Spinoza and Republicanism Raia Prokhovnik
Spinoza and Republicanism
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Spinoza and Republicanism Raia Prokhovnik
Spinoza and Republicanism
By the same author RHETORIC AND PHILOSOPHY IN HOBBES’ ‘LEVIATHAN’ (1991) RATIONAL WOMAN: A Feminist Critique of Dichotomy (2nd Edition 2002)
Spinoza and Republicanism Raia Prokhovnik Senior Lecturer Department of Politics and Government Open University, UK
© Raia Prokhovnik 2004 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2004 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 0–333–73390–8 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Prokhovnik, Raia. Spinoza and republicanism/Raia Prokhovnik. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–333–73390–8 (cloth) 1. Spinoza, Benedictus de, 1632–1677–Contributions in political science. 2. Republicanism–Netherlands–History–17th century. 3. Netherlands– Politics and government–17th century. I. Title. JC163.S8P76 2004 321.8⬘6⬘092–dc22 10 13
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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
For Eleanor and Conal Browning
Contents Acknowledgements
viii
Maps
ix
Introduction
1
1 The Revolt The history of the Revolt of the Netherlands Political thought during the Revolt
21 21 46
2 The Dutch Republic The date of the Dutch Republic Political thought in 1648
65 65 74
3 De Witt’s Republicanism
88
4 English and Dutch Republicanism English republican writings
117 133
5 Dutch Republicanism The significance of the Dutch mentality The Holland-centric factor
154 154 162
6 Spinoza’s Dutch Perspective The political works Spinoza’s Marrano status
168 169 191
7 Liberty and Sovereignty in the Political Works Liberty Sovereignty
200 201 220
8 Spinoza’s Republicanism The reception of Spinoza’s political works The character of Spinoza’s republicanism
237 237 246
Epilogue
257
Bibliography
262
Index
277
vii
Acknowledgements I am indebted to the Harold Hyam Wingate Foundation for its generous support through the award of a Wingate scholarship to pursue this research. In particular I would like to thank Jane Reid, the Administrator of the Foundation. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of a British Academy grant in support of the further research for this book. I am deeply grateful for their positive and constructive comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of the manuscript to Conal Condren, Gary Browning, Simon Prokhovnik, Terrell Carver, Noel O’Sullivan, John Horton, Mark Philp, the late Liam O’Sullivan, and two anonymous readers. This book also owes an enormous debt to Quentin Skinner’s revolutionary insights into the distinctiveness of contexts, highlighted in the illocutionary force of writers, in studying the history of political thought. I could not have completed this project without the sustaining encouragement of Gary Browning, the stimulation of colleagues at the Open University, and the warm support of Alan and Hilary Browning, Angela Radcliffe, Lorraine Foreman-Peck, and Caroline Thompson.
viii
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UTRECHT Utrecht Rijswijk Gouda Delft Rotterdam Waal Dordrecht
The Hague
Leiden
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TEXEL
VLIELAND
Haarlem
NORTH SEA
ZEELAND Veere Middelburg Flushing
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Adapted from K. Davids and J. Lucassen eds, A Miracle Mirrored. The Dutch Republic in European Perspective Cambridge University Press, 1995
The Habsburg Netherlands
Dutch border (post 1648)
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Introduction
Seventeenth-century Dutch political practice and thought, and in particular Dutch republicanism, set against the background of its history and political traditions, represents a crucially important context in which to discuss Spinoza’s political philosophy. Several modern commentators place Spinoza in a self-confident republican tradition dating from 1579 when, it is said, the United Provinces asserted its independence from Spain, embracing political change along with economic innovation and colonial expansion. Such change and innovation are seen as the foundation of the success of the northern Netherlands in the seventeenth century, when Dutch selfassurance resulted, so the story goes, in a Golden Age of wealth, prosperity, and the status of a major European power. In this Golden Age, a proud republicanism is depicted as given a definitive statement by Spinoza, and an unprecedented cultural flowering, for instance in painting, is seen as giving rise to a tradition richly diverse enough to embrace the genius and technical skill of both Rembrandt and Vermeer. But in closer focus, a series of curious features emerge from this history. The Dutch republic is an interestingly difficult term to define, and for almost a hundred years – almost a whole century after its ‘independence’ in 1579 – the politics of the United Provinces exhibits a profound mismatch between practice and theory. The disjunction is between (for the most part, a stubbornly unacknowledged) republican practice on the one hand, and, on the other, orthodox theory as taught in the universities, which continued to centre on an analysis of monarchy as the best form of government. Within the context of this unacknowledged lack of correspondence between theory and practice, political debate was elliptical at times and also demonstrated a 1
2 Spinoza and Republicanism
mismatch. However, neither dimension of this second anomalous situation conformed directly to either practice or theory, revolving instead around a substance-and-form dichotomy. The substance of political debate was often engrossed with the powers of the provincial regent oligarchies, the pre-eminent position held by Holland among the seven provinces, and with the strengths of shifting pro- and antiOrangist factions. But this substance was often framed in the language and fiercely held convictions of the confrontation between Remonstrant and counter-Remonstrant adherents. The lack of fit between theory and practice helped to mask the fact that United Provinces politics took place in the context of an intense fragmentation of loyalties. Spinoza’s work can be analysed fruitfully in a rich variety of contexts, as the history of commentary on Spinoza attests. A range of scholars have placed him within a narrative about the rise of liberal political theory; Wolfson regarded him as the last of the great medieval philosophers; and Gebhardt considered Spinoza in the light of the Marrano experience. In recent years Spinoza’s political writings have been the subject of important scholarly investigation by three groups of writers. Philosophers interested in tracing the connections between the Ethics and the political works, such as Lloyd, Gatens, van Bunge and others, have seen these texts as contexts for each other. In particular they have related the key categories Spinoza developed in the Ethics to his idea of political community and the values that inform it. Much valuable work has been done in illuminating Spinoza’s politics through the connections between the Ethics and the political works, but that is not the focus of the present work. Moreover, Jonathan Israel’s recent Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750 sees Spinoza and especially Spinozism as central to an integrated conception of the European Enlightenment encompassing the mainstream ‘French’ perspective, an English Enlightenment focusing on Locke and Newton and other ‘national’ examples, together with a radical and until now recessive Enlightenment in which Spinoza has latterly been seen as a key figure. Israel in Radical Enlightenment is dealing with Spinoza’s philosophy seen as inaugurating a distinctively modern view, for whom ‘nothing is based on God’s Word or commandment…the only legitimacy in politics is the self-interest of the individual’, according to a near-contemporary (Israel 2001, 5). Historians of political thought interested in classical republicanism, such as Skinner, Pocock, van Gelderen, Haitsma Mulier and others, have explored another important context in which to view Spinoza’s
Introduction 3
political works. This enterprise intersects with a large and lively literature on English republicanism by Worden, Scott, Sharpe and others. ‘Classical republicanism’ refers not to ancient republicanism but to early modern writings that draw upon ancient Greek and Roman republican authors. Over the past two or three decades historians of political thought have been involved in tracing the use of primarily Roman and Italian Renaissance reflections on republican theory and practice in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European contexts, and wider eighteenth-century transatlantic contexts. Recently Hankins has developed an argument that casts doubt on civic humanism and classical republicanism as constituting ‘a distinct tradition or language of political discourse’ (Hankins 2000, 3). His recommendation has been to ‘slice up Pocock’s long republican tradition into unrelated sections’ (Hankins 2000, 5), and he cautions against reifying both ‘classical republicanism’ and Pocock’s notion of tradition. Notwithstanding Hankins’ reservations, this school of thought continues to recover important insights into the meaning of early modern texts, to make valuable connections between writers, and to remind political theorists of the thriving republican tradition of thought and practice prior to the development of liberal political theory in Europe. In particular, Skinner’s series of interventions, documenting as Hankins says, the ‘long prehistory of the ideas in medieval scholastic and rhetorical traditions’ (Hankins 2000, 5), and his redefinition of classical republicans as neo-Romans, are very important. Skinner’s most recent contribution is found in his co-edited two-volume and immensely illuminating work, Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage (2002). The study contains a wealth of important scholarship devoted to the project of reclaiming the classical intellectual inheritance enriching the meaning of early modern republicanism. However, this literature is not the primary one within which the current project seeks to locate itself. Together with these two contextual organising frameworks, centring on the philosophical text and on the ‘classical republican’ tradition, there is a third tradition. This third organising framework is indebted to the work of Kossmann, Price, Israel, van Deursen and others, and highlights the distinctiveness of theory and practice in politics in the Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is to this third tradition that the present book on Spinoza’s political works seeks primarily to contribute. It is well known that Spinoza took an active interest in the public domain and politics, as part of the spirit of philosophical inquiry with which he viewed the world. This book draws out the extent of his interest in the conduct of political relations in the
4 Spinoza and Republicanism
United Provinces in particular. The current work highlights the extent to which Spinoza’s political works seek to defend and update the Dutch way of doing politics. These three forms of context are not mutually exclusive and are in places overlapping and mutually enriching. However, at times in what follows, it is necessary to distinguish the present endeavour from those other undertakings. The current work will attempt to show how this third context can throw further light on the meanings of Spinoza’s political works. These three domains of reflection on political theory, while overlapping, are irreducible and spring from different, equally legitimate, questions. One example of the difference in approach of the current perspective from the ‘classical republicanism’ perspective concerns, for want of less anachronistic terms, the national and international characters of seventeenth-century forms of republicanism. In the seventeenth century, before the pattern had been established of the self-determination of nations to gain statehood and before the consolidation of Europe as a group of nation-states, the terms ‘nations’, ‘states’, ‘Europe’, and ‘international’ did not have their current meanings. Pocock indicates that while ‘Europe’ was an ancient term, it was not used as a selfdescription by the Romans – theirs was a Mediterranean empire. ‘Europe’ as a continent needs to be clearly distinguished from ‘Europe’ as a civilisation (Pocock 2002, 59). The term ‘Christendom’ was the dominant political one to describe the area of modern Europe, delineating the realm of Latin Christians (Jordan 2002, 74–5), and it was only from the sixteenth century, with the construction of overseas empires, that ‘worlds beyond Europe’ were encountered in detail (Pagden 2002, 10), and a new distinction between Europe and the international was established. Pagden also notes (2002, 13) that it was only the treaties of 1648 that ‘put a final end to the Church’s role as arbiter in international affairs’. Over the following century an international politics inflected by national churches, the multiplicity of other churches, and based on the idea of a balance of power settlement between states emerged. ‘Europe’ as a secular civilisation developed only with the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century and the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht (Pocock 2002, 64). Writers like Scott, Velema and Armitage quite legitimately explore the trans-European connections between republican writers, though without always clarifying the different meanings of ‘international’ in seventeenth-, twentieth- and a possibly-transformed twenty-firstcentury usage. They examine the common and so in that sense
Introduction 5
‘international’ features of the intellectual inheritances or, as Castiglione and Hampsher-Monk put it (2001, 2), the ‘universalist and cosmopolitan ideals’ shared by such writers. Velema, for instance, contends that there were ‘few if any early modern European nations with totally and entirely exclusive traditions of political thought or language’, though his conclusion that the ‘dominant early modern political languages were, to a large extent, international’ may be an overstatement (Velema 2002, 10). This contemporary school of thought charts the rich vein of affinities in the classical education and common language of Latin shared by educated elites across Europe, aware of each others’ writings, forming a much stronger ‘international respublica literatum’ (Boralevi 2002, 261) network than exists in knowledge and learning today. Classically educated writers in the seventeenth century used that classical inheritance, to a greater or lesser extent, to inform their reflections on contemporary events, and exploited its rhetorical potential to do so. For the current project, however, the phrase, ‘to a greater or lesser extent’ is crucial. While it is useful to draw links and recover similarities and resemblances as Velema and others do, a different but equally valid emphasis is concerned to specify the distinctiveness of specific writers and practices in a particular political society in order to understand their illocutionary force. In the Dutch case, more strongly than in some others, the ‘national’ character of political culture can be clearly identified. Within this context the illocutionary force of a writer like Spinoza can be (at least partly and illuminatingly) specified within the ‘deeply communicative’ (Castiglione and Hampsher-Monk 2001, 4) Dutch tradition of political thought and action, taken to have stable meanings. For instance, Curley notes that the reason Spinoza put the Ethics to one side to write the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus has ‘much to do with political and social conditions in the Netherlands at that time’ (Curley in Spinoza 1985, 350). Klever describes Spinoza as one ‘who so loved his country and its much-praised freedom’ (Klever 1996, 45), and observes that ‘Amsterdam…was a positive example in the eyes of Spinoza’ (Klever 1996, 38). Because of Spinoza’s attachment to the strong and particular identity of the Dutch case, it makes sense to explore the purpose of a line of argument developed by a writer like Spinoza in terms of his political society and culture, as well as in terms of his intellectual peers and predecessors. It is also pertinent to raise the national/international distinction in the light of the approach taken by some philosophers. Philosophers committed to a mono-contextual meaning for Spinoza in the Tractatus
6 Spinoza and Republicanism
Theologico-Politicus (TTP), as only a member of an international ‘republic of letters’, seek to deny the significance of his interest in local politics, as well as being led to make inflated claims. For such philosophers Letter 23 is taken as definitive proof that Spinoza saw himself not as a United Provinces resident or a Jew but as a philosopher without national context, and Letter 30 is taken as Spinoza’s own statement as a philosopher of why he felt compelled to write the TTP. However in Letter 23, Spinoza’s description of ‘a pure philosopher’ who ‘has no other touchstone of truth than the natural intellect and not theology’ (Spinoza 1985, 387), and his stricture that ‘while we are speaking philosophically we must not use theological ways of speaking’ (Spinoza 1985, 388), refer to the separation between philosophy and theology in the TTP, and do not rule out Spinoza’s interest in contributing to republican debate in the United Provinces. In Letter 30, as Curley notes (Spinoza 1985, 350), Spinoza sets out his reasons for writing the TTP – the ‘prejudices of the theologians, for I know of no greater obstacle to men’s applying their minds to philosophy’, and the ‘opinion ordinary men have of me. They never stop accusing me of atheism, and I am forced to rebut this accusation as much as I can’. Curley observes that Spinoza aimed, in the TTP, to free ‘people from their reliance on Scripture as a guide to the truth about speculative matters’, before publishing the Ethics (Spinoza 1985, 350). Again, these reasons do not rule out others, including a desire to model his vision of a ‘free state’ on the political practice of the country in which he was born and lived. Indeed, the annotation to Letter 30 shows that Spinoza was motivated by an engagement with Dutch politics as much as with philosophical differences with Calvinist divines. Elwes relates that when an excited crowd suspected Spinoza of being a spy, Spinoza cried out, ‘I am a good republican’, adding that he had ‘never had any aim but the welfare and good of the State’ (Elwes 1883, xii). Moreover even the chief collections (Spinoza 1883, 1982, 1985, 1966) from Spinoza’s 88 letters, where the criterion of selection has been to highlight his philosophical correspondence, show not only an appetite for philosophical debate and of spirited clarification of critics’ mistakes but also a keen interest in optical lenses and other scientific matters and current affairs. Nonphilosophical correspondence was destroyed after his death. In the light of the modern national/international dichotomy, which only in the eighteenth century became the dominant way of conceiving home–foreign relations, it is important to make clear how the seventeenth-century United Provinces differs from a modern territorial nation-state. The Netherlanders do not form a nation in terms of
Introduction 7
having a stable territory, or a homogeneous language, religion or ethnic background. The United Provinces is nevertheless clearly a nation in the sense of having a shared political society and culture, and shared and relatively stable terms of contestation in political debate. In Castiglione and Hampsher-Monk’s important work, The History of Political Thought in National Context (2001), a group of writers discuss a range of issues that arise from the different meanings of ‘national’ political thought. The early modern United Provinces is still a neglected area of the history of political thought. This book is concerned to add to our understanding of Spinoza’s political works by explicating an important dimension of Spinoza’s intended meaning, which was primarily local and particularistic, rather than to recover evidence of classical learning in his political works or links with the Ethics as a guide to meaning. Moreover this dimension of Spinoza’s intended meaning was a contribution to a political society preoccupied with a local and particularistic discourse for articulating political reactions and policies. Asserting the distinctiveness or even uniqueness of Dutch republicanism and so accenting the diversity between different republican forms does not lead, however, to a withdrawal to a ‘nominalist’ position (Dunn 1994, 207), the view that each example can only be studied on its own. Neither does it entail subscription to a view of ‘national’ republican traditions. Indeed the comparison with English republicanism in Chapter 4 is designed to illuminate both cases and provide insights through comparison not available when cases are studied in isolation. Moreover it can be argued that Velema is setting up something of a straw man in his repudiation of a ‘totally and entirely exclusive tradition’. Specifically Velema regards Kossmann as instrumental in proposing ‘a purely Dutch and entirely original form of anti-monarchism’ (Velema 2002, 10). However, Kossmann is not guilty of this accusation, and it would be difficult to recall any historian of political thought suggesting a ‘totally and entirely exclusive tradition’. The current work is certainly not arguing for a ‘pure’ form of political theory in Spinoza or the United Provinces. But it is seeking to discover what is notable and characteristic about the meaning of republicanism in this context, on the grounds that terms like ‘republicanism’ and ‘anti-monarchism’ meant something different (as well as something similar) in their different configurations in different national (not nation-state) and other political communities. In short the term ‘republicanism’ in this context refers to much more than a simple anti-monarchism (and the identification of the Princes
8 Spinoza and Republicanism
of Orange with the monarchical component is by no means a simple one), and only secondarily involves a moral ideal of self-government and only doubtfully a notion of civic participation. ‘Republicanism’ in the Dutch context has most to do with, it will be argued, things like regional complementarity and Holland-centricity, provincial insularity and independence, traditionalist practice and the claim about the defence of privileges, the political dominance of the regents, and De Witt’s ‘True Liberty’ policy expressed in the loosest of polycentric confederal alliances – none of which figure in the abstract definition of ‘classical republicanism’. The legitimacy of this approach is strengthened by Sharpe’s, Pocock’s and Worden’s evidence, discussed in Chapter 4, for the novelty of republican ideas in England after the regicide, and by Conti’s statement highlighting the insularity of the Italians. He notes that in ‘sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Italy, the word “republic” was all but a synonym for Venice. When “republic” was mentioned, Venice was automatically evoked’ (Conti 2002, 73). Having identified some of the organising frameworks in the current literature in which Spinoza and republicanism can be studied, and having thereby established more fully the context in terms of which this book seeks to contribute, we return to the present endeavour. Spinoza’s contribution to the political culture of the United Provinces, while extensive and serious, appears as in important ways that of an outsider to the real issues of political life, as he wrote from a perspective that was outside both the university establishment and the ruling regent class. And while he was seen as lending support to De Witt’s republican government, in particular through his published interventions, the publication of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP) in 1670 was regarded as untimely, and the Tractatus Politicus (TP) in 1677 was too late to prevent De Witt’s vision of ‘True Liberty’ being overpowered. But in other ways, and this becomes clear with historical focus, Spinoza’s is the clearest statement that was made, during the 1660s and 1670s, of the moral, political, and constitutional implications of the republic’s identity. It was, however, supported by an abstract theoretical system that the Dutch distrusted and found unpalatable. Spinoza’s formulation also incorporates two traditional Dutch elements of crucial importance – a Holland-centric view of political arrangements in the United Provinces, and an emphasis on the role of practice, as traditionally understood, as the primary means of sanctioning political action. This second point is particularly important, in several respects, in understanding the nature of the ‘Dutch Republic’. It is in terms of
Introduction 9
the peculiarly Dutch understanding of traditional practice, as applied to politics, that we can make sense of the reluctance on the part of the Dutch to theorise the republican character of their state. It is also in terms of this understanding that we can account for their distrust of Spinoza for undertaking such theorisation, and their unwillingness to accept Italian, English or other forms of republicanism as models to follow or emulate. The Holland-centric perspective and the role of practice also help to account for the eclectic mixture of elements to be ultimately found in Dutch republican formulations at the end of the seventeenth century. The Dutch predisposition toward practice is not confined to traditional practice. While, during this period, in politics and government the northern Netherlanders favoured recourse to traditional forms of practice, they also embraced and excelled at a range of new scientific and technological practices. Under the demands of trade and war, important new developments were made in the practices of fortifications, surveying, navigation, mathematics, cartography, printing, optics, astronomy, shipbuilding, commerce, trade, manufacture, and cultural practices like painting and architecture. Descartes, for instance, was known first as a mathematician. Many of these new practices were important on a global scale and fostered world markets for the Dutch. Thus what can be understood by republicanism in theory and practice, in the seventeenth century in the United Provinces, and Spinoza’s role in it, turns out to be a fascinating and complex subject. For although 1579 marks the beginning of a process by which the seven northern provinces became in practice a republic, comprehensively republican ideas were not put forward, let alone accepted, until almost a hundred years later. For almost a century the United Provinces seemed at pains to deny a republican character. Spinoza published the TTP in 1670, and the Ethics and TP were published after his death in 1677. But to understand these works and the political climate of the 1660s and 1670s in the United Provinces in which they were written, we are constantly dragged back into the turmoil of the Dutch Revolt of the previous century. For this reason, it is important here to rehearse the character of the theory and practice of political life in the United Provinces from the time of the Dutch Revolt onwards, before Spinoza’s contribution can be adequately understood. The history of the Revolt and its aftermath provide the appropriate antecedent conditions, in this study, for evaluating Spinoza’s political contribution, but are not regarded as deterministically causal. The examination of the evidence
10 Spinoza and Republicanism
relating to the character of the theory and practice of politics during this period will not only disclose a more accurate picture of the background to Spinoza’s contribution. That examination will also undercut any assumption of a ‘natural’ reciprocal expression between theory and practice, in politics in the United Provinces at this time. Thus the long prelude to discussion of Spinoza is required in order to consider a whole range of crucially relevant questions. For instance, why were the United Provinces so reluctant to use their republican title? And why was Spinoza’s theoretical justification of a century of more or less republican practice received so poorly? Why had a more centralised and unified political and administrative structure not developed in line with the United Provinces’ status as a major European power? Why had Holland, obviously the wealthiest and most powerful province, not come to express its dominance in constitutional terms of institutional change, given the centralising tendencies at work elsewhere in Europe? The United Provinces is a notable exception to ‘that general drift towards absolutism which has often been taken as the theme par excellence of the century’ (Stoye 1969, 19). And how is it that Holland was overruled by weaker provinces, and accepted being overruled, at strategic points? Why did the United Provinces, as a major European power, not seek to increase its territory in Europe? In this way the United Provinces was going against the grain of the practice of France, Spain, Sweden and the Habsburgs – that is, going against the grain of the aggressively territorial ambitions of other major powers in seventeenth-century Europe. All the puzzling questions about the reluctance of the United Provinces to accept their republican status positively, and to develop a unified constitutional structure, draw us back to the previous century when the Netherlands began its eighty years’ struggle against the Spanish. But here more and more puzzles arise. Even in the 1570s, while staunchly fighting the Spanish, the northern Netherlanders still regarded Philip II as their overlord. Why did the Union of Utrecht in 1579 not announce the independence of the United Provinces, but instead emphasise the separateness and autonomy from Spain of the provinces that signed it, while protesting their allegiance to a true prince? Why did the Abjuration of Spanish rule in 1581 still not contain a statement of independence? Why, even after the Abjuration, did the United Provinces cast around among various European states (Anjou, France, England), inviting them to take on the overlordship of the United Provinces? Why wasn’t the States General regarded as a sovereign body, when it was able to behave with such power over affairs?
Introduction 11
Why didn’t Holland attempt to dominate and unify at this point? How is it that the Calvinists did not establish a national church in the northern Netherlands, and yet the Calvinist fervour of the Sea Beggars was a decisive factor in being able to defeat the Spanish in the years leading up to the Truce? Why were influential sections of the United Provinces so opposed to the Truce with Spain in 1609, when a truce would seem to have been in their interests? Furthermore, why did the United Provinces not exploit Spanish weaknesses and force a peace treaty before 1648? Again it would seem to have been in their interests. Why did the United Provinces reject the overtures of German princes to join them in 1648? And why did the United Provinces not seek to at least reunify the Netherlands by taking over the Spanish southern Netherlands in 1648? Why, in a republican state, was a monarchical form of government recommended and advocated in university political theory courses in the seventeenth century? And how can we account for the strength and power of the Calvinist feeling in the northern Netherlands, in the light of the provisions enshrined in the Union of Utrecht of 1579 for religious toleration, which allowed Calvinists to worship freely? In what follows I hope some light will be cast on these questions and so on the character of the political background against which Spinoza wrote. Kossmann’s excellent ‘Introduction’ provides a valuable general context for the discussion (Kossmann and Mellink 1974). Seventeenth-century Dutch political thought and practice, and in particular Dutch republicanism, represents an important historical context for understanding Spinoza’s political philosophy. Two factors support the argument put forward here for contributing to a ‘political’ reading of Spinoza’s political works. First, Spinoza’s metaphysical philosophy and the other-worldly aspect of his reputation have led some commentators to discount all contexts for his writings other than that in which to establish the precise nature of his place in a dehistoricised Descartes-to-Kant rationalist canon. The ‘political’ reading of Spinoza’s political theory is designed to enrich the view of him as a philosopher. In addition, Spinoza’s two political treatises are not widely known among an English-speaking audience, his name being most often associated with the modern history of metaphysics. However in recent years the narrowly metaphysical interest in the Ethics has been supplemented, by writers like Genevieve Lloyd (1994, 1996), Moira Gatens (1996a, 1996b), and Lloyd and Gatens (1999) with a growing interest in the rich ethical,
12 Spinoza and Republicanism
ontological and epistemological theories of the Ethics, and their political implications. In the second place, Spinoza’s Jewish upbringing, complicated by his Marrano status, also render complex his relation to Dutch seventeenth-century history and politics. The ‘political’ interpretation of Spinoza’s two political texts seeks to understand how these aspects of his background might impact on his thinking as well as on the public reception of his works. The case for studying Spinoza’s political works in the context of seventeenthcentury Dutch political thought and practice, and especially Dutch republicanism, is supported in this respect by the fact of Spinoza’s own great and enthusiastic interest in political affairs in Holland. The connections between Spinoza’s political philosophy and the times in which he lived are what are being explored here. Even this context is an ambitious one to undertake. The scope of all the aspects of theory and practice which it encompasses – all the ramifications and influences and further reaches of expression in contemporary texts and pamphlets – cannot hope to be comprehensively explored here. However the context has been examined in sufficient detail to demonstrate the soundness of the central propositions about the character of political life in the United Provinces in the 1660s and 1670s and the role of Spinoza’s contribution to it. The central theme of this book concerns the character of republicanism in the United Provinces in its ‘golden age’, and the assessment of Spinoza’s contribution to that meaning of republican government. Liberty and sovereignty are key concepts for understanding the parameters and form of republican dominion that Spinoza developed. These conceptions are developed in Chapter 7. Another major theme is to explore and highlight the meaning, for understanding Spinoza’s political thought, of the way in which the Dutch characteristically demonstrated a reluctance to theorise. This affected both political practice and political theory in the United Provinces and is the subject of Chapters 3 and 5. In terms of political practice, the way in which political and constitutional reform was not undertaken to bring it into line with events during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries requires particular attention. In terms of political theory it is worth examining the way in which the closest one comes to political theory before Spinoza, and to the use by political leaders of political theory, is represented in the pragmatic approach of the works of the De la Court brothers. The significance of the theoretical character of Spinoza’s reflections on politics, and their impact on political practice, is discussed in Chapter 6. In addition, the significance of the strands
Introduction 13
established by the historical material adduced in the earlier chapters, strands about the character of Dutch political life, is utilised in Chapter 8 on Spinoza’s republicanism. This book explores Spinoza’s political theory, his conception of republicanism, and the story of the interaction between Spinoza’s and Dutch republicanism. This exploration provides an opportunity to address the concept and tradition of republicanism more widely. The evidence which this book studies adds weight to the conviction of the diversity and specificity of meanings of republican theory and practice. As described earlier, the revival of scholarly interest in republicanism in recent years has been led by Skinner’s retrieval of the meaning and utility of the concept of liberty in republican writings prior to its adoption and redefinition in liberal political theory. Skinner’s important body of work on ‘liberty before liberalism’, in part building upon Pocock’s portrayal of a classical republican tradition stretching from Machiavelli to the American Founding Fathers, and Hans Baron’s recovery of a ‘civic humanist’ tradition, have stimulated an interest in republican political principles among political theorists like Pettit. ‘Classical republicanism’ is thereby contrasted both with ‘ancient republicanism’, and with ‘modern representative democracy’, ‘modern constitutional’ or democratic and liberal republican values ‘reinvented’ in eighteenthcentury America and France. In the course of his lively and programmatic work, intended to attract liberals, communitarians and others to the contemporary relevance of the ‘republican project’, Pettit (1997, 120) outlines a number of features of republicanism. These include the rejection of arbitrary government, the notion of freedom as non-domination, specific linkages with equality, community, civic virtue, constitutionalism and the checking of government, a radical set of social policies, and democracy. In order to support his modern republican project Pettit presents a story of a tradition, heavily indebted to Pocock’s work, incorporating origins in classical Rome, resurrection in the Renaissance, the English Civil War and Commonwealth, culminating in eighteenth-century English, French and American republican writings (Pettit 1997, 5–6) and its overshadowing by the development of liberal political theory and practice. Pettit describes a confidently transhistorical republican primary ‘theme’ of a ‘belief in freedom from non-domination which binds together thinkers of very different periods and very different background philosophies’ (Pettit 1997, 10–11). If Pettit’s depiction is correct, then his work does a service in illuminating, albeit indirectly,
14 Spinoza and Republicanism
the very distinctive insularity of Spinoza and the Dutch in only seeking legitimation for their republicanism from their own local tradition. Spinoza and Republicanism centres on Spinoza’s engagement with the concept of republicanism, in terms of his chosen context of the United Provinces in the seventeenth century. The present work’s title alludes to the importance of recognising how and in what ways the notion of republicanism that Spinoza engaged with and contributed to, was distinct and particular. In Chapter 8 specific elements of Spinoza’s republicanism are distinguished from a key feature of Pettit’s model. These elements draw on the discussions of Chapters 6 and 7. One of the things that emerges clearly from those discussions is that Spinoza was a republican but not a democrat. Pettit’s work is most useful in bringing to life a republican alternative to modern liberal political theory, and also in highlighting for the purposes of this book the specificity of the historical inflection of republicanism in the Dutch case. Dutch and even English republicanism, when looked at closely, do not fit neatly into Pettit’s schematisation. It may well be the case that other instances within ‘the republican tradition’ (Pettit 1997, 20) Pettit constructs were more selfconscious than were the Dutch about drawing upon external republican examples to reinforce their contemporaneous claims. It may also be that Pettit’s ideal model of republicanism rests on categories important in modern political debate – democracy and individualism figure large, and universal suffrage is taken as critical to grounding a society without divisions – which cannot accommodate either the specificity of the early modern Dutch case without anachronism or its peculiarity. Modelbuilding in the form of Pettit’s ‘ideal type’, as well as Pocock’s notion of a ‘tradition’ of political discourse, can be problematic if they lead to the suppression of differences and heterogeneity which are key to understanding a particular case or conception, and also if they reify their subject. In order to understand the Dutch case more fully it is important to start by looking backwards rather than forwards, because that is what the Dutch did. By tracing their practice, we find that the perspective of their political culture and mentality was backwardlooking in a positive sense. It characterises their political practice throughout the spectacular success of the Dutch ‘golden age’. We will tend to misunderstand Dutch republicanism if we attempt only to assimilate it, either to models of things that came after (‘bourgeois liberal republicanism’) or to the past in a place that was not central
Introduction 15
for them (Italian Renaissance city-states). The method undertaken in the present work, supporting the location of Spinoza’s meaning in the context of his chosen and local political culture, employs the following transcendental argument. 1 The Dutch could not have engaged in politics in the form they did, through an engagement with traditional political arguments about the location of authority in the privileges, without the assumption that there was an ongoing political discourse based on tradition in this sense. The transcendental argument distances to one remove the question of whether or not this political culture ‘really’ depended so crucially on the defence of privileges through a traditionalist practice or not. That question cannot be answered conclusively one way or the other, but what remains quite clear are the Dutch perception of what they were doing, and Spinoza’s primary intention in contributing to political debate in the United Provinces. The commitment to taking Spinoza’s local and particularistic political culture seriously is addressed and developed in more detail in Chapter 5 when the Dutch mentality is discussed. In contributing to the third organising framework in which to understand Spinoza and republicanism in the Dutch context, the novel or innovative aspects of the current work include a fresh understanding of the role of traditional practice and Holland-centricity in Spinoza’s political theory, and especially a reappraisal of Spinoza’s estimation of democracy and of his understanding of sovereignty. These reinterpretations, through a ‘political’ reading of Spinoza, arise in part from redressing the neglect of Spinoza’s second political treatise. The meaning of the Dutch appeal to the privileges is developed, in the light of the changing claims made about them and the unacknowledged slippage of meaning involved. The ambiguous meaning of the Dutch Republic’s constitution is also explored. Claims about the privileges of the cities and provinces, together with the international treaty of the Union of Utrecht of 1579, are the central elements of the de facto constitutional status of the Dutch Republic. Ideas about the role of regional complementarity in the success of the polycentric republic (which could be of interest to those theorising European integration in the twenty-first century), and about the mismatch between theory and practice, are developed further. The detailed examination of dates for 1 I am indebted to Gary Browning for pointing out the value of this transcendental argument and its ‘fit’ with the significance which their political culture and mentality held for the Dutch and for Spinoza.
16 Spinoza and Republicanism
the establishment of the Dutch Republic, and the comparison of English and Dutch republicanism, both represent more systematic analyses of their kind than have been undertaken previously. The book seeks to bring together the insights into Spinoza’s understanding of republicanism in the light of the Dutch context. It draws upon political theory, the history of political thought, and history, and thereby introduces to an English-speaking audience a specific case-study of this combined approach. Several notes on terminology are appropriate at the beginning. First, when the term ‘Dutch Republic’ is used, it refers specifically and precisely to its use during the period from the Treaty of Münster in 1648 to the end of the eighteenth century. This identification is in line with the usage of the inhabitants of the northern Netherlands themselves. Several modern commentators use the term ‘Dutch Republic’ to refer to the United Provinces from various dates going back to 1579. It is one of the major contentions of this book that such a usage creates a serious misunderstanding about the character of political life in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Chapter 2 discusses in detail the issues involved in attempting to date the inauguration of the ‘Dutch Republic’, on the basis of the framework of evidence presented in the first chapter that the term ‘Dutch Republic’ does not most accurately refer to the period 1579–1648. A related problem concerns the most accurate term to describe the country or state of the United Provinces after 1648. Thus ‘Dutch Republic’ and ‘United Provinces’ overlap to some extent. The ‘northern Netherlands’ and the ‘Seven Provinces’ can also be used. The term ‘Low Countries’ refers to both the southern and northern Netherlands or what is now comprised by Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and French Flanders. It is significant that these titles are in the plural, for they reflect both the intended distinctiveness of the parts and the unintended fragmentation of the area. Moreover, Blockmans confirms that only in the middle of the sixteenth century did ‘people attempt to give a name to these Seventeen Provinces’, and then it came in three languages – ‘Nederland’ or ‘Nederlanden’ in Dutch, ‘Pais Bas’ in French, and ‘Belgique(s)’ from the Latin (Blockmans 1999, 119). It is interesting that, roughly speaking, what is now commonly known as ‘Holland’ was in Spinoza’s time the United Provinces, one of the provinces of which was Holland. The term ‘country’ is also locally used interchangeably with province. A second note concerns the use of terms to refer to the inhabitants of this country, especially in the second half of the seventeenth
Introduction 17
century, where the attention of this book is focused. The problem is that there is no immediately accessible term by which to refer to the population of the United Provinces, or of the Dutch Republic. Consequently I have resorted to using the terms ‘northern Netherlanders’, ‘Netherlanders’ and ‘the Dutch’, though fully aware that strictly speaking, ‘the Dutch’ are the inhabitants only of Holland, just one of the seven provinces. In order to avoid confusion here, I have used the term ‘Hollanders’ when wishing to refer only to the inhabitants of Holland. In the same way a term like ‘Dutch political practice’ is taken to refer to the political practice of those in the United Provinces. Two further cases of terminological awareness concern some institutional terms used by the northern Netherlanders and shared by modern Dutch commentators. Prime among these terms are ‘States General’ (or ‘Estates General’) and ‘States’, which refer to the political assemblies of the United Provinces and of the separate provinces respectively. These councils combined some legislative and executive functions, but do not correspond fully to parliamentary and prime ministerial duties. The United Provinces was not a modern state but a loose confederation of provinces comprised of independent city-states. As Blom notes, it ‘seems inadequate to label the Republic a federal state…because it possessed no detailed regulation of the respective rights and duties of its different parts’ (Blom 2002, 97). It is in this light that the functions of the States and States General need to be read. Price accurately captures the character of the States General when he describes it as ‘a conference of ambassadors from separate countries rather than a parliament’ (Price 1994, 211). As I shall argue, the Union of Utrecht of 1579, together with claims about the defence of privileges, is the closest the United Provinces came to a constitution, and this was not very close. The Union of Utrecht remained an international legal and military treaty between the separate provinces, and the (changing) significance of the privileges lay in the claims made about them. The States General had direct control over foreign relations, the armed forces and the administration of the Generality Lands, that is, parts of Flanders, Brabant and Limburg annexed by the north during the Revolt (Price 1994, 210). Price confirms that the ‘precise constitutional position’ of the States General ‘was never absolutely clear’ (Price 1994, 4), and that its powers were greater in practice than in theory. The States General represented two ‘estates’ or social orders – representatives from the college of Nobles, and delegations from the Town
18 Spinoza and Republicanism
Councils and Colleges of Magistrates – which together were taken to represent ‘the whole state and entire body of the inhabitants’. The States General contained delegations of deputies from the States of Gelderland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Overijssel, Friesland, Groningen, and Holland, and each province had a single vote. The delegations from the provinces were chosen by different, locally determined, methods (Price 1994, 211). The States General met in permanent session, unlike the provincial States. Its administrative functions were undertaken by a Raadpensionaris, who was also the Pensionary of the States of Holland, the most powerful province. The towns (also known as cities), in Vranck’s authoritative description of 1587, were ‘independent self-governing political entities, governed by a college of town councillors’ (van Gelderen 1993, xxix). The Southern (Spanish and later Austrian) Netherlands contained its own set of States and its own States General. Likewise, and holding a position separate from but often in tension with the States and States General, was the office of ‘Stadholder’. The Stadholder historically had a leadership role as the emperor’s provincial governor, physically ‘standing in for’ him and controlling some appointments on town councils and the provincial States. The Stadholdership was historically associated with the House of Orange from the time of William the Silent (1533–84) (Blom 1995, 41). Moreover the association was with the extended House of Orange, including uncles and other family members who might hold titles in different Dutch provinces, and not just with the current Count. Velema says that the Stadholder in the form of the princes of the House of Orange was the ‘hereditary head (not monarch though) who was supreme military commander’ (Velema 2002, 19). But the situation was somewhat more complicated. From 1579 the post ceased to be hereditary since the Stadholder’s appointment now depended upon the separate provincial States (rather than on the States General), and the Stadholder was an agent of the States, although he could be appointed captain-general of the army by the States General. There were also two important ‘Stadholderless’ periods, the first of which between 1650 and 1672 largely coincided with De Witt’s republican government. Although the post of Stadholder had been abolished by most of the Northern Provinces after the death of William II in 1650, in fact Friesland and Groningen continued to have Stadholders throughout this period. Thus, strictly speaking, the first Stadholderless period was nothing of the kind. But
Introduction 19
because of the power and authority wielded by the province of Holland during this time, his absence there was decisive. Speck recounts that although William III revived the post in 1672, ‘and even got it to be made hereditary, he died childless in 1702’, which thereby inaugurated the second Stadholderless period of 1702 to 1747 (Speck 1995, 174). As Speck notes, a Stadholder ‘was not a monarch but the occupant of a post devised before the Dutch Revolt to represent the absentee Habsburg monarchs, being equivalent to viceroy or lieutenant’. It follows that the post was ‘therefore something of an anomaly after the successful movement to throw off the Habsburgs and establish a republic’ (Speck 1995, 174). But the post was not abolished at that point and the anomaly was at times exploited to decisive political advantage by the House of Orange. During the Dutch Revolt when resistance to the monarchical component of the regnum mixtum was focused upon the Spanish king, the Princes of Orange were often allied with and at times played a leading role in the defence of the Netherlands. But with the emergence of the Dutch Republic tensions in the relation between the regents, States General and States on the one side and the House of Orange on the other, always under strain, became more marked. For now the strategic significance of the Stadholderate changed, being as Speck says, ‘the one agency which had the potential to focus authority at the centre rather than the peripheries’ (Speck 1995, 174). The House of Orange thus represented a further and at times very strong focus for anti-monarchical sentiment, particularly in the light of its centralising ambitions at home and appetite for war abroad. In this way the ambiguity about whether the Stadholder was the monarchical component of a mixed constitution, or whether he harboured monarchical ambitions and aspired to the role of the Habsburg kings in the Northern Netherlands, is a distinctive feature of Dutch politics throughout this period. References to Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP) and Tractatus Politicus (TP) are to the unabridged Elwes translation of 1951. A new translation of the TTP by Samuel Shirley was published in 1991. While the Shirley edition has much to recommend it there are three reasons for staying with the Elwes translation. Shirley has translated the TTP but not the TP and for the purposes of this book it is important to retain the consistency afforded by using the Elwes edition of both political treatises. Second, not all of Shirley’s notes
20 Spinoza and Republicanism
to contemporaneous events are reliable – see for instance the final note on p. 218, which identifies Spinoza’s reference to ‘the last count’ as Philip II of Spain, when the reference is more probably to William II’s attempted coup d’etat of 1650. Finally the benefit of the Shirley translation’s modern updating of the language in a manner that makes it more accessible to students, comes at the cost of some of the nuances of the earlier translation.
1 The Revolt
The history of the Revolt of the Netherlands In order to demonstrate the legacy of political practices as an important framework for Spinoza’s political theory, it is valuable to highlight the key milestones of the Revolt, and to indicate how political negotiations were conducted at significant points during the Revolt. This undertaking is crucial in establishing the character of political practice in the United Provinces in the 1650s and 1660s. Throughout the period covered by the Revolt and the Dutch Republic a movable feast of provinces and towns resisted and fought the Spanish, the French and the English. Relations between the States General and the House of Orange are also important. Scott argues that after 1648 ‘periodic cooperation’ gave way to ‘sustained rivalry’ (Scott 2000, 459), but the history of the relations of the States General with the House of Orange overall is perhaps best characterised in terms of periods of cooperation within an overall framework of rivalry. In the middle of the sixteenth century the overlordship of the seventeen provinces comprising the whole of the northern and southern Netherlands, passed in dynastic succession from the Habsburg Charles V to the Spanish Philip II (his son). It was more than symbolically important that Philip, unlike his father, did not speak Dutch (van Gelderen 1993, ix). It was discontent with Spanish rule that led to the Dutch Revolt. Kossmann’s noteworthy assessment demonstrates a typically Dutch reluctance to theorise, or perhaps overtheorise, the beginnings of the Revolt. ‘Historians’, he says, ‘have stopped debating about the main causes and the true nature of the Revolt. A series of disturbances stretching over various decades cannot, they think, be explained by means of such imperialistic conceptions’ (Kossmann 1991, 283). It is, 21
22 Spinoza and Republicanism
nevertheless, possible to outline the stages or phases of the Revolt and to examine the character of the ‘independence’ of the northern provinces, achieved through eighty years of war with Spain. What follows does not attempt to represent a comprehensive history of the Revolt. The account highlights features of the Revolt which have a bearing on Dutch political theorising and Spinoza’s political thought. The ‘Seventeen Provinces of the Netherlands’ in 1566 were not easy to govern, with three million people living within the territory understood in terms of some three hundred cities, each with a local focus of interest, proud history, and loyalty. The Seventeen Provinces were organised into a group for the first time, for the purposes of imperial politics, only in 1548, ‘by the Transaction of Augsburg in a separate Burgundian Circle of the Holy Roman Empire and, following the 1549 Pragmatic Sanction, were the patrimony of Philip II’ (van Gelderen 1992, 1). Several different languages were spoken in different parts of the Netherlands, and Habsburg attempts to standardise law had been patchy (Blockmans 1999, 120). The country was in effect a confederation of cities, so the personality and conduct of the overall ruler was of great significance as the only real source of whatever administrative unity existed. In the eyes of the cities and their provincial States, Philip was not entitled to make decisions, as he boldly began to do, about important political matters such as foreign and financial policies and legal issues nor to levy taxes without the ‘counsel and consent’ of the States. These claims were an important resource of power for the provincial assemblies. One sign of Philip’s intentions is found in his order to the mapmaker Jacob van Deventer in 1559 to ‘visit, measure and draw all the towns of the Habsburg Netherlands, with the rivers and villages adjoining, likewise the frontier crossings and passes’. Philip’s determination to gather information using new scientific cartographic techniques in order to produce an accurate record of the territory for administrative and military uses was frustrated by Deventer, who having made maps of three hundred towns, fled to Cologne at the outbreak of war in 1572 (Parker 1992, 128). On the Netherlanders’ side, van Bunge notes that in the late sixteenth century Prince Maurice of Orange employed scientists to reformulate the principles of fortification, to benefit the Dutch army in the Eighty Years War, which in military terms was fought mainly as a series of sieges (van Bunge 1999b, 2). The decentralised tendencies of the Netherlands were also expressed in the structure and powers of the States General. The States General comprised representatives from the different States’ assemblies. As van
The Revolt 23
Gelderen notes, the States General was ‘created by the Burgundian Dukes in the course of the fifteenth century to foster the idea of unity amongst the provinces’, but was in practice used by the separate States ‘primarily as a useful instrument for increasing their influence on central policy’ (van Gelderen 1993, x). Duke details how each province of the ‘Seventeen Netherlands’ stood in a ‘special relationship’ to the prince. He comments that Philip was ‘duly recognised in 1555 as duke of Brabant, Limburg, Luxemburg and Gelre, count of Flanders, Artois, Hainaul, Holland, Zeeland and Namur and as lord of Friesland, Mehelen, Utrecht, Overijssel and Groningen’. Thus, importantly, Philip’s authority was not as prince over an integrated whole, but over the separate parts. Moreover, Duke remarks, ‘the Habsburg princes had never intended to foster a specific and exclusively Netherlandish consciousness’ (Duke 1990, 182). These territories were administered separately and the princes were not in the business of state-building. Duke also comments that the ‘precise nature of the bond’ between prince and each province differed, and was ‘defined by chartered privileges which the prince swore to observe when he made his entry’ (Duke 1990, 175). As a result of this disaggregated relationship between the prince and the different provinces, the ‘bonds of loyalty to the prince and the degree of participation in the wider community greatly varied’ (Duke 1990, 178). Duke also notes as a complicating factor the role of the nobles in the relationship between prince and province, further ensuring that chains of command were complex and mediated by differently framed local loyalties. Charles V, like his Burgundian predecessors had given, in Duke’s words, ‘a semblance of coherence to his fragmented territories by involving the score or so great noble houses in their government’ (Duke 1990, 176). But ‘the character and political power of the nobility differed widely between one part of the country and another’ (Duke 1990, 178). Only in the Walloon provinces ‘did conditions allow the nobility’ to function as the principal liaison ‘between the prince and his people’ (Duke 1990, 181). Moreover, as Duke relates, it was ‘precisely the Spanish character of the ruling dynasty after 1555 that the nobility of the Low Countries found hardest to stomach’. While in other circumstances the nobility might be natural allies of the prince, ‘the native nobility took a strong dislike to Philip because he preferred the Spanish ways of life and took counsel only from Spaniards’ (Duke 1990, 183). Among the nobility Philip was disliked not for state-building (which he didn’t attempt) but for his ‘Spanish ways’.
24 Spinoza and Republicanism
During the course of the Revolt and afterwards there is a strong trend in the decline in the political power of the old nobility and a corresponding trend in the growth in the power of the urban regent patriciates in the major towns. Van Nierop describes how the two trends are closely connected. In Holland, for example, the number of cities invited to join the States of Holland, initially just for the duration of the war but by default on a permanent basis, rose from six to eighteen. In consequence the nobles witnessed ‘the increasing importance of the cities and their regents in the states of Holland’ (van Nierop 1984, 203). There was a college of nobles and not all were enrolled in the college or Ridderschap. While the nobility had never held a monopoly of power, from the sixteenth century they shared it with the cities and the regents. But although the nobles and the cities then together, as van Nierop says, ‘constituted the administrative elite’, in social life a strict segregation applied (van Nierop 1984, 217–19). Furthermore the seventeenth century sees the ‘aristocratisation’ of the regent class in the Republic, as urban regents gave up ‘the activities in trade and industry in order to adopt an aristocratic style of life’ (van Nierop 1984, 212). Philip’s early, bold, policy statement of a centrally imposed tax was bound to antagonise the disaggregated sensibilities of the different provinces and towns. He ‘virtually started his reign by proposing a series of taxes’ (van Gelderen 1993, x) that radically disrupted the settled relation between centre and peripheries. Philip’s initiative was further confounded, however, when he discovered (not having realised beforehand) that the deputies of the different States assemblies were only delegates (only with powers to follow the mandate of their principals) rather than full representatives (entitled to act on behalf of their constituents). Moreover different provinces gave their delegates different kinds of instructions, and the more recently conquered provinces behaved differently from those long-established in the Burgundian empire. Thus, as Duke notes, while in the States General, ‘the Low Countries ostensibly possessed an institution capable of articulating a political identity of the country’, the ‘States General was by virtue of its composition and traditions quite unfitted to transcend provincial particularism’ (Duke 1990, 177). Duke confirms that outside ‘the ranks of the nobility, patrie continued to denote, as it had during the middle ages, one’s native town or province’ (Duke 1990, 185). Van Gelderen comments that this situation ‘not only made it almost impossible for the sovereign to exert the charismatic powers of his office’. It also ‘turned the negotiations into a time-consuming affair
The Revolt 25
with great possibilities for creative obstructionism’. Van Gelderen makes the further important point that although ‘eventually the States agreed to levy taxes, Philip interpreted’, or rather significantly misinterpreted ‘their behaviour as an attempt to tilt the balance of power in favour of a sort of parliamentary government’ (van Gelderen 1993, x). Philip’s subsequent repressive measures were in part due to a basic misunderstanding about the political intentions of the Netherlanders. Far from desiring a form of parliamentary government, the Netherlanders were uniting in the desire to reaffirm their fiercely held separateness. Within thirty years of Luther’s initiation of the Reformation in 1517, the establishment of a Calvinist Geneva and the emergence of the Catholic Counter-Reformation shortly afterwards, the United Provinces were substantially affected by the religious and political repercussions of these events. By the 1540s and 1550s the spread from the east and south of Protestant beliefs including Calvinism had become widespread. Antwerp in the southern Netherlands became the centre for the Protestant faith (Blockmans 1999, 129). Blockmans recounts that ‘during the Spanish siege of Antwerp from 1584 and 1585 – when the Protestant tide was already ebbing – one third of the population identified themselves as Protestants, and most of them as Calvinists’. A further third were Catholics and the remainder did not specify their religious conviction. Blockmans considers that this pattern was repeated in many other cities (Blockmans 1999, 129). Van Gelderen confirms that as well as ‘the rising number of Protestants there was a large “centre group” of people who, though themselves not Protestant, despised harsh persecution for legal, political and humanitarian reasons’ (van Gelderen 1999, xi). Van Bunge argues that from the ‘1560s onwards, after the first Lutheran and Mennonite waves that had swept the religious landscape of the Low Countries’ in the first half of the sixteenth century, Calvinist reformers ‘more or less hijacked the revolt, aspiring to establish a National Reformed Orthodoxy’. He notes that this attempt was resisted, for ‘in 1572 both William of Orange and the States of Holland had already declared that freedom of religion was to be guaranteed’ (van Bunge 1999b, 7). But theological and religious differences also need to be understood as a destabilising factor within a wider social and political context. Strong evidence supports the view that changes in religious allegiances could also have political motives. Blockmans argues that ‘sympathy for the Reformation meant a rejection of the status quo, which was embodied by the close relationship between the absolutist state and the Catholic church’ (Blockmans 1999, 120). Schöffer (1964, 76–7) also
26 Spinoza and Republicanism
reminds us not to underestimate the importance of homegrown influences on events. The Netherlands had been prepared to accept the burden of taxation imposed by Charles V in return for his protection of their interests and his abstention from interfering too closely in their internal affairs. But the high taxation imposed by his son Philip was less tolerable when accompanied by religious persecution, that is, when both the level of taxation and persecution amounted to insufferable interference in internal affairs. Philip’s return to Spain in 1559 further symbolised to the Netherlanders his view that the Netherlands were simply a territory to be exploited by Spanish interests and brought directly under the control of the Spanish crown. The first phase of the Revolt, in 1566, started in fact in western Flanders, in the southern, not the northern part of the Netherlands. It was prompted by the introduction of the Spanish Inquisition as a measure to stamp out opposition to the Spanish championing of the Counter-Reformation. As Blockmans comments, the ‘stakes were high: the Spanish global empire was confronted with a revolt from the most important economic region of the world’ (Blockmans 1999, 127). The announcement of a scheme to create three new archbishoprics and fourteen new bishoprics, in an attempt ‘to root out religious dissent’ (Blockmans 1999, 127), had already triggered the antagonism of the Burgundian nobles, the urban patriciate and the common people. The intimate relationship between the church and the imperial state was, he notes, ‘predicated on the notion that the monarchy had been established by God, and that the king was obliged to safeguard true worship’. This ‘realignment of bishoprics to reflect political boundaries and the advent of the Inquisition in the Low Countries were other striking examples of this cooperation between church and state’, Blockmans argues. The logic was that ‘the emperor forbade heresy, the ecclesiastical courts prosecuted and convicted, and the state punished’. Blockmans makes an important point about the nature of heresy under these conditions. The synchronism between the Catholic church and the imperial state led to the situation in which ‘it was easy for people with economic grievances, either because authorities wronged them or because they faced a decline in their standard of living, to be automatically branded as “heretics”’. Conversely, in the light of the introduction of repressive measures ‘discontented groups’, such as those facing a decline in prosperity, ‘found it natural to oppose both the church and the state’ (Blockmans 1999, 130). The subsequent prevarications of Margaret of Parma, and the cruelty of Cardinal Granvelle, the stationing of Spanish garrisons in the
The Revolt 27
Netherlands, the reign of terror and persecution of ‘heretics’ by the Duke of Alva, and economic depression all provoked the conflict and alienated local moderates. The Iconoclastic Riots of 1566 were an initially spontaneous uprising focusing upon the purging from Catholic churches of ‘papist idolatry’ in the form of statues, stainedglass windows and other ‘idols’, as symbols of defiance to Spanish rule. Blockmans notes that William of Orange’s subsequent attempted invasion of Brabant in 1568 is the ‘military move that is traditionally considered the beginning of the Eighty Years’ War’ (Blockmans 1999, 133). Philip II’s prevarications, partly due to debts and pressing problems in the divergent interests of his empire, reflected in his competition with the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean area and with England in the Atlantic region, also contributed. Blockmans argues that ‘indecision in Madrid produced a power vacuum in the Low Countries’, in which ‘the States [assemblies] of Brabant, Flanders and Holland were able to take decisive steps in formulating their own sovereignty’ (Blockmans 1999, 127). The second phase of the Revolt, in 1572, led by William the Silent’s Sea Beggars, focused on resistance in 26 northern towns, some of which had remained obedient in 1566. The name ‘Sea Beggars’ derives from an insult by the count of Berlaymont that the lower nobility were mere ‘beggars’, and the term subsequently became a ‘badge of honour’ for the rebels (Blockmans 1999, 133). The second phase was sparked off by opposition to the proposed Spanish imposition of a ten per cent sales tax, the ‘Tenth Penny’. This sales tax was designed by Alva as a permanent, direct and automatic source of revenue, and to ‘reduce the regional government’s dependence on both Spanish subsidies and the unreliable States’ assemblies (Blockmans 1999, 133). In 1574 Alva initiated a military campaign which not only failed to subdue opposition, but unified resistance against the Spanish and ‘further undermined the legitimacy of Spanish authority’ (Blockmans 1999, 135). Resentment against the Spanish grew, in Duke’s words, into a ‘strident hispanophobia’ (Duke 1990, 187). On Dutch attitudes to the Spanish, Swart (1975, 36–57) details how the Dutch, during the Revolt, popularised earlier criticisms of Spain, but did not themselves invent the potent Black Legend, though it was more virulent in the Netherlands than anywhere else in Europe. The third phase of the Revolt, of 1576, began in Brussels in the south, largely by Catholics in response to the uncontrolled destruction perpetrated by Spanish troops, unpaid because of Philip’s financial bankruptcy. The Pacification of Ghent at the end of 1576, the publicly
28 Spinoza and Republicanism
issued terms on which Brabant, Guelders, Flanders, Holland, and Zeeland agreed to accept peace following the unauthorised massacre undertaken by mutinous troops, marked a further significant grouping of provinces against the Spanish. But in 1579 some of the southern and eastern provinces (Artois, Hainaut, Namur, Luxembourg and Limburg), with a ‘growing aversion’ to the power of the Walloon nobility and Calvinist radicalisation, and with the promise of restored privileges and the removal of foreign troops (Blockmans 1999, 137), signed the Union of Arras, by which they swore to uphold the Catholic religion. Six of the ‘northern’ provinces (Brabant, Flanders, Tournai, Holland, Zeeland and Guelders) (van Gelderen 1993, xxii lists the provinces as Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Guelders and Groningen) signed the Union of Utrecht later the same year. The significance of the Union of Utrecht for the later history of the Netherlands is enormous, since it represents the ‘only legal foundation’ for the subsequent ‘Republic of the north’ (van Gelderen 1993, xxii). Initially the breakaway of the northern provinces was only undertaken in response to the Union of Arras with Spain by the southern states. The idea of ‘forming a closer union of the northern provinces’ had long been broached by William of Orange (although as van Gelderen says, possibly ‘only for strategic reasons’), but was taken up and implemented by Holland and Zeeland (van Gelderen 1993, xxii). Under the Union of Arras the southern states reaffirmed their Catholicism in return for the restoration of the situation that had obtained under Charles V, namely stable government at a distance and the removal of Spanish troops from southern Netherlands soil, together with the reaffirmation of Philip’s overlordship (Rowen 1972, 260–1). The Union of Arras was intended by Spain to restore peace and repose, not as a first step in the creation of a new political unit. The Duke of Parma and reconciled Catholics did not see the Arras agreement as accepting the permanency of a northern state above the Rhine–Meuse river line. On the northern side, the Union of Utrecht was not seen as the first step to independent statehood either. The Unions of Arras and Utrecht in 1579 were to prove decisive, with the northern provinces forming the United Provinces and the southern provinces remaining until 1794 under the Habsburg dynastic rule that had been established in 1477 (Blockmans 1999, 111). But in 1579 both unions were perceived simply as extensions of the Pacification of Ghent. Moreover, as Kossmann (Kossman and Mellink 1974, 31–2) points out, the Union of Utrecht was simply a formal alliance to integrate the foreign policies and war
The Revolt 29
efforts of the northern provinces, in order to defend traditional provincial independence and customs. It was not designed to set up a new state. William of Orange’s efforts later in 1579 at the peace negotiations at Cologne to reaffirm the unity of the seventeen provinces failed. The Union of Utrecht declared the refusal of the northern states to join the Union of Arras, and announced their intention to form a perpetual alliance of existing sovereign states, but with no intention of creating a new constitutional arrangement (Rowen 1972, 68–9). Most importantly, the Union of Utrecht did not contain a renunciation of Spanish rule. This decision, or non-decision, calls to mind an earlier incident of a similar kind in two important respects. In the ‘vacuum that had been created by Charles’s [the Bold’s] unexpected demise’ in 1477, the Low Countries had not taken the opportunity to reorganise their dynastic allegiance. Blockmans comments that it ‘is striking that in this critical phase the States-General never thought of choosing another dynasty to rule over them’, even though ‘one possible candidate, the French king, demanded the return of his fiefs, Artois and Flanders, because there was no male heir to rule over them’. Instead they accepted Charles’s daughter Mary as their overlord. The States General did, however, negotiate a critically important set of concessions which ‘undid much of the centralising arrangements…begun under Philip the Good and intensified under Charles’. As a result, the ‘large cities, duchies, and counties thus regained many of the legal, fiscal, and other prerogatives that they had lost to the centralised Burgundian state’ (Blockmans 1999, 114). Second, it is noteworthy that, as Blockmans confirms, the ‘respective States of the Low Countries opted to remain a union of principalities’. Blockmans accounts for this choice on the grounds that the ‘core regions of the Low Countries…had reached such a level of political integration that they desired to maintain their mutual ties’. The legal arrangement called the Great Privilege crucially established the ‘consensually derived conditions on which the new union would be based’ (Blockmans 1999, 114). It is clear that the precedent set in 1477 provided a pattern that played an important part in the decisions a century later in 1579, not to assert independence from dynastic lordship and to reaffirm the union between provinces. The extent to which the Revolt was a religious war of Calvinist versus Counter-Reformation positions is complicated by the history of Dutch historiography on the Revolt, in which the work of Geyl marked a turning-point. The conventional idea in Dutch historiography that
30 Spinoza and Republicanism
the Revolt took place between a Calvinist north and a Catholic south was successfully challenged by Peter Geyl in the twentieth century (see Renier 1946, 9). In an excellent article, Smit (1960, 11–28) re-evaluates the dispute among nineteenth- and twentieth-century Dutch historians. Smit’s view is convincingly more impartial than that of Renier, who is a disciple of Geyl. Kossmann again argues convincingly that the religious dimension in the Revolt should not be considered separately from its connection with the constitutional issue at stake. As early as 1566, he notes, the nobles, in their petition to the governess Margaret to mitigate the religious edicts, ‘expressed themselves carefully’. They ‘did not suggest that the States General had the right to take part in the legislation itself, they did not even suggest that they had the right to give the sovereign advice in this matter’. They ‘just stated that it was necessary for the sovereign’, that is Philip II, ‘to collaborate with the States if he wished to prevent the Low Countries being disturbed by, as they expressed it, “a universal rebellion bringing ruin to all the provinces and plunging them into utter misery”’ (Kossmann 1991, 284). Furthermore, as Kossmann notes, this was the first time when ‘it was quite openly stated by a large group of distinguished personalities, Catholics as well as Protestants’, that ‘royal policy was catastrophic and should be revised with the help of a local representative assembly better equipped to judge what was beneficial to the provinces in the given circumstances’. It was ‘taken for granted that the States General would, either for religious reasons or for political expediency, plead on behalf of toleration’. Moreover, pamphlet material of the time went ‘somewhat further than the nobles and vaguely hinted that there were ancient privileges and freedoms which seemed to suggest that the sovereign’s religious policy had always been subject to approval by the States General’ (Kossmann 1991, 284). What is clear, and is characteristic of the whole period under discussion, is the complex political mapping of disputes arising from religious differences on to political sources of contestation. Thus, conflict between Catholic and Calvinist groups – and later also between Remonstrant and counter-Remonstrant groups, as well as divisions within the Reformed Church, and tolerationist impulses – are intertwined in shifting ways with tensions between Netherlanders and the Spanish, regents and the House of Orange, regents and nobles, and between provinces. To return to 1566, Kossmann is right to emphasise the complex way in which ‘the religious problem was associated with the constitutional problem’. As a result, the ‘representative assembly, a
The Revolt 31
political body, was expected to take sides with the religious opposition without necessarily opting for the Protestant cause as such’ (Kossmann 1991, 284–5). Van Deursen concurs that the debate about ‘which had first priority: politics or faith, the struggle for civil freedom, or for the church’, is ‘a false dilemma’ (van Deursen 1999, 151). The situation was complicated because the privilege of belonging to the Catholic church was balanced by the desire for freedom of conscience. A further complication was that, as van Deursen makes clear, the Calvinist model of a Protestant church, widely implemented in the United Provinces, ‘opposed full doctrinal freedom’ and ‘strove for a tightly structured church government, organised on local, regional and national levels’ (van Deursen 1999, 152). Kossmann reaches the important conclusion that, ‘thanks to the conditions prevailing in the Netherlands in the 1560s and 1570s the constitutional and the religious problems came to be united in a way not to be found in other parts of Europe’. In consequence, ‘toleration and a form of provincial autonomy in the face of central government appeared two aspects of the same principle’ (Kossmann 1991, 285). Van Gelderen agrees that the religious and political aspects of the revolt were crucially interconnected both for the Netherlanders and for the Spanish. He comments that ‘Philip was not the scourge of Dutch heretics only because he thought it was his duty as a Catholic monarch to protect the Roman-Catholic church’. Philip’s view was informed ‘maybe principally’ by the belief that ‘maintaining religious unity within the empire was a precondition for maintaining the empire itself’ (van Gelderen 1999, 189–90). Phyllis Mack Crew also argues plausibly that the success of the Calvinist preachers, which helped to trigger off the first phase of the Revolt in 1566–67, was not due to their being a disciplined band of fanatics bent on revolution. They were certainly not a revolutionary vanguard, she argues. Their success lay in their being seen as a politically conservative reform movement. The ‘ministers were regarded by their adherents not as prophets of freedom from the dictates of the Catholic government, but as reformers who were also defenders of the traditional social and political hierarchy’ (Mack Crew 1978, 3). It follows that the question of whether the Revolt had a religious character cannot be resolved simply by concluding that the antiSpanish protest coincided with an anti-Catholic protest. Kossmann highlights the acutely significant point that the issue of toleration is more fundamental in Dutch history and political relations, for the Dutch, ‘while professing to be a Protestant state based its religious
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policy on a theory which was shaped by, and drew its impetus from, an anti-Calvinist rather than an anti-Catholic bias’. Crucially, according to the ‘liberal interpretation of Dutch history the battle about toleration was indeed one between the Calvinist Church on the one hand and the libertarian urban patriciate mainly in Holland on the other’ (Kossmann 1991, 294). Kossmann and Mellink sum up the political significance of religious disputes in this period. They argue that ‘religious issues played…a decisive part in the Revolt of the Netherlands only in their political form, that is, only in so far as they caused the problem of toleration to be discussed’ (Kossmann and Mellink 1974, xi; see also Schöffer, 1964). The provinces of the northern Netherlands that made a limited alliance in 1579 had far-reaching and long-standing differences, covering regional and linguistic sets of interests as well as their predominantly provincial loyalties. Wansink (1971) details the characters of the northern provinces and the tensions between them. Holland and West Friesland, together with Zeeland and Utrecht in the western part of the Netherlands, had commercial and seaborne trading interests in common. Groningen and Friesland in the north had common interests. And Gelderland and Overijssel in the east, the poorest provinces in the Union, with historical ties to the German states of the Holy Roman Empire, and the provinces most often overrun by Spanish and later French troops, shared common concerns. This complicated set of relationships between overlapping centres and peripheries, in local interests, regional perspectives, and traditional alliances and hostilities between provinces and within provinces, continued with other sources of tension to dominate the political debates of the seventeenth century, and to dictate the understanding of such notions as sovereignty in the northern Netherlands. Thus the history of the United Provinces in the seventeenth century derives from the 1579 Union not because this treaty represented a farreaching intention or statement of independence for them together – it did not. Neither was the Union of Utrecht a ‘constitution’ for a new polity, for it remained a legal international treaty between separate states, in a similar manner to the situation within the European Union based on a series of international treaties between states. The Union of Utrecht was crucial because its limitations and its ambiguities held in balance the various and complex interests, concerns, alliances, hostilities and loyalties of the parties, all framed by the ‘long tradition of autonomy in the Low Countries’ (Blockmans 1999, 112). And, to anticipate, when Spinoza a century later advocated a constitutional
The Revolt 33
balance, one does not have to look to Machiavelli or Harrington for his inspiration. Spinoza, like others in Holland, regarded the history of Holland in the context of the United Provinces as the primary exemplar of how a successful state could flourish, and of how a successful politics could be built upon an intense fragmentation of loyalties. Spinoza’s work is as much a celebration of Holland’s achievement as it is an analysis of the civil state in the abstract. If Spinoza uses Machiavelli it is with a light and selective touch. This represents a very different relationship between political theorist and political events from that found in the case of Hobbes, who thought that his civil society, in England, was going disastrously wrong. The Union of Utrecht was followed two years later, in 1581, by the Abjuration of Spanish rule. This was the culmination of lengthy decision-making processes between the provinces and negotiations with the Duke of Anjou (brother of the French king). The Act of Abjuration (Acte van Verlatinge) by the States General declared that Philip II had forfeited his sovereignty of their provinces because of his tyranny and had thus broken his contracts with them. Specifically their resolution ‘declared Philip II, King of Spain, Duke of Brabant, Duke of Guelders, Count of Flanders, Count of Holland and Zeeland, Lord of Friesland etc. forfeited of his sovereignty over the provinces’ (van Gelderen 1992, 1). Van Gelderen’s description again highlights that the resistance of the Netherlanders to Philip, King of Spain, was mediated through the posts he held in the separate provinces, and this is a crucial aspect of the construction and reconstruction of the meaning of sovereignty in the United Provinces. Blockmans regards the Abjuration of 1581 rather than the unions of Arras and Utrecht of 1579 as a decisive point in the development of the Dutch Republic. Van Gelderen agrees, arguing that the Abjuration was the result of negotiations which in effect transferred a crucial aspect of sovereignty from the prince to the States General. From 1581 the States were, according to van Gelderen, in a ‘powerful position. They now expressly elected the lord of the country and had the right to renounce him in case of disloyalty’ (van Gelderen 1993, xxiv). Moreover, van der Bijl notes the importance of the precedent set by the ban, issued by the States of Holland in 1581, on the interference of the municipal militia in political decision-making (van der Bijl 1986, 70–1). But the Abjuration again did not, it must be stressed, announce the independence of the northern states, since they now simply transferred their overlordship to Anjou. According to van Gelderen, negotiations
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with Anjou had been difficult because while ‘Anjou demanded sovereignty, the Dutch deputies, arguing (rather beyond the truth) that the word did not exist in Dutch, insisted on the title of “highest lord”’ (van Gelderen 1993, xxiv). Distrust of all things French may also have played a part in the Dutch opposition to Anjou’s attempt to introduce Bodin’s conception of sovereignty into the negotiations, although the northern Netherlands also had a very strong set of political identities from which to resist such a notion. Van Gelderen details that in 1578 ‘Bodin was adviser to the duke of Anjou, who was about to become the “Defender of the Liberty of the Netherlands”, but not its new sovereign’. He reiterates that in ‘the negotiations with the duke, whose military and financial assistance was eagerly sought by the leaders of the Dutch Revolt, the deputies from the Low Countries rejected the use of the word “sovereignty”, arguing that the word did not exist in the Dutch language’. Van Gelderen continues that this ‘was a flat lie on the part of the Dutch polyglots, who were trying to avoid a painful confrontation with Bodin’s conception of sovereignty’. As a result, throughout the negotiations the Dutch insisted on using ‘the respublica mixta…as the leading example for the Dutch constitution’ (van Gelderen 2002, 197). This is an intriguing story, demonstrating the importance to the Dutch of maintaining their local and particularistic notion of sovereignty, central to which was the balance between a number of separate and independent provinces. However the tale does not fully support van Gelderen’s assertion that it shows that as early as 1578 Bodin’s ‘new conception of sovereignty started to have an impact on Dutch thinking’ (van Gelderen 2002, 197). The evidence seems to demonstrate rather the opposite case, that the Dutch successfully resisted Bodin’s absolutist conception. Neither did the Abjuration introduce a new theoretical foundation of the state. It only justified the revolt by repeating arguments for the right of resistance against tyranny (van de Klashorst 1986, x). Moreover, William of Orange’s negotiations to find an alternative ruler had been in the name of the Seventeen Provinces, not simply the seven northern ones (Blockmans 1999, 139). As van Deursen notes, for William of Orange ‘the Revolt had been in the collective interest of all the Low Countries; he scarcely would have been able to imagine an independent state without the inclusion of Brabant and Flanders’ (van Deursen 1999, 144). The princes of Orange, in marked contrast with the political powers in the provinces and the States General, tended to appeal to ‘the whole Netherlands’, ‘our fatherland’, and ‘our dear fatherland’ (Duke 1990, 187). Such rhetorical appeals linguistically and
The Revolt 35
artificially constructed a whole that reflected the interests of the princes of Orange but did not reflect universal common usage. However, the Abjuration position established in 1581 did not remain a stable one. William of Orange was assassinated in 1584 and by 1585 the Spanish had reconquered most of Flanders and Brabant following Anjou’s unsuccessful attempt to retake Antwerp. Anjou’s territorial ambitions were out of line with the northern provinces’ aims, and his position had not been strong when groups such as the Walloon nobility refused to back him. Duke argues that the nobles ‘might have been induced to stand by the States General, if an acceptable alternative prince had been in prospect. Anjou was suspect in their eyes as a French prince’ (Duke 1990, 195). This is a good example of the long shadow cast by France over the Low Countries throughout this whole period. While the Revolt was waged against the Spanish, fear of the French also played an important part in motivating many decisions by many groups in the southern and northern Netherlands. Following the events of 1584 and 1585, a ‘dramatic exodus to the north’ (van Gelderen 1993, xxvii) took place, of refugees from southern towns like Ghent and Antwerp. The appointment by the States General in 1585 of the English Earl of Leicester as ‘Governor and Captain General’ was triggered in part by Elizabeth I’s alarm at the extent of the Spanish reconquest. But the appointment was short-lived when Holland, with the skills of Oldenbarnevelt, challenged Leicester’s ‘absolutist’ behaviour (van Gelderen 1993, xxvii). Like Anjou, Leicester sought to keep the centrifugal forces in check. But Oldenbarnevelt had, in Shetter’s words, ‘developed an office of relative insignificance into a base for far-reaching power’. For example, Oldenbarnevelt ‘was able to see to it that Prince Maurits, the son of William of Orange, was appointed – over Leicester’s head – stadholder of Holland and Zeeland, general of the armed forces and admiral of the fleet’. Leicester departed in 1587 in ‘disgrace and frustration’ (Shetter 1971, 80), only two years after his arrival. By 1588, having failed to enrol the services of an alternative overlord who could prove both trustworthy and effective in pursuing the objectives of the Northern Netherlanders, and with the Spanish suffering the defeat of their armada against England, the Northern (six at this point) Provinces abandoned the idea. They later became, by default rather than by design, and not irrevocably separated from the southern provinces, the ‘Dutch Republic of the Seven United Provinces’ (van Gelderen 1993, vii) or ‘United Provinces’ for short.
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Blockmans introduces an enriching complexity into understanding the Revolt and its outcome when he argues convincingly against a simple north/south divide. The number of refugees from the ‘Catholic’ south, as well as from other places including the exiled Protestant dissident ‘Polish Brethren’, destabilises any neat north/south split. Blockmans argues rather that core/periphery politics influenced the course of events along with more orthodox factors like the ‘religious zeal of the Calvinists’, the ‘selfconfidence of the local nobility’, the ‘moderation of regional Catholics’, the ‘growing class-consciousness of the artisans’, and the ‘Dutch love of freedom’. In contrast with an impression that ‘the revolt pertained only to “the North”, which became the Dutch Republic, or that the rebels all shared the same political objectives’, Blockmans makes a strong case that between the iconoclastic riots of 1566 and 1588, a ‘gradual radicalisation took place’ such that ‘moderate options, long supported by a majority, became unviable’ (Blockmans 1999, 128–9). At the time of the Abjuration in 1581, Blockmans insists, the inhabitants of the Low Countries were divided into three camps, not simply the two corresponding to the North and South. While ‘Flanders, Brabant, Holland, Zeeland, and Friesland declared the king deposed from his princely right to rule’, ‘Groningen and the Walloon (Frenchspeaking) districts (with the exception of Tournai) had already reconciled themselves with Philip’. A third camp, ‘[s]omewhere in the middle were Guelders, Utrecht, and Overijssel, which refused to adopt either position’ (Blockmans 1999, 129). Blockmans accounts for this arrangement of positions by noting that the ‘southern and eastern provinces like Artois, Hainaut, Namur, and Luxembourg – those areas least committed to the revolt – were relatively thinly populated, more agrarian, less commercialised, and lightly taxed’. These areas had only recently been ‘incorporated into the Habsburg empire’. Thus, Blockmans concludes, the ‘original fault lines’ were not between north and south but ‘between core areas, consisting primarily of the wealthy and urban coastal provinces, and the periphery, stretching from Groningen south to Luxembourg and Artois’ (Blockmans 1999, 129). Duke argues that instead of a simple north/south split, the character of the Low Countries was historically patterned by the ‘region’s ambivalent relationship with Germania and Gallia’. Equally important were ‘the incoherence of their political organisation and the absence of any sense of community between the Burgundian and the newly incorporated provinces’ such as Friesland and Gelre, ‘which looked Janusfaced both up and down the Rhine’ (Duke 1990, 186). Indeed the
The Revolt 37
provinces that broke away to form the United Provinces were those newest and least well-integrated into the Habsburg Netherlands, the remotest, and those with ‘peculiar social structure and independent political traditions’ which could ‘more easily detach themselves’ from the Spanish prince (Duke 1990, 197). In addition, against the simple north/south split, Duke notes the strength of feeling in a specific northern town against the United Provinces. After 1589 the town of Groningen, in the far north of the Netherlands considered, as the ‘armies of the Union slowly encircled’ it, ‘placing itself under the authority of the house of Saxony rather than suffer incorporation in the United Provinces’ (Duke 1990, 197). Furthermore, instead of a simple split between independent northern Protestants and dependent southern Catholics, Duke notes that a group of ‘stalwart Calvinists were still prepared in the mid 1580s to advocate a general peace with the king, provided the Protestants were granted a measure of religious freedom’ (Duke 1990, 195). Price points to another marked broad contrast within the United Provinces, that between east and west rather than north and south. He comments that Friesland took part in the (to some extent) ‘modernising, market-oriented western region’, while Overijssel, Gelderland, the countryside of Utrecht and Groningen, and Drente were all much more traditional in their outlook, not much touched by economic changes in the West. There is also a notable difference between the economic and political fortunes of predominantly urban or rural areas. Within the general picture of a boom in economic prosperity, some towns in the east even suffered economic decline in this period (Price 1994, 224). The east was much less linked into international trade, much less dependent on trade and manufacture, less reliant on imports and on exports to foreign markets. Agriculture was relatively more important, but less advanced and market-oriented. The economy was characterised by small-holding peasants and subsistence farming. But the biggest contrast within the United Provinces was between Holland and the other provinces. Price notes the ‘enormous imbalance’ (Price 1994, 278) resulting from Holland’s maritime concerns, and the fact that it contained 40 per cent of the population and more than half the wealth (Price 1994, 222). But, he maintains, the United Provinces was still a going concern because it was in the interests of both Holland and of the lesser provinces. In what follows, while recognising the importance of east/west and core/periphery divisions and tensions, ‘north’ and ‘south’ will be used as shorthand terms.
38 Spinoza and Republicanism
The next milestone during the Revolt occurred in the 1590s. Oldenbarnevelt, who held the powerful office of Advocate in Holland, and Maurice of Nassau, son of William the Silent of Orange, led the northern revolt in a ‘unity of purpose’ (van Deursen 1999, 151), a successful though unlikely team (Shetter 1971, 81). While Maurice of Nassau had been given the title of Stadholder (but now by the States rather than by the emperor) political power was vested in Oldenbarnevelt (van Deursen 1999, 150). Burke tells a story that indicates the power of the province of Holland at this time, and in particular of Amsterdam, and the priority given to continued economic activity with or without the war. In the 1590s, he notes, ‘leading Amsterdammers were engaged in trade with Spain, despite the fact that the Republic was at war with Spain at the time’. Their solution, he comments, was that ‘ships taking corn to Spain simply sailed under false flags’. In the light of this trade, in 1596 there was a ‘conflict between the States-General, which forbade the export of corn to Spain and Italy, and the rulers of Amsterdam, who objected; it was Amsterdam which won’ (Burke 1994, 47). By the end of the 1590s, van Deursen notes, ‘the whole area north of the Maas and the Scheldt Rivers lay in the hands’ of the northern provinces. The military successes of the United Provinces contrasted starkly with the declining fortunes of the Spanish, reflected in the death of Philip II in 1598. But the ‘ultimate military aim’ of its military leaders was to ‘carry the fight into Brabant and Flanders, the old centre of the Low Countries’ (van Deursen 1999, 153). Black outlines one example that illustrates this aim, of how all sorts of cultural products could further the rhetorical aims of the Dutch. The political purpose of Ortelius’ historical map of the Low Countries of the late 1590s is clear. The map purported to depict the area in the Roman period, but it ‘consists of the seventeen provinces belonging to the Habsburgs, creating a sense of territorial coherence that was misplaced for the earlier age’ (Black 1997, 10). The Truce with Spain in 1609, which ‘was not intended as a permanent peace’ (van Deursen 1999, 156), was regarded by some as Oldenbarnevelt’s triumph. As Rowen comments, with the Truce, the ‘independence of the States General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands – the Dutch Republic, as we call it – was an accepted fact although not yet acknowledged in law in Spain’ (Rowen 1972, 68). However, the signing of the 1609 Truce caused much apprehension in many quarters about the relationship between the northern provinces. As Price recounts, it was ‘feared that once the war was ended the
The Revolt 39
alliance would also collapse and with it the Union’. There was ‘no obvious or natural unity between the seven (or eight with Drente) provinces, never mind between them and the Generality lands’. Significantly, the provinces preferred to speak to each other as ‘allies’ (Price 1994, 221). Braudel confirms that, in the crisis of 1609, the ‘United Provinces were on the point of splitting up and demolishing what passed there for a state’ (Braudel 1979b, 185), as the religious (Remonstrant v. Contra-Remonstrant) and political (urban regents v. Stadholder Maurice of Nassau) conflicts became rolled into one. During the Twelve Years’ Truce, ‘both sides would send their troops eastward to fight in Germany’, in the struggle between supporters of the Catholic League and the Protestant Union (van Deursen 1999, 157). The Thirty Years War (1618–48) shifted the centre of the conflict between Catholics and Protestants to Germany. Nevertheless, Israel argues that even in 1618, the ‘antagonism between the Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants…brought the Dutch Republic to the verge of civil war’ (Israel 2001, 270). Van Deursen identifies that the reasons why the Twelve Years’ Truce was not extended and why hostilities in the Low Countries resumed ‘must be seen in the light of the German war’ (van Deursen 1999, 158). However, by 1618 Prince Maurice had won a notable military victory, and Oldenbarnevelt died on the scaffold in a public execution in 1619 after a systematic campaign by Maurice to discredit him (van Deursen 1999, 162–3). How can we account for such a reversal of fortunes over so short a time? Several explanations can be advanced. Price sees the threat of civil war as a key factor. He argues that when ‘Oldenbarnevelt seemed to be leading the country into civil war, Maurits emerged as the alternative pole of political power’ (Price 1994, 171). Van Deursen contends that suspicion of Oldenbarnevelt’s foreign policy (seeking alliance against the Spanish with France, a Catholic country) was compounded by his championing of the Remonstrant cause. The Remonstrant position sought room for a more tolerant Arminian Protestantism in the increasingly inflexible Calvinism of the Reformed Church that had been formed in 1572. Those supporting the Remonstrant cause were determined that the secular authority of the Holland States assembly, not the church, would decide the matter. In the eyes of the Calvinists Oldenbarnevelt’s one sin was a consequence of the other (van Deursen 1999, 160–1). Oldenbarnevelt’s defence was that, as the Advocate of Holland, he was ‘the principled defender of regional sovereignty’ in a conflict between Holland and the Generality (represented formally by Maurice). But van Deursen notes
40 Spinoza and Republicanism
that Oldenbarnevelt was a skilled and pragmatic politician who ‘did what was best for Holland’. Having lost his de facto pre-eminence with the States General, he could no longer force it to pursue the policy which was in Holland’s interests (van Deursen 1999, 164). At the same time the Synod of Dordrecht was convened and resolved upon something of a compromise settlement. While it settled the religious dispute in a strictly orthodox way, in favour of the strictly Calvinist Counter-Remonstrants, the decision was approved by the secular authorities. For, as Braudel comments, the consequence for church–state relations was that the church did not become independent. Crucially the ‘Reformed Church remained subordinate to the provincial and urban authorities’ (Braudel 1979b, 196). Wansink makes a case that Oldenbarnevelt’s fall was based less on the religious quarrel in which he became involved, than on Amsterdam’s revenge. He notes that ‘in the quarrels of the Twelve Years Truce (1609–21) Amsterdam’s opposition to Oldenbarnevelt, which eventually led to his fall, was based not so much on ideological grounds as on self-interest and wounded pride’. Amsterdam ‘had not forgotten Oldenbarnevelt’s resistance to its efforts to establish a West India Company, from which it expected enormous gains’. Wansink notes that not long ‘after the Advocate’s death the Republic got the Company and Amsterdam held a dominating position in its management’ (Wansink 1971, 137). The Dutch West Indies Company, founded then in 1626, developed interests in the area south of New York, along the northern coast of South America, and the southern coast of West Africa. The Dutch East Indies Company, founded in 1602, concentrated its efforts in what are now India, Pakistan and Southeast Asia, the southern tip of Africa, and the Caribbean islands. Van Bunge provides a different emphasis on the events which brought the United Provinces to the brink of a civil war during the Truce with Spain. In his view a purely academic dispute between theologians ‘spilled over into the political arena’. The dispute about the meaning of Calvin’s theory of predestination was politicised because the ‘two most powerful men in the Republic had chosen sides’ before a national synod could be called to decide the matter. Oldenbarnevelt, Advocate of Holland, took up the cause of the Arminian Remonstrants who had presented their petition to the States of Holland. Prince Maurice, Stadholder and general of the armies of the States General, championed the Counter-Remonstrant position and moved to isolate Oldenbarnevelt politically. Van Bunge attributes Maurice’s actions not to opportunistic political ambition but because
The Revolt 41
he was ‘worried over the failure of Van Oldenbarnevelt’s Arminian policies to restore order in the public church’. In van Bunge’s reading, the Synod of Dordrecht, meeting three months later, endorsed the Counter-Remonstrant position and ‘effectively banned all two hundred Remonstrant ministers, little less than a fifth of the entire Dutch ministry, from the Republic’ (van Bunge 1999b, 12). Oldenbarnevelt’s very ‘triumph’, moreover, in negotiating the Twelve Years’ Truce, was another factor contributing to his fall, as peace did not appeal to all. The image of a brave, and basically pacific, little United Provinces fighting off the might of the Spanish for eighty years, would be inaccurate. As Harline points out (1989, 184), it was only in the 1640s that there was sizeable public feeling, as expressed in the pamphlets which accompanied every public debate, in favour of peace with Spain. During the 1620s, 1630s and into the 1640s the Truce was regarded, in Kossmann’s words, as ‘a disastrous experience, leading to civil strife and threatening the young republic with disruption’. It was ‘repeatedly stated that never again should the risk be taken of such a pacific adventure, which divorced the state from its origin in war and from its true traditions’ (Kossmann 1963, 165). Harline sums up the point by remarking that, ‘[w]ar seemed the natural element in which alone the Republic could flourish’ (Harline 1989, 187). The long, final phase of the Revolt covered the period from the end of the Twelve Year Truce in 1621 to the Münster Treaty in 1648. Van Deursen comments that the ‘same peace conference that concluded the Eighty Years’ War with the Peace of Münster ended the Thirty Years’ War with the Peace of Westphalia’ (van Deursen 1999, 182). Indeed the town of Münster is located in the county of Westphalia, and the two treaties were actually signed in the same place. Price notes that the Treaty of Münster was not universally favoured among towns and provinces of the United Provinces. It was signed despite the abstention of Utrecht, and ‘ratified by the States General despite the refusal of Zeeland to assent to the treaty’ (Price 1994, 213). Israel discusses the curiously inconclusive role played by Holland. In this period political debate centred upon whether or not to accept Spanish peace terms. Holland, the most powerful province, and in particular Amsterdam, the most powerful town, he says, ‘failed to exercise effective leadership or exert decisive influence’ (Israel 1979, 41). Part of the explanation may lie in the way that in terms of relations between the United Provinces and the southern provinces, as van Deursen notes, the war had ‘actually helped the economy’ in the north, since the United Provinces had ‘blocked the Flemish harbours and closed the
42 Spinoza and Republicanism
Scheldt, Antwerp’s avenue to the sea’. Moreover this alone, he argues, had ‘prompted many Antwerp merchants to set up shop in the north, bringing with them not only money, but their expertise and their connections’ (van Deursen 1999, 147). Israel accounts for Holland’s indecisiveness by arguing that while the overriding domestic issue of the day centred on the Remonstrant/Counter-Remonstrant debate, it was the divergent and entrenched economic interests of the Holland towns (often expressed in the terms of the religious debate) that prevented Holland from acting decisively. Thus, for example, between 1629 and 1633 serious peace discussions were conducted, but the Holland towns were split. Israel observes that for ‘Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Dordrecht, the conflict was damaging; for Leiden, Haarlem, Gouda and also Utrecht, it was beneficial (Israel 1979, 68). These were the lines along which the towns voted in the 1629–33 municipal votes over war or peace with Spain. As Israel comments, ‘economic as well as internal political and religious rivalries caused the sharp split between the two groups of Holland towns which is the most important feature of the Dutch response to the Spanish truce and peace initiatives of 1629–1633’. Or rather, ‘economic rivalry, between two competing sets of interests, formed an inherent part of the domestic political and religious rivalry which prevented any prompt or unified Dutch response to the peace proposals’ (Israel 1979, 68). Israel has shown that, contrary to what one might expect, the superior political and economic power of Holland and of Amsterdam was not necessarily reflected in decision-making power. In the context of how politics was conducted in the United Provinces, it is clear why it was often the case that Holland’s and Amsterdam’s stature did not result in a decisive domination over policy. For while Holland’s and Amsterdam’s economic superiority clearly improved their political clout, they lacked (and more importantly, did not seek) any overall authority to act for the whole. This situation persisted throughout the following century, and constitutes an important element of the political framework in which Spinoza saw himself as contributing. Israel details the complexity of the economic interests involved for Holland. In addition to the clash of interests between the European carrying trade (between the Baltic and the Iberian peninsula and Italy, in which the Netherlands played a crucial role) and the colonial trade of the East and West India Companies, he says, ‘there existed within the province of Holland a still deeper contradiction of interest’, between ‘sea-borne commerce and manufacturing, which like the
The Revolt 43
former difference, became linked to Remonstrant and CounterRemonstrant rivalry’ (Israel 1979, 65). Thus, as Israel demonstrates, the attitudes of the towns of Holland, as elsewhere in the United Provinces, to the question of war with Spain, in this period, was dictated by the sophisticated economic interests of particular towns. Towns with sea-borne or manufacturing interests had divergent attitudes to war and peace, and the spread of European and colonial interests similarly had conflicting implications. Hibben chronicles that of ‘all the Holland towns Gouda was the most vociferous advocate of peace’. But Gouda’s ‘opposition to any transfer of sovereignty is not to be explained by any nascent republicanism’, Hibben argues, but rather by the town council’s ‘anxious desire for peace’ (Hibben 1983, 174) to promote its interests. In addition, as the history shows, for military leaders, the Princes of Orange and the nobility, peace was much less attractive than for the merchants in Holland. Moreover Calvinists hoped to continue the war with Spain until the Spanish were driven out of the southern Netherlands. It was only after 1648, and especially in the De Witt period, that peace arguments were generally held to be compatible with the identity of the Republic. One indicator of the degree of passion invested by the Dutch in economic activity is the phenomenon of tulipmania in Holland, culminating in a massive market crash in 1637. At its height bulbs of certain varieties of tulip were sold for 10,000 florins, at a time when the average annual income was around 160 florins (Pavord 2000, 133). This episode signals the wider cultural and economic perspective in which politics was enacted. It also demonstrates Dutch dominance in some areas of the global marketplace, the sophistication of trade with Central Asia, and the thriving state of markets and commerce in Holland. Tulipmania also occurred as part of wider changes in structural patterns of trading. In the sixteenth century Lisbon and Antwerp had become more important trading ports than Genoa, with increased access to goods like tulips from Central Asia. Amsterdam benefited from the decline in Antwerp as a trading port after 1585, after its sacking by Spanish troops (Pavord 2000, 147) and the blockade of the Scheldt river. Amsterdam developed a commodities market and stock exchange, facilitating dealing in many goods including exotic wares like silks, spices and tulips (Pavord 2000, 148). Israel comments that after the breakdown of peace discussions, apart from ‘a brief flurry of truce moves initiated by the Cardinal-Infante in 1635–36, there were no other substantive negotiations between Spain
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and the Republic until 1643 when the Münster talks began in earnest’. There was thus a ‘lengthy prolongation of the war’ (Israel 1979, 61), due in part to northern resistance to settlement on any other than the most advantageous terms for the northern provinces vis-à-vis the southern provinces. The interests of the East and West India Companies, and of other trade and commercial advantages, helped to keep the different political interests in balance. Van Deursen also notes that the impetus towards peace was strengthened by the abatement of the danger of a Catholic victory in the German war, reducing the need for solidarity with the Protestant cause through continued conflict with Spain. The move toward peace was also increased by the need to consolidate the southern border of the United Provinces in the light of possible French interests in invading the Southern Netherlands once Spanish control weakened. The Seven Provinces decided not to attempt to regain the southern provinces into a broader Netherlands, and it was not in their interests to do so. The prospect of additional territory was not considered an advantage, Antwerp might prove ‘a formidable trading rival’ to Amsterdam, The Hague would lose its control over the Generality Lands annexed from Brabant and Flanders and, as van Deursen comments, ‘Holland’s leading position in the States-General would be challenged by the new provinces’. For all these reasons, the peace conditions at Münster in 1648 resembled those of 1609. Spain acceded to formal recognition of the Seven Provinces, ‘allowing it to trade freely with the Indies’, accepted ‘the closure of the Scheldt, and did not insist on privileges for Dutch Catholics’. In the light of these terms, the United Provinces ‘could regard itself as a victor’ (van Deursen 1999, 181). Thus the Revolt was carried on over eighty years. Its protracted length reflects not only the determination of the northern provinces to free themselves from Spanish interference, but also expresses the conflicting political and economic interests between provinces and between towns in the north, and the periods when conflicting and fiercely held political positions led to overall stalemate. For instance it is surprising to note, in view of its dominant role in the United Provinces in the seventeenth century, that Amsterdam joined the Revolt only in 1578, the year before the Union of Utrecht. The reason lies in that Amsterdam had been ruled by a Catholic clique, which was purged in 1578. But despite the complex network of internal hostilities, the alliance of the Seven Provinces did not break up. For one of the most important factors helping to cohere the different phases
The Revolt 45
of the Revolt, from the Netherlanders’ point of view, was claims made about the protection of ancient privileges. The defence of privileges is a significant key to the meaning of both the political and military struggle of the period and the political literature and political thought of the Revolt. Van Gelderen outlines the meaning of Dutch privileges. They ‘consisted of a diversity of charters acquired or extorted by cities, guilds, crafts, clergy and nobility from imperial princes, vassals, dukes and counts, who had ruled the Netherlands during the late medieval period’ (van Gelderen 1993, xiii). Woltjer specifies the different types of privileges that played a vitally important part in the way political conflict in the Netherlands was articulated throughout this period. First there are privileges which are a collection of liberties equated with rules, freedoms, exemptions based on prerogatives, suspensions of the general law, ancient specific liberties of medieval towns and provinces obtained from the prince, over matters such as market rights. But it was not these that the insurgents against Spain primarily fought for, says Woltjer (1975, 21). It was the second category of privileges, those ‘concerning the administration of justice and local government’, that ‘certainly did play an important part in the Revolt’. Each ‘province and each city had its own form of government, often set out in charters that limited the power of the sovereign and guaranteed, in varying degrees, the conduct of government and justice by persons chosen from the local people’. Such charters ‘safeguarded an administration of justice that would be consistent with tradition and correspond to locally acceptable standards’. But as Duke notes, since the sixteenth century, between ‘the prince’s solemn obligation to uphold the privileges and the imperative to standardise legislation and legal practice in the interests of efficient government there remained an unresolved and, in the end, irreconcilable tension’ (Duke 1990, 176). Moreover Woltjer confirms that these privileges were not ‘rights of one town at another’s cost. In essence they ran in parallel for all towns and provinces alike. That is why towns and provinces could unite in the defence of these privileges’ (Woltjer, 1975, 22). Van Gelderen agrees that charters dealing ‘explicitly with the division of power between prince and subjects’ (van Gelderen 1993, xiv), like the famous Joyous Entry of Brabant of 1356 and the privileges (including the Grand Privilege) of 1477, played a very real and practical part in reaffirming the accepted parameters of the conduct of politics, administration and law. He notes that the charters ‘played a major role in the formulation and codification of political rights and duties’. Van Gelderen makes the
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significant observation that accumulated together, the privileges ‘began to form a sort of “implicit constitution”’, though not in any sense an explicit one. Combined with other written and unwritten customs and rules, they ‘restricted the power of the prince, codified participatory claims, guaranteed civic rights and, in doing so, secured the rule of law’ (van Gelderen 1999, 191). Most importantly, ‘the charters functioned as constitutional guarantees of liberty’, with the States assemblies ‘presented as [their] virtuous guardians’ (van Gelderen 1999, 192). Woltjer makes a strong case that the insurgents against Spain used the language of privileges because it provided ‘a legitimate basis for action’. The language of privileges provided a legitimation. Such language was not used ‘from a desire to defend all privileges at any cost’. Thus, for instance, in insisting on the punishment of heretics, ‘Alva’s violation of the privileges formed the justification for the Revolt, not its primary cause’ (Woltjer 1975, 25). The primary cause of the Revolt, according to Woltjer, was that the overlord ruler had failed to treat his subjects with humanity, goodwill and moderation and had neglected to uphold good law. This was what had been argued in 1579 by representatives of the States General at peace negotiations in Cologne. Two things emerge clearly from analysing the role of the privileges during the course of the Revolt. The first is that claims made about them change and strengthen over time. The claim being made about them in 1648 is different from that made previously. But in order to increase its plausibility and rhetorical power, the new claim is made as an assertion that the privileges have a constitutional status they had always had. The power of the new claim depended upon the denial that it was innovative. This habit of mind continues on after the Revolt into the Dutch Republic. The second thing that is clarified by the discussion of the privileges is that the political community of the United Provinces was not a state and did not have a formal or written constitution. The privileges remained a disaggregated collection of symbols but the claims made on their behalf were not only symbolic. Such claims referred to concrete issues of self-government in the ‘real’ world. In addition, and to anticipate, under the Dutch Republic, the idea that the privileges were symbolic in forming a default constitution was a claim that was constantly reasserted until it became accepted as a fact.
Political thought during the Revolt Political debate at every stage of the Revolt, stimulated by and further stimulating written treatises and tracts, was intense. Van Gelderen
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notes that the ‘Dutch Revolt most definitely established books and treatises as the principal media for public dispute’ (van Gelderen 1992, 290). He documents that between 1555 and 1590 alone, more than two thousand works of political literature were published. A ‘booming printing culture’ in the Netherlands (with one Antwerp publishing house particularly important), and the ‘fragmentation of political authority’ (van Gelderen 1992, 289) enabled this political literature to flourish. This body of material is largely pamphlet literature, petitions and declarations. They are often addressed to the prince and his subordinates, but are also designed as commentaries on and interventions in domestic political debates, sometimes but by no means always employing arguments from ancient and contemporary European authors to support their views and contest opposing ones. Moreover, van Gelderen shows that ‘authors of political treatises often anticipated the “common people” of the provinces as their audience’. While some treatises would have been expensive, a number of factors substantiate this viewpoint (van Gelderen 1992, 289–90) of a strong public domain. They include the relatively high rates of literacy, publication in the vernacular, the high number of copies of a treatise printed, a strong interest in political affairs among the public, and the perceived influence of political literature on the common people by contemporaries. The two most important modern collections of primary sources of political writings for the period are Kossmann and Mellink’s Texts Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands (1974) and Van Gelderen’s collection (1993), though they are both limited to the early years of 1565 to 1588. Both collections reflect well the highly charged political climate of the times. Kossmann and Mellink’s texts cover declarations, treaties, letters, proceedings and remonstrances by the States and States General, noblemen, Philip, Orange, and citizens of particular towns. Van Gelderen usefully brings together five of the most important of these tracts from the early period of the Revolt. A Defence and True Declaration of 1570 is a petition written by a friend of William of Orange in an attempt to gain German support. The Address and Opening of 1576 is a plea addressed to the States General to open negotiations with Holland and Zeeland to rid the country of ravaging Spanish troops. The Brief Discourse of 1579 is one of many negative commentaries on the Cologne peace negotiations and arguing for the States’ right of resistance. Political Education of 1582 justifies the Abjuration and the States’ demand that citizens take an oath of allegiance to the new regime. Finally there is the Short Exposition of 1587 by Vranck, in some ways the
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most important document, which is discussed below. Van Gelderen concludes that these publications exemplify that ‘the political debate of the Revolt was not only immense, but also comprehensive and, above all, passionate’ (van Gelderen 1993, vii). Kossmann identifies a crucial aspect of political discourse in the Netherlands when he notes that in ‘the early seventeenth century neither the Dutch statesmen nor the Dutch intellectuals sought to provide a theoretical foundation for the republican government which most of them admitted now did exist’. As he says, few ‘analysed its character or praised it for any particular merit’ (Kossmann 1991, 288). Kossmann’s key insight certainly also covers the second half of the sixteenth century as well. Van Gelderen confirms the characteristically traditionalist thrust of the political literature of the Revolt. In appealing to the privileges and the charters containing them, rather than seeking to articulate new arguments, this literature ‘placed itself firmly within a well-established tradition’ (van Gelderen 1993, xv). It is against the background of this intriguing lack of theoretical attention that we must see the political thought produced during the Revolt. Before examining further the character of political thought published during the Revolt, it is important to establish the nature of the inquiry. The term ‘political theory’ is an unstable and contested concept at the best of times, and its relation to political practice is constructed in different ways in different cultures. Political theory covers a spectrum of writing from journalistic reflections on a series of incidents, and commentaries on events through specific political perspectives, through ideological accounts which draw upon an intellectual legacy to support their claims, to normative political philosophy in which claims are justified more abstractly and in greater depth. It can also encompass, and does in the Dutch case, papers and documents, and the equivalent of ‘white papers’ and discussion documents, written by civil servants. In addition, in the Dutch case, these various categories of ‘political theory’ are not insulated from one another, and the best (in the sense of most abstract) political philosophy is also often intended as a contribution to a very local political debate. So in the case of the politics of the Netherlands over the crucial century or so under discussion here, the term political theory is deeply contested. On the one hand Kossmann represents the persuasive view that in general the political literature of the period was untheoretical and that its character is misunderstood if it is treated as abstract theorising. On the other hand van Gelderen very ably demonstates, and justifies the view (van Gelderen 1992, 4–5),
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that much of the work situated around the middle of the political theory spectrum is worthy of serious attention by those studying political thought across Europe in this period. The position developed here holds that both viewpoints are correct. Van Gelderen’s plea for the recognition of a lively and diverse body of work going well beyond the classification of ‘pamphlet’ (van Gelderen 1992, 288), and against an overly-narrow definition of political theory, rightly highlights the value of an under-represented body of political writing. Kossmann’s assessment taps into an enormously important and distinctive feature of the Netherlanders’ style of discussing, writing and doing politics. But while van Gelderen’s collection is an immensely important resource for studying a range of political thought in the second half of the sixteenth century, his categorisation of the subjects discussed by these writers is very general and blanches out to some extent the distinctive flavour of the characteristic approach to politics and justification captured by Kossmann. Van Gelderen says, ‘I concentrate on those treatises which have contributed significantly to the formation and transformation of political ideologies of the Dutch Revolt, either by developing, substantially reasserting, refuting or innovating arguments on the issues which are central to this study, such as obedience, resistance, forms of government, sovereignty and the relationship between church and political authorities’ (van Gelderen 1992, 4). Conscious that the present work is addressed primarily to an English-speaking audience for whom ‘political theory’ suggests a prima facie abstract engagement with political questions, this book seeks to elaborate Kossmann’s insight premised on a different approach to political theory. It seeks to understand the intellectual context of Dutch republicanism more fully by attending to underlying features such as the practical, local, particularistic nature of the Dutch mentality, and by exploring the complex meaning of the Holland-centric approach to political life. It examines the meaning and value attached to the new-old claim about the ‘privileges’, and seeks to understand the unintended republic. It seeks a wider understanding of ‘political theory’ than the one undertaken by van Gelderen. Scott’s phrase ‘political power of public memory as a context for present action (and re-enactment)’ (Scott 2000, 163) sums up well the concentration of Dutch writers. This understanding is crucial for making sense of the puzzling features of political practice and explicitly reasoned thinking in this period. It is also vital to the aim of realising in an accurate manner the
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character of Spinoza’s contribution to political debate. Velema challenges Kossmann’s emphasis on the pragmatic, practical commonsensical view of Dutch political theory, and refers to Grotius and Spinoza as ‘high’ political theorists (Velema 2002, 9). But the two perspectives are not contradictory. Kossmann would not wish to deny the theoretical credentials of Grotius and Spinoza, but makes the point that Dutch political theory was characteristically practical in approach despite them. These two theorists do not fit the norm of political thinking in the Netherlands. Moreover both hoped that their contributions would be taken up in political practice, and neither was entirely successful in overcoming the practical bent of political debate. In general terms political thought in the Netherlands, by proponents of the Revolt, between the middle of the sixteenth and the middle of the seventeenth century, focused upon justifications for resistance and on the new claim in the form of an old claim about the protection of ancient privileges. As taught in the universities, political thought over this period centred upon upholding the defence of monarchical government. Resistance and privileges were intimately connected, because resistance could be justified only against a prince who ceased to uphold and protect the law as expressed in the ancient privileges. Resistance was bound up with a prince who infringed his rights. While Skinner rightly points to the influence in the Dutch Revolt of the Huguenot text of the right of resistance Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, van Gelderen (1986) argues convincingly that there was an even stronger, home-grown Dutch development of resistance theory. In terms of ‘high’ political theory, the four major Dutch writers discussed here are Erasmus (writing in the earlier half of the sixteenth century), Lipsius, Althusius and Grotius. They are introduced here in order to register the bearing they had in helping to frame the terms of political debate and because they were taken to have political influence, rather than to engage in close textual analysis. The discussion draws heavily on the work of van Gelderen, Kossmann and others. Vranck’s important Short Exposition is also considered. We shall then examine what use the Dutch made of their reading of Machiavelli, and finally in this chapter, discuss the issue of whether Dutch Revolt theory led necessarily to Dutch republicanism. Erasmus (1469–1536) is a key figure in the development of the notion of toleration in the United Provinces, the idea that princes could not rule over the consciences of their subjects. Toleration was thus politically a highly inflammable concept, as it directly challenged Catholic belief in the prince’s divinely ordained legitimacy, and
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because it opposed the synchronism between church and state. Erasmus was born at Rotterdam, went to school at Deventer in Holland where Alexander Hegius combined the humanist emphasis on the classics with the religious ideals of the Brethren of the Common life, and entered a monastery at Stein near Gouda. Erasmus later lived in Flanders in the southern Netherlands for many years, which was the centre of the Burgundian-Habsburg Netherlands. Tilmans elucidates Erasmus’ notion of humanism when she notes that the ‘Erasmian humanist strove for the revival of the Christian humanitas, which in political terms meant the revival of a Christian respublica. Sapientia is the highest possible political virtue.’ She notes that ‘Erasmus argued in his Institutio principis christiani (1516): “goodwill may suffice in the ordinary citizen, since he is directed by laws; it is of little avail in a prince, unless accompanied by wisdom.”’ Tilmans notes Erasmus’ ‘plea for wisdom as the highest princely virtue, for an elective monarchy, government by consent and law, and political freedom’. She contends that to further these proposals, together with his ‘fierce critique of political corruption and tyranny, Erasmus called upon a Ciceronian political language which he directed against contemporary political culture’. Tilmans registers that Erasmus is the ‘best known of the early Dutch humanist thinkers, but at the same time he is the most un-Netherlandish of them all, working as he did mainly outside the political context of the Burgundian-Habsburg Netherlands’ (Tilmans 2002, 108). However, Tilmans also notes that while Erasmus’ notion of citizenship is ‘universal, rather than urban or national, he has been, from a totally different perspective, of major importance for the development of ideas on national citizenship in the Netherlands’. In his ‘adage The Batavian Ear (1508), he first formulated the idea of the Dutch natio as Batavian, and of its civic greatness since antiquity’ (Tilmans 2002, 113). In tracing how Erasmus’ humanist ideas were later taken up in subsequent political discourse, Tilmans argues that civic humanists provided later writers with the resources to think about ‘different levels of citizenship’ – urban, universal, aristocratic, and republican. ‘Civic humanism in the Burgundian-Habsburg Netherlands starts out at the end of the fifteenth century as humanist rhetoric in praise of the cities.’ But ‘in the course of the sixteenth century, it turns into republican rhetoric, entailing a moral philosophy committed to changing the body politic’. She finds a ‘strong continuity of civic or republican discourse extending from the sixteenth- to the seventeenth-century Netherlands’, and argues that the ‘ideological force of sixteenth
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century civic humanism in state formation seems so far to have been underestimated’ (Tilmans 2002, 124). Blockmans recounts how, after Erasmus had dedicated his work The Praise of Folly to Thomas More, the ‘two great humanists’ met in 1515, when More was in Bruges ‘to represent the interests of English merchants’. More was writing Utopia at the time, his ‘vision for an ideal society’, while Erasmus’ The Praise of Folly ‘used the theme of the world turned upside down to openly vent satirical criticism of all social roles, not least that of the clergy’ (Blockmans 1999, 126). Erasmus’ Christian Humanism in the first half of the sixteenth century sought to integrate the humanist recovery of classical learning in the original Greek and Hebrew (regarded as having achieved an inspiring harmony between form and content that had not been surpassed) with a reformed, tolerant Catholic Christianity. Blockmans comments that while Erasmus wrote a ‘princely mirror’ for the future emperor Charles as well as works on war and peace, he considered his religious works ‘based on his critical study of the ancient Greek and Latin texts’ including his ‘new two-language publication of the New Testament…far more important’ (Blockmans 1999, 126). Erasmus’ ideal of a tolerant international church and an international community of scholars was overtaken by the Lutheran challenge to the Catholic church. But his Christian Humanist programme, for a time developed at the University of Leuven where scholars could study the Hebrew, Greek and Latin sources of the Christian faith (Blockmans 1997, 126), had a wide, though quiet impact in many European countries, including the Netherlands. According to Blockmans, Erasmus shared Luther’s and other theologians’ ‘critique of religious formalism and the worldliness of the church’, but he did not break with Catholicism, ‘even though he had no patience with the war-making popes of his day’ (Blockmans 1997, 126). Schöffer makes the important point (1964, 76–7) that the strength of the traditions of Christian humanism and Erasmianism, with their stress on good personal behaviour and toleration, helps to account for the slowness of the development of the Reformation in the Netherlands. Indeed he considers that the Reformation was able to take root at all only because of the Revolt itself. Harline makes the telling statement that Erasmus was ‘one of the few’ in sixteenth-century Holland to point out that Mars, the Roman god of war, was the ‘stupidest of all the Gods’ (Harline 1989, 190). Lipsius, who edited the collected works of Tacitus in the 1570s and 1580s, was appointed professor of history and law at the university at Leiden in 1579, to enhance the reputation of the new university. His
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book on politics, Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae libri sex (Six Books on Politics or Civil Doctrine) of 1589, is important here because, as van Gelderen comments, it went against the grain of the ‘traditional Dutch emphasis on the limits of monarchy and the authority of the States’. It provided an ‘eloquent plea for princely rule’ (van Gelderen 1992, 180). Lipsius ‘was in touch with the leading politicians of his day’, but in ‘his view the States’ government of the 1580s was a catastrophe’ (van Gelderen 1992, 187). Van Gelderen comments that the book was intended to instruct those in government ‘and princes in particular’ in how to establish civil life whose aim was the bonum publicum. Lipsius recommended, ‘in line with the humanist fashion of his time’ that rulers should be ‘guided by prudence and virtue’ (van Gelderen 1992, 181). But while it advocated monarchical government, the book argued that the prince needs advisers to enhance his prudence – counsellors on foreign affairs as well as with ‘opinion and speech’, and ministers to assist with practical matters (van Gelderen 1992, 182). Lipsius recommended to rulers a combination of humanist values (such as justice, clemency, modesty and prudence) but, like Machiavelli, argued that ‘the traditionally overarching virtues of justice and honesty should be set aside if the supreme value of the common good was at stake’. Van Gelderen notes that his work also ‘featured the characteristic Stoic emphasis on self-sufficiency combined with a detached concern for others’, and self-discipline and frugality. The ‘principal duty of the citizen’ was ‘dutiful obedience under the guidance of a virtuous prince’ (van Gelderen 1992, 183–4). Lipsius’ edition of the collected works of Tacitus was part of a wider development in humanist scholarship that occurred in the second half of the sixteenth century in the Netherlands. In the first half of the century, Tacitus had assumed a notable importance because of the information on the Germanic peoples that was included in his History, and in particular for the value of his works as a historical source for the Batavian identity claimed by the Dutch. Interest in the Batavian heritage was further stimulated in the second half of the sixteenth century when Tacitus became seen, as Shöffer argues, as ‘the grand inspiration of a truly classical literary style, displacing Cicero, till then considered the purest model’. Schöffer notes that the work of Tacitus ‘proved, in addition, an inspiring source for the increasingly popular philosophy of Stoicism, soon to be accepted by humanist scholars as the prototype of public morality in the difficult art of politics and government’. According to Schöffer, Tacitus in this way ‘came to constitute for many
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a learned humanist a counterweight, a healthy medicine against the “pernicious, immoral” influence of the writings of Machiavelli’. Indeed, he says, ‘rebellious Holland became the intellectual centre’ for ‘this new fashion of “Tacitism”’. The new university in Leiden, ‘founded in 1575 by William of Orange, needing some special focus of interest, opened its doors to this up-to-date humanism next to becoming one of the centres of Calvinist theology’ (Schöffer 1975, 87). Klashorst, Blom and Mulier also highlight that the works of ancient historians, and in particular of Tacitus, ‘were carefully studied and commented upon, as sources of practical political wisdom’. Likewise, Stoic ethical treatises on virtues such as constancy and prudence helped ‘shape the political outlook of the age’. The reason, these writers suggest, for the popularity of Tacitus and Stoic authors, was that they ‘emphasise the importance of the relation between political thought, classical philology and the study of history’ (Klashorst, Blom and Mulier 1986, xi) as a guide to political policy and action. Thus the picture that emerges of political thought during the Revolt is not of writers seeking to justify the emergent Republic with innovative republican ideas, but of writers responding to the Revolt by acting as conduits of classical exemplars and virtues which strike a chord in contemporary minds and hearts, and as writers transmitting humanist ideals and ideas of both Erasmus and Tacitus, from both northern and southern European sources. Kossmann points to another feature of the Dutch writers’ dependence on a range of traditional sources for legitimacy, including both home-grown ideas like the privileges and foreign texts. He reflects that, looking ‘back on the history of Dutch political thought during the Revolt what strikes one is its unadventurous character and its precision. The Netherlands apparently felt compelled to justify all their acts and decisions as based on law’. But while these writers ‘strained law and precedent to the point of misrepresenting them perhaps wilfully’, and ‘failed to put forward a consistent theory of constitutional government’, there was ‘something moving and impressive in their sometimes desperate and sometimes extraordinarily pedantic attempts to prove that all they did was legitimate’ (Kossman and Mellink 1974, 50) The way in which attempts at republican formulations of political theory could only be accepted if absorbed into a transmission of traditional ideas, and could not be accepted if described as innovative – even though the practical consequences constituted an innovation – can be seen in the political thought of this period. The enormous significance of this disposition of Dutch writers, to habitually seek legitimacy for
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political proposals by invoking traditional sources, is a theme taken up in some of the following chapters. For as well as characteristic of a sound understanding of political thought during the period of the Revolt, this predisposition sets the intellectual context for later developments and for Spinoza’s works and their reception. Van Gelderen notes the on-going reaffirmation by the northern Netherlanders, in political debate, of local and particularistic traditions. He comments that the ‘Abjuration of Philip II in 1581 merely intensified the debates on the optimal state of the Dutch commonwealth and on the location of sovereignty in the peculiar Dutch interplay of towns, provincial States and States General’. The ‘most influential interpretation’ (van Gelderen 1999, 193) of this disposition to affirm change by appealing to the force of traditional texts and practices is demonstrated by Vranck, the influential Pensionary of Gouda and a deputy in the States of Holland. Vranck’s Short Exposition of the Right Exercised from All Old Times by the Knighthood, Nobles and Towns of Holland and Westvriesland for the Maintenance of the Liberties, Rights, Privileges and Laudable Customs of the Country is very important in two respects. It was taken as an authoritative declaration in 1587 locating and reaffirming sovereignty in the separate parts, and especially in the States assemblies, and the authority it held over the subsequent eighty years was immense. It was also, much more locally, as Hibben remarks, a ‘defence of the authority of the States of Holland’ and as such was fully endorsed by the town council in Vranck’s home town of Gouda (Hibben 1983, 173). Van Gelderen calls attention to the enormous significance of Vranck’s treatise by referring to it as ‘the “Magna Carta” of the Dutch Republic’ (van Gelderen 1993, xxviii). He describes how it was written to refute a Remonstrance of the same year by an English supporter of the Earl of Leicester, which had argued that the States assemblies could make no claim to sovereignty because they contained ‘mere delegates who acted on order and instruction’ (van Gelderen 1993, xxviii). Van Gelderen comments that while ‘Vranck admitted that the States were representative institutions whose work had to be seen in terms of delegation’ (van Gelderen 1999, 193), according to Vranck ‘this did not diminish the importance of the States’. Using a ‘distinction between the location and the administration of sovereignty’, Vranck argued that ‘although sovereignty resided with the people [that is, the towns and nobles], it was administered by their delegates, the States’ (van Gelderen 1999, 194). The force of the declaration was to deny sovereignty to the central organs of government, along the lines asserted by
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Leicester. Van Gelderen notes that the Short Exposition concludes by reasserting ‘how necessary it is to preserve the authority of the States’ for two reasons. The States are viewed as ‘the foundation on which the common state of the country rests, and which cannot be damaged without ruining the common good’. Second, ‘in all matters the sovereignty of the country is with the States’ (van Gelderen 1993, 238). This declaration was the first in a long line of such affirmations of a new de facto constitutional settlement, arrived at by contesting an opposing claim, and expressed as the confirmation of tradition. Althusius, like Lipsius and Vranck, fits into the pattern of reliance on traditional sources of legitimacy by writers on political thought during the period of the Revolt. Althusius is known to us as a writer whose right of resistance theory was written in response to the Revolt. But again the idea of a ‘right of resistance’ means something very specific to Althusius, couched in terms of reaffirming traditional ideas. In his Politica methodice digesta of 1603, as Kossmann describes, Althusius, among other publicists in the Netherlands of the sixteenth century, wanted to prove that ‘a representative body, or a body considered representative, had the right to resist a despotic prince’. Sovereignty was defined by Althusius, Kossmann notes, ‘as popular in order to allow the so-called popular representatives to withdraw it from a ruler who exercised it in an illegal manner’. The crucial point was that sovereignty ‘was not used by Althusius as a creative and dynamic concept symbolising the soul of state power; sovereignty was not basically power to be exercised, it was power to resist illegitimate exercise of it’. Kossmann remarks that the ‘concept was thus interpreted – quite differently from the way in which Bodin or Parker used it – as an instrument to defend the constitutional tradition and not as an instrument to unify and strengthen the State’ (Kossmann 1987e, 136). In other words, for Althusius, ‘sovereignty is not intended to be positive, to make laws and to act as the creative centre of the State, but only to check government’ (Kossmann 1960, 93). The purpose of this notion of sovereignty, for Althusius, is purely to retain the right of resistance to tyranny. Van Gelderen also considers the meaning of sovereignty for Althusius. He raises the important point that sovereignty was understood in the light of late medieval traditions of ‘“holistic” and corporatist notions of the community’. When writers like Althusius and Vranck referred to a conception of ‘popular sovereignty’ they did not mean by it a modern notion but were alluding rather to ‘a network of ancient institutions, of councils, parliaments, colleges and estates, and secondarily, those who have a place in them’. At the same time the important and distinctive
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Netherlanders’ political practice of bargaining toward consensus and concord ensured that the views of the wider public could not be ignored. Institutions were regarded as representative, not in the sense of assemblies ‘appointed by the people to give expression to popular will’. Rather it meant that such institutions ‘more or less personified the people, embodying the social bond which unites people in society’ (van Gelderen 1993, xxx). As to the character of the new political community, Kossmann notes that ‘the question was never explicitly put’ in this form. This ‘hesitation, this inability to come to grips with the most urgent task’, he says, ‘can be clearly demonstrated by an analysis of the important and great work published in 1603 by the Calvinist theorist Althusius … Politica methodice digesta’. This work was, says Kossmann, ‘a rationalisation of, and an apology for, the Revolt’ (Kossmann 1960, 92). Kossmann sums up that the ‘political theory which accompanied the Revolt had always remained more or less negative’. It had ‘above all been intended as the justification of a revolt, not as a justification for creating a new state. This is why this justification had for so long been based on positive law.’ Political theory at this time, he notes, ‘stated again and again that old privileges were being defended against a tyrant, and one simply did not feel the need to ask oneself what kind of state was taking shape’ (Kossmann 1960, 92). Althusius was widely followed in accepting monarchy as the norm. Political theory in the early seventeenth century in the universities considered monarchy the oldest and in most cases the best form of government. But monarchy was to be distinguished from despotism. These writers argued that all European monarchies were forms of mixed government, and they worked to assimilate the United Provinces into this formula. Significantly, no special status was given to the peculiarity of the form of political organisation with which the United Provinces found itself, although some teachers accounted for its remarkable freedom in terms of the state being more thoroughly mixed than were other European states (Kossmann 1991, 289–90). Grotius and Paul Buys were two writers who did seek to offer positive alternatives to the paradigm which Althusius’ work was considered to represent. Grotius was actively involved in politics in support of Oldenbarnevelt’s government as well as being a writer and lawyer. Grotius’ De antiquitate de statu reipublicae Batavae of 1610 was written in an effort to supersede the Calvinistic theory of resistance as put forward by Althusius. As Kossmann remarks, Grotius’ ‘defence of a nonmonarchical, almost unadulterated aristocratic form of government,
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deciding that this was the system adhered to by the Dutch from time immemorial’ was an innovation, attempting to ‘explain and glorify the State in the form it possessed in 1610’ (Kossmann 1960, 94). It praised ‘the republican form of government which’, according to Grotius, ‘Holland had possessed since its birth, 1,700 years ago’ (Kossmann 1991, 289). The popularity of this work by Grotius, given a vernacular translation soon after 1610, and reprinted seven times in the seventeenth century, can be understood in terms of his appeal to or appropriation of a Batavian past whose positive moral status was clear to his readers. Schöffer underlines the way in which Grotius ‘offered his readers … his view of the exemplary way in which the Batavi had organised their government’. As Schöffer comments, the ‘date of publication was certainly no accident. The Twelve Years Truce had just been signed, a firm legitimation of the independent existence of the young Republic, from the best sources, was urgently needed’. Schöffer asks rhetorically, ‘[w]ho but the erudite Grotius, himself nurtured in the Batavian atmosphere of neo-Tacitean Leiden, could so well muster the arguments drawn from the age-old classical documents?’ (Schöffer 1975, 92). Van Deursen is even more blunt. Grotius’ Liber de antiquitate et Statu reipublicae Batavae ‘is a political treatise’, he insists. While Grotius was a jurist, historian and theologian, he was also able to ‘use his scholarship as a political instrument’. Using historical arguments, Grotius ‘sought to prove that the supreme power in Holland belonged to the States – not to the prince, or to the people’. Likewise Grotius’s Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfrisiae pietas, van Deursen recounts, ‘is a defence of the church policy of Oldenbarnevelt, of whom he was a close and trusted associate’. Grotius’s political purposes were just as clear in the Mare liberum which, as van Deursen notes, directly defended ‘the right to free trade on the open seas vis-à-vis other states, whose established or growing interests were threatened by Dutch shipping’ (van Deursen 1999, 178). The Mare liberum was intended as an argument against the Portuguese (van Bunge 1999b, 14). It was originally chapter 12 of the longer work De iure praedae, but was published separately in 1609 because of the important topical relevance of the argument. As Van Gelderen comments, the ‘freedom of the seas was a key issue in the peace negotiations between Spain and the Dutch Republic which led to the truce of 1609’ (van Gelderen 1999, 203). Van Gelderen notes that in De iure praedae, in ‘line with the political thought of his rebellious Dutch predecessors’ (van Gelderen 1999, 202) like Vranck, Grotius defends the ‘authority of the States assemblies
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with reference to the old Dutch charters’. Grotius regards the assembly of the States as the ‘supreme magistrate which maintains the law of the commonwealth and the citizenry’. Van Gelderen argues that Grotius ‘puts the full weight of his justification of the Dutch Revolt on the basic principles that the commonwealth is the source of civil power and that government is based on contractual consent’ with a prince. The power given to the prince can be revoked if the prince ‘exceeds his bounds, because then ipso facto he ceases to be regarded as a prince’ (van Gelderen 1999, 203). Van Gelderen also notes that De iure praedae contained ‘a meticulous political defence of the activities of the Dutch East India Company’ (van Gelderen 1999, 204). Paul Buys, like Althusius, was very impressed by Bodin’s writings. The connection is pertinent since, as noted earlier, Bodin had been councillor to the Duke of Anjou when Anjou was offered the sovereignty of the northern Netherlands in 1580. But the attempt of Buys, a jurist, in 1613 in De republica libri tres, to outline the inner limits of government (as opposed to Althusius’ right of resistance to government) in order to advocate an aristocratic republic, did not exercise much influence. As Kossmann confirms, republican theory ‘in the first decades of the seventeenth century was never developed into a really coherent doctrine’. Kossmann makes the important point that republican theory could not achieve recognition – despite the reality of republican practice – in the context of ‘the body of humanistic and Aristotelian thought so predominant in Dutch and other universities’ (Kossmann 1960, 95). Monarchical Dutch political theory, dominant especially after the fall of Oldenbarnevelt in 1618 and the development of the United Provinces in the direction of a monarchy, was as Kossmann comments, ‘essentially traditional. It was Aristotelian, humanistic and Calvinistic’ (Kossmann 1960, 96). In a reversal of our expectations perhaps, Kossmann also registers the significance of the point that it was Calvinist educational principles, and not a republican impulse, that was ‘directed towards developing civic virtues and preparing its pupils for a life of responsible leadership’. Government, he affirms, ‘should, according to the humanistic theory that can hardly be distinguished from Calvinism, be exercised by the best, by the virtuous, by the well-educated’ (Kossmann 1960, 101). It was the traditional, and not the republican, theory that upheld the classical republican virtue of the active civic life of the citizen in high esteem. Moreover, Calvinistic theory was dominant not because it was Calvinistic but because it coincided with the traditions of classical and humanist learning which were dominant in the Netherlands.
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These dominant features are seen in the Idea politica of 1644 by Frank Burgersdijk, a professor at Leiden university. The popularity of this work is demonstrated by the successive re-edited publications of it in 1649, 1657 and 1668. In addition, Kossmann comments that a group of Dutch Calvinist university teachers used their Althusius to refute the ‘horrible doctrines of Hobbes’ (Kossmann 1960, 96). Kossmann aptly characterises political thought in the first half of the seventeenth century in terms of a ‘sterility’ which accounts for ‘the profound crisis to which Calvinistic politica eventually led’. For this theory, he comments, ‘was monarchical not so much because it preferred the monarchy to all other forms of government, and certainly not because it was Orangist, but simply out of inner, logical necessity’ (Kossmann 1960, 98). In addition, the problem persisted that this theory could not be made to fit the real situation in the Netherlands where there was no monarch. Kossmann takes the view that it is not surprising that the challenge, from around 1650, to this ‘absurd’ political theory taught in the universities, came from outside the universities. It came from Lambert van Velthuysen, the De la Court brothers and from Spinoza, drawing on Dutch political practice as well as using ideas from Hobbes and Descartes. It coincided, Kossmann reminds us, with the establishment of ‘a pure republican form of government in five of the seven provinces’ of the north, after the conflict of 1650 between the Stadholder William II and Amsterdam (Kossmann 1960, 99). While it is clear with historical perspective that the Revolt, and the Republic it led to, would have to be acknowledged in theoretical form, sooner or later, it was by no means obvious that this was so to contemporary commentators. The categorisation employed by Klashorst, Blom and Mulier (1986, xii–xiv), of four types of political thought in the United Provinces in the seventeenth century, is interesting. Instead of taking account of the republican challenge from around 1650 that Kossmann describes to the ‘sterility’ of traditional categories, it continues to classify political theory as mirroring unreflectively the traditional concerns of humanism, Aristotelianism, law and Calvinism. The first type, political thought in the literary-historical style, predominant in the first half of the seventeenth century and in the universities, brings together writers like Lipsius and others who analyse historical situations, often from Roman history or through Tacitus, to derive political lessons. The De la Courts are also included in this category. The second type, philosophical political thought, refers to Spinoza, but as an exception to political thought studied in philosophy departments
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in universities, in the academic Aristotelian tradition, by writers such as Busius and Burgersdijk. The third type, according to Klashorst, Blom and Mulier’s taxonomy, encompasses the contributions of jurists to Dutch political thought, mainly in the last third of the seventeenth century, in the works of Huber and others. This category also includes earlier works by Grotius (De jure belli ac pacis) and his pupil Graswinckel (1667 and 1674). The fourth type of political thought described is the theological-political, mainly concerned with the relation between the Reformed Church and the secular state, and covers the debate between Arminians and orthodox Calvinists, repeated in 1642 and again in 1688–90. Coming now to the use by the Dutch of Machiavelli, it is not surprising, from what has already been described, that the traditionalist political thought of the universities regarded Machiavelli as cynical and immoral. Machiavelli was regarded as in a sense dangerously modern, in contrast with Tacitus who offered comfortably ancient historical and moral exemplars. Pieter Hooft exemplifies the Dutch preferences well. Best known for his drama and poetry, and for his early work, Baeto or the Origins of the Hollanders (1617), which was in the tradition of the Batavian myth, Hooft also wrote a work of history and politics about the Revolt, the largest part of which was published in 1642. Hooft is typical, not only in the scope of his different writings, but also in that his great examples were Tacitus and Erasmus, not Machiavelli (Kossmann 1987c, 215–18). Like Machiavelli it was commonplace for Dutch writers at this time to be concerned with the notion of liberty. But they meant by it the defence of concrete examples from their own history of ancient liberties or privileges laid down in documents, expressed in specific laws. Dutch writers at this time were not concerned to articulate an abstract notion of liberty as a political concept as such. As Van Gelderen rightly notes, there is a crucial difference between Dutch and Machiavellian views on liberty: ‘unlike Machiavelli’s, the Dutch republican view of the political order was built on the trinity of liberty, privileges and States and was not developed out of the republican language of the Machiavellian moment’. Political thinkers and writers during the Revolt did refer to the classic authors of republican theory. However, as van Gelderen emphasises, they ‘did not conceive of the fight for the preservation of the old freedom and the old political order – for that is how they represented the resistance of abjuration – in terms of a fight between virtu and fortuna’ (van Gelderen 1990, 218). Moreover van Gelderen makes a good case (1990, 218–19), that there were two sound
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reasons why the theory outlined by Machiavelli on republican liberty was not followed, in political debate in the northern Netherlands after the Union of Utrecht. First, Florence had suffered the fate the Dutch were trying to avoid and, secondly Machiavelli was associated in Dutch minds with the calculating political behaviour in the southern Netherlands of Philip II, the Duke of Parma and Farnese. For the Dutch, political thought was about reaffirming the value of specific ancient liberties and privileges, always backward-looking. It was not about needing to look for new values or new forms of legitimation for constitutional arrangements. The mismatch between values and arrangements did not matter. So long as the fundamental values were expressed through the arrangements, it did not signify that the constitutional arrangements did not entirely or explicitly spell out the nature of the political reality. Thus the contemporary disjunction was partly due to the political arrangements (in terms of institutions and processes) not being significantly changed after the break with Spain, even though that was so fundamentally important a political fact. This disconnection was also partly due to the Dutch not perceiving a need to account theoretically or in constitutional justification for political change. The final reflection to be made on political thought during the Revolt is that it did not lead necessarily to the specific form later taken by Dutch republicanism, and could even have led instead to an Orangist monarchy. It is important to stress the contingency and indeterminism involved here, since at least one important commentator seeks to establish a much closer connection and see the seeds of later republican theory in the political thought of the Revolt. Van Gelderen’s initial aim, ‘to reconstruct the development of Neostoic and republican patterns of ideas during the Revolt and to indicate their relation to the political language of the Machiavellian moment’ (Van Gelderen 1990, 205), is not problematic. His view that conceptions of liberty were crucial in the political debate following the Union of Utrecht is common ground, and his observation that Dutch republicanism differs from Machiavelli’s is sound. However, van Gelderen’s argument that writers in the Dutch Revolt were putting forward republican views, needs perhaps to distinguish more clearly that republicanism is not a necessary consequence of a love of liberty. Van Gelderen expressly states (1990, 221) that ‘the vision of the Dutch political order…built upon liberty, privileges and sovereign States, contained a conception of republican self-government’. The following chapter seeks to show that republican implications were not drawn out until the second half of the seventeenth century, and the Dutch Revolt was not
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itself republican in character. The same difference of opinion occurs when van Gelderen says that ‘privileges were not just about rights, they were also about participation’. He argues that ‘when theorists of the Dutch Revolt appealed to the privileges they were not merely demanding the protection of rights, they were also demanding participation in the decision-making process especially for the state’, whose principals were cities. ‘In short’, he argues, ‘if the political authors of the Dutch Revolt were employing the “language of law”, for them this language was perfectly suited to express republican claims’ (Van Gelderen 1990, 222). In this way van Gelderen asserts that the Dutch used the language of law (that is, privileges) to express republican claims (that is, to take part in a federal body and its decision-making), and not just to guard privileges from central control. This view is at odds with Kossmann’s persuasive argument that Netherlanders during the Revolt ‘had no experience with republican government and tended to look upon it as something alien or even unnatural’. Furthermore, Kossmann notes, ‘some pamphleteers considered the merits of republicanism but without transforming their reflections into a concrete proposal or programme’ (Kossmann 1991, 287). In addition, while van Gelderen’s view assumes a selfconsciousness in their reflection on political practice on the part of the Dutch, Blockmans points out the precise absence of this approach in the Dutch. Blockmans makes the important point that it ‘did not matter very much to them if they practised’ the post-Spanish political reality ‘with or without a monarch, as long as he had no real power over them’ (Blockmans 1988, 154). Van Gelderen’s view is also problematic in that it has difficulty in accounting for the political leaders’ active and multiple attempts, after their ‘independence’ from Spain with Abjuration in 1581, to find themselves a new sovereign. Neither is van Gelderen justified in identifying a desire for participation with claims to republican status. For, as was noted earlier, it was the Calvinist and traditional political thought that emphasised civic virtue. Second, as Kossmann argues strongly, the development of provincial responsibility and organisation arose as a result of the ‘anarchy, disintegration and civil war’ of the long period of the Revolt. The provinces, he notes, retreated into ‘an old-fashioned particularism’ and did not embrace any revolutionary ideals of republicanism (Kossmann and Mellink 1974, 2). Van Gelderen’s (1986) attempt to draw new lines of ‘influence’ from resistance theory in the Dutch Revolt, to Spinoza and republicanism, can also be questioned. There are several strong arguments challenging
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van Gelderen’s view. The theory developed in the Dutch Revolt was open in the sense that it did not have to lead on to republicanism. The Orangist/monarchist strain was strong during the Revolt, particularly after Oldenbarnevelt’s fall in 1618. Also, the Dutch Revolt is a good illustration of the role of contingency in historical understanding. Dutch Revolt theory was not the origin of Dutch republicanism in any necessary sense, but only in the sense that the story, whose connections are contingent, can conveniently, though arbitrarily, start here. As Haitsma Mulier rightly notes (1990, 253), ‘[n]o real republican theory emerged during the Revolt from which the Dutch Republic originated’. Indeed, Haitsma Mulier also argues (1987, 181) that after the Revolt the only group who had a sense of identification with the United Provinces as a whole were the orthodox Calvinists of the Reformed Church, which included some of the Holland regents. They hoped to create a new Israel, and looked to the House of Orange for support. Furthermore, Kossmann warns against reading the term res publica as ‘republic’ in Dutch writings of the period. Dutch sources confirm, he says, ‘that in seventeenth century Latin “res publica” retained its old meaning’, that is, of ‘commonwealth’ rather than ‘republic’, ‘whereas in the contemporary vernacular it stood most often for non-monarchical government’ (Kossmann 1991, 289). This chapter has sought to provide an outline of the major political events and political writings that make the Revolt intelligible, to describe how politics was conducted, and to indicate the complex political mapping of religious dispute on to political dispute. It has also sought to indicate the extent and importance of the mismatch that existed between political theory and political practice during this period, and the contemporary perception of the situation as unproblematic. Finally the chapter began to indicate some of the grounds against employing the term ‘Dutch Republic’ to describe the United Provinces at any time during these eighty years before 1648. This question is taken up again in the following chapter.
2 The Dutch Republic
The date of the Dutch Republic Haitsma Mulier (1987) is one of several commentators who quite confidently use the term ‘Dutch Republic’ to describe the northern Netherlands before 1648, whereas Kossmann (1991) accurately comments that the term was not much used at this time in the United Provinces, and that it misdefines how the northern Netherlanders regarded themselves. The United Provinces’ shyness of the title ‘Republic’ illustrates their reluctance to recognise that a new state of affairs was emerging. Furthermore, the list of thresholds and milestones toward ‘a republic’, which historians can identify with hindsight, represents in retrospect moments when aspects of what it meant to be an (unintended) republic were consolidated. The argument developed here is that it was only with the advent of De Witt’s regime that the United Provinces can fully be called a republic and even then, only in a specific Dutch sense. Spinoza’s political work represents the pinnacle of the elaboration of that conception of republicanism. The successful establishment of an independent polity after the victory over the Spanish was cemented in 1648 is all the more remarkable considering that it went against the tide of politics in Europe. Scott makes a good case that the trend that dominated European politics in the seventeenth century was ‘the counter-reformation advance’ (Scott 2000, 30). Indeed the Revolt can be understood as a series of occasions when the Dutch fought against the ‘destabilising impact of European developments’ (Scott 2000, 166). The dynastic succession that led to Philip’s disastrous rule was none of their choosing. They defended themselves against Spain’s interfering efforts and against the Counter-Reformation assaults represented by the power of 65
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the French king. They defended themselves by clinging to their claim, by reiterating the value to them of their iconic charters and privileges in their changed circumstances, and thereby reinventing the claim that was made. They rejected Spanish and other attempts to reform their political, constitutional, legal and religious traditions. Another very important factor supporting a cautious use of the term ‘Dutch Republic’ lies in recognising the fluidity of the situation on the ground during the course of the Revolt. Shifting alliances among the seventeen provinces, and shifting borders between north and south (and with France), make a confident territorially based attribution impossible until quite late on. The dramatic flows of refugees, for instance in 1585 from southern towns to the north, make assumptions about stable populations in the ‘Dutch Republic’ and the southern Netherlands unfeasible. A fascinating article by Welu (1975) on Vermeer’s cartographic sources, reveals just how slippery are the territory and image of the ‘Dutch Republic’. Maps were regarded at the time as works of art in their own right as well as scientific and practical documents, and printed maps were fashionably associated with the new form of technology and culture of print. The Netherlands was the centre of map printing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, led by the leading cartographer Abraham Ortelius. The symbolism of maps was just as important as their topographic accuracy. The emblems, heraldic insignia and other ornamentation, as well as the topography included or left out, carried powerful wider social values and attitudes about the area depicted. In the seventeenth century (before the widespread use of the compass consolidated the orientation of maps to the north–south line) the convention of orienting maps with the north at the top was not yet stable. Some maps of the time were oriented (‘orientation’ coming from the Latin word for ‘east’, deriving from the word for the direction from which the sun rises) with the north at the top, but this was not standardised practice. Until the sixteenth century most ‘European world maps had east at the top’, because it represented the ‘direction of Paradise’ (Kaiser and Wood 2001, 50). Black notes that even ‘at the end of the seventeenth century, there was no standard alignment of maps, but in the following century the convention of placing North at the top was established’ (Black 1997, 15). Many maps, including some of those of the Netherlands in Vermeer’s paintings, were oriented with the west (that is, the coastal area) at the top of the frame. Confusingly, the east or south could also be represented at the top of the frame, showing that different habits and emphases flourished concurrently.
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However, whatever compass point is placed at the top of the map tends to be regarded as most important (Kaiser and Wood 2001, 52) and the alignment of the west at the top in maps of the Netherlands certainly signals the high value of Holland and seaborne trade. Moreover, evidence from maps in Vermeer’s paintings suggests a different attitude toward territory from that held later on. For a start, extensive land drainage and reclamation (poldering) during the seventeenth century changed the topography, and increased the area of the United Provinces dramatically. Also, all Vermeer’s maps were printed in Amsterdam, and a wall map clearly identified as ‘Europe’ dates from 1613, and another (probably from around 1652) is labelled, even at this date, ‘the Seventeen Provinces of the Netherlands (Germania Inferior)’. Maps of the ‘Seventeen Provinces’ continued to be issued as standard in the north long after the division of the northern and southern Netherlands, and long after the full independence of the United Provinces in 1648. This may perhaps be due to a disjunction similar to the one between theory and practice noted previously, or perhaps in order to trade on the glory of the earlier, larger (and more stable?) political identity. Because some of the measures by which to define the inauguration of the new polity do not give us clear answers, dating the beginning of the Dutch Republic, and the meaningfulness of the date, is shrouded in ambiguity. Let us consider the main possibilities. With the Union of Utrecht in 1579, undertaken in response to the Union of Arras in the south, the northern provinces separated from the southern provinces. Drente joined the 1579 Union but left again in 1580 with the ‘defection of Rennenberg’, because they were primarily a Catholic province and saw the Union ‘as a yoke imposed by the hollanders’, says Geyl (1955, 176), and sought Parma’s protection. Braudel contemptuously characterises the United Provinces as ‘an assembly of seven minuscule states’ (Braudel 1979b, 180). The United Provinces did not, however, renounce Spanish sovereignty over their country until 1581, with the Abjuration of Philip II. At this point, however, the United Provinces did not take on the responsibility of sovereignty, initially assuming that it belonged to the Duke of Anjou, and then offering it to several European monarchs. It was only in 1588, when Leicester returned to England (after losing his legitimacy following an ill-advised plan to take over several Holland cities), leaving the United Provinces to their own devices that the country, for the first time, had no overlord. Vranck’s Short Exposition of 1587 had reaffirmed the political power of the separate provinces. At
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this point the United Provinces, in a technical and very narrow sense, became a republic. The United Provinces thus consisted in 1588 of a ‘federation of autonomous provinces’, six in number, but seven ‘after the Republic’s seizure of Groningen in 1594’. Van Deursen lists the provinces in order of priority. The ‘Duchy of Gelderland retained its first rank in the official pecking order, followed by the country of Holland, and then Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland, Overijssel and Groningen’. Van Deursen also clarifies that an ‘eighth province, Drenthe, was granted self-rule but enjoyed no representation in the States-General’. In addition, the ‘so-called Generality Lands – conquered portions of Brabant and Flanders…were ruled directly by The Hague’ (van Deursen 1999, 148). But rather than proclaiming or conceptualising this state of affairs in a positive light, Blockmans describes the default position the Dutch fell back upon. Driven ‘more by negative experiences than a consistent theory, the States-General no longer sought a sovereign to rule over them. They would now simply appropriate that role for themselves’ (Blockmans 1999, 140). Van Deursen draws the contrast that in 1588 the permanent division of the Low Countries ‘still seemed highly unlikely’, whereas ‘in 1648, people regarded the division as both natural and inevitable’ (van Deursen 1999, 144). If 1579, 1581 and 1588 are all rejected as inconclusive, four further key markers for dating the Dutch Republic are 1592, 1606, 1609 and 1621. It was in 1592 that the northern provinces were recognised as an independent state by France and England, as the ‘States-General of the United Provinces’ (Rowen 1972, 68). Acknowledgement of one’s independent status by other countries is one sign of a sovereign polity. But in this case the northern provinces did not implement the constitutional changes that would take account of that recognition by France and England. In 1606 the Archdukes of the southern Netherlands declared their willingness to negotiate with the United Provinces as an independent state, but this invitation was not taken up. The Twelve Year Truce with Spain, agreed in 1609, as well as being a personal victory for Oldenbarnevelt, demonstrated Spain’s agreement in principle to formally recognising the de facto independence of the northern provinces. Grotius’ works of around this time represented important articulations of popular policies and perspectives in the United Provinces. Mare liberum, published in 1609, made a strong case for the United Provinces’ shipping policy, and his influential work on Holland’s Batavian past of 1610 asserted a quasi-republicanism in terms of 1,700 years of self-government. But it was the United
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Provinces that was more reluctant to agree peace conditions, and in 1621 the war with Spain resumed. The eighth possible, and in some ways the most likely, date for the beginning of the Dutch Republic is 1648. The Treaty of Münster in 1648 finally ended the war, and Spain renounced any further claim to the republic. However the peace, and Spain’s acknowledgement of the independence of the United Provinces, was made against the will of William II, whose ambitions required a continuation of the war. It was only with the sudden death of William II in 1650 (the ninth possible date) that the northern provinces became, according to Lockyer, a ‘republic in fact as well as in name, for the first time in their history’ (Lockyer 1979, 436), inaugurating a period of Stadholderless rule. William II had begun the process of a coup d’état in 1650, in alliance with parts of the Reformed Church and the ‘Further Reformation’ movement which was inspired in part by the English Puritans. But with his sudden illness and death the coup was averted. With the government of De Witt, 1653–72, the United Provinces became for the first time a republic in spirit as well as in name. It is this tenth date, 1653, that perhaps most accurately initiates the Dutch Republic. But there are yet at least four other possibilities. In 1675, William III finally accepted the defeat of his attempt to make the House of Orange the royal family of the United Provinces. He remained Stadholder of the separate provinces and captain-general of them all. Federal institutions were slow to develop. It was only in 1718 that the frontier between the United Provinces and the Austrian Netherlands was conclusively established. Black recounts how the use of a map to establish the border marked a highly significant and novel development in international diplomacy, and signalled a change in ‘mind-set’ from the medieval ‘approach to territory in legal/feudal’ terms towards a spatial perspective on territory in the modern age (Black 1997, 17). One can see how the development of nation-states and centralised governmental authority in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries following the Treaty of Westphalia was underpinned by this transformation of ‘mindset’ from legal to spatial territoriality. Black notes that societies in the seventeenth century ‘lived with a pronounced degree of tension over frontier zones, areas of overlapping jurisdiction and divided sovereignty’ (Black 1997, 17), that was sometimes resolved but sometimes exacerbated by the move to precision mapping of territory and borders. Black describes the import of employing a map to delineate the frontier as an integral ‘part of an Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1718’. This is an early example of the practice whereby, as ‘maps were more and more widely
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used, they increasingly gave form to political territoriality and resulting interests and concerns’ (Black 1997, 16). The 1718 map ‘owed much to the publication in 1711 of the Fricx map of the Low Countries, the first relatively large-scale military map of Europe’. Black comments that the ‘frontier was fixed literally on a map, signed and sealed by plenipotentiaries as an annex to that treaty’ (Black 1997, 16). While 1718 might seem far too late a date for the definitive establishment of the Dutch Republic, de Waele comments that it was only in 1839 that ‘the separation between Belgium and Holland was settled’. Territorial stability between the two countries was not established for almost two centuries after 1648. It was the Treaty of Münster ‘which at the request of the Dutch officially decided the closure of the Scheldt in 1648’. The decision indicated the extent of the antagonistic interests between the northern and southern Netherlands and it ‘cast a long shadow’. When the separation was settled, ‘the terms regarding the Statute of the Scheldt and the waterways between the Scheldt, the Meuse and the Rhine were perceived as distinctly disadvantageous in Belgium and its main port Antwerp’ (de Waele, 2000, 115). It was not until 1798 that an assembly was inaugurated which represented the whole nation and not just the separate provinces of the Dutch Republic. And it was not until 1806 that a legislative body was estab1ished in which members voted without instructions from their provincial constituents (van Raalte 1959, 2). Yet the Republic, by the end of the eighteenth century, ‘had been consigned to that indeterminate category of states neither truly sovereign nor yet completely subordinate’ (Schama 1977, 2), and remained under French influence for some time. Nevertheless van der Bijl detects the influence of the De la Court brothers’ recommendation of an isolationist Republic (proposed in the 1660s), in a political proposal of 1848. In the middle of the nineteenth century the minister Van Bosse ‘pleaded for the primacy of economic interest and expressed his preference for territorial reduction by agreeing to give Limburg away to Germany’ (van der Bijl 1986, 90). The reluctance of the United Provinces to accept their republican status was confirmed by Sir William Temple, the ablest diplomat employed abroad by Charles II, and by James Harrington. Temple considered that the United Provinces was a league. It cannot, he said, ‘properly be styled a commonwealth, but is rather a confederacy of Seven Sovereign Provinces united together for their common and mutual defence, without any dependence one upon the other’ (Temple 1932, 56). Furthermore, he accurately observed that sovereignty lies in
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the cities and towns of each province, not in the province as a whole. Harrington, who visited the United Provinces in the 1630s, also regarded the Seven Provinces as a league (Pocock 1977, 3). The ambiguity surrounding the date at which the Republic was established is due to several factors. It points up the mismatch that occurred between the extremely successful republican or quasirepublican practice and the weak monarchical theory predominant for much of the period we are considering. Moreover, as Kossmann points out, in practice, sovereignty resided in the confederation of States, but neither politicians nor political writers or theorists would, for the most part, throughout the seventeenth century, rationalise this state of affairs (Kossmann 1960). Thus the mismatch occurred because the focus of Dutch interest was the new-old claim for the preservation and reaffirmation of ancient liberties and privileges, and on protecting the authority of the separate provincial assemblies, the States. Only limited federal institutions existed. The only federal arrangements to be found in the 1580s and throughout the next century were the military council of state, the mint, the admiralty boards, and the audit office. Primary executive power rested with the seven provinces, but effective power lay with the councillors of the fifty-seven towns represented in the provincial States and in all the other, local, posts occupied increasingly by the regents. These included aldermen, burgomasters, pensionaries, secretaries, and judges, as well as posts in the admiralties, and army commissions and diplomats, who together with the increasingly marginalised nobility constituted the entire ruling class of the republic (Parker 1977, 141; Roorda 1964, 116). The date of the Dutch Republic is also ambiguous, Blom argues (2002, 96), in part because it ‘did not come about as the result of a conscious process’. Rather it was ‘the outcome of particular circumstances, of a particular cultural climate, of party conflict, and of philosophical achievements’. These unintended factors rendered the outcome difficult for the Dutch to accept. Moreover it is ambiguous because its ‘essentially contested nature’ was not resolved, and the Dutch Republic emerged through ‘dissent and criticism’ (Blom 2002, 95). The Dutch Republic was not born of a common history, language or religion, but in common resistance to the Spanish attempt to abolish their (different) ancient privileges. Language was not a common bond. The western, maritime, provinces spoke Dutch, Friesland had its own language, the eastern landward provinces spoke either Oosters or Low German. The House of Orange and its court spoke French, as did immigrants from the south. But while the common bond was resistance to the
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Spanish and the claim about the privileges, it is important to recognise that the situation regarding sovereignty did not in practice change with the coming of independence. The different provinces retained control over positive law, administrative procedures, policy-making, religion, and the courts. Calvinism was the official religion, but it was administered by individual provinces and therefore observance varied. The Reformed Church was not a national church institution. There were different legal systems and law codes (the Netherlands had hundreds of different legal systems), different local institutions such as supreme courts, parliaments, and fiscal laws, and different charters of liberties. Each province also retained economic autonomy to create tariffs and customs and duties charged, as they thought fit (Parker 1977, 60). Thus, as far as the Dutch were concerned, their republic consisted in sovereignty residing in the provinces and towns, the freedom of those provinces and towns to make policy, the local election of the representatives of those towns, the local election of the representatives of each province to the States General, whose authority derived entirely from the towns, and the election of the Stadholder. The States General was not a sovereign body: the deputies to the assembly were not free agents but merely the spokesmen of their provinces, and their unanimity was necessary before any action could be authorised. The Prince of Orange, except for the period 1650–72, was considered acceptable as Stadholder, so long as he was elected to the post and the office was not made hereditary. Only a hereditary Stadholderate would be anathema to the spirit of the republic, it was felt. The ambiguity over the date of the republic was due in part, then, to the mismatch between practice and theory, its unintended and contested nature, and to the catalogue of forms of local difference. The obscurity over the date lies also in another factor, that as Harline notes, the republic was founded on the war against Spain, and was ‘a military alliance, not a cartel’ (Harline 1989, 191). This provenance meant that, in a sense, there was less reason for a common identification of the northern provinces after the end of the war with Spain, than before when the common enemy provided the focus of identification. Thus, the ambiguity over the date at which the Dutch Republic was established, an ambiguity that persisted throughout its entire history, derives not from historians failing to provide a date, but from the contemporary Dutch mentality which did not focus primarily on externals like names and dates. Moreover, their entrenched perception was that the whole was not as important as the separate provinces. The
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northern Netherlanders’ traditions and outlook geared to practice meant more to them than attending to formal externals, with which they were uneasy anyway. But in a more positive light, the indeterminacy of the conclusive dating of the commencement of the Dutch Republic was to the Dutch both deliberate and beneficial. Price makes the important point that ‘only such a severely limited set of central institutions could have served’ the purpose of holding ‘the Republic together for over two centuries’. The Republic was composed of the two contradictory principles of provincial sovereignty and a union of provinces, and ‘any attempt to impose stronger leadership on the “united” provinces would have broken the Union apart’ (Price 1994, 209). As Price perceptively puts it, ‘the fiction was always maintained that the political system was being preserved just as it always had been, except that a ruler who had attempted to subvert the system had been removed – thus, pre-Revolt precedents retained their force afterwards’. But this ‘fiction’ created problems. Price significantly observes that ‘this attitude of mind was not particularly beneficial to the States General, which had never played a directing role in government before the Revolt’ (Price 1994, 214). There was a deep ambiguity kept in play. The States General in its post-Revolt form was a product of the Revolt, but the fiction was maintained that its power had deep roots in Netherlands history. The States General was the tangible sign that ‘the Union was in fact something more than a mere alliance of fully independent powers’ (Price 1994, 214). But that tacit recognition was not translated into theoretical and constitutional form. Formally sovereignty lay with the provinces, and the States General and the Republic had very few and restricted legal independent powers. The ambiguity remained, says Price, ‘because it was in the provinces’ interests to assert both the indissolubility of the Union and the autonomy of its members at the same time’ (Price 1994, 214). The outcome was an extremely successful republic and practical problems were dealt with at the level of practical politics. Indeed, the ambiguity extends beyond the issue of the ‘Dutch Republic’. From being the ‘Low Countries’, or the ‘Netherlands’, neither of which was a very positive attribution in terms of identity, the northern provinces eventually took their name from the dominant province, Holland, and were seen as ‘Dutch’. The reasons why the United Provinces ‘remained deaf’ (Smit, 1968, 26), for instance, to Venice’s request for an exchange of ambassadors between the sisterrepublics in the 1650s, to which we will return in a later chapter, derives from this ambiguity with which the Netherlanders lived.
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This survey of the different dates that could be used to mark the inauguration of the Dutch Republic has been undertaken to point to the complexity of the issues involved in establishing the meaning and identity of this entity ‘Dutch Republic’, to outline the contingencies that can be discerned in the historical process, and to explore rather than solve the ambiguities involved. It has also highlighted the importance in this development of the reluctance of the Netherlanders to recognise their republican status, and to place in context Spinoza’s theorisation of this ‘Dutch Republic’.
Political thought in 1648 In 1648 the war with Spain was formally ended and the United Provinces were (with the reservations outlined above) an independent, sovereign political system. But their republican status was more openly acknowledged and recognised by other countries than it was at home. As Kossmann notes, ‘Dutch diplomacy was generally not eager to underline the republican character of the state it represented’. Treaties were made by the States General of ‘this State’. Kossmann comments that only ‘in treaties with other republics was the word “republic” used with any regularity’, as in the phrase ‘both republics’. But crucially, ‘the United Provinces were never called “The Republic of the Netherlands” or “The Dutch Republic”’ (Kossmann 1991, 288). This shyness may be in part due to the persistence of monarchical political theory still being taught in the universities, with resistance still included and safeguarded but no longer emphasised. But it is also and more crucially due to other aspects of the traditional character of political thought. The ambiguity surrounding the date of the Dutch Republic, and the ‘fiction’ that traditional political practice was merely being reaffirmed, did not present a climate sympathetic to innovative political theorising. A political culture that concentrated on reinforcing the power of old ideas did not encourage the emergence of abstract and normative theorising grounded in first principles of a figure like Hobbes or Kant or Hegel. In consequence the state of political theory in the United Provinces at this time, before the flowering of De Witt’s ‘True Liberty’, the first Stadholderless period and the republicanism of the De la Court brothers and Spinoza, was still tied to four traditional principles grounding four political claims. The four principles were the protection of privileges; the notion that sovereignty resides in the individual provincial assemblies, the States, and in the towns represented in those States; the
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Batavian myth, so helpfully dramatised by Grotius and Hooft; and the idea of 800 or even 1,700 years (depending on the source) of uninterrupted peace and continuity of tradition in Holland and Zeeland. The role of religion is not highlighted here, for its importance in affecting political thinking was indirect. As Schöffer argues (1964, 83), the victory of the strict Calvinist Counter-Remonstrants in 1618, along with the downfall of Oldenbarnevelt and of tolerant Calvinist Remonstrants, and the coup d’état of Prince Maurice of Orange, did not lead to the Reformed Church becoming the cultural centre of the Dutch Golden Age. While the Counter-Remonstrants dominated the official Protestant Reformed Church, and finally won over the adherence of a narrow majority of the population, the circumscribed range of the code of acceptability it insisted upon limited its political and cultural influence. It is important to note that the Reformed Church never became a national church in the way that the Church of England did in England. We shall now look at each of the four traditional principles in turn. The protection of privileges This section builds upon the discussion of the privileges towards the end of Chapter 1. Van Gelderen makes a strong case that the ‘image of the Revolt as the struggle for ancient liberty became a foundational idea of Dutch political culture’. He observes that ‘Grotius provided the classic statement of the argument’. In his Apology of the Lawful Government of Holland (1622) Grotius ‘maintained that the Spaniards had tried “to persuade the public that the old government of the Netherlands had been absolute rule by the Prince”’. Grotius retorted that, ‘from immemorial time the power of the prince had been limited by both the privileges and the power of the States’. Indeed, van Gelderen notes, between ‘1566 and 1581 the position of the States was upgraded almost every year until it reached the level of sovereign powers’ (van Gelderen 2002, 200). Van Gelderen’s comments demonstrate well that the protection of privileges was the basis of old claims of resistance against the Spanish as well as of new claims asserting provincial sovereignty. The privileges stood for shared assumptions about the way politics was done. Boone and Prak make two important points about the privileges. They capture well the way in which the new claims made about the privileges were at the same time deeply conservative and very radical. They reflect that ‘[p]aradoxically, the very same rebellions’ that have been hailed ‘as the foundations of a bourgeois society have been
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condemned by others as utterly conservative affairs, attempts to retain Medieval structures, disregarding the requirements of the modern era’. They consider that the ‘apparent contradiction’ is ‘to a large extent the result of an anachronistic evaluation of early modern society’, and argue that ‘these opinions can very easily be reconciled’ (Boone and Prak 1995, 128). And second they indicate that the urban elites could ‘mobilise substantial segments of the populations under their jurisdiction’ in their struggle against centralising authorities. The reason for their capacity to mobilise extensive support was that the struggle for urban independence was not fought for some limited and narrowly self-serving interest, ‘but in the name of the urban community in general’ (Boone and Prak 1995, 128). At the same time, urban elites were thereby vulnerable to claims, which they resisted, particularly from local burgher groups, to enhanced political participation and representation (Boone and Prak 1995, 129). The new and old claims about the protection of privileges, a notion of enormous power and importance in structuring debate about the public domain in the Netherlands, was associated with the late medieval style of government and political mentality during the time when the Netherlands had been the jewel in the crown of the dukes of Burgundy. And it is worth looking briefly at the Burgundian background of the notion since, while in the seventeenth century it had the force of a myth, the protection of privileges was also understood as resulting from a set of actual historical events whose details could be articulated if necessary. The new claim made about the privileges thus had a dual potency, and the slippage from the old claim to the new was regarded unproblematically. Parker rightly points up the link between the Burgundian history of the Netherlands and the defence of ‘privileges’. ‘Local loyalties’, he writes, ‘were the more tenaciously defended because the “privileges” or “liberties” of each town and province predated the “State”. A central government appeared relatively late on the scene in the Low Countries.’ Indeed, there ‘was no political or dynastic union to embrace the entire area until 1548–9’, and the ‘defence of local privileges against the encroachments of the new central power’, that is, Spain under Philip II, ‘proved to be the mainspring of the early opposition to Philip II’ (Parker 1977, 13–14). A good example of the continuing force of the medieval, Burgundian, political arrangements in the late sixteenth century, is found in how the Abjuration of Spanish rule was framed in 1581 by the northern states. It was framed as Rowen comments, ‘on the
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grounds that he [Philip II] had broken his contracts with them, such as the Joyous Entry of Brabant, and therefore his legitimate power had ceased to exist’. On ‘this principle, it was not they who were breaking their oath to their Lord, thus committing the feudal crime of felony, but he who had broken his oath to them, and thus dissolved their obligation of allegiance’ (Rowen 1972, 92). It is worth exploring this link between the Burgundian history and the defence of privileges more fully, since the Burgundian association in the fifteenth century had a great impact on the outlook of the Netherlands, and its bearing on political theory in the seventeenth century is crucial. The Low Countries became part of the Duchy of Burgundy in the early fifteenth century under Philip the Bold and John the Fearless. It was John’s son Philip the Good who severed the fortunes of Burgundy from those of France and of Anglo-French struggles. The comparative peace that Philip’s dominions then enjoyed made them prosperous and their ruler rich. The last Valois duke, Charles the Bold, pressed his ambitions too far, and when he died in 1477, the Burgundian territories had not sufficient unity to maintain their integrity. They were divided up between Louis XI of France and Maximilian of Austria. It was by marrying Mary of Burgundy that Maximilian I increased his Habsburg empire beyond its Austrian base. And by arranging the marriage of his son, Duke Philip of Burgundy, to Joanna of Spain, he opened the way to a further extension of Habsburg power, into the Iberian peninsula (Lockyer 1974, 186). Consequently, the territories of Maximilian’s grandson, Emperor Charles V, embraced most of Christendom except for France. The sudden dissolution of the Burgundian territories in 1477, at the death of a prince, illustrates well the risks attached to dynastic politics of the late Middle Ages. The quality of rule available through the system of lordships, brought together by family arrangement and maintained by military force, was at best casual. It could constitute a power which, while appearing imposing, was in practice weak because it was politically and socially incoherent. The multiplicity of local customs and languages made government as a single unit impossibly difficult. The territory became a pawn in the dynastic power game. ‘Lordship’ implied a proprietary right to territory and a right to govern the people who lived on it. Like property it could be transferred or bought and sold. It did not necessarily imply what we now call sovereignty. Moreover lordship was not necessarily a personal right, for emperors in the past had granted lordships to corporations in the city communes of Italy, but most often it was so.
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‘Liberties’ defined in joint community or political terms, were regarded as more important than an individualistic freedom in sixteenth-century states in Europe, and the Netherlands provides a good example of this. The Duchess Mary’s granting of the ‘Grand Privilege’ at the States General at Ghent around 1480, when she was engaged to the future Emperor Maximilian, and faced with a French invasion, formally ratified the separate customs, laws and liberties of the cities and provinces of the Netherlands. The subsequent charters in which she confirmed these ‘liberties’, ‘undid much of the work of centralising ducal authority’ (Lockyer 1974, 7). In the Middle Ages all over Europe, power had been diffused and the ruler’s authority had been held in check by customary law, private and corporate franchises, representative assemblies, and a socially dominant aristocracy. But while this system persisted in the Netherlands, elsewhere in Europe central government, during the sixteenth century, steadily strengthened its authority. Customary law was modified or superseded by Roman law, with its emphasis on the rights of the ruler. For instance, Morrall argues that the reintroduction of Roman law fostered the development of the secular state in Europe. In the late Middle Ages the close connection between Sacerdotium and Regnum gradually separated. According to Morrall the ‘transformation of the latter into the State with its own autonomous functions was the logical outcome of the rediscovery of Roman law and Aristotle as well as of the economic and political changes brought about by the rise of a literate, wealthy and administratively competent laity’ (Morrall 1958, 132). Private and corporate franchises were resumed by the crown, and representative assemblies were bypassed or dispensed with. Nobles were replaced by ‘new men’ educated at the universities, trained in law, totally committed to royal service (Lockyer 1974, 187). Thus occurred the emergence of powerful monarchies determined to assert their authority over all their subjects. This was not the result of an abstract or theoretical belief in the virtues of absolutism, but was the outcome of a practical alternative to aristocratic factionalism that brought about the collapse of so many governments in the late Middle Ages. If this is the general picture of changing political arrangements in European countries in the sixteenth century, we need to ask why this pattern was not repeated in the Netherlands. Increased wealth and prosperity, which the Dutch wanted to hold on to, is certainly one factor. Challenge by infringement on the traditional style of government by post-Valois rulers, is how the Dutch saw it. But it is also worth asking why this challenge occurred in the Netherlands more successfully than elsewhere. One answer lies in the
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circumstance that when the Burgundian Netherlands was given to Maximilian, there was then no intervening level of government between the provincial States and minor nobility, and the Emperor. Whereas in the German case, for instance, the German Princes were the net gainers of power in the German states at the end of the Thirty Years War, in the Netherlands, once the Spanish were vanquished in the north, there was no other established seat of power above the States. The United Provinces saw themselves as a monarchy, but had no monarch. Furthermore, seen from a different perspective, as Blockmans notes, the city-state system – a communal, federative and constitutional political system – based on the supremacy of the major cities in the Middle Ages in Brabant and Flanders, provided the model for Holland and the United Provinces in the seventeenth century. It followed that, as Blockmans puts it, faced ‘with an immobile and increasingly inadequate legitimation of the monarchy’, the ‘highly urbanised provinces of the Netherlands could easily shift to their alternative of a state organisation which they had been developing during nearly three centuries of revolts and constitutionalism’ (Blockmans 1988, 154). Moreover, as Kossmann argues, the Burgundian rulers’ overall strategy for the Low Countries had been to collect ‘as many principalities as they could’, and they ‘had attempted to govern them as much as possible from the centre established in Brussels’. In the provinces, however, they had ‘not abolished the old institutions, regulations, instruments, and habits of mind but merely superimposed a federal structure upon them’. In consequence, Kossmann comments, in ‘the various provinces those who objected to the central government and succeeded in withdrawing their region out of its reach were able to use the traditional local governmental systems’ (Kossmann 1991, 286). Indeed Kossmann goes so far as to identify this situation as the key to the Revolt. This circumstance ‘made the whole Revolt possible and it is in no sense astonishing that provincial sovereignty should have been maintained’ at the same time as the establishment of the United Provinces (Kossmann 1991, 286). As Roorda shows (1964), the Revolt itself helped to accelerate the process of the decline of central, Burgundian government, and the corresponding rise in power of the provinces, and especially of the towns. This led, interestingly, to the diminishing of political accountability of rulers to citizens, for in general regents and magistrates came from the more narrowly based urban patriciate, drawn largely from the merchant class. The best example of the growth of provincial power during the Revolt is
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Holland, of course. Before the Revolt the most powerful city in the Netherlands was Antwerp, and Holland had not been particularly important. With the economic and political changes brought about by the Revolt, Holland became the dominant province. But at the same time, the regents of Holland became more and more aristocratic as the seventeenth century progressed, and wider popular rights diminished and died, according to Roorda. Van Nierop confirms the ‘aristocratisation’ of the urban patriciates and notes that the regents ‘tried to get knighthoods and patents of nobility’ (van Nierop 1984, 212). Furthermore, the changes in Holland’s political status were accompanied not by constitutional changes, but by recurrent purges. As Roorda says, the history of Holland is characterised by purges; for instance, of the ruling Catholic clique in 1578, of Oldenbarnevelt’s men in 1618, and of De Witt’s in 1672. The lack of constitutional development, both in theory and practice, is seen by some as due to the economic wealth and prosperity of the United Provinces, as led by Holland, allowing anachronistic political arrangements to be cushioned from change. While this economic factor may have played some part, the other element at work here, perhaps decisively so, is that the Netherlanders continued throughout the seventeenth century, as well as in the sixteenth, to see themselves as in an essentially medieval relation with a sovereign. They were habituated to the arbitrary and impermanent nature of sovereign lordship, witnessing different sovereign lords coming and going as the titles of Count of Holland and Zeeland, for example, were passed around the dynastic houses of Europe since the first Count of Holland in 860. Two consequences followed from this experience. In the first place, and this represents another reversal of modern expectations, the Netherlanders were quite accustomed to seeing the issue of sovereignty as quite separate from that of the power to govern, and indeed saw these two things as necessarily separate. The sovereign lord was meant to look after foreign relations and wars with those threatening to invade or actually invading the Netherlands, in return for adequate money raised through taxation. Meanwhile the detailed governing and administration of the provinces (called, significantly, ‘countries’) was entirely within the hands of the provincial States and their largely urban oligarchies in the towns. It was in this spirit that the United Provinces offered their sovereignty to Anjou, France and England in turn after the Abjuration of Spain in 1581. In the second place, the Netherlanders had a highly developed idea of their own power in relation to the sovereign. They protected their
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power tenaciously, and justified it with what seemed to them unassailable arguments in terms of ancient privileges, charters granted, ancient rights, and historical tradition. Because this was the status quo, one which had always been so back into the mists of time, real or imagined, was in itself more than sufficient reason in their eyes for it to continue. All innovation in politics had to be justified by demonstrating its conformity with traditional practice. This is an important part of the background against which we need to read Spinoza’s views. Woltjer brings out well the role of privileges in legitimating innovation in the traditionalist mentality, where historical proof was sometimes available but not usually required. He notes that ‘when something just was accomplished it was seen as a restoration of the ancient laws, or at least of ancient justice’ (Woltjer 1975, 34). As he says, ‘the appeal to the privileges implied that the world had once been more just’, and that ‘the present was a debased version of a golden age about which no details were available but in which justice and righteousness had most certainly prevailed’. Furthermore, to ‘put an end to all injustice it was necessary to return to olden times. With or without documentary evidence, the past had been better than the present’ (Woltjer 1975, 34). Moreover, Woltjer notes that the ‘passionate desire for a more equitable society’, which ‘could not be achieved without breaking with historic rights, continued still to reappear at the end of the eighteenth century, dressed up as a longing for the restoration of the past’ (Woltjer 1975, 34). Behind this political make-up lies a conservatism of such power that change can only be accepted and acknowledged if it is expressed in terms of the continuity of tradition, and the safeguarding of privileges. This situation helps to account for the persistence of the medieval form of government over such a long period, and also for the curious way in which ad hoc measures instigated during and after the Revolt changed the substance of political realities but not the form. Thus it becomes clear why the United Provinces were so reluctant to acknowledge their republican status. While the substantive issues of republican government – self-government, independence, sovereignty – had been fought for long and hard, an overt recognition of change was not to be welcomed. Two processes reinforced each other – the soundest defence of innovation was to root it in the past, and in the light of such a powerfully traditionalist outlook change meant a break with tradition and that was unacceptable. The accommodation of change to tradition was crucial to the northern Netherlanders for the sanctioning and authorising of political arrangements. This disposition constituted an
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enormously powerful element in the manner of conducting politics in the Netherlands. But the Burgundian medieval dispersal of power, the late integration of the separate parts in 1549, the understanding of privileges, and the Dutch mentality of making claims and introducing change only by casting it in the form of reaffirming traditional constitutional arrangements, only partly explain the failure of the Netherlands in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, let alone in the seventeenth century, to conform to the general pattern of political development in Europe, that is, towards centralised absolutist states, and only partly explain the character of political thought in 1648. These developments, anomalous in the context of the trends developing in Europe, were also due to the strength of the notion of sovereignty residing in the States of the individual provinces, and to the significance of the Batavian myth and the idea of Holland’s unconquered past. The sovereignty of individual provincial assemblies The notion of sovereignty has already arisen in Chapter 1 and in the discussion of privileges, but it is useful to highlight separately the curious understanding of sovereignty that was current at this time. On the one hand there is the paradox that, as Haitsma Mulier describes, ‘political theory in the new republic in the first half of the seventeenth century focussed almost exclusively on monarchy and its institutions’ (Haitsma Mulier 1987, 252). And on the other hand there was the trenchantly held awareness that the power to govern and administer lay with the provincial States and the towns represented in those assemblies. Geyl argues ‘that the Republic in respect of its particularism, was a medieval survival rather than an example of modern institutions’ (Smit 1960, 26). Thus on one side sovereignty lies with a monarch, but there is no monarch, and on the other side sovereignty lies with the provinces, but what then is the status of the United Provinces as a whole? Kossmann emphasises the important point that these problems and paradoxes remained unarticulated, as Dutch teachers of political theory in the universities took refuge in the flexibility of the traditional notions of mixed government and mixed monarchy. He argues that it was a ‘commonplace in Dutch political literature’ to ‘equate the Stadholdership with the monarchical’ element, and ‘the assemblies of the Provincial States, of the States General and of the town councils with the aristocratic or democratic elements’. In consequence, ‘the Republic could be interpreted as a perfect monarchia-aristocratico-democratica’. This did not tally
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with ‘pure juridical theory’, since ‘sovereignty [did] not reside with the Provincial States and were the Stadholders not appointed by those assemblies; and if this was true, how could anyone justify the term monarchia?’ Nevertheless, Kossmann concludes, ‘however that might be, the usage was widespread’ (Kossmann 1987c, 223). Moreover, Velema makes the valuable argument that while Orangism cannot be equated with monarchism, it ‘remains true…that the most intense anti-monarchism surfaced among the opponents of the Stadholderate’. He confirms that the ‘opposition between Orangists and Staatsgezinden’, that is the adherents of the States or States party, ‘that took shape in these years would dominate Dutch political debate until the final decades of the eighteenth century’ (Velema 2002, 12). Furthermore, the Dutch understanding of the sovereignty of the States assemblies reconceives centre–periphery relations. In the Dutch case the centre is in an important sense suppressed, or alternatively multiple centres cohere around a central periphery. The perplexing issues surrounding the notion of sovereignty – which, as we have seen, the Dutch themselves did not regard as perplexing – raises further important points that will be considered later. There is the question of the ability of the Dutch to live with such ambiguities, and to go on teaching the theory of Aristotelian mixed government in the universities, despite the mismatch with practice in their country. It is also significant to note at this point that this mismatch did not directly prompt the De la Court brothers or Spinoza to reflect on this situation. These writers were instead prompted to theorise by De Witt’s republican regime, and saw themselves as primarily lending support to that regime, rather than as contributing to or addressing the university tradition of political theory. Third, the issues around sovereignty highlight the exceptional quality of the 1650–72 period, which was without a Stadholder and thus without even a minimum justification for seeing the republic any longer as a mixed monarchy. And finally, it was the absence of a Stadholder in Holland that was decisive. Some of the other northern provinces did have a Stadholder in that period. This demonstrates the effect of the Holland-centric view, and not just Holland’s dominating power, in shaping the political climate in the United Provinces. The Batavian myth The Batavian myth played a very important part in the political struggles subsumed under the title of Dutch Revolt. Sympathisers agreed with the claim that, in van Gelderen’s words, in ‘its confrontation with
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the Spanish monarchy the Dutch rebellion is the renaissance of Batavian liberty’ (van Gelderen 1999, 186). Schöffer outlines the case that the Dutch understanding of their past, from the early 1500s and for the subsequent 300 years, centred on the Batavian settlement in Roman times. Holland claimed a close link for modern Holland with an ancient Batavia. This consciousness was untouched by the Renaissance and by the upheavals of the Reformation (which was only successful in the Netherlands after 1560). The articulation of the Batavian myth coincided with the rediscovery of Tacitus’ History, and was written up by Aurelius and Geldenhauer. We have already seen that Erasmus, Grotius and Hooft all wrote about the Batavian past in a way that promoted the Dutch claim. In The Batavian Ear of 1508 Erasmus introduced the ‘idea of the founder of the Dutch nation, Baeto…not as an hereditary king but “the most virtuous citizen of all his free and most noble people”’ (Tilmans 2002, 113). The Batavian defeat of the Romans was used by Lipsius, the young Grotius and Hooft as an exemplar during the Revolt. Moreover, as Schöffer specifies, it ‘was the Batavian situation rather than Batavian history … that was exemplary and edifying’ (Schöffer 1975, 85), in a society where exemplars of virtues and qualities like courage and love of freedom were noted, respected and followed. The location of the Batavian history of the Dutch in the Roman past added to its prestige. Schöffer notes that in this way the Dutch identified with the Roman past rather than with the German elevation of their Teutonic past, which had ‘an anti-Roman colouring’ (Schöffer 1975, 85). Lipsius, for instance, in his famous edition of Tacitus’ collected works, highlighted the glorious role played by the Batavian leader. As Schöffer says, Lipsius ‘wrote a jubilant comment when he edited the description of the rebellion of Claudius Civilis: Claudius indeed had shown what courage a Batavian could and would show when public liberty was in danger’ (Schöffer 1975, 88). Grotius’ treatise of 1610 on the antiquity of the Batavian Republic made a strongly polemical and partisan case that ‘Holland had always been a virtuous republic’. The treatise had great popular appeal, but this did not translate into a political recognition of republican status by the United Provinces. Many other less famous histories featuring the Batavians were also published in Holland from the 1580s (Schöffer 1975, 88). Kossmann comments that Grotius drew heavily on the high reputation of Tacitus, ‘who considered the Batavians the best of the Germanic peoples’ (Kossmann 1987f, 172). Van Gelderen remarks that in ‘Grotius’s hands the ancient constitution of Holland reached the age of antiquity with amazing ease’. He quotes Grotius’ view that the
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‘Batavian resistance against the Romans was presented as “the just beginning of a free republic, constituted in liberty by a people of free origin”’ (van Gelderen, 1999, 194). Though there was some historical foundation for the account, the ancient Republic of Batavia was unlikely to correspond to the territory of modern Holland as claimed. Nevertheless Sir William Temple, writing in his Observations of 1673, takes seriously the claim of Holland to be the ancient Batavia (Temple, 1932, 4). The significance of the Batavian myth, however, lies in the political claim being made at this time that it helped to articulate and strengthen. It assisted in giving meaning to and in sanctioning the longstanding sense of the liberty of the United Provinces, in the context of the Dutch struggle against the Spanish. In particular Grotius interpreted that struggle in terms of a republicanism whose meaning derived directly from the belief in a mixed commonwealth and so, as van Gelderen phrases it, an ‘overt anti-monarchism’ (van Gelderen 1999, 194). The uninterrupted peace, continuity of tradition and independence of Holland and Zeeland The idea of Holland’s long and unbroken history of peace was another commonplace of political thought in 1648. Vranck, the Pensionary of Gouda, proudly proclaimed in his Short Exposition of 1587, that ‘in 800 years the State of Holland and Zeeland was never conquered by the sword or brought into subjugation as a result of foreign or civil wars’ (Kossman 1974, 275; see also Kossmann 1991, 287). Rejecting the belittling by Leicester’s supporter of the States’ right to sovereignty, Vranck argued, as van Gelderen notes, that ‘for 800 years Holland had been governed by Counts in close cooperation with the States of the country’. Vranck maintained that the ‘Counts had never taken major political decisions without “the advice and consent of the nobles and towns of the country”, for they simply had no power in their own right’ (van Gelderen 1993, xxviii). Kossmann also registers that ‘the immemorial antiquity of the Dutch state [was] a favourite topic among humanist scholars and artists in the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries’ (Kossmann 1987c, 232). The idea of 800, let alone 1,700 years of uninterrupted peace in Holland and Zeeland, like the other ideas through which the northern Netherlanders expressed their political aspirations and that governed their political conduct, contained a large element of myth. But the power of these notions to advance their political claims was quite unaffected by the notion that they may not be supported by strict historical evidence.
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Two points are worth noting here about the idea of Holland’s long history of peace and independence. First it is pertinent that this claim was made, like that concerning the Batavian past, specifically by the province of Holland for itself, not for the United Provinces as a whole. However, since the political culture of the United Provinces was in important ways dominated by that of Holland, the notion of uninterrupted independence and of Batavian heritage became, by extension, identified with the political experience of the United Provinces as a whole. This remained the case, even where the reality was of territory, especially in the south and east, fought over and invaded countless times. Second, it is important to see how this notion continued to be used later, in the second half of the seventeenth century. For example, Jacobus Lydius, a Calvinist minister in Holland, published his Belgium gloriosum (meaning the ‘glorious Northern Netherlands’) in 1668, praising the northern Netherlands’ ‘unbroken tradition of more than 1,700 years’ (Kossmann 1987f, 162–3). Spinoza, significantly, also refers to the Northern Netherlands as ‘Belgium’ twice in his political works (TTP, 182 and TP, 360) when he described De la Court as the ‘prudentissimus Belga V.H.’ (Kossmann 1987c, 219). As Kossmann comments, ‘Lydius did not think that the Republic was at all young and unfinished. On the contrary, it was immensely old. More than 1,700 years of unbroken tradition gave the Republic an antiquity and a nobility hardly equalled by any other nation’ (Kossmann 1987f, 171). Here we have a good example of the Dutch disposition to absorb the new by integrating it into the old, into the tradition. But it is also very important to note that with Lydius, this strand is now allied to a strand of a peaceful and isolationist outlook, which was characteristic of the republicanism of De Witt’s time. This peaceful outlook, though not the isolationism, represents a change from that current for most of the Revolt years, when it was the glory of war that was emphasised, along with the religious view that war was ultimately out of human hands, and that, in a multi-faceted way, the Revolt could be understood as a just war. Harline (1989) describes how during the 1640s there was, for the first time, a large increase in the number of pamphlets in favour of peace. They show, he argues, new ‘moral’ attitudes to these three old themes, and the arguments for peace came to predominate in the run-up to the end of the war with Spain in 1648. But while, as Kossmann notes, Lydius’ ‘glorification of the Dutch Republic and of peace consciously isolated the country from its European neighbours’ (Kossmann 1987f, 162–3), the classical scholar
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R.H. Schele emphasised the moral responsibility of the Dutch Republic to establish in Europe the perpetual peace and domestic liberty which they had at home (Kossmann 1987f, 164). Kossmann continues that the ‘whole spirit of that age, this age of John de Witt, was characterised by…[the] limited aspirations’ of ‘isolationism, pacificism and collective self-glorification’ (Kossmann 1987f, 163). These strands of thinking will be explored more fully later, but it is relevant to note here how the republican political theory of the 1650s and 1660s drew on earlier thinking, not simply through historical continuity, but also because of the persistence of the value placed on tradition and traditional practice in doing politics.
3 De Witt’s Republicanism
Johan De Witt became the effective ruler of the United Provinces for an important and lengthy spell from 1653 at the age of 27, until 1672 when he resigned and an Orangist coup led by William III seized power. This chapter will examine the circumstances of De Witt’s rule, including his coming to power and fall from power. It will also explore the nature and implications of foreign policy under De Witt, and the character of De Witt’s influential but controversial True Liberty ideology. The chapter also examines the role of ideas derived from the political works of the De la Court brothers in supporting his government, and the distinctive character of De Witt’s republicanism. As Pensionary of Holland, De Witt held the most powerful civil service executive post in the United Provinces, all the more powerful without a Stadholder to claim a rival form of influence. De Witt’s two decades of leadership represented a triumph for the Holland peace party over the war party associated with the House of Orange’s monarchist aspirations and expansionist aims in foreign policy. The period in which De Witt ruled was exceptional in coinciding with the first Stadholderless period, and he developed what was for the first time a truly republican government in the United Provinces. As Lockyer says, after the death of William II in 1650, until 1672 when his posthumous son, William, came of age, ‘the United Provinces were a republic in fact as well as in name for the first time in their history’ (Lockyer 1974, 436). There had been an earlier, brief blossoming of quasi-republican thought and practice (but not Stadholderless rule) when Oldenbarnevelt had been Advocate of Holland in the early part of the century. Although he was a Catholic, Oldenbarnevelt had championed the Remonstrant cause, but this had been a factor in the politics leading to 88
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his downfall in 1618 and the subsequent supremacy of Maurice Prince of Orange, supporter of the strict Calvinist anti-Remonstrant faction. It is pertinent to note that Spinoza attributes Oldenbarnevelt’s fall to his having been too closely involved with the religious issue. De Witt ruled through his appointment to the office of the Grand Pensionary of Holland (the name had been changed from Advocate in 1618). Price argues that De Witt’s style of government was ‘to a very large extent a reaction to the actions of Willem II in 1650’. William’s sudden death during his attempt to seize power in a coup d’état enabled, under De Witt, the ‘development of a more systematic and principled republicanism’ (Price 1994, 164). Van Deursen agrees that the way in which De Witt came to power after William II’s failed coup attempt and early death ‘opened the way for an entirely new solution to the constitutional problem’. In characteristically pragmatic fashion, says van Deursen, ‘Holland dispensed with the problem of the stadholder’s role by simply abolishing the position’. In the power vacuum that followed, De Witt, as ‘the other high official in Holland’, took the opportunity to fill it (van Deursen 1999, 186). There are strong parallels between De Witt’s republic and Oldenbarnevelt’s quasi-republic. Like Oldenbarnevelt, De Witt was a leader of Holland who effectively became political leader of the United Provinces. Just as his predecessor had championed quasi-republican political principles against the House of Orange, and met a violent death, so De Witt followed the same pattern with fully republican ideals. The elements of republicanism that both Oldenbarnevelt and De Witt stood for were first, anti-Orangist (against a monarchical element in government); second, opposed to an Orangist foreign policy which favoured territorial expansion and a warlike attitude in Europe; and third, favoured Holland’s interests, which were commercial and required peace to flourish. All three features are closely related. What was new with De Witt was the Stadholderless condition, his ‘True Liberty’ strategy, and of course the Republic’s now independent status. Aspects of republicanism tended to flourish in periods when the Dutch were not at war. Considering that the United Provinces were at war for a good deal of the time covered by this study, it is intriguing that republican ideals were able to flourish at all. At the same time, however, the United Provinces displayed a, to modern sensibilities, puzzling reticence over its republican status. Smit (1968) describes how even under its most self-consciously reflective political leader – De Witt – the United Provinces did not wish to extol its republicanism, either
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within Europe or in its colonies in Asia and South America. The Dutch refusal of a Venetian request for an exchange of ambassadors between the two republics demonstrated the reluctance of the United Provinces to form diplomatic alliances which might enmesh them in the power struggles of France and Spain in Europe. Van Deursen argues that De Witt and the proponents of True Liberty ‘preferred…not to speak of a Republic; the regents referred to seven independent republics, since every province was fully sovereign’. He suggests that the reason is that ‘Holland’s interests were best served in this conception, since the weaker the central authority, the better the position for a strong regional power like Holland’ (van Deursen 1999, 187). Moreover, during the 1650s and early 1660s the Dutch aimed to make treaties of commerce and navigation, with other states, that fell short of obligations of mutual defence. Their international diplomacy under the True Liberty banner was undertaken in the service of a trading nation which did not desire to be a power expanding its territorial aims within Europe (Smit 1968, 26). In one sense De Witt was following an established and traditional history of resistance to territorial expansion. Precedents had been set in 1579, for instance, when German states adjoining the Netherlands had applied to join them in the Union of Utrecht, and had been rebuffed (Smit 1968, 17). A similar refusal had taken place with the Treaty of Münster in 1648. De Witt’s deliberate policy of isolationism in Europe thus represents a continuation of previous policy, but also expresses a marked difference from William II’s attempt to renew hostilities with Spain. The planned coup of 1650 was in part designed to force compliance from a reluctant Holland for this strategy (van der Bijl 1986, 71–2). De Witt’s isolationism also follows from the traditional importance attached by the Dutch to safeguarding economic interests. The protection and encouragement of commercial, financial and shipping interests, especially those of Holland, was a powerful economic motive in the formulation of foreign policy throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Dutch network of interlinked worldwide economic interests was very vulnerable to disruption through war almost anywhere in the world (Smit 1968, 27–8; see also Braudel 1979a, 600–1). Expanding the territorial base of the United Provinces in Europe would not advance those primary interests. Indeed, according to Wansink, a ‘contractionist’ foreign policy was very much Holland’s view. ‘Interested only in seaborne trade the Holland regents did not see any point at all in territorial gains’ (Wansink 1971, 142).
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There was also another traditional feature at play here. As Smit comments, before the Revolt foreign policy ‘had been the exclusive prerogative of the Habsburg princes’ (Smit 1968, 16), so it was only after the establishment of the Republic that the United Provinces took responsibility for foreign policy. Furthermore, it was only after 1648 that foreign policy was not defined by struggle against the Spanish. The tradition of paying as little attention as possible to the adventures and ambitions of the Habsburg princes, and of seeing as folly their intention and practice in involving the Netherlands in them, can be seen in both De Witt’s refusal to behave like the French or Spanish monarchs, and in continuing republican distrust of the House of Orange, identified as a potential European monarchy with hegemonic ambitions. The sharp contrast between the attitudes of De Witt and the House of Orange on this crucial matter remained a source of tension throughout the De Witt period. Even in the 1570s the House of Orange had attempted to use the States General as a federal legislature, a move which was fiercely resisted by the provincial States (Kossmann and Mellink 1974, 30–1). After 1579, as Stadholder the House of Orange was no longer the representative of the Crown, but was an appointment crucially controlled by the different States. The history of the Netherlands in this period is littered with examples of this kind, of ad hoc measures taken to adapt to new circumstances (in this case a crucial step toward the independence of the northern states from the Spanish crown), but not followed through in new constitutional arrangements. As a result, the ambiguity in the House of Orange’s position persisted. However, as van Deursen emphasises, it would be wrong to give the impression that the opposition between the Orangists and the regents was expressed in a sustained ‘political polarisation which offered a clear choice between the Orangists and the States’ party, as the True Freedom group was often called’. Multiple political factions existed, that had shifting allegiances depending upon the pragmatic particular and common interests of the different political actors, and politics was not practised through formal political parties (van Deursen 1999, 190). Price confirms that United Provinces urban politics is explained in terms of complex factional conflict rather than through a notion of party differences (Price 1994, 154). De Witt was not alone in distrusting the House of Orange. He was fully supported by the influential regent patriciate in Holland, whose importance increased in this period. The regents were not the nobility but were ‘highly born’, combining money and status, education and
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high culture, belonging, as van Deursen puts it, to the ‘very highest ranks of the bourgeoisie’ (van Deursen 1999, 187). Roorda describes the source of the antipathy of the Holland regents towards the House of Orange. It was due, he says, not just to the regents’ claims to power, for as the democratic element in the Holland political structure diminished, the regents became more oligarchic in character. Nor was the Holland regents’ antipathy due just to their commitment to the loose polycentric confederal structure of the Republic and to maintaining the strong local attachments of the patriciate. Neither was it attributable just to the economic interests of the regents and merchants. Roorda argues convincingly that ‘the crux of opposition to the Stadholder lay in the dynastic ambitions of the princes of Orange’, because the dynastic foreign policy which Orange princes tried to impose on the country clashed directly with the mercantile interests of the ruling classes (Roorda 1964, 124). Roorda adds the interesting point that the House of Orange’s ‘cosmopolitan court with frenchified airs could scarcely absorb the strong burgher atmosphere of the regents of Holland’. It followed that ‘cooperation between monarchical and aristocratic elements such as was possible elsewhere, where monarchy was an established institution and the aristocracy had a landed character, could not, therefore, be realised in Holland’ (Roorda, 1964, 124–5). The regents of Holland under De Witt agreed with the De la Court brothers’ republican portrayal of Orange princes as driven by dynastic ambition. Kossmann makes a strong case for recognising a ‘remarkable shift’ in the House of Orange’s outlook during the course of the seventeenth century, and argues that De Witt was right to be suspicious of their ambitions. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the House of Orange ‘still considered themselves as a political’ faction, but ‘at its end they had risen above this status. It was loyalty to a dynasty…that then inspired them’ (Kossmann 1987f, 168). It is at least in part in this light that we need to view De Witt’s negotiation of the secret Act of Seclusion with England in May 1654, regarded as a key event in De Witt’s period of leadership. With the recent coup d’état attempt of William II still fresh, and showing a degree of foresight uncharacteristic of the Dutch, De Witt sought to institutionalise the permanent exclusion of the House of Orange from the role of Stadholder. The Act of Seclusion debarred the infant William III from succeeding to his father’s appointments. In his famous Deduction or Demonstration of July 1654, which was written by De Witt but issued in the name of the States of Holland, De Witt justified the Act of Seclusion. Following this important document
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De Witt was appointed head of the federal administration, and by persuading the States General to delegate much of its work to committees endowed with plenary powers, he ran the United Provinces very effectively. The proximity of the States General’s meeting place in The Hague, the capital of Holland, in the same building as that used by the States assembly of Holland, facilitated efficient government. But while De Witt showed unusual forethought in transacting the Act of Seclusion, it is significant that he did not attempt to further reform the Republic’s de facto constitution to reflect the other changes that had been introduced. Instead De Witt carried on using the traditional structure to his own advantage. It was a very Dutch way of going about things. Rowen’s assessment linking Dutch and English politics is valuable here. ‘Thanks to the peace concluded with England’, he remarks, ‘Holland was able to ride out the storm over the Seclusion Act’. In Rowen’s assessment, John de Witt ‘proved to be a supple and superb leader for Holland and for the republic as a whole, but one who was stubborn in the defence of “republicanism”’, which he tellingly defines as ‘the rights of Holland within the Union and of government without a Stadholder’. Other historians, however, consider that the Act of Seclusion was prompted, not by De Witt’s intention to weaken the House of Orange, but to appease Cromwell (Stoye 1969, 138). If this is so, it represents yet another example of an ad hoc measure not fully followed through in new constitutional arrangements. Moreover, as Rowen adds, there was ‘no effective resistance to this policy until the English republic collapsed in 1660 and King Charles II, who was the uncle of William III, came to the throne’ (Rowen 1972, 197). On the English side the Act of Seclusion was recognised more directly as nullified in 1660, once the Restoration placed Charles II on the English throne. On the Dutch side it is clear that Holland feared not just the House of Orange’s monarchical aspirations, but domination by England under an Orange–Stuart alliance as well. Thus perhaps De Witt’s Deduction deserves its reputation as a republican tract, on the grounds that the reason De Witt favoured a republic was because only within a loose confederal alliance could Holland’s views and interests be assured of the dominance De Witt thought they deserved. The sharp contrast in the attitudes of De Witt and the House of Orange towards foreign policy in Europe also demonstrates how the House of Orange faction regarded the United Provinces as a whole or unity which could be enlarged. De Witt, in comparison, retained an essentially traditionalist view of the United Provinces as the loosest of polycentric confederal alliances, with crucial sources of power not at
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federal level, but in the provinces and towns. Wansink reports Pieter de la Court’s view, expressed in The Interest of Holland, that Holland itself was a league of eighteen city-republics, in which people felt an overriding loyalty to their city, and only after that to Holland. De la Court’s view, which represented, as Wansink says, ‘more than a flirtation with classical tradition’ (Wansink 1971, 136), reflected a commonly held belief, and was designed to support the De Witt regime. It is important to emphasise that De Witt’s championing of Holland’s interests is thus not to be interpreted as promoting a hegemonic ambition by Holland, but rather as part of the complex context in which there rested a consensus that all the provinces quite properly pursued their own economic and political interests. This understanding of the United Provinces as, at least in part, an instrumental balance of local and particular interests was the accepted modus operandi within the Republic. It helps to account for the importance in Spinoza’s political theory of the use of the notion of balance in all forms of political organisation. The disjunction in foreign policy under De Witt, between the colonial and European spheres, is very striking. In the pursuit of colonial interests the Republic showed itself to be aggressive and ruthless, in marked contrast with its attitude closer to home. The East India Company in particular established a powerful empire for the Republic, and the West India Company was extremely aggressive in fighting off especially Spanish and Portuguese colonial interests in Brazil. It is also significant that the Dutch colonies of the East India Company were treated purely in terms of economic exploitation, with no attempt to introduce ‘civilising’ social and educational values or the establishment of a stable administrative structure. De Witt’s True Liberty was not extended to the populations of these colonial possessions of the United Provinces. As Smit notes (1968, 26), when ‘De la Court extols Europe as the birth-place of the republican idea he has no missionary intentions, and instances of such are few indeed among his fellow-republicans: their ideal was not for export’. Relations between the United Provinces and England in particular were also complicated by competing and rival interests in both colonial exploitation and the European seaborne trade. Competition between the two increased in intensity during the early period of De Witt’s rule, as the English Protectorate government was able to turn its attention to international trade and commerce after the end of the Civil War. The three Anglo-Dutch wars in the second half of the seventeenth century, of 1652–54, 1665–67 and 1672–74, were all fought over these issues. English and Dutch republicanism are compared in more detail in the following chapter.
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We come now to an examination of De Witt’s important ‘True Liberty’ perspective. This was an ideological statement of republican self-government, a reaffirmation of provincial particularism, an international relations strategy, an economic plan, and a tolerationist policy document all rolled into one. Kossmann identifies the distinctive contemporary meaning of the phrase ‘True Liberty’, a meaning which is surprising to modern readers taking for granted the modern liberal understanding of such a phrase. In De Witt’s political system of True Liberty, Kossmann comments, the ‘term “liberty” was used in the classical sense of “libertas”’, that is, freedom from monarchy (Kossmann 1987d, 191). True Liberty (ware vrijheid) referred to a ‘genuine republicanism not allowing any interference in political matters by the Orangist court’ (Kossmann 1991, 291). Van Deursen goes even further in identifying a singularly local meaning for the term, arguing bluntly that ‘True Freedom was the right of the regents to be masters of their own lands and their own cities.’ The implications were that this ‘freedom was no longer limited by the stadholder, and it would no longer be subordinate to the higher unity of the Union’ (van Deursen 1999, 187). In other words the central purpose and significance of ‘True Liberty’ was to underline the particularist and separatist disposition shared by the provinces and cities. Also important is Smit’s argument that ‘the system of True Liberty was an elaborate example of seventeenth century interest-of-state theory’. He says that the ‘core of the system is the inseparable connection between the economic nature of the Dutch state, its political constitution and its place in international affairs’. According to Smit, ‘[t]rade being put forward as the eminent interest of the state, it follows as self-evident that the form of that state must be republican and its character bourgeois’. Trade, Smit comments, ‘it is argued, cannot survive in a monarchy or under the government of a military nobility, because there the rule of law and justice is lacking’ (Smit 1968, 23). Kossmann makes the important point that what was new with True Liberty was the addition, in the 1650s, of a fourth element in the Dutch understanding of liberty, ‘the conviction that the independent, federal and tolerant state should have a clearly defined republican form of government if it wished to be truly free’ (Kossmann 1991, 286). However, as Kossmann warns, there is ‘no logical link between these elements’ (Kossmann 1991, 286). Keenly attuned to the Dutch mentality of not over-theorising what works well in practice, Kossmann notes that these four elements in the Dutch understanding of liberty grew up through historical accident. They are related contingently and are not
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necessarily internally connected. Indeed, one of the remarkable features of True Liberty is the extent to which it was theorised at all, remarkable because it goes against the grain of so much Dutch practice in politics. There has been a debate about the role of the De la Court brothers in contributing to De Witt’s ideology. Smit makes a strong case for minimising the influence of the De la Court brothers on De Witt’s formulation of the idea of True Liberty. Smit notes that it was the late 1640s that were ‘the formative period of the ideology of True Liberty’ (Smit 1968, 23), while the thinking of the brothers De la Court, who produced some of the few systematic expositions of the True Liberty ideology, was done in the 1650s and 1660s. However, although De Witt formulated the principles of True Liberty independently of the De la Court brothers, their political works did provide De Witt with valuable arguments in support of his policies. But De Witt was careful not to associate himself too closely with their more radical and so controversial proposals. For instance a section of Political Discourses recommended that the clergy be supervised and inspected by a government agency. Van der Bijl describes how the De la Court brothers’ attacks on ‘clergymen striving for supremacy’ resulted in Pieter De la Court being censured by the church council of Leiden. He notes that De Witt, who normally acted against clergy with political ambitions, chose not to intervene on his behalf (van der Bijl 1986, 73). According to Wildenberg, the De la Court brothers ‘had a reputation of being little more than political pamphleteers’ (Wildenberg 1986, 173). If this is taken to mean that the De la Court brothers were writing directly in response to political developments in the United Provinces, then it is accurate. However, the political works of the De la Court brothers are more broadly based and general than those represented in the single-issue based discussions in the lively tradition of political pamphlets. At the same time the approach of the De la Court brothers is still practical rather than theoretically oriented. The significance of the De la Court brothers’ work in the history of Dutch political thought of this period is threefold. As well as in the support their publications supplied to De Witt, the De la Court brothers provided something of an alternative voice in political debate to that expressed in university political theory. Indeed van der Bijl describes their work as ‘daring’, as ‘mostly dissenting from the general pattern’ (van der Bijl 1986, 65), and identifies their position as not within the mainstream republican circle (van der Bijl 1986, 72). They also helped to stimulate Spinoza’s political reflections. However, while The Interest of Holland
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(one of their best-known works) was taken up by some French and English writers in the eighteenth century, contemporaries in the United Provinces interpreted their works primarily as an espousal of the policies of John de Witt in radical form. Tuck (1993, 200, 348) presents Grotius as an important figure in anticipating this later republican writing. However, while the brothers De la Court were well-read and alluded to early modern political theorists and Roman writers, their focus of interest was always justification of De Witt’s regime and policy recommendations for reform rather than abstract theorising. Kossmann more accurately captures the primarily practical source of the De la Court brothers’ interest in republicanism, and also confirms that ‘[o]nly in the second half of the seventeenth century did some Dutch writers develop an elaborate republican theory’. His estimate is that the ‘best, and best known, among them were Johan (1622–60) and Pieter (1618–85) de la Court and Spinoza who used their work’. Kossmann underlines the difference between contemporary political debate and academic political theory in this period, and the antagonism felt by the De la Court brothers, when he notes that the ‘De la Court brothers were businessmen in Leiden who felt deep contempt for the political views circulating in the universities’. The De la Court brothers, he comments, ‘admired Machiavelli, Descartes and Hobbes, intellectual radicals and realists in their opinion, and spurned the eclecticism, vagueness, dullness of traditional Aristotelianism, and the authoritarian conservatism of Calvinist orthodoxy’ (Kossmann 1991, 290). For this reason, van der Bijl comments, a ‘responsible statesman’ like De Witt had to keep his distance from the De la Courts. The De la Court brothers’ views held considerable appeal, articulating ‘what many in the republican circle thought and felt’. Nevertheless, the relationship between De Witt and the De la Court brothers was, according to van der Bijl, on a par with that between the Stadholders and the ‘explosive doctrines of the Reformed clergymen’ (van der Bijl 1986, 72). Pieter De la Court was trained in the law but followed his father into the business of textile manufacture at Leiden. Israel refers to him as ‘the celebrated economic theorist of seventeenth century Leiden, Pieter de la Court’, notable for analysing the reasons for the post-1648 weakening of his native Leiden’s textile industry, in Het welvaren van Leiden. Handschrift uit het jaar 1659 (Israel 1979, 68). Of the two brothers, Pieter was the economic theorist and Johan the political commentator, and it is generally agreed that Pieter edited and published the political works that mainly Johan wrote. Pieter’s role increased after the death
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of Johan in 1660. The key to understanding the De la Court brothers’ political writings lies in the close links that can be clearly seen between the active business interests of both brothers and the political recommendations made in their works. In view of this connection, Malcolm’s emphasis (1991) on the De la Courts’ academic connections could lead to a misunderstanding of them – and Spinoza – purely as abstract thinkers, detached from the tradition of practice in politics in Holland. The brothers were ideologically committed to the political and economic flourishing of their country, and advocated freedom of enterprise, the primacy of Holland’s interests and a vigorous republicanism, in the service of this aim. The De la Court brothers are known for three major works, the first of which was Consideratien en exempelen v staat (Political Considerations and Examples concerning the Foundations of Various Forms of Government) published in 1660. The book supported De Witt’s Act of Seclusion against William III becoming Stadholder and sought to disclose ‘the hidden agenda of princes’ (Blom 2002, 106). This work was such a success that it was reprinted several times, with the second (1661) and subsequent editions (the third, fourth and fifth published in 1662) renamed Consideratien van staat ofte polityke weegschaal (Political Considerations or Political Balance). Blom rightly highlights the centrality, for the De la Court brothers, of the fortunes of rulers being linked closely with those of subjects (Blom 1995, 160). The work considered monarchical, aristocratic and democratic forms of government, rejecting mixed forms, with the aim of establishing the best form of republic. One noteworthy element of this work was the recommendation (as found in Holland and the United Provinces) of a political assembly as the highest institution of government, a feature also found in Spinoza’s political works. The brothers’ second major political work was Politieke discoursen (Political Discourses) of 1662, and addressed issues of the distribution of power between cities confronting the Dutch Republic. Their third notable political work was Interest van Holland, ofte gronden van Hollandswelvaren (The Interest of Holland or the Grounds for Holland’s Prosperity), also of 1662 (Kossmann 1987c, 219; Malcolm 1991). This third work analysed in detail the consequences for Holland’s mercantile interest of the international situation in the wake of the Münster and Westphalian peace treaties of 1648, and weighed up the advantages and disadvantages to be gained from alliances with either England or France. According to Rowen, De Witt himself read over the manuscript of this third work and contributed parts of several chapters. Blom contends
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that De Witt collaborated in the editing of the book and contributed two chapters (Blom 1995,159). The work aroused furious controversy, in part due to its extreme isolationist stance, which was increasingly out of touch with the reality of international politics in the 1660s (van der Bijl 1986, 83). Other elements of the work that antagonised Netherlanders were the rationalistic temper of the writing, and the De la Court brothers’ aggressive advocacy of leadership by Holland over the United Provinces, and even of isolating Holland from the other provinces by the use of waterways to create an island (van der Bijl 1986, 86–7). Controversy resumed on the republication of this third work in expanded form in 1669 as Aansysing der heilsame politike grondel en maximen van de republike van Holland en West-Vriesland (Indication of the Sound Political Grounds and Maxims of the Republic of Holland and West Friesland) (Rowen 1972, 201). The parochial and particularistic focus of the De la Courts’ work, and the importance they assign to economic prosperity, is a characteristic feature of their writing. As Blom notes, the 1669 work describes ‘the political institutions and policy aims of the Dutch predominantly in terms of the economic conditions of their society’. The De la Courts defined the ‘welfare of the people’ in terms of ‘[p]rofitable occupations, thriving markets, and a numerous population’, and the main sources of welfare not in moral, religious, social, or political terms but as ‘fishing and trade, and in particular maritime trade’. For the De la Courts the importance of political institutions was not in themselves but that they should serve this primary objective, and those ‘appropriate to sustain this economy could be easily summarised’, Blom observes, ‘as religious tolerance and responsible government’ (Blom 2002, 91). Likewise republicanism is valued not in principle but because it best served the interests of Holland (Blom 2002, 95). The De la Courts’ practical perspective in this sense reflected a strong tradition in the United Provinces and especially Holland. What De Witt gained from the De la Court brothers, and what they had adopted from Hobbes, was a conception of government which challenged the regnum mixtum of the dominant previous political theory, which saw the House of Orange as performing the legitimate monarchical element of the mixture. They were not to first to use and praise Hobbes, however. Velthysen, a Dutch Protestant and a ‘loyal disciple’ of Descartes, published in 1651 an enthusiastic defence of Hobbes’ De Cive (Kossmann 1960, 101). Hobbes’s notion of an indivisible sovereignty was both theoretical ballast and ammunition for De Witt to justify a government without the House of Orange or the
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Stadholderate, a government that did not need a monarchical component because sovereignty was indivisible and not mixed or separable into pieces (Kossmann 1987c, 221). Velema judges the significance of the De la Court brothers in terms of their supplying the prime example of anti-monarchical political theory in the first Stadholderless period. He notes that to the De la Court brothers the ‘greatest threat to the liberty of the country was posed by the Stadholderate, which was viewed as the first step in the direction of monarchy’ (Velema 2002, 24). Further strong common ground between the De la Court brothers and De Witt is found on the meaning and significance of peace. As seen in the Indication (Rowen 1972, 200–13), Holland’s interests – peace, commercial prosperity and anti-Orange republicanism – were all closely interconnected and interdependent, and were identified as crucial too to the well-being of the Republic. Van der Bijl refers to the De la Court brothers’ striking image of the commercial Dutch Republic as a peace-loving cat, surrounded by aggressive powers chasing dynastic ambition like ‘devouring animals, lions, tigers, wolves and bears or the cheating foxes’. Approving the practical rather than theoretical flavour of the work van der Bijl considers that the De la Court brothers’ imagery is ‘much more revealing than any well-wrought explanation’, and accurately reflected the voice of the regent class (van der Bijl 1986, 79). Van Gelderen notes that in Political Balance the De la Court brothers criticise the Roman Republic for its bloodthirstiness. In line with Dutch political theory the brothers ‘favour peace, concord, moderation and prosperity’ (van Gelderen 2002, 215). As self-styled radical reformers, advocating the breaking of the monopoly of the East India Company, and introducing a new way to manufacture textiles