SALADIN IN EGYPT
THE MEDIEVAL MEDITERRANEAN PEOPLES, ECONOMIES AND CULTURES, 400-1453 EDITORS
(\'Varwick) (St. Andrews) D AVID ABULAFIA (Cambridge) BENJAMIN ARBEL (Tel Aviv) MICHAEL \ 'VHITBY
PAUL M AGDALINO, H UGH KENNEDY
M ARK M EYERSON
(Nolre Dame)
VOLUME 2 1
SALADIN IN EGYPT BY
YAACOV LEV
BRlLL LEIDEN . BOSTON· KOLN 1999
This book is printed on acid-rree paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lev, Yaacov. Saladin in Egypt I by Yaacov Lev. p. em. ( rile medieval Mediterranean, ISSN 0928- 5520 ; v. 21 ) ) and index. Includes bibliographical rererences (p. ISBN 9004 112219 (alk. paper) I. Saladin, Sultan or Egypt and Syria, 1137-1193. 2. Egypt- History-Saladin, 1171-1193. I. Title. II. Series. D'f 95.8. L48 1998 962'.02'092 dc21 98- 33830 e lP
Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Lev, Yaacov: Saladin in Egypt I by Yaacov Lev. - Leiden ; Boston; K61n : Brill, 1998 (lne medic:vaJ Mediterranean; Vol. 21 ) ISBN 9()-()+- 1 1221 ~9
ISSN 0928· 5520 ISBN 90 04112219
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PRI NTED IN TIn : NETIfERLANDS
CONTENTS
List of Abbreva tio ns ..... . ... .. ........ . ........... Acknowledgements ............... . ... . ... .. .... . .. Introduction ..................................... a. Questions and th e Sources ..................... b. The Ou tlines of Political History, 1 ]69-1174 ......
. . . . .
Chapter One: The So urces .......................... . I. Selling the Stage: The Twelfth Century .......... . a. Cultural and Religious Trends ................ . b. Political Life ............................•.. 2. Sa ladi n 's Hi slOri a ns ................ . .... . ..... . a. Qadi al-Fad il .............................. . b. ' iina d ai-Din .............................. . c. Ibn Shaddad .............. . .......... . d. Ibn a l-Athir e. Ibn Abi Tayy and Abu Sham a ................ . f. Maqrizi ................................... . 3. Textual Problems: Tendentious and Con fli cting Versions ..................................... . a. The Campaign of 11 67 ..................... . b. The Killing of Shawar ................ . ..... . c. The Nomination of Saladin as Vi zier ......... . d . The Battl e of th e Blacks .............. . .... . . e. The Procl amatio n of Abbasid Suzerainty
VII
IX XI XI XII
10 14 14
26 33 36 4I
43 45 45 46 49 49
50
Chapter Two: Saladin in Egypt. 11 69-1 174 . . . . . . . . . .. .. 53 1. Saladin's Rise to Power ................ . ... . . ... 53 a. The Sick Man on the Ni le. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 53 b. The Killing of Shawar ....................... 61 c. The Betrayal of the Fatimid State ............. 66 d. The Battle of the Blacks ............ . .... .. .. 8 ] 84 e. The Demise of the Fatimid State. . . . . . . . . . f. The Conspiracy of I 174 ...................... . 86 2. Expansionism and the Search for Legitimacy ...... 94 a. The Rupture with Nur aI-Din . . ............... 94 b . Yemen and Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 97
VI
CONTENTS
c. Syria........................... . ......... d. In Search of Legitimacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
IOl 105
Chapter Three: The Consolidation of Saladin's Rule. . . I . The Dismemberment of the Fatimid State ........ a. T he Appropriatio n of Urban Properties. . . . . .. h. In vestments in the Urban Econo my .......... c. The Acquis iti on of Agricultural Land. .. . . . . .. 2. Salad in 's Religious Policy ...................... a. Ismai li sm in Fatimid Egypt. . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .. b. The ReSLOration of Sunni Isla m ......•. . • . . .. c. Taxation and Religion. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. d. The Impact of Saladin's Pol icies ....•. . ......
108 108 108 J 13 11 5 11 6 11 6 J 24 132 136
Chapter Four: The Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. a. The Size and Military Composition o f the Army .. b. The Ethnic Composition of the Army ........... c. T h e Administration of the Army. . . . . . .. . . . . . ...
141 141 150 158
Chapter Five: The Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. a. T h e Fatimid Naval Inh eritance ................. b. Saladin and the Egyptian Mediterranean Towns .. c. The Creation of the Office of the Navy. . .. . . . . .. d. Saladin's Navy in Combat. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. e. Saladi n 's Navy and the Siege of Acre............ f. The Wider Context of Saladin's Naval Activity....
16 1 161 163 166 168 172 175
Chapte r Six: Th e No n-M uslim Com munities ... . . . . . . . a. Fatimid Realities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. b. Oppression and Pe rsecutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... c. The Impact of Saladin's Policies........... . ....
185 185 187 190
Co nclusions .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . ..
194
Bibliograp hy ....•........ • .... • ............ . •....
199
Ind ex ................................. . ... . •....
209
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AAS Abu Shama (Beirut) AI
BED BIFAO
BSOAS Crwadm and MII.dims
£,1.2. I:.gypl mid Syria
JESHO Th e jihad and its Time
l}MES JAOS JARCE
jNES JRAS JSM
JSS Maritime Asptr.1s
Asian and A/neall Studies ( H aira) Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatayn fi AltMar af-Dawlal(l)'II. (Heirul . o. d .), 2 vols Annahs hlam%giqllu Bulltlin des Eilides Oritmtaks Bulldin dt {'/nsli/1I1 Francais J'Archiologit GriU/lale Bulle/in of the School of Oriental (!lId A/neall S/lUlits
Crusadns and Muslims in
T~lflh-&lIl ury
Syria, (cd) M. Shalzmiller (I..eiden, 1993) Encyclopaedia of biOll/, 2nd Edilion I:.gypl arid Syria in the Falimid, Ayyubid and Ma1llluk Ears, (cds)
U. Ve rm eule n ;wc! D. De Sme t (Lcuven, 1995) jOllrrwl oj lilt Economic and Social History of lilt Orient The Jihad Gild its Time. Dedicated to And rew Stefan EhrenkrclILZ, (cds) H. D;yani-Shakeel and R. A. Messier (An n Arbor, 1991 ) International Journal of Middk f."'aJt Studies jOllnwl oJ the American Oriental Society journal of the American !usearch Center in Eg)'pt journal of Near Em/enl Studies jOllnwl of the ROJ'al Asiatic Society jenuakm Studies in Arabic and Islam journal of Semitic Studies Maritime Aspects of Migration, (cd ) K.. Friedland (Wien , 1989)
of Migration Medieval Historical Medieval Historical Writings in the Christian and Islamic Worlds, (cd ) D. O. Morgan (London, 1982 ) Writings MAl
MW REI SI War and Society
The Mariner's Mirror The Muslim World RevIU des Etudes /slarniques Studia Is/arnica War (md Socuty in the Eas/c7i MrditnTanean. 7th-151h CentuM, (cd) Y. Lev (Leiden. 1997 )
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In the course of my research and preparing this book I incurred debts of gratitude to many individuals and institutions. My thanks go first to Anne-Marie Edde of Paris, who read the elllire manuscript and made many helpful com ments and suggestions. John H. Pryor of Sydney read two early versions of the chapter on navy and cOnLributed much to its content. This chapte r was also read by Ruthi Geru.vagen of Haifa, who made valuable suggestions and ge nerously shared with me her vast knowledge of Acre during a tollr of th e city. John France of Swansea read th e chapter on army and offered many useful comments. Finaiy. I wish to thank Julian Deahl of Brill, who read the entire text and corrected my English. Need less to say that the responsibility for the book's content is sole ly mine. I am also pleased to acknowledge the generous assistance of the lib rarian s and staff of the following institutions: the Bodleian Library, Oxford; the Library of th e School of Oriental and African Studies, London; the Or iental Reading Room, the J ewish National and Un iversity Library, Jemsalem and Bar-Ilan Un iversity Library.
INTROD UCTION a) Questions and the SQurces
Th e m ain aim of thi s book is to discuss the wa nin g ofth e Fa timid sta le a nd to exa min e Sa ladin 's po li cies in Egyp t, whi ch created a new po liti cal and social o rde r. At th e beginnin g, it see med a simple and strai g htforwa rd malle r , the so urces abun da m and free ly avail· able. Howeve r, progress was ha mpe re d by pro bl e ms with the source ma te rial. It beca m e cl ear that m os t or o ur data o n Saladin 's adm inistrative , fiscal , military and naval poli cies in Egypt arc derived fro m a sin gle so urce: th e lost co ntem po rary c hro nicle by Qadi a lFa d il. O nl y Saladin 's re li gio us polic ies a rc we ll a ttested to by a va ri e ly of th e sou rces due to th e rich la te me di eva l bi og ra phi cal li te ratu re. I Oth er sou rces contem po rary with Saladin do p rovide in fo rm atio n o n hi s inte rn a l po licies, b ut th e data are bese t by imm e nse co ntradi cti o ns. Th e d iffi culti es with th e so urces are nOt a n ew pro bl e m . A numbe r of schola rs h ave d evo ted g reat effort in th e a tte mpt to und e rsta nd a nd cla rify th ese pro bl e ms, an d m y own work reli es mu ch o n th e ir Iindin gs.2 Th e co nte nt of th e book is shaped by th e n eed to re~exa min e th e sources a nd evenLS th a lle d to Saladin 's rise to power in Egypt. It must be said th a t re~exa minati o n of th e so urces is fru stra ting a nd occasionally quite futil e. Sa ladin is po rtrayed in diam e tri ca ll y o p posed ways by hi s admi rers a nd so m e of his c riti cs, nOla bl y Ibn a l~Athi r. Our ability to pe ne trate beyond th ese con t radi ctory ac~ counLS is se ri o usly ha mpe red by o ur limi ted unde rstandin g o f th e syste m o f po liti cal and m oral va lues th a t guide d th e men of th e tvre Lfth ce ntury. Th e refore, o ur abili ty to d iscern th e hidde n motives be hind th e confli cting prese nta tio ns of Saladin is restri cted. C hapter On e re n ec LS a nd d ea ls with th ese diffi culti es. But th e situa ti o n is no t a ltogeth e r ho pe less. T he o bvi o lls way out o f such dit-li culti es wi th connicting a nd co ntradi ctory d a ta is to empl oy sou rces whi ch d o not be lon g to th e tWO o pposin g hi sI Th is aspect has been deall with in great detai l by G. Lli Vicre Leiser, see bibliography. 2 See the works H. A. R. Gibb, P. M. Holt and D. S. Richards listed in the bibliography a nd quoted in Cha pters One and Two.
or
XII
I NTRODUCTION
torical traditions: of Saladin's admirers and his critics. Indeed, on some occasio ns. such independcm fragments do exist and provide an impo rtant corrective to sources biased one way or the other lO Salad in. Most surpri si ngly some origina l documents cited in fu ll in th e lite rary sources remain neglected. A careful reading of them sheds much fresh li ght on the events unde r discussion. These types of sources a re utili zed in C hapter Two. H owever, it is not only a question of so urces but also of perspeClive. Th e second chapter is written fro m the point of view of Fatimid history. The years 1169-1171 constitute a chapter in Fatimid history as much as they offe r a hislOI), of Saladin's rise to power. When th e events of these years are also approached from th e point of view of Fatimid realiti es a clearer picture of Saladin 's intentions and policies emerges. T h e n eed to exam in e and re·exam ine the sources also looms large when Saladin's inte rnal policies are examined (see Chapler Three). Frequently these policies are prese nted so as to accord with Salad in 's image as a pious and just ruler and devoted warrior of th e Holy War. We must always be aware of the fact that Salad in 's very real ac hi evements-th e victory at Hittin and the conquest of Jerusalem-had already been formed into a myth d u ri ng his lifeti me and thi s obli terated Saladin's personali ty and deeds . Only on rare occasi9ns is the non-mythical Saladin di sce rnable .
b ) Th e Outlines oj Political History, 1169-1174
The aim of this subsectio n is to provide a short account of th e political history of th e period 1169-1174 which wi n serve as an unifying te nn of reference for the whole book. T h e main eve n ts that took place in those years are refe rred to co nstan tl y in subsequent chapters. During th e .1060's Egypt became a battle ground between Fatimid military leade rs, who fo ught with th e h elp of fo reign armies for the post of the vizier. Two regional powers became involved in the internal affairs of Egypt; Nur ai-D in of Damascus and the Crusader Kingdom ofJ erusalem. From 11 62, Fatimid politics were overshadowed by Shawar's bid for power. In that year, Shawar, the governor of Upper Egypt, established himse lf in Ca iro and
I NTRODUCTION
X III
became the stro ng ma n beh ind th e throne . But hi s triumph was sh ort-li ved; he was drive n away fro m the capital by another co ntender for powe r , Dirgham . Shawar found refu ge in Damascus at the court of Nur ai-Din wh o m he persuaded to give military backin g to his attempt to regain power in Egypl. In Apri l 11 64, Shawar, supported by Nu r al-Din's expeditiona ry force commanded by Shirkuh. moved to Egypt. Shawar's bid for power was crowned with success: with Shirkuh 's help he re-established himself as vizie r. h oweve r , he had no intention of keeping his promises to Nur alOin . In order to oust Shirkuh from Egypt. Shawar e nlisted the support of Amalric. the King ofJ entsalem. Shawar's gamble proved to be correct beyond all expectations: the Fran ks a nd Shirkuh dashed in dec isively on Egyptian soi l and eve ntu all y both parties agreed to leave Egypt (Oc tober J 164). For a short period of time, Shawar cou ld enjoy the success of his divisive po li cies. In 11 67, Amalric and Shirkuh at th e h ead of their forces were again in Egypt. This rou nd of fi ghti ng was rich in eve nt. On 19 Marc h 11 67. th e Franks and Sh irk uh fought a major but inco nclusive battle kn own as the Battle of Babayn. In its wake. Shirkuh left Salad in to defend Alexandria whil e he himse lf overran Upper Egypt. For three months, Saladin was besieged in Alexandria by Shawar a nd the Franks. The siege brought great misery to tJl e be leaguered town and its inhab itants, but Salad in' s finn stan d c reated a military stale mate which co nvin ced th e Franks and Shirkuh to agree to the wi thdrawal from Egypt of both th e Crusad ers and Nur al-Din 's forces (Spri ng 11 67). By 11 68. the weakness of Egypt also attra cted th e atte n tion of Byza ntium . Th e two Christians powers o f the Eastern Mediterranean-Byzantium and the Crusad e r Kingd o m o f J e rusa le mnegotiated to combin e forces in ajoint military expediti on agai nst Egypl. It was an attractive alli a nce; Byza ntium had an important asset to offe r- h er nava l forces. No ne th eless, Amalrk lau nch ed hi s new offensive aga in st Egypt alone. In October 11 68, Shawar alone, with no h elp from Damascus, was confronted by the third Frankish invasion of Egypt. T he Crusaders stormed and conquered tJle town of Bilbays, and moved against the capilal whi ch comprised the two cities of Fustat and Cairo. On 12 November, Shawar set Fuslat on fire and alTered vast sums of money to buy off Amalric. Appeals for h elp from Shawa r , or a1-
XIV
I NTRODUCTION
invasion of Egypt with great concern a nd prepared, on hi s own initiative, a large force to be dispatched to Egypt. Shirkuh and Saladin found themselves once agai n campaigning in Egypt. Their very arrival to Egypt caused Amalric to retreat Uanuary 11 69). Following the departure of Amalric, Shawar found himse lf in a precarious position; he now had to face the victorious Syrian expeditio nary force . This proved to be a task beyond his ab ili ty. On 18 J a nu ary, he was killed by Shirkuh 's men. The e limin ation ofShawar paved the way for Shirkuh 's appointment as the Fatimid vizier. However, hi s term of office was a vcry short onc: he died o n 23 March 11 69. Three days later, Shirkuh was succeeded in the post by hi s nep hew, Saladin. From 26 March , 11 69 till I] September 1171 , Saladin served as Fatimid vizier. !-I e used h is post to stre ngthen his position vis-a-vis al-'Adid. The most important eve nt in the shift of power from a l-'Adid to Sa lad in was the dest ru ctio n o f the co rps of black Fatimid infan try, whic h compri sed the bac kbo ne of the army and se rved as the main buttress of the regi me (August 11 69). Nonethe less, the final overth row of th e Fatimid regime did no t fo ll ow imm ed iatel y. Wars with the Crusad e rs and th e d e fence of the Egyptian Mediterranean coas t absorbed mu c h o f Sa ladin's time and e ne rgy. Eventually, th e alliance between Byza ntium and the Crusad e r Kingdom of Jerusalem took co nc re te form and the two powers laun c hed a co mbin ed attack on Damie ua , which was beaten off by Saladin's forces (25 October-I 3 Dece mbe r, 1169). In December 1170, Saladin conducted a futile campaign in southern Palestine , but was more successful in Ayla (mod ern 'Aqaba), co nquerin g a Frankish fort o n a tiny off-shore island. In 1170, Saladin's position in Egypt greatly improved follo wing th e pacification of Upper Egypt, and his se nse ofpersollal sec urity stre ngth e n ed with the arriva l from Damascus of his exte nded family; father and brothers. During the period that Saladin served as Fatimid vizier, he pursued a policy which a im ed at undermining th e Isma ' ili character of the Fatimid state. In Muharram and Sha'ban 566/ September 1170 and May I] 71, three madrasas, law coll eges for teaching Sunni sc hools of law, were established in Fustat and Cairo, and a Sunni cadi was nominated in the capita l. At the beginning of Muharram 567/ September 1171 , the name of al-' Adid was omitted from the Friday sermon s delivered at the co ngregational mosqu es in the capital. The o mi ssio n of the name of the Fatimid
I NTRODUCTION
xv
ruler heralded a shift in political a ll egia nce in favor of the Abbasids and the offic ial return of Egypt to the Sunni fold. On 10 Muharram / II September, aVAdid died and with him was extin gu ished the Fatimid state. Until the death of Nur aI-Din in May 11 74, Saladin 's re lations with his fo rma l overlord were strai n ed. In Oc tobe r 1171 , a coordinated attack planned by Nul' a i-Din and Sa ladin on the Frankish fo rts of Karak a nd Shawbak came to naught due to Saladin 's failure to meet Nu r aI-Din. A year later, Salad in 's independent foray aga in st these stron gholds failed to restore trust to the relatio n s betwee n th e two leaders. SUl difficulties in the relations between Salad in and Nur ai-Din did not prevent Saladin from ruling Egypt as he saw fit. His position in Egypt was firm ly secured. A plot discovered in 11 74 was of minor significance, pos in g no rea l threat to his rule. From Egypt. Saladin conducted an expans ionistic policy in three directions: Nubia, the Mediterranean coast of North Africa and Yemen. Egypt itself was successfu ll y defended against a nother Christia n Mediterranean power-the Normans of Sicily. Their attack 0 11 Alexandria was repell ed after mu ch fighting (August 11 74).
CHAPTER ONE
THE SOURCES
I. Setting lhe Stage: The Twelfth Century
a. Cullural and Religious Trends I. The abundance of sources for Saladin's rise to power in Egypt should not mislead us as to our ability to fathom the deeper motives and aspirations of the main players on the political scene. We must be always aware that most of our information is derived from the writings of a small and well-defined group of Saladin's associates and admirers notably Qadi al-Fad il ,
2
CHAPTER ONE
lions of learning that spread throughout th e Middle East from the second half of the e leventh century. The cultural and religious life of the period was marked by traditionalism combined with mysticism, and focused on three institutions: madrasa, Manqo and dar aMtadilh. In the madrasa, Sunni law and other aux ilia ry subjects were taught. Dar al-Hadilh was an in stitution of a more narrow scope devoted to the study of the Prophetic traditions. The khanqa served the mystics (sufts) as a focal point of their social and religiolls life. The social life of the period was permeated to great extent by the zealous adherence of people. (la'assub),LO legal schools whic h were associated with theological schools of lhoughl.l The cu lture of Arabic-speaking lands of the twelfth-century Middle East was mu ch influenced by developments in Iran . The Seljuks, who reached Baghdad in 1055, were instrum ental in spreading re ligiolls trends and forms of social organ ization that had evo lved in the Iranian world. Parallel with the movement to ul e west of the Seljuks, men of religion «ulama') ,ju ri sts (juqaha') and Sufis e migrated from Iran. They tran splanted and disseminated Iranian Muslim culture to the Arabic-speaking Middle East and Egypt. The proliferation of madrasas in the Middle East is usually associated with the nam e of the Seljukid vizier, Nizam al-Mulk, th e founder of the Nizam iyya madrasa at Baghdad, in 1063. However, as the works of C. E. Bosworth and Ri chard W. Bulliet have shown, madrasas were common in Nishap ur and in o ther smaller towns of Khurasan before the second h a lf of the e leventh century. Also the fusion of law (jiqh), theology (kalam) and moderate forms of Sufism took place in Khurasan of th e tenth and eleventh centuries. In Nishapur two important developments took place; the adaption of Sufism by the Shafi' i jurists and the rise of the 1 For the traditionalist trend, see G. Makdisi, "The Sunni Re\ival ~, in Islamic Civitiwtioll,950-1150, (ed) D. S. Richards (Oxrord, 1973), reprinted in his History and Politics in Eleventh Ctnlury Baghdad, (London, 1990). For the spread of Sufism, see G. Makdisi. "The Ha nbali Sc hool and Sufism~, HtHnoniqra Isiamica, 2( 1974), 61-72. For Sufi institutions such as Ithanqa, wwiya and ribat see, D. Morray, An Ayyubid Notable (Hul His Wqrtd, (Le iden, 1994), 13940. For Ule social significance of the adhe rence to legal schools, see R. W. Bulliel, The Patricians ofNishapur, (Cambridge Mass., 1972 ), 28-39; I. M. Lapidus, "Muslim Cilies and Islamic Socielies~ in Middle Eastern Cities, (cd) I. M. Lapidus (Bcrkeley, 1969),50,53-4; W. Madelung, "The Spread of MaUl rid ism a nd the Turks~, re printed in his, Retigiow Schools and Stcu i1l Meditval Islam , (London, 1985), 135. l owe the last reference La the kindncS$ of O. Talman- Heller of the Hebrew University, J erusalem .
TH E: SOU RCES
3
khanqa as a lypical Sufi in slitUlion. 2 Th e personal contribUlion of Nizam al·Mulk. him self of Irani an o ri gi n . must not be unde res ti· mated. He c reated a ne twork of law colleges and hltanqas whic h covered the most important c iti es of Iran and Iraq . As an instilu· tion of learning th e NizamiYY'l was different in its educational cha r· acter and th e way it was admini stra ted fro m oth er institutions of learning in eleve nth centu ry Baghdad. As for th e motives of Ni7..am al·Mulk. th e vizier. in th e words of George Makdisi , "so ug ht to control the 'u lama ' in o rd er to control th e masses".3 In the earlie r periods. scholars a nd men of re li gion were to great ex te nt economically inde pe nde nt a nd pursued a varie ty of different occupatio ns. Th e process o f lea rnin g itself was not rigidly stru ctured and did not center o n a speci fic educatio nal institution . Most of the teac hing took place at the mosqu e which was a ffiu lti·pur. pose institution for worship, learn ing and soc iali zing. In th e longer run, th e spread of the law coll eges in th e Middle East (in th e seco nd half o f th e eleventh century and throughout the twe lfth ce ntu ry) was instrume ntal for the in stitutio naliza ti o n and professionalizatio n of scho la rship in m edievall sla m .'1 At the law coll eges. the sllld e nts l! For cultural a nd educational dcvelopmcn ts, see C. E. Boswon h, The GhlUlwvilts. T/,rir Empire in Afghanistan GIld East"" Imn , 994-1040. 2nd. ed. (Beirut, 1973). 173. 174-5: nulliet, The Patrician.J, 39. n. 19,249-55. and Islam. Th, View from the Edge. (N. Y.• 1994), c h. 9: Madelung. 141: t.L Malamud. ~Su fi Organization a nd
M Structures or Authority in Medieval Nishapur , IjMES. 26( 1994). 427-9, 435, 436. , G. Makdisi, - Muslim InSlilUtions of Learning in Ele\'cnth Century Baghdad". BSOAS. XX IV( 196 1),55, reprinted in his IUligioll, Law and Learnillg in Cla.ssiwl Isla III, (Lo ndo n, 199 1). In poiiticalrerms, Sulli e! sees the I/Illdrasll as o ne orthe tools in the hands of th e regim e to control the patriciate. See , Til e Palricia lls, 73. Thc esse nce of th e I/Itldra.Ja is much d ebated among the schola rs. For a rccell! critical review of the prevailin g views, see M. Cha mbe rlain , KlIOwltdgt' and Social Pra ctice i'l M"ditval /)(Hnascus, l19()..f350. (Ca mbridge. 1994). cll. 2. For his discussion o f the politica l utili ty o f the madra.sa, see 5 1-3, esp., 52. 4 For scho la r'S in th e first centuries of Islam, see H.J. Cohen. ~The Econo mic Backgrou nd a nd the Secular O ccupations of Muslim J urisprude nts and Tr.tdi· tiona1ists in the Classica l Period or Islam",JESHO, IS ( 1970), lfi..88. esp., 25, 39. For later periods. see J. E. Gilbert, Mlnsti mtionalization of Muslim Scholarship and Pro ressionalization of th e 'U lama' in Medie ..... 1 Damascus", SI,( 1980), 10534, esp., 114: Bulliet . Islam . 149. For the spread or madra.sa.s. sec D. Sourdel. ~Renexions sur la diffusion dc' la madrasa c n Orient du Xli: au Xlll e siecle". REI, XLlV( 1976), 165-84. On th c base or evidence drawn from Nishapur. Bulliet states that: · h \\'as tcaching rat he r than learni ng that V.~dS thc object o r systcm· ati zation~ and ~Thc cen tral co ncc rn of the systcm was ce rtification o r t cachers~. See . The l>alrician.J, 49, 50. To what ex tent these conclusions apply to th e Arabic· speaking la nds ofthe Middle EaSt in the eleventh·twelfth ce ntu ries is, at th is stage of the researc h, uncleOlf.
4
CHAPTER ONE
were fin anciall y supporte d durin g the pe riod of th e ir learnin g by in com es derived fro m pious e ndowme n ts se t up for the benefit o f th ese institutions. Needless to say that the tcachin g staff of the co llege was paid too. Under th e SeUuks the in volve m e nt o f th e government in the religious life, in th e form of politica l backing of lega l and theological sc hools of thought, was greatly inte nsified. The Turks adhered fanatically to th e Hanafi legal sys tem and objected to Ash'an theology. In th e la nds unde r th e ir rule in Ira n a nd the Middle East these re ligious pre fe re nces were translated into morc or less sys te mati c s late po licies.5 Wh e n approaching the religious and c ultural li fe o f the twe lfth century il would be misleadin g to focus o nly o n th e hig h culture of the jurists a nd law co ll eges or the lea rn ed Sufis in th e khanqas. Th e Islam of the m asses, urban a nd certainl y rural , was differe ntly o ri e n ted; more toward spirituali sm a nd less concern ed with texts. In popular Islam ho ly men we re m ore ce ntral than lea rn ed m e n of religion. But the religion of th e e duca te d e lite and that of the masses were not worlds e ntirely apa rt. Adherence to legal sc hoo ls was important and cen t ral in the lives a nd ou tlook of the historians of th e peri od as mu ch as it was in the li ves of their less renowned contempo rari es. 6 Within Sunni Islatn, a wide common ground can be discerned betwee n hig h a nd po pular fo rms of religion , and many religious practices were typical of bo th the Islam of the edu cated elite and o f that of the peopl e. Cross influences are discerned a lso be t\vee n Sh i SeUukid policies we re nOI withoul precedent. For instance, the Shafi'i legal school e njoyed the 5Upport or the Ghaznavid rulers, 5ee C. L. Klausne r, The &ljuk Vetirate, (Cambridge Mass., 1973),63-4. For Olher examples, see, Madel ung. 126-7, 129, 130-3, 146-7. 6 Madelung, 132, n.59, 140. 7 For the Fatimid origin or mawlid al-,wbi, see R. Sh inar. ~Traditional a nd Reformist Mawlid Celebrations in the Maghrib~ , in Studies in Memory of Gaston Wid, (cd) M. Roscn-Ay.d o n Uerusalem, 1977) ,73; Y. Lev, Stale and &x:Uty in Fatimid EgyPt, (Leide n, 199 1), 146. For its adaptation by Nur al·Din, 5ee N. J . G. Kaptein , Muhammad's Birthday Fej/ival, ( Leidcn , 1993). 3 1-4.
T H E SOU RCES
as in Fati mid Egypt. In Baghdad in t he thi rd decade of th e n in th ce n tu ry th ese ce lebra ti o ns we re opposed by th e Ha n ba li s who consi d e re d th em to be a n u nl awful innova tion . Bu t in the twe lfth ce ntu ry, a Ha n bali rura l com m un ity in Syria adopte d th ese rites withou t reserva ti on. Th e visita ti o n of th e graves of h oly me n a nd wome n was a n a n othe r re li gious p ractice com mo n to urba n and rural soc ieties whi ch crossed th e bounda ri es of Shi
6
CHAPTER ONE
mi zes the prevailing political id eologies and the measure of cooperation between the civi li an e lite and rulers in the twelfth ce ntury. As Ibn 'Asakir him self Slates, hi s ai m was to e num erate Nur al-Din 's virtues (manaqib). But hi s note is more than just a dull list of vinues. Ibn 'Asakir provides a compre hensive account of Nur a i-Din 's military exploilS and religious and social policies. Nonetheless, his account is a mixture of both virtues and policies and is dominated by the tendency LO personify Nur al-Din's policies. Nur ai-Din is described as a person with an aptitude for learning and religious learning in particular. He scrupulously followed religious observances such as prayers, alms-giving (sado.qa) , and fasting, and was modest and restrained in his personal manners. He fol· lowed the example of th e forefathers (salaj) and of men of reli· gion and piety. II Ibn 'Asakir's account begins with a brief history of th e Zengid family mentioning Nur a l·Din 's grandfather, Ak Sungur. and Nur al·Din's father, ' lm ad a l·Din, and his exploits against the C hris· tians-the Crusaders and the Byzantines. 12 The essential pan of the text begins with the establishment of Nur al·Din 's rule in Aleppo. At this point, Nur a l·Din's c redentials as a warrior ofthe Holy War are presented, and his struggle against the Shj'ites in Aleppo is described. Ibn
TH E S O URCES
7
Nur al·Din conquered submiltcd th cmse lves LO his rul e. I" Th ese re marks reflec t the fa ct th at illle rn al wa rs betwee n vari ous Musli m po te ntates were th e no rm in th e twelfth ce ntu ry and Nur al·Din in creating his state fought as much against fellow Muslims as against th e Christians. Nur al·Din 's po li cies a nd deeds in Damascus are d esc ribed in great d etai l. Th e walls of the town were imp roved a nd law co l· leges we re set up. Nur al· Din bro ught eco no mi c pros pe rity LO th e town and ill egal taxes we re a bo lished . Th e taxati o n of win e was stopped and its consumption pro hibited . Justice was administe red by th e judicial syste m and Nur al·Din established th e Palace o f Justi ce (dar at-cadl) personally pres id ing ove r th e hearings. Men of reli gio n we re well treated a nd ho n ored . IS Ibn ' Asaki r specifies Nul' al·Din' s ac ts of ge nerosity towa rd th e wea k ele men ts in th e soc iety. He lavished alms on the orp hans and poo r and es tablished p io us e ndowme n ts for th e treatme n t of th e sick, in san e a nd blind . Also those wh o taught o rpha ns th e Ko ra n and writin g were paid by p ious e ndowm e nts. 16 These deeds of Nul' ai-Din are pa n o f wha t migh t in mod e rn parla nce be d escribed as hi s soc ial policy. However , Ibn 'Asakir uses th e word sadaqa, alms-givin g/ charity, fo r bo th Nur al-Din 's soci al po licy and his pe rsonal religios ity. Th e lack of a di stin cti on be twee n publi c and pe rso na l aspects in th e lives and activiti es of rule rs is clea rly a nd ni ce ly illustrated here. This blurrin g o f bo unda ri es is be h ind th e juxtapositi o n of Nur alOin ' s vinues and po li cies in Ibn 'Asakir's account. Th e sa me lack of distin ctio n is revea led when Ibn 'Asakir me ntio ns vario us building proj ects of Nu r ai-Din such as 1ibals (a multiro le institutio n; fo rtifi ed o utpost, inn fo r trave ll ers or place fo r th e Sufis and poor ), khanqas, hospita ls, bridges and khans (carava nserais). Th ese po licies, says Ibn 'Asakir, were implem e nted thro ugho ut Nur ai-Dill 's te rrito ri es. 17 Th is account Jumps LOgether I~ Ibn 'Asa kir (cd ) ElisscclT, 137, para., 5: 140 , para., 3: MS, XVI, 293, I, 32; 296, II , 6-7. IS Ib n 'Asakir (cd ) ElisscelT, 137. para., 5, 7; 138, para., I; MS. XVI. 293, I, 33; 294 , II , 3-4, 10·2. 16 Ibn 'Asakir (cd ) El isseclT. 138, para ., 1-2; MS. XVI, 294 , 11 , 13,2 1-2. 17 Ibn 'Asaki r (cd ) Elissecff, 138, para., 1-2; MS, XVI, 294. II , 2 1-3. For the .spread of ribat.J fro m Khu r.Is,,·m LO lJaghdad and the associa tion of ribat.Jwith Sufism, scc J. Ch ab bi, ~La fo nc cion du riba l it lJagd ad du Vi: sicclc au d e b ut d u VUe sii:clc-, REI, XLI I ( 1972), 10 1-2 1. According to Lou is I'ouzet, wi thin the CO li text of the Sufi world of th in ccnth
8
CHAIYfER ONE:
two quite different categories of building; those which served commercial purposes and facilitated travel and trade (ca ravansaries and bridges), and buildings which had religious and social functions. In the same vein justice is equated with economic prosperity. The theme of justice appears several times in Ibn
c ialed with women. See, his Damas au Vlle/Xllle sieck. Vie et structures religieuses dmu une mitropole islamique. (Beirut. 1991 ). 21 1. lowe the last referen ce to the kindness of Anne-Marie [ddt. For ribals designated for women in pre-Fatimid and Fatimid Egypt, see ch. 3. 18 Ibn 'Asaki r (ed) Elisseeff, 137, para., 7, 140, para .• 2, 6. Ibn 'Asakir's reference to Nur ai-Din's buildings does not cover the full exte nt of his building activities. For that, see N. ElisseefT, ~Le5 monuments d e Nur al·Din"', BED, XIII ( 19491951),5-50. 19 Ibn 'Asakir (ed) [Iisseeff, 137, para., 6, 138, para., 3-4, 140. para., 5; MS, XVI, 294, 1, 7, 296, 11 , 8-9.
THE SOURCES
9
also given iqla's in exchange for ceasing their depredations against the pilgrims. 2o Ibn 'Asa kir, a scion of a leading family of learned me n in Damascus, lived and wrote his huge biographical di c tionary of people connected wilh the history of Damascus under the rule of Nur alDin (who expressed interest in hi s work and e nco uraged him to finish it). Ibn 'Asakir, on his part, lent SUppOrl to Nur al-Din's religious policies. 21 Thus Ibn ' Asakir's appraisal of Nur al-Din's rule , although not an official biography, is the product of a sympathizer. Ibn 'Asakir 's text bears witness to the fact that the call for a Holy War turned into a powerful political and religious force in Syria of the second haIf of the twelfth cenlllry. Nur aI-Din adopted the ideology of Lhe Holy War and manipulated it for political ends. He assumed the tiue t1lujahid, warrior of the Holy War, early in his rul e (1149). By comparison, Nur al-Din's faLher did not use this title. eve n not after th e conquest of Edessa in 11 44. In ur al-Din 's protocol the title al-'adil-the just (meaning the just mler)-preceded even the title tltujahid. Ibn 'Asakir's text reOecl'i this presumption by stressi ng Nur al-Din's concern with the proper administration of justice by the cadi and the establishment of the Palace ofJustice. In the Palace ofJustice the hearin g of grievances (nazirfi ' l-mazalim) look place. Basically, this was justice dispensed by the ruler himself: it had a long history in pre-Islamic Midd le East and medieval Islam before Nur a I-Din and was also perceived as a symbol of sovereignty and power. Nur a l-Din's innovation was essentially instrumental: he set lip the Palace of Justice to manifest his interest in the hearing of grievances and to e mphasize his authority as a sovereign. 22 Ibn 'Asa kir's text must have been known to ' Imad ai-Din who, about 1:\\'0 decades later, also wrote a n appraisal of Nur al-Din's Ibn 'Asakir (ed) ElisseeIT, 138, para., 1-2; MS, XVI, 294. II . lS..fi, 19. For the cooperation between Nur ai-Din and Ibn 'Asakir, see Elissceff. ~U ne docum c nl~ . 126; Mo rray, 144-5 ;Jean-Michel MOUlOn. Dama.s tl .sa Principallli .sOIlS It.s Saljoukich.s tt u.s Baurich.s 468-549/J076-1I54, (Cairo, 1994 ), 4.5,6-7. 22 Fo r Nur al-Din 's titles, see Y. Tabbaa. ~ M o numenlS with Message: Propagation ofJihad under Nural-Oin (1 14 6- 11 74)~, in Tile Muting of Two Worlds, (ed) V. P. Coss (Michigan , 1986),224,226; N. Elisscc fT. ~ La limlature de Nur aI-Din d'apres ses inscriptions\ BED, Xrv( 1952- 1954), 171-3, 18 1-2. For daral-'adl, see J. S. Nielsen, SecularJustice in tilt l.slamic Stalt, (Istanbul , 1985), 13; N. O. Rabbat. '"The Ideological Significance of Dar al-'Adl in the Medieval Islamic Oriene, IjMES, 27(1995),2()'1. 2(/
21
10
C HAPTER ONE
reign. The simil arities between the two texts are many and fundamental.
While Ibn 'Asakir's text is impo rtant for unde rstanding the ideological dimension of relations between rulers and civi li ans, 'U mara 's description of Fatimid politics reveals the real context in which th ese relations took place. 'U mara was a poet of Yeme ni origin,
U AI-Bundari, Sana at.Barq al-Shami, (ed ) R. Sesen (Beirut. 1971),55-6, 1434, 145. For ' Imad al-Din's admiration of Nur a i-Din, see D. S. Richards, ~' Imad ai-Din al-Isfahani. AdminislJ"ator, Litterateur and Historian ", in Crusaders and Mwlims in Twelfth-Century Syria, (ed) M. ShalZmi lier (Leiden, 1993), 146. 24 E_ Sivan, L'lslam et la Croisade, (Paris, 1968),73.
T H E SOU RCES
II
who live d in Egypt durin g th e clos in g yea rs of th e Fatimid period an d th e first years of Saladin 's rul e. 'Uma ra is a well-known perso nality. Hartwig De re nbo u rg h as studied his life and edited hi s poe try and mo re recenLl y Pie Ler Smoo r discussed many of its aspec ts . The refore I sh all o nly di sc uss a few poin ts d irec tly pertine nt to th e pu rpose o f th e prese nt wo rk . Maqri zi ( 1364- 1442) provides a con cise bu t vivid acco unt o f 'U ma ra's ea rl y life and hi s caree r at th e Naj ahid co urt in Zabid . 'U ma ra arri ved in Zabid in 53 1/ 11 36- 11 37 at th e age of sixtee n in searc h of fu rth e r educatio n. Fo r a bo ut seve n years he stud ied Sh afi ' i law in Zabid . From 538/ 11 43- 11 44
12
CHAPTER ONE
of Arabia, Yemen and Egypt were extensive. According to his own testimony, 'Umara served as an emissary. trader on behalf of rulers, keeper of deposits and above all as panegyrist 26 He describes his relations with members of the ruling circl es as based on payment in exchange of service (khudma) and panegyric (madh).27 But some of his relations were based on friendship (unsa), too. For example, such were
THE SOURCES
13
The reason behind the plot was the marriage between Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik's daughter and the Fatimid Imam. It was a forced marriage by which the vizier attempted to gain supreme power and legitimacy in the Fatimid state. 'U mara, a Fatimid sympathi zer, says nothing about the background and the circu mstances of Tala' i' ibn Ruzzik 's death. But he provides a summary of his ru le. Basically he describes him as a civilized ru ler. Undoubted ly what appealed most to 'U mara was Tala' i' ibn Ruzzik 's love of literature and literati and the fact that the viz ier himself was a poet. 'Umara is even more enthusiastic about the short rule of Ruzzik ibn Tala 'i', the vizie r's son, who was entitled as ai-Malik ai-Nasir al-'Adi L He occupied the post of the vizier between 1161-1162. The new vizier abo lished unlawful taxation , ceased financial extortions and was very generous toward the Holy Cities of Arabia. Ruzzik ibn Tala'i' was killed by Shawar, or hi s so n Tayy, following a successful rebellion. 'U mara describes in vivid terms how in the viz ierial palace he was shown by the conspirators the head of the slain vizier. 'U mara was shocked and says that it was a revolting killing. Although he condemns it, he is very positive in his appreciation of Shawar's first period as th e vizier.3o 'Umara tries to strike an objective tone when writing about Shawar whose friendship and financial support he fully acknowledges. During his second vizie rate Shawar shed much blood and 'U mara holds him responsible for the invasion of Egypt by th e Crusaders and Nur ai-Din. 'Umara sums up his evaluation of the Fatimid viziers by saying that there was no one like Tala' i' ibn Ruzzik who advanced members of the rulin g establishment wh il e the vizier Dirgham exce ll ed in killing them and the Shawar family impoverished them by financial extortions. The killings perpetrated by Dirgham were a result of factional power struggles with in the anny. Umara's remarks reveal the fear a nd the powerlessness of the civilians in the face of the unleashed violence. 3l Administrators and men of religion were politically and econom icall y dependent on so 'U mara, 66-7, 69. In many ways 'U mara 's poetry is highly idiosync ratic verging on the blasphemous. The same is true with his exaggera ted praises of the vizie r Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik. See, P. Smoor, '''The Master of the Century': Fatimid Poets in Cairo~, in ElrYpt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyuhid and Mamlulc Eras, (eds), U. Verme ulen and D. De Smet (Leuven, 1995), 148-52. For 'Umara's assessment of both the vizier Tala 'i' ibn Ruzzik and his son, Ruzzi k, see Oadoyan , 164-5, 168, 171·2. ~I 'Umara, 74, 77, 87, 88.
14
CHAI'>TER ONE
rulers. Th e rulers held a monopoly on administrative posts and they c reated vast and luc rative pious endowments through which religious and educational in stitutions were maintained. In this viol e nt politi ca l environment th e c ivilian e lite had to struggle for survival and influence while trying to maintain 3tleasl a semblance of self.respect and integ rity.32
2. Saladin's Historians 3.
Qadi al-Fa.dil
I. The p ersonal biographies of Saladin's historians are as important as the cultural and religious milieu of th e twelfth century. AJI of the three historian-admirers of Saladin entered into his service in the prime of th e ir lives bringing with th e m ex perience and established sets of values. In many ways the most imponant per· sonality among this group was 'Abd al·Rah im ibn 'Ali al·Baysani known as Qadi al·Fadil who was born on 15 Jumada II 529/ 1 April 1135, in Ascalon. Th e sources at our disposal differ regarding the famil y origin. One versions says tha t the family origin had been from Baysa n , a small and humble town in Palestine, and al·Fadil's father, who died in 544 / 1149·1150. at the age of 43. served as the cadi and Comptroller (nazir) of Ascalon. Following the fall of the town to the Crusaders ( 1153) the family moved to Egypt. 33 An· other version says that the family had its origins in Ascalon , but a l·Fadil's father was appo in ted as the cadi of Baysan and the fam· ~2 A different approach is adopted by O. E. P. Jackson, who sees the Muslim society of the twelfth century as vertically structured and c ut across by professional and administrative classes which "tended to be relatively unaffected by the higher political turmoil ofa given age~. See, his "Some Preliminary Reflections 011 the Chancery Correspondence of th e Qadi al-FadW, in Egypt and Syria, 208. " Ibn Muyassar, Akhbar MisT, (ed) A. F. Sayyid (Cairo, 198 1), 144; Ibn al'Adim , Bughyat al-Talab ft Ta'rikh Halab, (ed) S. Zakkar (Damascus, 1988), II , 981; Abu Shama, Kitah al-Rawdataynft AJrhbar al-Dawlatayn, (eds) M. H. M. Ahmad a nd M. M. Ziyada (Cai ro, 1962) , I, pt,2, 403. The fact that Qadi al-Fadil's father senred as a cadi in Ascalon is well attested to. Abu Shama quotes a docume nt issued in 1147 by aI-Hafiz to Qadi al-Fadil's father, who is described as responsi ble for jurisdiction (qu da 'and hukm) in /\scalon. This document deals with the question who are authorized to give attestation (taz.Jriya) at the court, i.e. to senre as witnesses. See, Abu Shama, (ed) M. H . M. Ah mad (Cairo, 1956), I, pt. l , 128-
9.
THE SOURCES
15
ily epithet reflects uli s appointment rather than the fami ly's place of origin.34 It is rather strange that such basic facts regarding an eminem pe rson like Qadi al-Fadi l are co ntroversial. Th e reasons for this differen ce of opinion and il'i possible significance, if any, are unclear. Notwithstanding this difficulty it is possibl e to reconstruct Qadi al-Fadil's ea rly career and how he emered into the service of Shirkuh and Saladin from the so urces. Acco rding to most of Qadi al-Fadi l' s biographers, he received his basi c education in Ascalon. This included the memorization of Koran and so me poetry. The next stage brought the young Qadi al-Fadi l to Cairo where he went in search for a patron and further education. According to Qadi al-Fadil's own memoires, the patron he found was head of the Fatimid Chancery, Ibn Khallal. There is nothing implausible in this version . It was a trad ition that people employed in th e administration brought their sons to the Chancery and other adm inistrative offices to be introduced to the an of an epistolary and secretarial writing (rasa 'il), which was highly cultivated in the Fatimid state. 35 It was an informal, but possibly forma li sed, system of cooperation among the administrators to help the careers of their sons and to improve the chances that they could bequea th their posts to their so ns. Thus the training of Qadi al-Fadil for a career in the admin istration fell within a familiar pattern. The same picture emerges from the available data concerning th e education of an another Falimid administrator and a renowned master of the e pistolary art, Ibn al-Sayrafi ( 1071-1147). In his youth, Ibn al-Sayrafi was instructed in the art ofwriling rasa 'it by the head of the Offi ce of the Army. Later he was assigned to serve in the Chancery becoming, in due time , th e head of the office. 36 As in any other pre-modern traditional society, the tenden cy to inherit posts and occupations was powerful and common and the civi li an elite was not exceptional in this. S? For its part, !14 AI-M undhiri , II , 2 10-1; YaquI, Mu'jam al-Udaba', ted) 1. 'Abbas (Be irut, 1993), lV, 1562-3; Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat ai-A'yan, (ed) 1. 'Abbas (BeirUl. 196871), III, 158, 161. 35 The source for this information is Diya ai-Din ibn al-Athir, the brother of Ibn al-Alhir, the historian. Diya ai-Din tells about a conversation he had with Qadi al-Fadil in Damascus in 1192. See, Abu Shama, I, pl ,2, 487-8; cf: C. Makdisi, Tlu Rist of H11 manum in Classical Islam and tht Christian Wtst. (Edinbu rg h, 1990). 65-6. ~ Ibn Muyassar, 138. '7 Diya a i-Din ibn al-Alhi r, 011 the authority of Qadi a l-Fadil. quoted by Abu Sham a, I , pt,2, 488.
16
CHAPTER ONE
the Fatimid regime was not hostile to these practices. 38 The beneficent altitude of the regime was in line with the conservatism and quest for social stab ility typical of the societies of thal age. It was also a calcu lated policy instrumental in fostering the loyalty and the dependence of the civilian e lite on the state. Allhough Qadi al-Fadi l found a patron in Cairo, the next stages of his education are a mystery, and the title of cadi (qadi) does not necessarily imply that he received a systematic legal education. It was a honorific for high-ranking persons common in the Fatimid administration. 39 In fact, in early lweJfth-century Fatimid Cairo, there were very few opportunities to acquire a solid education in one of the Sunni legal systems. The first colleges for teaching Sunni law in Egypt were established in Alexandria not in the capital. In its religious and cultural life Alexandria was very different from the capital. The impact of Ismailism on Alexandria was weak. The town was connected by sea-routes to Muslim North Africa and Spain and open to innue nces emanatin g from these staunch Sunni regions. Many scholars and jurists who belonged to the Maliki legal school came to Alexandria and settled there. The first institution for teaching Maliki law was set up in the town toward the end of the e leventh century, and other were established during the first half of the twelfth century. The beginnings of Qadi a l-Fadil' s career are connected with Alexandria; for some time he was employed in the local administration as a scribe. But it is unreasonable to assum e that he attended any law co ll ege in Alexandria. AI-Mundhiri (1185-1258), in his obituary note for Qadi a l-Fadil, says on ly that he studied under the two most celebratedjurisLS of !II See the somewhat vague and distorted repon of Ibn Abi TaY}' as quoted by Maqrizi in his Kilab al-Mawa'iz wa- 'l-rtibarbi Dhikr al-Khilaf wa-'l-Athar, (Bulaq , 1324 ), 11 ,309-3 10. Ibn Abi TaY}' credits al-Mu'izz, the first Fatimid ruler in Egypt, with the in itiative to train talented youth for governmental service. Provincial governors were ordered to se nd promising youths from the awlad al·na.s to Cairo for training. In Maqrizi's time the tenn awlad al-flas meant the sons of the Mamluks, however , his use of it for the Fatimid period is anachronistic. ~9 For instance, Qadi al-Fadil's secretary (haM), who served him in the Fatimid period, was also entitled as a cadi . In 400/ 10()9..10IO, me title cadi was bestowed on a Ch ristian administrator. But this case can be dismissed as o ne of al-Hakim's idiosyncrasies. See Ibn al-'Adim, IV, 2302; Maqrizi, ltti'az. at-Hanafa' bi Ahhbar alA'imma al-Fatimiyyin al-Khulafa', (ed ) M. H. M. Ahmad (Cairo, 1971 -1973), 11 , 8 1; III , 254; cf: I. M. Lapidus, "Ayyubi d Relig ious Policy and the Developmelll of Schools of Law in Cairo", in Colloq ue international sur l'hiSloire du Caire. 1969, (Leipzig, 1974), 282.
TIiE SOURCi':S
17
Alexandria of that time: a l-Sitafi a nd Ibn 'Awf. 4o In 556/ 11 6 1, Qadi a l-Fad il was call ed back to Cairo to senre in the Office of the Army. This was an initiative of Ru zzik ibn Tala 'j' taken im mediately after he ass um ed power fo ll owing the assassination of his father. 41 Qadi a l-Fad il was a n eyewitness to the disi ntegration of th e Fatimid state. He was in a good position to gai n insight into the eve n ts; he mingled with the key players on the poli tical scene. During the twilight ofthe Fatimid rule the paths of Qadi al-Fadil and 'U mara met o n seve ral occas io ns. 42 They moved within th e sa me circles, but their ways separated with the arrival of the Ayyub ids to Egyp t. II. How exac tly Qadi a l-Fad il gained the trust ofS hi rku h and later of Saladin is difficult to asce rtain. Certa inly, the circu mstances were propitious for shi ftin g his all iance toward th e leaders of Nur a lOin's army in Egypt. Qad i al-Fadi l him se lf, like the vast majority of th e civi li an e li te in th e service of th e Fatimids, was a Su nni Muslim. H e could have little religious sympat hy for the Fatimid regime . Furthermore, Qadi al-Fad il lived in a period which saw a steady declin e in th e position of Ismai l ism as the state religion of Fatimid Egypt. This process was most adva n ced in Alexand ri a but was felt in the capita l as wel l. During the twe lfth century, some of the vizie rs who actually rul ed the Fatirnid sta te adopted policies which e rod ed th e privileged position th at Ismai li sm had enjoye d in th e tenth-eleventh ce ntu ries. This trend also continue d durin g the vizie rate ofTa la'i' ibn Ruzzik , who did not hes itate to humiliate the Fatimid regime on public occasions by displaying the black co lors of the Abbasids instead of the Fatimid whi te. 43 An insight into Qadi al-Fadil's inner worl d is offe red by Smoor's analysis of his poctry from th e closing days of th e Fatimid dynasty. Smoor obsenres that it is evid ent th at Qadi al-Fad il "s howed no particular kn owledge of or interest in , Fatimid teachings". One of Qadi 40 The tec h nical term used by a l-M undhiri is a general one sami'a min. See. 11 ,2 10 ; Ibn Furat , To 'rikh ibn al-Furat. (cd) M. al-Shama (Basrd. 1969), IV, pt.2, 185. Fo r Alexandria and its mlllirasas. see C. Leise r, M The Madrasa and the Islamization or the Midd le East. The Case or EgyptM.JARCE, XX II (1985), 37-40; Lev, State, 139-40. 41 'U mara , 53-4; Maqrizi, IlIi'al.. , III , 254. 42 'U mara . 79-80. 4:i Maqrizi, IlIi'al.., 111 , 217, 222; Ibn H ajar al-'Asqalani, Raj al-' Isr 'an Qudat Misr, (ed ) I-I. A. Mag id (Cairo, 1961 ), II , 303-4.
18
CHAPTER ONE
al-Fadil's poems studied by Smoor "seems to be a kind of farewell to the whole Fatimid dynasty which would soon make way for the rabid orthodoxy of the Ayyuhids". 44 Whatever were Qadi al-Fadil's personal re ligious beliefs, as a perso n trained in the Chancery. he was well ve rsed in the intricacies of Ismai ' li doctrine and phraseoiogy. as is exe mplified by the le tlers of appointment which he wrote for Shirkuh and Saladin as Fatimid viziers. But a familiarity with a doc trine does not reflect convictions. Th e re can be little doubt that Qadi al-Fadi l already adhered 1O Sunni Islam when he was serving the Fatimids. 45 How th e ties between Qadi al-Fadil and Shirkuh were established remains elusive. The most common version as quoted by the historian Abu Shama (1203-1268) inspires little confidence. This account says that Shirkuh, following his a ppointment as the vizier, asked for a scribe to run his Chancery. Qadi al-FadiI's superiors in the Fatimid Chancery sent him to Shirkuh with the hope that he would share the fate of his predecessor, who had bee n killed by Shirkuh. The reason for their dislike of Qadi al-Fadil was hi s lofty position under Shawar's son, al-Kamil. 46 IL is difficull to ascerta in whether Abu Sh ama gives this in formation on the authority of <1m ad ai-Din, or whether it is his own independent statement. In any case this is an untenable version. It is hardly conceivable that Shirkuh would have agreed to employ a co mplete stranger in such a vital task.47 On the other hand, this account testifies that Qadi al-Fadil was at that time employed in the Chancery. According to Qalqashandi (1335-1418) , who is well informed
44 See, his ~ Fatimid Poets and the 'Ta khallas' that Bridges the Nights of the Time LO the Imam of Time ~, Der islam, 68(199 1), 25%0. A more cautious view is ex pressed by S. M. Ayyad who says that the extant poetry of Qadi al-Fadil is LOO meager to allow us LO form a view of his aUitude toward lsmailism. Ayyad writes: ~ .... much of what remai ns of his (i.e. Qadi al-Fadil's) encom iastic poetry is devoted LO the members of the Fatimid house and hi gh-ranking officers of the Fatimid state. But the texts have been corrupted in some places and purged in others, making il impossible 10 draw any concl usion as to how far or how consisten tly he uphe ld the !sma'i li id eology~. See his, kRegional Literature: Egypt", in The Cambn'dge History of the Arabic Literatun:. The Abbasid Belles-Leltres, (Cambridge. 1990).438. 4:' For Qadi al-Fadil's shift of loyallies, see A. S. Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, (Albany, 1972),58; M. C. Lyons and D. E. P.Jackson, Saladin. The Polilics ofllu Holy War, (Cambridge, 1982), 2S-6. 46 Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 403, 420. 47 Cf: Eh renkreutz, Saladin, 88.
THE SOU R CES
19
about th e histo ry of th e Fatimid a dmini stration, the head of th e Chan cery in that period was Qadi al~Muwaffaq ibn Khallai. He served in this post from the re ign of a l ~ H a fi z (1130~1149) until his death on 23Jumada 11 566/2 March 1171 .48 It means that during Shirkuh's campaigns in Egypt, Qadi al-Fad il was servi ng in the Chancery unde r the same man , who had supervised hi s trainin g as an apprentice in his early boyhood. No less a uth ority than ' Imad alOin asserts that Ibn Kh all al was a powerful offi cial who "wrote as h e wished ".49 This is not an unrea listic description. Undoubted ly, during the political disintegration of the Fatimids state, especially in th e 1] 60 's, Fatimid adm ini strators took into th ei r hand s, and usurped [or th emselves politi cal powers at th e expense of th e Fatimid rulers. Apparently durin g Qadi a l-Fadil' s se rvice in th e Chancery his re lations with Shirkuh we re es tablishe d , and hi s no min ation by Shirkuh was a n outcome of those relations. Followin g Shirkuh 's d eath , Qadi al-Fad il e ntered smooth ly into th e service of Salad in .5o Th e fi ftee nth-ce ntu ry Ma mluk hi storian , Maqrizi , says that th e a vo acted in uniso n and brings as an example of their cooperation the nomination of Sadr ai-Din ibn Oirhas as th e ch ief cadi .51 III. Anoth e r vers ion of Qadi aI-Fad iI's ea rl y career is provide d by Ya qut al-Hamawi (1 179- 1229), who says th at Qadi al-Fadil's father served as a cadi of Baysa n and la ter was appoin ted as a cadi of Ascalon. He was also entrus te d with responsibility for the secret service (khabar) in Ascalon, or in plain wo rds it was hi s duty to spy on o th er o ffi cia ls in th e town. Eventually, thi s assignment brought his downfall. Qadi al~Fadil's father fa il ed to info rm th e authorities in Ca iro about th e re lease of a va luabl e hostage by the 4tI Qalqashandi, Subh al-A'slla, (Cairo, 19 13-19 19), 1.96-7. Ibn Khallal lived h is last days in retirement in his house which , in ' Imad ai-Din 's words, became his grave. See, Abu Shama, I, pl,2, 487. 49 ' Imad a i-Din, Kharidat al-Qasr fiJaridat Aht al-'Asr, (Egyptia n Poets), (ed s) A. Amin, Sh. Dayfa nd I. 'Abbas, (n. p., n.d .), 1,235. Th is st.atcm c nt of ' 1m ad a lOin is much quoted by o ther aut ho rs. Sec, Ibn Khallikan , V1I , 219; Abu Shama, I, pl,2, 487. !.O Maqrizi and Safadi say that lhe first person who was employed in Saladin 's Chancery was Fakhr al-Dawla al-Aswani of the Zubayr family who supported Saladin in Alexandria. See, Maqrizi , MuqafJa, 1,269; Safadi , (ed ) S. Dedering (Beirut, 1972), VI, 118-9. ~1 Maqrizi, Kh itat, 111 , 378-9; cf: H. Dajani-Shakeel, ~ Di spl ace m cnt o flh e Palestinians During the Crusad es·, MW, LXVIII (1978), 175.
20
C H A PTE R ONE
governor of Ascalon. He was recall e d to Cairo and puni she d fo r thi s neglect of duti es by confisca tio n of his property. He died gri efstri cke n and pennil ess. His d eath h ad a direct inOue nce o n the youn g Qad i al-Fadil , who co uld not continue his trainin g in the ad ministra tion. Yaqul 's ano nymous source says that Qadi al-Fadil went on fOOL to Alexandria to seek a fresh start in the se rvice of th e cadi Ibn Hadid , wh o e mployed him as a scribe for a salary of three dinars per m on th .52 One co uld live on such a salary. but Q adi a l-Fad il cou ld barely support hi s siblings, a brother a nd a sisler, who lived in grea t difficulties in Ascalon. On ly fo llowing the fall of th e town to the Crusaders was the family reunited. DUling th e tim e of Qadi a l-Fadil 's e mploym e nt in th e service o f Ibn Hadid hi s great talent in th e e pi stolary art was m a nifested . So mu ch so that th e other scribes in Ibn Hadid 's service became e nvio us and anxious for the ir positio ns. They smeared Qadi al-Fadil at the court in Cairo and th e Fatimid Imam al-Zafir ( 1149- 11 54) o rde re d his governor in Alexandria to punish Qadi a l-Fadil by cutting off his hand. But he was dissuaded from sending his o rd e rs by Ibn a lAnbari, a scribe in the Chancery. Eventuall y, through th e efforts of Ibn al-Anbari, Qadi al-Fadil was examined by al-Zafir and offered a position in Cai ro. But he co uld not e njoy security for a long tim e. He, li ke others, was e ngulfed by the political upheava ls of th e late Fatimid period. Following th e ascendancy of Dirgham to viz ie rate and the esca pe o f Shawar to Damascus, Qadi a l-Fadi l found himself in an un easy position . Dirgham was greatly annoyed by Qadi a l-Fadi l' s association with al-Kam il. Shawa r' s son, who re mained in Cairo. Qadi al-Fadil, like 'Umara. was afraid of Dirgham 's wraLh and sought the intervention ofMulhim , Dirgham 's bro th e r. o n his be half. But this prud e nt move by Qadi a l-Fadi l was not e nough to forestall !'>2 Yaqut, Udaba', IV, 1563. The combination of the posts of cadi a nd official respon sible for the secre t police had precede nts in the Fatimid state. For the activity of secret police, see Y. Lev, ~ Th e Suppression of Crime, the Supervision of Markets, and Urban Society in th e Egyptian Capital duri ng the Te nth and Eleventh Centuries", Mediterranean Historical Review, 3( 1988), 77-9. Dive rse info rmation ahom the secret po lice is to he fou nd in the documents of the Cairo Ge niza. See, S. D. Goitein, A Mediterran ean Society, (Be rke ley and Los Angeles, 197 1). II , 37 1, 379. The Banu Hadid were a Mali ki fami ly from Toledo which had senle d in Alexandria in 1086-1087, and rose to power in the second decade of the twelfth cen tury. See, Maqrizi, Muqaffa, I, 505, 506-7. For th e family, see 'Abd al-'Aziz Salem, ~ D'A1 exa nd ria a A1me ria Revue de i'Occident musuiman et de ia Medilerranee, 46(1987), 64-70, esp. , 65-6. ft
,
THE SOURCES
21
his imprisonmenlLOgether with al-Kamil. Both were released on ly after the defeat and death ofOirgham. Qadi al-Fadil was rewarded for his loya lty to a l-Kamil ; he enjoyed a high position in Shawar's circle and the tiL1e al-Fadil was conferred upon him. 53 The fact that Qadi al-Fadil was Shawar's propagandist is we ll estab lished. He publicly supported, through his poetry, Shawar's decision to ask the help of the Crusaders aga in st Shirkuh. 54 But the changing political circumstances had once again an adverse effect on Qadi al-Fadi l's life and position. Following the killing ofShawar, Qadi al-Fadi l found himself without a patron. According to Yaqut's version, al-'Adid interceded with Shirkuh for Qadi al-Fadil's safety, and he invited him LO join his service. But Qadi al-Fadil refused to give his assent to the vi lification of Shawar's name. Noneth eless, Qadi al-Fadil established friendly relations with Shirkuh and after his death he was instrumental in convincing a l'Adid to nominate Saladin as vizier. 55 These two items of information provided by Yaqut are simply untenable. Yaqut's source is at pains to portray Qadi al-Fadil in a positive li ght as a man of principle who did not distance himself from his benefactors-the Shawar family. At the same time , Qadi al-Fadi l is g iven cred it for the promotion of Saladin. This version of Qadi al-Fadil's early life tries to expla in the problematic shift of Qadi a l-Fadil's loyalties from the Fatimids to the Ayyubids by stressing Qadi al-Fadil's relati ons with a l-'Adid , which are unattested by other source. Leaving aside the tende ntio us informati on of Yaqut's version, his biography of Qadi al-Fad il portrays a man whose life, like that of
~,
YaquI, Udaba', IV, 1563-4. H. Oajani-Shakeel, -Egypt and the Egyptians: A foca l Point in the Policies and Literature of ai-Qadi al-Fadil\JNES, 36(1977), 26. ~5 YaquI, Udaba', IV, 1565-6. ~
22
CHAPTER ONE
IV. Qadi al-Fadi l nourished in the sen,jce of Saladin. His career was tied to Egypt. Although he visited other lowns and regions of the Middle East, Qadi al-Fad il was a n Egyptian in the full sense of the word. In COlllrast to ' lm ad ai-Din and Ibn Shaddad whose educatio n and careers brought them to live in many parts of the Middle East, Qadi al-Fadilleft Egypt on ly on trips in the sClvice ofSaJadin an d for th e pilgrimage to the Holy Ci ti es of Arabia. Qadi al-Fadil's exact adm inistrative duties in Egypt are not emirdy clear. For exampl e, ' Imad ai-Din, in hi s ob ituary note on Qad i al-Fadi l, says in appreciative but vague language that Qad i al-Fadi l was the principa l drivi ng force behind the affa irs of Sa lad in 's regime (dawLa).56 Beside this remark very Iiule concrete inform ation is available. Yaqut says th at Qadi a l-Fad i! was above suc h things as concern in g himself with the title of vizier. H e performed the work of the vizie r behind the sce nes (l ite rally in secret, sirran).57 This piece of information ta llies with the overall ai m o f th e source used by Yaqut, but adds liule to our lInderstanding of the issll e. It sho uld be kept in m ind that Qadi al-Fad il 's skill s, whi ch ea rn ed him the admiration of his comempora ries. were clerical an d no t ad ministrative . T h erefore he was n o t a natural candidate for th e post o f vizier. About Qadi a l-Fad il 's actua l ad ministrative assignme nts we know very little. For examp le, it is said that in 584/ 11 88- 11 89, Saladin renewed Qadi al-Fadil 's appoimme nt as th e official respo nsible for th e affairs of Egyp1.58 In 586/ 1190-1191, he was involved in equ ippin g and dispatching ships to Acre to help Saladin's military effort in the war for the town. 59 During the absence of Saladin from Egypt, the COllntl)' was ruled by oth er members of hi s family; a l-cAdil , Saladin's brother, a nd Taqi a i-Din, his nephew. Qadi a l-Fadil's positi o n when al-'Adi ) ruled Egypt was somehow ambiguous. H e obeyed a l-'Adil's orders, but d id nOt hesitate to blame him for h armful policies which brought the finances of Egypt into disarray. However, h e brought his criticism of a )-'Adil to Saladin's auemion on ly after the d eparture of a l-cAdi l from Egypl. 60 Qadi a l-Fadil's involvement in the internal Abu Shama. AI,Rawdatayn fi Akhbar a[.J)awlotayn, (Beirut. n. d.), II , 24 1.
~ ~7
Yaqut. Udaba', IV, 1562.
!18
Abu Sham a, (Beiru t), II , 137.
59 Ibid, 165; Abu Shama, 'UJun al-RawdiJtaJ,yt,in Akhbar a[.Dawlotayn, (ed) A. al-Baysumi (Damascus, 1992), II , 220. IiO Lyons and J ackson, 211-2.
THE SOU RCES
23
politics of Sa la din' s fa mily was co nsiderable. Following Saladin 's seizure of Alep po Oun e 11 83), a l-'A dil asked to be a ll owed to relinquish Egyp t in favor of th e newly a nn exed te rritory. Qadi alFadil was instrum e ntal in lhe a ppoi ntm el1l of Taqi a i-Din , with whom h e was o n fri e ndl y terms, to Egypt and the transfer of al'Ad il to Aleppo.61 It seems that Qadi al-Fadi l was caught in a web of confli ctin g loyalties to Saladin, his so ns a nd other members of th e family.62 Due to unspeci fi e d reaso ns-sickness o r pe rhaps estrange me nt fro m Salad in -Qad i al-Fad il remain e d in Damascus and did not accompany Sa lad in on th e cam paign whi ch e nded in the victory at the Ho rns of Hittin . Ne ith er was Qadi al-Fadil present a t the co nquest of J erusale m by Saladin . No ne theless, ' Imad alDin claims th at after Hittin Saladin sought Qadi a l-Fa dil 's advice on military matters. 63 Following th e dea th of Saladin in Damascus, Qadi al-Fadil returned to Egypt where he was received with great honors by alMalik al-'Aziz 'U thman . Saladin's so n who rule d the country. But the last years of Qadi al-Fadil' s life in Egypt were not particularly quiet or happy. He was affec ted by problems in th e famil y life of his brother, 'Abd ' I-Karim, who lived in Alexandria, and he became in volved in th e quarrels betwee n Salad in 's heirs and their em irs. 64 Qadi al-Fadil di ed on 7 Rabi ' II 596/ 25 J a nuary 1200, and was buried at the Little Ce metery on the foot of the Muqattam Hill. Ibn Khallikan testifies that h e visited Qadi a l-Fadil' s mausoleum ( lurba) seve ral tim es and gives the date of his death as insc ribed on it. 65 In hi s lifetime Qadi al-Fadil reaped the material
61 Abu Shama. ( Bei nlt), 11 ,5 1-2 (q uoting ' Im ad a i-Din ). 62 Lyons and J ackson, 223; Abu Sham a, (Bcinu ), II , 70 (quoti ng Qadi al-Fadil's lelter to Taqi a i-Din ). For Qadi a l-Fadil's strained relations, ir not o pen animo.5'iry, with al-'Adil, see Ib n Taghribirdi , AI·N uj um a{·lahiraji Muluk Misrwa-'l-Qahira, (Cairo, 1932- 1950), Vl , 157. ' Imad aI-Din characterizes Taqi ai-Din , in co ntrast to al-'Adil , as e ndowed wi th hidda, vigor but a lso a potelllial ror vio le nce. Thus, he needed the man agement or Qadi a l-Fadil to rectiry the conseq uences or his aClion. See, Al-Barq al-Shami, (cd) R. Sese n (Istanbul , 19 79), V, 154. M Abu Shama, (Be irut) , II , 82, 99; 'Uyun, II , 144 , 158, 186. Sibt ibn a l-Jaw.t.:i (d. 1257) says that Qadi al-Fadil was absent fro m the battle fo r the conquest of J e rusale m due 10 a sic kness which kepi him in Dam ascus. See, Mira '( ai-lammi, (Hyderbad , 195 1), VIII , pt,l, 398. &I Maqrizi, Kitab fll-Suillk, (cd) M. M. Ziada (n. p., n. d ), I, pt, l , 143 , 156-7, 177, 198. M Ibn Khallikan, III , 162.
24
CHA PTE R ONE
benefits of his high position and fame . He was a rich man wh o used his wealth to sustain his interest in learning and for phi Jan. thropic purposes. Accord in g to the lale Safadi (d. 1363), Qadi alFad il 's ann ual remuneration was as high as 50,000 dinars. In addition, as a private person, h e was engaged in trade with Indi a an d Nonh Africa. Qadi ai-Fad i) set up many pious endowme n ts for the support of stud e nts of law and the e duca tion of orpha ns. He establis he d a large highl y profitab le comm e rcial building he had owned (rab', khan) as a pi o lls e ndowme nt fo r the ransom in g of prisoners-of-war. 66 Of Qadi al-Fad il's own family, wives and children, lillie is known. He h ad seve ral sons a nd the most famous among them was ai-Qadi ai-Ashraf Ahmad Abu ' I-
THE SOURCES
25
Only part of Qadi al·Fadil's hu ge co rrespo ndence (rasa 'it) has survived either in a manuscript form or through quotation by later historians. The scope of this correspondence is very diversified. Qadi al·Fadil wrote on behalf of Saladin and his brother, al·'Adil, to the Caliph in Baghdad, his vizier as well as to many other Muslim rulers of the time. This correspondence includes reports on c ur· rent events co ntaining references even to minor incidents. The main purpose of these lellers was not merely to inform the reader about Saladin's deeds, but to present the deeds and the inten· Lions of Saladin in a favorable light. More than anything else, Qadi al-Fadil was Saladin's propagandist. Nonetheless, he was also a historian. Qad i al·Fadil wrote a detailed chronicle in which he recorded events on a daily bas is. This work, known under many titles (the most co mm on being MUlajaddidal) , has not survived and is avai lable only th rough citations by later autilOrities. 70 The loss of the MUlajaddidat is irreplaceable especially as a source for the history of Egypt and, to so me ex te11l. for the history of Saladin himself, alth o ugh for the hi story of Saladin we have a greater variety of sources. In llsing the information cited from Mutajaddidal , it should be remembe red thatlhere is no strict dividing lin e between Qadi al·Fadi l the propagandist of Saladin and Qadi al·Fadil the histo· rian of Saladin.
Asad ibn Mammati composed books in the nallle of Qadi al-Fadi l. Sec, (cd) J. van us (Beirut, 1974). IX, 23. Due to the importance of the letters written by the Fatimid Chancery. gr.unmarians were employed in it as ed itors. See, Ibn alQifti, Anbah al-Rllwat 'ala Anbah ai-Nuhat, (ed ) M. Abu ' J-Fadl Ibrahim (Cai ro. 1952), II , 95, 96; Maqrili, Itti '(II.. 11 ,3 18. Evidently. Qadi al-Fadil needed no editor. Thejail (khiz.anat al-bullud), was located within the complex of the Fatamid roY-d.1 palaces. It "''as set up by al-Zahir (1021-1036) ll.'§ a royal wor~hop. For its subsequent history, see Maqrizi. Khital. I. 27g.9. and a$ jail. 280. iO For a discussion of the charac ter of the MUlajoddidat, see H. Rabie, Tht f inmICial System ofl!gJpt A. H. :J64-741/A. D. 1169-1341, (London , 1972), 13-4; H. Mohring, Saladin u"d dtr On'lIt Krtuuug, (Wicsbaden, 1980).220- 1. The question of the differe nt litles of this work has been examined by M. H. M. Ahmad. See. his ~So llle NOles on Ar.lbic HistOriography During lhe Zengid and Ayyubid Periods (52 1 / 1127-6 4 8/ 1 250)~, in J-/i.Jtoria11J of tht Mi(ldlt East. (cds) B. Lewis and P. M. Ho lt (London , 1962).85-6. A long quotation from the Mutojaddidat concerning the history of Yemen is found in Ibn al-'Adim's BughJat, VI, 2843-5.
26
C H A PTER ONE
b. <[ mad al-D in I. ' Im ad ai-Di n was born in Isfahan o n 2Jumada II 5 19/ 6Jul y 1125. In co ntrast with Qadi al-Fadil, ' Imad ai-Din acquired a solid education in jurisp rude nce. He be lo nged to the Shafi'j school of law a nd studied at th e Nizamiyya in Baghd ad where he distinguishe d himself in comparative law (khilaj) and belle-I ettres (funun al-adab). AI-Mundhiri says th at ' Imad ai-Din taught (haddalha) the Proph etic traditions in Baghd ad, Da m ascus and Fustat. Like m any o th er graduates or law co ll eges,
T H E SOU RCES
27
wh o open ed th e way fo r h im in Damascus was Nur al-Din 's chi ef ad ministrator, th e cadi al-Shah razu ri , whom ' Im ad ai-Din befrie nded a nd wh ose com pa ni o n he beca me. He was appo in ted by aiShahrazuri to th e Cha n cery where ' Im ad al-Din 's command of Pe rsian proved valua ble. ' Imad ai-Din left a vivid account of hi s misgivi ngs a bout th e kind o f work awa ilin g him in the Chancery.74 His previous appo intm e n ts were o f a n admini strative nature whil e th e work in th e Chan cery was esse nti ally cl eri ca l. However , he became fascin ated by th e fl ow of informa ti o n that reached the Cha ncery in th e fo rm ofi e u e rs fro m dine re nt region s, and by the need to keep contac t with rul ers in Pe rsia, Syria and Egyp l. 75 He clearly fo und his assign men t absorbing a nd he successfull y ado pted himself LO th e n ew workin g e nvi ro nm e nt. ' Im ad ai-Din also managed to establish fri e nd ly relations with o th e r adm inistraLOrs in Nur al-Din 's servi ce. Nota ble amo ng the m was al-Qaysa rani , who later se rved as Nur al-Din 's e nvoy to Saladin in Egypl.76 ' Imad al-Din 's service in th e Cha ncery became the key to e nter into Nu r al-Din' s inn e r ci rcle and to gai n h is confidence. By 568/ 1172- 11 73, ' Imad ai-Din was in cha rge of two administrati ve offi ces (diwans): the Cha ncery a nd th e Office of th e Fin an ce (uti/a'), whi ch was respo nsibl e fo r Slate's in comes and expenses. In add iti o n he se rved as a muslwrifof Nul' al-Din 's diwan (i.e. a fin ancial supe rviso r of th e o ffi ce whic h was responsibl e fo r th e management of Nu r ai-Din 's pe rsonal esta tes and prope rties). Occasio nally, ' Imad ai-Din we nt o n d iplo matic miss io ns o n be half of Nu l' al-Din .n Anoth er fea ture of ' Im ad al-Din 's ca ree r in Damascus was his involvement as a teac he r and administrator in th e wo rld of lea rning. In Raja b 567/ February-M a rc h 11 72, ' )mad ai-Din was nom inated as a p rofesso r of law (mudarris) at a law co ll ege es tablished 74 AI.Bundari, 68-9: Ibn Khallika n, V, 148: cf: D. S. Richa rds. MA Conside r· ation of Two Sources fo r Lhe Life of Salad in M.JSS. 25( 1980). 47-8. and M' lrnad 011· Din 135-6. For the beginning of ' Imad a l-Din's career in Damascus, see Ric htcr·8 crnburg. MFun ken Die Well MJ Orien/s, XX lI (1991), 105-10. 7~ AI-Bundari, 67-8. 76 Ibn al.'Adim. VI I, 3 100 (quoting ' Imad a l-Din's Kharidal a/·Q(lJr). 77 AI.Bu ndari. 67, 88, 94-5, 12(}. I , 13 1: Abu Shama. I. p l.2. 524: cf: Rich a rds. M' lmad a l_DinM, 136-7. Fo r iSlifa' in th e Sclj llkid pe riod, see M. F. Kop rll lll, Tht: &ljuks 0/ A llalolia, ed ited a nd tra nsla ted into English by G. Leiser. (Salt Lake City, 1992),35. In Fatimid Egypt diwall al.islifa·se rved as lh e Inspection Omce. See, C. Khan, Arabic Legal and Admi1!ulralivtl Documerlls in Ihe Cambridge (dniwh Colkctions, (Cam brid ge, 1993), 162-3,322.4 18. Fo r th e Mamll1k pefiod. see Ra bie. 156-7. M
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M
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CHAPTER ONE
by Nur a i-Din while serving at the same lime as Comptroller (nazir) of the college's finances. 78 Following the death of Nur ai-Din , ' Im ad ai-Dill's position beca me precarious. 79 It must have been a traum atic ex perience. For the second lime in his li fe. ' Im ad ai-Din was forced to seek an uncenain future in a new place. He left Damascus, where he had family and property, and wen l to Aleppo. But he fell un safe there and moved to Mosul. From Mosul ' Imad ai-Din intended to go Baghdad , where his uncle and a younger brother lived. However, he became seriously ill in Mosul and never reached Baghdad. In Syria ' lmad ai-Din found his third patron and a new benefaclorSaladin. The meetin g be tween ' Im ad ai-Din and Saladin was not coincid ental; it took place at 'Imad ai-Din's in iti ative .so ' Imad a lOin and Saladin were not total strange rs. According to « mad a lDin's own tes tim ony, he had become acquain ted with Najm a lOin Ayyub, Saladin's father, during his early career in Iraq wh ile selVing the vizier Ibn Hubayra. At that time. Ayyub with his brother, Shirkuh, served as the governors of the town ofTakrit in Iraq where ' Im ad ai-Din's uncle was imp risoned on the orders of the Seljukid Sultan Malikshah. 81 When ' Im ad ai-Din alTived in Damascus, Ayyub and Shirkuh had already served Nur a i-Din in military capacities. In Damascus,
,
T ..n: SOU RCES
29
that it was very imporlant for ' lm ad a i-Din to estab lish that hi s relations with the Ayyubids had already bee n good during Nur alDin's rule . Thus, his entry into Sa ladin's se rvice was an outcome of his early re lations with the Ayyubid family and not an act of opporlUnism dictated by the precarious condition s in which he found himself following Nur al-Din's death. Whether ' Imad al-Din's account is based on so lid fact, or is merely a tendemious retrospective embellishment of th e eve nts , or even pure invention , remains hard to settle. There are so me c haracteristic parallels between Yaqut's version of Qadi al-Fadil's en try into the service of the Ayyubids and ' Imad al-Din's version of his early relations with them. Both tried 1O expla in th e ir shift of loya lties in favorab le terms. Whi le Qadi a i-Fad iI's shift of loya lties was a radical one, ' lm ad ai-Din had less ofa nee d 1O explain hi s behavior; after the death of one Sunn i ruler he entered into the se rvice of another Sunni ru ler both of whom h e manifestly admired. ' lm ad ai-Din's path into Saladin's service was not smooth ; his opponents tried 1O prevent his nomination LO Saladin's Chancery, However, ' Im ad ai-Din was not a novice in struggles in the corridors of power; his experience and acumen LOld him to sec ure th e goodwill of Qadi al-Fadil who , however, was not eas ily accessible. ' Imad ai-Din was fortunate in finding a person willing to intercede on hi s behalf with Qadi al-Fadil. This was Ibn Masal who was influential with both Saladin and Qadi al-Fadil. When ' Imad alOin and Qadi al-Fadil became acquainted they found they spoke a COlll mon language. and Qadi a i-Fad iI's advoGlcy was instrumental for ' Imad al-Din's entry into Saladin's se rvi ce. ' Imad al-Din's merits, as poi nted out by Qadi al-Fadil, wefe evident: his command of Persian and his knowledge of th e internal aflairs of Nur al-Din's state, Qadi al-Fadil showed no objection 1O th e employment of ' Imad ai-D in in Sa lad in 's Chancery.8s ' Im ad a l-Din's relations with Qadi a l-Fadil remained amicable throughout the who le period of their employment in th e service of Sa ladin. In his writings, ' Im ad ai-Din refers LO Qadi al-Fadil as wahid ai-zaman (one [o f his] lime ) chosen by God and th e Sultan. 84 The impress ion gained from ' Imad al-Din's writing is of
83 Abu Shama, I, pl.2, 633, 641·2 (quoling ' Im ad ai-Din). 8.f Abu Shama, (Beirut), II , 241,242. (quoting ' Imad al-Din 's Kharidal al-Qasr and his obituary nOle on Qadi al-Fadil).
30
CHAPTER ONE
admiration and gratitude to Qadi al_Fadil. 85 In 572/ 1171)..1177, ' Imad a I-Din accompanied Saladin on a journey to Egypt where he enjoyed the hospitality of Qadi al-Fadil, who made his stay a pleasant and memorable event. 86 The geographical separation betwee n
TIn: SOU RCES
31
description of lhe Syrian L ighlning faithfully recorded
,
32
C HAPTER ONE
iarity with litera ture. In co ntrast to ' lmad a i-Din, Ibn Khallikan had a betler perspective of Qaraqush: he says that Saladin and Islam owed him mu ch .95 Th e lines of distinction b etwee n the military class a nd th e civilian e lite were many and visibl e. T he mi li tary class was composed of Kurds and Turks wh il e the c ivili a n eli te consisted mosLly of Arabs and Iranians. Eth ni c differen ces parall e led a lingu istic d ivid e and positions in th e social hi e rarchy: mlers vis-a.-vis those nil ed. T h ese differences we re compounded and made visibl e by distin c tive ways of dress in g. 96 H.A. R. Gibb, who studi ed ' Im ad ai-Din 's writings extensive ly a nd with e motional in vo lveme nt, asse rts that th e "impressio n of vanity and self-im portance o n the writer's part (i. e. ' Imad ai-Din )", is m istaken. Gibb is a lso very positi ve in hi s evaluation of ' Imad alDin 's qualities as a hi sto rian and regard s his writings as th e best so urce for Sa ladi n 's life. Gibb 's esteem of ' Imad a i-Din as an historian is a lso sha red by others. For example, D. S. Richards, a more dispass io nate stud e nt of ' Imad a l-Din's writings, c ha rac terizes the treatme nt of Sa ladin in lhe Syrian Lightning as free fr o m hagi ograp hi cal te nde nci es, a nd he find s that: "his (i.e. ' Im ad a l-Din 's) egoti sm is n o t di stasteful ".97 No ne th e less it is a pa rtisan account written by an adh e re nt and ad mirer. Among the group of Saladin 's hi sto rians-ad mi res, ' Im ad a i-Din was in a far closer contact with Salad in than Qadi a l-Fad il who stayed in Ca iro, and th e period h e h ad served Salad in was much longer than that of Ib n Shaddad. 98 However, during the criti cal years 11 69- 11 71, ' Imad ai-Din was in Damasc us servin g as th e head of ur a I-Din 's C hancery. The loss of the volu mes of the Syrian Lightning deali ng with th ose years is m ost unfortunate . It would have been very interesting to read how the events of th ose years were la ter portrayed by ' Imad aI-Din, with 9!> Ibn Khallikan , IV, 92; followed by Safadi, (cds) M. 'A. Bakh il a nd M. al· H iyari, (Beirut, 1993), XX IV, 223. See, also a l-Bundari , 234; Abu Sha ma, I, pt,2,
686. 96 For inSlance, Ibn a l·'Adim says ( III , 1258) tllal Saladin's son, ai-Malik a iMuhsin (born in 118 1), occu pied him self with re ligion and lea rnin g. This Slalement is emphasized by the observation that he abandoned military auire in favor of the dress of the men of religion a nd learning. Sec, also Maqrizi, Muqaffa, I, 724. 97 Rich ards, ''' Imad a i-Din"', 133, 144; ~A Consideration", 49; H. A. R. Gibb, ''The Arabic Sources fo r lhe Life of Saladin", Spuulum, 29( 1950),60. 98 O n o ne occasion ' Imad ai-D in secured Saladin 's permission to be abse nl from a campaign a nd on two olher cam paigns he fell sick, missing most of the action. See, Abu Shama, I, p t,2, 697; Richards. "' Imad a l_Di nft, 138-40.
THE SOU RCES
33
th e h e lp of hindsigill. a nd with in t he declared a im of lIll! Syrian Lightning-to p reserve the fame of Saladi n . T h e survivi ng fragme nts of ' Imad a l-Di n 's writi ngs dealing with those years are no t a su bstitUle for th e o rigi na l tex t in its e ntire ty. AI-Bunclari in hi s a bbreviatio n of lite Syrian Lightning ex trac te d fro m th e o rn a te na rra tive of ' lmad aI-Din exce rpts d ealin g with hi st.o ri ca l eve n ts. A5 with a ny oth e r rece nsion , we are de pe nde nt o n th e e ditor fo r his se lectio n . AI-Bunda ri 's tex t is lacon ic; ' Imad a l-Din's ri ch style was sacrificed to th e goa l of lu cidi ty a nd b revity, Thi s a pproac h has its pri ce; ' Im ad al-Din 's interpreta ti on of and co mm ents on the eve nts h e dea ls with a re obliterated. Thus, a l-Bu ndari's rece nsio n wh ile very useful is o f restri cted valu e on ly. c. Ibn al-Shaddad In cO lllras t to ' Im ad a i-Din , who joine d Salad in wh e n hi s pe rso na l c ircumstances we re a t a very low e bb. Ib n Shaddad e nte re d in to Sa ladin' s se rvice a t th e pea k of his career. Ibn Sh add ad was bo rn on 10 Ramadan 539/5 March 11 45, in Mosul , into a fam ily ofShafi' i jurists. Following th e premature dea th of th e fa th e r, Ib n Shaddad was raised by his mate rn al u ncle a nd ed uca ted in his native town specia lizin g in th e seve n ca no ni cal varia nt readin gs/ reci ta tio ns o f the Koran. His fi rst recorded appo intment W'ag as a 1IIu'id (a teaching assista nce wh o re pealS th e lec ture give n by th e p rofesso r) at the Nizam iyya in Baghdad .99 In 569/ 1173- 1174, afte r four years as mu'id, Ibn Shaddad was a ppo inte d as mudarris a t th e newly es tablished law coll ege in Mos ul. lOO Ibn Sh add ad a nd Salad in met in 11 88. At th at tim e Sa la din 's achi eveme n lS-the victory a t Hi ttin a nd th e conques t of J e rusale m- h ad made h im a lege nd in h is own lifeti me a nd Ibn Shaddad was his adm ire r . H e composed fo r Saladin a boo k o n Ho ly Wa r a nd need little pe rsuasion to acce pt a n o ffe r to serve Salad in as a military judge a nd a n o ffi c ia l respo nsibl e fo r jurisd ic ti on (llll k m) in J e rusa lem. Th e posts co nfe rred o n Ibn Shaddad re nect hi s so lid legal e ducati o n . Ibn Shaddad-ce rta inly if we co ntrast him to Qadi al-Fadil a nd eve n if we compa re him to ' Im ad a l-Din-was mo re a jurist th a n ma n of lette rs. In co ntrast 99 T he tech n ical terms pertaining to learn ing a nd ed ucation in medicmJ Is· lam are discussed in the various works of G. Mak.disi and more rece n tly by J. Bcrk.:;.;' '!'hI! 'fr(Humission of Knowudgl! in M l!dil!Vol Cairo. ( Princeton. 1992) , 4()'2. I Ib n Kha11i kan. VII , 86-7.
34
CHAPTER ONE
to <)mad al-Din's fa mOlls anthology of pOCLS and poetry, Kharidat al-Qasr wa-Jaridat AId aPAsr, which exemplifies his interest in and penchant for belles-kitres, Ibn Shaddad's scholarly output is dominated by works related to the 1aw. 10 1 For our purposes, Ibn Shaddad's most important work is his biography of Saladin which is divided into t\\TO parts. It is-in the words of Richards-a hagiographical work aiming to portray an "exemplary life".102 The first pan enumerates Saladin's virtues and the second is a chronicle of his life and deeds. For the period during which Ibn Shaddad served and accompanied Saladin on his campaigns ( 11 8S-1 193), his biography is based on a first-hand knowledge of the events. For the early career of Saladin, Ibn Shaddad's information is of secondary importance only. He must have relied on other works or on oral information. The first part seems to be an improved, extended and better o rganized version of Ibn
101 Ibn Shaddad, AI-Nawadir al-Suftallina wa- 'l-Mahasill al-Yusufi"a, (cd) J. ai-Din a l-5hayyal (n.p., 1964).85,86-7; Ibn Khallikan, VII, 88. 102 -A Consideration-, 5 1. 1 0~ Ibn Shaddad, 3. For the appcllation -worshippers of the cross and its uses. see Pouzct, 319. ft
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pilgrimage. IIH The o ther virtues of Saladin referred to are hisjustice and his personal invo lvement in hearing gl·ievances. 105 Ibn Shaddad describes Saladin's nobl e co ndu ct, hi s courage, fortitud e, mental strength , firmn ess and calm , his forbearance and his devo ti o n to the Holy War. 106 Until this po int Ibn Shaddad' s text tallies with that of Ibn 'Asa kir. But Ibn Shaddad d escribes Saladin as e nd owed also with hilm and ?nuruwwa. 107 Both terms have a lon g hi story going back lO pre.lslamic Arabia and acquired a wide range of meaning referring to personal virtues suc h as justice a nd mod· era tio n (hilm) an d po litica l wisdo m (mu nllvwa).108 Ibn Shaddad's en um eratio n ofSalad in ·s virtues must be exam· in e d against a wi der lite ra ry co ntext; that of Ion 'Asakir's biogra· phy of Nur a l·Din and ' (m ad al·Din 's c hap te r o n Saladin's virtu es include d in his al·fath at·Qussifi '[·/;alh at·Qudsi, a chronicl e d eal· in g with lh e battle of Hitlin , th e conquest of Palestine and Syria and the Third Crusade . ' Imad al·Din begins by desc ribing Saladin's commitm e nt to and involve me nt in th e Holy War. But th e main cha racte risti c of ' lmad al·Din 's narrative is its personal c harac ter: Sa ladin is de pic ted as a pe rso n and individua l. ' Im ad a l·Din dwells on Salad in 's ma nn e rs and modesty, he wo re si mpl e clothes and men o f re li gion with whom he associated himse lf felt in hi s pres· e nce as th o ugh th ey were sitting with one of their colleges (liter· ally brother) and no t with the Sultan . loo Saladin was generous with everybody: people of his imm ediate ci rcl e, emi rs and administra· tors, people of religion as well as simpl e folk. ' Imad al· Din 's text is rich in exa mpl es of Sa la din 's magna nimity quo ting events and describing Saladin's d ea lings with certa in people." o But perhaps th e grea tes t importance of these accounts by Ibn Sha dd ad and ' Im ad a l·Din is that they de al with Saladin's religi · osity. Ibn Shaddad says that Saladin believed in Res urrecti o n , He ll and Paradise. He di sliked philosoph e rs, mate riali sts (dllhriyyu71) and ?nu'attila i.e. those who den y God's attributes. And fo r the benefil of Saladin 's young sons the central tenets of religious beliefs 104 Ibn Sh addad, 7-9. 105 Ibid. 13-6. 106 Ibid, 17.8, 19,2 1-3. 107 Ibid, 28-30. 3 1-4 ; cf: i'. M. Ho h , "The Virtuous Ruler in Thirteenth-Ce ntury Mamluk Royal Biographies Noltingham MtdinJaI Stl/diu, 24( 1980), 28-9. ]08 e h. Pellal, "Muru·a £.1.2, VII , 636-8; " I-li lm~, £.1.2, 111. 39()"'2. ]09 See, Fath, 479-80. 110 Ibid, 48 1-2. M
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C HAPTER ONE
were formul ated in th e form of a c reed ('aqida) by QUlb a i-Din al-N isaburi. who was a leading Shafi'i jurist in Damascus of t he Zengid and Ayyubid periods. 111
point of view whi ch was hosti le to Saladin who, foll owing the death of ur ai-Din , had deprived them oflhe ir patrim o ny. Ibn a l-Athir ( 11 60- 1233), a native of Mosu l, spe nt m ost of h is time in the town a nd its e nviro ns m ovin g in the Zengid ruling circl es. From 1211 , Zengid ru le in Mosul was supplanted by Al.abeg Badr ai-Din Lu'lu' , a former military slave (mamluk ) of the Zengids. Ibn a l-Athir as we ll as m e mbers of his fami ly e njoyed the patronage of Badr alOin Lu ' ltt ' who di ed in 1259. According to Douglas Patlon , Ibn al-A thir's re nowne d uni versal history (al-Kamilfi 'l- T a'rikh) was com missioned by Lu tlu ' . 11 4 111
IJi! 11!I
IH
7,67,
Ibn Shaddad , 7, 10. Fo r Qu tb ai-Din , see Pouzet. index . Sec, Fa/h , 484. C. E. \'o n Gruneballm , Mtd~a llslam , (Chicago, 1969),329-330. Sec, his Badr ai-Din Lu 'iu' A/abtg of Mosul, 1211-1259, (Seattle, 1991 ), 5-
THE SOURCES
37
It remain s e lusive whether Ibn a l-Athir had eve r met Saladin or members of his inner circle suc h as Qadi al-Fad il , ' lmad a i-Din and Ibn Shaddad. Two of Ibn al-Athir's works are pertinent to the study of Saladin: the hi story of the Atabegs of Mosu l (ai-Ta'rikh ai-Bahirfi 'i-dawla al-AtabakiY)'a) an d the unive rsal hisLOlY. The histOlY of th e Atabegs of Mosul was comp le te d in 12 11 or 1219, and includes a long and detailed eulogy of Nur a i-D in which, as P. M. Holt has shown, was influ enced by Ibn Shaddad's biograp hy of Sa lad in . liS Ibn a l-Athir's universal history has a co mplex textual history: its first version was completed by the end of the twe lfth century and revised and up-daled between 1223 and 1231 wh en it abruptly ends. 116 Ibn a l-Athir's account of Saladin, in the universal history, is harshly judged by Cibb wh o maint;lins that whil e relying on ' Imad a l-Din's the Syrian Lightning Ibn al-Ath ir rewrote it with a malicious twist His con clusion is based upo n a compa rison of Ibn a J-A thi r's vers ion of th e events concerning Sa ladin in lh e universal hi story with th e two ex tant manuscript volum es of the Syrian Lightning covering the years J 177-1180 and I J 82-1184. Nonethe less. only one direct quotation from the Syrian Lightning has been attested to in Ibn al-Alh ir's universal history by Cibb. For some reason, Cibb assumes that Ibn al-Athir's account of the yea rs 1169-1171 is not derived from
Il~ See, his -Sa ladin and his Admirers: A Biogr.lphical Reasscssment~, nSOAS, XLVI(1983),236. 116 D. S. Richilrds, -Ibn al-Athir and the Later Pans of the Kamil; A Study of Aims and Mcthods in Mt:dieval H islarleal \\,rilinKJ ;11 Iht Christia" alld Islnmic Worlds. (ed) D. O. Morgan (London, 1982),80. Fo r Ibn al-Athir's ambi tious goals in writing al·Kmnil ilnd its SlrUClL!re, see Ahmad , 89. 117 Gihb, -The Arabic Sources 65-6. Gibb has d c mOll stratcd also other deficie ncies of Ibn al-Athir's narrative. Ibn al-Athir's lI SC of the history of Dam· asclls by Ibn a l·Qahm isi for the first half of the twelfth ce nt ury is highly problematic in terms o f accuracy, a nd Ibn al·Athir disto rts sOllie of Ibn al-Qalanisi's accou n ts. See, his "Notes on the Arabic Materials for the Il isLOry of the Earl)' Crusades~, nsOAS, 7(1933-1935), 746-53. R
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C HAIYfER ONE
dem of ' Im ad al·Oin. Ibn a)·Athir could have used ' Imad ai-Din for the years 11 69· 11 7 1 lOO,I1 8 2) Ibn al-Athir did collect informa tion and sources quite inde pendently of ' Imad a i-Din. In both ' works of Ibn al-Athir th e re are many accounts based on oral informa tio n ,I19 For examp le, th e man who was instru mental in the procla ma ti on of Frid ay sermons in Egypt in the name of the Abbas ids was pe rson ally known to Ibn al-Alhir,1 20 And the accoun t of Nu r aI-D in 's death is re la ted on th e a Ulhori[y of his personal physician,I 21 Therefore , the divergence be uveen the works of ' lm ad a i-Din and Ibn al-Athir is not n ecessa rily a reflection of Ibn alAth ir's disloflion o f ' Im ad ai-Di n ; it could have bee n a resull of different and inde pe ndent sources. l22 3) H os tility to Saladin does not discre dit outright Ibn a l-Athir's comm e ntary o n Sa ladin's deeds and motives. For the modern student of Salad in a non-partisan account might prove very valuable. 123 4) A comparison between Ibn a l-Athir 's accounts in the history of the Atabegs and the universal history reveals that the narrative in th e unive rsal history is more hostil e lO Salad in. In the universal history Saladin is always portrayed in a worse light than in th e history of the Atabegs. 5) However, hosti li ty to Saladin did not permeate the whole of Ibn a l-Athir 's writings. The following exampl e ca n serve as an illustration for the diffe re nt ways Saladin is treated by Ibn a l-Athir. In his acco unt of Shirkuh 's third ca mpa ig n in Egyp t, Ibn a l-A thir quotes Sa lad in as saying: "Alla h gave m e a possess io n of what I had not coveted". Ibn al-Athir's info rm a nt was a person very close lO Sa ladin . 124 The ge ne ral co ntext within whic h th is saying appears is Saladin 's rel ucta nce, reported by Salad in himse lf, to take part in th e third campa ig n to Egypt. Sa ladin co ntrasts his re lucta nce willl the ultimate o u tcome of th e ca mpaign. Pe rhaps Saladin 118 According LO Richard s, ' Imad ai-Din completcd the writing or the Syrian Lightning toward the end or the twelrth cen tu ry, i. e. a lo ng time berore Ibn alAthir put the last touchcs to his u nivcrsal history. Sec, MA Consid cration 60. 119 Fo r a discussion or Ibn al-Athir·s use o r ora l inrormation , see Ah mad, 90. ]2(1 Ib n al-ALhir, AI·Ta 'nlth al·Bahirft 'l-Dawla al-AtaMiyya, (cd) A. A. Tolaymat (Cairo, n. d .), 156. ]2] Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 582. 122 Fo r instance, see the carerul and illuminatin g discussio n or such an exam ple by Lyo ns a nd J ackson, 406, n AO. 12~ Such an example is disc ussed by Humphrcys, see From &ladin to the Mongols, 58-9. ]24 Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamilfi 'I- Tn 'rillh, (ed ) C.]. Tornbcrg, (Lciden, 1867· 187 1), XI, 226; Bahir. HI. M
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THt: SOURCt: S
39
was indeed reluctant to participate in the third campaign, and certainly the results of this campaign were beyond his expectations. But Saladin's sayin g is not only a record of his mood at tha t time, it serves a purpose. Saladin 's aim is LO portray himself as a man who is not avid for power. His fortun es were ordained by God in spite of his own reluctance and he is merely a tool of God's will. By using this account, Ibn al-Athir propagates in fact Saladin 's self-crea ted image. hardly a hostile service. Upon reading of this account one feels that Ibn al-Athir perhaps was not indifferent to Saladin's achievements ag-dinst the Crusaders. which were undeniable and already brought him fame in his lifetime. He provides a balanced evaluation of Saladin 's military problems when fighting the Crusaders. For exa mple, Ibn alAthir describes the deliberations of Saladin's war cou ncil before the battle of Hittin . Some of the emirs suggested avoiding a largesca le battle with th e ene my and advocated instead waging a war ofa tlrition against the Crusaders by co nstantly raiding their territori es. In their opinion this type of warfare would be also instrumental in si lencing those voices blaming Saladin for conducting war against Muslims instead the Crusaders. However, Saladin was in favor of an all-out battle. Ibn al-Athir is more critical of Saladin when he assesses his failure to conquer Tyre, in the wake of his victory at Hittin. He says that Saladin allowed the population of the towns conquered by him after Hittin to go to Tyre. The people there were ready to surrender the town, but the arrival of Conrad de Monlferrat and hi s leadersh ip inspired th e population to resist Saladin. Ibn al-Athir says that Saladin abando ned the siege of Tyre as a result of his policy of not gettin g involved in long sieges against towns whi ch vigorously defended themselves. Saladin's emirs also demanded the cessation of the siege due to lack of provisions, money, heavy losses, weariness and the onset of the winter. After some hesitation Saladin yielded to his em irs. Basically, Ibn al-Athir criticizes Saladin for bad judgment (lack of luum) regarding Tyre. But, later in his account, he presents in sobe r terms Saladin's dilemma whether to engage or not to engage the Crusading armies which were converging on Acre. 125 However o th er fragments of Ibn al-Athir's writings are tainted 12!> Ibn al-Athi r, Kamil. XI. 35 1, 359. 368·9, XII , 21-2. I alll g....Hefullo AnneMarie Edde, who draw Illy atlcntioTl to these accounts o r Ibn al-Athir.
40
C HAPTER ONE
with morc overt hostility to Saladin. T oward the end of th e account of Saladin's no min a tio n as th e Fatimid vizier, Ibn a l-Athir in se rts hi s own observa tio ns on how dynasties rise to power. He adduces man y exampl es from Islami c history to show th at the fo und e rs of dynasties were unabl e to pass on their rul e to th eir own sons. The be ne ficiaries were othe r members of the family who assum ed powe r and transferred rule to lhe ir proge ny. Th e Ayyubids fall into this pauc rn . Rul e (mulk) passed from Shirkuh to Saladin who es ta bli shed th e Sl a le (dawla) and expan ded it, but eventl y power was transferred to his brother and to his proge ny_ Ibn a lAthir re marks that at the lime he was writing only Aleppo was in th e hands o f Saladin's offspring. Ibn al-Athir points out that th e founder of a dynasty as well as his imme diate famil y are preoccupied with ga ining power. For this reaso n Allah de nies him and hi s progeny rule as an act of punishme nt. 126 On th e one h and , Ibn al-Athir puts the Ayyubids o n the same footing as the Umayyids, Abbasids. Buyid s and other grea t Isla mic dynasties and sta tes. On th e Olher hand, Saladin him se lf is co mpared to othe r fo unde rs of dynasties whose absorption with establishing their rul e in curred th e wrath of Cod. Ibn a l-Athir implies that the establishm ent of ntle is associated with th e shedding of blood a nd violence and therefore th e fo unde rs ca nn ot e nj oy th e fruits of their e ndeavors. The roots of this co ncept are Biblical, but it serves Ibn a l-Athir's purpose well. In contrast to Saladin 's histori a n-admire rs who depict him as unse lfish warrio r of th e H oly War and uph o lder of Sunni Islam , Ibn al-Athir portrays him as a man greedy for power. And he , like others. is punished for th e way he had gained power. These various accounts refl ect the in co nsis te n cy and complexity of Ibn a l-Athir 's narra tive. Manipulation of hi story was not fore ign to Ibn al-Athir nor was he above it. In hi s universal h istory, Ibn a l-Athir successfull y obfuscated the fact that Badr ai-Din Lu ' iu ' usurped powe r from th e legitimate rul e rs of Mosul, the Zengids. 127 Therefore, each acco unt o f Ibn al-Ath ir that de als with Saladin must be examin e d on its own me rits . In man y cases Ibn al-Athir's bias again st Saladin is no t eviden t, o r-to put it more ca utiously126 A/-Kami{, XI, 227~. This interesting passage is discussed by Tarif Khalidi (see 2 17) whose English re nderi ng of the tex t is a mixlUre of lfanslation and interpretation. Th e origi nal leXI is far more enigmatic than Khalidi's rendering sh ows. He also ignores the context which fo r his purposes is less important. 127 Patton. 5, 14.
T H E SOU RCt:S
41
is not d e tec tabl e to us because of o ur restric te d und e rsta ndin g of th e sys te m o f valu es whi ch gui ded twelfth /thirtee nth--ce ntu ry his· tori a ns.
e. Ibn Abi Tayy and Abu Shama Th e two most importam historia ns in the genera tio ns immedia tely afte r Saladin a re Ibn Abi Tayy (approxim ately 11 79-1232) of AJeppo a nd 'Abd al· Rahm an ibn Isma'i l Abu Sha ma ( 1 2 0 ~ 1 268) ofJ erusa· le m. Ibn Abi Tayy was bo rn in to a lead in g Shi' ite fa mily in Ale ppo. Sunni hi stori a ns p rovide scanty biograph ica l data a bo ut him.1 28 Like ma ny o f h is conte mpo raries. Ibn Tayy was a pro lific write r with inte rest in many subj ects. Hi s h is to rica l works dea lt not only with AJ e ppo, but a lso wit h Egyp t a nd No rth Afri ca. He wrote t he histo ri es of Sa ladin a nd his so n al·Zahi r as we ll as a n unive rsa l hi stOry. In AJ e ppo, as Cla ude Cah e n noted . Ibn Abi T ayy h ad a n o pportun ity to meet man y no tables from late Fa timid a nd ea rl y Ayyubid Egypt a nd to co ll ec t info rm atio n from th e m. l29 Ibn Abi Tayy suppli es very important in fo rma ti o n abou t Saladin , howeve l· no ne of his works have survived . He is known onl y fro m c ita ti o ns by la te r hi stori a ns such as Abu Shama a nd Ibn Fu rat ( 1334-1 405) who have transmi tted ma ny fragme n ts o f hi s wrilin gs in th e ir own works. 130 It is im po rta nt to exa min e h ow Abu Sh ama a p proach ed a nd used Ibn Abi T ayy's works. Ibn Abi T ayy is extensively q uoted by 128 The dates concerning Ibn Abi Tayy a re gh·cn according to K\ltubi (d. 1363). But h is entry on Ibn Abi Tayy is d u ll including a long list of his works a nd somc uncomplimcntary rcmarks on his lite rAry OUl pUt. See, his, Fmual af- WaJa),al, (cd) I. 'Abbas ( Beiru t. 1973), IV, 269-71. Ibn al-'Adim ( 1193-1262), the great Su n ni historian of Aleppo, rare ly re fers 10 Ibn Ab i T ayy. Sec, Mo rra}', 96. n.393. T h c a\'ai lable data o n Ib n Abi Tayy have bee n studied by CI. Cahcn in his La Syrie du Nord (ll 'ipoque des Croisatles, (Paris, 1940),55-7. Sunni historians, illllOng them Ibn Qalanisi, Ib n al-'Adim and especially Ibn al-Athi r, d istorted a lso the events and essence o f the Shi 'ite rcbellion in Aleppo under Nur a l·p in . See, H. M. KJlayat, "The Shi'ite Rebellion in Aleppo in the 6th A. H/ 12 A.D. Cent u l)'~, Rivista tlegli Sludi Orienlali, 46(1971), 184-5. 129 See, h is "Quelq ue ch roniqucs anciennes relatives a ux de rn iers Fat imi des~, BIFAO, XXXVIl (l937), 17·8. 1$0 Fragmen ts or Ibn Abi Tayy's wri tings, as q uoted by Ibn Furat, have becn u tilized in two studies by Ca he n. See, ~Une c h ron ique ch iite au tem ps des C roisad es~, Comptts rendus de I'Awdemie des Inscripliolls el des Belles leI/res, 1935, 259-63; Orient et Occident au temps des Croisades, (Paris, 1983),222·3. See, also Khayal, 167-95.
42
C HAPTER ONE
Abu Shama who at least once re fe rs to his biography of Saladin. Abu Shama has reservations ahoutlbn Abi Tayy's impaniality. Accordin g to him, Ibn Tayy was hos tile to Nur ai-Din who subdued the Shi'itcs in Ale ppo. This notion is share d by modern sc holars, lOO.131 But, as Gibb pointe d ou t, hostility to Nur a i-Din did n o t e ntail hostility to Saladin,l32 It seems that Abu Shama fail ed to noti ce th e niceties of Ibn Abi Tayy's differe nt approach to Nu r alOin and Sa ladin. For exampl e, Abu Shama disputes Ibn Abi Tayy's account about the e nmity between Nur ai-Din and Saladin which developed following Saladin's conquest of Egypl. Abu Shama says that Ibn Abi Tayy's vers ion is motivate d by hostility to Nur ai-Din. However, Abu Shama's accusation of Ibn Abi Tayy on this score is ground less. The en mity betw'ee n Nur ai-Din an d Saladin is reported also by Ibn al-Athir who is certainly not a hostile source to Nur ai-Din. Abu Shama. as th e tille of hi s chronicle suggests (the Book of the Two Gm·dens. Th e History of the Two Dynasties that of NUT ai-Din and Saladin), is a n admirer of both rule rs. Thus his re marks about Ibn Abi T ayy must be understood in the light of his effort to maintain the image and fame of both rulers and regimes. Abu Shama's method for dealing with a certain event is to quote th e accounts of several historians. To a large extent hi s ha ndling of these accounts is uncritical. However, the assertion that Abu Shama "does not comment" o n his sources must be qualified. 1jS Abu Shama do express hi s views. Sometimes he introduces such comments by the phrase: "" I say" (qultu).IS4 On other occasions, he provides an account of a ce rtain event, or a short statement, without quoting any authority for it. Such accounts and statements should be unde rstood as hi s own indepe ndent views. Therefore, when using and quoting Abu Shama, a clear distinction should be made be tween the passages cited by him on the authority of othe r historians and his own independent narrative. In his indepe ndent views. Abu Sham a is inclin ed to accept the accounts of 131 Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 441-2; Khayat, 180. Abu Sham a's quotation of Ibn Abi Tayy's biography of Saladin begins o n page 415 and it seems to continue up [Q pa§c 443. See, I, pt,2. 13 See, his ~The Achieveme n ts of Saladin~, Bullttin of the John Rylands Library. 35( 1952) reprinted in Studies on the Civilization of Islam, ( Boston, 1962), 92. 133 Ahmad, 93. 1' 4 The interruptio n of the narrative by the phrase qullu is a common technique in the writings of late medieval authors. See, Khalidi, 201.
THE SOURCES
43
Saladin 's hi storian-admirers. No ne theless, from the poinL of view of the prese nt study, th e value of Abu Sham's work is immense. Abu Shama provides long accounts taken from works which othe rwise have not survived. In co ntrast to Abu Shama, Ibn Wasil (d. 129B), another well known hi sto rian of th e Ayyubid pe riod , rarely quotes his sources and for th e years 11 69- 1174 he provid es littl e new or important information. In add ition to Abu Shama's chronicle the Book of lhe Two GaTdens, some a ttention should be given to hi s own abridgment of this work e ntitle d CUyun al-Rawdata),n min Akhbar al-Dawlalayn. 135 In it no so urces are c ite d. Essentially, this work repeats infonnation found in the full chronicle, but it has its own va lue too. From the point view of the mod e rn use r it is easier to obtain from CUyun th e gist of Abu Shama's narrati ve, which in th e full chronicl e is frequentJy obfuscated by redundancies. Free of redundancies, some of the accounts in CUyun have a quite differe nt tenor, almost a different essence, than in the Book of the Two Gardens. f. Maqrizi
Among the historians of the Ma mluk period th e most important for the present study is Maqrizi (1364-1442). The value of Maqrizi 's writings for the study of the Fatimid history is well known ; his various works are a mine of information on Fatimid Egypt. The most essential work is his three-volume chronicle IttiCaz al-Hunafa·... which deals exclusively with Fatimid history. A. S. EhrenkreuLZ was the first to utili ze luicaz (then available in manuscript form on ly) for the study of Saladin. Today with the publication of this huge work a be tter analys is of the text is possible. Unfortunately, by contrast to his practice in the early parts of laic az, in the late pa rts Maqrizi does not cite hi s sources. Judging from his Khital , a work d ea ling with the topography and history of Egypt and Fustat-Cairo in particular, Maqrizi was familiar with Qadi al-Fadil's chronicle Mutajaddidat. This work is cited many times for the events of the years 567-594/1171-1197. 136 This leaves open the question of what were th e sources used by Maqrizi for the events of 11 60's. Apparently, 1'-" See n.61. I ~ A. R. Guest, ~A List or Wrilers, Books and other Authorities Mentioned by EI-Maqrizi in his Khitat ~,JRAS, (1902). 110. 125.
44
C H APTER ONE
Maqrizi was familiar with Qadi al-Fadil's le tte rs (rasa'il). For insta nce, Maqrizi 's version o f the Ba ttJ e ofthe Blacks, in !ui'az. closely follows Qadi a J-Fadil's repon of th ese eve nts se nt to Nur ai-D in in Damascus. Maqrizi also uses 'U mara 's au tobiograph y, devotes much attention to 'U mara 's conn ecti ons with th e ru ling ci rcles of t he Fatimid period and quotes his poelry,I37 Syrian a uth o rs are littl e used by Maqrizi. ' Imad ai-D in is sparsely mentioned in Khilat, a nd the work qu oted is no t the origi nal-the Syrian Lightning-but Bundari's abridgment. Ibn Abi Tayy is a lso ra re ly quoted. 138 But, occas io na lly. some illuminating items of information provided by Maqri zi prove to be derived from quite un expected so urces. A point in case is a n account of Ibn J awzi, a [WelfLh-ce n tury histori an of Baghdad. reproduced by Maqrizi withou t na ming his source . 139 Maqrizi's account of the closing yea rs of the Fatimid period is worth reading. In contrast to Abu Shama, who combined in his narrative extraclS from different historia ns and his own indepe nd e nt statements, Maqrizi provid es an integra tive account. Its main value lies in the light it sheds on Saladin 's policy toward the Fatimid state from th e day of his nom ination as the vizier of al-'Adid until th e death of the Fatimid rul e r. No less importa nt is Maqrizi 's account of the years 1172-1198. Maqrizi relying o n Qadi a l-Fadil 's Mutajaddidat suppli es (in Khilal and Suluk a chronicle d ealing with the Mamluks which a lso includes a section on the Ayyubids) the most significant informatio n o n Saladin's inte rn al policies in Egypt. It is true that thi s informa tion is no t full and systemati c. but it touch es upon a who le range of Saladin 's policies.
m For the history of 'Umara in Egypt and his poetry, see Maqrizi , Illi'az., III , 224-8,249-52,259-60. For Maqrizi's use of 'U mara's autobiography, see 225 (:: 'U mara, 32)' 226 (:: 'U mara 34, he re Maqrizi omits 'Umara's reference to a lHafiz as Imam ai-Hafiz), 227 (:: 35-6, but in Maqrizi 's text the payment that 'Umara received is incorrectly quoted), 228 (= 38), 249-50 (= 44), 25 1 (:: 49), 252 (:: 48),253 (:: 53), 254 (:: 54), 259 (:: 68, he re Maqrizi repeats 'Umara's saying tha t the fall of the Ru zzik fa mily bro ugh t about the fall of the Fati mids). I~ Guest, III , 119. U9 See, ch.2. n.2.
TI·I E SOURCES
45
3. Textual Problems: Tendentious and ConJlir.lillg Versions
The aim of this sec ti o n is 1O show how th e diffe rent perspectives of Saladin's hislOrian-admirers and thal of Ibn al-A thir sha ped their accounts . This will be do ne by exam ining so me o f th e main even ts of th e years 1167-1171 such as Nur al-Din's ex pediti on to Egypt in 11 67, the killing ofShawa r, the election o f Saladin as th e Fatimid vizie r and th e proclamation of Abbasid suzerainty in Egypt. In Chap te r Two, usin g other so urces, th ese in cide nts will be re-exami ned in o rd e r 1O provide another more ind e pende nt perspecti ve o n the eve nts und e r disc ussion. a. The Campaign of 1167
Th e so urces for th e 1167 ca mpaign a re parti cularl y probl ematic. At th e tim e th a t Shirkuh and Saladin were campaigning in Egypt, 'Imad ai-Din had just arrived in Damasc us in search of employmenlo His knowledge o f the eve nts unfoldin g in Egypt must have been quite limited , and he was preoccupi ed with his own personal affairs. Nonethe less, when ' Imad ai-Din wrote the Syrian Lightning he was able to co mmand all th e releva nt so urces. Unfortunately, for this campaign, we o nly have at our di sposa l extracts from his original writings as provided by later a uth ors. Qadi al-Fadil , although well placed 1O be fami liar with th e inn er thoughts ofShawar and his extended family 110, is not quoted by Abu Shama or any other historian as a source for th e events unde r review. Ibn Shaddad, the third of Saladin's histo rian-admire rs, cannot be regarded as an indepe nde nt source for th ese eve nts . His acco unt is derived from oral informati o n and so urces h e ob tained durin g the time he had served Saladin. The most detailed and cohere nt acco unt is provid ed by Ibn alAthir. No hostile bias against Shirkuh o r Saladin is evident. Fo r example, the Ba ttle of Babayn is viewed by Ibn al-Athir as a remarkable victory and Saladin's deeds during this ca mpaign are recorded in sober terms without any detectable prejudice. In fa ct, one should note what seems to be a strange differe nce of opinion between
46
CHAPTER ONE
condemns Shawar for his alliance with the Franks and regards him as responsible for inviting the Crusaders into Egypl.!"l
THE SOURCES
47
of his regular visits to the Syrian camp Shawar missed Shirkuh who had left earlier. The conspirators arrested Shawar and at al-'Adid 's demand PUt him to death.'44 Although Saladin is not portrayed in this aCCOUnl in a bad light, it is hardly a convincing narrative. One gelS the im press ion that Ibn a l-Athi r' s versio n strives above all LO exonerate Shirkuh from any blame for the killing of Shawar. ' Imad ai-Din, in his account of these evenlS, says that Salad in spoke with Shirkuh about the need to eli min ate Shawar. But Shirkuh disapproved of Saladin's in te nti o ns and even sent hi s confidant,
See, his Kamil, IX, 223-4; BlIhir, 139-40. Al-Bundari, 77--8: repeated by Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 398. ]46 Ibn Shaddad , 40. 147 How historians or the Abbasid period dealt with the question or regicide is examined by T . EI-Hibri. Sec. his MThe Regicide or the Caliph a l -Amin~, Arabica, XLII ( 1995) , 334-64. The question ofrcgicide was an important issue in the Mamluk pe riod. For the ki lling or Qutuz a nd the rise or Baybar.>. see P. Thorau, The Lion ]45
48
C HAPTER ONE
In any case the aim of the plOl was mere ly to neutra li ze Shawar, his death was the resull of al-'Adid's d e mand . ' Imad a J-Din and Ibn a l-A thir portray th e co nspirators as powe rl ess in the face of a requ est made by th e fo rmal ruler of the co untry. Th e impression co nveyed by these acco unts is that the conspirators had to play by Fatimid politi cal norms. Conte mporal1' twelfth-century historians, Muslims and Franks. have e mphasized that by Fatimid political standards ascendancy to th e post of vizier by overthrowing and killing the former vizier was an accep te d praclice. 148 A possi ble insight into the impli cit po litica l values to which the historia ns of the period refe rred can be gained by borrowing terms common in Muslim jurisprude nce and e thi cs. These classify human action s into fi ve catego ri es starting with duti es whose fulfillme nt by th e be li ever is o bli gatory (jard/wajib) and descending to actions which are expressly forbidden (hamm). In the middle there are duties whose fulfillm e nt by the beli ever is merely recommended (mandub). Other action s are viewed as n e utra l (mubah) whil e othe rs are disapproved although not lega lly forbidden (makruh). In light of this classification, th e role of Saladin in the plot against Shawar, fro m whi ch he ga in e d nothing dire ctly, can be d escribed as ne utral (mubah) or, a.ccording to Ibn Shaddad's version, eve n mandub. Th e co ngrui ty of th e accounts of Ibn a l-A thir and ' Imad ai-Din regarding the killin g ofShawa r can be explained by th e ir admiration of Nur aI-Din. Shirkuh was a high-rankin g o ffi ce r in the se rvice of Nur ai-Din; his immoral be havior thus stains th e re putation of hi s master, which was preci o us to both of th e m a nd had therefore to be protec ted. I t seems to me that it is possible to infer from the accounts of Ibn al-Athir a nd ' Im ad ai-Din the impression that they strived to convey to their readers when they recoullled these events. Th e plot was justifie d. Shirkuh's be havior was n oble a nd he ha d nothin g to do with th e killing of Shawar. Saladin's of tiD'P'. translated i11l0 English by P. M. Holt ( Lo ndon, 1992), 83-4. The relevan! sources arc exa mined by P. M. Holi. See, his KSome O bservations o n Shafi' ibn 'Ali 's Biography of Baybarsft , jSS, XXIX(1984 ), 123-30; "Three Biographies of a l-Zahir Baybars in Medieual Historieal Writings, 20-7 . Fo r a wide r treatmen t of this topic, see U. Haarman n, ~ Regicidc and Law o f the Turksft, in bdellectual Studies on Islam, (cd s) M. M. Mazzoui and V. B. Mort:cn (Salt Lake City, 1990), 127-35. 148 Ibn Shaddad .36, 40; re peated by Abu Shama, I, pl.2, 398; William orTyre, 11 ,305. ft
,
THE SOURCES
49
actions were reasonable or even laudable whil e the direct responsibili ty for Shawar's death lies with the Fatim id Imam. c, The Nomination oj Saladin as Vizier
' Imad al-D in 's account of the election of Sa lad in as Fatimid vizier is succinct and straightforward. He adm its that the em irs of Nur al-Din's expeditionary force were divided over the nomination of Shirkuh's successor. Eventually, however, they unanimousl y decided to chose Saladin and they compelled al-'Adid to accepllheir se lection. Ibn Shadd ad adds nothing new to th is account. He says simply that following Sh irkuh's death Salad in was e ntrusted with authority,149 In contrast to these terse accounts, Ibn al-Athir provides a detailed description of the c ircumstances that led to the e lection of Saladin as Fatimid vizier. A number of emirs in the expeditionary force had a mbi tio ns to com mand the force and to be nominated as Fatimid vizier. However, a l·'Adid appointed Sa ladin knowing that he was the youngest and the weakest among the emirs with no military following of hi s own, thus easy to contro l. The Fatimids hoped that the nomination of Sa ladin would create a mpture within the ranks of th e expeditionary force that would play into their hands. On ly through the effo rts of ' Isa a l-Hakkiri did the emirs accept the selection of Saladin as vizier. 150 Ibn al-Ath ir's hostility to Saladin is evident; he depicts Saladin as an in significant person who owed his appointment to a here tic, the Fatimid ruleran Ismai'ili Imam, These two diametricall y opposed narratives give the impress ion that these events we re more complex and shadowy. The brevity and simp li c ity of the accounts given by ' Imad al· Din and Ibn Shaddad is as suspicious as Ibn a l-Athir's hostile version. d. The Battle oj the Blacks The single most important event in Saladin's rise to power in Egypt
was the BattJe of the Blacks. Th e re is a rare unity of opi ni on among our sources rega rding the events that led to it. Mu ' tam in , a black ]49 AI-Bundari, 8 1; Ibn Shaddad, 10; repeated by Abu Sham a, I, pI,2, 406. Ibn al-Athir, Kami{, IX , 226-7; Bahir, 141 -2.
150
50
C H APTER ONE
eunuch of al·'Adid , who was the strong man behind the thron e, wrote to the Crusaders urging them to attack Saladin 's forces in Egypt. Th e plot was discovered due to th e vigilance of one of Saladin 's m en who became suspicious of a certain person because of an mismatch in hi s anire. When a rrested h e turned to be Mu'tamin's messe nger who h ad carried letters to th e Crusaders. Th e messenge r led hi s in ves tigators to a J ewish sc ribe wh o had writlen these letters. Under the pressure of interrogation an d tortu re, th e J ew e mb raced Islam a nd in criminated Mu ' tamin as the man behind th e letters. Saladin dupe d him by keepin g quie t about his knowledge of the plot. After a tim e, as Mu 'tamin left Cairo for his country reside nce he was attacked and killed. His killing sparked off the Battle o f the Blacks. Pe rhaps we are being unduly suspic ious, but the way these events are re presented by th e historian s of th e period inspires little con· fiden ce. The combin ation in o n e account o f a despised bl ack eunuch who holds the reins of power behind an Isma'i li he retic and uses a J ewish infidel to co nspire with th e Crusaders, a reli· gious enemy, is too much to swallow. The unmasking ofa suspected person due to some mismatch in his attire is a literary co nve nti o n if not a topOS. 151 We can not escape feeling that the sole purpose of these accounts is to justify th e wa r Saladin waged on the Blacks. Our sources, with th e exception of Ibn Abi Tayy, represent the Sunni point of view. And th e fact th at Ibn Abi Tayy was a Shi
e . T he Proclamation of Abbasid Suzerainty Ibn al·Athi r's h ostility to Saladin is very evident in his account of th e circumsta nces whi ch led to the proclamation of Abbasid su· ze rain ty in Egypl. Furthermore, in this case, we can observe an 1.'>1 For example . this motive appears in the biography of Ahmad ibn Tulun , the nin th-century semi-independe nt ruler of Egypt. Balawi, his biographer, tells a story of how Ahmad unmasked an Abbasid spy by noting an expensive ite m in the attire o ra ce rtain person which did not matc h his supposed low social standing. See, Sirat Ahmad ibn Tulun. (ed) M. K. 'Ali (Damascus, 1939), 124-5. For the Baltle of the Blacks, see Ibn a l-Alhi r, Kamil, XI, 228-9; al·Bundari , 82-3.
TH E S O U RCES
51
evoluti on in Ibn a l-Athir 's hos tili ty as re fl ected by th e significa nt diffe re n ce be twee n th e acco un t in hi s ea rl ier work , th e hi story o f th e Atabegs, a nd h is la te r work, the u n ive rsa l h is tory. In th e hi story o f the Atabegs, Ibn a l-Athi r says th a t whe n th e pos itio n of al
Ibn a l-Athir, Bahir, 156. Kamil, IX, 24 1-2. Un fortunately, in the fragm ents of ' 1m ad al-Din 's writings, as q uoted by late sources, no ex pla na tion is give n fo r tilt: delay in ch anging the serm ons. L ~!I Ibn al-A lh ir,
52
CHAPTER ONE
tainted as they belong to different historical traditions and present two different ponraits of Saladin. The works of Gibb and EhrenkreuLz reflecllhis division. The modern student of Saladin must be aware , a nd must make his reader aware, of these two different pictures of Saladin. Two further points ought to be made: 1) none of these two different historical traditions is entirely uniform and co hesive. Internal contradictions within each onc of these traditions do exist. 2) There a fe external data for the hisLOry of Saladin. Contemporary documents, inscriptions and information wh ich emanate neither from the writin gs ohhe historianadmirers of Saladin nor from Ibn al-Athir. Such inform ation is limited but enlightening and must be systematically collected and used (see next ch apter).
CHAPTER TWO
SAlADI N IN EGYPT, 1169-11 74 1. Saladin's Rise 10 Power
a. The Sick M an on the NilI' I. Nur al-Din 's in te res t in Fatimid Egypt preda tes th e arrival of Shawar to his co un in Dam ascus in 1164. It see med in th e ea rly 1050's th at the Fatimid state was o n th e brink of inte rn al di sintegrati o n. On 6 Muh arram 548/3 April 11 53, th e military vizier Ibn Salar was killed by Ibn 'Abbas, his ste pso n. Followin g th e killin g of th e vizie r , a gro up of emirs loyal to him n ed to Damasc us. l As a result of th e conspiracy again st th e vizie r, Ascelon was los t to th e Crusade rs. Th e killing of Ibn Salar p reve nted th e dispatch of an army to reli eve Asce lon whi ch was besieged by th e Crusad ers fro m J a nuary 11 53. Th e Fatimid navy whi ch reach ed th e town was unabl e alo ne, with o ut th e assista n ce of th e ground fo rces, to preve nt the fa ll of the town (August 1153). A yea r later (e nd ofMuh arram 549/ mid April 1154), th e Fatimid Imam al-Zafir, toge th er with his bro th e rs, was killed by Ibn 'Abbas. No neth eless, Fatimid rul e in Egypt co ntinued wi th th e installation of al-Zafir 's fi ve-year-old son as the Imam unde r th e regal name of al-Fa' iz. At this grave mo ment in the Fatimid hi story, as o n ea rlie r occas ion s during Fatimid rul e in Egypt, women of the royal fa mily were instrume ntal in main taining the dyn asty in power. Al-Zafir' sister, Silt al-Qusur, staged a coup against Ibn 'Abbas using fo r this purpose a provincial gove rn or , Tala' i' ibn Ruzzik. With h is no m inati on as vizie r, 19 Ra bi ' I 549/3 June 11 54, th e Fatim id state regain ed a degree o f p oliti cal sta bi lity. Th ese eve n ts we re carefu ll y watch ed in Baghdad . With th e seizure of Damascus by Nur ai-Din (April 1154), a new ali gnment of powe r e merged in north e rn Syria. The Abbasid caliph did not waste time : he issu ed to Nur aI-Din a diploma of inves titure procl aiming him as ruler o f Egypt a nd urging him to ac t swiftly.2 But with th e consolidatio n of Tala' i' ibn Ruzzik 's positio n the h opes for a quick su ccessfu l interventio n in Egypt we re dash ed . Non eth eless I
Maqri zi, Wi'az., III , 205.
2 Ibn Jawzi , Al-Muntaz.am ft Ta'rikh al·Ummam wa-'l-Muluk, (Be irut, 1992),
XVIII , 98; Maqri1.i, Wi'az., III , 223.
54
CHAPTt:R TWO
Nur ai-Din's interest in Egypt did not evapora te, he approached Tala ' j' ibn Ruzzik on seve ral occasions adopting the posture of a champion of the Holy War and trying to galvanize the Fatimid vizier into action against the Crusade rs. At the time that Nur alOin approached Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik , the Fatimids were entangled in co mpl ex military and diplomatic relations with the Crusaders. In 549/ 11 54- 1155, the town of Tinnis badly suffered from an attack by a Sicilian neet. In 550/ 1155-1156, Tala'j' ibn Ruzzik launched a naval raid on Christian shipping off the Palestinian coast. The background and the motives behind this Fatimid naval aClivity are not entirely cl ear. It is tem pting to see it as retaliation for the raid on Tinnis; the Fatimids-unable or unwilling to auack Sicily-chose targets closer 1O th e ir borders. But Ibn Qalanisi (1073-1] 60), the historian of Damascus, puts the Fatimid naval activity in a different context. He says that Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik wished 1O pay the Crusaders tribute and 1O establish a truce with them , but his emirs refused to contribute the money. Eventually, it was decided in Cairo to ta ke military action. The naval raid that took p lace in 11 55- 1156 was a very successful one bringing much booty to the raiders. 3 Nonethe less, following this i
SA L A DI N I N EGY I' T , 11 69- 117 4
55
introduce a new dim e nsio n into th e Syria n-Egyptia n re lati o ns: he prop osed to Tala ' i' ibn Ruzzi k la un chin g a coo rdin ated attack o n the Crusad ers, Th e vizier's respo nse was h esitant; the Fatimid army was moving toward Gaza but d id nOl e ngage th e Crusaders, Tala' i' ibn Ruzzi k was in conve ni e nt pos ition : he was a pp roac hed by both sides, Nur ai-Din offe red him g ifts and th e Crusade rs asked fo r a re newal o f th e tru ce,5 From 11 6 1, in te rn al proble ms came again to dom ina te Fa ti mid politics. In fac t, Fatimid in vo lveme n t in wars aga inst th e Crusade rs a nd diplo mati c COnlacts with Damascus exte nded ove r a sh o n pe riod oftim e be tween 550-554 / 11 55- 11 60 only. In 11 62, th e rul e of th e Ruzzik fam il y as Fatimid viziers was termin ated by Sh awar, who was named th e new vizier o n 12 Muh arram 558/ 2 1 Decembe r 11 62, Eve ntually, Shawar was o usted from Cairo and sough t refu ge in Damascus at th e cou rt o f Nu r aI-Din ( 11 64). T h e a rri val of Shawa r in Da masc us marks th e beginnin g of Nur al-Din 's direc t in volve me n t in th e affa irs o f Egyp t. Ibn 'A.5akir's d e p ic ti on of Nul' al-Din 's first ca mpaign in Egypt as a so rt o f favo r to Sh awa r inte nd ed to res tore hi m to hi s previous post is un te na ble. Th e first ca mpaign in Egyp t was th e cul min atio n of Nur al-Din 's growin g illle res t in th e affai rs of Fatim id Egypt. Th e people in power in Egypt, th e vizie rs a nd th e Fatimid Ima ms, we re full y aware of this tende ncy and Nur ai-Din ca me to exe rt some influe nce on
~ Maq rizi, Wi'a1., III , 236; cf: A, F. Sayyid, Al-Dawla al-Fatimiyya fi Misr. TaJsir Jadid, (Cairo, 1992), 2 16-8, I am grateful to Paula San ders of Rice Un ive rsity, Housto n, who drew my altcmion to Sayyid's book. In his poetry Tala'i' ibn Ruzzi k a nguished over Latin rule in J erusalem a nd th e desecration of the Muslim holy p laces. See. P. Smoor, -Poet's Ho use: Fiction and Reali ty in the Works of lhe Fatim id Poets~, Quaderni di Studi Arabi, 10( 1992), 52, 53-4; Daja n i-Shakeel , M J ihad in Twelfth-Century Arabic Poetry: A Moral and Re ligious Force to Counter the C ru sades~, MW, 66(1976),110. Howeve r, Dajani-Shakeel's claim that Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik ini tiated a policy o f jihad for the conq uest ofJ erusalem is di nicul t to accept. It is tm c lhat Fati mid military activiry on land and sea was considerable and costly: between 100,000 to 200,000 dinars were spent on il. However when lhese actions are examined it is clear that no conquest ofterri tory, and certai n ly no t ofJ erusalem , was intended . T hese were merely raids. See, Ibn Mupssar, 156-7; Nuwayri, Niha)'al a{..Arab fi Funun a{"Adab, MS Lcid e n, O r.2k, IT, 229B, 231 B, For Tala'i' ib n Ruzzik 's regre t at the way he misha ndled h is military effort against the Crusaders, see Maqri zi, Khital, IV, 81. For a very careful and realistic assessmen t ofTa la' i' ibn RUlZik's involvement in the Ho ly War against the Crusaders, see Dadoyan , 1624.
56
CHAPTER TWO
Fatimid ruling circl es. 6 A case in point is Nur a l-Din's intervention on behalf of Usama ibn Munqidh. Usama entered Nur al~in's service following hi s escape in 11 54 from Egypt. where he left his family. Ta la'j' ibn Ruzzik offered Usama the governorsh ip of Aswan. But Usama rejected the proposition due to hi s unwillingness to leave again his Syrian homeland (awlan pI. of walan) for Egypl. Eventually, through Nur ai-Din's intervention and threats Tala 'j' ibn Ruzzik allowed Usama's family (about fifty people including family members and hOllsehold) to leave for Damasclls. The ship on which they sailed was wrecked off Acre and all their belongings were looled by the Franks. However, the king ofJemsalem provided them with 500 dinars, a very substantial sum of money, and they reached Damascus safely,7 In co ntraSt to the ca utious approach of Nur al·Din (prior to 11 64) LOward military intervention in Egypt, the Crusader King. dom ofJ erusaJem had no hesitation in sending its armies to Egypt. In 11 63, the C ru sadCl"s were campaignin g in Egypt. The direc t reason for the expedition was Shawar's refusal to pay J erusalem the annual tribute of 33,000 dinars, which was agreed by Tala'i ' Ibn Ruzzik. 8 In Shawwal 558/ September·October 11 63, after a vicLOry over a Fatimid force, the Crusaders besieged Bilbays. Although the Crusaders overrun a section of the wall they failed to conquer the town. 9 Nur al·Din did not se nd army to Egypt to assist in fighting the Crusaders. Whether his move against the fortress of Harim in Syria was aimed to distract the Crusaders from Egypt is not c1ear.lO One must take into account the diffi culties in sending armies from Damascus to Egypt. Geography was certainly on the side of th e C rusaders: it facilitated the dispatch of their armies to 6 Ibn 'Asakir (cd ), ElisseefT, 138-9, MS, XVl, 295, II , 4-5. It is interesting to nOte lhat bo th a1-'Adid and Shawar sho rtly aner assuming the ir offices sent robes of ho nor to Nul' a l-Oin. See, Maqrizi, lUi'm., III , 245, 260. 7 Usama ibn Munqidh , Kitah al-rtibar, (cd) P. K. Hiui (Princeton, 1930) , 34; English translation by P. K. Hiui, An Amb-Syriml Gentleman and Warrior in/he Period of the Crw;adm, (Prin cetO n, 1930); Abu Sham a, I, pt, l , 248. B Maqrizi, ltti'a:., III, 259. 9 Ibid, III , 262; William of Tyre, II , 302. ]0 Ralph:Johannes Lilie sees a connec tion hctween these two evenlS; see his 8Y1.a ntillm and the Crw;oikr S/ote.s, translated intO English by J. C. Morris and J ea n E. Ridings (Oxford, 1993) , 190. It is true that in August 1164, the Crusaders suffered a defeat at the hands of Nur a i-Din . However, according to the Arabic sou rces, they left Egypt after the siege of Bilbays. Thus the connection between these two evenlS remains ambiguous.
SALA DI N I N EGYPT, I 169- I 1 7 ~1
57
Egypt whi le making th is diffi cult fo r Nur ai-Din. Jud gin g fro m subseq ue nt events. the Crusade rs did not conside r the cam paign of 1163 to be a failure or a wa rning aga in st unde rtakin g future military actions in Egypt. II. Our sou rces (especia lly Ibn Abi Tayy and occas io nally also Ibn al-A thi r) exp lain th e invo lve me nt of Nur ai-Din and th e Crusaders in the affa irs of Egypt in eco no mi c and strategic te rms. Both powers cove ted Egypt for the mselves and made every effo rt to preven t th e ir adve rsary from gai nin g a fo o thold in th e country. Fo llowin g the initial in volve me nt of Damascus and Jerusa le m in th e affa irs of Egypt, bo th capi ta ls beca me awa re of the po liti cal and military weakness of th e Fatimid state. The co nqu est o f Egypt see med to the Crusaders as well as to Nul' ai-Din to be a feasib le und e rtak in g with in th eir reach. J I The co mbination of Egypt's econo mic po te nti al and inte rnal wea kn ess also lured Byzan tium into showing growing in terest in the affa irs of Egypt. Greek sou rces bea r witn ess to th e wish of th e e mpe ro r Manuel I to interve ne in Egypt. 12 There is n o reaso n to doubt an explanation emphasizin g eco no mi c and strategic motives as lyin g behind th e involvement of foreign powers in the affairs of th e Fatimid state. Egypt was a co untry wi th a viable eco no my; abu nd alll agricu lture and boom in g trade. Both Shawar and al-'Ad id made promises to Nur ai-Din to sh are with him th e econom ic resources of Egypt. For insta nce. when Shawar appealed for Nur ai-D in ts aid he promised him o ne third of the tax-reve nues of Egyp t; th e other hvO thirds were supposed to be divided between Shawar h imself and al-'Adid. 13 Al-'Adid , in his turn . made an even better offe r: in add ition to one third of th e Egyptian tax-revenues he promised to N UT ai-D in to cove r the full expe nses of Shirkuh 's army in Egypt. 14 Undoubtedl y Nur ai-Din expeCled co nsiderab le gai ns from hi s intervention in Egypt. Abu Shama's cand id remark th al when Shirkuh we nt to Egypt in 11 64 h e was determined 10 con quer the co untry and 11 AI-Bundari, 74; Ibn a l-Athir, Bahir, 121; Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 364; Ibn F'ural, IV, pl.l, 20. 12 Niketa C honiate, 0 City of ByumtiulII , translated in to Englis h
uy I-\, J.
l\1a,oulias (Detroit, 1984),9 1; William of Tyre, II , 348. , Abu Shama, I, pI,2. 4 18, 420 (quoting Ibn Abi Taw); Ibn al-Athir. at-Ka",il, XI, 196; Nuwayri, f, 233A. 14 Ib n a l-Athi r. Bahir. 13S-9, 140; Abu Shama, I, pt.2, 39 1.
58
CHAPTER TWO
annex it to Nur al-Din 's territories can be accepted without any reservalions. 15 Conveniently from Nur aI-Dill's point of view, the conquest of Egypt tallied also with the main political and cultural trends of his age such as the Holy War, fighting Shi' ism and tipholding the authority of the Abbasid Caliph . Economic consideratio ns were a powerful motive behind th e actions of J erusalem, toO. When Shawar invited the Crusaders to Egypt to counter Shirkuh, he paid them in cash. According to the Mamluk historian Nuwayri (1279-1332), the payment was as high as 400,000 dinars. I n ge nera l the Crusaders were well informed abollt Egypt's eco no mical potent.ial. They gathered econom ic intelligence and possessed a list of Egyptian villages and the inM comes derived from them. 16 The intention of the Crusaders to tap the agricu ltural wealth o f Egypt caused Shirkuh great concern. In 1167, h e ag reed to leave Egypt on condition that no troops of the Kingdom of J erusalem would be allowed to stay in villages in Egypt. This is a very telling piece of information whi ch reveals the military impli cation s of control of rural areas. The Muslim and Crusader armies were maintained by a system of all ocating land, or income from land, in return for military service. In direct con M trol of villages (i.e. the ability to derive income from them) and certainly direct control, meant that the side which achieved it was able to expand its military base by attracting additional military manpower. It must be remembered that, according to the agree M ment of 11 67, a Frankish garrison was left in Cairo and an annual payment of 100,000 dinars was promised to the Crusaders. Apparently this aspect of the agreement between the Fatimids and CruM saders concerned Shirkuh less. 17 The question that must be asked is why the Crusaders (who had geography on their side) failed in their efforts to control Egypt while Nur ai-Din was ultimately successful? In military terms the
15 See, his 'Uyllll, I, 261. 16 Abu Shama, I. pt .2, 421. 430 (quoting Ibn Abi Tayy): Nuwayri. r, 234A. For the different promises or Amalric to his vassals and allies and ho ..... they innuenced the timetable and the courSe or King's actions, see H . E. Mayer, ~Le service militaire des vaSSikUX de Jerusale m a l' elr.lIlger et Ie financemcnt des campagnes en Syrie du Nord el en Egypte au XII i! siccle~ in his Milangt5 5UT I'hisloirt du royaume latin deJiru5alem, (Paris. MCMLXXXIV). 14()...58; Lilie, 309-20. 17 Abu Shama , I, pt,2 , 366; ·Uyull. I, 282; Nuwayri, r. 235A; d: Sayyid. 226-8.
SALAD I N I N EGYI'T , 11 69- 11 74
59
Cmsaders were th e equals o f the Syrians and supe ri or to th e Fatimid army. But, the Crusad e rs made two colossal mistakes. The first was the decision of Ama il'ic to in vad e Ebrypt (Oc tober 11 68) with out e nli stin g any loca l help.l s It sh ould be stressed that Amal ri c's reluctance to coo pe rate with Byza ntium , in spile of the negotiations thal we re being co nducted at that ti me between these two Christia n powe rs of the Eastern Mediterranean , had no direct effect o n th e ou tco me of his invasio n of Egypt. 19 As late r events were to prove. at the siege of Dami e u a. Byza ntin e naval assistan ce was not of itself e nough to e nsure the conquest of the town . Christian naval supe ri o rity alo ne was not suffi cie nt to subdue Egypt. For example, during th e 11 69 invasions o f Egypt, the gro und forces o f th e Crusader Kingdom ofJ emsalem were assisted by some ships whi ch entered Nil e through th e mo uth o f the river at Tinnis. But the advance of this squadron was blocked by a barrier of ships hastil y e rec ted by the Fatimids. 20 As J ohn H. Pryor has recclllly shown. in naval operations in th e delta on ly a fl eet es peciall y designed to sai l in shall ow water is of an y lIse. 21 A pre-requisite for asse mblin g such fl eet is some awareness, which is no t self-evident, of the proble ms involved . Th ere a re no indi cations that the Crusaders or Byzantines planned th e naval as pects of th e ir illlc nded in vasion of Egypt with much attention to this problem . Therefore, in 1169, on lya successful land campaign could have achi eved the co nques t of Egypt. However, without any local Ebryp ti an allies, Ama lric's army was too small for thi s purpose. Amalri c's second mi stake occurred in the co urse of his in vasion . Un res trained by co mmitm e nts to loca l alli es and coll abo rators th e Crusade rs massacred th e pop ul ation of Bilbays durin g the co nqu est o f the town. Contempo rary J ewish sources tell a grim story of th e fate o f those who stllv ived th e massacre . They were 18 Ibn Fura t (IV, pl .1. 2 1, quo ling Ibn Khal1ikan ) and Nuwayri (f, 235 B) say that some Egyptians e mirs con·csponded with J crusa lc m . But the rc arc no indications thaI Amalric "'~dS assisted by loc;11 allics. t9 The shifts in the alt it udes of both IlY1.illl tium and the Crusader Kingdom of J erusale m toward military cooperation for th e conquest or Egypt ha\·e been exami ne d by Lilie and need no elabora tion. See. 198-200,309· 15. Fo r the Byza ntine sid e, see P. Magdalino. Tilt Empirt of M(illutl l Komn01s, 11 4)-1 180, (Cam. bri
60
CHAPTER TWO
put by their Frankish captors on sale in th e slave-markets of Palestine. According to Nuwayri, the retrea ting Crusaders LOok away with the m as man y as 12,000 captives. 22 It is unclear wh e ther this carnage was a calculated act of terror, or whether the Crusad ing army was simply undisciplined and its troops went on rampage on their own. Wh e n towns were co nqu ered, the interests of the military leade rs of th e Crusading a rmi es and those of the simple soldiers clashed. Th e leaders were inte res te d in an orderly co nquest and in res training their troops wh ile the soldi ers hoped fo r greater gain by killing and looting th e conquere d populalion. 2S Whateve r the circlIlllstan ces were that le d to the atrocities pe rpetrated again sllh e po pulation of Bilbays. The message sent to the population of Eb'Ypt was a c hill y one, and the advance of the Crusaders was watc he d with horror. If Amalri c ho ped to gain a foothold in the capital his co nduct in Bilbays was counler productive to that aim. On 12 November ] 168, Shawar set Fustat on fire . His motives re main obscure. Th e poet 'U mara says that what the Franks did in Bilbays necess itated th e burning of Fuslat, impl ying perhaps that Shawar wanted to save th e population of Fuslat from a Frankish bloodbath. Undoubtedly Shawar and others were haunted by th e expe rien ce of Bilbays. But se tting Fustat on fire caused immense suffe ring; many lost their li ves a nd the material losses we re co lossa l. 24 ' Umara's exp lanatio n is an apologetic one and cannot be acce pted without resen'a tion s. It seem s that Shawar panicked and overreacted. He was afraid that Fustat wou ld be used by the Crusade rs as a springboard for th e co nquest of Ca iro, and his move was a desperate attemplto fores tall this possibility.25 Shawar was n See, f. 236A. for Jewish sources, see S. D. Coitein , -Ce niza Sources for the Crusader Pe riod: A Survef, in Ou/remer. Studies in /ht flis/rrry oJ lht CnLJading Kingdom oJJ erusalem, Presented to J oshua Prawe r, (cds) B. Z. Kedar and others Uc rllsalem , 1982). 3 15-6. 23 William of Tyre, II , 352. 355. 24 ' Um
SA LADI N IN EGY PT , 1169. 11 74
61
unduly impressed by the ease with whi c h the Franks co nqu ered Bilbays. Fustat, however, was bigger a nd with a la rger populatio n than Bilbays. and Cairo was protected by wa ll s a nd massive gates. In add itio n , co nsid erable military forces we re sta ti o ne d in Cairo itself and in military quarte rs outside the wa lls. No ne thel ess, the conduct o f the Crusade rs inspired awe and brought Shawar to Lake ilTational steps. Foll owing the burnin g of Fuslat. Amalri c was faced with a difficu lt di le mm a: time was not on his sid e and an a ll--ou t attack on Cairo beyo nd hi s military mea ns.2U In any case, after some fighting directed again st Cairo, th e Fatimids were ready to buy off the Crusaders. A sum of o n e million dinars was offered of whi ch 100,000 wcrc actua lly delivered. 27 Howeve r, o nly th e arrival of Shirkuh 's sizeable force caused Amalric to retrea t fro m Egypt Uanuary 11 69).
b. The Killing of Shawar 1. Undo ubtedly th e re treat of the Crusaders strengthened Shirkuh but Nul' al·Din's expediti o nary force in Egyp t was vas tly ou tnumbered by the Fatimid army. It is tru e that both th e Syrians and the Crusade rs had a low estee m for the fighting abiliti es of the Fatimid forces. 28 The Fatimid army suffe red from two major shortcom in gs: it co nsis ted mostly of blac k in fa ntry and there fore its mobility and attac king capabil ity were restl; cted. Moreover, it lacked internal cohesion. The army was composed ofvario lls military corps differe nt in o ri gin , e thni c compositio n , military specializa ti o n a nd in the c haracte r of their troops: mi litary slaves or free·born troops. Th e fragmentation of Lhe anny ,vas an imporullll conuibllung fa ctor in the inte rnal political destab ilisation of the Fa timid sta te. Not· wilhstanding th e d e fi cie n cies of the Fatimid a rm y as a fighting count in Khilal as un rel iable o n two point.'i: the supposed moth'es for seuing the town on fire and the extent of the damages. Working fro m a wide range ofsOll rccs Kubiak expresses doubt.'i regarding the supposcd scalc of the dest ruction caused by the firc . He point.'i OUt tha t prior to Shawar's fire man y parts of Fustat were a lready in ruins. 26 William of Tyrc attributes th e failure to conque r Cairo to Amalric's slow advance followin g rh e co nquesr of Hilbays. Sec. II . 35 14, esp., 353 27 Ibn a l-Athir, Kam ii, XI, 222; Nuwayri , ff, 235 1~ 236A. 28 William of T yre, II , 3 134. In this account William refers to a sup posed meeting betwee n Shi rku h and the Caliph in which hc made some scornrul remarks about the fighti ng capabilities or the Fatimid army.
62
CHA PTER TWO
force, it e njoyed a massive numerical superiority over Shirkuh 's army. Th e \vay to Ayyubid ascendancy in Egypt was opened by th e killing of Shaw-ar, the on ly person who cou ld possibly face Shirkuh . This even t provides an unique opportu ni ty to utilize sources not traditionally used in the study of Salad in . The possible benefits of tapping suc h so urces have been demonstrated on two occasions by Ric hards. 29 A c hronicle from 11 96- 11 97, the a nonymous Bustan al-Jami', published long ago by Cahe n , furnishes interesting insighLS iOLO the conduct of the civili a n e lite of Alexandria during the period when the town was besieged by Shawar and Arnalric. Another examp le, a nd a far m orc signifi can t one, is provided by Ibn 'A.,akir's account of the killing of Shawar, ci ted by Abu Shama. Thi s account has not th e sli ghtest resemblance to the oth e r ver· sions disc ussed in C hapter One. In plain words Ibn 'Asakir says th a t Sh irkuh, with the he lp of Sa lad in , se t a trap for Shawar who was lured to the Syria n cam p to visit the su pposed ly sick Shirkuh. Upon his arrival, Shawar was ove rpowered and kill ed by Jurdik a nd Barghash, who are desc ribed as me n in th e service of Nur al· Din (litera ll y mawali, i.e. hi s cli e nts o r fr eedm en). Ibn 'Asaki r reminds his readers that Shawar was known for his wickedness a nd cunnin g. The fact that Shirkuh was responsible for th e killing of Shawa r is mentioned also in a terse remark that Ibn
2. so 185 .1 bn 'Asakir as quoted by Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 40 ) ; English translation by Richards, ~The Early History~. 154-5. For Shi rkuh's biography, see Ibn 'Asakir, MS, X, 170-1; (ed ) 'Arnrawi, (Beirut, 1996), XX III , 284.
SALADIN I N EGYPT, I 169- 1
' 74
63
with joy a nd relief by the population. However, Shawar whi le intoxicated revealed that he had approached the enemy. Ibn 'Asakir creates the impression that this should surprise no one. Shawar, he assures his readers, was known for his wickedness and cunn in g. Shirkuh set a trap for Shawar by feigning an illn ess. When Shawar came to pay him a visit, he was killed by Jurdik and Barghash, th e mawali of Nur ai-Din. Saladin is not mentioned as involved in any way in these events. Ibn
11 -20.
Ibn 'Asaki r (ed ) ElisseefT, 139. French translation, 13 1; MS. XVI , 295 , II ,
64
CHA PTER TWO
differences between Ibn 'Asakir's version and the versions of later hi storians are essential. While Ibn cAsa kir tries to justify Shirkuh 's invol vement they deny it altogether. Denial necessitated the invention ofa villain-al-'Adid. In thal way their accounts have been further re moved from th e real context. The question is why Ibn 'Asakir 's biographical nOLe on Nu r alOin makes no menti o n of Saladin's in vo lve ment in the plot? In my opinion, the possible answer is that this omission re fle cts Ibn 'Asakir 's awareness of Saladin's susceptibi liti es. Ibn 'Asakir' s account quoted by Abu Shama was written close to the events and at that time he fe ll no need lO suppress or modify information concem ing the plot. From the point of view o f Nur ai-Din, Shirkuh, and Saladin the re was nothing spec ial or shameful in th e killing of Shawar, who had a dubi o us record o f coo peration with the e ne my, the Crusaders, and heretics, the Fatimid Im am. It is said that the most famou s contemporary poet in Egypt urged Shirkuh to kill Sha\'v.::l r. It seems that later, with the rise of Saladin to power, he was not keen on mentioning hi s role in a regicide whose indirect beneficia ry h e was. Wh e n Ibn
SALA DI N I N EGY PT,
11 69- 11 74
65
administratio n . Among h is writin gs there is a lso a hi story of the Fatimids. 33 Ibn Zafir says in plain words th at o n l5 Jum ada I 564/ 14 February 11 69, Shawar, whil e on his way to Shirkuh , was caplUred by a group of e mirs and kill ed . Hi s brot.her and three so ns were also kill ed a nd th e ir h eads were publicly displaye d. ~ Ibn Zatir, as a man of th e Ayyubid age, is certainly not hostile to Saladin . Howeve r, h e did no t be lo ng to the circle of Sa ladin 's historianadm irers; he was a you nge r and less renown ed perso ll . But hi s remo leness from th e luminari es of his age had it advantages too. Among la ter historians o nly Ibn Furat ec hoes to th e same exte nt Ibn 'Asakir's account of the killing of Shawar. Ibn Furat says, without indi ca ting t hi s sources, that Shirkuh was determined to e limin a te Shawa r and h e e njoye d th e support of al-'Ad id . In a co nsultation with hi s officers, Shirkuh sa id th at hi s ambiti o n to possess Egypt is we ll known but th e Crusad ers have the sa me goal knowing how weak Egypt is. Shawar takes adva ntage of this situation by playing be tween the two sides. Following this meeting Shawar was caplllred by Shirkuh 's troops. It was a violent incident in which Sa lad in distinguished h imself. He wis he d to put Shawar to d ea th , but Sh irkuh hes itated. Only the de mand made by al-'Adid to ki ll Shawar brought Shirkuh to authorize the execUlion. 35 Ibn Furat does portray Shirkuh as involved in th e pl o t agains t Shawar. On this point his account is mo re in lin e with that of Ibn
66
C H APTE R TWO
have bee n composed ? A simil a r pro ble m o f d a ting a rises in respect o f a poe m by a n othe r Da m asce n e poe t, 'Arq a la . who composed a poem cong ra tulatin g Skirkuh o n th e killing of Shawa r a nd p raised Saladin 's rise to th e vizie ra le.'7 T h e poe ms by ' l mad a i-Din a nd
consolidatio n o r Sh irkuh 's positio n in Egypt, tho ugh th e vast Fatimid m il itary establishme nt was liule affec ted by it. None th eless according to th e le lle rs or a ppointm e nt o r Shirkuh a nd o r Saladin (sli ghtly la te r ) as Fati m id viziers, th ey we re e ntrusted with absolute politica l po we r. Th ese le tters testi fy th a t the Fa timi d state had bee n de ru nct before it actua lly was extinguished by Saladin . T h e Fa timid arm y had d ege ne ra te d a nd Fatimid civilia n administra to rs had beco m e a lie nated. In rac t, th ey be trayed a nd surre nd e red the Fa tim id sta te into th e hands or Shirkuh a nd Saladin . Th e tex ts o r bo th lette rs o r appo intm e nt, whic h were writte n by Q adi a l-Fadi l, a re rull y re produced in th e lite rary sources.38 S7 Ibid, 47. Ibn a l-' Adi m says th at 'Arqa la com posed an e u logy in hono r of Saladin d e cla ring th at Sa ladin would ta ke Egypt. Salad in o n his side p ro mised hi m a th o usand (/ilUJrs if h is p red iction were rea lized . Following Salad in's rise to power in Egypt . 'Arq ala visited h im a nd re minded hi m o f the promise he had made, bu t asked 10 rece ive the payment in Damascus n ot in Egypt. Th e story is int.e resting but lacks precision in te rms of time. See, Bugh),ot, V, 2242. Kut u bi (I, 313) says that 'Arqala d ied in 567/ 11 7 1- 1172 a t th e age o f e ig h ty and lhe payment p ro mised by Saladin was sen! to Da mascus. It is h ighly d oub tfu l if 'Arqala, consideri ng his age, could between 11 69- 1172 have unde rtaken the a rduo us j o urney fro m Damascus to Cairo to collect h is reward fro m Saladin. -'8 In a short accou nt. refe rri ng to th e Ayyubid rise to power in Egypt, Qalqasha nd i says tha t Shi rk u h was appointed as vizier by al-'Ad id a nd his le tle r of no mination was wri lle n by Qadi a l-Fadi l. I understand the p h rase: wa-kutiba lahu (i.e . to Shirkuh a nd late r Sa lad in ) ' ahd min insha' Qadi al-Fadilto mean that Qadi al-Fadil was the author of both doc um e n ts. See, III , 428. When Qalqashandi gives the tex t of both documents he p resents th em saying: ~a dOCllment composed by Qadi al-Fadil on behalf o f the Caliph a l -' Adid~ (sijjil bi-qalam Qadi ai-Fadil sadir ' an ai-khalifa al-'Adid). The preposition 'an (with verbs like kalaba and a nshu ) indicates that letters were written by Qadi a l-Fadi l 011 be ha lf
SALAD I N IN ECYI'T, 11 69-1174
67
Both leHers are extraordinary documenlS which have not received the attention they deserve. The essence of the opening paragraphs ofShirkuh's letter of appoint me III is in line with Fatimid (Isma'ili) traditional phraseology. The common Fatimid claims regarding the attributes of their Imams are re-stated: al-'Adid is described as the servant of Allah and his Friend (wali), and as the rightly guided Imam and Commander of the Faithful. Shirkuh is requested to acknowledge these standard Fatimid assertions. 59 T he dOCltment restates the Fatimid pretensions that they are the possessors of the divine li ght (nUT), and proof (lmjja) of All ah on earth. The concept that the Fatimid Im am is essentia l for the preservation of religion and human existence is powerfully sta ted: "there is no religion except through him and th e re is no wo rld excep t by a n association with him ".4o Shirkuh is addressed as th e most Illustrious Lord and the full list of hi s titles includes the following: the Victorious King, Sultan of th e Armies, Friend of the Imam and Glory ofth e Dynasty. Two titles traditionally associated with Fatimid military viziers (dictators) of th e twelfth century-Protector of the Cad is of the Muslim s a nd Guid e of th e Propaga ndi sts of the Believers (i.e. the Isma'i li s)-were a lso confCl"red o n Shirkuh. And most significantly, AI-'Adid's patronymic, al-'Adidi, was bestowed on Shirkuh as welL41 In the esse nti al paragraphs of the document it is stated that Shirkuh was appointed as the vizier with responsibili ry for the management (/mibir) of the state and the protection (hi)'ata) ofal-'Adid's throne. 42 Some of Shirkuh 's responsibilities are specified in detai l and what is expected of him is clearly stated. The document depicts an idealistic (but hardly realistic) picture of relations beof somebody else. When Qalqashandi wanL~ to indicale that the leller was composed by Qadi al-F'adil he adds the words he himself. See, VII . 90, in contrast to VII. 109. Qalqashandi's terminolob"Y reneclS that of ' Im ad aI-Din. See, al-Barq aiShami. MSOxford, Bruce II , fr, 16B. 4111, 104B; (ed) R. Sesen (Istanbul , 1979). V, 144. 172. Howe\'cr, ' Imad ai-Din avoids the awkward plm!.sc: ~he wrote on behalf of himselr . He simply omits the proposition 'fill fro m the combi n ation ansha' 'an indicating Ihal he himsclfcomposed th e letter in question. See, aiBargg (ed) Sesen, 23, 36, 54, 67 and passim. Ibn Wasi l. Mufam) al-Kunlb fi Akhbar Bani Ayyub. (cd) J. aI-Din al-Shayyal (Cai ro, 1957), II, 444, 445. 40 Ibn Wasil, II , 444 (last line). 41 Ibid, 443 (firsl para.). 42 Ibid, 450.
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tween the Fatimid ruler and the army. IL sta Les that the army is dependent on the Im am and sustained through his favors. Shirkuh is in structed LO treat we ll all segments of the army: the white and the black corps, the army in Ca iro and in the provinces (literally the close and lhe far-away), the foot soldi ers and the cavalry, the archers and those who fight with a lan ce. Shirkuh is required LO pay the u'oops their salari es (nafaqa) and to take care of their grants of land (iqla's). He is advised to be generous with th e arm y in order lO ens ure iL'i loyalty,43 The importance of jurisdiction and propaganda is emph asized, both in stitutions arc described as safeguarding the people from opprcssion.'H A h ope is expressed that Shirkuh'sjust conduct will be instrumental (wakil) in expanding the land und er cu ltivation ('imam). Shirkuh is a lso invested with the management of the affairs of the people (ra'iya) and with respo nsibility for conducting the Holy War.45 This document gives the illusion that Shirkuh is to act as the Fatimid vizier, within the framework of the Isma' ili state, with the sla'tus of a client of the Fatimid Im am bearing his patronymic.....,... al-'Adidi. This was quite an absurd presumption but necessary from the Fatimid point of view. In the twelfth ce ntury. Fatimid Imams had to come to terms with the rise of independent military viziers who acted as military dictators. The Fatimid Chancery created the impression that these viziers are subordinates of the Im ams. The best-documented case is thal of Badl' al:Jamali, a Muslim Armenian and the first military dictalOr in the Fatimid state in Egypt (who held power from 1073 to 1094). The patronymic of the Fatimid ruling Imam of that time, al-Mustansir, was conferred on Badr, who was the most powerful man in the country and supported by a private army. The meaning intended was that Badr a l:J amali was al-Mustansir 's c1ient. 46 The precedent of Badr was invoked to accommodate Shirkuh 's rise to the vizierate. Nonethe less, al-
SA LADI N I N EG YTJT,
,,69-' '74
69
ex traordin ary d ocume nt. Th e lette r begins in a traditi onal way a nd th e most esse ntial poin ts of th e Fatimid c redo are re-stated . Th e Fa timid rule r is referred to as Comma nde r o f th e Believers chose n and guid ed by Allah. His pivo tal rol e as suppone r o f Relig ion and the o ne who helps people to reac h the right pa th are reemphasized. The Fatimid claim that th e origin s o f th eir famil y go back to the Proph e t Muh amm ad and 'Ali is restated and Saladin is requested to acknowledge this. The docum e nt al so re-affirms the Fatimid belief th at their dynasty is divi nely suppo rted a nd rightly g uid ed. 48 But the mos t extrao rdina ry feature o f thi s d ocum e nt is its irreconcilable self-contradicti o n . On th e o ne ha nd , Sal adin is referred to as o ne wh o me rely ass umes th e place of Shirkuh. O n th e o th e r ha nd , a re ma rka bl e decl ara ti o n of far-reaching co nseque nces is stated : n amely, th at Saladin 's vizie rate is heredi ta ry. Th e precedent invo ked is th e h eredita ry viziera le th at was establi shed by Bad r al:J a mali. By e mpl oyin g a play o n wo rds, th e doc ument sta tes th at Saladin wo uld o uts hin e Badr's so n and successor, al-Afdal: 19 Howeve r, th e comparison is a false o ne. Th e Fatimid Imam al-Amir was fo rced to acce pt th e tra nsfer of th e pos t o f vizie r fro m Badr to his so n al-Aldal whil e Saladin 's lette r of a ppo intme nt gives a p rio ri legitimacy to such an d evelo pm ent . Othe r pa rts of the d ocume nt specify Saladin 's titl es and respo nsibilities in th e manner se t o ut in Shirkuh 's le ll.er of appo intm en t. 50 II. Th e unique n ess of th ese two lette rs o f a ppo imm e lll is clearly shown whe n th ey are compared to oth e r le tters of a ppo intm ent issued to Fatimid vizie rs. We shall begin our co mparison by examinin g a lette r o f a ppo intm ent from th e earl y e leve nth ce ntu ry, whi ch is in eve ry way a di ffe re nt docum e nt altoge th e r. But it helps to trace th e ch an ges that th e instituti on o f th e vizier unden ve nt in th e twelfth ce ntury. Th e tex t in ques tion is th e le tter of a ppo intment given to Abi ' I-Qasim 'Ali ibn Ahmad al:Jarjara 'i, in Dhu ' I-Hilla 4l 8/ Decembe r 1027:January 1028. It was written by th e head of th e Chance ry. Th e lan guage is ,-ic h and sometim es crypti c but the esse nce of the doc um e nt can be grasped . In 48 Ibid, 455-6. 49 Ibid, 459. II , 5-6. 50 Ibid, 460- 1.
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an absolute contrast to the viziers of the tw·elfth century. al:JaIjara 'j was a civilian vizier and all of his responsibilities were administrative. References to neither judicial nor to military responsibilities appear in the text. A1:Jaljara ' j is addressed as the Illustrious Vizier, the Pure One a nd the Essence of lhe Commander of the Believers and the recipi e nts of his favors. The vizier is authorized to use these phrases as his titles. According to aJ:JaIjara'i's lener of appointment, he was selected by the Fatimid ruler to act as a safam/wasita, i.e. a mediator between the ruler and the peo ple. He is entrusted with fisca l and administrative responsibilities and the management of the affairs of all the classes of peo p le; high.ranking and commoners .5 1 The meaning of saJara/wasila becomes clear only when the text is ex· ami ned as a whole . The document speaks of three social groups. The elite is alluded to in terms with Isma
Ibn al-Qalanisi. 80.
~1! Ibid. 8 1-2, the text says that the vizier is authorized to sign (tawqi') 011
half of the nller.
be·
SALADIN I N EGYPT, 1 169- 1 174
71
behalf of a l-
Qalqashandi , x, 310. For Ridwan 's protocol :, see Khan , Arabir /..Igal, 308. The titles Amir or the Armies and Swo rd or Islam appear also in Tala ·i' ibn Ruzzik 's letter or no minatio n as vizier. See, Maqrizi, II/i'm, III , 21 8: Dadoyan , 155, n.IO. !>.'! Qalqashandi , X, 3 11 , pard. 2, 3; 3 12, pard. 1. ~ ~
72
C H A I"TER T W O
tary vi zie r o n who m unpreced ented LiLI es were bestowed , the doclIme n ts clai ms that h e was care fu lly se lected by t he Comm a nde r o f th e Be li evers, wh o exa min e d his most trusted me n a nd fo und Shawar to be the mos t illustri o us a mo ng th e m .57 Shawa r's respo nsibilities we re admin istrative ( ladbir) and po litical (si)'asa) , and he was reques ted La ac t justly (' adl, insaj) in h arm o ny with established rules (kanun) a nd customs ('ada) in o rde r to eradica te o ppressio n (maz.alim) and infringe me n ts of th e law (i'tida). Shawa r is desc ribe d as wie ldin g overall respo nsibility be h ind th e th ro ne. 58 But, in lin e with the a rgum e nt th at Sh awa r's no min atio n was th e result of sel ectio n by th e Fa timid ru le r, it is re peatedly stated th a t th e Co mma nde r o f the Be li evers is th e drivi ng fo rce be hind t he vizie r a nd tha t he will guide a nd suppo rt him .59 This inte rn al contrad ictio n pe nnea tes the tex t. O n th e one hand , th e divin e na ture of Fatimid rule a nd th e d ynasty a re asserted in the most powe rful te rms. O n the o th e r ha nd , it is admitted th at the sta te is run by th e vizie r.GO Th e vizie r is de pic te d as surre nd e r· in g his swo rd to th e service ofl slam (tawhid, iman) p rotecting Isla m fro m po lyth e ism (shirk) a nd unbe li e f (kufr). T h e vizie r is a lso respo nsibl e fo r the a rmy a nd th e peo pl e (ra'i)'a), h e protects th e cadis o f th e Muslims a nd guides th e Isma' ili pro pagandists. 61 Th e vizier is ex pec te d to spea k in favor of th e mem be rs o f th e ruling elite (mnara', awli)'a') wh ose swo rds, the d oc um e nt de cla res, a re the pilla rs o f religio n .62 This state me nt re inforces th e impressio n th a t th e vizie r is in fac t the o nly cha nn e l o f co mmunication be· twee n th e ru le r and hi s subordin a tes. It is the duty of th e vi zie r to ac t in accordan ce with justi ce and to sec ure th e prope r fun ctio n· in g o fth e judicial syste m and preve nt oppression . Th is re pe tition o f th e duties in c umbe n t on th e vizie r is mad e in conne ction with th e d eclaratio n that the vizie r is responsible for th e provin ces a nd fiscal matte rs.6!I Th e diffe re nces be tw"ee n Shawar 's and Shi rkuh's le tters of a pS6 T he Fa timids a re referred to by th e term dawla. which mea ns both dynasty and state. See. Qalqasha ndi, X, 3 12 para. 2; 3 13. para. I. 57 Ibid, Ibid, 59 Ibid, 60 Ibid, 61 Ibid, 62 Ibid, 63 Ibid, 58
3 13, II , 7-8. 3 13,1. 13; 33 17, 11. 4-6. 3 14,11 , 10, 16. 3 15, II , 9- 10; 3 16, II , 3-4 . 3 15, 11 ,12-3,3 16, 11 ,9- 10. 3 17, 11 , 9-10. 3 17, 11, 3-7.
SALAD I N I N EGYPT, 11 69-1 174
73
poinunent are very substa ntial. In Shawa r's letter th e divine legitimization of the Fatimid rul e occupies a ce ntra l place in th e text and is constantly referred to. The document t ri es to convey the impression that the vizier, with a ll h is titles and responsibilities, is a subordinate of the Ima m. In Sh irkuh's letter the role of the Im am and his credentials are acknowledged, but most of the text is devoted to the vizier and his responsibilities. Shawar's letter ofappointmelll as the Fatimid vizier was followed by a letter addressed to his son, al-Kamil. The two opening paragraphs of th is letter are of a laudatory nature in praise of God. Then the divine chamctcr of the Fatimid dynasty (al-dawl(l alralwiy)'a) and its superior qualities (a//.San al-si)'flr) are asserted. 64 The assertio n that th e vizier was ch osen by the Imam is also re-stated in al-Kamil 's ieller. 65 On th e who le th e text is unyielding, the language I-ich and cryptic and th e esse nce of th e document becomes apparent on ly gradually. The text refers in an en igmatic way to the spread of kuJJar (i.e. unbelievers-apparently meaning Crusaders) in the provinces (di)'ar) of Egypt. The im pression co nveyed is that against this background the Commander of the Believers decided to invest al-Kami l with responsibility for the adm in istration of Cairo and the provinces. 66 What fo ll ows is an unexpected and quite unusual statemelll testifying to the importance of Cairo to the Fatimids. The statement begins by referring to Cairo by the standard appe ll ation as the Protected, al-mahrnsa. But then the town is also described as the pillar of Ismailism and Islam ('umdat al-iman wa- 'i-i slam), a nd dar al-Itijm. of t he Im am and the strongho ld of the Fatimid state (khilafa) since ancient tim es. 67 Each o ne of the terms used in this short description is a c ha rged one. The word iman, belief, refers to Ismail ism (in the same way as th e wo rd mu'71linin stands for t he Isma'ilis). The term dar al-hijra (Abode of Emigration) also acquired an Isma' ili meaning. At different stages of Isma'il i history, leaders of the various branches of the movement established in the regions in which they propagated their beliefs places ca lled dar al-hijra as bases for their activity and foca l points for their supporters. The fact that Cairo is regarded as
64 Ibid, 318, 65 Ibill. 319, 66 Ibid, 323, 67 Ibid. 323 ,
II, 12-8.319,11. 1-3. II, IS, 17.
II. 1-3. ll , 4-5.
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the dar al-hijra of the Fatimid Imam explains the references to it as ProteCled. The town is protected by the presence of the divinely inspired and rightly guided Imam. The appellation "Protected" when refcITing to Cairo continue d to be in use in the post-Fatimid period, but it lost iLS Isma'ili meaning. For example, the inscription commemorating the building of the Citadel of Cairo by Saladin from 579/1 183-1 184 speaks of Cairo as Protected by God. According to this inscription, the Citadel is to provide protection and comfort. The imm e nse differe nce between the meaning that the Fatimids attributed to their capita l and the Ayyubid point of view fenceLS the lack of divine pre tensions by the Ayyubid rulers. 58 Notwithstanding this important testimony to the significance of Cairo to the Fatimids, the essential part of the document deals with al~Kamil, who is to act as the deputy of his father. The document states that al-Kamil's d e putyship renects the wish (ray) of both the Fatimid ruler. the Commander of the Believers. and Shawar. the Most Illustrious Lord. In this section of the text the document refers to the Fatimid ruler and his vizier as almost equals. The wording of Shawar's and al-Kamil's letters of appointment mirror the dependence of the Fatimid Imam on his vizier for the running of the state. 69 AJ-Kamil's letter of appointment had its precedents. Ruzzik ibn Tala'i', the son of the vizier Tala'j' ibn Ruzzik, also received a letter of appointment during the vizierate of his father. It is a long. complex and quite obscure document. Qalqashandi who reproduces the entire text gives a succinct and accurate summary of it essence. He says that Ruzzik ibn Tala' i' was entrusted with the supervis ion ofthe mazalimjurisdiction and command of the army.70 Ind eed both matters are me ntioned in the text. 71 But these two points of substance are almost lost in the
68 Fo r the bma'ili meaning of the term dllr al-hijro, see F. Daftary. TM lsma'dis. Their Hi.story and Doctrines, (Cambridge, 1992), index. For the Ayyubid inscriplion on the citadel of Cairo, see N. O. Rabbal, The Citaikl of Cairo, (Lciden, 1995), 68-9. 69 Qalqashandi, X, 324, 11,12-3, see also, 11 , 2-3, 9. 70 Ibid, 325. 71 Ibid, 334,11, 6-7, 10. Command over the army is referred to by the phrase: ai-nazar fi 'l-isfahlllrlyya. The Persian title isfahlllr was widely used in the Arabicspeaking Middle East for the com mander of the army. For instance, the contemporary 'Umara uses it. See, 69. II signified a rank, or tille , higher than amir bmlower limn sultan. For a full discussion, see ElisseefT, ~La tilulature", 167-9.
SALADIN I N EGYPT, 1169-1 '74
75
long and occasionally e nigmati c text. 72 Large sections of the document are addressed to Ruzzik ibn Tala 'i'. It sa id that he is honored by God and serves as th e guard ian and protector of th e Commander of the Believe rs. 7s Other unspecified military and administrative respon sibilities are also alluded to and a sharing of responsibilities between the vizier, th e father, and the so n is mentioned as well. 74 The passage dealing with the esse nce of th e mazaLim jurisdiction is of inte rest. The importance of th is institution is stressed in powelful term s. Th e text states that the man responsible for mazalim is entrusted with a divine treas ure (kanz min kuma. al-m/nna) , and the in stitution is see n as a tool for safeguarding the publi c interest (masla ha al-'mnma) . 75 This passage re flects the fact that in the Fatimid slate, like in medieval Islam in general, the sove reign had wid e discretionary powe rs to mainta in th e publi c interes t as he understood it. In line with a long Middle Eastern tradition LO which me dieval Islam was a heir, the Fatimid Imam dispensed justice and had ove rall responsibility for jurisdiction. Goin g bac k to Ibn 'Asakir 's depi c tion of Nur a I-Din , it is clear that th e notio n of the "just king" and the impo rtance of the mazalim were neither original inve ntions of Nul' ai-Din nor of Ibn 'Asakir. These were commonly shared Islamic values whose origins go back to very ancient Middle Eastern traditions, which pe rceived Lhe king as a lawgiver and judge. It can be argued that the letters of appointment given to Shirkuh and later to Saladin represent th e cu lminati on of a process. In the eleventh centUlY th e Fatimid viziers were civilians and the Imams wie lded supreme political powe r in the sta te. The vi zierial letters of appointment reflected this distribution of power. In the twelfth ce ntury Fatimid military viziers became more powerful than the Imams, and this c hange is reflected in their letters of appointment. The titles of the viziers beca me more bombastic and the 72 The d ocume nts begi ns in a standard way by stating the crede ntials of the Fatimid ruler: se rvalll of Allah , his friend , Imam a nd Comma nde r of the Believers. Th e recipient of the le tter is requested to voice the usual blessings on the Fatimid ruler, the Prophe t Muhammad, his grandfather, the pure (Fatimid ) family a nd rightly g uided Imams. Later in the lex t, this demand is re peated. Th e divine naLUre of the Fatimid dynasty, which is supported by God himself, is asserted manr times. See, Qaqashandi , X, 325, 326, ll, 4-5, 9, 16-7,327, 11 , 1-9, 10-1. 7 Ibid, 330, 11 , 17, 19. 74 Ib id, 333, 11 , 6-7, 9- 10, 13-4. 75 Ib id, 334, \, 15.
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wording of th e tellers stressed the pivotal role of the vizier in the state and behind th e throne. Sons of viziers were given separate le tters of appointment reflcCling the desire of their fathers to establish a hereditary vizierale on the model of lheJamali family. Howeve r, in the three months that elapsed between the appointm e nt of Shirkuh and Saladin th e military balan ce of power between the Fatimids and Nur ai-Dill's expeditionary force in Egypt did l)Ql change. There was nothing new that might exp lain the authorization given to Saladin to sct up a hereditary vizierate. Certainly the precedent did ex ist and some tried to emulate it. But the clue to underslanding why Saladin accomplished what other viziers, unde r very sim il ar circumstances, failed to achieve should be sought in the text of Saladin's letter of appointment itself. In a phrase, which comes imm ediately after the statement about the hereditary nature of Saladin's vizierate, it is said that the Chancery was ordered by al-'Adid to write this document. 76 If this was indeed the case, any justification by the Chancery would have been spurious. The Chancery was not a policy-making body: it executed the orders of the ruler. However, we have every reason to doubt the declaration that the new character of Saladin's vizierate was an initiative of al-'Adid. More probably, Qadi al-Fadil, the author of both letters of appointment, is justifying himself as merely following al-'Adid's orders. Qadi al-Fadil as well as Ibn KhaUal, his superior in the Chancery, and other administrators cooperated with the Syrian emirs. The fact that the young and unexperienced al-'Adid, and the Fatimid ruling establishment as a whole, lost control over the Chancery is reflected by ' Imad al-Din's candid remark that Ibn Khallal had power over the correspondence and he wrote what he wished. 77 In plain terms, the Fatimid regime was betrayed by the administrators in its service. II. The cooperation of Fatimid administrators with Shirkuh and Saladin tilted the balance in the favor of the Ayyubids. None of the Fatimids viziers of the 1050's and 1060's obtained the same Ibn Wasil, II , 459, II , 6-7. ' Imad ai-Din, KluJrido., al-Q4ST, I, 235, repeated by Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 487. Ibn al-Sayr-afi (1071.1147) says in a manual dealing with the Chancery that the penon in charge must be ofthe same persuasion (madhhab) as the ruler (malilr). But his statement reflects eleventh<entury realities. See, his Al-Qanun Ji Diwan al-Rasa'il, (ed ) A. F. Sayyid (Cairo , 1990) ,9. 76 77
SALADIN I N EGYPT, 1 169-1 174
77
degree of coopera tion from the civilian eli te. Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik was a Shi'ite, Dirgham ru led by te rror and Shawar only brought calamities on the country. The Ayyubids o ffe red hope to the civi lian elite. They were Sunnis in the service of a powerful and respected Sunni ruler. Their own record, and the record of their master, was impressive. The cooperation of th e civi li an e lite with the Ayyubids was not li mited to a few key persons such as Qadi alFadi!: it was quite widespread. The sources are not detailed enough 10
allow a filII prosopog raphir<J1.';;llIrly of lh osf' who rhangerl siclf's
at that crucia l moment, but some revealing information is available. Some of those who made a smooth transition from their former employers to the service of Saladin were top-ranking administrators under the Fatimids. We can take as an example the case of cadi al-Athir ibn Bunan (507-596/ ] 11 3-] 199) from the Anbari family of Fatimid viziers. Unde r the Fati mids he had served as the head of the Office of the Inspection (diwan al-nazar). Following the de mise ofthe Fatimid sta te , Ibn Bunan , on the recommendation of Qad i al-Fad il, was accepted into Saladin's service. He served as Inspector in Tinnis and Alexandria and was later in the service of Saladin's brother, Tughtakin. 78 A recommendation from Qadi al-Fadil was always important in opening the way for former Fatimid admi nistrators to the service of Saladin. This was, for in stance, the case with Qad i al-Fadil's own secretary, Abu '1Hasan, known as the Egyptia n secretary, who h ad also served al'Adid. Saladin later appointed him as a secretary of his son alMalik al-Zahir. 79 Two of the better known administrative families whi ch span ned the Fatimid-Ayyubid period are the Makhwmis and Mammatis. In Fatimid times, Abu ' I-Hasan al-Makhzumi, the author of an administrative manual on tax-collection , had served as the chi ef of the Office of Fustat. Hi s son, Abu 'I-Qas im (547-615/ 11 52-121 8). entered into Saladin's service and became the official in charge of religious e ndowments in Egypt including Cairo. Muhadhdhab ibn Mammati was, in the late Fatimid period, employed in the Office of the Army. Following th e arrival of Shirkuh and Saladin to Egypt, he and his sons converted to Islam. Following their convers ion members of the family advanced rapidly in 78 Mundhiri, II , 206-8; Ibn al-Qifti, III , 209-10; Maqrizi, Muqalfa, VII , 154-5. 79 Ibn al-'Adim, V, 2302.
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Ayyubid service.BO lo another case, the son of a former Fatimid adm ini strator successfully establ ished himself in the service of Saladin and served in many posts including in the Office of the Army,SI For some people. entrance into Saladin 's service marked a great change in their life. For instance, Ja'far ibn Muhammad al-Ardali (543-622/1148- 1225), of the Mukhlar family from Qus, was known in his earl y adult life for his literary talents. BUlunder Saladin he embarked on a military career serving as an emir. His miiit.:lI1' service did inlclfere with his poetry; he became a renowned poet in his times. 82 Another case involves a former Fatimid pro-pagandist. Fakhr al-Dawla al-Aswan i, the stepson of the cadi Rashid ibn al-Zubayr, Saladin's supporter from Alexandria. Qadi al·Fadii much respected Fakhr al-Dawla and opened his way LO Saladin's service. B3 The most speclacular career was made by Masrur, a fonner Fatimid eunuch. He became the commander of Saladin's bodyguard (Jtalqa) and received the rank (or title) of emir. 84 Saladin's most distinguished admiral was also a former Fatimid officer. Other people who staffed Saladin's administration were born in the Fatimid period but were not necessarily employed by the Fatimids. These already represent the Ayyubid age. B5 Qadi a l-Fadi l himself had much to ga in by siding with Shirkuh and Saladin. But, it must be remembered that at the time he le nt hi s support to them both their final triumph was barely conceivable. The cooperation of the civi l e lite of the Fatimid state with Shirkuh and Saladin was religiously motivated. The commo n bonds of Sunni Islam proved to be a strong motivating force behind the cooperation given by Fatimid administrators to Shirkuh and Saladin as early as the campai g n of 1167. Ibn Abi Tayy's account is very 80 For the Makhwmis, see Maqrizi , Muqaffa , III , 665-6; Ibn al-'Adim, VI, 2647. For the Mammatis, see Safad i, IX, 19-27. 81 Maqriz.i, Muqaffa, II , 11 6-7. 82 Ibid, III , 64-5. Fo r another emir-poet who served the Fatimids a nd Saladin, see Ibn Sa'id a l-Maghribi, Al-Nujum al-Zahim ji Hula Hadm al-Qahim, (ed) H. Nassar (Cairo, 1970) , 228-9. IU Maqriz, Muqaffa, I, 269. Two brothers of the Zubayr family became famous in the late Fatimid period. One is aI-Qadi a l-Muhadhdhab, he was associated with the vizier Tala'i' lbn Ruz.zik and died in Rabi ' II 56 1/ January-February 1166. The other was ai-Qadi ai-Rashid, who supported Saladin in Alexandria and later was execUled by Shawar. See, Safadi, (ed) R. 'Abd al-Tawwab (Beirut , 1979), XII , 13 1-7; Kutubi , I, 337-41. 84 Maqrizi, Khilal , IV, 216. 85 For example, see al-Mundhiri, I, 10&-7.
SALADIN I N EGYPT, 11 69-11 74
79
revea ling on this point. Befo re th e Battle of Babayn was fought, Shirkuh had appea led to Al exa ndria for he lp. Th e civili an e lite of th e town respo nd ed positi vely a nd t he e mir Ibn Masa l se nt hi s nep hew, Ibn
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shall now re-examine these events relying mostly o n the accounts by Ibn Abi Tayy and Ibn Fural and utilizing some biographical data suppli ed by Ibn Khallikan. Following Shirkuh's death, al·'Adid asked the Syrian emirs who they recommended as vizier. The candidature of Shihab aI-Din, Saladin's uncle , was put fonvard. But Shihab ai-Din who was invited to the palace declined the nomination knowing that he did not enjoy the unanimous support of the other emirs. In a conversation with a l-'Adid. Shihab suggested Saladin as the vizier and his cho ice was accepted by the Fatimid Im am, who appreciated Saladin's bravery and his role in the e liminati on of Shawar. 91 However, al-'Adid's positive answer to Shihab's proposal was not enough to secure the post of vizier for Saladin. The sources which we follow do provide significant information for an understanding of the internal balance of power within Nur a l-D in 's expeditionary force. Shirkuh had at his disposal hi s own private corps, the Asad iyya, a force whi ch at the time of his death was 500 men strong. According to the late rbn Furat, these soldi ers were military slaves of Shirkuh and they supported Saladin. Ehrenkreutz has already call ed attention to the significance of the support given by the Asadiyya to Saladin.92 This support must have been crucia l to Saladin's rise to power, especially as two of Shirkuh 's confidants active ly backed him. One of them was the Kurd
81
SALAD I N I N EGYPT, I 169- 1 174
Th ese acco unts put th e nomin ation of Saladin in its prope r histo ri cal context. By 11 69 , the militari7..ation o f po litics in the Muslim Middl e East had been lo n g establish ed an d wi d espread. Military dictalOrs rose to power with th e backing of their military faction o r triba l fo llowin g. Both va ri a nts took pl ace in twe lfth -cenlu ry Fatimid Egypt. Within th e fra m ework o f the mili tariza tio n o f politics of the Muslim polity, collaboratio n be tween the civili a n e lite and th e military class a lso had a lo n g traditi o n. The coope ra ti on of th e Fatimid ad minis trators with the leade rs o f Nur a l-Din 's a rm y was a rather unusual case. The administrators sided with a fore ign military fa c tion against th e dynasty they served . But in th e lig h t of th e dismal pe rforman ce o f the Fatimid regi m e a nd-fro m the point of view of th e civilian elite- i ts unappealing religious ch arac te r their c hoi ce is quite und ersta ndable.
d . The Battle oj the Blacks Acco rding LO Maqrizi. wh o echoes a n e laborate ve rsio n of Ibn Abi Tayy, Saladin, fo ll owin g hi s n o min ation as th e Fatimid vizie r , underwent a spiri t ual transformation: h e abstained from wine and refrained from e nte rtainm e nt. H e matured and became serious. It is interesting to note th at Ib n Abi Tay}' portrays Nur a i-Din in a similar way. Pri or to attaining power, N ur ai-Di n gave himself to vice . H oweve r, a t a n ea rly stage of his rul e , he underwent a sp iritual experie nce a nd ch a n ged hi s ways.94 Notwith standi n g Ibn Ab i Tayy's g rudge against Nur a i-Din , it see m s th at in both cases the drift of his accou nt is positive a nd is m ea nt LO be a n appreciative ch a racterizatio n of bo th rulers. Whatever was Sa ladin's state of m ind , his immediate po li cies were aimed at sec urin g a smooth transfer o f power into his h a nds. Saladi n establ ished friendl y relations with al-'Adid and, a t th e sam e t im e , was trying to buy the good will of hi s comrades in the Syrian ex pe dition a ry force , especia ll y fo ll owing th e return o f some o f the e mirs to Syria. In order to secu re the lo yalty of the remainin g sold iers a nd e mirs, Sa ladin was in g rea t n eed of m o n ey. For that purpose h e used the ri ches amassed by his uncle Shirkuh .95 w
94 Maqri zi, IlIi'az. , III , 3 10; Ric hards, W A Con sideraLio n , 147·8 (who quotes a nd translates inlO English the account o f Ibn Abi T an '). Fo r Nur a i-Din , se e Khayat, 180. 95 Maqrizi. IUi'w., Ill , 310 .
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An a noth er powe rful instrument which was ava il able to Saladin was the distribution of iqta'. The allocation of these grants of land came at the expense of the Fatimid ruling estab lishment (alll aldawla), and the people in th e service of the Fatimid d ynasty (ahl Misr). In order to gain co ntrol over the distribution of the iqta', a l-'Adid's fre edom of action h ad to be curtai le d. The general purport of Saladin's polic ies was clear. and th e Fatimid ruling establishment did not delude itself as to Saladin 's ultimate goaI5. 96 In fact. Saladin 's friendl y relations with a l-
,
SALADIN I N EGY I~T , 11 6g-1174
83
by the History oj the Patriarchs oj the Egyptian Chuuh, concerning the fate of a l-'Adid. In th is work several versions are recounted. The first one is on the a uth ority of Safi ' l-Dawla , who was an eunuch in the service of the wife of t he Fatimid ruler al-Zafir ( 11 49I ] 54). He says that al-'Adid committed suicide after be ing informed th at Turanshah, Saladin's brmher, had come to the palace and was looking for him .99 The second version says th at Turanshah killed a l-'Adid, who did not reveal to him the loca tion of th e treasu re hidden in the pa lace. Accord in g to the thi rd version, Saladin and Tu ranshah had drunk win e with a l-'Adid and then asked the jurists if it were pe rmissible fo r the Ca liph to consume alcoho l. The jurists declared that if it proved to be so he shou ld be deposed. But Saladin took a mo re drastic step , he se nt hi s brother to kill a l-'Ad id. T he account in the History oj the Patriarchs ends ,\lith a quotation from the official announcement published by Qadi a l-Fadi l fo ll owing the dea th of al-'Ad id . T his document states that al-'Adid died a natural death a nd was buried in a dignified way.IOO Needless to say that Qad i a l-Fadi l's sta te ment came to be th e on ly ve rsion quoted by historia ns of the Ayyubid a nd Mamluk periods. We find indirect support fo r Ibn Khallikan 's account in another ind ependent report: Ibn Ju bayr 's description of his visit to Egypt in 1183. Al-Khabushani was known and fa mous in Muslim Spa in , an d Ibn Jubayr wished to visit him . He went to see th e tomb of Shafi' i and the law coll ege built there by Saladin , who also m et th e costs of maintain in g this complex. But a t that time a l-Khabush ani resided in his own mosque in Cairo, and it was there th a t
99 This work a lthough attribu ted to Sawirus Ibn a l-MuqaJTa' is in ract iI collective work written over a long period or time. The author or the sections dealing with the years 1166-1216 is anonymous. For textual histol)' or the History of the Patriarchs, see F. Micheau, MCroisades e t croises vus par les historiens ardbes chre.ie ns d'Egypte", in Itiniraires d'Orienl. Hommages a Claude Cahen, (eds) R. Curie l and R. Gyselen (Bures-Sur-Yvette, 1994 ), 169-70; ]. Den Heijer, ~Cop tic Historiograph y in the Falim id, Ayyubid and Early Mamluks Period s", Medieval Encounters 2( 1996),69-77. In the notes and the bibliography, this work is quoted as Ibn MuqafTa'. See, III , p1.2, e dited and translated in to Eng lish by A. Khater and O. H. E. Khs-Bunnesler (Cairo, 1970), 66 (Arabic), III (English). The English translation or this account is erroneous due to a misunderstanding of two crucial terms: ustadh meaning an eunuc h a nd jiha, which is a honorific ror a wife or a ruler. Furthermo re, in the Arabic lext, arter a l-Zafir , the lette r ba' should me eme nded to iyya. 100 Ibn al-MuqafTa', III . p1.2. 66-7. 68 (Arabic), 111 -2. 114 (English).
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Ibn Jubayr eve ntuall y mel him and received his blessing. WI Ibn Jubayr does n o t ex plain what bro ught al-Khabushani to such a n exalted position but, as we h ave see n , th e mi ssing link is supplie d by Ibn Khallikan. Taking into account th e data provide d by Ibn Khallikan , Ibn Jubayr and Maqri zi, we ca n conclude that Saladin had a cl ea r objective: to put an end to the Fa timid stale. And to that en d h e was preparing th e necessary legal and religious justifi ca tion. The war that Sa ladin waged o n th e Blacks was an aggressive act. Howeve r, Saladin himself a nd his historian-admirers deny any worldly motives on his part. Th e refore th e Battle of th e Blacks had to be justified and presented as an d efensive act. The compl ex story of th e plot, told in C ha pte r One. served that purpose and th e story itself is, in my view, a literary inve ntion. e. Th e Demise of the Fatimid Stale
Saladin too k full advantage of his victory against the Blacks ; his extortion of al-'Adid continued, and he began to billet his troops in Cairo taking possession of prope rti es which had becom e vacant following the destruction and dispersal of th e Blacks and th e Armenian troops which. like the Blacks. had been expelle d from Cairo. 102 AI-'Adid had in fa c t bee n put under house arrest. Qaraqush , who helpe d to secure th e support of Nur a l-Din 's expeditionary force in Egypt for Saladin 's nomination as vizier, was appointed supervisor of the Fatimid palaces. 103 During 566/11701171 , Saladin 's position in Egypt was greatl y strengthened. His family-father a nd broth e rs-arrived from Syria and he bea t ofT a Christian attack on Dami e lta. For that purpose al-'Adid had sent Saladin a million dinars which further weakened his position.104 Maqrizi says that th e successfu l defence of Damietta and the arrival of Saladin's fami ly in Egypt greatly strengthened Saladin's dete rmination to put an end to Fatimid rule in Egypt. 105 In the same year, Saladin carried out a further assault on the remnants of the Fatimid army and its officers wh ich lived in Fustat. In a well]0] Ibn Jubayr, RiMa, (ed ) W. Wrig h t (Leid en , 1907 ),48-9; English transla· tion by R. J. C. Broadhurst, The Travels of Ibn Jubayr, (London, 1952),40- 1. ] 1)2 Maqrizi, Wi'az, Ill, 3 14. ]O~ Ibid, 322. ItH Ib id, 3 16. 105 Maqrizi , SuiuJr., 64.
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85
prepared and coordinated action Fatimid military personnel in Fustat were attacked and driven out of the town , and the property of the dispossessed Fatimid emirs was seized by Saladin. 106 The cumulative effect of Saladin's actions was th e removal from th e capital, Fustat-Cairo, oftroops 10yai 1O al-'Adid. Th e overthrow of the Fatimid dynasty became only a question of time. Nur ai-Din , who was himself und er Abbasid press ure , demanded from Saladin the swift termination of Fatimid rule and the res toration of Sunni Islam. Saladin's tactic was cautious. The pace of his anti-Isma'ili policies depended on the progress made in weakening the power ofthe Fatimid army and co urt. Maqrizi 's account is helpful in fo ll owing the two-pronged policy of Saladin . In the perio d immediately following Saladin's nomin ation as vizier, the Friday sermons in Egypt continued to be delive red in the nam e of al-'Adid. The second person to be mentioned was Nur ai-D in and Saladin was referred to only as Nur al-Din 's deputy in Egypt. 107 Moreover, in accordance with a long-established Fatimid tradition, Saladin appeared together with al-'Adid for public prayers at the main mosques during the major religious festivals such as Ramadan and the Feast of the Breaking of Ramadan. loa Only after the Battle of the Blacks, the victory at Damietta and the arrival of Saladin's family. were significant anti-Isma'ili measures taken. On Friday, 11 Dhu 'I-Hilla 565/ 25 August 1170, the Shi ' ite formula for the call to praye r was dropped and the names of the three Rightly Guided Caliphs, whom the Shi'ites abhor, were inserted into the sermon. I09 During 566/ 1170-1171 , anti-Isma'ili policy was accelerated and intensified. Colleges for teaching Sunni law were established in Fustat, and Ismaj' ilijudges were dismissed from their pOSLS. Sessions of Ismai'ili teaching whi ch were traditionally held at the Azhar mosque in Cairo were also cancelled. 1 10 The policy of removing Isma'ili and non-I sma ' ili judges appointed by the Fatimids was carried out by Saladin's cad i, the Kurd Ibn Dirbas. N; exemplified by the case of Ibn Barkat Abu 'I-Hasan, the purge was carried out with leniency. The people removed from their post were not necessarily persecuted. Abu 'I-Hasan was born in Bahnasa, 106 Maqri zi, Illi'at, III , 32 1. 107 Ibid, 3 1) . 108 Ibid, 3 10. 109 Ib id, 317-8. 110 Ibid, 3 19, 320.
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a provincial town in Upper Egypt, and acquired his education in grammar and law in Fustat. In Fatimid times he was appointed as cadi of his hometown and then dismissed by Ibn Dirbas. He returned to Fustat and made a career as a teacher of the Koran and literature to the children of prominent people in the city. The cadis dismissed by Ibn Dirbas were replaced by Kurds and people from Syria. I I I Maqrizi says thallhe nomination of Ibn Dirbas was a result of the cooperation betwee n Saladin and Qadi al-Fadil aiming at the ovcnhrow of th e Fatimid dynasty. I 12 Howeve r, th e ultimate imple mentation of this policy took place only after Cairo had bee n cleare d of the remnants of the Fatimid army. Sa ladin's explanation for the slow pace of his actions was his fear of the response that his policies might provoke. II!! Actually he faced a dilemma quite si milar to which the Fatimids had faced at the beginning of their rule in Egypt. The Fatimids, like Saladin, were determined to impose their own brand of Islam on Egypt, but were unable to gauge the likely loca l reaction. In both cases the new rulers adopted cautious policies. With the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious that their policies were over-cautious.
f. The Conspiracy oj II 74 The full consolidation of Saladin's rule in Egypt took place after the overthrow of the Fatimid dynasty and coinc ide ntl y his relations with Nur ai-Din became strained. One of the most intriguing events in the early period of Saladin 's rule in Egypt was the conspiracy of 1174, which neither personally endangered Saladin nor threatened his rule. But the story of the conspiracy, or perhaps the alleged conspiracy, throws interesting light on Qadi alFadil and his relations with Saladin. On 2 Ramadan 569/5 April 11 74, Saladin put to death a group of people who were accused of plotting against him. An account contemporary with these events is Qadi al-FadiI's report sent to Damascus. It was used by Ibn Abi Tayy who is quoted by Abu Shama. According to Qadi al-Fadil, fonner Fatimid courtiers (ahl al-qasr) and military personnel (jund Misr) had correspo nded with the Crusaders, and had even apIbn al-Qifti, III , 333-4. 112 See, Khilat, III, 378-9. III Maqrizi. lui'az, III, 316.
III
SA L A DI N I N EGY PT , 11 69- 1174
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p roac he d th e Assassins. An e nvoy fro m th e Kin gd o m of J e rusale m , who was o n a n o ffi cial visit to Ca iro, secre tly met with th e conspira to rs as well as with J e wi sh a nd Chri stian scribes. Th e co nspirators cl aimed to e njoy the support o f Isma' il i gro ups and fo rme r Fatimid black a nd Arm e nian t roops. T he ir pl an was to stage a rebe llio n in Cairo which was to co in ci d e with an in vasio n of Egypt by th e Crusade rs. In th e talks with th e e nvoy from J e rusa le m th e co nsp irators in sisted th a t th e ti me was ri pe fo r actio n ; Ca iro had been e m p tie d of troo ps who had re turn ed to th e ir fie fs (iqta's) fo r the h arvest. However, Saladin 's age n t infi ltra ted th e conspirato r circle a nd ke pt Saladin info rmed a bo lltth e plo t. Th e conspi rato rs in te nd ed to resto re th e Fa timid state , but th ey we re divided a mo ng th e mselves o n two cru cial issues: whi ch me mbe r o f th e Fa ti m id roya l fa mily, ke pt in priso n by Sa lad in , was to be se lec te d as th e new Imam, and o n who m would th e post of th e vizie r be confe r red . Q adi al-Fadi l says th a t th e exec ution of th e conspi ratOrs was a j ust and legal ac t o rd a in ed by Cod . Oth e r puniti ve actio ns includ ed the d ispe rsa l of Isma' il i suppo rte rs a nd th e banishm e nt of fo rm e r Fatimid blac k sold ie rs a nd co urti e rs to re mote pa rts of Uppe r Egypt. l14
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quotes ' lmad al-Din's anthology of poets and poetry, says that the conspirators wrote to the Crusaders and hoped with their help to restore the Fatimid dynasty to power. J 16 Thus it is impossible to obtain an idea of the exac t conte nt of ' Imad ai-Dill 's version of the conspiracy of 1174. The main problem is to understa nd the discrepancies between al-Bundari's abridgmem of ' Imad ai-Dill's the Syrian Lighting and Qadi al-Fad il's report of these events, which 'Imad ai-Din must have known. Al-Bundari 's account indicates that
SALAD I N IN t:GYI'T, 11 69.1174
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The sources are ambiguous and co mradi cLOry about
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clue is supplied by Ibn a l·Alhir, who says that the relations betwec n Qadi al-Fadil and 'U mara were strained due to animosity which had originated in the Fatimid period. Nonetheless, according to him , Qadi al-Fadil inte rceded with Saladin o n the behalf of 'Umara . who was unduly suspicious of his advocacy. Regardless of Ibn al-Athir's tendentious re mark, it is clear that 'Uma ra sought and hoped for Qadi al-Fadil's intervention on his behalf and when Qadi al-Fadil refused 'Umara understood that his falc was sealed. 123 It appears that Ibn al-Athir, who like Qadi al-Fadil belonged to the same cultural and occupational group. is at pains to exonerate Qadi al-Fadi l from any direct responsibility for 'U mara' s death at the hands of Saladin. The same appli es to ' Im ad ai-Din who says that the jurists authori zed the execution of 'U mara. 124 This stateme nt cannot be harmonized with hi s other assertion namely that the conspirators were put to death according to the norms of th e siyasa. Does it m ean that the approval of the jurists was only needed for the execution of'Umara? Qadi al-Fadil's behavior can be co ntrasted to what is told of a former Fa timid cadi and propagandist, Qadi a l:lalis, who was executed toge ther with
SALADIN I N EGYI·T. I 169 ~ I 174
91
Also 'Umara's book of th e Egyptian viziers, which IS III fac t his autobiography, offe rs insight into his inner wo rld . The first thing that strikes the reade r is the total irrelevancy of'U mara's work La the new epoc h h eralded by Saladin's overthrow of th e Fatimids. Writing sometime between the fall of the Fatimids a nd his exec u ~ tio n , 'Umara revives in his book the bygone world of the Fatimid viziers. He explains the reaso n for writing th e boo k by a vague referen ce to th e pedagogical aim of di stinquishing the e nduring from the tra nsie nt and th e good from the bad. But this moralistic aim is lost in a wo rk which is, above all, about 'U mara himse lf. On e can understand 'U mara; he thrived in the mi lieu he describes. But the most surpri si ng thing is that 'U ma ra has nothing positive to say about th e new maste rs of the country. They are si mply re~ ferred to as Ghuzz. The only pe rson associated with the new regime who is praised by 'U mara is Qadi a l ~ Fadil.1 27 Thus 'U mara's pa negyri c to Saladin and his association with Turanshah must be see n in the co ntex t of 'U mara ' s attempt to ea rn a li vi ng. His old patrons and benefactors we re a ll dead and h e suffered heavy losses in th e fire that consume d Fustat. !-I e was appare ntly impove rish ed which might explain his almost obsessive indulgence in m e nti o n ~ in g the sum s of money he used to earn fro m Fa timid viziers for his pan egyri cs. Clearly 'U mara had railed to adopt himse lf to the new circ um sta nces and his abili ty to se nse danger had a lso be~ come impa ired. The allusion to the betrayal of al-'Adid in 'U mara 's e legy o n the fall of the Fatimids must have been very unpleasant to Qadi al-Fadil and might explain hi s animosity to 'Umara. We h ave every reason to question the reliability of Qadi al-Fadil's vers io n of th e cons piracy of 1174 as a whole. The list of those who pa id with th e ir lives for the alleged conspiracy offers a possibl e insight fo r unde rstanding th ese eve nts. Th e exec uted peo pl e were harml ess persons who were in no position to e ndanger Saladin's rule. Among th e m were a cadi, a Fatimid pro pagandist, a former Fatimid emir,
in her Ritual, Politics, mid the City in Fatimid Cairo, (N. Y., 1994), 136-7. Fo r o lher shOT! fragments of'Umara's poetry ex to lling the Fatimid Imallls and the ir su blime posilion as the g uides of the mankind. see H. C. Kay's introd uction to his Yamall. Its Early History. (the o riginal texts, with translation and notes). (London, 1892), IX-X. 127 'U mOlrd , 53-4, 80-1, 88, 93.
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two administrators and an Armenian aSlfo loger. 128 It seems that they were , as Ibn al-Athir hints , victims of o ld I-ivalri es between members of the civilian e lite. The people who were in power under Saladin put to death their old enem ies. This impression is strengthened when the biographies of the people involved in these events are examined. Ibn I-Iajar aJ.'Asqalani (d. 1449). in his biographic dictionary of th e Egyptian cadis , says that Ibn Kamil was a Shi' itc (Imami ) jurisl. H e was appointed to the posts of cadi and da'i. (i.e. Fatimid propagandiSl) by the vizier Tala ' i' ibn Ruzzik and held these posts intcrmiac nLly for severa l yea rs. He and others, including 'U mara , were acc used of attempting to restore Fatimid rule and of collaborating with the Franks. Ibn Hajar says that this slanderous report was brought to Saladin by a ce rtain jurist. On th e one hand, Ibn Hajar's account renects Qadi al·Fadi l 's version of the plot sayin g that th e re was an attempt to involve the Franks. But, on the other hand . he speaks of pe rsonal animosities as a lso playing a pan in these events. For example, the lsmai' li cadi, Ibn J a iis, was aJllong those executed by Sa ladin, who had interrogated him about hidden Fatimid treasure. He revealed some informa· ti o n but not to Saladin 's full satisfaction. l29 Othen\'ise Saladin is passive along the whole affa ir whi ch supposedly e nd angered his rul e. If o ur und ersta ndin g of these events is correct, Saladin 's passiven ess confir;ns that he was manipulated by members of the civilian e li te who had len t him th e ir support, ran his state and used him to settle their own private vendettas. Among the m em· bers of the civilian e li te , Saladin owed a special debt to Qadi al· Fadil. Apparently Saladin was quite aware of this. H e is quoted as sayi ng: " I took Egypt not by force of arms but by the pen of Qadi a l·Fadil ". In anothe r version h e is quoted as saying that he took the co untries not through the swords (of his emirs), but by the pen of Qadi al·Fadil.l ~ The first quotation can be understood as reflecting the faClthat Saladin's leller of appoinunent as th e Fatimid vizier was wrinell by Qadi al·Fadil . Both versions manifest Saladin's
Abu Shama, I, pl,2, 56 1 (quotin g Ibn Abi Tayy). 129 Ibn Hajar, I, 189-90, II , 30S-4, 306-8. For people who left Egypt following Saladin's rise to power, see Ibn al-' Adim , VI, 2802. L30 Fo r the fi rst version of lhis saying, see Dajani-Shakce1 , ~ Egypt and the Egyptians", 25; Ayyad , 422. For the second version, see Sibt ibn J awzi, VIII , pl .2, 472: Ibn Taghribirdi, XI, 157; Safadi, XVIII, 350. 128
SALAD I N IN EGY I·T . I
169-
I 1 74
93
profound understanding that the pen might occasiona lly be no less mighty th an the sword . The fact that the execution of
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CHAPTER TWO
th e jurists h ad d eclared 'U mara a here tic. Thus no one was really 1O be blamed for 'U mara 's death. His undoing was his own faull. Finally. one of the more interesting details to be found in Maqrizi 's biography of'Umara is his casual remark that Saladin was responsible for the killing of Shawar. 131
2. Expansionism and lhe Search fOT Legitimacy a. The Rupture with
NUT
ai-Din
Relations between Nur ai-Din and Saladin were a sensitive subject, especially for ' Im ad ai-Din who had flourished in the service of both. ' lmad a i-Din asserts that Saladin did not disobey Nur a1Din. 132 Abu Shama echoes
m Maqrizi, Muqaffa, VI II , 75 1-6. m Abu Sham a, I, pt,2 . 503.
m Ibid, 442. U4 Ibid, 440-1, 525, 558-9. In fact Nur al-Din's apprehension of Ayyubid success in Egypt was evi dent already during the sho n vizierate of Shirkuh. Ibn Abi Tayy, on the authority o f his fath er. says that following Shirkuh 's nom ination as Falimid vizier Nur ai-Din nullified the iqta's held by Shirku h a nd Saladin in Syria. If Nur ai-Di n did indeed do this it reveals his frustration in the face of developments which were beyond his COlllrol. See, Ibn Fural, IV, pL,! . 66 and 47. who lOO quotes Ibn Abi T ayy.
SALAD I N I N EGYPT, I
16g-1
174
95
says that Nur ai-Din h ad ordered Salad in to join him in a coord inated altack on the fortress of Karak. Saladin left Cairo on 20 Muharram 567/ 17 Sep tember 1171 , but failed to arrive at the meeting point. He wrote to Nur ai-Din excus in g him self that intemal problems in Egypt h ad obliged him to return, but Nur alOin refused to accept thi s explanation. Ibn al-Athir proceeds by describing a meeti ng of the Ayyub id fa mily in which the question ,or"'s discussed what should be done if Nur ai-D in invaded Egypt. Taqi ai-Din was militant advocati ng opposing Nur ai-D in if necessary. However, Saladin's father, Najm ai-D in (described in the hisLOry of th e Atabegs as a wise and cunning person) sile nced him by saying th at th e Ayyubids were the servants and slaves of Nur alDin , Egypt was hi s coulllry, a nd they wou ld obey whatever he commanded them to do. Later, in a private conversation, he told Saladin that his speech was for public co nsumption o nly, aiming at appeasing Nur ai-Din. He continued by saying that the Ayyubids shou ld avoid provoking Nur ai-Din inLO actio n a nd must show no disobedien ce to him public1 y.135 According to Ibn al-Athir's version of these eve n ts, Saladin's mistrust of Nul' al-Din's inte ntion s had far-reac hing consequences for Saladin's policies. The conq uests o f Nubi a (568/1172- 1173) and Yemen (569/ 1174- 11 75) were motivated by th e des ire of the Ayyubids to secu re a place of refuge in case o f military interventi o n in Egypt by Nu r al-Din. 13ti In co ntrast to Ibn al-Athir, ' Im ad ai-Din treats the conquest of Nub ia and Yemen as events unrelated to Salad in 's relati ons with Nul' ai-Di n. The conquest of Yemen is de picted by ' Im ad ai-Din as a cam pa ign against a local ruler who was a heretic and bloody tyrant, and the aim of the Ayyubid ca mpaign was to restore Abbas id sove reignty.137 ' Imad ai-Din confirms thalthe altac k on Karak and Shawbak in 11 7 1 was supposed to be a coordinated action by Nur ai-Din and Saladin. However, Saladin fa ce d diffi c ulties which prevented him from carryin g OUl his pan of the campaign.138 When in 568/ 1172- 1173, Saladin launc h ed a n altack against Shawhak and Karak. Qadi alFadil was quick to praise the ex pl o its of this cam paign . In a lelte r I:» Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, X I. 244-5; a/-Bahir, 158-9. Maqrizi follows al-Bahir. See, Su/ull, 70-1. 1!6 Ibn a l-Athir, Kamil. XI, 254. 260. 157 Abu Shama, I , pt,2, 551, 552 (quoting ' Imad al-Dill's Kharida/ al-Qasr). 158 AI-Bundari, 117-8; Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 518.
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CHAPTER TWO
to Nur ai-Din, he claimed a great success: the area around the two fortresses was laid waste and the Bedouin were dispersed. He asserts that the expuls ion of the Bedouin deprived the Crusaders of their guides. Furthermore, Saladin asks Nur aI-Din to provide these Bedouin with a new territory (iqta<) in Syria. 139 We have two diametrically opposed versions of the relations between Salad in and Nur ai-Din. Ibn al-Athir describes Saladin as aware of his misconduct toward his ove rlord and afraid of his wrath. ' Jm ad ai-D in simply denies any tension in the relations between the 1:\\10. The strength of Ibn al-Athir's account is that some of Saladin 's deeds are explain ed as by-products of his stra in ed re lations with Nur ai-Din. This explanation so unds more convin cin g than
AI-Bundari , 125-6. Abu Shama, I. pt,2 , 527 (quoting Ibn Shaddad).
SALADIN IN t:CY f>T, 1 169- 1174
97
between the brothers and to undermine their position in Egypt. 141 If indeed these were Nur ai-~in's hopes he mUSt have been very disappointed. The two brothers coope rated , es pecially during the Ballie of the Blacks in which Turanshah's co nlribution to th e Ayyubid victory was in valuable . Nur ai-~in's perm ission given to Saladin 's father, Najm ai-Din, to join his sons in Egypt is explained in the same manner. Najm ai-~in was instruc ted by Nur a i-D in to ensure that Abbasid suzeraimy was proclaimed in Egypt, a move that Saladin was reluctant to undertake. 142 AlLhough Nur ai-~in fai le d in his schemes to create rivalry and to provoke a rupture between members of the Ayyubid family in E~,')lpt , th e extended Ayyubid famil y was not necessarily united behind Saladin. Geographically the family was sp lit between Egypt and Syria, and some of its members cominued 10 se rve Nur a l_O in . 143 b. Yemen and IVl'ica
We lllUSt ad mit that we have very limited abi lity to penetrate far behind th e facad e of politi ca l history deeper in to the motives of the main actors on the politica l scene. We are unable to judge whether Ibn al-Athir is co rrect in stating that the conquest of Yemen and Nubia were motivated by Saladin's fear of Nur ai-Din. What we can do is to put some of Saladin's policies into th e wider context of Fatimid hi story. Wh e n exam ined from this perspective, the question of his motives for the conquest of Yeme n , ubia and North Africa appears less important. Saladin's policies, whatever the immediate reasons may have been behind them , were in line with the traditional policies of his Fatimid predecesso rs. Fatimid association with Ye me n had a long history going back to the early period of th e clandestine activities of the Isma'i1i movement. As ru lers of Egypt the Fatimids maintained diverse connections with Yemen. At the time ofTurans hah's invasion of Yemen, there were a number of local dynasties in th e region with various Isma'i li affiliations; some of them were pro-Fatimid while others were hostile to Fatimid Ismai li sm. Turanshah 's con quests in Yemen were not private ventures; they were Saladi n 's official policy sus141 Ibn Furat, IV, pt, l , 82 a lso 66.
Ibid, 88.9. Fo r instance, in 566/ 1 I 7().. I 17 1, Shirkuh's son, Muhammad, was in Syria in Nur a l·Oin's setvice. See, Ibn Fural, IV, pI, \, II J. 142
1 4~
98
C H A PTE R T WO
tained over a pe ri od of tim e. 144 AJj a resul t of these Ayyubid effo rts South Ye m e n , includ in g Ade n , cam e under th e ir control. It is possibl e to p resent a va ri ety of reasons fo r th e Ayyubid expeditio ns to Ye me n , it is mo re difficult to establish th eir relative impo rtan ce. T he desire to exe rt influe nce over Yeme n and es pecially th e po rt o f Ade n , through wh ic h p assed th e fl ow o f th e Indian trad e to Egypt, was a stron g mo tive be hind Fatimid. and subseq ue ntly Ayyubid . inte rest in th e regio n. 145 Com mercia l considerati o ns may have co in cided with oth e r reasons. One of th ese may have bee n a cl ash of pe rso na lities a nd ime rests between Sa ladin and Tu ransh a h. Salad in was ve ry ge ne ro us in confe rring wealth o n Tura nsha h who was give n lucra tive sources of income in Egypt BUlthis d oes n o t exclude th e poss ibili ty th at Tu ranshah desired mo re wea lth and a separate patri mony. Th e so urces at o ur disposa l a re re ticent on th ese po in ts. Th e absen ce of informati on may be due to th e fact that o nly a part o f co nte mpo rary twelfthce ntury histo rical writings su tvive: more probably it refl ects a hesitati on by conte mp orary write rs to d eal with this se nsitive issu e, whic h to uch ed o n in te rn al rela ti o ns within th e Ayyubid family. Perha ps th e most insightful accoun t of these eve n ts is su pplied by Maqri zi who, in the fifteenth centu ry, had at his disposal a greater variety o f sources th an we h ave tod ay. Alth o ugh we ca nn ot judge h ow acc urately he used his sou rces . In any case, Maq rizi's sta rtin g point is similar to that of Ibn al-Athi r: the Ayyubids fearing a possible invas io n of Egypt by Nur ai-Din wish ed to acquire a faraway territory as a place of refu ge. Th e conquest o f Nubi a proved useless due to th e pove rty o f the regio n . 146 Tu ra nsh ah 's own interest in Ye me n was a ro used by th e agitatio n of 'U mara and it tallied with For details, see Maqrizi, Suluk, 98, 99, iO l , 113, 11 4. For a detailed examination of the sou rces and research literature, see G. R. Sm ith, The Ayyubids and Early Rasuiid,s in the Yemen, (London, 1978), II , 31-47, esp., 47. A. Hamd ani points out tha t a t the time of the Ayyubid invasio n of Ye me n there were in the region Isma'ili com munities wit h pro- and an ti-Fatimid leanin gs. According to h im , Ayyubid efTon was concen trated alr.tinst th e Fatimid suppon ers. See, his ~Th e T ayyibi-Fatim id Com m u nity of th e Yemen at th e Time of the Ayyubid Con quest of Southe rn Arabia~, Arabian Studies, VII ( 1985), 1516, esp., 151-2. Fo r the commerce that passed through the pOrt of Ad en, see G. R. Smith, ~ H ave You Anythi ng to Decla re? Ma ri ti me Trad e and Comme rce in Ayyu bid Ad en. Practices a nd Taxes\ 170ceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, 25(1995). 127- 140; ~ M ore on the Port Practices and T axes o f Medieval Aden~, New Arabian Studies, 3(1996), 208-10. L46 Maqrizi, Suluk, 73. 144
L4!>
SALA DI N I N EGY PT, I 1 69~ 1 1 74
99
his wish to ex te nd his pe rso nal possessions. BUl Turanshah 's pri~ va te inte rests were in lin e with those of Salad in , who a uth o ri zed the ex ped iti o n to Yem e n a nd assisted Turanshah. IH It seems to me that we can improve very littl e on Maqri zi's acco unt. We ca n co nclude by saying that the co nques t of Ye men e pito mi zes th e convergence o f Ayyubid interests. as the rulers of Egypt, with Ayybid interests as a fam ily in conflict with Nur a l ~ Oin . whic h was also beset by inte rnal difficulti es. Very simil ar reasons were be hind the Ayyubid conques t o f Nubia . Musli m Egypt had a long histo ry of relati o ns with Nubia . In th e seve nth ce ntury, fo ll owing the co nques t of Egypt, Arab al.le mpts to co nque r Nubia met with littl e success. In 640, th e Arabs suf· fered a humili atin g defeat due to superior Nubian archery. In 65 1, a n Arab in vas io ll of Nubia en ded in a peace treaty acco rdin g to whi ch th e Nubian s ag reed to supply th e Arabs with slaves in ex· change for foodstuffs and other com mod ities. This agreement is kn own as a pact (baqt) and its supposed text is reproduced by Maqri zi. Th e ex isten ce of so me kind of peace treaty between the Arabs and th e Nubi a ns is alluded to in a letter se nt in 758 by lh e gove rn o r of Egypt to the king of Nubia. This treaty. among its o th e r provisio ns, guara nteed the safety of merchants travelling across lhe border between the two regions.148 Following the Fatimid conques t of Egypt, an e nvoy was dispatched to th e king of Nubi a askin g him to em brace Islam and demanding the d elivery of slaves accord in g to the baql agreeme nt. Upon his return , the Fa timid e nvoy prese nted to Im am al·
100
C H APTER T WO
Altho ugh Ibn a l-Athir followed by Maq l-izi states tha t th e Ayyu bid conqu est of Nubi a was motiva ted by th e fear of Nur aI-Din, th e begi n n ing of Ayyub id involve m e nt in this regio n , as Maqri zi's own narrative proves, was different. In Ohu 'I-Hilla 567/July-August 1172, th e Nubia ns ra ided vill ages in th e vicini ty of Aswa n . 150 In 568/ 1172-1173, Aswa n was besieged by tabid (i .e. fo rmer bl ack Fa ti m id so ldi e rs) who cam e from Nubia. Th e gove rn o r o f Aswa n . Kan z a lDawl a, him self a fo rm e r Fa timid e mir, as ked for re inforcem e nts, bu t th ose a rrived afte r th e tabid h ad a lread y le ft th e area. lSI Noneth e less, furth e r Ayyubid forces led by Tu ranshah arrived in Aswan a nd invade d Nubi a conque rin g the town ofibrim . Ibrim was given as a n iqta' to a Kurdi sh emir ofTu ransha h who se ttl ed there with un e mployed Kurdi sh troops. Fro m Ibrim th ey ra ide d th e regio n . Th e Nubi a ns aske d Tura n sha h fo r a n a rm is tice a nd se nt him a d e lega tio n . Altho ugh Tu ran sh ah 's re ply was militant he dispatch ed an e nvoy to th e king of Nu bia in Oa nql a. Upon his return th e e nvoy d escribed in gloom y te rm s th e pove rty o f th e regio n a nd of Oa nql a itse lf. 152 It see ms th a t th e Ayyubids we re dragge d into involve m en t in Nubia as a result of th e n eed to pro tec t Aswan a nd Upper Egypt a nd, a t a certain stage, th ey we nt to expl o re the poss ibili ty of fu rthe r exp a nsio n in th e a rea. Bu t th ey, li ke th e Fatimids befo re th e m, were disco uraged by tJl e pove rty of Lhe region in which the Muslim rule rs of Egyp t never had a real interest. The re was a sequ e l to th e Ayyu bid involve m e n t in Nubi a o f 568/ 11721173. In 570/ 11 74-11 75, Kanz a l-Dawla revolted against his Ayyubid maste rs with th e inte ntio n o f restoring Fatimid rul e. Hi s main suppo rte rs a re ide ntifi ed as Be do uin a nd Blacks (su dan). but th e rebe lli o n e nj oyed th e sup po rt of a multitude of o th e r pe ople as well. Coin cide nta l, o r e ve n co-o rdin ated , with Kan z a l-Dawla 's rebe llio n \vas a n uprising of a ce rtain pe rson na med 'Abbas ibn Shadi
Textual Problem-, AI, 21 (1985), 9-72. For the subsequen t Fatimid relations with Nubia, see B. I. Besh ir, MNew Ligh t o n Nubian Fati rnid Reiations Arabica, XXII ( 1975), 15-25; M. R. Cohe n,jewish Self Government in Medieval EgyPt, (Plincelon, 1980), 65, 68, 70, 289. 1.'>0 Maqrizi, Suluk, 69. ],,] Ibid, 72. Ibn Abi Tayy does not distinguish betwee n these two separate a ttacks. He combines them together by sayi ng tha t the Blacks (sudan) a nd 'abid laid siege LO Aswa n. Sec, Abu Sha ma, T, pr,2, 531. 1.'>2 Abu Sha rna, I, pt,2, 532-3 (q uo ting Ibn Abi Tayy); Maqrizi, Suluk, 72. M
,
SALAD I N I N EGY PT. I 169-1 174
101
who overrun Qus. Both rebellions were crushed by Saladin's brother ai-M ali k a l -
In 570/ 11 74- 11 75, a sh o rt tim e after the death of Nur ai-Din, Qadi a l-Fad il sent a lette r to the Abbasi d Ca liph in Baghdad . 156 This is 153 Ma{p·izi. Sulllk. 79-80. Ibn Shaddad, 47-8, sa)'! that Lh ey were Blacks (sudml). He is misquoted by Abu Shama who sa)'S 'ahid. Sec. I, pt,2, 601. Banu Kanz were a n Arab famil y of Ikdouin origin, the Rabi 'a tribe, from Arabia. They arri\'ed La Egypt at the time of the Abbasid Caliph al-Muta .....akkil (847-861) and settled in Upper Egypt. One of their chieftains captured the rebel Abu Rukwa in the early ele\'emh cem u ry a nd .....as handsomely re .....arded by the Falimid Imam ai-Hakim, ..... ho besto .....ed on him the honorific till e Kanz al-D;\ .....la and invested him .....ith the gm'ernorship of Upper Egypt. See. Maqrizi. /\i-BaJa1l wa- '{-fmb 'amma bi Ard Misr mi1l a/"'A'rab. (ed) A. 'Abidin (Cairo, 1961 ).44-6. ISoi Maqrizi , SlIfult, 69: Abu Shama. I. pt.2. 547-8. m. Maqrizi . Sulillt, 82-3, 125. 156 This leltcr is summarized by Ehrcn krcutz (Sa/adi", 133-4) and Lyons and J ackson (97-8). A morc comprehensive d iscussion is p rovided by H. Dajani-5hakeel, who to great ex tent misinte rprets Lhis docum e nt. The author sees thc leuer as a rc fl cction of Sal:ldin's perception of the Holy War. Out the leiter is not an exposition of Saladin's thoughts on th e Holy War, and the Illany refe rences to it are of instrume ntal character. Dajani-Shakeel admits that Qadi al-Fadil while writing
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a document of a paramount significance; in it Saladin presents his credentials and asks for the legitimization of hi s rule. Qadi a1Fadi! describes Saladin as a dedicated warrior of the Holy War, whose goal is to fight the Crusaders and ultimately LO restore Jerusale m to Islam. Th e ic ller begins by setting forth Saladin 's personal and familial services to the cause of Islam. The Ayyubids are depicted as a famil y of warriors dedicated to the Holy War whose beginnings were in Syria. 157 BUl their ach ieve ments there were ascribed to olhers (meaning of course Nur al-Din).158 The situation in Egypt, o n the eve ofth e arrival of the Ayyubids. is described in bleak terms: the coun try was mismanaged and the regime COffUpl.1 59 The Crusaders posed a very real threat and they extorted vast sums of money rro m Egypt. Sunni Islam was in a deplorable position , and harmful Shi'ite practices prevailed. 1OO Intervention in the affairs of Egypt-a policy sponsored by Nli r ai-Dill-is presented as a n exclusively Ayyubid e ndeavor. They hastened to Egypt and brought with them a large army and vast financial resollrces.! 6! The Ayyubid errorLS paid off. The Crusade rs who had subdued Egypt, iLS vi llages and provinces (a gross exaggemtion), were expelled.!62 And the Ayyubids also overcame internal elements which e ndangered Egypt such as the Blacks and Christian Armenians. Qadi al-Fad il goes into some detail in describ ing the position of the Blacks in Fatimid Egypt. They were very prominent and had at th eir disposal vast Sli ms of money. But the Blacks showed littl e zea l ror fighting the unbelievers (i.e, the Crusaders) and regarded the Fatimid ruler (Iitemlly: the dweller or the palace) as their God. 16.5 Also the Chri stian Armenians en-
this letter had practical objectives in mind , g'.aining recognitio n rro m the Caliph and secu ring the Caliph's investiture ror Saladin. See, -A Reassessment orSome Medieval and Modern Pe rception or tile Counter-Crusade-, in H . Dajani-Shakeel a nd R. A. Messie r (cd s), Th e Jihatl a nd its T imt:, De dicated to Andrew Stefan Eh renkrelllz, (Ann Arbor, 1991 ),58. 59.63. 157 Qadi a l-Fadil refe rs to Saladin in the first person plural. Literally, the text says "we (Saladi n ). our rather (Ayyub ) and our uncle (Shirkuh)~. See, Abu Shama. I, pt.2, 6 16, 11 , 16-7. 1!tII Ibid, 6 17, 11 . 2-3. IW Ibid. 617, I, 5. 160 Ibid, 617, 11 ,6-7,7- 11. 161 Ibid, 617. II , 12-3. 162 Ibid, 6 17, 11 , 13-22,6 18, 1,2. 16! Ibid, 618, II . 4-5, 5-6. 8.
SA L A DI N I N EG YPT, 11 69-11 74
103
joyed an exa lted positio n in Fa ti mid Egyp t. 164 Qadi al-Fadil exagge rates (wildly) th e numbe rs of black troops by sayin g th at th ey numbe red 100,000 soldi ers. 165 Exaggeratio n is a promine nt feature of Qadi al-Fad il's letter. Fo r exam ple, the Chri stian fo rces that attacked Da mi etta are descri bed as 200,000 strong and th e navy as mad e up o f 1,000 wa rships and me rchantme n. l66 Th e list of Salad in 's ach ieve me n lS as e num era ted by Qadi alFadil is a long o ne. Saladi n saved Dam ie ua fro m th e threa t of th e Crusad e rs, a nd Cairo from th e d anger of th e Blac ks and Arm enia ns. He also re nde red th e Fatimid rul er powe rl ess. 167 Saladin no t o nly staved off intern al and ex te rn al threa ts to Egypt, h e active ly pu rsued th e Holy Wa r. A lot o f good will and a co nsid e ra bl e stre tc h o f th e imaginati o n is needed to acce pt Qadi al-Fadil 's de pictio n o f Saladin as a warrio r of the Holy Wa r. By 11 74, Saladin 's achi eve me n lS in th e wa r against th e Crusade rs we re very mod es t at th e mos t. But Qadi al-Fadil e vades th ese diffi culties by speakin g in ge n eral term s, and by unwarranted boas tin g. Every yea r, he says, Ho ly War is carri ed out by la nd and nava l raids. The strategic impo rta nce o f th e co nques t of th e stro ngho ld off Ayla from th e Franks and its implicatio ns are g rea tly ove rstated . l 68 Acco rdin g to Qadi al-Fadil , this stro ngho ld posed a danger to the coast of Arabi a, th e Ho ly Cities o f Mecca and Medi na as well as Ye men. In th e inte rn al Islami c co ntext Saladin is po rtrayed as a warrio r aga inst h ere tics in Ye me n , and as o ne who restored Abbas id sove re ign ty in No rth Afri ca. 169 One of th e most illumi natin g sec tio ns of Q ad i al-Fadil's lelle r is th e d escriptio n of Egypt's relatio ns with th e Chris tian wo rld . Byza n tium is d escribed as an a ncie nt and worn-out kin gd o m whi ch had subdued o th e r Chri stia n states. Th e empe ro r is refe rred to as Goli ath a nd th e greatest tyra nt. Qadi al-Fadil continues by saying that nava l battl es were fought with the Byzantines but also open and secre t n ego ti atio ns we re condu cted with th em. 170 He mentio ns th e failure of Byza ntium and th e Crusade rs at Damie tta and l&l Ibid, 6 18, 165 Ibid, 6 18, 166 Ibid, 6 19, 167 Ibid, 6 19, 168 Ibid, 6 19, 169 Ibid, 620, 170 Ibid, 62 1,
11 , 9- 10. I, 7. 11 , 1-2. II, 1-2,6,8-9, 11 , 12-3, 1&8. II, 1-2,7-8, 15. 11, 4-7.
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CHAPTER TWO
the defeat of the No rmans at Alexandria. 171 Very revealing is Qadi al-Fadil's characterizauon of Egypt's relations with the Ilalian cities of Venice, Pisa and Genoa. He says that someti m es the Itali ans launc h destructive raids while on other occasions they come as merchants, who export weapons and other products to Egypl.l72 But the essential pan of the letler is that devoted to the situation in Syria in the wake of Nur ai-Din's death. Qadi a l-Fadi l describes the political disintegration in Syria; many petty rulers have emerged, and the Crusaders have buill strongholds which endanger Muslim territories. Inte rnal squabbles among the members of the ruling e lite of Nur a l-D in's former stale added to the disarray.173 In their internal struggles they brought in the Crusaders and allied themselves with them. In suc h circumstances, Qadi a lFadil says, the fe-conquest of J erusa lem from the Crusaders is impossible,17" a nd the Ayyubids who operate from Egypt are unable to ameliorate this situation. Qadi al-Fadil describes how the distance of Egypt from Syria impedes mi li tary operations. 175 It might have been difTe re nL, he cOnLinues, had the Ayyubids been neighbors of the Crusade rs in Palestine. Then they would have been able to wage war on the C rusade rs, and to put th e affairs of Syria in order. 176 And Saladin would have been able 1O protect Nur al~in's son, who is under the tute lage of persons ruling in his name. 177 Qadi al-Fadil fe-assures the Caliph that Saladin's sole purpose is to strengthen the Abbasid dynasty, the Sunni cause and the Islami c commun ity.178 A promise is made to the Caliph that, as it was the case in Egypt, Yemen and North Africa, any other future Ayyubid conquests will be carried out in the name of the Abbasids. l79 Qadi al-Fadil presents Saladin a lso as th e protector of J erusalem and its future conqueror. l SO Bm Qadi al-Fadil touches on another issue as well. The idea of estab li shing Ayyubid hered itary rule (passed from Saladin to his son or brother) is clearly stated. lS I 171 Ibid, 621, m Ibid, 62 1, 17' Ibid, 622, 174 Ibid, 622, m Ibid, 622, 176 Ibid. 622, 177 Ib id. 622, 178 Ibid. 623, 179 Ibid, 623, 180 Ib id, 623, I II] Ibid. 623,
II . 11 -7. 11 , 1S.20, 622, II , 1-3. 11 ,9-10, 11 -3. II , 14-5. II , 17-8. II , 1S.2 1. I, 2 1, 623, 11 , 1-2. I, 3. II , 5-6. II , S.12. I, 7.
SALA DI N I N t: CY PT, 11 69.11 74
105
d. In Search oj Legitimacy
IL is quite cle ar th a t upo n Nur al· Din 's de ath Saladin wi she d to establish hi s rul e o n a legal basis. Sa ladin had to win acce pta n ce a nd legitimacy for his rul e fro m two distin ct segme nLS of Musli m socie ty: th e Kurdish·Turkish military class a nd th e civilian socie ty a t la rge, espec iall y th e elite. Thus th e qu esti o n of legitim acy has two sepa rate faceLS whi ch , n o ne th e less, a re to so me degree a lso interd e pende nt. Cenain aspecLS of Saladin 's rul e a nd pe rsona lity that appe al ed to mem be rs of hi s famil y and th e military class we re no t necessarily in strum e ntal in winnin g suppon fro m wid er circl es o f th e Musli m socie ty and vice·versa. Th e questio n is: within th e co ntex t of Sa ladin 's e ffo rts to win legitim acy fo r hi s rul e, why did he write to Baghdad and what did he h o pe to achi eve from th e Caliph ' Th e Caliph was rega rde d as th e supre me leader o f th e Muslims, who h e ld ultim ate power to in ves t regio na l lea de rs, like Nul' a l· Din and Saladin , with legal a uth ori ty. Howeve r, due to th e Caliph 's wea k positi o n ca liph a l in ves titure h ad littl e practi cal mea ning. 182 No neth e less, it was much so ught afte r by both Nu l' al· Din and Sala· din and even by more di stant Muslim rule rs such as th e A1mo ravids of th e Maghre b . 183 Caliph a l investiture was viewe d diffe re ntly by th e (wo mai n segme n ts o f th e SOC ie ty wh ose su ppon a nd recogn iti o n Saladin sought. For th e Kurdi sh·Turkish military class caliphal in vestiture h ad appa re ntly a res tri c te d sig nifi ca nce o nl y, but it ca rri ed fa r grea te r weight with th e civilia n e li te, wh o served th e rul e r , a nd with th e ge ne ral po pul ace. In his le tte r to Baghdad , Qadi a l-Fadil makes ex te nsive use of th e mo tif o f th e Ho ly Wa r a nd prese n ts Saladin as an c hampi o n o f th e Abbas id cau se a nd o f Sunni Isla m . T h ese two th e mes pe r· meate th e le tter. Within thi s te rm of refere nce Q adi a l-Fadil se ts forth Sala din 's po liti cal progra m me. A re mo te goal, th e conqu est of J e rusa le m, is used to provide justifi ca ti o n for more im media te ac ti o n-Saladin 's interve nti o n in Syri a. Qadi al-Fadil is at pa in s to convin ce th e Ca liph th a t Sa ladin 's acti o ns in Syri a will se rve 182 Thesc points are fully discussed by R. S. Humph rcys, "Legitimacy and Political Instabili ty in Islam ill the Age of thc Crusad es", in TlItJih(1l1 und iu Tilll~, 6-7. For Salad in·s relations with Baghd ad . Illostlyartc r 1174, sec, E. Sivan, ~Salad in et Ie Cal if Nasir". Scripltl HierosolYlllituna, Uc rusalclll . 1972). 126-45. 183 R. A. Messie r, ~Th e Alllloravids a nd the Holy Wa r". in "'litJihad and its Tim~, 23-4.
106
CHAPTf: R TWO
his interests too. Saladin 's very modest achievements in the war aga inst the Crusaders were grossly exaggerated by Qadi al-Fadil, who attempts to portray Saladin as a warrior dedicated to the Holy War. Moreover, the motive of the Holy War is used to justify impending wars which would inevitably bring Saladin into confrontation with Muslims rather than the Crusaders. In faCl Qadi alFadi! in vented and promulgated the myth of Saladin the warrior of the Holy War many yea rs before Saladin had achieved any real success in that war. The notion that dedication to the Ho ly War is an important factor which enti tles legitimacy was consolidated on ly during NUT al-Din's rule . Qadi al-Fadil was hardly origin al in his propaganda; he merely followed th e exampl e set by Nur a i-D in and his propagandists. As we mentioned earlier Nur ai-D in assumed the title of mujahid, warrior of the Holy War, early on in his rule (1149). In contrast with Nur ai-Din, Zangi did not adopt the title mujahid during his reign, not even after th e co nqu est of Edessa in 1144. As Emmanuel Sivan has pointed out, the image ofZangi as a warrior dedicated to the Holy War was created by historians of the thirteenth century like Ibn al-Ath ir, Ibn al-'Adim and Abu Shama rather than by his twelfth-century contemporaries. However, with Nur al-Din's ascent to the throne the idea of jihad came to the fore. 184 The theme ofJ erusale m figured prominently in the poetry of Nur al-Din's court poets and panegyrists such as Ibn al-Qaysarani and ' Im ad ai-Din and the conquest of the town became Nur al-Din's declared goal. As a manifestation of his serious intent, Nur ai-Din ordered the construction ofa special minbar (pulpit) to be install ed at tile Aqsa mosque upon the conq uest ofJ e rusalem . But the minbar was not merely a religious artefact it served as a symbo l signifying the throne and political authority.1 85 The minbar like jihad epito18~
See. his L'lslam et La Croisade, 42-5; chAo For Zangid court poelS, see Dajani-Shakeel, 1ihad in Twclflh-Cenrury Arabic Poetry~, 97,108-9. For the political meani ng of minbar, see Tabbaa, 230-1, 234. The conquest of J erusalem was not among Nur al-Din's achievements, and the work on the minbar wh ich look some years might have been seen as rather premature if not completely ridiculous. However, ' Imad ai-Din provides an explanation for Nur al-Din's deed . In a clearly apologetic vein, he says that Nur alDin continued work on the pulpit knowing that he was no t destined to conquer J emsalem. What ' Im ad ai-Din wrole about Nur a i-Din resembles a motive which was widely employed by Falimid (Isma'ili) authors. The Fatimid Imam is portrayed as investing efforts in something he knows thal o nly his successors would achieve. The aim is to explain in retrospective the failures of previous Im ams 185
SALADIN I N [GYPT, I 169~ I 174
107
mized the fusion of religion and politics in lwelrth~c entury Mus~ lim Middle Easl. In 1174, Sa ladin was desperate for recognition and Qadi al~Fadil's attempt to legitimize his rule by employing the idea of the Holy War was unconvin cing. However, late r, as has been pointed out by Hannes Mohring, following the co nquest ofJerusalem , Saladin came to be identified as the Mess iah (Mahdi). His ide ntification with Joseph of the Koran and Muslim popular lore began even earli er going back to his early career in Oam ~ ascus and his own declaration from 1176. 186 Conclusions: Saladin was a typical Heerkonig of the Muslim high middl e ages. His unprecedented achievements in the Hol y War overshadowed the fact that he began his bid for power as an usurper. Although Holy War supplied the central element in the l egitim i za~ tion of Sa ladin 's rule it was compounded by other concepts such as the IUle ofjustice, Abbasid recognition, identification withJoseph and Messianic expectations. It proved to be a powerful mix el~ evating Saladin far above other rulers of his age.
especially in matters of a wide public character suc h as wars, By implicatio n il can be understood that Salo\din is Nur ai-Dill'S true heir in accomplishing what his Q\'erlord railed to ach ieve. 186 "ZwischenJoseph-Legende und Mahdi·Erwartung: Erfolge und Ziele Sultan Saladins im Spiegel zeitgenossicher Dichtun g and Wcissagung", in War and Sociely i71lhe Easlern MedittrTantan, 7th·15th Cellturies, (ed) Y. Lev (Leiden . 1997) , 177-225,
CHAPTER THREE
THE CONSOLIDATION OF SALADIN'S RULE 1. The Dismemberment oj the Fatimid Stale
a. The Appropriation oj Urban Properties I. The consolidation of Saladin's rule in Egypt involved th e dis-
mem berme nt of th e Fatimid state and the imposition of Sunni Islam. The expropriation of Fatimid properties assisted Saladin in the implementation of his religious policies. We must take into account the fact that Saladin took possess ion of a COUnlry which was economically disrupted and of which some regions were partly destroyed. The ca pital was co nside rably affected by the wars which ravaged Egypt during the sixth d ecade of the twelfth century. In 1164, during th e struggle between the Fatimid viziers Dirgham and Shawar. sections of th e capital were set on fire. - Following th e destruction and dispersal ofthe former Fatimid black and Armenian troops by Saladin. resid e ntial quarters inside and outside Cairo were left vacant and avai lable for new uses. 2 The burning of Fustat by Shawar was a catastrophe on an unprecedented scale. although parts of the town remained relatively intact. Many of those who fled Fustat sought refuge in Cairo which became overpopulated. Shirkuh, during his short vizierate, was personally involved in attempts to encourage the refugees to return to Fustat. The immediate effects of the misfortunes that befell the capital were a decline in population and economic activity. Other Egyptian towns suffered no less. Bilbays, for example , was destroyed by the Crusaders and its population was massacred and enslaved. In the tenth century the town was an important center for the provision of the Holy Cities of Arabia with flour and bread (ka'k), and many mills operated in it. 3 Alexandria was depopulated, too. In 1167, durI Maqrizi. Khitat, III , 19. 2 In the course of the Battle of the Blacks, the House of the Armenians, which was located near the complex of the Fatimid palaces, at the very heart of Cairo, was set o n fire by Saladin's fo rces. The quarters which were inhabited by the Blacks were Baha ' ai-Din , inside Cairo, and a l-Mansuriyya, outside the walls. See, Ma~rizi, Khitat, Ill , 2, 3, 29-30. Muqaddasi , Kitab Ahsan al-Taqasim, (ed) M.J. De Goeje (Leiden, 1967), (reprint), 195.
THE CONSO LIDATION OF SALADIN'S RU LE
109
ing the siege o f Shawar and the Crusaders , famine ravaged th e town taking heavy to ll in human lives and many inhabitanls fled the beleague red town. As a result of the fighting orchards around the town were des troyed . 100." In fact the whole Mediterranean coast of Egypt was in decline due to the wars of the Crusades. Economically it was a ve l)' important region. In the tenth-eleventh centuries, th e towns of Farama. Tinnis and Damietla were prospe rous ce nlers of the textile industry and also played a role in Med iterran ea n trade. In addition, commercial fishing in the shallow waters of the lakes of Tinnis and BurulJus provided a valuable so urce of food and generated income for th e state. s Tinnis and other coastal towns of Egypt were attacked by a fleet of twenty galleys during Amalric's advance against Cairo in 1169. This fleet inte nded to sa il from Tinnis up the Ni le to assist the advancing Crusading land army. However, the water-ways leading from Tinnis to the in land were blocked by Muslim boaLS. 6 In 545/ 1150-1511 , Farama suffered a devastating raid by the Crusaders. In 1169, the Crusaders found the town deserted by its inhabitants and the dikes which preve nted sea floods had coll apsed. The littora l was covered by a shallow sea rich in fish. 7 The rural areas suffered as much as the towns. The armies that invaded Egypt lived off the land collecting taxes and seizing provisions from the villages on their way. Shirkuh did so twice; in 1164 and in 1167. Th e regions that suffered most were those around Bilbays and Alexandria, but Upper Egypt was ravaged by Shirkuh's forces as well. s II. The collapse of the Fatimid dynasty produced littJe booty in the form of cash and the torturing of the Fatimid eunuch, who formerly had bee n in charge of the palaces, revealed nothing. 9 Lyons and Jac kson, 17. For the textile industries and trade in Tinnis, in the middle of the eleventh century, see Nasir-i Khusmu, Book ofTravtls (Safamama), translated into English by W. M. Thackston Jr. (N. Y., 1986),39-40; R. B. SerjaTlt, ~Mate rilll for the History of Islamic Textiles up to the Mongol Conquest~, An Isiamica, XIII-XIV(1948), 90-4. For fi shing in lake Burullus, in the 11 30's, see C. A. Khan, kA Copy of II Decree from the Archives of the Fatimid C han cery in Egypt~, BSAOS, XLIX (l986), 441-3. 6 Maqrizi, Kh itat, 1, 346; William of Tyre, II , 353-4. 7 Ibn Muyassar, 144; Maqrizi, Itti'az., III , 20 1; William of Tyre , II, 362. 8 Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 365, 366, 370; Maqrizi , Khitat, II , 14 2. 9 Maqrizi, Khital , II, 284. <4
~
110
CHAPTER THREE
What Saladin could divide among his supporters were urban and rural properties. Both types of properties were allocated to Saladin's emirs following the Sallie of the Blacks and this practice conLinued on a grand scale after the overthrow of the Fatirnid dynasty. The division of these properties was a reward for setvice and loyalty and was also in strumental in creating long-term ties between Saladin's emirs, the new ruling elite, and Egypt-a COUIllI)' in which they had quile un expec tedly acquired vested interests. In FustalCai ro the re was a massive co nce ntration of buildings and various commercial properties which be longed to the former Fatimid state and members of the ruling establishme nt including the royal family. All these properties were appropriated by th e new regime and reassigned for accommodation, co mmercial use and the foundation of new types of religious institutions. The urban landscape of Cairo was dominated by the huge palace complex which include d two separate buildings: the Great Easte rn Palace, and the Lesser Western Palace. The Persian travelle r. Nasir-i Khusrau, who visited Cairo in 1047·1048, says that when looking at Cairo from a distance the pa lace complex, due to its size and height, appeared like a mountain. An e mpty space around the complex isolated the palaces from the adjacent bustling city. The palaces were on ly accessible through a small number of gates which were known by different names. The palaces were made up of different structures designated by the term qa'a. These qa'as were very large structures which combined a covered central hall, used normally for receptions , flanked by hall s open at their ends (iwans). Nasir-i Khusrau was admitted into the interior of one of the Fatimid palaces, but he was too dazzled by the occasion and the splendor of the internal decoration to leave a detailed description. A description more contemporary with the period of Saladin's takeover of Egypt is provided by the Frankish historian William of Tyre. who refers to underground passages that connected the various buildings within the palace complex. The palace complex could accommodate 12,000 people. but the overall number of the court personnel was even higher than that. tO Within the palace 10 Nasir-i Khusrau, 45-6, 56-7; William ofTyre, lJ , 3 19-20; cf: R. Hillenbrand, Islamic Architectuu. Form, Function and Meaning, (N. Y., 1994) ,435. In the context of palace archilecture qa'a meant an audience hall . But this tenn appears also in the context of residential architecture. See, H. I. Sayed, ~Th e Development of the Cairene Qa'a: Some Considerations~, Ai, 23(1987), 3 1-53; Goitein , A Mediterranean Sotiety, (Berkeley, 1983), IV, 69-70.
TH t: CONSO LIDAT I ON 01-- SA LAD I N'S RULE
III
com plex were a lso located th e a d mini stra tive orga ns o f the state as well as a grea t va ri ety of asso rted sto rerooms a nd treasu ries. O th e r Fa timid pa laces we re b uilt o utside th e wa lls of Ca iro. T h e p referred sites were in proximi ty to water: the Nile. lakes a nd canals. In Fustat-Cairo th e re were a lso pal aces bu ilt by so me of th e powe rful Fa timid vizie rs suc h as Ya' qub ibn Killi s a nd Bad r a l:J a mali. In ad d itio n to pa laces, mem be rs o f th e Fatimid roya l fa mily a nd people of th e ru ling es tablishme nt owned ma ny commerci al prope rti es in Fusta t-Ca iro such as sh o ps, ma rke ts, covered ma rke ts, ba thho uses a nd wh ole resid e n tial blocks. Peopl e of this cl ass a lso own ed ma ny com me rciall y valuable o rcha rds in th e capital itse lf and its e nviro ns. Fo ll owing the d e mise of th e Fa tim id sta te, th e personn e l o f th e court, slaves a nd slave-girl s, was d ispe rsed by Qa raq ush , Saladin 's superviso r o f th e palaces. He kep t some of them, but mos t were se t free o r sold. Some o f th e treasu re fo und in th e pa laces was se n t as gifts o r tributes to Nur ai-Din shortly be fore his death a nd o th e r ite ms we re sold ove r a lo ng period of ti me. Th e ho uses a nd reside ntia l bl ocks that we re owned by mem bers of the FaLimid royal fa mil y a nd o th e r pe rso ns from th e fo rmer e lite were e ith e r co nfi sca te d a nd redi stributed amo ng th e n ew e lite o r sold by th e new regime. Most of the Lesser Weste rn Palace was alloca ted to Salad in 's brothe r ai-Malik al-'Adi!. I I Salad in 's fa th e r lived in anothe r Fa Limid royal buildin g; th e Pea rl Pavili o n , whi ch was situated o uts id e th e Qa ntara Gate o f Cai ro ove rl oo king th e Ca iro Ca na l (khalij) a nd Kafur 's Ga rde n . Altho ugh this a rea was destroyed by fire d urin g th e wa r be l:\vee n Dirgham a nd Sh awa r , th e Pea rl Pavilio n was regarde d as o ne o f th e mos t bea uti ful of all o( th e Fatimid pa laces. 12 Saladin ch ose as his reside nce th e fo rm e r pal ace of th e Fa timid vizie rs and hi s broth e r, T uran sha h , settled in Cairo in a qua rte r fo rme rl y occupi ed by Fa timid e mirs. 13 Sec ti o ns of th e Easte rn Pa lace we re give n to Salad in 's e mirs a nd administrators for th e ir use. One of th em took as h is reside nce th e palace ofth e Fa timid princess Sill a l-Mulk (wh o die d in th e early 1020s). But la te r thi s palace beca me th e p ro pe rty of th e Ayyubid family. 14
II Maqrizi, Khilal, II , 215, 394. 12 Fo r the h istory of this bu ilding, see Maqrizi, Khilai. II , 348-5 1. 13 Ibid. III , 59--60. 14 Ibid, II. 184-5,247,295,394-5; IV, 259.
112
CH APT ER THREE
Othe r sections of th e Fatirnid palace complex were turned into public buildings such as law coll eges and h ospitals. Th e hospital th at Saladin founded in Cairo (Dim 'I-Qa
THE CONSO LIDATIO N OF SALAD IN'S RULE
11 3
buildings to set up law coll eges. In 570/ 1174-1175, o ne of Sa lad in 's Kurdish em irs established th e fi rst law co llege in Ca iro . This in· stilUtion was loca te d in a seClio n of Dar al-Dibaj which originally h ad been buil t as a palace by th e renown ed Fatimid vizier Ya' qub ibn Ki llis (d. 989). Later it se rved as a wo rksho p for the production a nd sale of silk brocades. 19 b. Investments in the Urban Economy
All e lements of th e e lite, Saladi n 's fa mily. em il-s and civi li an ad· mini stra tors invested in th e urba n econom y of th e cap ital. Their investmenLS in vo lved the fo undati on of eillire iy new businesses and th e purchaser o f formerly Fatimid properties fro m th e state a nd their co nversio n to co mm e rcia l uses. Taqi al-Din 's business ac ti viti es exemp lify this twofo ld approach . He bo ught two large properties from th e state: th e palace of Manazil a l-' Izz a nd the island of J azira (whic h lay betwee n Fustat and the west bank of the Ni le). In add ition he se t up two new funduqs (mea nin g he re: urban caravanserais) and a te neme11l block (rab' ).20 Another Fatimid palace, kn own as al-Nafi, was bought by a n Ayyubid e mir who at first used it as a stab le, and then converted it inLO a funduq . A bathhouse, whi ch was pan of th e com plex of th e Western Palace, proved to be a va luable property. In 11 95 it was so ld by its owne r, a cad i, to an emi r at th e hi g h price of 12,000 dinars. In th e co ntext of th e urba n econo my, bathhouses were viable businesses and as such mu ch sought for by the new rulin g e li te. A military slave of Shirkuh appropriated for himself a bathhouse in one of t he best locations in Ca iro: in the vic ini ty o f Dar al-Wizara, the palace of the former Fatimid viziers. In the same area, anoth er bathhouse became the properly 0 1" one 0 1" Shirkuh 's e mirs.:.!) A com mon practice in the early years of Saladin's rule was the purchase from the sta te of trac ts o f land in the capi tal. The fo rm a! act of acqu isition of prope rti es from th e diwan (i .e. the state office which was responsible I"or th ese properties) is frequen tly referred to in t he sources. When Taqi ai-D in decided to d esignate Manazil a l-' Izz as a law coll ege, he for mally bought the building 19 Ibid, 11 ,3434, III , 51. 20 Ibid, IV, 194; Ibn Duqmaq, Kitnb al-Intisar. (cd ) K. Vollers (Bulaq. 18911892), IV, 93-4. 109- 110. 21 Maqrizi, Khitat , III , 129-30 , 135 .
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C H APTER THREfo:
from the state. From a lega l point of view, it was a necessary pre· re quisite to g ivin g the building the status of lawfu lly acquired pro pe rty and as such fitte d for its new lise. Other members of the elite bought properties e ith e r because simil ar legal con sidera tio ns or because they we re obliged to do so by the unwillingn ess of the Slate to hand o ut its assets for no thing. Wh e th e r th ey paid th e full market price for th ese properties is unknown , but this practice was widespread. For examp le, th e Hamra' district of Fuslal was sold lO a n em ir. H e planted a garden there a nd built a new irrigation system, whi ch included wells and water whee ls. 22 The Hamra' district was a very large area stretch in g along the Nile and was subdivided into three quarters. It \va5 a n ancient zone of Fustat, which dated from the tim e of Fustat's foundation, a nd was characteri sed by ilS Christian po pulation, churc hes and monas· le ri es. It is difficult to imagin e that th e whole area was sold to a single person or even that th e whole of Hamra' had been deserted by ilS population . Howeve r, the conversion ofa secti on of fo rme rly residential area to agricu ltural use shows the extent of the d e popu· lation of Fustat. Qadi a l·Fadil a lso acquired exte nsive possession s in the capital. He bought from the state for a vast su m of money a large tract of land in the Luq area, whi ch lay outs ide th e walls of Cairo. It was good agricultura l land from which the Nile ha d re treated (after 500/ 1106-- 1107) due to a shift in the co urse of lh e river. Qadi al·Fadil established a huge o rchard on hi s land which supplied th e ca pital with fresh fruit. It must h ave been a pro fitable e nterpri se. Qadi al·Fadil deve lo pe d the area by erect· jng a mosque and o th e r buildings there. After 660/ 1261· 1262, the Nile reconquered large pa rlS of these lands and d estroyed Qadi al·Fadil's property. Another orchard was established o n the site of what had formerly been the a l· Mansuriyya quarter, after the black Fatimid troops had b ee n exp e lled a nd th e ir dwe llings (masakin) razed. 23
:n Abu Salih (the Arme nian), The Churtw and Monasteria oJf.gypt, translated into English with notes by B. T. A. Evetts (Oxford , 1895),92. For the complex textual history of this work. see Den Heijer. 77-83. 2S Maqril.i , Kh itat, II , 154, Ill , 29, 189-90. lV, 89.
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c, The Acquisition of AgriculturaL Land Agricultural land was acqu ire d by the new elite by gra nts of iqLa' or by se izure (th e esse nce of the Ayyub id iqta' sys te m is disc llsse d in Chapter Four), Th e grants of iqLa' co uld include agricu ltural land as well as whole districL'i and eve n towns . Me m bers of Saladin 's famil y e njoyed th e greatest and th e most profitable iqla's. Saladi n 's bro ther, Turanshah , was rewarded with an immense iqU/. It included the towns of Qus a nd Aswan in Upper Egypt and th e Red Sea port of 'Aydhab. In 568/ 11 72- 11 73, th e reve n ues from th ese regio ns were es tim ated ('ibm ) at 266,000 dinars. Th e iqla' of Saladin 's father included Alexandria and the Buhayra province. 24 Iqla' was confe rred on both the mil ita ry a nd civi li ans. For exa mpl e, Baha' 'Ali , a jurisl from Da mascus, received the Basatin area in th e capital as an iqla'. Whol e regio ns were ass igned to [h e military (Ghu zz a nd Tu rks) as iqla'. For instance, this happene d with the provin ce of Fayyum . But in I 180, the region was re-ass igned to Taj alMulk Buri , Saladin 's b ro th er. Buri was a very ri ch perso n who indulged him se lf in expans ive building projects for pleas ure purposes. Wh e n Buri received Fayyum the revenues were eslima ted a t 100,064 dinars per year. It re presented a sign ifi cant drop in compariso n to the su m of 133,274 dinars whi ch was d e rived from the Fayyu m whe n th is area had been a ll ocated to the military several years ea rlier. 25 This data p rovid es a very im portan t indica tion for the potential danger inh e re nt in the iqta' syste m ; th e d e te rioration of the la nd an d a decl ine in th e reve nu es it produced. Although th e iqta' syste m was the main inStrume Ol used by th e new e lite to tap the wealth of Egypt, th ere is a lso evide nce for th e se izure of agri cultura l la nd by powe rful ind ividuals from the military, who succeed e d in co nverting this la nd into freel y he ld private estates (mulk). A word of caution is necessary here. Data on the seizure of agricultural land e manates from Chrislian so urces whi ch were co nce rned with the plight of the mon as te ries. The question is how representative this data is? Does su ch information provide a n indica tio n of more wide-spread practices, or do it me re ly reflect somethin g that happened to the mo re vulnerable Christian religious institutions? A further point must be taken into consideration: in a ll of the cases reponed , the la nd taken 24 Ibid, III , 59, IV, 270. 25 Abu Salih , 3, 133, 141 ,204.
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from the monasteries had been received as grants from the Fatimid rulers. Given Muslim atLilucies toward non-Muslims. th ese grants of land were rather unusual. Therefore, the seizure of these lands may have been seen as correcting an anomaly created by the previous regime. If this was indeed the case, these repofts are not necessarily indicative ofa Illorc widespread practice. Among those wh o acquired lands, which had belonged to Christian religiolls institutions, was Saladin 's brother, Tughtakin. He became the owner of land wh ich had belonged to Christian churches in the Adawiya district. This area was a lso renowned for its quarries afyell ow clay. Tughtakin set up gardens there and built some houses. How he acquired these lands remains unclear. H owever, in three other cases there is explicit information that the land was seized by force. InJi za, th e area on the west bank of th e Nile opposite the capital, 30 feddan of land whic h had been prese nted as a gift to a local monastery by the Fatimid ruler a l-Amir (1101-1130). were taken by Saladin's troops (Ghuzz). Two other identical in cide nts LOok place in the districts of Hulwan and Ashmunayn. 26 Another problem is what happened to villages in which black soldi ers had li ved during the Fatimid period. Ibn Abi Tayy mentions this practice and Maqrizi elabora tes by saying that in certain villages, rural estates (diya') and urban quarters (mahalla) the Blacks had special areas whi ch were outside the jurisdiction of the governor. 27 Following the destruction and the dispersal of the black regimc nts by Saladin these lands became avai lable for new uses. But how the new regim e administered this land remains unknown. There were sevcral options: these properties cou ld have been divided as iqta' a mong the em irs, th e emirs could have been allowed to seize the land and to convert it into mulk, or it could have been turned into state property.
2. Saladin's Religious Policy
a. /smailum in Falimid Egypt I. During the whole period of Fatimid rule in Egypt, Sunni Islam remained a constant force in the life of the country. The grip of 26 Ibid, 141 , 185-4, 197-8,248,250. 2' Ab u Shama, I, pl.2, 498; Lev, Slale, 94, n.6, where additional sou rces and studies are listed.
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lsmailism on Egypt was never compre hensive and from th e 1070's it was on the decline, evaporating almost entirely tOwards the end of Fatimid rule . Ismail ism, to use an expressio n co in ed by S. M. Stern, was merely the sta te re li gio n of Fatimid Egypt. 28 It was professed by the royal fam il y and to some extent by th e ruling establishment and the state ma in tained the in stitution of Isma' il i propaganda (cia'wa) , which was respo nsi bl e for the dissemination of Ismailism in and outside Egypt. For the first one hundred years of Fatimid rul e in Egypt, Fatimid law enjoyed a privileged positio n. But its predominant position was eroded under th e milita'1' dictatorship of Badr al:J amali. Even du ring th e period in which Fatimid law had reigned supreme, Sunni legal schools and Sunni jurists were active in Fustat and the provinces. A rare insight into th e attitude of Su nni men of religion toward the Fatimid state is offered by Maqrizi's biography of Sharf ai-D in al-Buni (c.1 126-1206). A1-Buni was a Maliki jurist from the town of BUlla in Tunisia. At some unknown date he arrived to Alexandria and lived in Cairo during the reign of al-'Ad id (1160-1171). A1-Buni twice went on pilgrimage to the holy cities of Arabia and visited Damascus and Baghdad. In Damascus he met Ibn 'Asaki r and when confronted by him with a question about the an ticipated demise of the Fatim ids, al-Buni replied that the demise of both the Fatimids and Abbasids was ce rtain. But al-Buni was particularly pessimistic about the fate of Egypt, only at th e end of time and with the appearance of the Mahdi would the situation in Egypt improve. He was more optimistic about the prospects of Syria and Iraq following the fall of th e Abbasids. 29 This reveals no particular hostili ty toward th e Fatimids, rath er o ne gets the strong feeling of general disillusion ment with rulers present and future. A1-Buni's p essi mi stic attitude toward rulership can be explained as arising from deeply rooted Islam ic values. Islam is a religion orienta ted towards the past with a cyclical view of history. On this view, little good is to be expected from the present times and rulers a nd even less from th e future. But al-Buni also 26 S. M. S(ern, ~Ca iro as (he Cenlre of (he Isma'ili Movement~, re prin ted in his Studies in Early Ismaili.sm, Uerusalem, 1983), 236. The same expression is used by Mouton (see, 373) for describing the position of Ismailism in Damascus during the Fatim id period. But in comparison to Egypt, the period of the Fatim id rule in Damascus was shoner and the Fatimid grip on the town much weaker. 29 Maqrizi, Muqaffa, I, 750-3, esp., 752-3.
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drew on his personal experience of Muslim North Africa and the Middle East. He enjoyed the advantage of a co mparative view of regimes and politi cs, and to him the differences betwee n Fatimid Egypt and the rest of t he Sunni world seemed very unclear if not altogether indistinct. The progressive de-lsmaJizalion of the Falimid stale during the twelflh century is undoubtedly behind al-Buni's outlook. The fa ct thal a Maliki jurist from Tunisia settled in Alexandria is very te llin g in itself and exempl ifies a more general trend. The influence of Sunni Isla m, in its Maliki form , was especially strong in Alexandria. In the first half of the twelfth century, the religious and educational life of the town was dominated by th e activities of two outstanding scholars. al-Turtushi and al-Silafi. In 516/ 11 2211 23, TUflushi submitted to the viz ie r al-Ma'mun a l-Bata' ihi a request to cease the implementation of Fatimid law in cases of inh eritan ce. Turtushi's demand reflected the growing seLf-confidence ofSunn ijurists in Lheir dealings with the sta te. For example, a Malikijurist whom the Fatimid Imam ai-Hafiz ( 1130-1149) wished to appo int as a cadi stipu lated that h e would judge on ly according to the precepts of his lega l sch ool. His request was denied and the nomination cance lled. Nonetheless, his stand was in sharp contrast to that of Sunni jurists of the second half of the tenth century and the first half of the eleventh , who when appointed to the post of cad i agreed to enforce the Fatimid law of inheritance. 30 The confident and assertive stance of Sunni men of religion visa-vis the state would not have been possible with out the co-operation of the viziers. Beginning with Sadr al:Jamali no ne of Lhe Fatimid viziers of the twelfth ce ntury was an Isma
THE CONSOLIDATION OF SALAD I N'S RULE
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cess of undermining Ismail ism was especia ll y adva nced in Alexandria wh ere Sunni law coll eges were set up. The impact of th e cultural and educationa l t rends typ ical of the Easte rn parts of th e Muslim wo rld was strongly fe lt in the town. Turtllshi was familiar with Nizam al-Mulk's policies and in Alexandria he founded a teaching institutio n modelled on the Iraq i colleges oflaw. 32 Cadis of the Banu Hadid family, who ruled Alexandria de/acto followed Turtushi's steps. Although their relations with Turtushi were fairly problematic, he set a trend and his example was compe llin g. The law colleges estab lished by the Banu Hadid continued to function well into the Ayyub id pe riod:'3 Turtus hi died in 520/ 11 26. Shortly before that, a Shafi' ijurist from Isfahan, al-S ilafi, had settled in Alexandria (5 I 1/ 1 I 17-1 11 8). AI-Si lafi was born in 475/ 1082-1083 a nd during th e period of his stud ies he travelled extensively in the Midd le East in searc h of fa mous teachers. His choice of Alexand ri a as the place for h is permanent residence was a consequence of his marriage to a wealthy woman. Al-Silafi became a towering figure in the educational life of Alexandria and a multilude of students and men of religion spent li me studyin g under him. The vizier Ibn Salar es tabli shed a law college for a l-Silafi and provided it with a pious endowment. 34 Turtushi and a l-Silafi represent foreign religious groups wh o settled a nd fl ourish ed in Alexa ndri a in th e twelfth ce ntu ry. But th e town h ad a lso an indi genous class of schola rs of whom the most promine nt was Ibn
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of aI-Ha fi z. Th e docume nt conce rning th e es tablishme nt o f th e law coll ege in Al exa ndri a by Ridwan is very inte res tin g. Th e ac t of se llin g up this institutio n was initia led by th e vi zie r but a ttribute d to th e Imam whose nam e the law coll ege carri ed-madrasa al-Ha fi ziyya. Th e Fa timid C han ce ry whic h was resp o nsibl e fo r d raftin g th e d ocum e nt ma inta in ed th e pre te nce th at th e Im a m ran the state. Th e local a uth o riti es in Alexa ndria were reques ted to support th e law coll ege whic h reveal s th e fa ct th a t the city was ba re ly unde r th e contro l of the ce n tral gove rnm e nt. Th e fo unding o f th e madrasa must have bee n pro bl e ma ti c. Th e vizie r was e ager to set it up, but was un able, o r unwilling, to p rovide it with a pious e ndowm e nt. Th e doc um e nt re fl ec ts thi s dil e mma by a strange ph rase sta ting tha t th e vizie r h ad e xpressed his stro ng wi sh tha t th e Im am wo uld fin a nce a nd supply the law co llege with grain fro m hi s own reso urces (lite ra lly from his diwan). Th e jUI-ist appo inted to te ach in this law college was of course Ibn 'Awf o n wh o m ex travagant praise was lavish ed .35 Th e establishm e nt of this col· lege must be see n aga inst a dua l backgro und: th e Sunni ch arac· te r o f Al exa ndri a a nd th e a bility o f th e vizie r to compe l th e Ima m to d o so methin g whi c h was aga in st his own bes t inte rests. II. In co ntras t to Al exa ndri a, law coll eges d id no t ex ist in Fusta t· Cairo un til the tim e o f Saladin . Th e m osque was th e m ost impo r· ta nt re ligio us institutio n in th e capi tal fo r the who le of the Fatimid pe ri od . Mosques prolife rate d th ro ug h o ut th e capi tal a nd its e nvi· roIlS, the a rea of th e ce m e te ri es , J aba l Muqa ttam a nd the d esert. In 403/ 10 12·101 3, th e re we re in th e capi tal 830 mosques whi ch had no pe rm a ne nt so urces o f reve nue . Al·H akim (991).102 1) alia. ca te d for t he ir upkee p a nd funnin g 9,220 dirhams pe r month .36 H oweve r, th e urban scen e a nd th e reli gio us life of th e ca pital we re dominated by th e large a nd I;chly e ndowed congregatio nal m osques built by th e Fa timid rul e rs and th e ir vizie rs. Th e buildin g of ca n· gregatio nal mosqu es symbo lized sovere ig n ty and it was th e ex clu· sive privilege o f rul e rs.37 Th e fi rst mosque built in Ca iro was th e '5 The tex t of the d ocum e nt a ppears in Qalqashandi (X, '158-9). and English trAnsla tion is provided by Le iser. See. The Resloration, II , 435-8. :16 Maqrizi , ilti'az, 11 ,96; Khilal , IV, 84. '7 The o nly known exception is the congregational mosque built on the J azira island by Gh ayn, a n eu nuch of aI-Hakim , who for a sho rt pe ri od of ti me wielded great powe r in the st
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Azhar (built between April 970 and Jun e 972). It was an Isma' ili mosque and an educational institution in which courses of Isma i' ili teaching look place. In its early history Azhar was also a focal point for th e activity or a group or jurists supported by al.'Aziz and hi s vizier Ya'qllb ibn Killis. 38 AJ-Hakim built three co ngregational mosques in the environs or Fustat-Cairo; in Maqs , in Rashida and outside the Zuwayla Gale of Cairo (this mosque was known as the Nlir mosque and later as the mosque or ai-Hakim). But the most sign ifi cant deed or aI-Hakim was the es tabli sh ment of pious e ndowme nts in support or the Azhar, th e three mosques built by him and Dar al-' lIm , and the in stitution of Isma' il i teaching th at he founded in Cairo. Its pious e nd owment includ ed urban estates and commercial buildings owned by ai-Haki m in Fustal. The inco me or the Azhar alone amounted to 1,067 dinars per yea r. 39 Later two other mosques were built in Cairo: the first by the Fatimid Ima m aI-A miI' ( 1101-1130) and his viz ier-the Aqmar mosque in 5 19/ 11 25-and by al-Zafir in 543/ 1148-1149. Both mosques were supported by piolls e ndowments made lip of urban properties and al-Zafir's mosque served also as a place ror the teac hing of law and a group or reciters of the Koran was attached to i1. 4o Other congregational mosques were built by Fatimid viziers. AI-Mdal , during th e ru le or his rather (Sha'ba n 478/ Novcmber-October 1085) bui lt a cgregational mosque outside Cairo on a high ground overlook in g th e Lake of th e Abyssinians. It was not an ex pensive project, the construction costs ran to 6,000 dhwrs, a very modest sum for such an enterprise. 41 The vizier Ta la'j' ibn RlIzzik es tablished two congregational mosques. One or them was outside the Zuwayla Gatc and originally was designated to serve as the burial place for a holy relicthe head of Husayn-which was kept in a mash/tad (martyri um ) and dicd from wounds inflicted on him. Sec. Ibn DU(jlnaq.IV. 11 5: Maqrizi. Khital. IV, 87-8. :vi Maqrizi. Khilal, II, 226 (quoling Musabbihi, an early clc\'enth<en lmy chronicler). "" Maqrizi. Khilat, IV, 49, 50. 40 Ibid, IV, 75-6, 80- 1. For the Aqmar mosque see, C. Williams, -The Cull of 'Alid Saints in thc Fatimid Monuments ofC.1.iro. Part I: the Mosque ofal-Aqm:u'~, Muqamas, 1(1983) , 37-52. 41 Maqrizi, Khilal. IV, 74-5. ~ I aqrizi's datcs in this account are problcmatical. In 478/ 1085, Afdal was not in power yet, and the su m of 6.000 dinars scems tOO low for the bui lding of a congregat ional mosque.
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at Ascalon. The fear that the town might falllo the Crusaders caused the vizier to build this mosque with the inte ntion of transferring the head to it. However, the Fatimids insisted that Husayn's head must be kept in the palace and a special mashhad was built for that purpose. Another mosque built bythe vizier was in Cairo and senl'ed as a commemorative monument for the Fatimid Imam al· Zafir killed in a palace intrigue in 11 54.42 The building of mosques which served as shrines pre-datcs the Fatimid period in Egypt. For instan ce, Tibr, an emir of the Ikhshidid period , built a mosque in which was buried the head ofa Shi'ite re bel against the Abbasid Caliph ai-Mansur. The Fatimid ruleral-Zahir (1021-1036) frequently used to visit it blll the reasons for his interest in the mosque remain vague. '13 The cult of shrines and tombs in the great southern cemetery, Qarafa al-Kubra, had a long tradition in ule pre-Fatimid and Fatimid periods. The area saw intense building activity during the Fatimid period. The first member of the Fatimid royal family to build there was al-'Aziz's mother, al-Sayyida al-Mu'izziyya. In Ramadan 366/ April-May 977, she built the congregational mosque of the Qarafa which included also an orchard and cistern. Her other projects involved qasT (its mean ing is vague; house, or residence ), a bathhouse, an orchard and a wel1. 44 The qasrexisted ul1liI567 / 11711172. In 520/1126-1127, ai-AmiI' buill on lOp of lh e qasr a pavilion from which he used to watch the dancing of the Sufis of whom he was patron. Female patronage of mosques and other structures in the Qarafa was very common during ule Fatimid pniod. In 522/ 1128, th e wife of al-Amir built on the outskirts of the Qarafa alKubra a mosque overlooking the Lake of the Abyssinians. It seems that the same woman, who was renowned for her piety and charity, built in 526/ 11 31-11 32 a mosque and a ribat for aged widows in the Qarafa. 45 Her ribat was not an unique institution. For ex42 Maqrizi, Khilal, lV, 8 1, 265-6. 4!! Ibid, IV, 271, (quoting al-Quda'i, an e le\·enth
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amp le, Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn 'Ali a l-Madha ra'i, a hi gh-ra nkin g administrator of the Ikh shidid period, set up a ribat for ashmJ women (i .e. th e fema le descendants of Hasa n and Husayn . th e tw"O sons of 'Al i and Fatima). Women of the house holds of Fatimid vizie rs a nd Im a ms were frequent pa tron s of religious buildings in the Qarafa. In th e 1020's. a slave-girl of 'Ali ibn Ahmad a l-J arj a ra'i found e d a ribal, which was supported by a pious endowment. 46 In 536/ 11 4 1-11 42, Sill al-Ghazala, who was in c harge ofa l-Hafi z's inkwell and responsi ble for th e upkeep a nd cleaning of pe ns, built a mosque in th e Qarafa which ca me to be known by h e r name.47 Another fema le servant of a i-Hafi z, hi s waqqaJa, whose duty was to stand in fro nt of h e r maste r, establish ed a mosque, too. It had an e nclosure (hawsh) which include d seve ral rooms (buyut) for women who live d in seclusion. 18 Other mosques in the area were found ed by a l-Afd a l's serva nt (farrash) and two e unu chs of ai-Hafiz. One of them was Shaqiq a l-Mulk. the d ire ctor of th e treasury and th e other, 'Azim a l-Dawla , was th e bearer of the paraso l a nd the veil behind which th e Fatimid Imam used to speak to th e peopJe .49 The Qarafa was an importa nt foca l point of religiou s life a nd social activi ty an d a popula tio n of pe rma nent inhabi tants-the Qarafi yya-li ved th ere. The patro nage of wo me n of the royal famil y, vizi e rs a nd slaves a nd serva n ts in th e house holds of th e Fatimid rul e rs exe mplifies the links th at th e Fatimid regime fostered with th e peopl e livi ng in th e ce me te ries. 50 For exampl e, the water reservoi r built in 366/976-977 by al-Sayyida al-Mu ' izziyya, was renovated in 546/ 11 5 1-11 52 and in 580/ 11 84- 11 85. In both cases the work was carri e d o ut on th e orders of high-rankin g patrons; a Fatimid vizie r and a top Ayyubid administrator. Th e involvement of th e regime in the social and re ligious li fe in th e Qarafa was manifold: it regulated th e riles that took place in th e Qarafa. 46 Who lh e beneficiaries of lh is ribal were is nOl e llli rely dea r. Sec, Maqrizi, Khilal, IV, 333-4. Ahmad al:J arjara'i was the brother of the vizie r Ab u 'l-Qasim a l:J arjara'i. 47 Maqrizi, Kllilal , IV, 326. The inkwel l was o ne of the Im am 's insignia of rule. Sec, Sande rs, index. 48 Maqrizi , Khitat, IV, 326. 49 Ibid, IV, 32 1, 327, 328. For these courtiers and their roles in the court life and ce re monies. see Sande rs, index, under sahib bay' ai·mal. sahib al-mizalla and sahib ai·silr. 50 Fo r lhe mosques of a l·Afdal. Tala'i ' ibn Ruzzik and lhe wife of the vizi e r Ibn Sala r, see Maqrizi , Khilal , IV, 324.
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maintained water suppli es and organi zed the distribution of a lm s to people living there. Shaqiq al-M ulk , for instance, kept a register (ruznamaj) with the names those who lived in th e mosq ues of the Qarafa and were entitled to support. On the nights of lights (layali l-wuqud i.e. the first a nd the middle days of th e months of Rajab and Sha'ban). he sent food to people in th e mosqu es a nd to those living in secl usion allh e buyut in the Qarafa. In addition he used to se nd to th ese people fruit from th e orchard that was part of hi s mosque. Shaqi q al-Mulk must have been a person of high sta ndin g with ai-Hafi z. In his mosque he gave a reception for hi s rul e r a llcnded by th e eu nu chs o f th e cou n , dignitari es a nd e mirs. The nights of the li ghts were po pular festivals whi ch attracted man y people to the Qarafa. O ne o f th e places wh ere crowds and Koran reciters ga tJl e red was the pavilion (jawsaq) built on th e model of the Kaaba by Abu Bakr ibn ' Ali a l·Mad h a ra' i.51 I
b. The Restoration of Sunni Islam I. Sa ladi n and the oth er Ayyubid rulers of Egypt did not compete with th ei r Fatimid predecessors by founding mosques but instead th ey established law coll eges. The foundation of law colleges in Fustat by Saladin was a carefully calcu lated act und el'taken from a position of strength. Saladin's d eeds reveal a conscious attempt to maximi ze the public impact of his new policy, On the first day of the Muslim year 566/ 14 September 1170, a prison just sOUlh of the Anc ient Mosque of 'Amr ibn al.'As, the religious and com· mercial h eart of Fustat, was demolishe d and co nverted in to a law college. The building th at represented the coe rcive power of the FaLimid regim e, formally still in power, was turned into a institu· tion identifi ed with Sun ni Islam. T h e symbo li c value of this act was noted by Ibn a l·Athir, even though h e was d istance to th e even t in both time an d place.52 This co ll ege became to be known as the 71ladrasa a l·Nasiriyya, derivin g its name from Salad in 's ep ith et a l· Malik al·Nasir, the Victorious King, and served the jurists of the Shafi' j legal school. However, the inauguration of teaching in it took place much la ter. Two weeks later, on another side of the complex of the Ancient Mosque, work began on a second law !iJ Maqrizi, Khilal, IV, 332-3, !i2 Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, XI, 240,
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college. Sa ladin demolished a commercial building, a covered market which had been used for the sa le of linen, Qaysariyya alC hazl, to make room for th e building of a law co ll ege dedicated for the jurists of th e Maliki legal sch ool. Bo th institutions were su pported by generous pious e ndowme n ts. The first to em ul ate Saladin 's deeds was hi s ne ph ew, Taqi a i-Din. He establis hed, half a year la ter, a law coll ege 1'01" Sh afi' i jurists within the palace of Manazil a l-' Izz. Like Saladin's coll eges in Fustal it was provided wi th a ric h pious e nd owment. 5j Another institution estab lished by Saladi n in 569/ 1173- 11 74 in Cairo was a Sufi khanqa. It was designated for foreign Sufis wh ose arriva l in Egypt the regime e ncouraged. It was a large in stitution which provided the Sufi s with acco mm odation and material suppo rt. 54 In 572/ 1176-1177, upon his return to Egypt from Syria, Saladin founded his third law coll ege. This o ne was adjacent LO the mausole Ulll ofShafi' i a nd became to be kn own as madrasa al-Nasi ri yya at the Qarafa ceme tery. As is au ested by the founding inscription th e esta blishm e nt of thi s in stituti on was th e initi ative of a lKhabushani. In the light of his special relations with Saladin , the positive response of the Sullan to al-Khabushani 's requests is not surprising. Moreover, al-Shafi'i's tomb was a mu ch vis ited site and the new in stitution enjoyed wide publi c exposu re. 55 Later, Su ltan a l-Kami l extended a small mosqu e in the vicinity ofS hafi' i's LOmb to become a large co ngregationa l mosque. The need for a bigger mosque was due to the great c rowds wh ic h used to visit th e pla ce a nd th e exis tence of Saladin's law coll ege and its stude nt populatio n .56 Th e association between Saladin a nd al-Khabushan i was far from be in g unu sual o r unique. Such relations between rulers and holy persons are well a ttested in the Fatimid a nd Mamluk periods. One of the best known cases is the compan ionship between Shaykh Khadir ibn Abi Bakr a l· Mihrani and the Mamluk Su ltan Baybars. However, due to al-Mi h rdn i's high ly idiosync ratic c haracte r and behavior he became a li ab ili ty to the sultan. A more typical case is the patronage ex te nd ed by the vizier a l·AfdallO Shaykh Ibn Sa'd al-Atfi h i. In th e period t hat a l-Mdal fou ght aga in st al-Mustansir's 5! Maqrizi , Khi/al, IV, 193-4. 54 Ibid, IV, 273: cf: Fernandes, 22-5. 55 Maqrizi, Khi/al, IV, 251: Leise r, The Res/oration. I, 225-3J. 56 Maqrizi , Khi/a/. IV. 86.
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eldest so n , al·Nizar, and his alli es in Alexandria (e nd of 1095beginning of 1096), hi s mother used to go o n Fridays in cognito among the peop le in the markets , congregational mosques and ribats. She lea rnt what people were saying about a l-Afdal and h ea rd the ir opinions on curre nt eve nts. In one of her tours she visited al-Atfi hi , who was a transmitter of the Propheti c traditions and an ascetic, at his mosqu e. He promised her victory to th e Sultan a nd the safe-being of her son, who as she lOld him was fi ghting with the a rmy aga in st the rebels in Alexandria. Followin g al-Afda l's triumph sh e Lo ld h im about th ose who spoke evil of him and recommended him to befriend al-Atfihi. AI-Afdal carried O ll t savage acts o f retributio n agai nst his e nemi es, but took al-Atfih i under hi s patronage. AI-Mdal's patronage evolved into ve neratio n and respect for al-Atfi hi with whom he spent many h ou rs co nve rsing about the Prophetic traditions a nd hi story. Al-Atfi hi 's mosqu e became crowded with people who reali zed th aL when al-Mdal was in the company of the Sh aykh he was more attentive to their needs and proble ms. The relationship between th e two was mutually beneficial. AI-Afda l's altitude was a mixture of pe rsonal adm iration for al-Atfihi and poli tical co nsiderations. AJ-Atfihi was in strumental to al-Afdal for keeping in touc h with the co mmon people and gaining their support. At the same time al-Atfihi's prestige among the people was mu ch e nhanced. AJso in other ways he gain ed immensely from al-Afdal's patronage. AI-Afdal secured a steady water supply for th e mosque, planted an orc hard, built a bathhouse a nd for himself he constructed a loggia and qa'a. In addition , he buil t for al-Atfihi an open prayer area where the Shaykh conducted prayers over the dead brought for burial in the Qarafa. 57 Saladin's policy of se ttin g up law coll eges was emulated by his successors and the milita ry and civilian elite of th e Ayyubid period. Two religio us in stituti o ns established by o the r Ayyubid rulers of Egypt exe mpli fy Saladin 's influ en ce in choos ing central locations and th e continued use of forme r Fatimid buildings. The Dar al-H adith es tablis hed by the Sultan al-Kam il was located in the most cen tral site in Cairo. th e stree t that run s between th e two Fatimid palaces-th e Western and Eastern. 58 In 1242, a section of the Eastern palace was de molished by the Sultan Salih Ayyub ~7
~
Ibid, lV, 329-30. Leiser, The RntQration, II , 36 1·75.
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to make a space for a new law college. The co nstruction work was carried out at great speed and, in a less than a year, this co ll egethe Salihiyya madrasa-was com pleted. Apparently the materials of the de molished palace were re·used which might explain the rapid progress of the work. AJ so an old gate of the p~, l ace was incorporated into th e new building serving as its e ntran ce. 59 Many law coll eges in th e ca pital were built by Ayyubid emirs. This tre nd began as ea rly as 570/ 1174-] 175, and continu ed during the whole period of Ayyubid rule in Egypt. Two emirs in Saladin's service were among th e founders of law coll eges. One of them was Sayf ai-Din Yazkuj , originally a military slave ofShirkuh who became an emi r in the Asadiyya regime nt. In view of th e ro le played by the Asadiyya in Saladin's nomination as Fatimid vizie r, it is not surprising to find officers of th is regiment in eminent positions during Saladin's rule . Yazkuj set up rwo co ll eges, one in Fustat and one in Cairo. 60 Also his wife, herself th e daughte r of another Asadi emir, founded a law coll ege. For that purpose she bought a building from a Jewish physician who served as secre· tary to Baha' aI-D in Qaraqush. 61 Another college was set up ac· cordi ng to the will of the emir Masru r, a former Fatimid eunuch, who became th e commande r of Saladin's body guard. He kept his assignme nt until th e reign of Sultan al-Kamil when he retired from service. In his lifetime Masrur became renowned for his righteo usness and charity. Upon hi s d eath , having no famil y and heirs , h e disposed all of hi s properly. In his will Masrur ordered th e building of a law college, which W'IS finan ced through the sale of rural property in Syria. The co llege i L~elf was supported by a piolls endowment wh ich included a small futlduq. Masrur was buried in the Qarafa next to a mosq ue he had established there. 62 Masrur re prese nts a type of re ligi osi ty characte ristic of th e e unuchs as well as o f free-born people of the military class. Saladin's distinguish ed co mmander of the navy, Husam ai-Din Lu 'lu ', was an Armenian and a form e r Fatimid officer. He died inJumada II ~ Maqrizi, Khitat, IV, 209; Qalqashandi , III . 352: Leiser, Tht: IU.'Jtoralioll, II , 352-61. 60 Maqrizi, Khital, IV, 19'1, 199; Leiser, Th, IUSlarflli(m , II , 327. 61 Maqri zi. Khila/, IV. 200; cf: Leiser, The Restamlioll, II . 33()'1. For a malirasa or a Kurdish emir or Saladin known as QUlibiyya. see Ma(lri:ri. Khitat. IV, 196; cf: Leiser, The Restorati07l, II , 298-9. 62 Maqri zi. Khilnl, IV. 2 16.
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596/June:July 1200 and was buried in a mausoleum (turba) he had built for himself in the Qarafa. H e too was known for his libera l charity and piety.53 The same mixture of military career, piety, charily and concern for personal salvation is reflected in the bi~ ography of Sultan al·Kamil's em ir. Fakhr ai-Din ibn Qizil al-Barumi (born in Aleppo in 11 66 and died in Harra n in 1232). During alKamil's reign h e became one ofthe most powerful persons in the state and is described as distributing bounteous charity including among those living in secl usio n (arbllb al-buyut). In Cairo. he built a compl ex composed of a law co ll ege and a mosque and another one in the Qa rafa, whic h included a ribat and an ele mentary school for orpha ns (kultab sabil) . His building activities extended also to Mecca, there he set up a ribal. 64 In 580/ 11 84-1 185, a splend id law coll ege was established by Qadi a l-Fadi l in Cairo. It also included a ha ll (qa'a) for the slUdy of th e seven different ways of reciting the Komn, a nd an elementary school for orphans. Qadi a l-Fadil's private residence was within this complex. The fame of this co llege, the Fadiliyya madrasa, was derived from its large a nd diverse library donated by Qadi al-Fadil, who was a renowned bibliophile. He used to buy books on a wide range of topics and his library also included rare items. Ibn a l-Qifti says that he had used this library and its cata logue. Members of Qadi a l-Fadil's family were connected with this institution. Qadi al-Fadil's SOil, Ahmad , taught in it and hi s grandson served as its librarian. 65 Other admin istrators of the Ayyub id age were also involved in setting up law co ll eges. 66 A law coll ege established in Fustat in 570/1 174-11 75. and known as the Arsu fi tnadrasa, ep itomi zes the foundations set up by private people from outside the ruling establishment. Arsufi was a mercham from Palestine who used hi s private wealth to es tabli she a well-endowed law cO llege. fi7 A most inte resting institution is the 63 See. chA, n.89. 6-4 Maqrizi, IV, 199; d: Leiscr, The Jus/oraliof!, II , 349-52. Fo r olhe r law colleges buill by Aryubid emirs, scc Maqrizi, Khital, IV, 208, 216, 2325; d: Leiser, The JUsloratiotl, II , 3 11 -3, 3 13-4, 332-3. 65 Maqrizi, Khilal, IV, 197-9; Leiser, The IUsloration, II , 334-47; Ibn al-Qifli, III , 187; Safadi, VI I, 57, XVI II , 198. For a school established by Saladin lO leach orphans and poor c hildren thc Koran, scc MacKenzie, 129. 66 Maqrizi, Khital, IV, 205; Ibn Duqmaq , IV. 92; Leiser, The /Ustoralion, II , 286-9,317-27. 67 Maqrizi, Khilal, IV, 194; Ibn Dlupnaq , IV, 98: Leiser. The /Usloration, II , 281-2.
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law coll ege esta blished in Fus!..'1 !, in 640/ 1242- 1243, by Wes t African pi lgrim s. It was a Maliki institu tio n whic h beca me famous in Wes t Afri ca, and was mai ntained by cash do nations brought by West Afri can p ilgri ms who passed th rough Egypt o n pilgrim age to th e Holy Ci ti es of Arabia. 68 As a resu lt of the es tablish me nt of new rel igious ins ti tu tio ns in Fusta t-Cai ro, many urban pro perties in the ca pital and even some agri cultural la nds we re ti ed u p in p io us e nd owm en ts se t up fo r th e mainte na n ce of th ese institutio ns. Fo r insta nce, th e pi o us e ndowme nt of al-NasiriYYd coll ege fo unded by Salad in in Fusta t included th e fo llowing prope rti es: a goldsmith s ma rket in Fustat and a vi llage. An inscription read by Maql; zi stated th at the bu ildin g ho usin g th e go ldsmith s ma rket was co nstructed by al-'Az iz. It was o ne o f ma ny buildings buill for comme rcial uscs in th e ca pital by me mbers o f th e Fa ti mid royal fam il y.fi9 O th er coll eges fo unded by Saladin ; the Qam hi yya madrasa and th e Nasiriyya madrasa in the Qarafa. we re provid ed with th e sa me combin ation of urban and rura l pro pe rties. Th e pi ou s e nd ow me n t of th e Qa mhi yya madrasa included a cove red marke t fo r the sale of paper, Q aysariyya al-Warraq in , in Fustat and a ru ral esta te in Fayyu m. T he Nasiri yya madmsa in th e Qa rafa was e ndowed with pro perti es adj ace nt to it sll ch as an oven , bathh ouse a nd sho ps as we ll as with th e Island of Ele ph a n ts whi ch was situated at some di st.lI1 ce fro m Ca iro. 70 An Olh er law coll ege established by Saladin , th e Suyufi yya madrasa, is n o ta ble fo r the abse nce of rural prope rti es in th e pio us e nd owment set up fo r its upkeep. Blit exte nsive properti es in Ca iro we re e ndowed in its favo r. Th ese included 32 sh o ps in th e area of th e Li ttle Marke t of Ami r al:Juyush (a marke t es ta blish ed by th e vizie r Badr al:J amali ), the Futuh Ga te o f Ca iro a nd the Barj awa n quarter. one of the ancie nt parts of the town datin g from th e second half o f th e tenth ce ntury.71 But it see ms th at th e Sufi khanqa esta blish ed by Salad in in Cairo e nj oyed the richest pious e nd ow· me n t; it was com posed mostly o f rural prope rti es which includ ed iii! Maq rizi, Khi/al. IV, 195; Ibn Duqm;lq, IV. 96; Le iser, The Reslomlion. 11 . 291).1. For th e di\'ersified relatio ns between Eb'Ypt a nd West Africa, see N. Lcvl7.ion, " M am 1u k Egypt and T akru r (West Ar.. ica)~. in Sllldiu ir! Islamic HislQry and Civiliwlior!, in Honour o rProressor David Aplon. (ed ) M. Sharon. (Jerusalem. Leid en . 1986), 183-209. 69 Maq rizi, Khilal, IV, 193. 7(1 Ibid, IV, 193-4, 251. 71 Ibid, IV, 196.
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a commercial garden outside Cairo, extensive rural lands in the provinces and a covered market for the se ll of beverages and potions, Qaysariyya al-Sharab, in Cairo. 72 Among the other law colleges. Taqi al-Din's madras" of Manazil a l_cIzz, was especially richly endowed with urban properties; a bathhouse, funduq for the storage and trade of palm dates, and the Jazira island on its agricultural lands. 73 Also the institutions set up by other Ayyubid rulers were supported by pious endowments no less extensive than those created by Saladin and Taqi ai-D in. For example, the daughter of the Sultan a l-'Adil, ' Ismat ai-D in Mu'nisa, founded an endowed law coll ege but no details aboUl the type of propenies aTe available. 74 The Sultan al-Salih Ayyub developed an urban estate (hukr) from which subsequently land tax (hikr) was coll ected and endowed it for his Salihiyya law college. Earlier, similar method was adopted by the Sultan al-Kam il. He converted a section of the Fatimid palacecomplex into a residential block (rub') and endowed it (i.e. the incomes from it) in favor of the Oar al-Hadith he had founded. 75 Taqi ai-Di n 's building activities were not restricted to the capital alone. but also included the foundation of two endowed law co lleges in the Fayyum. However, with the exception of the Fayyum, th ere is little evidence in the Ayyubid period for the setting up of law colleges outside the capital and the institutions founded were not establi shed by the Ayyubid rulers. 76 II. There are two basic approaches for interpreting the meaning and the significance of the law colleges established by Saladin and th e other Ayyubid rulers. George Makdisi strongly disputes the views of M. von Berchem and I. Goldziher who both regard the law colleges established in the Muslim world during the second half of the eleventh century as institutions supported by the state and, in the eyes of Goldziher, responsible also for the dissemination of the Ash'ari th eologi cal doctrine. Makdisi maintains that the madrasa "remain ed essentially a privately e nd owed institution destined for public, but according to the wishes of the individual Ibid, IV, 2734. 73 Ibid, IV, 194. 74 Ibid, IV, 200; cf: Leiser, The RtJtoralioll, II , 347-9. 7$ Maqrizi. Khilat, IV, 209. 2 1I. 76 Leiser, The Rnloralion, II , 37()'96; S. Tsugitaka. State (lIId Rural Society in MedievaL isLam, (Leiden, 1997), 75-6. 7'1
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founder who established the institution and who formulated its public c haracter". He argues that: "th e status of the founder did not in any way alter the legal status ohhe in stitution he founded: the institution remained a waq/. a c haritable trust",77 As has been poimed out by A. L. Tibawi, Makdisi 's claim that the stalUs of the founder, be he a ruler or a private person, does not matter is difficult to accept. 78 Ibn 'Asak ir 's biography of Nur ai-Din as well as the writings of Saladin's historian-admirers clearly show that, in the period unde r discussio n, the demarcation lin e between private and official aspects of th e behavior of the ruler was tenuous at best if not blurred altogether. Moreove r, Saladin, and members of his family which founded law co ll eges did so by exercisin g executive power. They acted as rule rs lIsin g for that purpose the properties of the former Fatimid state which they ca me to co ntro l by the virtue of their military u·iumph. We must regard the establishment of law co ll eges by Saladin as the embodiment of a coherent Slate religious poli cy. The drift of this policy was well unde rstood by late me dieval historians. Maqrizi, in his evalu ation of it, says that Saladin's chi ef cad i was a Shafi ' i jurist, the Kurd Ibn Dirbas. who appointed as his de puties only Shafi'i jurists. Maqrizi is also very explicit as to the theological teachings sllpponed by Saladin and his regime: it was the Ash'ari doctrine. Saladin imposed the Ash'ari doctrine and this was stipulated in the waqfdocuments of the institutions founded by him such as the law colleges and the Sufi khanqa, 79 The preference accorded to Shafi'is did not mean the exclusion of other legal sc hools. Law colleges were not built for the Shafi'is exclusively. During Saladin's rule and the Ayyubid period in genera l, law coll eges were built also for the Malikis, Hanafis and even Hanbalis. On the other hand, the support of Asharism was a clear state policy. Cadi Ibn Dirbas, in conjunction with Sa ladin, ordered the muezzins to announce the Ash'ari doctrine. known as the 'aqida murshida, during their night call to prayer. State support for ce rtain legal schoo ls and theological teaching was not Saladin's innovation. Maqrizi contrasts Saladin's support for the Shafi'is with 77 See, his 'fht Rist of Colltgts. IllstituliOlIS of i.£arnillg ;'1 Islam and the Wtsl, (Edi nburgh , 1981),300,302, 78 See, his ~O rigin and Ch al1lcte r oral-Madrasa h BSOAS, XXV (1962), 2312.234. See a lso, Chambcl'lain , 5 1·2. 79 Maqri7.i, Khital, IV, [61. M
,
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Nur a i-D in 's backing of the Hanafis. 80 Maqrizi's reference to Nur ai-Din is a very apt one; it pULS Saladin's re ligious policies in their proper context. 81 The establishmc m of law coll eges in AJeppo was pan of Nur a l-Di n 's struggle against Shi'ite Islam in the town. Nur a i-D in c ha nged the Shi ' ite fo rmula of call to praye r in Aleppo to the Sunni one and he suppo rted th e introduction of Sunni legal sc hools. He withdrew support from th e Sh i' ites and found e d law co ll eges sllstained by pi ous endowme n ts. For Saladin's religio us policies in AJeppo we have th e conte mpora ry authoritative account of « mad ai-Din himself. Wh en Sa ladin wrested Aleppo from the Zengids and annexed it to his te rrito ri es h e gave preference to the Shafi' j sc hoo l by appointing cadis and preachers from among its members. Although Saladin's preferences were dearly set o ut it did not mea n that a battle was waged again st the Hanafis. At least some leading Hanafi scho lars we re approved by the new regi me and maintain ed their positions. 82 The religious policies of Nur ai-Din and Saladin followed a similar pattern: the lega l sch ool of their cho ice was give n an emin e nt position in the state but th e regim e was n ot overtly hostil e to th e other sc hools, which were tolerated and occasio nally eve n suppo rted.
c. Taxation and Religion I. Saladin's religious policy can be characte ri zed as Sunni, conservative and pietistic. Pietism and the influ ence of Nur ai-Din are very evide nt when Saladin's fiscal policy is examined. A much publicized aspect of it was the abolition of taxes that were levied on the urban eco nomy of Fustat-Cairo and were unauthorized by lslami c law. These taXes were kn own as mukus or hilali and included sales and prope rty taxes. 8~ Other taxes , known under the nam e of bamtil, were coll ected by sta te functionaries such as ma rke t supelvisors, cadis and governors (IUUla al-bllilltl) in the rural areas.&! 80 Ibid, IV, 48-9, t 61. 81 The innuence of Nur a l-Din's religious policies on Saladin has been nOled by modern scholarship, too. See, Lapidus, 280, 284-5. Fo r the Ayyubid su pport of Asharism, see Madelung, 110, n.3, 158, 159-60. 82 Ibn 'Asa kir, (ed) Elisseeff, 137, para.,4, MS, XVI, 293, II , 29-30; ' Imad 111Din , Barq, V, 127, 129-30. For Hanafis dism issed by Saladin, sec MorrdY, 40-1, 123. 8' Rabie, 105-6. 11-4 Maqrizi . Khilal , I. 179.
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Both kinds of taxes. 1nukllS and baralil, we re coll ected during the Fatimid period. In 11 71, after the death of al·'Adid , Saladin or· dered the abolition of m'l.lkus taxes in th e capital and he regulated th e collection and paymen t of zakal, the al ms-tax. The decree (manshur) announ cing th e aboli tion of the mukus states that Salad in as the official respons ible for the affa irs of the people man ifests his good wi ll towards the inhabitants of the capital and the merchants trad in g th e re by abolishing th e custo m duties levie d at two ports wh ich served the city. Custom duties levied on merchanlS arriving in and departing from these two ports amounted to 100,000 gold coins (min al-'ayn) a yea r. The decree says that the Sultan was ready to renounce (the riches of) th is wo rl d for th e sake of the hereafter. The mukus levied in two provinces were abolishe d , too. In all , Salad in discontinued the coll ection of illega l taxes to th e a moun t of o ne million dinars per year and two millions irdabs of grain in kind. 85 Very li ttle is known about the collection and di stribution of the alms-tax in the Fatimid period. On 3 Rabi ' 1567/4 November J 171 , Sa lad in ordered the distribution of money from the alms-tax to those who were e ntitl ed to receive it: th e poor and th e ne edy, travellCl"s and insolvent de btors. It was said that the al ms-tax was collected for those who fought the Holy War and for th e free ing of slaves. Maqrizi specifies how the levying of the a lm s-tax was carried out. It was coll ected o n merchand ise, livestoc k, palm dates a nd vegetables. 86 In the sa me yea r, Saladi n tried to persuade th e e mi r o f Mecca to cease the coll ection of mukus from pilgrims arriving to Arabia by offering hi m compensation in the form of rural estates (di)'a').87 Appare ntly, simil ar effo rts were undertaken by Saladin in 572/ 11 76-1177, with the ai m of obtaini ng exemption for pilgrims from payin g mukus. ' Imad a i-Din says that on Salad in 's interve ntion the mukus levied on pilgrims in Mecca were aboli shed and Saladin promised to supply eac h year 8,000 irdabs of hard grain (hinla) to the Holy Cities through the port ofJedda. To finance th is ex pen-
85 Abu Shama, I, pl.2, 443 (q uoting Ibn Abi Tayy), 522-3, (where the full text of the document is given); 'Uy ll1l, I, 32 1. 86 Suluh, 65. Maqrizi's description of the collection of z.ahal talli cs with Lhat of Makhzurni. See, Khan , Arab I.£gal, 285: Rabie, 95-100. 87 Abu Sham a, ' UyUll, I, 32 1-2 (quoting Ibn Abi Tayy) ,
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diture, Saladin set up a spec ial pious e ndowme nt. 88 Maqrizi adds some furthe r details. The lax that had been levied on the pilgrims amollnted to 7.5 Egyptian dinars and was coll ec ted eith e r in ' Aydhab , the Egyptian port on the Red Sea, or in Jedda . This accounts implies that the revenues from laxing the pilgrims were shared between the rulers of Egypt and Arabia. H ow suc h an arnlllge menl could wo rk in practice is unclear. In any case, Maqrizi. in lin e with earli er histo rian s. says that the emir of Mecca had to be compe nsated for hi s loss of revenue by shipments of grain a nd allocation of iqta's in Yeme n and Upper Egypl.89 Saladin backed up his policies aimed at abolishing the taxes levied o n pilgrims by institutional arrangements which reflect his seriousness a nd longterm comm itmenl. Noneth eless, it was difficullto stamp out th e practice of collecting ill egal taxes from pilgrims. In 577/ 11 81-11 82, Saladin had 1O remain th e governor of Qus, in Upper Egypt, to end the collection of unauthorized taxes from merchants arriving from the Yemen and pilgrims from Arabia. 90 It seems that the administrative office responsible for coll ecting the alms-tax (diwan al*zakal) was a powerful body. Its officials compe lled Saladin's broth er, Tughtakin, who came from the Yemen during the reign of al}Aziz 'Uthm a n (i.e. sometim e between 11 93 and 11 99). to pay alms-tax on th e goods he brought with him . Although derived fro m a late source, this is very inte restin g information ope n to several inte rpre tations. It ca n be seen as indicating thaL everyone, even the rul e r of the Yemen and a membe r of the Ayyubid family, had to fulfill the reli gious duty of payin g zakat. Another way of lookin g at this account is to see it as a re n ec ti o n of the strained relations within the Ayyubid family and the officials of the diwan as acting on th e behest of th e ir political master, al-'Aziz 'Uthma n , Saladin 's son. 91
gs AI-Bundari. 30~; Abu Sham a, I, pl.2. 693 (quoting ' Imad ai-Din); 'U,un, II , 31-2. 119 Maqri1.i. Suluk. 86. Thc concern and il1\'olvement of both Nur ai-Din and Saladin in the aITairs o f the Holy Cities of Arabia might explain the auempts of historians of the Mamluk period to trace thc establ ishment of the e unuch guardians at lhe Prop hc llomb in Madina to onc ofthcm. For this issue and its wider context, see S. Marmo n, Eunuchs mid SaC7?d BOlmdaries ;" Islamic Society, (N. Y., 1995). esp., e h. 2. 90 Maqrizi , Suluk. 97. 91 Safadi. XVI, 450- 1.
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II. The sincerity of Saladin's attempt to adopt a tax-policy dictated by the precepts of religious law is beyond our abi lity to judge. In fac t it is quite irrelevant. We should consider Saladin's poli cies in their own right and examine their aims and context. When taken on face value, Sa ladin's tax policy was highly proble matic if not a priori doomed to fai lure. There is a basic tension between the restricted scope of taxation as authorized by the law and the needs of the state. This state of affairs is illustrated by a story narrated by Abu Shama on the authority of Ibn Shaddad, who in turn heard it directly from Saladin. Saladin said that Nur aI-Din always consulted Shirkuh about his policies. Once he informed him of his intention to abolish unlawful taxes. However, Shirkuh pointed out that the army was paid from reve nues derived from these taxes. It seems that the aim of this tale was apo logetic; to demonstrate that the need to maximize the state's reve nues always clashes with legal considerations. Furthermore, the hidden intention behind the whole account is to suggest that when the aim for which the taxes are collected is a just one there is no alternative but to continue levying unauthori zt!d taxes. 92 Such a conflict of intt!reslS is nicely exemplified by the decree of 567/ 1171-1172, prohibiting the sale of vine. Howevt!r, it was not implemented in Alexandria where the sale of alcoholic beverages was widespread. Apparently, the implementation of this decree in Alexandria could have an adverse effect on th e revenues that Saladin's father was deriving from the town. Only in 577 / 11 8 1-11 82, steps were taken to control the sale and consumption of alcohol in Alexandria. In that year, 120 shops in which beer was sold were destroyed in the 1Own. 9" The improbable nature of a tax policy dictated by pietistic considerations is again demonstrated by a decree from 580/ 11 84-1 185 concerning taxation in Bahnasa. The collection of taxes unauthorized by the law (hilali) was permitted, but the farming out of taxes on the sa le of beer, vine and taverns (malahin) was prohibited.94 In this case, a distinction was drawn between taxes levied on alcohol ex pressly forbidden by law and other less outrageous forms of ill ega l taxation. 92 Saladin' statement thilt Nur al·Din always consulted Shirkllh is of course a lendetllious saying aimed al portraying Ihe Ayyubids as the rightful heirs of Nur ai-Din. For the whole account, see Abu Sham a, I. pl .1. 37. 93 Maqri1.i. Suluk, 96; Rabie, 119. 94 Maqrizi. Suluk, 110.
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CHAPTER T HREE
d. The hnpacl oj Saladin's Policies On 9 Rajab 567/ 6 March 11 72. th e restoration of Sunni Islam in Egypt was publicly celebrated. On that day a black robe of honor sen t by the Abbasid Caliph to Nur a I-Din was delivered to Sa ladin. A day laler, h e worc it in ce remon y atte nd ed by me mbe rs of the re ligious es ta blishm e nt: the chie f cad i, court witn esses, Koran reciters and preachers, and o n 8 March Saladin clad in the black robe crossed Cairo in a procession. 95 Sa lad in's cond uct set th e norm for public behavior. The preachers who delivered the friday sermons at the mosques began to wear black attire. a nd th e public was reminded that auenctan ce at Friday praye rs was obli gatory. The mosques in Fustal and Cairo were stripped of distinctive Fatimid decorations and signs such as the silve r plates that were hung over the 11lihrahs and con tained the names of the Fatimid rulers. These were very valu able and heavy artifacts made of pure si lver. 96 It seems that Saladin adopted a carefully calculated policy toward the main mosques in the capita l. In 568/ 11 72- 11 73, in th e course ofrenoV'ation work at the Ancient Mosque in Fustat, Saladin's name was inscribed over the mihrab. 97 In that way, th e religious a nd educatio nal monu ments althe heart of Fustat, which included two law co lleges and th e congregationa l mosque, became associa ted with the nam e of Saladin, th e new rule r of the country, an d Su nni Islam. O n th e o th er hand , th e Friday prayers at the Azhar mosque in Cairo were abo li she d .98 The mosq ue close ly associated with Isma'i li Isla m and the Fatimid rulers was re ndered useless and lost its re ligio us significan ce. More subtl e was Sa ladin 's poli cy towards Husayn 's shrine in Ca iro. Salad in establish ed at the shrine a group ofjurists who taught and studied Sun ni law there. 99 What Saladin did was to associate Su nn i Islam with a religious cult that h ad origin a lly had a Shi' ite character and was introd uced by the former Isma' ili rulers of the country. 100 The veneration of Husayn became a characteristic feature of the religious make-up of late 95 Maqrizi, Khitat, 111 , 174-5 (q uoting Qadi a i-radii 's Ml4tajaddidat). 96 Maqrizi , S14114k, 65-6, 67, 68; Khit at, IV. 52. 97 Maqrizi , Kllitat, rv, 13. 98 Ibid, IV, 53. 99 Ibid, II. 284. ]00 For Ibn J ubayr's description of the rituals at the Husayn's sh rine see, C. Williams, ~ Th e Qura'nic Inscripti o n on the Tabul of al-Husayn-, I5lamic Art, 11 ( 1987),3- 13, esp., 9- 10; Lev, Stale, 15 1-2.
THE CONSO LIDATIO N OF SALAD I N'S R U LE
137
me dieval Egypt and lost any Shi'ite meaning. More mysterious in its purpose but no less significant was th e resto ratio n work carri e d Out by Saladin at th e Mosqu e of th e Nilom e ter, whi ch was built by Badr al:l amali. Th e mea ning of the mosque is not enti re ly clear. Howeve r, the Nilometer had a great significa nce for th e agriculture of Egypt and se rve d as an indi ca tor of th e size of the ha rvest. Saladin followed the form er Fatimid rulers who associated themselves with the Nil e and th e rituals conn ected with the river. 101 The full impac t of Saladin·s re ligi o us poli cies is mirrored by the account of the Maghre bi trave ll er Ibn Jubayr, who visited Egypt in 1183. In the reco rd of hi s trave ls, (rihia), h e vividl y desuibes the unpl easa nt recepti o n he and th e o ther passe ngers rece ived from the custom authorities at th e port of Alexandria. Th e tax collec ted fro m th e m was :.akal and it was levied in me rchandi se and cas h mo ney. IbnJubayr c riti cizes th e custom officials for a lso collecting zakat from pilgrims wh o had brought with th e m o nly the provisions th ey needed for the journ ey to th e Ho ly Citi es. He a lso no tes oth e r irregularities in the co ll ectio n o f z.akaL. 102 On the whole . Maghreb i travellers a nd pilgrims were roughly trea ted by th e custom offic ial s in Alexandria and Ibn Jubayr does not conceal his hard fee lings about th e ordeal he and others went through. But he does not lay the blam e on Saladin. In hi s view, Saladin was not aware of what went on at th e customs office of Alexa ndria . and had he bee n aware he would have ordered th e coll ecti o n of UlNa/. in th e prope r way. In faCl, Ibn Jubayr was very enthusias ti c about eve ly thing he saw in Egypt and highly appreciative of Saladin. Hi s account provides an o pportunity to see how Saladin's re ligious poli cy was viewed by th e public, o r at le ast what im pression it left o n o ne obse rva nt visitor from a broad . Notwithsta ndin g the difTiculti es at th e port, Alexandria muc h impressed Ibn Jubayr. He ex presses his admiration for the law colleges and hos te ls (maharis) designate d for sLudenLs and pious me n from abroad who received allowances, medica l care and had access to bathh o uses. Sa ladin sh owed a pe rso nal inte rest in th e welfare of the Maghrebi pil grims (ab1la' al-sa.bil). who a rri ved in Alexandria by land after an arduous journey thro ug h the dese rt. All Magh rebi trave llers were entitl ed to a dai ly portion of bread 101 Ibn Duqmaq , IV, 115-6. For the rituals co nnected wil h the Ni le a nd the Nilometer in the Fatimid period, see Sa nders, eh. 5. csp .. 116-7. 102 Ibn J ubayr. 39-40 (Ardbic). 3 1 (English ).
138
C HAPTER THREE
and this expenditure was financed through pious endowments set up by Saladin and by the incomes derived from the levy of zakal. Sa ladin's benevolence extended to religious institutions as we ll. The mosques and preachers in Alexandria were supported by Saladin and rece ived on average five dinars per monlh.lOj Religious institutions and people ofrcligion were also massively supponed by Saladin in Cairo. Ibn Jubayr notes that the holy shrines in the capital were well maintained , the government appointed supervisors over them and paid their salaries. The LOmb ofShafi'j and the adjacent law college wiLh its bathhouses made a greal impact on Ibn Jubayr. The costs of maintaining this complex were very high and the money was controlled by al-Khabushani. 104 Another religious institUlion which was on expensive to maintain was the Ancient Mosque in Fustat. Il enjoyed a hefty daily in come of thirty dinars, derived apparently from its pious endowments, which were spent on the salaries of its large personnel of men of religion and ancillary staff. Many other religious institutions in th e cap ital such as mosques, shrines, and law colleges, as well as professors of law and a diverse population of ascetics and destitute people were supported directly by the treasury (bayt al-mal). According to Ibn Jubayr, Saladin's monthly expenditure was in excess of 2,000 dinars. 105 People arriving from the Maghreb were treated in Cairo no less well than in Alexandria. They could stay and study at the Tulunid mosque and their sojourn was financed by the auth orities. IOG Ibn Jubayr was very much impressed by Saladin's hospitals. The hospital in Cairo in cluded three separate wards: for men, women and the insane, and the same is true for the hospital in Fustat. 107 IbnJubayr's testimony on th e support given by Saladin's regime to people arriving to Egypt from the Maghreb tallies very well with other evidence for Saladin's re ligious policies. Saladin was interested in attracting people whose skills he could use for the implementation of his Sunni religious policies. The fact that they were 10! Ibid, 42-3 (Arabic), 34-5 (English). Maqrili says that in 570/ 1174- 11 75 Saladin while visiling Alexandria sct up th ere a hospital, law college and houses for Maghribi pilgrims. See, Khital , III . 380. 104 Ibn Jubayr, 46-7. 48 (Arabic). 38-9, 40 (English). ]05 Ibid, 50 (Arabic), 42 (English ). 106 Ibid, 52 (Arolbic), 44 (English ). 107 Ibid, 5 1-2 (Arabic). 434 (English ).
THE CONSOLIDATION OF SALAD I N'S RULE
139
foreigners, as expliciliy stated in the endowment document of the khanqa al-Salahiyya in Cairo, made them dependent on and loya l to Saladin. Such groups enlarged the socia l base on which th e regime relied. Saladin used th e expe rien ce he had gained in Egypt in Jerusa lem where he faced a si milar problem in re-establishing Sunni Islam and creating a religious personnel loyal LO him. lOB The extent of the support that Saladin's regime gave to people of religion can be gauged from a remark made en passant by
,
140
C H APTER T HREE
sha ping of th e re li gious c ha rac te r o f m e dieva l Egypt is rathe r modesl. First of a ll , much of the ch a rac te r of th e re li g io us life was determ in ed from below and no t from above. Seco ndly. th e process of d e- lsma li zatio n of re li gio us life in Egypt was quite advanced be fore th e a rrival of th e Ayyubids in th e couotry. Th e Ayyubids in tro d uced the law coll ege as th e ce ntral e ducati o na l a nd rel igio lls insti tu tio n in th e capi tal a nd to so me exte n t in th e rest of Egyp t, too. T he in stiLUli o ns built by th e Ayyubid rul e rs e njoyed the richest pio us e ndowme n ts. With som e exceptio ns, such as Qadi al-Fadil's law college, th e law co ll eges established by Ayyubid e mirs a nd a dmini strato rs in Fu sta t-Ca iro were m od est a nd less s ig nifi c31ll. 11O No twithsta ndin g th e build in g ac ti vity durin g th e Ayyubid age, th e grea t prolife rati o n ofl aw colleges and Sufi khanqas a nd zawiyas in Ca iro took pl ace o nly in the Mam luk pe ri od . Sa ladin 's re ligio us po li cies be tray great und ersta ndin g of th e publi c a nd po litical as pects of re ligio n . He beca me associated wi th th e o ldes t Muslim in stitutio n in Egyp t- th e An cie nt Mosque in Fusta t-and thro ugh th e Mosqu e o f the Nil o m e te r wi th the lifegivin g Nile . He imrodu ced Sunni educati o n al a nd re li gious in stituti o n s a nd was instrume nta l in divestin g the cult o f Husayn of its Shi
C HAPTER FOUR
THE ARMY a. 71te Siz.e and Militwy Composition oj lite Army
I. The army of the late Fatimid period was destroyed and dispersed by Saladin, and replaced by a new milita ry force. Two soc io-m ilitary groups su ffe red mostly from Saladin's policy: the Blacks and the Armenians. In th e Fatimid army, the Blac ks had served as infamry and Saladin found Iiltl e use for th e m in the n ew a rm y he c rea te d in Egypt. A racial bias against the Blacks may also have played a role in Saladin's treatment of them. The Armenians posed a diffcrcm probl e m altogether. First of all , the Armenian troops who were in the service of th e Fatimids had been Christians. On the other hand , the Armenians cou ld serve as both cava lry and infantry. This characteristi c trait made th em highly altractive as military man-powe r as is testifi ed by their massive em ployme nt in the Byzantin e army. Howeve r , in Qadi al-Fadil's letter to Baghdad from 1174, th e destruc tion of both the Blacks and Armenians is given as one of Saladin's achievements. Qadi al-Fadil desc ribes Saladin's actions in religious terms as a war against infidel s (the Armenians ) and pagans (the Blacks). In the course of th e Battle of the Blacks many Blacks were killed and the rest we re driven out of Cairo and disperse d. Saladin's policy toward the Blacks was resolute: he ordered his military governors (wula. al-harb) to fight and kill them wherever they found them.' The core of Saladin's new army in Egypt was th e expeditionary force di spa tched to Egypt by Nur ai-Din in 1169. The question of who took the initiative for di spatching this force to Egypt is presented in different ways in the accounts of ' Imad ai-Din and Ibn al-Athir. ' Imad ai-Din says that the initiative was that of Shirkuh, who urged Nur ai-Din to begin military action following the invasion of Egypt by the Crusaders. Nur ai-Din responded positively and financed the expedition to the tune of 200,000 dinars, but the recruitment of troops was done by Shirkuh. ' Imad ai-Din testifies that he was prese nt at th e military review h eld by Shirkuh, I Anonymous, Buston ai-Jami', (ed) CI. Cahen BED, 7-8( 1937-1938), 39; Maqrizi, II/j'm., III , 3 13-4. The term wulo al-haTh, which appears in the Bustan, belongs to Fatimid military no menclature.
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who enlisted over 5,000 unemployed horsemen. These troops were augmented by a force of 2,000 cavalry assigned by Nur ai-Din for this campaign. He also dispatched with Shirkuh a group of his emirs, amongst whom were two of his military slaves (mamalik) while the others were men of his inn er circle (khawwasL apparemly. free-born peoplc.2 Ibn a l-Athir's account of these events is different. He presents the campaign of 1169 as Nur al-Din's initiative asserting that Shirkuh went to Egypt with the army of Nur aJ-Din (af.'asakir al-NuriY)·a),3 But in an passing remark, in his earlier work Bahir, he admits that Shirkuh recruited Turkmen for this campaign." Ibn al-Athir describes in detail the resources a ll ocated by Nul' ai-Din for the 1169 campaign. Shirkuh was given 200,000 dinars as well as clothing, pack-animals, weapons and other supplies and equipment. Nur ai-Din chose 2,000 cavalry from his 'askar and , according to the later work Kamil, he also recruited 6,000 Turkmen, paying twenty dinars as a special bonus to each horsemen among Shirkuh's troops. S It is not possible to decide who took the initiative for the 1169 campaign, but the socio-military terms e mployed by both authors are com mon and well understood within the broader context of Islami c military history. In the wake of the Seljukid invasion of the Middle East in the second half of the eleventh century, the Turkmen were widely dispersed in the region. They constituted a reservo ir of military man-power ready for employment, and they were a natural choice for recruitment for the 1169 campaign against Egypt. The existence of military slaves and the dual composition ofNur aI-Din's military elite (free-born people and slaves) are typicaI and long-standi ng features that need no special comment. The review Card) held by Shirkuh on the eve of his campaign to Egypt was standard practice for the reviewing and inspection of troops. The only term which poses some difficulty is the word 'ashar, which refers to the 2,000 cava lry assigned by Nur aI-Din for this camAI-Bundari, 75-6. Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, XI, 220; al-Bahir, 137. 4 Al-Bahir, 141. S Ibn aI-Athir, al-Kamil, XI, 222-3; al-Bahir, 139. Ibn aI-Athir's version is adopted by Abu Shama , who reports it as his own independent account. See, I, pl,2, 392. The differences between Ibn al-Athir's Bahir, less hostile to Saladin, and Kamil are interesting. The remark that Shirkuh himself recruited most of the troops for the campaig n, th e 5,000-6,000 Turkmen , was expunged from the accou nt in Kamil. 2
!
TI-IE ARMY
143
paign. Cibb understands thi s term as meani n g a regu lar regimelll ohhe army.6 R. Stephen Humphreys says that in the Ayyubid peliod this term d e no ted th e stand in g army ofa certain principality. But it \va.5 also used in referring to the military forces of specifi c Ayyubid rule rs.' In our context 'askar refers to tJ·oops, who formed part of Nur al-Din 's own regiments i.e. the military forces maintain ed an d recruited by Nur ai-Din himself. It is cl ea r from these re ports th at Saladin esta blish ed and conso lidated hi s rul e in Egypt with the help of a very small army. In order to deal with th e many inte rnal and ex ternal threats that Saladin faced in Egypt he had to e nla rge his army. Howeve r, the build-up of Salad in 's milita ry forces remains en igmatic. That such process took place in a short period of tim e is indi ca ted by accounts which describe th e stre ngth of Salad in 's army at the beginnin g of his ind epe nden t rule in Egyp t. The information at ou r disposal is highly aUlhoritaLive, being derived by Maqrizi from Qadi al-Fad il's Mutajaddidat. O n 8 Muharram 567/ 11 September 1171 , Salad in held a review of th e old a nd n ew armies. The arm y was made up of 167 tulhs of which 147 were present at th e review. 7,000 Bedouin of th e Judh am tribe also showed up , but Saladin enro ll ed only 1,300 of th e m for service. Most of th e troops belonged to the lawashi category while th e res t were qaraghulams. Qadi al-Fadil explains the term s he uses. It see ms that for him as well as for th e o ther Egyptian ad mini strators the military n omenclature of the eas te rn Islami c world that was introduced to Egypt with the arriva l of Saladin was a n ew one. And h e cl a rifi es for th e benefit of hi s reade rs the te rms h e employs. Qadi al-Fadil says that lulh means in the Turkish (Chuzz) la nguage a military fo rm ation whose stre ngth ca n vary from 70 to 100 to up to 200 cavalrymen. However, h e says that the cavalry fo rce that paraded at th e review was 14 ,000 stron g. This leaves th e actual size of a lulb rather vague. The co mmandin g officer of the lulb was an emir who, as a mark of his rank , had a standard and a trumpet. Tawashi were highly paid troo ps. Th eir remunerati on ranged from 700-1,000 up to 1,200 dinars. A lawashi so ldie r had at hi s disposal h o rses, pack animals a nd a ghulmn (a slave or serva nt ) who ca rri ed his weapo ns. 8 Qadi 6 See, h is "The Armies or Saladin Cahiers d'histoire f.gyplimne, ( 1951); reprin ted in Sludit!$ on t/ie Civiiiz.alion of Isiam, (Boston. 1962),74. 7 See, his ~The Emergence o f the Mamluk Ar m y~ , SI, 45 ( 1977), 77-9. 8 Maqrizi, Khilal, I, 139; Illi'(u , III , 327; cf: O. Ayalon. ~Stud i es o n the StrucH
,
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a l-Fadil 's description ta lli es we ll with William of Tyre 's acco unt of Saladin 's army allhe bauJe of Mont Gisard (25 November, 1177) whi ch e nd ed in a d ebacle for the Muslims. The overall stre ngth of Sa ladin's army which in vaded southern Pa lestine on that occasio n was 26,000 me n . But most of th ese troops we re li g htly-arm ed, m oun ted on cam e ls and pack-animals. Only 8,000 were tawashi. wh o are hi ghly regarded by William of Tyre , a nd the rest were qaraghulams. 1,000 elite troops served as Saladin 's bodygua rd ; Illey. like Salad in him self, wo re a distinctive yellow silk costume over their armor. William of Tyre alludes lO halqa whose ex istence at suc h an early d ate is a lso atlested to by Arabic sources. 9 Quite obvious ly th e terms tawashi and qaraghulams refer to t roops of different qualities. Th e distinction between the tw·o. a nd superiority of the tawashi, ,vas based o n the quality of their arms and a nn or. It see ms that th e lawaslti possessed a fu ll se t of arms a nd armor, an d th erefore needed a baggage train a nd servants. II. The Selju kid in vas ion of the Muslim wo rl d en ha nced tlle position of m ounted arch ers, who were th e main military specialists of th e Isla mic armi es of th e twelfth ce ntury. No ne th e less, co ntingents of heavy cavalry we re a lso employed. The presence of such troops had already been noted by the Frankish c h roniclers of the first Crusade. 1O This shou ld not surprise us too muc h . It is important to bear in mind David Nicoll e's observatio n made in the introductio n to his monumental AnTiS and Annor of lhe Crusading Em 1050-1350. He writes: "one po int whic h wi ll , I h ope, become clear is that no single culture had a monopoly of technological ture of the Mamluk Arm y~, I1S0AS, 15(1953). 465-6. The te rm lawnshi is part or the milital)' nomenclature or the Ayyubid age-not or the Fatimid. The rererences or Ibn al-Ath ir and Maqrizi to a certain Fatim id officer rro m 496/ 11021103 as S:.'d al-D:.wla al-Tawashi is appuently mistaken. Ibn Muyassar gives his name as Sa'd al-Dawla al-Qawwasi. See, 74. For the reference LO Ibn al-Alhir, see ediLOr's note c o n p. 74. For Maqrizi. see IlIi'at, III , 32. 9 William or Tyre, II. 430-1; Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 554 (q uoting Ibn Abi Tayy, who says that in 569/ 1173-1174 Saladin gave to his brother ror an expedition to Yemen 1,000 cavalry including troops rrom his halqa); cf: H. A. R. Gibb, The Life of Saladin, (Oxrord, 1973),21, n. 3; Ayalon, KStudies~, XV( 1953), 448. A rererence to haLqa rrom the reign of Nur ai-Di n h as been brought 10 light by An neMarie Edde. The sou rce is Ibn Abi Tayy quoted by Ibn Fu rat. Sec, her ~Quel qu es institution s militaires ayyoub ides~, in Egypl alld S),ria, 163-4. 10 Lev, Slale, 98, n.20; J. France, Vielory in the Easl. A Militmy History of the First CnlSade, (Cambridge, 1994), 149,359-60.
THE A RMY
14S
innova tion o r even of le adership in fas hi o n ". 11 We should give credence to th e descriptions of the Fra nki sh chronicl e rs. William of Tyre's desc ription of the Mu slim army at the batli e of Babayn is in the sam e ve in . He says that Shi rkuh's arm y was 12,000 me n strong. but he distingui shes between 9,000 troo ps who "wore the breast plate and h e lm e t and th e ot he r 3,000 who used o nly bows and arrows". These two types ofu-oops co nstituted th e core ofShirkuh 's army. wh ic h was a lso augmented by Bedouin levies. The Be douin fought in their traditi onal way e mployin g on ly the lance. Speaking of th e Crusader a rm y. Will iam of Tyre e mploys th e sa me differemiation as he d oes whe n referring to the Muslim force. He distinguishes between 347 knights (i.e. full y a rm ed and armored warri ors), a nd Turco po les-lightly armed cavalry.12 Muslim hi slOrians , like William of Tyre, a re ca reful to distin g ui sh between th ese two types of C hristi an cavalry. ' Im ad ai-D in , fo r instance, ex plains that th e cavalry force that landed from th e No rm an larrada ships o n the beach es o f Alexandria in 11 74 was co mposed of 1,000 knights a nd 500 Turcopoles. 13 Usa ma ibn Munqidh re fe rs to Turcopoles as th e archers of the Franks.14 Th e Turcopoles were the offspring of marriages betwee n Turks and Chri stia n women and Muslim con verts to Christianity. Th e existence of such a sociomilitary group re OecLS a wide r and more co mpl ex issue: th e trea tment and absorp ti on of fore ign a nd conque re d populatio n by both the C hristian and Muslim sta les o r the Eastern Me diterra nea n regio n in m edieval tim es. 15 Willi a m of Tyre's description of Muslim troops as clad in armo r is co rroborated by Arabic so urces. The most illumin atin g exa mpl e is the description of the battl e fought between Dirgham I] Published N. Y. , 1988. See, 1. x. The pictorial evidence collected and a nalyzed by Nicolle shows that armored cavalry existed in the Euras ian Steppes, the earliest allcstiltion being rrom sixth-seventh centuries. Sce, I, 4. para. IA-E, II , 630; I. 7. para. 19A-H, II ,634; I, 7. pard. 20; II. 634; I. 16, para. 45A-F, 46 and 47, II , 639; 1, 17, para. 48, 11 , 640; 1, 170. para. 440, II , 721. 12 See, II , 33 1. I!I AI-Bundari. 174. 14 See, 50-1 (Ara hi c), 79 (Engli sh ). I" The research litcrature dcaling with the Turcopolcs is quite extensive. For [ IVO recent contributions. sec B. Z. Kedar, Crusad, and Mission. (N. j. , [984 ). 76; A. C. C, Savvides, ~ Lat c Byza rlline and Weste rn Historiographers on Turkish Mercenaries in G ree k and La lin Arm ies: the Turcopoles/ Tou rkopouloi-, in The Making of 8),umtine HUlOry. Studies dedica ted 1,0 Do nald M. Nicol, (cds) R. Beaton and C. Ro ucchc (Aldcrs hot. 1993), 122-37.
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and the co mbin ed force of Shawa r and Shirkuh. At the o utset of th e ballle, the so ldiers had to lake off their armor which became unbearable warm in the heat. The sold iers stored their a rmor in a small tents under the care of their servanLS. 16 In itself, this account sheds no direct light on how the tawashi was armed and fought. David Ayalan says that the tawashi of the Ayyubid period was a free-born warrior and h e equates him with the non-Mamluk horsemen who were found in great numbers in the Mamluk armies toward the end of the Mamluk period. 17 In mili tary terms (Le. armament and training) and in hi g h socia-mi lita ry status the Ayyubid tawashi can be compared to the Mamluk Jaris trained in furusiyya. By his training the Mamluk fans was not merely a mounted archer. He was a many·sided warrior able to employ in addition to a bow also a lance a nd a sword . Indirect suppo rt fo r this state· ment is suppli ed by Maqrizi. He says that in 577/1 18 1·11 82. the construction of the fortress (bury) of Suis was completed, and it was manned with twenty fursan (pl. of faris). Their task was to guard the road to Upper Egypt whic h was used in t he trade in a lum with the Franks (meaning the Crusaders or Europeans in general) .18 Certainly, these fursan were knights and not mounted a rch ers. Maqrizi 's use of fursan is anachronistic, or a de liberate substiw· tion of fans for tawashi in order to be understood by his readers. How the term tawashi came to denote an eunuch in Mamluk times is unclear. Ayalon quotes Ibn Khaldun who says that tawashi in the terminology oftll e Eastern Islamic lands means e Ul1u ch .19 But this eq uation re fl ects the lin gu istic usage of the Mamluk times. In the Ayyubid period when a certain tawashi happened to be an eunuch the sources take the trouble to sta te this congrui ty expli. citly.20 Abu Sham a, I, pl,2, 4 19--20. 17 See, ~S tudies~, XV(1953), 465-6. 18 Maqrizi , Sululc, 95. For the training of the Mamluk horseman, see H . Rabie, ~The Training of the Mam lllk Faris-, in War, Technology and Socuty in the Middlt East, (cds) V.J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London, 1975)' 15g.{)3. For a discussion of the mining of alum a nd its trade, see Rabie, 82-5; TSllgitaka, 67-8. 19 See, MO n the Eunuchs in Islam- , jSAJ, 1 ( 1979), 79. 20 For example, Ibn al-MuqafTa', says that Saladin appointed Qaraq llsh over the Fatimid palaces and he d escri bes him as a: "tawashi who was also an eunuch-. See, History of the Patriarchs of th e Egyptian Church, III , part, 2, 66 (Arabic). Further evide nce is adduced by Anne-Marie Edde who, in a private communication of 13 April 1995, drew my attention to the case of the lawashi Shams ai-Din Sawab al-'Adili quoting Ibn Wasil, V, 34 and Ibn Shaddad, AI-A ' laq al-Khalira (Dimashq), 16
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Wh e n Usama ibn Munqidh 's memo ires a re exa mi ned from th e po int o f view of mil ita ry hi sto ry o n e fac t cl ea rly emerges. Usama and the mil itary soc iety of Shayzar, his prin cipali ty, fo ught as heavy cavalry e mployi ng the la nce. They fought
(ed ) S. Da ha n (Da mascus, 1956).238. and 208. n.5. In the Ayyubid period . some o f th e e mirs refe rre d to in th e sou rces as tawashi we re given large iqta's and h ad LO provide up to 250 horesmen as mil itary levies LO th ei r Sultan. see. Tsug itaka , 50. It appears fro m Maq rizi's refere nces to the Maml u k pe riod th at the eq uation of tawashi with e u n uc h was no t self-evid en t. See, Khitat, IV, 130, 13 1. 21 Usama ibn Munqidh . 40-2. 48-5 1, 57-8, 6 1-2. 67-70. 76-9 86, 90- 1. (Arab ic), 64-5. 96 (Eng lish ). l!2 Willia m of Tyre, 11 , 171 ; France, 14 7-8. 23 Abu Sha ma. 1. pt.2, 460.
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armies of these rulers were more diversified and also included heavy cavalry at least in moderate numbers. The other point revealed by the review of 1171, is the employment by Saladin of the remnants of the Fatimid army. The presence, in Fustat, of organized socio-military groups of the former Fatimid army such as Blacks and Masamida-Berbers from the western Sudan-is attested to until as late as 587/119 1-1192. 24 During Fatirnid limes, both groups fought as infantry and there is no reason to think thalthis had changed. 25 The continuities in employment over two decades of some elements of the former Fatimid armed forces by Saladin should not be over emphasized. The main characteristic of Saladin's army is a complete rupture with Fatimid military tradition a nd organization. It seems that the dale of Rajab 577/ November-December 118 ] can be considered as a watershed in the military history of Egypt under Saladin. Maqrizi quotes two fragments from Qadi al-Fadil's Mutajaddidat; the first refers to Saladin 's examination of the iqla' system and the second refers to the strength ofthe army. The first parts makes little sense. It seems th at Maqrizi distorted or abbreviated Qadi al-Fad il's account in a way that its essence is lost. It is said that the estimated revenues ('ibm) of the iqta's were registered as well as the actual incomes, above or beyond the estimated ones. It appears that Saladin increased the iqta's to those who had merited it. The second part of the account is straightforward: it says that the overall strength of the army was 8,640 cavalry, and its officer corps included 111 emirs. The army was made up of two types of troops: tawashi and qaraghulam. The strength of these two contingents was 6,976 and 1,553 respective ly (i.e. slightly below the figure of 8,640). The total expenditure on the army reached about 3,670,500 dinars. In addition there were Bedouin levies paid through the iqta' system, and other troops. Among these were "Egyptian"-i.e. former Fatimid-soldiers to whom certain spe2. Ibn al·Dawadari , Kan% al-Durar wa1ami' al-Churar, (ed) S. 'Abd a i-Farah 'Ashur (Cairo, 1972), VI I, 109-10. Ibn al-Muqaffa' says that Blacks (sudan) were among the troops of the garrison of Acre captured by the Crusaders following the fall of the town. In fact he says that among the prisoners taken were a lso Kurds, Ghuzz and Bedouin of the Kinaniyya tribe. See, III , pt.2, 91 (Arabic, in the text referring to the Kinaniyya the letter ta' should be amended to nun.), 155 (English ). For the military role of the Ki naniyya in the Fatimid period and during Saladi n 's time , see Lev, Stale, 103, n.34, 126-7. 2!t Nasir-i Khusrau, 49.
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cific so urces of income were assigned. Apparemly, th ese troops were engaged as mercenaries in times o f need. 26 This accoum indi cates th at expend iture o n the army took th e li o n 's share of th e state's resources. In 569/ 11 73-11 74, Saladin explained to Nur alDin's em issary, al-Qaysarani, who came to Egypt reques tin g that Salad in present an account of in co me d eri ved from Egypt, tha t the hi gh-rankin g dign itaries of th e sta te became used to a high sta ndard o f li vin g. Th ey took comrol of pl aces (mean in g a ppare ntly their iqla's) and it would be impossible to d islod ge th em. 27 We mu SI bea r in mind that it was in Salad in 's interest to prese nt th e revenues of Egypt as low and hi s military ex pe nditure as hi gh. There is a wide gap between the fi gure given as the pay of th e tawashi troo per (see th e account of the review of 1171 also based o l1lh c authodty of Qadi al-Fadil's MUlajaddidat) a nd lhe total spent o n th e army in 11 8 1. The pay of the tawashi must have been mu ch below the sum of 700-1 ,200 dinars. In fact, the total expend iture o n the army give n for 1 18 1 is excessive. In sharp contraSlto these exorb ita nt fi gures sta nds th e report that every tawash; who was dispa tched o n th e expediti o n to Yemen (57 7/ 11 81-1182) received ten dinars o nl y.28 This was ce rtainly a special bonus paid in add ition to th e regul ar income thallawashi troops derived from their iqla's. None th eless, thi s modest sum speaks for itself. On the other hand , th e numbe rs of troops qu oted fo r 11 8 1 are in lin e with Maqri zi's observa tion that during Saladin 's period th ere we re in Egypt only 12,000 cavalry. This number was reduced to 8,500 cavalry at th e time of Saladin's son, ai-Malik al-'Aziz 'U thman. Maqrizi says that the re were horse me n who had from te n to twenty to up to one hundred alba'. Therefore, when the troops paraded o utside Cairo, th eir numbers were much higher than 8,500.29 The alba' in this account mean the servants and the slaves of the lawash; whose participati o n in parades infl ated the overall nu mbe r of troops. Also oth er figures quoted for the stre ngth of the Ayyubid armies during th e rule of Saladin and his successors indicate that it was a small force made up of cava lry on ly.so 2'6 Maqrizi , Khitat , I, 139; cf: Gibb, Tlu Life of Saladin, 3 1, n.4. Maqrizi's account has been translated into English and discussed by Tsugitaka . See, 6 1-2. !7 Maqrizi. Sulult, 73. 211 Ibid, 99. 29 Maqrizi , Khilat, I, 152. !II Ibn al-MuqafTa' says lhe Saladi n 's army was 10,000 men strong a nd con·
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These figures can be compared to those quoted for the strength of the army in the late Fatimid period. Maqrizi quotes an account written by Ibn Mammali, who says that once he was asked by Qadi al-Fadil about the number of troops in the time of the vizier TaJaT ibn Ruzzik. Ibn Mammati was in charge of the Office of the Army and, according to his statement, the register of the department of the 'ard (review and in spection) included the names of 40,000 cavalry and 30,000 black (sudan) infantry. 31 Elsewhere Maqrizi quotes that same account but gives different figures: 40,000 cavalry, 36,000 infantry and 10,000 marines (muqatiLa, fighters) on board ten gaJleys.32 The existence of a special Marine Corps is not attested to by other sources and the number of 1,000 marines on ten ga ll eys is unrealistic. However, Maqrizi a lso quotes an another set of figures from a different source: 'Uthman ibn Ibrahim al-Nabu lusi (d. 1261). the well-known author of several administrative works. He says that when Shirkuh was given 1,000 cavalry to help Shawar regain power in Egypt, he complained that his force was too small to face the Fatimid army which included 10,000 cavalry and 40,000 black slave troops ('abd). Shirkuh a lso made an a llusion to 10,000 marines and iqta' troops. 33 The relative strengths of cavalry to infantry referred to by al-Nabulusi seems more reasonable than the high numbers of cavalry quoted by Maqrizi on the authority of Ibn Mammati.
b. The Ethnic Composition of lhe Army I. Maqrizi is very expli cit about the ethnic compositi on of the new army created by Saladin in Egypt; it was made up of Kurds and Turks (atrak).34 The army with whi ch Saladin estab lish ed his rule in Egypt was certa inly composed of these two ethni c groups. The sisted of tawashi, qaraghulams and mamluks whi le the army of al-'Adil was made up of 10,000 tawashi. See, III , 110, 131 (Arabic ), 163,221 ( English) . l owe these references to the kindness of Anne-Marie Edde. Maqrizi says that in 590/ 119311 94, the Sultan al-'Aziz 'U thman left Cairo for Syria with 27 emirs and 2,000 cavalry and 1,000 troops of the ha{qa leaving be hi nd 13 emirs and 700 cavalry o nly. See, Suluil, 150, '1 Maqrizi , Khilat, I, 138. '2 Ibid, I, 152. Ibid, I , 138-9. Ibid, I, 152.
'3 '4
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numerical stre ngth of eac h group is unknown . but it see ms that the largest cOOli ngelll consisted of Turk me n (turkuman). Th e term lurkwnan refers to no madic Turkmen tribes, whi ch became wide ly dispe rsed throughout th e Midd le East and Asia Minor after th e Seljukid invas io n of these regio ns in the secon d half of th e eleve nth centu ry. Th e place of the Turkmen tribes within the b roade r matrix of Middle Eastern soc iety a nd politics is not easily defined. On th e one h and . th ey fe nded for themse lves and posed a threat eve n to firml y established politi ca l e nti ties in th e region. On th e other hand , th ey co nstituted a pool of military manpower ready to take service wi th rul ers and states und er vari o us kinds of agreement. For exam pl e, Turkm e n we re e mpl oyed by Chri sti an Armeni an rulers as well as by Saladin in Syria. They fo ught against th e ann ies of Third Crusaders whe n these were cross in g As ia Min or. 35 The Seljukid rulers employed Turkmen on a large sca le in their armies, and th ey eve n served with the BY-lan ti nes as mercenaries. 36 A systemati c study of the relatio ns between various nomadic gro ups and states in th e medieval Musli m Middle East is still need ed. Sibt inJ awzi's Mir 'al ai-Zaman is a treasure hou se of info rmatio n on this to pi c. but it has not bee n studied yet from thi s point of view. Non ethel ess, informa tio n is abundam in other sources as wel l. For in stan ce, William of Tyre reCOllnLS two iOlerestin g e pisodes about th e relations betwee n Turkm e n a nd th e Crusade r Kin gdom of J e rusalem. Th e first co nce rn s a surpri se but abortive attack o n J e ru sa le m by th e Turkmen and the oth e r tells of th e breach of an agreement with the Turkmen by the Franks. Bedouin and Turkmen were pe rmitted by th e king ofJ erusalem to stay in the Banyas district to pasture their horses. No neth eless, they were attacked and the ir h e rds were looted . Many of th e m were killed a nd the rest fled th e area. 37 ~ Abu Shama. (Beirut). II , 154, 155. 156. For the impact of Turkmen nomads o n Asia Minor, see S. Vryonis, The Declirll! oJ Mediroal Hellmism in Asia Minor, (Be rkeley, 1971 ), 169-94. ~ A. Bo mbaci, "The Arm y of the Se ljuks of R u m ~, Annali lnstituto Oril!11tale di Nn.poli, 38( 1978),346-8, 354. The employment of merce nary troops was widespread and quite often did n ot respect co nressional boundaries. See, ]. Ric ha rd , ~A n Accou nt or th e Battle or Hiltin Referring to Lhe Frankish Me rce na ries in O riental Moslem Stales ft , Speculum, 27(1952), 171-5; Y. Lev, ftAr my, Regime and Society in Fatimid Eb'Yp t, 358-487/ 969-I094 ft , IjMES, 19( 1987), 338. For Muslim North Mrica. sec ]. F. P. Ho p kins, M edieval Muslim Governml!11/ ill Barbary, ( London , 1958), 73. S7 See, II , 215-7, 255-6.
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The fact that Saladin's army in Egypt cons isted of Turkmen is attested to by no less an authority than Ibn Mammati. In his book on the Egyptian adm inistration during the Fatimid and Ayyubid periods, he says that the army included Turks (atrak), Kurds and Turkmen. Ibn Mammati's observation is a casual remark appearin g in the secti on of his work dealing with iqla'.38 Given Ibn Mammati's position and knowledge his remark must be regarded as sign ificant. Turks and Turkmen belong, of course, to the same ethnic group. Thus we have to ask what Ibn Mammati m eant when he refers Turks and Turkmen as separate groups. One way of understanding this accoun t is to regard th e term Turks to m ean Turkish military slaves (mamluks) an d freedmen in contrast to Turkish free-born socio-mi litary groups such as the Turkmen. A clear-cut conclusion is hampered by the habilUal use of the term atrak in a generic way meaning troops of Turkish origin in generaL For example, Abu Shama, in his own ind ependent statement, says that Qaraqush, the military slave (ghulam) of Taqi ai-Din, conquered the coast of North Africa with a group of Turks and Bedouin.39 In thi s account, the term turk (si ng. of atrak) is used in a loose way, and there is no reason to assume that Turkish military slaves or freedmen are being referred to. The same holds for a passing reference to a contingent of800 Turkish troops from Egypt, which appears in the annals for the year 578/ 11 82-11 83. 40 On the other hand , our sources distinguish clearly between Kurds and Turks. Thus, Ibn Abi Tayy is very precise in id entifyin g the ethn ic origin of the emir who asked for the town of Ibrim in Nubia as an iqla': he was a Kurd named Ibrahi m. His request was granted and a group of unemployed Kurds was sent to join him.41 The same concern with preCise ethnic identifications is reOected by a short report fro m 58 1/ 11 85- 11 86, which says that Kurds were granted iqta's in territories beyond the Euphrates. 42 The Kurds in Saladin's army kept their tribal organization and names of Kurdish tribal groups occasionally are me nti oned in the sources. If our understanding of Ibn Mammati 's en passant remark is correct, then S8 Ibn Mammal! , Kilab al-Qawanin al-Dawallin, (ed) A. S. Al!ya (Cairo, 1943), 369. Y.I Sec, I, pl,2, 547-8. 40 Abu Shama, (Beirul), II , 38. 41 Abu Sham a, 1, pt,2 , 532-3. 42 Abu Sharna, (Beirut ), II , 62.
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we must wo nde r wha t was the re lative sign ifi ca nce of the each group me nti on ed by him . Thi s ques ti on has bee n th e subj ec t of studies by Ayal o n . Humphreys a nd most rece ntly by Ann e-Mari e Edde. Ayalon , who has dealt with it ex te nsive ly, reached the conclusion that unde r Saladin a nd th e Ayyubids th e Turks played a more signifi cant role than th e Kurds, a nd Turkish milita ry slaves occupi e d a ce ntral pla ce in th e armies o f all of the Ayyubid rul e rs.43 In his study, Ayal o n makes a n ex te nsive use of Ibn a l-Athir and th e info rmatio n d e rived from him is hi ghly regarde d . Ibn a l-Athir is ce rtainly a con ve ni e nt so urce to use, but his wrilin gs can not be simply rega rde d as a re posito ry o f stra ightfon \lard , re li a bl e a nd eas il y ava ilabl e data . Ibn a l-Athi r must be used criti call y and with cau tion . He h as hi s d e fi cie n cies. His acco unt of th e Fatimid pe ri od re flects a n a n ti-Isma< ili bi as, a nd his account of Sa lad in is n o less probl ematic. An exa min ati o n of two acco unts o f Ibn a l-Athir used by Ayalo n exem plifies this point. Th e pu rport of both accoun ts is tha l rule in Egypt passed from th e Fatimids LO th e Turks. Ayalo n understands th ese accoun ts and o th e r data as testifyin g to th e p red om in an ce of th e Turks in th e Ayyubid pe ri od .44 BUL, wh e n Ibn a l-A thi r spea ks abo ut th e pass ing of th e rul e from th e Fa timids to th e T urks, h e means Nur ai-Din (himse lf a Turk ) nOt Saladin a nd th e Ayyubids. It must be re me mbe red th a t Saladin conque red Egyp t whil e servin g Nur alOin. Certai nly, Ibn al-Ath ir regards a nd portrays Saladin as Nur al-Din 's li e ute n ant in Egypt. T he secon d passage used by Ayalo n in suppo rt o f hi s view a bo ut th e pre d omin a nce of th e T urks in th e Ayyubid pe riod is n o less p robl e matic. T he passage in questio n is quo te d by Ab u Sha ma o n th e au th o rity of Ibn Abi Tayy. It co nta in s a slory told to Sa ladin 's b rothe r, Tura nsh ah, by Qadi a lJ a li s who was a cl ose compa nio n of a l-
Ibid, pt. lI, &..7.
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the wrilings of 15ma' ili authors. It was used as a literary device for a retrospective justification of policies and events. In fact, a quite similar story is to ld regarding the absorption of the first Turkish troops imo the FaLimid army in the second half of the temh century in Egypt. 46 The only thing that can be concluded from this story is thal Qadi al:Jalis entertained his new masters with tales derived from Fatimid (Isma'jli) lore. The question of the ethnic composition of Sa ladin's army is a difficult one and the sources are largely reticent about it. In Usama ibn Munqidh's autobiography references to the ethnic origin of individuals and groups are common. But other criteria for expressing collcClive identity are no less important. For example, people are referred to according to a geogrdphical criterion as Khur.lsa~ nians without any indication of their ethnic origin. Mi li tary spe~ cialization serves as a powerful criterion for group identification. Knights are referred to asfursan, and their ethnic identity, be they Kurds or Arabs, is of secondary imporlance only. In the same vein Usama speaks of a group of Armenian archers stressing, in this case, the congruity between ethnic identity and military specialization. The Khurasanians mentioned by him are a lways sappers. Humphreys, who deals with this issue in a more dispas~ sionate way than Ayalon, reaches the conclusion that the Kurds were a minority in the Ayyubid army.47 Given the present stage of our knowledge this conclusion must be accepted. Nonetheless, it is more an educated guess from the sources than a firmly docu~ mented conclusion. II. AyaJon's opinion regarding the relative importance of military slaves under Saladin and the Ayyubids has evolved with time. In his early writings Ayalon expressed the view that mamluks were not, until the ru le of Salih Ayyub, a decisive factor in the Ayyubid period. 48 However, his later writings are permeated by a belief in the linear development of mamluk institutions from the eighth century to the time of the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt and Syria (13th·15th centuries). According to Ayalon, during these cent~· ries both the institution of military slavery and the military role 46 Y. Lev, ~ Falimid Policy Toward Damascus (358/ 968-386/ 996). Mililary, Political and Social AspeclSft,jSAI, 111 (1981-1982),1 75. 47 Usama ibn Munqidh, 67, 73, 83, 84, 85, 95-6,106, 128 (Arabic), 96,1023, 124.5, 136, 150 (English); Humphreys. MThe Emergence, 45(1977), 89. 43 See, ~Sludies", 465.
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of the T urks beca me more a nd more pred om inant in th e Muslim wo rld a nd th e Ayyubid pe ri od is no exce pti o n .49 Ayalo n 's views canno t be accepte d witho ut reservatio ns. First of a ll , o ur knowled ge of th e in stitu tio n o f mili tary slavery pri or to th e es ta blishme nt of th e Ma mluk Sul ta na te is ve ry limi ted . Th e most impo rtant tex t is by Nizam al-Mulk. In h is view, th e successful trainin g o f mili tary slaves req uires disci plin e, a lo ng pe ri od of tim e a nd slow pro moti o n .5O But in reality these rul es we re no t a lways obse rved . Compro mises were mad e with regard to th e le ngth of the training pe ri od a nd its ri go r. 51 Seco ndl y. mi litary slavery was no t a unifo rm in stituti o n th a t d evelo ped in a sim ple lin ea r ma nn e r. It had a checke red history and assumed many diffe re nt forms. Th us. in some cases (Aghl abid Tuni sia a nd pre-Fatimi d a nd Fatimid Egypt) , thi s instituti o n whi ch is lIsua ll y associa te d with Turks a nd mounted arche rs was used to proc ure a nd train Blacks which fought as in fa ntry. Surp risingly, th e o nl y co nte mporary twe lfth-centu ry d escription of th e instituti o n of military slavery is p rovided by William ofTyre. Alth o ugh thi s tex t re ma in s n eglec ted , hi s o bse rva tio ns are most valua bl e. Acco rdin g to Willi am of T yre , th e in stil Ulion of mili tary slavery utili zed three sources of ma npowe r: youn g priso ne rs-ofwa r, slaves bo ugh t in th e slave-ma rkets a nd th e offs prin g of slavemo th e rs. As an o utsid er, William of Tyre had no kn owle dge o f Ih e lives of slaves durin g th e pe riod o f th e ir trainin g. He says o nly th at th ey we re t rtline d in the a rt of war and adult mamluks rece ived re mun er.nio n a nd large possessio ns, acco rding to th e ir me rits. Th e milita ry role of th e mamluks was to pro tec t th e ir maste r du rin g ballie. Vi cto ry, says Wi ll ia m o f T yre , d e p e nde d la rgely o n th e m ilita ry pe rforman ce of th e ?namiuks. 52 Wi ll ia m ofTyres's account of Muslim military slavery be trays his inte rest in Arabic a nd knowled ge of Islam a nd wh at he says is co rro bo ra te d by Arabi c so urces. Fo r instan ce, the incorpora tion of yo ung pri so ne rs-of-war in th e in stitution of military slave ry is me ntioned in relation to the Fa timid pe riod wh ile the refe re nce to th e large possessio ns give n to mili49 See, his ~ From Ayyubids to Mam luks". IlEl , (198 1) , 44; "T he Auxi liary Forces o f thc Mam lu k Su ltan atc", Der Islam, 65( 1988). 37. !IO Nizam a l·Mu lk, Tlu: Book of Governmenl or Illlies for Kings, tr,lIlslatcd into English by H. Oa rke ( London , 1960), 106-8. Sl Lev, State, 10 1·2, S2 See, II , 43 1.
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C HAPTER FO U R
La ry slaves can be unde rstood as meanin g iqla<, Th e compa ri son be twee n th e tex t of Niza m al-Mulk a nd Willi am o f T yre is very revealing. Nizam a l-Mulk explains the prin ciples accordin g to which th e in stitu tio n of military slavery was supposed to o pe rate whil e William of T yre d esnibes the way it ac tua ll y did o pe ra te. In ma ny ways, th e pe l-iod o f Saladin 's rule was n ot co nducive to a OOUl-ishin g of th e in stituti on o f military slavery. So me of th e conditi o ns necessa ry fo r iLS prope r fun ctionin g Stic h as re liable so urCeS fo r th e suppl y o f slaves and economi c prospe rity we re lackin g. Sa ladin him self spe nt most of his lim e o n th e battl efi e ld , and hi s pe rsona l in vo lve me nt in the supervi sion and bre eding of hi s mamluks could not have bee n great. In fa ct, the locatio n in Da masc us, Cairo o r e lsewh e re of th e installation s assoc iate d with th e 11ltl11lltt k in stitution-su ch as th e training ba rracks (lntjra) re main s unkn o wn . Il see ms that o nly th e halqa can be desc ribe d with a ny confide nce as a unit composed of Saladin 's military slaves. Th e halqa serve d as Sal adin 's bod yguard and its existe nce is a ttested to fro m a very earl y pe riod of Sa ladin 's rule ( 1174 and 1177). Th e compos iti o n of th e halqa, at that tim e, is unknown . On e of th e first co mm a nde rs of the halqa was a fo rm e r Fa timid e unuc h , Masrur, who a ttain ed th e ra nk (or titl e) o f e mir. 53 Th e halqa was Saladin 's private co rps. Fo r instan ce, durin g th e protracted battle fo r Acre, th e halqa stayed with Saladin durin g th e win te r m o n ths wh e n o th e r co ntinge n ts h ad re turn e d with th e ir leade rs to th e ir h o m e te rrito ri es. Wh e n th e arm y took up ba ttl e fo rm a tio n , th e halqa occupie d the centre from wh ic h usuall y Sa ladin co mma nded th e a rm y. However . o n oth e r occas io ns, th e halqa was treated like an y o th e r military uni t. It perfo rm ed the task of advan ce-guard (yazk ) in rotati o n ,\li th o the r units of the army.54 In any case, explicit re fe rences to a sizeable bod y (seve ral hundreds at least) of Saladin 's milita ry slaves co m e fro m a very late stage in his rule; th e sie ge of Jaffa (end o f July 11 92). Th e ir perfo rma n ce was poo r and their be havio r aro used th e a nge r of th e Kurds.55 Undo ubte dly, through~,
Maq rizi , Khital , IV. 2 16. Ibn Shaddad , 147, 152, 155. The halqa is rcfe n'cd to as the khawwas aisultan, meanin g chosen special troops, see ' InHid a i-Din , Fa/h, 324. For the halqa of Sa ladin a nd o ther Ayyubid rule rs, sce Eddc, ~ QlI c lq ue'sM, 16 1·8, esp. , 166. ~!> Lyons a nd J ac kso n, 356, 358 . Military slaves (m(ImaliJ!) are refe rred lO several tim es in Ibn MuqafTa"s dcscri pLion of th e bailie fo r Ac re, see 86, 90- 1, 94 (Arabic), 146, 154 (Engli sh). At o nc point the military slaves a re referred to as al-mamalik al-Salahiyya wa- 'l-Asadi)')'a and at another as fll-lMmolih al-Asadryya. Li ttle, if a nYlhing, can be deduced fro m these a ll usions. !'>4
THE ARMY
157
out his rule Saladin, in spite of the unpropiti o lls conditions , cu i· tiva ted a force of mili tary slaves. In 585/ 11 89-1 190, for instance, the d eath of a commander of his military slaves is recorded. 56 These military slaves apparently co nstituted th e corps of Nasiriyya. In 587/ 1191 - 11 92, a person refe rred to as na'lib (m eaning head/ commande r) of ai-jandariy)'a ai·Nasiriy)'a escaped from the siege of Acre together with a numbe r of veteran emirs of the Asadiyya corps. Th e NasiriY)'(l are referred to as milit...'lry slaves (mamalik) of Saladin. 57 A rivalry between the Asad i emirs, originally the military slaves ofShirkuh, and the new emerging corps of the Nasiriyya existed and was ex pl o ited by al-'Adil fo ll owing the d ea th of Saladin. 58 In his disc ussion of the supposed predominance of Turkish lIuzmluks in Saladin 's lime a nd the Ayyubid peli od in general, Ayalon regards references in the so urces to Turks as mea nin g m(lmluks. But, as is born e out by Ibn Mammati's statement, this is nOt so. There we re Turkish mililary slaves as we ll as Turkish fr ee-born troops-Turkmen (Chuzz) . Hlllllphreys conclusion that the mi litary society of Saladin's period and that of th e Ayyubids in genera l was co mposed largely of free-born socio-m ili tary groups is fu lly justified. 59 Important light is shed on the issue at question by Edde's rece nt study of the em irs of AJ e ppo be tween 11 83- 1260 based on a sample of 122 biographies. First of all , her study gives attention to the social co mplexities of the issue under discussion. Ethni c diffe re nces be tween Kurds a nd Turks with the co ncomitant social tension s and strife betw·een th ese two gro ups were a permanenL feawre during th e period discussed by Eddc. However, o n certain occasions, th e behavior of the em irs was influenced by politi cal co nside ration s rather than by ethni c loyalti es. Amon g th e Turkish em irs we must distingui sh clearly be tween milita ry slaves a nd freedmen and free-born peopl e. Furthe rmore , the class of Abu Sh .ulla, ( Be irut ). II , 149. ' Imad ai-Din. Falh, 344; Abu Shama, ( Bcinll ), lI , 187. For the termjandar in the meaning of gua rd , see C I. Cahcn, Pre-Ol/oman Turkry. (Londo n, 1968), 223, 231; Edde, ~Quclqu es~, 172. 174; S. Elbehcil)'. L~s illslitulio1l$ tie l'Elfjpte a u Innps de aYYllbides, vol. I. L 'o rganisation de ['annee el Its institutions miiitaires, Ph . D. dissertation , (Ull i\'CI"siIY of Paris IV, 197 1), 26-45; R:lbbal . Th e Ciladel. 102. !oS Abu Shama, (Be irut), II, 229. For o ther military slaves and em irs of Shi rkuh , sec Maqrizi , Kh ital, III, 61, 130; an d for milital), slaves and e mirs o f Salad ill, see, 111 , 15 1. ~ Hum phreys. ~E m e rge n c e~, 45( 1977), 89·92. !06
~7
158
CHAPTER FOUR
emirs raised through the institution of military slavery was not composed exclusively of Turks. There were also Armenian emirs of slave origin.5O Eddc's conclusions are not directly applicable to Saladin's period, bUllhey do show that the issue is a complex one and shou ld not be reduced to a dichotomy of Turks versus Kurds.
C.
The Administration oj the Army
In the Fatimid period the Office of the Army and Salaries was responsible for the administration of the army. N; its title suggeslS, this office was in charge of two quite separate spheres of responsibilities; the army and the payment of salari es to all other employees of the Slale from the vizier at the lOp down to the servants of the palace. The main admi ni strative task of this office in as far as the army was concerned was to maintain and update the central military register. It included information about the overall number of troops, their equipment and welfare .61 Mallers concern in g iqla' were the responsibility of other offices. The allocatio n of the grants o f iqta' was the responsibility of the Office of the Chamber\Counci l while the Office of the Iqta' supervised the actual administration of the fiefs. The Office of the Chamber was th e most important Fatimid office: it kept records and data on every aspect of Slate activity.62 Th e most important change introduced in th e period of Saladin was the assignment of all agricu ltural land in Egypt as iqta' for the army. Maqrizi does not say that Salad in was th e first to introduce military iqla' to Egypt; he on ly says that Salad in expanded the system. The existe nce of military iqta' in Fatimid Egypt is well known and allested to by a variety of sources. 63 The consequences 60 See, her '"Kurdes e l Turcs in War lind SOCUI,. 225-36. 61 Ibn Tuwayr, Nm.hal al-Muqialo,n fi AJrhbar al·Dawialayn, (ed) A. F. Sayyid (Be irut, 1992), 82-5. 62 Ibid, 74-5, 86. M Maqrizi , Kh ilat, I, 156. Rabie has lnmslaled Maqrizi"s statement into English but he dnlw an incorrect con clusion by saying: ~ Maqrizi impli es thai it was Saladin who introduced the mi litary iqla' system to Egypt~. See, 26. The Fatimid military iqla' is discussed by Cl. Cahen in his ~ L 'administration financiere de l'armee falimide d'apres a l .Makh7.llmi ~, JESNO , 15 ( 1972), 163-82. Furth e r evid e n ce is adduced by Lev, Stale, 125-7. Some key textS have been tnlllsiated into English M
,
Tin:
ARMY
159
of this change for the life or the Egyptian rellah must not be exaggerated. It cou ld hardly have worsened his lot and there is no connection between military iqta' and slave armies. 64 The Ayyubid system of mili tary iqta' in Egypt has been studied by Cahen, Hassanien Rabie, Richard S. Cooper and more recently Michael Brett and Sato Tsugitaka, so that on ly a short summary of its main features is needed here. In COlllrast to the Fatimid period, in Ayyubid times the holder of the iqta' (muqtll') did not pay the tithe. The revenues of the iqta' were calcu lated according to th e ann ual average income ('ibm) generated by the fief, and paid in a mo netary unit of account (dinar jayshi). The e mirs , accordin g to th e value or their iqta', were obliged to mainta in a number o f soldi ers. 55 In the Zengid iqta' system, as practiced in Nur ai-Di n 's Syria, wide-ranging administrative authority was e ntrusted to th e iqta' holder. This characteristic feature W.:l.S preserved under the Ayyubids as we ll. For exa mpl e, in an acco unt from 572/1176- 11 77, ' Im ad ai-Di n describes Shams ai-Din ibn 'Abd ai-Malik as the man in charge (mulawaLli) or Ba' iabakk who h eld it as an iqta'. He was also the manage r or its affairs and the 11tutahakkim of its finances. 66 According to a report of Maqrizi rrom 577/ 11 81- 11 82, an em ir who received the Fayyum as iqla' al-khassa was also appointed as the governor or the region. 67 The term mulawalli had also a military connotaLion meaning a regional military commander. 68 In the Ayyub id system or iqla' in Egypt, grants of iqla' al-khassa constituted a special category. The holders of this type of iqta' were mostly memby M. Brett. See, his -The Origins of the Mam lu k Military System in the Fatimid Period-, in Egypl and Syria. 39-53. The Ayyubid ;qla' is discussed in great detail by Tsugitaka. See. Ch . 3. 64 K. Morimoto bclic\'cs that the supposed introduction of milital1' ;(I'a' to Egypt by Saladin reduccd the free fellah of the Fatirnid period to a se rf. See. his Th~ Fucal Admin;,slralioll of Eg)'PI i'l Ih~ Early Mamie pmod. ( Kyo to. 198 1), 262. Some connection be tween mi lital1' iqlll' and milital1' slavery is im pl ied by Brett in his, ~The Origins-. Howe\'er. black and whi te military slaves and installations for training military slaves existed in Fatimid Egypt pri o r to the emergence of the military iq/a' at th e beginning of t.he elc\'e nth ce ntuiY. Nor did the spread of the miiilal1' iqla' under Saladin herald an increased use of military slaves. 65 IQbie, 33, 35, 36-7, 39; R. S. Coope r. Ibn Mmnma/is Rll/esJor Minislers: Trans{alion wilh Commenlary oJlhe Qawanin al-Dawfwi'l, Ph. D. dissertation, (University of Cali forn ia , Be rekely, 1973), 708. 66 Abu Sham a, I , pt,2, 669; Tsugitllka. 55. 67 Maqrizi. Suluk. 95. For iqta' al-khajja, see Tsugitaka. 49, 68-9. 68 For instance, in 574/ 11 78- 1179, the term ml/lall/alii is used when referring to the commander of the army of Ham'l . see Abu Sh,una. (Beirut) , II , 5.
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C H APT E R FOU R
be rs of Saladin 's fa mily and th ey we re a lso e m itl ed to coHCel n onagri cultu ra l taxes. In a ny case, with th e full mili tari za tio n of th e iqta' in Egypt, the sa lary d e partme nt was se pa rated from the Office of th e Army whi c h assum ed res pon sibility fo r the iqta' as well as o th e r aspects co nce rnin g the army.69 Sa ladin himse lf was th e ho lde r of a n iqta', He maillla in ed his regul ar troops ('askar) and military slaves from reve n~ es d erived fro m th ese la nds. Th e relia n ce on iqla' as th e c hief method for paying th e a rmy exe mp lifi es the confed e ra te na ture of Sa ladin 's state. It is lfue that Saladin , as th e Sultan and Comma nde r in Chief, h ad full control of th e troo ps b roughl lO ca mpa igns and wa rs by o th e r hold e rs o f iqla' a mo n g th e peo ple of lh e mi litary d assme mbe rs o f th e Ayyubid famil y a nd e mirs. Howeve r, Sa la din ex pe rie nced ma ny diffi culti es in kee pin g his army ca mpaignin g during lhe win ler. Usua lly al lh e e nd of lh e campa ignin g season Saladin gramed lhe em irs pe nnissio n lO leave (dust ur).70 O nly unde r excep lio na l ci rcumsla n ces, suc h as h eavy pressure by Sal adin o r th e hope for subslan lia l reward, woul d have a llowed lh e campaignin g season to be eX le nd ed into th e winle r. 69 Rabie, 39, 42. 70 Ibn Shaddad , 11 8, and 60. 84, 9'1, 96, 146, 15 1-2,204-5, 2 10.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE NAVY a. The Fatimid Naval Inherilance
According LO various estimates, in the second half of the twelfth century the Fatimid navy comprised between 75 or 80, or eve n 100 galleys, and twenty transport vessels of two types: hatnmalal and musallahal. How many of these ships were operalional is unknown. Following the co nquest of Bilbays by the Crusaders, a Fatimid flotilla of twenty gall eys and ten harraqal/harmriq (ships from which Creek fire was hurled) is mentioned as operating on the Nile. J However, if we take our sources at face value, then at the time that Saladin became Fatimid vizier no navy existed in Egypt. The ships of the Fatimid navy had bee n destroyed in November 1168, when Fustat was set on fire by Shawar. However, it is quite possible that so me ships of the former Fatimid navy survived the burning of Fustat intact, and there are no indica tions that the naval workshop at the palace or the arsenal at Maqs were damaged by the fire. Although Fustat was an inland town it served as the main base for the Fatimid navy. The capital was well connec ted through a network of inland waterw'ays with Alexandria and Oamietta. Therefore the navy, which was protected in Fustat from the enemy raids to which coastal LOwns were ex posed, cou ld reac h the Mediterranean quite easily. Traditionally in Muslim Egypt, the main arsenals had been located in Fustat and later in Cairo. In 54/673-674, the Arab conquerors of Egypt built an arsenal on Jazira , the island on the Nile lying between Fusta t andJiza, on th e west bank of th e river. Following the Fatimid conquest of Egypt, a new arsenal was set up at Maqs, the port which served Cairo-the town built by the new rulers for themselves. 2 For most of the Fatimid period the arsenal on Jazira was used for cere mon ial purposes connected with the navy. From the second decade of the twelfth century the construction of warsh ips was moved to the arsenal in l Lev, Slate, 115. 2 Maqrizi quoles two aCCOlllll.'i, the first one by Ibn Abi TaY)' who credil.'i a lMu'izz with the building of the arsenal, and the second by Musabbihi, who says that it was established by al-'Aziz, a l-Mu' izz's successor and the second F'atimid ruler of Egypt. Sec, Kllital. III , 196,317.
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C HAPTER .' IV E
Fustat. 3 At Maqs, in additio n to wa rships, th e governme nt also built t\vo types o f ship inte nd ed fo r use on th e Nil e. On e typ e was des igned fo r shipping fir ewood and gra in fro m th e grain-producin g regio ns in Uppe r a nd Lowe r Egypt to th e state gra na ri es in th e capita l. Th e othe r type was a processiona l barge inte nde d fo r th e use o f th e Fa timid rul e r and oth e r sta te dignilaries.4 Boa ts for use on the Nile we re al so built by the pri vate sector in oth e r places in Egypl.5 An othe r importa nt naval installati on in th e capital was the workshop for ma nufacturin g e quipme nt fo r the fle e t which was adj acent to the complex of Fa tirnid pa laces in Ca iro. 6 We a re poorly info rm ed a bout the existe nce and ac tivities of a rse nals in Fa timid te rritories o utside Egypl. The Persia n travelle r, Nasir-i Khusrau , who visited Egypt and Fatimid Pal estin e in th e la te) 040 's, me ntio ns Ha ifa as a place whe re seagoing ships of th e j udi type we re buill. 7 Pe rh aps, at th ose times, Mount Cannel was still cove red by forests , o th e twise th e timber could have bee n procured fro m th e re latively close forests of the Le ba no n . Ibn alTuwayr (d. 122 0) a nd a utho rs o f th e Mamluk pe riod (which undo ubte dl y re ly o n him ), in th e ir ove rvi e ws o f Fatimid n aval histo ry, say th a t squa drons of th e Fatimid navy an chore d in Alexa ndria a nd Da mie tta and in both ports th e re we re active arse nals. s Thus it is qui te possible tha t in 11 68 some ships o f th e Fa timid navy we re stati o ned in both ports and thus were save d from th e uph eava ls th a t be fe ll th e capita l. Durin g th e whole pe riod of
S Ibn Muyassar, 93; Maq ri1.i, Khital, III , 320. ~ Ibn Fura t, IV. pt, I, 149. T he boats designated for the use o f the Fatimid
rule r a nd state dign itaries a re refe rred to as 'ushari a nd day mas (pI. dawamis). Two descri p tio ns of Fa tim id roya l boaLS a re availa ble; o n e by Nasir-i Kh usrau (see, 5 1) a nd a noth e r by 'Abd ai-latif a i-Bag hdadi (begin n ing of the 13th centu ry) in his The Ea.slern Key, facsi m ilc edition with Engli sh tra nsla tio n by K. H. Za nd a nd J. A. and I. E. Vid ean (London, 1964), 187-8. !I Nasir-i Khusr.llI, 40. 6 Ibn a l-Tuwayr, 14 1-2; Maq ri1.i, Khilal, II , 3 11 ; cf: Ra b ie, 123. 7 Nas ir-i Khusrau, 19. According to H. Kindermann , ships o f this type had o ne dec k. See, Schiffim ArabiscM1l, (Zwickau, 1934), 16. 8 Ibn al-T uwayr, 95; Ib n Mammati, 340; Q alqash andi, 11 1,5 19; Maq rizi, Khitat, III , 3 13. M. Lom bard 's statem ent (in his £.spaces eI ri.uaux du Haut Moyen Age, [ Paris, 19 72), I l l) abou lthe ex istence o f e ig hl arse n a ls in m edieval Egypt m us t be qualified . Firs t of all , one must disting uish be lwee n small sh ipya rds, suc h as Sali hi)'}'a in wh ich boats for sail ing lhe N ile were b uilt, a nd lhe ma in arsena ls in the capital. Secondly, the th ree a rse na ls in th e capi ta l mc ntion ed by Lo mbard we re ope ra ting in d ilTe rc nl pe rio d s and no t sim ultan eously.
THE NAVV
163
Saladin's rul e in Egypt th e cap ital continu ed to serve as the mai n base for the navy.9
b. Saladin and the I!.gyplian Mediterranean Towns
From the o utset of Saladin 's rul e in Egypt. th e defe nce of th e Medite rra nean coas t posed a n ac ute pro blem. The coast was d evas tated by the wars associated with the Crusades, but Damietta and Alexandria we re still viab le lawns that had to be protected. Both towns were attacked by Ch ristian forc es during th e ea rly years o f Saladin's ru le in Egypt. On 27 October 11 69, a Byza ntin e flee t in conjunction with land fo rces o f the Crusade r Kingdom ofJerusale m conve rged on Damie tta. According to William of Tyre. th e Byzantin e fl eet included 150 ga ll eys and 60 spec ial ships adapted for use in the amphibi ous lan ding of cava lry on beach es (Arabic: tarida pI. lara'id, tarrada; Latin: pI. imide). Th e war flee t was accompani ed by ten to twenty heavy transpo rt ships, dromone5,ioaded with siege e ngin es and suppli es. T he besieging forces e mployed against Damietta a va riety of siege e ngi n es, but th e siege fa il ed due to a delay in military actions again st the town following the landing, and th e d ee p m istrust betwee n th e Byza ntin es and th e Crusade rs whi ch cam e o ut into th e o pen durin g the siege. Severe winter storms aggravated th e situation of the besieging forces, tilting th e bal an ce of powe r o n th e battleground in favo r of the Muslims. Qadi al-Fadi l and Ibn Shaddad have exaggerated in their accounts the stre n gth of th e Byza ntin e fl eet. No neth eless, th e expedition against Damietta demonstrated the vast naval resources tha t Byza ntium co mmanded. lo Th e in creasing size and capacity of ships built in th e nve lfth ce ntury and the wide use of ships from whic h cavalry could landed 9 Maqrizi, Suluh, 118. Ibn Shaddad , 4 1-2; Abu Shama, I, pl,2 , 457, 458-9 (quoting Ibn Shaddad and ' Imad ai-Di n); Will iam o r Tyre, 11 , 361-9. For the Byzan tine perspective or these events, and a description orthe Hyzantine neet, see Choniates, 191-6. The word drom071 signi fi ed a Hyzantine war ga lley, but il acquired a wide r use meaning baltleship. See, Frederick M. Hocke r, ~ Lat e Roman, Byzantine, and Islamic Galleys and Fl eets~;Jo hn H. Pryor, ~ From Dro nlOn LO Galea: Mediterranean Biremc Calleys AD 500-1300~, both in Th t Age offht: Galley, (cd) R. Gardine r (London , 1995),94-5; 102, 103, respectively. In the account by Chon iatcs dromo/! sta nds fo r a heavy trans pOfl sh ip. 10
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CHAPTER FIV ..:
on beaches posed a serious threallo the rulers of Egypt who tried LO protect their coastal towns. 1I The obvious response was to improve the fortifications of the LOwns on the Mediterranean li ttoral. In Sha'ban 566/April-May 1171, Saladin ordered the strengthening of the fortifications of Alexandria.] 2 Twelfth-century Alexandria was situated several kilometers from the Nile, and an elaborate system of waler channe ls was built to provide the town with dl'inking water. It h ad two ports which were located along a narrow stretch of land defended on its seaward-side by a tower,l3 We do not know how far the works ordered in 566/1 170 had been completed at the time of the Sicilian attack on the LOwn. On 26 Ohu ' I-Hijja 569/27 July 1174, the pon of Alexandria was attacked by the Normans of Sicily. Sicilian galleys slipped imo the port under oar-power. The aim of the attack was to gain control of the pon and forestall a possible intervention by the Egyptian navy against the landing of cava lry on the beaches. The Sici lian fleet included 200 galleys and 36 tarrada ships from which 1,500 cavalry were disembarked. Supplies, siege engines and troops were carried on 46 transport sh ips. Arabic sources put the overall strength of the force that besieged Alexandria at 50,000 men , among whom were 30,000 soldiers, the rest being sai lors (each galley had a crew of 150), operators of siege engines a nd others. Although these numbers are inflated, the Sicilian fleet was undoubtedly a large one and brought a great quantity of equipment. The besieging forces built siege engines and bombarded the town with catapu lts whi ch shot blac k stones brought from Sicily especia lly for that purpose. However, the defenders in a sllccessful sally from the beleaguered town destroyed the siege engines, thus dashing the hopes of the Normans for a quick victory. Eventually, on 1 Muharram 570/2 August 1174, the siege was discontinued. 14 II The data about the coastal LOwns at the time of Saladin are derived from the works of the late Maqrizi. Unfortunately, geographers more conlempornry with the events such as YaquI and Idrisi do nOt supply information of any use for the present study. The hisLOry of trnn sponatio n of horses in the Mediterrnnean for mi lilary purposes in this period is examined by J. H. Pryor. See, ~The Transportation of Horses by Sea During the Era of the Crusades: Eight Century LO 1285 A. D.-, MM, 68(1982), 9- 19. 12 AJ-Bundari, 109; Abu Shama, I, pl ,2, 486 (quoting ' Imad ai-Din). I' William ofTyre, II , 336. For med ieval Alexandria, see M. Rodziewicz, "Alexandria and District of Mareotis·, GraecfJ-Arabica, 11 ( 1983), 205-6, 208. 14 AI-Bundari. 170-1 (quoting Qadi al-Fadil"s letle r to Damascus) ; Abu Shama,
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T he fa ilure o f th e No rma ns in Alexa ndria di d no t deter th e m from allac ki ng o th er costa l towns in Egyp t. Th e ir prefe rred tar· ge t was th e town of T innis wh ich sufre red repeated attacks. In 548/ 11 53-- 11 54, th e fi rs t recorded attack o n th e town took place. T inn is was a ttacked agai n in 549/ 11 54- 11 55, in 57 1/ 11 75· 1176, a nd in 573/ 1177· 11 78 th e town was co nque re d by a Sicili a n squadro n , com posed of fo rty gall eys. T h e raid ers set th e town o n fire a nd too k muc h booty a nd ma ny prison e rs. Th e p rese nce o f wa rsh ips in T innis was o f littl e h e lp to th e defende rs of th e town . At th e ti me of th e Norm a n attack, the comman de r of the Oee t was away fro m hi s shi ps a nd fo un d him se lf fi gh tin g th e a ttac ke rs o n la nd . In 576/ 11 80-11 8 I, a navtl.1 raid on T innis W'as launched from Ascalo n indi catin g th at it was a n initia ti ve of th e Crusade rs. Bu t the Cru· sade r Kin gd om ofJ e rusale m was short of naval resou rces, a nd th e a ttackin g sq uad ro n was com posed of o nl y te n sh ips fro m whi ch Gree k fi re was hurle d . It e nded in fai lure. 15 T h e need to co n tinue fortifi ca ti on wo rk in th e coastal towns was ve ry o bvio us to Sa ladin . Suc h work was ca rried o ut in 572/ 11 7&- 11 77 at Al exa ndri a a nd la te r in 577/ 11 8 1· I 182 a t Da mi e Lla a nd T inni s.16 In Ti n nis, a ci tade l was bu ill a nd th e wa lls we re im· proved . Howeve r, in sharp con trast to th e su pposed ex te n t of th ese works, t he sum spe nl is surp ri sin gly low: 3,000 dinars on ly.17 Ap· 1,1'[,2,598.600 (q uoting ' Imad al·Din a n d Qadi at-Fad il's ahovc·mentioned lc[ter). The information su p plied by Arabic sources is confirmed by the anonymous Old Frenc h translation of William of Tyre known as L 'estoire de Eraclu empereur et la conqlltsle de fa lerre d'Outremer. Howeve r, [he d etails which ap pear in Emcles are not derh'ed from William of T yrc. On th is subject, see J o h n H. 1'1) ·or. ~The Eracles a nd \Vittiam of T yre: An Interim Report~, in The Horns of Hallin, (cd) 8. Z. Kedar Uerllsalem, 1992),270-94, esp., 290. l owe this rcference [0 the kind ness of Pryor. Historians of Norma n Sicily see the attack on Alexandria in thc context of cooperation betwee n the Norma ns a nd the Crusaders in conju nction with a n al leged plot in Egypt to overthrow Saladin. This perception of these even ts is dete rmined by the tende n tious reports or Qadi al-Fadil q uoted by latter historians. These rragments of Arabic sources arc we ll known in their French translation, which have appea red in the volume o f Orie n tal historians of RHC. Sec, D. Abulafia, ~The Norman Kingdo m of Africa and the Norman Expedi lion .~ to Majorca a nd the Muslim Medi te rranean\ Anglo NOn/ian Studies, VII. reprintcd in h is. Italy, Sicily alld the Mediterralltall 1100-1400, (London, 1987),45. esp., 11. 107; D. Malthew, The Nonnall Kingdom of Sicily, (Cambridge, 1993),279. 15 Ibn al-Qalan isi, 331; Maq rizi, Khital, I, 29 1-2; I tti'm" II I, 207; cf: A. S. Ehren kreutz, "The Place or Saladin in the Naval H istory of the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle AgesM,jAOS 75( 1955), 104·5. 16 Abu Shama, I, 1'[,2, 689 (q uoting ' Imad ai-Din). 17 Maqrizi, Khilli/. I, 292. T he town ofTinn is was built on an island in a large
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parenLly. the town was no longer viable a nd the repeated naval attacks contributed tQwal-d its decline. Even the local Bedouins
became a danger. They harassed ships on the Lake ofTinnis and attempts to fight them with sh ips hurling Greek fire failed. A decade later, in 588/ 11 92·1 193. Tinnis was officially abandoned. Its popula tio n was evacuated to Damietta and it ceased to exist as a town, becoming a military outpost only. IS In contrast with Tinnis, vast sums of money were spent in 577/ 11 81-11 82 on the fortification of Damielta. It seems that th e town had recovered from the epidemics that had swept through it in 545-546/ 11 50-11 52. 19 The walls of Damielta were improved and a garrison was stationed in two defensive lowers between whic h a heavy chain was in stall ed. The towers and the chain were designed to prevent the entrance of enemy ships from the sea to the mouth of the Nile. The town was surrounded b y a trench, and the orchards in its vicinity were destroyed. Apparently, the a im was to prevent a potential enemy from using th e trees as a sou rce of timber for the construction of siege engines, as happened during the siege of Alexandria in 1167 by Shawar and the Crusaders. 20 H owever, the su m s quoted as the total expenditure spent on these works-one million dinan-seems too high and quite improbable. 21
c. Tlte Creation of lite Office of lite Navy In 572/1 176-11 77, Saladin went on a tour to Damietta and Alexandria. While visiting Darnietta, h e inspected 1,000 prisoners captured on a naval raid. 22 This is the first report of any n ava l activity by the Egyptian fl eet dating from th e time of Saladin's rul e in Egypt. The origin of the ships that were involved in this raid lagoon, which received water from the Nile and the sea. See, Yaqut, Mu'jam alBuidan, (Cairo, 1906), I, 4 19-22. On the other side of this lagoon, known as Buhayrat Tinnis, lay m e town of Damietta. See, G. Cornu, AIla.s du monde amboislamique a l'ipoque dassique, (Leiden, 1985), map X. 18 Maqrizi , Suiuk, 95, 98; Khilal, I, 347. 19 Abu Sham a, I , pt,], 207 (quOling Jbn al-Qilla n isi). W Maqrizi , Khilal , 1,347. 21 Ibid, I, 347; Suluk, 96-7, 98-9. Yaqut explains that the tOWIl of Damietta was spread out between the Nile and the sea. Th e Ni le entered the sea south of the town, and the mouth of the ri ver was protected by two towers with a chain bet.....ee n the m. See, Buidan, IV, 85. 22 Al-Bundari, 241; Abu Shama, 'Uyun, II , 36.
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is obscure. Were they remnants of the fonner Fatimid navy or new ships which had already been constructed during the rule of Saladin? According to ' Im ad ai-D in , Saladin during his vis it to AJexandria ordered the construction of warsh ips {la' mir al-ustul ).2. . Genera lly authors such as Qadi al-Fadil and ' Imad ai-Din say very littl e about naval affairs. Surprisingly, Ibn Abi Tayy is a source of detailed information on Saladin's naval policy in 572 / 1176-1177. However, the evaluati on of his report is problematic. He is the last historian whom one might expect to be interested in the naval history of Egypt, and his information about Fatimid naval history is particularly unreliable. Whatever the case, Ibn Abi Tayy says that the fleet in Alexandria had fallen into disrepair and that Salad in ordered the building of new warsh ips. It would seem that Salad in had a coherent naval policy and even paid attention to the details of his naval program. For example, he took measures to ensure a supply of ti mber and the recruitment of sk ill ed craftsmen n eeded for the construction of the ships. The manpower for the navy was mobilized from rural areas , and local authorities were instructed to cooperate. One of Saladin 's oHicers was appointed as commander of the fleet and was assigned a special iqta'. Once built, the ships were armed, equipped and manned. However, Saladin adopted a very cautious policy; the ships thal became operational were ordered to remain in the port. 24 Both the progress and the full extent of Saladin 's naval program are vague. Certainly one of the major problems was the procurement of timber. The Fatimid-A)'yubid administrator, Ibn Mammati. deplores the destruction of the forests of Uppe r Egypt wh ich were assigned for construction of the sh ips. He mentions that these forests were carefully managed but local governors and fief-holders overexploi ted them. 25 In contrast to Ibn Abi Tayy, who reports on Saladin's naval policy in his record of the year 572/ 1176-1177, Maqrizi refers to this under the years 577 / 11 81-1182 and 587/ 1191-1192. According to him , the Office of the Navy was set up in 577/ 11 8 1-1182. If this was indeed so, it means that in that year Saladin adopted an ove rall
23 Abu Sham a, I, pt.2. 689 (quoting ' Imad ai-Din ) . 24 Abu Sham a, I, pt,2, 689·90 (quoting Ibn Abi Tayy); 'll)' un, II , 32. 25 For English translatio n of Ibn Mamrnati ·s text, see Cooper, 288-9; Lombard. 130-1.
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naval policy aimed at strengthening both the coastal towns and the navy. Several sources of revenue were all ocated for the needs of the Office of the Navy. Among these were income derived from the region of the Fayyum and the mining of natron (which at that time amounted to 8,000 dinars), and the endowment (habs) of Juyushi. 26 This foundation was a pious endowment set up by Badr al·Jamali in favor of his descendants and included a number of rural properties. In order to divert the in comes generated by the habs al:Juyushi for the usc of the navy the approval of the jurists was sought. In fact, this step completed the dismemberment of the Fatimid Slate and the appropriation of the wealth orits former ruling class for the benefit of the new elite and the needs of the Ayyubid regime. 27 In 587/ 11 9 1· 11 92, responsibility for naval af· fa irs was entrusted to al·
d. Saladin's Navy in Combat Successful naval raids are the sole aspect of maritime history reasonably well attested by the sources. The interest of historians in naval warfare sprang from propagandistic concerns. Successful raids by the Egyptian navy on Christian shipping in the Eastern Medi· te rranean were presented as the e mbodiment of the Holy War. 26 Maqrizi, Suluk, 97. '17 Ibn Mammati, 336-9, esp., 339, followed by Maqrizi , Khilat, 111 ,210,2 11 , 315; cf: Gibb, Tht Lift of Saladin, 20; Rabie, 86. 28 Maqrizi, Suiuk, 134-5; Khilat, IV, 205-6.
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Ind eed. some o f these raids resulLed in great numbers of captives crea ting an impression of sp ectacu lar vic tories ove r the enemy. Th e idellliftcation of naval activity with Holy War goes back to th e Fatimid period . Authors of the Fatimid-Ayyubid period. in thei r d escripti o ns of the Fatimid sta te . id entify th e Office of the Holy War with the Office of th e Navy.29 In 572 / I 176- 1177, as memioned earl ier, Saladin while in Damiella in spec ted prisoners ca ptured by th e navy. As a matter of fact, in that year th e fl eets of bo th Damiella and Alexandria were e ngaged in naval raids .30 But successful nava l raids were few and spo radic. In 575/ 1 ]79-] 180, th e Egyptian navy achi eved an impressive success. It laun ch ed a raid o n Acre. a bustling town with a busy port, described as the Co nstantin ople of the Crusaders. Qadi al-Fadil claims that a numbe r of Chri stian ships were sei zed. 3 1 In the sa me yea r also two other Chri stian ships refe rred to as balsha were captured and 1,000 prison ers were brought to Egypt. 32 The term bats/ta is usuall y und e rstood as mea nin g a big ship with two masts. In 577/ 11 8 1-1182, a Chri stian batsha whi ch had bee n on he r way to th e Leva nt was wrecked off Dami etta. According to Arabi c so urces, it carri ed 2,500 passe nge rs of wh om 1,690 were ca ptured alive. But these ligures see ms to be hi ghly exaggerated. 33 In o ther cases th e numbe r of peo ple ca ptured was mu ch lowe r. In 578/ 11 82- 1183. the Eb'Yptian n avy seized two Chri stia n ships. On th e lirst occasion 400 peopl e were captured on board a batsJw which was sai lin g fro m Consta ntin o ple. 34 The seco nd incident in volved a balslw which was on he r way to Acre ca rryin g timbe r fo r th e co nstruction o f ga lleys and a team of shipwri ghts of whom 70 peop le we re ta ke n prlso ne r.35 This re29 Ibn Tuwayr, 94-5, followed by Ibn Fu nH, IV, pt , l, 149. ~ Abu Shama. I, pt,2, 692-3 (quoting ' Imad a i-Din). SI Abu Shllma , ( Beirut). II , 14. !2 Al-I\undari. 330. In his B(lI'q while describi ng Ihese evc n ts, ' Imad a i-Din makes a n unclear all usion to a naval raid coln'ied out by the Eg)'ptian fleet against Ihe Christian population of an unspecified island. See, MS Oxrord, Bruce II , f,136 B. :» Ibn Wasi l, II , 114; ~bqri7.i, SIIIIIIr, 101. My reservation follows a com ment made by Pryor. 54 Abu Shama , (Beirut ), II , 32 (quoting Qadi a l·Fadil's letter to Baghdad); Ibn \Vasil , II , 114. M Ibn Wasil , 11 , 13 1 (quoting Qadi al-Fadil's leite r 10 Saladin), \Vhcn desc ribing these c\'e nts, ' Imad a l·Din again makes an u nclear referen ce to some unspecified islands supposedly raided by the Egyptian fleet. See, ' (m ad a i-Din , Barq, (cd) Scscn, V, 26.
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p on sh ows, if fu rthe r evi de nce was n eed ed, that naval resou rces in the Eastern Mediterranea n , in Musli m Syria a nd Egypt as we ll as in th e Crusade r Kingdo m ofJ e rusalem . we re sca rce and h ad to be supplemented by impo rts. A rear later , a batsha which was sai ling fro m th e Levant was seized and 375 people were cap tured . Th e Musli m ships were o n the high sea for nin e d ays and returned with ca ptives a nd spo ils to Damic tta. 36 How many ships took part in these raids is no t me nti on ed in the sou rces. But Salad in co uld mu ster quite a large war fl ee t. Fo r instan ce, Will iam o f Tyre says th at in 11 82. 30 gall eys join ed Saladin 's ground fo rces fo r a threeday a bo rtive siege o f Be iru t. 37 Parall el with th e n aval and land ve ntures und ertake n by Saladin in th e ba u le for Acre (see n ext sub-sectio n ), naval raids which we re not directly conn ected with this war took place. In 586/ 11 9011 9 1, Saladin 's gall eys we nt to attac k Christian ships in th eir po rts. In th e batll es th at e nsued some Christi an ga ll eys we re d es troyed by n afla bo mbs (qawari r), bu t Muslim galleys we re also l osl.~ A numbe r o f raids were ca rri ed O ul by un id entifi ed Chri stian s who h ad alli ed th emse lves with Saladin ; they used small boats (barakis) and we re quite successful. O n o ne occasio n th ey attacked a large warsh ip (harraqa) wh ich was accompan ied by a boat and cap cured me rch an ts a nd goods.~9 In two o th er in cide n ts three Christian boats and a bo ut seventy-fi ve people were se ized . This group of raide rs also attacked Cyprus whe re they captu red a group of peopl e wh om they sold as slaves in Lata kiyya.40 O th er naval raids were conducted fro m Beirul. T he most spectacul ar e nded wi th th e cap ture o f five Christi an laJ7mla shi ps incl uding fe male and male passengers. goods and fo rty h o rses.'41 Saladin 's naval ac tivity also ex te nded to th e Red Sea. Comme rcial traffi c th at passed th rough th e Red Sea was of imm ense eco56 Abu Shama , (Be irm ), II , 47, 48 (quoting ' )mad ai-Din a nd Qad i a l-Fadi l); Ib n Wasil, 11 , 139-40; Maq rizi , Suiulr , 104 . 57 William o r T yre , 11 , 476, 477; Abu Sh a ma, ( Be irut) , 11 , 29 (q uoting ' )mad a i-Din ). T he nu mbers g iven by Willia m o r T yre are h igh; Arabic sources give lowe r figures: 15 galleys ro r the perio d rollowin g the victory o r Hittin a nd 3 1 gall~ and harraqat in 580/ 1184- 1185. Sec, Maqrizi, Suiulr , 112-3, 11 8. ' Imad ai-Di n , Fath, 3 19. :w Ibid, 3 16. I-Ie d escri bes these people as those who were granted amant sarety, by Salad in. 40 ' Imad ai-Din, Path , 3 17-8, 328. A leading pe rson a mo ng these rdirle rs conven ed to Isla m. 41 ' Imad a i -~ in, J-alh, 325, 330.
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17 1
nomi c impo rta nce to medi eval Egyp t. Qa lqas handi says th at th e Fati mids ke pt a war fl eet of three to fi ve ships in th e Red Sea to pro tec t th e Karimi me rcha n ts who e ngaged in trad e with In d ia. 42 Eve n if thi s in fo rm ati o n is ta ke n at face valu e, consid eri ng th e le n gth of the Red Sea a nd the li mited ra nge of the gall eys, th e prese nce of suc h a small squad ro n had little practical mean in g. Furthermo re, in fo rm atio n ga rn e red fro lll chron icles deali ng with th e Fatimid period does no t support Qa lq asha ndi 's statement. T he Fatimids did no t maintai n a navy in the Red Sea. T hey dealt with occasio nal nava l threats to sea·bom e trad e in th e regio n as th ey appeared by ad hoc measures. 43 Fatim id po li cy was not a result o f n eglect o r wea kn ess. It e pitomi zes th e fac t that in th e pe ri od unde r discuss io n no strong link ex isted betw"ee n sea power and sea·bo rn e trade. Fo r exam ple, mid·twelfth·centu ry ru le rs of Ade n did n ot mainta in a navy to p rotec t th e ir port town whose p rosperity, if no t very ex isten ce, was so de pe nde n t on sea-borne co mmerce.44 J o hn )-1. Pryo r poin ts o ut that in the twelfth ce ntu ry eve n Veni ce, Ge noa a nd Pisa "asse mbl ed wa r fl ee t.. fro m th ei r comm ercial shippin g whe n th e need a rose". In his view, o nly three Mediterra nea n states; th e Fatim id s, Byz...'l ntiulll and No rma n Sicily "did maintain anything like a pro fess io n al, pe rm a ne nt wa r fl ee t in th e twelfth ce ntu ry". 45 Salad in 's n aval policy in the Red Sea was in line with that of th e Fatimids. Th e re a re no indi catio ns th at he kept a perman e nt war fl ee t in the region . Small war fl eets we re created fo r speci fi c tasks. For instan ce, in 577 / ] 18 1-11 82, five ships ca pabl e of throwing Gree k fire and a contin ge nt o f arch e rs we re dispatch ed to Ye me n. Th ese ships we re built a t th e a rsena l in Fustat and som ehow transpo rted to the Red Sea. The naval raid launched by Reynald of Chatillon in 578/ 11 82-11 83 in the Red Sea was dealt with 10. cally by the hasty constru cti o n of warships o n th e sh o res of th e Red Sea and by pursuit of th e Fra nkish rAid e rs. 46 See, III , 520. Lev, Slate, 105. 44 This facl is clea rl y bo rn e o ut by th e ma terial pu blish ed by S. D. Goite in . See, his KTwo Eyewitness Reports o n th e Auack o f th e King of Kish (Qais) Against Ad e n", BSOAS, 16( 1954), 247-57, esp., 253. 45 See h is Geography, Technology, and War. Studiu i" the Maritime HistflT] 0/ the Mediummean 649-"71, (Cambridge, 1988)' 124. 46 Maqrizi, Su/ull, 97-8, 99, \02-3. ' Imad a l-Din 's narrative of these even t in Barq consistl5 of h is own accoun t of what happe ned a nd cita tions fro m Qadi 42
4:5
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e. Saladin's Navy and the Siege of A ere Saladin cap tured Acre fo ll owi n g his victory at Hillin. But from September 11 89 until 12 Jul y 11 91 th e tow n was besiege d by C hri sti a n land a nd naval forces dete rmin ed to retake it. This pro trac te d co nni c l offe rs an unusua l opportunity to exam in e the pe rforman ce of Saladin's navy ove r a lon g pe riod of time in a struggle which had far-reac hin g mil itary and mora l co nsequen ces for bOlh sides. Prio r to the struggle for Acre Saladin's navy was invo lved o nly twice in what mi ght be ca ll ed co mbin ed o pe ratio ns. The first time was a t Beirut in 11 82, and th e seco nd in 11 87, when a sq uadron of te n ga ll eys ass isted Saladin's army a t th e siege of Tyre. However , th e fleet fa ile d mi serably; ships were abandoned by the ir crews and five galleys were ca ptured by th e Christians in a night assault. 47 Du ring the ballie fo r Acre both Saladin and th e C rusaders possessed im portant ports at a sho n distan ce from the sce n e of the fighting; t he Crusad e rs co ntrolle d Tyre, and Saladin h e ld Be irut conque red, like Acre, in th e wa ke of his vic tory at Hillin . It should be e mph asized that th e main engagem e nts in the battle for Acre were fou ght on land. Sa ladin conducted two parall el mili tary efforts: one a im ed at d efeating the Crusad e r ground forces, and the other focuse d on providing Acre with supp lies a nd reinforceme nts by sea. Howeve r, his army was unable to break through th e Ch ristian besieging forces in order to link up with th e garrison in the be leaguered town and th e ships which en tered Acre found th e mse lves trappe d in the port. One of the most crucial naval eve n ts in the battl e for Acre occurred in its earl y stages. On 16 Dhu ' I-Qa'da 585/ 26 Decembe r 11 89, fifty gall eys (shinis) which arrived from Egypt e nte red Acre. Accordin g to ' lmad a i-Din , Saladi n , from the beginning of th e al-Fadirs leUers LO Baghdad d escribing this incident. Bo th re ports h ave been translated into English and discussed with the help of add itiona l sou rces by C. LaViere Leiser in his "The Crusad e r Ra id in the Red Sea 578/ 11 82-r,jARCE 14(1977) ,87-99. For a wider discussio n of the Red Sea and the secu rity considerations of the C rusaders see, J. Prawer, Crusadn- Institutions, (Oxfo rd, 1980), 47 1-83, esp., 480-3. 47 Ibn Shaddad, 84; ' Imad a i-Di n, Fa/h , 79-8 1; Abu Shama (Bei rul ), lI , 11 9 (q uoting ' Imad ai-Din); Ibn Wasil, II, 243-5; cf; D. Ayalon, "The Mamluks and Naval Power", in his Studies on the Mamluks oJEt;Jpt (12'().1' 17), (London, 1977), 4.
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Frankish siege on Acre, h ad written to Egypt ordering the preparation of a navy. The com mander of the fl eet whi ch e nte red Acre was Husam ai-Din Lu'Lu ', an accomplished naval officer. 48 On Saladin's orders further naval preparations were carrie::d out in Egypt. These cu lmin ated in the arrival, on 8Jumada I 586/ 13 Jun e 11 90, ora second fleet from Egypt at Ane. This fleet entered Acre following a naval battle in whic h each side lost a ship. ' Im ad alOin also mentions the capture of six Christian sailing ships (butash pI. of batsha) and th e e nslave men t of wome n and high-ranking mi litary leaders who were trave llin g on Lh e m.49 Saladin also urged the governor of Beirut, ' I Zl ai-Din Usama, to send suppli es to Acre. On 2 1 Rajab 586/ 24 Augus t 11 90, a sailing ship from Beirut entered Acre. This particular sh ip was originally a Christian batsha that had been captured on a raid and kept unused in Beirut. She was loaded with provisions and manned by a Christian a nd Muslim crew and had on board a fighting team composed of archers and nafta throwers. The ship was disguised as a Christian vesse l by displ aying crosses an d pigs o n the decks.50 Abou t three weeks later ( 14 Sha'ban 586/ 16 September 11 90) three other sailing ships arrived in Acre. They had bee::n dispatched from Alexandria followin g Saladin's cons tant demands fo r provisions for the besieged town. 5 1 Supplies continued to arrive in Acre even during the winter. On 2 Dhu 'I-Hijj a 586/ 11 J anuary 1191, seve n sai lin g sh ips arrived from Egypt at Acre with grain. 52 In sharp contrast to the extensive naval effort to reinforce and supply Acre by sea, whi ch was carried out during 586/ 1190-1191 , in 587/ 11 9 111 92 no Mus lim ships arrived at Ac re. A single attempt to ship supplies to th e bes ieged town took p lace on 16Jumada I 587/ 11 48 ' Imad ai-Di n, Fa/h, 224; Abu Shama, (Beirut). II , 148 (quoting ' Imad alOin ). Ibn Shaddad, 122-3, says that with the navy ships also arrh'ed rrolll coastal towns carrying provisions. The late Ibn Wasil says that the warships (qit'a min ClI· ustul) which e ntered Acre brought 10,000 mcn . See, II , 305. A figure which, as pointed out to me by Pryor, is quite reasonable. See, also Lyons and Jackson, 307-8. According to Latin sources, the term qit'a rerers to triremes (Latin: cal/us pI. catti). See, Pryor, ~From Dromon LO Galea\ 108. 49 ' Imad ai-Din, Fa/h, 257-8. Apparently this fleet was composed or warships. ' Imad a i-Din mentions in his description galleys, ships from which Greek Fire was hurled and shaumdiyya/. According to Ibn Mammati, shaiandiyyat were decked gall~s. See, .340. The Arabic term is derived rrom the Greek cheiandioll. ' Imad al. Din, Falh, 282-.3: Ibn Shaddad , 135. 51 ' Imad al·Din , Fath, 284; Ibn Shaddad, 138. ~2 ' Imad al·Din, Fa/h, 315.
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June 1191 and ended in a failure. A sailing ship from Beirut with provisions and about seven hundred fighting men (muqalila) was sunk by Christian naval fo rces off Acre.5~ From <Jmad al-Din's description of the battle for Acre it emerges that Saladin was very aware of and concerned wilh the naval aspects of the war. On the one hand, he urged his men in Egypt and Beirut to send supplies by sea to Acre. On th e other hand . there were seriolls misgivings in Sal-adin's camp in rc::gard to the ability of the Muslim naval forces. The Illost telling reOeclion of this pessimistic mood is ' Im ad al~in 's reference to the Christian ships as "spreading like scorpions and venomous snakes" while "o ur ships cling to their ports". In a lener written in 585/ 1189- 1190. to Yusufibn 'Abd al-Mu'nim, the Almohad ruler, Saladin admits that the Christians controlled the sea. He remarks that the losses which the Christian forces suffered at Acre were more than replenished by the reinforcements arriving from beyond the sea (meaning Europe). Saladin expressed his wis h that the Muslim naval forces wou ld perform as well as the land army. In general, he asked for naval support and implored 'Abd al-Mu'nim to send his navy against Sicily.54 In spite of this realistic appreciation of his naval limitations, Saladin continued to dispatch his fleets to Acre. Taking into account the limited speed of the galleys and their restricted ability to remain at sea a watertight naval blockade was impossible. Active patrolling of the sea off a besieged town was not the norm. In many cases the galleys were beached on the shore and sent to sea in time of need. 55 These limitations inherent in operating medieval navies made it possible for Muslim fleets to reach Acre with supplies and reinforcements. The main valu e of the Christian naval blockade of Acre, which could not have been total , was in deterring and making difficult the attempts to re-supply Acre by sea. On the other hand , the attempts of the Christian naval forces to storm the port of Acre were unsuccessful. Entry to the ~, ~
Ibid, 337; Ibn Shaddad. 161-2. For ' Imad ai-Din's remark., ~ee Abu Shama, (Beirut), II , 152; 'U,un , II , 2 10. For Saladin's letter, see Qalqashandi , VI, 526-30. For a French translation, see M. Gaudefroy-Oemombynes, ~Une lellre de Saladin au Galife almohade-, in Milangts Reni Basset, (Paris, 1925 ), II , 281-89. For the wider context of Saladin's relations with the Almohad rulers, see Mohring, Saladin, 192-209. The reason behind Saladin's request for actions against Sicily is no t clear. The Norman Kin~o m of Sicily was not involved in the battle for Acre. Lev, State, 117.
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port was protected by the Tower of Flies which was situated at the end of a mole. The fighting for possession of this fortress was the key to holding Acre. In th e course of this fighting th e Muslim de· fenders made very successful use of Greek fire against th e Chris· tian ships, and on one occasion the galleys trapped in Acre sai led out to meet the enemy ships.56 With the fa ll of Acre, Saladin lost a great number of galleys and transport ships. In fact, his navy ceased to exist. Th e refore , dur· ing the later stages of the Third Crusade the whole brunt of the fighting fell on Saladin 's ground forces and the problem of de· fending th e coast became very acute. Saladin adopted a policy of deliberate destruction of those coastal towns which he was unable to defend , extend in g this policy to inland towns as well . Follow· ing the peace seulement which ended the Third Crusade, he strengthened the forts along the Mediterranean coast and manned them with fresh troops. Apparently, the aim was to create an early· warning system against sea-borne invasions which possessed some defensive capabilities as well .57
f. The Wider Context oj Saladin's Naval Activity
Most of Saladin's naval activities were conducted in conjunction with attempts to conquer or defend coastal towns. Hi s naval ef· forts were not aimed at control of the sea or ach ieving naval supre· macy. IL is imponant to remember the illuminating remarks of John Guil martin Jr. that neelS of gall eys could not achieve control of the sea in the modern sense of the word. 'The capab ili ty of the galley as a warship was seriously restricted due to its limi ted
56 ' Imad a i-Din says that the Tower of the Flies was in the sea and was crucial to the defe nse of the port. See, Fa/h , 289; Ibn Shaddad, 138--9. For the port of Acre and its structure, see R. Gertwagen , ~ Th e Crusader Po rt of Acre: Layout and Problems ofMaintenance~, Au/our de fa Premiire Croistuie, (ed ) M. Balard (Paris, 1996 ), 553-81. In the twe lflh century, the Tower of the Flies was much larger than it appears (Oday and between it and another tower, now underwater, there was a chain protecti ng the entrance to the port. !'>7 Saladin's policy of destroying the fortificati ons of coastal towns is referred to by Abu Shama. See, (BeirUll, II , 157 (q uoting ' Imad aI-Din); 'Uyun, II , 2123. For references to naval evcnu; during the laS{ months of the siege on Acre, see Abu Shama, (Beirut), 11 , 160--1, 162·3, 164, 184 (quoti ng Ibn Shaddad and ' Imad al·Din); 'Uyun, II , 249 (for the loss of the navy in Acre).
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abi lity Lo re main at sea, its speed and its operational range. Naval warfare in the Mediterranean was characterized by sea-borne attacks on major ports and coastal towns. The attacks on DamieLta and Alexandria exemplify this lype of warfare. However, even in t hese comb ined operations the role of the navy was limited. The success of combin ed operations against coastal towns depended ultimately on the performance of the grou nd forces. Naval forces fighting on their own we re in effective in attempts to co nqu er or defend coastal towns. For instance, a Sici lian navy composed of 60 galleys and manned by 10,000 men was unable La prevent the fall of Jabala and Latakiyya to Saladin.58 On the other hand, efforts to conquer Acre from the sea also failed. In line with a observation made by Matthew Bennett iL ca n be sa id t hat mastery of the sea did not directly innuence fighting on land. 59 In combined operations the role of the navy was t\vofold: first, to bring the ground forces and the ir equipment and suppl ies to the scene of the fighting and, secondly, to continue to supply the army engaged in a siege wh il e preventing the enemy from providing help to the besieged Lown by the sea. However, the result of the siege was decided by the abi li ty of the besieged town to defend itself and by the will and ability of central government to commit its naval and above all its ground forces to such type of warfare. In order to evaluate Saladin 's naval policy and its ultimate failure we must take a wider view of the naval situation between 1099 and the fall of Acre to the Crusaders in July 1191. In the first decade of the twelfth century, the Fatimids lost a number of towns along the Syrian-Pa lestin e coast to the Crusaders and their Ita li an allies. On ly in one case, the siege of Sidon in 11 08, did the successfu l intervention of the Fatimid navy temporarily prevent the fall of a town. During the siege of Beirut in ]] 10, the Fatimid sh ips that entered the pon found themselves trapped within it. The sailors took part in th e defence of the town, bUl with the fall of the town to the Crusaders the neet was lost too. The fall of Tripoli was due to a great extent to the vind ictive Fatimid policy towards the de facto independent rulers of the town , the family of Banu 'Am mar. But Fatimid failure was above a ll a fa ilu re of the Fatimid army 58 ' Imad ai-Din , Fa/h , 142-3; Ibn Wasil, II, 258-9 (q uoting Ibn Shaddad). 59 Atthough his observation is made in a difTerent context, it is valid ror the period under disc ussion as wett. See. his ~Norman Naval Activity in the Medi terranean c. \060-1108~ , Anglo-Nonnan Studus 15 (1993 ), 41 -58, e sp. , 54 .
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to offer effective resistance to the Crusaders. The repeated attempts to re-co nqu er Jaffa , during th e summers of 1102, 1105 and 1123. exemp lify this point. The same happened in 1153 in Ascalon. The Fatimid navy brought supplies to the town. but Fatimid ground forces whi ch were dispatched to relieve th e town remained imm obilised in Egypt due to an in ternal power struggle in Cairo. On three occasions (at J afTa in 1105 and 1123, a nd at Ascelon in 11 53), th e Fatimid navy performed better than the arm y. But the navy o n its own, wiLhom the support of ground forces, achi eved nothing. The Fatimid navy was small and mostly consisted of galleys; it included on ly twenty transport ships and its capabi lity to ship supplies and reinforcements was limited. IL was vastly outnumbered by the European fleets whi ch ope ra ted in the Eastern Mediterranean in support of th e Crusades. For this reasons th e Fatimids were very hes ita nt to co mmit th eir navy when coasta l towns we re besieged by Crusaders who were supported by large n ava l forces (as happened at Acre in su mm er 1104 , at Tripoli in su mm e r 11 09 a nd at Tyre in su mmer 11 24).60 Egypt's naval resources were restricted by comparison to those of the European Mediterranean nations. Data coll ected from th e Geniza documents points to a lively trade in timber between Italian maritime cities (Amalfi, Genoa and Venice) and Fatimid Egypt in the twelfth century.61 Th e re are many indications th at during th e eleventh century European nations became prominent in the sea-borne trade in the Mediterranean. European merchants were com mo n call ers at Muslim city ports and became important buyers of the goods traded there . On the other hand, the business trips made by North African and Near Easte rn merchants to European ports were few and sporad ic. 62 Towards the end of the 60 W. Hamblin , ~The Fatilllid Navy During the Early Crusades: 1099-1124~, The Ammcan Neplu.ne, XLVI(1986). 77-83; Lev. Slate. 108-9. For details o n the
exploi15 of the naval forces of Genoa, Pisa and Venice in the decade lOO().IOIO. see M. Balard . "Communes italiennes. pouvoin et habitanLS des etaLS Francs de Syri(.... Paiestin e au XII i! siccle~. in Cru.sadt1'.s a11d MlLSfi m.s, 45-6. 61 Goitcin, Med.Sac., I, 46; S. M. Stern, "An Original Document from the Fatimid Cha ncery Concerning Italian M e rc hanLS~, reprinted in his Coins and Documnll.s from th e Meditval Middk East, (London, 1986). For attempts of the Byzantines to prevent Ve nice (in ea rl y 970's) from supplying timber to the Muslims and the conseque nces it had for the internal politics of the town, see Lombard , 133-4. 62 Goitein. Med. Soc .. I, 44-5, 2 11. Goitein refen to occasional trips by ~Ara bic-speaking tradcn", a definition which in cludes J ews and Muslims and in geographical tcnns means both North Africa and the Near East. In a later publica-
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CI-IAPTJo:R FIV,,:
e leventh century. the European nations were able to translate with relative ease their preponderance in commerc ial shipping into military naval superiority. The cont ribution of European fleets , including that of the English, to the success of the First Crusade is wide ly recognized and has been recentJy the subject of a detailed sLUdy by John France. 63 In the first decade of the twelfth century, Italian fleets played a crucial role in the conquest of the coastal towns of Palestine and Syria. The Fatimid vizier and miHtary-dictator, al-Afdal, retaliated against the Genoese merchants in Egypt by arresting th e m.'" This act reveals his weakness and frustration. Unable LO check the Italians at sea, al-Afdal endangered Egyptian commercial imerests. Following the conquest of the Palestine-Syrian coast, large European fleets were engaged in bringing pilgrims to th e Holy Land. In 1102, hundreds of European ships transporting pilgrims are said to have anchored atJaffa. 65 The establi shment of the Crusader states in the Levant brought about further naval developments in Europe, especially in Italy, enhancing and extending the naval preponderance achieved in the e leve nth century.56 The navy rebuilt by Saladin fa ced the same problems as that of the Fatimids: European superiority in numbers and me loss of ports along the coast of Palestine and Syria. The inherent deficiencies of galleys as warships combined with the geographical and other naval factors discussed recently by Pryor seriously restricted the raiding potemial of Saladin's navy operatin g from Egypt. Pryor argues that the use of amphoras (instead of barrels) for carrying water seriously reduced the operation a l range of Fatimid galleys. The shipp in g lanes used by th e European fl eets on their way to the Levant were to all intents and purposes beyond the range of
tion, Goitcin says that only one leiter from the eIC\'e nlh ce ntury testifies to an "Arabic-spea kingJ ewish merchant doing business in a Christian port of Europe(meaning Amalfi). Another leiter is from the thirteenth century a nd refers to a business trip 10 Genoa and Marse illes. See his Lmen of MtdievaIJ~/Jish Tradns, (Princeton , 1973),8. 63 See, his Victory in tM East, 98, 209-20. For cautious remarks on Italian naval superiority al Ihe time of the FirSl Crusade, see Pryor, Gtography, 30. 64 Goitein, Mtd.Soc., I. 45. 6/1 J. Richard, - le transport outre-mer des c roises e t des pe lerins-, in Mari· tinu Asptcts of Migration. (cd) K. Friedland (Wien, 1989), 33-4. 66 See, for example , the remarks ofM. Balard, MUS transports des occidentaux vers les colon ies du Levant au Moyen Age", in Maritimt Asptctl of Migration, 5.
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179
warships operating from Alexandria and Damieua. 67 Only with the conquest of Beirut, J abala and Latakiyya were new opportunities opened for raiding to Saladin's navy. But the main question that must be asked concerns the role of the navy in the failure to conquer Beirut and Tyre and to hold Acre. In the case of Beirut, Saladin gave up the siege when he realized, afte r three days of heavy fighting, that he was unable to take the town by assau lt. The defeat of Saladin's fl eet off Tyre was particularly humiliating but it had little effect on the failure of the siege, whi ch was abandoned because Mus lim ground forces failed to make any headway and, with the onset of wi nter, Saladin had to take into account the request o f his emirs to raise the siege. 68 The evalu ation of the role of the navy in th e battle for Acre is more comp lex. First of all , Saladin's naval effort was ve ry considerable and on the whole quite successful. The fleets, large and small , which were dispatched to Acre managed to bring in supp lies and reinforcements, which on several occasions proved crucial to th e ability of the defenders to continue resisting the Crusaders.6!l The fall of Acre was due to a combination of two faclors: Saladin's inabi lity to defeat the Crusaders on land and his in ability to match the naval resources of the European nations involved in the Third Crusade. Taking into account the limited naval resources of Egypt, Saladin built and assembled an impressive number of ships for dispatch to Acre. But the trapping of his ships in Acre created an impossible situation. Each ship that reached Acre safely was a ship lost and wh ich had to be replaced. This eventually exhausted Saladin's restricted naval resources. Saladin's heavy invesunent in the fortification of the coastal towns provided them with basic defensive capabiliti es. A similar approach was adopted by other Mediterranean powers, whi ch were faced with the problem of defending their coastal regions and towns. For example, in the first half of the tenth century, Southern Ital y 67 For a fu ll discussion of thc water problelll. winds and SCi! curre nlS, see his Grography, 80-6, 11 6-22. 68 Saladin's llilval defeat at Tyre was the result of an attempt to maint.ain lhe blockade on the port. Fo r this reason his ships were at sea off the port at nighL. See ' Imad ai-D in , Fa/h, 80. 6'.l This is clearly evidcnced by Ambroise's account. See Crusade of Richard Lion-Heart. Ir,lIlslaled imo English by M.J. Hube rt ;md annot,ned by J. L. LaMOille (N. Y., 1976), (reprint), esp., 156, 189 and also 147-8, 171 -2; cf R. Rogers, La/in Siege Warfare in Ihe Twelfth Crolury, (Ox fo rd, 1992),218.
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was vulnerable to Fatimid raids launch ed from Sicily and Tunisia. In this case th e geographical realities put the Fatimids in a good position to raid the area whil e the Byz3mines had to invest great effort in defending the region. The Byzantines coped with this problem by keeping a small naval presence in the Adriatic sea, es pecia lly in Da lmatia and at Dyrrachium, and by fortification of the coastallowns of Calabria and Apu li a. 70 The deSlruction of the fortifications of the coasta l towns (and occasiona lly of inl and towns as well) is an anoth er aspect of the same policy. A town that cannot be defended must be rendered useless to th e enemy.71 Our so urces sh ed littl e li ght o n the types of ships a nd o n naval wanare in general. The most com mon te rm used in Arabic sources when referring to a sailing ship is batsha. This te nn is used in two distinctive ways: with and with out th e adj ective huge / big. This means that th ere were batsha of ord inary size but some of th ese ships were especia lly big. Impressive three-masted sailing ships are depicted on glazed ceram ic bowls from th e Balearic islands in the early eleventh ce ntu ry,72 but how big th ese sa iling ships really were is not entire ly clear.7~ The term batsha in Arabic so urces re fe rs to both Christian and Muslim sh ips. It might indica te that th e outward appearance of Christian and Muslim ships referred to as batshas was very simi lar, or that the term referred to ships of the same type. 74 Appare n tly there was no difference in the outward a ppear70 J. Shepard , ~Aspecl.'i of Byzantine Altitudes and Policy Towards the West in the Tenth and [levelllh Celllurics~, in nyumtium and lhe West, (ed) J. D. Howard· johnston (Amstcrdam , 1988 ), 71 , 72-4,77. 71 When Acre W-dS conquered by Saladin in the aftermath of H ittin, there was a division of opinion among his emirs as t.o what to do with it. ' (mad a i-Din says that the w-dlls were badly damaged and most of the town was without walls at all. Some advised Saladin to demolish the town and to keep Acre as a fortified outpost only. Others held the opinion that Acre is the key to control of the sea and coasL Saladin decided to fortify Acre and the task was delegated to Baha a l· Din Qaraqush , who earlier had been responsible for the construction of the walls of Cairo and rustat. See, ' Imad a l·Din , Faln , 117-8; cf: Lyons and jackson , 285. n john. H . Pryor and S. Bel labarba, "The Medieval Muslim Ships of the Pisan Bacini~ , MM 76 ( 1991 ), 99-113 ; D. Nicolle, ~Shipping in Islamic Art: Seventh through Sixteenth Century AD~, The American Ntplunt' 172, Iia-b, 173 pard.ll. 7S For a summary of current knowledge about the medieval Mediterranean sail ing ship, seeJohn H. Pryor, ~The Mediterranean Round Ship~, in Cogs, Carawls and Galleons, (ed) R. Gardiner (London , 1993), 59-75. 74 The most revealing account is by the contempordry Usama ibn Munqidh , who describes lhe journey of his family from Egypt to Syria. They arrived in Damicna on boa rd a special ' ushari pm al their disposal by lhe Fatimid vizier, a nd sailed to Syria on board a Frankish (i.e. Christian) balsha. See, 34 (Arabic).
lS I
THE NAVY
ance of Muslim and Ch ristian warships. Ibn al-Qa lanis i's description of a Fatimid raid in 550 / 11 55- 11 56 is very revealing in this respect. On that occasion th e officer in c harge of the raid was chosen from the naval pt!rsonnel (tnuqaddam ulI:n al-bahriyya) , and he selec ted for the mission sai lors (mjul bahr) wh o spo ke the la nguage of the Franks. The crews of the warships were dressed in Frankish attire. The raid was vel)' successful; ofT Tyre the raiders se ized and burnt a big Chri stia n ship and o n th eir way back Lhey captured ships with pilgrims. 75 It would have been quite futile to put such effort into disguising the crews if the Fatimid warsh ips were markedly different fro m the Christian ones. In the sou rces transport sh ips are referred to by several terms. Salad in , in a letter describing the attac k of th e Norman fl eet on Alexandria, mentions six sh ips designated as su/ltn whi ch carried siege and war engin es, big ti mber logs and other suppli es. Ships of the ham-maia type were apparently smalle r carrying men and suppli es. 76 According to Ibn Mammati, ha1n1nala ships were used for shipping grain . An oth er type of transport shi p mentioned occasionally in the sources is the musatlah. Such a ship with 500 people on board was attacked by the Egyptian navy shortly after th e re-capture of Acre by the Cmsaders. Ibn Mammati has vel)' littl e to say about this type of ship. According LO him , the term musattah should be understood literall y, meaning a flat ship.77 When confronted by gall eys and ships hurling Greek fire. the sailin g sh ips. especially th e big balsha, cou ld. as lo ng as they enjoyed favorable winds, defend th emse lves successfully. The diffic ulties of warships in capturing large transport ships are nicely No less instructive is Ambroise's account or the Crusade or Richard Lion-Heart. According to him , the Crusaders had difficultie s in recognizing as Muslim vessels the ships, which they encountered at sea. On the first occasion , a big threemasted ship ofT the Syrian coast misled them . On another occasion, they had difficulties in deciding the identity of a neet which approached Acre. See , 1101, 148. We have here a funher indication of what Pryor and Bellabarba describe as a ~cross-cuhural fenilization in naval architec lllre in the Mediterranean See, their "The Muslim Medieval Ships" , 105. 75 The lype of ships the Fatimids used on these raids is unknown. Ibn alQalanisi uses the expression al-morakib ai-us/llliy)'ll. wh ic h can be trdnslated as ships or the navy. The term US/Ill pI. asn/it refe rs to navy. meaning, apparently, galleys. See, 332. 76 Abu Sham a, I, pl.2. 599 (quoting ' Imad aI-Din ). 77 Ibn Mammati, 340. For a n English translation of Ibn Mammati's short account dealing with t ilt: navy and arsenals, see Cooper, 285-6. M
•
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illustrated in the accoulll given by a contemporary twelfth-century Byzantine chronicler. In the winter of II7l , a group of Venetians escaped in a three-masted ship of great size from Constantinople. The fugitive ship was too swift for the pursuing galleys and ships throwing Greek fire. In any case, the chronicler remarks that any 3ncmpl LO board the escaping ship would have been impossible due La its height. 78 Big transport ships may have been used for military purposes as well. For exampl e, the English Crusaders overcame a big three-masted Muslim ship which was manned by 800 warriors armed with bows and arba lests and equipped with Greek fire. 79 OUT sources supply no information about the construction of warships or other related matters. Timber was scarce in Egypt, but some trees suitable for shipbuilding were grown in Upper Egypt. The price of lumber was very high and could reach fifty dinars a plank. SO It is quite clear that ships hurling Greek fire could have been easily and quickly built and equipped. This is borne out by the accounts dealing with the Frankish raid into the Red Sea and Lhe Muslim response to it. BoLh sides made use of fire as a weapon. 81 Th e refore , it can be safely assumed that the ships which had been assembled on the shores of the Red Sea were /tarmqat . In general, th e Muslims mad e quite extensive use of Greek fire in naval and land warfare. However h ow the Greek fire was hurled from Muslim ships is not always clearly stated. Both " mad ai-Din and Ibn Shaddad mention qawarir indicating that Greek fire was thrown from ships by nafta th rowers in the form of bombs. 82 But it does not mean that syphons for discharging Creek £ire were not used. 83 Medieval observers followed by modern scholars have been dis711 Choniates, 97-8. 79 Ambroise, 111-4. !jC) 'Abd al·Latif aI-Baghdadi, 35. 81 Maqri zi, Khilol. III , 139: Leiser, ''The Crusader Raid~, 92 82 'Imad ai-Din, Fath, 319; Ibn Shaddad . 14 3. 8~ For Greek fire in naval warfare, see V. Christides, MNew Light on Navigalion and Naval Warfare in the Meditcrranean, the Re d Sea and Indian Ocean (6th-14th Centuries)~, Nubica, 111 (1994). 5-25: esp., 24. Syphons are clearly mention cd in the Arabic sou rccs quo ted by Christidcs. Typcs of Greek fire, including the sort used in naval warfare, are discussed in a military treatise composed for Saladin. Sce, Cl. Cahe n, ~U n lraite d'armurcrie compose pour SaladinM, BEO, 12 ( 1947- 1948) , 123 (tex t), 146 (Frcnch tran.). In this text the type of Greck firc used in naval w;u'fare is desc ribed as spreading (literally walking) o n the sea. The spread of Greek fire on watcr is also referred to in the
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appointed by the performa n ce of Salad in's navy.
,
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C H APTER F IVE
in Acre. The com m ander of the fl eet of gall eys which en tered Acre in December 1189 was Husam ai-Din Lu ' Ill '. an experie nced naval officer. H e com m anded 111C Egyptian fl eet in the Red Sea in 578/ 11 82- 11 83. But, on that occasion his crc\'IS were composed of sai lors of North Africa n origin .88 We do not know wh at kind of sailors manned his fl t!t: t in 11 89. Lu'lll himselfwas a former Fatimid officer o f Armenian ex traction. His biographers desc ribe in detail his victory in th e Red Sea, but are reticent about hi s role in the batue for Acre . How he survive d the fall of th e town is no t me ntioned, but he died in Cairo o n 13 Safar 598/ 13 November 120 1. All of his biographers e mphasize that he devoted hi s wealLh to cha rity. Maqrizi says th a l h e quit the milita ry service but when this happened is not specified. 89 Further informati on on naval officers is scarce. The two sen ior officers captured with fi ve of th eir ships off Tyre in 11 87 were of Maghribi a nd Persian origin , (Abd a lSalam al-Maghribi a nd Badran al-Farsi. 90 It is difficult to m ake sense of the ir titles/ ranks; al-Maghribi is described as ra 'is and muqaddnm while a i-Farsi as mutawaUi. Another naval officer mentioned in th e an nals is Ya
C HA IYfER SIX
T H E NON-MUSLI M COMMUN IT I ES
a. /;atitnid Realities In com pa riso n to th e Muslim Mi dd le East a nd No rth Afri ca th e positio n of the non-Musl im communiti es in Fatim id Egypt was q uite uniq ue. T wo fac tors mi gh t expla in thi s situa ti o n : a) Egypt was o nl y pa rtia ll y Isla mized a nd b) th e po licies of th e Fatimid regime. T h e Cop ts co nstitu ted a ve ry la rge segme nt of th e popula tion an d were d istribu ted th rougho u t th e country whil e th e Cop tic Chu rc h was a powerful a nd rich instituti o n . In the capita l a nd AJ exa nd ria t he re we re J ewish com muni ties a nd o th e r small com muniti es a nd in d ivid ual J ews li ved in ma ny o th er places. Fa ti mid poli cy toward no nMuslims was to le ra n t a nd , with t he exce ptio n of a l-Hak im 's rul e (996- 102 1), th ere were ve ry few vio le nt o utbu rsts against no nMusli ms. Eve n th e wa rs o f th e Crusad es h ad little im pac t 0 11 th e positio n of t he no n-M uslim com mu n ities in Egyp t. O n th e whole, du ring th e Fa timid period Ch ristia ns and J ews were e m ployed in the adm ini stra tio n a nd served as ph ys ic ia ns at th e co urt. It was possible fo r Ch ristia ns a ndJ ews to build churches a nd synagogues, and they we re not obliged to wea r th e di stin cti ve colo rs and dresses (ghiyar) imposed o n no n-M uslim s by law a nd cus tom . Anoth er un usua l aspec t of Fatimid po li cy towards non-Mus lims was th e co nse nt of Fati mid ru lers to the im migration a nd senleme n t in th e country of th e Ch ristia n Ar me ni a ns wh o were e mployed as so ld ie rs. It is true th a t th e beginnin g of this im migration took place under th e rule of Badr a l:J ama li a nd t he Fatim id Im am al-Amir could do little abou t it. Bu t nothin g had ch an ged fo ll owin g th e fa ll of th e J a ma li fa mily a nd a n Arme ni a n Ch ristia n mili tary lead e r , Ba hra m, became th e Fa tim id vizie r. However h is ri se provoked a vio le n t local reaction wh ic h brought abo ut h is d own fa ll (11 37). Rath er pa radoxically, a t abou t th e same ti me th a t he was to ppl ed, Ch ristia ns fro m Pa les tin e a nd Syria found re fu ge in Egyp t escapin g persec uti on in th ei r ho mela nds. Eve ntua ll y a la rge po pulatio n of th ese re fu gees settle d pe rm a ne ntly in Egypt. It is true that th ey were ordin ary peop le with no mi litary associatio ns. 1 None thel ess, a t th e tim e tha t Shirkuh became Fatimi d vizier, ] Lucy-An ne H u m , ~C h ris tian-MlIsli m Relations in Pai n ti ng in Egypt of the Twelfth 10 mid-Thirteelllh Celllllries". Calliers Archiologiq ul!J, 33 ( 1985). 113. n.30.
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Christian Armeni ans still served in th e army. Arme ni an troops were sta ti o ne d in Ca iro and o th e rs li ved o u ts id e th e LOwn .2 Th e pos ition of no n-Muslims a l lhe Fatimid court surprised foreign visitors to Egypt includin g Fa timid sympathi ze rs. Pe rh aps it is no t just a co in cid e nce t hat Nasir-i Khusrau m e n Lio ns, in the account of hi s visit in Egypt (1 047-1048). a Chri stia n milli o na ire and a J ewish ad mi nistra to r. T he C hri stia n was a grain deale r a nd possessed imm e n se sto res of gra in . Nasir-i Khusra u ch ose him as an exampl e to illustrate the p rosp eri ty a nd secu ri ty tha t th e people of Egypt e nj oyed unde r Fa timid rule . Th e J e wish a dmini strator refe rred to was Abu Sa< id (in J ewish a nd Arabic sources Sa
THE NON-MUS LIM COMMUN ITIES
187
against non-Muslims were high o n Shirkuh's list of priorities. During the short pe riod of his vizierate, he enacted a number of edicts against non-Muslim s. There can be little doubt that to him the position they e njoyed seemed to be an anoma ly to be co rrected.
b. O/Jpression and Persecutions
I. Arab-Christian sources say that in the wake of Shawar's victory over the vizier Dirgham , troops of Nur al-Din's expeditiona ry force (refe rred to as Chuzz 'and Kurds) bega n to maltreat Chri stians, Armen ians, Blacks, Turks and th e local population. These in cidents ca nnot be regarded as persecutions of th e non-Muslims. Nur al-Din's army behaved as an occupying force mistreating everyone. But in periods of in stability and indiscriminate violence nonMusli m communities were especially vuln erable. Man y churches in Ca iro and its environs we re destroyed , and the local po pulation cooperated with th e Chuzz and Kurds in th e des truction of churches. 5 Such events lOok place in Jumada I 559/ March-April 11 64, and in 564/ 11 68-1 169. 6 Four churches which belonged to the Melkite community were seized by the Chuzz and Kurds. The buildings and the walls which surrounded the compounds were pulled down, and the looters took any timber that they found in the churches. The destruction of churches was not limited to the capital. In Jiza two churches were thoroughly ransacked by the Chuzz and the local population . Churches were also destroyed in Upper Egypt at the towns of Qus and Asyu1. 7 Churches and especially monasteries lost the lands bestowed on them by the former Fatimid rulers. Several Fatimid Imams showed interest in monasteries by viSiting them and grantin g them tracts of agricu ltural land as gifts. In 575/ 1179-1180, a survey of such lands was conducted. Altogether Christian institutions had 9 15 feddans of land belonging to this category. This land was unevenly distributed: 906 feddans were in Upper Egypt and on ly 9 fed dans in Lowe r Egypt. The income derived from this land amoullled to 2,923 dinars in cash and 4,824 irdabbs of grain. s All ~ Ibn a l-Muqaffa', III , 6 7 B
pan, 1,52 (Arabic), 87-8 (English); Abu Salih, 96,106. Abu Salih, 89, 90, 91, 94-5. Ibid,96-7, 174-5,234,235,249. Ibid, 15.
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of this land was seized from the Church. The Chuzz confiscated land which belonged to this category from monasteries inJiza and Hulwan. In 1174, at Ashmunayn, an emir of Saladin convened a flourishing monastery into a mosque and settled in its grounds. A monastery which had enjoyed exemption from taxes during the Fatimid period was seized in Asyul. 9 Some monasteries were big and prosperolls landowners. For instance, the monastery seized at Ashmunayn owned twenty feddans of land granted to it by the former Fatimid rulers. It also oper· aled a number of production installations including an oil-press, a mill and an oven. The monastery and its production complex were surrounded by a w
II. Shirkuh, during the three short months of his period as vizier, inaugurat.ed anti-dhimmi policies. He enforced the ghiyar regulations on non-Muslims. Arabic-Christian sources speak of a sweeping anti-dhimmi campaign at the beginning of Saladin's rule blaming Qadi al-Fadi l for advising Saladin to prohibit the employment of Christians in th e fiscal administration of the state. I I In Rajab 567/ February-March 1172, a group of non-Muslims was dismissed from th e ir posts. However, non-Muslims employed by Saladin's emirs in the administration of their rural estates were not affected by 9 Ibid, 183-6, 197-8,248,250. Ibid, 208. II Ibn al-Muqaffa', III, pt.2, 634 (Anlbic), 106-7 (English). The late al-Nabulusi, who was an anti-dhimmi bigot, says tha i Saladin prohibited th e appointment of Christia ns 10 diwans and provinces. See, his Kitah Tadjrid Say! ai-Himmo, (ed) CI. Cahen in his ~ Hi slOire Copte d'un cadi medieval", BIFAO, LlX(1960). 146, 147. This statement can be interpreled as meaning that Christians were prevented from holding pOSIS of authoriry as heads of administrative offices and fisca l governors. Even according to this sou rce Saladin 's policy was a se lective o ne and did not amount to a generAl purge of non-Muslims from the adm inistration. For Nabulusi and his anti-dhimmi altitudes a nd writings, see B. Callos. "To Catch a Spy: The Case of Zayn al·Din and Ibn Dukhan", Medieval encQunters, 2(1996), 99- 11 3. 10
THE NON-MUS LIM COMMUNITIES
189
this policy. The atmosphere in the capital must have been very tense; rumors spread aboUl the possible expulsion of non-Muslims from the town and aboUlthe confiscation of their homes. 12 In addition to the enforcement of the ghiyar regulations, restrictions were imposed on worship. Crosses were removed from churches and the ringing of church bells was forbidden. Religious processions were prohibited and non-Muslims were obliged La ride on asses alone. Public consumption of wine was also forbidden. 13 Th ese policies caused a group of Christian clerks to convert to Islam. Perhaps the most famous case is that of the Mammati family of Copts whose origin was in Asyut. In the Fatimid period, members of the famil y served the sta te and atlained great power. The father of the famil y, al-Muhadhdhab, was in state service at the time that Shirkuh became vizier, either in the Office of the Army or in the Office of th e Iqta '. He use d La appear in public witholll the obligatory ghiyarand Shirkuh had removed him from his post. AI-Muhadhdhab and his so n, Asad, converted La Islam and kept their posts under the new mastcrs. 14 It said that Saladin was instrumental in the conversion to Islam ofa Christian physician, al-Muwaffaq ibn ai-Matron, whose father had also been a physician. Following his conversion, al-Muwaffaq continued to serve Saladin. 15 Other anti-dhimmi edicts were proclaimed in 577/] 1811182. Non-Muslims were banned from practising medicine and the prohibition 011 their employment in the civi l service was reenacted includ ing th e ban on riding horses and mules. 16 But conversion to Islam was not a prerequisite for employment by Saladin. AJewish physician who had served the Fatimid rulers was employed by Saladin and was paid the high salary of 24 dinars a month. Other Jewish physicians were also employed by Salad in and members of the Ayyubid family. The most famous of the Jewish physicians of Saladin 's pe riod was Maimonides whose son, Abraham, fo ll owed him in the service of other Ayyubid rulers of Egypt. Maimonides, at the beginning of his career in Egypt, enjoyed the
Maqrizi , Suiuk, 68, 69. Ibn al-Muqaffa', Ill , pt.2, 97-8 (Arabic), 164-5 (English). 14 Yaqut, Udaba', V, 103-8; Ibn al-Qifti, I, 231-2. Safadi.IX, 20, 21·2. On the Mammati famil y in the later Ayyubid period, see Morray, 56-7. I~ Maqrizi , Muqaffa, II , 98·9. 16 Maqrizi , Suiul!, 100. 12
I~
190
CHA PTE R S I X
patronage and finan cia l suppo rt of Qadi al-Fadil, who a lso helpe d othe r J ewish phys icians. 17
c. The Impact of Saladin's Policies
One ca n wonder what was the overall impact of these policies on the non-Muslim communities in Egyp t ? We can derive some insight by comparing the beginning of the Ayyubid rul e with a l-Hakim 's p e rsecution s of non-Mu slim s at the begin n in g of the e leve nth ce ntury. As in the ea rly Ayyubid pe riod , a l-Hakim' s anti-dhi1n11li pol icies le d to th e co nvers io n to Isla m of se nio r Christi a n scribes and fiscal officials as well as of ordi na ry peopl e. IS However, in bo th cases there are no indica tio ns th at co nversio n of Christia n administrators c rea ted a ge n eral tre nd to co nve rsion or played a ny significant role in a mo re ex te nsive Isla mi zation. Ayyubid poli cies h ad a limited e ffec t eve n on th e high echelo ns of the non-Muslim commu n ities. Non-Muslims continued to be e mployed in the state adm inistration and by me mbers of ul e Ayyubid famil y. Ayyubid em irs e mploye d non-Muslims, especially Co pts. in the administration of the ir rural estates, which they had acquired e ither through seizure or as an iqta'.19 The e mploym e nt of non-Muslim s by me m17 Safad i, XV, 127. For a number of J ewish physicians in lhe service of Saladin and other Ayyubids, see E. Ashtor, ~Saladin a nd the J ews~. flebrt:w Uni011 College Annual, XXVII(l 956), 310-3; S. D. Goitein , Palesli1le Jewry i1l Early Islamic mId Crusader Times, (Jerusalem, 1980), 26 1-2, 270, 32 1-2 (in Hebrew). For Qadi a lFadil's a uitude to J ewish physic ians, see B. Lewis. ~Ma im onides, Lionheart, and Sa l adin~ , Ereldsrael, L. A. Mayer Memorial Volume, 7( 1964), 70-6; M. Meyerhof. ~Mediaeva lJ ewi s h Physicians in the Near East, from Arabic Sources\ Isis 28( 1938), 445,447. For Abra ham see, Goitein, Med. Soc., rv, 476-7. In Ayyubid Syria and especially Egypt non-M uslim physicians continue d to be e mployed a nd enjoyed high status. See, Ann e-Ma rie Edde, "Les medecins dans la societe syrienne du VIl e/X lll e siecJe", Ai, XXIX( 1995), 92, 93. However , the employme nt of nonMuslim physicians by the Muslim ruling class was a specia l case. It had a long history in medieval Islam and physic ians moved across political and confessional boundaries. See, for exam ple, E. Ko hlberg and B. Z. Kedar , "A Me lkite Physician in FrankishJerusalem a nd Ayyubid Damascus: Muwaffaq a i-D in Ya'qub b. Siqlab\ AAS, Studies in Memory of Eliyahu Ash to r, 22(1988) , 113-27. But oppositio n to the employment of non-Muslim physicia ns became biue r and vocal, especially during the Mamluk period. See, M. Perlmann , "Notes on the Position of J ewish Physicia ns in Medieval Muslim COllntries~, Israel Orienlal Studies, 2( 1972),3 15-9. 18 Y. Lev, "Pe rsecutions and Conversion to Islam in Eleventh-Century Egypt", AAS, 22(1988)' 82. 19 Ibn al-MuqafTa', III , pt.2, 98-9 (Arabic), 165-6 (English); For a Christian vizie r of Sultan al-'Adil, see Safadi , IX, 22.
THE NON·MUSUM COMMUN ITIES
191
bers of the military class in the management of their properties and rural estates became an established practice that continu ed well into the Mamluk period. In fact the anlj·dhimmi spasm of ] 172 abated quickly. The need in 577/ 1181·1182 LO proclaim new edicts sim ilar LO those of 564/ 11 68- 11 69 shows that. the situation returned to normal. Following the reversion of a 1-Hakim's persecutions of nonMuslims , in the late 1020's, the dhitntni communities invested great effort in recovering their religiolls establishments; synagogues, c hurches, monasteries and pious endowments, which had been damaged during the years of oppression. The destruction inflicted on religious institutions had wider implications for the ability of non·Muslims to conduct their li ves as communities. Synagogues, churches and monasteries were not merely houses of worship: they also served as focal points of communal life. The same happe ned in the 1160's and 1170's. Attempts to rebui ld damaged churches and monasteries Look place almost imm ediately after their destruc· tion by Nur a l-Din's expeditionary forces. For example, during a1-'Adid's rule a church that had been burnt by the Ghuzz and Kurds, in th e Hamra' district of Fustat, was restored. 20 In so me cases, churches that had been destroyed in 559/ 1163-1164, were already rebuilt in 560/ 1164-1165. 21 Other c hurches were rebuilt between 1172 a nd 11 86. includin g those in Qus and Asyut. 22 On the other hand, the small and feeble Melkite community was unable LO re-claim and restore its destroyed churc hes in the Hamra' di striCt. 23 But other churc hes in this area, destroyed either during Shawar's fire or deliberately, were re-bu ilt later. 24 A very special case was the Armenian Christian community in Egypt. Following Saladin's rise to power in Egypt, the Armenian Patriarch left Cairo for Jerusalem (23 Rabi I 568/ 13 November 1172), and Armenian churches and monasteries were closed. Other churches wh ich had been given LO the Armenians during the Fatimid period were reclaimed by their original owners, especially the Copts. However. eve n the Armenians tried LO rebuild th eir Abu Salih, 106. Ibid, 91, 96. 2'l Ibid,94-5 , 106, 121 ; 11 3, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 138 (see, also 95-6, 11 23); 234, 235, 249. 23 Ibid, 96-7. N Ibid, 112-3, 119-22 , 122-4 , 125, 126-7. 20
21
)92
C H A PTER SIX
c hurches. They were e ngaged in a lo n g a nd bitter di spute with th e Copts, and both parties tri ed LO secure th e goodwill of their new Ayyubid maste rs for th eir cause. 25 In Upper Egypt, an Armenian communi ty a nd its churc hes continue d to exist unaffec te d by th e tunnoilthat had befalle n the Arme nians in Cairo. The origin a fth e Arme nian seulemem in Uppe r Egypt goes back to the 11 30's, the period of th e Fatimid Armenian Christian vizier, Ba hram. 26 H owever , th e Christian comm unities did suffe r some pennane nt losses. For instance, the grants of land b estowe d on Chri stia n institutio ns by former Fatimid rulers were appropriated by the new regim e. Th e same is true of chu rch es and monasteries that h ad been converted to mosques a nd of lands e ndowed to church es and monaste ri es that had bee n se ized by Saladin's troops.27 Similar eve nts took place during al-H a kim 's persecution s; houses of worship were conve rted to mosques and the land e ndowed to th em taken a nd divided as iqta' among the soldiers. In such cases th e cessa tio n and reversal of al-Hakim's persec utio ns had no effec t on the new status of th ose buildings and lands. The non-Muslims lost th e m for ever. The Christian communities we re also affected by Saladin's allocatio n of iqta' to h is e mirs. La nd di stributed as iqta' also h oused ch urches and mo naste ries and this was the case in bo th the enviro ns of the capi tal a nd the co untryside. Re la tions betw'ee n the recipients of iqla' a nd th e Christian institutions on their la nd varied greatly. For exa mpl e, a Syrian jurist who had rece ived th e Basatin area on the outskirts of th e capital as a n iqta' left the church es the re untouched. Upon his death , the new holde r of this iqta< closed two church es th e re. Saladin 's bro th e r who boug ht land which included a c hurch refrain ed from inte rfe ring with i1. 28 Thus the pe rsecutions of non-Muslim s in th e ea rly p eriod of Ayyubid rul e in Egypt had some perma nent effects for th e dhimmi communities. Nonetheless these effects we re local and contained .29
25 Ibid, 3-4, 6, 8, 10-1, 13. 26 Ibid, 255; Lev, State, 126. 27 For such cases, see Abu Salih, 14 ,247-8,250. 28 Ib id, 3, 12, 141. 29 For local effecLS of the persecutions, see Abu Salih, 162-3, 165, 168,242, 256. For a systematic regional approach to Islami1.ation, see M. Martin, ~ La Province d'Asmunayn: historique de sa configuration re ligieuse", Ai, 23( 1987), 1-28, esp. 23, where the stages of the process are discussed.
TtlI': NON·MUSLlM COMMUN IT I ES
193
Even the Armenian community in Egypt survived the persec utions. 30 The Ayyubid rulers adhered to the basi c paramete rs that deter· mined the position of non·Muslims in medieval Islam 31 and the implemel1l.alion of the lega l restrinions imposed on non·Muslims by them was slack.~2 Th e persecutions by al·Hakim and the Ayyubids show that short periods of duress were not enough to bl-ing about a massive Islamization . Only pressure from below combined with the determined policies of rulers from above. as happened in the Mamluk period brought about the almost complete Islamization of Egypt. The powerfu l and extensive presence of the COplS at· tracted. th roughout t he Ayyubid period. an ever more militant response from the Mus lim religiolls class. But the deterioration of relations between Muslim society and the authorities and the non·Muslim communities LOok place only in the Mamluk period. first in Damascus and later in Egypt.·n "" For a con tinued Armenian presence in Egypt, see Abu Salih. 1·2, 13, 162· 3. 255. For the continued importance of the Armenians in the C hristian an of Ayyubid Egypt, see Hunt, 142, 144. 5] This i5 the view of AshlOr. Sec, 308-9, It can be corroborated by fresh evi· dence. $ce, C. Khan "A Doc umen t of Appointment of a Jcwish Leader in Syria Issued by al·Malik al·Afdal 'Ali in 589 A. I'I./ 1193 A.D.", in Y. Ragib (cd), f)0Ct11II1:1I/S dl:l'lslalll medieval, (Cairo-Pa ris, 1991 ),97- 116, esp., 99, 11 , 3- 18 (text), 102 (t ran .), whe re the rcspo nsibilities and powers of the head of lheJewish community arc enulI1erated. 52 E. Si\'an. "NOles sur la sit uation des c hrcticns a r cpoque ay}'ubide\ RLvlJ.e de l '/,istoirll dllJ religions, CLXII(1967) , 121. 53 Thc decade 1250- 1260 and thc period thaI followed marked a change in the relations between Christians and Muslims in Damascus. See, Pouzet, 328-34. For the Islamization of the Copts in the Mamluk period. see D. P. Liltle, "Coptic COIH'crsion to Islam under the Ba hri Mamluk.s 692-755 / 1293-1354~. BSOAS, 39( 1976), 552·569.
CONCLUSIONS I. Saladin was a man of his age: an age of constant warfare which
saw the rise of ambitious military leaders to supreme power through the ranks. The very essence of civi lized society is that it creates religion, cullure and legal and political systems which curb violence. Thus the quest for power by individuals had to accord with the fundamental values of society, or had at leasllo be presented as such. In other words, power and the quest for it had to be legitimized. unless violence is to be revolutionary violence which seeks to re-shape the values of socieLy and its institutions. But Saladin was not a revolutionary. Therefore his career must be examined within the framework of the established values ohhe Muslim society of his age. The need to see Saladin against the wider background of his period is a lso dictated by the character of our sources. Saladin's historian-admirers, espec ially Qad i al-Fadil and ' Imad alDin , were towering pe rsons in the cultural life of their times and they presented Saladin through the prism of their own system of values. Th e best example of how the values of the historians who wrote about Saladin determine the presentation of Saladin and his deeds is the killing of Shawar. Shawar examplifies the worst example of unrestrained behavior by any member of the military society of his age. Members of the civilian elite contemporary with ShawarIbn cAsakir and the poets in Egypt and Syria-saw his killing as a fully justified deed. However, later, when Qadi al-Fadil,
CONC L US IO NS
195
because the Ayyubids d eve loped a taste for Egypt quite ind epend ent of th eir master. Ostensibly, th e terminatio n of Fatimid rule by Saladin poses no difficulties of histo ri ca l presentation. Sunni Islam and Abbasid suzerainty prevailed over Isma' ili heresy. But the events were far more compl ex th a n that. Saladin, a man in the service of Nur ai-Din, became th e Fatimid vizier, a servant of an Isma
196
CONCLUSIO NS
ga ted if not invented sometim es by members o f th e civilian e li te . In this co ntext Qadi al-Fadil rende red to Salad in a tre mendo us service: h e presented Saladin's war again st Nur al-Din's heirs as h avin g a n ulterior motive-H o ly War and th e co nquest ofJ erusalem.
II. Medieval warfare had its own rationale. For an agraria n premodern, pre-industrial soc iety wa r was the main instrument for expansion a nd gain ing wea lth. Agricultural land and the co ntrol of th e peasa ntry constituted the main sources of wea lth. Towns with their trade and the urban eco no my were a second source of weallh. Both sources of wealth cou ld be best acquired by wars of conquest. From an economic point o f view wars agai nsllh e Crusaders for the conquest o f land and towns made perfect sense. These wars also accorded well with the religious and political values of Muslim soc iety in th e twe lfth century. Wars of defe nse made sense only when the core territories of the kingd om , on which its very existence depended, were threate n ed by an e n e my. Within these param e ters Saladin's battle for Acre made no sense at a ll. Following the conquest of Acre, there was a dive rgence of opinion a mo ng Saladin's advisors about what to do with t he town. Some advocated the abandonmelll o fth e town whi le others pointed out to its strategic a nd economic valu e. Saladin chose to retain a nd fortify th e town. Shortly aftenvards Acre came under Christian siege. From that very moment, from Salad in 's point of view. Acre instead o f being a future asset turned into a li a bility. The wisest thin g to have done was to h ave give n it up imm edia te ly. In stead Saladin fou ght a lo ng, costl y and eve ntua ll y disas tro us war for co ntrol of the town. It ca nnot be a rgued that Salad in was dragged into this struggle by th e dynami cs o f th e war itself. DUI-ing the winte r th e armies arou nd Acre were mu ch reduced a nd Saladin, ha d h e so wis he d , could have evac uated the town and disengaged his forces from co mbat. It can be argued that Saladin fought the ballie for Acre in order to preserve his re puta tion as a warrior of the H oly War. To put it differently. Saladin fell victim to his own-or mo re accurately Qadi al-Fadil's-propaga nda. But this argume nt has its limitations. The le ngth o f the period that Saladin chose to face th e ch all enge of th e Third Crusade and the tremendous stra in it put o n his resources make this argument look rather shall ow. Saladin could have given up Acre expecting Qadi al-Fadi l. ' Imad
CONCLUS I ONS
197
a i-Din and Ibn Shaddad to expla in thi s as an necessity. Undoubted ly, at the beginning of the battle for Acre, Saladin was confident of his abi li ty to win this war. But as the batLle dragged on and the cha ll enge of the Third Crusade intens ified, Sa ladin's continuous war effort must be also seen as a reflection of his com mitm ent to th e id eology of Holy War. Saladin was man of h is age, and on th e who le his policies lacked any originali ty. His religiolls policy, t he building of law coll eges a nd Sufi conve nts, his tax decrees and his policy toward the Holy Cities of Arabia were th e policies of hi s former master, Nur a lOin. T he same holds true of Sa lad in' s military policy. The army that Salad in c reated in Egypt, with iLS tota l dependence on cava lry and d isregard for infa ntry, was in direct line with the type of armies that emerged in the Muslim Midd le East and Asia Minor, from th e seco nd h alf of the e leventh century o nwa rd . It had iLS advamages as well as grave shortcom in gs as is exemplified by the battle for Ac re. Saladin's policies were in total accord with the re li gious and cultura l va lu es of hi s age a nd its political a nd military practices. His close aids and future hi storians-Qad i al-Fad il.
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INDEX 'abid, black milita ry slaves, 100 Abu Sh a ma , hiSlOrian, ( h istorical writings of), 18, 43, 62, 64; (usc of Ibn Abi Tayy), 4 1-2, 86, 89 Acre, 169, (besieged in 11 89- 11 91), 1725; (Saladin 's navy in), 172·3, 179: (Christian Oeets in ), 174 Aden, (comme rcial importance 01), YI:I al-'Adid. Fatimid Imam . 12,2 1,50.57, 64 ,68, 7 1, 76,82,84,85. 90.91 , 133; (o rdering th e killing of Shawar), 47, 48,65: (death of), 82. 83 al.'Adil , Saladin's b ro th cr. ( rulc r o f Egyp t), 22: (rule r o f Aleppo). 23; (campa igns in Egypt), 101 ; (properties in o:.ira). III al-Afdal, Fatimid vizie r, 69; (religious policies). 125. 126. 178 al-MdalLJa'far ibn Muhanumld, c mi r, 78 Aleppo, (Shi 'i le Islam in). 6,: (Nur a lDin 's relig io lls policy in ). 6, 132; (Saladin 'S religious policy in ), 132 Alexandria, (defended by Salad in in 11 67),108-9; (fortification of), 164: (po n s and arse n als in ), 162, 164 : (besieged in 117'1). 145. 164; (Maghrebi pil g rims in). 137·8: (taxation in), 135. 137, (Sunni Islam in), 16,20,78-9, 117 , 119; (law colleges in ), 16, 11 9- 120 alms-tax, 6, 133, scc also la kal Amalri c, Ki n g of J e rusalem , (ex pc ditions 1.0 Egypt). 59-60, 6 1: (relations wi th ByzaIHiulll ), 59, 60 al-Amir, Fatim id Imam , 69: (mosq ues built by), 12 1, 122 'a rd, milita ry review, 141 -2, 143, 148, 149. 150 Armenian(s). (i mmigration to Egypt), 68, 192, (sold iers in Fatimid Egypt), 87, 102-3, 141,185-6; (in Ayyubid Egypt), 19 1-3 arsenals, 161-2 Asadiyya, regim e nt, 80, 127 Ascalo n , (Qadi a l·Fadil's fa mily in), 14 , 19-20, (conque n.-d by Ihe Crus.'tders), 14.53
Ash'ari, (theological doctrine). 4.130, 131 '(l.Jkar, military formalion, 142-3 Aswan, l i S; (au acked by the Nubians), 100 almh, see Turks Aytl lon. D., 146, 153. 154-5, 157 'Aydhab, 11 5, 134 Ayyubid(s), 77-8: (pe rsecutions o f nonMuslims), 11 5-6, 186-7, 192; (101e l, uion of non-Muslims), 192-3 Azhar, (as an Isma'i li mosque), 85. 121 , 136; (educatiollal activity in), 12 1; (pious e ndowments of), 121 a l-'Aziz, Fatimid Ima m . 99, 11 2. 122, 129
Badr al:Jamali, Fatimid \;zier, 68, 69, 99. 129, 185; (religious policies 01).1 18, 137
baql, agreement wit h the Nu bian$, 99 h(mdil, taxes. 132. 133 batsha, a type of ship , 169, 170, 173, ISO, 18 1, 184 Bailie of Babayn, 45. 79, 145 Battle of the Bl ac ks, (\'crsions of), 4950,82, 110; (conseque nces of). 85. 84, 110, 141 Hatt ie of Mont Gisard, 144 Be nnett, M. , 176 \'0 11 Berch e m , M .• 130 Bilbays, (besieged in 11 63), 56; (conque red in 1167),59-60. 108 Blacks, (i n the Falimid army). 87. 100, \02, 108, 116, 14 1, 150 Bosworth , C. E.. 2 Brett, M. , 159 Bum e t, W. R. , 2 al-Bundari, Fath ibn 'Ali , historian, 30. 33, 88
Buni , Sharf ai-Din , jurist, 11 7·8 Buri , Saladin's brother, (properties of), 115 Byzantine, (naval fo rces), 59, 163, 17 1, 182
Cahen, CI. , 4 1, 62, 159
210
INDEX
Cai ro, (lsma'ili refere nces lO), 73-4; (military quarters in a nd outside of), 6 1,84, 108; (Fati mid pa laces in), il().I, 11 3; (Saladin 's hospital in ) , 112. 138; (Saladin 's khanqa in), 112, 125. 129, 138, 139; ( m osques in ). 12()'2, 136, see also madraso churches,
Dadoyan. S. B., 12 Damascus, (under Nu r al-Din's rule), 6-7; (unde r Saladin's rule), 139 Darnic tla , (besieged in 11 69), 84, 85, 109, 163; (fortificd bySaJadin ), 165-
6 dar al-'adl. (d e finiti o n of), 7; (establish ed by Nu r a i-Din ), 7, 9, 30 dar al-hadilh, (defini tio n of), 2; (in Cairo), 126, 130 De ren bou rgh , H., II , Dirgham , Fatimid vizier, 13,20,2 1,108 diwan al-naUlr, see Office ofthc Inspeclion diwan al·UJkal, 134 dromon, a type of ship , 163 duslur, 160
Eddc , Anne-Mane, 153, 157, 158 Egyp t, (Sunni Islam in the Fatimid period), 11 ~7; (economy of), 57, 58; (i nvad ed by the Crusaders), 13,456,57-8,59; (military weakness unde r the Fatimids), 57, 6 1; (relations with Byzantium ),57, 103; (relation5 with Italian towns), 104, 177; (Medi te rranean coast of), 109, 163-6, 179-80; (naval resources of) , 177-8 Ehrenkre uLz, A. S., 43, 52, 195 Farama, (destroyed by the Crusaders), 109 faris/fursan, cavalry, 146, 147, 154 Fatimid , (state in Egypt), 48, 53-4, 6~
8,70,75-7,8 1,82,84, 108; (religious credentials). 67, 69, 70, 7 1, 73, 90; (ruling establishment), 82, 86; (state prope nies), 108, 109, III , 11 2, 11 34; (army), 61,67-8,84-5,87,88, I'll , 14 8, 150; (navy), 161 -2, 167-8, 17~ 7, 18 1; (attitudes toward nonMuslims)' 185-7 Fayyum, (reven ues from) , 11 5, 168; (law colleges in), 130; (iqla' in ), 159 France, j., 178 funduq, caravanserai, (built by T aqi alDin ), 113 , 130: (built by Masrur), 127 Fustat, (set on fire in 1169), 50, 9 1, 108; (Saladin 's law colleges in), 124-5: (Taq i a l-Din 's law colleges in), 125; (the Hamara' district of), 114 , 191 : (mosques in), 124-5, 136, 137, 138, 140; (Saladin 's hospital in), 138 ghulams, military slaves, 143 Ghuzz, 91. 157; ( maltreatme nt o f C hristians by), 11 5, 116, 18 7-8, 19 1 Gibb, H . A. R., 32, 37, 42, 52, Goldziher, I. , 130 Greek fire, (in naval warfare), 170, 171 , 173, 175. 182; see also harraqat Gui lm artin Jr. j., 175 habs al-Juyushi, (confiscatio n of), 168 a i-Hafi z, Fatimid Imam, 19,7 1, 11 8 , 11 9-20, 123 a i-Hakim , Fati mid Im am, (mosques supported by), 120; (mosques built by), 120-1 ; ( pe rsecutio ns o f nonMuslims by), 185, 190, 19 1 Hakkari , ' Isa, e mir, 49, 80 halqa, body guard, 127, 144, 156 hatnmalat, ships, 160, 18 1 harraqat, ships, 160, 170, 171 , 18 1, 182, see also Greek firc hilali, tax, 132, 135 Ho ly Citics, of Arabia, ('Umara in the) , 11 -2; (Nur ai-Din 's policy toward), 89; (Saladin's po li cy to ward ), 103, 133-4, 197 Ho ll, P.M., 37 Holy War, 68; (in Nur al-Din's propaganda), 54-5, 106, 195-6; (i n Sala-
INDEX
din's propaganda), 102-3, 104, 105, 106, 107, 196; (Sa ladin's comm itllIent to), 19().7 H umph reys, R. S., 143, 153, 157, 195 Ib n Abi Tayy, histo ria n, (writings o f), 41 ,42,50,78-9,80,86,89,94, 116, 167, 183; (ignored by other hi.'Horians), 41, 44 Ibn 'Asakir, historian, (writings of), 5, 10, 34, 62, 63; (biography of Nur a lOin by), 5, 6-9, 34, 35, 75, 13 1; (relations with NUl" aI-Din), 9; (on the killing of Shawar), 62-3, 64, Ibn al-Athir, historian , (relations with 8
211
Ibn a l-Tuwayr, historian, 162 Ibn Wasil, hiSlorian, 43, 79,89 Ibn Zafir, hiSlOrian, (family background of), 64; (on the killing of Shawar), 64-5, 82 Ibn al-Zubayr, Rashid , adminislr,ttor, 78,79 ' ibm, 115 ' Imad aI-Din , hiSLOrian, (education of), 5, 26; (in tht: service of Ibn Hubayra), 26, 28; (in the se Eviee of Nur aI-Din), 26- 7, 32, 195; ( in the service of Saladin), 28-9, 30, 32, 195; (relations with Qadi al-Fadil), 29, 30I ; (historical writings of), 18, 19,30, 31-2,33,35,45,87,88,14 1,172,174, 183;( poetl1' and literary writings of), 34,65-6, 88;(sel f-view), 3 1-2 iqlu'. ( ho ld by F:uimid emirs and troops), 82,150,158; (gil'en to naval officers). 167; (given to Ayyubid emirs and troops), 100, 152, 159, 190, 192; ( the Ayyubid syste m of), li S, 159-60; (th e Zengid system of) , 159; (gi"e n to emir of Mecca), 8, 134; (distributed by Saladin), 82, 148, 149, 159-60; (given to Bedouin ), 96, 148 Ismailism (in Fatimid Egypt), 116-8, 140 if/ma', patronage , 186 Jackso n, O. E. P., 195 al:Jarjara'i, 'A li ibn Ahmad, Fatimid vizier, 123; (letter of appointment), 70-" J erusalem, (in Nur a i-Din 's propagallda), 106; (i n Saladin's propaga nda) , 102, 104, lOS, 107 J ews/ Jewish , (physicians), 127, 128, 189, 190: (administrators), 50, 87, 186; (sources),59 jihad. see Holy War jitya, poll-tax, 10 Jurdik, ' Izz aI-Din, emir, 46, 62, 63 kala tn, 2, see also Ash'ari
Kamil, son ofShawar, Fatimid vizier, 13; (Ieue r of appointment), 73, 74 al-Kam il , Ayyubid Sultan, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130 Khabushani, Najrn aI-Din, ascetic, (hos-
212
INDEX
tilil)' 10 Ih~ Fatimich). 82; (relations with Saladin ), 82·3. 84,125.138.139 khan, car.l\'an~r.ai, 7 It.honqa.. (definition of), 2, 3, 4, 7; (bui ll by Saladin), 112, 125. 129, 138 Jeharaj. land tax, 10 Khusrdu, Nasir-i, traveller, 162; (desc riplion of Falimid palaces). 110: (reports 0 11 Christians in Fatimid Egypl), 186 Kurds. 32; (i n Ayyubid armies), 150-1, 152. 157 l:1w colleges. 3; (eslabtished by Saladin), 112, 124, 126; (established by Taqi ai-Din), 112; (established by Ayyubid
emirs, SlIltam and women), 113, 1267,130; (established by NUT ai-Din), 6, 2708 Lu'lu', Badr ai-Din. "Iabeg of Mosul , 36, 40, Lu'Lu', Husam ai-Din, admiral, (in the Red Sea), 184; (in Acre), 173; (buildings of). 127-8, 184 Lyons, M . C., 195
madrasa, (definition of), 2, 130-1; (pious endowments of), 6,129,130,131; (in Iran ), 2; (al-Nizamiyya in Baghdad), 2,26; (in Aleppo), 6; (in Damascus). 7,27-8; (al-Hafiziyya in Alexandria). 119, 120; (al-Nasiriyya in FU5tat), 124; (of Arsufi in Funat ), 12S-9; (of West Mrican pilgrims in Fustat). 129; (a l-N asiriyya in the Qarafa) , 125, 129; (al-Sali hiyya in Cairo), 12&-7; (a l-Fadi liyya ill Cairo), 128; (alSuyuliyya in Cairo), 129; (alQamhiyya in Cairo), 64,I29 • .see also law college Makdi5i. G., 3, 130, 13 1 al.Makhzumi, Abu ' I-Hasan, admininrator, 77-8 mamlu.u. military 5laves, 153, 156, 157 Maqrizi, historian. (historical writings of),43,44,82,86,93.94,116.117, 143, 148; (Ol! a source for Saladin's policies). 43. 44, 9S-9.131·2, 134 , ISO, 167-8; (use of Qadi al-Fadil by), 434; (reports on Fatimid.Ayyubid armies), 143, 14S-9, 150
m(UIIIIa(/" martyrium. (of Husayn). 121-
2, 13&-7. 140 Masrur, emir. (military career of). 78, 156; (bui ldings and charities of), 127 mawlid a/· nab" festival, 4 military da\'ery. (inSlillition of). 154-5 military sla\'es, see ghulanuand mom/uks minbar. 106
Mohring. H " 107, 195 monasterics, 115-6 mosque, (as an educational in5titution). 3. see also Azhar. Cairo and FU5tat Mu'ayyad Ii-Din. ai-Shirazi, Fatimid propagandiu, (repo rts on Jews in Fatimid Egypt). 186 mudarriJ, law profellSor. 27. 33 mu'id, teac hing assistant, 33 muhw, taxes, 132, 133 mullt. land ho ld by Ayyubid family and emirs, 115-6 al-Mundhiri. biogr.tphcr, 16,26 I1Iwaltah, a type of ship. 160 al-MuSlansir. Fatimid Im am. 68, 112, 125 Nabulusi, 'Ulhman ibn Ibrahim, administrator, 150 nOlflOl, bombs of, 170, 182 navy, (in Fustat-Cairo), 161 -2; (in Damielta). 162; (in Alexandria), 162, 167; (timber for the) , 167 , 182; ( manpower for the) , 167 , 183; (officers of the ), 184; (of Saladin), 168- 75,182-3; (oflh e Italian towns). 177-8, 5ce also Fatimid nazir fi maUllim, 9, 30, 74, 75 Nicolle, D" 144 Nishapur, 2 Nizam al·Mulk, Seljukid vizier, (religious policy of), 2, 3; (military policy of), 155. 156 Nubia, (Fatimid re lations with), 99; (Ayyubid conquest of). 97, 98, 99,
100 Nur ai-Din, (pormlyed by Ibn 'Asaki r), 6-9,75; (portrayed by ' Imad al·Din), 10-1; (baraA:a of). 8; (religious policies), 4, 6, 10, 26. 131·2. 139; (policy toward Egypt), 45-6, 53, 54, 55, 57, 62, 141-2, 194-5 ;(rule in A1eppo),6, 132; (rule in Damascus), 6-7; (warrior or the Holy War). 6. 8,
INDEX
9, 10, 106; (titles of), 106; (\'irlllcs and rtligiosity). 6,7; (buildings aI), 7,8; (policy to ....a rd the Ho ly Cilies of Arabia), 8, 197 Nuw3yri, historian, 58, 60 Office of the Army, 15, 17,77,78,150, 157, 160 Office or the Chamber, 157 O ffi ce oflhe Chancery. IS, 18, 27, ~2, 69, 76, 120 Office of the Finance, 27 Office of Fust:k1 , 77 OlTtce o f the I-Io iy War, 169 Offict of thc Ilispectio n , 77 Office of the Iqt,\', 157 Office of the Navy. 167-8, 169 Offict of thc " ious Endowment, 134 see a lso ditIJall orpha ns, educa tion or, 7, 24, 128 Pallon . D., 36 pious endowment(s), (rol' law colleges) , 6, 10, 112 , 11 9, 120, 125; (for mosques). 120-1. sce also hubs prison trs-of-war, (ranso m of), 4; (capturt:d in naval raids), 155, 166, 169 Pryo r,J. H., 59, 171 . 178 Qadi al·Fadil, (fa mily background 01), 14·5. 19.20 ; (educa tio n 01). 15-6; (historical writin~ of). 25, 43, 44, 83, 88. 92. 143 ; (poe try a n d rasa'if w\'itings 01) , 17-8,2 1, 24, 25, 44 ; (letters ofappoinl mc lll written by), 18, 6~9. 76; (relatio ns with Sh awar), 20· I ; (ill lhe service o f Shirkuh ), 17, 18. 19,2 1, 78; (propagandist of Saladin ), 22-3. 102·3,10'1, 105-6, 107, 14 1, 148, 14 9, 196; (defende r of Saladin 's rul e), 86. 87, 9 1·2, 93; (administrative duties 01), 22; (C$trangement from Saladin ), 23; (later life of), 23; (....eal th a nd properties of), 23, 24, 114; (chari ties of). 24 , 128; (madrllStl of), 128; (alii tudes towa rd non· Muslims). 188, 189-90 Qalqas ha ndi , histOrian , 18-9, 74-5, 17 1 Q-... rafa, cemetery. (buildings in ), 1234 , 128; (populatio n a nd religious life
213
in ), 123-4, 126. 139; (Sh afi'i's to mb in),82, 125 qaraghulam, (d e finiti o n 01), 14 3; (number.; of). 143-4, 148 Qaraqush, Ba ha' ai-Din , emir, 3 1-2. 80, III Qaraqush. Sharfa\-Din, emir, 101. 152 qatIJurir, see na fta Rabie. 1-1 .• 159 rasa'it, (written b), Q;ldi al.Fadil ), 24·5; (writtcn by Ib n al· Sayrolli ), 15 Red Sea, ( Mu .~ lirn naval presen ce in ), 170· 1. 182. 184 ribal, (d c finition aI), 7; (huilt b)' and for women). 122·3 Ric hards, D. S., 32, 34, 62 Ridwan , Falimid vi/ier, 7 1, (religious policies 01), 11 9-20 Ruzzik ibn Tala'i'. Fatimid vil.icr. 13. 17, 74-5 jadaqa, charity. (distributed by Nur al-
Oin ), 6, 7 Saladin , (as Fatimid vizie r), 49. 69, 76. 80.8 1; (plo t ag-... inst Shawa r). 47·9, 62·3,64; (Ie lle r o fappoiuunenl ) , tiS9; (titles of). 34, 124; (virtues 01), 35; (religiosi ty of), 34, 35-6; (warrior of the I-Io ly Wa r). 1,35,39. 102, 103, 104, 105-6, 107, 196-7; (legi timacy of rule), 40, 102, 105-6, 107; (an ti· Isma' ili policies of). 50-1, 85, 86, 124, 136, 195; (religious policies of), 501, 131-2,136; (tax policy of), 132·3, 135, 137-8, 197; (policy toward the Ha l)' Cities), 103, 133-4, 197; (army in 1171) , 143-4, 14 8, 149; (army in 11 77), 144; (arm y in 11 8 1), 148, 149; (naval policy 01). 167-8, 175·6, 182· 3; (iqla' policy of) , 82 Salih Ayyub, Ayyubid Sultan , 126, 130 Seljuks, (spread o f the ), 147·8: (re ligious policies o f the), 4 Shawar, Fatimid vizier, (rise to po.....e r ). 13, 71 -2; (Ieuer ofappoinunellt), 7 1· 2,73; (titles of), 72; (relations with 'Um ara), 12: (burning of FU5la t by), 60- 1; (the killing of), 4~7, 48, 62·3, 64,65, 194 Shirkuh , (campaigns in Egypl) , 45, 46. 57-8, 141·2; (plo t against Shawar),
2 14
I NDEX
46-7; (letter of appoilllment), 67-9; (titles of), 17,67. 168; (persecm ions or n o n-M uslims by), 188-9 shini, a type or ship, 172 al-Silafi, JUI'ist, 17, 119 Sivan, E., 106, 195 Smoor, P., I I. 17, 18 Stern, S. M., 117 Tala'i',ibn Ruzzik, Fatimid vizier, (risc to power), 53; (relations with 'Ulnard), 12, 13; (religious policies 01), 12, 17, 177; (wa rs against the Crusad ers), 53-4, 55; (mosques built by), 121-2; (the ki lling 01).12-3,55 Taqi ai-Di n . Saladi n 's nephew. 10 1; (properties in FUSLOlI-Cairo). 95; (law colleges established by), 112, 130 lorida, a type of ship. 163-44, 170 tawa.shi, (defi nitio n of), 14 3, 136; (numbers of), 14 3-4, 148. 149 lax/ taxation, (levied on pilgrims), 8, 133-4; (permitlcd by law), 8, 10, (Nur a i-Di n policy), 7, 8, 10, 135; (Saladin po licy), 132·3, 135, 137,see a lso baratil, jiz.Ja, m Ilkus Ti bawi, A. L., 13 1 T innis, (attacked by the Nonnans), 165; (auacked by the Crusaders), 109; (rortifications of), 165--6 Tsugitaka, S., 159 Tughtakin, Saladin's brother, 77, 134 (properties of), 11 6 tulb, military rormation, 143 Turanshah, Saladin's brother, 83, 96; (relatio ns with 'U mara ). 89 98; (ex pedition to Ye m en). 89, 97, 989; (in th e Battle or lhe Blacks), 97; (campaigns in Nubia), 100: (iqlo's in
Egypt). 11 5; (wealth a nd prope rties in Cairo), 98, II I Turkm e n , (recruited by Nu r al·Di n ), 14 1·2; (in Saladin's army), 151 . 152, see also turkumon Turks, 32; (i n Ayyubid
THE
MEDIEVAL MEDITERRANEAN PEOPLES, ECONOM IES AND CULTURES, 400-1453 Editors: Michael Whitby (W'arwick), Paul Magdalino, H ugh Kennedy (SL Andrews), David Abulafia (Camblidgc), Benjamin Arbcl (l'cI Aviv), Mark Meyerson (Notre Dame).
This selies provides a forum for the publication of scholarly work relating to lhe interactions of peoples and cultures in the Medit erranean basin and the Black Sea area a nd is intended fo r readers wi th int.erest in late antiquity, the Middle Ages (h aly, Spain, the Latin East), Byzantium, Islam , the Balkans and the Black Sea. Manuscripts (in English, Gennan and French) should be 60,000 to 120,000 words in length and may include illustrations. The editors would be particularly interested to receive proposals for monograph studies; studies with texts; editions witll paraJleI translalions o r lexts or collections of documents; or translations provided wilh rull annotation. I. Shatzmiller, ;,,1. (cd.), Crusaders and Muslims ill Twe!flh -CtIl/ury
~n·a. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09777 5 2. T sougarakis, D., 71u Lift oj Leontios, Pa/narch oJ Jmt.raltm. Text , Translation , Commentary. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09827 5 3. Takayama, H. , TIe AdministratwlI if the Norman Kingdom if Sicily. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09865 8 4. Simon, LJ. (cd.), [berio. and tire Mediterranean World if tire Middk Ages. Studies in
H onor of Robert I. Burns
5. 6. 7. 8.
SJ.
Vol. I. Proceedings rrom Kalamazoo. 1995.
ISBN 90 04 10 1683 St6ckly, D. Le sysUme de ['[neanto des galies du marchi a Venise (fill X[lI e_ milieu XV'" ,~,k. 1995.9004100024. Estow, C., Pedro tJ~ C"'" qfCastiie, 1350-/369. 1995. ISBN 90 04 100946 Stalls, W.C. , Possessing the Lond. Aragon's Expansion in to Islam's Ebro Frontier under Alfonso the Battler, 1104-1134. 1995. ISBN 90 04 103678 C hevedden, P.E., OJ. Kagay & P.G. Padilla (cds.), [herio. and the Meditmallean World if the Middk Ages. Essays in Ho nor or R obert I. Burns Sj. Vol. 2.
Proceedings rrom 'Spa in and the Western Mediterranean ', a Colloquium Sponso red by The emier for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Unive rsity or Calirornia, Los Angeles, O ctober 26-27, 1992. 1996. ISBN 9004 105735 9. Lev, Y. (cd.), War and SOCU!Y ill the £aslem Meditmanean, 7th-15th Cellturin. 1997.
ISBN 90 04 10032 6 10. Ciggaar, K.N. , Weslern TrfllJellers to COrlStantinopk. T he West and Byzantium, 962-1 204: Cultural and Political Relations. 1996. ISBN 90 04 106375 II. Skinner, P., Health and Medicine in Early Medieva[ Southem [taly. 1997.
ISBN 90 04 103945
12. Parry, K. , Depicting the Word. Byzantine Iconophile Thought of tllC Eighth and Nintll Centuries. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10502 6 13. Crisafulli, V.S. & j.W. Nesbitt, TIle Miracles of St. Artemios. A Collection of Miracle Storics by an Anonymous Author of Scventh-Cen tLllJ' Byzantium. 1997. ISBN 90 04 105743 14. Antonopoulou, 1'., The Homilies of the Emperor Leo VI. 1997. ISBN 90 04 108149 15. Toughe r, S., The Reign of Uo VI (886-912). Politics and People. 1997. ISBN 9004 10811 4 16. O'Callaghan, J .F., Alfonso X and the Cantigas de Santa Maria. A Poetic Biography. 1998. ISBN 90 04 110232 17. Gilmour-Bryson, A., The Trio.l of tJu Templnrs in Cyprus. A Complete English Edition. 1998. ISBN 90 04 100806 18. Reyerson, K. &J. Orendel (cds.), Urbml and Rural Communities in Medieval France. Provence and Languedoc, 1000-1500. 1998. ISBN 90 04 10850 5 19. Kagay, OJ. & T.M. Vano (eds.), On the Social Origins of MedievaL Institutions. Essays in Honor ofJ oseph F. O'Callaghan. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11096 8 20. ferreiro, A. (cd.), the V"z.sigoths. Studics in Cultu re and Socicty. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11206 5 21. Lev, Y., Saladin in EgyP'. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11221 9
