littl e o r n o progress . Whil e it s policy , repea l o f th e Union, wa s clear-cut , i t seeme d t o hav e n o clea r ide a a s t o wha t means it should adopt t o gain this end,8 apart fro m holdin g meeting s at whic h the speaker s were ofte n carrie d awa y int o a n expressio n o f sentiments whic h mad e i t har d t o distinguis h thei r view s fro m Fenianism, eve n thoug h th e League' s polic y rule d ou t th e us e of physical force . Some o f the fieries t speeche s t o b e hear d a t thes e meeting s came from priest s whos e sympathie s ha d bee n wit h th e Youn g Irelan d movement. Th e Tenan t Leagu e priest s wer e als o amon g Joh n Martin's supporters , thoug h thei r hope s wer e directe d rathe r t o th e revival o f a n Independen t Oppositio n part y i n parliament , whic h should hav e Repeal as part o f its programme. Th e leadin g figure in this group was John MacHale, archbishop of Tuam.9 MacHale was as convince d a s eve r tha t n o Britis h governmen t coul d resis t a genuinely unite d Iris h opposition , an d tha t eve n fro m a religiou s point o f view, to secur e th e rea l fruits o f Emancipation, Repea l was comments an d example s ibid. , pp . 12 1 ff . Th e legislatio n wa s no t directe d a t " keeping priest s ou t o f politics, " bu t a t controllin g som e abuse s whic h coul d arise fro m th e larg e par t the y i n fac t too k i n politic s i n Ireland . 7 Cf. Morley , The Life o f William Ewart Gladstone (ed . Lloyd , London , 1908 , 2 vols.), i . 485 . 9 Irish People, 1 3 Augus t 1864 , 2 0 August 186 4 ; Fjf, 2 0 Augus t 186 4 ; an d cf . letter of John Martin , Irish People, 3 December 1864 . 9 See his lette r t o Joh n Martin , 3 August 1864 , FJ, 1 0 August .

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necessary. H e wa s convinced that th e instrumen t h e ha d helpe d to forg e i n th e 18503 , th e Independen t Iris h Party , ha d bee n a n instrument suite d t o hi s purposes . No w that thi s had failed , ther e was no t muc h h e coul d d o politically , apart fro m writin g long an d threatening publi c letter s t o Lor d Palmerston, 11 an d lendin g hi s support i n whateve r wa y h e could , usuall y not ver y effectively , t o the caus e o f " popular politic s ", 12 Another seriou s caus e o f weaknes s an d divisio n aros e fro m th e fact tha t MacHal e was convinced tha t Archbishop Culle n of Dublin had a heavy responsibility in destroying the Independent Iris h Party , and he was not a man who found it eas y to forgive . Thi s estrange ment betwee n th e tw o archbishop s ha d bee n on e o f th e graves t legacies of the dispute. Th e persona l feud between these two natural leaders o f Iris h Catholicis m wa s al l th e mor e .unfortunate becaus e there wa s a grea t measur e o f substantia l agreemen t i n thei r aims . While i t wa s true that MacHale' s approac h ha d mor e o f a political tinge tha n tha t o f Cullen , whic h meant , fo r on e thing , tha t h e attached grea t importanc e t o repea l o f the Union , whic h fo r Culle n was a secondar y consideration , bot h wer e agree d tha t th e urgen t task wa s t o secur e fo r Catholic s tha t jus t shar e i n thei r country , which, i n spit e o f the repea l o f the Pena l Code , the y wer e far fro m possessing i n fact , th e poore r classe s especially . Indeed , i n th e depression an d despai r o f th e earl y i86o s th e prospect s seeme d worse tha n ever ; an d i n thi s despai r th e straightforwar d solutio n proposed by Fenianism ha d man y attractions . This sense of depression and impotence can be traced very clearly in th e extensiv e correspondenc e o f Mgr . Kirby , th e recto r o f th e Irish College , Rome. " We are in a sad, puzzling condition indeed," the bisho p o f Elphi n wrote , " and i t i s a ver y har d thin g no t t o become a declare d rebe l amids t th e scene s tha t ar e rendin g ou r hearts ".13 Th e bisho p o f Kilmor e wrot e tha t th e archbishop s o f Dublin an d Tua m wer e working for Catholic education an d tenant right, bu t coul d mak e n o impressio n o n th e governmen t o r an y person of influence, and that there seemed little hope of improvement, as many Catholic s oppose d the bishops. 14 Th e archbisho p of Cashe l declared that the governmen t ha d no intention of changing th e lan d laws, a s the y wer e onl y to o happ y t o se e th e floo d o f Catholi c emigration continue. 15 Th e mor e occasiona l letter s from priests are usually mor e outspoken . I n letter s o f 186 5 Fr . O'Lear y o f St . "O'Reilly, John MacHale, Archbishop o f Tuam, i. 480; Broderick, The Holy Se e and th e Irish Movement fo r th e Repeal o f th e Union with England, p . 150 . "E.g., FJ, 2 0 Sept. 1861 , 2 0 Feb. 1862 . 12 See hi s lette r t o Bisho p Kilduf f o f Ardagh enclosin g a subscriptio n toward s expenses i n connexio n with the Longfor d election petition, Fjf, 9 Ma y 1862 . H e sends als o subscription s fro m th e bishop s o f Killala , Clogher , Clonfert , Derry , and Achonry . I n th e sam e issu e i s a lette r fro m Bisho p Keane o f Cloyne , als o sending a subscription. 13 Gillooly to Kirby , 1 0 Jan. 1863 , no. 13 . "Browne to Kirby , 1 2 March 1863 , no. 85 . 15 Leahy to Kirby , 2 7 March 1863 , no. 101 .

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Colman's College , Fermoy , clearl y showed tha t hi s sympathies were with th e Fenians. 16 Th e country , h e wrote , wa s wastin g away ; the peopl e had los t confidenc e i n al l but a few of the bishop s ; the y could no t o r woul d no t understan d th e condemnatio n of societies , secret o r otherwise, directe d agains t the state : " 'tis a sad thing t o see th e peopl e separatin g fro m th e priest s an d soul s remainin g in sin because , a s the y say , bishop s violate d th e article s o f '5 2 to whic h the y pu t th e sig n o f th e Cross. " Th e people , h e wrote i n a furthe r letter , aske d n o mor e tha n neutralit y fro m th e priests i n the Fenia n question , an d surel y the priest s owe d nothin g to a heretical government . " It i s ", h e declared, " an uprising of the Iris h rac e agains t Saxo n domination . Ther e i s n o irreligiou s tendency i n it n o matte r wha t ma y be said . . . . rise the y wil l and if oppose d b y th e hierarch y the y wil l mak e n o differenc e betwee n government official s an d clergymen. Woul d to God they could smash the first heretical powe r o n the glob e and destro y the grea t bulwark of the devil." O'Leary' s bishop, Dr . Keane of Cloyne, gave testimon y in a letter a few months late r t o th e continuin g attractiveness o f th e Fenian programme. 17 Th e ver y schoolchildren , h e said , wer e Fenians, not because the y wishe d to give up their faith , bu t becaus e they hated the Fenians ' enemy , England, the enemy of their country, their creed , an d th e Pope . Th e people' s faith , h e felt , wa s bein g dangerously strained ; the y ha d bee n complainin g fo r som e year s past that the clergy were interested onl y in the upper-class Catholics , and wer e neglectin g th e interests o f the poor . It was , indeed, a dangerous an d explosive situation, from bot h th e political an d th e religiou s poin t o f view . I t wa s ver y accuratel y summed u p b y David Moriarty , the bisho p o f Kerry, in a long lette r to Willia m Monsel l date d 2 March 1868 , whic h Monsel l fel t wa s of sufficient importanc e t o forwar d t o Gladstone , i n whos e paper s i t has survived. 18 Th e bisho p wrot e : In fine we are in a sad state. I do not fear revolution or rebellion or eve n sedition . I d o not fea r repea l o f the Unio n ! ! Bu t her e we are in the midst of a people who have renounced their allegiance, and wh o kno w n o patriotis m excep t hatre d fo r thei r rulers . I think thi s a far deepe r evi l tha n rebellio n itself . The clerg y wil l preach agains t rebellio n o n account of the evil s it will brin g o n th e people , bu t I a m sur e tha t thei r almos t un animous opinio n i s tha t i f ther e wa s a fai r chance o f succes s i t would b e lawful , nay , dulce e t decorum. I d o not spea k disrespectfull y o f them. I loo k o n them a s th e key o f the position . Th e Britis h treasur y coul d no t brib e them . They can be gained onl y by justice to the people. I f I diffe r muc h in opinio n with the m i t is because I hav e lived in other land s and studied othe r law s an d I sa w none lik e ou r own . "O'Leary t o Kirby , 2 8 July 1865 , no . 17 2 ; 5 Oct. 1865 , no . 218 . 'Keane to Kirby , 6 Feb. 1866 , no. 24. "Edited b y Whyte in Irish Historical Studies, x. 194- 9 (Sept. 1956) .

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While Moriart y wa s alon e amon g th e Iris h bishop s i n defendin g the Unio n o n purel y politica l grounds, 19 ther e coul d b e n o rea l difference o f opinio n expresse d i n th e publi c pronouncement s o f Catholic bishops o n Fenianism at the time. Whateve r modifications in practic e th e soli d Catholicis m o f Ireland migh t introduc e int o a revolutionary movement , i t wa s hardl y t o b e expecte d tha t th e Church coul d judge othe r tha n i n th e ligh t o f revolutionary move ments i n Europ e generally , an d thi s judgmen t wa s boun d t o b e adverse, especiall y in vie w of the revolutionar y threat t o th e Papa l States. An y possibl e temptatio n t o giv e a benign interpretatio n t o revolution i n Irelan d wa s rule d ou t b y th e statement s o f som e o f the Fenia n leaders , notabl y Jame s Stephens , wh o ha d certainl y come back from Pari s a convinced revolutionar y socialist, an d wh o certainly di d no t pla y dow n hi s contact s wit h revolutionar y circle s there. Strang e a s it ma y seem, ther e wa s in Rom e about th e tim e of th e MacManu s funeral , i n som e circle s a t an y rate , a certai n enthusiasm fo r the movimento Irlandese, bu t i t was prompted merel y by satisfaction i n seeing the discomfitur e of England facin g a t home a movement of the sam e kind as Palmerston an d Lor d Joh n Russel l had done so much to encourage in Italy. Th e mor e sober judgment, specifically tha t o f Cardinal Antonelli , wa s that Fenianis m mus t b e linked with the European revolution ; h e claimed to have information that Frenc h agent s wer e activ e i n Irelan d a s the y ha d bee n i n Hungary an d Poland . Th e Hol y See , h e said , ha d bee n lef t i n a very perplexed condition i n consequence o f the activ e par t take n by the clerg y i n revolution s i n thes e countries . The y ha d bee n approached b y th e Russia n governmen t t o restrai n th e clerg y o f Warsaw. The y ha d refused , o n th e ground s tha t th e issu e wa s a political one , bu t thi s ha d no t prevente d th e exil e of the archbisho p of Warsa w togethe r wit h grea t number s o f hi s clergy . Antonell i approved the actio n take n by Culle n in connexio n wit h the MacManus funeral, an d expressed the hope that the clergy in general would follo w hi s example. 20 In their Lenten pastorals of the following year a number of bishops issued a condemnatio n o f secret societies , th e bisho p o f Clogher, 21 for instance , th e archbisho p o f Dublin an d th e bisho p o f Ossory. 22 The matte r was considered at a bishops' meetin g in May, from which the followin g resolution s wer e issued : That we have heard wit h dee p regret tha t i n some parts o f the country person s hav e bee n know n t o administe r unlawfu l oaths , "See hi s lette r t o th e peopl e o f Kerry , Irish Times, 12 Jan . 1872 . Culle n wa s notoriously suspiciou s o f Isaa c Butt' s Hom e Rul e Movement , bu t hi s oppositio n was not t o Home Rule i n principle , bu t t o certai n aspect s of this particular move ment. Eve n i n thi s case , h e carefull y refraine d fro m makin g an y advers e publi c pronouncement. Se e the ver y interestin g letter , Crok e t o Kirby , 2 8 March 1881 , no.a 83. °DDA, Kirb y t o Cullen , 6 Dec. , 1 4 Dec . 186 1 ; Mora n t o Cullen , 1 4 Dec . 1861. 21 F7, 5 March 1862 . K Ibid., 1 0 March 1862 .

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and to entice foolish me n to enter secre t association s dangerous t o religion an d society . That we earnestly, and with all paternal affection, war n Catholics against all such combinations, whether bound by oath or otherwise, and especiall y against thos e tha t hav e for object to spread a spiri t of revolution , which , i n othe r lands , i s no w producin g suc h disastrous results . That while we warn our peopl e against thos e unlawfu l associa tions w e canno t b e blin d t o th e man y injustice s the y suffer , an d the manifes t inequalit y befor e th e la w whic h inspire s som e individuals wit h a spiri t o f alienatio n fro m authorit y an d o f resistance t o publi c orde r leadin g in som e case s t o crime s whic h we an d al l goo d me n deplore. 23 The bishops ' meetin g i n Augus t o f th e followin g yea r wa s eve n more specific . Th e secon d resolutio n o f thi s meetin g condemne d the Fenian s b y name, o r rather unde r the nam e of the Brotherhoo d of St . Patrick , a n organization which claime d to be " open an d un sworn " , but whic h undoubtedl y worke d in such clos e allianc e with Fenianism tha t the two bodies were not easil y distinguishable. Th e Brotherhood, whic h i s describe d a s " having fo r it s objec t th e support an d defence by arms of what is called in the oath of membership th e Iris h republi c ", an d all similar societies , " though some times no t boun d b y oath s ", wer e condemne d b y th e assemble d bishops, a s also was " the publicatio n o f any defence o f them unde r any pretex t ", 24 Th e followin g year , 1864 , sa w the publicatio n o f the firs t Roma n decisio n o n Fenianis m i n th e for m o f a decre e o f the Hol y Office. 25 The abov e i s a bar e outlin e o f th e step s b y whic h th e Iris h episcopate too k up a definit e attitud e toward s Fenianism . Ther e is no doub t tha t Culle n too k th e initiativ e al l through , bu t ther e is , almost equally , n o doub t that , thoug h ther e ma y hav e bee n som e misgivings ove r th e decisio n t o issu e a formal condemnation , onc e such a condemnation wa s proposed ther e wer e no suggestions o f any possible alternativ e action. 26 I t was , i n a sense , a n unfortunat e accident tha t th e Fenia n questio n becam e th e occasio n o f anothe r public persona l clas h between the archbishop s of Dublin an d Tuam. This aros e fro m th e cas e o f Fr. Patric k Lavelle . Again, i t i s possibl e t o giv e onl y th e briefes t outline . A ful l account woul d cal l fo r a book , man y passage s o f whic h migh t b e "Ibid., 2 7 May 1862 . *Catholic Directory, 1864 , pp . 28 5 ff . Again , th e bishop s calle d on th e govern ment fo r legislatio n an d calle d o n th e peopl e t o organiz e petitions, especiall y fo r tenant-right. "Text in I.E.R., 1864 , p. 38. 26 On 9 August 1863 , th e da y afte r th e meetin g ended , Culle n wrot e t o Kirb y saying tha t th e decisio n t o issu e a condemnatio n o f Fenianis m ha d bee n un animous. Th e lette r goe s o n t o describ e th e oppositio n raise d b y th e bisho p of Clonfert an d especially th e archbisho p of Tuam on a matter arisin g directly out of the condemnation , th e cas e o f Fathe r Lavelle—Culle n t o Kirby , 9 Aug . 1863 , no. 203. z

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very entertaining were it not fo r the grav e scandal involved. Lavell e was parish priest of Partry in the dioces e of Tuam, a poor area much troubled by proselytizing societies. H e was zealous, courageous, an d devoted t o hi s people , bu t outspoken , headstrong, an d defiant . I n defiance o f Cullen's ruling , h e had delivered the funera l oration over the grav e of MacManus, an d bot h befor e and afte r h e ha d attacke d Cullen insultingly in the publi c press . H e was vice-president o f the Brotherhood o f St. Patric k an d stuc k t o hi s post eve n when it came under episcopa l condemnation. Culle n wa s insisten t tha t Lavell e be punished for grave breaches of ecclesiastical discipline, and before long th e cas e o f the paris h pries t o f Partry ha d become a n issu e of personal prestig e between th e tw o archbishops . Culle n made ever y effort t o have Lavelle suspended, but resolutions of bishops' meetings , decisions o f Propaganda , an d eve n a persona l interventio n b y th e Pope, were ineffective i n the fac e of MacHale's dogge d determination not t o b e beste d i n the matter . In thi s way , then , th e Fenia n issu e becam e the caus e o f further public estrangemen t betwee n MacHal e an d Cullen . Thi s i n tur n meant tha t th e tas k o f findin g som e acceptabl e political alternativ e to Fenianism was made very much harder. I t wa s made harder still by Cullen' s tenaciou s convictio n that politic s a s suc h wa s no t th e direct concer n o f a bishop . Politics , h e felt , shoul d b e lef t t o th e politicians, wh o coul d b e guide d indirectl y by organize d Catholi c public opinion . Th e quarrel s whic h ende d th e Tenan t Leagu e strengthened hi s convictio n that ecclesiastic s shoul d no t b e directl y involved i n politica l movements . Ye t hi s ow n programm e fo r bringing pressur e o n th e governmen t ha d produce d n o results , which indee d wa s no t altogethe r surprisin g i n vie w o f the attitud e of th e Englis h governmen t an d th e lac k o f cohesio n amon g Iris h representatives. However, th e attraction s of Fenianism made the devisin g of some political organization an urgent necessity . Th e attemp t wa s made at the en d o f 1864 , with the foundin g of the Nationa l Association, an d the stor y o f ho w thi s becam e possibl e i s ver y largel y th e stor y o f Cullen's reluctan t acceptanc e o f th e necessit y o f takin g a mor e immediate par t i n politics . I t wa s a decisio n t o whic h h e move d with a genuine reluctance, an d even after readin g through hi s privat e correspondence fo r th e perio d i t i s no t possibl e t o d o mor e tha n indicate what seem to be the mai n factors influencing him in making it.27 According t o A. M. Sullivan , the new departure in Irish political life cam e abou t a s a resul t o f contact s betwee n " some Iris h "'Direct reference s to th e formatio n an d progres s o f th e Nationa l Association scarcely exis t i n Cullen' s correspondenc e for thi s period, which ma y indicat e th e reluctance with which he approache d the project . A passing reference in a lette r to Kirb y (undated , but no . 2 0 in th e letter s of 1865 , indicatin g a date towards th e end o f January—it seem s to b e a repl y t o DDA , Kirb y t o Cullen , 5 Jan. 1865 ) is very revealing : " The Association is going on slowly. I t is hard to keep laymen right, especiall y on the educatio n question ".

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ecclesiastical an d lay politicians " on the on e hand, an d " certain prominent Englis h Liberal s " on the other. 28 Ther e are reasons t o suspect tha t Sulliva n exaggerate s th e direc t par t playe d b y ecclesiastics i n thes e negotiations , an d on e ca n b e almos t certai n that Culle n too k n o par t i n them . I n th e event s leadin g t o th e foundation o f th e Nationa l Association , hi s primar y concern , a s always, wa s with th e interest s o f religion . Sinc e th e Ecclesiastica l Titles Bil l h e ha d th e deepes t suspicion s o f th e Whigs , an d an y possible hope s tha t Liberalis m migh t b e transformin g th e part y must hav e been severely shaken by the receptio n give n to Garibald i when h e visited Englan d i n Apri l i864. 29 Yet it cannot be denied that the Liberal programm e did hold som e attractions for him, especiall y a s it bega n t o appea r tha t the matte r in whic h ther e seeme d t o b e th e mos t immediat e hop e o f fruitfu l co-operation wa s a proposal for th e disestablishmen t o f the Churc h of Ireland . Nevertheless , Cullen' s approac h toward s some for m o f alliance with Liberalis m mus t hav e been slow and ful l o f hesitation . Almost certainl y th e two key figures in getting hi s co-operation wer e James Kavanag h and Pete r Pau l M'Swiney . Kavanagh ha d bee n a senio r inspecto r o f th e Nationa l Boar d of Education, bu t ha d clashe d wit h it s polic y whe n h e publishe d a n outspoken defenc e o f certain action s taken b y Culle n i n th e matte r of mixe d education . Fo r Cullen , ther e coul d b e n o stronge r re commendation, for he consistently held tha t th e securin g o f Catholic education wa s the mos t importan t politica l questio n o f the day , an d never tire d o f pointin g ou t ho w man y othe r problem s were , a s h e saw it , th e direc t consequence s o f the mixe d system. 30 M'Swine y was Lord Mayo r o f Dublin i n 1864 . H e to o cam e close t o Cullen' s ideal o f the Catholi c politician, 31 al l the more , perhaps , becaus e h e was so frequently the targe t o f Fenian attacks.^ 2 He was prominentl y associated with the committee planning the erection of the O'Connell monument, an d i n fac t th e plan s fo r th e Nationa l Association may well hav e take n shap e a t th e meeting s o f thi s body . Certainl y the list o f speaker s at th e banque t hel d o n 8 Augus t t o celebrat e th e laying o f th e foundation-ston e include s man y o f thos e wh o a t th e time wer e active in th e wor k fo r th e ne w politica l movement—th e 2S

New Ireland, p . 301 . Cf. Culle n t o Kirby , 5 Apri l 1864 , no . 78 , 1 5 April , no . 8 6 ; DBA , Culle n to Moran , 1 2 Apri l 1864 . 30 Kavanagh los t hi s post wit h th e Nationa l Boar d an d i n 185 9 he wa s appointe d professor o f elementar y mathematic s i n th e Catholi c University—McGrath , Newman's University, pp . 30 , 31 , 3 9 ; Devoy , Recollections of a n Irish Rebel, p . 12 . 31 See, fo r instance , DDA , Culle n t o Moran , 7 Nov . 1864 , praisin g M'Swine y for attendin g th e openin g o f th e academi c yea r a t th e Catholi c Universit y an d afterwards holdin g a banque t i n th e Mansio n Hous e a t whic h th e Pope' s healt h "was propose d befor e th e queen's . 29

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For a n exampl e o f a very shar p attack , se e th e Irish People, 9 Jan. 1864 .

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Lord Mayor , th e archbisho p o f Cashel , th e bisho p o f Ross , J . F . Maguire, Si r John Gray , an d Joh n Blak e Dillon. 33 For som e year s i t ha d indee d bee n inevitabl e tha t th e nam e o f O'Connell shoul d b e prominentl y i n th e mind s o f thos e wh o wer e seeking some workable political alternative t o the Fenia n programm e of arme d revolution . Ther e is evidence that O'Connel l wa s coming to occup y a ver y prominen t plac e i n Cullen' s min d too . Tw o interesting letter s from his friend an d confidant , Mgr . Kirby , recal l O'Connell's nam e in urging o n Culle n th e importanc e o f providing a vigorou s an d constitutiona l mean s whereb y popula r agitatio n could express itself against injustice. The English government, Kirby wrote , woul d neve r d o justice t o th e Catholi c religio n o r t o the Iris h poo r unless i t were forced t o d o so. O'Connell , thoug h h e vigorously condemne d secre t societies , expose d th e frau d o f th e government wit h equa l vigour , an d compelle d i t t o a measur e o f justice t o Ireland . N o matte r ho w vigorousl y th e clerg y migh t denounce secre t societies , h e wen t on , the y coul d no t hop e fo r permanent succes s a s long a s th e governmen t continue d t o den y justice t o the countr y and to the poor , for so long as this was denied the revolutionarie s ha d a permanen t pretex t t o lur e th e peopl e t o their destruction. 34 Cullen was certainly convinced that the Fenians were in fact luring the peopl e t o destruction . " God hel p th e poo r wh o are so easily duped ", he wrote to Kirby somewhat later , " the savages of England would trea t th e poo r people, i f disturbance s wer e go t up , jus t a s Muravieff treat s th e Pole s ". 35 Mor e important , hi s pastora l lette r of Ma y 186 2 contain s very definit e echoe s o f th e idea s Kirb y ha d been puttin g forward. 36 Hi s denunciatio n o f Fenianis m followe d the usua l lines , drawing a parallel with th e anti-Catholi c tendencie s of secre t societie s i n Europe , an d insistin g tha t th e Fenia n pla n fo r rebellion had no hope of success—it "would brin g ruin and desolatio n to ou r poo r country , makin g her positio n wors e than i t is, " bu t h e spoke to o of how Irish leaders ha d i n the pas t successfully kept th e people fro m secre t societie s — " many prelate s an d severa l dis tinguished laymen , and among others th e ever-lamente d Liberator , Daniel O'Connell , publicl y denounce d them , an d succeede d i n preventing thei r sprea d i n th e countr y ".37 H e also , thoug h wit h some caution , voice d Kirby' s positiv e recommendation s : It i s our dut y to call o n the publi c authoritie s to relieve publi c distress, an d t o petitio n fo r suc h measure s a s ma y preven t it s **FJ, 9 Aug. 1864. Th e speec h of the archbisho p of Cashel is especially interesting i n it s reference s to O'Connel l an d th e obligation s of the clerg y to spea k out against injustice. 34 DDA, Kirb y to Cullen, n Jan. , 1 4 Dec. 1861 . S5 Cullen to Kirby, 18 Dec. 1863, no. 331. ' The Irish People (7 May 1864) attacked Culle n for inconsistenc y in showin g sympathy with revolution in Poland and36 denouncin g i t in Ireland . Moran, Th e Writings o f Cardinal Cullen, ii. 13 4 ff . Extract s from th e pastora l in FJ, 2 6 May 1862 . 37 Moran, op. cit., pp. 144-5 .

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periodical recurrence . . . . Withou t preachin g u p seditio n or violence, we can and ought to love Ireland, an d prove the sincerity of our love by seeking for measures of practical utility, such a s the freedom o f education , encouragemen t an d protectio n fo r agri cultural industry , a prope r administratio n o f the poo r laws , an d relief fro m th e burde n o f the Protestan t establishment. 38 This reference to lov e of country i s further develope d in anothe r passage in the sam e pastoral, an d i t indicates a further trai n o f ideas working on Cullen's mind at the time, an d which mus t hav e had its influence i n persuadin g hi m o f the nee d t o tak e a more activ e par t in politica l affair s : With regard to Ireland, her literature, her history, her antiquities, her ruins , he r victories , he r heroes , he r sages , everything con nected wit h he r glories , ough t t o b e th e subjec t o f ou r pride . But nothing should be so dear to us as the memories of our saint s and martyrs who died for their religion, and who handed down to us th e mos t preciou s o f all inheritances, th e Catholi c fait h ; an d it should be our greatest ambition to preserve a profound veneration for ou r ancien t ChurcK , whic h ha s withstoo d th e storm s o f s o many ages , an d i s no w risin g u p s o gloriou s fro m he r ruins . Cullen wa s intensely Irish , bu t hi s patriotism , i n marke d contras t with that of , say, Thomas Davis , reste d o n a complete identification of Fait h an d Fatherland ; hi s interpretatio n o f past history , whic h is th e basi s o f al l patriotism , wa s dominate d b y th e fac t o f Iris h attachment t o th e Catholi c faith . Fo r him , thi s wa s not a n ide a of recent growth, 39 bu t ther e ar e indications that jus t abou t thi s tim e he was particularly preoccupied with it. On e reason was the publication of J. H. Todd's St. Patrick, Apostle of Ireland in 1864. This was a work at the sam e time scholarly and controversial, and Culle n was anxiou s tha t it s stron g confessiona l bias shoul d b e me t b y a n adequate Catholi c reply. H e had n o great hopes of an effective repl y from hom e sources—from Maynooth , where McCarthy an d Garga n were workin g o n historica l questions , o r fro m th e Dublin Review, which, h e wrote, " now becomes altogether English—Dr . Mannin g and I kno w not who are to be the future editors . Th e theologia n or professor o f theolog y i n th e Cardinal' s seminary , Mr . Ward , i s t o 3 *Ibid., pp . 147-9 . Th e Irish People ( 7 May 1864 ) professe d t o se e in Cullen' s May pastora l of tha t yea r (Moran , op. cit. , ii. 254 ff.) the first suggestio n of a constitutional alternativ e to their programme. A comparison of the two documents shows that th e late r pastoral i s no more explici t than th e earlier one. Th e attitud e of th e Irish People i n Ma y 186 4 probabl y represent s a n attemp t t o embarras s o r destroy th e growin g measur e o f agreemen t o n th e launchin g o f a constitutiona l movement. Cf . th e comment s o n a speec h o f Bisho p Butle r o f Limerick , Irish People, 1 6 Apri l 1864 , 39 See for instance the very interesting address which h e delivered o n 2 July 184 6 to th e Roma n Accademi a d i Religion e Cattolic a o n th e connexio n o f th e earl y Irish Churc h wit h th e Hol y See , printe d a s a n appendi x i n Moran , Writings, iii. 790 ff.

128

Reactions to Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914

be the principal . Yo u may guess ho w Irish i t will be ".40 I n thes e circumstances h e eagerl y encourage d th e wor k bein g don e b y hi s nephew, Patric k Franci s Moran , vice-recto r t o Kirb y i n Rome , supervising th e printin g i n Dubli n o f the Essays o n the Early Irish Church and the History of the Catholic Archbishops of Dublin, both published b y Duffy i n 1864, " and planning, or at leas t suggesting, a very ambitiou s programm e : Would i t no t b e a goo d thin g i f a projec t wer e se t o n foo t t o print al l th e document s printe d o r i n manuscrip t tha t relat e t o Irish history—suc h work s as those o f Dr. Frenc h an d th e bisho p of Ossor y [Davi d Rothe ] an d Dr . Lynch' s ar e useful . Colgan' s and Fleming' s an d suc h othe r work s should als o b e published. 42 His reading of the Life of Archbishop Whately*3 prompted the comment, again i n a lette r t o Moran , tha t i n hi s educatio n polic y Whately ha d tw o object s : first , t o banis h fro m th e school s ever y recollection o f Ireland , an d second , t o shak e th e people' s fait h b y giving the m onl y rationalisti c views , an d thu s settin g the m t o question it s foundations. Thoug h he failed i n his second object , h e succeeded ver y largel y i n hi s first , b y omittin g al l referenc e t o Ireland, her history or her church, in the text-books of the National Schools.44 I t is , i n fact , eas y t o fin d i n thi s correspondenc e wit h Moran i n 186 3 an d 186 4 indication s tha t Cullen' s reflection s o n religion and nationalism should b e leading him, however reluctantly , towards mor e activ e participatio n i n a n urgently-neede d politica l movement. II

The suppor t o f the archbisho p o f Dublin wa s valuable to the new Association; s o to o wa s th e suppor t o f Joh n Blak e Dillon , wh o agreed t o join i t i n th e Autum n o f 1864 . Whil e ther e i s n o doub t that Dillon's motive s were, essentially, the same as Cullen's, namely , the wis h t o provid e som e alternativ e t o wha t h e regarde d a s th e dangerous an d futil e Fenia n conspiracy, 45 i t wa s nevertheles s a n extraordinary developmen t t o se e Archbisho p Culle n workin g together wit h on e o f the me n o f 1848 . However , ther e were man y who di d no t fin d i t possibl e t o follo w th e exampl e of Dillon, a ma n of ver y eve n tempe r an d exceptionall y controlle d emotion s ; ther e were a number o f Irish politica l figures who simply could no t brin g themselves t o work with Cullen afte r th e recriminations of the fifties. 40

Cullen t o Moran , 29 May 1863 , Kirb y correspondence, no. 156 . "These writings of Moran, though inevitably bearing traces of the controversial atmosphere i n whic h the y wer e written , were , especiall y th e latter , invaluabl e pioneering work in showing how much of Irish Catholic history was to be found i n the42papal archives. DDA, Cullen to Moran , 20 May 1864 . 43 Also published i n 1864 . "DDA, Cullen to Moran, 20 July 1864 . *5See Gava n Duffy' s accoun t o f hi s conversatio n wit h Dillo n o n thi s matter , My Life i n Tw o Hemispheres, ii . 266.

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George Henr y Moore , i n particular , wa s altogether embittere d an d unforgiving. Gava n Duffy , wh o paid a visit to Irelan d i n 1865 , was less bitter , bu t stil l coul d no t brin g himself to si t at th e sam e tabl e as Cullen, even though, he admitted, he received a number of indications of the archbishop's goodwill. 46 Joh n Martin, thoug h undeniabl y impressed b y the course John Dillo n had taken, decided that, though it wa s possible t o hav e friendl y relation s wit h a n associatio n which aimed a t securin g jus t law s a t Westminster , th e Nationa l League , which had a single aim, repeal of the Union , would have to continu e to adop t a separat e platform. 47 John Dillon, then, was the onl y prominent politica l figur e amon g the Irish laity who gave wholehearted support to the new Association. Matters wer e quit e differen t amon g th e bishops , wher e ther e wa s only on e wh o completel y dissented—MacHale . MacHal e ha d s o identified himsel f wit h th e politica l programme adopted mor e tha n ten year s previously that it was hardly to be expected tha t he would revise hi s stan d sufficientl y t o allo w him t o join a party wit h whic h Cullen wa s so prominently associated . Thoug h h e wa s no Fenian , he was by nature a fighter, and the programme whic h ha d been lai d down for the Independen t Iris h Part y in the fifties was in some ways more suggestive o f the arme d camp than o f the oppositio n benches . It wa s not surprising then , tha t when he wa s approached b y Dillo n his answe r gav e littl e roo m for compromise , all the mor e as he insisted o n turnin g thi s answe r into a politica l manifesto by havin g it published. 48 Th e object s o f the propose d association , h e wrote , were mos t important—s o importan t that hi s onl y surprise wa s tha t there had been such a long silence about them. H e expressed himself altogether sceptical , however , o f th e adequac y o f th e mean s no w proposed, an d mad e it quit e clea r that th e onl y political association which coul d expec t hi s suppor t wa s a reviva l o f th e Independen t Irish Party . H e furthe r mad e it clea r that h e wa s not prepare d t o work with anyone whom he believed to have been guilty of treachery in th e pas t withou t forma l publi c repentance . Otherwise , th e ol d game would begin all over again. I f I though t yo u and a few other s I hav e confidence i n could stop it , he wrote to Dillon , I woul d give you m y support; bu t a s I fee l th e onl y effectiv e mean s i s a n un ambiguous renunciatio n o f pas t erro r b y a numbe r o f peopl e associated wit h th e ne w movement, I ca n have no par t i n it . MacHale's opposition , thoug h i t receive d littl e support , i f any , among hi s fellow-bishops, 49 wa s a serious handicap, all the mor e so as the new Association had no lack of other enemies. Th e Protestan t "Ibid., ii. 267-8. 4 'Letter o f John Martin, Irish People, 3 Dec. 1864 . *8MacHale to J. B . Dillon, 6 Dec. 1864 , published i n FJ, 2 2 Dec., with the note that it is published a t MacHale's request . 49 See the lis t o f bishops wh o appended thei r names t o th e notic e requisitionin g the meetin g t o inaugurat e th e Nationa l Association, FJ , 2 1 Dec . 1864 . Ther e are 2 3 name s i n all , an d th e absentee s ar e no t th e note d politica l supporter s o f MacHale, al l of whom signed thei r names.

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to Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914

Vigilance Committe e threatene d " to set the Liffe y o n fire " if any such Popis h meetin g wer e held . Th e seriou s an d prolonge d out break o f riotin g i n Belfas t whic h ha d bee n sparke d of f b y th e O'Connell processio n i n Dubli n th e previou s Augus t stoo d a s a warning that thi s might b e no empty threat, an d almost certainl y is the explanatio n o f th e fac t tha t fiv e o f th e te n episcopa l name s missing fro m the notice calling the inaugural meeting of the Nationa l Association ar e thos e o f bishop s o r coadjutor s o f see s i n Ulster , though th e tw o bishops fro m Belfast , Dr . Denvi r an d his recently appointed coadjutor , Dr. Dorrian , signed the requisition. Fro m th e opposite quarter , Fenia n hostilit y t o the ne w organization mounted steadily a s the dat e o f its inauguratio n dre w nearer. Quit e rightly , the Fenian s sa w in th e Associatio n a plan to provid e an alternativ e to their ow n programme, which they could only regard a s a weakening o f the nationa l effort . It s supporters , wrot e the Irish People, 50 are not merely place-seekers, bu t place-holders ; Judg e Keogh could hand i n hi s nam e without a qualm . Smal l wonder , seein g tha t i t was led by his friend, Archbisho p Cullen . Th e " honest priest s " who ha d bee n th e supporter s o f tenant-righ t wer e holdin g aloof . (These same " honest priest s ", of course, regularly came under th e lash o f th e Irish People, especiall y suc h o f the m a s wer e addicte d to makin g belligerent speeches at meetings o f the Nationa l League , but jus t no w they coul d b e usefull y invoke d t o discredi t Cullen. ) As for John Blake Dillon, the Irish People concluded, " we are curious to see how a rebel of '48 will play the par t o f lay-leader to this ne w brass ban d ". 51 All thing s considered , i t wa s somethin g o f a n achievemen t tha t the meetin g was held o n 29 December 186 4 and the Associatio n got under way without any outbreak of violence or rioting from on e side or th e other . Seve n bishop s attended—th e archbishop s o f Dubli n (Cullen) an d Cashe l (Leahy) ; th e bishop s o f Cloyn e (Keane) , Ardagh (Kilduff) , Ros s (O'Hea) , Elphi n (Gillooly) , an d th e co adjutor bisho p o f Meat h (Nulty) . Th e tw o archbishops , wit h th e bishops o f Cloyn e an d Elphin , togethe r wit h a numbe r o f laymen, addressed th e meeting. 52 Finally , a numbe r o f resolution s wer e moved an d adopted . First, it was resolved that a n association be founded, t o be known as the Nationa l Associatio n o f Ireland, havin g fo r its object s a lan d bill t o secur e compensatio n fo r tenants ' improvements , a bil l t o disendow the Established Church , and a bill to secure free and equal education right s for all denominations. Th e secon d resolution made it clear that the ne w association was not to be regarded as a political party, bu t wa s t o see k it s object s indirectly , b y workin g o n an d 60

Irish People, 2 6 Nov. 1864 . lbid., 24 Dec. 1864 . "Full repor t i n FJ, 3 0 Dec. 1864 . Cullen' s speech i n ful l i n Moran , Writings, ii. 283 ff . Se e also DDA, Cullen to Moran, 3 0 Dec. 1864 . n

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informing publi c opinion . Thi s an d th e followin g resolution wer e the caus e of so much wrangling that the y are best given verbatim : 2. Th e Associatio n will seek to realize its objects by convincing, as far as possible, all men of their fairnes s and utility, b y fosterin g a rationa l an d intelligen t patriotism , b y unitin g th e peopl e fo r mutual ai d an d protection , an d b y placin g i n representativ e positions, bot h imperia l an d local, men from whos e principles an d character they may anticipate a disinterested and effective support . 3. Th e Associatio n wil l no t suppor t an y politica l part y whic h shall not in good fait h co-operate with it in establishin g b y law the tenant's right to compensation, o r in procuring th e disendowmen t of th e Establishe d Church . Neithe r wil l i t recommend , o r assis t in th e electio n of , an y candidat e wh o wil l no t pledg e himsel f to act o n th e sam e principle . The fift h resolutio n provide d fo r th e setting-u p o f a committe e t o manage the affair s o f the Association , fro m whic h charges later arose that the whol e direction o f affairs wa s being deliberatel y kept in th e hands o f a narrow clique. Som e substanc e fo r thes e charge s migh t appear fro m th e tent h resolution , whic h lai d dow n that a fee of £1 was t o b e pai d b y eac h membe r o n joining, wit h a n annua l sub scription o f a shilling thereafter ; ther e was , however, provision fo r associate membership a t a n annua l fee of a shilling. The ne w Association ha d set itself th e task of winning and mould ing publi c opinion . Th e tas k wa s no t easy . Ther e wa s poin t i n Cullen's remark : " the people chee r anythin g tha t i s menacing to the Englis h government , thoug h i t ma y be shee r nonsense . I t i s hard t o d o anythin g righ t ", 53 Fo r th e momen t a t an y rat e th e Association offere d littl e scop e fo r cheerin g o r politica l excitement , for ther e wa s no widesprea d suppor t fo r it s plan s t o wor k i n clos e alliance wit h th e Libera l grou p i n England . Popula r opinio n i n Ireland a t thi s stag e doe s no t see m t o hav e mad e an y distinctio n between th e Liberal s an d the Whigs, an d the Whig administration s since th e tim e o f O'Connell, o r mor e accuratel y sinc e th e deat h o f Thomas Drummon d i n 1840 , ha d sow n suc h distrus t i n Ireland , culminating in the Italian policy of Russell and Palmerston, that many Irish Catholics were inclined t o the Tory alternative, thoug h thi s was so unpromising that the only thing possessing rea l popular attraction was the call for " independent oppositio n ". Th e Nationa l Associa tion was an attempt t o find a way out of this dilemma, but i t was hot going t o b e eas y t o convinc e peopl e tha t th e Liberal s wer e a rea l alternative t o th e Whigs. 54 S3 DDA, Cullen to Moran, 30 Dec. 1864 . Th e remark was occasioned by Cullen's opinion tha t Dr . Keane , th e bisho p o f Cloyne , ha d brough t " a littl e Youn g Irelandism " into hi s speech, and seemed anxious to get a good cheer . M Cf. Dorria n t o Kirby , 6 Feb . 1865 , no . 2 8 : " It wa s unfortunate tha t th e priests wer e for a time withdraw n from politics . Th e peopl e were thus drive n in despair t o combin e illegally , whe n they sa w that nothin g was to b e don e but sel l them fo r sops t o place-hunters . Th e ne w Association i s sound a t heart , bu t th e

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The Fenians , a s might be expected, assaile d th e ne w Associatio n continuously an d no t altogethe r scrupulously ; th e Irish People i s full o f scathin g attacks , especiall y o n Culle n personally. 55 A . M . Sullivan, i n a move which furthe r worsene d his already bad relation s with the Fenians , cam e out strongl y an d immediately i n suppor t of the ne w movement. 56 Th e Associatio n coul d o f cours e coun t o n the stead y suppor t o f the Freeman's Journal, whose proprietor , Si r John Gray , ha d bee n on e o f the leader s i n th e movemen t toward s an alliance with the Liberals. 57 Amon g the bishops, Culle n followe d up the implication s of his appearance at the meeting of 29 Decembe r by addressin g a lette r t o hi s priest s i n whic h h e commende d th e new organization, an d urged them to take part i n it in s o far a s they had th e tim e t o spare . Certai n difficultie s i n hi s positio n appea r when h e warns the m tha t their interes t in politics must not lead t o neglect o f duty, o r to any action unbecoming the ecclesiastica l state , and remind s them o f the synoda l legislatio n o f 185 4 regulatin g th e political activitie s o f th e clergy ; 5 8 i n private , h e mad e n o secre t of hi s belie f tha t t o mak e th e Associatio n a n effectiv e politica l instrument woul d b e a delicat e an d difficul t task. 59 Othe r bishop s took the occasio n of their Lente n pastoral s to recommend th e move ment t o thei r people ; 6 0 bu t MacHal e too k th e sam e occasio n t o show himsel f a s unbendin g a s ever. 61 It wa s in th e dioces e o f Meath, however , tha t troubl e cam e t o a head. Here , bot h bisho p an d clerg y ha d take n a prominen t an d well-organized par t i n th e Tenan t Leagu e agitatio n o f the fifties. 82 The coadjuto r bishop, Dr . Nulty , ha d bee n presen t a t the meetin g in Dubli n o n 2 9 December , bu t hi s Lente n pastora l fo r 186 5 ha d contained a sweepin g an d no t altogethe r discriminatin g attac k o n the slaver y o f Iris h member s o f parliamen t t o th e Whi g Party. 63 It soo n becam e clea r tha t th e pastora l onl y reflecte d growin g dis satisfaction i n Meat h a t the difference s becomin g apparent between the Nationa l Associatio n an d th e Tenan t Leagu e an d Independen t Opposition o f the previou s decade. Thi s dissatisfaction grew until a secession o f the Meat h clerg y threatened . country wil l be a long time i n comin g to believ e that, afte r havin g been s o ofte n betrayed. However , I hope it will work its way and do good in time ". (I have used the ter m " Whig " t o describ e Liberal s o f th e Palmersto n school , reservin g " Liberal " for the force s whic h cam e to power in Gladstone's first government. This terminolog y i s no t completel y satisfactory , but n o terminolog y ca n b e altogether accurate for these years in which the Liberal party was being transformed under th e influenc e o f Radicalism.) 55 E.g., Irish People, 7 Jan., 1 4 Jan., 4 Feb., 1 8 March 1865. 56 Nation, 3 0 Dec. 186 4 ; an d cf . Irish People, 7 Jan. 1865. 87 See, for instance, the leadin g article in FJ, 3 Oct. 1864 . "Letter to th e clerg y of the dioces e o f Dublin, 2 3 Jan. 1865 , Moran , Writings, ii. 326. "Cullen to Kirby , January 1865, no. 20 . O n the dating of this letter, see above, note 27. 60 E.g., Elphin (FJ, i March 1865 ) ; Galwa y (ibid., 3 March). Se e also MacEvilly to Kirby, 1 0 March 1865, no. 5 3 ; Gillool y to Kirby, 12 April 1865 , no. 80. "Pastoral in FJ, i Marc h 1865 . 62 Whyte, Th e Independent Irish Party, pp . 118 , 121 , 154 83 See Cullen's comments i n his letter to Kirby, 1 0 March 1865 , no. 52.

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The difference s wer e patche d u p a t a privat e meetin g i n Dubli n on 28 April 1865 . A s this meeting was not reported i n the press , i t is b y n o mean s eas y t o fin d ou t exactl y wha t happene d a t it . Th e only account s availabl e ar e a lette r t o Kirb y fro m Dorrian , th e coadjutor bisho p o f Down an d Connor , writte n a few days afte r th e meeting,64 and reference s mad e to it during the debate s at a general meeting o f the Associatio n o n 1 9 June. 65 Th e meetin g o f 2 8 April was attende d b y th e committe e o f the Association , th e archbisho p of Dublin an d som e Dubli n priests , th e bishop s o f Ross and Elphin , the coadjuto r bisho p o f Down an d Connor , the coadjuto r bisho p of Meath and representative s o f his clergy, and, in the chair, the bisho p of Cloyne . Afte r a lon g discussion , i t wa s agreed , apparentl y wit h only on e dissentien t voice , tha t certai n amendment s b e introduce d into the rules , rule (3) of the meetin g o f 29 December t o be replace d by tw o ne w rules , thes e t o rea d : That thi s Association pledge s itsel f t o th e polic y o f entire an d complete parliamentary independence, an d that—inasmuc h a s the reform o f the la w of landlord an d tenan t i s a question o f pressin g exigency, an d ca n onl y b e accomplishe d b y it s advocate s i n parliament voting , o n al l question s involvin g confidenc e i n th e ministry, i n oppositio n t o governmen t whic h will no t adop t an d make a cabine t questio n a measur e o f effectuall y securin g com pensation to the occupie r of the soi l for all improvements by which the annua l lettin g valu e i s increased—thi s Associatio n wil l no t support an y candidat e who wil l no t pledg e himsel f t o adop t tha t course. That th e acceptanc e o f place or the solicitatio n o f favours fro m government is incompatible with a n independent attitud e toward s the ministr y ; an d therefor e i t shal l b e a recommendatio n fro m this associatio n t o al l Iris h constituencie s t o bin d thei r repre sentatives t o accep t n o plac e an d t o solici t n o favou r fro m an y government which , by th e foregoin g rule, the y shal l b e boun d t o oppose ; an d to bind their representatives, further, to take counsel with th e part y i n th e Hous e o f Common s wh o hol d th e sam e principles, an d t o ac t i n accordanc e wit h th e decisio n o f th e majority. 66 A compariso n o f thes e rule s wit h th e origina l show s tha t the y represent a marke d gai n fo r the " independent oppositio n " party . Unfortunately, th e meetin g whic h dre w the m up , whil e i t wa s reasonably amicable , seems t o hav e bee n conducte d i n som e con fusion, an d th e ne w draf t showe d trace s o f bein g wha t Dillo n wa s later t o describ e a s " a documen t prepare d t> y twent y o r thirt y persons a t th e sam e time , al l taking a n activ e par t i n th e proces s ; one ma n suggestin g a phras e shoul d b e inserte d here , anothe r tha t a wor d shoul d b e omitte d ther e ", 67 C4

Dorrian toJCirby, 2 May 1865, no. 93. 05Reported in FJ, 20 June 1865. Cited b y MacCarth y Downin g a t meetin g o n 1 9 June , FJ , 2 0 Jun e 186 5 ; substantially in Dorrian to Kirby, 2 May 1865, no. 93. e7Fjf, 20 June 1865. SG

134 Reactions

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Certainly, Culle n wa s convince d o n mature r reflectio n tha t th e rules as now proposed wer e open to much criticism. 68 Hi s criticis m is to b e foun d in a memorandum apparently submitted t o a further meeting o f th e committe e sometim e toward s th e en d o f May , a draft o f which ha s bee n preserve d in th e Dubli n diocesa n archives. It is a long document, bu t obviousl y much thought-ou t (a s is evident from th e man y correction s an d modification s introduce d i n th e draft), an d i s wort h summarizin g i n som e detail . He bega n by expressing regret that i t had bee n thought necessar y to introduce any changes into the rules, as the discussion s o f 28 April had convince d him tha t ther e wer e n o rea l difference s o f opinion , and an y forma l chang e afte r s o shor t a tim e migh t wel l leav e th e Association open to charges of instability or fickleness. Nevertheless , he declare d tha t h e wa s satisfie d i n genera l wit h th e propose d alterations, a s expressin g mor e exactl y the sens e o f th e meetin g a t which th e origina l rules wer e draw n up . He wen t o n t o som e criticis m i n detail . H e agree d tha t parlia mentary polic y mus t b e on e o f complet e independence . Neithe r Whigs nor Tories were deserving of any commitment. Nevertheless , support shoul d no t b e refused to an y measure of justice for Ireland , no matter wha t quarter i t cam e from, even though, a s things stood , there were no indications that ver y much woul d be found worthy of support. H e approve d o f th e us e o f th e phras e " parliamentary independence " instead o f " independent oppositio n ", becaus e the latter phrase , rightl y o r wrongly , ha d bee n construe d a s meanin g blind an d indiscriminat e opposition . Althoug h thi s sens e ha d bee n disavowed b y leadin g clerg y an d laity , th e phras e ha d i n fac t bee n extensively use d a s th e watchwor d o f a n extreme , unsoun d an d morally indefensible plan of action, and as the sole test of the integrity of a public man. He approved als o of the decisio n t o restrict the obligation o f voting against a government advers e to the aim s of the Associatio n to votes of confidenc e i n th e ministry , fo r thi s explicitl y recognize d th e incontestable right, and , as he saw it, the bounden duty , of members to vot e o n othe r matter s accordin g t o thei r conscience . A test s o infrequently use d a s to b e i n dange r of being inadequate was bette r than a tes t whic h wa s unsound . Cullen furthe r expresse d hi s pleasur e a t th e enunciatio n o f th e objects of the Association , and hoped it would now be free o f charges of ambiguity. 69 H e pointe d out , however, that in the rul e as it now stood ther e wa s dange r o f a ne w ambiguity—tha t i t migh t oblig e the Associatio n to oppos e a candidate committed , fo r reasons which 68 Proposed, for, according to the rules of the Association, a rule could be changed only i f th e chang e wer e discusse d an d approve d a t tw o successiv e committeemeetings calle d fo r th e purpose , an d confirme d b y a genera l meetin g o f th e Association (FJ, 3 0 Dec. 1864). e9 The referenc e i s t o th e prominenc e given i n the revise d rules to th e need fo r land-legislation—a matte r i n whic h th e committee , draw n predominantl y fro m Dublin, ha d bee n accused of showing insufficient interest .

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he an d hi s constituent s judge d sufficient , t o onl y a par t o f it s pro gramme, a candidat e wh o migh t i n fac t b e a membe r o f th e Association. Again , it wa s a restriction o n the righ t o f members t o do thei r bes t i n accordanc e wit h conscience , an d thi s furthe r ambiguity—clearly arisin g fro m th e lon g an d awkwar d parenthesi s in th e draf t o f the rule—woul d hav e t o b e removed . Cullen no w addressed himsel f t o th e secon d o f the propose d ne w rules. I t wa s eve n mor e difficul t groun d tha n th e first , b y reaso n of th e commonly-accepte d vie w that th e Independen t Part y o f th e previous decad e ha d collapse d becaus e o f th e treacher y o f Sadlie r and Keogh , an d becaus e o f the episcopa l suppor t the y ha d receive d after thei r betrayal , suppor t fo r whic h Cullen , i t wa s commonl y believed, ha d a heavy responsibility . Whil e th e lates t authoritativ e examination o f the fact s come s t o th e conclusio n tha t th e defectio n of Sadlie r an d Keog h wa s by n o mean s decisive, 70 an d whil e ever y new piec e o f evidence goe s t o sho w tha t Cullen' s " commitment" to Sadlie r and Keog h had never really existed except i n the minds of Lucas and Gava n Duff y an d in the propagand a of the Irish People, 11 he was , nevertheless , believe d t o b e associate d wit h thos e wh o had taken offic e a t th e pric e o f principle . Thi s popula r misjudgmen t did no t modif y Cullen' s view s o n th e righ t o f Catholic s t o accep t public offic e ; neithe r di d th e fac t tha t th e promotio n o f Catholic s was a prominen t par t o f Whi g policy . H e ha d enunciate d hi s principles i n thi s matte r som e year s previously i n a public lette r t o Thomas O'Haga n : 72 I d o not censure Catholic s fo r seeking or taking office, an d I am very fa r fro m joinin g i n th e outcr y tha t everyon e doin g s o mus t be a traitor t o hi s religion o r an enemy to hi s country. Catholics , in m y opinion , hav e a ful l righ t t o shar e i n th e governmen t o f their ow n country , a righ t whic h i s stil l scandalousl y withhel d from them . . . . Wer e me n who act in a trul y Catholi c spirit , and d o honou r t o ou r countr y b y thei r live s an d thei r virtues , raised t o office , I woul d commen d the m fo r acceptin g it , an d rejoice i n thei r promotion . A s t o Catholic s wh o eithe r see k t o gain offic e b y denyin g the principle s or practice s o f their religion , or who, having obtaine d offic e throug h Catholi c influence, betray their promise s an d pledges , i t i s no t m y busines s t o thro w th e first stone a t them. I leav e them t o the judgment o f their countr y and thei r God . 70 Whyte, 71

Th e Independent Irish Party, pp . 175-6 . The followin g extract s from Cullen' s correspondenc e with Kirb y ma y b e o f interest: " Judge Keogh is said to be in Rome. Don' t let him get a grand audience. E un cattivo mobile. Th e wif e i s ver y pious. " (Culle n to Kirby , 2 5 Feb . 1867 . no. 63) ; " If you can do anything to conver t Judge Keogh it would be a charit y to d o it . H e i s th e wors t enem y o f Catholicit y w e hav e unde r th e nam e o f a Catholic " (same to same, i Marc h 1867 , no . 70); " I hop e you were able to see Judge Keog h an d tel l hi m som e truths whils t he wa s in Rom e " (same to same , 6 March 1867 , no. 74). "Published i n th e Catholic Telegraph, 2 0 Jun e 186 3 ; reprinte d i n Moran , Writings, ii . 18 0 ff .

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The whol e questio n wa s overshadowe d b y th e betraya l o f Sadlie r and Keogh , bu t i t nevertheles s remained a real problem because , as long a s a member o f parliament drew no salar y or allowance , there was littl e alternativ e to th e possessio n o f privat e mean s excep t th e acquiring o f som e offic e o f profit . Culle n coul d se e th e dangers — they wer e indeed obvious—bu t agai n hi s memorandu m insists tha t the distinctio n mus t b e draw n betwee n th e corrup t acceptanc e of office fo r private advancement and the righ t Catholics had a s citizens to a du e share i n th e publi c administration , indeed thei r obligatio n to accep t such a share . On th e fina l claus e i n th e secon d rul e h e commente d tha t i n recommending a mutua l understandin g betwee n candidate s an d constitutents, th e term s use d migh t b e better i f the y indicate d les s distrust o f th e candidates . Neithe r shoul d to o muc h relianc e b e placed o n pledge s o r verbal engagements . Th e onl y real guarante e that a candidate would keep his promises if elected was the candidate' s moral character . Finally, i n regar d t o th e proposa l tha t majorit y decision s o f th e party wer e to b e binding , h e argue d tha t whil e a unite d part y was very desirable, an d hitherto ver y lacking, unity mus t not be insisted on dow n t o th e smalles t detail . Again , roo m mus t b e lef t fo r th e conscientious discretio n o f the individual . Whil e it could be insisted that the part y must b e united o n the basic principles o f the Associa tion, an d whil e the dut y o f taking commo n counse l shoul d als o b e demanded, an d i t shoul d b e clearl y understood tha t eac h departur e from a majorit y decisio n wa s a prope r subjec t fo r enquiry , an y insistence o n absolut e unanimit y o f actio n i n al l thing s wa s a n extreme an d unsoun d tes t o f publi c morality , whic h migh t dete r men wh o migh t b e ver y usefu l t o th e Associatio n fro m joinin g it , and coul d easil y lead to fata l disputes. 73 Danger now threatened from anothe r quarter. Th e rule s proposed at th e meetin g o f 2 8 Apri l wer e give n t o th e press . Ther e i s n o direct evidenc e to sho w who was responsible, bu t ther e is no doub t that i t wa s done by some of the " Independent Oppositio n " party, to guar d agains t an y dange r tha t the y woul d b e watere d down. 74 The Irish Times immediately commente d that the new rules indicated that th e Associatio n ha d droppe d disestablishmen t fro m it s pro gramme, an d i n vie w o f th e ver y ba d draftin g o f th e firs t o f the m this wa s a n inferenc e which coul d no t easil y b e refuted . I t mad e the cas e for som e revisio n o f th e draf t stil l stronger . At this stage the Associatio n was in real danger of going the sam e way as the Independen t Part y of ten year s before , and for rathe r "The break-u p of the Independen t Irish Part y ha d show n that thi s las t poin t was a real consideration (cf. Whyte, op. cit., p. 176) ; tha t it remained such became evident from Dillon' s discussions in London with some of the Iris h members, who flatly told him they would have nothing to do with such an unreasonable pledge— J, 2 0 June 1865 . 74 See Dillon's remarks , FJ, 2 0 June 1865 .

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similar reasons . Th e proble m was urgent, for a general election was due in July. Ther e now began a n all-out effort , le d by John Dillon , to hol d th e Associatio n together . Again , i t i s impossibl e to fil l i n all the details , but the discussion s resulte d in a circular bein g sen t to al l wh o ha d bee n presen t a t th e meetin g o f 2 8 April , wit h th e proposal: This Association pledge s itsel f t o the polic y of complete parlia mentary independence , an d wil l suppor t n o candidat e fo r parliament who will not pledge himself to vote for all the objects of the Association , an d further , t o vot e (o n al l question s involvin g confidence i n the ministry ) i n opposition to an y government tha t will no t adop t and mak e a cabinet question a satisfactory measure of tenan t compensation ; tha t questio n bein g deeme d b y th e Association a s o f pressin g urgency. 75 In thi s lates t version, the draftin g i s noticeably tighter. However , the rejectio n o f an y acceptanc e of plac e o r favou r an d th e deman d that majorit y decisio n be binding have gone, except i n so far as they may remai n b y implication . A s migh t b e expected , ther e wa s a storm, Dillo n an d th e committe e being freely accuse d o f a breach of faith wit h thos e wh o ha d attende d th e meetin g o f 2 8 April. Th e general meeting , planne d fo r 5 June , ha d t o b e postpone d fo r a fortnight, an d when i t finally met on 1 9 June it was clear that it was going to b e a difficult one. 76 It bega n b y M'Swiney giving a n account o f what th e Associatio n had don e since its foundation . Committe e meetings had bee n held every week, petitions to parliament had been organized when matters arose which concerned th e interest s o f the Association . H e pointe d out, a s a firs t achievement , tha t o n thei r initiativ e a bil l t o abolis h oaths obnoxious to Catholics had been introduced, and was advancing in parliament. Publi c opinion in England and Ireland was rallying to the Association, whose policy, the constitutiona l polic y of O'Connell , uniting priest s an d people , shoul d appeal t o al l Irishmen . H e concluded wit h remark s clearl y inspire d b y Cullen . Th e presenc e or absenc e of a pledge in the Association' s programme , he said , was not a decisive factor. Pledge s of independent opposition had proved useless i n th e past . Wha t mattere d wa s t o retur n representative s who coul d b e trusted . Dillon now rose to propose the electio n address of the Association. It proposed , first , tha t a committe e o f electors shoul d b e se t u p i n each constituenc y t o judge whethe r candidate s wh o proposed them selves shoul d b e give n th e suppor t o f th e Association . Sittin g members were no t to be too hastily o r rashly rejected , bu t there was to b e n o toleranc e o f deliberat e treacher y o r corruption . I t wa s essential tha t th e election-result s shoul d produc e a n effectively independent party . 7

'Quoted by MacCarthy Downin g at th e meetin g o f 1 9 June, Fjf, 2 0 June 1865 . "Reported i n Fjf, 2 0 June 1865 .

138 Reactions

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So far , the meetin g seem s t o hav e proceede d i n ordere d silence . Everyone wa s waiting fo r th e sam e thing , an d Dillo n no w turne d to it. I t wa s a difficult speech . H e took the lin e of pointing out th e problems which had arisen in consequence of the bad drafting at th e meeting o f 2 8 April, an d propose d tha t th e forma l revisio n o f th e rules should be postponed until there was an opportunity for further discussion. I n an y case , h e said , ther e wa s a procedura l difficult y which mad e a postponemen t inevitable . Th e rule s a s drafte d o n 28 April were admittedly so full o f ambiguities as to be unacceptable . Yet he could not propose the amende d for m becaus e of the objectio n raised tha t i t wa s a breach o f faith with th e committe e responsibl e for th e firs t draft , an d i n an y cas e inadmissibl e a s the rule s o f th e Association demande d tha t a chang e o f rul e b e considere d a t tw o meetings o f th e committe e befor e bein g submitte d t o th e genera l meeting. Th e electio n address , i f adopted , was , h e claimed , a sufficient indicatio n that th e Associatio n wa s committed t o a trul y independent policy . The speec h was as skilful a s could b e made in the circumstances , but i t could hardly hope to escape challenge. Th e spokesma n of the challengers wa s MacCarth y Downing , wh o bega n b y complaining , with som e reason , tha t h e foun d i t har d t o b e sur e exactl y wha t Dillon meant . Th e essentia l fact , a s he sa w it, wa s that accordin g to the rule s of the Association, the change s proposed at the meetin g of 2 8 Apri l shoul d b e pu t t o th e genera l meetin g no w convened . There was nothing to be gained by postponement; unles s this issue was faced no w the Associatio n was dead . At thi s stag e th e peacemaker s took over . The y wer e helpe d b y the fac t tha t n o on e wa s willing t o contemplat e a complet e break down. Afte r a number o f speeches stressin g th e wort h o f the caus e and th e integrit y o f al l concerned , th e proposa l wa s made: That th e resolution s agree d t o a t th e conferenc e o n 2 8 Apri l last b e affirmed , subjec t t o suc h amendment s a s a committe e hereafter t o b e appointe d ma y dee m necessary , preservin g th e principles therei n enunciated . This prove d a sufficiently acceptable compromise . The scen e no w shift s t o th e bishops ' meetin g a t Maynooth. 77 Here, the initiativ e seem s to hav e bee n take n by Dorrian , and gradually people were brought together. 78 A number of the bishop s agreed t o mee t Dillo n i n Dubli n nex t da y (2 2 June ) a t Coffey' s Hotel—Derry (th e bisho p o f Clonfert) , Keane , Nulty , and , rathe r unexpectedly, MacHale. 79 Tha t nigh t Dorria n an d Dillo n wen t t o Cullen, who also agreed to attend . 7 'For 78

wha t follows, se e Dorria n to Kirby , 27 June 1865 , no . 141 . Dorrian's word s are : " a littl e private talk amongst a few of us showed good symptoms ". 79 There i s no evidenc e to sho w why MacHal e agreed at thi s stage . I t seem s a reasonable inferenc e tha t th e othe r thre e named were i n clos e contact wit h him, and, onc e persuade d that the y coul d usefull y atten d th e meeting , succeede d i n persuading MacHale to attend as well.

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The meetin g wa s hel d a s arranged , th e bishop s o f Elphi n an d Ardagh being present in addition to those already named. Agreemen t was reache d i n th e followin g terms , which , thi s time , wer e give n to the press: The Associatio n pledges itsel f t o the polic y of complete parlia mentary independence ; an d th e elector s shal l i n al l case s b e urged t o bin d thei r representatives , no t onl y t o vot e fo r al l th e objects o f th e Association , bu t als o t o oppos e an y governmen t which shall not incorporat e with its policy, or otherwise efficientl y support, a satisfactor y measur e o f tenan t compensation—tha t measure bein g deeme d on e o f pressin g exigenc y and paramoun t importance. That as it is impossible to give an honest an d efficien t advocac y in parliamen t to measure s and at the sam e time to incur persona l obligations t o a ministe r wh o i s oppose d t o thes e measures , th e electors shoul d bin d thei r representative s t o accept n o plac e o r honour fo r themselves , an d incu r n o persona l obligatio n t o an y minister wh o shal l no t suppor t a satisfactor y measur e o f tenan t compensation. That ther e shoul d b e a n understandin g betwee n th e elector s and thei r representative s tha t th e latte r shoul d tak e counse l together, s o a s t o secur e a genera l uniformit y o f polic y an d a combined actio n fo r th e end s o f th e Association. 80 This agreement bear s all the mark s of a hard-fought compromise , but th e meetin g seem s t o hav e bee n amicabl e an d eve n cordial. 81 MacHale, however , refuse d t o join th e Association , a t leas t fo r th e present. H e sai d tha t h e woul d d o so at onc e if it consiste d onl y of those present, but tha t he would have to wait and se e if it followe d the polic y no w agreed on . T o Dorrian' s suggestio n tha t h e migh t make a publi c statemen t formall y approvin g thi s policy , h e woul d go n o further tha n t o sa y that h e would d o this " at som e prope r time ", 82 On 2 7 June Dillo n reporte d hi s succes s t o th e committe e o f th e National Association . H e naturall y too k particula r satisfactio n i n having secure d th e suppor t o f MacHale. 83 Th e satisfactio n did no t last beyon d tha t sam e evening , whe n Dillo n too k th e chai r a t a dinner i n honour of Gavan Duffy , wh o had returne d to Irelan d o n a visit. A t thi s dinne r a numbe r o f letter s o f tribute t o Duff y wer e read. Amon g them wa s one from MacHale , date d Tuam , 24 June, in which h e made i t quite clear tha t if he were to join the Nationa l Association h e would not be satisfied with the compromise expresse d in the resolutions agree d to at the meeting of 22 June. Hi s letter ran : 80

F7, 24 June 1865 . Dorrian's lette r stresse s th e unexpecte d cordiality , especiall y betwee n Culle n and MacHale . 82 Dorrian to Kirby , 2 7 June 1865 , cit . *3FJ, 2 8 June 1865 . 81

140 Reactions

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Nothing shor t o f th e pledg e o f independen t opposition , i n al l its plenitud e an d vigour , ca n sav e th e country , wit h th e exercis e of greate r vigilanc e o n th e par t o f elector s t o se e thi s pledg e carried out by their representatives.... Owin g to the deterioratin g influence exercise d thes e year s pas t b y a n unfaithfu l party , " independent oppositio n i n a foreign parliament " is the highest grade of patriotism to which our best me n have ventured t o aspir e as a test fo r parliamentar y candidates . However , a t th e electio n following the , next the y will , I trust , agai n remembe r ou r anti union histor y b y referrin g t o th e example s o f Australi a an d Canada, an d kindlin g a desir e t o brin g bac k ou r exile d people t o share the prosperity which, in Ireland a s well as in those countries , must eve r b e th e frui t o f nativ e legislation. 84 Shortly afte r thi s lette r wa s read G . H . Moor e ros e t o speak . Moore ha d emerge d a s th e leade r o f th e Independen t Oppositio n party b y th e electio n o f 1857 , an d ha d becom e a clos e associat e o f MacHale. H e wa s a gifte d man , bu t lacke d almos t ever y qualit y needed t o hol d a part y together . H e throv e o n controversy , i n which, unfortunately , he wa s alway s offensive.85 Now , i n a speec h of grea t powe r an d bitterness , h e deliberatel y opene d ever y ol d wound o f the controversie s o f the previou s decade. 86 " He scoffe d at th e attemp t o f certai n persons , meanin g Dr . Culle n an d his associates, t o reviv e a nationa l movement , afte r havin g betraye d and destroye d on e o f the greates t nationa l movement s Irelan d eve r possessed ", 87 I t too k al l Dillon's tact t o carr y th e festivitie s t o an outwardly peacefu l conclusion . Four day s later , Saturday , i July , A . M . Sulliva n mad e a bitte r attack i n th e Nation, accusin g th e Associatio n o f " excessive amiability " in admittin g undisguise d Whig s an d place-hunter s t o membership, an d attackin g Culle n personall y fo r hi s " disastrous mistakes" a s a politicia n an d hi s " fatal incapacit y o f judgin g public me n ", 88 Whateve r b e th e explanatio n o f th e sharpnes s o f the attack—an d Sulliva n wa s certainl y playin g a deviou s gam e i n which personalitie s counte d a s wel l a s principles—i t wa s anothe r indication tha t th e controversie s o f th e fiftie s wer e stil l sufficientl y alive t o prejudic e the Nationa l Association' s plan s fo r co-operation with th e Englis h Liberals, 89 an d certainl y sufficientl y aliv e t o prejudice its chances of effective interventio n in the coming elections. "Ibid. 85

Whyte, op . cit., pp . 15 4 ff. Speech reporte d in FJ, 2 8 June 1865 . 87 Gavan Duffy , M y Life i n Tw o Hemispheres, ii. 268 . 8 "See Nation, i Jul y 186 5 ; Irish People, 8 Jul y ; Catholic Telegraph, 8 July; FJ, 1 0 July. 89 For th e continuin g oppositio n o f th e politician s an d priest s o f th e Tenan t League se e Gavan Duffy , op . cit. , ii. 268 ff. 86

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III The electio n results , a s might b e expected , wer e inconclusive . I t was clea r tha t th e programm e o f th e Nationa l Associatio n wa s tainted with "Whiggery" in the eyes of many of the Catholic electors.1 John Dillo n wa s returne d a s on e o f th e member s fo r Tipperary , but th e oppositio n wa s weak and th e electorat e apathetic; 2 the onl y excitement came from Fenia n obstruction . I n a review of the general result the National Association coul d onl y claim that the numbe r o f members returned t o parliamen t who ar e pledge d more o r les s t o ou r polic y i s considerable . Nearl y al l th e ne w members hav e declared fo r som e par t o f ou r programme . I f th e number of those wh o have subscribed t o our entir e programme b e not a s larg e a s it ough t t o b e n o on e will den y thei r powe r an d influence.:i There wa s stil l a lon g roa d t o b e travelle d befor e a n effectiv e parliamentary part y could b e formed. The developmen t o f such a party was made easier by the growin g strength o f Englis h Liberalism . I n Octobe r 186 5 Lor d Palmersto n died. I f eve r the phras e "end o f an era" wa s justified, it was justified here. H e ha d sa t i n parliamen t for nearl y sixty years; he ha d bee n a minister for nearly fifty. Abroad, his name had always been associated with constitutiona l reform, bu t a t home, especially as he gre w older, he ha d resiste d an y chang e i n existin g institutions . O n 1 8 Octobe r Lord Joh n Russel l succeeded him a s premier. This raised the hope s of th e reform-part y in England , but i n Irelan d th e distrus t arisin g from th e Ecclesiastica l Title s Bil l an d hi s Italia n polic y wa s stil l strong. Nevertheless, withi n a ver y shor t tim e th e ne w governmen t ha d made a n approac h t o th e Vatica n o n Iris h affairs . A . H . Layard , under-secretary fo r foreig n affairs , mad e hi s appearanc e in Rome . Mgr. Kirby , recto r o f th e Iris h College , wa s abl e t o report , fro m information supplie d b y Cardina l Antonell i an d Mgr . Talbot , that Layar d ha d informe d th e Vatica n tha t hi s governmen t wa s definitely resolve d to abolis h the Churc h Establishmen t in Ireland , and tha t i n genera l i t wa s prepare d t o gran t th e Iris h Catholic s all thei r jus t demands , no w that Palmerston , th e grea t obstacl e t o any suc h concessions , was dead . T o Antonelli , Layard gav e a firm assurance tha t a Catholi c educatio n system woul d b e provide d i n Ireland, the government insisting only on control of the examinations. That, Kirb y remarke d t o Antonelli , migh t b e a ver y important reservation. Antonell i agreed. I n writin g t o Cullen , Kirb y recorde d his impressio n that Layar d had spoke n clearly an d unambiguously ; while time alone could tell if he spok e truly, all the indication s wer e •"For a n analysi s o f the results , see Fjf, 26 July-1865 . See th e Irish People, 22 an d 2 9 July 1865 . P. P . M'Swiney , reporte d i n Fjf, 2 6 July 1865 .

2 a

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that h e did . Kirby' s conclusio n wa s that the governmen t wa s badly frightened b y Fenianism , an d hope d t o weake n it s influenc e b y concessions.4 Another importan t facto r i n th e ne w politica l development s was the stead y rise o f Gladstone as the ma n capabl e of forming a united party ou t o f the Whi g an d Libera l elements . Gladstone , thoug h a member o f Palmerston' s administration , ha d openl y champione d radical opinion s i n th e hous e eve n a t th e cos t o f incurrin g hi s premier's anger. 5 B y the autum n of 186 4 his plan s for refor m were extending to includ e the problem s of Ireland, 6 an d i n the sprin g of 1865 i n a debat e o n anothe r privat e member' s bil l involvin g th e disestablishment o f th e Iris h Churc h h e agai n defie d Palmersto n and spok e i n favou r o f disestablishmen t a s a measur e o f abstrac t justice, thoug h h e wa s equall y definit e tha t i t coul d no t ye t b e considered a s a matter of practical politics. 7 The problem s o f Italy , however , wer e stil l a barrie r betwee n Gladstone and Catholic opinion. The defenc e of the Pope's temporal power by French bayonet s was a genuine scandal for him. He share d the wave of pro-Italian feeling on the arrival of Garibaldi in England, though no t wit h som e misgiving s a t th e "attentuate d beliefs " o f "the soldie r wh o bor e th e swor d fo r huma n freedom." 8 Amon g those wh o attempte d t o driv e hom e th e contradictio n betwee n reform an d anti-Christia n revolutio n was Henry Edwar d Manning , since 185 7 provos t o f th e chapte r o f Westminster . Gladstone , Manning warned, was in al l honesty attackin g what h e believe d t o be evil s in th e administratio n of the Papa l States , bu t wha t h e sai d and wrote was being used by those whose real purpose was revolution. If h e di d not dissociat e himself from suc h people, he would be used as a tool and mus t face the consequences. 9 There was a genuin e mutua l estee m betwee n the two men , and Manning's nominatio n t o th e archbishopri c o f Westminste r o n 30 Apri l 186 5 naturall y adde d weigh t t o wha t h e ha d t o say . Un fortunately this link did not, immediately at any rate, bring Gladston e into an y close r relation s wit h th e Iris h hierarchy , becaus e Culle n distrusted Manning, quite simply, it would seem, because he regarded him a s "to o English" , to o read y to b e on friendl y term s wit h th e government.10 Fro m th e availabl e correspondence i t i s clea r tha t from the beginnin g of his episcopat e Mannin g set out to establis h co-operation an d unit y o f actio n betwee n th e Englis h an d Iris h 4 DDA, D

Kirby to Cullen, 29 Nov., n Dec . 1865 . See th e accoun t o f Gladstone' s suppor t o f a privat e member' s bil l fo r th e extension o f the franchise , n Ma y 1864 , Morley , Gladstone, i . 569. 6 See Morley' s commen t on Gladstone' s speec h a t Manchester , 1 3 Oct . 1864 , op. cit. , i. 574. Ubid., i . 58 0 ff . *Ibid., i . 55 4 ff. "Manning to Gladstone, 28 Nov. 1862 , 25 April 1864, 24 Oct. 1864—Bayswater . OSC. 10 He supporte d Errington for th e se e of Westminster. (Leslie , Henry Edward Manning, p . 153. )

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hierarchies, o n th e basi s o f a deman d fo r th e cessatio n o f Englis h anti-Roman policy , a demand fo r ful l an d perfec t equalit y o f rights for Catholics , an d a recognitio n o f th e integrit y o f th e Unite d Kingdom.11 Culle n wa s suspicious o f this offe r o f co-operation ; th e first repl y I hav e bee n abl e t o trac e i s date d 7 Februar y i867, 12 and i n it , whil e he recognise s th e valu e o f Manning's advocacy , h e makes no reference to his concrete proposals . In Ireland , Cullen' s project s wer e no t meetin g eas y weather. O n 10 Octobe r 186 5 h e issue d a pastora l lette r agains t Fenianism , o r rather against wha t he regarded a s the two extremist secret societies in Ireland , th e Orang e Orde r an d th e Fenia n Brotherhood . Th e Orange organizatio n h e condemne d a s a menac e i n itsel f an d i n a real sens e th e paren t o f Fenianism , fo r a s lon g a s thos e i n powe r were allowed to form secre t societies , i t was hard to blame the poo r for doin g th e same . Ye t thi s di d no t excus e thos e wh o too k th e Fenian oath. They had been warned by their Church, and they should have been warned by the characte r o f the movement , a secret societ y whose leader s wer e sai d t o b e infidel s an d wh o wer e certainl y dangerous, as was proved by the ideas circulated by the Irish People.™ The movemen t was impotent for all the dangerous ideas it circulated. It ha d wo n n o grea t followin g amon g a deeply-religiou s people . The leader s o f thi s "secre t society " wer e s o inep t a s t o conduc t their affair s i n public , an d no w it s member s wer e a t th e merc y of the English, wh o would show little mercy, in spite of their adulatio n of th e revolutionar y Garibaldi , eve n thoug h i t wa s thi s adulation , together wit h th e unjus t governmen t o f Ireland , whic h ha d cause d and encouraged Fenianism . In contrast , th e Catholi c attitud e t o revolutio n wa s clea r an d unambiguous; so too was Catholic approval of the lawful and available means o f fostering what i t ha d alway s proclaimed to b e th e virtue s of rational liberty and love of country. These means were the electio n of suitabl e member s t o parliamen t an d th e us e o f a fre e pres s t o call attention to wrong and injustice. They ha d been effective before, and could be effective now. 14 The pastora l wa s wel l receive d i n th e Englis h Libera l press . The Times summe d u p th e conservativ e reactio n b y denouncin g Cullen's clai m that Englis h misgovernmen t of Ireland ha d bee n th e cause o f Fenianis m a s " a mos t impolitic , no t t o sa y dangerous , doctrine". At home, it was not easy to make the "lawfu l and available means" effective . Fro m th e very beginning, it wa s obvious that th e question on which it was going to be most difficul t t o fin d commo n "See Mannin g to Cullen , 8 Dec. 1865 , 5 Feb., 3 April, 26 April, 29 May 1866 , ed. by Leslie, " Irish Pages from the Postbags of Manning, Cullen and Gladstone " in 12 Dublin Review, no. 33 1 (1919) , pp . 163-5 . Leslie, art . cit., pp. 165-6 . "Suppressed b y th e governmen t on th e occasio n o f th e Fenia n arrest s a few weeks befor e thi s pastoral wa s issued. ls Text i n Moran , Writings, ii . 38 8 ff . Th e sam e idea s recu r i n hi s Lente n pastoral fo r 1866 , ibid., 484 ff.

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ground betwee n Iris h Catholic s an d English Liberal s was education. Liberal opinio n in Englan d foun d i t very hard t o se e how disestab lishment an d Catholi c education could fit into the same programme. Disestablishment wa s Liberal , sectaria n educatio n was not . Ther e could b e littl e doub t tha t i f th e governmen t shoul d ge t the ide a of introducing a n education-bil l satisfactor y to Catholics , the y would , especially i n th e ver y flui d stat e o f part y allegiances , los e enoug h radical votes t o the Tories t o brin g about certain defeat. In thes e circumstances , th e divide d view s o f th e Iris h bishop s were hardly a decisiv e factor , bu t th e divisio n di d no t hel p wha t slight prospect s existed . Whe n th e governmen t raise d th e educatio n question wit h the m in the summe r o f 1865 , their difficultie s a t once became apparent . Cullen was not dispose d t o accept any substantial compromise on his Catholi c university ; MacHal e wa s not prepare d to hel p him i n thi s matter , no t o f course becaus e he was in any way in favou r o f mixed education , bu t becaus e h e regarded th e Catholi c University a s Cullen's university . I n consequence , whe n the bishop s met o n 2 2 August t o conside r th e educatio n question , ther e wer e no formal proposal s from th e government to put befor e the meeting , because, s o Culle n claimed , MacHal e ha d obstructe d th e step s necessary t o ge t suc h information. 15 I t i s certai n a t an y rat e tha t the governmen t woul d hav e give n detail s o f it s proposal s i f asked , for tw o bishops—Butle r o f Limeric k an d MacHal e himself—wer e able t o communicat e these detail s t o th e meeting , havin g go t the m privately fro m member s o f th e government . Th e proposal , Culle n wrote t o Kirby, 16 wa s to establis h a ne w Roya l University , whic h was to be a n examining body for degree s i n medicine, la w and arts , with a senate to consis t o f sixteen Catholic s an d sixteen Protestants . The governmen t hope d tha t th e Catholi c bishop s woul d agre e that som e o f thei r numbe r woul d accep t nominatio n amon g th e Catholic members . Cullen fel t i t would be difficul t t o get Roma n approval of bishop s sitting o n the senat e of a neutral university, no r di d he view the idea himself wit h an y grea t favour , thoug h h e reflecte d that a t Louvai n students appeared before a state examining board and that the French Conseil d'Enseignement include d rabbi s a s wel l a s Cardinals. 17 I n any case , a s thes e proposal s wer e no t formall y befor e th e meetin g the only decision which could be taken was that the four archbishop s should meet representatives of the government and report to a further meeting. Th e meetin g wit h th e governmen t seem s t o hav e bee n fairly encouraging , i n spit e o f Cullen' s fear s tha t th e difference s between himsel f an d MacHal e woul d b e s o obviou s tha t th e onl y answer the y coul d expec t woul d b e a reques t t o compos e thei r own difference s first . 15

Cullen to Kirby , 1 4 Aug., 2 5 Aug. 1865 , nos. 180 , 189 . 25 Aug. 1865 , no. 189 . 17 Culle n t o Kirby , 2 7 Aug. 1865 , no. 191 .

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The delegatio n reporte d t o a bishops ' meetin g i n th e middl e of December. MacHal e di d no t attend . I n hi s absence , Cullen' s views me t littl e opposition , an d th e meetin g dre w u p a petitio n asking fo r a charte r fo r th e Catholi c University . Whil e the y di d not rejec t th e governmen t proposal s directly , the y declare d the y could no t accep t the m i f they entailed mixe d education. 18 The y did not declare whether th e proposal that bishops shoul d be members of the senat e o f th e Roya l Universit y wa s acceptabl e o r not ; thi s decision, Culle n felt , woul d have t o b e lef t t o Rome, 19 Gettin g th e decision too k time, 20 an d wit h th e dela y th e "unanimity " o f th e bishops' meetin g showe d sign s o f breakin g down . MacHal e ha d refused t o sig n th e memoria l t o th e governmen t issue d b y th e meeting.21 Late r Moriart y lef t n o doub t tha t h e woul d settl e o n terms muc h les s exigen t tha n Cullen's. 22 I n it s fina l form , th e government's bil l di d n o mor e tha n confe r a supplementa l charte r on th e Queen' s University , empowerin g i t t o examin e for degree s students othe r tha n it s own , an d t o confe r it s degree s o n the m i f successful. Th e senat e of the Queen's Universit y was to be increased by th e additio n o f members favourabl e t o Catholics . Th e bil l was passed i n Jun e 1866 , bu t eve n thes e meagr e provision s wer e no t put int o effect , fo r a n injunctio n wa s obtaine d b y thos e oppose d to denominationa l educatio n settin g th e supplementa l charte r asid e as invalid an d the whole scheme collapsed . The land-questio n wa s als o th e caus e o f troubl e i n th e secon d half o f 1865. I n November , th e bisho p an d clerg y o f Meath finall y wi hdre w fro m th e Nationa l Association . Thei r grievanc e was stil l the sam e a s that whic h ha d threatene d a break earlie r i n th e year , namely, that the Association was not sufficiently seriou s in its demand for land-reform . Th e bisho p an d clerg y me t o n 6 Novembe r an d decided t o establis h a tenant-right society . A t this meetin g too they decided to draw up an address, which was published o n 29 November. The address was by no means complimentary to Cullen's programme, notably hi s Octobe r pastora l denouncin g Fenianism , an d t o th e programme of the Nationa l Association in general. I t declare d tha t the Meat h clerg y claime d littl e shar e i n th e congratulation s bein g widely offere d t o th e Iris h clerg y fo r thei r denunciatio n o f con spiracy. Ther e ha d bee n littl e conspirac y i n Meat h becaus e ther e the clergy and people had always stood together on the only question which reall y counted , th e lan d question . A s s o littl e coul d b e expected fro m th e presen t Iris h member s i n thi s matter , the y hoped tha t thei r exampl e in foundin g a tenant-righ t societ y woul d 18

Cullen t o Kirby , 2 2 Dec. 1865 , no . 297 , 1 6 Jan . 1866 , no . 8 . "Letter o f archbishop s an d bishop s o f Irelan d t o Si r Georg e Grey o n th e National syste m of education, Jan . 1866 , Moran , Writings, ii . 443-5 0 ; sam e t o same, o n Universit y education , ibid., 450—63. 20 DDA, Kirb y t o Cullen , 2 Jan., 4 Jan. 186 6 ; Culle n to Kirby , 2 0 Jan. 1866 , no.2113 . Cullen t o Kirby , 1 6 Jan. 1866 , no. 8 . 22 Same to same , 1 5 Ma y 1866 , no. 109 .

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be followe d b y th e establishmen t o f suc h societie s al l ove r th e country, whic h shoul d loo k fo r guidanc e t o Ireland' s bes t friend, , the man who had always held a steady course, John MacHale. 23 Bishop Dorrian of Down and Connor, who had taken the initiativ e in mendin g th e earlie r crisis , wa s als o growin g discouraged . Th e National Association , h e felt , ha d faile d t o wi n popula r suppor t because o f the "grea t folly " o f even indirect suppor t o f the Whigs , of whic h som e o f th e bishop s wer e guilty. 24 Whil e ther e i s n o indication tha t h e broke openly with the Association, i t is clear tha t he fel t i t wa s no longe r wort h workin g hard for . Bisho p Kean e of Cloyne to o showe d indication s o f bein g discourage d a t th e failur e of th e Associatio n t o wi n popula r support, 25 an d whil e h e stil l believed i n th e essentia l soundnes s o f its programme , h e mad e i t quite clea r that h e expected it to get down to business, i n particular to wor k for a satisfactory measure of land-reform. 26 The on e gai n o f thes e si x depressin g month s mus t b e credite d largely t o th e tac t an d patienc e o f Joh n Dillon . Som e tim e afte r the electio n th e Nationa l Associatio n me t t o discus s ho w to dra w some profi t fro m th e rathe r meagr e succes s i t ha d brough t them . Dillon urge d tha t the y shoul d tr y t o secur e som e kin d o f unite d action fro m th e Iris h member s wh o i n on e wa y o r anothe r ha d indicated thei r suppor t o f the Association , b y arrangin g a meetin g with the m i n Dubli n a s soo n a s possible. 27 Hi s negotiation s mus t have run int o difficulties , fo r a t a later meeting of the Associatio n i n October w e fin d hi m urgin g th e episcopa l member s present , th e archbishops o f Dubli n an d Cashe l an d th e bisho p o f Elphin , t o proceed cautiously , i n orde r t o giv e th e impressio n tha t th e con ference shoul d com e abou t throug h pressur e o f publi c opinion , not because the Association wished to impose conditions on members of parliament. 28 I t too k anothe r si x weeks to conciliat e wha t seem s to have been a touchy sense of independence, bu t th e meeting when finally held on 5 and 6 December was quite successful. Th e twenty two member s wh o attende d agree d t o adop t a commo n polic y o n the Land , Churc h an d Education questions , and , i n the knowledge that it s "advanced " sectio n share d thei r views , to co-operate wit h the Libera l part y i n matter s o f commo n interest. 29 I t wa s a small nucleus, roughl y one-fift h o f th e Iris h representation , a littl e les s than one-hal f o f thos e wh o calle d themselve s "Liberals" , bu t i f it coul d be held togethe r i t migh t wel l be effectiv e i n the Hous e of Commons a s then constituted . This wa s on e clea r gai n fo r th e Nationa l Association , t o offse t the ope n defectio n o f som e an d th e secre t questioning s o f more . ™FJ, 4 Dec. 1865 . 24 Dorrian to Kirby , 2 8 Sept. 1865 , no. 21 6 ; 1 0 Dec. 1866 , no. 341. to Kirby, i Jan. , 6 Feb. 1866 , nos . i , 24. See his Lente n pastoral, FJ, 12 Feb . 1866 . "FJ, 3 0 Aug. 1865 . **Ibid., 1 9 Oct . 1865 . "Resolutions of the meetin g in FJ, 8 Dec. 1865 .

25 Keane 26

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It wa s no w mor e tha n eve r th e onl y alternativ e t o Fenianism , fo r John Martin' s Nationa l Leagu e wa s moribund. 30 I n a serie s o f meetings i n th e sprin g o f 1866 , plan s were drawn u p t o mak e th e committee mor e widel y representative , fo r ther e wa s som e dis content arisin g from a feeling that it was drawn too exclusively from a smal l grou p i n Dublin. 31 Th e committe e als o kep t u p pressur e for remedia l legislatio n throug h contact s wit h th e Englis h Liberals , John Brigh t i n particular , b y th e organisatio n o f petition s t o th e government, b y furthe r emphasi s o n Cullen' s argumen t tha t Fenianism wa s a n inevitabl e produc t o f Iris h discontent , whic h could b e me t onl y b y removin g discriminatio n an d injustice , specifically the discriminations still imposed on Catholics.32 The Churc h Establishment inevitabl y appears as the great example of anti-Catholic discrimination , but i n deference to popular pressure most o f th e practica l effor t wa s directe d t o a consideratio n o f th e land-question. Th e defectio n o f th e dioces e o f Meat h an d th e Lenten pastora l o f th e bisho p o f Cloyn e wer e onl y tw o o f man y indications that this problem wa s widely held t o be the most urgen t one. A committee was set up, with John Dillon as chairman, to draft a Lan d Bil l to be introduced i n the Commons. 33 The draf t produced by this committee was considered at a meeting on 20 March. I t go t a mixed reception. Fro m many quarters it was criticized a s not securin g the vita l issue, th e tenant' s righ t t o com r pensation fo r improvements he had carried out, but Dillo n defended it o n th e groun d tha t i n thi s respec t i t compare d ver y favourabl y with the 186 0 bill and that i t was the most they could hope to carry. He argue d furthe r tha t som e succes s wa s essentia l no w becaus e feeling i n Ireland wa s growing increasingly restive at the continuin g inaction o f the government . I t wa s essential , however , tha t the y should continu e t o suppor t th e administration , fo r i t offere d th e only hope, and he believed it to be a real hope, of remedial legislation. After a debate the draf t wa s grudgingly approve d a s expressing th e minimum o f the tenants ' jus t demands. 34 The questio n a s to whether support o f the governmen t should b e continued became more acute as it began to appear that the Extension of th e Franchis e Bil l woul d provid e the Iris h Libera l members , i f they s o wished, wit h a n opportunit y o f putting i t ou t o f office . A t the en d o f April th e secon d readin g was carried by five votes only , in spite o f the stil l soli d support o f the Iris h Liberals. 35 A week o r so before this a meeting o f the committee o f the National Associatio n .showed indications that even here the commitment to the government 3 "bee 31

reports of meetings in FJ, 7 Feb., 8 Aug. 1866 . FJ, 2 4 Jan., 2 1 Feb., i Marc h 1866 . **FJ, 1 4 Jan., 2 4 Jan., 2 1 Feb. , i March , 7 March, 2 1 Marc h 1866 . Fro m th e reports of these meetings it is clear that the initiative an d control lie with Kavanag h and M'Swiney , an d tha t the y ar e the spokesme n fo r Cullen's views . ™Fy, 2 1 Feb . 1866 . 3t lbid., 21 March 1866 . ™Ibid., 2 8 April 1866 .

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was unde r sever e strain, 36 whic h wa s ver y littl e ease d whe n th e Tenure and Improvemen t o f Land (Ireland ) Bill was introduced o n 30 April . I t me t Conservativ e criticis m eve n o n th e firs t reading , and i n Irelan d ther e wa s much disappointmen t a t it s inadequacies , particularly th e provisio n fo r tenant-compensatio n i n clause s 2 9 and 30 . Thes e clauses ra n int o heav y criticism, especiall y from th e bishop o f Elphin, i n th e committe e o f th e Nationa l Association, 37 and a t furthe r meeting s o n 2 5 Ma y an d 1 2 Jun e al l Dillon's persuasiveness wa s called fo r t o secur e a vote o f continued suppor t for th e government. 38 Meanwhile , the debat e on the secon d readin g had bee n opene d an d adjourne d o n 1 7 May . Befor e i t coul d b e resumed th e governmen t ha d fallen . Th e increasin g restivenes s o f the Iris h Liberal s le d t o a defectio n o f eigh t o f them i n a crucia l vote o n a n amendmen t t o th e Refor m Bill . Ther e wa s a majorit y of eleven against the government. 39 Lor d Joh n Russel l immediatel y forwarded hi s resignatio n t o Balmoral . Th e quee n wa s unwilling to accep t it , fo r wa r betwee n Austri a an d Prussi a ha d just broke n out, bu t th e prim e ministe r insiste d an d o n 6 Jul y Lor d Derb y accepted th e reques t t o for m a Tor y ministr y i n circumstance s which suggeste d tha t th e ne w governmen t woul d b e eve n weake r than it s predecessor . O n 2 5 July th e debat e o n the secon d reading of th e Iris h Lan d Bil l wa s resumed , an d ended , inevitably , i n th e Bill bein g withdrawn . IV

The ne w governmen t wa s s o essentiall y a minorit y on e tha t i t could hope to remain in offic e onl y by professing to pleas e everyon e and doin g a s littl e controversia l a s possible . I t promise d reform legislation fo r Ireland , bu t th e National Associatio n determine d t o continue the policy of co-operation wit h the Englis h Liberals , no w in opposition. Joh n Dillo n ha d bee n chiefl y responsibl e fo r insistin g on thi s policy , an d i t wa s a grea t shoc k t o hi s follower s whe n th e news cam e o f hi s sudde n an d unexpecte d deat h o n 1 5 Septembe r at the ag e of 5i. 40 Hi s deat h mean t a by-election i n Tipperary an d an immediate trial of strength, fo r White, the Libera l candidate, was opposed b y Waldron, wh o argued tha t " the government shoul d be given a fai r tria l " i n vie w o f th e promise s i t ha d made. 41 Th e Catholic bishop s concerned—Cashel , Killalo e an d Waterford — openly declare d thei r suppor t o f White, 42 an d h e wa s returned , though no t b y a grea t majority , afte r a n election-campaig n whic h 3e lbid., 1 9 Apri l 1866 . Eve n withi n th e meeting , th e sloga n o f " independent opposition " was heard. 37 F7, 1 6 May 1866 . 3B FJ, 2 6 May, 1 4 June 1866 . 39 Ibid., 1 9 June 1866 . ™Ibid., 1 7 Sept . 1866 . "Ibid., 5 Oct. 1866 . ™Ibid., ii , 12 , 1 5 Oct . 1866 .

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drew protest s o f " clerical intimidatio n " fro m th e Tor y papers. 43 By-elections late r i n the yea r gav e mixe d results . I n Waterford , i n the firs t contes t sinc e 1852 , th e Libera l candidat e ha d a convincin g majority, eve n though , a t leas t i n Cullen' s eyes , th e campaig n showed tha t the conservative s could dispos e o f rather direc t method s of intimidatio n too. 44 I n th e Wexfor d by-election , th e contes t la y between tw o Derb y supporters , th e Liberal s no t bein g able eve n t o put a candidate in th e field , due , Culle n commented , t o th e foll y of the " Young Irelan d " priests, stron g i n Wexford as in Meath, who had thwarte d th e wis h o f their bishop , Dr . Furlong , t o pu t forwar d a Libera l candidate. 45 In spit e o f reverses o f this kind , th e se t o f the tid e wa s toward s co-operation between the Irish Liberals and the English reform-party. This wa s emphasized b y th e receptio n give n t o Joh n Brigh t o n his visit t o Dublin . O n 3 0 Octobe r h e wa s entertaine d t o a banque t which wa s attende d b y man y o f th e clergy , includin g prominen t clergy o f the dioces e of Dublin. Thoug h n o bishop wa s present, al l had bee n invited , an d eighteen , includin g th e thre e archbishops, 46 sent letter s o f apolog y whic h wer e rea d a t th e banquet , i n whic h they too k occasio n t o prais e Brigh t an d hi s associate s a s defenders of th e people' s rights. 47 Th e speeche s o n th e occasion , however , underlined th e fac t tha t th e education-issu e stil l raise d difficulties. 48 While ther e wa s agreemen t o n th e Churc h an d Lan d questions , i t was very hard t o ge t th e Englis h radical s to se e the demand s o f th e Irish Catholic s in regard to educatio n as demands for free education rather tha n fo r sectaria n education . Even though the allianc e prospered, littl e coul d b e done while the Liberals wer e i n opposition , an d th e continue d defermen t o f hop e helped onl y th e Fenians . A s th e yea r closed , fear s wer e expresse d on al l side s tha t a risin g wa s imminent , an d th e government , supported b y th e demand s o f th e conservativ e press , continue d t o strengthen it s garrisons . Culle n sa w developin g under hi s eye s th e situation h e ha d alway s feared, th e dange r h e ha d fo r year s consist ently warned against, a Fenian risin g which, because i t was doomed to failure , mus t inevitabl y strengthe n th e force s o f conservatis m and destro y th e hope s fo r a bettering o f the people' s lo t whic h ha d been raised by the Libera l alliance of the las t few years.49 A pastoral "The figures were : electorat e 8,996 , Whit e 3,419 , Waldro n 2,865 . FJ , 22-2 3 Oct. 1856 . 4 "Election result s i n FJ, 3 1 Dec . 1866 . " At Dungarva n th e lancers charge d th e poor people , killin g one an d woundin g nineteen . O f cours e the y wer e actin g fo r the Beresfords. " Culle n t o Kirby , 2 Jan. 1867 , no . 3 . 45 Results i n FJ , 2 0 Nov . 186 6 ; Cullen' s commen t i n Culle n t o Kirby , 2 Jan . 1867, cit . "Armagh was at this tim e vacant . 47 Letters in FJ , 3 1 Oct . 1866 . 'l8See especiall y the speeche s o f Brigh t an d M'Swiney , ibid. Iris h guest s a t a reform-banquet i n Mancheste r o n 2 0 November reporte d sign s o f a better under standing—FJ, 1 3 Dec. 1866 . 49 See Culle n t o Kirby , 2 7 Nov. 1866 , no . 323 , 2 Dec., no. 329 , 7 Dec., no. 339 ; DDA, Kirb y t o Cullen , 9 Jan . 186 7 ; Culle n t o Manning , 7 an d 1 3 Feb . 186 7 Leslie, art . cit. , pp. 165-7 .

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issued fo r th e feas t o f th e Immaculat e Conceptio n repeate d wha t were b y no w familia r warnings 50—that revolutio n wa s no t merel y wrong bu t coul d no t hop e t o succeed , tha t th e lon g lis t o f Iris h grievances, tenant-right , disendowment , improvemen t o f the poor laws, Catholi c education , coul d b e redresse d onl y b y lawfu l an d constitutional means , the succes s o f which was guaranteed, no t onl y by th e ver y justice o f the claims , bu t b y th e growin g sympath y o f a larg e section o f the Englis h people. 51 In th e end , patienc e di d no t prevai l and the insurrectio n cam e in 1867. Shortl y afte r th e prematur e an d abortiv e outbrea k i n Kerr y on Februar y 11 , Culle n ha d t o spea k a t a gathering o f a kind which he di d no t frequentl y attend . I t wa s a banque t give n b y th e Protestant Lor d Mayo r o f Dubli n t o mar k th e wor k o f th e inter denominational committee whic h had administere d relief during th e great choler a epidemic o f the previou s year . Th e Lor d Lieutenan t sat immediatel y t o th e Mayor' s right , Culle n immediatel y t o his left, a tribut e t o hi s enhance d statu s sinc e h e ha d receive d th e Cardinal's ha t th e previou s year , an d which , i t seems , mad e i t necessary fo r th e Protestan t Archbisho p Trenc h t o remai n away, so as no t t o hav e t o yiel d precedence. 52 The Lor d Mayo r ros e t o propos e th e toas t o f th e Cardinal , praising his " learning, devotio n to his country, his unceasing effort s to alleviate the calamities of cholera ". Th e choic e of theme to reply to suc h a gatherin g coul d b e difficult . Culle n chos e t o spea k o n charity an d work s o f charity. H e wa s thankful, h e said, t o fin d hi s name couple d wit h th e charitabl e works of Dublin . Th e peopl e of Dublin were untiring in works of charity. Th e Catholic s in particular had performe d miracle s o f charit y ove r th e pas t thirt y years , i n building churches , school s an d institutions . Peopl e o f al l faith s had com e together i n works of charity during the choler a epidemi c ; the relie f fun d ha d bee n impartiall y administere d b y th e inter denominational committee . Onl y th e da y befor e h e ha d ha d th e pleasure of hearing eloquent speeche s by two Protestants i n suppor t of th e Mate r Hospital . I t al l showed tha t whil e ther e wer e man y things o n whic h Catholi c an d Protestan t coul d no t agree , outsid e these ther e wa s a " vast neutra l groun d " wher e al l coul d wor k together i n alleviating the miseries of the country . Ther e were signs that better times were coming. I n a speech o f a few moments before , the Lor d Lieutenan t ha d mad e the m promises . I f thes e promise s were carried out, the false patriotism of which they had seen examples 50 Moran, Writings, iii . 20 ff. "Some indication s o f th e growin g bitternes s o f Iris h conservativ e opinion can b e see n i n th e commen t o f th e Evening Mail tha t Culle n an d Stephen s ha d identical interest s ; bot h favoure d th e destructio n o f property and th e establish ment o f communism, Stephens b y revolution , Cullen by a land-bill an d outdoo r relief fo r th e poor . (Cite d i n FJ , 2 0 Dec . 1866. ) 52 The Cardinal's precedence prompted a question in the Hous e of Commons by a Tor y member . Th e repl y wa s that th e functio n wa s not a diplomatic one, tha t the Cardinal got his due precedence as a prince of his Church, and that the presenc e of Catholi c bishops a t suc h function s wa s to b e encouraged . FJ , 2 6 Feb . 1867 .

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in the las t few weeks would lose its appeal. Th e Iris h people would respond t o justice, bu t onl y t o justice. Tru e patriotis m an d tru e charity la y i n workin g together fo r th e goo d o f the country. 53 The speec h mad e a considerable impression. It s immediate resul t was a messag e fro m th e Lor d Lieutenan t t o th e Cardina l assurin g him o f th e desir e o f th e administratio n t o satisf y th e bishops , an d pressing him to attend a t the Castle. 54 Th e repl y was courteous bu t firm : tha t the bishops sough t onl y justice fo r the country, an d that for th e presen t h e mus t declin e the invitatio n t o th e Castle . A s he wrote t o Kirby , i f he were to atten d stat e function s there h e coul d be hel d u p a s a Castl e hac k an d woul d los e hi s influenc e with th e people. I n suc h difficul t time s i t was best t o d o one's dut y t o th e government withou t seekin g favour o r recompense. Castl e Catholic s and libera l Protestant s woul d b e gla d t o se e th e bishop s accep t government patronage , no t t o strengthe n thei r influenc e bu t t o lessen it. 55 One motiv e o f Cullen' s choic e o f subjec t fo r hi s speec h ha d obviously been the need to bring calm in what was generally believed to b e the aftermat h of an unsuccessful Fenian rising. 56 Event s soo n showed tha t th e outbrea k i n Kerr y ha d no t bee n th e mai n effort . A muc h mor e widesprea d insurrectio n brok e ou t o n Marc h 5 , bu t met wit h n o bette r success . I n a pastora l date d 1 2 Marc h Culle n underlined th e warning s h e ha d alread y s o frequentl y given , th e latest i n hi s Lente n pastora l a fe w day s before , insistin g o n th e conscientious dut y o f allegiance , th e obligatio n o f adoptin g con stitutional mean s of redress, th e Mazzinia n and Garibaldian affinitie s of th e Fenia n leaders , an d endin g b y askin g the governmen t t o ac t with clemency. 57 The governmen t di d no t sho w th e clemenc y Culle n hope d for , but eve n when death-sentence s wer e passed h e still ha d goo d hope s they woul d b e commuted. 58 I n th e trial s o f those take n i n arms , two men , Burk e an d Doran , wer e sentence d t o death , wit h a re commendation to merc y in the cas e of Doran.583 Eleve n days later, on 1 2 May, Doran received news of the commutatio n of his sentence.

53 Speech reported in FJ, 2 0 Feb. 1867 . Se e also Cullen to Kirby , 22 Feb. 1867 , no.6459 , 1 8 March 1867 , no. 10 0 ; Mora n to Kirby , 5 March 1867 , no 73. The Iris h bishop s had no t attende d at Castl e functions sinc e Culle n came to Dublin ; befor e thi s number s of them attende d regularly . Th e occasio n for th e change wa s the Ecclesiastica l Titles Bill . 85 Cullen t o Kirby , 2 2 Feb. , 1 8 Marc h 1867 , nos . 59 , 10 0 ; Mora n t o Kirby , S Marc h 1867 , no. 73 . 66 For the sam e reason, h e wa s annoyed by th e bisho p of Kerry's denunciation. Moriarty ha d declare d in a sermon afte r th e risin g in Kerr y tha t " Hell was not hot enough nor eternity long enough " to punish the Fenians. " He is very much blamed," Culle n commented, " for so foolish a n exaggeration . .. I wish he could be called to a n account for it." Culle n to Kirby, 22 Feb., 1 8 March 1867 , nos. 59 , ipo. 57 FJ, 1 5 Marc h 1867 . Se e als o th e pastora l o f th e archbisho p o f Cashel , 12 Marc h 1867 , ibid., 1 4 March , an d als o the lette r fro m th e bisho p of Cloyne , dated 2 5 March 1867 , rea d at th e meetin g of the Nationa l Association a few days later (FJ, 2 8 March 1867) , an d hi s letter t o Kirby , 1 8 March 1867 , no. 99 . S8 Cullen to Kirby , 1 0 May 1867 , no. 170 . ! **FJ, 2 May 1867 .

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The silenc e i n regar d t o Thoma s Burk e could wel l be construe d a s an indicatio n o f th e government' s determinatio n t o carr y ou t th e sentence i n hi s case . Th e countr y wa s deeply agitated ; ther e ha d been n o suc h executio n i n Irelan d sinc e 1803 . Th e reform-part y in Englan d wa s prominent i n th e deman d fo r mercy—ther e was in fact genera l agreement in the Englis h pres s that th e sentence should be commuted . A smal l sectio n o f Iris h conservativ e opinio n wa s alone in demandin g blood. A meeting a t the Mansio n Hous e dre w up a petitio n t o th e Lor d Lieutenant . Th e Dubli n clerg y wer e prominent amon g the organizer s o f the meeting , an d a lette r fro m Cullen was read supporting their petition and saying that an execution would cause him the deepest pain. 59 Th e deputatio n was not received until 2 4 May , an d Burke' s executio n ha d bee n fixed for Ma y 29. 60 However, everyon e wa s confidentl y expectin g a reprieve , and , i n the circumstances , i t wa s a reasonabl e hope . Th e government , however, seem s t o hav e attache d ver y muc h weigh t t o th e nee d t o meet the demand of the Irish conservatives, and when the deputatio n waited o n th e Lor d Lieutenan t the y learne d tha t th e cabine t ha d decided ther e shoul d b e n o reprieve . H e coul d not , h e said , hol d out th e slightes t hope . Th e intervie w seem s to hav e bee n equall y painful an d embarrassin g for both sides. Everyon e had been expecting a reprieve . Ther e wa s a genera l shocke d disappointment , spreading eve n t o thos e wh o ha d earlie r bee n insisten t tha t th e sentence b e carrie d out. 61 A deputation o f 40 or 5 0 Irish member s of parliamen t waited o n Lor d Derb y o n Saturda y Ma y 2 5 ; shoul d this interview fail, a smaller deputation was ready for a night journey to Balmora l to th e queen . Th e deputatio n fel t tha t Lor d Derb y had no t quit e closed all hopes. I t i s hard to be sure ho w right the y were i n this , fo r the y wer e no w prepare d t o gras p a t shadows , an d time wa s pressing . Tha t sam e Saturda y afternoo n i n Dubli n th e Cardinal wen t t o th e Castle . It wa s understood, th e Freeman reported, 82 that th e Cardina l ha d urged tha t all the bishop s and clergy , who had don e so muc h to restrain Fenianism , wishe d fo r th e commutatio n o f th e sentence , and tha t th e Lor d Lieutenan t ha d bee n deepl y move d b y hi s re presentations and had promised to telegraph the cabinet immediately . It wa s public knowledg e that Cullen' s persona l interventio n woul d certainly carr y grea t weight ; wha t wa s no t publi c knowledge , of course, was that the Cardinal was now putting t o the test the specifi c and persona l undertaking the Lor d Lieutenan t ha d proffere d earlie r in the year, and which he had then rejected . Dubli n an d the countr y waited throug h Sunday , an d a t thre e o'cloc k o n th e afternoo n of Monday 27 May the news arrived from Londo n tha t Burke had been reprieved. Th e Lor d Lieutenan t immediatel y sen t wor d t o th e 59 F7, 15 Ma y 1867. ' 80 *Ibid., 2 4 May 1867 61

. Ibid., 2 5 May 1867 . «*Ibid., 2 7 Ma y 1867 .

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Cardinal an d th e Lor d Mayor. 62a I t i s impossible , naturally , to weigh wit h finalit y th e motive s whic h ha d le d t o th e reprieve , bu t there ca n b e littl e doubt , considerin g al l th e circumstances , tha t Cardinal Cullen' s firs t visi t t o Dubli n Castl e ha d bee n a ver y important factor. 63 The meetin g o f th e Iris h bishops , hel d i n th e openin g day s of October, issue d a furthe r warnin g against th e " criminal foll y " of secret societies , togethe r wit h a declaratio n t o th e governmen t tha t there woul d neve r b e peac e i n Irelan d withou t disestablishment , free education , an d land-reform. 64 Th e immediat e backgroun d t o this ne w pronouncemen t o n Fenianis m ha d bee n th e rescu e o f Colonel Kell y a t Manchester , i n consequenc e o f whic h me n wer e once again to stand tria l for their lives . Th e stor y is too well known to nee d eve n recapitulation—th e insistenc e i n pressin g a charg e of murder, th e completel y unsatisfactor y natur e o f th e evidenc e t o show that any of the prisoners had fired the fatal shot, the breakdown of the cas e implied in the unconditiona l pardon of Maguire and then the commutatio n o f Condon' s sentenc e becaus e o f American inter vention. Again , i t wa s a tim e o f tens e hope s an d fear s i n Ireland , but thi s time , i n spit e o f all the petition s an d memorials , in which bishops an d clergy joined,65 there wa s no[reprieve, and Allen, Larkin and O'Brie n wer e hange d i n Mancheste r o n th e mornin g o f 2 3 November 1867 . This time Cullen did not intervene. Th e circumstance s were very different fro m thos e o f the precedin g May , whe n hi s approac h was to th e Lor d Lieutenant , wh o ha d give n som e indication s tha t h e was anxious to oblig e him ; th e matte r the n wa s primarily an Iris h one, an d onl y a smal l an d dail y decreasin g bod y o f publi c opinion called for the execution . No w it was an English matter , an d Englis h public opinio n of all classes was inflamed at the idea that th e Fenian s could strik e in the Englis h cities , and was determined to have blood for blood . A fe w day s befor e th e executions , th e queen' s speec h a t th e opening o f parliament ha d referred , in pointedl y differen t terms , t o the revolutionar y movement s i n Ital y an d i n Irelan d : A band of Italian volunteers , withou t authorit y from thei r ow n sovereign, havin g invade d papa l territor y an d threatene d Rom e itself, the Empero r of the Frenc h fel t himsel f calle d upo n to despatch a n arm y fo r th e protectio n o f th e sovereig n an d hi s dominions. Tha t object having been accomplished, an d the defeat and dispersio n o f the volunteers having relieved the territory fro m the dange r o f external invasion , I trus t tha t hi s imperia l majest y ™a.Ibid., 2 8 Ma y 1867 . 83 The only reference I have been able to find in Cullen's private correspondence is tw o brie f sentence s : " The Fenian s ar e no w al l reprieved. I wen t t o th e Lord Lieutenan t t o plead thei r caus e ". Culle n to Kirby , 6 June 1867 , no. 219. "Resolutions o f th e bishop s i n Moran , Writings, iii . 89 . 66 See, e.g., th e lis t i n FJ, 1 9 Nov. 1867 .

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will find himself enabled , b y an early withdrawal of his troops, t o remove an y possibl e ground s o f misunderstandin g betwee n hi s majesty's governmen t an d tha t o f the kin g o f Italy . The treasonabl e conspiracy , commonl y know n a s Fenianism , baffled an d represse d i n Ireland , ha s assume d i n Englan d th e form o f organize d violenc e an d assassination . Thes e outrage s require t o be vigorously put dow n ; an d I rel y for their effectua l suppression upo n th e fir m administratio n o f th e la w an d th e loyalty o f th e grea t masse s o f m y subjects. 66 The referenc e t o Garibaldi' s lates t fora y int o th e papa l states , which ha d ende d wit h hi s defea t a t Mentana, wa s in the direc t lin e of Lor d Joh n Russell' s famou s despatc h o f Octobe r 1860 , an d le d to a debate on the Roman question in the Commons which provided the predictable tirades agains t Popery. N o one could read the reference t o Fenianis m withou t recognizin g tha t i t gav e th e highes t sanction t o the English deman d for vengeance and killed all possibl e hopes o f a reprieve . Cullen's privat e thought s wer e bitter. O n 22 November, th e day before th e executions , h e wrot e t o Kirby : The queen has been very kind in her speech to the Garibaldians . She calls them Italian volunteers. Lor d Stanley, minister of foreign affairs, wa s als o ver y friendl y t o them , an d als o Lor d Russell . Che razza d i vipere \ The y ar e hangin g Fenian s wh o ar e galantuomini whe n compare d wit h th e Garibaldian s who m the y praise an d encourage. 67 The Mancheste r Martyr s immediatel y becam e th e heroes , almos t the saint s o f Ireland . Publi c demonstration s wer e organized , an d public High Masse s celebrated for the repose of their souls. I n spit e of hi s bitte r reflection s o n Englis h inconsistenc y an d hypocris y i n the Mancheste r executions , Culle n coul d no t approve . I t was , h e recognized, a right , eve n a duty , t o pra y fo r me n wh o ha d die d i n the Catholi c faith , bu t th e publi c demonstration s an d eve n th e Masses wer e bein g organize d fo r politica l reason s o r a t leas t bein g used t o serv e th e politica l end s o f Fenianism. I n consequence , h e felt oblige d to take the same attitude a s he had taken in regard to the MacManus funeral si x years before, an d there were no High Masse s in Dublin . V

Fenianism ha d provide d al l th e dram a i n 1867 , an d neithe r it s prominence no r it s failur e wa s a great hel p i n winnin g suppor t fo r the constitutiona l party . Whil e it is true tha t the Fenia n outbreak s did shoc k Englan d into som e realization o f the problem s o f Ireland , «6F7, 20 Nov. 1867. *7Cullen to Kirby, 22 Nov. 1867 , no. 423 .

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the immediat e respons e wa s anger. Ther e wer e few in Englan d i n the autum n of 186 7 wh o wer e prepared to commen t s o dispassion ately a s Gladstone: But fo r the live s that hav e been so sadly lost I coul d almos t b e pleased with th e Mancheste r outrage . Fo r the Englis h peopl e ar e deep sleeper s an d n o voic e wil l awake n the m excep t on e tha t i s trumpet-tongued.1 Yet i n spit e o f th e disturbance s at hom e and popula r hostilit y an d a Tor y governmen t i n Englan d th e constitutiona l caus e di d mak e some progress durin g 1867 . O n 8 January the Nationa l Association held a n importan t meeting . Th e chairman , M'Swiney , reviewe d the progress which had been made, underlining the fact that it would have bee n fa r greate r ha d i t no t bee n fo r th e numbe r o f those wh o held aloof , som e becaus e th e Associatio n wa s to o radical , som e because it was too conservative. Thei r policy had been summed u p in Joh n Dillon' s decisio n t o suppor t th e Lan d Bill , no t a s final justice, bu t a s a firs t instalment . I f thi s ha d bee n give n twent y years ago , ther e woul d no w b e les s disconten t an d conspirac y i n Ireland, bu t s o lon g a s th e Tor y governmen t remaine d i n offic e there wa s littl e hop e o f a n instalmen t o f justice. Letters whic h wer e rea d fro m th e Cardinal , th e archbisho p o f Cashel, an d th e bishop s o f Cloyn e an d Ros s ha d clearl y provide d the mai n line s o f M'Swiney' s speech , an d the y shape d th e debat e and resolution s whic h followed. O n the Churc h question , a resolu tion was adopted to the eifect that the Association reject any proposal of equa l endowmen t o f th e churche s an d deman d th e voluntar y principle fo r all. 2 Furthe r resolution s wer e carrie d demandin g tenant-right an d a fai r shar e o f th e publi c revenu e fo r Catholi c education. A series of resolutions on Reform pledged the Association to support reform in principle, to co-operate with the English Reformparty, t o accep t it s suppor t i n return , an d t o organiz e a monste r reform-petition.3 The queen' s speec h a t th e openin g o f parliamen t ha d promise d the suspensio n o f emergency powers i n Irelan d a s soon a s possible, and the speed y introductio n o f a Land Bil l to promote the improve ment o f land by tenants an d to facilitate the gran t o f leases.4 Culle n was sceptical tha t anything could be expected from the government, 5 1 Gladstone a

to Manning, n Oct . 1867 . Bayswater , OSC . This issue had arise n because of the publicatio n of a pamphlet b y the convert , Aubrey de Vere, proposing equal endowment for all. Thi s solution had attractions, not merel y for those wh o fel t tha t religio n should b e endowed in some way by th e state, but als o to many who were seeking a compromise betwee n the Tor y defenc e of the status quo and th e Radica l policy of complete disendowment. *FJ, 9 Jan . 1867 . Shortl y afterward s th e Associatio n rejecte d a proposal fro m John Martin, that it add repeal of the Union to its aims and associate itself with the National League, on th e ground s tha t continue d co-operatio n wit h th e Englis h Reform-party was essential to its programme. Ibid., 1 6 Jan., 7 Feb. 1867 . *fj, 7 Feb. 1867 . 5 Cullen to Kirby , 1 3 Feb. 1867 , no. 53.

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and th e Fenia n outbreak s wer e naturall y a set-bac k t o an y hope s which may have existed. Whil e these outbreak s could b e used, an d were used , to drive hom e t o th e governmen t th e nee d fo r remedial legislation i n Ireland, 6 the y wer e undoubtedl y a n obstacl e t o th e introduction o f an y suc h legislation , an d o f cours e the y prolonge d indefinitely th e suspensio n o f habeas corpus. Whe n th e promise d Land Bil l was introduced, it s proposal s prove d very disappointing. 7 In th e event , it was not possible t o get even this attenuated measur e through th e Commons . Ther e were few regrets i n Irelan d whe n its withdrawal wa s announced. 8 The Church-questio n wa s als o clarifie d durin g th e year . A s ha s already bee n noted , a proposa l wa s put forwar d t o us e the existin g ecclesiastical property fo r th e equa l endowment o f all the churches . The initiativ e ha d bee n take n in this proposa l b y th e conver t poet , Aubrey d e Vere ; h e go t suppor t fro m Catholi c Whi g politician s such a s Monsell , an d foun d on e strenuou s defende r amon g th e bishops, Dr . Moriarty , th e bisho p o f Kerry. 9 Thoug h Moriart y excluded an y us e o f thi s propert y fo r th e direct suppor t o f th e Catholic clergy , Culle n oppose d an y suggestio n tha t i t shoul d b e put directl y a t the disposa l o f the Catholi c Churc h a t all. T o d o so would, h e felt , introduc e a fundamenta l chang e i n a syste m whic h had worked so well in Ireland , would put th e Churc h unde r a heavy obligation t o th e State , an d migh t easil y lea d t o it s incurrin g th e odium o f the people . Further , ther e wer e practica l objections—i n any division he expected tha t th e Establishe d Churc h woul d get the lion's share , an d i n an y cas e h e sa w n o prospec t o f gettin g suc h a scheme throug h a parliamen t i n whic h th e Torie s wishe d t o retai n the status quo and the Radical s wished t o disendo w all the Churches . He woul d prefe r t o se e parliament us e th e propert y t o establis h a fund fo r genera l charitabl e purposes. 10 With th e backin g o f Culle n an d othe r like-minde d bishops , th e National Association began to campaign for the voluntary principle.11 Moriarty expounde d hi s view s i n a pastora l whic h wa s answere d by a n articl e i n th e Irish Ecclesiastical Record, an d som e discree t Roman pressur e wa s brough t t o bea r throug h Kirby. 12 I n thi s matter Culle n was inclined to suspect eve n Manning's goo d offices — this migh t a t leas t b e deduce d fro m tw o o f hi s letter s t o Mannin g 6 See Culle n t o Kirby , 5 Apri l 186 7 ; Cullen' s pastoral , 1 2 Marc h 186 7 (FJ, 15 March); Kean e to Kirby , 1 8 March 1867 , no. 9 9 ; Kean e to Nationa l Association, 25 March 1867 (FJ, 28 March) ; O'He a (bishop of Ross) to Kirby, 28 March 1867, no. 117 . 1 FJ, 2 0 Feb. 1867 . Se e also the discussio n of the bil l at a meeting of the National Association, reported ibid., 28 March. *FJ, 2 1 June 1867 . 'See hi s pastora l lette r t o th e clerg y o f Kerry , 1 7 March 1867 , whic h wa s circulated i n pamphle t form. Printe d als o in FJ, 2 0 March 1867 . 10 Cullen to Kirby, 2 Jan., 22 March, 5 April 1867, nos. 3, 108, 128 . U FJ, 9 J an -> 2 4 April, 2 9 June 1867 . 12 Cf. Moriart y t o Kirby , 8 April 1867 , no . 131 .

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about thi s time, 13 an d seem s confirme d b y a lette r fro m Mora n t o Kirby date d 1 2 Apri l i867. 14 H e wa s no t prepare d t o se e th e in dependence o f the Catholi c Churc h i n an y wa y imperilled, no r di d he wis h t o se e the continue d endowmen t o f the Establishe d Churc h even i n a n attenuate d form . In th e summe r o f 1867 the bishops o f the world were assembled i n Rome t o commemorat e th e nineteent h centenar y o f the martyrdo m of th e Apostles , an d o n thi s occasio n th e Iris h hierarch y receive d a definite rulin g in favour o f the voluntary principle. Whil e this ruling emanated fro m Cardina l Antonelli , i t i s not difficul t t o se e Cullen's guiding hand i n it. Fro m their meetin g at the beginnin g o f Octobe r the bishops publishe d a series of resolutions, i n which they demande d the disendowmen t o f th e Establishe d Churc h ; repudiated , " in accordance with Iris h practic e an d traditions," any state-endowmen t for th e Catholi c Churc h ; an d expresse d th e wis h tha t existin g church-property shoul d b e use d t o establis h a fun d fo r charitabl e purposes. A s migh t b e expected , ther e wa s littl e discor d a t th e meeting. MacHal e a t firs t propose d tha t the y shoul d expres s n o opinion a t al l on th e subject , an d Moriart y showe d som e hankerin g after hi s earlie r views , bu t neithe r wa s i n a positio n t o pres s hi s point.15 The bishops ' meetin g i n Octobe r als o discusse d th e thir d an d thorniest problem , tha t o f education. Exchange s s o far betwee n th e government an d the bishop s ha d bee n concerne d wit h th e question s of recognizin g a s denominationa l th e grea t numbe r o f primar y schools wher e the pupil s were in fac t al l Catholics, an d th e grantin g of a charte r an d endowmen t t o th e Catholi c University . A s ha s been seen , the universit y measure proposed b y the previou s govern ment had been altogether unacceptable to the Catholics and had been successfully resiste d b y thei r opponents. 16 Negotiation s continue d with th e Tories , an d reache d a point wher e the Nationa l Board was so obviously in difficultie s i n finding a reply to the bishops ' demand s for primar y educatio n tha t th e ministr y fel t tha t th e onl y solutio n was th e appointmen t o f a Roya l Commissio n o f Enquiry. 17 At thei r meeting , th e bishop s repeate d earlie r resolution s o n National Education , an d decide d t o sen d a petitio n t o parliamen t asking for "suc h a chang e i n the existin g Nationa l syste m of educa tion as may afford th e Catholic s of Ireland all the advantages to which they are entitled ", 18 The y also considered the government proposal s to appoin t tw o Catholi c ecclesiastic s amon g th e seve n Catholi c members—half th e tota l o f fourteen—to b e nominate d t o the Powi s Commission o n education. Th e governmen t wishe d t o appoin t Dr . "Cullen t o Manning , 8 April, 1 7 Aug . 1867 , Leslie , art. cit. , pp . 167-8 . 14 No. 136 . "Resolutions i n Moran , Writings, iii . 85-6 ; se e als o Mora n t o Kirby , i Oct . 1867, no . 35 6 ; Culle n t o Kirby , 1 0 Oct . 1867 , no . 368 . 16 See above , p . 145. > 17 The Powis Commission, appointe d Januar y 1868 . "Education Resolutions i n Moran, Writings', iii . 87-9 .

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Moriarty, th e bisho p o f Kerry , an d Dr . Russell , th e presiden t o f Maynooth. Culle n woul d hav e neither , fo r h e suspecte d tha t the y were no t wholeheartedl y i n favou r o f denominationa l education . Finally, th e meetin g decide d tha t n o Catholi c bisho p o r pries t should si t o n th e Commission , bu t tha t th e archbisho p o f Cashe l and th e bisho p o f Clonfer t shoul d b e depute d t o trea t wit h th e government o n the Universit y question. 19 Th e bishops , i n fact, wer e not quit e s o united i n th e matte r o f education a s they ha d bee n o n the problem s o f th e Establishe d Churc h ; i n particular , MacHal e was stil l unwillin g t o indicat e an y publi c suppor t fo r th e Catholi c University. Cullen , wh o alway s held tha t educatio n wa s the mos t pressing o f problems , wa s particularl y insisten t o n i t durin g th e coming months, 20 but, onc e again, his hopes were to be disappointed . It wa s now thre e year s sinc e th e Nationa l Associatio n ha d bee n founded. Thoug h som e progres s ha d bee n mad e in buildin g up a n Irish parliamentar y party, an d som e progress als o in linkin g it wit h the Englis h Reform-party , nothin g concret e ha d i n fac t bee n achieved, and , give n th e compositio n o f th e Englis h parliament , there wa s littl e hop e o f an y immediat e achievement . Fenianism , though i t too had failed, wa s still strong. " My fear i s not of revolution, sedition , o r eve n repea l o f th e Union, " th e bisho p o f Kerr y wrote t o Monsel l o n 2 Marc h 1868 , " I fea r worse , a peopl e who have renounce d thei r allegianc e and wh o hav e no patriotis m excep t hatred fo r thei r ruler s ".21 I t i s eas y t o se e reason s fo r a growin g impatience, suc h for instanc e a s prompted the clerg y o f the dioces e of Limeric k t o com e togethe r an d issu e a declaration , whic h soo n won wide support, demandin g Repeal as the onl y effective remedy. 22 Cullen's pastora l fo r th e feas t o f St . Brigid 23 containe d th e usua l warnings against Fenianism an d th e usua l exhortations t o avai l of all constitutional an d lawfu l mean s o f redress , bu t h e wa s force d t o admit tha t ther e wer e n o indication s tha t anythin g woul d b e soo n achieved. Th e reactio n o f th e Englis h conservativ e pres s wa s hostile—Cullen wa s declare d t o b e playin g u p grievance s whic h i n fact wer e fa r les s tha n h e claime d the m t o be , an d i n thi s wa y h e was incitin g t o violenc e an d playin g th e Fenia n game : "i f eve r there wa s a tim e whe n th e professe d upholder s o f law , order , an d the constitute d authorit y were heavily bound over to keep silence o n Ireland's grievances , i t i s no w ",24 I f suc h commen t wa s i n an y way seriousl y meant , i t i s a n indicatio n o f a ver y dee p misunder standing o f th e reason s behin d episcopa l condemnation s o f "Moran to Kirby, 4 Oct. 1867 , no . 359 ; Kean e to Kirby, 6 Oct. 1867 , no. 361 ; Dorrian t o Kirby , 7 Oct . 1867 , no . 36 4 ; Culle n t o Kirby , 1 0 Oct. , 1 8 Oct . 1867 , nos. 368 , 38 4 ; Culle n t o Manning , 1 7 Aug . 1867 , Leslie , art . cit. , p . 181 . 2 "See especiall y th e repor t i n FJ, 1 9 an d 2 0 Dec . 1867 , o f th e meetin g o f th e clergy o f Dublin , wit h th e resolution s ther e adopted . 21 Ed. b y J . H . Whyt e i n Irish Historical Studies, x . 194- 9 (Sept . 1956) . ZI F3, 3 Jan., 2 1 Jan. 1868 . K Ibid., 2 7 Jan. 1868 . **Morning Herald, 3 0 Jan. 1868 . Se e als o Th e Times of th e sam e date.

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Fenianism, which were incisively summarize d i n the Lenten pastora l of th e bisho p o f Cloyne. 25 Lik e Cullen , h e describe d th e countr y as bein g i n a wretche d state . H e calle d hi s people' s attentio n t o the resolution s o f th e bishops ' meetin g o f th e previou s October , condemning secre t societies , an d setting out demand s i n the matte r of th e church , th e land , an d education— " an epitom e o f al l ou r problems ". Englis h inconsistency , h e said, condemn s th e Fenian s as criminal s an d supports " revolutionary an d infidel enthusiast s " in Italy, though the Pope's subjects ar e much better treated than th e Irish are. Iris h grievances, admitted by unbiassed Englis h observers , called urgentl y fo r a settlement , o r Iris h disaffectio n woul d grow . The Iris h wer e no w a literat e people , an d th e affair s o f th e whol e world were in the pres s for them t o read. The y knew the neglec t of their country , the y kne w that ther e wa s dissatisfaction i n Americ a because o f it , the y kne w th e hel p give n b y Englan d t o foreig n revolutionaries. Thoug h i t wa s attacke d b y extremist s fro m bot h sides, th e Catholi c Churc h alon e wa s consisten t i n it s attitud e t o revolution. He urge d hi s clerg y t o try t o ge t the peopl e t o sig n petition s t o parliament, eve n thoug h the peopl e calle d the petition s a mockery . They had not been far wrong, he commented, but now " the passionate earnestness of disaffected men " had created a situation i n which petitions woul d b e mor e favourabl y received . Th e tim e wa s now ripe fo r th e succes s o f a trul y independen t an d unite d Iris h party . The bishop s ha d bee n urgin g such a policy since 185 9 ; i t wa s not just " episcopal policy," thoug h it was frequently so referred to, but a true national policy , whic h migh t hav e bee n effectiv e eve n earlie r had i t go t steadie r support . In th e meantime , privat e negotiation s betwee n th e bishop s an d the governmen t seeme d t o b e makin g some progres s i n th e matte r of Universit y education , though , a s i s th e cas e wit h everythin g during thi s perio d o f political confusion , i t i s no t eas y t o sa y how much wa s bein g seriousl y offere d an d ho w muc h wa s bein g pu t forward t o hel p othe r politica l end s withou t an y rea l intentio n o f granting it. I n thi s case , there ar e rather soli d ground s for thinkin g that th e offe r wa s no t seriousl y meant. 28 Thoug h Mannin g an d Cullen were reasonably in one another's confidenc e on the question , Cullen di d no t share Manning' s belie f that th e Tor y proposals, pu t forward b y Lor d Mayo , th e Chie f Secretar y fo r Ireland , wer e sincere, no r hi s vie w tha t the y gav e th e bishop s a guarante e o f sufficient contro l ove r th e University. 27

™FJ, 2 4 Feb. 1868 . 2 "Cullen to Kirby , 24 Oct. 1867 , no. 391 . 27 As well , ther e wa s a lingerin g feelin g tha t Manning' s goo d offices , thoug h valuable, an d appreciated , introduced furthe r complication s into a n alread y ver y complex situation , which Manning , Culle n felt , di d no t full y appreciate . Se e Cullen t o Manning , u , 1 5 an d 2 0 March 1868 , Bayswater , OSC ; Mannin g to Cullen, 14 , 24 Jan., 20, 21, 29 Feb., n , 1 4 March 1868 , Leslie, art. cit. , pp. 182-3 . Cullen's doubt s were not full y share d b y Mgr . Woodlock , rector o f th e Catholi c University—see Woodloc k t o Kirby , 1 5 Apri l 1868 , no . 12 8 ; DDA , Woodloc k to Cullen, 1 4 March, 24 March 1868 .

160

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The Universit y negotiation s wer e stil l a t a ver y indecisiv e stag e when another politica l move completed the confusio n in parliament. On 2 3 March 186 8 Gladstone 28 gave notice of his intention to move three resolution s concernin g th e Iris h Churc h : 29 1. That , i n th e opinio n o f this House , i t i s necessar y tha t th e Established Church of Ireland should cease to exist as an Establishment, du e regar d bein g ha d t o al l its personal interests an d t o all rights o f property. 2. That , subject to the foregoin g considerations, i t is expedient to preven t th e creatio n o f an y ne w persona l interest s b y th e exercise of any public patronage , an d t o confin e th e operation s of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners of Ireland to objects of immediate necessity, o r involving individual rights, pendin g the final decision of Parliament . 3. Tha t a n humbl e Addres s b e presente d th e He r Majesty , humbly t o pra y that , wit h a view to th e purpose s aforesaid , He r Majesty woul d b e graciousl y please d t o plac e a t th e disposa l o f Parliament, He r interes t i n th e temporalitie s o f th e Arch bishoprics, Bishoprics , an d othe r Ecclesiastica l Dignitie s an d Benefices i n Ireland , an d i n the custod y thereof . Again, th e mov e wa s designe d t o gai n politica l advantage , t o embarrass the government and concentrate th e Liberal strength, an d the questio n o n whic h thi s issu e wa s t o b e force d wa s shrewdl y chosen. Ye t i t wa s not altogethe r a politica l manoeuvr e ; for som e months pas t Gladstone's commitment s t o th e Iris h demand s fo r reform ha d bee n explicitl y formulated in public speeches , an d were being assiduousl y encourage d b y Mannin g i n privat e corres pondence.30 The governmen t opposed th e resolutions , an d Gladston e move d that th e Hous e g o int o committe e t o discus s them . A vot e wa s taken afte r fou r nights ' debate . Gladston e ha d a majority o f sixty.31 The debat e i n committe e too k plac e o n 27 , 2 8 an d 3 0 April , afte r which Gladstone' s firs t resolutio n wa s carrie d b y a majorit y o f 65 . A wee k late r hi s secon d an d thir d resolution s wer e carried without a division. 32 This decisiv e politica l victor y wa s also , o f course , th e firs t fir m indication tha t th e Iris h reform s coul d b e carried . Culle n wa s naturally jubilant. H e saw in the successful vote on disestablishmen t a vindication of his view that the onl y hope of success had lain in th e policy h e an d Antonell i ha d agree d o n th e previou s summer , o f 28 Now leade r o f th e opposition . Lor d Joh n Russel l ha d retire d a t th e en d of 1867 ; Disrael i wa s prim e ministe r sinc e th e resignatio n o f Lor d Derb y o n 25 February 1868 . ^Hansard, serie s 3 , cxci, col . 3 3 ; FJ , 23 , 2 4 March 1868 . 30 Morley, Gladstone, i . 65 5 ff . ; FJ , 2 0 Dec . 1867 . Se e als o Mannin g t o Gladstone, 2 0 Dec. 1867 , n Feb . 1868 , Leslie, art. cit., pp . 169-7 0 ; FJ , i? March 1868 (Manning to Grey) . sl Hansard, cxci , 49 5 ff. , 57 5 ff., 79 0 ff. , 83 7 ff. FJ , 4 April 1868 . "Hansard, 133 8 ff. , 146 6 ff. , 158 3 ff. , 194 9 ff . FJ , i , 8 Ma y 1868 .

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refusing anythin g in th e wa y o f endowmen t fro m th e state. 33 H e was convinced tha t this refusal was not merel y a political necessity, but als o i n th e bes t interest s o f th e Catholi c Church , i n orde r t o preserve its independence o f the State . I n consequence , he insiste d on hi s refusal , eve n whe n it becam e clear tha t th e Libera l leaders , specifically Brigh t an d Gladstone , wer e prepare d t o conside r som e form of concurrent endowment,34 taking the form of disestablishment and disendowmen t o f th e Protestan t Church , it s propert y t o b e distributed proportionatel y a s a lum p su m betwee n th e Catholic , Anglican an d Presbyteria n churches , al l three bein g declare d com pletely independen t o f th e state. 35 Moriart y stil l hankere d afte r such a solution , thoug h h e ha d give n u p hope s o f it—" liberalism is the ne w religion and there is no seeking justice excep t through it s help ",36 Culle n woul d no t hav e it , an d throug h Mannin g h e impressed o n Gladston e tha t th e Catholi c Churc h woul d accep t nothing.37 After it s heavy defeat on the Irish Church resolutions, the government existed only on sufferance, a n agreement being reached whereby it remaine d i n offic e t o complet e th e programm e o f th e session , general election s bein g du e i n an y cas e befor e th e en d o f the year . In thes e circumstances , i t wa s impossibl e eve n t o conside r an y contentious legislation , whic h mean t th e en d o f th e Universit y proposals. Shortl y afte r th e government' s defea t o n Gladstone' s first resolution , th e negotiation s wit h th e archbisho p o f Cashel and the bisho p o f Clonfer t wer e broke n off . Thoug h a n attemp t wa s made t o blam e the bishop s fo r the breakdown , the situatio n in th e Commons wa s explanation enough. 38 With the carrying of Gladstone's resolutions , Ireland could indulge in a long-delayed moo d o f optimism. Th e countr y wa s alread y in this mood when the Prince of Wales made a visit to Dublin in April. The commen t o f the bisho p o f Cloyne was to th e point : 39 In trut h a great chang e has taken place, and fo r th e better , i n English opinio n an d feeling . A s Cardina l Antonell i sai d t o th e Irish bishops las t summer, " le Fenianisme es t bon pour quelqu e chose ". Whateve r othe r cause s ma y hav e brough t abou t th e 33 Cullen t o Kirby , 1 5 April , 1 0 Ma y 1868 , nos . 126 , 154 ; DDA , Kirb y t o Cullen, 1 0 April 1868 . 34 Of course , he may not have been wrong in his belief that such a measure could not hav e bee n go t throug h an y Englis h parliament . Th e issu e was never tested . 35 Manning to Cullen, 3 0 March, 2 April 1868—Leslie , art. cit. , pp . 171-3 . 36 Moriarty t o Kirby , 2 4 Marc h 1868 , no . 10 5 ; cf . als o Moriart y t o Monsell , 2 March 1868 , cit. "Manning to Gladstone, 8 April, 8 May 1868, Leslie, art. cit., p. 173 ; Gladston e to Manning, 9, 18 April 1868, Bayswater, OSC ; Mannin g to Cullen, 1 5 May 1868, Leslie, art . cit., p. 170 . 38 Cf. Culle n to Kirby , 1 0 Ma y 1868 , no . 154 . Afte r th e breakdow n of negotiations the bishops released to the press their correspondenc e with the government; it is printed in FJ, 2 3 May 1868 . 39 Keane to Kirby , 2 4 April 1868 , no. 137 .

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change, fea r ha s ha d it s fai r share . Th e Londo n Times admit s that Fenianism , i f no t th e cause , i s th e occasio n o f intende d concessions. In Dublin , th e Cardina l receive d th e ecclesiastica l plac e o f honou r at function s attende d b y th e princ e a t th e Castl e an d th e Roya l Dublin Society . H e dre w criticism fro m Th e Times fo r refusin g a n invitation t o b e presen t i n St . Patrick' s Cathedral fo r th e prince' s installation as a Knight o f St. Patrick, though Catholic s were present with hi s approval , and on e would like to se e how Th e Times would have drawn up the order of precedence had he chosen to attend. Fro m the othe r side , h e wa s criticize d i n a numbe r o f Iris h paper s fo r attending an y o f th e functions . Whil e hi s ingraine d pessimis m a t government intention s doe s find expression i n some of his letters t o Kirby at this time, there is no doubt that he regarded the royal visit, particularly th e fac t tha t th e princ e included i n his programme such Catholic institutions a s the Mater Hospital , th e Catholi c University , and Maynooth , a s som e indicatio n a t an y rat e o f mor e tangibl e benefits t o come. 40 The Nationa l Association ha d suspended it s meetings durin g th e winter, some apparently urgin g that it had done its part in presenting the evidenc e an d tha t al l tha t coul d b e don e no w was t o wait an d see if the governmen t would act. I t bega n committee-meetings agai n on 2 0 March , a t Cullen' s instigation , i t woul d seem. 41 A furthe r meeting o n Marc h 2 7 adopte d a n addres s t o th e peopl e o f Irelan d on the Churc h question. Th e lan d proble m cam e to the fore agai n in consequenc e o f a lette r fro m th e bisho p o f Cloyn e rea d a t a meeting on 1 4 April, but b y the tim e the genera l meeting convoked for 1 2 May had assembled, a t which a series of resolutions on church, land, and education were adopted, it was clear that the main interest had switche d t o preparatio n fo r th e genera l election. 42 This topic make s its appearanc e on the agend a of the committee meeting o f 2 6 May , whe n i t wa s decide d t o prepar e a n addres s t o the constituencies. 43 Befor e long a very active organization had come into being in Dublin. 44 Cullen' s lette r approvin g of these activities , read a t a meeting o f the committe e o n 1 4 July, wa s on e o f hi s las t public act s fo r som e time , fo r o n 1 6 Jul y prayer s fo r hi s recover y from a very serious illnes s wer e aske d b y th e vicars-genera l o f th e diocese.45 Fo r some time his life was in danger, and he did not return to wor k i n Eccles Stree t unti l 8 October. 40 Cullen to Kirby, 15 , 17 , 27 April, i May 1868 , nos. 126 , 131, 142, 147 J Mora n to Kirby , 8 May 1868 , no . 1533 . 41 At th e beginnin g o f Marc h Culle n ha d bee n writin g t o Mannin g expressin g doubts as to the sufficienc y of the government' s proposals on University education '—see above, p. 55 . Repor t of this meeting in FJ, 2 1 March 1868 , with letter fro m Cullen to M'Swiney rea d on the occasion . 42 Report o f meeting in FJ . 1 3 May 1868 . K FJ, 27 May 1868. "Ibid., 1 5 July 1868 . ™Ibid., 1 7 July 1868 .

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By then , th e electio n campaig n ha d reache d it s ful l momentum , and the tid e i n favour o f Gladstone and refor m wa s sweeping everything before it in Ireland. I n Meath , the bishop and clergy found i t necessary t o explai n that th e cours e the y ha d take n som e tim e ago did no t mea n tha t the y wer e oppose d t o disestablishment. 46 I n Wexford, where , a s Culle n ha d previousl y noted , th e clerg y wer e little dispose d t o give support t o parliamentar y agitation, they came forward prominentl y i n support o f the tw o Liberal candidates , eve n though thei r speeche s were at time s i n term s stronge r tha n Culle n would hav e approve d of. 47 I n Dublin , Culle n associate d himself publicly and unreservedly with the Libera l cause. 48 Eve n MacHale, though h e refuse d t o associat e himsel f wit h th e movement , an d though afte r th e electio n h e issue d warning s tha t th e deceit s o f 1852 must no t b e repeated, was nevertheless prepared t o admit tha t the results gave some ground fo r the people to have confidence onc e again i n thei r parliamentar y representatives. 49 The Iris h result s gav e th e Liberal s 66 , th e Conservative s 39 . More importan t tha n th e gai n o f nin e seat s wa s th e fac t tha t th e Liberal representatio n wa s no w muc h mor e unifie d an d wit h a definite programme . Further , Gladstone , th e ne w prime minister , was deeply committed to that programm e and ha d a majority o f 11 2 in the House. Th e ne w Liberal part y had come to maturity an d was in a position t o govern. Ireland ha d ever y reaso n t o expec t th e promise d legislation . A s things turne d out , becaus e of the rea l and dee p difference s betwee n Irish Catholi c an d Englis h Liberal , no t al l that ha d bee n expecte d was achieved . Disestablishmen t gav e th e leas t difficulty , fo r her e both sough t th e sam e end, i f for differen t reasons . Th e Lan d Bil l of 187 0 wa s onl y a n instalment ; i t wa s t o tak e muc h mor e tim e before i t becam e clea r i n Englan d tha t Englis h an d Iris h land problems required radically different treatment . I t was , nevertheless, the firs t rea l instalment— " it di d no t preven t evictions , bu t i t rendered the m a costl y lega l undertakin g t o th e landlord , whil e i t likewise lai d a foundation of legal protection fo r tenants—a tentative , halting protection—whic h was to poin t the wa y to the grea t charter of emancipatio n fro m landlor d injustic e t o b e wo n b y th e Lan d League i n th e Lan d Ac t o f 188 1 ".50 Education, wher e Catholi c an d Libera l idea s wer e s o widel y divergent, provide d th e greates t problem . Th e crisi s cam e i n th e spring o f 1873 , whe n Gladstone' s Educatio n Bil l face d a decisiv e vote. Th e bishop s had alread y mad e clear thei r dissatisfaction. O n ™Ibid., 5 Sept., n Nov . 1868 . 4 'Report o f conventio n t o selec t th e tw o Libera l candidate s fo r Wexford , FJ , 22 Sept . 1868 . Report s o f subsequent meeting s frequently durin g th e campaign . "See hi s lette r t o th e aggregat e meetin g o f th e Dubli n Liberals , FJ , 3 Nov . 1868 ; lette r t o diocesa n clergy , 1 4 Nov . 1868 , FJ , 1 6 Nov . "FJ, 1 6 Nov., 2 6 Nov., 1 0 Dec. 1868 . 60 Davitt, Th e Fall of Feudalism i n Ireland, pp . 77-8 .

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9 Marc h Culle n flatl y declare d hi s oppositio n t o th e bill . Th e division was taken at 2 a.m. o n the mornin g of 1 2 March . Thirty five Irish Liberals voted against the bill and it was defeated by three votes. This wa s th e en d o f th e experimen t i n co-operatio n betwee n Cardinal Cullen an d the Englis h Libera l party . Th e 187 4 election s returned a substantia l conservativ e majority , an d th e governmen t then forme d wa s still i n offic e whe n the Cardina l died. I n th e Iris h constituencies, th e Libera l representatio n ha d shrunk to little mor e than a dozen ; ther e wer e 5 8 Home Rulers , makin g it ver y clea r that a new chapter ha d been opened . Yet th e chapte r whic h ha d jus t close d ha d bee n productiv e o f the firs t tangibl e benefit s t o Irelan d fo r a long day , and ther e i s no doubt tha t th e Nationa l Associatio n ha d ha d a considerabl e shar e in winnin g them . The Fenia n outbreak s wer e certainly importan t in shocking English opinio n into a realization of the needs of Ireland, but ha d it not bee n for the co-operatio n betwee n Iris h Catholi c and English Libera l organization s the machiner y for remedial legislation for Irelan d would not have existed. I t had been genuine co-operation in spite o f genuine difficultie s an d differences . I t ha d been genuine , I would suggest, because it was based on a common factor fo r which there seem s t o b e n o bette r nam e tha n " radicalism ". Certainl y it wa s in man y ways the antithesi s o f conservative. Cardinal Culle n wa s personall y associate d wit h thi s programm e of th e Nationa l Associatio n o f Ireland . Hi s firs t commitmen t t o party politics was, as has been seen, a very reluctant one , but , onc e made, i t wa s definite an d positive . Th e evidenc e examine d goes t o show tha t h e wa s a rea l forc e behin d th e approac h mad e b y th e National Association to English Libera l and Radical opinion. Culle n came t o Irelan d fro m Rom e convince d tha t a bisho p ough t no t t o participate directl y i n politics , bu t th e histor y o f the i86o s show s that h e wa s prepared t o learn fro m hi s experience of Irish needs. 51 There was a real, if not immediatel y obvious, affinity betwee n Iris h Catholic and English Radical, because the Catholic Church in Ireland had no Ancien Regime splendours to regret, because it was the churc h of a people who had to struggle for a fair shar e and equal citizenship , but i t i s nevertheles s a tribut e t o Cullen' s courag e a s wel l a s hi s perceptiveness tha t h e wa s prepared to wor k wit h me n lik e Brigh t and Gladstone. H e had no real illusions as to the limits of the agree ment whic h coul d b e achieved ; eve n in the cas e of Gladstone, th e 61 Dr. Murra y o f Maynooth, wh o had bee n o n very intimat e term s with Gava n Duffy, an d whos e persona l relation s wit h Cullen , partl y i n consequenc e o f this , were b y n o means happy , commente d i n hi s diar y o n 25 Oct. 1878 , the da y afte r Cullen's death : " He came here a s archbishop o f Armagh wit h ver y strong views, which h e ofte n pu t forwar d i n ver y stron g forms . Ver y muc h t o hi s credit , however, i t mus t b e sai d tha t fo r man y year s bac k thos e view s ha d bee n greatl y moderated, som e o f the m entirel y abandoned. " (M S Diary , Maynoot h Colleg e Library.)

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Roman questio n wa s alway s a reminde r o f wha t rea l difference s existed. Indeed , i f Cullen' s politica l effort s ha d bee n dominate d solely by the exigencie s of the Roma n question, h e would have found Disraeli an d th e Torie s mor e sympatheti c tha n Gladstone . Ye t while h e wa s prepared t o negotiat e wit h th e Tor y governmen t fo r any concession s whic h migh t b e ha d fro m tha t quarter , h e wa s willing t o tr y th e experimen t o f positive politica l co-operatio n wit h Gladstone an d the Liberals . Althoug h h e had a n ingrained and not altogether unjustifie d pessimis m a s t o wha t Irelan d migh t expec t from an y party a t Westminster, 52 he was nevertheless read y to work with a movement which promised a more lively consideration for hi s Catholic people .

D2 Cf. Woodloc k t o Kirby , 2 9 July 189 2 (th e Kirb y letter s fo r thes e year s have not yet bee n numbered) . Woodloc k had bee n recto r of the Catholi c Universit y at the time of Gladstone's first government, and he had been much more optimistic than Culle n tha t Gladston e woul d mak e satisfactory provision for Catholi c highe r education. I n thi s letter , writte n i n hi s las t years , h e give s new s o f Gladstone' s latest electora l victory , an d expresse s th e hop e tha t i t wil l lea d t o som e goo d fo r Ireland. H e add s th e interestin g comment : "A t th e sam e tim e I mus t confes s that ever y day' s experienc e confirm s m e mor e an d mor e i n th e wisdo m o f th e axiom whic h wa s constantl y o n th e lip s o f ou r lat e belove d Cardina l Cnllcn — nolite confidere in principibus ".

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THE EARL Y RESPONS E OF TH E IRIS H CATHOLIC CLERGY TO THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT1 LI AM KENNEDY primar y ai m o f thi s paper i s to asses s the rol e o f th e Roma n T HE Catholic clerg y i n agricultura l co-operativ e development ,

drawing o n evidenc e fro m th e las t decad e o f the igt h an d th e earl y decades of the sot h century . I t i s hardly possible , however, t o trea t such activit y in isolatio n fro m th e manifol d preoccupations o f rura l society, as in practice n o clear demarcation existe d between economic and non-economi c activity . A n attemp t i s mad e t o plac e suc h clerical activit y i n th e cultura l contex t o f rura l society , whil e simultaneously payin g attentio n t o th e specifi c ideological , pastora l and economi c pre-occupation s o f the clergy , an d whil e treatin g th e latter as a distinctive social category wit h affiliations bot h withi n an d beyond th e rura l community . The importanc e o f th e clerica l respons e i n influencin g th e prospects o f an y socia l o r economi c developmen t i n rura l Irelan d requires n o amplification . Becaus e o f th e democrati c natur e o f co-operative organisation—requirin g a s i t doe s mas s participatio n by section s o f a rura l community—thei r strategi c importanc e i s likely t o hav e bee n eve n mor e heavil y underlined . I n som e area s clerical acquiescenc e wa s probabl y a necessar y conditio n fo r co operative progres s i n th e formativ e period . Moreover , clerica l numbers ha d increase d steadil y fro m abou t 5,00 0 priests , monk s and nun s i n 185 0 t o ove r 14,00 0 i n 1900—despit e a fallin g la y population. 2 I n additio n anothe r ke y social categor y wa s increasing in relativ e term s i n th e lat e igt h century : th e traders , publicans , shopkeepers, dealer s i n agricultura l input s an d outputs . Afte r th e 1

The write r acknowledge s hi s considerabl e intellectua l deb t t o E. W. Cooney, Reade r i n Economi c History, University of York. Profess or Cyri l Ehrlich , Queen' s University , Belfast , kindl y commente d o n an earlie r draf t o f this paper . Neither, of course, are responsibl e fo r an y defects i n th e final product. 2 Emmet Larkin, ' Economic growth, capita l investment , an d th e Roman Catholi c churc h i n igt h centur y Ireland ' i n A.H.R., Ixxi i (1967), p p 864-5.

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clergy, th e trader s formed the mos t influential non-farmin g element in rura l society. The institutional church: economic and social ideals Rerum Novarum*, publishe d i n 1891 , signifie d Pop e Le o XIII' s willingness to attempt a reconciliation betwee n th e catholi c churc h and moder n industrialising society. Leo XIII' s stricture t o * bridge the abys s between the priest and the people '4, believed to have risen out o f the twi n processe s o f industralisation an d urbanisation , wa s unnecessary i n th e Iris h case . Industralisatio n i n Irelan d wa s limited an d showe d a high degre e of regional concentration, an d i n rural Irelan d a revers e process ha d bee n unde r way . Thu s fo r the greater par t th e churc h operate d withi n a socio-economi c environ ment which traditionall y ha d prove d conduciv e to catholi c ortho doxy. The Irish hierarchy was delicately poised between the institutions of British civil authority and thos e of the nationalis t (predominantl y catholic) population , extractin g advantag e fro m both. 5 A t paris h level th e identificatio n o f chape l an d cabi n wa s mor e complete . Given tha t Catholicis m an d nationalis m wer e almos t perfectl y correlated, tha t th e socia l origin s o f the Iris h clerg y la y t o a very considerable extent in rural Ireland 6, an d tha t bot h priests and lait y subscribed t o a common , thoug h highl y selectiv e an d sometime s misleading, view of Irish history , the unity of priest and peopl e is not unexpected. Factor s which reinforced these bonds were the exclusion of th e loca l clerg y fro m th e mor e prestigiou s (usuall y protestant ) 3

Leo XIII : Rerum Novarum. Se e th e Englis h translatio n i n Sydne y Ehler an d J . B . Morral l (eds.) , Church an d state through th e centuries (Ne w York, 1967) . I n Europ e th e allianc e o f altar an d thron e preclude d th e church fro m adoptin g anything but a n extremel y cautious , i f not actually reactionary, rol e in relation to social reform . Whil e Social Catholicis m had manifested itsel f i n variou s form s an d o n a limite d scal e ove r th e igt h century, it wa s onl y i n th e closin g decad e o r s o of that centur y tha t i t received considerabl e encouragemen t fro m the papacy . 4 A. R . Vidler , A century o f social Catholicism 1820-1920 (Londo n 1964) p . 127 . 5 A detailed assessmen t o f relationships betwee n th e catholi c church , the stat e an d th e institution s o f Irish nationalis m i s contained i n D . W . Miller, Church, state an d nation i n Ireland 1898-1 g2i (Dublin , 1973) . 6 No systemati c analysi s o f th e socia l origin s o f th e Iris h clerg y ha s been undertake n bu t th e genera l consensu s o f opinio n favour s thi s interpretation. Se e Connell, Irish peasant society, pp 123- 6 and 148-9 .

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segments of society and a pervasive sense of being bounded by alien institutions, regarde d a s inimica l t o Roma n Catholicism. 7 A s L . Paul-Dubois commented i n 1908 : ' The catholic clerg y have never ceased t o regar d thei r floc k a s th e objec t o f th e snare s se t b y protestantism. '8 The positio n of the catholi c churc h on economi c policy ma y b e briefly an d somewha t crudely summarised as follows: maximis e th e numbers o f peopl e o n th e lan d a s thi s i s mor e conduciv e t o th e * good ' life 9 an d wher e possibl e develo p alternativ e employmen t opportunities t o ste m emigratio n an d it s associate d hazar d o f losing th e faith . A practica l implicatio n o f thi s wa s larg e scal e redistribution o f land , an d populatio n flow s fro m area s wit h un favourable man-lan d ratios—generall y th e wester n region s o f th e country—to area s less densel y populated. I n a joint pastora l lette r in 1900 , the bishop s signified their suppor t fo r such a lan d policy : ' . . . the grea t gras s plain s tha t ar e a t presen t worthles s t o thei r owners, and are economically lost to the country ' should be returned to the poverty stricken Irish peasant.10 Politica l constraints, however, ruled ou t an y massiv e structural changes in Iris h agriculture . Th e Congested District s Boar d (C.D.B. ) operate d a polic y o f lan d redistribution o n a modes t scale , an d thi s ha d th e suppor t o f th e Irish bishops . A C.D.B . schem e of land divisio n o n Clar e Island , for instance , had th e mora l and financia l backing of the Archbishop of Tuam, D r McEvilly. 11 7

In a characteristi c outburst , th e Irish Catholic leader-write r (3 1 Aug. 1895 ) declare s tha t th e civi l administration , ' so lon g a s i t rejects ou r nationa l demands , ca n onl y b e regarde d a s th e enem y o f Ireland and of her people '. 8 L. Paul-Dubois , Contemporary Ireland (Dubli n an d London , 1908) , p. 501 . Eve n Paul-Duboi s wh o wa s distinctl y sympatheti c t o catholi c aspirations coul d remark , (p . 481) tha t ' in no country doe s th e secula r arm show more respect for religion, an d its ministers ' . 9 The Iris h clergy' s vie w of the moral decadence o f industrial society , especially that of England ( ' pagan Englan d ' ) is brought out in a number of books, pamphlet s an d statements . See , fo r instance, Rev . J. Guinan , The Soggarth Aroon (Dublin , 1905) , p . 201 , an d Rev . M . O'Riordan , Catholicity an d Progress (London , 1906) , chapt . iv . I t ma y b e th e cas e a s one write r put s it—Arnol d Schrier , Ireland an d th e American emigration 1850-1900 (Boston , 1958)—tha t th e clerg y wer e les s forcefu l tha n Iris h nationalists i n protestin g agains t emigration , bu t thei r uneas e a t th e process, and the so-called moral dangers implicit in it are not in doubt. 10 Freeman's Journal, i Oct. 1900 . 11 W. L . Micks , History o f th e Congested Districts Board (Dublin , 1925) , p. 103 . Fo r generall y favourabl e comment s o n lan d redistributio n b y

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Striking confirmatio n of the effectivenes s wit h whic h th e notio n of the superiorit y of rural lif e wa s communicated to the la y catholic is furnished b y this extract fro m a taped intervie w with a townsman who i s no w approachin g eight y year s o f age . Referrin g t o D r Kelly, Bishop of Ross and a n acknowledge d specialis t o n economi c matters, an d t o Dea n White , P.P . o f Nenagh , h e recalls : ' they regarded th e land , you see, as the grea t asse t of the country , which it was, an d tha t character , (pause ) that eve n character wa s formed b y the land . ' Continuing , h e suggest s tha t th e clerg y o f this perio d were no t oppose d t o industria l development , rathe r the y wishe d t o see i t ' allied t o th e economy o f the countr y ' an d tha t betwee n agriculture an d industr y there shoul d b e * a goo d balance , bu t th e land shoul d be the greater ' . Nor wer e all form s o f economic development welcome d uncrit ically, by som e o f th e clerg y a t least . A Belfas t o r a Birmingha m might not be intrinsically 'hostil e to the spirit of the catholic church', according t o the Rev . T . F . Macken , but i t is emphatically no t the ideal to be striven afte r an d attaine d in this country. I f w e ar e t o loo k abroa d fo r examples , i t i s t o b e hope d tha t Ireland wil l develop after th e model o f Belgium or Denmark rathe r than on the lines of those countries where the land is deserted, an d where the toilin g millions ar e congregate d i n larg e citie s an d towns , an d leadin g live s o f moral an d physica l degradatio n . . . Th e far m i s known t o b e th e bes t place t o brin g u p worth y son s an d daughter s . . . And s o in Irelan d th e land industr y mus t b e cultivated first of all, and othe r industrie s mus t b e brought t o the homes of the people . . ,12

Clearly th e patter n o f development favoure d by many o f the clerg y was at variance with the experience, and probabl y th e requirements , of modern industria l societies. I t i s interesting t o note, though, tha t agricultural co-operative s woul d see m to fi t almos t perfectl y withi n the framewor k o f clerica l preference s regardin g organisatio n an d type o f economic activity . I f th e clerica l respons e t o co-operatio n was shaped solely by church social ideals then a uniformly favourable reaction is to be anticipated. Bu t then lif e is rarely that simple, even for me n whos e kingdom lie s elsewhere. prominent clergyme n see Record of the Maynooth Union 1898-99 (Dublin, i899 ) pp 31-4 ; Record 1899-1900, p. 40; Record 1900—01 , pp 66-7 ; Record 1901-2, p., 50; Record 1902-3, p. 69. 12 Rev. T. F. Macken,' After th e Lan d Purchas e Act s ' i n Record o f the Maynooth Union 1902-3 (Dublin , 1903) , p . 75 .

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Two hypotheses and some evidence In relatio n t o th e formatio n o f co-operativ e societie s it i s possible to envisag e tw o pola r positions o n th e par t o f the catholi c clergy. 13 One migh t hypothesis e tha t th e clerg y i n genera l sough t activel y to promote the cause of agricultural co-operation. A second hypothesis i s that th e clergy worked actively to impede such developments. Th e consensu s of opinio n i s i n favou r o f hypothesi s one. 14 The orthodo x interpretatio n laud s th e widesprea d participatio n o f clergy i n co-operativ e endeavour . The evidenc e i n favou r o f thi s interpretatio n i s impressive . Horace Plunket t i n a brie f referenc e i n Ireland i n th e ne w century (p. 119 ) note s tha t o f th e co-operativ e societie s organise d b y th e Irish Agricultural Organisatio n Societ y ' there are no fewer tha n 33 1 societies of which the local priests are the chairmen, whil e to my own knowledge durin g th e summe r an d autum n o f 1902 , a s many a s 50,000 person s from al l part s o f Ireland wer e personally conducted over th e exhibi t o f th e Departmen t o f Agriculture an d Technica l Instruction a t th e Cor k Exhibitio n b y thei r loca l clergy' . Othe r writers, while not providin g quantitativ e evidenc e of this kind, carr y a simila r them e o f constructiv e clerica l involvement . Further, such co-operative developments were congruent with the church's socia l thinkin g an d it s interes t i n stabilisin g th e rura l population, an d promotin g smalle r scal e industr y wher e possible . The Irish Catholic newspape r spok e in approvin g term s of th e Iris h Agricultural Organisatio n Societ y (I.A.O.S.) . 'It is simply the trut h to sa y tha t th e wor k o f th e Iris h Agricultura l Organisatio n i s planned exactl y o n thos e line s o f co-operation whic h th e sovereig n 13

It i s not m y intentio n t o giv e th e impressio n tha t th e protestan t clergy playe d n o par t i n th e formatio n o f co-operatives . Indee d the y played an important role in some areas, particularly in the more northerly half of Ireland, and sometime s alongside their catholic brethren. Howeve r their overal l significanc e i n relatio n t o co-operativ e developmen t a s a whole is not great. 14 Accounts of the historica l development of Irish co-operation devot e little spac e t o thi s poin t whic h i s surprisin g an d somewha t perplexin g given th e importanc e o f th e pries t i n rura l society . On e look s i n vai n for anything more than brief comments in such works a s Horace Plunkett, Ireland i n th e ne w century (London , 1904) ; L . Smith-Gordo n an d L . Staples, Rural reconstruction i n Ireland (London , 1917) ; Th e Horac e Plunkett Foundation , Agricultural Co-operation i n Ireland (London , 1931) . James Johnston , autho r o f Agricultural Co-operation i n Northern Ireland (London, 1965 ) doe s no t refe r t o thi s point , althoug h pressur e o f space may have been the chief constraint here.

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pontiff, Le o XIII, has so strongly commended to the worker s of the world. It i s eminently gratifying t o be able to infer fro m th e course of the proceedings at th e Conference, that th e counsels of the pope are destined t o bea r permanen t frui t i n th e countr y . . . '15 Th e first annual report of the I.A.O.S. states that in many districts its success is largely due to the hel p of the catholi c clergy. 16 The obviou s poin t o f departur e i n subjectin g thes e claim s t o more detaile d scrutin y i s th e privat e diarie s o f th e leadin g co operator, Horac e Plunkett , (referred t o hereinafte r a s th e Plunkett Diaries). Tha t Plunket t was sensitive to the tempora l power of the clergy ther e ca n b e littl e doubt . Hi s diarie s indicat e tha t a s a co-operative pioneer (an d also as a member of the G.D.B. ) h e made a specia l effor t t o tr y an d enlis t thei r suppor t fo r hi s work. Th e organisation o f local meetings was sometimes preceded by a call on the local clergy or, on occasion, by a visit to the bishop. Plunket t did not hesitate , for instance, to approach Bishop Goffey i n Killarne y to ' get his assistance with the pries t a t Listowe l *.17 Bisho p Dwyer of Limerick, in whose area much earl y co-operativ e developmen t took place, became a respected acquaintance, althoug h it should be noted that h e wa s a ver y independent-minde d prelat e an d regarde d as somewhat of a tory politically. D r O'Donnell , bisho p of Raphoe, entertained Plunket t durin g a co-operativ e organisin g tou r o f Donegal in 1893 , but th e relationship appear s to have declined at a later stage. 18 Viewing th e firs t thre e year s o f co-operativ e propagandisin g through the medium of the diaries, i.e . 1889-91 , i t appear s that a t four of the public meetings recorded the clerical reaction was favourable and at two it was negative. In this period one finds about 35 references to different publi c meetings arranged to promote the formation of co-operative societies for farmers and/or rural labourers. (Ther e is 15

Irish Catholic, 1 3 Nov. 1897 , in a report o n the third annual meeting of the I.A.O.S. McKevit t i n his essay ' Epilogue: Moder n Irelan d ' in Corish, Irish Catholicism (Dublin , 1970) , i s probably correc t i n claimin g that a detailed interpretatio n b y Irish churchmen o f Rerun Novarum never proceeded very far. Ye t it is unlikely that it failed utterly to produce some modification o f the clerica l worl d view. I t coul d o n occasio n serv e as a vague sourc e o f legitimation fo r innovation s an d alteration s t o existin g practices, a s illustrated i n the Irish Catholic report for instance. 16 I.A.O.S. Annual Report 1895 , p. 4. 17 Plunkett Diaries , i Ma y 1891 , (Plunket t Foundatio n fo r Co operative Studies , Oxford) . 18 Plunkett Diaries, 5 April 1910 .

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some degree of arbitrariness involved in determinin g what meetings fall int o thi s category ; I hav e trie d t o eliminat e reference s t o th e organisation o f urba n worker s an d t o meeting s o f co-operativ e committees, o r smal l groups of farmers tha t appea r t o b e of a semiprivate nature. ) I t seem s significant tha t o f thes e 3 5 meetings , a clerical presence , favourable o r otherwise , is recorde d i n onl y six instances. (Ther e is no indicatio n o f a clerica l presenc e at th e othe r gatherings excluded from thi s count.) Thi s would appear t o indicate that th e dominan t clerica l reactio n a t loca l leve l was one o f non participation. Allowin g for the hig h degree of selectivity and underreporting involve d in makin g diary entries , it still seem s difficul t t o inflate ou r roug h index o f active clerical involvement—abou t 17% , or n% if one includes favourable references only—t o a figure which might compe l a n alternativ e interpretation . No r wa s Plunket t normally indifferen t i n hi s diar y entrie s o r elsewher e to thos e wh o were presen t a t meetings . A n entr y i n th e summe r of 189 1 reads : ' A t 1 0 a.m . me t th e conferenc e of delegates fro m 1 5 dair y co-op , societies, and Fingall, Monteagle, Anderson, Stokes , Gibson, Cleeve , Beamish, tw o priest s an d i clergyma n an d a fe w others—over 6 0 in all'. Again, the number of catholic clerg y presen t a s a proportion of the tota l gatherin g i s tiny. Moving forwar d t o 1895 , whe n a centra l organisin g bod y (th e I.A.O.S.) wa s i n existence , on e find s tw o prominen t catholi c clergymen o n its committee, D r O'Donnell , bisho p of Raphoe, an d Fr Finla y S . J., o f whom M . Digby 19 commented in he r biograph y of Horace Plunkett : ' he wa s one of the fe w catholic clerg y o f high standing wh o fro m firs t t o las t gav e Plunket t activ e suppor t an d valuable counsel'. Again, turnin g t o clerica l participatio n i n co-operativ e activit y at nationa l level , a n analysi s of th e delegate s a t th e firs t Genera l Conference o f th e Iris h Co-operativ e Dair y an d Agricultura l Societies in September 189 5 reveals that of 60 delegates (representing 29 societies ) present , tw o wer e catholi c clergymen. 20 Anothe r rough inde x o f clerical interes t in the centra l organisin g bod y of the co-operative movemen t is provided by a breakdow n of the annua l list o f voluntar y financia l subscriber s t o th e I.A.O.S. 21 I n 1895 , there wer e fiftee n clergyme n amon g th e subscribers , representin g 19

M. Digby, Horace Plunkett (Oxford, 1949) , p. 55. I.A.O.S. Annual Report 1896, appendix E. 21 I.A.O.S. Annual Reports, 1895, 1905 , 1915 . 20

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4% o f the total. A decade later thi s number ha d increase d to 64, or roughly 13 % o f the total . B y 191 5 th e numbe r o f clergymen ha d declined t o a mer e nine , o r 6 % o f al l subscribers . These level s of clerical suppor t ar e furthe r deflate d when i t i s considered tha t the y also include a minority of protestant clergymen . Fro m this it would appear that enthusiasm for the co-operative movement as a significant national forc e di d no t ris e t o an y grea t level , an d thi s impressio n tends t o b e reinforce d b y a readin g o f the I.A.O.S . a.g.m . debate s between 189 6 and 1920 . A s reported in th e relevan t annual reports, these debate s d o not appear to have induced man y clerical contributions—if on e exclude s th e addresse s o f F r Finla y wh o wa s vice president o f th e I.A.O.S . ove r thi s lon g period . A fir m impuls e to th e co-operativ e movement , a s a movement, doe s no t appea r t o have bee n forthcomin g i n contras t wit h th e experienc e o f co operative pioneer s i n som e Europea n countries , mos t notabl y Belgium, wher e th e clerica l respons e woul d appea r t o hav e bee n more wholehearted. Thus in the initial stages of local co-operativ e endeavour clerica l reaction wa s mixed, and clerica l participation no t nearl y so marked (either a t loca l o r nationa l level ) a s forme r account s suggested . Nor, where there is evidence of non-involvement, is it safe to conclude that thi s indicated indifference . I t i s unlikely that man y cleric s did not pla y som e rol e a t paris h level , tha t a t th e ver y leas t a sens e o f approval o r disapprova l wa s communicated . Th e involvemen t o f the clerg y in political and socia l affair s require s little substantiation , especially durin g th e perio d immediatel y prio r t o an d afte r th e fal l ofParnell.2* So fa r w e hav e merel y considere d i n a fairl y abstrac t an d rather incomplet e wa y some measures of the exten t an d directio n o f clerical activity . N o explanator y schem e embracin g th e probabl e determinants o f such behaviour ha s bee n offered . W e posses s some observations but lac k a theory . Wh y should th e clergy show anything but favour to the new movement?

Conflict of economic interests The thre e socia l categorie s identifie d i n ou r introductio n a s being o f central significance , i n term s o f the presen t inquiry , wer e 22

One genera l instance , which has th e meri t o f being quantitative, may suffic e t o illustrat e thi s point . C . G . O'Brie n estimate s tha t th e county convention s fo r th e selectio n o f parliamentar y candidate s i n

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the peasan t farmers , th e clergy , an d th e traders . Ther e i s over whelming evidenc e fro m man y part s o f Ireland t o sugges t tha t th e last wer e generall y oppose d t o co-operativ e developments . Th e early writer s o n co-operatio n i n Irelan d whos e work s hav e bee n cited, Plunkett , Smith-Gordo n an d Staples , Johnston ar e consisten t on thi s point. S o also are M . Digby, 23 C . C . Riddall, 24 an d Padd y the Cope. 25 Newspaper s in th e 1890 3 suc h a s th e Skibbereen Eagle, Wexford People, Waterford Star, Cork Constitution, and , o n occasions , the Freeman's Journal and the Cork Examiner railed against the cooperative societies . Writte n communications 26 fro m twenty-on e societies indicat e tha t i n ove r hal f o f these case s opposition t o loca l co-operative developmen t was evident, an d that , i n som e instances, it wa s very bitte r indeed . Twent y o f thes e ar e dair y co-operatives , and i n seventee n o f thes e twent y case s late r expansio n int o non-dairying activities induced a hostil e reaction. This evidenc e suggest s that th e co-operativ e movemen t repre sented a disruptive forc e whic h expose d laten t contradiction s i n th e rural social structure. I n a small community characterised b y many face-to-face relationship s th e loca l clerg y woul d hav e foun d i t wel l nigh impossibl e t o insulat e themselve s wholl y fro m th e newl y emerging socia l tensions. 27 Th e natur e o f thei r dilemm a i n suc h situations i s wel l summarise d b y Dea n White , paris h pries t o f Nenagh an d a prominen t figur e i n Nort h Munste r agraria n an d political circles . Havin g reluctantl y accepted th e chairmanship of a public meetin g to discus s co-operation h e warned hi s audience tha t his presenc e shoul d no t b e misinterprete d a s signifyin g approva l o f 1885' consisted o n average of 150 laymen and 5 0 priests'—C. C. O'Brien, Parnell an d hi s party 1880-90 (reprinte d ed. , Oxford , 1974 ) p . 13 0 While th e compariso n i s somewhat unfair , thi s rati o o f priests t o laymen contrasts unfavourabl y wit h thos e w e have calculate d i n relatio n t o th e co-operative movement . 23 Digby, Horace Plunkett. 24 G. C. Riddall, Agricultural Co-operation in Ireland (Dublin , 1950) . 25 P. Gallagher, Paddy th e Cope: m y story (revise d ed., Tralee, n.d.). 26 See appendix. 27 Clearly th e clas h o f economic interest s an d th e consequen t tension s varied very considerably from area to area. I n remot e areas where there was little i f any concentratio n of traders the proble m was likely t o be less acute o r non-existent . Also, of course, traders were sometimes part-time farmers. Further , i n case s wher e co-operativ e endeavou r wa s unlikel y to resul t i n competitio n wit h traders , suc h developmen t coul d b e o f mutual benefit. For thes e reasons, and als o possibly a s a form of insurance, traders in some areas took shares in local dairy co-operatives.

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co-operative enterprise . Observin g tha t mos t o f th e trader s wer e absent fro m th e meetin g an d tha t the y wer e generally ver y uneasy regarding th e movement , he define d hi s positio n a s follows : * when it is made clear to me that the traders and shopkeepers have nothin g to dread from th e spread of this agricultural co-operativ e movement , I wil l have neither difficult y no r hesitatio n i n givin g th e movement my support, but until I am satisfied on that point m y position wil l be a neutra l on e '. H e i s further quote d a s saying: ' any effor t tha t would b e calculated t o weaken the trade' s influenc e an d interes t in towns would , I think , b e ver y dangerou s J . 28 The economi c prerequisite s o f church activity are often ignore d or naivel y assume d no t t o exist ; ye t thi s economi c dimension — the revenu e need s o f th e catholi c church—i s a relevan t variabl e in considerin g clerica l behaviour . Som e crud e estimate s o f th e revenue need s o f the churc h an d th e consequen t burde n impose d on it s member s hav e bee n mad e fo r th e nineteent h centur y b y Emmet Larkin. 29 Whil e on e may hav e little confidenc e i n th e cal culation o f thi s burden , hi s pioneerin g wor k a t leas t illustrate s the incontrovertibl e poin t tha t churc h financia l demand s wer e of a substantial orde r o f magnitude . Give n extensiv e belts of nearsubsistence farmin g an d th e frustratio n o f incom e expectation s in Iris h agricultur e i n th e i88o s an d th e 18905 , i t i s most probabl e that th e middl e strat a o f rura l society—bi g farmers , larg e an d medium size d commercia l interests , member s o f th e professions — contributed muc h more per capita than the relatively less prosperous peasant farmers . Thi s i s especiall y likel y i n relatio n t o item s o f capital expenditure , b e i t th e provisio n o f a staine d glas s window or a new church school . In rura l Ireland , then , suc h financia l dependenc e o n traders , shopkeepers an d publican s woul d ensur e tha t thei r interest s wer e not lightly forgotten b y the clergy . Th e correspondenc e reproduced in Larkin's article indicates th e intensity with which the clergy sought revenue; an y developmen t which endangere d revenu e is unlikely to have receive d a n unambiguou s welcome . And , a s w e hav e seen , commercial interest s wer e quit e vociferou s i n publicl y denouncing the co-operativ e movemen t a s a threa t t o * legitimate ' business . 28

Descriptions o f this meeting appeared i n th e Irish Daily Independent 27 Jan. 1896 , th e Eagle an d County Cork Advertiser I Feb . 189 6 an d a lon g account i n th e Cork Examiner 1 8 Marc h 1896 . On e repor t wa s aptl y titled' Agricultural co-operation o n trial in Tipperary ' . 29 As note 2 .

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Large farmers , particularl y graziers , stoo d t o gai n littl e fro m co operative organisation and no doubt the y also constituted importan t sources of clerical funds , bu t her e th e priest' s dilemm a wa s softene d to th e exten t tha t conflic t centerin g o n th e co-operativ e syste m impinged les s directly o n the interests o f large farmers. Oral testimon y from a forme r chairma n o f a dair y co-operativ e society (situated in a medium-sized village) claim s that clerica l opp osition t o hi s society wa s motivate d b y a desir e o n th e par t o f the local clerg y to protect their revenue sources among the local traders . The mos t vivi d descriptio n w e hav e o f clerica l oppositio n t o a co-operative enterpris e i s i n Padd y Gallagher' s autobiography. 30 Unfortunately h e doe s no t stat e explicitl y wh y priest s an d trader s were bot h strongl y oppose d t o hi s pioneerin g effort s t o establis h Templecrone Co-operativ e societ y in 1906 . Privat e communication s (see appendix ) fro m fou r othe r co-operativ e societie s (situate d i n east Cork , mid-Tipperary , Tipperary-Limeric k border , an d Co . Roscommon respectively) state that while the clergy were interested, and i n som e case s activ e i n th e formatio n o f purel y dair y co operatives, expansio n int o retailin g brough t clerica l opposition . Three of these communications imply that observations of opposition on thi s poin t ar e no t limite d onl y t o th e co-operativ e societ y i n question. Thu s on e such communicatio n reads : ' the shopkeepers accepted the co-operative up to the time when the stores started an d at that tim e in most places the parish priest was the man t o show his disapproval an d i n nearl y al l case s he sided wit h th e shopkeepers' . Another reads : ' ... a s in the last 3 0 or 40 years man y loca l clerg y were eithe r directl y relate d t o o r fairl y closel y relate d t o retai l traders, the y did as a matte r of ordinary persona l reactio n ten d to work in thei r loca l communit y agains t th e ide a o f the co-operativ e developing int o retai l tradin g '. 31 Thi s suggest s that , o n occasion , kinship ties may have played a crucial role in determining behaviou r and i t is also suggestive of the social origins o f the clergy . 30

As note 25. This come s fro m th e genera l manage r o f a larg e multi-purpos e co-operative society with a tradin g area extendin g ove r severa l counties . There i s a proble m her e i n tha t thi s evidenc e relate s t o a somewha t later period . However , i f one accept s tha t ther e i s littl e reaso n t o believe that rura l societ y or its social compositio n wa s changing dramati cally and tha t a group's position vis-a-vi s another social group tend s to be fairly endurin g the n suc h evidenc e i s admissible. Certainl y i n th e cas e of trader s a consisten t patter n (althoug h o f diminishe d intensity ) i s discernible from th e early period unti l recent times . 31

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The Plunket t Papers 32 contain a n interesting exchang e o f letters between Horac e Plunket t an d th e Bisho p o f Elphin , D r Clancy . Plunkett open s b y commenting: ' . . . . I understan d tha t yo u are letting i t b e know n tha t yo u ar e oppose d t o th e co-operativ e creameries whic h hav e bee n widel y establishe d i n you r dioces e 9.33 Dr Clanc y replie s tha t h e ha s bee n misinterprete d a s denouncin g such ventures , whe n i n fac t h e denounce d certai n liste d abuse s associated wit h co-operativ e creamerie s an d on e i s lef t i n littl e doubt as to the extent of Dr Clancy's enthusias m for such creameries . One such abuse may be significant in the context of clerical sensitivity to commercial interests . Many o f ou r Iris h town s possessed , som e fe w years ago , a flourishin g butter market , and whe n th e farme r sol d hi s butter, he expende d the money h e receive d i n purchasin g foo d stuff s an d clothin g fo r th e need s of his household. Thi s meant a large circulation of money in our towns , and commercia l interests of every kind were in flourishing condition. . . . Thus th e destructio n o f the loca l butter trad e ha s been followe d b y th e decay of many subsidiary forms o f industry, and nothin g has taken their place.34 Quite apar t fro m thes e possibl e economi c implication s o f co operative development, the political implications must be considered. Most member s o f th e Nationalis t part y saw , o r affecte d t o see , co-operation a s yet anothe r Tor y instrumen t designe d t o smothe r home rul e aspiration s wit h kindness . Prominen t Nationalist s lik e John Dillo n an d Michae l Davit t wer e especiall y bitte r i n thei r denunciations. Ther e ca n b e littl e doub t tha t som e o f the clerg y responded t o these strictures. On e paris h pries t consulte d hi s M. P Note th e acidi c commen t of Patrick D . Kenny—th e pries t ' petted the chil d o f the wealth y publica n an d ignore d o r intimidate d the chil d of the poor peasant'—' Pat', Economics for Irishmen, (4t h edition, Dublin, 1907), p . 148 . Kenn y furthe r allege s tha t th e clerg y ofte n oppose d co-operation becaus e it generate d local la y catholi c leaders who wer e seen as a threat to clerical leadership in secular affairs . 3A2Plunkett Papers —papers o f Si r Horac e Curzon Plunkett , (Plunket t Foundation fo r Co-operativ e Studies , Oxford) . 33 Plunkett to Clancy, 2 June 1908. 34 Clancy t o Plunkett , 9 June 1908 . I n a somewha t similar , thoug h more antagonistic , vei n not e the testimon y o f the Rev . M. Kan e to th e Royal Commission on congestion in Ireland: sixth report of the commissioners [Cd. 3747 ] H.C. 1908, xxxix, Q,. 34860.

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85

about th e I.A.O.S., an d wa s advise d t o stee r clea r o f i t a s it s purpose, according t o the M.P., was merely Plunkett's own political aggrandisement. Under a newspaper heading of February 189 6 ( ' Vigorous Condemnation o f th e Go-operativ e Associatio n b y th e Borrisokan e Nationalists') on e find s co-operatio n denounce d a s a landlords ' plot t o extrac t furthe r benefit s fro m tenan t farmers . Th e meetin g registered a protes t agains t co-operativ e project s i n th e regio n an d was chaire d b y a paris h priest. 36 Indee d thi s i s indicative o f th e divisions tha t sometime s occurred withi n clerica l rank s unde r th e impact o f conflicting loyalties. 37 Withi n this very region, an d at this time, ther e wer e a numbe r o f priests deepl y involve d i n loca l co operative societies. 38 Margaret Digby , Plunkett' s biographer , an d a membe r o f th e Plunkett Foundatio n tea m whic h carrie d out a count y by count y survey of agricultural co-operation in Ireland in 1930 , states that her impression is that b y and larg e the clerg y were suspicious of and/or antagonistic t o co-operator s i n th e early, formative years. 39 Whil e this impressio n i s not base d o n an y systemati c collection of data, i t cannot be easily set aside as Miss Digby had persona l access to most of the leading co-operative pioneers and is arguably one of the leading living authoritie s o n Iris h an d Europea n agricultural co-operation . This reaction , she feels, may b e explained partl y in economi c terms, partly i n terms of certain share d characteristic s betwee n clergy and the stronge r traders—relativel y hig h statu s in th e community , an d 35

Plunkett Diaries , 9 Sept . 1897 . I t i s als o tru e tha t som e clerg y shared th e popula r notio n tha t politica l reform s wer e precondition s for economic development . See , fo r example , th e comment s o f Cano n O'Mahony an d Bisho p Heal y i n th e Record o f th e Maynooth Union 1897-8, pp 35-7 . 36 Literary Cuttings : Early Histor y of the I.A.O.S., (Plunket t Foundation for Co-operative Studies). 37 Such divisions could also occur sometimes between priests associate d with different co-operative societies . Se e Plunkett Diaries, 4 June 1898. 38 For example , Rev . J . Gleeson , P.P. , Kyl e Co-operativ e Credi t Society, an d F r Crowe , Ballywillia m Co-operativ e Dair y Society . Rev . Fathers McKeog h an d Magrat h wer e involve d i n effort s t o establis h co-operative creamerie s abou t thi s time . Fo r a descriptio n o f conflic t between a pries t co-operato r an d hi s bisho p se e R. A . Anderson , With Horace Plunkett in Ireland (London , 1935) , pp 92-3 . Th e bisho p is alleged to have opposed co-operation becaus e of his kinship ties with traders . 39 Interview wit h Margare t Digby , 1973 ; written communication , Feb. 1975 .

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interests whic h extende d beyon d th e local an d the mundane. Thu s local clergymen , who incidentally wer e excluded b y virtue o f their religion fro m othe r hig h statu s groups i n Iris h society , woul d ten d to gravitate toward s elements in the local community who approxi mated mor e closel y t o the m i n term s of prestige, economi c status, and worl d view. Thi s accords reasonably well with our depiction of rural society . I f one excludes the larg e farmers , th e clerg y and th e traders wer e the onl y significant groups who might b e described as possessing a cosmopolita n outlook , wit h forma l link s (eithe r ecclesiastical o r trading ) extendin g outward s an d upward s fro m a n intensely community orientated, parochial setting. Economi c bonds between the clergy and the stronger traders ar e also compatible wit h this interpretation. Further evidence and attempted synthesis A narrativ e solely i n term s of the origina l assumptio n of favourable clerical reactio n is clearly inadequate. Nevertheles s clerical support and/or active participation i n the launching of co-operative societies was an important facto r in a significant number o f cases.40 Clearl y no neat synthesis is possible, but ca n we in some instances attempt a partial synthesi s o f the conflictin g evidenc e subjec t t o th e furthe r check tha t suc h a synthesi s meshes with evidenc e on othe r aspect s of rural life? Le t us take the case of one mid-Tipperary co-operativ e creamery, founde d i n 1908 , an d locate d i n a mediu m sized village. Local farmer s with long associations wit h the co-operativ e spea k of the major rol e of the parish priest in establishing the society. Thi s is confirmed b y th e minute s o f meeting s o f th e managemen t com mittee.41 Howeve r it is claimed privately that the original committee of managemen t ha d t o promis e hi m tha t th e creamer y woul d largely confin e itsel f t o mil k processin g an d no t engag e i n an y business activit y whic h migh t brin g i t int o competitio n wit h th e village traders.42 I f this off-the-record assuranc e was given, and m y 40

If on e divide s th e co-operativ e movemen t int o it s thre e majo r elements, credit, creamery, and agricultura l store societies, it is probable that th e firs t pose d th e fewes t problem s fo r the clergy , th e secon d coul d in certai n situation s b e controversial , whil e th e las t appear s t o hav e attracted little, if any, support . 41 These are now in the possession of the writer. 42 One informant, possibl y addin g a das h of colour t o hi s narrative , claims tha t the parish priest ' made the committee-men g o down o n thei r knees an d promis e no t t o ope n a stor e i n th e creamery, ' I t i s wort h noting tha t thi s clerica l respons e t o co-operatio n i s consistent wit h th e

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personal assessment i s that these informant s ar e quite reliable, then the priest/chairman wa s instrumental in blocking potential develop ments o f a controversia l nature . Holdin g a ke y positio n o n th e farmers' managemen t committe e an d combinin g wit h thi s rol e th e further rol e o f spiritual leade r o f the loca l community—embracin g both villagers an d country-fol k — he wa s in a powerfu l position t o determine wha t activitie s wer e th e legitimat e concer n o f wha t particular socia l groups . He , i t woul d appear , legitimise d co operative activit y in one direction, thus facilitating realisation o f the farmers' mai n objective—a n improve d syste m o f mil k processing . In tur n h e protecte d th e interest s o f the villag e trader s wh o wer e dependent i n par t o n th e sal e o f agricultural input s an d consume r goods an d th e purchas e o f certain agricultura l outputs , bu t wer e unconcerned wit h mil k processing. Thu s a direct clash of economic interests was avoided, stres s points in the social structure eased, an d the integrated natur e of this microcosm of Irish society reaffirmed . It i s impossible t o asses s ho w general thi s experienc e ma y hav e been. I t i s certainly compatibl e wit h muc h of our knowledge of the role o f the pries t i n Iris h societ y and i t woul d show our tw o funda mentally divergin g set s of experience in a differen t an d les s contra dictory light . Withou t doub t th e clerg y entertaine d a genera l sympathy fo r an y attempt s tha t migh t appea r t o promot e th e economic prosperit y o f their congregations , provide d ther e wer e no adverse side-effect s a s viewed from th e vantag e poin t o f the catholi c church.43 Evaluatin g a new social movemen t an d determinin g th e appropriate reaction was unlikely to be a hasty process. Th e presence of landlor d an d protestan t element s in th e co-operativ e movemen t strictures of Bishop O'Donnell a decade earlier. ' It seemed to him that co-operation was in itself a sound and healthy plant.... But , in the first place, i t seemed to him tha t the y had t o tak e care to besto w upo n that plant carefu l cultivation , so that it would not protrude its branches into the windows , or it s root s unde r th e foundation s o f th e shop s o f th e country . . . a s a frien d o f the movement he would war n its promoters to bewar e o f promotin g throughou t Irelan d an y genera l syste m o f co-operative stores. H e need not enlarge upon the reasons which would at onc e alienat e fro m th e movemen t the sympath y of th e clerg y i f a programme of that kind wer e adopted . . .' Record of th e Maynooth Union 1897-8, p. 33 . 43 The variou s work s o n Roma n Catholicis m cite d i n thi s pape r substantiate this point, as do leading articles from th e Irish Catholic, an d the observation s of writer s onl y incidentall y concerne d wit h religiou s topics.

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and th e hostilit y o f mos t nationalis t politician s compounde d th e problems pose d b y th e natura l antagonis m o f th e traders . I f th e direct an d indirec t evidenc e w e hav e adduce d i n favou r o f a reinterpretation o f th e clerica l rol e i s correct , the n i t appears , initially a t least , tha t man y o f th e clerg y stoo d coldl y aloo f fro m co-operation. Thi s in itself would prove quite an effective dampe r o n co-operators' organisin g moves. A more sophisticated development , however, woul d hav e involve d channellin g co-operativ e enterprise , as the movement gathered momentum , along more acceptable lines, thus deflectin g it s sociall y disruptiv e thrust . Thi s vi a media,, a s illustrated i n th e cas e of th e mid-Tipperar y co-operative , i s exactly analogous to the strategy adopted b y the clergy in the Lan d Leagu e agitation a decad e or so , earlier. 44 Taking anothe r are a o f rura l economi c life—tha t relatin g t o the labourer s an d thei r struggl e t o wi n economi c concessions—th e clerical mediating rol e between distinct socio-economi c groupings is perceptible. Thu s th e Rev. E . M'Swiney, presiding ove r a monthly meeting of the Enniskee n (Go . Cork ) branc h of the Democrati c Labour Federation, is careful t o refute th e suggestion of some farmers that * th e labour agitation was an attack upon themselves '. Nothing , he claims , coul d b e mor e absur d than this , * because th e labou r movement was as much in favour of the farmers as the labourers 5.45 This paris h pries t the n develop s a skilful , thoug h rathe r dubious , argument whic h serve s t o accommodat e al l interests . Devisin g a solution t o the land questio n an d th e proble m o f the rura l laboure r involves transferrin g the lan d t o th e tenan t farmer s a t lo w prices , thus leaving the new proprietor i n a sound economic position—one in which h e wil l b e abl e t o emplo y rura l labourers . B y contributin g to th e tenants ' agitatio n th e labourer s ca n brin g th e lan d struggl e to a successfu l conclusio n thu s ensurin g thei r ow n employmen t prospects withi n a prosperou s peasan t proprietary . Viewe d i n thi s light thei r respectiv e struggle s ar e complementary . 44

One recall s tha t onl y te n year s befor e th e foundin g o f th e firs t co-operative creamery Michael Davitt was setting up the Land League in Co. Mayo, in spite of strong clerical warnings of communist and socialis t influences. Ye t priest s wer e late r quit e activ e i n forwardin g an d channelling Lan d Leagu e agitations . Thu s th e fac t tha t b y 190 3 o r so there was considerable clerical involvement in local co-operative societies is not i n itself quite so significant a s might first appear. No r is it necessary to assume a conscious strategy; a mere clerical presence on committees of management woul d impl y certai n constraints . 45 Eagle and County Cork Advertiser, 1 0 March 1894.

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At a ' monster meeting ' o f th e representative s o f the trade s and labourer s o f Skiberee n i n 1894 , th e pries t presidin g note s th e growing strife betwee n capital and labour a t home and abroad . H e regrets tha t th e * friendly relation s tha t shoul d exis t between workmen an d employe r ar e bein g strained , an d ar e beginnin g t o sna p asunder '. 46 H e goes on to emphasise the necessary interdependence between capitalist an d labourer and the need for mutual co-operatio n and good-will. In almos t identica l vein , on e migh t not e th e addres s o f th e reverend chairma n to a labourers' meetin g in Nenagh in December 18g4.47 Th e rol e of mediator i n economi c affair s i s illustrated i n a more activ e sens e b y Bisho p Dwyer's interventio n i n th e strik e of bacon curin g worker s in 1890 , affectin g Limerick , Waterfor d an d Cork, an d i n th e Limeric k an d Waterfor d railworker s strik e o f 1891.48 Th e exercis e o f a simila r functio n b y th e clerg y i n relation t o lan d dispute s involvin g tenan t farmer s i s generall y recognised. Thi s furthe r dimensio n o f clerical activity , a s reveale d by comparative analysis , enhances our understandin g of the clerica l conception of social organisation and th e appropriate socia l relationships between differen t classes . Th e realit y of social stratification is recognised and accepted . Th e ideal society is conceived a s a system of interlocking, mutuall y interdependent part s functioning smoothly in th e interest s o f all . Althoug h non-egalitarian , i t i s essentially a harmony mode l o f society, a s opposed to , fo r instance, th e marxis t conflict model. Conflic t between different socio-economic groupings, be i t betwee n farmers/co-operator s an d traders , o r farmer s an d labourers represent s deviatio n fro m th e socia l idea l o f a harmon y of classes, or wha t continenta l clergymen knew as la paix sociale. In th e ligh t o f this ideological orientatio n i t i s hardly surprisin g that the priest should play an important par t in the management and resolution of conflicts withi n rura l society . Hi s role in settlin g land disputes betwee n neighbours an d agro-industria l dispute s betwee n employers and employees , and his reaction t o rural labourers' claim s and t o co-operative development s display s considerabl e consistency . Certain form s o f socia l conflic t wer e t o b e deprecate d a s thes e introduced tension s whic h disturbe d th e stabilit y an d cohesio n o f 46

47

Eagle and County Cork Advertiser, i Sept 1895.

Nenagh News, 22 Dec. 1894. Limerick Reporter an d Tipperary Vindicator, 1890-91 . Se e als o F r Ryder's address to th e Archconfraternit y (Limerick ) urgin g conciliation in the bacon industry dispute, referred to in the issue of 7 Feb. 1890. 48

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Roman Catholi c communities. 49 Socia l deviant s suc h a s co operative pioneers had t o be reintegrated into community structures if the old clerical power and authority patterns were to be maintained intact. Participatio n o f clergy in co-operativ e societies would have gone a long way towards achieving this . Evidence o f joint actio n o n th e par t o f priest s an d trader s i n a numbe r o f instances is somewhat unexpecte d an d suggest s some interesting line s o f enquiry . Whil e interpretatio n o f suc h a n association i s extremel y tentative , consideration s o f socia l status , revenue and kinshi p links suggest themselves as possible explanatory factors. Conclusion From ou r revie w o f th e availabl e evidenc e i t appear s tha t clerical reactio n t o th e co-operativ e movemen t too k thre e mai n forms. Firstly , reserv e or actua l oppositio n fo r a variety o f motives, this being most apparent where co-operative development threatened the socia l equilibrium in rural communities . Reserv e and suspicion are likel y t o hav e bee n mor e genera l i n th e innovativ e period , sometimes crystallisin g int o oppositio n wher e co-operato r an d trader group s adopted hostil e posture s vis-a-vis each other . A very different reactio n an d on e gainin g momentu m throug h tim e wa s that o f activ e promotio n o f co-operativ e enterprises . Th e thir d approach, whic h i s reall y a refinemen t o f th e second , involve d conditional an d selectiv e promotio n o f such enterprise s e.g . purel y milk processin g a s oppose d t o multi-purpos e co-operatives . Ap proaching th e end of the first decade of co-operative propagandising , the secon d reactio n o r perhap s som e refinement o f it represent s th e dominant pattern . Instance s of hostility migh t manifes t themselve s occasionallyifrom no w on, bu t th e co-operativ e for m o f organisation had establishe d itsel f a s a permanen t featur e o f rura l Ireland . Clerical participatio n an d interes t i n th e centra l organ s o f th e co-operative momen t and , b y inference , i n th e mor e visionar y aspects of the co-operativ e ideology, canno t b e viewed as noteworthy and woul d appea r t o hav e decline d fro m a pea k in th e earl y year s of this century. Th e publicatio n i n 190 4 of Plunkett's controversia l book, Ireland i n ihe ne w century, canno t hav e helpe d i n attractin g 49

While th e poin t i s no t develope d here i t i s fairl y obviou s wh y these generalisations cannot be stretched to embrace the landlord element in rural society.

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and maintainin g clerica l support . Th e subsequen t renewa l o f nationalist attacks on co-operation a s well as a general preoccupatio n with political issue s and remedie s after th e liberal electora l triump h of 190 6 wer e probabl y mor e significan t factors . I n vie w o f these , one ma y wonde r i f th e co-operativ e movemen t woul d hav e bee n even mor e successfu l i n attractin g th e energie s o f local clergyme n had i t assume d a somewha t sectaria n characte r o r adapte d itsel f to th e politica l current s o f th e tim e b y transformin g itsel f int o a vehicle fo r nationalism . A surve y o f co-operatio n i n 1931 , fo r instance, note d i n passin g tha t priest s an d schoolteachers , wh o i n other countries had provide d muc h of the local leadership fo r credit societies, ha d no t performe d a comparabl e rol e in Ireland. 50 European co-operativ e movements , i t ma y b e noted , tende d t o hav e strong identifyin g characteristic s o f a religiou s o r nationa l kin d (infusing them , perhaps , wit h th e ' vital heat ' Georg e Russel l found s o conspicuously lackin g in th e Iris h movement). 61 It seem s reasonable t o conclud e tha t i n certai n fundamenta l respect s th e movement in Irelan d fitte d les s than easil y into the emergin g socia l and politica l pattern s o f pre-independence Ireland . I t retaine d it s non-political an d non-denominationa l character , bu t probabl y onl y at the cost of reducing its appeal fo r certain non-farming groups—the Roman Catholi c clerg y i n particular. 52

APPENDIX Three distinct information gathering techniques were used in compiling evidence for this paper. Whil e the main emphasis was placed on analysis of conventional documentary sources, this was supplemented by use of the technique o f ora l histor y an d b y th e socia l surve y technique o f postal questionnaire. A few comments on th e posta l questionnaires (o r private 50

The Horac e Plunkett Foundation, Agricultural co-operation in Ireland: a survey (London , 1931), p. 385 . 51 George Russell, Th e building u p of a rural civilization (Dublin, 1910) , p. 3 . I t i s interesting t o not e tha t th e Iris h languag e movement , itsel f contemporaneous wit h th e co-operativ e movement , evolve d a radicall y different approac h t o the issue s o f language and nationality . I t i s hardly coincidental tha t th e languag e reviva l campaig n succeede d i n gainin g substantial clerical backing, especially amon g the younger clergy. 62 In genera l i t seem s that , o f th e broadl y politica l an d economi c roles open to him, th e Iris h soggarth found th e forme r th e more congenial of the two .

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communications) ma y b e i n order . Usin g th e 191 2 lis t o f co-operativ e dairy societie s a s a samplin g fram e 6 8 societies wer e randoml y selected . Simple questionnaire s seekin g informatio n on , amon g othe r things , trader and clerical reaction to the co-operative i n its formative period were distributed t o eac h society . I t wa s specifie d i n eac h cas e tha t writte n communications wer e desire d onl y fro m individuals , eithe r co-operativ e staff or past or present members of the management committees, who were intimately associate d wit h th e loca l co-operativ e societ y an d fel t the y possessed reliabl e historical information . It i s difficult t o assess precisely the response rate a s quite a number of these 191 2 societies are no longer i n business; others replied that they fel t unable to provide information. I n all 25 completed returns were obtained, giving a wid e geographica l spread , 1 8 o f which were usefu l withi n th e context of the present paper. (I n som e instances interesting replies were followed u p with oral interviews.) I t shoul d be noted in this brief review of procedur e tha t th e emphasi s i s o n treatin g an d presentin g evidenc e supplied b y private respondent s as historical source material whic h mus t be subjected to the historian's checks. N o broad social survey type claims are made, or intended.

9

THE ROMA N CATHOLIC CHURCH IN IRELAND, 1898-1918* DA VID W. MILLER

DURING THE TWO DECADE S from 1898 , when the Iris h Parliamentary Party began t o recover from the chao s of the Parnellite split, until 1918 , when that Party wa s decisively rejected a t the polls , the Catholi c Churc h wa s forced t o adap t t o a ne w rol e i n Iris h politics . B y examinin g th e Church's respons e t o th e politica l event s o f thes e year s I hop e t o indicate ho w i t accommodate d itsel f t o th e revolutionar y forces whic h achieved Iris h independence . In th e earl y 1890' $ th e Church , unde r th e leadershi p o f Willia m Walsh, Archbisho p o f Dubli n sinc e 1885 , an d th e vetera n nationalis t prelate Thoma s Croke , Archbisho p o f Cashel , ha d seeme d capabl e of regaining th e extraordinar y positio n i n politica l affair s whic h i t ha d enjoyed befor e the ris e of Parnell. Th e Church' s seemin g succes s i n th e struggle agains t Parnellism , however , wa s a hollo w victory. 1 Dissatis faction o n th e par t o f leadin g Antiparnellite s — notably Willia m O'Brien an d Joh n Dillo n — with th e rol e clergyme n wer e playin g i n political affair s contribute d t o a rif t withi n th e Antiparnellit e part y itself. Moreover , althoug h th e Churc h coul d stil l functio n quit e efficiently i n politic s on th e dioces e an d paris h level , the machiner y of political decision-makin g fo r th e whol e hierarch y ha d suffere d seriou s damage i n th e Parnel l debacle . Walsh , b y al l odd s th e ables t ma n i n * Thi s essa y i s a slightl y revise d versio n o f a pape r rea d a t th e 196 8 ACI S Conference a t Cortland , Ne w York , May , 1968 . i Se e Emmet Larkin , "Mountin g th e Counter-Attack : Th e Roma n Catholi c Hierarchy an d th e Destructio n o f Parnellism, " Review o f Politics, XX V (Apri l 1963), 157-182 , an d "Launchin g th e Counterattack : Par t I I o f th e Roma n Catholic Hierarchy and the Destruction of Parnellism," Review of Politics, XXVIII (July 1966) , 350-383.

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the hierarchy , ha d faile d t o gai n Rome' s confidenc e an d ha d bee n denied th e cardinal' s ha t i n favo r o f Michae l Logue , th e muc h les s imaginative Archbisho p o f Armagh . Though Logu e wa s incapabl e o f leading th e hierarchy wit h th e skill and sensitivit y Walsh had exhibite d in th e difficul t year s of Parnell' s ascendancy , he spok e fo r a significan t number o f clergyme n wh o hope d t o sustai n th e extraordinar y political influence derive d fro m thei r predominan t rol e amon g "priest s an d people" of the rura l parish . Thes e hope s le d man y o f thes e clergyme n to suppor t T . M . Healy' s factio n o f th e Antiparnellites , fo r Healy , b y championing th e rights o f constituencies at the expense of strong central leadership i n th e Party, 2 wa s offerin g th e Churc h th e opportunit y t o influence politic s at th e leve l a t whic h i t wa s best equippe d t o do so. The reunificatio n o f th e Part y wa s a proces s whic h bega n wit h th e founding o f the Unite d Iris h Leagu e by William O'Brie n i n 189 8 an d ended wit h th e genera l electio n o f October , 1900 , afte r whic h Heal y remarked tha t O'Brie n ha d create d "tw o unite d Iris h Partie s — of which I am one." 3 As friends of Healy who stood against official U.I.L. candidates i n a numbe r o f constituencie s wer e usuall y backed b y solid phalanxes o f priests , th e impor t o f th e Leagu e triump h wa s clear : Henceforward th e voice s o f layme n woul d dominat e th e council s o f the nationa l movement . Som e ecclesiastic s — notably Logue , wh o con tinued for a decade to sponso r Healy' s politica l claims — still hope d fo r the retur n of rather heav y clerical influence in politics . Most clergymen , however, came t o accept Healy's fal l fro m power , an d th e ris e o f Joh n Redmond, th e forme r Parnellit e leade r wh o ha d bee n electe d t o nominal leadershi p o f the reunite d Party . Redmon d graduall y assume d effective leadershi p an d worke d t o balanc e clerica l an d anticlerica l forces withi n th e nationa l movement . Throughou t larg e area s o f Ire land, particularl y i n th e West , where Leagu e candidate s ha d no t face d Healyite o r clerica l oppositio n i n th e election , the ecclesiastica l authori ties had alread y com e t o terms wit h th e ne w Leagu e befor e 1900. * Both 2 F . S . L . Lyons , Th e Irish Parliamentary Party, 1890-1910, Studie s i n Iris h History, Vol . I V (London , 1951) , pp . 42-44 . 3 Quote d ibid., p. 98. 4 Th e sprea d of th e Leagu e an d it s relations with th e ecclesiastica l authoritie s can b e followe d i n considerabl e detai l i n th e polic e intelligenc e note s fo r 1898-1901 i n th e Publi c Recor d Office , London , C.O . 903/8 , a sourc e whic h must, o f course , be use d wit h caution .

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before an d afte r it s anti-Heal y activitie s o f 190 0 th e League' s primar y function wa s agraria n protest . Mos t o f th e wester n bishop s wer e abl e to foster tie s between thei r clergy and loca l League branches while care fully guardin g agains t th e kin d o f attac k fro m Rom e whic h ha d s o complicated thei r tas k a decad e earlier . Moreover , clergyme n foun d the U.I.L. program, whic h gav e high priorit y to division of the grazin g farms among land-hungry peasants , particularly attractive, for it seemed to promise a n en d t o emigratio n t o Britis h and America n citie s where dangers t o fait h an d moral s wer e though t t o b e much greate r tha n i n rural Ireland. 5 Thoug h th e Leagu e agitatio n faile d t o obtai n suc h massive lan d redistribution , i t di d wi n th e 190 3 Lan d Purchas e Act . Genuine clerica l sympathy wit h th e League' s progra m betwee n 189 8 and 1903 , and th e traditio n o f clerica l involvemen t i n agraria n protes t to moderat e excesses , fostered much healthie r relations betwee n clergy men an d th e Party tha n had bee n apparen t durin g th e angry clashe s of the 190 0 general election . The suppor t o f many , perhap s most , individua l churchmen fo r th e Party, however, di d not constitut e suppor t b y the Churc h a s an institu tion. Althoug h Patric k O'Donnell , Bisho p o f Raphoe , ha d becom e a trustee of the Parliamentar y Fund an d activel y involved himsel f i n th e Party's interna l affairs , th e hierarch y a s a bod y di d no t immediatel y follow hi s lead . Th e lac k o f a general ecclesiastica l policy towar d th e Party di d no t resul t fro m an y fundamenta l disagreemen t wit h th e Party's state d goa l o f Hom e Rul e o r it s "constitutional " method s fo r achieving tha t goal. Except fo r John Healy , Archbishop o f Tuam, wh o despite fairly advance d view s o n th e lan d questio n wa s unenthusiasti c over Hom e Rule, 6 al l th e bishop s regarde d themselve s as nationalists . Given Logue' s antipath y towar d th e Iris h Party , however, only Arch bishop Wals h wa s i n a positio n t o lea d th e hierarch y into a workin g relationship wit h th e Party . Immediatel y afte r th e reunio n Walsh' s 5 Rev . Joseph Canon Guinan , The Soggarth Aroon, ninth printin g (Dublin , 1946), a n autobiographica l nove l b y a n Iris h priest wh o ha d retu rned t o Irelan d from a paris h i n England , provide s a revealin g pictur e o f clerica l attitude s toward emigration . Th e Church' s positio n on th e divisio n o f th e grazin g land s is se t forth i n th e join t pastora l o f th e 190 0 Nationa l Syno d (Freeman's Journal, October i , 1900 ) and a resolutio n of the hierarch y publishe d in The Tablet, July 5 , 1902 . 6 Archbisho p Heal y onc e tol d a congregatio n the y wer e no t ye t "fi t fo r Home Rule. " (Irish Catholic, February 27, 1909.)

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relations wit h Redmon d ha d becom e quit e cordial, 7 an d on e migh t have expecte d hi m t o assum e thi s role . B y 1903 , however , th e Arch bishop wa s devoting hi s bes t political energies t o obtainin g a Catholi c college within th e Universit y of Dublin a s a settlemen t o f th e Univer sity question . Sinc e fe w bishop s share d Walsh' s enthusias m fo r suc h close tie s wit h Trinit y College , hi s leadershi p capacit y wa s severel y taxed simpl y t o maintai n th e appearanc e o f episcopa l unit y o n thi s issue.8 H e wa s i n n o positio n t o undertak e th e additiona l tas k o f winning over such prelates as Logue t o suppor t fo r th e Party . At thi s stage , a long-standing feu d betwee n th e Party' s organizatio n in Belfas t an d th e Belfas t Catholi c Associatio n — a politica l machin e controlled by Henry Henry , Bisho p of Down an d Connor , an d heartily approved b y Logu e — was becomin g particularl y acrimonious. 9 More over, resentment against the vestige s of Protestant ascendancy in urba n economic lif e ha d produce d a n "Al l Ireland " Catholi c Associatio n which, thoug h i t explicitl y disavowed politica l ambitions , migh t wel l have precipitate d in othe r region s conflict s simila r t o tha t ragin g i n Belfast. Fortunatel y fo r th e politica l healt h o f th e country , Wals h unilaterally condemne d th e Catholi c Associatio n i n hi s archdioces e i n January, I904, 10 a t a momen t whe n th e sectaria n animositie s i t wa s arousing threatene d t o undermin e th e delicat e negotiation s fo r hi s University scheme. Although Wals h succeede d in crushing the "Al l Ireland" Catholi c Association , hi s negotiation s wit h th e Governmen t fo r the Universit y settlement miscarried — an even t which actually worked to th e benefi t o f th e Party . I t wa s no w clea r tha t th e Unionis t Party , which ha d bee n danglin g a Universit y settlemen t befor e th e bishop s since the lat e i88o' s i n hope s o f winnin g the m awa y from th e popular movement, would not actuall y deliver the settlement . Feeling betrayed in a matte r t o whic h the y attache d th e highes t importance , th e hier archy a s a whol e now recognize d th e nee d fo r a workin g relationship 7 Se e correspondenc e betwee n Wals h an d Redmon d durin g 190 0 an d 190 1 in th e Nationa l Librar y o f Ireland , Redmon d Papers . 8 See , e.g. , Bodleia n Library , MacDonnel l Papers , M S Eng . hist. , c . 351/149-150, Wals h t o Si r Anton y MacDonnell , Januar y 7 , 1904 . 9 Th e controvers y can b e followe d i n th e Part y organization' s Belfas t organ , the Northern Star, an d i n th e Irish News an d Belfast Morning News, whic h generally supporte d th e Association . Logue' s attitud e i s reveale d i n a speec h reported i n th e Irish Catholic, April 28 , 1900. 10 Th e Times, January 18 , 1904 .

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with th e Iris h Party . Moreover , durin g 190 4 Part y leader s improve d their standin g wit h th e bishop s by conspicuous oppositio n t o proposal s which might reduc e clerica l influenc e i n Iris h primar y education. 11 Early i n 1905 , th e Standin g Committe e o f th e hierarchy , i n a lon g statement o n th e Universit y question, calle d upon "th e whole country " to "rall y roun d ou r Parliamentar y representatives , an d giv e the m th e whole strengt h o f th e nation' s suppor t i n thei r endeavo r t o secur e ordinary civi c right s fo r Iris h Catholic s i n educationa l an d al l othe r matters." 12 Thi s admonitio n wa s backe d u p b y individual expressions of suppor t fro m som e o f th e mos t recalcitran t o f th e Party' s episcopa l enemies. Subscription s t o th e Part y Fund wer e received from Cardina l Logue and from two prelates long regarded a s "Castle bishops " — Archbishop Heal y an d Edwar d Thoma s O'Dwyer , Bisho p o f Limerick. 13 Bishop Henr y stil l hope d t o salvag e hi s politica l machine , bu t Part y leaders, backed b y substantial clerica l opinion i n his own diocese , force d the Bisho p virtually to liquidate th e Belfas t Catholi c Association . Wha t Bishop O'Donnell calle d "the flowin g tide" 14 wa s running strongl y i n the Party' s favo r — a fac t whic h wa s dramatize d i n April , 1905 , whe n Redmond wa s cordially received at the Vatican an d grante d a two-hour private audienc e wit h th e Pope. 15 The promisin g shar e o f ecclesiastica l confidenc e achieve d b y th e Party i n 190 5 wa s graduall y erode d i n th e succeedin g year s b y force s which wer e perhap s inheren t i n th e fac t that , althoug h a lan d settle ment ha d bee n enacte d i n 1903 , th e Party' s othe r traditiona l objec t — Home Rule — did no t convincingl y enter th e real m o f possibilit y until about 1909 . Serious attentio n t o th e Hom e Rule questio n almos t inevi tably dre w th e Part y int o a close r relationshi p wit h th e onl y Englis h Party whic h coul d no t conceivabl y gran t Hom e Rul e — the Liberals . Though Liberal s tende d t o b e sympatheti c t o Iris h nationa l claims , they were , a t this time, preoccupie d wit h program s towar d whic h Iris h ecclesiastics were , a t best , apathetic , and , a t worst , implacabl y hostile . 11 Se e statemen t by th e hierarch y in Freeman's Journal, Jun e 23 , 1904 , an d speech b y Dillon a t Ballaghaderee n i n Freeman's Journal, Octobe r 10 , 1904 . 12 Ibid., January 18 , 1905 . 13 Ibid., Februar y 13, 1905 ; Th e Tablet, February n, 1905 ; Irish News an d Belfast Morning News, Februar y 14 , 1905 . 14 Redmon d Papers , Bisho p O'Donnell t o Redmond , Februar y 17 , 1905 . 15 Deni s Gwynn , The Life o f John Redmond (London , 1932) , pp . 112-113 .

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In particular , the Libera l Governmen t whic h cam e t o powe r lat e i n 1905 was committed t o rescinding the financial benefits which the Con servatives had conferre d on denominational school s in Englan d i n 1902 . During 190 6 Redmond establishe d a healthy working relationshi p with the sensitiv e an d pragmati c Archbisho p o f Westminster , Franci s Bourne. Despit e effort s b y Tor y Catholi c spokesme n t o associat e th e Catholic Church wit h th e Hous e o f Lords' intransigen t positio n on th e Liberals' Education 'Bill, Bourne privatel y sanctioned a course of action by whic h th e Iris h Part y secure d meaningfu l concession s o n mos t points directly affecting Catholi c interests. 16 The Part y was thus able to avoid alienatin g th e Liberal s an d vot e wit h th e Governmen t t o rejec t the wreckin g amendment s o f th e Hous e o f Lords . Thi s action , how ever, elicite d a mos t abusiv e publi c lette r fro m Bisho p O'Dwye r o f Limerick, wh o use d suc h term s a s "canin e servility " t o describ e th e Party leaders ' relationshi p t o th e Liberals. 17 Th e Party' s defens e o f Catholic interest s i n earlie r deliberation s o n th e Bil l ha d been , i n hi s view, "an elaborat e imposture, " fo r no w "th e scre w i s put on , an d th e Irish Party , by a vot e tha t wil l neve r be forgiven, rat upo n themselves, and forswea r thei r ow n professions. " A n immediat e publi c defense by Bourne o f Redmond' s action s forestalle d furthe r episcopa l attacks , bu t it di d no t dispe l fro m O'Dwyer' s min d th e belie f whic h ha d bee n growing sinc e earl y 190 6 tha t th e Iris h Part y ha d sol d it s sou l t o English secularists . O'Dwyer's intemperat e outburs t i s o f interes t no t because h e spok e fo r an y large , well-organize d bod y o f clerica l opinion — he ha d lon g bee n a maveric k withi n th e hierarch y — but because i t foreshadowe d th e clerica l componen t o f a mor e genera l tendency to regar d th e Part y a s out of touch wit h th e genuin e currents of opinio n in Catholic , nationalis t Irelan d i n late r years. In a n ominous passage o f hi s lette r o n th e Educatio n Bill , th e Bisho p o f Limeric k wrote, "I f jus t no w the y [th e Iris h Party ] coul d separat e themselve s from Mr . Birrel l an d Mr . Lloy d Georg e an d th e res t o f th e Eight y 16 Th e Redmon d Paper s contai n extensiv e correspondenc e wit h Bourn e during 1906 . Se e especiall y th e statemen t accompanyin g Bourn e t o Redmond , December 4 , 1906 . Fo r Bourne' s ow n accoun t o f th e critica l event s se e Archive s of th e Archdioces e o f Westminster , Bourn e Papers , cop y o f Bourn e t o Duk e of Norfolk , Januar y 6 , 190 7 (ite m 1 2 i n pin k folde r marke d "I I Duk e o f Norfolk o n Educatio n almos t al l 1907." ) Th e Bourn e Paper s wer e use d b y kind permission o f Hi s Eminenc e Cardina l Heenan , Archbisho p o f Westminster . 17 Freeman's Journal, Decembe r 15 , 1906 .

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Club, an d com e over to Irelan d an d inquir e wh y th e fin e generatio n of young Irishme n tha t i s growin g u p i s turnin g awa y fro m the m e n masse fo r th e Gaeli c League, o r Sin n Fein , o r som e othe r policy , the y would lear n som e salutar y truths." Within a fe w month s ther e wa s a strikin g illustration of th e wa y i n which religiou s an d secula r objection s t o th e Libera l allianc e migh t reinforce eac h other . Augustin e Birrell , wh o afte r th e defea t o f th e Education Bil l ha d bee n transferre d fro m th e Presidenc y o f th e Boar d of Educatio n t o th e Iris h Chie f Secretaryship , brough t forwar d th e Government's Iris h Counci l Bil l in May , 1907 . To "th e fin e generatio n of youn g Irishmen " t o whic h O'Dwye r ha d alluded , th e Bil l wa s bitterly disappointin g becaus e i t di d no t offe r ful l Hom e Rule . T o churchmen, however , th e Bil l wa s positivel y menacing, fo r i t seeme d the culminatio n o f officia l effort s begu n severa l years earlier unde r th e Tories to introduce mor e democrati c contro l int o th e Iris h educationa l system.18 Whe n a Nationalis t convention , heavil y attende d b y clergy men, rejecte d th e Bil l ou t o f hand , Birrel l o f cours e droppe d it . Mor e significant, however , he reconsidere d hi s entir e political positio n i n th e light o f tw o majo r defeat s i n th e firs t eightee n month s o f hi s Cabine t career. H e institute d new , generou s financia l policie s towar d Iris h primary education, 19 whic h fo r severa l year s ha d bee n deliberatel y starved fo r fund s a s par t o f effort s t o forc e th e reform s whic h th e Church opposed . Moreover , h e abandone d th e idealisti c Universit y scheme whic h hi s Libera l predecessor , Jame s Bryce , ha d revive d wit h Walsh's concurrence , i n favo r o f a mor e pragmati c schem e whic h accorded bette r wit h the desire s of the averag e ecclesiastic. 20 Thoug h Birrell's action s helped t o stav e off temporarily any widesprea d clerica l 18 A s ther e i s n o publishe d accoun t o f th e bitte r controvers y ove r educa tional refor m i n thi s period , on e mus t rel y chiefl y o n newspape r accounts . Fo r this purpose , a collectio n o f pres s cutting s kep t b y th e Iris h Educatio n Offic e and no w availabl e a t th e Publi c Recor d Offic e o f Irelan d (cal l number : 20-64 ) is particularl y useful . Fo r ecclesiastica l respons e t o th e Iris h Counci l Bill , se e especially Irish Catholic, Ma y n , Ma y 18 , 1907 ; Freeman's Journal, Ma y 13 , May 17 , Ma y 25 , 1907 . 19 Freeman's Journal, Novembe r 23 , 1907 , Jun e 24 , Jul y 3 , Jul y 28 , 1908 . Parliamentary Papers, 1919 , Vol . XX I Cmd . 60 , "Repor t o f th e Vice-Rega l Com mittee o f Inquir y int o Primar y Educatio n i n Ireland, " I , 37 . 20 Augustin e Birrell , Things Past Redress (London , 1937) , pp . 200-203 . MacDonnell Papers , M S Eng . hist. , c . 350/15-16 , Birrel l t o Si r Anton y MacDon nell, Augus t 25 , 1907 .

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reaction in Irelan d against th e Liberal Government, the Chie f Secretary did not , indee d coul d not , preven t th e corrosiv e effect s o f th e Libera l alliance upo n clerica l opinio n o f th e Iris h Party . A s th e Universitie s Act o f 190 8 seeme d mor e th e produc t o f lon g year s o f ecclesiastica l agitation tha n th e frui t o f th e Iris h Party' s policies , th e Part y ha d n o great successe s comparable t o th e 190 3 Land Purchas e Bil l with whic h to deflec t attentio n fro m it s strategie s a t Westminster . Moreover, afte r 1903 , agrarian agitatio n wa s a n inadequat e means of maintaining popula r enthusias m behin d th e Part y an d it s curren t leadership. The Party' s organization wa s augmented b y Joseph Devlin's capture o f th e Ancien t Orde r o f Hibernian s — a benefi t societ y based on feeling s o f Catholi c solidarit y simila r t o thos e manifeste d i n th e Catholic Associations . Thoug h th e A.O.H. , whos e primar y strengt h lay in Ulster , tried t o obtain ecclesiastica l sanction, it wa s not s o willing as th e U.I.L . ha d bee n t o accep t clerica l influence . B y 190 9 th e Orde r became a standin g sourc e of friction betwee n man y Ulste r churchme n and th e Party. 21 Th e A.O.H . wa s only on e elemen t o f a "Tamman y Hall" image whic h the Party was acquiring i n these years. The delicate negotiations fo r Hom e Rule , whic h no w becam e th e Party' s principal occupation, necessitated the concentratio n o f authorit y in relativel y few hands so that Party leaders might dea l as plenipotentiaries with Cabine t ministers. Shift s i n Iris h publi c opinio n ha d t o be take n int o account , but effort s t o encourag e suc h shift s wer e understandabl y regarded b y Party leader s a s a specie s o f treachery . Therefore , whe n Willia m O'Brien lef t politic s in 190 3 over a disagreement wit h Dillo n an d the n tried t o retur n t o publi c lif e i n th e followin g yea r b y callin g fo r a drastic revision o f nationalist objective s an d strategy , Redmond, Dillo n and othe r Part y leader s turne d th e organizatio n h e had don e muc h t o create agains t him . I n doin g so , they disregarde d man y fin e point s of stated Leagu e an d Part y procedur e (a s O'Brie n himsel f ha d don e several year s earlie r i n drivin g Heal y int o isolation) . Thoug h the y prevented O'Brie n fro m becomin g mor e tha n a n annoyanc e i n nationalist politics , in th e process the y forfeited th e confidenc e of Archbishop Walsh , whose legalisti c min d recoile d a t th e breache s o f estab21 C.O . 904/117 , 904/118 , 904/119 , passim. Emme t Larkin , James Lar\in, Irish Labour Leader, 1876-1947 (London , 1965) , pp . 313-314 .

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lished procedure s whic h wer e employed t o figh t "factionism. " Fro m about 190 6 Wals h becam e thoroughl y disillusione d wit h th e Party , ceased t o contribut e t o it s fund s an d tende d t o restric t hi s politica l activity t o direc t dealing s wit h Governmen t officials . The strategie s adopte d b y th e Part y i n th e wak e o f th e 190 3 Lan d Purchase Ac t — the Libera l allianc e in Englan d an d "machine " politic s in Irelan d — paid dividend s i n th e perio d fro m 191 0 t o 1914 , when th e Irish Part y wa s able t o obtain a Home Rule Ac t "on th e statut e book. " During these year s when Redmon d hel d th e balanc e of power a t West minster, thos e churchme n whos e confidenc e in th e Part y wa s wanin g wisely refraine d fro m strikin g a t th e ma n wh o wa s no w i n a mor e commanding positio n tha n Parnel l ha d eve r been . Willia m O'Brien , despite hi s allianc e wit h T . M . Healy , faile d miserabl y t o obtai n fo r his "All-for-Ireland League " the clerical backing whic h he hoped woul d result fro m hi s oppositio n t o th e Libera l allianc e an d t o th e Ancien t Order o f Hibernians. 23 Nevertheless , th e hierarch y a s a bod y di d no t rally roun d th e Party . When , i n 1910 , th e Part y trie d t o persuad e bishops t o doubl e thei r usua l subscription s t o th e Part y Fun d a s a n indication o f thei r renewe d suppor t i n thi s critica l period , Cardina l Logue observe d wit h pleasur e tha t onl y nin e o f som e twenty-eigh t prelates mad e th e gesture. 24 Th e lac k o f a coheren t ecclesiastica l policy toward th e Part y ha d certai n advantage s fo r Redmon d an d hi s col leagues. Th e fir m friendshi p o f tw o prelate s — Dr. O'Donnel l an d Denis Kelly , th e Bisho p o f Ros s — together wit h th e routin e suppor t of man y others , protecte d the m fro m an y allegation s tha t th e Churc h opposed th e Party. A close r workin g relationship wit h th e hierarch y a s a bod y might hav e aroused th e suspicion s o f secularis t members o f th e Liberal Part y whos e fear s tha t Hom e Rul e migh t reall y mea n Rom e Rule wer e a constant sourc e o f anxiet y t o Redmon d an d Dillon . The nee d t o alla y Englis h Protestan t misgiving s ha d le d th e Part y leaders to enunciate a broad, toleran t concep t of Iris h nationality. 25 Th e 22 Redmon d Papers , Wals h to Redmond , December 3, 1905 . Irish Catholic, August 17 , 1907 . 23 Se e leading articl e in O'Brien' s mouthpiece, th e Cor\ Free Press, December 22 , ipio. 24 Nationa l Librar y o f Ireland , O'Brie n Papers , M S 8556/3 , T . M . Heal y to O'Brien , May 13 , 1910 . 25 Se e Redmond' s speec h a t Leed s conventio n o f Unite d Iris h Leagu e o f Great Britain , Irish Catholic, Jun e 13 , 1908 .

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independent Irelan d fo r whic h the y worke d woul d b e a natio n o f diverse creed s i n whic h th e traditio n o f Swift , Grattan , Davi s an d Parnell woul d b e a s highl y revere d a s tha t o f O'Neill , O'Connell , MacHale an d Davitt . Thoug h fe w nationalist s activel y engage d i n politics woul d hav e taken issu e wit h thi s definitio n o f Ireland , a ver y different nationalis t ideology wa s als o in circulatio n in thi s period . Fo r D. P . Moran , edito r o f Th e Leader, Irelan d wa s abov e al l a Catholi c country i n whic h Protestant s woul d b e mad e welcome , bu t onl y o n Catholics' terms. 2*' Th e Iris h Irelan d movemen t ( a ter m coine d b y Moran) cam e t o res t o n thi s ideological base , towar d whic h clergyme n were rathe r mor e sympatheti c than the y wer e towar d th e Iris h Party' s concept o f Iris h nationality . To b e sure , th e Gaeli c League , th e mos t broadly-based componen t o f Iris h Ireland , loudl y proclaime d it s non sectarian, non-politica l status , but fro m abou t 189 9 th e Leagu e move d in a directio n whic h mad e mos t Protestan t member s distinctl y uncomfortable an d precipitate d thei r withdrawal . Priest s vote d fo r th e Iris h Nationalist Party , but th e nationalism that capture d thei r affection s wa s to be found no t i n th e column s o f Hansard, bu t i n th e column s o f The Leader?1 Despit e occasiona l frictio n betwee n Iris h Irelan d an d th e Church, th e movement' s leaders , especiall y Dougla s Hyd e an d Eoi n MacNeill, wer e wel l suite d t o th e tas k o f maintainin g clerica l con fidence.-8 Moreover, afte r th e settlemen t of th e lan d question , languag e 26 See , e.g. , The Leader, Jul y 27 , 1901 : "I f a n Englis h Catholi c doe s no t like t o liv e i n a Protestan t environmen t le t hi m emigrate ; i f a non-Catholi c Nationalist Irishma n doe s no t lik e t o liv e i n a Catholi c atmospher e le t hi m turn Orangeman , becom e a discipl e o f Dr . Long , o r otherwis e giv e u p al l pretence t o bein g a n Iris h Nationalist . . . . W e ca n conceive , an d w e hav e ful l tolerance fo r a Paga n o r non-Catholi c Irishman , bu t h e mus t recognise , an d have respec t fo r th e poten t fact s tha t ar e boun d u p wit h Iris h Nationality. " 27 Arthu r E . Clery , "Th e Gaeli c League , 1893-1919, " Studies, VII I (Sep tember, 1919) , 401-403 . Se e als o Joh n Horgan , Parnell t o Pearse: Some Recollections an d Reflections (Dublin , 1948) , p. 307 . 28 See , e.g. , MacNeilP s lette r t o P . H . Pears e o n th e latter' s plan s fo r St . Enda's School : Nationa l Librar y o f Ireland , MacNeil l Papers , M S 10,883 , cop y of MacNeil l t o Pearse , Marc h 4 , 1908 . Th e MacNeil l Paper s wer e use d b y kin d permission o f Mrs . Eibhli n MacNeil l Tierney . O n Hyde' s relation s wit h th e Catholic clergy , se e Donal McCartney , "Hyde , D . P . Moran , an d Iris h Ireland, " in Leaders an d Me n o f th e Easter Rising: Dublin: 1916, ed . F . X . Martin , o.s.a. (Ithaca , N.Y., 1967) , p . 51 .

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revival had tende d to replace agrarian agitatio n a s the leadin g corporate secular activit y of th e rura l paris h wit h whic h th e paris h clerg y nat urally associate d themselves . Iris h Irelan d probabl y benefited fro m thi s circumstance i n muc h th e sam e wa y tha t th e Iris h Part y ha d earlie r profited fro m clerica l involvemen t i n th e lan d agitation . Nevertheless , though Iris h Irelan d di d includ e advocate s o f th e "Sin n Fein " policy of abstentio n fro m Parliament, the movement in general wa s not really unified behin d an y progra m fo r politica l action . A secon d nationalis t force outside th e Party's control, the Iris h Republica n Brotherhood , di d possess a well-define d politica l progra m but , becaus e o f th e Church' s explicit condemnation, wa s likewise not a real threa t t o the Iris h Party . Toward th e en d o f 1913 , however , th e growin g threa t o f Ulste r Protestant resistanc e to Hom e Rul e calle d fort h the Iris h Voluntee r movement — the firs t stag e i n a n ominou s coalitio n o f th e tw o nationalist movement s outsid e th e Party's control . When, in th e sprin g o f 1914, the Voluntee r movemen t bega n t o seem formidable, man y churchmen , thoug h no t th e Churc h a s a whole , responded accordin g t o th e traditiona l ecclesiastica l patter n o f aidin g the force s of constitutionalis m in th e fac e o f a "physical force " threat. 29 The outbrea k o f World Wa r I i n Augus t an d Redmond' s declaratio n of suppor t fo r th e wa r effort , however , altere d th e entir e politica l equation. T o b e sure , th e effect s o f th e alarme d ecclesiastica l reactio n to th e Voluntee r movemen t wer e stil l perceptibl e a s lat e a s th e en d of 1914, whe n th e polic e reporte d tha t "th e Catholi c Clerg y throughou t the countr y in genera l supporte d th e polic y o f th e Iris h Parliamentar y Party i n relation t o the wa r and recruiting. " 30 Initia l clerica l sympath y with th e wa r effort , however , decline d fairl y rapidly , as wa s illustrated when i t becam e clear , lat e i n 1915 , tha t no t enoug h Iris h priest s were volunteering t o serv e a s chaplain s t o th e forces. 31 I n contras t t o th e "general support" fo r th e wa r effor t note d a t th e en d o f 1914 , a police memorandum prepare d tw o week s before th e Easte r Risin g state d tha t 29 C.O . 904/93 , Jun e 1914 . 30 Chie f Secretary' s Office , Dubli n Castle , Intelligence Notes 1913-16, Preserved in the State Paper Office, ed. Breandan Mac Giolla Choille (Dublin, 1966), p. 119 . 31 Se e Cardina l Logue's appea l for chaplain s i n Irish Catholic, November 6 , 1915.

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"the R . C. Clergy a s a body are , on th e whol e lukewar m o n th e subjec t of recruiting. " 32 It wa s agains t thi s backgroun d o f growin g clerica l disillusionmen t with the Party's policy tha t th e coalition o f nationalist force s outside th e Party thrus t itsel f onc e more int o nationa l attentio n o n Easte r Monday , 1916. A s ther e ha d bee n tw o year s earlier , ther e wa s som e stron g ecclesiastical reactio n agains t th e physica l forc e movement , which , i t was argued , ha d mounte d a morall y an d theologicall y unjustifiabl e rebellion. Seve n prelate s spok e ou t agains t th e Risin g o n th e tw o Sundays followin g it s suppression . Th e majorit y o f th e bishop s re mained silent , perhaps waitin g to consult thei r colleague s a t the regula r June meetin g o f th e hierarchy . Tw o o f thos e wh o di d spea k urge d leniency towar d th e rebels , whil e Michae l Fogarty , Bisho p o f Killaloe , tempered hi s condemnation wit h a stron g note o f extenuation. 33 Ther e was no t eve n a hin t o f condemnation , however , i n th e reactio n o f Bishop O'Dwyer . I n a repl y (whic h wa s quickl y published ) t o a re quest fro m Genera l Maxwel l tha t h e disciplin e tw o priest s implicate d in Iris h Voluntee r activities , th e Bisho p o f Limeric k denounce d th e General i n unmeasure d terms. 34 In vie w o f th e ver y obviou s threa t o f violen t revolution , on e migh t have expecte d th e hierarch y t o ac t quickl y an d decisivel y to shor e u p the existin g constitutiona l movement . B y placin g hi s view s o n recor d in suc h an extrem e form , befor e the hierarch y had eve n had a n oppor tunity t o meet, however, O'Dwyer had gravel y complicate d th e already difficult proble m o f reaching a consensus among th e bishops . Moreover , in th e week s followin g th e Rising , th e Part y itsel f furthe r alienate d another sectio n o f th e hierarch y b y agreein g t o accep t a "temporary " settlement providing immediate Hom e Rule for the twenty-six southern counties. Tw o year s earlie r Redmon d ha d foun d a surprisin g willing ness among th e norther n bishop s t o accep t a simila r schem e for "tem32 Parliamentary Papers, 1916 , Vol . XI , Cd . 8311 , Roya l Commissio n o n the Rebellio n i n Ireland , "Minute s o f Evidenc e an d Appendi x o f Documents, " p. 58 . 33 Irish Catholic, Ma y 13 , Ma y 20 , 1916 . Joh n H . Whyte , "191 6 —Revolution an d Religion, " i n Leaders an d Men, ed . F. X . Martin, p . 221 . 34 Mainchi n Seoighe , "Limeric k an d th e Easte r Wee k Rising, " in Cuimnionn Luimneac (Limerick , [1966]) , pp . 43 , 45.

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porary" exclusion o f th e fou r countie s wit h clea r Unionis t majorities. 35 The ne w scheme , however, aroused episcopa l fears no t onl y by excluding a sizabl e territor y wit h a Catholi c majority , bu t als o b y spellin g out, rathe r mor e explicitl y tha n the 191 4 proposal , plan s for separat e government authoritie s t o administe r th e exclude d area . Suc h sugges tions immediatel y raise d th e specte r o f a Protestant-controlle d Educa tion Offic e i n Belfas t whic h migh t b e especiall y hostil e t o clerica l control o f Catholi c schools. 36 Unabl e t o obtai n an y suppor t fro m th e bishops of the area to be excluded, Redmond nevertheles s mobilized th e Party's organization t o secur e acceptance o f the proposal s b y a conven tion o f Nationalist s fro m th e si x norther n counties , onl y t o hav e th e entire schem e torpedoe d b y a spli t i n th e Unionis t camp . Th e Part y thereby forfeited much o f their standin g with th e norther n bishop s and permanently alienate d Charle s McHugh , th e politicall y activ e Bisho p of Derry , wh o ha d previousl y bee n quit e friendl y towar d th e Party . Moreover, the y los t a golde n opportunit y t o regai n th e suppor t o f Logue, whose dislik e of the Iris h Party wa s matched onl y b y his terror of arme d revolution . Th e Jun e meetin g o f th e hierarch y produce d n o public resolution s o f an y moment . Whe n th e hierarch y me t again i n October, i t reportedl y debate d a grou p o f resolution s opposin g con scription an d th e continuanc e o f martia l la w i n Irelan d bu t endorsin g "the constitutional , a s opposed t o th e physica l force, movement. " Th e resolutions wer e droppe d afte r a segmen t o f th e hierarchy , including McHugh, Logue, Walsh an d O'Dwyer, objected that such action migh t imply "satisfactio n wit h an d approva l of , th e policy , an d cours e o f action, o f the Iris h Party. " 37 During th e yea r followin g th e Rising , whic h th e pres s dubbe d th e "Sinn Fei n Rebellion, " a shif t o f opinio n i n th e rebel' s favo r resulte d in th e reviva l of th e ter m "Sin n Fein " t o cove r almos t an y specie s of nationalist disenchantmen t wit h th e Iris h Party . I n September , 1916 , O'Dwyer, deprecating the Party's faith in th e Liberals, proclaime d himself a Sinn Feiner.38 By-election victories by two "Sinn Fein" candidates 35 Redmon d Papers , Devli n t o Redmond , Marc h 5 , Marc h 6 , "Saturday " [March 7] , 1914 . D . Gwynn , Redmond, p . 270 . 36 Se e letter from Bisho p McHugh, Irish Weekly Independent, Jun e 24 , 1916 . 37 Ibid., Octobe r 28 , 1916 . O'Brie n Papers , M S 8556/11 , T . M . Heal y t o O'Brien, Octobe r 17 , 1916 . I a m indebte d t o Mr . Joh n Whyt e fo r callin g th e item i n th e Weekly Independent t o m y attention . 38 Letters o f th e Late Bishop O'Dwyer (n.p. , n.d.) .

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in early 1917 demonstrated not onl y the waning popularity of the Party, but th e growin g willingnes s o f younge r clergyme n t o associat e themselves wit h th e ill-define d ne w politica l forc e eve n t o th e poin t o f defying thei r ecclesiastica l superiors. Th e hierarch y desperately needed a clear policy for dealin g with th e rapidly-changin g pattern o f political events but wa s paralyzed by divisions which had their roots in pre-War episcopal attitudes . A t thei r June , 1917 , meeting , th e hierarch y di d agree upo n a stopga p polic y i n th e for m o f a n "instruction " t o thei r clergy, which , beyon d som e platitude s abou t vaguely-define d nationa l dangers, onl y restate d standin g regulation s governing political activity by priests. 39 Som e bishops perhap s hope d tha t th e Iris h Convention , t o which the y nominated fou r delegate s a t this meeting, might solv e thei r difficulties b y agreein g upo n a n Iris h settlement . O'Donnell , wh o i n effect le d the delegation, found scope in that assembl y for his leadership talents whic h ha d lon g bee n thwarte d withi n th e hierarchy. 40 Th e episcopal delegates , b y consistent oppositio n t o an y for m o f autonom y for Ulste r which might lea d to Protestant contro l o f Catholic educatio n in th e North , foreclosed th e onl y avenu e of compromis e i n whic h th e Ulster delegate s wer e interested . Th e Bisho p o f Rapho e presse d fo r a report demandin g muc h fulle r fisca l autonom y fo r Irelan d tha n ha d been contemplate d i n th e 191 4 Hom e Rul e Act . Whe n th e Souther n Unionists offere d a compromis e fisca l scheme , whic h Redmon d wa s inclined t o accept in hope s of forcing the Government' s hand , O'Don nell dramaticall y broke with th e part y leader , who , hi s healt h rapidly failing, retire d fro m th e Convention' s deliberations . Th e Bisho p o f Raphoe, who moved easil y into leadershi p o f the Nationalis t delegates , had virtuall y abandoned hop e o f reaching a n immediate settlemen t bu t did hop e to commi t th e Part y an d it s followers to a n extrem e enoug h position t o render th e constitutiona l movemen t a viabl e competito r i n Irish politic s onc e again . I n thi s hop e h e wa s disappointed , fo r a number of Nationalist delegates refuse d to endorse the extreme position and vote d with th e Souther n Unionists fo r a compromis e program . 39 Irish Catholic, July 7 , 1917 . 40 Th e fulles t genera l narrativ e o f th e Conventio n i s [Si r Horac e Plunkett] , "The Iris h Convention : Confidentia l Repor t t o Hi s Majest y th e Kin g b y th e Chairman," a cop y o f whic h i s availabl e i n Plunkett' s paper s a t th e Horac e Plunkett Foundatio n fo r Co-operativ e Studies , London . Othe r materia l i s con tained i n Parliamentary Papers, 1918 , Vol . X , Cd . 9019 , "Repor t o f th e Pro -

The Roman Catholic Church inlreland: 1898-1918 20

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The Conventio n adjourne d i n March , 1918 , withou t providin g th e hierarchy wit h a new basi s for formulatin g a n effectiv e policy . Despit e several by-electio n defeats , Sinn Fei n wa s becomin g mor e an d mor e formidable, an d th e June "instruction" ha d prove d practically valueless in assertin g episcopal control over the younge r clergy , who wer e flocking t o th e Sin n Fei n standard . "Sin n Fein, " however , remaine d a n ambiguous phenomenon. Alongsid e members of the I.R.B., it contained many youn g men whos e political educatio n i n th e Iris h Irelan d move ment ha d b y n o mean s alienate d the m fro m th e Church . Thoug h popularly associate d wit h rebellio n — past an d futur e — in th e presen t it wa s engage d i n th e unexceptionabl y "constitutional " activit y o f winning election s an d i t coul d poin t t o a n ideolog y purportin g t o b e non-violent. B y early 191 8 i t wa s becomin g quit e eas y fo r churchme n to persuad e themselve s tha t Sin n Fei n wa s no t th e kin d o f revolu tionary movement upon whic h the theology textbooks had taugh t the m to pronounc e anathema . Thoug h man y ecclesiastics , o f course , con tinued t o prefer th e Irish Party, the Churc h a t las t had a n opportunity to resolve its fundamental problem . The occasio n fo r seizin g thi s opportunit y wa s th e Governmen t pro posal, in April, to extend conscription to Ireland. The episcopal Standin g Committee immediatel y denounce d th e measure, and o n the followin g Sunday th e administrato r o f Cardina l Logue' s cathedra l paris h an nounced a series of demonstrations agains t Conscription. A nationwide anti-conscription movement with episcopal blessing and ver y prominent clerical participation wa s quickly organized.41 By choosing t o act on th e conscription issue , th e bishop s avoide d th e kin d o f difficultie s whic h had resulte d in th e i88o' s from Britis h government overtures at Rome . The Hol y Se e was, of course, not anxiou s to compromis e it s neutrality by intervention in such a delicate matter.42 The anti-conscriptio n movement embraced both Sinn Fein an d th e Iris h Party — a fac t whic h was crucial to the hierarchy's new-found consensus. From thi s time until the ceedings o f th e Iris h Convention" ; Stephe n Gwynn , John Redmond's Last Years (London, 1919) ; D . Gwynn , Redmond; an d Horgan , Parnell to Pearse. 41 Irish Catholic, April 13 , Apri l 20 , 1018 . Warr e B . Wells an d N . Marlowe , The Irish Convention an d Sinn Fein (Ne w York , n.d.) , pp . 147-151 . Doroth y Macardle, Th e Irish Republic, is t Am . ed. , (Ne w York , 1965) , pp . 249-251 . 42 Se e Public Recor d Office , London , P.O . 380/17/201 , Balfou r t o Coun t d e Salis, May 20, 1918 ; P.O . 380/18/272 , Cardina l Gasparr i t o d e Salis , Jul y 9 , 1918 .

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general election in December, churchmen tried in vai n to bring about a more genera l unio n o f nationalis t forces . Afte r d e Valer a ha d bee n received, along wit h Dillon, b y the hierarchy at Maynooth, however, no one coul d plac e upo n Sin n Fei n th e stigm a o f theologica l unacceptability whic h wa s associate d with mos t form s o f rebellion . B y th e tim e of th e genera l electio n n o bishop used term s stronge r tha n "unwise " or "impracticable" t o describe Sinn Fein , and i n expressin g hi s preference for th e Iris h Party's polic y of "non-abstention fro m Parliament " Arch bishop Gilmarti n o f Tuam noted , significantly , that ther e wer e "goo d Irishmen an d goo d Catholics " o n eac h side. 43 Onl y i n a fe w easter n constituencies an d i n Dr . O'Donnell' s dioces e o f Rapho e di d Iris h Party candidate s receiv e concerte d clerica l support . Elsewher e a fe w priests clung t o their ol d allegiance to th e Party , bu t i n genera l i t wa s clear durin g th e electio n tha t Sin n Fei n ha d wo n th e suppor t o r acquiescence o f mos t o f th e clergy . The inabilit y of the hierarchy to formulate a coherent policy for deal ing wit h nationalis t politic s i n th e wak e o f th e Easte r Risin g wa s a chronic, rather than a n acute , condition. Sinc e th e earl y 1890*5 , the out lines o f suc h a policy ha d emerge d onl y briefly , in 1905 , and afte r th e formation o f th e Libera l allianc e th e hierarch y wa s unabl e t o unit e behind leadershi p which might carry this or any alternative policy int o effect. Bot h Wals h an d Logu e held stron g politica l view s whic h wer e out o f harmon y wit h thos e o f th e averag e prelate , an d neithe r wa s prepared to turn ove r political leadership to O'Donnell, the only bisho p whose practica l abilitie s rivale d thos e o f Walsh . Lackin g a workin g relationship with the Party and paralyzed by the dissent of a handful of prelates, therefore , th e hierarch y di d nothin g i n 191 6 rathe r tha n ac t upon thei r onl y othe r rea l optio n — some for m o f condemnatio n o f violent revolution . B y thwartin g unite d actio n i n 1916 , the episcopa l dissidents wer e givin g th e revolutionary movemen t tim e t o reconstruct and redefin e itself i n suc h a way that by 191 8 ecclesiastics had th e addi tional optio n o f treating i t a s a constitutional movement. Th e primar y achievement of the Churc h in thi s period, therefore , was not a decisive redirection o f the cours e of political events such as had bee n attempte d in 1891 . B y forcing th e hierarch y to limi t it s goals , a minorit y o f th e bishops was compelling the Churc h t o accept a more realistic role tha n 43 Irish Independent, November 28, 1918.

The Roman Catholic Church in Ireland: 1898-1918 203 that whic h i t ha d trie d t o pla y i n th e earl y iSpo's . Th e achievement s gained b y acceptin g thi s rol e i n 191 8 wer e fa r fro m insubstantial . B y acting a s i t did , th e Churc h entere d th e revolutionar y period , 1919 1923, passively , i f no t actively , associated wit h th e revolutionar y cause. If thi s had no t bee n th e case , the Churc h migh t wel l hav e suffere d ver y serious repercussion s i n post-revolutionar y Ireland . Th e bishop s ha d taken a strong positio n fro m whic h t o preserv e the Church' s influenc e in Iris h society .

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J.S. MIL L AND THE IRIS H QUESTION: REFORM, AND THE INTEGRIT Y OF TH E EMPIRE , 1865-1870 E.D. STEELE i THE first part of this stud y o f Mill sough t t o show how much les s radical he was on the subjec t o f Irish lan d reform tha n i s often supposed. 1 In th e earlier editions o f th e Principles o f Political Economy fro m 184 8 to 185 7 ther e wer e passages which constitute d a terrible indictmen t o f landlordism, an d insiste d on the nee d fo r legislation to conver t th e tenan t farmer s into joint owner s of their holdings : bu t i n anothe r passag e thi s hars h criticis m was substantiall y withdrawn, and the demand for fixity of tenure effectively retracted . Althoug h they continued t o reproduce th e criticis m an d the cal l for a drastic measure , the edition s o f 1862 and 186 5 were more moderate still in their conclusions o n Irish land. With th e progress of the changes in the economy and society set in motion b y the Grea t Famine , Mil l became more strongly convinced tha t th e country should b e left t o evolve slowly under th e existin g law of tenure, onl y slightly amended . On e canno t imagin e Mil l saying , ' tenant-right... is equivalent to landlords' wrong' :2 but he and Palmerston wer e none the less in nearly complet e agreemen t b y 186 5 o n th e degre e o f laissez-fair e tha t wa s desirable i n Ireland . Fo r al l his stricture s upo n aristocrati c misgovernmen t and middle-clas s prejudice , Mil l wa s to o war m a n admire r o f Britis h in stitutions to want to undermine their social basis over a wide area of the Unite d Kingdom. The secon d part of this study deals with his action and his motives, in briefl y advocating , withou t an y reservation s thi s time , th e revolutionar y land legislatio n fro m whic h h e ha d alway s previousl y shrunk , despit e hi s brave words written fo r th e earlie r editions of the Principles. In Octobe r 186 5 Mil l wa s returne d t o Parliamen t fo r Westminster , th e most notabl e radica l succes s o f that genera l election. Betwee n then an d th e appearance of England and Ireland in 1868 , hi s thinking on Iris h lan d under went littl e change , s o tha t peopl e wer e quit e unprepare d fo r th e shoc k h e administered i n the pamphlet. At the same time he evinced a degree of insight into the natur e of Irish unrest which reflected events since he wrote Considerations on Representative Government (1861). These three years, 1865-8 , saw the Fenians' greates t activit y in Irelan d an d i n Britain , an d th e passin g o f th e Second Refor m Bill . Parliamentary reform and th e popula r feelin g i t genera ted arouse d hope s among militant radicals of eroding the powe r of the rulin g 1 Thi s paragraph i s a summary of the article ' J. S. Mill and the Irish Question: The Principles o f Political Economy , 1848-1865 ' i n Historical Journal, xii (1969). 2 Lor d Palmersto n i n House of Commons Debates, 27 Februar y 1865 .

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landed class in other ways . These hopes di d not take any very definite shape , but they contributed t o the profound uneasiness felt by many of the propertied classes, and not merely by the landed, when they contemplate d their possibl e future unde r th e ne w dispensation . Fenianis m wa s reall y a revolutionar y movement, wit h the eliminatio n of alien landlords high amon g its objectives. There existe d a genuin e fea r tha t th e Fenian s an d Britis h working-clas s radicalism were associated in planning to overthrow the established order in all its aspects. 3 Ther e was , mor e reasonably , anxiet y les t th e growin g political consciousness o f the lowe r classe s shoul d b e turne d agains t th e landlord s of Britain by their sympathy with the grievances of the Iris h tenantry, for which the Fenia n outbrea k ha d secure d increase d publicity. 4 Emboldene d b y th e current optimism o f progressives, Mil l sought t o exploit these apprehension s when h e wrot e England and Ireland. He tol d J . E. Cairnes a t th e beginnin g of 186 6 tha t h e wa s 'disposed ' t o support a measure securing compensation t o Iris h tenant s fo r their improve ments, whic h shoul d b e draw n t o giv e the m a ver y wid e clai m agains t th e landlords.5 I n th e sixt h editio n o f the Principles h e had no t trouble d t o con sider wha t kin d o f basi s suc h legislatio n ough t t o have . Tha t h e wa s bein g forced t o revis e his outlook on the Iris h questio n emerge d ver y clearly a few weeks later . Hi s speec h o f Februar y i n th e Hous e o f Common s o n th e sus pension of Habeas Corpus in Irelan d migh t fairl y hav e been regarded a s selfcriticism, althoug h i t certainl y di d no t hav e tha t sound . 'W e wer e present' , said Mill,' at the collapsing of a great delusion. England had for a considerable number o f years been flattering itself tha t th e Iris h peopl e had com e to thei r senses; tha t the y ha d go t Catholi c Emancipatio n an d th e Incumbere d Estates Bill , whic h wer e th e onl y thing s the y coul d possibl y want ; an d ha d become awar e that a nation coul d no t hav e anythin g t o complai n o f when i t was under such beneficent rulers... '6 He would not say so, but he had shared, almost t o th e full , th e superficialit y an d complacenc y whic h h e wa s no w censuring. Not only in the latest edition of the Principles] the Considerations on Representative Government containe d a passag e a t whic h th e remark s jus t quoted migh t hav e been directl y aimed . No Irishman [he had written in 1861 ] is now less free than an Anglo-Saxon, nor has a less share of every benefit either to his country or to his individual fortunes, than if he wer e sprung from an y other portion of the Britis h dominions.. . There i s now 3 A n example of this apprehension in official circles : Lord Strathnairn , Commander of the Forces i n Ireland , discusse d th e possibilit y o f suc h a n alliance,i n a lette r t o th e Duk e o f Cambridge, C.-in-C. , Ros e Papers (B.M . Add . MSS . 42824) , 2 0 October 1867 . 4 Eve n befor e Fenianis m capture d th e attentio n o f this country, W. E. Forster, one o f th e leading representative s o f a mor e advance d radicalis m tha n Joh n Bright's , issue d a warnin g that the continue d denial of agrarian reform t o Ireland would have the effect o f turning public opinion agains t th e positio n o f th e lande d clas s i n England . House o f Commons Debates, 31 Marc h 1865 . 5 Mill-Taylo r Collection, British Library of Political and Economic Science, (vol. LV) , Mill to Cairnes , 6 January 1866 . 6 House o f Commons Debates, 1 7 February 7 1866 .

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next to nothing, except the memory of the past, and the differenc e i n the predominant religion , t o kee p apar t [the ] two races... The consciousnes s of being a t las t treated no t onl y with equal justice bu t wit h equal consideration, i s making such rapid way in the Irish nation, as to be wearing off all feelings that could make them insensible t o th e benefit s which.. . must necessaril y deriv e fro m bein g fellow citizens. . .7 While Mil l deride d th e attitud e toward s Irelan d whic h ha d seldo m re ceived suc h confiden t expressio n a s in these words o f his, h e had , the n an d for som e tim e afterwards , nothing reall y constructiv e t o offe r i n it s place . He tol d th e Hous e that foreig n opinio n woul d fro m no w on se e Irelan d a s restrained b y 'brute force'. Th e descriptio n o f British methods elicite d crie s of disapproval from Members, an d he at once denied tha t he himself believed it t o b e justified. Next, however , he compare d Grea t Britai n and Irelan d t o the perpetrato r an d subject , respectively , o f a flogging . Th e punishmen t might occasionall y b e necessar y bu t h e asserte d tha t ' when an y man.. . needed th e instrumen t o f floggin g to maintai n hi s authority—tha t ma n de served flogging as much as any of those who were flogged by his orders'. Th e severity o f this wa s weakened by hi s immediatel y addin g that h e woul d no t vote against the Bil l before the House , sinc e the governmen t had n o alterna tive ope n t o it , an d b y his acquittin g minister s o f responsibility not onl y for 'the misgovernmen t o f centuries ' bu t als o 'th e neglec t o f hal f a century ' which he had newly discovered. He ended with the hope that when the Fenia n threat had been overcome,' "We don't d o it in England"' would not counter every suggestion of reform fo r Ireland. 8 It wa s soo n eviden t ho w littl e Mil l ha d t o suggest . Hi s hostilit y t o th e educational concession s wante d b y th e Catholi c Churc h i n Irelan d wa s determined. I n Ma y h e explaine d hi s conceptio n o f agraria n policy in thi s challenging situation when speaking on the extremely mild tenants' compensa tion bill devised by the second Russell ministry, which did not get beyond the second reading . I t was , in effect , a permissive measure : t o reverse , prospec tively, an d in the absence o f written agreement t o the contrary, th e presumption of law as to the propert y in improvements. N o ministerial land bill since the modes t an d half-hearte d serie s commence d i n 184 5 ha d bee n quit e s o careful o f landlor d rights , an d quit e s o patentl y a n empt y gesture. 9 Mil l nevertheless greeted it with resoundin g praise: ' It was in an auspicious hour for th e futurit y o f Ireland, and of the Empire of which Ireland is so important a part , tha t a Britis h Administratio n ha s introduce d thi s Bill.. . nothing... any Government has yet done. .. not even Catholi c Emancipatio n itself—ha s shown s o true a comprehension o f Ireland's needs... ' Coming fro m Mill , no t fro m som e hanger-o n o f the ministry's , thi s was 7 J . S . Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, Everyman's Librar y edn. (1954), p. 365 ; hereafter cite d a s Considerations. 8 House o f Commons Debates, 17 Februar y 1866 . 9 Se e the comments of J. E. C.[airnes] in The Economist, 12 May 1866, ' The Irish Land Bill'.

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preposterous; except o n the assumptio n tha t th e bil l wa s the precurso r o f a stronger measure . Thoug h at first his arguments di d appea r to point i n that direction, h e mad e n o suc h assumption . Th e speec h seeme d positivel y t o exclude further legislatio n i n the tenant' s interest . Mil l reminde d the Hous e of what was familiar to students of the Principles, that Ireland in respect of her small farms and her popular desire for a more permanent tenure conformed to the practic e and opinion of those countrie s wher e the occupie r was neither a serf no r a proprieto r i n th e fulles t sense ; whil e th e lik e o f Britain' s lan d system di d not prevail i n any other country . ' If we are making rules fo r the common case, ' h e asked , 'is i t reasonabl e t o dra w our precedent s fro m th e exceptional one?' Fixit y of tenure, he insisted , was indispensable if the Iris h tenant-farmers wer e to prosper. Then he suddenly change d th e tenor of his speech; continuing: 'Do I therefore ask you to establish.. .fixity of tenure as the rule.. . in Irelan d ? Certainly not . I t i s perhaps a sufficient reaso n that I know you will not do it; but I am also aware that what may be very wholesome when it grows up as a custom... would not necessarily have the same succes s if, withou t ever having existed a s a custom, it were... enforced as a law.' Mil l told Member s that he regarded their wish to introduce the English structur e of landholding in Ireland as 'very disputable' but added: 'I accept this is the thing you have got to do, and assuming it to be desirable, I ask how is it to be brought about?'. There wa s only on e wa y of proceeding: t o hel p th e mos t enterprisin g of Ireland's smal l tenants t o gro w into substantia l farmer s of the Britis h type . 'You cannot evict a whole nation,' he commented, 'the country would be too hot to hold you and your new tenants if you attempted it.' The bil l under con sideration would give the tenants a vested interest in betterment, fosterin g the mutual confidence betwee n landlord and tenant that wa s the natural thing in Britain but wa s conspicuously absen t i n Ireland. Mill ha d more to say about this lac k of confidence. On the on e hand, h e said that ' one-half o f the land lords, or some other proportio n o f them d o not deserv e confidence' . O n th e other hand, he remarked that the fact of large savings by Irish tenant-farmer s in recen t year s di d somethin g t o clea r thei r landlord s o f th e charg e o f extortion levelled against them . H e conceded tha t a t any rate ' a much greater number.. .than ha s often bee n suppose d ar e neither greed y no r grasping' . The bill' s machiner y o f adjudicatio n upo n dispute d case s woul d enabl e trust t o for m betwee n th e tw o classes . Par t o f th e speec h wa s devote d t o refuting th e complain t tha t transfe r o f propert y i n improvement s wa s a violation o f right . Th e theor y o f right s ove r lan d se t ou t i n th e Principles was restated. Stressing the bill's very great moderation, its acceptability to the Irish Libera l M.P.s wh o spoke for the tenantry , and its value as an earnest of Britain's goodwill ; h e conclude d b y exhortin g th e Hous e t o ris e abov e it s ingrained prejudic e agains t touching property. 10 10

House o f Commons Debates, 1 7 Ma y 1866 .

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Despite the tone of much of it, the aspersion s i t cast on the landlords , and its recognitio n o f peasant discontent , Mill' s speech di d no t reall y represen t any significant advanc e on the Principles o f 1865 , either in his understanding of th e Iris h lan d questio n o r i n hi s conclusion s abou t th e polic y whic h h e thought Britain should pursue with regard to it. The fact that there were many tenants who m h e anticipate d woul d becom e larg e farmer s wit h onl y th e minimal help , an d tha t chiefl y psychological , afforded b y th e government' s land bill , showe d that h e believed th e ' misery' of which he had spoken to be far fro m universal , and testifie d to hi s underlyin g confidence i n th e Britis h land syste m a s a goal, o n a realistic plane , o f economic an d socia l progress , Like mos t o f his countrymen , Mil l remaine d blind t o th e convictio n of th e Irish tenan t tha t h e wa s something mor e tha n a tenant. Th e speec h mad e little impression on the House . Th e press , which saw the bill for what it was, deemed hi s theoretical excursio n o n the natur e an d scop e o f property-right s an unusua l and interesting contributio n t o th e debat e in the Commons , bu t not one that improve d th e measure's unfavourabl e prospects.11 What is significant about this speech is that it showed no diminution of the new-found awarenes s o f Iris h nationalit y whic h Mil l ha d displaye d whe n speaking o n th e suspensio n o f Habea s Corpus . I n hi s openin g word s o f extravagant commendatio n fo r the mildes t o f government lan d bills , h e ha d referred t o the importanc e of Ireland in the Empire . That reference explains the hyperbole. Mil l was most anxiou s that Parliament shoul d demonstrat e t o the Irish people its readiness' to legislate... according to Irish exigencies and no longer accordin g t o Englis h routine'. 12 To Mill , a s to othe r politicians—h e acknowledged the lead recently given by Gladstone—this was the condition of Anglo-Irish reconciliation . Th e hollownes s o f the bil l di d no t matter : th e legislative gestur e wa s everything . Nex t yea r hi s concer n tha t governmen t should hav e the intelligenc e t o b e tender o f Irish sentimen t joine d wit h hi s genuine sympathy for brave and sincere men when he was prominent among those who pressed for clemency to captured Fenians . H e made great and suc cessful publi c effort s t o preven t i n th e cas e o f th e leader s o f th e abortiv e rising of 1867, what he called in a letter t o Cairnes 'the gross blunder a s well as crime of shedding the bloo d of Fenian prisoners'.13 He spok e of them to a packed meeting o n Parliamentary reform—no t a n audience to appreciate th e reservation in his careful wording — as ' men who have been driven desperate by th e continuanc e o f wha t the y thin k mis-government...'. 14 No t lon g afterwards, h e was at pain s to emphasiz e in th e Hous e o f Commons that h e considered th e Fenians ' activitie s ' greatly culpable , because . .. contrary t o the genera l interests o f society and o f their country' . A statement worthy of 11

E.g . th e comments of the Saturday Review, 26 May 1866, 'The Irish Tenure Bill'. House o f Commons Debates, 17 Ma y 1866 . 13 Mill-Taylo r Collectio n (vol . LV) , Mil l t o Cairnes , 2 6 Ma y 1867 ; M . S t J . Packe , Th e Life o f John Stuart Mill (London , 1954) , pp. 462-4 . 14 Ibid . pp. 463-4 12

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the most fervent British patriot, typica l of much less sophisticated minds in its identification o f the nationa l cause with what was best fo r humanity . H e ye t pleaded that th e Fenians ha d shown themselves ' certainly not... likely to be guilty o f ordinar y crim e an d vice—rather.. . capable o f heroi c action s an d lofty virtue'. 15 However myopi c he ha d onc e been, Mil l no w took Iris h nationalism very seriously indeed . B y contrast, hi s contemporarie s wer e still widel y prone t o think of it as a menace, no doubt, but wantin g the moral and political force of Continental nationalism. The y were even capable o f believing th e Fenian s t o be adventurer s an d criminal s wh o ha d suborne d th e poores t an d leas t re sponsible element s o f th e population . Mill' s defenc e o f th e revolutionarie s from thes e imputation s bespoke his grasp of Britain's difficult y i n Ireland . I t was only a matter o f time before he perceived tha t the struggle betwee n land lord an d tenan t wa s not just somethin g whic h th e nationalist s coul d exploit but a n integral part, perhaps the most important part, of popular resistance to the fusio n o f the tw o countries . Th e Britis h pres s was , o f course , generally hostile t o Irish aspirations bu t gav e them a great dea l of publicity. The lan d question receive d a lot of attention bu t it s real character did not emerg e at all clearly from th e protracte d discussio n whic h was severely limited b y th e ig norance o f Irish realitie s and b y th e editoria l tendency t o pas s over fixity of tenure a s a n impossibility , an d concentrat e o n subsidiar y issue s lik e com pensation fo r tenants' improvement s an d the substitution o f written contract s for parol e tenancies. 16 Whil e th e Iris h peasant s ha d considerabl e sympath y for Fenianism , the y displaye d ver y littl e inclinatio n t o tak e up arms . The y responded i n their own way to the excitement stirred up by the Fenians. Like the Continenta l peasant s i n 1848 , the y sa w a chanc e o f furtherin g thei r traditional hope , but di d not wan t to fight for the abstraction s o f the revolu tionaries. ' They ar e no t loyal—bu t the y ar e no t Fenians.. . They... care little fo r anythin g bu t th e land' , wrot e Lor d Naas , Iris h secretar y i n th e Derby-Disraeli ministry. 17 Th e deman d fo r fixity of tenure i n on e for m o r another wa s voiced more loudly than for many years past, encouraged by th e conciliatory postures of the outgoing Liberal cabinet and viceroy.' Fortescue's Land Bil l and Kimberley' s las t speec h hav e don e a n enormou s amoun t o f mischief—Naas reporte d soo n afte r takin g offic e 'an d eve n th e mos t re spectable amon g the farmin g class openly avow that tenan t Compensatio n is all humbug, an d 3 1 years' lease s at low rents are what they must extrac t from the landlords'.18 The twofold danger was that the agrarian unrest would grow 15

House o f Commons Debates, 1 4 June 1867 . Underlyin g this tendency wa s the assumption voice d by The Times, i May 1867:'.. . the Englishman's vie w of the question i s that which must prevail in the end , whateve r temporar y and partial expedients may be applied'. 17 May o Papers, National Library o f Ireland (M S 11 , 144), Naas to Lord Derby, 2 3 Decem ber 1866 . 18 Derby Papers, Cnris t Church , Oxfor d (Box 155/3), Naas to Lord Derby, 1 5 August 1866 . 18

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in the unsettle d atmospher e of Ireland; and tha t the Fenian s woul d succeed where they had hitherto failed i n harnessing this agitation to theirs. I n Britain The Spectator, a journal whic h admire d Mil l an d reflecte d his influence, had for some time been arguing the politica l case for fixity of tenure on the analogy of Britis h India , maintaining that ' now in Ireland , a s a hundred year s ago in Bengal, th e secre t o f order wil l b e foun d i n a Perpetual Settlement'. 19 Th e paper's championshi p o f this policy was well known, and Mill must have been aware that he was following in its footsteps when he wrote England and Ireland. Thomas Hughes, another o f the tiny ban d o f advanced radical M.P.s, echoe d The Spectator an d anticipated Mill in a speech of December 1867 which elicited a sharply critical reaction. For Hughe s was a respected figure, social reforme r and philanthropis t a s wel l a s autho r o f a n influentia l classi c o f moralizing fiction; a man whos e pronouncements carried mor e weight than did thos e of The Spectator wit h its rathe r consciously literary and intellectua l appeal.20 Mill wrote his pamphle t i n th e las t month s o f 1867 . H e mus t hav e had in mind th e Fenians ' lates t strok e an d it s aftermath . I n Septembe r a grou p effected th e audaciou s rescu e o f two capture d leader s in th e hear t o f Man chester. Th e incident , th e tria l of some of the rescuers , an d th e executio n of three o f the m fo r killin g one o f th e liberate d men' s polic e escort, ha d pro found repercussion s in Irelan d wher e thos e hange d wer e remembere d a s the 'Manchester Martyrs' . I t wa s demonstrate d ho w ver y fa r Fenianis m wa s from having suffered a fatal blow when its botched risin g evoked little popula r response an d collapse d i n Februar y an d Marc h o f tha t year . A s Mil l ha d foreseen earlie r i n th e summer , th e acquisitio n o f political martyr s gav e th e movement fresh impetus . I t was against this background that he composed his pamphlet. Befor e h e ha d finishe d i t ove r twent y peopl e die d i n December , when the Fenian s trie d t o blow up th e wal l of Clerkenwell Gaol, in a thickly populated district o f London, i n a bid t o free on e of their chiefs. There was a tremendous outburs t o f alar m an d rag e fro m al l classe s i n Britain. 21 Mil l related i n hi s Autobiography, composed i n th e 18703 , tha t whe n h e wrote , ' there were few who did not feel that if there was still any chance of reconciling Ireland t o th e Britis h connexion , it coul d onl y b e b y th e adoptio n o f much more thoroug h reform s i n th e territoria l and socia l relation s o f the countr y than ha d yet bee n contemplated'. 22 Manchester an d Clerkenwel l had a great 19

Th e Spectator, 9 March 1867 , 'The Insurrection in Ireland'. Ther e is a short stud y o f Hughes i n Asa Briggs, Victorian People (London, 1954) , ch. vi; it make s no referenc e to thi s speech , whic h attracte d considerabl e notice . Hughe s receive d a notable rebuk e fro m Th e Times, 23 December 1867 . 21 Papers relating to Foreign Affairs accompanying th e Annual Message o f th e President t o Congress, 1868 , pt . I , p . 130 . Charle s Franci s Adams , U.S . Ministe r i n Grea t Britain , t o William H . Seward , Secretar y o f State , 2 4 Decembe r 1867 . Adam s observed : 'I t ma y b e doubted whethe r a t an y time since the discovery of the scheme of Guy Fawkes there has been so much o f panic spread . . . throughout thi s communit y a s at this time.. . I thin k i t woul d now b e ver y unsaf e fo r Irishme n t o attemp t t o hol d a meeting for any purpose in an y grea t town i n England. ' 22 J . S . Mill, Autobiography, World's Classic s edn. (1955) , p . 249. 20

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deal to do with that mood; which he exaggerated, however, both at the time and in retrospect. Concession s t o Ireland ha d alway s run u p against the difficult y that they were not popular in this country, although politicians and newspapers might agree that they were necessary and just. This general feeling was naturally intensified fo r some littl e whil e by the Fenians ' spectacula r violenc e in their midst. Tw o month s afte r th e Clerkenwel l explosion wa s not the mos t auspi cious moment for Mill to launch his pamphlet, and in it to remind the public that ' Repressed b y forc e i n Ireland.. . the rebellio n visit s u s i n ou r own homes, scattering death amon g those who have given no provocation bu t tha t of bein g English-born'. 23 Mill linked the absolute necessity of concession to Ireland with the political situation in Britain, as he pictured it , created by and to be anticipated fro m th e future developmen t of the changes of the last three years. During the struggle over Parliamentary reform som e nervous an d resentfu l conservatives had accuse.d him of being associated wit h the Refor m League in its extreme courses , real and supposed: whereas in fact h e had exercised a restraining influence on that bod y a t a critica l juncture, an d ha d maintaine d a distinctiv e position throughout.24 His enthusias m for the extensio n of the franchis e was offset by insistence tha t th e eventua l realizatio n of universa l suffrage , o f whic h h e termed himself'a strenuous advocate', must be accompanied by checks on the dominance of the majority that were more popular with his political opponents than with other advanced radicals.25 He thus adhered to the line he had taken in hi s Thoughts o n Parliamentary Reform o f 185 9 and i n th e Considerations on Representative Government. The severes t censure s h e had attracte d sinc e en tering Parliamen t resulted fro m hi s leading par t i n the attemp t t o secure the conviction o f E. J. Eyre in th e Englis h court s fo r hi s action s a s Governor of Jamaica in putting down the Negro rebellion of 1865 on the island. Too much has perhaps been made of this episode b y those wh o would see Mill i n thei r own image . His condemnatio n o f Governor Eyre was not a condemnation of empire, bu t o f its abuse . A goo d man y people who wer e not radical s a t al l agreed wit h th e substanc e o f the charge s brough t b y Mil l an d th e Jamaic a Committee agains t Eyre, while they did not think the circumstances justified a criminal prosecution. 26 It cam e a s a rude shoc k whe n Mil l declared tha t 'the rising power i n our affairs, th e democrac y of Great Britain ' would no t tolerate a n Iris h polic y i n 23

J . S . Mill, England and Ireland (London, 1868) , p. 6 . M . S t J. Packe, op. cit . pp . 457-62. 25 Se e the speeche s o f Mill an d Si r Joh n Pakingto n i n House o f Commons Debates, 31 Ma y 1866. 26 H . S . R. Elliot (ed.), Th e Letters of John Stuart Mill, 2 vols (London, 1910) ; n, 68, Mil l to David Urquhart, 4 October 1866: '. . . you see', he wrote,' that I am not. . . standing up for the negroes, or for liberty, deeply as both ar e interested i n the subject—but fo r the first necessity o f human society , law'. B. Semmel, Th e Governor Eyre Controversy (London , 1962) , pp . 178-9 eulogizes 'John Stuart Mill and his comrades' from the standpoint o f a mid-twentieth century liberal . 24

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which step s t o preserv e th e Unio n wer e negativ e i n characte r an d faile d t o include ' revolutionary measures' tha t struc k a t the roots o f the Ascendancy . He called for the disestablishment o f the Anglican Church in Ireland, toward s which th e Libera l part y was , of course, alread y moving. Stron g though thi s was, it pale d besid e th e scop e an d th e languag e of his deman d fo r legislatio n against wha t he described a s 'great-landlordism' in that country. 27 It wa s the period whe n even Bright' s permissive land purchas e scheme seeme d fraugh t with hidden menace to worried landlords; when one sensible an d liberal Whig politician, no alarmist, coul d write to another: ' We are entering... on a new and unquie t er a o f politics whic h wil l require very wary walking, especially for thos e wh o like ourselves are liberal s b y conviction , an d larg e landowners . . . > 2 8 Mil l trie d t o tak e advantag e o f thi s curren t uneasines s amon g th e propertied, an d no t merel y th e landed , classes ; threatenin g the m wit h th e following dir e prospect i f they did not reform the Iris h land system o n India n lines: ' An age when delegates of working-men mee t i n European Congresse s to concert united action for the interests of labour, is not one in which labour ers will cut down labourers at other people's bidding . Th e tim e is come when the democracy of one country will join... with the democracy of another, rather than bac k their ow n ruling authoritie s in puttin g i t down.' 29 The reactio n t o this warnin g wa s powerful , i f i t wa s no t wha t Mil l ha d hoped . Takin g th e pamphlet i n the roun d Mil l never wrote anything so reckless of criticism, an d so vulnerable to it . ii

Mill was possibly at his most eloquen t in England and Ireland. He was clearly conscious of the pressur e o f events and was straining what has unkindly been called his ' power-loom prose ',30 to make an impact, to create a vivid awareness of th e gravit y of the Iris h question , an d t o impar t hi s stron g convictio n tha t there wa s not to o muc h tim e lef t fo r Britai n to com e to term s wit h a people whom she ha d severel y oppressed no t s o long ag o and ha d persiste d i n mis understanding an d neglecting . Ferven t an d vigorou s beyon d hi s wont , Mil l sacrificed candou r an d accurac y to th e determinatio n t o mak e his case . H e generalized as boldly as he had ever done, but withou t his usual care to qualif y and balanc e the positiv e statement . Th e objection s which h e dispose d o f in these page s receive d cavalier treatment ; other s wer e simply not mentioned . All are weaknesses which should no t be permitted t o obscure the pamphlet' s merits. H e brough t ou t th e relationshi p betwee n th e politica l and agraria n 27

Mill , England an d Ireland, pp . 25 , 43-4, 21 . Th e Duk e o f Argyll tol d Gladston e i n th e autum n o f 186 6 tha t 'Bright' s speeche s ar e frightening al l Whiggish Liberals into absolute Toryism', Gladstone Papers (B.M. Add . MS S 44100), Argyll to Gladstone, 4 November 1866 ; Ripon Papers (B.M. Add . MS S 43522) , Lor d de Grey t o Lor d Kimberley , 2 5 November 1867 . 29 Mill , England an d Ireland, p . 26 . Th e 'Congresses ' are , o f course , thos e o f th e Firs t International. 30 B . Willey, Nineteenth Century Studies (London , 1949) , p. 161 . 28

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aspects o f th e Iris h question , whic h wa s a s little understoo d b y th e Britis h public as it had been by Mill himself for many years. He set forth an effectiv e indictment, in which there was much truth, o f the lack of justice and imagination i n Britain' s treatmen t o f a peasan t societ y unite d wit h on e o f a ver y different character . Althoug h th e internationa l odiu m an d dange r whic h Fenianism ha d revive d and extende d fo r thi s countr y ha d soo n bee n keenl y felt, Mill' s minatory picture of the liabilities of our behaviour towards Ireland made a definit e impression . Thes e merits , however , ar e bette r appreciate d today tha n the y wer e b y Mill' s contemporaries . Th e fac t o f Iris h nationa l consciousness wa s conveye d to o strongl y t o sui t hi s avowe d purpose . H e sounded excessivel y sympatheti c whe n portrayin g th e feeling s o f th e dis affected. Th e ton e o f England and Ireland, an d th e extraordinaril y arrogan t references t o th e stupidit y a s wel l a s th e peril s o f opposin g it s demands , militated effectivel y agains t its chance s o f securing a favourable reception. It wa s thus o n both politica l and economi c grounds that Mil l no w argued for convertin g the Iris h tenan t int o th e substantia l owner of his holding. Th e political reasons he adduced have already been mentioned an d will be further discussed below . Consideratio n o f th e economi c reasons h e foun d t o justif y this tremendous change is not less important, and certainly not less interesting, for a n assessmen t o f Mill . Three year s earlier , in th e las t editio n t o dat e o f the Principles, Mill ha d given an optimistic account of the progres s and prospects of the Iris h farmer, while expressing reservations about the condition of the landless labourer, and he ha d state d quit e plainl y that drasti c land refor m was no longer needed. 31 To judge fro m th e pamphlet , h e might neve r hav e written thus . He di d no t recant hi s opinion s o n thes e o r an y othe r matter s o n whic h h e ha d befor e pronounced in a different sense : he simply disregarded them. ' . .. In Ireland, ' he now wrote, ' where the well-being of the whole population depend s o n the terms o n whic h the y ar e permitte d t o occup y the land , thos e term s ar e th e very wors t i n Europe. ' Th e contex t make s it clea r tha t h e wa s no t merel y referring t o th e lega l insecurity o f tenancy-at-will, wit h fe w parallels on th e Continent. H e wa s insistin g tha t th e stat e o f rura l Irelan d a t th e tim e o f writing full y demonstrate d th e validit y of his dictum , which hitherto h e ha d largely qualified awa y when applying it to Ireland, that where peasant farmers did no t enjo y fixit y o f tenure o r fixed rents, ' the socia l economy resulting i s intolerable'. No t onl y di d he asser t tha t 'a n averag e Irish landlord ' entirel y neglected t o mak e an y improvement s o n th e estate ; h e alleged , 's o man y landlords eve n o f high rank ' fel t n o sham e i n takin g for themselves tenants ' improvements o r th e valu e o f them, b y evictin g or raisin g rents , tha t ' it i s evident their compeers do not think it at all disgraceful'.32 Here, by way of 31 J . S . Mill, Principles of Political Economy, variorum edn . formin g vols. n an d i n o f the Collected Works o f John Stuart Mill (Toronto , 1963 - ) ; n, 331-6; hereafter cite d a s Works, 2 II o r in. 3 Mill , England and Ireland, pp . 14-20 ; quotations fro m pp . 15 , 19 , 17-18 .

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proof, he gave one spectacular exampl e of landlord greed and lack of scruple; one tha t wa s t o elici t a circumstantia l rejoinder. 33 I t wa s the onl y specifi c instance quote d o f the tyrann y ascribe d t o a whole class . A n activ e an d un wearying tyranny : fo r wha t els e wer e Mill' s reader s t o understan d b y thi s statement about the practical working of tenancy-at-will in Ireland ? ' . .. The bulk of a population dependen t wholly on the land , cannot look forward with confidence t o a single year' s occupatio n o f it...' Mil l lai d great stress on an obvious point , her e straine d fo r maximu m effect: th e weaknes s of an almos t purely agricultura l population , wthou t an y alternativ e mean s o f gettin g a living at home, in bargaining with those in whose hands the ownership of land was heavil y concentrated . Th e poin t was , o f course , a vali d one , bu t mor e impressive if it was understood, as he intended it should be, that the landlords in genera l exploited thei r advantag e ruthlessly. Wel l migh t h e then inquire : ' . . . to wha t sympath y o r consideratio n ar e thos e entitle d wh o avai l them selves o f a bad la w to perpetrat e wha t is morally robbery?'. 34 It ma y bear repetitio n tha t Mil l wa s describing contemporar y reality : h e seemed obliviou s o f wha t h e ha d writte n i n 186 2 an d 1865 , an d ha d sai d in Parliamen t i n 1866 ; th e amelioratio n Irelan d ha d experience d sinc e th e Famine was , apparently , a delusion . I f Mil l ha d the n erre d o n th e sid e of optimism abou t th e Iris h lan d system , thi s descriptio n o f th e Iris h tenant' s lot wa s absurdl y overdrawn . Ho w fa r di d h e believ e i n i t himself ? Th e question shoul d b e asked, and a n answer will be propounded later . When he put forwar d hi s remedy for the peasantry's melancholy condition, Mill coul d no t overloo k the familia r argument s agains t i t an d h e deal t wit h them in a summary, not to say contemptuous fashion. The y were swept aside with th e words : 'Thos e wh o stil l believ e that smal l peasan t propertie s ar e either detrimenta l t o agricultur e or conduciv e t o over-population , ar e dis creditably behind the state of knowledge on the subject.' At the same time he fell int o a n oblique admission that th e lo t of the Iris h peasan t had improved considerably over the las t twenty years. He was defending himself against th e objection tha t th e peasan t wa s too wretched, to o deprived , not t o abus e th e benefits o f fixity of tenure. Th e relevan t passag e is too lon g to quote , bu t i t opened wit h the revealing statement: ' All prognostics o f failure draw n fro m the stat e o f things preceding the famin e ar e simply futile' . The lesson s of political economy in this contex t were reinforced by an ap peal, for the first time in all Mill had written and said about Irish land, to the notions o f propert y i n lan d cherishe d b y th e peasantry , whic h wer e quit e different fro m thos e embodied in the laws of the United Kingdom . In Britain, he conceded with perceptible reluctance, the absolute ownership vested in the landlord ha d no t prove d unacceptabl e to th e people—'Th e tradition s an d 33 Ibid . pp . 18-1 9 an d footnot e t o p . 18 ; fo r th e rejoinde r b y Viscoun t Lifford , a n Iris h landowner, se e House of Lords Debates, 12 Marc h 1868 . 34 Ibid . pp. 16-19 ; quotations from pp . 16 , 19 .

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recollections o f native Iris h society' , h e wrote , mor e or les s accurately , 'are wholly the contrar y way. . .In the moral feelings of the Irish. . .the right t o hold th e lan d goes , a s it di d in the beginning , wit h the righ t t o till it. ' Th e agrarian secret societie s of Ireland, he rightly insisted, were seeking to defend , not t o violate , property . H e invoke d th e Britis h experienc e in rulin g India , where they had risen above 'insular prejudices' and 'reconciled themselves to the ide a tha t thei r busines s wa s no t t o swee p awa y th e right s the y foun d established... but... to protect.. . and us e the m a s a startin g poin t for.. . steps i n improvement' . Although h e remarke d that i t wa s one to embarras s 'our historica l Conservatives' , Mil l di d not , however , develo p thi s lin e of argument. I t wa s left t o a n Anglo-Indian admire r of his to tak e it furthe r i n the followin g years . Thes e fe w lines wer e nevertheless th e mos t perceptive , and th e mos t prescient , i n England and Ireland?* Mill propose d a statutory commissio n wit h compulsor y powers , charge d to ac t expeditiously an d commut e presen t rent s fo r fai r an d fixed levels and invest ever y tenant wit h a permanent righ t of occupancy , transferable to his heirs and assignees. Landlords shoul d hav e the option of receiving the officia l rent directly from the tenant or in the form of interest on government bonds.36 Nothing shor t o f this agraria n upheaval would serve to counter the attrac tions o f revolutionar y nationalism t o th e Irish ; t o satisf y th e conscienc e of British democracy; and to meet the threat t o the international security of this country fro m disaffectio n i n Ireland . Th e las t wa s a n aspec t o f hi s subjec t which at the time excited grave apprehension. ' Neither Europ e nor America would no w bea r th e sigh t o f a Polan d acros s th e Iris h Channel. ' Mil l thu s gave exaggerate d expressio n to a danger of which Englishmen wit h a knowledge of the politic s of power were uncomfortably aware. The Fenian s ha d as one o f their chie f aim s th e enlistmen t o f American sympathie s throug h th e agitation of the large Irish community in the United States. On the Continent , liberals an d reactionarie s wer e bot h fa r mor e inclined to tak e Ireland's par t than England's. Mil l did not believe in amity between the nations, as a matter of fact , an d h e asserte d tha t hi s countr y wit h it s scattere d possession s an d heavy dependence on overseas trade could only hold down a rebellious Ireland 'until th e man y enemie s o f Britis h prosperit y ha d tim e t o complicat e th e situation b y a foreign war'. 37 In th e Autobiography Mil l describe d thi s pamphle t a s writte n firstl y t o vindicate th e Unio n an d onl y secondl y t o mak e known his schem e o f land reform.38 Th e firs t o f thes e aim s wa s uncontroversial , an d contemporarie s fastened o n the second . No r ha s much notice been given since to the longes t part o f the pamphlet , settin g ou t hi s arguments fo r the Union . The y were a mixture o f nationa l self-interes t an d wha t ma y be calle d imperia l altruism. 33

Ibid . pp. 38-41 , 9-14 , 22-3 ; quotation s fro m pp . 39, 40, 11-12, 22 , 23, 13. Fo r Mill' s 8 Anglo-Indian disciple se e below pp . 234-5 . 3 Ibid . pp. 36-40 . 37 Ibid . pp. 21-6 ; quotation fro m p. 24 . M Mill , Autobiography, p. 249 .

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Mill di d no t underestimat e th e difficult y o f combatin g the reviva l of Iris h nationalism in the i86os : but h e was clear that it ought to be resisted fo r the sake of both peoples . He seems to have thought, wit h good reason, that Fenianis m had gone far to remove Irish unrest fro m th e plan e of religious an d agrarian discontent t o that of pure nationalism. The ful l realization of this dangerous prospect could not yet be averted. Th e ide a and sentiment of nationality wer e formidable in themselves—he acknowledge d that , an d warne d agains t th e dispositio n t o forget it—but he was optimistic that in the case of Ireland i t was still possibl e to arres t thei r growt h b y remedyin g th e complaint s abou t othe r aspect s of British rule tha n th e constitutional . Th e cru x of his whole argumen t wa s as follows: ' Rebellions ar e never reall y unconquerable until the y hav e become rebellions fo r a n idea... wait till al l practical grievances hav e merged i n th e demand for independence, and there is no knowing that any concession, short of independence , wil l appease the quarrel.' 39 What i f the polic y of redressing 'practica l grievances', in which the grea t land refor m was everything, did no t hav e the desire d effect ? Th e possibilit y that Irelan d migh t hav e to be allowed to go her ow n way was not a very real one to Mill . Th e peasantr y woul d have received all they could hope to gain from a nationalist revolution ; only gran t the m ' permanent possessio n o f the land, subjec t to fixed burthens' and 'the difficulties o f centuries in governing Ireland woul d disappear' . Indeed , th e Iris h alread y derive d considerabl e benefits from the Union. An example was the opportunities they enjoyed in the political life an d government o f the Empire . Throug h her representative s a t Westminster, Irelan d was able to exert more influence in support of any cause favoured b y he r peopl e tha n sh e migh t b e expecte d t o d o a s a smal l inde pendent stat e o r with , lik e Canada, internal self-government and n o repre sentation in the imperial Parliament. None of this implied that the Irish could safely b e entrusted wit h the task of governing themselves. They coul d not. I t was not merel y the ris k of civil war betwee n inveteratel y hostile Protestant s and Catholics , shoul d the authorit y of Britain be withdrawn, that Mill had in mind. Th e Iris h wer e deficien t i n the necessar y attributes . Thi s significan t admission, whic h aligne d Mil l wit h unreconstructe d Torie s an d sceptica l Whigs, rounded off his case for the Union: he had been explaining why it was not feasible , as a compromise, t o put the Anglo-Irish constitutiona l relation ship o n a similar basi s t o tha t o f the Dua l Monarchy . The Hungarians , h e considered, had demonstrated ' a measure of the qualities which fit a people for self-government, greater than has yet been evinced by Continental nations in many othe r respect s fa r mor e advanced . Th e democrac y o f Ireland' , h e observed tersely,' and those wh o are likely to b e its first leaders, have, at all events, ye t to prov e their possession o f qualities at all similar.'40 39 40

Mill , England and Ireland, pp . 7 , 21-2, 42-4; quotatio n from p . 7. Ibid . pp. 21 , 36 , 30-5; quotations from pp . 21 , 36, 35.

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Mill's rejection of an independent o r autonomou s Irelan d reste d o n mor e fundamental consideration s tha n thi s unflatterin g estimat e o f th e politica l capacity of her people. His opinion that she stood to gain nothing by breaking away ' except the satisfaction, whic h she is thought t o prize, of being governe d solely by Irishmen '41 must be taken in the contex t of the theoretical solutio n he had formulate d for the proble m of small nations. I n th e Considerations on Representative Government h e ha d compare d th e destin y o f the Iris h i n th e United Kingdo m to that of the Breton s in France, an d justified thei r absorp tion in these terms: 'When the nationalit y whic h succeed s i n overpowerin g the other is both the most numerous and the most improved; and especially if the subdue d nationalit y is small, an d has no hope o f reasserting its indepen dence; then, i f . .. governed with any tolerable justice... the smaller nationality is graduall y reconciled t o it s position , an d become s amalgamate d wit h th e larger.' The absorption o f smaller nations, in accordance with these desiderata , satisfied the ultimate moral requirement: it was' a benefit to the human race '.42 Mill believed that this country had a special role in the progress of humanity; her strength an d security were therefore of much more than national concern . These propositions he stated quit e plainly and consistently. H e even went so far a s to asser t that i n respec t o f them 'th e feeling s o f the elit e o f Europ e would bear me out'.43 With all that, i n his opinion, cried out for reform in her political and social institutions, no t only was England ' the Power, which of all in existence, bes t understands liberty' , but sh e 'whatever may have been it s [sic] error s in the past, has attained to more of conscience and moral principle in it s dealing s with foreigner s than an y othe r grea t natio n seem s eithe r t o conceive as possible or to recognize as desirable'. It scarcely needs to be pointed out tha t i n bein g thu s assure d o f hi s country' s righteousness , Mil l wa s expressing a very widely held view . The quotation s abov e are taken fro m th e Considerations on Representative Government;** six years later, in August 1867 , Mill made it clear in a Commons speech that he did not shrink from the use of force agains t countries with which England had n o quarrel, to safeguard he r international position . H e wa s attackin g England' s renunciatio n a decad e earlier of her right to seize enemy cargo in neutral vessels , 'th e natural weapon of a maritime nation.. .our main defence'. This had been the act of a Liberal ministry, and Mill felt obliged to censure his own side for its unwisdom. 'The bulk o f the Liberal party acquiesced, silentl y o r approvingly : an d therein , I confess, w e showed les s knowledg e of the subject , les s understandin g o f th e situation tha n th e Conservativ e Leaders... ' Englan d wa s not responsible t o herself alone . 'Grea t almos t beyon d calculatio n a s ar e th e Britis h interest s dependent o n this issue, ' he declared, 'it is on no narrow grounds of merely 41

Ibid . p. 31 . * * Mill , Considerations, pp . 364-5 . House o f Commons Debates, 5 August 1867 . 44 P . 380 . H e expressed himself similarly to J. E. Cairnes, who was an advocate of Imperial contraction, o n mor e tha n on e occasion , Mill-Taylor Collectio n (vol . LV) , Mill t o Cairnes , 15 June 186 2 and 8 November 1864 . 43

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British patriotis m tha t I.. . raise it.. . the safety , an d eve n th e powe r of England, are valuable to the freedom of the world, and therefore to the greatest and most permanent interests of every civilized people...' Like most English men who watched the cours e of events in Continenta l Europe, h e feared th e inherent aggressivenes s o f its 'militar y monarchies'. 45 Concern for 'the safety, and even the power' of his country figured prominently amon g Mill' s argument s i n England an d Ireland fo r maintainin g th e Union in its present form . He laid greater stress, indeed , on this aspect of the matter than on his contention that the Irish were better off within the United Kingdom an d on his belief that they were not fit for self-rule. The first of his stated aims in writing the pamphlet—' to show the undesirableness, for Ireland as well as for England, o f separation... '46—may appear to us, as it apparently did to contemporaries, a superfluous labour in so far as it was directed t o con vincing Englishmen tha t their countr y could not afford t o let the sister island go, whic h wa s th e practicall y universa l vie w here . I n arguin g thus , Mil l placed himself in a long tradition of English statesmanship; but he was seldom willing to rely on inherited wisdom and he did not do so now. It is a reasonable surmise tha t h e wa s squarin g hi s sensitiv e conscienc e whe n h e sough t t o reassure liberal opinion which was not oblivious of the question—coul d it be right t o hol d Irelan d t o th e Unio n agains t he r wil l indefinitely ? Tha t well known publi c figure and advance d radical M.P., Thoma s Hughes , wh o was politically connected with Mill, voiced this uneasiness in the speech mentioned earlier that attracted wide publicity and was delivered some two months before the latter' s pamphle t cam e out . Although a n arden t patriot , Hughe s 'con fessed that at times he thought it impossible that the two countries could go on in union. He could conceive a separation between them, and that England and Ireland shoul d stan d in the sam e relationship a s Norway and Sweden , which were governe d b y the sam e sovereign. >47 Mill hel d som e familia r language . The proximit y of the tw o islands made for thei r union ; i f they di d no t for m a single state , the y would pose a n un ending mutual threat . He was patently committe d t o the English standpoint ; although thi s was understandably no t acknowledged : for he claimed t o have transcended vulgar prejudice. Raising the old fear that an independent Ireland would fal l victi m t o a rival power, would becom e 'a province of France', he inquired: ' I as k any patrioti c Englishma n wha t h e woul d thin k o f suc h a prospect...' There was another inescapabl e fact. Give n their lon g and con tinuing histor y o f antagonism , 'Parted. . .the tw o island s woul d be , o f al l countries i n Europe , thos e whic h would hav e th e mos t hostil e dispositio n towards on e another'. This, accordin g to Mill, was decisive in excluding any relationship othe r tha n union : an alliance between independen t nations ; in ternal autonom y on the Canadia n pattern; imitation of the recently conclude d 48 48

House of Commons Debates, 5 August 1867 . Mill , Autobiography, p. 249. "

Th e Times, 20 December 1867 .

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Ausgleich—were i n tur n rule d out . As regard s th e first , Irelan d woul d b e more inclined to ally with England's enemies . Then she could not be granted, nor woul d she be reconcile d to , th e degre e o f freedom enjoye d by Canada : because it was effectively open to the latter to decide whether or not she would take part in England's wars; because ' Canada is a great way off'; an d because her actual status, compared with Ireland's under the Union, was' a derogation, a descent...' . T o adop t th e solutio n foun d b y Austri a an d Hungar y was, Mill conceded , superficiall y attractive . ' In that there is nothing humiliatin g to the pride of either country': but he thought it was too new for any fair conclusions t o b e draw n from it s functionin g as yet. The overridin g objection, however, was the same: this solution was not safe for England; 'the wrongs of centuries' ha d inspired suc h 'vindictiv e feeling' i n the Iris h people. 48 The analysi s of Mill's attitude to Irish nationalis m would be incomplete if his strong dislik e of Catholicism were left ou t of account. While he was not a Christian, his outlook on the religious issues that loomed so large in Victorian politics was scarcely distinguishable from tha t o f the Nonconformis t element in the Liberal party. He shared their wish to disestablish the Irish church, and also thei r obdurat e resistanc e t o th e educationa l concession s persistentl y sought by the Catholic Church in Ireland. In their readiness to attack even the hint of such concessions, he and they showed themselves t o be as righteously unsympathetic a s an y Orangema n to th e sentiment s o f th e majorit y o f th e Irish population . Mill i n hi s essa y O n Liberty ha d depicte d th e popula r intoleranc e whic h evangelical Protestantism coul d evoke in England as something to be deplored and contained. 49 When the Libera l government of Russell and Gladstone was disposed t o g o som e littl e wa y toward s meetin g th e Catholi c Hierarchy' s objects i n the fiel d o f eduction, he was prepared, i f necessary, to excit e that same popula r emotio n t o compel minister s to abandon this part of the Iris h policy whic h the y wer e tryin g t o fasio n '.. .1 a m i n hopes' , h e wrot e t o Cairnes, 'that the Catholic prelacy is showing itself so impracticable as to give the Governmen t a fai r ground fo r withdrawin g an y offer s the y ma y hav e made, if only they can be induced to think such a retraction desirable: and it must b e the business o f members o f Parliament to try to make them thin k so ... Any tolerable stand made in the House will have powerful support outside from the mass of feeling in the country always ready to be called forth against any new concession to Catholics.' 50 In England an d Ireland h e advocated th e further developmen t o f ' a really unsectarian education. . .the mos t solid , an d b y fa r th e greates t benefi t w e have yet conferred upon Ireland'. For this was the antidote to those error s of Catholicism whic h ha d th e resul t mentione d i n hi s pamphle t a s a reaso n 48

Mill , England an d Ireland, pp . 26-35 ; quotations fro m pp . 29 , 30, 27, 32-4 . J . S. Mill, On Liberty, Everyman' s Library edn. (1954), pp. 90-4. 50 Mill-Taylo r Collectio n (vol. LV), Mill to Cairnes , 6 January 1866 .

49

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against Iris h independence—that' the sympathies... of Ireland are sure to be on the sam e side as the Pope—tha t is , on the sid e opposed t o moder n civili zation and progress, and to the freedom of all except Catholi c populations hel d in subjection by non-Catholic rulers'. While he of course saw much that was good in Catholicism , he held, i n common with most Englishme n of his time , that its claims were incompatible wit h freedom as that wa s understood b y all shades o f opinion in thi s country. 51 Mill recounte d i n hi s pamphle t ho w a crowde d meetin g i n Londo n ha d responded wit h fervent denials to the inquiry : '"Do you think tha t Englan d has a right t o rul e ove r Irelan d i f she canno t mak e the Iris h peopl e conten t with her rule?'" 52 Taking th e pamphle t a s a whole, it is clear enough that h e did not seriously contemplate th e possibility suggested b y this question : that England might have to acknowledge herself unable to reconcile Ireland to the Union, an d gran t he r independenc e in som e form. Th e essentia l interests of England forbade it. Th e Considerations on Representative Government an d hi s Commons speech on the maritime right of search explai n what is left unsai d i n the pamphlet : th e mora l justificatio n fo r s o obviousl y puttin g England' s interests first . Wha t wa s goo d fo r Englan d i n respec t o f he r strengt h an d security was good for the res t o f the world . This is not a parody of Mill: the morality of Ireland's subjugation was all-important to him. He was nevertheless quite well aware that the res t of the world—'th e elite of Europe' apart — did no t se e those essentia l interest s o f Englan d i n th e sam e light , an d th e pamphlet was not the plac e to take issue with them. If he di d not specificall y refer t o hi s theor y o f th e destin y of smal l nations , hi s estimat e o f th e Iris h people, o f their politica l maturit y an d o f the religio n t o whic h the y wer e so firmly attached , enable d hi m t o represen t th e Unio n a s offerin g th e bes t future tha t an y rational person could expect for their country . Mill was sometimes critica l of the doctrine, commo n i n his day, that certai n races or peoples were inferior t o others in their aptitude for free an d progres sive institutions: but onl y when he thought it was being strained, and used in too deterministic a fashion.53 His writings furnis h examples o f judgements o n the basi s o f rac e o r nationa l character. There i s a commen t i n England and Irelandwhich ma y imply an unfavourable opinion of Irishmen on such grounds, as distinc t fro m thei r lo w leve l o f politica l an d religiou s development . Ad vancing his Indian solution to the lan d question, he observed: 'Persons who know both countries, have remarked many points of resemblance between the Irish an d Hindo o character. >54 One wonders whether an y of those in Irelan d who hailed the pamphlet reflected on these words. They might have noted that in the Considerations th e ' Hindoos' wer e ' a people... unfit fo r more tha n a 51 Mill , England and Ireland, pp. 42-3 , 30 ; quotations fro m his speech i n House of Commons Debates, 12 Marc h 186 8 and E. & I . p . 30. 52 Ibid . pp. 25-6 ; M . S t J. Packe, op. cit. p . 463 . 53 Elliot , op. cit. n , 44, 190, Mil l to J. Boy d Kinnear, 1 9 August 1865 , and to Sir C. Dilke, 4 9 February 1869 . 5 Mill , England and Ireland, p . 22.

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limited and qualified freedom... '.55 In support of the suggested interpretation of this comment in England and Ireland—or a t any rate as a further illustratio n of hi s view that th e Iris h wer e far behind th e Englis h i n political civilization —there may be cite d a letter writte n man y years earlier, in which he avowed that ' I mysel f hav e always been fo r a good stou t Despotism—fo r governin g Ireland lik e India'. In tha t lette r Mil l ha d continued : 'Bu t i t canno t b e done . Th e Spiri t of Democracy ha s go t too muc h hea d there , to o prematurely. ' I f 'Despotism ' was impracticable , keepin g Irelan d withi n th e Unite d Kingdo m i n spit e of herself wa s not , an d now , thirt y year s afterwards , h e wa s trouble d b y th e necessity o f confining that spirit . Thi s feelin g emerged strongl y a t th e clos e of hi s pamphlet. 56 'If , withou t removin g thi s [th e agrarian ] difficulty, ' h e wrote, ' we attempt t o hold Irelan d b y force... we shall be in a state o f open revolt against the universal conscienc e o f Europe and Christendom, an d more and mor e agains t our own.' 57 Henc e th e sweepin g lan d reform ; no t onl y t o bribe the peasan t mass int o a more positive acquiescenc e i n British rule , bu t also to assuage the moral discomfort suffere d b y Englis h liberal s like himself at havin g to approv e the forcibl e suppression o f those wh o ha d turne d thei r cherished principles of liberty and consen t agains t them. Hence , too , the nex t remarkable featur e of th e pamphlet : hi s pretenc e tha t th e conditio n o f th e Irish peasantr y ha d no t changed sinc e befor e the Famine , blatantl y ignorin g what h e ha d writte n i n th e Principles an d sai d i n Parliamen t o n the subjec t between 186 2 and 1866. He must have felt that he had to exaggerate their pligh t to recommen d hi s extraordinary plan an d tha t i t was permissible to d o so in the circumstances . Permissibl e als o to pla y on topica l fear s b y conjurin g u p the spectre of collaboration between the Britis h and Irish commonalt y against the selfis h an d th e shortsighte d wh o obstructe d a n ac t o f manifes t justice. Letters of March 186 8 to Cairne s seem to confirm thi s hypothesis . Th e latte r had expresse d the hope that les s drasti c means of dealing with Irish lan d than the pamphlet advocated would suffice, an d Mill replied:' You will not find in it much argument , of a nature to remove any difficulties whic h you ar e likely to feel. Th e objec t was to strike hard , an d compel people to listen t o the larges t possible proposal.' From everything that he had been able to learn, nothing less ' would now tranquillize Ireland, or reconcile the Irish people to the Union'.58 55

Mill , Considerations, pp. 178-9 . F . E . Minek a (ed.) , Th e Earlier Letters o f John Stuart Mill 1812-48, forming vols . x n and xi n o f th e Collected Works o f John Stuart Mill (Toronto , 1963 - ) ; xn , 365 , Mil l t o J. P. Nichol, 2 1 Decembe r 1837 . 57 Mill , England and Ireland, p. 44. Thi s uncomfortabl e though t had bee n wit h him throughout. O n a n earlie r pag e h e ha d pu t a questio n which admitte d o f only on e answer: 'On wha t principl e di d w e act when w e renounced th e governmen t o f the Ionia n Islands? ' (p. 24) . Th e cessio n o f those island s to th e weak , imperfectly civilize d kingdom o f Greece i n 1863, notwithstanding the large claims that had been made for their strategic value, constitute d an acknowledgemen t o n th e part of this country that she found a genuine and stubborn nationalism morally har d to repress, in a European people at any rate. 58 Mill-Taylo r Collectio n (vol . LV) , Mil l t o Cairnes , 1 0 and i Marc h 1868 . 56

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in Mill overdid it in his desire to impress people with the urgency of the situation. He coul d hav e anticipate d th e emotio n h e elicited . Hi s associat e Thoma s Hughes ha d bee n assaile d fo r sayin g i n hi s ver y recen t speech , withou t re ference to Mill's authority, that a n Indian lan d settlement shoul d b e given to Ireland. It did not help Hughes that , as Mill was to do, he represented thi s to be dictated by the threat to England's plac e in the world. His suggestion tha t otherwise the Union might have to be dissolved was lost in the enormity of the proposed invasio n o f the right s o f property. Mil l suffere d th e sam e fate . It ha s to b e remembered tha t a t this time th e propertie d classes , an d especially landowners, in both Britai n and Irelan d were a prey to active fears as to what th e future held fo r them. The Secon d Refor m Act and its attendant circumstances had given rise to exaggerated gloom about the political strengt h of property , an d abov e all o f lande d property , unde r th e ne w dispensation . While Iris h landlord s wer e afrai d o f thei r bein g sacrifice d t o mak e Britis h rule more acceptable to a refractory people, English landlord s were now really apprehensive tha t a surrende r o f fundamenta l principle s i n Irelan d woul d encourage the radica l wing of the Libera l party and its working-class allies to exploit i t agains t themselves . Given the benefit of hindsight, thes e fears may appear to have been unreal : but the y wer e reflecte d i n journal s lik e Th e Economist an d th e Pall Mall Gazette. The forme r under Bageho t can certainly not be accused of alarmism, and in fact both usually took a balanced view. The Economist urged the govern ment i n Jul y 186 8 not t o leav e Irish lan d t o th e next , reforme d Parliament , which migh t no t b e incline d t o dea l gentl y wit h th e owners . Recen t histor y abroad exhibite d th e ris k incurre d b y th e postponement : ' that... a reall y popular assembly.. . manifested... very little , muc h to o little , respec t fo r proprietary rights. The sam e disposition may be shown by the ne w House of Commons... >59 In a leading article of early February, headed' The Attitude of the Liberal Party in the Coming Parliament', the Pall Mall Gazette complained that ' too many of our parliamentar y politicians ar e holding language which implies.. .that "fixit y o f tenure " shoul d b e conceded. . .or tha t th e Stat e shall become "middleman" on a great scale, and purchase large estates.. .to create a . .. "peasan t proprietary"'. The reference was to Bright an d Hughes and their respective schemes: only they among English political figures of note had so offended—but the y were enough i n themselves t o justify this concern . ' . . . herein, accordin g to our view' continue d the Pall Mall Gazette, ' lie the danger an d wron g o f suc h language ; tha t th e politician s w e spea k o f ar e giving a parliamentary status to projects hitherto entertained only by irresponsible agitator s an d reckles s doctrinaires.. . They are acting a s the Conserva tives acted when they first pronounced the words " Household suffrag e "; they 88 Th e Economist, 25 January 1868 , 'Lord Stanle y at Bristol'.

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are doin g wha t ca n neve r b e quit e undone.. . >6° Th e las t illuminate s th e anxiety that Brigh t and Hughes, standin g for the old and the new radicalism, had commenced an irreversible process of escalating the concessions demanded of landowners , simila r t o tha t whic h ha d s o recentl y marke d th e cours e of Parliamentary reform. In such an atmosphere as this, Mill's pamphlet dismayed and angered those who had been nervously awaiting a full-blooded attack on property. They had not supposed that it would come from him, from so respected and authoritative a quarter . The reactio n was caused as much b y his extremist languag e in th e places that hav e been quoted a s by the pla n itself. The warnin g he gave that the masse s i n Britai n an d Irelan d woul d mak e commo n caus e agains t thei r rulers if the occupiers of Irish lan d were not speedily turned into it s substan tial owner s seemed mor e than a threat whic h was calculated to be peculiarly disturbing, an d appeared to imply a hope that this social revolution would not be confined to Ireland . On e may instance the shocke d surpris e o f a moderate Whig politicia n an d Iris h proprietor , Lor d Bessborough , wh o later helpe d Gladstone with the provisions of the 187 0 Land Bil l and, as chief government whip i n tha t House , wit h it s passag e throug h th e Lords , 'Mil l ough t t o be sent t o pena l servitud e a s a Fenian ' h e declare d when acknowledgin g 'that wicked pamphlet ' sen t b y hi s acquaintance Delane, th e edito r o f Th e Times. To Bessborough' s indignatio n a t the 'plunderin g views' se t forth was joined his natura l resentmen t o f the highl y coloure d picture o f the Iris h landlord s and the condition of their tenantry. He was clearly worried about its effect i n the light o f th e existin g widel y diffuse d prejudic e agains t them . 'Englan d i n general', he wrote,' believes that we are perpetually evicting wretched squalid people who have no resource but beggary. ' He believed in the stock economic argument against fixity of tenure. Shoul d th e landlord' s controllin g han d b e removed o r paralyse d b y legislation , th e tenant s woul d assuredl y rever t t o type, t o th e endles s subdivisio n an d primitiv e agricultur e whic h ha d le d inexorably t o th e Famine . Bessboroug h ende d o n th e authenti c not e o f th e Ascendancy: '.. . if w e eve r expec t t o legislat e t o th e exten d o f stoppin g agitators fro m speakin g abou t th e wrong s o f Ireland , an d th e mo b fro m believing an d hallooin g after them , w e may legislat e fo r eve r an d shal l find ourselves just a s near at the end'. 61 The editorial s and reviews which gave very full, if mainly adverse, publicity to England and Ireland show how disconcerting was Mill's conversion to fixity of tenure. Th e Times, after a n initial passing reference to ' the sweeping inter ference with the rights of property contemplated by Mr Mill', 62 printed on the following da y a long review that di d not spare pamphlet an d author. H e was castigated for his style o f advocacy: 'It is irritated and impatient, an d seems 60

Th e Pall Mall Gazette, 1 0 February 1868 . Delan e Papers (MSS o f Times Newspapers Ltd. ) (vol . 15) , Bessborough t o J. T. Delane , 2 22 February (1868). 6 Th e Times, 19 February 1868 . 81

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to express a supercilious contemp t fo r every one who is not a philosopher, o r has no t ha d th e experienc e o f a n India n official.. . His chie f argument.. . is an appeal to our fears, and he seems to hope to goad us into agreeing with him by combining threats with taunts... '63 The feeling thus expressed that he had abused hi s great influenc e as a savant was general. Th e Economist, which was kinder t o him than most , reproache d him with relyin g 'mor e than he shoul d upon a sor t o f intellectua l terror. . ,'.64 Th e conservativ e Saturday Review cried tha t ' the professiona l mouthers o f revolutionary slang may salute with respectful admiration the successful competitio n o f Mr Joh n Mill.. . '.65 It is only fair t o note tha t i n the opinion o f the middle-of-the-road Libera l paper , the Daily News, ' He neve r wrot e wit h mor e judicial calmness, gravity , and luminosity.. ,'.66 Mill's theory o f rights ove r land, said Th e Times reviewer, was the sam e as that o f Proudhon—property wa s theft. Fo r th e rest, the comments ran along lines tha t wer e t o becom e ver y familiar—Mil l ha d grossl y exaggerate d th e political unres t in Ireland ; the cas e for peasan t proprietorshi p was certainly not proved , particularl y as far as that countr y was concerned; his plan would impel a fligh t o f capita l an d th e exodu s o f those o n who m agricultura l im provement depended ; an d i f th e provision s h e ha d include d agains t non payment of rent and subdivision wer e enforceable, whic h was questioned, th e reform would not get rid of the agrarian discontent. Surprisingly, th e reviewe r did not quot e Mill' s previous statement s on Irish lan d agains t him. 67 On the next two days The Times followed up this review with editorials. Th e first reiterate d tha t th e achievemen t o f peasant proprietorship , b y mean s of either fixity of tenure or state-assisted purchase , would do nothing bu t har m to Ireland. 68 The secon d of these editorials took what it saw as the vital issue raised b y Mill' s 'mischievous ' schem e an d warne d tha t ther e coul d b e n o avoiding it. Urging the Parliamentary partie s not to afford hi m any encourage ment, Th e Times wrote: Every man should make up his mind whether the received laws of property are to be upheld in the United Kingdom; or whether, beginning first with Ireland, we are to establish principles which would unsettle our whole social fabric... The first thing to be borne in mind is that every theory accepted for Ireland is accepted for England also, an d tha t thos e who ar e no w callin g fo r 'exceptional ' legislatio n would be, if successful , th e firs t t o declar e tha t suc h legislatio n was not 'exceptional' , bu t normal, and.. .should b e applied in Great Britain... Mill and those who put forwar d similar schemes must b e made to realize that neither in Ireland nor in any other part of the Kingdo m will the possessor s of the soil be ousted in obedience to political theories...69 63

Ibid . 20 February 1868 , 'Mr Mill o n Ireland'. Th e Economist, 22 February 1868 , 'Mr Mil l o n Ireland'. 85 Th e Saturday Review, 29 February 1868 , 'Mr Mill on England an d Ireland'. 68 Th e Daily News, 1 8 February 1868 . 67 Th e Times, 20 February 1868 , 'Mr Mill on Ireland'. 68 Ibid . 2 1 Februar y 1868 . 6 » Ibid . 22 February 1868 . 64

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The sam e thing wa s being said privately . 'It is impossible not to see', wrote Lord Stanley , 'that what these men want is less to benefit the tenant than to drive out the landlord.. .'70 The Times returne d t o attackin g Mil l o n two further occasion s during the period o f some thre e week s between th e publicatio n o f England an d Ireland and th e openin g o f the majo r debat e o n Iris h polic y i n th e Common s tha t began toward s th e middl e o f March. 71 Th e libera l Conservativ e Pall Mall Gazette di d no t diffe r essentiall y i n its conclusion s o n 'M r Mill' s panacea': but it s approac h eschewe d mora l indignatio n i n favou r o f practical reason s why 'w e ventur e t o disregar d eve n hi s authorit y an d resolutel y t o oppos e ...'. The Pall Mall reaffirme d it s Palmerstonian lin e that governmen t an d society as at present constitute d i n Ireland, should be left alone; and suggested an official inquir y int o Iris h land i n the declare d convictio n tha t the policy it preached woul d be vindicated . Mil l wa s commended fo r hi s exposition , de scribed a s the clearest an d mos t powerfu l ye t given, of the har m tha t would result to the empir e an d to Irelan d fro m th e dissolutio n o f the Union. 72 The weekl y Saturday Review, which purveyed an intellectual conservatism, carried a violently hostil e revie w of England an d Ireland. Not onl y was Mil l accused of pandering to 'the malignity o f anti-English hatred ' since there no longer existe d an y Irish grievanc e susceptibl e o f legislativ e redress . He was the ' most recent an d most thoroughgoing apostle of Communism'; and there was more in th e sam e strain. Thi s invective was in som e measure provoked by th e shee r unexpectednes s o f hi s displa y o f fierc e socia l radicalis m afte r enjoying for so long quite another reputation. As is witnessed by the reviewer's concluding lament—'. . .that th e grea t doctrin e o f Iris h socia l problem s i s reducible to. . ."La propriete , c'es t l e vol" i s one of those startling phenomena ... which... occasionally reminds th e huma n rac e o f the follie s o f its wisest guides' . If absolut e property in land was foreign t o the Irish , so were representative governmen t an d a fre e press , whic h wer e equally o f Englis h provenance. No r could the reviewer see any merit i n the comparison betwee n Ireland an d India , deride d a s unflattering to the former . There was nothing distinctive abou t th e remainin g objection s her e mad e t o Mill' s plan , fore casting it s breakdow n unde r th e socia l pressure s o f rura l Ireland : bu t th e whole articl e wa s a paea n o f indignatio n tha t suc h proposal s shoul d hav e emanated fro m ' a stai d an d sober politicia n in the nineteent h century. . .'.73 The rea l cause of this furious anxiet y was exposed by an editorial in the nex t issue, whic h provide d a marked contras t i n it s dispassionat e analysi s o f th e conflicting tensions set up by the Irish question . Ther e wa s in this country, in the judgement o f the Saturday Review, a genuine desire t o d o something fo r 70 Dufferi n Papers, P.R.O. Northern Ireland (D 107 1 H/B/F. 147) Stanley to Lord Dufferin, n.d. [Marc h 1868] . 71 Th e Times, 28 February and 1 0 March 1868 . 72 Th e Pall Mall Gazette, 2 4 February 1868 , 'Mr Mil l an d Ireland' . 73 Th e Saturday Review, 2 9 February 1868 , 'Mr Mil l on England an d Ireland'.

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Ireland and thereby ease the prick s of conscience. Thi s would take the for m of a n assaul t o n th e Iris h Church , becaus e a propo s o f Bright' s an d Mill' s schemes, ' the great mass of English landlords, both Liberal and Conservative, hold that any change in the lan d tenure of Ireland would be a source of great danger, socia l and political, to England.. .'.74 The Daily News with its large popular circulation combined praise for Mil l with grav e doubts a s to whethe r hi s plan could b e justified i n terms o f agricultural improvement an d social progress—doubts which it said ' seem t o us, until bette r instructed , unanswerable' . Th e sympatheti c prais e wa s fo r hi s courage i n treating i t a s of human, and no t Divine , institution. The impres sion was left that Mill had gone far beyond the limits of practical politics. Th e Daily News though t tha t th e pamphle t woul d hav e littl e effec t excep t t o promote greate r understandin g o f 'the radical and national character of Irish discontent'.75 The Manchester Guardian, prominent amon g provincial Liberal newspapers, simpl y sai d that the dange r of an uprising i n Irelan d wa s not so alarming that Mill could secure the acceptance of the ' revolutionary measures' he aske d for. 76 The Spectator wa s naturally please d Mil l had abandoned th e view that Ire land di d no t requir e 'heroi c remedies' , an d ha d adopte d th e gran d refor m urged by itself fo r years. I t attacke d the Pall Mall for seriously underestimat ing Irish unrest, and criticized th e ' unmeaning chatter ' about property right s ' which no one proposes to invade except as they are involved by every Railway act'—this was worthy o f Mill i n his doctrinair e vein . Th e Spectator di d no t here deny the economic advantage s o f large farms, nor that their lan d syste m was still—'as yet, a t least' it said—socially acceptable t o the Englis h people : but base d its support o f Mill chiefly on the generalization that the system was wholly unsuite d t o an d unworkabl e in a country like Ireland withou t an in digenous aristocrac y enjoying popular esteem. A gloss, seemingly , on a point of Mill's . The wors t offenders amon g Englishmen who declined to recognize this truth , o r to see that th e incentive s of ownership could transform th e bad habits o f Iris h peasant s wer e ' the economist s who , of al l Pharisees, are th e most Pharisaic'. 77 It wa s nevertheless Th e Economist tha t provide d th e mos t perceptiv e and balanced critiqu e o f England and Ireland. Observin g tha t Mill' s behaviour since entering Parliamen t wa s difficult t o reconcile with wha t he had written before, it offered a qualified defenc e of his conduct. Mill' s honesty was held to be beyond question , but he was portrayed a s 'easily excitable and susceptible; the evil that is in his mind... seems to him the greatest... for the time nearly the only evil...'. Thus less than three years earlier, continued Th e Economist, his 74

Ibid . 7 March 1868 , 'Ireland'. Th e Daily News, 2 5 and 1 9 February 1868 . 76 Th e Manchester Guardian, 22 February 1868 . 77 Th e Spectator, 22 February 1868 , 'Mr J. S. Mill on the Iris h Lan d Question'. 76

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conclusions o n Iris h lan d i n th e las t editio n o f th e Principles amounte d t o 'erasing and unsaying the most striking part of his first edition'. His temperamental reaction to the subsequent manifestatio n of Fenianism was accordingly to require ' a most heroic remedy'. Taking the picture he had just drawn of the Irish peasantry's wretched lot, this editorial pointed out that the changes in his proposals o n Iris h lan d betwee n th e firs t an d las t edition s o f th e Principles explicitly reflecte d their altered condition . In the light of his statements in the edition of 1865, it was surely unnecessary to have to resort to a plan 'which is thought to be , an d will have the mora l effec t o f confiscation' . The Economist recognized that Mil l had been influenced mainl y by political considerations. I t coul d no t accep t tha t th e pla n woul d hav e th e effec t h e predicted on Irish disaffection , becaus e too strongly impressed wit h the argu ments it proceeded to deploy, of the kin d style d 'Pharisaic ' by Th e Spectator and summarized here as:' Our answer is that land... is a blessing only to those who ca n use it, an d a poison to those who cannot'. Givin g Iris h land to th e people, subject to a fixed rent, would appear to promise, not contentment, bu t increased wretchedness. The administratio n of the proposed settlement would involve the stat e i n inextricable difficultie s ove r the regulatio n and collectio n of rents . Continental an d India n example s of fixity of tenure wer e not really relevant: in those cases legislation had defined and determined what previously existed i n the shap e of old-established practice , as The Economist supposed i t did no t i n Ireland . 'W e ar e rathe r frightened' , th e articl e ended , 'b y th e glowing "Prospectus" of Mr Mill.' 78 None o f th e journal s whos e receptio n o f England an d Ireland ha s bee n analysed a t possibl y excessiv e lengt h wa s narrowl y conservative . Betwee n them they represented all shades of the broad, unifying liberalism that took in both partie s an d wa s characteristi c o f Britis h politic s i n tha t age . Onl y th e Spectator wa s approving. Th e res t concurred i n regarding Mill' s demands a s impossible to accommodate within the social and political framework to which, if some, like the Daily News, professed to view it with an open mind, there was generally felt to be no desirable alternative. The avowedl y Tory pres s was not more damnin g than Th e Times o r Saturday Review. In the first of two letters to Cairnes, dated i and 10 March, Mill put a brave face on the treatment h e had received, saying:' On the whole I have met with more approbation , and not more abuse , than I expected' . In bot h letter s he referred t o his motives for writing as he did in the pamphlet . Th e poin t has been made that his aim was to inspire the sort of action which was imperative, in his judgement, t o preserve th e Union . Afte r goin g into the pres s reaction , it should perhaps be stressed that this was his aim, and not to shake society to its foundations. Hi s explanatio n o f the metho d he employed t o tha t en d has been briefly mentioned, and will now be given in full. 'I am sure', he wrote on i March , 'nothin g les s tha n som e ver y startlin g proposa l woul d hav e any 78 Th e Economist, 22 February 1868 , 'Mr Mill on Ireland'.

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chance o f whippin g u p th e langui d interes t o f Englis h publi c men.. . and making them fee l the critica l nature of the situation...' On 1 0 March he told Cairnes ' if there is any intermediate course... its adoption i s likely to be very much promoted by frightening the Government an d the landlords with something more revolutionary... *.79 While these remarks testify to his deep concern about th e Iris h question , and about th e rol e o f the agraria n proble m i n that question, the y also hint faintly a t the partia l retraction which was to follow of his demand fo r universal fixity of tenure. The letter s as a whole suggest tha t although h e believe d nothin g els e woul d hav e the hoped-fo r result , h e was beginning t o rationaliz e th e acceptanc e o f less . Th e barrag e o f criticis m affected hi m more tha n h e let Cairne s know . The appearanc e of Lord Dufferin' s ' Mr Mill' s Pla n for the Pacificatio n o f Ireland Examined' early in March served to prolong the criticism. Thi s reply to Mill does not nee d t o be discussed at any length. It rehearsed the arguments of the press , onl y more extensively. 80 Thus by the ev e of the debat e o n Iris h policy, ' the Hous e o f Squires' as the Daily News not unfairly called it, 81 was fortified, no t i n it s aversio n to invadin g property-rights, whic h could hardly have been stronger than it was to start with , but in its resolution to withstan d the kin d of pressures tha t Mil l had brough t to bea r in his pamphlet . Both th e Libera l an d th e Conservativ e leadershi p ha d encountere d acut e difficulty wit h thi s Parliamen t o f 1865- 8 whe n thei r Iris h lan d bill s cam e before it. Lord May o introduced a bill in March 186 7 to secure compensation for tenants ' improvement s which involved an element of compulsion upon the landlord, exercisabl e b y a governmen t commissioner , an d whic h fo r tha t reason was very badly received, so much so that it was not proceede d with. 82 For the same reason Mil l privatel y hoped i t would pass, althoug h h e thought it was otherwise of little value. 83 When the Conservativ e cabine t decided to reintroduce Mayo' s bil l a t th e beginnin g o f Marc h 1868 , th e elemen t o f compulsion was left ou t as not bein g among ' those points o f the controvers y on whic h there begin s to b e a concurrenc e of opinion'. 84 Gladston e wa s no more confident than the Conservatives that the feelings of the Commons against any suc h measur e coul d b e overcome . H e wa s anxious , tw o month s befor e Mill's pamphlet sa w the light , that th e liberal s should mak e 'every effort ' t o agree on a land bill with J. F. Maguire , who voiced in Parliament, with great 79

Mill-Taylo r Collectio n (vol . LV) , Mill t o Cairnes , i an d 1 0 March 1868 . Publishe d in London. ' You have discusse d like a gentleman an d Mill has not argued lik e a philosopher', wrote an aristocratic friend o f the author ; Si r A. Lyall , Th e Life o f the Marquis of Dufferin & Ava, 2 vols. (London, 1905) ; I, 167, Lord Arthur Russell t o Dufferin , 1 0 March 1868. 81 Th e Daily News, 2 5 February 1868 . 82 See.th e speeches of Mayo and G . M . W . Sandford , 1 8 Februar y and 2 9 April 1867 , an d Mayo's reference t o this bill on 1 0 March 1868 in House o f Commons Debates; also the Saturday Review, 4 May 1867 . 83 Mill-Taylo r Collectio n (vol . LV) , Mil l t o Cairnes , 2 6 May 1867 . 84 Derb y Paper s (Bo x 146/4) , B . Disraeli t o Lor d Derby , 4 . March 1868 . 80

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moderation, th e hope s an d grievance s of th e tenants . A t th e sam e tim e h e confessed tha t h e did no t kno w how the innocuou s Liberal proposal s of 186 6 could be significantly extended.' It would have been with the utmost difficulty' so he reminde d his correspondent, Chicheste r Fortescue , th e autho r of these proposals, 'tha t w e should hav e got tha t Bil l wel l supported b y th e Cabine t and ou r friend s an d a more ultra measur e would only mean more splitting'. ' More splitting': this wa s a severely limiting factor i n his calculations of the action i t wa s possibl e t o tak e o n Iris h issues . No t tha t h e wa s incline d t o underestimate th e gravit y o f the situation . ' The Iris h question.. . long... grave, is growing awful', h e informed Fortescue. 'In my opinion this Empire has bu t on e danger . I t i s the dange r by the combinatio n o f the thre e names Ireland, Unite d States , an d Canada.' 85 Gladstone's Southpor t speech o f 1 9 December 1867 , made a few days afte r writing this letter, publicize d in less specific terms his awareness of the threa t Ireland posed to Britain from withou t as well as from within . H e di d not need Mill to tell hi m ho w alarming it was. 86 Th e Commons ' lon g debat e between 10 an d 1 6 Marc h showe d tha t othe r leadin g parliamentarian s beside s Glad stone were more alive than the pres s apparently was to the sapping of British power an d influenc e b y th e Iris h problem , an d th e concer n o f som e wa s heightened by Mill's warnings on this head. A Conservative cabinet minister, Gathorne Hardy, felt impelled to state that if Mill were correct in his estimate of th e problem , an d mor e especiall y a s t o it s effect s o n Anglo-America n relations,' then I say it may be necessary to resort to some measure which I do not now like to contemplate'. 87 The dange r to which the empire was exposed furnished on e of the debate's themes. Another was the rejection notwithstanding o f Mill's truly radical lan d reform . Mill an d hi s pamphle t figured very prominently in th e debate . Th e pre vailing ton e o f th e reference s t o the m wa s se t b y Charle s Neate , a forme r professor o f political economy a t Oxford , in these words: O

<J

It migh t be thought work of supererogation to defend landlord s in this House; but they must loo k a little to what was... said... elsewhere. He was chiefly addressing himself to a remarkable work which most Gentleme n had read , lately published by the honourabl e Member fo r Westminster. Neate was, he said, 'quite taken aback' by the pamphlet ; he could no longer acknowledge th e author' s 'excellen t wisdom' . H e likene d hi m t o th e mos t dreaded type of social revolutionary— It migh t appear startling to compare the two men; and a month ago he should have drawn a very unfavourabl e contras t betwee n th e violenc e an d rapacit y o f Jack... Cade and th e mil d philosoph y o f the honourabl e Member... 85

Strachi e Papers , Somerse t R.O . (H . 324/0? i), Gladston e t o Fortescue , n Decembe r 1867. 86 Th e Times, 20 December 1867 . 87 House o f Commons Debates, 12 Marc h 1868 .

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He hoped that Mill's onslaught would rouse English an d Irish landlords , who had thus been served with notice of their imminent extinction, to fight back.88 There was inevitably a wealth of repetition a s one speaker succeeded anothe r with charge s of ' confiscation' an d prophecies of the misery that woul d ensu e from conferrin g fixity of tenure upon those who would surely abuse it. Of the cabinet, Gathorn e Hard y attacke d Mil l o n bot h counts , an d Lor d Mayo 89 laboured th e second i n his speech. The y pointed out , too , tha t th e landlord s constituted th e strongest of Anglo-Irish ties. The government adhered to their main proposal on Irish land, of a royal commission on the question, which they had adopte d a t Delane' s promptin g befor e th e publicatio n o f England an d Ireland;90 and like Delane they made it clear—Disraeli apart—that this was expected t o vindicate the landlords . O f the Liberal s John Brigh t di d not be lieve that' so vast and extraordinary a scheme' as Mill's could ever be relevan t to Ireland , an d h e underline d th e respec t h e ha d fo r property. 91 Gladston e observed with restrained irony:' I have not daring sufficient t o accompany my honourable friend... [in] what appeared to me to be the dismissal of the land lords o f Ireland'. H e voice d warm sympathy fo r th e sufferin g allege d of th e peasantry bu t limite d th e hop e o f legislativ e ai d whic h h e hel d ou t t o a n eloquent restatemen t o f the Libera l bil l o f 1866 . Predictably, h e gav e notice that the new departure whic h he thought wa s urgently require d i n Irish policy would be directed against the Protestant Establishment, and not the landlords.92 This had the obviou s advantage of uniting the large majority in all sections of his party . The mos t powerfu l criticism o f Mill—for s o it struc k th e Hous e an d th e press—came fro m Rober t Lowe , whos e formidabl e oppositio n t o Parlia mentary refor m ha d bee n influence d by the fir m vie w he took that i t would undermine th e whol e structure o f society . I n a prognosi s o f th e reform' s baneful consequence s give n t o J . T. Delan e i n Decembe r 1866 , h e ha d included an agrarian measure that' would gravely injure Ireland , by inspiring apprehension, b y diminishin g th e valu e [of ] th e lan d an d b y fomentin g animosity'.93 Over the past few years, Lowe had made something of a speciality of Iris h land , i n th e Common s an d i n th e leader s h e wrot e fo r Th e Times, taking the landlord' s part on rigidly orthodox economic grounds, expounded with the lucid aggression characteristic of him.94 The speec h he now delivered was meant t o eradicat e any positive impressio n that Mill , who m he rate d ' a great authority' , migh t hav e mad e o n Englis h opinion . O n th e subjec t o f 88

9 Ibid . 1 0 March 1868 . 8 Ibid . Disrael i Papers , Nationa l Trust , Hughende n Mano r (B/XX/S/796) , Lor d Stanle y t o Disraeli, 25 January 1868 ; Mayo Papers (MS n, 164), Disraeli to Mayo, 7 February 1868 ; for Disraeli's speec h se e House o f Commons Debates, 16 Marc h 1868 . 91 Ibid . 1 3 Marc h 1868 . " Ibid. 1 6 Marc h 1868 . 93 Delan e Paper s (vol . 15) , Low e t o Delane , 2 0 December 1866 . 94 See , fo r example , hi s speeche s i n House o f Commons Debates, 27 Februar y 186 5 an d 17 Ma y 1866 ; hi s leaders ar e noted i n the diar y of contributors among th e record s of Times Newspapers Ltd . 90

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landlord-tenant relation s he was as disingenuous, wit h a contrary aim, as Mill had bee n i n hi s pamphlet. Low e asserte d tha t th e selec t committee s o f th e Commons which had gone into this aspect of the question in recent years, and to whic h h e ha d belonged , 'wer e entirel y unsuccessfu l i n discoverin g an y case of real grievance'. This seems t o have been in the narro w sense he first specified here : that witnesses before the committees did not identify concret e instances of landlord oppression—but the broa d conclusion he suggested di d not follo w fro m thei r evidence . Classically , h e sa w Irish discontent a s explicable almost wholly by rural over-population and the small farmer's impossible plight as the occupie r o f a holding which was quite uneconomic . Ther e was, to his mind, n o cure for the country's depressed conditio n but th e establish ment of a climate of confidence and physical security, to attract British capital. ' Reason and good political economy' taught that the owner of land should be completely fre e t o d o wit h i t a s h e like . H e pronounce d i t 'ridiculou s t o inveigh agains t a law.. .the sam e in Irelan d a s in England.. .whatever may be the differenc e betwee n the two countries, it is impossible that there can be any fundamenta l injustice i n a law which works with entir e satisfactio n in a country like this'. His detailed objections to Mill's plan were the usual ones: it was the assuranc e and incisiveness with which they were stated tha t was so telling.95 Mill's speec h containe d on e passag e tha t i s wel l know n t o historian s o f economic thought—a measured rebuke to Lowe for treating political economy not a s a theoretica l science , a means to understanding , bu t a s prescriptive, laying down certain unvarying propositions. It is not always remembered that his contemporarie s though t Mil l tende d t o fal l int o th e sam e error , an d especially when he wrote about peasan t proprietorship . In th e remainde r of the speech he was much less sure of himself. Not onl y was he now palpably on the defensive : h e was trying to be conciliatory, and he mad e importan t concession s to hi s critics . Thes e he di d no t mentio n a s such in the Autobiography. Whil e he repeated his view that Iris h unres t gave cause for greate r concer n tha n eve r before—because o f its American dimension and its intensified national consciousness—there was no uncompromising insistence o n hi s pla n a s th e jus t an d imperativ e respons e t o th e crisis . He opene d with th e acknowledgemen t tha t h e ha d fa r outstrippe d publi c opinion. When he reached his plan, he claimed, a s in the Autobiography, that it had been misunderstoo d an d misrepresented . Ther e wa s afte r al l 'a ver y grea t number of tenants who do not pay a full rent' under those landlords who were ' most moderate in their exactions... the best... the most improving... on the best terms with their tenants, an d whom it is most important to retain in the country'. The saving s amassed by Irish farmers were remarkable, and he was generous i n hi s acceptanc e of the corollary : 'I mus t say. . .it reflect s grea t 95

House o f Commons Debates, 1 2 March 1868 .

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credit o n th e landlord s o f Ireland , take n a s a body, tha t th e tenant s shoul d have bee n abl e t o accumulat e suc h almos t incredibl e sums... ' Thes e pas sages in the speec h coul d not be convincingly reconciled with his description of Iris h landlord s an d tenant s i n th e pamphlet . Sinc e th e pla n strictl y pro hibited fixit y o f tenure a t less than ' a full rent—fair.. . not... excessive, bu t still.. .full', h e anticipated tha t many occupiers would prefer t o retain thei r existing tenure under landlord s wh o would be glad to accommodate them. I t is not at all evident from England and Ireland that Mill had in mind this large exception to his plan; nor that there were a substantial proportio n o f tenants so fortunately placed , and a comparatively blameless landlord class . Coming t o ' the strongest argument I have... heard... against m y plan'— that b y it the governmen t woul d incur unpopularit y an d get involved in the peculiar difficultie s o f Irish landlords—this was, he said, decisive if valid. He did not think the tenants coul d fail to be grateful and co-operative. Removing the landlords' optio n t o conver t thei r rent s into Treasur y bond s would , h e suggested, sav e the government from embarrassment o n this score. He ignored the objection that government still had the even more invidious task of settling the officia l rents . Other, ver y significant, modifications of his pla n considerabl y reduced it s benefits, and consequently it s attractions, t o the Irish peasant. H e mentioned here, exceeding his optimism in the last edition o f the Principles on this point, that holdings were in general no longer too small to be viable: but if they were, the tenants would find themselves unable to pay the rent an d they would be evicted—'a necessary par t o f my plan'—thus enabling th e landlord s t o con solidate suc h holdings . Mil l wen t further : possibly , i n the cas e of occupiers below an acreage t o be specified, fixity of tenure shoul d b e conditional upo n improvement of the land. Pasture too might be excluded, to begin with, fro m the ambi t o f the scheme . I n conclusion , Mil l implie d tha t h e woul d not be unhappy if the Hous e an d hi s proposed lan d commission effecte d additiona l ' temperaments' as he called them, of his plan: its essence, he said, was ' not... that ever y tenant shoul d hav e an actual perpetuity... only that ever y tenant who actually tills the soi l should have the power of obtaining a perpetuity on an impartia l valuation' . Bu t not , presumably , th e luckles s occupier s o f uneconomic farms. 96 These far-reaching changes are termed' explanations' in the Autobiography. 91 Mill had hi s share of vanity: nothing he wrote was so disrespectfully treated as England and Ireland. The amendment s in this speech t o his proposals were an admission tha t h e had perpetrate d a n egregiou s blunder i n pretending, if for patrioti c reasons, tha t the Iris h lan d syste m wa s so much wors e than h e had described it only three years earlier in his most authoritative work. There was not muc h lef t o f the pamphle t afte r th e speech , an d Mill' s intellectua l 96 87

Ibid. ; Mill, Autobiography, pp . 250-1 . Ibid . p. 251 .

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reputation ha d suffered. ' Mr Mill himself completed the work of demolition' said the Pall Mall Gazette 'partly by (for him) a singularly weak defence of his project, and partly by explaining much of it away'. 98 He did not care to record this unusua l discomfiture for posterity . IV

In th e Autobiography Mil l too k t o himsel f muc h o f the credi t fo r th e 187 0 Irish Lan d Act. 'It is most improbable', he wrote, 'that a measure conceding so much to the tenantry as Mr Gladstone' s Iris h Lan d Bill , would have been proposed b y a Government, o r could hav e been carrie d throug h Parliament , unless th e Britis h publi c had been led to perceive that a case might b e made, and perhaps a party formed, for a measure considerably stronger.' Change, he fairly remarked , must b e presente d t o th e uppe r an d middl e classe s o f thi s country under the form of compromise, an d other agrarian schemes appeare d as such besid e his. " There ma y have been somethin g i n thi s claim ; it canno t b e dismisse d a s absurd. Al l th e evidenc e suggest s tha t i t i s very much exaggerated . I n th e first place, Mill had so modified hi s plan that, whateve r its exact scope there after, i t seeme d t o fal l wel l short o f universal fixit y o f tenure. Secondly , h e dropped the subject of Irish land, to all intents, after his speech in March 1868. Fixity of tenure, however, continue d t o be demanded b y the more outspoke n leaders o f the agraria n movement i n Ireland , lik e Isaa c Butt, Si r John Gra y and some of the Catholic Hierarchy, and it was accordingly with them, and not with Mill, that this extreme was identified i n the British mind. Thirdly, whil e Mill's plan did attract a little more support tha n it had initially received, tha t support represente d additiona l strength i n th e quarte r wher e he ha d foun d approval t o star t with—th e intellectual s o f advanced liberalism . Lastly , hi s plan is not considered in the mass of papers relating to the Gladstone cabinet's deliberations upo n th e Iris h Lan d Bil l i n 1869-70 , an d there i s mainl y in cidental mentio n of him in the ver y extensive journalistic debat e at the time . For th e cabine t an d the press the most influential single contribution to the overwhelming literatur e o n th e Iris h lan d questio n wa s tha t mad e b y a disciple of Mill's, bu t it s approach was quite distinct from his . In England and Ireland Mil l had made , but faile d t o develop , the poin t tha t th e English an d Irish notion s of property in land were historically opposed to each other. Th e full relevanc e of thi s t o th e contemporar y agraria n problem wa s show n b y an Anglo-Indian admire r of his, Georg e Campbell . I n tw o remarkable pamphlets written i n th e summe r an d earl y autum n o f 1869, Campbell expose d the pervasiv e influence of customary tenure i n Ireland beyond the are a where it flourishe d openly , an d th e wa y in which it circumscribe d th e operatio n of 88

Th e Pall Mall Gazette, 14 March 1868,' Irish Land Question in the House of Commons'. " Mill , Autobiography, p . 250 .

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the la w o f landlord an d tenant know n to the courts . Legislation , h e argued, should aim at constructing an agrarian code out of the custo m of tenant-right . Effectively, thi s meant fixity of tenure; but Campbell' s approac h wa s much subtler an d more profound than Mill's peremptory call for fixity. Advocating the extensio n a s wel l a s th e legalizatio n o f Ulste r custo m wa s no t new : Campbell's justification of it was. He demonstrated that in Ireland as in India fixity of tenure could be seen as the crystallization by government of practices which were integral to the fabric of native society. Gladstone tried, and failed, to induc e th e cabine t to accep t a bill based on Campbell' s proposals . Campbell's two pamphlets, publishe d i n book form under th e titl e of Th e Irish Land,100 showed that the author was strongly influenced by Mill on property an d society . Mill himself privately accorded Campbell high praise , but he was inclined to think, as in the Principles, that fixity of tenure should be limited to 'ryots, o r labourer-farmers', 101 which was to misunderstand, or to reject, the whole point of Campbell's book . The 187 0 Land Act gave the force of la w to tenant-right i n Ulster an d elsewhere only if the custom were shown to exist with at least the implied consent o f the landlord. The large majority of tenants received a right to the value of their improvements, such as these were, and quit e limite d compensatio n fo r 'disturbance ' o n eviction. 102 Mil l wel comed the bill in a Fortnightly Review article as ' a great step in advance, and a signal triumph of political necessity over inveterate prejudice' because it went a long way towards establishing security of tenure :103 but i n the preface to the 1871 edition of the Principles he inserted the cryptic statement that' all notice, of th e alteratio n mad e i n th e Lan d Law s o f Irelan d b y th e recen t Act , i s deferred until experience shall have had time to pronounce on the operation of of that well-mean t attempt.. ,'.104 A recent boo k on Mill seeks to show that ' the godfather of English liberalism . .. emerges... considerably less libertaria n than i s sometimes suggested .. .emerges considerably mor e radical.. .'.105The present writer seems forced 100 London , 1869 . The foregoin g paragrap h i s a summary o f the presen t writer' s articl e i n the Historical Journal (1968) , ' Ireland and the Empire in the i86os . Imperia l Precedents fo r Gladstone's First Iris h Lan d Act'. 101 Mill-Taylo r Collection (vol . LV) , Mill t o Cairnes, 1 6 November 1869 ; printed i n Elliot , op. cit. n , 229-30. In the following January Mil l told Cairne s tha t he approved of the latter's article i n th e Fortnightly Review fo r tha t month , o n 'Political Econom y an d Land' , whic h endorsed Campbell' s scheme, with th e suggestio n o f certain mino r changes . Ye t while Mil l thought th e scheme was 'without doub t the utmost which ther e i s any chance of obtaining a t present fro m Parliament' , h e doubte d whethe r anythin g les s tha n th e absolut e securit y of ' fixity of tenure at a valuation made once for all' would content th e Irish. Cairnes, whos e views had undergone a marked change since he first wrote to the master about Iris h land, was 'truly sorry to find you so desponding a s to the efficienc y o f a measure such a s Campbell has pre pared'. Mill-Taylo r Collectio n (vol . LV) , Mil l t o Cairnes , n Januar y 1870 ; ibid . (vol . LVI) , Cairnes to Mill , 1 3 January 1870 . 108 I n principle the 187 0 Land Act was a measure of great moment : in practice i t was much less significant. Th e Times, 10 August 1870 . 103 Th e Fortnightly Review, Jun e 1870 , 'Professor Lesli e o n the Lan d Question' , p. 644 . 104 Mill , Works, H , xciv. 108 M . J. Cowling , Mill an d Liberalism (Cambridge, 1963) , p . xii .

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to conclud e tha t Mil l wa s less libertaria n bu t les s radica l tha n i s often sup posed: becaus e h e ver y largl y share d th e complacency , i f that i s the righ t word, o f his contemporarie s abou t Englis h politica l an d social institutions : because h e wa s a patrio t an d even—wha t i s anathem a t o hi s mos t ferven t admirers today—a convinced 'imperialist'.

11 THE IRIS H QUESTION AN D LIBERAL POLITICS, 1886-1894 D.A. HAMER BETWEEN 186 7 an d th e en d o f th e nineteent h centur y th e Iris h questio n was on e o f th e majo r issue s i n Britis h politics . Betwee n 188 0 an d 189 3 i n particular i t achieve d th e statu s o f th e predominatin g issue , th e grea t an d abiding preoccupation o f politicians. Ther e would appear t o be little difficult y for th e historia n i n explainin g wh y thi s wa s so . Ther e wer e obviousl y abundant reason s i n th e Iris h situatio n itsel f wh y politician s shoul d hav e devoted s o muc h o f thei r tim e an d effor t t o dealin g wit h it—th e urgen t nature o f Ireland' s socia l problems , especiall y i n relatio n t o land-holding ; the growth of Irish agraria n agitation so much bette r organize d and supporte d than had hitherto been the case that it had to be met by a large and extremel y time-consuming amoun t of coercio n or lan d refor m or a combinatio n of both; th e growin g hol d i n Irelan d o f nationalis m an d o f th e deman d fo r home rule ; th e ne w strengt h an d cohesio n o f the Iris h parliamentar y part y and it s impac t o n Britis h politics , bot h withi n th e Hous e o f Common s an d through th e mobilisation of the votes of Irishmen i n the non-Irish constituen cies. Ireland clearly needed, and had the means of exacting, a very considerable amount o f attentio n t o it s problems . Th e natur e o f the preoccupatio n wit h Ireland seems equally clear. The issue s o f land and loca l government reform , home rule, and coercio n predominate i n the though t an d action o f politicians with regar d t o the Iris h question . Most analyse s o f th e situatio n concentrat e o n thes e aspect s o f it , an d i t cannot b e denie d tha t durin g this period th e problems o f Ireland constitute d for politician s a majo r obstructio n t o progres s i n othe r area s o f politica l interest. Th e realit y o f thi s obstructio n havin g bee n acknowledged , ther e are, however , othe r question s whic h ough t t o b e asked . Ther e ar e othe r ways o f considering th e causes , th e nature , an d th e significanc e o f the grea t Irish preoccupation. What seems deserving of closer examination, for instance, is th e reactio n o f th e politician s t o findin g themselve s preoccupie d i n thi s way. Di d the y resen t i t o r di d the y welcom e it ? On e ha s alway s t o bea r i n mind tha t thes e wer e me n electe d by , an d responsibl e to , a predominantl y non-Irish electorate , a n electorat e greatl y increase d i n 186 7 an d 188 4 t o include large numbers fro m th e working classes, whom the y wer e cultivating with policies and national campaign s and appeals . Ho w di d they present an d explain thei r preoccupatio n wit h Irelan d t o thes e ne w voter s fo r whos e support the y wer e appealin g throughou t thi s perio d an d man y o f who m

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presumably expecte d tha t thei r acquisitio n o f the vot e woul d lea d to greate r attention t o thei r ow n problem s ? Associated with this is another important but neglecte d line of investigation. Was ther e an y relationshi p betwee n th e Iris h preoccupatio n an d th e othe r leading policy issues of the day more substantial than the fact that it prevented politicians from devotin g enough tim e an d though t t o them ? To wha t extent did it , a s th e concer n o f thes e politicians , acquir e characteristic s fro m th e broader non-Iris h contex t withi n whic h the y principall y operated? I t woul d certainly b e surprisin g i f a preoccupation o f suc h duratio n faile d t o acquir e or hav e imposed o n i t som e connexio n wit h other , non-Iris h aspect s o f th e political lif e o f th e time . Eve n i f on e assume s tha t thi s concentratio n o n Irish problems wa s inescapable for an y leading politician durin g th e period, one ough t t o recogniz e that h e wa s still able , an d indee d migh t hav e bee n obliged, t o adap t o r exploi t th e preoccupatio n t o confor m wit h th e need s of hi s ow n particular non-Irish political situation . Various theorie s hav e bee n pu t forwar d whic h sugges t tha t th e Iris h preoccupation di d develo p i n thi s way . Ther e is , fo r example , th e ide a that i t functione d a s a safety-valv e fo r th e expressio n o f feeling s an d th e adoption o f attitude s whic h wer e non-Iris h i n origi n an d natur e bu t coul d not easil y b e manifeste d i n th e mor e genera l context . A recen t biographe r of A . J . Balfou r call s i t a n 'escap e ven t fo r passion s altogether to o stron g for thei r over t subject', a safety-valve for a body politi c 'worrie d b y sign s of "democracy", murmur s o f Socialism , fear s o f a declinin g economy'. 1 A variant on this is the idea that Ireland was a testing-ground fo r new political principles, suc h a s stat e interferenc e wit h contract s an d wit h propert y rights, o r tha t i t wa s a battle-groun d t o whic h wer e transferre d conflict s that reall y belonge d i n England . Accordin g t o E . Strauss, 2 Irelan d wa s ' an obvious field for the stratagem s o f mines an d countermines betwee n th e two parties' . On e o f th e Libera l argument s fo r hom e rul e afte r 188 5 wa s the desirabilit y of ending a situation in which Ireland wa s treated as a cockpit for th e struggle s o f th e partie s rathe r tha n i n referenc e to it s ow n specia l problems. Joh n Morley , advancin g thi s argumen t i n a speec h i n 1891 , remarked o n ho w orator s delighte d t o us e Iris h issue s fo r th e displa y o f ' all the grand common-places of their art', such a s '" Law and order" on the one side, "Reconciliatio n o f the people" an d "Freedo m of a nation" on th e other'. Bu t he went furthe r an d claime d that the ma n wh o hate s chang e i n England , th e ma n wh o distrust s th e loo k o f present things and dreads the future , th e man whose great object i s to stem the democrati c tide an d t o sav e hi s cherishe d inequalitie s an d privileges , delight s wit h hi s whol e 1 K . Young , Arthur James Balfour: Th e Happy Life o f th e Politician Prime Minister Statesman and Philosopher, 1848-1930 (1963) , p . 128 . 2 Irish Nationalism and British Democracy, (1951) , pp . 184-5 .

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heart i n keepin g a s long as he can , and fo r eve r i f he can , the tw o grea t politica l hosts of this country eternally clashing in the Iris h ditch. 3 Both thi s theor y an d th e notio n o f the safety-valv e raise th e questio n of choice, o f whether th e preoccupatio n was alway s or completel y involuntary and unavoidable . Di d politician s deliberatel y either creat e o r prolon g an d unnecessarily enlarg e it i n orde r tha t i t migh t b e a safety-valv e or a battle ground? Wha t Morle y wa s suggestin g wa s tha t th e Iris h questio n wa s employed deliberately by certain politicians to distract attention from proposals for refor m a t home . Thi s 'distraction ' o r 'diversion ' theor y is t o b e foun d in the works of some recent historians. C . C. O'Brien says that Tor y coercio n after 188 6 'distracte d attentio n fro m Britis h domesti c issues' , an d L . P . Curtis, Jr. , remark s that, whil e neithe r Liberal s no r Conservative s ca n b e blamed for creating the Irish question , ' elements in both partie s consciously allowed event s i n Irelan d t o obscur e socia l an d economi c problem s a t home'.4 Space doe s not permit an examination o f the relevance o f these suggestions as t o th e natur e an d significanc e o f th e preoccupatio n wit h Irelan d t o al l aspects o f the Iris h questio n i n thi s period . I inten d i n thi s articl e t o tak e one majo r episode—th e devotio n o f the Libera l part y t o th e polic y o f home rule fro m 188 6 to 1893 . The origin s o f th e preoccupatio n o f th e Libera l part y wit h hom e rul e after 188 5 obviousl y lie mainl y i n th e exigencie s o f the Iris h questio n itself and i n th e developmen t o f the thinkin g o f Liberals , notabl y Gladstone , o n Irish polic y i n respons e t o thes e exigencies. 5 Th e fac t tha t littl e referenc e will b e mad e i n thi s articl e t o thes e origin s doe s no t impl y tha t the y hav e been disregarded . Wha t I hav e concentrate d o n doin g i s examinin g th e preoccupation i n relatio n to th e developmen t o f th e part y itself an d seein g what impac t i t had, o r was made to have, on that development . One o f th e majo r weaknesse s tha t appeare d i n th e Libera l part y i n th e early 1870 3 was sectionalism. Th e part y seeme d t o b e simpl y a coalitio n of adherents to various reform interests eac h of whom believed that th e refor m which h e favoure d wa s the mos t importan t o f all and th e mos t deservin g of attention b y the part y leadership . Professor Hanha m ha s traced th e growth , of thi s 'faddism' , a s it cam e to b e known. 6 I t becam e a danger t o th e unit y of th e party , especiall y when th e advocate s o f thes e reform s threatene d t o 3

Th e Times, 22 Sept. 1891 . C . C . O'Brien , Parnell and His Party i88o-go (Oxford, 1957), p. 210 . L . P . Curtis , Jr. , Coercion and Conciliation in Ireland, 1880-1892: A Study i n Conservative Unionism (Princeto n and London , 1963) , p. 431 . 5 Fo r a ful l accoun t o f thes e origin s se e D . G . Hoskin , 'Th e genesi s an d significanc e of th e 188 6 "Hom e Rule" split in th e Libera l Party', Cambridg e Ph.D . thesis , 1964 . 6 H . J . Hanham , Elections an d Party Management: Politics i n th e Time o f Disraeli an d Gladstone (1959) , chapte r 6. 4

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make suppor t o f thei r 'fads ' test s fo r Libera l candidates . Th e Nationa l Education League , th e Liberation Society, an d the United Kingdom Allianc e were amon g th e mos t prominen t o f thes e pressur e groups , bu t ther e wer e many more . A s thes e compete d fo r th e attentio n o f th e Libera l leader s and reacte d rebelliousl y i f thei r demand s wer e ignore d o r thei r interest s damaged, th e conditio n o f Libera l politic s becam e increasingl y anarchic . Joseph Chamberlai n remarke d o n 'th e prominence o f special questions ' i n the general election of 1874:' The organizations o f the Alliance, the Liberatio n Society, the Nationa l Education League , the Anti-Contagiou s Diseases Acts Association, the Home Rulers, the Women's Suffrag e Association , and others —all consistin g mainl y o f Liberals—wer e everywher e pressin g thei r claim s and strivin g t o mak e their concessio n th e crucia l test.' 7 Gladston e to o was at thi s tim e deplorin g th e existenc e o f s o man y refor m questions , 'eac h with a group o f adherents to a special view, but incapabl e of being pursue d by commo n and united action'. 8 Professor Hanha m ha s suggested, however , tha t th e Libera l defea t a t th e 1874 elections was a great shock t o many 'faddists ' an d led to a more sobe r appreciation among them of the necessity i n their own interest o f maintaining the strengt h an d unit y o f th e whol e party . Chamberlai n is , o f course , th e outstanding exampl e o f a Libera l politicia n wh o behave d a s a sectionalis t before 187 4 bu t afte r 187 4 turne d t o buildin g u p th e unit y o f th e party . He sa w the proble m thus : 'A t presen t ther e ar e onl y individua l Radicals , each speciall y intereste d i n som e par t o f th e whole.. . There ar e League s and Association s an d Union s bu t n o party... '9 What th e Liberal s neede d was some principle that would bind together all these Leagues and Associations and make a unified party. Mathew Arnold perceived the basic weakness when he wrot e afte r th e 187 4 election s tha t th e Libera l part y ha d 'n o bod y of just, clear, well-ordered thought upo n polities' and would have to 'find a new basis'.10 Liberalis m a s a politica l cree d wa s n o longe r systemati c enough ; there was no general agreemen t amon g reformer s calling themselves Liberals as to wha t th e principle s tha t shoul d gover n the politica l actio n o f Liberal s really were. What the n wer e the alternatives ? For a tim e th e developmen t o f part y organizatio n appeale d t o man y Liberals, notabl y Chamberlain , a s th e answe r t o th e proble m o f Libera l disunity, the cure for the Liberal 'disease' . In Birmingha m Liberalism ther e had develope d wha t coul d b e calle d a mystique o f democracy , a dee p fait h 7 Chamberlain , 'Th e Nex t Pag e o f th e Libera l Programme' , Th e Fortnightly Review, no. 9 4 (Oct. 1874) , 413. 8 J . Morley , Th e Life o f William Ewart Gladstone (1903) , n , 502-3 . Fo r example s o f sectionalism, cf . A . W . W . Dale , Th e Life o f R . W . Dale o f Birmingham (1898) , pp . 281 , 285-6 and J . L . an d B . Hammond, James Stansfeld: A Victorian Champion o f Se x Equality (1932), p. 177 . 9 J . L . Garvin , Th e Life o f Joseph Chamberlain (1932) , I , 161 . 10 G . W . E . Russel l (ed.), Letters o f Matthew Arnold, 1848-1888 (1901), n, 129 .

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in th e possibilit y o f establishin g i n politica l institution s th e expressio n o f a unified popular will.11 The theory on which the' caucus' type of organization and th e Nationa l Libera l Federatio n wer e base d wa s tha t th e democrati c principle coul d provid e a n effectiv e integratio n o f minority section s int o unified part y action . Whe n Chamberlai n and hi s supporter s discusse d th e merits o f the 'caucus ' an d th e N.L.F. , the y lai d grea t stres s o n th e endin g of ' faddism' a s a disruptiv e forc e an d o n th e harnessin g o f the energie s of the sectionalist s to the wor k of securing and maintainin g a Liberal majority . Under the genera l organizational 'umbrella' the sectionalist s woul d acquire the democrati c instinct, develo p a sense o f wider loyalties, and b e prepared to accep t a n orde r o f prioritie s fo r refor m legislatio n a s decide d b y th e majority. Th e basi c proble m wa s the establishmen t o f thes e priorities , th e evolution o f order among the man y diverse and competin g reform interests . Through fre e an d ope n discussio n suc h orde r woul d emerge . Ther e would be a consensus, a sense o f a majority interest.12 The 'caucus ' an d th e N.L.F . represente d Libera l politic s base d o n total comprehensiveness, the inclusion of all sections within the party organization. But quit e th e opposit e attitud e t o th e proble m o f securin g part y unit y sometimes appear s amon g th e Libera l leaders . Thi s wa s a dispositio n t o seek o r t o welcom e and exploi t a n opportunit y fo r th e purgin g o f the part y and its reconstruction on some narrower but mor e solid basis. Either electoral defeat o r a split in the party over some clear issue of principle might actually be beneficia l i f what was lef t o f the part y wa s more coheren t an d compact . As early as 1866 Gladstone wrote: 'A general election, which should somewha t reduce th e party , woul d be o f great use, i f i t shoul d als o have th e effec t o f [purging?] it.' 13 After 187 3 in particular there emerge d in the part y a fram e of min d tha t eithe r assume d tha t a split wa s inevitable or favoured bringing on a split a s a solution to the party's problems . Liberalism was seen by some as bein g i n suc h a disorganize d stat e tha t perhap s it s onl y salvatio n la y in a reconstruction involvin g the cuttin g off of sections of the party. Hartington, who wa s prepared i n 187 5 t° se e the radical s and moderate s g o their own separate ways , said t o Gladston e i n 188 5 that 'th e point alway s urged upo n him was, not to break up the Libera l party. But.. . can we avoid its breaking up, withi n a ver y shor t tim e afte r you retire , & ough t thi s consideratio n 11

Cf . A . Briggs , Victorian Cities (1963), pp . 188-227 . Fo r th e source s o f thi s mystique , cf. T . R . Tholfsen , 'Th e Origin s o f th e Birmingha m Caucus' , Th e Historical Journal, n , no. 2 (1959), 161-84 . 12 Hanham , op . cit. , chapte r 7 . R . S . Watson , Th e National Liberal Federation from It s Commencement to the General Election of 1906, 1907, esp. pp. 8 , 15 , 19 , 20, 24. M. Ostrogorski , Democracy an d th e Organization o f Political Parties, (1902) , I , 175 , 183 . P . Eraser , Joseph Chamberlain Radicalism and Empire, 1868-1914 (1966) , pp . 29-32 . J . Chamberlain , ' A Ne w Political Organization' , Th e Fortnightly Review, no . 12 7 (Jul y 1877) , 127-9 ; 'The Caucus', The Fortnightly Review, no . 14 3 (Nov . 1878) , 726-7, 730 , 734, 737 . 13 Gladston e t o Russell , 2 0 June 1866 , Russel l Papers , P.R.O . 30/22/16 , quote d i n F . B . Smith, Th e Making o f th e Second Reform Bill (Cambridge , 1966) , p. 114 .

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therefore t o be regarded as of such very great force.' 14 Chamberlain , in spite of hi s claim s t o b e settin g u p a n all-inclusiv e part y organisation , ha d th e long-term strateg y o f expellin g th e whig s an d establishin g th e ascendenc y of th e radical s i n a reconstructe d party . Th e hop e o f seein g a spli t an d a reconstruction o n a ne w basi s was, of course , characteristi c o f th e attitud e to th e part y o f many advocates of particular reforms . The exampl e may b e given of W. E. Bear, a land-reform enthusiast, wh o wrote thus in 1879, wnen urging th e part y t o 'tak e Fre e Agricultur e fo r it s watchword' : 'I t wil l b e objected tha t t o adop t thi s suggestio n would be to divid e the Libera l party. No doub t i t woul d be ; bu t th e Libera l part y ca n only be unite d b y being divided. I t is just now a nondescript body, without distinct aims, and without even a reason for existence beyond that of preventing the Conservative s from doing mischief.. ,'15 Associated wit h this were certain othe r characteristic s o f late nineteenth century Liberal politics—the growing aversion of some leaders from holding office, th e recurrenc e o f desperat e attempt s t o fin d an y excus e t o leav e office, th e increasin g inclinatio n t o cour t electora l defea t an d exil e fro m power. The leadershi p of a party plagued by the demand s of sectionalists for attention t o thei r refor m interest s naturall y found itsel f i n grea t difficultie s whenever i t constitute d th e government , fo r the n th e section s clamoure d for action , and refusa l o r defermen t of action at a time when the part y hel d power onl y intensifie d thei r sens e o f grievance . Selectio n fro m amon g th e reform proposal s wa s a highl y invidiou s operation . N o guidin g principle s for thi s selection existe d tha t wer e acceptable both t o th e refor m advocates and to the party leaders. Power came to seem less and less attractive to those leaders who, upon acquirin g it, had to try t o organize reform legislatio n an d restrain o r satisf y th e impatienc e o f th e sectionalists . Bein g i n oppositio n was, a t an y rate , th e bes t o f al l excuse s fo r abstentio n fro m commitmen t and action . Event s afte r 188 5 hav e t o b e see n i n relatio n t o th e declin e of two Libera l government s fro m grea t electio n triumph s int o a situatio n o f disunity, incoherence , an d longin g for release from office. 16 Controversy concernin g th e mean s o f restorin g orde r t o Libera l politic s tended to be focuse d o n the questio n of the mos t desirabl e for m of Liberal policy. Shoul d th e part y adop t a wid e programm e o f reforms o r shoul d it concentrate on a single major issue ? The proponent s of these two principles of actio n engage d i n frequen t debat e durin g thi s period . Th e outstandin g

14 A s reporte d i n Gladston e t o Granville , 2 2 Jan . 1885 , A . Ram m (ed.) , Th e Political Correspondence o f M r Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886, n (Oxford , 1962) , 326 . Fo r Harrington in 187 5 see B. Holland, Th e Life o f Spencer Compton, Eighth Duke o f Devonshire, (1911), I , 141-4 . 15 W . E . Bear , 'Th e Libera l Part y an d th e Farmers' , Th e Fortnightly Review, no . 14 7 (Mar. 1879) , 443. 18 Fo r 1873-4 , cf - Morley , op. cit. n, 480-2. For th e 'ac t of hara-kiri' in 1885 , cf. Curtis op. cit. pp. 19-23 .

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advocate an d practitione r o f 'programme ' politics , an d indee d th e ma n around who m muc h o f th e controvers y centred , wa s Josep h Chamberlain . Yet eve n h e ha d wavered . I n th e earl y 1870 8 h e wa s very muc h a 'singl e question' politicia n wit h hi s involvemen t i n th e Nonconformis t agitatio n against Forster' s Educatio n Act . The n i n 187 3 h e produce d hi s firs t pro gramme—'Free Schools , Fre e Land, Fre e Church , Fre e Labour'. However, the chaoti c multitud e o f 'specia l questions ' whic h h e sa w Liberalism t o b e in th e 187 4 election s le d hi m t o loo k bac k to th e electora l triump h o f 186 8 and conclud e tha t th e voice s o f the specia l interest s wer e mos t likel y t o b e silent whenever ther e was a 'larger issue' 'fel t t o be of sufficient magnitud e to justif y th e postponemen t o f al l mino r subjects' . B y lat e 187 4 h e ha d decided tha t i t wa s necessar y t o 'conside r whic h o f th e man y practica l applications o f Libera l principle s ha s th e firs t clai m t o b e selecte d a s th e next rallyin g cr y of the Libera l party'. 17 Fo r a time, prompted b y his frien d John Morley , a n ardent advocat e of concentrating o n one question, h e looked to disestablishmen t a s a possibl e rallyin g cry o f thi s kind ; bu t b y 187 7 h e had reverte d t o hi s belie f i n programme . Organizatio n no w seemed t o hi m capable of providing the essentia l cohesion . But othe r Libera l politician s lacke d hi s fait h i n organization . T o the m a programm e wa s a n unsuitabl e mod e o f politica l actio n becaus e o f th e absence o f generally accepte d systemati c principles tha t coul d hol d togethe r the variou s parts . A party tha t devote d itsel f t o mor e tha n on e reform issu e at a tim e wa s doome d t o incoherenc e an d disunit y i f i t ha d n o underlyin g principles stron g enoug h t o bin d thes e issue s together . Gladstone , wit h hi s belief i n grea t missions , wa s a notabl e practitione r o f 'singl e question ' politics. H e wa s well known as having a 'one ide a at a time faculty'. 18 Joh n Morley an d H . H . Fowle r ma y b e mentione d a s prominen t Liberal s wh o theorized about the advantages of this mode of political conduct.19 Particularly significant ar e reference s t o Joh n Bright' s oppositio n t o 'programme ' politics.20 I n th e 1870 5 Bright' s influenc e i n thi s regar d wa s stil l bein g felt . At th e inaugura l conferenc e o f the Nationa l Libera l Federatio n i n 187 7 h e made plain his antagonism t o the type of political activity now being promoted by Chamberlain—an d Chamberlai n wa s very annoyed. 21 Ostrogorski quote s Bright's advic e t o a grou p o f Lancashir e Liberal s wh o i n 187 4 wishe d t o 17

Chamberlain , 'Th e Next Page of the Libera l Programme' loc . cit . pp . 413 , 418. Lor d Houghton , quote d i n J . L . Hammond , Gladstone an d th e Irish Nation (1938) , p. 164 . 19 Fo r Morley , cf . his correspondence wit h Chamberlai n in Aug. 187 3 in the Chamberlai n MSS., Birmingha m Universit y Library , an d i n Garvin , op . cit . I , esp. pp . 146 , 161 . V . also Morley, Th e Life o f Richard Cobden, i (1881) , 203 . Fo r Fowler , cf . E . H . Fowler , Th e Life of Henry Hartley Fowler, First Viscount Wolverhampton, G.S.C.I. (1912) , pp. 239-40 . 20 Fowler , op. cit . p . 384 . Morle y t o Chamberlain , 1 8 Aug. 1873 , and in a speech reported in Th e Times, 1 0 Dec. 1889 . 21 Cf . Chamberlain, ' A New Political Organization' , loc. cit. pp. 127 , 130 ; and Gladstone' s recollection o f the quarre l i n F . E . Hame r (ed.) , Th e Personal Papers o f Lord Rendel (1931) , P- 93 18

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revive the Nationa l Refor m Union: that if they di d so its programme shoul d consist o f one point, a single reform, an d comments : ' In thi s he adhered to the ol d concep t o f popula r Organization s forme d fo r th e realizatio n o f a distinc t an d specifie d object ; i n th e pursui t o f whic h me n differin g i n opinion o n othe r point s migh t unite , resumin g complet e libert y o f actio n as soon a s the objec t was attained.' 22 Fo r Brigh t ha d bee n involve d in what was now the classic instance of successful' one question' politics, the campaign of th e Anti-Cor n La w League ; an d bot h Fowle r an d Morley , for instance , stressed tha t in the conditions of British politics concentrating on one question at a tim e seeme d t o b e th e sures t wa y t o politica l success. 23 I n th e i88o s Liberals were give n a renewed reminde r o f the effectivenes s o f that kin d of political activit y i n Morley' s biograph y o f Cobden , publishe d i n 1881 . It s advantages are referred to frequently in the book, both in Cobden's own words and i n Morley' s commentary. 24 A recen t historia n o f th e Anti-Cor n La w League ha s traced the conflic t i n radicalism in the 1840 5 between those suc h as Cobde n wh o advocate d concentratio n o n a singl e issu e an d thos e wh o would rathe r hav e agitate d fo r a programme o f reforms , an d ha s suggeste d that ' an attack on the Cor n La w was found an acceptable focu s for Radical energies a t a time whe n the Radical s were sadl y in nee d o f suc h a rallying point'.25 Th e succes s o f the Leagu e wa s a powerfu l argumen t i n favou r o f a retur n t o 'on e question ' radicalism— if suc h a unifyin g issu e coul d eve r be foun d again. In orde r t o understan d wh y hom e rul e becam e suc h a n issu e w e mus t examine mor e closel y the 'singl e question ' politic s o f Gladstone . Sinc e th e early 1870 3 at least Gladston e ha d been ver y concerned abou t th e disunited , factious conditio n o f the Libera l party, it s lack of a 'great positive aim' , th e fact that none of the reforms advocated b y the various sections was supporte d by a 'clear an d decisiv e majority' o f the part y o r capabl e of 'bein g pursue d by commo n an d unite d action'. 26 Gladston e ha d littl e tim e fo r me n wit h 'fads' an d 'crotchets'. 27 An d i t i s clea r wha t remed y h e favoure d fo r th e disorganization whic h the y cause d i n th e party—som e 'positiv e force ' tha t would 'carr y u s onwar d a s a body', som e issue tha t woul d serv e fo r a tim e 'to moul d th e rest'. 28 H e believe d tha t th e 'vita l principl e o f the Libera l party, lik e that o f Gree k art , i s action'. Bu t effectiv e actio n i s possible onl y 22

Ostrogorski , op . cit . I , 218. Fowler , op . cit. pp . 239-40 . D . A . Harner , John Morley: Liberal Intellectual in Politics (1968), pp. 94-5 21 Cf . Morley , Life o f Cobden, i , 126-7 , 142 , 203-4 ; n, pp. 38-41 , 112-13 , 121 , 384 . 25 N . McCord , Th e Anti-Corn La w League, 1838-1846 (1958) , pp . 16-17 , 19-20 , 41-3 , 23

77-80, I I I - I 2 . 26

Morley , Life o f Gladstone, n , 457 , 498, 502-3 . Cf . his attitud e t o Leonar d Courtne y a s reported i n G . P. Gooch , Life o f Lord Courtney (1920), p. 250 . 28 Morley, Life o f Gladstone, i, 479. 27

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if energie s ar e concentrated . Therefor e h e searche d constantl y fo r som e 'question o f rea l magnitud e likel y t o unite ' th e party. 29 Whe n 'th e grea t Irish questio n cam e u p i n force ' i n 1868 , th e actio n o f th e part y had , h e believed, bee n concentrated . Late r hi s conduc t i n regar d t o th e Easter n Question wa s influence d b y a hop e tha t her e migh t b e foun d th e 'grea t question' tha t coul d bring abou t a Liberal revival. 30 Never wa s the party more disunite d tha n i n 1885 . Th e final spli t betwee n the Chamberlainit e radical s an d th e whig s seeme d imminent . Gladstone' s thinking on Irish policy meanwhile moved on its own lines towards acceptanc e of th e home-rul e solution . Bu t hi s obsessio n wit h th e Iris h proble m wa s not s o complete a s to prevent hi m fro m givin g some though t t o the proble m of Libera l part y unity—an d th e connexio n betwee n tha t unit y an d polic y preoccupations an d forms . I n th e electio n campaig n th e proble m o f orde r among refor m question s an d th e notio n o f on e questio n tha t woul d hav e a special , subordinatin g relationshi p t o al l others appea r t o hav e bee n ver y much o n hi s mind . I n a speech i n Edinburg h o n 1 1 Novembe r h e sai d tha t political question s ha d a 'prope r time ' an d a 'prope r order ' an d tha t dis establishment wa s no t a matur e enoug h subjec t t o justif y al l other s bein g thrust asid e an d cas t int o darknes s for it s sake. 31 In 188 5 th e greates t threa t of Libera l disorganizatio n cam e fro m th e eruptio n o f th e othe r kin d o f Liberal politic s i n Chamberlain' s 'radical ' an d 'unauthorized ' programmes . There i s some evidenc e to sugges t tha t Gladston e sa w a possible remed y i n the re-assertion of 'single question' Liberalism. In mid-October Chamberlain wrote, afte r visitin g Hawarden, that Gladston e did no t concea l that hi s presen t interes t wa s in th e Iris h question , an d h e seeme d to thin k tha t a polic y fo r dealin g wit h i t migh t b e foun d whic h woul d unit e u s all an d whic h woul d necessaril y throw int o th e backgroun d thos e mino r point s o f difference abou t th e school s an d smal l holdings which threaten t o driv e the Whig s into th e arm s o f the Torie s or int o retirement .

A fe w day s late r Gladston e wrot e t o Chamberlain : 'A n instinc t blindl y impresses me with the likelihoo d that Irelan d ma y shoulder aside everything else.'32 I n Novembe r Gladston e expresse d th e belie f tha t Irelan d woul d act o n al l other issue s 'like the su n o n a fire in the grate'. 33 The Iris h crisi s came firs t i n influencin g Gladstone' s idea s o n policy ; but w e ca n als o se e emerging i n hi s min d th e thought , obviousl y by n o mean s unwelcom e to him, tha t concentratio n on dealin g with i t migh t brin g about the restoration of unit y in Libera l action. 29

Ramm , op . cit . I , 40 , 42 . Holland , op . cit . I , 149 , 176 . Morley , Life o f Gladstone, in , 248 . 32 Chamberlai n to Labouchere , 2 0 Oct. 1885 , A. L . Thorold , Th e Life o f Henry Labouchere (1913), p . 239 . Gladstone t o Chamberlain , 2 5 Oct. 1885 , C . H . D . Howar d (ed.) , A Political Memoir i88o-g2 b y Joseph Chamberlain (1953) , p . 132 . 33 S . Childers , Th e Life an d Correspondence of th e Right Hon. Hugh C . E . Childers (1901) , ii, 234. 30

31

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Was Gladstone likel y to be very worried if the prelude t o the achievemen t of suc h unit y wa s schism an d purg e i n the part y ? We must bear i n min d hi s own recor d i n regar d t o party . H e ha d bee n a Peelite; that is , h e ha d onc e been involve d i n th e disruptio n o f a part y ove r a grea t issu e o f principle. In addition , hi s own movement durin g hi s career across the party spectrum , and th e wa y i n whic h th e Libera l part y seeme d t o hav e grow n u p aroun d him an d t o b e dependen t o n hi s ow n persona l appea l t o th e electorate , undoubtedly had left him rather less influenced that many others by' ordinary' party considerations . H e wa s i n fac t i n th e habi t o f distinguishin g betwee n 'party' question s an d question s involvin g 'highe r interests' . Thu s whe n he vote d i n 187 8 wit h a minority o f Liberals for a motion condemnin g th e calling ou t o f th e reserve s h e said : 'O n thes e grea t questions , whic h cu t s o deep int o hear t an d mind , th e importanc e o f takin g wha t the y thin k th e best cours e for the questio n wil l often seem , even to those who have the mos t just sens e o f party obligation , a higher dut y tha n tha t o f party allegiance.' 34 It certainl y seem s tha t thi s distinction wa s again in his mind i n 1885 . I n th e speech a t Edinburg h o n n Novembe r h e describe d himsel f a s 'labourin g with al l my hear t fo r th e unit y o f th e Libera l party ' bu t the n define d thi s unity as having to be ' founded upon common convictions as to the importance of th e wor k t o b e done' . H e agree d therefor e tha t ther e migh t b e ' a poin t which ou r conviction s shoul d part , i f th e question s a t issu e ar e o f vita l importance'. 'Conscientiou s motives' wer e 'higher than part y motives' , and if the need arose , he said,' I hope the Liberal part y will sever an d split rathe r than sacrifice conviction and principle'. For a party ought to be ' an instrument for th e attainmen t o f grea t ends'. 35 I n othe r words , th e grea t caus e cam e first, and a party ough t t o become its instrument eve n if a split resulted . An d then, when the spli t ove r home rule did occu r i n 1886 , Gladston e seeme d t o regard i t a s leadin g paradoxically to th e emergenc e o f a party mor e unite d and mor e capabl e of common an d effectiv e action . One-third o f th e Libera l M.P. s electe d i n 188 5 rebelle d an d repudiate d Gladstone's leadership. Bu t the spli t coul d be seen also as producing a purge and a reconstruction . Th e whig s an d radical s who secede d ove r th e Hom e Rule Bil l ma y hav e mad e strang e allie s but the y ha d thi s i n common , tha t they ha d bee n th e principa l feudin g elements in the party ove r the previou s decade. Seceding , the y lef t behin d a part y that , eve n i f smalle r an d ou t o f power, seeme d muc h mor e united , an d man y Libera l leader s rejoice d i n this. A compariso n wit h th e chao s o f 188 5 wa s implici t i n Shaw-Lefevre' s claim in 1887 tnat> *f tne two parties took up positions for and against home 34 Gladston e t o Granville , 1 2 Apr . 1878 , Ramm . op . cit . i , 70 . O n thi s preferenc e fo r questions involvin g 'highe r interests' , se e R . T . Shannon , Gladstone an d th e Bulgarian Agitation 1876 (1963) , pp. 96-7 . 35 Th e Times, 1 2 Nov. 1885 .

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rule, ' we shall, at the next general election, have no difficulties o r dissensions in ou r ow n party' , an d i n G . W . E . Russell' s observatio n tha t i n 1886 , 'though w e were heavil y beaten, ou r stat e was , i n on e mai n respect , mor e gracious than it had been in 1885. We were no longer hampered by conflicting policies, o r calle d o n t o decid e betwee n authorise d an d unauthorise d pro grammes.'36 A speake r a t th e Nationa l Libera l Federatio n counci l i n 188 7 called the party 'eage r and united, better and stronger for its recent purge'.37 John Morle y claime d tha t th e part y ha d 'neve r bee n mor e united , mor e firm, mor e compact' , whil e Campbell-Bannerma n eve n thanke d th e Iris h Nationalists 'fo r havin g invente d a n Irelan d an d a n Iris h question , whic h had bee n a sourc e o f s o muc h goo d an d s o muc h strengt h t o th e Libera l party'.38 Lor d Rosebery , a very unenthusiastic advocat e of home rule, wa s inclined t o dwel l on thi s aspec t o f th e concentratio n o n it . Th e party , h e would say , had once been a 'disorganized multitude ' with 'severa l leaders'; now i t enjoye d 'unio n unde r on e leader' an d ther e wa s 'only on e questio n of policy to be considered'. It was better to be a minority that was 'compact' and 'unite d b y a principle ' tha t a majorit y tha t wa s 'flabby ' an d 'dis connected'. Roseber y woul d describ e wha t usuall y happene d whe n ther e was a Liberal government. A certain number o f Liberals would 'peel off' a s reforms whic h di d no t satisf y thei r sectionalis t interest s wer e undertaken, and ther e wa s ' a proces s of waste , o f deterioration ' tha t 'neve r occurs , a s far a s I know , in the othe r party as it doe s among the mor e ardent mind s of the Libera l party' . Whe n th e part y ha d bee n 'enormousl y preponderan t in the Hous e of Commons' it s very siz e had meant tha t ' it contained many schools o f though t an d stil l mor e numerou s leaders' . No w ther e wa s onl y one policy and on e leader. 39 The basi s o f th e Liberals ' cas e a s t o th e relationshi p o f th e home-rul e policy t o genera l Britis h politic s wa s the 'obstruction ' argument , summe d up i n th e sloga n 'Irelan d block s the way' . The y claime d that Irelan d con sumed, unavoidably , s o muc h o f th e tim e an d demande d s o muc h o f th e attention o f parliamen t an d politica l leader s tha t n o satisfactor y progres s was possible o n an y domesti c refor m question unti l Irishme n wer e enabled by the concessio n of home rule to attend to Irish affair s themselves . A manifesto issued by the National Liberal Federation in August 1886 declared that, until th e Iris h questio n wa s settled , 'n o progres s ca n b e mad e wit h th e ordinary wor k of the Libera l party'. 40 A n imag e often use d t o describ e th e obstruction was that of a railway accident or a blocked railway line. Gladstone 36 Th e Times, 1 2 Jan . 1887 . G . W . E . Russell , 'Th e Ne w Liberalism : A Response' , The Nineteenth Century, Sept. 1889 , p. 494. 37 Watson , op. cit . p. 89 . 38 Th e Times, 1 3 Dec. , 2 1 June 1888 . 39 Ibid. , 2 0 Oct . 1886 , 2 8 Apr., 21 , 2 3 May , 1 8 Aug . 1887 , 1 0 Oct . 1888 . R . R . James , Lord Randolph Churchill (1959) , p. 322. 40 Th e Times, 9 Aug. 1886. Cf. Herbert Gladstone,' Ireland Blocks the Way', The Nineteenth Century, Jun e 1892 , pp. 89 9 ff.

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said tha t Irelan d ' blocks the way' lik e a wrecked train, preventin g anythin g else from gettin g through. 41 Spencer likene d Irelan d t o an express train tha t 'stops th e line' : al l other trains , 'lade n wit h preciou s measure s value d b y the Libera l party' , wer e 'blocke d an d shunted ' unti l i t ha d passe d by. 42 Thus the home-rul e preoccupatio n wa s associated wit h th e maintenanc e of a genera l Libera l fait h i n progress . Progres s remaine d inevitable , indee d mechanical. The only obstructio n t o it was the Iris h question . That th e obstructio n di d exis t ther e ca n be no doubt . Wha t interest s us here, however, is the bearing which its existence was made to have on general Liberal politics . Wa s the certai n progres s whic h th e Liberal s claime d tha t Ireland wa s obstructing itsel f a myth? For , quit e apar t fro m Ireland , ther e was anothe r obstacl e t o developmen t i n Libera l politics—th e confusio n among Liberal s a s to wha t no w constitute d progress , thei r indecisio n a s to what lin e o f actio n t o follow , thei r inabilit y t o agre e o n wha t reform s t o promote an d i n wha t order . Irrespectiv e o f it s accuracy , th e notio n o f a n Irish obstructio n di d enable the Liberal s temporaril y t o find a scapegoat for these weaknesses within their ow n politics. I f ardent reformers—or impatien t voters—demanded to know why the Liberal s were not acting on the reform s in which they ha d a special interest, her e was the answer : Irelan d rendere d the Liberal s 'impotent'. 43 Wha t th e Libera l leader s constantl y implie d i n their speeche s wa s that th e remova l o f this obstructio n wa s the ke y to th e entire situation . Confusio n woul d disappear , progres s woul d resume . Gladstone pu t i t thus : ' it i s in th e remova l o f that on e great obstacl e tha t the secre t o f all rational and effectua l progres s lies'. 44 The home-rul e preoccupatio n offere d a temporar y remed y fo r faddism , a temporar y answe r t o th e proble m o f fixin g a n orde r o f precedenc e fo r action amon g th e refor m proposals. Clearin g 'Ireland ' ou t o f the wa y was obviously the first duty of every reformer, no matter what his special interes t might be . Progres s o n al l other question s depende d o n the remova l o f th e Irish obstruction . Th e home-rul e issu e thu s becam e suc h a questio n a s Gladstone had craved in 1873, one that would, if 'worked into certain shapes', 'help to moul d th e rest , a t leas t fo r the time' . I n th e absenc e o f a Liberal creed, thi s singl e grea t questio n functione d a s a substitute , conferrin g a provisional orde r o n th e miscellaneou s 'causes ' o f Libera l politics . T o th e promoters o f 'particular subjects' , t o those organizations , 'i n som e respect s competing', whic h ha d 'specia l an d wha t migh t b e calle d preferentia l interests i n on e o r other ' o f thes e subjects , Gladston e gav e thi s message : 'Your firs t interes t i s t o ge t ri d o f th e Iris h question. ' H e aske d the m t o appreciate tha t the y coul d no t ge t pas t thi s blockag e o n th e lin e an d tha t until the y cleare d th e lin e thei r question s 'mus t continu e i n thei r presen t 41 43

Th e Times, 1 8 Mar. 1887 . 4 Cf . Morley , Th e Times, 1 2 Feb . 188 7 4

a 4

Ibid . 27 Apr. 1887 . Ibid . 2 5 Mar . 1890 .

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state o f inactio n and , fo r practica l purposes , oblivion'. 45 Th e post-188 5 career o f W . S . Caine , th e arden t advocat e o f temperanc e reform , show s how difficul t suc h 'faddists ' no w foun d i t t o asser t th e primac y o f thei r sectionalist interest s i n fac e o f th e absorptio n o f politica l controvers y i n the issu e o f hom e rule . Muc h agains t hi s will , h e wa s oblige d t o becom e categorized primaril y i n term s of this issue. 46 I n 188 6 Gladston e predicte d that Irelan d woul d 'contro l an d pu t asid e al l othe r politica l question s i n England';47 an d hi s prediction appeare d t o be fulfilled . Accordin g to Glad stone, Irelan d becam e ' the key to the position o f every English questio n and the rea l hel m tha t steer s th e shi p o f polities' , with th e consequenc e tha t 'perhaps thirty or forty questions', 'al l of them having larg e an d intelligen t bodies o f me n pushin g the m forward' , ha d t o remai n i n oblivion. 48 On e cannot imagine that the thought o f this alternative to the Irish preoccupatio n —the uncontrolle d an d uncontrollabl e 'pushing ' o f thirt y o r fort y bodie s of arden t reformers—fille d Gladston e wit h pleasure . Wha t wa s especiall y significant i n thi s regar d wa s the appearanc e in Th e Nineteenth Century o f a serie s o f article s b y Gladston e entitle d 'Electora l Facts' , surveyin g th e party's electora l progress sinc e its commitment to home rule. In 187 8 he had published a simila r article , allegin g tha t th e enthusias m arouse d i n th e Bulgarian agitatio n ha d ha d a highl y beneficia l effec t i n checkin g 'th e excesses of rampant an d erratic individualism' and sectionalism in the party . Concentration o n a singl e issu e o f thi s kin d reduce d th e numbe r o f riva l Liberal candidate s considerably. 49 No r di d Gladstone' s colleague s fai l t o see the advantag e o f the preoccupatio n i n this light an d to be anxious to see it maintained if the only alternative was chaos. Thus Rosebery told Gladstone in August 188 9 that the only cure for a certain ' critical condition' in the party would be the knowledge that the leaders were once again devoting themselves to 'Iris h polic y & measures' a s thei r firs t priority . H e was worried about the growing interest i n 'vague Socialistic schemes' and ' vaporous views which have at present n o ripeness or consistency'. 'I am all', he said, 'fo r th e fre e play of individuals in the party but not for chaos.' Onl y the Irish commitment gave the party 'fait h & discipline'.50 The Iris h preoccupatio n als o represente d a decisio n b y Gladston e an d those Liberal s wh o supporte d hi m i n favou r o f concentrate d 'singl e ques tion' politic s a s agains t dispersiv e 'programme ' politics . Th e Nationa l Liberal Federation , whic h had bee n create d a s a vehicle o f Chamberlainit e 45

Ibid . 1 8 Mar., 2 0 Oct. 1887 . Hamer , op . cit. , pp. 203-5 . J . Newton , W . S. Caine, M.P.: A Biography (1907) , pp. 167-8 , 179-82 . Lord Askwith, Lord James o f Hereford (1930) , p. 190 . 47 R . R . James , Rosebery: A Biography o f Archibald Philip, Fifth Earl o f Rosebery (1963), 8 P- 191 - 4 Th e Times, 2 3 May 1888 , 1 8 Mar. 1887 . 49 W . E . Gladstone , 'Electora l Facts' , Th e Nineteenth Century, Nov . 1878 , Oct . 1887 , Dec. 1889 , Sept. 1891 . 60 Roseber y to Gladstone , n Aug . 1889 , Roseber y MSS. , Nationa l Librar y o f Scotland, Box 19 . 48

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'programme' politics , wa s temporaril y transforme d int o a n agenc y fo r promoting th e alternativ e mode of political activity. The attitud e o f the Libera l leader s to th e Iris h 'obstruction * was highly ambiguous. Frequently , o f course , the y curse d it s existenc e an d lamente d the effec t tha t i t wa s having o n refor m politics . Ye t a t time s the y seeme d to welcome it and to feel no strong desir e for its removal. The preoccupatio n appeared t o b e doin g th e part y s o much goo d tha t the y wer e reluctan t t o face u p to the prospect o f its coming to an end. Lor d Ripo n told th e N.L.F. in 1887 : 'The y migh t res t i n th e shad e o f opposition, a s long a s Fo x an d Grey, but they would work on until they had accomplished.. .their policy.'51 Rosebery promise d tha t the y woul d figh t o n unti l hom e rul e wa s secured, 'however lon g their exil e ma y be fro m powe r an d fro m place'. 52 This kind of attitude set a deep gulf betwee n the Gladstonia n Liberals an d the Libera l Unionists. T o th e latte r suc h a willing acceptance o f defea t an d exil e fro m office seeme d little short of madness Fo r example , Jesse Collings made what must hav e seemed to him a very practical and reasonable argument in favou r of Libera l reunio n at the en d of 1886 : 'The choice then seem s to be Hom e Rule as the Libera l policy an d certai n defeat , or a Liberal platfor m (minu s Home Rul e for th e present) , an d succes s wit h a restoration o f the part y t o power.'53 But the Gladstonian s seemed actually to prefer th e former o f these alternatives. Power had lost its attractiveness for the time being. Some Liberals move d on from talkin g about th e ' obstruction' to praising the ne w electorate for having voluntarily taken up th e caus e of Irish reform . The voter s were encouraged to believe that i t was they, no t th e politicians , who were responsible for the preoccupation and that in assuming the responsibility they had shown great 'nobility of spirit', a 'wonderful record ' of 'self sacrifice'. I t wa s an 'unselfis h cause' , on e in which the ne w democracy had 'so littl e t o gain' , whic h 'di d no t affec t it s ow n interests' ; an d ye t th e democracy ha d take n i t up. 54 I n othe r words , i t bor e n o direc t relatio n t o 'selfish' clas s interests . Th e alternativ e t o th e Iris h preoccupatio n wa s attention b y the ne w voters to their own needs, an d such a prospect alarme d many Liberals . The ' obstruction' argument and the concentration on Irish policy provided the Liberal s wit h tim e i n whic h t o evolv e new principles an d policie s tha t would b e relevan t t o th e voters ' need s and would present a viable and saf e alternative t o 'selfish ' 'Socialis t schemes ' suc h a s Roseber y an d other s s o feared. The y provide d a n excus e fo r abstentio n fro m actio n that migh t b e considered premature s o long as such principles wer e not availabl e to guide it. Som e o f th e younge r Liberals , suc h a s R . B . Haldane, understoo d thi s 61

2 Th e Times, 1 9 Oct. 1887 . 8 Ibid . 21 May 1887 . Colling s to H. H . Fowler , 2 7 Dec. 1886 , quoted in Fowler , op. cit. p . 219 . 84 Th e Times, 7 Dec. 188 7 (Arnold Morley), 5 May, 6 July 1892 (John Morley). J. Guinnes s Rogers, 'The Middl e Clas s an d th e Ne w Liberalism' , Th e Nineteenth Century, Oct . 1889 , p. 712 . Hamer , op . cit., pp. 192-3 . 53

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aspect of th e situation clearly . For example , i n 188 8 Haldane published two articles i n the Contemporary Review on the them e of th e nee d to be working now to prepare th e Liberal future . H e warned Liberal s that ' there will come a time when the Iris h questio n i s out o f the way, and when we shall fight on our genera l policy' . Unles s tha t polic y becam e mor e definite, th e Libera l leaders woul d fin d themselve s repeatin g th e experienc e o f 1885 . Liberal s should 'insis t o n th e breathin g spac e whic h th e questio n o f Hom e Rul e has give n u s bein g use d i n makin g preparations ' fo r th e post-home-rul e situation. The y mus t counterac t th e effort s o f 'the extrem e Socialis t party' 'to moul d th e ne w voters t o it s wishes'. 55 Haldane , A . H. D . Acland , and others fel t tha t Chamberlain' s attemp t t o rais e socia l question s i n 188 5 had bee n prematur e becaus e hi s idea s ha d bee n inadequatel y thought out . It wa s their ai m t o d o th e kin d o f wor k whic h woul d ensur e tha t thes e subjects coul d b e turned int o useful legislation. 56 But there were several consequences of the upheava l of 1886 which helped to diminis h th e usefulnes s o f th e 'breathing-space ' fo r th e reconstructio n of th e part y an d it s policy. The secessio n o f Chamberlain and othe r radicals removed valuabl e talen t that would hav e bee n devote d t o suc h work . What remained wa s th e leadershi p o f Gladstone , whic h wa s mor e tha n ever , i n association wit h th e Iris h policy , th e rallying-poin t fo r th e man y divers e elements o f Liberalism . Th e Liberal s wer e paralyse d b y th e fac t tha t s o many peopl e ha d followe d Gladston e himsel f an d accepte d th e home-rul e policy principall y becaus e h e recommende d it. 57 Gladstone' s authorit y remained paramount . Th e part y a s it existe d afte r 188 6 was a party shape d in his own image, constructed aroun d his own decision to take up home rule. Because of this, and because h e did not regard i t as part o f his responsibilit y after 1885 to ne^P with the development of domestic policy, his leadership necessarily constitute d a major obstruction to this development. H e remained 'in situ fo r the Iris h questio n only'. 58 I n 188 5 h e ha d mad e i t plai n that at his age he felt n o further concer n with the 'ordinar y exigencies of party' and wanted t o b e trouble d n o mor e with th e wid e range o f questions normall y attended t o b y a party. 59 Thereafte r h e expressl y absolve d himsel f fro m participation i n th e discussio n o f the ne w ideas an d policie s tha t th e part y would so urgently need after th e Iris h interlude , an d the party was paralysed by th e lac k of direction fro m th e to p o n anythin g excep t Iris h policy 60—or issues suc h a s Wels h an d Scottis h disestablishmen t wher e Gladston e sa w commitment a s necessary i n the interest s o f the Iris h policy. 65

Haldane , 'The Liberal Party and its Prospects', Th e Contemporary Review, Jan. 1888 , pp. 14 5 ff. ; 'Th e Libera l Creed', ibid., Oct . 1888 , pp. 46 1 ff. 59 Cf . J. A. Spender, Sir Robert Hudson A Memoir (1930) , pp. 21-2. 57 Fo r a goo d exampl e o f the attitude s o f Gladstonia n 'loyalists' , se e A. J . Mundell a t o Gladstone, 1 5 Dec. 1885 , Gladstone Papers, B.M . Add . MSS . 44258 , fos. 211-15. 68 9 Morley , Life o f Gladstone, m, 355 . 5 Ibid, in , 225-6. Ramm, op. cit . n , 405 . 60 Cf . Haldane' s comment s o n this , Contemporary Review, Jan . 1888 , p . 148 ; Oct . 1888 , P- 474 -

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Another inhibitin g facto r stemmin g fro m th e reconstructio n o f 188 6 wa s the reviving in Liberal politics of the spirit of mid-nineteenth-century refor m movements. Th e Libera l part y seeme d t o hav e been force d t o revert t o th e mode o f refor m agitatio n practise d s o successfull y b y th e Anti-Cor n La w League an d imitate d b y the hos t o f pressure group s tha t sough t t o promot e the 'fads ' o f mid-Victoria n Liberalism . Bu t th e essentia l characteristi c o f such agitatio n wa s tha t it s aim s wer e limite d an d tha t eac h organizatio n formed wa s ' destined t o come to a n end with th e triumph o f the particula r cause which had called it into life'.61 The home-rule commitment represente d a similar limite d cause. But the Libera l part y ha d to look to a future beyond the succes s o r definitiv e rejectio n o f tha t cause . Th e politic s o f th e grea t reform movement s wer e quit e differen t i n spiri t fro m th e politic s o f th e permanent parliamentar y parties. Perhap s th e attemp t t o fus e the m i n 188 6 reflected th e attitud e o f men suc h as Gladstone himsel f wh o still understoo d party politic s an d refor m movement s mainl y i n term s o f th e pre-i86 y situation. Th e Libera l part y afte r 188 5 wa s perilousl y clos e t o bein g a n anachronism. Chamberlai n ha d appreciate d th e nee d fo r a framewor k tha t would allo w flexibilit y an d th e simultaneou s promotio n o f a variet y o f reforms an d s o be relevan t to a changed politica l system . Th e proble m wa s whether afte r 188 5 th e part y ha d no t acquire d a for m s o rigi d a s t o allo w change onl y through dissolution , no t through interna l evolution . Historians have been reluctant to acknowledge that at the time the Liberals' 'obstruction' argumen t wa s met b y a considerable amouh t o f criticism an d disbelief. There were those who claimed—and perhaps their claim s have not been attende d t o sufficientl y since—tha t Irelan d wa s no t th e onl y o r th e real obstruction , tha t ther e migh t b e anothe r obstructio n t o b e sough t i n the fear s an d perplexitie s an d deliberat e diversion-creatin g tactic s o f th e Gladstonian Liberals . Di d Ireland , the y asked , reall y need t o b e treate d a s obstructing progress o n everythin g else ? Resentment o f th e monopolizin g o f Libera l politic s b y hom e rule , an d disbelief that this was necessary, were among the bases of the Chamberlainit e or Radica l Unionis t position . Joh n Brigh t expresse d thei r attitud e wel l when h e wrot e i n 1887 : 'M r Gladston e stop s th e way . H e insist s o n a n impossible legislatio n fo r Ireland , an d insist s upo n i t t o th e exclusio n o f legislation fo r th e whol e Kingdom'. 62 Chamberlai n maintaine d afterward s that Gladston e ha d take n u p hom e rul e becaus e 'ther e wa s nothin g els e for hi m except m y programme' an d ' to have adopted tha t woul d have been humiliating'.63 When Chamberlai n sough t Libera l reunio n i n 1887 , he trie d 61

Ostrogorski , op . cit. i , 132-3 . Hamer, op.cit., pp. 269-70 . G . M . Trevelyan , Th e Life o f John Bright (1913), p. 443 . 68 F . W. Hirst, In th e Golden Days (1947), p. 169 . J. Amery, Th e Life o f Joseph Chamberlain, (1951), iv , 511-12. 62

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to confron t Liberal s with th e choic e o f a differen t for m o f action , on e i n which 'al l Libera l reform ' woul d no t b e 'indefinitel y adjourned ' unti l th e wishes o f th e Iris h ha d bee n met. 64 Chamberlai n sa w the situatio n a t leas t partly in term s of a counter-revolutio n by conservativ e Liberals , led by Gladstone, wh o feare d wha t looke d i n 188 5 lik e th e imminen t triump h o f his radicalism . T o hi m th e adoptio n o f hom e rul e constitute d a deliberat e diversion. Then, a s Herber t Gladston e acknowledge d i n 1892 , th e Libera l leader s were 'frequentl y attacke d b y som e o f th e mor e advance d member s o f th e labour part y fo r thei r insistenc e upo n th e paramoun t importanc e o f th e Irish question , an d thei r determinatio n t o giv e i t priority'. 65 Th e Fabian s argued that the Liberals were trying' to stifle English questions by an agitation about Iris h grievances'. 66 Accordin g t o Sidne y Webb , workingme n fel t ' a dail y increasin g suspicio n tha t th e Hom e Rul e question i s being use d b y Liberal landlord s an d capitalists , no t t o sa y b y M r Gladston e himself , a s a mean s o f stavin g of f th e fa r mor e deepl y reachin g socia l reform s whic h would otherwis e hav e t o b e take n u p b y th e Radica l party'. The y feare d 'that th e Libera l leader s ar e usin g th e pretex t tha t "Hom e Rul e stop s th e way" as a cloak for their fundamental lack of faith i n the possibilit y o f social reform b y legislativ e action'.67 Within the Libera l leadership itsel f Harcour t was a constant criti c of th e preoccupation with Ireland, maintainin g that the party existed for something more tha n Irelan d alon e an d mus t sho w that i t did . Perceivin g clearl y an d urgently the proble m of the futur e o f the part y in the parliamentar y system , he argued that i t was wrong and dangerou s for the part y o f progress t o coo p itself u p withi n th e confine s of a single policy. 68 But wher e else di d orde r an d cohesio n li e ? Beneath their discussio n o f th e Irish polic y Harcourt' s colleagues , i n particula r Gladstone , showe d a con tinuing consciousnes s o f dange r fro m faddism . The y foun d grea t difficult y in resistin g th e demand s fo r commitmen t t o priorit y o f attentio n fro m th e advocates o f Wels h disestablishment , fo r instance—excep t b y usin g th e pretext of the Iris h obstruction. 69 The impatienc e of labou r als o worried them. Th e Libera l chie f whi p warne d Gladston e i n September 189 0 o f th e danger o f 'th e ver y large an d importan t clas s affected ' b y labou r question s such a s the eight-hou r day ' being persuaded that thei r specia l interest ough t to outweig h an y consideration s o f th e claim s o f Irelan d i n th e vote s the y will b e calle d upo n t o give'. 70 I t i s not surprisin g therefore that , whil e th e 64

Garvin , op . cit . (1933) , n , 292 . Loc . cit . p . 903 . 66 P . P . Poirier , Th e Advent o f th e Labour Party (1958) , p . 32 . 67 S . Webb,' The Mora l of th e Elections', Th e Contemporary Review, Aug. 1892 , pp 282-3 . 68 Th e Times, 8 Feb. 1888 , 2 4 Oct. 1889 . Hamer , op . cit. , pp . 228-30 . 69 K . O . Morgan, Wales in British Politics 1868-1922 (Cardiff, 1963) , pp. 90-1 , 122-3 , I 3970 Arnol d Morle y to Gladstone, 24 Sept. 1890 , Gladston e Papers, B.M. Add. MSS . 44254 , fos. 34-5 . 65

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Parnell divorce crisis with its weakening effect o n the home-rule policy caused Harcourt t o argu e tha t no w othe r question s shoul d b e attende d to , hi s colleagues seemed more anxious about the possibility that the' special interests' might b e enable d t o tak e charg e an d reintroduc e anarch y int o Libera l politics.71 Th e notio n o f th e home-rul e preoccupatio n a s a n alternativ e to 'socialism' i s see n i n Lor d Ripon' s recommendatio n tha t th e part y 'firml y retain' hom e rul e a s it s grea t polic y because 'i f i t wer e displace d a whole series of labou r question s woul d com e to the front'. 72 The Libera l leader s examined th e alternative s to th e Iris h preoccupatio n an d foun d the m in adequate an d unattractive. 73 Tattere d a s i t was , i t ha d t o remain . Eve n Harcourt had to acknowledge the difficulties. Th e ' selection of any particular subject fo r th e firs t place ' instea d o f hom e rul e would , h e wrote , 'caus e discontent i n th e cam p o f thos e whos e heart s lik e the Temperanc e peopl e and th e Wels h Noncon s are mainl y set o n othe r topics' . H e wa s prepared, therefore, t o se e the Iris h preoccupatio n maintained , but no w with a n anti coercion rather tha n pro-home-rule emphasis. 74 The alar m in the party at the prospect o f having to go to the electorate with so meagr e a programm e was s o great , however , that th e leader s deeme d i t expedient to adopt the resolutions passed by the National Liberal Federatio n at Newcastle in October 189 1 as a vast' omnibus' programme. Even Gladstone recognized th e necessit y o f a wider reform commitment and , when returne d to powe r i n 1892 , seeme d a t firs t read y t o suppor t legislativ e actio n o n a broad front. 75 Th e home-rul e issu e soo n too k over , bu t th e chafin g an d straining of Liberals a t the cur b which it imposed were very hard to contain . Liberals wer e describe d a s 'famishing ' fo r wha t the y ha d no t bee n abl e t o get in the ' too many years in the wilderness', and Liberal M.P.s had promised the voter s tha t ther e wa s 'n o dange r o f a one-sessio n Parliament , an d a Parliament o f on e idea' , bu t tha t Englis h reforms woul d b e carrie d a s well as home rule.76 The leaders realized that there was in the party' no enthusiasm for Hom e Rule, and a desire to put fowar d at once other measures'.77 Younger Liberals insiste d o n the importance of attracting to the party ' the confidenc e of tha t nascen t bod y o f opinio n i n th e constituencie s whic h care s littl e fo r 71 Arnol d Morle y t o Gladstone , 3 0 Dec . 1890 , i Jan . 1891 , B.M . Add . MSS . 44254 , fos. 65, 67. Harcourt t o Joh n Morley , 1 9 Dec . 1890 , 6 Jan. 1891 , Harcour t Papers , Stanto n Harcourt, Oxfordshire . Joh n Morley t o Gladstone , 3 1 Dec . 1890 , B.M . Add . MSS . 44256 , fo. 104 . Hamer, op . cit. , chapte r 17 . 72 L . Wolf , Life o f th e First Marquess o f Ripon, (1921) , n , 196-200 . 73 Ibid . Morley , Life o f Gladstone, in , 457 . F . S . L . Lyons , Th e Fall o f Parnell 1890-91 (1960), p . 219 . Memo , b y J . Morley , enclose d i n A . Morle y t o Harcourt , 3 0 Dec . 1890 , Harcourt Papers . A . Morley t o Gladstone , 30 Dec. 1890 , B.M. Add . MSS . 44254 , fos. 63-4 . J. Morley to Gladstone, 3 1 Dec. 1890 , 2 Jan. 1891 , B.M . Add . MSS . 44256 , fos . 103-4, 107 . 74 Harcour t t o Gladstone , 3 Jan. 1891 , B.M . Add . MSS . 44202 , fos. 48-9. 75 Gladston e t o Harcourt, 14, 18 , 22 July 1892 , B.M. Add. MSS. 44202 , fos . 157-8, 166-7, 176. 76 F . A . Channing, Memories of Midland Politics i88s-igio (1918) , pp. 129 , 147 . 77 Wolf , op. cit. n , 200-1 .

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any Iris h polic y an d concentrate s itsel f o n socia l questions'. An y clai m by Gladston e tha t 'Englis h reform s wer e "subordinate " t o Hom e Rule ' was now reported t o arouse 'a good deal of complaint' among Liberal M.P.s. According to Labouchere, because these men had won their seat s by empha sizing non-Irish reforms, they dreade d ' the slightes t possibilit y o f these not being passe d b y th e Hous e o f Commons befor e the nex t Genera l Election ' so that they would have to return empty-hande d t o the electors. 79 There is evidence in Gladstone's correspondenc e afte r th e Parnel l divorce crisis i n 189 1 an d afte r th e election s i n 189 2 that h e was aware of the nee d for th e party to take up an d attend t o other refor m questions. 80 But it is also clear tha t thi s nee d wa s see n b y hi m mainl y i n relatio n t o th e strateg y o f promoting th e home-rul e policy . Tha t polic y remaine d th e focu s o f al l Gladstonian politics . A s Campbell-Bannerma n pointe d ou t t o Harcour t i n August 1892 , the government was 'formed for the special purpose of enabling Mr G . to carry out his ideas: it is in an unusual degre e his Government'.81 The breakdow n of the grea t Iris h preoccupatio n cam e with th e rejection of th e secon d Hom e Rul e Bil l b y th e Hous e o f Lord s an d th e decisio n of Gladstone's government no t t o mak e this rejectio n the subjec t of an appea l to th e country . Thes e development s dethrone d th e home-rul e polic y fro m its statu s o f the grea t concentratin g facto r i n Libera l politics . Fo r behin d i t was reveale d anothe r obstructio n o n whic h i t itsel f depended—th e vet o power o f the Hous e o f Lords. Hom e rule had hithert o bee n represente d a s the polic y that alon e coul d en d th e paralysi s i n refor m politic s an d ensur e progress o n th e variou s cause s tha t Liberal s ha d a t heart . Thi s argumen t could no longer be used. Home rule was reduced to the level of other refor m issues that appeale d only to sections or minorities. Like them, it would have to wai t unti l th e Lords ' vet o coul d be effectivel y challenge d o n som e issue which did appeal to a majority of the electorate. Until then it too was paralysed. The ne w situatio n wa s mad e clea r by Lor d Roseber y in hi s declaration in Marc h 189 4 afte r becomin g prim e ministe r tha t hom e rul e coul d no t be concede d until there wa s a majority fo r i t i n England , the 'predominan t member o f the Thre e Kingdoms' . What Roseber y was expressing was both a reactio n among Liberal s agains t a n er a when non-Irish reform s ha d been subordinated t o the home-rul e policy and also a feeling that , i n the interest s of it s survival , th e Libera l part y mus t tr y t o re-establis h contac t wit h th e moods and aspiration s of the Englis h electorate. The brie f an d unhapp y caree r o f th e Roseber y governmen t i n 1894- 5 78 Haldan e to Sir A. West, 8 Aug. 1892 , Haldane MSS. 5903 , fo. 205, Nationa l Librar y of Scotland, Edinburgh . 79 Laboucher e to Harcourt, 9 Aug. [1892] , Harcourt Papers; Labouchere to H. Gladstone , 27 Aug. [1892] , Viscount Gladston e Papers, B.M . Add . MSS . 46016 , fos . 156-8 . 80 Cf . above, note 75. 81 J . A . Spender , Th e Life o f th e Right Hon. Si r Henry Campbell-Bannerman, G.C.B., I (1923) , 124 .

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reflected th e consequence s o f the sudde n remova l of the tw o factor s which had discipline d an d concentrate d Libera l politic s ove r th e previou s eigh t years—Gladstone's leadership an d the preoccupation with clearin g the Iris h 'obstruction'. Sectionalis m appeare d onc e mor e t o b e rampan t an d un controllable. 'Faddists ' an d othe r 'whos e question s ar e hardl y read y fo r immediate settlement ' wer e observe d t o becom e 'impatient , an d i n thei r impatience exacting and impracticable '.82 John Morley admitted that' amongst the variou s interests whic h this Governmen t represents ther e is a rivalry for priority'.83 Th e Libera l leader s now lacked the mean s o f imposing priority which th e Iris h 'obstruction ' ha d provided . Th e questio n whic h occurred to many of them was whether they could find a substitute . Although th e event s o f 1893-9 4 di d lea d to a reaction agains t a primary concern with the problems o f Ireland, ther e was definitely not also a reaction against th e kin d o f politics whic h this concentratio n o n a singl e issu e rep resented. Th e multifariou s commitments of the Newcastl e Programme were blamed fo r muc h o f th e confusio n an d indisciplin e i n Libera l politics. 84 There wa s a yearnin g fo r a retur n t o simplifie d 'singl e question ' politics . In 189 5 H . H . Fowle r recalle d Bright's warning 'that i t was not possible t o drive hal f a doze n omnibuse s through Templ e Ba r a t once' , an d remarked of th e governmen t o f th e previou s thre e years : 'W e trie d t o d o tha t an d we have failed.' Th e fac t tha t th e governmen t 'at one and the sam e moment was working right an d left, nort h an d south' mean t that i t had ' diminished forces' an d 'exhauste d resources ' an d s o coul d no t resis t th e 'powerfu l combination' of' all the sections' offended b y the proposed reforms. He called for a n end to 'Liberal programmes' an d a return t o conforming to the 'old fashioned prejudic e in thi s countr y i n favou r o f doing on e thing a t a time , and doin g i t well'. 85 N o on e preache d thi s messag e mor e vigorousl y tha n Rosebery himself . I n th e 189 5 electio n campaig n the them e whic h h e trie d to induc e th e part y t o tak e u p wa s 'concentration' . H e wante d th e part y to abandon the ' enormous and multifarious programme' which had burdened it sinc e 189 1 an d t o hav e instead a single aim . A programme with onl y one point i n i t wa s best 'fo r th e purpos e o f a practica l appea l t o th e English speaking people'. 86 The mos t obviou s an d mos t favoure d substitut e fo r the home-rul e policy was a campaign against th e Hous e o f Lords. Thi s was a natural successor t o the Iris h question , sinc e th e vet o power s o f th e Lord s wer e no w visibl e as a greate r obstructio n blockin g the wa y t o progres s o n al l othe r refor m 82 J . Guinnes s Rogers , 'The Position o f the Liberal Party' , Th e Nineteenth Century, Feb . 1894, pp. 191-2 . 83 Th e Times, 22 May 1894 . 84 Cf. , fo r example , Lor d Rosebery , Th e Pressing Question for th e Liberal Party (speec h at Eighty Club) , [1895] ; Th e Speaker, 1 7 Oct . 1896 , editorial on 'Party Discipline'. 85 Fowler , op. cit . pp . 384 , 441-2 . 86 Th e Pressing Question for th e Liberal Party, pp. 9-11 .

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questions. Gladston e himsel f ha d wante d th e part y t o concentrat e o n thi s issue afte r th e rejectio n of the secon d Hom e Rul e Bill ; an d Roseber y took it u p a s the singl e ai m o n which al l Liberals shoul d unite . I n hi s speeches of 189 4 and 189 5 he agai n an d agai n presented i t i n th e classi c for m of th e single great question , connecte d it with the principle of the ' concentration' of policy , an d referre d t o i t i n term s ver y simila r to thos e use d b y himself and othe r Libera l leader s abou t th e Iris h 'obstruction ' betwee n 188 6 an d 1893: .. .when th e dissolutio n comes , wha t wil l i t b e fough t upon ? Wil l i t b e fough t upon Disestablishment , o r Home Rule , or the liquor question?. . .the next electio n will be fought on none of these questions , bu t o n one which includes and represent s them all—I mean th e Hous e of Lords. . ...[People may ask:] 'Wha t i s it yo u wish w e should concentrate.. . ? You say you wil l no t presen t a doze n grea t question s i n line . I s ther e on e questio n tha t embraces and involves the m all ?' I say that there is. That question is the question of the dominatio n o f the Hous e o f Lords... That is a question whic h involve s and concentrates i n itsel f al l thos e othe r causes , i n whic h yo u speciall y ma y bea r a particular interest. 87

For a time , i n 1894 , othe r Libera l leader s an d th e Libera l ran k an d file seemed t o manifest a similar enthusias m fo r the issue. 88 But it soon becam e apparent no t onl y that i t wa s not a n issu e o n whic h th e Liberal s were any more likely than they had been over home rule to gain the support o f a majority of th e non-Iris h electorat e bu t als o tha t ther e wa s considerabl e variet y of opinion on what should in fact b e done about the Lords' powers. Th e appea l of th e issu e a s a single , clear-cut , concentratin g questio n wane d rapidly. 89 In th e 189 5 electio n campaig n ther e wa s no concentratin g issue , i n spit e of Rosebery's effort s t o mak e the Lords ' vet o int o one . I n it s place ther e wa s a renewe d willingnes s among the leader s to cour t defea t an d th e excus e for abstention fro m commitmen t an d action that i t would provide. ' I can' t hel p feeling tha t defea t ma y b e goo d fo r us, ' wrot e Herber t Gladston e a t thi s time. 'W e ar e plague d wit h obstinat e faddist s wh o ar e to o stron g fo r th e leaders, and except for Ireland I could wish to get rid of them through defeat.'90 After th e Unionis t victor y i n 189 5 Rosebery , althoug h h e ha d los t hi s premiership, was pleased that the party would now be forced t o pass through a wholesome' purgatory'. It had ' become all legs and wings, a daddy-long-legs fluttering amon g a thousand flames' and 'ha d to b e consume d i n order that something mor e sane , mor e consistent , an d mor e coheren t coul d tak e it s 87

Ibid . pp. 12-13 . Lord Rosebery's Speeches (1874-1896) (1896) , pp. 268-96 , 347 . See , fo r instance , th e editorial s i n Th e Speaker durin g 1894 , an d als o th e report s o f Liberal an d N.L.F . activit y i n Th e Liberal Magazine, n (1894) , e -S- PP - 46-7 , 50 , 166 , 204-17. 89 Cf . th e complaint s i n editorial s i n Th e Speaker durin g th e earl y par t o f 1895 , e.g . 11 May an d 6 July 90 C . Mallet, Herbert Gladstone: A Memoir (1932) , p. 156 . 88

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place'. He devote d hi s ow n efforts hencefort h t o th e tas k o f 'consuming ' what h e regarde d a s th e encumbrance s o f Gladstonia n politics. 92 On e o f these wa s th e commitmen t t o hom e rul e fo r Irelan d whic h h e becam e convinced wa s preventing 'th e restoratio n o f the Libera l part y t o wha t i t was i n richness , variet y an d "strength befor e i886'; 93 an d afte r 189 5 h e developed 'Libera l Imperialism ' a s a unifying an d concentratin g them e for all Liberals, includin g the Liberal Unionists. 94 Thus did Rosebery endeavour to cance l ou t th e consequence s o f th e reconstructio n an d purg e o f 188 6 and star t again^vit h a 'clea n slate ' o n whic h h e intende d t o writ e a ne w constructive and 'purgative' principle . In 189 6 John Morle y deplore d the wa y in which 'the divisio n of parties' was becoming 't o a very considerable exten t als o a division o f classes', an d then commente d tha t 'h e ha d neve r bee n abl e t o se e wh y tha t divisio n should follo w upo n a difference o f opinion a s to wha t wa s the bes t for m of government fo r Ireland , an d h e coul d no t bu t thin k tha t befor e th e ne w Home Rul e polic y wa s launche d ther e mus t hav e bee n laten t difference s underneath.'95 No w tha t th e Iris h preoccupatio n wa s gone , th e 'laten t differences' i n both party and nation which it had overlaid were reappearing . The preoccupatio n ha d bee n n o mor e tha n a temporar y diversion . I t ha d not bee n use d creativel y fo r th e formatio n o f ne w Libera l principle s an d policies. In 188 8 Haldane had warned of the possible dangerous consequences of 'concentratin g attention , no t o n th e genera l purpose s o f th e party , bu t on single questions'. The preoccupatio n wit h home-rule ha d led the leaders to neglect 'th e general purposes', an d nothing had been done to counter th e development o f the unjustifie d impressio n tha t th e party was ' a class party, the party of the non-propertied class'. Liberals should ' insist on the breathing space which th e questio n o f Home Rul e has given us being used i n making preparations' fo r th e comin g politica l conflict s ove r socia l problems , i n which th e Liberal s mus t b e read y with a positive non-social programm e of action. But , h e complained , ther e wa s stil l 'a n absenc e o f suc h sign s o f preparation as one would like to see'. 96 These signs were still lacking in 1894. The systemati c Libera l creed , fo r whic h th e Iris h preoccupatio n ha d bee n a temporar y substitute , an d o n whic h th e Liberal s woul d depen d i n th e long ru n fo r strength , purpose , an d coherenc e i n thei r actio n an d th e preventing o f the disruption threatened b y sectionalism an d class antagonism, had no t emerged. 91

Roseber y t o Cano n Holland , 2 1 Aug . 1895 , Rosber y MSS. , Bo x 89. Culminatin g in his 'clean slate' speec h at Chesterfield , 1 6 Dec . 1901 . 93 Cf . hi s memo, of 25 Aug. 1896 , quoted i n Crewe , Lord Rosebery (1931), n, 522-3 . 94 Thi s them e ca n b e foun d firs t enunciate d i n hi s speec h a t th e Cit y Libera l Club , 2 4 Apr. 1894 . Se e Th e Liberal Magazine, n , 114 . 95 Th e Times, 5 Feb. 1896 . 96 'Th e Liberal Creed', loc. cit . pp . 464-5, 474 . 92

12

HOME RULE, RADICALISM , AND THE LIBERA L PARTY, 1886-189 5 THOMAS WILLIAM HEYCK In 1887, Joseph Chamberlain wrote a letter to The Baptist in which h e blame d th e preoccupatio n o f Liberals an d Radical s with Home Rul e fo r delayin g socia l reform . "Thirty-tw o million s o f people," h e complained , "mus t go without much-neede d legislation because thre e million s ar e disloyal." 1 Early i n the 1890s , socialist s and militan t working-clas s spokesmen sometimes took u p thi s cr y to expres s thei r disconten t wit h th e Libera l party . An d i n late r years, th e Liberal-Radica l commitmen t t o Hom e Rul e provide d one o f th e mai n historica l explanation s fo r th e foundin g o f a n independent working-class party; thu s the dampenin g o f Radicalism supposedly cause d b y Hom e Rule has bee n regarde d a s the source of th e mos t importan t politica l transformatio n o f recen t Britis h history. I n the words of G. D. H. Cole: With Chamberlain' s departure , an d wit h th e increasin g preoccupation o f Gladston e wit h Hom e Rule , th e Radica l impulses o f th e 'seventie s ha d die d away . Som e attemp t wa s made to revive them when it had become plain tha t Liberal ism wa s i n seriou s dange r o f losin g it s working-clas s support. Bu t th e attemp t wa s mad e to o late , an d th e Libera l 'Newcastle Programme' of 1892 was only a very pale shadow of Chamberlain' s 'Unauthorize d Programme ' o f 1885. 2 D. A. Hamer, in a recent article , takes essentially the sam e view, with some modifications. Th e Liberals , he says, took up Hom e Rule in a deliberat e attemp t t o pape r ove r confusio n and disagreemen t within the party ove r other policies. I n the 1880s , the Liberal party tended t o b e dominate d b y "faddists, " wh o coul d no t agre e o n the precedenc e t o b e give n variou s reform proposals. B y adoptin g Home Rule , the y earne d a perio d o f "breathing-space, " durin g which the y coul d hav e worke d ou t thei r problems . However , th e Liberals waste d this opportunity becaus e the "secession o f Chamberlain an d othe r radical s remove d valuabl e talen t tha t woul d hav e been devote d t o suc h work. " Al l tha t remaine d wa s Gladstone , whose leadership , committe d a s it wa s to Hom e Rule alone , para lyzed th e party . Further , som e moderate Liberal s use d th e Hom e Rule issu e t o bloc k th e advanc e withi n th e part y o f labo r o r 1. Th e Baptist, Feb . 25, 1887 . 2. G . D . H . Cole , British Working Class Politics (London, 1941), pp . 82-83.

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"collectivist" question s whic h cam e u p i n th e latte r 1880s . Whe n Home Rul e seemed t o hav e bee n pu t asid e in 189 3 an d 1894 , th e Liberals then adopte d refor m of th e powe r o f the Hous e of Lords as anothe r blockad e against issue s that might split the party. 3 In on e for m o r another , thi s interpretatio n o f late-Victoria n Liberal politic s i s th e standar d view . However , despit e th e para digm's neatnes s an d simplicity , anothe r opinio n expresse d firs t i n 1887 suggests that a n alternativ e point o f view must be considered. In tha t yea r Gladston e told th e Nationa l Libera l Federatio n tha t Radicalism actually owed much to the adven t of the Iris h Question: After thi s Iris h controvers y i s a t a n en d th e advance d Liberals, the Radica l portion o f the party, wil l have a vastly increased influenc e — not i n consequenc e o f th e proposa l of Home Rule , bu t i n consequenc e o f th e resistanc e t o tha t proposal, an d o f all o f the influence s and power s which tha t resistance will have brought into action.4 Even i f Gladstone' s predictio n wa s onl y partl y right , seriou s modifications o f the standar d interpretatio n woul d be i n order . I f the spiri t o f Radicalis m wer e no t dampene d an d it s influenc e not decreased b y th e commitmen t t o Home Rule , an d i f th e Hom e Rule spli t di d not depriv e th e Libera l part y o f its Radical element , then anothe r view of the natur e o f the late-Victoria n Liberal party must b e adopted , an d som e othe r explanatio n o f th e militan t working-class an d socialis t disconten t wit h th e Liberal s mus t b e found. I f th e natur e o f Radicalis m afte r 188 6 di d no t becom e less reformist , les s concerne d wit h it s traditiona l issues , an d i f Radicals di d no t los e powe r withi n th e Libera l party , the n i t might hav e bee n th e substanc e o f Radicalis m itself wit h whic h so many working-class leaders became disenchanted. What i s neede d t o sor t ou t thes e alternativ e explanation s is, first, a har d loo k a t th e basi s o f working-clas s discontent ; an d second, a n analysis of the Radica l movement after 188 6 an d its role in th e Libera l party . Th e firs t requiremen t i s bein g supplie d b y Henry Fellin g an d othe r student s o f th e labo r movement . Th e second is to be provided by this article . British Radicalism , especiall y sinc e the 1850s , ha d alway s bee n a disorganize d an d crankis h movement . Indeed , "faddism " wa s one of its definin g characteristics . Peopl e becam e Radicals because 3. D , A . Hamer , "Th e Iris h Questio n an d Libera l Politics, 1886-1894, " Historical Journal (1969) ; below, ch. 11 . Hamer develops thi s thesis more thoroughly i n hi s Liberal Politics i n th e Ag e o f Gladstone an d Rosebery (Oxford , 1972) . 4. Quote d i n Nationa l Libera l Federation , T enth Annual Report, 1887 (Lon don, 1887) , p. 48.

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of on e o r anothe r specifi c grievanc e a t th e hand s o f traditional , Anglican landownin g society . Thu s th e Radica l progra m i n th e late-Victorian perio d wa s largel y on e o f abolishin g privileges : th e established churches , denominationa l influenc e i n education , ex clusive Anglica n rights t o paris h buria l grounds , a nea r monopoly in lan d ownership , an d oligarchica l politica l arrangements . Th e structure o f th e Radica l movemen t wa s mad e u p o f a clou d o f organizations an d societies , eac h devoted , a s th e Anti-Cor n La w League ha d been , t o th e accomplishmen t o f a singl e goal . More over, th e movemen t ha d tw o wing s tha t wer e neve r successfully integrated — middle-class and working-class. Middle-clas s Radicals, organizing themselve s i n agencie s lik e th e Liberatio n Society , th e National Educatio n League , an d th e Refor m League , like d t o use the electora l influenc e of certai n working-clas s organizer s suc h a s George Howel l an d Howar d Evans , but the y di d no t incorporat e workingmen into their own structure of power.5 Yet ther e wa s a n essentia l unit y t o th e Radica l movement , arising fro m a commo n sens e o f wh o th e enem y was , fro m a common se t o f values, an d fro m commo n ideas abou t th e rea l an d ideal Britis h societies . Agreemen t on thes e thing s hel d th e politi cally activ e workingme n i n th e Radica l movemen t wel l int o th e 1880s.6 Al l Radicals agree d tha t thei r enem y was orthodox , landowning society . T o a remarkabl e degree , the y though t tha t rem nants o f feudalism still dominate d Britis h society , wit h th e resul t that independent , pruden t individual s wer e prevente d fro m ful l self-improvement. O f course, in thi s vie w they differe d fro m Con servatives and Whigs , who believed tha t th e landed order s alread y had see n thei r right s an d institution s seriousl y eroded . Bu t th e Radicals als o differe d fro m moderat e Liberals , wh o wanted no t t o destroy th e lande d order s bu t t o brin g abou t a balanc e o f social forces, an d who by the 1870 s considered tha t only relatively moderate reform s wer e neede d t o finis h th e task . Radical s generall y 5. Fo r Radicalism , se e T. W . Heyck, "Britis h Radical s an d Radicalism , 1874 1895: A Socia l Analysis, " i n R . J . Bezuch a (ed.) , Modern European Social History (Lexington , Mass. , 1972) , pp . 28-58 . Fo r Howell' s career : F . M . Leventhal , Respectable Radical: George Ho well an d Victorian Working. Class Politics (Cam bridge, Mass. , 1971) . Fo r Howar d Evans : Howar d Evans , Radical Fights o f Forty Years (London , n.d.). 6. Heyck , "Britis h Radical s an d Radicalism, " passim; Henr y Felling , Th e Origins o f th e Labour Party, 1880-1900 (Oxford , 1965) , p . 6 ; Trygv e Tholfsen , "The Transitio n t o Democrac y i n Victoria n England, " i n International Review o f Social History, V I (1961) , 226-48 ; Royde n Harrison , Before th e Socialists: Studies in Labour an d Politics, 1861-1881 (London , 1965) , passim. Th e bourgeoi s ideal , of whic h Radicalis m was th e epitome , i s describe d ver y well i n Harol d Perkin , Th e Origins o f Modern English Society (Toronto , 1967) , Chap . VI-VIII .

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wanted t o establis h n o balanc e o f forces , bu t a societ y i n whic h bourgeois style s an d institution s prevailed . Societ y woul d b e orderly, bu t highl y competitive. I n effect , thei r socia l idea l wa s an extention of the middle-class Nonconformist value system. In th e 1870 s an d 1880s , mos t Radical s fel t tha t thei r number s and influenc e were increasing . Becaus e o f som e internal dispute s and a disenchantmen t with th e Libera l party , Radicals did not far e well i n th e genera l electio n o f 1874 . Afterwards , they bega n t o recover, slowl y i n th e mid-1870 s an d rapidl y thereafter . Throug h a statistica l procedur e calle d multipl e discriminan t analysis, which can us e divisions in th e Hous e of Commons to distinguish between political groups , th e numbe r o f Radical M.P.s can b e se t a t abou t eighty fo r th e parliamen t o f 1874-80 , an d a t abou t 12 0 for tha t of 1880-85. Radica l M.P. S thus represente d abou t one-thir d o f th e Liberal parliamentar y party. 7 The y wer e convince d tha t th e pro portion o f Radicals among Liberals wa s very much greater outsid e the Hous e than inside , an d the y expecte d th e refor m act s o f 188 4 and 188 5 t o uncove r th e tru e Radica l powe r an d enabl e the m t o sweep th e Whig s from thei r traditiona l positio n o f influence in th e parliamentary party . However , th e Radical s wer e disappointe d a t the result s of the 188 5 genera l election , a s only about 16 0 were returned t o parliament . Still , thi s numbe r amounte d t o almos t one half o f th e Libera l M.P.s , a considerabl e advanc e ove r th e tw o previous parliaments . In th e spli t ove r Hom e Rule which followed , th e grea t bul k of Radical M.P. s supported Gladstone , and only a few dissented along with Chamberlain : 13 1 fo r Hom e Rul e an d thirty-tw o against . A greate r proportio n o f Radical s vote d fo r Hom e Rul e tha n di d the member s o f eithe r th e moderat e o r Whi g section s o f th e parliamentary party. Becaus e most of the Whig s an d a substantia l number o f moderate s abandone d th e part y ove r Hom e Rule , th e Radicals wer e lef t i n a numerica l majorit y o f th e parliamentar y Liberal party. 8 This i s no t t o den y tha t th e grou p o f Radical s wh o splintere d 7. Th e statistica l procedure on whic h thes e conclusion s ar e base d i s describe d in T . W . Heyc k an d Willia m Klecka , "Britis h Radica l M.P.s , 1874-1895 : Ne w Evidence fro m Discriminan t Analysis, " The Journal o f Interdisciplinary History, IV (Autumn , 1973) , 161-84 . List s o f al l Radica l M.P.s , develope d b y usin g thi s procedure, ca n b e foun d i n th e appendice s o f T . W . Heyck , Th e Dimensions of British Radicalism: Th e Case o f Ireland, 1874-1895, forthcoming. 8. Th e Hom e Rul e division i s analyze d i n detai l i n Th e Dimensions o f British Radicalism, forthcoming , Chapte r V , an d i n T . W . Heyck , "Englis h Radical s and th e Iris h Question , 1874-1895 " (Ph.D . dissertation , Universit y o f Texas , 1969), Chap . VI . Se e also , Donal d Southgate , The Passing o f th e Whigs, 18321886 (London , 1962) , Chap . XV .

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from th e Libera l part y wa s significant . A s the y include d Josep h Chamberlain, easil y th e mos t outstandin g Radica l i n Englan d before 1886 , th e Radica l Unionist s inevitabl y wer e important . Ye t in shee r numbers, the Radica l Unionists were a small and declinin g faction fro m 188 6 t o 1895 . Durin g th e Hom e Rule parliament, th e Radical Unionist s could clai m thirty-three M.P.s , an d shortl y after ward, Chamberlai n enliste d som e fiftee n thousan d member s fo r his new organization, th e National Radical Union. 9 Neithe r sectio n of unionis t Radicalis m eve r amounte d t o a s muc h again . Th e number o f Radica l Unionis t M.P.s decreased t o abou t twent y afte r the genera l electio n o f 1886 an d t o eleven afte r 1892 . Th e Nationa l Radical Union , founde d fo r purel y electora l purpose s i n 1886 , faded awa y in 1888. 10 Apparently, th e reaso n tha t Radica l Unionis m decline d wa s that Unionis m put Radical s in a n awkwar d an d unnatura l position . Chamberlain trie d t o us e thei r weigh t t o mov e th e Conservativ e party towar d progressiv e policies, bu t wheneve r th e Conservative s were i n dange r o f defeat , th e Radica l Unionist s ha d t o suppor t them, regardles s o f th e issue , i n th e interest s o f maintainin g th e Union. Thi s sometime s entaile d Radica l Unionis t suppor t fo r th e Tories o n matter s ver y distastefu l t o an y Radica l — coercio n i n Ireland an d defens e o f th e Hous e o f Lords , fo r example . A fe w Radical Unionists , among them G . O . Trevelya n an d W . S . Caine, eventually found that their allegianc e t o Radical policies outweighe d their doubt s abou t Hom e Rule, an d returne d t o th e mai n Radical force.11 The vas t majorit y o f Radicals afte r 188 6 belonge d t o th e Glad stonian Libera l party ; thu s i t i s amon g th e Libera l Hom e Ruler s that on e finds the me n most appropriately calle d "Radicals. " A careful examinatio n o f this group make s several important thing s clear . First, accordin g t o multipl e discriminan t analysi s o f th e votin g behavior o f th e Libera l parliamentar y party , abou t 14 5 Radical s held seat s i n the 1886-9 2 parliament , som e 9 percent fewer tha n i n the Hom e Rule parliament, an d abou t tw o hundred i n th e 1892-9 5 parliament. Second , despit e a n absolut e decreas e i n th e numbe r of Radica l M.P. s afte r th e electio n o f 1886 , a highe r proportio n 9. Josep h Chamberlain , A Political Memoir, ed . C . H . D . Howard , (Lon don, 1953) , p . 228 ; Pete r Fraser , Joseph Chamberlain: Radicalism an d Empire, 1868-1914 (London , 1966) , p . 106 ; J . L . Garvi n an d Julia n Amery , Life'of Joseph Chamberlain (London , 1932-1969) , II , 252 . 10. Si r Ivo r Jennings , Party Politics (Cambridge , 1961) , II , 202 . 11. Fo r Radica l Unionis t policy , se e Michae l Hurst , Joseph Chamberlain and Liberal Reunion: The Round Table Conference of 1887 (Toronto , 1967) , passim, especially pp . 34 3 an d 361-62 .

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of Libera l M.P.s voted 'Radically * than in the previou s parliaments : over 7 0 per cen t i n bot h th e parliament s fro m 188 6 t o 1895 , a s opposed t o abou t 3 3 per cen t fro m 187 4 t o 188 5 an d 4 8 per cen t i n 1886. An d third , i t become s increasingl y difficul t eve n b y fairl y sophisticated votin g analysi s t o distinguis h th e votin g pattern s o f those M.P. s generally know n as "Radicals" from those known simply as "Liberals" ; thu s th e distinctio n betwee n moderat e Liberal s an d Radicals, whic h wa s plainly demonstrabl e throug h 189 2 wa s much less so by 1895. Together , these observation s sho w that, though th e attachment t o Hom e Rul e slowe d th e advanc e o f Radicalis m i n the Hous e o f Commons a s a whole , i t contribute d t o th e progres s of Radicalis m withi n th e parliamentar y Libera l party . Afte r 1886 , Radicalism was by far the mos t important segment of parliamentary Liberalism.12 It should be emphasized tha t what multiple discriminant analysis shows i s th e increasin g willingnes s o f Libera l M.P. s t o adop t measures tha t formerl y had bee n th e preserv e o f Radicals, and not the moderatio n o f Radical policies . Thi s poin t i s confirmed b y th e recent finding s o f Hug h Berrington , who has use d a differen t kin d of votin g analysi s t o understan d th e realitie s o f late-Victoria n politics. Berringto n measure s no t onl y th e frequenc y but als o th e direction o f vote s agains t part y conformit y in th e late-nineteent h century, and , lik e Ostrogorsk i befor e him , find s tha t th e unit y of the parliamentar y partie s increase d durin g th e latte r 1880 s an d 1890s. Unlik e Ostrogorski , however , Berringto n observe s tha t o n the Libera l sid e th e characteristi c rebellio n agains t the party lead ership ha d bee n b y th e Radicals ; and it was this fractiousness tha t diminished afte r 1886 . Further , th e reaso n tha t Radical s rebelle d less ofte n afte r 188 6 was that th e part y leaders acted i n conformity to Radica l wishes . Befor e 1886 , th e leadershi p o f th e tw o majo r parties ofte n forme d a consensu s against th e Radicals . However , the Hom e Rule issue drove s o many Whigs an d moderate s ou t of the Libera l part y tha t Libera l leader s ha d t o loo k t o th e pre dominant Radical s fo r support . Th e result s wer e a n increas e i n Liberal part y conformit y and a Radicalization of the party.13 The socia l backgroun d o f th e Radica l M.P. s afte r 188 6 wa s generally th e sam e as in th e thre e earlier parliaments . Fro m 187 4 to 1885 , mos t o f the Radica l M.P. s were wealthy middle-class men, about 80 per cen t getting their incomes from bourgeoi s occupations. 12. Heyc k an d Klecka , "Britis h Radica l M.P.'s, " passim. 13- Hug h Berrington , "Partisanshi p and Dissidenc e in th e Nineteenth-Centur y House of Commons," Parliamentary Affairs, XXI (Autumn, 1968), 338-74.

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The typica l Radica l M.P . in those year s would hav e been someon e like Joh n Bright , Josep h Chamberlain , Samue l Morle y o r H . J . Wilson — hard-driving, self-mad e me n wh o considere d th e lande d orders t o b e non-productiv e parasites . Th e sam e wa s tru e afte r 1886: TABLE I . OCCUPATION S O F RADICA L M.P.s , 1886-95 * 1892-95 1886-92 Occupation 89 71 Commerce and Industry 53 35 Law 4 4 Other Profession s 19 13 Writing an d Journalis m 7 5 Teaching 3 3 Civil Servic e 11 10 Workers 1 0 Armed Force s 6 9 Land 3 2 Others 11 7 Unknown (N o visibl e mean s o f income) 159 207 Totals * These figure s represen t th e total numbe r o f Radical s wh o sa t i n the tw o parliaments, an d no t the numbe r wh o held seat s a t an y one time . Thu s th e actua l Radica l strengt h i n bot h parliaments , as reflected in the tex t above, wa s somewhat lowe r tha n the total s given here . It i s perhap s surprisin g tha t Radicalis m stil l recruite d mos t of its parliamentary elite from th e upper middl e clas s at a time when big busines s wa s becomin g increasingl y importan t i n Britis h society. Jame s Cornfor d ha s show n tha t b y th e 1880 s th e ne w suburbs were providing th e path t o Conservatism for many middleclass people. 14 Nevertheless , i t i s apparen t tha t substantia l num bers o f bourgeois people stil l felt aggrieve d by the privilege s o f the landed orders , an d considere d tha t Britis h societ y di d no t reflec t their middle-class Nonconformist ideal Another feature o f the Radica l M.P. s must be pointed out: th e number o f workingmen . Standin g a t nearl y a dozen , th e numbe r of working-clas s Radica l M.P. s wa s muc h highe r tha n i n 1874-80 , when i t wa s two , an d 1880-85 , whe n i t wa s three. However , th e 14. Jame s Cornford , "Th e Transformatio n o f Conservatis m i n th e Late-Nine teenth Century, " Victorian Studies, VII (Sept. , 1963) , 35-66 .

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number wa s no t growing . I n 1885 , eleve n working-clas s Radical s had bee n returne d t o parliament , th e sam e numbe r a s i n 1892 . Moreover, a smal l numbe r o f socialist s an d workingme n emerge d in parliamen t distinctl y t o th e lef t o f the Radicals . I n 1886 , R . B. Cunninghame Graham , a n eccentri c middle-clas s Fabian , wo n a seat; an d i n 189 2 s o di d Joh n Burns , Kei r Hardie , J . Haveloc k Wilson, an d Sa m Woods, al l o f whom were militan t working-class spokesmen.15 Thei r presenc e indicate d tha t a s th e workin g class became politicall y mor e powerful, Radicalism would hav e t o com pete wit h a ne w kin d o f riva l fo r it s support ; th e ol d attachmen t of politically-activ e workingme n to the Radica l movement could n o longer be assumed. Nonconformity continue d t o be th e roc k of Radicalism. Nearl y 75 pe r cen t o f th e Radica l M.P. s fro m 188 6 t o 189 5 wer e Non conformists, an d a heav y majorit y o f al l Nonconformist s i n di e House were Radicals. Thes e fact s suggest that, despite the severit y of th e disput e ove r Hom e Rule within Nonconformity , the Radica l movement continue d t o recrui t ver y wel l amon g Dissenters . Pre cisely ho w an d wher e Hom e Rul e cu t throug h th e Nonconformist community i s hard t o tell . I t i s possible tha t th e numbe r o f Nonconformist M.P. s wh o adhere d t o th e Gladstonia n part y wa s de ceptively large . Nevertheless , Joh n Morle y though t tha t mos t Nonconformists did in fact support Home Rule: The attempt t o kindle the torc h o f religious fea r o r hate was in Grea t Britai n happil y a failure . Th e mas s o f Libera l presbyterians in Scotland. , and o f nonconformists in England and Wales , stoo d firm , thoug h som e o f thei r mos t eminen t and abl e divine s resiste d th e ne w project [Hom e Rule], less on religious grounds than on what they took to be the balance of politica l arguments. 16 Other contemporar y observation s confirme d Morley' s appraisal . The Methodist Times, for example, state d tha t th e heav y vot e b y Methodist M.P. s in Jun e 188 6 fo r Hom e Rule (onl y two o f seventeen oppose d it ) accuratel y reflecte d the feelin g o f English Meth odists. I f true , thi s remar k woul d b e doubl y significant , fo r th e Methodists wer e probably mor e divided ove r Home Rule than an y other Nonconformis t denomination.17 Th e Baptist, whic h oppose d 15. Burns , Hardie , an d Wilso n alik e were know n as socialist s when the y first entered th e House . Burn s turne d out t o b e a n orthodo x Radical , an d ha s bee n in cluded her e in th e totals for working-clas s Radical M.P.s. 16. Joh n Morley , Th e Life o f William Ewart Gladstone (London , 1903) , III , 323. 17. Methodist Times, Jun e 10 , 1886 .

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Home Rule, had t o admi t tha t a t Baptis t associatio n meetings , th e preponderance o f opinion supported Gladstone. 18 The genera l suppor t rendered t o Home Rule by Nonconformists is show n b y a loo k a t th e constituencie s fro m 188 6 t o 1895 . A s Henry Fellin g point s out , ther e is no evidenc e o f a fligh t o f Nonconformist voter s fro m Liberalis m t o Unionis m i n thes e years. 19 The strongl y Nonconformist areas o f Britain remaine d Libera l an d Radical, excep t i n Cornwal l an d Birmingham , th e forme r bein g explained b y th e proximit y of Ireland an d th e consequen t urgenc y of a n imagined Iris h threat, the latter by the influence of Chamberlain. Th e Radical s manage d t o increas e thei r victorie s eve n i n th e election o f 188 6 i n Wale s an d Scotland , wher e Nonconformity was exceptionally strong . Thei r losse s occurre d mos t i n England , an d in th e bi g cities , wher e Nonconformit y wa s no t s o influential . A s Felling ha s written , th e large r th e city , th e weake r th e Noncon formity.20 On e o f th e effect s o f Hom e Rul e o n Radicalism , thus on th e Libera l party , wa s t o increas e th e Radica l dependenc y o n the Celti c fringe . Realizin g this , Scottis h an d Wels h Radical s pressed thei r demand s forcefully, an d successfully , on th e Libera l party after 1886 . In England , nevertheless , ther e wa s on e significan t develop ment i n Radica l representatio n afte r 1886 . Thi s occurre d i n Lon don, wher e th e Radical s since the 1860 s ha d no t wo n man y seats . In 1885 , Radical s wo n onl y eightee n o f sixty-tw o metropolita n seats, an d i n 188 6 onl y twelve . Betwee n 188 6 an d 1892 , how ever, Radical s i n Londo n engage d i n strenuou s organizationa l an d propaganda work . The y forme d th e cor e o f a stron g Progressiv e party tha t wo n contro l o f th e Londo n Count y Counci l i n 1894 . In th e genera l electio n o f 1892 , Londo n Radicals won twenty seats in th e Hous e o f Common s an d ha d hig h hope s fo r mor e i n th e future. Thei r risin g fortune s gav e Londo n muc h more importanc e in Libera l an d Radica l circle s tha n a t an y tim e sinc e th e declin e of th e Philosophi c Radicals . B y 1890 , Londo n Radicals , wh o in cluded som e of the mos t modern an d flexibl e o f all Liberals , wer e one o f th e ke y group s competin g fo r influenc e withi n th e Libera l party. 18. Th e Baptist, Jun e 1 8 and 25 , 1886 . Newma n Hall , i n a letter t o th e Fortnightly Review, admitte d tha t a s a Nonconformis t opponen t o f Home Rule , h e wa s in a "smal l minority. " "Nonconformist s an d Unionism, " Fortnightly Review, No . CCLXC, (Feb. , 1891) , 320-23 . 19. Henr y Felling , Social Geography o f British Elections, 1885-1910 (Ne w York, 1967) , pp . 431-32 . 20. Ibid., p. 433.

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For al l the strengt h of Radicalism within the Libera l party afte r 1886, Radical s wer e hampere d b y inadequat e leadership , an d i n this regar d Hame r i s righ t t o coun t th e los s o f Chamberlai n a s a disaster t o th e Radica l movemen t an d t o th e Libera l party . Th e Radical prototyp e afte r 188 6 woul d hav e resemble d tha t o f th e previous tw o decade s —a staunch , earnest , piou s bi g businessman or lawye r —but i t wa s precisel y thi s kin d o f perso n wh o di d no t have a leader . Chamberlai n formerl y ha d provide d th e provincia l democrats with aggressiv e leadership , bu t wit h him gone, the command fel l t o les s wel l suite d men . Man y Radicals expecte d Joh n Morley t o assum e Chamberlain' s mantle . H e wa s th e chie f write r of th e factio n eve n befor e 1886 , an d hi s earl y an d enthusiasti c devotion t o Hom e Rule gav e hi m a n exceptionall y stron g position after 1886 . Unfortunately , Morley's brillian t talent s i n editin g an d writing wer e accompanie d b y marke d politica l weaknesses . H e did not have the abilit y t o perceive th e country' s increasingly complex socia l problems , stil l les s th e capacit y t o construc t practica l solutions fo r them . Essentiall y a n intellectua l o f th e 1850 s an d 1860s, Morle y felt les s an d les s a t hom e in th e worl d o f the 1880s , and s o clun g t o th e on e issu e h e understoo d an d fel t secur e i n — Home Rule. Moreover , Morley was a nervous man, hypersensitive , shy and vain; h e did not strike blunt, hard men as a leader. Though a good platform speaker, Morle y was a poor debater, too frequently slow, humorles s an d of f the mar k in th e House . I n Jul y 1886 , th e positivist Frederi c Harriso n urge d Morle y t o tak e th e lea d an d form a party , muc h a s Morle y himself ha d onc e urge d Chamber lain.21 Bu t th e sur e sens e o f th e sourc e an d use s o f powe r wer e not there ; withou t it , Morle y coul d neve r tak e Chamberlain' s place.22 No on e els e ros e t o fil l th e void . Th e onl y Radica l o f an y prior standin g t o enhanc e hi s reputatio n afte r 188 6 wa s Henr y Labouchere, wh o ha d wi t an d charm , bu t wh o wa s totall y unfi t by background , belief s an d temperamen t t o lea d th e Radicals . After 1886 , Laboucher e attracte d a followin g o f malcontent s b y his ceaseles s energy , b y frequen t attack s o n th e Hous e o f Lords , and b y constan t criticis m o f th e expens e o f maintainin g th e roya l family. H e lacked , however , an y stead y plan s o r programs . Th e 21. Britis h Librar y o f Politica l an d Economi c Science , Harriso n t o Morley , July 24, 1886, Harriso n Papers , Sectio n A, Box 2. 22. Th e mos t recen t biography o f Morle y is D . A . Hamer , John Morley: Liberal Intellectual in Politics (Oxford , 1968) . Bu t perhap s th e bes t evidenc e o f Mor ley's weaknesse s i s i n Pete r Stansky , Ambitions an d Strategies: th e Struggle fo r the Leadership o f th e Liberal Party i n th e 189tfs (Oxford , 1964) .

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most promisin g youn g me n amon g the parliamentar y Radicals detested him . Thes e mad e u p th e grou p later know n as the Libera l Imperialists: H . H . Asquith , R . B . Haldane , Si r Edwar d Grey , Arthur Acland , Sidne y Buxton , Augustin e Birrell, an d To m Ellis . Receptive t o ne w ideas , th e littl e allianc e wa s self-consciousl y progressive an d ha d goo d relation s wit h th e Fabians. 23 Becaus e these youn g men , know n a t th e tim e a s th e "Ne w Radicals " o r "New Liberals, " though t o f themselve s a s constructiv e politicians , they sough t t o counte r Labouchere' s influence , whic h the y re garded a s all destructive. T o this end they concerted thei r activitie s in parliamen t with Rosebery , Morley and H . H . Fowler. 24 Bu t th e "Articles Club, " a s th e anti-Laboucher e allianc e wa s called , wa s flawed b y som e confusio n o f purpose. I t clearl y wa s not intende d to diver t th e attentio n o f th e part y awa y fro m Hom e Rule . Th e members tende d t o regar d Morle y a s thei r mentor , ye t h e wa s among th e stronges t Hom e Rulers in th e House . Wha t held the m together wa s a commo n desir e t o chec k Labouchere' s frivolous , irresponsible kin d o f Radicalis m and hi s annoyanc e of th e Libera l front bench . Moreover , th e Article s Clu b di d no t represen t th e provincial Nonconformis t Radicals; mos t o f the m wer e to o cosmo politan, to o "modern " t o spea k fo r th e bul k o f Radicalism. I t wa s in regar d t o leadership that Radicalis m suffere d mos t heavily fro m the Hom e Rule split: Chamberlai n di d not take many Radicals out of th e Libera l part y wit h him , bu t h e di d tak e hi s ow n ability , and it was sorely missed. II.

The Hom e Rul e crisi s ha d a marke d impac t o n th e organiza tional structur e o f bot h th e Libera l part y an d th e Radica l move ment. Befor e 1886 , th e structur e o f th e part y wa s quit e separat e from tha t o f th e Radica l movement . Th e officia l headquarter s o f the party , th e Libera l Centra l Association , attempted t o coordinate the parliamentar y activities o f al l Liberals, includin g Radicals , an d engaged i n electora l wor k as well ; bu t i t ha d n o direc t structura l link wit h an y o f th e variou s extra-parliamentary Radical organiza tions, including th e Nationa l Liberal Federation . I t ha d lon g bee n a concer n o f Radical s lik e Chamberlai n an d Dilk e t o ge t mor e 23. Joh n Morley , Recollections (London , 1925) , I , 323-24 ; A . M . McBriar , Fabian Socialism an d English Politics, 1884-1918 (Cambridge , 1966), pp . 253-57 . 24. Dudle y Sommer, Haldane o f Chan: Hi s Life an d Times, 1 856-1928 (Lon don, 1928) , pp . 76-77 ; Ro y Jenkins, Asquith (London , 1964), pp . 45-46 .

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influence fo r thei r persuasio n withi n th e Centra l Association. 25 The Radical s ha d n o parliamentar y agenc y o f thei r own , though Chamberlain ha d trie d t o for m on e i n th e 1870s. 26 Consequently , Radical M.P. s tended t o dissipat e thei r strengt h i n a kaleidoscope of temporar y alliances. Outsid e parliament, th e Radicals dominated a larg e numbe r o f special-purpos e league s an d societie s — the United Kingdo m Alliance , th e Liberatio n Society , th e Nationa l Education League , th e Lan d Tenur e Refor m Association , and th e Peace Society , t o nam e onl y a fe w —but the y ha d n o centra l or ganization to mobilize their forces. Afte r 1886 , th e National Liberal Federation, stil l a Radica l organization , wa s elevate d t o officia l party statu s an d a t th e sam e tim e cam e t o overshado w al l th e smaller societies . Libera l part y agencie s themselve s becam e th e chief organization s of and for Radicals. The National Liberal Federation underwen t a number of crucial developments afte r 1886 , al l tendin g t o increas e Radica l influence within the Liberal party. Th e first changes originated i n the Libera l defeat i n th e genera l electio n o f 1886 . Th e result s o f the electio n made i t plai n tha t Radical s fare d bette r tha n moderat e Liberals ; consequently, man y Liberals a s well as Radicals expresse d a desir e for greate r electora l contro l b y th e N.L.F. , a t th e expens e o f th e Liberal Centra l Association , i n futur e campaigning. 27 I n addition , Birmingham n o longe r bein g a congenia l hom e fo r th e N.L.F. , Frank Schnadhorst , the executiv e secretary , move d th e Federatio n headquarters t o Londo n i n Octobe r 1886 , int o office s adjacen t t o the Centra l Association . Schnadhors t becam e secretar y o f the Association a s wel l a s th e N.L.F. 28 Thes e alteration s effectivel y in stalled Radica l view s i n th e party' s parliamentar y comman d post . Distinctions betwee n th e parliamentar y an d extra-parliamentar y organizations faded . Bot h Schnadhors t an d th e whip s carrie d ou t electoral duties , an d both advise d Gladstone on party policy. Radi cals wer e appointe d whip s fo r th e firs t time : Arnol d Morley , son of th e influentia l Radical industrialis t Samue l Morley, in 1886 ; an d Tom Ellis , a popula r Wels h Radical , i n 1892 . I n 1887 , th e com 25. BM , Memoirs of Sir Charles Dilke, Dilke Papers, BM 44,932, f. 17 ; 44,933, f. 71 ; 43,940 , f . 16 . Barr y McGill , "Franci s Schnadhors t an d Libera l Part y Or ganization," Journal o f Modern History, XXXI V (March , 1962), 25 . 26. Thi s wa s th e so-calle d "ne w party, " consistin g o f Chamberlain , Dilke, L . L. Dillwyn , Josep h Cowen , Thoma s Burr , Joh n Morle y an d th e Irishma n E . D . Gray. BM , Memoirs of Si r Charles Dilke, Dilke Papers, B M 43,932, flf, 248-49. 27. A sampl e o f Radica l opinio n i s i n BM , Henr y Laboucher e t o Herber t Gladstone, Jul y 9 , 1886 , VSscoun t Gladston e Papers , B M 46,016. 28. Barr y McGill , "Franci s Schnadhors t an d Libera l Part y Organization, " Journal o f Modern History, XXXI V (March , 1962) , 29 .

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bined part y headquarter s establishe d a n offic e fo r officia l part y propaganda, th e Libera l Publicatio n Department . I t wa s con trolled fro m th e outse t b y Radical s who mad e u p it s managemen t committee: Jame s Bryce , Jame s Stuart , Perc y Bunting , an d T . Wemyss Reid. 29 Furthermore , Schnadhorst' s assistan t (an d successsor), Rober t A . Hudson , di d administrativ e chore s fo r bot h th e Federation an d th e Centra l Association . Throug h Acland and Ellis he kep t clos e contact wit h th e youn g New Liberals, som e of whom conducted a serie s o f studie s tha t contribute d muc h t o th e New castle Program. 30 Thes e step s amounte d t o a considerabl e advanc e of Radicalis m in th e party . I n 189 2 Arnol d Morley rightly declare d that th e Centra l Offic e wa s "mor e efficien t & more i n harmon y with recen t development s o f Libera l though t tha n i t ha s bee n a t any previous moment of its existence."31 Meanwhile th e Federatio n vigorousl y expande d it s organiza tion outsid e th e office s i n Parliamen t Street . I n Octobe r 1886 , Schnadhorst se t ou t t o establis h Libera l association s o f th e demo cratic typ e i n ever y par t o f Great Britain, all to b e connecte d b y a network o f regiona l federation s o r b y direc t affiliation wit h part y headquarters. Federation s o f Libera l association s wer e forme d i n North an d Sout h Wales . Sixty-fiv e association s wer e founde d o r newly affiliate d wit h th e Londo n office , an d 34 0 other s wer e at tached t o th e tw o Wels h federations . I n 188 6 an d 1887 , nin e re gional conference s wer e stage d b y th e N.L.F . throughou t Englan d and Wales . B y th e en d o f 1887 , hardl y a localit y outsid e o f Scotland lacke d a Libera l associatio n affiliate d t o th e Federation . Th e lists o f thei r officer s an d representative s t o N.L.F . conference s show tha t the y were for the mos t part dominate d by th e "advance d men" so feared by the Whigs before 1886. 32 Much th e sam e kind of unifying proces s too k place i n Scotland. As Kella s ha s shown , Scottish Radical s befor e 188 6 ha d thei r ow n organization, th e Nationa l Libera l Federatio n o f Scotland , whil e the Whig s an d moderate s controlle d th e Scottis h Libera l Associa tion. Rivalr y betwee n th e tw o organization s i n 188 6 contribute d to a numbe r of th e Libera l losses . Iris h Hom e Rul e was th e ke y 29. Nationa l Libera l Federation , Tenth Annual Report, 1887, pp. 28-29 . 30. J . A . Spender , Sir Robert Hudson: A Memoir (London , 1930) , pp. 17-21. 31. BM , A . Morle y t o Gladstone , April 21 , 1892 , Gladston e Papers, B M 44 , 254. 32. Thes e list s preced e eac h o f th e annua l report s o f th e N.L.F . Fo r th e organizational efforts : Nationa l Libera l Federation , Tenth Annual Report, 1887, pp. 11-25 ; an d Perc y Corder , The Life o f Robert Spence Watson (London , 1914) , p. 244 ; Robert Spenc e Watson , Th e National Liberal Federation: From Its Commencement t o th e General Election o f 1906 (London , 1907) , pp. 65-69 .

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issue a t odd s betwee n th e tw o organizations , th e Scottis h Federa tion strongl y supportin g Hom e Rule , th e Libera l Associatio n opposing. Lat e i n 1886 , Scottis h Radicals , b y permeatin g th e As sociation, manage d to carr y a resolutio n for Hom e Rule at a conference o f th e Association . Thei r victor y cleare d awa y th e mai n obstacle t o unification . I n Decembe r 1886 , th e Federatio n wa s merged int o th e Association , an d Radical s soo n won contro l ove r the policy-makin g conference s o f th e ne w join t Association . B y October 1887 , the y ha d committe d th e Associatio n executiv e t o disestablishment; by 1892, to a full Radica l program.33 Radical organizationa l powe r als o increase d markedl y i n Lon don afte r th e Hom e Rul e division . A s earl y a s Februar y 1886 , the Radical s W . S . Cain e (wh o late r becam e a Unionis t fo r a time) an d Renwic k Seager , secretar y o f th e Libera l Centra l As sociation, wer e working to reconcile th e rival moderate an d Radical claims i n variou s metropolita n constituencies. 34 However , a t th e time o f th e genera l electio n o f 1886 , mos t Londo n Radical s wer e still divide d int o tw o competin g associations , th e Londo n an d Counties Libera l Union , an d th e Londo n Libera l an d Radica l Council. Man y constituencie s ha d n o loca l association s a t all . Others ha d working-clas s Radica l clubs , which remained independ ent o f th e large r bourgeoi s associations . Afterwards , through th e efforts o f Jame s Stuar t an d R . K . Causton , tw o leadin g metropoli tan reformers , the Libera l association s combine d t o for m th e Lon don Libera l an d Radica l Union , wit h Radical s a s officers : Joh n Morley a s president , Causto n a s chairman , Stuar t a s honorar y secretary, an d Seage r a s secretary . Decidedl y Radica l i n bot h program an d membership , th e Libera l an d Radica l Union affiliate d with th e N.L.F . a s on e o f it s majo r subordinat e units . Fo r th e area surrounding London, party leaders founde d the more moderate Home Counties Division. 35 It i s importan t t o note , however , tha t th e formatio n of a sub stantially Radica l organization in London did no t en d the ol d division betwee n middl e an d working-clas s Radicals . Mos t o f th e Radical clubs , whic h ha d lon g bee n hostil e t o th e bourgeois dominated N.F.L. , refuse d to be brought int o the new Liberal and Radical union . Eve n thoug h th e Radica l club s wholeheartedl y supported Hom e Rule, as did mos t working-class Radical organizations everywhere , the y preferre d thei r ow n Metropolita n Radica l 33. Jame s G . Kellas , "Th e Libera l Part y i n Scotland , 1876-1895, " Scottish Historical Review, XLIV (April , 1965), 5-14 . 34. Times (London) , Feb. 18 , 1886 . 35. Nationa l Liberal Federation, Tenth Annual Report, 1887, p. 26 .

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Federation t o an y middle-clas s agency , i n whic h the y woul d b e treated a s Indian s an d no t chiefs . Thi s wa s tru e i n spit e o f th e fact tha t som e Fabian s "permeated " variou s Londo n Libera l an d Radical associations ; i n 1889 , fo r example , Sidne y Webb wa s ap pointed t o th e executiv e committe e o f th e Londo n Libera l an d Radical Union. 36 Class-consciousness , an d no t Hom e Rule , kep t the middl e an d working-clas s wing s o f Radicalis m i n Londo n separate.37 The structural problem s in London wer e common to the Radica l organizational experience s o f th e latte r 1880 s an d earl y 1890s . During thi s period , th e mos t crucia l organizationa l proble m tha t the Radical s face d wa s to respon d effectivel y to growin g demand s by th e workin g clas s fo r parliamentar y representation , an d con sequently fo r position s o f authorit y withi n th e part y structure . For decades , middle-clas s Radical s ha d claime d t o spea k fo r th e working class, but fro m th e mid-1880s , thi s claim no longer sufficed . The ne w working-clas s deman d ha d nothin g t o d o wit h Hom e Rule, an d littl e t o d o wit h policie s o f an y kind . Workingme n i n increasing number s wer e identifyin g themselve s a s a separat e class and wante d t o see their ow n kind in the Hous e of Commons. 38 Schnadhorst an d th e othe r Radica l leader s too k th e positio n tha t they woul d welcom e th e retur n o f mor e working-clas s M.P.s, bu t that decision s t o adop t candidates , whethe r middl e o r working class, mus t remai n wit h th e loca l Libera l associations , whic h con tinued t o b e ru n b y bourgeoi s Radicals . They fel t tha t the y coul d not depriv e thei r loya l constituenc y chief s o f thei r time-honore d right t o choos e candidates. 39 I n th e lon g ru n thi s respons e wa s inadequate, fo r i t preclude d large-scal e working-clas s representa tion throug h Libera l institutions , eve n thoug h Radical s no w con trolled those institutions . One exampl e illustrate s th e point . I n Novembe r 1890 , James Tims, secretar y o f th e Metropolita n Radica l Federation , formall y asked Schnadhors t t o hav e fifty Liberal candidate s throughout th e country withdrawn , s o that labo r candidates , wit h N.L.F . support , could contes t th e seats . Schnadhors t replied tha t th e N.L.F . could 36. McBriar , Fabian Socialism an d English Politics, pp . 234-38 . 37. Th e bes t discussio n of Londo n Radicalism i n thi s perio d i s Pau l Thomp son, Socialists, Liberals, and Labour: th e Struggle fo r London,- 1885-1914 (Toron to, 1967) , Chap . V. 38. Leo n D . Epstein , "Britis h Clas s Consciousnes s an d th e Labou r Party, " Journal o f British Studies, I (May , 1962), 136-50 . Henr y Pelling , Popular Politics an d Society i n Late-Victorian Britain (Ne w York , 1968) , Chaps . 1 and 6 . 39. Pelling , Origins o f th e Labour Party, p . 59 ; Nationa l Libera l Federation , Eleventh Annual Meeting, 1888 (London , 1888) , p . 29 .

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not interfere with the local associations ; furthermore, that working class candidate s woul d hav e t o pa y thei r ow n election expenses. 40 Under these conditions very few Liberal candidatures woul d ever be available to workingmen. In earlie r years, Schnadhorst had don e good service for Radicals and Liberals, but he showed poor judgment throughout his dealings with socialist s an d laborites . H e wrot e t o Gladston e o f Sidne y Webb: He i s quit e a ne w ma n & has littl e mean s of knowin g the sentiments o f Londo n workmen . Londo n t o hi m & others means th e fe w nois y impracticable s wh o mee t i n a fe w Clubs, a clas s who m n o programm e ca n eve r satisfy—the y are th e me n wh o keep Londo n Liberal s divided an d weak. Cooperation wit h the m i s almos t impossible . Ther e i s a wide gul f betwee n th e sober , intelligent , hardheade d me n of th e province s an d thes e men . Sidney Webb i s a socialis t with littl e sympath y with u s o n th e Iris h question. 41 This opinio n reflecte d middle-clas s attitude s an d interests , a s th e views o f the Radica l elit e since th e 1840 s tended t o do. Indeed, as the Radica l structur e afte r 188 6 wa s give n officia l Libera l part y status, it becam e mor e impervious t o working-class views and pressures. Thi s tendency , rathe r tha n th e commitmen t to Hom e Rule, would eventuall y depriv e Radicalis m an d th e Libera l part y o f working-class support .

III. The improve d numerica l an d organizationa l positio n o f th e Radicals, o r a t leas t th e middle-clas s sectio n o f them , withi n th e Liberal part y naturall y increase d th e influenc e o f thei r policies . Thus the effec t o f Home Rule on the Radica l program was to hel p promote it to official party policy. At the same time, however, Home Rule had n o effect o n the nature of the Radical program, and it was in thi s regard tha t Radicals , a s well a s moderate Liberals, faile d t o respond to new conditions. By 1886 the "Great Depression," whether economic historian s thin k i t substantia l o r not , wa s beginnin g t o produce tw o related phenomena : aggressive , independen t working class activity , an d socialis t criticis m o f British society. 42 Th e pres sures generate d b y these development s caused an important debat e within Radical circles , an d to a limited exten t led to a modification 40. Nationa l Libera l Federation , Proceedings o f th e fourteenth Annual Meeting, 1891 (London , 1891) , pp . 18-20 . 41. BM , September 10 , 1888. Gladston e Papers, BM 44,295. 42. Hele n Merrel l Lynd , England i n th e 1880's: Toward a Social Basis fo r Freedom (London , 1945) .

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of th e Radica l program ; however , o n th e whol e th e Radical s hel d to their ol d individualistic an d competitive ideology. Insofar as ideas were concerned , th e root s o f the eventua l declin e o f Liberalism la y in thi s failure — an inadequat e respons e cause d muc h less b y th e commitment t o Home Rule than by the nature of British Radicalism itself. The main political objectiv e of the Radicals had been to establis h political democrac y for me n (wome n wer e anothe r matter) . The y believed i n majorit y rule o n principle, an d the y expecte d i t woul d destroy th e powe r o f th e lande d orders . Eve n afte r passag e o f th e reform act s o f 188 4 an d 1885 , the y gav e hig h priorit y t o proposal s leading t o democrati c politica l arrangements : abolitio n o f plura l voting ("on e man one vote"), simplifie d electoral qualification s and registration, paymen t fro m th e rate s o f officia l electora l expenses , and shorte r parliaments. Mos t of them also supported a t least partia l payment o f M.P.s. 43 Fo r loca l affairs , the y wante d electiv e county , district, an d parish councils. 44 Bu t the political ide a they talked most about wa s refor m o f the powe r o f the Hous e of Lords, though they could not agree whether to "en d them or mend them." I n 1894, when the Lord s ha d rejecte d a numbe r o f Radica l bills , th e sentimen t among Radical s fo r som e kin d o f refor m o f th e Lord s wa s ver y strong, but the y wer e frustrated b y the ambiguit y of Lord Rosebery and b y disunit y among party leaders . B y 1895, refor m of the Lord s had becom e the leading rival to Home Rule itself for primacy in the Radical program . I t woul d b e wrong , however , t o se e thi s rivalr y as a struggle between those who wanted t o abandon Hom e Rule and those wh o thre w u p Hom e Rul e a s a diversio n t o refor m o f th e Lords. I t wa s rathe r a questio n o f whethe r th e Hous e o f Lord s should b e reforme d befor e Hom e Rul e wa s brough t i n again , o r whether Hom e Rul e shoul d b e take n t o th e electorat e t o ge t a mandate with which to override the Lords. 45 Issues connecte d wit h religio n provide d importan t point s i n th e 43. Andre w Rei d (ed.) , Th e Ne w Liberal Programme (London , 1886) , passim; Th e Speaker, Jan . 11 , 1890 , an d Apri l 2 , 1892 ; Thoma s Burt , "Labou r i n Parliament," Contemporary Review, L V (May , 1889) , 681-82 ; J . Fletche r Moulton, "What Mr . Gladston e Ough t t o Do, " Fortnightly Review, No . CCXI V (Feb. , 1893), 265. 44. Reid , Ne w Liberal Programme, passim; BM , Laboucher e to Herber t Glad stone, Aug. 27 , 1892 , Vicount Gladstone Papers, B M 46,016 . 45. See : Labouchere' s motio n i n th e House , Hansard, CCCXXIII , Marc h 9 , 1888, 763 ; E . A . Freeman , "Th e Hous e o f Lord s an d th e Count y Councils, " Fortnightly Review, No . CCLVI I (May , 1888) , 599 ; Alfre d Russe l Wallace, "Ho w t o Preserve th e Hous e o f Lords, " Contemporary Review, LX V (Jan. , 1894) , 114-17 ; The Speaker, Dec . 5 , 1891 ; T . Wemys s Reid , "Th e Leed s Conference, " Th e Liberal Magazine, X I (July , 1894) , 200-02 .

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Radical program , a s the y ha d sinc e th e eighteent h century . Th e Radicals o n principle oppose d al l establishe d churches , bu t th e influence o f th e Celti c fring e afte r 188 6 pushe d Wels h an d Scottis h disestablishment t o th e forefron t an d lef t disestablishmen t i n Eng land t o the distan t future. 46 Le d b y Stuar t Rendel, Welsh Radicals were especiall y insistent , an d b y 1891 , the y had forced the leader s of th e Libera l part y t o pu t Wels h disestablishmen t secon d onl y to Home Rule in the part y platform . The temperanc e advocates , who wanted t o mak e publicans g o the wa y of the establishe d churches , also gaine d i n influence . Having finally agreed o n a singl e planlocal option—the y persuaded th e party leadership t o accept temper ance as party policy; and this achievement got men like W. S. Caine to abando n Unionis m and return t o the fold. 47 Disestablishe s and temperance advocate s alik e (ver y ofte n the y wer e th e sam e people) remaine d stron g Hom e Rulers . I n 1894 , i t i s true , fou r Welsh Radical s — Lloyd George , D . A . Thomas , Fran k Edward s and Herber t Lewi s — rejected th e part y whip s i n a n effor t t o wi n attention t o Wels h demands , mainl y disestablishment . Bu t the y were not s o much opposed t o Home Rule as upset wit h the party' s concern for claims other than their own. 48 For decade s th e primary Radica l socia l polic y ha d bee n refor m of th e lan d laws . I n th e lat e 1880s , popula r disconten t wit h th e land syste m bega n t o wane , bu t Radical s continue d t o expres s great hostilit y t o landlords . The y stil l talke d o f establishin g fre e trade i n lan d throug h abolitio n o f wha t the y calle d entai l an d primogeniture, an d o f granting allotment s o f land throug h compulsory purchase o f land b y local authorities. 49 Increasingly , however , they concentrate d o n making landowners pa y wha t the y regarde d as a fai r shar e o f social expense s — that is , t o pa y taxe s a t a rat e equal t o tha t born e b y personalt y owners. 50 The y adopte d fro m Henry Georg e th e ide a tha t th e ful l valu e of the "unearne d increment" enjoye d b y landlord s ough t t o g o t o publi c authorities . I n 46. Kennet h O . Morgan , Wales i n British Politics, 1868-1922 (2n d ed.; Cardiff, 1970) , Chaps . Il l an d IV ; Jame s G . Kellas , "Th e Libera l Part y an d th e Scottish Churc h Disestablishmen t Crisis, " E.H.R., LXXI X (Jan. , 1964) , 31-46 . 47. W . S . Caine, "Th e Attitud e of th e Advance d Temperance Party, " Contemporary Review, LXII I (Jan. , 1893) , 47-60 ; Si r Wilfri d Lawson , "Th e Classes , the Masses , and th e Glasses, " Nineteenth Century, No . CXVII I (Dec. , 1886) , 795804. 48. Morgan , Wales i n British Politics, pp. 143-44 . 49. Arthu r Arnold , "Th e Lan d Transfe r Bill, " Fortnightly Review, No . CCXLVII (July , 1887) , 113-14 ; BM , R . T . Rei d t o Schnadhorst , Sept . 16 , 1891 , in Gladston e Papers, BM 44,295 . 50. Star, Nov . 11 , 1890 ; BM , Laboucher e t o Herber t Gladstone , March 31 , 1888, Viscoun t Gladstone Papers, B M 46,016 .

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response t o urba n problems , th e Radical s afte r 188 6 followe d th e Radical Progra m of 1885 in turning thei r criticism o f the "unearne d increment" t o th e cities . The y wante d t o giv e cit y authoritie s th e right to tax the urban unearned increment, t o take land for housing, sanitation, an d beautification , an d t o forc e landlord s a s wel l a s occupiers to pay the rates. 51 Thi s was a thoroughly Chamberlainit e approach, an d show s conclusively that th e Radical s afte r 188 6 ha d not become less "radical." The Londo n Radical s in particular wer e th e advocate s o f what was, t o them , a n advance d socia l program . The y introduce d int o Radicalism a ne w emphasi s o n specificall y metropolita n problem s and a ne w rhetori c i n criticis m o f rigi d laissez-faire principles . Led b y Professo r Jame s Stuart, a leader o f the universit y extension movement, an d J . F . B . Firth , Quake r barriste r an d presiden t of the Municipa l Refor m League , th e Londo n Radical s sough t t o amalgamate th e obsolet e an d complicate d syste m o f vestries , dis tricts, an d corporation s o f Londo n int o on e representativ e govern ment. The y woul d us e thi s centra l authorit y th e wa y Chamber lain ha d use d th e Birmingha m cit y counci l — to improv e gas , water, and sanitation services, and to raise the standards o f workingclass housing. The y woul d tax groun d owners instead o f occupiers , and woul d throug h 'leasehol d enfranchisement " enable occupier s to becom e owners . Fo r th e countr y a t large , th e Londo n Radicals advocated improvemen t o f th e hour s an d wage s o f governmen t employees an d abolitio n o f taxes on common items of the breakfas t table.52 There ca n b e n o doub t tha t th e socia l concer n o f th e ne w Radicals o r New Liberal s an d th e Londo n Radical s — the member ship o f thes e group s overlappe d considerabl y — disturbed man y other Radicals , a s wel l a s moderat e Liberals . T o som e extent, thi s situation cause d a debat e amon g Radical s involvin g th e attentio n that the y shoul d giv e Hom e Rule. But the substanc e o f the debat e within Radicalis m wa s not abou t Hom e Rule , whic h the y al l sup ported, but abou t th e relative merits o f the new social issues versu s the ol d Radica l nostrums . B y th e latte r 1880 s i n Britain , funda mental question s wer e bein g aske d abou t th e natur e o f industria l 51. A . T . Williams , " A Mode l Lan d Law, " Fortnightly Review, No . CCXLI V (April, 1887) , 558-72 ; J . Fletche r Moulton , "Th e Taxatio n o f Ground-Rents, " Contemporary Review, LVI I (March , 1890) , 412-20 ; Th e Speaker, Aug . 9 , 1890 . 52. McBriar , Fabian Socialism an d English Politics, pp . 187-9 8 an d 234-42 ; Thompson, Socialists, Liberals, an d Labour, pp. 90-111 ; Jame s Stuart , "Th e Lon don Progressives, " Contemporary Review, LX I (April , 1892) , 521-32 ; H . W . Massingham, "Th e Governmen t an d Labour, " Contemporary Review, LXI V (Dec. , 1893), 770-75 .

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society itself . T o som e o f th e younge r Radical s thes e question s demanded a more positive program than Radical s traditionally ha d pursued. Haldane , traine d i n Germa n idealis m rathe r tha n Ben thamite empiricism , wa s th e intellectua l leade r o f th e progressiv e movement. H e wrote: The mer e remova l o f obstacle s whic h use d t o bloc k th e highway o f huma n progres s ha d bee n prett y wel l com pleted. W e are face to face with a new kind o f social prob lem. Liberalis m ha s passe d fro m th e destructiv e t o th e constructive stage in its history.53 Implicit i n th e though t o f th e ne w Radical s wa s a ne w vie w of th e world . Unlik e Radical s o f olde r generations , the y di d no t believe tha t th e unimpede d actio n o f socia l an d economi c forces led necessaril y t o progress ; indeed , the y believed , mos t o f th e impediments wer e gone , an d th e socia l problem wa s greate r tha n ever. Lik e all Radicals of the nineteent h century , th e new Radical s wanted t o establis h th e condition s i n whic h a n individua l woul d have maximu m freedom o f self-development . Bu t the y no w fel t that positiv e actio n by the state would be necessary t o bring abou t these optimu m conditions. Thu s the y wer e severel y critica l o f unrestrained capitalis m an d regarde d som e o f th e olde r Radical s a s obsolete kind s o f individualists . T o som e o f them , fo r example , John Morle y represente d th e 'individualis t tail " o f old-fashione d Radicalism; he was the "bondslav e o f Political Economy/' 54 Radicals lik e Morle y and Bradlaugh , an d man y others, di d no t share thi s sens e o f urgency abou t urba n socia l issues , an d di d no t look upo n th e ne w spokesme n o f th e workin g clas s wit h muc h understanding. Morle y wrote of the London Radicals: The anarchi c follie s o f the Londo n Radical s ar e playing th e Tory gam e t o a marvel . Indee d i f thes e me n ar e Radicals , I'm a Tory . W e canno t wi n withou t accessio n o f strengt h from th e Londo n constituencies , an d that strengt h wil l never come so long as these blatant democrats persist in frightenin g the smal l shopkeeper , fo r on e thing , an d i n standin g aloo f from organizatio n fo r another. 55 53. Haldane , "Th e Libera l Creed, " Contemporary Review, LI V (Oct. , 1888) , 463. 54. G . W . E . Russell , "Th e Ne w Liberalism : A Response, " Nineteenth Century, No . CL I (Sept. , 1889) , 498 . Se e also : L . A . Atherley-Jones , "Th e Ne w Liberalism," Nineteenth Century, No . C L (Aug. , 1889) , 192 ; Joh n Pag e Hopps , "The Nihilism s and Socialism s of th e World," Contemporary Review, LVIII (Aug. , 1890), 271-82 ; an d J . Guinnes s Rogers , "Nonconformis t Forebodings, " Nineteenth Century, No . CCXII I (Nov. , 1894) , 790-806 . 55. Morle y to Chamberlain , Feb. 8 , 1888 , quote d i n Garvin , Chamberlain, II , 515.

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He regarde d th e Fabian s a s impruden t upstarts : "Th e Fabian s interest an d stimulat e and sugges t — but the y are loose, superficial, crude, and impertinent."56 Yet if the ol d Radical s differed fro m th e ne w Radical s in world view an d i n attitud e toward s socialis t spokesmen , i n bot h basi c ideals an d specifi c policie s the y differe d ver y little . Thi s i s wh y one ca n speak of a Radical movement within the Radica l traditio n after 1886 . Th e Londo n Radicals , fo r example , buil t thei r plan s on th e municipa l intervention an d lan d refor m so important t o th e older element s o f th e Radica l progra m o f th e "civi c gospel." 57 Further, al l o f th e Radical s rejecte d th e cooperativ e idea l under lying socialist programs and reaffirmed thei r belie f i n a competitiv e system. Arthu r Arnold , a lan d reforme r wh o stoo d a t abou t th e middle of the Radica l spectrum, explained tha t Radical s wanted t o regulate, no t replace , th e capitalis t system : "W e see k t o establis h well-ordered competition , becaus e w e fin d tha t i n som e for m competition i s th e main-sprin g of production, an d tha t mora l an d material stoppag e an d declin e follo w upo n remova l o f thi s mainspring of society."58 A s Haldane put it , the state provides a civilized environment fo r capitalists , an d th e stat e ha s th e righ t t o charg e "rent" fo r its services. 59 Haldane' s sentiment was only an extension of Chamberlain' s olde r doctrin e o f "ransom " t o propert y o f al l kinds. Mos t Radical s coul d agre e wit h it , an d wit h Haldane' s specific proposals: fre e education , release of charitable endowment s through disestablishment , refor m o f land transfer laws, compulsory powers for local authorities fo r allotments, taxatio n of the unearne d increment, an d equalizatio n an d graduatio n o f deat h dutie s o n realty an d personalty. 60 Thi s was old Radical wine in new Radical bottles. If th e Radical s agreed in rejecting socialism, in terms of practical policies the y coul d no t agre e on where to dra w th e line . Th e proposal o f establishin g th e eight-hou r day , whic h wa s the issu e tha t most ofte n divide d Radical s fro m socialists , illustrate s th e point . In th e belie f tha t competitio n shoul d operat e throughou t society , 56. Nationa l Librar y o f Scotland , Morley t o Haldane , Sept. 28 , 1891 , Haldan e Papers, MS 5903 . 57. Th e civi c gospe l i s discusse d i n As a Briggs , Victorian Cities (Ne w York , 1970), Chap. 5. 58. "Socialis m an d th e Unemployed, " Contemporary Review, LI H (April , 1888), 561 . 59. Haldane , "Th e Libera l Creed, " Contemporary Review, LI V (Oct. , 1888) , p. 466. 60. Ibid., pp . 462-74 ; an d R . B . Haldane , "Th e Libera l Part y an d It s Pros pects," Contemporary Review, LIII (Jan. , 1888) , 156-59 .

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Radicals lik e Morley, Bradlaugh, Mundell a an d eve n Thoma s Bur t (a forme r coa l miner ) rejecte d th e eight-hou r day . The y woul d accept limitatio n o f working hours only i f it wer e prove d t o the m that th e healt h an d safet y o f th e worker s wa s a t stak e — as the y thought i t wa s i n th e cas e o f mining. 61 However , a numbe r o f Radicals, mainl y fro m consituencie s wher e th e working-clas s elec torate wa s large , supporte d th e eight-hou r da y fo r al l industries . It woul d b e convenien t fo r th e historia n i f thi s issu e ha d neatl y divided ol d from ne w Radicals, but i t di d not . Haldane , for example, rejecte d th e eight-hou r da y an d hel d t o th e Radica l polic y of the 1870 s — support fo r th e developmen t o f well-run unions, which could obtai n throug h fre e an d fai r bargainin g al l th e legitimat e demands o f labor. 62 Clearl y th e issu e trouble d th e Radica l move ment, fo r i t se t a t odd s th e interest s o f capita l an d labor . Th e eight-hour da y hi t a t th e structura l weaknes s i n Radicalis m jus t as did the proble m of working-class parliamentary representation . In wha t way was Home Rul e related t o thes e policies an d programs? I n th e firs t place , i t di d no t mak e Radica l ideolog y o r proposals an y mor e o r les s "radical*' ; Radicalis m remaine d afte r 1886 wha t i t ha d bee n sinc e th e 1850 s an d 1860s . Second , th e Radical progra m itsel f wa s on e o f the mai n reason s that Radical s had take n u p Hom e Rule ; tha t is , in a n effor t t o clea r th e Hous e of Common s o f legislativ e blocks , th e Radical s ha d b y 188 6 t o support self-rul e fo r th e Irish. 63 Further , immediatel y afte r th e general electio n o f 1886 , a numbe r o f Radicals , mos t notabl y Labouchere, ha d urge d th e Gladstonia n leadershi p t o sandwic h Home Rul e between Radica l measures , in orde r t o ge t th e electo rate t o swallo w it. 64 Others , however , wer e enthusiasti c abou t Home Rule in itself, and felt i n additio n that there wa s no point in trying to pass any reforms unti l the Iris h Questio n was settled. Th e Radical campaig n for Hom e Rule was extremel y enthusiastic fro m 1886 throug h 1889. I t wa s not until the Parnell-O'She a divorc e rev61. Hamer , Morley, pp . 255-70 ; Charle s Bradlaugh , "Regulation by Statut e o f the Hour s o f Adul t Labour," Fortnightly Review, No . CCLXXI X (March , 1890) , 440-54; Thoma s Burt , "Mr . Chamberlain' s Programme, " Nineteen^ Century, No . CXC (Dec. , 1892) , 868 ; Frederi c Harrison , "Th e Ne w Trades-Unionism, " Nineteenth Century, No . CLII I (Nov. , 1889) , 721-32 ; The Speaker, Nov . 15 , 1890 ; BM, Arnol d Morle y t o Gladstone , Sept . 24 , 1890 , Gladston e Papers , B M 44,254 . 62. R . B . Haldane , "Th e Libera l Creed, " Contemporary Review, LI V (Oct. , 1888), 468 ; an d "Th e Eigh t Hour s Question, " Contemporary Review, LVI I (Feb. , 1890), 240-55 . 63. Se e T . W . Heyck , "Englis h Radical s an d th e Iris h Question, " Chap . VI . 64. Fo r example : BM , Laboucher e t o Herber t Gladstone , Jul y 9 an d 28 , 1886, Viscoun t Gladston e Papers , B M 46,016 . (Th e lette r o f Jul y 2 8 quote s Schnadhorst t o the sam e purpose.)

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elations tha t Hom e Rul e wa s see n a s a n electora l albatros s b y a large numbe r o f Radicals . At that time , the Radica l movement, like the Libera l party, becam e divide d betwee n thos e who thought tha t without electora l emphasi s o n Radica l issue s a majorit y o f pro Home Ruler s could neve r be elected , an d thos e who felt that unti l Home Rul e wa s passe d n o Radica l measure s coul d b e enacted . Thus th e disput e wa s not whether Hom e Rule should be offere d a s a devic e t o hold the party togethe r o r as a distraction from extreme collectivist proposals ; i t concerne d th e tactic s mos t likel y t o win a majority sufficien t t o pas s bot h Hom e Rul e an d th e Radica l pro gram.65 IV. It remain s t o b e see n ho w the variou s Radica l proposal s fare d within th e officia l part y afte r 1886 . Th e evidenc e seem s clea r tha t the Radica l progra m afte r 188 6 enjoye d greate r attentio n an d support withi n Libera l circle s than eve r before . Th e Liberal party, as w e hav e seen , relie d heavil y afte r th e Hom e Rul e spli t o n th e National Libera l Federation , an d fo r al l practica l purposes , th e party an d th e N.L.F . wer e th e same . Th e part y systematicall y adopted Radica l policie s betwee n 188 6 an d 1892 ; insofa r a s th e involvement wit h Hom e Rul e affecte d thi s process , i t cause d Liberals, i n search o f support, t o accept Radica l policies the y migh t otherwise hav e avoide d fo r years . Th e Federatio n designe d it s series o f politica l demonstration s i n 188 6 an d 188 7 t o associat e Home Rul e wit h th e reform s desire d i n eac h o f th e traditionall y Liberal area s o f Englan d an d Wales . Thi s mean t tha t th e N.L.F . deliberately sough t ou t an d adopte d Radica l policie s t o buil d enthusiasm fo r Hom e Rule . I n Novembe r 1886 , fo r example , Asquith wa s th e mai n speake r a t a conferenc e i n Leiceste r o f th e Liberal association s o f the midlan d counties . H e too k a s his sub jects Hom e Rul e an d th e electora l registratio n laws . I n Rhyl , Mundella spoke to the Liberal s o f North Wales abou t Hom e Rule , disestablishment o f th e Churc h i n Wale s an d a Wels h "thre e F " land bill. 66 65. Example s o f th e differen t side s i n th e dispute : Haldan e tol d Edwar d Hamilton tha t socia l an d labo r question s would b e force d t o th e fron t a s a resul t of Parnell' s disgrace. (BM , Si r Edward Hamilton Diaries, Dec . 14 , 1890 , Hamilton Papers, B M 48,654. ) Morle y wrot e Gladston e t o kee p Hom e Rul e i n firs t posi tion. (BM , Morle y t o Gladstone , Dec . 31 , 189 0 an d Jan . 2 , 1891 , Gladston e Papers, B M 44,256.) 66. Nationa l Libera l Federation , Tenth Annual Report, 1887, pp . 17-25 ; R . Spence Watson, Th e National Liberal Federation, pp . 65-69.

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Such meeting s generate d Radica l policie s whic h wer e adde d to the resolutions accepte d a t the annua l conferences of the N.L.F . At th e 188 7 conference , hel d i n Nottingham , th e N.L.F . adopte d Welsh disestablishment , Londo n municipal amalgamation , abolitio n of th e legislativ e powe r o f th e Hous e o f Lords , an d equalizatio n of rea l an d persona l property taxes. 67 A t the 188 8 conference , th e N.L.F. added one man one vote, taxation of ground rents and mining royalties, bette r housing for tie working classes, shorter parliaments , and publi c payment of election expenses. 68 I n 188 9 cam e payment of M.P.s , "th e fre e breakfas t table," Scottish disestablishment , an d local option. 69 Fro m 1889 through 1893, the list of policies remained substantially th e same. 70 Th e 189 4 conferenc e adde d suppor t fo r an employers ' liabilit y bill. 71 Th e 189 5 meetin g change d the orde r of proposal s by movin g reform o f the Hous e of Lords to a position second onl y t o Hom e Rule , bu t otherwis e lef t th e progra m un altered.72 Hom e Rule stood at the top of the list every year. Leaders o f th e parliamentar y Libera l part y accepte d th e ful l Radical program. Th e key men from 188 6 to 189 5 were Gladstone, Rosebery, Harcourt , an d Joh n Morley . Roseber y wa s on e o f th e more progressiv e member s o f th e party , an d di d no t bal k a t th e Radical program. 73 Harcourt , b y birt h an d temperamen t mor e Whig tha n Radical , throug h mos t o f hi s caree r move d t o th e lef t to kee p u p wit h part y opinion . Carin g littl e for Hom e Rule , h e frequently urge d hi s colleague s t o adop t Radica l policies t o offse t the unpopularit y o f the Iris h cause. 74 A t the N.L.F . conferenc e in 1894 Harcour t wen t s o far a s t o declar e himsel f a "ne w Radical " and accept explicitl y the complete Radical program.75 Joh n Morley was ver y uneas y abou t policie s tha t t o hi m smacke d of socialism, and h e resiste d an y attempt s t o ignor e eithe r Hom e Rule o r th e 67. Nationa l Libera l Federation , Tenth Annual Report, 1887, p. 9 . 68. Nationa l Libera l Federation , Eleventh Annual Meeting, 1888 (London , 1888), pp . 6-9 . 69. Nationa l Libera l Federation , Proceedings o f th e Twelfth Annual Meeting, 1889 (London , 1890) , pp . 6-10. 70. Nationa l Libera l Federation , Proceedings o f th e Thirteenth Annual Meeting, 1890 (London , n.d.) , pp . 9-11 ; Proceedings o f th e Fourteenth Annual Meeting, 1891 (London , 1891) , pp . 7-8 ; Proceedings o f th e Fifteenth Annual Meeting, 1893 (London , 1893) , p . 6. 71. Nationa l Libera l Federation , Proceedings o f th e Sixteenth Annual Meeting, 1894 (London , 1894) , p . 5. 72. Nationa l Libera l Federation , Proceedings o f th e Seventeenth Annual Meeting, 1895 (London , 1895) , pp. 5-7. 73. Rober t Rhode s James , Rosebery (Ne w York , 1963) , pp . 71-76 ; 197-99 74. Fo r instance , Harcour t t o Gladstone, Jul y 16 , 1892 , quote d i n A . G . Gardiner, Th e Life o f Si r William Harcourt (London , 1923) , II , 179 . 75. Nationa l Libera l Federation , Proceedings o f th e Sixteenth Annual Meeting, 1894, pp. 68-72 .

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alliance wit h th e Parnellites . Bu t Morley ha d lon g been a leadin g Radical, an d h e ha d n o troubl e i n acceptin g th e officia l Liberal Radical program . I n 1892 , h e campaigne d fo r th e ful l platfor m as well as for Home Rule.76 Even Gladston e accepted mos t of the Radica l policies. Becaus e he wa s seventy-seve n year s ol d i n 1886 , Gladston e insiste d tha t Radical proposal s woul d hav e t o b e manage d an d carrie d b y younger men. H e did not , however, stand in the way of the party' s acceptance o f them. H e wrote Harcourt in 1886 : " I will not break with th e 20 0 (the Federation ) o r the Radica l sectio n o f them if I can hel p it . Bu t I a m rather to o old t o pu t o n a bran d ne w sui t of clothes.'* 77 Ye t put o n a new sui t of clothes h e did . Afte r coach ing b y Arnol d Morley , the Gran d Ol d Ma n accepte d th e Radica l program a s i t stoo d a t th e N.L.F . conferenc e o f 1887. 78 Durin g 1888, h e introduce d int o th e Hous e a motio n t o equaliz e deat h duties o n rea l an d persona l property , an d spok e an d vote d fo r payment o f members. 79 I n Novembe r 1888 , h e strongl y advocate d one ma n t o vote. 80 I n 189 0 h e adopte d Wels h disestablishment. 81 And i n 1891 , b y endorsin g th e Newcastl e Program , Gladston e accepted a stron g Radica l program. 82 Thi s i s no t th e recor d o f a man chaining Radicals to a moderate Liberal policy.83 It i s clear , then , tha t th e Radical s gaine d influenc e within th e Liberal part y a s a resul t o f Hom e Rule . Despit e th e setbac k i n 1886 an d th e los s o f Chamberlain , Hom e Rul e o n balanc e con tributed t o Radica l power . Ye t th e year s fro m 188 6 t o 189 5 un deniably wer e a period whe n Radicals an d Liberal s bega n t o los e the allegianc e o f som e working-clas s an d socialis t leaders . Th e point to remember is that it was not the Radicals' involvement with Home Rul e whic h cause d the m t o tur n a dea f ea r t o th e ne w voices. Rather , it wa s that t o liste n woul d hav e required Radical s to violate the basi c preconceptions an d power arrangement s withi n 76. Se e Morley' s speeche s reporte d i n Times, Jun e 1 5 an d 20 , 1892 . 77. Nov . 16 , 1886 , quote d i n Gardiner , Harcourt, II , 12 . 78. BM , Arnol d Morle y t o Gladstone , Oct . 4 , 8 an d 15 , 1887 , Gladston e Papers, B M 44,253 ; Nationa l Libera l Federation , Tenth Annual Report, 1887, pp. 67-75. 79. BM , Si r Edwar d Hamilto n Diaries , Apri l 25 , 188 8 an d Jul y 11 , 1888 , Hamilton Papers, B M 48,648 and 48,649 . 80. BM , Hamilto n Diaries , Nov . 6 , 1888 , Hamilto n Papers, B M 48,649. 81. Morgan , Wales in British Politics, p. 90. 82. Gladstone' s speec h a t th e Newcastl e conferenc e i s quote d i n Nationa l Liberal Federation , Proceedings o f th e Fourteenth Annual Meeting, 1891, pp . 100-15. 83. Th e sam e genera l conclusion , fro m a differen t perspective , i s argue d i n E. D . Steele , "Gladston e an d Ireland, " Irish Historical Studies, XVI I (March , 1970), 58-88 .

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their movemen t — and a t jus t th e tim e whe n the y ha d obtaine d preeminence i n th e Libera l party . T o accep t working-clas s an d socialist demands, they would have had to alter their ultimate goals and ignor e th e vita l interest s o f tH e main , distinctl y bourgeois , element of their alliance . Wha t seems to have happened afte r 188 6 is that with most Whigs and many moderates gone from th e Liberal party, an d wit h Radica l people , organization s an d idea s elevate d to officia l status , th e condition s wer e create d fo r middl e an d working-class Radical s to confron t eac h other squarely — to recognize themselves an d eac h other fo r what they were . Th e develop ment o f a separate , independen t working-clas s party seem s th e inevitable result . Non e o f thes e observation s i s mean t t o argu e that Radicals , a s wel l a s moderat e Liberals , di d no t debat e th e rank Hom e Rule should have in th e Radica l program, o r th e im portance o f th e Parnellit e alliance . Thes e wer e importan t issues; but they are the subject of a different story.

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ROSEBERY AN D IRELAND, 1898-1903: A REAPPRAISA L DAVIDW. GUTZKE THE P R O T R A C T E D D E B A T E o n Iris h polic y withi n th e Libera l part y followin g W. E . Gladstone' s retiremen t ha s receive d considerabl e attentio n fro m histo rians. Mos t o f the m hav e focuse d o n th e contribution s o f th e talente d Libera l Imperialist grou p o f Asquith , Gre y an d Haldan e wh o successfull y wrote thei r 'step b y step' approac h int o th e 190 6 Libera l programme. 1 Les s well scrutinize d has been th e policy of Lord Roseber y and hi s followers. Emerging fro m retiremen t i n lat e 1901 , Roseber y gav e hi s studied judgemen t on Irelan d i n a serie s o f speeches whic h contemporaries an d scholar s alik e hav e dismissed a s 'purel y negative ' an d opportunistic. 2 Ye t Rosebery' s Iris h polic y does no t requir e a n apologist , a s hi s critic s hav e mistake n it s subtlet y fo r opportunism. Fo r Rosebery , whil e revealin g pronounce d scepticis m abou t th e expediency o f home rule , di d no t repudiat e thi s policy. Indee d h e expounded a position i n Februar y 190 2 compatible wit h Liberal hom e rul e principles , which paradoxically preclude d th e eventualit y o f a subordinat e Iris h parliament . Th e inspiration fo r thi s polic y i n par t derive d fro m W . E . Gladstone' s Europea n perspective o n th e Iris h question , an d i n par t fro m Joh n Redmond' s extrem e demands i n 189 8 an d 189 9 for an independen t parliament . Wherea s Gladston e had argue d i n the home rule debate s tha t the successful European constitutiona l relationships lurnishe d a 'precedent ' fo r a mor e restricte d Anglo-Iris h arrange ment, Roseber y stresse d th e difficultie s subsequentl y encountere d i n th e Norwegian-Swedish an d th e Austro-Hungaria n union s t o refut e thi s conten tion. Thes e tw o importan t development s sinc e 188 6 were unite d i n Rosebery' s argument tha t th e concessio n o f a n independen t Iris h parliamen t woul d creat e the problem s inheren t i n Europea n dualism , an d eventuall y lea d t o Iris h separation. Convert s h e achieved , bu t th e riva l gradualis t approac h becam e official policy . Th e exten t t o whic h Rosebery' s ow n enigmati c personalit y impaired th e appeal o f his policy must be considered . The twelv e years followin g th e inauguratio n o l Gladstone' s allianc e wit h th e Irish ha d create d a chas m acros s whic h th e Iris h viewe d th e Liberal s wit h increasing distrust , especiall y when the y detecte d an y retrea t fro m th e 'Gran d Old Man's ' Iris h priorities . Fo r thei r part , th e Liberal s confronte d a seemingl y insoluble dilemma . To renounc e hom e rul e fo r offic e appeare d t o many Libera l supporters a s a n odiou s betraya l o f principle , bu t t o procee d wit h th e Gladstonian approach tha t had alread y bee n twic e defeated i n parliament an d a t subsequent election s threatene d t o stultif y th e party . Othe r factor s als o contributed t o th e Libera l impasse . Liberals , fo r example , justifiabl y pointe d t o the quarrelsom e Iris h faction s a s a n obstacl e t o th e implementatio n o f thei r 1 M . E . P . Marlcy , 'Asquith , hom e rule , an d th e Gladstonia n tradition ' (unpublishe d Queen' s University Belfas t Ph.D . thesis , 1 9 7 2 ) ; H . W . McCready , 'Hom e rul e an d th e Libera l party , 1899-1906', Irish Hut. Studies, xii i (1962-3) , 316-48; H . C . G . Matthew , Th e Liberal Imperialists: th e Ideas an d Politics o f a post-Gladstoman Elite (Oxford, 1973) . I am gratefu l t o Professo r Trevo r Lloyd , m y adviser. Professo r Dav e Healy , Mr . Crai g Horl e an d Mr . Rober t McCarro n fo r thei r helpfu l comments and suggestions. 2 McCready, p. 336 ; Marley , p . 284 .

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principles. I n addition , s o influentia l wa s th e 188 6 electora l realignmen t o n Liberal expectation s tha t a retur n t o th e over-al l parliamentar y majoritie s o f 1868 and 188 0 coul d no t b e anticipated . This gloom y situatio n wa s a recurren t theme throughou t 189 8 i n th e Westminster Gazette, th e Libera l pape r edite d b y J. A . Spender. Whil e the Libera l party stil l adhered t o th e Gladstonian solution of hom e rule , th e pape r commented , 'ther e i s no furthe r benefi t t o b e go t b y repeating th e processes which failed i n 188 6 and 1893' : the Irish 'cannot retreat', and th e Liberal party, lacking a majority independent o f the Iris h to overwhelm the Lords , 'canno t g o forward' . Bu t th e pape r di d no t recommen d a policy of despair. Mor e tha n a yea r befor e th e onse t o f th e Boe r War , th e Westminster Gazette helpe d t o giv e notoriet y t o Richar d Haldane' s 'ste p b y step' polic y first enunciated i n 1896 . Logicall y rejectin g a thir d senseles s onslaugh t o n th e entrenched Lord s wit h th e concomitan t damag e t o th e party' s electora l prospects, th e pape r advance d 'Hom e Rul e b y stages ' a s a metho d o f circumventing the Unionist veto.3 It was only from July 1902 that this progressive newspaper—invariably eschewin g part y label s an d dispute s t o pursu e a self-appointed rol e a s preache r o f unity—woul d consistentl y advocat e a n instalment approac h t o hom e rule. 4 Thi s four-yea r hiatus , nevertheless , should not obscur e th e importan t fac t tha t a prominen t Libera l dail y newspape r wa s predisposed t o th e Liberal Imperialis t policy before th e heated debat e of 1901-2 . on Irish policy began i n earnest. Two events in 189 8 fostered this uncertainty in Liberal thought about the Irish question. Man y historians hav e rightly emphasized th e significanc e o f th e Iris h Local Governmen t Act. 5 Henceforth Liberal s argued tha t th e nature o f the Irish question had been fundamentally transformed, an d t o substantiate this view they frequently cite d Lor d Salisbury' s 188 5 dictum tha t th e concessio n o f Iris h loca l government woul d b e mor e dangerou s tha n hom e rule . A mor e portentou s event, late r engenderin g bitte r recriminations , involve d a n amendmen t t o th e address moved b y John Redmond proposin g th e 'concession o f an independen t Parliament'. Defendin g thi s motion , Redmond , leade r o f th e Iris h Parnellit e faction, characterize d the two home rule bills as compromises rathe r than 'a ful l concession o f th e right s o f Ireland' . H e furthe r rebuke d th e Liberal s fo r thei r apostasy i n no t acknowledgin g the priorit y pledge inheren t i n the Irish-Liberal alliance. An d Joh n Dillon , th e leade r o f th e Iris h factio n dependen t o n thi s alliance, was castigated for deserting Charle s Stewart Parnell in favour of fruitles s Liberal co-operation. I n response , Si r William Harcourt, the n Libera l leader i n the Commons , cogentl y demonstrate d th e contradictio n betwee n a n indepen dent parliamen t an d th e principles embodied i n the home rul e bills , th e essence of which was the supremac y of the Westminster parliament. Libera l accession t o Redmond's deman d fo r a n independen t parliament , Harcour t asserted , woul d entail nothin g les s tha n th e repudiatio n o f ever y Gladstonia n precep t upo n which the Liberal s 'at least with the consent of the Leader s of the Iris h Part y . . . have founde d a Measur e o r (sic) Hom e Rule' . No t surprisingl y Redmon d attracted littl e Liberal support , onl y three joining hi s sixty-five followers, several joining the 233 members i n the opposition lobby , and most abstaining.6 For Redmon d t o hav e willingl y confirme d hi s mos t vehemen t antagonists ' worst suspicion s appeared t o be inexplicable . But the Westminster Gazette offere d 3 Westminster Gazette, 1 8 March, 1 9 July and 2 3 Aug. 1898 . Matthew, pp. 268- 9 discusses Haldane' s speech. 4 Westminster Gazette, 25 July and 2 2 Nov . 1902 . 5 F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine (1971) , p. 207 ; McCready, pp. 320-1 . 6 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 4th ser. , liii, cols. 371-87.

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three feasibl e explanations : part y tactics , patriotis m an d Iris h reunification . First, by composing a n amendment unacceptabl e t o the Liberals but difficul t fo r Dillon, a s a riva l nationalis t leader , t o reject , Redmon d ha d adroitl y under mined th e Libera l alliance. Second , give n the ascendancy o f Irish national prid e in th e centenary commemoratio n o f the 179 8 rebellion, th e Iris h parliamentary leaders fel t compelle d t o placat e thei r supporters . Last , th e Redmon d factio n construed th e allianc e a s a n insurmountabl e obstacl e t o th e reunio n o f Iris h factions i n th e Westminste r parliament . 'Withou t Parnell' , th e futur e bio grapher o f Joseph Chamberlai n remarked , 'th e Iris h Part y . . . i s without th e slightest influence upon th e course o f events'. 7 Eve n less hostile critics could no t question thi s verdict, and, despit e the presence o f the other factors in Redmond' s speech, this reconciliatory purpose appear s th e most compelling . Harcourt's dismissa l o f Redmond' s injudiciou s amendmen t migh t hav e successfully diverte d publi c interes t t o othe r issues , had i t no t bee n fo r Georg e Doughty, Libera l M.P. for Grimsby , who resigned hi s marginal sea t in July 1898 and sough t re-electio n a s a Libera l Unionist . I n a lette r t o hi s constituents, h e queried th e Iris h commitmen t t o hom e rule , concludin g tha t separatio n wa s their objective . Dought y cite d Redmond' s motio n a s on e reaso n fo r hi s conversion. O n onl y a slightly diminished poll, he was re-elected i n a three-wa y contest agains t Libera l an d Conservativ e opponents , bu t significantl y hi s majority ros e fro m unde r 20 0 t o ove r 1700 . Whil e th e Westminster Gazette reproached hi s illogica l defectio n fro m th e Liberal s wh o ha d dissociate d themselves fro m Redmond' s view , i t reluctantl y acknowledged tha t Doughty' s letter wa s a manifestatio n of 'certai n discontent s which have a rea l existenc e i n the Liberal Party' . Sir Robert Perks , a staunch if somewhat errati c nonconformis t Liberal M.P . representing th e adjacen t Lout h constituency , wrote t o Roseber y that 'unti l w e formall y state , thro[ugh ] th e recognize d leaders , tha t ou r Iris h programme i s somethin g ver y differen t fro m Gladstonia n Hom e Rule' , th e Liberals were susceptible to 'similar escapades like that of G. Doughty'. 8 Perks di d no t hesitat e t o ac t o n hi s ow n advice . Hithert o Perks' s disconten t with the Gladstonian approach ha d not prevented hi s adoption of the traditional Liberal postur e o f pledging adherence t o hom e rule i n theor y whil e denying its practical application . Doughty' s los s o f fait h brough t abou t a remarkabl e transformation. B y stating th e positio n Roseber y woul d subsequentl y espous e early in 1902 , Perks became th e first public Roseberian. Perk s argued i n a speech before hi s constituent s i n Octobe r 189 8 tha t th e Libera l leadershi p shoul d unequivocally declar e that , i f returne d t o office , the y woul d no t establis h a n independent parliament . H e dre w specia l attention t o Redmond' s amendment : 'English elector s coul d no t b e expecte d t o forge t th e significan t debat e o n Mr . Redmond's motio n o n nt h February , whe n upward s o f sixt y Iris h member s declared tha t "thei r presen t ide a o f Hom e Rul e i s no w a n independen t Parliament"'. Adeptl y removing hom e rul e fro m Libera l consideration , Perk s argued tha t if home rul e meant a n independen t parliament th e British could no t assent t o it , while if it implied a more attenuated for m o f local governmen t th e Irish woul d no t accep t it . I n a n endeavou r t o appea l t o th e importan t nonconformist elemen t withi n Liberalism , h e als o referre d t o th e repugnan t 7 L. Garvin , 'Parnell and hi s power', Fortnightly Rev., Ixiv (1898), 879; Westminster Gazette, 1 1 and 1 4 Feb., an d 1 6 March 1898 ; British Library , Si r Edward Hamilto n papers , Additiona l MS . 48672 fos . 124-5 (Diary , 1 2 Feb. 1898) ; F. S. L. Lyons, John Dillon: a Biography (1968) , p. 187. 8 Westminster Gazette, 1 5 July 1898 ; Perks to Rosebery , 2 9 July 1898 , National Librar y of Scotland , Rosebery paper s (hereafte r cited as Rosebery papers), MS. 10050 fo. 25r-v . I should lik e to thank th e Trustees of the National Library of Scotland for permission t o consult the Rosebery papers .

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possibility o f a n independen t parliamen t installin g a n Iris h Roma n Catholi c university financed by public funds. 9 At th e openin g o f parliamen t i n Februar y 1899 , Redmon d reiterate d hi s appeal fo r legislativ e independence, dennin g this constitutional arrangement a s an Iris h parliament whic h in both its sphere and functions would be independent of the Westminster parliament. Again the Liberals could no t allo w this challenge to go uncontested. Si r Henry Campbell-Bannerman, therefore , wh o had recently succeeded Harcour t a s Libera l Common s leade r earl y i n 1899 , thoug h reaffirming th e Liberal commitment t o home rule, adamantl y declined t o accept any amendmen t embodyin g a n independen t parliament . 'W e hav e alway s refused', h e replied t o Redmond , 't o agree t o what is known as an independen t Parliament'. Haldan e pu t th e Libera l cas e succinctly : 'Wha t h e [Redmond ] means by this Motion i s to lay down something new to what Mr. Parnell meant'. The Freeman's Journal, th e Dillonit e newspape r orga n i n Ireland , reflecte d th e Irish factions ' increasing exasperation wit h these tactics by ascribing Redmond' s conduct to a perverse desire to affront th e supporters and assist the adversaries of home rule. 10 Redmon d wa s nonetheless successfu l i n achieving the reunification of the Irish parties at Westminster in the following year: under hi s leadership the 1885-90 Parnellit e polic y wa s revived , an d th e Iris h onc e agai n advocate d Gladstonian hom e rul e an d complet e independenc e fro m Britis h parties . However, althoug h Redmond' s actio n contribute d t o the amicable resolution of Irish problems , i t engendere d intens e dissensio n amon g Liberals , threatenin g party cohesion , leadin g som e Liberal s t o questio n Gladstonia n hom e rul e principles, and finally serving as a primary issu e for th e leadership debate i n the following years. The outbrea k o f the Boe r War provoke d heate d discussio n within the Liberal party o n bot h imperialis m an d th e Iris h question , an d eventuall y divide d th e party int o thre e groups : th e Gladstonians , represente d b y C.-B. , John Morley and Lor d Spencer ; th e Libera l Imperialists , represente d b y H . H . Asquith , Sir Edward Gre y an d Richar d Haldane ; an d th e Roseberians , wit h Si r Henr y Fowler, Sir Robert Perk s and Ronal d Munro-Ferguson . The refusal o f the war to end i n accordanc e wit h Unionis t expectation s furnishe d th e opportunit y fo r Rosebery t o resum e a n activ e role i n Libera l party councils . O n 1 6 December 1901 Roseber y delivere d hi s Chesterfiel d speec h callin g fo r th e adoptio n o f a clean slat e i n domesti c politic s an d a negotiate d peac e i n Sout h Africa . Campbell-Bannerman, succumbin g t o th e pressur e Herber t Gladstone , Chief Liberal Whip , and other s exerte d o n hi m t o see k a reconciliation , obtaine d a n interview with Roseber y on 2 3 December. Bu t the contradictory press reports— doctored fo r purpose s o f leadershi p rathe r tha n definin g policy—whic h appeared i n the following weeks left Rosebery' s position on Irelan d unclear. 11 Any assessmen t o f Rosebery' s attitud e toward s hom e rul e mus t includ e a distinction between his public and privat e views. From hi s discussion with C.-B., it i s evident tha t Roseber y oppose d th e creatio n o f a legislativ e body i n Dublin whether subordinat e o r independent. 12 Bu t onc e thes e privat e opinion s wer e passed o n t o th e Libera l press, Rosebery' s persona l antipath y was transforme d 9 Louth and North Lincolnshire News, 15 Oct. 1898 ; compare this speech wit h his statement in the same paper on 15Jan.1898 . 10 Hansard, 4 , Ixvi, cols. 1178 , 1183, 1197, 1221; Freeman's Journal, 1 7 Feb . 1899 . 11 For example , Dundee Advertiser, 2 8 and 3 1 Dec . 1901 ; Leeds an d Yorkshire Mercury, 3 1 Dec . 1901 ; Leeds Mercury Weekly Supplement, 4 and 1 1 Jan. 1902 . 12 Rosebery memorandum , 2 3 Dec. 1901 , quoted R . O . A . Crewe-Milnes , is t marques s of Crewe, Lord Rosebery ( 2 vols., 1931) , ii. 573-4-

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into a publi c repudiatio n of hom e rule . T o profes s such an opinio n mad e any Liberal leader' s position untenable . What gave credibility t o thi s interpretation , of course , wa s th e rhetorica l flouris h o f th e phrase , th e 'clea n slate' , whic h implied th e adoptio n o f a mor e relevan t and productiv e approach t o th e Iris h question rathe r tha n a rejection of home rule. Roseber y frequentl y indulged hi s vivid imaginatio n on publi c platforms , a practic e whic h no t onl y produce d enigmatic speeches , bu t which , i n thi s instance , materiall y contributed t o th e misconstruction adopte d by , an d th e plausibilit y give n to , th e anti-imperialist press reports. In actual fact, Roseber y refused t o disavow home rul e for the same reason th e Gladstonian s declined t o giv e a pledg e implementin g thi s policy: it was not practica l politics. Rosebery's Liverpoo l speec h o n 1 4 Februar y generate d les s publi c interes t than hi s oratorica l performanc e a t Chesterfield . Hi s extensiv e retrospectiv e remarks o n Ireland , however, described by one historia n as 'standar d unionis t arguments', meri t a n examination. 13 In declaring that the Irish alliance had bee n abrogated, tha t th e resurrectio n o f the hom e rul e bills would b e futile , an d tha t the Iris h questio n ha d bee n transforme d throug h th e Loca l Governmen t Act , Rosebery simpl y restate d th e Libera l Imperialists ' arguments. Fro m thes e sam e three propositions, Asquith, Grey and Haldan e urged th e Liberal adoption o f an instalment approach , whic h would graduall y prepare fo r a n Iris h parliament , whereas Roseber y articulated a widel y hel d sentimen t that th e disloyalt y of th e Irish leader s i n th e wa r disqualifie d the m fro m hom e rule . Bu t thi s ha d les s importance tha n hi s centra l argument—the change s i n th e Iris h constitutional demand an d Europea n dualism . 'Th e Irish leaders' , he contended, 'hav e at las t played thei r full hand . They have demanded, no t what Mr. Gladstone was willing to giv e them , but a n independen t Parliamen t i n Dublin' . Probabl y referrin g to Dillon's speech in 189 8 on Redmond' s amendment, he asserted tha t this demand itself fel l shor t o f th e ultimat e Iris h goa l o f separation . Howeve r muc h th e steadfast Gladstonian s woul d disput e th e relevance, the y could no t discoun t th e accuracy o f this judgement.14 What made Rosebery' s statement more than just a repetition of the position already marked out b y Perks was his attempt, following Gladstone's lead, to view Ireland i n a European context . Among th e divers e arguments advance d t o suppor t Iris h self-government i n 1886 was the concep t o f historica l analogy . Durin g a visit to Norwa y i n Augus t 1885 W . E . Gladston e cam e t o vie w th e Norwegian-Swedis h constitutiona l relationship as a conceivable pattern fo r Anglo-Irish union. Within a week of his return on 8 September h e wrote to Lord Hartingto n expressing his ardent desir e 'that our friend s wil l give to the Irish case a really historical consideration', citing both th e Norwegian an d Austro-Hungarian development s a s worthy of study in 'the reconsideratio n o f th e whol e position'. 15 Gladston e furthe r elaborate d o n this convictio n during th e home rul e debates i n 1886 . Arguing that as the strain successfully endure d b y the Scandinavian countries exceeded tha t inherent in any scheme th e Britis h contemplated , Gladston e maintaine d tha t th e Norwegian Swedish associatio n coul d serv e a s a usefu l 'precedent ' fo r Iris h self-govern ment. Gladston e agai n employe d thi s logic t o justify th e bil l o f 1893 . Sceptical 13 Leeds an d Yorkshire Mercury, 1 5 Feb. 1902 ; McCready, p. 331 ; see also J. A . Spender , Th e Life o f the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman ( 3 vols., 1923) , ii. 26-7 . 14 Hansard, 4 , liii, col. 391 . 15 Anna Brassey , Lad y Brassey, 'Mr . Gladston e i n Norway' , Contemporary Rev., xlvii i (1885) , 494 ; British Views o n Norwegian-Swedish Problems, 1880-95: Selections from Diplomatic Correspondence, ed . P . Knaplund (Oslo , 1952) , p . xi ; Gladston e t o Hartington , 8 Sept . 1885 , quote d i n J. L . Hammond , Gladstone and the Irish Nation (1938) , pp. 404-5.

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critics, however, found Gladstone's refuge i n historical analogy indefensible. The Oxford la w professor , A . V . Dicey , fo r example , i n hi s classi c unionist study, England's Case against Home Rule, devote d almos t twent y pages t o assailin g this proposed emulatio n o f foreig n political relationships. The tenuou s tie s uniting the Scandinavia n countries also receive d pres s coverage i n Th e Times befor e th e introduction o f th e secon d bill. 16 Eventuall y Gladstone' s critic s foun d thei r apprehension confirme d whe n th e harmoniou s relationshi p deteriorate d i n th e eighteen-nineties and a prolonged acrimoniou s debate ensued , finally culminating in the separation of Norway from Sweden in 1905 . Mindful o f the danger o f allowing his private aversion to home rule to becom e a Libera l Unionist pronouncement, Roseber y in his Liverpool speech combine d the Gladstonian historical analogy and Redmond' s demands for an independen t legislative bod y t o forestal l the consideratio n o f hom e rule . H e allude d t o th e analogies tha t ha d previousl y bee n employe d betwee n Europea n dualis m an d Irish hom e rule, arguin g that ne w problems i n th e Scandinavia n union mad e it undesirable t o put Irelan d i n a parallel situation. Rosebery refused, however, to be entirel y negative. Hi s Iris h polic y include d proposal s fo r a n expansio n o f county government , devolutio n an d th e refor m o f Dubli n Castle . H e furthe r suggested tha t i t migh t b e possibl e t o gran t Irelan d a loca l subordinat e legislature a s part of a scheme o f imperial federation , bu t tha t did not, Roseber y re-emphasized, involv e an independent parliament. Rosebery's positio n wa s neithe r Unionis t in substanc e no r opportunisti c i n intent. As'president of the Imperial Federatio n Leagu e he had delivered a speech in Octobe r 188 8 attacking Austro-Hungarian dualism , and assertin g that, a s a union o f two equal states , it excluded th e path t o federation. I n a memorandu m written almos t a decad e later , noteworth y i n itsel f fo r demonstratin g hi s entertainment o f a hom e rul e solution , Roseber y fel t th e changin g circum stances i n Austri a an d Norwa y 'shoul d redoubl e ou r vigilanc e i n regard t o th e question o f Iris h governmen t . . .'. Th e passag e o f thre e year s increase d hi s doubts, an d i n his discussion with C.-B. in December 190 1 he confessed that th e Austrian an d Swedis h system s 'made m e fee l tha t I coul d neve r b e a part y t o introducing anything of the kind in Great Britain' . Merely to accuse Rosebery of opportunism, therefore , a s on e historia n ha s recentl y done , i s t o ignor e th e evolution o f hi s beliefs. 17 Fa r fro m exploitin g Europea n dualis m i n a n opportunistic wa y a s a tacti c fo r opposin g Redmond' s deman d fo r a n independent parliament , Roseber y wa s convince d b y Europea n affair s tha t a n independent parliamen t woul d creat e parliamentar y dualism , which would lead ultimately t o separation . Althoug h h e ha d no t oppose d a subordinat e Iris h parliament, th e tensio n withi n hi s positio n ha d brough t hi m t o th e precipice, beyond whic h lay Liberal Unionism . Eve n the Iris h construe d hi s speech i n this manner: Tweedmout h informe d Munro-Ferguso n tha t Redmon d di d no t discern an y statemen t a t Liverpoo l whic h woul d 'ba r a statutor y assembl y in Ireland'.18 16 Norwegian-Swedish Problems, pp. xi-xiv ; Hansard , 3 , ccciv , cols. 1046-7 , 1540-1 ; ibid., 4, x, cols. 1609-10; A. V. Dicey , England's Case against Home Rule (1886) , pp. 48-66 ; Th e Times, 1 5 Nov. 1892 and 27 Dec . 1893 . "Jour. Imperial Federation League, iii (1888) , 244 ; Rosebery memorandum , 2 8 July 1898 , Rosebery papers, MS . 1017 7 f°s- isov—isi ; Crewe , ii . 573-4 ; Marley , p . 284 . I t i s interestin g tha t Joh n Morley's biograph y o f Gladstone , publishe d i n 1903 , disparage d th e recourse to foreig n analogies , which 'carrie d littl e conviction' an d were 'rather decorativ e tha n substantial ' (J . Morley , Th e Life o f William Ewart Gladstone ( 3 vols., 1903) , iii. 315-16). 18 Munro-Ferguson t o Rosebery, 9 March 1902 , Rosebery papers, MS . 10019 f°- Hiv .

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The subsequen t Rosebery/C.-B . breach—ostensibl y th e resul t o f difference s over hom e rul e an d imperialism—leadin g t o th e formation o f an organizatio n dedicated t o advancin g the Chesterfiel d polic y is well known . Of th e tw o groups contained i n th e Libera l League , however , th e idea s o f th e Libera l Imperialist s have bee n mor e full y analyse d than thos e o f th e Roseberians . Tw o themes — Redmond's enlarge d demand s an d Iris h disloyalty—dominate d th e Roseberian speeches and privat e correspondence. I n a lengthy letter to C.-B . on 1 0 January 1902, Fowle r enumerate d fiv e factor s influencin g th e Libera l attitud e towards home rule , bu t h e gav e the greatest weight to a discussion of the Iris h challenge to th e unlimite d superiority of th e Westminster parliament. His aversion to th e Irish wa s partl y provoke d b y thei r disavowa l of th e constitutiona l provision ensuring Westminster' s supremacy. Fowler contended tha t th e Iris h refuse d t o recognize 'any settlement as final until they have secured absolute independence', a belie f that reflected les s his Liberal Unionist predilections than his exasperation at Iris h duplicity. 19 Wha t especiall y incurre d Fowler' s ange r wa s th e typ e o f conduct Redmon d displaye d in th e Common s o n 2 3 January. Afte r drawin g a parallel betwee n Canad a an d Ireland , Redmon d asserte d tha t jus t a s th e Canadians refuse d t o b e governe d b y Westminste r so woul d th e Irish . Several days later in a letter t o Rosebery advising Liberal dissociatio n fro m thi s attitude, Fowler mistakenl y attributed Redmond' s speec h t o John Morley. 20 While this may have been inadvertent, i t is quite possible tha t t o him and th e other Leagu e members th e pro-Boer Liberal s and th e treacherous Irish were indistinguishable. Indeed, i n th e Roseberia n min d thei r tw o centra l tenet s wer e merge d i n th e concept of Iris h disloyalty : one response t o two similar threats to the integrity of the empire. A t home th e Iris h were assaulting the empire throug h thei r demand for a n independen t parliament , whil e abroa d the y wer e n o les s assuredl y undermining th e empir e throug h thei r suppor t fo r th e Boers . Lor d Crewe' s speech i n the same month exemplifie d thi s attitude. Redmond's refusal t o accept a subordinat e parliament a s a settlement of Irish nationalist aspirations, and th e Irish alignment with th e 'enemie s o f the empire' require d a Libera l reconsideration o f th e Iris h question . To thwar t any repetition o f th e policies of 188 6 an d 1893, Crew e denounce d th e Iris h demand s fo r a Libera l priorit y pledg e t o introduce an independent parliament. The Leeds and Yorkshire Mercury's editorials also emphasize d tha t Iris h disloyalt y preclude d a Libera l alliance . 'Ever y intelligent Liberal' , th e pape r commented , 'no w perceive s tha t n o regula r co-operation i s possible wit h a part y whos e leade r . . . insist s on a n absolutel y independent Parliamen t fo r Ireland ' an d wh o anticipate d th e opportunit y 'when, lik e th e Boers , the y ma y tak e u p arm s agains t he r [England]'. 21 Apprehension prevaile d amon g th e Roseber y factio n tha t th e abstrac t Glad stonian commitmen t to hom e rul e would lead t o a renewal of the alliance if the Liberals lacked an independent majority at the next election. 19 Fowler to Campbell-Bannerman , 1 0 Jan. 1902 , Brit. Libr. , Campbell-Bannerma n papers, Add . MS. 4121 4 fos. 24i-245v ; fo r othe r example s se e Perks t o Rosebery , 7 Feb. 1902 , Rosebery papers , MS. 1005 0 fos. 2i6v-2i7 ; Rea y to Rosebery , 9 Nov . 1901 , ibid., MS . 1004 4 f°- ^S ; 'I s th e Libera l League a conspiracy?' , Ne w Liberal Rev., iv (1902), 624 , 627; W. Robertso n Nicholl , 'Ho w t o attain Liberal unity' , ibid., p. 345 ; C . Douglas, 'The Liberal League', Contemporary Rev., Ixxxi (1902) , 581-2; 'Liberalism and labour' , Liberal League Publications, x (n.d.), 7-8 . 20 Hansard, 4 , cl , col . 713 ; Fowle r t o Rosebery , 2 5 Jan. 1902 , Rosebery papers , MS . i o i i 6 f o s . g 10. 21 Leeds an d Yorkshire Mercury, 5 Oct . 1901 ; fo r Crewe' s speech se e th e Westminster Gazette, 2 4 Jan. 1902; fo r othe r example s o f hostilit y to Iris h disloyalt y see earl o f Crewe , 'Irelan d an d th e Libera l party', New Liberal Rev., i (1901), 582-3; 'Th e present aspec t o f the Iris h Question: a letter by the Rt. Hon. Si r Henr y H . Fowler , M.P.' , Liberal League Publications, xvii (n.d.) , 7 ; Perk s to Rosebery , 6 Dec. 1901, Rosebery papers, MS. 10050 fos. 194V-195.

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As th e Liverpoo l speec h mobilize d considerabl e support , i t i s importan t t o understand wh y th e Roseberia n polic y struc k suc h a responsiv e chor d amon g certain Liberals . Within a wee k of hi s declaratio n Rosebery receive d th e suppor t of th e Harrnswort h pres s empire , o f whic h tw o newspapers—th e Leeds an d Yorkshire Mercury an d th e Glasgo w Daily Record an d Mail —enunciated th e Roseberian Iris h policy . Withi n tw o month s o f th e formatio n o f th e Libera l League a fun d o f £6,000 existed and gre w to £11,00 0 by November. A dedicated group o f journalists , includin g Si r Thoma s Wemys s Reid , formerl y bot h a Gladstonian Liberal and editor of the Leeds Mercury for which he continued to write a leader , an d E . T. Cook , furnishe d propagand a throug h pamphlet s an d the League' s periodical, the New Liberal Review. 22 One conspicuou s sourc e o f Libera l disconten t wa s th e initia l adoptio n o f home rule . Thoma s Heyc k ha s convincingl y argued tha t th e radica l conversio n to Gladstone' s Iris h polic y was motivated les s by ideological convictions than by a purel y pragmati c approac h t o a largel y incomprehensibl e Iris h situation . Rosebery himsel f had epitomize d thi s tendency i n 1886 . This practica l commit ment t o hom e rul e was also base d o n th e assumption o f a conciliation/coercio n framework, i n whic h hom e rul e becam e increasingl y see n a s th e onl y viabl e alternative t o coercion. 23 Rosebery' s oppositio n t o a n independen t parliamen t offered thes e disenchante d Liberal s a n idea l justification for withdrawin g fro m home rule . Fo r thos e wh o embrace d Lor d Rosebery' s policy , th e questio n o f a subordinate parliamen t nee d no t b e confronted , an d charge s o f recantin g a dubious Libera l principl e nee d neve r b e raised . Wemys s Rei d exhibite d th e tactical elemen t i n thi s polic y i n a lette r t o Roseber y i n Septembe r 1901 . 'Th e Liberal party' , h e observed , 'go t it s charte r o f freedo m whe n Dillo n 8 c Redmond mad e their speeches demandin g a n independent Parliamen t i n Dublin . . .'. Considerin g th e origi n o f thei r conversion , i t i s no t surprisin g tha t th e Roseberians wer e sensitiv e to C.-B.' s accusation tha t th e abandonment o f home rule mean t th e reviva l of coercion. This polic y deflecte d thi s criticism. 'If we can show tha t whils t w e shal l no t touc h anythin g i n th e natur e o f a n independen t Parliament', Rei d wrot e t o Roseber y severa l week s earlier , 'w e hav e a polic y o f our ow n which is not founde d o n mer e coercion'. Rosebery' s follower s adopte d this polic y fo r divers e reasons . Some , lik e Fowler , resente d th e Iris h pre varication; others , lik e Perks , foun d nonconformis t problem s impede d b y o r inconsistent wit h hom e rule ; whil e others , lik e Reid , underline d th e mutua l advantages o f avoidin g bot h a subordinat e parliamen t an d coercion. 24 Despit e the dissimilarit y of thei r reasons , al l concurre d i n th e refusa l t o resurrec t th e Irish alliance and t o promote a third home rule bill. Throughout 190 2 th e subject o f a Liberal Iris h policy provided ampl e materia l for animate d discussion . Roseber y delivere d thre e mor e disclaimer s o f a n independent parliament , but , a s hi s speec h i n Marc h exemplified , h e becam e increasingly pessimisti c abou t th e possibilit y o f grantin g Irelan d a legislativ e body whos e authorit y woul d remai n circumscribed. Redmon d addressed himsel f to thi s challeng e i n a speec h i n th e sam e month , denyin g th e assertion tha t th e Irish ha d change d thei r demand s an d insistin g tha t hom e rul e wa s thei r sol e 22 Harold Harrnswort h to Rosebery , 2 2 Feb. 1902 , Rosebery papers, MS . 1016 8 fos. 34, 35v; Perks to Rosebery , 2 2 Nov. 1902 , ibid., MS. 1005 1 fo. 29 ; Rei d to Rosebery , 2 6 Sept. 1900 , ibid., MS. 1005 7 fo. 73 . A. W. Roberts, 'Leed s Liberalis m and late-Victoria n polities', Northern Hist., v (1970), 131-56 , discusses the importance of the Leeds Mercury a s a provincial organ for Liberalism. 23 T. W . Heyck , The Dimensions o f British Radicalism: the Case o f Ireland, 1874-95 (Chicago , 1974), pp . 134, 145 , 233-4; R. R.James , Rosebery: a Biography o f Archibald Philip, 5 th Earl of Rosebery (1963) , p. 176 . 2 * Reid to Rosebery, 24 Aug. and 5 Sept. 1901 , Rosebery papers , MS. 10057 f°s- 1 75 V » '84-

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aspiration. Ye t th e vacillation s o f th e Iris h nationalis t pres s reveale d th e consternation withi n th e Iris h part y a t thi s attack . Followin g th e Liverpoo l speech, th e Freeman's Journal admitte d tha t th e home rule bills were compromise s for th e 'ful l claim ' of an independen t parliament . I t swiftly change d thi s positio n two days later, however , wit h the clai m tha t n o departur e fro m traditiona l Iris h desires ha d occurred , bu t late r i n th e yea r confesse d a n inabilit y to discer n i n Rosebery's statement s an y obstacl e t o hi s supportin g a subordinat e parlia ment. 26 Both the Liberal Imperialist and Gladstonia n wings also endeavoure d t o discredit th e Roseberia n position . Th e Westminster Gazette an d th e part y leadership's Liberal Magazine bot h stresse d tha t Redmon d spok e fo r a mer e handful o f Irish M.P.s on th e two occasions in proposing hi s amendments, whic h the Liberal s refuse d t o endorse . Redmon d ha d 'proclaime d independence' , th e Westminster Gazette conceded , 'bu t i t i s significant tha t h e ha s neve r repeate d th e demand a s Leade r o f th e Unite d Iris h Party' . Hesitan t Liberal s would no t hav e received complet e reassuranc e ha d th e paper publishe d a later Redmon d speec h in Octobe r 190 1 i n whic h h e agai n describe d th e hom e rul e bill s a s 'compromises' and th e minimum of the Irish demand. 27 Ultimately th e succes s o f th e Libera l Leagu e wa s dependen t o n th e siz e o f its parliamentary membership a s Edward Hamilton , a life-long friend of Rosebery , realized whe n h e note d tha t 'quantit y help s t o form a party bette r tha n quality' . Quality wa s certainly evident wit h th e presenc e o f Asquith, Gre y an d Haldane , but quantit y apparentl y faile d t o materialize . From a lis t o f Leagu e candidate s for th e 190 6 genera l electio n i t ca n b e estimate d tha t ther e wer e twenty-fiv e sitting M.P.s, probably a reasonable figure, even excluding those individuals who died o r retired. 28 Unfortunatel y numerous problem s wer e encountere d i n th e attempt t o rea d th e speeche s o f thes e M.P.s to ascertain the relativ e strengths of the tw o group s withi n th e League . Nevertheless , seve n ca n b e classifie d a s members o f th e Roseberia n wing : Charle s Douglas , Si r Henr y Fowler , Joh n Fuller, Ronal d Munro-Ferguson , Si r Rober t Perks , Charle s Da y Rose an d Harold Tennant. 29 A n almost equal numbe r wer e Libera l Imperialists: Asquith, Grey an d Haldan e alon g wit h Rowlan d Barran , Edwar d Ellic e an d Rufu s Isaacs.30 This leaves a group o f twelve M.P.s about who m on e can speculate, bu t not confidentl y classify. 31 Why did Rosebery , on e o f the most articulate and dynami c public speakers o f his time , fai l t o translat e suc h asset s int o parliamentar y support ? Hi s clos e friends wer e convince d tha t hi s disinclinatio n to resum e offic e a s wel l a s hi s desire t o forwar d bot h th e Chesterfiel d polic y and th e politica l careers o f other s irreparably damaged , i f not destroyed , hi s chances of success. 'A hint of this kind 2 * Leeds an d Yorkshire Mercury, 1 1 March , i Aug . and 3 Nov . 1902 ; fo r Redmond' s speeche s se e th e Dundee Advertiser, 17 Marc h 1902. 26 Freeman's Journal, 1 5 and 1 7 Feb. , and 2 Aug. 1902 . 27 Westminster Gazette, 1 7 Feb . 1902 ; Liberal Magazine, x (1902) , 103-4 ; fo r Redmond' s speech an d the Roseberia n reactio n se e the Liberal Magazine, i x (1901), 546; Leeds Mercury, 3 Oct. 1901 . 28 Brit. Libr. , Hamilton papers , Add . MS. 48679 fo. 4 1 (Diary , 3 March 1902) ; Matthew , appendi x ii. Roseber y gav e a figur e o f 2 6 M.P.s in Nov . 190 4 (Spender memorandum, 2 Nov. 1904 , Brit. Libr. , Spender papers , Add . MS. 46387 fo . 53). 29 Douglas, pp . 581-2 ; Fowler , Th e Times, 6 Ma y 1902 ; Fuller , Wiltshire Times an d Trowbndge Advertiser, 1 5 March 1902 ; Munro-Ferguson, Leith Burgh Pilot, 1 3 Sept. 1902 ; Perks, Louth and North Lincolnshire News, 6 Sept. 1902 ; Rose , Cambridge Independent Press and Ely Gazette, 5 Jan. 1906 ; Tennant , Berwickshire Advertiser, 23 Dec. 1902. 30 Barran, 'Mr . Rowlan d Barran, M.P. , on th e Nort h Leeds bye-election', Liberal League Publications, xxiidi.d.); Ellice , St. Andrews Citizen, 12 Sept. 1903 ; Isaacs, Reading Observer, 16 Dec. 1905. 31 Andrews, Leeds an d Yorkshire Mercury, 2 8 Sept. 1905 , adopted a polic y of administrativ e reform . Both Chance , Carlisle Express an d Examiner, 1 0 June 1905 , and Emmott , Oldham Evening Chronicle, 2 1 Dec. 1905 , favoured a system of home rul e all round .

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takes th e hear t ou t o f hi s friend s wh o ar e muc h mor e numerou s tha n h e wil l allow', Hamilto n lamente d afte r admonishin g Roseber y fo r thi s view . On e credible explanatio n fo r th e limite d appea l o f th e League , therefore , wa s th e inscrutable personalit y o f th e leade r himself . Du e i n par t t o Rosebery' s indifferent attitud e toward s hi s ow n caree r prospects , Alfre d Harmswort h withdrew hi s newspape r suppor t t o follo w a ne w champion an d a ne w cause , Joseph Chamberlai n an d tariff reform.32 Yet Roseber y himsel f believe d tha t thi s reproo f wa s unwarranted , an d ironically blame d hi s so-calle d 'friends' . Thus , i n repl y t o a simila r reproac h from Wemys s Reid , Roseber y patheticall y describe d himsel f a s 'diggin g m y grave' fo r th e benefi t o f th e Libera l Imperialists , wh o eschewe d activ e participation for the more congenial role of interested observers . Clearly , he was alluding to M.P. s of the J. M . F. Fuller type , who, despite professed Roseberia n affinities, di d no t joi n th e Leagu e unti l July 1903 , an d whos e justification fo r finally joinin g wa s irrelevant , i f no t meaningless . Disregardin g hi s ow n reservations, Roseber y continued , h e acquiesce d t o thos e wh o argue d tha t hi s leadership would have widespread appeal, bu t with the expiration o f almost nine months th e Leagu e contained onl y fifteen M.P.s and a n equal numbe r o f peers. The resulting despondency he expressed i n his sardonic repl y to Hamilton: 'I t is all very well for you t o talk of my many friends. But as far as I can see they don't come tumblin g over on e another' . I n fact , a n overwhelmin g feeling of betrayal permeated Rosebery' s attitud e t o thos e 'wh o pushe d m e forwar d an d the n returned home'. 33 Rosebery's rejoinde r t o th e criticis m of Reid and Hamilton , however , ca n b e seen i n a differen t light . Whil e oppositio n t o a n independen t parliamen t appealed t o a segmen t o f Liberal s wh o foun d confrontatio n politic s with th e Lords a fata l Libera l preoccupation , Rosebery' s simila r obsessio n wit h Iris h disloyalty appeare d incompatibl e wit h Libera l principles . Lor d Crewe , Rosebery's son-in-law, included both argument s in his January 190 2 speech an d should presumabl y hav e bee n dispose d toward s Rosebery' s policy . But , as h e informed Rosebery , Crew e declined t o join th e League becaus e h e felt h e could exert influenc e i n dissuadin g Liberal s fro m supportin g th e pro-Boers . Ye t in a discussion wit h Hamilton , Crew e reacte d t o th e suggestio n tha t th e Iris h neglected a propitiou s occasio n o f drawin g a paralle l wit h th e loyalt y o f th e self-governing colonies. The Irish , he retorted, 'ha d found in the past that if they behaved themselves they never got anything done for them'. As a result they were compelled t o agitate—legall y and illegally—t o elici t a positive British response . Alfred Emmott , a League member wh o advocated gradua l reform a s the path to imperial federation, echoed thi s sentiment. He wrote to Rosebery: The particular point which has caused searching s of heart t o me & others whom I know is the stres s laid in your [Liverpool] speech on disloyalt y as if it were an incurabl e disease, as compared wit h th e vaguenes s of you r reference s t o remedia l measure s whic h ough t i n time to remove that disloyalty.34 S2

Brit. Libr., Hamilton papers, Add . MS. 48680 fos. 19 , 34 (Diary, 7 Sept. and 1 2 Oct. 1902) ; Reid to Rosebery , 1 3 Nov. 1902 , Roseber y papers, MS . 1005 8 fos. 69-74; Perk s to Rosebery , 8 Oct. 1903, ibid., MS. 10051 fo. isSr-v. 33 Fuller to secretarie s o f th e Libera l League, 2 2 July 190 3 (copy), Wiltshire Record Office , Fulle r papers, MS . 1196/4 ; Roseber y t o Reid , 1 4 Nov . 190 2 (marked neve r sent) , Roseber y papers , MS . 10058 fos. 79-8ov; Brit. Libr., Hamilton papers, Add. MS. 48680 fo. 34 (Diary, 1 2 Oct . 1902) . 34 Crewe t o Rosebery , 2 3 Feb. 1902 , Rosebery papers, MS . 1016 8 fo. 62r-v ; Brit . Libr. , Hamilton papers, Add . MS . 4867 9 fo . 1 6 (Diary, 5 Jan. 1902) ; Emmot t t o Rosebery , 2 3 Feb. 1902 , Roseber y papers, MS . 1016 8 fo. 4ov.

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One o f th e reason s th e Libera l Leagu e di d no t attrac t a wide r membershi p derived no t fro m th e denunciatio n of an independen t parliament , bu t fro m th e castigation o f Iris h behaviou r during the war . This i s not t o sa y that Rosebery's own test y an d errati c character was anything but a liabilit y to th e Leagu e an d t o himself, bu t tha t othe r factor s als o playe d a n importan t rol e i n th e demis e o f both. Rosebery's Iris h policy originated i n par t fro m W . E . Gladstone's endeavou r to place Ireland i n a European context , and i n part from Redmond' s deman d fo r what Liberal s coul d no t contemplate , a n independen t parliament . This polic y found a receptive audience amon g thos e Liberal s whose adoption o f home rule in 188 6 reflected their antipathy to coercion, bu t whose devotion t o this principle never exceede d thei r ow n limite d understandin g o f Iris h problems . Exclusio n from powe r served onl y to undermine this feeling. Yet, whereas oppositio n t o an independent parliamen t coul d b e reconcile d wit h Liberalism , Rosebery' s emphasis on Iris h disloyalty contradicted a basic Liberal assumption upon which home rul e ha d bee n predicated . Onl y a thi n line divided th e Roseberian s fro m the Libera l Unionists , and t o embrac e bot h thes e idea s woul d eradicat e tha t distinction. Almost a decade later on th e third reading of the home rule bill, two followers o f Rosebery , Munro-Ferguso n an d Tennant , supporte d thi s policy, despite Rosebery' s inabilit y t o follo w thi s cours e i n th e Lords . C . M . Douglas , however, ha d accepte d thi s conclusio n b y standin g a s a Libera l Unionis t candidate fo r Sout h Lanarkshir e in Decembe r 1910 . Writing t o Alfre d Emmot t after hi s defeat, he expressed th e sentiment Rosebery himself must have felt: I hav e always bee n les s hopeful than yo u o f findin g a way of self-governmen t fo r Irelan d which woul d no t injur e thi s country . M y las t hope s wer e dissipate d i n th e fat e o f th e Councils Bill. 35 85 Douglas t o Emmott , 6 Jan. 1911 , Nuffiel d College , Oxford , Emmot t papers , MS . 4 fo. 343v . I should lik e t o than k Mrs . Joan Simon , Penden e Road , Leicester , fo r permissio n t o consul t th e Emmott collection.

14

IRISH HOME-RULE FINANCE: A NEGLECTED DIMENSIO N OF THE IRIS H QUESTION , 1910-1 4 PATRICIA JALL AND

ome rule', complained Augustine Birrell, 'is the most unlucky cause 'H X A m o r t a l ma n wa s eve r associate d with . It s pat h i s strewn wit h ghost s

and skeleton s — wine, women an d money . No w it is money. . . . Sentiment is easil y kep t alive , fro m on e generatio n t o another ; i t costs nothin g bu t a harp an d a song. Bu t cash — where is that to com e from?' 1 Th e proble m o f finance prove d t o b e a n insurmountabl e obstacle t o an y compromis e ove r Irish hom e rul e a t th e abortiv e Iris h Conventio n o f 1917-18 . By contrast, the struggl e over th e thir d home-rule bill fro m 191 2 to 191 4 was dominate d by th e questio n o f Ulste r an d no t finance . Th e bil l was ultimatel y wrecked by the opposition of the Ulste r protestants to any home-rule bill fo r a united Ireland. Home-rul e financ e has been overlooke d b y most historian s because it seeme d les s importan t an d n o doub t als o becaus e i t wa s immensel y complicated. 2 Bu t th e proble m o f financ e was a ver y real difficult y whic h still confronte d politician s even i f th e objection s o f th e Ulste r protestant s could b e overcome . Mor e important , th e comple x relationshi p betwee n Ireland an d Britai n canno t b e full y understoo d unles s th e financia l dimension i s taken int o account. Informed politician s in 191 1 believed that the chief obstacle i n the path of the thir d home-rul e bil l woul d b e th e fisca l question . Th e prim e minister, H. H . Asquith , told his liberal cabine t i n January 191 1 that financ e wa s the supreme proble m i n view o f th e bankrup t conditio n o f Ireland.Birrell , wh o was the chief secretar y fo r Ireland , feare d tha t ther e would b e no hom e rul e unless a satisfactor y conclusio n coul d b e reache d ove r finance. 3 Severa l colleagues i n th e cabine t share d thei r concern . Walte r Runcima n believe d that hom e rul e would collapse o n th e problem o f finance . Joh n Morle y ha d more experienc e tha n mos t liberal s o f th e pitfall s of Anglo-Iris h finance, 'Birrell t o Lloy d George , 1 3 Apr . 191 4 (H.L.R.O. , Lloy d Georg e papers , C/3/8/3). I wis h t o than k Professo r Trevo r Lloy d fo r hi s numerou s helpfu l an d detailed suggestion s on a n earlie r draft o f thi s article. 2 But se e R . B . McDowell , The Irish Convention, 1917-18 (London, 1970) , fo r a n excellent examinatio n of th e discussion s on financ e at th e convention. 3 Pease diary , 2 0 Jan . 191 1 (Nuffield College , Oxford , Gainfor d papers , Peas e diary, vol . i , f . 137) ; C. P . Scot t diary , 2 Feb . 191 1 (B.L. , Add . M S 50901 , f f 1-2) ; The Times, 4 Mar . 1911 ; Nation, 1 5 Apr . 1911 .

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and h e saw 'the question o f money ' as the root o f th e problem facin g the m 'in th e rapids ' o f th e thir d home-rul e bill. 4 Th e independen t Iris h nationalist, Willia m O'Brien, warne d Asquit h tha t 'financ e will either mak e or mar th e bill'. And whil e the conservatives devote d fa r mor e attention t o the Ulste r question than th e liberals , they did no t neglec t the significance o f fiscal matters . Thoma s Gibso n Bowles , a unionis t financia l expert , tol d Bonar La w i n November 1911 : 'financ e i s going, I believe, t o be for th e firs t time th e grea t difficult y — thoug h indee d i t alway s wa s on e o f th e greatest'. 5 They ha d goo d reaso n fo r suc h fears . Th e existin g Iris h administratio n was notoriousl y inefficien t an d unwieldy . A separat e Iris h executiv e wa s maintained afte r th e union , thoug h th e Iris h excheque r wa s abolishe d i n 1817 an d a n Iris h departmen t o f financ e wa s no t create d unti l th e foundation o f th e Dai l i n 1919 . After 181 7 'both Britis h and Iris h revenu e was pai d alik e int o th e imperia l excheque r an d Iris h expenditur e wa s controlled b y th e Treasur y i n Whitehall , subjec t onl y t o th e Westminste r parliament's impositio n an d repea l of Iris h taxation'. The usual difference s of opinio n betwee n Treasur y an d spendin g department s wer e magnified by the existenc e of th e Iris h executiv e and th e proliferation o f mor e than fort y Irish board s an d department s wit h varyin g degrees o f independence . Th e size o f th e financia l proble m increase d a s th e balanc e o f indebtednes s moved agains t Ireland . Th e cos t o f th e governmen t o f Irelan d wa s alread y regarded b y the Treasury as disproportionately hig h in 1890 , but i t escalate d over th e nex t twent y year s wit h 'constructiv e unionism ' an d ne w socia l services. 6 A cabinet sub-committee was established i n 191 1 to examine all aspects of the third home-rule bill except fo r its fiscal clauses. Th e committee operate d in a leisurel y fashion , deciding almos t b y default to follo w the Gladstonia n home-rule mode l o f 1893 . Th e fisca l aspect s wer e investigate d firs t b y a specialist committe e o f financia l experts unde r Si r Henr y Primrose , an d later b y Herber t Samuel . Thi s metho d o f procedur e ha d distinc t disadvantages, sinc e th e me n workin g o n th e mai n provision s o f th e bil l were no t actin g in close co-ordinatio n wit h th e financia l experts. The resul t was a measure which combined a reproduction o f the 189 3 bill with a wholly revised financia l scheme . Th e separat e examinatio n o f th e tw o section s o f the bil l wa s unwise , given the interdependenc e between financia l an d othe r aspects o f hom e rule . A smal l specialis t committe e o f financia l expert s wa s appointe d i n January 1911 , unde r th e chairmanshi p of Si r Henr y Primrose , t o examin e the financia l relation s betwee n Englan d an d Irelan d an d t o recommen d a 4

Emmott diary , 1 Sept. 191 1 (Nuffiel d College , Oxford , Emmot t diary, vol. ii , f . 35); Newcastle Chronicle, 1 9 Jan. 1912 ; Morley to Carnegie , 2 5 Oct. 191 1 (Bodl. , MS fil m 569) . 'O'Brien t o Asquith , 4 Nov . 191 1 (Bodl. , M S Asquith 36 , f. 9) ; T. G . Bowle s t o Bonar Law , 1 6 Nov. 191 1 (H.L.R.O. , Bona r La w papers , 24/3/42) . 6 Ronan Fanning , Th e Irish department o f finance, 1922-58 (Dublin , 1978), p . 4 ; Pauric Travers , 'Th e las t year s o f Dubli n Castle : th e administratio n of Ireland , 1890-1921' (unpublishe d Ph.D . thesis , Australia n Nationa l University , 1981) , passim.

Irish Home-Rule Finance, 1910-14 29

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fiscal schem e fo r th e home-rul e bill . Th e member s o f th e Primros e committee wer e mainl y Englis h financia l experts , wit h n o stron g politica l affiliations thoug h wit h a decidedl y libera l bias . The y include d W . G . S . Adams, reade r i n political scienc e at Oxfor d an d recentl y an officia l o f th e Irish departmen t o f agriculture ; William Plender, presiden t o f th e Institute of Chartere d Accountants ; Henr y Gladstone , ship-merchant , an d F . M . Jackson, exporter, bot h highl y respected i n mercantile and bankin g circles. The cabine t seeme d unawar e o f th e nee d fo r adequat e Iris h representatio n on th e committe e i f th e nationalist s were t o b e satisfie d wit h it s findings. Birrell, a s chie f secretary fo r Ireland , ha d t o plea d fo r th e inclusio n of a n Irish catholi c bisho p an d o f Lor d Pirrie , th e libera l chairman o f Harlan d and Wolff , th e famou s Belfas t shipbuildin g firm . Birrel l was ridicule d i n cabinet,7 bu t h e won hi s point, thoug h th e nationalis t pres s was far fro m satisfied wit h th e Iris h representatio n o n th e committee . Th e mos t influential Iris h exper t wa s Denis Kelly , Roma n Catholi c bisho p of Ross , a staunch nationalis t and remarkabl y able man, wit h considerable experience of variou s bodie s concerne d wit h Iris h economi c development . Birrel l prematurely reveale d th e existenc e o f thi s financ e committe e i n a publi c speech i n March 1911 . Subsequently he refused information o n it s activities on the grounds that it was 'a purely advisory body fo r the sole benefit of the cabinet' and no t ' a star chambe r of mysterious persons arme d wit h all sorts of powers'. 8 This home-rul e financ e committee devoted si x months' carefu l study t o the financia l aspect s o f th e Iris h questio n an d interviewe d numerou s witnesses. The y produce d a critica l actuarial repor t whic h was printe d fo r cabinet us e in Octobe r 191 1 an d finall y issue d a s a parliamentar y paper i n April 1912 , afte r considerabl e controvers y regardin g it s possibl e publication. 9 This Primrose repor t provide d a critical review of the financial provisions o f th e firs t tw o home-rul e bills , outline d significan t change s in the financia l relationshi p betwee n Englan d an d Irelan d sinc e 18% , an d finally propose d it s own simpl e and clea r solution . The Primros e committe e naturall y started b y examinin g th e financia l provisions o f Gladstone' s bills . Unlik e th e libera l cabine t o f 1911 , Gladstone wa s fascinate d b y th e fisca l aspect s o f hom e rule . H e believe d that th e two mai n financia l question s were the siz e of th e Iris h contribution to imperia l expenditure and th e fisca l power s to be granted to the new Irish parliament. Th e 188 6 bil l sai d tha t th e propose d Iris h parliamen t should receive al l th e revenu e collected i n Ireland , includin g the mone y raise d b y excise taxe s on spirits , even when they wer e eventually sold an d consume d outside Ireland . From thi s revenue Ireland wa s t o pa y one-fifteent h o f th e common imperia l expenditure. This wa s oppose d b y Josep h Chamberlai n and othe r critics who claime d tha t i t wa s taxatio n withou t representation , 7

Pease diary, 20 Jan. an d 1 Mar. 191 1 (Gainfor d papers). ^Hansard 5 (commons), xxiii , 241 8 ( 6 Apr. 1911) ; xxix , 2000-0 1 (1 6 Aug . 1911) ; The Times, 4 Mar. 1911 . ^Report o f th e committee o n Irish finance (hereafte r cited a s Primrose report), [Cd. 6153] , H.C . 1912-13 , xxxiv, 5-40 ; Minutes o f evidence taken b y th e committee on Irish finance, [Cd . 6799] , H.C . 1913 , xxx, 1-252. See also cabinet paper date d 1 7 Oct. 191 1 (P.R.O., Cab . 37/108/132) .

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since th e Iris h wer e to hav e n o member s a t Westminster . Th e Iris h fought hard t o pa y n o mor e tha n one-twentiet h o f th e tota l budge t fo r imperia l purposes. Joh n Morley , Gladstone' s chie f secretar y fo r Ireland , late r recalled tha t 'o n mor e tha n on e financia l point th e conflict went perilously near t o breakin g dow n th e whol e operation' ; h e believe d th e Iris h might have rejected th e bil l on thi s issue, had i t ever reache d committe e stage. 10 It was alread y clea r i n 188 6 tha t i t wa s impossibl e t o determin e a fai r rati o between Britis h an d Iris h share s o f join t imperia l expenditur e whic h ha d any logica l statistica l basis." The 188 6 bil l als o provide d tha t custom s an d excise , whic h wer e th e principal sourc e o f taxation, shoul d continu e t o b e imposed and controlle d by th e imperia l government. The Iris h were lef t onl y wit h power t o impos e direct taxes, bu t the y felt les s strongly on thi s issue in 188 6 than i n 1911-12 . Gladstone's origina l proposal s o f Marc h 188 6 suggeste d tha t th e Iris h parliament contro l custom s an d excise , thu s makin g Iris h exclusio n mor e logical an d justifiable. 12 Bu t Chamberlai n an d Hug h Childer s proteste d s o strongly abou t th e hostilit y of Britis h public opinion an d busines s interests that th e bil l finall y retaine d contro l o f custom s a t Westminster. 13 Th e majority o f Iris h member s woul d hav e preferre d Iris h contro l o f custom s and excise , bu t di d no t fee l sufficientl y strongl y t o propos e defeatin g th e measure o n tha t issue . Parnel l wa s one o f th e fe w nationalists who wanted to fight thi s point i n committee, a s he sought th e right for Irelan d t o impos e protective tariffs. 14 Two financia l schemes wer e involve d in th e 189 3 bill , since th e origina l plan wa s late r foun d t o b e base d o n fault y calculation s an d ha d t o b e drastically amende d i n committee . Th e firs t schem e provide d tha t th e imperial excheque r shoul d receiv e th e revenu e fro m Iris h custom s an d excise, t o cove r th e Iris h contributio n t o imperia l expenditure . Al l remaining Iris h revenu e wa s t o b e use d b y th e Iris h governmen t fo r loca l Irish expenditure . Thi s essentiall y simpl e pla n wa s unfortunately based o n inaccurate calculation s whic h ha d suggeste d tha t th e amoun t collecte d i n Irish custom s an d excis e dutie s equalle d approximatel y th e amoun t th e government fel t th e Iris h ough t t o contribute . Th e governmen t wa s compelled t o mak e th e embarrassin g admissio n i n committe e tha t th e Treasury ha d over-estimate d th e yiel d fro m Iris h excise , an d th e pla n wa s consequently abandoned . Th e Primros e committe e regrette d this decision, for i t considere d thi s scheme muc h superio r t o tha t o f 1886 , o r t o th e on e which eventuall y replaced i t in 1893 ; i t decided the difficul t questio n o f th e I0

john Morley , Th e life o f William Ewart Gladstone ( 3 vols, London , 1903) , iii , 306. "Government o f Ireland bill, 1 3 Apr. 1886 , p p 6-1 2 (H.L.R.O. , Lloy d Georg e papers, C/19/1) . 12 Ibid.; Gladstone' s memorandu m t o Morley , 2 9 Mar . 188 6 (B.L. , Gladstone papers, Add . M S 44647) ; Cabine t pape r o n 'Ireland : finance ' (P.R.O. , Cab . 37/18/33). l3 Childers t o Gladstone , 1 8 Mar. 188 6 (B.L., Gladstone papers , Add . M S 44132); Irish financ e committe e report, 1 Apr. 188 6 (ibid., Add . M S 44647) . ]4 The Times, 6 Oct . 188 5 (Parnell' s Wicklo w speech) ; Hansard 3 , ccciv , 1131 (Parnell, 8 Apr. 1886) .

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Irish imperia l contributio n i n a simpl e manner , withou t referenc e t o insoluble problems o f relativ e taxable capacities or mora l obligations. 15 The revise d scheme of 189 3 provided tha t two-thirds of Ireland' s revenue would cove r loca l Iris h charges , whil e th e remainin g one-thir d woul d constitute Ireland' s contribution to imperia l expenditure. For a provisional period o f si x years th e impositio n an d collectio n o f al l Iris h taxes woul d b e retained b y th e imperia l government , an d arrangement s woul d b e revised thereafter. Joh n Redmon d expresse d th e common criticis m tha t this bill did nothing t o solv e th e financ e problem , sinc e th e schem e wa s merel y provisional. Th e Primros e committe e share d Redmond' s disapprova l o f postponing comple x issue s to some future date; it also condemned th e pla n on th e ground s tha t th e onl y practicabl e wa y t o calculat e th e imperia l contribution wa s t o assig n a singl e hea d o f revenue , rathe r tha n a proportion o f th e tota l revenue. 16 Birrell commente d tha t th e financia l proble m wa s almos t insuperabl e even i n Gladstone's day, bu t b y 191 1 it was a fa r greate r obstacle , since th e balance o f indebtednes s ha d move d agains t Ireland. 17 Th e Primros e committee analyse d th e crucia l change s whic h ha d take n plac e i n th e intervening years . I n 188 6 Irishme n contribute d i n taxe s t o th e Unite d Kingdom excheque r wel l ove r £ 2 millio n mor e tha n the y receive d fro m government expenditure. 18 B y 1910-1 1 Irishme n receive d ove r £ 1 millio n more i n benefits, mainly for ol d ag e pensions an d lan d purchase , tha n they paid i n taxes. Iris h revenue had increase d b y only 28 per cen t betwee n 189 6 and 1911 , wherea s government expenditure in Irelan d had soare d b y 91 per cent. Th e tota l increas e i n governmen t expenditur e since 189 6 wa s abou t £5.4 million . Nearl y hal f o f thi s wa s accounte d fo r b y ol d ag e pensions , which amounte d t o one-thir d of government spending i n Ireland. Estimate s presented t o th e governmen t suggeste d tha t expenditur e i n Irelan d woul d increase b y a furthe r £500,00 0 i n 1910-11 . Th e Primros e committe e an d most Iris h nationalis t economist s disapprove d o f thi s steadil y risin g expenditure, whic h mad e Iris h self-sufficienc y an d financia l autonom y increasingly unattainable . The financia l link wit h Grea t Britai n entailed in Ireland a scal e o f expenditur e whic h wa s beyon d th e requirement s o f a largely rura l population an d beyon d th e natural resources o f th e country to supply. Th e committe e als o considere d i t mos t unwis e to saddl e th e ne w Irish governmen t wit h impossible liabilities fo r imperia l expenditure under existing circumstances. 19 The Primros e committe e rejecte d Gladstone' s financia l schemes , an d proposed instea d a radical ye t simple plan. Th e Iris h government should b e 15

Cabinet paper 'Irish finance', 14 Dec. 1892 (P.R.O., Cab. 37/32/51); Primrose report, p . 19 . ^Government o f Ireland bill, 1 Sept . 1893 , p p 6- 7 (H.L.R.O. , Lloy d Georg e papers, C/19/1) ; Hansard 4 , viii , 1476-8 , xi, 237-8, (Redmond , 1 4 Feb. an d 1 3 Apr. 1893); Primrose report, p. 21. I7 C. P . Scot t diary , 2 Feb. 191 1 (B.L. , Add . M S 50901, f f 1-2) . 18 First report o f th e royal commissioners appointed t o inquire into th e financial relations of Great Britain and Ireland, [C. 8262]. H.C. 1896, xxxiii. ^Primrose report, pp 6-7, 25-6.

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given ful l contro l ove r al l her own revenu e and expenditure , except tha t th e imperial exchequer shoul d mee t th e Iris h deficit by assuming liabilit y for all Irish ol d ag e pension s alread y grante d befor e hom e rul e cam e int o operation. Thi s woul d b e a temporar y charg e o n th e Britis h exchequer , which woul d steadil y diminis h wit h th e death s o f existin g pensioners , forcing Irelan d t o reduc e he r inflate d expenditure . Moreover , Irelan d should no t b e aske d t o contribut e t o imperia l expenditur e unti l sh e ha d reduced he r annual deficit . The committee believed that th e granting of ful l powers o f taxation, combine d wit h complete contro l o f expenditure, woul d remove mos t point s o f potentia l financia l frictio n betwee n th e tw o countries. Thi s pla n wa s expected t o promote 'an autonomous Ireland, self contained an d self-sufficin g s o fa r a s it s ow n loca l administratio n an d finances ar e concerned'. 20 The Primros e committee' s repor t wa s printed fo r cabine t us e in October 1911, afte r si x month s o f carefu l stud y o f Anglo-Iris h finance . It s recommendations wer e ver y simila r t o thos e propose d b y Iris h nationalis t financial experts , suc h a s Thomas Kettle , C . H . Oldham , Thoma s Loug h and Erskin e Childers . Sinc e th e 1880 s Iris h economist s increasingl y recognised th e significanc e of fisca l control a s a n instrumen t o f socia l an d economic policy . A vigorou s publi c campaig n fo r fisca l autonom y wa s waged i n Ireland , placin g particula r emphasi s o n th e deman d fo r Iris h control ove r custom s and excise , and arguin g that hom e rul e would have no meaning withou t financial independence. I t was obvious that Irelan d would suffer financiall y fro m fisca l independence , bu t sh e would learn t o shoulde r her ow n responsibilities , instea d o f bein g 'demoralise d b y Britis h doles'. 21 The nationalist s wer e naturall y delighte d t o lear n tha t th e Primros e committee's proposal s were so favourable t o Iris h interests. Bisho p Kell y of Ross kep t th e Iris h leader s an d th e chie f secretar y informe d o f th e committee's progress . Kell y remaine d hopefu l i n 191 1 that th e committee' s generous proposal s woul d b e adopted , fo r 'i n th e altere d circumstance s a bold an d ful l measur e o f hom e rul e has a bette r chanc e o f succes s tha n a half-measure'. T . P . O'Connor , however , wa s less sanguine , eve n i n Jul y 1911, and doubte d whethe r a scheme so favourable to Irelan d would ever be accepted b y the Commons. 22 The Iris h chie f secretar y als o agree d wit h th e Primros e committee' s proposals. I n Januar y 191 1 Birrel l confide d t o Si r Walte r Blun t tha t h e anticipated grea t difficultie s i n persuadin g certai n section s o f th e libera l party to agre e t o hom e rul e on generous financial lines. Birrell was also wel l aware tha t whils t fiscal independenc e woul d give the ne w Iris h governmen t far greate r powers , i t would los e extensiv e British subsidies; he tol d Jame s Bryce, 'Irelan d i s rathe r puzzle d betwee n othe r people' s mone y an d a 20

lbid.,pp 29-32, 44. See e.g. T . M . Kettle , Home-rule finance (Dublin , 1911); Erskin e Childers, The framework o f home rule (London, 1911) ; Lough's letter s to Nation, 3 0 Sept. and 1 1 Nov. 1911 ; Fran k MacDermot' s letter t o Nation, 1 1 Nov . 1911 . 22 Bishop Kell y t o Redmond , 1 6 Sept. an d 6 Oct. 191 1 (Deni s Gwynn, Th e life o f John Redmond (London, 1932) , p p 193-4) ; C. P . Scot t diary, July 1911 (B.L., Add . MS 50901 , f f 21-2) ; Birrell t o Churchill , 2 6 Aug. 191 1 (Verne y papers) . 2l

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23

cabinet o f it s own'. Birrel l mad e severa l speeche s favourin g a bol d an d generous financia l settlement , arguin g tha t generosit y mus t 'fring e th e footing o f justice'. H e tol d Churchil l privately in August 191 1 that Irelan d should b e give n 'ver y ful l power s ove r he r ow n revenue , taxatio n an d expenditure'.24 Unfortunately fo r th e nationalists , the Iris h chief secretary wa s the onl y minister t o suppor t th e Primros e committee' s recommendatio n o f Iris h financial independence . Th e Primros e committe e wa s merely advisory, an d it wa s no t Birrell , bu t Herber t Samuel , wh o wa s delegate d t o fram e th e financial provision s o f th e bill . Th e postmaster-genera l wa s on e o f Asquith's brilliant young proteges. Precise , accurat e an d restrained , he was highly respecte d i n th e cabine t fo r hi s quic k master y o f comple x materia l and hi s general quie t efficiency. 25 Th e member s o f th e mai n committe e o n home rul e were onl y too please d t o leav e th e financia l aspects in Samuel' s capable hands . Lor d Loreburn , th e chairman, admitte d t o C . P . Scot t tha t he had 'no t gon e muc h into ' the financia l problems o f th e bill. 26 Thanks to Samuel, financ e wa s th e onl y aspec t o f th e home-rul e bil l whic h wa s thoroughly an d efficientl y examine d i n 1911 . In October 1911 , Samuel studie d the Primrose report, utilised mos t o f its statistics, bu t entirel y rejected it s fundamenta l propositio n regardin g Iris h fiscal autonomy . Samue l worke d exceptionall y har d o n th e financia l provisions, draftin g detaile d proposal s whic h wer e revise d tim e an d tim e again befor e submissio n fo r commen t t o Rober t Chalmer s a t th e Treasur y and t o hi s colleagues o n th e cabinet committee. 27 From th e autumn o f 191 1 he devote d muc h o f hi s remarkable energ y an d concentratio n t o hi s hom e rule financ e scheme . H e deluge d th e leisurel y home-rul e committe e wit h detailed memorand a o n finance , throughou t Novembe r 1911 . Hi s si x statements suggeste d numerou s alternativ e proposals , outlinin g th e advantages o f each , an d providin g subsequent modification s in the ligh t of additional information . Th e memorand a discusse d variou s method s o f meeting th e Iris h expenditur e o f £1 2 !4 millio n an d examine d ever y conceivable method o f apportionin g Iris h revenue and expenditur e between the tw o governments. 28 However , Samuel' s conscientiou s devotio n t o home-rule financ e ha d it s limitations . Th e schem e h e ultimatel y produce d 23

W. S . Blunt , My diaries: being a personal narrative o f events, 1888-1914 (2 vols, New York , 1923) , ii , 33 6 (28 Jan. 1911) ; Birrel l to Bryce , 4 Jan. 191 2 (Bodl., Bryce papers, uncatalogued). 24 The Times, 2 5 Mar . 191 1 (Birrel l a t Mancheste r Refor m Club) ; Birrel l t o Churchill, 2 6 Aug . 191 1 (Verne y papers) ; Nation, 2 1 Oct . 191 1 (Birrel l a t llfracombe). 25 The lat e Mr s Luc y Masterma n commente d tha t Samue l 'wa s no t a ver y good handler o f th e house' ; h e di d wel l i n th e comple x financia l matters , no t full y understood b y othe r people , bu t h e di d no t manag e peopl e well , no r wa s h e particularly sympatheti c to thei r feeling s (interview , 3 Feb. 1974) . 26 C. P . Scot t diary , 7 Jan. 191 2 (B.L., Add . M S 50901, f f 58-9) . 27 See Samue l papers (H.L.R.O. , A/41/2-4) . 28 Samuel's si x memorand a o n 'Iris h finance' , 6 , 13 , 14 , 2 2 (two) , 2 3 Nov . 1911 (H.L.R.O., Lloy d George papers , C/20/1/5 ; P.R.O., Cab . 37/108/141 , 145-6) ; see also Samuel papers (H.L.R.O. , A/41/2-4) , which include Samuel's draft s and notes .

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took accoun t o f s o many variable s that it s manifol d complexitie s baffle d his colleagues an d bored the house of commons. Samuel' s plan did not even begin to satisfy the nationalists o r the Irish chief secretary. Ther e wa s never any doubt that he would rejec t th e Primrose recommendation of Irish fisca l autonomy. Samuel finall y presente d hi s proposal s t o th e cabine t o n 4 Decembe r 1911, and the y were incorporated int o the latest draf t of the home-rule bil l on 5 Marc h 1912 , thoug h ver y fe w change s wer e mad e i n th e interim. 29 Samuel's scheme wa s extraordinarily elaborate , an d involve d a fa r greate r degree o f Britis h contro l ove r Iris h financ e tha n th e Primros e proposals . For the sake of clarity the provisions are outlined here in their final form, as incorporated int o the last draft of the home-rule bill, and includin g the few changes mad e a t th e nationalists' request . Unti l the £2 million Iris h deficit was extinguished , ^jthe entir e proceed s o f al l Iris h taxes, includin g customs and excise , wer e to b e paid int o th e imperia l exchequer. A block gran t o f about £ 6 million woul d b e transferre d annuall y fro m th e imperia l t o th e Irish exchequer , t o cove r al l purel y Iris h expenditure , othe r tha n th e 'reserved services'. The imperial government was to control an d pay for the 'reserved services' , includin g ol d ag e pensions , nationa l insurance , lan d purchase and collection of taxes. I f the Irish government chose to take over any o f th e 'reserve d services' , the n th e bloc k grant , generall y terme d th e 'transferred sum' , woul d b e increase d accordingly . Th e transferre d su m would include a surplus of £500,000 per annum fo r the firs t thre e years, t o provide a working margin fo r th e Iris h government. This surplus would be reduced graduall y during the nex t si x years, unti l it reache d £200,00 0 per annum, a t which poin t i t would remain fixed . The financia l scheme should be re-examine d whe n Iris h revenu e exceede d expenditur e fo r thre e consecutive years . Onc e Iris h solvenc y wa s thu s established , th e imperia l parliament woul d consider imposin g a fai r Iris h contributio n to commo n imperial expenditure . Samuel' s decisio n tha t Iris h custom s an d excis e should remai n under imperia l control, a s i n Gladstone' s bills , was one of the mor e controversia l points. However , the Iris h parliament wa s granted very limite d power s t o var y custom s an d excis e dutie s impose d b y th e imperial parliament , and coul d als o lev y any entirel y new taxes other than customs duties. The balanc e sheet of th e Iris h government' s first propose d budget wa s outlined as follows: 30

29 See 'Iris h finance' , 4 Dec. 191 1 (Bodl., MS Asquith 105 , f f 223-8; P.R.O., Cab . 37/108/167). 30 This is a simplified sketc h of an extremely intricate scheme. For details, see 'Irish finance', 4 Dec . 191 1 (ibid.) ; 'Governmen t o f Irelan d bill', 1 5 Apr. 191 2 (ibid., M S 106, f f 199-222) ; Hansard 5 (commons), xxxvii , 62- 6 (1 5 Apr. 1912) , for Samuel' s outline of th e provisions ; Outline of th e financial provisions of th e bill, [Cd . 6154] , H.C. 1912-13 , Ixix .

Irish Home-Rule Finance, 1910-1914 30 Revenue Transferred su m Post Offic e Fee stamps

Expenditure £6,127,000 1,354,000 81,000 £7,562,000

Total

5

All purposes no t separately specifie d £5,462,00 0 Post Office 1,600,00 0 Surplus 500,000

7,062,000 *

Total 7,562,00

0

*Subject t o reduction t o £200,000. The imperia l government' s balance-sheet wa s as follows : Expenditure

Revenue Irish revenu e (excludin g Post Offic e and fe e stamps) £9,404,00 Deficit 2,015,00 Total £11,419,00

0 0 0

Transferred su m £6 , 127,000 Old age pensions 2,664,00 0 National insuranc e an d labour exchange s 19 1 ,500 Land purchas e — (1) Land Com mission 592,000 (2) Other charges 1 69,000 Constabulary 1,377,500 Collection o f revenue 298,00 0 Total £11,419,00

0

Birrell's reactio n t o Samuel' s somewha t indigestibl e statistica l materia l was predictable . H e circulate d t o th e cabine t a characteristicall y informa l memorandum i n Novembe r whic h provide d a refreshin g contrast . Birrel l pointed ou t wit h a touc h o f sarcas m tha t Samue l ha d exhauste d th e possibilities o f th e cas e i f i t wer e deal t wit h b y no t grantin g Irelan d ful l control o f he r ow n revenue . Samuel' s approac h coul d b e reduce d t o th e basic question o f 'how much o r how little of revenue can be given to provid e the new Irish parliament wit h useful and educational occupation?'. The chief secretary reserved his strongest criticis m for Samuel' s proposa l tha t the new Irish parliament should be deprived of control o f customs and excise. Birrell believed it was dangerous to focu s Irish resentment o n the customs issue ; an active publi c opinio n throughou t Irelan d wa s demandin g contro l o f customs fro m th e convictio n tha t 'withou t custom s ther e i s n o self government'. H e warne d tha t th e suppor t o f influentia l Irishmen , such a s Sir Horace Plunkett , would be withheld from an y proposals fallin g shor t o f the Primrose recommendations. Th e government's schem e would inevitabl y have a cool receptio n i n Ireland, especially by comparison wit h the generous Primrose proposals . Birrel l appeale d t o hi s colleague s t o rejec t Samuel' s scheme: 'giv e Irelan d th e Primros e repor t an d thu s secure her support'. 31 3

'Memorandum b y Birrel l o n Iris h finance , 2 7 Nov . 191 1 (P.R.O. , Cab . 37/108/161; H.L.R.O., Lloy d Georg e papers, C/20/1/4).

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The chie f secretar y ha d littl e hop e o f influencin g th e home-rul e committee whic h seem s t o hav e bee n generall y oppose d t o Iris h fisca l autonomy. Si r Edward Grey , Lor d Loreburn , Joh n Morle y and Joh n Burn s all a t variou s time s agree d tha t 'fisca l independenc e wa s impossible'. 32 Birrell barel y manage d t o concea l hi s disappointment , whe n h e sen t a n untypically ters e memorandu m t o Redmon d i n Decembe r informin g him that th e Primros e repor t ha d bee n rejected . Birrel l explained rather weakly that th e decisio n wa s du e t o 'publi c consideration s outsid e th e purel y financial aspec t o f th e Iris h problem' . H e mentione d i n particula r tha t complete fiscal autonomy fo r Irelan d mus t involve the total exclusion o f the Irish member s fro m th e imperia l parliament. 33 Bu t ther e wer e stron g objections t o Iris h exclusion . I t woul d b e oppose d o n principl e b y thos e liberals wh o favoure d a n ultimat e scheme o f Unite d Kingdo m devolution. As Th e Times pointe d ou t i n Februar y 1912 , 'ther e i s a stron g federalis t element i n th e cabine t whic h see s i n Iris h fisca l autonom y a ba r t o th e ultimate establishmen t of a federa l system'. 34 A t th e leve l of politica l self interest, Iris h exclusion would also reduc e the voting strength of the liberals in th e hous e o f commons . Th e Nation subsequentl y trie d t o explai n th e rejection o f th e Primros e repor t i n term s o f 'th e stron g oppositio n i n England, th e violen t oppositio n i n Ulster , th e reluctanc e o f som e libera l members t o agre e t o an y schem e no t reducibl e to federa l terms, o r seeming to threate n i n th e remotes t wa y th e securit y of fre e trade'. 35 Som e liberal s undoubtedly feare d als o tha t financia l autonomy woul d eventuall y lead t o demands fo r a n independen t foreig n policy , an d ultimatel y t o complet e separation. Strong objection s t o the Primros e report certainly existed . Ye t it was not the mos t sensibl e procedure t o appoin t a committe e o f financia l experts to advise the government, only to reject their recommendations so completely, especially when they won so much Iris h support. Samue l migh t at least have worked i n co-operatio n wit h some o f th e Primros e committe e members in an attempt to reach a compromise settlemen t likely to be more acceptable in Ireland. Instead , Samue l develope d a pla n entirel y independentl y o f th e Primrose committee, base d o n completel y different aim s and assumptions . The Iris h nationalist s deteste d Samuel' s financia l provision s an d wer e most unhapp y abou t th e rejectio n o f th e Primros e report . Redmon d an d Dillon outline d their response t o Samuel' s schem e in a memorandu m of 2 9 January 1912 , i n whic h they deal t wit h issues o f principle , leavin g matter s of detai l fo r late r consideration . The y objecte d forcefull y t o imperia l control o f taxatio n a s a 'distinctivel y retrograd e step' , an d requeste d that Ireland be given the power to impose all taxes. They also urged that the Irish parliament's power s t o ad d t o th e specifie d custom s an d excis e dutie s should b e much wider. 36 Redmond's misgivings were no doubt increased b y n

The Times, 5 Dec. 1910 ; C. P . Scot t diary, 6-8 Sept. 191 1 (B.L., Add. MS 50901, ff 37-40) ; Burn s diary, 5 Feb. 191 2 (B.L., Add. M S 46334, f . 4) . 33 Birrell's memorandum, c. Dec . 191 1 (N.L.I. , Redmon d papers, M S 15169 , seen on Bodl . M S fil m 1059) . 34 77?
Irish Home-Rule Finance, 1910-1914 30

7

the causti c remark s o f Bisho p Kell y tha t Irelan d wa s merel y lef t wit h 'th e amusement o f addin g tag s to taxe s u p to 1 0 per cent an d th e game of blin d man's buf f o f goin g i n searc h o f ne w subject s o f taxation' . Oppositio n i n Ireland t o Samuel' s pla n wa s extensive . Fran k MacDermo t expresse d widespread indignatio n in a letter to th e Nation i n January 191 2 'contesting the propriet y of puttin g aside financia l autonom y thus unceremoniously'. 37 L. S. Amery reported t o Bona r Law , after a visit to Irelan d i n January 1912 , that ther e were increasing doubts a s to whether the nationalists coul d accep t the fisca l pla n fo r hom e rule : 'th e deman d fo r a complet e contro l o f customs an d excise is growing and will , so many people think, soon be much too stron g fo r Redmon d an d Co . t o resist , i f no t thi s sprin g a t an y rat e before th e two year s o f possibl e dela y ar e out'. 38 Redmond wa s full y awar e of th e strengt h o f thi s hostility , an d hi s frien d Michae l Enni s adde d th e warning i n February that the Genera l Counci l o f th e Iris h County Council s would b e force d t o oppos e inadequat e fisca l provisions. 39 However, Redmon d an d Dillo n decided tha t the y must tolerat e Samuel' s scheme, rathe r tha n ris k wreckin g home-rule prospect s onl y a fe w month s before th e introduction of th e bill. Dillon advised Redmon d tha t it would be tactically wise r t o accep t Samuel' s proposal s rathe r tha n hol d ou t fo r th e full fisca l autonom y recommende d b y th e Primros e report . I f i t becam e known i n Irelan d that th e nationalis t leaders ha d presse d fo r wide r power s and bee n refused , th e Irish " national conventio n migh t endanger th e entir e bill an d discredi t th e nationalis t leader s b y demandin g radica l fisca l amendments. 40 S o th e nationalis t leader s reluctantl y acquiesce d i n th e general principle s of Samuel' s fisca l scheme , thoug h they were prepare d t o fight ove r som e o f th e details . They believe d the y were unlikel y t o succee d with th e cabine t wher e the Primros e committe e an d th e chie f secretary ha d failed. I t seemed tacticall y wiser to concentrate th e ful l forc e of thei r critical attack o n othe r aspect s o f th e home-rul e bill , wher e prospects o f obtainin g concessions migh t be greater . The nationalis t leaders , then , wer e onl y prepare d t o contes t a fe w financial points . Samue l ha d initiall y intende d tha t th e surplu s sum neede d to provid e a workin g margi n fo r th e Iris h governmen t shoul d b e abou t £150,000.4I A series o f conference s wa s held i n the las t tw o week s of Marc h 1912 between th e tw o Iris h leaders an d Asquith , Lloy d George , Birrel l and Samuel t o discuss disputed point s i n the bill. 42 Redmond an d Dillo n insisted that '£150,00 0 would be useless. . . It would see m t o be absolutely necessar y that th e surplu s shoul d b e considerable'. 43 Afte r a cabine t discussio n o n 2 "Bishop Kell y t o Redmon d (Gwynn , Redmond, p . 197) ; Nation, 2 0 Jan. 1912 . L. S . Amer y t o Bona r Law , 1 7 Jan . 191 2 (H.L.R.O. , Bona r La w papers , 25/1/33). 39 M. A . Enni s to Redmond , 1 7 and 2 0 Feb. 191 2 (N.L.I., Redmon d papers , M S 15254, see n o n Bodl . M S fil m 1081) . 40 Dillon to Redmond , 1 4 Jan. 191 2 (ibid., MS 15812 , seen o n Bodl . M S fil m 1063) . 41 Samuel, 'Iris h finance' , 6 Mar. 191 2 (P.R.O., Cab . 37/110/39) . 42 Harcourt's pencille d note s o n cabine t meeting , 1 4 Mar. 191 2 (Bodl., Harcour t papers); Asquith' s cabine t letter , 1 4 Mar . 191 2 (Bodl. , M S Asquit h 6 , f . 118) ; Memorandum b y Samuel , 2 7 Mar. 191 2 (H.L.R.O., Samue l papers , A/41/7a) . 43 'The home-rul e bill: memorandu m o n certai n points ' (H.L.R.O. , Lloy d Georg e 38

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April, Birrel l reported t o Dillon , wit h relief , that 'th e surplus was agreed t o (with som e grimace s an d wr y faces) ' o n th e line s o f £500,OOO. 44 Th e nationalist leader s als o succeede d i n thei r request fo r th e remova l of th e 1 0 per cen t limitatio n initially impose d o n th e increas e of custom s an d excis e duties o n bee r an d spirit s b y th e Iris h parliament . Samue l informe d Redmond tha t thi s concession wa s a considerabl e extensio n of th e power s contemplated i n hi s original scheme.45 By 4 Apri l 1912 , Samue l wa s satisfie d tha t th e financia l clause s o f th e home-rule bill were 'water-tight'. The postmaster-general worked extremely hard i n the las t fe w days before th e introductio n of th e bill , discussing final drafting point s i n numerou s conference s wit h Birrel l an d Redmond . Luck favoured hi m i n hi s tortuous task . Th e da y befor e th e firs t readin g began , Samuel wrot e jubilantly to hi s wife: 'th e figure s o f las t year's Iris h revenue and expenditur e (to Apri l 1st ) are i n toda y an d sho w th e [deficit ] situation to be a million pounds better than had bee n estimated! So we rejoice.'46 This recent increas e i n Iris h revenu e provide d a n unexpecte d bonu s fo r th e government. I t helped t o justify thei r claims that the Irish deficit, which was expected t o reac h £ 1 Vi millio n in 1912-13 , could ultimatel y be extinguished. On th e mornin g o f 1 1 April , Samue l wa s require d 't o g o throug h th e finance par t o f th e P.M.' s oratio n wit h him' . Late r tha t day , whe n h e introduced th e home-rul e bil l i n th e hous e o f commons , Asquit h outlined the financia l proposals. H e argued tha t continuation of the existing method of governin g Irelan d woul d 'inevitabl y increas e th e curren t deficit ' b y further developin g Iris h resource s a t Britis h expense . Hom e rule , o n th e other hand , woul d adjust Iris h finances to Iris h needs and reduc e the defici t by givin g Irishmen a direc t interes t i n effecting economies. Unfortunately, Samuel's coachin g wa s no t entirel y effective , a s Si r Courtena y Ilber t thought Asquit h 'lef t th e financia l provision s i n som e obscurity'. 47 Fou r days later , Samue l explaine d hi s comple x schem e a t greate r length . H e emphasised th e transformatio n fro m a situatio n o f £ 2 millio n surplu s i n 1893 to th e £ 1 Vi millio n deficit expected i n 1912-13 . If the unionists rejected home rule , th e existin g Iris h burde n o n th e Britis h taxpaye r woul d b e progressively increased. 48 The Samue l schem e presente d jus t a s man y difficultie s a s th e Primros e plan withou t providing a fina l solutio n t o th e questio n o f Iris h finance . I t was s o complicate d tha t fe w people othe r tha n Samue l eve r understoo d it . papers, C/20/2/13) . Samuel's memorandum of 2 7 Mar. 191 2 indicates that thi s was the joint wor k of Dillon , Redmond, T . P . O'Conno r an d J . J . Clanc y writte n c.2 5 Mar. 191 2 (H.L.R.O., Samue l papers, A/41/7a) . 44 Birrell t o Dillon , 2 Apr . 191 2 (N.L.I. , Redmon d papers , M S 15182 , see n o n Bodl. M S fil m 1063) . 45 'Memorandum o n certai n points ' (H.L.R.O. , Lloy d Georg e papers , C/20/2/13); Samuel to Redmond , 4 Apr. 191 2 (Redmond papers, N.L.I . MS 15224, seen o n Bodl . M S fil m 1071) . 46 Ibid.; Samue l t o hi s wife , 9 an d 1 0 Apr . 191 2 (H.L.R.O. , Samue l papers , A/157/609-10) . 47 Ibid.; Hansard 5 (commons), xxxvii , 1399-142 6 (Asquith , 11 Apr. 1912) ; Ilbert diary, 1 1 Apr. 191 2 (H.L.R.O.). ** Hansard 5 (commons), xxxvii , 62- 6 (Samuel, 1 5 Apr. 1912) .

Irish Home-Rule Finance, 1910-1914 30

9

The Times complaine d tha t it s chie f characteristic s wer e 'complexity , entanglement, an d obscurity'. 49 Th e financia l schem e provide d a n eas y target fo r unionis t attack s an d ridicule . Si r Joh n Marriot t declare d i n th e Nineteenth Century tha t 'constitutiona l independenc e an d financia l dependence canno t permanentl y coexist' . I f Irelan d wante d t o enjo y th e advantages o f a larg e degre e o f self-government , then sh e should shoulde r her ow n financia l responsibilities. 50 Th e mos t scathin g attack s cam e fro m Amery, in the commons an d the press. H e declared tha t Irelan d shoul d have been give n eithe r ful l fisca l autonom y o n Primros e lines , o r n o taxin g powers at all. The worst featur e of Samuel's bil l was that it provided endles s causes o f frictio n betwee n Englan d an d Ireland. 51 Th e unionist s als o complained tha t th e schem e coul d no t possibl y b e final , becaus e th e humiliating restrictions an d dual contro l of finance would prov e intolerabl e to th e Dubli n parliament. 52 Carso n accuse d Asquit h o f attemptin g t o en d the unio n becaus e th e poore r countr y was reaping to o muc h benefi t fro m the richer . Lord Hug h Ceci l argue d tha t Ireland' s statu s woul d b e reduce d from tha t o f wif e t o mistress , wh o wa s t o b e kep t b y Joh n Bull . Georg e Wyndham als o believe d tha t a n equa l unio n woul d b e replace d b y ' a morganatic alliance with a chance of saving something on the pin-money'. 53 However, th e privat e correspondenc e o f th e unionist s suggest s tha t the y were neve r reall y ver y concerne d abou t th e financia l aspect s o f th e bill , except s o fa r a s the y offere d eas y target s an d usefu l debating points . Th e opposition ha d a far more promising line of attack in the Ulster question. In any case , the y coul d rel y o n th e government' s ow n rank s t o provid e damaging criticis m of th e financ e scheme. Durin g th e debate s o n th e firs t and secon d readings , Carso n an d Amer y predicte d a libera l revol t agains t the propose d taxin g system , bu t th e crisi s whic h develope d b y Novembe r 1912 probably exceede d thei r expectations . Many libera l member s wer e fa r fro m satisfie d b y Samuel' s intricat e system o f check s an d balances . MacCallu m Scott , a Scottis h libera l backbencher, note d i n hi s diar y i n May : 'complet e fisca l independenc e would b e bette r tha n th e complicate d fisca l machinery i n th e bill . I t i s to o ^The Times, 3 0 Apr . 1912 . O n th e genera l failur e t o understan d th e financia l scheme, se e e.g. Hansard 5 (commons), xxxvii , 26 9 (Lough , 1 6 Apr. 1912) ; ibid., cols 126-7 , 130-3 1 (Walter Guinness, 1 5 Apr. 1912) ; ibid., xxxviii , 132- 4 (Barnes, 6 May 1912) ; ibid., xlvi , 2173- 4 (Horner, 1 5 Jan. 1913) : 'ther e i s not on e ma n i n thi s house understands the finance s of thi s bill , and . . . I do no t believ e that one man in twenty eve n tried to understand' . 50 J. A. R . Marriott , Th e thir d editio n of hom e rul e — I: a firs t impressio n of th e bill' i n Nineteenth Century, Ixx i (Ma y 1912) , pp 833 , 842-3 . 5l See e.g . L . S . Amery , Th e case against home rule (London , 1912) ; Hansard 5 (commons), xxxvii , 1772-8 5 (Amery, 30 Apr. 1912) ; Amery's lette r to Th e Times, 20 Apr. 1912 . 52 See e.g . Hansard 5 (commons), xxxviii , 248-5 3 (Auste n Chamberlain , 7 Ma y 1912); ibid. , col s 145-5 7 (Locker-Lampson , 6 Ma y 1912) ; Anon. , Th e home-rul e bill' i n Quarterly Review, ccxvii (Jul y 1912) , esp. p p 265-74 . ^Hansard 5 (commons), xxxvi , 143 2 (Carson, 1 1 Apr. 1912) ; ibid., xxxvii , 80-8 5 (Lord Hug h Cecil , 1 5 Apr. 1912) ; ibid., xxxviii , 419-34 (Wyndham , 8 May 1912) .

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ingenious. I t i s fancy finance.' 54 B y the tim e the home-rul e bill reached th e committee stage , th e libera l criticis m o f th e financ e schem e ha d focuse d more specificall y o n th e taxin g clauses . Samue l ha d mad e minima l concessions t o th e Iris h demand s fo r fisca l autonomy b y allowing th e Irish parliament t o retai n onl y ver y limited power s t o var y custom s an d excis e duties. Thes e wer e sufficien t t o provok e a libera l back-benc h revolt , supported b y more than sevent y members, durin g th e committee debat e o n the financial provision s i n October and November 1912 . A large proportion of thos e liberal s wh o consistentl y abstaine d o r vote d agains t th e taxin g provisions represente d Scottis h constituencies . Th e objection s o f me n like Cathcart Wason , Munro-Ferguso n an d D . V . Piri e see m t o hav e bee n genuinely inspired b y a conviction tha t the Iris h fisca l provisions coul d no t be reconciled wit h the futur e federal organisatio n o f th e Unite d Kingdom . These Scottis h liberal s wer e among th e mos t enthusiasti c supporters o f th e movement fo r 'hom e rule all round', to make the Irish bill the first ste p in a more ambitiou s schem e for Unite d Kingdo m devolution. 55 Among som e of the other speeches , there was more than a hint of resentment at the prospec t of Irish people enjoying tea or tobacco taxed a t lower level s than in Englan d or Scotland . Notice wa s serve d o f th e impendin g attac k o n 1 7 October, durin g th e committee debat e o n claus e two , concernin g th e legislativ e powers o f th e Irish parliament . Hayes-Fisher , a unionist , pu t dow n a n amendmen t t o withdraw the power o f varying imperial taxation fro m th e Irish parliament , since he believed th e 'grotesque ' financia l clauses would reduc e an y futur e federal schem e to chaos . Thi s led to a preliminar y debat e on the financ e scheme, which was not schedule d for discussion until early November. Tw o Scottish libera l 'federalists ' spok e i n favou r o f th e unionis t amendment . MacCallum Scot t expresse d considerabl e anxiet y over th e fisca l provision s and state d tha t hi s fear s wer e shared b y many othe r member s o n hi s side . The secon d libera l critic , Cathcar t Wason , a forme r libera l unionist , became a prominent leader o f the liberal members' revolt . Wason proteste d against conferrin g o n th e Iris h parliamen t eve n a limite d contro l ove r customs, particularl y the righ t t o reduc e custom s duties , sinc e this would postpone th e Iris h imperia l contributio n eve n furthe r int o th e distan t future. 56 The advers e criticis m evidentl y worried th e postmaster-general , fo r i t prompted hi m t o circulat e a cabine t pape r o n 2 2 October, remindin g his colleagues of the provisions concerning customs variations, and the reason s for thei r insertion . Samue l emphasise d tha t th e term s o f th e bil l prevente d the Iris h parliamen t fro m practisin g a protectiv e polic y agains t Britis h goods — a point frequentl y ignored b y the opposition in their eagerness to score debatin g points . Th e Iris h parliament' s powe r t o var y custom s an d excise duties was already severely restricted. If even this right were revoked, it coul d rais e littl e revenu e as i t woul d b e deprive d o f an y effectiv e taxin g 54

MacCallum Scot t diary , 1 5 May 1912 . See Patrici a Jalland, 'Unite d Kingdo m devolution, 1910-14: political panacea o r tactical diversion?' in E.H.R., xci v (1979) , p p 757-85 . *The Times, 1 8 Oct. 1912 . 55

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powers. H e furthe r argue d tha t i t wa s wrong t o den y th e Iris h peopl e th e right t o reduc e indirec t taxe s o n te a an d sugar , whic h affecte d th e poores t classes most closely. Samuel also ridiculed fears that such reductions i n Irish duties woul d lea d t o seriou s inconvenienc e in traffic betwee n Englan d an d Ireland, o r t o large-scal e smugglin g operations . Recognisin g th e implications o f th e sourc e o f the attack o n the customs provisions , Samue l carefully distinguishe d between Scottish an d Iris h requirements in the event of a futur e syste m o f devolution . Th e Iris h defici t force d th e imperia l exchequer t o tak e th e norma l growt h i n yiel d o f Iris h revenues , s o tha t Ireland mus t b e allowed som e taxing power s t o mee t th e normal growt h in expenditure. Scotlan d coul d no t ultimatel y b e grante d simila r taxin g powers, sinc e Scotlan d an d Englan d wer e physically contiguous, bu t suc h rights would no t b e needed a s Scotland ha d n o deficit. 57 Samuel wa s well-advise d t o justif y hi s case , fo r th e attac k rapidl y gathered momentum . Ninetee n liberal s wh o oppose d Iris h contro l o f customs met to discuss the question on 24 October. MacCallum Scot t sa w in this the 'making s of a strong movement ' which had a real chance of forcing the government' s hand. 58 The y decide d t o sen d a deputatio n t o interview Samuel fou r day s later , t o urg e tha t 'i n th e interest s o f th e federa l ide a customs an d excis e shoul d b e controlle d b y th e imperia l parliament' . Th e deputation wa s no t satisfie d b y Samuel' s expositio n o f th e relevan t provisions, thoug h MacCallu m Scot t admitte d tha t th e ministe r was 'ver y glib an d know s hi s stuff'. 59 Th e Manchester Guardian gav e substantia l support t o this group of critics in a leader article on 4 November: 'the whole of th e provision s wit h regar d t o custom s dutie s appea r t o u s fraugh t with possibilities o f friction' . Samuel' s schem e wa s condemne d a s ' a hal f measure that bristles with difficulties'. Th e Guardian suggeste d instead tha t control o f custom s shoul d b e withdraw n fro m th e Iris h parliamen t altogether, bu t i n exchang e Britai n shoul d no t forc e Irelan d t o pa y th e balance o f he r deficit. 60 The ful l strengt h of the liberal opposition t o Samuel's financ e scheme was revealed i n Novembe r 191 2 whe n th e financia l provision s wer e a t las t debated i n committee . Th e principle s o f th e schem e wer e presented t o th e house first , i n the for m o f a brie f resolution , whil e the detaile d provision s were debate d late r i n th e month . Durin g th e mai n debat e o n th e financ e resolution o n 7 November, Lewi s Haslam gav e th e governmen t du e notic e of th e intention s o f th e grou p o f dissidents . H e pu t dow n a n amendmen t asking fo r remova l o f th e Iris h parliament' s powe r t o reduc e custom s an d excise duties. He declared that ' a great majority' o f liberal members disliked this provision, an d h e kne w that sevent y or eight y libera l members wante d the powe r o f reductio n omitte d altogether . Haslam' s primar y motiv e wa s federalist, sinc e he believed tha t centralisatio n o f custom s wa s an essentia l prerequisite to United Kingdom devolution. He also objected t o the massive "Samuel, 'Variatio n o f custom s dutie s i n Ireland' , 2 2 Oct. 191 2 (P.R.O. , Cab . 37/112/116); Mottiston e paper s (Nuffiel d College , Oxford , M S 14 , ff 98-9) . 58 MacCallum Scot t diary , 2 4 Oct. 1912 . 59 Ibid., 2 8 Oct. 1912 ; Th e Times, 2 9 Oct. 1912 . ^'The financ e o f hom e rule ' i n Manchester Guardian, 4 Nov. 1912 .

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cost an d practica l complication s likel y t o resul t fro m differentia l dutie s between th e tw o countries , includin g Englis h hostilit y t o lowe r price s i n Ireland.61 Hasla m though t th e majorit y o f libera l member s woul d b e reconciled i f the Iris h parliament's powe r to vary taxes was confined to the right to increase custom s an d excise duties. But a grou p o f libera l dissident s wante d t o g o eve n further . Cathcar t Wason pu t dow n anothe r amendmen t proposin g t o depriv e th e Dubli n parliament o f all powers to var y customs an d excise duties. Waso n an d his friends circulate d a memoria l amongs t al l liberal member s justifying thei r demand fo r th e retention of ful l imperia l contro l of all customs an d excis e duties. The y argue d tha t Samuel' s provision s woul d establis h irritatin g customs barriers , and tha t poor people in Britain woul d bitterl y resen t th e injustice o f Irelan d enjoyin g untaxe d tea , sugar , tobacc o an d drink . Secondly, the y believe d tha t 'th e proposal cut s int o th e very vitals of an y federal system'. 62 Th e Manchester Guardian wa s sympatheti c bu t no t sanguine: 'ther e i s n o likelihoo d tha t th e governmen t wil l budg e o n thi s question. No r will the effect o f Mr Wason's movemen t be considerable on a division.' Th e Times note d tha t libera l feelin g o n th e custom s provision s was divided, but trusted that 'th e federalist liberals who desire that customs and excis e shoul d b e unde r complet e imperia l contro l wil l probabl y no t press thei r views to extremities'. 63 However, attention wa s diverted fro m the actual substanc e of the finance scheme b y a deliberat e oppositio n manoeuvr e intende d t o destro y i t altogether i n a notorious sna p division . Mentio n o f this famous incident is the closes t tha t mos t historie s an d biographie s o f thi s perio d ge t t o th e finance o f hom e rule , thoug h the y rarel y explai n it s context ver y clearly . When the report stage of the finance resolution was taken o n 1 1 November , the unionist s defeate d th e governmen t o n a crucia l wreckin g amendmen t moved b y Si r Frederic k Banbury . H e propose d t o reduc e th e transferre d sum so drastically as to remove the British subsidy to Ireland . This surpris e opposition mov e caused a dramati c parliamentar y crisi s marked b y severe disorder an d grea t excitement . Unionist s wer e summone d unexpectedl y early on a Monday b y a code telegra m urging them to 'mee t m e at Marbl e Arch a t four . Susie. ' The adverse vote was only rescinded afte r wil d scenes in the house of commons whic h disrupted th e tight home-rule timetable.64 In cas e th e governmen t ha d forgotte n th e libera l members ' grievance s over the taxing provisions, a deputation waite d on Asquith on 1 8 November to refres h hi s memory . Th e tw o stage s o f a slightly-revise d financ e resolution wer e taken o n 1 9 and 2 0 November in a much-subdue d house . Damaging criticis m o f th e custom s an d excis e provision s cam e fro m fiv e prominent Scottis h libera l federalists , le d by Cathcart Waso n an d Munro Ferguson, repeatin g previou s arguments. 65 Ther e wa s considerabl e backbench suppor t fo r th e dissidents . Whe n th e division s o n th e financ e ^Hansard 5 (commons), xliii , 1535-7 . ^Manchester Guardian, 7, 8 Nov. 1912; The Times, 8 Nov. 1912. ^Manchester Guardian, 8 Nov. 1912; The Times, 11 Nov. 1912. ^See Patrici a Jalland , Th e liberals and Ireland (Brighton, 1980) , pp 106-7 . 65 Hansard 5 (commons), xliv, 147-9 (Cathcart Wason, 19 Nov. 1912); ibid., cols 159-60 (Munro-Ferguson, 1 9 Nov. 1912) ; Th e Times, 2 0 Nov. 1912 .

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resolution wer e take n o n 1 9 and 2 0 Novembe r 1912 , forty-seve n liberal s failed t o vot e on 1 9 November an d fifty-on e di d no t vot e th e followin g da y at repor t stage . O f th e sixty-fou r liberal s who faile d t o vot e o n on e or bot h divisions, mor e tha n one-thir d wer e federalist s an d thirtee n represente d Scottish constituencies. 66 The Iris h nationalist s had maintaine d a remarkabl e degre e o f restrain t during th e debate s o n th e financ e schem e whic h the y dislike d s o intensely. Consequently, th e demand s o f th e libera l dissident s fo r remova l o f th e already limite d taxin g powers wer e embarrassing a s well as infuriating . O n 20 November Th e Times alleged tha t the government intende d to revoke the Irish parliament' s power t o reduc e custom s an d excis e duties , t o mee t th e criticism o f ' a formidabl e sectio n o f th e party'. 67 Redmon d immediatel y sent a n anxiou s warnin g t o Birrell , tha t ther e woul d b e 'a n outburs t o f dissatisfaction' i n Irelan d i f th e powe r t o reduc e custom s wa s withdrawn : 'if, i n th e firs t instance , w e ha d bee n deprive d o f thi s power , Iris h publi c opinion woul d probably hav e swallowe d it ; but t o tak e i t from u s now, an d in consequenc e o f th e threatene d revol t o f som e o f th e libera l members , would have a very serious effect'.68 But despite Redmond's appeal, the cabinet nex t da y revoke d th e Iris h parliament' s powe r t o reduc e custom s duties. Asquit h late r informe d the kin g that this was a necessar y concessio n 'in vie w o f th e prevailin g opinio n i n th e commons' . Birrel l explaine d regretfully t o Redmon d tha t Asquith, Lloyd Georg e an d Samue l 'wer e full y persuaded tha t a parliamentar y situation ha d arisen , which cannot b e fairl y estimated simpl y by counting vote s i n the lobby , an d tha t th e concessio n is really necessary i f we are t o carr y the brains of ou r Englis h part y wit h us'. 69 A governmen t amendmen t deletin g th e Iris h parliament' s powe r t o reduce custom s dutie s wa s carried b y 324 votes t o 21 3 on 2 6 November. I t was alread y clea r tha t thi s concessio n woul d a t leas t partiall y satisf y a considerable numbe r o f th e dissidents . Abou t twent y ha d passe d a resolution a t a meeting o n 20 November, statin g tha t they would b e satisfie d by such a concession. The y include d men like Cathcart Wason , Haslam an d Munro-Ferguson. Altogethe r a t leas t seventee n o f th e dissiden t liberal s voted fo r the government amendmen t the following week . Bu t a sufficiently large proportio n o f th e dissident s remaine d unappease d t o sugges t tha t a n unpleasant crisi s migh t hav e develope d withou t th e government' s concession. Forty-fiv e liberal s faile d t o vot e o n th e governmen t amendment, twenty-on e o f who m ha d als o abstaine d o n on e o r bot h divisions o n th e financ e resolution . Thes e twenty-on e include d si x federalists an d a number o f extremist s wh o wanted the powers of variation abolished i n bot h directions. 70 66

See Hansard 5 (commons), xliv , 251-6 , 443-7 , fo r th e tw o divisio n lists . 77ie Times, 2 0 Nov . 1912 . 6x Redmond t o Birrell , 20 Nov. 191 2 ( N . L . I ., Redmon d papers , M S 15169 , see n o n Bodl. M S fil m 1059) . 6V Birrell t o Redmond , 2 1 Nov . 191 2 (ibid.) ; Asquith' s cabine t lette r t o king , 2 1 Nov. 191 2 (Bodl. , M S Asquit h 6 , f . 184) ; Peas e diary , 2 1 Nov . 191 2 (Nuffiel d College, Oxford , Gainfor d papers , Peas e diary, vol . ii , f. 57) . 1(> The Times, 2 1 Nov . 1912 ; Hansard 5 (commons), xliv , 1109-2 0 (divisio n lis t o n government amendment , 2 6 Nov. 1912) . 67

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Redmond reluctantl y agree d t o th e government amendment , bu t h e had good reason fo r bitterness. The nationalist leaders had co-operated wit h the government, despit e thei r oppositio n t o Samuel' s financ e scheme. Ye t the first seriou s attack fro m th e libera l benche s led the cabine t t o deman d stil l further fisca l concession s fro m th e nationalists , regardles s of th e respons e in Ireland. Redmond's positio n wa s not helped b y the insensitive comments of th e libera l press . Th e Westminster Gazette di d no t imagin e th e Iris h people woul d object t o th e omission o f a power t o reduc e taxe s which they would b e unabl e t o affor d i n th e foreseeabl e future . Th e Manchester Guardian eve n predicte d tha t th e nationalist s woul d gladl y assen t t o th e alteration, since they valued the reduction powers only as a symbol of fisca l freedom, rathe r tha n a practica l weapon. 71 Suc h comment s illustrate d th e failure o f mos t liberal s t o understan d th e Iris h position . Th e Dubli n correspondent of Th e Times was more accurately informe d o f the true stat e of feelin g i n Ireland. 'Somethin g like consternation' had bee n provoke d b y this lates t amendment , whic h intensifie d th e existin g disconten t i n Irelan d over the fiscal provisions. The Irish parliament's powe r to reduce duties was highly valued by the poorer classes as a means of lowering food prices . This amendment destroye d tha t hop e an d Irelan d woul d demand a n explanation if th e nationalis t leader s swallowe d th e amendmen t withou t protest . William O'Brien's All-for-Ireland Leagu e reache d a unanimous decision on 24 November that this amendment wrecked the last vestiges of national self government in the bill and rendere d th e fiscal clauses wholly unacceptable.72 The liberal s ma y hav e bee n correc t i n statin g tha t th e propose d Iris h government could no t afford to reduc e duties; but the Irish were justified in their complaint tha t the customs amendment mad e such fiscal autonomy as was granted b y the bill illusory in the extreme . Samuel's financia l provisions provoked a rebellion on a ke y issue among about 20 per cent of liberal members. Thi s threatened revol t was responsible for on e o f th e ver y fe w amendments of an y importanc e inserted in th e bil l at committe e stage . (Th e onl y othe r importan t amendmen t wa s th e abandonment o f th e nominate d senate. ) I t i s significan t tha t thi s amendment wa s force d fro m th e governmen t b y pressur e fro m it s ow n liberal supporter s rathe r tha n it s nationalis t allies . Th e governmen t coul d not affor d t o ris k alienatin g it s ow n follower s o n an y point s whe n th e opposition wa s prepared t o mak e politica l capita l ou t o f th e leas t hin t o f division i n governmen t ranks . Bu t th e nationalis t leader s fel t oblige d t o acquiesce i n th e financia l provision s a s th e pric e o f hom e rule . A s a Quarterly Review articl e pointe d ou t i n Octobe r 1912 : 's o lon g a s th e ministers keep th e home-rul e fla g flying, it is not fro m th e nationalist s tha t they hav e any defection t o fear'. 73 After Novembe r 1912 , however , th e seriou s problem s involve d i n Samuel's financ e scheme were obscured b y th e increasin g emphasis on th e Ulster question , which rapidl y cam e t o dominate the scene. The debate on the remaining financial clause s was an anti-climax . The financ e scheme was 71

Westminster Gazette, 2 1 Nov. 1912 ; Manchester Guardian, 2 0 Nov. 1912. The Times, 2 5 Nov. 1912. Anon., Th e Ulste r covenant ' i n Quarterly Review, ccxvii (Oct . 1912) , p . 569 .

12

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rushed throug h th e hous e unde r closure , whe n member s wer e alread y exhausted afte r a length y and tirin g session. Onl y fiv e ou t o f th e thirteen fiscal clause s were discussed at all thoroughly in committee. The other eight clauses were passed unde r closure, with little or no debate, accompanie d b y recurrent protest s fro m th e opposition . Eleve n clauses wer e disposed o f i n the las t wee k o f November , an d onl y thre e o f thes e wer e adequatel y discussed. Moreover , th e debat e o n thos e clause s whic h di d receiv e attention wa s not particularl y inspired, frequentl y repetitive, and marke d by abysma l ignorance. 74 The only alteration worth y of not e othe r tha n th e change i n th e customs ' provisions , wa s th e governmen t amendmen t t o clause twenty-six , enabling th e Iris h parliament t o secur e a revisio n in th e financial arrangement s soone r tha n previousl y stipulated. The repor t stag e o f th e financia l clause s was disposed o f o n 8 Januar y 1913 i n a particularl y thi n an d apatheti c house . Amer y denounce d th e scheme as a 'miserable , bastard framewor k of finance . . . It is a finance of odds an d ends ; i t is jumble sale finance.' 75 Th e unionis t Evening Standard described th e debate i n an entertaining , if highly prejudiced manner : And the n nearl y everybod y wen t of f t o tea . For hom e rul e wa s th e subjec t — a boring topi c — an d th e particula r men u o f th e nigh t wa s th e financia l relation s between Englan d an d Irelan d — a n appallin g prospect . . . A t on e tim e eve n th e nationalists slackened dow n to 14 . . . Liberal and radical s totalled 14 , and — may it portend nothing ! — the entir e unionist party numbered 13 . M r Herber t Samue l was the sol e guardia n o f th e Treasur y bench .

Samuel 'babble d amazing statistics ' in defence of hi s scheme, and i n such a fashion 'th e muddled financ e of th e bill was approved'.76 Not surprisingly, Samuel wa s immensely relieved 'not to have my share of the burden of tha t bill any longer on m y shoulders'. 77 Under th e terms of the 191 1 Parliament Act, th e financia l provisions coul d no t b e altere d afte r th e firs t complet e passage throug h th e commons , excep t perhap s a s par t o f a n entirel y separate agreemen t ove r Ulster. Little more was heard o f home-rule finance after Januar y 1913 , with the increasin g gravity of th e Ulste r situation. In term s o f th e Ulste r crisis of 1912-14 , the mos t fundamenta l weakness in Samuel' s schem e wa s tha t i t increase d th e government' s difficultie s i n making subsequent provision for Ulster. It tied the liberals even more firml y to th e origina l home-rul e bil l o f Apri l 1912 , which ignore d th e Ulste r problem. I t wa s clea r tha t Samuel' s complicate d syste m o f check s an d balances woul d automaticall y brea k dow n i f Ulste r had t o b e exclude d a t any stage . Samue l himsel f claime d tha t 'i t i s difficul t t o se e ho w an y workable financial scheme, of any kind, can be evolved, based upon a fiscal separation betwee n Ulster and the rest of Ireland'. 78 Evidently, Asquith and Lloyd Georg e di d no t shar e thi s view when they agreed t o Ulste r exclusion 14 The Times, 2 5 Nov. 1912; J. H . Morgan , Th e home-rul e bill reconsidered ' in Nineteenth Century, Ixxii i (Jan. 1913), pp 213-17. 15 Hansard 5 (commons), xlvi, 1218-19 (L. S. Amery, 8 Jan. 1913). 76 Evening Standard, 9 Jan. 1913. "Samuel t o hi s mother, 1 9 Jan. 1913 (H.L.R.O. , Samue l papers , A/156/426) . 78 Samuel, ' A suggestio n fo r th e solutio n o f th e Ulster question', 18 Dec. 1913 (ibid., A/41/12 ; P.R.O. , Cab. 37/117/95).

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in 1914 , bu t th e complexities o f Samuel' s schem e added immensel y to their problems in revisin g th e financia l provisions. 79 Hostil e critic s claimed tha t 'freedom fo r Ulste r walk s han d i n han d wit h financia l chao s i n thi s particular bill' , and eve n interpreted th e finance scheme as a 'craft y devic e to .. . creat e a dilemma fro m whic h Ulster cannot escape'. 80 In th e cours e of th e negotiation s ove r Ulste r i n 191 3 an d 1914 , Asquit h was prepare d t o reduc e th e fisca l power s o f th e Iris h parliamen t eve n further a s a quid pro qu o for unionist concession s over Ulster . Th e Dublin parliament's remainin g righ t t o increas e custom s an d excis e duties becam e an incidenta l counte r i n the part y leaders ' bargaining . Whe n Asquit h me t Bonar La w o n 6 Novembe r 1913 , th e prim e ministe r admitte d tha t th e taxing provision s woul d hav e to underg o considerabl e modification , whic h would b e unwelcom e t o th e nationalists . Th e likel y natur e o f thi s modification wa s indicate d i n a not e fro m Samue l t o Asquith , si x weeks later, discussin g methods o f compensating the Irish parliament for the total withdrawal o f custom s variations. 81 Nothin g wa s settle d whe n the cabine t discussed possibl e arrangement s for th e temporary exclusion of Ulster early in March 1914 . The fixe d par t o f the transferred sum would obviously have to b e reduced i f the imperial parliamen t continue d t o govern Ulster. I t was further argue d tha t i f exclusio n wer e onl y t o b e temporary , i t woul d eas e matters i f the taxing power s o f the Irish parliament wer e postponed until the expiration o f th e exclusio n period. 82 I t wa s clea r tha t th e inevitabl e result would b e the loss of the Iris h parliament's remaining taxin g powers. The government' s treatmen t o f home-rul e financ e reveale d majo r weaknesses. I t was unwise to commissio n a committee o f financia l expert s to examine the fiscal question, only to jettison its proposals, especiall y when these ha d suc h fir m suppor t withi n nationalis t Ireland . I t wa s unusua l procedure t o ignor e th e Primros e repor t completel y an d reques t th e postmaster-general t o develo p a n entirel y independent scheme , base d o n different aim s an d assumptions . Samuel' s pla n overrule d the view s of th e chief secretar y fo r Ireland , th e nationalis t leaders , an d th e Primros e committee, an d arouse d considerabl e resentmen t in Ireland . Thi s intricat e system o f check s an d balance s di d no t eve n satisf y th e government' s ow n liberal supporters , while it increased th e problems o f devising a subsequen t compromise o n th e Ulste r question. Th e 191 2 home-rule bill wa s a curious combination o f th e 189 3 bil l wit h a totall y revise d financia l scheme . Th e separate examinatio n o f th e tw o section s o f th e bil l wa s unwise, given the interdependence betwee n financia l an d othe r aspect s o f hom e rule . A complete reappraisa l o f th e entir e measure, suc h as Samue l applie d t o th e 79

See e.g. 'Government o f Irelan d bill : note' , earl y Mar. 1914 (H.L.R.O., Lloy d George papers , C/20/2/8) ; Draf t o f whit e paper , 6 Mar. 191 4 (Bodl., M S Asquith 110, f . 216) . *() Hansard 5 (commons), xxxix , 110 8 (Newman, 1 3 June 1912) ; Marriott , 'Th e third editio n o f hom e rule' , p . 841. 8l Asquith's notes (Bodl., M S Asquith 39, ff 3-6); Samue l t o Asquith, 20 Dec. 191 3 (ibid., f . 60). "'Government o f Irelan d bill : note' , earl y Mar. 1914 (ibid. , M S 110 , f f 206-14 ; H.L.R.O., Lloy d Georg e papers, C/20/2/8).

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financial provisions , migh t hav e bee n mor e effective . Instead th e 191 2 bil l ignored Ulster , an d pu t forwar d a highl y complicated fisca l schem e whic h infuriated enemie s an d allie s alike. The obsessio n wit h th e Ulste r question , however , obscure d th e rea l gravity o f th e financia l problem s o f hom e rul e fro m 191 2 to 1914 . As Sir Almeric Fitzro y note d i n Jul y 1913 , 'th e governmen t hav e escape d substantial criticism on the financia l claims which constitute the real fla w in their constructiv e statesmanship , an d might , i f properl y exposed , hav e upset thei r plans'. 83 While the Ulste r problem becam e mor e intractabl e th e fiscal expectation s o f th e Iris h nationalist s ha d increased . The y di d no t insist ver y strongly on contro l o f custom s i n 188 6 and 1893 , but thei r sense of it s significanc e rose substantiall y betwee n 189 3 and 1914 . By 1917-18 , even th e mor e moderat e nationalist s accepte d th e vie w o f Willia m Marti n Murphy that control o f customs was 'the most essentia l right that a country with an y pretenc e t o self-governmen t shoul d possess' . Thi s reflecte d th e rapid movemen t i n Iris h publi c opinion sinc e the Easte r rising . Bu t a s th e nationalists increase d thei r fisca l demands , s o th e tw o question s o f Ulste r and financ e becam e mor e obviousl y interwoven . The Ulste r unionist s lef t no doub t tha t contro l o f custom s b y th e imperia l parliamen t wa s a n essential conditio n fo r an y home-rul e compromise . Deadloc k wa s reache d over th e issu e o f fisca l autonom y befor e th e conventio n broache d th e question o f partition. 84 B y 191 7 fisca l autonom y wa s a s muc h a matte r o f fundamental principl e concernin g Iris h nationalit y a s wa s partition . Th e gap between nationalists and Ulste r unionists could not be bridged on either issue by mutual agreement .

s3

Sir Almeri c Fitzroy , Memoirs ( 2 vols, London , 1925) , ii, 51 8 (15 July 1913) . "McDowell, Irish Convention, pp 108 , 118, 122-5 , \44etpassim.

15 LORD RANDOLP H CHURCHIL L AN D HOME RULE * R.E. QUINAULT

'If we wish to maintain th e Ac t of Union w e must abide by the condition s of the Ac t o f Union. ' Lord Randolp h Churchil l 1883 1 'It i s rather i n thes e ol d speeche s tha t w e find instructio n tha n i n anythin g said a t th e presen t day. ' Lord Randolp h Churchil l 1888 2

I

C

ontroversy ha s alway s surrounde d th e Iris h polic y o f Lor d Randolph Churchill . In particular , h e played an importan t par t in opposing Gladstone's home rul e bil l of 1886, whe n h e 'played th e Orange card' . Bu t despit e thi s episode ther e ha s bee n muc h varie d speculation abou t hi s rea l attitud e toward s hom e rule . Wa s h e a sincere an d consisten t opponen t o f hom e rule , a s hi s so n an d hi s friend, Rosebery , claimed , o r wa s he , a s Wilfre d Blun t alleged , a secret sympathise r wit h hom e rule? 3 Alternatively , di d Churchil l merely adop t a n opportunis t attitude towards hom e rul e as Rober t Rhodes James has implied? 4 In their recent book, entitled Th e Governing Passion, A. B. Cooke an d J. R . Vincent have produced a new and idiosyncratic interpretatio n o f Churchill's involvement with Ireland

*I wis h to than k A . D . Macintyre , o f Magdalen College , Oxford , fo r his comments o n an earlie r draft of this article and fo r stimulating my interest in Irish history. l The Times, 2 1 Dec . 1883 . 2

Roth sides of the home rule question: two speeches by Lord Randolph Churchill and John Morley a t th e Oxford ( Tnion (Oxford , 1888), " p. 19 . 3

Winston Churchill , Lord Randolph Churchill (2nd ed. , London , 1907) , p p 470—1. Lor d Rosebery , Lord Randolph Churchill (London, 1906 ) p p 21—2 . Randolph S . Churchill , ]\'inston S. Churchill, ii. companion par t i (London , 1969), p . 491 . 4 Robert Rhode s James, Lord Randolph Churchill (London, 1969) , p . 211 .

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and hom e rul e in the perio d 1885-6. 5 The purpos e o f this enquiry is to re-examine thes e interpretations , especiall y Cook e an d Vincent's . Cooke an d Vincen t depic t Churchil l a s a mercuria l opportunist , whose attitud e toward s Irelan d wa s determine d b y persona l an d party ambition s an d strategies . Churchil l wa s n o exceptio n i n thi s regard sinc e 'th e Iris h questio n wa s th e temporar y an d particula r name give n i n th e 1880 s t o a continuou s and permanen t existentia l problem whic h party manager s inflic t upo n themselves.' 6 This statement form s part o f a welte r of sinuous prose whic h merel y contend s that Westminste r politician s only though t o f Ireland a s a convenien t party battleground . Sinc e Cook e an d Vincen t giv e n o overvie w o f Churchill's Iris h policy , thei r individua l (an d somewha t contradic tory) point s ma y b e liste d fo r convenience : 1. Churchil l wa s 'greatly mor e concerned wit h part y alignments than wit h Irish unrest/ 7 2. Churchil l understoo d Iris h politic s 'probabl y bette r tha n an y othe r British politician.' 8 3. 'Churchil l pushed i n turn all possible policies, whether substantively pro Irish o r anti-Irish , whethe r sensationa l o r irresponsible , s o long a s they pointed toward s some hope of joint action with th e liberal s or towards an eventual possibl e reconstructio n o f th e tor y party.' 9 4. 'Churchill' s Iris h policy , i f he ha d one , wa s no t ver y evident befor e July 1885."° 5. 'I n Iris h terms , Churchil l wa s basically 'green ' no t 'Orange' i n his whole orientation." 1

The veracit y o f thes e statement s wil l b e examine d b y considering , first, th e natur e o f Churchill's contacts wit h Ireland an d secondly , his actual Iris h policies . Churchill's involvement wit h Irish politics derived, originally , no t from persona l initiative , but from his family and socia l circumstances . He showe d n o interes t i n Irish affairs befor e 1876 , when hi s father, th e seventh duk e o f Marlborough , reluctantl y agree d t o becom e lor d lieutenant of Ireland, at the invitation of Disraeli.12 At that time, Lord Randolph wa s unpopula r i n fashionabl e Londo n society , becaus e r

'A. B . Cooke and Joh n Vincent, Th e governing passion: cabinet government and party politics in Britain 1885-6 (Brighton , 1974) , hereafter cite d as Cooke an d Vincent. 6 /6^., p. 18. ''Ibid. 8Ibid., p. 39. 9Ibid., p. 47.

™Ibid.,p.l6. n 12

lbid.,p.75.

Marlborough to Disraeli, 22 July 1876 (Hughenden House, Buckinghamshire, Disrael i papers , B/xii/A/138) .

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of hi s actio n abou t a scanda l involvin g the Princ e o f Wales. 13 H e therefore avoide d socia l ostracism in London b y becoming unofficia l private secretar y t o hi s father i n Dublin. By working and travellin g with hi s parents , durin g 1877-9 , Randolp h learn t abou t bot h th e Dublin Castl e administratio n an d th e trouble d rura l area s o f Ireland. 14 H e thu s became wel l aware o f both Iris h distress and th e everyday problem s involve d in governing Irelan d fro m Dublin. Sinc e Cooke an d Vincen t admit that politicians who had actually to govern Ireland woul d no t thin k merel y i n term s o f party advantage , thei r claim that Churchill was 'more concerned with party alignment than with Iris h unrest ' appear s doubtful. 15 Moreover , the y produc e n o evidence t o sho w tha t Churchil l forgo t hi s Iris h governmen t experience whe n evolving his policie s in th e 1880s . It certainly was the case that the Irish contacts Churchill made in the late 1870 s proved usefu l t o him in the following decade. I n particular , his associatio n wit h th e Iris h government' s la w adviser , Gerald Fitzgibbon , resulted i n a life-time' s friendshi p and a hos t of letters from Dubli n relating to current Iris h politics. Churchill's Irish correspondents i n the 1880 s were mostly Tories, particularl y Dublin lawyers. H e di d no t correspon d regularl y wit h Iris h catholic s an d nationalists. Th e limite d natur e o f his contacts mus t inevitably have affected hi s thinking on Irish affairs.16 In the late 1870s, when resident in Dublin, Churchill had been intimat e with Isaac Butt , theteaderof the hom e rul e part y an d th e catholi c priest , Fathe r Heal y of .Little Bray. Bu t thes e friendship s were no t indicativ e o f nationalist, anti tory leaning s o n Churchill' s par t a s Cook e an d Vincen t hav e im plied,17 since Butt was then wooing the tory government i n the hop e of gaining remedia l legislatio n fo r Ireland . Hick s Beach , th e Iris h chief secretary, observe d tha t the tories had 'already received no little advantage fro m Butt' s sympathies being tor y rather tha n whig.' 18 A decade later , Churchill pointed out tha t ther e had bee n a conservative and constitutiona l element i n the early hom e rul e party — citing 13

Philip Magnus , King Edward th e Seventh (London , 1964) , p p 140—150 . The Times, 29 Jan. 1895 . Mrs G. Cornwallis-Wst , Reminiscences of Lady Randolph Churchill (London , 1908) , p p 78—9 . 15 Cooke & Vincent , p . 18 . 16 See Lor d Randolp h Churchil l papers , Churchil l College , Cambridge , (hereafter cite d a s RCHL). 17 Cooke & Vincent , p . 75 . 18 Beach t o Northcote, 1 June 187 7 printe d i n David Thornley , Isaac Butt and home rule (London , 1964) , p . 355 . 14

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Butt, E . R . King-Harma n an d Georg e Morri s a s examples. 19 Eve n less significan t wa s Churchill' s intimac y wit h Fathe r Healy . Th e latter was essentially non-political and also became friendl y with such unbending torie s a s Arthu r Balfour , Lad y Salisbur y an d eve n th e Monaghan Orangeman , Si r John Leslie. 20 Gooke and Vincen t exaggerate th e exten t t o which Churchill was directly involved in Irish affairs. 21 Althoug h he usually attended Fitz gibbon's annua l Christma s part y a t Howth , h e seldo m staye d fo r more tha n a fe w days. H e onl y mad e tw o othe r ver y brie f visit s t o Ireland i n 1885—6 . H e neve r revisite d th e disturbe d area s o f rural Ireland i n th e 1880s . No r wa s h e eve r directl y responsibl e fo r th e formulation o f tory Irish policy. Moreover, man y other matters ofte n engaged hi s attention . A fou r mont h visi t t o Indi a i n 1884— 5 wa s followed b y his involvement in the Afghan frontier crisis and late r by his appointmen t a s Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Indi a i n Salisbury' s tor y government. Churchill' s knowledge o f Irish politics derived fro m hi s experience as unofficial privat e secretary t o his father in 1877—9 and from th e contact s h e mad e then . Thi s gav e hi m an advantag e ove r most, bu t b y n o means all British politicians. In the commons, i n the mid-1880s, a numbe r o f leadin g politicians , suc h a s Hartington , Hicks Beach , Lowther , Forster , Trevelya n an d Campbell Bannerman, ha d formerl y bee n Chie f Secretar y fo r Ireland . I n th e lords, severa l peer s ha d bee n Lor d Lieutenan t o f Ireland , i n particular Spencer , wh o ha d hel d th e pos t fo r nin e years . Thus , i n terms of the exten t of his official experience, there is no prima facie cas e to suppor t Cook e an d Vincent' s clai m tha t Churchil l understoo d Irish politic s probably bette r tha n any other Britis h politician.22 But their other assertions about Churchill' s Irish policy can only be tested by examinin g in detail Churchill's views on home rule , Irish government an d Ulste r unionism. II

Cooke an d Vincen t stat e tha t Churchil l ha d n o ver y eviden t Iris h policy before July 1885. 23 But since they do not investigate Churchill's views on Ireland befor e the formation of the tory government i n June 19 20

Both sides o f th e home rule question, p. 1 8 Memories o f Father Healy o f Little Bray (London , 1896) , p p 274—86 .

21 22

Cooke & Vincent , p p 74—5 . Ibid., p . 39 . 23 /A/
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1885 the y hav e n o righ t t o mak e suc h a claim . I n fact , Churchil l believed i n an d advocate d a broa d bu t tangibl e Iris h polic y lon g before the tories came to power. That policy may be simply defined as enlightened unionism . He wished to defend the act of union betwee n Britain an d Irelan d a t all costs, but i n such a way that Irelan d woul d become reconcile d t o the arrangement, an d profi t from it . To under stand wh y Churchill advocated suc h a policy one has to examine the early influence s whic h affecte d hi s Iris h thinking . Thes e earl y influences have been overlooked , not only by Cooke and Vincent , but by such earlier writers as his son Winston and Rober t Rhode s James . All thes e writers have regarde d Churchill' s Irish polic y as something which h e evolved individuall y i n response t o current circumstances, whereas, i n reality , hi s attitude was largely derive d fro m the existing views o f hi s ow n family . Lord Randolph' s father , the sevent h duke of Marlborough, was a strong upholder of the union between Britain and Ireland . In 1868 , he opposed th e disestablishmen t o f th e Iris h churc h partl y o n th e grounds that i t might lead t o the repeal o f th e union. 24 In 1880 , Lor d Beaconsfield cas t hi s election address i n th e for m o f a lette r to Marl borough, a s lor d lieutenan t o f Ireland , drawin g attentio n t o th e home rul e threat . Afte r Beaconsfield' s deat h i n 1881 , Marlboroug h reminded th e publi c o f the ex-premier's warning. 25 But the strongest unionist influenc e o n Churchill was probably tha t of his mother. She was th e daughte r o f th e thir d marques s o f Londonderry, th e half brother o f th e famou s politicia n Rober t Stewart , Viscoun t Castle reagh. The unionist tradition Castlereagh establishe d was maintained by hi s famil y i n subsequen t generations . Th e thir d marquess , Randolph's grandfather, publishe d Castlereagh' s correspondence , i n 1848, t o rescu e hi s nam e fro m th e calumnie s o f hi s politica l opponents.26 Hi s daughte r Frances , duches s o f Marlborough , apparently passe d o n her family's unionist sentiments to her two sons, Blandford an d Randolph . Th e former , thoug h somewha t libera l in politics, was a strong opponent o f home rule.27 Randolph wa s much influenced by his mother and obtained from her, according t o Escott, 'the rudiments o f hi s practica l instructio n i n a t leas t th e politic s o f ^Hansard 3 , cxciii , 35 . 2 -\Jacksons 0\ford journal, 2 0 Oct . 1881 . 26 Memoirs and correspondence of Viscount (,'axllereagh, second marquess of Londonderry ed . Charle s Vane , marques s o f Londonderr y (London , 1848) , i , iii. 27 Marlborough t o th e edito r o f a n unstate d newspaper , 1 Jan . 188 6 (RCHL l/xi/1310) .

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28

Ireland.' Certainly Randolph wa s aware o f the unionist tradition of his mother' s family . I n hi s famou s speec h a t Belfas t i n 1886 , h e declared, ' I lik e greatl y t o remember tha t I can numbe r amon g my ancestors th e great ministe r Castlereagh, wh o founded the union between Grea t Britai n and Ireland.' 29 The family' s unionis t principles were also upheld by the sixth marquess of Londonderry, who was Lord Lieutenant o f Irelan d i n 1886- 9 an d partl y owe d hi s offic e t o hi s relationship t o Churchil l wh o wa s Londonderry' s cousin , no t hi s brother-in-law as stated by Cooke and Vincent.30 The latter only draw attention t o Londonderry's progressiv e views. 31 They fai l t o mention that he was a vehement and life-lon g opponent of home rule. In 1912 , when he opposed a home rule bill for the third time, Londonderry told the hous e of lords: 'M y whol e political life ha s been boun d u p i n the union of England an d Ireland . I am th e collateral descendan t o f the man wh o carrie d th e unio n — I entered parliamen t a s Member fo r County Down, my only pledge being that I would uphold the union to the best of my ability.' 32 When M.P . fo r Dow n i n th e lat e 1870s , th e futur e marques s of Londonderry hel d simila r view s o n Irelan d t o thos e o f hi s cousin Randolph. Bot h me n wante d t o strengthe n th e unio n b y passin g remedial Iris h legislation . This woul d undermine the positio n of the militant hom e rul e M.P. s wh o wer e disruptin g parliament a t tha t time. Churchill , speakin g i n hi s Woodstoc k constituenc y in 1877 , declared tha t 'it was inattention to Irish legislation that had produce d the obstructio n to English legislation.' 33 His remarks were attacked as Parnellite b y th e Morning Post an d wer e disliked by hi s father, the n Lord Lieutenant. 34 Bu t Churchill had onl y advocate d a progressiv e unionist Iris h polk y an d ha d specificall y oppose d hom e rule. 35 A s Parnell's influenc e waxe d i n Ireland , whil e tha t o f But t an d th e moderate hom e ruler s waned , Churchill' s unionis t sentiment s became more negative. Thus in 1879 , he opposed th e extension of the Irish boroug h franchis e since he thought it would result in the retur n of M.P. s pledge d t o repea l th e union . H e describe d Parnell' s sup porters as 'the ignorant, idle and drunken' unenfranchised part of the -8T. H . S . Escott , Randolph Spencer Churchill (London , 1895) , p . 98 . 29 77/f Times, 2 3 Feb . 1886 . :10

Cooke & Vincent , p . 448 . p p 447—9 . Hansard 5 (lords) , xiii, 636 . Jackson s (hford Journal, 2 2 Sept . 1877 . ^Winston Churchill , Randolph Churchill, p p 73—5 . ^Jackson's Oxford Journal, 22 Sept. 1877 . 51

;//;/>/., :V1

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population. 36 In his 1880 election address, Churchill declared tha t th e Parnellite party mus t 'b e resiste d at al l costs.' 37 Speakin g at Hull , in 1881, h e observe d abou t Parnel l tha t 'n o one fear s hi s influence i n Ireland mor e tha n I do.' 38 A t Edinburgh , i n Decembe r 1883 , Churchill devoted th e whol e of a major speech t o the danger o f home rule. Lik e Salisbury, he saw home rul e as a strategi c threa t t o Great Britain. Churchil l claime d tha t i f England los t control ove r Irelan d she woul d ceas e t o b e a grea t power. 39 But, i f Churchill wa s a consisten t opponen t o f home rul e h e wa s prepared t o co-operate wit h th e hom e rul e party on a range o f other matters, includin g remedial Iris h legislation. The latter , he argued , might induc e th e Parnellit e party t o abandon it s major objective. 40 But Churchil l thought that a polic y of killing home rul e by kindness would onl y succeed i f Ireland wa s treated o n really equal terms with the res t o f th e Unite d Kingdom . Thus , h e oppose d a Common s cloture by two-thirds majority vote i n 1882 , because i t would only be used agains t th e hom e rul e party . Thi s woul d arous e resentmen t in Ireland whic h might lead to independence.41 In his Edinburgh speech in 188 3 h e expresse d th e hop e tha t th e unio n would com e t o repos e 'not on forc e of arms, as it does now, but o n force of habit.'42 It was his desire for a positive unionist Irish policy which explains largely why he changed his mind about the wisdom of extending the proposed parliamentary refor m act to Ireland i n 1884 . H e had initiall y opposed suc h a mov e on the grounds tha t i t would strengthen the electoral position of the home rul e party. 43 But in May 1884 , he decided t o support th e inclusion oflreland i n the refor m bill. \-{\^ voile-face wa s denounced b y a fe w tory M.P.s 44 There is no evidence that hi s action was prompte d by a desir e t o gai n th e Iris h vote i n England a t th e nex t election as Lord Georg e Hamilto n late r claimed. 45 Churchil l ha d previousl y observed tha t th e Iris h vot e i n England wa s 'by no means so great as those who wish to dispose of it supposed.'46 Another tor y M.P., St John ™Hansard 3 , crxiii , 1233—4 . "Winston Churchill , Randolph Churchill, p . 828 . ™The Times, 1 Nov. 1881 . 39 Ibid., 2 1 Dec . 1883 . ™Hansard 3, cclviii . 197 . 4I /A/W., cclxxi v , 61 0 42 The Times, 2 1 Dec . 1883 . "Churchill t o H . H . Wainwright , 9 June 188 4 (RCH L 1/3/4 24 ) "Hansard 3 , cclxxxviii , 854 , 862 . 45 Lord Georg e Hamilton , Parliamentary reminiscences an d reflect ion* 1868-1885 (London , 1916) , p . 249 . ^Hansard 3 , cdxxxiv , 369 .

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Broderick, late r allege d tha t Churchill' s actio n ha d resulte d from a private understandin g h e ha d mad e wit h Parnell. 47 Bu t Churchill made n o agreemen t wit h Parnel l i n 188 4 an d Broderic k clearl y conflated th e events of!884 with those of 1885 . In fact , Churchill' s chang e o f heart reflecte d th e prevailin g vie w in th e tor y party. I n hi s own words , 'Chaplin' s proposals t o exclude Ireland fro m th e Bil l me t wit h so little favour from th e leader s of our party that h e wisely declined t o press it to a division.'48 But it was also true tha t Churchil l had reason s of his own fo r supporting the extension of parliamentary refor m t o Ireland. I f this was effected o n equal terms he believed tha t i t would 'so w th e seeds of conciliation . .. by sowing th e seed s o f complet e politica l equality.' 49 Hi s fathe r ha d declared i n 188 0 tha t 'I t wa s mos t desirabl e . . . that everything in Ireland shoul d be assimilated to England' and Randolp h wa s simply following tha t precept. 50 Moreover , Randolp h argue d tha t th e enfranchisement o f the Iris h agricultura l labourer s — who had been neglected b y th e Lan d Leagu e an d wer e influence d by the catholic hierarchy — woul d weake n th e positio n o f th e hom e rul e party. 51 Although this hope did no t materialise at the 1885 general election, it was true tha t th e Lan d Leagu e ha d receive d littl e support fro m th e agricultural labourers. 52 Moreover , Churchil l soo n ha d doubt s whether th e extensio n o f th e refor m ac t o n equa l term s t o Irelan d would no t increas e the representation o f the home rule party. But he argued tha t i t was less dangerous fo r the Iris h t o express their views constitutionally tha n i n othe r ways . H e though t tha t onc e th e rea l extent o f the hom e rul e threa t wa s apparent, ther e woul d b e mor e chance o f overcoming it. 53 Much controvers y surround s Churchill' s Iris h polic y in 1885 . I n particular, hi s opposition t o Iris h coercion an d hi s support for a new enquiry int o th e Maamtrasn a murder s gav e ris e t o th e suspicio n that he would do anything to please the nationalist M.P.s — even support hom e rule . Bu t Churchill's action s in 1885 can only be properl y 47

61.

48

The earl of Midleton, Records and reactions 1856-1939 (London, 1939) , p. Churchill t o Wainwright, 9 June 188 4 (RCHL 1/3/424).

^Hansard 3 , cclxxxviii , 855 . 50 Ibid., cclii , 1322 . 5l lbid., cclxxxviii , 855—7. 52 Sam Clark, 'Th e social compositio n o f the Land League' , in I.H.S., xvi i no. 6 8 (Sept . 1971) , pp 455—69 . 53 The Times, 9 Oct . 1884 .

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understood i f the y ar e se t i n th e contex t o f hi s earlie r view s an d policies o n Ireland . Churchill's oppositio n t o extraordinar y crimina l legislatio n fo r Ireland derive d fro m th e view s o f hi s fathe r i n th e lat e 1870s. 54 I n 1881, Churchil l opposed th e introductio n of an unlimite d coercion bill, arguin g tha t forc e wa s not a long-ter m remedy. 55 I n 1882 , h e expressed th e hope tha t futur e tor y policy towards Irelan d woul d not be confined to negative suppor t fo r coercion.56 Thus hi s opposition to coercion i n 1885 wa s not unprecedented. I n May 1885 , he pointed out that a renewa l o f coercion woul d onl y convert th e ne w Iris h electors into hom e rulers. 57 Moreover , Churchil l wa s aware tha t th e ailin g liberal government , undecide d abou t renewin g Iris h coerciv e legis lation, contemplate d resolvin g th e proble m b y resignation. 58 Thu s the torie s woul d b e responsibl e fo r th e renewa l o f coercion, whic h would provok e th e ire of the nationalist s and th e radicals, leaving the tories i n a wea k positio n a t th e forthcomin g election. 59 Churchill' s opposition t o a renewa l o f coercion wa s further strengthene d b y his knowledge tha t th e amoun t o f serious crime i n Irelan d ha d recentl y decreased.60 Whe n Salisbur y forme d hi s tor y governmen t i n June 1885, Churchil l refuse d t o joi n i t unles s coercion wa s abandoned. 61 But Churchil l wa s no t directl y responsibl e fo r persuadin g th e ne w government t o adopt thi s course. The politica l situation in general lef t Salisbury with no choice in the matter. A s Churchill later observed, a minority tor y government woul d hav e ha d littl e chance o f passing a new coercio n bil l a t th e en d o f a parliament. 62 The ne w tory government depende d o n an understanding wit h the nationalists in order t o survive. Consequently, Churchill had severa l private discussion s with Parnel l i n order t o ensure tor y co-operatio n with th e nationalists. 63 Bu t there i s no direct evidenc e tha t Churchil l contemplated buyin g Parnellit e suppor t b y a pledg e tha t th e torie s would adopt home rule . In any case, Churchill was in no position per r>4

Compare, for example, th e duke's speech in the lords (Hansard3, ccxxxv , 1309—10) wit h hi s son' s speec h i n th e common s (ibid., ccliii , 1651) . ^Ibid., cclvii , 363 . ™Ibid., cclxxiv , 613—4 . 57 'The Times, 2 1 Ma y 1885 . 58 Churchill's memorandu m o n event s i n 1885 , writte n c . 188 9 an d published i n Winston Churchill , Randolph Churchill, p. 328 . ™The Times, 4 June 1894 . 60 Gorst t o Churchill , 2 8 Ma y 188 5 (RCH L 1/5/618) . 61 Churchill's memorandum in Winston Churchill, op. cit., p . 332 . 62 Ibid. 63 Cooke & Vincent , p p 74—5 .

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sonally t o decid e suc h a momentou s chang e i n part y policy . Man y years later, Wilfred Blun t did alleg e that in May 1885 , Churchil l had talked o f educating his party to accept hom e rule. But in his account of their conversation, Blun t admitted tha t Churchill ha d objecte d t o the phras e 'home rule'.64 Thus he may have had in mind only popular Irish loca l governmen t — whic h he di d urg e Salisbur y t o adopt. 65 When Blun t again raise d th e question of home rule with Churchill, in December 1885 , h e wa s told tha t th e tor y party woul d no t support it. 66 Churchill later observed tha t Blunt knew 'as much about Irelan d as the ma n i n the moon' and th e two men never co-operated on Irish matters. 67 Blunt's allegation that Churchill was contemplating hom e rule i n Ma y 1885 , directl y conflicts wit h th e evidenc e of Churchill's public speeche s a t tha t time , whe n h e declared tha t th e tor y part y would maintai n th e unio n unimpaired. 68 Churchill's close contact s wit h the nationalists did, however , lea d some tor y back-bencher s t o vie w hi m wit h suspicion. 69 Onc e a member o f th e ne w government , h e refuse d t o b e draw n i n th e Commons o n th e questio n of home rule. 70 I n September'1885 , The Times attacke d hi s silence on thi s matter i n a speec h a t Sheffield, 71 which, i n Salisbury' s opinion , ha d lef t 'nothin g t o b e desire d i n respect t o ministerial caution.'72 A month later, Churchill explained: I trus t i t will not b e though t necessar y fo r us to show ou r han d about loca l government or to allude t o home rule or repeal at all. The nationalists do not expect us to do so and d o not want u s to do so. Perhaps it might b e indicate d that perfec t similarit y o f treatmen t betwee n th e tw o countrie s a s regard s local governmen t i s our platform , bu t negative s woul d I thin k be mos t illtimed. 73

But Churchil l ha d no t abandone d hi s antagonism t o home rule . In October 1885 , he told Holmes, the Irish attorney-general, tha t he had not committe d himsel f to th e Parnellite s i n favou r o f hom e rule , 64

W. S . Blunt , Gordon a t Khartoum (London , 1911) , p p 429—30 . "Winston Churchill , Randolph Churchill, p . 436 . 66 W. S . Blunt , Th e land war i n Ireland (London , 1912) , p . 9 . 61 The Tunes, 2 5 Oct . 1887 . 6 *Ibid., 2 1 May , 4 June 1885 . 69 D. C . Savage , 'Th e origin s o f th e Ulste r Unionis t part y 1885—6' , i n /.//.£, xii, no. 47 (March 1961) , p . 191 . ''"Hansard 3 , ccxcix , 116—117 . 11 The Times, 5 Sept. 1885 . "Salisbury t o Churchill , 6 Sept . 188 5 (RCH L l/7/860a) . "Churchill t o Salisbury , 1 Oct. 188 5 (Hatfiel d House , Salisbury papers) .

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which would be fatal to the'tories.74 Cooke and Vincent claim that his evidence was 'probably base d o n Holmes's selective memory in later life only, and . .. may reflect anxiety to wipe away any trace of earlier political frailties.' 75 Bu t thi s is mere supposition , wherea s Holmes' s memoir is corroborated b y Churchill's Birmingham election address, issued only a week after his conversation with Holmes and containing a commitment to support th e union 76 more explicit than Salisbury' s at Newpor t a fe w day s before. 77 Churchil l als o tol d Lor d Georg e Hamilton that in his dealings with the nationalists he had never compromised himsel f on th e questio n of home rule. 78 In July 1885, Parnel l sought a fresh inquiry into the verdicts in 188 2 on th e allege d Maamtrasn a murders . Hick s Beach , th e ne w tor y leader o f th e commons , intimate d tha t Carnarvon , th e lor d lieutenant, migh t reconsider th e verdicts which had bee n uphel d by Lord Spencer , th e previou s lor d lieutenant . Churchil l seconded hi s leader's remarks and attacked Spencer's administration. 79 Cooke and Vincent's account o f this incident throws no light on Churchill's role but merel y states that th e action o f Hicks Beach and Churchil l conflicted with a previous decision of the cabinet.80 They do not point out that, in 1884, Churchil l had vote d with the nationalists in favour of a new enquiry.81 Even Salisbury thought Churchill could not have said much els e 'pledge d a s h e was'. 82 Churchill' s attack s o n Spence r reflected th e acrimonious disputes over Irish policy between the latter and Randolph' s father , th e duk e o f Marlborough , i n precedin g years.83 Spence r late r claime d tha t th e remark s of Hicks Beach an d Churchill converted him to support home rule, since the Tories wer e 74

A. B . Cooke & J. R . Vincent , 'Irelan d an d part y politic s 1885—7 1 a n unpublished Conservativ e memoir', in I.H.S., xvi , no . 6 2 (March 1968) , p. 163. 75 Cooke & Vincent , p . 479 , not e 112 . 76 Winston Churchill , Randolph Churchill, p. 831 . 77 The Times, 8 Oct . 1885 . 78 Lord Georg e Hamilton , Parliamentary reminiscences an d reflections 1886-1906 (London , 1922) , p . 20 . ^HansardS, ccxcix , 1098—9 . 80 Cooke & Vincent , p . 276 . 81 Winston Churchill , Randolph Churchill, p . 355 . 82 Salisbury t o Carnarvon, 22 July 1885 , printe d i n Sir A. Hardinge, The life o f Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, fourth earl of Carnarvon, 3 vols (London, 1925) iii , "170. 83 See, for example, the speeches by Marlborough (Hansard3, ccxxxv, 1309, and th e speeche s b y Spence r (ibid. , cclif , 85— 9 an d ibid. , cclxi , 389) .

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clearly going in that direction.84 But Churchill cannot be held responsible for Spencer's misreadin g of the situation. Nothing Churchill said indicated tha t th e tories were about t o adopt hom e rule. The allegation of Robert Rhode s James that Churchill waited until the genera l electio n of 1885 befor e making up hi s mind abou t hom e rule i s demonstrabl y false. 85 Ove r a mont h befor e th e electio n h e wrote t o Fitzgibbon: It is to the bishops entirel y t o whom I look in the future to turn, to mitigate o r to postpone th e home rul e onslaught. Le t us only be enabled t o occupy a year with th e education question . B y that time , I am certain , Parnell' s party wil l have becom e seriousl y disintegrated . . . and th e bishops, wh o in their hearts hate Parnel l an d don' t car e a scra p for home rule , wil l . . . complete th e rout.86

His remarks were reminiscent of his mother's in 1877 — that the Irish catholic clerg y 'hat e home rul e i n their hearts.' 87 Before the result of the 188 5 electio n wa s known , Churchil l sketche d fo r Salisbur y a possible programme fo r the 188 6 parliamentary session. He assumed 'that anythin g i n th e futur e o f a n Iris h parliamen t i s impossible always.'88 Hi s hostilit y t o hom e rul e wa s unshake n b y th e libera l election victory. 89 Whe n Churchil l learnt , wit h surprise , tha t Carnarvon favoure d some kind of home rule, he called for the resignation o f the lor d lieutenant. 90 Cooke and Vincen t have argued tha t Churchill took an anti-home rule stanc e afte r th e election s 'to creat e a libera l cav e an d perhap s thereby a tor y reconstruction . . . . it was a fusionist tacti c aimed a s much agains t Salisbur y as against Gladstone.' 91 But since there wa s nothing ne w abou t Churchill' s anti-hom e rul e stance , n o nove l explanation o f his action i s required. I t wa s not tru e tha t Churchil l favoured an y Iris h policy which would resul t in a tory-libera l coalition. H e only supported co-operatio n wit h dissident liberals in order to prevent the passage of home rule. During the 188 5 election — while the tories still had hope s of winning an overall majorit y — Churchill lambasted bot h whig s an d Chamberlainite s an d claime d tha t b4

Sir Joh n Ros s Bt. , Th e years o f m y pilgrimage (London , 1924) , p . 177 . R. R . James , Randolph Churchill,'?. 211 . 86 Churchill t o Fitzgibbon , 1 4 Oct. 188 5 (RCH L 1/8/978) . 87 Duchess of Maryborough to Corry, n.d . (Disrael i papers, B/xx/Ch/87.) 88 Churchill t o Salisbury , Nov. 188 5 (RCH L 1/10/1126) . 89 Churchill t o Morris , 7 Dec. 188 5 (RCH L 1/10/1145) . 90 Churchill t o Salisbury , 1 0 Dec. 188 5 (Salisbur y papers) . 91 Cooke & Vincent, p p 41—2 . 85

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Hartington wa s supporting Parnell. 92 H e woul d no t hav e use d suc h language ha d h e wishe d himsel f t o lea d a tory-libera l coalition . Before th e electio n resul t was known, Churchil l di d privatel y advo cate a coalition , bu t on e wit h a specifi c object whic h would en d hi s own front-benc h career . H e tol d Salisbur y tha t th e latte r woul d 'never get whi g support a s long a s I am i n the government an d whi g support yo u must have.' He claimed that a formal whig-tory coalition 'would keep the Parnellite s and radicals at bay for years, and after all, that i s what mus t b e arrive d at.' 9 * Once it became clear tha t Glad stone favoure d hom e rule , Churchil l trie d publicl y t o wi n ove r Hartington i n a speec h a t Paddington. 94 I n th e followin g months, Churchill did his best to cement a n alliance between the tories and th e dissident liberal s b y emphasisin g thei r commo n suppor t fo r th e union. 95 There is no evidence to support Cook e and Vincent' s contention tha t Churchill' s anti-hom e rul e ardou r abate d afte r th e earl y spring o f 1886. 96 I n hi s speec h agains t th e hom e rul e bil l i n April , Churchill declared tha t n o M.P . 'woul d eve r b e called upo n t o consider matter s mor e momentou s tha n thos e whic h are no w before the house of commons.'97 Hi s June 188 6 electio n address wa s exclusively devoted t o an impassione d attac k on Gladstone and hi s Irish policy.98 Although Churchil l too k a holida y durin g th e 188 6 electio n campaign, h e wa s the n confiden t tha t Gladston e woul d b e heavily defeated. 99 Much o f the credit that Churchill gained i n his party for his opposition t o hom e rul e wa s dissipate d when h e resigne d fro m th e lor y government i n Decembe r 1886 . Bu t there was a connection betwee n his resignatio n an d hi s oppositio n t o hom e rule . Befor e th e 188 6 election, Churchil l though t that , althoug h th e torie s would win , the longer ter m dange r o f home rul e would remain. 100 After th e unionis t *2The Time*, 1 Nov . 1885 . "'Churchill t o Salisbury , 2 9 Nov . 188 5 (Salisbur y papers). 9 *The Tunes, 1 5 Feb . 1886 . 95 Scc, for example: Th e Times, 4 March 1886 ; also, Churchill to Salisbury, 17 Apri l 188 6 (RCH L l/10/1480a ) and Churchil l to Hartington , 1 9 June 1886 (RCH L l/13/1537a) . 96 Cooke & Vincent , p . 77 . 91 Hansard 3, cdv, 1317 . 98 Winston Churchill , Randolph Churchill, p p 858—62 . "The Times, 1 5 Feb . 1886 , an d Churchil l t o Hartington , 19 Jun e 188 6 (RCHL l/13/1537a) . 100 Churchill t o th e duches s o f Marlborough , 1 7 Jun e 188 6 (RCH L 1/13/153 2).

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victory, he complained tha t 'the allied armie s d o not understand th e necessity o f hot pursui t of the route d foe.' 101 I n hi s famous Dartfor d speech, i n October, he warned hi s party against over-confidenc e an d stressed th e nee d t o preserve th e unionist alliance.102 A liberal policy (the Dartfor d programme ) wa s thu s essential , sinc e althoug h th e unionist allianc e wa s firm amongst th e leaders , thi s was not the cas e amongst th e rank-and-file. 103 H e mad e th e sam e point , afte r hi s resignation, i n a n explanator y lette r t o th e tor y whip , Akers Douglas: The primar y objec t o f all government a t th e presen t momen t i s to maintai n the union , t o maintai n i t no t fo r a session , o r fo r a parliament , bu t fo r ou r time. Th e maintenanc e o f the unio n is , to my mind, i n no way a question o f men, bu t entirel y a questio n o f measures an d administration. 104

Churchill, i n othe r words , believe d tha t hi s resignation, i n itself , would hav e n o deleteriou s effec t o n th e unionis t cause. Indeed , hi s resignation wa s partly prompted b y his belief that hi s part y wa s not doing enoug h t o defend th e union . He fel t tha t Englan d woul d onl y be secured for the unio n if the government passe d progressiv e legislation. l05 His prediction that Gladstone's hom e rule policy would otherwise triump h at th e nex t election 106 wa s full y born e ou t i n 1892 . In hi s resignatio n statement , Churchil l declare d that , whe n i n office, ' I regarded th e liberal unionist s as a useful kin d of crutch and I looked forwar d to the time, and n o distant time, when the tory party might wal k alone/ 107 A n apparen t chang e i n libera l unionism prompted Churchil l to change his own attitude, which was not, as has been alleged , inconsistent. 108 Shortl y befor e Churchil l resigned , th e first 'Round Tabl e Conference' too k plac e a t whic h th e term s for a possible libera l re-unio n wer e discussed . Chamberlain , wh o led th e ""Churchill to Morris , 9 June 1886 , printe d i n Maud Wynne , An Irishman and his family (London, 1937), p. 115. 102 77W Tunes, 4 Oct. 1886 . ""The Quee n t o Salisbury , 2 5 Nov . 1886 , printe d i n Th e letters of Owen Victoria, third series , ed. G . E . Buckle (London, 1930) , i . 225—6. l04 Churchill t o Akcrs-Douglas , 1 Jan . 1887 , printe d i n Winsto n Chun-hill, Randolph Churchill, p . 640 . ""Hansard 3 . ccvx , 288 . ""'Churchill t o Morris , 2 Jan . 1887 , printe d i n Wynne , A n Irishman, p . 118. 101 Hansard 3 , cccx , 289 . I08 M. C. Hurst , Joseph Chamberlain and Liberal reunion: the Round Table Conference o f 1887 (London , 1967) , p . 256 .

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liberal unionist delegation at the conference, was advised by Churchill not re-unit e with Gladstone. 109 But, when Chamberlain wen t ahea d with the negotiations, Churchil l told the commons that Chamberlai n was pursuing 'an erroneous and mistake n course.'110 When, after the failure o f the Roun d Tabl e Conference, th e liberal unionists move d closer to the tories, Churchill, welcomed Hartington' s statemen t that all hopes of liberal reunion must be finally abandoned a s 'the cardinal feature o f the recess.' 111 Thereafter , h e continuousl y supported th e liberal unionist s and denounce d hom e rul e and th e Parnellite party . For example, in his 1892 election address he declared that his opinions on home rule 'are unaltered and unalterable,' 112 and, inthelastyearof his political career, h e made very many speeches against home rule in various parts of Britain.113 H e died a s he had live d — true to his unyielding unionist principles. Ill

Churchill's mos t dramati c involvemen t in Iris h politic s was what he himsel f describe d a s 'playin g th e Orang e card' . Cook e an d Vincent hav e questione d bot h hi s sincerity an d consistency . Mor e generally they argue that 'Ulster failed t o make any impact on events in 1886 ' sinc e 'British politician s did no t thin k about Ulster.' 114 But this i s no t tru e o f Churchil l wh o ha d importan t link s wit h Ulste r before 188 6 whic h were not investigated either by his biographers o r by Cooke an d Vincen t wh o therefore failed to appreciate the degree to which his 'playing the Orange card' in 188 6 was both sincere and consistent wit h his earlier policy . As a grandso n o f the marques s of Londonderry, Churchill came partly from Ulster protestant stock. As he pointed out in his 1886 Belfast speech, he was descended from both the McDonnell s o f Antrim and th e Stewarts of Down.115 His mothe r spent much of her early life at Mountstewart, her father's seat at Newtownards, outsid e Belfast . Randolp h staye d a t Mountstewar t i n 1877, when his father, the lord lieutenant, was paying an officia l visi t to Ulster. Th e duk e of Marlborough considere d tha t his reception in Belfast wa s th e highligh t o f his career and h e pointe d toward s th e 109

/A/V/., p . 114 . ""Hansard 3, cccx , 289 . The Times, 1 6 Dec . 1887 . ll2 Winston Churchill , Randolph Churchill, p p 862—3 . 113 See, fo r example , Th e Times, 8 , 15 , 23 & 2 7 Ma y 1893 . 114 Cooke & Vincent , p . 162 . 115 The Times, 2 3 Feb . 1886 . 111

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loyalty and prosperit y of Ulster as an example t o the rest of Ireland. He expressed the hope that religious discord in Ireland wa s now only 'a relic of the past.' 116 His unsectarian unionist outlook was matched by tha t o f hi s wife' s family . Th e thir d marques s o f Londonderry , Randolph's grandfather , declared i n 185 0 tha t h e wa s neither 'a n Orangeman o r a repealer.' 117 Hi s wido w erecte d a ne w Roma n Catholic chapel at Newtownards. 118 Thus Randolph wa s brought up in an atmosphere favourable to Ulster unionism, if not to Orangeis m as such. It was events in Ulster in 1883, rather than in 1885—6, which convinced Churchill that Orangeism was an indispensable ingredient of Ulster unionism. By th e early 1880s , protestant Ulste r was the onl y part o f Ireland which had remained impervious to the appeal of home rule. This hostility t o Parnell' s part y recalle d th e region' s previous opposition t o O'Connell's repea l part y in the 1830s. 119 Before th e summer of 1883 , the only part of Ulster to elect a home rule M.P. wa s County Cavan, which was largely catholic. But when T. M. Healy was elected as the first home rule M.P. fo r County Monaghan, i n June 1883, th e Ulste r protestants fel t a ne w sens e o f politica l insecurity . Whe n th e nationalists extended their operations to County Tyrone, which had a larger protestan t population , they were opposed by counter-demonstrations organise d b y th e Orang e Order. 120 A t thi s juncture, Si r Stafford Northcote , th e tor y leade r i n th e commons , accepted a n invitation to visit Belfast. He was enthusiastically received by loyalists angry a t th e nationalis t 'invasion' of Ulster.121 Northcote's visit soon acquired a n Orange character122 and Churchill later described i t as a 'frightful blunder.' 123 I n 1883 , Churchil l was busy establishin g th e Primrose Leagu e a s an inter-denominationa l association to comba t atheism. I t ha d bee n foreshadowed by the alliance of tories and Iris h nationalists agains t th e admissio n o f Bradlaug h t o parliament. 124 u6

The Belfast News Letter, 2 4 July 1877 . Hansard 3, cxii, 464. U8 The Belfast News Letter, 2 5 July 1877 . 119 Angus Macintyre , Th e Liberator, Daniel O'Connell an d th e Irish party 1830-47 (London , 1965) , Appendi x D . l20 The Times, 2 7 Sept. 1883 . m lbid., 2— 8 Oct. 1883 . 122 Andrew Lang , Life, letters and diaries of Sir Stafford Northcote, first earl o f Iddesleigh (London , 1891) , p . 375 . l23 Churchill t o Salisbury , 1 6 Nov. 188 5 (Salisbur y papers) . 124 R. E. Quinault, 'The Fourth Part y an d the Conservative oppositio n t o Bradlaugh', Eng.Hist. Rev. ccclix (April , 1976) , p p 332—3 . 117

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Early in 1884 , fo r example, Healy , the newly elected hom e rule M.P. for Monaghan , wa s th e telle r in a divisio n agains t Bradlaug h whic h attracted genera l tor y support. 125 But , althoug h Churchil l wa s anxious to co-operate wit h the nationalists against the liberal government, h e wa s no t unawar e o f th e significanc e o f events in Ulste r in 1883. Fo r example , hi s frien d Fitzgibbo n ha d pointe d ou t that , although th e Orangemen migh t be inept politicians, they were indispensable allie s in th e figh t agains t hom e rule. 126 In Octobe r 1883 , th e nationalist s bega n campaignin g i n Fermanagh ' a count y still mor e deepl y tinctured with the traditions of Orangeism' tha n Tyrone. 127 A nationalist meeting at Rosle a pro voked a riva l Orang e meetin g there attended by Lord Rossmore , a local landowner wh o late r declared tha t there would be bloodshed if nationalist demonstration s were allowe d t o continue . This declara tion provoke d Spencer , th e libera l lord lieutenant , to remove Ross more fro m th e magistracy , thu s makin g hi m a loyalis t martyr . Support for Rossmore was voiced at a large Belfast meeting which was chaired b y Lord Arthu r Hill M. P., who invited Churchill to speak.128 Although h e di d no t attend , Churchil l sent a lette r to th e meeting , declaring that Rossmore' s dismissa l 'was but on e of the many proofs' of th e sympath y whic h existe d betwee n th e governmen t an d th e nationalists. 129 H e reiterate d thi s charg e a t th e openin g sessio n of parliament i n 1884. 130 H e als o defende d th e Ulste r Orangemen' s 'vigorous resistance ' t o th e nationalis t 'invasion' , referrin g to fol k memories of the 164 1 catholic massacre of protestants. He pointed out that althoug h Parnel l controlle d mos t o f Ireland , 'ther e wa s on e province and one people and one race and one religion' which resisted him. 131 Whe n Churchil l later decided t o support th e extension o f the reform bil l to Ireland, he tried to persuade the Ulster protestants that the measur e would no t har m thei r interests. He pointed ou t that th e protestant minorit y ha d alread y los t powe r outsid e Ulster , whil e inside tha t province , 'superio r wealth , superio r enterprise, superio r learning an d superio r intelligence ' woul d enabl e th e protestant s t o I2b

House o f Commons Divisions, 1 1 Feb . 1884 . Fizgibbon t o Churchill , 1 1 Oct . 188 3 (RCH L 1/2/181) . 121 The Times, 1 7 Oct. 1883 . 128 Lord Rossmore , Things I ca n tell (London , 1912) , p p 240—9 , Hil l t o Churchill, 1 5 Jan. 188 4 (RCH L 1/2) . 129 77z6> Times, 2 9 Tan . 1884 . 130 Hansard 3, cclxxxiv, 370 . m lbid., 373. 126

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hold thei r ow n politically. 132 Suc h argument s di d no t convinc e al l protestant Ulstermen , bu t th e Belfast .Vews letter admitte d tha t Churchill wa s no t th e onl y tor y M.P . t o chang e hi s min d o n th e reform question. 133 In June 1885 , Salisbur y formed a minority tory government which bought th e neutralit y o f the nationalist s by no t renewin g coercion . Although i t ha s bee n suggeste d tha t thi s ministr y was no t truste d by Ulste r tor y M.P.s, 134 Churchil l claime d that , 'almos t withou t exception, [they ] supporte d th e polic y o f th e government.' 135 I t ha s also been claimed tha t Churchill's support fo r a new enquiry into the Maamtrasna verdict s offended mos t Ulste r tory M.P.s, 136 but, i n the commons debate , onl y tw o Ulste r M.P.s , C . E . Lewi s an d J . Macartney, criticised Churchill's attitude. Lewis, who was more outspoken, was an Englishman who had been the only tory M.P. publicly to criticis e th e governmen t fo r abandonin g coercion . Churchill , unlike Gorst, had no brush with the Ulster tories during thedebate. 137 But, although Cooke and Vincent point out that Churchill repudiated Gorst's remark s in cabinet,138 they fail to draw the obvious conclusion that h e had n o wish to alienate th e Ulster tories, but argue instead on the evidence of a single letter — to Salisbury in November 188 5 — that Churchill wa s hostile t o th e Ulste r tories . Churchil l her e remarke d that 'thes e foul Ulster Tories have always ruined our party. 139 But this comment must be placed i n context. A month before, Carnarvon, the tory lor d lieutenant , had complaine d t o Churchill tha t interna l disputes amon g th e Ulste r torie s migh t resul t in seats being los t t o the nationalists. 140 Churchill only attacked th e Ulster tories because they were co-operating wit h th e whigs: 'The original plan of campaign t o carry o n th e contes t o n tor y line s irrespectiv e o f whig s wa s quit e sound, but i n order t o secure th e retur n o f Lord E. W. Hamilton for Tyrone, seat s have been given to the whigs. This is too maddening.'141 Churchill had earlier declared tha t the Ulster tories would be foolish to 132

//>»V/.,cclxxxviii, 858—9. "The Belfast news Letter, 21 May, 1884. 134 Savage, 'Origin s of Ulste r unionis t party 1 , i n I.H.S., xii , p. 191. 135 The Times, 5 Sept. 1885 . 136 Winston Churchill , Randolph Churchill, p p 356—7 ; James , Randolph Churchill, p . 207 , Midleton, Records an d reactions, p . 64 . l31 Hansnrd3,ccxc\x, 119—230 . 138 Cooke & Vincent, p . 278 . I39 lbid., p . 160 . HO Carnarvon t o Churchill , 1 8 Sept. 188 5 (RCHL 1/8/903) . 141 Churchill t o Salisbury , 1 6 Nov. 1885 (Salisbur y papers) . l

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make an electoral pac t wit h the whigs since he believed that no Irish whig would be returned a t th e coming election. 142 Thus hi s letter to Salisbury i s further evidenc e that, contrary to Cooke and Vincent's allegation, he did not pursue a tory-liberal coalition.143 Churchill's comments on th e Ulste r tories must also be seen in the context o f hi s poo r relation s wit h th e Hamiltons . I n hi s lette r t o Salisbury, Churchil l observe d tha t 'thos e Hamilton s car e abou t nothing except themselves.' 144 The Churchil l and Hamilto n familie s were, t o som e extent , rival s fo r prefermen t withi n th e tor y party . Although th e marques s of Blandford, th e duk e of Marlborough's heir, had marrie d a daughte r o f Abercorn i n 1869 , h e subsequently neglected his wife, preferring an affair with the countess of Alyesford. Consequently, Abercorn's so n refused to serve under Marlborough whe n he wa s appointe d Lor d Lieutenan t o f Ireland. 145 Othe r difference s widened the rift between the two families. In October 1883, Northcote stayed with Abercorn whe n he visited Belfast. The duke expressed th e hope that Northcote would head the next government.146 Earlier that year, Churchill ha d risked his whole political positio n by publicly declaring that Salisbury, rather than Northcote, should lead the next tory government.147 Then, i n 1884, Lor d Clau d Hamilton , a younger son of Abercorn an d a tory M.P. for Liverpool, denounced Churchill for supporting the extension of the reform bill to Ireland.148 In July 1885 , Churchill refuse d t o speak at Liverpoo l becaus e o f the oppositio n of Lord Claud , wh o believe d tha t Churchil l was i n allianc e with the Parnellites.149 Cooke and Vincen t assert that Churchill's adoption of an Orang e stance i n Decembe r 188 5 wa s merel y a feint : ho w could a ma n i n favour o f concessions to nationalis t sentiment i n th e field s o f local government an d catholi c education 'thro w himself whole-heartedly into vulga r unionism ' b y sincerel y allying with Orange bigot s like Saunderson?150 Bu t ther e wa s nothing inconsisten t abou t bot h op posing home rule by co-operating with Orangemen and supporting remedial Irish policies acceptable t o th e nationalist s — the policy of ^The Times, 7 Nov. 1885 . '"Cook e & Vincent, p . 47. 144 Churchill t o Salisbury , 1 6 Nov. 188 5 (Salisbur y papers) . 145 G. Hamilto n t o Corry , 1 3 Sept. 187 6 (Disrael i papers , B/xii/A/145). l46 The Times, 4 Oct. 1883 . I41 lbid., 2 Apri l 1883 . 148 Hansard 3 , cclxxxviii . 862 . l49 See RCH L 1/6/74 3 & 752—7 . Se e also Savage , op . cit. 150 Cooke & Vincent, p p 296—7 .

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enlightened unionism which Churchill had alway s preached. More over, no t al l th e Orang e leader s wer e vulga r bigot s oppose d t o remedial measures . Saunderson , th e leader of the Ulster tories in the commons, ha d only joined the Orange Order as recently as 1882 and had formerl y bee n a Libera l M.P. for County Cavan.151 He claimed that the opposition to the nationalist 'invasion' of Ulster was a protest 'against revolution , agains t separation , agains t crim e an d agains t lawlessness; no t agains t Roma n Catholicism.' 152 Ewart , on e o f the tory M.P.s for Belfast, als o claimed tha t Orangeme n supporte d civi l and religiou s liberty for catholics.153 Lord Rossmore, the leader of the Monaghan Orangemen , cam e fro m a liberal background like Saunderson. His grandmother had been a catholic and his grandfather had supported catholi c emancipation . Rossmor e wa s on good term s with the loca l catholic bishop and provide d lan d fo r a catholic chapel. 154 Nor were all Orangemen reactionary . I n January 1886 , Saunderson , in Churchill' s words , 'greatl y impresse d th e House,' 155 whe n h e pointed ou t tha t h e ha d supporte d th e 187 0 Lan d Ac t an d com plained tha t 'th e misfortun e o f al l th e concession s yet extorte d b y Ireland ha s bee n tha t the y hav e bee n snatche d fro m a n unwillin g hand.' 156 His speech ma y hav e been partl y inspired by Churchill, to whom h e ha d talke d a fe w days before 157 an d h e implie d tha t h e would support remedial Iris h measures, providing the union and law and orde r wer e maintained . Soo n afterwards , Churchill, i n Saun derson's words , 'place d himsel f a t m y disposa l fo r a meetin g i n Ulster.'158 Cooke an d Vincen t argu e tha t Churchil l 'sounde d th e Orang e note' because he wanted to make his peace with the Ulster tory M.P.s; because h e wante d t o leav e Salisbur y stranded o n the far right an d 'chiefly becaus e othe r leadin g torie s ha d decide d t o sta y silent an d Churchill ha d a chance t o engross party orthodoxy.' 159 These argu ments are unconvincing. I t was not so much Churchill, bu t Salisbury and Northcote , th e officia l part y leaders , wh o wer e viewe d wit h 151

Reginald Lucas , Colonel Saunderson M.P. a memoir (London , 1908) , p p 65—6. ' 152 Edward Saunderson, Tw o Irelands, or loyalty versus treason (London 1883), p. 31 . ^HansardS, cci i 173 . l ™Ibid., 167—8 . 154 Rossmore, Things I ca n tell, p p 19 , 38—9 . ^Hansard 3, ccii. 173. }56Ibid., 167—8. 157 lbid., p . 96 . Lucas, Saunderson, pp 94—6 . I58 159 Cooke & Vincent , p . 77 .

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suspicion b y th e Ulste r tories. 160 No r di d Churchil l leav e Salisbur y stranded o n th e fa r right , sinc e the latte r ha d lon g been oppose d t o home rule , whil e h e di d no t directl y associat e himsel f wit h Ulste r unionism unti l his visit to Belfast i n 1893. The silenc e of the other tory leaders wa s largely fortuitous . They ha d collectivel y supported th e union in the Queen's speech and they had no concrete policy to attack before th e introductio n o f Gladstone's hom e rul e bill . Hick s Beac h had als o been invite d to speak at Belfast , but ha d though t it unnecessary for both himself and Churchil l to be 'on the stump in Belfast in the same week.' 161 Churchill' s visit t o Belfas t reflecte d his real link s with Ulster. Whe n h e lef t Londo n h e wa s accompanied b y Saunderson , Rossmore an d Si r John Leslie . Rossmor e ha d first met Randolp h a t Dublin Castl e i n th e lat e 1870s. 162 Leslie , anothe r Monagha n Orangeman, als o kne w Churchill , sinc e hi s so n ha d marrie d Churchill's sister-in-law , Leonie Jerome, in 1884. Whe n h e landed at Larne, Churchil l was greeted b y Captain McCalmont , tor y M.P. for East Antrim, and by William Johnston, tory M.P. for East Belfast. The former had bee n aide-de-camp t o Churchill's father in Dublin, while the latte r ha d bee n appointe d inspecto r o f Irish fisheries by Marl borough i n 1878. 163 Churchill's visit to Belfast wa s not exclusively Orange in character. At th e Ulste r Hall , fo r example, h e received addresse s fro m th e Irish Primrose Leagu e whic h wa s inter-denominational. 164 Althoug h h e asked th e Orang e Orde r t o hel p t o defend th e union , h e mad e n o more concession s t o Orang e sentimen t tha n h e ha d don e whe n addressing hi s Paddington constituents. 165 H e di d no t advocat e sec tarian confrontation , bu t appeale d t o loya l catholics to defen d th e union. H e di d no t encourage militancy , bu t merel y predicted tha t if home rul e was enacted th e conflict would cease to be constitutional in character. 166 Salisbury thought Churchill had 'avoided all shoals and said nothin g to which any catholi c could object.' 167 Th e Times noted that Churchill' s remark s wer e accepte d b y liberal s a s wel l a s b y 160

The Belfast .Mews Utter, 1 6 Nov . 1885 . Beach t o Churchill , 1 2 Feb. 188 6 (RCH L 1/12/1376) . 162 The Times, 2 2 Feb. 1886 . Rossmore , Thirds I ca n tell, p . 260 . 163 The Times, 2 3 Feb. 188 6 an d 2 7 Nov. 1885 . D..\.B., William Johnston (1829—1902). 164 The Times, 2 3 Feb . 1886 . 165 Ibid., 1 6 Feb. 1886 . 166 Ibid, 23 Feb. 1886. '"Salisbury t o Churchill , 24 Feb. 188 6 (RCH L l/12/1390a) . 161

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conservatives i n Ulster. 168 Nevertheless , Churchill' s politica l opponents wer e quic k t o clai m tha t h e wa s fannin g th e flame s o f sectarian hatred. This charge appeared t o be justified when a letter of Churchill's wa s published i n May 1886 . Thi s containe d th e phrase , 'Ulster wil l fight , Ulste r wil l b e right. ' Bu t th e tru e purpor t o f this letter ha s no t bee n appreciate d sinc e only the concludin g sentence was quoted i n Winston's biography of his father.169 Significantly , th e letter was written to a Glasgow liberal, William Young, who wanted bi-party co-operation t o defend the union. Most of Churchill's letter advocated hi s usua l policy of enlightened, egalitarian treatmen t of Ireland withi n th e union. Churchill pointed out that the readiness of Ulster t o figh t t o sav e th e unio n recalled th e polic y of the northern part o f the Unite d State s whic h provoked th e American civil war.170 The America n analogy would have come readily to Churchill's mind since his father-in-law, Leonard Jerome, th e New York financier, had been treasure r o f th e Unio n Defenc e Committe e durin g th e civi l war. 171 The triump h of the unionis t cause in America and th e subsequent peac e an d prosperit y o f th e Unite d State s encourage d Churchill t o believ e tha t a fir m defenc e o f the unio n wit h Irelan d would b e justified b y results. Contrary t o what Cooke and Vincent have claimed, Churchill did not abando n hi s Orange contacts afte r th e sprin g o f 1886. 172 I n his 1886 election address, he denounced th e 'desertio n of our Protestan t co-religionists' an d praise d th e Churc h o f Irelan d — sentiments which appeale d t o Orangeme n i n particular. 173 Shortl y befor e th e elections, Saunderso n asked Churchil l to use his influence t o secure the North Belfast tor y candiature for Maxwell Somerset. 174 But there was another candidat e i n th e field and Churchil l replied: Any action which could b y any possibility imperil a unionist seat and produce the smallest appearance of division among unionists would be fatal.. .A disaster in Belfast would be terrific an d woul d be a sorry reward to English politicians wh o a t som e ris k o f misconception hav e identifie d themselve s wit h Ulster. I therefore on the whole implore yo u to restrain Somerse t Maxwell.175 168 77?^ 169

Times, 2 3 Feb . 1886 . Winston Churchill , Randolph Churchill, p p 478—9 . 110 The Times, 8 May , 1886 . 171 Ralph G . Martin , Lady Randolph Churchill (London , 1974) , i . 29 . 172 Cooke & Vincent , p 77 . '"Winston Churchill , Randolph Churchill, p p 858—62 . 174 Saunderson t o Churchill, 2 5 June 188 6 (RCH L 1/13/1549) . 1 "Churchill to Saunderson, 2 8 June 1886, printe d i n Lucas, Saunderson, p p 104—5.

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In Augus t 1886 , Saunderso n tol d Churchil l tha t ' I kno w an d al l Ulster knows the deep interest you feel i n the welfar e of Irish loyalists in general an d i n Belfast in particular.'176 When Churchill resigned in December 1886 , Saunderso n expresse d hi s regret an d refuse d to condemn hi m unheard. 177 Churchill replied, reaffirming hi s attachment to th e union , bu t arguin g tha t a polic y of peace, retrenchment an d reform wa s require d t o ensur e long-ter m Englis h suppor t fo r th e union. H e though t tha t Saunderson , wit h hi s 'soun d libera l prin ciples' would concur wit h this view.178 Saunderson remaine d friendl y with Churchill , allowing him t o take his own back-bench sea t i n the commons. 179 Churchill, on his part, remained a loyal defender of the Ulster unionists . When Gladston e introduce d hi s second hom e rul e bill, i n 1893 , Churchil l told th e common s tha t Ulster was 'the most important consideratio n i n an y measur e yo u ma y propos e fo r th e government o f Ireland.'180 In a speech at Liverpool , h e declared tha t 'I have bee n a great dea l in Ulster and I have family ties in Ulster' and was therefor e awar e o f th e strengt h o f Ulster' s hostilit y t o hom e rule.181 Bu t unlik e his son , Winston , h e oppose d hom e rul e eve n i f Ulster wa s exclude d fro m it s jurisdiction.182

IV Throughout hi s career, Lor d Randolp h Churchil l was a sincere and consistent opponent o f home rule: as his son's biography demonstrates . But, i n some respects, Winston's life provide s an incomplet e and mis leading account of his father's involvement with the Irish question. In particular, Winsto n wa s apparently unawar e o f the exten t t o which Lord Randolph' s Irish polic y o f enlightened unionis m was largely a family heirloo m whic h he simply up-dated t o meet the circumstances of the mid-1800s . Winston , b y ignorin g this family dimension, faile d to provid e a n explanatio n fo r hi s father' s consisten t unionis m an d underestimated hi s involvemen t i n Iris h politics . Nevertheless , hi s 176

Saunderson t o Churchill , 1 0 Aug. 1886 (RCHL 1/14/1653). '"Saunderson t o Churchill , 1 2 Jan. 188 7 (RCHL 1/19/2333). 178 Lucas, Saunderson, p . 120. 119 Ibid., p . 124. ^Hansard3, viii , 1625—6 . 181 The Times, 7 April 1893 . 182 Churchill to Fitzgibbon, 30 April 1893 , printed in Winston Churchill, Randolph Churchill, p . 808 .

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biography provide s an infinitel y mor e usefu l an d correc t accoun t of Lord Randolph' s attitud e towards hom e rul e tha n an y subsequent study. In Th e Governing Passion, Cooke and Vincen t hav e presented, inter alia, a n incomplete , inaccurat e an d highl y misleadin g accoun t o f Churchill's involvemen t i n Iris h politic s durin g 1885—6 . Thi s i s particularly true of their five contentions listed at the beginning of this article. Churchil l wa s much concerned wit h Irish unrest because he believed tha t i f it was left unchecked , it would undermine the union. His desire to mitigate Irish unrest prompted hi s attitude towards coercion, th e cloture, parliamentar y reform , denominational education and loca l government. 183 His Irish policy was not determined merely by a desir e for a liberal alliance o r a tory reconstruction. Before th e 1885 genera l electio n an d th e emergenc e o f hom e rul e a s a n immediate threat, Churchill's Irish policy was essentially anti-liberal. After the election, Churchill's objectiv e wa s both t o defeat home rul e and strengthen the existing tory party, by means of a unionist alliance with a minorit y of dissident liberals . I t i s both incorrec t an d mis leading t o describ e Churchill' s Iris h polic y a s 'green ' rathe r tha n 'Orange'. I n term s o f hi s genera l Iris h policy , Churchill , a s a n enlightened unionist , was neither 'green', nor 'Orange'. He favoured co-operation wit h th e nationalists , on th e on e hand , an d wit h th e Orangemen, o n the other, only for Tory an d unionis t reasons. But on the centra l questio n o f home rule , Churchil l wa s clearl y 'Orange ' rather tha n 'green ' whe n force d t o take sides . Cook e an d Vincent' s use of such simplistic dichotomies as 'Orange' an d 'green ' and 'pro Irish or anti-Irish' reflects th e superficiality of their approach. Thes e terms imply that Iris h politics were clearly polarised . Bu t within the protestant an d catholi c communities, various hierarchies — clerical, Parnellite, Fenian , Orang e and moderat e unionis t — were rivals for authority an d influence . Thes e group s ha d differen t concern s an d priorities, man y o f which had littl e direct relevanc e t o the home rul e question. Churchil l wa s awar e o f thes e distinction s and hi s Iris h policy reflecte d thi s complicated situation . Cooke an d Vincent' s erroneou s view s o n Churchill' s rol e i n 1885—6 reflec t th e genera l methodologica l shortcoming s o f thei r approach. The y clai m tha t t o understan d th e crisi s of those years ,

183

Lack o f spac e ha s prevente d attentio n bein g pai d t o al l aspect s of Churchill's policy . I hop e t o rectif y thi s i n a subsequen t study .

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'minute analysi s o n a day-by-da y basis ' i s essential. 184 Bu t suc h a study has little value if it is not relate d t o the wider historical context. Cooke an d Vincen t mak e n o seriou s attemp t t o d o this . Thus , for example, the y examine Churchill' s Irish policy i n a grossl y myopic way, ignorin g his views both before and afte r 1885—6 . Eve n i f such a survey was not strictly relevant to their immediate objective, it would have enable d the m t o obtai n a fa r mor e profoun d insigh t into th e mentality o f their principa l characters. Fo r al l politicians approach contemporary problem s wit h attitudes born o f previous experience . Cooke an d Vincen t believ e tha t th e publi c misjudge d th e leadin g politicians o f the da y becaus e the y di d no t appreciat e 'th e calculations abou t persona l competitio n whic h shape d politica l action.' 185 But th e authors ' obviou s pre-occupatio n wit h suc h alleged calcula tions lead the m to ignore evidence which suggests that politicians did not thin k merel y i n term s o f personal advancement . Fo r example , they do not mention Churchill's readiness to stand aside if a whig-tory coalition wa s formed. The y als o argu e tha t event s in 1885— 6 were determined b y a handfu l o f politician s whos e 'conception s wer e formed, o n a very small factual basis , by interpreting what they read in th e newspaper s i n th e ligh t of the opportunitie s the y saw in high politics.'186 But, even on their own evidence, there is ample proof that Churchill's conceptions, at least , were not merely formed in this way. For example, hi s family tie s and contact s wit h Ulster mean t tha t h e was able t o estimate th e potentia l seriousness of protestant revolt. 187 Cooke an d Vincen t separat e thei r theories from thei r chronicle of events, claimin g tha t differin g view s ca n b e derive d fro m thei r evidence.188 Bu t th e genera l characte r o f thei r diar y render s i t o f limited valu e as a foundation for theoretical enquiry. Although they believe tha t a day-by-da y analysi s i s essentia l t o understan d th e period, thei r diary does not give a complete everyda y account. Thus, for example , hal f the perio d of Salisbury's first ministry is dismissed in a few pages. Yet the diary does include much trivial information, such as the exact time when Salisbury left for his French holiday. 189 Most of the diar y i s derived, no t fro m newspapers , bu t fro m correspondenc e between politicians . Bu t thi s typ e o f informatio n usuall y doe s no t throw muc h ligh t o n eithe r th e genera l view s of politicians, o r th e wider influence s acting upo n them . Thes e aspect s ar e ofte n mor e 184 Cooke & Vincent, p. xiii . I85 lbid., 196 Ibid., p . 161 . lBf !bid., p . 162 . l l 9

™Ibid., p . xiii .

* Ibid., p . 438 .

p . 166 .

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clearly reveale d i n th e speeche s of politician s to whic h Cooke an d Vincent pa y littl e attention . Yet th e positio n and influenc e o f politicians wer e muc h affecte d b y th e characte r an d qualit y o f their speeches, whic h were usuall y reported verbati m i n th e press . Thu s Cooke an d Vincen t neglec t evidenc e o f indisputable contemporary importance, preferrin g to concentrate on, often hypothetical , houseparty cabals . Fo r example, the y ignore a strongly unionist speech by Churchill o n 2 June 1886 , bu t d o mentio n tha t h e was expected t o spend th e week-en d i n th e compan y o f Elle n Terr y a t Labouchere's.190 Suc h mistake n emphasis accounts for man y of the misconceptions whic h fla w Th e Governing Passion. Finally, wha t wa s th e wide r significanc e o f Churchill' s opposi tion to home rule? At the personal level, Churchill's fervent unionism had a n importan t effec t o n hi s politica l career . I t reinforce d hi s loyalty to the tory party as the principal pillar of the union. Ironically, however, i t als o prompte d hi m t o champio n progressiv e policie s (intended to strengthen the union) which helped to alienate him from the othe r tor y leaders after th e 188 6 general election . Hi s consistent policy of enlightened unionis m does not tally with recent interpreta tions o f hi m a s a n unprincipled , self-seekin g opportunist . A t th e public level, the importanc e o f Churchill's role in the formulation of tory Iris h polic y can b e exaggerated. H e wa s a cabinet minister for only a yea r an d neve r ha d departmenta l responsibilit y for Ireland . His unionist sentiments were shared by nearly all his colleagues, while his 'playin g o f the Orange card' reflecte d th e lon g established tie s between protestan t Ulste r an d th e tor y party . Nevertheless , Churchill's hostility to home rule was of considerable political importance. A s perhaps the most popular politician on the tory side in 1886, he had grea t influenc e over the British electorate. I f he had favoured home rul e he would have seriously , if temporarily, compromised hi s party's unionis t image. Instead , h e played a ke y role i n creating a united fron t agains t hom e rule . Hi s policy o f enlightened unionis m reflected th e innat e conservatism of his outlook. H e sa w himself as carrying on the traditional tory Iris h policy as developed by Pi(tt, Peel and Disraeli. 191 His policy was as much influenced by the history of Ireland over the previous century as it was by contemporary events. Thus, for example, h e believed that the home rule party would collapse, just as O'Connell's repeal part y and all other Irish indigenous parties had I90

lbid., p . 431 . Th e Times, 3 June 1886 . The Times, 4 June 1885 .

191

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withered away.192 But, although he believed that the home rule threat could b e defeated , h e di d no t deriv e hi s polic y fro m dr y politica l calculation. For his attachment t o the union was a personal sentiment: an article of faith h e was never prepared to question.

l92

Both sides of the home rule question, p. 27 .

16 THE ULSTER LIBERAL UNIONISTS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM, 1885-1898 CATHERINEB. SHANNON

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n th e mid-i88o s Englis h politica l leader s foun d i t essentia l t o develop ne w policie s for Ireland . Whil e the liberals , le d by Glad stone, wer e converte d t o th e home-rul e solution, th e torie s sought to preserv e th e unio n wit h a two-pronge d policy . First , Ireland' s economic disorder s wer e t o b e cure d b y vigorousl y developin g th e system o f state-aide d lan d purchase , an d b y havin g th e imperia l treasury assume a large portio n o f the cos t of developing the country' s natural resource s an d industria l potential . Thi s aspec t o f th e polic y rested upo n th e tor y convictio n that Iris h suppor t o f home rule would diminish i n direc t proportio n t o significan t economi c an d socia l advance. Th e secon d par t o f th e polic y calle d fo r th e establishmen t of a democrati c system of local government which was to be th e limi t of political concessions to Irish nationalist sentiment. When Iris h loca l governmen t refor m finall y wa s granted i n 1898 , it was a unionist government backed by strong liberal-unionist suppor t that secure d th e necessar y legislation. I n fact , th e consisten t exertio n of liberal-unionist pressure was largely responsible for the progressivism of unionis t polic y fro m 188 7 t o 1892 . I n th e followin g study , th e emphasis wil l b e o n th e relationshi p betwee n thi s liberal-unionis t pressure an d th e government' s ultimat e extension o f democratic local governing institution s t o Ireland . Consideratio n wil l be give n t o th e genesis o f th e tor y adoptio n o f loca l governmen t refor m an d t o th e effect whic h thi s adoptio n ha d upon th e sensibilitie s of th e Iris h an d English unionists . The grea t parliamentar y an d administrativ e reform s o f th e nine teenth centur y culminatin g i n th e franchis e ac t o f 188 4 an d th e redistribution ac t o f 1885 , stimulate d interes t i n a simila r refor m o f county administratio n throughou t the United Kingdom. Th e politica l motivation t o abolis h th e oligarchi c gran d jurie s wa s reinforce d b y the pressure s whic h th e rapi d industrializatio n o f Victorian Englan d had thrus t upo n loca l authoritie s i n th e real m o f public welfar e an d the maintenance o f sanitary conditions . Centralizatio n an d uniformity had t o b e brough t t o th e multifariou s and ofte n overlappin g organ s

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hitherto entruste d wit h loca l affairs . Whil e i n Irelan d th e adminis trative confusio n wa s equally serious, actio n wa s politically imperativ e because th e gran d jurie s wer e th e bastions o f th e protestan t landlor d ascendency, an d henc e entirel y ou t o f sympathy wit h th e majorit y o f the population . Although th e liberal s ha d bee n th e firs t t o includ e loca l govern ment refor m i n thei r 188 1 platform , foreig n entanglement s an d th e larger parliamentar y reform s prevente d the m fro m preparin g a bil l until th e sprin g o f 1885 . However , th e proposa l o f th e loca l govern ment boar d fo r a n Englis h refor m wa s neve r introduced , owin g t o considerable disagreemen t i n th e cabine t betwee n th e whigs , le d b y Lord Hartington , an d th e radical s le d b y Josep h Chamberlain , ove r the exten t o f power s t o b e conferre d o n th e propose d loca l councils . While th e latte r wante d t o provid e th e loca l bodie s wit h power s o f compulsory lan d purchase , Hartingto n an d th e whig s believe d suc h a provision, if applie d to Ireland , migh t lea d to disastrou s consequence s for th e landed classes. 1 Chamberlain's subsequen t effort s t o settl e th e loca l governmen t question an d als o satisf y th e Iris h first by his ' central board ' schem e and late r b y th e nationa l council s plan adde d t o th e cabine t divisive ness. B y th e secon d wee k o f August rumour s o f a possibl e split i n th e liberal part y ove r th e lates t Chamberlai n proposa l a s wel l a s ove r Gladstone's proclivitie s towards home rule , wer e spreading throughou t the parliamentar y ranks. 2 Gladstone' s failur e t o denounc e Parnell' s August speec h i n whic h the latte r emphaticall y declare d hi s goal t o be an Iris h parliament , substantiate d th e earlier rumours . The torie s wer e wel l awar e o f these whispering s withi n th e libera l camp, an d th e situatio n wa s rapidl y progressin g t o th e poin t wher e they migh t stea l th e liberals' thunde r o n loca l governmen t reform . By earl y autumn , Salisbur y wa s absolutel y convince d tha t Parnell' s goal wa s a Grattan' s parliament. 3 Possesse d wit h thi s information , the conservative s could conveniently abrogate any plan s fo r an allianc e 1

S. Gwyn n an d G . Tuckwell , The life o f Si r Charles W . Dilke (London, 1917) , ii , 11- i 2. 2 B. Holland , Th e life o f Spencer Compton, th e eighth duke o f Devonshire (London , 1911) , ii , 77-8 ; C . H . D . Howard , 'Th e Iris h "central board " scheme , 1884- 5 ' i n I.H.S., viii , no . 32 , (Sept . 1953) , 61 PP 3243 Salisbury's convictio n derive d fro m hi s intervie w wit h Lor d Carnarvon followin g th e latter' s secre t meetin g with Parnel l i n Augus t (Hansard 3, cccxxv , 1179) .

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with th e Iris h nationalists , an d propos e th e politicall y les s dangerou s local governmen t reform. Lor d Randolp h Churchill's recentl y publicized plan s fo r ' tory democrac y '4 woul d mak e th e ne w conservative policy easy to defend. Th e stag e was thus perfectly set. On 7 Octobe r a t Newpor t Lor d Salisbur y pledge d hi s part y t o abolish th e gran d jur y syste m throughou t th e Unite d Kingdom . Ireland, h e emphasized , presente d a difficult y owin g t o th e division s in th e population , an d h e promise d tha t th e integrit y o f th e empir e would tak e precedence ove r al l othe r matters , includin g loca l govern ment.5 However , th e ' Hawarden kite ' o f 1 6 Decembe r 1885 , an d Arthur Balfour' s December repor t t o hi s uncle that Gladston e woul d have difficult y i n withdrawin g hom e rule 6 confirme d i n finalit y tha t the tory alternative would be local government reform . Following th e officia l tor y announcemen t i n th e Queen' s Speec h on 2 1 Januar y 1886 , Si r Michae l Hick s Beach soothed both tor y an d landlord nerve s when h e asserte d tha t th e Iris h refor m woul d have t o wait unti l conditions in Irelan d woul d no t enabl e th e majority , eithe r political o r social , t o tyranniz e th e minority. 7 However , onc e th e successful mutin y o f th e Iris h part y o n 2 6 Januar y place d Gladston e at th e head o f the government, the Iris h member s showed little interest in loca l governmen t no w tha t th e libera l leade r wa s publicly pledged to ac t i n accor d wit h th e constitutiona l theorie s o f th e Iris h parlia mentary party . The stor y o f th e firs t hom e rul e bil l nee d no t detai n us . I t i s convenient t o tur n t o Augus t 188 6 whe n Lor d Salisbur y returne d t o office, backe d b y a majorit y o f 118 , o f whom 7 4 wer e former liberals who ha d deserte d th e Gladstonia n rank s i n orde r t o preserv e th e union. Thi s liberal unionis t conservativ e alliance becam e th e medium through whic h continuou s pressur e wa s exerte d upo n th e mor e moderate win g of the conservativ e part y to offe r a positive Iris h polic y rather tha n mer e resistanc e to home rule. Josep h Chamberlain' s clos e relationship wit h Arthu r Balfour, 8 th e prim e minister' s nephew , gav e the libera l dissident s convenien t politica l leverag e i n thei r attemp t t o secure comprehensive land legislatio n an d initiat e economi c revolutio n in Ireland . 4 5

The Times, 4 June 1885.

The Times,8 Oct. 1885 . B. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (London , 1936) , i, 90. 7 Hansard 3, cccii, 125 . 8 Dugdale, op. cit. , i, 101 .

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Quickly appreciatin g thei r newl y establishe d influence , th e Ulste r liberal unionist s instructed thei r delegate s t o the Decembe r conferenc e of libera l unionist s i n Londo n t o impres s upo n th e governmen t tha t the maintenanc e o f the unio n depende d upo n a n aggressivel y positiv e Irish policy. 9 Encourage d b y th e discussion s whic h th e Ulste r dele gates had ther e with Chamberlain regardin g loca l government schemes for Ireland , th e Ulste r associatio n soo n sen t a deputatio n t o th e Iris h chief secretary , Si r Michael Hick s Beach . I n additio n t o askin g for an extension o f the fai r ren t clause of the lan d ac t o f 188 1 to leaseholders and town park tenants, the Ulster deputation requeste d that : the Ashbourn e ac t shoul d b e extende d s o a s t o mak e th e abolitio n o f dual ownershi p a matte r o f a fe w year s only ; that , pendin g th e result s of a n enquir y o f th e roya l commissio n o n th e developmen t o f Iris h resources, arteria l drainag e shoul d b e undertake n an d agricultura l developments fostere d b y th e government ; tha t th e establishmen t o f light railway s an d tramway s shoul d b e undertake n o r assiste d b y th e state; an d tha t th e loca l governmen t proposal s fo r Englan d shoul d b e extended t o Ireland. 10

This wa s an ambitiou s programm e indeed . Althoug h th e chie f secre tary favoure d suc h remedia l legislation , hi s failin g healt h an d th e prime minister' s insistenc e tha t la w an d orde r b e restore d first , militated agains t th e introductio n o f an y comprehensiv e programme . Nevertheless, th e libera l unionis t pressur e t o redee m th e loca l govern ment pledg e wa s so strong tha t Gladston e though t i t significant . The governmen t hav e a s you observe promised a measure prescribin g for some typ e o f loca l governmen t i n Ireland , an d th e dissiden t leader s have mad e ver y larg e declaration s i n thi s respect . Si x months o r mor e it ha s take n fo r consideration . Wha t I conten d i s that unionist s will be bound t o produc e thei r measur e whe n parliamen t ha s me t an d abov e all tha t th e dissident s ar e boun d t o mak e the m produc e it , whic h undoubtedly they have the power to do.11

Meanwhile i n Irelan d th e stead y succes s of the Pla n o f Campaign during Novembe r cause d suc h uneasines s amon g th e Iris h unionist s that the y clamoure d fo r th e applicatio n o f Salisbury' s la w an d orde r formula. Th e first indication o f Dublin Castle' s intentio n t o vigorously 9

The Ulster Liberal Unionist Association: a sketch of its history, 1885-1914 (Belfast , 1914) , p . 22 ; hereafte r cite d Ulster Liberal Unionist Association. 10 Ibid., p . 22 . 11 Gladstone t o Campbell-Bannerman , 1 6 Dec . 188 6 (B.M. , Add . M S 41215, 1 27).

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fight agraria n disorde r cam e wit h th e resignatio n o f Si r Rober t Hamilton, th e permanen t under-secretary , whos e opinion s o n hom e rule were too sympatheti c for unionis t peace o f mind. I n a n effor t t o appease th e Iris h landlord s an d unionists , Hamilton' s positio n wa s filled by Si r Redvers Buller wh o had alread y establishe d a reputatio n as a fir m administrato r i n th e colonia l service. Whe n Hick s Beach' s resignation transferre d th e Iris h mantl e t o Arthur Balfou r in March , the prim e minister' s nephe w quickl y demonstrated tha t h e shared hi s uncle's convictio n o f th e urgenc y o f restorin g respec t fo r th e la w i n rural Ireland . Arme d wit h th e famou s ' jubilee coercion ' act , an d encouraged b y th e Iris h loyalists , Balfou r launche d his first attack on the Pla n o f Campaig n whe n h e persuade d th e 1 2 Augus t cabine t t o proclaim th e Nationa l Leagu e a s a dangerou s organization. 12 Fo r th e remainder o f th e yea r an d wel l int o 188 8 Balfour' s Iris h adminis tration prove d ver y adep t i n suppressin g th e widesprea d agraria n unrest. Because th e essentiall y moralisti c philosoph y whic h governe d Balfour demande d tha t th e caus e o f th e agitatio n b e tackle d a t it s roots, th e chie f secretar y di d no t limi t hi s activitie s t o coerciv e measures. Viewin g th e lan d proble m a s th e see d fro m whic h al l th e agrarian an d separatis t agitatio n germinated , Balfou r concluded tha t only the abolitio n o f dual ownershi p and th e establishmen t o f peasan t proprietorship coul d bring peace t o Ireland. Whil e the liberal unionist s had bee n continuall y urgin g suc h action , th e Marc h repor t o f th e Cowper commissio n stresse d th e urgenc y o f a rapi d conversio n t o single ownership . Moreover , th e agricultura l depressio n o f 1885- 6 was so serious tha t drasti c revisio n o f rents was essential. Determine d to cur e Irelan d o f it s histori c lan d sickness , an d backe d b y libera l unionist support, Balfour waged a tedious but successfu l parliamentar y battle fo r ren t reductions. 18 I n cabine t discussion s o n hi s lan d pro gramme, Balfou r wa s highl y critica l o f recalcitran t landlord s wh o claimed a violatio n o f property rights . Th e chie f secretar y reminde d his colleagues that the land scheme like tha t whic h w e hav e propose d (whic h i t b e observed , violate s n o recognized principl e of legislatio n o r justice ) i s a n essentia l part o f an y plan fo r th e restoratio n of law an d order . Th e landlord s mus t no t consider i t i n isolation . The y mus t tak e i t i n connectio n wit h th e whol e 12

L. P. Curtis, Coercion and conciliation, p. 185 . F. S. L. Lyons, ' John Dillo n and th e Plan of Campaign' in I.H.S., xiv, no. 56 (Sept. 1965), pp 321-2. 18

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policy o f th e government ; an d the y mus t fee l tha t th e sacrific e aske d of the m (i f sacrific e i t be ) i s absolutel y required i f th e union , and al l the union means to them, is to be maintained.14 In th e followin g yea r peasan t purchas e increase d afte r Balfour' s land legislatio n secure d a reduction in the purchase price, a relaxation in securit y requirement s a s well a s a n additiona l fiv e millio n pound s for th e lan d purchas e scheme . Th e introductio n o f four drainag e bill s and a light railway s bil l i n th e sprin g o f 188 9 demonstrate d th e chief secretary's appreciatio n o f th e nee d t o develo p Ireland' s natura l resources an d industria l potential . Whil e the ligh t railway s bill alon e achieved passage , i t appear s tha t Balfour' s policy wa s exactl y aki n to th e recommendation s which the Ulste r libera l unionist s had previ ously made to Hicks Beach. Despite th e significant land measures , the questio n o f local government refor m continue d t o plagu e th e governmen t because th e libera l unionist campaig n fo r th e refor m di d no t abat e i n th e least . Afte r emerging fro m mor e discussion s wit h Chamberlai n i n Octobe r 1887 , the Ulste r Libera l Unionis t Committe e looke d t o th e nex t parlia mentary sessio n fo r th e redemptio n o f th e 188 6 promise. 15 I n fact , at thi s juncture , th e cabine t wa s draftin g proposal s fo r th e Englis h and Scotc h reforms , bu t th e minister s wer e obdurat e i n resistin g a n Irish measure . Tha t th e government' s resistanc e ha d th e suppor t of many o f th e Englis h libera l unionist s member s i s apparen t fro m a letter A . C . Sellars , a n Englis h libera l unionist , sen t t o Hug h d e F . Montgomery o f Sixmilecross, Co . Tyrone: ' . . . Hartington, nearl y all th e libera l unionist s wh o hav e spoken , Salisbur y an d th e govern ment ar e almos t unanimousl y agains t a n Iris h loca l governmen t measure thi s sessio n V6 Indeed , th e cabinet' s rejectio n o f th e Iris h reform, whic h wa s th e unwante d chil d o f th e conservativ e dissiden t marriage, turne d th e Ulste r Libera l Unionis t Committe e into some thing lik e a ' nagging wife' , an d it was Sellar's opinio n that ' . .. we had bette r giv e th e thin g u p s o far a s Ulster i s concerned . . ,', 17 if the Ulster-me n wer e consistentl y t o hol d a pisto l t o th e government's head a t every disappointment. 14

Balfour's cabine t memorandum o n lan d policy , 8 Apr. 1887 (B.M. , Add. MS 49822, ff 49-50). 15 16

Ulster Liberal Unionist Association, p. 83. 83..

A. C. Sellar s to Montgomery, 29 Jan. 188 8 (P.R.O.N.I., Dod/627/ 428/218). "Sellars t o Montgomery , 13 Mar . 188 8 (P.R.O.N.I. , Dod/627/428/ 219)-

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While th e openin g o f parliamen t i n 188 8 brough t th e promise d reforms fo r Englan d an d Scotland , th e continue d seriou s agitatio n sponsored b y the Pla n o f Campaign gav e both landlords an d unionist s the ammunitio n to figh t a n Iris h reform . I n th e same session Maurice Healy, Timoth y Harrington , Arthu r O'Connor , J . L . Care w an d Thomas Sexto n sponsore d a privat e bil l fo r Iris h count y councils . It i s apparen t fro m th e debat e accompanyin g th e introductio n tha t the Iris h motivatio n wa s t o embarras s th e governmen t an d t o driv e a wedg e between the conservatives and th e liberal unionists . Althoug h admitting i n debat e tha t th e gran d jur y syste m wa s indefensibl e i n theory, Balfou r echoe d th e officia l resistanc e whe n h e stated : ' different circumstance s and differen t behaviou r ar e essentia l befor e local sel f governmen t ca n b e propose d wit h hop e o f succes s i n tha t country, an d th e reason s whic h ar e agains t i t canno t b e describe d as political V8 Chamberlai n als o opposed th e bil l but o n th e ground s that a partia l solutio n o f th e lan d questio n mus t preced e an y loca l government reform. 19 Meanwhile, th e failur e o f th e roun d tabl e conferenc e prompte d more determine d effor t b y th e libera l unionist s t o secur e a mor e progressive governmen t policy. 20 I n April , an d agai n i n Ma y a t th e meeting o f the Gran d Committe e o f the Ne w Birmingham Association , Chamberlain calle d fo r publi c work s schemes i n Ireland' s congeste d districts, comprehensiv e lan d purchase , an d fo r th e establishmen t of provincial council s t o supplemen t th e propose d futur e count y coun cils.21 Despite Chamberlain's appeals , cabinet procrastination prevaile d as lat e a s January 188 9 a s i s show n b y Salisbury' s lette r t o Arthu r Balfour. We ar e save d fro m an y reproac h fro m ou r Englis h friend s b y th e fac t that we do not at presen t contemplat e settin g up count y council s in Ireland. Th e mod e o f dealin g wit h th e difficult y t o whic h w e hav e pledged ourselves her e is not available in Ireland.22

However, withi n thre e months , fea r o f Chamberlain' s schem e of provincial council s awakene d unionis t interes t i n Iris h loca l govern ment. Writin g t o Hug h Montgomery , Willia m Kenny , a prominen t 18

Hansard 3, cccxxv, 503 . Ibid., col . 507 . 20 For th e fulles t account o f attempt s a t libera l reunio n se e M. Huret , Joseph Chamberlain an d liberal reunion (London , 1967) . 21 The Times, 29 May 1888 . 22 Salisbury t o Balfour, 1 6 Jan. 188 9 (B.M. , Add . MS 49689, ff 49-50). 19

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Dublin libera l unionist , describe d loca l unionis t apprehensivenes s ove r popularly electe d provincia l councils . Pirn an d other s rightl y fea r Chamberlain' s ' awful schem e of provincial councils' an d i n orde r t o counterac t it , wante d t o deman d a loca l government bil l a s soo n a s possible. W e all thought i t wel l tha t I should communicate with Lord Hartingto n who replied ver y freely an d frankl y saying, ' each delegat e shoul d giv e hi s ow n individua l view admittin g that ther e wa s a differenc e o f opinio n o n th e subjec t i n th e bod y h e represented. . . . ' W e hav e ha d som e smal l frictio n wit h Birmingham and Joe on local government but no w smoothed over.23 Despite thi s libera l unionis t pressur e an d a weakenin g o f the lan d league agitatio n b y mid-1889 , Balfou r insiste d tha t loca l governmen t would hav e t o await the passag e of a comprehensive lan d bill, because only the n could th e government be sure that the national league would not us e th e council s a s weapon s t o wiel d agains t th e landlords . Accordingly, th e chie f secretar y devote d hi s legislativ e effort s t o th e abortive lan d purchase bil l o f 1890 . Throughou t th e parliamentar y consideration, Chamberlain , wit h Parnell' s support, continuall y urge d the governmen t t o associat e th e futur e loca l authoritie s wit h th e land purchase scheme . A n indicatio n o f th e anxiet y whic h thi s proposa l engendered amon g both Iris h an d Englis h unionist s i s shown i n A. V. Dicey's letter t o Balfour . The proposa l t o exten d loca l governmen t t o Irelan d o n wha t i s termed English lines , seem s t o m e i n itsel f absurd . On e thin g i s certain . Th e state o f Englan d is quite different fro m tha t o f Ireland, and ther e i s no t the leas t presumptio n tha t a n arrangemen t whic h succeed s in Birmingham wil l succeed sa y i n Limerick . The extensio n of loca l government is absolutely inconsisten t with th e polic y o f strictl y enforcin g th e la w b y means o f so-calle d coercion . I hav e lon g though t tha t th e dogma s entertained b y libera l unionist s abou t loca l government , were, i f an y attempt wer e mad e t o appl y the m t o Ireland , likel y t o brea k u p th e unionist party . Tha t th e governmen t shoul d b e i n an y wa y pledged t o 28

Kenny t o Montgomery , 2 1 Apr . 188 9 (P.R.O.N.I. , Dod/627/428 / in). Kenn y wa s active i n establishin g the libera l union of Irelan d and in organizin g the Hartingto n an d Gosche n visi t t o Irelan d in 1887 . H e sat as a unionist M.P. fo r Stephen's Green fro m 1892-7 , and was solicitorgeneral fo r Ireland , 1895- 7 (Who wa s Who, 4t h ed. , London , 1967 , ii , 580-1). Frederi c William Pirn, another prominent unionist, was chairman of th e Dubli n an d South-Easter n Railwa y fro m 189 6 t o 191 7 (Who wa s Who, 4th ed. , ii, 840).

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the policy of extending local self-government i n Ireland. I greatl y regret, but eve n i f thi s is inevitable I d o trus t it ma y b e foun d possibl e t o keep apart th e questio n of loca l governmen t and no t t o mix th e weakes t wit h the strongest point of the unionis t programme. 2'4 Although Balfou r wa s oppose d t o Chamberlain' s proposal , h e rebuked th e Oxfor d professor , maintainin g that failure t o initiate local government refor m i n deferenc e t o righ t win g unionist s constitute d a far greate r dange r t o th e party' s futur e tha n a promp t introductio n would. Th e chie f secretar y emphasize d tha t h e ha d n o choic e i n th e matter becaus e whe n h e too k offic e th e government wa s '. . . already absolutely pledge d t o it ; th e libera l unionist s hav e neve r cease d t o press i t upo n ou r consideration , an d I understan d tha t a no t incon siderable numbe r o f libera l unionis t elector s regar d i t a s a vita l question '. Chastizing Dicey even further, Balfour asked ' ... is it worthwhile o r righ t t o repudiat e th e pledge s whic h hav e bee n given , and t o brea k u p th e unionis t part y rathe r tha n attemp t t o carr y a measure t o whic h a mos t importan t fractio n o f th e part y attac h th e greatest consequenc e ?J 2 5 While ultra-unionis t an d landlor d nerve s wer e momentaril y soothed b y th e defea t o f the 189 0 land measure , th e successfu l passag e of th e 189 1 lan d bil l mean t tha t loca l government refor m fo r Irelan d ceased t o b e a n academi c question . Firstly , Balfou r ha d alway s promised tha t refor m would immediately follo w a comprehensiv e lan d measure. Secondly , Balfou r genuinel y believe d tha t Irelan d deserve d local governmen t reform . Thirdly , conservativ e losse s i n th e bye elections o f th e previou s eightee n month s necessitate d stron g libera l unionist suppor t i n th e imminen t genera l election . Moreover , b y th e summer o f 189 1 promp t actio n offere d a n irresistibl e opportunit y fo r capitalizing o n th e division s an d disillusionment s whic h th e exposure of th e Parnell-O'She a affai r engendere d withi n th e Iris h part y an d Ireland. Speakin g a t Plymout h o n 1 0 August 1891 , Balfour announced that th e Iris h legislatio n woul d b e introduce d i n th e nex t session . Immediately followin g th e announcement , Balfou r wa s deluge d with letter s fro m irat e Iris h unionist s an d landlord s wh o accuse d th e government o f gros s indifferenc e t o th e interest s o f th e ' loyal minority', an d wh o predicte d tha t th e Nationa l Leagu e woul d monopolize th e ne w organ s jus t a s the y ha d controlle d th e poo r la w 24

Dicey t o Balfour , 2 9 Apr . 189 0 (B.M. , Add. MS 49792 , f . 182) . "Balfour t o Dicey , 3 0 Apr . 189 0 (B.M. . Add . MS 49792 , f . 185) .

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boards.26 Lou d demand s wer e raise d i n th e unionis t pres s fo r pro tective device s suc h a s minorit y representatio n o r specia l franchis e qualifications.27 Answerin g th e Honourabl e S t Joh n Broderick , on e of th e mos t strenuou s objector s t o th e extension , th e chie f secretar y denied tha t th e council s coul d rais e havo c an d driv e th e mai n supporters o f th e unio n fro m Ireland . Extremel y bitte r ove r th e sudden eruption of this unionist opposition, Balfour said: I conside r tha t I hav e a rea l grievanc e agains t th e party , fo r th e pledg e has bee n give n ove r an d ove r again . I t ha s bee n introduce d i n on e queen's speec h afte r another , an d s o far a s I know , no t a singl e seriou s expression o f disapprova l ha s bee n receive d durin g al l thes e year s b y any responsibl e member o f th e government . I d o no t kno w whethe r th e party tak e th e vie w tha t promise s ar e mad e t o be broken, i f so, I canno t agree wit h them. 28 Writing t o th e duk e o f Abercor n a wee k later , Balfou r dashe d an y unionist hopes of postponement. . . . eve n i f we desir e t o retreat , whic h (s o far a s I a m concerned , a t al l events), it i s not possibl e for us t o do so without th e mos t serious discredit . I thin k tha t yo u wil l fin d a goo d man y norther n member s ar e strongl y in favou r o f th e bill . . . . I hav e a lette r fro m Waterfor d strongl y approving th e governmen t policy . I kno w Saunderso n an d Macartne y take th e sam e view , an d I hope , therefore , tha t on the whole our friend s will b e tolerabl y unanimou s i n suppor t o f th e governmen t proposals. 29 Nevertheless, a s th e autum n progressed , Dubli n Castl e receive d more an d mor e unionis t protest s agains t th e measur e a s wel l a s demands fo r protectiv e devices , an d Si r Wes t Ridgewa y warne d hi s chief that : ' You wil l hav e grea t difficult y wit h Ulste r unles s yo u -° It shoul d b e note d tha t th e loca l governmen t board whe n consider ing th e 189 2 loca l governmen t bil l assure d th e chie f secretar y tha t i n th e past the y ha d enjoye d sufficien t powe r t o tak e effectiv e actio n agains t any loca l bod y whic h persiste d i n passin g inflamator y resolutions , o r i n arousing unlawfu l activity . Th e insinuatio n o f th e board' s minut e wa s that the y coul d an d woul d take actio n unde r th e ne w syste m i f necessary (S.P.O., C.S.O. , R.P . 1892/4813) . 27 The Times, 21 Aug. 1891 ; The Spectator, 1 5 Aug.. 1891. "Balfour t o Broderick , 2 Sept . 189 1 (B.M. , Add . M S 4983 0 f . 199) . 20 Balfour t o duk e of Abercorn , 9 Sept . 189 1 (B.M. , Ad d M S 49830 , fF 229-30) .

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strengthen an d rende r possibl e th e positio n o f th e Protestant s i n th e five counties . . . .'30 Despite Ridgeway' s advice , Balfou r wa s reluctan t t o introduc e strong safeguards , an d h e requeste d th e marques s o f Waterford , on e of his few enthusiastic supporters, to . . . impres s upon you r friend s tha t th e vie w (whic h the more I reflec t upon i t th e mor e I a m convince d is the righ t one ) tha t an y dyke s an d safeguards i n th e shap e o f franchis e qualification s an d s o fort h ar e no t only useles s bu t wors e tha n useless . The y irritat e on e part y withou t protecting th e other . The y destro y al l appearanc e of equalit y betwee n the treatmen t o f Englan d an d Ireland , an d the y woul d certainl y b e swept awa y i n th e firs t storm . I a m ver y anxiou s for minorit y representation if tha t can b e obtained as this will ensure some good men upon every count y council , whic h i s absolutel y on ' democratic line s '.31 The suppor t o f a ver y fe w enlightene d unionist s suc h a s Lord s Waterford, Castletow n an d D e Vesci, 32 a s well as the deat h o f Parnell in October , encourage d Balfou r t o procee d directl y wit h th e Iris h reform. Writin g t o Ridgeway , Balfou r reported Georg e Lewis' s vie w that ' . . . thi s wa s the momen t fo r th e governmen t t o promot e a compromise an d tha t th e present men, McCarthy , O'Brien and others , if properl y approache d woul d accep t almos t anything'. 33 Thi s appraisal mus t hav e considerabl y encourage d Balfou r becaus e i t wa s not apparen t tha t Parnell' s deat h ha d lef t th e McCarth y follower s a s weak an d disillusione d a s Lewi s indicated . Ridgewa y replie d tha t a good loca l governmen t bil l wa s th e perfec t instrumen t wit h whic h t o dish hom e rul e an d driv e a wedg e eve n deepe r into the rank s o f Irish nationalists.34 Irrespective o f Balfour' s wishes , th e ultra-unionis t campaig n t o secure stringen t safeguard s wa s successful , an d th e measur e intro duced o n 1 8 February 189 2 b y Balfour was so halting an d inadequat e 30

Ridgeway t o Balfour , 1 9 Oct . 189 1 (B.M. , Add. MS 49812 , f . 199) . Ridgeway wa s probabl y referrin g t o Cavan , Monaghan , Donegal , Fer managh an d Tyron e wher e catholic s an d protestant s wer e mor e evenl y balanced than in th e res t off the north . 31 Balfour t o Waterford , 2 2 Oct. 189 1 (B.M. , Add. MS 49830 , f. 311) . 32 The Times, 24 Aug. 1891. 33 Balfour t o Ridgeway, 1 4 Oct. 189 1 (B.M. , Add. MS 49830 , f. 282). Lewis wa s Si r Georg e Henr y Lewis , 1833-1911 , wh o ha d represente d th e nationalists durin g th e investigation s o f th e specia l commisison , 188 8 (Who wa s Who, 3rd ed. , London, 1962 , i, 428). 34 Ridgeway t o Balfour , 1 9 Oct . 189 1 (B.M. , Add . MS 49812 , f . 199) .

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that al l the Irish nationalists as well as many English liberals demurre d from takin g i t seriously . Th e lon g awaite d bil l provide d fo r count y and distric t councils , electe d o n a parliamentar y franchise . Gran d jury responsibilitie s relatin g t o roa d maintenance , sanitatio n an d som e appointments to asylu m boards wer e to be transferred t o the proposed councils. Th e administratio n o f local revenue s and th e strikin g o f th e county ces s were hande d ove r t o th e majorit y o f the ratepayers . Th e three mai n safeguard s include d wer e firstly , a cumulativ e vot e fo r those payin g th e highes t count y cess . Secondly , th e gran d jur y righ t of travers e wa s retaine d enablin g an y ratepaye r t o challeng e an y council presentmen t befor e a judge an d jury . A storm o f indignation arose fro m th e Iris h member s o f parliamen t ove r th e thir d an d mos t controversial safeguard , whic h provide d fo r th e dismissa l o f count y and distric t council s fo r disobedienc e t o th e law , corruptio n o r consistent malversatio n an d oppression . A petitio n o f accusatio n signed by twent y cesspayer s an d approve d b y tw o judges of assize was sufficient fo r th e dismissal . Th e fourt h an d fina l safeguard , an d on e entirely withou t precedent in the Englis h an d Scotc h system , provide d for a join t committe e of council member s an d gran d juror s t o hav e a supervisory vot e o n al l capita l expenditure s a s well as on the appoint ment of all new local government officers . The receptio n whic h th e Iris h member s accorde d Balfour' s bil l was on e o f universa l condemnation . Th e bill , wit h al l it s unpre cedented an d encumberin g safeguards, wa s useles s t o th e Iris h fo r i t did no t reall y abolis h th e oligarchi c gran d juries , o r thei r contro versial power s o f grantin g compensatio n fo r maliciou s injury . Th e Irish member s regarde d i t a s a n insul t t o th e mora l an d politica l integrity o f the Iris h people, an d labelle d the proposal as nothing more than a coercio n bil l i n disguise. 85 Joh n Redmond , th e Parnellit e leader calle d i t ' monstrous ', S6 whil e Colone l Nola n calle d i t ' absurd 5 .37 I n short , nationalis t opinio n wa s entirely an d irrevocabl y opposed t o thi s tory attemp t t o redeem the loca l government promise . While i t i s conceivable that th e bil l migh t hav e been satisfactorily amended i n committee , nationalist suppor t wa s impossibl e owin g t o the increasin g possibilit y o f a genera l election . Th e Iris h coul d no t support any tor y loca l governmen t bill , no matte r how libera l its construction, becaus e th e recen t bye-election s mad e i t almos t absol utely certain that the liberals, the party officiall y pledge d to home rule, yj

Hansard 4, i, 726-95 . Ibid., col . 726 . 3T Ibid,, col . 726 . 36

Local Government Reform, 1885-1898 35

9

would emerg e victoriousl y fro m th e impendin g electora l struggle . I n the las t day s o f 189 1 an d th e earl y month s o f 1892 , Iris h member s had thei r sight s o n a highe r goal , an d n o matte r ho w desirabl e democratic contro l o f local affair s migh t b e i n itself , hom e rul e wa s still th e primar y an d ultimat e aim . I f an y politica l energ y wa s to be expended, i t woul d b e fa r bette r utilize d i n convincin g th e Englis h liberal electorat e o f th e justic e o f th e Iris h demand . Whe n i t wa s clear tha t th e onl y suppor t fo r th e proposa l cam e fro m th e libera l unionists, th e bill was abandoned . The retur n o f th e conservative s t o offic e i n 1895 , followin g three years o f libera l rule , dashe d fo r a t leas t fiv e year s Iris h hope s o f attaining hom e rule . Whil e th e Iris h parliamentarian s use d ever y device availabl e t o publiciz e the justificatio n of their demand , i t wa s imperative tha t they alter thei r positio n t o suit the new circumstance s resulting fro m th e libera l defeat . Complet e concentratio n upo n a n object whos e attainmen t ha d bee n propelle d int o th e futur e wa s tactically an d politicall y impossible . Th e nationalis t attitud e would have t o b e determine d b y tor y inclination s towar d Ireland . Fortun ately fo r Ireland , th e unionis t governmen t was not dispose d t o renew a coercionis t policy . Agricultura l prosperit y an d th e politica l apath y engendered b y th e internecin e rivalr y withi n th e Iris h part y gav e a great stimulus to a conciliatory policy, and thus made Gerald Balfour' s task o f pilotin g remedia l legislatio n throug h parliamen t a bi t mor e tractable tha n hi s brothe r ha d faced . Moreover , Ireland' s freedo m from activ e coercio n enable d th e Iris h member s to offe r som e cooperation wit h remedia l legislation . Th e Iris h wer e not oblige d a s in th e past t o us e ever y discussio n o f Iris h affair s t o condem n th e govern ment's la w enforcemen t procedures . A growt h i n th e numbe r o f Irish unionist s wh o favoure d a progressiv e polic y wa s als o o f grea t help t o Balfou r in hi s attemp t t o brin g socia l an d economi c amelioration t o Ireland . Th e chie f secretar y cam e t o rel y upo n th e activ e support o f me n lik e Lord s Monteagle , Castletown , Waterford a s wel l as Hugh d e F . Montgomery , th e O'Cono r Do n an d Horac e Plunkett. Chamberlain's presenc e i n th e cabine t onc e agai n gav e th e libera l unionists a usefu l channe l throug h whic h t o pres s fo r a progressiv e policy. Indeed , th e pressure s o f fightin g th e secon d hom e rul e bil l had give n Chamberlai n greate r influenc e i n th e conservativ e wing s of th e unionis t party . I n short , b y 189 5 the unionis t ministers responsible fo r Iris h polic y ha d becom e convinced , a s Arthu r Balfou r wa s previously, tha t negativ e unionis m wa s imposible , an d tha t preser vation o f th e unio n depende d upo n significan t economi c an d socia l

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improvement. O n 1 9 Jul y 1895 , Arthu r Balfou r forecas t th e ne w departure whe n h e criticize d pas t Britis h polic y a s crue l an d stupid , and calle d upo n al l unionist s t o accep t thei r Iris h responsibilities. 38 However, six weeks later, Geral d Balfour's sincere but unfortunate confession tha t h e hel d a sanguin e hop e o f * killing hom e rul e b y kindness' prevente d the larges t sectio n o f the Iris h part y from render ing activ e cooperatio n an d eventuall y stigmatize d man y genuinel y nonpartisan effort s t o bring a better lif e t o the Irish people. Th e most famous exampl e o f nationalis t oppositio n wa s th e hostil e receptio n given t o Horac e Plunkett' s effort s wit h the Iris h Agricultura l Society . Nevertheless th e unionis t majorit y wa s larg e enoug h t o pas s beneficial measure s and th e cabinet' s mos t trying difficulties wer e with the reactionar y landlord s lik e Lords Ardilaun , Westmeath, Barrymor e and Clonbroo k wh o viewe d an y concession s to th e nationalist s wit h jaundiced eyes . Proo f o f the ministry' s newl y found benevolenc e was shown b y th e promp t actio n i n 189 6 t o reviv e th e lan d purchas e programme. Sharin g hi s brother' s convictio n tha t a mor e complet e solution o f th e lan d questio n wa s fundamenta l to Iris h pacification , Gerald Balfou r free d th e 189 1 legislatio n o f it s elaborat e securit y arrangements39 an d augmente d th e lan d purchas e fund s b y thirty-si x million pound s in th e 189 6 act. Th e risin g value of purchase applica tions fro m 500,00 0 pound s i n 189 5 t o 750,00 0 i n 1897 , an d finall y to tw o millio n pound s i n 189 8 wa s th e bes t indicatio n o f th e act' s success.40 Yet th e questio n o f Irish local governmen t refor m remained. Th e problem wa s resurrecte d in th e sprin g of 189 7 a s a resul t of universal Irish indignatio n ove r the allege d overtaxatio n of Ireland. Th e repor t of th e roya l commissio n o n financia l relation s ha d prompte d al l Iris h members to press for an equivalen t grant fro m th e imperial exchequer for approximatel y 750,00 0 pound s in aid o f agricultural rating . When the governmen t proposed t o di p int o these funds fo r 150,00 0 pound s to financ e th e abortiv e agricultura l an d industrie s bil l o f 1897 , a storm o f Irish protes t arose . Whe n all th e Iris h unionist s joined with the nationalist s i n supopr t o f V . F . Knox' s 7 Ma y budge t motio n which accuse d th e governmen t o f gros s financia l injustic e toward s 38

The Times, 20 July 1895 . Under th e 189 1 act , prospectiv e tenan t buyer s 'had t o pa y highe r rents lor five years as security against default (Curtis , Coercion and conciliation, p . 351) . 40 J. Pomfret , Th e struggle fo r land i n Ireland (Princeton , 1930) , p. 274 . 39

Local Government Reform, 1885-1898 36

1

Ireland, th e ministr y abandone d th e agricultura l an d industrie s bill , and promised Ireland her full equivalen t grant . The officia l announcemen t tha t Irelan d woul d receive her equiv alent gran t fo r agricultura l ratin g alon g wit h an d conditiona l t o a reform o f loca l government , cam e o n 2 1 Ma y 1897 . I n hi s address , Arthur Balfou r emphasize d th e impossibilit y o f givin g an y relie f t o Irish rate s withou t firs t reformin g th e antiquate d syste m o f loca l administration, { . . . which we have rejected in England and Scotland, and whic h th e grea t majorit y o n this side of the hous e are pledge d t o reform i n Irelan d als o '.41 Whil e th e prospect o f a democratic syste m of loca l government was warmly greeted by the Iris h nationalists, even the zealou s unionis t Si r Edwar d Carso n declare d tha t i t woul d b e narrow fo r hi s part y t o b e antagonisti c a s lon g a s th e governmen t kept it s promise o f protecting th e hig h rat e paying minority. 42 The cabinet' s ide a o f attachin g th e financia l relie f t o th e loca l reform wa s ver y astute . Whil e it grante d th e nationalist s a decide d political advantage , th e financia l proposal s were sufficiently attractiv e to th e landlord s t o preven t the m fro m opposin g thei r inevitabl e exile from loca l administration . Th e landlord s were to b e relieve d of their former shar e o f th e poo r rates , an d the y wer e no w liabl e fo r rate s only a s occupiers, not a s owners. I n effect , th e agricultura l equivalent grant ha d enable d th e unionis t government to grant democrati c local government t o Ireland by buying off landlord opposition. The rol e o f th e libera l unionist s i n redeemin g th e 188 6 promis e at thi s juncture was of no mean importance . Whil e Chamberlai n an d Devonshire place d continuou s pressure upon the cabinet , immediately after th e passag e o f th e 189 6 lan d act , th e Ulsterme n resume d thei r local governmen t campaig n b y passin g a resolutio n a t thei r annua l meeting i n iSgy. 43 Moreover , th e fiv e Iris h libera l unionis t parlia mentarians wer e no t conten t wit h pur e resistanc e t o hom e rule , an d consequently, H . O . Arnol d Foster , Si r Thomas Lea , T . W . Russell, William Kenn y an d W . E . H . Leck y continuall y displaye d thei r progressive unionis m b y supportin g scheme s fo r th e agricultura l an d industrial developmen t o f Ireland . Alon g wit h al l th e othe r libera l unionists, the y also wanted democratic local government. The growin g administrativ e pressur e t o brin g efficienc y t o th e workhouse syste m furthe r stimulate d th e government' s determinatio n ^Hansard 4 , xlix , 1041 . Ibid., col . 1047 . 43 Ulster Liberal Unionist Association, p. 85. 42

362 Reactions

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to proceed with the reform. Th e desire d amalgamations an d improvements coul d b e bette r accomplishe d if th e propose d genera l refor m relieved th e guardian s o f thei r superfluou s duties . Lastly , b y 1897 , the antiquate d gran d jur y syste m wa s politicall y indefensibl e an d procrastination ha d becom e intolerable once the land purchase scheme had bee n passe d an d th e landlord s secure d i n thei r payments . B y placing th e incidenc e of taxatio n o n th e occupier , th e landlord s an d unionists wer e sufficientl y protecte d fro m financia l rui n throug h excessive taxation . The loca l governmen t bil l whic h Geral d Balfou r presente d o n 21 Februar y 189 8 eventuall y establishe d count y and distric t councils , elected trienniall y o n a parliamentar y franchise . Thos e wome n an d peers, wh o bu t fo r thei r se x an d titl e woul d hav e qualifie d fo r th e parliamentary register , were also given the local government franchise . The applicatio n o f th e one-ma n one-vot e principl e t o ever y occupier abolished th e plura l votin g privilege s formerl y enjoyed b y th e land lords. Becaus e th e onl y qualificatio n for eligibilit y fo r offic e wa s th e possession o f a loca l governmen t franchise , loca l politic s wer e no w open t o al l Irishmen , irrespectiv e o f wealth, religio n o r politics . Th e new council s assume d al l th e fisca l dutie s formerl y exercise d b y th e grand juries , a s wel l a s th e administratio n o f certai n parliamentar y acts formerly executed by the guardians . The parliamentar y receptio n accorde d t o Balfour' s bil l di d no t give th e governmen t an y ground s fo r complaint . Th e ver y minut e objections brought forth b y both nationalists "and unionists were solely for appearanc e sake . Unionist s di d no t wan t t o jeopardiz e th e prospective financia l relief . The nationalists , o n th e othe r hand , sa w the legislatio n a s a ste p o n th e roa d t o hom e rul e becaus e the y believed th e council s would provid e usefu l machiner y t o furthe r th e home rul e agitation . Appreciatin g thi s possibility, Joh n Dillo n spok e of .. . tha t absolute necessity of a limited movement to secure popular control o f th e count y council s . . .', 44 whe n Willia m O'Brie n wa s planinng th e conventio n o f th e Unite d Iris h Leagu e t o b e hel d i n September 1898 . When th e firs t election s unde r th e Loca l Governmen t (Ireland ) Act, 1898, were held in March 1899, tne results expressed an overwhelming confidenc e i n th e abilitie s o f th e nationalisti c Iris h t o manage thei r ow n affairs . I t wa s inevitabl e tha t th e firs t election s were fough t primaril y o n politica l lines . T o hav e expecte d th e Iris h 44

Dillon to O'Brien, 8 July 1898 (N.L.I., O'Brien papers, MS 8885/13).

Local Government Reform, 1885-1898 36

3

in th e firs t flus h o f thei r newl y obtaine d electora l power s t o ignor e the predominan t politica l issue s o f th e day , whethe r the y b e hom e rule versu s unionism , o r landlordis m versu s tenan t demands , wa s asking to o much . Th e fina l return s gav e th e nationalist s 55 1 place s on th e count y councils while th e unionist s coul d clai m onl y 125 , with 86 of these being in Ulster. 45 The promis e t o exten d democrati c loca l governmen t t o Irelan d had bee n largel y a direc t outcom e of the Gladstonia n conversion, an d as w e hav e seen , it s fulfilmen t wa s in grea t measur e attributabl e t o the constan t pressur e whic h th e Ulste r Libera l Unionis t Committe e exerted upo n th e ministry . Whil e th e cabine t position s o f Josep h Chamberlain an d Lor d Randolp h Churchil l gav e th e Ulsterme n a channel o f communicatio n t o th e highes t echelon s o f th e unionis t party, thei r perennia l campaig n fo r popula r governmen t no t onl y added furthe r confirmatio n t o Arthu r Balfour' s persona l belie f i n progressive unionism , bu t als o provide d bot h Balfou r brother s wit h the politica l argumen t t o forc e thei r mor e reluctan t conservativ e colleagues t o accep t a progressiv e Iris h policy . Arthu r Balfour' s insistence tha t democrati c loca l governmen t wa s necessary , no t onl y because o f the unionis t alliance, bu t als o because he believe d that th e act o f unio n demande d equa l treatment , wa s als o o f crucia l signific ance. I t i s t o hi s credi t tha t h e attempte d t o redee m th e pledg e i n 1892 i n th e fac e o f grea t unionis t opposition an d cabine t reluctance. His expositio n o f th e benefit s o f economi c an d socia l amelioratio n t o his younge r brothe r Geral d furnishe d th e latte r durin g hi s tenur e in the Iris h offic e wit h th e determinatio n t o achiev e significant improve ments in Ireland's economic , social and political life.

45

While th e issue s of hom e rul e an d lan d entere d int o th e 190 2 an d 1905 count y counci l elections , afte r 190 3 loca l elector s demonstrate d a n increasing concer n fo r econom y an d efficienc y i n loca l government . Se e my unpublishe d M.A . thesis , ' Local governmen t i n Irelan d : th e politic s and administratio n ', University College, Dublin, 1963 , ch. 4.

17

THE SOUTHER N IRIS H UNIONISTS, THE IRIS H QUESTION, AND BRITISH POLITICS, 1906-19141 P.J. BUCKLAND

T

he period 1906-1 4 is often regarded as one of continual disagreement an d turmoi l i n Britis h politics . Thi s may b e true ; bu t i t is important t o understan d why . I n fact , Britis h politic s betwee n 1906 an d 191 4 wer e marke d b y a stron g desir e t o avoi d extremes . Developments o n th e fring e o f politics , socialism , syndicalis m an d suffragism, mad e a dee p impressio n upo n th e moderat e element s of both majo r partie s an d thei r desir e t o contai n suc h sign s o f disturb ance wa s epitomise d i n th e constitutiona l conferenc e hel d i n 1910 . Yet th e Iris h questio n frustrate d attempt s a t moderation , embittere d politics an d hindere d th e developmen t o f a mor e representative , democratic an d socia l stage in the United Kingdom . Until 191 1 th e Iris h questio n allowe d a disput e ove r th e power s of th e hous e o f lord s t o dominat e politics . I n th e las t analysi s th e liberals wante d t o cur b th e power s o f th e lord s t o allo w th e passag e 1

This pape r i s base d o n th e M.A . thesi s b y P . J . Buckland , ' The unionists an d Irelan d : th e influenc e o f th e Iris h questio n upo n Britis h politics, 1906-1914' , Birmingha m University , 1966 , hereafte r cite d a s Buckland. Th e mai n manuscrip t source s consulte d wer e : th e Auste n Chamberlain paper s i n th e Birmingha m Universit y Library , A C 1-56 ; the Arthu r Jame s Balfou r papers , B.M. , Add . MS S 49683-49962 ; th e records o f th e Iris h Loya l an d Patrioti c Union an d (fro m 1891 ) o f th e Irish Unionis t Alliance , th e souther n unionists' politica l organisation i n Ireland, an d o f th e Join t Committe e o f th e Unionis t Association s o f Ireland, a n Iris h unionis t propagand a organisation . Th e Iris h unionis t records ar e deposite d in th e P.R.O.N.I. , D 98 9 an d D 1327 . Als o consulted wer e th e Carso n papers , the Montgomer y papers, and th e record s of th e Ulste r Unionis t Council in P.R.O.N.I. ; th e Redmon d papers and the persona l diarie s an d journal s o f Lad y Mar y Howar d o f Shelto n Abbey, Bray , i n N.L.I . Extract s from th e mor e usefu l (fo r the purpose s of thi s paper ) collection s ar e printe d wit h th e kin d permissio n o f th e librarian, Birmingha m University; the trustee s o f th e Britis h Museum ; and th e deput y keeper of the P.R.O.N.I. , respectively.

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of a measur e suc h a s hom e rule , whil e th e unionists 2 wer e anxiou s to kee p th e powe r o f forcin g a dissolutio n i n orde r t o maintai n th e union. Thus , b y preventin g agreemen t a t th e constitutiona l confer ence, th e Iris h questio n cause d th e libera l governmen t t o implemen t a mor e radical , thoug h les s democratic , scheme fo r th e refor m o f th e relations betwee n th e tw o house s o f parliament tha n migh t hav e been achieved b y agreemen t betwee n th e tw o parties. 3 Then , th e wa y having been cleare d fo r the thir d home rule bill which was introduced in Apri l 1912 , th e Iris h questio n dominate d politics , squeeze d ou t 2

Until a fusio n i n 191 2 th e oppositio n part y afte r 190 6 comprise d two wings , th e member s o f th e conservativ e an d constitutiona l associa tions an d thos e o f th e libera l unionis t organisation , th e forme r bein g th e predominant partners . Althoug h th e ter m unionis t was generally applie d to thi s allianc e i n th e earl y twentiet h century , i t comprise d thre e broa d geographical section s : th e Britis h section , primaril y conservative ; th e southern Iris h sectio n whos e overridin g concer n wa s th e maintenanc e of th e legislativ e unio n betwee n Grea t Britai n an d Ireland ; an d th e northern Iris h sectio n whose main politica l interes t was also the maintenance o f th e union . Th e varie d interest s o f members o f thes e differen t sections mean t tha t a t time s th e distinctio n wa s no t clear-cut ; but , fo r the purpose s of this paper, th e ter m conservative wil l apply t o the British, the predominan t sectio n o f th e opposition ; th e ter m souther n unionis t to tha t sectio n o f th e part y wit h majo r interest s i n th e thre e souther n provinces o f Ireland ; an d th e ter m Ulste r unionis t t o tha t sectio n wit h interests i n th e norther n provinc e o f Ireland . Whe n th e oppositio n part y as a whol e i s meant, th e epithe t unionis t will b e applied ; th e ter m Iris h unionist will apply to the two Irish sections taken together . 8 These point s hav e bee n argue d i n Buckland , ch . 7 . Thoug h ofte n assumed b y historians , th e dominanc e o f th e Iris h questio n a t th e consti tutional conferenc e ha s neve r hithert o bee n adequatel y documented . However, a meeting-by-meetin g accoun t o f th e conferenc e recorde d b y Austen Chamberlain , on e of the oppositio n delegates , and hi s daily letters to hi s wif e i n whic h h e give s hi s impression s of th e fina l meeting s o f th e conference, d o confir m tha t th e Iris h questio n prevente d effectiv e dis cussion o f th e othe r issue s before th e conferenc e an d obviate d th e agree ment reache d o n othe r matters , suc h a s finance . Chamberlain' s accoun t and a supplementar y on e b y Lor d Lansdowne , anothe r oppositio n delegate, ar e i n th e Auste n Chamberlain papers , A C 10/2/35-65 . Thes e accounts resolv e an apparen t conflic t of evidenc e tha t has perturbe d Mr R . Jenkin s (i n M r Balf OUT'S poodle (1954) , p . 103 ) an d le d hi m t o doubt whethe r ther e wa s an y chanc e o f agreemen t a t th e conference . Contrary t o M r Jenkins' s suspicion , th e substantia l libera l concessio n over financ e wa s mad e afte r th e summe r reces s a t th e fourteent h an d fifteenth sittings , i.e . o n 1 1 an d 1 2 October . Fo r Chamberlain' s letter s to hi s wif e i n Novembe r 1910 , se e AC 6/1/81-3 . A n attemp t t o recon struct th e conferenc e has bee n mad e i n Buckland , pp. 667-95 .

The Southern Irish Unionists, 1906-1914 361 progressive measure s an d attitudes , an d brough t th e Unite d Kingdo m to th e verg e of civil war. 4 I t wa s not jus t that tw o armed force s faced each othe r i n Irelan d an d tha t Englis h countr y house s wer e bein g prepared t o receiv e (unionist ) casualties. 5 Fre e rei n wa s given t o th e reactionary element s withi n th e oppositio n part y whic h hope d t o defeat th e bil l b y supportin g th e Ulste r unionists ' resistanc e t o hom e rule.6 Th e struggl e wa s thu s brough t t o th e centr e o f politics , wit h scenes i n th e hous e o f common s an d th e formatio n o f arme d bands , in th e midland s a t least , unde r th e cove r o f Ulste r Athleti c Clubs. 7 A viciou s spiral wa s created . Plan s t o amen d th e mutin y ac t helpe d to precipitat e th e Currag h incident , whic h le d t o a furthe r degener ation o f Britis h politic s i n 1914 , affectin g tha t giv e an d tak e o f political an d socia l lif e tha t lie s behin d th e successfu l workin g o f parliamentary democrac y i n Grea t Britain . I n attemptin g t o accoun t for th e influenc e o f th e Iris h questio n o n Britis h politic s thi s pape r will emphasis e thos e factor s previousl y underrated , i f no t ignore d completely, vi z souther n Iris h unionis m an d i s especiall y intimat e relationship wit h th e conservativ e part y i n Grea t Britain . The reaso n tha t th e Iris h questio n coul d exercis e such an influenc e on Britis h politic s la y i n th e natur e an d exten t o f th e disagreemen t of th e tw o major partie s ove r that issue . Abortiv e attempts at compro mise i n 1913-1 4 o n th e basi s o f th e exclusio n o f Ulste r fro m th e operation o f th e thir d hom e rul e bil l onl y underline d th e differenc e between th e partie s o n th e Iris h question . For , owin g t o th e organisation o f Iris h nationalis m an d o f Iris h unionism , liberal s an d conservatives foun d themselve s i n fundamenta l disagreemen t ove r Ireland. I n th e firs t plac e the dee p division s of Irish politics , between nationalists an d unionists , betwee n catholics an d protestants , between the ' Gaels' an d th e ' British ', wer e translate d int o Britis h politics , thus introducing a degre e o f intransigence alien t o the Britis h politica l system. Secondly , becaus e o f th e vitalit y o f th e Iris h organisation s 4

Buckland, ch . 8 . Duchess o f Somerse t t o Si r Edwar d Carson , 1 3 Jan. [1914?] , Carson papers, P.R.O.N.I . 6 See e.g . th e changin g view s o f Lor d Lansdown e i n Official report (house o f lords), serie s 5 , ix , 1 0 Aug . 1911 , col . 888 , an d i n Lansdowne to A[rthur ] J[ames ] B[alfour] , 6 Mar . 1914 , B.M. , Add . M S 49730 , ff. 268-9 . 7 Lord Willoughb y d e Brok e t o Carson , 1 7 Nov . 1913 , enclosin g a letter fro m Willia m Nightingal e (th e Birmingham agent o f th e Britis h League fo r th e Suppor t o f Ulste r an d th e Union ) t o d e Broke , 1 3 Nov. 1913, Carson papers, P.R.O.N.I. 5

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taken i n conjunctio n wit h circumstances , the libera l an d conservative attitudes on the Irish question became, or appeared t o contemporaries to be , essentia l t o thei r existenc e a s majo r politica l parties. 8 The essentia l natur e o f th e attitud e o f th e liberals , i n powe r between 190 6 an d 1914 , ha s lon g been note d b y their supporter s an d opponents. Th e liberal s believe d i n principl e i n hom e rule , whil e dependence upo n th e Iris h nationalist s i n parliamen t an d i n certai n British constituencie s compelle d the m t o ac t upo n thes e principles . Despite th e consequence s fo r Britis h politics , the y refuse d t o gover n Ireland b y coercio n an d wer e committee d t o som e modificatio n of th e union. 9 O n th e othe r han d th e attitud e o f th e oppositio n has bee n accepte d rathe r tha n explained . Th e unionis t part y vigorously an d heatedl y conteste d libera l polic y toward s th e govern ment o f Ireland. Oppositio n t o liberal Iris h polic y became their main plank10 an d the y were determined to frustrate liberal effort s t o modif y the unio n eve n a t th e ris k o f civi l war . Indee d oppositio n t o hom e rule became a s much essential to th e lif e o f the unionis t party as belief in hom e rul e wa s to th e libera l party . T o compromis e o n th e unio n would hav e spli t th e party ; o r (wha t is as important) thi s i s what th e opposition leader s feare d throughou t th e perio d 1906-1914. " For thi s critica l situatio n withi n th e unionis t party , th e Iris h unionists, particularl y o f th e sout h an d west , wer e responsible . I t i s true tha t consideration s o f empir e an d constitutio n mad e th e opposition, avowedl y th e constitutiona l part y an d b y professio n th e imperial one , reluctan t t o accep t hom e rul e fo r Ireland ; bu t neithe r of thes e objection s wa s sufficientl y conclusiv e t o permi t intransigenc e upon th e Iris h question. Wha t di d make for this intransigence, whic h was b y 191 3 endangerin g th e empir e an d th e constitution , wa s Irish unionism. I t gav e some point t o the unio n whe n other argument s fo r its maintenanc e seeme d irrelevant . Iris h unionist s persuade d th e 8 9

These points are discussed in Buckland, ch. 1-3. Buckland, ch . 2 . Mos t helpfu l fo r a n understandin g o f th e libera l Irish polic y are E. P. M. Wollaston, 'The Iris h nationalist movement in Great Britain', London M.A. thesis (1958 ) and H. W. McCready,' Home rule an d th e libera l party , 1899-1906' , i n I.H.S., xiii . 316-4 8 (Sept . J 963)10 The emphasi s t o b e placed by th e oppositio n on the Iris h question in thi s period was indicated in a speech by Balfour, th e opposition leader, during th e 190 6 electio n campaign, The Times, 6 Jan . 1906 . 11 See e.g. Lord Lansdowne (opposition leader in the lords) to A(usten) G(hamberlain), 2 4 Nov. 1913, A C 11/1/50 . Fo r th e fear s o f th e leadership in 190 6 and 191 0 see below.

The Southern Irish Unionists, 1906-1914 369 opposition t o accep t thei r ow n intransigent attitud e towards the unio n and libera l policy : an d wer e i n a positio n t o exac t condig n punish ment should the leadership fai l them . The wa y in which the oppositio n seemed t o identify itself wit h the Ulster section o f Irish unionism whe n the thir d hom e rul e bil l wa s introduce d i s wel l known. 12 Yet , sinc e the protestantis m an d determinatio n o f Ulsterme n als o mad e a n impact upo n Britis h opinio n a t large, 13 an d sinc e th e liberal s wer e prepared t o conside r a compromis e o n th e basi s o f exclusion, 14 considerations o f Ulste r unionis m d o no t i n themselve s accoun t fo r the opposition' s emphasi s upo n th e maintenanc e o f the union . More over, a s will be suggeste d later , ther e seems good reaso n fo r doubtin g the popularit y o f th e caus e o f th e Ulste r unionist s amon g conser vatives.15 Rathe r th e oppositio n i n th e mai n too k u p th e Ulste r question afte r 191 1 o n tactica l grounds , hopin g tha t loca l resistanc e would defea t hom e rul e an d usin g th e Ulste r questio n a s a cloa k t o hide thei r ow n intransigenc e o n th e Iris h question, 16 a n intransigenc e due t o concer n fo r th e unionist s o f th e thre e souther n province s of Ireland. While th e strengt h an d determinatio n o f th e Ulste r unionist s t o resist hom e rul e ha s neve r bee n doubted , th e souther n unionist s have received a ba d press . The y wer e a small , scattered , thoug h wealthy, minority i n th e sout h o f Irelan d s o that the y made little impact upon the generality of British politicians and electors . They neve r threatened to resis t hom e rule b y arme d force , o r eve n t o d o violenc e t o nationalist politicians . Th e resul t ha s bee n tha t the y hav e receive d little attentio n fro m historian s an d hav e bee n belittle d eve n b y thei r own forme r leaders . Lor d Midleton , a forme r chairma n o f th e Iris h Unionist Alliance, 17 ouste d i n 191 9 followin g hi s acceptanc e o f th e principle o f hom e rul e i n th e convention , wrot e thu s o f souther n unionists: With rare exceptions they lacked political insight and cohesion. Contented to air thei r feelings a t intervals , they restricted themselves to the easy tas k of attendin g meetings in Dublin and votin g strong resolutions which the y 12

The bes t accoun t i s i n R . Blake , Th e unknown prime minister (1955), ch. vii, ix-xm. 13 See e.g. leader in The Times, 18 May 1914 . 14 See e.g . Asquith' s memorandu m to H.M. , quote d i n R . Jenkins , Asquith (1964) , pp . 276-7 . 13 See below. 16 Buckland, pp . 240-59 . 17 See below.

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expected the British government to respect. I remember a special meeting at Londonderr y House , a t a crisis , whe n afte r vigorou s attack s o n th e government, o f whic h I happene d t o b e a junio r member , th e meetin g adjourned t o a sumptuou s luncheo n withou t definin g an y polic y the y might accept. 18 Such a n estimat e i s misleading , fo r sinc e th e i88o s th e souther n unionists ha d show n great energ y and initiativ e i n safeguardin g their interests, interpreted to mean the act of union. In 188 5 wa s founde d th e Iris h Loya l an d Patrioti c Unio n t o co-ordinate unionis t energie s i n Irelan d i n orde r t o maintai n th e union. It s immediate object, however, had been to combat Parnellite s in th e thre e souther n province s i n th e genera l electio n o f tha t year , the firs t followin g th e extensio n o f th e franchis e i n 188 4 an d th e redistribution o f i885. 19 Fifty-tw o seat s wer e contested ; bu t th e difficulty o f electioneering in southern Ireland soo n becam e apparent . Therefore i n 188 6 th e I.L.P.U. , limitin g itsel f t o 'constitutiona l means', trie d t o se t u p a mas s party organisatio n fo r al l Irelan d t o maintain a consisten t propagand a o n behal f o f th e unio n i n Britis h politics.20 Thoug h branche s were established in all counties in Ireland , save Monaghan, 21 th e I.L.P.U . faile d t o becom e th e on e unionis t association fo r all Ireland. Th e Ulste r unionists, separated by religious intensity an d socia l situatio n fro m th e souther n unionists , preferre d to maintai n thei r ow n organisation, s o that th e I.L.P.U. , calle d afte r a reorganisatio n i n 189 1 th e Iris h Unionis t Allianc e (I.U.A.), 22 wa s by 189 3 generally recognise d a s representative of unionist opinion only in th e thre e souther n provinces; 23 an d b y 190 6 souther n unionists , 18

Earl o f Midleton , Records an d reactions, 1856-1939 (1939) , pp. 226-7 . "I.L.P.U. manifest o i n Th e Times, 1 6 Oct . 1885; . I.L.P.U. Prospectus (1886) , cop y i n Bodleia n Library ; I.L.P.U., Annual report 1887, pp. 1-2 , P.R.O.N.I., D 989/46. 20 Irish Times, 9 Jan . 188 6 fo r repor t o f th e firs t annua l genera l meeting of the I.L.P.U., 8 Jan. 1886 . 21 I.L.P.U. , Executiv e counci l minut e book , 1886-9 , passim , P.R.O . N.I., D 989/1 ; I.U.A. , Annual reports, 1901-13 , appendices , D 989/3 6 and i2a/2 . 22 Executive council minute book, 1889-1920 . 28 Balfour's lette r t o th e organiser s of a unionis t demonstratio n i n Dublin, Apri l 1893 , cop y i n I.U.A. , Executiv e counci l minut e book , 1893-4, I0 Apr. 1893, P.R.O.N.I., D 989/2; ibid., 24 Nov. 1893, f°r a resolution fro m th e Libera l Unio n o f Irelan d t o I.U.A. , suggestin g a Dublin demonstratio n t o b e addresse d b y Josep h Chamberlain . Th e

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seemingly becomin g war y o f the Ulster-men' s intensity, wer e conten t with this. 25 No r di d th e I.U.A. , whic h i n 191 3 ha d a nucleu s o f some 68 3 members, 26 eve r achiev e mas s part y status , it s branche s tending t o var y i n strengt h a s di d th e densit y o f th e protestan t population i n th e sout h o f Ireland. 27 Thi s organisationa l failur e reflected th e limite d socia l basi s o f souther n unionism , whic h tende d to b e protestant , anglicised , propertied , an d aristocratic. 28 Typica l of the member s o f th e souther n unionis t associatio n wer e me n lik e Si r Thomas Butler , a founde r member , an d th e Shaws . Si r Thoma s owned lands in county Carlo w valued a t his death in 190 8 at £82,028 , the demense , whic h containe d 93 7 acres , bein g assesse d a t £9,837 . Despite mortgages, such holding s enabled hi m to enjo y a comfortabl e social an d a n activ e publi c lif e a s on e o f th e leadin g representative s unionists o f th e nin e counties of Ulster i n th e mai n had littl e to d o with the southern unionist association whos e branches in the north were invariably weak , dependin g o n th e energ y o f on e o r tw o individuals . Onl y after th e exclusio n o f si x countie s o f Ulste r ha d becom e b y 191 8 th e definite polic y o f th e Ulste r Unionis t Council , di d th e unionist s o f th e other thre e counties o f Ulster , whos e socia l an d religiou s structur e wa s similar t o tha t o f th e countie s in th e souther n provinces , thro w i n thei r lot wholeheartedl y wit h unionist s of the south . I n 1919 , for instance, th e Monaghan Unionis t Associatio n wa s affiliate d a s a branc h o f th e souhern unionis t association . Se e Montgomer y papers , P.R.O.N.I. , DOD 627/43 5 anc * I.U.A. , Annual report, 79/9-20 , P.R.O.N.I. , D 989/i2a/2 . 24 Midleton t o A.J.B. , 5 Oct . 1911 , B.M. , Add . M S 49721, ff. 291-2, complaining o f Garsonis m an d Carson' s aggressiv e languag e an d con cluding * it i s of cours e a s impossibl e to refut e Carso n p ublicly as to con trovert hi s silly proposal s t o march upo n Cor k etc.' ; ' cadet o f one of the old Iris h Catholi c families ' writin g t o Th e Times, 1 4 Oct . 1912 . 25 1.U.A. resolutions , D.D.E., 3 0 Aug . 1906 , 2 7 Apr . 1912 . 26 1.U.A., Annual report, 1912-13, appendi x A , givin g th e official s and representative s of th e loca l branche s o f th e I.U.A . o n th e suprem e governing body of the association. 27 See e.g. th e diminishin g ambitions of th e successiv e constitutions of the association , Executiv e counci l minut e book , 1889-1920 , P.R.O.N.I. , D iio/Mic ; an d compar e th e numerica l strength o f the branche s o f th e I.U.A. indicate d b y Annual report, 79/2-75 , appendi x A , wit h th e religious profession s of th e inhabitant s in eac h count y given in Census of Ireland fo r th e year ign, preliminary report , Cd . 5691 (1911) , pp. 6-7. 28 For th e qualitie s tha t a souther n unionis t lad y require d o f othe r southern unionist s se e Mary ffolliot t t o H . d e F . Montgomery , 1 4 Mar . 1918, Montgomery papers, P.R.O.N.I., Dod 627/432.

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of Iris h landowners. 29 Th e Sha w famil y seem s t o hav e trie d t o establish a dynast y withi n th e souther n unionis t organisation . Si r Frederick Shaw , baronet , wa s an honorar y secretar y of the associatio n while his son, Herbert, was first an organise r of an Iris h unionist anti home rul e campaig n i n Englan d an d the n becam e secretar y o f th e association. Fathe r an d so n wer e member s o f th e Dubli n branc h o f the association , wit h a n estat e i n Dubli n count y hande d dow n fro m William Sha w o f Hampshire , a soldie r o f Scottis h descen t wh o ha d established himsel f i n Irelan d afte r fightin g a t th e battl e o f th e Boyne.30 Though i n a n ag e o f democrac y thi s narro w socia l basi s wa s t o prove fatal , ove r a shorte r perio d i t wa s a sourc e o f strength. Th e limited natur e o f souther n unionis m mean t tha t it s organisatio n wa s based upo n clos e socia l contact s an d wa s itsel f closel y knit; 31 th e wealth o f the souther n unionist s mean t tha t wha t wor k their associa tion undertoo k coul d b e adequatel y financed; 82 an d finall y thei r social an d financia l standin g encourage d souther n unionist s t o ac t in British politics with every hope of success.33 The souther n unionis t associatio n worke d o n tw o fronts : i n Ireland an d i n Grea t Britain , thoug h afte r 190 6 th e wor k don e in Irelan d onl y suffice d t o giv e evidenc e o f th e fac t o f souther n unionism.34 Apar t fro m subsidisin g Ulste r unionism , th e I.U.A . contested thre e seat s i n th e sout h o f Ireland , outsid e o f Dubli n University, an d organise d meetings , manifestoes , petition s an d tour s of th e sout h o f Irelan d fo r Britis h electors . B y 191 4 on e o r tw o deputations o f betwee n te n an d fiftee n elector s wer e arrivin g weekl y to inspec t certai n area s illustratin g (alleged ) nationalist incompetenc e 29

Probate wil l o f Si r Thoma s Pierc e Butle r grante d 8 Mar . 1909 , P.R.O.I., no. 6034; Notes from Ireland, passim. 80 1.U.A., Annual reports, 1901-13 , appendices ; minute boo k o f th e Joint Committe e o f the Unionis t Associations of Ireland, passim, P.R.O. N.I., D 1327/2/1 ; Burkes peerage (1911) , p. 1767 . 81 See e.g . th e persona l diarie s an d journal s o f Lad y Alic e Mar y Howard of Shelton Abbey, Bray, in N.L.I., no. 3621. 82 1.U.A. pamphle t entitle d ' The Iris h Unionis t Alliance: it s wor k and organisation ' (1893) ; I-U.A. Subscription book, 1907-14, P.R.O.N.I. , D 989/4/3 . 83 Leader in D.D£., 9 Jan. 1886 . 84 See e.g . editoria l commen t upo n th e reorganisatio n of th e I.U.A . in 1906 , Notes from Ireland, June 1906.

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and terrorism. Th e succes s o f thi s wor k i n Ireland , particularl y o f the tours , depende d upo n th e enthusias m an d self-sacrific e o f loca l unionists in the smal l town s of Ireland wh o had t o give a great dea l of time an d troubl e t o the m an d wh o ha d themselve s t o intervie w th e visitors an d t o ge t othe r unionist s t o d o so . On e suc h self-sacrificing unionist, selecte d fo r commendatio n b y th e secretar y o f th e I.U.A., 86 was a Roma n Catholic. 37 H e wa s Michae l M'Can n o f Newtown forbes, Longford , wh o wit h hi s wife ha d ' done a s much a s anybody in Irelan d t o conver t th e radica l visitors' . ' A bi g farmer ' an d th e Longford branc h representativ e o n th e genera l counci l o f the I.U.A. , he entertaine d a ver y grea t numbe r o f tourist s a t hi s hous e an d frequently fe d them . Fo r hi s pain s h e wa s (allegedly ) severely boy cotted. Anothe r organise r wa s H . V . McNamar a o f Ennistymo n House, count y Clare , honorar y secretar y o f the Clar e count y branc h of th e I.U.A . Despit e living in ' one of the worst district s in Ireland ' he showe d ' the ver y greates t pluck' , makin g ' admirable arrange ments fo r the receptio n o f tours i n Ennis ' an d doin g ' splendid wor k in co . Clare during the last year '.38 All suc h work i n Ireland , itsel f a sufficien t rebutta l o f Midleton' s slighting assessmen t o f souther n unionists , serve d t o suppor t a continuous campaig n i n Britis h politic s agains t hom e rule . Souther n unionists recognise d th e futilit y o f tryin g t o contai n th e nationalis t movement i n Ireland , bu t wer e stil l unwilling t o accep t hom e rule . Moreover, bein g a scattere d minority , the y wer e unabl e t o conside r the us e o f forc e t o resis t th e impositio n o f a hom e rul e bill. 39 Thus southern unionist s had t o ensure that a bill dissolvin g the union would 85

Buckland, pp . 340-59 . Apar t fro m th e severa l minute book s of th e I.L.P.U. an d I.U.A. , th e othe r usefu l source s fo r unionis t activit y i n th e south of Irelan d are Notes from Ireland (a bulletin of Iris h political news published regularl y b y th e souther n unionis t organisation) , th e Irish Times an d D.D.E. 36 Shaw to Wick s (Carson's secretary) , 1 5 Jun. 1914 , in a file of letters from th e I.U.A . t o Si r Edwar d Carson , P.R.O.N.I. , D 989/123/1 . 37 For thi s reaso n h e wa s probabl y single d out fo r a wor d o f encouragement, since the I.U.A. hoped t o persuade substantia l Roman Catholic s to becom e unionists . Se e e.g . Midleto n writin g to Th e Times, 2 1 Oct . 1912. 88 Shaw t o Wicks , 1 5 Jun . 1914 , I.U.A . t o Carson , P.R.O.N.I. , D g S g / i a a / i ; I.U.A. , Annual report, 1912-13, appendix A. Th e relativ e strength o f th e count y Clare branc h o f th e I.U.A . i n 191 3 would seem t o confirm Shaw' s appreciation o f McNamara's energy. ^ Irish Times, 9 Jan. 1886 .

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not b e passe d b y a Westminste r parliamen t o r approve d b y a British electorate. Th e onl y constitutiona l mean s open t o souther n unionist s was t o carr y on , mainl y throug h thei r association , a campaig n throughout British politics, organised, owing to the exigencie s of party politics, throug h th e conservativ e opponents o f the hom e rule party. 40 The campaig n wa s waged i n tw o spheres. I n th e mor e restricte d sphere o f parliamentar y an d part y politics , souther n unionist s relie d upon actio n i n parliamen t b y representative s i n bot h houses , an d behind th e scene s b y correspondenc e an d deputation s t o unionis t leaders an d conferences . Th e campaig n i n th e constituencie s wa s fourfold: th e productio n an d distributio n o f literary propaganda ; th e organisation o f demonstrations ; canvassing ; an d th e maintenanc e of a ' follow-up' service . Thi s work , concentratin g o n mor e margina l seats an d crystallisin g aroun d elections , ha d bee n carrie d o n b y th e I.L.P.U. o r th e I.U.A . eve r sinc e 1886 ; bu t afte r 190 7 i t wa s don e in conjunctio n wit h th e Ulste r Unionis t Council , unde r th e auspice s of th e Join t Committe e o f th e Unionis t Association s o f Ireland , though th e souther n unionist s bor e th e greate r burden , supervisin g the wor k i n Englan d an d Wales. 41 I n fac t afte r 190 6 thi s campaig n was al l th e mor e insisten t an d develope d a s libera l polic y toward s Ireland evolved , fo r souther n unionist s hope d t o forc e a genera l election o n th e specifi c issu e o f hom e rule . Seein g tha t Redmond' s position wa s bein g challenge d i n Ireland , bu t (absorbe d i n constitu tional politics ) not appreciatin g th e independenc e and strengt h o f th e extreme nationalis t wing , souther n unionist s wer e convince d afte r 1906 o f th e mystica l qualit y o f a thir d rejectio n o f a hom e rul e bil l to kil l hom e rule completely. 42 Therefor e al l their energies after 190 6 were directed to this end. The exten t t o whic h thi s campaig n create d a n anti-hom e rul e opinion i n Grea t Britai n canno t b e determined ; bu t ther e ca n b e n o doubt that , organised a s the campaig n wa s through th e unionist party, it mad e th e oppositio n awar e o f th e souther n unionis t viewpoint. 43 40

Resolution of the executive committee of the I.U.A. , 26 Oct. 190 6 in D.D.E., 27 Oct. 1906 . 41 This campaign is dealt with in some detail in Buckland, pp. 355-401 and ch . 6 . Apar t fro m newspaper s th e mai n source s wer e th e severa l minute books of th e I.U.A . an d th e minut e book of the Joint Committee of th e Unionis t Associations of Ireland. 42 D.D.E., 29 Aug. 1908, 27 Apr. 1912. 48 Some attempt at assessin g the impact of the Irish unionist campaign in G.B . ha s bee n mad e i n Buckland , pp. 359 , 364-5 , 387-90 , 395-6 , 486-7, 493-4, 495, 501, 503-4, 504-6.

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This souther n unionis t success , an d som e pictur e o f th e wa y thei r association worked , can be seen in the way southern unionists deterred the unionis t leadershi p fro m workin g wholeheartedl y i n 191 3 an d 1914 fo r a compromis e o n th e Iris h questio n o n th e basi s o f th e exclusion o f Ulste r fro m th e operatio n o f th e thir d hom e rul e bill. 44 By th e autum n o f 191 3 th e effec t o f th e disagreemen t o f th e parties ove r th e Iris h questio n wa s causin g grave concern , an d i n a n effort t o avoi d possibl e civi l war politician s looke d fo r a compromis e on th e basi s of the exclusio n of Ulster. I n commo n with an influentia l section o f th e party , includin g a forme r leader , Balfour, 45 an d th e leader o f th e Birmingha m group , Auste n Chamberlain, 46 Andre w Bonar Law , th e leade r o f th e oppositio n i n th e hous e o f commons , genuinely desired a settlement; and in September 191 3 in conversatio n led libera l minister s t o believ e tha t som e settlemen t wa s possible. 47 Meanwhile, however , Lansdowne , leade r o f th e oppositio n i n th e lords, a souther n Iris h landowner 48 an d membe r o f th e I.U.A., 49 learning o f th e drif t o f suc h conversations , reminde d La w o f th e southern unionists. 50 Thus , whe n th e king' s secretar y suggeste d a conference o n th e basi s o f th e exclusio n o f Ulster , La w coul d onl y refuse o n the groun d tha t ' there would be a wil d outburs t o f resentment agains t u s i n th e sout h o f Irelan d whic h woul d b e reflecte d with almost equal violence in England '.51 44

Although th e Buckingha m Palac e Conferenc e wa s concerne d wit h a compromis e base d o n th e exclusio n o f Ulster , thi s doe s no t mea n tha t the oppositio n reall y wante d suc h a compromise . The y woul d hav e pre ferred a genera l electio n an d i t seem s likely that the opposition coul d no t refuse t o ente r an y sor t o f conferenc e withou t alienatin g publi c opinion , which woul d hav e bee n fata l t o a part y hopin g fo r a n earl y dissolutio n of parliament . 45 K. Young , Arthur James Balfour (1963) , pp. 119-120 ; Th e Times, i Feb . 1913 ; A.J.B . memo , o n 'th e constitutiona l question' , 1913 , B.M. , Add. M S 49869, ff . 123-32 . 48 A.C. t o Mar y (hi s step-mother), 2 5 Feb. , 2 3 Mar., 2 4 Apr., 4 Ma y 1914, A C 4/1/1078 , 1098-9 , 1124 , 1131 ; A.C . t o Lansdowne , 2 9 Oct . 1913, AC 11/1/46 . 47 Law t o Carson , 1 8 Sept . 1913 , quote d i n Blake , p . 156 ; La w t o Lansdowne, 2 9 Sept . 1913 , ibid. , p . 159 ; Jenkins , Asquith, pp . 286-8 . 48 G.E.G., Th e complete peerage (revise d ed. , Londo n 1910-59) , vii . 436-43. Especiall y instructive (wit h reservations ) is th e surve y of estate s made i n 1883 . 49 I.U.A. Subscriptio n book ; I.U.A. , Annual report, igis-is, appen dix A . 50 Blake, pp. 157-8 . 51 Law t o Stamfordham, n.d. , i n Blake, p. 159 .

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The difficult y wa s tha t th e souther n unionists , a s a resul t o f persistent organisatio n an d propaganda , ha d man y sympathiser s among Britis h conservatives , thei r lonel y pligh t i n th e nationalis t southern province s givin g som e rea l meanin g t o th e ide a o f th e union.52 B y th e beginnin g o f October , though , th e situatio n seeme d to hav e altered . Si r Edwar d Carso n ha d ha d a n intervie w wit h leading souther n unionist s an d reporte d t o La w tha t they ha d indicated tha t they were not prepared t o agitate strongly against home rule an d tha t the y wer e afrai d o f intimidatio n an d damag e t o thei r financial an d busines s interests . Thu s La w wrot e t o Lansdown e o n 8 Octobe r tha t I a m mor e hopefu l tha n I wa s of a settlemen t o f tha t kin d . . . th e leading me n i n Ulste r d o desir e a settlemen t o n th e basi s o f leavin g Ulster out, and Carson thinks that such an arrangement could be carried out withou t any seriou s attac k fro m th e unionist s in th e south. 58 When, therefore , Asquit h suggeste d a privat e meetin g with Law , th e latter accepted 54—and, t o judge fro m th e abov e letter t o Lansdowne, his mood was not pessimistic . During th e conversation s (thre e took plac e betwee n October an d December), Law' s sligh t optimis m disappeared , t o b e replace d b y a deep despondency ; fo r La w though t tha t Asquit h would propose th e exclusion o f fou r o r si x counties of Ulste r t o settl e th e Iris h question . The troubl e wa s that suc h a proposa l woul d see m t o publi c opinio n so reasonable tha t th e unionis t leadershi p coul d scarcel y take respon sibility for rejectin g it; ye t should the y agree a party revolt was likely. Law, therefore , refuse d t o pres s Asquit h upo n th e issu e an d th e conversations drifted inconclusively. 35 The reason s behin d Law' s despondenc y and driftin g ar e not har d to find . O n th e on e han d ther e wa s Ulster . Ulsterme n demande d the exclusio n o f th e whol e provinc e o f Ulster , fo r thei r organisatio n applied t o th e whol e provinc e an d afte r th e signin g o f th e covenan t the concep t o f Ulste r had , to Ulstermen , achieved an almos t mystical 52

See e.g . Si r Charle s Petrie , Walter Long an d hi s times (1936) , p. 176 . 58 Law t o Lansdowne , 8 Oct . 1913 , cop y in B.M. , Add . MS 49693, ff. 62-4 . 54 Blake, pp . 160-1 . 55 Blake, pp . 161-7 ; f° r A.C.' s comment s upo n Law' s performance , see A.C. to Mary, 11 Feb. 1914, AC 4/1 /1069.

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7

significance.36 Ye t had th e Ulsterme n bee n th e unionis t party' s only concern, a compromis e betwee n th e tw o partie s migh t hav e bee n effected, givin g Ulsterme n les s tha n the y ostensibl y demanded. 57 They wer e not, however , for ther e remaine d th e souther n unionists . In hi s first conversation wit h Asquith , Law ha d pointe d ou t th e danger o f th e unionist s i n th e sout h an d wes t thinkin g tha t w e ha d betrayed them , whic h woul d mak e an y actio n o n ou r par t impossibl e if the y were unanimous in that view;58 and sinc e Law' s conversatio n wit h Carso n souther n unionist s ha d clarified thei r position , announcin g their firm determination t o defea t home rule . Thi s ha d bee n thei r polic y sinc e 188 5 an d the y wer e keeping t o it . Admittedl y afte r 191 1 ther e wer e complications , fo r the parliamen t ac t ensured that , wit h a majority for home rule within the hous e o f commons , a hom e rul e bil l woul d becom e law . Face d with thi s likelihood on e or two southern unionists favoured accommodation with the nationalists;59 but this attitude was not widespread an d the I.U.A . — pledged t o th e maintenanc e o f th e unio n — actually increased it s membership as the thir d home rule bill progressed unde r the protectio n o f th e parliamen t act. 60 I t i s als o tru e tha t souther n unionists di d suppor t Ulster' s agitation ; bu t the y di d s o onl y fo r tactical reason s in the hop e of wrecking the bill. 61 Th e las t thing that southern unionist s wanted wa s a settlemen t in 191 3 and 1914 . The y hoped t o preven t th e bil l fro m becomin g la w o r fro m becomin g operative b y forcin g a dissolutio n o f parliamen t an d havin g th e government defeate d i n a n appea l t o th e elector s o n hom e rule . Accordingly, i n th e autum n of 191 3 the Join t Committe e stepped up it s campaig n i n th e constituencies; 62 and , jus t befor e La w me t 56 57

Blake, pp . 161-7 . To judg e fro m th e eas e wit h whic h th e U.U.C . a t a late r dat e accepted and defende d th e exclusio n of only six counties. 58 Law, * Notes o n conversatio n wit h th e P.M.' , 1 5 Oct . 1913 , quoted in Blake , pp . 161-2 . 39 J. K . P . Newma n t o Redmond , 3 Jan . 1913 , Redmon d papers , N.L.I., PC 262 (vi). 60 Comparison o f appendice s in I.U.A. , Annual reports, 1906-13 ; an d the increas e i n smal l subscription s show n i n I.U.A . Subscriptio n boo k would see m t o confir m assertion s abou t increasin g interes t i n unionis m in th e sout h mad e a t I.U.A . a.g.m. , 191 3 i n D.D.E., 25 Apr. 1913 . 61 J. M . Wilso n a t I.U.A . a.g.m., 1913 , D.D.E., 25 Apr. 1913; minute book o f th e Join t Committe e o f th e Unionis t Association s o f Ireland , 25 Mar . 1914 . 62 Ibid., 31 Jul., 5 Sept. 1913 .

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Asquith fo r th e firs t o f their compromis e talks , a lette r was published in Th e Times fro m Lor d Barrymore , the n chairma n o f th e I.U.A . He complaine d o f th e dominanc e o f th e Ulste r questio n an d demanded tha t souther n unionists , oppose d a s eve r t o hom e rule , ' should hav e an opportunity o f laying the true facts before the British people an d takin g their verdict at a general election 5 .63 Thi s carefull y phrased lette r was , i n fact , a threa t t o th e unionis t leadership , fo r southern unionist s ha d realise d wha t wa s happening an d determine d to represen t thei r rea l viewpoin t t o the unionis t part y an d leadership . Prior t o th e publicatio n o f Barrymore's letter the vice-chairma n of the I.U.A. ha d writte n privatel y t o Carso n tha t ther e wa s a ' strong feeling amongs t a numbe r o f th e unionist s in Dublin , Cor k an d else where ' that their case was being overlooked, but w e a t headquarter s here ar e mos t anxiou s tha t nothin g shoul d b e done a t th e presen t junctur e which could i n an y wa y embarrass you o r Mr Bona r Law. W e therefor e though t that i t woul d mee t th e situation and satisf y ou r peopl e if Lor d Barrymor e (ou r chairman) wer e t o writ e a lette r t o Th e Times an d othe r leadin g newspaper s remindin g thei r leaders of the positio n o f the unionist s of the sout h and wes t without . . . in th e leas t complicating the situatio n fo r either you or M r Bona r Law. 64 This lette r epitomise s th e spiri t o f souther n unionis m an d it s organ isation: persisten t an d determined , ye t appealin g an d tactful ; an d its protes t succeede d i n makin g a n impac t upon th e unionis t leader ship. Lansdown e wrote to Carson that Barrymore's letter ' will receive a goo d dea l o f backing' ; an d reminde d hi m tha t althoug h th e unionists o f th e sout h an d wes t wer e helples s t o organis e resistanc e to home rul e i n Ireland , ' they ar e quite powerfu l enoug h to provok e a serious outcry against us if we throw them over '.65 Law mus t hav e been awar e of such correspondence. Eve n shoul d he not hav e noticed thes e protests, the energy of the southern unionists in organising demonstrations brought home to him the southern unionis t reliance upo n th e oppositio n leadership . Earlie r i n the yea r La w ha d been waite d upo n b y a deputatio n o f th e I.U.A . an d ha d agree d t o address a demonstratio n i n Dubli n i n th e followin g November. 66 Any doubt s abou t souther n unionis t determinatio n woul d hav e bee n ™The Times, 1 1 Oct . 1913 . F . Stewar t to Carson , 8 Oct . 1913 , Carso n papers, P.R.O.N.I . Lansdowne t o Carson , n.d., i n I . Colvin , Th e life o f Lord Carson (1934\ ii . 220-2 ; see also Lansdowne to A.C., 1 2 Dec. 1913, AC 11/1/56 . 66 Notes from Ireland (1913) , p. 38. 64 G. 65

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dispersed whe n La w attende d o n 2 8 Novembe r * the mos t impressiv e and significan t demonstratio n eve r hel d sout h o f th e Boyne' , a s Carson's biographer , non e to o sympathetic to th e souther n unionists , described it. 67 Prio r t o th e demonstratio n La w receive d protest s against hom e rule fro m unionist s throughou t th e sout h an d wes t o f Ireland; an d i t mus t hav e bee n wit h a twing e o f conscienc e that , i n reply to these thirty-one addresses , h e declared : I di d no t nee d thes e addresse s t o kno w ho w stron g an d ho w rea l i s th e feeling i n favou r o f unionis m o n th e par t o f thos e district s o f th e grea t country to which you belong.68 Southern unionis t pressur e upo n th e oppositio n mounte d i n 1914 , mainly throug h a sub-committe e o f th e I.U.A . heade d b y Lor d Midleton.69 He had entered the commons in 1880 and had quickly risen t o prominenc e an d t o government ran k owin g to hi s criticism o f Gladstone's Iris h policy. 70 Indeed , despit e hi s late r alienatio n o f th e I.U.A., th e defenc e of the unio n wa s the underlyin g theme o f most of his career . Soo n afte r h e entere d th e hous e o f lords , o n hi s father' s death i n 1907 , h e becam e leade r o f th e Iris h peer s there , an d kep t their interest s t o th e fore , fo r example , whe n th e refor m o f th e lord s was bein g discusse d i n igio-ii. 71 Thi s emphasi s upo n th e Iris h question i s no t surprising , fo r Midleto n derive d th e greate r par t of his income fro m estate s in Cork. 72 Closel y associated wit h th e I.U.A . until igig,73 he assiduously put the southern unionist viewpoint before his conservativ e colleague s an d th e press , especiall y fro m 191 1 onwards whe n unionism in Ulster seemed to D C obscuring th e existenc e of unionis t opinio n i n th e sout h o f Ireland. 74 H e thu s took hi s dutie s as hea d o f th e I.U.A . sub-committe e seriously i n 191 4 an d trie d t o prevent th e ' shadow cabinet ' fro m effectin g a compromis e base d o n the exclusio n o f Ulster. 75 Thes e effort s o n behal f o f th e I.U.A . wer e 67

Colvin, p. 247; or rather he accepted such a description. Notes from Ireland (1913) , p. 112 . I.U.A. to Carson, P.R.O.N.L, D 989/^/1. ™D.N.B.} 1941-50, p. 108 . 71 Midleton's memo, o n hous e o f lord s reform , 2 1 Mar . 1911 , B.M. , Add. MS 49721, ff. 255-62. 72 G.E.G., Complete peerage, viii. 701-706. 73 Irish Times 25 Jan. 1919 . 74 Colvin, pp. 249-50 ; se e above. 75 I.U.A. t o Carson , 1914 , P.R.O.N.L , D 989/123/1 ; Midleton' s memo, o n th e amendin g bill , 2 3 Jun . 1914 , B.M. , Add . M S 49721 , ff . 302-5. 68 69

380 Reactions

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complemented b y th e activitie s o f individual southern unionists , quick to threate n a spli t i n th e conservativ e part y shoul d th e leadershi p countenance compromis e instea d o f a genera l election. 76 Thi s wa s the unanimit y whic h La w s o feared . I n fac e o f i t th e discussion s of the ' shadow cabinet ' wer e dominate d b y consideration s o f Iris h loyalists.77 Al l that th e oppositio n coul d d o was to drif t toward s crisis, putting forwar d demand s fo r th e exclusio n o f Ulste r know n t o b e unacceptable t o the government an d the Irish nationalists, 78 and taking up the southern unionist cr y of dissolution.79 Clearly, then , th e souther n unionist s wer e a significan t forc e i n British, if not i n Irish , politics . Thei r efficien t an d energeti c campaig n throughout Britis h politic s i s sufficien t t o explai n wh y th e unionis t party should hav e been mor e awar e of the southern unionis t viewpoint than th e liberals . Bu t i t i s another thin g t o explai n wh y th e unionis t party wa s so susceptible t o souther n unionis t pressur e a s to allo w tha t viewpoint t o dominat e oppositio n thinkin g betwee n 190 6 an d 1914 ; and wh y the part y wa s more responsiv e t o southern unionis m tha n t o Ulster unionism . Th e shor t answe r is that the southern unionist s were better place d tha n th e Ulste r unionist s throughou t th e unionis t party ; the fulle r explanatio n i s threefold. (i) I n th e firs t plac e Iris h unionists , especiall y thos e o f th e southern provinces , wer e wel l represente d withi n th e unionis t part y at al l levels . The y wer e well place d i n th e policy-makin g sectio n o f that part y an d worke d throug h suc h leader s t o ensur e th e bes t presentation o f thei r case . A s i s wel l known , unionis t polic y wa s a t that tim e determined by a small group of some twenty or thirty leaders comprising th e ' shadow cabinet' , an d a n eve n smalle r numbe r was frequently, thoug h informally , consulted b y th e officia l leader s o f th e party i n th e common s an d th e lords. 80 O f thes e th e mos t influential 76

See e.g. Lord Oranmor e and Browne' s letter in Th e Times, 1 9 Ma y 1914 protestin g agains t a leade r articl e whic h hel d tha t oppositio n t o home rule (outsid e Ulster) was no longer practical politics. 77 See e.g. A.G. to Mary, 4 May 1914 , AC 4/1/1131. 78 See e.g. Colvin, p. 397. 79 See e.g. Carson's speeches i n G.B. , especially a t Hern e Hill, 5 Jul y 1914, Colvin, pp. 402, 414-5. 80 B. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (1936) , ii . 25; R . T . MacKenzie , British political parties (is t ed. , London, 1955) , p . 75 ; Si r Charles Petrie, The life an d letters o f th e rt . hon. Si r A . Chamberlain (1939), i . 22 9 e t seq.; Petrie , Walter Long, pp . 17 1 ff. ; Blake , p . 103 ; A.C . t o Mary , i Mar . 1912 , A C 4/1/765.

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were Iris h unionists. 81 Amon g leadin g unionist s i n the lord s wer e fou r southern unionists, the fifth marquis o f Lansdowne, th e ninth Viscoun t Midleton, th e firs t Baro n Ashbourn e an d th e eight h an d nint h duke s of Devonshire ; an d on e Ulsterman , th e sixt h marques s o f London derry. I n th e common s ther e wer e tw o southerners , Si r Edwar d Carson an d Walte r Lon g (wh o regarde d himsel f a s a souther n unionist);82 an d Law , wh o ma y b y origi n an d outloo k b e classe d a s an Ulsterman. 83 Suc h leader s constantl y urge d th e Iris h unionis t viewpoint upon thei r colleagues . Lansdown e an d Midleto n wer e associated wit h th e I.U.A.; 84 bot h derive d th e greate r par t o f thei r income from estate s in the south of Ireland ;85 and i t has been suggested how activ e the y wer e o n behal f o f th e souther n unionists. 86 The Iris h unionist s wer e als o importan t t o th e unionis t oppositio n in bot h house s of parliament . I n 1914 , thoug h onl y tw o unionist s sat for souther n Iris h constituencies , the fac t tha t souther n unionist s ha d close British connection s enabled eightee n southerner s to si t for Britis h constituencies, whil e ther e wer e eightee n Ulsterme n i n sixtee n Ulste r and tw o Britis h seats. 87 Th e ver y numbe r o f Iris h unionist s i n th e commons wa s significant . Afte r 190 6 th e numerica l weaknes s of th e opposition mad e th e soli d suppor t o f th e Iris h unionist s see m mor e important tha n ever; 88 an d afte r th e closel y fough t election s of 191 0 their importanc e wa s enhanced , fo r withou t th e Iris h unionist s th e differences betwee n th e tw o majo r partie s i n th e common s woul d have bee n greater. 89 Bu t thei r importanc e an d influenc e reall y depended upo n th e wa y i n whic h the y worke d withi n th e party . 8l

Buckland, pp . 514-45 . - Between th e I.U.A . an d Lon g ther e existe d a mutua l admiratio n society. Se e e.g. report s o f I.U.A . meeting s attende d b y Long, i n D.D.E., 4 Jan., 3 0 Aug. 1906 . 83 Blake, pp . 17-22 . 84 I.U.A., Annual reports., 1906-13 , appendi x A ; se e above . 85 G.E.C., Complete peerage,, vii . 436-43 , viii . 701-706 . 86 See above . 87 Figures base d upo n informatio n i n Dod's parliamentary companion, IQI4' 88 See e.g . A.C.' s commen t o n th e deat h o f Col . Saunderson , M.P. , the leade r o f th e Iris h unionis t M.P.s , i n A.C . t o Mary , 2 7 Oct . 1906 , AC 4/ 1 /111 : ' He i s a rea l loss , especiall y at thi s time , a s h e exercise d some influenc e ove r that very wild body of men, th e Iris h unionis t M.P.s.' 89 See e.g . W . Lon g t o A.J.B. , 3 Apr . 1910 , B.M. , Add . M S 49777 , ff. 65-7. Tha t Balfou r appreciate d thei r importanc e is shown in Sandars to A.J.B. , 1 4 Feb . 1911 , B.M. , Add . M S 49767 , ff . 99-110 . 8

382 Reactions

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By assiduousl y courtin g th e unionis t party , persona l contact s reinforcing th e politica l propagand a o f th e I.U.A . an d Join t Com mittee o f th e Unionis t Association s o f Ireland , Iris h unionist s created between Iris h unionist s an d Britis h conservativ e parliamentarian s a n attachment whic h coul d neve r hav e bee n achieve d betwee n th e liberals an d th e nationalists , th e latte r insistin g o n holding themselves aloof fro m th e intimat e sid e of British politics. Th e succes s of Walter Long's Unio n Defenc e Leagu e testifie s t o this; 90 bu t i n thi s respec t southern unionist s attaine d mor e influenc e tha n di d th e Ulste r unionists, a s perhaps i s indicated b y th e greate r number o f marriage s of Britis h conservativ e M.P. S int o southern , rathe r tha n Ulster , unionist families. 91 Althoug h th e politica l suppor t o f th e Ulste r unionists wa s regarde d a s valuable, 92 thei r ' prejudice an d intoler ance '93 cause d persona l revulsio n amon g man y Britis h conservatives , especially whe n tha t fanaticis m ha d politica l consequences , suc h a s leading th e Ulsterme n t o vot e agains t th e part y a s in 1908 . I n tha t year Ulste r unionist s complaine d tha t som e conservativ e by-electio n candidates wer e payin g insufficien t attentio n t o th e Iris h question ; while o n Ma y 4 , som e Ulste r member s vote d agains t th e part y upo n the licensin g bill . Th e resul t wa s tha t thei r complaint s abou t candidates fel l upo n unfavourabl e ground , Balfour' s secretary , Sandars, tartl y recording : Moreover . . . the actio n of the north of Ireland members in the division on th e licensin g bil l las t nigh t i s no t calculate d t o recommen d their advocacy o f unionis t interest s i n Irelan d t o th e Englis h electorate . I t would hav e bee n regrettabl e that the y shoul d abstain o n a matte r of such interes t t o th e part y a s th e licensin g bill , bu t tha t the y should deliberately vot e agains t thei r party in respec t o f a bil l which applies to England bu t doe s not appl y to Irelan d is outrageous. The y had t o liste n to some very straight talk last evening. 94 00

W. Long , Memories (1923) , passim , thoug h h e exaggerate s th e League's electora l work. Se e als o A . M . Gollin , Proconsul i n politics (1964),p pp. 185-7, 190; and Buckland, pp. 456-8, 461-2. 91

Dod, 1914 . Ther e appea r t o hav e i n 191 4 seve n Britis h M.P. s married int o southern unionist families an d onl y tw o into Ulster unionist families. 92 Lord Cawdo r t o Sandars , i Feb . 1909 , B.M. , Add . M S 49709 , ff. 63- 4. 93 Sandars t o A.J.B. , 1 3 Jan . 1907 , B.M. , Add . M S 49765 , ff. 5-8 . 94 Ibid., 5 May 1908 , ff. 148-51.

The Southern Irish Unionists, 1906-1914 38

3 95

Even apar t fro m suc h issues , th e Ulste r unionist s lacke d tact. On th e othe r hand , souther n unionists , eve r aware o f the wide r issue of th e union, 96 alway s acte d wit h th e unionis t party , movin g easily, like Walter Guinness97 or Edward Goulding, within the party, merging into th e mai n bod y o f unionis t M.P. s an d becomin g activ e an d influential o n th e back-benche s i n a non-controversia l way . O f Edward Goulding , D.L . fo r count y Cork , J.P . fo r London , membe r for Worcester , frien d o f Auste n Chamberlai n an d Bona r La w an d leader o f man y sortie s agains t th e governmen t o n diver s issues, 98 Robert Blak e has truly said that h e was one o f thos e bac k bencher s wh o ar e neve r seriou s aspirant s fo r office , bu t who, b y thei r hospitality , thei r energ y i n part y manoeuvres , thei r lov e of gossip , an d o f intrigu e i n th e bette r sens e o f th e word , exercis e a n influence upo n part y politic s whic h i s ap t t o b e overlooke d b y th e historian."

More significantly, perhaps , althoug h he was a leading tariff reformer , Goulding wa s prepare d i n 1912-1 3 t o subordinat e hi s fiscal views t o the caus e of the union. 100 More politicall y important , afte r 1906 , whe n th e unionis t part y relied upo n th e hous e o f lord s t o redres s th e verdic t o f th e constitu encies, wa s th e Iris h unionis t representatio n i n th e hous e o f lords . Again th e southern, as opposed t o the Ulster , unionist s predominated. In 1914 , fo r instance , 10 4 peer s ha d Iris h interests , 2 8 bein g Iris h representative peers ; an d o f th e total , 8 6 ha d interest s in th e sout h of Ireland , thei r influenc e bein g increase d b y connection s throug h marriage.101 Thi s grou p o f Iris h peers , le d afte r 190 7 b y Lor d Midleton, ha d thei r ow n organisation 102 an d ha d i n th e pas t secured 95

See e.g. lette r o f complain t fro m th e secretar y o f th e Britis h Leagu e for th e Suppor t o f Ulste r an d th e Union , T . Comy n Plat t t o Bate s (sec . of U.U.C.) , 6 Apr. 1914 , P.R.O.N.I., D 1327/4/2 . 96 1.U.A., Annual report, 7907-8 , pp. 9-10. 97 A.C. t o Mary , 21 , 3 0 Nov . 1906 , 16 , 1 8 Ma y 1908 , 1 7 Jun e 1909 , AC 4/1/120 , 122 , 272 , 273, 444. ™Dod, igo8; Sandar s t o A.J.B. , 1 0 Mar . 1910 , B.M. , Add . M S 49766, ff . 161-73 , an d 1 8 Jan . 1911 , ibid. , 49767 , ff . 86-9 ; Blake , ch. V . "Blake, p . 52 . 100 A. M . Gollin , Th e Observer an d / . L . Garvin (1960) , pp . 380-3 .

™Dod, 1914. 102

Midleton's memo , o n hous e o f lord s reform , 2 1 Mar . 1911 , B.M. , Add. M S 49721 , ff . 255-62 . H e say s tha t Iris h peer s 'hav e a goo d organisation, a stron g sens e o f grievanc e an d a scan t belie f i n protectio n by the front bench an d by English colleagues' .

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the defea t o f Salisbury' s government. 103 Thei r ver y numbe r mad e Irish peer s important . Fo r instance , whe n i n 191 1 tw o differen t sections of the opposition were whipping up support for their respective views o n th e parliamen t bill , specia l effort s wer e considere d t o wi n over thes e Iris h peers. 104 Apar t fro m number , thoug h partl y because of it , peer s with Iris h interest s provide d some o f th e mos t prominent and activ e member s of th e unionis t part y i n th e hous e o f lords . I n addition t o leaders like Lansdowne and other members of the ' shadow cabinet', th e Iris h unionists—thoug h th e evidenc e for this is scanty 105 —appear t o hav e bee n th e mainspring s o f wha t mean s existe d fo r consultation between front an d bac k bench opposition peer s on matters of hig h policy . Thi s wa s throug h th e * so-called Donoughmor e committee ', dominated , i t woul d appear , b y Lor d Donoughmore , a n active member of the I.U.A. 106 Irish unionist s als o possesse d considerabl e influenc e i n th e constituency organisations . Thi s can b e partl y attribute d t o th e clos e connections tha t the y maintaine d wit h Grea t Britai n throug h famil y and property; 107 bu t mor e politicall y impellin g wa s th e effec t o f th e anti-home rul e campaig n wage d b y Iris h unionist s a t a tim e whe n conservative organisatio n wa s defective . Th e stat e o f Britis h conser vative organisatio n wa s suc h tha t th e centra l offic e coul d offe r littl e assistance b y wa y o f speaker s o r othe r worker s to loca l associations , who thu s fel t neglecte d an d disgruntled , especiall y when confronted with wha t the y regarde d a s an efficien t radica l machine. 108 Int o this unhappy situation entere d the Irish unionists. The y offere d t o arrang e and t o publicis e meeting s an d t o provid e speakers , canvasser s an d literature, especially at election time , in those areas where a little extra 108

R. B . McDowell , British conservatism, 1832-1914 (1959) , p . 117 . Selborne t o Carson , 2 6 July 1911 , Carso n Papers , P.R.O.N.I . 103 Consisting o f a lette r fro m Lansdown e t o Sandar s relatin g t o unionist polic y an d hous e o f lord s reform , 2 Ma y 1911 , B.M., Add. MS 49730, ff . 236-7 . 104

106

Dod, /p/o ; D.D.E., 24 Apr. 1910; I.U.A. , Annual reports, 1906 1913, appendices. 107 E.g. Midleton, whose famil y ha d lon g hel d estate s i n Cor k an d Surrey, appear s t o hav e bee n i n touc h wit h th e Surre y M.P.s . Se e Midleton t o Carson , 1 1 Nov . 1913, quote d in Colvin , pp. 249-50 . 108 por state of conservative organisation see Sandars to A.J.B., ii Oct . 1909 , B.M. , Add. MS 49766 , ff . 15-6 ; 19 , 2 1 Jan. , 1 8 Mar. , 24 Sept. 1910 , ibid., 49766, ff. 71-4, 75-80, 186-95 , 247-9; '9 °ec. 1910 , ibid., 49767, ff. 44-9; Sandars to Lansdowne , 6 Nov. 1909, ibid. , 49730, ff. 21-6 .

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5

effort migh t possibl y secure the return o f the conservativ e candidate.109 All thi s wa s don e a t ver y little cos t t o th e loca l association, wh o go t the credi t fo r thei r cooperatio n an d wh o coul d fee l tha t the y wer e no longer neglected but rather part of a larger cause. Throughout th e perio d 1906-1 4 th e service s o f th e I.U.A . an d then o f th e Join t Committe e o f th e Unionis t Association s o f Irelan d were i n constan t deman d b y loca l British conservativ e associations,110 with th e resul t tha t th e unionis t part y became tie d a t gras s roots level to th e caus e o f th e Iris h unionists . Th e campaig n ensure d tha t conservative organisations an d candidates maintained a firm opposition to th e variou s stage s o f libera l polic y toward s Ireland; 111 bu t mor e than thi s th e defectiv e stat e o f conservativ e organisatio n i n Grea t Britain and th e efficienc y and persistence of Irish unionis t campaignin g created a feelin g amon g loca l conservative s tha t thei r succes s wa s dependent i n larg e par t upo n th e Iris h unionists . Afte r th e secon d general electio n o f 1910 , i n whic h the Join t Committe e had sen t 27 8 workers into 28 2 British constituencies and had circulate d almost three million pamphlet s an d leaflets, 112 the conservative eastern district agen t in Englan d wrot e t o th e actin g secretar y o f th e I.U.A. : Let m e than k yo u an d thos e wit h yo u fo r th e immens e hel p yo u hav e given us ; m y onl y sorro w bein g that th e result s appea r perhaps to yo u so meagre. Bu t let me assur e you that without your help the conservativ e party at th e presen t moment would not be nearly so strong as they are. 113 Even whe n conservativ e candidate s wer e unsuccessfu l th e Iris h unionists reape d benefit , sometime s receiving very fulsome letter s fro m 109

1.L.P.U., Executiv e council minute book, 1886-9 , 2 5 June, 6 Aug. 1886, 3 0 Sept. 1887 ; I.U.A. , Annual report, igo6-7, pp. 16-17 ; I.U.A. , Finance committee minute book, 2, 15 Apr. 1907, P.R.O.N.I., D 989/4/1; minute boo k o f th e Join t Committe e o f th e Unionis t Association s of Ireland, passim. 110 See e.g . minut e boo k o f th e Join t Committe e o f th e Unionis t Associations of Ireland, 3 1 Dec. 1908, 1 9 Oct. 1911 . 111 E.g. afte r th e Join t Committe e ha d decide d t o ste p u p it s campaign i n 1913-14 , particularl y in respec t o f th e distributio n of (free ) literature, th e U.A.I.' s easter n agen t wa s able t o repor t tha t ' a goo d many o f th e Secretaries ' o f conservativ e club s an d readin g rooms ha d undertaken to ' have prominently displayed ' the U.A.I.'s literatur e and that * many agents . . . are a t presen t enga ged in makin g a specia l antihome rul e campaig n i n thei r division' , minut e boo k o f th e Join t Committee o f th e Unionis t Association s o f Ireland , 2 0 Feb. 1914 . 112 Bate's repor t o n genera l election work, ibid. , 4 Jan . 1911 . 118 Quoted in Ball's report, ibid., 4 Jan. 1911 .

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grateful candidate s o r thei r agent s askin g th e organisatio n t o ' keep yourself in readiness agains t futur e demand s by me V14 What thes e an d simila r letters 115 signif y i s that th e Iris h unionist s had th e organisatio n an d goo d wil l i n a goo d numbe r o f Britis h constituencies t o convert, 116 wit h th e hel p o f thei r powe r i n th e unionist parliamentary party , tha t dislik e of compromise , norma l i n constituency politics, into a party revolt , should the unionist leadership consider a policy not acceptable to them. (2) I t wa s not, however , tha t th e unionis t party' s attitud e o n th e Irish questio n wa s a mer e cynica l respons e t o th e persisten t politica l pressures o f Iris h unionism . A secon d reaso n fo r th e opposition' s attachment t o th e Iris h unionis t caus e wa s tha t tha t caus e wa s acceptable t o Britis h conservatives . Th e Iris h unionis t cas e appeale d to th e mor e imperially-minde d member s o f th e opposition , fo r Iris h unionists wer e carefu l t o link home rul e with the disintegratio n o f th e empire.117 Thi s was to the benefit o f Irish unionist s in general; but th e southern unionis t cas e mad e a n especia l appea l t o th e opposition . Whereas th e Ulste r cas e undoubtedl y mad e a direc t appea l t o me n like Law 118 an d t o Scottis h nonconformists, 119 th e souther n unionis t case ha d a wide r appea l t o thos e lande d Britis h conservative s wh o comprised th e mos t effectiv e par t o f th e entir e oppositio n party. 120 114

Letter fro m th e defeate d unionis t candidat e i n th e Wes t Lothian by-election, 1913 , quote d in Bates' s Scottis h report , minute boo k o f th e Joint Committe e o f th e Unionis t Associations o f Ireland , 1 8 Nov . 1913 . 115 See e.g. ibid., 1 8 Jan. 1911, 4 Aug. 1914. 116 In Englan d from Septembe r 1911 t o th e middl e o f July 191 4 th e Joint Committe e o f th e Unionis t Associations o f Irelan d organised over 5,000 meetings, canvassed 1,246,225 doubtfu l voter s in ove r 20 0 constituencies an d assiste d a t 2 3 conteste d elections . I n th e sam e perio d i n Scotland 3,84 3 meeting s wer e held , 205,65 4 doubtfu l voter s wer e can vassed an d ai d wa s give n i n 1 0 by-elections . A n estimate d 6 million booklets, leaflet s an d pamphlet s wer e distribute d throughou t Grea t Britain i n thes e months. Se e minute book o f th e Join t Committee o f th e Unionist Associations of Ireland , passim. 117 See e.g . th e speec h b y Chamberlain' s theorist, Professo r Hewins , at I.U.A . a.g.m., 1913 , D.D.E., 25 Apr. 1913. 118 Blake, p . 17-22 . 119 See e.g . repor t o f th e activit y o f th e Unionis t Association s of Ireland a t the Leith by-election in The Times, 26 Feb. 1914. 120 W. L . Guttsmann, 'The changin g social structur e of th e British political elite , 1886-1935' , British Journal o f Sociology, i i (1951) , pp . 122-4; Guttsmann, 'Aristocracy and middle classes in the British political

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7

There existe d betwee n th e lande d an d aristocrati c souther n unionists and Britis h conservative s a genera l sympath y symbolise d in th e clos e attachment o f Walte r Long , th e epitom e o f th e Englis h countr y gentleman,121 to the southern unionis t cause . I n th e twentieth century this sympath y wa s al l th e stronge r whe n th e lande d classe s i n bot h Great Britai n an d Irelan d fel t unde r pressure , Souther n unionists , fearing tha t unde r hom e rul e thei r estate s woul d b e heavil y taxed , if no t confiscated , insiste d upon identifyin g th e unio n a s th e barrie r to socialism. 122 Pu t thi s way, their appea l coul d hardl y fai l t o arous e a warm response among landed men like Walter Long, who was under pressure an d havin g t o sel l par t o f hi s estates, 123 an d amon g ol d conservatives suc h a s the fift h marqui s o f Salisbury, wh o wa s anxiou s to rall y ' cautious me n wh o wil l joi n m e i n resistanc e t o restles s change V 24 (3) A third reaso n is , however, necessar y to complet e th e explan ation o f how the Iris h unionis t viewpoint could dominate th e thinking of a majo r Britis h part y afte r 1906 , eve n a t time s whe n th e libera l government wer e tryin g t o avoi d th e Iris h question . Wer e ther e no t any othe r Britis h issue s upon whic h the unionis t part y coul d tak e a united an d fruitfu l stand ? Th e plai n trut h wa s that ther e wer e not . British conservatis m wa s split , i f no t exhausted , b y a n internecin e dispute ove r th e questio n o f tarif f reform ; bu t neithe r factio n wa s sufficiently i n sympath y wit h th e liberal s t o deser t completel y th e unionist party , an d bot h wer e determine d t o conver t th e undecide d mass o f th e part y t o thei r respectiv e viewpoints. Ther e were , there fore, tw o factions , bot h i n differen t degree s o n th e defensive , an d a party leade r searchin g fo r commo n ground . Suc h circumstance s provided a splendi d opportunit y fo r a well-organise d an d well-place d body with a clearly defined objec t and a simple and acceptabl e appea l to insinuate itself an d its views into the party an d to become dominant. elite, 1886-1916' , ibid. , v (1954) , pp . 12-32 . Fo r a n interestin g illustra tion o f suc h statistica l evidenc e se e Ld . Mount-Edgecomb e t o A.C. , 18 Jan. 1909 , an d A.G . to Mount-Edgecombe , 19 Jan. 1909 , A C iy/3 / 75-6121 See Petrie, Walter Long, passim; Lon g t o A.C. , 6 June, 6, 7 July 1905, A C 16/3/62-3 , 65 , concernin g the workin g o f th e 190 3 lan d ac t on terms favourable to the Irish unionists. 122 Lords Ardilau n an d Longfor d reporte d in D.D.E., 29 Aug. 1908 , 23 Apr. 1910. 123

F. S . L . Thompson , English landed society i n th e nineteenth century (1963) , p . 322 . 124

Salisbury to A.G., 12 Feb. 1910, AC 8/5/10.

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Licensing an d denominationalis m wer e th e tw o othe r issue s whic h separated th e conservative s fro m th e liberals ; but , thoug h i t i s ironi c to not e tha t withou t th e hom e rule questio n th e nationalist s woul d have bee n incline d t o vot e wit h th e conservative s o n thes e tw o othe r issues, bot h interest s ha d politica l o r electora l drawbacks . Iris h unionism o n th e othe r han d ha d organisation , powe r throughou t th e party an d a generall y acceptabl e appea l t o tak e advantag e o f th e vacuum created by the fiscal dispute.125 Although Iris h unionist s i n th e mai n accepte d th e nee d fo r fiscal change, thei r prim e concer n wa s the maintenanc e o f the union . A s a body the y di d no t tak e any par t i n th e controvers y ove r th e merit s of fiscal reform, bu t concentrate d o n keeping the party united an d rallie d to it s leaders. Thi s they di d i n tw o related ways : b y encouraging th e unionist leader s t o avoi d eithe r extreme ; an d b y ensurin g tha t n o reliable or talented opponents o f the libera l government wer e excluded from th e part y o r fro m parliamen t o n accoun t o f thei r fisca l views . Their hop e wa s tha t bot h fre e trader s an d tarif f reformer s ' would declare full y fo r th e maintenanc e o f the unio n an d unionis t principle s first '. 12f> Thi s expectatio n wa s realised , fo r th e Iris h unionist s cam e to b e regarded a s a useful bod y of support i n the party and th e middl e fiscal cours e wa s hardl y a platform . Thu s th e ne t resul t o f thei r mediation wa s that th e Iris h unionist s succeeded in attachin g no t onl y both fisca l wings , bu t als o th e whol e party , t o thei r cause . There ar e man y instance s of this process o f attachment, 127 but th e best documente d example of the wa y in whic h Iris h unionist s ensure d that thei r view s would prevai l an d o f th e wa y i n whic h th e division s of Britis h conservatism assiste d them is the Kenda l by-electio n o f 1913 . The fac t tha t thi s by-election occurred i n the midst o f the struggle over the thir d hom e rul e bil l onl y increase s it s significanc e a s committin g the oppositio n t o th e Iris h unionis t interpretatio n o f th e Iris h question. 125 126

See Buckland, pp . 576-605 . The Times, 2 Nov . 1905 ; se e als o Londonderr y t o A.G. , 5 Nov . 1905, A C 17/3/14 , 16 ; Londonderry to A.J.B. , 5 Nov. 1905 , B.M., Add. MS127 49802, ff. 101-2. See e.g . th e wa y i n whic h Lon g helpe d Balfou r t o avoi d fisca l amendments t o th e Address , A.J.B . t o A.G. , 9 Feb . 1907 , A C 7/6/18 ; the wa y Iris h unionist s rallie d suppor t fo r Law' s leadershi p in 1912-13 , Buckland, pp . 595-8 ; an d th e wa y i n whic h Lon g negotiate d between unionist fre e trad e candidates and th e party organisation, Long to A.J.B., 29 Dec. 1907 , B.M. , Add. MS 49776 , ff. 229-34, an d R . Ceci l to A.J.B. , 16, 2 1 Mar . 1909 , ibid., 49737, ff. 90-1, 92-4 .

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Colonel Westo n wa s selecte d o n 8 Marc h 191 3 a s conservativ e candidate fo r th e vacanc y i n th e Kenda l divisio n o f Westmoreland , caused by the deat h o f the sitting conservative member , Colone l Bagot . He wa s chose n a s a n influentia l an d activ e loca l man , fo r year s interested i n loca l governmen t an d affair s an d a larg e employe r o f labour i n th e district . Appealin g a s ' Westmoreland bor n an d bred', and fightin g th e governmen t o n it s declare d polic y a s a whole , h e seemed t o b e a n idea l candidate. 128 Th e onl y difficult y wa s that h e was a fre e trader , i n favou r o f th e the n existin g fisca l system . Loca l conservative leader s wer e awar e o f this an d no t a t al l perturbed. ' By postponing tarif f refor m w e hav e knocke d ou r radica l friend s of f their perch' , wa s th e rac y commen t o f th e chairma n o f th e loca l executive.129 The centra l organiser s o f th e conservativ e movemen t i n Grea t Britain di d not se e it thi s way. Onl y i n December ha d th e party bee n brought t o a standstill ove r the tarif f question , an d a compromise ha d been patche d up . Th e arden t tarif f reformers , no t please d wit h tha t compromise, wer e fumin g withi n th e part y an d temper s wer e mounting.130 Shoul d th e unionis t leadershi p countenanc e furthe r withdrawals fro m th e polic y o f tarif f reform , th e effect s upo n th e party wer e unpredictable . Therefor e sinc e th e selectio n o f Colone l Weston an d th e publicatio n o f hi s fisca l views , the centra l offic e ha d been negotiating wit h th e local leaders in the hope of devising a means of escape. 131 Colone l Westo n wa s not , however , willin g t o declar e himself i n agreemen t wit h th e part y o n th e fisca l question ; an d hi s committee stoo d b y him . Therefor e th e centra l offic e repudiate d Weston, it s thre e agent s an d twent y speakers , sen t befor e hi s fiscal views were known, being withdrawn. 132 This repudiatio n an d withdrawa l lef t onl y th e twent y workers of the Unionis t Association s o f Ireland , wh o ha d bee n a t wor k i n th e constituency sinc e th e openin g o f th e campaign . Th e Iris h unionist s did no t judg e a candidat e b y hi s fiscal views an d wer e anxiou s t o 128

The Times, 8, 1 2 Mar . 1913 . Ibid., 1 2 Mar . 1913 . 130 See e.g . A.C . t o Mary , fo r Jan . an d Feb. , bu t especiall y 8-9 , 1 6 Mar. 1913 , AC 4/1/942, 948. 131 Speech b y La w (ironically ) a t Mancheste r Fre e Trad e Hal l o n 18 Mar. , reporte d i n Th e Times, 1 9 Mar . 1913 ; als o electio n report , ibid., 1 5 Mar . 1913 . 182 The Times, 14 , 1 5 Mar. 1913 . 129

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prevent th e return o f home rule candidates. 133 ' The simple fac t that Colonel Westo n wa s oppose d t o th e governmen t mad e hi m worth y of support' , commente d on e Iris h unionist. 134 Therefor e th e Join t Committee's worker s under th e norther n agen t remaine d a s Weston's ' mainstay in speakers and canvassers '. Westo n appreciated thi s hel p and o n 1 7 March , fou r day s afte r th e withdrawa l o f centra l offic e support, wrot e t o th e headquarter s o f th e associatio n i n Dubli n thanking them for their assistance and declarin g that h e would regar d his return as a victory for the union.135 The sequenc e o f event s i s mos t important . Westo n ha d begu n his campaig n a s a fre e trader , allegedl y a s an advocat e o f th e settle ment o f hom e rul e b y consent , takin g a s his main plan k compulsor y military training . A t first the contes t revolve d aroun d thi s issue; eve n the Irish nationalis t M.P., wh o came to speak for the liberal candidate , took a s hi s tex t no t th e blessing s o f hom e rule , bu t th e evil s of con scription barrack-lif e o n th e continent. 136 The n o n 1 3 Marc h th e central offic e withdre w it s worker s fro m th e constituency . Afte r h e became thu s dependen t upo n Iris h unionis t support , Westo n adopte d as hi s chie f plan k oppositio n t o hom e rule . H e wa s returned wit h a majority o f 58 1 an d th e Iris h unionist s dul y reape d thei r reward — notice that h e wrote to the southern unionis t office—Weston declarin g ' if wit h God' s hel p m y retur n shoul d assis t th e loyalist s o f Ireland , I shal l indee d b e truly thankfu l V 37 Althoug h thos e wh o disliked th e ' whole-hoggers' wer e please d a t th e Iris h unionists ' independen t support fo r Weston, 138 i t mus t b e admitte d tha t th e polic y wa s no t without it s danger s fo r Iris h unionis t relation s wit h th e tarif f reformers.139 Weston' s success , however, offset an y hostility that might have spread , th e mas s o f th e unionis t part y bein g gratefu l fo r th e Irish unionists ' contributio n t o the party's success. 140 Clearl y the fiscal dispute gav e Iris h unionist s a n opportunit y whic h the y wer e quic k to grasp . 133

Irish Times, 18 Mar. 1913. The Times, 20 Mar. 1913 . 135 The Times, 18 Mar. 1913 . 136 Ibid., 12 , 1 3 Mar. 1913 . ™The Times, 20 Mar . 1913 ; minut e boo k o f th e Join t Committee of th138 e Unionis t Associations of Ireland, 21 Apr. 1913. Sandars t o A.J.B., 2 3 Mar. 1913 , B.M., Add. MS 49768, ff . 42-5. 189 A.C. to Mary, 16 Mar. 1913, AC 4/1/948. 140 See e.g. leader comment in The Times, 20 Mar. 1913. 134

The Southern Irish Unionists, 1906-1914 39

1

Another circumstanc e assiste d th e Iris h unionist s whe n th e thir d home rul e bil l wa s bein g discussed . I n 191 1 th e unionis t part y ha d allowed th e parliamen t bil l t o pas s throug h th e hous e o f lords , a n action characterise d b y some a s surrender. Th e resul t wa s to increas e that feeling of futility engendere d b y the fisca l disput e and t o intensif y a determinatio n o n th e par t o f a significan t sectio n o f th e unionis t party not to compromise on home rule.141 Just i n cas e an y unionis t di d flir t wit h hom e rule , ther e wa s a n incident t o remin d hi m o f th e influenc e tha t Iris h unionist s could , and would , exer t withi n th e party , shoul d the y fee l tha t the y wer e being betrayed . Thi s wa s th e famou s ' devolution crisis ' o r ' MacDonnell mystery' , which , i f i t di d no t brin g dow n Balfour' s government i n 1905 , certainl y paralyse d th e oppositio n i n igoG. 142 Balfour clearl y remembere d th e incident 143 an d i t i s a tribut e t o th e power o f th e Iris h unionist s that , whe n i n 191 0 a fe w member s of the oppositio n wer e canvassin g federalism , Balfou r forwarde d t o Austen Chamberlai n ' a pai r o f Iris h unionis t letters—th e first drop s in th e stor m whic h wil l assuredl y break over u s if an y ne w departur e be admitted'. 144 Of thes e Iris h unionist s th e souther n unionist s wer e th e mor e influential i n term s o f conservativ e politics , givin g th e conservativ e party i n Great Britai n a politically impelling commitment on the Iris h question. Thi s fac t ha d seriou s consequence s fo r Britis h an d Iris h politics, an d help s t o explai n th e so-calle d failur e o f British statesmen to solv e th e Iris h questio n fo r man y years . Th e agitatio n o f th e southern unionist s in British politics delayed the most rationa l solutio n to th e proble m o f reconcilin g th e aspiration s o f th e large r nationalis t majority i n Irelan d wit h th e prejudice s an d interest s o f th e Ulste r protestants. Furthermore , sinc e th e liberal s ha d a n equall y impellin g but opposit e commitmen t o n th e Iris h question , th e existenc e o f a n united an d activ e unionis t opinio n i n th e sout h of Ireland allowe d th e Irish questio n t o influenc e an d embitte r Britis h politics , especiall y after 1912 . Anxiou s t o defen d th e souther n unionists , an d feelin g magnanimous in their defence , th e conservativ e party in Grea t Britain 141

Law, 'Notes on conversation wit h th e P.M.' , 1 5 Oct. 1913 , quoted in Blake , pp. 161-2 . 142 Buckland, pp . 607-20 , base d mainly upo n a file of letter s relating to th e 'mystery ' amon g A.C.' s correspondence , ACy/4 passim , an d Sandars to A.J.B., B.M., Add. MS 49764, passim. 148 A.J.B. t o Gawdor , 7 Jan. 1909 , B.M. , Add . M S 49709, ff. 59-60. 144 AJ.B. to A.C., 27 Oct. 1910 , AC 10/2/10 .

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was willing to condone th e direc t actio n o f the Ulster unionist s and t o countenance othe r scarcely constitutional steps. Onl y with the altere d conditions o f Britis h politica l lif e afte r th e wa r an d wit h th e disunit y of souther n unionist s coul d th e partitio n o f Irelan d becom e practica l politics an d th e Iris h questio n b e take n ou t o f Britis h politics .

INDEX Abercorn, Duke of , 337 , 35 6 Acland, A.H.D. , 251 , 269 , 27 1 Adams, W.G.S., 29 9 agricultural labourers , 23 , 182-3 , 214, 32 6 agricultural problem s (depression , distress) , 24, 33,35,37,42,59,65 Akers-Douglas, A., 33 2 'All-for-Ireland League' , 195 , 31 4 'All Ireland' Catholic Association , 190 , 194 Amery, L.S, 307,309 , 315 Amnesty Association , 38, 42, 45 Ancient Orde r o f Hibernians, 194- 5 Anderson, R. , 22- 3 Annual Register, 7, 14 anthem, 6-8, 15-1 9 Anti-Contagious Acts Association, 240 Anti-Corn La w League, 244, 252 , 26 0 Anti-Parnellites, 187- 8 Antonelli, Cardinal, 122 , 141 , 157 , 160- 1 Ardilaum, Lord, 36 0 Arnold, A., 27 9 Arnold, M. , 240 Arnold Forster, H.O., 36 1 'Articles Club', 26 9 Ashbourne Act (1885), 350 Ashbourne, Baron , 38 0 Asquith, H.H. , 269, 281 , 285, 288-9 , 293 , 297-8, 303, 307-8 , 312-13, 315-16, 375 6 athletics, 95-9, 101 , 105 , 107- 9 Bagehot, W., 223 Bagot, Colonel, 388 Balfour, A.J. , 115 , 238 , 322 , 349, 351-61 , 363,374,381,390 Balfour, G. , 359-60, 36 3 Ballot Act (1872) , 33-5 , 37 , 49, 51 , 55-9 Banbury, Sir F., 312 Baptist, The, 259 , 266- 7 Barran, R. , 293 Barry, W., 10 2 Barrymore, Lord, 360 , 37 7 Bear, W.E., 242 Belfast Catholi c Association , 190-1 Belfast News-Letter, 33 6 Bendix, R., 63 Bennett, E. , 112-14 Berrington, H. , 264

Biggar, J., 10 1 Birrell, A., 192-4 , 269 , 297 , 301-8 , 31 3 Blake, R., 382 Blennerhassett, R.P. , 49-54 Blennerhassett, Si r R., 55 Blunt, Sir W. , 302, 319 , 32 8 Boer War, 286,288, 29 4 Boland, J.,97 Borrow, G., 36 Bourne, Archbishop F. , 192 Bowles, T.G. , 29 8 Bracken, J.K., 97, 102 , 104 , 106-7 , 112 Bradlaugh,C.,278, 280, 33 4 Bradley, J.A., 113 Bright, J., 51, 147 , 149 , 161 , 164 , 213 , 2234,252,256, 265 Broderick, St. J. (Lor d Midleton) , 324-5, 356 , 368-9,372,378,380,382 Brotherhood of St. Patrick, 123- 4 Browne, Bishop , 12 0 Browne, G., 45 Bryce, J., 193,271,30 2 Buckingham Palac e Conference, 37 4 Buller, SirR., 351 Bunting, P., 271 Burns, J., 266, 30 6 Burt, T., 280 Butler, Bishop , 14 4 Butler, J., 104 Butler, Sir T., 37 0 Butt, I., 38-9, 42-3 , 46, 48-9, 58 , 83-4 , 234 , 321-2,324 Buxton, S., 269 Caine,W.S., 249, 263,272 , 276 Cairnes, I.E., 206, 209 , 220 , 222 , 228- 9 Callan, P., 45 Campbell, G., 234- 5 Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H., 247, 255 , 288 , 291-2,322 Carew, J.L. , 35 3 Carnarvon, Lord , 329-3 0 Carson, Sir E., 309, 361 , 375-8 , 38 0 Castledown, Lord , 357, 359 Castlereagh, Viscount, 323- 4 Castlerosse, Lord , 5 2 Catholics, Catholicism , 5-6, 10, 13, 16, 378, 43-4, 48, 50, 56-8, 64 , 66-9, 73, 120-4, 127, 135-7 , 141 , 143-4 , 150 , 157, 162 , 165 , 168 , 191-2 , 196, 199 ,

394

Reactions to Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914

217, 220-1 , 321 , 334 , 339 , 342 , 366 Catholic Association , 6 7 Catholic Church, 36, 42, 47, 59, 67, 73, 143 , 156-7, 159 , 161 , 164 , 168-9 , 176,181 , 187-8, 192 , 195 , 197 , 201-3 , 207 , 220 , 338 Catholic Emancipation, 10-11 , 57, 73, 119 , 206-7, 338 Catholic Young Men's Society, 31-2 Causton, R.K. , 272 Cecil, Lor d H., 30 9 Celtic Times, 107 Centenary o f 179 8 Rebellion , 28 7 Central Board Scheme , 348 Chalmers, R., 303 Chamberlain, A. , 374, 382 , 39 0 Chamberlain, J., 240-3 , 245 , 249, 251-3 , 259, 262, 265, 267-70 , 279 , 283, 287 , 294, 299-300 , 330 , 332 , 348-50, 352-5 , 359,361,363 Chaplin, H. , 326 Childers, E., 30 2 Childers, H.,300 Churchill, B. , 323, 33 7 Churchill, Lor d R. , 319-45 passim, 349, 363 Churchill, Sir W.S., 303, 323 , 340- 2 citizen army, 15 , 17 Clerkenwell explosion, 211-12 Clonbrook, Lord , 360 Cobden, R., 244 coercion, 66, 239 , 263, 292 , 295, 327 , 336,342,359,367 Confederation o f Kilkenny, 5 Coffey, Bishop , 172 Cole, G.D.H., 259 Collings, J., 25 0 Collins, Sergeant , 11 4 Compensation fo r Tenants' Improvements , 130-1, 133 , 137 , 139 , 145 , 147-8 , 155 , 206,210,214,229,235 Congested Districts Board, 169, 17 2 Connaught Telegraph, 71 conscription, 20 1 Conservative(s), party, 38, 40-50, 52, 55-7, 84, 118-19 , 131 , 134 , 144 , 148-9 , 155 7, 163 , 165 , 178 , 190 , 192-3 , 217-18, 223, 227 , 229, 230 , 239 , 242 , 261,278 , 298, 321 , 325 , 328-32 , 336-40 , 342-4 , 347-9, 352-3 , 355, 358-9 , 366-8 , 373, 379,381,383-8,390 Constructive (Enlightened ) Unionism, 323 , 325,340-2,344,347 Contemporary Review, 251 Cooke, E.T.,292

Co-operative Movement , 167 , 170-8 , 180-5 Cork Examiner, 12 , 113 , 17 5 Cork Exhibition, 17 1 Cornford, J., 265 Corrigan, Sir D., 44 Councils Bill (1907), 193,29 5 Cowper Commission, 351 Crewe, Lord, 291,294 Croke, Archbisho p T. , 96-7, 100-1, 1035,107,109,111,114,187 Cullen, Cardinal P., 21, 47, 117-18 , 120 , 123-38,140-7, 149-6 5 Cunningham Graham , R.B., 266 Curragh Incident, 366 Curtis, L.P. , Jr. , 23 9 Cusack, M., 95-100, 102- 3 Dahrendorf, R., 63, 74 Daily News, 225,227-9 Daily Record and Mail, 29 2 Daly, J. (Limerick) , 25 D'Arcy, M., 56 Daunt, W.J.O'N., 21,35 Davies,J.,62, 64- 5 Davin, M., 96, 98, 102-5 , 107 , 109 , 112 13 Davis, T., 7, 95, 127 , 19 6 Davitt, M. , 69-70, 73 , 96, 101 , 104-5 , 111 , 178,196 Dawson, C., 11-12, 14 Dease, E., 50-1,53, 55 Delane, J.T.,224,231 Democratic Labou r Federation , 182 Denieffe, J.,2 4 Denny, Mr., 53 Denvir,Dr., 130 Department o f Agriculture an d Technica l Instruction, 17 1 Derby, Lord, 148, 152,21 0 Deutsch, K.,63 Devlin,!., 194 Devoy, J., 22-4, 6 9 Dicey, A.V., 290, 354-5; England's Case Against Home Rule, 290 Discontent Thesis , 62-6, 74- 5 Digby, K., 55 Digby,M.,173,175,179 Dilke, Sir C., 26 9 Dillon, J.B., 126, 128-30 , 133 , 137-9,141 , 146-8, 155 Dillon, J., 178, 187 , 194-5 , 202, 186-7 , 189,292,306-8,362 Dineen, F.B., 104 , 106 , 108 , 11 3 Disestablishment, 125 , 127 , 130-1 , 136 ,

Index

395

Eyre, E.J., 21 2 141-2, 144 , 146 , 149-50 , 153, 155-7 , 159-63,213,323 Fabians, 253 , 269 , 273 , 279 Disraeli, B., 32, 165 , 210 , 231 , 320 , 323, 344 farmers, tenan t farmers , 23-4, 31, 54, 61-2 , Donoughmore, Lord , 38 3 64-74, 80, 83, 86-9 , 92-3, 163, 172-3, Dorrian, Dr., 130, 133 , 138-9 , 14 6 175-7, 179-83 , 205 , 208-10 , 214-17 , 222, Doughty, G., 287 224,227,230,232-3,235 Douglas, C, 293, 295 Feierabend, I. and R. , 62, 64, 75 Downing, M., 38, 48, 13 8 Fenian(s), Fenianism , 3-4 , 6-8, 21-33 , 35-42 , Drummond, T., 131 45-6, 48, 50-2 , 55, 58, 69-70, 95-7, 100 Dublin Castle, 8, 22, 26, 101-2 , 108 , 151-3 , 290 , 15, 117-26, 128-30 , 132 , 141-3 , 145 , 147, 321,339,350,356 149, 151-4 , 156, 158-9 , 161, 164 , 197 , Dublin Cit y flag , 14 , 19 201, 205-11 , 214 , 216-17 , 224, 228, 342 Dublin Corporation, 13-1 4 Fermoy, Lord, 30 Dublin Evening Mail, 44 festivals, 8- 9 Dublin Nationa l Exhibitio n (1882) , 3, 11 Finlay, Fr., 173- 4 Dublin Review, 127 Firth, J.F.B., 27 7 Dufferin, Lord , 46, 22 9 Fitzgerald, P.N., 96, 104 , 108 , 110-1 5 Duffy, C.G. , 129 , 135,13 9 Fitzgerald, V., 47 Duggan, Bishop, 97 Fitzgibbon, G., 321-2, 33 5 Dunbar, J. , 103 Fitzroy, Si r A., 31 7 Dwyer, Bishop, 172, 183 , 191-3 , 198- 9 Fogarty, Bisho p M., 19 8 Ford, J.C. , 11 2 Easter Monda y (1916), 19 8 Easter Risin g (1916), 15-16 , 18 , 197-8 , 202 , 317 Forster, W.E.,32 2 Fortescue, C., 39,210, 230 Eastern Question , 245 , 24 9 Fortnightly Review, 235 Ecclesiastical Title s Bill , 119 , 125 , 14 1 Fowler, H.H. , 243-4, 256, 26 9 Economist, The, 223 , 225, 227-8 Fowler, Si r H., 288, 291- 3 education, 42-3, 46-8, 50-1 , 55 , 82, 120, 125 , Fox, C.J. , 25 0 127-8, 130 , 141 , 145-6 , 149 , 150 , 153 , Freeman, T.W. , 66 155, 157-62 , 190-4 , 199 , 200 , 207 , 220 , Frewen, R.J., 106 , 11 3 288,337,342 Fuller, J., 293-4 Education Act (1870), 24 3 Furlong, Dr. , 14 9 Edwards, F. , 276 Edwards, O.D., 6 Gael, The, 10 7 Edwards, R.D., 11 8 Gaelic Athletic Association, 31 , 95-115 Eighty Club, 192- 3 Gaelic League, 97, 193 , 19 6 Elections (Ireland) , 35-6, 38-41 , 43 , 45Gallagher,?., 175, 17 7 58, 70, 80-1, 84-6 , 89 , 141 , 148-9 , Garibaldi, G., 125 , 142-3 , 151,15 4 162, 199 , 201- 2 General Post Office , Dublin, 1 6 Ellice, E. , 293 George, H., 276 Ellis, T. , 269-71 Geschwender, J., 62 Emmott, A., 294- 5 Gilloohy, Bishop, 120 , 13 0 Empire, 207 , 209 , 212,21 7 Gilmartin, Archbishop, 202 English Amateu r Athletic Association, 95 Gladstone, Henry, 299 Ennis, M. , 30 7 Gladstone, Herbert , 253 , 257 , 28 8 Ensor, Sir R., 33, 42 Gladstone, W.E., 35, 37, 41, 43, 46, 48, Escott, T.H.S. , 32 3 55, 117,121,142,155, 160-5,209, Esmonde, Si r J., 55 220, 224, 229-31, 234-5 , 239-41 , 243 Established Church (Church o f Ireland), 156-8 , 6, 248-60 , 262-3 , 274, 280, 282-3 , 285 160-1,227,231 7, 289-93, 295 , 298-301 , 304, 319 , Evans, H., 26 1 332-3, 339, 341 , 347-50 , 363, 37 8 Evening Standard, 31 5 Gorst, I.E., 336 evictions, 61-2, 64-6 , 74,16 3 Governing Passion, The, 319 , 342, 34 4 Extension o f the Franchis e Bil l (1866), Goulding, E., 382 147-8

396

Reactions to Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914

Grand juries, 79, 81-2, 347-9 , 354- 5 Grattan,H., 34, 10 , 12,196 Grattan's Parliament, 10 , 12 Gray, E.D., 14 , 107 Gray, Sir J., 10 , 126,132,234 Greville-Nugent, G.F., 4 4 Greville-Nugent, R., 41- 2 Grey, Lord, 250 Grey, Sir E., 269, 285 , 288-9 , 293 , 30 6 Guinness, W., 382 Gurr, T., 62 Gwyn, W.B., 34 Haldarie, R.B., 250-1 , 258 , 269 , 278-80 , 285-6, 288-9, 29 3 Hamer, D.A., 259, 26 8 Hamilton, Lor d C, 337 Hamilton, Lor d E.W. , 336 Hamilton, Si r E.W., 293-4 Hamilton, Lor d G., 325, 32 9 Hamilton family , 33 7 Hamilton, Si r R., 351 Hammond, J.L. , 3 4 Hanham, H.J., 34, 239-4 0 Harcourt, Sir W., 253-5, 282-3, 286- 7 harp, 5, 16 , 19 Hardie, K., 266 Hardy, G., 230- 1 Harmsworth, A., 294 Harrington, T.C. , 25 3 Hartigan, J. , 27 Hartington, Lord , 39, 42, 45, 50-1, 55 , 241 , 289, 322 , 331 , 333 , 348 , 354 , 361 , 380 Harrison, F., 268 Haslam, L. , 311-13 Hauser, P., 75 Hawarden Kite, 34 9 Hayes, C., 18 Healy, Fr., 321- 2 Healy, Archbishop J., 189, 191 Healy, M., 353 Healy, T.M., 188-9, 194-5 , 334- 5 Henry VIII, 5 Henry, Bishop H., 190- 1 Henry, M. , 47,49 Hern, D.C., 40 Heyck, T.W., 29 2 Hibernian Bank , 13 Hicks Beach, Sir M., 321, 329 , 339 , 349 52 Hill, Lor d A. , 335 Hinds, J.T. , 3 7 Hoctor, P.T., 96 , 104,106, 110-14 Hocker, P. , 104

Hogan, Alderman, 110, 113 Holmes, H., 328-9 Home Governmen t Associatio n (League), 42-3 , 45-7,55-6,58,84 Home Rule, 191 , 193-4 , 197-8 , 237-8 , 244-55 , 257-60, 2624, 266-9, 271-93 , 295 , 297 315, 319-20 , 324-33, 335, 339 , 341-2 , 344-5, 347-9 , 358-60, 365-8, 372-3 , 375-9, 386-7, 389-9 0 Home Rul e Bil l (1886), 246, 272 , 299-300 , 304,319-20,339,349 -, (1893) , 255, 257 , 289-90, 298-301 , 304 , 316,341 -, (1912/1914) , 195 , 200 , 295, 297-8 , 301 17, 325, 365-6 , 368, 374 , 376 , 387, 39 0 Home Rule finance , 297-31 7 Home Rul e Movement (Association, League), 2-3,7,39,43-5,47-9,51-8,82 House of Commons, 9,14, 40, 117,133,146, 154,160-1,163, 206-9, 218 , 220-1 , 223, 226 , 229-33 , 247 , 255 , 262 , 273 , 280 , 283, 286, 291 , 309 , 312-13 , 315 , 325 , 338 , 378,380,383 House of Lords, 192, 255-7 , 260, 267-8 , 275 , 282,286,294-5,364,390 Howell, G.,26 1 Hughes, T., 211, 219, 223- 4 Hughes,!., 211,219, 223-4 Hyde, D., 196 Ilbert, Sir C., 30 8 Imperial Federatio n League , 290 Incumbered Estates Bill, 206 Independent Brigade , 37 Independent Iris h Party.(1850s), 120, 129,132 , 135-6,140 Invincibles, 10 8 Irish Agricultural Organisation Society , 171-4 , 179,360 Irish Amateu r Athleti c Association , 99-101 , 105 Irish Athleti c Association , 99 Irish Catholic, 17 1 Irish Churc h Ac t (1869), 33, 36, 42 Irish College, Rome , 120,141 Irish Conventio n (1917), 200-1, 297 Irish Co-operative Dairy and Agricultura l Societies, 17 3 Irish Cycling Association , 99 Irish Ecclesiastical Record, 15 6 Irish Felon, 46 Irish Football Association , 9 8 Irish Freedom, 1 7 Irish-Ireland, 196-7, 201 Irish Labou r Movement , 15, 29

Index Irish Land, The, 23 5 Irish Loya l and Patriotic Union , 369 , 373 Irish Party, 2-4 , 6-13, 15 , 17-19 , 34-5 , 52 , 52, 54, 59, 67, 81 , 83, 117-19 , 158-9 , 187-9, 191-2 , 194-202 , 237 , 286-7, 293, 325-6, 328-9 , 333 , 336 , 349 , 360, 373 , 389 Irish People, 24 , 27, 29, 31, 130 , 132 , 135 , 143 Irish Times, 44, 136 Irish Transport and Genera l Workers' Union, 15 Irish Unionist Alliance, 368-74, 376-8 , 380, 383-4 Irish Volunteers, 3, 17, 197- 8 Irish vote, in Britain, 237, 325, 367 Irishman, 30 , 51,98 Isaacs, R., 29 3 Italy, 119 , 141-2,153-4,15 9 Jackson, P.M., 299 James, I., 5 James, R.R., 319 , 323,330 Jerome, L., 339 Johnson, W., 339 Joint Committee , Unionist Associations of Ireland, 381, 384 , 388- 9 Joyce, J., author, 95 Jubilee Coercion Act , 351 Kavanagh, J., 12 5 Keane, Bishop, 121, 130 , 138 , 14 6 Keegan, G., 109 , 11 3 Kellas, J., 271 Kelly, Bishop D., 170, 195 , 299, 302, 307 Kelly, Cojonel, 15 3 Kelly, P.C., 104 Kelly, P.J., 97 Kenmare, Lord, 50- 4 Kennedy, J.E., 102 , 106 , 11 2 Kenny, W., 353, 36 1 Keogh, Justice, 49, 130 , 135 , 136 Kettle, T., 302 Kickham, C.J., 29,31,41,95, 103, 111 Kilduff, Bishop , 130 Kilmainham Treaty , 87 Kimberley, Lord, 210 King Harmon, E.R., 44, 48, 322 Kirby, Mgr., 118, 120 , 126 , 128, 133 , 141-2, Knox, Major , 4 4 Knox, V.I . , 36 0 Kornhauser, W., 6 3 Labour Party , 25 3

397

Labouchere, H., 255, 268-9, 280, 344 Lampson, G. Locker, 65-6 Land Ac t (1870), 33 , 36, 42, 163 , 224, 234-5,338 -,(1881), 80-1, 163,35 0 Land Bil l (1866), 231 -,(1867), 156 -,(1891), 355 Land League, 62, 70-1, 73 , 81, 85, 87, 100 , 102, 163 , 182,32 6 Land Purchase Act (1903), 189,191, 194 Land question, 145-7 , 149 , 153 , 155,159 , 162, 169 , 182,189,196 , 207-10 , 213 15, 217, 221-5, 227-35 , 237 , 351, 35 3 Land Tenur e Reform Association , 270 Land War, 61-2, 64-8, 73-5 , 80, 87 landlords, 30-1, 35 , 40, 44-5, 48-54, 57-9, 61-2, 64-7, 69, 73-4 , 79-81, 83, 85-7, 89, 92-3, 205-10 , 213-16 , 223-4 , 227, 229-33, 348, 351-2 , 354-5 , 361-2, 371 language revival, 196-7 Lansdowne, Lord, 374-5 , 377, 380 , 38 3 Larkin, E., 73, 176 Lavelle, Fr. P. , 123- 4 Law, A.B., 297-8, 306, 309 , 314-17 , 322 , 374-80,382,385 Layard, A.H.,141 Lea, Sir T. , 361 Leader, The, 19 6 Leahy, Bishop, 130 Lecky,W.E.H., 361 Leeds an d Yorkshire Mercury, 291- 2 Leslie, Sir J., 322, 33 9 Lewis, C.E., 336 Lewis, G., 357 Lewis, G.C., 66 Lewis, H., 276 Lewis, H.O., 48 Liberal Centra l Association, 269-70 , 272 Liberal Gazette, 293 Liberal League, 291-5 Liberal(s), Party, 36-53, 55-8, 84, 117 , 119, 125 , 131 , 134-5,140-2 , 144 , 146-9, 156 , 163-4 , 185 , 191-2 , 1945, 199,202,208,213,217-18,220, 223-4, 227, 229, 231, 238-95, 2979, 306, 309-16 , 327 , 330-3, 335-9, 342-3, 347-8, 358, 364 , 366-9, 381, 386-7, 390 Liberal Publications Department, 271 Liberal Unionists, 250/258, 287, 291, 295,332-3,349-55,359,361 Liberation Society , 240, 261, 27 0

398

Reactions to Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914

Lichfield Hous e Compact, 5 7 Lloyd George , D. , 192, 276 , 307, 313 , 31 5 Local Governmen t Ac t (1898), 79, 81-2, 93 , 286,289,347,362 Local Government Board , 8 2 local self-government, 12, 79, 81, 94, 237 , 286-7, 290 , 328 , 337 , 342 , 347-50 , 352-63 Loewenstein, K., 1 9 Logue, Archbishop M. , 188,190-1, 195 , 199 , 201-2 Londonderry, Marques s of, 324, 334 , 38 0 Long, W., 380-1,386 Loreburn, Lord, 303, 30 6 Lough, T., 302 Lowe, R. , 36, 231- 2 Lowther, J. , 322 Lucas, F., 13 5 Lucy, T.C., 21-2 , 24- 5 Lynam, J., 97 Maamtrasna Case, 326 , 329 , 33 6 Macartney, J.E., 56 , 336 MacDermot, F., 307 MacHale, Archbisho p J., 11, 37-8, 42 , 49-50, 119-20, 123-4,129,132, 138-40, 144-6 , 157-8, 163 , 19 6 Macintyre, A., 66 Macken, Rev. T.F., 17 0 Mackey, A., 10 4 MacManus, T.B., 119 , 122 , 124 , 15 4 MacNeill, E., 19 6 Madden, J., 48 magistrates, 86- 7 Maguire, J., 48 Maguire, J.F., 126,22 9 Mallon, J., 3 2 Manchester Guardian, 221, 311-12, 314 Manchester martyrs , 7-9, 19 , 33, 153-5 , 211 Mannheim, K., 6 3 Manning, Cardinal H.E., 118 , 127 , 142-3 , 156, 159-6 0 Marlborough, Duk e of , 320, 322-3 , 326-7,, 333,337,339 Marlborough, Duchess of, 323-4, 329-30 , 333 Marriott, Sir J., 30 9 Martin, J., 22, 41-2,46,49, 119 , 129,14 7 Marx, K., 6 3 Mathew, Fr. T., 29 Maxwell, General, 198 Maynooth, 127 , 138 , 162 , 20 2 Mayo, Lord, 159 , 229 , 23 1 McCaffrey, L.J. , 34 , 69

McCalmont, Captain, 33 9 McCann, M., 37 2 McCarthy, J., 357 McCarthy, J.P., 9 7 McCarthy, St.G., 9 7 McEvilly, Archbishop, 16 9 McGee, T. d'A., 2 1 McHugh, Bishop C. , 19 9 Mclnerney, P.J., 10 8 McKay, J., 97, 99, 102 McMahon, Fr., 100 McNamara,H.V.,372 M'Swiney, Rev. E., 182 M'Swiney,P.P.,125,137,155 Meagher, T., 95 Menton, J., 96 Methodist Times, 266 Mill, J.S., 205-3 6 passim -, Autobiography, 211 , 216 , 232- 4 -, Considerations o n Representative Government, 205-6, 212, 218,22 1 -, England an d Ireland, 205 , 211 , 213-14 , 216, 219-22 , 224 , 226-8 , 231 , 233 4 -, O n Liberty, 220 -, Principles o f Political Economy, 205-6, 208-9, 214, 222 , 228 , 233 , 23 5 -, Thoughts o n Parliamentary Reform, 21 2 Mobilisation Thesis , 69, 72 , 74- 5 Moloney, Fr., 112 Moloney, F.R., 97 , 103-4 , 106- 7 Monsell, W., 39, 47, 50 , 121 , 156 , 15 8 Monteagle, Lord, 35 9 Montgomery, H. de F., 352-3, 35 9 Moore, G.H., 37-40, 42-3, 47 , 58 , 129 , 140 Moran, Bishop, 157 Moran, D.P., 19 6 Moran, Fr. P.P., 128 Moriarty, Bishop, 39, 50-1, 54 , 121-2 , 145 , 156-8,161 Morley, A., 270-1,283 Morley, J., 34, 238-9, 243-4, 247, 256 , 258 , 266, 268-9 , 272 , 278-80 , 282-3 , 288 , 291,297-8,300,306 Morley, S., 265 Morning Post, 324 Morris, G. , 32 2 Mundella, A.J., 280- 1 Municipal Corporations Act, 94 Municipal Reform League , 277 Munro-Ferguson, R., 288, 290 , 293 , 295 , 310 , 312-13 Murphy, Fr., 10 0 Murphy, J.F., 102 , 10 8 Murphy, W.M., 317

Index Murtagh, J., 42 Naas, Lord, 21 0 Nagle, P., 26- 9 Nally, J., 113 Nation, 6, 46, 73, 84, 140, 306-7 National Association, 117-18 , 124-5 , 128 , 13041,145-8, 155-6,158,162,164 National Education League , 240, 261 , 270 National Flag, 3-7, 9 , 15, 18-19, 101 National League , 3, 7-9, 84-5, 100 , 102, 108 , 111,113,354-5 -, (1860s) , 119, 14 7 National Liberal Federation, 241-3 , 247, 249k 50 , 254 , 260, 271-2 , 281- 3 National organisation, 17, 57-8, 63, 67, 74, 87 National Radica l Union , 263 National Reform Union, 24 4 National symbols , 1-20 Nationalist(s), nationalism, 3 , 8, 12-1.4, 43, 468, 56, 58, 70-1, 74, 84 , 101, 128, 168, 185 193, 196 , 210, 217, 220, 237, 247, 299, 304, 321 , 327, 335, 337, 358, 360-3 , 371, 376,379,381,387,390 Neate, C., 230- 1 New Liberal Review, 292 Newry, Viscount, 47 Nineteenth Century, 249 , 30 9 Nipperdey, T., 18 Nolan, J.P., 49-50, 53 Northcote, Sir S., 334, 337-8 Nulty, Bishop, 130,132, 138, 145, 147

399

Oldham,C.H.,302 O'Leary, C., 34 O'Leary, Fr. , 120-1 O'Leary, J., 21, 103-5, 11 1 O'Neill, H., 196 O'Neill, M., 23 Orangemen, .10, 16, 38, 41, 434, 46, 48-9 , 143, 220, 319-20, 334-5, 337-40, 342 Orange Card, 319, 3334 O'Reilly, J.B. , 104, 108,113 O'Riordan, T. , 104, 106,112-13 Ortega y Gasset, J., 63 0'Shea,K.,34 O'Shea, P.,11 3 Ostrogorski, M., 243, 26 4 O'Sullivan, Rev. E., 54

Pall Mall Gazette, 223, 226-7, 23 4 Palmerston, Lord, 120, 122, 131,141-2 , 205 Parnell, C.S., 3, 8-12,14, 334, 40, 45, 49, 52, 55, 57-9, 69-70, 73 , 81, 84-5, 87 , 96,101-2,104-5,107,111,115,174, 187-8,195-6,254-8, 280, 286-7, 300, 324-7, 330-1 , 335 , 348, 354-5 , 35 7 ParneUite(s), 86-7, 89,187-8 , 2834, 286, 324-5,327,337,369 Paul-Dubois, L., 169 Peace Preservation Act (1871), 42, 45-6 -,(1881), 70-1,81,87 Peace Society, 27 0 Felling, H., 260, 267 Penal Code, 12 0 Perks, Sir R., 287-9, 292-3 Phoenix Society, 26 , 29, 32 Oberschall, A., 63 Pirn, J., 44 O'Brien, C.C., 34, 239 Pinard, M., 63 O'Brien, P . (Nenagh), 113 Pirie, D.V., 310 O'Brien, R.B. , 33 O'Brien, Rev. R., 31- 2 Pirrie, Lord, 299 O'Brien, W., 79-81, 83 , 86-7 , 111, 113-14, 187-8 Pitt, W., 344 Plan of Campaign, 89 , 113, 350-1, 353 194-5,298,314,357,362 O'Connell, D. , 3, 10-14, 19, 42, 57, 59, 67, 125- Plender,W.,299 6,130-1,137, 196,334,34 4 Plunkett, G. , 46-7 Plunkett, Sir H., 171-3 , 175,178-9 , 184, O'Connell, Si r J., 53 O'Connor, A. , 353 305,359-60 police, 22, 28, 30, 45, 106, 108-9, 112, O'Connor, T.P., 302 197 O'Connor Don , The (elder), 55 Poor Law , 150 O'Connor Don , The (younger), 359 Poor La w Commission, 8 2 O'Crowley, F. , 99, 102, 104 O'Donnell, Bishop , 172-3, 189, 191, 195, 200, Poor La w Guardians, 3, 80-94, 355-6 , 362 202 Power, J.W., 97, 1024 O'Hagan, T., 135 Powis Commission, 157 O'Hea, Bishop , 130 Primrose Committee, 299-310, 316 O'Kelly, Major , 11 0 Primrose, Sir H., 29 8 O'Keefe,P.J.,104 Primrose League, 334, 33 9

400

Reactions to Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914

Pro-Boers, 291, 29 4 Protestant(s), 6,10,13,16 , 48, 50, 56-8, 64, 66-7, 69, 84,144,150-1, 168-9,181, 190 , 195, 200, 217, 220, 342, 348, 366 Protestant Vigilance Committee, 129-30 Quarterly Review, 314 Radical Programme (1885), 277 Redmond, J.E., 4,188,190-2,194-5,197-200, 285-7,289-93, 295 , 301, 307-8 , 313-14 , 358,373 Reform Ac t (1867), 205-6, 223 Reform League , 212 Reform Union , 26 1 Reid,T.W., 271,292, 294 Reilly, Constable, 11 4 Rendel, S., 276 Repeal (association), 10-12, 32, 56-7, 67,69, 119-21,129; 158, 323-4 , 334, 34 4 rents, 61-2, 64-6, 74, 233 RerumNovarum, 168 Ribbonism, 42, 45 Ridgeway, Sir W., 356-7 Ridker, R.G., 7 5 Ripon, Lord , 250, 25 4 Rising (1798), 17 -, (1867) , 22, 35-7, 39,1514, 209 Ronayne, J.P., 5 5 Rosa, J.O'D., 26-7, 39-41, 57 Roscommon Journal, 71- 2 Rose, C.D., 29 3 Roseberry, Lord, 247, 249-50, 255-8, 269 , 275, 282, 285, 287-95, 319 Rossmore, Lord , 335, 33 8 Round Table Conference, 332-3, 353 Royal Irish Constabulary, 7-8, 25 , 27, 2930, 104 Royal University, 144 Runciman, W., 297 Russell, Dr (Maynooth), 158 Russell, G., 18 5 Rusell, G.W.E., 247 Russell, Lord J., 119,122, 131,141, 148 , 154,207,220 Russell, T.W., 36 1 Ryan, P.J., 9 7 Sadleir.W., 135-6 Salisbury, Lady , 322 Salisbury, Marquiss of, 286, 322, 325, 32739, 336, 338-9 , 343 , 348 , 350-3 , 383 , 386 Sandars, J., 381 Saturday Review, 225-6, 228

Saunderson, E., 337-41 Scanlan, Fr., 110-1 1 Schnadhorst, F., 270-1, 2734 Schramm, P.E., 1 Scott, C.P., 303 Scott, M., 309-11 Seager, R., 272 Secularists, 192,19 5 Sellars, A.C.,252 Sexton, T., 353 Shaw, family, 370- 1 Shaw, W., 45 Shaw-Lefevre, G., 246 Sinn Fein, 15,17,194, 200, 346 Smyth,P.J.,45,47,49 Somerset, M., 34 0 Southern Irish Unionists, 200 , 366-70 , 372 82,386,390,391 Special Commission (1888) , 33 Spectator, 211, 227-8 Spencer, Lord , '229-30, 248, 288 , 322 , 335 Spender, 3.A., 286 Stack, W., 10 0 Stanley, Lord, 35-6,154, 236 'Step by Step' policy, 285-6 , 289 Stephens, J., 22, 24-7,122 Steward,!., 102 Strauss, E., 34, 238 Stuart, J., 271-2, 277 Suffivan, A.M., 22, 124 X-5, 132,140 Sweeney, J., 97 Swift,!., 196 Synder, D., 63 Talbot, Mgr. , 141 Tandy, N., 95 Temperance, 29, 249, 254, 276 Tenant Righ t (League) , 36, 42, 46, 48, 55-6, 67, 70,118,120,124, 130,132,145, 147,150,155,205,235 Tennant, H., 293, 295 Tenure and Improvemen t of Land Bill (1866), 148,15 5 Terry, E., 344 Thorn's Directory, 86, 89 Thomas, D.A., 276 Thomley, D., 34 Tilly, C, 62-3 Times, The, 39,143,161, 224-6, 228, 231, 290, 306 , 308 , 312-14 , 328, 339 , 377 Tims, J., 273 tithes, 66 Tocqueville, A. de, 62 Todd.J.H., 127 Toibin, M. , 16

Index Tone, Wolfe, 95 Torley, J., 11 4 Treasury, 121 , 298,300 , 302-3, 347 Trench, Archbishop, 15 0 Trench, E. le Poer, 50 Trevelyan, G.O., 263 , 322 Troy, W., 113 Ulster, 4, 10 , 13, 56, 62, 84, 93, 130 , 194, 197 , 200, 297-8 , 306 , 309 , 314-17, 322, 333-6 , 340-1, 343-4, 346 , 356,368,370,374-9,381,390 Ulster Athleti c Clubs, 366 Ulster Custom, 23 5 Ulster Libera l Unionis t Committee, 351, 363 Ulster Unionis t Council , 37 3 'Unauthorized Programme', 245, 259 Union Defence League, 381 Unionist(s), Party, 13-14 , 45, 56-7, 190 , 199, 267 , 272 , 276 , 286 , 288-90 , 297, 308-9, 312, 317 , 322-4 , 331-2, 334 , 339, 341-2 , 344 , 347 , 350-2 , 355-6 , 359-60, 362-3, 366-9 , 371-3 , 375-9 1 United Ireland, 79 , 95-7,100-1 United Iris h League , 188-9, 194, 362 United Irishmen , 3-5 United Kingdom Alliance, 240 , 27 0 United Trades Association, 2 9 Universities Act (1908), 194 University Bill (1873), 43, 46, 55 , 163-4 Valera, E. de, 20 2 Vere, A. de, 15 6

401

Vesci, Lord de, 357 Victoria, Queen, 32,148, 152 Vincent, J.R., 319-24, 329-31 , 333 , 336-8, 340 , 3424 Wales, Edward, Prince of, 3, 8,14, 45 , 161-2,321 Walsh, Archbishop W., 187-8,190, 194-5, 199, 20 2 Walters, Inspector, 10 2 Ward, W., 12 7 Watson, C, 310, 312-1 3 Waterford, Lord , 357, 35 9 Webb, S., 253, 273-4 Weldon, J., 113 Westmeath, Lord, 360 Westminster Gazette, 286-7 , 293 , 314 Weston, Colonel, 388- 9 Whateley, Archbishop, 12 8 White, Dean, 170,175-6 Whyte, J.H., 34 , 40 William III , king of England, 4 Wilson, H.J., 26 5 Wilson, J.H., 26 6 Women's Suffrage Association , 24 0 Woods, S., 266 Wyndham, G., 309 Wynne, Mr., 54 Young Ireland (ers ) Movement, 34,7,16,24,37,67,119,128, 149 Young, W., 34 0