The European Union at the United Nations: The Functioning and Coherence of EU External Representation in a State-centric Environment

The European Union at the United Nations

Studies in EU External Relations Edited by

Marc Maresceau Ghent University Editorial Board

Marise Cremona, European University Institute Günter Burghardt, former EU ambassador Washington Alan Dashwood, University of Cambridge Frank Hoffmeister, European Commission Pieter Jan Kuyper, University of Amsterdam

VOLUME 1

The European Union at the United Nations The Functioning and Coherence of EU External Representation in a State-centric Environment

By

Maximilian B. Rasch

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2008

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rasch, Maximilian B. The European Union at the United Nations : the functioning and coherence of EU external representation in a state-centric environment / by Maximilian B. Rasch. p. cm. — (Studies in EU external relations, ISSN 1875-0451 ; v. 1) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-16714-8 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. United Nations—European Union countries. 2. European Union. 3. International cooperation. 4. International relations. I. Title. JZ4997.5.E87R37 2008 341.23—dc22 2008011213

ISSN 1875-0451 ISBN 978 90 04 16714 8 Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

To my wife Saskia

CONTENTS List of Figures ............................................................................. List of Tables .............................................................................. Acronyms and Abbreviations ...................................................... Acknowledgements .....................................................................

xiii xvii xix xxi

Introduction ................................................................................ Literature Review .......................................................................

1 13

PART ONE

THE EUROPEAN UNION’S REPRESENTATION AT THE UN IN NEW YORK Chapter One: The EU at the UN—the Coordination Process: Actors and Mechanisms .........................................................

23

Chapter Two: The EU Factor in the Coordination Process ..... The EU Factor Part One —the New York Dimension ...................... The EU Factor Part Two —the Brussels Dimension .......................

95 95 120

Chapter Three: Functioning of the CFSP in Specific UN Bodies ...............................................................................

135

Chapter Four: External Factors Changing the Basis of EU Cooperation .....................................................................

191

PART TWO

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF EU VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY Coherence of EU Member States’ Decision-making—Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly: Introduction and Methodological Considerations ..............................................

205

viii

contents

Chapter Five: Voting Coherence of the EU as a Group ..........

219

Chapter Six: Inside Europe: Voting Coherence Within the EU and With Other European Countries .............................

255

Conclusions .................................................................................

301

ANNEX 1: List of Interviews ....................................................

317

ANNEX 2: Statistics on Voting Coherence ...............................

318

Bibliography ................................................................................

329

Index ...........................................................................................

349

DETAILED CONTENTS List of Figures ............................................................................. List of Tables .............................................................................. Acronyms and Abbreviations ...................................................... Acknowledgements .....................................................................

xiii xvii xix xxi

Introduction ................................................................................ Literature Review .......................................................................

1 13

PART ONE

THE EUROPEAN UNION’S REPRESENTATION AT THE UN IN NEW YORK Chapter One: The EU at the UN—the Coordination Process: Actors and Mechanisms ......................................................... 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4

Introduction: ‘Let’s Unite. And the World Will Listen to Us’ . .................................................................. Role of the EU Presidency ............................................ The Role of the EU Member States—National Interests as the Basis of EU Coordination ..................... The EU Coordination Process in New York .................. 1.4.1 General Overview ............................................. 1.4.2 Meetings on Specific Issue Areas: Experts Level ..................................................... • Institutional and Thematic Subdivision in Accordance With the UN’s Organisational Structure ......................................................... • EU Internal Regulations: Article 19 Meetings on UN Security Council Issues ............................................................... 1.4.3 Meetings on the Whole Range of UN Issues: HoMs and DPRs Meetings ............................... • HoMs Meetings ............................................... • DPRs Meetings ...............................................

23 23 35 47 59 59 74 74 78 86 86 92

x

detailed contents

Chapter Two: The EU Factor in the Coordination Process .....

95

The EU Factor Part One —the New York Dimension ...................... 2.1 Role of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN ....................................................................... 2.2 Role of the Delegation of the European Commission to the UN ....................................................................... 2.3 Towards a Single EU Representation—Cooperation Between DECUN and NYLO ....................................... 2.4 Troika Meetings .............................................................

95 95 105 114 116

The EU Factor Part Two —the Brussels Dimension ........................ 2.5 Influence from Brussels-based Intergovernmental Bodies ............................................................................. • European Council ...................................................... • Council of Ministers ................................................... • COREPER and PSC ................................................. • Council Working Groups ............................................ • European Parliament ..................................................

120 123 124 126 127 132

Chapter Three: Functioning of the CFSP in Specific UN Bodies ...............................................................................

135

3.1

3.2

The EU in the UN General Assembly ........................... 3.1.1 Introduction . ...................................................... 3.1.2 The EU in the UN General Assembly ............... 3.1.3 The Six UNGA Main Committees .................... 3.1.3.1 The First UNGA Main Committee on Disarmament and International Security—the Confrontational Type of UNGA Committees .............. 3.1.3.2 The Second UNGA Main Committee on Economic and Financial Questions as an Example for the Consensus-oriented Category of UNGA Committees ............................ The EU in the UN Security Council: Cooperation Attempts and Reform Disputes ...................................... • Overview .................................................................... • The Status Quo of CFSP Within the UNSC ................ • UNSC Reform—EU Internal Power Politics Illustrated .......................................................................

120

135 135 140 143

146

157 169 169 171 183

detailed contents Chapter Four: External Factors Changing the Basis of EU Cooperation ..................................................................... 4.1 4.2

EU Enlargement: Cooperation with Associated and Acceding Countries at the UN ....................................... The Way Ahead: Implications of the EU Reform Treaty for the EU at the UN ..........................................

xi 191 191 196

PART TWO

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF EU VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY Coherence of EU Member States’ Decision-making—Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly: Introduction and Methodological Considerations ..............................................

205

Chapter Five: Voting Coherence of the EU as a Group ..........

219

5.1 5.2

5.3

Overall Voting Coherence ............................................. Voting Coherence of the EC/EU MS by Issue Areas ..................................................................... 5.2.1 Issue Areas With High Levels of EC/EU Coherence: Middle East and Human Rights Questions ................................................ 5.2.1.1 Middle East ......................................... 5.2.1.2 Human Rights ..................................... 5.2.2 Issue Areas With Low Levels of EC/EU Coherence: Security and Decolonisation Questions ........................................................... 5.2.2.1 Disarmament and International Security ............................................... 5.2.2.2 Decolonisation and Self-determination ............................... Conclusions: EU Voting Coherence as a Group ...........

Chapter Six: Inside Europe: Voting Coherence Within the EU and With Other European Countries ............................. 6.1

The EU-25 ..................................................................... 6.1.1 Core Europe ....................................................... 6.1.2 The Main Dissenters ..........................................

219 232 235 235 238 242 242 246 250 255 255 256 262

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detailed contents 6.1.3 6.1.4

The Big 5 ........................................................... The Ten New EU MS ........................................ • Eastern European Countries (EU-8) .............. • Cyprus and Malta: The ‘Nonconformists’ ..... The Last Round of Enlargement: The EU-27 .............. EU Candidate Countries and Potential Candidate Countries: The EU-33 ................................................... Voting Behaviour by Issue Areas: EU Internal View ............................................................................. 6.4.1 Middle East ........................................................ 6.4.2 Human Rights .................................................... 6.4.3 International Security and Disarmament .......... 6.4.4 Decolonisation ................................................... Conclusions EU Internal Voting Analysis ......................

271 272 273 277 279

Conclusions .................................................................................

301

ANNEX 1: List of Interviews ....................................................

317

ANNEX 2: Statistics on Voting Coherence ...............................

318

Bibliography ................................................................................

329

Index ...........................................................................................

349

6.2 6.3 6.4

6.5

284 288 288 291 293 296 299

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Organisational Chart of the UN System ................. Figure 1.2: Depiction of CFSP Decision-taking Process Within the EU at the UN in New York ............................... Figure 1.3: Depiction of CFSP Decision-taking Process Within the EU at the UN in New York, Including EU Bodies ................................................................. Figure 1.4: Total Number of EU Coordination Meetings in New York, 1995–2005 .............................................. Figure 1.5: Seating Order in EU Coordination Meetings— Example of Seating Order During the Dutch Presidency, July to December 2004 .......................... Figure 1.6: Personnel Hierarchy in EU MS Missions to the UN .................................................................. Figure 1.7: Number of Article 19 Meetings, 2001–2005 ........... Figure 1.8: Number of HoMs Meetings, 1998–2005 ................ Figure 1.9: Number of DPRs Meetings, 1998–2005 ................. Figure 5.1: Coherence of EC/EU Voting in the UN General Assembly, 1988–2005 ................................................ Figure 5.2: Details EC/EU Split Votes in the UN General Assembly, 1988–2005 ................................................ Figure 5.3: Voting Coherence of Regional and Political Groups and Organisations in the UNGA, 1988–2005— EC/EU Compared With Arab League, ASEAN, CARICOM and ECOWAS ..................................... Figure 5.4: Voting Coherence of Regional and Political Groups and Organisations in the UNGA, 1988–2005 (Recorded Votes)—EC/EU Compared With OAU/AU, CIS, CoE and G8 ................................... Figure 5.5: EC/EU Voting Coherence on Middle East Questions, 1988–2005 .............................................. Figure 5.6: EC/EU Voting Coherence on Human Rights Questions, 1988–2005 .............................................. Figure 5.7: EC/EU Voting Coherence on Disarmament and Security, 1988–2005 ..................................................

26 33 34 61 69 73 82 88 93 220 223

227

230 237 240 244

xiv

list of figures

Figure 5.8: EC/EU Voting Coherence on Decolonisation and Self-determination, 1988–2005 ....................... Figure 5.9: EC/EU Voting by Issue Areas, 1988–2005— Overview and Comparison ..................................... Figure 6.1: Voting Coherence All EC/EU MS and EU-15, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.2: Voting Coherence All EC/EU MS and EU-25, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.3: Voting Coherence ‘Core Europe’, 1988–2005 ....... Figure 6.4: Luxembourgian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 ............................................... Figure 6.5: German Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 ............................................... Figure 6.6: Belgian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.7: Italian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.8: Cyprian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 ............................................... Figure 6.9: Maltese Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 ................................................. Figure 6.10: Cyprian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.11: Maltese Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.12: British Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.13: French Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.14: British Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.15: French Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.16: Voting Coherence EU-15 and EU-13, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.17: Greek Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.18: Greek Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.19: Voting Coherence ‘Big 5’, 1988–2005 ...................

249 252 256 257 258 259 260 261 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 269 270 271 272

list of figures Figure 6.20: Slovenian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1992–2005 ............................................... Figure 6.21: Polish Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.22: Voting Coherence EU-8, 1988–2005 ..................... Figure 6.23: Hungarian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1994–2005 ....................................................... Figure 6.24: Lithuanian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1994–2005 ....................................................... Figure 6.25: Voting Coherence EU-8 and EU-10, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.26: Cyprian-Maltese Voting Coherence, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.27: Voting Coherence EU-25 and EU-27, 1988–2005 ... Figure 6.28: Bulgarian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 ............................................... Figure 6.29: Romanian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 ............................................... Figure 6.30: Bulgarian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 ....................................................... Figure 6.31: Romanian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 ....................................................... Figure 6.32: Voting Coherence EU-33 and All EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 ............................................................... Figure 6.33: Croatian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1993–2005 ............................................... Figure 6.34: Croatian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1994–2005 ....................................................... Figure 6.35: Turkish and Macedonian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1993–2005 .................. Figure 6.36: Albanian, Bosnian and Serbian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1993–2005 .................. Figure 6.37: Voting Coherence in Middle East Questions, ‘Core Europe’, 1988–2005 ................................................ Figure 6.38: Voting Coherence in Middle East Questions, EU-13 and EU-15, 1988–2005 .............................. Figure 6.39: Voting Coherence in Middle East Questions, EU-10 and EU-8, 1988–2005 ................................. Figure 6.40: Voting Coherence in Middle East Questions, EU-27, 1988–2005 ..................................................

xv 273 274 275 276 276 278 279 280 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 290 291

xvi

list of figures

Figure 6.41: Voting Coherence in Human Rights Questions, ‘Core Europe’, 1988–2005 ..................................... Figure 6.42: Voting Coherence in Human Rights Questions, EU-13 and EU-15, 1988–2005 .............................. Figure 6.43: Voting Coherence in Human Rights Questions, EU-25 and EU-27, 1988–2005 ................................ Figure 6.44: Voting Coherence in Security and Disarmament, ‘Core Europe’, 1988–2005 ..................................... Figure 6.45: Voting Coherence in Security and Disarmament, EU-11, EU-13 and EU-15, 1988–2005 ................. Figure 6.46: Voting Coherence in Security and Disarmament, EU-25 and EU-27, 1988–2005 .............................. Figure 6.47: Voting Coherence in Decolonisation Issues, ‘Core Europe’, 1988–2005 ................................................ Figure 6.48: Voting Coherence in Decolonisation Issues, EU-13 and EU-15, 1988–2005 ............................................ Figure 6.49: Voting Coherence in Decolonisation Issues, EU-25 and EU-27, 1988–2005 ..........................................

292 292 294 294 295 296 297 298 298

LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1: EU Presidency Statements at UN Headquarters in New York, 2000–2005 .............................................. Table 1.2: EU Presidency Statements in the UNSC, 2000–2005 ................................................................ Table 1.3: European Commission Statements at UN Headquarters in New York, 2001–2005 .................. Table 1.4: Total Number of EU Coordination Meetings in New York, 1995–2005 .............................................. Table 1.5: EU Coordination Meetings First Semester ( January –June), 1995–2005 ...................................... Table 1.6: EU Coordination Meetings Second Semester ( July–December), 1995–2005 ................................... Table 2.1: Council Working Groups With UN Relevance ....... Table 3.1: Total of EU Presidency Statements in the UNGA and Its Main Committees, 2000–2005 .................... Table 3.2: EU Coordination Meetings Regarding the First Committee, 1998–2005 ............................................ Table 3.3: Troika Meetings on First Committee Issues, 1998–2005 ................................................................ Table 3.4: EU Coordination Meetings Regarding the Second Committee, 1998–2005 ............................................ Table 3.5: Joint EU Coordination Meetings by Second and Third Committee Experts, 1998–2005 .................... Table 3.6: Troika Meetings on Second Committee Issues, 1998–2005 ................................................................ Table 3.7: Membership of EU MS in the UNSC, 1993–2006 ... Table 3.8: EU Speeches in the UN Security Council, 2000–2006 ................................................................ Table M.1: Consensual Resolutions and Recorded Votes in the UNGA, 1988–2004 .................................................. Table 5.1: Overview EC/EU Voting Coherence, 1988–2005 .... Table 5.2: Details EC/EU Voting Coherence in the UN General Assembly, 1988–2005 ................................. Table 5.3: EC/EU Voting Coherence on Middle East Questions, 1988–2005 ..............................................

41 42 43 62 62 63 128 141 155 155 168 168 170 172 180 212 221 224 236

xviii

list of tables

Table 5.4: EC/EU Voting Coherence on Human Rights Questions, 1988–2005 ................................................ Table 5.5: Details EC/EU Voting Coherence on Disarmament and International Security, 1988–2005 ..................... Table 5.6: Details EC/EU Voting Coherence on Decolonisation and Self-determination, 1988–2005 .......................... Table 5.7: Details EC/EU Voting Coherence on Other Questions, 1988–2005 ................................................

239 243 247 251

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union CONUN Working Group ‘Coordination Nations Unies’ COREPER Comité des Répresentants Permanent (Committee of Permanent Representatives) COREU Correspondence Européenne DECUN Delegation of the European Commission to the United Nations in New York DPR Deputy Permanent Representative EC European Community(-ies) EP European Parliament EPC European Political Cooperation (instantly: European Political Community) ESDP European Security and Defence Policy EU European Union EU MS Member States of the European Union FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia G-77 Group of 77 GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council HoM Head of Mission HoS/HoG Head of State/Head of Government HR/SG High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary-General of the Council ICC International Criminal Court ICJ International Court of Justice IMF International Monetary Fund IGO International Governmental Organisation LDC Least Developed Countries MS Member States NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO Nongovernmental Organisation NYLO Liaison Office of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union with the United Nations ODA Official Development Assistance

xx OSCE PJCC P2 PR PSC SEA TEC TEU UN UNDP UNDSG UNGA UN MS UNSC UNSG US

acronyms and abbreviations Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters France and the UK as the two EU Member States being permanent members in the UN security Council Permanent Representative Political and Security Committee Single European Act Treaty establishing the European Community Treaty on European Union United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Deputy Secretary-General United Nations General Assembly Member States of the United Nations United Nations Security Council United Nations Secretary-General United States of America

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank a number of individuals and institutions that have made this book possible. First of all, I gratefully acknowledge the help of my PhD supervisor, Dr Heiko Walkenhorst, in matters of style and substance. His constructive and searching criticism throughout has been vital in assisting and developing this book. Furthermore, I benefited greatly from the inputs and comments of the two full members of my PhD board, Professor Emil J. Kirchner and Professor Hugh Ward. I could not have asked for better mentors for this project. I am grateful to Dr Han Dorussen, who acted as internal reader, for going through the entire draft and offering important and extremely helpful feedback and suggestions. In the early stages of my research my exchanges with Professor Gerard Braunthal, Professor Simon J. Nuttall, Dr Paul Luif and Dr Klaus-Dieter Stadler, particularly on the practical difficulties of tackling the thematic complex of EU at the UN, proved very fruitful. I very much appreciate their support. Without the backing of the Liaison Office of the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU with the UN and the European Commission Delegation to the UN the project would never have been completed. Only by enabling me to work for both institutions over several months, I obtained the insights into the EU cooperation at the UN which form the foundation of this study. In this context I would like to thank my supervisor in the Council’s Liaison Office, Francesco Presutti, for giving me all the freedom I needed to conduct my research, for patiently answering all my questions and for showing so much interest in the project. He taught me so much on EU-actorness and UN-diplomacy. HE Elda Stifani, Ambassador in the Council’s Liaison Office and the DPR Micail Vitsentzatos became equally valued allies in my attempts to understand the political framework at the East River. I would also like to thank Ditte Juul-Joergensen of the Commission Delegation in New York for entrusting so much interesting work to me while allowing me to collect information and data, and for offering every support possible. The arguments made in the qualitative part of the book are in quite a few instances based on the valuable inside knowledge provided by numerous diplomats from EU Member States and EU institutions. I wish to thank them for agreeing to be interviewed and exchanging their views

xxii

acknowledgements

with me—also during and between the never-ending meetings at the UN, at receptions and in the notorious breaks in the Vienna Café. The work on the quantitative part then was made much easier by the astonishing helpfulness of the librarians and the reference team of the Dag Hammerskjöld Library at New York Headquarters. Thus I would like to include them in my acknowledgements. I presented four papers outlining the main findings and arguments of this book at different conferences and workshops in Bruges, Brussels and Macao. I am grateful to the various participants in these meetings for offering important comments and criticism, but also to Professor Emil J. Kirchner for enabling me to go to these gatherings in the first place. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Saskia for the enormous emotional support she provided during all those years which were fully absorbed by the project. Her love, encouragement, and patience were essential for completing the study. Furthermore I am grateful to my parents for giving me the financial backing of my research.

INTRODUCTION Regionalisation and globalisation, regional and global governance, are two opposing, but on parallel levels still strongly developing and mutually complementing and stimulating tendencies in international politics today. Institutionally, two organisations embody the archetypes of global and regional governance: the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). The UN forms the centre of the multilateral system of global governance by providing a unique and with 192 member states quasi-universal forum and problem-solving capacity, in which the whole range of global problems can be discussed and tackled. It remains irreplaceable despite widespread dissatisfaction with the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation, coupled with reservations about the UN’s political relevance. The EU has largely passed through the stages of economic and internal political integration, providing a model of the so-called ‘new regionalism’, which again provides the basis for regional governance.1 With its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) the EU already enters the stage of a third generation regionalism, the integration in external policies.2 The CFSP is a complex intergovernmental construct, shaped by shared interests and a common cultural background, but also individual national interests, Treaty regulations and tacit regimes. It has been created mainly to achieve a coherent policy of all EU Member States (MS) on the external plane in order to maximise the Union’s influence—and also that of its MS. This book examines a prominent juncture between regional and global governance: the EU at the UN. Even though the UN is often rather a house of words than of straight actions, the organisation plays an important role within the EU’s result-oriented CFSP, as well as in the policies of the 27 EU MS: in various instances the EU and its MS highlighted that they 1 Björn Hettne, “Globalization and the New Regionalism: the second Great Transformation”, in Björn Hettne, András Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel. (eds.), Globalism and the New Regionalism (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 1–24. 2 Luk van Langenhove, “To what extent could the EU improve legitimacy of the global regulatory framework?”, unpublished paper presented at the first GARNET PhD School, Brussels, 15 December 2005, pp. 7 ff.

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introduction

perceive the UN as the most important international organisation and as a central instrument in foreign affairs.3 Also the fact that the EU implemented an institutionalised coordination process outside Brussels only at the UN, with Council Secretariat support and representative EU venues, shows how much importance the EU and its MS attach to the world organisation. The same is true also for the immense financial and political support the Union offers to the UN. But the policies of the EU and its MS at the UN have to be consistent to have an impact,4 not least because “[t]he point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy [. . .] is that we are stronger when we act together”, as the European Security Strategy of December 2003 points out.5 This notion of collaborating internally and externally and speaking with one voice towards third parties is at the core of EU actorness on the world scene.6 It has particular importance in multilateral arenas, and involves various practical and political implications for the work of the 27 EU MS and the EU institutions involved in such fora. Not least, the degree to which the EU manages to speak with one voice “is an important indicator of its development as a foreign policy actor”.7 To reach the aim of coherence, the EU MS and the European Commission are requested to cooperate at the UN to ensure that “common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented”.8 That a united appearance at the UN is a worthwhile 3 The prominent role of the UN in international politics has been underlined by various EU bodies, for instance the European Council (see “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy”, December 2003, online available at www.consilium. eu.int), the European Commission (see Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism (doc. COM(2003) 526 final), 10.09.2003) and the European Parliament (see “Resolution on the relations between the European Union and the United Nations (2003/2049(INI))”, adopted 29.1.2004, to be found in the Official Journal of the European Union dated 21.4.2004). 4 Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that “[t]he Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies”. 5 European Council, op. cit. in note 3, p. 15. 6 The notion of ‘actorness’ is understood along the lines of David Allen and Michael Smith, “Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena”, in: Martin Holland (ed), The Future of European Political Cooperation, Essays on Theory and Practice (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), pp. 95–120. 7 Katie V. Laatikainen, and Karen E. Smith, “Introduction—The European Union at the United Nations: Leader, Partner or Failure”, in The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms, ed. by Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 3. 8 Article 20 Treaty on European Union, referring to the EU Council of Ministers.

introduction

3

objective for the EU MS is again reflected by the fact that all of them accept the complex and time-consuming EU coordination process on the East River as inevitable, demanding their active participation. But is it really necessary or even favourable for the EU MS to act consistently to be able to influence developments at the UN and to attain the Union’s objectives, or could the EU MS achieve better results for the European cause or for themselves when acting individually?9 Sophie Meunier has shown recently that the collective mode of representation may be restricting or even counterproductive when defending European interests in the international stage.10 This examination wants to shed light on the situation at the UN in that regard. It does so by scrutinising the institutional and instrumental disposition of the CFSP by concentrating on the practical edge of the EU’s external actorness, on the real-world implementation of the regulations stipulated in the EU-Treaties and other documents, as well as on the evolutionary process behind the coordination, cooperation and representation of the EU MS at the UN and the role and involvement of the EU institutions. Particularly the latter aspect is important in view of the complex three-pillar structure of EU policies, influencing also the EU-representation at the UN. A number of general questions will be tried to be answered in the course of the examination: how do the legal, institutional and instrumental foundations of the CFSP work in praxi when confronted with the specific environment of an international governmental organisation (IGO)? Are the foundations suitable to achieve the prime aim of the CFSP, i.e. a coherent EU policy in external relations? In which way and to which degree does the CFSPregime influence the policy outcomes and shape EU MS policies? The environment of an IGO functions as a magnifying glass when looking at the advantages and deficiencies of the CFSP-regime and the Union’s outward representation.

9 On the importance of coherence and consistency in the EU external affairs see Stephen Keukeleire, “The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional and Structural Diplomacy”, Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 14 (3) (2003), pp. 31–56 (focussing on diplomacy) and Simon Nuttall, “Coherence and Consistency” in International Relations and the European Union, ed. by. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2005), pp. 91–112 (general analysis). 10 Sophie Meunier, Trading voices: the European Union in international commercial negotiations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).

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As the term CFSP suggests, the aim of the EU MS is to act together towards a shared objective in the different intergovernmental aspects of the Union’s external relations. However, the situation within IGOs, and within the UN in particular, poses very specific challenges for this undertaking: not only are those organisations based on the concept that nation-states are the key units of international relations. But with 27 members the Union is also a relatively small group compared to the UN membership as a whole, of which 130 alone are organised developing countries, forming their own interest group (the Group of 77). The one-state-one-vote principle intensifies this relative weakness. The interaction with third parties in multilateral settings is much more direct than on the usual bilateral policy-making level or within contacts between the EU and third parties. In this confrontational atmosphere of politicised North-South conflict, transatlantic tensions and other long-standing quarrels, the EU MS have to show if they manage to overcome national egoisms and speak with a single voice. But the direct dealing with third parties at the UN produces visibly another common feature of CFSP: the EU MS weigh up on a case-by-case basis whether the costs of the incorporation into the mechanisms of the CFSP regime are in appropriate relation to the benefits, or whether their national interests can be better pursued outside the EU framework. At the UN the Union has to act in a timely manner to achieve positive results, i.e. the regime in place has to be effective and efficient. Within this forum EU MS have to position themselves, as they are not the only actors in the game, as they are used to in Brussels: 165 other UN MS will push things forward and will not wait for the EU to sort out their internal differences. Long-winded discussions or even problem-solving by sitting them out—often practiced in EU internal proceedings—is therefore no option. Another helpful feature when analysing the CFSP through its implementation in IGOs is that the usually sacred principle of unanimity can be circumvented in those fora, as individual EU MS or groups of EU MS can proceed alone. Consequently there is nevertheless political progress and action-taking possible even when EU internal disagreement prevails, and not as usually the case within the CFSP, that everything comes to a halt because no common line is achievable. But since such solo efforts by EU MS are a viable option—despite a quite high inhibition level—the real interests of individual EU MS become much more apparent to the researcher than usually within the CFSP. And the existence of this option also influences the policy-making within the group, because everyone is aware that there is no institutional

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mechanism in place to prevent individual EU MS to proceed unilaterally. That puts much more pressure on the EU MS involved to reach an agreement and to show flexibility. Open incoherence among the EU MS that way becomes brutally apparent within an IGO in comparison to many situations in EU politics and results in a loss of image towards third parties. Consequently all EU MS have an interest to avoid such a scenario wherever possible. But the unified appearance of the EU is complicated by a number of determinants: the final EU position at the UN is formed within an institutional triangle of EU MS missions to the UN, EU MS capitals and EU bodies in Brussels. It is often difficult to bring those different institutions in accordance with each other, as their perspectives and interests are divergent: the ministries in EU MS capitals often take a much more rigid perspective based on the competences existing in the ministerial bureaucracies, impeding the efforts of their representatives in New York to reach a common EU position. On the other hand, Brussels-based EU bodies with their experience of communauté d’action have not enough weight and influence to create a counterweight to the influence exerted by national capitals. On a more theoretical level, the analysis of EU representation within IGOs offers the advantage that it is appropriate to judge the EU upon a model of actorness that is similar to that of a state, as—ideally—it acts as a single player in an environment of nation states, which lets third parties treat the Union as an entity similar to a state. Therefore the examination can avoid the criticism at the concept of actorness, i.e. that the benchmark of statehood is flawed as the EU cannot and never will be a state, simply because within IGOs this benchmark is very real in everyday policy debates.11 But besides all those reasons which are more or less valid for IGOs in general, the scenery of the UN in New York12 appears to be a specifically apt choice for a number of reasons: first of all, the UN provides a framework in which the whole range of today’s problems—political, social, humanitarian, environmental, health-related, economic and many other—are being discussed. It therefore allows to observe the 11 Michael E. Smith, “The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Post-Modern Policy Framework?”, Journal of European Public Policy (2003), 10, 4:556–573. 12 Five of the six main organs of the UN are located at the UN headquarters in New York. Also large parts of the UN system have their main offices on the East River. Therefore it appears to be justified to concentrate on this location and not to include other UN locations, such as Geneva, Vienna or Nairobi in the analysis.

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performance of the CFSP on virtually all the issues it incorporates. Other IGOs, such as the IMF, OSCE or the WTO would allow only a much narrower scope.13 Second, because of this broad range of issues discussed at the UN, all three pillars of the EU, i.e. European Communities (EC), CFSP and Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC), are involved in policy-making. This creates a unique situation of interaction and overlapping competencies and interests among EU bodies on the one side, but also between EU entities and EU MS and inter-pillar tensions on the other side. However, due to the fact that most issues discussed at the UN in New York fall into the sphere of the intergovernmental second pillar of the EU, i.e. the CFSP, the main emphasis of the study will lie on this element of EU external actorness. Third, the UN has sizeable relevance, politically, diplomatically and with regard to legitimacy. This status makes it to a forum which is closely observed by the public, governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Consequently EU MS try hard to defend their national interests, being therefore a litmus test for the harmonising and pressurising effects of the CFSP. Fourth, as the EU and its MS highlighted that they perceive the UN as the most important international organisation, the Union itself turns on the spotlight as concerns its contribution and representation in New York. That makes it even more interesting to the researcher to examine how the Union meets the expectations of coherence and credibility raised by itself. Fifth, usually it is very difficult to measure coherence within CFSP. But the scenery of the UN offers a quite good opportunity to do so by looking at the voting behaviour of EU MS in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). This again is useful as it allows for a research design with a qualitative core backed by quantitative analysis. And finally, the UN is a stage in which it can be observed how the rest of the political 13 As is reflected in articles by Fraser Cameron (“Das Krisenmanagement in der KSZE und in den Vereinten Nationen—Die EG und ihre Mitgliedstaaten als bedeutende Kraft und bescheidener Beobachter”, in Elfriede Regelsberger (ed.), Die Gemeinsame Außenund Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union: Profilsuche mit Hindernissen (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1993) = Analysen zur Europapolitik des Instituts für Europäische Politik, Band 9), pp. 95–105), Jörn Sack (“Die Europäische Union in den internationalen Organisationen: Bedeutung der Beteiligung sowie Aktion und Einfluss von Gemeinschaft und Mitgliedstaaten in diesen Gremien”, Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien, vol. 4 (2001), 2, pp. 267–284 and Lorenzo B. Smaghi (“A Single EU Seat in the IMF?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 42 (2004), no. 2, pp. 229–248). Interesting in this context is also the more theroretical account by Jeffry A. Frieden, entitled “One Europe, One Vote? The Political Economy of European Union Representation in International Organizations”, European Union Politics, vol. 5 (2) (2004), pp. 261–276.

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world perceives the actorness of the EU and responds to the activities undertaken within the CFSP. This reaction by the addressees of EU policies shows how credible and relevant EU external affairs are. Consequently the main research question guiding the analysis with regard to the specific case of the UN is: through which means and how successfully is a coherent EU policy achieved at the UN? Questions deriving from that are: what is the character of the CFSP-regime on the East River? What are the EU internal measures, instruments, procedures and processes? Is the Union a unitary actor and do EU MS and the European Commission speak with a single voice? What are the costs and benefits for the EU MS of cooperating at the UN? Even though moulded by the specific multilateral environment of an international organisation, whose character is very much shaped by the assumption that membership in the international community is based on the Westphalian concept of statehood, the proceedings within the CFSP at the UN in New York serve as a good example for the developments within the CFSP-regime in general, for the coherence and quality of the representation of EU interests on the international stage, and offers valuable insights into EU internal mechanisms. Therefore this book provides a description and analysis of the CFSP through an inductive case-study approach. It could be argued that the specificity of the case study approach may produce results applicable exclusively to this single institutional environment, with no useful implications for similar situations. However, it is claimed that this examination is both specific and representative: specific, as it looks at the situation at UN headquarters in New York and focuses on a small number of UN organs. On the other hand it is representative, given that the situation on the East River can serve as an example of the functioning and character of the coordination and cooperation of EU MS and EU institutions in IGOs in general. Its general applicability is enhanced by the fact that case studies provide a ‘holistic’ research approach that focuses on “how processes and relationships are interlinked to achieve certain outcomes” by looking at “the subtleties and intricacies of complex social situations”, and by examining “why certain outcomes may happen—more than just to find out what these outcomes are”.14

14 Martyn Denscombe, The good research guide: for small-scale social research projects (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp. 31–35.

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There are only three places in the world with an institutionalised and standing EU coordination process: Brussels as the place, where the idea of Europeanisation is practiced with more purity and conviction than anywhere else.15 And then in New York at UN headquarters and in Geneva at the UN location—to make sure that the voice of the EU is powerful and free from significant cacophonies. This is why this study, particularly with its emphasis on the description of the EU coordination process, has its raison d’être: the EU internal processes in Brussels concerning foreign policy-making have been discussed and analysed in length by a large number of scholars.16 From the level of institutionalisation the only comparable situation to that in Brussels is the one in New York, as the UN location Geneva is much smaller and with much less regular business, not requiring such intense EU coordination.17 Therefore it appears to be very attractive to demonstrate the institutional conditions in New York to confront them with the notions of Brussellisation and Europeanisation. Only then it will be possible to tell what the scope and the limitations of the EU representation in New York, but also of EU external relations in general, are. By describing the coordination process it will also be disclosed, how those EU internal consultations promote or thwart national interests. On that basis a cost-benefit analysis, which shows what EU MS get in return for giving up competences to the EU partners, can be set up. The introduction of the CFSP-regime within the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in force since 1 November 1993, changed the basis for the European representation at the UN significantly. However, the literature has not yet adequately examined the influence of this newly created regime on the cooperation, coordination and representation of

See pages 57 ff. on Europeanisation. The classic examples are Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); Simon Nuttall, European Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Michael E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalisation of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). An example for a comprehensive analysis of the general policy-making processes in Brussels is a book by Paul W. Meerts and Franz Cede (eds.), Negotiating European Union (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 17 On the EU coordination and representation at the UN in Geneva see Paul Taylor, “The EU in Geneva: Coordinating Policy in the Economic and Social Arrangements of the United Nations System”, in The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms, ed. by Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 133–153. 15 16

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the interests of EU MS and the EU at the UN. While two monographs looked in detail at this thematic complex during the times of European Political Cooperation (EPC),18 the CFSP’s predecessor, no such thorough analysis has been undertaken for the post-TEU period. Only a range of shorter studies examined the implementation of the CFSP at the UN, most of them with a specific focus.19 Also the European Commission in its Communication “The EU and the UN: the choice of multilateralism” of September 2003 asked for a general reflection on the role of the Union at the UN, the status quo already achieved in building an effective common presence in and vis-à-vis the UN, and the EU coordination process.20 The aim of this study is therefore to close this gap and describe in extenso the functioning and quality of the CFSP- and EC-regime at the UN, by concentrating on the state of affairs, but also with an evolutionary perspective for the period 1993 to 2005, where useful for the support of the argumentation. Roy Ginsberg described the CFSP as a system of external relations through which national actors pursue partly common and partly separate international policies.21 The aim of this study is to find out to which degree those actions are common, to elucidate where the CFSP stands more than a decade after its implementation. Thus it will be shown how far European

18 Namely Beate Lindemann, EG-Staaten und Vereinte Nationen: Die politische Zusammenarbeit der Neun in den UN-Hauptorganen (Munich and Vienna: Oldenbourg, 1978) and Klaus-Dieter Stadler, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft in den Vereinten Nationen: Die Rolle der EG im Entscheidungsprozess der UN-Hauptorgane am Beispiel der Generalversammlung (BadenBaden: Nomos, 1993). 19 Examples are Jean-Pierre Cot, “La Communauté européenne, l’Union européenne et l’Organisation des Nations Unies”, in Boutros Boutros-Ghali amicorum discipulorumque liber: paix, développement, démocratie (2 volumes) (Brussels: Bruylant, 1998) pp. 327–46; Georgios Kostakos and Dimitris Bourantonis, “Testing CFSP at the UN—EU Voting at the General Assembly 1990–1997”, Peace and Security 31 ( June 1999) pp. 19–26; Paul Luif, EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly, Occasional Papers of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, no. 49, December 2003; Elisabeth JohanssonNogués, “The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: What Future for European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ Europe?”, European Foreign Affairs Review 9 (1, Spring 2004): pp. 67–92; Katie V. Laatikainen, “Norden’s Eclipse: The Impact of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy on the Nordic Group in the United Nations”, Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 38(4), 409–441; Maria Strömvik, “Fifteen Votes and One Voice? The CFSP and Changing Voting Alignments in the UN”, Stadsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 101 (1998), pp. 181–197. 20 Commission of the European Communities, op. cit. in note 3. 21 Roy H Ginsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 37, no. 3 (1999), pp. 429–54.

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integration has been realised in institutionalised foreign policy today, as well as disclosed, how severe the tensions between national interests and the striving for common EU action-taking at the most important international organisation are. And as the EU has the ambition to be recognised as the ‘second global actor’,22 which can only be put into practice through the incorporation and utilisation of the UN as part of the tool box of the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), this study intends to clarify whether the regime in place is reliable and predictable enough to support those ambitions in accordance with the policy aims of ‘Mr. CFSP’, Javier Solana, the EU Presidency or the European Commission—and not only with the interests of an individual EU MS government. In addition, this book will give the most detailed analysis in the voting behaviour of a regional group at the UN since more than fifteen years. With that, but also with its qualitative analysis, this study will contribute to the analysis of the internal structures of the UN, the processes of decision-building in it and the influence and role the UN MS and the different caucus groups play in it. At the same time it offers the novel perspective of an institutional analysis on European integration in general and the EU’s CFSP in particular. In contrast to most existing studies this examination will benefit from and add new substance because of its insider’s perspective, primarily based on the author’s eight months work experience at the two EU bodies at the UN in New York in 2004.23 Interviews conducted with 38 diplomats and officials from EU MS and EU bodies in the same year complement the qualitative analysis. Organisation of the book The study is divided into two parts. Part One looks at the EU at the UN from a qualitative angle. The first chapter of this part constitutes the core of the book, as it deals with the implementation of the CFSPregime and first-pillar-policies at the UN. In four sections the institutional and instrumental status quo of the mechanisms and functioning

Mario Telò, Europe: a civilian power? European Union, global governance, world order (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 23 Delegation of the European Commission to the UN; Liaison Office of the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU with the UN. 22

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of the harmonisation efforts in the coordination process are being described to sketch the framework in place to speak with a single voice. Chapter Two then surveys the inputs by EU MS and supranational and intergovernmental EU bodies into the EU internal decision-taking process. It is analysed whether the esprit de corps within the EU group is strong enough to overcome the national interests of the EU 27 to form European positions. In Chapter Three an external perspective is taken, analysing the EU’s role, influence and cohesiveness in specific UN bodies to demonstrate whether the EU is really perceived as an influential and consistent actor by third parties. Chapter Four then looks at the effects of EU-enlargement and the EU Reform Treaty on EU coordination and representation at the UN. Part Two takes a quantitative approach to elucidate whether the Union is objectively a unitary actor at the UN. By eyeballing the outcomes of the CFSP with regard to the UN General Assembly through the examination of voting results (EU as a group, Chapter Five, and EU internally, Chapter Six) it will be possible to reveal the level of coherence in different issue areas and to measure the consistency, or rather inconsistency, of the policy positions of the EU countries and to see if a convergence of EU MS policies is ascertainable over time, i.e. if the CFSP works as it produces a more coherent policy. This analysis will also show, whether there is a ‘Core Europe’ of countries acting coherently or if other group constellations exist. Furthermore it illustrates which EU MS are the main dissenters from EU majority—and offers explanations for that. But before going into the substance, a short literature review will describe the current state of research.

LITERATURE REVIEW As has been argued above, the uniqueness of the UN environment places this arena under close observation of the world community. The scenery of the UN in New York provides a clearly demarcated microcosm of EU unity in external activities under the specific precondition of a multilateral environment, which is a good reflection of reality en miniature, constituting its special charm for students of EU foreign relations. Therefore it comes as no surprise that the EU’s working methods, influence and internal coherence at the UN has attracted the interest of a number of scholars. Before laying out the methodological and theoretical foundations of this study, it seems to be helpful to briefly critically analyse the literature published on the EC/EU at the UN to highlight its relationship to this book and to give an idea of the work that has been carried out. With the exception of a few important studies only literature examining the situation in post-Maastricht days is being considered. In a number of aspects, this examination follows the tradition of the two monographs mentioned,24 which looked in detail at the EPCregime and the EEC at the UN. This study wants to ‘write on’ their analysis of the European cooperation at the UN for the period after the implementation of the CFSP-regime. Lindemann and Stadler in their doctoral studys (published in 1978 and 1993 respectively) described the implementation of the internal and external EPC regime, i.e. the EEC MS coordination process and outward representation and the role of Brussels with regard to the UNGA and other UN organs. Both researchers also used voting analysis to back their argument. Lindemann observed for the late 1970s that the nine EEC countries formed a closely cooperating and prominent group. But the EPC-regime in place had reached its institutional and structural limitations, as the influence from MS capitals was very strong on the proceedings in New York. The voting behaviour even showed signs of disintegration within the group, mainly between small and big EEC countries. Stadler in his analysis

24

Lindemann and Stadler, both op. cit. in note 18.

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of the 1980s and early 1990s shared this sceptic tone by stressing that the then twelve EEC countries had achieved already a high level of communauté d’action at the UN. At the same time he illustrated that the common policy-making was confronted with significant deficits and limitations in the decision-making structures and that a unified policy would still be a distant aim. Nine much shorter studies looked at the EU representation at the UN in globo for the post-TEU period.25 Most of them described the status quo very much from a distance with limited investigation of the problems at the core of the EU coordination process—not surprising in view of the fact that four of the authors had no direct insights into the processes themselves. Consequently those examinations remained superficial and gave a rather positive account of what had been achieved by the EU group, while at the same time not offering well-substantiated analysis. Paasivirta, Porter, Sucharipa and Winkelmann had worked for Delegations in New York, therefore could fall back upon first-hand knowledge of the situation. While Winkelmann’s analysis took a legal-technocratic stance, Paasivirta, Porter and Sucharipa succeeded in painting a vivid 25 Hans Arnold, “Die Politik der EU in der UNO als Möglichkeit und Maßstab für ihre Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) und ihre Europäische Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP)”, in: Praxishandbuch UNO. Die Vereinten Nationen im Lichte globaler Herausforderungen, ed. by Sabine von Schorlemer, (Berlin, 2003), pp. 157–175; Jürgen Dedring, “Reflections on the coordination of the EU member states in organs of the United Nations”, FORNET CFSP Forum, Volume 2, Issue 1 January 2004, pp. 1–3; Paul Luif, EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly, Occasional Papers of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, no. 49, December 2003; Mary Farrell, “EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations”, in The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms, ed. by Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 27–46; Edward Mortimer, “Europe’s Role in the United Nations”, The International Spectator, vol. XXXV (2000), no. 4, pp. 7–11; Katie V. Laatikainen, “Assessing the EU as an Actor at the United Nations: Authority, Cohesion, Recognition and Autonomy”, CFSP Forum, vol. 2 (2004), no. 1, pp. 4–9; Esa Paasivirta and Dominic Porter, “EU Coordination at the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC: A View From Brussels, A View From New York”, in The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership, ed. by Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister and Tom Ruys (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), pp. 35–48; Ernst Sucharipa, “Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) der Europäischen Union im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen”, in Verhandlungen für den Frieden / Negotiating for Peace. Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel (Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht 162), ed by Jochen Abr. Frowein / Klaus Scharioth / Ingo Winkelmann and Rüdiger Wolfrum (Heidelberg und Berlin: Springer, 2003), pp. 773–797; Ingo Winkelmann, “Europäische und mitgliedstaatliche Interessenvertretung in den Vereinten Nationen”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 60 (2000), 413–445.

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and sensible picture. Sucharipa and Winkelmann gave a rather critical account of the achievements almost ten years after Maastricht, while Paasivirta and Porter took a positive view, shaped by their perspective as Commission officials. All three studies showed the peculiarity of the multilateral environment of the UN and its influence on the EU’s external representation, and also the huge importance and influence of the national interests pursued by EU MS. However, in view of their limited length, those two publications did not have the opportunity to look into the heart of the problem, i.e. the coordination process itself. All six examinations also neglected the Brussels-dimension of the issue. Concerning the global approach of looking at the EU at the UN, a recent publication by the European Commission has to be mentioned.26 It describes briefly the EU internal processes and allows thus conclusions on the self-perception of the Union’s actorness on the East River. A couple of researchers approached the issue by looking at a single EU MS or a subgroup of EU MS. This produced important results by showing the underlying national interests and EU-group-internal quarrels at UN headquarters. Into the first category, i.e. single EU MS, fall three studies, focussing on Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.27 As those three countries are part of what is defined in this study as ‘Core Europe’, it is not surprising that all three authors illustrated how much those EU MS are integrated into the common representation in New York. However, they also demonstrated how much even for those countries national interests matter, and that those interests have higher priority than common EU positions if both layers collide. Concerning the second category—subgroups of EU MS—, five studies have been produced. They singled out the ten countries which joined the

26 European Communities, The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making Multilateralism Matter, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004. 27 Lisette Andreae, Deutschland als Motor einer europäischen Politik in den Vereinten Nationen?, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, No. 48 (02.12.2002), pp. 32–39; Francesco P. Fulci, “L’Unione Europea alla Nazioni Unite”, Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, LXVIII, no. 1 (2001), pp. 32–41; Ingeborg J. Thijn, “The European Political Cooperation in the General Assembly of the United Nations: A Case Study of the Netherlands”, Legal Issues of European Integration; 1991, no. 2, pp. 101–127.

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Union in 2004,28 the Nordics,29 and the ‘neutrals’ which became EU MS in 1995, i.e. Austria, Finland and Sweden.30 The examinations on the latter two issues showed convincingly that subgroups of EU MS at the UN still have their own agenda of areas they frequently are most interested in, which has to be recognised by the other EU MS in order to achieve common positions. However, it became also clear that those subgroups nevertheless integrate well into the wider EU group in New York, only rarely distancing themselves institutionally and thematically from the rest of the ‘club’. The third study by Johansson-Nogués’ is a projection of how enlargement would effect the EU coherence at the UN, carried out before the accession actually took place. She showed how well the newcomers had adjusted their policies to the EU majority prior May 2004, diagnosing only little risk of a gap between ‘new’ and ‘old’ Europe. A third and widespread way of scrutinising the EU at the UN has been through quantitative methods, i.e. voting analysis. This technique produced uninterrupted data of EEC/EU voting behaviour in the UNGA from the early years of the UN until 2002: Hurwitz analysed the years 1948–1973,31 Thijn the period 1973–199032 and Luif the years 1979

28 Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, “The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: What Future for European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ Europe?”, European Foreign Affairs Review 9 (1, Spring 2004): pp. 67–92 and a later study by the same author, building up on the 2004 article, entitled “Returned to Europe? The Central and East European Member States at the Heart of the European Union”, in The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms, ed. by Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 92–111. 29 Katie V. Laatikainen, “Norden’s Eclipse: The Impact of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy on the Nordic Group in the United Nations”, Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 38(4) (2003), pp. 409–441 and her later study, which included also the Netherlands, entitled “Pushing Soft Power: Middle Power Diplomacy at the UN”, in The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms, ed. by Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 70–91. 30 Paul Luif, “The Western European Union and the Neutrals. The Security Policy of Europe’s Non-aligned Countries in the Context of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy”, Studia Diplomatica (1998) 51 (1–2), pp. 77–98 or idem, On the Road to Brussels: The Political Dimension of Austria’s, Finland’s and Sweden’s Accession to the European Union (Vienna: Braumüller, 1995). 31 Hurwitz, Leon, “The EEC and in the United Nations: the Voting Behaviour of Eight Countries, 1948–1973”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 13 (1975), pp. 224–43. 32 Thijn, op. cit. in note 27.

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to 2002,33 just to mention a few studies. Hurwitz’ voting figures show that the five EEC MS (Germany joined the UN only in 1973) voted quite coherently until the mid-1950s.34 Even though the EEC was created in 1957, coherence levels dropped in the second half of the 1950s, as Gaullist France began to develop policies diverging from the European partners. Cohesion rose again until the early 1970s. The first round of EEC enlargement in 1973 did not dramatically influence coherence values.35 Greece’s accession in 1981 then marked a tangible watershed, halving the overall EEC voting coherence compared to previous years. Portugal’s and Spain’s accession did not have such an effect. Luif then showed that since the early 1990s the EEC/EU voting coherence increased from fifty to more than seventy-five per cent, notwithstanding the fourth round of EU enlargement in 1995.36 The examinations suggested that while the voting coherence remained relatively stable in the days of the EPC-regime, the end of the Cold War and the introduction of the CFSP increased the EU voting behaviour in the UNGA, even though full coherence was still to be achieved. Finally, scholars tackled the complex of the EU at the UN by selecting specific thematic angles. Most prominent in that regard is the question of UNSC reform.37 While all researchers shared the view, even though Luif, Cohesion, op. cit. in note 19. Hurwitz, op. cit. in note 31, pp. 234 ff. 35 Thijn, op. cit. in note 27, pp. 104–6. 36 Luif, Cohesion, op. cit. in note 19, pp. 27 ff. 37 Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis, EU Representation in the UN Security Council: Bridging the ‘Capabilities-Expectations’ Gap?, (unpublished working paper, University of Essex, 2002); Edith Drieskens, Daniele Marchesi and Bart Kerremans “In Search of a European Dimension in the UN Security Council”, The International Spectator, vol. 42 (2007), no. 3: 421–430; Bardo Fassbender, “The European Union in the United Nations and the Issue of UN Reform”, in Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security: Proceedings of a Workshop to Analyze the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (Yale Center for the Study of Globalization: New Haven, 2005), pp. 71–88; Christopher Hill, “The European Dimension of the Debate on UN Security Council Membership”, The International Spectator, vol. 40 (2005), no. 4: 31–39; Jeffrey Laurenti, “What ‘reinforcement’ for the Security Council?”, in The European Union and the United Nations: Partners in effective multilateralism, Chaillot Paper no. 78 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), pp. 69–73; Peter Schmidt, “A Complex Puzzle: The EU’s Security Policy and the UN Reform”, The International Spectator 29 (3) (1994), pp. 53–66; Panos Tsakaloyannis and Dimitris Bourantonis, “The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Reform of the Security Council”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 2, no. 2 (1997), pp. 197–209; Ingo Winkelmann, “GASP der Europäischen Union in den Vereinten Nationen am Beispiel der Reform des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen”, in Die Vereinten Nationen und Regionalorganisationen vor aktuellen Herausforderungen 33 34

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with gradual qualitative differences, that opposing national interests among EU MS will prevent a common line on the creation of new UNSC seats, mainly in view of Germany’s candidature and the competition within the group deriving from it, views differ on whether a reform can be achieved at all and what the consequences would be for the EU actorness. On the one end of the spectre some authors argued that reform is possible and that the effect would be positive for the EU by granting more influence to it. On the other end researchers argued that reform is not possible at all and that none of the EU MS should seek membership, as that would imbalance the geographical distribution in the Council even further. An EU seat is discussed by some of the scholars, but dismissed as unrealistic by the majority of them. Other examples of specific thematic perspectives are the examination of the EU coordination on human rights within the UN by Karen E. Smith and of the similarities and differences of EU and US policies in the UNGA by Luif.38 As it is linked to the external effectiveness of the EU at the UN, also the literature on EU/UN relations should be taken into account.39 All (Potsdamer UNO-Konferenzen, Band 3) (Potsdam: Menschenrechtszentrum der Universität Potsdam, 2002), pp. 32–39. 38 Karen E. Smith, “The European Union, Human Rights and the United Nations”, in The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms, ed. by Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 154–174; Paul Luif, “The Similarities and Differences of the EU and US Foreign Policies: Empirical Indicators from the UN General Assembly”, Paper presented at the EUSA 8th International Conference, March 27–29, 2003, Nashville, Tennessee, USA. 39 Examples are: Jean-Pierre Cot, “La Communauté européenne, l’Union européenne et l’Organisation des Nations Unies”, in Boutros Boutros-Ghali amicorum discipulorumque liber: paix, développement, démocratie (Brussels: Bruylant, 1998.—2 Bde. (XLIV, 1635 S.), pp. 327–46; Bardo Fassbender, “The Better Peoples of the United Nations? Europe’s Practice and the United Nations”, The European Journal of International Law, vol.15 (2004) no.5, pp. 857–884; Bruce Jenks, Die Vereinten Nationen und die Europäische Union: Wer braucht wen? (Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen, 1997) (Blaue Reihe No. 71); Armin Laschet, “Gemeinsame Strategie gibt der EU-Außenpolitik Profil. Für ein neues Verhältnis Brüssels zu den Vereinten Nationen”, Vereinte Nationen 3 (2001), pp. 97–100; idem, “Für einen effizienten Multilateralismus. Gemeinsame Werte von Europäischer Union und Vereinten Nationen”, Vereinte Nationen, vol. 2, 2004, pp. 41–45; Koen Lenaerts and Eddy de Smijter, “The United Nations and the European Union: Living Apart Together”, in International Law: Theory and Practice. Essays in Honour of Eric Suy, ed. by Karel Wellens (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp. 439–58; Hans van den Broek, “Ein besonderer Partner. Die Europäische Union und die Vereinten Nationen”, Vereinte Nationen 5–6 (1995), pp. 189–192; and many interesting chapters in Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister and Tom Ruys (eds.), The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006).

literature review

19

studies falling into this thematic complex stress the close relationship between both organisations. Some of them even see an interdependence between them. A common theme, however, is the need for further deepening of the EU/UN partnership to make it more functional and effective. Particularly the EU is seen as the one who has to deliver in that regard. In view of the aspiration of this study to give a well-founded account of the EU at the UN, it will employ and combine different of the approaches described above: the study will give an overall account of the present situation, supplemented by a detailed description of the implementation of the CFSP-regime, which has not been done by any researcher so far. It will also look at specific thematic issues by examining the EU cooperation and representation in the First (security and disarmament) and Second (economic and financial) UNGA Main Committees, as well as the UNSC (including UNSC reform). This study will also analyse the relationship between the EU and UN as it is today, not least because critical improvements are ascertainable in that regard. Finally, it will use the quantitative method of voting analysis to support the qualitative arguments and to write on the analysis until the end of 2005, which allows to see the impact of the fifth round of EU enlargement in 2004.

PART ONE

THE EUROPEAN UNION’S REPRESENTATION AT THE UN IN NEW YORK

CHAPTER ONE

THE EU AT THE UN—THE COORDINATION PROCESS: ACTORS AND MECHANISMS 1.1

Introduction: ‘Let’s Unite. And the World Will Listen to Us’1

Article 20 TEU2 is the key legal basis for the EU coordination process in New York as it stipulates that the EU MS and the European Commission shall cooperate in international organisations to ensure that “common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.” According to this Article, EU internal cooperation should be maximised by the exchange of information and carrying out of joint assessments. Even though these provisions are useful in delineating the general line to be taken, they are by no means detailed enough to characterise the complex cooperation necessary for the representation of the Union’s interests in such an important organisation as the UN. This demonstrates that a comprehensive understanding of the character of a regime is possible only with the aid of other means, particularly the analysis of its practical arrangements. Only when supplementing and confronting legal regulations and politico-theoretical reflections with the realities of their everyday implementation, it is possible to see where a regime’s limitations are located, which improvements would be possible—and most importantly the manifestation of the regime and what it is all about, i.e. the inspirations, purposes, objectives, main driving forces, inherent dynamics, political structures and technical mechanisms that stand behind it and form the regime. An important part of the analysis is the question of how and through which means the EU MS manage to speak with one voice at the UN in most cases. The need for insights into the internal arrangements is even more pressing as the operation of the CFSP

Pro-European ad campaign, September 1992; taken from Meunier, Sophie, Trading voices: the European Union in international commercial negotiations ( Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 1. 2 Treaty on European Union. 1

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regime in New York is shaped very much by long-standing traditions, tacit regimes and non-codified customs, rather than by clear-cut rules of procedure. In addition, policy-making unfolds to the largest extend behind closed doors, making insights even more difficult. In order to disclose the character of the work of the EU MS and EU bodies at UN headquarters, the following part of the study describes the practical and technical functioning of the EU’s representation at the UN from two different perspectives: an internal and an external one. The EU coordination process in New York is discussed and the main actors within the EU group, i.e. the EU Presidency and the EU MS, are portrayed when taking an internal angle. In addition, to be able to identify whether national interests of the EU MS are the main shaping factor of the Union’s common policies on the East River or if the EU institutions in Brussels and New York have a significant influence on the proceedings, the EU factor in the coordination process is examined. In a second step an external perspective is taken by eyeballing the functioning of CFSP with regard to particular UN bodies, namely the UNSC and two Main Committees of the UNGA. The part concludes by looking at issues of specific importance and crosscutting nature with regard to the EU’s representation at the UN, namely UN Reform, EU enlargement and consequences of a potential entry into force of the EU Reform Treaty. Before going into the details of the examination in the following chapters, it nevertheless seems to be helpful to provide some very general background information about the working culture at the UN and within the EU group. Despite a different general perception in the public, the UN is by no means to be equated with the UNSC.3 It comprises five other main organs (UNGA;4 ECOSOC;5 Trusteeship Council;6 UN Secretariat;7 International Court of Justice [ ICJ ])8 and a whole system of subsidiary bodies, functional commissions, specialised agencies, funds,

3 4 5 6 7 8

Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter

V of the UN Charter. IV of the UN Charter. X of the UN Charter. XIII of the UN Charter. XV of the UN Charter. XIV of the UN Charter.

the eu at the un—the coordination process

25

programs and other entities (see figure 1.1, p. 26). Even though the UNSC is the most important executive agency and is a unique instrument in the entire field of international politics, as it holds the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security9 and even has the right to use military might to enforce peace,10 the body and the UN in general has, at best, a mixed record in militarysecurity issues. The main work and financial involvement, but also the real achievements of the World Organisation lie not in political and security affairs, but in the socio-economic field. Albeit not familiar to everyone, development and social policies are the two aspects the UN mainly deals with. Those tasks are primarily taken care of by the UNGA and ECOSOC. Furthermore, the UN also has a dominant position on the agenda of contemporary world politics with regard to human rights, environmental, humanitarian and north-south issues. Because of the fact that non-security aspects are so important and prominent at the UN, the EU coordination process and CFSP in New York consequently copes only to a small extent with security issues, which is reflected also in the following two sections of the study. Despite the general dissatisfaction with the effectiveness and efficiency of the UN on the part of its members, it is still a very important forum for most of them in view of a lacking alternative. Therefore the opposing parties do not pull their punches but take the work very seriously, even though the UN is usually just a ‘house of words’ and not of actions, and the words of resolutions and decisions most of the time go unheard by the world community. The main motivation for the UN MS to be present at UN headquarters is to defend their national interests and to cultivate and extend their contacts with the world. Developments in world politics outside the UN have always also an influence on the developments within the UN. But it is obvious that the UN is a microcosm revolving to a large extend around itself. The Organisation is hampered by many old unresolved questions and can produce only little tangible progress and success. As one diplomat put it:11 “I can understand why [HR/SG] Solana sometimes, when choosing

Article 24 UN Charter. Article 42 UN Charter. 11 Interview number 11, 11 May 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]). 9

10

R

I

N

C L

UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services

UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

UNICRI United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

S

UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

UNIDIR** United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNSSC United Nations System Staff College

Source: UN Department of Information.

* Autonomous organizations working with the United Nations and each other through the coordinating machinery of the Economic and Social Council. * Report only to the General Assembly.

UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research

INSTRAW International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women

RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTES

OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

OTHER UN ENTITIES UNU United Nations University

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNHSP United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat)

WFP World Food Programme

UNV United Nations Volunteers

UNDCP United Nations Drug Control Programme UNRWA** United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women

ITC International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO)

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

PROGRAMMES AND FUNDS

Peacekeeping Operations and Missions

United Nations Compensation Commission

UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Other subsidiary organs

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

N

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A

UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (Iraq)

G

Standing committees and ad hoc bodies

R

Other sessional committees

O

Main committees

SECURITY COUNCIL

A

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

P F T H E U

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

CTBTO Prep.com PrepCom for the Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization

WTO (tourism) World Tourism Organization

WTO (trade) World Trade Organization

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

Sessional and Standing Committees Expert, ad hoc and related bodies

United Nations Forum on Forests

Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)

REGIONAL COMMISSIONS

Commission for Social Development Commission on Human Rights Commission on Narcotic Drugs Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Commission on Science and Technology for Development Commission on Sustainable Development Commission on the Status of Women Commission on Population and Development Statistical Commission

FUNCTIONAL COMMISSIONS

O I E D

TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

T N

UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization

WMO World Meteorological Organization

UPU Universal Postal Union

ITU International Telecommunication Union

IMO International Maritime Organization

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA International Development Association IFC International Finance Corporation MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

IBRD

WORLD BANK GROUP

WHO World Health Organization

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

ILO International Labour Organization

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES*

N A

T O N S

SECRETARIAT

I

Published by the United Nations Department of Public Information DPI/2299 - February 2003

UNON UN Office at Nairobi

UNOV UN Office at Vienna

UNOG UN Office at Geneva

ODC Office on Drugs and Crime

OHRLLS Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States

UNSECOORD Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator

OIP Office of the Iraq Programme

DM Department of Management

DPI Department of Public Information

DGACM Department of General Assembly and Conference Management

DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DDA Department for Disarmament Affairs

DPA Department of Political Affairs

OLA Office of Legal Affairs

OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services

OSG Office of the Secretary-General

UNITED NATIONS system

Standing Committee and ad hoc bodies

I

The

Military Staff Committee

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

P

UNITED NATIONS

Figure 1.1: Organisational Chart of the UN System

26 chapter one

the eu at the un—the coordination process

27

between Washington and New York, chooses Washington—because there is some work to do and not just empty talking going on.” It is by the very logic of the UN that groups of states are more effective than individual countries. This is because the UN in a natural course of evolution has become so difficult to manage with 192 members that it reorganised itself as a place where groups talk to each other rather than individual countries. The groups are the ones that make policies and the size of these groups matters—the bigger, the more influential. But also the status of the countries within the groups is crucial. Groupdominated politics are therefore both a UN characteristic but also the way the EU conducts business with other countries: the EU as a collective body, which in principle performs its CFSP as a group, fits in well into the UN’s functioning. Policies at the UN are usually formed by a small number of players, predominantly the EU, the US and the developing countries banded together in the Group of 77 (G-77)12 or alternatively the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).13 However, also a few other Western countries, in particular Canada and Japan play an important role. Besides the EU, JUSCANZ is the most important interest group of Western countries at the UN.14 In general, the EU prefers to work with other blocs, especially the Latin Americans, thus marginalising individual states.15 That causes the problem that the US is often left out of the informal dealing and wheeling. Since the membership of the G-77 is very heterogeneous, incorporating regional powers like

12 Founded on 12 May 1964 with originally 77 members, the Group of 77 is a coalition of currently 132 (2005) developing countries from all over the world. It exists only in the UN. The G-77 concentrates mainly on economic and social questions. It has no institutions, but the position of a chair, assumed by one country for one year, which conducts the representation of the G-77 similar to the EU Presidency. The chairmanship rotates among the three regions Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Asia and Middle East. 13 The Non-Aligned Movement plays a role in international relations in general. It has been created on 1 September 1961 and serves as a forum for 113 (2005) developing countries on a range of political, economic, security and social issues. At the UN it deals predominantly with political questions. G-77 and NAM are linked through the Joint Coordination Committee ( JCC), which decides on common positions of both groups. 14 JUSCANZ consists of Japan, the US, Canada and New Zealand. 15 Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, “Introduction—The European Union at the United Nations: Leader, Partner or Failure”, in The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms, ed. by Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 20–21.

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India, Brazil, China,16 Egypt and South Africa, which are important players at the UN and opinion leaders for the developing countries, but also very small countries like Benin, Kiribati or Bhutan, being LDCs17 and/or HIPCs,18 this group is often quite estranged internally and rarely has common positions. In order to do justice to the different views within the G-77, the group is divided into a range of subgroups such as the Rio Group, SIDS,19 CARICOM,20 OIC21 etc. Because of their fragmentation, negotiations with the developing countries are habitually difficult and time-consuming for the Western states. Besides the groups mentioned already, five regional groups are important for the technical proceedings at the UN, especially the elections in the different UN organs.22 They are the most institutionalised groups at the UN—with the exception of the EU. Only Kiribati and the US are not part of any of them.23 The members of the EU are part of three regional groups. Most of them are in the Western European and Others Group (WEOG).24 Groups of Friends,25 Ad-Hoc-Groups,26 political and regional alliances27 are other sorts of groups. In quite a few situations the Western countries form one group of countries sharing the same interests and the G-77 the other, due to the situation that the discussions often deal with questions dividing the UN membership along the lines of donor and receiving countries, as well as North and South.

China is associated with the G-77. Least Developed Countries. 18 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. 19 Small island development states. 20 Caribbean Community. 21 Organisation of The Islamic Conference. 22 The five groups are African Group, Asian Group, Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), Eastern European Group and West European and Other States Group (WEOG). This classification was stipulated by UNGA Res. 1990 (XVIII) and 1991A (XVIII) of 17 December 1963 and UNGA Res. 33/138 of 19 December 1978. On regional groups see Roman Kirn, “Regional Groups within the UN post-EU enlargement”, in The United Nations and the European Union: an ever stronger partnership, ed. by Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister and Tom Ruys (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), pp. 355–362. 23 The US is not a formal member of any regional group, but attends WEOG as an observer and is considered part of that group for election purposes. 24 See Kirn, op. cit. in note 22, pp. 359 ff. 25 For instance Group of Friends of Afghanistan, Group of Friends of Haiti, Group of Friends of the Secretary-General. 26 Ad-Hoc-Groups occur often during large multilateral conferences and also in the UNGA, for instance in the discussions on the International Criminal Court (ICC). 27 For instance Arab League, OAU and Commonwealth Secretariat. 16 17

the eu at the un—the coordination process

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The UNSC is the only key UN body in which groups have little influence. Due to the Council’s importance its fifteen members make use of their seats to pursue national interests rather than to follow decisions taken within the interest groups they are associated with. Formal meetings in all UN bodies are carefully prepared and scripted events. The debate is decided by vote-building and consensus beforehand, rather than by persuasion on the speaker’s platform. But even the day-to-day sessions, informal meetings and negotiations are usually pre-determined. Most of the discussion and decision-making takes place off stage, during and in advance of deliberations at the UN in the stereotypical backroom talks, in corridors, during lunches and coffee breaks, and therefore remains hidden. The parties most interested in an issue, and those most powerful and influential, hammer out deals that way in small groups, which they will then present to their partners in the larger interest groups (e.g. EU or G-77) to get their blessing and support. Therefore policies at the UN are dominated by a small number of countries, namely the Permanent Members of the UNSC and other economically and financial powerful UN MS, as well as the leading developing countries. Those countries have a strong network of loyal supporters among other UN MS, which are in political or financial dependency or have cultural or ideological links with those players. The most powerful countries therefore have to be won by any country which wants to see its national interests be incorporated in the final outcome. The less powerful UN MS enter the picture only when they chair one of the groups or have strong views in a particular issue and therefore possess a leadership role. The EU group is a permanent and influential fixture in policy debates at the UN.28 And most UN members see the EU as a coherent political operator given that in most cases the EU Presidency is able to present a common position agreed on by all 27 EU MS. A common EU policy is pursued in most UN bodies in New York. The only notable exceptions are the UNSC and some special agencies. But also with regard to the

28 This was the tenor of all interviews conducted in New York in 2004, which all included the question “How would you assess the importance of the EU as an actor in the UN?”. See also Katie V. Laatikainen, “Assessing the EU as an Actor at the United Nations: Authority, Cohesion, Recognition and Autonomy”, CFSP Forum, vol. 2 (2004), no. 1, p. 5.

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Security Council the exchange of information and cooperation among EU MS has increased significantly in recent years. The EU’s aim to speak with one voice on most questions at the UN is achieved through a complex and sophisticated coordination process, which has its roots in the coordination of the Benelux countries in the late 1940s. Even though there is some influence from Brussels-based bodies on the EU internal proceedings on the East River, the detailed discussion on the line to be taken at the UN takes place directly on the spot in New York, with most input coming directly from EU MS capitals.29 A simple picture should help to illustrate the general functioning of this EU internal process: the final common EU position is the dish that needs to be cooked. It is the EU Presidency, which has to prepare and organise the cooking procedure, i.e. the coordination process. The ingredients, i.e. the substance and national views that ought to be incorporated in the common EU position, come from the EU MS. The Presidency has to put together all the ingredients in a cautious approach that leaves all EU MS satisfied in the end, creating a solid dish being tempting and acceptable also to third parties. A recipe, i.e. the EU Treaties and a whole range of subsidiary regulations relevant particularly for the coordination at the UN,30 guarantees that the cooking process is undertaken within certain margins. Usually it is also the EU Presidency, which represents the EU outwardly in UN meetings and negotiations and in all contacts with third parties. In areas of exclusive or shared European Community competence, namely trade, fisheries, agriculture and specific aspects of development and environmental policy, the European Commission is responsible for the whole cooking exercise and enjoys nearly exclusive autonomy in

A concise description of the EU coordination process can be found in Esa Paasivirta and Dominic Porter, “EU Coordination at the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC: A View From Brussels, A View From New York”, in The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership, ed. by Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister and Tom Ruys (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), pp. 40–43. 30 Examples are a policy document by the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) entitled European Union Coordination in the United Nations Framework, 10 April 1995 (COREU PAR 483/95); a conclusion of the GAERC on EU-UN Co-operation in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management (Council Conclusions, 2356. GAC 11 June 2001); a ‘code of conduct’ adopted by the GAERC on 18 March 2003 with the aim to improve the working methods within EU coordination in light of EU enlargement in 2004. 29

the eu at the un—the coordination process

31

its undertakings, including the outward representation. Also within the UNSC and in the UN Funds and Programs different rules apply.31 In summation, three different layers of EU coordination and representation can be found at the UN in New York: 1) General EU coordination process on most CFSP issues concerning most UN bodies and the whole range of issues discussed at the UN (Presidency is the cook; EU MS give the ingredients; EU Treaties and subsidiary regulations are the recipe); 2) Areas with exclusive/shared Community competences (European Commission is the cook and provides the ingredients, but EU MS receive information on the cooking process and offer support; European Community Treaties are the recipe); 3) UNSC (3 to 5 different cooks [i.e. EU MS being members of the UNSC], using 3 to 5 different ingredients with 3 to 5 different recipes [i.e. national interests], producing 3 to 5 different dishes, but all cooks nevertheless try to prepare dishes which are not too divergent); the same structure applies to the UN Funds and Programs. The benefit for the 27 EU MS of working together instead of acting individually follows clearly from the fact that UN business is mainly undertaken through groups and by the weight the EU group has in comparison to that of a single EU country.32 That means that even important EU countries like France or the UK get a benefit out of the cooperation with their European partners, usually providing them with more influence than they would have individually.33 On the other

31 See Sven Biscop, “Security and development: a positive agenda for a global EU-UN partnership”, in The European Union and the United Nations: Partners in effective multilateralism, Chaillot Paper no. 78 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), p. 27. 32 Fraser Cameron made the same observation for the OSCE by saying that “no single country [EC/EU MS], even if might be a big one, can achieve its aims better by going alone instead of proceeding within a larger group of states” (see Fraser Cameron, “Das Krisenmanagement in der KSZE und in den Vereinten Nationen—Die EG und ihre Mitgliedstaaten als bedeutende Kraft und bescheidener Beobachter”, in Elfriede Regelsberger (ed.), Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union: Profilsuche mit Hindernissen (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1993) = Analysen zur Europapolitik des Instituts für Europäische Politik, Band 9), pp. 101–102. 33 This, and most of the findings on the benefits of EU internal cooperation at the UN for the EU MS, is in line with Mancur Olson’s ‘logic of collective action’ he

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hand, single EU countries, within or outside the EU group, can still play an important role by acting alone, through voting but also by exerting unofficial political influence. In the main, the unequalled homogeneity within the group, its size, as well as the incorporation of wealthy and influential countries makes it a very powerful actor at the UN. Also the fact that the EU talks with a single voice and behaves consistently in most cases increases its influence. In contrast to that it often happens that the chair of the G-77 talks on behalf of its group, but then G-77 members intervene and add elements and sometimes contradict each other, complicating decision-taking. This hardly ever occurs with the EU. Therefore the EU coordination effort also contributes to a more effective and easier UN negotiation process in general. Since the EU position is most of the time balanced and based on substantial expertise, many likeminded countries listen to what the EU has to say and then make up their mind about their own position. This creates a suction-effect that brings a significant number of other UN member states behind the EU. But one of the downsides of group dynamics at the UN is that the strong and united appearance of the EU bloc also invites counter reactions by the G-77, the US or JUSCANZ. The EU proposals then provoke negative reactions that make the negotiation process more difficult. The EU Presidency is also often not in the position to respond on new proposals from third parties without returning to the group to receive further instructions. That is particularly problematic in heated negotiations where a window of opportunity remains open only for a limited period of time. A simplified depiction of the general decision-taking process within the EU group at the UN is given on the next page (figure 1.2). It shows that the capitals of the EU MS, through their missions to the UN, are the most important and influential actors within the process. Their interests are fed into the EU coordination process practically unfiltered and then communicated via the EU Presidency to third parties at the UN. The details of this (figure 1.2) and the following depiction (figure 1.3, p. 34) will be described throughout this part of the study. described in The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (New York, Schocken Books, 1968).

Council

the eu at the un—the coordination process

33

34

Figure 1.2: Depiction of CFSP Decision-taking Process Within the EU at the UN in New York

27 EU MS capitals

give instructions

report back

27 EU MS Permanent Missions to the UN feed in national interests

EU internal coordination of EU MS interests

produces mandate mediates and informs for action-taking

EU Presidency represents the EU all UN bodies except the Security Council34

34

Regularly the EU Presidency delivers statements in the UN Security Council.

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Much less influence than one might expect exert the intergovernmental EU-bodies on the proceedings at the East River (see figure 1.3). Only the European Commission through its Delegation to the UN has a tangible influence in areas of its competences,35 which are of Figure 1.3: Depiction of CFSP Decision-taking Process Within the EU at the UN in New York, Including EU Bodies 27 EU MS capitals

give instructions

feed in national interests

report back guidance

Intergovernmental bodies in Brussels36

27 EU MS Permanent Missions to the UN feed in national interests Delegation of the European Commission to the UN

EU internal coordination of EU MS interests

produces mandate mediates and informs for action-taking

EU Presidency

participation in EU meetings (mainly passive)

mainly administrative support

Liaison Office of the Council Secretariat to the UN

represents the EU all UN bodies except the Security Council37

See Chapter Two, section 2.2 on DECUN (page 105 ff.). Most importantly European Council, Council of Ministers, COREPER, PSC, Council Working Groups. 37 Regularly the EU Presidency delivers statements in the UN Security Council. 35

36

the eu at the un—the coordination process

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course mainly irrelevant when discussing CFSP. The second EU body represented at UN headquarters, the Liaison Office of the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU (NYLO), plays only a marginal political role. It essentially supports the Presidency and the coordination process administratively and organisationally.38 1.2

Role of the EU Presidency

The EU Presidency is the most important actor not only in the internal EU coordination process, but also in the external representation of the Union at the UN. As ‘Chef de Cuisine’ for a limited period of time it is the voice, face and executive arm of the EU. The EU Presidency is at least fifty per cent of what the Union does at the UN. It carries a heavy burden of significant responsibility and extreme workload on its shoulders. Presidencies are transient, but during their semester they are the primus inter pares within the EU group. In general, the single EU Presidency is the counterpart of the single institutional framework, probably the most important element of the political structure created by the TEU. The EU Presidency is held by the same EU MS in every area of activity of the Union (Community matters, CFSP and PJCC) and at all levels (from Council working parties to the European Council). However, the European Commission represents the Union in questions where the European Community has exclusive competences, which is one of the exceptions to the principle of a single Presidency. At the UN the other exception to that principle is that the EU MS sometimes follow their individual interests and present national positions in areas where no common EU position exists. In accordance with Article 203 TEC39 the Presidency rotates among EU MS every six months in an order decided unanimously by the Council. However, the Presidency’s overall function is not described by the Treaty. Therefore practice has played a large role in defining the role of the Presidency. For the CFSP, Article 18 paragraphs 1 and 2 TEU lay down the responsibilities of the Presidency: representing the Union in matters coming within the CFSP and implementing decisions taken with CFSP relevance. That capacity also includes the responsibility for expressing positions of the Union in international organisations and 38 39

See Chapter Two, section 2.1 on NYLO (page 95 ff.). See also Article 27 of the ECSC Treaty and Article 116 of the Euratom Treaty.

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international conferences (Article 18 paragraph 2 TEU). In addition to that, Article 24 TEU stipulates that the Presidency shall negotiate agreements with non-EU states and international organisations, if so authorised by the Council. With regard to the EU internal coordination processes in international organisations it is the EU Presidency that has to ensure that the provisions of Article 20 TEU are fulfilled, i.e. that EU MS and the Commission cooperate to guarantee the compliance and implementation of Council decisions. The Presidency, assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council, is also in charge of ensuring the horizontal consistency within the EU’s external activities, i.e. the consistency between the decisions and actions taken by the different EU bodies dealing with issues of an external bearing. This institutional aspect is particularly important regarding the division of powers between the Community and the EU MS and the procedures for exercising both side’s respective responsibilities, but also when looking at the Union’s representation at the international level. As part of this EU internal coordination and cooperation complex, the Presidency has the obligation to consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP (Article 21 TEU) and keep it regularly informed about developments within the CFSP. As a rule, the burden the six-months period as Presidency entails for the people working in the respective mission to the UN concerned, is enormous. Since the Presidency is the true actor within the EU group, its delegates have to be very well familiar with the issues that are under discussion, much better than any other EU MS diplomat. In areas in which thousands of pages of official reports and other background material are being produced every session, e.g. within UNGA’s Fifth Committee, the Presidency’s representatives have to cope with an extreme workload. Weeks with 80 hours of work are no exception for those delegates. In order to be well-prepared for the six-months turn, diplomats usually are posted to New York a couple of years before the commencement of the Presidency. Only with this experience diplomats are able to run the processes themselves. The size of the extra workload is particularly difficult to digest for smaller EU MS, but even large countries have to stretch their capacities in order to fulfil the duties of the Presidency. During their Presidency, all EU MS missions at UN headquarters significantly enlarge their personnel resources by employing representatives from capitals and the national administrations, as well as by hiring interns and other low-paid employees, which are engaged only for the length of the semester. Among the latter are also so-called

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‘mercenaries’, i.e. people who do not have the nationality of the EU MS holding the Presidency, but who can offer work experience in the UN environment.40 However, even then some Presidencies are unable to deal with the whole range of issues discussed at the UN due to staff restraints. For instance the Luxembourg Presidency (2005) gave away complete issue areas due to its limited resources: the EU representation and coordination within the Fifth Committee and Sixth Committee was entirely assumed by other EU MS, namely Belgium (Fifth Committee) and the Netherlands (Sixth Committee). In general, a professional and competent team of the Presidency is the single most important factor of a successful Presidency on the East River.41 The success of an EU Presidency in New York also very much depends on how effectively it coordinates with its national administration. Furthermore the Presidency’s ministerial apparatus has to be employed heavily for the work at UN headquarters by offering guidance and expertise.42 EU Internal Role Everything begins and stops with the Presidency. This is true for most parts of the EU’s outward representation at the UN, but applicable with hardly any exception also for the EU internal coordination process. In the practice of the harmonisation of the national positions of EU MS in New York it is the Presidency which carries out the actual work. It manages the EU coordination meetings by organising, preparing and presiding them. The EU Presidency therefore has a great influence on the course of the meetings, especially as it is the one that decides on the agenda and accordingly can canalise discussions. But it also has a substantial responsibility as it must make sure that the meetings are conducive to good results and common positions. In principle the Presidency has to guarantee that all EU partners can present their opinion in the coordination process, that all positions can be discussed and that a common EU view is achieved in an appropriate period of time. A successful guidance of the EU coordination process requires

This phenomenon usually occurs only with small EU MS. Interview number 12, 12 May 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]). 42 Interview number 23, 14 September 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]). 40 41

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that the Presidency elicits in advance, which issues will surface during their semester, to locate questions which will cause difficulties both when negotiating with third parties and EU internally. Another aspect of the Presidency’s internal role is to keep the EU partners informed about developments at the UN and also about informal contacts with third parties. Furthermore, the Presidency usually proposes the strategy and tactics that should be employed in the contacts and in negotiations with third parties. A crucial part of the daily routine of the EU Presidency on the East River is to produce drafts of resolutions, speeches and speaking points as a first basis for EU internal discussions. Those drafts are often based on previous resolutions and statements. Habitually they are just updated in accordance with the developments that occurred in the meantime. Therefore the Presidency does not have to start from scratch every time and there is continuity in the whole process. In every case the Presidency takes into account the well-known sensitivities on the part of the EU MS when drafting their proposals for a resolution or a speech. Trust by the EU MS into the Presidency is key for a successful semester. Essential therefore is that a Presidency is impartial: since it is the moderator for discussions it cannot back either its own preferences or those of an individual EU MS.43 However, if national statements are made, for instance during the ministerial week at the beginning of each UNGA session, the country holding the Presidency has to manage the balance act of expressing the national position without impeding the work of the Presidency. In praxi at UN headquarters it happens very rarely that a Presidency puts its own position on top. Therefore the Presidencies are unable to use their semester in order to put into practice their exclusive interests, even though each Presidency sets up its own specific programme for its term. Even large and influential EU MS usually do not influence the final EU positions more strongly than any other EU MS when holding the Presidency, most of the time even on the contrary: when an EU MS, which regularly has strong national positions, has the Presidency, it has a problem bringing forward its national positions during its term, since it has to refrain from any position-taking. It will be particularly under observation in its activities compared to less important EU MS. However, what every Presidency

43 Interview number 2, 27 April 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]).

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can do and also should do is to exert a significant influence on the way the negotiations get to a certain conclusion and also on the substance achieved by the way of presenting its views in a particular situation, the way it leads the meetings and asks questions to delegations, by setting the choices and by the handling of items of business, by the order of priority that is induced by considerations of topicality and of deadlines, as well as by the political tone which the Presidency wishes to set for its six-months period.44 Therefore indirectly the Presidency does not necessarily predetermine the EU internal discussions, but channels them towards a certain result—but usually not in accordance with its own national interests, but in the interest of reaching common ground. However, the Presidency has to be careful not to exaggerate its indirect exertion of influence, since otherwise the other EU MS would complain. Frankness is another crucial characteristic a Presidency should bring along. However, some Presidencies do not show enough transparency and impartiality to be regarded as integer. Because after all, each Presidency, although representing the Union, wants to “show the flag of its country” at the UN.45 The final EU position is determined by the ingredients provided by the other 26 EU MS, while the Presidency prepares a common EU position by combining all the ingredients. In that regard it is important that the Presidency gives all EU MS the feeling that their interests have been taken into account. Usually the Presidency is successful in doing so with the help of all its diplomatic skills. Therefore the Presidency through large parts of the internal discussions plays the role of facilitator, mediator and arbitrator in its endeavour to reach common ground. As part of this exercise the Presidency must also take action where it is obvious that an impasse has occurred. This will take the form of compromise suggestions to reconcile the different views. In that connection it has to be said that the package deals common in other areas of EU cooperation in Brussels, meaning that a set of interconnected or non-connected issues is taken together in one package to facilitate a giving and taking and to reach agreement, is only rarely happening in New York. This is due to the limited link between the issues discussed at the UN and the fact that EU MS diplomats in New York are usually

44 45

Ibid. Ibid.

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only performers of policies set by their capitals, who are consequently not in the position to set precedents for the EU’s work in general by arranging package deals. Whether a Presidency was successful in making the chemistry between EU MS work can also be read from the number of deviations and split votes that occurred within the EU group under its aegis. However, it is clear that even an overall successful Presidency might be powerless against strong and opposing national positions within the EU group. It is not in the position to change the national views of the EU MS and can only facilitate when there is room to do so. Therefore a good will from all sides to reach consensus and a solid basis for compromise, i.e. national positions that are not diametrically opposed, are essential. The overall aim to achieve a single EU voice puts the onus on all EU MS and the EU bodies in New York to do what they can to support the Presidency—also in their own interest. But unfortunately it happens that some EU MS have a score to settle with the Presidency from disputes in previous years. Thus they try to make the life of the Presidency difficult and to “ruin its semester”, as one diplomat put it in an interview.46 That is one of the reasons why some people do not like the current system of rotating Presidencies, since delegates are not necessarily in the position to speak frankly in the coordination process, because there is always a possibility of retribution. EU External Role The EU Presidency represents the Union in all informal and formal settings at the UN. Most visibly it does so by giving statements in formal UN meetings. The tradition of Presidency statements at the UN on behalf of the EU MS dates back to the year 1975, when the Italian foreign minister Mariano Rumor as the President of the Council for the first time spoke on behalf of the ‘nine foreign ministers of the Community’ during the General Debate.47 In 1981 the British foreign minister Peter Carrington addressed the UNGA “on behalf of the Community and its Member States”,48 which became the standard 46 Interview number 22, 26 May 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]). 47 UNGA, Provisional Verbatim Records, 2358th Meeting, 23 September 1975, p. 16. 48 UNGA, Official Records, 36th Session, 8th Plenary Meeting, 22 September 1981, p. 106.

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Table 1.1: EU Presidency Statements at UN Headquarters in New York, 2000–2005 Year

First Semester ( Jan.–Jun.)

Second Semester ( Jul.–Dec.)

EU Presidency

EU Presidency

Number of statements

Number of statements

Total

2000

Portugal

82

France

110

192

2001

Sweden

92

Belgium

129

221

2002

Spain

71

Denmark

115

186

2003

Greece

49

Italy

129

178

2004

Ireland

74

Netherlands

148

222

2005

Luxembourg

80

UK

179

259

Source: Own calculations based on the digital online archive of the EC Delegation to the UN in New York.

formula for Presidency statements until the TEU. It was the first time during the German Presidency in 1994 that the country’s foreign minister Klaus Kinkel spoke on behalf of the European Union.49 All that is an illustration of the steady evolution of European integration in external relations. Today, the EU Presidency gives statements in all EU bodies at UN headquarters and on the whole range of issues discussed. The total number of Presidency statements in recent years is quite significant with up to 148 statements in one single semester (Dutch Presidency 2004; see table 1.1).50 There is variation in the number of statements between each six-months period and consequently also between each year, due to the different political and organisational style of the Presidencies, their varying resources and political developments. Accordingly considerably smaller numbers of speeches arose in some semesters: for instance only 49 statements were delivered by the Greek Presidency (2003). As can be seen from the quantitative analysis above, it is a general feature that more EU Presidency statements are delivered 49 UNGA, Official Records, 49th Session, 6th Plenary Meeting, 27 September 1994, p. 15. 50 It has to be emphasised that in this and the following statistics only the statements in formal meetings are included. Declarations made in informal settings or short contributions in formal meetings are not included, since there are no figures available for them.

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Table 1.2: EU Presidency Statements in the UNSC, 2000–2005 First Semester ( Jan.–Jun.) Year

EU Presidency

Number of statements

Second Semester ( Jul.–Dec.) EU Presidency

Number of statements

Total

2000 Portugal

15

France

13

28

2001 Sweden

23

Belgium

22

45

2002 Spain

24

Denmark

14

38

2003 Greece

15

Italy

17

32

2004 Ireland

25

Netherlands

15

40

2005 Luxembourg

14

UK

14

28

Source: Own calculations based on the digital online archive of the EC Delegation to the UN in New York.

in the second halves of the year. This is due to the occurrence of the main session of the UNGA. Probably the most important statement each year is the one given by the Presidency on behalf of the EU during the General Debate of the ministerial week at the beginning of each UNGA session. This statement is based on the ‘EU Priorities’ for the respective UNGA session and outlines the aims of the EU for the upcoming twelve months and serves therefore as an important orienting line for third parties, but also for the EU MS in the course of the session. There are four exceptions to the rule that the Presidency has the prerogative to speak on behalf of the EU in formal UN meetings: 1) within the UNSC, where usually the EU MS being members of the UNSC express national views and the Presidency gives statements on behalf of the Union only a couple of times each semester in open meetings on issues where there is a clear common EU position.51 On all questions of national interest or raised international awareness, in other words ‘important questions’, the EU MS in the UNSC would not

51 See also the section “The EU in the UN Security Council: Cooperation Attempts and Reform”, particularly pp. 179 ff.

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give up their right to speak. Table 1.2 shows the number of statements given by the EU Presidencies in the UNSC since the year 2000. They range between 13 to 25 statements in each semester. Political actualities and the level of engagement of each Presidency are relevant for the variation in the figures. Many of the speeches by the Presidency are delivered on frequently reoccurring questions. 2) The infrequent occurrences of national statements by EU MS in UN bodies except in the UNSC. 3) The cases in which the European Commission speaks on behalf of the EU group on issues in which the European Community holds exclusive competences or particular interests. Commission statements were delivered for instance on HIV/Aids, trade, development and human rights. Table 1.3 shows how seldom the Commission actually took the floor during the last years to make a statement in formal settings. 4) The last exception to the rule that the Presidency expresses the Union’s views are the few instances in which an EU MS not holding the Presidency represents the Union as part of a burden-sharing exercise (see below). Cases three and four concern also informal meetings, since also in unofficial settings the European Commission and the burden-sharers negotiate and speak on behalf of the Community or the Union, depending on the issue area or arrangements with the Presidency. Also with regard to the second variant informal meetings are included, since EU MS sometimes defend their own interests directly without making a detour through the EU Presidency. Table 1.3: European Commission Statements at UN Headquarters in New York, 2001–2005 Year

Number of Commission statements

2001

1

2002

5

2003

4

2004

3

2005

3

Source: Own calculations based on the digital online archive of the EC Delegation to the UN in New York.

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Only the second variant, i.e. national statements by EU MS in UN bodies except the UNSC, is really problematic from an EU perspective, whereas all other three options are a common and accepted component of the work at the UN, even though some EU MS would like to see a more active role of the Presidency also in the UNSC. If an EU MS takes the floor in a meeting in its national capacity this can happen for two reasons: because it wants to state the national position of its country when no EU common position exists and the EU Presidency remains silent accordingly. Then all EU MS that deem it necessary will speak. Such a situation is a unpleasant display of disagreement within the EU group to the wider UN membership. The other variant is that the Presidency gives a statement on behalf of the EU, but an EU MS requests the floor to add information to that statement. In that case the individual EU MS wants to highlight its specific important role in an issue area or underlines its views in points, in which it is not in complete agreement with the position presented by the Presidency or the country’s views go beyond the EU position. Usually the EU partners are informed about such a step, but sometimes it happens by surprise. Also this second variant is not welcome within the EU group, because the Union should express its position only through the Presidency in order to avoid to water down the EU position through additional statements, as well as to prevent the occurrence of contradictions.52 In addition it is a common perception that the EU’s voice is stronger and more influential at the UN if the Union also literally speaks only with one voice. But quite a few diplomats from EU MS doubt that it is always an effective tradition to leave the active part in discussions with third parties exclusively to the Presidency.53 Because in practice the single EU voice drowns when fifty developing countries take the floor. Then the impression arises within the UN membership—and is also put in writing accordingly in the minutes of proceedings and the press release of a meeting—that the exchange of arguments took the

52 Also the European Parliament in its resolution on “The relations between the European Union and the United Nations (2003/2049(INI))” highlighted that “whenever an EU statement is presented on behalf of the European Union or the European Community, EU Member States should refrain from making their national statements, which should only be envisaged on an exceptional basis and justified in advance to the EU Presidency”, adopted 29.1.2004, paragraph 36; to be found in the Official Journal of the European Union dated 21.4.2004. 53 Information received from diverse interviews conducted by the author in New York in 2004.

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form 50 to 1, even though the EU Presidency of course has spoken on behalf of at least 27 UN MS. Obviously the principle of a single Presidency can weaken the EU’s position at the UN. Perhaps it therefore would sometimes be better from an atmospheric and psychological perspective, if the EU MS spoke with ten massed voices than with one strong Presidency voice. In that case of course it would only be repeated ten times what had been previously said by the Presidency and not anything contradictory. Even though that might look like a mere question of presentation, such a strategy could nevertheless have an influence on the substance and the outcome. Therefore in some rare instances the EU Presidency has allowed to ‘open fire’ and asked other EU MS to speak in a meeting in support of the Presidency’s statement to create a fairly balanced picture of positions prevailing. Usually it is the EU Presidency, which negotiates on behalf of the Union with UN MS and the regional groupings on all matters which fall within the scope of the CFSP. In those typically informal settings the Presidency acts in accordance with the strategies, tactics and the substance agreed on in advance to each individual meeting within the EU group. Representatives of most of the other EU MS, as well as officials from the Commission and the Council Secretariat usually also attend those negotiations. Therefore they can support and advise the Presidency and also control its activities. Troika meetings are another special form of a negotiation format under the leadership of the Presidency.54 Also the European Commission plays an important part in the EU’s external representation in New York. It conducts negotiations with third countries in fields in which the Community has exclusive competences, and it also acts as negotiator, together with the Presidency, in areas of joint competences.55 The EU Presidency functions also as the often demanded ‘telephone number’ of the EU, the EU contact for third parties, at the UN. UN MS, other groupings or UN officials will approach the Presidency when they wish to build up a dialogue with the EU. And also vice versa, it is the Presidency which maintains informal contacts with third parties on behalf of the Union. Therefore the network a Presidency has at the UN

Troika meetings are discussed in Chapter Two, pp. 116 ff. See the section on the work of the Commission Delegation to the UN in New York, pp. 105 ff. 54 55

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is crucial for a successful term. Especially larger and more influential EU MS consequently have an advantage in representing the interests of the Union on the East River. On the other hand, small EU MS, which have a neutral reputation or no reputation at all because they have not been much involved in the processes, can also serve the interests of the EU very well, since third parties might approach them less prejudiced than the notorious big players within the Union. When asking EU MS diplomats about their impressions of good and successful Presidencies during the last years, it became clear that the skills of the people employed is the most decisive factor.56 Particularly the Greek, Irish and Dutch Presidencies were praised for their effectiveness, efficiency and overall accomplishment. On the other hand the Italian Presidency showed major weaknesses and produced chaos in some areas. In addition, some interviewees had the impression that the Italians were often not successful in separating their work for the EU from their national agenda and tried to implement national politics covered as an EU approach. Interesting is also that some EU MS diplomats saw a difference in the efforts undertaken by EU Presidencies to reach common ground within the EU group. They observed that for some Presidencies it was not a very high priority to try to get the EU to form a common position behind a resolution, especially when difficult to achieve. Other Presidencies tried to get closer to an EU consensus despite little prospect for success. This very much depended on the perception of its role by each individual Presidency and its reading of how important it is to achieve a common position, or rather how damaging it would be not to reach common ground. One of the main deficits of the current organisation of the EU Presidency is precisely that the work weighs down one-sidedly upon the Presidency. As a rule, most EU MS attend EU coordination meetings and follow the internal and external discussions, but their expertise and abilities are not really exploited. The potential of the combined capabilities of the 27 EU partners is taken advantage of at best to a degree of 20 per cent.57 Therefore, but especially to relieve the Presidency, it becomes more and more common practice within the EU group that

Based on diverse interviews conducted by the author in New York in 2004. Interview number 7, 6 May 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]). 56 57

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the EU Presidency mandates different EU MS and the Commission to represent the EU in discussions on specific resolutions or entire issue areas. This exercise is called ‘burden-sharing’. The sharing of the work with other EU MS takes into account the knowledge they have in some specific topics. Burden-sharing is utilised most often on an ad hoc basis. The EU MS acting in support of the Presidency through burden-sharing is responsible for the EU internal coordination on that issue, but also for the external representation, including negotiations at the UN. In general, this practice needs to be encouraged and extended, as well as used in the ‘outreach’ to other groups or countries. An adaptation of this comprehensive version of burden-sharing would be that the EU MS break up into groups of three or four countries to deal with and prepare a certain issue area, particularly in order to make use of the expertise existing in specific questions. The EU Presidency would remain in charge of the outward representation. Germany suggested this option for the negotiations on the UN budget in the Fifth Committee in the year 2003, regrettably without success. Another problem of the dominant headship of the EU Presidency is that the rest of the EU MS are often waiting for the action-taking by the Presidency and the other 26 limit themselves to take note of what is happening. Their action is concrete often only during the EU coordination meetings. Therefore the EU is not using the potential of its huge number of diplomats for lobbying for the EU positions with third parties. Burden-sharing is a solution also in that respect. 1.3

The Role of the EU Member States—National Interests as the Basis of EU Coordination

Supporting realist notions of international politics, national interests of EU MS are the main factor forming the EU voice at the UN. Their inputs into the coordination process, as well as the positions and interests of the 27 EU MS are only marginally influenced by the existing of the CFSP.58 Therefore EU MS capitals are crucial for the EU’s influence at the UN, driving the foreign political reasoning and action-taking of the

58 This is in line with several interviews conducted in New York in 2004, in particular interviews number 29, 9 December 2004 and 36, 20 December 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]).

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group and the EU Presidency at the UN. This remains true despite more than three decades of EPC and CFSP, particularly in an environment like the UN, which is a collective of sovereign states interacting intergovernmentally. Policies driven by ideas of national sovereignty, power and interests are consequently part of the daily routine in the meetings and corridors of the UN. The close cooperation of the EU MS and the Commission within the UN is primarily guided by an operational imperative and should not be confused with a surrender of competences or power. Room for the European idea is therefore only as long it does not collide with individual EU countries’ interests—which does not mean that there is no galvanizing and disciplining factor caused by the existing of the CFSP. With that the fundamental paradox which lies at the core of the EU coordination at the UN, but also in other multilateral settings and in Brussels, is addressed: on the one hand, business with EU partners has to be done efficiently and consensus-oriented by means of minimising differences. But on the other hand, while taking this dictum into account, the EU MS diplomat’s raison d’être is to protect the interests of his or her country by achieving the most positive result possible as defined by the national interests. A careful and incessant balancing of those incompatible features is therefore necessary in order not to forfeit credibility, trust and influence within the EU group. This paradox is the single most shaping element of EU coordination in New York and becomes much more visible than in Brussels.59 The EU MS are the actors behind the scenes with regard to the EU’s representation at the UN. However, they are the ones that bring in the substance, which the EU Presidency then has to put together to an EU position. Therefore, even though they leave the centre stage to the Presidency as their speaker, the Presidency is representing nothing else than the compilation of the national positions of the EU MS. That makes them to the real players in the process, because—to stay within the metaphor used above—the selection of the ingredients the EU countries deliver and expect to be incorporated determines how the Presidency has to cook the dish in consideration of the fixed recipe (TEU), and most importantly what the dish will be, i.e. what the final common position transported outwardly will look like.

59 Information received from various interviews conducted by the author in New York in May, October and December 2004.

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Of course it is hardly ever the case that an individual EU MS will be in the position to enforce a particular view, especially if it is isolated. And most of the EU MS are reasonable enough to know that at a certain point they have to give up a rigid national position for a compromise solution. As a matter of fact, as a result of the sheer size of the EU group, which makes it more likely that divergent views emerge, most of the time an EU standpoint is a compromise position as a mixture of 27 national positions and the views of the Commission and sometimes the Council Secretariat. However, most of the time, the basic political approach within the group is shared by all EU MS on most issues, usually making it easy to achieve such a compromise. Variation among the national views usually exists only on details, which nevertheless have to be accommodated in the final EU position. As a general rule an EU common position is the stronger and therefore more likely to influence the final outcome at the UN, the closer the national positions within the EU group lie together from the outset. If there is a significant gap between two positions within the group, a middle course has to be found. Since agreement on substance is usually not realisable in such situations, this middle course will most likely be a statement or a draft resolution presented by the EU, which does not explicitly express a position on a problem and simply includes ‘empty’ words. This would be a lowest common denominator solution. It would be a weak position, since the EU cannot expect to give input into the final result reached at the UN without a competitive standpoint. In that case the EU Presidency could nevertheless try to be involved in the negotiations with third parties, even though it has a very limited room of manoeuvre. It is even more destructive, if there is no EU contribution at all in a UN meeting, i.e. the EU remains silent on an issue or—as the worst case scenario—if individual EU MS produce national contributions because of EU internal disagreement. Since it has no mandate, the EU Presidency remains passive in those cases. The EU internal conflict is obvious to everyone outside the group. Only if the national positions of EU MS are located within a certain margin it is possible to reach common ground within the EU group. Ideally, national positions are identical. That would be a largest common denominator solution. Then the EU has a very strong position, since the Presidency has a clear mandate and can use clear language in speeches or resolutions without having to show consideration for sensitivities by individual EU MS.

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There is significant pressure within the EU club to achieve a common position. In questions of minor or moderate political importance, EU MS would therefore rather give up a national interest in order not to stand in the way of a compromise or eventually go it alone. The danger of trying the ties to the EU partners and to risk isolation also in other fields as a spill-over effect would not stand in adequate relation to the national interest to be defended in that case. Only if a country regards it as absolutely necessary to defend an interest it will block a common position and rather proceed alone. But before taking such a step a clear weighing up of what can be achieved when acting without the EU partners has to be undertaken, as a single country has hardly any chance to influence proceedings at the UN. If an EU MS proceeds without the support of its group it therefore has to be sure that other allies outside the EU will support its objectives in order to have influence on the outcome of the deliberations at the UN. This rational actor assumption might only be qualified if domestic policies or a differently shaped calculation of a government makes a country proceed alone because of a matter of principle, i.e. let it proceed without any prospect of playing a role in negotiations at the UN as its position is shaped by a reasoning different from the usual Realpolitik at the UN aimed at maximisation of power. However, before the actual isolation becomes inevitable, diplomats of the respective EU MS will try to avoid this scenario through intense informal consultations within the EU group. Good diplomats may be that successful in their EU internal lobbying that a country, which was isolated in the beginning, is joined by a couple of other EU MS and perhaps even amasses a majority, making it necessary for the EU Presidency to incorporate its interests in the common EU position. Decisions within the EU group in New York are not taken through voting. Such a way of conflict solution is out of the question for several reasons: the core cause is that the adoption of decisions within the CFSP has to be generally done by unanimity. The EU MS were eager not to give up this principle in the TEU and the subsequent Treaties. In addition, one should not forget that it is an informal coordination process that takes place at UN headquarters. Such a structure does not allow formal voting, which could set precedents also for EU bodies outside New York. And in general, any form of decision-making, which would impose the will of a majority upon a minority of EU MS is unthinkable in an intergovernmental environment such as the one at the UN. Accordingly all EU MS have to have the right to act in

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accordance with their national interests and cannot be forced to give up this right unwillingly. Since there is no option to reach a solution via internal voting, EU MS have to discuss as long as there is a common position or it becomes clear that such a position is unachievable. However, as will become clear in a later Chapter,60 the EU internal culture very much depends on the individual issue and the culture that prevails in a UN body. While for instance the EU will always act as a group with regard to the Second UNGA Main Committee, some deviation is possible in the Fifth and Sixth Committee. In the First and Third Committee it is even happening regularly that EU MS vote differently in UN meetings (‘split votes’). In EU coordination meetings on those two Committees then sometimes table rounds are done, in which each EU MS only states how it intends to vote in a UN meeting. Discussions on substance or attempts to reach a common position are useless at this stage and on those issues. When the EU group is in the process of forming a common position it does not want the rest of the UN membership to know what it is discussing and which position each country is taking. And once a common position is reached, this position is communicated and tried to be maintained. It is attempted to avoid the emergence of heterogeneous perspectives on the part of EU MS vis-à-vis the UN membership, as this would be divisive. But this attempt is not only doomed to failure if contradictory views by EU MS on important issues become public, most importantly at the UNSC, but also undermined frequently on less important questions in a unofficial manner. Because even if a country officially joins an EU consensus by giving up national interests to that end, it has nevertheless the chance to exert influence informally to achieve a final outcome that comes closer to the originally envisaged national position than possible within the EU common position. This lobbying is done both within the EU group and within the wider UN membership, and should not be underestimated in its relevance. For instance the UK has established a network of close contacts, e.g. the US and the Commonwealth. They use those tracks in parallel to the EU to accomplish their objectives, i.e. they work outside of the EU. France

60

See Chapter Three on the EU coordination in various UN bodies, pp. 135 ff.

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and other former colonial powers use similar measures. This reflects a reality that is also vital for many other EU MS: as most EC/EU MS were members of the UN already before the institutionalised cooperation among started within the EPC and later the CFSP, these networks within the organisation are much older and sometimes deeper than the ties within the European group. An example of the efforts in parallel to the EU would be the informal activities of a large EU MS with regard to the Fifth Committee in 2004. The large EU MS formally supported the common EU line taken, but managed to convince other important players from JUSCANZ and the Rio Group to represent its position against the EU in the negotiations, for which reason its interests were finally included in the overall compromise in the Committee. The pursue of national interests justifies such measures, even though they might emasculate the cooperation within the EU. Within the EU coordination process the individual EU MS present their national views on substance, strategies and tactics. If contradictory views surface, EU coordination turns into a negotiation process. It is important to mention in that regard that one of the complaints that nearly all delegates of EU MS have with regard to the effectiveness of EU coordination is that the EU internal negotiation often absorbs a lot of the energy that should be better devoted to negotiations and lobbying with third countries, particularly informally. But due to the group formation at the UN as described above, there is hardly an alternative to that time-consuming process: if the EU does not have a position it is not able to talk to the other countries and groups. Therefore internal negotiation is essential, but the Presidency has to try to leave some room for contacts with third parties and prevent the EU group from becoming too much self-absorbed. However, since the EU Presidency knows very well where the fundamental sensitivities of the individual EU MS lie it includes them within EU coordination in its first proposal on how to proceed in a specific issue area, in order to have a working basis that in principle every EU MS could live with. On the basis of good and thought-through proposals, and perhaps through informal bilateral discussions before the EU internal discussions begin with the countries that might have strong views, the EU Presidency can achieve a common position more easily. As a consequence the national positions of some EU MS are represented in the final EU position, although they did not even have to state them in EU coordination meetings. The extent of input from their capitals is shaped by the importance the individual EU MS attaches to the UN and what those countries try

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to achieve through the organisation. Hardly surprising, France and the UK as permanent members of the UNSC see the UN, also independently from the Security Council, as an important vehicle to pursue their national interests on the international stage. Both states have an extensive network of external relations outside the EU, particularly to former colonies, which makes the forum UN even more central to them. The endeavour of Germany to play a greater role in world politics makes the New York-based organisation intensely important to it. In addition there is a group of EU MS, which do not have an extensive network of foreign policy relations, and are therefore inclined to work through international organisations, especially Austria, Finland and Sweden. An active utilisation of their UN membership is therefore particularly in the interest of those countries. And it is also important to differentiate by the subject areas in question when looking at the influence from EU MS capitals to the EU coordination in New York. On issues of security the national interests of most EU MS are strong and therefore the process is capital-driven and hardly flexible. Other subject areas, where the Europeanisation, i.e. the convergence of national positions, has progressed very much, e.g. development policies, the coordination process is characterised by a much less confrontational atmosphere within the EU. Since no national interests are at stake and there is a long tradition of EU common positions and a long history of UN decisions, making surprises less likely, the influence from capitals is then less visible. Additionally, some EU MS attach importance to some specific issues, and back their interests accordingly with influencing control from capitals when they are discussed. Examples are disarmament, crucial for France and the UK, population and development, very important for Sweden and the Netherlands, or budget and financial questions, where Germany and the UK have big interests to defend. In general it is obvious that certain countries have certain priorities in certain issue areas and in certain parts of the world, so they tend to influence the positions of the others on those issue areas, in these parts of the world. History also plays a vital role in that regard. Most often the fields of specific importance for each EU MS, and accordingly their national positions, have a long tradition and are therefore well known within the EU group. Also the resources available to EU MS for their representation at the UN shape the influence from their capitals. Particularly some of the EU MS that joined the Union in 2004 have very limited financial and personnel resources. But when one diplomat has to deal with two

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UNGA Main Committees in parallel, for which large EU MS employ more than ten people, the flow of information back to capitals is sparse and the influence of the respective capital—and the country in general—is restricted. If a country has a longer tradition of international diplomacy, it is also better equipped to put its views across. However, an ideal existence of resources and diplomatic tradition does not mean that a country is necessarily perceived as being a more important MS than others: some EU MS with huge resources are surprisingly passive and ineffective. The representation and communication of member states’ interests happens through their Permanent Missions to the UN, which every EU country runs in New York. Effectively they are their countries’ embassies to the UN. These bodies have a significant weight in decision-making. It is from governments and ministries that the Missions to the UN receive their instructions on content and sometimes even tactics with regard to the EU coordination process and their behaviour at the UN. Missions often only translate these instructions into feasible negotiating positions, through representatives which might be good diplomats, but unable to be real experts in all the issue areas discussed. Especially in the case of the larger EU countries it is the national bureaucracies where the expertise is located. In the ministries in charge of a specific subject area, i.e. mainly the ones responsible for foreign and economic affairs and development cooperation, but also ministries of finance, environment, defence and others whose provinces are involved, experts cope with the details of ongoing or forthcoming negotiations and give instructions to New York. When a Functional Commission is convened at the UN, during the main session of the UNGA, or whenever specific interests are at stake in a certain period, EU capitals send experts to New York in order to have the expertise and manpower in situ to influence the discussions in their favour. Furthermore, some EU MS, e.g. Germany, assign experts from other ministries for the work at the UN even for a longer period of up to three years. However, despite the know-how of all those experts their lack of diplomatic training is often unhelpful in the multilateral environment of the UN, where negotiating skills and cautious behaviour is often more important than a well-founded knowledge of the substance discussed. The communication between delegations to the UN and their capitals is not a one-way street. Diplomats report back fully and accurately to their colleagues in the foreign service or other relevant ministries about

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the positions of EU partners and the development of the negotiations, EU internally and externally with third parties, and also offer interpretations. Therefore, they can influence the guidance they will receive from their home countries through their way of reporting about the events. Furthermore, the corset of instructions given by capitals to their representatives at the UN varies significantly in their breathing space from EU MS to EU MS. While especially the Scandinavian countries often have only a few general guidelines on objectives to be achieved during a UNGA session in a particular subject area, it happens particularly in the case of larger EU MS that extremely detailed instructions are given, also for each individual EU coordination meeting. In practice, the diplomat concerned then has no other choice but to communicate these directives literally, sometimes by reading them out word-by-word. In those cases they have no flexibility to react to unexpected developments without conferring anew with the respective capital. This is a consequence of the significant resources by some EU MS in the form of large ministerial bureaucracies, in which experts cope with the details of ongoing or forthcoming negotiations with noteworthy meticulousness, giving clear guidance to delegates in New York. Such a concentrated expertise at the ‘home front’ have only the large EU MS, which often grant them an advantage within EU internal consultations.61 Another reason for the varying room of manoeuvre given to delegates is the different culture prevailing in diplomacy. While some EU MS see their diplomats primarily as recipients of instructions and as an executing tool of the foreign office, others concede fantasy, self-initiative and adequate assessment of a situation and appropriate action to their representatives on the spot. The latter strategy often proofs to be more effective. Nevertheless, even though by no means independent from their capitals, the HoMs62 have a certain margin of flexibility in the EU coordination process. Their position in the hierarchy allows them to take decisions more independently, also in rather important questions, especially if

61 This aspect, and most of the ones mentioned above, are in line with Robert D. Putnam’s findings on the entanglements of domestic and international politics. See Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988), pp. 427–460. 62 Head of Mission; Permanent Representative of each EU national representation to the UN, usually a very senior official from the respective foreign ministry.

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the time factor is crucial and no instructions can be received from the capital in due time. Input by EU capitals into the processes and decisions taken within the EU at the UN is given through three different channels: 1) Directly through instructions given by capitals to their diplomats in New York; 2) national representatives take decisions in Brussels-based EU bodies on certain issues, from the European Council to the Council Working Groups, and therefore provide directions to the experts in New York on substance and sometimes also on process and tactics; 3) the middle course between both variants and the most frequent adaptation of channel 2 is that there are decisions taken by EU bodies, but that the concrete elaboration of these guidelines is again incumbent upon the directive of national capitals, especially since those decisions are often very general and not necessarily timely in nature or even outdated. Diplomats of EU MS posted to New York are aware of events in EU bodies mostly only through COREUs.63 A rather complete institutional memory with an over-arching view on the activities of a range of EU bodies exists only within the Liaison Office of the Council. But this Office provides its knowledge only on request. A weekly information letter on the latest developments in all relevant EU bodies prepared by the Office is directed to the Heads of Missions of all EU missions, but unfortunately not to lower ranks. Therefore the relevance and influence of this ‘Brussels Brief ’ is limited. Even if there have been decisions taken within bodies under the EU umbrella, such as in Council Working Groups, on a particular issue, it will be the national ministries that will translate these decisions into instructions for their diplomats at the UN. This tendency is particularly visible in the case of larger EU countries. Problematic is, however, that the individual instructions might not be always in accordance with decisions taken in Brussels, or even contradictory to them. This is due to the fact that those decisions are often general in nature and their translation into concrete policies and tactics appears to be difficult or that capitals sometimes simply are not aware of developments in EU bodies. Furthermore, negotiations at the UN often gather a dynamic of their own, which compels capitals to revise instructions sometimes even several times a day. This again results in completely different strategies than designed beforehand, also

63 Correspondence Européenne; correspondence system between all EU MS and EU bodies.

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contradictory among EU countries, despite constant coordination efforts on the spot in New York. And of course, the safeguarding of national positions behind the back of other EU partners in contact with third parties, while officially supporting the EU position, leads to national positions communicated outwardly that have hardly any EU substance. Some smaller EU countries, on the other hand, take the decisions taken by Brussels-based bodies as the way to move forward, not least because it represents a strategy based on the expertise of various EU partners taken together, on which they could not fall back upon in their own capitals. The notion of ‘Europeanisation’ or ‘Brusselisation’64 (generated by the reflectivist/constructivist school of thought), which leads to ‘Brusselsbased intergovernmentalism’,65 described as “institutionalised policy coordination, involving common EU-wide work practices and structures, a shared information base, the establishment of a common substantive agenda and of a unique policy making structure [. . .] establish[ing] a truly collective context through which a large proportion of ‘national’ foreign policy is now formulated and pursued”,66 derives from the assumption that the constant and intense cooperation and interaction among EU MS changes ideas, behaviour and policies over time.67 This again enables an effective and efficient implementation of the CFSP. However, this concept is not convincingly applicable when analysing the CFSP at the UN. The EU MS continue to feel and act as individual entities and not as parts of a group. Only when looking at procedures and processes, the same mechanisms and practices, which shape the

64 David Allen, “Who Speaks for Europe? The search for an effective and coherent External Policy”, in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP, (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 41–58. 65 Jolyon Howarth, European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?, Chaillot Paper 43 (November 2000), Paris, Institute for Security Studies. 66 Ben Tonra, “The European Union’s Global Role”, FORNET Working Paper (unpublished), Working Group 1: Theories and Approaches to the CFSP (London, 2003), p. 7. 67 Critical analysis of the phenomenon ‘Europeanisation’, its relevance on policymaking within the EU and its impact on EU MS policies can be found in Klaus Goetz and Simon Hix (eds.) Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems (London: Frank Cass, 2001), Johan P. Olsen, “The many faces of Europeanization”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40 (5) (2002), pp. 921–52 and Reuben Wong, “The Europeanization of Foreign Policy” in International Relations and the European Union, ed. by. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2005), pp. 134–153.

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cooperation among EU MS in Brussels, are in place. But the influence of Brussels and the spill over of political culture established there on the formulation and pursuit of national foreign policies at the UN is only insignificant. Therefore, even though the idea of Brusselisation does not exclude the existence of national interests, it overrates the role of the European context as a catalyst, influencing and changing national foreign policies before they are discussed intergovernmentally, described as a “consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex, collective policymaking system”.68 The existence of CFSP and Brussels-based institutions absorbs differences in some areas, because of the pressure to reach consensus, and might even alter national positions themselves over time. But the multilateral environment of the UN with its much stronger influence from national capitals than from Brussels-based institutions creates a much lower inhibition level to go alone or with third parties or even to act against EU partners than one might expect. Therefore it can be substantiated that a ‘consultation reflex’ exists,69 but only with limited effects on the policies themselves. Why is there otherwise a plateau within EU voting coherence in the UNGA ascertainable, or even a drop in coherence, as will become clear in Chapter Five? Apparently the EU cooperation serves only to harmonise or ‘brusselise’ the positions on the anyway less controversial issues. But the really contentious questions are not solved through ever closer cooperation. The national interests would have to change to achieve coherent policies on those issues. However, it is certainly true that the foreign policy expression of EU MS has changed during the last years at the UN. Especially the smaller EU MS have broadened their ‘cognitive reach’ significantly and the very fact that they are members of the EU obliges them to be involved in a much wider range of issues than before.70 Their EU membership makes them create and protect positions they not necessarily have interests in themselves, but which are of EU common interest. Another effect is that EU MS use their obligations towards the consensus-orientation within the EU as a means of excusing their own policies towards third parties, i.e. by saying they would have liked to act differently, but would have to take into account the interests of the EU partners (‘shield effect’). This Ben Tonra, The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policies in CFSP (Aldershot: Aldgate, 2001). 69 Simon J. Nuttall, European Political Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 70 Tonra, The European Union’s Global Role, op. cit. in note 66. 68

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utilisation of the EU for national interests works also rather pro-actively, in the way that an individual EU MS can influence the whole EU group at the UN to endorse its position and uses the EU Presidency to present this country’s otherwise uncomfortable position, which prevents third parties to know who actually stands behind a position absorbed by the EU group in general. The observations made in this chapter underline that it is the national interests that drive the processes among EU countries at the UN, that it is still the age of intergovernmental dealings between EU countries, that the CFSP has not yet fully arrived at the UN, although it is now already fifteen years old. As one senior diplomat from an EU institution said: In a way I remember the times of the old political cooperation [EPC] when everybody tried to cooperate with everybody in order to pursue national goals. This is very much the situation in New York these days. Hopefully the EU MS will realise that we now have a common policy and that this common policy in general has made an enormous progress over the last few years—and that they somehow have to express it also here at the UN.71

So far, the particularly strong national interests in the state-centric environment of the UN prevented such a development. Or in the words of Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith: “It is indeed surprising the degree to which intergovernmental and even ‘realist’ theoretical approaches continue to have relevance in understanding EU diplomacy at the UN”. 1.4 1.4.1

The EU Coordination Process in New York

General Overview

Policy coordination is the precondition for cooperation among sovereign states. Coordination is present if the decisions by states are adjusted with the consequence that the adverse effects of any one decision for other decisions are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, or

71 Interview number 36, 20 December 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]).

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counterbalanced or overweighed.72 Intergovernmental cooperation as we spot it in CFSP at the UN “takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realisation of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination”.73 The cooperation and coordination among EU MS at the UN, and finally the representation of common positions agreed on, has a long tradition. Since the founding of the UN in 1945, the Benelux countries have coordinated their policies within the UNGA.74 With the creation of the European Communities France and Italy joined the regular consultations. The establishment of the EPC in 1970 and the accession of Germany to the UN (1973) deepened the cooperation among the EC members in New York further. A main reason for the establishment of a coordination mechanism between European countries at the UN have been the numerous entries of developing countries to the UN since the late 1960s in the course of decolonisation. This development deprived the Western countries of the dominant position they inherited in the 1950s. Only in a united fashion it was then possible to pursue national interests, which were of course not that fundamentally different within the Western bloc, and even more congruent among the Western European countries. EU policies at the UN are coordinated and formed to a large extend in New York directly. The EU MS, represented through their missions to the UN, are the main actors in the coordination process. One of them, the country holding the Presidency for six months, represents the EU outwardly and is responsible for organising and carrying out the internal coordination. The whole process of EU coordination in New York is therefore a reflection of the CFSP en miniature: an intergovernmental structure, regulated through a regime aimed at speaking with one voice to achieve outcomes unachievable when the 27 EU MS would act individually.

72 Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 227. 73 Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 51–3. 74 Beate Lindemann, EG-Staaten und Vereinte Nationen: Die politische Zusammenarbeit der Neun in den UN-Hauptorganen (Munich and Vienna: Oldenbourg, 1978), p. 57.

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Figure 1.4: Total Number of EU Coordination Meetings in New York, 1995–2005 1400 Number of meetings

1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Year

Source: Own calculations based on figures of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN in New York.

Internal communication is key to speak with one EU voice outwardly. Coordination meetings are the single most important instrument for achieving a coherent EU policy at the UN. According to the Treaty (TEU), all EU meetings in New York are informal meetings, since coordination is not part of the institutional framework of the Council. Experts from the 27 EU MS missions to the UN, joined by delegates from the EU Commission and the Council Secretariat meet very frequently: more than 1,000 internal EU meetings are held every year (see figure 1.4 and table 1.4, p. 62). Compared to the days of EPC this is a significant increase, as for instance in 1975 there were only 173 such meetings and in 1989 490.75 In the period observed, 2001 was the year in which most coordination meetings (1254) meetings were held, while in 1998 only 864 meetings were scheduled. Within the first semester, January was the most quiet month (average of 47 meetings) (see table 1.5, p. 62) and March the most busiest (average of 116 meetings).

75 Silvia Bartali, “Italy and the EC at the UN”, in Italy and EC membership evaluated, ed. by Francesco Francioni (London: Pinter, 1992), p. 140.

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Table 1.4: Total Number of EU Coordination Meetings in New York, 1995–2005 Year

First Semester ( Jan.–Jun.)

Second Semester ( Jul.–Dec.)

Total

1995

451

466

917

1996

543

516

1059

1997

505

515

1020

1998

395

469

864

1999

494

633

1127

2000

665

579

1244

2001

674

580

1254

2002

541

601

1142

2003

483

578

1061

2004

569

543

1112

2005

488

535

1023

AVERAGES

528

547

1075

Source: Own calculations based on figures of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN in New York.

Table 1.5: EU Coordination Meetings First Semester ( January–June), 1995–2005 Year

Presidency

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Total

1995

France

61

67

87

114

79

43

451

1996

Italy

74

113

101

91

101

63

543

1997

Netherlands

46

80

84

146

64

85

505

1998

UK

30

75

98

84

52

56

395

1999

Germany

29

78

134

98

82

73

494

2000

Portugal

43

150

135

101

131

105

665

2001

Sweden

58

123

139

138

115

101

674

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Table 1.5 (cont.) Year

Presidency

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Total

2002

Spain

70

108

144

113

63

43

541

2003

Greece

32

80

133

71

76

91

483

2004

Ireland

36

71

129

163

105

106

569

2005

Luxembourg

41

96

93

86

95

77

488

47

95

116

110

88

77

529

AVERAGES

Source: Own calculations based on figures of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN in New York.

Table 1.6: EU Coordination Meetings Second Semester ( July–December), 1995–2005 Year

Presidency

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Total

1995

Spain

52

36

52

99

148

79

466

1996

Ireland

75

26

92

107

150

66

516

1997

Luxembourg

35

13

55

134

175

103

515

1998

Austria

76

4

56

141

150

42

469

1999

Finland

29

21

78

171

210

124

633

2000

France

77

17

71

175

167

72

579

2001

Belgium

55

14

48

190

183

90

580

2002

Denmark

82

23

60

203

170

63

601

2003

Italy

36

18

60

183

189

92

578

2004

Netherlands

87

10

43

152

174

77

543

2005

UK

64

26

55

148

149

93

535

AVERAGES

61

19

61

155

170

82

547

Source: Own calculations based on figures of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN in New York.

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When one looks at the second semester (see table 1.6, p. 63), it becomes clear that, due to the summer break, only a small number of EU coordination meetings were organised in August (average of 19 meetings), while the main session of UNGA made it necessary to hold many EU meetings in October (average of 155 meetings) and November (average of 170 meetings). At first sight it might be surprising that the number of EU coordination meetings is not significantly higher during the second semesters, even though the UNGA is in its main session then. That is an indication for an increased convening of on-the-spot meetings at UN premises due to time constraints. In addition the preparation of the main session is usually done very thoroughly, for which reason the Presidency generally has a clear mandate on how to act, making additional meetings obsolete. On the whole, the numbers make also clear that the main session is by no means the only time of the year when the UN is working, but that also many bodies besides the UNSC hold deliberations all over the year, except during the summer break. It has to be underlined that the number of meetings in the individual months fluctuates significantly from one EU Presidency to another. For instance in August there was a variance between 4 and 36 meetings. The variation between years and months in different years results from the different events occurring in each Presidency, but also from the diverse style of each Presidency. However, on average the numbers given should be representative also for the years to come in illustrating a tendency at what time during each year EU coordination is especially intense. Only changes in the schedule of UN events and a progressing European integration would alter the general appearance of the number of EU coordination meetings in New York. In general it is apparent that the overall number of EU coordination meetings is stagnating since the year 2000, and even decreasing since 2002. However, it is crucial not to derive directly practical or political interpretations from the numbers of meetings. If smaller or greater numbers are positive or negative is difficult to generalise. Small numbers of meetings might indicate that there is not much need for coordination due to EU internal agreement on most issues. Therefore clear common positions or at least a regular synchronisation of positions exist. Small numbers could also hint at less hectic times and unproblematic developments at the UN. But few coordination meetings can also result from an effective coordination regime under a specific EU Presidency: some EU Presidencies manage through good preparation of their semester and also of the coordination meetings themselves, as

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well as through the consequent use of silent procedures76 that they have a clear mandate, and that therefore less meetings are needed. It is also possible that fewer meetings are organised in subject areas in which it is impossible to reach EU consensus, and in which it is accordingly useless to coordinate. Large numbers of meetings, on the other hand, may signify busy times at the UN or diverging positions within the EU group, making extensive consultations necessary. They might also be a symptom of an overly cautious EU Presidency, which tries to avoid a firm management and guidance of the process and allows discussions on a whole range of details until all EU MS are satisfied entirely. They could be also interpreted positively: large numbers denote that there is a lot of communication going on among EU MS, that they make use of coordination meetings as much as possible to harmonise action, instead of proceeding individually. Qualitative insights into the realities at UN headquarters are obviously indispensable for a conclusive interpretation of the figures. With those insights in mind it is clear that the stagnation or even reduction of the overall number of EU coordination meetings during the last years is a good sign, showing that despite intense coordination in all issue areas besides the UNSC and the interlocking of the activities of all EU MS the peak of necessity for coordination is reached. The common understanding among EU MS with regard to substance is evidently better than ever, since such a concentrated cooperation implies that increasingly more meetings have to be used for the discussion of organisational and technical questions, for which reason even with a stagnant total of coordination meetings the number of coordination meetings on substance declines. There are two encouraging and important exceptions of the stagnation in coordination meetings, Article 19 and HoMs meetings: the number of both meetings has increased in recent years, as will be discussed below. Council regulations recommend that EU Presidencies keep the number of meetings down. The overall numbers just reflect that. However, most Presidencies were not successful in their attempts to reduce and control the number of meetings in all subject areas. Particularly the number of meetings related to the Second and Third Committee should and could be cut down. In practice, the aim of less coordination meetings can only be achieved if the organisational efficiency and

76

The instrument of ‘silence procedures’ is described below, pp. 66 ff.

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internal cooperation of the mission of the EU MS holding the Presidency is enhanced. However, there is a tendency that with progressing duration of a Presidency it looses control on the number of meetings. The other EU MS can contribute to a reduction especially through a more systematic use of flexible mandates given to the Presidency. The numbers given in the tables include only the official EU meetings, not on-the-spot meetings at the UN. Those additional meetings in corridors and vacant UN conference rooms are often necessary during ongoing negotiations to adjust the mandate of the EU Presidency, to harmonise EU positions or to agree on tactics in reaction to unexpected developments without having the time to conduct a proper meeting. The real numbers of EU coordination meetings are therefore higher, presumably by more than hundred meetings per year.77 In periods without exceptional political developments or special events at the UN, three to five meetings with a different thematic focus take place every working day. However, during busy times, e.g. during a crisis, when a Functional Commission meets or when the UNGA Main Committees are in session, a significantly higher number of meetings is carried out. Then it happens that EU experts come together for the same event in the morning (to prepare the discussions at the UN during the morning, usually taking place between 10 a.m. and 1 p.m.), during lunchtime (to prepare UN discussions during the afternoon, usually taking place between 3 p.m. and 6 p.m.) and also in the evenings (to allow sufficient time for further EU internal discussions on the developments). Meetings are convened by the EU Presidency via email through the ‘Cireu’ system.78 Those emails called ‘Cireus’ contain information on the agenda of the respective meeting and relevant documents as emailattachments. This electronic means of communication links all EU MS missions in New York with each other and is the other important instrument to achieve a coherent EU policy besides coordination meetings. In addition to the convocation of meetings it allows the Presidency and all other EU countries to inform partners timely and inexpensively about latest developments and carry out administrative and organisational matters. The management of the ‘Cireu’ system and the circulation of emails and documents is undertaken by the Council Secretariat. Another important part of the coordination process undertaken through the ‘Cireu’ system is the running of silence procedures. That means that the

Statistical data for on-the-spot meetings does not exist. More information on the ‘Cireu’ system is given in the section on the work of the Council’s Liaison Office to the UN, pp. 95 ff. 77 78

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Presidency sends out a document combined with a deadline. If none of the EU MS, Council Secretariat or the Commission raises an objection to the document, i.e. everyone remains ‘silent’, the document is cleared. Silence procedures are used to clear speeches and speaking points of the Presidency, as well as draft resolutions or technical organisational matters. However, if the silent procedure is broken by an EU MS, EU internal discussions have to be taken up again. Silence procedures are usually used to clear documents discussed in a previous EU coordination meeting. Since the Presidency tries to incorporate all the views around the table in the respective document, the silence procedures are hardly ever broken. This instrument makes it possible to avoid convening EU coordination meetings and gives a clear response and mandate to the EU Presidency and simplifies the coordination process significantly. The decreasing overall number of coordination meetings as shown above indicates also that the mechanism of silence procedures is used more often, increasing the efficiency of the process. Planning and announcement of the coordination meetings should be done by the EU Presidency as far in advance as possible. This is particularly useful for those EU MS that maintain small missions and need to prioritise attendance as much as possible. But for all other delegations it is equally important to have time to prepare for each meeting. In addition, the quality of the meetings, the likelihood of fruitful discussions and the chance to get a common position are higher if a meeting has been planned well in advance, simply because experts then have time to let their capitals know about the issues to be discussed in a upcoming meeting and to get complete instructions. Otherwise experts sometimes have to ask for another meeting since they are unable to agree to a common position without further directives. In addition experts can use the meantime to approach other EU partners informally and arrange a compromise before the actual meeting starts. A provisional weekly timetable of upcoming coordination meetings is issued each Friday for the following week. As in Brussels, EU coordination meetings usually take place on the premises of the Council Secretariat. For instance in the year 2003, only 86 of the 1061 meetings (8,1%)79 were convened elsewhere, mostly in the

79 Within the eight EU Presidencies from 2000 to 2003, 6.7 per cent of all EU coordination meetings were held outside the Council Secretariat. On-the-spot EU coordination meetings at UN premises are not included in those calculations, since they are not included in the Council Secretariat’s statistics.

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Presidency’s mission. Meetings have to be convened outside the Council Secretariat when its meeting rooms are all booked out or because a meeting is supposed to take place after the office hours of the Council Secretariat. Since its move to the new premises in July 2004, the Council Secretariat has six meeting rooms, before that four. At least up to thirty people can be accommodated around the table in each of the rooms. A predetermined seating order exists in the meeting rooms, which is the same in all EU coordination meetings, rotating with each Presidency (see figure 1.5). It is based on a Council decision and corresponds with the sequence of the EU Presidencies. The seating order takes the same form on all other locations where EU coordination happens. Please note that the Commission is seated vis-à-vis the Presidency and the delegate of the Council Secretariat sits to the left of the Presidency to support its work, while to the Presidency’s right one of its own representatives is seated for the same purpose. According to rules established by the Deputy Secretary-General of the Council in Brussels, meetings take place during normal office hours of the Council Secretariat (8.30 a.m. to 6.00 p.m., Monday to Friday) only. Exceptions are hardly ever made. Only when a discussion directly following consultations at the UN, which are as a rule to be finished by 6 p.m. every day, or a preparation of a conference on the weekend is necessary, meeting hours sometimes differ from this directive. EU coordination then usually has to take place at other locations. EU internal meetings habitually last for about one hour. However, if discussions are difficult it can well take a couple of hours until the way forward has been clarified. Coordination meetings are crucial for the exchange of national views and positions. Only by discussing and frequently even negotiating internally, it is possible to adopt a position that can be supported by all partners and can be communicated as a common EU position outwardly. To reach a common EU position it is fathomed out in discussions, which are often led very frankly, where other EU MS stand and what their bottom lines are. If positions sometimes are far away from each other, discussions can take the form of heated negotiations. Naturally, the individual national positions discussed in New York are predetermined by the positions of the respective EU MS capitals. Therefore, in some issue areas, where national interests are strong and controversial, flexibility is limited. This way, EU discussions only reflect realities existing in high-politics EU bodies, like the Council of

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Council

EU Presidency

Netherlands

Figure 1.5: Seating Order in EU Coordination Meetings—Example of Seating Order During the Dutch Presidency, July to December 2004

Luxembourg

Ireland

United Kingdom

Italy

Czech Republic

Greece

Austria

Slovakia

Estonia

Denmark

Finland

Slovenia

Cyprus

Spain

Germany

The seating order rotates one seat clockwise at the beginning of each new Presidency. The seating of the EU Presidency, European Commission, Council Secretariat and the ten EU MS that joined the EU in May 2004 does not change. This system will be revised when the new order of EU Presidencies, as agreed by the GAERC on 13 December 2004, is implemented (beginning from January 2007) or when the EU Reform Treaty enters into force.

Poland

Latvia

Belgium

Portugal

Malta

Hungary

European Commission

Sweden France

Lithuania

Ministers or the European Council. But in many questions discussed at UN headquarters, less important ones or important ones with a shared political approach, only the harmonisation of the details of the EU MS positions is required to form an European position, which is done by diplomats in New York directly. In some cases it is also possible to fall back upon decisions taken by higher political levels in Brussels to create an EU position on the East River. In general, complete, differentiated and timely information is the key for a successful work at the UN. Hence another important function of EU coordination meetings, besides offering a medium for discussions, is the exchange of information on contacts with third parties and other

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developments at the UN. Especially the smaller EU countries can benefit from the openness of those EU partners that are more important players, have a more extensive network within the UN or more expertise, which is again in line with Mancur Olson’s ‘Logic of Collective Action’.80 But also the big EU MS do profit from the information provided by partners. This is one of the most important advantages of the close cooperation in a group: no single state at the UN can have its eyes and ears everywhere. A network of close allies sharing information therefore creates a win-win-situation for everyone involved by increasing the level of information to a degree that is higher than any single UN member state has. However, the exchange of information among EU MS is also relevant as it creates more equality among them, ideally avoiding the formation of a spearhead of countries giving directions, letting the others just follow. Part of the exchange exercise is that experts present their personal views and interpretations of a specific situation. Furthermore, decisions on tactics and strategies for upcoming negotiations are taken in coordination meetings. In addition, statements to be delivered by the EU Presidency are prepared. Language and EU input for resolutions and other UN documents is discussed. All those aspects show that representatives in coordination meetings look rather at technical questions than at substance. This is because all delegates are very well familiar with the substance, for which reason no time has to be wasted for explanations or questions on the issues. Only if it becomes clear that a different reading of the facts and the substance leads to different positions on the way forward, on wording of resolutions or negotiation strategies, discussions on content will follow. Important is also that EU coordination meetings provide a medium to maintain contacts informally and to discuss issues unofficially before and after the meeting itself and simply to get to know each other. Therefore those meetings are crucial to create an EU in-group feeling. This is particularly applicable for the weekly HoMs meeting, which is the only regular opportunity for EU MS’ Permanent Representatives to maintain contacts with their counterparts. Personality of the people involved in the everyday business of EU policy harmonisation is very important. Working in a multilateral set-

80 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (New York, Schocken Books, 1968).

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ting requires skills that are negligible in bilateral diplomacy. This factor seems to be often underestimated, by observers from outside the system as well as from decision-makers in EU MS capitals, who send diplomats to the missions at the UN. Because of this ignorance it is happening that high staffing levels by an EU MS sometimes has little influence on the results finally achieved by some EU MS at the UN, since their diplomats are not in the position to influence the proceedings within the EU group and at the UN decisively because of their personality and their expertise. And vice versa it happens quite often that also a single delegate of an EU MS with a winning personality can influence the EU coordination process so significantly that also the mark of a small EU country is clearly visible in the final decision. ‘Soft skills’ and emotional intelligence, coupled with alert senses and quickness of mind, persuasive power and a charisma, which generates sympathies, unquestionably can make all the difference. And this is not limited to specific levels in the hierarchy: in spite of extensive diplomatic experience prevailing, even at the top levels of diplomacy personal dislike and conflicting personal styles can have a serious effect. It is striking that the quality and effectiveness of an EU MS’s diplomatic service seems to have deeper roots: the selection of personnel before the entry into the service, the training of the diplomats, but also the cultural characteristics of each individual nation play a role. One country obviously has found an excellent fusion of all those aspects: it is a view shared by many experts in New York that the British mission functions as a model for all other EU MS with having the most effective diplomatic corps.81 It is also obvious that the behaviour of the individual EU MS diplomat at the UN is shaped very much by his or her previous professional experience. If he or she has been posted to Brussels or an international organisation in the past, the respective person tends to show much more respect for the EU internal procedures and unwritten rules, tends to think more within the ‘EU-dimension’ than the national one and adjusts his or her actions accordingly.

81 Information gathered from a number of interviews and informal conversations with EU MS diplomats by the author in New York in 2004.

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EU coordination meetings are carried out in different constellations in accordance with subject areas and the rank of delegates. Two main categories emerge: 1) meetings on specific issue areas, based on a) institutional and thematic subdivision in accordance with the UN’s organisational structure (e.g. Third Committee meetings, Middle East Experts meetings, etc.) b) EU internal regulations (Article 19 meeting on UNSC issues) → work undertaken on experts level (3rd Secretary up to Heads of Departments) 2) meetings on the whole range of UN issues, with the rank of participants as the decisive factor: a) HoMs meetings b) DPRs meetings → HoMs and DPRs Figure 1.6 shows the hierarchy existing in EU MS missions, at the Commission Delegation and the Council Secretariat. Not in all missions all ranks are represented: only large missions need Heads of Departments and Third Secretaries, while others do not have personnel in the rank of First Counsellors or Counsellor Ministers. Diplomats usually serve a term of three to four years in their missions in New York. Mainly they are sent from foreign ministries. However, some representatives come from other ministries, e.g. those responsible for environment, development or economy. EU coordination meetings also take place on the highest levels during the ministerial week at the beginning of the main session of the UNGA: in 2002 for the first time EU foreign ministers met in the Council Secretariat premises to synchronise their way of proceeding. Due to the rare occurrence of such meetings they are not being discussed here. The coordination process works with dissimilar effectiveness and efficiency in its different parts. Which is true for all kind of meetings, however, is that their working methods could be improved and strengthened to have stronger common positions and enhanced mandates for the EU Presidency in less time and through less coordination efforts, and

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Figure 1.6: Personnel Hierarchy in EU MS Missions to the UN PR (HoMs)

hold EU meetings on the whole range of UN issues

DPR Heads of Departments First Counsellors/ Counsellor Ministers Counsellors First Secretaries

hold EU meetings on specific issue areas

Second Secretaries Third Secretaries

to have in general a more coherent policy at the UN by all EU MS, the Commission and the Council Secretariat. When looking at efficiency, the GAERC82 in 2003 adopted a ‘Code of conduct’ with which it tried to improve the working methods within EU coordination.83 This Code has implications rather for experts level and DPRs consultations than for HoMs meetings. Most importantly the GAERC asks to avoid table rounds in coordination meetings and for discipline in interventions: points of previous speakers should not be repeated when one is in agreement with a proposal. The principle ‘cum tacent, clamant’ shortens discussions considerably, since only contradictory positions surface. A measure to avoid holding a meeting at all is the systematic use of silence procedures. This proposal by the GAERC has already become an often-used feature in EU coordination in New York. Efforts to make EU coordination more effective and efficient have been undertaken in some parts of the experts level. Particularly with regard

General Affairs and External Relations Council. Adopted on 18 March 2003 with the aim to improve the Council’s working methods in general in light of EU enlargement in 2004. However, some of the provisions in this ‘Code of conduct’ are also relevant for EU coordination in New York. 82 83

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to the Third Committee, where split votes within the EU occurred frequently, those considerations have made noteworthy headway. But also in the EU coordination on the First Committee measures have been implemented in that regard. 1.4.2

Meetings on Specific Issue Areas: Experts Level

To allow a better impression of how the EU coordination process functions within the two main sub-areas (meetings on specific issue areas; meetings on the whole range of UN issues), it seems to be prudent to begin with a description of the experts level, on which most of the coordination work is undertaken, and to describe the top of the above shown pyramid at the end of this chapter. Institutional and Thematic Subdivision in Accordance With the UN’s Organisational Structure The majority of EU coordination meetings (in 2003 85 % of all meetings)84 are meetings on the so called ‘experts level’, i.e. all ranks below HoMs and DPRs. Their focus lies on the six Main Committees of UNGA85 and on ECOSOC. The differentiation on the basis of the UNGA Committees is undertaken throughout the whole year, irrespectively if the UNGA holds meetings or not. For instance, all economic and financial questions are dealt with in Second Committee coordination meetings, legal issues in the Sixth Committee EU coordination. Therefore, so-called Second Committee experts cover not only the issues discussed in this Committee itself, but also the ones of the social and financial side in ECOSOC and all the functional Commissions taking place in that field (e.g. CSD, CPD, CDP),86 as well as all other events that are one the agenda for this particular issue area. That is the reason 84 This and all following calculations were prepared by the author, based on statistics of the Council Secretariat of the EU to the UN, New York. 85 The Main Committees of the UNGA cover specific subject areas and are entitled the following way: First: Disarmament and International Security Committee Second: Economic and Financial Committee (including Development and Environment matters) Third: Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee Fourth: Special Political and Decolonisation Committee Fifth: Administrative and Budgetary Committee Sixth: Legal Committee. 86 Commission on Sustainable Development, Commission on Population and Development, Committee for Development Policy.

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why there are no ECOSOC expert meetings, since Second and Third Committee experts cover the issues dealt with by ECOSOC. Of all EU coordination meetings on expert level in 2003, 78 per cent were meetings of experts for the UNGA Main Committees. Most meetings on UNGA issues were undertaken by Second Committee (35 %)87 and Third Committee (27 %)88 experts. This is not surprising since economic and social questions form the largest part of the work at the UN. However, the amount of meetings taking place on that level varies significantly from month to month: for instance there was no Second Committee EU coordination meeting taking place in August 1998 (Austrian Presidency), while there were 54 such meetings conducted in April 2001 (Swedish Presidency). Nevertheless, the general findings of the statistics are very well comparable between the different years and the different EU Presidencies in the same period. There are also expert meetings which deal exclusively with specific issue areas of major importance, e.g. Middle East, humanitarian issues or conflict prevention, independent from the usual attribution to UNGA Committees or other UN bodies.89 For practical reasons and because of limited personnel resources, experts covering such specific issues are often also the ones that are experts for a UNGA Main Committee or the UNSC. For each of these issue areas typically only a couple of meetings take place each year. Therefore this group of meetings merely came to 13 per cent of all meetings on expert level in 2003. In this category of meetings, most EU coordination meetings take place on Middle East (28 %), peacekeeping (26 %) and humanitarian (23 %) questions.90 The meetings on experts level are subdivided and labelled in accordance with their thematic orientation into ‘First Committee’, ‘Middle East’, ‘humanitarian’, etc. expert meetings.

87 Share of Second Committee Meetings of all EU coordination meetings on UNGA Main Committees in 2003. 88 Share of Third Committee Meetings of all EU coordination meetings on UNGA Main Committees in 2003. 89 Other specific subjects discussed are peacekeeping, mine action, Africa, Law of the Sea, Balkan, decolonisation, information, Afghanistan, Latin America, UN Forum on Forest, Asia and IAEA. 90 All percentages show the share of the specific field of coordination meeting of all EU meetings in 2003 on expert level that were not UNGA related or Article 19 meetings.

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The meetings dealing with the issues discussed in the UNSC have a special status. They are called ‘Article 19 meeting’ and are discussed in the next section. The share of Article 19 meetings on all EU expert level meetings was 9 per cent in 2003. Similar to the coordination process among national representations in Brussels, the ranks of experts usually range from Third Secretary up to Counsellor level. In important meetings also higher-level delegates, up to Heads of Departments, put in an appearance. However, First Secretaries and Counsellors are usually the ones representing their missions in the meetings. Nevertheless, due to limited personnel capacities some smaller EU countries are being represented also by First Counsellors/Minister Counsellors or DPRs in the expert meetings. For the same reason it also happens that the same person is responsible for the coverage of several issue areas and therefore attends different types of EU coordination meetings as the expert of his or her country. In genere, the differences in the personnel resources of the EU MS missions to the UN are substantial. Whilst large missions like the ones of France, Germany and the UK muster up to six experts for the work in just one UNGA Committee, missions of smaller EU MS have only one delegate at their disposal for the same amount of work, who also has to cover a different subject area in addition to that. Those disparities of course affect the representation and influence of an EU MS within the EU internal process of opinion formation: while for example in the case of the Second Committee British diplomats have the time to deal with the details of an issue, a delegate from Poland, Luxembourg or Malta can only gain sporadic insights. Inputs into the process, however, depend on substantial knowledge of the issues discussed. Not surprisingly the employment of its personnel also reflects the interests of each EU MS in a specific field. For instance when continuing with the example of the Second Committee, Sweden employs four and the Netherlands five diplomats for this subject area, in order to defend their interests appropriately.91 In other areas those countries are much more sparsely represented. As a rule, only one delegate per EU MS is present in coordination meetings on expert level. More than one diplomat attends only if the issues discussed are particularly important for a state or if different

91

Numbers accurate in 2004.

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delegates are responsible for the diverse items on a meeting’s agenda. In addition, when experts arrive from capitals on the occasion of a session of a functional Commission, e.g. the Commission on Population and Development (CPD) or the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), or for other special events, it happens that a group of up to five people represent one EU MS in a single EU coordination meeting. The overall participant quota, meaning how many EU states are represented in the individual coordination meeting, varies and depends on the subject area on the agenda. If a state has no specific national interests at stake or if the issue discussed has not significant political implications or will be uncontroversial among EU MS and UN MS, it is obviously more useful, especially for smaller missions, to employ their limited resources elsewhere and not attend the meeting in question. In addition, smaller EU MS frequently do not come to meetings since they can be sure that the delegates attending will develop a way forward that is in accordance with EU standards. This just reflects an aspect that is probably true for many EU MS: they are not really interested in the EU coordination process on experts level (except Article 19 meetings), since usually nothing of vital importance is deliberated. Only if the issues discussed are ‘important’, they really see a need to get involved. However, as a rule, the big EU states France, Germany, Italy and the UK will always be represented in the meetings. Also the human factor is important when looking at the participation in meetings, since some diplomats take their job more seriously than others and try to be present in each meeting. But also the individual guidelines in the respective mission regarding the attendance vary and so does the control of the higher levels in each mission on the working habits of their subalterns, resulting in different degrees of independence in the working patterns of each diplomat. Also the physical and mental degree of resilience differs among delegates, which does not allow all of them to attend all meetings, especially in extremely busy times. In addition to the general comments made above on the content and use of EU coordination meetings, it has to be stressed that it is the expert level with an institutional or thematic focus, which is the backbone of EU coordination. That can easily be read from the fact that 78 per cent of all EU coordination meetings in 2003 were held in that segment. Therefore the actual preparation of the EU’s representation in the countless number of UN meetings is done in those meetings: the detailed discussions and negotiations, as well as the EU internal consensus building on all issues discussed at the UN, excluding partly

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only the UNSC. Only if agreement is not possible or their involvement is necessary for other reasons, higher levels in the hierarchy, i.e. DPRs or HoMs, will deal with the substance of the issues. During meetings EU MS experts are often briefed and informed by invited guests from EU bodies, UN bodies, UN MS, NGOs and other people who can give relevant input for the coordination process. Also EU MS representatives brief partners. Besides, an exchange of views takes place in expert-level coordination meetings on the minutiae of tactics the Presidency should follow. Furthermore, the drafting of resolutions or decisions or parts of them, which often means to talk about a single word, a comma or a full stop, is done there. Expert level EU coordination includes discussions on the general direction, structure, length and wording of speeches to be delivered by the EU Presidency in formal UN meetings, or what the Presidency ought to say in an informal meeting at the UN. It is also conferred what shall be said informally towards third parties in the corridors, who should be approached and who not talked to. All these points and the other details that are crucial for the work in an multilateral environment, in addition to the ones mentioned above, are multiplied in their intensity on experts level compared to other parts of EU coordination, since those experts are usually the ones that actually go to the UN meetings and negotiate, who are in direct contact with the other UN MS. Experts also meet on NYLO premises, on the spot at the UN, or in UN MS missions with other groups of UN MS that have interests and views similar to those of the EU (e.g. CANZ, Rio Group). Such ‘wider group’ meetings are very useful to coordinate positions and to make plans for common strategies and tactics. For instance within the EU coordination process on the Fifth Committee there is a weekly meeting between the EU and JUSCANZ when the Committee is in session. EU Internal Regulations: Article 19 Meetings on UN Security Council Issues92 No EU coordination takes place with regard to the most important UN body, the UNSC.93 However, there is some UNSC cooperation existing

See also the chapter on EU policies in the UNSC on pages 169 ff. for a complete picture of the situation. 93 In that regard I disagree with Johan Verbeke (see Johan Verbeke, “EU Coordination on UN Security Council Matters”, in The United Nations and the European Union: 92

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within the EU group, which even takes an institutionalised form since a few years. In view of the thematic complex involved, this part of the EU coordination process is probably the most essential one. But it is also very important as it might in time lead to a common EU policy also in the UNSC. However, as will become apparent below, this part of the EU representation at the UN is nonetheless still in its infancy. The provisions on EU cooperation in the UNSC were introduced with Article 19 of the Maastricht Treaty (originally Article J.9). Article 19 asks those EU MS, which are members of the UNSC, to concert and to keep the other EU MS fully informed. But even though it was clear since the signing of the TEU on 7 February 1992, which would be the implications for the work of EU MS at UN headquarters, its practical implementation, i.e. to create a mechanism that translates the duty of information into practice, began only several years later—in January 2001—in an informal and pragmatic step by step approach. That the mechanism was finally implemented was probably due to the increasing dynamic of the EU coordination complex in New York with regard to all other issue areas discussed at the UN—which put pressure on UNSC members to share with their EU partners also a bit of their last privilege—as well as to the general deepening of EU integration. Before January 2001 the weekly HoMs meeting was the only place in which non-UNSC EU MS were able to receive information on UNSC matters besides other informal channels. But in this body discussions did only take the form of a retrospective résumé. The implementation of Article 19 made significant progress in the second semester of 2000 owing to the initiative of the French EU Presidency. It enforced to bring in a progressive element into the HoMs meetings by concentrating also on the week to come in the UNSC’s business. Furthermore, the French Presidency in December 2000 introduced the practice to discuss the monthly programme of work of the UNSC at the beginning of each month in order to determine which subjects would be suitable for common EU statements in public UNSC meetings. But the substance discussed in the UNSC is too complex, too diverse and too much characterised by unexpected developments and changing realities to be sufficiently covered in the one hour-meeting of HoMs

An Ever Stronger Partnership, ed. by Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister and Tom Ruys (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), pp. 49–60.

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each week. In addition, HoMs are too busy to focus on the UNSC in depth and emergency meetings are difficult to be organised on that level due to time constraints. Therefore it was clear from the outset that a separate instrument had to be installed to do justice to the duty of information asked for in the TEU. The result was the ‘Article 19 meeting’, which started to be carried out in January 2001. From that date, EU members in the UNSC began to give a weekly briefing to EU partners on matters discussed in the UNSC. Mechanisms for the policy cooperation with regard to the UNSC had been agreed among EU MS via COREU in December 2000, based on a Franco-Spanish document.94 This agreement, supported by all EU MS, also called for enhancing the forward-looking dimension. Despite its limitations, the ‘Article 19 meeting’ meant an important step forward, and HoMs in their first assessment in March 2001 drew a very positive picture when reporting to CONUN about it. But already in March 2001 HoMs looked at means to implement Article 19 further. A Spanish non-paper dealing with this complex served as the basis for discussions. Most importantly this paper asked to make the discussions of HoMs on UNSC issues more forward-looking and strategic.95 Under the Spanish Presidency in the first semester of 2002 the Article 19 mechanism was improved further. First, weekly EU expert meetings on UNSC matters got an agenda. Meetings from now on took place on Thursdays, usually at 4 p.m. Second, the Spanish EU Presidency introduced the practice that the monthly UNSC programme of work is introduced and consolidated in the last Article 19 meeting of the previous month or the first meeting in the current one. Third, the Spanish Presidency improved the mechanism of exchange of information further and started the tradition of inpromptu meetings outside the usual Article 19 meetings whenever developments require to do so or on demand. Those inpromptu meetings take place also outside Council Secretariat premises, i.e. on the spot at the UN. In July 2002 the Council of the EU dealt with the implementation of Article 19 in New York and produced a document in that regard.96 94 Coreu PAR/1766/00, not available to the public. This document has been approved by CONUN and the PSC without any changes. 95 This idea was taken up in the paper by the Council of the European Union, Action des États de l’Union européenne au sein des organisations internationales, des conferences internationales et au Conseil de sécurité. Mise en œuvre de l’article 19 du TUE (doc. SN 3133/02), Brussels 16 July 2002 (not available to the public). 96 Ibid.

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However, this document rather reiterated the status quo in New York than adding new force to the Article 19 mechanism. The Council merely underlined the progress made but did not preordain the way forward. The Article 19 consultation mechanism was then extended during the Irish Presidency in the first semester of 2004. The Irish Presidency organised special briefings on particular issues considered by the UNSC, which were of particular importance for EU MS, e.g. on the CounterTerrorism Committee, weapons of mass destruction and Iraq. In May 2004 the Irish Presidency put in place an out-of-hours alert system to inform EU MS delegates of UNSC meetings which take place over weekends or in holiday periods. In praxi, the ‘briefer of the month’ (see below) contacts the Presidency, which then informs predetermined contact persons from EU MS via telephone about significant developments. Even though not revolutionary in substance, this approach carries a lot of symbolic value: even with regard to the UNSC the EU MS perceive themselves now as a group that has to work together in crisis situations. Those EU MS that are members of the Council approach the other EU partners to enable them to follow latest developments on the UNSC, which are usually only known to UNSC members. This adds an important active element to the duty of information flowing from Article 19, extending the concertation asked for in part also to non-UNSC members. The Dutch Presidency (2nd semester 2004) started to invite representatives of the UN Secretariat for briefings of EU UNSC experts. This, of course, also sends the important message outwardly that the EU works together as a group with regard to the UNSC. The progress made in the implementation of the Article 19 in New York can also be seen from the development of the number of meetings (see figure 1.7, p. 82). In the year 2001 49 Article 19 meetings were held, while in 2003 there were already 80 of such meetings taking place. With regard to the Article 19 mechanism higher numbers are unquestionably positive, since they clearly indicate more intense and closer cooperation among EU MS. This shows that the EU coordination reflex begins to have an effect also with regard to the last bulwark against a common EU position, the UNSC: there are increasingly more issues the UNSC members inform their EU partners about, and Article 19 meetings, and also special Article 19 meetings, become more and more a routine in the EU coordination process. However, as the number of meetings decreased again in 2004 and 2005 it is too early to say into

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Figure 1.7: Number of Article 19 Meetings, 2001–2005 80 Number of meetings

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Year Source: Own calculations based on figures of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN in New York.

which direction EU internal cooperation on UNSC issues really moves. The high number of meetings in 2003 was due to the Iraq crisis and should not be taken as a representative value. Despite the creation of the Article 19 meeting, HoMs continue to confer UNSC matters due to the political importance of the body itself and of the sensitivity of many of the issues discussed in it. Therefore it is established practice today that the same questions are discussed both in HoMs and Article 19 meetings. This leads to duplication and to frustration on the part of EU MS UNSC experts, since they perceive their obligatory participation in the HoMs meeting often as a waste of time, as hardly any new information is given. However, the fact that HoMs sometimes make meaningful comments on developments in the UNSC, and also that HoMs are in the position to give information, which experts in the Article 19 meetings are not allowed to give, is an incentive for UNSC experts to go to the HoMs meetings. Procedures in Article 19 meetings are quite different from those in the other meetings on experts level as described in the previous section. The P2 (France and the UK) and the other EU MS in the UNSC inform

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EU partners in a rather factual manner about the developments in the UNSC during the previous week and give an outlook into the upcoming events of the next week or the next month, but mostly in a technical and organisational manner. On most occasions a considerable part of a meeting is devoted to a more in-depth analysis of some specific issues on the SC agenda, i.e. Iraq, Cote d’Ivoire or a specific resolution. It is a tradition now that one representative of the three to five EU states in the UNSC takes the lead and describes the developments in detail, the so-called ‘briefer of the month’. This role rotates every month. It is decided informally among the UNSC members, which delegation will do the detailed reporting. The only rule is that the UNSC member that holds the UNSC Presidency in a specific month should also do the EU internal briefing in this particular month. The other UNSC members add to the detailed report of the ‘briefer of the month’ if they wish to do so. Sometimes the briefing is supplemented by the delegates’ own impressions and interpretations or national positions. This very much depends on each individual delegate sent from UNSC members to the Article 19 meetings. EU MS delegates of non-UNSC members merely absorb the information given to them. They also direct questions to their colleagues in the UNSC following the briefing, but only in a notably cautious manner, respecting the special status of the UNSC members. Non-UNSC members usually do not comment on the points raised in the briefing and give no advise or any other input or try to influence the work of the UNSC members by any means. However, all that is in complete accordance with the Treaties. Article 19 meetings are consequently primarily retrospective and informative in character. Only rarely they entail a forward-looking dimension on substance. Good examples of such a forward-looking approach have been provided by parallel discussions within the EU and the UNSC on sanctions, ICC, peacekeeping operations (mainly, but not exclusively, when the EU and its MS play a major role) and in the case of some major international crisis (not necessarily characterised by an EU common stand), e.g. Haiti and Darfur. Usually the Article 19 meetings last one hour. Increasingly important become the special Article 19 meetings, i.e. those ad hoc Article 19 meetings that are convened because of important developments outside the weekly cycle of Thursday meetings. Those meetings often take place immediately after the end of a UNSC meeting to inform EU partners without delay about what happened in the

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meeting. This established practice highlights most apparently the service idea behind the Article 19 meeting: the EU MS that are ‘outsiders’ wait impatiently for information by the ‘insiders’, which the latter share with remarkable endurance and under additional personal efforts. Since the Article 19 meeting is of importance to all EU partners—for the UNSC members, because they want to show their goodwill towards the EU states not part of the club, but also perhaps listen to the views of the other UNSC members or the information other EU MS have received from third parties, and for the non-members as an important source of information—the level of participation is high and usually representatives from all EU MS missions are present in those meetings. In view of the fact that UNSC matters are regarded as the most important field at the UN, the diplomats attending are often of higherlevel ranks, even Heads of the Political Department of a mission. The Council Secretariat, despite its special interests in many of the issues discussed, does not play a more active role than in other expert level meetings. The Commission is present, but remains very passive in view of its limited interests in that field. But there should be no illusion about the depth of transparency offered by the Article 19 meeting. The P2 and the other UNSC non-permanent members have strict limits of how much information they are willing to share. Particularly the P2 will give information only when explicitly asked for, but only rarely do so on their own initiative.97 Nevertheless the meetings are very useful for all the states not being members of the UNSC. Firstly because they get first hand information about the latest developments. But especially because the interpretations and assessments offered by the briefers are often precise and well-informed and the presentations tell a lot about the national perceptions of the situation and the reasoning of their counterparts in the UNSC. Even though the picture offered by UNSC members might be incomplete, it is nevertheless much more extensive than what the non-members among the EU MS could receive by waiting outside the UNSC chamber and consulting their own sources informally.

97 See Ingo Winkelmann, “Europäische und mitgliedstaatliche Interessenvertretung in den Vereinten Nationen”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 60 (2000), pp. 427–8.

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The Article 19 Meeting has made enormous progress during the last years. It is useful and it is a great achievement that such a mechanism is in place.98 However, it also can still be cultivated. Therefore it is positive that the implementation of Article 19 is an ongoing exercise that continues to develop with the cooperation of all partners and is moving slowly, but steadily, towards a more pro-active reporting of higher quality. Particularly the non-permanent members can play an important role in that regard, since the progress depends also on the way they inform EU partners. For instance Ireland, on the UNSC in 2001 and 2002, but also Germany (2003/2004), have set very high standards in their information policy in Article 19 meetings, which forces the P2 and other non-permanent members to continue on this level. The fact that already today several Article 19 meetings can take place on a single day when important developments occur is perhaps a first indication of a close EU cooperation leading in time to coordination also with respect to the UNSC. But one has to be careful before being captivated by too much optimism: there is a constant weighing up of interests and resistance on the part of the UNSC members, particularly the P2, on the extension of the Article 19 mechanism. The author only subscribes to the view of Ambassador Sucharipa when he points out that it tells a lot about CFSP when the matter of course of the information transfer within the Article 19 Meeting, which needed almost ten years to be implemented after included in the TEU, is celebrated as a great achievement by officials in EU MS capitals.99 It is very well possible that the level of cooperation achieved by now will remain on that level for a long time without further deepening. As the discussions on the UNSC reform during the last years have demonstrated, the prestige and importance of the membership in the UNSC and the importance of the UNSC itself, is unchanged. Therefore it is not very likely that the members of the UNSC will get the EU partners more involved than absolutely necessary or useful for themselves. After all, the P2 do not necessarily have an interest in the indirect Europeanisation of their seats via an Article

See Verbeke, op. cit. in note 93, pp. 55 ff. Ernst Sucharipa, “Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) der Europäischen Union im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen”, in Verhandlungen für den Frieden / Negotiating for Peace. Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel (Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht 162), ed. by Jochen Abr. Frowein / Klaus Scharioth / Ingo Winkelmann and Rüdiger Wolfrum (Heidelberg und Berlin: Springer, 2003), p. 789. 98 99

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19 meeting, which becomes a coordination exercise. They certainly do not want to be dictated on what to do in the UNSC because they consider their presence in that body as a national responsibility—and a prerogative. It therefore seemed to be very far off from reality when the European Parliament in January 2004 asked in its resolution on “The relations between the EU and the UN” for “internal coordination both in Brussels and at the UN” also on the UNSC and wanted to see the “preparation of EU common positions or mandates and guidelines, before any decision is taken in the UN’s political bodies”, including the UNSC.100 1.4.3

Meetings on the Whole Range of UN Issues: HoMs and DPRs Meetings

Meetings conducted on the basis of the second decisive factor—rank— do occur in two constellations: meetings of DPRs (Deputy Permanent Representatives) and HoMs. Both cover all issues discussed at the UN and focus on the most important questions. HoMs Meetings The Heads of Missions of EU MS at the UN are the most senior officials EU MS send to the East River. They are the Permanent Representatives of their countries to the UN, similar to Ambassadors in bilateral settings. All of them are in the rank of an Ambassador.101 The position of a HoM at a mission to UN headquarters is one of the most senior postings available in EU MS foreign ministries, for which reason quite a few of them can look back at an illustrious professional career as state secretaries or ministers, or use their position in New York as a springboard for the promotion into the ministerial level back home. Due to their background, HoMs bring along substantial diplomatic experience and skills. At the same time they are also responsible for the smooth running of their missions, i.e. have to bring along management skills.

100 European Parliament, “Resolution on the relations between the European Union and the United Nations (2003/2049(INI))”, adopted 29.1.2004, para. 34; to be found in the Official Journal of the European Union dated 21.4.2004. 101 While a PR is always an Ambassador, an Ambassador is not necessarily a PR. Larger missions have more than one official in the rank of an Ambassador, for instance the German and British missions have two Ambassadors (PRs and DPRs), while the US mission has even five Ambassadors. But there can be only one PR. The ambassadorship is a rank in ministerial hierarchies, while the PR is the head of a mission to the UN.

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Within proceedings at the UN HoMs play a very important role. They are the ones that are fully in charge of the tactics and of the negotiations. However, in order to achieve coherence and consistency in the EU’s policies and activities, HoMs are in direct contact with the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is its focal interlocutor in Brussels in political and security questions in the CFSP and ESDP, to confer about possible actions. But in general New York HoMs prefer to receive instructions directly from their capitals, and not from the PSC, CONUN or other EU bodies.102 HoMs represent their countries in high-level UN meetings, give speeches and lead negotiations. However, a principle of subsidiarity exists also in that regard: HoMs only become active when lower level involvement would not be appropriate in an event or has proved fruitless. They enter the stage when problems occur or a stalemate exists in discussions, or when it is necessary to exert pressure on other parties. The mere appearance of a HoM in a UN meeting for a couple of minutes during negotiations underlines the interest a state has in a particular subject and can influence the outcome. EU MS HoMs in New York meet weekly, in contrast to HoMs at the UN in Geneva, who come together only once a month. This is due to the considerably more extensive workload in New York and perhaps to the more elaborated EU coordination process at UN headquarters. HoMs meetings are comparable to COREPER II in Brussels. Traditionally HoMs meetings take place on Tuesday at 9 a.m. However, it is nevertheless no exception to conduct additional meetings on HoMs level if further coordination is needed or specific issues have to be discussed. This is the reason why there was an average of 5.6 HoMs meetings every month in the years 1998 to 2005 (see figure 1.8, p. 88). Similarly to the Article 19 Meeting, the year 2003 marked the peak in the number of EU HoMs meetings (86 meetings), due to the need for intense discussions over the Iraq crisis. Because of the summer break, August is usually the month with the least HoMs meetings (average of 1.7 meetings), while October has been the most busiest period (average of 7.2 meetings).103 Due to the different 102 Interview number 37, 20 December 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]). 103 Those numbers and the ones following describe the average meetings within the twelve EU Presidencies during the years 1998 to 2003.

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Figure 1.8: Number of HoMs Meetings, 1998–2005 90 Number of meetings

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

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1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Year Source: Own calculations based on figures of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN in New York.

style of EU Presidencies and developments at the UN there is significant variance in the number of meetings per month. One extreme were ten meetings in July 2002 (Danish Presidency), the other extreme only one meeting in August (all Presidencies in the period observed except the Danish Presidency, which held five meetings). 7.6 per cent of all EU coordination meetings in 2003 were HoMs meetings. The overall high number of HoMs meetings can be interpreted as a sign of ever closer cooperation also on the highest level of EU MS representatives, which again underlines the increasing need seen by all EU MS to harmonise their positions to be effective as a group, but also the necessity to lobby within the EU group to influence processes at the UN in accordance with the individual national interests. In general, frequent coordination at HoMs level is very important, as this is the level where a real change concerning the quality of the EU coherence can be achieved. In addition, HoMs have the authority to alter the coordination process itself and they deal with the most delicate questions discussed at the UN, also with those that are most controversial within the EU. If they see a need to come together gradually more often it shows that they realise that it is useful for their own national interests to achieve a common position in ever more questions. And if 27 EU PRs speak

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with one voice in a particular issue area this really has the potential to influence matters at the UN. Similar to HoMs meetings in Brussels, i.e. meetings of COREPER II, only the most important political questions in need of further discussion surface in this high-level consultation. However, COREPER II plays a bigger role in EU internal processes because it actively coordinates, which is only occasionally the case with New York HoMs. HoMs meetings are conducted as a forum to exchange views and information. Customarily the agenda of New York HoMs meetings looks similar each week. The list of items is prepared on Friday morning for the HoMs meeting on the following Tuesday in a meeting between the HoMs of the EU Presidency, the Council Secretariat and the Commission at the Presidency’s mission.104 An annotated agenda for HoMs meetings follows, at the latest, on Monday. If no briefer has been invited, who will speak at the beginning of the meeting, the first item on the agenda are always UNSC matters. Under this item the whole range of issues momentarily or in the near future discussed by the UNSC is looked at. Like in Article 19 meetings the UNSC members present their impressions in the beginning. Only if an EU MS holds the monthly UNSC Presidency, its HoM will begin, otherwise there is no particular order of contributions and no obligation for comments. The other EU MS add information or ask questions. Besides the usual outlook at the programme of work of the UNSC during the upcoming week or the next month, discussions in the HoMs meetings only sometimes take a forward-looking dimension with regard to the UNSC. Subsequently to those presentations EU MS can make remarks. Even though those comments do not have a big impact on the actions of EU MS on the UNSC, they do have a different effect: to a certain degree nonmembers of the UNSC can request indirectly that the EU MS in the UNSC operate within the boundaries of the CFSP. Then the UNSC members are bound in some respect in their political decisions. And in general there is a certain pressure laying on UNSC members to justify their actions towards the other 26 EU MS or the non-members in the UNSC. In that regard it is well known within the EU group which It is misleading to speak of ‘HoMs’ in the case of the Council Secretariat and the Commission. The most senior official in the Council Secretariat is called ‘Head of Liaison Office’, while the person in command at the Commission is a ‘Head of Delegation’. 104

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countries have which interests in specific issue areas and the UNSC members try to respect those interests.105 However, that works rather informally and indirectly, since a mechanism to translate the interests of non-members into practice in the UNSC does not exist. And there is sometimes a difference of what has been stated by a representative in the HoMs meeting and what the same HoM then says in the course of the week towards third parties and in UN meetings. Usually up to three quarters of the one-hour HoMs meeting are devoted to the thematic complex of the UNSC. In the time remaining pressing questions such as UN Reform or the work in the UNGA Committees are raised. At the end of the HoMs meeting an outlook on the next working week is on the agenda, in order to localise potential problems in advance. HoMs meetings outside the Tuesday cycle of meetings usually deal with specific issues and therefore have a different agenda. Topics dominating the work at the UN are dealt with in these consultations. Briefings by high level officials of other UN MS, mainly PRs, by officials from EU institutions, such as Commissioners, EUSRs106 or the HR/SG, by UN representatives, such as SRSGs107 and USGs,108 and other important officials take place in a couple of HoMs meetings in each EU Presidency. Even though usually no real dialogue between guests and HoMs follows a briefing, HoMs nevertheless get a first hand impression of the views of the individual briefer and have the opportunity to pose questions. It has to be stressed that the HoMs meeting is the most formal meeting within the EU coordination process in New York. Real discussions hardly ever take place. It is rather the case that PRs intervene only if they see the need to highlight a national position or to briefly offer important information. Substance is only considered in depth if agreement was unachievable on lower levels, but could be within reach, which happens rarely, or if issues are so important that they have to be discussed by HoMs from the outset. However, the static character of the HoMs meeting is not necessarily welcomed by all participants. The interest in the meeting seems to diminish and measures have to be determined

105 Interview number 37, 20 December 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]). 106 EU Special Representatives. 107 Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General. 108 UN Under-Secretary-Generals.

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to revitalise it and make it more pro-active, especially on non-UNSC issues.109 The use of the HoMs meeting is particularly limited since the first part of it is a repetition of what has been said in the Article 19 meeting five days earlier. Instead of repeating what a lower official has already said in the last Article 19 meeting, HoMs would rather have to go into the real political issues to make the meetings more attractive. In addition, less important issues that do not merit the attention of HoMs should be left aside. Sometimes the differentiation between important and non important has been in need of improvement. Helpful would probably be also an increase of the number of meetings, but not at the cost of reducing quality. In those additional meetings to the usual Tuesday consultations the focus should lie on UNGA matters and issues of particular interest to all delegations. An effort for change in that regard has been undertaken: the Dutch EU Presidency (2004) tried to make meetings on HoMs level more functional by holding special meetings on pressing issues. A more informal and frank atmosphere was achieved by choosing unofficial venues and a HoMs-only format. Those ‘fireside chats’ were held on UN reform and on the implications of the European External Action Service on EU coordination in New York. This approach to cover more politically charged subjects or those of general EU interest by HoMs seems to be a good one, even though these meetings did not produce tangible outcomes. If this practice of special and less formal meetings is continued by other Presidencies it would most likely result in closer EU internal cooperation also on highest levels. It is striking that despite the structural deficiencies of the HoMs meetings and the tight schedule of most HoMs, usually at least 20 out of the 27 HoMs attend weekly Tuesday meetings. This quota speaks for the relevance of this meeting, which still remains one of the highlights of the week for all parties involved. Since the meeting’s decisions have also implications for the work of other delegates in EU MS missions, the HoMs are by no means alone in the Tuesday meeting: EU MS diplomats of various backgrounds of expertise and of different ranks follow the meeting. Therefore the conference room is usually very crowded during HoMs meetings with up to 70 people. Remarkable is,

109 Interview number 29, 9 December 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]).

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however, that in most HoMs meetings in which a briefing by a Commissioner or other high ranking EU officials has been arranged, the level of diplomats attending drops visibly. Apparently the pieces of information given by EU representatives is not as valuable as the ones given by other invited guests, and the link to Brussels too weak to be crucial for the work of the HoMs, for which reason DPRs or even lower ranks replace them. An important manifestation of the EU group’s common action to the wider UN membership is transported through working lunches, in which all EU HoMs meet with third parties, i.e. individual UN MS and groups of countries. Those meetings allow EU HoMs to exchange views and cultivate relationships with important players at the UN in a sociable ambience, while being able to express common positions backed by the impressive number of 27 EU MS PRs around one table, ideally perceived as a homogeneous actor. An average of 18 to 19 lunch meetings are conducted in each Presidency. There is a traditional list of interlocutors, which are met every semester, complemented by meetings with changing parties. Lunches are conducted with important players such as China, India, Japan, Russia and the USA, state-groups such as CANZ, CARICOM,110 the Pacific Islands Forum, SAP countries111 and SIDS,112 as well as UN dignitaries such as UNSG,113 UNDSG114 and the UNGA President. The responsibility of being the host rotates between the EU (lunch meetings held in the Council Secretariat) and the individual interlocutor, usually with the exception of UN dignitaries, who are always guests of the EU. There are also HoMs working lunch meetings in Troika format. DPRs Meetings EU MS Deputy Permanent Representatives (DPRs) meet only infrequently and relatively seldom. In the years 1998 to 2005 an average of 24 DPRs meetings took place each year (see figure 1.9). The number varied between 12 (1998) and 63 (2005) meetings. The high values in The Caribbean Community. Stabilisation and Association process countries, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. 112 Small Island Development States. 113 United Nations Secretary General. 114 United Nations Deputy Secretary General. 110

111

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Figure 1.9: Number of DPRs Meetings, 1998–2005

Number of meetings

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

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1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Year Source: Own calculations based on figures of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN in New York.

2004 and especially 2005 were a consequence of the discussions on UNSC enlargement, in which the positions of some EU MS were far away from each other and intense consultations were needed, in view of the importance of the issue on DPRs level.115 DPRs Meetings are conducted when a concrete need for further discussion on a high level exists, mainly on issues of high political importance (UN reform; 2005 Major Event). Overlapping with this thematic complex is that DPRs also come together to discuss crosscutting issues, which do not fall into the area of a specific group of EU MS experts (e.g. rationalisation of the UNGA agenda; reform of the UN General Committee). DPRs also take up issues that have been raised by HoMs, but which require deeper discussions that would be too time-consuming to be negotiated by HoMs, or those issues that are not in need of consultations on the highest level (e.g. discussion of the NAM resolution on “International Peace and Security”, May 2004). It also happens that EU MS DPRs have to find common ground where

115 On these fierce EU internal discussions see the chapter on the UNSC, particularly on reform (pp. 183 ff.).

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it was not possible to do so on experts level. They then will focus on the core problems and discuss them in detail. However, consultations of DPRs are often less detailed than those on experts level. This flows from the fact that they often discuss general questions. Another reason is that DPRs—like HoMs—do not follow a specific subject area in their missions, but the whole range of issues, for which reason they are no experts in the questions to be discussed, not allowing them to go into the specifics of an issue. However, every now and then, issues require detailed discussions, e.g. on the exact wording of a resolution or an EU speech. They then have to fall back upon the expertise of their subalterns. In its character and institutional structure, the DPRs meeting at the UN is comparable to COREPER I in Brussels. However, the thematic focus of both bodies is rather different in view of the divergent political environment both bodies are located in and the topics discussed.

CHAPTER TWO

THE EU FACTOR IN THE COORDINATION PROCESS It has been argued above that the EU bodies, both in New York and in Brussels, do not exert much measurable political influence on the common positions adopted in New York. This hypothesis is going to be supported in the following section of the study. It is divided into two thematic parts: the first part looks at the role of the two EU bodies which are physically represented in New York, namely the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office and the Commission Delegation. Furthermore the cooperation between the two bodies is analysed. Also the EU instrument ‘Troika meetings’, in which Council Secretariat and Commission Delegation play a crucial role, is described in this thematic part. The second part examines the influence exerted on the EU proceedings at UN headquarters by the intergovernmental bodies and other EU organs located in Brussels. The EU Factor Part One—the New York Dimension 2.1

Role of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN

The Council’s Liaison Office to the UN (NYLO)1 is an administrative unit of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.2 Its main purpose is to provide support to EU activities in the UN context in New York. Plans for such an Office were already discussed in the final stages of the negotiations on the Treaty of Maastricht. After the TEU had created the European Union, the Council of the European Union3 and also the CFSP on 1 November 1993, NYLO was established in the summer of 1994.

1 2 3

The acronym is used EU internally and is derived from ‘New York Liaison Office’. Therefore it belongs institutionally to the General Secretariat and not to the Council. Formerly Council of the European Communities.

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In Brussels, the Council’s work is supported by the General Secretariat (GSC), entrusted with a whole range of mainly secretarial tasks.4 The GSC plays an important role in the smooth handling of the systematic cooperation between the EU MS, and functions therefore as a tool to adopt joint actions and common positions (Article 12 TEU). For that reason, but also because—according to the Treaty—the Council (and particularly its Presidency) is responsible for the external representation of the Union in CFSP matters and moreover to buttress the specific provisions of the TEU with regard to international organisations, namely the EU MS’ obligation to coordinate their action in international organisations (Article 19 TEU) and their duty to cooperate in ensuring the compliance and implementation of common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council (Article 20 TEU), and simply to organise the increased activity in terms of EU coordination on a number of issues, it was necessary to establish Liaison Offices of the Council at the major UN sites. Today, two GSC Offices exist outside Brussels, located in New York and Geneva.5 Being a horror for everyone who is eager to see a strict separation between the different EU institutions, NYLO is considered as part of the Delegation of the European Commission to the UN6 for the purpose of being granted full diplomatic privileges and immunities by the US Government and to obtain accreditation to the UN. This solution was also suggested by the US authorities. They agreed to grant privileges and immunities to the members of the Council Office if that office were to be presented as part of the Commission Delegation. The various issues were finally settled by a solution which was regarded as

4 Article 207(2) TEC provides that the “Council shall be assisted by a General Secretariat”. 5 The Council’s Geneva Liaison Office was set up already in the late 1960s. However, before 1993 the Office dealt mainly with the negotiations within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). After the entry into force of the TEU the Geneva Liaison Office continued with its support for the EU coordination process within GATT’s successor WTO, but became also increasingly involved in the EU coordination process within questions of CFSP (e.g. Commission on Human Rights and the Conference on Disarmament), and those under the scope of the TEC (e.g. human health [WHO], social policy [ILO], development [UNCTAD] and immigration and asylum [HCR]). 6 Several other possibilities were explored in 1993, but abandoned for various reasons: attaching the Office to the delegation of the EU MS holding the EU Presidency, having the EU apply for observer status at the UN (thus replacing the European Community), attaching permanently the Council’s Liaison Office to the delegation of a particular EU MS.

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only temporary, but has not been revisited since then.7 Nevertheless, from the administrative and operational viewpoint both bodies work entirely independently from each other. Still, members of NYLO are officially members of the European Commission and have the right to participate in all UN meetings as observers. A separate observer seat for the Council at the UN would have been difficult to obtain, would not have been in accordance with the role and conception of the EU Council and would have been counterproductive in communicating the idea of a single EU voice at the UN. Already under the current framework it is confusing for most people within the UN environment to understand what the differences are between EU, European Commission, NYLO and EU Presidency and which specific roles these institutions play. The entry into force of the EU Reform Treaty will provide more transparency in that regard.8 In contrast to the European Commission, NYLO operates mainly at an EU internal level. The only occasion where it plays an outward role, even though still a passive one, is in Troika meetings with third parties. In UN meetings members of NYLO keep in the background and observe. They communicate primarily with diplomats of EU MS and the Commission and not with other parties. Traditionally the seat behind the sign ‘European Communities’ in an official UN meeting will only be used by members of NYLO if no Commission official is present. With regard to personnel resources, NYLO has a Head of Office in the rank of an Ambassador, not covering a particular subject area. Furthermore, five other officials, including a Deputy Head of Delegation, have to monitor the whole range of events at the UN—a nearly impossible task. However, in order not to be left fighting a losing battle, usually each of them has allocated constantly one intern as support, who are replaced at least every four months. Seven other employees, including a security officer, deal with administration, protocol issues and conference room service. From personal experience I can say that the officials working for NYLO have an impressive background of professional experience 7 COREPER in a meeting on 21 September 1994 agreed to solve temporarily the problem with the US by letting the Council office appear to be a part of the Commission Delegation only for the purpose of dealing with the US authorities. The practical relation between the two institutions was governed by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General of the Council and that of the Commission, finalised in February 1995. 8 See the chapter on the effects of the EU Reform Treaty on proceedings at the UN, pp. 196 ff.

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and know the game of intergovernmentalism within the EU very well. But their abilities are generally underestimated, also by their colleagues from the European Commission, primarily because they so rarely play an active role. Therefore it is often difficult for diplomats from EU MS and of the Commission to see a bigger role of the Council Secretariat in the EU coordination process in New York. The principle raisons d’être of NYLO are to 1) practically help facilitate the adoption of common positions among EU MS at the UN on all aspects covered by the Maastricht Treaty, i.e. CFSP and the amended provisions of the ECSC and Rome Treaties, through assistance in the daily running of EU business in New York; 2) help ensure consistency and continuity in the EU’s action across the rotating Presidencies; 3) inform EU MS delegations in NYC about developments in the European Council, Council of the EU, PSC, PJCC and other relevant subject areas and bodies; 4) monitor UN work and maintain a flow of information to different EU institutions in Brussels; 5) assist the HR/SG within his activities under Article 26 TEU; 6) co-represent the EU in meetings with Troika format; 7) serve as a Council representation to the UN. 1) When looking at the first of those aspects, i.e. the supportive role of NYLO in the EU coordination process on a daily basis, a whole range of elements has to be considered, first those that are of use to all EU MS. In general, those tasks are very similar to those of the GSC in Brussels. Together with the EU Presidency, the Liaison Office is involved in organising, preparing, conducting and managing the EU coordination meetings. From 1 January 2003 NYLO took over from the Presidency the task of issuing all e-mail messages to delegations (meeting convocations, silence procedures, circulation of UN draft documents etc.). Borrowing from the acronym COREU, a document send between EU MS and EU institutions, these internal circulars, distributed only among the missions of the EU 27, NYLO and DECUN, are called CIREUs. Furthermore, NYLO hosts most of the EU coordination meetings in its six meeting rooms. Even though a matter of course for most EU diplomats, this physical base creates an important EU in-group feeling. It

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provides also a neutral space for EU internal negotiations, where neither the Presidency or any other EU MS can influence the process by being the host of a meeting. The importance within diplomatic circles of who is host should not be underestimated. This is even more true for the large number of lunches with third parties held on HoMs level within the NYLO premises, where it is clearly the Council together with the Presidency that is the host. Those lunch meetings are conducted both in EU-27 and Troika composition. They take place with individual important countries (e.g. US, India, China), groups of states (EU Associated Countries, Mercosur, African Group) or representatives of the UN Secretariat (UNSG, Deputy UNSG). In the new premises of NYLO in the East 41st Street a room safe from interception has been built for EU coordination meetings which discuss confidential substance. Before that, in order to be invulnerable to espionage, HoMs or other senior delegates had to go to the German delegation, the only mission of an EU MS with a secure room. However, there is only rarely the need to make use of that room, mainly in discussions on the Middle East, Iraq or other delicate questions like the demands by US politicians asking UNSG Kofi Annan to resign (autumn 2004). A number of rather technical points should also be mentioned: of some of the EU coordination meetings, even though systematically only for HoMs meetings, NYLO officials prepare and circulate a written report, promoting transparency. Sometimes they are also directly involved in drafting of speeches of the EU Presidency or UN resolutions. The Office has the technical resources to produce large numbers of photocopies of documents needed for the coordination meetings and of other documents intended for UN meetings, such as statements by the EU Presidency. The Office is also responsible for archiving documents produced EU internally in New York. Although not often requested, NYLO can as well provide EU documents through a direct link with the Council’s archives in Brussels. Furthermore, NYLO runs the alignment procedures with the acceding countries, the candidate countries, the EFTA countries, which are members of the EEA,9 and the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process.10

Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegowina, Croatia, Former Yugoslaw Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro. 9

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Probably NYLO’s most important contribution to the EU’s representation in New York is to assist the EU Presidency. This duty flows directly from the obligation of the GSC to back the work of the Council, and therefore the work of the Presidency of the Council, being the Presidency of the EU. It does so in the planning, management and administration of the EU coordination process. This is crucial, since each Presidency at its beginning is not familiar with the practical sides of the coordination process and needs guidance. Therefore already more than a year before the commencement of its semester, NYLO begins to inform the respective EU MS mission to the UN about the written and unwritten rules of its impending EU Presidency. During the Presidency, NYLO first of all facilitates the work of the Presidency significantly simply by taking care of all the technical matters of the coordination process as mentioned above. Furthermore, the Office offers regular support in the identification of possible topics for discussion at HoMs or DPRs meetings. In the case of the HoMs meeting the NYLO Ambassador participates in its preparation meeting each Friday. The element of planning includes also the wider timeframe by analysing together with the Presidency the agenda of upcoming UN and EU meetings, deciding on the preparation efforts necessary. In addition, NYLO officials stand ready to give background information to the Presidency on EU or UN matters whenever requested or even to prepare briefing points on specific issues. This aspect is broadened by the possible active policy assistance to the Presidency, with the special focus on CFSP and ESDP matters. The support for the Presidency contains also that NYLO officials accompany it in contacts with third parties, UN MS or UN bodies, when it is acting on behalf of the EU. The presence of members of NYLO in third party meetings does preserve continuity in the activities of the EU. Idealiter, the relationship between NYLO and the EU Presidency in New York is a close teamwork. Therefore the EU Presidency needs to see NYLO as an outsourced part of its own Delegation and treat it correspondingly. Only if NYLO is involved fully in the processes and receives a steady flow of information it can display its full potential as a partner of the Presidency. This partnership might then even produce unexpected effects: some diplomats of the EU Presidency will build up confidence to NYLO officials and ask them informally for their views on certain developments at the UN or within the EU group. This then reflects the notion that the Council Secretariat is the only friend of the Presidency, which takes a neutral stance while all other 26 EU

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MS pursue their own interests and try to influence the EU Presidency in accordance with their goals. 2) One of the most important institutional roles of the GSC, even though of quite abstract nature and hardly visible in day-to-day affairs, is to ensure the consistency and continuity of the external action of the EU. NYLO can offer an institutional memory of the Union’s foreign policies, which is crucial, since the frequent rotation of the EU Presidencies places national governments and administrations in the leading position of the EU, which are not necessarily aware of the common EU stance in external affairs. Hence, although seldom intervening actively, NYLO functions as a watchdog in the coordination process. By following the work of the EU Presidency it can ensure that decisions taken EU internally, EU statements at the UN and EU contributions to UN resolutions, as well as EU negotiation positions and the way of proceeding of the EU Presidency at the UN, are in line with previous positions taken by the EU or with recent developments in the labyrinth of EU bodies. 3) It is striking, if not alarming, that most diplomats from EU MS are not aware of developments in Brussels, even though they sometimes might be of importance for their work at the UN. Even though it is part of NYLO’s portfolio to enhance the flow of information on Brussels activities by disseminating the relevant information to EU MS in New York, it was not yet very successful in putting this task into practice. Only in summer 2004, according to prior agreement with the incoming Dutch Presidency, the Liaison Office established the tradition of a weekly information letter on the latest developments in all relevant EU bodies. This ‘Brussels Brief ’ offers on two pages information on the developments during the last week in the major EU bodies, gives an overview over important upcoming events and lists under short thematic headings all the latest COREUs distributed on a particular issue area in order to be consulted by the EU MS diplomats if a subject falls into their field of expertise. So far, however, this compilation of Brussels highlights is not widely allocated within the EU missions and often reaches only the top levels of diplomats. This limits its influence significantly. Therefore, this approach taken by NYLO should be improved and extended in order to create a more tangible link between activities taken in Brussels and New York and to enhance the group identity among EU MS.

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4) Regarding the next aspect mentioned above, NYLO’s liaison with Brussels, the Office has different contact points it provides with information, reports and analysis about developments at the UN in New York, including ‘early warning’ on selected important files. First and foremost these contact points are the High Representative for CFSP/Secretary General and the GSC in Brussels. Within the GSC it is specifically the Directorate General E (External and Politico-military Affairs), DG E, to which NYLO is administratively attached and primarily works with. DG E forwards information to other Council bodies where appropriate. As required, information is also directed immediately to designated NYLO correspondents from EU MS, the Geneva Liaison Office, Joint Situation Centre of the European Union (SITCEN), Police Unit (PU), DG G,11 DG H,12 DG I,13 and to a limited extend also to the missions of EU MS at the UN. Contributions of NYLO are especially important for the work of the internal DG E UN Task force, created in 2002. This is a team of two experts dealing inter alia with UN questions within Directorate General E in the section Directorate IV “Transatlantic Relations, United Nations and Human Rights”. This relatively small number of experts illustrates the limited importance attached to the World Organisation by this EU body, but also indirectly the restricted influence the GSC plays in New York, making a larger UN section superfluous. But there are also other units within DG E, which deal not with the UN as such, but look at the Organisation with a specific thematic angle. For instance there are three officials who deal with the UN in DG E’s section IX “Civilian Crisis Management”. Flowing from the responsibilities of the HR/SG and the focus of DG E, the main areas of interest of NYLO are Security Council issues (crisis management, current political issues, EUPM)14 and other issues of security. Today, conflict prevention and peacekeeping have become an important facet of security. The EU’s role in this field has developed significantly within the last years, to be seen also from the signing of the “Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management” on

GSC Directorate-General G, Economic and Social Affairs. GSC Directorate-General H, Justice and Home Affairs. 13 GSC Directorate-General I, Protection of the Environment and Consumers—Civil protection—Health—Foodstuffs—Education—Youth—Culture—Audiovisual. 14 The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina started on 1 January 2003. It follows on from the UN’s International Police Task Force. 11 12

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24 September 2003 by UNSG Kofi Annan and PM Silvio Berlusconi during the Italian EU Presidency. NYLO is able to provide first hand information on this issue area to the GSC. In general it can be said that the quick deepening and widening of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), because of the important role the Council plays in it, also provided NYLO with an operational function on most of the security related issues. Particularly in the field of crisis management NYLO, together with EU MS and the Commission Delegation, is involved in deepening the cooperation with the UN Secretariat and its Departments. In order to advance the implementation of the Joint Declaration, NYLO’s team in 2005 has been supplemented by an EU Military Staff liaison officer. The very limited personnel resources of NYLO make it impossible for the officials working in this Office to follow all meetings. Therefore they have the priority to participate in the EU coordination meetings to do justice to their obligation to support the EU Presidency. Nevertheless, the large number of conflicting EU meetings frequently makes it necessary for NYLO staff members to prioritise attendance, often on a daily basis, so as to follow the most important issues. Meetings with third parties in Troika format, however, will always be attended by a NYLO official. All other meetings at the UN are only covered if there is time left and if the topic dealt with is relevant for the Council. It is mainly a task for the interns working for NYLO to cover the UN meetings and report back to their supervisors. Consequently, in order to receive first-hand information, NYLO officials have to fall back heavily upon the information provided within EU coordination meetings and received from EU diplomats at the floor at flying visits during or after UN meetings. For that reason the reporting to the General Secretariat headquarters in Brussels is often relatively superficial, summarising the events from a factual perspective rather than interpreting them, and is often not timely. During the main session of the UNGA, PrepComs (UN Preparatory Commissions) or for other important events Council officials come from Brussels to support the permanent NYLO officials for a limited period of time to manage the increased workload, which would be impossible with the existing personnel resources. 5) The creation of the function of a High Representative for CFSP by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 enhanced NYLO’s focus significantly. Under the provisions of Article 26 TEU the HR/SG contributes to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions

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within the scope of CFSP and has the authorisation to act on behalf of the Council through conducting political dialogue with third parties. In this function HR/SG Javier Solana comes to New York several times a year, to speak in different UN bodies, primarily the UNSC, to meet high-ranking representatives from UN MS and UN Secretariat and to seek contact with EU MS diplomats and ministers. NYLO is then responsible for his assistance (e.g. secretarial support and reporting), as well as for security arrangements, protocol and accreditation issues. These tasks are also undertaken for other visitors such as EU Special Representatives and their teams as well as for Council officials. 6) Pursuant to Article 18, paragraphs 3 and 4 TEU, the EU Presidency is assisted in its representation towards third parties by the Council Secretariat, the Commission, and if need be, by the incoming Presidency. Meetings in such constellation are called Troika meetings.15 Even though the Presidency usually is the one leading the discussion in Troika Meetings, NYLO has the role to co-represent the Union and also to report on the respective meeting to the EU MS. NYLO official’s presence in such a setting is even more important than usual, since it guarantees to the other 26 EU MS that the Presidency will not exceed its mandate and takes a consistent approach. 7) Comparable to the missions of the EU MS, NYLO also has the ‘classical’ function of a representation of the Council to the UN. Besides the facets of that role already mentioned above, this also includes to uphold and expand the network of working contacts with EU MS, the Commission Delegation, third country missions to the UN and pertinent sections of the UN Secretariat, where particularly the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has to be mentioned. In the perception of most EU MS delegates the Liaison Office plays only an administrative, but not a political role. Considering its resources this view is not surprising and it is also mainly in accordance with the Council Secretariat’s mandate. But since NYLO is the only direct EU antenna dealing with CFSP in New York, which is important and necessary to have, it could and perhaps should take a more pro-active stance in the EU coordination process. That could have a positive effect on the

15

A detailed description of the Troika meeting mechanism follows on pp. 116 ff.

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activities of EU MS in New York and augment EU cohesion. Therefore NYLO not only has to continue to adapt to the changing realities within the CFSP and to the changing needs of the EU institutions it works for, but also to sharpen its profile and to enhance its ability to deliver on substance. For the time being, NYLO is at the beginning of playing a political role in New York and building a bridge to Brussels, trying to link activities at the UN to developments in Brussels. 2.2

Role of the Delegation of the European Commission to the UN

Even though as well representing an EU institution, the role of the second EU body at the UN, the Delegation of the European Commission to the UN (DECUN), and particularly its influence on the processes within the EU group, is significantly different from that of NYLO. In contrast to NYLO the Commission Delegation, which is responsible for the external representation of the European Community, does not have a deputation at the UN to support the representation of interests of the EU MS and the EU in toto, but to preserve the interests of the European Commission and the EC. Therefore, DECUN is very much similar in nature and function to the missions of the EU MS. But while EU MS represent national interests, DECUN safeguards the exclusive and shared competences of the EC. This section focuses on the work and functioning of the Commission Delegation to the UN in New York. Nevertheless, even though its engagement at the UN and EU in New York will be discussed from a practical perspective, some legal considerations have to be intertwined occasionally. The roots of the European Commission’s representation to the UN in New York date back to 1964, when an information office was established to foster relations with third parties and exert influence on the proceedings at the UN indirectly. This office was transformed into an official Delegation of the European Commission when the European Economic Community16 obtained observer status on 11 October 1974.17 The European Economic Community was the first non-state actor that was granted permanent observer status at the UN. This status is 16 17

Changed into ‘European Community’ after the implementation of the TEU. UNGA resolution 3208 XXIX.

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enjoyed by the EC in the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)18 and most of its functional commissions,19 as well as in UN subsidiary organs,20 both in full sessions and in technical committees.21 It does not encompass the UN Security Council. Besides the observer status, the EC enjoys a full participant status22 in ECOSOC’s UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD),23 and in the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF). The full participant status gives more influence to the EC than the observer status. Also in the few international conferences held in New York within the period under examination, e.g. Millennium Summit (2000) and UNGA highlevel meeting on HIV/AIDS (2004), the EC participated as an observer since the UNGA rules of procedure applied, due to the fact that the conferences were held under the auspices of the UNGA. However, it is important to emphasise that the EC has not, under any circumstances, the right to vote, as this right is reserved for the participating states. On the basis of the often overlooked Article 302 TEC, which asks the Commission to maintain all “appropriate relations with the organs of the UN”, the EC expanded its work as an observer within the UN System significantly over the years. And as a senior EC official pointed out recently, the Commission’s idea is obviously “to get membership for the EC wherever that is possible”.24 In accordance with that, the Commission in its Communication entitled “The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism” of

In accordance with rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure of ECOSOC. In accordance with rule 74 of the Rules of Procedure of ECOSOC. The functional commissions with EC observer status are: Commission on Population and Development, Commission for Social Development, Commission on the Status of Women, Statistical Commission, Commission on Science and Technology for Development, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Commission on Human Rights. 20 Pursuant Art. XXII of the UN Charter. 21 In accordance with the perspective taken in this chapter, this analysis focuses exclusively at the UN’s activities in New York. 22 This status allows the EC be present at all meetings, to submit written and oral comments, introduce proposals and amendments, includes the right of reply and enables it to take the floor whenever EC competences are touched upon. Participation in informal meetings is also possible. No right to vote is included. 23 Pursuant ECOSOC decision 1995/201. 24 Kuijper, Peter Jan, Director at the Legal Service of the European Commission, speech given during session 1: “Towards a Structural Cooperation between the UN and the EU” of the conference on “The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership”, Palais d’Egmont, Brussels, 18 May 2004. 18 19

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September 2003 claims that the current status of the EC at the UN does not any more meet its competences, which have been significantly extended since its admission as a UN observer in 1974. It therefore asks for further efforts “to ensure that the EC is able to contribute to the work of UN bodies, in close concertation with Member States” for the period before the entry into force of the EU Reform Treaty, which would ‘boost’ the EU’s representation anyhow.25 The Commission therefore seeks to enhance the EC status in refugee and asylum issues, concretely by obtaining full observer status in the UNHCR Executive Committee and in environmental questions by becoming a party to the Global Environmental Facility.26 Nonetheless, having said all that it has to be stressed that the Commission’s activities flowing from Article 302 TEC also contribute to constantly increasing the level of cooperation with and support for the UN, and is therefore unquestionably advantageous for both sides. It should be mentioned that the Commission in New York is in regular dispute with third parties, specifically the US, about its participation in the UN’s dealings.27 The US frequently expressed concerns about the EC role at the UN during the past few years, specifically about its participant status in UN conferences. The US tried to block EC participant status in a couple of instances, e.g. to the conference on Small Island Development States during UNGA 58 and in the preparations for the Conference on Disaster Reduction in the same session. The matter is so important that the US tried to link the question of the EC status to the US ratification of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Even EU MS capitals were approached by the US administration to discuss the matter. Obviously the US is concerned about the rising influence of the EC and the EU at the multilateral stage and tries to contain it wherever possible. In addition the US seems to see the risk that the EC would try to obtain at full participant status in a whole range of

Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism (doc. COM(2003) 526 final), 10.09.2003, p. 22. 26 Ibid., p. 23. 27 This is true for the period under consideration. However, since then a high-level EU-US Working Group has resolved almost all related questions. See Frank Hoffmeister, “Ousider or Frontrunner? Recent developments under international and European law on the status of the European Union in international organizations and treaty bodies”, 44 CMLR (2007), pp. 43–44. 25

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issue areas discussed at the UN, and that other observers would follow the example of the EC and would try to enhance their status as well. Both arguments are not baseless as became clear above. However, in most cases the EC managed to achieve a status necessary to uphold its interests despite harassing fire on the part of the US. To cultivate the EU-UN relationship, the European Commission has Delegations at all major UN sites in addition to UN headquarters in New York, namely in Geneva, Nairobi, Paris, Rome and Vienna. The organisation of the relation between European Commission and the UN is done centrally by the Commission’s Directorates-General (DGs) responsible for External Relations (RELEX) and Development (DEV). Moreover, in specific issue areas DGs with other thematic orientation maintain their own contacts to UN bodies relevant for their work. Due to an arrangement with the US authorities, as indicated already in the previous chapter, it is the European Commission, and not the European Community, which has been accredited to the UN in New York. The roots of this lie in the dual representation of the EC position at the UN, shared between Commission and EU Presidency, as laid down in an internal arrangement (Council document 1/119/74). On the basis of this arrangement the Commission requested and obtained in its own name diplomatic immunities and privileges, and not in the name of the EC. However, this practise is undertaken with regard to all the EC Delegations to third countries and is therefore being used also in multilateral settings. The reason for that is that EU MS did not vest the EC with the right to active legation. However, the limitation of the first pillar representation to the UN of the Commission has no consequences in praxi. DECUN, representing the executive arm of the EC, is de facto responsible for the EC representation in toto. The personnel resources of DECUN are almost double the size than those of NYLO. Of the 22 people working in the Delegation, eight are as ‘A-officials’ directly involved in the political representation at the UN (including the Head of Delegation), while 14 are responsible for secretarial, information, technical and administrative tasks. Similar to their counterparts in NYLO, the ‘A-officials’ have an impressive background of many years’ work experience in multilateral settings, but did not go through the rigorous diplomatic training most of the EU MS representatives have undertaken. Interns, sometimes up to ten at any one time, are fully integrated into the work of DECUN. They

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are indispensable for the smooth running of the delegation.28 In some instances, i.e. for the work in some Committees or individual events, experts from Commission headquarters in Brussels reinforce the work force of DECUN. In general, DECUN’s A-officials, heavily supported by the interns, try to cover as many UN meetings as possible. Particularly in all formal UN meetings it is made sure that the EC seat is never deserted, to show how seriously the EC takes its role as an observer. However, DECUN’s personnel resources are too limited to cover all the UN meetings, for which reason the officials have to concentrate on meetings most important for their work. Nevertheless, through contacts within the EU group and the participation in EU coordination meetings, which have priority, it is possible to follow the main lines of the developments. Besides its involvement in the work of the UN bodies mentioned above, DECUN also has working relations with the UN funds and programmes that are located in New York. UNICEF, UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) are the most important institutions to be mentioned in this context. Through the participation in various donor groups DECUN officials are able to coordinate with other donor countries in order to achieve the most effective and efficient use of the Commission’s financial support possible. Since 1974, the Community position is represented by the Commission when the subject matter concerns EC policies, and by the EU MS holding the EU Presidency in all other cases. The representation of the EU/EC is therefore a kind of “amalgam of the first and second pillar”.29 The details of this division of labour were settled in the already mentioned Council document 1/119/74. This way of proceeding allows a way out of the dilemma that the EU does not have any legal status at the UN. Despite this arrangement and even though it has political interests only in specific fields, DECUN is involved in 28 The Ambassador of DECUN said about the role of the interns in an interview: “The only way we are able to report back on and take account of the European Community angle at the thousands of UN meetings that take place each year is through the 8–10 interns that we have at any one time”. Taken from Claire Hewitt, “The EU at the UN: Propagating a Model of Good Governance”, Commission en direct (weekly internal newspaper of the European Commission), no. 284 (6–12 June 2003), p. 5. 29 Kuijper, op. cit. in note 24.

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the whole EU coordination process to the same degree as the EU MS are. In the day-to-day routine in New York, Commission officials or interns on their behalf follow all EU coordination meetings relevant to Community interests. However, the nature of its participation in the EU coordination process varies by subject area. Like EU MS delegates, Commission officials are most of the time silent on issues where they have no particular interests, such as UN budget or disarmament issues. On the other hand they actively give input on substance and tactics on questions where they have interests or shared competences, i.e. environment and development, conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building, human rights, humanitarian aid and humanitarian relief, good governance, democratization, justice and reconciliation, health, consumer protection and energy policy. In practice, the concrete input by DECUN A-officials is subject to variation due to the personality of each individual official and simply the individual’s expertise. What does not vary is that the DECUN’s delegates will coordinate with the Presidency and the EU MS on all these questions on equal footing to reach a common EU position. In the outward representation of this agreed position in UN meetings it will be the EU Presidency that speaks for the Union, also in questions of shared competence. Third parties will therefore not be aware of any specific role of the Commission. In general it has to be pointed out that a clear-cut differentiation between first pillar and second pillar questions is often not existing, in particular at the UN.30 The peace and security related issues just mentioned make that obvious. An important concrete example is the signing and implementation of the Declaration on Civilian Crisis Management of September 2003, which comprises both CFSP and EC activities. That may produce some duplication and need for coordination between DECUN and the EU Presidency, while the latter of course remains the EU body mainly responsible for peace and security issues. In areas in which the European Community has exclusive competences, processes are different, both internally and outwardly. Those are trade issues and aspects of fisheries, agriculture, development and

30 Interview number 38, 21 December 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]).

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environmental policy. In these areas the Commission speaks for and acts as negotiator for the EU and its Member States with third parties. Regarding EU internal discussions on these questions mutual discussions among the EU MS, Commission and Council Secretariat take place in the usual setting of coordination meetings. It is not the case, as some might think, that the Commission, due to the European Community’s exclusive competences, would simply pursue its own line without consulting the EU MS, as it does in contacts with third parties in other settings. But the special intergovernmental environment of the UN also sets the rules for the EU internal proceedings. That means that, as in any other EU coordination meeting, EU MS will present their views on substance and tactics, trying to find common ground. Nevertheless it remains clear that the Commission is the main protagonist in such subject areas, being the focal point for EU MS, the one setting the route and the outcome to be achieved. The Commission therefore really has a special position within the discussions on issues of exclusive EC competences that only the P2 sometimes have in other areas. The process is then driven mainly by EC interests; the Commission allows input from the EU MS, but only to the extend that it fits into the rationale of its activities. While the P2 justify their occasional solo efforts, independent from the common view among EU MS, with its special obligations under the UN Charter, the Commission can do so by falling back upon the fact that the EU MS have vested it with special rights it has to do justice to in the interest of the EC. But there is a main difference in this comparison: while the P2 sometimes play the card of their special standing openly in favour of their own interests or even against other EU MS, the Commission officials will always manage to integrate the views of EU MS, producing a group feeling in which it rather plays the role of the EU Presidency, forming a common position, than of a primus inter pares, overruling other country’s views. After all, despite EC exclusive competences, the Commission has to represent the interests of the EU MS, and not some interests of its own that could stand in opposition to the EU MS. When an issue area is discussed in UN meetings in which the EC has exclusive competences, Commission officials will represent the Union, and not the EU Presidency. In negotiations, for instance on trade, DECUN’s experts therefore will be the ones undertaking the discussions as a counterpart to the other main players G-77 and US, while the EU MS are in the room only as passive observers, consulting with the negotiator of the EC as required. However, sometimes the

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EU Presidency leads the consultations jointly with EC delegates. By now, third parties are used to this difference in the EU’s representation. What still causes confusion are events where the EU Presidency and the Commission change among each other in the middle of a meeting, or even within a speech, due to the allocation of competences. The Commission delegate than literally takes over the seat of the EU Presidency and gives a statement behind the name plate of the EU MS holding the Presidency. However, there are also cases in which the Commission gives a speech in a UN meeting without any introduction by the EU Presidency, e.g. on “The Role of Diamonds in Fuelling Conflict” or on “HIV/AIDS”, behind its own name plate. DECUN can rely on a sophisticated network of experts and support in Brussels. The administration apparatus located there is more extensive than that of most EU MS. Due to the broad thematic orientation of the UN in New York a whole range of Commission Directorates-General (DGs) are contact points for DECUN delegates. Particularly important are the ones responsible for External Relations (RELEX), Development (DEV), Environment (ENV), Fisheries (FISH) and Trade (TRADE). Other DG’s are involved from time to time. Other Commission services, such as the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) or the Legal Service (SJ) are involved as required. Contacts to the other 127 Commission Delegations all over the world complement the network. Due to its more active role in comparison to NYLO, DECUN limits its contacts to all those EC bodies not only to the reporting on developments within the EU and at the UN, but is involved in a close dialogue with Brussels on issues where it has to defend EC interests, within the EU and with regard to third parties. This dialogue resembles very much the exchange of EU MS missions with their capitals, including the receiving of information and instructions. The thorough and timely reporting of DECUN looks in some areas quite different from that of NYLO. Whereas the reporting looks similar compared to NYLO’s reporting style in the areas where no specific EC interests exist, i.e. it is then mainly factual and descriptive, coverage is somewhat more analytic and interpretational on all the issues of shared and exclusive EC competences. The reasons for that are twofold. Based on more extensive personnel resources, DECUN can follow the developments in its fields of interest exhaustively, an essential prerequisite for reporting that gives a glimpse behind the scenes. Furthermore, for the recipients of NYLO reports mainly factual coverage is often sufficient.

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In contrast to that, action-taking in UN negotiations is only possible on the basis of a three-dimensional picture of a situation, for which reason Commission officials in Brussels need more background information in certain areas than their Council colleagues to give instructions and to offer support. In contrast to NYLO, DECUN has a much more distinct outward orientation. Contacts therefore exist not only to EU MS, but in a similar practice as EU MS also to other UN MS, observers, the UN Secretariat and other officials from the UN System, NGOs, think tanks, academia, business associations and the media. When looking specifically at the representation with a UN focus, the maintenance and extension of a contact network begins with the informal exchange of views at the side of UN meetings and official events at other locations, e.g. at UN MS missions or NGO legations. Complemented is the classic work of a representation at the UN through events organised for third parties by the Delegation. This comprises press conferences, receptions, conferences, exhibitions and cultural events. Those occasions are important for the outreach towards the ‘UN society’ in communicating how the EU/EC sees itself. Useful in that regard are also side events at the UN as a supplement to ongoing meetings, e.g. panel discussions, such as the one at the meeting of the Commission on Sustainable Development focussing on EU partnerships in the water and energy fields (with Commissioner Nielson) or a special trade event focusing on the Doha Development Agenda (with Commissioner Lamy), both held in 2003. Another important facet in the contact to the UN audience is also the EU@UN website. This internet platform gives background information about the EU’s activities at the UN by covering the six Commission Delegations at the major UN sites, but also the work of EU Presidency and EU MS on the whole range of UN issues. It has been created with the intention to emphasise the internal coherence in the EU’s activities at the UN. Modern technologies are also exploited through another medium, an e-mail alert service, providing frequent information on EU related developments through a newsletter, dispatched several times a year. Both EU@UN website and e-mail alert service are administered by officers working in DECUN. They also deal with media and general enquiries. Independent from the UN work, DECUN is involved in a quite different undertaking, namely the task to convey the EU’s policies to a wider audience in the North-East of the USA. The main aim of this

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undertaking is to improve and deepen the EU-US relationship. The target recipients are US decision-makers and opinion-formers, media, organisations and associations based in New York and the adjacent states. To this end events are being organised and Commission officials are sent as speakers to US universities, think-tanks, chambers of commerce, Model UN simulations and the UNA Association, summing up to 60 speaking engagements in 2003 alone. The already mentioned EU@ UN website and e-mail alert service also plays a role in the contact to the non-UN community. 2.3

Towards a Single EU Representation—Cooperation Between DECUN and NYLO

Since August 2004 DECUN and NYLO have their premises in the same building, three adjacent stories in 222 East 41st Street. The search for new and joint premises began as early as July 2002 and was undertaken primarily in light of EU enlargement, requiring larger meeting rooms. Possible closer cooperation between both EU legations and more representative and more secure meeting space were only of minor relevance at that stage. Nevertheless, the contacts between NYLO and DECUN are much less intense than one might expect in view of their common standing under one roof. From the administrative and operational points of view, both bodies work entirely independent from each other. On the whole, real coordination between both bodies is limited to a few substantive issues. Both sides cultivate a parallel-existence and are not perceived by third parties as standing closer to each other than to the other EU MS. This has to do with the diverging functions of the two, but also with the self-conception of the representations, of the people working for them and their views of each other. While some people in NYLO see the Commission officials as being conceited and behaving like diplomats, enjoying their special status buttressed by EC exclusive competences in some issue areas, some Commission delegates see NYLO representatives as coping mainly with secretarial and administrative tasks and as being only superficially familiar with the substance discussed at the UN. These resentments seem to be rooted in a general competition between both institutions, but appear not always to be incorrect. The Ambassador of the European Commission Delegation stated already in summer 2003 that the functions of DECUN and NYLO

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needed to be “better coordinated, and eventually integrated”.31 Discussions for closer cooperation between both Offices, however, began in earnest only in October 2004, i.e. after the move to the shared premises.32 They were undertaken by both legations on the spot in New York, in view of the sensitivity of such a ‘pilot project’ nevertheless in close consultation with the parent institutions in Brussels. The discussions were triggered by the possible implementation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in a future not very far away, i.e. once the EU Reform Treaty would enter into force. But also the ever more pressing logic that the operational resources of both NYLO and DECUN could be used more efficiently through cooperation played a role, and were, perhaps to a limited extend, pushed forward by the increased physical closeness of both Offices since their move into one building. The need to look for synergies was obvious: both Delegations covered issue areas they did not have any particular interests or competences in, such as 5th Committee matters. In other areas one legation followed matters it had no interests in, but was relevant to the other Delegation, e.g. 1st Committee (of interest primarily to NYLO) and 2nd Committee (important mainly for DECUN). By dividing tasks, resources could be released to focus on the core fields of interests of each Delegation. The aim was not to have representatives from both EU institutions in one meeting any more. After a few consultations in autumn 2004 it was decided that the coverage of the work of the UNGA Committees and parts of the EU coordination process would be divided between the Offices. In some areas, however, due to sensitivities on the part of the Commission, collaboration would continue to be limited. Cooperation also includes the administrative area. A weekly meeting between both Heads of Offices and their deputies to exchange information and views is another important part of the teamwork effort. The cooperation under this arrangement began in January 2005. Whether it creates a win-win situation for both sides, and if the 31 Interview with Ambassador John Richardson by Claire Hewitt, “The EU at the UN: Propagating a Model of Good Governance”, Commission en direct (weekly internal newspaper of the European Commission), no. 284 (6–12 June 2003), p. 5. 32 The European Parliament encouraged to create a common external delegation of Council and Commission already in its resolution on “The relations between the European Union and the United Nations (2003/2049(INI))”, adopted 29.1.2004, para. 38; to be found in the Official Journal of the European Union dated 21.4.2004.

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cooperation will cause changes visible also from the outside remains to be seen. However, it is a very important project, which can teach lessons also for more cooperation in Brussels and Geneva. Council and Commission will learn to understand each other better and the teamwork will generate more trust. Both institutions might even profit from the expertise and resources of the other side and widen their horizon accordingly. NYLO’s and DECUN’s cooperation is an important facet on the way towards a unified and coherent external representation of the EU and for the success of the EEAS. And even though the creation of a real common external Delegation, as envisaged by the European Parliament,33 is still a long way off, its assessment that a closer cooperation between NYLO and DECUN might also have positive effects on the relations between EU and UN can be shared. 2.4

Troika Meetings

Two ways of the EU’s representation towards the wider UN membership have been discussed already: usually the EU Presidency represents the EU group and sometimes the whole EU 27 group conducts meetings with third parties, particularly on HoMs level. A third mode is a specifically European one, called Troika meetings. This variant means that a group of three or four representatives from EU MS and EU bodies meet with third parties. Those representatives come from the EU Presidency, the European Commission, the Council Secretariat and, if need be, the incoming EU Presidency. Therefore this group of delegates represents all the EU institutions involved in the external affairs of the Union. The concept of a Troika representing the EU was introduced in 1977 in order to meet the practical requirements within the activities of the EPC. Under its original configuration the Troika consisted of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and its direct predecessor and successor. In December 1993 the European Council decided to organise the rotation of the Presidency among the EU MS in such a way that at least one representative in the Troika would come from one

33

Ibid.

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of the large EU MS. The make-up of the Troika was modified into the form described above (Presidency; Commission; Council) when the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force (May 1999), as stipulated in Article 18 of that Treaty. The Troika mechanism is limited to CFSP issues. Even though the Treaty gives the impression that Troikas are undertaken only on highest levels (HR/SG; Commissioners), in praxi that procedure is employed also on lower hierarchical levels. Through Troika meetings at UN headquarters it is intended to represent the EU in the best possible way. The main objective of Troika meetings is to have a common representation of the EU by the three bodies which are most relevant in its foreign policy formation. The presence of the current and sometimes the next Presidency aims at ensuring the political continuity across the semesters. Since it is associated with the CFSP, the European Commission is an integral part of the Troika meetings.34 And in view of the fact that the Council plays an important role within the framework of the CFSP, the Council Secretariat is involved in those meetings to have a say also on the EU’s policy formulation at the UN.35 The fact that the Commission and the Council Secretariat participate in Troika meetings guarantees continuity of the EU’s policies across the rotating Presidencies as well: officials of both bodies represent the Union in Troika meetings over several years and are therefore accustomed with procedures and substance, while the Presidencies are regularly faced with a new and unfamiliar role during their six months. The incoming Presidency is only part of the Troika if the issues discussed have direct implications also for its semi-annual turn.36 In the actual meetings, however, both the Commission and the Council Secretariat are usually passive participants. It is the current EU Presidency that leads the conversation. Usually a structured agenda predetermines the course of the meeting and also canalises the discussion. Transparency is ensured through a report, written and allocated to all EU MS by the Council Secretariat following the Troika consultation. Troika meetings are a forum of negotiation with other actors at the

34 35 36

Article 18, para 4 TEU. Article 18, para 3 TEU. Article 18, para 4 TEU.

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UN in parallel to or in advance of the official negotiations. Instead of arranging a meeting between all 27 EU MS, the two EU bodies and the third party, the Troika is send as an EU deputation. Of course the whole concept of Troika meetings only works if the EU MS have given a clear mandate to the Troika. Then Troika meetings are helpful to reach a quick agreement with third parties on issues in which it is not necessary to involve delegates from all EU MS and the two EU bodies. This is particularly useful since a meeting between diplomats of 27 EU delegations representing the EU and a third party always carries the risk of ending in confusion, since different views among the EU MS could emerge and cause cacophonies. And interlocutors prefer to have as few counterparts as possible to negotiate. In addition the atmosphere in negotiations is usually the more productive the smaller the group of negotiators is. Since they facilitate procedures and imply a significant saving of labour to the EU MS, Troika meetings are a functional tool and should be used as much as possible. In New York, EU Troikas are conducted on most hierarchical levels and with regard to a broad range of issue areas. Most Presidencies held such meetings also on HoMs level. The Dutch EU Presidency (2004) for instance, with 16 meetings, organised a unusual great number of Troikas at that level.37 In contrast to that, the Belgian (2001) and Greek (2003) Presidencies did not conduct any Troika meeting with HoMs. However, the largest part of Troikas is conducted on experts level. During the Swedish Presidency (2001) for instance 86 per cent of all Troikas were held on issues of the six Main Committees of UNGA, a percentage representative for most other Presidencies. The only areas where Troika meetings happen very rarely or are non-existing are the DPRs level and the section of the experts level, which covers questions with a UNSC relevance. Interlocutors of the EU Troika are diverse. They range from representatives of single UN MS and chairs of groups of UN MS, to interlocutors from the UN, NGOs and other important players. It goes without saying that the ranks of the Troika group and its counterparts are always on an equal footing.

37 This figure, and all the following ones, is based on statistics of the Liaison Office of the Council Secretariat to the UN in New York, converted into own calculations.

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During the ministerial week at the beginning of each UNGA session, Troika meetings take place also on ministerial level, from the EU side with Commissioners and the HR/SG. The unique gathering of highlevel representatives at UN headquarters during those days is used for a large number of Troikas. For instance during the Dutch EU Presidency in 2004 seven such meetings were held, namely with the UNSG, China, Latin America, G-77/NAM, GCC,38 Japan and OIC.39 The proposal to convene a Troika meeting can come from both EU MS and the Presidency. However, the EU Presidency is most often the one suggesting to hold Troikas, simply because it is generally the one managing the EU’s representation. Only rarely a Troika meeting is conducted on the invitation by the counterparts. Usually it is the EU Presidency, which invites the respective interlocutor and the other members of the Troika. Also the other organisational matters of a Troika meeting are devolved on the Presidency. Since it is most of the time the EU Presidency, which initiates a Troika meeting, the number of Troikas varies between each semester, depending on the level of importance each individual Presidency attaches to this instrument. Within the period observed Troika meetings were conducted most often during the Swedish (2001; 63 Troikas), French (2000; 52 Troikas), and Belgian (2001; 51 Troikas) Presidencies. Periods in which only rare use was made of this vehicle were during the Presidencies of Greece (2003; 19 Troikas), Italy (2003; 27 Troikas) and Spain (2002; 28 Troikas). It is tempting to derive the level of Europeanism of each EU Presidency from the number of Troika meetings conducted during their rotation. And indeed it cannot be denied entirely that some Presidencies prefer to get clear mandates by the other EU MS and then enter the negotiations at the UN, than using the combined efforts of the EU institutions represented at the UN. Those Presidencies rather want to act as the only voice of the EU, independent from Commission and Council Secretariat. However, it also has to be said that the employment of a Troika depends very much on the concrete situation, and therefore in some Presidencies it is simply not opportune to have many Troika meetings with third parties due to the respective developments

38 39

Gulf Cooperation Council. Organisation of The Islamic Conference.

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at the UN. Another factor is that some Presidencies try to avoid Troikas because of the limited transparency they mean for the other EU MS. The style of the individual diplomats involved is also relevant, since some are more familiar with the Troika mechanism than others. Tradition is another factor. Regarding Second and Third Committee issues Troikas are an regular part of each EU Presidency. The experts in those fields are familiar with this instrument and therefore use it. On the other hand, DPRs Troikas for instance did not take place before the Portuguese Presidency (2000). The three succeeding Presidencies followed the Portuguese example, but Troikas on that level have not been undertaken since then. Apparently, EU MS DPRs did not embrace the Troika mechanism for their work and the Portuguese innovation did not establish a tradition but fell into oblivion. While some delegates of EU MS and EU bodies in New York see the clear advantage of conducting Troika meetings, others question the usefulness of that mechanism.40 Points of criticism are that some Presidencies use Troika meetings to blow their own trumpet and to display their dominant role in the EU’s representation. Some diplomats regard many of the Troika meetings as completely futile since they would repeat often only what has been said already in Brussels. The added value for interlocutors, which are therefore aware of the EU’s position, is consequently limited. Another point of criticism is that it is rather the exception than the rule that real issues are discussed in Troika meetings, and that important questions are resolved only rarely. The EU Factor Part Two—the Brussels Dimension 2.5

Influence from Brussels-based Intergovernmental Bodies

In general, intergovernmental EU bodies do not exert significant influence on the EU coordination process at the UN. Therefore Brusselsbased EU bodies do not have a tangible impact on the final decisions taken within the EU group in New York, of course with the exception of the Commission headquarters, which gives instructions to the Com-

40 Based on information received in interviews conducted with delegates in New York throughout 2004.

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mission Delegation in New York. As one senior diplomat from a large EU MS put it: 90 per cent of the input into the EU internal discussions at the UN comes from capitals, only 10 per cent from EU bodies.41 It hardly ever happens that there is direct guidance from Brussels on substance or process to EU MS delegations. Instead, it is the case that basic positions are taken in a particular issue area by an EU body, which then serve as a guiding principle for several years. General agreement achieved in Brussels on issues like the International Criminal Court, human rights or death penalty then indirectly influence the actions taken by EU MS at the UN. As a consequence, the common line agreed upon on different levels in Brussels, up to HoS/HoG, cannot be translated directly into the proceedings at the UN. This has to be done through the internal EU coordination process in New York. This channel also has to be used when there is no decision from an EU body to lean on. Then the intergovernmental bargaining takes place in New York on the basis of guidance from EU MS capitals. Due to the little visible impact from CFSP bodies on processes in New York it is tempting to imagine a scenario in which New York and Brussels work independently from each other, or even against each other. But one has to keep in mind what it actually means when one talks about Brussels-based bodies. To these bodies the same 27 EU MS like in New York send representatives. As a result, EU MS diplomats in Brussels would not take different decisions than experts in New York, since people sitting in Brussels-based bodies work for the same ‘employers’ as delegates in New York. Conclusions taken in Brussels and New York are consequently consistent, at least most of the time. But as has been pointed out above,42 it is still the case that the interests of EU MS drive the processes in New York much more openly than in Brussels. Integration and Brusselisation has made less progress. The communauté d’ action has its limits. But it also has to be emphasised that the coordination process at the UN is very much a microcosm. The rules existing within the EU as a whole not necessarily apply in this “strange and surreal world”,43 limiting the influence of Brussels. The strong influence of national capitals curbs a common

41 Interview number 25, 17 September 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]). 42 See chapter one on the influence of national capitals, pp. 47 ff. 43 The EU Presidency welcomed a new EU MS delegate in an EU coordination meeting in October 2004 with the words “welcome to our strange and surreal world”.

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European policy and stands in the way of a close connection between New York and Brussels. As a consequence of all that, Brussels is only left the role of giving additional input into EU coordination in New York. Its control of and influence on the processes there are limited. It is rather an incomplete version of the spirit of Brussels prevailing in New York, creating an esprit de corps, than that all EU missions understand themselves as performers of EU policies. And EU MS only feel as part of the EU as long as it fits into their national interests. This is one of the reasons why the representation of a single EU voice at the UN is not yet fully developed. The job of delegations in NYC is to make the implementation of their interests function in practice in cooperation with their EU partners. This stands in contrast to the rather esoteric work in Brussels. Realpolitik drives processes in New York: it has to be explored what is doable. Are there already prefabricated decisions from Brussels they will be used in New York. Then the national interests are communicated via the roundabout way through Brussels. Otherwise the input comes directly from capitals. The whole secret of CFSP is that there is a coordination process, wherever that takes place. In any case the ideas to be implemented at the UN are being introduced by the capitals of the EU MS. Whether these ideas go the way through an EU body or are directly addressed to the other 26 EU partners in New York is within the discretion of the respective experts in EU MS capitals. Of course, the suggestions and ideas of New York based delegates will be incorporated in the capitals’ approach. Nevertheless, in some issue areas guidance from Brussels-based bodies is wanted by diplomats in New York. This is particularly true in areas where EU consensus is difficult to achieve or unachievable, e.g. disarmament or human rights. Without preparation in EU bodies and corresponding guidance from capitals it would be very difficult to reach a common position in New York, especially not in the time available. Leadership from higher-level bodies is also useful since it tells experts in New York in which tracks they are working in. It also prevents ambitious solo attempts by individual diplomats creating new initiatives, which would complicate things even more. In general, to use the picture used above, EU MS capitals think about the ingredients for the dish; if it is a dish difficult to cook they will prepare it already in Brussels and only leave the final flavouring to experts in New York. Otherwise the ingredients are put together in New York without going via Brussels.

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The restricted influence of Brussels is certainly related to the level of information of experts in New York: usually they are not very well informed about developments in relevant EU bodies. EU MS delegations in New York learn about the discussions mainly through the filter of their capitals, but also through COREUs and to a limited extend through NYLO. But this again only reflects the level of importance that EU MS attach to developments in Brussels for their work in New York: the flow of information would be more intense if it were more relevant for EU coordination in New York. The quantity and quality of input from Brussels depends on the respective EU bodies, for which reason a brief analysis of the role individual EU bodies play in the formation of an EU voice at the UN will follow. European Council The European Council in its three to four annual meetings with its general political guidelines of course sets also implicitly the overall direction of the EU countries at the UN. However, that HoS/HoG take conclusions that have direct implications for the work of EU MS delegations in New York, as for instance in the case of tensions with Iraq,44 EU-UN cooperation45 or the preparation of the 2005 UN Summit46 is clearly an exception. More frequently the European Council comments retrospectively on developments or decisions at the UN, which not surprisingly has only marginal effects on future EU cooperation at the UN.47 Other decisions have consequences for the work of EU MS and EU representatives in New York, such as conclusions on the Middle

44 Conclusions of the Brussels Extraordinary European Council of 17 February 2003 (Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, doc. 6466/03). Also the Brussels European Council 20 and 21 March 2003 dealt with the role of the UN and the UNSC with regard to Iraq (Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, doc. 8410/03), as did all the European Councils that followed until June 2004. 45 Decisions on reinforcement of the political dialogue and strengthening of cooperation between the EU and the UN taken at the Göteborg European Council 15 and 16 June 2001 (Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, doc. SN 200/1/01 REV 1). 46 Brussels European Council 16 and 17 June 2005 (Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, 10275/1/05 REV 1), paragraphs 21–40. 47 Examples for such a retrospective political commentary were the welcoming of UNGA resolutions on “The Olympic Truce” (Brussels European Council 12 and 13 December 2003), “Fight Against Terrorism” (Thessaloniki European Council 19 and

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East peace progress,48 the environment,49 human rights50 or the strategy for sustainable development.51 However, these directives are often too general to influence the practical work of the EU countries at the UN. Therefore hardly any influence of the highest EU body can be felt in the daily routine of EU coordination in New York. Council of Ministers The Council of Ministers in its different subject-based configurations meets much more frequently than the European Council, on average eighty times a year. It also addresses a much broader range of questions in much more detail. Instead of dealing with high politics only, it also copes with technical and organisational matters. Potentially it therefore affects EU activities at the UN more visibly. However, only in a few concrete questions there is a tangible influence of decisions taken in Brussels on actions undertaken by EU MS at the UN. As an example can serve the discussions on Darfur in 2004 and 2005, in which the interest of the EU foreign ministers in that matter and their decisions taken, as well as the cooperation on ministerial level with the African Union produced a basis for the work in New York. These directives even shaped the positioning of EU MS in the UNSC. Other examples in which the Council gave direction to experts in New York were its decision to support the UN in its efforts in Angola,52 to increase EU consultations with Russia within the UN framework,53 to underline the crucial role of the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,54 and to welcome the UN’s role in the Iraqi state-building process.55 In addition, it happens quite often that the Council uses UNSC resolutions or other decisions of UN bodies as

20 June 2003) and the UN’s position on Iraq (Brussels European Council 27 and 26 March 2004). 48 Inter alia at the Cardiff European Council 15 and 16 June 1998 and Santa Maria da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000. 49 Inter alia at the Cologne European Council 3 and 4 June 1999. 50 Inter alia at the Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999. 51 Göteborg European Council 15 and 16 June 2001 (Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, doc. SN 200/1/01 REV 1). 52 1871st Council Meeting, General Affairs Council, Brussels, 2 October 1995. 53 1922nd Council Meeting, General Affairs Council, Brussels, 13 May 1996. 54 2631st Council Meeting, External Relations Council, Brussels, 13–14 December 2004. 55 2637th Council Meeting, General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussels, 31 January 2005.

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a point of reference to underline its positions. Retrospective reactions by the Council on developments at the UN are also occurring. An example is the accentuation of the important role of the UN in the negotiations on the “Convention on Water Protection” and the “Convention on Industrial Accidents”.56 The declaratory character of such statements and the non-existence of a forward-looking component in it is the same as in the case of the European Council. Council decisions, like European Council conclusions, however, are ‘politically binding’, which gives them additional weight.57 But the fact that the process that was passed through before the final decision, i.e. the discussions in the bodies subordinate to the Council, is usually not known to experts in New York, might be problematic, since decisions on that level are often classical compromise agreements, which makes it important to be aware of the sensitivities that led to them. As already said when examining the legal foundations of EU coordination, it is also the Council which sometimes sets guidelines for the day-to-day running of the process. This was the case when the Council adopted an orientation document for the EU coordination process at the UN,58 set guidelines for the implementation of Article 19 TEU59 and developed a ‘Code of conduct’ for the coordination process.60 Besides the limited number of direct instructions for EU MS activities at the UN, it is the large number of decisions taken by the Council, which influences the work at the UN indirectly. Decisions on the complete range of issues on the political agenda of the EU, i.e. with relevance for all three pillars, as diverse as security, development and human rights, on the proceeding towards specific countries or regions are taken by the Council. Therefore Council activities have indirect implications for nearly all experts of EU MS in New York. Even though

2487th Council Meeting, External Relations Council, Brussels 24, February 2003. 57 As has been said by an EU MS delegate in interview number 37, 20 December 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]). 58 Document d’orientation sur la coordination de l’Union européenne dans le cadre des Nations Unies, approved by the Council of the European Union on 10 April 1995, Doc. SN 2435/01. 59 Action des États de l’Union européenne au sein des organisations internationales, des conférences internationales et au Conseil de sécurité, Council of the European Union, 16 July 2002; not available to the public. 60 Working methods for an enlarged Council. Code of Conduct, Council of the European Union, 11 March 2003 (adopted on 18 March 2003), Doc. 7105/03. 56

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they might not be aware of them, their capitals are and formulate their instructions accordingly. COREPER and PSC COREPER hardly ever takes operative decisions which are relevant for the EU coordination process in New York. It happens only now and then that language agreed on within COREPER is adopted for the formulation of EU positions within the UN framework. The PSC, which deals with the whole spectrum of CFSP issues, on the other hand, is the main interlocutor with New York-based EU diplomats on day-to-day political and security issues. It is sometimes even involved in the discussion of EU input to UN resolutions. The Committee’s contributions on the whole, however, are not always welcome to experts in New York. First, because the knowledge of PSC ambassadors of UN particularities in general and the issues discussed specifically is often not very significant. Second, because of frictions between Brussels and New York: HoMs in New York are less senior than PSC ambassadors when looking into the EU internal hierarchies: the PSC provides guidelines on how to implement EU foreign policies. But de facto New York HoMs often have gone through a career as state secretaries or ministers and their position within national ministries is very strong, perhaps even stronger than those of PSC ambassadors. Guidance from their compatriots in Brussels is therefore not always accepted as being unalterable. This reveals a noteworthy dilemma in the structure of EU external politics. Because in the rare cases in which HoMs in New York and the PSC in Brussels deal with the same question and come to different conclusions or if HoMs do not agree with the approach of the PSC, it is getting quite dangerous and the EU Presidency has to use all its skills to ease those inter-institutional differences. Nevertheless, the PSC is involved in UN questions as a result of its mandate, but also due to the nervousness of some EU Presidencies. The latter try to enforce a common line in New York and prevent quarrels through preparation on senior levels in Brussels. But the initiative for that comes from the capital of the respective EU Presidency rather than from its representatives in New York.

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Council Working Groups The Working Parties or Working Groups of the Council are probably the most important bodies regarding input into EU internal processes in New York. They are the bodies which most often take decisions that have direct implications for the work at the UN, at least some of the Working Groups. For that reason they will be examined more comprehensively than the other EU bodies. The institution of EPC Working Groups was established with the Copenhagen Report of July 1973. In subsequent years a large number of such Groups was created. As of today there are some 250 Council Working Groups and subgroups, of which, however, the vast majority are first-pillar Working Groups. They discuss in great detail all the political, legal and technical issues in their clearly demarcated, limited subject area. Only if agreement is not achievable in the Groups, the points of discord go to the next level, i.e. PSC, COREPER and later Council. As the first level of Council internal consultations, these bodies are very influential within the EU’s dealings. The Working Groups consist of mid-rank civil servants from the 27 EU MS, the Commission and the Council Secretariat. In some particularly important meetings, however, Political Directors represent the EU MS.61 National officials come either from the permanent representations in Brussels or travel to the Working Group meetings from capitals. Most of the Groups come together once a month for one day, only very rarely for two days. The Working Parties relevant for the EU coordination process at the UN are mainly those within the section ‘External Relations/Security and Defence/Development’ of Council preparatory bodies. They can be differentiated with respect to their orientation into thematic and geographic Groups. The table on the next page shows the Groups which are particularly important for the work at the UN and also gives the areas of UN work they are involved in:

CONUN, for instance, meets traditionally on Directors level in New York on the Friday of the UNGA Ministerial Week in autumn. 61

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Table 2.1: Council Working Groups With UN Relevance Council preparatory bodies: Working Groups on External Relations/Security and Defence/Development (selection) a) thematic differentiation Acronym

Full designation of Working Group

UN areas dealt with

CODEV

Development Cooperation

2nd Committee, ECOSOC

CODUD

Dual-Use Goods

1st Committee

CODUN

Global Disarmament and Arms Control

1st Committee, Conference on Disarmament (CD), Disarmament Commission

COHOM Human Rights

3rd Committee, UN human rights mechanisms, Commission on Human Rights

COHUM Humanitarian Questions

Humanitarian Questions

COJUR

Public International Law

6th Committee, International Criminal Court, International Law Commission

COMAR

Law of the Sea

6th Committee

COMEP

Ad hoc Working Group on Range of areas, including the Middle East Peace Process UNSC

CONOP

Non-Proliferation

1st Committee

CONUN

United Nations

Institutional and crosscutting issues

COSCE

OSCE and the Council of Europe

Police operations

COTER

Terrorism (International Aspects)

6th Committee

PROBA

Commodities

2nd Committee, ECOSOC

—

Preparation for International Development Conferences

e.g. Istanbul +5 (Habitat), ICPD +5, UNCTAD X

—

Horizontal Drugs62

UNDCP

—

Social Affairs Group

e.g. Beijing +5 (Women 2000)

62

Placed in the section ‘General Affairs’ of Council Preparatory Bodies.

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Table 2.1 (cont.) Council preparatory bodies: Working Groups on External Relations/Security and Defence/Development (selection) b) geographic differentiation Acronym

Full designation of Working Group

UN areas dealt with

COAFR

Africa

COASI

Asia-Oceania

COLAT

Latin America

COMAG

Mashreq/Maghreb

The whole range of resolutions of the UNSC and other UN bodies, but also UN peacekeeping operations falling into the scope of these Working Groups

COMEM Middle East/Gulf COWEB

Western Balkans Region

It has to be highlighted that many of the 250 Council Working Groups once in a while decide on issues that have a UN dimension, that the list given above is therefore by no means exhaustive. The Council Working Group coping specifically with UN questions (CONUN) is responsible for UN institutional and horizontal issues, while the other Groups deal with the particulars of specific topics. Working Groups are involved in the discussions on substance and tactics, as well as in the drafting and approval of speeches to be delivered in New York. They also participate in the debate on EU input to UN resolutions. The Groups sometimes give direct guidance, even instructions on how to act in New York. Occasionally the work between Brussels and New York is divided: the Working Groups say which final outcome is expected and the actual coordination is then undertaken in New York. In general the Working Groups have an important function in settling problems in some of the issues before they are being discussed on the East River. That saves valuable time at the UN. Two Council Working Parties deal specifically with UN matters: the Working Group for the Preparation of Major UN Conferences and the already mentioned CONUN (Coordination Nations Unies). The former Group meets only in the run-up to a major UN conference, but plays then a central role in the coordination and synchronisation of the EU approach. But these conferences usually do not take place in New York, which makes this Group less relevant for this examination. Only in the case of the Millennium Summit in 2000 and the Major Event in 2005,

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which were held in New York, the work of this Group, i.e. organising the preparation and realisation of the EU participation in the Summits, had an impact on EU processes at UN headquarters. Since CONUN is the only EU body continuously dealing with the UN, it seems to be appropriate to look at its role and work in greater detail. CONUN was established by the Political Committee on 23 January 1975. Back then, its original mandate was “to identify problems in the common interests, to suggest means to resolve them and to undertake the appropriate work in view of the 30th session of UNGA and the 7th special session”.63 This partly time-bound mandate was extended in the coming years. For instance CONUN became the focal point for EU internal coordination of candidatures to posts as heads of UN organisations and agencies (1994) and became responsible for the supervision of the coordination process for UN conferences (1995). In accordance with these elaborations one would expect that CONUN would be very much involved in the developments in New York. But its guidance remains superficial, since the monthly meeting cycle of CONUN does not allow the Group to get involved in all the daily work within the EU coordination process. Its main role is to develop strategic medium- to long-term goals regarding institutional or crosscutting issues. In contrast to most other Council Working Groups, CONUN’s mandate is limited to CFSP, and does not include first or third pillar matters. CONUN does also not deal with ESDP matters and questions related to the UNSC. While the former is covered by other Council bodies, the latter is discussed by the PSC and directly in New York. CONUN has a kind of supervising role over the other Council Working Groups whenever they deal with subjects with a UN dimension. That brings CONUN closer to the level of competences of higher EU bodies, such as the PSC. However, clashes of competences are not occurring since CONUN’s relations with other Council bodies are clearly defined. Problematic is sometimes only the relationship with HoMS in New York, since such a clear demarcation of competences is missing. Parallel discussions with divergent outcomes have occurred in the past.

63

EU internal document adopted by the Political Committee, 23 January 1975.

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CONUN also maintains political dialogue with third parties and meets for instance twice a year with the US and Canada, but also with the associated countries, Turkey and Japan. EU MS or the EU Presidency can identify certain items which are considered as political relevant and in need of detailed discussion in CONUN. What the Group covers determines which direction coordination in New York should take. CONUN preserves guidance to the local offices in New York, to the EU MS experts, including HoMs. Even though the HoMs do not necessarily like that, this is how it has to be seen institutionally. Diplomats of EU MS in New York are critical of CONUN because of the broad scope it covers.64 It happens quite often that the EU MS representatives in CONUN meetings are not very familiar with the topics on the agenda. This is a problem especially in the case of bigger EU MS: due to their large administrations with different departments dealing with UN questions, only about a third of the topics discussed in CONUN fall into the area of competence of the person who participates in the monthly meeting. As a consequence, consultations are often not very fruitful and efficient. And there is also a common feeling by New York-based delegates that CONUN is simply too far away from the developments at the UN. Therefore the Group often discusses other questions than those that are pressing for experts in New York. While CONUN deals mostly with pivotal issues, for delegates on the East River the prime interest lies on the practicalities of how to achieve a particular political aim. Similar to the resentments towards the PSC all that leads to dissatisfaction with CONUN by some New York based experts, which often gives them guidance that is perceived to be impracticable. This might be the main reason why experts in New York in general do not necessarily pay much attention to the discussions in the Working Groups. CONUN could and should play a much more influential role with regard to EU coordination processes in New York. A strengthened central EU body responsible for UN matters would be able to promote more coherent EU policies at the UN. To achieve that, however, the frequency of CONUN meetings would have to be increased and EU MS would have to ensure that the level of expertise of their representatives in the

64

Information received in interviews in New York, spring and autumn 2004.

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Group allows productive discussions. The Group should concentrate more on questions of substance and less on technical issues. To that end, other Working Groups should hand over, at least for the period of heightened importance, specific issues to CONUN. In addition, its position vis-à-vis HoMs in New York would have to be clarified. In any case, duplication between CONUN and New York-based bodies has to be avoided, for which reason the Group should give guidance in those questions only where it is not more useful to coordinate on the spot in New York. European Parliament The European Parliament (EP) is not much concerned with UN matters and is not giving input into the EU coordination in New York. That is de iure not possible. The EP could influence the coordination process through debates. But in recent years only during the peak of the Iraq crisis in spring 2003, the UN was the main subject of most plenary discussions.65 Only the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy sometimes deals with UN questions. The recent establishment of a ‘Working Group United Nations’ in this Committee might produce tangible results in the future. But so far concrete input from the EP, such as the resolution on “The relations between the European Union and the United Nations”, adopted in January 2004,66 or the resolution on “The outcome of the United Nations World Summit of 14–16 September 2005”, adopted in September 2005,67 is the rare exception. Hitherto, experts in New York do not perceive the Parliament as an actor relevant to their work. That is also the reason why all the other decisions by the EP on international events, that fall into the thematic complex of the UN, are usually not taken note of by EU MS delegates at UN headquarters. The EP only becomes central for New York when UN notables take the floor in Strasbourg, such as UNSG Annan in January 2004.68 Even though 65 Armin Laschet, “Für einen effizienten Multilateralismus. Gemeinsame Werte von Europäischer Union und Vereinten Nationen”, Vereinte Nationen, 2004, no. 2, p. 41. 66 European Parliament, resolution on “The relations between the European Union and the United Nations (2003/2049(INI))”, adopted on 29.1.2004; to be found in the Official Journal of the European Union dated 21.4.2004. 67 European Parliament, resolution on “The outcome of the United Nations World Summit of 14–16 September 2005”, adopted on 29.9.2005. 68 UNSG Kofi Annan’s Address to the European Parliament upon receipt of the Andrei Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, January 29, 2004.

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the EP shows its presence in New York through frequent visits by EP delegations or individual MEPs and through their passive participation in UN meetings, also in the UNGA, it was unable to enhance its status in the past. However, even if the EP would become more active with regard to the UN, due to the weak position of the EP in the EU in general and in the field of foreign policies in particular, its inputs are not likely to develop a substantial stimulus. Enlargement of its competences would be necessary for further involvement. Other EU bodies than the ones mentioned do not give significant input into the EU’s proceedings at the UN. The Commission is very much involved in the work in New York, particularly in its field of competences, but does not often influence the overall coordination process.69 Contributions of general nature, such as the Commission Communication “The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism” of September 2003, do therefore not occur frequently.

69 For a detailed description of the role of the Commission in New York see pp. 105 ff.

CHAPTER THREE

FUNCTIONING OF THE CFSP IN SPECIFIC UN BODIES Chapter One provided an EU internal perspective of the representation of the Union’s interests at the UN. This section of the study takes an EU external angle by showing how and to which degree the EU group influences proceedings and organises itself in specific UN bodies. Two bodies will be examined: the UNGA (including by looking at two of its Main Committees) and the UNSC. 3.1 3.1.1

The EU in the UN General Assembly

Introduction

At the heart of the United Nations system is the General Assembly. Even though quite different in scope, character and legitimisation, it is modelled on national parliaments. The UNGA is often called ‘world parliament’, since it is composed of representatives from 192 nations and therefore has almost universal relevance. Due to the onestate-one-vote principle, theoretically each MS has the same weight in the Assembly.1 In reality however, important countries like France can influence proceedings and decisions much more than for instance Luxembourg. But the term ‘world parliament’ also seems to be appropriate in view of the fact that the Assembly deals with virtually all issues and problems under the scope of the UN Charter, i.e. anything which concerns international security, or has humanitarian, cultural, economic or social implications and should be tackled on a multilateral level.2 In fact, the UNGA has the right to discuss and initiate studies and plans of action on any matter that relate to the powers and functions of any UN organ provided for in the Charter.3 But the UN Charter makes an exception to that and clearly gives supremacy to the UNSC over the UNGA when it stipulates that the Assembly may not make

1 2 3

UN Charter, Article 18. UN Charter, Articles 1 and 10. UN Charter, Article 10.

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any recommendations for action if a given issue is under consideration in the UNSC.4 The UNGA’s secondariness in comparison with the UNSC also becomes clear by the fact that whatever the results of its deliberations are, its resolutions have no legally binding force under international law, in contrast to those of the Security Council. UN MS only commit themselves to act in accordance with UNGA’s decisions, but the ‘world parliament’ has no instruments to enforce them against unwilling states in case of non-compliance.5 However, UNGA resolutions serve as recommendations and carry the weight of the support of the international community and have a political and moral impact. Through the way of continued utilisation of UNGA resolutions and their tacit observance by UN MS they can turn into customary law and therefore gain factual and legal significance. Most importantly, UNGA resolutions can represent the ‘opinio juris’, which must be supported by state practice to constitute custom (Article 38 (1) (b) ICJ Statute).6 Nevertheless, the UNGA largely remains a house of words and not of action. Most of the time, speeches and debates at the Assembly make only “good media events and excellent political theatre”,7 but seldom produce tangible results. With regard to the internal organisation of the UN, the Assembly carries important responsibilities. It considers and approves the budget of the UN, and also decides on the assessments each MS has to contribute to the budget.8 The UNGA elects the rotating members of the UNSC and ECOSOC, and is involved in the appointment of the UNSG and the judges of the International Court of Justice.9 Through its decisions it also directs the work of the UN Secretariat. Together with the UNSC, the UNGA is responsible for the admission of new members or the exclusion of them. In conjunction with ECOSOC, the UNGA is also accountable for a number of UN programs and subsidiary organs.

UN Charter, Article 12 (1). Theoretically, an appeal can be directed to the International Court of Justice to settle conflicts with non-compliant member states. 6 Relevant in this context: ICJ advisory opinion, Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 1996, § 70. 7 Linda Fasulo, An Insider’s Guide to the UN (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 70. 8 UN Charter, Article 17. 9 UN Charter, Articles 23, 61, and 97; Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Articles 4 ff. 4 5

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The UNGA begins its official year or session usually at the third Tuesday in September, which then runs for twelve months. In 2007/2008 the UNGA is in its 62nd session. One week later the General Debate takes place during the so-called ‘ministerial week’, which is not really a debate in its usual definition, but two weeks in which Heads of State or Government or other senior members of government of all 192 member states provide a mixed bag of statements of principle and position on global issues, updates on national developments and veiled or blunt criticisms. The General Debate is commonly the largest gathering of Heads of State or Government of each year anywhere in the world.10 It is a long-standing tradition that the unique environment of the ministerial week is being used for discussions in numerous different side events. During this period the EU holds a number of ministerial-level meetings with different groups and countries. The foreign ministers of all 27 EU MS participate in a meeting with the US and Russia. EUinterests are furthermore pursued in Troika-format11 with the HR/SG and Commissioners representing the EU. Traditionally the EU Troika meets on ministerial level with seven interlocutors, namely the UNSG, China, Latin America (in a single group), G-77/NAM (in a single group), as well as the GCC, and since the Dutch EU Presidency in 2004 also Japan and the OIC. All those meetings are usually chaired by the HR/SG, which is an important signal in terms of CFSP. Troika meetings in the ministerial week also take place on Political Directors level with the SAP and EU Candidate countries. Once the members of government have left New York, the ‘real work’ of the UNGA begins, also in its plenary, but mainly in its six Main Committees. Each year the UNGA considers up to 170 agenda items. Of those over sixty are discussed in the plenary, on issues such as the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East. The consideration of the remaining items is divided between the six Main Committees. Until mid-December regular meetings of the UNGA and its Committees take place. However, the UNGA reconvenes whenever necessary throughout a session. At the beginning of each session a new President of UNGA and twenty-one Vice-presidents are being elected, rotating among the five geographical groupings of UN MS. As a moderator between opposing parties and as the organiser of UNGA meetings,

10 11

In 2004, 81 Heads of State and Government attended the ministerial week. On Troika meetings see the related chapter on pp. 116 ff.

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the President of UNGA can play an important role in the UN’s processes. In addition to its regular sessions, the UNGA occasionally holds special sessions, which are dedicated to specific topics. Until 2006, 28 such special sessions took place. They were dedicated to issues diverse as the “World Drug Problem” (1998), “Population and Development” (1999) and the “Commemoration of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Liberation of the Nazi Concentration Camps” (2005). If there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and the UNSC is unable to act because of internal disagreement, the UNGA may take action on the Security Council’s behalf pursuant the “Uniting for Peace” resolution.12 Most clauses of the resolution have not gained any practical significance, but on its basis ten so called Emergency special sessions were convened, on issues as diverse as “Hungary” (1956), “Namibia” (1981) and the “Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (1997–2000). Important were also two specific Summits held by the UNGA in recent years: the Millennium Summit in September 2000, the largest ever gathering of world leaders, in whose course the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals were adopted, aiming at tackling the major problems of today’s world such as poverty, hunger and illiteracy. The 2005 World Summit in September 2005 examined the achievements five years later and tried to implement an ambitious reform package, modernising the UN itself. While the Millennium Summit really created new momentum within the international community and revived the dream of a better world, it became clear in 2005 that the will for noteworthy reform would fail because of shortsighted national egocentricities. The UNGA tries to take its decisions by consensus to strengthen the support to its decisions. However, if consensus cannot be reached a simple majority is necessary. A two-thirds majority is required for decisions on important matters, such as the admission or expulsion of members, election of UNSC members, UN Charter revisions,13 bud-

12 UNGA resolution 377 (V), of 3 November 1950. See Marc Schattenmann, “Uniting for Peace resolution”, in A Concise Encyclopedia of the United Nations, ed. by Helmut Volger (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp. 574–6. 13 A revision of the UN Charter also requires the ratification by two-thirds of the UN MS, including all permanent members of the UNSC, in accordance with their constitutional law.

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getary issues, as well as questions of peace and security. The EU MS, but also the Western countries in general, have only a weak minority in the UNGA: 27 EU countries stand against 130 developing countries within the Group of 77. This makes it not always easy to defend its standpoints and interests. Western countries in most cases try to show their opposition against decisions taken within the UNGA not openly by casting a negative vote when a roll-call vote is asked for. To avoid a strong reaction by third parties, they would abstain and show this way that they cannot support the proposal. A negative vote is the last resort to demonstrate very contradictory views or national interests. An elegant way out of open confrontation, particularly in the case of resolutions that are supposed to be consensus resolutions, is also to leave room for all countries interested in an issue in the interpretation of a document’s wording. Vague formulations allow then everybody to support a decision. To be on the safe side, UN MS can also deliver a statement to have their interpretation on record. Similar to most UN bodies also the UNGA is in need of reform. This question has been discussed since the 46th session. Pursuant to its resolution 58/12614 the UNGA committed itself to enhancing its authority and role. Particularly the Assembly’s working methods are therefore under review to achieve rationalisation, to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the UNGA’s work and to make its outcomes more productive. This undertaking is known as the ‘revitalisation of the UNGA’. In comparison to the UNSC, reform efforts concerning the UNGA are easier to pursue as the stakes are not as high and UN MS are more willing to compromise. In addition, the problems are equally visible and disappointing to all delegations and the need for reform is uncontested. As main points for reform are being discussed: composite institutional and/or regional committees, the biennialisation and triennialisation, clustering and elimation of items of the customary agenda of the Assembly, strengthening the UNGA Presidency, as well as re-evaluating relations between the main UN organs, especially the Security Council and the General Assembly.15 Although progress has been made, concrete results regarding UNGA revitalisation are yet

Adopted on 19 December 2003. A first step on the long way towards UNGA reform was made with the adoption of resolution 58/316 on 1 July 2004. 14 15

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to come. It remains unclear if the UN MS have the political will to resolve the remaining, but critical, obstacles. 3.1.2

The EU in the UN General Assembly

For each session the EU MS produce a document with the thematic priorities they want to pursue in the UNGA. Until a couple of years ago this framework text was a lengthy ‘Memorandum’, which delineated the whole range of CFSP policies. In 2000, the EU reviewed its practice and began to present a paper outlining its policy priorities on a couple of pages. This document is circulated among UN MS in advance of each session. In recent years there have been renewed attempts for streamlining the text by making it even more operational and ‘strategic’. The preparation of the priorities is capital-driven (with initial input from New York) and usually starts in May each year. The priorities are discussed within CONUN and are finally approved without discussion (‘A’ item) by the July GAERC.16 The EU Priorities for the 60th UNGA session comprised four main points: • 2005 High Level Event: the EU deems it crucial to agree on a package of development, human rights, security and UN institutional reforms; • Humanitarian Assistance: the Union aims for improvements in humanitarian response commitments to predictable funding, predictable capacity and standby arrangements, as well as safe and unimpeded access to vulnerable populations; • UN Regular Budget for 2006–07: the EU will seek to adopt a budget that will strengthen the UN in support of implementation of Millennium Declaration proposals and agreements reached at the 2005 Summit; • Capital Master Plan: the EU attaches great importance to the agreement of a comprehensive and coherent plan for the renovation of the UN headquarters in New York.

16 For instance the GAERC 12 and 13 July 2004 in Brussels adopted the EU’s priorities for the 59th session of the UNGA.

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Table 3.1: Total of EU Presidency Statements in the UNGA and Its Main Committees, 2000–2005 Year

First Semester ( Jan.–Jun.) EU Presidency

Number of statements

Second Semester ( Jul.–Dec.) Total EU Presidency Number of statements

2000 Portugal

3

France

19

22

2001 Sweden

8

Belgium

24

32

2002 Spain

6

Denmark

22

28

2003 Greece

1*

Italy

27

28

2004 Ireland

14

Netherlands

29

43

2005 Luxembourg

19

UK

39

58

Source: Own calculations based on the digital archive of the EC Delegation to the UN in New York; * incomplete data.

The statement which the EU Presidency delivers on behalf of the Union in the General Debate draws heavily from the list of EU priorities. Certainly more influential in the concrete policy-making in New York are the EU Presidency statements in the daily formal meetings of the six Main Committees and the UNGA. Up to 39 such statements were delivered in each Presidency (see table 3.1). The issues discussed in the UNGA are part of the CFSP-portfolio. The only exception are those issues that fall into the competences of the European Commission (see section 2.2 from page 105). As the real work of the UNGA is done within its Main Committees, this section will present the EU’s representation in two quite unlike Committees: the First (Disarmament and International Security) and the Second Main Committee (Economic and Financial). Those Committees have been chosen as they are good examples of two different main political cultures existing within the UNGA Committees, which are called confrontational and consensus-oriented in this study. The First Committee is representative for the first type of political culture: the views among UN MS in the Committee are openly divergent and the atmosphere is therefore often confrontational. Voting is a common occurrence. Those characteristics have an impact on the discussions within the EU as well,

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causing tensions, not least because also the views among the EU MS are divergent. Comparable to the First Committee are the cultures within the Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) and Fourth (Special Political and Decolonisation) Committees. The Second Main Committee is accordingly representative for the consensus-oriented political culture prevailing. Of course the positions among UN MS are also very divergent in this Committee. However, the way to solve the differences is notably different from the first type of Committees. The aim is to reach an agreement which is acceptable to all parties. Therefore voting occurs only in extremely rare cases. The Fifth (administrative and budgetary) and Sixth (Legal) Committees have a similar culture of internal interaction. The reason for this pattern of behaviour roots in the issues discussed within the Committees: questions of development (which the Second Committee mainly deals with) can be solved sustainably only when all parties involved combine their efforts. And as all UN MS have to be able to defend the financial and legal framework of the UN, as it is their organisation: for that reason it would not make sense to vote against each other in decision-making. This approach equally influences EU internal behaviour, as also the EU MS have to reach a consensus, which can lead to a weak lowestcommon-denominator-position. Or the different EU MS lobby strongly outside of the ‘club’ for their national positions and seek partners, which can bring in positions on their behalf, which would not have a chance of being integrated into the common EU position. This section tries to illustrate that the quality of EU coherence (as quantified in the second part of this book) very much depends on the UN entity concerned. Many observers simply look at the issues when examining the EU at the UN. Therefore they see that the EU acts, for instance, very coherently on development issues. But this is also due to the fact that the UN body taking the decisions has a consensusoriented culture. If that were not the case, it is very likely that also the EU coherence would be much lower for instance on development issues. And in the inversion of this argument the EU voting records on disarmament would look much different, if open confrontation and voting would not be an usual occurrence in the First Committee. This assumption also adds another dimension to the analysis why in certain issue areas EU coherence is very low: it is not necessarily the case that the EU MS have very different national interests. Perhaps simply the repercussions of the dynamics and interactions within a certain UN

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body make the EU MS vote against each other. And on the other hand complete coherence on some issues might not necessarily mean that the EU MS share the same positions. Perhaps they are simply not in the position to express their different views openly, as there has to be consensus among all UN MS in a specific body. Chapter One of this study has already examined the EU internal mechanisms of coordination, cooperation and representation at the UN within the CFSP. Consequently there is no need to go into those issues again (as will be the case when looking at the UNSC). Instead, the next two sections will unswervingly illustrate the confrontational and consensus-oriented cultures within the UNGA Committees and the consequences for EU cooperation, coordination and representation after giving a short introduction into the UNGA’s Main Committees. 3.1.3

The Six UNGA Main Committees

The matters discussed within the UN General Assembly are too numerous, too complex, too time-consuming, too contentious, and require too much expertise on details to be deliberated within the entire body. Also the UNGA in its plenary assemblage is too cumbersome in its procedures to deal with all issues with the necessary view on details. Many national parliaments and other international organisations solve those problems by directing the issues for comprehensive discussions to supplementary bodies. The UNGA follows this example, making use of Article 7, paragraph 2 of the UN Charter, which allows the establishment of subsidiary organs. Four different types of committees have been created by the UNGA under this stipulation. Two procedural committees are responsible for the organisation and running of the UNGA sessions: the Credential Committee and the General Committee.17 Two standing committees, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ ) and the Committee on Contributions, support UNGA in budgetary matters. Specific tasks, limited in scope, are undertaken by Ad hoc committees and Working Groups, such as “The Open Ended Working Group on UNSC Reform”. However, most important are the six Main

Further information on this and the following types of Committees can be found in Peter M. Schulze and Helmut Volger, “System of Committees”, in A Concise Encyclopedia of the United Nations, ed. by Helmut Volger (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp 32–36. 17

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Committees.18 They have been established in accordance with Rule 98 of the Rules of Procedure of the UNGA and divide the portfolio of the ‘world parliament’ into specific issue areas. They are dealing with the following subject areas: First Committee: Questions of disarmament and international security; Second Committee: Economic and financial questions; Third Committee: Social, humanitarian and cultural issues; Fourth Committee: Special political and decolonisation questions; Fifth Committee: Administrative and budgetary issues; Sixth Committee: Legal questions. Similar to the proceedings in its parliamentary counterparts, the main work of the UNGA is done within the Committees, and not within the plenary. That is why they are looked at in more detail in contrast to the UNGA itself. The Main Committees are the place where open discussions and negotiations on the substance come about, less restricted by formalities. Here lies the expertise and institutional memory. Here is the planning done for the organisation and financing of large parts of the UN and its projects. Accordingly, the Committees produce most of the resolutions and decisions. They also perform an important advisory function. The Main Committees present to the plenary separate reports on the Committees’ considerations on every agenda item allocated to them, to provide the UNGA with detailed information, as well as with draft resolutions and decisions, which are being recommended for adoption. Accordingly agreement has to be reached first in the Committees, before their decisions are passed on to the UNGA to allow it to take action and finally adopt the resolutions within the plenary. Being ‘Committees of the whole’, all 192 member states of the UN have the right to participate in each Main Committee. The deliberations within the Committees are undertaken within formal, informal and ‘informal informal’ settings. In formal meetings approximately

18 Until the 48th UNGA session (1994/95) seven Main Committees existed: besides the six Committees existing today, there was a Special Political Committee, dealing with specific political questions, especially the Middle East and apartheid. However, with its Resolution GA 47/233 of 17 August 1993, the UNGA decided to incorporate the tasks of the Special Political Committee into the Fourth Main Committee, which was hitherto responsible for trusteeship questions.

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two thirds of the UN MS make use of their right of participation, depending on the importance of the issues discussed. Formal meetings in principle are convened only to give representatives from UN MS and the UN Secretariat or its organisations, and rather rarely also to other invited guests from non-governmental organisations or the civil society, an opportunity to express their views, to UN reports and inform about developments. The atmosphere is very formal, and hardly ever a real debate takes place. Importantly, within formal meetings also voting on resolutions and decisions takes place. If there was a voting in a Committee, it will then again be voted upon the same resolution by the General Assembly before it is finally approved. However, usually there is no difference between the voting results in the six Committees and in the UNGA later on. In informal meetings, the number of UN members participating varies and depends largely on the issues on the agenda. Informal meetings are the setting in which the actual negotiations take place. A facilitator, a diplomat from the midst of the UN MS, is selected to guide through the informal negotiations and to compile draft resolutions as a working basis. The atmosphere is less official than in formal meetings, but the discussions are still characterised by hardly transparent wheeling and dealing, and diplomatically involved language, not really illustrating what an individual party aims to achieve. If negotiations are stuck, it is often necessary to switch from the mode of an informal meeting into ‘informal informals’. Then all parties most interested in an issue try to get to the core of a problem and solve it by talking comparatively frankly. To achieve a very informal atmosphere, the delegates directly involved come together closely around a few tables. They call their counterparts by their forenames and speak exclusively in English, not using interpretation any longer. Since the different positions often become much clearer in such a setting, it is often possible to reach agreement within ‘informal informals’. If not, voting is unavoidable, as long as consensus is not a must in the respective Committee. All those differentiations of meeting constellations of course do not question the influence and role of parallel discussions and negotiations on the corridors, backrooms and cafés at the UN. They are the places where most of the decisive deals are made among the parties which are most interested in an issue. That often causes surprises, when problems evaporate within or between meetings, because the opposing parties were able to find solutions without the involvement of the other UN MS.

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At the beginning of each session, the GA elects the Chairpersons of the Assembly’s six Main Committees in a consistent pattern of rotation among the regional groupings. The ‘quality’ of the Chair of a Committee, who is always a Permanent Representative of a UN MS, has a major impact on how work is conducted, as he or she has the responsibility for the proceedings of the Committee in general, and the convening of meetings and the time attributed to the discussion of the individual agenda items in particular. Also the other members of the bureaux are appointed. For each Committee the bureau consists— besides the Chair—of three Vice-Chairpersons and the Rapporteur, who is responsible to inform the full UNGA about the Committee’s work. Each bureau reviews the work of its Committee and organises it, as well as coordinates the draft resolutions and monitors the course of the negotiations. The presence of representatives of the EU-27 in the bureaux is very useful, as they can influence the organisational aspects of the work in the Union’s favour. They can also provide timely first hand information on important developments, problems in the negotiations and other party’s views, as the bureau is the focal point of each Committee in which all information comes together. In principle, the practices and working methods of the Main Committees follow closely the Rules of Procedure of the UNGA. However, it has to be said, that each Committee has developed its own ‘culture’, traditions and unofficial rules over the last sixty years. Therefore the internal working methods and procedures differ quite significantly in some points from Committee to Committee. And also the dynamics of the consultations, particularly the informal ones, vary significantly from one Committee to the other. Those specifics will be described briefly in the next sections, exemplified by the First and Second Main Committees. 3.1.3.1 The First UNGA Main Committee on Disarmament and International Security—the Confrontational Type of UNGA Committees Overview The First Main Committee of the UNGA deals with the whole range of questions related to global security, arms control, disarmament, weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional weapons. It is the central international forum for debates on those issues. Besides the UNGA and its First Committee, two other important multilateral intergovernmental

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bodies cope with questions of disarmament and international security, namely the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD). The CD is part of the UN system, but still independent in its functioning. In the First Committee’s deliberations the work and results of both bodies are incorporated and form often a centre of its discussions. In general, differences of interests within the First Committee are quite significant. The ability and willingness among the 192 UN MS to reach consensus is much more limited than in most other Main Committees. The percentage of consensus resolutions of all resolutions adopted by the Committee is the lowest of all six Committees. All UN members use the Committee as a platform for expounding their own ideas and seeking support of a majority for them. Even though consensus should always be the aim of discussions at the UN, voting is not a taboo in the First Committee in order to obtain a result at the end of discussions despite the existence of divergent views. In general, the national interests of individual states, especially of the nuclear powers, play a much more visible role in the First Committee than in most other Main Committees. Debates in the First Committee during the last years have been dominated by issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A milestone in that regard has been the creation of the so-called “New Agenda Coalition” (NAC) in 1998,19 which aims at a “speedy, final and total elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability”.20 The NAC introduced its resolution on “Nuclear Disarmament” in the same year, being the centre of the annual discussions ever since. The formation of the NAC represented a serious challenge to

19 The founding members of the NAC were Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and Slovenia. Due to political pressure exerted by the US, Slovenia subsequently left the NAC (see Rebecca Johnson, “The NPT Review: Disaster Averted,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 56, no. 4, July/August 2000, pp. 52–57). The NAC was founded in June 1998 in direct response to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998. The eight saw themselves obliged to act jointly as the elimination of nuclear weapons, as aimed at by the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was obviously impeded, and the world rather faced an increasing nuclear threat instead of seeing sustainable disarmament efforts. In addition they criticised the official nuclear powers, China, France, Great Britain, United States and Russia for the lack of progress in the reduction of their nuclear arsenals, meaning the non-compliance with the obligations laid down in the NPT. 20 New Agenda Coalition, Statement by Eight Nations Calling for Moves Toward a NuclearWeapon-Free World, June 9, 1998.

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the nuclear-weapons states and their self-perception, also with crucial repercussions for the EU group. Usually the Committee manages to cope with all the issues before it in a four to five weeks session, which is held every year from the beginning in October following the General Debate. The questions discussed are often the same each session. Consequently also most of the resolutions passed by the First Committee, about fifty each year, are only updated versions of resolutions which were adopted already in previous years, often several times without significant changes. However, it is open to UN member states to introduce new texts. How rarely that happens shows the example of the year 2001: of the 45 resolutions and six decisions adopted by the First Committee, only three had been newly brought in, while all others were previously existing texts which were simply reconfirmed. Because many agenda items have changed little over the years and are regarded as routine, there is already acceptance within the Committee for bringing some resolutions up for consideration every two or three years instead of annually. In recent years, resolutions were grouped in accordance with ten issue-based clusters, such as “Nuclear Weapons” and “Regional Disarmament and Security”. If there is a deviation from agreed language and new resolutions are being proposed, sometimes severe controversies emerge in the First Committee. In 2001, for instance, Russia tabled a resolution calling on the parties to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The US, however wanted to abandon or amend the Treaty in view of its plans for the National Missile Defence. Also within the EU, that resolution caused a divide. Another example was the session in 2002, when the NAC introduced a resolution on “The Reduction of Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons”, which proved to be very controversial, leading to an EU three-way voting split. The First Committee’s deliberations in each session begin traditionally with a General Debate covering all issues under its competences. In this very static part of the discussions ambassadors from most of the delegations elaborate in detail on the points raised already by their Heads of State or Government in their speeches in the General Debate of the UNGA a couple of days earlier. Until 2004, informal meetings followed the General Debate in the First Committee. Those meetings were again a series of speeches, this time oriented on the different clusters. This part of the discussions was closed to NGOs. In contrast to for instance

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the Second or Fifth Committee, ‘real’ informal meetings with actual negotiations and even a frank exchange of views did and still do not take place very often in the First Committee. Informal meetings are organised predominantly to introduce new resolutions. In general, the work of the Committee to a large extend has “become ritualistic, routine, and cumbersome”.21 The Committee therefore has discussed possible ways for reform of its processes and procedures since several years. In 2004, first steps for internal reform were initiated by the Chair of the First Committee, the Mexican Ambassador de Alba, when he introduced some significant improvements to the practical elaboration of the working procedures. He justified his undertakings with the “state of crisis the multilateral system” for disarmament and international security, namely the UNDC and the CD, was in, which put the onus on the First Committee to “reaffirm the urgent need to make progress on substantive issues and identify specific initiatives” to change the situation in practice.22 The “universal political and normative environment” therefore needed to be “made more conducive to dialogue than at present, based on shared interests and enabling collective action”. Under the aegis of the Mexican Chair thematic sessions were held following the General Debate on key issues such as prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament of small arms and light weapons. Those sessions were open also to the civil society. In addition, deliberations of the Committee became less static through the invitation of UN officials and other experts to different panels, allowing true exchange of views and enhanced interactivity. In general, steps to rationalise the First Committee led to a compromise resolution in the 2004 session, incorporating ideas from the Chair, the EU, the NAM, the US and others, after the US and the NAM had introduced two rivalling draft resolutions. It was agreed that the biennialisation or triennialisation of resolutions should be encouraged on a voluntary basis wherever appropriate. The resolutions themselves should be more action-oriented and to the point. Also debates should be more focussed on the issues discussed and incorporate interactive elements. The reports produced and the work done by Rebecca Johnson, “2004 UN First Committee: Better Organised, with Deep Divisions”, Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 79, April/May 2005, pp. 5–38. 22 Press release GA/DIS/3272, 59th General Assembly, First Committee, 2nd Meeting (AM), 4 September 2004. 21

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expert groups, relevant UN bodies and regional centres should serve as focal points in the Committees deliberations. If all those measures will have a lasting impact remains to be seen. The Committees work in 2005, however, seemed to confirm that things have not returned to the status quo ante, but have changed positively, even though there is still a very long way to go for a truly transparent, effective, efficient and interactive First Committee. Besides the session of the First Committee in autumn, also a couple of events related to disarmament and security take place in New York during the first half of each year. Perhaps most important is the already mentioned UNDC, a deliberative body and a subsidiary organ of the UNGA. It consists of all 192 UN member states and convenes every year in late spring for usually three weeks. However, due to stark internal differences the UNDC has been unable in recent years to make a reasonable contribution to the international disarmament agenda. Every five years a “Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT” takes place in New York. The last one (Seventh Review Conference) was held for four weeks in May 2005.23 It again was a failure due to the inability to reach agreement on any of the issues discussed, due to a small number of states which were unwilling to restrain their nuclear options. The Seventh Review Conference was another proof for the crisis in multilateral cooperation with respect to international security and non-proliferation.24 A whole series of Preparatory Committees come together during the first six months of each year. For instance three Preparatory Committee sessions were held for the NPT Review Conference in 2005. Also three Preparatory Committee sessions took place for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, which was then held in July 2001. Another First Committee-related event during the first semester is the Open-Ended Working Group on “Marking and Tracing of Small Arms and Light Weapons”, which started its work with an organisational meeting in

23 For background information see Burkard Schmitt (ed.), Effective non-proliferation. The European Union and the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Chaillot Paper no. 77 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005). 24 See Rebecca Johnson, “Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed”, Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 80, Autumn 2005, pp. 3–32.

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February 2004. So far it held three substantive sessions, the last one in June 2005. EU Perspective Questions of disarmament and international security became part of the competences of EU institutions only in a gradual process in the 1980s, marked by the adoption of the “Report on European Political Cooperation” of October 1981, the “Solemn Declaration on European Union” ( June 1983) and finally the Single European Act of February 1986. However, cooperation among European countries at the UN in New York on those issues was common practice already in the 1970s. The general atmosphere in the First Committee, but also the fact that confrontation and voting is accepted in the Committee, has consequences for the EU internal proceedings. Of course the unchallenged aim within the EU group is a coherent pattern of positioning towards the resolutions by all EU members, and the 27 usually show their willingness to reach common EU positions on all the resolutions. But in comparison to the other Main Committees this is a more difficult exercise since the EU MS have deep-rooted and often diverging historic national records on the question of disarmament. Problematic is also their very different military status and obligations. Most of the EU countries are not ready to give up easily their national point of view on what they consider either security interests or their role in the world debate. This is particularly true for both France and the UK. Others pursue policies driven by peaceful means of conflict resolution or neutrality, where Ireland and Sweden deserve special accentuation. The two pairs of countries form the opposite poles within the Union: France and the UK as nuclear-weapons states have similar interests to defend, aiming at maintaining their nuclear deterrent and their perceived prominent position in the world. On the other hand, Sweden and Ireland as the only EU countries being members of the NAC and traditionally pursuing pacifist policies, stand for quite radical ideas of disarmament and the objective of a world without nuclear weapons. Both of them are neutral states. All other EU countries are located between these poles. Relevant for the EU countries’ considerations is also if they are members of NATO or not. That naturally brings together non-NATO members Sweden and Ireland, but also Finland and Austria. However, NATO member Denmark also sometimes feels

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closer to its partners from the Nordic Group than to the other NATO countries.25 Greece, but to a certain extend also Spain, from time to time orientate themselves rather at the positions of developing countries than those of their NATO partners. Mostly congruent positions in the First Committee have Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Portugal. As a result of the quite inflexible and clear-cut frontiers within the EU group, coherent EU action is sometimes not within the realms of possibility. On the contrary, it is repeatedly the case that EU MS act individually within the First Committee rather than to present a single EU voice. Therefore it is no surprise that even split votes among EU countries are a recurring appearance in the work of the First Committee, and are an accepted fact. The percentage of EU split votes has been the highest in the First Committee of all Main Committees in the period observed (see section 5.2.2.1, pp. 242 ff.). In around forty per cent of all resolutions voted upon between 1988 and 2005 no common EU position has been achievable. In the foreseeable future the occurrence of open divergences, most visible through split-votes, within the EU group on First Committee issues is not likely to disappear, since no real convergence of positions is taking place on the difficult issues, namely disarmament and nuclear weapons, despite the existence of CFSP. By experience EU diplomats know in which areas EU internal consensus is not possible. Then they will not even go into intense negotiations within the group, since the positions would not allow any union of views anyways. Rather the Member States concentrate their work on the resolutions dealing with nuclear weapons or new resolutions, in which compromise is possible. And apart from the Netherlands, which is always very much engaged on the resolution dealing with disarmament and development, EU MS have the tendency to leave aside the other resolutions accepting the same wording as in previous years without proposing substantive changes. However, for some EU Presidencies it has been a higher priority to form an EU common position behind a resolution than for others and have accordingly tried harder to reach common ground.26 That does not mean that a different outcome would

25 Klaus-Dieter Stadler, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft in den Vereinten Nationen: Die Rolle der EG im Entscheidungsprozess der UN-Hauptorgane am Beispiel der Generalversammlung (BadenBaden, 1993), p. 223. 26 Interview number 5, 5 May 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]).

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have been possible if some of the Presidencies would have tried harder. But it reveals that within the First Committee environment some EU Presidencies are more willing to accept the fact that there are internal differences without trying to reduce them, also because they might be the ones standing in the way of a compromise. Other Presidencies might not have such strong national interests, or are so convinced by the European idea, that they try to increase the pressure on all EU countries involved in order to change the prevailing national sentiments into a feeling of shared responsibility—not necessarily with directly visible results, but still with a potential for change in the long-term perspective. The fact that currently unbridgeable differences exist between EU countries in some of the issues discussed bears a strange ritual during the phase of the First Committee session, in which voting on the resolutions takes place: instead of going into the substance, experts use EU coordination meetings then simply to do a tour de table, where all EU MS state how they will vote. Even if a split vote becomes apparent, not much pressure is exerted upon the dissenters and no lengthy discussions are led in order to exchange arguments and produce a common EU line. But it is happening quite often that countries qualify their positions by altering a ‘no’ or ‘yes’, if standing in opposition to the EU majority, into an abstention, this way avoiding diametrical opposed voting (pro-con). Extensive discussions are also not taking place among the 27 in New York on First Committee issues due to the fact that most of the work is done already in Geneva within the framework of the CD, but also because the relevant EU Council Working Groups, being mainly CODUN,27 but also CONOP28 and CODUD,29 deal already in extenso with the issues before the opening of the UNGA session. However, the involvement of those bodies of course has a positive effect on the homogeneous appearance of the EU within the First Committee. Thus the coordination meetings in NYC deal only with minor changes. Furthermore, intense coordination meetings are often not necessary in New York, since EU MS often do not really take into account some of the main issues of the General Assembly session, such as the debate on

27 28 29

Working Party on “Global Disarmament and Arms Control”. Working Party on “Non-Proliferation”. Working Party on “Dual-Use Goods”.

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the reform and the rationalisation of the intergovernmental work, but rather concentrate on the issues that are most important to them. For the deliberations in New York, nearly all representatives from EU countries are coming from Geneva or their capitals for the duration of the session. Very few experts from the missions to the UN in New York attend the coordination meetings. Table 3.2 shows that the total number of EU coordination meetings conducted each year by First Committee experts is relatively small. Even though there are several months of meetings and conferences at the UN each year, only between 29 (1998) and 82 (2005) EU coordination meetings took place between 1998 and 2005. That means that there were many days of events at the UN on which the EU group did not come together to discuss its proceedings. That reflects the limited usefulness for EU internal discussions due to the factors just elaborated. Table 3.2 also illustrates that the second semester is by no means always the more work-intensive one for First Committee experts, despite the taking place of the main session of the Committee. Also events during the first semester require EU coordination, particularly since the guidance from the capitals, Brussels or Geneva is sometimes less elaborated for them than for the main session in autumn. In addition, the great variance between the figures in both semesters shows once again how different the style of each EU Presidency is and how specific developments dictate the need for EU coordination. Only a few Troika meetings were conducted on First Committee issues, between two and 22 per year between 1998 and 2005 (see table 3.3).30 The Spanish, Dutch, Luxembourgian and British EU Presidencies did not convene any Troika meeting in that subject area. It is striking that the use of the instrument of Troika meetings has decreased significantly in recent years. This phenomenon and the small number of First Committee Troika meetings in general might be rooted in the fact that there are not many situations, in which it would be useful for the EU Presidency to deepen discussions with third parties based on a clear mandate, since individual MS prefer to lead such discussions themselves in this delicate subject area. But also the involvement of the Commission as part of the Troika has no particular use in First Committee matters, since it has neither competences nor specific interests

30

Background information on Troika meetings can be found on pp. 116 ff.

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Table 3.2: EU Coordination Meetings Regarding the First Committee, 1998–2005 Year

First Semester ( Jan.–Jun.) EU Presidency

Number of meetings

Second Semester ( Jul.–Dec.) Total EU Presidency

Number of meetings

1998 UK

11

Austria

18

29

1999 Germany

29

Finland

19

48

2000 Portugal

37

France

27

64

2001 Sweden

28

Belgium

42

70

2002 Spain

11

Denmark

27

38

2003 Greece

39

Italy

40

79

2004 Ireland

35

Netherlands

24

59

2005 Luxembourg

57

UK

25

82

Source: Own calculations based on figures of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN in New York.

Table 3.3: Troika Meetings on First Committee Issues, 1998–2005 Year

First Semester ( Jan.–Jun.) EU Presidency

Number of meetings

Second Semester ( Jul.–Dec.) Total EU Presidency

Number of meetings

1998 UK

1

Austria

4

5

1999 Germany

6

Finland

9

15

2000 Portugal

6

France

10

16

2001 Sweden

6

Belgium

16

22

2002 Spain

0

Denmark

7

7

2003 Greece

3

Italy

7

10

2004 Ireland

2

Netherlands

0

2

2005 Luxembourg

0

UK

0

0

Source: Own calculations based on figures of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN in New York.

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in that issue area, making Troika meetings obsolete for it. The third party to Troikas, the Council Secretariat, has some interests in First Committee matters, but is still not actively involved in the proceedings, due to the limited European element in the negotiations among EU MS in New York, but also since there is no real expert based on the East River working for the Council. A Council expert usually comes from Brussels for important meetings and the autumn session. First Committee Troika meetings have been conducted recurrently with a limited number of important players such as the US, Egypt, Japan, China, Russia or Canada. But also this tradition has disappeared. A significant proportion of Troika meetings were conducted with the associated countries, which became EU members in 2004 (four meetings in 2001, two meetings in 2002 and 2003), and had therefore no real outward perspective. Since Troika meetings can be very useful to produce a coherent European outreach to third parties, this instrument should be revived and extended to some countries with which there is no regular political dialogue. As supported by some EU MS and strongly recommended by representatives from the two EU representations in New York, NYLO and DECUN, CODUN should assume the task of laying down the work of the EU for the First Committee (‘mettre a plat’) to create an organisational framework, which also considers the substance. That would further strengthen the cohesiveness of the EU. Also the possibility of presenting joint EU draft texts, including resolutions, should be further examined, particularly as it is common practice already in most other Main Committees. Further reinforcement of the EU appearance within the First Committee could be achieved by enhancing a wider EU participation in the thematic debates. In the main, more extensive use should be made of the existing cooperation mechanisms within the CFSP framework to achieve a policy with a stronger European flavour. That again could provide the EU with a more influential role within the UN on First Committee issues. Particularly in view of the fact that developments on a common EU approach on security have gained significant momentum in recent years and that the scenario of an European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is not a futuristic castle in the sky any more, but a regime with tangible results and a realistic scope for deepening and expansion, puts the onus on the EU MS to develop a uniquely European profile on security, but also disarmament, within the UN. That this profile would need to be more coherent than at present and would require the support of all 27 goes without saying.

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Hopefully the positive developments within CFSP have also a spill-over effect on the EU voice at the UN in this issue area, harmonising the momentarily diverging positions. 3.1.3.2 The Second UNGA Main Committee on Economic and Financial Questions as an Example for the Consensus-oriented Category of UNGA Committees Overview The Second Main Committee deals with the whole range of issues of economic and social nature on the UNGA’s agenda. Predominantly that is economic and social development, as well as all the aspects linked to this area, namely financing for development, the international financial system, external debt crisis, science and technology for development, and international economic cooperation, namely trade, human settlements, poverty eradication and commodities, aiming at more equality in a global economy. But also questions not necessarily related to sustainable development, such as globalisation and interdependence, population growth, world food problems, good governance, environmental policies and problems such as desertification, natural disasters and climate change, humanitarian and disaster relief assistance, biological diversity and international migration, are discussed within the Committee. Since most of the issues formulated as targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) fall into the sphere of competence of the Second Committee, the Committee works towards aligning its objectives with the framework of the MDGs and takes decisions that should help achieving them. Together with ECOSOC, the Second Main Committee is, in comparison with the other UN bodies looked at in this study, the organ whose work is most visibly shaped by the North-South-antagonism. Hence in most discussions there is a clear dividing line between industrialised Western countries as donors on one side, and developing countries receiving development assistance and humanitarian aid on the other. This constellation pulls together the different players within the two interest groups much more visibly than in other bodies and leads to cooperation between otherwise not necessarily close parties. Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, the US and the EU and some of its members are the most important actors within

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the donor community. They coordinate their activities within a donors group. The developing countries defend their shared interests mainly through the Group of 77 (G-77) or the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).31 Influential countries like Egypt, India, Brazil, South Africa and China32 are often the ones setting the direction within both groups. But also smaller developing countries can expect attention when they defend their national interests forcefully or have excellent personnel. But of course differences in the policies between the actors within the donor community and the G-77/NAM prevail. The US for example is only sometimes a close partner of the EU in the Second Committee, for instance on enabling macroeconomic environment for development, but has different views on questions of environmental protection and population policies, and even on trade. Particularly in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 the positions of the EU and the US moved apart. Under the impression of the attacks in New York and Washington, the US decided that it, but also the developed world in general, had been too flexible in previous years with developing countries on issues of good governance, and that it would be necessary to follow very firmly the notion that without solid democratic institutions and without a functioning micro-economic framework development would not work. And in this important field the US became noticeably stricter than the EU and got in opposition to the Union, because the EU is certainly defending the same principles, but does so in a less ideological and less radical way. Most visibly, the US has started to not accept any longer the consensus on certain resolutions where it believes the balance is not right. The US is even unwilling to recognise the existence of the target of spending 0.7 of the GDP on Official Development Assistance (ODA), which is again a central aim for the EU MS. And in general, the US tends to have much more inflexible positions than the EU or other actors. That the members of the G-77 with their very different geo-political interests, economic situations, cultural and historical backgrounds and experiences have difficulties to speak with a single voice, is not surprising. However, the G-77’s chronic inability to maintain its group cohesion makes negotiations often extremely complicated and protracted.

31 32

See the clarifications given on pp. 23 ff. China is associated with the G-77.

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The annually rotating G-77 Presidency is often unable to minimise the divergences within the group to find a common position for the 130 member states of the group. Then the G-77 falls apart and negotiations take place between the donor countries and the individual developing countries most interested in the issue under discussion or with subgroups of the G-77, e.g. Rio Group or AOSIS-Group. Nevertheless, most discussions within the Committee come to pass between the G-77, the EU and the US, with less influence from other countries or groups. The EU is actually the main interlocutor for the G-77. The EU is often the deal-maker in negotiations because of an objective element, which is the fact, that EU positions are often located in the middle between the G-77 and the US. In terms of negotiation tactics, but also with respect to strategic influence, it is naturally the best place to act from such a middle position. It certainly pays off within the UN environment that the EU has a very strong culture of compromise, of making deals, of coping with issues in a multilateral way, which brings it into an intermediate spot between two extremes. Despite the fact that the Second Committee’s work typically touches on delicate North-South issues, the inherent political confrontation does not create a stalemate or open hostilities. On the contrary, discussions on issues of development always need to be undertaken aiming at mutual satisfaction, creating a win-win-situation. Consensus is therefore a tradition in the Second Committee on all its activities, i.e. the adoption of the programme of work, as well as the introduction, discussion and adoption of resolutions and decisions. The consensus principle within the Second Committee is rooted in the fact that it mainly deals with the allocation of the financial support the developed countries give to the developing countries. Therefore development is in fact a NorthSouth partnership: the beneficiaries have to agree with the donors on how to use the assistance. The developing countries cannot impose decision’s on the donors, if they are not in agreement with them. On the other hand the spending by the donors does produce only good results, if the recipients have a say on how, where, and through which means the assistance is being employed, since the developing countries are the ones knowing best where support is needed, and also being the ones responsible for the effective utilisation of the resources given to them. Developing countries themselves must accept ownership of their development programmes and make external assistance supplementary to national efforts. Therefore consensus is crucial within the Second

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Committee “because this is the only way for the [Committee] to go ahead with the full commitment of all its membership”, as Committee Chairman Francisco Seixas da Costa said in 2002.33 Discussions during recent years have shown that a linkage between sustainable development, trade issues and also financing for development is essential to achieve a consensual result within the Committee. However, disagreement and voting still occurs, even though on an irregular basis and very rarely. And a vote constitutes a dramatic event and major crisis by Second Committee standards, causing a considerable trauma. When a vote occurs, then mainly on resolutions which are politically charged and reveal incompatible world views. For instance in the 58th session, a total of 37 resolutions were recommended to the General Assembly for adoption, of which two were adopted with a vote. The first of them urged the international community to adopt ‘urgent’ measures to eliminate unilateral measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries. The US was the only country voting against the resolution, defending unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions. Very politically charged was also the second nonconsensus resolution in that session, one on natural resources in the occupied Palestinian and Syrian Golan territories, which touched upon the Israeli-Palestinian-conflict, forcing Israel, the US and two of its allies34 to cast a negative vote. On the whole, between 35 and 40 resolutions are adopted by the Committee in each session. Most of the resolutions are initiated by the G-77 and its individual members. Due to its heavy agenda and substantial workload, the Second Committee is usually the second last of all six Committees to end its deliberations during the autumn session, just before the Fifth Committee, which has to finish last to decide on the budgetary effects of the other Committees’ agreements. The Second Committee’s session therefore is normally held from the beginning of October to mid-December. Similar to the First Committee, a great deal of time is absorbed by the General Debate in the Second Committee at the beginning of each session. This debate is often perceived as an endless stream of

33 Questions of development.—GA 56—Second Committee Economic and Financial—United Nations, UN Chronicle, March–May, 2002 (interview summary, author unknown). 34 Federated States of Micronesia and Marshall Islands.

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speeches delivered by the delegations on general economic and financial questions. Time-consuming is also the consideration of each cluster of its programme of work, which follows. In those discussions thematically similar agenda items are taken together. In the main, the range of issues discussed by the Committee is too large to be duly addressed during the eight weeks of meeting time available during an Assembly session. Therefore sometimes there is not enough time left for the actual negotiations, which follow the cluster-discussions. Those negotiations take place within informal consultations or ‘informal informals’ and are the most important part of the Committee’s deliberations. Similar to the Fifth Committee, most of the work on draft resolutions in the Second Committee is carried out in those meetings. Besides discussions among UN member states’ delegations, there is a long-standing practice of inviting key speakers and organising panels and round tables. An increasing role play side events related to the Committee’s agenda, organised by MS or other players such as the European Community. How little the Committee’s work can actually achieve becomes clear when it states in self-critical manner that final outcomes of its work needed to be meaningful and add value to the issues under consideration.35 Usually one would expect such aims to be self-evident. And indeed, not only the weak position of the UN General Assembly and its organs has to be blamed for the weak outcomes of the Committee’s deliberations. Second Committee discussions in general are hampered by the chronic inadequacy of its working methods. Since several years efforts to revitalise the work of the Second Committee have been discussed. However, ambitions have already been scaled down significantly, since a consensual approach towards reform has proved to be very difficult, even though only rather technical improvements have been tackled so far. Particularly the review of the programme of work and the methods of work are important in that regard. For example the situation could be somewhat resolved by using multi-annual programmes, as already common practice in other UN bodies. The number of resolutions could be rationalised by using more omnibus-type approaches, combining resolutions. The proliferation of agenda items should be contained and the inclusion of issues in the agendae of other 35

Press Release GA/EF/3106, 1 April 2005.

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bodies, which might be better equipped to deal with them, should be pursued. Also should the agenda items be clustered more effectively, allowing the UN Secretariat more room of manoeuvre to issue reports on time. Strict observance of timetables and deadlines would make the Committee’s work much easier and effective. Finally, on 1 April 2005, the Committee approved a document containing recommendations on improving its working methods.36 According to this paper, Second Committee resolutions should be concise and action-oriented, i.e. focus on the implementation of the measures included therein. The EU expressed its disappointment with the very limited achievements of the revitalisation efforts, as included in the document. However, this approach is hopefully just a first step towards real reform, followed by further action in upcoming years. Part of the general revitalisation effort is also to incorporate the expertise of NGOs more extensively by allowing them a more pro-active participation in the Committee’s work. NGOs can offer substantial input to most of the issues discussed in the Second Committee. Their participation should become much more active and influential, leading to a true partnership between UN member state delegations and NGOs. But even though it is true that the UN MS are often reluctant to share their influence with NGOs, also the NGOs themselves should adjust more to the institutional reality at the UN to achieve better results. For instance NGOs accredited to ECOSOC can suggest agenda items for consideration by the General Assembly. However, this avenue has hardly ever been made use of. Besides the main session of the Second Committee during the autumn, a whole range of other events on Second Committee issues take place during the rest of every year in New York. Good examples for several week-long events with difficult negotiations are the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the Commission for Population and Development (CPD), which take place in the spring every year. Second Committee experts also cover the Committee on Development Policy (CDP), whose annual meeting usually takes place in April.37 Another event during the first semester has been the Intergovernmental Forum Document A/C.5/59/CRP2/Rev.1. Before it received its current name in 1998, the CDP was called Committee for Development Planning, a subsidiary body of ECOSOC. 36 37

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on Forests (IFF), which became after four annual meetings from 1997 to 2000 the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) in 2001, now taking place each year in May.38 Also a whole range of Preparatory Committees absorb the time and energy of EU experts during the first half of each year, for instance in the four Financing for Development Preparatory Committees, held until 2002, and the four Preparatory Committees on the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg in late summer 2002. EU Perspective In general, EU MS have quite homogenous national interests on Second Committee issues, allowing coherence with slight nuances. Therefore the EU is perceived most of the time as a single actor within the Second Committee. Remarkable is that despite the obligation felt by EU MS to reach a group-internal consensus on Second Committee issues, the EU can avoid in most cases to have a weak position as a lowest common denominator outcome. Quite the opposite is the case: in general on development policy the EU position is much more balanced and therefore stronger than that of many other players and certainly that of the US. That results from the fact that the national positions among EU countries within this issue area are very much congruent, allowing strong common positions. But the balance in EU positions on economic and financial questions is to a large extent also the result of the intense internal negotiations within the EU group, forming a compromise among the 27 which is well-substantiated. Certainly the good balance is also a consequence of the fact that some countries in the EU have special relations with a range of developing countries, so that they absorb their views when discussing a common EU position. This allows an EU position which is much more acceptable to the developing countries. Even though all EU MS are committed to development and have similar approaches also within the other issues discussed in the Second Committee, significant differences prevail among the 27 on how and

38 The precursor of the IFF was the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF), which hold four meetings in the years 1995 to 1997.

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through which means they want to do justice to the kind of responsibility they have. Therefore even in the area of development the EU contribution is not crystal clear and predictable. However, the consensus principle within the Second Committee puts significant pressure on all EU member states to form a coherent position. That becomes obvious in EU coordination meetings, but even in contacts with third parties, for instance within donor group coordination meetings, when occasionally some EU countries are on one side of the political spectrum and other countries are on the other side. That was clearly the case during discussions on reproductive health in spring 2004. Also on the question of accreditation of specific NGOs in the Commission for Social Development (12th and 13th session) sharp differences arose (February 2004). The same was true with regard to the graduation of Cape Verde and Mauritius from the list of LDCs (March 2004). Internal conflicts emerged also whenever the issue of joined boards, coordinating the work of different agencies within the UN, was on the agenda in recent years. Also within the whole complex of trade policy well known differences of opinions between EU member states exist on some of its facets, for example agricultural trade.39 However, once the debate on all these issues has left the stage of coordination and the issues are being discussed within the Second Committee, the EU MS stand united and speak with one voice, and most importantly, present a common position—despite quarrels under the surface. And usually the EU MS end up with a common position without too much difficulty. As one diplomat from an EU institution said in an interview: “After having produced common positions for nearly fifty years now, the EU countries are used to have common positions. They have a habit to do so. It is almost a sworn clique”.40 Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that this reflex for unity is not only owed to the existence of the CFSP and the constraint to act coherently, but also to the consensus culture within the Second Committee. In any case this disciplined behaviour makes the EU an important player within the Committee. Having said all that, it comes as no surprise that statements by EU MS within the Second Committee

39 However, trade is not a major issue in New York, as it is mainly discussed in Geneva. 40 Interview number 34, 15 and 20 December 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]).

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in their national capacity occur extremely rarely. There were only a handful such national statements given in each session. And even that number is decreasing. However, the finding of EU common positions despite quite different national interests works only if all member states restrain themselves from time to time. It is a process of giving and taking. A feeling of onesidedness in this process can be very dangerous and must therefore be avoided. Once one country starts being little flexible on their national positions over a longer period of time, it might create a trend inside the EU for everybody becoming less flexible. Germany for instance was criticised heavily in the first half of 2004 for presenting very rigid positions, obviously in connection with its candidacy for a seat in the Security Council: the Germans tried to be unusually close to the US, producing serious tensions with their EU partners by presenting quite extreme positions by EU standards. In reaction to that a few other EU countries showed much less flexibility than usual, until finally the unprecedented case in recent history of an EU split vote within the Second Committee was looming. One EU country even said that Germany should call for a vote and then vote against the other EU countries, since that would actually show the G-77 that they should not support the Germans in their ambitions for a seat. Finally a vote was averted and tensions eased within the upcoming months, but the example shows what the above-cited diplomat said: “Once you start being confrontational everything can happen—even within the Second Committee, even within the EU group”. Not surprisingly, the UK plays an important and active role on Second Committee issues, both within the EU group and among the wider UN membership. But also a number of other EU countries, notably all of them smaller ones, are prominent players within the Union and in contact with third parties. The Netherlands, for instance, are a powerful donor, and a ‘big’ actor in terms of Second Committee issues. Also the Nordic EU members, Sweden, Denmark and quite often Finland, who are very committed in this field and are big donors as a share of GDP, having achieved already the mark of 0.7 per cent of GDP,41 and

41 Also the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway have reached this mark. Finland, besides Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain and the UK have agreed on a time-frame to achieve the MDGs in accordance with the Monterrey-Consensus achieved in 2002.

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giving a lot of money to UNDP and UNFPA,42 manage to influence discussions considerably. Particularly visible within the Committee is that a lot of a country’s influence comes down to individuals and their personalities. For example Belgium in the years 2003 to 2005 was certainly extremely active on Second Committee issues because of the individuals concerned. On the other hand it is perceived by many that Germany is less influential in the EU work than its resources would let expect.43 There are areas in which the EU does not operate as a single actor, but each member state trades for its own account. Examples for this can be found within the whole thematic complex of the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR) of operational activities for development, which sets specific targets, benchmarks and time frames for development on the grass-roots level under the auspices of the United Nations system. The same is true for the funds and programs related to the Second Committee. While some countries are keen to have a common voice also on those issues, a number of EU members, which would otherwise be very oriented towards operating as a coherent EU, do not want to do so in these particular cases. For instance Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Sweden are falling into the latter category. Because of the size of their financial contributions they are eager to maintain a national voice wherever possible. Consequently those countries which are more interested in having a common EU position than others, are the ones that give less in terms of development cooperation. But also EU countries which have in general a smaller role on Second Committee issues and which can only have an impact on the discussions, if they do so through the EU, want the 27 to act together. This demonstrates that those countries considered pro-European, i.e. those keen to form a common EU position, do not pursue this line out of a strong European motivation, but merely because of their national interests and their perception of influence. In contrast to most other Committees, the European Commission has specific interests and competences on Second Committee issues. However, with the exception of a few areas with EC exclusive competences,

United Nations Development Programme and United Nations Population Fund. Based on answers given by six diplomats from EU member states and EU institutions conducted in New York in 2004. 42 43

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being trade, fisheries, agriculture and aspects of development and environmental policy, the Commission does not play a more influential or active role than the EU MS on Second Committee issues.44 But its active involvement in the EU internal discussions is worth stressing, seeing that the Commission is often relatively passive in most other areas of EU coordination. Within the coordination on Second Committee issues, but also in the respective UN meetings, the European Commission is a respected actor, whose interpretation and advise is sought by the Presidency and the EU MS, recognising the Commission’s expertise in this field. The highest proportion of all EU coordination meetings at UN headquarters is conducted on Second Committee issues (see table 3.4, p. 168): between 157 and 354 EU coordination meetings were convened every year between 1998 and 2005 in that field. However, the figures shown include all meetings by EU Second Committee experts, also those not directly linked to the Second Committee. It is striking that the average of coordination meetings was higher in the first half of the year (average of 149 meetings) than in the second half (average of 129 meetings). That underlines the heavy workload Second Committee experts are faced with also independently from the autumn session of the Committee. The importance of the before-mentioned EU countries, which are big players on Second Committee issues, namely the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, has no direct consequence on the number of EU coordination meetings conducted under their Presidency. Even though Sweden held the highest number of meetings during its Presidency in 2001 (253 meetings) of all Presidencies in the period examined, the Netherlands and the UK in their semesters did not conduct a higher number of meetings than the overall average, which was 139 per semester. In addition to the Second Committee coordination meetings, economic and financial experts also held quite a large number of EU coordination meetings together with experts from other thematic areas. Most of those joint meetings took place with Third Committee experts (see table 3.5, p. 168), due to the close linkage of social and development issues, but also because both are working on ECOSOC matters.

44 On the role and activities of the European Commission Delegation in New York see the respective section in this study, pp. 105 ff.

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Table 3.4: EU Coordination Meetings Regarding Second Committee, 1998–2005 Year

First Semester ( Jan.–Jun.) EU Presidency

1998 UK

Number of meetings

Second Semester ( Jul.–Dec.) Total EU Presidency

Number of meetings

84

Austria

73

157

1999 Germany

157

Finland

111

268

2000 Portugal

119

France

116

235

2001 Sweden

253

Belgium

99

352

2002 Spain

161

Denmark

193

354

2003 Greece

104

Italy

141

245

2004 Ireland

165

Netherlands

177

342

2005 Luxembourg

105

UK

118

223

Source: Own calculations based on figures of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN in New York.

Table 3.5: Joint EU Coordination Meetings by Second and Third Committee Experts, 1998–2005 Year

First Semester ( Jan.–Jun.) EU Presidency

Number of meetings

Second Semester ( Jul.–Dec.) Total EU Presidency

Number of meetings

1998 UK

28

Austria

22

50

1999 Germany

14

Finland

9

23

2000 Portugal

4

France

21

25

2001 Sweden

7

Belgium

1

8

2002 Spain

0

Denmark

6

6

2003 Greece

41

Italy

2

43

2004 Ireland

14

Netherlands

2

16

UK

3

6

2005 Luxembourg

3

Source: Own calculations based on figures of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN in New York.

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Items on which experts from both Committees worked together were for instance in 2001 a resolution on UNIFEM45 and a resolution on the follow-up to the World Summit for Children. Between six and fifty such joint coordination meetings were conducted each year between 1998 and 2005. Second Committee experts also held up to 16 joint meetings with Six Committee experts annually in the same period to discuss legal components of issues deliberated. An example of this cooperation was the work on the follow-up to the decision 7/1 of the 7th Commission on Sustainable Development on Oceans and the Seas in 2001. Due to the distinct unity among EU MS on most Second Committee questions, giving a clear mandate to the EU Presidency on how to proceed, it is not surprising that the instrument of EU Troika meetings is used frequently on those issues (see table 3.6, p. 170). Up to 36 such meetings took place every year in the period examined. However, it is also striking that some countries like Greece and Italy (both in 2003) did not make much use of this instrument. The relatively numerous employment of Troikas might have to do with the competences and expertise the European Commission—as one of the Troika members— has in the field of Second Committee issues, making the instrument more attractive. Troika meetings were also held in a joint format of Second Committee experts with Third (up to seven such meetings per year) and Sixth Committee experts (one meeting in 2001). 3.2 The EU in the UN Security Council: Cooperation Attempts and Reform Disputes Overview The UN Security Council is the most important body of the World Organisation, notwithstanding its severe institutional fatigue due to a gap between decision-making and implementation, questioning its relevance, credibility and legitimacy.46 The UNSC’s elevated position

United Nations Development Fund for Women. Fraser Cameron, The EU and international organisations: partners in crisis management, EPC (European Policy Centre) Policy Paper for CPP (Conflict Prevention Partnership) 2005, p. 14 and Jeffrey Laurenti, “What ‘reinforcement’ for the Security Council?”, in The European Union and the United Nations: Partners in effective multilateralism, Chaillot Paper no. 78 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), pp. 69–73. 45 46

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Table 3.6: Troika Meetings on Second Committee Issues, 1998–2005 Year

First Semester ( Jan.–Jun.) EU Presidency

Number of meetings

Second Semester ( Jul.–Dec.) Total EU Presidency

Number of meetings

1998 UK

8

Austria

10

18

1999 Germany

8

Finland

12

20

2000 Portugal

9

France

12

21

2001 Sweden

28

Belgium

8

36

2002 Spain

19

Denmark

17

36

2003 Greece

3

Italy

2

5

2004 Ireland

20

Netherlands

0

20

UK

5

9

2005 Luxembourg

4

Source: Own calculations based on figures of the Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN in New York.

roots mainly in its “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”47 and its exclusive power to create law binding to all UN MS under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Those attributes grant the UNSC a special position and relevance in the international system and gives its fifteen members, and particularly its permanent members,48 a special capability and authority. If the UN is seen as the central organ of multilateralism, the UNSC can be regarded as its ‘Board of Directors’.49 While de jure all members of the UNGA are equal, membership in the UNSC is a distinct privilege held by five members permanently and ten elected members for a twoyears period. It is noteworthy that seventy-three UN MS have never been on the Council at all.50 And it is important to keep in mind that the group dynamics in the UNSC are very different from those within Article 24 (1) UN Charter. China, France, Russia, the UK and the US. 49 Rudolf Geiger, Article 23, in Bruno Simma (ed.): The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, Munich and Oxford, 1994, pp. 393–97. 50 Own calculation based on the website of the UNSC (www.un.org/sc/list_eng6. asp). 47 48

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the UNGA or other UN bodies, due to the close and intense working relations between its fifteen members.51 The Status Quo of CFSP Within the UNSC The basic and crucial structural difference between the UNGA and the UNSC when looking at the EU’s representation in the latter is that not all EU MS are members of the Council. Depending on how successful the EU MS are in the elections of the three regional groups they are part of, up to three EU MS serve a term as non-permanent UNSC members at the same time (see table 3.7, p. 172).52 In theory it is possible that six EU MS are members of the Council at any one time (two permanent and four non-permanent members).53 However, for political reasons such a constellation will hardly ever be seen in reality. Nevertheless, in contrast to the UNGA, the EU with up to a third of all UNSC members potentially could very much influence and dominate proceedings and discussions in the Council, utilising it profitably for CFSP and ESDP. When it acted unitarily, the EU group could be also a decisive factor when it comes to voting in the Council. As the adoption of a UNSC resolution requires a nine-member majority, the EU MS do not have enough votes to block a resolution simply by abstaining. However, with France and the UK being veto powers, the EU has the possibility to oppose all resolutions contrary to its interests (except for procedural questions). But those scenarios are rather of academic relevance, given that in contrast to the UNGA the EU as such is not an actor within the UNSC. Despite the fact that the UNSC is the most important entity within the UN, the EU does not develop common policies and activities with

51 On decision-making within the UNSC see Courtney B. Smith, Politics and Process at the United Nations: The Global Dance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 162–177. 52 The ten non-permanent UNSC members are elected by the UNGA, with five seats up for election every year. By common practice equitable geographic distribution of the non-permanent seats is achieved by allocating the seats in accordance with the following ratio among the five regional groups existing: 3 seats for the GAFS (Group of African States); 2 seats for the GASS (Group of Asian States), 2 seats for the GRULAC (Group of Latin American and Caribbean States), 2 seats for the WEOG (Western European and Other States), 1 seat for the EES (Eastern European Group). 53 Six EU MS would be members of the Council at the same time when EU MS held two permanent seats, two non-permanent seats from the WEOG (Western European and Other States), one non-permanent seat from the EES (Eastern European Group) and one non-permanent seat from the GASS (Group of Asian States [Cyprus]).

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Table 3.7: Membership of EU MS in the UNSC, 1993–2006 Year

EU MS as non-permanent Total number of EU MS in the UNSC members in the UNSC (including France and the UK)

1993

Spain

3

1994

Spain

3

1995

Germany; Italy

4

1996

Germany; Italy

4

1997

Portugal; Sweden

4

1998

Portugal; Sweden

4

1999

Netherlands

3

2000

Netherlands

3

2001

Ireland

3

2002

Ireland

3

2003

Germany; Spain

4

2004

Germany; Spain

4

2005

Denmark; Greece

4

2006

Denmark; Greece; Slovakia

5

Source: UNSC website (www.un.org/sc/members.asp).

regard to the UNSC. There is no formal or informal EU coordination process on UNSC affairs. Rather all EU MS pursue individual policies. It is exactly the influential and prestige-giving role of the UNSC that prevents formalised policy-harmonisation and cooperation among the EU MS in the Council: France and the UK, as permanent members of the UNSC and the one to three other EU MS being non-permanent members, prefer to utilise the powerful instrument UNSC for their own national interests. And this practice is not really challenged by any EU MS. The UNSC with its power-political disposition is therefore the case in point of the limitations of communitised EU policies within foreign affairs in general and at the UN in particular. Within the Council EU MS are egoistic benefit-seekers, which is also true for EU MS being previously ‘good Europeans’, who change their patterns

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of behaviour once they are temporary members. For instance the German PR, representing a country part of ‘Core Europe’, stressed the national dimension by pointing out in 2005 how pleased he was that his country was able to develop its own positions and to promote them successfully in the recent years in the Council.54 The ‘Permanent 2’ (P2),55 France and the UK, are the primus inter pares among the EU MS, which can be felt quite strongly within the group.56 In this situation, in which all EU partners have to take into account the special standing of the two, it does not seem to be convincing that the UK stresses that its contribution in the UNSC “draws on the unique strengths and experience which comes from our membership of the EU”—but only besides other factors.57 France and the UK justify their independent policies in the UNSC often with their special responsibility as permanent members and their obligations under the UN Charter. Also EU MS serving their nonpermanent membership follow this line of reasoning. However, as a common EU position would certainly never contradict this responsibility in view of the values the Union is based on, this seems to be used rather as a pretext. Nevertheless, France and the UK managed to place their special standing in Article 19 TEU, which allows them to act in the Council only “without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the UN Charter” despite the existence of CFSP.58 This

54 Gunter Pleuger, “Deutschland im Sicherheitsrat. Bilanz aus zwei Jahren als gewähltes Mitglied”, Vereinte Nationen, 53rd vol. (2005), no. 1, p. 1. 55 Usually the term ‘P2’ refers to the UK and the US. However, some New Yorkbased experts from EU MS also use this term when talk about France and the UK. The expression ‘P2’ is used here in this latter meaning to highlight their special role as the only EU MS being permanent members on the UNSC have—also within the EU. 56 See the analysis of the role of France and the UK play within the UNSC and the repercussions on the EU group in Christopher Hill, “The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests, Differing Arenas”, in The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms, ed. by Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 49–69. 57 Factors such as the UK’s global diplomatic network and the and from the membership of the Commonwealth, the G8, the NATO and other international bodies. See the Stationery Office, The United Kingdom in the United Nations, Paper presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, September 2003, paragraph 9. 58 Article 19 (2) TEU, as Günter Burghardt, Gerd Tebbe and Stephan Marquardt, “Artikel 19” in Kommentar zum Vertrag über die Europäische Union und zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, ed. by Angela Bardenhewer-Rating, Gerhard Grill, Thinam Jakob, Ulrich Wölker, 6th edition (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), p. 233 argue.

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does justice to the pre-eminence of the obligations under the UN Charter59 and the principle that all activities under CFSP have to be in accordance with international law.60 However, what those special responsibilities of France and the UK might be, remains unclear, as the UN Charter in Articles 23 to 32 only mentions the responsibilities of the UNSC in general, and not those of the permanent members.61 In any case the clauses in Article 19 reflect well France’s and the UK’s perception that their seats are national ones, not European ones.62 However, the explicit mentioning of France and the UK is already an impressive departure from the EPC, as both countries prevented such a language in the SEA to defend their exclusive position.63 Moreover, Article 19 TEU lays down quite detailed provisions for EU MS behaviour and cooperation in UNSC questions, namely on (1) information, (2) concertation and (3) the defence of Union interests.64 Regarding the first point, the Treaty obliges the EU MS holding a seat in the Council, both permanent and elected ones, to keep the other EU MS “fully informed”.65 To do justice to this duty of information, the so called Article 19 Meeting has been established in 2001 (see the respective section on page 78 ff.). This regulation is important, as it allows for all EU MS not being members of the UNSC to receive first-hand information on the body’s proceedings. Only on the basis of these pieces of information they can make use of the potential indirect influence they have through the EU MS in the UNSC on the Council’s decisions, as provided by Article 19. This exchange of information is Article 103 UN Charter. Volker Epping, “Das Recht der internationalen Organisationen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses zwischen der Europäischen Union/den Europäischen Gemeinschaften und den Vereinten Nationen”, in Kooperation oder Konkurrenz internationaler Organisationen: Eine Arbeitstagung zum Verhältnis von Vereinten Nationen und Europäischer Union am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, ed. by Stephan Hobe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), p. 28. 61 Burghardt, Tebbe, Marquardt, op. cit. in note 58, p. 233. 62 Hans Arnold, “European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy at the UN”, in A Concise Encyclopedia of the United Nations, ed. by Helmut Volger (The Hague, London and New York: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 132. 63 Peter Brückner, “The European Community and the United Nations”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 1 (1990), p. 179. 64 In addition to that, a document by the Council of the European Union of 16 July 2002 dealt with the implementation of the Article 19 mechanism and gave detailed instructions to that end (Action des États de l’Union européenne au sein des organisations internationales, des conferences internationales et au Conseil de sécurité. Mise en œuvre de l’article 19 du TUE [doc. SN 3133/02][not available to the public]). 65 Article 19 (2) TEU. 59 60

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particularly important, as non-UNSC members are excluded from the informal meetings of the Council, which take place almost daily and in which the actual negotiations and decision-taking happens.66 EU MS not being UNSC members can receive information otherwise only through personal contacts to diplomats from UNSC members or by trying to sift out valuable information from the formal meetings, in which the fifteen countries on the Council read out their national positions in prepared statements. However, it should not be forgotten that the EU internal information mechanism is in statu nascendi. It will take a couple of years for it to become a reliable tool for EU MS not being on the Council. At the moment, the condition of full or even continuous67 information on all matters of common interest is not met. That is even more unfortunate as the TEU uses the wording ‘keep fully informed’ only when talking about the UNSC: with regard to international organisations in general only the weaker wording ‘keep informed on any matter of common interest’ is employed. Obviously the authors of the Treaty wanted to do justice to the exclusive importance of the UNSC and ensure unconditioned transparency. However, the reality looks different: the timeliness and extent to which UNSC members inform their EU partners depends very much on personalities and political concepts of the individual EU MS.68 And the issues to be informed about are clearly channelled by the EU MS in the Council, i.e. are not on “any matter” of interest to the other EU MS.69 Furthermore, the exchange of information is done primarily only on an oral basis.

66 Even the so-called ‘informal consultations on the whole’ are quite formal and see hardly any real negotiations. They take place in backroom talks of a few UNSC members or specific constellations, ad hoc Working Groups or drafting groups. See Fasulo, op. cit. in note 7, pp. 98–99; Hans-Peter Kaul, “Arbeitsweise und informelle Verfahren des Sicherheitsrats. Beobachtungen eines Unterhändlers”, Vereinte Nationen vol. 46 (1998), no. 1, pp. 6–13; Loie Feuerle, “Informal Consultations: a Mechanism in Security Council Decision-Making”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 18 (1985) pp. 267–308; Courtney B. Smith, Politics and Process at the United Nations: The Global Dance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 238–245. 67 The German translation of the Treaty uses the wording ‘laufend unterrichten’, which goes beyond the English wording ‘keep fully informed’, as it implies a timely and steady flow of information. 68 Ingo Winkelmann, “Europäische und mitgliedstaatliche Interessenvertretung in den Vereinten Nationen”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 60 (2000), pp. 427–8. 69 This very broad interpretation of Article 19 is clearly intended as Burghardt, Tebbe, Marquardt, op. cit. in note 58, p. 235, argue.

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Unquestionably a more elaborated, deepened and institutionalised framework is required than the current arrangement, i.e. the Article 19 Meeting. The Iraq crisis in 2003 has done a lot to stress the need for EU internal dialogue also with regard to the UNSC, and has accelerated the evolution of the Article 19 mechanism.70 And it should not be forgotten that the Article 19 meetings serve the P2 as an outlet to avoid tackling the issue of UNSC reform, i.e. extending the number of the permanent seats or allowing for an EU presence in the Council. On the second point pursuant Article 19 (2) TEU, all EU MS on the Council have to concert. As a logical consequence from the fact that the EU MS use their UNSC membership to follow national interests, this specification is largely ignored in practice. It happens very rarely that the EU MS on the UNSC meet to concert their positions. Cooperation among the fifteen Council members develops along the lines of similar interests. Thus for instance the UK feels often more inclined to seek an ally in the United States than in France. But also the special position of the other three permanent members let France and the UK seek contact to them rather than to their European partners on the Council. Accordingly concertation among EU MS is only feasible and useful on those questions in which the national interests lay closely together. This occurred for instance on the question of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and on Rwanda. Even the fact that the experts from the EU MS know each other very well does not create particularly strong bonds in the UNSC, where the fifteen PRs and their subalterns spend long hours together and establish close relationships, creating a kind of in-group or club-atmosphere of its own. Thus Portugal as a non-permanent member might have closer links to some African countries than to its European allies. As a consequence it is simply not true that the EU MS on the Council would be perceived as a group. The UK in its own analysis of the situation, however, gives the impression of a close consultation between the EU MS of the UNSC by highlighting that areas are identified at the beginning of each month “where the countries working together can have most impact”.71 It is hardly surprising that the UK gives this rather positive impression, as it is generally eager to imply that it takes

70 Sven Biscop, “Security and development: a positive agenda for a global EU-UN partnership”, in The European Union and the United Nations: Partners in effective multilateralism, Chaillot Paper no. 78 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), p. 27. 71 The Stationery Office op. cit. in note 57, paragraph 19.

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its “particular responsibilities with regard to the EU” seriously, even though the UK does not suggest to do more than absolutely necessary by reiterating its Treaty obligations in the respective document.72 However, it is clear that a more pro-active consultation among EU MS is indispensable with a view to maximising the degree of consensus on matters discussed in the UNSC. In 1997, in the course of the negotiations on the Treaty of Amsterdam, the PR of Spain to the UN73 suggested to extend the obligation for concertation under Article 19.74 By changing the wording to “the MS which are also members of the UNSC [. . .] will keep the other MS fully informed and will concert with them”, a concertation between all EU MS would have been achieved, integrating also those EU MS into the process which are not members of the UNSC. At the same time this would have meant the Europeanisation of the UNSC seats of the EU MS, incorporating them into CFSP mechanisms. It is not surprising that this initiative failed. Also the P2, as well as Germany and Spain as incoming elected UNSC members in 2002, tried to improve their concertation through more coordination meetings and even by informing each other on the instructions they received from their capitals to be followed in the UNSC.75 However, the quarrels over Iraq brought this project to a sudden end.76 For its last non-permanent membership on the UNSC (2003–2004) the German Foreign Office presented the idea to incorporate an official

Ibid. Carlos Westendorp, who was Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1996, Spain’s PR to the United Nations 1996–1997 and High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina from June 1997 to July 1999. 74 Ernst Sucharipa, “Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) der Europäischen Union im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen”, in Verhandlungen für den Frieden / Negotiating for Peace. Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel (Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht 162), ed by Jochen Abr. Frowein / Klaus Scharioth / Ingo Winkelmann and Rüdiger Wolfrum (Heidelberg und Berlin: Springer, 2003), p. 790. 75 Paul Luif, EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly, Occasional Papers of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, no. 49, December 2003, p. 18. 76 Jürgen Dedring in his article draws a surprisingly positive picture regarding the concertation efforts among EU MS in the Council. He even says that an EU ‘caucus’ has been founded during the membership of Norway and Portugal on the Council in 2001/2 (which is factual incorrect, as Portugal was on the Council in 1997/8 and Norway is no EU MS), a mechanism which was deepened during the years of Spanish and German membership. As my own experiences and interviews, as well as all the other sources, present a very different picture and since I found no evidence for such a caucus, Dedring might have been misled (see Jürgen Dedring, “Reflections on the coordination of the EU member states in organs of the United Nations”, FORNET, Volume 2, Issue 1 January 2004, p. 3). 72 73

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from the Council Secretariat and a diplomat of the EU Presidency into its Delegation for the direct coverage of UNSC matters. This would have opened the opportunity to these ‘observers’ to participate in all formal and informal UNSC meetings and therefore receive first-hand information on its work, which then in turn would have been made available to the other EU MS. However, France and the UK blocked this approach in its early stages with the argument such a proceeding would be illegal under UNSC procedures. This line of reasoning is not particularly convincing as Brazil during its tenure on the Council (2004–2005) included Argentinean diplomats for UNSC coverage in the Brazilian delegation, and Argentina did the same with Brazilian diplomats during its non permanent membership on the UNSC (2005–2006). Besides the obligation for information and concertation, the TEU asks France and the UK as permanent UNSC members to defend the “positions and interests of the Union”.77 Even though this pragmatic approach contradicts the principle of equal representation of EU MS within CFSP,78 this is an extremely important stipulation, as it can be seen, when interpreted broadly, as a quasi-utilisation of the two permanent seats held by EU MS as an instrument to pursue the EU’s interests within CFSP. Implicitly this even extends to the possible use of the veto.79 However, as said already above, the reality could not be further away from such an interpretation of the Treaty: their national interests guide the activities of France and the UK in the UNSC. Only when coinciding with Union interests, the two would defend their positions as EU interests. This situation prevails despite the fact that all EU MS on the UNSC are requested by the EU Council of Ministers to give a uniform expression of the positions of the Union whenever they exist and to take into account systematically the decisions with a UN dimension agreed on by the PSC.80 This analysis highlights how important it is that France and the UK explore “more systematic ways of fulfilling their commitments under Article 19 of the TEU”, as the

Article 19 (2) TEU. Schmidt, Peter, “A Complex Puzzle: The EU’s Security Policy and the UN Reform”, The International Spectator 29 (3) (1994), p. 63. 79 Simon Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press, 2000), pp. 142–143. 80 Document by the Council of the European Union of 16 July 2002, op. cit. in note 64, p. 2. 77

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European Commission put it.81 But the Commission’s suggestion to that end, namely that both countries should present common EU positions explicitly, perhaps in turns, is certainly far away from becoming a workable option. This suggestion can only be understood as a helpless appeal,82 as the P2 are not interested in “reinforcing the efficiency and coherence of EU external action”83 by giving up sovereignty in the UNSC. Despite all that there is nevertheless some scope for the representation of CFSP within the UNSC: EU positions are presented in statements on behalf of all 27 EU MS in formal UNSC meetings. But those statements are relatively rare occurrences (on average around thirty-five per year, see table 3.8, p. 180) and are of mere declaratory and symbolic value. Most of the cases it is the EU Presidency which delivers a statement. However, in UNSC meetings in which the EU Presidency takes the floor also other EU MS express frequently their own views. Particularly France and the UK do not want to refrain from their right of national statements in view of their special role as permanent members. This behaviour very much qualifies the relevance of a statement on behalf of the EU group. Rarely also the HR/SG presents the views of the EU in the UNSC.84 His appearances are a relatively complicated undertaking for two reasons. First, under the rules of procedure of the UNSC, he has to be invited by the Council and explicitly granted the right to speak by all members of the UNSC. Second, France, but especially the UK, have worked actively against the participation of the HR/SG in UNSC meetings in the past, even as recent as 2001 and 2003.85 It is notable 81 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism (doc. COM(2003) 526 final), 10.09.2003, p. 18. 82 Of equally hypothetical relevance is the demand that “EU members of the Security Council should intensify their efforts pursuant to Article 19, regarding consultation and concertation on Security Council discussions” (Commission of the European Communities, Communication, op. cit. in note 81, p. 18). 83 Commission of the European Communities, Communication, op. cit. in note 81, p. 18. 84 Between July 2000 and July 2006 the HR/SG addressed the UNSC four times according to the database of the European Commission Delegation to the UN: on 29 January 2002 (on Africa at the Security Council), on 18 July 2003 (on the “DRC”), on 19 August 2003 (following the death of Sergio Vieira de Mello in Baghdad), an on 22 September 2004 (on “Civilian Crisis Management”). 85 Sucharipa, op. cit. in note 74, p. 791.

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Table 3.8: EU Speeches in the UN Security Council, 2000–2006 Year

First Semester ( Jan.–Jun.) EU Presidency

2000 Portugal*

Number of speeches N/A*

Second Semester ( Jul.–Dec.) Total EU Presidency

Number of speeches

France

13

N/A

2001 Sweden

23

Belgium

22

45

2002 Spain

24

Denmark

14

38

2003 Greece

15

Italy

17

32

2004 Ireland

25

Netherlands

15

40

2005 Luxembourg

14

UK

14

28

2006 Austria

15

Finland*

N/A*

N/A

Source: Own calculations based on the digital archive of the EC Delegation to the UN in New York; * no data available.

that those problems prevailed even though the EU Council of Ministers in 2002 clearly stated that such interventions should be supported.86 The EU Reform Treaty would bring improvement in that regard, as it stipulates that “when the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the UNSC agenda, those MS which sit on the Security Council shall request that the High Representative be asked to present the Union’s position.”87 In recent years also other representatives of EU institutions addressed the UNSC, such as the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries88 and Louis Michel, the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid.89

Council of the European Union of 16 July 2002, op. cit. in note 64. Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Art. 37 iii. That this provision will not necessarily lead to a more frequent presence of the HR/SG in the UNSC argue Edith Drieskens, Daniele Marchesi and Bart Kerremans (see Edith Drieskens, Daniele Marchesi and Bart Kerremans “In Search of an European Dimension in the UN Security Council”, The International Spectator, vol. 42 (2007), no. 3: 424–425). 88 On 23 June 2005 in a statement to the Counter-Terrorism Committee established by UN Resolution 1373 and on 24 June 2005 to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban. 89 On 27 January 2006 on “The Great Lakes Region”. 86 87

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But in the Council’s informal consultations, where the decisions are taken and not only ceremonial politics are being done, the EU has no voice or role at all.90 It is therefore not only overly optimistic, but simply not true, that the EU’s political role “has been heightened by the frequent participation” of the EU Presidency and representatives from EU entities in UNSC meetings, as the European Commission tries to make us believe.91 Their participation has not tangibly influenced policymaking within the Council. And at present there is no political role for the EU in the Council. Therefore the idea of further deepening the EU cooperation mechanism on UNSC affairs is currently not realistic. The same has to be said concerning suggestions for enhanced interaction between Brussels, particularly the PSC, with EU MS delegations in New York to achieve more coherent action-taking and perhaps even an European voice in the Council.92 Such undertakings are not within the realms of possibility under unchanged geopolitical conditions. Having said that, the PSC should nevertheless systematically take into account the ‘UN dimension’ of its activities. One way of enhancing the direct involvement of Brussels would be by establishing the practice of regularly discussing the Security Council monthly programme of activity at the beginning of each month. Over time the PSC would perhaps gain the competence to be perceived as an actor the EU MS in the UNSC would have to listen to, leading to the desired interaction. Besides the EU statements, there is a second element of influence of the CFSP on the proceedings of EU MS on the Council. A certain pressure can be felt that France, the UK as well as the EU MS being elected UNSC members, should not pursue policies too divergent from the interests of their European partners, but have to act within the margins of CFSP.93 EU MS in the Council are confronted with a certain pressure to justify their policies towards the other European partners. But as there is no mechanism to translate the interests of

90 Bardo Fassbender, “The European Union in the United Nations and the Issue of UN Reform”, in Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security: Proceedings of a Workshop to Analyze the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (Yale Center for the Study of Globalization: New Haven, 2005), p. 76. 91 Commission of the European Communities, Communication, op. cit. in note 81, p. 16. 92 This idea has been proposed by Biscop, op. cit. in note 70, p. 27. 93 Interview number 37, 20 December 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]).

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EU MS not holding a seat on the UNSC into policies through actiontaking by their European colleagues in the Council, those channels work only indirectly, informally, and mainly bilaterally—but they still work to a certain extent. Non-UNSC members also offer their expertise in particular areas, which allows them a certain degree of influence. EU MS have nevertheless no legal basis or handle to actively claim information or policy-making by their partners on the Council, particularly as decisions taken within EU bodies are not binding to EU MS in the UNSC. Also due to the existence of the CFSP, it will hardly ever happen that the P2 countries would stand against the other 25. Rather, as in the case of Iraq in early 2003 and in other instances, division goes through the EU in general. This brings France and the UK in the comfortable position to cover national interests pursued on the UNSC as positions a minority of EU MS could go along with. The clash within the EU over Iraq is just the most notorious example for such an occurrence, but certainly the most important one in the recent history of the EU at the UN. The EU internal conflict in the UNSC had an impact on the work of the EU partners in most other UN bodies, spreading distrust and disillusionment, making the usual EU coordination very difficult. Even today, five years on, the events are a fresh memory and an echo can still be felt—with the positive consequence that closer ties are being meshed to prevent a repetition of this nadir in CFSP-history. But also in general the policies of EU MS have that much converged by now that there are few recent instances in which the national prerogatives of the P2 arise. On the contrary, on most questions dealt with by the UNSC agreement prevails among the EU MS. And only very rarely Anglo-French differences occur on the use of the veto. However, contrariety can surface connected with the support of US operations, especially concerning the Middle East.94 More generally it can be said that if France and the UK share the same line—and would therefore probably be able to present an European position—, other UNSC members usually have to follow. If France and the UK have different views, the Council is also more broadly divided and immobilised. When having ambitious delegations, EU MS as non-permanent members can also play quite an important role in the Council’s proceed-

94

Duke, op. cit. in note 79, p. 143.

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ings. This holds true on the one hand for the work of the Council itself, as can be read from the words of the former Slovenian HoM to the UN, Danilo Türk, who observed that smaller countries holding a non-permanent seat have the possibility to devise “creative diplomacy where otherwise there might be conflict or confrontation. [. . .] Their imagination and experimentation” can make them to “constructive and genuinely helpful members of the UNSC”.95 On the other hand elected EU MS being UNSC members can also make a difference EU internally. They can use their insights to lower the information gap the non-members have by pursuing a very frank communication policy. By doing so for instance Ireland used its recent years on the Council (2001–2002) to build up a lasting pressure for the other EU MS in the UNSC to defend their activities. Germany, on the Council in 2003–2004, also pursued quite an open information policy towards the EU partners and tried to integrate their views into its policies, and the German PR to the UN stated clearly that he would like to see this ‘service’ returned by the incoming EU MS.96 Furthermore, the temporary EU members of the UNSC can also be useful for the P2, as they can back and strengthen their position within the Council in general, but also specifically towards the other three permanent members. UNSC Reform—EU Internal Power Politics Illustrated As the importance of the UNSC thwarts a working CFSP and a stringent common European approach in the body at present, it is not surprising that the EU MS also have no collective line concerning the reform of the Security Council. Despite all rhetorics calling for ‘effective multilateralism’ the EU is unable to pro-actively support the important reform efforts.97 This question has poisoned the working atmosphere in New York from autumn 2004, when the discussions on UNSC reform gradually began to gain pace in the run-up to the ‘UN Major Event’

See Fasulo, op. cit. in note 7, pp. 96–7 Pleuger, op. cit. in note 54, p. 4. 97 Cameron, op. cit. in note 46, p. 12. For an historical account of the EU internal discussions on UNSC reform see Panos Tsakaloyannis and Dimitris Bourantonis, “The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Reform of the Security Council”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 2, no. 2 (1997) and Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis, EU Representation in the UN Security Council: Bridging the ‘CapabilitiesExpectations’ Gap? (unpublished working paper, University of Essex, 2002). 95 96

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in September 2005, to the present day, similar to the Iraq crisis, even though of course on a smaller scale. All UN MS share the view that the UNSC has to be reformed to do justice to the changed international environment.98 But the way to this end is bitterly contested due to diverging national interests also in the wider membership. The current initiative on the reform of the UNSC was opened by the UNGA at its 34th session in 1979.99 However, the General Assembly did not decide to consider the issue until the 47th session in 1992. With its resolution 48/26 of 3 December 1993 the UNGA created an “Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council”. Since then the Working Group held a series of meetings in each session. Five points have been the basis for the informal exchange of views: 1) size of an enlarged UNSC; 2) question of regional representation; 3) criteria for membership; 4) relationship between the UNGA and the UNSC and 5) accountability. Of the issues discussed under those headings tangible progress has been made only on the transparency of the working methods of the UNSC. Most difficult were the discussions on the veto, the categories of membership to be enlarged and the size of an expanded Security Council. In this impasse the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan established a high-level panel on UN reform,100 which—besides other things—presented suggestions for UNSC reform in December 2004.101 This widely noticed report listed four principles UNSC reform should meet:

98 On the possible positive consequences of UNSC reform for the credibility and impact of the body see Thomas G. Weiss, “The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 26 (2003), no. 4, pp. 147–161. 99 Decision 34/431 of 14 December 1979 included the item in its provisional agenda. 100 The so-called High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 101 In document A /59/565 of 2 December 2004 entitled “A more secure world: our shared responsibility”. On the work of the panel and the background of its recommendations see the many excellent contributions in the collection of articles Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security: Proceedings of a Workshop to Analyze the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (Yale Center for the Study of Globalization: New Haven, 2005), e.g. Mats Berdal, “The Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change: A Preliminary Assessment”, pp. 39–47 and W. Andy Knight, “A More Secure World? A Critique of the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change”, pp. 109–126; Sebastian Graf von Einsiedel “Vision mit Handlungsanweisung. Das High-level Panel und die Reformagenda der Vereinten Nationen”, Vereinte Nationen, 53rd vol. (2005), no. 1, pp. 5–12.

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Reforms should (a) increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the UN; (b) bring into the decision-making process countries more representative of the broader membership; (c) not impair the effectiveness of the UNSC; (d) increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body.102 The panel also suggested two models for the increase of membership: Model A provides for six new permanent seats without veto power and three two-year new non-permanent seats.103 Model B does not propose the creation of new permanent seats, but of eight four-year renewableterm seats and one two-year seat.104 The panel does not make recommendations on specific countries to be members on an enlarged UNSC. However, the candidates are quite clear, not least because most of them make claims for a seat themselves.105 Among the EU MS only Germany announced its candidature, together in the high-profile G4 initiative it launched with Brazil, India and Japan.106 Germany’s main motivation is to see its global economic and political importance reflected also by a permanent membership in the most prestigious world body and to achieve Gleichberechtigung (equality of status) with its European partners France and the UK.107 It is noteworthy that Germany was virtually 102 UN document A /59/565 of 2 December 2004 entitled “A more secure world: our shared responsibility”, pp. 66–67. 103 The new permanent seats would be divided among the regional groups the following way: Africa: 2; Asia and Pacific: 2; Europe: 1; and the Americas: 1. 104 The new seats would be divided among the regional groups the following way: four-year renewable-term seats: Africa: 2; Asia and Pacific: 2; Europe: 2; and the Americas: 2. The two-year non-renewable seat would go to Africa. 105 The author conducted various reports when working for the Commission Delegation to the UN in New York on this issue in 2004 with the following results: For Africa the candidates are South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt, for Asia they are Japan, India, Pakistan and Indonesia, and for Latin America the candidate is Brazil and perhaps Argentina and Mexico. 106 The G4 introduced their draft resolution on “Security Council Reform” in the General Assembly on, 6 July 2005, mainly following Model A of the High-level Panel. Japan left the G4 in January 2004 to pursue its own candidacy without the partners, hoping to have better chances on a seat when negotiating with its supporter USA and its opponent China directly. Brazil, Germany and India re-introduced their resolution without Japan on 5 January 2006. 107 Tsakaloyannis and Bourantonis, op. cit. in note 97, p. 200. For a more extensive analysis of the German reasoning see Lisette Andreae, Reform in der Warteschleife. Ein deutscher Sitz im UN-Sicherheitsrat? (München: Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V., Bd. 69, 2002).

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forced to pursue the line of obtaining a permanent seat due to the reluctance of France and the UK to communitise European external relations.108 Opposition to Council enlargement came from many different sides, most notably from some of the decisive permanent members themselves, namely the US and China. But also within the EU the debate on UNSC enlargement caused fierce discussions, mainly because of Germany’s application and the envisaged changes a success of this undertaking would bring to the balance of power among EU MS, particularly the larger ones. Besides the already mentioned G4 group, EU MS pursued their interests on Security Council reform in different groups such as the so-called Coffee Club (Italy, Spain), the Group of 10 (Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, Austria) or the Nordic WEOG states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden).109 France and the UK support Germany’s ambitions. They calculate that Germany, once satisfied, would refrain from the idea of an EU seat in the Council, which would guarantee their own status. Italy is the most prominent opponent of Germany’s bid.110 It blocked already in the early stages of the discussions in the UNGA the noncommittal exchange of views within the EU group in New York and even started to leave the room in EU coordination meetings during the Dutch EU Presidency in 1997 whenever the issue was on the agenda, arguing that vital national interests would be affected.111 This way of proceeding was very unusual for the consensus-oriented EU coordination process on the East River and already laid the ground for a very tense atmosphere in the process to come. But also Poland and Spain have raised reservations. Those three European countries are sceptical of the “German-national (deutschnational) revision attempts”.112 But Italy and Spain also fear that their position as middle powers in European politics will be weakened once Germany enters the club of big powers with the help of a permanent

Tsakaloyannis and Bourantonis, op. cit. in note 97, p. 205. Fassbender, op. cit. in note 90, p. 84. 110 On the Italian position see the former Italian PR to the UN, Francesco P. Fulci, in his article “Italy and the Reform of the UN Security Council”, The International Spectator, vol. 34 (1999), no. 2, pp. 7–16. 111 Winkelmann, op. cit. in note 68, p. 429. 112 Those are the words used by Andreas Zumach, “Überflüssig wie ein Kropf. Zur Frage eines deutschen Ständigen Sitzes im Sicherheitsrat”, Vereinte Nationen, 53rd vol. (2005), no. 1, pp. 7–8. 108 109

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UNSC seat. All other EU MS support Germany’s candidature or at least do not openly oppose it.113 When looking at possibilities to give the representation of common EU interests in the UNSC more weight, three options come to mind: 1) The most likely possibility is that the status quo, i.e. the Article 19 mechanism, experiences a further deepening. This would happen mainly informally and would create tacit regimes among the EU MS on the spot in New York. In a scenario of further progressing EU integration this option would certainly include the possibility of tangible improvement over time. But in a period in which nationalism is again gaining ground in Europe, it is equally possible that the current situation remains cemented for a long time, due to inflexibility of France and the UK. 2) Despite the failure of the efforts to enlarge the UNSC in 2005, there is still a slim chance that one or two EU MS will become new permanent members in an enlarged Council. Such an opportunity could surface only in a couple of years, but then Germany and perhaps an Eastern-European country might join the exclusive club. However, due to disagreement among UN MS and within the EU group that is only a unrealistic alternative. 3) Even more impractical is the option of an EU seat.114 UN Charterrelated obstacles stand in the way of such a solution, as only sovereign national states are granted membership to the UN.115 And also within the EU only the less influential countries, such as Austria and Sweden, promote an EU seat. Little surprisingly, the EP also backs a permanent seat for the EU in addition to the seats of France and the UK.116 The more powerful EU MS would rather opt for new national seats, Germany to support its ambitions, and France and the UK to prevent their seats being converted into EU seats in the end. And also objectively the idea of an EU seat is rather unattractive, as

113 Ingo Winkelmann, “GASP der Europäischen Union in den Vereinten Nationen am Beispiel der Reform des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen”, in Die Vereinten Nationen und Regionalorganisationen vor aktuellen Herausforderungen (Potsdamer UNO-Konferenzen, Band 3) (Potsdam: Menschenrechtszentrum der Universität Potsdam, 2002), pp. 33–34. 114 For a comprehensive discussion on this issue see Blavoukos and Bourantonis, op. cit. in note 97, pp. 6 ff.; Winkelmann, op. cit. in note 68, pp. 434 ff.; Johan Verbeke, “EU Coordination on UN Security Council Matters”, in The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership, ed. by Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister and Tom Ruys (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), p. 53. 115 Article 4 UN Charter. 116 Official Journal of the European Union dated 21.4.2004; European Parliament, Resolution on the relations between the European Union and the United Nations (2003/2049(INI), paragraph 12.

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chapter three the EU would be forced to remain silent in all cases of EU internal disagreement. Furthermore it would be only a logical step that the EU MS would then have to convert their 27 seats in all other UN bodies into one EU seat as well, which would in turn significantly decrease their voting power and political influence. Only when leaving Realpolitik aside it is certainly true that a really common EU foreign policy would require an EU seat. It would strengthen CFSP and have positive effects on its institutional framework.117 Once created, the effect of ‘Brusselisation’ could also work with regard to the EU seat, making EU internal agreement easier. It is interesting to see that the European public supports the idea of an EU seat much more clearly than their governments: in 2004 only 16 per cent of the public tended to disagree that the EU should have its own UNSC seat, while 65 per cent tended to agree with that proposition.118 Another study from 2005 supports this result: 60 per cent of the Europeans119 supported the idea of an EU seat, even if it replaced the French and British seats.120 The unexpectedly high number of 62 per cent of French and 64 per cent of German respondents shared this sentiment. 55 per cent of British interviewees, however, opposed such a step (the only one of the EU countries considered).

That the Europeans are unable to agree on and therefore support the reform of the UNSC is even more tragic, as a more effective Council is an important cornerstone in their multilateral approach to world politics. Also only a UNSC that can be saved from becoming marginalised can increasingly turn into a tool of the CFSP and ESDP. But as Jeffrey Laurenti points out, exactly the fact that the EU might need a strong UNSC should make their governments careful whether an enlargement of the Council’s membership would not be a risk, as it might become “unwieldy and immobilised” with more members.121 The existing of CFSP clearly questions the privileged institutional position of France and the UK.122 But at the moment the prospect for a common EU policy in the Council or agreement on the question of

Blavoukos and Bourantonis, op. cit. in note 97, p. 7. European Commission, Eurobarometer 61, Public Opinion in the European Union, Spring 2004 (Brussels: requested and coordinated by the Directorate General Press and Communication, 2004), p. B86, taking into consideration the EU-15. 119 Average of the combined responses of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 120 German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2005, pp. 9–10. 121 Laurenti, op. cit. in note 46, p. 71. 122 Schmidt, op. cit. in note 78, p. 55. 117 118

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UNSC reform is bleak. Within the Union too many member states have a strong interest one way or another, and positions, i.e. national considerations, are not likely to change in the foreseeable future. But the stalemate also roots in geopolitical factors, as the EU does not need to be coherent regarding UNSC matters because it is not faced with a common threat, despite terrorism. And it should not be forgotten that on UNSC reform the positions of the other major powers, such as China and the US, are also decisive. If they make up their mind to clear the way, the Union will probably follow, irrespective of EU internal quarrels. A common EU policy in the UNSC is a mandatory vehicle for a common EU foreign policy. Also the ambitious project of ESDP can only become a powerful and credible mechanism when a single EU voice in the UNSC is part of its toolbox. But the preservation of their perceived ‘great power’ status is certainly more important to France and the UK than to relinquish their privileges to buttress the deepening of CFSP. Perhaps the special status of France and the UK itself already poses a severe challenge to the CFSP, even a more severe one than their occasional different views on substance.123 Mario Telò assessed the EU internal disputes over UNSC reform quite interestingly by saying that they would “clearly show [. . .] the non-state nature of the EU as a fully unified political actor”.124 Perhaps it is important to lower the expectations placed in the EU by simply changing the perspective of what it really is.

123 David M. Malone, “Conclusion”, in David M. Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 636. 124 Mario Telò, Europe: a civilian power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order (Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 55.

CHAPTER FOUR

EXTERNAL FACTORS CHANGING THE BASIS OF EU COOPERATION The EU representation and cooperation at the UN is confronted with continuous change due to exogenous factors, which alter the basis for the CFSP in general. Two main factors are EU enlargement and modifications of the legal foundations of the EU, the Treaties. The accession of new MS inevitably changes the balance of power and influence within the EU group in New York. This has been the case visibly after the 1995 round of enlargement and to a smaller extend also after ten countries joined the EU in 2004. The following chapter will elucidate how the cooperation with the new EU MS is prepared and implemented in New York already long before the actual accession takes place. By changing the legal foundation of the CFSP through the revision of EU Treaties, as with the Amsterdam and Nice amendments, also the processes at UN headquarters are affected. A further, even more fundamental, alteration is still under consideration: the EU Reform Treaty. This agreement would have a significant impact on the character of the EU representation in New York, as will become clear in section 4.2. 4.1

EU Enlargement: Cooperation With Associated and Acceding Countries at the UN

On 1 May 2004 ten new EU MS joined the Union. For the time being, the last round of enlargement has been completed with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Croatia, FYROM and Turkey are official ‘candidate countries’. Four other European states are categorised by the EU as ‘potential candidate countries’, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina along with Montenegro and Serbia. The twelve new members cooperated with the EU MS at the UN already before their actual accession in 2004 and 2007. Those countries still waiting to become EU MS also cultivate strong and—depending on their legal status towards the EU—even institutionalised links to the

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Union in the UN framework. This is true also for the non-EU members of the EEA, i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The cooperation between the Union and the other European countries is organised within the so-called alignment procedure. The evolution of this procedure, the duties and benefits resulting for the associated countries from their collaboration with the EU in the UN framework, as well as the impact of the last round of enlargement will be described in this chapter. The alignment procedure in New York commenced already in the early days of CFSP.1 Its basis was the decision of the GAERC in March 1994 to establish enhanced political dialogue with the then six associated Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs).2 As early as 22 December 1994 in a New York-driven process the six countries discussed and agreed with the EU MS a non-paper on coordination at the UN on the East River.3 The political dialogue was institutionalised in June 1995 following the signing of the Europe Association Agreements, which also included Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and was extended to Cyprus and Malta in July 1995. On 20 October 1995 the Political Committee approved the “Guidelines for enhanced political dialogue with the CEECs associated with the Union, and the associated countries Cyprus and Malta”.4 Point 6 of the Guidelines dealt with coordination in international fora, stating that “[t]he EU and the associates will instruct their representatives [. . .] to cooperate whenever possible. The modalities should [. . .] be agreed locally taking into account the specifics of the various fora.” Experts in New York updated their 1994 non-paper in accordance with those Guidelines and produced a new non-paper on alignment with the eleven associates in New York, agreed

1 This section is based on information received in various interviews in New York and from a number of EU- internal documents. 2 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. 3 This was based on an EU Presidency non-paper, contained in COREU BON 1717/94 on “Coordination with Central and Eastern European countries in New York”. In this papers introduction the following information is given: “On 24 October 1994 the Political Committee approved guidelines on enhanced political dialogue with the associated CEECs (SEC 1070 of 28 October 1994). Political Directors discussed the guidelines with their counterparts from CEECs on 27 October 1994 (SEC 1122 of 8 November 1994). Ministers took note of the final version at the General Affairs Council on 31 October 1994.” The document Guidelines for Enhanced Political Dialogue with Associated Countries, approved by the Political Committee on 31 May 1996 (COREU SEC 660/96) was a generalisation of those documents. 4 Contained in COREU PESC/SEC 1048 of 13 October 1995.

external factors changing the basis of eu cooperation 193 on 15 December 1995. This document stressed that its stipulations were “to be applied with appropriate flexibility”, therefore leaving room for manoeuvre in the implementation. Nevertheless, despite this flexibility clause it provided concrete guidance on meetings on HoMs and DPRs level and within CONUN concerning UNGA and ECOSOC. Stressing that the “coordination in the main committees is the most important concern,” the non-paper emphasised that on expert level the EU Presidency would inform the associates as early as possible of “EU initiatives, positions and major developments.” This already shows the notable closeness of the working relationship between EU MS and their European partners in New York. Also the outward presentation of those close ties to the wider UN membership was regulated in the document by allowing the eleven countries to associate themselves with EU statements and demarches. To this end, the Liaison Office of the Council Secretariat communicates since January 1996 the elements of statements and demarches before they are delivered. Associates then can decide whether they would like to support the respective statement or demarche, if possible as a group. However, the ‘take it or leave it’ principle applies, in other words they can support the EU initiative, but cannot make any changes to the text. The supporting associates are mentioned in the respective documents accordingly. Also the non-EU members of the EEA, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, were included in the alignment mechanism. Slovenia (November 1996) and Turkey (December 1999) joined the enhanced political dialogue. The accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania were concluded in December 2004 and a Treaty of Accession was signed in April 2005.5 The EU officially launched accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey in October 2005.6 Candidate country status was granted also to FYROM in December 2005, with which accession negotiations have not yet begun.7 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia are linked to the EU through the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). However, the countries within the SAP framework do not have access to the alignment procedure in New York,

5 Treaty concerning the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, 27 April 2005, Official Journal of the European Union, L 157/11, 21.6.2005. 6 The negotiating frameworks for both countries have been agreed on by the GAERC in Luxembourg on 3 October 2005. 7 European Council, Brussels 15/16 December 2005, Presidency Conclusions, DOC/05/4.

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but can nevertheless align unilaterally. Most of the time the associates make use of the possibility of alignment, not least because it means quite a significant saving of work for them.8 The formula employed in EU Presidency statements and used in formal UN meetings, which incorporate the aligning countries, is always the same, varying in accordance with the number of countries aligning themselves: I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Acceding Countries Bulgaria and Romania, the Candidate Countries Turkey and Croatia, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,9 Serbia and Montenegro, EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this statement.10

When today all associated and acceding countries align themselves with the EU statements in different UN bodies, the EU Presidency speaks on behalf of the large number of 33 countries, almost twenty per cent of all UN MS. When, as in the example given above, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Ukraine and Moldova are among the countries supporting an EU statement, this figure increases to 38 countries. Candidate countries are obliged to ensure that their status in international organisations is in line with the obligations resulting from their accession to the EU. In the run-up to the 1995 and 2004 enlargement, but also for the 2007 and other potential enlargement rounds, the following mechanisms were set up to ensure a smooth integration of the new EU MS into the processes in New York, for a good functioning of an enlarged EU and to enlist those countries for EU lobbying efforts: for the period preceding the conclusion of the negotiations of accession no formal procedure is in place. However, in order to familiarise the

8 Ingo Winkelmann, “Europäische und mitgliedstaatliche Interessenvertretung in den Vereinten Nationen”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 60 (2000), p. 423. 9 Today, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is a candidate country as well. 10 Taken from the EU Presidency Statement on Item 84: Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 2005 by H.E. Adam Thomson, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations General Assembly Plenary, New York, 31 October 2005 (http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5221_en.htm).

external factors changing the basis of eu cooperation 195 accession countries with the EU internal working methods and decision-making procedures, contacts with them are intensified already at this stage. Particular the alignment procedure concerning statements and speeches is employed in that regard, but also input and comments are encouraged. Important is at this stage to identify key issues on which more substantive coordination would be useful or necessary. During this phase the Council Secretariat informs candidate countries on practical arrangements and organisational matters. For the period after the conclusion of the accession negotiations (interim period) a horizontal information and consultation procedure was established.11 In this framework, candidate countries do receive draft proposals on common positions and joint actions, as well as on Commission proposals. After the signing of the Accession Treaty and of the Final Act, candidate countries are invited to participate as ‘active observers’ in all EU coordination meetings, including HoMs and Article 19 Meetings. With that status they have the right to take the floor and to contribute to the discussions, regardless of the issues under consideration. Under special circumstances, the EU MS have the right to exclude the new partners from coordination meetings, which has hardly ever happened in the past. Even though the alignment procedure for statements and demarches is maintained, it looses its importance for the candidate countries during this period. They have to align themselves systematically as non-alignment would be politically unthinkable at this stage in view of their status as EU MS in waiting. The alignment procedure becomes also obsolete for the new members, seeing that as ‘active observers’ they are in the position to actively influence the proceedings within the EU group, and not just to endorse the positions presented by EU MS. With this long period of mutual habituation it is not surprising that the three rounds of enlargement the EU has seen so far (in 1995, 2004 and 2007) were a remarkably smooth exercise for the EU in New York. The day-to-day EU coordination after 1 May 2004 continues to work in a satisfactory way on the same level of effectiveness and efficiency as before the accession of the ten new members. The same is true for

11 Those arrangements and those for the next steps in the accession process were revised and refined by the GAERC of 18/19 November 2002 in documents 14303/02 and 13569/02.

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the time after 1 January 2007. This is mainly due to the fact that the new members are comparably passive in the EU meetings, but also at the UN in general, primarily because they have very limited resources, small missions and no critical profile or interest to defend on the East River. Probably they also need a couple of years to sound out the possibilities they have within the EU group and become accustomed to be accepted as full members with the right to block consensus decisions. But there was also no tangible change in the consultation mechanisms as the twelve new members bring only few issues into the group which would proof controversial, as also the empirical analysis will show in the next part (see especially pages 272 ff.). That reduces the risk of increased disagreement within the enlarged EU group to a theoretical quantity, at least for the time being. 4.2

The Way Ahead: Implications of the EU Reform Treaty for the EU at the UN

The Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (‘EU Reform Treaty’) is currently the most important prototype for institutional change in the CFSP. Therefore its implications for the EU at the UN will be examined in the next section. It has become clear throughout this study, that the main problem of the CFSP within the UN is that the EU MS do not manage to speak with a single voice in too many instances and on too many issues. The EU Reform Treaty contains institutional innovations that have a significant impact on the Union’s external action and can therefore also help to overcome the lack of coherence observable regarding the EU at the UN. Even though it currently remains unclear whether the EU Reform Treaty will be ratified by all 27 EU MS and therefore can enter into force, it nevertheless seems to be worth examining its implications for the coordination, cooperation and representation of the EU at the UN. Three main aspects have to be mentioned as having direct repercussions on the EU in New York: 1. The end of the rotating Presidency; 2. The establishment of an EU ‘Foreign Minister’; 3. The conferring of legal personality to the EU.

external factors changing the basis of eu cooperation 197 (1) The first aspect scrutinised will be the end of the rotating Presidency responsible for group-internal mediation and EU representation in New York. When the EU External Action Service (EEAS), consisting of civil servants from EU institutions and EU MS (which would still receive instructions from their capitals), would run the daily business at UN headquarters, coherence would be likely to increase.12 In the course of those changes the European Commission Delegation would fuse with the office of the Council Secretariat to form a single EU Delegation, speaking on behalf of the EU in all its policy areas.13 This would be a turning point in the relation between the Commission and the Council Secretariat. Problematic is in that regard that both institutions pursue their own interests—already now in the preparatory phase. Furthermore, the Troika would cease to exist. In practice this would mean moving towards a more formalised system of burden-sharing in terms of outward representation of the EU at the UN and a different kind of negotiating format internally and externally, with some kind of hybrid of Commission and Secretariat chairing coordination meetings. Once the EEAS would be in charge in New York, the expression of diverging national views would be more difficult for three practical reasons:14 first, an EU Delegation incorporating diplomats from all EU MS would really create an ideal breeding ground for ‘Brusselisation’ also on the East River. Second, as this EU Delegation would have to communicate the common EU positions, a deviation of positions would be more difficult, as all EU MS are then, so to say, the EU Presidency and would be responsible to reach common ground within the EU. If no common ground is reached, the EU Delegation would have to remain silent and the EU MS would act in their national capacities in the respective UN body. Third, there would be a physical transfer of resources, most importantly of diplomats, from EU MS missions in New York to the EU Delegation. As a consequence EU MS would 12 Interview number 2, 27 April 2004, number 7, 6 May 2004, and number 34, 15 and 20 December 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]). For background information on the EEAS see Simon Duke, “The European External Action Service: A Diplomatic Service in the Making?”, FORNET CFSP Forum, Vol. 2, Issue 4 ( July 2004), pp. 4–7. 13 Claire Hewitt, “The EU at the UN: Propagating a Model of Good Governance”, Commission en direct (weekly internal newspaper of the European Commission), no. 284 (6–12 June 2003), p. 5. 14 Those ideas are based on an interview with a representative of an EU institution (interview number 34, 15 and 20 December 2004 [see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews {p. 317}]).

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probably become more and more passive and would concentrate on the issues which are problematic within the Union. Perhaps through an intensified focus on those challenging issues the positions of the EU MS would converge more quickly over time. Also the angle of third parties’ reactions on a common EU representation has to be mentioned in this context. Probably the close relationships between individual EU MS and specific UN MS would continue to exist, which could be threatening for the functioning of the EEAS in New York, but also fruitful by combining the traditional links EU MS cultivate with the world. For the time being, however, it needs to be clarified what kind of role the EU Delegation in New York would have and how it would interact with the EU MS missions. Open is also who would represent the EU in which UN body and who would be responsible for both the formal and informal EU-dialogue with third parties and the UN Secretariat. Politically very sensitive terrain concerns the consequences for EU representation in the UNSC. In general the EU Reform Treaty seems to advocate a more coordinated EU approach by the EU in UNSC matters, which would cast doubts on the future of the special status of France and the UK as permanent members. At least the EU MS would have to reach common ground on the practicalities of the Article 19 mechanism and its possible deepening. Those are just a few questions of many to be answered. It would be important to start thinking about the practicabilities of EEAS-implementation in New York as soon as possible. But in view of the sensitivities by some EU MS, it was necessary so far to leave things a little bit in the vague. However, it is clear by now that the implementation will be particularly difficult in New York, as the EU MS have well-established structures and are unwilling to get a ‘competitor’ in policy-making on the East River. (2) The innovative proposal of an EU ‘Foreign Minister’ (EUFM) (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) would sharpen the EU’s outward appearance at the UN and present a clear and more powerful contact person to third parties, guaranteeing continuity.15 Such an authority would allow the EU to play a more

15 For an assessment of the possible role of the EU ‘Foreign Minister’ see Mathias Jopp, “Ideen und Realitäten im Verfassungsprozess am Beispiel der Reformansätze

external factors changing the basis of eu cooperation 199 visible role in the Organisation. He or she would preside over the Council for External Relations, be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, stand at the head of the EEAS and would be responsible for the representation of the Union on the international scene. Thus the EUFM could ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action and would be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities falling into First Pillar competences and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s External Action. The EUFM would be even responsible for organising the coordination of the action of EU MS at the UN, which would give more power to the Council Secretariat.16 This role is foreseen for the EUFM by saying that he leads the political dialogue with third parties and represents the Union’s position in IO’s.17 This stronger influence from Brussels would most certainly increase the EU coherence. But also in general a common EUFM being active on UN matters would probably limit the room for solo efforts by EU MS and therefore increase the coherence. Perhaps the EUFM will even have an impact on the EU representation in the UNSC.18 In that regard the EP went so far to suggest that the EUFM should occupy the EU seat the Parliament proposes for the UNSC and the UNGA.19 However, the EUFM would only be successful when being supported and given a certain leeway by the EU MS—certainly more than currently allocated to the HR/SG. (3) Also the fact that the EU Reform Treaty gives legal personality to the EU would alter the outward appearance of the Union and could

für GASP und ESVP”, in Die Rolle der erweiterten Europäischen Union in der Welt, ed. by. Peter-Christian Müller-Graff (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), pp. 43–70, particularly pp. 46 ff., Brian Crowe, “The Significance of the New European Foreign Minister”, FORNET CFSP Forum, Vol. 2, Issue 4 ( July 2004), pp. 1–4, and Christopher Hill, “A Foreign Minister without a Foreign Ministry—or with too many?”, FORNET CFSP Forum, Vol. 1, Issue 1 ( July 2003), pp. 1–2. 16 Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, § 37 a. 17 Ibid., § 30 (2), second sentence. 18 The European Commission sees “a reinforced role for the future Foreign Minister in bringing Member States’ positions together to avoid split votes on Security Council resolutions” (European Commission, EU-UN: Commission calls for the EU to renew its commitment to the UN system and multilateralism, Press release IP/03/1230, Brussels, 10 September 2003). 19 Official Journal of the European Union dated 21.4.2004: European Parliament, Resolution on the relations between the European Union and the United Nations (2003/2049(INI), paragraphs 13 and 14, see also paragraphs 6 and 7.

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allow for a “better conformity with the actual contribution and the actual possibilities of the EU to act within the UN framework”.20 Once the Reform Treaty would enter into force, the duality between EC and EU would end, as the EU would inherit the different legal statuses the EC has in the UN bodies, and de facto raise the status of the EC. In the UNGA, the EU would therefore become an observer or could even aim for a slightly better status when receiving a standing invitation by the Assembly, granting it more influence.21 Such a special status would also be conceivable because—as a Commissioner pointed out some time ago22—it would be not easy to imagine a situation with the EEAS in place, in which the EU, and perhaps even the EUFM, has to speak after all other UN MS (as observers are allowed to speak only after full members), given that the Union is one of the most important players in the Organisation.23 Practically constrained circumstances could therefore accelerate the process of giving a special status to the EU at the UN once all the stipulations of the EU Reform Treaty are in force. It should also be noted that the Reform Treaty provides for enhanced possibilities on security-policy, which would be important for the cooperation between the EU and the UN, as it allows for permanent structured cooperation of some EU MS under the EU flag “outside the Union for

20 Those are the words of Peter Jan Kuijper, Director at the Legal Service of the European Commission, in his speech in session 1 entitled “Towards a Structural Cooperation between the UN and the EU” of the conference “The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership”, 18 May 2004, Palais d’Egmont, Brussels. Available online at www.irri-kiib.be/speechnotes/04/EUUN/coll_EU_UN.htm. 21 In an EU internal document produced by the Legal Service of the EU Council, entitled “The European Union and the United Nations: the absence of legal status of the EU in the UN ” (distributed at a CONUN meeting on 19 November 2003) it says: “For the General Assembly, there may be other options than the recognition of a classic Observer status to the Union. Precedents show that the UN distinguishes between “Entities having received a standing invitation to participate in the sessions and the Work of the General Assembly” and “Intergovernmental organisations having received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly.” The first status avoids both the qualification of Observer and the issue of the legal personality. In a highly symbolic environment, such as the one of the UN, the distinction can have a far-reaching practical potential.” 22 According to an official from an European institution (interview number 34, 15 and 20 December 2004 [see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews {p. 317}]). 23 Currently the EU Presidency is always one of the first speakers on the list of speakers, as it is a sovereign UN MS representing a group. Countries representing groups are allowed to speak before individual countries in most UN bodies.

external factors changing the basis of eu cooperation 201 peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.”24 HR/SG Javier Solana pointed out rightly that the EU Reform Treaty has the possibility of adjusting the institutional foundations of the EU, which “were built with their main aim [being] the internal construction of Europe”, to the needs of a global actor.25 Along those lines, the EU Reform Treaty would certainly constitute a major shift in terms of the representation at the UN and would create the basis for more active and more offensive EU politics on the East River.26 However, institutionally the EU MS would remain UN MS as sovereign entities. This would be particularly felt in the UNSC. And no completely new framework of EU institutions would be created. But the EU Reform Treaty would be a step into the direction of a gradual stronger political convergence. On 5 November 2004, the HoMs of all 27 EU MS missions in New York held a so-called ‘Fireside Chat’ on the implications of the EU Reform Treaty, and particularly the EEAS, for the work in New York. This meeting was closed without any result. As the author has heard from diplomats involved, some EU MS refused strongly to talk about the issue at all. Particularly France seemed to see its role in the UNSC endangered. Even three years later, some EU countries are still hesitant to talk about the implications of the Treaty for the EU at the UN, although a brainstorming exercise and an informal debate would be crucial. This casts a dark shadow on the implementation of the Reform Treaty’s provisions in New York. But this defensive demeanor also shows which potential for change the EU Reform Treaty could have for the EU at the UN—and how afraid some EU MS are of this potential.

24 § 48 c (6) and § 48 (a) of the Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. 25 Summary of remarks by HR/SG Javier Solana at a Conference of Ambassadors in La Farnesina (Rome), 27 July 2004, p. 4. 26 Armin Laschet, “Für einen effizienten Multilateralismus. Gemeinsame Werte von Europäischer Union und Vereinten Nationen”, Vereinte Nationen, 52nd volume (2004), no. 2, p. 42.

PART TWO

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF EU VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

COHERENCE OF EU MEMBER STATES’ DECISION-MAKING—VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS To test the assumption that the striving for a common EU voice at the UN has to take second place behind national interests if the two are incompatible, this section will look at the voting behaviour of the EU MS in the UNGA between 1988 and 2005. The aim is to show that voting coherence is high only in those areas in which the national policies of the EU MS have very much converged over the last decades. In other fields national interests continue to be pursued by the individual countries. Thus the CFSP does not make such an overall difference: it works where in line with national interests, it does not where conflicting interests exist within the EU group. In any case national interests, at least on important issues, carry more weight than the pressure to act coherently. In addition, it seems to be correct to say that “UN voting patterns do give some assistance in identifying general trends”.1 This is certainly also true for the CFSP at the UN. Besides, it is usually very difficult to measure coherence within CFSP or EU policies in general. But the voting behaviour of EU MS in the UNGA shows very explicitly and unambiguously, on which issues the 27 really speak with one voice—and in which they do not. Methodological Considerations A country’s voting behaviour at the UN gives the researcher extensive information about its preferences in diverse issue areas. However, the meaningfulness of a single isolated vote cast within a UN organ on a country’s policy objective and behaviour is extremely limited. Only when seen in relation to other countries and examined over time, regularities

1 Ben Tonra, “Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands in European Political Cooperation”, unp. paper presented to the ECPR Madrid Joint sessions, 17–22 April 1994, p. 13.

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and inconsistencies become apparent and changes in national policies emerge. This way a comparative view is taken. The same is also true when analysing a group of states. Then, as an additional aspect, also the internal coherence becomes possible to evaluate. Voting analysis is especially useful in the case of the EU at the UN, since the quantitative determination of state behaviour demonstrates the quality of coordination and solidarity among the EU countries in the world organisation in a relatively unambiguous and objective manner and allows to ‘measure’ the quality of CFSP. This is particularly valuable, as it is generally impossible to assess the coherence within the CFSP through quantitative means, given that no such exploitable data results from EU internal political processes in Brussels. To evaluate the coherence among the EU member states within the UN System this investigation will concentrate on votes cast in the UNGA. This organ has been chosen, as it is the only body within the UN System dealing with the full range of issues on the world agenda. Furthermore the UNGA constitutes a forum, in which virtually all countries in the world, including all EU MS and accession candidates, are represented. Homogeny of European voting behaviour in the UNGA is measured by performing a quaternary classification: the percentage of identical votes (i.e. when each EU state casts the same vote as all the others, whether it be pro, con, or abstention), two-way split voting (voting of EU members splits into pro-abstention or con-abstention), three-way split votes (voting of EU members splits into pro-abstention-con), or diametrical opposed voting (voting of EU members splits into pro-con) of all recorded or roll-call votes in the Assembly. The timeframe of the quantitative analysis is 1988 to 2005 (43rd to 60th UNGA session). This allows judging the voting behaviour of the EC/EU MS five years before the creation of the CFSP to see whether the introduction of the new regime influenced voting patterns. For practical reasons the last date within the 60th UNGA session included in this examination is 21 December 2005, therefore taking into account the full main part of the session. The number of recorded votes ranges between 61 (1998/99) and 136 (1988/89) in each session. 1403 recorded votes were included in the dataset, which should be large enough for a representative analysis. The voting behaviour of 33 countries have been analysed for each of those resolutions: the 27 EU MS and the six candidate and potential candidate countries.

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Even though rather complex mathematical methods have been applied successfully to analyse voting behaviour within the UN System, such as Gutman scaling, factor analysis, complete analysis, cluster-bloc analysis, or the employment of indices, it seems to be adequate for the purpose of this study to utilise less sophisticated techniques. In order to determine general coherence-values of EU states’ voting behaviour in a UN organ for a given period, elementary arithmetic methods will suffice. However, in order to ascertain the materialisation of a coherence-value on the basis of the voting behaviour of an individual EU MS in proportion to all other EU countries, or in a comparison of the voting patterns of two EU states within the UNGA, a different procedure is needed. A method introduced by Arend Lijphart,2 who again based his approach on the ‘Index of Cohesion’ developed by Stuart A. Rice,3 refined by Herman C. Beyle,4 is of use in this regard. The ‘Lijphart Index of Agreement’ will be employed with the alterations undertaken by Klaus-Dieter Stadler in his study on the European Community at the United Nations.5 Percentages are obtained as results from all formulae employed. A coherence-value of 100 percent indicates the maximum convergence among EU states or between an EU country and the Union, while 0 percent marks the absolute low point of coherence (not existing in facto).6 To ascertain how often an individual EU state voted with the majority of the Union’s countries, in other words to determine its conformism vis-à-vis EU consensus, the following formula is employed: EU Index of Coherence of country A with EU consensus: EU-I A =

a + d−m × 100 a+d+s

Where:

2 Arend Lijphart, “The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal”, American Political Science Review, vol. 57 (1963), no. 4, pp. 902–17. 3 Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York, 1928), pp. 208–9. 4 Herman C. Beyle, Identification and Analysis of Attribute-Cluster-Blocs (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931). 5 Klaus-Dieter Stadler, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft in den Vereinten Nationen: Die Rolle der EG im Entscheidungsprozess der UN-Hauptorgane am Beispiel der Generalversammlung (BadenBaden: Nomos, 1993), pp. 161–8. 6 The same holds true for the analysis of all 33 countries examined.

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a: number of UN votes, in which all EC/EU MS voted uniformly; d: number of divergent UN votes, in which an (absolute) EU majority and minority is ascertainable;7 s: number of three-way split UN votes without an EU (absolute) majority;8 m: number of UN votes, in which the respective state did not vote with the EU majority. Example: Great Britain’s agreement with EU majority in the 56th UNGA (2001/2): EU-IGB =

54 + 13 − 9 × 100 = 86.6 per cent. 54 + 13 + 0

It is useful to be able to calculate how the voting behaviour of two EU states can be seen in relation to each other. Thus it is possible to distinguish in individual cases, which members of the ‘club’ have congruent policy preferences and which have contradictory interests, and to locate the respective policy areas. All that allows to identify coherence patterns at the sub-EU level. In order to calculate the conformity between two EU states it is proceeded in the following way: EU Index of Conformity for two countries, A and B: I A, B =

a+t × 100 n

Where: n: the total number of recorded UN votes in the period examined (UNGA and Main Committees: individual session; UNSC: individual calendar year); a: number of UN votes, in which all EC/EU MS voted uniformly; t: number of UN votes, in which the two countries observed voted uniformly when there was no EU consensus. 7 An absolute majority of votes exists, when at least eight EU states vote the same way (pro, con, abstention) (between 1995 and 2003). For the years 1993 and 1995 (with 12 EU member states) the majority is 7. From EU enlargement in May 2004 the EU majority is 13 votes. If there is no majority (e.g. within the EU-27 12 MS vote with yes, 12 with no, and one MS abstains), all MS are treated as dissenters, as no EU majority exists. 8 E.g. 7 votes pro, 3 con, and 5 abstentions (for the period 1995 to 2003).

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Example: Conformity of Great Britain (GB) and Luxembourg (LUX) in the 56th UNGA (2001/2): IGB, LUX =

54 + 5 × 100 = 88.1 per cent. 67

By going in a time-consuming process through each individual of the 1403 recorded votes it was identified how the 33 countries voted with each other. Therefore it is possible to tell exactly how many identical voting decisions for instance Germany and Belgium made, i.e. in how many cases both voted with yes, no or abstention on the same resolution. The proximity of policy preferences among all 33 countries has been detected that way. In May 2004 the Union was joined by ten new MS. Until this date these countries are considered as third parties. Within the period observed, 1988 to 2005 inclusive, it is nonetheless of great interest to analyse how the voting patterns of the new members are composed and how they developed over time, compared with the EC-129 and EU-15.10 The same holds true for the other accession countries Romania and Bulgaria, as well as the candidate countries11 and potential candidate countries.12 For the calculation of an incoming state’s convergence with the EU consensus, the EU Index of Coherence described above can be employed without any alterations. However, if the conformity in the voting behaviour between an EU member state and a country set to join the Union is to be calculated, the formula given has to be modified slightly: Index of Conformity between EU country A and candidate country C: I A, C =

a−c + t × 100 n

Where (for a, n and t see page 208): c:

number of UN votes, in which the applicant state’s vote diverged from EU consensus.

9 The twelve MS that formed the European Community between 1986 and 1993, and the European Union between 1993 and 1995. 10 The fifteen MS that formed the EU between 1995 and 2004. 11 Croatia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Turkey. 12 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina along with Serbia and Montenegro.

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Particularly problematic is the conduct of abstentions in UN voting. Since he regarded abstaining as a form of partial agreement or disagreement, Lijphart counts an abstention with “half the weight of a complete agreement”, for which reason his “Index of Agreement”formula takes the following form when entering the factor-denotations used above:13 Lijphart Index of Agreement I A =

a + t + ½p × 100 n

Where (for a, n and t see page 208): p: number of UN votes with partial disagreement between two states. However, in this study the three possible ways of voting (pro, con, abstention)14 are weighted equally. In contrast to Lijphart, who investigated voting blocs in the UNGA altogether, this study looks at the specific situation within the caucusing group of the European Union member states, who developed their own rules and strategies in order to pursue common aims and to represent a homogeneous outward policy. For that reason, every vote which deviates from the EU consensus, also if it is an abstention, undermines the endeavour to speak with one voice within international circles. In accordance with this objective, partial agreements are therefore not possible with regard to EU voting at the UN: either a state joins the prevailing opinion or it diverges from EU consensus, in an obvious way by voting diametrically opposed or in a less blatant manner by abstaining. For that reason the factor ‘partial disagreement’ is dropped in the formulae used in this study, as treating pro, con and abstention in the evaluation as being equivalent seems to be justifiable.

Lijphart, op. cit. in note 2, p. 910. A fourth option of declaring a country’s position is ‘Non-Participation’. This behaviour demonstrates that, in the opinion of the state in question, the matter discussed does not fall into the area of responsibility of the respective UN organ, that it wishes to avoid showing its positions, or has other specific reasons (usually lack of resources). In this study absence is treated as lack of data. Absenteeism in more than 30 per cent of UNGA voting results in a UNGA session results in the exclusion of the country from the analysis for the whole session, depicted by ‘n/a’ in the tables. This case applied, for instance, to Greece in 1996. 13

14

introduction and methodological considerations

211

Another qualification has to be made for the examination. All votes cast without a vote in the UNGA, i.e. adopted by consensus of all members in the Assembly, are not included in the analysis. Instead, only recorded or roll-call votes are considered. Recorded votes amount to around 20 to 30 percent of all resolutions passed by the UNGA session (see table M.1, p. 212). If the consensus votes were included in the analysis, the EU coherence for instance in the 55th UNGA session (2000/2001) amounted to 96 percent. When looking at the recorded votes only, the analogous figure is 80.6 percent. This way the limitation made is reasonable, since consensus votes artificially increase the value of coherence without adding substance to the analysis: it does not say anything about the quality of the CFSP regime in place at the UN that the 27 manage to harmonise their policies and support an agreement adopted by consensus in a UN organ, since all other UN members—192 states in the UNGA—are able to do so as well. But if countries poles apart as the United States and North Korea, Israel and Syria share the same interests in an issue and can reach agreement, the unitary behaviour of the EU states does not need an individual accentuation and examination. Other researchers have not only excluded resolutions adopted by consensus, but also those passed on less controversial issues, to evaluate EU coherence on sensitive issues.15 This would imply ignoring areas like Middle East conflict, human rights and democracy; development and globalisation, in which the Union’s communauté d’action is very pronounced. Yet such a way of proceeding seems to be counterproductive, since it neglects that the EU countries occasionally stand in sharp contrast to other UN MS in these questions, which makes a consistent European position sometimes difficult to achieve. But obviously it is even more important in these questions to present to the world a coherent EU voice. Also the open representation of positions, which are usually not disputed within the Union, is at times difficult, since national states have to make allowances for economic interests or consider their ties with former colonies. It is therefore unsuitable to stipulate sweepingly that EU coherence in certain issue areas is easier to accomplish because of fundamental political concord among the 27, for which reason these

15 Stelios Stavridis and Duncan Pruett, European Political Cooperation at the United Nations: A Critical Assessment 1970 –1992 (Occasional Paper No 20, University of Reading, Department of Politics, June 1996).

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introduction and methodological considerations

Percentage of recorded votes

Number of recorded votes

Percentage of consensus votes

Number of consensus votes

UNGA Session

Total number of all resolutions adopted

Table M.1: Consensual Resolutions and Recorded Votes in the UNGA, 1988–2004

43 (1988/1989)

327

191

58.4

136

41.6

44 (1989/1990)

342

226

66.1

116

33.9

45 (1990/1991)

344

258

75.0

86

25.0

46 (1991/1992)

315

240

76.2

75

23.8

47 (1992/1993)

295

220

74.6

75

25.4

48 (1993/1994)

337

272

80.7

65

19.3

49 (1994/1995)

336

268

79.8

68

20.2

50 (1995/1996)

335

254

75.8

81

24.2

51 (1996/1997)

320

244

76.3

76

23.8

52 (1997/1998)

298

229

76.8

69

23.2

53 (1998/1999)

303

242

79.9

61

20.1

54 (1999/2000)

341

273

80.1

68

19.9

55 (2000/2001)

328

261

79.6

67

20.4

56 (2001/2002)

360

293

81.4

67

18.6

57 (2002/2003)

351

278

79.2

73

20.8

58 (2003/2004)

324

248

76.5

76

23.5

59 (2004/2005)

325

254

78.2

71

21.8

60 (2005/2006)*

257

184

71.6

73

28.4

324.3

246.4

75.9

77.9

24.1

AVERAGES

Source: Own calculations based on UNBISnet; *until 21 December 2005.

introduction and methodological considerations

213

resolutions should not be disregarded. Controversial subject areas are anyhow dealt with in a separate, detailed scrutiny within this study. In addition, only when the EU convergence for all resolutions taken with a vote had been determined beforehand it is possible to judge, if the coherence-values in controversial questions such as disarmament and decolonisation are really strikingly low. Without this standard of comparison it would be impossible to distinguish areas of divergence, since low values could be linked otherwise not to content, but for instance to underlying institutional realities of the CFSP regime. This study will take into account only the votes cast on entire resolutions. One could also include the recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on motions and decisions. Even though the share of these recorded votes in the total of recorded votes is relatively high,16 Paul Luif has demonstrated that there exist only “slight differences” in the final results when one compares the outcome of coherence analysis of examinations based on voting on entire resolutions on the one hand and those using a larger data set by including votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on motions and decisions, on the other.17 This finding is not very surprising, since a remarkably different voting behaviour by EU member states on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions etc., compared to entire resolutions, is unlikely in view of the actual practice in New York. Given that an evaluation of rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions etc. would require to search the verbatim records of all the sessions of the UNGA, such undertaking was hardly feasible within the scope of this investigation. Besides general voting analysis for the UNGA, also a dissection of the recorded votes from a content-orientated, thematic point of view appears to be useful. Only then it becomes possible to locate issue areas,

51st UNGA session (1996/97): 23.3 %; 55th UNGA session (2000/01): 20.5 %; 57th UNGA session (2002/2003; until December 31 2002): 32.1 %. See Paul Luif, “The Similarities and Differences of the EU and US Foreign Policies: Empirical Indicators from the UN General Assembly”, Paper presented at the EUSA 8th International Conference, March 27–29, 2003, Nashville, Tennessee, USA, Annex II, List 1. 17 Paul Luif compares his own findings on UNGA voting, including voting recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on motions and decisions with the results obtained by Klaus-Dieter Stadler, who only used the recorded votes on entire resolutions. The differences between both examinations, considering the period between 1976 and 1991, are only marginal. See Paul Luif, On the Road to Brussels: The Political Dimension of Austria’s, Finland’s and Sweden’s Accession to the European Union (Vienna: Braumüller, 1995), pp. 277–8. 16

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introduction and methodological considerations

in which on the one hand a coherent UN policy by the EU countries is implemented, and on the other hand, in which competing national interests impede a common EU stance. Whether a resolution belongs to one or the other thematic category is determined by the author. The categorisation is carried out on the basis of the content of a resolution. Often the researcher gets a useful hint on the content by identifying which Main Committee dealt with the respective resolution. Since resolutions discussed in the UNGA in most cases are being prepared by the Main Committees, this selection criterion is often applicable also to the UNGA. However, it happens time and again that a topic has a multi-faceted dimension. Then the information, which Committee is responsible, does not allow valid conclusions about the substance. Assistance in categorisation offers the UN Yearbook. In this official annual all resolutions adopted are being classified by issue areas. Even though qualitative analysis comes into play by looking at the content of resolutions, it is nevertheless impossible when examining voting behaviour in the described way, to assign different weight to the various resolutions in accordance with their actual political importance. Introducing a measure of importance would mean presupposing a single EU classification of what an important resolution is. With 27 national interests existing, this would be extremely difficult. Consequently, every resolution has been allocated the same weight in the quantitative analysis, independent of its content. Nevertheless, even though one has to acknowledge that some resolutions are more important than others by looking at their implications, this fact would still be unproblematic, if EU consensus and divergence is distributed evenly among important and less important voting. Yet, this again is difficult to quantify. However, if uniform EU voting practice is achieved in less important issues only, while incoherence prevails in terms of important ones, this had significant implications for this investigation. Hence, even though the different weight of resolutions is not measured quantitatively, there nevertheless has to be a certain qualitative alertness in this regard. In order to interpret and give reasons for national voting patterns in certain issue areas, it is necessary to consult national and EU statements, explicating voting behaviour. Valuable are also declarations made in the debate within UNGA, its Main Committees and the UNSC. These public illustrations of European positions are supplemented by nonofficial and non-public accounts of the 27 EU MS’ positions within the EU coordination framework in New York and Brussels. On this policylevel, content-orientated positioning is feasible in a most direct way,

introduction and methodological considerations

215

provided that insights into the bodies dealing with EU coordination are achievable. After all, national preferences are expressed and discussed here, before Union’s coordination procedures yield the lowest common denominator, which then is announced externally as the EU position. Therefore it goes without saying that also with regard to resolutions, which had been adopted by consensus, differences of opinion among EU states may have existed, but have been smoothed for the benefit of consensus. In general, the pressure existing within the Union to speak with one voice, produces a substantial adaptive reflex: instead of reductio ad absurdum European endeavours for consistency with an opposing vote, EU countries in several cases resort to abstaining in a voting, as a sign of diverging opinions. Qualitative investigations therefore have to illustrate the gap between public representation and political reality. Qualitative analysis as a verifier is also important in view of the fact that the definite materialisation of the result in a voting for a resolution depends on various factors, like agreements with third parties, as well as political and economical stick and carrot policy measures. This informal side of UN policy is not measurable quantitatively and also qualitatively hard to ascertain. One should therefore be aware of the limitations of the conclusions drawn from the examinations undertaken in this part. However, even though the quantitative analysis may not fall back upon satisfactory qualitative reasoning in all cases, the general meaningfulness of the findings acquired should be nevertheless high. On the one hand, since also irrespective of the actual course of events behind the scenes, which lead to a certain voting, the quantitative values of coherence among the EU states in the UN System exist as ‘objective’ figures in the different records. This allows valuable analytical conclusions also without qualitative backing. In globo, only by incorporating a content-orientated component supplementing quantitative analysis, a comprehensive and convincing picture of the representation and cooperation of the 27 within the UN System can be drawn. What the analysis definitely can do, is to show trends over time and in certain issue areas, and this is the main motivation of this exercise. As Stelios Stavridis and Duncan Pruett pointed out,18 one also has to be aware of a couple of other problems when analysing voting at the UN: in contrast to decisions passed by the UNSC, resolutions adopted by the UNGA have no binding consequences under international

18

Stavridis and Pruett, op. cit. in note 15, p. 3.

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introduction and methodological considerations

law (except for budget questions) and are merely of admonitory or recommendatory nature. Seeing that this way not necessarily tangible consequences are to be expected, it is easier for EU MS to put their own preferences last for the benefit of a uniform EU position in a UN voting. Nevertheless, this notion is qualified substantially by the political and moral authority of the UNGA: EU countries are aware of the great relevance of the Assembly and try to utilise it for their interests, although one has to admit that this relevance has also a disciplining effect. Voting moreover not automatically reflects the national policy position in an issue area, seeing that tactical or other reasons may have instigated the respective voting. In addition, the wording used in a resolution can lead to a state’s negative vote or abstention, despite it has no reservations about the substance of it. Dissent as brought to light by voting analysis among the Union’s constituent parts is also problematic in view of the three different ways of voting in UN bodies (pro, con, and abstention), making absolute consensus much more difficult than in other international organisations or within the EU framework. The data collected may therefore look dramatic and expressive, even though the concrete political gap between national positions do not have to be that significant in praxi. Voting may as well occur only on atypical issues in specific years, obstructing an analysis across time. A general problem regarding the implications of voting concerns the size of the voting bloc examined: when evaluating the voting patterns of a small group of states it is possible to achieve a high index of voting cohesion by pure chance.19 However, even though all these objections cannot be waived utterly, they nevertheless can be weakened considerably by employing qualitative analysis revealing a country’s motivation. Besides, these counter-arguments are “true of any system, be it based on voting patterns or anything else for the matter”.20 Furthermore, most probably the errors in the figures are relatively constant, for which reason the information can be employed to specify trends—also general ones within the CFSP regime—and to compare country positions, which is this study’s major concern.

19 Lijphart, op. cit. in note 2, pp. 906–907. Lijphart calculates that under realistic circumstances the “chance of achieving an identical vote even if ” the states involved “cast their votes in a completely different manner” is 16 % for a bloc of three states, 1.6 % for a bloc of six states and infinitesimal when 15 states or more are examined. 20 Stavridis and Pruett, op. cit. in note 15, p. 3.

introduction and methodological considerations

217

The data for the UNGA coherence evaluation comes from different sources. For the years 1988–1996 a dataset provided by Eric Voeten has been used (Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly v1.0 [http://home. gwu.edu/~voeten/UNVoting.htm]), which is again based on Voeten’s own compilation, derived from a dataset by Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo (UN General Assembly Voting V3.0). For 1997–2002 a dataset assembled by Zachary Wynne and Eric Voeten (Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly v1.0 [http://home.gwu.edu/~voeten/UNVoting.htm]) was employed. For the last three UNGA sessions (2003–2005) I set up my own database, derived from data provided by the UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet).

CHAPTER FIVE

VOTING COHERENCE OF THE EU AS A GROUP 5.1

Overall Voting Coherence

A mixed picture emerges when looking at the overall voting coherence in the UNGA of all EC/EU1 MS taken together: on the one hand, coherence has developed quite positively, as its percentage rose from 45.6 to 76.7 per cent from 1988 to 2005 (see figure and table 5.1, pp. 220–221).2 This is even more remarkable, as EC/EU membership increased in this period, from twelve in 1988 to fifteen in 1995 and to twenty-five in 2004. Particularly between 1990 and 1999 there has been a steady growth in coherence, reaching an all-time high of 85.2 per cent in UNGA session 53. On the other hand, EU voting coherence seems to have reached a plateau of around 75 per cent in recent years. At the moment, this seems to be the maximum coherence achievable.3 Coherence could only be increased through further institutional adjustments or alterations of national policies. EU coherence has even experienced a decrease between the years 2000 and 2004. But the trend line suggests that this has only been an interim low: particularly the developments observed in 2004 and 2005 allow a rather optimistic outlook, as the last round of enlargement did not have a negative effect on the overall EU coherence. Quite the contrary, the voting coherence increased during the last two years of the analysis to 76.7 in 2005. This phenomenon had also been visible

1 As the EU was created only in 1993, but the qualitative analysis comprises also the years 1988 to 1992, it is necessary to talk of EC/EU MS rather than only of EU MS. 2 As the declared aim for the EU is to speak with a single voice, hundred per cent coherence on all votes in the UNGA is the target the voting behaviour of EU MS is judged by in this examination. 3 Which renews Elfriede Regelsberger’s assumption, that EC coherence has reached the maximum level of coherence. See Elfriede Regelsberger, “EPC in the 1980s: Reaching Another Plateau?”, in European Political Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?, ed. by Alfred Pijers, Elfriede Regelsberger and Wolfgang Wessels (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), pp. 3–37.

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EC/EU voting coherence (in %)

Figure 5.1: Coherence of EC/EU Voting in the UN General Assembly, 1988–2005 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Overall voting coherence

Trend

Sources: 1988–1996: dataset provided by Eric Voeten (Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly v1.0 [http://home.gwu.edu/~voeten/UNVoting.htm]), based on his own compilation, derived from a dataset by Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo (UN General Assembly Voting V3.0); 1997–2002: dataset assembled by Zachary Wynne and Eric Voeten (Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly v1.0 [http://home.gwu.edu/~voeten/ UNVoting. htm]); 2003–2005: author’s own calculations based on UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet); 51st UNGA Session: without Greece because of strike by Greek diplomats; 60th UNGA Session: data until 21 December 2005.

when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the Union in 1995: the coherence had not been affected negatively by this accession, but rather continued to grow.4 The effect the TEU with its stipulations for a CFSP has on voting behaviour at the UN is difficult to determine. However, to a certain extend the rise of coherence since 1990 can be attributed to the

4 The low coherence in the 50th UNGA session (1995/1996) cannot be attributed to the previous enlargement. It was due to a split within the Union over one resolution on decolonisation, on which was voted on each individual part (A/Res/50/38A, A/Res/50/38B-I, A/Res/50/38B-II, A/Res/50/38B-III, A/Res/50/38B-IV, A/ Res/50/38B-V, A/Res/50/38B-VI, A/Res/50/38B-VII, A/Res/50/38B-VIII, A/ Res/50/38B-IX, A/Res/50/38B-X, A/Res/50/38B-XI, A/Res/50/38B-XII), causing an large number of three-way-splits within the Union. This vote was a unusual specific event. Belgium, France, Greece and the UK voted against the EU majority, but not the three new EU MS.

voting coherence of the eu as a group

221

Percentage EC/EU disagreement (recorded votes)

Percentage EC/EU consensus all resolutions

136

62

74

45.6

54.4

77.4

44 (1989/1990)

342

116

55

61

47.4

52.6

82.2

45 (1990/1991)

344

86

40

46

46.5

53.5

86.6

46 (1991/1992)

315

75

40

35

53.3

46.7

88.9

47 (1992/1993)

295

75

47

28

62.7

37.3

90.5

48 (1993/1994)

337

65

42

23

64.6

35.4

93.2

49 (1994/1995)

336

68

47

21

69.1

30.9

93.8

50 (1995/1996)

335

81

48

33

59.3

40.7

90.1

51 (1996/1997)†

320

76

61

15

80.3

19.7

95.3

52 (1997/1998)

298

69

56

13

81.2

18.8

95.6

53 (1998/1999)

303

61

52

9

85.2

14.8

97.0

54 (1999/2000)

341

68

53

15

77.9

22.1

95.6

55 (2000/2001)

328

67

54

13

80.6

19.4

96.0

56 (2001/2002)

360

67

53

14

79.1

20.9

96.1

57 (2002/2003)

351

73

57

16

78.1

21.9

95.4

58 (2003/2004)

324

76

53

23

69.7

30.3

92.9

59 (2004/2005)

325

71

53

18

74.6

25.4

94.5

60 (2005/2006)*

257

73

56

17

76.7

23.3

93.4

324.3

77.9

51.6

26.3

68.4

31.6

91.9

UNGA Session

AVERAGES

Recorded votes with EC/EU disagreement

327

Number of recorded votes

43 (1988/1989)

Number of all resolutions adopted

Percentage EC/EU consensus (recorded votes)

Recorded votes with EC/EU consensus

Table 5.1: Overview EC/EU Voting Coherence, 1988–2005

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; * until 21 December 2005; † without Greece.

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increasingly more sophisticated coordination mechanisms in place in New York since the agreement on and implementation of the TEU, creating the above-mentioned coordination reflex. And the provisions on CFSP have surely amplified the pressure to reach consensus within the EU group, forcing EU MS to reconsider, whether they really have to vote different from the EU majority, or whether there is a certain leeway within their decision-taking without compromising their national interests. The feeling that national interests can be served better when acting as a group and the fear of isolation might also have had an influence on voting behaviour. But more crucial are certainly aspects to be found outside the EU. Most important is the fact that the issues discussed at the UN have changed drastically since the early 1990s, making it easier for the EU MS to have shared positions. Problematic issues, such as South African politics, have disappeared, while others have lost in importance, for instance questions of nuclear armament.5 Furthermore the general atmosphere in the General Assembly has become less confrontational in the last ten years, enabling more unity within the EU. More coherence has also been achieved since a couple of countries mainly responsible for low coherence rates, namely Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Spain and the UK, have altered their policies, bringing them more in harmony with the EU mainstream. The last column of table 5.1 (see page 221) shows the percentages of EC/EU consensus on all resolutions, i.e. consensus and non-consensus votes combined. This approach artificially increases the percentage of EC/EU coherence, as the comparison between this column and the column on EC/EU coherence illustrates.6 However, this difference is particularly interesting, as the EU Presidency and the European Commission, when describing EU coherence in the UNGA, only refer to the coherence concerning all resolutions.7 This way the impression of

5 See Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, “The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: What Future for European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ Europe?”, European Foreign Affairs Review 9 (1, Spring 2004), p. 73. 6 See the section on methodology on this question, particularly pp. 210 ff. 7 See for instance European Communities, The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making Multilateralism Matter (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004), p. 12. But also Esa Paasivirta and Dominic Porter

voting coherence of the eu as a group

223

Figure 5.2: Details EC/EU Split Votes in the UN General Assembly, 1988–2005 40

Split votes* (in %)

30

Two-way Splits Three-way Splits Opposed Votes

20

10

0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; * missing to 100%: EU consensus votes; 51st UNGA Session: without Greece because of strike by Greek diplomats; 60th UNGA Session: data until 21 December 2005.

a very unified Union within the world body is given without taking into consideration the empirical unsuitability of such an analysis. A look at the details of EC/EU voting behaviour provides deeper insights into the development and composition of EU voting coherence. Figure 5.2 and table 5.2 (see page 224) subdivide the votes cast into four categories: consensus, two-way splits (EC/EU votes divide into ‘yes’/‘abstention’ or ‘no’/‘abstention’), three-way splits (EC/EU votes spread over the possible spectrum of voting options of ‘yes’, ‘abstention’ and ‘no’), and opposed votes (EC/EU MS vote with ‘yes’ and ‘no’).8 have done the same in their assessment (see Esa Paasivirta and Dominic Porter, “EU Coordination at the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC: A View From Brussels, A View From New York”, in The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership, ed. by Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister and Tom Ruys (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), p. 45. 8 This empirical-quantitative technique has been used by Ingeborg J. Thijn, “The European Political Cooperation in the General Assembly of the United Nations:

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Percentage consensus votes

EU Two-way split votes

EU opposed votes

Percentage opposed votes

136

62

45.6

52

38.2

22

16.2

0

0.0

44 (1989/1990)

116

55

47.4

39

33.6

22

19.0

0

0.0

45 (1990/1991)

86

40

46.5

30

34.9

16

18.6

0

0.0

46 (1991/1992)

75

40

53.3

29

38.7

6

8.0

0

0.0

47 (1992/1993)

75

47

62.7

25

33.3

3

4.0

0

0.0

48 (1993/1994)

65

42

64.6

19

29.2

4

6.2

0

0.0

49 (1994/1995)

68

47

69.1

16

23.5

5

7.4

0

0.0

50 (1995/1996)

81

48

59.3

15

18.5

17

21.0

1

1.2

51 (1996/1997)†

76

61

80.3

10

13.2

5

6.5

0

0.0

52 (1997/1998)

69

56

81.2

9

13.0

4

5.8

0

0.0

53 (1998/1999)

61

52

85.2

4

6.6

4

6.6

1

1.6

54 (1999/2000)

68

53

77.9

10

14.7

4

5.9

1

1.5

55 (2000/2001)

67

54

80.6

8

11.9

5

7.5

0

0.0

56 (2001/2002)

67

53

79.1

10

14.9

4

6.0

0

0.0

57 (2002/2003)

73

57

78.1

9

12.3

7

9.6

0

0.0

58 (2003/2004)

76

52

69.7

15

19.7

7

9.3

1

1.3

59 (2004/2005)

71

53

74.6

10

14.1

7

9.9

1

1.4

60 (2005/2006)*

73

56

76.7

10

13.7

7

9.6

0

0.0

77.9

51.6

68.4

17.8

21.3

8.3

9.8

0.3

0.4

AVERAGES

EU Three-way split votes

Votes with EU consensus

43 (1988/1989)

UNGA Session

Percentage Two-way split votes

Total number recorded votes

Percentage Three-way split votes

Table 5.2: Details EC/EU Voting Coherence in the UN General Assembly, 1988–2005

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; * until 21 December 2005; † without Greece.

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Two-way splits are the least confrontational variant of EC/EU voting divergence. Often an EC/EU MS decides to abstain when it cannot fully support the formulation or the intention of a resolution. Due to the pressure exerted by CFSP, EU MS might refrain from voting with ‘no’ in order to cover EU internal disagreement, and therefore abstain. Without qualitative background information it is impossible to tell the motifs behind an abstention. Nonetheless, in the case of the EU MS with their well-developed diplomatic corps an abstention will most certainly not mean that a country is undecided which position to take. Three-way splits are a significantly stronger indication of EC/EU internal incoherence. Through intense bargaining and consultations it is tried to avoid such splits and to convince countries to abstain to reach at least a two-way split. Opposed votes are the worst case scenario, as they show that EC/EU MS pursue entirely different interests and are so serious about their positions that they cannot give in and abstain. Only five opposed votes occurred between 1988 and 2005. However, this category has been included in this analysis, as opposed votes took place quite often in the beginning of the examination period. Furthermore it appeared to be interesting to allow a comparison with Ingeborg J. Thijn’s study of EC MS voting behaviour from 1973 to 1990 by including opposed votes. The results of the detailed analysis sketch quite an encouraging picture of EC/EU coherence. Not only did the percentage of unanimous votes increase. Positive is also that disagreement occurred mainly in the form of two-way splits: the proportion of two-way splits of all divergent votes is on average 66.2 per cent, while three-way splits add up to only 32.1 per cent and the number of opposed votes was negligibly low (1.7 %).9 In general, three-way splits have dropped significantly since 1990, much more dramatically than two-way splits. Perhaps the manifestation of the upcoming CFSP did cast a shadow already. Three-way splits remain on a low level ever since. The only exception marked the 50th

A Case Study of the Netherlands”, Legal Issues of European Integration, 1991, no. 2, pp. 101–27 and has been adapted in a slightly modified way by Johansson-Nogués, op. cit. in note 5. 9 See table A.2 in Annex 2 (pp. 318–319).

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UNGA session (1995/1996) with its very high proportion of three-way splits (51.1 %), which was even higher than the proportion of two-way splits. This was due to an exceptional vote on the individual parts of a resolution on decolonisation (see footnote number 4). Opposed votes did not play a significant role throughout the period examined. Three of the five opposed votes dealt with security and disarmament.10 In those three cases France and the UK voted against the rest of the EU. In the fourth case the UK voted alone against the fourteen EU partners in a resolution on decolonisation.11 Perhaps most interesting is the most recent opposed vote of 8 March 2005.12 Being the first UNGA resolution on human cloning, the EU was nearly evenly divided, with ten EU MS voting with ‘yes’ and fourteen with ‘no’,13 apparently linked to religious majorities in the respective countries. As the thematic complex of human cloning is likely to surface more often in the future, a new field of severe differences seems to have emerged. Nevertheless, the low share of opposed votes is remarkable, particularly in view of two rounds of enlargement. Ingeborg Thijn in her study showed that between 1974 and 1980 a couple of opposed votes occurred within the EC each session.14 Particularly the accession of Greece in 1981, but also those of Portugal and Spain in 1986 produced up to ten opposed votes each session. With the SEA and the TEU those times seem to be over, and the enlargement rounds of 1995 and 2004 seem to have been better prepared by allowing time to the accession candidates to bring their positions in line with EU majority before they became EU MS. However, EU voting coherence is much less impressive when contrasted with that of the members of other regional organisations and political

10 A/Res/50/70M on the observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control, 3 December 1995; A/Res/53/77Q , 6 December 1998 and A/Res/54/54L, 4 December 1999, both on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. 11 A/Res/58/110 on dissemination of information on decolonisation, 9 December 2003. 12 A/Res/59/280 on the United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning, 8 March 2005. 13 Notably, Greece was absent in the voting. Austria, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia voted in favour of the resolution. 14 Thijn, op. cit. in note 8, pp. 106–112.

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Figure 5.3: Voting Coherence of Regional and Political Groups and Organisations in the UNGA, 1988–2005—EC/EU Compared With Arab League, ASEAN, CARICOM and ECOWAS 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90

80 EU ASEAN Arab League

70

ECOWAS CARICOM

60

50

40 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; 60th UNGA Session: data until 21 December 2005; for other restrictions see footnotes 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20.

groups.15 Figure 5.3 shows a comparison of the voting coherence of EU MS16 with that of UN MS being members of ASEAN,17 the Arab

15 The eight groups contrasted with the EU have been selected by the following criteria: 1) they should have some basis of economic cooperation or even some forms of political collaboration and an institutional foundation to make it comparable to the Union; 2) they should offer a broad range of geographical diversity; 3) give insights into voting coherence depending on group size (i.e. smaller than EU (ASEAN, CIS and G8), similar to EU (Arab League; ECOWAS and CARICOM for the EU with 15 MS) and bigger than EU (OAU/AU and Council of Europe); 4) compare EU voting coherence with other Western organisations/groups (Council of Europe and G8) 5) allow an assessment and comparison of coherence with groups from the same cultural environment those smaller groups are again part of (EU and Council of Europe, ECOWAS and OAU/AU). 16 Without Greece in the 51st UNGA session (because of strike by Greek diplomats). 17 The ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) has ten member states. It was formed in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei became ASEAN member in 1984. Within the period under observation joined

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League,18 CARICOM19 and ECOWAS.20 The average voting coherence for the period 1988 to 2005 of those four groups has been remarkably higher than that of the EU (68.4 per cent):21 ASEAN’s average voting coherence reached 82.4 per cent, the Arab League’s respective figure was 81.1 per cent, for CARICOM it was 77.7 and ECOWAS’ members voted coherently in 78.8 per cent of all recorded votes. As those four organisations have a much lower level of integration and institutionalisation than the EU, this outcome is even more surprising. Their foreign policies are by no means as coordinated as within the CFSP regime. In addition, none of the groups have an institutionalised cooperation, coordination and representation at the UN in New York comparable to that of the EU. They even do not usually act as groups at the UN. A couple of reasons can be attributed to the high coherence rates of ASEAN, Arab League, CARICOM and ECOWAS. Due to small missions with limited personnel resources, the proportion of non-attendance in votes is relatively high among the UN MS from developing countries. Also because they do not have any national interests in many of the issues discussed, UN MS may decide to be absent in a voting. However, absenteeism influences voting coherence as it artificially increases the coherence ratio without underlying substance. Furthermore most UNGA resolutions are introduced by developing countries, which makes Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999). Those countries are considered in the analysis only from the date of their accession. 18 The Arab League (League of Arab States) has 22 member states, namely Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen (Arab Rep.). Palestine is no UN MS, therefore only 21 MS are included in the analysis. Comoros is the only member of the Arab League which joined the group after 1988 (on 20 November 1993). It is therefore considered in the analysis only after this date. 19 CARICOM has fifteen members: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. As Montserrat is not a UN MS, the analysis comprises only fourteen CARICOM MS. Suriname joined CARICOM in 1995, Haiti in 2002. Both countries are therefore considered in the analysis only after those dates. 20 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) has currently 15 member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo). Mauritania left ECOWAS in 2002 and has been considered in the analysis only up to this date. 21 See tables A.3 and A.4 in Annex 2 for a complete overview over the voting coherence of ASEAN, Arab League, CARICOM and ECOWAS in the individual UNGA sessions (pp. 320–323).

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it easy for a number of UN MS to vote in favour of them as a question of principle without going into the details of a subject matter, which boosts voting coherence.22 Perhaps Western countries take the UNGA as a forum slightly more seriously than some developing countries do, making them defend their interests also at the cost of splits with their partners, which developing countries would avoid. Nevertheless, it seems to be most likely that the national interests among the MS of those four groups are simply more congruent than those among EU MS. It is beyond the scope of this study to test this hypothesis, but the fact that at least ASEAN and CARICOM are formed out of states with relatively homogenous backgrounds supports this view. The interests within the Arab League and ECOWAS seem to be more diverse, albeit this does not seem to be true regarding the issue areas discussed within the UNGA. When compared to four other groups, namely the Organisation of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU),23 the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),24 the Council of Europe (CoE)25 and the

22 That this aspect has limitations shows the analysis of voting coherence within OAU/AU and CIS below. 23 The African Union (AU) was founded in July 2002 and succeeded the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It has 53 member states, comprising the entire African continent without Morocco. They are Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Tanzania, Uganda, Western Sahara, Zambia, Zimbabwe. As Western Sahara is not a UN MS, the analysis comprises only 52 OAU/AU MS. Namibia joined the OAU/AU in 1990, Eritrea in 1993 and South Africa in 1994. The three countries are therefore considered in the analysis only after those dates. 24 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has 11 member states, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Originally there had been twelve member states, but Turkmenistan withdrew in 2005 (associate member since then) and is therefore not included in the analysis of the 60th UNGA session. The agreement establishing the CIS has been signed on 8 December 1991. As there was only one recorded vote in the 46th UNGA session (on 3 August 1992 on A/Res/46/242) the analysis starts with the 47th UNGA session. 25 The Council of Europe (CoE) has 46 member states, which are Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia,

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Figure 5.4: Voting Coherence of Regional and Political Groups and Organisations in the UNGA, 1988–2005 (Recorded Votes)—EC/EU Compared With OAU/AU, CIS, CoE and G8 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 70 EU CoE G8 OAU/AU CIS

60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; 60th UNGA Session: data until 21 December 2005; for other restrictions see footnotes 16, 23, 24, 25, and 26.

Group of Eight (G8), EC/EU voting coherence appears in a more positive light.26 The MS of those four groups voted much less coherently in the UNGA than the EU, as Figure 5.4 illustrates.27 The respective

Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and Ukraine. The following countries joined the CoE later than 1988 (dates in brackets) and are therefore included in the analysis only after those dates: San Marino (16.11.1988), Finland (1989), Hungary (1990), Poland (1991), Bulgaria (1992), Czech Republic (1993), Estonia (1993), Lithuania (1993), Romania (1993), Slovakia (1993), Slovenia (1993), Andorra (1994), Albania (1995), Latvia (1995), Macedonia (1995), Moldova (1995), Ukraine (1995), Croatia (1996), Russia (1996), Georgia (1999), Armenia (2001), Azerbaijan (2001), Bosnia-Herzegovina (2002), Serbia and Montenegro (2003), Monaco (2004). 26 The eight member of the G8 are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and USA. Russia joined the group in 1998, which was called G7 until then. Russia is therefore included in the analysis only from the 53rd UNGA session. 27 See tables A.3 and A.4 in Annex 2 for a complete overview over the voting coherence of OAU/AU, CIS, CoE and G8 in the individual UNGA sessions (pp. 320–323).

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figures of the average voting coherence of those four groups in the period 1988 to 2005 are: OAU/AU 54.0 per cent; CIS 43.3 per cent; CoE 37.0 per cent and G8 22.5 per cent. It does not come unexpected that the voting coherence of the members of large Organisations such as the OAU/AU and the CoE is relatively low, as it is more difficult by pure mathematical logic, but also because of the increase of different national interests within the group, to act coherently with a large number of countries. Nevertheless it is notable that the voting coherence of the OAU/AU members has been higher than that of the EU until 1992, even though the size of its membership did not change. Obviously the development of the issues discussed and the increased self-confidence of some of the OAU/AU members made it more difficult to achieve coherent voting patterns. It is also interesting that the voting coherence of the mainly Western alliances EU, CoE and G8 dropped in a similar way since the year 2001. The new environment in world politics after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 seems to have influenced the definition of national interests in the Western hemisphere differently. In any case it is startling to see how divergent the interests really are within the CoE and the G8, in the latter mainly between the US and Russia. Its failure and internal disputes are clearly reflected in the voting coherence of the CIS. The observations made reject the assumption that smaller groups necessarily vote more coherently. It rather supports the supposition that it is the homogeneity of the national interests of an organisation’s member states that is decisive. Of course this also sheds a rather dull light on the EU. The high voting coherence of the members of the Arab League, ECOWAS and CARICOM, which are of similar size as the EU with 27 and fifteen members respectively, shows that European integration cannot necessarily balance out divergent national interests, which seem to be less openly existing within other entities. This fact is not counterbalanced by the result, that the EU is doing significantly better concerning voting coherence than the CoE, of which all EU MS are members of: ECOWAS has shown the same tendency towards the larger group it belongs to, the OAU/AU—but the coherence values of ECOWAS in contrast to the OAU/AU are significantly higher than those of the EU compared with the CoE. However, the findings of this comparison should not be over-interpreted, as it is a contrast among quite unequal entities. The EU is unique in its supranational character. But the point to be made is that despite

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all harmonisation efforts and a complex EU coordination process the results are not more positive than those of other much less elaborated organisations. This finding is alarming, not least because the CFSP has always been result-oriented and lived on visible progress. Or, as former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl put it: “Decisive is what comes out in the end”:28 to speak with a single voice on all UNGA resolutions should be the aim and the result—and not the perfection of the complicated, elaborated and institutionalised regime that produces a position. It would be very interesting to investigate the reasons of the high voting coherence within the UNGA of ASEAN, Arab League, CARICOM and ECOWAS. Perhaps the EU group could benefit from the experiences of other players at the UN. A well-founded comparison between the different groups and their mechanisms behind the scenes should be undertaken in further research. 5.2

Voting Coherence of the EC/EU MS by Issue Areas

In the following section the coherence of EU MS at the UN will be examined with regard to four specific issue areas: Middle East, human rights, international security (including disarmament) and decolonisation. Being the most controversial issues within the UN General Assembly, nearly all resolutions adopted via recorded votes fall into those four categories.29 On average only 5.6 per cent of all recorded votes were cast in other issue areas than these four (maximum of 11.8 per cent in 43rd UNGA session). Similar categories have been used in a range of other studies, facilitating a comparison with the findings of this examination.30

28 “Entscheidend ist, was hinten rauskommt.”—statement made in a press conference on 31 August 1984; cited in DER SPIEGEL, 3 September 1984. 29 See table A.5 in Annex 2 for the proportion of UNGA recorded votes within those four issue areas (pp. 324–325). 30 See for example Ernst Sucharipa, “Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) der Europäischen Union im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen”, in Verhandlungen für den Frieden/Negotiating for Peace. Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel (Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht 162), ed by Jochen Abr. Frowein/Klaus Scharioth/Ingo Winkelmann and Rüdiger Wolfrum (Heidelberg und Berlin: Springer, 2003), pp. 773–797; Kim, Soo Yeon and Bruce Russett (1996): The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly, in The Once and Future Security Council, ed. by Bruce Russett (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 29–57; Paul Luif, EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly, Occasional Papers of the European

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All 1403 resolutions voted upon between 1988 and 2005 have been categorised individually by looking at their content and the Main Committees introduced by. Of course, this way of proceeding leaves a certain margin of error, but is the only viable option, as there is no official classification of resolutions. With an average of 34.6 per cent, recorded votes on international security and disarmament mark the highest share of all resolutions voted upon. Resolutions on the whole range of questions related to conventional and nuclear armament, proliferation and disarmament are included in this category, but also other questions on security such as the violent disintegration of states31 or the cooperation between the UN and the OSCE.32 The second highest share of all resolutions voted upon occurred within the thematic complex Middle East (average of 28.6 per cent of all recorded votes). The largest fraction of Middle East resolutions deals with Palestine.33 Other actors involved, namely Israel,34 Lebanon35 and Syria36 are also the point of reference in resolutions within this category. On average 18.8 per cent of roll-call votes between 1988 and 2005 were on human rights questions. However, this percentage has increased since 2001, as with a more controversial atmosphere in international relations on this issue area also the number of recorded votes has increased. Under this category fall resolutions regarding human rights in specific countries, but also rather general human rights issues such as the connection between human rights and unilateral coercive measures,37

Union Institute for Security Studies, no. 49, December 2003, and Johansson-Nogués (op. cit. in note 5). 31 E.g. A/Res/51/55 of 3 December 1996 on “the maintenance of international security prevention of the violent disintegration of States”. 32 E.g. A/Res/55/179 of 4 December 2000 (annually recurring resolution). 33 E.g. A/Res/59/120 of 10 December 2004 on “Palestine refugees’ properties and their revenues” 34 E.g. A/Res/57/127 of 5 December 2002 on the “Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan”. 35 E.g. A/Res/54/267 of 6 June 2000 on the “financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon” (annually recurring resolution). 36 E.g. A/Res/51/28 of 4 December 1996 on “the Syrian Golan” (annually recurring resolution). 37 E.g. A/Res/52/120 of 6 December 1997 (annually recurring resolution).

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terrorism38 and globalisation,39 rights such as free travel,40 development41 or food,42 as well as institutional questions.43 Resolutions on democratisation, racism and apartheid are also included in this category. In view of the virtually completed transition of colonial territories into independence, the issue of decolonisation and self-determination does not occupy much space in the discussions at the UN any more. However, the relatively small number of recorded votes within this issue area (on average 12.4 per cent of all recorded votes) illustrates quite divergent views among UN MS. Besides recorded votes directly dealing with decolonisation and self-determination,44 also those on economic45 or political46 coercion against countries have been included in this group of resolutions. All other resolutions, which do not fall into the four categories identified, are included in the category ‘other issues’. A clear division can be made regarding the EC/EU voting coherence in the four issue areas (excluding ‘other issues’): while coherence has reached very high levels in recorded votes on Middle East and human rights questions since the early 1990s, international security and decolonisation are the categories with only low proportions of EC/EU coherence. To allow a better understanding of the development of

E.g. A/Res/54/164 of 6 December 1999 (annually recurring resolution). E.g. A/Res/55/102 of 3 December 2000 on “globalisation and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights” (annually recurring resolution). 40 E.g. A/Res/57/227 of 5 December 2002 on “respect for the right to universal freedom of travel and the vital importance of family reunification” (annually recurring resolution). 41 E.g. A/Res/53/155 of 4 December 1998 (annually recurring resolution). 42 E.g. A/Res/58/186 of 22 December 2003 on “right to food” (annually recurring resolution). 43 E.g. A/Res/56/146 of 5 December 2001 on the “equitable geographical distribution of the membership of the human rights treaty bodies”. 44 E.g. A/Res/46/72 of 4 December 1991 on “dissemination of information on decolonisation” (annually recurring resolution) and A/Res/54/91 of 2 December 1999 on “Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” (annually recurring resolution). 45 E.g. A/Res/48/16 of 4 November 1993 on the US embargo against Cuba (annually recurring resolution) and A/Res/60/111 of 8 December 2005 on “economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories” (annually recurring resolution). 46 E.g. A/Res/44/147 of 6 December 1989 on “Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes”. 38 39

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EC/EU coherence, the four issue areas will be analysed individually in the following sections. 5.2.1 Issue Areas With High Levels of EC/EU Coherence: Middle East and Human Rights Questions 5.2.1.1

Middle East

EC/EU voting coherence on Middle East questions is the highest of all four issue areas examined. On average, the EC/EU voted coherently in 87.7 per cent of all Middle East resolutions (see table 5.3, p. 236). Notably in six sessions EU MS voted coherently on all Middle East resolutions, namely in the 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th and 57th session. The Union’s members agreed as early as 1980 in their Venice Declaration to aim for a common policy on Middle East issues, i.e. to take a single position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And indeed, there has been a steady increase of EC/EU voting coherence in the UNGA on this thematic complex, as figure 5.5 (see page 237) illustrates. By 1995 a level of EU voting coherence of more than ninety per cent has been achieved. Between UNGA sessions 49 and 58 EU internal disagreement prevailed at most only on one Middle East resolution, namely in the 49th, 50th, 56th and 58th session. The visible deviations in the coherence of around five per cent in those sessions are therefore an effect of the low total number of votes on Middle East questions. Those four single occasions of EU dissent were not attributed to specific questions, as they dealt with different facets of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.47 Strangely enough, EU disagreement in two of those four cases occurred on resolutions on which the group had voted coherently for several years.48 Obviously topical developments in the region or at the UN influenced the voting behaviour in those cases, leading to different

47 In sessions 49 and 50 the single vote in which EU disagreement occurred on a resolution, which had been characterised by EU disunity already since a number of years, namely on “revenues derived from Palestine refugees properties” (A/Res/49/35F [6 December 1994]; A/Res/50/28F [4 December 1995]). Only from the 51st session onwards the EU MS managed to vote coherently on that resolution. 48 Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK caused a two-way split over a resolution on the “peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine” (A/Res/56/36 [3 December 2001]) and Germany and the UK voted differently from the other 13 EU MS in a resolution on “Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (A/Res/58/99 [9 December 2003]).

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Percentage of EC/EU disagreement on Middle East

Percentage of EC/EU coherence on Middle East

Votes on Middle East with EC/EU consensus

Votes on Middle East with EC/EU disagreement

UNGA Session

Total number of votes on Middle East questions

Table 5.3: EC/EU Voting Coherence on Middle East Questions, 1988–2005

43 (1988/1989)

28

17

11

60.7

39.3

44 (1989/1990)

26

17

9

65.4

34.6

45 (1990/1991)

25

16

9

64.0

36.0

46 (1991/1992)

27

19

8

70.4

29.6

47 (1992/1993)

25

20

5

80.0

20.0

48 (1993/1994)

20

16

4

80.0

20.0

49 (1994/1995)

19

18

1

94.7

5.3

50 (1995/1996)

20

19

1

95.0

5.0

51 (1996/1997)†

22

22

0

100.0

0.0

52 (1997/1998)

21

20

0

100.0

0.0

53 (1998/1999)

20

20

0

100.0

0.0

54 (1999/2000)

20

20

0

100.0

0.0

55 (2000/2001)

21

21

0

100.0

0.0

56 (2001/2002)

21

20

1

95.2

4.8

57 (2002/2003)

21

21

0

100.0

0.0

58 (2003/2004)

22

21

1

95.4

4.6

59 (2004/2005)

19

17

2

89.5

10.5

60 (2005/2006)*

16

14

2

87.5

12.5

21.8

18.8

3.1

87.7

12.6

AVERAGES

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; * until 21 December 2005; † without Greece.

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EC/EU voting coherence (in %)

Figure 5.5: EC/EU Voting Coherence on Middle East Questions, 1988–2005 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session EC/EU Voting coherence on Middle East questions

Trend

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; 51st UNGA Session: without Greece; 60th UNGA Session: data until 21 December 2005.

voting patterns. Nonetheless, EU MS managed to settle their differences the year after the dissent when the resolutions were tabled again. However, as the trend line suggests, the EU coherence on Middle East questions declines since 2004. The reason for that has been the latest round of enlargement: Cyprus and Malta caused a two-way split on two resolutions in the 59th and 60th session, while all other 25 EU MS voted coherently.49 Traditionally both countries pursue a pro-Palestinian line, bringing a new source of incoherence into the Union. It will be very interesting to see whether Cyprus and Malta will change their policies in the near future due to the pressure for harmonisation within the EU group. Probably EU coherence on Middle East questions will continue to be around ninety per cent until then. However, the Cypriot and Maltese deviation might have a positive effect on the other EU MS: as every single vote has a visible impact on EU voting

49 In both sessions on the same resolutions, namely the ones on the “Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People” (A/Res/59/28 [1 December 2004]; A/Res/60/36 [1 December 2005]) and on the “Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat” (A/Res/59/29 [1 December 2004]; A/Res/60/37 [1 December 2005]).

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coherence, the 25 other countries might feel pressurised to refrain from any dissenting votes, as this would mean that the overall EU coherence within this issue area would fall significantly below ninety per cent. 5.2.1.2

Human Rights

After the formal end of racial discrimination in South Africa in 1990, the number of votes on human rights resolutions in the UNGA dropped significantly from an average of over 20 to 11.3 between 1991 and 2000, as several resolutions traditionally dealt with apartheid. From 2001 onwards the number of votes increased again to an average of 18.2 between 2001 and 2005. Obviously developments in international politics in recent years influenced the discussions on human rights in the UNGA, particularly the Arab-Israeli stalemate, the rise of fundamentalism and terrorism, as well as divisions over US foreign policy. In general the atmosphere in this issue area has become more confrontational, which can be read from the adoption of ‘no-action motions’ on country resolutions, which experienced a new peak in recent sessions. The EC/EU managed to speak with a single voice on average in 77.3 per cent of all human rights resolutions between 1988 and 2005 (see table 5.4).50 This percentage was almost nine per cent higher than the overall average of EC/EU consensus (68.4 per cent). The signing and entry into force of the TEU seems to have had a tangible impact on voting on human rights questions. In UNGA session 47 (1992/1993) EC voting coherence jumped to 75 per cent from values in a range between 52 and 58 per cent between 1988 and 1992. From 1993 onwards EU coherence in this field did not fall below seventy per cent anymore (see also figure 5.6, p. 240). On the contrary: since the entry into force of the TEU voting coherence of EU MS reached an average of 84.4 per cent. Before 1993, EC MS disagreement sparked off mainly on resolutions on South Africa and related questions of apartheid.51 In the 47th session apartheid in connection with South Africa was on the agenda 50 On the issue of EU politics on human rights within the UNGA see Karen E. Smith, “EU Coordination on Human Rights within the UN”, CFSP Forum vol. 2 (1) (2004), pp. 16–18 and by the same author “The European Union, Human Rights and the United Nations”, in The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms, ed. by Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 154–174. 51 In the 43rd session, seven out of eleven EC split-votes occurred on apartheid/South Africa, in the 44th session seven out of nine, in the 45th session five out of seven, in the 46th session three out of five, and in the 47th session one out of three.

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Percentage of EC/EU disagreement on human rights

12

11

52.2

47.8

44 (1989/1990)

20

11

9

55.0

45.0

45 (1990/1991)

15

8

7

53.3

46.7

46 (1991/1992)

12

7

5

58.3

41.7

47 (1992/1993)

12

9

3

75.0

25.0

48 (1993/1994)

9

8

1

88.9

11.1

49 (1994/1995)

11

8

3

72.7

27.3

50 (1995/1996)

10

7

3

70.0

30.0

51 (1996/1997)†

11

10

1

90.9

9.1

52 (1997/1998)

14

12

2

85.7

14.3

53 (1998/1999)

8

7

1

87.5

12.5

54 (1999/2000)

13

11

2

84.6

15.4

55 (2000/2001)

13

12

1

92.3

7.7

56 (2001/2002)

16

14

2

87.5

12.5

57 (2002/2003)

18

15

3

83.3

16.7

58 (2003/2004)

20

14

6

70.0

30.0

59 (2004/2005)

19

17

2

89.5

10.5

60 (2005/2006)*

18

17

1

94.4

5.6

14.6

11.1

3.5

77.3

22.7

AVERAGES

Votes on human rights with EC/EU disagreement

23

Votes on human rights with EC/EU consensus

43 (1988/1989)

UNGA Session

Total number of votes on human rights questions

Percentage of EC/EU coherence on human rights

Table 5.4: EC/EU Voting Coherence on Human Rights Questions, 1988–2005

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; * until 21 December 2005; † without Greece.

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EC/EU voting coherence (in %)

Figure 5.6: EC/EU Voting Coherence on Human Rights Questions, 1988–2005 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session EC/EU Voting coherence on human rights questions

Trend

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; 51st UNGA Session: without Greece; 60th UNGA Session: data until 21 December 2005.

of the UNGA for the last time. One resolution on the world social situation, dealing with the deterioration of the economic and social situation of the world, in particular in the developing countries, caused an EC split from the 43rd to 46th session, before it was taken off the agenda. After the entry into force of the TEU various issues caused EU split-votes. Only a few resolutions caused dissent in more than one session. A resolution on the right to development was first tabled in the 52nd session.52 Ever since, a vote took place on this resolution each year. For no apparent reason the EU managed to vote coherently on this resolution in three sessions (53rd, 57th and 60th), but was divided in five other sessions in the period observed. Divisive proofed to be a resolution on the operation of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, which was introduced in the 57th session.53 In this session and in all following sessions, the EU was very much divided over this subject matter, mainly because of

52 53

A/Res/56/136 of 6 December 1997. A/Res/57/175 of 5 December 2002.

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criticism about the effectiveness of the Institute’s work.54 One resolution tabled in each session between 1988 and 2004 caused an EC/EU split in every single year. It dealt with the use of mercenaries as a means to violate human rights. Over this resolution the EU group was nearly evenly divided.55 In the 60th session this resolution was not tabled for a vote, for which reason this stumble bloc on the way for EU coherence disappeared. With six split-votes, the EU was unusually highly divided in the 58th UNGA session. The reason for that was a combination of the accumulation of three votes being controversial EU internally also in previous sessions,56 newly introduced resolutions57 and changed voting behaviour on one resolution with traditional EU unity.58 However, the fact that such a sudden decrease of EU voting coherence is possible from one session to another, stresses the argument that the national interests of the EU MS are the dominant impulse in their decision-taking, and that the CFSP regime in place is by no means strong enough to prevent such eruptions from happening. As there is no single key human rights question which seems to divide the EU, it is possible that full coherence can be achieved in this thematic complex, depending on the issues discussed within the UNGA. But as the 58th session has shown, also the complete opposite is possible. None of the EU countries could be identified as a major dissenter. Rather a couple of countries, such as Spain, Greece and Ireland, voted differently from the EU majority in various instances. Enlargement in 2004 did not have an affect on EU voting coherence in human rights questions, as the ten new MS are in line with the EU group and do not seem to bring in new contentious interests.

Information taken from the discussions followed by the author in EU coordination. In the EU group with 15 MS (between 1995 and 2004), Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK traditionally voted against the resolution, while the other EU MS abstained. 56 A/Res/58/162 on the “use of mercenaries as a means to violate human rights”, A/Res/58/172 on the “right to development” and A/Res/58/244 on the “operation of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women” (all three resolutions of 22 December 2003) 57 A/Res/58/173 on “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”; A/Res/58/274 on the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict” (both of 22 December 2003). Those resolutions were not tabled again in the following sessions. 58 Spain caused a split-vote on a resolution on “human rights and terrorism” (A/ Res/58/174) of 22 December 2003. 54

55

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5.2.2 Issue Areas With Low Levels of EC/EU Coherence: Security and Decolonisation Questions The two remaining issue areas, security and decolonisation, are characterised by a quite high ratio of divergence in EC/EU voting patterns and by less coherence than in the previous two fields examined. The low coherence in both issue areas is responsible for lowering the overall percentage of EU coherence to an average of around 78.0 per cent. Since the absolute number of resolutions on disarmament and security is much higher than those on decolonisation, the former is the core reason why the overall EU coherence in the UNGA experiences a stalemate. 5.2.2.1

Disarmament and International Security

On disarmament and international security, two pairs of countries form opposite poles within the Union: France and the UK as nuclear-weapons states have similar interests to defend, aiming at maintaining their nuclear deterrent and their perceived prominent position in the world. The opposites are Sweden and Ireland as the only EU countries being members of the pacifist alliance called “New Agenda Coalition”. Both of them are neutral states. All other EU countries are located between those poles, even though other specificities, such as NATO membership, influence the countries’ voting behaviour.59 That the positions of both groups of EU countries are not compatible in many cases, show the voting statistics (see table 5.5 and figure 5.7, p. 244). The EC/EU overall voting coherence on security issues surpassed the mark of fifty per cent in the 47th session and was higher than sixty per cent in the following sessions, with the exception of the 49th and 58th session. However, the fact that the maximum coherence level ever reached on disarmament and security was 84.0 per cent (53rd session), and that the average voting coherence of the EC/EU between 1988 and 2005 was 60.4 per cent illustrates how divergent views are within the EU group. Also in the sessions following the entry into force of the TEU the average EU coherence was only 67.6 per cent. The years directly following the creation of the CFSP show tangible progress: between 1992 and 1999 EU coherence increased gradually but steadily from 52.4 to 84.0 per cent. Surprisingly, the inclusion of the ‘neutrals’

59 See the chapter on the First UNGA Main Committee on Disarmament and International Security for a full discussion of the EU perspective on disarmament and international security and EU MS reasoning (pp. 146 ff.).

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Percentage of EC/EU disagreement on disarmament

21

32

39.6

60.4

44 (1989/1990)

45

18

27

40.0

60.0

45 (1990/1991)

28

8

20

28.6

71.4

46 (1991/1992)

21

10

11

47.6

52.4

47 (1992/1993)

21

11

10

52.4

47.6

48 (1993/1994)

22

14

8

63.6

36.4

49 (1994/1995)

26

15

11

57.7

42.3

50 (1995/1996)

25

16

9

64.0

36.0

51 (1996/1997)†

30

22

8

73.3

26.7

52 (1997/1998)

23

18

5

78.3

21.7

53 (1998/1999)

25

21

4

84.0

16.0

54 (1999/2000)

26

18

8

69.2

30.8

55 (2000/2001)

22

15

7

68.2

31.8

56 (2001/2002)

22

15

7

68.2

31.8

57 (2002/2003)

25

16

9

64.0

36.0

58 (2003/2004)

23

13

10

56.5

43.5

59 (2004/2005)

23

14

9

60.9

39.1

60 (2005/2006)*

28

20

8

71.4

28.6

27.1

15.8

11.3

60.4

39.6

AVERAGES

Votes on disarmament with EC/EU disagreement

53

Votes on disarmament with EC/EU consensus

43 (1988/1989)

UNGA Session

Total number of votes on disarmament questions

Percentage of EC/EU coherence on disarmament

Table 5.5: Details EC/EU Voting Coherence on Disarmament and International Security, 1988–2005

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; * until 21 December 2005; † without Greece.

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EC/EU voting coherence (in %)

Figure 5.7: EC/EU Voting Coherence on Disarmament and Security, 1988–2005 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session EC/EU Voting coherence in disarmament and security

Trend

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; 51st UNGA Session: without Greece; 60th UNGA Session: data until 21 December 2005.

Austria and Sweden—but also the traditionally pacifist Finland—into the Union in 1995 did not have a negative impact on EU coherence. However, in the years between 1999 and 2005 EU coherence dropped visibly, reaching a low point of 56.5 per cent in the 58th session. This development seems to be linked to the creation of the “New Agenda Coalition” (NAC) in 1998. Since then the positions on disarmament and security within the wider UN membership have become more confrontational and perhaps even more radical. Feeling growing support for their interests, it is not surprising that the two EU MS being part of the NAC, Ireland and Sweden, began to pursue their interests with more self-confidence and voted more often against the nuclear powers and the EU majority. And even though the trend line suggests a slight increase in EU coherence in recent years, it is not likely that positions in this field will converge within the EU group, as interests are too different between the major opponents. Certainly, this situation is mainly due to the startling inflexibility of France and even more so the UK. Both countries continue to defend their nuclear interests even at the price of total isolation within the EU group. Having said all that, it comes as no surprise that the EU votes coherently on questions concerning classical security, i.e. for instance

voting coherence of the eu as a group

245

on resolutions dealing with the maintenance of international security60 or the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security.61 Also conventional arms transfer, regulation and control62 and other issues such as land mines,63 the authority of the 1927 Geneva Protocol64 or arms race in outer space65 provoke no disunity. The dissent arises mainly around the development and potential use of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. For instance in the 57th and 59th session six and five out of nine EU split-votes on disarmament and international security respectively fell into this category. But it is not surprising that resolutions asking for a “Nuclear-weapon-free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas”,66 the “Reduction of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons”67 or resolutions demanding a “Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”68 cause frictions within the EU group whenever they are re-tabled. The only ascertainable flexibility by France and the UK in the field of nuclear weapons was shown by their acceptance of a comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, allowing them to support the respective resolutions from 1996.69 EU split-votes on non-nuclear issues occur regularly on resolutions concerning the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,70 the relationship between disarmament and development,71 the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and

E.g. A/Res/51/55 of 3 December 1996. E.g. A/Res/48/83 of 5 December 1993 on the “Review of the Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security”. 62 E.g. A/Res/55/33P of 3 November 2000 on the “Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels” or A/Res/57/66 of 7 November 2002 on “national legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology” or A/Res/58/54 of 8 December 2003 on “transparency in armaments” 63 E.g. A/Res/53/77N of 6 December 1998 on the “implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction”. 64 E.g. A/Res/59/70 of 3 December 2004 on “measures to uphold the authority of the 1927 Geneva Protocol”. 65 E.g. A/Res/49/74 of 5 December 1994 on the “prevention of an arms race in outer space”. 66 E.g. A/Res/57/73 of 7 November 2002. 67 E.g. A/Res/58/50 of 8 December 2003. 68 E.g. A/Res/55/33R of 3 November 2000. 69 A/Res/50/245 of 3 September 1996. 70 E.g. A/Res/56/16 of 6 November 2001. 71 France traditionally votes differently than the other 14/26 EU MS on that resolution, e.g. A/Res/60/61 of 8 December 2005. 60 61

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non-proliferation72 and the observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control.73 When looking at the percentage of individual EU MS voting with EU majority (always voting with EC/EU majority = 100 percent; never voting with EC/EU majority = 0 percent) on disarmament and security issues, the expected candidates emerge for the period 1988 to 2005: France (78.8 per cent), the UK (76.6 per cent), Ireland (81.3 per cent) and Sweden (81.6 per cent) voted most often different from the EU majority.74 Only Cyprus (68.4 per cent) had a lower percentage of coherence, but adapted very quickly during the last ten years. After becoming an EU MS in 2004, its coherence with EU majority amounted to 93.9 per cent. The three EU MS who voted most coherently with the EC/EU majority between 1988 and 2005 were Belgium (99.2 per cent), the Netherlands (98.5 per cent) and Luxembourg (98.4 per cent)—obviously countries not having strong—or at least divisive—national interests in the field of disarmament and international security.75 At the moment it does not seem to be likely that convergence of EU MS policies in this issue area is to be expected. 5.2.2.2

Decolonisation and Self-determination

Even worse than in the field of disarmament and security is the coherence ratio of the EU countries in the field of decolonisation and selfdetermination (see table 5.6). On average the EC/EU was able to form a common position leading to a unified voting behaviour only in 32.8 per cent of all votes in this issue area between 1988 and 2005. The absolute low-point in the period under examination marked the 50th session with 13.6 per cent voting coherence, while the highest percentage was reached in the 51st session with 57.1 per cent. Certainly the low number of resolutions and votes in this field are in part responsible for these figures. And the 50th session marked a very exceptional case by voting on the different parts of one resoluE.g. A/Res/57/63 of 7 November 2002. E.g. A/Res/50/70M of 3 December 1995. 74 See table A.6 in Annex 2 (pp. 326–327). For the years when Sweden was not an EU MS, its voting behaviour towards the EC/EU majority was still calculated. 75 Belgium and the Netherlands are NATO members. However, they rather pursue a distinct multilateral approach on disarmament and security. 72 73

voting coherence of the eu as a group

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Percentage of EC/EU disagreement on decolonisation

43 (1988/1989)

16

3

13

18.8

81.2

44 (1989/1990)

13

2

11

15.4

84.6

45 (1990/1991)

11

2

9

18.2

81.8

46 (1991/1992)

8

2

6

25.0

75.0

47 (1992/1993)

9

2

7

22.2

77.8

48 (1993/1994)

10

2

8

20.0

80.0

49 (1994/1995)

9

3

6

33.3

66.7

50 (1995/1996)

22

3

19

13.6

86.4

51 (1996/1997)†

7

4

3

57.1

42.9

52 (1997/1998)

8

4

4

50.0

50.0

53 (1998/1999)

7

3

4

42.9

57.1

54 (1999/2000)

8

3

5

37.5

62.5

55 (2000/2001)

8

3

5

37.5

62.5

56 (2001/2002)

7

3

4

42.9

57.1

57 (2002/2003)

7

3

4

42.9

57.1

58 (2003/2004)

9

3

6

33.3

66.7

59 (2004/2005)

7

3

4

42.9

57.1

60 (2005/2006)*

8

3

5

37.5

62.5

9.7

2.8

6.8

32.8

67.2

UNGA Session

AVERAGES

Votes on decolonisation with EC/EU disagreement

Percentage of EC/EU coherence on decolonisation

Votes on decolonisation with EC/EU consensus

Total number of votes on decolonisation questions

Table 5.6: Details EC/EU Voting Coherence on Decolonisation and Self-determination, 1988–2005

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; * until 21 December 2005; † without Greece.

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tion, which considers internal developments and responsibilities of the administering powers of a series of dependent territories (see footnote number 4).76 This produced a high number of votes in that session (22 votes), but did not produce new substance for this examination or illustrated a deep-rooted quarrel within the EU. Four resolutions are put for a vote each session and every year the EU votes incoherently on them:77 on the “Information From Non-SelfGoverning Territories”,78 “Economic and Other Activities Which Affect the Interests of the Peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories”,79 on “Dissemination of Information on Decolonisation”80 and on the “Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”.81 And traditionally most often only France and the UK vote not in favour of these resolutions.82 EC/EU internal disagreement prevailed in a number of sessions also on a resolution on “Unilateral Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries”.83 Besides those regular occurrences, EU-splits on resolutions, which were tabled, took place only once or only in a few sessions.84 As figure 5.8 suggests, EU voting coherence on decolonisation and self-determination has reached a plateau of around forty per cent since 1998. Even though this level is higher than in the days before CFSP, it can hardly be satisfying for the Union with its ambition to speak with a single voice. However, as policies and politics on colonial issues do not experience any development since many years, seeing that this issue area 76 Namely American Samoa, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Guam, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Saint Helena, Tokelau and US Virgin Islands (A/Res/50/38A, A/Res/50/38B-I, A/Res/50/38B-II, A/Res/50/38B-III, A/Res/50/ 38B-IV, A/Res/50/38B-V, A/Res/50/38B-VI, A/Res/50/38B-VII, A/Res/50/38BVIII, A/Res/50/38B-IX, A/Res/50/38B-X, A/Res/50/38B-XI, A/Res/50/38B-XII of 4 December 1995). 77 Other exceptions occurred only in sessions in the beginning of the 1990s. 78 E.g. A/Res/59/127 of 10 December 2004. 79 E.g. A/Res/57/132 of 5 December 2002. 80 E.g. A/Res/49/90 of 6 December 1994. 81 E.g. A/Res/50/39 of 4 December 1995. 82 Belgium and Germany joined France and the UK in recent sessions by abstaining on the resolution on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In previous sessions also other EU countries joined the group. 83 E.g. A/Res/58/198 of 22 December 2003. 84 E.g. A/Res/55/146 of 7 December 2000 on the “2nd International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism” and A/Res/58/161 of 22 December 2003 on the “universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination”.

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EC/EU voting coherence (in %)

Figure 5.8: EC/EU Voting Coherence on Decolonisation and Self-determination, 1988–2005 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session EC/EU Voting coherence on decolonisation and self-determination

Trend

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; 51st UNGA Session: without Greece; 60th UNGA Session: data until 21 December 2005.

is trapped in a different political era, it is not likely that this handicap can be eliminated in the near future. It can only be hoped for that the aim to reach a common EU position will exert enough pressure on the dissenters to harmonise their positions with the EU majority. As indicated already above, France and the UK as the EU MS with the richest colonial past, vote most often different from the EU majority. Between 1988 and 2005, France voted on average only in 58.1 per cent of all decolonisation votes with the EC/EU majority, the UK even only in 49.5 per cent of the votes.85 It is interesting however, that Belgium, Portugal, Spain and other EU countries with a colonial past took a quite different line in their voting behaviour. On the contrary: Italy was the EU MS voting most often with the majority (96.3 per cent), followed by Luxembourg (93.3 per cent) and the Netherlands (90.4 per cent). Among the new EU MS and candidate countries, Slovenia (96.2 per cent) and Croatia (90.7 per cent) reached high percentages.

85

See table A.6 in Annex 2 (pp. 326–327).

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The voting coherence of issues falling into the fifth category called ‘Other Issues’ is not going to be analysed here for two reasons. First, because the number of split votes in each session is very low throughout the period examined, particularly the years after 1992. Second, because the issues causing EC/EU splits have been quite different, for which reason no general tendency can be derived and no comparisons between the voting behaviour in the different sessions could be undertaken. On the whole, EC/EU coherence on issues other than the four main categories looked at above has been quite high with 75.9 per cent (see table 5.7). But because of the low total number of votes in that category those observations are of limited value. Figure 5.9 (see page 252) brings together the coherence ratios of all four issue areas observed in this section in one table to allow a better comparison between the four. Contrasted with the overall EU coherence it becomes clear that the voting coherence on Middle East and human rights questions has always been higher than the EU average coherence. On security and disarmament, voting coherence surpassed the overall EU voting coherence only in the 50th session, while voting on decolonisation and self-determination produces regularly extremely low coherence ratios. 5.3

Conclusions: EU Voting Coherence as a Group

All indications suggest that the current plateau of EU voting coherence will remain stable in the foreseeable future. In the issue areas in which coherence is low, it is not likely that the individual policies of the EU MS are going to change quickly. Probably it will only be possible in the areas with already high coherence, namely Middle East and human rights, to come closer to full consensus within the EU group. There is room for improvement in the practicalities of the EU coordination process, but those changes would most likely not lead to a visible rise of voting coherence. In the long run only a further convergence of EU MS policies can cause further increase in cohesiveness. Also progress in the development of the CFSP regime and a deepening of the EU in general can diminish the dissonances in the EU’s representation at the UN. Some of the proposals included in the EU Reform Treaty would create institutional changes with direct implications also for the coordination, cooperation and representation of the EU at the UN. An example for such a change is the end of the rotating Presidency

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Votes on other questions with EC/EU consensus

Votes on other questions with EC/EU disagreement

Percentage of EC/EU coherence on other questions

Percentage of EC/EU disagreement on other questions

Total number of votes on other questions

Table 5.7: Details EC/EU Voting Coherence on Other Questions, 1988–2005

43 (1988/1989)

16

9

7

56.3

43.7

44 (1989/1990)

12

7

5

58.3

41.7

45 (1990/1991)

7

5

2

71.4

28.6

46 (1991/1992)

7

3

4

42.9

57.1

47 (1992/1993)

8

5

3

62.5

37.5

48 (1993/1994)

4

2

2

50.0

50.0

49 (1994/1995)

3

3

0

100.0

0.0

50 (1995/1996)

4

3

1

75.0

25.0

51 (1996/1997)†

6

3

3

50.0

50.0

52 (1997/1998)

3

2

1

66.7

33.3

53 (1998/1999)

1

1

0

100.0

0.0

54 (1999/2000)

1

1

0

100.0

0.0

55 (2000/2001)

3

3

0

100.0

0.0

56 (2001/2002)

1

1

0

100.0

0.0

57 (2002/2003)

2

2

0

100.0

0.0

58 (2003/2004)

2

2

0

100.0

0.0

59 (2004/2005)

3

2

1

66.7

33.3

60 (2005/2006)*

3

2

1

66.7

33.3

4.8

3.1

1.7

75.9

24.1

UNGA Session

AVERAGES

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; * until 21 December 2005; † without Greece.

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Figure 5.9: EC/EU Voting by Issue Areas, 1988–2005—Overview and Comparison 100

Voting coherence (in%)

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Overall EU Coherence Coherence Security/Disarmament Coherence Human Rights

Coherence Middle East Coherence Decolonisation/ Self-determination

Source: See figure 5.1, p. 220; 51st UNGA Session: without Greece; 60th UNGA Session: data until 21 December 2005.

responsible for EU representation in New York. When the EU External Action Service, consisting of civil servants from EU institutions and EU MS, would run the daily business at UN headquarters, coherence would be likely to increase. The proposal of an EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy would sharpen the EU’s outward appearance at the UN and present a clear and more powerful contact person to third parties and allow the EU to play a more visible role in the organisation. A common EU ‘foreign minister’ being active on UN matters would also limit the room for solo efforts by EU MS and therefore increase the coherence among them. Also the fact that the EU Reform Treaty gives legal personality to the EU would alter the outward appearance of the Union and could allow for a better conformity with the real contributions and the real possibilities of the EU to act within the UN framework. The European Commission analysed aptly the negative effects of incoherent EU voting patterns: “While in the past the practical implica-

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tions of such split-votes have generally been marginal, their impact on the EU’s credibility is disproportionate—particularly in cases where there are established CFSP Common Positions on the issues in question”.86 In other words: even a few EU split-votes are noticed very attentively by the international community and interpreted as an indication how little the Union can be relied on as a single actor. As the implications of UNGA resolutions are generally very limited, it is the political credibility that is so important in the ‘world parliament’ and the message transported to governments around the world through the behaviour in this forum. And this credibility of the EU as an international actor is endangered by diverging national interests.

86 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism, 10 September 2003, COM(2003) 526 final, p. 4.

CHAPTER SIX

INSIDE EUROPE: VOTING COHERENCE WITHIN THE EU AND WITH OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES The previous chapter looked at the EU voting coherence in the UNGA from a group-perspective by examining the Union as a whole. This chapter will now take an EU internal angle. To this end different EU subgroups are identified and analysed with a view to their voting behaviour with EC/EU majority, the voting coherence among EU MS and the subgroup-internal voting coherence on specific issue areas. The subgroups to be investigated are: • EU-25 – Core Europe (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) – Main dissenters – Big 5 (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK) – New EU MS (divided into Eastern European countries, Cyprus and Malta) • EU-27 (EU-25 and Bulgaria and Romania) • EU-33 (EU-27 and the candidate and potential candidate countries) 6.1

The EU-25

In January 1995 the EU was enlarged from twelve to fifteen members. On 1 May 2004 with ten simultaneous accessions the largest round of EU enlargement ever took place. Figure 6.1 (see next page) shows the voting coherence of the fifteen EU MS that formed the Union from 1995 to 2004, compared with all EC/EU MS. In the years 1988 to 1995 the voting behaviour of the twelve EC countries is remarkably similar to the voting patterns of the EU-15, i.e. the EC-12 plus Austria, Finland and Sweden. Apparently, the countries joining the Union in 1995 had very similar national interests like the EC MS, at least of some of them. And if the EU enlargement in 2004 would not have taken place, the voting coherence of the EU group would only have been marginally higher, as figure 6.1 shows for the years 2004 and 2005.

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Figure 6.1: Voting Coherence All EC/EU MS and EU-15, 1988–2005

Voting coherence (in %)

90

80

70 all EC/EU MS EU-15 60

50

40

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

In both last rounds of enlargement no substantial new political differences and problems were brought into the Union. Policy positions of the accession states had converged already with the positions inherited in the EC and later the EU before the ten countries joined the Union. The process of convergence can be seen in figure 6.2, particularly—as the related section will show below—in the cases of Cyprus and Malta. The voting coherence of all EC/EU MS and the EU-25 developed very much in parallel without coming closer to one another for many years. Only from the year 2000, when the prospect for the ten new members to join the Union became increasingly more concrete, also the voting coherence levels began to converge. With the gradual implementation of the Union’s acquis communautaire in the individual accession countries obviously also their policy positions at the UN were more and more ‘Europeanised’ and adjusted to the EU mainstream. 6.1.1

Core Europe

Five EU MS form a nucleus of high coherence values: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Being the haven of

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Figure 6.2: Voting Coherence All EC/EU MS and EU-25, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 70 60 all EC/EU MS EU-25

50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

continuity and representing mainstream EU policies, they are called ‘Core Europe’ in this analysis.1 It is probably no coincidence that these EU countries are five of the six founding members of the European Communities. On average they voted coherently with each other in 93.4 per cent of all recorded votes since the inception of the CFSP (1993–2005). This means that their voting behaviour differed only in one to seven votes each session, with the exception of the already mentioned special case of the 50th session.2 Hence, as figure 6.3 (see next page) 1 The term core countries has been used by Stelios Stavridis and Duncan Pruett, European Political Cooperation at the United Nations: A Critical Assessment 1970–1992 (Occasional Paper No 20, University of Reading Department of Politics, June 1996), p. 9, who again refer to Elfriede Regelsberger. In their analysis of EPC Denmark was part of the core European group, while Germany was left out. In this study however, Denmark has lower coherence values with the EC/EU majority than Germany, for which reason it is left out, whereas Germany is included within ‘Core Europe’. 2 The low coherence in the 50th UNGA session (1995/1996) cannot be attributed to the previous enlargement. It was due to a split within the Union over one resolution on decolonisation, on which was voted on each individual part (A/Res/50/38A, A/Res/50/38B-I, A/Res/50/38B-II, A/Res/50/38B-III, A/Res/50/38B-IV, A/

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Figure 6.3: Voting Coherence ‘Core Europe’, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90

80 all EC/EU MS ‘“Core Europe’ + France” ‘Core Europe’

70

60

50

40

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

shows, the voting coherence of the ‘Core Europeans’ was significantly higher than that of all the EC/EU MS taken together. In the years 1996 to 2005 the coherence level within the group was always higher than ninety per cent. Included in figure 6.3 is also the graph of the six founding members of the European Communities, i.e. the ‘Core Europeans’ and France. Even though the voting coherence values of the six countries combined are higher than those of all EC/EU MS (mainly because Greece negatively influenced EC/EU overall coherence in the early years of the analysis), France clearly lowers the coherence level. It cannot be counted to ‘Core Europe’ due to its independent policies in decolonisation and security questions.

Res/50/38B-V, A/Res/50/38B-VI, A/Res/50/38B-VII, A/Res/50/38B-VIII, A/ Res/50/38B-IX, A/Res/50/38B-X, A/Res/50/38B-XI, A/Res/50/38B-XII), causing an large number of three-way-splits within the Union. This vote was a unusual specific event. Belgium, France, Greece and the UK voted against the EU majority, but not the three new EU MS.

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Figure 6.4: Luxembourgian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 Voting with EC/EU majority Involved in Two-way Split Involved in Three-waySplit Involved in Opposed Vote

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

It comes as no surprise that the ‘Core Europe’-countries have the highest coherence ratios with EC/EU majority of all the 33 countries examined:3 Luxembourg voted in 98.3 per cent of all votes that occurred between 1988 and 2005 with EC/EU majority—an extremely high value (see figure 6.4).4 In five sessions Luxembourg voted in all resolutions with EU majority.5 On the spots two to five are Italy (97.8 %), the Netherlands (97.4 %), Belgium (97.2 %) and Germany (96.2 %) (see figure 6.5, p. 260). The ‘Core Europeans’ also vote extremely coherently among each other. In facto, the three states out of all 33 countries Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands voted with most coherently are coming from the ‘Core Europe’-group (see the example of Belgium

3 EU-25, Bulgaria, Romania and the candidate (Croatia, FYROM and Turkey) and potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro). 4 See table A.6 in Annex 2 (pp. 326–327) for the values of all the 33 countries examined. 5 46th, 47th, 48th, 58th and 60th UNGA sessions.

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Figure 6.5: German Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 Voting with EC/EU majority Involved in Two-way Split Involved in Three-waySplit Involved in Opposed Vote

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

in figure 6.6).6 Generally the same is also true concerning Italy (figure 6.7). However, Italy’s overall voting coherence was the highest with Slovakia and the Czech Republic, besides Luxembourg.7 But the other ‘Core Europeans’ follow on the next positions. Very congruent are the ‘Core Europeans’ regarding the EU-25 MS they have least coherently voted with from 1988 to 2005: Cyprus, Malta and the UK come up for all of them (see also the examples of figures 6.6 and 6.7). It could be the case that the decades of close cooperation have created a culture among the Core Europeans that makes them more eager to reach and support EU common positions. But perhaps it is also the case that their own national interests are located closely to the

6 Belgium voted most coherently with Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands; Germany with Belgium Luxembourg and the Netherlands; Luxembourg with Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands; and Luxembourg with Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. 7 In the period 1993–2005.

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Figure 6.6: Belgian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 Luxembourg Netherlands Germany Cyprus UK Malta

70 60 50 40 30

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

Figure 6.7: Italian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 Slovakia Luxembourg Czech Republic Cyprus UK Malta

70 60 50 40 30

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

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Figure 6.8: Cyprian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 100 90

Voting coherence (in %)

80

Voting with EC/EU majority Involved in Two-way Split Involved in Three-waySplit Involved in Opposed Vote

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

EU mainstream or the lowest common denominator, making it easy for them to vote with the majority. Conceivably those five countries are also so influential that the final EU common positions are actually their own positions. Thus there is no need for them to vote against the EU majority. Nevertheless, those findings support the notion that there is a core of EU mainstream that can serve as a model the other EU MS have to adjust to, in order to reach a high level of overall EU voting coherence. 6.1.2

The Main Dissenters

On the other end of the spectrum, i.e. the EU-27 countries with the lowest coherence values with the EC/EU majority in the years 1988 to 2005, are two new MS, Cyprus and Malta. Their overall voting coherence with EC/EU majority amounts to 70.3 per cent (Cyprus) and 79.2 per cent (Malta) (see figures 6.8 and 6.9). However, these results are qualified when only the years 2000 to 2005 are looked at: in those six UNGA sessions Cyprus voted with the EU majority in

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Figure 6.9: Maltese Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 100 90

Voting coherence (in %)

80

Voting with EC/EU majority Involved in Two-way Split Involved in Three-waySplit Involved in Opposed Vote

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

87.1 % of the cases, Malta in 88.6 %. Their policy convergence is a clear success story, particularly as it showed results already before the actual accession took place. That spared the Union the painful process of policy harmonisation following an accession. This was experienced with Greece when the EC had to live with decreased coherence values for many years after 1981. The policy convergence of Cyprus and Malta might be an indicator how successful the instrument of annual Progress Reports of the European Commission on the CFSP during the accession course has been in bringing their national positions in line with the EU. Figure 6.10 (see next page) illustrates that Cyprus has arrived in the EU also by developing high coherence values with individual EU MS. Its overall coherence among the EU-25 is the highest with Malta, Slovakia and Czech Republic (1988–2005). But the coherence ratios with the EU-25 MS it has the lowest overall voting coherence with, namely the UK, France and Germany, have developed steadily in recent years, building up high coherence also with ‘Core Europeans’. Notably,

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Figure 6.10: Cyprian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 Malta Slovakia Czech Rep. UK France Germany

70 60 50 40 30 20

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

Cyprian voting coherence with Greece has never been especially high despite the close links the island has to its Hellenic ally. How closely Cyprus is linked to South-Eastern Europe is also highlighted by the fact that the three countries it has the highest overall coherence values with are Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia (EU-33). Malta has a traditionally stronger orientation towards the ‘old’ EU MS than Cyprus. It developed high coherence values with the ‘neutrals’: Austria and Ireland are the two countries Malta most coherently voted with, besides Slovenia (see figure 6.11). The voting coherence with those countries has not fallen below seventy per cent in the period examined. This continuity in voting coherence cannot be observed in the Cyprian case. Nevertheless, there is congruency between Malta and Cyprus concerning the EU-25 countries Malta least often votes with, as also the UK, France and Germany come up. But despite all the positive developments with Cyprus and Malta it should not be forgotten that the two countries were responsible for a

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Figure 6.11: Maltese Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 Ireland Austria Slovenia UK France Germany

70 60 50 40 30 20 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

decrease in EU coherence on Middle East questions since 2004. The two countries caused a two-way split on two resolutions in the 59th and 60th sessions, while all other 23 EU MS voted coherently.8 It remains to be seen whether a convergence of policies with EU majority will be achievable for Cyprus and Malta also regarding Middle East questions, a thematic complex of high political importance to them. More important for this analysis than Cyprus and Malta are certainly the two countries that occupy the third and fourth rank among the EU-25 countries with the lowest voting coherence with the EC/EU majority from 1988 to 2005 (or the first and second position among the EU-15): the UK (83.1 %) and France (85.7 %). More important,

8 In both sessions on the same resolutions, namely the ones on the “Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People” (A/Res/59/28 [1 December 2004]; A/Res/60/36 [1 December 2005]) and on the “Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat” (A/Res/59/29 [1 December 2004]; A/Res/60/37 [1 December 2005]).

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Figure 6.12: British Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 Voting with EC/EU majority Involved in Two-way Split Involved in Three-waySplit Involved in Opposed Vote

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

as France and the UK are, together with Germany, two of the socalled ‘Big 3’ within the EU, i.e. the most important and influential players in the Union. More important also, as they are even the most important EU MS at the UN, seeing that they hold permanent seats in the UNSC. But the most crucial factor is that convergence with EU majority positions, as observed in the cases of Cyprus and Malta, cannot be seen when looking at France and the UK: even though they are members of the EC/EU already since several decades, they still have not sufficiently adjusted their policies in accordance with common EU positions. While the most notorious dissenters Cyprus and Malta brought their policies in harmony with EU mainstream over the years, no such convergence of policies is noticeable with regard to the UK and France (see figures 6.12 and 6.13). The British voting coherence with EU majority since 1996 (51st UNGA session) has been constantly above 80 per cent. But over the last ten years the overall coherence dropped, reaching values in the low 80s. This is problematic, as convergence between the EU mainstream and the UK national policies is becoming rather less than more likely.

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Figure 6.13: French Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80

Voting with EC/EU majority Involved in Two-way Split Involved in Three-waySplit Involved in Opposed Vote

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

This is supported by the fact that the UK in recent years was involved increasingly often in three-way splits. The French curve looks similar to the British one, even though there is no such steady decline in voting coherence discernible. In addition to that the situation is slightly more positive in the French case as its involvement in three-way splits is a less common appearance. Bearing in mind the similar policy orientations in questions of security and decolonisation, it comes as no surprise that the UK voted most often the same way as France did (88.9 % overall voting coherence) (see figure 6.14, p. 268). Germany and the Czech Republic are on positions two and three (both 84.2 %). Cyprus and Malta are the countries the UK voted least coherently with (59.5 and 66.5 per cent respectively). In view of the differences they have with the UK over security and disarmament, the group of neutrals follows on the next three ranks (Ireland 74.9 % overall voting coherence, Austria 75.0 % and Sweden 75.4 %). When looking at France, exactly the same five EU-25 countries come up with which it voted least coherently: Cyprus (63.5 % overall

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Figure 6.14: British Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 France Czech Rep. Germany Cyprus Ireland Malta

70 60 50 40 30 20 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

voting coherence), Malta (69.3 %), Sweden (77.3 %), Ireland (78.1 %) and Austria (78.3 %) (see figure 6.15). Notably different is the picture regarding the countries France voted most coherently with: the UK as the number one is not surprising, but on the following five ranks follow the members of the ‘Core Europe’-group.9 Obviously France is very much attached to its partners it closely cooperates with on European level since almost fifty years. They are still the countries with the most similar policy preferences in the UNGA, but obviously on a much lower level than the coherence among the Core Europeans, as a consequence of the independent French policies. As France and the UK are so important players within the EU group in New York it is interesting to examine the level of EU voting coherence when both countries would not be part of the group. Figure 6.16 compares for that purpose the voting coherence of the EU-15 with the

9 The figures for the highest values of French overall voting coherence with EU-27 MS in the years 1988 to 2005 are: UK: 88.9 %, Belgium: 87.6 %, Luxembourg: 86.2 %, Italy: 85.8 % and Germany: 85.2 %.

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Figure 6.15: French Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 UK Luxembourg Belgium Cyprus Malta Sweden

70 60 50 40 30 20

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

Figure 6.16: Voting Coherence EU-15 and EU-13, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 EU-15 EU-13

70 60 50 40

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

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Figure 6.17: Greek Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 Voting with EC/EU majority

80 70

Involved in Two-way Split

60 50

Involved in Three-waySplit

40 30

Involved in Opposed Vote

20 10 0 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

EU-13, i.e. the EU-15 excluding France and the UK. The overall voting coherence of the Union is on average five to ten per cent higher when the two countries are left out. In the 47th UNGA session (1992/93) the difference would have been even sixteen per cent: 76 per cent as opposed to 60 per cent. Very different to France and the UK is the state of affairs in the case of Greece, the country with the fifth lowest coherence in relation to EC/EU-25 majority (87.7 %). Greek policies have converged significantly with the EC/EU mainstream over the last eighteen years, as figure 6.17 illustrates. The times in which Greece was responsible for low overall coherence ratios are definitely over.10 In the years 2000 to 2006 its voting coherence with EU majority reached exemplary 97 per cent. In the 56th UNGA session Greece even voted in all resolutions with the EU majority. Greece can unquestionably serve as the example Klaus-Dieter Stadler, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft in den Vereinten Nationen: Die Rolle der EG im Entscheidungsprozess der UN-Hauptorgane am Beispiel der Generalversammlung (BadenBaden, 1993), pp. 208 ff. 10

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Figure 6.18: Greek Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 100 95

Voting coherence (in %)

90 85 Spain Slovakia Slovenia UK Cyprus France

80 75 70 65 60 55 50

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

of what European integration can effect in the convergence of policy interests. It therefore is interesting that the country voted most coherently, besides with Spain (94.6 % overall voting coherence 1988–2005), with two new members of the Union, namely Slovakia (94.6 %) and Slovenia (94.6 %) (see figure 6.18). With all three countries Greece voted identically on all resolutions in a couple of UNGA sessions, which is quite unusual. Even more unusual is that Greece voted identically as Slovenia in as many as five UNGA sessions.11 The three EU-25 MS Greece voted least coherently with are the usual suspects: UK (73.6 %), Cyprus (76.1 %) and France (78.5 %). 6.1.3

The Big 5

The ‘Core Europeans’ could act as point of reference for the rest of the Union. But three of the five biggest EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK) are not part of ‘Core Europe’, namely France, Spain

11

53rd, 54th, 55th, 56th and 58th UNGA sessions.

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Figure 6.19: Voting Coherence ‘Big 5’, 1988–2005

Voting coherence (in %)

100 90 80 all EC/EU MS ‘Core Europe’ ‘Big 5’

70 60 50 40

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

and the UK. However, as the debate on UNSC reform has proved, those five countries have to be united to achieve results on important questions in New York. Therefore it is interesting to see whether the ‘Big 5’ really can function as a gravity centre of harmonised policies, comparable to the ‘Core Europeans’. Figure 6.19 gives a straightforward answer: no, they cannot. The five biggest EU countries vote on average between five to ten per cent more coherently than all EC/EU MS. However, that is certainly not enough to be a driving force or good example for European synchronisation efforts. Compared to ‘Core Europe’ the ‘Big 5’ are far too disunited themselves to take on such a role. In addition, their voting coherence dropped in recent years, while the ‘Core Europeans’ managed to increase their group-internal coherence. 6.1.4

The Ten New EU MS

As will become clear on the next pages, two groups of states with similar voting patterns can be distinguished within the ten new EU MS: the Eastern European countries as one group with large similarities and Cyprus and Malta as another subgroup, which could be called ‘nonconformists’.

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Figure 6.20: Slovenian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1992–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 Voting with EC/EU majority Involved in Two-way Split Involved in Three-waySplit Involved in Opposed Vote

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220; Slovenia joined the UN only on 22 May 1992.

Eastern European Countries (EU-8) It is interesting that the integrational forces that were important in the Greek case do not seem to have played a tangible role with regard to the eight new EU MS from Eastern Europe. Slovenia (95 %) and the three Baltic countries Lithuania (93.3 %), Estonia (92.9 %) and Latvia (91.4 %)—just to mention the most positive examples—achieve a higher overall coherence with the EC/EU majority (1988–2005) than most of the EU-15 MS. But all of the Eastern European countries have voted together with the EU majority in the large majority of cases already long before their accession, as the Slovenian and Polish examples show (see figures 6.20 and 6.21, p. 274), a pattern which can be found in all ten new EU MS. Apparently the national interests of the new MS are similar to the EU mainstream, notwithstanding CFSP or EU membership. This is also the reason why the latest round of enlargement did not have a tangible effect on overall EU voting coherence. Figure 6.2 (see page 257) is therefore misleading by suggesting that the convergence of the ten new EU MS took place only in the last couple of years. This

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Figure 6.21: Polish Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 100 90

Voting coherence (in %)

80

Voting with EC/EU majority

70

Involved in Two-way Split

60 50

Involved in Three-waySplit

40

Involved in Opposed Vote

30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

is not true for the eight Eastern European newcomers, which adjusted their policies already much earlier.12 That the eight new members from the East bring in even a stabilising factor shows figure 6.22: the voting coherence within the EU-8 has been steadily higher than that of the EC/EU MS. However, a high level of EU-8-internal voting coherence does not automatically imply that the group’s positions are also congruent with the EU. It is well possible that the EU-8 have similar interests, but that those interests are not shared by the wider EU-membership. That this is not the case show the examples of Hungary and Lithuania, which are representative for

12 Explanations for that offers Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, “The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: What Future for European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ Europe?”, European Foreign Affairs Review 9 (1, Spring 2004), pp. 79 ff.

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Figure 6.22: Voting Coherence EU-8, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 70

all EC/EU MS EU-8

60 50 40 30 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

all eight countries (see figures 6.23 and 6.24, p. 276). Since the mid1990s the EU-8 voted the same way as most of the EU-15 countries in ninety per cent of the cases or even more often, especially in recent years. Particularly important is that the countries voted very similar as the ‘Core Europeans’, showing that they have the same interests as the Union’s mainstream. For instance the three EU-25 MS Hungary voted most coherently with in the UNGA sessions from 1994 to 2005 were from the ‘Core Europe’-group (see figure 6.23, p. 276).13 It voted on average identical as Germany in 97.8 per cent of the votes and with Luxembourg and the Netherlands in 97.7 per cent. In UNGA sessions 55 and 56 Hungary even voted identical as Germany in all resolutions. The picture looks similar for Lithuania for the same period. Lithuania voted most often the same way as Slovenia, Latvia and Hungary (see figure 6.24, p. 276).14 However, the ‘Core Europeans’ follow very closely

13 In contrast to the other examinations on voting coherence among EC/EU MS made in this book, the figures 6.23 and 6.24 reflect only the years after 1994, in order to obtain coherence values free from Cold War block pressure. 14 Lithuanian voting coherence with those three countries from 1994–2005 were: Slovenia: 96.3 %, Latvia: 96.0 % and Hungary 95.9 %.

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Figure 6.23: Hungarian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1994–2005

Voting coherence (in %)

100

90 Germany Netherlands Luxembourg Cyprus UK France

80

70

60

49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

Figure 6.24: Lithuanian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1994–2005

Voting coherence (in %)

100

90 Slovenia Latvia Hungary Cyprus UK France

80

70

60 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

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to the traditional partners of Lithuania. Luxembourg for instance is on rank four with just 0.1 per cent less average coherence than Lithuania has with Hungary.15 As all EU-8 countries, Hungary and Lithuania have the lowest coherence ratios among the EU-25 with Cyprus, the UK and France (also all of them in that order).16 The main reason for this divide are the votes on international security. Therefore it can be substantiated that the EU-8 cultivate close ties among each other. But they also established policies that are very much in agreement with those of the old EU members. Consequently the ‘Core Europeans’ have gained in strength with the EU enlargement by ‘recruiting’ eight new members which stand in for EU-mainstream policies.17 And the main dissenters within the EU at present, i.e. France and the UK, are confronted with an even larger number of EU MS which vote differently from them. The notion of ‘New Europe’ as formulated by Donald Rumsfeld, which identifies the UK and the EU-8 as a coherent group with different policies than the rest of Europe, is therefore completely mistaken when looking at the situation at the UN, as the Eastern European EU MS rather vote against the UK then in line with it. The EU-8 are very much part of ‘Old Europe’ or rather ‘Core Europe’ in this analysis. Cyprus and Malta: The ‘Nonconformists’ Cyprus and Malta as initial main dissenters, which have in recent years adjusted their policies coming closer to EU mainstream, have been examined already above. Nevertheless it is interesting to look at those two countries in contrast to the EU-8. Figure 6.25 (see next page) illustrates how much lower the voting coherence is among the ten new EU MS (EU-10) than among the eight Eastern European EU MS (EU-8): once all ten new EU MS are examined together, the curve is much lower than that of the EU-8. That shows that Cyprus and Malta should not be really be equated with the EU-8. They have 15 Lithuanian figures of voting coherence with the ‘Core Europeans’ are: Luxembourg: 95.8, Netherlands: 95.4, Germany: 95.3, Italy: 94.7 and Belgium: 94.3. 16 The only exception to that rule is Latvia: on the third spot of the countries it voted least coherently is not France, but Malta. 17 This argument is supported by the findings of Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, “Returned to Europe? The Central and East European Member States at the Heart of the European Union”, in The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms, ed. by Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 92–111.

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Figure 6.25: Voting Coherence EU-8 and EU-10, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 70

all EC/EU MS EU-10 EU-8

60 50 40 30

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

different interests and policy orientations than the other new members. The two countries can be regarded as a relatively homogenous subgroup, as their interests are quite similar: in the analysis of Cyprian voting similarities Malta shows the highest percentage of all EU MS, and the same is true for Maltese voting coherence with Cyprus, if the period from 1995 is examined.18 Interestingly this high level of voting consistency or ‘partnership’ developed only in the second half of the 1990s, as figure 6.26 shows. Apparently their advancement of similar positions on security, but even more importantly on Middle East questions, brought the countries together.

18 Ireland, Austria and Slovenia come up as the countries with the highest coherence values with Malta in figure 6.11, as the whole period 1988 to 2005 is observed. From the years 1995 the picture changes as there is a convergence of Cyprian and Maltese voting behaviour in the UNGA which supersedes Ireland, Austria and Slovenia from the top spots.

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Figure 6.26: Cyprian-Maltese Voting Coherence, 1988–2005

Voting coherence (in %)

100

90

CyprianMaltese Voting Coherence

80

70

60

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

6.2

The Last Round of Enlargement: The EU-27

In 2007 the Union was joined by Bulgaria and Romania. Is the EU voting coherence likely to be significantly affected by that or do the observations made for the EU-8 are also valid for the two latecomers? A look into the developments in recent years suggests that—similar to the 2004 accessions—also the sixth round of enlargement will not negatively affect EU voting coherence in the UNGA, as the voting behaviour of Bulgaria and Romania has been almost identical to that of the EU-25 (see figure 6.27, p. 280). That means that the two countries can be counted to the EU-8 group, with all the positive effects as described above, i.e. proximity to ‘Core Europe’ and continuity in policies and voting behaviour. Those findings are supported by the voting behaviour of the two countries vis-à-vis EC/EU majority (see figures 6.28 and 6.29, pp. 280–281). Both countries constantly reached values of more than ninety per cent voting coherence with EC/EU majority since 1992, i.e. as

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Figure 6.27: Voting Coherence EU-25 and EU-27, 1988–2005 90

Voting coherence (in %)

80 70 60

all EC/EU MS EU-25 EU-27

50 40 30 20

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

Figure 6.28: Bulgarian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 100 90 Voting with EC/EU majority Involved in Two-way Split Involved in Three-waySplit Involved in Opposed Vote

Voting coherence (in%)

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

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Figure 6.29: Romanian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1988–2005 100 90

Voting coherence (in%)

80

Voting with EC/EU majority Involved in Two-way Split Involved in Three-waySplit Involved in Opposed Vote

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

soon as they had adjusted their policies at the UN to the new realities of the post-Cold-War-world.19 The overall average of coherence values with EC/EU majority in the years 1988 to 2005 were 88.1 per cent (Bulgaria) and 88 per cent (Romania). However, in the years 2000 to 2005, in which the accession negotiations with the Union were opened and concluded, Bulgaria showed an average coherence value of 97.5 per cent (even 100 % in the 56th session), Romania of 96.3 per cent. That again shows how much the positions of the two countries have converged with the EU majority. Noteworthy is how similar the voting patterns of Bulgaria and Romania are when looking at their voting coherence with other European countries. Within the EU-27 scenario, Bulgaria voted most often the

19 There are two exceptions to that observation in the case of Bulgaria, which had coherence values lower than ninety per cent in the UNGA sessions 49 (89.7 %) and 52 (87 %).

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Figure 6.30: Bulgarian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in%)

90 80 Poland Romania Slovakia Cyprus France UK

70 60 50 40 30 20

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

same way as Slovakia (96.4 % overall coherence 1988–2005), Romania (96 %) and Poland (95.8 %) (see figure 6.30). With those countries Bulgaria voted coherently in more than ninety per cent of all resolutions in almost all sessions, with the 45th and 52nd session marking the only exceptions. These figures do not mean that Bulgaria has not come closer to ‘Core Europe’ as the EU-8 have done since the mid-1990s. On the contrary: there is indeed a strong convergence of positions with those five European countries observable since several years. However, this convergence has not reached the same level as in the cases of the EU-8 countries, which is another indication that it was positive to wait for another three years before Bulgaria follows the EU-8 in joining the Union, to allow for the implementation of the acquis communautaire. The three EU-27 MS Bulgaria voted least often coherently with were the UK (74.3 % overall coherence 1988–2005), Cyprus (77.6 %) and France (78.3 %). Romania voted most often identical with Slovakia (97.6 % overall coherence 1988–2005), Czech Republic (96.9 %) and Poland (96.5 %)

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Figure 6.31: Romanian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 Poland Czech Republic Slovakia Cyprus UK France

70 60 50 40 30

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

(see figure 6.31). As in the case of Bulgaria, those numbers are qualified by the fact that in recent years it developed increasingly high coherence values with ‘Core Europeans’. When turning towards the three countries Romania voted least often coherently with, the same countries come up as in the Bulgarian case, even though Cyprus and France switch the order: Romania votes least coherently with the UK (74.6 % overall coherence 1988–2005), followed by France (77.5 %) and Cyprus (78.0 %). The analysis of the two countries that joined the Union in 2007 demonstrates how similar they are in their national interests and in their allies, but also in their ‘opponents’ within the group. It also shows again that the former Eastern bloc countries still have strong ties among each other, but that Bulgaria and Romania have arrived in the Union already by building up high voting coherence with the EU mainstream. Now being full members, the two countries are likely to contribute reaching high levels of EU voting coherence instead of thwarting the harmonising efforts.

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Figure 6.32: Voting Coherence EU-33 and All EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 70 all EC/EU MS EU-33

60 50 40 30 20

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

6.3

EU Candidate Countries and Potential Candidate Countries: The EU-33

And what about the European countries that wish to become EU MS? Is their voting behaviour already in line with the Union? Have their policies perhaps even converged with EU mainstream as much as the EU-8’s positions did before their accession? Figure 6.32 compares the voting behaviour of all EC/EU MS with that of an EU with 33 members, i.e. the EU-27 plus the official ‘candidate countries’ Croatia, FYROM and Turkey, as well as the ‘potential candidate countries’ Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro.20 It shows that the difference in voting coherence is not as significant as one might expect. Rather the picture looks similar to figure 6.2 (see page 257), which showed that also in the years before the 2004 enlargement there was a gap of 10 to 15 per cent between the EU-15 and the envisaged EU-25. Only when the accession plans

20 Serbia and Montenegro are formally split since June 2006. However, as the quantitative part of this study includes only data until 21 December 2005, Serbia and Montenegro is treated as a single entity.

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Figure 6.33: Croatian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1993–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80

Voting with EU majority Involved in Two-way Split Involved in Three-waySplit Involved in Opposed Vote

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220; Croatia joined the UN only on 22 May 1992.

materialised, this gap was closed. Therefore the prospects are promising, particularly when taking into consideration that the accession talks just started with Turkey and that there are no such negotiations with FYROM at the moment. It will take decades before the accession of the ‘potential candidate countries’ will become reality. The exception is Croatia, with which the negotiations have progressed quite far already. If voting behaviour at the UN is a parameter to assess the readiness to join the EU, then one can say that Croatia is unquestionable ready to do so, as figure 6.33 suggests. Since 1996 Croatia voted in ninety per cent of the roll-call votes or even more often with the EU majority, with a visible increase in recent years. Furthermore, the country voted most coherently with its direct neighbours Austria and Slovenia—besides Estonia—of all the EU MS, suggesting that similar, i.e. EU mainstream-oriented, policies can also be expected from Croatia (see figure 6.34, p. 286).21 In addition, the voting coherence with those

21 The responding average values for the years 1994 to 2005 are: Austria: 94.8 %, Slovenia: 94.1 % and Estonia: 93.9 %.

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Figure 6.34: Croatian Voting Coherence With Other EC/EU MS, 1994–2005

Voting coherence (in %)

100

90 Austria Estonia Slovenia UK Cyprus France

80

70

60

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

countries is shaped by a remarkable continuity over the last ten years. The UK, France and Cyprus are once more the three countries coming up as those, with which the least identical votes are cast.22 In view of the fact that the prospects of the other candidates to join the EU are uncertain, not least because of the Union’s own difficulties to adjust its institutional framework to further enlargement, the remaining countries will only touched upon briefly. The voting coherence of the outstanding candidate countries with the EC/EU majority has increased remarkably in the period observed. Macedonia can present a voting coherence of more than ninety per cent since 1998 (see figure 6.35). Since the same year, Turkey managed to vote with the EU majority continuously in more than eighty per cent 22 The respective average values for the period 1994 to 2005 are: UK: 79.5 %, France: 81.2 % and Cyprus: 84.7 %.

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Figure 6.35: Turkish and Macedonian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1993–2005

Voting coherence (in %)

100

90

Turkish Voting with EC/EU majority

80

Macedonian Voting with EC/EU majority

70

60

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

of the roll-call votes. While there is still room for improvement, the progress is tangible and the two countries certainly show a convergence of their policies and interests with those of the EU-mainstream. Not very different looks the picture concerning the ‘potential candidate countries’ (see figure 6.36, p. 288). A prognosis, however is difficult to make, as the three countries were absent in several sessions. It can be only said that in recent years Bosnia and Serbia voted surprisingly coherently with EU majority. Even though one would expect substantial political differences between them, both countries voted identical in three out of the five last UNGA sessions and also showed high coherence values with the ‘Core Europeans’. How the recent separation between Serbia and Montenegro will influence their voting behaviour remains to be seen. Albania is further away from the EU majority than the other two potential candidates. In fact, its coherence dropped significantly in the last two sessions. This was due to a number of differing votes on

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Figure 6.36: Albanian, Bosnian and Serbian Voting Behaviour Vis-à-vis EC/EU Majority, 1993–2005

Voting coherence (in%)

100

90

Bosnian Voting with EU majority Albanian Voting with EU majority

80

Serbian Voting with EU majority

70

60

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

Middle East resolutions, but also on questions of decolonisation, in which Albania abstained, while the Union collectively voted in favour.23 Therefore no qualified prognosis can be given for Albanian voting patterns vis-à-vis the Union. 6.4 6.4.1

Voting Behaviour by Issue Areas: EU Internal View

Middle East

As has been shown in Chapter Five, the overall EU voting coherence within the four issue areas examined is the highest on Middle East resolutions. When EU internal disagreement occurred in this area in recent years, also ‘Core Europe’ was affected, as figure 6.37 illustrates. For the 60th UNGA session those resolutions were on Middle East: A/Res/60/41, A/Res/60/100, A/Res/60/101, A/Res/60/102, A/Res/60/103, A/Res/60/105, A/ Res/60/106, A/Res/60/107, A/Res/60/108, A/Res/60/183 and on Decolonisation: A/Res/60/118 and A/Res/60/119. 23

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Figure 6.37: Voting Coherence in Middle East Questions, ‘Core Europe’, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90

all EC/EU MS

80

‘Core Europe’ ‘Core Europe’ + France

70

60

50

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

In 2001 out of the ‘Core Europeans’ Germany and the Netherlands were involved in a split vote,24 in 2003 only Germany.25 Therefore the overall coherence remains unchanged when the voting patterns of the most notorious dissenters France and the UK are contrasted with the EU-15 (see figure 6.38, p. 290), as the ‘Core Europeans’ themselves contribute to the rare disagreement in Middle East questions. The observation that Cyprus and Malta have been in the past the countries mainly causing deviations and also producing EU split-votes in their first two years as full members in the Union, is supported by figure 6.39 (see next page): the eight Eastern European countries, which joined the Union in 2004 (EU-8), show an equally high internal coherence as

24 Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK caused a two-way split over a resolution on the “Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine” (A/Res/56/36 [3 December 2001]). 25 Germany and the UK voted differently from the other 13 EU MS in a resolution on “Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (A/Res/58/99 [9 December 2003]).

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Figure 6.38: Voting Coherence in Middle East Questions, EU-13 and EU-15, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90

80 EU-15 EU-13 70

60

50

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

Figure 6.39: Voting Coherence in Middle East Questions, EU-10 and EU-8, 1988–2005

Voting coherence (in %)

100

90

80

all EC/EU MS EU-10 EU-8

70

60

50

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

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Figure 6.40: Voting Coherence in Middle East Questions, EU-27, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 70

all EC/EU MS EU-27

60 50 40 30

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

the EC/EU. But when Cyprus and Malta are added to them (EU-10), the voting coherence drops immediately. In the first two UNGA sessions as EU-25 there would have been complete EU coherence in Middle East questions when only the EU-8 had joined the Union. Bulgaria and Romania have no particular interests in Middle East questions which would stand in opposition to the Union. Also for an EU with 27 members the overall EU voting coherence on Middle East resolutions should remain stable, as figure 6.40 suggests. 6.4.2

Human Rights

Similar to the evolution of voting patterns on Middle East resolutions are the developments on human rights issues. Since 1999 the five ‘Core Europeans’, France (see figure 6.41, p. 292) and the UK (see figure 6.42, p. 292) voted identical. This creates an important gravity centre within the Union, which might have been responsible for the increase in the overall coherence in EU votes on human rights resolutions. However, a couple of observations qualify this view. First of all, because in three recent sessions (beginning in 1999, 2003 and 2004) the voting

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Figure 6.41: Voting Coherence in Human Rights Questions, ‘Core Europe’, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90

80 all EC/EU MS ‘Core Europe’

70

‘Core Europe’ + France 60

50

40

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

Figure 6.42: Voting Coherence in Human Rights Questions, EU-13 and EU-15, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90

80 EU-15 EU-13

70

60

50

40

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

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coherence of ‘Core Europe’ and France was higher than that of the EU in general. Therefore the influence from ‘Core Europe’ and France was not that significant. Besides, ‘Core Europe’ had a voting coherence of hundred per cent in six UNGA sessions (years 1992 through 1997 and 1998/1999). But the voting coherence within the group dropped, even to lows of 83.3 per cent, or three diverging votes in two sessions. Responsible for splits within the group were mainly Italy,26 the Netherlands27 and Germany. However, no clear-cut explanations come up for those findings, due to the diverse nature of the issues that caused difficulties. Nevertheless, if issues are so divisive that even split votes occur within ‘Core Europe’, they are truly problematic. And that the former unanimity within the group gives way to partial disagreement in recent years is not a positive omen. However, as figure 6.42 shows, France and the UK had different views than the rest of the EC/EU until 1994 (gap between EU-15 and EU-13). It is remarkable that both countries managed to adjust their policies on human rights with the EU-mainstream since then. The new EU MS pursued an impressive convergence of their positions in human rights questions with the EU majority (see figure 6.43, p. 294). In the year 1988 their coherence with the EC MS in human rights questions was zero per cent. In the last two years however, the EU-25 reached a coherence of ninety per cent or higher. 6.4.3

International Security and Disarmament

We will now turn towards the issues which are most controversial within the Union, security and decolonisation. The ‘Core Europeans’ vote extremely coherently on security and disarmament questions, in a number of sessions even entirely coherently (see figure 6.44, p. 294). Figure 6.44 confirms that France lowers the EC/EU coherence in security questions significantly and that the values are even lower when all EC/EU MS are considered, mainly because of the UK. Figure 6.45 (see page 295) takes a closer look into that. It shows, how much higher the EC/EU voting coherence is compared to EU-15 when France and the UK are left out (EU-13). When also the other main troublemakers 26 Italy voted different from the ‘Core Europe’-majority in human rights resolutions A/Res/54/151, A/Res/55/86, A/Res/56/232, A/Res/57/175, A/Res/57/228, A/ Res/58/245, A/Res/58/245, and A/Res/59/260. 27 The Netherlands voted different from the ‘Core Europe’-majority in human rights resolutions A/Res/52/136, A/Res/54/175, A/Res/57/175, A/Res/60/229.

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Figure 6.43: Voting Coherence in Human Rights Questions, EU-25 and EU-27, 1988–2005 100 90

Voting coherence (in %)

80 70 60

all EC/EU MS EU-25 EU-27

50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

Figure 6.44: Voting Coherence in Security and Disarmament, ‘Core Europe’, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 70

all EC/EU MS ‘Core Europe’

60

‘Core Europe’ + France

50 40 30 20

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

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Figure 6.45: Voting Coherence in Security and Disarmament, EU-11, EU-13 and EU-15, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 70

EU-15 EU-13 EU-11

60 50 40 30

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

in this thematic complex, Ireland and Sweden, are excluded from the examination (EU-11), the EC/EU voting is again slightly higher. However, the analysis shows that the four countries are not the only ones responsible for quarrels within the EU group, as the voting coherence among EU-11 for instance in UNGA session 58 (2003–2004) fell to 73.9 per cent. Responsible for that were mainly Austria and Finland, voting different from the other EU-11 members three times in that session.28 The two neutrals or pacifist countries shared the positions of Ireland and Sweden also in other sessions and voted accordingly against the EU majority. Spain, on the other hand, rather had a tendency away from the EU majority towards the UK and France in several sessions. In the

28

A/Res/58/46, A/Res/58/50, A/Res/58/51.

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Figure 6.46: Voting Coherence in Security and Disarmament, EU-27 and All EC/EU MS, 1988–2005 90

Voting coherence (in %)

80 70 60 all EC/EU MS EU-27

50 40 30 20 10

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

58th UNGA session it was, together with other countries, responsible for EU-11 splits in two resolutions.29 The same was true for Portugal.30 That the new EU MS are not responsible for lowering EU voting coherence in security issues shows figure 6.46. Even with 27 MS, the EU voting coherence would have been the same as with 15 in the years from 2001, and with 27 from 2004. Already from 1998 the EU25 coherence level was almost identical with the EU MS at that time. This again is a noteworthy proof of the mainstream orientation of the new EU MS. 6.4.4

Decolonisation

On decolonisation issues even the ‘Core Europeans’ have difficulties to reach full coherence. It is mainly the former colonial power Belgium who

29 A/Res/58/44. Also Italy and Portugal voted different from EU-11 majority in that resolution. 30 A/Res/58/29 and A/Res/58/44.

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Figure 6.47: Voting Coherence in Decolonisation Issues, ‘Core Europe’, 1988–2005 100

Voting coherence (in %)

90 80 70 60

all EC/EU MS

50

‘Core Europe’

40

‘Core Europe’ + France

30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

causes difficulties, but from time to time also the Netherlands and Germany (see figure 6.47). France has distanced itself more and more from ‘Core Europe’. This results mainly from the continuously decreasing total number of resolutions on decolonisation. It comes as no surprise that France and the UK are to be seen as the main troublemakers in this field, as figure 6.48 (see next page) clearly shows, when leaving both countries out (EU-13) in comparison with the EU-15 countries. How dramatically the new EU MS have converged their policies with EU majority positions in the last ten years illustrates figure 6.49 (see next page). In the early 1990s until 1995 an EU-25 or EU-27 would have achieved no coherence on decolonisation at all. Today, the ten new MS, but also Bulgaria and Romania, orientate their voting behaviour on moderate positions of the ‘Core Europeans’ and are not responsible for the low overall coherence values the EU reaches.

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Figure 6.48: Voting Coherence in Decolonisation Issues, EU-13 and EU-15, 1988–2005 100 90

Voting coherence (in %)

80 70 60 EU-15 EU-13

50 40 30 20 10 0

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

Figure 6.49: Voting Coherence in Decolonisation Issues, EU-25 and EU-27, 1988–2005 60

Voting coherence (in %)

50

40 all EC/EU MS EU-25 EU-27

30

20

10

0 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

UNGA Session

Source of data on which calculations are based: See figure 5.1, p. 220.

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Conclusions EU Internal Voting Analysis

The game-theoretical assumption that agreement within a group will become more difficult the more players are involved, does apply only to a very limited extend when looking at the last round of EU enlargement and voting coherence in the UNGA: even though the number of actors increased from fifteen to twenty-five, the coherence did not decline significantly. The eight Eastern-European countries did not bring in any new difficulties, only Cyprus and Malta caused some problems in the area of Middle East resolutions. Also now that Bulgaria and Romania have joined the Union the picture is likely to remain unchanged. If the EU invites Croatia and even other candidates to enter its illustrious round, the voting coherence might be to a certain extend affected negatively, but no dramatic change in terms of voting coherence in the UNGA is to be expected. Very important is that the ten new MS, but also Bulgaria and Romania and most of the candidate countries see the ‘Core Europeans’ as their focal points in policy formation. It is France and the UK who are the causes for concern. The UK—more than France—votes most differently from most individual EU MS. The two countries do not seem to adjust their policies. For them the times have changed least since the inception of the CFSP. In view of the voting patterns of the new MS and candidate countries it will become increasingly likely that the two will be isolated with their ‘extreme’ positions. In reality, France and the UK are the non-conformists within the EU group. But without their support, the ‘Core Europeans’ will not be influential enough to increase the EU voting coherence to higher levels. The bleak hope is that the fear of isolation will bring France and the UK more in line with the EU mainstream, in the interest of their own policy aims.

CONCLUSIONS Even in 2008, fifteen years after the entry into force of the TEU, national interests are the main driving forces behind the policies of the EU countries and the processes within the CFSP at the UN. In New York, the CFSP-regime is simply an instrument for intergovernmental dealings between the EU MS, aimed at pursuing the individual national positions. There is little room for a single European voice on the East River, i.e. for a truly common foreign policy. The method of intergovernmental policy-making is very similar to the processes and the disposition that characterised the EPC regime, the CFSP’s predecessor. Certainly the CFSP with its enhanced provisions has not yet arrived at the UN. Or to be more precise: the regulatory framework of the CFSP is in place, but not the spirit anticipated with this regime. In other words, the EU MS have only adjusted to the basic needs of CFSP regulations by setting up a sophisticated EU coordination process in New York. But their policy actions did not keep pace with the substance at the heart of the idea of CFSP, being to act coherently in external relations. Therefore Allen’s and Wallace’s description of the EPC as “procedure as substitute for policy” still has some validity for the EU’s processes in the UN framework today.1 And apparently, the institutional structure of the CFSP is too weak to force EU MS to behave coherently. When applying the concept of a ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’, as first outlined by Christopher Hill, on the situation in New York, it can be substantiated that such a gap between expectations (by third parties, EU institutions and the public) and the capacities that the EU MS have actually bestowed upon the CFSP policy framework, exists.2 But the scope of this gap has to be extended, as the EU MS do not only fail to live up to the expectations connected with the CFSP, but even deliberately neglect to make use of the full potential of the regime they have created, to avoid endangering their national interests. 1 David Allen and William Wallace, ‘Political Cooperation: Procedure as Substitute for Policy’, in Policy-making in the European Communities, ed. by Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb (London: Wiley and Sons, 1977, 1st ed.), pp. 227–247. 2 Christopher Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no 3 (1993), pp. 305– 328.

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One of Jean Monnet’s principal beliefs was that Europe would be build on practical achievements, the réalisations concrètes. And as became clear in the course of this study, the practical achievements of European coordination and cooperation at the UN have improved over the last decade, but are still imperfect and therefore do not yet create an integrated European representation at the UN. As the practicalities in New York are very much shaped by national interests and not an European identity, Europe itself has not really arrived at the UN. This fact underlines another core idea of Monnet: that common institutions are the key to a successful European entity and not intergovernmental cooperation. But intergovernmental cooperation is the current practice among EU MS at UN headquarters. And the institutions within CFSP, and the CFSP as an institution itself, have only marginal influence on the proceedings on the East River. This study suggests that the phenomenon of Europeanisation, as it has captured most processes in Brussels (‘Brusselisation’), and with it also changed the policies of the EU MS themselves, has not reached a comparable zenith when looking at the EU internal harmonisation processes abroad.3 The work in Brussels is “much more esoteric”.4 The CFSP as performed in Brussels, for instance within COREPER, the PSC or the group of Relex Counsellors, has a different culture and esprit de corps than the CFSP in New York, where EU MS pursue their national interests much more openly than in Brussels. The process of integration is less developed. The communauté d’action has its limits. Obviously the EU MS behave differently in different environments, even if they committed themselves to act in a unified manner as an overarching principle. The role of the national states is different in IGOs—or rather they perceive their role differently than in Brussels, allowing less relevance to the EU voice. For most EU MS the UN is an arena to demonstrate sovereignty and prestige—and to present a very specific national profile to the world. Those aspects carry more weight than the striving for a coherent EU representation. In addition, the strong influence of national capitals stands in the way of a close

3 For an account of the character of the CFSP regime in Brussels see Simon Nuttall, European Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Michael E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalisation of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 4 Interview number 2, 27 April 2004 (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]).

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connection between New York and Brussels: the umbilical cord of the EU MS missions to the UN goes directly to their capitals, rather than to Brussels-based bodies. And also the capitals themselves want to make use of their missions on the East River first and foremost for their own national interests. As a consequence of all that, Brussels is left with the role of giving additional input into the processes in New York—despite the fact that the European public is clearly in support of a strong role of the EU in external relations.5 The EU’s control of and influence on the work there is limited. Most EU MS do not see themselves as performers of EU politics. A single EU voice? Yes, but only when in congruence with national concepts. Realpolitik drives processes in New York: it has to be explored what is doable. If relevant decisions have been taken already in Brussels, they are used as a working basis on the East River. Then the national interests are communicated to New York by a roundabout via Brussels. Otherwise the input comes directly from EU MS capitals. The whole secret of CFSP in New York is that there is a coordination process. Apparently the formation of CFSP depends on preconditions and the environment. The CFSP-regime has no uniform mode of implementation. It is shaped by the EU MS in the way the regime benefits them most in the individual setting. Form follows function, and not, as one might expect, the other way around, i.e. that the processes and proceedings in the EU’s external affairs adjust to the framework of rules stipulated in the Treaties, everywhere in the world, resembling a corporate identity. EU MS support the idea of speaking with a single voice at the UN primarily out of selfish motives: since only groups can influence developments at the UN, the EU MS follow the CFSP-principle of coherence whenever it is beneficial for the achievement of their policy aims. Often only via an EU position they have a chance to see their own interests included in decisions taken at the UN, because of the weight the group has. This creates tremendous incentives for European cooperation, as the carrots, i.e. achievement of national interests, and the sticks, i.e. isolation within the EU group and therefore limited chances for influence at the UN as a single country, have a much more direct and

5 53 per cent of the Europeans believe that the Union can play a positive role in foreign affairs. See Eurobarometer 62, fieldwork: October–November 2004, publication: May 2005, p. 26; (includes respondents from all 27 EU MS).

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sizeable effect than usually visible in EU internal processes. Owing to convergence of policies and the need to cooperate, already an average of 75 per cent voting coherence has been achieved (1993–2005). But because of the unstable foundation the EU coherence builds on, this also means that the EU MS are unified in the politically less important questions, but hold divergent views on important ones, as other scholars have also pointed out.6 That EU MS can best pursue their national interests if they work effectively within the EU group also explains why such close cooperation took place in New York among EC MS already before the Treaty of Maastricht: Intergovernmental cooperation served national interests and was therefore useful, even though at that time the cooperation in New York might have gone even further than the EPC coordination mechanisms established in Brussels. This observation supports the view that proceedings in New York are in a way undertaken in a ‘time and space vacuum’: the behaviour of EC/EU MS in New York has developed largely unaffected by European foreign policy integration. Therefore, to misuse Marx’ famous saying, the existence very much influences the consciousness also in EU foreign policies: the interaction within the EU group and the decision-making process in Brussels, with its more self-absorbed environment influencing the decision-taking of EU MS officials because of the existence of the EU regime, is evidently different in New York. Even though the CFSP framework and a rational choice operative for power-maximisation make EU MS harmonise their positions as far as possible in a sophisticated coordination process, the multilateral atmosphere of the UN brings out the national-state perspective very visibly. This fact sometimes lets the EU MS proceed alone when their goals are unachievable through the group. As Rolf Annerberg, chief of staff to Margot Wallström, the EC Communications Commissioner, put it: “The EU has a brand but it is competing with 25 national brands”.7 This is very much the situation

6 Beate Lindemann, ‘European Political Cooperation at the UN: a challenge for the Nine’, in European Political Cooperation, ed. by D. Allen, R. Rummel and Wolfgang Wessels (London: Butterworths, 1982), p. 120; Elfriede Regelsberger, ‘EPC in the 1980s: Reaching Another Plateau?’, in European Political Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?, ed. by Alfred Pijers, Elfriede Regelsberger and Wolfgang Wessels (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), p. 12. 7 Andrew Bounds, ‘Brussels calls in team of brand experts’, Financial Times, 2 May 2006, p. 10.

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the EU Presidency is faced with in New York, when representing the Union on CFSP issues. How little the EU group cooperation is part of the national EU MS concepts is illustrated by the important example of the UK: the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office in its 58 page-long command paper of September 2003, entitled “the United Kingdom in the United Nations”, mentions the EU sixteen times, seven of which are related to the UNSC.8 But the whole document nowhere attributes a single sentence to the EU in the representation of British interests at the UN. The paper is mainly the account of a country which feels itself as being a nation-state pursuing its own interests independently, not being an integrated piece of the EU group. It seems to be the case that stringent EU policies at the UN are difficult to achieve, as EU policies cannot be separated from its constituent states. Only with a very broad acquis communitaire of identical national interests this separation would become possible. It also speaks volumes that in 2006, despite the development of CFSP, the EU still has no official status at the UN. Even though full recognition of the EU as a legal entity and actor within the UN framework would be difficult to implement due to legal obstacles and resistance by parts of the wider UN membership, the EU MS could have given legal personality to the EU and fought for an EU role at the UN at least pro forma and to demonstrate the special status of the Union in comparison to other regional organisations represented in New York. None of that has happened, as it would be contradictory to the strong roles of the national states within the EU representation at the UN. However, the situation should not be regarded as being all too negative. The EU is a visible and influential actor at the UN. It is able to present common and coordinated positions in most UN bodies, particularly the UNGA, ECOSOC and the specialised agencies. Concerning UNGA, in 88 per cent of the votes on Middle East resolutions and 77 per cent of human rights resolutions unanimity prevailed among the EU MS in the period examined. In recent years even significantly higher values have been achieved. Particularly regarding the Middle East this is an

8 The Stationery Office, The United Kingdom in the United Nations, Paper presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, September 2003.

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important achievement in view of the current geopolitical situation. The Union’s leverage is amplified further by the fact that the weight of the acceding countries is added systematically through alignment. Besides, other European States often align themselves to EU positions. In most cases the EU has a clear objective and strategy at the UN. Then it can make a clear impact on the discussions and the final outcome. This is possible as the EU MS share common interests in most questions. Yet it is also important to note that coherence of EU policies is not only affected by converging or diverging member state interests, but is also subject to the specific bodies in which policies are conducted in New York. The latter can at times have a negative influence, and hence can make EU internal agreement more difficult. This became particularly clear in the comparison of consensus-oriented and confrontational bodies: specific political cultures within the individual bodies have developed over decades, in some cases leading to an atmosphere of open differences among UN MS. But in such an environment the Union’s principle of speaking with one voice is very difficult to maintain. The character of how policies are conducted within a UN body has therefore a direct effect on EU MS behaviour, without necessarily reflecting intense disunity among EU MS. As has been shown with the examples of the UNSC and the First Main Committee, it is not necessarily a question of EU internal deficits in harmonisation, which causes incoherence, but also the importance of and—again—prevailing cultures in individual UN bodies which make it difficult to present a unified Union. Only with a shared will among EU MS to do justice to those external factors by building up stronger cooperation internally, those aspects can be compensated for. With that in mind it is also important to mention that the low coherence in the issue areas security, disarmament and decolonisation are also due to the political cultures within the UN bodies involved. It also has to be said that the national interests of EU MS are not static in their depth, orientation and flexibility towards EU partners. National interests change over time, and with them the coherence and effectiveness of the overall EU policies. An example would be the thematic complex of development. This issue area is traditionally a domain of shared interests within the EU, resulting in high coherence. However, the quarrel over the creation of new seats in the UNSC influenced EU MS positions and policy-making on development significantly in 2004 and 2005. The reason for that was the preparation of the 2005 World Summit, which mainly dealt with the progress made

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on the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (i.e. development), but also with UN reform. Therefore development and UNSC enlargement was linked politically, making EU agreement and coherence also more difficult on development due to frictions on UNSC reform. Nevertheless, while EU coherence can drop, national interests can also develop positively due to domestic or external factors. The abolition of apartheid in South Africa, ending years of EC split votes at the UN, would be an example for that. It is also likely that a shift in the geopolitical balance on security policy, caused by the proliferation of WMDs, would increase the EU coherence in the field of security and disarmament. The relevance of specific issue areas, the political culture in individual UN bodies and the dynamics within national interests are important to keep in mind in order not to overrate the purity and impact of national interests in New York. Nevertheless, the expectations towards the EU are different than those towards other political groups within the UN. A single voice is the declared aim, and rightly so, as influence on decisions can only be exerted by a coherent group. But a value of 25 per cent EU split votes is clearly too large under these circumstances. In addition, too often the Union does not know what its common aims are and how they could be achieved, and therefore punches below its weight. Only when the EU moves together into the same direction, formally and informally, it can have a substantial impact on how things work or do not work at the UN. Or in the words of the HR/SG: “To successfully make use of its potential, the EU needs to be able to act in a more coherent manner”.9 Therefore there is no alternative to the principle of coherent action at the UN, even if that might be different in other fora. And a truly common voice at the UN would also require more voting coherence. The real practical implications of split votes are usually insignificant. But serious political damage, which stands in no apt proportion to the issues themselves, is caused by this open demonstration of European disunity. However, the concept of speaking with one voice should be adjusted: it should be understood as working into the same direction by excluding open differences among EU MS. But as positions often differ in nuances

9 Summary of remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Conference of Ambassadors, La Farnesina (Rome), 27 July 2004, p. 4.

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even despite overall common agreement within the Union, and as slight dissonances occur even within EU MS governments, EU MS should always have the possibility to express their specific views at the UN as a supplement to EU positions agreed upon, whenever necessary. Without such an outlet they would never accept and internalise the principle of speaking with one voice. If the EU positions would be decided on exclusively within the EU group in New York, EU coherence would be presumably much higher. The constant interaction with other EU partners would create much more balanced positions, based on a mutual understanding of all EU MS policy preferences. However, since most of the input is coming from national capitals, lacking this Brusselisation effect, the occasional clash of positions roots far away from the scenery in New York, making it more difficult to reach consensus in controversial questions. EU MS diplomats in New York have not enough means to influence the positions taken by national capitals to be presented on the East River. In addition to this kind of micro-management on the spot, the Brusselsbased EU bodies should have a larger influence on the proceedings in New York. Policies should be prepared mainly within the Council Working Groups, in which the relevant expertise lies. CONUN should play a special role in that regard by developing strategic medium- to long-term goals regarding institutional or crosscutting issues. The main interlocutor with New York on day-to-day political and security issues should be the PSC. Brussels should also ensure the upstream and overall consideration of UN issues. This would certainly contribute to the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of the EU external action. But the main problem that can be felt in New York is a general institutional predicament of the CFSP: the principle of unanimity. The current consensualist policy-setting is too inefficient in terms of preparation and human resources, but also thwarts the possibility of common EU positions in cases in which just a few EU MS hold different views than the mainstream. Only if qualified majority decisions were allowed, the EU could move forward also despite internal differences. Then of course the overall coherence would be complete, as no divergent votes would occur and no national statements could impede the EU Presidency line. The EU would be a credible and reliable single actor for third parties.

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The EU coordination process is part of the problem of an efficient and effective representation of EU interests at the UN. It is certainly too time-consuming: consultations could be streamlined and directed more to the point. Too much time is also spent on symbolic politics, mainly the preparation of EU statements. Therefore the complex coordination machinery within the EU group also leaves little room for the informal lobbying of the EU Presidency and the EU MS, is too selfabsorbing and egocentric. The process is also too reactive, as it most of the time only responds to developments at the UN or initiatives by third parties. A stronger emphasis should be put on a pro-active and forward-looking dimension in the development of EU positions. Then the EU position would be the benchmark from which the discussions begin and to which third parties would have to react. To that end the European Commission’s suggestion of a “more extensive dialogue and preparatory work with other countries and groups” would have to be implemented.10 Currently the contact of the EU is too much focused on the members of the Western European and Others Group. Intensified political dialogue would be particularly important with the African and Latin American countries. However, having said all that, it should not be forgotten that common EU positions come at a cost. In the words of an EC official: “coordinated positions are always compromises, they are not as sharp and pro-active as they should be, and the compromises really smooth out all the edges of our positions. We sort of pre-censor our positions a little bit. And we also have ‘bad’ subjects for all of the member states, which means that our positions may be less focussed than we would like them to be”.11 Linked to the coordination process is the question of the EU Presidency mandate. It is often too limited and not easily to be changed once agreed upon in long EU internal bargaining. Therefore the Presidency has only little flexibility in negotiations with third parties. That decreases the efficiency of the negotiations at the UN, but also within the EU 10 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism, 10 September 2003, COM(2003) 526 final, p. 3. 11 Timo Wilkki, speech in session 2 entitled ‘UN-EU Cooperation on Development, Humanitarian, Human Rights and Refugees Issues’ of the conference ‘The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership’, 18 May 2004, Palais d’Egmont, Brussels. Available online at www.irri-kiib.be/speechnotes/04/EUUN/coll_EU_UN.htm.

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coordination process, as additional EU meetings are necessary to adjust the mandate given to the Presidency in accordance with developments in the negotiations with third parties. This also prevents the Union from becoming a dynamic force in policy debates at the UN. The Way Forward: Improving the EU Representation in New York The positive effects the EU Reform Treaty could have on the cooperation, coordination and representation of EU interests at the UN have been described already above. But there is additional room for improvement besides the aspects just mentioned in this conclusion, which could be implemented without any Treaty changes, through informal agreements and tacit regimes among EU MS. It follows from the points raised in the analysis that the strong influence from national capitals on the decision-making in New York, leaving aside Brussels in most cases, would have to be contained. At present the EU representation at the UN, or rather the EU coordination process, is directly connected to EU MS capitals. To reach a more dynamic and probably more coherent EU representation at the UN, it would be necessary to de-link it more from the EU MS and a) give more competences and flexibility to EU MS diplomats in New York. This would provide them with more leeway in the daily business of EU coordination, by giving them only general guidelines on the goals to be achieved from a national perspective. This would also be crucial as EU MS diplomats in New York are usually more convinced of the importance of common positions than their counterparts in capitals, due to their direct involvement in policy-making; b) allow more influence from Brussels-based bodies, where appropriate. Brusselised thinking and decision-making would positively influence developments on the East River. This would be possible in all the issue areas in which EU bodies deal with questions discussed at the UN. Decision-taking in New York would become easier that way. EU bodies in Brussels, however, would have to meet more often to keep pace with the developments in New York and adopt a ‘UN-perspective’ to comprehend matters. Closer cooperation between Brussels and New York would be the consequence.

But the best way to strengthen the link between Brussels and New York would be a de facto joint EU representation in New York following the idea of the envisaged EEAS. This should be the main political aim even

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if the EU Reform Treaty does not enter into force. Before the joint representation comes into fruition the Troika format (EU Presidency/ Council Secretariat/European Commission/Incoming Presidency) should be used as much as possible. In addition, also the lower ranks of EU MS should be informed about developments in Brussels-based bodies relevant to the issue areas they cover at the UN. Currently it is surprising how little particularly First Secretaries and Counsellors, who are the ones mainly involved in the policy-making, know about the decisions taken in Brussels. To this end it would be a good idea to make the weekly Brussels briefing circular produced by NYLO available to all EU MS diplomats, not only to the higher ranks. An effective representation of European interests within the UN framework also requires better coordination between EU and EU MS representatives in the different UN bodies and other international bodies linked to it, including the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. Sven Biscop is right in pointing out that “all too often, European delegations to different organisations spread contradictory messages”.12 Furthermore it would be important to ensure a better consistency between the positions pursued in EU MS capitals and in EU institutions in Brussels.13 But also inter-institutionally there is room for improvement: the EU should enhance the cooperation and coordination with the UN to achieve a more effective and efficient division of labour. Of course the unreserved implementation of Article 19 would be a crucial factor on the way to a credible EU at the UN. The UNSC in general has to be incorporated in the undertakings of the CFSP. A CFSP without a common EU policy in the UNSC will never be a credible tool.

12 Sven Biscop, ‘Security and development: a positive agenda for a global EU-UN partnership’, in The European Union and the United Nations: Partners in effective multilateralism, Chaillot Paper no. 78 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), p. 27. 13 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Building an effective partnership with the United Nations in the fields of Development and Humanitarian Affairs (COM(2001)231 final), Brussels, 2 May 2001, p. 12.

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It has been suggested by Armin Laschet that the EU should establish a so-called common strategy for the UN.14 That does not seem to be a viable solution to achieve more coherence for three reasons: first, the common strategies currently in place do not show tangible results, and as very general declarations of intent there is not much substance behind them either.15 Second, the range of issue areas discussed within the UN is too broad and divergent to deal with all of them under a single strategy. Third, all the areas in which dissent prevails within the EU would have to be excluded from that strategy. But such an incomplete strategy would be even more embarrassing to the outside world then the present situation. Reform of the EU coordination process in New York has been discussed since a number of years. Particularly promising is the approach taken with regard to coordination on Third Committee issues in 2004.16 Because of the number of EU split votes occurring in previous UNGA sessions, EU Third Committee experts developed a ‘vade-mecum for streamlining EU Coordination’ for the 59th UNGA session, to achieve more coherent results more efficiently. This was a consensus based exercise initiated by the French and the Dutch, by the latter in view of their upcoming EU Presidency. This vade-mecum is still in use. Some EU MS diplomats stated that they could imagine the points in this paper to be used more widely in other parts of the EU coordination process in New York, not only on experts level, but even on HoMs and DPRs level.17 So far this has not been realised. The vade-mecum included six general principles for streamlining EUcoordination:

Armin Laschet, ‘Gemeinsame Strategie gibt der EU-Außenpolitik Profil. Für ein neues Verhältnis Brüssels zu den Vereinten Nationen’, Vereinte Nationen 3 (2001), pp. 97–100. 15 Introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (Article 12 TEU), the European Council decides by unanimity on important common interest of the EU MS to be pursued within the framework of a common strategy. So far, there have been four common strategies: on Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. 16 Vade-mecum for streamlining EU Coordination at the 59th session of the UN General Assembly (Third Committee) 28 June 2004, EU internal document produced by EU MS Third Committee experts. 17 Stated in a Third Committee EU coordination meeting on 18 May 2004. 14

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• Anticipate, as far as possible, the work of the Committee; • Set priorities, both among resolutions as well as within amendments to individual resolutions; • Concentrate on formulating a general position instead of going too quickly into details; • Decide more through silent procedure; • Give the Presidency more room to manoeuvre; • Avoid EU-splits, including through ‘early warning mechanisms’ and dispute settlement procedures. The implementation and functioning of those principles was then described in detail in eleven sections, looking at issues such as burdensharing, lobbying of EU positions, national initiatives of EU MS and Presidency negotiating mandates. This effort produced tangible results in reducing Third Committee EU split votes in the 59th and 60th UNGA sessions and by creating a more constructive and efficient working atmosphere in the EU coordination process.18 Therefore the vade-mecum should be used as a model to produce a guideline for the whole EU coordination process in New York, or as a point of departure for guidelines for the EU coordination in the individual UN bodies. Notably, the European Commission itself assessed that “substantial challenges remain for the EU if it is to fulfil its potential in the UN”.19 Only if the EU MS recognise the need to face those challenges, a change of the current situation is possible. In the medium-term perspective, the implementation of the EU Reform Treaty or parts of it could be a force for change also at the UN. Ironically policy-makers in drafting the EU Reform Treaty have not thought about the consequences for settings such as the UN—which is probably positive, as they might have thought twice before transferring power to the proposed High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

18 While there were six EU split votes in the 58th session, this number dropped to two (59th session) and one (60th session) split votes on human rights (see table 5.4, p. 239). Interview number 18, 20 May 2004 and interview number 31, 10 December April 2004 and (see table A.1 in Annex 1 for a codified list of interviews [p. 317]). 19 Commission of the European Communities, op. cit. in note 10, p. 3.

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and the EEAS in multilateral fora.20 But even if better cooperation and higher coherence would be achieved in the end, one way or another, the EU MS will not refrain from seeing themselves as independent actors at the UN. The political developments in recent years, particularly regarding the ESDP, suggest that the EU is a legitimate “superpower in the making”.21 But being an influential actor in a multilateral global system implies adequate representation at the UN. Therefore it is true that more agreement in the various external policy fields would have an impact on the Union’s influence in IGOs. But at the same time a more coherent standing in multilateral institutions is also the requirement for a more influential and successful CFSP in general: the CFSP and also the ESDP are certainly in need of having a strong EU representation at the UN at its disposal to place emphasis on the Union’s objectives in the world. But only an EU voice free of the present cacophonies in the areas of international security and decolonisation within the UNGA, and even more importantly within the UN Security Council, can support the ambitions of European external policies. The EU MS therefore have the duty to increase their efforts to solve the remaining open differences in order to act cohesively at the most important international organisation. 68 per cent of the Europeans think that foreign policies should be dealt with jointly within the EU as opposed to individual national approaches.22 That is a clear backing of harmonised EU-policies also at the UN and should be interpreted by policy-makers as an impetus to act. At present it can be substantiated that the EU’s “real influence—and its ability to project European values—on the world stage still falls short of its economic and combined political weight, or indeed its contribution to the funding of UN organisations”.23 But only when the EU and its MS manage to strengthen the coherence, consistency and predictability of their collective actions in the principal UN organs this would also signify a crucial backing of multilateralism. Only then they could 20 Many interview partners stated the belief that in the high-politics debates the practical consequences, at least with a view to international for a, have simply been disregarded during the Convention. 21 Johan Galtung, The European Community: A Superpower in the Making? (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973); David Buchan, The Strange Superpower (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993). 22 Eurobarometer 62, fieldwork: October–November 2004, publication: May 2005 (includes respondents from all 27 EU MS), p. 35. 23 Commission of the European Communities, op. cit. in note 10, p. 3.

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effectively and credibly make an effort for greater respect for multilateral decisions and greater determination in their implementation. The EU MS at the UN may, in the course of the next two decades, form “the integrating nucleus for cooperation in the larger context of the West”.24 Other spectators even believe that the UN would be doomed entirely, if the EU does not increase its influence at the UN and establishes a visible opposition to the US-American UN policies, which question the Organisation altogether.25 And at the moment it indeed appears to be likely that—despite the close ties of the UK and some new EU MS to the US—the EU will create an opposite pole to the US at the UN, instead of intensifying the Transatlantic cooperation. In a much-cited speech the UNSG argued that the UN were at a fork in the road.26 This is also true for the EU at the UN: the EU MS have to decide quickly whether they wish to end the stagnation in voting coherence and the EU internal coordination processes to become a dominant and credible player without any exceptions. Or whether they want to continue with their particularism, gambling away in the long run the credits and respect the EU has in the wider UN membership, leaving the Union and its MS less influential and trustworthy in the end.

24 This hope was expressed already by Beate Lindemann in 1982: Beate Lindemann, ‘European Political Cooperation at the UN: a challenge for the Nine’, in European Political Cooperation, ed. by D. Allen, R. Rummel and Wolfgang Wessels (London: Butterworths, 1982), p. 113. 25 Rainer Sütfeld, ‘Ein Gipfel der Belanglosigkeit’, Commentary in Tagesschau.de, 14.09.2005. 26 Kofi Annan, speech in the 58th UNGA session, 7th plenary meeting, 23 September 2003, A/58/PV.7.

ANNEX 1

LIST OF INTERVIEWS Table A.1: Codified List of Interviews Interview

Date

Time

Interview Date

Time

1

13 April 2004

11.30 a.m.

20

24 May 2004

4.30 p.m.

2

27 April 2004

2 p.m.

21

25 May 2004

6 p.m.

3

30 April 2004

9 a.m.

22

26 May 2004

10.30 a.m.

4

4 May 2004

3 p.m.

23

14 September 2004

5 p.m.

5

5 May 2004

3.30 p.m.

24

14 September 2004

6 p.m.

6

6 May 2004

2 p.m.

25

17 September 2004

9 a.m.

7

6 May 2004

6 p.m.

26

28 September 2004

11 a.m.

8

7 May 2004

11 a.m.

27

28 September 2004

6.15 p.m.

9

7 May 2004

2 p.m.

28

28 September 2004

2 p.m.

10

10 May 2004

3 p.m.

29

9 December 2004

noon

11

11 May 2004

4 p.m.

30

10 December 2004

11 a.m.

12

12 May 2004

noon

31

10 December 2004

3 p.m.

13

12 May 2004

3 p.m.

32

13 December 2004

9 a.m.

14

12 May 2004

5 p.m.

33

15 December 2004

5 p.m.

15

14 May 2004

11.30 a.m.

34

15 December 2004 20 December 2004

6 p.m. 3.30 p.m.

16

17 May 2004

11 a.m.

35

16 December 2004

5 p.m.

17

19 May 2004

1.15 p.m.

36

20 December 2004

9.30 a.m.

18

20 May 2004

11 a.m.

37

20 December 2004

5 p.m.

19

21 May 2004

1 p.m.

38

21 December 2004

11 a.m.

ANNEX 2

STATISTICS ON VOTING COHERENCE

UNGA Session

All votes with EU dissent

Two-way split

Percentage Two-way splits**

Three-way split

Percentage Three-way splits**

Opposed votes

Percentage opposed votes**

Table A.2: Divergent EC/EU Votes in the UN General Assembly, 1988–2005 (Recorded Votes)

43 (1988/1989)

74

52

70.3

22

29.7

0

0.0

44 (1989/1990)

61

39

63.9

22

36.1

0

0.0

45 (1990/1991)

46

30

65.2

16

34.8

0

0.0

46 (1991/1992)

35

29

82.9

6

17.1

0

0.0

47 (1992/1993)

28

25

89.3

3

10.7

0

0.0

48 (1993/1994)

23

19

82.6

4

17.4

0

0.0

49 (1994/1995)

21

16

76.2

5

23.8

0

0.0

50 (1995/1996)

33

15

45.5

17

51.5

1

3.0

51 (1996/1997)†

15

10

66.7

5

33.3

0

0.0

52 (1997/1998)

13

9

69.2

4

30.8

0

0.0

53 (1998/1999)

9

4

44.4

4

44.4

1

11.2

54 (1999/2000)

15

10

66.7

4

26.6

1

6.7

55 (2000/2001)

13

8

61.5

5

38.5

0

0.0

56 (2001/2002)

14

10

71.4

4

28.6

0

0.0

57 (2002/2003)

16

9

56.3

7

43.7

0

0.0

statistics on voting coherence

319

UNGA Session

All votes with EU dissent

Two-way split

Percentage Two-way splits**

Three-way split

Percentage Three-way splits**

Opposed votes

Percentage opposed votes**

Table A.2 (cont.)

58 (2003/2004)

23

15

65.2

7

30.4

1

4.4

59 (2004/2005)

18

10

55.5

7

38.9

1

5.6

60 (2005/2006)*

17

10

58.8

7

41.2

0

0.0

26.3

17.8

66.2

8.3

32.1

0.3

1.7

AVERAGES

Sources of data on which calculations of the table in this Annex are based: 1988–1996: dataset provided by Eric Voeten (Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly v1.0 [http://home.gwu.edu/~voeten/ UNVoting.htm]), based on his own compilation, derived from a dataset by Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo (UN General Assembly Voting V3.0); 1997–2002: dataset assembled by Zachary Wynne and Eric Voeten (Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly v1.0 [http://home.gwu.edu/~voeten/UNVoting.htm]); 2003–2005: author’s own calculations based on UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet).* until 21 December 2005; ** percentages of divergent votes only; † without Greece.

45.6

47.4

46.5

53.3

62.7

64.6

69.1

59.3

80.3

81.2

85.2

77.9

80.6

43 (1988/1989)

44 (1989/1990)

45 (1990/1991)

46 (1991/1992)

47 (1992/1993)

48 (1993/1994)

49 (1994/1995)

50 (1995/1996)

51 (1996/1997)

52 (1997/1998)

53 (1998/1999)

54 (1999/2000)

55 (2000/2001)

UNGA Session

EU

79.1

76.5

77.1

76.8

82.9

80.3

79.4

78.5

84.0

92.0

94.2

93.1

87.5

ASEAN

73.1

73.5

78.7

72.5

72.4

70.4

76.5

81.5

82.7

88.0

91.9

87.1

80.9

Arab League

85.1

79.4

83.6

68.1

68.4

66.7

69.1

75.4

70.7

73.3

91.9

88.8

72.1

ECOWAS

88.1

82.4

78.7

82.6

85.5

71.6

76.5

72.3

76.0

74.7

77.9

69.8

76.5

CARICOM

64.2

54.4

44.3

34.8

47.4

46.9

51.5

49.2

56.0

60.0

70.9

67.2

56.6

OAU/AU

50.8

38.2

42.6

43.5

36.8

32.1

36.8

33.9

38.7

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

CIS

46.3

42.7

44.3

37.7

39.5

33.3

44.1

36.9

36.0

36.0

33.7

29.3

22.1

CoE1

Table A.3: Voting Coherence of Regional and Political Groups and Organisations in the UNGA, 1988–2005 (Recorded Votes)

14.9

19.1

19.7

31.9

39.5

32.1

36.8

30.8

25.3

28.0

20.9

20.0

22.8

G8

320 annex 2

78.1

68.4

74.6

76.7

68.4

57 (2002/2003)

58 (2003/2004)

59 (2004/2005)

60 (2005/2006)*

AVERAGES 82.4

80.8

77.5

79.0

80.8

83.6

81.1

80.8

85.9

85.5

89.1

89.6

78.8

84.9

76.1

90.8

90.4

83.6

77.7

75.3

59.2

81.6

79.5

89.6

54.0

50.7

47.9

48.7

61.6

59.7

43.3

53.4

50.7

50.0

50.7

47.8

37.0

30.1

35.2

38.2

41.1

40.3

22.5

9.6

11.3

17.1

11.0

14.9

1

Council of Europe.

Source: See table A.2, pp. 318–319; * until 21 December 2005; for other restrictions see Chapter Five, footnotes 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, and 26 on pages 227–230.

79.1

56 (2001/2002)

statistics on voting coherence 321

327

342

344

315

295

337

336

335

320

44 (1989/1990)

45 (1990/1991)

46 (1991/1992)

47 (1992/1993)

48 (1993/1994)

49 (1994/1995)

50 (1995/1996)

51 (1996/1997)

Number of all resolutions

43 (1988/1989)

UNGA Session

Number recorded votes

76

81

68

65

75

75

86

116

136

Recorded votes with EU consensus 61

48

47

42

47

40

40

55

62

Recorded votes with ASEAN consensus 63

65

54

51

63

69

81

108

119

Record. votes with Arab League consensus 55

57

52

53

62

66

79

101

110

Recorded votes with ECOWAS consensus 52

54

47

49

53

55

79

103

98

Recorded votes with CARICOM consensus 65

58

52

47

57

56

67

81

104

Recorded votes with OAU/AU consensus 36

38

35

32

42

45

61

78

77

Recorded votes with CIS consensus 28

26

25

22

29

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Recorded votes with CoE consensus 30

27

30

24

27

27

29

34

30

30

26

25

20

19

21

18

22

31

Recorded votes with G8 consensus

Table A.4: Number of Consensual Recorded Votes of Regional and Political Groups and Organisations in the UNGA, 1988–2005

322 annex 2

303

341

328

360

351

324

325

257

329.7

53 (1998/1999)

54 (1999/2000)

55 (2000/2001)

56 (2001/2002)

57 (2002/2003)

58 (2003/2004)

59 (2004/2005)

60 (2005/2006)*

AVERAGES

77.9

73

71

76

73

67

67

68

61

69

51.6

56

53

52

57

53

54

53

52

56

64.8

59

55

60

59

56

53

52

47

53

63.4

59

61

65

65

60

49

50

48

50

61.4

62

54

69

66

56

57

54

51

47

60.2

55

42

62

58

60

59

56

48

57

42.7

37

34

37

45

40

43

37

27

24

35.6

39

36

38

37

32

34

26

26

30

28.0

22

25

29

30

27

31

29

27

26

17.5

7

8

13

8

10

10

13

12

22

Source: See table A.2, pp. 318–319; * until 21 December 2005; for other restrictions see Chapter Five, footnotes 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, and 26 on pages 227–230.

298

52 (1997/1998)

statistics on voting coherence 323

136

116

86

75

75

65

68

81

76

44 (1989/1990)

45 (1990/1991)

46 (1991/1992)

47 (1992/1993)

48 (1993/1994)

49 (1994/1995)

50 (1995/1996)

51 (1996/1997)

Total number of recorded votes

43 (1988/1989)

UNGA Session

Number of votes

22

20

19

20

25

27

25

26

28

Percentage of all recorded votes 28.9

24.7

27.9

30.8

33.3

36.0

29.1

22.4

20.6

Number of votes 30

25

26

22

21

21

28

45

53

Percentage of all recorded votes 39.5

30.9

38.2

33.8

28.0

28.0

32.6

38.8

39.0

Number of votes 7

22

9

10

9

8

11

13

16

9.2

27.2

13.3

15.4

12.0

10.7

12.8

11.2

11.7

Percentage of all recorded votes

Decolonisation and Selfdetermination Human Rights

11

10

11

9

12

12

15

20

23

Number of votes

Security and Disarmament

14.5

12.3

16.2

13.8

16.0

16.0

17.4

17.3

16.9

Percentage of all recorded votes

Middle East

Number of votes 6

4

3

4

8

7

7

12

16

Other

7.9

4.9

4.4

6.2

10.7

9.3

8.1

10.3

11.8

Percentage of all recorded votes

Table A.5: Proportion of UNGA Recorded Votes by Issue Areas, 1988 to 2005

324 annex 2

61

68

67

67

73

76

71

73

77.9

53 (1998/1999)

54 (1999/2000)

55 (2000/2001)

56 (2001/2002)

57 (2002/2003)

58 (2003/2004)

59 (2004/2005)

60 (2005/2006)*

AVERAGES

21.8

16

19

22

21

21

21

20

20

21

28.6

21.9

26.7

29.0

28.8

31.3

31.3

29.4

32.8

30.4

27.1

28

23

23

25

22

22

26

25

23

Source: See table A.2, pp. 318–319; * until 21 December 2005.

69

52 (1997/1998)

34.6

38.3

32.4

30.3

34.2

32.8

32.8

38.2

41.0

33.3

9.7

8

7

9

7

7

8

8

7

8

12.4

11.0

9.9

11.8

9.6

10.5

11.9

11.8

11.5

11.6

14.6

18

19

20

18

16

13

13

8

14

18.8

24.7

26.8

26.3

24.7

23.9

19.4

19.1

13.1

20.3

4.8

3

3

2

2

1

3

1

1

3

5.6

4.1

4.2

2.6

2.7

1.5

4.6

1.5

1.6

4.4

statistics on voting coherence 325

Bulgaria

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Belgium

Austria

Albania

85.2 95.1 98.4 93.3 90.4 86.1 81.4 76.0 89.2 96.9 91.5 89.3 95.5 84.6 92.4 86.6 93.5

Croatia

Coherence other issues

Cyprus

74.6 91.2 98.9 93.6 83.3 85.1 61.3 60.0 83.9 90.2 91.8 90.9 94.9 75.1 96.1 86.5 88.2

Czechoslovakia

Coherence Human Rights

Czech Republic

76.6 81.0 86.6 89.2 83.9 90.7 68.5 62.7 85.9 86.0 87.6 83.9 58.1 85.7 88.6 76.0 83.9

Denmark

Coherence Decolonisation

Estonia

83.8 83.9 99.2 94.1 88.2 91.7 68.4 70.6 90.4 93.8 90.4 88.3 78.8 91.5 97.6 92.2 88.3

Finland

Coherence Security

France

84.0 96.1 99.8 99.1 92.7 99.2 76.0 81.4 94.0 99.5 98.7 98.3 98.7 99.6 99.1 90.1 93.5

FYROM

Coherence Middle East

Germany

82.0 89.0 97.2 94.8 88.1 92.1 70.3 71.0 89.4 93.8 92.9 91.2 85.7 89.6 96.2 87.7 89.5

Hungary

Overall Coherence

Greece

Table A.6: Average Coherence With EC/EU Majority of Individual EC/EU MS by Issue Areas, 1988 to 2005

326 annex 2

Malta

Luxembourg

Lithuania

Latvia

Italy

Ireland

highest three values of all countries examined in each category (no occurence) highest three values of EU-15 MS in each category highest three values of EU-25 MS in each category lowest three values of all countries examined in each category lowest three values of EU-15 MS examined in each category lowest three values of EU-25 MS examined in each category If a EU-15 MS has the highest/lowest value of all countries examined, it automatically has the highest/lowest value of the EU-25 MS and of all countries. Only if a EU-25 MS has a higher/lower value than a EU-15 MS it will be marked, and only if a country not belonging to the EU has a higher/lower value than a EU-25 MS it will be marked. Therefore it is possible that not three countries are given for each of the sixth categories. Since EU-15 MS always have the highest values of all the countries examined there is no occurence of the category ‘highest three values of all countries examined in each category’.

Legend:

95.2 97.4 97.5 92.3 97.7 83.0 97.0 91.9 94.0 89.6 79.6 91.5 93.5 93.8 96.1 55.6 89.7

Netherlands

Coherence other issues

Poland

88.2 95.9 91.9 92.3 99.0 78.8 97.7 84.8 93.9 80.7 62.5 79.3 90.2 87.3 89.0 69.4 92.5

Portugal

Coherence Human Rights

Romania

78.3 96.3 76.1 83.5 93.3 73.1 90.4 86.0 85.1 83.8 62.3 86.7 96.2 78.5 82.0 74.3 49.5

Serbia and Montenegro

Coherence Decolonisation

Slovakia

81.3 98.1 91.7 92.9 98.4 81.8 98.5 89.5 97.3 88.9 70.4 90.7 95.4 94.8 81.6 93.0 76.6

Slovenia

Coherence Security

Spain

99.0 99.8 97.9 98.2 100 78.4 99.3 94.4 100 93.2 83.2 94.8 100 90.5 98.0 73.0 98.9

Sweden

Coherence Middle East

Turkey

88.2 97.8 91.4 93.3 98.3 79.2 97.4 89.7 95.6 88.0 72.3 89.2 95.9 90.0 88.4 79.1 83.1

United Kingdom

Overall Coherence

statistics on voting coherence 327

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INDEX Acceding Countries 194, 306 – Alignment procedure 99, 191–194, 306 – Political dialogue with 191–192, 192 n. 3 – Preparation for accession 191–196 – Treaty of Accession 193 Ad-Hoc-Groups 26, 28, 128, 175 Albania 229 n. 25 – Alignment procedure 192–195 – Preparation for accession 191, 193–195 – Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) 92, 99 – Voting behaviour 284, 287–288, 326–327 Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 159 Amsterdam Treaty 117 Annan, Kofi 99, 103, 132, 132 n. 68, 184, 315 n. 26 Arab League/League of Arab States 28 n. 27, 227, 227 n. 15, 228, 228 nn. 18, 21, 229, 231–232, 292, 320–323 Armenia 229 nn. 24, 25 Article 19 meeting – Ad hoc meetings 83–84 – Candidate countries 195 – EU coordination process 72, 77, 81 – Number of meetings 80–82 – P2 82, 84–86, 176 – Procedures 80, 82–85 – Role of 76, 80–81, 174 – Role vis-à-vis HoMs 80, 82, 87, 89, 91 Associated countries 99, 131, 156, 192 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 227, 227 nn. 15, 17, 228, 228 n. 21, 229, 232, 320–323 Australia 157 Austria 16, 53, 151, 187, 229 n. 25 – EU coordination meetings 63, 69, 75, 155, 168 – Group of 10 186 – Presidency Speeches 180 – Troika meetings 155, 170

– Voting behaviour 220, 226, 244, 255, 264–265, 267–268, 278, 285–286, 295, 326–327 Azerbaijan 229 nn. 24–25 Belarus 229 n. 24 Belgium 37, 165, 180, 229 n. 25 – Core Europe 255–260, 268, 277, 296–297 – EU coordination meetings 63, 69, 155, 168 – Group of 10 186 – Presidency statements 41–42, 141 – Second Committee 166, 168, 170 – Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review 166 – Troika meetings 155, 170 – Voting behaviour 220, 241, 246, 248–249, 255–260, 268–269, 277, 296–297, 326–327 Berlusconi, Silvio 103 Bosnia and Herzegovina 229 n. 25 – European Union Police Mission (EUPM) 102 – Preparation for accession 191, 193–195 – Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) 92, 99 – Voting behaviour 264, 284, 287–288, 326–327 Brazil 147 n. 19, 178 – G4 185, 185 n. 106 – Permanent seat in UNSC 185, 185 n. 105 – Role in the Group of 77 27, 158 Brussels – Brussels-based intergovernmentalism 57, 120–133 – Brussels Brief 56, 101, 311 – Brussels Dimension 15, 120–133 – COREPER I 94, 126, 302 – COREPER II 87, 89, 126, 302 – Council of Ministers 124–126 – Council Working Groups 56, 127–132, 308 – Death penalty 121 – European Council 56, 123–124

350

index

– Europeanisation 8, 57, 302 – European Parliament 86, 132–133 – General Secretariat (GSC) 96, 98, 102–103 – Guidance from 30, 34, 121–122, 126, 129, 154 – Human rights 121–122 – Institutionalisation 2, 5, 8, 57 – Interaction with DECUN 109, 112–113, 115 – Interaction with NYLO 98–99, 101–103, 105, 112, 115 – International Criminal Court 121 – Link between New York and Brussels 5, 13, 30, 34, 56, 69, 87, 92, 98, 101–102, 105, 115, 121–123, 126, 156, 181, 199, 303, 308, 310–311 – National interests 4, 24, 48, 122, 302, 310 – Political and Security Committee (PSC) 34, 87, 98, 126, 130, 181, 302, 308 – Relationship, Political and Security Committee/New York-HoMs 87, 126 – Troika meetings 120 Brusselisation/Europeanisation 8, 53, 57–59, 121, 302–303, 308 – EU External Action Service (EEAS) 197 – EU seat in the UN Security Council 85, 177, 188 Bulgaria 229 n. 25 – Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 192 – Preparation for accession 191–196 – Treaty of Accession 193 – Voting behaviour 255, 279–283, 291, 297, 299, 326–327 Burden-sharing 43, 47, 197, 313 Canada 131, 156–157 – G8 230, 230 n. 26 – JUSCANZ 27, 27 n. 14 Candidate countries 137 – Alignment procedure 99, 191–195 – Political dialogue with 192, 192 n. 3 – Preparation for accession 191–196

– Treaty of Accession 193 – Voting behaviour 206, 249, 255, 259, 284–287, 299 CANZ 78, 92 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 228 n. 19 – G-77 27 n. 12, 28 – Interaction with other groups 28, 92 – Voting coherence 227–229, 231–232, 320–323 Carrington, Peter 40 Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 192, 192 n. 3 China 92, 99, 119, 137, 156, 158, 158 n. 32, 170 n. 48, 185 n. 106, 186, 189 – Group of 77 27, 27 n. 12, 28, 158 – Nuclear weapons 147, 147 n. 19 CIREU 66, 66 n. 78, 98 CODUD 128, 153 CODUN 128, 153, 156 Coffee Club 186 Coherence – Of EC/EU voting in the UN General Assembly 220–221, 223–225, 230, 234–237, 239–240, 242–244, 247, 249, 251–252, 293, 295 – Of regional and political groups and organisations in the UNGA 227, 230, 320–323 – On decolonisation and selfdetermination 213, 232, 234, 242, 246–250, 252, 258, 267, 288, 293, 296–298, 306, 324 326–327 – On disarmament and security 213, 232–234, 242–246, 250, 252, 258, 267, 293–296, 306–307, 324, 326–327 – On human rights questions 211, 232–235, 238–241, 250, 252, 291–294, 305, 324, 326–327 – On Middle East questions 211, 232, 234–238, 250, 252, 265, 278, 288–291, 305, 324, 326–327 Commissioners 26, 90, 92, 113, 180, 304 – Troika-format 117, 119, 137 Commission on Population and Development (CPD) 26, 74, 74 n. 86, 77, 106 n. 19, 162

index Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) 26, 74, 74 n. 86, 106, 113, 162 Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) 26, 77, 106 n. 19 Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 97 n. 7, 302 – COREPER I 94 – COREPER II 87, 89 – Role of 34, 126–127 Committee on Contributions 143 Committee on Development Policy (CDP) 74, 162, 162 n. 37 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 227 n. 15, 229, 229 nn. 22, 24, 230, 230 n. 27, 231, 320–323 Conference on Disarmament 96 n. 5, 128, 147 CONOP 128, 153 n. 28 Convention on the Law of the Sea 107 Coordination Nations Unies (CONUN) 80, 80 n. 94, 127 n. 61, 128–132, 140, 193, 200 n. 21 – ESDP matters 130 – HoMs 80, 87, 130–132 – Political and Security Committee 130–131, 308 – Political dialogue with third parties 131 – Role of 129–132, 140, 308 Coordination reflex 81, 222 Core Europe 11, 15, 173, 255–257 – Decolonisation and selfdetermination 258, 296–298 – Human rights questions 291–293 – Middle East questions 288–291 – Security and disarmament 258, 293–296 – Voting coherence 255–262, 268, 271–272, 277, 287–299 Correspondence Européenne (COREU) 30 n. 30, 56, 80, 98, 101, 123, 192 nn. 3–4 Council of Europe (CoE) 128, 227 n. 15, 229, 229 n. 25, 230–231, 320–323 Council of the European Union 80 n. 95, 95, 123 nn. 44–46, 174 n. 64, 178, 180 – Role of 34, 124–126 – Troika 116 Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN (NYLO)

351

– Observer status 97 – Personnel resources 97, 103, 108 – Relationship with Commission Delegation 96–98, 103–105, 112–116, 156 – Relationship with EU Presidency 35, 96, 98–101, 103–104 – Role of 35, 95–105, 311 – Single EU Representation 114–116 Council Working Groups 34 n. 36, 56, 127–130, 153, 308 Credential Committee 143 Croatia 229 n. 25 – Candidate countries 191, 193–194, 249, 259, 284–285 – Political dialogue with 193 – Preparation for accession 191–196 – Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) 92, 99 – Voting behaviour 249, 264, 284–286, 326-327 Cyprus – Europe Association Agreements 192 – Nonconformists 277–279 – Relationship with Greece 264, 271 – Voting coherence with Malta 237, 260, 264, 277–279, 289, 291 – Voting behaviour 237, 246, 260–265, 267–269, 271–272, 276–279, 282–283, 286, 299, 326–327 Czechoslovakia 326 Czech Republic 69, 229 n. 25 – Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 192, 192 n. 2 – Voting behaviour 260–261, 263, 267, 282–283, 297, 326–327 Delegation of the European Commission to the UN (DECUN) – Cooperation DECUN/NYLO 114–116 – EC exclusive competences 110–112, 114, 166-167 – EU coordination process 34, 110–111, 115 – Functioning of 105–114 – Influence 34, 105–106

352

index

– Outward orientation 110, 113 – Personnel resources of 108–109, 112 – Reporting of 112 – Role of 105–114 – Second Committee 166–167 – UN funds and programmes 109 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 124, 179 n. 84, 229 n. 23 Denmark 180, 229 n. 25 – EU coordination meetings 63, 69, 155, 168 – EU Presidency 88, 180 – Membership in the UNSC 172 – Nordic WEOG states 152, 186 – Presidency statements 41–42, 141 – Second Committee 165–168 – Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review 166 – Troika meetings 155, 170 – Voting behaviour 222, 235, 241, 289, 326–327 Deputy Permanent Representatives (DPRs) Meeting 72–73 – Code of conduct 73 – Role of 92–94 – Troika meetings 118, 120 de Vries, Gijs 180 Eastern European Group (EES) 28 n. 22, 171 nn. 52–53 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) – NGOs 162 – North-South-antagonism 157 – UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) 26, 74, 106, 113, 162, 169 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 227, 227 n. 15, 228, 228 nn. 20–21, 229, 231–232, 320–323 Effectiveness 46, 54, 71 – Of EU coordination 32, 52, 64, 72–73, 88, 195, 304, 306, 309, 311 – Of EU external action 4, 18, 57, 308 – EU seat in the UN Security Council 37, 188 – Of the UN 1, 25, 183, 185, 188 – Revitalisation of the UNGA 139 Egypt 28, 156, 158, 185 n. 105, 228 n. 18

– African Union (AU) 229, 229 n. 23 – New Agenda Coalition 147, 147 n. 19 Enlargement of the EU – Alignment procedure 99, 192–195 – Cooperation with Associated and Acceding Countries 191–196 – Effects of 4, 191–196 – Political dialogue with candidate countries 192–193 – Preparation for accession 191–195 – The EU-27 255, 262, 279–284, 291, 294, 296–298 – The EU-33 255, 264, 284–288 – Treaty of Accession 193 Estonia 229 n. 25 – Europe Association Agreements 192 – Voting behaviour 273, 285, 285 n. 21, 286, 326–327 EU Constitution (see EU Reform Treaty) EU Counter-Terrorism 180 – Committee 81, 180 n. 88 – Coordinator Gijs de Vries 180 EU Foreign Minister (EUFM) 196, 198–200, 252 EU Presidency (see Presidency of the European Union) EU Reform Treaty – EU coordination and representation at the UN 196–198 – EU Foreign Minister 196, 198–199 – European External Action Service (EEAS) 91, 115, 197–199 – Implications for EU at UN 196–201 – Legal personality EU 196, 199–201 European Commission – Accreditation 96, 108 – Annual Progress Reports 263 – Cooperation with Council Liaison Office 114–116 – Delegation of the European Commission to the UN 105–114 – EU Reform Treaty 197, 199–200 – Second Committee issues 166–167, 169 – Statements 43, 112

index – Troika 45, 95, 97, 116–117, 154, 169, 311 European Community (EC) – Exclusive competences 30–31, 35, 43, 110–111 – Representation of 105 – Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) 196, 201 European Council – Council Working Groups 34, 56, 127–132, 153, 308 – Influence from 34, 56, 123–124 – Role of 34, 123–124 – Rotating Presidency 35, 68, 116–117 European External Action Service (EEAS) 91, 115–116, 197, 197 n. 12, 198–201, 252, 310, 314 Europeanisation / Brusselisation 8, 53, 57–59, 121, 302–303, 308 – EU External Action Service (EEAS) 197 – EU seat in the UN Security Council 85, 177, 188 European Parliament (EP) 44 n. 52, 86, 86 n. 100, 132 n. 68, 187 – European External Action Service (EEAS) 116 – Influence from 36, 132–133, 199 – Role of 132–133 European Political Cooperation (EPC) 48, 52, 59–61, 116, 127, 174, 304 – Comparison of CFSP with 301 – Literature on 2 n. 6, 9, 13, 15 n. 4, 17, 58 n. 69, 205 n. 1, 211 n. 15, 219 n. 3, 301, 304 n. 6 – Report on 151 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 10, 87, 100, 103, 130, 156, 171, 188–189, 314 European Security Strategy 2 Europe Association Agreement (EEA) 99, 192–193 EU status at the UN 96 n. 6, 105–109, 171, 186–187, 200, 305 Fifth Committee 36–37, 47, 52, 78, 144, 149, 160–161 Finland 151, 180, 229 n. 25 – EU coordination meetings 53, 63, 69, 167–168, 155 – Nordic WEOG states 16, 186 – Presidency statements 41, 141 – Role as donor 165–166

353

– Second Committee issues 165–168, 170, – Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review 166 – Troika meetings 155, 170 – Voting behaviour 220, 241 n. 55, 244, 255, 295, 326–327 First Committee 51, 144, 146–149 – Coordination meetings 74–75, 151–155, 306 – Comparison with other intergovernmental bodies 141–142, 160 – Non-proliferation 147, 150 – Nuclear disarmament 147 – Open-Ended Working Group “Marking and Tracing of Small Arms and Light Weapons” 150 – Troika meetings 154–156 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 230 n. 25 – Alignment procedure 99, 191–196 – Candidate countries 191, 193–194, 259, 284–285 – Voting behaviour 259, 284–285, 326–327 – Stabilisation and Association process 92 Fourth Committee 74, 142, 144 France – Article 19 TEU 79, 173–174, 178–179 – Big 3 266 – Big 5 255, 271–272 – Decolonisation 52, 248–249, 267 – Disarmament and international security/nuclear weapons 53, 147, 151, 242–246, 293–296 – EU coordination meetings 62–63, 69, 77, 155, 168, 312 – EU Presidency statements in the UN Security Council, opposition to 182 – EU Reform Treaty 185–187, 198, 201 – G8 230 n. 26 – HR/SG 179 – National interests 53, 77, 151, 172–174, 178–179, 182, 186–187 – Nonconformists 299 – P2 82, 84–85, 111, 151, 172–173, 176–177, 179, 182–183 – Presidency statements 41–42, 141 – Troika meetings 119, 155, 170

354

index

– Veto powers 171, 182 – Voting behaviour 220, 226, 242–246, 258, 263–271, 276–277, 282–283, 286, 289, 291–295, 297, 299, 326–327 General Assembly (UNGA) – EC/EU voting coherence in 219–232 – EC in 105–106 – EU in 140–143 – Main Committees 143–146 General Committee 93, 143 Geneva 164 n. 39 – Coordination 8, 108, 116, 153–154 – Council’s Liaison Office 96, 102 – European Commission Delegation 108, 116 – First Committee issues 153–154 – HoMs 87 Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) 96 n. 5, 128, 147, 149, 153 Geneva Protocol 245 Georgia 229 nn. 24–25 Germany, Federal Republic of – Article 19 meetings 85 – Big 3 266 – Big 5 255, 271–272 – Burden-sharing 47 – Core Europe 229 n. 25, 255–262, 271–272, 275, 289 – EU coordination meetings 62, 69, 77, 155, 168, 177 – First Committee 152, 155 – G4 185–186 – G8 230 n. 26 – Membership in the UN Security Council 47, 172, 177, 183 – National interests 53, 165, 173, 185–186 – Personnel resources 54, 76–77, 166 – Presidency statements 41 – Reform, UN Security Council 165, 185–188 – Seat in the UN Security Council 165, 185–187 – Troika meetings 155, 170 – Voting behaviour 226, 235, 241, 248, 255–262, 264–268, 271–272, 275–277, 289, 293, 297, 326–327 Global Environmental Facility 107 Greece 180

– Accession 17, 226, 263 – Cyprus 264, 271 – EU coordination meetings 63, 69, 155, 168 – EU integration 17, 222, 270–271 – Membership in the UN Security Council 172 – Presidency statements 41–42, 141 – Strike by Greek diplomats 220 – Troika meetings 119, 155, 169–170 – Voting behaviour 17, 152, 220, 222, 241, 258, 263, 270–271, 326–327 Group of 10 186 Group of 77 (G-77) 4, 27, 27 nn. 12–13, 28, 28 n. 16, 139, 158, 158 n. 32, 160, 165 – Common positions 28 – Cooperation with other groups 28–29, 32, 111, 119, 137, 159 – G-77 Presidency 27 n. 12, 32, 159 Group of African States (GAFS) 171 n. 52 Group of Asian States (GASS) 171 n. 52, 53 Group of Eight (G8) 230, 230 n. 26 – Comparison with other groups 227 n. 15, 230, 230 n. 27, 231, 320–323 – Voting coherence 230, 230 n. 27, 231, 320–323 Group of Four (G4) 185, 185 n. 106, 186, 227 n. 15; (see also Germany, Brazil, India and Japan) Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC) 28 n. 22, 171 n. 52 Group of Friends 28, 28 n. 25 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 119, 119 n. 38, 137 Heads of Missions 86 – ‘Brussels Brief ’ 56 – See also HoMs Meeting Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 28, 28 n. 18 High Representative for the CFSP/ Secretary-General of the Council (HR/SG) 25, 90, 98, 102–104, 117, 119, 137, 179–180, 199, 201 307, 307 n. 9; see also Solana, Javier

index High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (see EU ‘Foreign Minister’) HoMs Meeting 94, 99–100 – COREPER II 87, 89 – Function / role of 70, 72–73, 79, 82, 86–87, 89–92 – Number of meetings 65, 79, 87–88 – See also Heads of Mission Hungary 69, 138, 230 n. 25 – Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 192, 192 n. 2 – Voting behaviour 226 n. 13, 274–275, 275 n. 14, 276–277, 326 Iceland 229 n. 25 – Alignment mechanism 99, 193–194 – EEA 99, 192–193 – EFTA 99, 194 – Nordic WEOG states 186 India 28, 92, 99, 158 – G4 185, 185 n. 106 – Nuclear weapons 147 n. 19 – Security Council Reform 185 nn. 105–106 Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF ) 26, 75 n. 89, 106, 162–163, 163 n. 38 International Criminal Court (ICC) 28 n. 26, 83, 121, 128 International Governmental Organisation (IGO) 3, 5 Iraq 26, 81–83, 87, 99, 123, 123 n. 44, 124, 124 n. 27, 132, 176–177, 182, 184, 228 n. 18 Ireland 46, 151, 165 n. 41, 180, 205 n. 1, 229 n. 25 – EU coordination meetings 63, 69, 155, 168 – Group of 10 186 – Influence on Article 19 Meeting 81, 85 – Membership in the UN Security Council 46, 85, 172, 183 – New Agenda Coalition (NAC) 147, 147 n. 19, 151, 242, 244 – Presidency statements 41–42, 141 – Troika meetings 155, 170 – Voting behaviour 222, 226 n. 13, 241–242, 244, 246, 264–265, 267–268, 278 n. 18, 295, 327

355

Italy 15, 40, 46, 60, 103, 180, 229 n. 25 – Big 5 255, 271 – Coffee Club 186 – Core Europe 15, 255–256, 259–260, 271, 277 n. 15, 293, 293 n. 26 – EU coordination meetings 62–63, 69, 77, 155, 168 – G8 230 n. 26 – Membership in the UN Security Council 172 – Presidency statements 41–42, 141 – Troika meetings 119, 155, 169–170 – UN Security Council reform 186, 188 n. 119 – Voting behaviour 226 n.13, 249, 255, 259–260, 260 n. 6, 261, 268 n. 9, 277 n. 15, 293, 296 n. 29, 327 Japan 27, 92, 119, 131, 137, 156–157, 185 n. 105 – G4 185, 185 n. 106 – G8 230 n. 26 – JUSCANZ 27, 27 n. 14 JUSCANZ 27, 27 n. 14, 32, 52, 78 Kazakhstan 229 n. 24 Kinkel, Klaus 41 Kohl, Helmut 232 Kyrgyz Republic 229 n. 24 Latin Americans 26, 75 n. 89, 185 n. 105 – COLAT 129 – G-77 27 n. 12 – Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC) 28 n. 22, 171 n. 52 – Interaction with EU 27, 119, 137, 309 Latvia 69, 230 n. 25 – Europe Association Agreements 192 – Voting behaviour 273, 275–277, 326–327 League of Arab States/Arab League 28 n. 27, 227, 227 n. 15, 228 nn. 18, 21, 229, 231–232, 292, 320, 322 Least Developed Countries (LDC) 26, 28, 164

356

index

Legal personality EU 196, 199, 200 n. 21, 252, 305 Liechtenstein 229 n. 25 – Alignment mechanism 192–194 – EEA 99, 192–194 Lithuania 69, 229 n. 25 – Europe Association Agreements 192 – Voting behaviour 273–277, 326–327 Luxembourg 37, 76, 135, 152, 165 n. 41, 180, 229 n. 25 – Core Europe 255–256, 259, 277 n. 15 – EU coordination meetings 62–63, 69, 155, 168 – Presidency statements 41–42, 141 – Troika meetings on 154–155, 170 – Voting behaviour 241 n. 55, 246, 249, 255–256, 259–261, 268 n. 9, 269, 275–277, 326–327 Main Committees 24, 26, 54, 66, 74, 135, 214, 233 – Confrontational type of Main Committees 146–157 – Consensus-oriented type of Main Committees 157–169 – EU Presidency statements 141 – Fifth Main Committee 36–37, 47, 51–52, 74 n. 85, 78, 142, 144, 149, 160–161 – First Main Committee 146–157 – Fourth Main Committee 74 n. 85, 142, 144 n. 18 – Role of 143–146 – Second Main Committee 157–169 – Sixth Main Committee 37, 51, 74, 142, 144, 169 – Third Main Committee 51, 65, 72, 74–75, 120, 142, 144, 167–169, 312–313 – Troika meetings 118, 120, 137, 154–156, 169–170 Malta 69, 76, 230 n. 25 – Europe Association Agreements 192 – Nonconformists 277–279 – Political dialogue 192 – Voting behaviour 226 n. 13, 237, 255–256, 260, 262–269, 277–278, 278 n. 18, 289, 291, 299, 326–327

Methodology 205–217 Michel, Louis 180 Millennium Summit 106, 129 – Millennium Declaration 138, 140 – Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 138, 157, 165 n. 41, 307 – Second Committee 157 Moldova, Republic of 194, 229 n. 24, 230 n. 25 National interests 1, 4, 6, 10–11, 15, 24–25, 29, 31, 33–34, 42, 59–60, 105, 122, 139, 158, 176, 178, 182, 205, 214, 228–229, 231, 241, 253, 301–303 – EU coordination 8, 39, 47–53, 58–59, 68, 77, 88, 122, 172, 176, 182, 186, 205, 222, 260, 304–307 – First Committee 53, 142, 147, 153, 246 – Influence on UN Security Council reform 18, 165, 184 – New EU MS 255, 273, 283 – Second Committee 53, 163, 165–166 Netherlands 37, 46, 53, 76, 81, 101, 180, 188 – Core Europe 230 n. 25, 255–256, 259–260, 275, 293, 297 – EU coordination meetings 62–63, 69, 91, 155, 167–168, 186, 312 – Membership in the UN Security Council 172 – Presidency statements 41–42, 141 – Role as donor 165 – Troika meetings 118–119, 137, 154–155, 170 – Voting behaviour 152, 235, 241, 246, 249, 255–256, 259–261, 275–276, 289, 293, 297, 326–327 New Agenda Coalition (NAC) – Influence on voting behaviour 148, 151, 242, 244 – Membership 147, 151, 242, 244 – Policy aims 147–148 New Zealand 157 – JUSCANZ 27 n. 14 – New Agenda Coalition (NAC) 147 n. 19 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 27, 27 n. 13, 119, 137, 149, 158 – Resolution on “International Peace and Security” 93

index Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 6, 78, 113, 118, 145, 148, 164 – ECOSOC 162 – Second Main Committee 162 Norway 157, 165 n. 41, 230 n. 25 – Alignment mechanism 194 – EEA 99 n. 9, 192–194 – Nordic WEOG states 186 Observer status – Candidate countries 195 – European Community 96 n. 6, 97, 105–106, 106 n. 19, 107–109 – NYLO 97 – View of United States 107–108 Organisation of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU) 28 – Darfur 124 – ECOWAS 227 n. 15, 231, 320–323 – Voting coherence 227, 229–231, 320–323 Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 28, 119, 137 Pacific Islands Forum 92 Permanent missions to the UN 33–34, 54 Permanent Representative (PR) 55 n. 62, 70, 73, 86, 86 n. 101, 88, 90, 92, 146, 173, 176–177, 177 n. 73, 183, 186 n. 110, 194 n. 10 Personalities, role of 70–71, 110, 166, 175 Poland 69, 76, 230 n. 25 – Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 192 – UN Security Council reform 184 n. 98, 186, 188 n. 119 – Voting behaviour 226 n. 13, 282–283, 326–327 Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC) 6, 35, 98 Political and Security Committee (PSC) 80 n. 94, 87, 126–127, 130–131, 302 – Influence of 34, 126, 178, 181 – Interaction with other bodies 34, 87, 98, 127, 181, 308 Portugal 176, 188, 230 n. 25 – Effect of accession of 17, 226 – EU coordination meetings 62, 69, 155, 168

357

– First Committee 152, 155 – Group of 10 186 – Membership in the UN Security Council 172, 177, 180 – Presidency statements 41–42, 141 – Troika meetings 120, 155, 170 – Voting behaviour 226, 249, 296, 326–327 Potential candidate countries – Alignment procedure 191–195 – Political dialogue with 192 – Preparation for accession 191, 193–195 – Voting behaviour 206, 255, 259, 264, 284, 287–288 Presidency of the European Union – Burden sharing 43, 47 – ‘Cireu’ system 66–67 – Deficits of current system 40, 46, 309–310 – EU coordination meetings 31, 46–47, 62–70, 75, 103, 155, 167–168, 186, 309, 313 – EU internal role of 35–40 – External role of 35–37, 40–47 – HoMs 88–89, 91, 99–100 – Interaction with NYLO 35, 96–101, 103–104 – Interaction with other parties 36, 43–45, 52, 104, 112, 167 – National interests 38–40, 44, 48, 50, 59, 186 – Neutrality of 100 – Statements 33–34, 40–43, 70, 99, 112, 141, 179, 193–195 – Statements in the UNSC 40, 42–43, 141, 179–180, 194, 200 – Troika meetings 45, 104, 116–120, 137, 154–155, 169–170 Programmes and Funds of the UN 24, 26, 31, 166 – European Commission Delegation 109 – Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR) 166 Regional groupings in the UN 45, 146 Rio Group 28, 52, 78, 159 Romania 209, 230 n. 25, 299 – Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 192 – EU-27 255, 259, 279–283, 291, 297

358

index

– Preparation for accession 191–196 – Treaty of Accession 193 – Voting behaviour 255, 259, 279–283, 291, 297, 326–327 Rumor, Mariano 40 Russia 92, 124, 148, 156, 170 n. 48, 230 n. 25 – Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 229 n. 24, 231 – G8 230 n. 26, 231 – Nuclear weapons 147 n. 19 Second Committee 19, 51, 65, 74–76, 120, 141–142, 144, 146, 149, 157–170 Secretary-General of the Council (see High Representative for the CFSP) Security Council – EU cooperation 169–171 – EU presence/representation 171–183 – Membership 85, 171–173, 176–177, 184–185, 187–188 – Permanent seats 18, 170–174, 176, 178, 185–187, 266 – Reform of 17–19, 85, 143, 176, 183–189, 272, 307 Serbia and Montenegro 230 n. 25 – Potential candidate countries 191–194, 259, 284, 287 – Stabilisation and Association process (SAP) 92, 99, 193–194 – Voting behaviour 264, 284, 287–288, 326–327 Silence procedure 65 n. 76, 66–67, 73, 98 Single European Act (SEA) 151, 174, 226 Sixth Committee 37, 51, 74, 144, 169 Slovakia 69, 188 n. 119, 230 n. 25 – Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 192, 192 n. 3 – Membership in the UN Security Council 172 – Voting behaviour 226, 260–261, 263–264, 271, 282–283, 326–327 Slovenia 69, 230 n. 25 – Alignment mechanism 193 – New Agenda Coalition (NAC) 147

– Voting behaviour 226, 249, 264–265, 271, 273, 275–276, 278, 285–286, 326–327 Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 26, 28, 92, 107 Solana, Javier 10, 25, 104, 201, 307 n. 9 (see also High Representative for the CFSP) South Africa 28, 185 n. 105, 229 n. 23 – Apartheid 144 n. 18, 222, 234, 238, 307 – New Agenda Coalition (NAC) 147 n. 19 Spain 17, 165 n. 41, 177, 230 n. 25 – Big 5 255, 271–272 – Coffee Club 186 – EU coordination meetings 63, 69, 151, 155, 168, 222 – Membership in the UN Security Council 172, 177, 180, 186 – Presidency statements 41–42, 141 – Troika meetings 119, 155, 170 – Voting behaviour 222, 226, 241, 249, 255, 271, 295, 326–327 Split votes 40, 51, 74, 148, 152–153, 165, 206, 223–226, 237, 240–241, 245, 248, 250, 253, 259–260, 262–263, 265–267, 270, 273–274, 280–281, 285, 289, 293, 296, 307, 312–313, 318–319 Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) 92 n. 111, 99, 193 – Candidate countries 137, 194 Sweden 53, 180, 230 n. 25 – EU coordination meetings 62, 69, 155, 167–168 – Membership in the UN Security Council 167, 172, 187 – New Agenda Coalition (NAC) 147 n. 19, 151, 242, 244 – Nordic WEOG states 165, 186 – Personnel resources 76 – Presidency statements 41–42, 141 – Role as donor 165 – Second Committee issues 53, 76, 165–168, 170 – Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review 166 – Troika meetings 118–119, 155, 170 – Voting behaviour 220, 241 n. 55, 242–244, 246, 255, 267–269, 295, 326–327 Switzerland 157, 230

index Tajikistan 229 n. 24 Think tanks 113, 114 Third Committee 142, 144 – ECOSOC 75, 167 – EU coordination meetings 51, 65, 72, 74–75, 167–168, 312–313 – Split votes 51, 74, 312–313 – Troika meetings 120, 169 – Vade-mecum for streamlining EU coordination 312–313 Treaty on European Union ( TEU ) – Article 12 TEU 96, 136, 312 – Article 18 TEU 35–36, 104, 117, 135 – Article 19 TEU 79–81, 85, 96, 125, 173–179, 311 – Article 20 TEU 2, 23, 35–36, 96 – Article 21 TEU 36 – Article 24 TEU 36 – Article 26 TEU 98, 103 – Impact on EU cooperation in the Security Council 79, 174, 176, 178, 222 – Impact on voting behaviour 220–222, 238, 240, 242, 301 – Permanent membership France and the UK in the UN Security Council 173, 175–176, 178 Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR) 166 Troika meetings 45, 95, 116–120, 137, 311 – First Committee 154–156 – HoMs level 92, 99, 116, 118 – Lunch meetings 92, 99 – NYLO 97–98, 103–104 – Second Committee 120, 169–170 – Single EU Delegation 197 Turkey 194, 230 n. 25 – Political dialogue with 131, 191, 193, 285 – Preparation for accession 191, 193, 285 – Voting behaviour 209 n. 11, 259 n. 3, 284–287, 326–327 Ukraine 194, 229 n. 24, 230 n. 25, 312 n. 15 United Kingdom – Article 19 TEU 79, 81–82, 84–85, 173–174, 176, 178 – Big 3 266

359

– Big 5 255, 271–272 – Budget and financial questions 53, 165, 167–168, 170 – Decolonisation 226, 246–250 – Disarmament and international security 155, 242–246 – EU coordination meetings 62–63, 69, 76–77, 155, 167–168 – EU Presidency 41–42, 141, 154–155, 168, 170, 180 – EU Presidency statements in the UN Security Council, opposition to 179 – G8 173, 230 – HR/SG 179–180 – National interests 51, 53, 165, 167, 172–174, 176–178, 182, 187, 189, 244, 305 – Nonconformists 299 – P2 82, 84–85, 111, 151, 173, 176–177, 179, 182–183 – Presidency statements 40–42, 141 – Second Committee 76, 165, 167–168, 170 – Troika meetings 154–155, 170 – UK and EU relationship 187, 277, 305 – UK and US relationship 51, 173, 315 – UN Security Council 40, 42, 51, 172–173, 176–178, 180, 186–188 – Veto powers 171, 178, 182, 184–186 – Voting behaviour 226, 235 n. 48, 241–242, 244, 246, 248–249, 255, 260–261, 263–272, 276–277, 282–283, 286, 289, 291, 293, 297, 299, 326–327 United Nations – Article 3 2 n. 4 – Charter 24–25, 106, 111, 135–136, 138, 143, 170, 173–174, 187, 201 – Disarmament Commission (UNDC) 26, 128, 147, 149–150 – General Assembly 135–143 – Reform 139–140, 183–189 – Reform proposals from the European Parliament 187 – The role of the EU in UN reform 85–86, 176, 180, 183–189 – UN Development Programme (UNDP) 26, 109, 166

360

index

– UN-EU Cooperation 102, 169–171 – UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) 26, 106, 163 – UN Fund for Population Activities ( UNFPA) 26, 109, 166 – UN International Children’s Emergency Fund ( UNICEF ) 26, 109 – UN Security Council 169–183 – UN Secretary General (UNSG) 92, 99, 103, 119, 132, 136–137, 184, 315 United States of America 27–28, 28 n. 23, 86 n. 101, 92, 99, 137, 147, 147 n. 19, 157, 211, 234 n. 45, 238 – Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 148 – Biennialisation or triennialisation of resolutions 149 – CONUN 131 – ECOSOC 157 – EU-US relationship 18, 27, 32, 114, 147 n. 19, 158–159, 163, 315

– – – – –

G8 230 n. 26, 231 Israeli-Palestinian-conflict 160 JUSCANZ 27, 27 n. 14 Middle East 182 Reform UN Security Council 165, 185 n. 105, 186, 189 – Relationship with European Commission 96, 97 n. 7, 107 n. 27, 107–108, 111, 114 – Troika meetings 99, 156 – US and UK relationship 51, 176, 315 Uzbekistan 229 n. 24 Wallström, Margot 304 Western European and Others Group (WEOG) 28, 28 n. 22, 23, 171 nn. 52–53, 186, 309 Working Groups of the Council of the European Union 34 n. 36, 56, 127–130, 153, 308