Spinoza

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^srrsr*

SPINOZA'

JOHN OAIRD, I'UIN^'Jl'AI,

I

LLl A K1

M )

I

OK

II

'nil!

LI, I).

fNIVIIItSITV

UK

LAC K WOOD AN I) SONS

N U t) H 1888,

:

A

N

I>

ii

t )

N I)

-itKriUNT, 1809

3Sf

'z^ErSi:;^^ vt -"3wrae^

1

1liltLiiJ^^feSiS,

I-

ilfe

; ^

PEEFATOlt

THIS materials which

E.

the.

author had prepared for this

book were found greatly

to exceed tlie limits assigned

to to

it.

He

which

has therefore, "besides other parts of his plan

special reference

need not here he made, been

compelled to leave out the account of Bpino^a's letters,

and

to confine the

philosophical system. that the life has

works of

Mr

work

HUB

is

to

Pollocl^jind

and

the loss to be regretted

been HO fully narrated

Dr

life

an examination of his

Martineau.

in.

the recent

Those works

and elaborate expositions of the Hpinoxistic philosophy, but this book attends to deal with that philosophy from a point of yiow contain, also, very able

from that of either of thene

writers.

CONTENTS.

PAOK '

INTRODUCTION, I.

,

.

THE ETHICAL MOTIVK OF THE TKKATIfW

*

III.

'

f

'

*

THE

'

X.

'

HPXNOJSA.'H

-1TH

MKTHOJ),

,'

>

.

MODES,

,

ATTJUBUTIfiS,

INFINITE MODK8,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

ING IMPPLKR,

AND

141

157 17t5

UitUlIN OK TUJS MINI),

1

ySTKLLIGJBNOK

.

,

XUI, DOOTRINK OB THK

(10

75

*

.,,...

AND

XL THK NATUUK AND

XIV.

,

-,

HTAKTI NO- POINT--HUBHTANCJK,

X1L THE MORAL NATUHK OK MAN,

.

V

'

-i

)^

.

KTHIOH

VIH. BUBSTANOE IX.

:

.

:>

vn.

T1IK RABIJA LA,

THE MKIHKVAL JKWIHII PHILOHOPHBKN, GIORDANO BHUNO, v '

VI,

.

,

INFLUENCE OF PRKCM'JIHNU WRITKRH

V, IXKSGAUTEH,

1

CONCERN INU THK IMPROVEMENT

*''

IV.

,

PHILOSOPHY

HlMNOXA'tf

OF THM UNDKRHTANDINU/ II.

.

.

KMoTKWK

,

*

.

.

.

188

THK

.

WIMi,

,

240

AND KKKBPoM OK MAN, XVl IMMORTALITY AND THK BLE8BFJ) UKK, XV. THI5 BONDA(JK

aoa

SPINOZA. INTRODUCTION. A

GREAT system of philosophy

Is

exposed to tlmt Idnd

of injustice which. arises from

the multiplicity of its interpreters, and from the fact that these interpreters are apt to contemplate and criticise* it, not from the

I

|

point of view of

I

its

author, hut from their own.

and commentators of

different

schools

Critics/

and shades

of;

opinion are naturally desirous to claim for thoir own? views the sanction of a great writer's name, and imoon-j aciously exercise their ingenuity in forcing that sanction',

when

it is

not spontaneously yielded.

If

any ambiguH

lurk in his doctrines, they are sure to he "brought to light and exaggerated 1>y tho tendency of conflicting schools to fasten tin what in most hi acties or inconsistencies

;

!

/

cordance with their

when

\-

f ;

'.

a writer

is

And

special principles.

sol f-co insistent, it

even

is

possihlo for a one-sided expositor so to arrange the lights

and shadows, so to give prominence and throw into tho shade what is

him the advocate P. j|

own

on tho whole

xn.

to

what

is

incidental

essential, as to

make

of ideas really antagonistic to his own.

A

2

Spinoza.

More, perhaps, than most systems of philosophy, that of Spinoza has been subjected to this sort of misconDoctrines the most diversified and contra-

struction.

Pantheism and idictory have been extracted from it. nominalism and and realidealism atheism, empiricism, ;

Usni, a non-theistic naturalism as

uncompromising

as that

the modern evolutionist, and a siipernaturalism_ or jof ^cosmism which. makes as little of the world as the '\<Maya of the

Wrable

Buddhist

sanction

have

all

alike

found

a..col-

A

in

Spinoza's ^teaching. philosophy apparently as exact and logically coherent as the Geometry of Euclid or the Principia of Newton, has

proved, in the hands of modern interpreters, as enigmatical as the utterances of the Jewish Kabbala or the

mystical theosophy of the JSTeo-Platonists.

To the

vision

pervaded and dominated by the idea of the Infinite, that he can describe its author only To the acute inspection as "a God-intoxicated man." of one observer, it

is

so

of another, the theistic element in it is only the decor-

a judicious but ous guise of a scientific empiricism to the concession theological prejudices of unmeaning

the author's time, or an incongruous dress of medieval scholasticism of which he had not been able wholly to

'

Whilst some

r

*4

divest himself. at least of those heterogeneous notions

which have been fathered on Spinoza have no other origin than the mistakes of his modern critics, th^^are^ it must be acknowledged, others which indicate real incon-

> ',*

\ 1

J/

^ />

$ *

sistencies.

It is true, indeed, that the controversies of

&, T

subsequent times

may

easily read into the language of

an early writer decisions on questions of which he knew "Philosophers of an earlier age," it has been nothing.

$f?

}& '^

"often contain, in a kind of implicit unity, different aspects or elements of truth, which in a subsequent time,

said,

become distinguished from and opposed to each other." They make use, in a general and indeterminate way, of terpisjL,

which

later

special significance

;

controversies have stamped with a they may thus seem to answer ques-

which they never put to thoniBelves, and may easily be got to pronounce seemingly inconsistent opinions on Tim problems which they never thought of solving.

tions

eager controversialist catches at his pet phrase or nnd and hastily concludes that tho old writer speaks

d'ordre,

in the distinctive tone of tho modern polemic. But obviously tho inconsistencies which thus arise are inconsistencies only to tho oar. It may bo possible to get Spinoza to side in appearance with the modern evolutionist or

with the modern

spiritualist, to

make him an

indi-

vidualist after the fashion of Mill or Spencer, or a universal ist

who speaks by lint

anticipation with tho voice,

(if

attempts are made, they aro mere philosophical anachronisms. Tho problems which they soem to solve are problems which, when tho supposed Behelling.

if

Bitch

solutions were given, could not

oven be propounded*

impossible to ascribe

the discordancy of only to the luHiessary llm philosophy ambiguity of their author's language, Yc^t

it

Hpinoxa's

is

is

modern

interpreters

JMtja Completely homogeneous product

It

mny

rather bo said to be tho composite result of conflicting tendencies, neither of which is followed out to ita utmost If wo gay in general terms that philothe search for unity, tho effort of thought to

logical results.

sophy

is

gain a point of view from which tho contrast variously expressed by tho tenets tho One and tho Many, the Unl-

i

i

Spinoza.

and the Individual, the

versal 1

j

|

and tHe Finite,

Infinite

God and the World, shall be reconciled and harmonised, then we shall look in vain, in the philosophy of Spinoza, one consistent solution of the problem. No solution can be regarded as satisfactory which suppresses or fail to do justice to either of the extremes, or which, though for

giving alternate expression to both, leaves them still in merely external combination without being reconciled for thought. Yet, at most, the latter result is all that the philosophy of Spinoza can be said to achieve. There such as the reduction of all are parts of his system

modes or accidents of the absolute and the assertion that all determination is in which the idea of the infinite is so empha-

finite individuals to

substance,

negation

sised as to leave

nature and man,

and

illusion.

hand

other

no place for the

finite,

or to reduce

individual existences, to unreality" There are parts of his system, on the all

such as his assertion that the individual

real, his ascription to each finite thing of a conatun in suo esse perseverancli, his rejection of general ideas as

is

the

mere entia

rationis, his polemic against teleology, his use " term " Nature as a synonym for " God " which. seem to give to the finite an independent reality that

of the

leaves

no room for the

infinite, or

it to an expresThus the sjsiem

reduces

sion for the aggregate of finite things.

ntems^ements which

resist

an^attenygtjbo a^pSffielsTor an atheist^a, naturor supernaturalist, a nominalist or a realist. As ho *"" ""' ---

:^^

alist -

...._. ......

;

.....

______./.-A

.

~^,^__^u,,-./

-,

.

^

^*

-~..> n

^^.-^^

approaches the problem wilE^which he deals from different sides, the opposite tendencies by which his mind is

governed seem to receive alternate expression; but to the last they remain side by side, with no apparent coix-

5

Underlying Unity*

mousness of tlioir disharmony, and with no attempt to mediate between them, it may be conceded that the philosophy not self-consistent, or contains elements not irreconcilable, are unreconciled, it does not

But though of Spinoza

is

which, if follow that the task of the expositor of Spinoza is limited to what is involved in this concession. Inconsistency

may

not so

arise

much from

incompatible principles as| Contradictory elements may have been admitted into a system, not bowman its author

from defective

!

logic.

looked at things from different and irreconcilable standpoints, but because ho failed to see all that his funda-

mental standpoint involved; not because he started from different premisses, but because he did not carry out

what was results.

for him the only true premiss to its legitiimito As moral defects assume an altogether di 11V rout

aspect according as they are regarded as the expression of a retrograding or of an advancing moral natureas willing divergences or as involuntary shortcoming*) its own ideal so intellectual inconsistencies may

from

menu

more or

loss according to the attitude of the mind from which they proceed. It may be possible to discover,; through all a man's thoughts, a dominant idea or general! tendency, and to explain liis inconsistencies as only un-/

conscious aberrations from.

it.

It

may oven bo

possible/

underneath apparent contradictions or abrupt transitions from one point of view to another, an implicit to discern,

unity of aim the guidance of thought by an unconscious logic towards a principle of reconciliation not yet fully

And

if any such dominant idea or implicit detected in a great writer, it cannot fail to throw light on the general character and bearing of his

grasped.

aim can b

^

Spinoza,.

speculations,

and

it

enable- us to

may

pronounce whether

-and to what extent in his seeming inconsistencies he

is

only unfaithful to himself, or inadequately representing his

own

idea.

Now

there

are

various

which wo may bo aided of tendency in the

bo

may

able,

conceivable

indications

by

in detecting this undercurrent

mind

of a philosophical writer.

for instance,

We

learn something of the to discover in his previous

to

motive of his speculations

was that constituted for him, so and tho which intellectual guided process by

spiritual history

what

it

to speak, tho original impulse towards philosophy,

that secretly

satisfaction has been

something

Hough t.

of the. helps

Or

again,

we may know

which have been afforded him in

the search for truth, of the studies on which bin opening intelligence ban been fed, of tho sources from which

he has derived inspiration, of tho books or authorities which consciously or unconsciously have moulded the

Or

substance or form of his thoughts. have- the

means

finally,

of viewing his system in tho

we may

making, of

watching tho working of his mind and the development of his ideas from their earlier and cruder shape to tho

form which they have

finally taken.

Wo

may be

able

thus to see which, if any, of tho conflicting elements in his thought has gradually tended to prevail over tho others,

and to which of them therefore, though the

victory to the last may be incomplete, the place of tho ruling or characteristic principle must be ascribed.

Wo

find

may

it

possible in this

way

to

pronounce of the

which disfigure his system in its final form, that they are not radical inconsistencies, but only irrelevances

"blots

tereseences foreign to its essential character*

Interpretation of Ais System.

Now we

7

are not without sncli helps to the unclerstShd-

In the first place, wq ing of the Spinozistic philosophy. ' to the treatise in tlxo preface possess Concerning' "thdr

Improvement of the Understanding' an autobiographical* fragment .in which Spinoza narrates what may bo termed the origin

and development of his

which we gain

and from motive and genesis In the second place, we*. spiritual life,

a clear insight into the

of .Jiis_pJi,ilQSOphical system.

have information, direct and indirect, as to Spinoza's early studies in philosophy.

From

his

own

testimony,

from the internal evidence supplied by liis writings, and from other sources, wo know something UH to the authors he had read, the intellectual atmoHpho.re in which ho grew up, the authorities which may have influenced the formation of his opinions. Lastly, earlier works the means of two. ing

ment

wo have the,

in.Spinojsu'H

gradual develop-

of those ideas which, took their final Hystomatisod

form in the 'Ethics/ cerning

only in

Especially in

the,

*

Treatise con-

God and Man/ winch lias been brought to light our own time, wo possess what may bo, regarded

an early study for the Ethics/ (unbracing the same subjects and dealing with the same fundamental ideas, <

as

but presenting them in a cruder and less coherent form, and exhibiting the oondieting tendencies of the later work in harder and more unmodified opposition to each

From

these varicniH sources some help may bet towards the right apprehension of Spinoza's philosophy and the explanation of its apparent other.

derived

guities

and

inconsistencies.

I

CHAPTER nil';

I.

MOTIVK OF HPINOHA'N

KTiitrAii

THKATWK

PHILOSOPHY-

TIIH

THE IMPROVEMENT OF

'CoNtfKHN'JNU

TIIK

UNDKHHTANDINU.'

THR

Inwards philosophy was not In Spinoza's int.'ilti'tiwl om*. His philosophy in the

hupiilHi*

fwHy

mini! a

winti'i

lo^ini!

that of

l.i

Hf-si-art**,

hut,

thti

(.lurtcHian

philuH
!ii**ml

wnk

<>xpori n*.. t

!!

WUH

prrmiptcid to

a iiM'thml of knowh'tlgj* hwatwc primarily ho It. NVUH tht nu^hi aft-i'r Hpirittml rt'Ht. conwinuwieHS iiflir

tho tlinMutiNfartitm ami dwtpnVttuh*. whtrh
a

n-p in

fiil^H IIP

I

wmUwipmtto!! of thr worhl from

tin,!

iiiil

fwttftuM anil

liun^t

i

t<

in

tititi

to

itna^itiutiou

not,

Imn

Nor

jitnTfiHophy

tlitj

1md

ortli-

point of view

tht*

cnly porturhatiou

to nnk hininnlf

wlmthwr that

mi ilitmory imn, and whether

{tittrat-^ IxMionth th

tiMnenrm

S|tintW*

th

whii'h 1ml

vlmv

H>ini of

the*,

pHHsi
a

uuliiUHhwl

i

it

in

nltowrt of things tp*tluir

ihiw nnutuut of tlm origin of

nt

eonjf!'iuw,

trontitto

Tim- introduc-

ub)vo named i,

its

wo

Motive of his PMlowplti/. have said, a kind of spiritual autobiography, in which the, author explains to us what were the moral difficulties f

f

and aspirations in which his ated.

He tolls us what of human existence

is

.speculative inquiries origin-

the view of the true end and

which

\

own

experience had goal led him, and he points out the moans by which he con-j His philosophy eoivGil that that end could be attained. took

its...rise,

ho

to

tells us,

intellectual satisfaction,

his

not primarily in

I/he

search

'

foi

but in the endeavour to discover)

some true and abiding object of love, something in lind-|j ing which, ho would find a perfect and eternal joy- a joy I ........

not bo found which could * -

the ordinary objects "of .._..*...."I human desire in riches, honour, the pleasure** of appc| All these objects experience proved to tifo and sense. -

.....

in

*

'

-

-

bo deceptive and inconstant, attainment, and

ment and

*

when

difficult/

and uncertain of

attained bringing only disappoint-

disquietude.

"

Our happiness," lie Bays, "depends entirely on the quality of the objects to which we are attached by love. For, on' account of that which is not loved, no strifes will ever arise! no sorrow

if it perishes,

no envy

if

others possess

it,

ao fearJK

all of which cptR.e rio"Eatred, no perturbation of mind llpoiJjj as are all those tis in the love of things which ftro^^erislujjjj^ tEings of which we liave/spokcn. JOffinoyfljtQ.a t)]i,g..W.]iich f I

W

.....

is eternal

and

only with joy ajsyl with any sorrow; that therefore desire and with all our strength

infinite feeds the mtfi'd

?

tTioETs UnBlnglc.d

should ..eagerly

The* end of

which nature

all

human

consists tho is

union

endeavour, therefore

perfection

and

Ijlesffodne^H

an infinite bj^love *vvi% i

Dulnt Emend, 1

that in of

our

and etumal

|j

10

Spinoza.

object. \

ledge

ihini,

;

But love, ae.cording to Hpinoza, rests on knowor rather there is a point of view in which, for

fooling and intelligence, The sure and only

^identified.

seek

is

to

minds of

know error

knowing and

way

being, arc

to attain the

end we

things us they really are, to disabuse our

and

illusion

;

and

for this

purpose what

a discipline of the intelligence, "a method," as he ox presses it, "of curing the understanding and of so purifying it that it may know things as is

chiefly needed

is

'But all knowledge, well as possible and without error." repeats, has a value for him only as it is direeled to

he.

one

end.

and goal

-viz.,

the aUainment^of that highest

human

perfection of which he. had spoken- and everything in the sciences which does not bring us nearer to

that end he will reject as useless.

whieh

The

task, therefore,

in thin treatise he proposes to himself

is

the de-

method of knowledge or organon of tho gonoral, but of a moaim of attaining that kind

vising, not of a

wiimooH

in

of knowludgo, or of apprehending all things in that aspect of them, which will lead to the attainment of moral and spiritual perfection,

It is unneee.MHnry, for our present purpose, to follow out in detail the Num*sni\v steps by which Spinoza works out his conception of the true, method of knowledge.

genera! drift of the treatise may be mid to be thin, to' t before, tin an ideal of true knowledge, and Jo

The

to Jw realised. jmiut out tho way in which that ideal w In ((> triwt with the kind of knowledge which con-

stitute poritmcw,

and

the 4liafc

acletjiifit

our ordinary tmrolleeting oxkitciwlodge which cuu be Hiutl to 1m real must ho intuit] vo or wlf-ovidoncing ; it

rontivut of

agf-rpltend

iU ohjocU

in their unity or

Notes of True Knowledge.

11

tion to each other as parts of one absolute whole ; and it must see them in their right order, or in their relation to "*

principle of knowledge so that the order of our " correspond to the exemplar of nature," thoughts shall The knowledge of or represent the real order of things.

the

1

first

.,

the ordinary, unreflecting consciousness

is,

in the first

place, merely second-hand and unintelligent, it is derived from hearsay, or from loose and unsifted experience. Trj^Jknowlodge, in contrast with this, must be that h

which the mind is in immediate relation to its object, fa which truth is seen in its own light, or, as Bpinoza ex presses it, "in which, a thing is perceived solely from its

own

essence, or

cause."

''Jj

*^

from the knowledge of

its

proximate)

Ordinary knowledge, again, is disconnected and'

fragmentary, it looks at things apart from each other, or in the accidental order in which they are presented to the common observer of nature, or connected with each other only this, true

by

In contrast "with arbitrary associations. is that which breaks clown the fal
knowledge

isolationancTTnucpoiulpnco which popular imagination it gives to*In
iCSEEE no

i

object exists for itself, or can a^wliple, understood save in its relations to other objects and ta

the whole.

It discerns, or seeks to discern, the real

lations of things, or

what

tions of the ideas of things !

all

re-

the same, the rational rela-

is ;

and therefore

it is

fatal to

such connections or combinations of ideas as rest on

4

accident or arbitrary association. For the same reason, lastly, true knowledge is that "which not only sees its objects as related to each other, but sees thorn hi that

\

definite relation of ordered

Jy

I

'L*2Ht^M.-JE^l?lL JiS 3

12

Spinoza.

There are certain ideas on which other ideas

spring.

"universals"

Spinoza rejects the

rest.

of

scholastic

metaphysic as mere entia rationis or^fictions of the imagination. _Yt we are not left to the impossible task of attempting to collect or string together in thought the infinite multiplicity of

finite

and changeable

J <^'> ';

A/

*?

.x^ *%

things.

There are certain ideas which come to us in the place of universals, and which gather up our knowledge into that unity which by means of the after.

Bought

"

There

precise significance of

,

,

r

are,"

fictitious universals

he

was

us in language the cannot at present ex-

tells

which we

" amine, certain fixed and eternal things, which, though they are individual, yet on account of their omnipresence

^"and all-comprehending power become to us as universals, or as genera in the definitions of individual changeable 1 Hbhings, and as the proximate causes of all things." '

/ >

"'

one highest idea, that of "the most

tFinally, there is

/perfect-Being," which 'all

other ideas, as

it

the source and explanation of represents the source and origin of is

That knowledge therefore alone can be things. termed adequate which proceeds from and is moulded by " That our this supreme or central idea. mind," says he, " may thoroughly reflect the exemplar of nature, it must evolve all ideas from that which represents the origin all

and source

of all nature, so that that idea

be the source of a, is

all

other ideas."

may

appear to

2

Spinoza's theory_pJL

knowledge

:

howjs

it to

^Jg^gjojjiatCtice 1 What, in other words, is the "Wh^t Spinoza says in ^^ejjxaliod of kno^edge (

?

>

answer to

^

little 1

J^JS

(

ques tion in the present treatise amounts more than this, that we should endeavour to

De Int. Emend.,

xiv.

2

Ibid., vii.

v>

I

Method of Knowledge.

1.3

" true ideas," and that "become possessed of what he calls of the we should "by means highest of all ideas seek to " so to order and or endeavour to them reduce unity,

our ideas that our

concatenate

mind

shall represent

objectively (i.e., in thought) the formality (i.e.., objective reality) of nature, "both as to the whole and as to its *

parts."

Spinoza does not atttempt here to investigate the relation of

mind

to nature, of

sumes that a true idea

thought to

is

something

lie as-

its object.

different

from

its

object, the idea of a circle from an actual circle, the idea of the body from the body itself but lie takes for granted :

that the former agrees with or adequately represents the latter. To verify a true idea we need not go beyond itself. " Certitude is nothing but the objective essence (the idea) itself

essence reflex:

the

;

is itself

way

in

which we perceive the formal 2 We may, indeed, have a

certitude."

knowledge of our

of a second idea, or, in

make one idea the object ideasmodern phraseology, be not only

conscious but self-conscious.

ment

of knowledge, it is

Yet, in order to the attain-

no morn necessary to know that

than, in order to know the essence of a triangle, But necessary to know the essence of a circle. though it is possible to havo true ideas without reflecting

we know, it

is

on them, and even to reason correctly without a knowideas, both ledge of logic or the principles of reasoning in themselves and in their relations, "being their own evidence

yet this does not hinder that, for lack of

and by reason of various prejudices, people often mistake error for truth and go wrong in their

reflection

reasoning, so that i

Da

Int.

"

it

Emend, ,

seldom happens that in the inves-

xii,

a

Ibid.,

vL

14

Spinoza.

tigatioix of

arises the

flected

nature they proceed in proper ordor." " which is

need for method,

or the idea of the idea."

knowledge this means

What

is

that

Hence

nothing but

we do not need

ro-

l

to go outside

of thought in search of a criterion of truth, inasmuch as this would virtually he the demand to excogitate a

method of thought before we begin to swim before wo go into the water.

to think, to

"We cannot

loam criti-

Ideas the forms of thought without using them. themselves. In criticise to so speak, reflecting must, cise

on them, making them objects of consciousness, they determine their own nature, and limits, and so become capable of being used as

the

instruments

of

further

knowledge.

"True

ideas,"

Spinom

says, constitute

thomaolvoa "the

inborn instruments of knowledge" which the understandHaving ing makes for itself by its own native force.

wo have only to direct the mind's opermake Urn given Into idea "a norm accord-

grasped a true idea, ations so as to

ing to which

wo

shall

understand

all things."

Method,

in short, consists in bringing idous to Holf-conwjioiiHnesB, and then in using them as the principles of investigation.

Having a true idea--such ns r.tfa that of Cuuwilily you become conscious of it, understand and define it; and t

thenceforward

it

is

no longer used at random, unintol-

but becomes a principle of method or u guide in future inquiries. Knowledge thim acquired will possess, so far, the charactoriHticn which havo boon laid down an ligtmtly,

constituting the ideal of knowledge it will nmi off ideas or principles which are their own evidence, and it will, ;

instead of a men? collodion or combination of tilings *

I>t Int. JtaMttd., viL

*

15

Unity of Knowledge.

arbitrarily associated, consist of parts related to each other

by links of reason or necessary thought. But there is a further and more important element which method must include ere it can bo adequate to the whole field of knowledge. Knowledge must remain we can until contemplate all things from the imperfect

True ideas nuiy point of view of their absolute unity. of instruments as serve thought ; but their provisional a who nsra like workman that we is use main may, ruder implements to construct more perfect ones, fashion " other intellectual instruments, by by means of them

which the mind acquires a farther power of investigation, and so proceeds till it gradually attains the summit of wisdom." 1 Each true idea, Spinom neonm to teach, furnishes UB with a term of thought which far to

serves so

correct the false independence

imagination gives to individual objects* itself

needs to have

As

conception.

others

"

effects

are,

individuality dissolved in a higher " have commerce tilings in nature

its

all

with each other,

which

but that idea

v'.c,,

are

produced

in other words,

-so each idea or

by and produce wuweB and

reciprocally

term of thought

of relations, a transition point in

in

only a foetw

a systematic

whole

;

and ideas vim in importance according an they extend over a wider portion of the realm of knowledge. But this be so, that knowledge must ntill bo imperfect which stops short of the highe.at und most comprehen-

if

sive idea in this* intellectual hierarchy. indivicfeal

but ideas isolated

Not only must

up their false itulopondeiKie, themselves must surrender in succession thoir objects

yield

authority, until *

Do

wo

roach that which

Int. Btouxul.,

vL

is

**

tho

16

ftpinom.

fountain and source of

Hpinoza terms "

it,

of

(ill

oilier

ideas

"

tlio

"tho most perfect

as

idea,

.Being."

That method will be good which shows how the mind

is

to be directed according to the norm of a given true idea. Moreover, since the relation between two ideas is the same

with the relation between the formal essences (objects) of that reflective knowledge, which is that of tho, idea of the most perfect Being, will be more excellent than the reflective knowledge of other ideas that iH, that method will be the most perfect which shows how the mind is to be directed according to the norm of the given idea of the most perfect Being." l these, ideas, it follows that

;

"If we proceed an little as possible abstractly, and begin as BOOH an possible with the first elements -i.e., with the source and origin of nature we need 110% fear deception. . No confusion is to be apprehended in. regard to the idea of ,

.

(the origin of nature), if only we have the. norm of truth, For this is a Being single, infinite ie., an already shown. all being, and beyond which there in no being/' a it

"As

regards order," again Spinoza writes, ''and that we arrange and unite all our perceptions, it is required that, UH HOOU an it ran be done and reason demands, we inquire whether there is any boing, and, at the name time, of what Hort, which is the cause of all things, an its objective

may

esHence

is

mind, as possible its

;

and then will our reproduce nature as completely as will contain objectively both its c&se&cQ and

also the cause of all our ideas \vo.

have

for

it

;

said,

order and unity,"'

1

ro

" ,"

to

Sjnuossn,

th

tho

I*

wo

" *, 11

to understand

single, infinite,

Idea of which constitutoB, acoorjjing Is it principle of knowledge ?

It rat

above nature, outside of tho cosmos of

D

I&t.

EmtmL,

vlL

Ibid,, ix.

finite

Ibitl, xiv.

"The Most

Perfect

17

Bdwj."

things and relations, though itself the source or cause of all things ? Or is it, though the highest, only one of the elements which constitute nature, the first principle of the system of related

ly part of that system

phenomena, but

Or

?

itself essential-

again, is it only a

synonym

for Mature, the totality of individual things and beings, and is this identification of nature with "the most per" fect Being merely a concession to theological prejudices,

whilst really nothing

more is meant than that the unibe conceived of as an ordered system of things ? According to one of the ablest of Spinoza's recent ex-

verse

is to

positors,

"the idea

of the

iLjLil..?* equivalent nature is v

first

to,

most perfect Being includes the belief

.,,pnV^'an"^uniJorm," which

principle of

science."

"

tliat

the

belief is

"In knowing

,^l|^k,,,,.o:

"the von the \ 'mos

he adds, " the mind also knows itsel as^pajt. of the universal order and at one with it, thereii. perfect Being/

finding, as

I

:

we have

to learn

elsewhere, the secret

and freedom. rain's happiness

What

o:

more" "Sphiow

may have meant is

certain."

1

is doubtful, that he meant this mucl Spinoza, he further explains, whilst "at-

tached by an intellectual passion to the pursuit of exact science," was also "attached by race and tradition to the Hebrew sentiment of a one and only Supreme Power;" and in this he seems to find the explanation of the fact that Spinoza clothed the purely scientific idea of the unity and uniformity of nature in the theo" the most perfect logical guise of Being." Spinoza, lie tells us, " follows in form aaid even in languag the

examples made familiar by theologians and philosophers under theological influence and pressure, who* had *

P.

XII.

\>

Pollock's Spinoza p. 180.

B

18

Spinoza.

undertaken to prove the existence of a being apart from and above the universe. He does not simply break off '

from theological speculation, and seek to establish pliilohe seems intent on sophy on an independent footing ;

showing that theological speculation

itself,

when

i^ascffii

once allowed free play, must at last purge itself of all ''anthropomorphism and come round to the "scientific ;is

Spinoza does not ignore theology, but provides an euthanasia for it." Many of Spinoza's other modern interpreters have convinced themselves on various

.'/View.

1

-

grounds that Spinoza's system

is

one of pure natumliani,

that his highest principle does not go

beyond

tlio

con-

ception of an all-embracing, all-dominating, but unconscious nature-force, and that wo should not misconstrue

him

if

we

'

substituted the

wherever the

word "Nature"

for

"God,"

latter occurs in his philosophy.

we

think, be questioned that tlio view is so far true that in Spinoza's ;aken by system "theological speculation has," in Mr PollgckV It

cannot,

these writers

ghic w phrase, "purged

itself

3pinozs Godjs certainly not i

;ate

or "magnified

man"

of anthroponun^phisui."

tlio

supranrumlano pptoujr even

of popular thoughj^

^ll-wise Creator and Governor "^o nattiraLJtJiQ-. Whatever else the idea of "the most perfect ology. ng" means, it is an idea which is supposed to constitute a principle, and the highest principle, of knowledge ;he

j>i>s

at once its tion of Dr

own

the whole

evidence and the evidence or explanaBut an outside Creator

finite world.

is a notice. wiij&, Not eacploinB nothyig. it does the reduce who is God outside the y placecf ld to something finite, but it is essentially

Contriver

.

.

^-*"-*-JU

1

>

I

Wl

i' (

,'tt.tu^'

pollock's Spinom, p, 108.

No Anthropomorphic The

link between

God and

God.

19

the world, according to To find in God

notion, is a purely arbitrary one.

thii

tin

explanation of the world implies that the existence o: the world and all that is in it is traceable to somethin, in the nature of God,

and not to His mere

A

arb^a^ wil

cause which thought can rec<5gSseas sucl is one which contains in it the reason and necessity of But a the effect, and which reveals itself in the effect. or power.

personified cause,

which

mere will produces an

of its

might have refrained from producing, is an In such a conception cause and impossible conception. effect

it

effect

stand

apart,

and the gap

is

not

filled

up

foi

thought by the interposition of an arbitrary, omnipotent will. To find in God the first principle of all being and

knowledge implies a relation between ,tlj,o which flows from it between God ciuiejind^that of all

ant'

such that, in one point of view, God wouli not be God without it ; and on the other hand, tin world would not be what it is, would be redxiced tc the world

unreality or nonentity, without God.

IsTow this, as

we

have seen, is what Spinoza doe*, or attempts to do. The " most perfect Being," whatever else the phrase means,

is

a Being the idea of

which

is

the

first

prin-

knowledge, the key to the meaning of the whole system of being. "Without this central principle, ciple

of

things and beings have no existence other than the illusory existence and individuality which imaginafinite

tion ascribes to

And on

them

are

mere

fictions

and

unrealities.

the other hand, to anticipate Spinoza's favourite

from this fundamental principle all things follow as necessarily as from the conception of a triangle follow the equality of its angles to two right angles, and illustration,

J

20

Spinoza.

other properties. If, therefore, Spinoza's system can only be redeemed from naturalism by the idea of

all its

|

an anthropomorphic God the dem ex macldna of popular theology a pure naturalistic system it is. The exclusion of the notion of an anthropomorphic God

Idoes not, however, of necessity reduce a system of phillosophy to pure naturalism. principle which explains mature is not therefore, to say the least, a part of nature.

A

It

possible to derive from such a principle all that

is

renders the facts of nature intelligible without regarding it as itself one of these facts. The definition of nature

may

indeed be so widened as to include in

it

the idea

or principle which constitutes the world an ordered or rational system ; but in another and truer semse that

and properly must, bo contemplated as something prior to and above nature. The treatise before us is, as above said, an unfinished work, and it does not contain except inforentially any explanation of what author meant by the idea of the "most perfect its, But if we take into view the general drift and Being." principle may,

intention of the

workif,

of its

in other words,

we

consider

and the general bearing of we shall be led, I think, to theory knowledge,

the motive from which

it starts,

see in Spinoza's "most perfect Being" somctliingjyery different,_ at .once from crude supeniaturaliani, andjfrom

thejpure situralism ..with which

L The

knowledge

of the "

it

has been soughtjo

most perfect Being" as the

constitutive principle of the world is the formal expression of the result to which Spinoza was led "by Ms

search for that spiritual satisfaction and rest which he could not find in tf the things that are changeable and

^ \

^

God and Nature.

21

His examination of the principles of know-

1

perishable."

ledge had given theoretical justification to his dissatisfaction with the ordinary objects of human desire, by proving that these objects have no reality save the ficti-1

which imagination lends to; the presumption with which he started," and which indeed constituted the implicit ground of his

tious

and

them.

illusory reality

And

discontent with these

objects

viz.,

that

must

there

"something eternal and infinite, love to which would fill the mind with joy and with joy alone," now exist

finds verification in the rational idea of a

"most

perfect

Being," "a Being single, infinite, and beyond which there is no being." Now, however intense may have been Spinoza's "intellectual devotion to the pursuit of exact science," the process just described

one which that formula docs not cover. the attitude of

mind

to which,

cations, the designation

If

is,

wo

think,

it did,

then

under whatever modifi"

" religion

has been given, must

be something essentially indistinguishable} from "the For, however foreign to passion for exact science." Spinoza's nature religion

much

that passes under the name of to be, his account of the *

must be pronounced

mental experience that constituted the impulse to speculative inquiry

is

that of a^rggejs in

which the very

If wo pass beessence of religion may be said to lie. " " the the mere infetichism of barbarous races, yond

discriminating ascription of mysterious powers to maobjects (which is as .irrelevant to the religious

terial

history of the world as the other

phenomena

of savag

7" i

life are to

the history of morality and civilisation), the f

a 'belter

***

,

+

, .

22

Spinoza.

The dawn of religious feeling may be Pantheism, traced to the impression which experience forces upon us of the -unsubstantial character of the world on which

we

|

j

look and of which this

we form

a part.

In

different

sense of the illusoriness of the world

ways come

to different

their

less

men and

may

different races, according to

The apparent outward scene, the lapse of time, the

or greater depth of nature.

shifting of the

impossibility of staying the passing moment to question it means, the uncertainty of life and the insecurity

what

!

|

!

'

of its possessions,

may

be to one what to another

is

its

inner counterpart, the changing of our opinions, feelings, desires, which, even if the world remained steadfast,

would perpetually make and unmake

it

for us.

Or

the sense of the illusoriness of life deepens into again, weariness and disgust or into a sense of shame and remorse, in the

man who

himself the sport of

it,

reflects

who

on himself and

fools

has detected the vanity of

his desires and hopes, yet is powerless to emancipate himself from their dominion. If ow it is this sonsojjf

the unreality of the world regarded from the point of

view of ordinary experience which not merely gives rjge to the longing for some fixed and permanent reality,,

"some Life

continuous, Being imexposed to the Hind ofjQj&EJLaj accident/' but is in itself, in a sense, already the implicit recognition of tho existence of such

walk

a Being.

Arguanente^rom^.". design," which conclude of finite things to a God conceived

from the existence

of after the analogy of a maker of machines, are HQijEL. ession of the Such naturaljiistojtj j2jaaisgpon. e only the of an imperfect ^

It

is

afterj^^ht

not the realu^but

W" -f The Process of Religion.

God

jvvOTldjbl}^^^ It is not from

,

the

:ir

23

but from the

affirmation,

human spirit rises to the And when we reflect on infinite. this elevation of spirit means, we

negation, of the finite that the

conception of the

what

this

process,

discern that \\^iat_ia_ second in time

is

jeally,

though

Thej^rjL^

iffiyfiliSitoJ^

^J^tti^^ isioottneconclusion

God

J|^^^^g^^g^^g

e

gn ^ e

world, but the yrius or presupposition which reveals its presence in the very sense of our finitude and that of

the world to which

we

belong.

conies to us first in time

is

The impression that

that the world

is nothing ; but that impression would have no existence or meaning if the thought really though latently first were not

this

God is all. It is not, of course, meant that the we have described is one which all who experi-

process

ence

it

experience in the same manner.

Like

all

nor-

human

experience it varies, as we have said, with the varying character and the wider or narIn the deeper] rower culture of individuals and races.

mal elements

of

and more reflec^yj^natures it manifests itself cniefly ini the consciousness of an inner life other and larger than the

life

desires.

of sense, of a self that transcends the naturalf

With widening

experience of

life

this

con-*

sciousness deepens, since wider experience only furnishes new materials for the contrast between the nixiltiplicity of

of

impressions and the self that is identified with none them. Advancing intellectual and moral culture

brings with

it

the prpfounder coaBoiousaessjjjjgg^jpL'i withiixus, of being greater than our

finite possibility

-

capacities to

which the

outr

24

Spinoza.

ward, lifo

is

lint

Thin conse.iouanosH, rightly

adequate.

which involves a

u negative

inte.rproted, is

It

positive*

the revelation in us of a something that is not of us, of n perfect, by comparison with which the imperfection of otu'HC'lven and thn whole, complex of finite existences i

is

dise.loHe.d,

between

.Ileileeting

and

itself

thai

is

iin

on

the,

meaning

deHires,

unquenchable by

tin

1 ,

world becomes to

a nature tho premimptivij proof of

ohj
Now

f

Invis

to

mid abiding

of the discord

cnuHciousnoss of a

the.

which would

"an

fill

jnfinite

the

aud

mind with

joy."

any truth in the foregoing analysis of tlw movement of mind of whidi we. Hpe.ak, it in obviously onn whieh nuinut b*^ identificul with tho processcm of if then*. In?

and the msult of which could never ho by empirical ohwrvation of the facts and

phynic'id Hc;ieiiei, gi'iierati'it

{ihtmomtmii of tlte world. other dialet'ttr, than ilw dottbtilly U

-a

a

it

It logte.

may

IH

of

l\u\

if

tht^ro

RrienccB,

muvemtnit which roason dcum not

puU more

into the conclusion

be no it

uu-

jiwtify,

than

is

pr^mmHeH, or rather, as we havo scan, inthe negative of the premiss concliiHitn i

in the iwmtirJt. on itn

with which

m

it HOI'IUM

to utarL

**

If it cvuporatea any tiling The not Clod but nature,

a tiagmatio tlmim," ohjtet to which it conclude*! i not one which is conin, or can by any pxocoM of gonoralisation be exit

traoUxi from the

fat

of nature, or identified with

its

and mioceatioii" If Boientifto ex bo
of

'^L^LSI^

Relation

to the Infinite.

25

imscientific, the attitude of inind wliicli Spiiioza records

as that

which constituted Jfor him the impulse

to specu-

lative inquiry is identical, or in close analogy^,

which in the history of mankind has been J secret-iiorye. of what, we mean., by .ik
.

nor philosophy which seeks to develop the logic of religion, can rest content with an idea of God from which

no explanation of the

world can be derived.

finite

Even

if the independent existence of finite things "be an illusion, the idea of God must contain in it a reason if only

\

j

i

'

for their illusory existence.

The shadow, though

but a shadow, must have

reason in the substance

To say

reflects.

its

that the infinite

is

he

it

it

the negation of the

implies that there is in the infinite at least a negative relation to the finite. But it implies something

finite,

more than

this.

finite objects is

The recognition of the inadequacy o: not only the expression of the implici

consciousness of an infinite object, but also of to. tjiat

am

u

rjajjjjy.

I II

Itjsjhr^ pron^in^

object.

capable of

finite

my relatioi

If therefore,

on the one hand,

world which, as an independent

on the other hand, there I belong or

am

eternal reality

is

a side of

I belong to

tb

reality, is

my

negated nature in whicl

inwardly related to that infinite anc

which negates or annuls

own, realityjaapart of J^jfimjbjB

it.

IfX4^LS

worldjljnj^

It same act reassert this which explains what may be termed the positive sicl of that mental experience which formed the starting

point of

Spm&a's iaye8%aMom

The inadequacy

o

Spinoza.

26

I

*

was to him. an implicit revelation, unreality of the finite not" only of an infinite and eternal object, but also of And what he was himself as in essential relation to it. thus implicitly conscious of he seeks to It

is,

we

think, from this point of

make

explicit.

view that we must

partially fulfilled only in interpret Spinoza's attempt the fragmentary treatise before us, burdened with con-

elements even in the later work in which

flicting

embodiment

finds systematic

to reaffirm

it

and explain

the reality of the finite world in and through the idea of But though in the present work the thought

the infinite.

which forms the fundamental principle of his system is undeveloped, it is possible, from the general drift and

left I

!

bearing of the

treatise,

to divine in

some measure the

meaning he attached to that principle, and the direction in which its development must lie. And, considered in this light, I venture it^isjmpossible,

to say, to find in

Spinp^s^jhilosophy only that pure naturalism with which it has been identified, m* to regard "the meaning of his " idea of the most perfect Being," as exhausted

by any such formula mature*

"

It is

no doubt

"the unity and uniformity of

possible, as already said, so to define

"JSTafcure" as that tibe

as

it

shall include

both

finite

and

in-

multiplicity of

individual things, and the If we mean by the pixociple which gives them unity. unmrae all reality, then to say that there is

nothing

outside of

an

it,

that nature or the universe

is all, is

only

identical proposition. Moreover, as we have seen, nothing can be more unfWssiaGnable than that Spinoza's God was no transcen-

^m

ex machtna, existing apart from the world, or

J

Universals" I'l

connected with

it

27

only by the unintelligible bond of an Again, it may be conceded that

'

arbitrary creative act.

we do

not as a matter of fact begin by forming a con cegtionTpf God as the principle of all things, and tlieii

by a

t

?'

separate mental act or process of thought, bring this

conception to bear on the world of finite, individua existences. Observation and experience are, it may b granted, the only instruments of knowledge in this sensd that which gives unity to knowledge^! tijejmnciple not apart from, but as inseparably impHcatej: grasped, with, the facts -

^-zyZSE""'

BuTthe is

real

i

f

and phenomena observed or experienced ...--.,... is, whether if^**** *

...

JL..

,.

and only important question

Spinoza's doctrine that the individual, the things of outobservation, or the world as a collection or sum of,

ward

finite existences, are

whether there

the sole constituents of knowledge

not involved in real knowledge or a principle of unity distinguishof realities, knowledge able from the manifold of phenomena, a universal disis

tinguishable from, the sum of particulars, an infinite and eternal distinguishable from the finite and changeable,

not given by

it,

logically prior to

be answered in the affirmative,

it

it.

If this qiiestion

matters not whether

you give the name God or JSTature to the universe ;,in neither case is Spinoza's system ajp^ojnafcjjrJism.

How

it

answer sense,

might seem,

at first sight, to preclude

any such one

that, for Spinoza, individual things are, in

the only realities, and that he regards general " universals " as one of the chief sources of error

ideas or

and confusion. "

When

anything," says he,

1

"

conceived abstractly, as

is

,

tx.'

/

| t| j

7^

28

Spinoza.

are all nniversals, it is always apprehended in the, understanding in a wider sense than its particulars can really exist in

nature.

.

*

*

Further, since in nature there are many things the which is so slight as almost to escape the under-

difference of

it may easily happen, if we think abstractly, that we should confuse them." And again " W^pj^i n ?ve when we are inquiring into the nature of things, to draw any conclusions from abstract notions, and we should carefully

standing,

:

| '

f

?:x

guard against confounding things which are only in the under1 standing with those which actually exist."

f**

4$J 1 f

?

& Whilst, however, here as elsewhere, Spinoza wages a constant polemic against the "nniversals" or abstract

and treats as nugatory on such premisses, tlTds by nojneans implies that he excludes from knowledge notions- of scholastic metaphysics,

any conclusions that

rest

element

aaM>

every element other than that observation of particular facts.

ej^^iioi^isaL which is generated by The very context from which the foregoing passages have been taken renders any such inference impossible. His denunciation of the abstractions of scholasticism is introduced expressly to contrast these false, with what he deemed true, nniversals. Deception arises, he tells us, in a passage already quoted, from conceiving things

" such deception need never be dreaded by ," he adds, us if we proceed as little as possible abstractly, and begin as soon as possible with the first elements, that is, with the

/A

/>

\

and origin of nature. And as regards the knowledge of the origin of nature, we need have no fear of confounding . it with abstractions. . For, since the origin of nature, as source

.

we shall see in the sequel, 1

can neither be conceived abstractly,

De Int Emend.,

xii.

l

|^

$ <

| 4

W |f >.

W* 11

?

True and False Unimrsals,

29

nor can "be extended more widely in the understanding than nor has any resemblance to things that are it actually is, changeable, there is no need to fear any confusion in regard to the idea of it, if only we possess the norm of truth, and tliis is a being single, infinite, i.e., it in all being and beyond 1 And again he says: "It is to which, tliere is no being." "be

remarked I

n

that

by the

and of real en-

series of causes

understand the series of individual tities, changeable things, but only the series of fixed and eternal things. For the series of individual changeable things it would be because of the impossible for human weakness to attain to infinite circumstances in, one and the same thing of which be the cause of the existence or non-existence of each cl

^

.

.

.

may

since the existence of things has

no connection have just said, is not an eternal I* i however, not at all necessary to know their truth. series, since the essences of changeable individual things are not derivable from their series or order of existing, for this but external denominations, relations, or, at gives us nothing most, circumstances which are foreign to their inmost essence.

the

thing

;

with their

essence, or, as I fi

>

Tlie last is only to be nought from

fixed

and eternal

things,

and at the same time from tlie laws that are inscribed in these things as their true codes, according to which all individuals both take place and are ordered yea, these changeable things depend BO intimately and essentially, so to speak, on those fixed things, that without them they can neither exist nor be conceived. Hence those fixed and eternal things, although they are individuals, yet on account of their omnipresence ;

and all-comprehending power, are to us as universals or as genera of definitions of the individual changeable things, and as the proximate causes of all things." 8 in the tcgggse

,,,--"

Spinoza*

D

Int. Ba^ttd,.,

is.-

:

.

a

ibid,, xlv.

it

is

Spinoza.

30 viduals,

finite

the

objects,

and

facts

the

are

phenomena

of

or that

only not universals other than the abstract essences scholasticism which constitute a necessary element of

empirical observation,

realities,

^there are

I

ijof

In the

fall true knowledge.

what are the individuals

of

first

place,

which

it

that they constitute the only realities,

when we

it

is

be con-

to

sidered that the individuality or independence !

ask

can be affirmed

which

ordinary observation ascribes to particular objects is no real m^viduaHty. Ordinary observation contemplates tMngs under the external conditions of space and time, it can begin and end anywhere. It conceives as an independent reality whatever it can picture to itself

and so

as such.

Even

scientific

observation does not go

beyond

the conception of the system of things as a multiplicity of

separate

qualities,

substances,

and

all

each endowed with

'according to invariable laws.

what

we

perceive that

pendence, which

its

own

acting and reacting on each other

Bj^^when we

examjaa,-

thi

it is

a mere fictitious isolation or inde-

the function of advancing knowledge to dissipate. Objects are not abstract things or substances, each with a number of qualities attached to it.

it is

Thejujlities^by .which we define the nature of a its

relations

relations]"~'and

^lf^ej^s_t^haye

,

It is the qualities or relations

fa

the

jany^ existence for"!

which

<

:Tn^substaSce'"inVnich they are supposed to inhere, and which remains one and the same through all the manifoldness of its properties, if detached from them

have no meaning.

At most,

it

would be but a

True Individuality.

31

name for the bare abstraction of being or existence ; and when we think away the predicates or properties, the But if the qualities by substance vanishes with them. which we determine any object are simply its relations to other objects, then, inasmuch as each individual object is

directly or indirectly related to all other objects, coin-

pletejy to determine any individual, to see what it really Ani is, is to see it in its relation to all other objects.

object cannot be perfectly individualised until it is perIn other words, knowledge of it* fectly universalised.

would be knowledge

in its complete individuality as determined

by

the whole universe of which

of

it

is

it

a

TrueL knowledge, therefore, does not begin with part. individuaW*rcgardcd as more isolated singular things ;

nor

is it

the apprehension of

the-

universe as a collection

any generalisation got from them In so far as it is knowledge process of abstraction. of the individual, it is of the individual which has be-

of such individuals, nor

by a

come more and more specialised by each advancing step in the progress of science, by every new and higher conception which exhibits it in new and hitherto unobserved and the idoal_of true knowledge canngj/jstop short j>f the conception of each individual in ite,iMion to.jbhe Ixighost.^uiveisal, or seen in the light of the whole

relations;

.

system oFToiug in

its

unity.

It is this conception of

individuality to which Spinoza points when he speaks of individuals as the only realities. For

viduals of ordinary observation ll,tti_J5SSSSM2l^ as

fch?

men, they are 'Hhe^j^^ existence e,"

_.

ancfthe "accidental series" of

wMoh

"it

Spinoza.

32

not at all necessary to know." The true be discerned only in thelFrel to what lie calls "fixed and eternal things and their laws, according .to which all individuals exist and are Is

of individuals are to

and "without which they can neither

ordered,"

nor be conceived,' that which infinite,

is

7

and, above

the "highest

and

all

all,

norm

exist

in their relation to

of truth, a being single,

-comprehending."

So

far,

therefore,

from asserting that knowledge begins with individuals " that regarded as the only realities, he tells us that i

i

method of knowledge would be the most perfect in which we should have an idea of the most perfect Being,

'

to the

soon

knowledge of which, therefore, it becomes us as and that our mind can only

as possible to attain,"

exemplar of nature by deriving all its ideas from that which reflects the source and fountain of nature i.e., the "idea of the most perfect Being." reflect the

In the second place, it is implied in what has now been said that Spinoza's " nominalism " does not involve the denial of universals other than the abstractions of scholasticism,

as

constituting a necessary principle or What arc* these univorsajj^

factor of true knowledge.

and

what is that/'idoa^o^tho most 2Sf2fj which.jis Jflift.. highest universal or first pnnwjjlg have seen that a recent expositor

especially,

more in it than the idea of and unity uniformity of nature." Even if we could suppose that by the " idea of the most perfect Being " Spinoza meant nothing more than the scientific conception of the unity and uniformity of nature, the supposition would be fatal to the assertion of Spinoza finds nothing

" the

of his "thorough-going nominalism."

Nominalism

re-

Uniformity of Nature.

33

gards individual substances as the only realities, and! nature as, at most, a name for the collection or of such substances.

natoe^is the

first

aggregate^ JBut the unity and unifonnitvpf

principle of all science.

All scientific

proceeds on the __ tacit assumpiiion that not a chaos, but a system oOFvariable coex-

investigation

nature

is

and successions constituting a self-consistent " It is an assured fact that discoveries are not

istences *

whole.

made without belief mean the sure trust ances there is

is

in the nature of things, by which I that under all diversity of appeara constant and sufficient order,, that there

no maze without a

clue.

the mainspring of

Belief in the nature of

and the condition sound thinking. " l But if this be so, it seems beyond question that a belief which is presupposed in a]l SQJentific observation and experience cannot itself 1 is

things

all

science

of all

a product or It is from observapart of that experience. and experience that we learn what are the

tion

particular

sequences of phenomena in nature, what are the particular causes or conditions of particular effects ; but the -with

idj^^^

which we

start

To the canno^jtself^ }>^J0a^t__fro^ e2g2engace. unreflecting mind nature seems to reveal its own unity >

and uniformity. The objective world and the system, only function of

is

a ready-made

intelligence

observe and investigate what in

its

complete

formity

is

is

already presented to

Nature in

to it

unity and unigiven to us, ready to be taken up into our

is

reality.

its

the facts and phenomena and their unity and uniformity are things of the same order, and our knowledge of both conies from the same source. "We

experience

;

1

P.

XII.

Pollock's Spinoza, p. 142,

1

1

Spinoza.

34

have before us a world organised into unity, and then our consciousness simply reproduces it. liu^a.Jittlo reflection teaches. us that this is not the true account of the process of knowledge.

,

Our knowledge

of nature as

an^ordered system implies a principle which ia not observed as we observe the natural, and which cannpjLbe facts, of

nature.

Experience of difference implies already

the presence of a principle of unity, experience of successions or changes the presence of a principle that is

A

constant or self-identical. process of change cannot be conceived to generate a consciousness of itself, still

generate a consciousness of change according to In order to the minimum of sciena uniform method. less to

tific

experience, the observation of a single sequence of is presupposed in the observer the

related facts, there

consciousness that the relation that the same conditions will

same

result

;

is

an unalterable one,

and must ovor give the

in Bother words, there

is

presupposed the

But that which is the prim or precJidea of uniformity. ondition of all knowledge of the facts of nature cannot i

itself

one of those facts or the result of the observa-

number of such facts. The idea or prinwhich is the necessary condition of all knowledge of nature, without which there could be for us no nature, and in the light of which all particular

tion of any

ciple, therefore,

facts or objects are

known

this,

though

it is

not a uni-

versal, like the abstract essences of scholastic realism,

may be

said, in Spinoza's language,

omnipresenci%nd

" on account of

its

all-eoinprehencling power, to take the

place of a universal, or a genus of definition of indi-

vidual changeable things." the mosljerlect Being," can it by the jdejLof

we

F 35

Presuppositions of Knowledge.

suppose that Spinoza meant no_morejh|mjbhat of JHlie " Or if he did mean u3SJ]Si^,iJUQif pjrniity of nature ?

something more, if the latter formula does not exhaust the meaning of the former or of the equivalent expres"a sion, Being single, infinite, and all-comprehending," can

we form any

more

conjecture as to

The answer

is ?

beyond the contents at least

we

what that something would carry us

to this question

of the

can gather from

work before

This

us.

much

that^gpmoza's.speciilative

it,

in his moral and spiritual aspirations, inquiries originated in both his endeavour was lo rise above the andjbliat The unrest inand unreality of the finite. illusoriness w,^,,- ...~ /

..-,,..

..

.

...,-,,,

.

^jjjfsfa***"

separable from desires and passions that point only to finite and changeable things is M Jitsolf implicitly the :

after aspiration o..'B*^, w M^_ _,.

.

_|

...

.

an .

infinite

which eternal object, in "' *,.

and

.

.

-,..<

'

And the spirit can find perfect satisfaction and rest. in the steps of aspiration, following tou^Tknowledge, discovers to us the unreality of the world as it appears

1

and imagination, and has for its aim to rise] above the finite and to grasp that primary idea or first principle which is the source of all other ideas, in the to sense

1

1

light of

which the fragmentary, contingent, confused

aspect of things will vanish, and all things will "be seen in their unity and reality as parts of one intelligible

whole.

36

CHAPTER

II.

INFLUENCE OF PRECEDING WRITERS CONCEDING- that

the

philosophy

thoroughly self-consistent, possible to discover

we have

THE KABBALA.

of

is

Spinoza

said that

what was the dominant idea or

vailing tendency in its author's mind, inconsistencies, not so

and

much the presence

not

may

it

bo

pro-

to see in ite

of irreconcilable

principles, as an inadeguate ajjgrehension of Jthfijjioniiing a One help towards 34jSJ&d^ principle. the right understanding t>f his system we have found in

Spinoza's

own

account of the motive of his speculations,

the impulse which originated and guided the process by

which he endeavoured

to attain intellectual satisfaction.

Another help may be found in what we know of Jus and of the writers who may have moulded ejrj^jtu^s,

Ms mind or given a special direction to his thoughts. Much ingenuity has been spent, perhaps we might say " sources "of Spinmisspent, in tracing the supposed ozism.

Not only has

it

been regarded by

many

writers

as the

bg^^^dogment ofjhe Cartesian philosophy, but, ia so far as it diverges fromlae latter, It lias Bete

represented as reflecting or rggrod^oing the

mystical

Originality.

and other medieval Jewish philosophers,

or the revived

Platonism of Giordano Bruno/and other writers of the

and sixteenth

fifteenth

But

it

is

to

writer

philosophical the measure in

centuries.

be considered that the is

jDiigiixaJity of

a

not to be determined simply by

which his ideas

are traceable to earlier

by the suggestions he has caught up from other minds. To lend real value to any contribution to

sources,

or

philosophy is

it

must reproduce the

past, the sole question a dead or living reproold materials collected from

whether the reproduction

is

a rechauffe of various sources, or a revival of them, absorbed, transformed, renewed, by the quickening, transmuting power

^duction,

of speculative thought. On the other hand, no doubt, a great philosophical system must advance beyond the past; but the all-important test of the new element is,

whether

connected with the past as a mere arbitrary or as the outcome of an organic development. increment, of thought cannot", from its nature, be it is

The^histOTy arbitrary

one.

It

is

true

that,

as

the formation

o:

individual opinion may be deflected by a thousand accidents from the order of reason or rational progression, so tho history of the thought of the world

may be

times the record of what

irrational

is

accidental

and

errors, vagaries, reactions, incohoroncios

:

someof

but in both, in

so far as there is real progress, it is a progress which must follow tho order of reason an advance by steps, each of which contains in it a reason for the -next, each of which is at once the result and the explanation of that which preceded it. Thjmj^^

toajy^filg^^

he takes

iii

38

Spinoza.

of thought at the particular stage which it has If his work have real or perreached in his own day.

ment

will be due, indeed, to h^jawji. BIS" but to that as an activity which has jductiye activity, the intellectual life_of its presupposition necessary jfor

hnanent value,

it

growing out of

)thej>ast,

it

and -determined by

it.

Con-

make that life his sciously or unconsciously he must The originality of Ins work will consist, not in own. his independence of the thought of tho past, but in this, that whatever ideas or suggestions ho

may have

gathered

from various thinkers of various times, all his acquirements have become fused in a mind that is, so to apeak,

sympathy with the

in

time,

Jits

dialectic if

ffisjpeatness,

movement

ho be

of tho spirit of

great, will

bo that of

who

has at once put and answered the questions for the solution of which the ago is pressing, given articulate expression to the problem of philosophy in tho

lone

form in which

it is silently

moving the thought of the

world, and either partially or completely furnished tho solution of it.

That cated

the'

merit of in tho sonao now ind^ioriginality justly claimed for tho philosophy of,

may be

S^injo^jw'e snail endeavour to show in the sequel* But though the solution of the problem of philosophy to which,

he was led was

logically involved in,

of the teaching of Descartes,

cfrtb

with this to say that

measure

it is

reed^juid

it

is

and grew

not inconsistent

one for whiok he was in som

predisposed

by

Toy

tlie

^t

tlie"

from mysticism Kabbala, from the Jlwiaix mtiondists, and from the of the

I

\

'

M

to the

39

Katibala.

Platonic or jSTeo-Platonic revival of times near his own, I discern, though not the logical origin, at least'

we may

the predisposing impulse towards the pantheistic side of

\

Spinoza's philosophy. Tlilfi

KABBALA.

"No direct reference to the

Kabbala

is to

be found in

Spinoza's writings, with the exception of one sentence in the 'Tractatus Theologico-politictis/ the contemptuous

tone of which

lias

"been

supposed to

settle

the question

"I have

of his indebtedness to Kabbalistic speculation,

read," says he, "and, moreover, boon (personally) acquainted with certain Kabbalistic triiievw, at whose folly I

cannot sufficiently wonder."

But

this

depreciatory

been pointed out, has special reference judgment, to the arbitrary and grotesque method of interpretation by which Kabbalistic writers endeavoured to extract a it lias

hidden significance from the historical narratives and other parts of the Old Testament Scriptures and that ;

his contempt for such vagaries does not extend to

what

may be termed the speculative element of the Kabbala seems to be placed beyond question by two passages in his writings in to

with at

which Kabbalistic doctrines are referred

leant a qualified respect.

Replying to Olden-

who had urged that, in. the work above named, Spmom seemed to many to confound God and Nature,

burg,

he says

:

" I hold that

transient cause jf

in

t

God

GodJBjblxo ru^mjU]^^

all, thjiigs.

*

ThaJJj^LJi^^

I affirm with Paul,

and perhaps

also

**

philosophers, and I might even venture to say with all the ancient Hebrews, in so far as may be conjectured from certain traditions, though these

*i

ancient

%

**

40 Spinoza.

have beaa in many ways corrupted."

dort^rf^^T?*"

listic

^

1

Tho other

f th0

Kal>b

-

aa^SSEw^ c

< X

^

archetype of

aTthi^

"abrtanoa ,

Ho t

i.

the

!&.t&~?Mi? SS t'.

J.

J

I

tafulkll.

^^

.

.BM.

Neo- Plato nwm. doubtful. l>y the

fact tliat

Spinoza knew anything

we have BO

of the writer

evidence that

whom

from

it

is

taken, and also, that in the 'Guide to the Perplexed/ the well-known work of the Jewish philosopher MaimonidoB, from whom Spinoza elsewhere quotes, a passage occurs in

which the same doctrine

is

maintained in almost the

same terms. It is not, however, in particular citations from tho Kabbala that wo iind tho most probable indication** of the influence of its ideas on Spinoza's mind. Even tho

incoherent

of

Kabbalistic

j

works, tho so-called 'Book Zohar/ can only bo described as a strange* eon-l glomerate of philosophy and allegory, reason and rhap-f least

1

*

spdy, of ideas from Plato

and

Aristotle

and ideas from

the Pentateuch, of Jewish traditions and oriental mysticism. But if we try to extricate from this curious com-

dement, wo find in one particular phase or school of Whatever tho dato or outward origin of tho/

posite the underlying speculative it

distinct traces of

thought.

or

Kabbah, physic,

the

its

historic relation to

philosophy;

it

teaches

And

is

Alexandrian

nieta-l)

J

flimjdj

if

Neo>f

through whatever channel thej

reached him, ,

cations ^

Q! a. -^Blfi^^

iiecessary/Hxerefore,

of thought to

to^^sc^^con^

systoni

which these ideas belong, its rise at

a period

whan

and philosophies of the world began and (though the Greek element in it ways the

religions

ating one) out of

it

attempted to produce derived 'from

mysticism, and ih* pMloaofUrn ol

to

the old! ;

A tod

42

Spinoza.

The main problem tlie

of jSTeo-Platonic speculation j^that of and finite, of God and the

relation of the infinite

Starting from a conception of the two extremes of this relation which made them absolutely irreconcilable, the whole system was the expression of one long

world.

effort to

idea of

bridge over an impassable gulf to deal with the conceived of as an absolute unity, beyond

God

on the one hand, to make it Himself not merely in nature but in an absolute formless matter and on the

limitation or definition, so as, possible for and, PLari,

God

to reveal

;

other^hand, for the

human The

with the divine.

spirit to rise into

communion

solution of this absolute dualism

which $"eo-Platonism propounds may be represented by the two words Emanation and JSbstas^ In the first placeT^e^mtense religious feeling which was the underlying motive of !N~eo-Platonic speculation, and the consequent endeavour to elevate the conception of

God above

ence, led to

all

the limiting conditions of

human

an idea of the First Principle of

exist-

all

things which is simply that of the absolutely indeterminate that which can be thought of only as the negation of all that can be affirmed of the finite.

On^umt^

beyond

can be att^hM,

all difference, to

oj[_

God

is

the Absolute

w

which nothing c

We may nof think of Him as intelligent, for

intelligence implies distinction

between the knower and

the object known. For a similar reason we ascribe to Him a will. " Strictly speaking, He

may is

not

neitter

consciousness nor unconsciousness, neither^ freedojnjoor for all such opposites pertain to the realm of finite things.

He gives

life,

yet

I

Even when we name Him

Emanation. " the

One,"

we must exclude any thought

of numerical

unity, for that contains or implies the idea of multipliis meaningless when applied to that which is city, and

above

"

Only by negation can we define inexpressible, for all speech" names some

all distinction.

He

Him.

is

He is incojgiprjehensible^ for thought dis; between itself and its object ; if we would tinguishes it Him, grasp Js only by an act of intuition definite thing

i,

thought and

But when the idea of God has been thus an abstraction which

rarefied to

simply the negation of the finite, every way back to the finite would seem to be cut off. The Absolute One of Neo-Platonism, in which the exis

planation of all finite things is to be found, would seem to be shut up in its own self-identity. In a unity so

conceived there itself to

no reason why

is

manifest or reveal

itself

it

should go beyond

in the manifoldness of '

The

solution of the problem which Jtfeo-Platonism gives is contained, as we have said, in the

finite

existence.

word "emanation/'

The

self-involved

imprisonment of

the Absolute which reason cannot break down, Plotiaus attempts to. dissolve by the aid of

pagination ^dgie-

"

EverytTu^g,""says he,"" that is 'in any *f degree perfect, and most of all, therefore, the absolutely *> perfect, tends to overflow itself, to stream forth, and 1

to^.jnalogr.

pro-

duce that wMcnisother than self.

Pire produces heat,

yet an image of it~f cold, fragrant substances ^

itself

snow

The most perfect cannot re-% odours, medicine healing. main powerless, shut up in itself," Accordingly, that| Absolute which is above knowledge is conceived to) forth in a series of emamation^ descending

Spinoza.

through successive stages in which the irradiation becomes fainter and fainter, till it reaches the realm of darkness, of that formless matter ledge.

As

which

is

below know-

Plato endeavoured to overcome the dualism

between the ideal and phenomenal world by the concep,worid-soul as

a^ind^^med^or,

so Plotinus

io ,escape^omastill more absolute dualism, by; expandmg the Platonic conception into that of fjoj^, de-

scending .stages of ema^ation^ each of which successively Thejirst is the represents a lower degree of perfection. ideal_ world or realm of ideas, in which the Absolute One, the ineffable light which is indistinguishable from larkness,

becomes conscious of

image of itself

mind

itself

source

all

of is

or produces as the

This ideal world, the archetype of all finite being, the the light and life of the phenomenal

though in world,

itself,

or intelligence.

in itself incapable of any immediate relation

and so, by the same emanational expedient, the ; conception is formed of an jn^eTmeJiatmgjpnn^igle, the world-soul or reafejpfjs^uls, related, on the one hand, to the realm of ideas from which it emanates, and on

to it

2..

the other hand, to the realm of matter, by its Jmgregnation of which it produces the j^ermmejQal^world, anxj*.

\

^^25^iM2S.l- 9^ J^JfeSS^In this descending series we pass, circle beyond circle, wiiioM the world of light and reality till we reach its utmost limit in the world of

souls,

beyond which

the sensible phenomenal world, which tlie

is

lies

produced by

last circle of light casting forth "its fays into the

darkness beneath.

The phenomenal world is thus a beinffan^ju^n;^^, due to thBj^

composite of light and darkness*

45

Hcstasy, trates it

from the world above.

Beneath

it

lies

the

region of formless matter, which, as the opposite of the First Principle, is designated ^sjpJu^eJEvil, in the sense

In the phenomenal redeemed from negation ; but that phenomenal itself only a world of shadows, owing its reality

of pure negation or non-being.

world

it is

world

is

to the worlcj-soul, as that in turn to the ideal world,

and

both alike to th^j^mojcdmljajiity, the only absolute, allcomprehending reality. There, and there alone, all distinction, all mutation, cease; the whole universe of thought and being exists only as

its

transient image

,

or irradiation, and the reabsorption^of that universe into its^^mal source would be at once the vanishing ,awjwl| of^tejfimte^xistence and its retiirii.tQ the only.absolute/]

w7> ;

j

In the second

place, this last

thought receives definite

expression in an ascending series of stages, in which aspiration, ending in ecstasy^or ecstatic intuition, reverses

the process of the descending series of emanations.

union with its origin, being strives ~~- after .....^^.-'-.^^SU*^ x

finite ....__-.-.__

..>!..._,._-

..

All

All in-

.

dividual existences in their sej:>arateness and transiency are under an impulse which urges them backwards to^wards the centre from which they emanated. The individual soul, like the soul of the world, of which it is

a part, stands at the middle of this universe of

emana

and combines in itself elements at once of As embodied^ it is a highest and of the lowest. tions,

the

part oi nature and allied to the lower world of matter; as spiritual it belongs to the ideal world and to the unity from which it emanates, in estrangement from which it is in bonxlage to a natural necessity separating it from its true home and to that home, in obedience to its proper destiny, it ;

1^ g

46

Spinoza.

ever seeks to return.

The

steps

by which

this return is

achieved repeat in reverse order those of descent.

By

knowledge or contemplative energy it emancipates itself from the "bondage of sense, an^remounts into the ideal world, the region where thought or intelligence finds nothing foreign to itself, but lives and moves in the pure

But even here, intelligence fatmosphere of eternal ideas. has not reached its highest goal, the absolute unity to which it aspires. Even_jn_ the realm j>f ideas there is, which contemplates objective by any dialectic pro-

truth, or which attains to knowledge 'cess, is still

not absolutely one with

its object.

There

t

te

is

a stage of spiritual exaltation higher than that of definite There is a joint where the last.. distinction, thought. .....

'that of subject

and

object,,, vanishes,

^

s

*.

abgorbed in thai absolute transparent unity where no division is. This is the final goal of ^eo^El^tQnJ^^sgecu" " which can only be descnbed as lation, the ecstasy the extinction of thought from its own intensity, the striving of the finite spirit

beyond

itself till it is lost

in God. If

we

try to characterise this system generally, it

may

a kind odEjgoetigljOT.im It does not succeed in overcoming the original which is involved in the two extremes of an

be described as

(

and an absolute, formless it no reason for the exof a world in which its latent riches shall be the idea of emanation to which recourse [y and

absolute, self-identical unity,

matter. istence

The former

i&lw} Is oxdy

iite

contains in

substitution of a matffihor for aj

.f

Neo-Platmism in But

the Kabbala.

in intention at least,

leistic, or rather it

belon^ToTthat

it

47

_jsj3urely;..pan-,'

class of .pantheistic

winch the designation "acognigm^'.is mores The successive orders of emanations rc^rly applied. hich constitute the world are only phantoms, unreal as ^sterns to

r

le reflections in

a mirror;

its

only reality

is

the absolute

nity from which their phantasmal existence is projected, nd that, as it was without diminution through their

remains without increase

xistence,

when they have

anished away. If we endeavour to

disengage from the arbitrary and other ingredients of which the Kabcomposed, the speculative element which gives it

lythological

ila

is

ny value for thought, little

aid,

else

we

shall find in

n the Book Zohar, the only .as

any

it,

as

we have

than a reproduction of Itfeo-Platonism. part of the

Kabbala which

pretension, to systematic connection, the funda-

"En Soph," or unlimited, The former, "Sephiroth," or emanations. he source from which all the life and light of the unimental idea is that of the

rith its ten

-erse, all

s "the

ideal

and actual

unknown

existence, flows, is described

unknown," "the mystery of "He cannot be comprehended by thef aysteries." ntellect nor described in words, and as such he is in ;

of the

certain sense non-existent, because, as far as our

ore

concerned, that which 1

is

minds

perfectly incomprehensible

loes

not exist."

iieir

endeavour to exalt the conception'^JoSdaStove

In other words,

^-^K^^fe^

***' all!

miiropomorphic elements, refine it away till it beeom&s amply the abstract notion of being which is indMinguishfcble feom This Absolute Being, unknowable non-being. ,

quoted by Ginsbti*gy The Kabbc&,

p,

&

48

Spinoza.

become known, even indirectly, only by But He cannot become im-

in Himself, can ^

becoming

mediaH

Him

to

active or creative.

creator of a finite world

:

first,

because to ascribe

intention and will would bo to introduce

finite*

determinations into His nature; and secondly, because an Infinite Being can produce only that which is infinite. ,

1

Accordingly, in Neo-Platonic fashion, the Kabbala invents a mediating principle bused on the figure of the radia-

This principle, tion of light from an invisible centre. " ideal world " of to the is desigHotinua, corresponding nated "the world of emanations," and is elaborated and arranged by tlxe Kabbalists into successive trinities, each

which constitutes, on the one hand, one of tnevarioua " aspects under which the En Soph," or incomprehensible of

divine nature,

archetype of

is

contemplated; on the other hand, the

some one

of the various orders of existence

In their

in the finite world.

totality, gathered up into unity by the last emanation, which is the harmonising principle of the whole series, they are designated the 'Adam Kadmon,' the ideal or celostijil jjjan, inasmuch as,

according to the Zohar, "The form of

all

that

inferior,

is

and

principle

own."

l

man

contains

earth, all beings superior

and therefore the ancient

for his

it

in heaven

and

of ancients lias chosen

In order to constitute the mediating

between God and the world, the Sephiroth are

represented as partaking of the nature at once of the

and

finite

finite

;

are tiiemselxes jufinije; as^^diiiinjaiibiJbla

theai&ih& first

fimte,

world

in-

asjemanatione from^ft^mfimt, they order

o|,.

rt

fram.lhtJE-

,,jObaifc&..ilun^,

The

finite

not a creation out of nothing, but simply a further expansion or evolution of the Sephiroth* By a is

3-

1

>

ft

{

If

Zoliar,

quoted by Fmnok,

La KMate,

p. 179,

/

Emanation.

'49

-f

Kabbala supposes, prior to the exthe istence of present world, certain formless worlds, abortive attempts at creation, so to speak, to have%ssued curious conceit the

from the ideal archetypal fountain of being and then vanished away and these it compares to sparks which beaten by a hammer, and which fly from a red-hot iron ;

are extinguished as they separate themselves from the 1 On the other hand, in contrast with "Burning mass. these failures, the being of the actual world is due tA

the continuoiis presence in

measure, greater or

less,

it

and in

all it

contains of

of the luminous element

"'^

from

'

All finite existences are made in* " after the pattern of things in the descending "First comes the 'Briatic world/ which is heavens."

which

it

springs. series

the abode of pure spirits or world of formation,

and

lastly,

the

*

;

next, the

which

is

'

Yetziratic world/

the habitation of angels

Assiatic world/ or world of action,

;

which

contains the spheres and matter, and is the residence of 2 Without folthe prince of darkness and his legions." in the details of fantastic lowing this Sieory of creation

imagery into which it is wrought out by the KaWjalists,.. it may be observed in general that its characteristic principle, the emanational conception of tho relation of the world to

God which

reappears in

it

is

jGomn^^

in a form modified

,,

by Jewish mythological"' and demons was deeply

The belief in angels rooted in the spirit of the Jewish people, and under its influence the emanations of Neo-Platonism become pertraditions.

sonified into the angels of the Kabbala,

and the world-

soul of the former becomes in the latter the

Briatic

world, which

la like

i

P,

is

the habitation of pure

Ginsburg, lc. XII.

t

p. 15.

s

spirits. *

Qrinsburg, p. 24.

P

N

*i}'r[<*--'\

q,

50

Spinoza.

phenomenal world of ]^eo-Platonism becomes l

L

^

, ,*

*

^

O

the Yetfkatie world of the Kabbala ; and as the former constituted by the irradiation of lighif from above tib darkness of matter, so in the cosmology of the 'Kabtalft the jof

To

same

result is brought

about by the presence

the whole realm of nature. angelic beings pervading of the material world the and process every part

heavenly firmament, the orbs of light, the earth, the of fire, the revolution of the seasons,
and

their harmony

and unity

to the

it is

agency of the

movements

tests that all the varied

of nature

are to be ascribed.

Finally, the same personifying influence, the Keo-Platonic remfgi^of darkness, beneath the last circle of ideal life, in the Kabbala, the Assiatic world, the habitaof evil spirits a conception in which the demonof Jewish tradition and its wild imaginative

.eome

I

SSo

strange conjunction with thgjcesMifcs thought.

m .wCM^j^ecgJative la ti

I

of

KabMMIc

man we ind

theory of the nature and destiny

the same reproduction of

Man

Jewish forms. ffi

I

is

T

JN

eo-Platonic

the epitome of the

i^!!*?9^ who tombinesln which constitute the

Ms ''''nature

aJJ

totality obeing.

tt once the

m

.

Wtt far

m

.

As

soon as

sum and theli^hest man appeared every-

fe>a the higher and lower worlds, in

him

;

Me unites in him-

Has ^otherwise

expressed

by the

^.Jtol.^^iK^jliow ~d^cribecl ' '^

%

Absorption.

^

51

-

As the

latter is simply an expression for the totality of Sephiroth, the eternal ideal archetypes of all that exists in the finite world, so, to say that man is the earthly image of the heavenly Adam is to say that all things in heaven and earth, from the highest to the lowest, are

Ho represented or expressed in the unity of his nature. is at once spiritual and animal, divine and demoniacal on the higher side of his being an emanation from the spirits, which is itself an emanation from

world of pure the Infinite

;

on the other hand, having relation through world und to that form-

his fleshly nature to the material less

matter which

is

figured as the abode of the spirits of

Finally, in its doctrine of the destiny of

darkness.

and the world, the Kabbala reproduces, under a

man

slightly/

modified form, the reascending stages of Noo-Platonism.i all individual souls, according to the Zohar, in their

As

world of emanations, so, inhabitocTminian bodies, and passed through the having an of life earthly discipline (or through successive lives), ideal essence, in the me^xistej.

they become emancipated from the blind power of nature which governs the animal life, and return to the source from which they emanated. In this reascending process^ two stages arc distinguished, eacli* marEeir^y its own cnaHcTielSi^^ soul rises

first

servitude of the animal life the into that real but

still

imperfect relation to

the divine source of light in which knowledge is only re^ flective and obedience is more that of fear than of love

But there

is, stys the Zohar, a state of perfection ii the Eternal Light falls no longer indirectly an< as through a veil on the spirit, but shiaes on it direct!

whic,]i

and full-orbed in immediate love casts out fear,

IB. this

vision,

and in which,

consummation of

its

perfeq

being

1

if-

52

Spinoza.

and unmingled love, there is no longer any division between the spirit and its object.

[this state of, intuitive vision

It has lost its individual character; all finite interests,

return

all activity,, all

itself

upon

have vanished.

Jts

1

I have ibeing becomes still leaves in the the ISTeo-Platonic that said system "formless matter" which lies beyond the last circle of absolutely lost in the divine.

light

an element of unsolved dualism, which its panemanation has not overcome. But

theistic principle of

the pantheism of the Kabbala

In

more -unconiproniising.

v i

primordial unity

V;

integration.

is

it

is, in expression at least, tho differentiation of the

succeeded by a more complete

re-

"Not even the lowest world of darkness, the

habitation of evil spirits, which is tho analogue for the " " formless matter of Neo-Platonism, is left in the final

unreclaimed. The Kabbala knows no absolute no being doomed to"everlasting separation from tho source of light. There will* come a time when the world [crisis evil,

|

and even the archangel of "the venomous beast," will be restored to his angelic name and nature, and when all orders of being of darjmess will disappear,

/evil, '

will

have entered into the eternal

rest,

tho

endless

Sabbath of the universe. 2 It is not, as

we have

of the Kabbala,

thought of his

Vn

said, in the theosophic mysticism but in the dialectic movement of the

own time

movement which found

^

and in the theology /I pfgenesis >.l U ^^. M

'

a

independent expression where there could be no question ^ ew * sk i n fluenc in the philosophy* of Malebranche of ^^

Spinozism

MIK

of the is

to

Reformers

that the"lnie

be ."../ discerned.

,,,.,,..,'.,,.*,

But

wMkt *** Offf*

of Spinoza, there are \Descartes^is Jhejpgical parent v.

,;.i

Franck, p. 248.

2

Ibid., p.

217

;

Ghwbuxg, p.

44.

Spinoza and the KaVbala. traces in the 'Ethics/ treatise

earlier

'

and

still

more

53

distinctly in the

Concerning God and Man/

of

his

fam^ritj^with Kabbalistic ideas, and these ideas may have constituted in a mind early imhned with them a predisposing tendency toward that view of the world of its relation to God which lies at the basis of the

and

Whatever else Spinozism is, it an attempt to find in the idea of God a principle! from which the whole universe could be evolved by/ Spinozistic philosophy.

f

is

a

as

necessity

strict

as

that

by which, according to

Spinoza's favourite illustration, the properties of a triTor the clear intellii angle follow from its definition. it was impossible to rest satisfied with! a system in which metaphor art of the logical! plays thought i and accordingly, in his philosophy the emana-\

gence of Spinoza

tion theory of the Kabbalists finds

no

place,

.

Yet even

I

STa system

in which logical consecution is the "Supremo principle of method, there are traces of that attempt to effect

by an

arbitrary mediating principle

accomplish, which of Kabbalistic speculation. to

fails

is

the main

In one point

what reason characteristic of

v|ssLthe

the infinite transition^ from it as was for tlie^ Kabbalists, Spinoza,

tojt^jm^ ^J^jdeajpf

starts. If we interpret that idea by " all determination is that principle negation/' means for him is the absolutely indeterminate,

Godjwith which he his

own

what

it

of Being which is reached^by all determinations. It is true that he from abstracting a&cnbeiTto^od or absolute substance the two attributes

the

of

bare

affirmation

thought and extension, but these attributes axe only

distinctions relative to finite intelligence; they ^do^ riot

^^-*

of the divine pertain to the absolute essence"" "" txatee, bujr

~~

'

'

Si

Spinoza.

ways in which the human understanding conit. Beyond these attributes or determinations the indeterminate substance, of which nothing can

are only

ceives of lies

be affirmed but that

it

is

the self-identical unity into

But in so would seem to have rendered impossible all advance from this primary idea In that of which nothing can be to anything further. which no

difference or distinction can enter.

defining the nature of God, Spinoza

affirmed there can be no reason for the existence of

anything

else,

and

of the finite world

own be

to find in it a reason for the existence

would be to find in

To

negation.

it

a reason for

rehabilitate the finite

its

world would

which the idea of would be to destroy God in order to derive the finite from Him. Yet though in this point of view the fundamental principle of Spinozism would seem to preclude all furto reaffirm that

God

by

abstracting from

has been attained

;

it

ther advance, it was, as above said, the intention of author to find in that principle the explanation of things.

The whole

in the idea of

God

finite

its

all

world was to be so involved

as to be deducible

from

it

as cer-

as the propositions of geometry from its defini^tainly tions and axioms. To achieve this result it is obvious

that^ejther J}he fiindamelataT principle as above defined mustjbe^modified, or some illogical expedient must be ;

it of 'IS^rreimessT The Tatter thaJ^wMch Spinoza adopted. **"He attempted

.ogtedto cure native is

by means

of a conception analogous to the world-soul of the Neo-Platonists, to mediate between the infinite and finite, and to gain for the latter a legitimate derivation

from the former. stance difference

is

Out of the rigid unity of absolute subto be educed from an infinite which ;

-*'..-.

"Infinite Modes." is

55

in incommunicable isolation the finite world is to be

derived.

This problem Spinoza thinks to# solve by con-

ceiving of all individual finite existences as i.e., finite

"modes" and

determinations of the infinite substance

escaping the contradiction implied in determinations of the indeterminate by means of the conception of what he terms "infinite modes." On the one hand tlieli

we have

the

on the

indeterminate substance

infinite,

other, a world of finite

modes

and in ; them we have a third

or determinations

order to bridge the gulf between

something which, as its name implies, is so conceived with both, with the finite or modal is to be in affinity " mode " with the infinite, as world, as being itself a ; " " mode. In other words, Spinoza thinks it in infinite possible to

conceive of modes which, though as such

/hey belong to the finite, changeable world, are themlelves infinite

vorld

iniversal

The whole

and unchangeable.

may bo

represented

as

motion which, embracing

aents, remains itself eternally

corporeal

a single individual, a all

move-

particular

unmoved; and as a universal

piritay^j^

;

embracing all^fiiiite ideas or mte! unlimited or jnfimte. Thus these universal

nce, which, a^itself

idividuals having in

nd

finitude,

may

them elements

at

once of infinitude

constitute the transition

salm to the other.

As

infinite

and

from the one

eternal,

they in-

?oduce no negation into the one absolute substance xpressions for the totality of finite existences le whole series of phenomenal changes, they .ose relation to

the

finite world.

It is

ir business to ciiticise this notion^" all

to

pomTout

;

as

and

of

fi^e

in

act

^e have

thalTwKeSiei suggested to his

to do

mind from

56

Spinoza.

his early studies in

Jewish philosophy or not, there is at between it and the Neo-Platonic

least a certain, analogy

i

reproduced in the Kabbala, of an ij^C-g between the absolute unity unxTtGe mediating principle ^^'j* | n ft existences, between the ideal world, in

/conception, ! .

and unchangeable, and the world of mutable

itself eternal

things and beings. JSTor, on the other hand,

is it

impossible to discern in

Spinozism a Certain reflection of the reascending move-

ment which

the converse aide of the 3N"eo-Platonic

fotftis

As in the descending movement we have the system. stages of infinite attributes, modified by infinite modes, and these by an the return to steps

infinite

God

by which

there

number

is,

of finite modes, so in

so to speak, a retracing of the

finite individualities

have become

differ-

entiated from the unity of infinite substance in which In the attitude of ordinary all reality is comprehended.

experience (twiMriwiMtt mtjti)

we contemplate

the world

and beings, .But the independence wo tints ascribe to them in illusory. iAs it is only by applying to .space or extension, which one and indivisible, the conceptions of number and which arc more "aids of imagination/' that wo jjinoasuro, lean think of it as made up of discrete parts, so it is only Imagination which gives to ourselves and all other finite Not only Individuals a separate, independent existence. as consisting of independent things

loos each finite lite !iat

mode

modes in an it

is

a

mode

tot

escape from the

i

exist only as determined

infinite series, it

has no

by other

but by the very fact

clain\Jtojnd<^^

therefore, fc^e

commencement

of our

illusion of the finite, is that of our passing

57

Stages of Knowledge.

from "vague experience"

"reason" or the rational

to

contemplation of the world. This kind .of knowledge " l Spinoza defines as that in which we contemplate things

^~/K twiOM- -C

and again, 2 as " that not as accidental but as necessity; in which we know things under a certain form of eter"

It is not the highest stage of knowledge, but it way to the highest that in it we are

nity." is

so far on the

rescued from the dominion of accidental associations

;

we look at things no longer in the arbitrary relations of time and place, but as linked together iff necessary connection of cause and

effect, so

that

all

things are seen

to:

be what they are because they are parts of that series or/ totality which, as above described, constitutes the "in"

modes of the absolute they have in them, underneath finite

substance.

So J^^^^S

I

appearances of change,!] an element of unchangeabieness, of necessity, of^eternityJf -gui^ej^nd even this ideal aspect of things^ there is all

a%^

higher attitude of mind which Spinoza designates scientia intuitiva, in

which we "proceed from an adequate idea

of a certain attribute of of th

God

nature of things."

them injheir

to the adequate knowledge This stage of knowledge is

essenge,

no longer proceed

infer-

from premisses to conclusion, from 'causes to hut as by immediate vision penetrate to the heart

5y, effects,

and

life,

the inmost reality of the world.

If there is

any element of mediation in this knowledge, in so far as tilings

in

it is

that of

God and

in

the^r^^^m risen atotq

things as individi^ate,

it is

*

*'.'

58

Spinoza.

God

as they are in

unity,

Even

attributes,

its

or as modifications of

of

knowledge

God

His

no longer

is

of the infinite, simply the knowledge which the finite has has of Himself. God which the of a it is knowledge part

oi

K

his identification

in

intelligence, the reascending process is for The as well as an intellectual one. moral a Spinoza of ideas and the sense of inadequate bondage bondage

ti

Moreover, of will

he noticed

to

it is

one and the same.

is

ence

that,

by

with

we

To

discern the illusory independand to all finite things is to

ascribe to ourselves

escape from

under which

it

;

to

we

know

lie

is

the absolute law of necessity

to

become

free

;

know

to

our-

" " under the form of is to rise above the eternity It is time. the false of reality which opinion and sphere

selves

imagination ascribe to the finite that subjects us to the Season, in destroyslavery of our desires and passions.

And when, ing their unreal basis, breaks the yoke. we have risen that attitude of mind to finally, supreme in

a

which we not merely reason from the idea

first

principle to the nature of things, but

and

of intuitive insight see ourselves

all

of

God

as

by the grasp

things in the

then with the very existence of our finite self the desires and passions that were implicated with it of light of

it,

necessity vanish.

niS

As we

cease to

or love, any object outside of

know,

so

God ; and

we

cease to

osr^kve^to

God, HkejOjraJ^

Here as elsewhere in YherBwith. God re^ds^imsdf. the philosophy of Spinoza there are elements which, as we shall see in fhe sequel, essentially distinguish him from the mystical JSTeo-Platonic theosophists ; yet even in the sketch of the process by which he reaches that

a<

Influence of the Kablxihi. "intellectual love" which is for him the final goal of moral endeavour and aspiration, wo may discern points of analogy to the Neo-Platonic "ecstasy" and to the " " En Kabbalistic absorption, in the Soph which, in a mind steeped from early youth in Jewish literature and tradition,

accident.

cannot

have

been altogether a matter

of

60

OHAPTEE

III

THE MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHERS.

A

VAST amount of learning and ingenuity has been ex-

pended on the question of Spinoza's supposed obligations to Maimonidcs, Chasdai Crcskas, and other distinguished philosophic writers of his

own

race.

Many

parallelisms

and expression have boon adduced by Dr Joel and others, and it has oven been maintained that of thought

his debt to these writers seriously affects his title to Such occasional coinciv originality as a philosopher.

^'f

dences, however, even if they had been more numerous and unambiguous than those on which this opinion rests,

cannot without further consideration be accepted as proving the derivation of Hpino/jsm from Jewish sources. Particular points of resemblance, as

more or

less

wo have already said, mean

according to the general principles

view of the writers in whom tBoy occur. The significance of an idea or form of expression can only be estimated in view of its organic relation to the whole of

-of

which it forms a

part,

and even exact verbal coincidences,

so far from establishing the intellectual obligation of a later writer to earlier writers of a different school or standpoint, only go to prove, at most, that

"JJM

and point r*

ho was acquainted

Maimonidcs.

61

It is on this principle that we must of the judge alleged anticipations of Spinozism in the

with their works.

medieval Jewish philosophers. J?joni one and all of these_ writers he differed, at least in this respect, that

two masters, he only one. The conclusions reached were the result of a compromise between they reason and authority. Their aim in all they wrote was thej^ served

with the teaching of Moses and the traditional dogmas of Judaism, and the result was even more unsatisfactory than in the parallel case of the to reconcile philosophy

That result varied, indeed, in its character in different instances, according as the philosophic or the authoritative tendency predominated in the

scholastic philosophy.

mind

In some cases Jewish dogma was

of the writer.

manipulated by arbitrary interpretation into accordance with. .Greek philosophy, in others Aristotelian and Platonic terminology was crudely applied to the cosmogony! of and the theology of the synagogue. In all

Closes

cases

alike

the

issue

of

forced

this

alliance

was a

spurious one, which neither reason nor authority could claim as its own. Between such composite productions

and a

strictly

be no

common

reasoned system like Spinozism there can measure.

A detailed examination of Spinoza's relations to the Jewish philosophers would carry us beyond the limits of this work. We must confine our remarks to that one of these writers to

the most, ings of

whom

Spinoza has been said to

^^^^SS^^*

Maimonides

ow

r

^'ie philosophical writare characterised as 'a whole by the S*

tendency above indicated, the endeavour to establish foregone conclusions. But perhaps the part of Ms philosophy in which this tendency shows itself least is that

62

which

relates to the idea of

In his treatment of

God.

Jewish theologian

almost entirely subordinated to the follower of Plato and Aristotle. In this subject the

is

one passage of his most important work, the 'Moreli 6 Guide to the Perplexed/ he adopts the 7

j^ebuchim, or

God as vo^crts own object, pure,

definition^of

thoughT'^EicnS consciousness (Aristotelian

its

yo^crews

and in other passages in which he

;

i.e.,

abstract selftreats

of the divine attributes, the notion of abstract unity involved in this definition is further rarefied into the

^eo-Platonic conception of absolute self-identity, a unity which repels every element of difference. have already seen how, in the endeavour to clear the idea

We

God from all anthropomorphic alloy, ISTeo-Platonism endeavours to get beyond the stage at which there is a of

between thought and its object, and to rise a point of exaltation higher even than thought or inwhich this distinction vanishes. ^telligence, a

j

distinction

jto

^^^

Maimonides in different parts of his writings wavers between these two conceptions. AsPlotinus maintained that the highest ideal of intelligence is that in which the object of knowledge is no longer something external to the knowing on subject, but that

SS2SJ 3

J?HiJ^^

iS9illai^e

closely" following

the Aristo-

^Mk..ftpught wj^e o^ectj^ite "own activiLy, .

to Maimonides,

still

more

telian dialectic, endeavours

on the same principle to

*58SS^Jbetj2^^

dis-

It is

of t&e very nature of thought or intelligence that it " grasps the "forms or real essences of things ; and when i* does so, these forms are not different from

something

for it

is

only as active, as thinking these forms,

if realises its

'

own

nature.

Intelligence apprehend'

Divine Intelligence. ing the forms of things,

63

and the forms

of things appre-

hended by intelligence, are only different expressions for one and the same thing, or the same thing regarded from different points of view.

When,

therefore, the

human

intelligence is in the state of actual thought, thought, the ButS tlTinker, and the thing thought of, are wholly one.

man

is

not always in the state of actual thought.

At

first

thought in him is only potential, a capacity of thinking which has not yet come into actuality ; and even when

him has become developed, it is not "When the mind is at stage of thought, or when the capacity of

intelligence in

always or continuously active.

the potential thinking is in abeyance, wo can regard tho power of apprehension and tho object capable of being appre-

hended

as

two separate things

;

and

further,

inasmuch

power can only bo conceived of as residing in a being or nature which possesses it, to these two wo have to add a third viz., the mind in which the power as a

ojjhought Besides. sal and ever-active

*.

But when we conceive of a univer| i y'r * intelligence), an intelligence in whiet n ,

f

no unrealised capacity, no potentiality that is nol j>*^ actuality, and which does not apprehend at one time

there

is

and cease

when, in other apprehend at another a no we think of mind which to words, reality is foreign, in which tho forms or essence** of things are over present

and which then

to

is

eternal activity us well as potentiality,

we have

before us tho conception of abeing in whicl the threefold distinction vanishes. In a mind which eve] ___

thinks there

is

no separation

of thinker

and power

o:

thought, nor of the power of thought from its own objects, In God, the absolute energy, the ever-active intelligence, thought, the tWnker? and the object of thought, are one,

*

/

64

of

In the passage wliich I have here epitomised, the idea God which Maimonides reaches is that which, if

ollowed out and freed from the limitations which are it in the Aristotelian philosophy, would ead to the inodern ^conception^pj absolute^ self~cons,cious > of thought which at once reveals ielf-determining Spirit tself in the manifold differences of the finite world ani

ionnected with

.

roni all these differences returns

upon

itself.

But

in Maimonides not only does this idea remain undeveloped, hut it is left in unreconciled contradiction

with another conception of the divine nature on which he more frequently insists. In the false search for unity,

which destroys unity with that concrete fulness in which the highest unity consists, he sets himself to think of something higher even or confounding that discreteness

than intelligence, an absolute which is not the unity of subject and object, but the abstraction in which these 'distinctions are lost.

Aii^bsoliite unitj

_is_

that _from

be

HMcJ^j^ryj^^ excluded.

Our

belief in the divine

unity,

therefore,

implies that the essence of God is that^toj^lndbjioj^ced"When we describe icates or attnbutes^ can be attached.

an object by

attributes, these attributes must

be conceived

of either as constituting its essence, or as it.

If the attributes of

we

God

superadded to are conceived of as con-

the absurdity of conceiving of a plurality of infinites, and further, of introducing into the nature of God that divisibility or

stituting his essence,

fall into

compositeness which belongs only to corporeal things, If the attributes are thought of as superadded to the essence,

then are they merely accidents and express in the reality of the divine nature.

By

iiiese

The Absolute Unity. and similar arguments, Maimonides convinced himself that such attributes as power, wisdom, goodness, cannot be understood as expressing any positive reality, and that even such predicates as existence, unity, &c., can-

be applied to the applied to finite beings, existence is something separable from essence ; the idea of a house in the mind of the builder, for instance, being something

not, in the ordinary sense of the words,

As

divine essence.

from the house as an actually existing thing existence and essence, idea and reality, are

different

but iu

:

God

When, again, we say of God that we must understand something different from " unity and unity we predicate of finite things, for

one and indivisible.

He

is

the

one,

accidents belonging

are

plurality

discrete quantity."

one,

we add

to

the

"When we pronounce

category

of

a thing to

1m

to its essence the accidents of its relations

to other things

;

but in

God

as

an absolute or necessarily

The con existing Being, unity and essence are one. which Mahnonides to elusion, therefore, comofy is thai thejgredicates by which we suppose ourselves to attaii to a knowledge of God do not express, any^positive, jiieal

itJ^Tthe

divine nature, but can only be

employed

it

a negative sense, tcud^xist^ He^js^notj in other words, tliojrjaj?o Mi ^^

The essence of God is that pure fqr^our ownjgnacanco. absolute unity which lies beyond all plurality, and there 'fore

beyond

tJiat it is,

From

all predication, of

but not what or

the foregoing

how

summary .

*

P.

XII,

Moreh,

i.

which we can only

it is.

saj

1

it is ^obvious

If

any positive reference

51-67-

Spinoza/.

be traced in Spinoza's "writings, it is in the in which he speaks in a somewhat passage above quoted,

to him. can

some faint anticipation of his doctrine attributes of thought and extension the of. " as to the divine substance as having dawned through

slighting tone of of the relation

a cloud" on the minds of "certain of the Hebrews."

On

the further question,

whether on

this

point any

indirect influence of the writers so designated can

traced in the philosophy of Spinoza,

been :

be

already

said.

"Whatever the relation of Spinoza's doctrine as to the

{nature of \

enough

lias

from

God

to that of Maimonides,

when we

pass

this point to the teaching of the latter as to the

God to the world, the divergence between two amounts to nothing less than radical systems ^the Here it is no longer Aristotle but Moses /inconsistency. w^is^e^mastejj^f MaimQ^ios. He is no longer an 'relation of

independent thinker, but a rabbi striving by npocial pleading to force philosophy into reconciliation with tlw creed of the synagogue. A philosophy which starts from the notion of a transcendent God, a self-identical

unity excluding

all distinctions,

logical ^explanation

can find in^itaelf

of the existence

becomes there

is

no element

of difference

Eveu the Aristotelian conception"!)? God consciousness, pure

Form without

realised in matter. still is

And

i

wM/he as pure self-

Matter, rendered

impossible to account for a world in tipn becomes

no

ofj^ finite world.

it

which form was

the impossibility of the tranri-

more obvious when the unity

of self-

--

sublimated into the Neo-Platonie idea of without difference" The only device b '

Relation of -God

to the

World.-

67

,

an apparent transition from the one to the many, from God to the world, can, under such conditions, be

'

wliicli

effected, is either to substitute

we have

metaphor

seen attempted in Neo-Platonism,

for reason, as or, failing "iSji*

-

that*

,

.

I

expedient, to take refuge in mystery and to account for) the world by a supernatural creative act. It is tlier^ latter expedient

which, under the constraint of the pre*

supposed orthodox doctrine of a creation of the world ex nihilo, M'ahnonides adopts. There is indeed one! remarkable passage in the

which tho

Hsfeo-Platouio theory of

How,

taught.

Guide

lie asks,

to the Perplexed

emanation

is

'

in

-

Many

possesses

much good

spiritj

but

contains

a,

in

that there emanates from

Him, not only

This second

sphere of spirits. it

spirit

ever such a fulness that from

it

again also

spirit are derived, and so forth spirit down to tho last intelligence and the first matter from

and spheres

which

all

of

the dcvmonts

arose,.

This idea of

God was

held by the prophets, and bo.eause this emanation of God is limited neither by space nor time, they have

compared God

to

^

can that which remains eternally

can not only bestow on others what they are in want of, but can so enrich them that they in turn, can enrich In like manner there is poured forth from God others. so

f

distinctly

the same and umnoving be the cause of all motion and becoming? .And lie answers by the following illustra" a man so much wealth that he tion ;

,/

1

an eternal and inexhaustible fountain

x This passage, howpouring itself forth on all sides." ever, can only be understood as the passing lapse of an

unsystematic writer, adopting for the moment aad for a special purpose a theory inconsistent with, his ftmdar h,

a

11,

3&

*

''

;

68 It is scarcely necessary to show by formal quotations that the theory, if so it can bo (sailed, on which Maimoiiides rents as the only possible, explanation of the existence of tho finite world, is that which is " creation out of In nothing." expressed by tho phrase, answer to tho Aristotelian argument that creation in

mental principles.

time would imply in yet passed

"the

God

into actuality,

a potentiality which

had not Maimonides maintains that

sole ground, of .creation is to

of_Gp3, and that

it

be found in

tluj will

belongs to tho nature of will that

a thing takes place at one time and not at another." l "For all these phenomena of nature," ho adds, "I see no law of necessity, but can only understand them when

we

say with the doctrine of Moses that all has arisuu by "If I had any proofs the jjree.will of the Creator." 2 " I for the doctrines of Plato," again ho writes, would

unconditionally accept them, and interpret allcgorically the_ verses of Moses which speak of a creation out of

And

8

nothing."

then he proceeds elaborately to defend

3tJMJ^i5L.dDcteino against the philtmoj)hic, which, in his

opinion,

would completely subvert religion, our and the hopes and fears which reli-

belief in Scripture,

gion inculcates. r

It

need scarcely be said that

we have

hero ajclojatrmj

ixpt^^Y^wjth.the philosophy^j|,

W

bother .tyjbjjri^ '%i&
any adequate

aolution of the problem of the relation of the world to

'jQodv

it is

at least

^^^l^riaciple

an attempt

fr.om i^hioh

to find in the idea of G-od

ev^ythiog

else followi

by

Creation out of Nothing.

The finite world is for him that which " follows from the that necessity of the divine nature

^strict necessity.

the modes of the divine attributes, in so far as

is, all

they are considered as things which are in God., and cannot he conceived without God." 1 Even the theory of emanation

an attempt to solve the problem But the theory of creation out ojj nothing is simply the abandonment of the problem as insoluble; and if it seem anything more, it is only

with which

because

is at least

deals.

character is disguised by a meaningless The theory itself, as well as the world forjj would account, is created out of nothing.

its real

phrase.

which

it

it

It is unnecessary to follow the so-called philosophy of Maimonides into further details. Setting out from a

point of divergence such as has just been, indicated, it is? obvious that in the subsequent course of their specula1

tions Spinoza and Maimonidcs could never meet, and their occasional coincidences are such only to the ear.

many

thinkers of the

impelled to

seek a basis for

Maimonides, for example, like

same

order, feels himself

moral responsibility in a freedom of indifference or indeterminism, and from the difficulties involved in this conception he finds a ready escape in his theory_of

He who

creation.

begins by tracing

arbitrary supernatural act

all

things to

can never be at a loss for

solution of particular speculative difficulties. " To man, 2 " has been given complete freedom wheflaSrne says he, will incline to the good or evil way. ""Here there is no

law of causality as in outward nature, so that the will of man should be the effect of any cause, but 1

^^^^^K

"But," he

wjlljtejbhc^ *

Eth.

i.

29, solid,

*

Yad-ha-ohazakali, v.

4.

*f **

**

70

Spinoza.

"does not the assertion that the will with

the i

answer

own

is,

Not

so

;

lias

will that it should

The

dmno^o^^

God has given to everything its made it the nature of the human

be

is

In other words, the un-

free."

human

conditioned freedom of the derived from but

free stand

for, as

He

nature, so

is

will is not only not

in absolute contradiction with the

nature of God, and must therefore be ascribed simply to

His arbitrary

will,

and what

nature ceases to be so

contradictory to God's is the author

is

when God Himself

How far apart from Spinoza, both in matter and manner, lies this kind of reasoning, need of the contradiction.

not here be pointed out. There is, however, one Hubject on w.hioh, viewed apart from the general principles of the two yRtorns, JJiejr

m or e_

coincidence^ ^frcst^si^.^ Jocks the nj^iBS^^ and moral

"We whence

tl

lanjve rbal

-v La. ,

1 must," says Maimonides, "first of all consider and what is the nature of good and evil,

evil comes,

%4y the good

is

something positive

j

ovil,

on the contrary,

is only want of good, tTierefore a mere negation, is the combination of this form with this matter

Life, e.g., ;

the cessa-

tion of the combination or the division of the

two is death. Health is- liarmoay in human, bodies, sickness arises so soon ft* iwsoLcnay is destroyed. God, therefore*, can onljr. be

^fi

9$

&e

watKor of evil fiTthe "world in 50 far as lip wej^orldrarise put pi matter whicli .

And

implies "ffie possibility of not oaly of natural evil but of moral

^

?OBai

a wwat of

a

'

Nature of

71

Were men wholly rational there would be neither hatred, nor envy, nor error, which work destructively amongst men, just as blind men injure themselves and others through want Both kinds of evil are mere negations which God (./ of sight. does nQ| cause, but only permits. Both are consequences of'" matter from which the world and man have become, and yet from matter nothing better could arise." ?

Compare with this doctrine passages from Spinoza

of

the following

evil

:

"With

regard to good and evil, these indicate nothing

positive in things considered in themselves, nor anything else than modes of thought or notions which we form from own the comparison of one thing with another," * " For

my

admit that sin and eyjljijiy^jin^j^^ie We know that whatever is, when considered without regard to anything else, possesses perfection,

part, I .cjmnot . existence. .

.

in itself

extending in each thing as far as the limits of that thing's The design or determined will (in such an act as essence. Adam's eating the forbidden fruit), considered in itself alone, includes perfection in so far as it expresses reality. Hence it may be inferred that we can only perceive imperfection in things when they are viewed in relation to other things possessing

more

Hence

sin

maintain that

God

reality.

imperfection

>

'

I

.

.

.

which

inc3

<

really (as causa sui) the cause of ewjSice (.
.

is^

.allTI^^ When you .

*can prove

me

that evil, error, crime, &c., are anything which expresses essence, then I will grant to you that God is the cause of evil. But I have sufficiently shown that that

to

which

constitutes the form, of evil does not " '"*'

"

thiaglwESh said that

..

expresses,

Qad js

To the

congg^jgjjy" -^^^ and therefore it cannot be '

the

cursory reader of these

i Etli. iv.

'

Pref.

%. SI

bot-Jx

writers

Bp> 36.

aooiu k> teach tin

1

wainr doctrine.

u,s

to the nature of (nil,

and with a common object To prove that Uod no t 'the author of evil, it worn* to be tins endeavour of both to show that no piwifcivo. reality can he ascribed to it, {

i

aud that physical and moral evil alike niuat be relegated But a little to the category of mentions or unreal itiea closer examination proven that a fundamental difference underlies

thin

Maimonidcs

IB

HUperlieial

Htmilarity,

essentially duaiistic. (Jreator from

Tim

To

theory of exonerate his

caunation of

(^vil,

ho

adopts the Aristotelian diHtinction of form and matter, ascribing all that in positively ^ood in the BjHtem of

m

being to the former, and regarding e.vil only the clement of negation or limitation which necBHiirily clings

In HO fur UH any finite l>eing in rtnlooniod from imperfection, the element of good that is in it is due to the divine caunution in KO far an imperfection still adheres to it, it is to 1m aHcriiKu.1, not to tho positive}

to tho latter,

;

\ r

agency of God, but, BO to Hjwnk, to the intructablenosH of tho matoriala with which Ho iuw had to deal. Matter js^

* >:?
puin, sickueHH, death

*

IIKJ

its inevit-

able conditions; only the life which arreatn chango and Error "and crime are not disintegration is duo to (loci traceable^ to

God, any more than tho blunders and mis-

of 'the blind to tho author of tho organ of vision.

were

If sin

;

p-erfeot there

wd thertfor

wMch men I

would be neither

error nor

the xnoaauro of knowledge and virtue Is to be ascribed to the author of

no more, and theroforo yield

{hat

m

anotlur

way

which *

to

of Haying that ro-

r

I

73

Unreality of Evil. that. they arc' only partially

said only to permit.

*

oui'busmoss to

It is not

than

-

'

to point out

its

He

can at most bo

criticise* this

theory, further

reclaimed '.*

dualistic character, essentially

and

discordance with every system which, like therefore of that Spinoza, maintains the absolute unity of the its

JSTot only does it start from tlie funclamental dualism of a sttpramundane Creator and a world lying outside of Him, but even in that world all does not spring

universe.

from the

it. God is not responsible for the world, simply because another that of "matter," has there a role which is in-

will that creates

all that takes place in

principle,

dependent of Him, and over which best only a partial victory.

He

can achieve at

Spinoza, on the other hand,

knows nothing

of such, an e^^mal Creator, or of any element of matter which poSSesse's substantiality and For him there is but one infinite subindependence.

stance, outside of

ceived

;

and

which nothing

all finite

exists or can

beings, corporeal and

only modes of that one substance.

be con-

spiritual, are

Interpreted in the*

fundamental principle, Spinoza's language! with respect to the non-positive nature of evil means! something with which the doctrine of Maimonides has!

light of this

Finite things, as such, have neither, in relation. their existence nor their essence any substantial reality.

no

Everything that has a real existence, everything in nature and man that can be said to have any positive a modification or expression of the dlvijae else that seems to 'be only

reality,

is

nature,

and everything

unreality, nonentity^

that

we

m

If,

then,

we

ask

How

it 'Oovh,8/

regard anything as evil, or ascribe reality tol that are injurious or wicked, the a&fftw to that \ things

74

Spinoza.

this arises

from the

which imagmotion Whatever wo think

false substantiation

"

gives to things finite.

or_gpmion and

evil, and, moreover, whatever we think to be impious, or unjust, or wicked, arises from this, that we conceive things in a distorted and mutilated fashion." l

injurious

As by means which

of the conceptions of

are merely

number and measure,

" aids of the imagination,"

we

to discrete parts of space,

false

give a

which

is independence one and so the element in continuous, really negative

and

individual things apart from God,

is

which have no

actions,

only due

to the

reality

fake isolation or

which the imagination or the abstracting unEemovo the fictitious limit derstanding gives to them.

limitation

by

which they are

distingiiished

Jrom God, and_tho

the positive element, which alone njegtionj^nishes Whether expresses their essence, is all that remains. ;

this

view of the nature of

evil

be tenable or not,

it is

oVviously one which has nothing in common with that Maimonides. For the latter, God is not the author

| of

evil, because the evil or negative element in things is be ascribed to another and independent source for Spinoza, God is not the cause of evil, because, from the point of view of the whole, contemplating the system of :

eing in the only aspect in which

ive existence,

i

evil vanishes

Eth.

iv, 78,

dem.

it

has any real or

away

into illusion

t

75

CHAPTER

IV.

GIORDANO BRUNO.

ONE

of the

that

'

/

jm^ton^

His numerous works,

Giordano'"Bruno. tific,

;.;,/

'.

i

'

;

most remarkable writers of the transition

between medieval and

period

-

'

(

is

poetical, scien-

philosophical, reflect the general characteristics of period, modified in some respects by a strongly

marked

The

individuality.

revolt against authority, the

almost exulting sense of intellectual freedom, the breaking down of the artificial division between things sacred and

human and divine, the revival of ancient philo sophy, and resumption of its problems from a new anc higher standpoint these and other distinctive feature

secular,

of

the spirit of the time, and along with these th< and unrest, the predilection foi

intellectual imsettlement

occult sciences

and

arts,

dreams and vagaries

the tendency to commingle the with the results

of imagination

which marked some of its more are vividly re yet undisciplined minds, in Bruno's multifarious writings. In these

rational investigation

seek Jor

mind

sjjstejsalM Jjnity.

filled

original,

"with

They

intellect^

axe the

76

Spinoza.

and making random guesses now in this direction, now in that, pouring forth with almost inexhaustible productiveness speculations, theories, conjectures, under the impulse of the moment or the varying influence of external circumstances and of the intellectual atmosphere if

in

which he moved.

Betwixt such a mind as this and

'

the

clear, patient,

disciplined intelligence of Spinoza,

it

-would seem impossible to iind any point of contact, and in the absence of any direct evidence wo might ho disUposed to regard Spinoza's alleged obligations to Bruno as i

It is true, Vtnothing more than accidental, coincidences. to that the absence of reference Bruno in indeed, any (locus not settle the cjucstion, inasmuch was undoubtedly conversant with, and derived

Spinoxa's writings as Spinoza

important suggest ions from, authors whom he docs not But without attaching any weight to Spinoza's quote. silence, the positive proof of his obligations

would seem,

at first blush, to consist only of a fpw.vorlwl comcidoii^s ,

scarcely

avoidable in writers treating of the same subjects,

and more than overborne by the lack

of

any

real affinity

of thought.

Wlum, however, wo examine more drift of Bruno's phikwophical writings

closely the general

the loading ideas

which, though never developed into a coherent system, underlie his speculations concerning man and nature and

God

we

not a little which may be kind of anticipation of Spinozisiu. Tho idea which seems to have dominated the rnjncJLof J^uno, shall find in thorn

regarded as a

and which, by moans partly of Aristotelian categories, partly of Noo-Platonic emanation theories, he socks in his various writings to explain

and defend, is thg,t-Q|,jlp Ho was in profound aym-

Bruno s Pantheism.

77

pathy with tlio revolt against tlio medieval notion of a transcendent God, and a sphere of divine tilings absolutely separated from nature and the secular life of mankind,

The

course of religious thought during

tlio

i

scholastidi

period had tended more and more to ol)scure Uio QJisiatlaiil unity of the divine and^^iyytnan. Thoj ecclesiastical conception of God had gradually become \

id(3a_of^ the

that,

i

r

not of a Being who reveals Himself in and to spirit, but of a Being above t]ifi_wjarld, and

human

whom

thought can bo related only as the passive

cipiont of mysterious

dogmas authoritatively

re-

revealed.

The false exaltation thus given to the idea of God led by obvious sequence to the degradation of nature, and the individual and social life of man. The observation of nature lost all religious interest for minds in which the divine was identified with the supernatural, and which found the indications of a divine presence not in the course of nature, but in interferences with its laws In like manner, and for the same reason, the specially religious life became one of abstraction from the world,

and the secular

came

relations,

life

spiritual .things. this

false

of

man,

its

domestic, social, political

to be regarded as outside of the sphere of It is easy to

seejiow the reaction from

separation of the $aiural Jind., spiritual^ tjie

human and

on thojjn^ojtmnd, td nature which is indicated.by

divine, should give rise,

the reawakened

inti

i

mst

in.

the scientific revival of the sixteenth and centuries,

and on the

other, to the pantheistic

tendency

in philosophy which gives their

J^ and the

poetical side of his nature,

Both on the religious Bruno .recoiled front

the conception of $ supramundane God, and a world

78

Spinoza.

and thought no divine element could be In the external world, in whose least (discerned. had begun to perceive the hidscience iphenomena in the inner of Iden glory intelligible order and law; in

whose

life

world of mind, to whose boundless wealth of thought the consciousness of the time was becoming awakened, Bruno seemed to himself intuitively to discern, not tho

I

;

mere production of a distant omnipotence, but the imAnd mediate ex Pssin ^ a divine presence an

^^^^

whc^^

with the

sought

to give philosophic

sense of

form and

verification to this intuitive

^Jut religious

akingd

and poetical feeling may instinctively grasp what reason Bruno was a poet first and a is inadequate to justify.

And

philosopher only in the second place. direct influence his writings

Ms own to "The

*

overtake the task he set himself to accomplish. from tho

true philosopher," says Bruno, "differs in.

^theologian, ""

-Bejng, ~

begin,

^ agent

in-

a greater

needed a calmer intelligence and severer logic than

it

mind,

whatever

may have had on

this,

that the former seeks tho infinite it. Wo must by recognising "the universal

not^utside tho world, but within other words,

in

in

creation,

elevated region in + created beings," 1 VK

before

attempting to rise to that finds the archetype of Dismissing, then, the conception of

which theology

a suprwoindane God,

it

is

Bruno's aim to show

how

philosophy justifies the idea of an immanent relation of God to the world. examine his soluM,QlL-Q

Whenjwe

^MjSlMsS1

)

i*

kjfoirnd.tp consist partly in

to Itfeo-Platonic figures 1 *

De

"

H

la causa, pinciplo et uno % J. Bniuo, ii. p. 130. ,

W;y*

a^^^^es,

+<

i ,

;",'

,.'

f

.

a. ....recujrfittfie

partly in a laanigu-

Wagner's

'edit.,

i,

p. 175.

Of.*

The "Soid of the World."lation of the Aristotelian cj,{ggories of mattere

and

of potentiality and actuality. To the former point of view belongs his elaborate exposition of the notion of a to be conceived

3

of as an infinite living organism, not created by any out ward cause, but having the principle of all its existence;

and

activities

nothing

within

exists, in

itself.

It is that

all

have their being. principle he compares to the principle of " which sends forth from itself or

life

in the root

shoots, branches,

seed,

twigs,

beyond whicl

things live, and move, anc This inward, ever- active, creative

which

&c.,

which disposes and fashions the delicate and again, by the same

tissue of leaves, flowers, fruit,

interior energy, recalls the sap to the root."

It is in one

sense external, in another internal, to purely natural things; the former, because it cannot be regarded as itself latter,

a part or element of the things it creates the because it does not act on matter or outside of

matter, but wholly Iteaii of matter.

but :

(1.)

f^^^^^n,

He it

in the very bosom and

represents this

first

principle again

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

That the

latter operates

already alive or instinct

on matter wMeit is

with form, whereas in the ease

of the former no such presupposition

is

involved.

He

argues, therefore, that though we may shrink from garding the universe as a living being, yet we

conceive any form which is not already, diieeiiy cw directly, the expression of a soul, any m@m conceive a thing which has abaoinld^ ntf jBfe0%,*

would be absurd, indeed^ fo productions of

human

art,

3?egawt qja

My

table, as such, is

fiiijfr'

not

*" f

: ,

80 animate 'j

I

i

I

but inasmuch as

;

composed There is nothing, bo

nature, living. ^

matter

it

is

taken from

which are already

ever so

little

or worth-

.-^(g^^jj^j^^

that does not

less,

its

of materials

is

it

contain in .

it

life

or

1

The

...spul.

works from without to

communicate his own thought to materials which are taken from nature, and which have already, as part of .nature, a life and "being of their own ; but the divine or inner artist has no pre-existing materials on which to work. His art is creative, at once of the materials and of the infinitely diversified

forms imposed on them. in

Creative and the and same Hiinjme thing; and

r^a^fc^^Lergy^are He transmutes lower into higher forms of existence, the former are not taken from a sphere that is foreign

if

or external to life

and the

;

Him, but already instinct with His own same life putting forth a

latter are only the

new expression 1

of its inexhaustible energy, (2.) It is only a slightly varied form of the same thought when Bruno tells us that jnjfoe.jdy^ in con-

trast

with the human, the ideas In nature, he argues, the

officjojit

caugo

Every reasonable a^JErgsujDjjo^s^an^j^id jjlfflgn. "That " Design is nothing else than the form of the thing to "be

ptofeced.

I^ogj^clxjt JfoHows

thatjax intelligence)

*%lS^^ sb^uM c<

22i^^

Since

2

intelligence or the soul of the

it is

creates natural things, '

'. ,

/^

,

,

it

is

* Be la causa,

i.

p. 241.

Of.

2

L

p. 237.

Of. Bartholmtei, il

Be

I

k

caiiflft,

^w^/4*,

f

world which

impossible that the formal Baitholmto, II p, 185. p.,

].$4

The Universe an Organism.

81

-

should be absolutely distinct from the efficient cause. They must fall together in the inner principle of things. Bruno expresses the same thing in another way when

In of the universe as a living organism. he^sge_aks the work of a human artist the thought or conception lies outside of

which

it is

by

the materials on "which he works, and in hand to be realised. But the

his plastic

thought or design which is at work in the creation of an organised structure, is not a mere mechanical cunning acting from without, shaping and adjusting matter accordHere, ing to an ingenious plan which is foreign to it. on the contrary, thejdeal principle or formative power

gejwith

the matter, and constitutes

its essence.

Such

a principle is supposed to be present from the beginning, inspiring the first minutest atom of the structure with

the power of the perfect whole that is to be. The inne^l life the is both cause first and last it within, principle, ;

.....

mSESs the last first, and the first last. ,Wnen, therefore, we apply 93s conception to the xiniverse, what it brings before us is, not an extramundane omnipotent agent, creating and shaping things to accomplish an end outside both of himself and them implying, therefore, something originally lacking both to himself and the matter on which he operates but a universe which contains in

h^^ -

m^^^h^^T^^^^ffl^Bo^^^SgnitLcant

o|

assLmaauffiataJhe end to be

and in which the first principle is at once beand end of all. Had Bruno realised all that is ginning contained in this conception, his philosophy might have realised,

/

/gone beyond that of Spinoza, p.

xij.

md

anticipated B

much

which

was

it

for

left

later

thought

speculative

to

develop.

But when we follow the

course of his speculations,

and

thought ho proceeds asE^*ojL ft om His relation to tho and of nature the to explain God, the under find "we that, limiting influence of m>3d,"~ his fundamental

>

fc

scholastic or Aristotelian categories, tho inherent

wealth

With him as with a idea escapes his grasp. abstract the of than he, identity is in principle greater fatal opposition to that of concrete unity, or if the latter of his

own

faintly adumbrated in his conception of tho soul of the world as a self-differentiating, self -integrating unity, the former speedily reasserts itself, so as to reduce the

is

idea_of

i

of

God

to

a meaningless and barren abstraction,

world to evanescence and unreality, order to determine the nature of the first principle

and the

finite

all things,

distinction of

Bruno

lias

;

recoursTio'tue^Aj^

and " matter."

'ann

$\i

"Democritus and the Epicureans," says he, "hold that is no real existence which is not corporeal they regard matteras the sole substance of things, and assert that it is

there

itself

;

the 3ivme"nature.

hojxl also that

^

These, with the Stoics and others, forms are simply the of acc^jnj[aJL diaposition*

A closer

G^almniS^^

mS^su^tencjg, form and jnt|a^6r cIl^^

,

principle of

t

If,

no"consti tuti ve

all, there is also a subject or passive principle corresponding to it, a something that is capable of being acted on as well as a something that is capable of Human acting. art cannot operate except on the surface of things already formed by nature; but nature opewybas^sa-to speak* from .

.

.

;

Matter and Form.

^^

subjecfcmatter of from form." proceeds

seeing that all diversity

A.

1

83

In this passage and elsewhere, what Erano seeks tp|f is, that the conceptions of matter jand form ar

prove

correlative, that noitEor can t)e

apprehended in abstrac

tion from the other, and that the necessities of force us beyond them to another and higher

p^in^^uljvstance which

that of a

is

t

neither matter .alon

We

nor form alone, but the unity of the two. are le to the same result, ho elsewhere shows, when wo consider the supposed hard and fast distinction of sub" It stances corporeal and incorporeal. of all things that {subsist there should of

subsistence.

.

.

But

.

all

is

necessary that

bejon^ jgrmcjple

distrnguislfable

things

That indisindistinguishable. trngidshublt HoiiKithiug is a common reason to which the diilbroneo and distinct! vo form arc added." .Just as senpresuppose

soinothing

1

.

sible

,ol)jo
prosuppoHo a sensible subject,

iiitojligible

ojjj^fe,_au intelligible subjoct "

So

it is

to the

necessary that there be one thing which corresponds reason of both subjects,

common

which contains in agreed, prcHii])poMes a matter which is dot body, and which therefore naturally precedes that which we designate a properly corporeal, we cannot admit any absolute incompatibility between matter and the substances which we

name

immaterial.

divine

mut

i^ay

BtanceB.

an

...

If

we

discern something formal and,!

corporeal substances, on tlio same principle wel that -there IB something material in dirine @ub~i

in,

As

infinite

says, if the intelligible world eQkd$l&8 variet^TexiBtences, there muBt be in them, along

De

la oamsa, p.

*

84

Spinoza.

with their characteristic differences, something which they all have in common, and that common element takes the place of matter as the distinctive element takes that of form. This common basis of things material and immaterial, in BO far as it includes a multiplicity of forms, is

many-formed, but injtself.it and because it is all, visible^.

multiple and

absolutely simple and indicannot be itself any one par-

is it

l

ticular being."

Such considerations do

idea of a g (anjaxtraimiiitlano God), "but of the

d and

tial^

as all

suggest

the actuality of in all

tlio

all,

the poten-

Whoiu;o, though there

are innumerable

"There

individuals, yet everything one form or soul, one matter or

is

is

ono."

2

body, which and the perfection of all, which camiot bo limited or determined, and in therefore un-

is

the fulfilment of

all

8 ;

changeable."

These quotations

may suffice to show what is the genBruno's speculations. Tho result to which lua reasoning leads is not that which ho intended or supposed himself to have attained. His obvious aim was to attain eral drift of

to a first principle

explanation of

which should bo the living source and material and spiritual.

all finite existences,

^

a lu " .

J5se^^ >rlcL7

but an ,

88

whic

^^lf$L

tho utoaTo 1

Be

]*,

m

caitt%

A,, $,

llton

OlJQQikaL'

^L^2^^

mate 'and

form, and again of

Wagner, I pp, 269, 270, 271 9 rbw.

His Unity an Abstraction.

85

corporeal and spiritual, cannot be held apart, but that

when we attempt

to think it, each implies and falls over into the other, he does not rise to a higher unity^ a^ vg unity, which transcends, yet at the same time compr^-!

hends both v Henjce his only available resource is to findj his higher unity in that which matter and form, mindj

.-

''

and body, have in common when their differences areK eliminated. But by thinking of that which mind has in\7

common with

[

is

we common with

than

we do not reach

body, or form with matter,

higher and richer than both, any more do so when we think of that which gold has in

a unity which

other words,

silver is^

a

or copper.

jnere

A

in generic unity,

logical abstraction

than the lowest individual

In after him,

differences

it is

which has supposed. tc

short, like many,~ot;her thinkers beforj.-anc

Bruno conceived himself to be explaining the and contrarieties of existence by the simple

process of eliminating or ignoring them.

And

his

"/

first

or highest principle (which he identified with God), in which he conceived himself to have reached the origin of all things, was nothing more than the abstrac" tion of Being," which is logica^y lughyBr^iniglj^gi^sef

and end it

or isjgooje^jn^c^n^ent, not merely than matter

But than the lowest of

mindJ

finite existences.

And if thus his idea of God or the

infinite

was depleted

i

of all content or reality, it fared no better, and for the same reason, with his idea of the finite world. "What

he sought for was a first principle or " soul of the world," in which all finite existences should find their being and reality.

at

The

solution of this problem, therefore, implied

once the no thingness of

God, and their

reality in

all finite

God.

being apart from

Hi$ fundamental notion

;

86 of an organic unity imposed on him the the universe as an organism in whie.h explaining

the

members

are nothing but dead, meaningless fragments in separation from tho lifo or vital principle of the whole

;

but alo the neceiwity of showing that through their relation to that principle thoy cease to bo such unreal His method certainly enabled him, as he former of these results-

abstractions.

himself saw, to achieve the viz.,

that of reducing

all

existences, as such, to

Unite-

evanescence and nothingness. u In its <{ nature in nothing more than externality/' snyn he, a shadow, im empty image of the iintt principle, in which Thou art not nearer . potentiality and actuality are one. to the infinite by being man rather than insect, by being star ,

.

And what I Bay of these 1 understand of Now, if all these things whose HttbsiHtence. is particular. particular things are not different in the infinite, they are

rather than HUH. all

not really different.

Therefore the universe

in still

one,

and

immovable. It comprehenda all and admits of no difference of being, nor of any change with itself or in itself. It IB all that can be, and iu it w no difference of potentiality and 1 Individuals which continually change do actuality, not take a new oxintcniee, but only a new manner of being, It w in this Bonw that Bojy^i^ojajyuuABtud, There is nothing T that which is was beTore. ,

,

.

*

4

IthhxgB ar0 tnUio universe aiwT (lie uni verse in in all things, all concur to one perfect in it and it is iu m^ and which ia over stable, sole, ft remaining. It is one

m

IttoftaL f,

\

t

Every form of

existence, every other thing

every thing outside of that one

in

nothing."

Bat irMM Bnmo thus proved the from tho

ftart

unreality of principle the i

s

ltW M

is

s

2BS,

all

Relation

to

87

Spinoza.

what he failed to prove, and the of his method could conditions from self-imposed not prove, was that even in their relation to the first or substance of the world,

principle any reality that which is reached finite existences,

the

was

by

them.

left to

as

Eegarded

abstraction from the limits of principle does not explain,

first

simply annuls them. Their distinction from God finitude, and the withdrawal of their finitude,

makes them one with God, makes them

is

lost in

it

their

which.

God.

are only figures carved out in the infinitude of

They

space, and, like figures in space, they vanish

when

the

defining lines are withdrawn.

Such that

then, in substance,

problem with which,

ie

Brauo's_coi^ or

directly

speculative thought attempts to deal.

indirectly,

It

forestall the exposition of the Spinozistic

tempt

question,

if

toi\

system to at-

any, traces are to

the influence of this writer on the

^

allf

way, to answer the be found in it of

here, save in a very general

What,

would be

there

would seem

mind

to

of its author t

be

great between the leading ideas of Bruno and of Spinozt: as between the glowing, imaginative, poetical mannei and style of the former, stamped throughout with the

personality of the writer,

and the

rigid mathematical

excluding every trace of personal feeling, in which the ideas of the latter are cast. "What point of

mould,

contact, for instance, can be discerned

view of the universe

low from the idea

as a

between Spinoza's

system in which

all

things fol-

of infinite substance fey as strict logical

deduction as the properties of a triangle from its .definiand Bruno's conception of an infinite organism in-

tion,

gg

Spinozd,

with the freedom, the

stinct

and variety of

activity, the perpetual

and in which the

life,

first

change

principle

is

with the spontaneity and inexhaustible productiveness of art, in the forms and ? Yet perhaps a closer examination aspects of the world

for ever manifesting itself,

1

lead to the conclusion that, with

may

and some

their essential lead's^

fo

many

apparent

between the two systems, in and iu. tho.. results to which it principle Both seek a real affinity between them.

real differences

"there is

of tho absolute unity of lustifv for thought that idea *'-JL "

^^^r^.r-1 S which is the

"

"

...

it

j

presupposition 01 all science and Both seek to explain the universe

oi^airjEUosophy.

any external or arbitrary of tho problem a virtual abandonment implying In the idea of God both endeavour rto be solved.

irom

itself,

to the exclusion of

cause, as

an inexplicable"supramundano Creator, but In both tEeimmanent causej^jpiricj^^ " God and "Nature " there is a sense in which the words

Itofind^iot I

JJ

I

In Bruno, the union of potentiality and actuality

jare interchangeable. I

{consider (actual,

it

and

as

principle

is the,

and whether you

a principle which realises itself in the God, or as all actuality in relation to

call it

its principle, 5

first ;

and

call it

Nature,

it

is

only one and tho

thing contemplated from different sides. In Spinoza, is that beyond which nothing exists or can bo >

tod Natureunderstood as the whole ,

itxcluding all possible modifications of

number of infinite attributes in their relation :

in so far as they are expressions of

an

finite

infinite

to Substance,

only another tho same xmiYerse regarded from a different ft tiew, Finally, in, both systems the logical reit

is

fr

Brwio and Spinoza. suit falls short of the

89

aim and intention

of the author,

s

and the failure in both cases arises, to some extent at viz., the attempt to reach a least, from the same cause can a method that concrete, by yield only an abstract,

We have

unity.

seen

how

in

Bruno the

'.

infinite living

,

"^

organism, which was his ideal of the universe, reduces itself to a God who is only a bare self-identical abstraction, in

which the

we

finite is lost or annulled.

shall find that

And

in the

from one point of

Spinozism sequel view, the ambiguous result of two conflicting elements a self-identical, undetermined substance which is all in one,

and

is,

a world of finite individualities, each of

which

has a being and reality of its cfwSFT? is the obvious intention of the author to bring these two elements into the

unity of a perfect system

to find in Substance the origin

and explanation of finite existences, and also to bring back all the individualities of the finite world into unity But the in their relation to the one infinite substance. relation

between the two elements

Demonstrated.

The

is

only asserted, never

absolutely undetermined

is,

by

very definition, precluded from going forth out of itself into a world of finite determinations; and if we start

^ from the latter, they can only be brought back to the former by the destruction of their finitude, and their absorption in the infinite all. From these considerations

it

whatever weight we attach

the external evidence of

to

seems to follow

that,

Spinoza's indebtedness to Bruno, in the movement of thought in both writers, in the principle foam the end at

they

start,

cess,

and the reason

which they aim,

of their failure, a

thdfo

$&xA^

/

90

Spinoza. i

may be

traced.

ate Spinoza's

Whether, in point of

fact,

wo

can

affili-

system to the speculations of his predeconbut it must at least be conceded that

4

sor is doubtful,

the philosophy of the former betrays tendencies which,

had he been acquainted with Bruno's writings, would have led him to recognise in the latter a spirit akin to his own.

u*

^

91

CHAPTER

V.

DBSCARTKH.

and the theology of modern times origin, and a certain _SMl

THE

philosophy

start

from a common

may be

traced,

at

in

least

their

earlier

in

stages,

the course of development through which they^passed. ijtrikes xis in studying that developmentjsjts What_firsfc

r

LiaSS^i^^J.-^^ 1 fr s .?!ffi?}- ^h principlo oi om JjLJjhs. common source of both, yet injagib-i .

1

which seemil, to be the complete negation of freedom, ment in which everything seems to be

From

a

grounded on

tlw

individual consciousness, we are brought almost imme diately to a theory of the universe in which God is s<

conceived of as to leave to the world and

man no

In

inde-

the assertion of pendence religion, to a theology rise of right private judgment gives " irresistible absolute predestination and grace." philosophy the principle of self -consciousness, as or reality.

source of

all

knowledge and the criterion of

develops into a system of

uncompromising

a little reflection will

Ygj^ thuslndibated involves

show

thift jftoj

'

MJMLfeoo^Si^^,

Spinoza. of

ciple

the Protestant .Reformation WUH,

reawakening religiouH consciousness

tho

indrcul,

It expressed the

assertion of spiritual freedom.

revolt

ngairiKt

cxr

ternal mediation or authority in matters of faith.

It

of the

implied in the very idea of religion that th human to tho divino, and that in spirit is essentially related

is

seeking to realise that relation it i attaining to a deopnr consciousness of itself. By whatever outward HKJRHH

God and

the knowledge of

of divine things

to us, it is not religious

veyed been grasped 'ound

rath^mxist

lie

God

conscience of

hold good for Iceived I

i

its

con-

until it has

the spiritual consciousness and

"by

witness therein.

its

oice of

knowledge

may lw

linn

of ^^^Jlltinuito not without^ but with The jn^i&t^^^ must find its response in tho hoart and criterion

him to whom it him as true or

and nothing win

speaks,

divine which has not res" authentication in the assurance of faith." Ihtt

it would seem, can be more thoroughgoing than this assertion of spiritual freedom, it involves

"" it

^

whilst nothing,

and directly leads

to

what might

he negation of such freedom,

^man atj)nce

of

easily

bo regarded OR

IJf^gWES knowledge. it freeZGSTand of abgd^iJ^

of freedom, because it is to consciousness

hat truth appeals, tshat

truth

is

and by the activity of oonsciouautmB

apprehended

of absolute

dependence, bo-

at the vety first step of out entrance into th lorn of teuth, we fed otuselves in a where

region

5an be ,ty

ohd

it

king*

nothing

made or -unmade by. us, in the presence of an author-

which dominates our will

nibroission of our thoughts/

ajad claims the

The very

involves the rennaeiatiou of ,

all

:^',

;:,.,.,

comploto

act of entering

individual opin-

prejudices, ol everything

^Sl^iM^^

dm,

*V

,

W&tttU*L-l,d!&!*'--

tMt

m

Principle of the Reformation. to

mo

merely as this individual

self.

It implies, nior<

self, not mere! and dependence, but of its moral blindne; and weakness. Truth must find its witness in the con-

over, the recognition

by the individual

of its finitude

sciousness

;

but the consciousness to which

it

appeals

man, but of the spiritual awakens is that not of

that not of the natural

response which

it

1

;

is ;

The,'

but of a higher or universal self, with which the former is not In 'harmony. It is therefore the revelation^ > self,

to

me

not merely of a universal reason to which the. inj must subject itself, but of a

dividual consciousness

moral jnithority,

a^sokitfi

ajijnlijiite will at

^*ffWT?.

volves will

is

is

""""Siii^-io**

once in rn

am

and above mo, before which I Kclmon be^nj with

^ww

butTEo^rosuppositioii which this in that of an infinite will with which my finite

not in harmony, and to which

it

JiJ2J^XiiL

It is from this point o, view that we can understand how, from the principle o; Protestantism, the early Eeformers should be led to tha

idea of

God which

constitutes the primary doctrine

o:

their theological system.

The

principle

which was

Reformation found thus

it

at the root of the Protestant first

expression in the sphere

was hove that tho human spirit first attained emancipation from that bondage to authority in which it had been held. But thejjgntuj^^ of religion, and

it

and both in

its

origin

and dev@lopeft% &

analogy can be traced between the philosophical aaid tlw religious movement. Speculative; thoxtgbt i tit the

94 Spinoza. impulse with religion to liberate itelf from the wom.n, poaitams which had hitherto fettered it and

Tlilrt

""""*" >

first

'

t

Criterion of Certitude,

95

none of them -which visionally, reject

;

it cannot doubt, and, at least pronot authoritative dogmas and beliefs,

by their very definition have no inherent cernot things we seem to perceive by the senses,

for these

tainty ; for the senses often deceive us, " '^*"^^

^

and jkzb&Lpnce ~ ^** ****deceives rt * *~ eve n mathematical propositions, "^^L^^^^^M^ > for, as we are not the makers of our own minds, it is at

n

least

iiH

t

f

H tl

fc

conceivable that they are the

creation of

some

malicious or mocking spirit who has so constructed them as, even in their seemingly demonstrative certainties, to

be mistaking error for truth. But when, by of^lminatioii, I have got rid of or provisionally rejected| one after another of the elements of that accidental conglomerate of beliefs which I have hitherto accepted,

is

there nothing that remains, no primeval rpckof ^certiiTade^ orjundamental basis of knowledge unassailable bj doufet ? i

And

the answer

that

when

is, everything else has been doubted, there isjme. thing which lies beyond the reach

of doubting I tacitly o^doubt, wMc^nj^^e^ery process affirm.

Doubt

J jgnn^

is

I

thought,

and in thinking I cannot but affirm the existence of the 1 thinker. From everything else I can abstract, but I I cannot abstract from myself who performs the process of jr ;

abstraction.

In

\

Cofjito,

#222^H^

which Descartes gives of the way in which he seemed to himself to have reached an ultimate principle of certitude, it is obvious that he this account

p oses from the oatsel.ihe principle pt^w^ r

When he sets

"

out by saying, I will question which I can doubt," he virtually posits the "I" ass umpire by whose verdict everything is to be decided. In this, as in

every other possible mvestig^oaoL

wfeidj. it

96

Spinoza.

Tn brinj. undertake, thpujght presupposes itsolf. to the bar of consciousness, consciousness presumes thing its own reality. Nay, we can go further, and say that in every act of intelligence, in the most rudimentary exorcise of thought by which I bring any object before

i

that object

what

|see

is

^principle. !"

And

is referred.

enables us to

this, further,

the real significance of Descartes' fundamental

As has boon

often pointed out, tho proposition, -is only in form syllogistic/ As

think, therefore I am,"

I.

author himself expressly says, it is not an argmnent on tho major premiss, " Wljjttevor thinks exists,"

[ts

iasod 'or

jjaavo

Df

* ;

1

jj

tho terms of that premiss would have no meaning what is derived from thorior j.^

boiug and thought.

f-%(^

wy

and tho consciousness predicated of In affirming tho consciousness

wo

it

cannot bo separated*

affirm the

Descartes*

I.

(proposition, tlu^rt^fore, is tl^uBStirtitni of.j^xu..uiluj>lo

Ifiuuty^

of thought

and

r(.alit.y

l^l^ll^L011 Descartes bad

now

in

whicli

w ii.

which ho but tho inquiry would have boon fruitless unless in that principle ho had found not only that which was is

iu quest

attained the principle of

;

absolutely certain iu

itself,

of all other certainties,

If

but that which

thojdoa J)jjuoan8

this principle is not to

is

thjyaaucco

of

which wo

remain a

^barren abstraction, a form of knowledge without content* it ..must enable us to recover, as objects of rational and

knowledge what had been

rejected as a

Principle of Self-Consciousness.

97

How., then, asks Descartes, shall we|

of unsifted beliefs.

the failureTor'''success of any "atlempt to answerwiis question must, it is easy to see, turn upon the sense in which

Whether the proposithe principle itself is understood. "I " I in more or think," is to tion, briefly, thinking am," be fruitful or barren, depends on the part of it on which the emphasis

is

term be limited by the

If the latter

thrown.

former, if, in other words, the thought or self-consciousness here affirmed be taken as merely subjective andj individual, the proposition contains in it the beginning and end of all knowledge. In. the empirical fact of Ids

own_self-consciousness there

the

that

is

Thought bridge by which

is

transcend

to

individual

nothing jwhicli enables

own

his

purely mine can build

indixidgaji 'fSTIfeelf no

can pass to a world that

it

lies,

by

The future history of supposition, wholly beyond it. philosophy was to show, in the vain endeavours of the empirical psychologists, from

Locke downwards,

to solve

this problem, that ij^iffiiiM^ an(l can

never attain to

the legitimate knowledge of the nature or even of the existence of any reality beyond it. On the other hand, the principle of self^Qjigciousnes!

st J^wJ).Ml all

What

^.^^^^

it

may be

.Jjnow-j

understood ._

that beyond all difference of thought and beingj mea^Js^ thought and its object, there is a unity which,

"of

makes

-this

difference^JnteU

first-

presuj^od^ s 3S^E^^,Jfe.e Jl% dS^l3LiilflSr* ^BNjo 1

.

T>

y^TT

]

state it diff^c-| {7t

4 98

Spinoza.

ntly, it

hing

may mean that whilst I can abstract from everyI^^^^S^iiSSiJE? 131 ^ne being which is ideni^^oT^eDeln^ofiny

else,

particular self

;

for that too, like every other particular

ontingent existence, I can in one sense abstract from. "

can make

nd

it

an object of observation, I can think of

I can think

night not be. jjract,

it

it,

away, as that which was not and I cannot ab-

^J^Jj]-^

the self whichjs.identical jffithjhpught,

___

__

jn^which^ I and^ali things

are.

that

is

am

?

So

^HJ far

from shutting me up in a mere subjective experience, a world of realities lying beyond and inaccessible, thus understood, is that which __

___

It is

jDOjssjb^

^H!Li9J^ __.

_

.5iJi!i2:^^

In his endeavour to re^__JfenJ^tgitel^^ construct the world by means of it, did he employ it in tb0 sense in which it is altogether inadequate for the task, or in the sense in

which a system of knowledge eaa legitimately be based on it? Thejnswer is, that jlid neither, but wavered between the Jwo radically iigfc

m

and whilst his system conimples or points towards the higher grasps

it

firmly nor carries it out to

the arbitrary expedients

he eiap%s

m

flke

to eodacad;

3MWPeir

more from his

a^ It

j&

^AfvM^ /uW.t;f.v

*!%',%',

first

prin-

could yield, proves

^ -

i

was

left for

Mind and

Matter.

other and more consequent thinkers to discern

its full

/v

significance.

To say

that self-consciousness

things are relative,

is

is

that to which

say that the world

to

telligible world, and that betw^ thought and being, there is no essential

is

an

in-

division, and

some thirc Such a necessity!

nonnecessity, therefore, to go in search of principle to

mediate between them.

The doubt

however, Descartes creates for himself.

'

If

or

provisional negation of external things by which the affirmation of a" conscious self had been reached, he

speedily hardens into an absolute negation. the oppQsition of a not-self ^hat_jnind

How

It js..,through reali^Q^.^iigelf.

self which exists only as it which is not-self, which knows itself opposes only in abstracting from a world without, hold any inIn attempting to know telligent converse therewith?

then can that conscious itself to that

anything beyond

not consciousness committing

itself, is

This difficulty was rendered a virtually suicidal act mor^jEgrmidable for Descartes by ^hejfie^w^ 1

?

;

_

the_ essentially distinctive naturej:^^ Mind and matter are independent substances, each having /^ The its own determining or characteristic attribxite. characteristic

attribute

mind

of

consciousness, that of matter

can only be understood in a reciprocally contradictory.

is

thought or

self-

extension, and these two sense which renders them

is

Thought

or self-consciousness

that which is absolutely self-included and indivisible"We can ideally distinguish in it that which thraks, and that which is object of thought but they do not lie out-

is

;

side of each other, they are

>

|^

^

V*"

Spinoza. I

'h3 essence

mind, that of matter

of

the very opposite ^tension, self-externality, ex-

or contradiction of this istence j

j

which

is

without

consists of parts outside of parts,

any centre of unity. Mind is self-consciousness is absolute selflessness. ter, on the other hand,

niat-

;

Now

which by their very definition are exclusive, can there be any communion'?

then, between things reciprocally

[Howjmn

that

whose very being

is to

belated to that whoso very being }lf$

mind, matter

In^jgassinjj^^

latter

iS2^S-l5J?^

;

sease to

is

^

be

in ust ceaso_.JboJbo

^ PJ?

a

1

become

selfless

to bo a conscious

le3:u^ * u -

^

tir

n( >3!H, :l

* 11US ^

be mind.

The ^rgedient by which ultimately_..r)oacg^rte8 endeavours to overcome this ^difficulty is, as we shall see, tllatofarbitrarily depriving the two independent substances of their independence

them

ness by reducing ^su^gtancg.

and reciprocal exelusiveand higher

to nioj^ionts of a third

Whilst the distinctive attribute which makes

each a substance with reference to the other remains, their opposition is mediated by the abflolut^^suLsintixce, aends.

Bujj this

uintf arurWatter ttempt to overcome the dualism of niintf presents itself first in a somewhat cruder and moro

Mind and matter are essentially opGod becomes the guarantee to mi ml of the of its ideas of matter. Mind has no im-

mechanical form.

but

the truth of those ideas; finds

them ia

itself.

objective reality corresponding to them. as

it

They convey no assurance

simply of

any

It is conceiv-

was formerly supposed, that our notions of or even, of tixe existence of an, external

But our idea

of Ck>d ia that

Idea of^God.

-

whose perfections

of an all-perfect Being, one of solute veracity

\^

or truthfulness.

If,

therefore,

101 :

iar -arV

in

the/

mind which owes to Him its existence we find certain/ clear and distinct ideas of matter or of external realities,? the veracity of God is the unquestionable security that these ideas are true. Ideas of things which we could

not otherwise a

God

trust,

that cannot

we

can trust as implanted in us by

lie-

Arbitrary and forced^ as this

problem before him seems tojbe, what iSj^tliat

it

really indicates

De^ajrtes_had discerned the^injutejjTm

merely individualistic jmncrgle - oJJ^.ojvvObdge, andjhad begun to sTselEEaf^^ th^jndiyidual is with a and more consciousness wider ini]2licate.(l lute

than

And

itself.

we go on

to consider

this

becomes more obvious when

how

Descartes contrives, without/

any conscious departure from his fundamental principle^ from it the idea of God anithQ4>roof of Hisf

to extract

IrTTwo^ to

^to ITini self.

testify

to

he finds

In^Jiie^^

.J^JS^^ and

source,

consciousness seems

something more absolute than

he

it

caSSoTTe^^ jv"hicli_therefore witnesses to

as Jte causo^or archetvjDe. ity,

in

an

"Wliatever

any thing or idea contains, at least as be contained in its cause. If I find in

argues,

much must

myself an idea which contains more reality than is contained in my own nature or could be derived or collected

that there of

reality

from other

finite natures, I may conclude a being containing in himself an amount transcending that of all finite existence.

is

Such an idea

is

that of

God,

the infinite

substance,

f

102

Spinoztf.

could only have boon implanted in actually existing God.

and

it

To

this

it

argument

is

easy to take

mo by

ejccjojjition,

an

on the

obvious ground that it presupposes the. tiling which it is intended to prove that it seeks to deduce, from consciousness, or

one of the ideas of consciousness, a being

who

guarantee the veracity of consciousness ; and further, that it attempts to find In thought the proof of someis to

thing outside of thought or unthinkable Yet to make thought transcend, itself.

in other words,

though implicit

The being who contains

in himself

a being thought of in a most defiway. Seeming to himself to have forced a path outward to a region beyond consciousness, Descartes is ill

perfections

is still

...

and what^hp has

adividual.

The

really achieved^

argument, and that motive and significance, was, that element in thwi^t, or tliat the eon-

secret nervo of the

vhich constituted

its

ciousness of the individual,

when

closely oxaitnuod,

dominated couitrast

IB vir-

is,

% a uruyorsal

"between the apparent and tho real signi-

argument becomes Btill more obvious in form in which Descartes presents it, and " ^tioii of the

of the

seeotid is

or

^>d. ""

VJto

""'

'

^

Amongst the highest

*'

wis wad powerful and

Ontoloffical

absolutely perfect ; others, contains in

Argument.

and we perceive that it

this idea, unlike

the characteristic, not of possible

In

or contingent, but of absolutely necessary existence.

the same way, therefore, as from the fact that the idea of a triangle necessarily involves that its angles should be equal to two right angles, wo conclude that every

must have this property ; so from the fact that| the idea of an absolutely perfect being includes in itl that of existence, we conclude that such a being triangle

necessarily

^in

exist.

thejtem

Here again the argument, /thoughf which Descartes presents Jt^s

in

|

^^^S^iii]^ the uutonahleness^of nal jiajadjgoint, and

the_

iiumtable tendencj to read into

I

If self - consciousness

j

jJLJLJSiS^ is

only individual, and

his ojigi-l

we suppose

a world of realities

lying outside of it, it is impossible to conclude from selfexistence or any other clement of an idea in us that there is any actual reality corresponding to

more than, according

to

^m^^familiar

can infer from the idea o^ajau^jdj^ that I have

them

in my""purse.

in TflEat

it

any

illxxstration,

I

my mind

equality of

its

two right angles is a necessary element of the a triangle, proves no more than that if any actual

angles to idea of

it will possess this property]* and that existence belongs to the idea of God, merely necessary is a being corresponding to the idea, that there if proves

triangle exists,

"

he

exists necessarily.

By no

straining, therefore, could

the principle of self-consciousness, if regarded individua^ticjt, break down, in this case any more in any other, the barrier between the subjective s&tf the world of realities opposed to it* But

^

^

104

Spinoza.

not individual Hut "universal, or the principle that the real presupposition of knowledge is not the individual's consciousness of himself as an individual, but the thought or consciousness of a self which is beyond all individual selves

and their objects that, viz., of u^iversjil J^absoOther existences may be contingent.

lute intelligence. *

^

lMH

IIHfBV*>*\W'-'*B*irff*t*^, i ^

other things may or may not be; ideas there is one which, whether we jxre explicitly or oniyTniplIcitly conscious of it, sjoj(2ravejj.ts j:eality^ojai Jhought, tlmt^thought becomes^ impgssib^ Its absolute so fundamejatalto^ thought, reality^is

doubt it is to^doubt reason itself. This was the goal to which Descartes was tending. Had he reached it, the principle of individual freedom with which he started -would have converted itself into another form, which is either the pantheistic suppression of freedom, or the re-

In his own hands, remained in the imperfect form in which it

establishment of

on adeejp^bais.

it

however, it served only to introduce into his system a new element absolutely inconsistent with the principle from wliich he

^ ^

&* '

I

*

*

started.

The foregoing view of the tendency and results of the Cartesian philosophy will be borne out if we consider,

I

abandonment

I

a different stand-

|

further,

to the

howjoej:^

in express terms of his point; in other words,

origjj^al for

to^^recpgnition

that

it is

of the truth

not the consciousness _of^sT''T5ut the con-

sciousness of

God

whJj^^

he had represented to himself as the original certainty of self had been reached by doubting every thing else; bit it was not the doubt that had Jcieated

the certitude, but the certitude that had ere-

;

| *J

f

I

Infinite

and

Finite.

105

It was tlie implicit presence of a doubt. standard of reality that had led him to pronounce his The idea first notions of things illusory and unreal.

ated the

that

was the prius in the process of doubt was not

that of the things doubted, but the idea or conscious-j

ness of

self.

In

like

sider the relation of

manner when he comes the idea of

God

to con-

to other ideas,

or of the idea of the infinite to that of the finite,

he

expressly maintains that the idea of infinite and necessary being does not arise by abstraction or negation

from that that

is

it

of finite, contingent being, but conversely, the presence Blind __of the jbhe

m

^^

" I existences to Be_ finite^and contingent. " that I perceive the inought not lo think," says he, finite only by negation of the finite, as I perceive rest

and darkness by negation

of

motion and light

contrary, I clearly perceive that there is

in infinite substance than in

finite,

more

;

on the

of reality

and therefore

that, in

a certain sense, the idea of jhe_jnfinite in me to jgjprjgr In other words, the idea of the infithatjof Jhe finite." :

presupposed in that of the finite ; the former the positive idea, the latter produced merely by nite

is

tion or limitation of

it.

y,

ideas of other existences as finite

soi we have

here the

complete subversion- of

original principle of knowledge.

amongst the ideas of infinite is

For, in

finite things to

now pronounced

the idea of the finite

the

wMdb

is

;

(

106

Spinoza.

sum was, as we can now God in another form. In the mind an idea which, in contrast

second place, the coyito ergo see,

only his proof of

latter,

with

he finds in his

ideas of merely finite, contingent existences, is

all

In the former that of infinite or necessary existence. he found in his mind an idea which, in contrast with all

was absolutely

ideas he could doubt or deny,

certain.

The

starting-point and the process are in both cases, the same. What he denies or reduces to negativity and

contingency in contrast with the idea of God, is precisely the same with what he denied or reduced to illusion

The

and

nullity in contrast

conclusion he

same.

And

rea.eh.es

with the idea of

must be in both

self.

cases the

that the self of the one process is really God of the other, is further obvious

identical with the

from

this, that

tainty of

self,

doubt is possible, not through the cerbut through the certainty of absolute

I^doubting or denying anything, the tacit appeal to a finite but to an infinite standard, not to the isjipt truth.

idea

otl^^ub|ective

tive reality.

but to that of absolute objec-

self,

the cogif The^self of_ overgo

sum was

there-

self7

of all Snite existence^

r

\\

But though Descartes' own express admis^logically sion implied the abandonment of his former for a new jpriBciple of knowledge, he didjipt himself recognise or .

S<

C

I

admit

thejmj^i^ttion.

To save his~own consistency lie

has -recourse to a distinction which

is

simply the ac-

of the

itnresolved^dualism which charac*n order ?o*retain ttiecogito ergo as a first^principle, whilst yet asserting that God or iihe

knowledgment

'^^^iS.S^S

1

mm

I&wwing and

107

Being.

thought the prius of the tmite, he distin-

infinite is in

the principle of guishes between

knowledge (principium and the principle of being (prmci2num the Ego, the latter essendi\ assigning the former role to fails But a to God. phiJ^sojpho^al system ifTt dqe^not give lo all with cognoscendi)

showing, the ijnity

f^*f^^

world

ligible

existences

bers of

What,

?-

undertakes to do,

is

trace

to

as

to explain the ratjgjyiJ

and orders of

a

world"^I^ji

relations

"Being, to

*wScli,j3t,ll.

all

make them ^em-

onesysjem by showing how jail

oT~one^pnnciple to

intel-

between

are expressions

their differences can J)e

'foinake Being, therefore, something aparf from and irreducible to the principle of knowledge, is virtually to confess the inadequacy of the

brought back,

system and of the principle on which save that principle it cannot explain. his

based

it is

to

by admitting that there is^something rorJQescartes the tiru^jBscaj^jrojp

dilemma would

l^ave j3e^jDy_j}^^

2_2M5k-il?. own hesitating language

-

^ ol

God, and make the latter only the of the the impossible attempt to go was proof former, outside of knowledge for the explanation of knowledge and it was an attempt which his own account ;

of that idea rendered wholly arbitrary dictory.

or

Forwhat

inlateL'

ia

^

.alone

.....

of Grod is

To from the idea of from tibe

and

can be meant Jby ro i

fe

fe>

of

ft,

<^

108

Spinoza.

The^e^kjio ^advance to something new God, when in thought I The idea iiu :have already His necessary existence. " I think GooTtherealready ^he^jsxj^j^^

God from

f

itself.

fin thinking of the existence of

1

\

>//cfore

"jf lence

dod

is,"

is

no more a syllogism in which

exist-

from thought than cogito ergo sum is such a syllogism. The existence and the tjhgyf^ are^ is

inferred

It was because given in one act, i^s^g^jjlv^iiiiit^dr I Descates failed to jerceiy^this SEaJJhe ..unity to which

-j

was^ left_sjalL euQumbered with a y, it is to

be remarked that

the"

dualism which

remains unresolved in Descartes' view of the relation of

God and the world, continues of necessity unresolved in his conception of the relation of jnindjmd matter, of jsojoL,., and body.

If the infinite be arbitrarily separated from thefinite, the latter necessarily breaks into irreconcilable I

oppositions.

%

Thojug^l^^

and Accordingly, mind Lik^ ^ the world and the world .within matter, without,

ew independent Jfbitrary bond. They ^

J

entities tied together

are, as*we~~have seen, so defined as to be each the absolute negation of the other. The two are conceived of only as substances recip-

I

and

their very nature consists in being It would seem, therefore, imposreciprocally exclusive.

roeally exclusive,

sible that

two substances so defined should be united in

one system or brought into any real relation to each other. To be so would imply that mind should cease to be mind, or matter matter

that

mind should become

All the devices, therefore, extended, or matter think. which Descartes endeavours to include them in one "by

1

if

^'

Subordinate Substances. to knit together system, are expedients Mind has in rent asunder. irreparably

109

what has been it

ideas of cor-

but these ideas have no real but only a poreal things; to external objects, representative relation

and they

are

not the mind's own, but due to an outside power who mechanically inserts or infuses them and vouches for

Body and

their truth.

soul are not in themselves re-

they are not correlative factors of a whole which explains at once their difference and

lated to each other

;

unity, but independent substances brought and kept together by an external and unintelligible force. I Thus matter and mind fall asunder, and that which is \ their

supposed to unite them does not unite them for thought. There being nothing in their own nature which unites them, an arbitrary act of power, even

when

ignated omnipotent, explains nothing, but

another

way

of saying that

somehow

it

is

is

des-

merely

or another they

are united.

Thersndeed me

form

C

of

with

____

_

i<

e:^ his

phnosophvj^ads.

The dualism which

is

only verb-

reference to an inexplicable act of power, finds at least a possible solution when the extended and ally solved

by

thinking substances are subordinated to an absolute or substance in which their differences are

infinite

But in order in the

first

two things are the subordinate substances place, to this solution

deprived of their substantial character aad in ftft ;

attributes or accidents

common

substance

m

wMcli

*$&?>

110

Spinoza.

conceived of as something underlying yet different from And this, accordingly, is the process by which both. Descartes effected his final solution of the problem before him,

his disintegrated

the restoring to unity of

" that which so Substance, he tells us, is exists that it needs nothing else in order to its existBut in this sense the notion cannot be applied ence." Mind and matter retain, to finite, created existences. universe.

indeed, each its substantial character attribute with reference to the other to

God they

lose their

;

and distinguishing but with reference

independence and exclusiveness,

and become, as absolutely dependent, moments or accidents of His being. Further, the supreme or absolute substance in which mind and matter find their reality must be something in which their distinctive characno longer exist, a unity which is different

teristics

from both.

Though

elsewhere,

therefore,

Descartes

speaks of the nature of God as having a nearer affinity to mind than to matter, yet, contemplated as substance, he expressly declares that nothing can be predicated in the same sense of

and imperfect it is

in

God and

quali-

;

cannot have, for matter is divisible and if thought can be ascribed to Him,

Him

something "essentially different from thought God is therefore for us simply the unknown

fin man,

something which remains

and

The

finite creatures.

He

matter

ties of

man

when we

abstract

their distinctive attributes.

from nature

He

is

neither

matter nor thought, and if He can be conceived at all, it is only as the bare abstraction of Being which is common, to both.

It

is

little

wonder that Descartes' language should when lie seems to be

"become hesitating and ambiguous

Ml

Pantheistic Tendency.

own logic to a conception "which, instead of the differences of the finite world, seems to explaining them which, having absorbed nature annul or suppress

led

by

his

man

reduces God Himself to a lifeless which we can say nothing but that it is. But whilst Descartes, recoiling from the pantheistic abyss to the brink of which he had been led, refuses to

and

in God,

abstraction of

commit himself in left for

definite terms to this result,

it

was

another and more resolute thinker to follow out

his principles to their legitimate conclusion.

Spinoza.

NOTE. '

The

*

treatise

De Deo

et

Homiiie/ which has been brought

to light in recent times, may. be regarded as a kind of study ' for Spinoza's greater and more systematic work, the Ethics. 3

For the student of his philosophy its chief interest lies in Ihe fact that the ideas of the. later work are here presented As the title indito us in an inchoate and cruder form. cates, the subject of the earlier work is the same as that of the ]ater the succession of topics -is the same in both, ;

and we find in them many coincidences both of thought and expression. But the earlier treatise is less coherent and complete. There is much in it conceptions, definitions, phrases, scholastic and theological formulae which are. not found in the Ethics/ and which can only be regarded as survivals from a more immature stage of thought. At the outset Spinoza seems to be hesitating between different starting -points, and making trials of fundamental principles which are essentially inconsistent. There are many gaps in "

c

the logical sequence of thought, dialogues are interposed which interrupt the main .argument} and an appendix is added in whkh the doctrines of the work are re^discussed Ayfrom a different point of. view. But with all these diiferences the general character of the two works is the same. They bear the stamp" of the same niind, only of the same mind at an earlier and a later stage of its philosophical development. In the former we see the writer feeling his way .

J

!

God and man which reappear in the from irrelevances and inconsequences, as the

to ideas concerning

latter^lreed

final result of his speculations. p

/It was my intention, as formerly indicated, to prepare fbj * /the critieism and interpretation of the Ethics by a carec ful examination of the treatise De Deo et Homine. Such '

r AI /

I

,

/

3

an examination, however, would have extended this book I have theregreatly beyond the limits assigned to it. fore

been compelled

to

omit this part of

my general plan.

113

CHAPTEK VI THE

'

ETHICS

'

ITS

METHOD.

THE point of view of a philosophical writer reflects itself, not only in the substance of his teaching, "but in the form in which it is cast. Clear speculative insight may '

above the restraints of a

rise

false

but cannot altogether withstand

or defective method, its

influence.

Form

on matter, method unconsciously modiideas or hinders their full expression and develop-

inevitably reacts fies

ment.

From

we may

derive

its its

the form, therefore, of Spinoza's system some help in the endeavour to apprehend

general bearing and to discover the reasons both of success and of its failure, of what it does and of

what

it leaves undone. "What Sginozaaimed at was a ^system of knowledge in \ which e very th ing jjKoulcL_ follow by strjcj^ece^ityjof from the first principle with which .-ii^iaJiaEbs.r thought l*u~-~i f!mammitnmmMamm^ ^omaKaoM*****^, ^^^.^m^:a

1

WiuMMX^. xl

ti

3p; .

is

I

.>,..,,...,,,*.-"*

the function of reason to rise above the influence \

of the senses, to strip

away from the

plates the guise of contingency

objects

it

contain-

and independence with which ordinary observation clothes them, and Joje^^l things related tojaach other under the form of absolut To this enTir^ks to penetrate to the first necess^r. P.

XII,

\

114

Spinoza.

ground or presupposition of all thought and "being, to " that idea which represents the origin and sum of grasp nature,

and

so to

develop

all

our ideas from

that

it

knowledge

it

it

shall appear as the source of all other ideas."

With such

a conception of the nature of

how

Spinoza should regard thejscience of mathematics as affording the purest type of method, and

is

easy to see

should endeavour, as he has done, to cast his system in In geometry everything is based on geometrical form. the fundamental conception of space or quantity, and the whole content of the science seems to follow by rigid logical necessity

from

definitions

and axioms

re-

Might not the same exactitude, of certainty, necessity sequence be obtained for the truths of philosophy as for the truths of mathematics by

lating to that conception.

following the same method ? It was probably some such anticipation that led Spinoza to give to

the form which

is

indicated

by

its

^

inonstrated in

and

to

sefforHihis

of Euclid, in a series of definitions,

axioms, postulates, and of propositions and corolfrom these by strict logical deduction.

laries flowing

To what to

extent the defects of Spinoza's system are be traced to his method will perhaps appear in the

sequel

;

"but it

may

"be

pointed out here that, feomjhe

1. For one thing, philosophy must go further back than either mathematics or the sciences that treat of

outward nature. for granted

j

These sciences

may and do take much." admits of no unexamined prephilosophy The former not only deal with Iimite4

Geometrical Method.

115

departments of knowledge, and with tilings the existence of which is regarded as already known, without asking

how

they come to

known, "but they employ categories which they do not investigate, and which they do not pretend to do more presuppositions than verbally define. Even geometry may, in this point and forms

"be

of thought

of view, Toe called a hvjDothetical science. It presupposes the objective existence of space, and employs, without

inquiry into

its validity,

the category of quantity.

It

begins with certain definitions, e.g., of a point, a line, a surface, without examining into their origin or asking whether they are mere arbitrary conceptions, or express

what

and

absolutely true

is

content

itself

real.

PMosojahycannot

with such a method.

It start

and axioms,

tions

or

employ in an

caniiotToUow with

defini-

uncritical

way,

the physical sciences, such categories as being, It must go back to the very! substance, causality, &c. in a sense, create the matter with which begmning, and,

like

I

It

it deals.

by

gories

coming

must

entitle itself to the use of its

see them medium of thought, and necessary movement or pro-

tracing their origin

and development,

to the birth in the pure

evolving themselves in the

The

cess of reason. selves,

each with

its

special sciences

own

may

content them-

provisional view of things, and

relegate to philosophy the task of explaining

may

verifying

A

it.

fails

The geometrical method, when .

in that

.......

and

philosophy which did so would need

another philosophy to examine and criticise 2.

cate- \

it.

closely' ex^itiiieay

^BftlfoO^^

It does not furnish to philosophy the paradigm of a science in which everftMng follows "by strict

peculiar ^traction.

116 Spinoza. necessity from its flmdamental

rf

"

soplneal syste^ according to Spinoza's

the dmgrams of the nmthematici^ out a senes of

favour^

Ito

it i s

propositions

constructions are conditioned by and but are not produced bv it

idea,

* lt*{&fa
** *. nrrl

/<M

*,

<*.

i^

-

PI ,

r;r szzzs?. '

Inadequacy of tigns, it, gets^ are arbitrarily

Imp osed on

philosophical truth

If, therefore,

117

Method.

this

it

fr oni

is to be,

not a system

which by arbitrary synthesis you become fertile, but one in which that^pnnciple it own genetic power, ne^essa^ily^^ by

force its first prin-

in

ciple to

differentiates itself to

all particular

^

then obvi-f

truths,

the^

seek

is aT

?

"mlsconcetion_Jo system in the province^qf^ the mathematician. 3.

ophy

Xh^^Lafn^objSction to the employment in philosof the

geometrical

method

is

that

the^catego^^mi

confusion and error arise iroBT

i

one order of things conceptions or categories which are strictly applicable only to another and lower order of things, or in leaving out of account in lying to

the higher and more complex sphere all conditions and which pertain to the lower. Now the

relations save those

conceptions of space and quantity have their proper and exclusive application only to objects which can be conceived of as occupying extension or lying outside of each

w^nst philosophy, in ^ESiH^i has_to_dojj[i^^

other

;

so far as

it

deals wjththig

In vanish. ojjgejcialrelations matical method is applicable OB but^is ij^caa[^^ "consciousness, whicl^is^tlie^snhere of

science

recommends

itself

immanenci

by the

clear-

ness anosirnplicity of its conceptions and tae demonstrative certainty of its results. But; however valuable

within it

its

may be

own

sphere, as

compared with other sciences

said that itesir^ljje^^

118

Spinoza.

and

j^

its

certainty from its ignoring

of the very elements which, in the case of these sciences,

complicate the problems to be solved. Geometry, as we said, is based_ on the conception j)f _sj^ce, ,and_on

have

,

luG^J^.cjiiftsteujpiuioiis

all

or ligures in space.

relations of actual objects,

Xt abstracts

Irom

save those which arise

from their being extended from all conditions save that of not occupying the same parts of space with each

But

other. | which 1

this obviously is a

way

of looking at things

and conclusions reached with _^__~-_. .^-x**,^^^^^, ref do no I e^en^ejojuchjmGtoc^ons lapp^^Iotly,, lp,|ikis purely i J

ing, to^ _ 1

1

:

norg .eld

abstract

; )

any thing _T5e5cmd the abstraction Q

itself.

Even

ec ^ s are incapable of being reasoned about ]^j

conclusions which are true of space arid its parts good with respect to them. In the material world

which are unities merely of aggrethat of parts which seem to be only is, up, externally related to each other, and to be connected with other unities only externally. But there are no mate-

there are indeed unities

dion

made

rial realities

which

are absolutely continuous or

which

can be thought of as if their component parts were related to each other as the ideal parts of pure space, or as if propositions with reference to lines, surfaces, solids

were unconditionally applicable to them. Nor, again, axe there any material realities which are not related to ,eacii

other in other ways than can be embraced under Inorganic sub-

the conception of spatial extension. stances undergo chgoaiQal changes

which do iK^admitjpf

bejrxg^^^ but spacedEesnot, and the rusting a change of spatial

relations.

involve other

rusts, is

something more

ChejnigaJ. changes,

Inadequacy of

this

Method

119

In a chemical compound the unity is one which the elements have lost their independent

spajje.

o;F

quantitative existence

;

their spatial individuality has

Still less do vanished in the neutral product. existences admit of being adequately dealt with ^

^ganic

unoer the category

of quantity.

A living

being

is

not

composed of parts which exist simply outside of each other, and have only external or spatial relations to each other. There is a sense in which in an organism In a mere material aggregate the whole

the_whole. simply the

i

sum of the parts but in ajivijig uniiy, when summed have you up all the parts, you Tiave left out ;

something which escapes

spatial, measurement, and yet which constitutes the very essence of the thing. It is lei \ ^ eaS6 s *~ J ,livnig ^at^ ajijDXg&nism descends into the sphere to which quantitative me^sTfte AiKJ"tKe reason isTEat"itsunity is Hot of parts belong.

A

On

io4

t

^external to parts, but of parts which havejiheir being in each other notji^je^^

manenffor rise to

self-internal unity.

all, when we when we propose

Least of

the sphere of spiritual things,

tSerelationsof tioa and man, to treat of such things as intelligence, freedom, duty, immortality, can we adequately apprehend them by a method which

to consider

turns on quantitatiye relations. else

they are, are things

which

Organisms, whatever occupy space, and

still

therefore partially be apprehended by means of a category which deals with objects externally related

may

tcj

each other. sciousness

we

outwardness.

t.

But

in the sphere of thought of self-conhave absolutely transcended that of spatial

The Jad-isisiB unity

of

120 Spinoza.

No

.s

thought or

*

'#

'

r7'i*'./

(t

.

feel

Influence of this Method.

121

and the explanation of the errors into which he is of his system becomes betrayed and the general bearing more intelligible when we consider it in the light of that method, as a brie|_glanee at some ideas,

;

may suffice 1.

One

to show.

of these points is his

with the jmrely^ ajmnatiye, In one of his determinejd_^'"ith the

infinite

negative.

it

is

1

passage: "As to the doctrine^ and not anything positive, * negation figure in- ^ plain that the whole of matter, considered

occurs that

letters

the following is

definitely,

can have no

figure,

and that

and determinate bodies.

exist in finite

figure can only

He who

*t

says

*j

that he perceives a figure, merely says that he has before But this limitation does not his mind a limited thing. pertain to the thing in. respect of its being, but, on the 'A

?

*i *f

As^ then, figure j_s nothing contrary, of its non-being. but .limitation,, and limitation is negation, figure, as. I ,

:

hve_jaid, can be nothing but negation." The same** principle is expressed in more general terms in another 2

letter,

where he writes

whose

ceive anything

which

is

:

" It

is

a contradiction to con-

definition involves existence, or,

the same thing, affirms existence, under negaAnd since determination indicates

tion of existence.

nothing positive, but only a privation of existence in the i nature conceived as determinate, it follows that tl^at^of H

be Applying the principle enunciated, he in the same ^^ affirms^jexistencejcannot

.

50.

.co&*

.

122 f

Spinoza.

since the nature of

God

does not consist in a certain

kind of being, but in being which, is absolutely indeterminate, His nature demands everything which perfectly expresses being, otherwise it would be "determinate and " the same doctrine, that finite being is negation, infinite being absolute affirmation," is laid down 1 in the Ethics.

And

defective."

7

i

In these passages the influence of what may be termed a geometrical^ conception of the universe is jobyipus. WherTlve'represent to ourselves the relation of infinite finite by that of space and its determinations, the idea of the finite becomes that simply of privation or figure in space has no individual reality ;

and

A

^negation. 11 so far as it has

any positive reality, it is only the that reality belongs to the part of infinite space which ts periphery cuts off; and in so far as it can be said to lave any individual existence in distinction from infinite

space, that existence is not positive

created solely .s

outside. of

by

but negative,

negating

of being. negation, want,^

Its sole

being

it

is

of space that

all

Itsjscy; essence, th eref ore,

it.

,

cutting off or

is

is

privation,

non-being.

Spinoza applies to all finite or In so far as they have any reality, it is not their own, but that which pertains to them as and any apparent parts of the being of the infinite particjilarjxij^ences.

;

negative ixregseg,

not what

itjjx-

It is

we

can pictorially represent to ourselves figured but these constructions are purely portions of space entia ideal, rationis, fictions of the mind. Space itself true that

;

has no parts

;

it

overflows, so to speak, these arbitrary i

Eth.

&*ii*Al^AiilfeA.

i.

8,

schoL

Determination and Negation.

123

'

divisions

And

and annuls them.

in like manner,

it is

to particular finite beings, possible for imagination to lend material or spiritual, an apparent independence or in-

But

dividuality.

this individuality is purely fictitious.

1 '

which is imagination, which regards under the

It exists only for ordinary experience,

controrof 'appe&rjB&e.s

or for

;

as real anything that can be pictured. penetrates to the reality of things, it to be an. illusion

Whe^jthought j

it

breaks

down

the false abstraction, and perceives the

n^t ofjhejgart but of the... whole, not of the .finite It is obvious also what, from this / but dfthe^^mfinite. is the of view, only conception that can be formed point

that,

of

"a

When we

Bem

withdraw

the arbitrary limits which distinguish the finite from the infinite, what we reach is simply that which is free from all limits or

and

1

determinations, the absolutely indeterminate ; merely negations, the removal

as determinations are

of all negations leaves us in the presence of non-negation, or of pure, absolute affirmation. As the very essence of

^5"^j^"-^-^^g5527privation or negation the essence of the infinite

which

is,

existing, seeing its very nature is

We see, is

of being, so

simply pure Being, that or that which cannot be conceived save as is

one with existence.

therefore, in so far as this part of his

concerned,

system

the^jn^^

me^bjo^ The conception of things on which that method is based excludes any other alternative of

determination or indetermination.

other words,

another^ ,

tjjgfcjjg,

of

an

124

Spinoza.

Yet the way to this alternative lay open to Spinoza when he had reached the last result which his method ;ould yield. For an affirmation _ which is J_eachedjpy legation, cannot JgjiQre

Apart from negation pure A negative element enters

it.

affirmation has no meaning.

into Its very essence.

pure space on which

In

it is

itself,

like the conception of

it is

based,

a mere abstraction

needs the negative or determinate as And when we have reached this point, t

jits

;

correlate.

we have got elements of the beyond contradictory negation and affirmation to an idea which includes both. Thus thejiiinite,

in the _ highest sense of the }vord, niust_ JD_ con-

ieived not as the simple negation _of the finite^^biit^as ,hat

which

at once denies

and

affirms^

What

it.

this

lew further implies what is involved in the notion of infinite which does not annul, but realises itself in id

through the differences of the

not the place to show. step,

it

Had

finite

world

would have implied the reconstruction

whole system.

As

this is

Spinoza taken this further of his

the idea of a purely affirmative or a which of finite is merely the illusory subinfinite, it is,

stantiation of imaginary distinctions in the infinite, it

j^tjb^^

ever illogically associated with his

2.

system

Connected with the

it,

modify or correct

and

foregoing,

and in further thought to his

w
his rejection of

any other than that of amount or quantity of being. In a system in which all things follow from the

"

it,

one^j^^

illustration of the relation of Spinoza's

'method,

had

which, how-

first

r *'"'''

Freedom and

12&

Perfection.*"

with the same necessity as the properties of a geometrical figure from its definition, or a jjogcal^ conprinciple

course,

premisses, individual

its

clji^Lpji^jfoom

The

an impossible conception.

dom. according to Sginoza,

arises

freedom illusion of

of

is,

Jjee-

from the tendency

the already noticed as belonging to ordinary thinking tendency to see things abstractly or with the eyes of imagination. The individual thinks himself free becaus<

he

is

conscious of his desires

and

actions, but.jjot of

t

He can imagine him con^ti^is^lhat determiiie them. self to have acted otherwise than he has done, and can j

ascribe to himself a capacity of so acting, for the same reason that he can picture himself as an isolated and But when he looks independent being in the universe.

with the eye of reason rather than of imaginahe can no more think himself acting otherwise than tion, he has acted, than a triangle, if it were conscious, could at himself

think

its

other

number

angles equal to three or four right angles or any of right angles than two. For the same

reason the terms __

.

.

good andeyil, |iaV6j :

or a

^ he

frqrn^

meaning_diggrent from thatj^ti^

"Were men "that

born?

were they led by reason alone, or possessed of adequate ideas of things they could form no idea of good and evil." "We may create for ourselvei free," says

is,

the abstracting power of imagination fictitious standards of human perfection, and judge men

by

ing as they fulfil or fall short of them; merely a human way of looking at divine intelligence what we call

good

ing individual independence

a&4

but

126

Spinoza.

We

the infinite, have no existence. compare men with, each other in view of this arbitrary standard, and regard 1

but what separates the God, absolutely perfect Being, is simply his finitude, and no one finite being can be nearer to the one as more imperfect than another

man from

than another.

infinite

There

indeed, another side of Spinoza's, teaching^ we shall see, a certain

is,

orcling to which, as

independence or self-assertion, a tendency to maintain itself or ersist in its own being, is ascribed to each individual existence.

But even here we find that the quasi moral

"distinctions

which

this principle introduces,

do not turn

on any conception of a universal element in man's nature, a self deeper than the natural self, to which merely

On the contrary, quantitative measures will not apply. this supposed tendency or impulse points to is

what

simply the maintaining and increasing by each individual " Perfection and of the amount of its being. reality," "

mean

the same thing."

1

It is the possession that "reality" distinguishes one individual from another. The more reality, the more says" he,

of

more or

less of this

thinking and acting an intelligent being so much the more perfect or virtuous he is. possesses, " I say that an individual passes from a less to a of

power

^ When

^greater perfection and vice versa, I understand Jby this, that we conceive that his power of action, in so far *A as it is 'understood from his own nature, is increased

^

2

The

*\or diminished.",

great

principle

of

all spiritual

thus simply the working out and enlargement of our own individual nature. Even if apparently un-

activity

is

such as sympathy with and participation

selfish naotives,

fc, flef.

.

,>

*j

;

HI'I

f

f

i'

<

"*

' j (

,

/

f

Ibid* iv., Prefc

fl.

t

P

"

|

"

jjUytf

x

tf (t /,'.

*

A

'

-

'

^ *i*^

3

?

Idea of Final Cause. -in the good of others, are admitted as possible principles of action, the ground of this possibility is that the

happiness of the object of such affections contributes to the increase or expansion of our own individual being. 3.

The

influence of Spinoza's

method betrays

itself

again inJjilLiej^

1 * }>

A

philosophy which regards all things as following by logical sequence from the first principle, obviously excludes any question of the end or final cause of Such a principle does not aim at its results, or things.

employ means to reach them. These results simply are, and cannot be conceived to be other than they are

;

they do not arise as matters of foreseen design, "but are absolutely determined by the nature of the principle

with which

we

to finite things exist^

start.

We may

or beings,

why

not ask, with respect

j

what end thoyj what end the proper-!

or for

any more than we ask for a triangle exist. Of these we can only say that

*

ties of

they axe-j or that they are because they are given along with the definition of the thing itself. And in like/

manner, of

all finite existences

they point to or are explained that they are because

God

is,

we can

only ay, not that

by any

ulterior end,

but/

or because they are the

necessary ^determinate expressions of His being. Spinoza's condemnation of a teleological view of the

world

is directed mainly against that kind of teleology which constitutes the so-called "yCTJ^^ To view the world teleologically^ would, he twg$% imperfection in God by conceiving of Hte a$ an end outside of Himself. It would be to <j

^

after the

analogy of

finite benajfy

,

.'"'/'>

'['>['

/^/:

6

V'.,)".J

,'swi

i

r ,'.

128

Spinoza.

to their unrealised conceptions, or are impelled

conscipusnes^ of wants satisfy

them.

an end, ^ stands

He

to

aim

by the which will

at objects

"

Ifjjtad," says b-^^l^AlJor^the^safee, necessarily seeks something of which^He

Theologians maintain that" God and therethings for His own sake, fore they are necessarily compelled to admit that Godi stood in need of and desired those things for which He Jii jieed.

has done

v

.

.

.

all

.

determined to prepare the means."

view

ological

1

.

.

But though

a tele-

of the world, rightly apprehended, does

not thus separate the end from the beginning, and therefore .may be freed from the objection that it implies original imperfection in the axithor of it, it is obvious that in no sense can such a view be expressed in terms of quantity, or under that category on which the geo-

metrical

method

The idea

is based.

of Final Cause is

that of a unity which realises itself in differences, which, by its own inner impulse, gives rise to differences, yet ever

maintains returns

itself

upon

and through these

in them,

It implies

itself.

which neither the unity

is lost

a geometrical method

is

But, as we have already seen, incapable of expressing any such

sejf^drtiating, does not determine rise to

in the differences nor the

but in which, the^further the

differences in the unity,

original unity become.

differences

an organic process, in

itself

"g

Space Sfefc "ETts^own*^msioiis, or give

the determinate objects conceived as existing in

'Nor does space retract these arbitrary differences any more than it produces them and when we have withdrawn, them and restored the original unity and

it.

;

1

a

Eth.

'

i,,

Append,

True and False continuity of space, process. itself,

The unity

Teleology.

129

has not become any richer by the prior to the finite was complete in

it

and the arbitrary differentiation and reintegration

has not increased

its

wealth.

The

differences are not

preserved but annulled in the final unity, and it is the same self -identical unity at the end as at the beginning.

I

p,

xn.

130

OHAPTEE

VII.

7

SPINOZA S STABTING-POINT

THE

starting-point of

SUBSTANCE.

Spinoza's system " as

which he defines

is

the idea of

thai

itseKjuadJs_jc^QejredJhroii^hjt^lf

i.e. 9

that, the con;

ception^of which tloesjnptn^ ^

This substance he

^^^J^sl^tojts^^^^ion."

characterises as infinite, indivisible, unique, free, eternal, as the cause of itself and of all things, and as consisting of a

2j#]^^

two

^^,

,

whom

solutely injfoute-^tEat

is,

he defines

Being ab-

substance consisting of infinite

which each expresses an

attributes, of

as " a

eternal

and

infinite

essence." 2

In beginning with

this idea Spinoza

is

attempting

own thepry of knowledge viz., that "in our mind may correspond to the exemplar of

to realise his

order that nature,

it

must develop

all its

ideas from the idea

which

represents the origin and sum of nature, so that that* idea may appear as the source of all other ideas." 8

1

,

del

a.

2

Ibid.,

del

6.

3

D e Emend., vii.

42.

Philosophy and Experience. *3*.<,t...i.~.

j

^

K

.

"...

-.,

r J31 ,^/v^ >

\vitli the according to this view, beginj^ the ^i?HJ ar ? it *"2oes not proceed by

induction or generalisation from the facts of observation

and experience, but

it

seejsajjg^asg thej^imat.ejinjiyj

t

\

|

f

the highest principle of things, andjbo Its method is, not to ?5i?tsBS e s. the universaTlSFoni reach the particular, but to jknowjQj.e

from

it

all J^ti*]dfl

particular

thrj^^

But in thus endeavouring from -which

are

all

to to

find a first

principle

be evolved, does not

things Spinoza lay himself open to the charge often brought against philosophy, of neglecting or anticipating ex-

perience,

and attempting

to

explain

the world b

mstance St-SSj: ^l ^^tem^.a flagrant^ j^B2ll^2iifl0of the ^unscientific method of metaphysicians who in-fl terpret nature by siibjective theories, instead of2 bj s

s ^

patnj)bservation "and genera iisatin of_| acts, t

^^

own

letting

Suppose we could ever apprehend the unity with which he starts, would it not be the end rather than the beginning of knowledge?

nature be her

interpreter

?

Science is ever seeking to embrace lower in higher and more comprehensive generalisations, and the ultimate goal to which the scientific impulse points may be a law

which would comprehend all laws, a final principle which would transcend the inadequate and partial explanations of the world which particular sciences give, and achieve for them what they, each in its own province, attempt to

do for the special phenomena with,

which they deal. But even if such a goal were actually attainable, would it not be so only as th$ la$t of the-, long labour of science ; and must not the hasty attempt to snatch at this unity by a mere

result

u^

132

Spinoza. of

effort

futile

abstract

thought be regarded as vain

and

?

The answer in the case of Spinoza^ as in that of all kindred ^inkers^Js that .Jghilosogh^^does not^e^^ct but only seeks to examme^andLcnticise jbhe expedience, presuppositions involy^ed m^ jt, to trace back jo their ultimate ground the principles on which, unconsciously, ^

ordinary and scientific thought proceeds ; and then to or, in one sense, to re-create it ^interpret experience in

the light of the results thus reached.

This account

work implies that philosophy must, in a sense, reverse the order of ordinary and even, of scientific experience, and beginning with the highest universal which thought involves, show how from it all lower universalities take their rise, and how the whole world of its

of finite particular existences is

by becoming linked in bonds first

transformed for thought

of rational necessity to the

principle of all things.

The

then

projjSggj^^

is,

in

^je^nseT^^ed^ oj^.^nd^^^ Metaphysic does not pretend to create the world out of ts

owncategories,

work

of science.

less to supersede the special the contrary, it is through the

still

On

discovery of the partial and inadequate explanation of hings which the categories of science furnish that it is

ed to seek

after

a deeper satisfaction for thought, an

interpretation of the world

by higher

principles, till it

that final interpretation which is given by a principle that rests on no higher, but is seen by its own Attains

Reversing the process,

ight ,

iq'Jin.,

it

then seeks to show

how

previous stages of knowledge, from the highest lowest^ become transformed in the light of the

133

True Order of Knowledge. principle of knowledge, or

first

in their reality

only when

how

all

regarded as

things are seen

^its

expressions or

manifestations. Spinoza's,

method, then^

is_iiot justly chargea-blejw:

If his

i&vexBmgJht^^

phil-

osophy be found defective, the defect will lie not in his beginning where he did, but in the nature of the idea with which he began

;

not in his attempt to start with

which all things might be derived, but in the idea with which he started being incapable of fulfilling the function assigned to it, and in his a

first

principle from,

attempting to explain all things from this principle If nio^S3LJB^SSB simply by analytic deduction. has had more success in dealing with the problem, perhaps the reason may, in some measure, be that science, its

by

marvellous progress, has worked into the hands day as it did not and could noi

of philosophy in our

do in Js,_

it

his.

The inadeg^a^

o

in part at least, traceable to the fact that he found possible, so to speak, to reach the infinite by a short

whjktmodernj^ou^.t, in some measure, owes, the of the idea which constigreater tutes its starting-point, to the fact that it has had to attain that idea by a slower and severer process. The own to find his was problem forJSginoza, by showing, a first principle which would explain the universe, after cut

;

the analogy of mathematical science, according to the simplest

of

categories.

The probl^mv of finding

-a

final

which must presuppose the previous interpretations of it "by the whole range of the physical and biological $taenq?e&, ^nd wMch must interpretation

of nature

I

134

Spinoza. the categories on these sciences are "based, and itself at once com-

supply a principle of criticism of I which

Iprehend and transcend them. SUBSTANCE. Spinoza's starting-point, the idea which is to be "the source of all other ideas," that which explains all else but needs no other idea to explain it, is " Substance," " that which is in which, as already said, he defines as

and is conceived through itself." When we ask what Spinoza means by substance, we seem precluded by the very terms of the definition from all ordinary methods of explanation. The question what it is, itself

seems to be answered simply by the affirmation that

it

the question how we are to conceive of it, by what other ideas we are to be enabled to apprehend its mean-

is

;

seems to be met by the affirmation that it is that which can be conceived only through itself: we may understand all other ideas by means of it, not it by means of them. But whilst thus we seem debarred from any direct

ing,

explanation of the nature of substance, we may come at the answer indirectly if we consider, in the light of Spinoza's theory of knowledge/

,

wh&^^ Wecan

v^

understand the world, or bring our thoughts " into correspondence with the exemplar of nature," he tells us,

we have seen, only by "developing aU our ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source of " and the idea which constitutes the " origin of nature ; as

natrare," iofinito,

he elsewhere defines as that of " a Being, single, which is the totality of being, and beyond

'M j$,d>< f

j

Whole.

which there

is

no being."

1

From

this

^ wtgjile,

and

for

which aU other ideas have a meaning

they are deto of the idea of the whole. light ---^^^r,^*,*,*^*****,,*,^.*!!^ ^J3**~~~~~>-~~" -

rg^tj^onlj

^

as

stance means, therefore,

stand this

that,

true or

much

by

at least

this

Whatever

else sub;

term we are to under-

that idea of the whole or

which only can all inThis maj dividual things and thoughts be understood. be further illustrated by considering the contrast whicl totality of being, in the light of

elsewhere Spinoza draws between that "vague rience

"

expe

which popular knowledge consists, and thai intuitiva which is the highest and only rea

of

scientia

kind of knowledge.

The^j^a^

^

to individual

No

jbhmgs is pMc.J. in .nature '".>.^.

......

a singlejsplated thing. Each object is what it is on.1} in virtue of its relations to other objects, and ultiniatel) to the whole system of being. Ordinary observation

looks at things superficially, or as to the outward eye they seem to exist, each%tpart from or side by side with

the

rest.

Judging merely by the

senses, it confound;

externality in space with independent existence, and leaving out of view all deeper relations, it represents t< itself the spatial separation of stones, plants, animals, a

But when equivalent to an isolated or absolute reality. cease to look at outward appearance things^terjhe

we

imier 1

* L

bond

De Emend,

of

Each

i

ix.

I

136

Spinoza.

dividual thing forms part of a^nj^nitejse^^ effects;

what they

its

place,

form, functions,

activities,

are

but through its connection with other beings, and ultimately with the whole universe of being. !N~ot an atom of matter could not through

are,

be other than

it is

itself alone,

without supposing the whole material is ; and to understand a single

oiid to be other than it naterial

substance,

we must take

into

ac.c,9U3xL_aot

immediate environment,.. but the causesjor onditions, which have created that environment^jupj. so .erely its

And^the sam$_prinj3i^^

to

spiritual beings; they, too, are successive

existences

which have only a semblance of individuality,

a trick of the imagination,

we

look upon ourselves

independent, self-determined individuals; but oux life is involved in our relations tocher as theirs

again in that of those^

who

sur-

Rightly viewed, each so-called ndividual

is

only a transition-point in a

movemenTof

the gast^and Chus the substantial reality erf " " substance vanishes, and we can apply the designation only to the whole, the totality of being which includes

determines them. tlie

dved through

"All

That whole

is

" only being which is in

the only true initself

and

is

con-

1

"are

itself."

bodies," writes Spinoza in

one of

Ms

letters,

by other bodies, and reciprocally determine and e determined by them to exist and act in a fixed and clefi-

ixroiinded

p.I5.

'

4-

The Universe a Substance. Hence

nite way.

it

137

follows that every body, in so far as

it

under a certain definite modification, ought to be considered as merely ajDa^ti[ie^whole universe, which agrees and thereby is injffiJaiSS^ the witihjtsjwhole, and since the nature of the universe is not limothejr^Barts ited, but absolutely infinite, it is clear that by this nature, exists

;

with its infinite powers, the parts are modified in an infinite number/of ways, a.nd compelled to pass through an infinity aJb>^~ of variations. Moreover, when I tiwrik., ^ I conceive of a y^clpje^Tj^^^ x>le for, as 1 have elsewhere shown, it is the nature ,nce to be infinite, and therefore each single part .

s

.

_

;

to the nature of corporeal substance, so that apart it can neither exist nor be conceived. And as to

therefrom

I

cj^nsmejoLii^

as

which, as infinite, contains in

it

the idea of all nature, and whose thoughts run

parallel with existence."

By

"substance," therefore,

we

are to understand, in '

t^ t^|Hjy

the^j2a,pf

7

of,"being' or the

Further, thissu'bstajace

is

by

its

to

^^^ ticular to

step the regress of causes

by

existence,' material or

be what

are

it

trace

back par-

needs as

much

of the series.

that

we

1

is

determined

to

it was only by an illusory abstraction conceived of the latter as an

individual,

Y

spiritual,

But, however far back we go, we with the particular or finite, which be determined as the initial member

is.

still

dealing

ma y

by which each

"^" e

step

it

If

is

only by a like abstraetioxi

conceive of any aggregate of such individufrl& $& any reality apart from, the wjhole, "W& JOO&y t&solve

'

'

-

'

v

^'^i^^

my

M

,

'

u

138

Spinoza.

particular tiling into a larger

whole of which

forms a

it

"an part, but that larger whole is itself but a fragment individual of the second order, but still an individual."

And though we may of

process

proceed in the same

successive

inclusions,

way by

correcting

a

con-

the

by a higher, we can neyjgr reach that of wjiich such movement by any ascending ception of each lower unity

we areTinjuest by which

the

all finite

whole, the ^solute unity

iiiflnite

things are

dete^mjrmi^

ev^a^e.

But all

if

we

cannot reach the

^En^by

finite

causes and

infinite,

series

of

Thea^wer

jpf

are^jve^ to ^con^lu^

effects,

that the object joj^jn^uj^^ is it to be attained?

truest is vain,

how

,

>'f*.

that

down from

to bring it

the substance of

through a receding

it

seeking

we need not ascendtoheaven

above, for

"Every idea or

thing

existing

and

infinite

;

necessarily l

of

any body

mj^vej^^ Jhe^ jetonal

Our ordinary consciousness

^essence."

is

we have seen, in one point of view, arbitrary and illusory but we have only to examine what is its indeed, as

;

real content

and meaning

-hat is -virtually

to perceive that it involves

the consciousness of the

infinite.

All

what is limited rests on an implicit iwledge Terence to what is unlimited. Every conception of a ieular space or body presupposes the idea of infinite pace or extension. Every particular idea implies a of

mal reference to an infinite thought. .ction of itself

mind and

matter, of ideas

impossible save

by

And

the dis-

things,

would

a tacit appeal to the idea of "

i

and

Bth..ii. 45.

Infinite Substance.

an

unity which

infinite

finite jlxonght

lies

and being,

beyond

therefore,

And

AIL*

their difference.

rests^njiiaj^i^-^fi

of this ultimate

idea,

this}

prius of all thought and being, it must be affirmed that j whilst other ideas rest on it, it rests itself on no other It cannot be proved by anything outside of itself, fo: no thing or thought could be or be conceived save or ant It the assumption of it. is^beyond demonstration

inaccessible to doubt, for demonstration

It

djyDe^ defined as

"that which

is

can only

in itself and

is

b<

conceived:

itself."

through

What

is

to

be said in criticism of Spinoza's funda-

That mental principle has been already anticipated. the individual can only be understood in the light oJ the whole system of being to which he belongs, that al the differences of the finite world presuppose and resi on an ultimate unity which is itself beyond demonstra tion or doubt, are propositions the soundness of wldcl

cannot doctrine

The

be questioned. may be jsa^

y ea^gggo^ that his substance

oTjiffi feSLjfe^feSfit.

that ^^jj]j*i s

It

n

may be

it se ]j;

true to say that substance

%&

conceived through

itself,

is

or

otherwise expressed, that tl^thou^ht^ But the significance and force of the prov^JHiaJhfiing. so-called

"ontological argument" lies in this, that the

unity ofjhouglit and an abstract but a r

thought,

which,

is

The a distinction in

one which thought caa

when we

bmg

to

HO

Spinoza.

it has already tranimplied in it, thought in thinking But the unity Jbhus reached is_j;]ie^mity^o/' scended.

the related^elements, npt something which merely

beyond them;

it

lies

jB^Jains^

What

expresses is, that thought and"beare correlated elements in that ing, though distinguishable, which all knowledge self-consciousness ultimate unity of

beginning and seeks as its goal. The substance, on the other hand, is reached, as

presupposes as Sjjonpzistic

we have

it

its

reconciliation of opposed but

by the

seen, not

elements in a higher unity, but simply by It is abstracting from the difference of these elements.

related

not the reason of these differences but the unity that is And as all differences vanish got by obliterating them. in of

it, it.

no

so

determination, but (0

from or be predicated no principle of self-

differences can proceed

It not only contains in it

How

mraations.

it is itself

the negation of

then can Spinoza

frnj^jln

all detor-

!^Jnfi^ite

su^sjance. the JSOTI^^ _

and. multiplicity question

is

of

existence

containejd in

and "modes."

^'^ fa

The answe^Jo^^tiiis

3

his doctrine -

(I

n *.y/

^^

,

H.

J

HI

k

I

CHAPTEE

VIII

SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTES. to fulfil the function assigned to it as the first

EIGHTLY

of

principle

knowledge,

so conceived as to

"be

"be,

"substance" must

Spinoza's

not only the presupposition,

It must but the productive source of all finite being. be the ideal origin and explanation of things as well as

that which transcends them.

forced back to

ences, but also

ences are evolved. finite

We

must not merely be

the unity which is above find in it that from which

it as

world must

The transition, lie

all differall differ-

in other words, to the

in the very nature of substance.

Does Spinoza's substance answer

to this conception? capable of doing so is obvious, not merely causa sui, but causa omnium

That he deemed Substance rerum. into

It

is

is

it

a unity

which

differentiates

"infinite attributes," then into

and these of

first

last again are niodified by an infinite number " finite modes." The world which is meaxiiagteap

apart from

and

itself,

"infinite modes,"

it,

the individualities which are

unrealities looked at in themselves^

from non-entity by the intuitive which sees them instinct tvith. tin,

Spinoza. of

" substance."

All things are unreal viewed as inde-

pendent or distinct from God; in so far as

we

can discern in

all

things become real

them the

self-affirmation

All thinking things, all objects of all thought, as Spinoza regards them, throb with the The dead world vital pulse of the universal life.

of the divine nature.

becomes alive in God.

But though there can be no doubt as to the part which Spinoza intended his first principle to play, the first step he takes raises the question whether it is inherently I

,>* tl/

I

capable of the function assigned to

it

IcajDable,

sub-

be

inis_not jo^cpngeive without ^ivm^.u,pi%, ssa^i^J^ure, j^jjassing

staJ4Sfi^j^lLe_ ^defines it^

J

whether^ ct as to

oride^tityj^ which consists in the

|fxoia,ita..self-my.oived unity

This tion of

step is that

first

ascrip-

" infinite attributes " to the infinite substance.

"Substance"

or

"God"

"consists of infinite attributes

expresses the eternal and infinite But of these infinite attributes, whilst wo essence." x know that their number is infinite, only two, " thought "

each

of._which._

and " extension," *

are cognisable by human intelligence. the ground or reason of this differentiation How does Spinoza find the of the absolute unity 1

What,

then,

attributes

is

in his

substance'?

To

this

answer seems to be, that whilst (1) there

question the nothing in

is

the nature of substance, as Spinoza conceives

it,

which

can logically yield, but everything to preclude ^any such element of difference, (2) failing such logical ground, lie simply asserts without proof the differentiation of sul)r which he has empirically reached. -

'stance into attributes

In other words, the attributes are not differences to 1 ,

Eth. i, del 6.

S'td>stance

and

which substance determines determined by

143

Attributes.

itself,

but to which,

it

is

us.

As we have

already seen, Spinoza's process to the the infinite, regressive .movement by which he reaches substance as the ultimate unity of knowing and being, (1.)

is

simply the removal of the limit by which

finite

things

are supposed to be quantitatively distinguished from the Number and measure are nothing but fictitious infinite.

instruments of the imagination by which we break up the indivisible into parts. Space in itself is one and ? f

'"

You cannot continuous, not made up of discrete parts. take one portion of space and isolate it from the rest, or Part say that one portion is here and the next there. runs into part, and it is only by a false abstraction that you can view them as separate from each other. 1 " And the Figure," therefore, is "nothing positive."

The same principle applies to all finite existences. positive existence we ascribe to them is, when closely To get to real viewed, only negation, or non-existence.

we must

or affirmative being

draw the

fictitious limit,

negate the negation, withas the real

and what we get

simply the absolutely indeterminate, the logical abstraction of Being.

To predicate

entity would be

differences of this colourless

to introduce into it non-entity.

A

termined absolute would be a partly non-existing abIFrom this point of view, therefore, it would solute.

seem that Spinoza

is

precluded Jrpm

<

gjjgLJL-S^^ To do ^sta^^.

.so

would

be, as

hBlumself

SSys/*

conceive under the category of non-existeax^tlxat whose definition affirms existence."

Ep*50.

2

Ep. 61.

]

whilst by the very idea of substance Spinoza (2.) Yet would seem to bo precluded from giving to it any determinations, we find him passing at once from the notion of substance as the negation, to that of substance as the

1

I

jless 1

The codourup with a rich and The unity which was reached by ab-

affirmation, of all possible determinations.

blank becomes at a stroke

varied content. straction

from

differences

filled

seems to bo identified with a

unity which contains all differences. Thought' seems to re-enact the part for which imagination was condemned that of dividing the indivisible, of introducing

number and measure

into

the absolute.

Substance -^ ****

~. -

which, logically, substance^ modified. """"TfiTis

the

which

of

n

consists of Infinite attributes infinitely

easier to discern the

logic

w

the purely indeterminate, passes into^

is

motive than to understand

this transformation.

by

refTD^ijbjx-^eJ.ed

his

own

Had_ Spiiic^a-

Jogic, his system

not

would

have ended where

it began. Philosophy, along with other things, comes to an end, in a principle which reduces all thought and being to nothingness. Moreit is not difficult to understand how should over, Spinoza

seem

to see

more in the idea of substance than it legitiWhile he ostensibly rejected all

contained.

mately detOTinations from

>n tacitly

it,

in his thought an element of

dung

to

it.

^^hid^g^oOTe^m^^tlie is possible to devise a theory which implies the separation of unity aoxd difference, of th universal and But the particular, of affirmatioxi and negation. cty$psit
laments

am

really corr^tives^

v ,dejaejih secretly cliags

to

md

145

Difference.

denies

It is impossible really to

it.

think an affirmative

affirms nothing in particular,

which

blank affirmation devoid of

or-

which

is

pure,

When^the

all negation.

.jjartigolar

vanishes from thought, the universal vanishes

withjit.

TJmJj^hicl^ carries with

"diversity,

b^m^jitg.jiiganingless ^cpnception^ag^atjpf

therefore,

Spinoza began by rightly denying, or pronon esse, the particular existences of the

it

no implication. pj

nouncing to be

world apart from their unity, that to which his thought pointed was the assertion, not of pure abstract unity, but of the reality of these particulars in relation

finite

The converse

to their unity.

of the nothingness of the

particular independent of the universal was, not the reality of the abstract universal, but the reality of the

Prom the negation of accidents without substance what thoiight sought after was, not the assertion of substance without accidents, but

particular in the universal.

the assertion of accidents transformed into the necessary moments or attributes of substance, of substance realising itself in fore,

and through

accidents.

the former of these alternatives

was the was the real

indeterminate substance

method, the

latter

Though,

the:

pure, absi

logical result of

hi

which

th<

result

to

hidden, unconscious logic of his thought pointed.

was

latter for the former,

leap,

It

natujrarToT- him, therefore, tacitly to substitute the

and so

to pass, apparently

by a

from the notion of God or Substance as the nepr

tion, to that of all possible

God

or Substance as the affixmation, of

determinations.

But though it is possible thus to trace the real movement of Spinoza's thought, that movement was not a p.

K

XIL

'

,#

146

Spinoza.

conscious one, and

own

it

was not thus that he

justified his

"What he seemed to hiinsel|_tq have the presupposition of all things was the

conclusion.

reached as purely

indeterminate

self-identical

how

infinite

parsing

int

how

difference,

to

infinite

to

problem immediately unity as, without abandoning arose,

and the

;

conceive

its essential

of

this

nature,

find in this moveless

Absolute the explanation of the diversity and change.""""Hii.%..,..>f^rp,.r~. [illness of the finite world. The device which Spinoza falls upon to reach the diversity without tampering with "

ft*

""**

l

-.-

.

.'.

-.-.,..

.

.

,.^v.',.-A'ii>:wf'.;,'"~"!"if'".

*.'"

T .*>-:.;-'i-^t*i.'-^..,^>,fc,,

unity, is to regard the former as differences, not in itself, but in substance in relationJ^JJ^

the substance

('

finite intelligence\ioMcli, contemplatesjt.

By attribute,

'J

1

"I understand that which tliejritdlecj. persays he, ceives of substance as constituting its essence." It is, in other words, not the essence itself of substance, but

that essence

In one

rdat^^

of

" defining substance, he adds, By attribute I understand the same thing, only that it is called attribute with reference to the understanding

phis letters,

2

after

The relative attributing a certain nature to substance." or subjective character of the element of difference expressed

by

attributes

illustrations.

is

further explained

by various

1

which, regarded objectively, eiSed " a plane," but with reference to the observer described as ''white." "By a plane," says he, "I ,

is is

mean a altering

which reflects all rays of light without them; by a white surface I mean the same,

surface

with this

difference, that a surface is called

reference to a ;

* Mfe. L,

man clef. 4,

looking at *

it."

Ep.

The same 27,

white with distinction * Ibid,

147

Relativity of Attributes.

by the

is illustrated

who

different

names

of the third patriarch,

is in one special Finally, in the following and

in his proper character called Israel,

relation called Jacob.

other passages of his writings Sr^ioj^j^ that the true or absolute _natiuia^ jffi22^.ifiy.oji4,all conceptions

" intelHgencje

:

formed of Jlim_by_finjie

If the will be supposed infinite,

it

must

be determined to exist and act by God, not in so far as He is absolutely infinite substance, but in so far as He

has an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal " 1 essence of as thought."

^

Being

being,

by

itself alone,

and therefore from which yet

as substance, does not affect us,

be explained by some attribute, distinguished save ideally."

2

'

Theologico-political Treatise/

To the same 3

it

is

it is

effect,

tc

no1

in the

speaking of the various

God in the Hebrew Scriptures, he says that the name "Jehovah" points to "the absolute essence of God without relation to created things " whilst on the. other hand "El Saddai" and other names express/ titles of

;

"attributes of God, and pertain to Him in so far as\ is considered with relation to created things or is[

He

manifested by them." Thus the ascription of attributes

^^

tojGp^^esnot

absoluteljjndeterminate

divine nature, inaslMch^as^iej^ dojipt characterise that nature in itseJjLbut m Monly as reflected '"" iWl*"* 1

tl

"

1

*"""*^IWy^M"Sw

''^

>jWK

1

T

>

**'T

'

""

***e**

^TftEJJ^i*

"I*

^^* m^0, a

**>*^ai

,-*<M

Finite intelligence cannot JS--Sa-BffiiS J2^iSSice rise above itself, or see things otherwise than under the '

l

conditions that arise from its

own nature. As man is Mm-

a being at once spiritual and corporeal " mode " or modification of language, a self

i

Eth.

i.

32.

2

.

Cogitat. Metapji.

1.

Si

in Spinoza's

thought and xiii, 11, 12.

148

Spinoza.

he can know God only under these two But jve^cannot conceive of the

extension

aspects or attributes.

ing

"

it.

The more

reality or being

m^*attributes belong

to it."

l

anything has, the

"A

being absolutely

which which ex-

infinite, therefore, is necessarily defined as being

of infinite attributes,

consists

each one of

Though, presses a certain essence eternal and infinite." therefore, to us God is expressed only under the two "

and " extension," to minds thought differently constituted from ours the divine nature would of

attributes

"

reveal itself in different ways, and to an infinite number of minds or to an infinite understanding in an infinite

number

"The

of

ways or by an infinite diversity of attributes. ways whereby each particular thing is

infinite

expressed in the infinite understanding cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular thing, but infinite

minds, seeing that each of these infinite ideas has no connection with the rest." 2

By

yet another expedient does Spinoza find

it

pos-

sible to ascribe attributes to the infinite substance with-

out infringing its purely indeterminate nature YLZ., by means of the distinction between what is " absolutely

only "infinite ^^its^own kmd" avoid the implication that by atfechiag predicates to substance we necessarily introduce an element of finiteness or negation into it, he tries to

JBJffiite" '

(m mo

and what

is

gettere). "To

conceive of predicates which express something not negbut positive, not finite but infinite, and which

ative

limit neither the infinite substance nor each therefore Such, predicates are th

-

'

Plurality of Infinites.-

/

',

God. All finite distinctions disappear in the infinite "fuTwe can conceive of distinctions which are not finite, in this sense that no one of them is limited either by ;

the rest or

a thing

by anything within its own sphere. We call when it is "bounded by another thing of the

finite

same kind, as one piece of matter by another kinds

^^

;

doot Jum^a^.other.

but^thmgs MgSfel

thmgsare not Jinii^^b^^atenal, i^mcej^sA. Bodies axe nedther

in^

'.-

;

(

W^? s

sideofmmols,. If therefore we can think of the attribute of extension as that which has no limit within its

own

sphere, its infinitude is not infringed by the existence of another attribute of a wholly different kind, such as thought. It is no limitation of infinite exten-

cannot think, nor of infinite thought that it not extended. may conceive an infinite number

sion that is

it

We

of such attributes, each infinite in its

own

kind, and

tation.

implying no reciprocal limiIt may be said that if we conceive of an infinite

number

of such attributes as together constituting the

yet their infinite diversity

nature of a being, each of

them can express only a part

and therefore each must be regarded as But Spinoza's answer to a limitation of its infinitude. it would be a valid obthat is, thisobjection virtually of that nature,

jection

if

we

conceived of infinite substance as

of thought, extension,

and other

attributes.

made up

When we

think of a thing as an aggregate or combination of qualieach of them is less than the whole, and expresses a limitation of nature. But the absolutely infinite sub-

ties,

stance is not the

sum

or totality of its attributes^

Ac-

cording to Spinoza's peculiar conception^ each, of the different attributes expresses the same infinite reality

I

150

Spinoza.

and the whole of that

reality.

The

attributes are npjj

complementary jDroperties, the omission of any one "of which leaves the whole imperfect, but each the same perfect whole contemplated in a ^different aspect. are not correlative members "of an organic unity

They which

have no independent reality apart from each other, but parallel,

i^jgj^^dent., ec[my^ni^nanifestations of the si^Jn^ite^object, Thought does not contain more or less of God than extension, but the content of both and of an infinite

the same.

number of other "Each attribute/

attributes is absolutely

5

1

"of one substance must be conceived itself." "It is obthrough 2 vious," he adds, "that though two attributes are conceived as distinct

i^the

other

yet

that

is,

says he,

the one without the aid of

wejsajmoj^ For that each of

is

t

conceived through has have existed

itself

it

its attributes

(since all the attributes

which

simultaneously in it), nor could one be produced by another; but each expresses the reality

or being of substance.

stoice."

From

^ *

this point of* view, therefore,

Spinoza enabled to combine the notions of absolute indeterminate unity with endless difference, or to conceive of is

am U3$mte multiplicity of attributes without tampering with the unconditioned unity of substance. The two expedients, however, by which he accomplishes this re~ 1

suit, virtually

I "buries,

resolve themselves into one.

The

attri-

though said to be mfinite each in its own Mrxd, axe V# waJly different in kind from each, other. The con-

151

Criticism of the Doctrine. tent of each is precisely the

and the

difference is

lookin^at^it.

The

same

as that of

any

onlv^a^ difference in our

difference in

kind

is

other,

way

of

nc^ESg'more

than

Spinoza's "reconciliation, _a difference of aspect. therefore, of diversity of attributes with absolute self-

identical unity of substance, is simply that the diversity is a purely subjective one.

One obvious

1.

criticism _on_

,

&****** Spinoza^ doctrine of '

attributesTsThat J^JBESSaEEOsesjwliat itjs j^ended tg, The definition of attribute is "that which inligence

in

perceives

But

essence."

substance

as

constituting its " " only a mode

finite intelligence is itself

or modification of one of the attributes of substance.

The

attributes, therefore, exist only through that which The thought simply a modification of one of them. or intelligence which is the product of an attribute,

is

is

surreptitiously introduced to

Thought, indeed, thinks

itself

create the

and everything

attributes. else

;

and

the intelligence which differentiates the infinite substance were its own, there would be no paralogism in

if

supposing infinite intelligence or self-consciousness to be the source or origin of the finite intelligence which knows

But in the

it.

stance, as

case before us, the absolutely infinite sub-

we have

seen, is expressly distinguished from, or logically jmojrfco, the attributes that of thought as well as every other. is Thought only one of the aspects ^ into which the absolute unity is diffracted by finite intelligence.

create that 2.

jrjom

The

Finite intelligence, therefore,

by which

,

attributes

^^^^p^o,

is

supposed to/

it is itself created.

are ^ot^der^iYed^^fcojay but^ Jxrgaght To reneLer tlie system co-

substance.

herent, the existence

and

distinctive character of the

/

-

o-/J

1 152

Spinoza.

attributes should arise out

of

the essential nature of

In the very nature or idea of substance an element of self-differentiation must be shown to exist, and that an element which does not tamper with its In other words, substance must be conceived unity. substance.

a

jlJLS?J ^ieh__has Jn_T^^

gjteit|i_oiit

to realise itself in the infinite determinations

ofJLtself,

their modifications, and expressed by the attributes and -. "*.-. .,,.~.~. f R .^v^ ~^ m ^<-t~* -" '* ^^^^^^.n,^,^,"""""

,

**

'

<-*

*'*i.*sifr4

-

,

,x

yetJLII so gomg^forth.as remaining in unbroken identity Spinoza's substance, however, as we have ^v^hjjsjejf. just seen, not only does not contain, but is exclusive '

I

\<

.-

of,

such element of self-determination, and the determination expressed by the attributes are ascribed to a ai*y

"We feel and perceive," says particular things save bodies and modes of thought," and therefore we conclude that thought and purely empirical origin. 1

he,

"no

extension ourselves

are

God

attributes as a

of

We

God.

represent

to

"thinking thing" or an "extended

It is we who ascribe or thing." bring the attributes to the substance, and the we has not been accounted for. 3.

The

accidental character of the attributes

cated, not only in the origin ascribed to them, in their number and relation to each other.

is indi-

but also If sub-

to have the character of a principle from which everything in the system is to be logically deduced, it should contain in itself the reason why such and no

stance

is

other determinations belong to

it

;

it

should determine

the order of their sequence, and show how each involves or is involved in all the rest. To say simply that a number of attributes cohere in one substance, is not to or "give

any

rational idea of their unity, but i

BJUL ii, ax. 5,

Number and Relation of Attributes.

153

I 1

In the Spinozistic and the other attributes are system extension, thought, not organically related to each other. Each is absolutely merely to affirm that they are united.

'i

r

,

;

independent of the rest forms, so to speak, a completed whole in itself, and is to be conceived in and /^v" " One attribute can no more be related to m|4l|f^ through itself. another than an object seen through a glass of one colour

)

can be related to the same object seen through a glass of a different colour, or than an idea expressed in one

i

language can be related to precisely the same idea exAs it is perfectly inclifferpressed in another language.

i

ent to the object itself through how many differently coloured glasses it is seen, so it is perfectly indiffer-

,

by what or how many IfSpinoza speaks of the

ent to the nature of substance attributes it is manifested.

diyjl^y^^jattribites a. infinite, the infinitude isjapt t^t^yhich arises out of the essence of substance, but is

|

U

^onjjjijiumencal infinitude the false iiSmSTof enjdlgjgsmdefimteness. In. predicating of substance an ^ness^pr infinite number of attributes, Spinoza relapses into the

I

'

j

ambiguity which he himself had censured in a remarkfc

able letter already quoted the ambiguity, viz., of the term "infinite" as denoting either that which by 'its

very nature is incapable of limitation, or that which exceeds every assignable limit. The infinitude which

he ascribes there tucle

to substance is of the former kind, and no legitimate connection between such an infinir and the merely quantitative infinitude of is

the number of which exceeds any given or

number. 4.

In the

letters

which pasaed %eM$#ft,

his acute correspondent

XsdxK&&$^^

-

154

Spinoza.

fects

and

butes

inconsistencies

in

doctrine of the attri-

liis

are brought to light.

other pertinent

Amongst

First, whether questions, Tschimhauseii asks these two it can he proved "that we cannot know any "attributes " 1 of God other than thought and extension or, more :

;

"

why my

fully expressed,

mind, which represents a

cer-

tain modification (of absolute substance), a modification

which

expressed not only

is

by

extension, but in an

perceives only that modificaextension, and not as expressed

infinite variety of ways,

tion as expressed

by

through the other attributes ?

"

2

Sjjcjgjjlly,

whether,

down

that every attribute is of equal though " content and significance with every other, the attribute of thought is not really (as Spinoza defines it) of wider " extent than any of the other attributes ? 3 it is laid

To the former " the

tl^ese...qu^stipM...S^JI, that is defined solely by its essence, the essence of the mind is the idea of the body, o

power of a thing

and that which idea does not involve or express any of God's 4 Of this answer attributes save extension and thought. said that, though from Spinoza's point of view no doubt conclusive, yet it betrays in some measure the insufficiency and even inconsistency of the principles it

may be

it is

on which

it is

related to

is,

based.

In a philosophy in which thought

mind to own object,

extension,

scious subject to

its

matter,

as

the con-

Tschirnhausen's ob-

jection would, in one point of view, be unanswerable. For in such a philosophy there is nothing which lies outside the realm of intelligence, nothing

tknown Ision, I

or knowable.

there

* t

$5.

is

If thought can

nothing which 2

Ep. 67.

it

which is not

either

apprehend extea-

cannot apprehend. Bp. 68.

If

TscMrrikauseris Questions.

155

liumaii intelligence can transcend the distinction

I

itself

and one attribute

f

between

or manifestation of God, it there-

capacity to transcend the same distinction in the case of every other attribute. Mind cannot be

by proves

its

capable of apprehending its object in one aspect or two and not in every other aspect. But, on the other hand, in a philosophy in which thought and ex-

aspects

tension,

are

still

other sions, is

though regarded as attributes of one substance, conceived of as wholly independent of each

as

simply two parallel but unconnected expres-

amongst many

why, knowing one know any The relation of parallelism does not carry with of thought

such attribute or expression, other. it

there

others, of the divine essence

no reason in the nature

what

ness to

is

it

should also

involved in the deeper relation of consciousAn arbitrary connection does not object.

its

imply the universal results of a necessary relation. In fact, the difficulty here is, not why, knowing extension, thought should not know everything else, but why it should transcend the gulf between outside of

it

at

all.

itself

and what

[

\

is

In^jSpi^^

thought should overleap this gulf even in the one case of extension is an inconsistency but it is one ojjhose

which render it so frmtful^jo haj^nviiiconsiste It must be added, however, that from an'suggejtwe. other point of view a philosophy which is based on the principle of self-consciousness would, though on different grounds, accept Spinoza's limitation of knowledge to exFor to such a philosophy extentension and thought. sion

is

not, as Spinoza conceives, simply

multiplicity

happens

to

of

attributes

know, but

it

which is

one amongst a

intelligence

in

man

the essential correlative of

156

Spinoza.

It is not one amongst many things which can tholight apprehend, but it is the necessary form of the object in its opposition to the thought for which it is. Extension and thought, in other words, are

thought.

|ot

^duality of

attributes,

but the dualism which con-

tutes the very essence of mind. If we conceive of rod as Infinite Mind or Spirit, extension, instead of >eing one amongst an infinite number of attributes, the form of objectivity imply through which alone "

f-consciousness possible. to the second question,

As

is

is

which does

have been answered by Spinoza,

it

may

n^fc seem to be remarked that

whilst, according to Spinoza's doctrine, every attribute expresses the whole of substance, and is of precisely the

same value with every

other, yet, inasmuch as all the attributes alike are relative to thought, or are "what

intelligence perceives of

thi^^

essence,"

substance as constituting its ir^ Ms system a wider the case of

man

knows the two

it

and body

attributes

of

which

his

mind

are modifications, but it also, in the case of all

other possible intelligences, knows the other attributes of their natures are the modifications. If we conceive

which

the attributes as running in pairs, thought will always of them. Each finite nature will be a modifica-

be one

tion of thought

and

of

some other

attribute

which plays

a corresponding part to extension in the nature of man. in the Though|. has therefore a purely exceptional

scheme

;

it is

the correlate of

all

place the other attributes.

not simply one of the two attributes which WJigence knows, but is

i*j&8S^^ w uehi^^

hmaan

It in-

157

CHAPTEE

IX.

MODES.

THE t

!

the process by which Spmpzaattesjpted next^tejDin ^ substance the first principle of all jfclnngg^is /

pJ2ndj^

.

tnajLJWiiiGJX^ls

The

expressed

even

m

nis doctrine of

^

JNdod.es.

/

l?&C^iatelj^Ajiuced, leavejisj still in thlTregion of the infinite, and furnish no transit tion to a finite world. Though thought and extension! attri^;D[|es,

aJe**"ol3y expressions

definite

if

of

substance,

manner, they are

each in a

still infinite.

The

certain,?

character-

\

istic of being conceived through itself (per se eoncipi)\ idea as to the of attribute well as to that of^ belongs

substance

;

there

which points to anyContains no ISiSmtj^self-l

nothing in

is

thing beyond itself;

it

it

dig^gitiation by whihJhe jDjpjess_t^t^ The attributes, like the substance, be mediated. t

pure

self-identical unities,

intelligence as the

and

if

are?

finite

they presuppose the colour-

medium through which

unity of substance is refracted, they only tacitty presuppose but do not prove it. less

is

in Spmqza^s

dockme.offl^deB." 'm&

of

_

158

Spinoza. "

of its relation to the infinite.

By mode,"

1

says he,

"I

understand affections of substance, or that which is in " Modes another, through which also it is conceived." can neither exist nor be conceived without substance ;

therefore they can exist only in the divine nature,

can he conceived only through

and modes nothing

exists,

it."

and

" Besides substance

2

and modes are nothing but God." Finite modes are, *

affections of the attributes of

further, identified with individual things (res particu4 " lar es), and of these it is said that they are nothing but affections of the attributes of

the attributes of

God

God, or modes by which

are expressed in a certain definite

manner." '

these

jment lone

is,

that

is

Their beijog

is

listence I

with Substance or God, who an exaU^Jl^^

that, in contrast

is self-existent,

djejgende^^ a

being ^whichjs^not in the is

-iiJlS^

I

meant

" " by the phrase in another," or in God," the following passages may help us to understand -

:

"

Whatever

or be

an

^^JBt%^t,9ip %iSS^n

From the necessity of the 5ivine

number of things follows in if we reflect that from the

ke

naSuTe'

infinite ways, as will

definition of a thing the TCadexstaixdiixg infers many properties which necessarily that is, from the very essence of the thing foHow from it " The modes of the divine nature follow defined." 6 there-

"foe^

f

infinite

^in"

is, is

evident

L

necessarily and not contingently,

and

that,

whether we

2 Eth.

1.

4 Eth.

i 25

15, dem, cor.

16 ? clem.

Derivation of Modes. it

consider the divine nature absolutely, or as determined to manner. Further, God is the cause of these

i>

act in a certain

L

modes not only in

so far as they simply exist, but in so far 1 they are considered as determined to any action."

as IP*

I

f

159

In these passages the relation of modes or finite things God is represented by the equivalent forms of expres-

to I

I

"

caused by

God "

;

and

be observed that in the last-quoted passage the causality of God with regard to modes is spoken of as of to

it is ft

God " and

sion " following from

a

tjfl&ojojd

character

sidereol absolutely,"

so far as

it

is

viz.,

J

that of the divine nature " con-

and that

of the divine nature

"in

determined to act in a certain manner."

)

This distinction, to which Spinoza frequently recurs, and on the tenableness of which the coherence of his * system may be said to turn, is more fully expressed in the following passages " That which

is finite

:

\

and has a determinate existence can-

not be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God for whatever follows from the absolute nature of any ;

I

God is infinite and eternal. It must therefore follow from God or from some attribute of God, in- so far as He J attribute of

j

by some mode, . (or) in so far as modified by a modification which is finite and has a determined existence. This mode again must in turn be

is

considered as affected

He

.

.

is

determined by another which also

is finite, and this last again ad infinitum." 2 Yet "it cannot be said that God is only the remote and not the proximate cause of individual things, except to distinguish them from those which follow from His absolute nature." 3

by another,

&c.,

.

Thus the of God,

.

causality of finite things, considered as

not the nature of

God viewed

absolutely, tot that nature as modified by, or r^|3ressecL u% the* endless *

Efch,

i.

is

29,

dem.

2

EEh,

i.

2$ 4&tt.

>

H)i
Wwi.

''

^

160

Spinoza.

or what Spinoza elsewhere calls regress of finite causes, " the common order of nature and constitution of things," 1

This idea reappears as a solvent of the diffiwhole the system throughout Icuities involved in the relation of the purely indeteror the "connection of causes."

]

]

inmate God to a world of

|and space. ^existing is

finite individualities in

time

"The

idea of an individual thing actually an individual mode of thinking distinct from

other modes," and

is

caused by

God

" not in so far as

is a thinking thing absolutely, but in so far as He is considered as affected by another mode of thinking, of which again He is the cause as affected by another, and " The human mind is 2 so on to infinity." part of the and when we of God ; infinite intellect say that the

He

human mind

perceives this or that,

we

has this or that idea, not in so far as in so far as

He

is

expressed

by

'

.

is infinite,

the nature of the

mind, or constitutes the essence of the I

affirm that

He

God but

human

human mind." 3

On

the other hand, though the causality of individual things is thus ascribed to God not as He exists absolutely or infinitely, we find from other passages that there_is a sense in

which they can be referred

eternal nature of

God

as their cause

to the absolute or e.g.

:

"It is the nature of reason to regard things not as contingent but as necessary. But this necessity of things is the v&ry necessity of the eternal nature of God, and therefore it i& the nature of reason to regard things tinder this form of "

eternity."

EvervJLd^^^

thmg^aetuajly

BylESfence (of mdivISiiaTthings), I do not mean is conceived abstractly and as a certain

e&istence in so far as it '

vjBfe. ft S0 ? dencu

fi.

9,

dem.

.

li^dbU

it 11, cot,

Relation of Substance

and Modes.

161

form of quantity I speak of the very nature of existence^ which is ascribed to individual things, because an infinite;! number of things follows in infinite ways from the eternal ;

of the existence of individual things;/

necessity of God's nature

as they are in God. "For, although each individual thing is* determined by another individual thing to exist in a certain

manner, yet the force whereby each individual thing perseveres in existing, follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of God." l Further, the two kinds of existence of individual things that in which they are viewed as a series of causes and eifects in time and space, and that in which they are

viewed "under the form of eternity" contrasted as follows in two

ways

:

"Things

are expressly

are conceived as actual)

either in so far as they exist in relation to

I

a certain time and place, or in so far as we conceive them as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature. When in this second way we

con-j

ceive things as true

and

real,

we

conceive

the form of eternity, and the ideas of eternal and infinite essence of God." 2

In the

light of these

in

Ms

system

is

them involve

the|

and other passagesjbojwiiiclo^ 7 w^j^

a's.conception

to its

them under!

of the relation j

"modes."

When we

ask what

the FelaSSn of the finite world and in-

dividual finite things to God, the question is not settled simply by referring to his doctrine that all things exist in God, or

and that modes

or finite things have no existence operation independently of the infinite substance 1

2

P.

XII.

Eth. ii 44, cor., ii. 45, aad ibid., sehoi Etk. v. 29, schoL

L

'

T 162

Spinoza.

Spinozism is not at once proved to be pantheistic "by such expressions as these. For every system that is not dualistie, and for which the terms infinite and finite

have any meaning, ispani^^ holdjof ing that the world liasnoaSdfote or independent} existence, and that the ultimate explanation of all things is

to

be found in God.

Before pronouncing Spinoza a

pantheist, therefore, the point to be determined is not whether he ascribes independent reality to finite things, ascribes to them any reality at all but

^^t^^ie

i

whether his modes have any existence distinguishable from that of substance, and such that we can speak of If, on the one hand, can be shown that the existence he ascribes to modes

an actual relation between the two. it

only a fictitious or fugitive semblance of existence, if the distinction of modes from substance is a ^distinction

is

by the imagination and has no objective the unity into which all individual things reality, are resolved is one which does not maintain but sup-

which

is

created

and

if

presses or annuls that distinction, then indeed his philosophy may justly be characterised as pantheistic. But,

on the other hand,

since real distinctions

do not exclude

but imply a unity which transcends them, if Spinoza's substance is a principle which subordinates but does not if his modes are the expression for a world which does not vanish, but constitutes" a

suppress differences, finite

necessary and permanent

moment

in the unity of the

no proof of Spinoza's pantheism that infinite, he affirms that "whatever is is in God," and. that modes are thongs that "exist only in God, and only through God 'can be conceived." In the passages quoted above, then

it is

read in the light of his general principles, there

v

i

Is tke Doctrine Pantheistic ? is

much

to favour the former of these

163

two construc-

but in these, as elsewhere, there are expressions which refuse to lend themselves to a purely pantheistic view of the relation of God to the tions of his system

;

world. 1.

The^ consideration have already been adduced, andi interpretation need not here be repeated. They amount to tW^ that! theistic

finite, things have no real ^je^isto^jdis-| tlnguishaile from that, of absolute substance, bavLaie merely creations of the abstracting imagmation.

individual

"

,

1

"

to suppose that It is mere folly or insanity," he writes, extended substance is made up of parts or bodies really distinct from each other. ... If you ask why we are by nature so prone to attempt to divide extended substance, I answer that quantity is conceived by us in two ways viz., abstractly, superficially, as we imagine it by aid of the senses ; or as substance, which can only be clone by the understanding. So that if we attend to quantity, as it is in the imagination, it will be found to be divisible, finite, made up of parts, and manifold. Again, from the fact that we can limit duration and quantity at our pleasure, when we conceive the latter in abstraction from substance, and separate the former from the way in which it flows from things eternal, there arise time and measure time for the purpose of limiting duration, measure for the purpose of determining quantity so that we may, as far as possible, imagine them. Further, inasmuch as we separate the modifications of substance from substance itself, and reduce them to classes in order, as far as possible; :

to imagine them, there arises number, whereby we limit them. . "Whence it is clear that measure, time, and num.

.

ber are nothing but modes of thinking, or rather of imagin" ing. But," lie adds, there are many tMngs which, cannot

;

164

Spinoza.

be conceived by tlie imagination, but only by tlie understanding e.g., substance, eternity, and the like. Thus, if any one tries to explain these things by means of conceptions, which are mere aids to the imagination, he is simply trying to let his imagination run away with him."

The quoted

drift of these is,

and other passages which might be

not simply that modes, or individual

finite

things, have no existence independent of substance, but that they have no existence at all, save for a faculty

which mistakes abstractions for the unreflecting

mind

for realities.

It is possible

to suppose itself capable of

thinking the separate halves or minuter isolated parts of a line, but intelligence corrects the illusion. line, it

A

discerns, could as easily

be made up of points lying miles

The apart as of points contiguous yet really isolated. point it perceives to be a mere fictitious abstraction, an unreality, a thing which has no existence apart from the line,

and when we think the

have any existence

at

And

all.

line the point ceases to

the same

is

true of lines

in relation to surfaces, of surfaces in relation to solids, and of all existences in space in relation to space itself,

which

is

the one

infinite,

indivisible reality.

In

like

manner, when we

regard the modes in relation to the infinite substance, we see that they are mere creatures of the imagination ; when we contemplate individual

tMnga from

th.e

point of view of intelligence, or as they and the

really are, their illusory individuality vanishes,

only reality left, the only being in the universe, is God, or Infinite Substance. And indeed it is only, Spinoza expressly affirms, when we leave out of view the fictitious

***'

f/

wMch modes latter

1

'

7f

>^:f;,

can;

introduce into substance that "

be truly contemplated.

Substance

is

.

Spinoza? s considered in

It

is

that

itself

all its modifications

"

Quatenus"

is,

truly

when we

165 set aside

"

(depositis affectionibtis).

true that whilst Spinoza not only concedes "but

expressly teaches that modes orjnclividual finifce^things reality in relation to the absoIuTe nature of God,

have no he

J^fccon^yesj^ascribe

to

** That which is finite," says he, way, $(^fcyineorigiii. in a passage above quoted, "and has a determined ex-

istence,

cannot he produced or follow from the absolute

nature of any attribute of .God," for "whatever does so follow is infinite and eternal." And " every individual thing, or everything

which

is finite

and has a determined

existence, can only exist or be determined to act by another thing which is also finite, and this again only by another which also is finite, and so on indefinitely." " Only the infinite can follow from the infinite, the finite

can follow only from the finite." How, then, ,dpes.pinojK reconcile these propositions with the assertion that jnode

"are conceived through the divine^ nature^ and follow The answer is, that hejrimpl; " That which is the

i^cjejsj^y^^feojm^ it"?

begs question. finite," he tells us " cannot be produced by the absolute nature of God o of any of His attributes ... it must therefore follow from God, or some attribute of God, in so far as (qua;

terms) He is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determined existence, and this mode or cause must in turn be modified by another, &c." The only construction of which this proposition, taken in connection with what precedes it, is capable, is that

it^^^y

jssssBfi^^ viz.,

God.

that individual finite things oan be derived from. The nature of God is such t^t it does not admit

166

Spinoza.

of modification, but finite things follow from, it in so far

Or, otherwise expressed, Spinoza presupposes the existence of finite things in order to prove in order to express it, or virtually makes God finite Himself in the finite. Finite things follow from God

as it is modified.

in so far as

He

(already)" modified

by finite things*. knows what an important role is assigned to this quatewus, and how often, by means" of what is nothing more than a tautological phrase, he contrives to escape from difficulties and inconsistencies is

Every reader of Spinoza

otherwise insuperable. It may be said that Spinoza's reasoning here is not the bare petitio prmdpii involved in the assertion that things follow from God in so far as they already but that what he affirms is that they follow from Him

finite

follow, not

from individual

finite

things, but

from the

interminable series or connection of finite things, which But to this the is not finite but relatively infinite.

answer is what, as we have seen, Spinoza has himself taught us, that by the spurious infinite of mere endlessAn ness we do not rise above the region of the finite. infinite

quantity

is

a contradiction in terms, a phrase in

which the predicate denies the

subject.

By no

indefinite

addition or aggregation of finites can we reach the essenthat infinite from which tially or absolutely infinite

Spinoza asserts that the finite can not be derived. In the foregoing view of Spinoza's doctrine as to the relation of

God

to the world,

we have

considered

it

a relation of the absolutely indetermined infinite to determined or finite tnings. But in some of the simply as

afrove-guoted passages, and elsewhere, we find him eithis relation in terms of another category viz., ;

167

Divine Causality. "

that of

'caugaligy.

Godj&the efficient cause

that canTianunder an infinite intellect.

33

of all tilings

"

1

God

is

the

efficient cause

not only of the existence of tlung^.but

al^of^ their

essence."

"The modes

have God for their cause, &c."

attribute tjiej

2

are

in.

themselves

God

of

"

3

any given

QfJ^agSJ- 8

is .really the... cause,

&c."

4

.Now, as the relation of cause and effect is one in which we- ordinarily think of the effect as something which,

though dependent on the cause, actually emerges out of it into an existence of its own, th^aj^^tion^jof^t

God

of

seem

aj_^

give to foxite things ^a reality ^^v e, a being, which is not, aj^,oxbe

to

But that, in its proper

which

is

applicable

sense,

it is to

be consider-

cai^HtjjL^^not^a

and if we attempt so to apply it, what the but ej realitj of^the finite, isjaot or the non-reality of the infinite. finite

^mtui,

;

i4Ba$w^

catego^yj

to the relation of the infinite to th< it

expressj

w

!

Causality

is

a category only of the

finite.

The

rela-

tion^oTcaiSeanT'eBecTis one which implies the succession or (though not with strict accuracy) the coexistence of its

members.

In the

latter case it

presupposes the

existence of things external to, and ja,fecto In the former, it is a relation in

which the second

;

stitute

it,

the

first

member is

logSHtse^^ to which

new conditions

in other words, 1

conceived of as passing into the sum of conditions which con-

the cause, or the

Eth.

i.

is

has given

rise.

only cause in and through the con-

16, cor.

a Efck. ii. 6.

sum of The c&ttse,

or in the it

2 Bfih. *

]$fck

i.

25.

ii. 7,

sdxoL

.

168

Spinoza.

summated

which we

result

call effect,

and the very

reality or realisation of the former implies, in a sense, its own extinction. In the impact of two halls the

motion of the

"becomes the cause of the motion of

first

second only when it has ceased to exist in the former; the force which has existed as heat becomes

the

the cause of motion only when it has exhausted itself of existence in the one form and become converted into

its

the other.

can

But, obviously, in neither of these senses the relation of the infinite and the finite

we embrace

under the form of

causality.

T^Jn^it^.ca^rio^lm

a&djM^^

jis

and actson^ another ; in would cease to be infinite.* "God," omne esse." Beyond substance there of

L

such a relation " says Spinoza, is

finite.

Substance and

real.

nothing

stitute the

it

is

totality of existence,

But

this

it

could not be

affections

its

and

is

con-

absolutely ininstead

if its affections,

it and being conceivable only through had an existence capable of being acted on by it. Nor, again, can you speak of the infinite as a cause

of existing only in

it,

which, in producing the

and becomes of the finite

lost in it

;

passes wholly into it in that case, the existence

finite,

for,

would be conditioned by the non-existence

or extinction of the infinite.

TJaysH^^ and finite is thus so obvious that can Spinoza only give a colour of relevancy to it by the term " cause " when applied to God so as qualifying

relation of infinite

" God," he frotuaUy to destroy its meaning. "is not the transient but the ininiaiisrj^^

tells

us/

of the

Immanent

169

Cause.

He can only be designated cause of all things same sense in which He is cause of Himself the in world."

1

In other words, to obviate the contradic-

(causa mi).

tion involved in the idea of an infinite which, is exter-

nal to the

finite,

conceive of

it

he modifies the notion of cause so as to

as existing, not outside

of,

but wholly

within, the things which are said to be its effects ; and to obviate the further difficulty which thus arises, of

conceiving an infinite which passes

away

into the finite,

he again modifies the notion of cause so as to conceive of

it

as maintairiing, its

the same time that

it

own independent

existence at

loses itself in the effect.

tSougBT in the conception of a causa omnium rerun which is at the same time causa sui, what Spinoza is

aiming at

is

the idea

itself in all

itsjchanges, or^ of a a self-integrating, infinite, this i^at^the^sa^e time which is one idea in^j^in^attemjots to express ,

Jitsel:

under the

^t^nLJSl^2^^ty'

The attempt

so

to

may be regar^eoas one of those indications express in Spinoza of the consciousness of another than the it

purely negative relation

of the finite

to the infinite

which his own inadequate

logic forced him to maintain. 2. The foregoing considerations seem almost conclusively to favour that view of Spinoza's doctrine of modes

which denies

to individual finite things any existence that is not fictitious and illusory. His derivation of modes from substance would seem to be nothing more

than a reversal of the process of abstraction by wMch the idea of substance was reached. It is not $ti$tft&6&6

which determines

itself to 1

Etk i

modes, but

we who, with a

25, dem.

'(// i,*,'

)>

j

170

show

Spinoza. of, logic,

reintroduce into

it

the fictitious distinc-

which the same logic had abolished. But this account of Spinoza's doctrine would be incomplete if we did not point out that, however incon-

tions

sistently they enter into

it,

there are element sjjjLJajs

SZSiSHL^ of the Modes are not unreality of the finite world. invariably represented as merely transient creations of the abstracting imagination. They have in them a

element which

positive

even when

remains

on the

negative side they have been resolved into the unity of substance.

Besides the tacit implication of another doctrine in mi which is at the same time causa

the idea of a causa

omnium

rerum, the following in the same direction point

considerations

seem

to

:

(1.)

Even

if

modes

are only transient forms, there in the nature of substance for their

everything else in the finite resolved into negation, the negation itself is aot so resolved. Evanescence itself does not vanish. world

is

the

drei

and obviously the Bxtad

^mjM>_.. aBcnbSgto intelligence ...........

DDL

_.

and abolishing the

^

l

m

from substance

distinction

things, Spinoza virtually the process of abolition.

"that

^e^^^^^^j7^^^^^!

exempts intelligence

The

is

-finite-

from

yita^ix^^

If

wMch

of

itself

.

ve

therefore,

as

Spinoza

and has a determinate

finite

"

'

-'

Element in

171

the Finite.

nature cannot follow from the absolute nature of God, for

whatever does so follow

what

is

infinite

this involves as to that intelligence

and eternal," which discerns

the nothingness of finite things is, not that it does follow from the absolute nature of God, but that in

it,

in its very discernment of its djstin^fcion fron

(2.)

That Spinoza himself, despite

" ple that

all

determination

is

of his

own

princi-

negation," recognises in

modes something that is not mere negation, is indirectly indicated by the qualified form in which in the Ethics '

*

that principle

is stated.

"

"

1

Thejfimte," says

lie,

is

Jn

The negation implied

^a^iji^atioja," (ex parte negatio). There is, in finitude is not complete but partial. in.^fimtejshiags, whic" other words, element ajpositiye is not annulled when the fictitious distinction from th< i:

There is an individuality which! taken away. survives the extinction of the false or spurious indrviduNor is this implied only in the phrase " partial

infinite is

^ality^

Besides the idea of God as the negation of negation." all determinations there are traces of another and oppothat of the afiirmation of

site idea

all

determinations.

For the indivisible unity in which all differences vanish, Spinoza seems often, without consciousness of inconsisJ tency, to substitute the ^nfini^

in

it all

\

possible differences.

"From tlie necessity of the divine nature," says he, 2 " must follow an infinite number of things in mfinite " There is not to God materials all things

for ti.e wanting from the highest to the lowest d$gtq df

i Btt.

1

8,

schoL

.

L

16,

l

-

172

Spinoza.

things which can be conceived There are two ways," says he in a passage already quoted, " in which things are conceived

tion

for the

by an

infinite intellect."

all

"

as actual

certain time

we

l

viz., either as existing in relation to a place, or as contained in God and following the necessity of the divine nature. In the second way

by us from

producing of

and

conceive them as true and real, under the form of eterjind the ideas of them involve ffiFeter^TanTIn^nite

"essence of God."

2

And when we

have reached the

what we have ceased

latter point of view,

to see in finite things is not their

individuality, but their finitude.

"

Their true individu-

every idea of a

ityisn0tlost^or

force

by which each individual thing perseveres in

its

own

existence follows from the eternal necessity of the divine " In God there is nature." 3 necessarily an idea which

expresses the essence of this or that body under the form of eternity,' 4 and this idea is a certain mode of thinking 3

vhich

5 necessarily eternal.

is

What

is

what

lost,

ur former unreal view of things disappears,

is

of

their con-

ingency, their transient, fugitive being as things of time is of the nature of reason to contem-

ind sense, for "it

things as they are in themselves t.e., not as con6 not " as determined each by ing^ut "but as necessary," nother finite thing, but as following from the eternal >late

.ecessity of

the nature of God."

That there

'

1

/^*#

* >t

}.l.

'I

^

in Spinoza's view, an '

is,

1

2

8

*

Etiu i. , Append. Btiu ii 4, dem. and schol. 5 Etn. v. 23, schol. * BtlL ii. 45, schol.

'I

'

u

,

'

/

'

'

<

y,

,

to

1

Eth. v. 29, schol.

Etk

v,

Eth.

ii.

22.

U,

cor. 2.

The Self-maintaining Impulse.

* 473. *

when the negative j^ma^^ element which seemed to distinguish them from the infinite is obliterated, an individuality which, taken up into the

and can be known through the

infinite, still exists

finite,

these passages seem clearly to teach.

in-

Bu^^s;&j|gjj:|

and more definitely "P^titoLfiiSiBSis> it" follows, from the infinite nature of further

an(^

_

i the finite which lifts it out of the sphere " " the form of is, Spinoza tells us& eternity the inherent impulse or endeavour of each individual

of time into

thing to maintain itself or persevere in its own being! " No individual thing has in it anything by which it can be destroyed or which can deprive it of its existence ;

but,

on the contrary,

opposed to all that could deThere is in each thing an existence." l

prive it of its " endeavour (conatus)

itsj>wn being," and

it.

is

by which

this

seeks to persevere

it

endeavour "

actual essence of the thing _itsslfc"

something noT conditioned by finite

but an indefinite time."

2

is

nothing, but.th

and

time,

But

i:

it is

therefon

"it involves no is

not this con-

ception of the self-maintenance or persevering in existence of an individual thing a simple tautology 1 Does

mean any more than this, that when we think of it as an existing thing, we cannot think of it as a non-existing it

Is not the inherent capacity to persevere in existing simply the incapacity of the mind to predicate of a thing at once existence and non-existence ? "When

thing]

we say do

we

that a thing necessarily perseveres in, existence, say any more than that, so long as w,0 tbipifc oi it,

we think

of

i Bth.

it iii.

as existing, or that the cottcepffcion. of 6.

dem.

I

__

~\*<#

mi 174

Spinoza.

existence .

non-existence

( existing

the conception of not this perseverance in MOTeovj^r, supposed to pertain to a thing as seen

excludes

which

contradicts

or

is

?

is

7

y" under the form of eternity/ a conception which is We do not escape from still conditioned by time 3 | the quantitative idea of duration merely by indefinite. Indefinite or endless duration

making is

a

it

form

As to the secgndwgjjg; eternity. the relation of this self-maintaining element in the finite to God all that Spinoza says of time

and not of

^Jiojgbz--viz,, as

to

amounts simply

to the affirmation that it has its ori-

gin in the absolute nature of God, and is a determinate expression of that nature. "Although each individual thing/ says he, 1 " is determined to exist in a certain way by another individual thing, yet the force 5

*

by which each thing

perseveres in existing follows from " the eternal necessity of the nature of God." Jndivi<J^axe^jooclssJ^jwiuch the attribute^ in a certain definite manner, &c." 2 How [ expressed finite

things can have in

them a power

of self -mainten-

ance, a capacity of continuous

existence flowing from their own nature, and yet have nothing in them which does not follow from the nature of God, is the problem to

be solved, and Spinoza's only solution both propositions are true.

is

simply to

affirm that v

As thB,re^J^^^^M^^|uii'y we seem

to

have found in

Spinoza's account of the nature of modes statements which, if not irreconcilable, he has made no attempt^ to reconcile. In accordance with the principle" which

generally governs his

r

ii 45, soliol

the very essence of with negation or non-being

reasoning,

finite things is identified

;

2

Eth.

iii 6,

dem.

Result of Inquiry.

175

they not merely have no real existence apart from God, but existence in God is for them equivalent to extinction Yet, on the. other hand, as

of existence.

same

seen, to these

finite

we have

just

things Spinoza ascribes a posi-

self-affirmative nature, an individuality which is inherent and essential, and which is not extinguished when the limits that divide the finite from the infinite tive,

And if

are removed.

thus Spinoza's two representations

of the nature of finite things

conjlictmg

seem

are the

corra^ To the former

n^ture^^cj^pd^

to conflict, equally

P !

the^ representation of the

corresponds the notion of a purely indeterminate,

finite

to the latter that of a self-determining Infinite.

other, the

of God,

world

is

In

the.

nothing and God is all in the the manifold expression of the nature

one case the world

is

;

and God the Being whose nature unfolds with-

out losing itself in the innumerable individualities ol If Spinozism contained no other confinite world. of the relation of God to the world than the ception

the

we should be compelled

to pronounce it a purely the second conception may pantheistic system. Perhaps be regarded as the expression on Spinoza's part of an\ first,

unconscious endeavour to correct the inadequacy of the, But the correction, whilst it obviates the inipu-/ first. tation of thorough

system above

imge^e^in

-

self-determination in tive

going pantheism, and elevates his

other pantheistic philosophies, is still this respect, that it implies a princi;ple"*"of all

God which

is

ground in his idea of the divine nature.

only creates the

demand

consistent philosophy,

which

it lies.

for a

and

L*

without any specula- Q

At

best, it

more complete aB$ sd

indicates

the

direction in

C*

176

CHAPTEK

X. I

INFINITE MODES.

SPINOZA'S system, so far as we httve traced its development- in the foregoing pages, leaves us still without any If, principle of mediation "between God and the world. as we have just seen, it sometimes represents finite things as possessing an element of individuality which, taken up into the infinite, still remains, and therefore

seems to imply a principle of self-determination in, the divine nature, so far as we have gone this principle is simply affirmed, not proved; the gap "between the infinite But there are certain and finite remains unbriclged. ' passages in the Ethics tion not yet referred

J

in

to,

which we meet with a concepthat of "Infinite Modes,"

may be regarded as an attempt As the very phrase indicates,

conception which to fill up the gap. a

" infinite modes" point to something which constitutes a link "between the two worlds. A^J^jnodes," they of^t^e, finite; as ^mfinite" modes, Despite of Spinoza's own assercan only follow from the finite, have here a conception in which the ideas of in.

tion, that the

we ,

finite

!

and

i

'JVM

finite

finite are

//>

'* ,'

combined.

The following

are the

Examples of Infinite Modes. which the doctrine

in

passages

of

177

infinite

modes

is

most fully expressed " "Whatever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modifica:

tion

which

exists necessarily

said attribute,

must

and

as infinite

also exist necessarily

and conversely, " Every mode which sarily and as infinite, must necessarily

and

exists

through the 1

infinitely;"

both neces-

follow, either

from

the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an atMbute modified by a modification which exists neces-

and

sarily

modes

as infinite."

2

Spinoza here speaks of certain

divine attributes, differing therefore from the attributes in this respect, that the or modifications of

latter are conceived through themselves, the former only Further, of these modes he through the attributes. specifies

two

classes or grades

immediately from attributes

;

first, those which follow and secondly, those which :

follow from attributes already modified but to both the " infinite " One of Spinoza's coris. applied. predicate 3 asks of these two classes of for examples respondents :

modes, and

may

conjectures

belong to the

first,

that thought and extension " " the intellect in thought and

" motion in extension " to the second.

Spinoza, without waiting to correct the obvious error of finding in thought and extension, which are themselves ,attributes, examples of modifications of attributes, answers

thus

4

"

:

Examples which you ask

are, of

the

first class,

in thought, the absolutely infinite intellect (intellectus absolute infinitus), in extension, motion, and rest ; of

the second -

class,

the form of the whole universe (fames it varies in infinite

totim universe), which, although ways, remains always the same." i

BflL P.

i.

22.

XII.

2 flflL

i 2a.

*

Bp. 65.

*

M

Ep.

66.

178

At

Spinoza. first sight,

Spinoza seems to be here attempting to are reciprocally exclusive. Sub-

combine ideas which

stance and modes, he himself affirms, include all being. But in infinite modes we have a third something which " belongs to neither category which is neither in itself" " in another," neither infinite nor finite, but both at nor once.

If the absolutely infinite is

" that which contains

in its essence whatever expresses reality

negation,"

is

not an infinite

mode

and involves no

as self-contradictory as

round square or a rectangular circle 1 " Intellect," he " 1 " whether finite or infinite (and the same is tells us,

a

lt

true of the other infinite modes), belongs to the sphere of natura naturnta that is, to the order of things which

and its quantifying forms and measure ; yet, at the same time, these infi" cannot have a limited nite modes are things which " must exist always and infinitely," or to duration," but which pertains the timeless immanent unity of the na2 In this conception of infinite modes there ture of God. ieems thus to be involved the same rbion with which theological c exist only for the imagination

of time

in whicK*

we "meet with

the same

which is " begotten," and therefore finite, which is consubstantial with God, and therefore " ite ; of that which is described as eternally begotand to the sphere of at once as therefore ten," belonging the temporal and to that of the eternal. And that this is not a merely fanciful which was one but analogy, o Spinoza's own mmd, we leara from Ms earlier of that

itat

2, 6or.

* Bttfc i. SL, -aad dettt,

179

Motive of the Conception.

God and Man/

'

treatise

Concerning

in which, with ex-

press reference to the subject before us,

writing

we find him

thus

:

"As to thejmodes, or creatures which immediately depend on God, of these"we know only ^gb^viz.,.m^^^JinjQiatter and intellect jnjikojught of which we affirm that they have been from all eternity, and will be unchangeably to all eterAs to motion, therefore, that it is that which is in nity. its nature infinite, and that it can neither exist nor be conceived through itself, but only by means of extension,

f

?

.

.

^

.

.

.

.

of all this I will only say here that it^a^son^^God^ or > created by God. As tojntellect worJgjM^ effect

immediately inj&ftugh^ this also, liEe "flie former, is a JS&j2Lfiodlj createdjrom .ajljaifiinity, and continuing unchangeable to .

Its sole function is that 'of clearly l understanding all things in all times."

eternity.

and

all

distinctly

Can the conception of infinite modes be freed from the cotadi^tioB.^ which it thus'seamso g^lye $ The answer is, that though on Spinoza's principles the contradiction is really insoluble, yet in this conception

have

a^i^^bo^^^^^jDjJ^s^^^it.

Infinitude

we

and

which, as Spinoza dereciprocally exclusive; but when we

finite individuality express ideas

fines

them,

are

examine what

we

is

meant by the phrase "

infinite

modes,"

involves, in opposite directions, an endeavour so to modify these ideas as to bring them, into

find that

it

On the one hand it introduces, at a lower the idea of the infinite, that element of activity or self-determination which is lacking to On the higher ideas of substance and attributes. coherence.

stage, into

hand,

it

attempts to raise the finite world to a quasi i

De Deo, i

cap. 9.

I

180

Spinoza.

infinitude

which

that compose fertile,

is

and then

denied to the separate individualities infinitude is thus rendered

The barren

it.

finite things are so

ennobled as to make

The possible to claim for them an infinite origin. former side of this modifying process is expressed by " immethat class or grade of infinite modes which are

it

diate modifications" of the attributes of thought and extension ; the latter, by those which are modifications

which Spinoza adduces only one totms the universi. fades example, 1. Of the infinite modes which are immediate modi-

of the second degree, of

fications of attributes,

two are

"

specified

viz.,

"motion,

"

the absoas modifications of extension, and " as the infinite intellect modification of lutely thought.

and

rest

if we examine the function assigned to these " immediate modes," we shall find that they are simply the attributes of extension and thought, plus that element of activity or self-determination which these attributes

Now,

and yet which is necessary to make them the proThe very designation ductive sources of finite things. " infinite mode " shows that Spinoza is here uncon-

lack,

sciously seeking to introduce into his system the element of difference or finitude which is excluded from the abstract unity of substance. infinite,

From such an

abstract

the purity of which can be maintained only

the elminaiaon of

by

all distinctions (depositis affectionibus),

!Nbr impossible to find any way back to the finite. could it legitimately be made the living source of finite

it is

(

by kansforming it from the abstract which unity extinguishes difference into the concrete of a principle in which aU differences are at once naitrf existences save

embraced and subordinated.

But whilst Spinoza's

logic

r>'

debarred

him from any such

introduction of a negative

or finite element into the purely affirmative unity of

substance,

or even into

the infinitude

in

mo

genere

which is the cpnception of attribute, the need for such an element, if he would not arrest the descending movement of thought, asserts itself at the stage we have now, reached, and finds its expression in the conception of modes, or of an infinite which contains in it the element of negation or finitude. "With such a conception! a ]

infinite

J2LJE55^~^

The barren self-identical infinite becomes which has in it the impulse to realise

Mssvjjjtem.

now an

infinite

j^^ That

it

this

is

self-

dey^opment which Spinoza ception

of

infinite

modes,

at in the

is

aiming becomes

clear

con-

from

the

examples he gives of these modes, and from what he Of extension the says as to their nature and function.

"motion and rest"; and

infinite modification

is

what he conceived

be the relation in

mode

to

to the attribute,

we have

of

this case of the

a clear indication in

answer to inquiries on this point from his acute

Ms

corre-

" It is 1 very difficult," writes spondent Tschixnhausen. the latter, " to conceive how the existence of bodies which

have motion and

figure can

be demonstrated a -priori,

since in extension, considered absolutely, nothing of the

To own from

kind occurs."

this Spinoza answers

ing his

the

G^esian notion

by of

distinguish-!

extension.'^

" From extension, as Cartesius conceives it that j^ a# a mere inert mass it is not only difficult, as you! sajp , "but 1

altogether impossible, to demonstrate the existence of 1

Epp. 69-72.

**

%

182

Spinoza.

For inert matter, as it is in itself, will persevere and will not be excited to motion save by a more powerful external cause. And on this account I

"bodies.

in

its rest,

have not hesitated formerly principles

natural

of

things

In a subsequent

absurd." difficulties

to affirm that the Cartesian

propounded by

points out that Descartes

7

are

letter,

useless, not to say in answer to further

his

correspondent, Spinoza notion of extension breaks

down by his own showing, seeing that he can only ^deduce the variety of things from extension by supposing to be set in motion by God. Matter, therefore, cannot jit *be

explained

by extension

as Descartes defines

" it,

but

must necessarily be explained by an attribute which The further expresses eternal and infinite essence." elucidation of this answer which Spjjaoza promises is not

meaning is obvious. An attribute of God which explamsTne manifoldness of things only by calling in the co-operation of an arbitrary external force, is not what it pretends to be viz., "that which ex-

given, but his

presses

must not be

It

anj^ezaalm^

supplemented by an outside mover, but must contain in itself implicitly the element of motion or activity. And this idea Spinoza

for

Ms own

conceives himself

attribute of extension

have attained

to

by

the proposition

that motion and rest constitute its immediate infinite

mode.

same

In other words, thing,

extension, or

what

is

here the

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^j JtsS1 It is to Ibe noticed that

it

it

are here represented

by Spinoza, not

motion and

as

two

drffer-

things, but as constituting one infinite mode> " to th&t of " infinite intellect ill thought,

J

I

Meaning of

Modes.

these

183

i^iiil

m^onjsj^ not moved by anything outeide rest of that

which

is

in intense

In other words, his

first

^Jtself

his rest

;

c

s

is

the

and unchangeable activity.

infinite

mode

is

simply

self-

1

determined extension, or extension with thejjkm^nl.oi activity

or_^H: detenniMtjjDn

in

it.

From

purely infinite or indeterminate thought it is as impossible to derive the manifold world of finite intelligences as from extension, considered as a mere inert Blank mass, to demonstrate the existence of bodies. It is the self-identical thought remains one with itself.

form of

all

ideas without the possibility of the actual

existence of any. Implicitly the whole wealt^ of the world of intelligence is contained in it ; but it can never realise that wealth, or

become conscious

of its

own

con-

tent, because to do so would be to introduce distinction into that the very nature of which is to transcend all

distinctions.

But what Spinoza wants

which, while

it

remains

source of an

is

or^,3yijji

an

infinit

i,|self,

i^yj

actualj^ thi

could be achieved would be by transforming the idea o

God

as Substance, with thought for its attribute, int

that of

se^conscious

S^^or^Mmd.

From

this,

how

which would have implied the reconstruction o: whole philosophy, Spinoza was precluded, and the

ever,

his

expedient to which he had recourse was to introduce the element of self-determination into thought under guise of an "infinite mode." solutely infinite," is solutd),

fore

.

.

"Intellect,"

though /^

not absolute thought

but only a certain mode of thinking, &nct there?- *' must be referred not to na$utr& tt#uro?t$ but .

184

Spinoza* 1

By this means, without intro" absolutely perfect ducing difference into that which is " that is, absolutely indeterminate Spinoza can claim ,for the whole finite realm of thought a necessary derivato

natura naturata"

jtion

"

from the divine nature.

thought, but that which

infinite

j

simply

|

thought and

all

that

is

contained in

necessity of the divine nature of things in infinite

under an

ways

Jciioios

it.

is, all

2

"

is

the

infinitude

things that can

"Active

not

infinite

"From

must follow an

that

infinite intellect."

fall

intellect,.,, finite

comj^h^

nrast " The ideas of ofj&od." (even) non-existent individual modes be or must things comprehended in the infinite idea of God." 4 Thus to "intellect," as an immediate OR, infinite,

~~

Infinite intellect

mode

of thought,

sphere of the

though

finite

it

(tiatura

is

said to belong to the

naturata),

the

predicate

may be applied, inasmuch as there is nothing in the realm of thought which it does not comprehend. Though it contains an infinite number of "absolutely infinite"

determinations, they are, from first to last, se?/-deterThough, as the productive source of all

minations.

ideas, it is intensely

parallel

which

mode

of

and unceasingly

extension,

never moved.

is

same time

rest, is infinite,

>d

its activity

its

active, yet, like the

activity is

a motion

As

motion, which is at the because it is motion which is

only by itself, so intellect is infinite, because fcaows no limit that does not fall within its

own. domain.

"^3j;|^^

2S^^ is

the virtual introduction into his

WL i 31, dem, SO.

M'; f$"

,,'

svstemof

Bflu L 16.

Second Class of Infinite Modes.

what he had actuallyjexclxided from his idea viz.,

185 of

God

I

^J^^glLJL^^ -^9S?^2SS5SS JL-2JLJli9S^^fi

I

.

S

3LJ^%LJS^~

2. I have said that the conception of infinite modes is an atte^pttobring into union the irreconcilable ideas of infinitude and finite individuality, not only in the

way we have

viz., by introducing the just considered element of self-determination into the idea of the infi-

nite but also, from an opposite direction, by elevating the finite world into a quasi infinitude. Spinoza had down the principle that nothing can follow from

the infinite save that which

is itself infinite

and conversely, that "that which

is finite

and eternal, and has a

determined existence cannot be produced by the absoThe world of finite individualities,

lute nature of God." therefore, can never

with the nature of

first

God

be connected by necessary derivation of his system, the absolute

principle

or

an attribute

trive to lend to that

will

make

it

of God, unless he can conworld such a guise of infinitude as

homogeneous with

attempts to do

its

by the second order

origin.

of infinite

This he

modes

or

modifications of divine attributes in the second degree, the nature of which he exemplifies in the phrase " form of the

whole universe."

And

the

way

in which he finds

possible to connect this totality of things with the/ absolute nature of God, is by ascribing to it/ as a whole,!

it

a kind of infinitude and unchangeableness which does not pertain to the parts of which it is composed, taken Tor this " form of the whole universe," individually.

"though it varies in infinite ways," though, its constituent finite parts are determined each only by other

*

186

oinoza.

and may be conceived to be endlessly diverparticular movements, yet taken as a

finite parts,

in their

sified

whole, or as one composite individual, remains ever the same. 1 Tho_ individual parts are finite or determined but as constituting together the whole universe, outside ;

of

which there

nothing to deterinine them, they jire

we have

Hero, therefore,

infinite. 'finite

is

an- aspect

lute nature of God,

it

the

the condition that nothing not infinite and eternal. Un-

fulfils

can be so derived which

is

der whatever attribute

we contemplate

whether

things or as the it

of

world in which, in a being derived from the abso-

save

sum

of all ideas

" the

this totality of

as the aggregate of all corporeal tilings,

presupposed to

is

nothing

absolute nature

some

of

God, or of such an attribute modified

by

attribute

of

a modification

The sole presupposinecessary and infinite." tion of the totality of finite bodies is the attribute of

which

is

extension, conceived as self-determining, or tinder the mode of motion the sole presupposition of the

infinite

;

totality of ideas is the attribute of

under the

infinite

mode

thought conceived of

of intellect.

If

the phrase

"

"fades totius timversi be regarded as embracing both the world of thought and the world of things, then we have here a point of view from which we can contemplate it as

lute

If

an

natae

we

of

ask

infinite

and eternal expression of the abso-

God

wjjy|jn^

-^Ji^J^ the

woiMJ^^^

^^^

of^^cond;umvenejs. is

T&e sum

not equivalent to

tlte

Lemma 7,

or aggregate

unmodifi.ed ;

by

187

Criticism of the Conception. endless additions of finites

we do not reach

the true

the totality of relative, changeable things is ; ho nearer than any one of them to the unchangeable absoinfinite

Spinoza's finite modes, even when,

lute.

by a

petitio

he speaks of each mode as determined by God in so far as He is expressed by another finite mode, and that by others in endless series, are only contiguous, not

principii,

essentially related,

to

world, in so far as

we

up

The whole

each other.

can conceive

it at all, is

finite

broken,

and

into an endless multiplicity of isolated atoms,

sum them

gives us only the false infinite of indefinite number, which leaves us no nearer the true

the attempt to infinite at the

end than

at the beginning.

^^ As

15^^ a

j.^m^r^^^i

parts,

is

a unity

which

is

not the

sum

of its

but prior to yet expressing itself in each and all it may be possible to conceive of the fades

of them, so

totius universi as

an ->m

^ life,

every jgart

and

all

related

together constitute, not an aggregate outwardly to, but a ..

undoubtedly aimed all

at a

finffe~lihings^ "should

But though Sginoza view of the universe in which be seen to follow from, and

constitute a necessary expression of, the absolute nature

of God,

we

seek in vain in his dialectic for any such, between the individualities

principle of organic coherence

of the finite world

and the

own acknowledgment to the sphere of

them and

infinite substance.

his " infinite

By

his natura

natwam remains

his

J>

modes belong natura naturata, and the gulf ujabridgecl

stffl

188

CHAPTEE XL THE NATURE AND

THE Second Book title is

will

OBIG-IN OP

of the

*

THE MIND.

which the above

Ethics,' to

prefixed, opens with the following words

now

explain the results which

must

"I

:

necessarily fol-

low from the nature of God, or of the Being eternal and infinite ; not, indeed, all these results, but only those .

.

.

which can lead us to the knowledge of the human mind and of its highest blessedness." In these words we have the key to the subsequent course of Spinoza's speculations with respect both to the intellectual and the moral Here, as in his former work on Improvement of the Human Understanding/

nature of man.

*

The

l

!

But n and is

tljejjr^^

n

s

vew,

.

a

-nr'a

one sense identical with intelligence, the true perfection is to' disabuse our minds of error and

and

to gain a point of

view from which

iMngs

as they really are.

of tl^

human mind,

we

way

as,

in to

illusion,

shall see

ffis^^pjiry into the nature

therefore, resolves itself into the

fopm

its

very natuxe, hum&o.

Twofold Aspect of Mind.

^^

^ doctrine

modes

189

" finite

of

"

cilable

contains two different and apparently irreconviews of the nature of individual finite things

that- in

which the

represented as destitute of that, on the other hand, in

finite is

and

any positive reality, which the negation involved in the notion of the

finite

only a partial negation, leaving to it still a positive " a force element, by which each individual thing

is

perseveres

in

and which follows from the And what is

existence,

eternal necessity of the divine nature."

true of finite things of them. has,

The

equally true of our knowledge

is

mind, like all other finite things] on the one hand, an existence that is merely? finite

negative and illusory; the idea of the finite is itselff limited and determined by other finites, and in-f

finite,

On the other hand, capable of rising above itself. has in it an element which is not mere negation, which transcends the limits of the finite and relates absolute nature of God. actual, empirical

;

to the

In the former aspect, in

reality, it

under the form of time

it

its

all

contemplates, things only looks on the world from the

it

point of view of sense and imagination, broken

up into which have things only accidental relations to each other in time and space. In the lajbter^jLSpect, it sees all things from thBBoint of view of reason or intelligence, fictitious individualities, or into

accMejM, butjghich

^

Now

whether

this

twofold existence and

*#

190

Spinoza.

which Spinoza

to

ascribes

human mind

the

is

not,

examined, an impossible and self-conwhat tradictory notion, need not here be considered that it is to notice concerned we are at present is,

when

closely

;

I

obviously Spinoza's aim, both here and in the more strictly ethical part of his system, to represent the lower

human

or finite aspect of

nature as an imperfect stage

and the higher or infinite aspect as the of perfection to which, by its very essence, it is goal of man's being,

capable of attaining.

The human

inind, as

prisoned in the

we J^| It

finite.

contemplate

it,

im-

is

an individual amongst

is"

other individuals, a link in the endless series of existences,

is

it

stands in immediate

it knowledge is only of the particular mode which has for its object only another

Its

a finite

finite

which only

to parts of

relation.

mode

;

;

and

it

has no knowledge of other things

save in their accidental relation to

its

no knowledge, therefore, which The mind fragmentary and confused. being

own is

particular

not at once

is thus in its " the idea of an individual thing actually " and its existing, or an individual mode of thinking ;

origin simply

whole conception of things

is

determined by this indi-

vidual reference.

But

though

it

would seem

S]piaozsj22nciples,

that

sEol337without ceasing to be dividuality, |

attain

to

to

be impossible,

on

the individual finite niincl finite

any higher

or losing

knowledge,

its init

is

implied in his whole treatment oj^jh^&ubj^ct, that the

There

is

a stag

of

human

191

Stages of Intelligence. in

intelligence

it' has become liberated from and can contemplate things not

which

accidental associations

merely in relation to our own individuality, but as they are in their own nature and in their as they are

necessary relations

each other.

to

knowledge Jhe_nij^

_anOM-.ma&Mi.isii

;

its

objects

are

mere transient phenomena, but permanent laws. a .jet higher stage.

this there is

beyond

stage of knowledge, in

under

Even

no^

But the

which we connect things and laws, rests on and

necessary principles " the involves the highest principle of all, very necessity But there is a form of know of the nature of God." ledge

of.

which

basis but

this principle is not

the very essence

that "

merely the impliec

which Spinoza de

" intuitive knowledge," jwJMchjroce^sJfr an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certaii signates

the adequate ^knowledge of it has reached this,

"When

essence of things." the mind, s stage of ''intelligence^

the

finite,

h^g^

and regard^

as it has the infinite in

the nalufeofthe of the

th<

mind

as

.oza's

it.

inquiry into

human

" the

n -^__ S2Lfflfe-^^^^^ r_~knowledge of_tkej?o .

^

GocL

Its first consciousness of thin*

Bi(

from a purely individual, but it/ is capable of rising Lost at, first in the confuseC to a universaTstandpoint.

is

and inadequate ideas of sense an4 imagination, human intelligence has in it the cap^oliy i>f rising above itsel

\

192

Spinoza.

ad mdividuum, but and necessary relations and

seeing things no longer in ordine

n

their objective reality

;

capable of reaching_a^ of reason it 3y the intuitive grasp and all relations of things njmdual.^thuigs,

inally,

it,

is

ibsplute, unity, as expressipiis

...of

....

i

"Jjhe^ eternal jiecgssjiy _,

_

??

^.di vine nature. I. If now we examine of

thought of

a little

more closely the course is an outline, the first

which the foregoing

important proposition in Spinoza's account of the nature of the mind is that ^ejiumajguro body."

"The

first,"

actual being of the

says

he,

"which

human mind

is

constitutes the

nothing

else

than

the idea of an actually existing individual thing," and " the object of the idea which constitutes the human

mind is the body that is, a definite actually existing mode of extension and nothing else." 1 The proof that the mind is the idea of the body is

man of Spinogeneral doctrine of the attributes of thought and extension, and\of the modes as parallel expressions of these attributes! Substance is both a " thinking thing" simply .an application to the nature of

za's

and an " extended thing " ; but thought and extension, and their respective modes, are not essentially different, "but

only different expressions of one and the same To every mode of thought a mode of extension >

the owler or

order or exfefeiag

series of

of

series

things,

thoughts

the same

is

and every

.actually

r^gaarded as a modification both

tHng mayVbe

and extesion. I

^

'^^^* ^^^"*"^ B

^

1

but the body and the a

if.

18, cor.

Mind idea of the

body

The two worlds

and the same

are one

now under one

plated,

Idea of the Body.

is the

attribute,

mind jnd

of

thing, contem-

now under

matter,

another.

thoughts

and

things, are thus absolutely separated^ ji3^_eac^><w other. Though completely correspondent, they are absolutely

independent,

and

and

materialistic

idealistic

explanations

explanations

of

physical,

mental phenomena,

of

In Spinoza's theory there is as are equally precluded. room for the deus ex machina of Descartes as for

little

" " of Geulinx or the the " occasional causes pre-estab" of Leibnitz, to explain the relation of lished harmony

and and in this case there is no difference, but only one and the same "We may, thing contemplated in different aspects.

body and mind and the correspondence mental acts

;

of bodily

for relation implies difference,

indeed, refer both mental and material as th%ir cause, but

we can

phenomena

God God God or to

refer the former only to

or Substance as thinking thing, the latter to To trace the existence of Substance as extended thing. " will of God " would be to the material to object any .

what can only be A circle and the idea of a circle are ono and the same thing, conceived now under the attribute of extension, now under the

by the attribute explained by the attribute explain

attribute of thought

;

of thought

of extension.

but

we

cannot explain the ideal

by the actual or by any mode of extension, but only by thought and modes of thought, and vice versd. Body and mind, in like manner, are to be conceived each as a mode of its own attribute ; and the only .ixniop,

circle

which we can speak, is involved;, in the for everything that exists *' formally" that proposition as a modification of extension there exisite some-.&, of the

two

p.

xii.

of

'

jsr

/;!,

194

Spinoza.

thing exactly parallel "objectively"

as a modifica-

I.e.,

tion of thought.

then, from this view of the nature of things,

What, are

we *to* understand

"the

"by Spinoza's

Jcfea pf the body'"? 4

"seem that there

much

is

definitiojija^mind^^s

In the

this definition does not embrace. " " or mode of thought, does idea of sight

first place, it

might which By defining it as an

in man's spiritual nature

not Spinoza leave out such essential elements of that nature as feel-

and reduce it to something purely The ajgwer is, that, ^

ing, desire, will, &c.,

intellectual

1

knowledge, the oT^ective knowledge ofjhe j ^cedes all other forms of consciousness and cpnstitutes "No the fmxdaniental essence of man's mentj^^bure. emotional or volitional element can exist without presupposing thought, and the latter can exist without the former.

Thought

faculties,

each having

time and

mode

is

not one among its

own

of action;

co-ordinate

many

peculiar function,

it

its

own

the principle which aspects of our spiritual is

underlies all the many-sided life, and of which these are but various specifications. " Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or affections of

the mind,

by whatever name they

are designated, do not same individual an idea &c. But the idea may exist

exist unless there exists in the

of the thing loved, desired,

"

The essence without any other mode of thinking." l of i&an is constituted by modes of thinking, to all of which, the idea

is

by nature prior, and it is only when modes can exist in the same

that exists that the other

individual

jf

flfli.

Therefore thejdes^^

$,.,*.

8.

*

Etk.

ii.

11,

'

'

L^o

t

i

I-

Mind

not

But, secondly, even ideal element is that to

an if

195

abstract Entity.

we

accept the doctrine that the all other elements of man's

which

may be reduced, this doctrine, it may be does not to the modern ear seem to be expressed " by the proposition, the mind is the idea of the body." Modern thought conceives of mind as the conscious, spiritual nature said,

tE2|mg;jelf to ^wMch^Meas^a^^^referred, the rational which is not one idea but the source or subject, atjowest, "the permanent possibility," of aU. ideas.

nature^

But the explanation

of Spinoza's phraseology lies in that as mind, this, anything more than the idea of the " " of the body), is for him a mere of affections body (or It is only by a fictitious, imaginative genabstraction. eralisation that

we

conceive of any abstract faculty of

thinking, feeling, willing, apart from particular thoughts, feelings, volitions ; so it is only by carrying the same fictitious generalisation still further

that

we

conceive of

an abstract entity called " mind," which is no particular mental activity, but a capacity of all activities. Such a conception belongs to the same fictitious region with the " " " lapidity in relation to stones, or conception of aquos1 "There to "in streams. the mind is," says he, ity"

no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, These and similar faculties are either
we

things.

Thus the

same relation to

and the will stand in the

*-

this or that idea or this or that volition,

*^

intellect

as lapidity to this or that stone, or

"The mind

thought, and not the 1

Etlu

ii.

entirely***

merely metaphysical entities or universals,^ are accustomed to create from particular ^

such as

Paul."

*\

loving,*-,

48, sckol.

man

to Peter

and \

is a fixed and definite mode of free cause of itp actions." 2 Mind *

Ibid.,

dem.

196

Spinoza.

not a general capacity of knowledge without definite content, but a definite knowledge of definite things, an individual mode of thought which

is

for" Spinoza,

has for

object an individual mode of extension, the ' t body or of the affections of the body."

its

idea of the

to understand that for Spinoza there is

Are we, then,

no

sucli conception as a conscious self,

to

subject,

Is the

ajgermanent ego or mental experiences are referred? consciousness nothing but a succession of

which

human

all

bound together by no

isolated thoughts, feelings, &c.,

principle of

only be

To

unity?

that,

Spinoza's philosophy contains often seen, are inconsistent

though

elements which, as

answer can

this question the

we have

with his fundamental

principles, there is for him, according to these principles, no unity or unifying principle of ideas that stops short of that ultimate unity of all things which lies in God. may group a number

We

of the simplest bodies (corpora simplissima) by aggregation, or by the constant relation of their motions to each other, into a

combined or corporate individual, and these

by a similar process, into larger individuals in like manner we may combine the simplest ideas, or ideas of the simplest bodies, into the more complex idea of an again,

;

individual body, which

is

the aggregate of

many such

simpler elements, and from that again we may rise to the idea of a larger and more comprehensive individual.

But

all

such

unities, the

most comprehensive alike with

the smallest, are artificial creations of the imagination, which can ascribe to the part an independent unity that exists

only in the whole. of all

modes each

mode

f ji.u.\L

/%

The unity

modes of

of all

of extension, lies solely in the

W
.,.

expresses in a certain definite

i,k

l .

t

,

.

t

/

Jf i

t\iCi

>

'<

197

Alleged Ambiguity.

manner

and the attributes themselves are only different expressions of the one ultimate and only absolute unity, ;

As a mode of human mind has

that of Substance or God. bute, therefore, the

a divine attri-

^

Miy^ say that it perceives this or that, what we affirm is that God has this or that idea, not in so far as He is infinite,

but in so far as the

He

human mind,

mind."

manifested through the nature of

is

or constitutes the essence of the

human

1

N

the phrase " idea of the body," we are thus to understand that particular mode of thought called the

By

human mind which of extension

corresponds to that particular

which we term the human body.

mode Mind,

in other words, is the_ correMe_inJhought ofj^dyjiii It has been alleged that here, as elsewhere, exten^ip^. Spinoza wavers between two entirely different senses of* " the word " idea that, viz., in which it means, as just explained, the mental correlate of a certain modification v

^

and that in which

of matter,

that modification.

it

means the conception

oj

one thing to say that there exists in thought an idea which is parallel to the thing we call hody, and another thing to say that the body is the object of that idea. The relation expressed in the former phrase tion of the

is

It

is

something quite different from the

knower

known, which

to the

is

rela-

the relation

A

constant relation of the niind expressed in the latter. does not body imply that we are always l^hM& of the body, nor a relation of the mind as a whole to the

to the

body

as a

whole that there 1

Eth.

is

ii.

a complete knowledge of

11, por.

/

198

Spinoza.

the body in every man's mind, or that every human " an accomplished physiologist." Yet a confubeing is " sion of these two uses of the term " idea is to be traced, it is averred, in

and

much

of Spinoza's speculations,

to this cause are to be ascribed

errors.

some

of his gravest

1

we look to. the whole drift of Spinoza's must, I think, be .^cqiiitted^rtiiis^ Alleged Though, unquestionably, the idea of the

Ifjiowever, doctrine,

it

ambiguity.

according to Spinoza, an idea which has the

body

for its object, yet neither directly nor

by implicabody with The human mind is

tion does Spinoza confound the idea of the

the physiologist's knowledge of it. a mode of thought, but relation to an object

is

of the

very essence of thought. Spinoza, we have just seen, rejects an^such notion as tEaF of an J^^^L^^SSf^ ^

1

a

^c^agty.^of thinking

ajgart Jromjbhe

There is no thought^joi^a^particular object? tTiougET; or idea which is not the thought or idea of actual

then, can be the special object of the a particular mode of thought if not the particular mode of extension which corresponds to it? For man the whole universe of .being consists of thought

something. idea which

What,

is

and extension, and

their

therefore, there

modifications. for

is

Outside of

the individual

nothing naiad to think, nothing that for it immediately exists, save the .individual mode of extension which is the*

itself,

obverse, so to speak, of

coml^gofthebody is

no confusion,

itself.

1^^

the mind. thinks the .body.

therefore, of correlation

the idea that l

is

and

correlated to the

Pollock's Spinoza, p. 132,

There

relation in

body

is

the

"Idea" idea which has the

-not

Knowledge.

Scientific

199

for its object, or, in brief, that

body

*

the mind lint

is

the idea of the body.

body, Spinoza logically

mind

the-

though

"in so

bound

primarily, the idea of the

is,

defining

it

neither identities, nor

is

body with maintain anything!

to identify, this idea of the

the scientific knowledge of " so absnrd as that every

it,

or to

]

human being must be ani As a matter of fact, he

accomplished physiologist." expressly teaches that the knowledge of "the body which is the content of this "idea" is very imperfect and " The human * inaccurate knowledge. mind," says he, " does not involve an * adequate knowledge of the parts * " The idea," again he composing the human body." * " of each affection of the human body does not writes, *

adequate knowledge of the human body itself;" and again, "The idea of the affections of the*

involve an

human body, human mind, Nor does his

in so far as they are related only to the; are not clear and distinct, but confused." l

theory force him to hold any more thari The idea of the body and the body correspond to

this.

each other

;

as this finite

but the correspondence

mode

is

between the idea

of thought, dwelling in the region of

imagination or sensuous perception, and the body as this mode of extension apart from its relations to the

finite

whole system of the physical universe. view " thej^ody^ no morejincludes Junctions as they

In

this point

o:

a

than "the idea of

body

"

or the

mind

includes its whole constitution and

by the psycholog Between the adequate idea o|

relations as they are contemplated

or the metaphysician. i

Bth.fi 2^,27,28.

*

?

Spinoza. body, indeed, and the body as

it

really

is,

there

bid be a perfect correlation, and the relation in this but the^ corcase would be that of scientific knowledge ;

relation implied in Spinoza's definition of the mind, is not between the body as it really is and the scientific

mind,

between the former and the unscientific

still less

mind, but between body as a

mind

in that attitude

sciousness its

all,

physiologist, the

who

us God,

is

mode of matter, and for the ordinary con-

is

as

finite

If it be

grjj^c^

said that, after 1

which

is

the

answer

also the

body

it is

to the perfect

that the perfect physiologist body as it is in reality i.e., as is

fletermined in relation to the whole of extension, and Mind is tlie idea therefore in all its physical relations. of the body, and only so as it is the idea of itself ; but is as imperfect in the one case as in Idea and object, therefore, are here exactly

the consciousness the other.

^correspondent. tiori, and there

IM^ion^^clu^s no more thanjioj^a-

no confusion between two different tEngs between the body as the condition of thought, and the body "as the object of thought. What^ma^e^ is

J^ The

first important point in Spinoza's inquiry into tke nature of the human mind is the definition of the mind

II.

"idea of the body."

The second

is

the^fu^ier the* further step

may be is

expressed by saying that the

that of

determination

mind as^nsci^^

to ffc&

thesgggnjl

As "the mind

ifei^^ f)

first

body because the body

is tlie

is

object of the

1

mind, so

the idea of the

...

.

mind

is

united to

.

.

the mind, in the same way as the mind is united " the body ; the only difference being that "

ject,

now

^

lLJitstoit e jof Jijgjiglit, no wjmder^ thafcjjf. ,ejx" tension," wherejs the^^eao th .

...

Sg^ojLe^ndjt^^eJ^ong regardedjiui^r^^,^ l

same attiibni^ The jnw&LjQL^

(2) from the nature of mind " the idea of the body." (1.) The human mind, " as we have seen above, is, according to Spinoza, part of the infinite intellect of God." To say that the mind (1)

from the nature of God,

itself as

" that God has this or that perceives anything is to say idea, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He constitutes the essence of the human mind." But it is involved in the divine attribute of thought that " there must necessarily exist in God an idea both of Himself

and

of all

His

human mind." mind

itself

and therefore an idea of the mind and the in God by the same necessity and

affections,

" The idea of the

2

exist

the same power of thinking." therefore

idea of

God

(or

3

The human

as constituting its essence),

miiadj

has an

itself.

The same thing

is proved from the nature of " the idea of the " The body." idea of the mind, or the idea of the idea, is simply the form of the idea considered as a mode of thought with(2.)

mind

itself, regarded as

out reference to

its

object.

For one who knows any-

thing, in the very act of doing so 1

2

Itk

ii.

20,

knows

t3mt

Eth. ii 21, dem. and sdiol.

dem.

-

Ba.

ii 21,

he knows

202 it,

Spinoza.

and knows that he knows that

on ad infinitwn"

What

it is

of

lie

knows

it,

and so

l

most importance to remark

doctrine of idea mentis

is

that,

as to this

notwithstanding Spino-

the absolute independence, and equality modes, a richer^contentjis to the mental than -* .*,*-

za's assertion of

two

of the

parallel series of ,^,.^.

The

,.,,._..,.<

t

.,,,,.,,.,..,..

body corresponds to the body, but there is nothing in the latter which corresponds to. the idea's The body, as a mode of extenconsciousness of itself. has relations to modes of extension, and the other sion, idea which constitutes the mind has relations to other modes of thought; but in the series of ideas there is interposed a relation which has nothing parallel to it in the series of material modes viz., the relation of each In returning upon itself, mind is not the idea to itself. idea of the

correlate in thought of

d,

anything that takes place in exa

a Itjgossesses winch has no

tension.

matter.

In his

whole doctrine, indeed, as to the relation of the ideal and the material, we find an unconscious preponderance In the very definition of ascribed to the ideal side.

mind

as the idea of the body, there

seems to be attributed

power to transcend the gulf between thought and things, which is not ascribed to the latter.

to it a

;,

becoraeBjd^toed,

^t^^Rdy

by the mind's own inknows the body, or has the body "It would be absurd," says Spinoza, "to

on the mind,

herent activity, that for its object.

bT^^^^c any influence cFTinpression

It

bxit

it

of tte idea as something Eth,

ii.

dumb,

21, schoi

like a picture in-

Preponderance of Ideal Side. scribed on a tablet,

and not

as a

mode

203

of thinking, as in-

1

"By idea," says he elsewhere, 2 "! understand a conception of the mind which it forms be-ffi telligence itself."

cause it is a thinking thing. I say conception rathe than perception, because the word perception' seen to indicate that the mind is passive to the object, bu| l

'

'

conception seems to express the activity of the In being the idgg, of the body, mino^^

m

selfong: Moreover, as we have just inherent activity manifests itself in a wholly

a^tiyj^ja^^

^^^^^^^m^ ^!^^^' m

seen, its

original manner, to which there is nothing corresponding in the body viz., as reflection on itself. It is not the idea of the but it makes that idea its merely body,

owno^ject;

and in so doing,

as

Spinoza teaches,

it is

^^ The_ toutti ...of ..its knowledge ^i tifigd.

The content

certainty with

it,

of every true idea carries subjective " or characteristic pro-

and the " form

perty of the idea is something that pertains to it> "in so far as it is considered as a mode of thought, wifhowb 3 reference to the obfeet."

Finally,

see that Spinoza ascribes to

we

shall afterwards

mind not merely an

activity

independent of the body, but a power to control^j^d and its affection?. The mind masters the passions

by the very

act of thinking them, or

"by

"4

them and when forming it is thus liberated from passion, it can order and COILH catenate its ideas according to the order of reason, But, clear

and

distinct ideas of

as ideas are ordered

;

and connected in the mind, so are

i Eth.

ii.

43, schol.

2 Bfchi ii, def. S.

Eth.

ii.

21, schoL

* Etlu v, 3.

204

Spinoza.

the affections of the body or the images of things in the body. "So long," he therefore concludes, "as we

by passions which are contrary to our nature, possess the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of l Noi withstanding, therefore, Ms d reason." causal nexus between mind, and Jxxly, ^ are not assailed

we

is^ribing^Jo^mind not_gnly a power over Jjself j^d it n^ internal activities, which the body does notjgos>

jess,

butjalo^_a Jpjwer,

III.

The

essence

extendingj^

ofbhemiud

as

the idea of the "body, and in the idea the of Its being body it is the idea of itself. towards both the outward and the It is idea,

inward world ask,

What

is

if

is,

telligence,

its

we go on

to

^

the

that in the

knowledge

definitely, it is neither

is

first

exercise of our in-

"inadequate"

or,

more

a complete nor a distinct, "but

only a fragmentary and confused knowledge of things, Its point of view is purely individual ; it is that of a

who is only a part of the world, and as such apprehends only the part with which he stands in immediate connection, and even that only partially and

being

and

as the mind's knowledge of itself ia knowledge of the body as it knows itself only in knowing, and in the measure in which it knows, outward things i

indistiaotly

;

relative to its

^^^ '

Btt

w

Inadequate Knowledge..

The proof

of the

7

-

205/

inadequacy of that knowledge which

mind 'as the idea of the body, is based on the proposition that the mind knows the body only by pertains to the

means of ideas of bodily affections i.e.. -of the modifications which the body experiences in its relations to* out-

ward

1

has been

It

objects.

shown 2 that an

indi-

vidual finite thing can exist only as determined by another finite thing, and that as determined by another

ad infinitum; and

as the knowledge on the depends knowledge of its cause and includes it, 3 an adequate knowledge of any indifinite thing, &c.,

of

an

effect

vidual thing would imply a knowledge of the whole in other words, endless series of causes and effects would imply a knowledge which pertains only to the

God.

infinite intellect of

Eut the human mind

is

only

Its knowledge is God's a part of that infinite intellect. knowledge of the body, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is regarded as affected by another

idea of a particular thing actually existing, or by many such ideas. * In other words, the idea or knowledge of! the body is not the idea_of the bodjjnjisfil^ but only! of the body as determined or affected "*Dyother bodies j or the

mind know-s

of the affections

what

is

the

body only by means

Kow,

it

experiences. the value of the knowledge

obvious that is partial j

it

if

of the ideas

we

consider

so defined, it is

must be bothj^

It

itjij^r^^

knowledge of the body, a knowledge wMch. but a fragment of what would

^^^^D^and^a^ons. of outward bodies,

excludes or conceals

and of all

Its

itself, is

Etk 1

Bflj.

ii.

19.

2

Eth.

i.,

ax. 4.

* Bfck

ii.

28.

19,

dem.

206

Spinoza.

be necessary to true or perfect knowledge.

own body

its

objects, it

only as

and

it affects

knows both only

is affected

in one relation,

Knowing by outward

the external

objects only in so far as they influence the human body, but not in their innumerable other relations 1 the human j

body only in that

relation in

which

it

has been affected

in a particular way, but not as it is capable of being 2 affected in a multiplicity of other ways. Further,

the

human body

is a highly composite individual of the which thing, parts belong to its essence only in so far as they participate in its movements in

definite

reciprocal

relations

but in so far as

;

they

and reaction with other bodies, the knowledge of their existence and activity is not included in the idea of the body which constitutes the human mind. Thus th exist in other relations, or in action

outward objects, of the ledge ~** mwof -~ ^c5S55JII!iMMW*"^Sw.. ,

,

..

.

body <

^..

.

constituent parts,

and of its w~-~--- ~^ >

r .,.^-

only in^rt^^^ It is also,

is^CT^o^in^^c.t^^jgadal.

far as it goes, indistinct or confused.

wMcnlEeliiind

itself,

''"'~"'"5*M..i, < ^

is

conscious

and even so

Each"an^ction of

the result of two factors

is

the action of the outward object and the susceptibility of its

much ward

own body is

and

it is

incapable of determining how much due to the out-

merely subjective, how " These ideas and

affections, therefore, in

object.

so far as they are related to the

human mind

like conclusions without premisses " ised ideas."

If the

is,

alone, are

they are con-

3

knowledge that comes

affections of the ft.

that

& 2Q.

body

is 2

to the

mind through

thus inadequate, Bquali Etku

ii.

27.

Ettu

ii,

28,

the

'

Inadequate Knowledge.

-

**"'

It

-

2^fcj2Jjh, self The idea of the withTfc. quate

idea must partake of the im"As the perfection and indistinctness of its object. does not an of the involve idea of an affection body

adequate knowledge of the body or adequately express its nature, so the idea of that idea does not adequately

other words, which

il

^ But

6

is

thejcojis^^

nl2^MJ^^i^ besides this imperfection and confusion

which

characterises our first consciousness of things, or that

knowledge which body, there

is

mediated by the affections of the

is

a further defect

whid:^^

ra

^oT onI^irT!us^age

tpji,

tions inadequate, but

are our particular percep-

thejgimej^^

1S2^^ knows things only through the or as they present

A mind which..

affections of the body,

themselves in individual sensible

experience, can have no other notion of the relations of things than that of arbitrary or accidental association*

The

affections of the body,

and therefore the ideas of

these affections, vary in each case with the ^individual They are limited in number by the susceptibility.

range of individual experience, and they succeed each other in no rational order, but only in the order in

which the individual chances

to be affected

by them.

says Spinoza, "is an association of ideas which involves the nature of things outside the body,, but it is an association which arises in the mind ac-

cording to the order and association of the affections 1

Eth, ii 29, dem.

208 of

Spinoza. the "body," in "

contradistinction

from

tlie

order of

whereby the mind perceives things through l their primary causes, and which is the same in all men." Thus, so long as our knowledge is derived from mere external experience, Spinoza shows (though by the help

intelligence

of a

somewhat crude physiological explanation, 6n which

nothing really turns) that

it

things which

possible to regard as

is

even nonactually present, 2 and to connect existent, things arbitrarily "according to the manner in which the mind has been accustomed are absent or

and bind together the images of things." 3 the inadequacy and arbitrariness which, is the Lastly,

to connect

general characteristic of this kind of knowledge finds " another example in the fictitious universals," the general or abstract terms by which we attempt to give connection and unity to our particular perceptions of " things. Transcendental terms, such as "being," thing," " " " " man," horse," something ; generic terms, such as " so far from expressing real relations of dog," &c.,

our individual

things, only intensify the confusion of

They

are expressions of the

perceptions. ness, not of its strength. its is

They

arise

mind's weak-

from the

fact that

capacity of forming even confused images of things limited, so that when they exceed a certain number

they run into each other, and our only resource group them indistinctly under some general term. stead, therefore^ of giving unity to the

is to

In-

differences of

our primary perceptions, they only redouble the original And they are as arbitrary as they are

.indistinctness.

^confused.

They do not supply any objective

which Uhe ItL UU8,

principle

differences of things are explained

sekoL

Ibid., 17.

&

Ibid., 18,

and

Is Adequate Knowledge Possible

209

?

harmonised, but only images or subjective conceptions, varying with individual temperament, by which we

attempt to bind together diversities too complicated for " Those who have most ordinary thought to embrace. frequently looked with admiration on the stature of men will understand by the term. man an animal of erect '

i

stature;

while those

fixing their thoughts

who have been in the habit of on something else will form a dif-

ferent general image, as of an animal capable of laughter,

a biped without feathers, a rational animal, &c., each person forming general images according to the tempera-

ment of his own body." * The knowledge which is mediated by the " " of the body in other words, our sciousness of

affections

things as they are given in immediate '

^a^BMMalBWWglia,*.^^

raany^

The mind, regarded simply as "the idea of the body/ has no adequate knowledge " either of itself or of the It is but an individual body, or of outward bodies." thing in a boundless universe, catching only indistinct. glimpses of other finite things in their immediate relation to its

mode

own

individuality.

of thought,

of a transitory

which knows

mode

and

of matter

;

It is but a transitory only as the reflex

itself

and of

all

that lies be-

j

I !

immediate object it knows nothing save through the dim and broken impressions of its

yond

itself

its

accidental surroundings. is)

capable

^JJf^

Li!JS\

<^"j^^

&jv\

0tjd339jS 1

particular

prehend the universal, i

P,

XII,

oafcwmch

Btlu

ii.

is

"^553^ ggubifec^

I

40, sckol. 1. -

O

1

210 tive

Kmiioza.

and contingent^can find in

Spinoza^answer

itself

the

to this question is

^lZ^ik^-l e X,e i9P,me^

contamecHrM^ e individual

.kBpwlBcyje. constitutes the mind's first attitude ?J!

point of view which towards the world, is only the beginning of knowledge. for man to rise above himself and the It is possible ***"'"'- M --"... >., ,,,..,,^,,rtMBOTM*^^ B.^WifaW' *.,,**

~^,

onditions of his finitude.

,

The human mind has

in

it,

an element in virtue of which can escape from the narrowness and confusion, the rbitrariness and contingency of its own subjective its

y

eelings s

essential nature,

or

affections,

or

that

of

knowledge

which

merely generated from them.

Itjsjjpssible for to eliminate its own o|_knpjwld^e,

',

xntroubled

and Jo^jttajn^Jbo a by the peculiarities

of individual tempera-

js^of jLadividtial experience.

onceptions which represent wn body to outward bodies

omytEe it

Tjgnnciples

it,

in-

relations

From of

its

can^rise to the apprewhich are common to

and which determine, not their

11

bodies,

tit

their necessary relation to each other.

accidental,

And

foaQy,

eyond even that emancipation from itself which is mplied in the knowledge of things as determined by miversal laws and rules (per leges et rer/ulas univers)* %!LJBS!^^^ levation in which all finite things

and

all

^

c

Eth,

iii,,

Prief,

lawsand

211

Higher Stages of Knowledge.. and not in

partial

"

in their"^e"ssential relations,

fragmentary aspects, not in accidental combinations, eternity,"

and jmj^in^grj^

word, the

human mind, when

capacity of intelligence,

is

"under

tlie^

"JpJHLe.

it

anc

'

has realised

its

In

inheren

no longer "the idea of

the

"body," but thejtdb*^

and

of all

*]5itlurascending

scale of intelligence thus generally

indicated, Spinoza specifies

respectively

ignates

two

"reason"

stages, (ratio)

"

knowledge

In the

(scientia intuitivd).

which he desand "intujjffe earlier

sketch of

the theory which is given in the treatise on ' The Improvement of the Understanding/ these two kinds or stages of

knowledge are defined as that "in which the

essence of a thing is inferred from another thing," and " in which a that thing is perceived solely from its own the or essence, by knowledge of its proximate cause." '

In the Ethics

'

the distinction

is

presented in a some-

"Eeason" is that knowledge what modified form. which arises " from our possessing common notions and 1 "ideas adequate ideas of the properties of things," which are common to all men," of those "things in

2 " which exist equally in the bodies agree," human body and in external bodies, and equally in the 8 part and in the whole of each external body."

which

all

^

tuitive knowledge,"

again, is

wh^Tpro^l^^irom an

"that kind

of

knowing

adequate idea of the forioa! God to the adequate know-

essence of certain attributes of

ledge of the essence of things."

Etk

it 40, sclioL 2,

Eth. it 89, demu

4

And

this last

kind

Etlu it 88, cor. Httu ii 40, scfcol. 2.

o;

2.J/.

212

Spinoza.

knowledge he further describes

as the

knowledge

of

" the

existence of individual things in so far as they are in God for although," he adds, " each individual thing is ;

determined by another individual thing to exist in a certain way, nevertheless the force by which each thing in

perseveres

its

existence

1.

son^"

raw8

The kind as

is,

from the ejejaml

follows

necessity of the nature of God." of

1

knowledge which

we have

is

designated "rea-

just said, in the earlier form

*tJ^

theory distinguished from the third or highest kind of knowledge simply as mediate from immediate, that

which

is

obtain

reached,

by

b^ra^dn^bion^ from that which we

intuitive

"Beason," in other

perception.

words, denotes that knowledge of which the object is not apprehended directly and immediately, but only inf exentially,

Of

bv^^deduct. ^^

^

this inferential or deductive

knowledge Spinoza ad-

examles thejspjic^^ or " from any universal to a property which always accomIn the Ethics' the explanation of the panies it." duces as

'

matter, though varied in form, is substantially the same. There are certain common notions or fundamental principles of reason

which enable us

to rise above the

merely individual and subjective view of things, and which form the basis of a real knowledge.

which vary sujrject,

^

^^^ parts of things

nature which each things,

thu^T^mcommon

and in virtue

of

which

is

a member of the

Of these universal elements

or order of nature. * EtitL.

it

a universal

with other

ii.

45, schol.

Second Stage of Knowledge.

mind can form adequate ideas it can apprehend them in their simplicity and purity underlying the confusion of the sensible world, and so perceive in that

the

;

world, not the accidental play of circumstances, but a real or rational order. These adequate ideas enable us ^fc^W^^MB-*^^

a**""*""

^

*

oppositions.

Thejrjorm^e

basis of reason

(fundamenta

of ratiocination (fundtmie^a ratiocinii}^ as "whatever ideas in the mind follow from

r^^j^-Gs inasmuch

" 3 adequate ideas are also themselves adequate," and the things we clearly and distinctly understand are either the

common properties from these." to

,

form

clear

4

"

of things, or things

which

are

deduced

Eeason," in

and dSSnct

ideas,

This kind of knowledge, he further points out, though it raises us above our first crude perceptions of things, inasmuch as it liberates us from accidental associa-

j

tions, y^etjft^lgjg^^

!LJ!2H;^^

from that which is the

It only incompletely redeems us

or abstract

way

of looking at things

partial *

radical

In our ordinary unscientific attitude of mind we proceed from part to part setting out from ourselves and our immediate surroundings, we pass from

defect of the latter.

:

object to object, regarding theraas isolated, self-identical

^ ^^

.

f

^^ ^^^

them with each other fafc^-Q^ ' Reason of time and associations accidental place. by far corrects this abstract, disintegrated view of t that it connects and separates them as genera aad things, or only vaguely connecting

^

\

1

Mh. ii.

a

BtiL ii 40.

5

Itk

44, cor.

2

dem.

v. 10, dem.

^

B&u it

* 'E&.

T.

40, seboL 1.

1%

dem.

j

214

Spinoza.

according to their likenesses and dissimilarities, or links them, together by necessary laws, such as that of cause xnd effect. But in so doing reason only partially over-

comes the crude"a5stractions

of ordinary thought. When, reason frpm effect to cause we jfni^pntemDkte

we

:

?

things as^jsejD^te,

selMdentical^ substances^^onn^ted .....

on ty "ky 5n 5?i9IB,^ carry out tne series of causes

^^5i?- er we

Far

li 11

^

and

an d however

>

effects,

we

can

never arrive at any real principle of unity. The utmost we get by any such method is only an endless or indefinite succession of objects externally determining and deterined. If the real unity of the

some

^ j^ ^ r

by an

infinite

it,

which

is

only the__end]^ssrepetitjon of "

^reason principle which will at^once

p.ve us,

mowledge of which I have spoken, and ,ence anA utility of which I shall in the

of the excel-

fifth part (of 1 It is thus that 'Ethics') have occasion to speak." Spinoza describes that soientia intuitiva which forms .he

1

1^^

I

dFttSftJO

the attitude

"

4|

i '''.',<

sth. it.47, scliol

Third Stage of Knowledge. of view, 'dividual point tilings in the light of

and

in

that

which

it

215

apprehends

principle in

first

all

relation

which alone they truly are and can be known. we have seen, so far corrects the arbitrary abstractions of sense and imagination, but its point of

to

"Reasoji," as

view

The

is still abstract.

nects things with each other

link of necessity which conis something other than and

external to the things themselves.

them unity is foreign means of such general

That which

not immanent

to,

givesi

in^^^.

principles as that of causality can infer or conclude from one thing to another, but

do not

see,

By we we

We

the unity that runs through them. perand that which unites

ceive the differences of things

them, but

not^^ s

in

"intuitive

What

knowledge,"^th<^ "

7

SpinozanieansD} which it

this phrase is a

ion^ but

f erence to unity,

kind of knowledge in

is

whole, s^jdjEJO^ It is the 'realisation of what, else-

where, he had viz,,

that

laid

down

as the ideal of true

knowledge

thBnjsd^^

^ the source of is

all

other ideas."

Moreover,

noj process from unity to!

^

which first apprehends the prindtple things as an independent, self-contained

difference is not one

or origin of reality,

and then advances to the manifold existences world; but one in -which, as Irg,^-, gjaigte

of the finite

.....

216

as

Spinoza.

genetically

involved in their

;he differences as tli^

.ninianenj in j^e^differpiices. all tilings in God.

md

That the human mind

^

A

n

is

capable of this highest kind

on the considejatioj.^iat all knowledge virtiiailyTSvbivesjbhe idea of God, and that \venavBonly to evolve its content to bring our knowledge into correlation with its first principle or immanent of

knowledge Spinoza

source.

"The

rests

idea," says he,

1

of every individual thing

actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God." As all spaces must be known as in one space, or through the conception of

prehending space, so

an

individual ideas can be

all

all-com-

known

" Inasmuch only through the all-embracing idea of God. as individual things have God for their cause, in so far as He is regarded under the attribute of which they are

modes, their ideas must necessarily involve the conception of the attribute of these ideas

and

infinite essence of

God."

without that knowledge It is tru^TJiaFi^^

we

2

that

is,

the eternal

Thekn

could

know

^

apprehend that which is really the fundamental element of our consciousness ; but the reason of this is, that the uareflective

mind confounds thought with

and. conceives itself to it

cannot represent to

imagination,

be incapable of thinking what

itself by an outward picture or have been accustomed to associate the of Gdd with images of things they hare been in

"Men

IWv

m*

i&

/.

Intuitive Knowledge.

217

the hdbit of seeing," and the absence of the image is^ mistaken for unconsciousness of the If the} thing.

_^____^--w_

"khan the

,

.

an error in calculation would ascribe in the

human mind

to

it

maBLwEomake^ to

an incapacity?

apprehend the idea of number,

rather than to its unconscious substitution of false

bers for true. bring,

we our

by

When we

thus " see

num-

iMogaXJ^ds>

n

oi

reflection, their content to clSix consciousness,

discern that our ideas of all of ourselves, oi things own bodies, and of external bodies as actually exist-

presuppose and are based on an adequate knowledge "the eternal and infinite essence of God." 1 Intuitive

ing of

.

It not only liberates us from the arbitrary abstractions oi sense and imagination, but it frees us from the abstract

ness that thought.

still clings

to the general notions of ratiocinate v*

When we

"proceed from the absolute know-

ledge of the essence of .G-od to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things," from the idea of an. absolute unity, which is immanent in all diversity, to particiilar

things as only the expression of that unity in a certain definite manner, the duaHsmjw;hich is involved in tin

The view of the world, as a succession of finite things conditioned by and conditioning each other in endless series, yields to the view in which everything is seen in the light of cc the infinite unity which is immanent in all If or, al* i Btk. ii. 47,

-t-

218

Spinoza.

ithough each particular thing bo conditioned by another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force by each particular thing perseveres in existing" (i.e,.,

jvvhich

" follows " (not from other particular " from the eternal necessity of the nature of but) The intuition of reason is possible only when

fifejn^o^ib jJgsgnpe) jfchings, 1

|God."

'diversity is seen

through

.unity, for till

then the special

existence of things and their mediating link are inde"We cannot properly see the whole at once. pendent.

Mediacy thus can become immediacy only at^ttiejhi^^t and this explains the difficulty that is involved goint in asserting at the same time an intuitive knowledge and ;

The perfect a deduction of ideas from the highest idea. for into is reason unity possible only at the collapse where it returns, so to speak, to the directpoint highest It

1 I

ness of sense.

knowledge

but only as

Even

Pinally,

as a

we cannot speak

knowledge which

is

of intuitive

determined by time,

knwj^

ratiocinative knowledge, in so far as it lifts its

objects out of their contingency into a system of unalterable relations,

"under a

may

be said to be knowledge of things

certain form of eternity." (sub

But

quadam

specie

only intuitive knowledge to which, in the fullest sense of the words, this description can be applied. ITor hep our consciousness of things^ ceternitatis).

it

consciousness which

is

is

no longer

.^JutTc^^ joJj^BdJvine

nafrore,''

or

wMchiden^^

^

by either as existing in relation

^""aciuMintwoways ii.

45, soh-oL

*

Knowledge under to a given time

and

the

r

"Form of Eternity? 219

place, or -as contained in

God and

1 following from the necessity of the divine nature." Time and number are only forms of the imagination,

pertaining to the phenomenal unreal aspect of things. It is only individual things, or things regarded as isolated in their inner individuals, that arise and pass away essence they neither begin nor cease to be.

?

When we

contemplatethemjto

^we in which duration and succession

^^^ angle sees all its properties to be simultaneously present in it, so he who intuitively apprehends the natttre* of things sees all finite existences as eternally involved in the idea of God seesthem ^

"Here," says Spinoza, "by existence I do not under-*j stand duration

and

as a certain

that

is,

existence abstractly conceived, *t I speak of the very*i

form of quantity.

nature of existence which

is

ascribed to individual things +\

this, that from the eternal necessity of the *f nature of God an infinitude of things follow in infinite *

because of

ways."

2

It is unnecessary at present to enter into any detailed "What examination of Spinoza's theory of knowledge.

we may here point

out

is,

that the

Setting out from the purely individual poinFoFvie^of the ordinary consciousness, it traces the! rise of the mind through the higher but stiH iraperfectj it fails

to fulfil.

universality of reason, to that highest or absolute universality which is involved in the apprehension of all 1

Eth. V. 29,

scliol.

2

Bttu ii 45/sehol.

220

Spinoza.

of God. Expressed things in their relation to the idea the gradual evolution of thought is in modern language, that in which the mind, beginning with ordinary unsoto the scientific phisticated experience, advances, first attitude, and finally to that of philosophy or speculation.

But whatever may be

said as to the transition from the

the second stage, the fatal defect of Spinoza's scheme of knowledge is, that the final step is, not from a

first to

lower universality to a higher, from a plurality .of principles or categories to one highest principle which embraces and explains them, but simply from the diversity of the former to a mere abstract identity which lies be-

The

iyond them. /of

which

is

principle the intuitive apprehension

to constitute the ultimate explanation of all

the differences of the finite world I

is,

when we examine

what it means, nothing more than the common element I which we reach when these differences are left out of

I

implicit universality of intelligence, as we may express it, asserts itself, first, in raising us above the partial, accidental, confused aspect of things as they are sight.

The

regarded from a merely individual or subjective point of view, and in apprehending them as related to each other

by universal

principles or laws.

scientific point of view,

though

it

But the

rational or

so far corrects that of

ordinary experience, leaves the impulse towards univerThe claim of ghiloso^hxjbo be a sality still unsatisfied. aigher explanation of the woSfd than that of science is based on the fact, not only that science employs categories,

such as substance and

qualities, cause

and

effect, &c.,

does not explain, but that these categories give us $oljr $> provisional explanation of the world conceived of existences outside of each other, and 5

Defect of the Theory.

221

apart from their relation to the intelligence that

know

things indeed by real and ohjec tive, instead of accidental and subjective relations, bu

them.

They connect

the highest view they reach is that of an aggregate o finite substances acting and reacting externally on each other, and contemplated in abstraction from the iatelli

gence for which alone they

exist.

What

philosophy,

musit

and at the same

al 1

once of the*

^^I.^S^SSSe

di^^Stce ottEED^^ffljBfejc^^gMd

knows thenTu^vv^fen.erm 'ihisresTiLt

we need

not here inquire.

at least is obvious, that

But

this

muchf

the^^^^^,

ad being cannot befoTind in

from

their difference.

If

what we are in and man, of mind and

o***ffiLe^meaning of nature

matter, of the manifold differences of the finite world, is

not supplied by an idea which destroys these

ences, or is itself destroyed

with them.-

when brought

il

differ-

into contact

3m

222

CHAPTER

XII.

THE MORAL NATXJBE OF MAN.

THE the'

ethical part of

Spinoza's philosophy

is

based on

metaphysical, and partakes of the merits and

fects of the latter.

A th

r

ugj]^ TAsit adinitsOTnoqualithings, so it admits of no

of

letter

od

han

is

and worse, higher and lower, in man's nature. not more revealed in what we call the noblest

Each

in the meanest of finite existences.

mode ,here

which

de-

of the infinite,

and none can

"be

more.

is

but a

Nor can

be any part or element of any individual nature is more or less divine than another, or by the

;riumph or subjugation of which that nature can elevate to a higher or degenerate to a lower stage of being.

.tself

such a system the terms "good" and "evil" must be meaningless, or at most, expressions of facts of the same 'n

order with the terms heat and cold, motion and rest, or (in the case of sensitive beings) pleasure

and

pain.

Fi-

such a system the independent existence of things is an illusion, and their only distinction

nally, as in finite

from the

infinite a distinction

aj)0twotion which gave

it

which vanishes .with, the birth,

any

such, notion as

Sketcli

of

the,

223

Theory.

that of aspiration, self-devotion, union with God anyf such notions as form the basis of the religious life

arq

equally excluded with those of freedom, responsibility! f duty, &c., which form the basis of the moral.

But

whilst, in one point of view, the metaphysic of

Spinozism, as of

all

pantheistic systems,

is

subversive of

what we commonly understand by "ethics/* the less true that the ethical

it is

not

in^^S^m^^sdm^^^^n-i

e^aTto^^^^^^^^^^^^S^^J^L^*^ And

even in his metaphysic

poir^ed. S5ere"~are ideas and principles

with

its

pantheistic

and

side,

rate ethical theory is

which

which his

of

itsellj

are incongruous!

the logical result

elabo-j

The

origin]

and explanation of all moral activity he finds ic tain self-maintaining or self-realising impulse, which s

"the its

own

effort

by which 1

being."

it

endeavours to persevere in

FeeHn^^ and modifications

^ self-maintaining

is

individual

impulse

is

of feel-

or repression. "When, the satisfied, or when the mind

conscious of an increase

of power, the feeling is that of pleasure or some modification of pleasure ; in the opposite case the feeling is that of pain or a modification is

of pain.

When

the individual

is

himself the adequate

cause of such increased power, the emotion is termed an "a when the diminution or increase of power ;

tr^v^" folfowsfrom something individual

termed a a

is

and of which the

external,

only the partial cause, the emotion is or passive state. From this ac-

^^^>"

human emotion we

count of tlG^imture and origin of '

i

Bth,

iii.

6 and

7.

I

224

Spinoza.

are enabled to understand the relation of the intellectual

and the close he between the traces which successive correspondence successive the and of stages of man's knowledge stages

to the ethical part of Spinoza's philosophy,

I

I

I

a*

moral

life.

Through

and expressing

itself in

lectual atmosphere in -./r"

all

the stages of knowledge runs

the self-realising impulse, taking its complexion and content from each in succession, expanding and enlarging itself with the widening sphere of intelligence,

emotions coloured by the intelit breathes. At the lowest

which

stage,

corresponding to that of

where

intelligence is governed

"vague by accidental and subwhich seeks realisation is

jective associations, the self

the

purely

individual

with individual

varying

self,

temperament and the accidental relations of time and Its good and evil are nothing absolute, but place. only that in wTiich a purely individual nature can experience the feeling of enlargement or repression viz., plg22SE^flo4 E?*

moves

activity, as,

aB<^ as

11 >

or affects

own

veres in

its

it is

emotions, and

being " external causes

is

all

experience,

not from the mind's

but from that which

in other words,

of its

^ s wno ^ e

arises

it,

is

that

own

external or foreign to it only the partial cause

at best

"

the force

whereby it perseby the power of

infinitely surpassed

at this stage of the

moral

life

man

is

condition of

human

nature can only be described as that of impotence

or

But

an individual amongst and never can be, foee,

whilst, regarded simply as

other; individuals,

man

The

is not,

I,

^ e$

m

^

S J tfoat

fee true

Sketch of the Theory. self

is

by what

repressed

225

foreign to

is

The

it.

fun-

damental impulse of self-maintenance, which is our very essence, has here not free play; it is in con-

which

it

exists,

above these conditions

is

the ex-

tradiction with the conditions under

and the

effort to rise

All the force of that pression of our deepest nature. nature goes with the effort to throw off the yoke of Corresponding, therefore, to

the stage of intelligence

which Spinoza designates " reason," in which the mind passes from the sphere of inadequate to that of adequate ideas, there is a stage of

moral activity, in which^the

in j^aTFnaEire'aSserFs itself, and the ^element to be the slave of "^Sfcen3ri5id accidental ceasing

universal

mind

impulse, its exerie^.ce becomes the expression of^ its own seMr originated energy. On the intellectual side of our nature, reason, as we have seen, is the sphere of

freedom; it liberates from the confusion and contingency of the senses and the imagination, and is itself the pure activity of the mind, all the operations of

which can be " understood from our own nature adequate cause." But it isJ&J^^ as_ regards

the

mor^h^.

To

as their

live according to reason^

ourselves, ature.

to^ma^e^^uj^lHe^,^^

We

cannot,

indeed,

and imagination, or, so to have a consciousness which

cease to be creatures of sense

long as the body exists, of

consists

though

it

ideas

of

p.

;

affections.

But

caix^t^ffl

above a their controL passion

bodily

for

xii.

"to

all

It

dS^make

actions to ^hiteh we> &re determined

P

-

226

Spinoza.

by passion, where the mind is passive, wo can be determined by reason without passion." 1 And it has in it,

by

its

jmssion

very nature, a power to abate the control of for, in one ge ;

^^^

passion ; by flunking a passion, we make it cease to be a passion. The particular objects of our desire or aversion, love or hatred, lose their

bodily affections

we

their true origin

viz.,

power over us when the

ascribed to

them

are referred to

the whole order and complex of

and the -universal laws by which they are reguSeen in this light, the vehemence of passion becomes as foolish as the child's anger against the stone tilings,

lated.

that hurts

it,

or the infuriated man's indignation against

the messenger of evil tidings. passion

by

Moreover, reasonjjjigjls on

revealing J^gjrajb^^ Tlie mind

lias greater*

power

over the passions, and is less subject to them, in so far 2 as it understands all things as necessary." gain true freedom by the detection of false freedom. The

We

and and pity resentment,

feverish restlessness of hope

and

regret,

when we

disappointment

fear, is

allayed or cured

see in our ai lections of

expression of a necessary

body and mind the and unalterable order. Reason

can no more be pleased or pained, be moved by love or hate, desire or aversion, towards the beings or events th^at often give rise to such emotions, than it can love or

hate a triangle 'for

its

properties, or a

law of nature

for

inevitable results.

KnaJJy, the fluctuations of feelI ing which depend on the succession of things in time subdued or quelled, the more we learn to see in them its

jare

.

v*

59,

are the objects of rational 2

mth. v. 6,

Sketch of the Theory. observation.

go with, th the imagination, but the true order of things which reason reveals is not transitory. It lifts us into a sphere in which neither the things

transitory

relations "oT

themselves nor our ideas of them are things of time.. Not the latter, for our knowledge even of things in time

not itself a thing of time; not the former, for that in the things themselves of which reason takes cognisance is not accidental and arbitrary successions, but relations

is

which never change. Thus the mind that is guided by is elevated above the ebb and flow of passion, is

reason

no longer tossed to and fro on the ever-changing tides of feeling, and its only emotion is thBjp^pJpjander joy with which-jit

ojjjujp^ujejj^^

identifigsjiself

when .it

..c

But the km)wje^e j}|Jh^ <

" ejiscnity

is,

we have

in the full sense of the words, as

seen, only attained

when

the

mind

rises to J

stage of .toiowledge,

which Spinoza designates

sciential

intuitwa; and tojihi^ As knowledge is still imperfect which Jife. to finite even by the link of necesfinite from proceeds and unchanging relation, so the activity and freedom sary of the spiritual life are

still

imperfect

when they

determined by affections which spring from tions of things.

are

finite rela-

Joy in an invariable order

is

still

a

joy in which the mind regards itself and other mJb its body and other bodies, under the limits of the finite. 1

Though the links are golden, the ehaca -fe stall there. The alloy of finite passion IB ^Jall |>ssiHe when the mind and the objects of its contemplafion lie outside of

228

Spinoza.

each other, and are not referred to the ultimate unity from which all differences spring, when it does not yet live

and

life of

with the universal heart and

"breathe in unison

But

the world.

intuitive knowledge, as

we have

seen, not only annuls the arbitrary abstractions of sense and imagination, but evaporates even that residuum

abstraction

of

!

which reason or ratiocination

involves.

Eaised to this point of view, the mind no longer contemplates the world and itself as a system of finite

,

rfchings

conditioned by each other, but by the glancejDf

immediate intelligence sees them in the light of that absolute^jonity of which they are only the jinfin^tely

ned^exp rj^sio?r" s

And

this

supreme attitude of intellove" which

reflects itself in that "intellectual

ligence is the goal and consummation of the moral

I

the idea of God^asLits. cause.

iffi2SL^I-2^^n ^B^ s

e

pletely is due.

It

is

life.

Intel-

a iov into which, no

^aa^^^^J;^ Itim
^ or ^ne

has here comemerged from that passivity to which passion )

Its consciousness is JbliQ

cgnscious^ess^^^^re determined by no other finite consciousness, but only by that infinite intelligence with which its own inmost nature is identified. Yet, though

ac^vity, because

,

it is

absolutely unimpassioned, "^ilSjoy^^^ ^ or

and hereT^^ae!^^ its

consciousness of God, pjisrfecl!io"a is at

as this joy in the consciousness the same time joy in. th,e it is combined with, the idea of

x<

.

Sketch of the Theory. is

name

another

for the love of God.

" intellectual love " is itself is

mode

a

229

is

the love to

of God,

God

and which, in

Further, as this

all its activities,

the expression of the divine nature,

that

mind which

of a

may

it

be said

themind^skTO^

wherewilnGodloves Himself.

Yet in so describing

it

Spinoza does not imply that, in attaining to this its highest perfection, human nature loses it^jndmdua^ty,

and

absorbed in indistinguishable identity with the

1

is

For whilst there

divine.

which

an idea or consciousness of

is

implicated with the affections of the body, and which therefore perishes with it, the idea or con-

self

is

which

sciousness of self

intuitive

knowledge involves

is

not implicated with the body or with temporal and spatial conditions.

God, the mind eternal.

in

As knowing God and

all

things in

not determined by time, it is Taken up into the infinite, it still knows is

and through the

itself

itself

Its negation of self is the

infinite.

negation, not of all consciousness, but only of that illusory consciousness which belongs to the imagination

the negation, leaving to

i.e.,

it still

which

of that

is

itself

a negation,

truer

the^fem^^

^jJO^lDgs^Lfi^-

^

^her words, the

negation of the finite as finite is not the negation, but the realisation of that affirmative essence of humanity

which

is

the eternal object of the love, of God. the train of thought

gu^bjji^^ which Spinoza that which,

reaches, in the ethical part of

we know, was

by

J& worfe^

the implicit aim'- of all his

c*

the inquiry, whether may not be ateiraaeiit of which some real good, the diseov^f

speculation

^4

^

IL 230 will enable the

Spinoza.

mind

perfect happiness," nal, will feed the

to enjoy constant,

supreme, and which, as a thing infinite and eter-

mind wholly with joy, and be itself unmingled with sorrow." It must now be. our business to trace somewhat more in detail the stejs by which this conclusion is reached.

*"*

231

CHAPTER

XIII.

DOOTBINE OF THE EMOTIONS

THE SELF-MAINTAINING

IMPULSE.

^L^^^L^^^^find a

^^.sssiiss 8 we

s^/at

'

sight to

first;

coniEietejrc^ gkftSiSEby as ^ l^as been unfolded in the preceding! pages.

Ear a pantheistic there >

is

now,^ub.stItutedL^hatf apparently a purely individualistic principle. Instead I of deriving all from infinite suBsSnce, he seems to make is

everything a deduction from a social impulse, which is with the particular "native of each individual

identified

thing. "Whereas, hitherto, reality and modality had been opposed to each other, and to modes or individual finite things had been denied any other than a fugitive, ^

contingent, or merely negative existence, to ascribe to each finite an

thing

individuality,

determines

its

an independent

now he seems

original, indestructible 1

,

s

Slf-cjmjfcEed__ bei3ag

relations to all other beings^

is

which

capable of

asserting itself against them,

and can never be swamped In particular, which, alike with all other modes7only a negative existence had been predicated, Spinoza now endows with a

by them.

itive essence,

It is possessed of a power-

232 "

Spinoza.

to persevere in its

own being/

1

a capacity of resisting

its

suppression, and of perpetually seeking its own enlargement and not only so, but this inmost essence of

own

;

man's individual being can survive the disintegration of the body, and instead of vanishing

when brought

immediate relation to God, only then

into

realises itself

and

attains to its ideal perfection.

The fundamental principle of the emotions and of the whole active and moral life of man, in Spinoza's view, is, as I

have

jnTjjulse

and which "

said, a certain self-asserting, self-inainta^ming

which, is

lie ascribes_

only another

Everything, so far as in its

sist

own

to^iyefy Jli5iYldvial,^.^iatejice, for its nature or essence.

name

it is 1

in

itself,

endeavours to per-

"The endeavour "wherewith persist in its own being is

being."

everything endeavours to

2

nothing else than thej|cj^

The mind, whether it

as it has clear

and

distinct or as

has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in

own

its

being for an indefinite time, and is conscious of this en" deavour. s As Spinoza deals with it, this fundamental principle is

an impulse in the individual, not only

to

self-preservation, but also to self-expansion or enlargement. It is that in virtue of which the individual

nature consciously or unconsciously aspires to its own perfection, seeks after everything that contributes to that

perfection,

shims

everything

that

hinders

it.

4

Though, the proof which he gives of this principle viz that a thing cannot without contradiction "be sup;

,

5 posed to contain anything which would destroy itself/*' and makes the self-maintaining im-M3 merely negative, a

Eth.

iii.

7,

* Etfc. iii

4-,

* Btli,

dem.

*V.$&'s,>/-.'' ''^i^mJMi^^,'^..

iii.

9.

The JBmotims. - fiM'tf'v*

t

pulse nothing more than self-identity or the formal agreement of each thing with itself, yet in his hands it assumes the character of a positive, active principle, reacting on limit

it,

its

environment, rejecting

all

that

assimilating all that furthers or expands

it.

would The

Li221^^^ (q/ectus), defines as "those affections of the body, and

the ideas of them, by which its active power is increased Emotion arises or diminished, furthered or hindered." in the transition from less to greater, or from greater to

When we

"

pass from a less toft a greater perfection," the emotion takes the particular!

less activity

and power.

form of "^pleasure"

(Icetitia)

;

the opposite kind, the emotion " term " desire (cupiditas)

when is

"

the transition "

pain

(tristitia).

is

off

The 1

simply the self-maintaining impulse particularised, or filled with a definite content. "Desire is the very essence of man in so far as it is conis

ceived as determined to any action by a given affection of itself."

x

These three, degjig^^ of

which

all

iifi^

othBr^^tions^ tbeseprimar

elements Spinoza, by a process, so to speak, of logical combination and permutation, aided by the principle of

worj^ mit .an elaborat^sjch^nie ^f_JjbjU^9" tion-S^-., which, however ingenious as a feat of psychoassociation,

logical analysis,

system, and

is,

adds nothing to the development of

Ms

in that point of view, of slighter value '

than the other parts of the Ethics.' In basing all human feeling and action on " the impulse to persist in one's being," does Spinoza reduce all 1

Eth. iii, del.

1.

234

i

\

|

Spinoza.

morality to self-seeking $ Is his whole ethical system to be regarded as the development of a purely subjective, to the exclusion of any objective or egoistic principle, absolute standard of good and evil his language that

would appear

this construction of his teaching.

may

lowing passages " "

virtue and

By

The

be quoted

There

*?

is

much

in

at first sight to sanction

To

this effect the fol-

:

1 power I understand the same thing." the first and only founda-

effort 01 self-preservation is

" To act 2 absolutely in obedience to virtue in us the same thing as to act, to live, to preserve one's being under the guidance of reason, on the ground of seeking " The 3 of is useful to one's self." and tion of virtue/'

3

is

what

knowledge good nothing but the emotion of pleasure and pain in so "The more every man enfar as we are conscious of it." 4 deavours and is able to seek what is useful to him that is, to 6 preserve his being the more is he endowed with virtue." evil is

"

By good

I

mean

that

which we certainly know

to us, by evil that which we certainly know to to us in the attainment of any good." G

to be useful be a hindrance

Sel^assertion would thus seem to be the onlyjfoundaIndividual power the

tion, self-enlargement or increase of

only measure, of virtue.

ment

is 7

good,"

As consciousness of self-enlargewhich bring pleasure are

pleasure, "all things all

things

which bring pain

evil.

By

their

utility or their tendency to increase our individual being,

and the pleasurable emotion inplicated therewith, are our relations to other things and beings to be determined. |LojeeJ.s pleasure tots cause.

associated with the idea of another as

When we

Eth!

2 Etli. iv. 22, cor.

iv., clef. 8.

Eth.

ir. 8. ..,

App.

rejoice in the happiness of others,

c.

30.

iv. 20.

Eth.

iv.

24.

Etli. iv., clef. 1, 2.

r Is the Theory Egoistic ?

U:^/L

r

W0 ^#35 f

our seemingly disinterested delight is to be traced to the r fact that the contemplation of another's happiness con-* yt

^

.

'

in

9

i

by the reflection that "there is no individual thing ^''";/C/ nature which is more useful to man than a man who

under the guidance of reason." 2 And even the supreme virtue, the knowledge and love of God, appears to be regarded as the climax of moral perfection, because

lives

" the

God."

mind's highest utility or good

is

the knowledge of

3

however

conclusively such passages seem to a poirLtto purely egoistic or selfish basis of morality, the conclusion is one which a closer examination may serve Y|J|-

to modify, if it

ethical theory

discerned in

do not even lead us to see in Spinoza's

what some

it

of the profoundest

the expression of

minds have

the^ujj^

and moral 1. It is to be observed, for bne thing, that, in Spinoza's intention at least, the self-maintaining impulse is no new departure, no deviation from that which in the meta-

physical part of his system, had been set forth as the first Though, as above deprinciple of thought and being.

the impulse to persist in one's being seems to be the expression for a hard, logical self-identity, an atomic isolation or independence excluding from the individual

fined,

nature

all

reference to other natures, finite or infinite,

yet Bpinpza_e^pressly asserts that the "

^ 1

p'

^

1 Our desire that our^wjxjncrease of being. pibntes others should lead a rational or virtuous life is accounted ^/'A/^

to

for

"

Eth.

iii.

21.

The

in existence 2 Efih. iv. 35, cor.

force

f ollows 8

by which^achi from the

Eth.

iv. 28,

eter- 1

dem.

Spinoza.

236

i "The power the nature of God nai necessity of and therefore man, prething, whereby each individual

of God or nature is the power serves his being, in so far as it is explained of man, Thus the power actual essence, is part of the infinite through his own of His essence." 2 If, inthat is, part iM-)wer of God reconciled these two things, deed, we ask how Spinoza source and centre of all immanent the is who -a God and an individual finite nature which is its

things,

substance which is the negation of and finite things to which a real self-affirma-

0wncentre, the

finite,

infinite

or again, how finite individualtive essence is ascribed ities can be at once contingent, evanescent modes, to ;

which only an illusory being "belongs, and things which and permanent being, to have, through God, a real these questions Spinoza's dialectic furnishes op jnsjEer. Xevertheless, the fact remains that the affirmative element, which in the self-maintaining impulse is ascribed

to the nature of

man,

is

neither obliterated when

referred

to God, nor is left, on the other hand, a purely independent, self-centred thing, but is, according to Spinoza, a

thing in and through, which God realisesJEiipaaDlf. 2. The impulse to persevere in one's being, as Spinoza I iexplEJns it, is not the affirmation but the negation of the iiiidmdiial self as such. The " self" of selfishness is not

but destroyed by the la

words, th^n^ure^^elejaeiijj y^-I^^J^omjelfthe self we seek is that

^Jj^^.^^^SS.^i.l lie

too

selfish,

a *** **"*

^

of God.

Rationality too

cannot seek itTown^atisfaction

with culpable '

self-affirmation of reason.

excess for the enlargement a

Bth.

iv.

Meason cannot

be Selfish.

237

of its own being. All things that bring pleasure to it are good, all things that bring pain to it evil ; pleasure, that is, becomes a term of moral significance and honour

when

the subject of feeling is identified with reason. That reason or a purely rational nature should lov others for

its

own

sake rather than for theirs, means

" love honoi truly loye another if we do not more." Even to say that " man's highest utility is knowledge of God," or that we seek to know God be-

we cannot

cause the knowledge of

God

useful to us, is a formula

when

sensibilities

is

of all things the

most

which

ceases to shock pious translated into this equivalent, that

,

I

infinite intelligence is the supreme good of finite intelligence, or that it is in the knowledge of God that a rational

nature finds

son, or

key

own

perfection and blessedness.

the., divine element in

Now

man with naturef ^ him which Jumish.es

it

rea-

the

much

to

in Spinoza's ethical teaching^ that sounds The self which is affirmed in the repulsive.

harsh and "

its

self-maintaining impulse," and of which the satisfacand enlargement is identified with " virtue," is not

tion

the individual self as such, not the self of appetite and passion, but rather that which is repressed and limited thereby,

which

to reason."

finds its

freedom in rising above the

self-

" the life proper sphere in according "The human mind consists of adequate

and

ish desires

its

and inadequate ideas." l The essence of man, in other Even in the lower stage words, is the power to think. of imagination and inadequate ideas this its true essence manifests

what

is

itself

in the pain of repression or limitation by In thfi^tage of " reason " the,, itself.

foreign to

i Efeh. iii. 9,

dem.

238

Spinoza.

1

true self has sliaken off the bondage of the non-rational Here and. "emerged into the sphere of pure self-activity.

itTuiows nothing of pains and pleasures that refer only " " Its to the narrow individual self. good is no longer

determined only by varying individual a good that is common to all rational but temperament, natures and determined by an objective standard. Finally, " " of intuitive the self has reached in the or

subjective

knowledge

stage

the point of enlargement at which left

.

behind, and it_segs,_aiid feels

of that. wjbacli is j^aixfirsol

and

imo^re^sgL^reference to which can be applied, has_m^^^

all finite limits are

all

things_in th And here

absolute.

the. stigi^a,. Q .

,,&8K&bflSS

that even

seek a personal response. Though in the knowledge and love of God self-consciousness and selfaffirmation still survive, yet the taint of subjectivity is " so absolutely obliterated, that h^LSi^J^^^ not seek that God should lovehimmrBturn." l

love ceases

3.

ibo

Lastly, -w-^"--.*

m

it

is

to

be "c^nsiaOTed that there

is

an

_

Ibbvious distifigtioj^petween

^^^S^^SSAr^i^S^f^

between unselfishness and

self-extinction.

Moral

Disinterestedness does not mean, even at the highest, 'the cessation of self-consciousness or self-satisfaction.

Moral action implies in the agent the idea of a self which realises itself in that which is done, which seeks and finds satisfaction in the act. The "good" of a it be sensual pleasure or the purest intellectual and spiritual enjoyment, whether it "No purer be low or high, must be a good for Mm. philanthropy can be conceived than finding one's own

conscious agent, whether

atisfaction in

the welfare of others. i

,

Ji

<>

>

.

Eth. v. 19.

Even

in

self-

and Self-Realisation.

Selfishness sacrifice for

another there

an idea

an object

of

to

seeks self-satisfaction.

present a reference to

self,

be attained in which the agent Without such reference even

a conception that swims in the Though in unselfish acts the ^end^^^ought^^is^ not

the purest self-denial air.

is

239

selves

and our own

self-affirmation,

is

Moreover, the increased, not dimin-

satisfaction therein.

self-realisation, is

If in every with the unselfishness of the act. benevolent feeling there must be a consciousness of self/ as well as of the object loved, in every benevolent actj a consciousness of self as well as of the object attained, ^ ished,

then the wider the range of benevolence, the more!& numerous the objects embraced in it, so much the fuller, \j richer,

more complete becomes the

self-realisation of the subject.

self-consciousness orj

Even

the knowledge and

love of an infinite object is still my knowledge, my love, and the infinitude of the object implies a kindred ele" vation of the subject. Let slip the my," and you sink of the mystic, or the selfspujtious rapture annihilation of the pantheist. Whatever may be said of Spinoza's philosophy in general, in this part of it into the

at least

he knows nothing of such

false self-abnegation

;

yet as little does the doctrine of self-affirmation as the basis of morality introduce into his ethics a principle

inconsistent

with the purest moral disinterestedness.

In other points of view, indeed, that principle is by no means unexceptionable, as will be seen, when we ex-

amine in

detail the

manner

in

which Spinoza applies

to .the elaboration of his ethical system.

it

;

240

OHAPTEE .-,.

^.,

..<-'

XIV.

4 INTELLIGENCE AND WILL.

WE

have seen that Spinoza finds the origin and ex" self-mainplanation of the active or moral life in the of which and taining impulse/' pleasure pain, desire, and the innumerable varieties of feeling which spring

from these fundamental emotions, are only different We have pointed out, expressions or modifications. further, that it is this self-maintaining

constitutes the link

between the

impulse which

intellectual

and the

emotional and active sides of man's nature, and which explains the close correspondence that can he traced between the successive stages of knowledge and the successive stages of the moral

There of

is,

human

life.

however, in Spinoza's account of the nature knowledge one doctrine to which we have

not yet adverted, and which seems to imply, not simply the correspondence., but the absolute identification of the intellectual and the moral

life.

Knowledge and

will are not elements of man's spiritual nature which, though closely related and constantly acting and react-

ing on each other, are yet different in nature and fnncSpinoza's assertion

would seem

to

be

that,

when

Intelligence closely examined, the active

tive or theoretical

and

241

merges in the contempla-

and that

life,

Will.

feeling, passion, desire,

only various phases of knowledge or intelli"There is in the mind," says he, 1 "no volition

volition, are

gence.

save that which an idea as idea involves."

"

"Will

and

A

particular understanding are one and the same. ... 2 volition and a particular idea are one and the same."

we examine

If

and

the reasons

why men

think otherwise,

ascribe to themselves a faculty of will different

from and of wider range than that of understanding, Tor one shall find that they are all alike futile.

we

thing, popular thought, while it supposes intelligence to he purely passive, and ideas to he merely "images

formed in us by contact with external bodies," 3 regards all beyond such images as the product of the mind's own voluntary activity; whereas, if we reflect on the

we shall see that ideas are dumb pictures on a tablet," but

nature of knowledge,

mere images

like

"

not that

it an element of activity, a prinin other words, that intelligence self-affirmation of ; ciple contains in it that free, voluntary activity which we

every idea involves in

commonly regard

as

the

exclusive function

of

will

Common

thought, again, distinguishes between truths to which we necessarily assent, which carry with them the assurance of their own reality, and arbitrary or obscure conceptions with respect to which we have the

power to suspend our judgment, ascribing the former to the understanding and the latter to "the will or faculty of assent, which is free and different from the under4

standing."

Closer examination,

Etk

2

*

* Btlx.

p.

xn,

ii 49. ii.

49, schoL

however, teaches us Ibid., cor.

and dem.

4 Ibid.

Q

1

242

Spinoza.

that ihe real activity of the

The

processes.

difference

difference

mind

is

common

between them " and "

between " adequate

is

both

to

simply the "

inadequate

ideas,

and the suspense of judgment which is ascribed to a faculty of volition is nothing more than the consciousness of a confused and imperfect as distinguished from a clear and distinct idea.

The conception

of a

winged

horse implies mental activity as much as that of a horse without wings, only the latter includes the affirmation of existence or reality,

which the former does

not.

If,

of again, there be no faculty of will different from that mind the it then to seems unreflecting understanding,

would be justified in concluding that assent to and evil is not essentially different from assent to what is true and good; to which Spinoza's answer is, that the idea of what is false and evil is really the idea of that which has in it no positive reality, and

that

it

what

is false

the distinction in question

is

not between two equally

but between the affirmation of being and the affirmation of non-entity not between under-

amrmative

acts,

standing and will, but between a sound and a diseased or disordered understanding. Finally, to the popular that it is the objection prerogative of will to decide

between conflicting motives, and that without such a faculty, where there is an equilibrium of motives (as

famous example of " Buridan's ass "), action would be absolutely suspended, Spinoza's reply virtually is> that the supposed conflict of motives is, when we examine what we mean, only a conflict of ideas, and tfcat ideas never really conflict save when one idea is sdagiiate and another confused and imperfect ; that in in

&&

.file -.latter

ease reason is the true umpire,

and that

sus-

Identity of the Two.

^

pense or inaction would prove, not that reason

243

fails to

decide, but that the non-deciding agent is a fool or a

madman. From these and -

other considerations the conclusion

which Spinoza reaches is, that the element of activity which is commonly regarded as peculiar to the will is

one which "belongs essentially to the understanding,

or that "there

which an idea

mind no

volition save that

On

the other hand, thus held to be active, all activity, maintained, is intelligent, all the supposed ele-

if intelligence it

in the

is

as idea involves."

is

ments

is

when

of man's active life seem,

to be only

modes

not one among

of thought.

many

closely examined,

or intelligence co-ordinate "faculties," but it

Thought

is

is

that which constitutes the very essence of the mind, and the underlying principle of all our mental experiences " and activities. Love, desire, or the affections of the

mind, by whatever

"modes

essentially

of thought " the idea idea exists the other individual."

2

name they

of thought."

and

.of other

To

designated," are all these modes

prior in nature, and when the modes must exist in the same Spinoza would thus seem to reduce the is

whole content of man's telligence

are

1

its

spiritual life to

modifications

;

thought or inand though he treats

elements which pertain to the active in contrafrom the intellectual part of man's nature

distinction

of an impulse or endeavour in the

own

being,

of pleasure

and

mind

and aversion, which when we examine the real yet

and of particular emotions in elaborate this impulse gives birth

to persist in its

pain, desire

detail to

significance of his teaching, these seemingly non-intel1

Etk

ii.

ax. 3.

a

Bth. ii 11, dem.

244

Spinoza.

lectual elements, it has "been held, lose their indepen-

and resolve themselves into the one all-absorbing

dence,

As

principle of the theoretical intelligence. of the

mind consists

of adequate

" the essence

and inadequate ideas," 1 more than the

so the self-maintaining impulse is nothing self-affirmation

by the mind

of its

own power

of think-

only another name for this impulse, ing. "when referred solely to the mind ; " 3 desire (cupiditas) " in is the same intellectual impulse, so far as it is conceived as determined to any action by some affection of "4 " ideas of itself emotions are 2

Will

itself is

affections of

(affectus)

;

the

body by which

diminished/'

5

or

its

power "

again,

of acting is increased or

emotion which

is

called

a

passion (or passivity of the mind) is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body, or any part of it, a " Pleas6 power of existing greater or less than before." ure (IcBtitia) is a passion by which the mind passes to

a greater, pain a passion by which 7

pleasure and

it

in

passes to a less, other words, of

pain, perfection;" which all the other emotions are only specifications, are not a new element different from anything in our purely intellectual nature,

but are simply "the transition from

a less to a greater or from a greater to a less perfection." 8 The process by which moral progress is achieved is in

the same

way reduced

If -there are

the activity

to a purely intellectual activity.

any outward causes which help or hinder of the body, and therefore the mind's

power of thinking, the mind, in seeking to affirm or i

Bth. iiL

5 Bfih.

iii.

* EHi. in., 7 Etk iii

9,

dem.

2 Efch.

iii.

9.

9, sclioL

4

Eth.

iii., aff.

def. 1.

del 3. 11, dem.

6

Bth.

iii, aff.

gen. def.

8

Eth. iii,

aff.

def. 2, 3,

Morality identified with Intelligence. realise

endeavours to conceive or recollect the

itself,

1

The

advances to

and forget by which it seem not merely

far as possible, to exclude

former, and, as .the latter.

245

stages of the moral

its goal,

life,

and that goal itself, be identified with

to correspond but to

its intellectual

progress and perfection. As the dominion of the passions is that of inadequate ideas, so emancipation from their,

power

is

2 simply the formation of clear and distinct ideas.

" The

power of the mind is defined solely by knowledge, weakness or passivity by the privation of knowledge." 3 We are in moral bondage when the content of our conits

sciousness

determined by that which

is

foreign to the

mind's

mind

own

is

activity

that

which

when

external or

is

wholly due to the but the pure inner activity of the

mind, free ;

it

possesses

it

is

when

it

apprehends

it-

the bodily affections, and all outward things, no longer in the confused and imperfect way in which self,

sense and imagination present them, but from a universal point of view, as part of a universal order or

concatenation of things, in other words, when it understands or thinks them according to the order of 4

"The

intelligence."

and

effort to

understand

simply equivalent to power to think or understand."

supreme

is

the

first

5

"Good"" and "evil" are "that which helps or hinders our

sole basis of virtue."

6

"In

life

it

is

of

importance to us to perfect the

understanding one thing consists man's highest 7 happiness or blessedness." Finally, the culmination of the moral life is attained when the understanding, by or reason,

i

4

and in

Eth. ill 12, 13. Eth. v. 10.

7 Etli. iv.,

App.

4.

this

2

Eth.

v. 3.

5

Eth.

iv. 26,

*

dem.

Eth. Eth.

v. 20, schol. iv. 27.

246

Spinoza.

the intuition of reason, grasps all the differences of finite things in their unity, discerns all ideas in their relation virtue of the inind

to

understand j

understand or

therefore, to is

is

"The

God.

to the highest idea, the idea of

its

know God."

l

absolute

highest virtue, " Blessedness

the contentment of spirit which arises from the in-

tuitive

knowledge of God."

From what

has

now

be seen that and will is a prin-

"been said it will

Spinoza's identification of intelligence

which runs through the whole of his ethical sysand there appears to be substantial ground for the tem, assertion which has often been made, that the moral ciple

life

resolves

itself,

in his hands, into a purely intellecIf this construction of his

tual or theoretical process.

philosophy were the whole truth, his doctrine would seem to be, not merely that ignorance is the cause and

knowledge the cure ignorance

ledge itself

of

moral imperfection, but that

the only moral disease, and knowthe true moral health and perfection of our

is

itself

being.

view of Spinoza's teaching

Plausible, however, as this

seems to

be,,

a careful study of the

lead us to regard

it as

one-sided

c

'

Ethics will, I think,

and exaggerated.

It is

possible to maintain the essential unity of intelligence

and will without obliterating them.

all

distinction

between

Spinoza's apparent identification of the practical

with the theoretical side of man's nature

is

not incon-

with the recognition of the distinctive character and functions of the former and when we examine his sistent

;

doctrine it

more

closely,

many

of the criticisms to

has been subjected are seen to be irrelevant. * Efih. iv. 28, dern.

which

Limits of the Doctrine. 1.

It is to

be considered

tliat

fjfc]^

247

objections to the docin order to be

must contemplate knowledge and will as emsame objects. Popular thought rightly distinguishes between knowledge and goodness, between

relevant,

2)loyed about the

Great moral excellence is intellectual and moral power. not incompatible with a feeble and uncultured intelligence, nor intellectual elevation with a low moral life. Spinoza does not maintain, .nor could any one be so absurd as to maintain, that piety and virtue are inseparable literary and scientific abilwhich constitute the mathematician, the philosopher, the artist, are necessarily and in equal measure combined with those which go to make

from and commensurate with ity, or that the qualities

All that the good citizen, the philanthropist, the saint. this proves, however, is only that intelligence in one province does not imply practical activity in another. To render the objection valid, what would need to be

proved

is,

that within the same province,

and when

employed about the same objects, there is no necessary N~ow, so limited, conjunction of knowledge and will. Spinoza's doctrine, as we shall immediately see, is by no

means

indefensible.

It

may be

possible to

show

that,

within the province of the moral and spiritual, as well as within the province of what we call the secular life,

knowledge and will are, if not identical, at least coexistent and commensurate that, e.g., practical goodness or piety implies in every case a measure of spiritual insight which, though not speculative or scientific, is of

the nature of knowledge, and is proportionate to the purity and elevation of the life ; and, on the other hand, that the

man

of science, the philosopher, the

man

of letters,

248

Spinoza.

exerts in every act of his intellectual life a force and energy of will commensurate with the degree of intelli-

gence that is called forth. 2. But even when we thus narrow the ground to which Spinoza's doctrine applies, is there not much which seems to justify ordinary thought in denying the supcoincidence or even invariable conjunction of

posed

Within the sphere of man's moral not knowing and willing not only distinguishable in thought, hut in actual experience notoriously separknowledge and will 1

life are

Is it not a moral

commonplace that our actions ^ There are ideas which are purely contemplative and theoretical, projects which never go beyond themselves, opinions about virtue and goodness, which, through indolence .or irresoable 1

often fall short of our convictions

lution or pravity of will, are never realised in action. Thought and will are not only not invariably coincident, but in individual actions, and even through the whole

course of

each

life,

other.

are not seldom in glaring contrast with ISTowhere, indeed, has this incongruity

been more forcibly expressed than in Spinoza's own language

:

"

"

The powerleasness of man," says he, to govern anct restrain his emotions, I call servitude. For a man who is controlled by Ms emotions is not his own master, but is 1

mastered by fortune, under whose power he is often compelled, though he sees the better, to follow the worse." aI have shown why the true knowledge of good and evil awakens disturbances in the mind, and often yields to every kind of lust whence the saying of the poet, 'Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor j and Ecclesiastes seems to have ;

'

1

Efek. iv., Pref.

All Intelligence

249

is Active.

had the same thought in his mind when he said, He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.' And this I say, that we may determine what reason can and what it cannot do in governing the emotions." z e

.

.

.

Spinoza's doctrine of the unity of knowledge

and will

however, not really affected by this recognition of the

is,

notorious inconsistency "between human thoughts and What that doctrine really means is that, within actions.

the same limits, or jects, intelligence

when employed about

and

ence inseparably interwoven. the same time an act of

is at

an act of

intelligence.

the same ob-

will are in our conscious*experi-

And

Every will,

act of intelligence

every act of will also

his answer to the above ob-

is, that the thought of intelligence which can conceive of as separate from or in conflict with will is not true thought, but thought falsely so called,

jection virtually

we or,

in his

own

"inadequate"

AH

thought

which

phraseology, thought

"confused and imperfect

i.e.,

is essentially active,

all will

consists* of

ideas."

essentially

On the one hand, to represent thought as devoid of the element of activity or as a merely passive " thing, is to reduce its content to images or inanimate

intelligent.

pictures formed in us

by contact with external bodies." But mind does not become possessed of ideas as wax

receives the impression of a seal, or blank paper the

stamp of the thought tion

Every

printer's types.

is essentially

and negation.

an act or a

idea" or process of

series of acts of affirma-

In the simplest perception there

is

something more than the passive reception of impres" " Affections of the sions from without. body do not

become the content i

of thought Eth.

iv. 17,

by a mere mechanical

soboL

250

*

Spinoza.

To

transference.

elevate

them

into ideas or objects of

rational thought implies a spontaneous activity of the

mind, stripping them of the contingency and confusion " those of sense and imagination, fastening on properties

them which are common them its own universality. in

to all things,

act of

Every

process of reasoning involves in

7'

it

infusing into

judgment

or

a reaction of the

mind on the objects with which it deals, connecting them in relations other than those of immediate perception, "Arranging and associating them (not according to the natural but) according to the intellectual order." The idea of a triangle is, so to speak, the self-affirmation of its

own

content.

" The idea of a triangle must

in-

equal to two right angles/' and "this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived without the idea of a triangle." l To prove the proposition that " there is in the mind no volition save that which an idea as idea involves," Spinoza here volve that

selects his

its

three

angles

are

example from what ordinary thought regards

as specially the province of contemplation or theoretic

and the implied conclusion is, that if here, what we deem its proper sphere, intelligence is shown

intelligence

in

;

to be essentially active, a fortiori the element of activity must pertain to it in what we account as more peculiarly the sphere of practical activity. ity is the characteristic of the idea

the

it is

the idea

much more must it be the idea when it is that of a moral act.

of a geometrical figure, acteristic of

If inherent activ-

when

char-

If

it

cannot be or be conceived within the domain of science save as self-realising, much less can it be or be conceived save as' self-realising when it pertains to man's moral life. 1 EttL-ii. 49,

dem.

All Will

On

the other hand,

251

is Intelligent.

all will

or practical activity

is

"Will," says Spinoza, "is the in one's being when that endeavour

essentially intelligent.

endeavour to persist

referred solely to the mind."

l

Will, in other words, It is the conscious endeavour of presupposes thought. the mind to realise itself and its own inherent power. is

Devoid of the element of intelligence, will ceases to be " We will, and becomes mere blind impulse or passion. act when anything takes place in us of which we (or that intelligence which is our essence) are the adequate cause that is, when anything follows in us from our

nature which that nature taken by

and distinctly intelligible.

itself

makes

clearly

We are passive when anything

takes place in us or follows from our nature, of which are not the cause, save partially." 2 In modern

we

language, will is distinguished from animal impulse this, that in the former and not in the latter there

by is

present the element of self-consciousness and self-determination. The merely animal nature is lost in the Its experience is a succession feeling of the. moment. of feelings or impulses, each of which expires with its it contains no constant element which the successive feelings are referred, no permanent self which realises itself in them. Its impulses and actions are not self -originated, but forced upon it from without. They are not woven into

immediate satisfaction ; of self-consciousness to

a continuous experience

by

reference to any universal

centre of thought, and are connected together at most Li only by the general life-feeling that pervades them.

a rational or intelligent being, on the other hand, there present throughout all its feelings the uniting element

is

i

Eth.

iii.

9,

schoL

*

2 Etli. iii.,

del

2.

252

Spinoza.

of reference to one self-conscious subject, and through all its volitions the uniting element of self-determina-

In

tion.

willing,

it

knows that

it

wills

and what

it

conscious at once of the object willed and of ; It is conscious of a self which is itself as willing it. wills

it is

yet realised in, all its particular actions, and in each particular case as realised in this action and not another. Thought or

distinguished from,

Yolitions

and

self-consciousness, in short, is the all

special

ISTow,

agent.

minds

common element

of

and that which gives them their character and complexion as the acts of a moral

voluntary

acts,

though in Spinoza's philosophy individual modes of the Divine Substance, and as

are only

such are necessarily destitute of

all

independence or

capacity of self-determination, yet he attributes to them a self-maintaining impulse which is identical with their

very essence, and to this principle he assigns

all

the

functions of a self-conscious, self-determining individuIt is in virtue of this principle that he can ality.

maintain the distinction between the blindness of the passive impulses

and emotions, and the

intelligent activity of all

human

self-conscious,

volitions.

From what has now been said it is clear that Spinoza's doctrine of the unity of knowledge and will is to be understood as implying, not that these elements coexist side

by

side or in mechanical conjunction,

but that they

are inseparably interwoven with each other in our conscious experience. He does not mean that our spiritual life, or any part of it, is made up of these two elements

an element of will added to an element of thought that what we first think, we then will ; his doctrine kat no, thought would be what it is if an element

of

*">

Amwer

to

of will did not enter into

were not

253

Popular Objection it,

no volition what

it is if it

We can see,

essentially intelligent.

therefore,

how, from Spinoza's point of view, the popular objection above noticed is to be met. If it be said that experience disproves the inseparableness of thinking and willing, that we are conscious of thoughts, opinions, convictions

which flict

in

are never realised in action, of actions

with our ideas and convictions such cases there

all

from

will,

for the

is

no

which con-

the answer

is,

that

real separation of

knowledge which

is

knowledge divorced from

will is not true knowledge, the will that is divorced from knowledge not really will Knowledge that is inert or inactive is not real

knowledge ;

it

does not consist

of "adequate," but only of "confused and imperfect Meas." When we see the right without willing it, our seeing is not the same seeing with that of the mind

which

lofh sees

and

wills.

to ourselves

1

by saying that know unless we love them ;

We

sometimes express this there are things we cannot that there is no real percep-

tion of beauty or goodness into which the element of of love, admiration, self-devotion does not feeling enter that it is only the pure in heart who can see

God. The object that is before the mind which only inertly contemplates a moral and spiritual act, is something essentially different from the object that is before the mind in which contemplation necessarily passes into action.

mind to

is

itself,

immediately and In the former case, the

looking at an object as outside of and for^a the form of which may engage the poweis of

observation, comparison,

reflection,

or

which

it

may

classify under some general head or category, such as 1

Cf. Green's

Prolegweaa to SUkg*,

p. 152

ff.

254

Spinoza.

" " " good," or just," or pious ; in the latter, at an object which is regarded not merely as good, but as my good, that

"

in

which I discern the fulfilment and

realisation of

own inmost nature. "When this discernment is when the object of thought is apprehended as |

j

my

present,

not

for-

which I find myself, with which I identify myself, which is the medium of my own self-realisation there is no possible separation between the act of knowing and the act of willing. The eign or external, but one in

object is

known

or to

know deny

cannot will

my

which

self-affirmation.

without willing it, for not to will would be equivalent to self-negation.

it

it,

it

without knowing

become conscious Lastly,

as that the affirmation of

bound up with

indissolubly

cannot

known

is

it is

of the unity of

it,

for to will

of myself as realised in

it

I it,

I

is to

it.

be observed that Spinoza's doctrine thought and will does not imply the

to

denial of all distinction between the contemplative and life. Thought and will are present in all our

the active

mental employments alike, whether they be those which have for their end simply the acquisition of knowledge, or those which have for their end the performance of some outward

act.

It does not follow,

ever, that the relation of these

two

the same in both cases, or that

we

how-

factors is precisely

cannot distinguish

between thought and will as they are manifested in the theoretic, and thought and will as they are manifested in the practical life between, e.g., the attitude of the mind in the solution of a mathematical problem and

mind

in the performance of a moral Spinoza's philosophy is couched in too abstracts form to admit of any speculative treatment of the dis-

the attitude of the

ael

The Theoretic and r L,

the Active Life. .

.

tinction

1

life,

between the theoretic or

255 .

.

and the active

scientific

yet in the ethical part of his system the distinction,

though not formally, thought represents

is

it,

As modern

virtually recognised.

the theoretic and the

practical

only different sides or aspects of the same proIn both there is a reconciliation between the ideal

life are

cess.

and the

actual,

between consciousness and

But the

between thought and things. this,

that in the one case

we begin with

object,

the actual, the

and end with the

objective, the particular,

its

difference lies in

ideal,

reversed.

the

in the other the process In both, the same elements are present

subjective, the universal;

is

a

undetermined yet determining element, and a and in both there is particular or determined element an effort to overcome the opposition between them. But

universal,

in the theoretic

life,

or that of

sense, the universal element

knowledge in the limited

is

present at

In the endeavour

plicitly or potentially.

first

to

only im-

overcome

the opposition between itself and the world, thought takes up at first a purely objective attitude. The mani-

which it deals present themselves as external or foreign to the conscious subject. something But the latent presupposition under which it acts is that

fold objects with

the objects it contemplates are not really foreign to itself, that the principle which constitutes its own essence is

that which also constitutes the essence of things withand that it is possible for reason or intelligence to

out,

find itself at

home

The whole process of a bringing back of the world Underlying the particularity, the diverin the world.

knowledge, therefore, into thought. sity,

is

the contingency of the phenomenal world,

con-

sciousness silently discerns the presence of that unity.

256

Spinoza. t

universality,

and necessity which are

its

own

essential

And

every step in this process is a step towards the complete transformation of the particular into the universal, the actual into the ideal, the characteristics.

manifold and accidental objects of thought into the In the pracunity and necessity of self-consciousness.

on the other hand, the reconciliation between consciousness and the objective world begins from the

tical life,

That -life may be described as the conopposite pole. tinuous effort of the self-conscious subject to realise It starts where the theoitself in the outward world. retical life ends.

To that which

content of thought

it

some outward

is already a realised seeks to give further realisation in

Whether

act.

it

be an

aesthetic or

moral

or religious ideal, the mind is conscious of a conception which involves in it the possibility, the desire, and the effort for its embodiment in some particular concrete

form and under

the

conditions

of

the phenomenal

vision of beauty which exists in the creative imagination of the artist, he seeks to infuse into the

The

world.

rudeness and unconsciousness of matter and material

To the conception of righteouswhich dwells in the mind of the good or pious man, he seeks to give outward actuality or realisation, and so to make the mere the functions of the physical relations of things and to make the the life of with instinct life animal spirit

forms and colours. ness,

goodness,

holiness,

,

outward world the expression of the inner world of Thus, in both the theoretical and the practhought. the same general result which is accomthe reconciliation between the actual and '

iiical life, it is

plished ideal;

viz.,

and

in both cases alike the process

is

permeated

Their Distinction and Unity.

by the presence and of thought and will.

257

activity of the inseparable elements

Yet

this unity of the

two

is still

consistent with their distinction as different aspects of

the same process, inasmuch as the reconciliation is that which proceeds, on the one hand, from the object to the

from the particular to the universal; on the

subject,

from the subject to the object, from the univerto the particular. In Spinoza's philosophy there is

other, sal

not to be found any formal analysis of the process into its opposite yet related movements ; yet we should err in concluding that he ignores the distinction between them, or that his principle of the unity of thought and will implies the resolution of the moral life into a purely theoretical process.

His account of the emotions and

bondage of the human mind and of its freedom, and of the method by which that freedom is achieved the whole specially ethical part of passions, his theory of the

his system, in short, constitutes

of the active as distinguished life.

And

if,

as

we have

an elaborate exposition

from the purely

intellectual

much

seen, there is

in big

treatment of ethical problems which seems to imply the identification of virtue with knowledge, of moral evil

with ignorance, the

true

he describes the moral

explanation in terms

life

while

is,

that

of

knowledge,

knowledge with him is that highest kind of knowledge above referred to, which includes or "connotes will, 5'

or which

is instinct

with the element of

All

activity.

other knowledge is not really knowledge, but only " confused and imperfect ideas." Such ideas may "be, nay,

must

be, inert.

action,

passive p.

They not merely do not

but the mind that slave of its own "

XIL

is

lead to moral

the subject of them

is

the

bodily affections," and the ex-

B

258

Spinoza.

which these affections are impliBut " adequate ideas " are not doad or passive To think but living things. They are self-realising. them is to live them, to be quick with spiritual activity, So far from to be master of one's self and the world.

ternal influences with cated.

man's moral

life

being reduced to a merely contemplative of ideas without volitions, Spinoza's

process, a thing

view

that no such ideas exist, or

is

if

they can be said

to exist, that they belong not to the realm of true ledge, but to that of illusion

know-

An

idea

"

adequate/' or which alone deserves the name, one "which by its very essence asserts itself against

which is

and ignorance.

is

foreign and hostile to the mind; it cannot and error and the passions that are bred of them, any more than light can coexist with

all

that

is

coexist with confusion

"When the mind, or the self-maintaining imis one with its essence, identifies itself with which pulse such an idea, it is ipso facto possessed of moral vitality and power. And when it rises to the highest kind of knowledge, the intuitive apprehension of that idea which in other comprehends and transcends all other ideas darkness.

words,

when

the self-affirming impulse realises

its

true

significance as not the affirmation of the individual self, but the self-affirmation of God in us then does it attain 1 to the perfection of virtue and power. intellectual life is thus, at one and the

The goal of the same time, the

culmination of the moral life, and the best expression " intellectual love " which consists in

for both is that

the consciousness of the mind's ftd

own

with the idea of God as i

BtTi. v. 27.

perfect activity its

cause."

259

CHAPTEE

XV.

THE BONDAGE AND FREEDOM OF MAX.

IN the

latter portion of

Ms work

Spjnoza, as

we have

seen, contemplates the eourse_of .niaji's ntpial life asr a/ movement from pndage to freedom, from the stage of .

passivity in "

which he

cause of his

own

life

is

not, to that of activity or the

according to reason," in

mode amidst the

actions."

which he

Kegarded

is

as

" the adequate an individual

modes, he is a link in the endless concate-

infinite series of finite

onlvj^j^^

nation of cause^jn^jeff^cfeLj his self-activity is infinitely by the power of external causes, and the free-

^surpassed

dom he

ascribes to himself is only

due to the

and

actions,

an illusory freedom,

own thoughts but not of the causes that determine them.

fact that

he

is

conscious of his

Yet^ though thus, by the very essence of his finite nature, man is under a law of external necessity, the

freedom

all

him

determination. '

is

not thereby^ precjiided.

It is

^

through reason, above encroachment of outward influences on his own self-

possible for

J

to elevate himself,

Accordingly, the

last

Book

of

the

devoted to the development of the idea of freedom, or of that state of moral perfection in which Ethics

is

260

Spinoza.

man. has become at once the source of his own. spiritual life

and sharer in the life of God. difficulty which meets us in this part of Spinoza's

The

speculations is not simply that of his apparent reasserFor necestion of a doctrine he had formerly denied.

and freedom are not predicated of the same subject and the same time, but are viewed .as different But though a transition stages, in man's moral life. sity

at one

from the bondage

of natural necessity to spiritual free-

dom is

not inconceivable, the question arises whether it is conceivable under the conditions here laid down, or in

the manner here described. of

man

as

If

but a unit amidst the

we

start

from the idea

infinite multiplicity of

other finite units, a single force encompassed and determined by the endless series of natural forces, is not freedom excluded by the very conditions of the problem ? To make freedom a possible achievement, there must be at least some fulcrum on which it can be made to rest, some qualitative distinction between the one force which is destineSTto triumph and the many forces which are to

mode, each member of the has precisely the same value

be overcome.

If each finite

series of causes

and

effects,

is not the possibility of freedom simply in the ratio of one to infinity 7 If individuality be only the "force by which each individual persists in his

as another,

own

and that is infinitely surpassed by the of similar external forces, is not individual multiplicity existence,"

freedom reduced to a numerical contradiction ? Must not man be something more than " a part of nature " to 1

begin with, in order to the possibility of escape from

bondage] even

if

we

its

concede the possibility of freedom.

Conditions of the Problem.

261

can the transition be accomplished in the }vay in which i

from the

The problem is that which arises between the positive or self-asserting

it 1

conflict

and the negative or passive elements of man's nature ; and Spinoza's manner of solving it is, as we shall see,

The negative simply by the elimination of the latter. element 'disappears, leaving only the purely affirmative But

to hold the field.

as in the idea of God, so in that

pm^affirmation, apart from negation^ is_an nnDossible conception. In the struggle with passion, to reason according Spinoza, prevails, but it prevails, not

of man,

.....

by overcoming and subordinating passion, but simply by abstracting from or excluding it. Yet if it is not shown that in some way the natural desires and passions can be rationalised, they are simply left behind as an

As

unresolved element. itself

organic

exclusion, but

by the

does not maiatain

transformation, of elements, so the ideal of the

mS^ ratinJife

life

by the

that not j3fja_ps^^

is

^^ man

h

In one sense

^

nature," but in the higher

j

a part of reason.

V

The

force of these

eluding part of the

;

<j|

I 1

/

more in bondage, and little

c

"a

part of

itself

become

can never cease to be life

nature has

and other

Ethics

'

criticisms of the con-

will be seen

by considering

a

detail (1) Spinoza's conception of human (2) his theory of the transition from bond-

age to freedom.

THE BONDAGE OF MAN.

"When we examine what Spinoza means by " the bondage of man," we find that

it

ultimately resolves

262 !

[itself

Spinoza. into that conditioned or^.determined natiije.

all mdiyijiial finite Freedom is things. or self-determination, bcmdage js^subjectipn jself-activity to external caiisjition. act or are active "when

ipertains to

We

we

are the adequate

solely

from the laws of

anything takes place in us of which cause, or

which can be deduced

own nature as we are a part our

" ;

cc

we

are passive, therefore, in so far a part, that is, which cannot

of nature

be conceived by itself and without the other parts." 1 But as " no individual finite thing can exist or be determined to act unless it be determined to exist and act by another which

and has

is also finite

ence, as that also

by a

a" 2

third, &c.,"

determined

it

exist-

follows that

"

it

impossible that man should not be a part of nature or should be capable of undergoing only changes which can

is

be understood through his is

own

nature,

and

of

which

it

the adequate cause." 3

ItjLsJjrue, as we have seen, that Spinoza introduces into his account of the individual nature an element

which seems

to

modify the law

of absolute

external

causation, a self-maintaining impulse or capacity to

act on outward influences, and to I

I

3

!

being."

But inasmuch

as

this

"

persevere in its

re-

own

element of apparent

independence belongs to all finite things alike, it does not in the least modify the preponderance of the whole or of the infinite multiplicity of external causes over affect man's bondage as a

Leach individual thing, or part of nature.

"The

force

by which a man

persists

limited and infinitely surpassed by the 4 Moreover, when we conpower of external causes." sider the special case of man as an intelligent and moral

^in existing

is

"Btibi.

i.

28.

11 The Bondage of Man.

263

all-dominating power of nature over the individual loses nothing of its force,

"being, this

which nature exerts

its

power ovei Jajmjs

the struggle of the individual with the determining power of external causes becomes, in the case of man, the struggle of the mind or the idea of

of

-fllfi-passign^

But the passive the body with the passive emotions. emotions are simply various modifications of the feelings of pleasure

and

pain,

which

body, or necessarily arise external causes

and the

;

reflect

when mind

the affections of the

the body is affected by in the unequal struggle

has no more power to resist the emotions than the body, as an individual mode of extension, to resist ite^.ajffections

"I

by external

mean

greater,

nature.

"

By

" pleasure,

a passive state by which the

by pain

a passive state "

says Spinoza, passes to a

mind

by which

it

passes to a

lesser, perfection."

Emotion, which

sivity of the soul, is a

confused idea by which the mind

is

called a pas-

body a force of existence greater or less than before, and by which it is determined to think one l Thus the whole content of thing rather than another." the mind's experience, all that moves or affects ity Is affirms of its

due, not to

its

own

activity,

but to something that

is

external and foreign to it. If, under the sway of pasincreased as well as of sion, it has sometimes a feeling of diminished power, the former, alike with the latter, as

being determined from without, its

bondage.

strjmgth,

is

only the witness to

Th^jS^^

anj^till^^

is in) which, like the increased power produced by wine, thereconclusion weakness. of a Spinoza's sign reality 1

Bth.

iii.,

general

cfef,

#1 Emotion.

264 foro

Spinoza. iSj

mode

mind nor body, neither as a thought nor as a mode of extension, can

that neither in

of

the individual tions,

that "

man

"be

the free cause of his

"in the mind there

that

if ...men

think themselves

is

will,"

ac-

and

only "because

is

it

free,

own 1

no free

they are conscious of their volitions and, desires,

and

never dream of the causes which have disposed them so " that " It is to will and desire." 2 impossible," says he,

man

should not be a part of nature

follows that he passions, that

he

;

.

.

.

hence

it

necessarily always in jmbjeg;feipn to follows and obeys the general order of

is

nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto as the " I have nature of things requires." 3 explained," he writes, at the conclusion of his account of the emotions,

"the principal emotions and changes of mind which from the combination of the three primary emoIt is evident from this tions, desire, pleasure, and pain. arise

S^??* "^L.^te rna^

that wj&.jxe^jnj^^

driven by^ntend-

hig_winds, we are, swayed hithsr^^ scions of the issue and of our destin

SuchTTEen,

is

Spinoza's account of the state of bond-

That it is age from which man's moral history starts. of human account not a complete or exhaustive nature, but only of its ikst or lowest stage, he himself expressly is only the diagnosis of the disease which order to the understanding of the cure. in necessary " " It is,, necessary Jojoxaw ^n Js^nut^^

tells us.

It

is

,

its^mjgotence, that

"before

we

under

is, thejEpjn^^ can determine what reason can do to liberate 2

Etk

4

Eth.

L, App. iii. 59 , sckoL

Is such

265

Bondage

us from their control." * But before passing to what he has to say of " the course that is prescribed to us by reason," we majjjause for ajnomentjbp consider whethei " the his of wiiat of hu description

man nature^

he^calls

impotence

and whether that impo defined as to place it beyond th

isjjjejf -consistent,

tence has not been so

reach of remedy. In other words, we may inquire, ii the first place, whether the conception of a - cpngciou ^wo" ft.... ..--.~ _._ "

......

...

.,.,..

being under a law of causation in the same sene as..; niodScatipn of matteVTs a possible conceptioii; an< secondly, whether,

if

conceivable,

it

can be

made a

basi

for anything higher.

Is suc^a_jj^.^pi..Jaodjag.Q4 sible for a c^ngQWus^ subject 1 If gpssible, cajojifi ^a

emerge^^m

it 1

of man, as we have seen, is or arises from that conditioned or determined nature which per1.

The bondage

tains to all individual finite things.

body and mind

man is

as a

mode

to

man

as a

of thought.

determined by what

is

mode

It is

common

of extension,

to

and to

In both points of view he external to his own being;

igjLlJ^

A

T^cJbJ^ "causes its

and

own

effects.

desires

and

J TheJtOT^^ volitions than the latter of its aiidjcest.

Both

of external, mechanical causation.

The

own

are under a

law

Mind is^ijnplj^a

order and

connection

of

s^ritujL^itomaton." thoughts is the same as the order and connection of

But unless the two processes are ateoluMy in. which case the distinction "between thought and extension would be a distinction' without a difference

things.

identical

'

i

Elk iv,

17,

MfeoL

t

^

r !/

iV

-I.

266

Spinoza.

we

can. I

j

I

attach any meaning to the conception of an operated on by anotheridej,, or of a mind

idea* externally

externally acted on by or body by another 1

its

passions, as one material thing

Ideas, Spinoza himself tells us,

"are not mere images formed in us by contact with exon a panel." can

We

ternal bodies like lifeless pictures

think one body or mode of extension as lying outside of and acting on another but can we conceive of the pro;

cess as exactly reflected or paralleled in the relation of

one body to that of another

the idea of

?

We

can, of

course, think or have an idea of mechanical causation, but the idea of a mechanical effect is not mechanically

A

determined by the idea of a mechanical cause. passion " a confused idea, by the presence of which the mind is determined to think one thing rather than another." is

A passion, then,

its

by up

to say, is " present to the

mind," and the on mind, operation thoughts and desires

that

is

therein. But a passion, a feeling of pleasure or pain, cannot be first present to the mind in the sense of being externally in contact with it, and then begin to

r spring I

I

i operate upon the in

mind

is

it.

Being present

conscious of

it,

that

to the it is

mind means

that

already, in a sense,

the mind, and therefore the subsequent mental changes

are not the result of a thoughts, desires, volitions in thejaiind The change merely external causation. ---___ is ^ ,,.-'-."'"-*" V..., ...-"*"' ,_,.. -----

determined by the passion, as o

by an_ antecedent event, but the^iiiind^ is determined by a condition of which it, The earliest or lowest stage at which we can sojgcge. ieterjjiined

date the beginning of man's mental history is one in which he is not " a part of nature," in the sense of beingsubjected to appetites, impulses, passions which are out-

Motives not External Causes. side of the nature that is to be determined

267

by them.

It

may, indeed, be possible to conceive of a lower stage than this of sensitive creatures that are under the control of blind impulse, and therefore absolutely determined from without. But if the lower animals be such creatures, self-conscious beings

from the very outset of their con-

scious life belong to a different order.

If there is a

which man can be regarded as a being of merely animal impulses and passions, so long as it lasts his stage at

A

moral history has not begun. nojijfche

The

conscious jnapulse

isf

same as a merely natural or""animal impulse!

infusion of the element of consciousness

change^ of Jium^i .^action, In becoming a motive an appetite or passion undergoes_ a^radical tmnsformation. Itjs no longer an external motor acting jw

its

nature.

t

has already been taken out of the sphere of externality, and in. its character of motor become a it

Inind;

flmigpui a sense, of the mind's own

creation.

In so

far, therefore, as the passions are natural_^rces, D6 reKirde d as a

and

;

of external causation, ;

of "him

as

such,

it

and the moment you conceive to be possible for you to

ceases

account for his actions

by a law

of external causation

an element jof ,,jsel|> _determ.ination^_er^ea., Juaio^jjU Unmotived volition and action that""detemaines ^.^^ indeed an absurd and impossible notion, butj that of a is " Human bondage^" ihearef ore, ^ in Spinoza's sense of the wor3s,

is

absurd

is^n^JbinMb

and

could

only be

made

to

seem thinkable by a "

false

sepamtiojD,~b^

268

Spinoza.

tween passions acting which they act. It

2.

may

the mind, and the

oil

mind

.on

be urged as a further objection to Spinoza's if man were under such a bondage he could

doctrine, that

=

never escape from it. Spinoza proceeds to show how reason liberates man from the slavery of passion and elevates

him

into participation in the

But

edness of God.

is

free

it is

man "

not the

is

bless-

human

freedom, His ngt Jegitimatelj readied. .

hQ3Vyj3^ "

freedom and

his conception of

man

with whom, he started, and

only by an unconscious modification of his original

conception that he contrives to rear upon it his doctrine of freedom. To make freedom a possible attainment, there

"must be some germ

may picture

of it to begin with.

Imagination

to itself the transformation of a stone or plant

or animal into a rational nature, but for thought there can be 110 such transformation. The stone or organism

does not become a man, but the idea of the former is dropped and that of the latter substituted for it. In the

same way Spinoza's bondsman may be represented as becoming a free man; but from his definition of the former the transformation the system of being

and dominate I

I

for imagination only, not

lie

outside of the individual mind,

from without, they can never cease to do so. Mind can only become free in the presence of what is external to it, by supposing it from the outset capable it

of finding itself therein

j

is

If the agencies that constitute nature or

for thought.

that

is,

by supposing

in

it

that

\which has virtually annulled the externality. Limiting conditions can never cease to limit a nature that is not J

from' the

first

potentially

beyond the

limits.

A

slave

could never become a free citizen of the State unless he

Transition

Freedom.

to

269

were capable of finding himself in the constitution and laws of the State. If animal passions rule man from

Reason indeed

anjaidmal^

^itihout, may, as

Spinoza shows, attain the

supremacy in man's

; only because man is from the beginning from the being of whom Spinoza; different something

life

but

it is

speaks, for only that being which, in the forces that act on it, can have in

sense, creates

"

it the latent capa-] in is, short, the presence in wMclTas"not subject to the bondage

city to control them.

mjn4 o^jomething

some

It

1

of externality, that constitutes the fulcrum freedom can be achieved.

by which

its

TRANSITION FROM BONDAGE TO FREEDOM. Spinoza's conception of seen, self-contradictory.

human bondage is, as we have A being who is subject to a

law of purely external causation aiid jherefore incapable of

incapable of freedom, To be a part of bondage.

nature would be no bondage to

is

man

if

he could be a part

" The very term " bondage implies that essentially One mode of andjromJK^rsF Tie is^soggfching^^gje.

of

it.

matter

is

not in

bondagefW 'another,

not in bondage to the expression of

its

its

cause

;

to

a 'physical effect

be so related

very nature.

is

is

simply

Subjection to

the,

passions would be no. slavery ; the vicious man would be as innocent as an animal, if like the animal he were blind-^ ly determined

by his appetites. Spinoza's "bondage," by the proof he gives of it, is simply or fmitude, and it applies to man as a mode of modality thought precisely as it applies to him as a mode of exIt implies no more reaction in the individual tension.

as interpreted

mind than

in a stone, against the determining

power of

270

Spinoza.

the infinite series of external causes.

But, in order to the deeper signification which the "bondage" term implies, and to make it the basis of a theory of

ilend to

freedom, Spinoza unconsciously shifts the definition of the subject of bondage. What he wants in mind is a feelf

which ...can. be the source

which, in so far as

it

of its

own

^activity,

and

in .bojidage. Man than an individual in a world

not

is

must be something more

so,

is

\)f individuals, a larger universal

him, if the limits of individuality are to ,be dj A* life controlled by passion hindrances to freedom. " ian be stamped as impotence," only if reason be issumed to be the essence, and a rational life the proper

10

is

\

i

lestiny of the being so controlled.

To make this assump-

tion possible, Spinoza changes and deepens the significance of that which constitutes the essence of mind.

which

Thej^yj^ with

its essence,

that of

other finite natures,

all

is at first

and deeper in the former than in the

dowed with

is identical

" in order to be " infinitely surpassed by

the individual

nothing more

latter.

mind

As

en-

at most,

is, it, only quantitatively distinguished from the infinite multiplicity of other individuals, one force amidst the infinitude

of

forces,

to

^

which

it,

it

it

necessarily succumbs.

has to be

invest^jwitti^the

Eut^to functions

self-conscious, self-determining part of a "^z~3S^ax^^^^^SSSff A -'"j35saaKBKi!SISriS^?5Sss:-' *

subject. essential

Its

essence

is

understanding or Ig^ojn,

^ ^<* its

function is knowledge or the capacity of ideas that knowledge which, as we have seen, adequate is not inert or merely theoretical knowledge,

and

The Subject of Bondage. the goal of which

own

is

perfect activity

271

" the consciousness of the mind's

combined with the idea of God."

"The

1

effort of self-maintenance," Spinoza writes, "is nothing but the essence of a thing itself, ... its power of doing those things which follow necessarily from its nature. But the essence ofjreason is nothing but our mind in so far as

\

j

The effort of the and distinctly understands. mind by which it endeavours to persevere in its own being is nothing else than understanding, and this effort at understanding is the first and sole basis of virtue," the source, " The essence of the that is, of its moral and spiritual life. mind consists in knowledge, which involves the knowledge of God, and without it, it can neither be nor be conceived." 2

it clearly

"

.

.

]

absolutely according to the laws of his own nature under the guidance of reason." 3 "To act

Man acts

when he

.

lives

rationally is nothing else than to do those things which follow from the necessity of our own nature considered in itself alone."

what

"We know

4

3'

standing.

By

assuredly nothing to be good save

helps, nothing to be evil save

what

hinders, under-

5

this tacit modification of the

we have

definition

of

mind,

said, infuses into it thatjlem^atjof of which self-determinatipn a process of and ^fooffiJbflDid^ge,

Spinoza, as

bondage

^

emancipation

j>f

human bondage, instead of for finitude, or the detername another being merely mination of a single mode by the infinite series of external modes, becomes now the subjection ^pf^re^on^oi (1.)

As

to the former:

It is no of a being essentiaUyrational to the irrational. " " part of nature to longeF*smiply the relation of one dem.

i

Eth.

iv. 26,

3

Eth.

iv. 35, cor. 1.

s

Eth,

iv, 27,

2

4

Ibid., $7,

ML

dem. dem.

iv. 59,

1

i

272

Spinoza.

the whole, but

it is

the subjection of the spiritual to the intelligence is essentially active, a

Reason or

natural.

rational nature has in

it

the spring of perpetual activity.

It is of its very essence to realise itself, to be the adequate cause of its own thoughts and volitions, to make

whole experience the expression of its own essence and as pain and all painful emotions are the indications its

;

of restrained or diminished power, it

is

the characteristic

of a rational nature to be a stranger to pain, to revel, so to speak, in the unbroken consciousness of its own Bjgi, through the medium^ of^the jgassjpns^^a element foreign gains access to ,the_ mind, ideas., imteujde it which are no longer its own creation, but which

energy.

\

t

<>

|\pon

Reflect the involuntary affections of the body by the host of desires and emotions^j-rise External world.

A

in

it

of

which

it is

not

itself

the source

;

the presence

and of emotions coloured by pain, betrays its repressed activity; and even its pleasurable or joyous emotions, and the sense of power that accompanies them, are not of legitimate origin, but, being due to external of pain,

stimulus, are the sign of the mind's weakness, not of its strength. Again, it is of the very essence of a rational nature, not only to determine itself, but to determine of action.,,. itself by uniform^ and invariable principles " Whatever the mind conceives under the guidance of

conceives under the same form of eternity or necessity, and it is affected by it with the same certitude" 1 ?'.&, independently of all variable conditions or

reason,

1

it

of the accidents of time its satisfaction is

and

place,

an^bsolute^good,

i

be diminished by distance jDr^Japse of^time, and which i

Eth.

iv. 62,

dem,

Season and is

the^same

the Passions.

But

f or jll^minds.

it is

/

,-

:

-

273

of the very nature

passions to introduce into the mind an element of fitfulness and caprice, and to determine our actions by a of

tlie

gain,

'

Pleasure and contingent and fluctuating. reflecting as they do the affections of the body,

good which

is

vary with individual temperament, with the accidental and ever-changing relations of the individual to outward

and space Hence the inroad,., on the

j

j

j

things, with the nearness or distance in time of the objects that affect us.

mind

of a whole brood of emotions

sion,

hope and

and render

eg^pjjjnxity, tionality.

pride and and remorse, &c.

fear,

daring, exultation

Hence,

too,

and the disturbance

|

of desire and,ayer-*|. humility , timidity and!

it

which disturb

the slave of accident and

itsj

irra-

the tyjraimjjjf.jfl^^

of that

harmony and repose which

For whilst the same for all minds, and they who seek them seek a good which is common to all, which can never be diminished by the multiplicity of participants, and which each individual must desire that 1 on the other hand, pleasure and others should seek; pain, from which the passions spring, are in their nature constitute the atmosphere of reason.

objects of reason are the

Not only do their objects affect difpurely individual. ferent men in an infinite variety of ways, so that what one desires and loves, another may hate and shun, but their appropriation by one implies the loss of them to Envy, jealousy, anger, hatred, all the malign those who make pleasure their good. beset In passions, these and other ways Spinoza shows that the passions, all besides.

as the

word

indicates,

man's true nature.

P.

XII.

imply the passivity or bondage of

The

essence of the jniTtdJs reason3

iBth.

Iv.

1$.36,

37.

S

274

Spinoza. "but in so far as the

;

under the control of passion, our actions " no follow from the laws of our own nature, "but are longer determined "by what is alien to it." To let passion rule

mind

is

a kind of suicide, for a suicide is one "who is overcome by external causes, and those which are contrary

is

to his

own

in^so Jar

nature." as

he

1

On

the other hand,

"man

is free

led Jby_ reason, for then only is he

is

determined to act by causes which can be adequately see thus own nature alone." 2 "

We

understood by his

man who man who is

the difference between a tion or opinion and a former,

led solely by emoled by reason. The

is

whether he will or no, does those things

of

which he is utterly ignorant ; the latter does those things only which he knows to be of the highest importance in Therelife, and which therefore he desires above all. a fore I call the former a slave, the latter a foee naan,"

The<^^ now reached

(2.)

has

supplies

him with

a basis forJiisjlpc-

trine of freedom, and indicates the process by whichjQie So from bondage to freedom is mediated. transition " or with determination identical is bondage is impossible, or possible only by the the of very existence of the being to whom it annulling if the freedom of man be conceived, not But pertains. as indetexmination but as determination by the laws of

finitude,

freedom

own nature, the possibility thereof resolves itself into the question whether that nature can rise above the

his

external influences whicT^lominate

As

it.

the lowest

or inadequate stage of knowledge is that of imagination ideas, so the lowest stage_oi.

iMos^^

iv. 20, schol.

2

Tract. Pol., cap.

ii.

11,

3 Etli. iv. 66, scliol.

How Freedom

is to Ic

Attained.

275

bondage to the passions, which are, if not simply another form of inadequate ideas, necessarily generated by

Can^j^r^gLJrpm this state; and JsJfcdom .possible; and ^Jjjossibl^^ them.

As

to the first of these questions, it

the answer

is

if

so,

may be

how

1

?

said that

involved in the doctrine that the activity

and that pain belongs The pa^^.TjonJa^^is-^^j

of reason is essentially pleasurable,

only to the passions. freedom.

Pain, in other words, is the con or repressed activity, and th< sciousness_,oi.,,limitatipn

phgejr,

.-of

If

man

could be perfectly happy unde: moral condition would be

Die^flominion of passion, his

hopeless.

The

fact that in the lowest stage

of selfish!

indulgence there is an element of unrest is the witness J to the presence in man of a nature greater than his pas-i

and capable of rising above them. But granting the possibility of freedom, how is it tcj conflict of passion W ie attained? In the be ggt^MMMMMKl wm*-^^~**~~- ~~-~*<*~~*~~+~~*MI~' MMMMmmMMM"y mt^^ In answer to this -gm^^ " the question, Spinoza enumerates what he terms remedies of the emotions, or what the mind, considered l The jaore ^imin itself alone, can do against them." sions,

J^^

ll

'

,,

"

" remedies we shall briefly consider. portant jrf these 1. "The mind's power over the emotions consists, first,

in the actual knowledge of the emotions."

knowledge of passion

" desferoy^s jgasap^

An

Thej/

emotion

wMSK^*T*passion ceases tdpbe a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it" 2 Spinoza's proof of this proposition is in substance this i

Bth. v. 20, schol.

that a passion 2 Itli. v. S.

!

276 is,

Spinoza.

or rests on,

and

clear

"a

confused idea," and that forming a it is equivalent to the vanish-

distinct idea of

Error is extinguished, ing of the confusion. when we know it ceases the mind over power a idea " of an confused is a Moreover, passion of the body" But there is no affection of the

which we cannot form a can

clear

and

and

its

a* error. affection

body

distinct idea.

of

"We

above the confusion of ordinary knowledge to

rise

the clear intelligence of reason. "When, therefore, we think a passion, what remains of ii^ is not the passion itself,

but the

idea of

trjie

it,

or that is involved in it.

thus transferred from the sphere of our passivity to Reason not only masters passion, that of our activity.

It

!

is

but receives a fresh accession of power ; it not only detects the illusion, but becomes possessed of the truth that underlies

j

H passion 1

it,

we now

so that

seek

what we sought blindly from from rational

or

intelligently

motives.

Stripped of

its

ar^umejotseems

technical form, the^ to

be this

:

"When

it

is

asserted that

^ nowjj^^y^jr p ass ions ^e gain

the mastery " that over them, or every one has the power clearly and distinctly to understand himself and his emotions, and

by

the

therefore, if not absolutely, yet in part, of bringing it

about that he should not be subject to them/'

l

itjs^

obviously j^jneant that to have a

would be as absurd doctrine

as to say that

its fare. Nor, again, is Spinoza's the commonplace maxim, that as an simply

enemy we know

is

comparatively harmless, so 1

Mil.

v. 4, schol.

by

study-

Thought transforms Passion. ing our passions

we

how

learn

But what jhe means

against them.

277

to

be on our guard

is,

that

when we

gaii

overjas.

passion loses its hold As, in the intellectual sphere, the aspect of the

world as

it

,

is

for imagination, in

which

things are

all

regarded from a purely individual standpoint, necessity annulled

when we

ol

is

the higher standthings are discerned in

rise to

point of reason, in which all

universal and necessary relations, so. in the ethical sphere, the attitude of purely individual feeling, in- which things are good or evil only as they contribute their

to the satisfaction of

away when we

our appetites and passions, vanishes

rise to that

higher attitude

in.

identify ourselves with the universal. .injbgjcests,

which we and look

on our

particular pleasures and pains in the light of that universal order of which we are but an insignificant

So viewed, our particular satisfactions lose their They become no more to us, or deceptive importance. to reason in us, than those of other individuals, and part.

infinitely less

than the interests of that universe of

being to which we and they belong. Thus, regarded from the point of view of reason, the passions cease to exist for us except in so far as they are functions of the universal, or forms under which reason itself

is

realised.

These considerations explain to us also the sequel of Spinoza's argument, in which he maintains that in thus

knowing our of the

passions we_^tmnsfom. "

To

mind^ac^vity.

all actions,"

he

writes,

" to

wTncnwe

are determined by passion, we can be determined without passion by reason," l " Every desire, it 7'

1

Eth.

iv. 59.

278 is

Spinoza.

"which springs from an emotion wherein the passive, would "become useless if men were guided

added,

mind by

is

reason."

l

And

again

" All appetites or desires are

:

passions only in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas, and the same results are ranked as virtues when

they are aroused or generated "by adequate ideas. all desires

by which we

arise as well

may

ideas."

2

There

is,

are determined to

any

For action

from adequate as from inadequate in other words, a rational meaning^or

end underlying the passions, and what we seek blindly under the influence of passion we may seek deliberately under the guidance of reason. When we know or form an adequate idea of a passion, we discern this under--

make

lying end, and

"We

pursuit.

possible a clear order that the

an object of conscious deliberate

it

must endeavour to acquire as far and distinct idea of every emotion,

as in

mind may be thus, through emotion, determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives

and in which

thus that the emotion

itself

it

fully acquiesces, and

may be

separated from the

thought of an external cause and connected with true thoughts whence it will come to pass, not only that ;

love,

hatred,

appetites

and

&c., will

desires

be

but

destroyed,

which usually

arise

also

that

from such

will become incapable of excess." 3 Even the lowest appetites are capable of being thus transferred f from the sphere of passion to that of reason, from the The wise or passive to the active side of our nature. Jernotions

I

j

I

free bv:

man is no longer impelled by hunger or lust> but the rational endeavour after that to which these

j

l&ppetites point

-the preservation

iv. 59, -sehoL.

2

BQu v. 4>

and continuance schol.

*

IM
of

The Passions become nationalised. the

the individual and the race.

life of

279

Anibitiojti

and

kindred passions are based on the desire "that other men should live after our fashion ; " but this is only an

aim when

irrational

impulse

;

it

is

the dictate of blind,

selfisli

in a nature that is elevated to the universalityl

it becomes simply the endeavour that all menjj Animal courage or daring should lead a rational life.

of reason

impulsive character, becomes that wise express itself as much in

purged of

its

presence of

mind which may

1 Even evading danger as in facing and overcoming it. those emotions, such as pity or compassion, which we

wont to regard as good and praiseworthy, are, considered merely as emotions, bad and hurtful ; 2 but reason! or the rational man extracts the valuable element in< are

them, and instead of being impulsively calamities

and

moved by the

tears of the wretched, seeks

on rational

3 grounds to ameliorate their condition.

ti^knowledge

Tims, in general, of passion annihilates passion, and_,guj>-

sjat^^

...Activity ofjreason. perfectly wise man would be absolutely passionless, and therefore absolutely free. He " would hate no man,

A

envy no man, be angry with no man," and for the same would love and pity no man, do nothing at the mere dictate of feeling, but would order his life from

reason,

4 purely rational motives for the general good. " 2. As another and kindred remedy for the passions/ or means of attaining freedom, Spinoza points out that 5

" the mind can bring

it

about that

all

bodily affections

or images of things should be referred," (a) to "the common properties of things or deductions therefrom," i

3

Etb.

iv. 69.

Ibid.,

dem.

3 Eth. iv. 50,

*

Mh.

iv. 73,

dem. and

scfcol.

/

280 or

(?;)^to "

"the idea of God." 1

This "remedy for the

only the converse or correlate of that which have just considered. Thought or reason transforms

passions

we

Spinoza.

,

is

the object as well jasj^ejjul^ think oi\ know myself, the passion vanishes

think or

know

which appeals

the world,

it

I

when

I

ceases to be that world

The

to passion.

When ;

already involved in the former.

latter result

is,

Even from

indeed,

Spinoza's

peculiar point of view, thought and its outward object The world, as it was for stand or fall with each other.

inadequate thought, no longer exists for that which has become adequate; thought cannot rise from the individual to the universal without implying a parallel vation in the extended world which is its object. :

|t

ele-

But though the one transformation implies the

other,

possible, following our author, to consider

them

is

Separately. of as the

The dominion

dominion of

world as

it is

the essence of which

world

in

tWOTld

for sense

their

and the

reason, of the things of the

The

and is

independence the idea or self-

"Jjondajge,"

on that supposi-

reality

over a nature the essence of which

tion,

conceived

and imagination over a nature

is

fictitious

affirmation of God.

may be

of passion

wo^djjej;^^

^jej^te,

of a being

whose essence

is light,

harmony,

unity, in a world of darkness and disfrom this bondage is that The deliverance cordancy. " " which Spinoza here points. to for the passions remedy

eternal order

and

Annihilate the world, and the passions which were reBut the world on which feted to it die a natural death. i Efih. Y.

14 and 12.

.

The World transformed for Reason. passion fed has no real existence. to imagination it

to

which the

seemed

Nothing

281

really is as

Tlie individual things

to be,

affections of the "body

were referred, and

which, through these affections, became the objects of desire and aversion, love and hate, are purely, illusory.

The body and

its affections,

and

all

bodies which affect

are nothing save as determined

by universal relations which link the whole order or syseffect, tem of things into one vast unity. The mind that is the prey of the passions is wasting itself on a vain show, fastening on that as real and permanent which is fugitive and evanescent. Thought or reason dissolves the jshow, and with it the passions to which it gave it,

of cause

butjL

and

Passion, again, in its fluctuation anH variableon relations to a world which is the scene

ness, is based

and accident. But there is no such The "common, properties," the universal laws,

of arbitrariness

world.

by an absolute neces" body to sity, tnese, when the world puts off the mask of change and contingency^ and the presence of eternal order and neof things determine their relations

and when we " refer the

affections of the

cessity confronts us, the restless alternations of .satiety!

and discontent vanish with the illusory world they re"If we remove a disturbance of the mind or flected. an emotion from the thought of an external cause, and connect

it

with other thoughts, then will love or hatred

towards the external cause, and also the fluctuations

mind which arise from 1 But further, in the stroyed." of the

these emotions* be de-

real world wMcli supikere is someof the world illusory imagination, plants n " thing deeper even than the common properties wMdh ^

BUi. v.

2.

4 282

Spinoza.

Thought, even

reason^ discerns.

when

it

has grasped

the universal principles or laws which bind all finite things- in the bonds of an unchangeable necessity, falls short of apprehending their deepest meaning. "The mind can bring it about that all bodily affections and

images of things should be referred to the idea of God." It

1

we have seen, for thought to rise to a view from which the world is contemplated,

is possible, as

point of

not merely as a system of things conditioning and conditioned by each other, but asja system in, which all the light of that absolute of things are seen in "*unity "*" --"...-. ~ -wSf...***"^ '

...

'

-

\vhic,k~ihey are only the infinitely varied expression. The true " existence of things " is that which is ascribed to

them because

of this, that

of the nature of infinite

2

ways."

from the eternal necessity

God an infinity of things follows in The system of the world, in other

words, contains an element of unresolved diversity

and

ithe particular existence of things,

till

their mediating

no longer independent, and by the " " intellectual intuition we can, so glance of immediate

link of causation, are

whole

to speak, see the I, thin king

at

once

all

diversitjjnjmity,

objects of thought as exgressigns God" which is their immanent prin-

things,

all

In this highest "and truest Fnowledge the world lies the secret of complete

^

e s P nere ^ the passions that JJETJBSSJJS^ is most vivid and which is referred to a powerful present rather than an absent object, or to a greater rather tliaa a lesser number of objects, or to objects that most

__

emotion

frequently reeitr *

I

ML v. l&

;

and an emotion possessing 2

-gt^

all

^ 45^ szhtiL

these

The final ^Emancipation.

283

would prevail over every other. But iff there be one object or idea which is ever present and! incapable of being excluded by any other, which all! characteristics

things and thoughts suggest, and from which everything else derives its significance and then must that reality

and the emotion to which it gives rise > dominate every other in the mind in which it dwells.

idea,

It is the idea to which it is 2jichJs ^jde^of^gpj5L, " to refer all bodily affections or possible for the mind ii

images of things," and in the mind which has achieved this result, to which all things speak of God, or are seen only as they exist in God,

passions that relate are quelled, and every othe: absorbed in that " intellectual love

to things finite

emotion

is

all

and transient

only another ^ aspect

.of

the intifflErvT^Bwl

... ^ w^,^... ^WM w*-w*_ KJM->-MSKaM Finally, whilst every other emotion limits the mind a!S-

....... ...

,.,..,.,..

,

,

<

...... ,,...,.,..-.-.*.,

' 3

activity, this is the expression of its highest freedom,

For whilst

"

passion springs from pleasure or painj accompanied with the idea of an external cause," all

emotion springs from^^aus^jwhich or foreign to thejnind,

is

no longer outwj

hutjs J

For the mind, the essence of which is that self affirming impulse which is in reality the self-amrmaMon

gejice,,

God in it, and for which the world is a world in which all things are seen in God, or awaken the thought and love of God, subjection to what is external ceases of

every object it contemplates, every tiling that stirs th fount of feeling, only contributes to its own puresl aetr ity.

verse

The mind

inj5^

JJa^^^

284

Spinoza.

In ^viewing

this theory of the transition

pointed out that

may be

from "bondage

its

main defect on

to freedom,

it

seems to

in the abstract ideal of man's highest life

which

lie

it is

Freedom

based.

sefi-acTivity, all passion is ideal, therefore, of life.

the moral

life is

that of an absolutely " to reason is that " reason without

The " life according

passionless in which, the agent

is

determined

by

Eeason and passion cannot

passion."

emotion

is pure self-affirmation or negation of that activity. The

is

coincides with reason,

it

is

useless

:

Where

coexist.

where

it

in either case,

it

noxious

contrary to reason, it is

;

an invasion from without on that purely self-affirming The activity in which the mind's freedom consists.

is

triumph of reason

is

not the subjugation but the ex-

To think

tinction of passion.

a passion

is

to kill

it.

Thought and passion are opposed as activity and passivity, and the positing of the former is equivalent to the annulling of the latter. Further, it follows from this that the free or rational life is one from which

Pain is the pain or sorrow is absolutely excluded. indication of repressed activity ; pleasure, in the sense in which it is not of the nature of passion, of lurimpeded or expanding activity.

no

Into the spiritual

life,

therefore,

which pain or sorrow is an element can enter ; and judged by this criterion, humility, penitence, pity, compassion, and kindred emotions must be pronotoiced to be evil 1 But it is to be remarked that a freedom which is thus feeling of

identified with passionless intelligence, or the pure selfaffirmation of reason apart from negation, is either an

impossible notion, or a notion which Vi

iEth.lv. 50,53,54.

is

only a

moment

Criticism of the Theory. or factor in the true idea of freedom.

It is true tfcat the

above and beyond the pasthough not in itself spiritual freedom, is a step in the

affirmation of a self sions,

which

285

is

process towards it. It is of the very essence of a spiritual nature to he conscious of a self which is more than any or all particular desires and affections, which does not come and "go with the succession of feelings, hut underneath all their transiency and ehangefulness remains ever one

with

itself,

negativity.

posits or affirms itself in opposition to their

But though thi^jelf-affirmation

of the process,

it

is

an element

is

only aj^eleinent. AjDurely selfaffirming intelligence, or, otherwise expressed, a rational will which has no materials of activity outside of itself, It is a Determiner witlxQut,ariya universal without thejartjcular,

ahtractipn. ine,

the^blankw form of the moral life without anj fiUiogjcij 'cojate^ET *'Eeason can never realise itself merely by willing to he rational

;

can only do so hy willing particular

it

acls~^n^E*come under the form this implies that

passions, m

J**<***~^* *>>**m.

And

of rationality.

thege^^

own ends or objects. which have - their An .~.4...-~ on itself dies of inanition, or ---

.,

.....

......

'-

...... -----

...........

-.-*

------------

. -------

intelligence feeding only rather,

never begins to

live.

But whilst thus the

ex-

would be the extinction of spiritual life, or whilst an intelligence that could annihilate passion would annihilate the very materials of its own

tinction of passion

existence, yet,

on the other hand, the passions, in so far an element of the spiritual life, do not

as they remain

remain unchanged. mutes them. of a

t

4

I

1'

Beagon, ifjflulggs notajmui, trans-

286

own

tiis

thralls.

conflict

.e

Or rather itjs more than that

with the passions reason achieves

'reedom by infusing into 1

realises

itself

them

own

own

for in

rationality.

own It

natural impulses and As the touch of art universality.

"by elevating

lesires into its

its

;

its

the

matter, transmutes stones and pigments into the and 3eauty splendour of the ideal ; or as organic life, yhilst it takes up inorganic materials into itself, leaves

glorifies

hem not unchanged, hut sufruses

them with

assimilates

its

and transforms

own power and

hem, he impulses and passions of the natural

energy,

self are

so

but the

aw

material which the spiritual self Jransf orms into Jhe The free man, the man who has organs of its own life.

entered into the universal

life of reason, is still

a creature

and blood; he hungers and thirsts, he is no |f ,nger to ordinary appetites and impulses, or to those passions which animate the most unspiritual flesh

.

But in living, not for his individual pleasure, for the higher ends of the spirit, the passions, whether

itures. nit

the mere organic basis of the spiritual life, or as conand denied for the sake of it, or as used up as its

if oiled

oirces,

become, to ^the

spirit,

imiinct with

i

287

CHAPTEE

XVI.

IMMORTALITY AND THE BLESSED SPINOZA'S doctrine of immortality

viewTo^y^^^ is

11

is,

LIFE.

in one point of It

foKQi of his doctrine of freedom.

the passions or passive emotions which hinder the

mind's inherent activity and subject it to the control of a foreign element. But so long as the "body exists, the passions must more or less limit the autonomy of reason. For the passions correspond to and reflect the affections which the body receives from external bodies ; or, other-

wise expressed, they are due to the illusory influence of the imagination, which contemplates outward objects in

body and gives to them a and independence. A passion is " a confused idea by which the mind affirms greater or less power of -Its lody than before, and by the presence of which

their accidental relations to the false substantiality

determined to think one thing rather than another." " Whatsoever hinders the power or activity of the body,

it is

71 the idea of that thing hinders that of the mind/ Whilst, therefore, the body endures, we must be more or less

the slaves of imagination and passion.

were wholly imagination it i E&.

If the

mind

would perish with the body Si. 11.

1

I

]

288

Spinoza.

and is

The

affections.

that reflect

world and the ideas

illusory

would vanish

it

together.

But, as

we have

just seen, there is that in the mind which enables it to rise above the slavery of passion, to emancipate itself from the illusions that are generated by ideas of bodily

The

affections.

true essence of

under the

things, not

iees

mind

is reason,

which

fictitious limits of time,

but

under the form of eternity and in their immanent relaIt is this essence of the mind tion to the idea of God.

which constitutes what Spinoza calls its " better part," and in wMchlies the secret at once of its, freedom and its ^

It

Hlimprtality.

makes man

free, for it raises

him above

the desires that are related to the accidental and transient, and brings him under the dominion of that "intellec" which is the expression of his own deepest tual love bature, It niakes man immortal, for, having no relation to the

body and

can be

affectecl "By

is

nolKng

its affections, it

has in

it

nothmgjjhat

the destruction, of the body. " There in nature that is contrary to this intellectual

1 "It is possible for the away." mind to be of such a nature that that in it which

love or can take

it

human we have shown

to perish with the body is of little im2 portance in comparison with that in it which endures." the mind is of the eternal "The part understanding, through which alone we are said to act ; the part which

we have *shown which alone we

to perish is the imagination, through

are said to be passive."

8

is, however, another and very peculiar aspect of Spinoza's doctrine of 'imrnortality which remains to

There

We naturally

be explained.

ojj&ejmind i

Eth.

after the.

v. 37.

ask h^qw^any^ ju^^urvival

destruction^^

2 EtTi. v. SB, schol.

s

Etk

v, 40, cor.

The maintained,

is

"

"

Essence

of the Body.

289

consistent with the fundamental dt>etrihe

of the^uniform parallelism of thought and extension, or with the principle that to all that takes place in the

human mind

as a

mode

of thought there

must he some-

thing corresponding in the human "body as a mode of extension. Spinoza's answer to this question, turns on the

?

distinction which, according to him, obtains between theil " " essence " and the " actual existence of the body. The!

mirin^ survival does not leave us with something in the sphere of thought to which nothing in the sphere of exFor though the particular mode of tension corresponds. extension which

we designate this actually existing body,

" in so far as

it is explained by duration and can be defined by time," ceases to exist, there is nevertheless an a essence "of the bodj,wMjh.^n^gnlj_be

or the

body

God or under the and which therefore endures when eternity, of which can we speak in terms of everything corporeal

conceived through the essence of

.

form of

" " time passes away. God," says Spinoza, is the cause not only of the existence of this or that human body but also of its essence/ 1 " There is in 7

necessarily

God

(and therefore in the human mind) an idea which ex2 It would presses the essence of the human body."

thereforejiE^ afso, survives doath. is

mode

kw something J^tjoj^es

which we

If that paxticu.-

the actually existthat also mode of Bought so does ing body passes away, which constitutes the idea of the actually existing body. i

P.

of extension

Bth. v. 22, dem.

XIL

/ /

^ parallelism of thought and the destruction of the actually

away, inJ^^jo^B^^^^.aijejQ^m.s, lar

,

The

not affected by In both there existing body.

extension

j

call

* Bfe; v.

2-3.

dem.

T

^

;

/ "V

-

-r

M

1

j

290

Spinoza.

fOn tke other hand, if the immortal element in mind (is the reason, which contemplates all things under the form of eternity, in like manner the immortal element in

!

" that " essence of the "body which is the " " reason. The form of of object eternity belongs alike to the essence of the body and to the essence of the

the

I

;

body

is

mind.

;

1. In criticising this theory, it may be remarked that in such phrases as " the duration of the mind without relation to the body," "the mind does not imagine, &e.,

save while the

body endures/* Spinoza employs language which, as addressed to the ordinary ear, is misleading, inasmuch as it suggests the notion of an incorporeal im/mortality, a survival of the purely spiritual element of man's nature when.the material element has passed away.

Such phraseology perhaps betrays an unconscious concession to the

^E^L^o^ception

of the material as the

^osser, the mental as the nobler element, and of immortality as the emancipation of the spirit from the bondage In any case, such language is obviously with Spinoza's doctrine as above explained. xinco^stent Spinoza knows nothing of the false spiritualism which " " recoils from the supposed grossness or of pravity of

matter.

matter.

To him, on the

contrary, matter is as divine

as mind,. modes of matter are as

.

much

the expression of

modes of mind. On his principles it would be equally true and equally false to say that the body survives the mind, and to say that the mind survives the To each he ascribes an " essence " which is disbody. " actual existence " and if the tinct from its essence of ;

God

the

as

mind

survives the

body regarded

as a particular,

transient modification of matter, the essence of the

body

Criticism of

Doctrine.

tJie

291

mind regarded

survives the

tion, or the particular

as the idea of that mpdificamodification of thought which

corresponds to it. 2. It is a more important criticism of Spinoza's doctrine that it ascribes to death or the destruction of the

body what

is really due to reason, as the destroyer of/; The triumph of mind is' the illusions of imagination. not the destruction of the body, but the destruction of a

false

view of

It is not achieved

it.

by

the cessation of

the body's existence, but by the dissipation of the illuThe immortality which is sory reality ascribed to it. predicated of the mind is not continuity of existence after death,

of time

but

capacity to rise above the category itself, the body and all things, under

its

and to see

To speak of this as something I the form of eternity. of or as a future, living on after a certain date, capacity or of surviving a certain event, is simply to explain in? I

terms of time that the very nature of which is to tran j scend time. The Jmniortality which is sanctioned by

^^

Sgigo^ eno!ojra

It is

quaM^^ fore,

an

.....

but the

immortaliirf^ jth

wMchBS^SS^^red^nfijr. to the sfcagiToFTSEu^

In so f^r as and intel-

we have an immediate experience of it, enter at once into the sphere of eternity, and the old world of imagination vazusEes' away. And if we ask,

lectual love,

.^gjjj''^gg^fgaSSo^^Sis eternal consciousness to tfee life

or death of the

body?

it

^ ^^^-S^E^^^^^^^ liberation,

form of

might 1

foe anffweo^cl tliai

^ "^ ^P^

^^

f

For the mind that s^^ffi^^TCinder the

eternity, the

boiy,

s

n

I

292

Spinoza.

has already vanished, the disillusioning power of reason has anticipated in a deeper way the physical disinteof death. Spinoza knows nothing of the Plagration notion of the corporeal state as an imprisonment jtpnic it. The mind I of the soul, from which death liberates

knows God has already achieved its liberation, and the eternity in which it dwells is neither hindered nor helped by the destruction of the body. According to his own principles, therefore, it is an obvious inconsist-

that

ency in Spinoza to speak of a subjection of the mind to " imagination and passion so long as the body endures," " " as contributing in destruction of the body or of the

For the higher conits emancipation. sciousness of the mind, the body has been already deand the only emancipation of which the mind stroyed, is capable is one which reason, and not the destruction of any measure to

the body, has accomplished. 3, Spinoza's doctrine implies a tacit ascription to the mind of a ^superiority: over the body which is inc

with their^paraTlelism as modes of thought and extension. That doctrine is, as we have seen, that there is an essence of

mind and an

essence of

body which both

alike tran-

scend the category of time, and are part of the eternal But whilst Spinoza's conception of the nature of God.

nakue of mind *

supplies a ground for its superiority to

all change, he assigns no similar ground for the perpetuity of the body. Modes of tiiouglit are determined by other modes ; but besides

fim%

its

permanence through

^^^J^^pjj^^i011 of thought upon itself ; in ofea; voids, thought thinks itself. Modes of extension other modes there is no similar "but y ,*by

ifcm, t3iere is

of eixtension upon

itself,

nory {pom

Inconsistency of the Doctrine.

293

the very nature of the thing, is any such return conceivable. jSTow, though the conception of mind as not

only idea of the body, but as the idea of that idea, does not amount to what is involved in the modern doctrine of

self-consciousness,

yet in Spinoza's speculations

it

performs in some measure the functions which that doctrine ascribes to the mind. As conscious of itself,!

mind

contains in its very essence a principle of continu-i a ity, unity which remains constant through all phenomenal changes. It can abstract from all determinations,

and

it is

that to

which

all

determinations are referred

the living, indestructible point of centrality to which the thoughts and feelings that compose our conscious life

are

But there

drawn back.

is

nothing approximat-

ing to this principle of self-centrality in Spinoza's con" The human ception of the body. body is composed," he tells us, 1 " of many individual parts of diverse nature, each one of

which

is

extremely complex," and

"

these individual parts of the body, and therefore the body itself, are constantly being affected by external bodies." .

In

all

this diversity

principle of unity

;

and change there

is

no

the unity to which the body as a referred is not in itself, but in the

composite thing is " idea of the body," or the

mind

that thinks

it.

Spinoza's conception of immortality, or of the eter4 nal element in mind, is, as we have seen, simply "that oil 4.

a mind for which the illusion of time has disappeared. % But to drop or eliminate an illusion is not to account for it,

or to explain its relation to our mental

and

spiritual

Spinoza points out as a fact that time as well as figure, number, measure, are only illusory forms of imalife.

*

Eth. it,"post. 1 and

S.

294

Spinoza.

and that reason rises albove them. But even must be in some way grounded in the intel-

gination,

an

illusion

ligence that experiences

It

it.

can be explained only

and by showing that it forms a in the development of the finite mind.

its

by tracing

origin,

necessary stage iTimg, in other words, is not explained even as an illu[sion, unless in the eternal there is shown to be a reason for it

I

;

nor

is

the eternal which rises above time to be

understood unless the negation of time is shown to be " If the aspect of things under the contained in it.

!

I

form of eternity

"

has no necessary relation to their mere excrescence

aspect as things in time, the latter is a in the system,

and

for

any reason that appears, might

If thinking things under not a necessary stage in the process towards true knowledge, there is no reason why th

have been omitted the form of time

altogether.

is

mind should not have

started at once

which nothing

of view in

is

illusory,

from the point and in which

eternal realities are immediately apprehended. Spinoza contrasts reason and imagination, the point of view in

which things are regarded as independent realities, and the point of view in which they are seen in the light of the idea of God, or under the form of eternity. But he makes no attempt to show the relation between the lower and the higher point of view. He simply proBotmoee Hie former to be false and illusory, and the latter to be an attitude of mind in which lihe former is .

But i^Jhggjg^ay,

or left behind.

I

it

may be

determination

lX^^ in time, not merely empirically precedes, but is $i!eHappostiion of their determination under ft

r

te

fom ot efemity ! 1

Is

*

.

t'. 1'..

not possible to discern that

'

" t

it

i..

itutll'"

j.

,

1 .V

J

*.

'./

.1

'

.

.

,

,

.

Time

Illusion of

295

the rise from imaginative to rational knowledge* is not I an accident in the history of thought, but a necessary! step in the process by which a self-conscious intelli-f

gence realises

itself

and

its

own

an^wexjo_ this questiojg^maj

inherent wealth ? Thej be said to be involved in|

^Ll^X-J^ura ^l^jf^SgE06 agination to reason

is

-

The

relation of im-

simply the relation/ miaodern,

of consciousness^}*) self-consciousness. The consciousness of self implies relation to objects which are opposed to self, and yet which, as related to self,

lanjujtge,

form a necessary element of its life. It is only by the presentation to itself of an external world i.e., of a world conceived of under the forms of externality

that

mind

or intelligence can, by the relating or reclaiming of that world to itself, become conscious of its own latent

content

Thought, in other words, is no^ a_restinc a process, a life, of which j&e_xer< but identity, essence is ceaseless activity, or movement from unifr to d^eiencejjaTfeOT^j^^^ce by brooding on itself in some

to jndty.

pure,

It is

no

supersensuou

sphere of untroubled spirituality, but by j^wpjdd that, in the first instance, is outside o

into

and foreign

to

itself,

and of which the constitaen

elements in their self-externality ha space and succession in time, are the contradiction of its own inheren unity,

and then by the recognition of that world as no

really foreign or

independent or discordant, but in

real or essential nature related to is

it*

and

by t^^

and integration that SBlf-conscious in ^i^f^Mtm telligence ceases to be a lifeless abstraction, and becomes a concrete reality. But if this be so, the differentiat

of differentiation -**~^"''

'-~*^

A

296

Spinoza.

is presupposed in the integrating, the world of imagination is no longer a mere illusion which somehow the mind outlives, a dream from which it

mg movement

awakes, but a necessary step in the

subjective deception objectivity which it posit, and transcend. j

I

life of spirit

Time

in its progress to higher things.

is

and

not a mere

which passes away, but a^forin

of

the very essence of spirit to It is only by the affirmation and

is of

negation of time that we can rise to the contemplation The eternal life of^jhings under the form of eternity.

not that which abstracts from the temporal, but that which contains while it annuls it. 5. The most important question as to Spinoza's doc[trine of immortality still remains, and that is the quesis

tion,

not whether the individual

mind can

in any

way

be said to survive the body, but whether ^jn ,,Jheir there can be said to be any relationjbo^j&od jiirvival jjeal

The view which we take of man's nature and must be based on a corresponding view implies Whatever independence we of the nature of God. ascribe to the finite involves as its correlate an idea of the infinite which admits of and is the ground of either.

of

that independence.

-Does

Spinoza's

idea

of

Gpd

admit of and furmsj^ajbasis for Ms^doctnne ofInhuman freedom and immortality ] The peculiarity of the view _

and destiny which we have now exjust at the point where the limit between the finite and infinite vanishes, and where

of man's nature

plained

is

that

indeed there

is

that the finite .

K.

\

it is

the strongest reassertion of the doctrine and is conceived only through the in-

is

^fbifo, that instead of being suppressed or indistrnguish-

ably

t*ke finite

mind

is *

represented as "

'

'

.

A,

atfcain-

Individuality not oWiteratedr

t

and activity.* "The Ing the most complete individuality the eternal part of the mind is understanding through

which alone we shown to perish

^

we

are said to

(

*

which we have * the imagination through which only 1 The state which constipassive."

are said to act, the part

*'

is

"be

supreme or eternal destiny of man is not of absolute unity with God, but that in that simply which man attains to the consciousness of that unity, tutes the

and in which the

between

distinction

adequate and

I

is fitted

to

know

and God is "The mind as

itself

not only not obliterated but intensified. eternal has a knowledge of God which

* *

is necessarily those things which*' and the more potent *

all

. follow from this knowledge, ^ one becomes in this kind of knowledge, the more * 2 completely is he conscious of himself and of God." .

.

!any maximum Not only

is it

a state in which the mind has attained

the

of self-originated activity,

ne^r^^oS^" if joy

and therefore

but with^the con-

highest individual perfection, sciousness of this comesjilsojh^

its

consists in the transition to a greater

assuredly blessedness must consist in the "Het mind being endowed with -perfection itself. 773 who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to 1 the highest human perfection, and therefore is affected^ * by the highest joy, and that a joy which is accompanied 4 of own virtue." his Finally, by the idea of himself and

perfection,

!

all

these elements of individual perfection

activity, '

self

summed up "

I i

designates 1

-

in that attitude of

*

~ in^lle^|u^Jove,"

Etli. v. 40, cor.

s Etti. v. 33, schol.

i

self

consciousness,

*

-

freedom,

determination

are

mind which Spinoza

which he defines as "joy

3 Efck. v. 31, 4 Efch. v. 27,

dem. and dem.

cor.

298

Spinoza.

*

or delight accompanied

by the idea

therefore

of

by the idea

God

of one's self,

as its cause/'

and

1

Th<| per-

human nature, in other words, is a state of blessedness in which the consciousness of sell is not lost fection of

in God, but actually based

Can we any room

The answer must be, .of man $ God on which Spinoza's whole system

and destiny

that the

idea of

is osten-

sibly based is one }

on the CQnsciousnm,jof^od-

find in Spinoza's idea of the divine nature or ground for this conception of the nature

reality or

which involves the denial

independence to the

finite.

It

is

of

any

by negation

of all individual finite things that that idea is reached.

by abstracting from all distinctions material and mental, and even from the distinction of matter and mind itself, that we attain to that pure, indeterminate It is

unity, that colourless, moveless abstraction of substance

which

is

Spinoza's formal conception of the nature of

God.

But

this

though formally

God on which

is

Spinoza's system

S & principle which nite

\YJ^^-^gkt

woulc^

which "an infimust necessarily and from the adequate knowledge of which the

number

follow,"

not really the idea of rests.

the WjDrJxJ^from of things in infinite ways

mind could proceed

to the adequate knowledge of the nature of things*" 2 And though the idea of God which he formulates does not constitute such a principle, yet

in the course of his speculations we find that idea undergoing various modifications which, if carried out to their logical results,

would have involved the complete recon-

siraeiicL of ids philosophy. iL 40, sch.

&

Immortality and Idea of God. (1.)

His constant use of the phrase guatenus

299 is

really

an

acknowledgment of the inadequacy of the premiss it is introduced to qualify an exgedknt, in jother words, for surreffiousl reachin results

The

_

which is conceived would he tampered with if existence could he regarded as an expression infinitude

of as pure indetermination

any

finite

of

the essential nature

of

God;

content with a barren infinitude

yet

is

Spinoza

not

an infinitude which

and man unaccounted for. Hence the " The frequent recurrence of such expressions as these : idea of an individual thing actually existing has God for

leaves nature

its cause,

He

not in so far as

He

is infinite,

hut in so far as

regarded as affected hy another idea of an individ" ual thing, &c. ; 1 " God has this or that idea, not in so is

He

far as

is infinite,

but in so far as

He

is

expressed

human mind or constitutes the by " essence of the human mind ; 2 " The intellectual love of the mind toward God is the very love with which the nature of the

He so

loves Himself, not in so

human The is

far as

He

is infinite,

but in

He

can be expressed by the essence of the mind conceived under the form of eternity." 3

far as

infinite

can never be expressed by a nature which

nothing but the negation of the

infinite.

Tet

this

inevitable conclusion Spinoza will not let himself acThe whole moral use and value of his knowledge.

philosophy would vanish

and end

if

man

of his being in

origin contained, self-identical infinite isolation

mind. i

could not find the

God, and so the self-, must break through its

and reveal itself in the essence of the human on what philosophical ground this rev-

How or Eth.

ii. 9.

s

Eth. ii.ll, cor.

*

BBu v.

36.

Spinoza.

$ elation* is

to be conceived Spinoza does not attempt explain; but to speak of "God in so far as He is expressed by the human mind," or of the human mind as surviving in its individuality " in so far as God can be expressed by its essence under the form of

1

to

eternity,"

would be

to

employ words without meaning

" in so far " did not point to something positive and real in the nature of God. To say that a thing ! exists or survives in so far as the divine idea is exif this

pressed in it, would be absurd if Spinoza believed that the The everdivine idea did not express itself in it at all

I

\

recurring phrase must have been to its author something more than a transparent artifice or a petitio principii. (2.)

of

.whose !

S

Whilst Spinoza

God

as a being

essence

who

rejects the

acts

contains

anthropomorphic idea on nature from without or

arbitrary

elements after

analogy of man's imperfect thought c

An

IHi!S2:^^ is

'.absolute

and

a dead'

ammoveless

will,

the

hejet

indeterminate

absolute.

Whilst

iGod's activity cannot proceed from any external cause or constraint, but must be the expression of an internal necessity, yet

"

He

The omnipotence

is essentially

and eternally

active.

God

has been from eternity actual, and will to eternity remain in the same actuality." 1 "From God's supreme power or infinite nature an infinite

things

of

nimiber of things in infinite ways that is, all -have necessarily flowed forth." 2 And this con-

ception of the essential productive activity of the divine nature is based on the principle that the more reality a

thing has, the more properties follow therefrom, and therefore the infinite nature "has absolutely infinite *

JBQi.

i.

17, BCh.

2 Ibid.

"

Self-Consciousness of

G-ocl.

which each expresses infinite The infinite which is the negation o: properties or determinations thus becomes the infinite which has an infinite number of properties or deterattributes, of

own

kind."

1

-

minations. (3.)

It is true indeed, as

we

formerly saw, that the

which Spinoza^ascriBes to God he is compelled by stress of logic to remove from the nature -., ,.., ,,... ^ .^^i-"*-of Godj> Jubstance, absolutely viewed, and to regard as! having an existence only relatively to fei^mtelligei They are not distinctions which pertain to the divinef/ properties or attributes

"--

-"*..-.-,

essence as

.....,,

in

it is

:,:,-*.

..

itself,

but

._...,,,,,..,.,.,,.-'"

"

"

onjv^disjinctions^

understanding perceives as constituting that^ essence.'' or They"o!onot exist, ^ in otlier words, for ^^ff^' ^^through God's t the butjor^or through^^ Yet, it is to be observed that there are in"

dications that,

him the

however

illogically,

significance of absolute

tions in the divine nature

the

human but

4

!

1

;

the attributes had for

and not

and

relative distinc-

further, that

it

is

not

the divine intelligence in and for wliich

he conceived them to

exist.

"By

God," says he,

2

that is, "I understand a being absolutely infinite Substance consisting of infinite attributes of which each expresses eternal and infinite essence:" "By attri-

butes of

God

the essence

is

of

to be understood that

which expresses

the divine Substance."

3

"The

attri-

God which

express His eternal essence, express at the same time His eternal existenca" 4 Further, as

butes of

we have

though in his formal docfeine Spinoza on a level with extension and all other places thought seen,

iEth.i.16, dem. 3 Eh. i. 19, dem.

2

1&.

*

BH). i 20, dem.

L,

del

6.

Spinoza.

302 |>ossibl

attributes, lie really ascribes to the

exist for

some

former an more and It comprehensive ^function. Altogether higher in man for which both exten|s thought or intelligence ion and thought exist; and as all other possible attributes intelligence, not only are the infinitude of

accompanied each by a parallel attribute of of them exist for thought. thought, but each and all number of intelligences an infinite of In this conception attributes

which the attributes of God

exist, Spinoza is hoverthe of an infinite intelligence idea of brink the on ing as not an attribute or distinction outwardly ascribed to

for

God, but the principle of distinction in the divine essence from which all attributes or distinctions fiow. BuJJba this. further still than goes ?SsiSS-JsJ^JigSce is for _

him not merely the aggregate of an

indefinite

number

of

mindSj it^^^mfinite^^ui^a truer sense. For, as have attempted to show, the conception of "the

finite

we

absolutely infinite intellect/' as

one of what

Spinoza simply a device by which he is pnconsciously seeking to introduce into the idea of God that element of activity which neither his abstract terns " infinite modes/'

is

abstanee nor even its attributes contain, e

^egulf

-

Jbe.

iJiSS^SSL^

]^^,^^dient which,

ostensibly without

^ the indeterminateness of the absolute substance,

8K^^ into

of

it,

in

othear

words,

sdf-
^^22^ self-determination,

303

CONCLUSION

1

.

THE

last word of Spinoza's philosophy seems to be. the contradiction of the first. Tot only does he often fluc-

tuate "between principles radically irreconcilable, but he seems to reassert at the close of his speculations what he

had denied at the beginning. The indeterminate mi finite, which is the negation of the finite, becomes the infinite, which necessarily expresses itself in the finite^ and which contains in it, as an essential element, the} idea of the human mind under the form of eternity. The all-absorbing, lifeless substance becomes the God who knows and loves Himself and man with an infinite

'

'*/

;

*

1

" intellectual love." of the

human mind

On

the other hand, the conception an evanescent mode of the

as but

whose independent existence is an can become one with God only by and which illusion, be to distinguishable from God, yields to that ceasing of a nature endowed with indestructible" individuality,

infinite substance,

capable of knowing both itself and God, and which, in becoming one with God, attains to its own conscious The freedom of man, which perfection and blessedness. rejected as but the illusion of a being who is unconscious of the conditions under which, in body and mind, he is fast bound in the toils of an inevitable neces-

is at first

L/ /^*;

/

304

Spinoza.

*

the essential prerogative of a nature knowing itself through the infinite, is no The doctrine of a longer subjected to finite limitations. final cause or Ideal end of existence, which was excluded sity, istsceasserted as

which, as

as impossible in a is

world in which

all

that

is,

and as

it is,

given along with the necessary existence of God,

restored in the conception of the

is

human mind

as having in it, in its rudest experience, the implicit consciousness of an infinite ideal, which, through reason and intuitive

knowledge,

ffeet,

capable of realising, and of the realisaAt tjje^oiitactual life' is the process.

it is

which

tion of

its

we seem

in one word,

to have a paj^l^ej^tic_unity in

and man, all the manifold existences of Jjje j|vhich nature iite world, are swajlowed up ; at^ the olpse, an infinite jiconscious mind, in which

all finite

thought jmd. being

id their reality and explanation. Is it possible to harmonise these opposite aspects of ,,jft>wwa!^w^ ,

Spinoza's system, and to free it from the inherent weakCan we make him ness which they seem to involve ?

many of his interpreters have done, only by emphasising one side or aspect of his teaching, and ignoring or explaining away all that seems to conself-consistent, as

flict

with

it

by clearing it of all individualistic

elements,

an uncompromising pantheism, or the pantheistic element as mere scholastic by eliminating In to find in it an anticipation of order surplusage, so as to reduce

it to

modern individualism and empiricism ? The answer is, that though "Spinoza's philosophy cannot, in the form in which he present* it, be freed from inconsistency, yet inuxsh^

sophy of a

later

tiraeJiajM^

Negation and He-assertion of the Finite.

30|>

embrace in one system ideas which in him seem to be There is a point of view which he at mos" ^^gpjo^tic. only vaguely foreshadowed, in which it is possible to maintain (1) at once the nothingness of the finite world before

God and

its reality

in and through God, and

the idea of an infinite unity transcending all differences which nevertheless expresses itself in nature and man in all the manifold differences of

finite

thought andl

being. 1.

The negation

to the idea of

of the finite

God is,

by which Spinoza

in one sense,

rises

an elejnBm^ wjucli enl

ters into the essence of aUjsj^itualJife.

But when w|

consider the twofold aspect in which Spinoza himself that, on the one represents this negative movement,

hand, which is involved in the principle that all determination is negation; and that, on the other hand,

which

is

involved in the rise of the

human mind from

the lower to the higher stages of knowledge, we can discern in his teaching an approximation to the idea of a

tion

affirm;

|g^^^ in other words, of that

ciation^

which

is

the condition of self-

the intellectualj _jhje_mor^ of the is the condition

Ii

Scientific

mteJk^u^._Hfe. knowledge is the revelation to or in my conscl of a system of unalterable relations, a world j)fj)"bjec^ ijje_reanties which I_can neither jmAe_n^^ and which only he who abnegates his individual fancier and opinions can IpDrehend ; and jtHJ^owledge on the tacit^jDj^^p^srlioli ofafli^^sptojfctr^^i o: which is^tnTmeasure of mdividual opinion reason,

which cannot be questioned without p.

XIL

self-contradiction,

306

Spinoza.

*

.

whiehin our very and to which in

and \meertainties we assume,

dou"bts its

every

movement the

gence must surrender itself. The which I can live only by ceasing

my own thoughts, ;hought that pertains to

&ink

finite intelli-

intejllecjual

one

life is

assertm^self or to

to

by cxueiimg^Tdsu5p ressuio

me

as this particular^self,

a^

and

an intelligencffTEES is universal Yet the negation of which we thus speak

identifying myself with

md :s

absolute.

The

not an absolute negation.

finite intelligence is

lot absorbed or lost in the infinite to

which

it

surrenders

Surjender_ or subjection to absolute truth is n,o, t the extinction of the finite mind, but the realisation of itself.

,

The

sJtrxigLnfe. life

life of

absolute truth or reason is not

that is foreign to us, but one in

our own.

The armujjing

froinjor opposed to

it, is

of

jmy

which we come

life

that

to

is ^separate

the j^uic^

^oj^

Here, denial of any reality to the finite in the face of the infinite, with his reassertion of its reality in and through the infinite.

too, it is possible to reconcile

For

j

Spinoza

inndlife ofnan netion

s

s

The

^

that of the individual regarded as a being of natural tendencies, of impulses* instincts, appetites natural life

is

which look to nothing beyond their immediate

Mm

satisfac-

and seem to point to no other end than his own private plea&um But man never is a mfgrje individual, or, in a particular self, and J^^^^^sjon^are^lj&is sense^ tion.

tiiey

They

pertain to

as this particular self,

The Moral and Religi&m

attainment of their immediate objects

comgKte

He

satisfaction.

is

nevfr their

has, so to speak, not only

but to satisfy himself

to satisfy tfiem,

he has thus

307

Life,

own

to satisfy is not his

and the

;

seljf

individuality as

af

being separate from others, but a self which is developed in him, justmj^ogortion.as he makes himself an jnstruf inent to the

life. _of

essgice of^ _a_

mc^Jbei^g

others.

.

tg>

,

it

is

of the very!;

JseJiimselfL he jniisi!

Shut up within the limits of

himself.

^jcoOTeJihan

Hence

that,

purely isolated satisfactions, infinitely the larger part off his nature remains undeveloped. To realise the capaci^ ties of his

the

own

being he must take jipjntp it the life oj of the social It is in proorganism.

o^^menibers

portion to tiiejiee^riin^ life grows richer and fuller

thatjns

and perfection

which

of himself with a life

But if

be

;

and its ideal purity

are conceivable only as the identification is

universal and infinite!

then the higher or spiritual life implies of the lower or natural, life. It is imposthe^Lej^tipn sible to lead at the same time a life that is merely particular

this

and a

so,

life

that

universal, to be at once

is

bounded

individual impulses, and giving free play to capacities that are virtually limitless. In ^heveijjact of livin

by

intellectual

involves the abandonment of

thought that is merely our own, so the moral life involves the abnegation of all desire, volition, action that begins and ends with the

will of the individual

all

self.

Lastly,, the r^li^pus

life isA ,above.all^

thaijjiich, cjm-

fojcnDy3^

For

if

true religion

is

not the appeasing of an alien it for the attainment of our

power, or the propitiating of

308

Spinoza.

own

emds, neither can

finite

it

before the infinite.

be the mere prostration of the With Spinoza we can discern

involves the negation of all that pertains to the "a part of nature " ; and yet admit the justice of his condemnation of asceticism as a tristis et tofva superstitio, and of his assertion that joy is itself that

it

individual as

a progress to a greater perfection. "We can see a meaning in the doctrine that finite beings have no existence save as vanishing modes of the divine substance, and at the same time in the seemingly contradictory doctrine that the self-affirming impulse,

essence of the finite, reaches

which

is

the very

hi^h^st^acM^ can perceive, in one word, lute union with J^od. bow the negation of the finite before God, may be the its_

We

beginning of a process which ends with the reaffirmatioji of the finite in 2.

finite

and through God. negation and reaffirmation of the

Finally, this

through the

infinite

involves a

correlative con-

ception of the divine nature which harmonises elements The unit that in Spinoza appear to be irreconcilable.

whkh transcends and the unity which comgreh^ the differences of the finite world; the God who Kt

is

at

once absolutely undetermined and infinitely determined,

beyond

whom

is

no

reality,

yet from

whom

an

number of things in infinite ways necessarily who must be conceived of as the negation thought and being, yet whoesgix^^

^ point of f

';'

infinite

proceeds, of finite

there any

view from which ideas so discordant can be

hapaonised 1 Can thought compass a conception which wiH read a meaning at once into the featureless, moveless '.infinite

whose

eternal repose

no breath of living

,

Idea of God.

309 *

;hought or feeling can disturb, and into the infinite, rvho knows and loves Himself in His creatures with an " " nfinite intellectual love ThejixsiYer is, that what, *

^^mom was

feeling after through alH/hese contradictory/ he found in the conception of God as]

expressions, is to

For when we examine what

ibsoiute Spirit. ception means,

we

this con-

shall find that it includes at once

what

Spinoza sought in the unity which li^ ninatiqns and injhe iij which is itself thesource p ill the determinations of the finite world.

nust rest on the presupposition of the ultimate unity of in other words, that onjbhigrm^ciple3

Pr

no^el^mejit ce is he_^intelligible

which in

its hard., irredu-

mcapahle ^of, heing embmcedjn .,.

totality or sy s.teiipL of Jiangs. .

,

All the

nanifold distinctions of things and thoughts must be so conceived of as to be capable of being

^wM-e

capable, that

is,

in

the^utmost ^

Liversity that can be ascribed to them, of being broudit ^=*******^' -

>ack to unity. ,theistic,

______

T "Tj""""T fc

_

All philosophy, moreover, which

is

not

must find^that jiMmate^uj^

xod^ "Without rending the universe and falling into lualism, whatever reaHj^ and miiidep^.de^c^^ na that^reality but must not be pressed s^^ ieyond the point at which it is still consistent with the elation of aE things to God. To say that God is abso-f ately infinite, is to say that in His nature must be con-i ained a reason for the existence of the finite world, I nd also that nothing in the finite world can have or I etain

any existence or

reality that is outside of

Godl

310

Spinoza.

What

this

|a

is

implies

I

unity which

an idea

t|n all the Distinctions

of the

one idea which perfectly of

God

as

of the

natu^of J*od

maintains and

reveals, yet

finite world.

Itfow the

condition

fulfils this

as

realises, itself

is

that

infinite,

have we a unity whose thought or self-consciousness nature it is to he infinitely determined, jet which in ;aU its determinations never goes beyond itself, hut in jail this multiplicity and variety is only _and everjrejl-

;

,

jasing_

itself.

Of this_junitj_we find the type, though

ojdyjie imperfect type, in^pur own, minds. The philc sophic interpretation of the world may he said to yhe

application to nature

and

man

whose action we are conversant in

ojt

a principle wit]

pji

It is of the very nature of thought to reveal itself, to

give itself objectivity, to discover to itself its herent wealth by j^ingjg^^ to,

own

in-

and in one sense external and foreign to itself, igence is no abstract, self-contained identity,

its whole reality in its own self-included being. consciousness that is_ conscious of^ nothing, a thinking subject which opposes to itself no external object,

having

A

a mere blank, an abstracUo^w^ Without a world of objects in time and

is

space, without

other kindred intelligences, without society and hiswitikout the ever-moving mirror of the external , oonseiousness

never

could

exist,

mind

could

from the slumberjrf jmcoBsciousness and

But of mJTid in

aU

|t

is

also of

the very

this endless objectivity to main-

that thinks is never borne ole

loM

lo>

itself

and

its

own

oneness

away

in the-

f

God ami

the World.

It

objects of its thought

is

311

the one constant in their;

ever-changing succession, the indivisible unity whose pres-t ence to them reclaims them from chaos. Eut further, itself

iJnaotM}^ tibB^pbiects it contemplates.

If

it

begins

movement

They

by opposing the world

is to retract

in_ad,tl3i^pugh

are its

own

objects.

to itself, its

the opposition, to

next

annul the

seeming foreignness, to ^sdLi^^J^^^D* K"-nfvwlgdgft| a revelation, not simply of the world to the observ-f]

is

ThosW ing mind, but of the observing mincl to itself. unchangeable relations which we call laws of nature arej nothing foreign to thought- they are rational or intelligible

grasps

discoveries to the intelligence thatj of a realm that is its own, of which in the

relations,

them

very act of apprehending them And still more do our_ soda

community, the

state,

become

it

comes into possession. ^

to us a revelation of pur-/

sejy^, a reflation of a life which, though in one sense! other and larger than our own, is still our own. Thus!

knowledge

by

first

is

a

mind

of that self-externality which is thought's attitude towards the outward world, and a

the

selJ^eaMon or sciousness, in

realUisation of

its

other words,

exlSmality realises itself or Itfow the prmdple^with whose ^action in thus cpnverjant is one

not simply a^licable, ~ our

own

is

the

essential characterlsffc^oTspint as to JSO

SS^S^^^y

wSi

312

Spinoza.

To conc%ive would be

God as an abstract, self-identical infinite make Him not greater but less than finite

of

to

intelligence

less

by

all

that spiritual wealth which

is

The

involved in our relations to nature and man.

or merely quantitative infinite excludes the consciousness of any existence other than itself. It " can remain " secure of itself only by the reduction of

abstract

all finite

But the

thought and being to unreality and infinitude

which

is

preserved only

illusion.

by the

ab-

solute negation of the finite world is a barren infinitude. Its greatness is the greatness of a i

the greatness which is attained by leaving out from it all those elements of life and thought and love which constitute the wealth of

sen-consciousness, whilst

it

contains in

relation to a finite world, is not limited 5

For in so conceiving of

we

it,

On

a spiritual nature.

other hand, an infinite whose essence

as

we have

ascribe to it is a limitation

the

is

intelligence or

it

the necessity of

by that

necessity.

seen, the limitation

which

is

the

medium

of

I

its is,

own

no

a going forth, from itself .wJiich or but loss, ojjjy^a .step in the Drocess by lessening self-realisation

which

it

being,

""l/Ti^^

returns^

uon

itself

in

a,

completejMness j)f

n 24lire

and man are neither ^severed from God nor

The ;>f

jrej&fcy, is

lost in

God,

e^ternal^world,

endowed__with that hj^iest__realitj which that from the lowest^mojganicjm.aiter

and that science partially discloses,

of nature

MeaMjgjtfy which art> by

creations, foreshadows, is only

its

which

imaginative

then clearly apprehended

313

Infinite, Spirit.

when we

recognise

it

as

thejunj^

^^5S

oe fof^k ? world in a that existi of jelf^xtermlity t^ejatmost jBige under the conditions of space and time, yet in all thi

j^^one^^

man^oj^obie^ivitjreiigms^ev^ onejn^jtedf. all,

in the light of this idea of

can seejbiow

which yet

medium

is

God

Abovi

as infinite Spirit

we

man hj^a^j3ei^ (

no

limit to the nature of

of its complete manifestation.

communication of

God, but the only For only in thj

its.

in the lull sense of the word tliejcejwhat can_be termed, a revelation of the Being whose nature^is_^Qu^Ltj

Only in its relation to finite intelligence do removed from that twofold movement tha goings forth from itself and, return upon itelf which is the very life of infinite Spirit. Only Jin jnan does th

lorn.

see the veil

divine Spirit go forth from itself; for whjttJSocl Jgves

Thought, indeed, in us

is

limited in this sense,

that the knowable world exists independently of our knowledge of it, and that there are boundless possibilities of

knowledge which for us have not become actual ;

bri

in^^^e^^ci^that Jhought or self-consciousness can be limited

bynojk^

conceivable advance in knowledge is qnJj^reaHsai^ojL^ that the very consciousness of our limits

k ere^^EEaTWT^wlddbjtonsceadsJ^^n

tlyyDr^dLJ^^

LJ^L^sSssfes^j^siajsii^^ Yet in

this

communication of Himself to

man there is no

outflow from the infinite source which does not return

314

Spinoza.

upon rteelf. "Without .life in the life of otlj^rs spirit would not be truly spirit. In jpisiual JKfe, grving^and and _ receiving, loss and gain, self-surrender^ ment are ideas which implicate and pass^into ea< Infinite intelligence is not limited

existence of teristic of

finite, for, as

we have

the latter that to realise

but

itself it nrast

feself.

To renounce every thought and

nerely

its

he

fulfilled

by the

seen, it is the charac-

abnegate

volition that is

own, to become the transparent medium of and will, to be conscious of its dis-

infinite rnind

iinction

from God only that it

may return into

indivisible

tM^Js^ts^or^^ inity with God For this self-abnegation, rightly interpreted, eaKsatjon. is

not the subjugation of the finiteintelligence to an out-

ward and absolute authority, but when the tjij>ught and will to_which :

.

tsl^gnised

as

its

it

surrende^J^lf

own -JMMa^^S^Q^922 ^ that speak in

and the

to

its

>

"when

thought,

dictates of tiie ^

far as this ideal is realised it

may be

^s

so

said that in the

utmost activity of the spiritual life in man God never through the charmed circle of His own infinitude,

His own knowledge His own love that comes '^^kryD^ ^^ffl^^jmig^.

is

to

It is not the finite as

God knows and loves* nor the finite as which seeks to be known and loyed, but the which is transfigured with an infinite .element, the that is not a thing of time, but that is and knows Taiidai the form 6f eternity. We have hare a point

""which lite

{finite

|finite :

Unity of Infinite and Finite. of

315

view in which, the contradictions under which Sfpinoza's

thought seems ever to labour can "be regarded as the accidents of an unconscious struggle after a deeper principle in which, they are solved and harmonised. In the light of that principle we can speak with him, of an indeterminate and infinite unity in which, all finite distinctions lose themselves,

and with him we can

see that therejs

?J!!^

7^5L.^?7?

^!SLnotj^

We

S

^^"

return,

(

can discern at the same time a profound meaning

in those apparently mystical utterances in which he seems " G-od to gather up the final result of his speculation " " God love loves Himself with an infinite intellectual ; in so far as

He

loves Himself loves

lectual love of the

love wherewith to

man and

God

mind

to

God

is

loves Himself ;

the intellectual love of

and the same."

man

" " ;

the intel-

part of the infinite " " the love of God

man

to

God ,

33

are one ,

&