Risk Regulation in the United States and European Union: Controlling Chaos

Risk Regulation in the United States and European Union

E. Hall

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E. Hall

Risk Regulation in the United States and European Union Controlling Chaos Lina M. Svedin, Adam Luedtke, and Thad E. Hall

E. Hall

RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION

Copyright © Lina M. Svedin, Adam Luedtke, and Thad E. Hall, 2010. All rights reserved. First published in 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–62049–0 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Svedin, Lina M. Risk regulation in the European Union and the United States : controlling chaos / Lina M. Svedin, Adam Luedtke, and Thad E. Hall. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978–0–230–62049–0 (alk. paper) 1. Political planning—European Union countries. 2. Political planning—United States. 3. Risk—European Union countries—Public opinion. 4. Risk—United States—Public opinion. 5. Public opinion— European Union countries. 6. Public opinion—United States. 7. European Union countries—Politics and government. 8. United States—Politics and government. I. Luedtke, Adam, 1973– II. Hall, Thad E. (Thad Edward), 1968– III. Title. JN32.S84 2009 363.1094—dc22

2009040517

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: June 2010 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

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CON T E N T S

List of Illustrations

vii

Acknowledgments

ix

One

Introduction

1

Two

The Risk Society

27

Three Objective Differences Four Five Six

47

Immigration, Security, and Social Risk Perception

69

Food Safety, Health, and Biological Risk Perception

89

Flooding, Disaster Prevention, and Environmental Risk Perception

113

Seven

Election Technology and Election Fraud

143

Eight

Conclusions

163

Notes

183

Bibliography

193

Index

209

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I L LU ST R AT ION S

Tables 2.1 American and European perceptions of potential risks 4.1 Percentage of public attached to Europe

35 78

Figures 2.1 American and European perceptions of the risk of becoming a victim of crime 2.2 American and European perceptions of the risk of becoming a victim of terrorism 2.3 American and European perceptions of the risk of becoming a victim of serious illness 2.4 American and European perceptions of the risk of being in a serious car accident 2.5 American and European perceptions of the risk of being injured by consumer goods 2.6 American and European perspectives on risk compared based on political affiliation 2.7 Summary of differences found in American and European perspectives on risk 3.1 Risk regulation model 5.1 Risks EU citizens worry about

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E. Hall

AC K NOW L E DGM E N T S

The writing of this book would not have been possible without the support of a number of people and institutions. First of all, we are grateful to the Political Science Department at the University of Utah for providing a research assistant for this project and for providing other logistical and administrative support. We also thank the Dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Science at the University of Utah, who funded the survey reported in chapter 2. We would also like to thank Evrim Koltuksuz for her willingness to work with the three of us on this project, providing excellent and vital research support. In addition, we would like to thank our colleague Daniel Levin, whose insights on public law and comparative institutions inspired much of the material in chapter 3. Douglas Byrd also provided research support for various parts of the book, and particularly helped with the writing of chapter 3. Furthermore, we express our gratitude and thanks to Daniel Patterson for providing copyediting support. We would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers who provided early feedback on our book idea. Their comments have made this a stronger and more consistent research product. On a personal note: Adam Luedtke would like to thank Helen Milner and the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton University, where he resided in 2009–2010 as a research fellow, for providing a stimulating

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Acknowledgments

intellectual environment; Lina M. Svedin would like to thank Harriet Svedin for vital child care services during the final editing phase of this book. Thad E. Hall would like to thank Michael Alvarez for his help with chapter 7 of the book and for being a source of critical analysis.

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CH A P T E R

ON E

Introduction

On June 1, 2007, the European Union (EU) passed an ambitious law requiring all chemicals to undergo testing to determine the potential effects of human exposure to these substances. The idea behind these regulations, the “precautionary principle,” asserts that chemical companies should have to prove that their chemicals are safe for human use before they are allowed on the market. Prior to this law, chemical sales had historically operated on the assumption that materials were safe until proven otherwise. Chemical safety is merely one policy area in which the EU is trying to apply this precautionary principle of risk management. In America, the EU’s new regulatory approach has been viewed with much skepticism. In fact, applying such a precautionary principle to manage product risks on the free market would be anathema to many politicians, both on the left and the right. However, globalization of trade means that this new European risk strategy will inf luence the behavior of American companies, given that the EU is the United States’ largest trading partner. As a point of contrast, the United States has approached policy areas with the same precautionary intent in a way that presents a jagged pill for most EU member-states to swallow. During the Bush administration, a version of the precautionary

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Risk Regulation in United States and EU

principle was applied in the “War on Terror,” with policymakers assuming that security risks with the smallest possibility of occurrence had to be addressed regardless of the detriment to the public purse (Suskind 2007). In this context the EU has been sharply critical of the use of a principle that the EU itself finds quite attractive for regulating environmental risks. The United State’s specific application of the precautionary principle, including many of the tactics that the Bush administration used in its war on terror, has led to considerable friction between the two continents. As a result, the EU has had to adjusted to security regulations and standards required for access to the United States. Our ability to control and manage the physical environment around us increases, whether through scientific discovery or advanced management techniques, and expectations that governments will do away with traditional threats to their citizens have increased exponentially. The European model “calls for pre-emptive action if scientists spot a credible hazard, even before the level of risk can be measured” (Economist 2007, 1), and advocates that any suggested policy change is assumed ex ante to be riskier than keeping a known status quo. This conservative viewpoint vis-à-vis risk,1 however, is not without controversy and comes at significant political costs. Unless the risks of change can be measured, precaution that privileges the status quo clashes head-on with the pressures policy-makers face to be seen as active in confronting, and thereby changing, the way we identify and manage threats to our way of life. Ironically, as public expectations increase along with scientific progression, our pursuit of safety (Perrow 1999b; Wildavsky 1988) and regulation of risk sometimes lead to new and unforeseen risks (Perrow 1999a; Sagan 1993; 1996). These new risks range from the global (climate change as a consequence of technological progress) to the very local: two economists recently found that when some American state and local governments banned smoking in bars, the number of fatal car accidents involving drunk drivers rose by about 13 percent

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Introduction

3

(Adams and Cotti 2008). In a similar vein, a county in Virginia banned giving food to the homeless unless it was prepared in a county-approved kitchen, in an attempt to prevent food poisoning. The unforeseen consequence was a drop in food donations to the homeless (Economist 2008b, 46). John Adams (2007) found that laws making drivers wear seat belts do not make roads safer; they move deaths from inside cars to outside them because they encourage poor driving. While globalization generally tends to promote policy diffusion and convergence, there are areas, particularly within trade, that see the reverse trend. The debate over genetically modified (GM) foods is an example of globalization being thwarted by policy divergence and strong efforts to trump dissenting perceptions of risk, to the point of leading to trade wars with patriotic overtones (Sherman 2002; Sherman and Eliasson 2006). European fears of so-called Frankenfoods are largely driven by questions about the possible, albeit unknown, health risks associated with GM products. U.S. citizens, however, are much less concerned with the risks in this area and have accepted the much-touted benefits of increased crop yields and the decreased need for pesticides and fertilizers (n.a. n.d.). The EU and the United States take different stands on whether it is “pure” science or comparative trade advantages that are driving the transatlantic rift on these policy issues. Understanding how we, as a society, perceive and respond to risk is an equally compelling and complicated task. Although protecting their citizens against harm remains a core function of governing institutions, the paths Western states have taken to fend off dangers, both imagined and real, has varied greatly across time and across administrative settings. The way communities organize to meet collective risks has been molded over time by cultural ideas of taboos (Lupton 1999) telling us what is bad and should be avoided, as well as through the institutional mechanisms that encourage or discourage individual behaviors for the collective good. While faced with many of the same challenges, Europeans and Americans approach risk

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and risk management very differently in a number of policy areas. “Some Eurocrats suggest that the philosophical gap ref lects the American constitutional tradition that everything is allowed unless it is forbidden, against the Napoleonic tradition codifying what the state allows and banning everything else” (Economist 2007, 2). As the EU chemical standards illustrated, in a globalized international market, risk management techniques adopted by one society quickly affect other countries. Modernization has all but eliminated most “traditional” forms of risk from human life (Hopkins 2005). Yet, as previously mentioned, our pursuit of safety and an increasing ability to control ourselves and our environment has created new risks (Perrow 1999a; 1999b; Sagan 1993) and new anxieties about the yet-unknown (Giddens 1998; Wildavsky 1988).2 The explosion of technology, science, and information has led to debate over the degree to which society should try to eliminate risk, with an extreme version found in the “precautionary principle” mentioned in the first paragraph (Durant and Boodphetcharat 2004; Sunstein 2005). We argue that societies’ understanding of and approach to risk is mediated by a host of psychological, social, and political factors (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004; Mitroff, Alpaslan, and Green 2004; Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981). These factors subsequently force policy-makers to shut down certain paths (see Pierson 1993) in trying to regulate these risks. As Kurzer (2005) notes, American and European risk assessment and management differs in part due to differences in cultural attributes, institutional arrangements, and interest group activities. These differences shape the way in which risk is conceptualized. Likewise, both American and European advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 2007) arrayed around their respective risk issues vary in how they frame risk, conceptualize risk theoretically, and interpret public concerns (Bernauer 2003; Gaskell, Allum, and Stares 2003; Jasanoff 2007). Questions about how to measure, understand, and portray risk are at the heart of the risk debate in the United States and the EU, and form the basis of our discussion.

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Introduction

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The Aim of the Book This book speaks to readers with a broad interest in how media, culture, and public institutions shape our perceptions of dangers, and how we subsequently attempt to manage what is seen as out of control. The book also provides a comparative view of societal phenomena and politics in the United States and Europe. Through a series of observations and analysis, we hope to shed new light on the origins and approaches to risk assessment and management currently practiced on the two sides of the Atlantic. This book also addresses broader questions of interest to professionals and scholars focused on policymaking in the EU and the United States, risk policy and risk-taking, federalism, as well as globalization and the management of transboundary issues. This study ultimately presents an analysis of how the regulatory structures in each polity differ, how perceptions shape the workings of these structures, and how the regulatory environments are evolving to shape future public and private behaviors. As Americans and Europeans move into the twenty-first century, one might argue that they are safer than ever before, thanks to science, technology, and evolving regulatory regimes. However, there is a paradox inherent in the advance of science, technology, and risk regulation: the better we become at identifying and regulating risk, the more salient are the political debates surrounding these advances. Have we actually been made safer? Are the new public fears regarding food safety, immigration, and so on largely unfounded and exaggerated? And if science and technology have unwanted secondary effects, such as global warming, how should regulators deal with these new risks? Do they demand a revamping of our entire framework for thinking about risk and regulation, along the lines of the precautionary principle? And central to our argument here, are European and American governments likely to take similar or cooperative approaches to these problems? If not, what factors explain convergence and divergence? Our analysis seeks

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Risk Regulation in United States and EU

to contribute to the debate on risk and risk management by delving into the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical controversies at play in a series of current risk case studies. The Research Puzzle This book examines how European and American policymakers try to meet the challenge of regulating risk while facing both the growing expectations of risk elimination or control (Hopkins 2005), and the diminishing capacity to foresee and counteract risks (Perrow 1999a). As Beck (1998) eloquently argues, today we live in a “risk society” with many hard-topredict man-made risks that can cause great disruption to society if they come to fruition, regardless of probability. The chapters that follow illustrate certain forces, like globalization and federalism, that have affected risk adaptability, causing transatlantic convergence in some areas (such as the immigration-security-terrorism nexus), but divergence in other areas (such as f lood preparedness and response). As the chapter on voting technology and voting fraud shows, certain regulatory environments provide more fertile soil for adaptation than others. But what are the factors that lay the foundations of these regulatory environments, and what causes the regulatory environments to change? This book examines these questions and explores the complex relationship between societal expectations and risk regulation in the twenty-first century. The study specifically examines how sociopolitical factors contribute to divergent views, methods of managing and responding to risks in society, and how these factors inf luence paths of risk regulation on the two sides of the Atlantic. Six Factors That Shape Risk Regulation As polities with incredibly varied histories of thinking about and regulating risk, Europe and the United States provide

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Introduction

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us with natural laboratories for testing factors that inf luence adaptability to risk in the twenty-first century. We argue that six main factors shape risk regulation in the United States and EU today. These inf luencing factors—globalization, federalism, institutional mechanisms, cultural ideas and views, interest group activities, and perceptions—can be characterized as largely political, institutional, and psychological in nature. Using recent developments in antismoking legislation as an illustrative example (Reid 2005), the sections below identify and describe our understanding of these inf luencing factors. Differences and similarities in the European and American risk context are highlighted for each variable. We indicate the anticipated effect each factor will have on risk regulation, either by contributing to diverging or converging policies in the EU and the United States. A more detailed account of the specific mechanisms by which the variables inf luence risk regulation is presented in chapters 2 and 3, together with a graphic account of these relations. The case studies investigated in chapters 4 through 7 subsequently serve to demonstrate how these factors shape differences and commonalities in risk assessment and regulation across a diversity of policy domains. Close examination of these inf luencing factors in risk regulation and their relationship to these four diverse policy areas provide an important and timely contribution to the field of comparative policy development in the United States and the EU. Globalization In context of this study, globalization can be viewed as a dynamic that inf luences the choices available to policy-makers and the costs and benefits associated with different policy options as they seek to regulate risk. Through increasing contacts between experts, public servants, and policy-makers from different states, as well as the participation in growing international professional networks (Adams and Kriesi 2007), globalization helps spread knowledge, innovation, and policy

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Risk Regulation in United States and EU

concepts, and promotes the development of epistemic communities (Haas 1989; 1992) and advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 2007). These types of exposure and interaction make the diffusion of policy and the adaptation of shared standards more likely (Berry and Berry 2007). As such, globalization may serve to overcome the regulatory or cultural heritage in certain policy domains. As mentioned previously, globalized commercial markets have impacted policy adaptability on both sides of the Atlantic, sometimes generating policy convergence. Risk management techniques and regulations pertaining to products and services adopted by one country instantly affect other countries. Establishing product or service standards in one country makes entry to that country’s market potentially more difficult and more costly. Yet, even in light of such negative response, the incentives for policy convergence are strong. Countries may complain about production change costs and often see specific risk regulation as an attempt by a trade partner to skew competition by keeping other countries’ products off their market. In the case of the EU and the United States, the two sides can be seen as a single market. Because of the extensive trade between the two, any change to standards and regulations has a direct impact both domestically and on the other trading partner. As such, European and American trade relations continually involve thorny issues of how to assess, mitigate, and pay for risks taken. Fundamental differences in perception, approaches to science, risk management strategies, and inf luence by advocacy coalitions pull these societies in different policy directions. In certain policy domains, such as food safety, discussions about some of these differences have led to full-f ledged trade wars with strong patriotic overtones (Sherman 2002; Sherman and Eliasson 2006). In the case of (anti) smoking regulation, on the other hand, globalization was a powerful force in pushing Europe to gradually extend smoking bans in line with American standards. Such a push did have powerful cultural resistance to overcome

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Introduction

9

along the way. Roddey Reid (2005, 2), an expert on the topic, notes that French media “portrayed French measures against secondhand smoke as the importation of puritanical intolerance from America.” Yet the antismoking forces were part of a powerful global coalition spearheaded by the World Health Organization (WHO), whose Director-General said in 1999 that “the tobacco epidemic . . . spares no nation and no people. Wherever we come from and whatever we do, we are never truly safe from the long arms of the tobacco industry as long as they search the world for new markets and victims” (Brundtland 1999). Reid (2005) notes that global initiatives like the WHO’s found fertile soil in newly popular market modes of governance that stressed the benefits of globalization and the introduction of corporate marketing techniques into the public sector. Weighing the numerous ways in which globalization impacts policymaking, our sense is that globalization is likely to produce more of a converging rather than a diverging effect on policymaking and risk regulation in the EU and the United States. Federalism In this study, federalism is viewed primarily as a particular governance structure that shapes the way policy is constructed, envisioned, and implemented, one that channels access to the policy process by experts and advocacy coalitions. Likewise, this governance structure provides a certain set of tools for policy incentives and disincentives. Policy implementation in a federal structure also presents a number of challenges for those at both ends the political hierarchy. Those at the top of the political pyramid aim to achieve full compliance and coherent implementation on the ground, while those at the bottom are required to implement policies that they themselves have a hard time funding and that may be very unpopular with local constituents. Interstate competition, a more prominent issue in the United States than in the EU,

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Risk Regulation in United States and EU

also established incentives for states to comply with federally mandated risk management strategies and regulation in order to display either a set of established best-practices or to avoid being at an unfavorable position in the marketplace (Berry and Berry 2007). A federalist structure also provides opportunities for policy innovation and experimentation (Berry and Berry 2007). U.S. states, and more recently EU member-states, have historically been used as testing grounds for the adaptation of regulation and for the vetting of new policy strategies (Walker 1969). In the EU, member states frequently serve as inspiration for policy diffusion and best practices in specific policy domains. The ability to test out policy in part of a system is a positive aspect of the federal governance structure that encourages a certain amount of diversity (Oates 1999). Taking the example of (anti-)smoking regulation, federalism has played a key role in policy diffusion. Between 1975 and 2000, forty U.S. states adopted restrictions on smoking in government buildings, while thirty-two legislated against smoking in restaurants. Thirty-one states passed laws restricting sales of individual cigarettes, which were thought to be easier than full packs for youths to obtain. Shipan and Volden (2006) studied this rapid policy diffusion and found that federalism played a key role in “snowballing” the spread of smoking restrictions, though they argued that two factors powerfully mediated this relationship: local governments (which can be seen an extension of federalism to the municipal level) and legislative professionalism at state level. In adopting a local restriction on smoking in restaurants and bars, owners may worry about losing patrons to surrounding communities. Such a fear could be assuaged through state-level restrictions that would level the playing field for all localities within the state. To the extent that professional legislators are more responsive to such local concerns, we would expect a snowball effect of increased pressure for statewide action upon local restrictions (Shipan and Volden 2006, 827).

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Introduction

11

Examining the ways in which federalism may inf luence policy, our sense is that overall federalism is more likely, like globalization, to create convergence rather than divergence in U.S. and EU risk regulation. Institutional Mechanisms While the federal governance structure that the EU and United States share creates certain incentives and disincentives for states, it is far from the only institution or institutional mechanism to impact the regulation and management of risk. Within the federal governance structure, the composition and division of authority between department and agencies, the nature of the political institutions, and the regulatory tools available for policy design all shape how policy-makers regulate risk, as well as the likely effect this regulation will have on the successful management of risk. The length of procedures—who can initiate policy and regulation, the number of actors that weigh in on a policy proposal, as well as the utilization of experts and experimentation in the policy process—also shapes the nature of risk regulation. The presence of preexisting regulations and agreements will further push policy-makers down certain policy paths by generating path dependencies. The EU and United States differ considerably in terms of these institutional arrangements and mechanisms that operate within each federalist framework. Chapter 3 reviews some key examples: trust in government, views of the welfare state, presidential versus bureaucratic systems, the age of particular regulatory frameworks, and the heritage of a given legal system (common law versus civil law). The differences become particularly noticeable when considering any of the four specific policy domains outlined in chapters 4–7. Generally speaking, however, a stronger emphasis on and utilization of scientific testing and incremental policy change characterize much of the institutional operations in the EU. Innovation and wholesale

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Risk Regulation in United States and EU

adaptations of new frameworks, however, seem to characterize the regulatory process in the United States. This comparison, however, is likely to be contingent upon the regulatory structure applying to the particular policy area in question—that is, which particular authorities have jurisdiction over a given issue. In the case of (anti-)smoking regulation, institutional mechanisms have played an interesting role both in the United States and the EU. Since no EU-wide smoking bans have been enacted, the EU exhibits wide national diversity. France, a relative laggard in banning smoking, has taken a more centralized approach than the United States, with its reliance on state/local diffusion. Kagan and Vogel argued in 1993 that smoking regulation in France is the result of elite bargaining among bureaucrats and health officials. As a result, the French took a different route than the United States, avoiding restrictions on smokers’ behavior (via geographical and physical bans), and instead relying on “paternalistic” controls like prohibitions on advertising and high cigarette taxes (Kagan and Vogel 1993, 30). Looking at diversity of institutions and institutional mechanisms that weigh in on the regulation of any one risk on the two sides of the Atlantic, we expect institutional mechanisms (to the extent that they differ) to have a diverging effect on policy development and risk regulation in the United States and the EU. Culturally Based Ideas and Views While it is always dangerous to talk about culture and ideas as belonging to a whole country, let alone a conglomeration of twenty-seven countries, it is important to understand differences in how Americans and Europeans tend to view basic components of risk and the regulatory process. These traceable culturally based differences include European and American ideas of and views on experts, science, the role of the state, trust in government, and the role of individual responsibility in the

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Introduction

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management of risk. Public and elite understandings of these components, as well as their view of what their proper role and function is, inf luences how risk regulation and policy is made and directs policy-makers down certain paths. It has been suggested that these differences ref lect a Napoleonic tradition in Europe, where the state codifies what is allowed and everything else is banned, and a constitutional tradition in America, which prescribes that everything is allowed unless explicitly forbidden (Economist 2007, 2). With its preventive and conservative approach to risk and the wide acceptance of a high paternalistic and prescriptive role for the state, there is a sense that Brussels is becoming the world’s regulatory capital. Comparative considerations of risk regulation often occur through the lens of the traditional libertarian (United States) versus communitarian (EU) dichotomy. Through this lens, Americans are viewed as being individualistic in their consideration of risk. From this perspective, risk assessment and mitigation requires the individual to be observant and adept at assessing risk and accepts that the less prepared will bear the cost of their lack of preparedness. “The American model turns on cost-benefit analysis . . . companies enjoy a presumption of innocence for their products: should this prove mistaken, punishment is provided by the market (and a barrage of lawsuits)” (Economist 2007, 1). By contrast, communitarianism suggests that all parties have an interest in minimizing risk in a community, since the community as a whole often bears the brunt associated with risk decisions. Although this framework is helpful, it presents an incomplete understanding of European and American regulation in a number of policy areas (Kupchan 2001). In many areas, Europeans are more willing than Americans to experiment with risk and to determine scientifically what factors constitute risk ( Johnson and Covello 1987). The emphasis on scientific testing and incremental policy changes, as suggested by experts in the field, is often viewed as responsible

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governing in the European context. An incremental approach to regulation within the EU assumes “reasonable” risk-taking and risk-avoiding behavior both on the part of governments and the part of citizens and consumers. It also assumes that, as more is revealed and science progresses, governing institutions will assume the responsibility of keeping their citizens safe and informed about known risks and that citizens will adjust their behavior accordingly. By contrast, Americans use a culture of litigation to determine what constitutes risk. The courts determine whether something is risky, sometimes without a comprehensive account of the science involved. In America, therefore, individuals and firms are often focused on mitigating risk and establishing financial responsibility for any risks taken. This legalistic determination of risk is not appreciated by Europeans, especially because they see the rise of this attitude in the EU (Kelemen 2006). “To many Europeans, an ‘ambulance-chasing’ legal environment, which sees every mishap as an opportunity for a lawsuit, is an unwelcome pathology that has spread in their direction from the United States” (Economist 2008a).3 The example of (anti-)smoking regulation illustrates a number of the culturally based views and ideas that we think play an important role in shaping risk regulation. For instance, the turning point in the battle against “big tobacco” in America came with the successful lawsuits brought by state governments for costs incurred from smoking, some of the largest lawsuit penalties ever. This approach, while unthinkable in Europe, was considered perfectly appropriate by most Americans, and has even served as a model for attacking other types of health risks (e.g., fast food). Europe, as mentioned earlier, lagged in smoking restriction in part because such restriction was often considered a “puritanical” import from the uptight Americans. Taking into consideration how culturally based ideas and views differ between the United States and the European Union, we feel that these variables are more likely to contribute to diverging policy paths on risk regulation.

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Introduction

15

Interest Group Activities and Advocacy Coalitions Interest groups, lobbying, and the growth of advocacy coalitions across interest groups differ considerably between the United States and the EU. Furthermore, the way that advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 2007) are arranged around various risk issues and have access to the policy process in the American and European settings is quite different. The way in which advocacy coalition players—from the media and think tanks to legislators and bureaucrats—frame risk, conceptualize risk, and interpret public concerns varies considerably on either side of the Atlantic. The ability of policy entrepreneurs to get particular risks or policy proposals regulating risk on to the political agenda depends to a great extent on how much public attention an issue is getting (through a focusing event in the media, for example) and the ability to link this attention to specific policy proposals as solutions to the problem that policy-makers face (Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007). The media plays an important part in informing the public and interest groups on important substantive issues and also in framing and shaping societal perceptions of risk, as well as by whom and how risk should be managed. Often the lack of attention that the media pays to one or another type of risk also has an important impact on public perceptions of risk and the degree to which the public is concerned with a specific risk. Looking again to our example of (anti-)smoking regulation, interest group activities and the impact of advocacy coalitions on the policy process is pronounced. In the United States, one can speak of a “movement” against smoking, particularly because it was almost exclusively an effort on the part of private actors. At every step of the way, citizen groups lobbied, campaigned, and persuaded governments to take action. Shipan and Volden (2006) show how diffusion of antismoking restrictions in the United States was initiated by citizen advocacy groups, who used a strategy of “venue-shopping” to target the government most likely to respond favorably (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

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Risk Regulation in United States and EU

In Europe, on the other hand, interest group lobbying was quite muted, although this varied somewhat across national contexts. Antismoking strategies rarely relied heavily on private actors, though in France one agency closely linked to the state rejected “Anglo-American health promotion strategies” while one with weaker government ties “actively argued for their adoption” (Reid 2005, 153). Many of the advocacy coalitions engaged in specific policy domains are international and, as such, may add to policy diffusion and shared ideas about risk. Yet their access and impact on the policy process in the United States and EU differ markedly. For this reason we argue here that the impact of interest group activities and advocacy coalitions on specific risk regulation in the United States and EU have a primarily divergent effect. Perceptions of Risk Perceptions of risk provide a key component in understanding diverging and converging policy trends in the United States and EU across a number of different policy domains. Perceptions of risk exist at all levels of government and are held by both the public and by political elites and area experts. Societies’ understanding of and approach to risk is mediated by a host of psychological, social, and political factors that force policymakers down certain paths when regulating risk. This leads to divergent ways of managing and responding to risk in America and the European Union. Broadly speaking, societies today, both in the EU and America, have a very low tolerance for risk (Hopkins 2005); we expect life to be relatively risk-free and often expect policymakers to create a protective barrier against life’s unpleasantness (Giddens 1998; Mythen 2004). Yet, as previously mentioned, our pursuits of safety and control have helped create new and unforeseen risks (Perrow 1999a). These new risks range from global (climate change as a consequence of technological progress) to local (the spread of multi-resistant weeds that have been

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Introduction

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exposed to genetically modified pesticides) and tend to be more complex because of the increasingly tight coupling of highly integrated systems of production and consumption. In many policy areas Americans and Europeans show broad perceptual differences. These differences include how they view individual risk, collective risk, risk insurance, and the role of the state in mitigating risks. In part, we argue, the differences seen in how the United States and the EU approach risk regulation and risk management is a consequence of these broad perceptual differences. There are also differences, however, within the EU and the United States regarding how elites and the general public view concerns around risk. Perceptions play an important role in motivating individuals to act. How citizens in the EU and the United States actually behave, the risks they subject themselves to, and the degree to which they will act to mitigate risks are linked to very subjective perceptions of risk. Our example of (anti-)smoking regulation is perhaps most vivid in its ability to illustrate how perception inf luences people’s behavior and actions around a risk. The French were “sometimes assigned a place of honor in terms of their willful indifference to matters of personal risk . . . defiance of health codes and selfish disregard for the well-being of others” (Reid 2005, 156). Even the French Committee for Health Education, an agency tasked with regulating smoking, went so far as to write the following in an internal review: “French society has regularly rejected directive, melodramatic or excessively moralizing messages” (cited in Reid 2005, 155). And yet on other issues, such as hormones in beef or genetically modified crops, the French have shown a willingness to regulate that makes the Americans look positively laissez-faire. This study anticipates perceptions of risk, to the extent that they differ between the continents, to have a divergent effect on policy and risk regulation in the EU and the United States. This is not to say, however, that the most likely differences in risk perception are going to be between the two sides of

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the Atlantic. It may very well be that differences are sharpest between the public and elites on both sides, which will then have a different effect on policy formation, creating a gap between the measures put in place to manage risk and the degree to which the public pays attention and modifies their actual behavior in relation to specific risks. Policy Domains and Case Selection After setting the stage for understanding differences in attitudes toward risk in Europe and the United States in chapter 2, and exploring some differences in regulatory structures in chapter 3, we consider how these risk issues play out in practice. The four succeeding chapters outline and examine risk regulation in four policy domains. These domains present policy-makers with social, biological, environmental, and political risks, respectively. Specifically, the first case study concerns immigration as a social risk. The second looks at food safety as a biological risk. The third case is geared toward f loods as environmental risks. And, finally, the fourth case takes a look at a new risk on the perceptual horizon, namely, voting technology and voting fraud as political risks. The content of the case studies is outlined in the section below (Examining Risk in a Cross-National Context: An Outline of the Book). We selected these domains and cases to provide a purposively diverse set of policy areas where states are currently facing politically controversial risks. The four policy areas chosen are all areas where the generation and mitigation of risk fuels the debate about the role of government in public protection, the role of individuals in mitigating risk and contributing to collective public efforts, and to perceptions of science and “progress” in the framing of the risk. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the diversity in policy domains sheds light on the degree to which the dynamics we have identified as shaping risk regulation contribute to convergence and divergence in the regulation of these radically different risks.

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Introduction

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Examining Risk in a Cross-National Context: An Outline of the Book Exploring a concept as large as risk regulation requires the definition of several concepts at the outset. In chapter 2, we provide a map of theoretical underpinnings in sociology, economics, psychology, and public policy that contribute to our conceptualization of risk. Risk is a difficult concept to define. As Holton (2003) notes, in financial literature there have been many definitions about risk adopted over the last 100 years; he argues that risk is largely an intuitive concept. In general, we define risk as an issue, threat, or situation that can be avoided or mitigated through some strategy. As we discuss in the next chapter, risks may be real or perceived and a risk to one person in one context may not seem like a risk to other people in other contexts. We examine how elites and the general public in America and Europe view risk and how policy-makers manage risk differently. Broadly speaking, America represents the less-regulated but highly litigious society and the EU represents the trust-based regulatory superstate. We consider risk cultures in both societies using data on perceptions of risk in the United States and the EU collected by scholars of sociology, psychology, and public policy. The analysis of the data brings us to a discussion about how we know what is risky, including the roles of experts, science, and trust, more broadly, in the risk debate. We then review individual-level data on risk-taking, examining how citizens of the EU and the United States actually behave and the risks they actually subject themselves to. We contrast these empirical numbers to the perceptions that Americans and Europeans have different views on risk. This discussion leads us to consider differing perceptions of individual risk, collective risk, insurance, and the role of the state in mitigating such risks. The desire to mitigate risks leads to differences in regulatory schemes and in specific public policy outcomes. We

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Risk Regulation in United States and EU

address this issue in chapter 3, where we focus on decisionmaking by governmental actors at either the federal (U.S. government or the European Commission and the European Parliament) or sub-federal level (the U.S. states or at the EU member-state level). We argue that federalism plays a key role in shaping regulatory behavior, especially given the historical evidence in the United States of states functioning as “laboratories of democracy,” where regulatory innovations can be developed and studied. Globalization—the global spread of ideas, technology, information, goods and services, and business practices—and the interconnectedness that springs from it has also shaped the way in which risks are perceived and information about risks is considered. This study considers how these institutional factors, not just EU and U.S. regulatory schemes but also international trade and globalization, inf luence risk regulation. Although there are broad perceptual differences in how we think risks are viewed and regulated in the United States and the EU, it is the case that these differences are likely to lessen across both governance bodies as the dynamics of globalization continue to inf luence the regulatory environment. Specifically, globalization and policy diffusion is likely to result in a strong pull for homogenization of risk-regulating policies in both the EU and the United States. Globalization, affecting both corporations and NGOs, creates strong pressures in favor of policies that allow for companies to compete freely on American and European markets, and for consumers to enjoy similar rights on both sides of the Atlantic. International production and commerce place serious limitations on what regulatory bodies in one part of the world can achieve in terms of regulating risk, as the strictest standard often becomes the default policy in both locations. “The more proscriptive European vision may better suit consumer and industry demands for certainty. If you manufacture globally, it is simpler to be bound by the toughest regulatory system in your supply chain. Self-regulation is also a harder sell when it comes to global trade, which involves

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Introduction

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trusting a long line of unknown participants from far-f lung places” (Economist 2007, 2). The European Union and the U.S. government both share similarities that push toward policy innovation related to risk and toward similar mitigation strategies. Both governmental bodies benefit from a form of federalism where states (or nationstates, in the case of the EU) serve as laboratories of innovation that can serve as proving grounds for new national or multinational policies. In addition, both are subject to policy diffusion, with European policies being adopted in the American states and American policies being adopted in Europe. Globalization and diffusion may serve to overcome the regulatory heritage— the institutions, policies, and regulatory legacies—that inf luences the desire to look to one’s local or national government to regulate “scary” things. After we set the stage for understanding differences between the United States and the EU, we turn to consider how these risk issues play out in practice in four policy areas: social, biological, environmental, and societal risks. The first case study concerns immigration as a social risk. The second case looks at food safety as a biological risk. The third case is geared toward f loods as environmental risks. And, finally, the fourth case takes a look at a new risk at the perceptual horizon, namely, voting technology and voting fraud as political risks. In chapter 4, our chapter on immigration, we review the psychological, sociological, and political science literature on why public opinion often sees the immigrant as a risk, and how governments respond to this perception. Particularly in the post-September 11 context, where Islam and terrorism have added new salience to the immigration debate (and new elements of risk to immigration policy), public opinion tends to oppose immigration and view it as a threat. Traditional perceptions, that the United States is an open “country of immigration” and Europe is a closed, xenophobic “fortress,” are becoming increasingly outdated. In fact, while citizens in both polities are converging on similar types of immigration

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Risk Regulation in United States and EU

threat perceptions, governments have been taking increasingly divergent approaches to regulating this risk. Specifically, the United States is experiencing internal divergence caused by federalism, with some states experimenting with harsh laws against immigration, while others remaining quite open. The European Union, on the other hand, has been taking some collective steps toward a proactive “federal” policy built on a recognition of the general benefits (as well as the shared risks) of immigration. As with the increased ability to detect and assess risk with the help of science and technology, the application of science in a way that alters the biological makeup of f lora and fauna holds great potential for human improvement while stirring heated debates over deep-seated fears about unknown consequences. Chapter 5 looks at food safety and the controversy surrounding genetically modified (GM) foods as a biological risk. The concern of many EU member-states and citizens about so-called Frankenfoods are largely driven by questions about the possible, yet unknown, environmental and health risks associated with GM products. In the United States, much less consideration is given to GM food risk. Instead, the benefits of such modifications for crop yields and limiting the need for the use of pesticide and fertilizer have been stressed. It is an open question whether “pure” science or comparative trade advantage is the primary driver of transatlantic differences in this policy area. What is clear is that we see strong efforts to trump dissenting perceptions of risk, and that this battle over perceptions has led to trade wars with patriotic overtones. In recent years the EU and United States have been clashing over the export of genetically modified tomatoes, bananas, and beef (Economist 1999; Josling and Taylor 2003). The EU has adopted a precautionary principle with regard to GM foods and has, with great public support, tried to keep American GM products off the European market (n.a. 2001a; Scott 1999). In large part as a response to a perceived “overreaction” to American advances and discriminating snobbism of

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Introduction

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Europeans, the United States took a chance at revenge when British beef contaminated with BSE was linked to CreutzfeldtJakob Syndrome in humans (n.a. 2001b). The American ban on British beef is only one example of the complex relationship that consumers have to trust in brand name products, scientific information, and biological risks that lie close to personal safety. The British beef ban, which lasted far longer than necessary in British eyes, also brings up the debate about how U.S.- and EU-based corporations have a vested interest in winning the battle of perception, as risk regulations directly impact their profit margin. In chapter 6 we take a look at f loods and the management of f looding as a type of environmental risk management. Flood risks and the benefits of early warning are two issues that EU countries and the United States encounter with relative frequency. The countries in Europe that common ly face spring runoff and f lash f loods have set up a rather advanced “early warning system” among governmental agencies tasked with water management, weather services, or disaster response in these countries. The massive f loods of 1995 and 1997 showed that this system was not without f laws. Yet, interestingly, the general reaction to shortcomings in the f lood response was further institutionalization of cross-border and transnational cooperation in planning and response (Rosenthal and ‘t Hart 1998). Most of the coastal United States is also f lood-prone, especially the southern coasts that are hit every year by hurricanes coming in from the Atlantic. The response to Hurricane Katrina in Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas illustrated a lack of coordination at the local level, country level, between states, and between the states and the federal government. Unlike the European cases previously mentioned, the response to these shortcomings has not been a move toward greater centralization of f lood mitigation and response. While Europeans are keenly aware of the risks of living in f lood-prone areas, they tend to trust in government to manage this type of risk and have, since

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1997, moved steadily closer to an EU-level plan for communicating and responding to disasters. In the United States, the general public is also readily aware of hurricane-related f lood risks, but the steady migration of an older, more aiddependent population to places like Florida sets state governments and the federal government in a dilemma. The U.S. government is facing a risk culture where there is a great deal of “cry-wolf ” cavalierism about hurricanes and the regulatory environment, where much preparation for mitigating and responding to risk is left to the individual. In chapter 7, we consider the ways in which elections and the risk of technology-aided election fraud varies across the United States and the EU. As it relates to voting and elections, political corruption and fraud are two areas that remain a primary policy interest of NGOs. We do, therefore, expect different levels of concern and differences in perception and policy management toward this risk. In the area of electronic voting and fraud, existing election-related regulation and policy has not been greatly affected by formal institutional policy innovation and diffusion across continents. However, a diffusion of ideas and perceptions of risk in this policy area, as well as the efforts of policy entrepreneurs on both sides of the Atlantic to inf luence the activities of the other, have created interesting cross-continental dynamics. The differences across the continents regarding how elections are managed and implemented, as well as how political institutions are structured, create different incentives for regulating and portraying risk. This is particularly the case with regard to technology and risk, where Europeans are much less concerned than Americans with the perils of electronic voting and the perils of attempting other electoral reforms. However, critics of electronic voting technologies in the United States have actively begun to inf luence risk perceptions in Europe. Finally, in chapter 8 we summarize our empirical findings by exploring three crosscutting themes in the book: Transatlantic risk cultures, individuals and their risky business,

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Introduction

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and governments as public risk managers. In this chapter we also evaluate the extent to which the examined policy areas support our ideas, introduced in chapter 1 and elaborated in chapter 3, of the diverging and converging effects of globalization, federalism, institutional mechanisms, cultural views and ideas, advocacy coalitions, and perceptions of risk.

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CH A P T E R

T WO

The Risk Society

This chapter compares and contrasts European and American perceptions of risk and risk regulation. We first lay out the theoretical basis of the “risk society,” or how risk and views about risk have changed with modernity and the advancement of technology. We then highlight the importance of framing, showing how the media and other actors shape the public’s views on risk. Finally, we break down empirical data on risk perceptions in Europe and America, comparing identical questions on surveys conducted on both sides of the Atlantic. These results highlight the role of culture and framing in shaping the public’s perceptions of risk in some surprising ways. Public policy differences between the United States and the European Union need to be considered in a broader understanding of how people conceptualize risk. People have been doing risk analyses on the back of an envelope—or the back of a rock—since the beginning of civilization. Throughout this period, the primary risks that man has faced have been natural risks; plagues, f loods, wild beasts, fire, war, famine, and disease were all risks that man had to address. Although man was often involved in creating these risks—war, famine, plagues, and disease often have human causes and human accelerants— nonetheless, they are endemic to the human condition.1 Today, the risks posed by the natural world remain, albeit often at lower rates for certain natural risks. However, other

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risks have come to the fore. As Ulrich Beck has discussed, the world of natural risks are part of a larger “risk society.”2 Beck considers the risk society a place where the natural risks continue to occur, but there are also many man-made risks that we have created over the past 200 years. The problem with these risks is that, once unleashed, the ability of man to get the genie back into the bottle could be quite difficult. These risks are even more difficult to manage because they often arrive in the guise of beneficial changes that will help improve life. As Beck argues, we currently treat the earth as one large laboratory for experimentation, but one where we cannot turn the experiment off or seal off the lab if the experiment goes awry. Although successes can be transmitted around the world quickly in this new, connected world, failures and externalities spread equally as quickly. The larger problem with our risk society is that efforts to control risk often serve to produce the externalities that generate greater problems. In our efforts to use science and technology to control the risks in our society, new risks often occur that were unintended but are, nonetheless, quite potentially devastating. There are many examples of this problem. For example, in the area of medical technology and innovation, we create new drugs to treat diseases and these drugs do an excellent job. However, a by-product of our effective efforts to treat infectious diseases aggressively is that now there are drug-resistant bacteria that cannot be treated using traditional antibiotics. Even medicines that seem safe—such as antidepressants and pain relievers—may have long-term consequences for users. In other areas, decisions often have perverse or unknown consequences. The decision in America to stop the construction of nuclear power plants led to a proliferation of coal-fired plants, with obvious deleterious effects on the environment and the acceleration of global warming. The decision to use genetically modified foods raises questions in certain quarters about the possibility of aggressive new plants taking over in certain areas or affecting the pollination and growth of other plant matter.

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These risks are what Beck refers to as manufactured risk; our innovative efforts that serve to improve our lives in the here and now may either create future problems that are vast in scope and expensive to mitigate, if they can be mitigated at all. Beck (1998) notes that natural risks can be understood and evaluated using actuarial sciences, which, as he notes, is an attempt to make the “unforeseeable foreseeable.” This world of risk is one that most people are comfortable living in. They buy insurance for their home to mitigate the risk of fire or theft. They purchase health- and life insurance to mitigate against cases of sickness, accidents, or death. Ironically, one of the lessons of the past eight years is that we have found that some efforts to mitigate risks have many of the same problems that Beck suggests are problems in the risk society. For example, the levies designed to address f looding in New Orleans could not address the substantial power of Hurricane Katrina. Likewise, the incredibly complex financial instruments intended to mitigate the risks of financial f luctuation were unable to address the financial tsunami that occurred in 2008. The financial tsunami is an example of the key aspect of the risk society: the potential problems associated with manmade risk are often unknown and unpredictable. Importantly, these risks are often low probability but have the potential to be highly disruptive and destructive. This world of unpredictable risks is one where we “are operating in terms of probabilities, which do not exclude the worst case” (Beck 1998, 13). In this world of risk, the worst-case scenario can produce the “worst imaginable incident” (WII), one where the world, mankind, or its creatures are destroyed through a technological, biological, nuclear, or environmental disaster (Beck 1999, 53). Most problematically, a WII is not likely to be easily reversible; once it occurs, we will live with the aftermath of that event for some time. The wealth of new scientific discovery, information, and innovation—things that most of us take for granted—serve to

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increase the risks in our world. To take but one small example, some scientists who now work in computer artificial intelligence are worried that innovation in that field may create computer systems that are more advanced than we might be able to control, a realization of the realities that science fiction authors and moviemakers have presented in works like Terminator or Eagle Eye. Advances in computing, technology, and related fields change the world in which we live and the risks we live with. The other side of the scientific debate is that new research and innovation lead to discoveries establishing that the innovations that were thought to be risk free are actually ones that have higher risks than were known. In the United States, the medical community has had numerous discoveries about the risks associated with pain medicines such as acetaminophen, Vicodin, and Percocet, because they can cause liver problems for some individuals when taken for extended periods or at too high a dose. These discoveries come on the heels of other drug controversies, such as the use of COX-2 selective inhibitors, another pain medicine that was pulled from the market because studies determined that there were dangers associated with their use. These examples are important because they illustrate how, in the risk society, a product can be deemed safe for use, endorsed by science and the government, and then be later determined to be dangerous. These debates typically occur under bright media spotlights, but they also often fail to provide basic information that the public needs to appreciate the complexities of the issues involved. While the Americans have experienced the risk society directly through its many experiences related to the risks associated to medical drugs, the Europeans had a focal experience with the risk society in a series of outbreaks of “Mad Cow” disease—Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans.3 Food is a basic need and is something that people generally expect to be safe, especially in a regulated market. Importantly, BSE has

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been a known risk to international food supplies for some time and has been monitored to ensure that just such outbreaks do not occur. This incongruity—having a catastrophic outbreak of BSE in a regulated society—spawned a large research literature examining why such an event occurred, and this literature has found that British authorities did not respond rapidly when the threat of BSE became known, and that they still did not respond rapidly when the evidence showed that this threat was quite serious.4 The conf licting goals within the government— between choosing to address the public health problem and maintaining public confidence in the food supply—may have led officials to deny that the BSE problem was severe until it was too late for it to be contained. The failure to act had tragic results; the crisis required more than one million head of cattle in the United Kingdom to be destroyed and to the spread of both BSE and vCJD to Europe. It also undermined confidence in the safety of the European beef supply in other parts of the world and confidence in the safety of the human blood supply for individuals who had lived in parts of Europe during this crisis.5 Although some scholars, such as Beck, have argued that the world is becoming riskier, another school of thought argues that, because of increases in knowledge, our ability to control many natural risks, and information diffusion, we are obsessed with risk, even if our lives are less risky. As Giddens (1998) argues, “it is a society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety) that generates this notion of risk” (Giddens 1998, taken from Mythen 2004). In our computerized and connected society, the public can acquire information rapidly across a wealth of information platforms. Scientific knowledge is exploding as computers allow for evermore sophisticated analyses to be done on different phenomena in the world. On top of this, the explosion in media outlets is also increasing the level of conf lict reported in the media (Mythen 2004, 140–42). Together, these factors expand our ability to measure, learn about, and become frightened by, risks.

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Sunstein (2005) has argued that, as the media and others often focus on new risks, there can be a tendency to lose sight of existing risks. For example, concerns about genetically modified foods might lead the public to lose sight of the traditional risks associated with food-borne diseases. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “foodborne diseases cause approximately 76 million illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths in the United States each year” (Center for Disease Control n.d.). This argument by Sunstein, made in a critique of the risk management technique known as the precautionary principle, suggests that our obsession with future risk can lead us to overlook the risks posed by the status quo. For example, if we worry about the potential risks of some medicines on the public, we may be less willing to do research on new vaccinations, medical procedures, or antibiotics. Risk and Framing Two of the most prominent scholars of how the mass public experiences risk are Roger and Jeanne Kasperson.6 These scholars are quite focused on the way in which risks are communicated within the public sphere and the factors that lead some risk concerns to be amplified and for others to be attenuated. In their work, they define a personal component to understanding risk, which centers on how the likelihood that a given risk will affect an individual is perceived by that given individual. In addition, there are institutional and social aspects that affect how risks are interpreted and addressed (Kasperson and Kasperson 1996). In this framework, “Risk analysis, then, requires an approach that is capable of illuminating risk in its full complexity, is sensitive to the social settings in which risk occurs, and also recognizes that social interactions may either amplify or attenuate the signals to society about the risk” (Kasperson and Kasperson 1996, 96). As they see debates over risks in society play out, Kasperson and Kasperson recognize that, for the typical person, risks are

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not experienced directly but are instead experienced through the media. For example, we may worry about the risks associated with a given drug, but such events occur within the context of multiple uses of the same product safely by large numbers of individuals. This does not mean that the public does not have experience of such risks, but that, when they do, they experience it through a certain framing and decision about how the risk will be portrayed. As Kasperson and Kasperson note: Risk issues are also important elements in the agenda of various social and political groups . . . To the extent that risk becomes a central issue in a political campaign or a source of contention between social groups, it will be vigorously brought to greater public attention, often imbued with value-based interpretations. Polarization of views and escalation of rhetoric by partisans typically occur, and new recruits are drawn into the conf lict. These social alignments about risk disputes often outlive a single controversy and become anchors for subsequent episodes. Indeed, they frequently remain steadfast even in the face of conf licting information. (1996, 98–99) The goal of each side in any policy debate is to use various techniques to create an enduring perception or image of the issue that will outlast its stay with the public for many years. Ultimately, if they are successful, the public will carry these perceptions with them when such debates occur in the future. Public Attitudes toward Risk—Differences between the United States and the EU We wanted to examine differences between risk attitudes at the mass level in the United States and the European Union using survey data. We accomplished this by replicating a series of questions from the Eurobarometer September–October 2005 survey (Eurobarometer 2005) that asked specifically about

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risk. We replicated these questions in the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).7 Specifically, we asked the following: Below is a list of potential risks. For each of them please rate how likely you think they are to happen to you personally. You can respond “very likely, “fairly likely,” “not very likely,” or “not at all likely.” The respondents then used those response categories to state how likely they thought they were to have each of the following occur: (1) being injured in a car accident, (2) a serious illness, (3) consumer goods (other than food) damaging your health, (4) being the victim of a crime, and (5) being the victim of terrorism. When we consider the ratings for each of these questions in the United States and the European Union, we see that, for some questions but not for others, there are inherent differences at the aggregate level between how individuals view these issues, especially at the extreme responses (“Very Likely” and “Not at all Likely”). In table 2.1, we present the results for each of the five questions for both the European Union and the United States, as well as a difference in attitudes between the European Union and the United States for each question and response category. For example, in the first column—the likelihood of being a victim of a crime—we see that neither Europeans nor Americans think that they are very likely to be the victim of a crime. However, Europeans are 12.77 percentage points less likely than Americans to think they are fairly likely to be a victim of a crime (23.57 percent in the EU versus 36.34 percent in the United States). The biggest gap, however, is at the “not at all likely” response category. Here, we see that Europeans are roughly four times more likely (a 17.55 percentage points difference) to think that they are not at all likely to be a victim of crime compared to Americans. While perhaps a predictable response to cultural

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The Risk Society Table 2.1

European Union

United States

Difference (EU-US)

35

American and European perceptions of potential risks Injured Serious Injury by Unsafe in Car Consumer Good Accident % %

Victim of a Crime %

Victim of Terrorism %

Risk of Serious Illness %

6.19 23.57

3.74 16.96

10.52 44.08

9.67 45.21

10.44 37.04

46.21

48.96

37.87

37.29

41.11

24.03

30.33

7.52

7.83

11.41

Very Likely Fairly Likely Not Very Likely Not At All Likely

7.99 36.34

4.98 13.31

14.20 43.42

10.62 43.07

6.78 23.95

49.19

52.89

38.11

42.15

58.18

6.48

28.82

4.27

4.16

11.10

Very Likely Fairly Likely Not Very Likely Not At All Likely

−1.80 −12.77

−1.23 3.65

−3.68 0.67

−0.96 2.14

3.66 13.09

−2.98

−3.93

−0.24

−4.86

−17.07

17.55

1.51

3.25

3.67

0.31

Very Likely Fairly Likely Not Very Likely Not At All Likely

stereotypes of violent America and safe Europe, these public perceptions are not necessarily ref lective of the underlying reality. Americans are indeed roughly four times as likely as Europeans to be murdered, but rates of property crime in Europe have recently matched or even surpassed American levels, with the burglary rates in England and the Netherlands higher than the American burglary rate (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2004). When we consider the responses for the terrorism question, we see that there are actually not large differences between the EU and U.S. respondents. We see that, across all four response

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categories, there are similar attitudes expressed regarding the likelihood of being the victim of terrorism. Until 9/11, Europeans were much more likely than Americans to die in terrorist attacks, with roughly 5,000 terrorism deaths in Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Spain alone in the past thirty years. Since 9/11, however, this is increasingly seen as a common risk. We see a similar pattern for the questions related to the likelihood of suffering from a serious illness. Ironically, in the context of the current health care debate and the relatively low U.S. life expectancy, Americans, amusingly, are 3.68 percentage points less likely to respond that they are very likely to suffer from a serious illness compared to their European counterparts. There is a similar 3.25 percentage point difference at the “not at all likely” end of this question; Europeans are less likely to think they will not fall victim to a serious illness. When we examine the question of the likelihood of being seriously injured in a car accident, we see that Americans and Europeans have similar attitudes. This is somewhat surprising given the lower rate of traffic fatalities in Europe, and given that Americans drive at much higher rates, over much longer distances, than their European counterparts do (Lytton 2008). There are slight differences, but, overall, the Americans and Europeans are similar in attitudes regarding this risk area. When we turn to the likelihood of being injured by an unsafe consumer product, we see confirmation of the conventional wisdom that Americans trust the private sector while Europeans are suspicious of big business. The data show that Americans across the board are less likely to worry about such risks compared to Europeans. This is especially true at the two middle response categories—“fairly likely” and “not very likely”—where there is roughly a 30 percentage point difference in concern between Europeans and Americans, with Americans expressing much less concern than Europeans about unsafe consumer products.

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Attitudes of European and American Partisans Of course, for politicians and policy-makers, the positions of the general population are important, but it is the opinions of their partisan compatriots that are most important. Liberal (conservative) politicians care about the views of the liberal (conservative) citizenry; the views of the opposition may be of interest but are not something that they necessarily need to respond to in the policy process. In the U.S. context, members of Congress do serve all of their constituents, but they pay more attention to the voting members of their constituency, even more attention to the voters belonging to the same party as the legislator, and the most attention to the voters of the same party who vote in party primary elections. These core partisans are the individuals who are most likely to donate money to the candidate, mobilize other voters to cast votes, and to vote themselves. In Europe, a different route is taken to reach the same conclusion. European systems privilege party discipline, since candidate selection is generally made by party leaders and not through primary elections. In this dynamic, legislators have perhaps even more incentive to cater outputs to partisans alone, since cross-party voting is rare and one’s political future depends on impressing party bosses, not primary voters or campaign donors. In figures 2.1–2.7, we consider the differences between all five partisan categories as to whether each of the five risks are very likely or not at all likely. In figure 2.1, we consider the question of the likelihood of being a victim of crime. Here, we see that, across all five partisan categories, EU respondents are much less worried about crime than are their American counterparts. Both very right-leaning and very left-leaning Europeans are not at all worried about being a victim of crime. Across the board, we also see that Americans are more worried about crime than are Europeans. This is especially true among “very liberal” respondents, where leftist Americans

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Risk Regulation in United States and EU Total Very Conservative/ Right

Conservative (7–8)

Moderate/Centre

Liberal (3–4)

Very Liberal/Left 0

5

10

15

20 (%)

25

30

US Not at all likely

US Very likely

EU Not at all likely

EU Very likely

35

40

American and European perceptions of the risk of becoming a victim of crime

Figure 2.1

are 3.5 percentage points more likely than leftist Europeans to think they are very likely to be a victim of crime, and leftist Europeans are 19 percentage points more likely than leftist Americans to think that they are not at all likely to be a victim of crime. Perhaps, this is due to the fact that the European understanding of “Left is more radical, although there is also a gap in the United States between very liberal and very conservative respondents, with very liberal ones about 9 percentage points more likely to think that they are not at all likely to be a victim of crime. In general, it seems that conservative emphasis on “law and order” platforms is underpinned by more intensive worries about crime, on both sides of the Atlantic. When we turn to the terrorism question, we see here that there is a large difference on the American side between liberals and conservatives as to whether they are not at all likely to

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be victim of a terrorist event. Very liberal Americans are more than twice as likely as are very conservative Americans to think that they are not at all likely to be a victim of terrorism. Very conservative and conservative Americans are also more likely to think they are very likely to be a victim of terrorism compared to liberal and very liberal Americans. In Europe, there is not the same divide, largely because both left-wing and rightwing Europeans think in large numbers that they are not at all likely to be victims of terrorism (figure 2.2). When we examine the question of the likelihood of being the victim of a serious illness, we see that, in the United States, all ideological groups except the “very conservative” are more likely to say that they are very likely to suffer from a serious illness compared to not at all likely to suffer from a serious illness. The same is true of Europeans on the left and the right.

Total Very Conservative/ Right Conservative (7–8)

Moderate/Centre

Liberal (3–4)

Very Liberal/Left 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

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(%) US Not at all likely

US Very likely

EU Not at all likely

EU Very likely

Figure 2.2 American and European perceptions of the risk of becoming a victim of terrorism

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However, what is interesting is that, in America, very liberal individuals are more likely to express a response on either extreme, compared to very conservative Americans. Americans who are very liberal are 4.9 percentage points more likely than very conservatives to think they are very likely to suffer from a serious illness. Very liberal Americans are also 7.27 percentage points more likely than very conservative Americans to think they are not at all likely to suffer a serious illness. In Europe, similar percentages of people on the left and right think they are likely to suffer from a serious illness (figure 2.3). When we ask about the likelihood of being involved in a serious car accident, we see that there is a 10 percentage point difference between very liberal and very conservative Americans when asked if they are not at all likely to be involved in a car accident. American “very conservative” respondents were also

Total Very Conservative/ Right Conservative (7–8)

Moderate/Centre

Liberal (3–4)

Very Liberal/Left 0

2

4

6

8

10

12

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(%) US Not at all likely

US Very likely

EU Not at all likely

EU Very likely

American and European perceptions of the risk of becoming a victim of serious illness

Figure 2.3

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almost 2 percentage points more likely to think they are very likely to be in an accident compared to very liberal respondents. This may be, in large part, because driving is more prevalent in historically conservative states compared to more liberal ones, and conservatives are aware that there is a relationship between the amount a person travels and their likelihood of being in a serious accident.8 In Europe, right and left respondents are equally likely to worry about being in a serious car accident, but right respondents are more likely to think they are not at all likely to be in a serious accident compared to left respondents (figure 2.4). When we examine attitudes about the likelihood of being injured by consumer goods, we see that, for all groups except moderates, Americans are more likely to think such injuries are not at all likely than very likely. For European liberals,

Total Very Conservative/ Right Conservative (7–8)

Moderate/Centre

Liberal (3–4)

Very Liberal/Left 0

2

4

6

8

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(%) US Not at all likely

US Very likely

EU Not at all likely

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American and European perceptions of the risk of being in a serious car accident

Figure 2.4

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there is a bias toward thinking such injuries are very likely instead of not at all likely. For more rightist Europeans, there is a much closer relationship between these two categories. This difference between the United States and the European Union residents on this question may in part be a function of Europeans living in a better regulated environment—or being under the impression that they are—compared to Americans, where problems with such products are often addressed solely through litigation. Scholars have argued for some time that differences in liability law and tort actions create differences in product development and safety innovations between the United States and Europe (e.g., Huber and Litan 1991). The reason is pure economics; if managers perceive that innovation will cause a concomitant increase in legal liability, then innovation will not be rewarded. However, if the legal landscape is not litigious and there is a healthy market for innovations that promote health and safety, then you will see safer and better products in the market. The United States has been seen as an example of this first model and Europe an example of the second model (e.g., Mackay 1991) (figure 2.5). In figure 2.6, we summarize the differences between the very left (liberal) and very right (conservative). Within both the United States and the European Union, there are clear differences across the political spectrum regarding attitudes about the likelihood of these risks.9 An analysis of variance (ANOVA) for both the U.S. and EU surveys for each question shows that the differences are significant for four of the five questions. In the case of the European Union survey, we see that the differences are significant for all questions except for the risk of being a victim of terrorism. In the case of the United States, the risk of a serious illness question is the only question that is not statistically significant. The data here suggest that there are clear ideological differences in Europe and the United States in regard to the likelihood of various threats occurring. In the United States, terrorism, crime, and automobile accidents are all areas where there are clear differences between the left and

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Total Very Conservative/ Right Conservative (7–8)

Moderate/Centre

Liberal (3–4)

Very Liberal/Left 0

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4

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10 (%)

12

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16

US Not at all likely

US Very likely

EU Not at all likely

EU Very likely

18

20

American and European perceptions of the risk of being injured by consumer goods

Figure 2.5

right and are also areas where there are often stark policy differences related to regulation and policy formation. In Europe, terrorism is one issue on which both sides agree and there are no large differences, which likely is the result of a longer history with terrorism and a recognition that the threat of terrorism affects all individuals. More importantly, the resulting European policy responses were not as partisan as was the case in the United States. In figure 2.7, we summarize the differences between the United States and the European Union in the way they view each risk. We see that, for several of the questions, there are large gaps in the perceptions of Americans and Europeans. For example, we see that Europeans view crime much differently than do Americans. Europeans view themselves as living in a far safer world than do Americans, which, of course, bears

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Car Accident

Illness

Terrorism

Crime −10

−5

0

5

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(%) Crime (%) US Left-Right Difference, Very Likely US Left-Right Difference, Not Very Likely EU Left-Right Difference, Very Likely EU Left-Right Difference, Not Very Likely

Terrorism (%)

Illness (%)

Car Consumer Accident (%) Goods (%)

8.88

27.96

7.27

9.93

3.77

−0.81

−3.87

4.90

−1.99

0.48

0.88

−6.47

−2.65

−3.11

−5.24

−2.88

−2.77

−0.49

1.23

−0.22

American and European perspectives on risk compared based on political affiliation

Figure 2.6

out in real violent crime statistics (though not necessarily with property crimes). Americans also worry more about consumer goods, which may bear out in the way in which Europeans view risk and the fact that their products are better regulated, in general, than are American products. We also see a small but important gap regarding the likelihood of suffering from a serious illness. In summary, the regulatory environment in which the citizens of the European Union and the United States live is affected by the way in which people in those regions perceive risk. Risk perceptions are highly subjective and Americans and Europeans do, in some ways, weigh some objective risks in ways that

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Injured by Unsafe Consumer Good Serious Injury in Car Accident Risk of Serious Illness

Victim of Terrorism

Victim of a Crime −20

−15

Victim of a Crime (%) Difference (EU-US) Not at all likely Difference (EU-US) Not very likely Difference (EU-US) Fairly likely Difference (EU-US) Very likely

−10

5

0 (%)

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Serious Injury in Injured by Unsafe Victim of Risk of Terrorism Serious Illness Car Accident Consumer Good (%) (%) (%) (%)

17.55

1.51

3.25

3.67

0.31

−2.98

−3.93

−0.24

−4.86

−17.07

−12.77

3.65

0.67

2.14

13.09

−1.80

−1.23

−3.68

−0.96

3.66

Figure 2.7 Summary of differences found in American and European perspectives on risk

track objective facts. For example, Europeans worry less about crime than Americans and this is correct given the difference in (violent) crime rates on each side of the Atlantic. It also fits into the way in which we think about the amplification of risk. The U.S. media is very crime focused—the saying “It bleeds, it leads” is very American—and this further shapes the way in which Americans worry about crime. In addition to cultural differences, we also see that political institutions play an interesting role in attitudes about regulatory evaluations. For example, the litigious nature of American tort law affects the way in which both Americans and Europeans view consumer products. The consumer product industry is very contentious and partisan in America because there are

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clear lines between conservatives, who think that America is overregulated and there are too many frivolous lawsuits over defective products, and liberals, who think America is underregulated and that there are too few efforts to rein in corporations through the court system. The Europeans, by contrast, do not have a contentious legal environment compared to the Americans, and use a much more consensual process of regulating. This leads to less politicization of many regulatory issues, which are entrusted to an ostensibly nonpartisan bureaucracy. The fact that more risk regulation is now conducted at European Union level also serves to depoliticize regulatory issues in Europe, since European publics have little knowledge of, or engagement with, EU-level politics, allowing “experts” to conduct their work in a relatively depoliticized environment. The next chapter delves into these differences by highlighting the important roles played by political/institutional factors in leading to convergent or divergent regulation of risk in either polity.

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T H R E E

Objective Differences

Introduction The previous chapter highlighted differences in perception and culture regarding risk regulation between Europeans and Americans. This chapter demonstrates how the desire to mitigate risks has been mediated by other differences between the EU and the United States—namely, differences in federalism, institutions, and interest groups—leading to divergent policy outcomes in some cases. The different institutional, federal, and lobbying schemes utilized have their roots in the general design of the political and economic systems, and, in this sense, decisions made far into the past have a great deal of inf luence on the specific responses to risk generated. Our focus in this chapter will be to outline some of the path-dependent outcomes and to contrast the polities of the United States and EU on three of our six hypothesized factors that inf luence risk regulation: federalism, institutions, and interest groups (the other three being perception, culture, and globalization). The specific cases of immigration policy, food safety, f looding, and election fraud will be examined in chapters 4–7. This chapter focuses on comparing the general institutional framework of risk regulation involving interest groups and governmental actors at the federal level. Federalism itself also plays a key role, we argue, in shaping regulatory behavior, especially given the

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historical evidence of U.S. states functioning as “laboratories of democracy,” where regulatory innovations can be developed, studied, and copied or adapted by other jurisdictions (Oates 1999). In some cases federalism pushes toward regulatory convergence across polities, while in other policy areas it pushes toward divergent outcomes, as our empirical studies make clear. Throughout the analysis one constant should be kept in mind: globalization—the global spread of ideas, technology, information, goods and services, and business practices—and the interconnectedness that springs from it has also shaped the way in which risks are perceived and information about risks is managed. At the end of the chapter the reader can find a visual layout of our hypothesized model of risk regulation, where all six factors interact to produce regulatory outcomes. In this model, globalization and past regulations are filtered through two “subjective” factors (culture and perception) and three “objective” factors (federalism, institutions, and interest groups) to produce new regulatory outcomes. This chapter reviews prevailing explanations for “objective” (federal, institutional, lobbying) differences in regulatory approaches on both sides of the Atlantic. Specifically, we analyze the following factors as potential causes of divergence in risk regulation between the two polities: (1) Interest Groups: American pluralism versus European corporatism; (2) Federalism: the relative power of U.S. states as compared to EU member nations; and (3) five other aspects of the politicalinstitutional context: (A) Varying levels of trust in government versus business; (B) The relative size of the welfare state and its role in risk/harm mitigation; (C) Presidential dominance versus bureaucratic dominance; (D) The relative age of the respective regulatory programs/institutions; and (E) common law versus civil law judicial traditions. After analyzing the strength of each factor in creating divergent approaches to risk regulation, we conclude with a discussion of globalization and its role in pushing for policy convergence.

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Pluralism versus Corporatism One of the major differences between policymaking in the United States and the European Union continues to be the ability and scope of interest groups to affect the policymaking processes. In their ideal type, we would expect a pluralistic system to favor more specific and powerful interests, to allow for a multitude of inputs and approaches from actors, and to facilitate an overall greater access to the system. Harmon Zeigler defines pluralism as: “the belief that advanced industrial democracies, especially the United States, generate a system of multiple, competing elites (including interest groups) that determine public policy through bargaining and compromise” (1988, 3). In contrast, a corporate system privileges broader coalitions; the promotion of less specific interests and more difficult access to decision-makers can ensure a more harmonious but less open system with less overall diversity. With regard to interest group activities and access to decision-makers, the EU more closely represents a corporatist system and the United States ref lects a more pluralistic system. We follow the view of David Lazer and Viktor MayerSchoenberger (2001), who argue that the U.S. legislative process is predominantly pluralistic, despite some efforts to add technocratic review procedures to the process (2001, 131). In executive administrative processes there is a greater tendency to add technocratic review procedures with respect to weighing costs and benefits. Adding effective mechanisms with respect to federalist issues seems to hold little weight. For EU, the “where” part of the subsidiarity1 issue seems to be tied to the “how” part of the question (2001, 137). The authors conclude that, in both cases, the executive branches don’t pay enough attention to the federal level of procedures, while the procedures addressing the “how” part of the issue seems to have more weight within the respective unions. The EU has very limited capacity to actually implement any policies and has to rely on member states for this part of the policy process. In contrast, the American

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federal government has considerable capacity to implement policies across states. It’s also important to understand that litigation in the United States has been a significant force of interest group activities resulting in both restrictions on regulation (almost always through suits by business organizations) and adoption of greater regulation led by either business or “public interest” groups. Business groups play a disproportionate role in interest group litigative activities. An example of business lobbyist power is how the auto and life insurance industries compelled the U.S. Department of Transportation to adopt rules requiring airbags. Labor groups have also used litigation to promote regulation especially under Republican administrations when their access to decision-makers has been harder to achieve. Litigations initiated not only the safety advocacy groups like those made famous by Ralph Nader, but also the Natural Resource Defense Council, Environmental Defense Fund, Cancer Society, Lung Association, and so on. Policy-orientated (as opposed to tort/personal injury) can best be understood as an expression of interest group activities in regulatory politics. The role of U.S. courts with regard to regulatory policy is not entirely straightforward, despite the fact that they frequently fill this arbitrator function between interest groups and decision-makers. The courts interact with the agencies and cannot be seen as entirely separate from the politics that go on within policymaking agencies. Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that the view of the courts are predominate even in the United States, rather the courts limit agency autonomy while still largely deferring the determination of risk back to the agencies. It is also important to note the significant Washington think tank community that contributes to both larger arguments and to the debate and personnel that goes with Executive branch turnover (see Teles 2008). The courts have a substantial effect on regulatory policy in the United States, but this largely ref lects how public policy in general is inf luenced through multiple entry points in the

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United States. One could argue that the use of the courts is far preferable to farmer protests or trucker blockades as a way to inf luence policy. Alfred Aman (2004) in particular has written of the European “democracy deficit” in the EU policy process, and how courts can be used to overcome this deficit. An important limitation, though, is that litigation sets outside boundaries but does not shape the bulk of policy content, and is often preempted by statute and administrative regulation. Interest groups may simply target legislators or bureaucrats in order to preclude the necessity of jurisprudence. But the adversarial dynamic that sometimes arises out of litigation sets much of the background for relationships between different interest groups. An American common law tradition does provide greater interest group voice and opportunities for judicially created policy, but that does not necessarily translate into overall regulatory effectiveness. Overall, we see a much different picture of interest group activities in U.S. and EU pluralist and corporatist environments, and we expect that this difference will affect the regulation of risk. For example, the American system is not only much more open, it is also more contentious than the EU environment. As we will see later, business relations with the state have historically been characterized by periods of conf lict, and the earliest regulations were rooted in antimonopolistic crusades and passed in politically changed atmospheres. The European Union’s less contentious and more corporatist relationship opens up space and eases the regulation of risk. Relative Power of Sub-Federal Jurisdictions Both the United States and the EU are federal entities. In the United States and in Europe many of the responsibilities for enforcing regulation lie with subnational units, or, in the case of the EU, the member states. The American experience with federalism is one of increasing growth in the power of the federal government over the history of the Republic. In the EU,

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a somewhat similar experience is playing itself out, but with some major differences. Unlike the American states, the EU is made up of historically sovereign nation-states that have very different legal, cultural, political, and historical experiences. Moreover, as Ellerman et al. (2007) argue, “notwithstanding the increasingly common and convenient reference to the European Union as a single entity, it is well to remember that the Union consists of twenty-[seven] sovereign states, all of whom jealously guard national prerogative” (2007, 366). Thus, we have major difference between the American model of a dominating federal government within a federalist system and a European model where the member states are much more powerful with regard to its supranational institutions (this is especially so in the all-important European Council). Moravcsik (2001) expresses this in “the EU is not a superstate in the making. The contemporary EU is far narrower and weaker a federation than any extant national federation—so weak, indeed, that we might question whether it is a federation at all” (emphasis the author’s, 2001, 163). Moravcsik’s argument has merit in the sense that the member states are far from quiescent; indeed, they shape and control much of the EU’s actions. However, policies ranging from the environment to health care have been emerging in Brussels, and have achieved a remarkable level of acceptance and institutionalization. For example, the issue of the EU Emissions-Trading System (ETS), the European climate change and emission regulations scheme, underlines the very real unity and power of the EU. Ellerman et al. write that: Given the highly different circumstances of the EU Member States and their equally varying commitments to adopting meaningful measures to restrict CO2 emissions, one must ask: what caused the reluctant followers to adopt caps and to enter into the multinational trading regime? The short answer is that participation was a requirement of membership in the European Union. But

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this easy answer relying on legal formalities evades the more serious issue of what caused highly sovereign nations to accept a measure that they did not seek, would not otherwise have chosen, and that involved costs . . . the answer would appear to be the broader benefits of participation in the European Union. (2007, 367–68) The EU has a significant leverage over member states in this way; at least in the long term, the member states see the overall benefits of EU membership as high, and are unwilling to seriously consider pulling out. This is especially true for those who have joined, or will be joining, the Euro (the common EU currency). Overall, the case of the EU ETS suggests that, much like the American case, federal governments are assuming responsibility for a multitude of issues, often because the nature of the problems defy national or state boundaries. Traditionally the view that American states (or any subnational units for that matter) serve as “laboratories of democracy” is more accurate for taxation, services, and subsidies for purposes of economic development than it is for regulation. Thus, relocation decisions are more often made on the basis of cost and access to resources (such as a trained workforce and vendors) rather than a different regulatory climate.2 One of the primary reasons that industry calls for national regulation is to create national standards that preempt differing state requirements. Creating national standards allows for greater efficiency and economies of scale—and avoids the problem of regulations with varying degrees of strictness, thereby avoiding having to manufacture different jurisdiction-dependent products. In some cases, companies simply manufacture products to meet the strictest standards (e.g., California’s auto emissions requirements), while in other cases industries have been willing to accept stricter regulation at the national level to avoid differing standards, and even to accept national regulation when the federal agencies have no mandate (such as the EPA’s regulation of woodstoves) so as to avoid state-by-state regulation. A similar

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dynamic can be seen in the area of tort (harm) liability, which is now increasingly nationalized, with the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 2008, for example, that federal law preempts statelevel tort claims on the liability of medical device manufacturers (United States Supreme Court 2008). Regulatory innovation among states is largely based on federally issued waivers, where the federal government agrees to grant states the authority to preempt or surpass federal rules. California’s Clean Air rules illustrate both the limits (hindered economic development) and opportunities (environmental protection) of such moves, while Maryland and Washington states’ water discharge rules show the importance of specificity of local conditions in pushing policy innovation (water pollution conditions and threats vary widely across geographical contexts—“strict” regulation in one jurisdiction might be seen as “weak” in another, depending on the fragility of the ecosystem and the economic context). One major difference, of course, is that U.S. states have little ability to veto proposed federalization of policy, in contrast to EU member states that have a significant say in shifting policymaking to the supranational level. A certain amount of state tailoring of regulatory policy has occurred through the delegation of enforcement. Decentralized enforcement has allowed state agencies to mediate between federal agencies and local interests, something that, in turn, has led to significant state variation in matters like worker safety, despite uniform federal rules. Tort suits are primarily found at the state level and federalism allows for “forum shopping” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) among states in larger product liability cases. However, defendants have been able to move many of these cases into federal court, where the tort claims receive a more hostile treatment, which limits the effects of venue shopping and the usefulness of attempts to use states as “laboratories of litigation.” Federal product liability law has recently changed to preempt many of these tort suits by making it easier to move such suits into federal court.

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In 2008, the Supreme Court found that allowing state juries to impose liability on the maker of an approved medical device “disrupts the federal scheme” of regulation that had delegated the responsibility for evaluating the risks and benefits of a new device to the Federal Drug Administration (United States Supreme Court 2008). The same year, the Court ruled that a federal law deregulating interstate shipping hindered state efforts to prevent juveniles from improperly purchasing cigarettes. State laws requiring delivery companies to verify a recipient’s identity and age was seen as counteracting federal deregulation and the creation of a more competitive national marketplace (United States Supreme Court 2006). Trust The relationship between business, government, and the public, and specifically the level of trust between the three, plays a major role in the shape and amount of regulation. Of course, the mutual opinions of publics, governments, and companies are neither monolithic nor unchanging, and specific changes in institutional leadership or context may greatly affect the relationship between the three actors. The traditional American relationship between industry and government has been quite adversarial; the pluralistic and litigious nature of the American system has encouraged divides between the private and public sectors in ways that the European corporatist state has not. Similarly, the American public is much less trusting of its government than Europeans are of theirs. Charles Kupchan has claimed that this is due to the more libertarian streak in the American public, while the European tradition is more communitarian (Economist 2008a). Our thesis here is that the closer the relationship that industry and the public enjoy with the government, and the higher the levels of trust, the higher the levels of regulation. This might seem counterintuitive; we might assume that contentious relations would increase the chances of government monitoring

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and regulating industry. However, it is likely that the opposite occurs; that the more corporatist environment of the EU encourages a closer relationship between the state and its public, this is especially due to the pervasive social welfare programs in Europe. This more trusting relationship opens up space for government to regulate on behalf of the public good, whereas such regulations in the United States would be opposed by industry and public as “big government takeovers.” For example: Language can be revealing. The European press has written much about America using the “state” to save AIG and other outfits. Americans talk instead of a “government” bail-out. There is a difference. In places like France, the state is the State, run by a bureaucratic elite with a special claim to disinterested wisdom. America’s government does not claim a monopoly on wisdom when it comes to bailing out markets; it is just that, in hard times, it is the only bit of the economy with money. (Economist 2008c) President Obama’s attempts to regulate the American economy quickly met with stiff resistance, not only from the public but also from politicians (even in his own party) who feared a public backlash. Even as Obama’s personal approval ratings remained relatively high, public support for government intervention in the private sector was consistently low. In June 2009, for example, Rasmussen (Rasmussenreports.com 2009) found that only 42 percent of the public strongly supported Obama’s economic policy, while 53 percent approved of the president overall. The Welfare State The relative size of the welfare state plays a role in the state’s approach to risk. When policy-makers examine the need to regulate or legislate certain activities, they are likely to consider the forms of social insurance available to citizens. If the government provides a social safety net that mitigates risk to

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some degree, the issue may be less politically or legally contentious. Litigation in the United States, regarding, for instance, auto injuries, comes against a backdrop of privatized costs, such as medical costs and loss of income. These costs are carried indirectly by the individual in the United States through private insurance (or lack thereof ), but they are state-compensated (or at least buffered) in Europe (Kritzer 2006). This has led to the issue of tort law becoming highly politicized in the U.S. context, including its central role in conservative arguments in the American health care debate. For years the Republican Party has argued that the single best way to control high U.S. health care costs would be to minimize the legal liability of medical practitioners. On the European side, governments that have already guaranteed some form of insurance in a certain policy area are less likely to then regulate the risk associated with that area. Medical malpractice is a virtual nonissue in Europe. Here we see a divide between the more litigious and less insured American system and the less litigious and more (publicly) insured European one. American individualism has combined with a legal system that facilitates access to the courts and lawsuits to create major regulatory uncertainty and new spaces for regulation of risk. Presidential versus Bureaucratic The European Union, despite efforts to establish a permanent presidency (in the proposed Lisbon Treaty), remains a highly bureaucratic system largely dominated by unelected and appointed leaders. Dramatic changes in the tenor, scope, and role of the EU are unlikely to follow the election of new leadership in member states. However, the American presidential system is prone to much more f luctuation. The election of Barak Obama in 2008 has had a major impact on the regulatory environment in the United States, for example. Under Obama, the United States has granted the Food and Drug Agency far-reaching power over tobacco products, including

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the ability to regulate nicotine levels and packaging (Layton 2009). Additionally, the U.S. House narrowly approved a new climate change/emission bill that would have been unlikely to pass under Obama’s predecessor. Under a new administration, especially one from a different party, many, if not most, of the leadership of the federal government is expected to change. American politics also tends to be highly fractious in regard to regulatory issues. For example, certain industries often back specific parties and/or candidates that are likely to favor a less stringent regulatory regime. Big business, for example, has traditionally allied with the Republican Party while trial lawyers have allied themselves largely with the Democratic Party. Both interest groups expect a different regulatory environment depending on who is elected. Overall, the two U.S. parties have fundamental differences in terms of their attitudes toward risk/regulation (one could argue that this is the singlemost important partisan divide if one includes the welfare state as part of this). Given the two-party (as opposed to multiparty) nature of American politics, this leads to very different approaches to risk regulation depending on who occupies the White House. Funding for agencies, for example, has been highly dependent on the partisan landscape.3 The American example is somewhat oversimplified due to the fact that many of the bureaucrats in Washington do not change with the administrations, as well as the fact that a president’s power is often quite limited. However, in terms of appointments, it is fair to view the president as very powerful, and this is especially true when the president’s party controls Congress as well as the White House. In the European Union this process is replicated, but in less direct, partisan, and divisive ways. The multilayered system of governance makes rapid changes more difficult in the EU; a single prime minister or president is unlikely to have the power to make wholesale changes to EU regulations. The European Union lacks a single leader who can claim the “mandate” for

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change that Obama (or for that matter all American Presidents) does. Instead, the overall leadership in the EU is divided and the EU will therefore not see the kind of change possible in the American context. Additionally, the party system in the EU’s Parliament is highly volatile and parties do not formulate consistent policy platforms, making lobbying and partisanship more difficult (Thomson and Stokman 2006). Kissinger’s famous quote “who do I call if I want to talk to Europe?” comes to mind here. In part because it blurs the line between domestic polity and international organization, the European Union’s political structures are far more complicated and varied than America’s. When it comes to the mediating power of the bureaucracy versus the ability of a presidency to create critical junctures for regulatory change, the overall regulatory framework in Europe has more consistency than we see in America. The Age of Regulatory Institutions and Structural Determinants A significant factor that can easily be ignored by an ahistorical analysis is the simple longevity of regulatory programs and agencies in the United States, whereas the EU institutions and regulatory programs have been around for a far shorter time. As we will see in empirical examples, like in the chapter on electoral fraud and voting technologies, the EU is more likely to be governed in many fields by a newer risk culture; one perhaps more open to scientific criteria and less dependent on established political battle lines. America’s history of regulation is rooted in highly politicized antimonopolistic actions, such as Teddy Roosevelt’s famous “trust-busting” cases in the early twentieth century. Tony Freyer has argued that: “Before World War I the British considered but rejected antitrust; in America, however, it became a fundamental political and cultural value” (1992, 1). Freyer’s book goes on to describe the convergence of American and

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British policies post-World War II, while the continental model, which was much more corporatist than either the British or the American one, did not share the same experience. Indeed, the “competition” (aka antitrust) portfolio has been one of the European Commission’s most controversial new powers—the European Competition Commissioner has a great deal of institutional power on paper but is strenuously fought by national governments for treading in an area that had been theirs until very recently. Thus, the European Union has a much more recent experience of risk regulation. This presents both advantages and disadvantages. The EU, while a newer and continuously evolving institution, has a legacy of regulations and rules that were designed to “sell” the Union to its member states (such as the Common Agricultural Policy, which doles out generous farm subsidies). The EU, within the framework of its newer institutions, has also been freer than its U.S. counterparts to create new regulatory frameworks and agencies to deal with newer issues such as climate change. The European model rests more on scientific findings, and is much more isolated from both public opinion and lobbying than the American model. For example, while the United States has struggled to incorporate a climate change/emissions reduction plan into its institutions (such as the EPA), the EU has been able to pass a comprehensive climate change plan, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).4 The EU ETS is currently in its second stage, and has established an EU-wide cap on greenhouse gas emissions, a remarkable achievement that “constitutes a path-breaking new chapter in EU environmental law and policy” (Zapfel 2007, 13). The differences in regulatory climate caused by historical legacies (frameworks marked by past struggles versus relatively new frameworks) should be expected to result in policy changes toward risk on either side of the Atlantic. The differences are perhaps best illustrated by the European Union’s response to Bovine Growth Hormone (BGH) and

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genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Unlike the United States, which has largely left GMO unregulated, the EU has the world’s strongest set of regulations regarding genetically modified products. The differing approach to BGH and GMOs is in large part based on the disproportionate power of both agribusiness and larger farms in the United States versus the political power of small farmers in Europe and an anti-American sentiment. Similarly, continental suspicion of British beef allegedly due to the outbreak of Mad Cow disease had just as much to do with the opportunity to adopt new anticompetitive policies favoring smaller local farmers. The treatment of BGH is a particularly good example of how the European approach regarding food safety is largely based on protectionism. Notions of human risk asserted by European stakeholders is not based in science, as milk from cows treated with BGH is absolutely identical to milk produced by non-BGH treated cows. The primary threat is to animal welfare and economic risk to small producers because of the efficiency large-scale operations can muster. The arguments surrounding GMOs, though more complicated by the diversity of GMOs, is similarly shaped by the structure of the agriculture sector. Cultural views of farming, especially the romantic narrative of farmers as the custodians of national traditions, have much to do with the way the EU has perceived the development of GMOs . If we compare the American response (or lack thereof ) to BGH and GMOs with the regulations of cured meats and raw milk products, both of which are more suited to small producers than large-scale industrial processes, we find that the United States is far more restrictive in the latter area than the EU is. A very important factor in the U.S. requirement of pasteurization is the early creation of a larger American market that supports larger scale industry in multiple fields, including dairy production. This development took place in the United States well before it started in the EU.

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Not only have different historical precedents and legal rendering been established, but the United States and the EU (with the exception of Britain and Ireland) have different legal traditions. American law is based in common law traditions inherited from the United Kingdom, while the continental European model, civil law, is derived from much older traditions that date back to the Roman Empire. The extent of litigation in the United States is often exaggerated. Much of the source of that larger narrative, which describes a litigation explosion involving cases of mass toxic torts, the drug industry, and product liability between 1970 and the 1990s, ref lects the “catch-up” nature of national health and safety regulation in the 1960s and 1970s. The rise of consumer rights and risk awareness movements during this time was propelled by harmful industry actions, such as the use of asbestos and dioxin, taken prior to newer forms of regulation. Industry-supported political campaigns have promoted the idea of increased liability costs being due to an unnecessarily adversarial legal culture in the United States (Haltom and McCann 2004). This can be seen with the medical malpractice issue, because of the privatized (United States) versus public (EU) costs of continuing medical care and income support. Blaming adversarial legalism in the United States is politically useful as a distraction from public solutions that would have a cost to other actors, especially physicians (the American Medical Association frequently brings up malpractice suits and insurance rates as a major reason for higher health care rates and suggests limits on suits as a solution to such costs). Bob Kagan (2001) argues that U.S. litigation rates are not drastically higher than those in other advanced democracies once one controls for other forms of claiming. He does argue, however, that the most important difference is the perception of greater litigation and a culture of adversarial litigation, which is especially prevalent in relation to regulatory rule-making (Kagan 2001). Others are even less

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persuaded that the United States is substantially more litigious, while Frank Cross (2003) argues convincingly that litigation actually created higher costs in certain EU countries than in the United States (Cross 2003). The claim of excessive litigation is tricky. Blaming the United States for a perceived recent increase in litigation in Europe might score political points with European publics, but is simply not accurate (Kelemen 2006). Studies of litigation rates have long shown less differences between U.S. and EU lawsuits than is commonly assumed.5 In fact, in some instances, such as nuisance lawsuits, Germans bring lawsuits against their neighbors over small property disputes at much higher rates than Americans do. One important difference, however, is that courts move more quickly in the United States, perhaps in part because of the number and accessibility of venues, which is artificially suppressed in some European jurisdictions to deter litigation.6 Such restrictions on access, and restrictions on the number of attorneys, have been shown to be a very significant factor in Japan’s low litigation rate. Consequently, it is not just culture that determines litigative tendencies. In fact, culture may be a very small part of it when one distinguishes myth from the reality and when people are allowed to do as they please, as the increase in litigation in Japan following increased access to courts has demonstrated. Courts also regularly defer risk assessment to agencies, for example, relying on the FDA for approval of medical devices and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) regulations regarding product safety (especially in products used by children). Judicial review of administrative rules is also highly inf luenced by the expert testimony included both at the trial level and through the briefs filed at the appellate level. Litigation often involves a “battle of experts.” This may be distinguished from agency use of science (more widespread in the EU), but it also ref lects the American preference for pluralism in all things (or distrust of authority in all its forms).

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Risk Regulation in United States and EU Conclusion

We can now present our model as a simplified visual. Figure 3.1 shows how the pressures of globalization and the legacy of past regulations are filtered through culture and perception, as well as the political context of federalism, interest groups, and institutions, to produce new regulatory outcomes. The historical paths of regulatory institutions in the United States and the EU have been quite different, and have led to differing schemes of regulation. For example, the United States was founded as a decentralized Republic with the federal government playing a minor role compared to the current power it has. In both the EU and United States, a primary motive behind increasing the power of central governments has been the push of globalization for more standardized trade, legal, and economic rules. In both polities, new rules have privileged centralized power at the expense of subcentral jurisdictions. The U.S. Constitution’s

Convergence Pressures (globalization)

Past Regulations

Culture and Risk Perceptions

Federalism

Interest Groups

Regulatory Outcomes

Figure 3.1 Risk regulation model

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Commerce Clause (Article I, Section VIII, Clause III) has been central to the decline of state-level power while the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty and the Monetary Union have, likewise, increased EU power at the expense of member states in order to achieve financial and legal standardization and growth. Many of the European Union’s institutional legacies, such as the more corporate-oriented relationship between business and the government, have made it easier to regulate. Likewise, the higher levels of public trust, and the relative newness of the regulatory framework in the EU, have created space for new scientifically minded regulations without massive public outrage, even when regulation has had far-reaching impacts (such as the EU ETS). In the United States, the institutional legacy surrounding all of these factors has encouraged the government to avoid regulating the private sector. Unlike in Europe, the American government does not enjoy high levels of public trust and has traditionally had a rocky relationship with the public sector. Regulation of risk in the United States has been a highly politicized process that has often been up for discussion after major scandals, such as the current banking crisis, when the public has been more open to considering government intervention. The older regulatory framework of the United States has also posed challenges. Old institutions have been forced to adapt to the changing regulatory climate and newer issues of risk within the paradigm created many years ago for completely different issues. Finally, the stronger position of the EU member states, as compared to the American states, has made regulation, and especially enforcing regulations, much more difficult. The federal government in the United States has used a variety of measures to force its will on the states. Most notably it has threatened to withhold funding for projects, such as interstate highway money, to states who do not share the federal vision of risk regulation.7 These broad differences between the United States and the EU are largely examples of the unique historical evolution of each regulatory framework. The differing conceptions of the state and its relationship to the private sector have

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evolved for many centuries in Europe, and the American case has its origin in colonial times and legal precedent such as the use of common law. Although this chapter and the previous one highlighted broad perceptual differences in how risks are viewed and regulated in the United States and the EU, it is the case that these differences are likely to lessen across both governance bodies as the dynamics of globalization and federalism continue to inf luence the regulatory environment. Specifically, globalization and policy diffusion (facilitated by federalism) are likely to result in a strong pull for homogenization of risk-regulating policies in both the EU and the United States. Globalization, affecting both corporations and NGOs, creates strong pressures in favor of policies that allow for companies to compete freely on American and European markets and for consumers to enjoy similar rights on both sides of the Atlantic. International production and commerce place serious limitations on what regulatory bodies in one part of the world can achieve in terms of regulating risk, as the strictest standard often becomes the default policy in both locations. The current economic recession, while opening up some international fissures, also encouraged international cooperation and regulation to deal with the crisis. For example, the Federal Reserve acted in concert with the Bank of England and others to reduce interest rates. Overall, the pressure to normalize regulations on both sides of the Atlantic is increasing. “The more proscriptive European vision may better suit consumer and industry demands for certainty. If you manufacture globally, it is simpler to be bound by the toughest regulatory system in your supply chain. Selfregulation is also a harder sell when it comes to global trade, which involves trusting a long line of unknown participants from far-f lung places” (Economist 2007, 2). The European Union and the U.S. government both share similarities that push toward policy innovation related to risk and toward similar mitigation strategies. Both governmental bodies benefit from a form of federalism, where states (or

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nation-states, in the case of the EU) serve as laboratories of innovation that can serve as proving grounds for new national or multinational policies. And while the nature of EU and U.S. federalism is quite different, many similarities have been discussed in this chapter. In addition, both are subject to policy diffusion, with European policies being adopted in the American states and American policies being adopted in Europe. Globalization and federalism may serve to overcome the regulatory heritage—the institutions that inf luence the desire to look to one’s local or national government to regulate “scary” things.

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Immigration, Security, and Social Risk Perception

This chapter will compare European and American views of immigration, and link these views to public policy choices on both continents. It will be shown that although immigration triggers apparently universal dynamics of risk and insecurity, governing institutions in the EU and the United States mitigate these dynamics differently in producing highly divergent policy outcomes. After a brief introduction, the chapter analyzes why immigration poses a risk for publics, weighing the relative impact of instrumental (“rational”) and affective (“emotional”) factors in stoking public insecurity toward outsiders. Since both types of factors appear to drive public opinion toward “the other,” we agree with Kaufman (2001) that a synthetic theory of ethnicity and risk is needed. After laying out this theory, we then analyze the linkage between public opinion and risk regulation by officials, showing how the particular institutions of federalism in both the United States and EU shape policy responses to migratory pressures and xenophobia, often in ways that challenge the conventional wisdom. Increasingly since the 9/11 attacks, and the Madrid and London bombings that followed, immigration is perceived to be a grave security risk for states and publics alike (Givens, Freeman, and Leal 2008). The 2008 U.S. presidential debates

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focused on illegal immigration to a degree rarely seen in modern campaigns, with Republican candidate Tom Tancredo running a campaign advertisement that directly linked illegal immigration to terrorism. In Europe, a Eurobarometer survey showed that citizens ranked the issue importance of immigration higher than pensions, taxation, education, housing, the environment, public transport, defense, and foreign affairs (EEIG 2003). Interestingly, while both polities appear to be converging on a near-panicked, fearful, security-oriented view of immigration risks, Europe has taken the lead in central policy regulations on this issue. In the United States, recent developments have shown a willingness of states and municipalities to adopt tougher immigration policies, often in a greatly expedited fashion or in apparent violation of the central government’s regulatory direction (Boushey and Luedtke 2006). The developments in Europe and America ref lect a political struggle in both polities where anti-immigration publics face political elites who take a more positive view on immigration. In both countries anti-immigration sentiment is fueled by populist politicians who capitalize on the perception of threat and an often amorphous set of fears. Political elites in both Europe and America see the economic benefits of immigration, as well as judicial and normative dangers in overregulating this “risk” (Freeman 2002; Hollifield 1992). With regard to immigration, the regulatory evolution shatters the conventional wisdom, since the United States, the mythological “land of immigrants,” uses its federal structure to crack down on immigrant rights and freedoms to the point of making state and local level enforcement look like a chaotic patchwork. Meanwhile in Europe, which until the new millennium often called itself a “zero-immigration” continent, the EU policy-makers increasingly take a proactive centralized approach that seeks to attract skilled immigrant talent while admittedly trying to minimize the public risk perception, through shows of “tougher” border controls and coordinated action against illegal immigration.

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Despite this move toward liberal regulation, where European publics and politicians seem to have come to accept that immigration cannot be completely stopped, immigration is an area of considerable controversy in the EU because of its ties to hotbutton issues such as national identity and the loss of national sovereignty. The latter two issue areas have been characterized by the work of Lauren McLaren (2002; 2003) as areas of deep social risk, and her work on survey data finds the perception of a “cultural threat” to be the single most important reason for opposition to European integration itself. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) have shown that fear of immigration is strongly correlated with this perceived “cultural threat,” and that fear of immigration partially explains the 2005 “non” and “nee” votes on the European Constitution in France and The Netherlands, respectively. In the current climate, despite a pressing awareness of the economic and demographic benefits among political elites, migration is continually perceived as a worrying, even destabilizing, phenomenon (den Boer 1995). This gap between elite opinion and public anxiety mirrors feelings about the EU in general, as shown by the Irish “no” vote on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. To a large extent, migration as a policy area in the EU has undergone a “securitization” process (Bigo 2002). Buzan et al. (1998) argue that an object or phenomenon (e.g., migratory movements) never constitute threats in and of themselves. A security actor, or “securitizing” actor, is required to define something as a threat. Securitization is an intersubjective process where other actors have to join the interpretation that an object is a threat. In line with the arguments presented in this book, den Boer (2005) concurs that we require communicative mediums for the promotion of shared security notions: politics, the media, and leading institutions can be seen as major transmitters of the securitization process. Monica den Boer (2005, 1–2), from the Dutch National Police Academy, draws a strong connection between immigration and Beck’s (1992) “Risk Society” concept, arguing that

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“anxiety seems to be one of the core drivers of current domestic and European politics.” Den Boer (2005) highlights the fact that terrorism is a new element of social insecurity surrounding immigration: “In the risk society, catastrophe—being the exceptional condition—becomes the norm. Nowadays, the fight against terrorism—whether incidental or structural in nature—has become the norm in the organization of safety and security. The perception of risk and anxiety is based on the relative loss of security and trust, to the exposure to a society which becomes more anonymous and more globalized” (1–2). Since 9/11, terrorism has become the number one security item on many Western agendas, and this perception of terrorism as an “existential” security threat is exceedingly difficult for liberal states to negate in the face of a global economy. Unlike in Europe, where the Arab populations tend to be concentrated among working-class demographics, “the median income of Arab Americans . . . is actually higher than the overall American one” (Fallows 2006, 3). Fallows reports that Arab American “business-ownership rate and their possession of college and graduate degrees” (3) are also greater than that of the average American. And yet the diffuse and anxiety-producing nature of non-state threats like Al-Qaeda has prompted the United States to react asymmetrically to the threat (e.g., by invading Iraq), raising perceived risks and anxieties both in the United States and the Muslim world. Since the immigration issue is now inextricably linked to terrorism-related security fears, the United States and the EU are both facing new challenges in regulating immigration as a risk. Current trends seem to indicate that while the EU combines progressive central regulation with anxieties about its own identity as a federation, the United States continues a federal immigration policy of benign neglect,1 even as several of its fifty states experiment with draconian measures. A recent analysis by Salehyan (2008) illustrates the point of benign neglect at the federal level. This study found no evidence of anti-Muslim bias in the U.S. refugee determination

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process, showing that even the hottest-button issues in immigration-related security questions can be mitigated by the pro-immigration forces in what Hollifield (1992) calls the American “embedded liberalism” (courts, NGOs, etc.). Salehyan (2008) actually finds a positive correlation between being Muslim and obtaining refugee status in the United States, even when controlling for the human rights record of the sending state. If the average American citizen was asked to vote on whether Muslims should be favored refugee candidates on U.S. soil, one can imagine that the policy would quickly change. In short, one can see a broad convergence in both Europe and the United States; in both polities, immigration is a policy area where the media and public are acutely sensitive to perceived risks (real or imagined), and yet political institutions temper any dramatic policy outputs that might stem from this anxiety (Freeman 2002). For instance, in 2003 the United States implemented a program called “Operation Liberty Shield,” which required that asylum-seekers from Muslim countries (plus North Korea) be detained while their cases were being heard. After human rights groups protested that this detention without parole would add to the plight of those f leeing torture and persecution, the program was terminated that same year, illustrating that the political institutions remain open to more moderate voices, despite majoritarian insecurity. Public Risk Perceptions and Immigration on Both Sides of the Atlantic Many scholars argue that general public reactions to immigrants are rooted in deep social, psychological, or cultural forces such as norms, identity, and religion. Although these mechanisms are said to hold on both sides of the Atlantic, scholarship on public opinion regarding ethnicity and nationalism is generally divided between rational/instrumental accounts, on the one hand, and theories focusing on “symbolic” factors such

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as identity, psychological biases (both cognitive and affective), and myths and norms, on the other. In the rationalist camp, scholars such as Hardin (1995) explain ethnocentrism through cost-benefit calculation, showing how even the most seemingly “irrational” actions based on nationalism (genocide, tribal killings, etc.) can have an instrumental basis (see also Lake and Rothchild 1998; Posen 1993). Hardin’s rationalist argument is well-summarized by Christie (1998): Hardin emphasizes the psychological ease produced by cultural familiarity as a primary benefit of ethnic-group membership, and believes that this provides a reason for xenophobia, since strangers may make group members uneasy. Thus, rational individuals may be motivated to develop xenophobic sentiments and to engage in hostile forms of collective action that have often been thought to be inexplicable by rational-choice theory. Such individuals may also undertake very risky actions on behalf of groups, where such actions seem less costly than withdrawal from the group. Finally, it may be rational for an individual to be a member of a group, and rational for the group to maintain its solidarity, even though norms of solidarity turn out to be self-destructive. (30) Through constructivist and sociological institutionalist schools of thought, theories of ethnicity and nationalism grounded in concepts like “myths” and “symbolism” are now a staple of political science, but these ideas draw on longstanding work in social psychology and anthropology (see Edelman 1971; Horowitz 1985; Smith 1998; Young 1976). The most salient concept in this approach to nationalism and ethnicity has been the idea of national “identity.” Although the concept of identity is widely used in discussions of nationalism, “there is a lack of standard and commonly accepted definitions and measures” (Christin and Trechsel 2002, 417). The field of social psychology, however, provides a rigorous

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definition of identity as an affective state of belonging to a social group (Brewer 1999; Brown 2000). An affective state, as opposed to a cognitive state, can on its own generate social and political preferences that lead to emotional evaluations of ethnic or national groups. These evaluations take both positive and negative forms, that is, “ingroup love” and “outgroup hate,” to use terms from the psychological literature (1991). Leading theorists of nationalism, such as Benedict Anderson, see national identity in this affective sense, as a “deep, horizontal comradeship” (7). As a norm of belonging and selfdefinition that is cultural and affective in nature, his theory implies that national identity would hold relatively steady over time, despite instrumental or political incentives for members of nations to drop, add to, or modify their national identities (Luedtke 2005). National identity can thus develop independent of and prior to any instrumental calculations, and viewed this way it then “explains the occurrence of in-group bias even in the absence of objective or instrumental causes—for example, conf licts of economic interests” (Brown 2000, 748). One experimental study has shown that, beyond instrumental causes, “national identification by itself was the most consistent predictor of xenophobic attitudes, an association observed in other studies of inter-nation or inter-ethnic attitudes” (Brown 2000, 748). In attempting to weigh the relative impact of instrumental calculation and affective factors like identity, we agree with Kaufman (2001) that a synthetic approach is necessary. Kaufman’s path-breaking work criticizes monocausal accounts of ethnic conf lict and discusses the shortcomings of only seeing “ancient hatreds,” manipulative leaders, economic rivalry, or structural anarchy as the cause of ethnic clashes. Dismissing pure economic rivalry as a cause of ethnic conf lict, Kaufman rules out “hard rationalist” accounts (Hardin 1995) as arguments about individual self-interest that tend to be under-theorized with regard to “group norms” of violence. Kaufman lends more credence to “soft” rationalist accounts that ex ante assume

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group norms and hostile preferences, but he also argues that soft rationalist accounts are weakened by their reliance on hostile preferences endogenous to the actual theory. In an effort to remedy the shortcomings of prior theory, Kaufman constructs a theory that accounts for group norms and hostile preferences, combining “primordialism” and constructivism into what he terms the “symbolist synthesis.” In his theory, ethnic identity may be socially malleable in a limited sense, but is still based on a relatively immutable “myth-symbol complex.” “Appeals to emotionally laden ethnic symbols,” he argues, motivate ethnic movements, and “appeals to myths blaming other groups” then motivate ethnic wars (30). Kaufman is quite clear about where and why rationalist accounts go wrong. For him, rational motivations only provide “opportunities,” while the myth-symbol complexes “short-circuit the complicated problem of making tradeoff decisions because they encourage people to put ethnic issues ahead of other concerns” (30). Kaufman himself is not without theoretical shortcomings, however, and his rationalist critics may point to issues of parsimony as well as substance. Kaufman invokes social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) in his quest to explain “irrational” group norms. He criticizes rationalists like Hardin for relying on group norms in what are supposedly individualist theories; however, Kaufman neglects to mention one of the most pressing problems facing social identity theory; its reliance on individual self-esteem as a causal mechanism (Brown 2000). Consequently, Kaufman critiques rationalists for ignoring group norms, while he himself ignores the individual, “rational” (broadly construed) “psychic payoffs” of self-esteem in a purportedly more grouporiented theory. Public Opinion Regarding National Identity For obvious reasons, there is a dearth of public opinion survey research in the world’s hot spots of ethnic conf lict. These

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hotspots are predominately in developing countries, and ethnic conf lict scholars such as those surveyed above have had to use proxy measures or indirect studies to test “opinion” toward ethnicity and nationalism in the developing world. While poor in direct measures of ethnic conf lict, the access to data on public opinion is much greater and more nuanced in the developed world. One of the most fruitful natural laboratories for studying the dynamics of identity politics, as they apply directly to “public opinion,” has been the European Union (EU), which regularly carries out “Eurobarometer” surveys that gauge attachment to and identification with “Europe” and the individual nation. As the world’s most powerful supranational project, scholars have debated the degree to which the European Union can break down or supplant national identity and replace it with a “federal” or mixed loyalty (Checkel 2001; Risse 2001; Weiler 1998). As such, the EU allows scholars to test the causes and effects of a wide range of variables as they interact with national identity, under conditions of international and transformational political, social, and economic change. In contrast to constructivists like Risse (2001) or Checkel (2001), rationalists expect that the EU, as a primarily economic project designed to maximize national interests, would affect citizen “loyalties” or attachments relatively little (Moravcsik 1998). The “no” votes on the defunct European Constitution, by two of the Union’s six founding member countries, seems to lend credence to this skepticism. What can we tell empirically about a potential shift from a national to a European identity, or some hybrid of the two? One EU-related Web site summarizes the trends well: Surveys show that EU citizens continue to identify first of all with their own country. According to a Eurobarometer survey, at the end of 2004 only 47 percent of EU citizens saw themselves as citizens of both their country and Europe, 41 percent as citizens of their country only. 86 percent of the interviewees felt pride

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in their country, while 68 percent were proud of being European. In general, people feel more attached to their country (92 percent), region (88 percent), city (87 percent) than to Europe (67 percent). Low voter turnout at the European Parliament elections in 2004 (54 percent) seems to be an indicator hereof. Relatively low political participation and weak attachment pose a legitimacy problem to the EU. However, there is little agreement on how identification can be strengthened. (Euractiv. com 2006) Here we present data from November 2007, showing that European identity has actually declined in recent years (Eurobarometer 2007). The average score among publics of the twenty-seven member states was only 53 percent attached to Europe, down from the 67 percent figure in 2004, listed above. Table 4.1 shows the twenty-seven member states and the three official candidate countries2 for membership, ranked by their attachment to Europe. Interestingly, one cannot jump to easy conclusions from the above data in terms of the determinants of European identity. Table 4.1 Percentage of public attached to Europe Macedonia - 71 Belgium - 66 Poland - 65 Luxembourg - 63 Spain - 62 Italy - 62 Hungary - 61 Ireland - 57 France - 56 Portugal - 56

Malta - 56 Romania - 56 Germany - 55 Slovakia - 55 Slovenia - 55 EU-27 average - 53 Latvia - 52 Czech Republic - 50 Austria - 48 Bulgaria - 46

Lithuania - 42 Greece - 41 Estonia - 41 Denmark - 40 Sweden - 38 United Kingdom - 34 Netherlands - 32 Cyprus - 32 Croatia - 32 Finland - 30 Turkey - 25

Note: Question wording: “People may feel different levels of attachment to their village, town or city, to their country, or to the European Union. Please tell me how attached you feel to [The European Union]” (percent claiming “attached”). Source: Eurobarometer (2007).

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Scattered across the table is a seemingly random mix of new members, old members, richer countries, poorer countries, small countries, large countries, and so on. Perhaps the only solid conclusion that the reader may draw from table 4.1 is the relative volatility of public opinion, given the thirteen-point average shift in attachment to Europe in only a three-year period. It seems that many Europeans are not “fixed” in their identity, which begs the question of what causes identity to shift. Answering this question is important for knowing about Europeans’ views of immigration as a risk, since the source of public insecurity toward immigrants must be at least partially due to the fact that they are viewed as “the other.” But then this begs the question of whether immigrants from fellow EU countries are also viewed in similarly “alien” terms, and, if so, how this dynamic might change. Obviously, one would expect that feeling more “European” would reduce hostility toward immigrants from other EU countries. But how does this identity occur and/or shift? A great deal of literature attempts to explain the causes and effects of a European identity (or lack thereof ). The Eurobarometer study itself (2007) finds apparent correlations with gender and education, though these are not tested for statistical significance: Men and those who studied the longest are more attached to the European Union than women and those who left school the earliest: 55 percent of men and 61 percent of those who studied up to the age of 20 or more consider themselves attached to the European Union, compared with 51 percent of women and 43 percent of those who left school before the age of 16. (Eurobarometer 2007, 86) Kritzinger (2005) asserts a rationalist explanation for variations in European identity, arguing that citizens’ utilitarian expectations of Europe cause them to attach more strongly to Europe. Based on the work of Lipset (1960), she argues E. Hall

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that a political system that is expected to be efficient can create identity. For Kritzinger, identity is believed to encompass different dimensions, including efficiency. Thus, like Hardin (1995), she posits that: It is possible to use utilitarian reasoning to observe affective (identity) variations. As utilitarian expectations we use citizens’ policy preferences. We observe whether they favor a national handling of the policy or whether they prefer the EU to be the main policy actor. The results of factor and multinominal logit analyses confirm the existence of a “utilitarian identity” at the European level indicating that the development of a European identity is closely connected to the EU’s ability to deliver policy outputs according to citizens’ expectations. (Kritzinger 2005, 50) For noninstrumental explanations of identity in Europe, a wealth of literature looks at psychology, norms, culture, and symbols in tracing variations across time and countries in the degree to which citizens identify with Europe and/or their nation-state (Carey 2002; Christin and Trechsel 2002; McLaren 2002). For example, McLaren (2002) finds that “cultural threat” plays a key causal role in the puzzling persistence of national identity despite deepening European integration. Thus, if even the European Union is viewed as the “other,” then it appears that as long as immigrants (whether European or non-European) are viewed as culturally different, the perception that they pose a risk will remain among a significant segment of the population. EU Policy Responses Despite deep-rooted fears on the part of publics, the EU has pushed forward with relatively liberal immigration legislation at the supranational level. This push has been spurred on by

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the Commission’s mission to liberalize movements of goods, services, capital, and labor (people) across the Union, as well as a relative lack of xenophobic voices in the EU’s governing institutions (Guiraudon 2003). In the past decade, the EU has passed a raft of laws that oblige member states to harmonize the standards by which immigrants should be allowed entry, the length of stay they are allowed, as well as harmonize the rights and obligations during the immigrant’s stay. For instance, in 2000, the EU passed the Racial Equality Directive (RED), which grants judicial remedies to victims of racial discrimination, which had not previously been available in many EU member states (particularly in newer member states). In total, eight antidiscrimination policies were proposed after the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, and in addition to the Racial Equality Directive, five others passed because left governments were in power in the vast majority of member states. Two directives— police and judicial cooperation on hate crimes/antidiscrimination, and creating an EU agency for Fundamental Rights—did not pass, however, as they were considered an institutional overstep by member states who resent the EU’s attempt to regulate in these “new” policy areas. It is clear that one should not underestimate the effect of political partisanship on the success of six out of eight of these directives. On antidiscrimination and the social integration of immigrants, the literature has shown a strong effect from party politics (Givens and Luedtke 2005). With regard to immigration, one might expect that left-leaning politicians, irrespective of cultural context, would be inherently pro-immigrant, while politicians on the right of the political spectrum would be inherently anti-immigration. One of the underlying reasons for this argumentation is political capital. Parties of the Left normally consider immigrants potential “core” constituencies, and are more likely to perceive gains from an expanding immigrant population. In other words, the political capital argument holds that left-wing parties are more likely than right-wing parties to prefer proimmigrant integration policies (such as legislation prohibiting

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discrimination, or making it easier for immigrants to acquire citizenship). However, parties of the Left cannot afford to be more liberal or lax in terms of immigration control policies (regulating the borders and admissions of new immigrants), because short-term public backlashes would offset any future gains from an expanded immigrant electorate (Givens and Luedtke 2005). Not all ideological explanations, however, revolve around political capital. Ideology in and of itself is hypothesized to be a “pure” motivator, and left-wing parties’ tendency to favor society’s disadvantaged elements is seen as an underlying reason for their pro-immigration stance. Lahav’s (2004) work on the European Parliament shows that “partisans of the left are more likely to endeavor to amend social inequalities and to extend immigrant rights . . . and to be open to increased immigration than their colleagues on the right” (2004, 133). Not only did the EU pass a wave of antidiscrimination legislation in the late 1990s, but it also continued apace with more instruments to bring the “right type” of immigrant in—an area in which it felt it had lost ground to the United States since the economic slowdowns of the 1970s. Although immigrants have continued to enter both polities, immigrants in Europe have tended to be of three types: humanitarian refugees, family migrants, and undocumented migrants working off the books. Hansen (2002) shows how, in part, these f lows were created through Europe’s colonial relationships with its ex-subjects, who could not easily be denied immigration despite the fact that the economic and political climate had turned against labor migration. However, Europe lived in a form of denial during the 1980s and 1990s, when labor immigration was seen as a thing of the past. Refugees, illegals, and family migrants (often seen as a drain on the generous European welfare state) were during this period viewed as either necessary evils or as grave societal problems in need of action, culminating in the rise of anti-immigrant, extreme right-wing parties in the 1990s

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(Givens 2005). This contradictory stance on immigration continued until just the past few years, when immigration policy-makers in Brussels decided to avoid the controversy over the European “Constitution” (which would have handed substantial new powers over immigration to the EU) and instead passed a “Plan B,” called “The Hague Programme,” which became the institutional framework for EU immigration policy until the Lisbon Treaty’s passage. The Hague Programme represented a significant and surprising institutional victory for the EU’s governing organizations, in that it granted the “sole right of initiative” (to propose new laws) to the European Commission, and it mandated majority voting in the European Council (as opposed to unanimity, which is usually reserved for “touchy” issues) and veto power for the (relatively liberal) European Parliament. This was surprising given the controversial nature of immigration as an issue, which would lead one to suspect that national governments would guard decision-making powers for themselves. This new opening allowed the EU to pass several pieces of progressive legislation in recent years. For instance, a directive on the right of residence for foreign students and those receiving vocational training was first proposed in 1993, but it was only in 2004, with the Hague Programme’s passage, that the Directive became law, and in 2006 the European Commission reported to the European Council and Parliament arguing that the Directive is finally taking effect in the intended way, highlighting the dwindling number of infringement proceedings being brought against national governments for blocking students’/vocational trainees’ rights of movement and residence. Another 2004 Directive harmonized EU laws toward the entry, stay, and residence of high-level researchers. As of December 11, 2008, ten member states had implemented the EU’s Researchers Directive, which works by allowing for the fast-tracking of visa procedures for researchers. Accredited research organizations will certify the status of the visa applicant. They will also verify

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the existence of a genuine research project, as well as the possession by the researcher of the necessary scientific skills, sufficient resources, and health insurance. Once a permit is granted, the researcher is able to move between the EU countries that have signed up to the Schengen (free-travel) zone, plus Ireland. Finally, the EU moved to keep up with countries like Canada and Australia, who had created “points systems” for immigrants with in-demand skills, high-tech knowledge and experience, or funds to invest. Here we see the effect of globalization, as mentioned in chapter 3, pushing for policy convergence. The EU attempted to shift immigration from a “humanitarian” issue to a cost/benefit issue of how to compete for skilled labor migration in an increasingly complex and globalized world. For instance, in 2008 the United States received roughly half of the world’s highly skilled immigrants (GlobalHigherEd 2008). Accordingly, the European Commission proposed an ambitious scheme in October 2007 that would grant “blue cards” to this same type of worker. The problem to that date had been that potential high-skilled immigrants had to deal with a bewildering array of twenty-seven national immigration systems and economies. The new measure, according to the European Commission: provides for a “one-stop-shop” system for the applicants. It introduces a single application procedure, which aims to simplify and accelerate the procedure both for the employer and for the immigrant as well to introduce certain safeguards (access to information on the documents needed for an application, obligation to provide reasons for rejection and to take a decision on the application within 90 days). Once admitted, the immigrant will receive a “single permit,” which will entitle him/her to stay and work for the period granted: in practical terms, information on access to the labor market will be on the residence permit. (European Commission 2007)

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Thus we see that the EU, far from being the “zero-immigration” breeding ground for the far right parties and xenophobia, is passing policies at “federal level” that are much more proactive than one might expect from analyzing public opinion. In part because of their insulation from populist hostility, Eurocrats are free to listen to business and human rights lobbies while shaping these pragmatic policies, and to essentially disregard worries over national identity and perceived cultural threats mentioned earlier. U.S. Policy Responses The United States, in contrast to the EU, is currently going through an extended bout of soul-searching on immigration. The 9/11 context has thrust immigration into the security light, with legislators and presidential candidates scrambling to be seen as looking “tough” on immigration: building border fences, penalizing employers who hire the undocumented, and so on. Even before 9/11, in 1993 and 1997 when two national polls asked “Was immigration a good thing or a bad thing in the past?” 59 and 65 percent, respectively, of the respondents said it was a good thing. However, when asked whether immigration is a good or bad thing today, only 29 and 45 percent of the respondents of these two years, respectively, said it was a good thing. Additionally, in March 2000 when asked which statement most clearly represented their feelings—whether immigrants strengthen or weaken the American character—58 percent said they weakened the American character compared to 44 percent who said they strengthened it. Furthermore, when asked to identify the greatest threat to the United States remaining a major world power in the next century, almost four times as many respondents answered “too much immigration from foreign countries” as the number that answered “population growth within the United States” (Lynch and Simon 2003). In terms of policy responses, federal immigration legislation remained stalled in 2009 after the failure of the Bush-backed, McCain-Kennedy Senate Bill. The compromise in the Bill

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would have built a border fence and toughened controls in exchange for a pathway to legal residence and eventual citizenship for America’s roughly 12 million undocumented residents. Frustrated with perceived federal inaction due to “special interests” pushing liberal policies (Freeman 2002) in Washington D.C., and with the failure of Tom Tancredo’s single-issue presidential candidacy, states and municipalities have now begun taking matters into their own hands. Their actions with regard to immigration policy are creating a hodgepodge of widely varying rules and practices from one jurisdiction to another, which mirrors the situation we will see in chapter 7 with electoral reform. As of April 13, 2007, state legislators in all of the fifty states had introduced at least 1169 bills and resolutions related to immigration or immigrants and refugees. This is more than twice the total number of introduced bills at the state level (570) in 2006, and a much larger increase in state legislation from previous years. It should be noted that states are not solely restriction-minded; representatives (like in the EU) have petitioned for expansion of visa programs for specialized pools of labor that will meet the needs of their jurisdiction. For example, California representatives have advocated for the expansion of the H1B visa program to meet the growing demand for technical-oriented labor in Silicon Valley. Yet these appeals are largely informal. State governments must communicate through congressional representatives, and have little say in the actual placement of new workers. Some border states have also asserted limited powers over immigration control, and have taken steps to mediate against the high costs of both documented and undocumented immigration across their borders. While states have no authority in controlling the mobility of migrants once they have entered the United States, they are responsible for providing basic social services (health care, education, welfare) to new immigrants. Those states with the highest rates of immigration have argued that this policy is unfair, as it demands that they shoulder much of the cost of mass immigration with limited support from the

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federal government (Borjas 1999). States have experimented with both federal lawsuits and local policies to address these concerns. In 1994 California and Texas together unsuccessfully sued the federal government for compensation for the costs of illegal immigration. California and Arizona have experimented with more drastic strategies for deterring immigration. California voters passed the now notorious Proposition 187 in 1994, designed to limit the social service spending on undocumented immigrants by restricting their access to publicly funded healthcare, education, and social welfare programs. Arizona voters approved a similar initiative (Proposition 200) in 2004. Both California and Arizona have also passed legislation requiring English-language-only instruction in education. These policies ref lect state-level efforts to recover some authority over immigration. Like the “pauper laws” at the founding of the Republic, California and Arizona have f lirted with proposals to limit the inf lux of poor and unskilled laborers. Not surprisingly, it is difficult to separate these economic concerns from the rise of anti-immigrant hostility in the southwest. Social policies in education are demonstrative of state-level worries over questions of risk: culture, identity, and xenophobia. These examples of experimentation with immigration policy at the state level suggest that local governments would welcome devolution of immigrant integration mandates. The justification for this is both economic and cultural. Not only do state governments bear the economic costs of immigrant integration in the United States, but there is rising political and cultural friction over immigration in the southwest. States such as California, with a long tradition of anti-immigrant policies, are forced to balance policies to preserve their own identity with the immigration programs of the national government. The United States deviates from the classic federal model of immigration policy in some significant ways. The eventual centralization of immigration control policies solved the inefficiencies of the subnational control of immigration mobility

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that existed in the first century of American history. However, in this trend of centralization the federal government assumed control of virtually all aspects of immigration policy—from race-based quota programs to labor recruitment programs. The result is that immigrant-heavy states are increasingly frustrated with their lack of voice in immigration policy. Where possible, state governments have experimented with immigrant recruitment and integration policies. However, these are weakened by a lack of formal concurrent powers as with the central government, since the states are not granted constitutional power to legislate on immigration. This institutional arrangement has imposed costs on subnational governments in two key ways. First, it has complicated the recruitment of specialized labor to meet local needs. Second, mass immigration remains a politically divisive issue in some of the nation’s largest states.

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CH A P T E R

F I V E

Food Safety, Health, and Biological Risk Perception

This chapter explores differing perceptions of health risks, as well as the role of experts and the state in mitigating such risks. Looking at food safety as a particular form of health risk management, this chapter examines diverging and converging trends in the EU and United States with regard to food regulation and the introduction of genetically modified (GM) foods. Food safety in America and the European Union is greatly inf luenced by global trade in food commodities putting pressure on governments to adapt policies that will grant consumers cheap and immediate access to exotic foods.1 Both the EU and the United States utilize their federal structures to control product access to their domestic or internal markets, but, as noted in chapter 1, considerable experimentation and testing of new food products and methods of food production is taking place at the state and member state levels. Consumer protection and the power that food producers have in the United States and the EU present different venues and conditions for monitoring food production and for consumers to make informed choices about the risks they expose themselves to. There is an interesting and distinct difference in the overall approach EU and the United States take to food protection. While the EU approach is centered on poor

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production and processing practices in the food industry, the U.S. approach is focused on the potential for intentional sabotage and attacks on the food delivery system as a critical societal infrastructure. The events of 9/11 have had a major impact on American risk management, and its far-reaching effects are evident also in the area of food safety. Regulation in the area of food safety presents a particularly important and interesting area of comparative research because of these differences in institutional and cultural settings as well as the implications regulation has for citizens’ protection. This chapter also specifically examines and contrasts public opinion with regard to GM foods and other GM products. In the EU, the issue of GM foods is very controversial, whereas American consumers know far less about the topic, but they are also far less concerned by the things they know. The latter part of the chapter analyzes efforts made at the EU level to improve food safety within the internal market. The section touches on the raising of standards throughout the food process, “from farm to fork,” and the Union’s work to keep potentially unsafe products off the European market. The EU-level regulatory work gained momentum after the occurrence of a series of food- and farming-related safety crises in the 1990s. In this chapter the U.S. work on food safety is reviewed in terms of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) long-term commitment to food and drug safety, but also to the new focus on food supply chains as part of the post-September 11 security agenda. The expansion of the FDA’s regulatory reach in the international arena and the need for assessments and interagency coordination are discussed in the context of the U.S. war on terror and existing institutional fragmentation. Eating good and healthy food is a major public concern in both America and the EU. Page after page in magazines and books talk about how to eat healthier or how to eat yourself healthy, as well as what you should absolutely avoid eating lest you risk heart disease, high cholesterol, or a stroke. The health

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food industry is booming, with organic and environmentally friendly grocers like Whole Foods and Sunf lower Farmers Market reaping good profits even in an economic downturn (see BusinessWeek 2009; House 2008). At the very same time, obesity, following smoking and high blood pressure, is the third most common cause of preventable deaths in the United States (Danaei, Ding, Mozaffarian, Taylor, Rehm, Murray, and Ezzati 2009). Eating well (“natural”) is a privilege far more accessible to those who are economically well off, as prices for organic produce, free range eggs, and fresh juices are much higher than products from large-scale industrialized food producers. Most consumers in the EU and United States are used to exotic foods being available year-round. “We live in a world where we can catch a fish in Chile today and eat it in Chicago tomorrow or when throughout the United States watermelon is in season every day and we expect fresh strawberries in supermarkets in February. We [Americans] are now a nation that demands foods—ready to eat: cleaned, cut and cored, and even cooked” (von Eschenbach 2008). Yet, few consumers are informed enough to know where some of their most common food items come from and what they contain. The risks that consumers in the United States and the EU expose themselves to, through the food they eat and the water they drink, and their ability to know and mitigate these risks differ markedly. Consumer protection and the power that food producers have in the United States and the EU presents different venues and conditions for monitoring food production, labeling contents, testing new products before they are put on the market, as well as means for consumers to gain retribution if exposed to unreasonable health-related food risks. As Eschenbach expressed it, “[e]xponential advances in science and technology are again coupled with changes in how we live. Urbanization has given way to globalization, and the industrial age now embraces the information age” (von Eschenbach 2008). He plainly states that “these changes are filled with promise

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but also peril as they impact on our health,” and “[t]he simple truth as I see it today is that the FDA of the 20th century is not adequate to regulate the food and drugs of the 21st century” (von Eschenbach 2008). As noted in chapter 1, while science has allowed many traditional risks to be mitigated, our efforts at improving and controlling our environment has also brought about new risks. These new and unforeseen risks generate a great bit of anxiety with the public, as they are harder to predict and often less visible. How governments have chosen to regulate food production industries and limit the public’s exposure to food and health-related risks differ quite markedly across the Atlantic. Public Risk Perceptions of Food Safety on Both Sides of the Atlantic Not only do the risks consumers are exposed to and their ability to know and control those risks differ between the United States and the EU, but what the public is afraid of and perceives as dangerous in foods also varies quite a bit between the continents. Generally speaking, people tend to be more afraid of threats they cannot discover with their own sensory capacities, that is, things they cannot touch, smell, taste, or see. Crisis research has shown that the public tends to be more anxious and fearful in situations that involve “invisible” threats such as radiation (e.g., the effects of the Chernobyl nuclear accident) and toxic gas (like the Sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway) than they are in situations where the threat is more easily identified and tangible, such as a massive oil spill (the Exxon Valdez oil tanker accident) or even large forest fires (California wild fires in 2007 and 2008). Food-related risks fall into the category of risks that are hard to detect by sensory means, hence they have the potential to generate a lot of public fears, not only when a threat materializes but at the mere possibility of a threat. Food-related risks and threats also have an added sense of urgency about them in E. Hall

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that there is such a high reliance on industrial food production. The public in most of the EU and United States has long since left sustenance farming by the wayside and most Western societies rely completely on the provision of food and fresh water from commercialized producers. There have been considerable efforts on both the United States’ and the EU’s part to win the battle of competing perceptions of risk. Over time, this battle has led to trade wars with patriotic overtones. In recent years the EU and United States have been clashing over the export of genetically modified tomatoes, bananas, and beef ( Josling and Taylor 2003; Economist 1999). The EU has adopted a precautionary principle with regard to GM foods and has, with great public support, tried to keep American GM products off the European market (Scott 1999; n.a. 2001a). The United States, in large part responding to a perceived “overreaction” to American advances and discriminating snobbism of Europeans, took a chance at revenge when British beef contaminated with BSE was linked to Creutzfeldt-Jakob Syndrome in humans (n.a. 2001b). The American ban on British beef is only one example of the complex relationship that consumers have to trust in brand name products, scientific information, and biological risks that lie close to personal safety. The ban on British beef, which lasted far longer than necessary in British eyes, also brings up how U.S.- and EU-based corporations have a vested interest in winning the battle of perception, as risk regulations directly affect their profit margin. Looking at the development of public perceptions around food safety and public food safety regulation, the United States and the EU show both diverging and converging trends. Public Opinion and Genetically Modified Foods In a recent Eurobarometer study, commissioned by the Directorate-General of Health and Consumer Protection and the European Food Safety Agency, public opinion in the EU showed that people did not distinguish much between various E. Hall

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types of food-related risks. What they tended to worry most about, however, were risks “caused by external factors over which they have no control” (Commission of the European Communities 2006, 3). In the category of external factors that consumers identified as clearly dangerous were things like “pesticides residues, new viruses such as avian inf luenza, residues in meats, contamination of food by bacteria, unhygienic conditions outside home” (Commission of the European Communities 2006, 3). A category of external factors that invoked a midrange of fear and concern included “environmental pollutants (e.g., mercury), GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms), food additives, animal welfare and ‘mad cow disease’ or BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy)” (Commission of the European Communities 2006, 3). Consumers in the EU seem least concerned with factors that they had some measure of personal control over, such as “individual susceptibility to food allergies . . . food preparation, food hygiene at home and putting on weight” (Commission of the European Communities 2006, 3). Generally speaking, there is a great deal of trust and confidence in European public authorities’ actions in the area of public health. “. . . 54 percent think that their health concerns are taken seriously by the EU and 55 percent believe that authorities react quickly” (Commission of the European Communities 2006, 4). This confidence in the responsible management of public authorities ref lects the European application of the precautionary principle, and the tradition that the state codifies what is allowed and everything else can be counted on as being unadvisable.2 This confidence aside, “47 percent of citizens think that when deciding on priorities, authorities would favour the economic interests of producers over the health of consumers” (Commission of the European Communities 2006, 4). Turning to food specifically, 58 percent are confident that public authorities account for the most recent scientific evidence in taking decisions regarding food risk and one in two praises public authorities for their work

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in informing citizens about food-related risks. While 62 percent of EU citizens agree that food safety laws in the EU are strict, some reservations emerge regarding their enforcement, with only 46 percent who consider that this is properly done. (Commission of the European Communities 2006, 4) As asserted in chapter 1, the European emphasis on scientific testing and incremental policy changes suggested by experts being perceived of as “good governance” is evident in the area of food safety. The EU public is assuming that science is one of the baselines for decision-making, and that, as more is revealed and science progresses, governing institutions will assume the responsibility of keeping their citizens safe and informed. Interestingly enough, consumers in the EU are not very likely to act on media reports of dangerous foods. Only 16 percent reported that they had changed their eating habits permanently after reading or hearing a story about an unhealthy or unsafe food. Over 40 percent ignored the report completely or worried about it but did not take any action (Commission of the European Communities 2006, 4). Here we see that even when citizens feel that they are well-informed about the risks they expose themselves to, they may be very reluctant to take action to reduce or mitigate those risks. In America, where so much of the actual mitigation of risk rests on the individual, rather than with proactive public policy and a protecting welfare state, the results are much more severe, as we see in the case of food-related illnesses like obesity and high blood pressure.3 In summary, whilst Europeans indicate they are worried about health-related risks, those concerning food appear to be less salient. Overall, food has positive connotations of taste and pleasure; concerns regarding health and food safety are not top-of-mind. When confronted with possible risks associated with food, consumers identify a wide

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range of concerns and tend to worry most about those factors which they cannot themselves control. Clearly identifiable groups [women and people with less education] are more liable to worry about risks than others, suggesting that in order to be effective, communication on risks may need to be tailored to meet specific needs of target audiences. (Commission of the European Communities 2006, 4) Looking at a hotly debated topic in food safety, that is, genetically modified (GM) foods, we see contrasts in public perception regarding food and health risks between the EU and the United States even more clearly. GM foods really ref lect the difference in presumption that either a product or a behavior is deemed as unsafe until proven safe, as in the EU, versus the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, which the American producers enjoy with their products.4 Americans, on average, do not know a great deal about GM foods. In a poll from 2004, “the disconnect between reality in the marketplace and public knowledge of GM foods” (Fink and Rodemeyer 2007, 137) is stark. In 2001, only 14 percent of Americans thought that more than 50 percent of food in a typical American grocery store was genetically modified (PIFB, 2001). At the time, it was estimated that 70 percent or more of the processed food on American shelves contained genetically modified ingredients. Additionally, Hallman et al. found, in their 2004 survey, that even those who believed GM foods to be on the market had difficulty identifying which foods were genetically modified. (Fink and Rodemeyer 2007, 137)5 The level of awareness of GM issues among the American public has largely been attributed to the American media’s shifting attention to GM products. In years when scandals

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involving GM products have been in the news, the public’s awareness of GM issues has been greater compared to years when the focus has not included GM scandals. A majority of the American public (57–65 percent), however, has seen, read, or heard little (“not too much” or “nothing at all”) about GM foods across four polling years (Fink and Rodemeyer 2007, 138). “While a majority of Americans report having heard relatively little about GM foods over the last 5 years [2001–2005], their lack of awareness has not translated into an absence of opinions about GM foods” (Fink and Rodemeyer 2007). As a natural extension of this great unawareness, perhaps, Americans are not particularly concerned with GM foods compared to other food-related risks. Food freshness and the risk of salmonella are much greater concerns to the public than the genetic modification of food (Fink and Rodemeyer 2007, 131). Interestingly enough, only 25 percent of Americans who were asked favored the introduction of GM foods on the American market (Fink and Rodemeyer 2007, 134). About 40 percent of the public was unsure or had no opinion regarding whether or not they thought GM foods are safe when they were asked about it in 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2005. However, when being told that more than half of the processed food in American supermarkets contain GM ingredients, almost 20 percent changed their minds and concluded that GM foods were safe (Fink and Rodemeyer 2007, 138). This seems to indicate that American risk perceptions are fairly malleable, and there may be an unconscious trend of shifting the threshold of risk perception to accommodate everyday behavior. Only about 25 percent of the polled public did not think GM foods were safe. Despite the widespread use of GM foods, in 2001 a majority of Americans (58 percent) opposed GM foods, and, in 2003, 2004, and 2005, approximately half of the public (47–50 percent) opposed their introduction in the United States (Fink and Rodemeyer 2007, 134).

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Americans primarily look to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for information about GM foods. The FDA got a whopping 83 percent approval rating and was the number one trusted information source for Americans regarding food-related issues in 2001 and in 2003 (Fink and Rodemeyer 2007, 139). On the other hand, GM foods and organisms in agriculture have been a controversial topic in Europe since the early 1990s, and they are continuing to fuel debate. The mid and late 1990s saw a number of significant events, with the voluntary removal by retailers of at least one food product (GM tomato paste) from British supermarket shelves, controversy over shipments of unlabelled GM soya to Europe by the multinational corporation Monsanto, and in 1998–1999 a very public disagreement among scientist about the safety of GM potatoes (the so-called Pusztai affair). (Pidgeon, Poortinga, Rowe, Horlick-Jones, Walls, and O’Riordan 2005, 469) This turbulent period in European food safety coincided with public opinion against GM foods in many European countries reaching its highest point. This controversy over GM foods came on the heel of the mad cow crisis, which marked a clear turn in British and other European countries’ approach to risk and science (Pidgeon et al. 2005, 472). The policy choices available to governments to some extent depend on whether trust in risk regulation affects the public’s perception and attitudes toward risks, or if the people’s attitudes and perceptions shape public trust in regulation. “The most common interpretation is that the reluctance of the (British) public to embrace GM food is caused by their distrust of the government’s ability to regulate GM food. It is often said that the BSE (‘mad cow’) crisis is one of the root causes of the current unease about GM foods. BSE is often considered as a warning of the fallibility of expertise, unrecognized risks of modern farming

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techniques, and of the failing of risk regulations” (Poortinga and Pidgeon 2005, 201). Crises serve as focusing events that open up for the possibility of linking problems to viable solutions and get enough political willpower to get new policies adopted (Kingdon 1995). Crises also have the ability to rearrange and reprioritize the political agenda so that whole policy areas that have been largely stagnant or neglected break into significant and drastic change, punctuating the equilibrium of day-to-day policymaking (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2007). A large part of the refocusing power of crises have to do with the shift in perception that often comes with unexpected and threatening events such as massive outbreaks of food-related diseases or food-product tampering. After the mad cow crisis, strong suggestions were made that policy-makers and scientists needed to engage in dialogue about risk with affected stakeholders.6 The result of the “GM Nation?” debates in the United Kingdom revealed a number of interesting things about public opinion with regard to GM agriculture. People were generally uneasy about the safety and risk to the environment related to GM agriculture, and they worried about wider social and political issues related to it. Furthermore, the more the public engaged in discussion and learned about GM agriculture, the stronger and more negative their opinions became. There was generally little support for Britain going after early commercialization of GM agriculture and there was a wide mistrust of the government and private businesses’ actions in this area. While the public was not adverse to the topic as such, people wanted to know more and thought more research should be done, and they welcomed and valued discussion on these issues (Pidgeon et al. 2005, 472). U.S. farmers started using GM organisms in 1996. The main application was, and has continued to be, genetic manipulation of crops to protect them from herbicides and to introduce genes that would keep damage-causing insects at bay

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(Schueller 2009, 14). “Today, about 92 percent of all soy and 80 percent of all corn grown in the United States is GM. These crops feed the animal that feed us, and they provide the bulk of our sweeteners and cooking oil” (Schueller 2009, 14). Lisa Weasel (see Schueller 2009; Weasel 2008) estimates that 70 percent of processed foods sold in the United States contain GM ingredients. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and several corporate studies have assessed that these products are safe for human consumption, but critics argue that the issues surrounding genetically modified food are very misunderstood in the United States. These domestic critics argue that there are too many unknowns and too few solid studies to say with certainty that GM products in the United States are safe.7 One problem they cite is that the studies that are submitted to the government have all been undertaken by the companies that produce GM products, which is a ref lection of the policymaking power of private interests in the United States as compared to the EU. Even in the context of its own scientific approach to risk assessment, European Union member countries recognize that public opinion regarding genetically modified foods may not be turned on a dime. Highlighting the policy importance of societal perception (right or wrong) over “objective” science, individual member states at the forefront of testing genetically modified foods and feeds, like Great Britain, have since 2000 stated that “safety assessment procedures for GM foods (under the novel foods arrangement) were sufficiently robust and rigorous to ensure that approved GM foods were as safe as their non-GM counterparts, and posed no additional risk to the consumer” (Food Standards Agency 2008b). However, the same agency that stated its unequivocal support for the safety of approved GM products (the British Food Standards Agency) was still in 2008 publicly recognizing that the public may be skeptical of and may want to avoid GM foods despite scientific proof of their non-harm8 (in line with the precautionary principle). The Food Standards Agency has therefore chosen to

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label GM food items sold on the British market, so that consumers who want to avoid consuming GM foods can in fact do this (Food Standards Agency 2008b). In the United States, GM foods are not discussed as a separate or particular concern by the FDA, the authority with primary responsibility for food safety.9 Increases in food-related risks (identified as perils of the twenty-first century) that are emphasized are instead about naturally occurring ones, such as salmonella, botulism, and E.coli. The American public’s view of the primary food risks they are exposed to corresponds to those emphasized by the FDA, and this is interesting in light of the fact that the public views the FDA as its most trusted source of information on GM foods. The FDA is also much more positive in its assessment of food safety overall, emphasizing with equal weight the potential promise that food production in the twenty-first century brings, such as ample supply of fresh fruits and produce yearround and the essential health benefits (such as lowered cholesterol) that some processed foods bring (see von Eschenbach 2008). To the extent that GM foods are discussed by the FDA, it is exclusively in terms of its potential for health benefits, with the FDA asserting that America “can do more to prevent disease” by “genetically engineering crops to improve nutrition and promote health” (von Eschenbach 2008). It is also worth noting that the FDA’s preferred term for GM foods is bioengineered products or foods, and this is a term that is consistently used in all regulation regarding GM foods. The American public, however, was much less familiar with this term10 than with GM foods or GM products when asked in surveys (Fink and Rodemeyer 2007, 131). This indicates that the information on GM foods that regulators, including the FDA, present to the public is likely not registering with the public. Subsequently, it is a fair assessment that the general public is largely unaware of what laws and regulations actually apply to the production, use, and sale of GM foods and products in the United States.

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Risk Regulation in United States and EU Genetically modified products in food or drinks Additives like colors, preservatives, or flavorings used in food or drinks Chemical substances that are formed during heating, baking, barbecuing, or frying foods

45 40 35 30

(%)

25 20 15 10 5 0 Very worried

Fairly worried

Not very worried Not at all worried

Figure 5.1 Risks EU citizens worry about Note: In order to better distinguish between levels of concern, an “average index” of opinions was constructed by transforming the “worry scale” into numerical values. The purpose of this summary index is to give an overall ranking of the average level of concern expressed by citizens by not only looking at the “very worried” and “fairly worried” responses but also taking into account those indicating little or no concern. Source: Commission of the European Communities 2006, 15.

In the table below (figure 5.1), the Eurobarometer results for question 5 are displayed. This question was designed to measure “people’s concerns about a range of named risks/ problems associated with food. For each of these potential risks/problems, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt worried” (Commission of the European Communities 2006, 15).

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EU Policy Responses Legislation and Regulation In 2000, the EU published a White Paper on Food Safety outlining an EU-wide framework for food safety controls. The new policy direction presented therein included two major steps: the establishment of an independent European Food Agency; and a set of updated laws, regulations, and procedures across the EU that would maximize food safety through the whole food production chain, hence the initiative’s name “From Farm to Fork.” The Commission hoped that the proposed agency would serve as the scientific point of reference regarding food safety for the whole Union and would “contribute to a high level of consumer health protection, and consequently will help restore and maintain consumer confidence” (Commission of the European Communities 2000, 5), which had been badly battered by the food scandals and crises in the 1990s. The “Farm to Fork” initiative, the Commission hoped, would increase transparency and accountability for food safety among producers and among member states, as well as updating existing legislation to meet the challenges of new modes of production, among them the use of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and nanotechnology. On the lead principles that would guide the policy initiative, the Commission’s White Paper stated that “[t]he use of scientific advice will underpin Food Safety policy, whilst the precautionary principle will be used where appropriate” (Commission of the European Communities 2000, 3). The first EU-wide set of regulations to follow the White Paper on food safety came in 2002, with the adoption of The General Food Law Regulation (EC) 178/2002 (Food Standards Agency 2009). The next major set of regulations at the EU level pertained to food hygiene and was established in 2004 with the EU Food Hygiene Regulations. This set of regulations was followed by a number of implementation regulations

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and transitional measures (Food Standards Agency 2008a). In 2006 the EU introduced its newest set of regulations pertaining to food production hygiene. This regulation package included Regulation (EC) 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs, Regulation (EC) 853/2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin, and Regulation (EC) 854/2004 laying down specific rules for the organization of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption.11 In 2006 the EU finally launched what it calls its “from farm to fork” approach to food safety. This new approach brings all the links in the food production chain, including farmers and growers, under the same regulation across the EU. The regulation requires food business operators to adhere to the EU’s Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) principles. Parts of the requirements are implemented through national level, rather than EU level, legislation (Food Standards Agency 2008a).12 As the largest exporter/importer of food products in the world (Commission of the European Communities 2000, 4), the EU has long regulated the entry of new food products on the European market. The Novel Food Regulation set up in 199713 stated that a new or novel food, subject to scrutiny and approval, is “a food that does not have a significant history of consumption within the European Union (EU) before 15 May 1997” (Food Standards Agency 2008c). Novel foods include food products stemming from cloned animals, such as milk or eggs, and foods produced using nanotechnology14 (Food Standards Agency 2008c). Regarding genetically modified foods (GMFs), the testing and approval of GMFs were performed by the individual member states up until 2004. Until April 2004, the scope of the “Novel Foods Regulation” (Novel Food Regulation (EC) 258/97) included all foods produced using genetically modified organisms but GM foods are currently subject to approval under a separate

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regulation, Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. . . . The safety assessments of GM foods are carried out by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). . . . Assessments include a detailed study of potential for toxic, nutritional and allergenic effects. (Food Standards Agency 2008b)15 Before any genetically modified organism can enter the European food chain, through animal feed for instance, it needs to be approved for sale and use on the European market. The 2003 Regulation (EC No 1829/2003) establishes the procedures for getting genetically modified food and feed approved in the EU (Food Standards Agency 2008b). Institutions and Principles The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) functions as “an independent European agency funded by the EU budget that operates separately from the European Commission, European Parliament and EU Member States” (European Food Safety Authority 2008b). EFSA’s Scientific Committee and subordinate risk assessment Panels are comprised of proven experts on scientific risk assessment, “appointed through an open selection procedure” (European Food Safety Authority 2008b). The Scientific Panels conduct risk assessments regarding animal health and welfare16 (AHAW); food additives and nutrient sources added to food17 (ANS); biological hazards18 (BIOHAZ) including BSE-TSE-related risks; food contact materials, enzymes, f lavorings and processing aids19(CEF); contaminants in the food chain 20 (CONTAM); additives and products or substances used in animal feed 21 (FEEDAP); genetically modified organisms22 (GMO); dietetic products, nutrition and allergies23 (NDA); plant protection products and their residues24 (PPR); and plant health 25 (PLH) (European Food Safety Authority 2008b).26 “EFSA’s role is to assess and communicate on all risks associated with the food chain. Since EFSA’s advice serves to inform the policies and decisions of

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risk managers, a large part of EFSA’s work is undertaken in response to specific requests for scientific advice” (European Food Safety Authority 2008a). The policymaking bodies requesting this type of advice are individual member states, the European Parliament, and the Commission. The EFSA is not merely a passive advising body, however, as the agency is also able to initiate its own scientific investigations through so-called self-tasking. U.S. Policy Responses Legislation and Regulation Three agencies bear the main responsibility for regulating biotechnology in the United States: the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA); the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The main regulatory framework (the Coordinated Framework) pertaining to biotechnology was adopted in 1986 and consists of a collection of laws. The central premise of the Coordinated Framework was that the process of biotechnology itself poses no unique risks and that products engineered by biotechnology should therefore be regulated under the same laws as conventionally produced products with similar compositions and intended uses. A second and no less important conclusion was that existing laws were adequate to meet regulatory needs. (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004, 1–2) This is the framework that, together with agency regulations, has regulated the first generation of GM foods that have been produced and introduced to the U.S. market. When legislators developed the framework over twenty years ago, they realized that it would need revision as the science of GM food production evolved (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology

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2004, 4). The changes proposed in 2005 and 2007 are part of this predicted need for redress. The courts, which ultimately determine whether or not agency behavior is within the rules of the law, have been quite generous with the three agencies regulating GM foods and products as they have creatively tried to adapt and apply the framework to GM products (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004, 10–11). A number of problems with the framework have been identified. First, the fact that there are no laws in the framework that specifically regulate GM foods and products has left it to agencies to write regulation to fit the laws to specific GM products (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004, 10). Second, since there was not a good legal fit to begin with, it has proven hard to consistently apply the laws and to determine which set of laws are the most applicable. The applicability of a law is determined both by the nature of the organism and its intended use. This is a tricky process as any single GM organism often spans several product categories (it is a plant, a food, and a pesticide) (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004, 8). The problem of determining legal applicability is important because different sets of laws carry with them notably different levels of restrictions. Third, the Coordinated Framework and its application to GM products also leaves considerable judgment calls regarding which of the three agencies has primary jurisdiction over a product. Furthermore, “[e]ven where a biotechnology product falls clearly within the jurisdiction of a particular agency and law, the law may give the agency authority over only a limited set of risks. For existing biotechnology products, agencies have responded to these limitations by coordinating their regulatory review functions (OSTP 1986)” (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004, 12). . . . for example, with respect to a crop that has been engineered to produce a pesticidal substance, the EPA has responsibility for assessing and managing the environmental

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and food safety risks of the pesticidal substance, the FDA has responsibility for assessing other food safety risks (and enforcing the EPA’s food safety decision), and the USDA has responsibility for assessing and managing plant pest and other environmental risks other than those posed by the pesticidal substance. In some cases, however, particularly for some new biotechnology products, it is not clear whether any one agency or any group of agencies will have clear legal authority to look at the full range of potential risks posed by the product. (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004, 12) When the jurisdictional ownership is clear, the individual agencies still run into authority problems. Critics argue that “a regulatory system that effectively depends upon the voluntary cooperation of those subject to the regulation is unlikely to be viewed as credible” (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004, 12). The regulations for bioengineered products developed by the FDA, for example, are suggestive only and encourage voluntary submission of information by GM producers regarding test results and launching of new products on the market (see, e.g., Panna 2005; U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2001). Those more optimistic about the process argue that the symbiotic relationship that has been set up between the regulatory agencies and the companies being regulated maximizes efficiency and prevents the market from becoming overregulated. Whether these legal uncertainties are significant from a policy perspective is subject to opinion. On the one hand, to the extent that no one challenges an agency’s assertion of its authority and all parties comply with its requirements, legal uncertainties may have little practical effect. For example, developers of genetically engineered crops routinely consult with the FDA on a voluntary basis because of the practical marketplace reality that buyers

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would penalize products that had not been through the FDA’s consultation process. Technology developers are unlikely to challenge a regulatory agency, because they obtain market benefits from having a regulatory review or approval. (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004, 11) Under the auspices of an initiative called “FDA beyond our Borders,” the FDA is currently working to establish a presences overseas and “to build capacity at foreign sites—in at least five regions, beginning with China” (von Eschenbach 2008). In an interesting new approach to food safety and risk regulation, the FDA states that “[i]n an age when a border is not a barrier . . . [t]his requires us to regulate products where they are produced, before they arrive at our borders” (von Eschenbach 2008). The FDA beyond our Borders initiative involves “expand[ing] our work with foreign regulators, to share information more fully” (von Eschenbach 2008). Under another part of the initiative, FDA experts have been holding meetings with embassy representatives to inform other producer countries of the FDA’s food and feed protection initiatives and the desire for collaboration. This foreign initiative exemplifies an interesting turn in risk regulation in that the United States is expanding its mandate to inf luence the legislation of foreign governments, to support the capacity of on-site producers to uphold higher production safety standards and tests, and to monitor the direct implementation of these new regulations and standards. While pressure on foreign governments to comply with a nation’s preferred standards is by no means a new policy tool, the direct foreign involvement of the United States in issues of food and drug safety and the unapologetic approach with which it is going about using its resources and inf luence is quite unique. Part of this assertive and hands-on foreign approach has been made possible by the way in which the United States has generally strong-armed policy changes in foreign countries since

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September 11 (n.a. 2002; 2003; 2005). This increased U.S. presence and inf luence has paved way for other agencies such as the FDA to work directly abroad. In the United States, food safety as a societal good, and the agencies responsible for it, has been enveloped in the larger and well-funded U.S. initiative of critical infrastructure protection (CIP). Under this major federal program, services deemed core to American society’s functioning and economic well-being27 have undergone intensive review and have received reinforcements in infrastructure upgrades and protection tools. The ties between CIP, the overall U.S. security strategy, and the Department of Homeland defense’s central policy formulating role are clear. The FDA’s work with risk regulation internationally has clearly benefitted from the inf luence of larger U.S. policy initiatives such as the global war on terror, but it is also greatly supported by the importance that access to the American market plays in global trade generally, but especially for developing countries. Institutions and Principles The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) supervises and regulates food for consumption, but it shares this responsibility with the Department of Agriculture, which is responsible for the safety of meat, poultry, and eggs (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2009). The FDA also regulates “genetically engineered animals and products from pet food and pet turtles to feed and drugs for livestock” (von Eschenbach 2008). Its mission, to protect and promote the health of American consumers, is broad and deep in its societal impact.28 The FDA has developed “a comprehensive Food Protection Plan to address the changes in food sources, production, and consumption” (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2009) that American consumers face today, through domestic food production and imports. The plan specifically focuses on protecting America’s food supply from unintentional contaminations

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and deliberate attacks. The plan is divided into sequential segments of action, starting with prevention, followed by intervention, and then response. The American food protection strategy and national plan is focused on food safety in terms of the potential for sabotage and intentional attacks on the food delivery system as a critical societal infrastructure. As such, the American approach to food protection is very much in line with the general development and strategic plans developed by the Department of Homeland Security. In contrast, the EU approach is one where threats to food safety are primarily envisioned to be the result of poor industrial practices (grinding down and feeding sick cows to healthy cows), the spread of naturally occurring diseases, such as foot and mouth disease, across borders through the open internal market, and sneaky exposure to potentially dangerous genetically modified products through poor labeling. The American focus on contamination (intentional or unintentional) and attacks on the food system is more narrowly focused in terms of threat perception and the envisioned origins or underlying causes of those threats. Furthermore, unlike the European Union, the United States is working with an old institution. The FDA was established in 1908. In 2007 an initiative for change was introduced, however, with the Strategic Action Plan (von Eschenbach 2008). The plan outlined four rather sweeping goals for the FDA: “strengthening the FDA, improving the safety of patients and consumers, increasing access to new medical and food products, and improving the safety and quality of manufactured products and the supply chain” (von Eschenbach 2008). The responsibility of the FDA has increased over time and, as is the case with so many government agencies in the United States, mandates and responsibilities have not been accompanied by supporting federal funds. While the FDA’s budget increased in 2007 and 2008, the agency’s initiatives are predicted to require continued and expanded funding to be effective (von Eschenbach 2008).

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The FDA is also an institution with a legacy in the chemical industry field and with a strong presence in medical development and regulation today. This inf luences the way it looks at food safety and health, looking more toward development, breakthroughs in science and the biochemical engineering part of food and feed, than its EU counterpart. While several factors still pull the EU and the United States in different directions with regard to food safety, the pressure for convergence generated by advocacy groups invested in the international trade of foods and food products is substantial. It is likely, with the FDA’s historic focus on drugs and product innovation and the considerable experimentation that the United States allows in food production, that the United States will remain at the forefront of innovation in food production and processing. The risks presented with this development will continue to worry a significant portion of EU citizens and decision-makers, but as consumers on both sides of the Atlantic become exposed to new products in familiar settings, such as grocery stores, the draw of convenience is likely to increase consumer demand for American products on the European market, adding pressure on regulatory conversion. On the other hand, the United States does not seem to have a way of arguing its way out of the European sentiment for information, particularly clear labeling that enables consumers to make informed choices. The inf luence of consumer rights groups in Europe is strong and enjoys popular support, which U.S. producers are going to have to recognize as a legitimate factor if U.S. products are going to be successful on the European market. This aspect of convergence has more to do with culture than regulation in and of itself, but it plays an important role in ameliorating public perceptions and skepticism surrounding, for instance, GMO products in the EU.

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Flooding, Disaster Prevention, and Environmental Risk Perception

In this chapter we take a look at f looding and the management of f loods as a type of environmental risk management. Floods constitute the single most frequent source of natural disasters, and the costliest type of natural disaster in the world (Center for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters 2009). As mentioned in chapter 1, the United States and the EU share many of the same societal challenges, yet they often go about managing them quite differently. Flood risks and achieving early warning across borders are two things that EU countries and the United States struggle with relatively frequently. The countries in Europe that commonly face spring runoff and f lash f loods have set up a rather advanced, so-called early warning system among governmental agencies tasked with water management, weather services, or disaster response in these countries. Most of the coastal United States is also f lood prone, especially the southern coasts that are hit by hurricanes coming in from the Atlantic every year. Much of the Midwest in the United States is also prone to spring f looding when consistent warm temperatures create fast melting snow. Protecting citizens against known and prevalent dangers remains one of the core functions of the state. People expect government to identify and act on risks that face society as a whole. Furthermore, scientific and technological progress has E. Hall

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lulled citizens in the United States and the EU into believing that the materialization of risks is an inconvenient threat of the past. Ironically, many of the preparatory and mitigative efforts that are available to American and European policy-makers with regard to floods, as well as other risks, assume that citizens are observant and adept at assessing risk, and that they engage in risk-avoiding behavior or take only reasonable risks (see chapter 1). Data on public risk perceptions and related actions, however, reveal that people who live in and around environmental dangers often are keenly aware of these dangers but remarkably unlikely to do anything to mitigate the risks, such as moving away from actual dangers. Examples from Iceland show how people in known avalanche areas refuse to move even after repeated avalanche disasters and fail to prepare for the event of an avalanche even when preparation clearly would pay off (Bernhardsdottir 2001; Bernhardsdottir and Svedin 2004). Furthermore, on the plains of Canada the Flooding of the Red River running north from the American Midwest to Hudson Bay is a predictable annual event. Despite repeated devastating f loods, people in North Dakota and Manitoba keep building (and often rebuilding) their homes on the river banks and fail to incorporate adequate protection for what can easily be predicted f lood levels to come over the next 50–100 years (Svedin 1998; 2001). In fact, it seems more and more people are moving to sites known to be environmentally risky than there are people moving to safer areas. In the 1990s, the European system for early f lood warning involved governmental agencies tasked with water management, weather services, or disaster response in these countries. The massive f loods of 1995 and 1997 showed that this system did not work f lawlessly, many human errors and miscommunications took place, but interestingly the general reaction to these shortcomings was further institutionalization of crossborder and transnational cooperation in planning and response (Rosenthal and ‘t Hart 1998). The level of acceptance within the EU of the state telling citizens what they can and cannot

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do, asserted in the introduction of this book, is evident also with regard to f loods. The shape of the response with mass communication in forced evacuations run by public service agencies is almost universal in Europe, and the expectation of governmental intervention and supervision of this kind of risk is accepted by people living in f lood-prone areas. In fact, the largest public agency in the Netherlands is the Department of Water Works, which controls the very complex water management system that keeps roughly 60 percent of the country’s housing from going under water (Holland.nl 2009). In the case of the United States, “[f ]loods are one of the most common hazards in the United States. . . . Every state is at risk from this hazard” (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2009c). Between 1978 and 2009 the most common trigger of significant f looding events in the United States has been tropical storms and hurricanes (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2009b). Despite the prevalence of this type of environmental risk, American society’s resistance to major government control and initiatives with regard to known risks, as discussed in chapter 1, is also evident in the case of f loods. The unfolding of the hurricane season is a major news item in the gulf coast states, and also on national U.S. TV stations. While the metrological monitoring and subsequent issuing of hurricane warnings are very similar across states, coordination in the response to hurricanes and possible f looding across states is rare. To the extent that it does occur, it often cease as soon as the predicted hurricane trajectory shifts from one state on to the next. The many effects of Hurricane Katrina in Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas illustrate this lack of coordination at the local level, at the country level, between states, and between the states and the federal level of government.1 The disproportionate lack of resources in Alabama and Louisiana, the lack of coordination of evacuee f lows, and ultimately the lack of coordination of water and f lood management f lows at the local and county level, made f lood risk management and the f lood response seem much less coordinated and planned for in the

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United States than among the EU countries involved in the 1993 and 1995 f loods.2 A number of things may account for the differences in f lood management and f lood risk regulation that we see on the two sides of the Atlantic. One explanation is culture. There are great cultural differences in how the public and the government perceive their roles in relation to f lood risk and mitigation. While American government agencies, such as the National Weather Service, send out massive amounts of information to the public about the risks of hurricanes and f loods (to a point where there is a serious risk of information overload), and updates information available to the public almost minute by minute, there is a much stronger sense that each individual is responsible for reacting to and taking measures that they view as appropriate in response to this information. While it seems the U.S. public expects the government to make available resources for rescuing people faced with materialized risks, such as being f looded, the system draws heavily on the individual’s choice to stay by their property or evacuate somewhere they see fit if there is heightened risk. The same seems to be the case with states and counties. Once information about possible risks is made available it is really left to the individual county and state to form their own response, leaving coordination across boundaries as an optional extra if there is time and resources. While Europeans are keenly aware of the risks of living in f lood-prone areas, such as the Dutch country side or the French lowland Alps, they tend to trust in government to manage this type of risk and have, since 1997, moved steadily closer to an EU-level plan for communicating and responding to disasters including f loods (see Commission of the European Communities 2009). In the United States the general public also seems readily aware of the risks of hurricane-related floods, but the steady migration of an older, more aid-dependent population to places like Florida places state governments and the federal government in a dilemma. The government is facing a culture where there

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is a great deal of “cry-wolf” cavalierism about hurricanes and where lots of freedom is left to the individual to form their own response to flood risks and disasters. At the same time, vulnerable populations are increasingly exposing themselves to risks and the government needs to plan for and accommodate these populations’ needs in disasters. Post Katrina, the pressure on government to respond better to floods has increased, while a similar shift in risk culture among the public has not necessarily taken place to a point where individuals are more willing to have their lives regulated by government intervention and direction. Public Perceptions of Environmental Risks on Both Sides of the Atlantic While there are similarities in the level of concern with environmental risks among the EU and U.S. public, several differences can be noted. In part, these perceptual and attentive differences, as highlighted in chapter 1, are related to politics and culture. However, public perceptions of risk are also mediated by the ways in which media and political institutions form and convey information on risks. Europeans are quite worried about environmental risks. The top category of fears that between 40 and 50 percent of the EU citizens surveyed were very worried about in 2002 included nuclear power and radioactive waste, disasters caused by industrial activities, air pollution, natural disasters such as floods, and pollution of bodies of water. Analysts argue that many of these perceived top fears consist of “environmental problems that could be described as traditional in the sense that they have been mentioned in the media on a very regular basis for at least thirty years or so,” and thus have developed into “deeply-rooted perceptions” (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 9). The group of issues that EU citizens are comparatively least worried about (between 17 and 30 percent are very worried about these topics) include much newer issues such as genetically modified organisms (30 percent), or concern “relatively old but perhaps

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forgotten ones” (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 9) such as acid rain (29 percent).3 Not only are EU citizens very worried about environmental risks, they are more worried about them now than they used to be. Comparing topics that citizens were very worried about in 1999 and in 2002, the Eurobarometer shows that “in most cases, the level of concern about the damage to the environment has risen in Europe. This rise is particularly noticeable in the case of ‘natural disasters’ (+21 [percent]) and some damages to the natural environment (rivers and lakes, +15 [percent]— seas and coasts, +10 [percent]—animal and plants species, +10 [percent]—air pollution, +9 [percent])” (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 13). It is interesting to note that information about environmental risks and the level of fear that different risks generate do not seem to be connected. “One might have expected the most feared problems to be also those about which Europeans feel least well informed. But analysis shows that this assumption is wrong: there is no strong statistical link between fear of these different environmental problems and information about these same problems” (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 15). There are some marked differences in how groups of EU citizens view environmental risks, including natural disasters such as f loods. “[W]ithout exception, women are more worried than men, but the discrepancy is greater than or equal to 5 percentage points only in three cases,” one of them being natural disasters “(47 percent compared to 40 percent)” (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 12). Young people are also, “as a general rule, less worried than older people,” however, the differences are again only substantial in very few instances, one of them being “natural disasters (38 percent among 15–24-year-olds, 48 percent among 55 and + year olds)” (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 12). Culturally and socially based differences are also visible; “as far as ‘natural disasters’ are concerned, the worry is more marked when the age on completion of education is younger (48 percent for those who completed their

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education before the age of 16 compared to 40 percent among those who continued their education beyond the age of 20)” (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 12). The American public also cares a great deal about the environment but is not very attentive to news stories about materialized environmental risks such as wildfires, droughts, and melting glaciers. A PEW survey in January 2009 showed that 83 percent of Americans surveyed thought that protecting the environment should either be an important priority or a top priority for the country’s government (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2009a). When asked about a report showing that the ice in the Arctic is melting faster than scientists had previously expected, only 24 percent of those asked had heard a lot about the report, 43 percent had heard a little, and 32 percent of those surveyed had heard nothing at all. Other materialized environmental risks also do not garner a great deal of attention from the American public (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2009b). Wildfires in California were followed fairly closely or very closely by 49 percent of those interviewed (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2008a), and wildfires in South Carolina were followed fairly closely or very closely by 33 percent of the population surveyed (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2009c), whereas news stories about droughts hitting American farmers was followed fairly closely or very closely by 88 percent of those surveyed (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 1988). Public perceptions around environmental risks pose an interesting challenge for the regulation of risk on both sides of the Atlantic. To some extent the communitarianism that has marked risk management in Europe seems particularly salient when it comes to environmental risks. The idea that we all have an interest in minimizing risk in a community, since we often bear the brunt associated with risk decisions together as a collective, is really the most effective approach to addressing environmental issues. Furthermore, as noted in chapter 1,

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the spillover effects of risk regulation in one country, such as the presence or absence of environmental regulation, quickly become noticeable in other locations and directly affect trade partners and participants in the global arena. Some of the most effective prevention and preparedness actions that can be taken with regard to environmental risks rest with the public and individual initiatives. The challenges start with the fact that “[p]eople must be motivated to take preventive actions that would result in decreased personal risk and decreased economic losses” (Siegrist and Gutscher 2006, 971–972). Motivation is intrinsically linked to perception, and this is where the regulation of risk and preventive actions by policy-makers and the public become really interesting and somewhat counterintuitive. Public action with regard to f lood risks may to some degree be attributed to how much the public knows about f lood policies and measures that can be taken. Vari (2002) has looked specifically at the relationship between public knowledge and attitudes toward f lood risk. He found that “[c]ompared to people living in lower-risk regions, people living in high-risk regions possessed more knowledge about evacuation plans and the proper actions to take in case of an emergency” (Siegrist and Gutscher 2006, 972). Furthermore, Lave and Lave (1991) have studied public perceptions of f lood risks in communities recently hit by f lood. The results they show indicate that residents have little knowledge about what causes f loods and what could be done to prevent damage (Siegrist and Gutscher 2006, 972). In recent years, efforts by EU member countries to produce f lood risk maps and make this information available to the public seem to have increased public knowledge about substantive f lood issues. A study of Swiss public perceptions (Siegrist and Gutscher 2006) showed that Swiss citizens’ perceptions of risk were quite well-aligned with experts’ assessments of f lood risks. Furthermore, EU citizens in general feel that they are well informed about environmental issues, especially regarding natural disasters (64 percent of those asked felt they were very

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well informed on this topic) (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 14). The alignment of the public’s assessment of risk and that of experts, seen in the Swiss case, may be the exception to the rule, however, and citizens do not necessarily act in accordance with their perceptions of risk. The Swiss study (Siegrist and Gutscher 2006) revealed, quite intuitively, that residents who lived in designated “no risk areas” perceived themselves to be at lower risk than did residents of higher risk level areas. The study also showed, however, that with regard to concrete prevention behavior, no differences between people living in different risk areas were observed. . . . Results suggest that in some regions people overestimate the risks associated with f looding. Consequently, some people are more afraid of f looding than is justified by the facts. Some people show prevention behavior that most likely is superf luous. However, in other regions people underestimate the risks associated with f looding. These people do not show prevention behavior, and they are not well prepared for an adverse event. (Siegrist and Gutscher 2006, 971) The cited Swiss study also showed support for the idea of availability heuristics, that is, that people’s experience of something, like a f lood, is closely related to their perceptions of these events or types of risks (Siegrist and Gutscher 2006, 971). “According to the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982), people use the ease with which examples of a hazard can be brought to mind as a cue for estimating the probability of a hazard. As a result, experiences with a hazard should increase perceived risks” (Siegrist and Gutscher 2006, 972). In other words, people will judge a risk more likely to occur if they can easily bring a memory of it to mind. This is not a very accurate way of perceiving or assessing risk, it also impairs action on the part of risks that have yet to materialize. As an available heuristic

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“. . . the experience of a previous f lood was the most important motive for buying insurance. Furthermore, the degree to which a f lood was perceived as dreaded positively affected the decision to buy insurance. Knowledge, on the other hand, did not inf luence the decision” (Siegrist and Gutscher 2006, 972). The public’s reaction to materialized risks is a known and often calculated exacerbation in disasters. In order to manage public reactions to disastrous events, a fair amount of thought and planning on the part of governments go into public education on disaster response and public information dissemination in acute events. We can also learn a great deal about risk perception and what the public views as an appropriate management of risks by examining the public’s perception of their own response to risks and disasters. Hurricane Katrina provides some insight into this type of self-ref lection. Looking at responses to the question, “[t]hinking about the people who stayed in New Orleans during the storm (Hurricane Katrina) and became stranded by the f looding, do you think . . . most stayed behind because they wanted to or most stayed behind because they didn’t have a way to leave the city?,” 62 percent of those asked believed people stayed behind because of exogenous circumstances, that is, they did not have a way to leave. Only 29 percent thought that the public’s reaction in this case was primarily a consequence of choice, that is, that they did not want to leave (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2005b, Question 17). Public Opinion on Environmental Risks and Floods EU citizens often think of f loods and other natural disasters when the word “the environment” is mentioned. In 2002, f loods, earthquakes, and other natural disasters were the third most common association to “the environment” among those asked in the fifteen member states (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 5). Part of this strong association can be explained by the numerous f loods that hit Europe in 2002,

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but an interesting side-finding has been that poor people associate “the environment” more with negative events like f loods and other natural disasters, compared to those who are financially better off (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 6). In the United States, f loods and hurricanes seem to be an exception to the otherwise relatively mild interest in environmental threats and disaster news stories. News stories of f looding in Texas and other southwestern states were followed fairly closely or very closely by 73 percent of those surveyed (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 1990), and f looding in North Dakota were followed fairly or very closely by 57 percent of those asked (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2009d). Furthermore, a whole 79 percent of Americans surveyed followed the impact of Hurricane Ike in 2008 fairly closely or very closely (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2008b). Major hurricane and flooding events also have a great psychological impact on the American public and is something they have an emotional reaction to. After Hurricane Katrina, the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press confirmed the profound psychological effect the hurricane had had on the public. About “58 percent of respondents say they have felt depressed because of what’s happened in areas affected by the storm. In recent years, this percentage is only surpassed by the 71 percent reporting depression in a survey taken just days after the September 11 attacks. But it is significantly greater than the percentage who reported feeling depressed in the opening days of the current war in Iraq” (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2005a, 1). There are differences in how the public views the origin of disasters, as being caused by unusual but unavoidable natural phenomena or as part of a larger pattern of associated human events and behaviors. In the EU, the public’s optimistic ideas about the state of the environment “(‘the deterioration of the environment can be halted by changing our way of life,’ 45 percent) are

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almost exactly offset by pessimistic ideas (‘human activity has led to irretrievable damage to the environment,’ 44 percent)” (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 3). Furthermore, in the EU “[h]alf of the respondents feel that they can take useful action regarding the environment while the other half think that their actions in this field make no difference” (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 3). However, the vast majority of EU citizens “say they are willing to act only ‘if others also make an effort’ ” (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 3). In the case of hurricane Katrina, 66 percent of those asked attributed the severe materialized risk to extreme weather that simply happens from time to time, whereas 25 percent saw the hurricane as part of a larger pattern, that is, a result of global climate change (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2005a, 4). Due to the expansion of urban dwellings into f lood-prone areas, more and more people are directly affected by riverine and hurricane generated f loods. How communities choose to manage f lood waters and how they set up their f lood mitigation structures often directly impact people upstream and downstream from rivers and inside or outside of city f lood structures (see Lamberte 2000; Prezelj, Malesic, and Dolscak 2004; Svedin 2001). What is protected by f lood dikes and similar physical structures is considered of higher value and that which is outside of such protective walls is considered of lesser value, or is harder to protect in a cost-effective way. Sometimes this leads to bitter arguments and heightened emotions between residents in less protected areas and community leaders who are viewed as coldheartedly discriminating against poor or rural area populations. This type of reaction was very visible in the case of hurricane Katrina. While 50 percent of American’s across the country felt angry about the events that took place, the reaction from African Americans was much more pointed. Half of those polled (50 percent) say they have felt angry because of what happened in areas hard hit by the hurricane.

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But overall opinion on this measure obscures a substantial racial divide in reactions to the disaster—as many as 70 percent of African Americans say they have felt angry, compared with 46 percent of whites. Blacks are twice as likely as whites to know people directly affected by the hurricane and are generally much more critical of the government’s response to the crisis.4 (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2005a, 1) It is also clear that people who associate with or sympathize with the victims in a disaster are more likely to view the public’s reactions to the disaster as caused by external factors or as caused by necessity rather than choice. In the public opinion data on Katrina, African Americans held much more sympathetic views toward the parts of the public that became stranded downtown in New Orleans. An overwhelming majority [of blacks] (77 percent) say most of those who stayed behind did so because they didn’t have a way to leave the city, not because they wanted to stay (16 percent). Most whites agree, but by a slimmer 58 percent to 32 percent margin. Most blacks (57 percent) also think people who took things from homes and businesses in New Orleans were mostly ordinary people trying to survive during an emergency. Just 38 percent of whites see it that way, while as many (37 percent) say most who took things were criminals taking advantage of the situation. (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2005a) Government responses to materialized environmental risks, such as f loods, and any shortcomings in these responses, such as a lack of preparedness, that become visible during a disaster have the potential to inf luence the public’s trust in government.5 Feedback after hurricane Katrina specifically pointed out that the response to the hurricane and subsequent f lood by several public agencies and levels of government changed the American’s perception of government (in)competence and

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shook the public’s trust in government. Answering the question, “Has the government’s response to this disaster (Hurricane Katrina) affected your confidence in the government’s ability to handle a major terrorist attack, or not?, 42 percent of those surveyed said that they were now less confident. Only 7 percent said their confidence level had increased as a result of the government’s response” (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2005c, Question 29). The three sources of information about the state of the environment that EU citizens trusted the most in 1997 were, in order of preference, environmental protection associations, scientists, and consumer associations. This ref lects popular support of the precautionary principle regarding risk in the EU, where science and expert opinions are trusted to best adjudicate what is potentially harmful (see chapter 1). Public authorities, political parties, and the media were sources that citizens were far less confident would tell them the truth about the environment (Reif and Marlier 1997, 171–172). A follow-up survey showed that, in 2002, environmental protection associations and scientists still garnered most citizens’ trust (48 percent and 35 percent, respectively). The European Union and national governments only had the trust of 13 percent and 12 percent of their citizens, respectively, with regard to being honest about environmental problems (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 26). In both surveys, businesses were the least trusted with regard to telling the public the truth about the state of the environment and any problems therewith (Reif and Marlier 1997, 171–172; The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 26). Environmental protection is a policy area where the European Union is enjoying strong public support. “A third of Europeans see the European Union as the best level for taking decisions about protecting the environment” (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 4). The public prefers to have environmental issues regulated at the supranational level (33 percent of those asked think it should be regulated here), rather than at the national level (30 percent), the local level (27 percent), at the

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United Nations’ level (21 percent), or at the regional level (18 percent) (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 29). When it comes to specific policy preferences regarding the environment, EU citizens are rather split in their view of what works best. “Of the solutions intended to ‘most effectively solve environmental problems,’ more or less the same number of Europeans choose the solution of constraint (stricter regulations) and the idea of persuasion (increase ‘raising general environmental awareness’)” (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 4). The persons interviewed were offered a range of solutions which “could most effectively solve the environmental problems” and asked to select three (out of eight) of them. The hierarchy of the choices shows that the preference for constraint (stricter regulations) is selected by 48 percent of the sample while, conversely, the idea of persuasion (increasing “general environmental awareness”) groups together a similar proportion (45 percent). But the regulative solution is reinforced by the option consisting of “better enforcement of existing environmental legislation” (40 percent) and by the desire to “tax only those who cause environmental problems” (36 percent). (The European Opinion Research Group 2002, 32) EU citizens think that protecting the environment and consumers should be a high-priority issue for the European Union, together with other policy issues such as “maintaining peace and security in Europe, the fight against terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration, fighting poverty and social exclusion” (European Opinion Research Group 2003, 38). Approximately half of the citizens’ surveyed trust that the EU is effective in protecting consumers and the environment (European Opinion Research Group 2003, 38). Several countries, Poland, Germany, and Greece, hit by f loods the year of the survey also stated that they thought EU membership was

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an asset in managing the f loods (European Opinion Research Group 2003, 3, 37, 43). In individual EU countries, such as the Netherlands, governments have been challenged in their implementation of f lood policy by negative public opinion. Sometimes, as was the case with the Dutch development of “calamity polders,” the friction that has risen between government and those affected by f lood plans has largely been created through the government’s choice of policy process (Roth and Warner 2007). The Dutch government assigned a bipartisan commission to investigate the need for controlled f looding areas, so-called calamity polders, and what compensatory measures would be implemented to reserve space for these emergency f lood areas. How the commission went about its mission and the process of developing its policy recommendation created a great deal of distrust between segments of the Dutch population, on the one hand, and the commission and the Dutch government, on the other hand. Though formally neutral, in its communication the commission gave the impression that it was primarily after legitimising a decision already taken. It started using the metaphor of an airbag in a car to explain the functionality of calamity polders. This impression was further strengthened by the fact that the commission actively avoided open dialogue with the local populations likely to be affected. Most importantly, the commission had chosen not to engage in discussions about the quantitative assumptions of design river discharge, uncertainty and causes of failure. (Roth and Warner 2007, 522) On a separate but related note, EU citizens are also very skeptical of the U.S. contribution to environmental protection. “Only 16 percent across the Union took a positive view [of America’s role]—notably 31 percent in Ireland and 24 percent in Portugal” (European Opinion Research Group 2003, 96). Denmark and Sweden had only single-digit support of U.S. efforts regarding the environment, and across the EU

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57 percent of those surveyed had a negative view of the U.S. contribution to environmental protection (European Opinion Research Group 2003, 96). EU Policy Responses Flood risk management and disaster mitigation is one area in which we see Brussels really becoming the world’s regulatory capital (see chapter 1). The level of public support for policy formulation, regulation, and enforcement at the EU level with regard to f loods and water management, as we have seen in the polls above, is significant. The response by the EU to the threat of f loods and the possibility of regulating this type of environmental risk has three major components: the exchange of information, financing, and legal instruments (Martini 2007). Within the latter component the EU has worked on developing a Flood Directive, which was finally adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council in 2007 (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2007). This Directive complemented the Water Framework Directive (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2000) adopted in 2000, which regulates water protection and water quality in the EU, with a specific focus on f lood assessment and f lood management. Legislation and Regulation The adoption of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) in 2000 drastically changed the EU’s approach to water protection and water management (Commission of the European Communities 2009).6 The directive requires “integrated management plans be developed for each river basin” (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 6) within the EU, and will, as a secondary effect, help mitigate the impact of f loods. “The need for developing a more

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comprehensive European water legislation was already identified by the Council in 1988. It took nearly 10 years and several interim steps until the Commission finally published its first proposal in February 1997” (Commission of the European Communities 2009). In 2002, the Water Directors charged with implementing the WFD together with the European Commission responded to the floods that hit Europe in the later summer and fall. In an effort to improve flood prevention, the Water Commissioners and the EU Commission developed a manual on best practices in flood protection presented in 2003. The Directors’ were seen as a likely group to continue this work on flood protection (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 6), and have since been engaged in the work on regional flood management planning. “The theme of ‘environment and risk prevention’ is one of the core issues” identified by the Commission as areas where “future cohesion policy action” ought to be focused and where “intervention can be expected to bring about a leverage effect and significant added value” (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 5). One of the envisioned future objectives, European territorial cooperation, is aimed to “preserve and strengthen required trans-national cooperation activities and build on achievements of INTERREG” (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 5) to help further environmental risk prevention. In 2005 the EU moved forward by creating an action program regarding flood risk management, a proposal on a directive on flood mapping, and a flood risk management plan. The proposal by the Commission was passed to the European Parliament and, after approval, to the Council. The so-called Flood Risk Management Directive was finally adopted and sent to the Member States for implementation by the European Parliament and the Council jointly at the end of 2007 (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2007). The objective of this Directive is to establish a framework for the assessment and management of f lood-related

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risks to human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity. It will ask for a preliminary f lood risk assessment, f lood mapping in all areas with a significant f lood risk, coordination within shared river basins and production of f lood risk management plans through a broad participatory process. (The Council of the European Union 2006) Because there is considerable variation across the member countries in terms of geography, waterways, and urbanization, the Directive is purposefully f lexible. It gives considerable leeway to member states to set their own f lood risk management objectives and their own timetables for reaching those objectives. Experts have also exerted that the f lood risk management plan and the WFD river basin management plans should be developed in connection with one another to reap synergetic effects (Wood and Gendebien 2005, 6).7 The Parliament and the Council therefore included the stipulation that the [d]evelopment of river basin management plans under Directive 2000/60/EC [the Water Framework Directive] and of f lood risk management plans under this Directive [the Flood Risk Management Directive] are elements of integrated river basin management. The two processes should therefore use the mutual potential for common synergies and benefits, having regard to the environmental objectives of Directive 2000/60/EC, ensuring efficiency and wise use of resources while recognising that the competent authorities and management units might be different under this Directive and Directive 2000/60 EC. (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2007, 28) While the two Directives aim for coordinated action, the member state agency in charge of implementing the Water

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Framework Directive may not be the same as the one handling the implementation of the Flood Risk Management Directive. The possibility that opens up with these two regulations, which were adopted quite a few years apart, is that, with a growing number of cases where two different agencies are in charge within each member country, the level of coordination complexity will increase exponentially. In terms of the actual management of f loods, the European Union has another piece of legislation to draw on. In 2001, the Council adopted Council Decision 2001/792/EC, within the framework of Euratom,8 “establishing a community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions mobilises support and assistance from Member States in the event of major emergencies, including f loods” (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2007, 27). This was a very tangible effort to improve early warning, information sharing, and prevention in the case of transboundary and transnational f lood events (see European Council 2001). Institutions and Principles Effective f lood prevention and mitigation requires, in addition to coordination between Member States, cooperation with third countries. This is in line with Directive 2000/60/EC and international principles of f lood risk management as developed notably under the United Nations Convention on the protection and use of transboundary water courses and international lakes, approved by Council Decision 95/308/EC (4), and any succeeding agreements on its application. (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2007, 27) The support for f lood control and f lood regulation in the EU has, up until 2007, primarily taken the form of financial support. The financial support, which has been used for preventive

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infrastructure investments as well as infrastructure-related research and technological development, comes primarily out of the EU’s Structural Funds and its subordinate European Regional Development Fund. The Regional Development Fund has spawned the INTERREG initiative, which, in turn, funds and supports projects directly related to regional f lood control integration and coordination. One of these projects, the IRMA project, started in response to the 1993 and 1995 f loods of the Rhine and Meuse rivers. The project now promotes “cross border cooperation and an integrated approach to combating f loods” in a prevention program “between the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Germany and Switzerland” (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 5). “The SCALDIT project, another INTERREG initiative, was launched in 2003 and concerns the Scheldt/Escaut river basin. It involves France, the Netherlands, and the Belgian regions and tackles the issues of river basin planning and f lood protection” (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 5). Furthermore, in 2002 the EU established the European Union Solidarity Fund (Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002) aimed to “grant rapid financial assistance in the event of a major disaster to help the people, natural zones, regions and countries concerned to return to conditions that are as normal as possible” (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2007, 28). The fund was established in response to the major f loods that took place in Central Europe in 2002 (The European Economic Council and Social Committee 2005, 36). This is a source of direct emergency funding to help support affected countries and communities as they are dealing with a crisis, and cannot be used for preventive measures or preparedness investments (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2007, 28). The European Economic Council and Social Committee, in its comments to the Commission’s f lood directive proposal, expressed a curious and particularly European view of risks

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in general and the approach to risk management with regard, specifically, to f loods. “The estimated costs of this joint action are hard to quantify, but the qualitative benefits that minimising the effects of f looding will have for the people of Europe, their property and for the people and areas concerned far outweigh any costs” (The European Economic Council and Social Committee 2005, 37). When it comes to eliminating or mitigating the effects of identified risks, the European Union will err on the side of caution. And, as so often the case in other settings, money does not seem to be a primary concern or problem with regard to risk management, even when both the measurable costs and benefits of specific policy actions are hard or impossible to establish. In the statement by the Economic Council and Social Committee, it seems that the value of life and the viability of geographic areas are superordinate to the cost of legislation and implementation of policy. With regard to public information about flood risk regulation and management, the EU has really taken an active approach to informing and in trying to get stakeholders involved. The Parliament and the Council’s Directive on flood risk management states that “Member States shall make available to the public the preliminary flood risk assessment, the flood hazard maps, the flood risk maps and the flood risk management plans” (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2007, 32). It also states that “Member States shall encourage active involvement of interested parties in the production, review and updating of the flood risk management plans . . .” (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2007, 32). One way that the Commission has worked to engage stakeholders in the process of development of flood regulation and management is through an Internet feedback site for, for example, the original Flood Directive proposal that the Commission developed.9 The feedback that citizens, interest groups, and experts left on the site were summarized and posted for public access after the feedback period ended. The commission also evaluated the feedback process itself and made this evaluation available to the

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public. The Commission has really tried to encourage grassroots’ engagement with regard to flood risk management in a way that directly links citizens to the supranational governance process. The Council and the European Parliament also emphasize some important guiding principles when dealing with f loods within the Union in their Flood Risk Management Directive (Directive 2007/60/EC). Two of these principles are fundamental to the European Union as a governing unit: the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of proportionality. The former means that policy should be implemented and managed at the lowest level of government possible, and the latter that the EU level should only regulate and manage to the extent that is required to meet common objectives, not more. With regard to f lood risk regulation, the Parliament and the Council assert that the Community as a whole can adopt measures to reach the objective of the Flood Risk Management Directive when this objective would not otherwise “be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can by reason of scale and effects of actions be better achieved at Community level” (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2007, 29). The Directive, in and of itself, also exclaims that “[i]n accordance with the principle of proportionality . . . [this Directive] does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective” (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2007, 29). In all other specific cases of Directive implementation, “in accordance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity . . . , and in view of existing capabilities of Member States, considerable f lexibility should be left to the local and regional levels, in particular as regards organization and responsibility of authorities” (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2007, 29). The Council and the Parliament also underline the importance of the solidarity principle in cases where f lood risk management requires multiple member states to work together to achieve effective results. “Member States should be encouraged

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to seek a fair sharing of responsibilities, when measures are jointly decided for the common benefit, as regards f lood risk management along water courses” (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2007, 28). Over a period of about ten years, from the mid-1990s to 2007, the European Union has raised and addressed a number of issues that commonly plague f lood risk management at a supranational level. One of these problems is risk assessment and crisis management that, by the nature of the risk or threat, are transboundary. In this case, f looding of many major European rivers involve not only several jurisdictions but also planning and management action in several countries. With the Flood Risk Management Directive, “measures have been put in place for international cooperation on transboundary rivers, in Central Europe in particular, by setting up bodies to ensure a coordinated approach to river basin management” (The European Economic Council and Social Committee 2005, 36). A number of practical problems related to the transboundary nature of environmental risks such as f loods have aggravated the effects of risks when they have materialized, and is now being addressed at the EU level. First, information about precipitation, f lood risks, and early warning of f loods between countries has been problematic (see Rosenthal and ‘t Hart 1998, 190–207). Second, efforts to prevent f looding and manage f loods in countries upstream simply pushes the problem downstream, putting the countries further downstream at a distinct disadvantage. Without coordination of f lood measures for whole connected water bodies, pretending that the rivers edge is literally at the national border has proved devastating and has, at times, created international tension. The cost of f loods have also been a topic of hot debate, especially in cases where preventive measures or active management of f loods upstream have pushed f loodwaters further downstream and caused massive f looding in other countries as a consequence. The EU has now, with the Flood Risk Management Directive, tried to take on this coordination problem, in part by tying f lood coordination to

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already existing planning forums and engaging the authorities that are responsible for implementing water policy originating in the 2000 Water Framework Directive. The EU’s programme for concerted action [regarding f loods] contains some features that are crucial to establishing measures to prevent and mitigate the effects of f looding. The most noteworthy are: improving coordination between authorities through the river basin and coastal area management plans, f lood risk mapping as a tool for planning, and exchange of best practice. (The European Economic Council and Social Committee 2005, 36) A third problem that the EU is now trying to address is the, if not predictable at least repetitive, nature of river floods across Europe.10 Floods in Europe over the past twenty years seem to come more frequently and with larger consequences (The European Economic Council and Social Committee 2005, 35). As the European Economic and Social Council point out, “between 1998 and 2002 Europe suffered over 100 major floods including the catastrophic floods along the Danube and Elbe rivers in 2002. Since 1998 floods have caused some 700 fatalities, the displacement of about half a million people and some EUR 25 billion in insured economic losses” (The European Economic Council and Social Committee 2005, 35). One of the reasons seems to be the growing and changing nature of the urban centers that line major rivers. As the rivers are being forced into narrower stream paths and natural flood plains are converted by urban growth, flood waters have fewer natural places to flow.11 A fourth problem is that, despite what appears as an increasing frequency with which floods occur across the EU (The European Economic Council and Social Committee 2005, 35), people who live in flood-prone areas are not reacting in a manner proportionate to the risk they face. This seems to be part of a larger trend of people not heeding risk warnings, reacting to what is perhaps perceived as government officials crying wolf, and choosing not

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to act on this information either in a state of denial or fatalism. This behavior should be seen in light of the Swiss study (Siegrist and Gutscher 2006), which shows that many citizens are not reacting appropriately to the risk of flood, both in cases where they face this risk and in cases where they are not. U.S. Policy Responses The U.S. federalist structure and its political culture of decentralized initiatives and state-based program funding (see chapter 1) set the tone for f lood risk management and disaster mitigation. The U.S. development, implementation, and maintenance of f lood prevention and control measures take place at the local level, with support from Federal agencies and programs. The federal government provides money and expertise for locally run and supported f lood mitigation initiatives. One exception to this general picture is the flood mitigation initiative that has been introduced under the umbrella of President Obama’s Recovery Act. In an effort to “revitalize dams and rural economies by creating jobs and supporting local businesses that supply needed products and services,” the U.S. Department of Agriculture introduced “$45 million in Recovery Act funds to rehabilitate aging flood control structures nationwide” (United States Department of Agriculture 2009) on April 6, 2009. This effort is unique in that it serves the explicit dual purpose of strengthening flood protection infrastructure in several states and in that it provides local and state owners of this infrastructure 65 percent of the funding for the upgrades, whereas flood protection measures are ordinarily a 50-50 split cost-sharing venture between the federal and state or local level. Legislation and Regulation The basis for U.S. f lood regulation and prevention is contained in The Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act (PL 83-566) established in 1954 (The Senate and House of

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Representatives of the United States of America in Congress 1990). This legislation has been amended on a number of occasions12 but it still provides the basis for a majority of the preventative f lood work that is being done in the United States. The Act charges the Natural Resources and Conservation Service (NRCS) “to cooperate with States and local agencies to carry out works of improvement for soil conservation and for other purposes including f lood prevention” (Natural Resources Conservation Service 2009a). The latest amendment to the 1954 Act (P.L. 104-127) approved on April 4, 1996, (110 Stat. 1151) “changed language regarding the terms of loans to local organizations and state/local governments for carrying out projects under this [the 1954] Act. Also, this amendment set a cap on the amount of any loan for a single project at $10M” (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service n.d.). Institutions and Principles The Natural Resources and Conservation Service (NRCS) carries out its mandate through three programs: Watershed Surveys and Planning, Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Operations, and Watershed Rehabilitation. The Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act vests the NRCS with authority to work with “Federal, State, and local agencies in making investigations and surveys of river basins” in order to develop “coordinated water resource programs, f loodplain management studies, and f lood insurance studies” (Natural Resources Conservation Service 2009a). The NRCS also “provides technical and financial assistance to States, local governments and Tribes (project sponsors) to implement authorized watershed project plans” under the Watershed Operations program for, among other things, f lood mitigation (Natural Resources Conservation Service 2009a). There are a number of government institutions in the United States that supply vital f lood information to the public. One is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s

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(NOAA) National Weather Service, which provides f lood warnings across the United States through its state-located offices (National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration 2009). The primary source of information for the public in terms of how to prepare for a f lood, what to do in the acute phase, and after a f lood, is provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The agency’s Web page provides facts about significant f lood events, practical information about what to do, f lood risk maps, and how to get f lood insurance (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2009c). Information about f lood-related health risks is provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the FEMA Web page on f loods has a link to this information (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2009). The U.S. federal government is also working on making coordination of f lood recovery efforts more efficient by providing stakeholders and those affected by f loods with information about all government activities in a particular f lood on one easily accessible Web portal. Through its e-government initiative, “government made easy,” the Federal government’s Office of Citizen Services and Communications has created a portal for consolidating vital information about f lood responses performed by all government agencies involved. The information is formulated for a number of different stakeholders and is organized as one page per stakeholder group. The Web sites of agencies that have some responsibility for f lood recovery efforts are cited on the federal e-government site under a heading of the function this agency fills for the stakeholder looking at the information (see United States Government 2009). In the United States, f lood prevention (measures and investments) is very much a bottom-up policy area. The preferred principle for covering costs of f lood prevention, as stated in the 1954 legislation (The Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress 1990), has been cost-sharing between localities and the U.S. Federal government. “The original 1954 statute sought cooperation between

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the Federal Government and states and localities to prevent f lood damages. The Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to construct f lood protection measures below a certain acre-foot limit. Such initiatives were to be cost-shared and localities were required to contribute rights-of-way” (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service n.d.). Recently, f lood protection has gotten a boost from federal efforts to improve the American economy. In April 2009 the Department of Agriculture announced that it was going to distribute $45 million from the federal Recovery Act funds toward improving aging f lood control structures across the country. In addition to helping repair dams and other f lood control structures, funding for this type of infrastructure work is an important part of President Obama’s efforts to create jobs and work on a more sustainable environment policy (United States Department of Agriculture 2009). The Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) is distributing the Recovery Act money through its Watershed Rehabilitation Program and focuses on “the most cost-effective projects where there is the greatest risk of infrastructure failure and threat to life and property” (United States Department of Agriculture 2009). The federal government still requires local communities to participate in cost-sharing for these infrastructure improvements, but at a discounted rate. State and local organizations will only have to pay 35 percent of the cost for the projects and they still remain the initiators and owners of the projects (United States Department of Agriculture 2009). Under its Watershed Operations program, the NRCS promotes public involvement in the policy process by having an eligibility criteria that requires its supported local partners to “conduct public meetings to assure local involvement” (Natural Resources Conservation Service 2009b). Furthermore, all measures that are put in place at the local level through the support of NRCS are locally owned and operated by the local organizations and individuals involved (Natural Resources Conservation Service 2009b).

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In the United States, f looding is not covered by regular homeowners’ insurance. The U.S. government therefore set up a National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) that has been in operation since 1968, and is administered by FEMA. The program offers f lood insurance to homeowners, renters, and business owners if they can convince the communities, where they live in, to join the NIFP.13 This basically means that local stakeholders with a particular interest in f lood protection need to advocate to getting a larger collective to adopt and enforce ordinances that meet or exceed FEMA’s standards for f lood risk reduction (National Flood Insurance Program 2009a).14 Interestingly enough, homeowners who live in what the federal government has classified as high-risk f lood areas15 are required by law to buy f lood insurance (National Flood Insurance Program 2009c). If the community these homeowners live in is not participating in the National Flood Insurance Program, then homeowners will have to purchase private f lood insurance on top of their homeowner’s insurance. The Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Program “was created as part of the National Flood Insurance Reform Act (NFIRA) of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 4101) with the goal of reducing or eliminating claims under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)” (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2009a). FEMA administrates these FMA funds in order to “assist States and communities implement measures that reduce or eliminate the long-term risk of f lood damage to buildings, manufactured homes, and other structures insurable under the National Flood Insurance Program” (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2009a).

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CH A P T E R

SE V E N

Election Technology and Election Fraud

This chapter demonstrates how governments take divergent paths in managing technologies and innovations that have risk associated with them. We shall see that federalism is a key factor here in pushing policy divergence, in contrast to some of the other policy areas examined in the book. In the United States, the implementation of new voting technologies and election reforms that followed the 2000 election were implemented largely in a haphazard process. States and localities often adopted new voting equipment and new election reforms without carefully testing or evaluating the implementation of these reforms. This approach contrasts with the model of reform in Europe regarding the implementation of new voting technologies and the evaluation of election reforms generally. In Europe, greater consideration is given to regulating risk through pilot testing and third-party evaluations of elections. In this chapter, we see that, even though American elections are more complicated and more technologically dependent than European elections, both the diffuse management of elections across states and the lack of a central, national election office inhibit learning about effective management and implementation strategies. By contrast, the Europeans, who have simpler elections, tend to have centralized election offices that promote evaluations of election policies and facilitate the

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effective transmission of knowledge. Moreover, the EU is much more open to third-party election observation and evaluations, such as those conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The 2000 American presidential election illustrated for many people around the world how much American elections differ from those held in other countries. Many international observers were shocked that the election was essentially decided by the Supreme Court because the states and federal governments lacked effective administrative arrangements for addressing election controversies. The federal nature of the United States means that each state runs elections based on state-specific rules. This is rather unique; Switzerland is one of the only other nations without centralized election administration governance, where decisions are made at the state (or, in the case of Switzerland, canton) level (Massicotte, Blais, and Yoshinaka 2004). The regulation of elections in the United States varies across multiple dimensions as compared to Europe, and these differences have clear implications for election reform, the introduction of new voting technologies, and general public confidence in the electoral process. The issue of confidence is one that motivates much research in the United States today (e.g., Alvarez and Hall 2008; Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn 2008, Atkeson and Saunders 2007; Hall 2009), and international research as well (Alvarez and Katz 2009; Alvarez and Levin 2009; Birch 2008). In the United States, attitudes about election administration have a strikingly partisan component, something that is much less evident in other countries. This is a function of several issues, including that the United States has had several polarizing elections— from 2000 to 2008, each federal election was viewed as illegitimate by some partisans, especially from 2000 to 2004—and the partisan nature of election administration in the United States served to exacerbate these attitudes (Alvarez and Hall 2008; Hall 2009; Arceneaux 2006; Kimball, Kropf, and Battles 2006). In the United States, directly elected Secretaries of State,

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with open party affiliation, tend to administer elections. There are strong partisan differences that explain differences in voter confidence, with Democrats (the losers in the 2000, 2002, and 2004 elections) less confident than Republicans. Even in 2008, when Democrats might have been thought to be more confident in the electoral process, they still had lower voter confidence than Republicans (Alvarez et al. 2009). The differences in attitudes in the United States about election administration were first considered by Hansen (2001) in a report to the National Commission on Federal Election Reform, a bipartisan task force created after the 2000 election to make recommendations for reforming the election system. He analyzed both the 1996 and 2000 American National Election Study and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems for the same years and found that, in 2000, the United States had much lower voter confidence than existed there in 1996. However, even in 1996, the percentage of U.S. respondents who rated the fairness of the most recent election as very fair or somewhat fair was very low; in fact, the evaluation of the fairness of U.S. elections was lower than the rating in every West European nation surveyed. The data on voter confidence in Europe and internationally do not show the same partisan or ideological effect (Birch 2008); individuals who identified with either the left or right were not significantly more likely to be unsatisfied with the fairness of elections.1 One reason why this may be the case is that individuals who live in nations with proportional representation are more satisfied with the electoral process. The highly contentious winner-takes-all electoral process makes losing more extreme; in countries with proportional representation, even the interests of a small minority may be represented in the legislature or coalition government. The confidence of Americans about the electoral process may in part be a function of the political nature of election administration in the United States. In the United States, elections are often run by partisan, elected officials (Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn 2008). This is relatively unique among countries

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in the Western world, where election officials are usually part of national or regional election commissions or are appointed officials of the government. For example, in France the elections are governed by civil servants at the Ministry of the Interior, and in Germany elections are governed by a ninemember election commission. These two models of election governance—an appointed government official or a commission running elections—are the common models in Europe. By contrast, in the United States, there is no central, national election body, and most state election officials are elected officials.2 At the local level, where elections are actually governed in the United States, the county or municipal officials who run elections are also often partisan elected officials (Kimball, Kropf, and Battles 2006). The more consistent nature of election administration in Europe also extends to the electoral process itself. In general, American elections have the benefit of being quite regular— something that can be lacking in countries with pure parliamentary elections—but they have the distinct problem of being very complex in the sense of combining multiple elections into a single ballot. This complexity often leads to problems, with voters being able to completely vote on all of the races on an American ballot—a ballot that likely includes multiple federal, state, and local, as well as constitutional amendments, referenda, and initiatives.3 Long ballots also create a counting problem in the United States that does not exist in other countries. The problem with counting ballots in the United States is that hand counting, which is prevalent in Europe, is almost unused in the United States because it would be almost impossible to hand count the several dozen races on a ballot by hand in an accurate and timely fashion.4 In Europe, where there are typically only one or two races on a ballot, vote counting is primarily conducted through hand counts in the precincts after the polls close on election day. In the United States, ballots are almost always counted electronically, using either a computerized tabulator to count paper ballots or a precinct electronic

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voting machine that both captures votes (voters vote directly on the computer) and tabulates votes (Alvarez and Hall 2008; Saltman 2006). However, even though the process of ballot tabulation is a critical aspect of American elections, the decentralized nature of elections in the United States makes the process for evaluating, adopting, and regulating these technologies much more haphazard. As Alvarez and Hall (2004; 2008) have argued, the haphazard regulation of risk in the United States regarding voting technologies (especially electronic voting)—and election reforms in general—can be contrasted with the European model of reform, where reforms tend to be considered more seriously. As is discussed throughout this chapter, the Europeans are much more systematic in their efforts to implement and evaluate election reforms. The United States model of implementation can be contrasted with the more careful model of implementation that has been followed in Europe, where reforms are more often pilot tested under controlled conditions before being implemented in a large scale, specifically in the area of electronic voting technologies and convenience voting in the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland. In the next section, we discuss how such pilot testing can be done successfully by examining the United Kingdom as a model, and then compare this success to the way in which such tests occur in the United States. Pilot Testing Election Reforms: The U.K. Example The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network is an international election project that collects data on election administration and voting systems around the world. ACE has a specific project related to electronic voting, and its work illustrates, at a basic level, how haphazard the reform initiatives in the United States have been compared to other countries.5 In describing implementations of e-voting systems around the world and the

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evaluations of the efficacy of these systems, the United States stands out in not having a systematic process for making decisions about how to evaluate these systems, how to determine when they should be implemented, and how they should be regulated. More generally, the United States stands out in not evaluating reforms and conducting pilot trials of such systems. Here, it is helpful to compare how the United Kingdom has evaluated election reforms and then contrast this reform to similar efforts in the United States. In the United Kingdom, from 2002 to 2004, pilots had several goals related to testing systems that offered the highest level of accuracy, including testing for the improvement of technology design, looking for systems that enhanced security, userability, and convenience, and initiating administrative changes that increased voters’ confidence and attendance. In 2004, the Electoral Commission (EC) and the Office of the e-Envoy conducted a series of experiments, or pilots, examining various election reforms and new voting techniques. As the EC wrote in its report Modernising Elections: The pilots took place against a backdrop of seemingly irreversible declining participation in local government elections and the substantial drop in turnout in June 2001 general elections . . . However, turnout was not the only, or even primary, goal of the pilot schemes. Some were looking for administrative efficiency gains; others wanted to be involved in the state or the process of developing electronic voting mechanisms robust enough to win public credibility. (2002, 15) In this situation, stakeholders had very differing ideas and goals in mind for the pilot programs. Given the varied goals, the pilot tests had a multipart evaluation component. The evaluation criteria used in the pilot schemes are a part of a larger model of evaluating program effectiveness. The evaluation criteria, taken from the EC reports from 2002 and 2003, provide

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a framework for implementing and evaluating a successful pilot program. This evaluation methodology was used to test five sets of election reforms, including: (1) all-postal voting, (2) multichannel and electronic voting, (3) electronic counting, (4) early voting and extended voting hours, and (5) greater voter education. The process of implementing a successful pilot program begins with the identification of evaluation criteria, which are often supplemented by criteria from other sources. Other criterions are also contained in statutes within the Electoral Commission and its mandate to conduct pilots. Following the identification of evaluation criteria, pilot programs are then identified and implemented, and the pilot is evaluated based on various data collection methods. Finally, the pilot program is extensively evaluated. The evaluation period is rather intensive because it is meant to ensure that the findings are—in all reality—used as part of the overall decision-making process for future pilots. In formulating what was or was not effective and successful during the pilots, the evaluation period allows evaluators to establish recommendations ensuring the success of the eventual rollout of these programs. The evaluation methodology, in practice, had two components. First, the EC analyzed the pilot scheme, which had been implemented in specific localities. As part of this analysis, they determined its affect on factors such as turnout, election administration, and fraud. The EC asked eleven evaluation questions: 1. Does it facilitate voting, the counting of votes, or informed vote choices by voters? 2. Does the reform increase turnout? 3. Is the reform easy to implement? 4. Does the reform have an effect on electoral offence rates or malpractice in elections? 5. Does the reform increase costs or create savings?

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6. Does the reform encourage participation by particular communities, especially minorities, the young, and people with disabilities? 7. Does the pilot project have an effective outreach component? 8. What are the attitudes and opinions of key stakeholders to determine level of confidence in the election reform in question? 9. Does the reform improve the efficiency of the process and the service delivered to voters? 10. Did the reform improve or impair election administration? 11. Is the reform a good value for the money spent? One important feature of this evaluation strategy is that it asks questions that are critical in an era of competing demands on government. There may be numerous reforms that a jurisdiction wants to consider implementing; the strategy noted here of conducting a multipart evaluation is important for knowing the tradeoffs associated with any reform and for evaluating multiple potential reforms comparatively. For example, a reform may be costly but increase organizational efficiency, public confidence in the voting process, and boost turnout. If a jurisdiction needs to choose which of several reforms to implement, a comprehensive evaluation may be necessary. A second important part of this evaluation strategy is that the EC used surveys to analyze public attitudes toward the experiment in question. These public evaluations allowed the EC to know whether the public—and especially targeted populations such as older voters, younger voters, or individuals with disabilities—liked the reform in question. These public evaluations are important because a reform might seem to be a good idea in theory but the public’s perception of the reform may be different from the perceptions of policy-makers or policy advocates.

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The EC’s piloting process parallels piloting principles recommended by the U.S. General Accounting Office (2003).6 The GAO has promoted a multipart process for effective pilots. The GAO recognizes the need to clear statutory guidance prior to evaluation and implementation; the agency implementing the pilot needs to communicate with its principals regarding what objectives should be achieved with the pilots. In terms of evaluations and implementation, the GAO outlines that first there needs to be a clear linkage between the pilot program proposal requirements and a set of overall goals and measurable objectives for the pilots, after which the pilots can be selected based on their quality. They can then be implemented and evaluated. Finally, the GAO noted that an effective pilot provides participants with a positive experience, and others then become more willing to participate in future pilots. The process used by the EC also closely resembles the approach to evaluation in most textbooks (e.g., Rossi and Freeman 1993). In linking evaluations to programs, the key steps to evaluating a program’s success involve conceptualizing the evaluation by defining the problem, operationalizing the objectives, identifying the target population, formulating a research design, implementing the research design, and planning for how the evaluation data will be used (Rossi and Freeman 1993, chapter 3). This textbook approach is designed to ensure that program evaluations are methodologically effective as well as useful to policy-makers. Following the stringent evaluation process, including various improvements for election reforms that were discussed earlier, the United Kingdom implemented additional pilot schemes in jurisdictions across the region in local elections. Not only were there detailed evaluation reports produced on each pilot but an overall report was issued after each set of pilots was completed to provide policy-makers with a plan for how to move forward with election reforms, based on the social-science research evidence at hand. Finally, these reports and much of the evaluative data used in the pilot tests are made

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available to other researchers, policy-makers, and the public so that additional analysis can be undertaken. In 2002 and 2004, there were three sets of pilot schemes implemented, including thirty individual pilots in 2002, fiftynine pilots in 2003, and forty-seven pilots in 2004. The pilot process allowed for a wide range of technologies to be tested, but in carefully chosen settings. By piloting small, and by providing multiple channels for voting in cases where new technologies were being implemented, the risks associated with a problem in any one voting system being piloted were greatly minimized. Once the small-scale pilots in 2002 proved successful, they were expanded in 2003 so that more information could be collected on the critical factors of success identified at the outset of the pilot process. The pilots also allowed the United Kingdom to build on successes and refocus research so that implementations that are more successful were made in years to follow. The 2003 report, The Shape of Things to Come, ref lects the confidence of the EC that postal voting was a successful means for promoting more convenient voting, higher turnout, and effective election administration. However, the report goes on to state that “It is important that the roll-out of all-postal voting incorporates the best practice that has been developed by the pilot authorities . . . successful all-postal pilots require consideration be given to a wide range of operational and management issues that are not stipulated in law but nevertheless play a major part in ensuring the success or otherwise of moving to an all-postal ballot” (Electoral Commission 2003, 35). For example, in the case of the all-postal pilots, public education was a key factor in the success of the pilots. Electronic voting pilots were held in 2002 and 2003. These pilots tested a wide range of electronic voting technologies, including voting over the Internet, voting on precinct-based touch-screen machines, voting over text messaging systems, voting via the telephone, and voting using interactive digital television services. These trials were all successful. In fact, respondents in focus groups stated, “voting using the internet

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is tacitly accepted by most as ‘the way forward’ (at least in conjunction with other methods). Some see it as a logical and perhaps even inevitable development, especially in the context of the younger generation’s perceived preference for communicating electronically” (Electoral Commission 2003, 66). It was also noted that, when given a choice between paper ballots and new electronic technologies, voters chose the electronic technologies. However, compared with the postal option, the electronic channels, while beneficial for many voters, did not result in the large boost in turnout that the Electoral Commission had hoped. It is clear that the EC was provided necessary information that inevitably helped them gain a better understanding of what works best in certain situations. They were also able to learn quite a bit about the issues associated with the deployment of these systems. For example, issues associated with interacting with vendors, such as contract negotiating, quality assurance efforts, and project management all came to the fore in the pilots. A related issue—scalability and cost of scaling—also came into play with the electronic voting systems. The EC determined that these systems require professional support and relatively high usage to justify the costs. From the pilots, they found that developing a business model for elections is needed to make such systems effective. By conducting and gathering survey data, the EC witnessed and addressed concerns that some voters had with the potential for fraud in the system, a finding that occurred with the postal voting as well. By piloting, and using the pilots to develop a plan for future action, the EC developed a new timetable for further testing electronic voting systems and developed a plan for further investments in these technologies. In 2004, the EC again engaged in a series of trials, but this time focused on postal voting. This trial ramped up postal voting trials in combination with European parliamentary elections and local elections. As expected, turnout increased in the locations using the all-postal voting and increased as well in

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locations that had used all-postal voting during all three years. Additionally, the specter of fraud also increased, as more allegations were made about the security of these systems, especially in regard to voter intimidation. However, what is of greatest interest in this pilot is not the overall result but the process that was followed. In order to have the most effective and efficient postal voting system possible, the EC issued a report about what needed to be done in regard to improving the legal framework. They also offered best practices and recommendations and suggested better applications for election management. With these changes, the EC was confident they would see major improvements specifically with postal voting and voting in general. The EC also focuses on two issues that are far too often overlooked in the United States: project management capacities and public relations. The report notes that postal voting requires the development of new administrative capacities by election officials, the political parties, and third-party contractors in order for it to be successful. There is a different model of work with large-scale postal voting that involves outsourcing more work, such as printing and processing ballots for delivery to voters, which also raises all of the issues associated with contracting and procurement. On the issue of public relations, throughout the pilot the EC explicitly focused on the importance of educating voters about pilots and about changes in election processes and procedures. In the United States, too often these changes are not well communicated either to voters, candidates in elections, or those responsible on the day of execution, that is, volunteers. It is also important to note that the pilots are only one feature of the EC’s research efforts related to election reform. The EC also engages in a regular pattern of surveys, focus groups, and policy analyses in order to inform its decision-making. For example, in just the last few years, the EC has commissioned studies on ballot security, electronic tabulation, and vote registers. They have also conducted survey research on issues such as political engagement, reasons for voting and nonvoting, the

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success of the pilot schemes, gender, and political participation, and perceptions on fraud. In short, the work of the EC is well-informed regarding the public’s perceptions as well as the realities on the ground. The EC model is not unique to the United Kingdom but is reflective of a different model of election reform in Europe. Other European nations are following the United Kingdom in a similar vein in piloting voting technologies. Though efforts that are more extensive have also been attempted, a total of eight nations have conducted real remote Internet voting pilots, and two pilots that closely mirror EC efforts and that have been attempted in the United States are the French and Dutch pilots for allowing expatriates vote. In addition to the experiments with remote Internet voting in the United Kingdom, the Estonians first piloted Internet voting in local elections and then expanded their efforts to cover the entire nation in recent elections. The efforts in the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Estonia are all a part of political and legal frameworks for promoting experimentation and innovation in the area of elections. The Dutch experiments in e-voting are even authorized under an “Experiments Act.” The Dutch are also interesting because they are a country that has evaluated and terminated the use of electronic voting in their elections based on an evaluation of the system by the country’s government, working with third-party organizations. Although the process of encouraging this evaluation was instigated by a third-party group, the evaluation was done through the auspices of the government and, unlike in the United States, the process of switching voting technologies was not a political one (Loeber 2008). As the country considers moving back to the use of electronic voting, it is likely that the Experiments Act in the Netherlands will provide a framework for testing new voting systems. The political framework in which e-voting is being conducted in Europe is generally one that is characterized by deliberative consideration of the issues associated with moving to e-voting. In Germany, a phased approach is planned, with

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Internet voting to be tested first in nongovernmental elections, then local elections, with the goal of having an online national election later. In Switzerland, Internet voting was pilot tested in Geneva in January 2003 without incident. The Swiss also hired a team of “white-hat” hackers to try to break into their security system over a three-week period—the system was online to voters only for two days—but the hackers failed (Alvarez and Hall 2004). The Estonian government plans for remote e-voting have been carefully integrated into a national program that promotes e-government services generally (Alvarez and Hall 2008; Trechsel and Mendez 2005; Trechsel, Schwerdt, Breuer, Alvarez, and Hall 2007). The country implemented e-voting first in its 2005 municipal elections. The program was evaluated as part of a Council of Europe study of e-voting and this evaluation was extended when the Estonians used e-voting for the first time in its 2007 elections, and in 2009 when it was used in EU parliamentary elections. These evaluations occurred concomitant with the evaluations of these implementations conducted by outside auditors for the Estonian national election commission. The U.S. Model There are several aspects of voting in the United States that have been evaluated through time. “Electoral rules are endogenous; they are determined by the very same people who will be governed by them in the future” (Massicotte, Blais, and Yoshinaka 2004, 160). As such, every year, case studies and research are initiated for determining what could make elections run more smoothly. In the book Establishing the Rules of the Game, the authors conclude that there are many puzzling findings that warrant future investigation, including the use of paper ballots instead of electronic balloting; administrative functions during elections and how they seek to encourage electors to go to the polls; provisional, absentee, and

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write-in ballot standards; statutes related to the right to challenge; and reevaluation of election laws (Massicotte, Blais, and Yoshinaka 2004). We do not argue that evaluation of current election law does not occur in the United States. Instead, pilot tests in the United States are rarely conducted in a comprehensive and scientific manner. Although some election jurisdictions have undertaken small-scale pilot projects before making broader, jurisdiction-wide voting system implementations, trials are rare. Instead, evaluations of election reforms in the United States tend to occur post-implementation and on an ad-hoc basis, as social scientists study these questions for academic purposes. One example of such a pilot in the United States is the case of Georgia’s move to electronic voting. There, the state engaged in a set of trials, where each approved voting system was used in a municipal election. Voters were surveyed after using the system, and statewide surveys were conducted to gauge the public’s views toward the move to electronic voting. These data, along with data from the pilots, were used to select a voting machine that was then deployed statewide. However, most decisions regarding the adoption and implementation of either electronic voting or optical scan voting were done on an ad-hoc basis after the 2002 Help America Vote Act reforms (Alvarez and Hall 2008). Early Voting Pilot Program: The Maine Example Other states, including Maine, also felt that improvements needed to be made with early voting. In 2004, the Secretary of State noticed discrepancies in the way early voting was defined and implemented. While other states defined early voting to parallel absentee voting only, the Secretary of State for Maine redefined the term early voting to “describe a time period before an election during which voters have the

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opportunity to cast a ballot,” given the laws and regulations associated with early voting, which differ from in-person absentee voting laws.7 In 2005, the 122nd Maine Legislature directed the Secretary of State to design a pilot program for early voting. Since that time, the Secretary of State, with assistance from the Legislature, the Office of the Attorney General, and municipal clerks, has studied early voting to determine the feasibility and appropriate procedure to adopt early voting for Maine’s statewide elections and issued two reports regarding early voting.8 The final report, issued in 2008, provided recommendations that were generated based on the results of surveys that were completed by participating voters and reports from election officials in the pilot municipalities. According to the Report on the November 2007 Pilot Program for Early Voting: Prepared for the 123rd Maine Legislature,9 the analysis group reevaluated several problems with the existing early voting regulations, including times for early voting, location specification for early voting, security measures, reconciliation of ballots cast, staffing during early voting, notices and publicity for early voting, and overall procedures for early voting. After implementing processes to solve these issues and implementing pilot programs throughout several jurisdictions, there were still several recommendations provided by the legislature. At the end of three years of analysis gathering, ultimately the pilot resulted in the creation of new laws and regulations that eliminated confusion during the overall voting experience. However extensive the preceding pilot was, in the United States it is much more common for a very ambitious project to be undertaken, often without any piloting at all. Similarly, the City of Alexandria, Virginia, conducted a trial to test two voting systems before selecting one for purchase.10 Those responsible for these trials tested the new voting technology in a single precinct, surveyed voters at that precinct regarding their attitudes toward the new technology, and

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collected other data on system performance. These data were compared to a “sister precinct” that had similar demographic characteristics. Again, even where previous trials have been conducted, the temptation in the United States is often to move from very small to very large quite quickly without additional piloting programs. Maybe thought to expedite the process, some feel it is unnecessary to extend the process more than it needs to be. This was the case with the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE), which built on the successful Internet voting proof-of-concept trial conducted by the Federal Voting Assistance Program in 2000. SERVE was a quite ambitious project that involved developing, testing, and certifying a novel Internet-based registration and voting system in a relatively short period of time and then deploying such a system in seven states and over fifty counties. The goal was to have the active participation of perhaps as many as 100,000 UOCAVA citizens, including military personnel, their dependents, and overseas citizens that could vote from around the world. This implementation would have been done in 2004, in the midst of a closely contested presidential election season and in an environment where election procedures and voting technologies were under extremely close scrutiny. However, the pilot was terminated because of political pressures regarding the efficacy of Internet voting. Given the success of the 2000 proof-of-concept, it would have likely made more sense to follow the EC’s model. Should the proof-of-concept have been implemented, the scope of the project would have been much more limited, but could have also been much more efficient and effective. For example, the rollout of an Internet voting system would have been done over a series of election cycles. This would have allowed for better training of election workers in the use of the new voting system, more effective assistance, and involvement from key players such as the system vendor and the independent testing authority, and for meaningful postelection analysis of problems

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that arose so that retraining or system redevelopment could occur between trials. The first principle of the proof-of-concept, therefore, would be to start small, both in terms of the number of participating jurisdictions and in the types of elections the system is initially used in. For example, initially implementing the system in two to four states in a non-presidential election would be ideal. Then the voting system could be scaled for other states depending on their needs and based on the lessons learned in the first trial. The voting system could then be prepared in an eventual presidential election, in a much broader set of states. This model would require a project that spans a number of election cycles and is part of an ongoing research and implementation process, where the lessons learned from each use and evaluation of the voting technology allow the system to improve with each implementation. This incremental development, implementation, and evaluation path would also allow for key milestone goals to be specified for each stage of the project, especially focused on quantitative documentation of how the project is resolving known UOCAVA registration and voting problems. The second problem with these trials, when they are undertaken, is that in the United States few trials are conducted in a controlled, evaluative manner. The Arlington, Virginia, example, while far from perfect, is an excellent one. There the local election board was deeply interested in making a decision that was informed with real evaluative data; however, they were unable to implement a carefully controlled scientific trial of how different voting systems worked for their voters in their local context. Instead of utilizing a controlled study of randomly assigning voters entering a single precinct to use different voting devices, they used a second-best approach, where all voters in certain precincts used a voting system and the analysis was based on a weaker methodology of comparing the effect of the “experimental” voting system relative to the current voting system as used by voters in a “most-similar” precinct. The

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latter methodology is much weaker in its ability to differentiate the precise impact of the voting systems themselves on the voting experiences of participating citizens in this pilot trial, as policy-makers are then forced to rely on a statistical analysis of quasi-experimental data rather than on a much stronger analysis of truly experimental data. Third, rarely is election officials in the United States asked or willing to provide a careful analysis of their implementation of new voting systems, even when that implementation is based on carefully designed pilot studies. In addition, when such studies are produced, there is no entity, private or public, that collects the results of new voting system implementations (especially pilot studies) and that seeks to aggregate the results of these trials. The result is that potential knowledge is lost, that trials are needlessly repeated, and that voting systems may be implemented without the procurement process necessarily being informed by the experiences of other jurisdictions with identical voting systems. Conclusions The key difference between the United States and the European model of election reform is one of evaluation of effectiveness and a related concern about mitigation of risk. When we think about elections in the United States, the decentralized process— which lacks many rules that are national in scope—means that the implementation of election laws, reforms, and procedures varies widely. In this context, the federal policy inhibits knowledge about effective practice and implementation, even if general election reform policies may diffuse across states. The lack of a central election agency also means that the facilitation of information diffusion is also hampered; it is hard for one jurisdiction to learn lessons from others. More basically, the American model is one where there is not a clearly stated set of goals for improving elections and a clear evaluation strategy for getting the information needed to determine whether reforms work.

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In the European context, elections are simpler but there is also a general model of conducting evaluations of elections and determining how they can be improved. The OSCE, through its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, often evaluates European elections using defined criteria and makes recommendations for effecting future election improvements. In addition, as we saw with the U.K. example, there is also a tendency to go slow and evaluate reforms, understanding that the status quo is a much simpler election process than what exists in America. There is a certain irony here; the United States has more complexity in its elections but manages them with less information diffusion than do the Europeans, who have less complexity but conduct better experiments and evaluations to improve the process.

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CH A P T E R

EIGH T

Conclusions

Science, technology and the evolution of regulation are gradually eliminating many of the traditional risks in society. As our ability to control the environment around the United States grows, we feel safer and expect the world to be more predictable. This development poses a number of paradoxical challenges for governments on both sides of the Atlantic. The abject side of scientific progress and technological precision is that we are creating new and more interconnected risks. The 2009 concerns about a disastrous global H1N1 f lu pandemic illustrate this point. Airplanes and globalization are the products of scientific advancement, yet they also facilitate the rapid spread of diseases worldwide. Furthermore, as we become better at identifying and regulating known risks, the political discussions about who should bear the financial and social responsibility for mitigating risks are getting fiercer, as the international discussions over addressing global climate change show. As we have seen throughout this book, public policy and public attitudes about risk are tied to perception. The role that the state plays as a risk manager and the part that citizens take on as responsible consumers and voters are mediated by their perceptions of particular risks. Differences in risk regulation that we have uncovered in the empirical chapters of this book are directly tied to the six inf luencing factors we identified at

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the outset of the study. These factors—globalization, federalism, institutional mechanisms, cultural ideas and views, interest group activities, and perceptions—shape what is considered risky, how risks should be regulated, how they can in a very practical sense be controlled, and the cost to the individual, society, and the state of achieving this peace of mind. Risk regulation in the United States and the EU differs notably in the four policy areas explored—immigration, food safety, f lood management, and voting technology. Many questions about the effectiveness of different types of risk regulation remain, as do questions about whether or not we really perceive the most potent risks or if we are exaggerating mere trif les. Have we actually been made safer? Are the new public fears regarding genetically modified foods and security threats posed by immigrants largely unfounded and exaggerated? If science and technology have unwanted secondary effects, are regulators wise to keep investing in hydraulic technology to keep houses in f lood prone areas on dry land, and to improve election efficiency through electronic voting in states where only a third of the voters turn out at the polls? Do the new risks that advancement of control creates require policy-makers in the EU and the United States to rethink their whole strategy to risk management, toward strategies such as: (1) a heavier emphasis on circumscribing private action; (2) imposed federal coordination of local efforts; or (3) imposing tough testing requirements before new products hit the markets? European and American governments have taken different approaches to risks. In the four policy areas studied, the six inf luencing factors we identified in chapter 1 explain part of the divergence, but also occasional convergence, in contemporary transatlantic risk regulation. Transatlantic Risk Cultures As we set out to explore risk regulation in four policy areas, we found that the EU and the United States have fostered both

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surprising and predictable risk cultures with regard to immigration, food safety, f lood management, and election fraud. Although the United States has traditionally been viewed as a fairly open “immigrant society,” this image is changing fast as 9/11 introduced tougher border controls and states are increasingly legislating restrictions on immigration in response to what they see as the federal government letting immigration regulation lapse. The United States is experiencing internal divergence caused by federalism, with some states experimenting with harsh laws against immigration, and others remaining quite open. Where immigrants used to be relatively welcome in the United States (at least when compared to Europe), they are now often perceived as a great risk to national security, and public perceptions of fear drive this grassroots crackdown on legal and illegal immigration. European governments for years denied that they were countries of immigration, and steadfastly maintained “zeroimmigration” policies. Nevertheless, the image of Europe as a closed, xenophobic “fortress” is increasingly becoming outdated. In fact, although citizens in both the United States and the EU are seeing similar types of risks and threats related to immigration, their governments have been taking increasingly divergent approaches to regulating this risk. Recently, the European Union has taken several collective steps toward a more proactive, “federal” policy that recognizes the overarching benefits, but also costs, associated with immigration. The EU has initiated a sharp turn in its immigration policy, focusing on reaping the potential rewards of high-skilled immigration to a point where immigration regulation in the EU is becoming more sophisticated and efficient than the U.S. system at meeting labor market needs. This new turn in immigration policy is not well-anchored in public opinion, which (like its U.S. counterpart) is still quite skeptical and afraid of immigration, but is rather driven by policy-makers themselves at the EU level. The aggregated trend with regard to immigration as a social risk is that immigration in the United States is

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not actively treated as “risky” at the federal level, unless the immigrant is a criminal or suspected terrorist. Benign neglect and administrative red tape serve to implement some degree of (albeit arbitrary) control. However, since 9/11, public opinion increasingly views immigrants as a risk to public safety and national security. In the EU, immigration is now treated by regulators as desirable, but EU citizens often worry about immigrants abusing the generous welfare benefits that EU states provide. Food safety as a policy area in the EU and the United States is heavily inf luenced by the global trade in food products and the pressure that trade puts on states to adopt policies that do not challenge standards in use or limit consumers’ access to cheap and exotic foods. Both the United States and the EU allow considerable experimentation and testing of new food products and methods of food production at the state and member state levels. They do, however, like to keep a tighter control on what potential risks their consumers are exposed to from outside, that is, from commercial vendors outside of their domestic market. In an effort to limit the risk of unsafe food products from outside, both the EU and the United States utilize their federal structures to control product access to their domestic or internal markets. Generally speaking, there are noticeably more powerful advocacy coalitions in the United States arguing on behalf of the food producers than there are in the EU, even though French and Polish farmers regularly display their inf luence very publicly. The power of consumer protection groups and the ability to monitor food production in the EU is also much greater than in the United States. As a result, the ability of EU consumers to make informed choices about the risks they expose themselves to through food consumption is much greater than the ability of American consumers to know what they are consuming and what the related risks are. The institutional mechanisms, as well as public views and ideas about food safety as a biological risk, have propelled the EU and the United States in slightly different regulatory directions.

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The EU approach is much more holistic, attempting to regulate food risks at every step of the chain from farming to consumption. The EU’s approach is centered on poor production and processing practices in the food industry and was triggered by a number of very public food-related crises that outraged the European public in the 1990s. The U.S. approach to risk regulation for food and food consumption lets a great deal of responsibility lie with the Food and Drug Administration, an agency that the U.S. public perceives as very trustworthy. However, food regulation in the United States is also conducted by the United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service. The USDA is responsible both for promoting and regulating food products, which creates regulatory conf lict. The United States has also, however, pulled its regulation of food safety closer to the security realm since 9/11, focusing on the potential for intentional sabotage and attacks on the food delivery system as a critical societal infrastructure. Floods as an environmental risk are the costliest and most frequent source of natural disasters. As such, f looding is not a new risk or a new phenomenon that policy-makers have to deal with, but the challenges surrounding f lood management as risk management seem to be endemic and near universal. While achieving early warning and coordination across borders remains a serious management challenge in both the EU and the United States, the primary challenge for states as risk managers with regard to f loods is people. The citizens the state sets out to protect from this risk remain the largest part of the problem in f lood management for a number of reasons. Citizens expect their government to identify and act to subvert risks that face society as a whole. Furthermore, the type of scientific and technological progress that has helped eliminate many traditional risks has lulled citizens in the United States and the EU into believing that the materialization of longstanding risks like f looding is an inconvenient threat of the past. The paradoxical challenge for states as risk managers is that many of the mitigative efforts available to avert f looding

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require citizens to be observant and adept at assessing risk, as well as taking a cautious risk-avoiding approach in choosing where to live. The data on public risk perceptions and related actions indicate, however, that even well-informed individuals are unlikely to mitigate f lood risk by moving away from f loodprone sites. Despite the fact that the United States and the EU share many of the same societal challenges to f lood mitigation, they often go about meeting these challenges quite differently. Even though f looding is a prevalent environmental risk in the United States, the U.S. public and sub-federal levels of government continue to resist major government initiatives and control of known risks such as f loods. By contrast, the level of acceptance within the EU of exactly this kind of control, where the state tells citizens what they can and cannot do, is evident in regard to f loods. Political corruption and fraud is an area where there is less of a globalization effect among corporations but where there remains an interest by NGOs, who strive to affect policy related to fraud and political corruption. We do, therefore, expect greater differences in both perceptions of the risks associated with election fraud in the EU compared to the United States. Here, the historical legacy of election-related regulation and policies will have been less affected by policy innovation and diffusion across continents. Instead, the growing complexity of American elections compared to the rather simple modes of elections in Europe has created differences in the policy environment on both sides of the Atlantic. The differences across continents regarding how elections are managed and implemented and how political institutions are structured create different incentives to regulate and different views of risk. This is especially the case in regard to technology and risk, where Europeans are more systematic in their approach to testing and implementing electoral reforms compared to Americans. This has been especially true regarding the evaluation and testing of electronic voting systems.

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Individuals and Their Risky Business Having examined four policy areas and the regulation of risk, we can now consider the individual role vis-à-vis the state in how risk is perceived and acted upon. How do citizens know what is risky? Whom do they trust to tell them about risks and how to avoid them? In addition, how is trust in government and governing institutions inf luencing citizens’ perceptions of risk and how they act on these risks? Food-related risks fall into the category of risks that are hard to detect by sensory means and as such generate a lot of public fear not only when they materialize but even at the mere possibility of a threat. Food-related risks and threats also have an added sense of urgency about them in that people are so reliant on industrial food production in their everyday lives. The controversy in the EU over genetically modified foods can be understood as heavily colored by the shock and awe that the mad cow crisis had struck in European policy-makers and citizens alike. The mad cow crisis, as a high profile food scandal that rocked consumer confidence and trust both in the EU and the United States, generated a shift in the European approach to risk and science. The European emphasis on scientific testing and incremental policy changes suggested by experts as the way to do good risk management gained further ground and laid the foundation for the EU adoption of the precautionary principle. The European public assumes that science is one of the baselines for decision-making, and that, as more is revealed and science progresses, governing institutions will assume the responsibility of keeping their citizens safe and informed. Citizens in the EU do not grant a lot of trust to media reports on dangerous foods, and regulators are unlikely to act on such public reports. Americans, on average, are not well-informed about genetically modified (GM) foods. They do not know when they are consuming GM foods; they assume that since these are allowed in stores they are safe, but they would prefer not to have GM

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foods brought on the market. Polling has shown a great disconnect between what American consumers find in their grocery stores and public knowledge about the products they find there, particularly with regard to GM foods. The low level of awareness of GM foods as a potential biological risk has been attributed to the American media’s shifting attention to GM products. In years when the American media has reported on a scandal or crisis involving GM products, the general public awareness of GM foods has been greater. However, the majority of American consumers have heard or read little about this risk, and they trust that the Food and Drug Administration has done its due diligence before allowing these kinds of products into the marketplace. The use of experiments and science in the realm of voting technology is interesting for several reasons. First, it illustrates that the EU attitudes about the precautionary principle and research vary across policy domains. In the GM food policy domain, the EU has been much less willing to base its findings purely on extant science and worries more about potential, future crises, whereas the United States has been a leader in both research and use. By contrast, the election technology domain is one where the roles are reversed; the Europeans conduct experiments and the Americans are much more skittish about the use of technology, and many state governments are employing precautionary principle rhetoric to critique certain possible reforms. Looking at the individual-level data on risk perception in chapter 2, we have examined in more detail how citizens of the EU and the United States actually prioritize fears in the context of their political views. Strikingly, in some cases the actual risks that people in the EU and the United States report worrying about contrast sharply with the reality of those very same risks. In the perception of risk, there are a number of differences in Americans and European perspectives. Our polling data show a disconnect between perception and reality with regard to (1) property crime—despite levels of property crime that are

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in some cases higher than in the United States, Europeans are much less worried about crime; (2) health—despite lower life expectancy and higher rates of chronic disease, Americans are less worried about falling victim to a serious illness; and (3) traffic accidents—despite driving less and having lower rates of traffic fatalities on their roads, Europeans are just as worried about traffic accidents as Americans are. In the case of food safety, as well as that of f looding, we find that even when citizens feel they are well-informed about the risks they are exposed to, they may be very reluctant to take action to reduce or mitigate those risks. In America, where so much of the actual mitigation of risk rests on the individual, rather than with proactive public policy and a protective welfare state, the results are much more severe, as we see in the case of food-related conditions like obesity and high blood pressure. Public fears about immigration are notable in both the United States and the EU, particularly after 9/11 and the bombings that followed in Madrid and London. These events seem to have boosted the perception on both continents about immigration as a grave security risk, at least as far as the public is concerned. As such, the perceptions of immigration as a societal risk are converging across publics, but the governmental response on either side of the Atlantic is diverging. The story of immigration is a political battle where the public sometimes supports strong anti-immigration measures while the political and economic elites, both in the United States and the EU, hold a much more positive sentiment toward labor immigration, and see dangers in overregulating this type of risk. In the United States, however, this elite sentiment is increasingly negated by populism, whereas in Europe, populism (while rampant) is often less effective at altering the legislative agenda. Immigration is a hot-button issue in both the United States and the EU, but where the United States has opted for federal neglect and experimentation at the state and local level, the EU has gone for a much more concerted supranational policy

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objective. The devolution of immigration policy in the United States is justified by supporting local and state officials for both economic and cultural reasons. In the EU, the more concerted effort to homogenize and liberalize immigration policy is still fraught with controversy. Mostly, the controversy boils down to issues about what Brussels should and should not control, with many member states being deeply skeptical of supranational policies that have to do with deep-rooted issues like border control. The perceived importance of maintaining some level of member state sovereignty and a perception of “cultural threat” are key factors in the opposition to further European integration. Despite a pressing awareness among EU elites of the economic and demographic benefits, migration is continually perceived as a worrying or even destabilizing phenomenon by the public. On the U.S. side, a majority of the American public stated that immigrants weaken the American character, and that too much immigration poses a great threat to America remaining a major world power. Looking at the development of public perceptions around food safety and food safety regulation, the United States and the EU show both diverging and converging trends. Public opinion polls in the EU have shown that people do not distinguish much between various types of food-related risks. What they tended to worry most about, however, are risks caused by external factors over which they have no control. Among the external factors EU consumers identified as dangerous were factors such as pesticide residues, residues in meats, contamination of food by bacteria, and unhygienic conditions outside the home. Consumers in the EU seem least concerned with factors that they have some measure of personal control over, such as food allergies, food preparation and hygiene, and weight gain. Overall, while Europeans are worried about health-related risks, those concerning food appear to be less salient. Generally, food has positive connotations of taste and pleasure, and concerns about health and food safety are not at the forefront of the EU consumers’ mind.

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In the EU, genetically modified food is a very controversial issue and is something the public worries greatly about. American consumers know far less about the topic, but are also far less concerned by the things they do know. Perhaps (Fink and Rodemeyer 2007) a natural consequence of being a less informed public, Americans are not particularly concerned with the risks of GM foods compared to other food-related risks. Food freshness and the risk of salmonella, instead, top the list of American fears on food safety. What is noticeable about American public opinion on food safety is that the perceptions are fairly malleable. When consumers are asked about GM foods and then given more information about the large amount of GM foods they are actually exposed to, their perceptions shift from one that is relatively skeptical to one that is more accepting and at ease. In the American case there seems to be an unconscious trend of increasing acceptance of potentially risky foods when it seems very inconvenient in everyday life to actually act to avoid this risk. Governments as Public Risk Managers The perceptions and actions of individuals have, as we have seen, a great impact on larger societal choices and approaches to risk management. There are, however, also larger differences between the United States and the EU in terms of cultural ideas and views on (1) what is and should be individual risk versus collective risk; (2) to what extent insurance (both public and private) is used to cover risk; and (3) what the ultimate role of the state as a public risk manager should be. In the area of food safety there is a tremendous amount of pressure on governments to adapt to trade efficiencies and a global convergence of regulation. Both the EU and the United States utilize their federal structures to control product access to their domestic or internal markets, but allow for considerable experimentation and testing in order to produce new food products and develop new methods of food production. Rather

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than taking a categorical stand on what specific products should be allowed to enter either market, the EU and United States are both focusing on other aspects as they exercise their food safety regulation. In response to the pressures of international trade, there have been considerable efforts by both the United States and the EU to win the battle of competing perceptions of risk. Over time, this battle has led to trade disputes regarding specific products, and this resistance to a convergence of global food standards is being fought largely through the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. Particularly salient examples have been EU and U.S. disputes over the export of genetically modified tomatoes, bananas, and beef. In fact, the exception to the rule of appeasing the forces of global trade seems to be the rather staunch stand the EU has taken on GM foods, but even on this issue the EU has met global trade halfway by allowing GM foods on the internal market, provided that these products follow strict labeling rules. The regulatory exercise of power by the EU has really been internally focused, aiming at improving production standards and avoiding contamination in that production process. The United States, as mentioned earlier, has, in addition to the FDA standards, added a focus on threats to supply lines, viewing food safety as an issue of secure supply across the country rather than as problems in the actual production of food. Generally speaking, the roles that the EU and the United States have taken as public risk regulators with regard to food safety seem to be widely accepted by their respective publics. There is a great deal of trust and confidence in European public authorities’ actions in the area of public health. The American public also displays a large degree of trust in the FDA as the agency regulating food and drug safety, with the consequence that not many calls have been made to change the current U.S. approach to food-related risks. Governmental management of environmental risks such as f loods has a long history in both the United States and the European Union. Many EU citizens are keenly aware of the

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risk of f looding, and their response to this risk is to trust government to mitigate and manage this type of risk. At the supranational level, the EU has, since the mid-nineties, worked to create an EU-level plan for communicating and responding to disasters such as river f loods. The shape of the response, with a rather advanced so-called early warning system between governmental agencies tasked with water management, weather services or disaster response, public mass communication, and forced evacuation by public service agencies, is almost universal in European f loods. This kind of governmental intervention and supervision is generally accepted by the European public and expected by people living in f lood-prone areas. There are a number of challenges facing the U.S. government as a risk manager, which the European governments and the EU as a whole do not face. The public in the United States is readily aware of some of the risks discussed in this book, such as hurricanes and f looding, but individual choices and a lack of regulatory mechanisms to enforce safer behavior place states and the federal government as public risk managers in a predicament. The steady migration of retirees, comprising a more aid-dependent population, to locations that are highly risk-prone, like the coast of Florida, makes risk management increasingly difficult for the state. The U.S. government is also facing a cultural challenge when it comes to risks that the population is aware of. There is, for instance, a great deal of “cry-wolf ” cavalierism about hurricanes, and people do not take these risks seriously enough to actually act preventatively on them. In the regulatory environment in the United States, freedom postulates that responsibility for taking initiative with regard to risks falls largely on the individual. The U.S. system draws heavily on the individual’s choice to stay by their property or, in the case of evacuation, evacuate to areas of their choice. This particular feature of the U.S. regulatory system extends to risk mitigation at the local and state level, leaving these levels of government with substantial leeway in how they mitigate risk and form their response to disasters. Consequently, much

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potential prevention, mitigation, and collective action around risks is lost. In the wake of hurricane Katrina there were strong pushes for the government to take a stronger and more coordinating role in the regulation of f lood risk. This expressed desire on behalf of the American public has not, however, necessarily been accompanied by a corresponding desire by the public to change their behaviors or make more risk-averse choices. This public resistance to having their lives curtailed by government intervention and direction really limits what role the U.S. government can play as a public risk manager. Both the EU and the United States have a vested interest in acting as public risk managers with regard to immigration as a social risk. There is strong public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic against immigration, even though the perception of what risks immigration actually poses seem to be less clear. The U.S. government has been using the federal structure to actively limit immigrants’ rights and freedoms in the United States, even though the overall federal immigration policy seems to have fallen into a state of stagnation or neglect in the face of political dissensus. The EU is using its supranational mandate and structure to pursue a new, more immigration-friendly regulation toward skilled immigrants. The need for both polities to address and minimize the perceived societal risk related to immigration has led both the EU and the United States to strengthen external border controls and to make more intensive efforts to check illegal immigration. We see a broad convergence between the EU and the United States in both polities; immigration is a policy area where the media and public are acutely sensitive to perceived risks, and yet political institutions temper any dramatic policy outputs that might stem from this anxiety. While the EU appears to be combining progressive central regulation with anxieties about its own identity as a federation, the United States appears to be continuing a federal immigration policy of benign neglect, avoiding taking on the political battle that a revised federal

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policy will inevitably entail. Illustrating how the U.S. bureaucracy is tempering the effect of heightened perceptions of risk, there is, for instance, no evidence of an anti-Muslim bias toward refugees processed in the United States. Consequently, it seems that even the most alarming immigration-related security concerns can be mitigated by the pro-immigration forces of American “embedded liberalism.” As public managers of risk, EU policy-makers are more insulated from populist hostility. Eurocrats are freer than their American counterparts to listen to business and human rights lobbies while shaping these pragmatic policies and to essentially disregard worries over national identity and perceived cultural threats mentioned earlier. Policy-makers in the United States, by contrast, are more susceptible to a politicization of the regulatory process. Federal policy-makers in the United States seem to currently be going through an extended bout of soul-searching on immigration. The 9/11 context has thrust immigration into the realm of national security, with the result that many legislators and candidates have scrambled to appear “tough” on immigration by proposing more border fences and penalizing employers who hire undocumented workers. Societal risks perceived in relation to election fraud have recently surfaced in the EU and the United States, but for quite different reasons. In Europe, the introduction of potentially risky election technology has primarily been spurred by a desire to reach disenfranchised voters, whereas in the United States the desire to revamp voting technology came at the heels of the controversial butterf ly ballots in the 2000 presidential election. In both the United States and EU, electronic voting has been introduced as a means of improving elections. However, each has taken a different approach to this kind of regulatory reform. Since 2002, U.S. states have started changing voting technologies and changing election procedures in an effort to improve the electoral process. These voting changes have neither been subject to any systematic pilot implementation efforts nor to any subsequent evaluation efforts. In the United States,

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it is common for very ambitious voting technology projects to be undertaken without any pilot testing at all. The United States approach to regulatory reform can be contrasted with the more cautious and careful approach to implementation that has been followed by EU member states. In the EU, reforms have more often been pilot tested under controlled conditions with evaluation being a key component of the process. Through experimentation, the EU as a public risk manager has been able to limit the risks that might arise from experimentation failure and has been able to accumulate best-practice knowledge that can be applied to conduct larger scale implementations. When problems have been identified regarding voting technologies, such as occurred in the Netherlands earlier this decade, the decision to switch from electronic voting to paper voting occurred through an effective policy debate, not a political one. The Pushes and Pulls of Transatlantic Risk Regulation The European Union and the U.S. government both share similarities that push toward policy innovation related to risk and toward similar mitigation strategies. More than a billion dollars’ worth of goods and services per day is traded between America and Europe, and this enormous trade volume pushes toward common regulatory standards. Both governmental bodies benefit from a form of federalism, where states (or nation-states, in the case of the EU) serve as laboratories of innovation that can serve as proving grounds for new national or multinational policies. In addition, both are subject to policy diffusion, with European policies being adopted in the American states and American policies being adopted in Europe. Globalization and diffusion may serve to overcome the regulatory heritage—the institutions, policies, and regulatory legacies—that inf luence the desire to look to one’s local or national government to regulate “scary” things.

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By weighing the numerous ways that globalization affects policymaking, we have shown that globalization produces a converging effect on policymaking and risk regulation in the EU and the United States. Chapter 3 showed how globalization pushed for convergence on smoking regulation, both in the impact of international institutions, such as the WHO, on agenda setting, and the global diffusion in elite circles of a neoliberal mentality, which brought corporate-inspired marketing techniques to the public sector. Examining the ways in which federalism may inf luence policy, our sense is that, overall, federalism is more likely, like globalization, to create convergence rather than divergence in U.S. and EU risk regulation. Within the EU and United States, horizontal policy diffusion caused the rapid spread of smoking regulations across states (and EU member states), as neighboring jurisdictions used each others’ regulatory experiences as testing grounds for their own innovation. Looking at diversity of institutions and institutional mechanisms that weigh in on the regulation of any one risk on the two sides of the Atlantic, we expected institutional mechanisms (to the extent that they differ) to have a diverging effect on policy development and risk regulation in the United States and the EU. This is broadly what we found, with political institutions like the U.S. legal system creating a very different approach to risk regulation, with very different outcomes. In the United States, judges are often forced into playing the role of de facto risk regulators in the process of delivering redress to individuals for harm suffered. In the EU, on the other hand, more trust is placed in civil servants to regulate in a top-down fashion. Taking into consideration how culturally based ideas and views differ between the United States and the European Union, we have shown that the impact of these kinds of variables is most likely to be divisive. In other words, cultural ideas and views in the United States and EU are more likely to contribute to diverging policy paths on risk regulation. The culture of individualism in the United States, and mistrust of “the

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state,” while certainly no catchall explanation, has certainly played a role in stoking ambiguity and even hostility regarding government actions to regulate risk. While many of the advocacy coalitions that are engaged in specific policy domains are international, and as such may add to policy diffusion and shared ideas about of risk, their access and impact on the policy process in the United States and EU differ markedly. For this reason, we also predicted that the impact of interest group activities and advocacy coalitions on specific risk regulation in the United States and EU has a primarily divergent effect. On the issue of immigration, the business lobby in the United States has prevented populist hostility from winning the day, although populism is increasingly becoming effective at state level. In the European Union, on the other hand, regulators are not forced to listen to civil society, with all the positive and negative consequences it entails. We show that perceptions of risk, to the extent that they differ between the continents, have a divergent effect on policy and risk regulation in the EU and the United States. This is not to say, however, that the largest differences in risk perception are between the two sides of the Atlantic. On some issues, our data show that differences are strong between the Left and the Right. On other issues, such as immigration, the strongest gap is between the views of the public and the elites, which we expect will have a different effect on policy formation. If the Left and the Right diverge on the issue, then it becomes part of the “normal” partisan battles that every democracy wrestles with periodically. If the gap is between the public and the elite, then this in turn creates a gap between the measures put in place to manage risk, and the degree to which the public pays attention and modifies their actual behavior. This last point holds important implications for how risk is managed in democracies. One enduring question will be the degree to which citizens can and do stay active in the face of increasing inf luence of science, technology, globalization, and complexity. Balancing science, free markets, and democracy

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is not an easy job. In the United States, the role of interest groups and lobbyists will be the key factor, especially as the media becomes more politically polarized. Across the Atlantic, European integration has progressed rapidly even as voter turnout for European elections has steadily declined. Paradoxically, EU institutions might be better risk regulators precisely because public input is limited. However, this is certainly not an ideal situation, and the EU risks increasing public backlashes as Europeans increasingly realize that it is Brussels, not their national leaders, that is keeping them safe from the frightening world “out there.”

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NOT E S

Chapter 1 1. The precautionary principle is also directly mentioned in the French Socialist Party’s 2008 manifesto, in Article 4 (Parti Socialiste 2008, 2) 2. For a good overview of the arguments presented by so-called Normal Accidents Theory and High-Reliability Theory, see Rijpma (1997). 3. On potential U.S.-EU legal convergence, see Kelemen (2006).

Chapter 2 1. Hobbes state of nature is filled with these problems, and many persist today even in societies that are far removed from the pure state of nature. 2. See Beck 1992, 1998, 1999; Mythen 2004; Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slovic; Slovic 2000, for a complete discussion of the risk society and the social aspects of understanding risk. 3. See, for example, data from the World Organisation for Animal Health, http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_esbincidence.htm (accessed August 21, 2009) and from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/cjd/bse_cjd.htm (accessed August 21, 2009). 4. The problem of BSE in Europe and the United Kingdom is covered in numerous studies of the risk society, including Beck 1998; Harris and O’Shaughnesy 1997; Mythen 2004. 5. A single incidence of BSE in the United States led to bans on American beef imports in several countries in the early 2000s. 6. Their work and its implications are well covered in Nick Pidgeon, Roger Kasperson, and Paul Slovic, The Social Amplification of Risk, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

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Notes

7. The 2008 CCES was a national stratified sample survey of registered and unregistered adults with a sample size of approximately 40,000; registered voters were over-sampled in order to produce similar rates of voting and nonvoting participants. In order to attain a nationally representative sample a random subsample was first selected from the 2004 American Community Study (ACS). Each individual selected out of the ACS was then matched to an individual who completed the CCES survey via matching on socioeconomic attributes such as gender, age, race, and education. Finally, CCES respondents were weighted using poststratification weights in order to equilibrate the CCES marginals and ACS marginals along a number of socioeconomic variables. Each CCES survey was comprised of approximately 120 questions where questions common to all participants comprised half of the questionnaire and the other half consisted of questions designed by individual groups and asked of a subset of 1,000 people. The survey had a pre/post election design where questionnaires were completed on-line and fielded by the survey research firm Polimetrix, Inc. Preelection surveys were conducted in October 2008 and the postelection surveys were completed in November 2008. The results presented here are based on a subsample of CCES participants who were asked questions about their attitudes regarding risk. 8. See the Federal Highway Administration’s report on vehicle miles traveled, by region, at http://www.f hwa.dot.gov/ohim/tvtw/09juntvt/ page3.cfm. 9. For the questions in each survey that were statistically significant, the F statistic was 2.67 or higher.

Chapter 3 1. “Subsidiarity” is an EU term meaning that governance decisions should be taken at the level “closest” to the affected parties, implying a preference for local over regional, regional over national, national over EU jurisdiction. 2. One exception is the regulation of labor relations, and the relative power of unions, but this is not directly related to the regulation of risk 3. One exception is the area administered by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which includes regulation of workplace injuries. 4. This plan was adopted in 2005. 5. This is especially true if one discounts auto accidents (which should be discounted for several reasons, including privatized and socialized medical costs, different approaches to insurance, and different rates of auto usage).

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6. The EU is more open than the United States to litigation in some areas, particularly in Germany. 7. One example of this was the national 55 mile per hour limit instituted under Richard Nixon in response to fuel shortages.

Chapter 4 1. Let us be clear that “benign neglect” refers only to immigration policy at the federal level, whose relatively mild degree of “toughness” does not match the rhetoric or public anxiety that casts immigration as a grave risk. U.S. foreign and military policy, on the other hand, is neither “benign” nor “neglectful” when it comes to aggressively attacking supposed risk sources. 2. The official candidate countries are Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey.

Chapter 5 1. For a more in-depth discussion on the effects of globalization on policy diffusion and policy convergence, see chapter 1. 2. For a more in-depth discussion of how Europe has applied the precautionary principle and the Napoleonic tradition of a permissive and forbidding state, see chapter 1. 3. For a longer discussion of the role of the individual in risk mitigation in Europe and America, see chapter 1. This chapter also discusses the gap between the knowledge of risks and risk exposure, and individuals’ propensity to act preventatively. 4. In the United States, should this prove mistaken, punishment is provided by the market and by extensive and expensive lawsuits in a way that is not institutionally available in the EU. For a more extensive exploration of these issues, see chapter 1. 5. Seventy-nine percent of respondents thought that GM tomatoes were on the market when, in reality, GM tomatoes had not been on the market for seven years. Moreover, 61 percent believed GM chickens were available, though GM chickens have never been on the market. Hallman et al., 2004 cited in Fink, W. and M. Rodemeyer. 2007. “Genetically Modified Foods: US Public Opinion Research Polls.” In Media, the Public, and Agricultural Biotechnology, 126–159, edited by D. Brossard (Wallingford, GBR: CABI Publishing). 6. The British House of Lords, in particular, suggested that “in order to regain public trust in science, greater openness and transparency in the risk policy process . . . [d]irect dialogue with the public should move from being an optional add-on to science based policy-making . . . and

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8.

9.

10. 11.

12.

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should become a normal and integral part of the process.” Pidgeon, N.F., W. Poortinga, G. Rowe, T. Horlick-Jones, J. Walls, and T. O’Riordan. 2005. “Using Surveys in Public Participation Processes for Risk DecisionMaking: The Case of the 2003 British GM Nation? Public Debate.” Risk Analysis 25:467–480. In addition to potential human health implications, such as allergies and decreased fertility, biologists in the United States suggest that GM crops may be responsible for so-called super-weeds (resistant to herbicides) and cross pollination that threatens genetic biodiversity of corn, as well as destroy the organic production of plants closely related to their new GM relatives. Schueller, Gretel 2009. “Lisa Weasel on GMOs.” Eating Well, April, 14. This is an assessment term that stems from the precautionary principle applied to food risks. The precautionary principle stipulates that changes to existing products or the introduction of new products are only acceptable when it has been proven that they would not add risk or harm. With the precautionary principle, new products and services are, from a risk perspective, “assumed guilty until proven innocent.” “Three federal agencies have the primary responsibility for regulating GE organisms and products under at least ten different laws” (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004. “Issues in the Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants and Animals.” PEW Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 6–7). These agencies are The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The survey’s used the term “biotechnology used in the production of foods.” Two additional pieces of EU legislation were presented with this initiative. One is Directive 2004/41, which replaces and amends existing legislation in the food safety area, and Directive 2002/99, which establishes animal health rules for animal products that are meant for human consumption. Food Standards Agency. 2008a, “Background to the 2006 food hygiene legislation.” Retrieved October 6, 2008 (www. food.gov.uk/foodindustry/regulation). Principles that aspiring member states such as Turkey have had to adopt and practice as a result of the “Farm to Fork” initiative and legislation include Food Quality Assurance (FQA), Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), Good Hygiene Practices (GHP), the EU’s Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) principle, The European Union Twinning Project. 2008, “Restructuring and Strengthening of the Food Safety and Control System in Turkey.” Retrieved October 14,

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15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

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2008 (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/projects-in-focus/selectedprojects/health-and-food-safety/index_en.htm). Regulation (EC) No 258/97. “Nanotechnology is the manufacture and use of materials and structures at the nanometre scale (a nanometre is one millionth of a millimetre).” Food Standards Agency. 2008c, “Novel foods.” Retrieved October 14, 2008 (www.food.gov.uk). Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 came into effect in April 2004. Food Standards Agency. 2008b, “GM foods.” Retrieved October 14, 2008 (www.food.gov.uk). http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientif icPanels/efsa_locale1178620753812_AHAW.htm. http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientif icPanels/efsa_locale1178620753812_ANS.htm. http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientif icPanels/efsa_locale1178620753812_BIOHAZ.htm. http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientif icPanels/efsa_locale1178620753812_CEF.htm. http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientif icPanels/efsa_locale1178620753812_CONTAM.htm. http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientif icPanels/efsa_locale1178620753812_FEEDAP.htm. http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientif icPanels/efsa_locale1178620753812_GMO.htm. http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientif icPanels/efsa_locale1178620753812_NDA.htm. http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientif icPanels/efsa_locale1178620753812_PPR.htm. http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientif icPanels/efsa_locale1178620753812_PLH.htm. “In addition, the Scientific Co-operation and Assistance (SCA) directorate manages projects in the areas of scientific co-operation, data collection, emerging risks, and assessment methodology. This directorate also supports two structures dealing with specific risk issues and directly involving experts from Member States: Zoonoses Data Collection, which collects and analyses EU-wide data on animal diseases that can be transferred to humans, and Pesticide Risk Assessment Peer Review, which carries out an EU-wide review of the safety of all active substances used in pesticides.” European Food Safety Authority. 2008b. “Who we are.” Retrieved March 3, 2009 (http://www.efsa.europa. eu/EFSA/AboutEfsa/efsa_locale-1178620753812_WhoWeAre.htm).

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27. Critical infrastructure has been referred to as financial control systems; Gorman, Sean P. 2005. Networks, Security and Complexity: The Role of Public Policy in Critical Infrastructure Protection (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar); power plants and electricity distribution systems, water storage facilities, and water distribution systems; Baranowski, T. M. and E. J. LeBoeuf. 2008. “Consequence Management Utilizing Optimization.” Journal of Resource Planning and Management 134:386–394; transportation systems, de Bruijne, Mark and Michel van Eeten. 2007. “Systems That Should Have Failed: Critical Infrastructure Protection in an Institutionally Fragmented Environment.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 15:18–29, such as roads, railroads, subways, ports, airports, aviation systems. They also include “information technology, telecommunications, healthcare, . . . government and law enforcement, and banking and finance” (de Bruijne & van Eeten 2007, 18). Consequently, what is viewed as critical infrastructure touches nearly, if not all, sectors of society and often crosses jurisdictional and geographical boundaries. 28. “By law, the FDA must regulate, except for meat, poultry and some egg products, all the food we eat: vegetables, fruits, fish and the spices that go on them and the bottled water accompanying them. We regulate vitamins and dietary supplements; every medical product from simple aspirin to more sophisticated drugs and biologics for the treatment of acute and chronic diseases; blood products; medical devices from cardiac pacemakers to PET scanners and from surgical masks to surgical robots and linear accelerators. We regulate radiation-emitting equipment including microwave ovens and products that affect not only how we feel but how we look, from toothpaste and underarm deodorant to sun screens and cosmetics. And our responsibility extends to products not just for humans but also animals: we regulate genetically engineered animals and products from pet food and pet turtles to feed and drugs for livestock.” (von Eschenbach, Andrew C. 2008, “FDA at the Turning Point: Meeting the Challenge of a Rapidly Changing World.” Retrieved March 15, 2009 (http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2008/ fdaworld022908.html).

Chapter 6 1. For more information on the nature and management of Hurricane Katrina, see Katel, Peter. 2006. “Rebuilding New Orleans: Should f lood-prone areas be redeveloped.” The CQ Researcher 16:97–120; Kettl, Donald. 2007. System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics: CQ Press.

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2. For more information on the nature and management of the 1993 and 1995 f loods in Western Europe, see Rosenthal, Uriel and Paul ‘t Hart. 1998. “Flood Response and Crisis Management in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis.” Berlin: Springer. 3. In this category we also find topics that “have a largely unappreciated environmental impact” such as “noise (18 percent), hunting and shooting (17 percent) and tourism (17 percent).” The European Opinion Research Group. 2002. “Eurobarometer 58.0: The attitudes of Europeans towards the environment.” DG Environment. 4. “Blacks make harsher judgments of the federal government’s response to the crisis, perceive the plight of disaster victims in a different light, and feel more emotionally connected to what’s happened. More than eight in ten blacks (85 percent) say Bush could have done more to get relief efforts going quickly, compared with 63 percent of whites. Blacks are also considerably more critical of the federal government’s performance in general, 77 percent say the federal government’s response was only fair or poor, compared with 55 percent of whites. While both of these attitudes are also strongly related to partisanship, these racial differences remain even when party affiliation is taken into account” (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. 2005a. “Huge Racial Divide Over Katrina and its Consequences: Two-in-Three Critical of Bush’s Relief Efforts.” The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Washington, D.C.). 5. For a more in-depth discussion on how we perceive what is risky, including the roles of experts, science, and trust more broadly, see chapter 1. 6. “The adoption of the Water Framework Directive (1) (WFD) can be said to have brought about a significant shift in EU water policy, not only because it introduced a harmonized approach to the various situations facing our continental and marine waters, but also because it established an effective method of assessing the quality of these waters and put in place a centralized organisational system that makes it easier to tackle each river basin in a uniform manner, regardless of the various competences which exist for each stretch of the river basin. Furthermore, the Commission has continued to supplement and develop the WFD by means of legislative (2) and other provisions (3), to ensure that EU water policy works to protect our rivers and seas” (The European Economic Council and Social Committee. 2005. “Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—Flood risk management—Flood prevention, protection

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8.

9.

10.

11.

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and mitigation.” 35–39, vol. C 221: Official Journal of the European Union). This report has been prepared by WRc at the request of the European Commission within the support contract for the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (WFD). The report is to support the Impact Assessment of the European action programme on Flood Risk Management, in particular, the elements of f lood mapping and f lood risk management planning. Euratom here refers to a treaty on nuclear energy that in 1957 established the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). “Euratom is legally separated from the European Community (EC) and has its own Framework Research Programme, however, managed by the common Community institutions. Although Member States retain most competencies in energy policy, whether based on nuclear or other sources, the Euratom Treaty has achieved an important degree of harmonisation at European level. It legislates for a number of specific tasks for the management of nuclear resources and research activities” (Commission of the European Communities. 2008, “Seventh Framework Programme of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for nuclear research and training activities (2007–2011)).” Retrieved June 3, 2009 (http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/euratom/home_en.html). For more information about the Internet feedback process that took place in 2005, see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/f lood_risk/ consult.htm. “Floods are natural phenomena associated with the normal functioning of river and coastal systems and operate on a geological timescale that is far greater than the timescale normally used for example in managing economic planning or land-use planning, etc. The ‘recurrence interval’ therefore means that: when f looding takes place, be it in 100 or 500 years’ time, the river will f lood a given area; these f loods will definitely recur; they can recur at any time” (The European Economic Council and Social Committee. 2005. “Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—Flood Risk Management—Flood Prevention, Protection and Mitigation.” 35–39, vol. C 221: Official Journal of the European Union). “Flood risks are increasing in the EU for two main reasons: firstly, the effects of climate change, which could lead to more frequent torrential rains and higher sea levels as a consequence of the warming of the atmosphere. The second factor is the impact of human activity, such as construction work in rivers and projects to divert and channel the

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13.

14.

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course of rivers, and the construction of ports without adopting measures to assess and correct their environmental impact./. . ./ In short, f lood risks are increasing as a consequence of unsustainable activity. Adopting sustainable models of economic, social and environmental development can therefore minimise these risks.” Ibid. The Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act (16 U.S.C. 1001–1009, Chapter 18; P.L. 566, August 4, 1954; 68 Stat. 666) has been amended by: Chapter 1018, August 7, 1956; 70 Stat. 1088; P.L. 85-624, August 12, 1958; 72 Stat. 567; P.L. 85-865, September 2, 1958; 72 Stat. 1605; P.L. 86-468, May 13, 1960; 74 Stat. 131; P.L. 86-545, June 29, 1960; 74 Stat. 254; P.L. 87-170, August 30, 1961; 75 Stat. 408; P.L. 87-639, September 5, 1962; 76 Stat. 438; P.L. 87-703, September 27, 1962; 76 Stat. 608; P.L. 89-337, November 8, 1965; 79 Stat. 1300; P.L. 90-361, June 27, 1968; 82 Stat. 250; P.L. 92-419, August 30, 1972; 86 Stat. 667; P.L. 95-113, September 29, 1977; 91 Stat. 1022; P.L. 97-98, December 22, 1981; 95 Stat. 1332; P.L. 99-662, November 17, 1986; 100 Stat. 4196 (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. n.d., “Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.”) Retrieved May 13, 2009 (http://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/WATRSHD.HTML). Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) “works closely with nearly 90 private insurance companies to offer f lood insurance to property owners and renters./. . ./ Rates are set and do not differ from company to company or agent to agent. These rates depend on many factors, which include the date and type of construction of your home, along with your building’s level of risk” (National Flood Insurance Program. 2009b, “About the National Flood Insurance Program: The NFIP Partnership.”) Retrieved May 13, 2009 (http://www.f loodsmart.gov/f loodsmart/pages/about/nf ip_ partnership.jsp). In 2009, there were 20,500 communities participating in the NFIP and who had “implemented f loodplain management measures.” Homeowners living in communities that did not participate in NIFP could petition their local government to join the program. High-risk f lood areas are defined as areas that have at least a 1 percent annual chance of f looding or a 26 percent chance of f looding over the span of a thirty-year mortgage.

Chapter 7 1. Interestingly, however, there is the same tendency in international data that there is in the United States for left-leaning individuals to be less

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3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

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confident in the fairness of the electoral process, but this tendency is not a statistically significant one, as it is in the United States. The Federal Election Commission is only empowered to regulate certain aspects of campaign finance law, and the Election Assistance Commission, which was created after the 2000 election, is explicitly not allowed to regulate any aspect of national elections in the United States. Not surprisingly, there is a long literature on ballot fatigue, ballot “rolloff,” and related problems in the literature on voting in the United States but no similar literature on voting in Europe. See Alvarez and Hall 2008 for a summary of the American literature. See http://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDMap?question=VC to see how ballots are counted in both Europe and the United States. http://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/e-voting/countries. At the time this report was written, the Government Accountability Office was known as the General Accounting Office. Information can be found at http://maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/voter_ info/early-voting.htm. Second paragraph: http://maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/voter_info/earlyvoting.htm. Report can be found at http://maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/voter_info/ early-voting-2008.pdf. The evaluation report for this trial can be found at http://www.vote. caltech.edu/Links/AlexandriaReport.pdf.

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I N DE X

advocacy coalition, 4, 8–9, 15–16, 25, 31, 166, 180 antismoking, 7, 9, 15–16 attitudes, 14, 18, 33, 34, 36–37, 41, 42, 45, 58, 75, 98, 120, 144–45, 150, 158, 163, 170, 184, 189 ban, 2–4, 8, 12–13, 22–23, 65, 93, 183 Baumgartner, F., 15, 54, 99 Beck, U., 6, 28–29, 31, 71, 183 Berry, F., 8, 10 Borjas, G., 87 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), 23, 30–31, 93–94, 97–98, 103, 105, 110, 183 Brewer, M., 75 bureaucratic, 11, 48, 56–57 chemical, 1, 4, 102, 112 climate change, 2, 16, 52, 58, 60, 124, 163, 190 Commission of the European Communities, 20, 60, 81, 83–84, 94–96, 102–106, 116, 129–30, 133–34, 189–90 communitarianism, 13, 119 competition, 8, 9, 60 conservative, 2, 13, 37–43, 46, 57 convergence, 3, 5–6, 8, 11, 18, 48, 59, 64, 73, 84, 112, 164, 173–74, 176, 179, 183, 185 converging, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 27, 70, 89, 93, 112, 171–72, 179

policy conversion, 7, 16, 20 corporatism, 48–49 crisis, 31, 65–66, 90, 92, 98–99, 103, 125, 133, 136, 167, 169–70, 188–89 critical infrastructure, 110, 188 critical societal infrastructure, 90, 111, 167 cultural ideas and views, 3, 7, 25, 61, 164, 173, 179 diffusion, 3, 8, 10, 12, 15–16, 20–21, 24, 31, 66–67, 161–62, 168, 178–80, 185 directive, 17, 81, 83, 129–37, 186, 189–90 disaster, 23–24, 29, 113–27, 129, 131, 133, 135, 137–39, 141, 167, 175, 189 distrust, see trust divergence, 3, 5–6, 11, 18, 22, 48, 143, 164–65, 179 diverging, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 25, 89, 93, 171–72, 179 diverse, 7, 18 diversity, 7, 10, 12, 18, 49, 61, 179, 186 Dutton, J., 4 early warning, 23, 113, 132, 136, 167, 175 elite, 12–13, 16–19, 49, 56, 70–71, 171–72, 179–80

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Eurobarometer, 33, 70, 77–79, 93, 102, 118, 189 European Food Agency (EFA), 103 European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), 105, 106, 187 experts, 7, 9, 11–13, 16, 19, 46, 63, 89, 95, 105, 109, 120–21, 131, 134, 169, 187, 189 factors, 4–7, 10, 13, 16, 20, 31–32, 46–48, 59, 61, 63, 65, 69, 73, 75, 80, 94, 96, 112, 125, 143, 149, 152, 163–64, 172, 181, 190–91 institutional factors, 7, 20, 46 political factors, 4, 6, 7, 16 psychological factors, 4, 7, 16, 73, 123 federalism, 5–7, 9–11, 20–22, 25, 47–48, 51, 54, 64, 66–67, 69, 143, 164–65, 178–79 federal, 9–11, 20–24, 47–55, 58, 64–66, 70, 72, 77, 85–89, 110–11, 115–16, 138–46, 159, 161, 164–66, 168, 171, 173, 175–77, 184–86, 189, 191–92, 194 federalist structure, 10, 138 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 115, 140, 142, 191 Fink, W., 96–98, 101, 173, 185 Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 63, 90, 92, 98, 100–101, 106, 108–12, 167, 170, 174, 186, 188 food product, 89, 91–93, 98–99, 101, 103–104, 106, 110–12, 166–67, 169, 173 food safety, 5, 8, 18, 21–22, 47, 61, 89–93, 95–99, 101, 103–12, 164–67, 171–74, 186–87 fraud, 6, 18, 21, 24, 47, 59, 143, 145, 147, 149, 151, 153–55, 165, 168, 177 Freeman, G., 69, 70, 73, 86, 151 From Farm to Fork, 90, 103, 104

genetically modified (GM), 3, 17, 22, 28, 32, 61, 89, 90, 93–94, 96–108, 111, 117, 164, 169, 170, 173–74, 185–87 GM foods (GMFs), 3, 22, 89–90, 93, 96–101, 104–107, 169–70, 173–74, 187 GM product, 3, 22, 90, 93, 96–97, 99, 100–101, 107, 170 Genetically Modified Organism (GMO), 61, 94, 103–105, 112, 117–18, 124, 186–87, 190 Giddens, A., 4, 16, 31 Givens, T., 69, 81–83 globalization, 1, 3, 5–9, 11, 20–21, 25, 47–48, 64, 66–67, 84, 91, 163–64, 168, 178–80, 185 global, 2, 3, 5, 9, 16, 20, 28, 48, 66, 72, 89, 110, 120, 124, 163, 166, 173–74, 179 globalized, 4, 8, 72, 84 governance, 9, 10, 11, 20, 58, 66, 95, 135, 144, 146, 184 governance structure, 9–11 Haas, P., 8 Hall, T., 144–45, 147, 156–57, 192–93 Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) principles, 104, 186 health, 3, 9, 12, 14, 16–17, 22, 29, 31, 34, 36, 42, 52, 57, 62, 84, 86–87, 89–96, 101, 105, 110–12, 131, 140, 171–72, 174, 183–84, 186–88 Hollifield, J., 70, 73 Homeland Security, 111, 188 Horowitz, D., 74 hurricane, 23–24, 29, 113, 115–17, 122–26, 175–76, 188 individual responsibility, 12 institutional mechanism, 3, 7, 11, 12, 25, 164, 166, 179

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Index interest groups, 4, 7, 15–16, 47–51, 58, 64, 68, 134, 164, 180–81 advocacy coalitions, 4, 8, 9, 15–16, 25, 31, 166, 180 interest group activities, 4, 7, 15–16, 49–51, 164, 180 Jones, B., 15, 54, 99 Kagan, R., 12, 62 Kasperson, R., 32–33, 183 Kelemen, R., 14, 63, 183 Kettl, D., 188 Kingdon, J., 15, 99 law, 1, 3, 10–11, 13–14, 22, 38, 42, 45–46, 48, 51, 54–55, 57–58, 60, 62–63, 66, 81, 83, 87, 95, 101, 103, 106–107, 142, 152, 157–58, 161, 165, 185–86, 188, 191–92 liberal, 37–43, 46, 71–72, 80, 82–83, 86, 179 litigation, 14, 19, 42, 45, 50–51, 54–55, 57, 62–63, 185 Luedtke, A., 70, 75, 81–82 management of risk, 11, 13, 122 McLaren, L., 71, 80 media, 5, 9, 15, 27, 30–33, 45, 71, 73, 95–96, 117, 126, 169–70, 175, 181, 185 mitigation, see prevention Mitroff, I., 4 Moravcsik, A., 52, 77 Mythen, G., 16, 31, 183 Napoleonic tradition, 4, 13, 185 Natural Resources and Conservation Service (NRCS), 139, 141, 148, 150 obesity, 91, 95, 171 pandemic, 163 paternalistic, 12–13

211

perception, 3, 5, 7–8, 15–19, 20–25, 27, 32–33, 35, 38–44, 47–48, 61–64, 69–73, 80–81, 85–86, 89, 92–93, 95–100, 111–14, 116–17, 119–22, 125, 137, 150, 153, 155, 163–65, 167–74, 176–77, 180, 189 Perrow, C., 2, 4, 6, 16 Pidgeon, N., 98–99, 183, 186 Pierson, P., 4 pluralism, 48–49, 63 policy, 1–22, 24–25, 27, 33, 37, 43, 47–51, 54, 56–57, 59–60, 66–67, 69–73, 80–81, 83–88, 95, 98–100, 103, 106, 108–10, 114, 120, 126–30, 134–35, 137–38, 140–41, 143, 150–52, 154, 161, 163–72, 176–80, 185, 188–89, 190 policy area, 1, 4, 7, 12–13, 17, 18, 21–22, 24–25, 48, 57, 71, 73, 81, 99, 126, 140, 143, 164, 166, 169, 176 policy development, 7, 12, 179 policy direction, 8, 103 policy domain, 7, 8, 10–11, 16, 18, 170, 180 policy path, 11, 14, 179 policymaking, 5, 9, 49–50, 54, 57, 99, 100, 106, 179, 185 precautionary principle, 1, 2, 4, 5, 22, 32, 93–94, 100, 103, 126, 169–70, 183, 185–86, 196 presidential, 11, 48, 57, 69, 85–86, 144, 159–60, 177 prevention, 33, 111, 113, 120–21, 130, 132–33, 138–40, 176, 183, 189–91 mitigation, 13, 18, 21, 23, 48, 66, 95, 114, 116, 124, 129, 132, 138–39, 142, 161, 167–68, 171, 175–76, 178, 185, 190 preventable death, 91 protection, 3, 18, 54, 61, 89–91, 93, 95, 103, 105–106, 109–11, 113–14, 119, 126–30, 132–33, 138–39, 141–42, 166, 186, 188–91 consumer protection, 89, 91, 93, 166

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212

Index Rodemeyer, M., 96–98, 101, 173, 185 role of the state, 12, 17, 19, 173 Rosenthal, U., 23, 114, 136, 189

protection—Continued environmental protection, 54, 106, 126, 128–29, 186 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 54, 60, 106–108, 186 f lood protection, 130, 133, 138, 141–42, 166, 189–90 punctuated equilibrium, 99 regulation, 1, 2, 5–20, 23–24, 27, 43, 46–48, 50–66, 69–72, 89–90, 93, 98–99, 101, 103–10, 112, 116, 119–20, 127, 129, 132–35, 138, 144, 147, 158, 163–65, 167–69, 172–74, 176, 178–80, 184, 186–87 regulatory capital, 13, 129 regulatory institution, 59, 64 regulatory process, 12, 177 Reid, R., 7, 9, 16–17 risk, 1–25, 27–39, 41–51, 55–67, 69–74, 79–80, 87, 89–102, 105–10, 112–22, 124–26, 129–43, 145–47, 150, 152, 161, 163–81, 183–87, 189–91 biological risk, 18, 21–23, 89, 93, 166, 170 collective risk, 3, 17, 19, 173 environmental risk, 2, 18, 21, 23, 108, 113, 115, 117–20, 122, 125, 129–30, 136, 167–68, 174 individual risk, 17, 19, 173 new risks, 2, 4, 5, 16, 28, 32, 92, 164 risk assessment, 4, 5, 7, 13, 63, 100, 105, 131, 134, 136, 187 risk culture, 19, 24, 59, 117, 164–65 risk insurance, 17 risk management strategy, 8, 10 risk mitigation, 17, 19, 29, 47, 175, 185 risk regulation, 5–9, 11–19, 23, 27, 46–48, 60, 64–65, 69, 93, 98–99, 109, 110, 116, 120, 134–35, 163–64, 167, 178–79, 180 risk society, 6, 27–30, 71–72, 183 risk-taking, 5, 14, 19 unforeseen risk, 2, 16, 92 Risse, T., 77

Sabatier, P., 4, 8, 15 Sagan, S., 2, 4 Sandeland, L., 4 science, 3–5, 8, 12, 14, 18–19, 21–22, 28–30, 61, 63, 74, 91–92, 95, 98, 100, 106, 112, 126, 151, 163–64, 169–70, 180, 185, 189 September 11, 21, 36, 69, 72, 85, 90, 110, 123, 165–67, 171, 177 smoking, 2, 7–10, 12, 14–18, 91, 179 Staw, B., 4 Sunf lower Farmers Market, 91 Sunstein, C., 4, 32 survey, 27, 33, 42, 70–71, 76–77, 96, 101, 117, 119, 123, 126–27, 129, 139, 145, 150, 153–54, 157–58, 184, 186 Suskind, R., 2 Svedin, L., 114, 124 ‘t Hart, P., 23, 114, 136, 189 Tajfel, H., 76 technology, 4–6, 18, 20–22, 24, 27–28, 30, 48, 91, 103–104, 106–109, 143, 148, 158, 160, 163–64, 168, 170, 177–78, 180, 185–88 terrorism, 6, 21, 34–36, 38–39, 42–45, 70, 72, 127 trade, 1, 3, 8, 20, 22, 64, 66, 76, 89, 93, 110, 112, 120, 150, 166, 173–74 trading partner, 1, 8 trust, 11, 12, 19, 21, 23, 36, 46, 48, 55–56, 59–60, 65–66, 72, 93, 94, 98–99, 101, 116, 125–27, 167, 169, 170, 174–75, 179, 185, 189 trust in government, 11–12, 23, 48, 116, 125–26, 169 distrust, 63, 98, 128 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 106, 108, 138, 167, 186

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Index U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, see protection, Environmental Protection Agency U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, see Federal Emergency Management Agency U.S. Natural Resources and Conservation Service, see Natural Resources and Conservation Service

213

War on Terror, 2, 90, 110 White Paper, 103 Whole Foods, 91 Wildavsky, A., 2, 4 World Health Organization (WHO), 9 xenophobia, 21, 69, 74–75, 81, 85, 87, 165 Zapfel, P., 60

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