The Persians (Peoples of Asia)

the

Persians

The Peoples of Asia General Editor: Morris Rossabi Each volume in this series comprises a complete history, from origins to the present, of the people under consideration. Written by leading archaeologists, historians, and anthropologists, the books are addressed to a wide, multi-disciplinary readership, as well as to the general reader. Published The Manchus Pamela Kyle Crossley

The Mughals of India Harbans Mukhia

The Mongols David Morgan

The Persians Gene R. Garthwaite

The Afghans Willem Vogelsang

In preparation The Turks Colin Heywood

The Japanese Irwin Scheiner

The Phoenicians James Muhly

The Chinese Arthur Waldron

the

Persians Gene R. Garthwaite

© 2005 by Gene R. Garthwaite blackwell publishing 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK 550 Swanston Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia The right of Gene R. Garthwaite to be identified as the Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. First published 2005 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Garthwaite, Gene R. (Gene Ralph), 1933– The Persians / Gene R. Garthwaite. p. cm.—(Peoples of Asia) Includes index. ISBN 1-5578-6860-3 (alk. paper) 1. Iran—History. I. Title. II. Series. DS272.G27 2004 955—dc22 2004006863 A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library. Set in 10 on 12.5 pt Sabon by SNP Best-set Typesetter Ltd, Hong Kong Printed and bound in the United Kingdom by TJ International, Padstow, Cornwall The publisher’s policy is to use permanent paper from mills that operate a sustainable forestry policy, and which has been manufactured from pulp processed using acid-free and elementary chlorine-free practices. Furthermore, the publisher ensures that the text paper and cover board used have met acceptable environmental accreditation standards. For further information on Blackwell Publishing, visit our website: www.blackwellpublishing.com

To R. Andrew, Alexander, and Martin

Contents

List of Figures

viii

List of Dynastic Tables

x

List of Maps

xi

Acknowledgments

xii

Dynastic Tables

xiv

Maps

xix

1 Persia: Place and Idea 2 The Achaemenians (c.550–331 bc)

1 22

3 Alexander (330–323 bc), the Seleucids (312–129 bc), and the Parthians (247 bc – ad 224) 4 The Sasanians (c.224–651)

66 86

5 “Non-Iran”: Arabs, Turks, and Mongols in Iran

118

6 The Safavids (1501–1722)

157

7 The Qajars (1796–1926)

191

8 Iran, 1921–2003: Pahlavi and Islamic Republican Iran

221

Notes

282

Further Reading

286

Index

296

Figures

2.1 Cyrus’s tomb 2.2 Bisitun inscription 2.3 Apadana, Persepolis 2.4 Persepolis reliefs of procession of peoples bearing gifts 2.5 Rock-cut tomb at Naqsh-i Rustam 2.6 Persepolis reliefs of Persians and Medes 2.7 Achaemenian ruler, fire altar, and Ahura Mazda, rock-cut tomb 3.1 Heracles at Bisitun 4.1 Investiture of Bahram I 4.2 Ardashir I receives the diadem 4.3 Khusrau I’s palace, Taq-i Kisra, at Ctesiphon 4.4 Shapur I’s triumph over Rome 4.5 Investiture of Ardashir II 4.6 Dish with Khusrau I 4.7 Khusrau II, Taq-i Bustan 4.8 Dish with Shapur II on a lion hunt 5.1 The Shahristan Bridge crosses the Zayandah river just to the east of Isfahan 5.2 Stucco mihrab (niche that indicates the direction of prayer) and inscription 5.3 Oljeitu’s tomb 6.1 Ardabil carpet 6.2 Masjid-i Shah, Isfahan 6.3 Si-u-sih Bridge is named for its 33 arches 6.4 Madrasah-yi Madar-i Shah, the theological school of the mother of the shah 7.1 Qajar rock-relief, Taq-i Bustan 7.2 Nasir al-Din Shah on the Peacock Throne 7.3 Shrine of Fatima, Qum

31 48 51 52 54 61 63 73 88 89 90 91 101 106 115 116 119 129 145 171 176 178 181 196 198 203

Figures

7.4 7.5 7.6 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10

Gathering of ulema Central section of a contemporary copy of Fath ‘Ali Shah mural Two cigarette papers Riza Shah The Shahyad Tower, Tehran The poet Furugh Furrukhzad Postage stamp showing Muhammad Riza Shah and the 12 component symbols of the White Revolution Postage stamp commemorating the centenary of the birth of Riza Shah Poster showing Khomeini’s expulsion of the shah The Imamzadah (shrine) near Shahr-i Kurd has revolutionary slogans painted on its walls Postage stamp showing a woman with a rifle barrel and wearing the hijab, or Islamic dress Two wall murals in Tehran, Khomeini and the Mother of Martyrs The cemetery near Junaqan, Chahar Mahal

ix

204 205 216 234 243 245 249 250 256 258 265 273 277

Dynastic Tables

1 2 3 4 5

The The The The The

Achaemenians Sasanians Safavids Qajars Pahlavis and the Islamic Republic

xiv xv xvi xvii xviii

Maps

1 2 3 4 5

Iran’s geography Achaemenian Iran Sasanian Iran Safavid Iran Contemporary Iran

xix xx xxi xxii xxiii

Acknowledgments

My fascination with Iran goes back a long time, and I am indebted to a very large number of individuals who first assisted me, especially to the late Robert J. and Linda Braidwood, Patty Jo and Red Watson, the late G. E. von Grunebaum, and Nikki Keddie. I would like to thank Roy Mottahedeh and Stephen Dale, who gave me the opportunity to try out my initial ideas for this book at seminars at Harvard and Ohio State University. I owe special thanks to colleagues who willingly read chapters at their various stages: Mangol Bayat, David Morgan, Bill Sumner, Touraj Darjaee, Drew Newman, Misagh Parsa, Morris Rossabi, and the late Charles Wood. In addition these colleagues and others shared their unpublished work with me, and I would like to thank David Stronach and Edmund Herzig in particular. Others took the time to meet with me; I am especially grateful to John Curtis and Amelie Kuhrt. Thanks, too, to Ervand Abrahamian, Jim Bill, William Hanaway, and Shaul Bakhash for their assistance and insight. Special thanks are due to Pamela Crossley for our many discussions regarding rulership and Central Asia. Others at Dartmouth who have patiently discussed aspects of this book with me and freely offered their support include Gail Vernazza, Marysa Navarro, Dale Eickelman, Kamyar Abdi, Nahid Tabatabai, Virginia Close, Patsy Carter, Fran Oscadal, and my History and Dartmouth colleagues in general. My students at Dartmouth have contributed to this book, and as representatives of that large group, I thank David Ruedig, Drew Newman, Beth Baron, and Justin Stearns. Thanks, too, to Ali Bakhtiar, Sheila Blair and Jonathan Bloom, Sheila Canby, Richard Tapper, Sandy Morton, and notably, Susan Reynolds. I should acknowledge, in particular, my colleagues in Iran, Sekandar Amanolahi, Iraj Afshar, and Kaveh Bayat. Lynn Smith could not have been a better editor, and I am grateful to her for her sharp eye and critical questions.

Acknowledgments

xiii

I am grateful to Susan and Jim Wright, and especially to all the Bernsteins, Jane and Raph, John and Jennie, Dan and Claire, and Jeff and Yoshimi, for their generous support and unending encouragement.

Transliteration There is no agreed-upon Persian transliteration. In The Persians I have followed common usage for well-known names and words; otherwise, I have followed the style of the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, but omitting most diacritical marks.

Dynastic Tables Table 1

The Achaemenians

Cyrus II (the Great) (c.558–530 bc) Cambyses (530–522 bc) Gaumata (Bardiya) (522 bc) Darius I (522–486 bc) Xerxes I (486–465 bc) Artaxerxes I (465–424 bc) Xerxes II (424–423 bc) Darius II (423–404 bc) Artaxerxes II (404–359 bc) Artaxerxes III (359–338 bc) Arses (338–336 bc) Darius III (336–330 bc)

Dynastic Tables

Table 2

The Sasanians

Ardashir I (ad 224–239) Shapur I (239/240–272) Hormizd I (272–273) Bahram I (273–276) Bahram II (276–293) Bahram III (293) Narseh (293–302) Hormizd II (302–309) Shapur II (309–379) Ardashir II (379–383) Shapur III (383–388) Bahram IV (388–399) Yazdgard I (399–421) Bahram V (Gur) (421–439) Yazdgard II (439–457) Hormizd III (457–459) Piruz (459–484) Valakhsh (484–488) Kavad I (488–496 and 499–531) Zamasp (496–498) Khusrau I (Anushirvan) (531–579) Hormizd IV (579–590) Khusrau II (590–628) Bahram VI (Chubin) (590–591) Kavad II (628) Ardashir III (628–630) Shahrbaraz (630) Khusrau III (630) Puran (630–631) Azarmigdukht (631) Hormizd V (631–632) Khusrau IV (631–633) Yazdgard III (633–651)

xv

xvi

Dynastic Tables

Table 3 Shah Shah Shah Shah Shah Shah Shah Shah Shah Shah Shah

The Safavids

Isma‘il I (1501–1524) Tahmasp (1524–1576) Isma‘il II (1576–1578) Muhammad Khudabandah (1578–1588) ‘Abbas I (the Great) (1588–1629) Safi I (1629–1642) ‘Abbas II (1642–1666) Sulaiman I (Safi II) (1666–1694) Sultan Husain (1694–1722) Tahmasp II (1722–1732) ‘Abbas III (1732–1749)

Dynastic Tables

Table 4

The Qajars

Agha Muhammad (1779 –1797) Fath ‘Ali Shah (1797–1834) Muhammad Shah (1834–1848) Nasir al-Din Shah (1848–1896) Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1896–1907) Muhammad ‘Ali Shah (1907–1909) Ahmad Shah (1909–1925)

xvii

xviii

Dynastic Tables

Table 5

The Pahlavis and the Islamic Republic

Riza Shah (1926–1941) Muhammad Riza Shah (1941–1979) Khomeini (1979–1989) Khamenei (1989– )

Z a rsi Pe n

BAHRAIN

5671

Mount Damavand

Isfahan

IRAN

Kavir Dasht-e

MOUNTAINS

lf

Gu

Red

Sea

Map 1 Iran’s geography

SAUDI ARABIA

M

KUWAIT

M S IN TA N U O

EGYPT

JORDAN

IRAQ

Baghdad Karbala S RO AG

ISRAEL

LEBANON

RZ

Tehran ELBU

Sea

R.Tigris

S IN TA N U O

Tabriz

n pia Cas

SYRIA

R.Euphrates

6165

Mount Ararat

S SU CA U A C

TURKEY

Black Sea

D as ht -e Lu t

Am ry a

Da

Samarkand

Tashkent

Other important city International boundary Mountain summit (height in metres) Land over 1000m

Capital city

PAKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

u

r Sy rya a D

d

Map 2 Achaemenian Iran

Damascus Jerusalem

Re

Territories Conquered by Cambyses

Territories Conquered by Cyrus II

Persian Empire c.558 BC

Kingdom capital

Memphis

Sais

CILICIA

Gordian

Ur

500 miles

750 km

Pe rsi an

Bushir

Bishapur

G

ul f

SISTAN

KHURASAN

Pasargadae Persepolis KERMAN FARS

Tall-i Malyan

Susa

Nihavand

Ecbatana/Hamadan

Caspian Sea

Ancient coastline Ancient course of river

Babylon

LURISTAN

KURDISTAN

ARMENIA us a) ary uD m (A

Mediterranean Sea

Sardis

LYDIA

Black Sea

Ox

Sea

Cas

Tashkent

pian Sea

Nisa

Bukhara

Samarkand

Merv Dura Europus

Bisitun

Ecbatana

Ctesiphon Isfahan Babylon Susa Istakhr

an

rsi Pe f

ul G

ARABIA

Principal routes of Silk Road Other routes of Silk Road

Map 3 Sasanian Iran

Indian

Ocean

Ottoman Empire

DI

K BA

M

EN

R

300 miles

Baghdad

AB

500 km

Najaf

Karbala

AZARBAIJAN

Tabriz Ardabil

Chaldiran

IA

GEORGIA

‘AR Shiraz

The Gulf

Bushire

BAHRAIN I.

KHUZISTAN

Tehran

Isfahan

Rayy Hamadan

MAZANDARAN

Lahijan

Caspian Sea

Qazvin

S

Map 4 Safavid Iran

R YA

Nisa

Bandar ‘Abbas

KI RMA N

KH U RA SAN

SI STA N

Herat

MA KRA N

Mashhad

PARTH I A

Merv

Am u rya

Da

Qandahar

Balkh

Bukhara

ire

tes

hra T

Emp

is

r Tig

M

Mughal

up

Kabul

us

E R.

nd

R. G S

R. I

AR ZA RO

AN IST

Map 5 Contemporary Iran

600 km

400 miles

International boundaries

Main railways

Main roads

Main airports

IRAQ

KUWAIT

Khorramshahr Abadan

ESTAN

KHUS

Isfahan

Qum

Tehran

Caspian Sea

Bushehr

Bandar Khomeini

Hamadan

Ardabil

Kermanshah

Tabriz

S

SAUDI ARABIA

SYRIA

TURKEY

CAUCASIAN REPUBLICS

tt ha b ra ‘A

al-

The Gulf

Shiraz

Bandar ‘Abbas

BALUCHISTAN

Mashhad

PAKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

1

Persia: Place and Idea

Persia/Persians and Iran/Iranians “Persia” is not easily located with any geographic specificity, nor can its people, the Persians, be easily categorized. In the end Persia and the Persians are as much metaphysical notions as a place or a people. Should it be Iran and the Iranians? Briefly, “Persia/Persians” is seldom used today, except in the United Kingdom or when referring to ancient Iran/Iranians – c. sixth century bc to the third century ad. Riza Shah (1926–1941) decreed in 1935 that Iran be used exclusively in official and diplomatic correspondence. Iran was the term commonly used in Iran and by Iranians, except from the seventh to the thirteenth centuries. Following the Second World War, oil nationalization, the Musaddiq crisis, and subsequent greater sensitivity to Iranian nationalism, the designation Iran/Iranian became widely used in the west. Until recently the use of Persia/Persians was often rejected among Iranians themselves. Iran/Iranian also had its own hegemonic dimension, especially from the experience of some of Iran’s multi-ethnic population. The usage of Persia/Persian, however, was revived by Iranian expatriates in the post1979 era of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This common usage among them represents an attempt on their part to be spared the opprobrium of “Iran” and its recent association with revolution, “terrorism,” hostages, and “fundamentalism,” while Persia/Persian suggested to them an ancient glory and culture – a less threatening contemporary political identity. Nevertheless, the political ramifications of either Persia or Iran cannot be escaped. Above all, the history of Persia/Iran is the history of the interaction between place and the peoples who have lived and who currently live there.

2

Persia: Place and Idea

Place Usage of Persia or Iran and its geographical location depends not only upon context, but also upon historiographical traditions and their underlying assumptions. Where is Persia/Iran? In the beginnings of recorded Persian history, Persia was the home region of the Achaemenian dynasty (c.550–331 bc), located in the southwestern part of the Zagros mountains and Iranian plateau. Persia was derived from Pars, or in Old Persian Parsua, or today’s Fars province. (The Sasanian dynasty, c.224–641 ad, the fourth of the ancient Persian dynasties, came to power from their home in Fars, too.) The use of Persia, or the Greek Persis for the larger region of what we know as Iran was a Greek concept that becomes reified in the west. Interestingly, the Achaemenians appear not to have had a general designation for the whole of their empire, but utilized existing regional names for specific parts of it. The designation “Iran,” was used by the Greek historian, Erastothenes (third century bc) and derives from the Old Persian word ariya (Aryan). The Sasanians, however, called the core of their empire Iranshahr (the empire of the Iranians) or Iranzamin (the land of Iran). Subsequent and modern usage derives from this Sasanian precedent. The boundaries of these ancient empires fluctuated and reflected the ability of their dynasts to defend or expand them. The greatest territory of any Persian empire was that established by the Achaemenians and extended from the Mediterranean to Central Asia, while the Sasanian empire, the next largest in extent, stretched from Mesopotamia to Central Asia.

Geography Political history compounds the problem of locating Iran. In terms of geography, there is the specific place of the Iranian plateau that extends from Mesopotamian lowlands to the Amu Darya (Oxus river) and south to the Indian Ocean. The western border is defined by that great mountain chain known as the Zagros, some 2,000 kilometers in length, that separates the Iranian plateau from the lowlands of Mesopotamia. The Zagros chain meets the Caucasus mountains in the north with the Alburz mountains to the north and east. The northern border of the Iranian plateau continues from the Zagros and the Alborz, across the Syr Darya to the Amu Darya, Transoxiana and to the Hindu Kush, where it turns south to the Indus Valley to the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Oman, and Persian Gulf. Although the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and plains are not encompassed by the Iranian plateau, they were vital to it, as were Central

Persia: Place and Idea

3

Asia and the Indus Valley. Like so much of the history of such a vast, strategic region, geographic designations relate to political factors and to historic patterns of hegemony. At the start of the twenty-first century, this extensive region – some 2,300,000 square kilometers! – comprises the modern states of Iran, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, southern Turkmenistan, and the western half of Pakistan. The ancient empires of the Achaemenians, Seleucids, Parthians, and Sasanians centered on the plateau and often extended far beyond it to the west and to the east. Topography, too, defines the Iranian plateau, with its extremes of temperature, elevation, and precipitation, giving the region a unity. The plateau is characterized by eroded high deserts and steppes roughly 3,000 meters above sea level, far higher mountain ranges, and great salt basins and lakes formed largely by seasonal rivers that disappear into them. There are great and often stark topographical variations that change dramatically according to the light and by season. Temperatures are extreme, very hot in summer and cold in winter, bitterly so at higher elevations. Similarly, precipitation ranges from 10 centimeters to 250 centimeters (in the lowlands just to the south of the Caspian Sea) per annum. The Iranian plateau is quite barren, often starkly so, and this barrenness is the result of both climatic and cultural conditions. For most of the region, precipitation is sparse and falls mainly in late autumn, winter, and early spring. Precipitation is affected by altitude, and falls as snow at higher elevations. Its slow melt there during the relatively cool summer months provides runoff for agriculture and pastoralism. Perhaps 10 percent of the region is arable and another 15 percent is suitable for pastoral nomadism. Pastoral nomadism, with the constant problem of over-grazing by sheep and goats, and political instability, are probably the prime factors, in addition to climactic limitations, for the region’s barrenness. Agriculture without irrigation is possible at higher elevations, though for a shorter season of growth, and in those regions where there is more certain rainfall, especially in the provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazanderan, and northern Khorasan. In such places, too, and along rivers, open parkland forest is still to be found. Where there is water, produce is abundant.

Economic and Social Adaptation Regardless of where Iran as a place is located, love of the land long predates modern nationalism, indeed begins with the Achaemenians. The land with its expanse, variety, and beauty is never far from thought.

4

Persia: Place and Idea

The topographical and climatic conditions of the Iranian plateau have shaped its economy and have helped to define its history. The western edge of the plateau, the foothills and lower elevations of the Zagros mountains, were areas where the domestication of cereal grains such as wheat and barley and of sheep and goats – still critical to the whole region in the twenty-first century – first began to occur some 20,000 years ago. Archaeological sites in western Iran, northern Iraq, and southwestern Turkey provide the evidence for this critical process. The material culture – shards, flints, obsidian, bones, architecture – from these sites also reveal trade in objects and ideas over great distances. From the beginnings of this process of domestication of plants and animals and with continuing technological and social changes throughout the Middle East, important economic, demographic, social, and cultural developments resulted in larger-scale agriculture in Mesopotamia. Complex communities developed there. In these complex communities, cities emerged along with administrative organizations, social and cultural distinctions, religion and ideas, and writing. In addition to Mesopotamia, Central Asia, that vast area to the east, was also important in shaping Iranian history. According to recent archaeological excavations and analysis complex communities developed there also. The most important long-term factor in Persian history was human adaptation to the Iranian plateau with the development of agriculture, pastoralism, pastoral nomadism, and urban communities. Agriculture was – and continued to be – focused on production of cereal grains and then fibers, initially wool and flax. The raising of sheep and goats paralleled the domestication of wheat and barley. And there is early evidence for transhumance, that is, seasonal movement from lowlands to upland pastures, where snow melt provided water and grass throughout the summer for sheep and goats. Transhumance, and longer-range pastoral nomadism, represented further specialization and dependence on flocks. Cereal production, however, was part of the pastoral economy. Pastoralists probably represented more of a difference in emphasis from agriculturists, who were more dependent on fields than pastures. Presumably, differences in social organization and culture between agriculturists and pastoral nomads emerged, although both probably shared a kin basis for production and organization. Pastoral nomads played and continued to play a significant role in Persian history beyond their critical economic one in the form of social–political federations tied to the pastoral economy of access to and protection of pasture and water. Federations formed into confederations for military purposes and for the achievement of political and economic

Persia: Place and Idea

5

goals that required greater numbers than a federation; typically, confederations were of short duration, for tension would develop between the short-term needs of the pastoral economy and the longer-term political and military ones of the confederation. In pre-Achaemenian history, confederations from the Iranian plateau, the Zagros in particular, challenged Mesopotamian hegemony, and sources suggest that small kingdoms, for example the Medes, emerged from them. Such confederations possessed leadership, necessary skills and organization, weapons, and an economy and culture that could mount a defense as well as an offense to maintain autonomy in the Zagros. Pastoral nomadic culture required care and defense of flocks and pastures that entailed certain organizational and military skills that were reinforced by hunting skills. While the agriculturists, pastoral nomads, and urban dwellers complemented each other in the larger economy and society, pastoral nomadism required a degree of autonomy. For pastoral nomadism to be viable, the pastoralists had to be responsive to their flocks’ particular short-term needs in terms of pasture and water, and that responsiveness was paramount in making social and political decisions as well. Such autonomy made pastoral nomads unreliable in terms of larger and persisting social and political organizations, and pastoral nomadic leaders who overcame the reluctance to form larger groups did so because they possessed extraordinary political and military ability, family or dynastic base, and, perhaps, charisma. There have been dramatic historical instances when pastoral nomads have combined to mount long-term campaigns of conquest and domination. The emergence of the Achaemenians – and preceding them, the closely related Medes or the Scythes – represent this process.

Ethnic Complexity Ethnic complexity has also helped to define the history of the Iranian plateau. Such complexity is seen in the economy, settlement patterns, and movements of peoples to and across the plateau region. Language, as a significant ethnic indicator, becomes even more important for historical analysis and differentiation after writing emerged. By the eighth century bc, the Iranian plateau and its adjacent environs included Semitic speakers of Assyrian, Hebrew, and Aramaic; Dravidian peoples, for example the Elamites; Indo-Europeans speakers of Scythian, Armenian, Persian, and a number of dialects; and Turkic speakers toward and in Central Asia. Religion, too, served as an important factor in ethnic and cultural

6

Persia: Place and Idea

complexity. Local deities, shamanism, and animism predominated in the Iranian plateau and adjacent regions. However, proto-monotheism – perhaps monotheism itself – was to be found in the teachings of the ancient Persian prophet, Zoroaster (now accepted as having lived well before the Achaemenians,1 probably, c.1300–1000 bc), and among the Hebrews. Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam would all play important roles in Iran’s subsequent history.

Sources and Historiography Unfortunately for historians, the ancient Zoroastrian tradition was an oral one, and our knowledge of it is greatly limited; its earliest written sources date only from the period of early Islamic history. However, we know something of ancient Persia, its people, its culture, and even the names of some the actors in its history, because some of the tradition, especially dynastic politics, was transmitted through written sources. The familiarity of the names of Cyrus the Great, Darius, Xerxes, and Alexander the Great even constitute a part of western culture. Our knowledge and understanding of the ancient world is based not only on primary and secondary sources, but also upon historians’ use of those sources, and their own conceptions and perceptions that they bring to those sources from the culture within which they live. Reconstructing the past involves us, then, in understanding the historiographical tradition. Granting for the moment that Persian history begins with the Achaemenians (c.550–331 bc), there are earlier references to what becomes known as Persia in Assyrian sources. Then there are extant if limited Achaemenian sources of various sorts, including monumental inscriptions and administrative records, and finally a larger number of Greek sources and biblical references. And, of course, there is the archaeological record. Achaemenian sources have only been available to us since their rediscovery and transcription in the nineteenth century; consequently, the far earlier and pervasive classical and biblical studies have shaped our views of them. In the mid-nineteenth century, Rawlinson and Grotefend independently deciphered the trilingual texts in Old Persian, Median, and Babylonian of Darius’s monumental Bisitun inscription, thus making it possible to read Achaemenian inscriptions there and throughout the Middle East for the first time. The chancery records – the Treasury and Fortification tablets – at Persepolis, however, were not discovered until the archaeological excavations of the 1930s; moreover, these cover only a very short period of time.

Persia: Place and Idea

7

Long before Rawlinson and Grotefend, however, a historical tradition of looking at the Achaemenians through a Greek perspective had been well established: Achaemenian history was seen as an extension of Greek history at best or as a counterpoint or a debased version of it. Only seldom was Achaemenian history seen in its own terms. Even in much of twentieth-century scholarship, attitudes toward the Persians were not unlike those of Herodotus in the fifth century bc who found them fascinating, exotic, and “Oriental.” Given the number and detail of Greek sources and the corresponding paucity of Achaemenian ones, Greek histories are understandably seductive. The Greeks defined themselves against the Achaemenians, and viewed them with both awe and condescension. The Persians were clearly non-Greek, the Other, in every category, especially politics, society, and art and architecture. This is history written by rivals if not enemies. Moreover, that subsequent historians well into the twentieth century adopted the Greek view of the Persians is also understandable given political and cultural attitudes, the dearth of Achaemenian sources, and the nature of their own classical education. The Greek-dominated perception of ancient Middle Eastern history is still common and is reinforced by romantic notions of the unchanging, timeless nature of Oriental or, in our case, Persian history. For example, descriptions by Herodotus have been seen as applicable for all periods of Achaemenian and Persian history with the assumption that little or nothing had changed. Or no discrimination was made between the sixth and third centuries bc; nineteenth-century nomads were likened to biblical “forebears.” Third century bc autocracy and despotism explained seventeenth-century politics. In addition, Greek sources were accepted as primary and contemporary when many were more often secondary, at best, and well after the fact. Not until the 1960s, when a new generation of archaeologists began excavating in both Iran and Central Asia, and with the emergence of a comparable new generation of historians, were accepted Greek-dominated views of the ancient Persians challenged. So in the 1970s and 1980s attitudes toward Persian/Iranian history of whatever period, ancient to modern, began to change among specialists. A new cohort of Achaemenian specialists, for example, have had a major impact in the reassessment of that history either through new evidence or through the new questions they raised. Especially important was the formation of study groups such as the Achaemenid History Workshops. Certain fields of Iranian studies, in addition to archaeology and history, have experienced a renaissance. One notable area has been the development of Zoroastrian studies. Iranian scholars, also, are now playing a role in this process. In art and architectural history, too, there have been

8

Persia: Place and Idea

recent attempts to understand the Achaemenians on their own terms. There has been a similar transformation in Safavid studies with significant new scholarship and publication across disciplines. Romanticism and idealization of the western cultural tradition, especially regarding the roots of democracy, which have been seen as springing solely from Greek origins, has been slower to change. Use of the past can also be seen in Iranian nationalism, in which nineteenth-century Iranian intellectuals and then the Pahlavis (1926–1979) glorified Iran’s pre-Islamic era at the expense of the more recent Islamic past to legitimize their rule. But Pahlavi rulership affected how both Iranian and western scholars have looked at the ancient past, and the study of kingship, because it has now been linked with the Pahlavis, has itself become something of anathema. Far earlier, from Darius (522–486 bc) and then during the time of the Greek historians, rulership was inextricably bound up with Persia and what is was to be Persian. Central for the Greeks in defining Persian “Otherness” was Achaemenian autocracy and decadence. In the same way modern westerners continue to define their idea of Persia in terms of themselves against both the Pahlavis and the Islamic Republic. Another aspect of our idea of Iran and its historiography has been to view the past through another lens of very recent history and to project on the past assumptions derived from “the state.” The state was not established until the Pahlavis centralized rule in the 1920s, when Iran’s political culture was radically transformed. In addition, the very use of dynastic names such as the Achaemenian or Sasanian or Safavid (1501–1722) or Qajar (1796–1926) implies a unity, control, or even centralization that was not to be found before the twentieth century. The category “state” is freely adopted from common usage, when in fact the pre-twentieth-century empires represent at best loose confederations with central government institutions. The common use of “state,” knowingly or not, relies on Weber’s definition: “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”2 No Iranian government until the Pahlavis had a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, and key institutions associated with the Weberian state including a bureaucracy and a military were not the sole prerogative of Iranian governments. And to deal with an additional Weberian factor, that of “a given territory,” while there were notions of sovereignty over territory and regions, there were no delineated boundaries of Iran until 1914. Furthermore, the power of government hardly extended beyond capitals and cities in frontier regions, or beyond fortified trading centers along the great trade routes.

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Political Culture: Overview Iran’s historic political culture was shaped by its geography, society, and historical interaction with Mesopotamian culture to the west and Central Asian culture to the east. The interaction of agriculture, pastoralism, and urban centers of government and trade persisted until the Pahlavis in the twentieth century; change took place within that framework. Characterizing Iran’s political culture over some 2,500 years of history necessitates both lumping and the development of broad generalizations. From Cyrus the Great (c.558–530 bc) until the Pahlavis (ad 1926–1979), Iran’s political culture was hierarchically conceptualized within a Zoroastrian and then in an Islamic context: sovereignty, all authority, belonged to God, who selected the ruler, who then reigned on his behalf as vicegerent. Critical ideas included: one God, one universe, one ruler, and one law that included acceptance of alternative religious traditions so long as primacy was granted to the ruler and the dominant sociopolitical group. The ruler was attended and supported by specific institutions, symbols, and a favored core group of the population with whom he identified. Administration of the population as a whole was based on recognition of autonomy – tribal, regional, ethnic (and Iran’s population was multi-ethnic and represented a rich complexity of peoples) – within an essentially religious framework; consequently, there was also tension between toleration and inclusiveness versus exclusiveness and intolerance, regardless of historical period, whether in Zoroastrianism or Islam, or for that matter Pahlavi nationalism during the mid-twentieth century when the political culture was dramatically transformed. Beginning with the Achaemenians, there was the concept of an empire composed of regions and confederations with their independent bureaucracies and armies and identities within, of course, the encompassing imperial bureaucracy and military structure. Moreover, the empire was headed by a king, as were some of the regions or even confederations. During the reign of Darius (522–486 bc), the paramount king becomes the king of kings – not so much first among equals, but in the sense of being a worthy addition to the ancient Near Eastern kingship tradition. Before becoming kings, or king of kings, the Achaemenians were fed eration leaders who built a confederation in their home region of Pars/Fars, or Persis/Persia, where they were identified and identified themselves as kings. Certainly from the time of the Sasanians – and probably earlier – until the twentieth century, Iran’s bureaucracy, although institutionalized and in service to the ruler and his administration, appears to

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have been both public and private, central and regional. The ulema (legal scholars) in the Islamic period, and the Zoroastrian clergy certainly in the earlier Sasanian period and possibly even in the Achaemenian period, performed bureaucratic functions and were independent of the government, although they were often co-opted by and functioned as an adjunct of it. The Afshars and Qajars in the eighteenth century, and confederations such as the Bakhtiyari, which in the nineteenth century were clearly not “states,” also had their “bureaucrats,” patronized ulema, and governed territories. No government before Riza Shah’s in the 1920s had a monopoly on the use of force; notables and federation leaders all had their own armies. Maintenance of order was largely decentralized. Government in Iran historically was extractive but inefficient, expecting little from and performing few services for the population. Government inefficiency in extracting surpluses related to, and reinforced, local and regional autonomy. Government held power through force, but was legitimized in a moral framework and accepted society as it was, including the tension between the center and its component parts. And for more recent historical periods – possibly earlier as well – there was widespread cynicism for centralized government despite an idealized and moral worldview that made it seem necessary. Iranian government, again until well into the twentieth century, interacted with a society whose economy was essentially based on agricultural and pastoral production with local and regional trade that was essentially self-sufficient and autonomous in production and distribution. Government administrative policies beginning with the Achaemenians recognized and institutionalized the essential federation or decentralized system to reinforce local autonomy. One example would be the assignment of land by the government to holders who performed military and bureaucratic functions from the usufruct. A primary purpose of government, and a critical role for its military, was defense of frontiers and control of pastoral nomadic peoples. Migration of peoples, in itself, was another recurring feature of the Iranian plateau’s history, which contributed to local or regional autonomy and weak centers, and complicated concentration of power in a center. Confederations, or petty kingdoms, in the central Zagros in the eighth century bc faced off against Assyria, and it was from this region that the Medes and then the Achaemenians were to emerge. The eleventh-century ad Saljuq and subsequent Turkic-Mongol invasions signaled the arrival of a new people with flocks and culture. Turkic languages and culture added to the mix of peoples that had pre-existed in Iran, and their

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appearance reinforced pre-existing social and political processes and established policies and institutions. While sedentary agricultural society dominated Iran even before the Achaemenians, Iran may well have had a majority nomadic population. The Turkic-Mongol arrival resulted in increased pastoralism, first, in terms of the numbers of pastoralists and their animals at the expense of agriculture. Second, in response to that impact Iran’s agricultural society, facing competition for land and water from the newly arriving nomads, emphasized the pastoral component of its economy and adapted it for the Zagros. For example, in Luristan, part of ancient Elam, or in Fars itself at Anshan, there is archaeological evidence to indicate increased pastoralism with the advent of new pastoral peoples. The truism that all governments of pre-twentieth-century Iran – save for the Selucids – came to power from confederations of pastoral nomads, even in those instances where dynasts were not themselves pastoral nomads, emphasizes the importance of pastoral nomads. Some of these confederations were indigenous to Iran, the Achaemenians, Sasanians, the Safavids, the Qajars to name only a few, and others moved into Iran from Central Asia – the Saljuqs and the Ilkhans, for example. The historical cycle of the overthrow of government by pastoral nomads and the migration of pastoral nomadic peoples, including through conquest, is an essential pattern in Iranian history. Pastoral nomadism and confederation building characterized Iran’s political culture until the midtwentieth century, when that political culture was permanently changed. Iran’s political culture and history resulted in a characteristic rulership that survived even the seventh-century Arab destruction of Sasanian Iran and subsequent gradual Islamization. On Iran’s other great divide, Central Asia, its traditions of rulership reinforced the Iranian tradition. There, too, the fragmented polity that so typified ancient Iranian history existed. Central Asia, however, unlike Iran, was dominated by far larger confederations of pastoral nomads. That political culture, society and economy profoundly affected Iran when Central Asian nomads, through conquest or emigration, reinforced existing regional and local autonomy, both socially and politically, to shape Iran’s history down to the twentieth century.

Rulership Rulership expressed itself within Iran’s political culture through interactions of the ruler, his government, and his institutions with constituent

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groups and within a framework of shared values, culture, and economy. Here representation of the ruler to the ruled was a matter of legitimacy, or multiple legitimacies,3 or what Crossley refers to as simultaneous rulership.4 Most successful rulers of Iran have also sought to legitimize their rule in relation to preceding rulers, and have seen themselves as the rightful heir of a tradition of rulership even in the face of – or especially because of – the discontinuity that has so characterized Iranian history. Legitimacy is not just the representation of the ruler to the ruled, or the interaction between them, but about the relation between the ruler and tradition, his relation to history. Iranian rulership represented a form of imperial expression in which the ruler transcended the realm’s, or, more typically, the empire’s, parts to create a historical reality and congruent images and symbols. Moreover, the ruler created, or could destroy, constituencies, which existed as expressions of his rulership. Simultaneous rulership – or, in our instance, Iranian rulership – describes multiple ruling personae within one political individual, and functioned in the context of a hierarchical cosmology and political culture: God (in both Zoroastrianism and Islam), the ruler, and the ruled, and then the cosmos, the realm, and the region or locality. Especially important, the simultaneous ruler mediated between God (tengri in Central Asian contexts) and his subjects, and consequently both dominated them and transcended particular cultures. Moreover, the ruler ruled over an ethnically and geographically complex society. On the one hand, “Iran” and its peoples are the product of its rulership; the ideological product of imperial centralization. On the other, rulership is shaped by its interaction with the society and economy of the ruled. Through rulership, the ruler represented and institutionalized himself and his lineage and descent group, those closest to him. The ruler headed but was, in addition, a member of a variety of constituencies (historical identities – satrapies, for example, under the Achaemenians) that might have only a loose connection with ethnographically verifiable groups that ranged from his own family and lineage to the broadest categories under his dominion, and represented them in the full range of his religious, political, administrative, military, and cultural capacities. These groups existed as expressions of his rulership and were symbolized through trilingual inscriptions – an essential marker for Crossley as a representation of simultaneous rulership. Moreover, he mediated between them in the present as well as in the future and in the past. In particular, certain ideas and symbols are seen by the simultaneous ruler’s subjects as embodying these universal, all-encompassing qualities that go beyond one’s particular group. In one sense, simultaneous rulership

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allowed the ruler’s subjects to project on to him their worldviews, but at the same time he transcended them. Yet simultaneous rulership is more, and expressed itself in institutions of government and religion, in values and culture, and concretely through patronage politically and culturally in material representation. Too typically, dynastic history tends to be both mechanistic and simplistic in assigning causation to the will and consciousness of the ruler rather than the interplay of ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural factors. Consequently, there is an objective and historical reality to Iranian rulership, through which the rulers operated within a political culture and yet responded to a complex of dynamic relationships.

Iranian Political Culture: Historical Bases of Rulership On the historical level, notions of rulership had a basis in society and its political culture. Centers of government were characteristically weak, despite being powerful military machines for conquest, while regionally based political and economic groups were accorded autonomy and a defined place in the imperial structure. Indeed, imperial structures started with tribes or tribal-like organization. The pre-modern Iranian economy itself was based on agriculture, pastoralism, craft-production to a degree, and trade. A shaping force in Iranian history has been the society and economy that evolved on the Iranian plateau. Especially important, the Achaemenians – indeed, the Medes and Scythians before them, as well as subsequent Iranian dynasties – emerged as leaders of federations of pastoralists, typically nomadic, and of agriculturists. Pastoral nomadism, whether of the Central Asian steppe or of mountain type, is especially well suited to simultaneous rulership, particularly in its confederationand empire-building forms. Pastoralism, and especially pastoral nomadism, requires flexibility in response to geographic and both macro- and micro-climatic changes in competition for pastures and water. On the one hand, such flexibility has resulted in corresponding fluid and ephemeral social and political organization. On the other, such fluidity and emphasis on small groups, typically nuclear or extended families owning their own flocks and pastures, has meant that such groups are absent from historical sources – with some exceptions – until relatively recent times and then mainly when they are linked to dynastic leadership. Without avoiding the charge of being anachronistic and extrapolating from one period to another and assuming a fixed meaning of “tribe,”5

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it is useful to remember Albert Hourani’s elegant and uncomplicated definition for seventh-century Arabia: “The [nomadic peoples] were not controlled by a stable power of coercion, but were led by chiefs belonging to families around which there gathered more or less lasting groups of supporters, expressing their cohesion and loyalty in the idiom of common ancestry; such groups are usually called tribes.”6 The problem of tribe for many Middle Eastern and Central Asian analysts starts with unexamined assumptions. All Iranian specialists use the term “tribe,” but what is meant by “tribe”? For most, it means the political organization of pastoral nomads. The use of the term is highly contextual and varied; yet many historians assume that it has a fixed meaning and therefore assumed social form.7 I suspect that most historians don’t even think about it, but when historians do use “tribe,” they assume several qualities of social organization that will be discussed below. The single term “tribe” fits into itself a range of potential economic, political, social, and cultural activities and organization, from small family-centered herding units to empire. Historians commonly see tribes negatively in terms of urban society and government, in other words from the viewpoint of sources that themselves are usually anti-tribal. Again, historians’ assumptions about the twentieth-century Iranian nation-state – its need to control and centralize – affect interpretations of pre-modern Iran. Economic roles are assumed and generally undocumented save for those which involve conflict with settled society. What is not articulated by historians is the notion that what sets tribes apart is their autonomy – that they are difficult to control from the perspective of settled society, that tribes are unreliable and follow their own selfinterest. The principle of autonomy prevailed also within the tribe itself, and it is this fact that made federation and then confederation building so difficult. Autonomy should not be confused with freedom or equality. What is the basis for the idea that Iranian tribespeople upheld the values of equality or egalitarianism? While egalitarianism may be an Islamic ideal, its expression was difficult.8 (In Safavid studies, one encounters the generalization that Sufis – Islamic mystics and their institutions – were egalitarian, but the basis for this claim is elusive, too.) While access to tribal pastures, water, and migration routes was essential for all tribespeople, pastoral nomadic society was far from egalitarian.9 One can generalize from historical sources that tribespeople’s worldviews were hierarchical, that they were organized socially, economically, and politically hierarchically. Even though tribal groups may have enjoyed autonomy and independence, they were interdependent within the tribe, federations, or

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confederations and within the larger contexts of agricultural, settled, and urban society. Pastoral nomadic tribes’ autonomy relates to their economy and associated social and political organizations. Tribal autonomy was self-sustained, given that typically pastoral nomads were mounted and armed. Of course, they entered the historical picture through raiding – also an aspect of their economy – and as warriors, both defensive and offensive, for themselves or for government. Hunting, itself a part of pastoral nomadic culture, reinforced that role and self-image. Trade was also critical for the pastoral economy, probably more so in Central Asia, for both transport and exchange. It is important to remember that pastoral nomads interacted with agriculturalists around them, and shared many of the same skills in an overlapping of pastoral and agricultural economies; however, husbandry was primary for pastoralists, and secondary for agriculturalists. Agriculturalists probably did not play equally significant military roles. Certainly in western Iran there was considerable movement between the two economies. In eastern Iran and Central Asia, however, nomads and agriculturalists were more clearly set apart. Pastoral nomadism expanded and waned; though it appeared to have increased within the indigenous population with the arrival of the Saljuqs and then the Mongols.10 Again, historians assume too often that tribes constitute distinct ethnic and lineage groups – some exceptions would be Crone, Lindner, and Tapper.11 Better to conceive of them as political constituencies that idealize and justify their social and political organization and culture in kinship and, often, descent terms. As with simultaneous rulers, tribal leaders gave definition to tribes. As political constituencies the political skills of leaders were paramount – probably more important than kinship and lineage, although descent in the dominant lineage carried its own authority – in forming larger and more complicated organizations and coalitions. Tribal leaders formed federations, some leaders of pastoral nomadic federations built confederations. It is important to remember that a confederation is a weakly linked body whose members have a great deal of autonomy, with some notable exceptions such as serving under Chingiz Khan. Some confederations became governments and even empires, which are distinguished by institutions of administration and dynastic rulership. Dynastic names, however, obscure the fact that even when these empires were formed and then persisted, they were not highly centralized. There were many centers of power within these empires and even within their many regions. It should be noted, too, that autonomy was not limited to tribally organized people; whole provinces could be

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autonomous under hereditary governors. Furthermore, there were significant interactions and tensions within and between federations and confederations and other constituencies, both urban and rural, that resulted in autonomy at each level. Federation and confederation building that allowed for autonomy of groups and regions has characterized Iran’s history down to the twentieth century, when a centralized nationstate developed under the Pahlavis. The federations/confederations were “descent” federations, because central leadership was typically vested in a dominant family and its descendants – the Achaemenian, Seleucid, Parthian, Sasanian, Saljuq, Chingizid and Ilkhanid, Timurid, Safavid (even though their origins were non-tribal), or Qajar families, for example – within which legitimacy was based and from which authority was derived. Such families were seen as having kin ties to the whole federation or confederation. These families experienced intense competition for rule among those eligible for leadership. The vague criteria for rulership included: membership of a particular family, in which all males were potentially eligible, and a process of selection that involved some level of competition to determine the one “best-suited” for leadership.

Historical Overview and the Dynamic of Rulership Already at the beginning of the first millennium bc, when the first Persians began to arrive on the Iranian plateau and move into the Zagros from Central Asia, the population consisted of agriculturalists and pastoralists representing a variety of ethnic groups. At the end of the first millennium ad this same complexity of peoples and economies was reinforced in both its agricultural and nomadic sectors by the arrival of a Turkic population also from Central Asia. The first Persians probably appeared as a gradual infiltration of mounted and armed pastoral nomads.12 The arrival of the Saljuqs in the eleventh century was more abrupt; they first made their presence known militarily. Subsequently large numbers of nomads with their flocks arrived. Lastly, the introduction of Saljuq administration and institutions had its effect on subsequent Iranian history. The Saljuq impact was then compounded when Iran became part of the Mongol empire of Chingiz Khan (d. 1227), and especially during the administration of Hulegu, his grandson (d. 1265), and under his successors, the Ilkhans. Once more Iran was to be affected by Central Asian government, especially military organization, administration, and ideology.

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Another point that relates to Achaemenian and later periods, including the Arab-Muslim invasions of the seventh century and the later Turkic-Mongol ones, is the role of nomads as cultural transmitters. Crossley has pointed out that Central Asian nomads were important transmitters of culture, especially religion, across Asia: The [Central Asian] steppe, however, remained a mix of religious affiliations, in which it was not unique to find a single lineage group including members professing Buddhism, Manichaenism, Islam, Christianity and Judaism, any of which were likely to be crossed with the traditional shamanism. This plurality of religious practice among the Central Asian nomads was partly related to the fact that ideas about rulership were not [my emphasis] always associated with ideas about established religion. Since very early times, Central Asian societies had been permeated by an ideal of world rulership, in the ruler, or “khan,” [who] speaks to an ultimate god, represented in Central Asia as Heaven, or the Sky. By his role as the enunciator of Heaven this universal ruler transcends particular cultures, and dominates them all. This is an extremely old idea in the region, and may have originally derived from Iranian influences.

Crossley continues that these ideas were merged with Islamic ones through the Saljuqs – and later through the Ottomans and Nadir Shah. “This ideal was also extremely important in the rise of the Mongols. It entitled them to appeal to any and all religious systems to legitimate their rule. It permitted them to patronize and gain the favor of any religious establishment. And it demonstrated the ability of the Great Khan to claim superiority over all religious leaders.”13 It is possible that the role of nomads as religious transmitters developed long before the Achaemenians with the ideas and teaching of Zoroaster. Leaving aside for now whether or not the Achaemenians were Zoroastrian, or how Zoroastrian they were, the ideas of Zoroaster – especially ones of a dominant, all-encompassing deity, a cosmic, dualistic struggle between good and evil, and highly developed ethics – stand as one of the critical legacies of the Achaemenian period. The role of nomads as religious transmitters also emphasizes their taken-for-granted importance in Iranian history. The role and titles of federation leaders, often themselves pastoral nomads, suggest a variety of parallels between ancient, medieval, and early modern Iran. The Safavids, in particular, revive usage of earlier Iranian titles – again going back to the Achaemenians – of self-affirming/selfauthenticating emperorship: king, king of kings/shahanshah by the

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Achaemenians and Sasanians; padishah by Ghazan Khan Ilkhan; and shah/shahanshah again by the Safavids, Qajars, and Pahlavis. Interestingly, whereas khan, a sufficient title for Chingiz, and subsequently khaqan for his Mongol successors, implied universal or cosmic rule, khan certainly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is used for those who exercise power, such as sultan, in the Saljuq era, although in the twentieth century khan was used as a general male honorific. Khaqan and shah then imply universal power. In addition, cosmic notions of universal rulership in Iran not only incorporated indigenous notions, but Islamic ones as well: khaqan/khan, padishah (protecting lord, emperor)/shahanshah (king of kings), and Zill Allah (shadow of God), among others. It should be noted, too, that self-affirming and self-authenticating titles were used not only by imperial leaders but also by federation leaders. The dichotomy between title and function, an ideal and reality, and religious/cultural values and power is generally regarded as part of Saljuq/Central Asian/Mongol legacy, which it was. However, TurkicMongol practice reinforced the already existing parallel practice in the political culture of Iran and continued well into the twentieth century. An aspect of the idea of rulership, especially its legitimation, was the shaping of identity and the interaction between the ruler and the ruled, between elite culture and popular culture, and between inclusiveness – especially in periods such as the Achaemenian one and then Central Asian – and the more exclusive claims that occurred periodically in Sasanian and Islamic Iran. The Achaemenians, probably, and the Sasanians supported an official Zoroastrianism, and periodically tried to suppress heterodox movements. The Buyids – the first “Iranian” government after the 641 Sasanian collapse – were themselves Shi‘i Muslims, while Iran for the most part was Sunni, and then the Saljuqs and Ghazan Ilkhan became Sunni Muslims. Other rulers sought religious change: Oljeitu, Shi‘a; Shah Isma‘il and the Safavids, Shi‘a, and it is under Safavid rule Iran became Shi‘i; Nadir Shah espoused a more inclusive Islam; Riza Shah advanced nationalism as a new ideology; and even Khomeini’s Islamic primacy fits into this pattern. Perhaps the most important point was this interaction between inclusiveness and exclusiveness, not only in terms of rulership and religion, legitimacy, and identity, but the reciprocal interaction between the center of power and the larger society itself, with weak centers and regional autonomy. There were limits placed on authority and power by the hierarchical nature of society – both in terms of worldview and in practice. For authority to be upheld and for power to function, a general consensus of groups had to be recognized – this was essential for Iran’s political culture.

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The Arab-Muslim conquest of the mid-seventh century introduced a new element to Iran’s political culture, the idea of egalitarianism. Interestingly, there is an element of egalitarianism within pastoral nomadism in terms of access to pastures and water and in political organization. In the end, however, pastoral nomadism embodies a hierarchical structure and worldview. Islamic egalitarianism was not to be realized in Iran. Importantly in the mid-eighth century, with the ‘Abbasid victory over the Umayyads, the Sasanian imperial tradition was re-established with the ‘Abbasid caliphate centered in Baghdad. Islam and then at the time of the Safavids its Imami (or Twelver) Shi‘i form came to be identified inexorably with Iran and its rulership. However, the earlier, pre-Islamic and pre-Safavid patterns of government, the relationship of the ruler to the ruled, titles, a weak center in face of the autonomous regions and groups of Iran, and the hierarchical nature of society, continued. Even the reigns of Safavid rulers, regarded as centralizers, make the point of continuity. Shah ‘Abbas, despite his attempts to centralize power, ruled very much in the mold of his Iranian and Central Asian predecessors. This can be seen in his commercial and patronage interests; in administration and ulema/Sufi roles; in the nature of society including its multi-ethnic composition and identities; in the agricultural and pastoral economy, and the autonomy of its units; and in military decentralization. One significant change that confronted the Safavids, and would prove to be beyond their control, was the emergence of an expanding west, particular its military and economic power. Iranian responses to the western impact profoundly changed Iran’s political culture and historical patterns. The experiment in constitutionalism and liberalism failed in the first two decades of the twentieth century from the lack of a broad social basis, from ulema and monarchical opposition, from the failure to develop institutional support, and from continued European imperial interference. In the second and third decades of the twentieth century the Qajar dynasty was ousted, and the newly elected and then crowned shah, Riza Pahlavi, ruled as autocrat but carried out that liberal agenda save for the development of liberal political institutions. He centralized his rule at the expense of the historic autonomy of regions, tribes, and groups; he established the nationstate and a nationalism based on Iran’s pre-Islamic past; he modernized the military, economy, and administration; and he westernized and secularized education, law, and culture. These changes have not been reversed and continued to evolve at the end of the last century. Iranians now look at themselves and their relationship to government in quite different ways.

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The Pahlavi state became centralized under a bureaucracy and a standing army, and a new active role for the state involved it directly in the economic, political, legal, social, and cultural life of the people. The autonomy of groups and regions was subordinated to the center; their leaders acquiesced or were co-opted or executed. Centralization of government and modern technology gave Riza Shah the means to rule as an autocrat and, as it continued, would cut his son, Muhammad Riza Shah, off from that reciprocal relationship with the population. His rule ended in the 1978–9 revolution. Although Riza Shah appropriated the traditional titles and symbols of rule, especially the pre-Islamic ones, he also utilized western ideas and technologies. His ideology of nationalism focused on Iran’s pre-Islamic and imperial past and a western, urban, industrial, and secular future, with Iran restored as a west Asian power. As a critical component of its centralization and westernization policies, Pahlavi Iran demanded a single identity and did not tolerate competing ones and loyalties; the new identity was to be Irano-PersianPahlavi. Existing inclusive notions of identity gave way to an exclusive one. Layers of identity did persist, however, and were tolerated if they were subsumed under the Pahlavi ones. All groups making up Iran were expected to adapt to the dominant identity. Finally, the Pahlavis’ radical notions of society and its representation were to persist even after the Islamic Revolution. The revolution of 1978–9 and the formation of the Islamic Republic changed the ideology and symbols of the state but not its form. The Islamic Republic replaced the Pahlavi national-civic-religious identity with an Islamic one, but Iranian identity reasserted itself at the beginning of the Iran–Iraq war. Aspects of westernization, especially cultural and legal ones, have been superceded within the governing ideology in favor of Islam; the direct link between government and religion was reestablished. Until it faced challenges from the Kurds, Turkmen, Baluch, and then the Qashqa’i and Arabs – all of whom were attempting to reassert autonomy – it appeared that the Islamic Republic might tolerate groups or regions and be more inclusive rather than exclusive in organizing society. However, a single-minded autocracy was established, and identity has been made even more exclusive, especially through carefully monitored public morality and behavior, controlled education, and government subsidies. Significantly, however, in 1979 a constitution with liberal political institutions was adopted, although control was vested in the hands of selected ulema. The Islamic Republic rejected not only those who are secularized or westernized but also those whom the ulema regard as only

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nominally Muslim. In face of increasing economic problems and overwhelming cynicism, it remains to be seen whether or not religious rule will in the end succeed or persist. However, the Iran of the future, despite its unchanging geography, will be decidedly urban, and the modern centralized state will continue to affect all aspects of the lives of its citizens directly. Most significantly, as the twenty-first century began, Iranians increasingly expected political roles for themselves as citizens, which challenges the very basis for clerical rule.

2

The Achaemenians (c.550–331 BC) Persian1 history and rulership is given voice in Achaemenian inscriptions and in near-contemporary biblical and classical sources. The history of the Persians begins long before the Achaemenians, but not until the late sixth century do we have historical sources written by Persians explicitly identifying themselves as Persian. Cyrus II, or Cyrus the Great (558–530 bc), on his famous cylinder from Babylon, legitimizes his rule by descent from his forebears who had been the kings of Anshan, the dominant city of Fars. Darius I (522–486 bc), in his proclamation written high on the Bisitun cliff about 517 bc, similarly legitimizes his rule by descent in another Achaemenian line from Fars. The Achaemenian family, Fars, and empire come together first with Cyrus as its founder, and then with Darius, often identified as the second founder of the Achaemenian empire. Was Darius a usurper? Did he fabricate an Achaemenian lineage? Both share the name of Teispes – Cyrus’s greatgrandfather and Darius’s great-great-grandfather. Identification of a ruler with his family and place was not necessarily new in the ancient Near East, but the intensity and persistence of Achaemenian identity with Persia beginning with Darius was new. What is also extremely important is the Achaemenian concept of rulership, one that provided a model for much of Iran’s subsequent history in spite of significant discontinuities. When Alexander the Great brought the Achaemenian dynasty to its end in 331–330 bc, his own reign was but a breath of seven years – 330– 323 bc. His Seleucid (312–129 bc) successors continued Achaemenian institutions under a Hellenistic overlay that affected little more than the urban elites. The Parthians/Arsacids (c.247 bc – c. third century ad) consciously set about re-creating the Achaemenian empire and rulership, even though the names of its kings were by now lost. In turn, the Sasanians (ad 224–641) (even more than the Parthians and for a far longer period of time), from their home base in Fars, successfully emu-

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lated that first Persian empire. Despite the overwhelming success of the Arab armies in ending the Sasanian dynasty and the establishment of an Arab-Islamic government, the Achaemenian model of bureaucracy and ideas of rulership persisted. The oral tradition of a mythicized ancient Iranian history is set down in writing late in the tenth century under Turkic patronage – Turco-Mongol Iran (c.970–c.1500) – in the great epic the Shahnamah by Firdausi (d. 1020). For subsequent dynasties, the Shahnamah’s themes of idealized rulership, including descent and place, stood as a model. Only in the twentieth century, however, did the Shahnamah’s mythic past confront Achaemenian reality through archaeology. While Persian history certainly begins before Cyrus II, he was the first Persian to inscribe his identities, or at least the first whose sources are extant. And this affirmation of family and ethnic identities, collateral or fabricated, would be re-emphasized by the second founder of the Achaemenian empire, Darius I. A linkage is established between the Achaemenian ruling family and its home region of Parsua, Fars, where there was important interaction with Media to the north and with Elam to the west. In the end, the most important bases for an emerging Achaemenian dynasty were the social-political traditions of Fars itself that related to the adjacent empires of Media and Elam. Cyrus II from the unlikely Fars – a small but strategically located region – defeated the far more powerful Medians, possibly his overlords, conquered the Near East save for Egypt, and extended his power to Central Asia. Egypt was added to this vast empire, the largest the world had seen, by Cyrus’s son Cambyses, and Darius II, his successor, overcame internal rebellions and extended Achaemenian hegemony even further and provided it with an administrative structure that allowed the dynasty to rule until its defeat by Alexander the Great in 331 bc. Why did the Persians rather than the Medes or, more likely, the Elamites, who were far more powerful, emerge as the empire builders? Elam is a particular historical problem, but first Media. The Medes and the closely related Persians first arrived in the Zagros late in the second millennium in a new wave of Indo-European migration from western Central Asia. It is the Medes who receive attention in historical records in the ninth century. Media was located in the west central Zagros and centered on Ecbatana, or modern Hamadan, and its power seems to have extended into Anatolia in the west and into Central Asia in the east. Media was one of many federations in that region. Sources refer to Media as a strategically located kingdom that dominated the Zagros and harassed the Assyrians, and provided access to the Iranian plateau and beyond for trade both east and west. The Zagros region itself was

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important for commodities, especially horses, which were highly valued in Mesopotamia for military purposes. Horses and mounted and armed forces must have underpinned Median power and military success. Herodotus’s well-known observation that the Persians were taught to ride a horse, shoot a bow, and tell the truth is assumed to have held true for the Medes as well. The contemporary historical record mentions little more than names of groups or regional powers in the Zagros and then as an irritant or threat to Mesopotamia; nothing indicates actual socio-political organization. Subsequent Greek sources as well as historians generally refer to the peoples of the Zagros as tribes, or “non-civilized,” although there is little basis for doing so. The assumption made by more recent historians, but probably by the Greeks as well, is that these tribes, or groups, were autonomous and not amenable to government control, and symbolized chaos versus civilization. Moreover, it is assumed tribes were organized along descent lines, and that their economies were based on pastoral nomadism, especially sheep and goats, for which there is explicit prehistoric archaeological evidence in the Zagros. A significant problem for better understanding the Medes is the paucity of sources. Only two Median sites have been excavated, Godin Tepe and Nush-i Jan (or three if you include Hamadan, where excavations are now taking place). They have produced very interesting materials but seem to lack a distinctive Median style. In the absence, too, of sources there is little evidence to explain earlier Median success and their eventual failure to withstand the Achaemenian challenge. Late-eighth-century Assyrian reliefs depict Median fortresses, and seventh-century treaties would indicate the importance of the Medes to the Assyrians; although subordinate, Median support was sought in succession struggles. Medes did conquer Assur in 614 bc. In 612 bc Cyaxares, king of Media, allied with the Babylonians to overthrow Assyria. Median power thus extended throughout the Zagros and beyond. To the south the Medes controlled Fars, and to the north and the west the Medes dominated the whole of the Zagros, northern Mesopotamia, and eastern Anatolia, which included Scythians, the Mannaeans, and Lydia. In 585 bc the frontier between Lydia and Media was established at the Halys river. In the east Median power may have extended into Bactria. Although Media is commonly referred to as a state and its ruler a king, sources provide us with scanty information about the nature of its rulership, government, organization, and society. Presumably Media consisted of federations that included urban centers and mounted, armed groups, such as the Achaemenians in Fars,

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who enjoyed considerable autonomy. Media was a decentralized empire to the extent that it exercised sovereignty over a large territory that included a multi-ethnic population and autonomous groups, collected taxes and tribute, and entered into treaties with other governments. At this point there is little evidence regarding a Median ideology in any form, and in terms of material culture there is little to distinguish it from what has been found among its Middle Eastern neighbors. Perhaps even more surprising than the emergence of a great empire and imperial institutions from Fars rather than Media, is the failure of Elam to emerge as the greater empire. Significantly for us, it is against both Elam and Media that the Achaemenians emerged to rule a vast empire. Elam had a very long history, extending back to c.3400 bc and continuing into the mid-sixth century when it was displaced in the Zagros by the Medes. Geographically, Elam can be identified with today’s Khuzistan in southwestern Iran. This area has been seen as an extension of Mesopotamia, especially from the view of its contemporary texts and from the location of its main urban center, Susa, there. Long overlooked, however, was the fact that Elam extended well to the east through the foothills and into the Zagros itself. In these highlands Elamite power and culture extended from Mesopotamia into Fars and well beyond it. Excavations in the last 25 years in that region, especially at Tall-i Malyan – recognized as the long “lost” Elamite city of Anshan – reveal the extent of Elam and its links with the Iranian plateau that possibly continued as far as Central Asia. Despite Elam’s very long history and political and cultural importance, our knowledge of it is in fact quite limited. The very large number of Mesopotamian texts and references to Elam and the Elamite texts are concentrated in specific time periods so that its general history is very sketchy. Even for those periods with relatively more texts, there is too little to establish even an outline of its political and administrative history. Elam’s material culture – architecture, art, seals – relate both to Mesopotamia and to its Zagros hinterlands and constitutes an identifiable style. The earliest forms of the Elamite language are still not understood; it should be noted here that it is unrelated to other Middle Eastern languages and in its later form was an important administrative language that continued to be used into the Achaemenian period. Elamite is neither a Semitic nor an Indo-European language, and could be related to Dravidian. For our purposes, in terms of early Persian history, it is first through Elam rather than through Media that the ancient Mesopotamian tradition of rule and culture provided a model for Cyrus.

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As already indicated, sources are the major problem in understanding early Persian history. Broadly speaking, there are four types of sources for ancient Iranian history: Old Persian inscriptions and accounts; contemporary non-Old Persian records from Persepolis, Mesopotamia, and Egypt; classical sources from the Greek and Roman historians and geographers and biblical references; and archaeological evidence. Persian is an Indo-European language. The written form used by the Achaemenians is known as Old Persian, and could well have been developed by Darius explicitly for monumental inscriptions and for inscriptions on some small objects related to rulership. Old Persian was written in cuneiform, but different from that used for Akkadian (Babylonian) in Mesopotamia. Most significantly for Achaemenian rulership, Old Persian was almost always accompanied by two other languages, typically Elamite and Akkadian. Aramaic, a Semitic language, was the most widely used language throughout the Near East and Egypt, and continued to be so for Achaemenian administration. The Bisutun inscription aside, the most significant Achaemenian sources are the so-called Treasury and Fortification texts from Persepolis itself, whose names derive from sites where they were discovered. Both sets of texts are written in Elamite and both sets deal with administrative matters, particularly payments and rations. There are approximately one hundred Treasury Texts, dating to the fifth century, while there are thousands of Fortification Texts from the late sixth and very early fifth century. The majority of the Fortification Texts and fragments are yet to be published. The Fortification Texts provide insights into all kinds of Achaemenian economic activity – especially in Fars – including agriculture, labor, land holding, and trade and subsistence patterns. Both sets of texts are limited to quite specific time periods, which leaves great blanks in subsequent periods of Achaemenian history. Texts in Akkadian from Mesopotamia and in Aramaic from Egypt complement the Elamite and Old Persian ones, but these are also timespecific and date from the second half of the fifth century. Interestingly, one of the Aramaic texts from the Jewish garrison at Elephantine includes a fragment of the Bisitun inscription. The Akkadian documents record the business dealings of the Murashu family, which include military land grants and commercial interaction central to the imperial government. In addition to the Elephantine texts on papyrus and pottery shards, are those in Aramaic, and in some cases demotic, from other parts of Egypt. Classical texts in Greek and Latin present a special problem, partly because they were written by masterful historians and geographers, often in great detail, and partly because they were written with an essentially

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Greek bias that was antithetical to the Achaemenians, or to non-Greeks in general. Even those who recorded contemporary events – Herodotus (fifth century bc) and Xenophon (430?–355? bc) – did not hesitate to include events or episodes that they knew only through others. Some of the classical historians are known simply by reference or by the incorporation of their work by subsequent historians, for example, Ctesias. Plutarch (46?–120? bc) wrote a biography of Artaxerxes II centuries after his reign. The Greek sources, too, have their time limitations and generally concern themselves only with those events that affect the Greeks or those that reflect Achaemenian activities at the Mediterranean edge of their empire. Achaemenian or other external sources do not exist to corroborate Greek ones, some of which are clearly fabulistic. Although the Greeks viewed all non-Greeks as barbarians, clearly the “Other,” the Achaemenians in particular defined for them what Greekness and nonGreekness were. At the same time and even as an element in national myth making, it was Cyrus the Great’s non-Greekness and his brilliance as general and autocrat that allowed Xenophon to use him as his model ruler in his Cyropaedia. In the Greek view the Achaemenians exemplified autocracy, power, wealth, and excess. Ironically, slavery was essential for Greek society but not for the Achaemenians. In addition, the Greek historians explained history in terms of their society and its moral values; they attribute the Achaemenian decline – which begins with Xerxes for the Greeks! – to decadence and to weakness, even effeminacy. Such attitudes have dominated thinking in the west down to the present. Biblical sources for the Achaemenians, although well known, also have their own problems and biases. Cyrus the Great may be “God’s anointed” in Isaiah and in Ezra and Nehemiah, and responsible for freeing the Jews from the Babylonian captivity to return and rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem, but in Esther there is the after-the-fact Greek view of the Achaemenians. The truism that all sources must be used critically is all the more important in the case of the Achaemenians, given their scarcity. Archaeology, finally, provides us with a new source for the Achaemenians; new in the sense that archaeology is a nineteenth- and twentieth-century phenomenon. The nineteenth-century’s Henry Rawlinson probably stands as the father of Achaemenian studies. Although a pioneering archaeologist of the ancient Near East – in northern Mesopotamia – his importance for Persian history derives from translating the Bisitun inscriptions and establishing its Old Persian text. In Iran archaeological excavations began in the nineteenth century, first at Susa, then at other Achaemenian sites in Iran including Persepolis, Pasargadae, and Tepe Malyan (Anshan). Further afield Achaemenian and related sites from Central Asia to the

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Mediterranean have also been excavated. Just as written sources present us with major problems, so does archaeology. Here the greatest problem is the absence of an Achaemenian pottery sequence that would allow for the establishment of a verifiable chronology and basis for site comparison throughout the empire. Despite the problem with sources, which becomes more acute in the last half of the Achaemenian era, an outline of its history can be established. Sources and a historical tradition that emphasizes history as a series of great events and great leaders characterize almost all the writing about the Achaemenians. Warfare, imperial expansion, and heroic figures have been the main themes of Achaemenian history almost from its beginning. Babylonian sources record that in the third or sixth year of the reign of King Nabonidus (554/553 bc or 550/549 bc), Cyrus of Anshan, a “vassal” of the Medes, captured their king, Astyages, after subverting the Median troops. Cyrus then took the capital and royal residence in Ecbatana (Hamadan), plundered its treasury, and sent the booty to Anshan. Cyrus launched his attack against Media from his home region, the eastern part of the Elamite empire, roughly Fars/Anshan. Persia had been under Elamite domination until their empire was destroyed by the Assyrians in 639 bc, and then it was controlled by the Medes until the appearance of Cyrus II. Consequently, in 559 bc, Cyrus, when he overthrew his superior, Astyages, King of Media, became King of Persia and Media. Regardless of whether this marks a historical break in terms of it being something old or something new, this event does begin Achaemenian and Persian history. Moreover, the Achaemenians and Persians remained in the historical memory from this point, unlike many others of their contemporary empires in the Zagros. Cyrus II was the son of Cambyses I, who was the son of Cyrus I, and who in turn was the son of Teispes, all of whom had governed Anshan as kings. There is no clear evidence for the extent of their Persiancentered kingdom nor is there much evidence for the sequence of events that led to Cyrus’s success over and against Astyages. He may have conquered Susa first, which would have been a challenge to Media, but there is no source that indicates actual Median sovereignty over Persia at that time. A contemporary Babylonian chronicler made the claim – which Herodotus repeats – that Astyages moved against Cyrus, King of Anshan. Astyages’ army, however, not only mutinied and seized their king but also turned him over to Cyrus who then occupied Ecbatana and took its treasury to Anshan. (Ecbatana later became one of the Achaemenian imperial centers and royal residence and capital of the Median satrapy. It had a strategic location in the central Zagros and an important eco-

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nomic role in terms of pastures for grazing, and for trade to the central Iranian plateau.) That the Median army went over to him suggests that not only was power passed to him, but along with it the legitimacy of Median kingship. Moreover, Cyrus began as king of a small territory and a confederation builder, and demonstrated that he was the superior military tactician and strategist, which may indicate that he had charismatic leadership qualities. Cyrus’s success and absorption of Media, possibly preceded by that of Susa, signaled that now he was a major power in the Zagros and would influence political relationships in western Asia. Croesus, King of Lydia, possibly in response to the emergence of this new leader to his southeast, crossed the Halys river, which had been the agreed-upon boundary between Lydia and Median territory. Cyrus responded by quickly moving to the north and east into Cappadocia. The two armies met and fought with no clear victor. When Croesus returned to his capital, Sardis, where his army was disbanded for the winter, he was followed by Cyrus who built alliances against him. Most likely in 547–546 bc Cyrus successfully besieged Sardis, and defeated the Lydians. In only three or four years Cyrus’s empire extended across Anatolia to include Lydia and then Lycia, Caria, and some of the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Cyrus, who is known to us primarily through his extraordinary military exploits, next turned east, crossed the Oxus river (Amu Darya), reached the Jaxartes river (Syr Darya), and possibly the Indus, only to turn west and capture Babylon, overthrowing Nabonidus in 539 bc. Again there is no certainty regarding Cyrus’s relationship to Babylon before this, but at the very least his overthrow of Media must have been seen in Mesopotamia as a serious threat. The Babylonian and Persian forces fought at Opis, east of the Tigris, and the Persian victors carried off its booty. After this, Babylon itself was taken without a fight, Nabonidus was captured, and Cyrus was hailed as the new King of Babylon. According to the Cyrus Cylinder, Cyrus acted at the behest of the Babylonian god, Marduk, and restored his cult to its former dominance. In so doing, Cyrus gained Babylonian legitimacy, but he also gained legitimacy in the eyes of members of the other religions living in Babylon when he repatriated peoples, including the Jews, or restored the images of the gods to their sanctuaries. In the case of the Jews, he allowed them to return to Jerusalem to rebuild the Temple, and in biblical references Cyrus is referred to as “God’s anointed” even though he was clearly not Jewish. As recent scholarship has shown, Cyrus’s response after his conquest of Babylon was pragmatic and traditional and was not innovative.

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Co-optation of indigenous gods and leaders facilitated and strengthened Cyrus’s legitimacy and enabled him to rule. Cyrus’s administration of Babylon followed his earlier practice of utilizing the existing elite and administrative structure while appointing a Persian as military governor. Curiously, and only for one year, Cambyses, Cyrus’s son and heir, was named co-ruler as King of Babylon. Was this to secure Cambyses’ succession to the throne? With the fall of Babylon, significant parts of the Babylonian empire came over to Cyrus, including Syria and Palestine. On the Cyrus Cylinder, Cyrus is described as a universal ruler: “I, Cyrus, king of the universe, mighty king, king of Babylon, king of Sumer and Akkad, king of the four quarters.” And it is here, too, that Cyrus’s genealogy back to Teispes is given – a genealogy attested independently by a contemporary seal found at Persepolis. Cyrus was emphasizing his rulership and continuity both in his family and within the Mesopotamian imperial tradition. On the Cyrus Cylinder, too, it is asserted that Marduk sought out Cyrus, King of Anshan, and selected him as the just ruler in opposition to Nabonidus. “All the inhabitants of Babylon as well as of the entire country of Sumer and Akkad, princes and governors (included), bowed to him (Cyrus) and kissed his feet, jubilant that he (had received) the kingship, and with shining faces. Happily they greeted him as a master through whose help that had come (again) to life from death (and) had all been spared damage and disaster, and they worshipped his (very) name.”2 While little is known about Cyrus, even less is known about his final years. Traditionally, he is believed to have focused his attention and military forces in Central Asia, and to have incorporated into his empire the territory now encompassed by the modern states of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. An important contemporary source, Darius’s Bisitun inscription, lists this vast region, or its component principalities, as part of the empire. And it was in Central Asia, according to Herodotus, that Cyrus II was killed in 530 bc during a campaign against the Saka Massagetae (Scyths), east of the Aral Sea. Cyrus’s body was brought back to Fars, to Pasargadae, for burial, where his tomb in all its simplicity still impresses all who visit it. Cambyses (530–522 bc), Cyrus’s first son, succeeded him. It was Cambyses who conquered Egypt in 525 bc and added it to the Achaemenian empire. Reminiscent of his father’s precedent in Babylon in particular, Cambyses was enthroned as Pharaoh of Upper and Lower Egypt, as the legitimate successor of the preceding Saitic dynasty. In contrast to his father, the exemplary ruler, however, Cambyses was depicted as the inept successor in Greek sources.

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Figure 2.1

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Cyrus’s tomb (photograph by author)

Cambyses’ conquest of Egypt was no mean achievement. It required the creation of a navy including construction of ships and recruiting sailors from among Mediterranean coastal subjects; the commanding officers were Persians. Cambyses also developed and negotiated a foreign policy that would isolate the Egyptian ruler, Amasis (570–526 bc), from potential eastern Mediterranean allies. Amasis had regarded Achaemenian power there as a threat and had long sought to erode Achaemenian power in the Levant. Cambyses also successfully negotiated with the Arabs to allow for the movement of the Persian army overland through the Sinai to Egypt. Fighting began in 526–525 bc, and the Egyptians were easily overcome in their first encounter and fled to Memphis. There they were decisively defeated and the new king, Psammetichus III, captured. This victory persuaded Libya to submit to the Persians; furthermore, Cambyses consolidated control over Egypt’s southern boundaries. The perception of Cambyses as tyrant and despot and, unlike Cyrus, insensitive to local culture and politics comes from Herodotus. Con-

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temporary Egyptian sources, however, present quite a different assessment. From the inscription on the statue of a high Egyptian official, Cambyses is described as conforming to traditional Egyptian customs, including the honoring of the gods and maintaining offerings, cult rituals, and sanctuaries. Like Cyrus in Babylon, he co-opted and utilized the indigenous elites to re-establish and maintain stability. The King of Upper and Lower Egypt [Cambyses] came to Sais. His majesty betook himself to the temple of Neith. He touched the ground before her very great majesty as every king had done. He organized a great feast of all good things for Neith, the Great One, the Mother of God, and the great gods who are in Sais, as every excellent king has done. That his majesty did because I had caused him to know the importance of her majesty; for she is the mother of Re himself.3

Not only this text, but also other Egyptian sources indicate Cambyses’ sensitivity to Egyptian cultural and political norms. Anti-Cambyses or anti-Persian sentiment possibly emerged when certain priests had become dissatisfied with Cambyses and the Persian occupation, or when temple activity was restricted after the revolts had been crushed. Possibly, too, there were negative reactions to taxation and Persian domination, and consequently an anti-Persian bias emerged that was then attached to Cambyses himself. Such anti-Persian sentiment may have been the source of Herodotus’s anti-Cambyses bias, as well as the source for Greek notions contrasting Cyrus’s rule with his son’s. Herodotus is the major source for the unknown and unclear last years of Cambyses’ reign. Consequently, his account has affected our perception of the events leading up to the death of Cambyses and the transfer of succession and power to Darius, a member of another Achaemenian family. The only contemporary Persian source, Darius’s Bisitun inscription, gives little information on Cambyses as ruler, as its whole purpose was to proclaim Darius’s own self-image. Clearly, there was a challenge to Cambyses’ leadership that hinged on his brother Bardiya, or Smerdis, according to Herodotus. Both the Bisutun inscription and Herodotus assert that Cambyses had him murdered. Next in the unfolding sequence of events, a magus, an official of possibly priestly standing and learning by the name of Gaumata, claimed that he was Bardiya and the legitimate king, hence in Herodotus the “false” Smerdis or in the Bisutun inscription, the impostor Gaumata. On his way from Egypt through Syria to put down the revolt, Cambyses was accidentally killed. Bardiya, either the actual son of Cyrus or the impos-

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tor, ruled only for several months. He, in turn, was killed by a group of seven notable co-conspirators, one of whom, Darius, became king (522–486 bc). According to the Bisitun inscription Darius was the son of Hystaspes, grandson of Arsames, who was descended from the eponymous ancestor, Achaemenes, the father of Teispes – Cyrus’s ancestor. Most likely, Bardiya/Gaumata was in fact the son of Cyrus, and Darius led a coup d’etat against him after Bardiya had revolted against his brother, Cambyses. Darius’s assertion that Gaumata was an impostor – ultimately Herodotus’s source must have been based on Darius – was to cover up the fact that he had killed a legitimate successor in the Cyrus succession. Moreover, Darius’s allegation of descent from Achaemenes represents Darius’s attempt to legitimize his own claim to rule. The Bisitun inscription notes that both Darius’s father and grandfather were still living, and presumably they would have had stronger claims to rule had they been so closely related to Cyrus II. Moreover, the subsequent empire-wide revolts, including those led by the kings of Babylonia, Elam, Armenia, Media, Scythia, and even in Persia by a leader claiming himself to be Bardiya, were seen by Darius as a challenge to his legitimacy as ruler. While the motivations of some of these peoples and rebels may have been opportunistic, the turmoil in reaction to regicide and to Darius’s probable involvement in it most likely reflects general attachment to the legitimacy of Achaemenian descent. The brilliance of Darius’s military leadership was breathtakingly demonstrated by his ability to suppress the revolts across such a vast empire and re-establish the empire in little more than a year. Darius won the battles in the field, captured and executed the rebel leaders – the “kings” dramatically represented in relief at Bisitun – and their supporters, and reimposed order under commanders loyal to him. Warfare between Darius’s supporters and the rebelling leaders, some of whom were most likely loyal to the family of Cyrus, indicated the significant fissure that had appeared in Persia itself and the empire as a whole following Cyrus’s death. Cambyses, as Cyrus’s successor, despite his success in Egypt, may have lacked his father’s authority and may have been part of the problem. Bardiya’s insurrection against him reflected a changed reality. Cyrus in the newly formed Persian empire, and Cambyses in Egypt, governed through the indigenous elites; however, governorships and military command were held by family members or close Persian and Median affiliates. Access to the new wealth and power from conquest was gained through personal contact with the ruler and his very closest associates; consequently, rivalries may have intensified over the issue of access to the ruler. The too rapid expansion of the

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empire under Cyrus – often cited as the cause of the rebellions – explains little. Given the probable economic, social, and political organization of Persia and Media and the factor of autonomy there and throughout the empire, established relationships with the Achaemenian rulers changed with the expansion of their power. Such changes would have heightened political and economic competition among leaders and elites. Consequently, the deaths of Cambyses and then of Bardiya brought out competing forces that coalesced in support of, or against, Darius, who would claim the throne for himself. We have an important contemporary source for Darius’s extraordinary accomplishment in suppressing the empire-wide rebellions and re-establishing Cyrus’s empire. That source, of course, is Darius’s own account carved in three languages below the graphic depiction of the submission of the rebel leaders high on the mountain face at Bisitun. For what purpose was this historical record and monument created? The three languages of the inscription could only be read by a tiny number of readers. One of the languages, Old Persian, could very well have been created for this purpose (although Old Persian was used at Pasargadae, the inscription was probably put there by Darius). Furthermore, the inscription was carved so high up from ground level that the cuneiform itself could not be read even were the reader literate. Bisitun’s location – today midway between Tehran and Baghdad – is strategically located at the crossing of an east–west and north–south axis of trade and communication routes in the Zagros and faces a great natural spring of water. In addition to being sited at a crossroads, it is near Ecbatana and centers of power in Mesopotamia and the Iranian plateau. At Bisitun all the world could marvel at Darius’s power, and the carving still stands as a record of and monument to power, a concern for legitimacy, and a sense of historical continuity and future expressions of rulership. These values of power, legitimacy, and sense of history were understood not only by Achaemenian subjects but by the Greek historians as well. Darius not only reunited Cyrus’s empire and apparently gained the support of all elites despite the fact that the empire had earlier been riven by factionalism. He went further; he clearly established himself as the Achaemenian empire’s second founder. The empire was expanded in size, and Darius established a bureaucracy and administration, built on Cyrus’s model, which continued even after Alexander’s conquest when the Achaemenian dynasty came to an end. In coupling his lineage and ruling effectiveness with Cyrus’s, Darius so established the legitimacy of his Achaemenian descent group and of the Persians that their bases for rule never faced a serious internal challenge. Even Alexander felt

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compelled to establish a link with the Achaemenian family and its ruling traditions. After establishing his own position, Darius undertook two important military campaigns early in his reign. One was an expedition to India that resulted in annexation of Sind and possibly the Punjab, and the other was a less successful campaign against the Scythians to the north of the Black Sea. Possibly the Scyths’ mobility allowed them in the end to escape Darius’s forces, which were probably more restricted in movement given their far greater numbers. Under Darius, the empire extended from Egypt and Libya in the west to the Indus and into Central Asia in the east. Darius was a brilliant administrator, and his reign established a number of precedents that were followed throughout the Achaemenian period by his successors. According to Herodotus, Darius divided his empire into 20 provinces or satrapies, each with its own governor or satrap; a satrapy was assessed for tax purposes and provided a fixed annual tribute. He was the first Achaemenian to mint coins. He built the Royal Road that stretched from Susa to Sardis with regular post houses that allowed for contact with and reports on the conditions and events in the western part of the empire. Cuneiform was already extensively used for inscriptions, but Old Persian seems to have been created by Darius, although it was never widely used and did not supplant Aramaic as the language of administration. At Bisitun and in other places the use of trilingual inscriptions, including Old Persian, related to Darius’s sense of history, identity, and legitimacy. Darius also emerged as an important builder. In Egypt he completed the canal that linked the Nile to the Red Sea. This project may have been to facilitate trade between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf or it may have been an attempt to identify the new Persian ruler with an Egyptian grand building project and thus legitimize him in that tradition, or both. This concern for legitimacy and expression of continuity and power seen in the case of the Nile canal was exemplified in the Achaemenian heartland of Persia, Media, and Elam. The development of cities and administrative centers, including the already well-established Susa and especially at Persepolis, received significant amounts of his attention. Susa was Darius’s most important administrative complex, and the imperial court spent part of each year there and at Ecbatana. Darius built extensively at Susa: among other works he built the Apadana, or audience hall, and a palace constructed in the Babylonian style with rooms grouped around courtyards. Here, too, Darius’s focus was on expressing his rulership, and foundation tablets well describe his intent.

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Late in his reign and his life, Darius encountered the Greeks. It should be noted here that even the limited number of Persian sources disappear altogether during Darius’s reign and the other sources for it are fragmentary at best. Inscriptions on statues and stelae from Egypt indicate that Darius continued the earlier Achaemenian practice of assuming pharaonic titles and roles there that included worshipping and being supported by local gods. For the most part, however, the sources are essentially Greek or biblical. Again, our main source is Herodotus. Ionians in the western empire revolted and, along with Athenians and Eretrians, sacked Sardis. Darius, in response to the attack on this important western citadel, sent a large army and fleet across into Europe to attack Athens and Eretria, but his forces adopted a strategic retreat following storms at sea and clashes with small, armed groups. A larger army was assembled, successfully attacked Eretria, and then Persian troops landed on the mainland near the Plain of Marathon. The outcome, of course, was the famous defeat of the Persians and their withdrawal to their ships. The navy then sailed on to attack Athens, which had by now been forewarned and the Persians were once again defeated and retreated. Darius died. Hostilities would be resumed against the Greeks after Xerxes acceded to the throne. Xerxes (486–465 bc) was clearly the son of his father, Darius: the continuity between son and father in terms of performance and ideas is striking. On ascending the throne, Xerxes’ first priority was to maintain control over Iran and suppress insurrections in Babylonia and Egypt. After his authority was established there, and he had consolidated his father’s conquests and restored a hold over them, he could turn to the Greek challenge. While Achaemenian authority was re-established in Egypt and in Babylonia, he was no more successful than Darius with the Greeks. Xerxes reorganized the administration of Babylon by dividing it into two great provinces: one that is now present-day Iraq and Syria east of the Euphrates; and the other to the west, essentially Syria and Palestine, the province of “Beyond the River.” Finally, in 480 bc, Xerxes was secure enough to confront the mainland Greeks, especially Athens and Sparta. With a large force that Xerxes himself led, he crossed the Hellespont, marched through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly to be confronted at the pass of Thermopylae by Greeks. The Persian army successfully attacked them from the rear on the advice of a Greek renegade, which cleared the way to march on Athens. Athens was occupied. The Greeks, including their fleet, had withdrawn to Salamis to face the Persians at the Isthmus of Corinth. Had the Persians won this battle, the Peloponnesus would have been open to

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them. In that often told incident, the Persian fleet was sunk, many troops were drowned, and the mighty Xerxes was forced to withdraw to Asia, leaving his general, Mardonius, with an army in northern Greece. Xerxes seems to have returned to Babylonia to put down once and for all another insurrection there. In 479 bc Mardonius advanced: Persian and Greek troops fought yet another famous battle, this one on the Plain of Plataea near Thebes. Mardonius was killed and the Persians were routed. Subsequently, Greeks landed on Asia and defeated the Persian army that had previously left Greece. With this disaster, and subsequent military disappointments during the next generation of Achaemenian rule, they would give up any attempt to control mainland Greece. There are no extant Achaemenian sources for the Greek wars; consequently we have no idea of their importance for them. Understandably, the Greek-Persian wars were formative for the Greeks, but possibly of marginal importance for the Achaemenian empire. It could well be that the Persians were not fully motivated and mobilized to engage the Greeks beyond the western frontiers of Anatolia, while Babylonia and Egypt were of central strategic and imperial importance for the Achaemenians, who tolerated no threats there. Xerxes also followed in his father’s footsteps when he continued construction projects at Persepolis and carried on his administration of the empire. Again from the vantage point of the Greek historians, the last years of Xerxes were devoted to palace intrigue. Xerxes was assassinated in 465 bc in his palace along with his designated successor, Darius, and was succeeded by another son, Artaxerxes I (465–424 bc). This episode of the royal murders has continued to be something of an unsolved mystery. Artaxerxes had to face a serious insurrection in Egypt which was supported by Athens. His forces gained control over Egypt and the rebels were annihilated. The Athenian-Greek challenge continued until the Peloponnesian wars when the Spartans and Athenians turned against each other, and their disunity gave the Persians something of a respite. Under Artaxerxes the building work at Persepolis continued, and by the end of his very long reign that great complex was essentially completed except for small additions constructed during the reign of Artaxerxes III. The Achaemenian empire after Artaxerxes I is commonly depicted as having lost its élan and direction and having entered into a century-long decline as the result of dynastic decadence. Again this constitutes a continuing biased view that after suffering defeat in the Greek wars there was no recovery for the Achaemenians – such a view explains little. If the Achaemenians were so incompetent, how did the dynasty survive for

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yet another century? Other than dynastic sequence, little can be established with certainty. Moreover, regicide and internecine struggles for the throne would seem to fit into the established Greek perception of a pattern of decadence and decline. And given extant sources, battle with the Greeks was always in the wings. Artaxerxes I died in Babylon in 424 bc, and succession to the Achaemenian throne was in dispute. Ultimately, a bastard son, Ochus, known as Darius II, withstood challenges by two brothers, who were killed. Darius II (423–404 bc) reigned for 18 years. Succession to the throne remained within the immediate Achaemenian royal family, and whereas a challenge might be made to succession, it could only come from within the family. This would indicate that legitimacy was accorded to the Achaemenian dynasty within Persia and the empire as a whole, resulting in both stability and conservatism. Darius II once again gained an advantage against the Greeks when Athens became involved in Sicily. He allied the Persians with Sparta to further weaken Athens and reimposed the tribute on the Ionian Greeks. Greek and Roman historians – and in the case of Plutarch long after the events – describe the rebellions of the Cadusians (of whom nothing is known save for the name). This new conflict would have been closer to the center of Achaemenian power in what is now Kurdistan – northwestern Iran, northern Iraq, and southeastern Turkey. Darius II was succeeded by his eldest son, Artaxerxes II (404–359 bc), who, in turn, was challenged by Cyrus the Younger four years into his reign. In the struggle Cyrus was killed, and Artaxerxes II went on to rule for no less than 46 years. Despite that record of longevity, little is known about him from contemporary sources. Plutarch, writing almost 500 years later, extols Artaxerxes II’s virtues as a ruler. Extant inscriptions do show an interesting change in the formula for kingship, which acknowledges the support of Ahura Mazda, but for some reason includes the names of Mithra (the god responsible for cosmic order) and Anahita (goddess of the waters and source of life). In 401–399 bc Artaxerxes II had to deal with a successful revolt against his rule in Egypt that forced the Achaemenians out of Egypt. Despite repeated attempts to reimpose their sovereignty over Egypt, the Achaemenians were ineffectual until late in the reign of Artaxerxes III. Artaxerxes II was able to retain control over Palestine, which was of even greater strategic importance after the loss of Egypt. Moreover, he was in a position to push the Greeks out of Anatolia and force their acceptance once again of Persian domination, which would last until the emergence of Alexander the Great.

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The contest for succession between Artaxerxes II and Cyrus the Younger became well known because it was recorded by Xenophon in his Anabasis. Cyrus the Younger’s army included Xenophon among 10,000 Greek mercenaries. Cyrus must have had some standing in court, because while his father was still living he had been sent to the western front to end a conflict between two governors there. Nevertheless, Cyrus the Younger received little support in his attempted coup against his brother, and was easily defeated and killed in battle in 401 bc. Fratricidal struggle for the throne erupted with Artaxerxes II’s death. Three of his sons, including Darius, the crown prince, died, and a fourth son, yet another Ochus who assumes the regnal name Artaxerxes III, took the throne. The Achaemenian family, despite internal conflicts at the time of succession, continued to monopolize kingship, which would suggest widespread support for rule descending in the dynasty. Artaxerxes III (359–338 bc) is also known because of Plutarch. During Artaxerxes III’s 19-year reign, he reimposed Achaemenian rule on Egypt, but only after first having brutally crushed a Phoenician revolt instigated by Egypt. Greek sources, long after the fact and therefore suspect, recount the death of Artaxerxes and his entire family save for the youngest son, Arses, who took the name Artaxerxes IV (338–336 bc). His very brief reign of two years ended with his murder. The first, but necessary, lateral succession went to a second cousin, Artashata, who took the name Darius III (336–330 bc). He was the last in the Achaemenian dynasty to reign over the empire. It was Darius III who was defeated by Alexander of Macedon (330–323 bc). Notwithstanding Darius III’s ignominious burden of relinquishing Achaemenian and Persian sovereignty to Alexander, he did mount a credible defense of his empire. Nor was it inevitable that the Macedonians would be victorious. Alexander, son of King Philip II of Macedonia, became the instrument to execute his father’s plan of domination of the Greek world that resulted in confrontation with the Achaemenians over the Aegean side of Anatolia. Philip was assassinated in 336 bc, after he had formed the League of Corinth but before he could lead it against the Persians. By 334 bc Alexander had consolidated his position and crossed the Hellespont with his army to begin the Persian campaign. On the coasts of Anatolia and the Levant, Alexander met stiff resistance, but was able to defeat the armies of Darius III at the River Granicus, then at Issus, and ultimately at Gaugamela in northern Iraq in 331 bc. The defeated Darius III fled Babylon. Susa, Persepolis, and then Ecbatana were open to Alexander. In 330 bc Darius was deposed and killed by Bessus,

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satrap of Bactria, a general and a member of the royal family. Bessus appropriated the royal insignia and assumed the name Artaxerxes IV. Alexander had him seized and then executed, and declared that he was King of Asia and presented himself as the avenger and rightful successor to Darius; even so his armies sacked Susa and burnt Persepolis. Alexander as successor ordered that Darius’s body be returned to Naqsh-i Rustam for interment among other Achaemenian rulers buried there. Alexander’s famous military progress continued into the eastern parts of the empire in 329 bc, into Bactria and Sogdiana. Alexander suppressed revolts against him there, and with his army recrossed the Hindu Kush, then traveled on to the Indus and the Punjab, and down to the mouth of the Indus before turning west to complete the circle with a return to Susa. In the next year, 323 bc, Alexander died. Alexander successfully balanced off the Achaemenian-Persian elite with his own Macedonian notables. Persepolis was torched, but Cyrus and the Achaemenian tradition were honored. Revolts were suppressed, often with great brutality, which possibly turned the Zoroastrian magi, clerics/priests, against him, but Persia itself remained essentially loyal to the new ruler. After Alexander’s death his generals quarreled over the division of the empire. In the east, one of them, Seleucus, emerged victorious and by 311 bc he was in control of not only Iran but also Mesopotamia and northern Syria. This so-called “Hellenistic” domination of Iran would continue for about 150 years. There is no adequate explanation for Alexander’s extraordinary success. It does recall, however, the equally extraordinary success of Cyrus II in founding the empire some 200 years earlier. Recent scholarship rejects the charge that Achaemenian decadence was responsible for that great defeat and demise of the dynasty. The Achaemenian armies, including its Greek mercenaries, and Achaemenian notables remained loyal to Darius III almost to the end. The Achaemenian empire itself was still well administered. The empire by its nature and from its beginnings was multi-ethnic and multicultural, and made up of socially, legally, and politically autonomous if not separate population groups and a broad range of administrative units. Even the perennial potential for rebellion in key regions was no higher under Darius III than under Artaxerxes III. Nor is there evidence that significant economic and social changes played a role in the defeat of the Achaemenians and the end of their dynasty. The autonomy of whole groups and the loose federation of the empire in the end would necessitate the Achaemenians’ submission to Alexander and their political recognition of him. This social and

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political autonomy was certainly a factor in the military success of Alexander’s campaign. Alexander’s generalship, even charismatic leadership, was probably the key factor in his military success over the Achaemenians and his appropriation of their empire.

Achaemenian Rulership and Political Culture Examination of Achaemenian rulership affords us a glimpse of a past that provided the basis for so much of subsequent Persian history. Central to that rulership was representation of the ruler to the past and to his subjects, and their reciprocal representation to the ruler. Achaemenian rulership wedded a political culture with an ideology of divine authority that had a basis in Zoroastrian and, perhaps more immediately, in ancient Mesopotamian ideas of the ruler as God’s vicegerent on earth. Central to Achaemenian rulership was the idea of the cosmic struggle between good and evil with the final vindication of good through the defeat of evil in this world by the just ruler. Accordingly, this integration of millennial religion and imperial ideology occurred with the Achaemenians and only such rule protected the cosmos from chaos.4 Achaemenian rulers expressed their relationship to, and role in, the cosmos explicitly in their inscriptions and friezes and implicitly in their architecture and art and in their administration and all institutions, including economic and social ones, such as the court and the role of women there. Importantly, their political culture can be reconstituted to a degree on the basis of textual and archaeological sources. Achaemenian authority incorporated rulership and divine authority to establish an essential hierarchy that expressed itself throughout their empire. Moreover, this hierarchy started with Ahura Mazda – Zoroastrianism’s supreme being – who not only created the cosmos but also selected its rulers, Ahura Mazda’s vicegerents, from the Achaemenian family of Persia. (It is generally now accepted that the Achaemenian great kings were Zoroastrian.) Consequently, the right to rule and govern was theirs alone. This central relationship ensured a universal equipoise: to rebel against the Achaemenian ruler was to rebel against Ahura Mazda and his universal order. These ideas and ideals are clearly expressed in the early Achaemenian inscriptions of Darius I at Bisitun and on his tomb at Naqsh-i Rustam and on Xerxes’ tomb. A similar relationship and idea is also expressed on the Cyrus Cylinder, but there Cyrus is depicted as the King of Babylon divinely sanctioned by Marduk, Babylon’s supreme god, rather than Ahura Mazda. Centrality of a moral order and descent

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within the Achaemenian family were critical for Cyrus and, expressed in Zoroastrian terms, for Darius and his descendants. In the end, how is Achaemenian history to be interpreted? To go beyond unidimensional Achaemenian, Greek, and historical representations of Achaemenian rulers, it may be possible to reconcile the variety of factors that comprise that rulership and its relation with Achaemenian society by drawing upon Crossley’s concept of simultaneous rulership, which she first developed as a means to analyze Chinese and Central Asian polities (see Chapter 1).5 Such simultaneous, or universal, rulership represents a form of imperial expression in which the ruler transcends the realm’s, or more typically the empire’s, parts to create a historical reality and congruent images and symbols. Moreover, the universal ruler creates, or can destroy, constituencies or audiences, which exist as expressions of his rulership. Simultaneous rulership and Iran’s political culture were joined together beginning with the Achaemenians, and this is clearly represented in their inscriptions and in their patronage of the construction of buildings and cities. Achaemenian rulership was first enunciated by Cyrus the Great on what has become known as the Cyrus Cylinder, which justifies his conquest of Babylon: “I am Cyrus, king of the world, great king, legitimate king, king of Babylon, king of Sumer and Akkad, king of the four (rims of the earth), son of Cambyses, great king, king of Anshan, grandson of Cyrus, great king, king of Anshan, descendant of Teispes, great king, king of Anshan, of a family (which) always (exercised) kingship.” Cyrus legitimized himself first as the successor in the line of Mesopotamian rulers and through its titles and then in terms of his Achaemenian descent and membership in that family, including their place of rule, Anshan in Persia. Cyrus establishes his legitimacy through these two lines of descent, thereby establishing his fitness to rule and his relationship to earlier imperial rulers. On the Cylinder he also established the parameters of rulership, its relation to the cosmos, and the succession of rulership in his family, and even suggests the ruler’s administrative roles: All the kings of the entire world from the Upper to the Lower Sea, those who are seated in throne rooms, (those who) live in other [types of buildings as well as] all the kings of the West land living in tents [this phrase refers either to nomadic society or in contrast to an urban one] brought their heavy tributes and kissed my feet in Babylon . . . from as far as Ashur and Susa . . . I returned to (these) sacred cities on the other side of the Tigris, the sanctuaries of which have been ruins for a long time, the images which (used) to live therein and established for them permanent sanctuaries . . .

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May all the gods whom I have resettled in their sacred cities ask daily Bel and Nebo for a long life for me and may they recommend me (to him): to Marduk, my lord, they may say this: “Cyrus the king who worships you, and Cambyses, his son . . .”6

The Cyrus Cylinder stands as an important contemporary source as Cyrus represented his rulership to the past, to himself, and to others. He is king of the world and of kingly descent. He identifies his son Cambyses as receiving Marduk’s blessing, and by inference anoints Cambyses as his successor. Cyrus restored order and well-being to the people of Babylon, including the abolition of forced labor. Cyrus, likewise, represents the administration and divisions of his empire. All the kings subordinate themselves to him by bringing tribute and kissing his feet in Babylon. He also includes the “kings of the West land living in tents.” Presumably, these were pastoral nomads. The kings “seated in throne rooms” or the “kings . . . living in tents” reveal both hierarchy and autonomy. The emphasis on the Cyrus Cylinder is the relationship of the ruler to Marduk and other gods to maintain an equipoise in the cosmos; the outcome of just rule is order, peace, and happiness in Cyrus’s/Marduk’s realm. Cyrus II’s creation of Pasargadae represents yet another important and contemporary primary source for the rule and expression of his rulership. Cyrus’s city and royal complex, Pasargadae, was important to Cyrus personally and politically, and was certainly important to the economy of Fars. Even after Persepolis was built by Darius and then by Xerxes as their personal representation of Cyrus’s city, Pasargadae continued to be an important touchstone of legitimacy and a ceremonial center for coronations. Its location in the Achaemenian heartland of Fars, and named – it is traditionally said – after his own tribe, served to legitimize an Achaemenian past and, possibly, its nomadic origins. It was certainly park-like and may have been designed as a nomadic encampment. Furthermore, Cyrus’s own Pasargadae was linked to the earlier imperial cities, Anshan and, probably, Susa and Ecbatana. Both of these cities were associated with the earlier imperial traditions and administration of the Medes and Elamites. And Susa and Ecbatana, of course, continued as the main administrative centers even after Pasargadae and then Persepolis were built, and were enlarged and augmented by subsequent Achaemenians. Construction of Pasargadae probably began after Cyrus’s conquest of western Anatolia, in about 546 bc, when stonemasons were presumably brought from that region to construct the buildings. Little is known about the indigenous architecture in Fars, where there appears to have

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been no tradition of monumental stone architecture. The buildings constructed at Pasargadae may have incorporated an indigenous tradition that utilized wood and mud/mud brick with stone and monumentality from the Mesopotamian tradition or possibly from further north in western Iran. The site of Pasargadae consists of a rolling plain with four main clusters of buildings. The most complete is Cyrus’s tomb, impressive even today, a simple stone and gabled structure erected on a stepped platform. Nothing remains inside it, and, according to Strabo, the tomb bore an inscription – no longer extant, if it ever existed – that read: “O man, I am Cyrus, who founded the Empire of the Persians and was King of Asia. Grudge me not therefore this monument.”7 The other three clusters are identified by their presumed use as citadel, palace and pavilions, and sacred areas. One palace and its pavilions were built with columns and porticos, and in the context of water channels, which suggests a garden. Pasargadae’s eclectic architecture incorporated styles and forms that link Fars with the whole of the empire – to be repeated at Persepolis – to emphasize Cyrus’s simultaneous rulership. This is also reinforced in Pasargadae’s reliefs and trilingual inscriptions in Old Persian, Elamite, and Babylonian. One of the reliefs depicts a figure, a genius, with Assyrian wings, wearing an Elamite dress and an Egyptian headdress, which bears an inscription above it: “I, Cyrus, the king, an Achaemenian.” Out of necessity, Darius I had to establish that he, too, was an Achaemenian. The very first line of his Bisitun inscription of 520–519 bc asserts: “I am Darius, the great king, the king of kings, the king of Persia, the king of the provinces, the son of Hystaspes, the grandson of Arsames, the Achaemenian.” The next four lines hammer home the point of descent, and line 4 itself acknowledges two genealogical lines: “(Thus) saith Darius, the king: Eight of my race were kings before (me); I am the ninth. In two lines have we been kings.” Once legitimacy of descent is established in the Bisitun inscription, Darius links his name with Ahura Mazda’s and credits his grace with his success, and the two are joined together in rulership (lines 5 and 6): (Thus) saith Darius, the king: By the grace of Ahura Mazda am I king; Ahura Mazda hath granted me the kingdom. (Thus) saith Darius, the king: These are the provinces which are subject unto me, and by the grace of Ahura Mazda became I king of them: Persia, Susiana, Babylonia, Assyria, Arabia . . . twenty three lands in all.8

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The inscription at Darius’s tomb at Naqsh-i Rustam reiterates these themes of Ahura Mazda’s grace in making him king, his titles and genealogy, and the countries under Darius’s rule. The Bisitun inscription continues: Says Darius the king: Ahura Mazda when he saw this earth in commotion, thereafter bestowed it upon me, made me king; I am king . . . Ahura Mazda bore me aid, until I did the work. Me may Ahura Mazda protect from harm, and my royal house, and this land: this I pray of Ahura Mazda, this may Ahura Mazda give to me! O man, that which is the command of Ahura Mazda, let this not seem repugnant to you; do not leave the right path; do not rise in rebellion.9

An important theme of rulership throughout Iranian history is the theme of the just ruler, and in Persian history it is first articulated by the Achaemenians. While the Achaemenians themselves emphasized their absolute power they exercised it in the context of a universal moral order that bound them to itself. Consequently, their actions were necessarily ethical. That the king could only act justly is explicitly stated in texts of royal inscriptions – almost formulae into which any Achaemenian ruler’s name could be inserted – from the reigns of Darius and Xerxes and on papyrus texts from Egypt, which implies this idea was accepted as a universal characteristic of Achaemenian rulership: A great god is Ahura Mazda who created this excellent work which one sees; who created happiness for man; who bestowed wisdom and energy upon Darius (Xerxes) the king. Says Darius (Xerxes) the king: by the favour of Ahura Mazda I am of such a kind that I am a friend to what is right, I am no friend to what is wrong.10

Moreover, these texts extol the equanimity that characterizes the just ruler. All of these qualities – the equipoise of the universe and the equanimity of the ruler – reappear in Persepolis’s famous reliefs. The king, with his Ahura Mazda-given qualities of discernment, ensured order and justice; just reward and punishment were a natural consequence that followed consideration of evidence and the innate qualities of kingship. Kingship’s qualities included physical attributes as well – and these are also represented in reliefs: the hunter, the bowman, the spearman, and the horseman. Theoretical absolutism was limited by a number of factors, especially the geographical one of the vastness of the empire and the available technology to exercise it. Above all, the Achaemenians represented rulership in a moral context.

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Again in lines 55 and 56 of the Bisitun inscription: (Thus) saith Darius, the king: Thou who mayest be king hereafter, beware of lies; the man who is a liar, destroy him utterly if thou thinkest “(thereby) shall my land remain whole.” (Thus) saith Darius, the king: This is what I have done, by the grace of Ahura Mazda have I always acted. Whosoever shall read this inscription hereafter, let that which I have done be believed; thou shalt not hold it to be lies.

In this last reference to lies, Darius is using lie in its customary sense, but in the first usage – “beware of lies; the man who is a liar” – the context clearly means liar in the sense of rebel and heretic. And in lines 63 and 64 of the Bisitun inscription: (Thus) saith Darius, the king: On this account Ahura Mazda brought me help . . . because I was not wicked, nor was I a liar, nor was I a tyrant, neither I nor any of my line. I have ruled according to righteousness . . . (Thus) saith Darius, the king: Thou, who mayest be king hereafter, whosoever shall be a liar or a rebel (?), or shall not be friendly, him do thou destroy!11

Xerxes declared, after suppressing a rebellion: “Where previously the demons were worshipped, there I worshipped Ahura Mazda and arta [truth] with reverence . . . You who (shall be) hereafter . . . have respect for that law which Ahura Mazda has established; worship Ahura Mazda and arta with reverence.”12 Khurt observes this is the only extant Achaemenian text where the word arta, presumably truth, is written, calling to mind Herodotus’s observation: “They [the Persians] train their sons from their fifth to the thirteenth year in three things only: horsemanship, archery, and truth-telling.”13 Here “truth-telling” may or may not relate to arta (truth in the abstract), but it is linked to that ethical dimension of rulership that is directly expressed by both Darius and Xerxes in identical inscriptions: “Says Darius [or Xerxes] the king: by the favour of Ahura Mazda I am of such a kind that I am a friend to what is right, I am no friend to what is wrong . . . What is right, that is my wish. I am no friend of the man who is a follower of the lie.”14 For Darius, the trilingual Bisitun inscription represented more than just historical consciousness on his part, or an awareness of the preceding traditions of the Assyrians, Elamites, Babylonians, Medes, and the Achaemenian family itself. Darius embodied kingship past and present as he embodied the Achaemenian family’s right to rule Anshan, Persia,

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Media, and the whole of the empire – especially so given his probably fabricated Achaemenian genealogy. Medes, Babylonians, Jews, Lydians, and Egyptians, as well as the Persians, could each see the Achaemenian king as their ruler, legitimized not only by lineage and military success but by Ahura Mazda himself. A moral order was established. Social, bureaucratic, military, religious, economic, social, and cultural institutions supported the Achaemenian, the universal and simultaneous, ruler. Not unexpectedly, there were tensions and conflicts within and between them. To protect the ruler and his critical universal roles, he was isolated, represented as serene and above it all – in fact, a nullity. Also, simultaneous rulership made it difficult to challenge the ruler, or even the dynastic family, or for one to break out from what had become the established mold of rulership. Achaemenian imperial constituencies were the products of imperial conquest and rulership. Rulership both identified and defined groups as extensions and necessary products of that rulership. It should be remembered that official Achaemenian sources are the only extant indigenous ones and that is the only way Achaemenian rulers are seen in their own sources, although the idea of Achaemenian universal rulership is supported by Greek and Hebrew sources. Not only does the Bisitun inscription record Darius’s account of his victory and proclamation in the third-person rhetorical manner of the Cyrus Cylinder, but he is also depicted in relief as victor; one of his feet rests on the chest of the presumed Gaumata/Bardiya, and he represents himself as receiving the submission of eight captives roped together – a ninth was subsequently added. Darius is fully a third taller than his prisoners and is dressed in a Persian-style robe, with royal shoes on his feet, bracelets on his arms, and a crown on his head. His right arm is raised, while his left holds a bow. Behind him there are two warriors, also in Persian dress, one carrying a spear and the other a bow. Hovering over the captives and facing Darius is the familiar winged-disk bearing a human figure who also wears a crown and whose right arm is raised and whose lefthand extends a ring. The Akkadian/Babylonian text is inscribed to the left of the relief, the Elamite to the right and below the Akkadian inscription, and the Old Persian text is carved under the relief. The iconography of the relief is only indirectly explained by the trilingual texts. Essentially, Darius, after his defeat of the pretender Gaumata, crushed the eight rebels who challenged his rule. They are identified by region in the texts and by regional dress in the reliefs. The ninth rebel and the last to be conquered wears the distinctive pointed Scythian hat. Ahura Mazda, although frequently mentioned here and in other inscrip-

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Figure 2.2

Bisitun inscription (photograph by author)

tions, cannot with certainty be identified with the winged-disk figure; however, it is widely assumed that he was represented in this manner. Ahura Mazda, if he is the winged-disk figure depicted in the various reliefs, acknowledges Darius as king by his raised right hand and by extending to him the ring of sovereignty with his left. Darius holds the bow of sovereignty is his left hand and acknowledges Ahura Mazda with his right. Reciprocity between the cosmic sovereign and his earthly vicegerent is completed; consequently, to disobey the ruler is to transgress against the cosmic and moral order. Darius goes on to recount his legitimate suppression of the rebellion raised by “a Magian, Gaumata by name”(line 11), and continues: “(Thus) saith Darius, the king: The kingdom that had been wrested from our line I brought back (and) I established it in its place as it was of old. The temples which Gaumata, the Magian, had destroyed I restored for the people, and the pasture-lands, and the herds, and the dwelling places, and the houses” (line 14). Darius continues his historical narrative of the suppression of the great rebellion following Cambyses’ death, which included some 19 battles by his counting. Darius in the Bisitun inscription goes on to equate himself with “truth” and rebellion with the “lie.”15 Darius successfully established the legitimacy of his descent line. Not only was rebellion a crime against kingship itself, but after Darius, when rebellion broke out, there was no attempt to supplant his Achaemenian

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lineage. Even Alexander the Great made sure that he performed the burial rites for Darius III to establish his legitimacy as an Achaemenian successor and avenger; in addition, Alexander married into the lineage. What was the purpose of the Bisitun inscription? It is often characterized as propaganda, which explains little, for when are political representation and expression not propaganda? Bisitun’s location and monumentality were indeed meant to impress. The texts of two of the three languages could be read by only a minute fraction of the population and the third, the Old Persian text, could be read by even fewer. Furthermore, the texts are so high up on the cliff above ground level that the cuneiform could not be deciphered even if it could have been read; the relief of Darius and his captives, given their greater size, could be more easily seen. Bisitun’s message was copied and distributed, and fragments have been found in Babylon and in an Aramaic translation in Egypt. Similarly, subsequent Achaemenians used Bisitun as a model for their own monuments and records that included trilingual inscriptions expressing Achaemenian descent, the ruler’s relationship with Ahura Mazda in a cosmic, ethical, and historical framework, and reliefs that depicted the ruler, attendants, the winged-figure disk, and other symbols both religious and dynastic. Bisitun’s purpose was to present Darius’s account of his accession to the throne and his suppression of the challengers to it. The relief and the trilingual inscriptions expressed power and declared his legitimacy as the result of descent in the Achaemenian family and relationship to the cosmos and cosmic being, Ahura Mazda. Bisitun articulated an ideology in which the ruler not only defined history and recorded the present, but also at the very heart of his rule fulfilled a moral purpose, which was the will of Ahura Mazda. With such harmony – between Ahura Mazda and the king, between the cosmos and the realm – equipoise, harmony, bounty, and happiness would result. Just as the ruler fulfilled his relationship with Ahura Mazda through obedience to his will, so did subjects fulfill their role by obeying the ruler. Xerxes and subsequent Achaemenians depicted themselves in reliefs with the winged-figure disk, again presumably Ahura Mazda, receiving the ring or diadem from him in front of the fire altar, a central element in Zoroastrian ritual. Achaemenian rulers are shown seated on thrones, in procession, the recipients of tribute/gifts, with bows and horses, and in conflict with lions. Just as Ahura Mazda commanded the cosmos, the ruler’s dominance over nature can be seen when he is depicted as hunter – a tradition with Mesopotamian origins and found in Achaemenian reliefs and later in Sasanian reliefs associated with hunting parks.

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Patronage of architecture and art was clearly another critical aspect of rulership, and Darius’s own account of his role as architectural patron can be found on the foundation charter from his Susa palace: This palace which I built at Susa, from afar its ornamentation was brought . . . the Babylonian people – it did (these tasks) [to build the palace using] . . . The cedar timber, this – a mountain by name Lebanon – from there was brought. The Assyrian people brought it to Babylon; from Babylon the Carians and the Ionians brought it to Susa . . . The gold was brought from Sardis and from Bactria, which here was wrought. The precious stone lapis lazuli and carnelian which was wrought here, this was brought from Sogdiana. The precious stone turquoise, this was brought from Chorasmia ... The silver and the ebony were brought from Egypt. The ornamentation with which the wall was adorned, that from Ionia was brought. The ivory which was wrought here, was brought from Ethiopia and from Sind and from Arachosia . . . The stone columns . . . The stone-cutters who wrought the stone, those were Ionians and Sardians. The goldsmiths who worked the gold, those were Medes and Egyptians. The men who wrought the wood, those were Sardians and Egyptians. The men who worked the baked bricks, those were Babylonians. The men who adorned the wall, those were Medes and Egyptians. Saith Darius the King: At Susa a very excellent (work) was ordered, a very excellent (work) was (brought to completion). Me may Ahura Mazda protect, and Hystaspes my father, and my country.16

Susa, even more than Pasargadae, represented Achaemenian simultaneous rulership. While explicit cosmic order and descent were given less emphasis here, what was symbolic was actualized. Darius’s power and rule could command craftsmen and material from the breadth of the empire to build his monuments. Such ideas were taken even further at Persepolis. The palace at Susa served as Darius’s model for Persepolis, which he started building about 515 bc; it was his most important project. Persepolis was built some 30 kilometers southwest of Pasargadae, Cyrus’s construction; Persepolis would stand as a symbol of Darius’s own rulership. The workers and their work at Persepolis, like Susa, represented the diversity of the breadth of the empire and its unmatched power and wealth. Again, the overall plan, the buildings, their decoration, and use emphasized power, wealth, and rulership. Darius’s imperial edifice complex is rooted in his consciousness of a historical tradition that began in Mesopotamia with the Assyrians and

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Figure 2.3

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Apadana, Persepolis (photograph by author)

Elamites, who along with the Medes were the possible transmitters. Persepolis’s actual purpose remains unresolved. It has been suggested that it was built as a ceremonial and cultic center, but its purpose – beyond Darius’s desire to leave a monument in the center of Fars to what he had accomplished and represented – has not been satisfactorily explained. Darius sited Persepolis at the edge of Marv Dasht plain in front of Kuh-i Rahmat, the Mount of Mercy. Persepolis is first seen from the west across the vast Marv Dasht plain, and the visitor would have mounted massive staircases to the great artificial platform upon which the complex was constructed. Next, the visitor would have passed through the great gateway of “All Lands” that was flanked by two immense Assyrian-style

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Figure 2.4 Persepolis reliefs of procession of peoples bearing gifts (photograph by author)

winged bulls with human heads, supported by four columns (built by Xerxes). Then turning right the visitor would face the great Apadana, whose roof would have been supported by 36 columns, each 67 feet in height that could supposedly hold some thousand people. On the north and the east the Apadana was approached by two staircases, each with its rows of reliefs of guards and peoples of the empire bearing gifts and tribute of their regional products, animals, and produce. Adjacent to the Apadana were some 10–11 smaller palaces and ancillary buildings. Kuh-i Rahmat rises up and serves as the backdrop to the whole complex as well as the site for two imperial rock-cut tombs – a third was not completed. On the tomb facades – which repeat Persepolis’s columns and capitals – and on the walls of buildings are more reliefs of Darius and Xerxes with their inscriptions. The most remarkable features of the site are the images of the enthroned ruler supported by his subjects “of all nations,” the gift-laden attendants along the Apadana staircases, the astrologically significant reliefs showing a lion attacking a bull, the columns and their capitals, and the sculptural detail of all the reliefs. In ruins today, the remains of Persepolis are dramatically impressive, and with a little imagination visitors can reconstruct the original spec-

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tacle of the city when it was occupied. The reliefs, especially on the staircases, allow you to see the attendants, peoples from across the empire each in their characteristic dress, and even the great king himself down to the smallest detail. The reliefs of the enthroned king supported by the peoples of the empire symbolize his rulership and imperial power. Here, particularly, we still can see a distinctive Achaemenian style and concept of rulership and empire with its timeless idea of universal and cosmic order upheld by divine assistance and mutual loyalty between king and subjects. In the end, the ruler’s moral significance in the divine order is represented. Persepolis has been criticized for not being Greek, or for being too “Asian,” or grandiose. It has been criticized for its scale, for being imitative and unoriginal, and even for its traditional conservatism – perhaps better, archaism – harkening back to earlier traditions. But the composite nature of Achaemenian art and architecture, which is derived from the traditions and workmanship of the empire’s multi-ethnic society and historical past, underscores their rulership. Regardless of its purpose, Persepolis, like Bisitun, was built to impress upon subjects and visitors the Persian imperial order with its claim to universal, eternal legitimacy and cosmic purpose. Construction at Persepolis would be continued by Darius’s son, Xerxes I, and his grandson, Artaxerxes I. These same elements of simultaneous rulership at Persepolis can be seen at Naqsh-i Rustam, six kilometers northwest of Persepolis, which stands as Darius’s last monument and burial place. Earlier, Elamites had used Naqsh-i Rustam for their reliefs. Subsequent Achaemenian rulers were to be buried there in similar rock-cut tombs, cruciform in shape and surmounted by reliefs, but only Darius I’s can be identified with certainty. The others could have been built for Xerxes, Artaxerxes I, and Darius II. The tomb reliefs represent a platform supported by attendants in rows, on which stands the king attending a fire on an altar over which floats the winged-figure disk. On the upper right the moon and sun are represented together. Naqsh-i Rustam’s tombs are the models for those cut into Kuh-i Rahmat. In addition, Naqsh-i Rustam is the site for the so-called “Ka‘ba of Zardusht,” possibly build by Darius, upon which later Sasanian reliefs and inscriptions were cut. To expect but a single answer to the question of Persepolis’s purpose would be simplistic. Clearly it was an imperial residence, and because of that a ceremonial center. Whether or not it was a religious site, or associated with specific religious ceremonies, cannot be established; that it may have been is suggested largely by its reliefs of subjects bearing gifts. Given the number of clay tablets found in the “treasury,” Persepolis must

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Figure 2.5

Rock-cut tomb at Naqsh-i Rustam (photograph by author)

also have been something of an archive and an administrative center, although not on the scale of Susa. Probably, too, Persepolis was an economic center for that region when it was being built or when the king was in residence. The very construction of Persepolis and its reliefs emphasize an imperial ideology and representation seen previously at Bisitun or in the Cyrus Cylinder or at Cyrus’s Pasargadae. The king represents his power and his cosmic role across the empire; all the empire’s resources and population are represented to him in a reciprocal, universal relationship that results in equanimity and prosperity. Both the past and the future are represented: the past in terms of ideas of rulership, architecture and art,

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and in written language. The Mesopotamian, especially Assyrian, roots of monumentality, sculpture and reliefs, and architecture are transformed by indigenous Persian and foreign Greek, Egyptian, and Anatolian forms and craftsmen to achieve a distinctive and an immediately recognizable Achaemenian style. Curiously, archaism occurred in architecture and in the use of seals and cuneiform, but also in titles that emphasize universality to establish a link with the past for the good order of the present and for future continuity. Perhaps to balance such universality, the Achaemenians also stressed, to an unprecedented degree in the ancient world, that they were Persian and from Persia. The Achaemenians called Persepolis Parsa, or Persia, and for them it represented the universal nature of their empire centered in Persia. Persepolis, consequently, conceptualized universal rulership and empire rooted in Persia and the past, part of a cosmic order upheld by divine grace and reciprocity between ruler and his multi-ethnic subjects. Trilingual inscriptions and composite architecture and art signify that universal rulership and the constituencies created by it. These same qualities are seen in titles. Achaemenians entitled themselves “Great king,” “King of kings,” “King of countries,” “King of the four rims [or quarters] [of the earth],” “King of this earth,” “the son of . . . the king [with a recitation of the genealogy]”, and in addition identified themselves, or ancestors, as the king of specific places. Some of these titles had long been in use in Mesopotamia, for example “king of kings.” This usage demonstrated Achaemenian historical consciousness and legitimized them in terms of the rulership of the earlier kings of Media, Elam, and Mesopotamia rather than implying paramountcy in relation to subordinate, vassal kings, as the title “king of kings” is sometimes interpreted. In the Achaemenian context, kingship was linked with sovereignty over a realm granted by Ahura Mazda through his grace. Aside from Ahura Mazda only the Achaemenian ruler possessed sovereignty; vassal kings served and defended the king of kings, his kingdom, and his sovereignty. Consequently, “king of kings” implies worthiness in a tradition where sovereignty emanates from God and is bestowed only on the great kings, not on petty, or vassal, ones. Another title, “king of the countries/peoples,” is first used by Darius, and links him and his successors to their multi-ethnic empire. These titles emphasize their legitimacy as rightful rulers through Ahura Mazda’s grace, through their descent in the Achaemenian kingly family, and in comparison with earlier rulers, primarily in Mesopotamia but also in Media, but subordinating those earlier rulers to the current one. The titles stand as metaphors for universal, simultaneous rulers and underscore what must have been the

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underlying tensions in a society that was concerned about legitimacy and was conscious of a historical tradition of rulership. These titles also emphasized absolutism and the ruler’s singularity, but possibly, too, an implied insecurity where there appear to have been no established rules of succession aside from descent. The ruler’s legitimacy and theoretical absolutism also reflect his position as the representative of Ahura Mazda in this realm. And the formula “By the favor of Ahura Mazda . . .” underscores the idea of universal rulership and emphasizes that the ruler is the vicegerent of the cosmic being, whether it be Marduk in Babylon, another set of gods in Egypt, or Ahura Mazda. The Achaemenian kings were neither worshipped nor did they claim divine descent. They had, however, responsibilities to and a special relationship with the supreme deity, which, together with royal descent and leadership qualities such as courage in battle and in the hunt, legitimized rulership across the empire: such divine-right legitimacy was identified with its own term, khavarnah (farr, in modern Persian). Justifying legitimacy and accession to rulership was necessary for both Cyrus II and Darius I, because both were usurpers and succeeded through their military success. Cyrus overthrew Astyages, his Median overlord, and claimed membership in a royal lineage that had ruled Persia and Anshan. Cyrus presumably designated – he named him his co-ruler of Babylon – his son, Cambyses, as his successor, who in turn was challenged by his brother, Bardiya/Gaumata. Darius I followed a similar pattern, and after first defeating Bardiya/Gaumata he successfully suppressed the rebellions in the empire, instituting his own singular power to re-establish Cyrus’s empire. Darius designated his son Xerxes as his successor. At Persepolis, Xerxes had inscribed: “Says Xerxes the king: other sons of Darius there were, (but) – thus unto Ahura Mazda was the desire – Darius my father made me the greatest after himself. When my father, Darius went away from the throne (i.e. died), by the will of Ahura Mazda I became king on my father’s throne.”17 Xerxes, in addition, brought the two Achaemenian descent lines together. He was born to Darius’s wife, the renowned Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus. Darius’s successors stressed descent as they participated in the initial legitimacy of the dynasty’s founders, and justified their fitness for their role as rulers within the existing political culture, given the absence of a rule of succession – a striking characteristic in all of Persian history – and the need to maintain the allegiance of groups across the empire. And an empire-wide consensus kept succession in the Achaemenian family.

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Some of the implicit qualities for rulership would have included proven political and military skills such as the ability to muster supporting coalitions. The Achaemenian family cemented such ties with important families in the military and bureaucracy though political marriages, especially marrying their daughters to key leaders. The status of a royal prince’s mother – the Achaemenians were polygamous – seems to have been significant both in terms of the resources and support that could be marshaled from her family, but also in the negative sense of excluding a candidate to succeed to the throne and excluding a prospective wife whose family could challenge the dominant family faction. Issues of succession, marriage, and the nature of the royal Achaemenian families are based largely on Greek sources that reveal a fascination with the power and, thus, from a Greek perspective, the unnatural role of women in the imperial family. Such sources are the ultimate origin of the widely accepted view of Achaemenian decadence – especially, the role of women – in the dynasty’s demise in the fourth century. Regardless, the mothers of potential heirs must have exercised influence and power through their husbands and sons. Persepolis’s Treasury Tablets, however, affirm that imperial and noble women owned property and received allotments, which would imply that such women indeed had power. Women in the court, especially within the family, had power as mothers of the ruling elite, specifically potential heirs. Given the importance of descent, successors to the throne came from interfamily marriages, although probably not from brother–sister marriages as sometimes asserted. Some daughters and sisters were married out of the family to fellow and conquered rulers and regional notables to cement political ties. Consequently, elite women exercised power in political, economic, and symbolic realms. In regard to the roles and status of non-elite women, historians can only infer from sources or, more typically, extrapolate from later periods of Iranian history that women played critical roles as wives and in childbearing. Or it could be assumed that since marriage in elite families had a contractual and political nature that involved the consent of both families, marriage in non-elite families may have been similar. Federation building at lower levels could well have involved marriage exchange. Women certainly played important roles in society as a whole and in the economy by working on the land and in craft production. Classical sources provide us with accounts of the education of princes, who were taught horsemanship and military and hunting skills, as well

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as leadership qualities. Classical sources also provide us with the only accounts of coronation and burial rites. Plutarch’s Life of Artaxerxes18 (probably based on Ctesias) describes the accession ritual in which the Achaemenian ruler was invested as king at Pasargadae, where he put on the robe of Cyrus and donned other clothes, along with a crown, and ate certain foods, including “sour milk,” which seems to have symbolized assumption of Cyrus’s roles and legitimacy and Achaemenian origins. It is somewhat curious that Cyrus becomes the symbolic progenitor given that he descended in the other lineage. Classical accounts describe the ceremonies following the death of the king when the sacred fire was extinguished and public mourning took place. The body would be transported to Pasargadae in the case of Cyrus or to the rock-cut tombs of Naqsh-i Rustam and Persepolis. Respect, even legitimacy, fell on the one who conducted the burial rites. When Alexander the Great arranged for Darius III to be taken to Persia for burial, he was able to declare himself as the legitimate heir to Darius. Achaemenian inscriptions and reliefs, along with classical sources, emphasized the king’s power, his role in the cosmos, and how he was set apart from others. Although the king was central to a cosmic equilibrium and remote from the affairs of humanity, in certain roles he was very much present and active. Even at the end, Darius III led his troops into battle. The king and his court traveled, even migrated, between the major administrative centers, where he could experience his subjects’ lives and problems, and they be made aware of his awful presence. Both Achaemenian and classical sources establish the significance of the dominant court culture. The culture of the court reflected the wealth of the empire and the role and power of the king within it. Whether in one of his palaces or in his great tent when traveling, the king and the court lived on a sumptuous scale; partly to support the imperial ideology and partly for political and as well as economic reasons. Such a display of wealth was political in terms of cementing alliances and winning support, and economic in terms of redistribution of imperial resources. Once the imperial family had established itself, whether in the case of Cyrus II or Darius I, the first level of tension was in the family itself over the issue of succession. The next level of tension was most likely the relationship between the imperial family and the administrators of empire. The most important officials were either Achaemenian family members or notables from Persia who had personal ties to the imperial family. The Bisitun inscription identifies no less than six noble families who assisted Darius in his overthrow of Bardiya/Gaumata and the reestablishment of the empire under his family’s rule. The Bisitun relief

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even depicts Gobryas, an important notable. Clearly, there was a powerful established group of hereditary Persian notables who supported the king, who was dependent upon them. It was with such families that the king arranged political marriages for his daughters. The Bisitun inscription identifies a specific imperial category, bandaka19 (elite state servants), whose loyalty and support were recognized by the king. The bandaka were members of important Pesian families and they served the king. In return they received titles and office, grants of land or incomes from it, and insignia demonstrating their close ties to the king. Given the ideology and hierarchical nature of Achaemenian society, all authority was derived from the king – ultimately, of course, Ahura Mazda – and the bandaka’s relationship was dependent upon the king’s grace. Achaemenian service, save for the highest levels, had to be open to non-Persians, given the size of the empire. Indeed, this factor further suggests that autonomy characterized Achaemenian service and administration, and only the highest officials of the largest administrative units had direct access to Achaemenian officials. Nevertheless, loyalty to the Achaemenians and their system was paramount. Subjects from across the empire lived and worked in the capital centers of Susa, Ecbatana, and Persepolis in the imperial workshops, administration, and agricultural holdings. The Treasury Tablets clearly indicate that these were freedmen, not slaves, paid for their work and services. Achaemenian administration was famous, and its effectiveness held the empire together. Administrative power was necessary and based on the empire’s ability to collect taxes and tributes to finance the bureaucracy and military. Given the patrimonial nature of the Achaemenian family, family members played a dominant role as head administrators of the empire’s vast provinces. The provinces were called “satrapies”, and their governors “satraps,” although there is no agreement on their number, size, boundaries, or nature, or indeed even their name. The bestknown of the Achaemenian satrapies were the historic ones of Media/Ecbatana, Egypt/Memphis, and Lydia/Sardis, but Achaemenian sources record the designation of new ones such as “Beyond the River,” greater Syria. There is no indication of uniformity of satrapy administration other than that they were all part of a single Achaemenian empire. The satrapy administration reflected the imperial center in terms of the roles of their personnel as well as through the principle of self/family service to the great king and to his empire as a whole. Satrapal capitals, like the imperial capitals of Susa and Ecbatana, were centers of administration, and

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of economic life and trade, for storage of food, precious metals, and commodities, for garrisoning of military forces, and for the production of crafts, art, and architecture. The purpose of satrapal organization was essentially administrative: to maintain order, to remit revenues and gifts to maintain that order, and to defend the empire and its institutions. The empire was linked by a vast system of roads across it that are mentioned in Achaemenian sources and are highly praised by Herodotus. This road system, with relays of mounted couriers, and post-houses, must have contributed significantly to the effectiveness of Achaemenian administration and even to subsequent notions about the centralization of it. Despite an established infrastructure of roads and bureaucratic and military institutions, the satrapies, and the regions and peoples encompassed by them, enjoyed considerable autonomy. In addition, many peoples and groups were never fully part of any satrapy nor directly administered by its satrap. The most significant and sizable groups outside the Achaemenian satrapy system were the pastoral nomads of Arabia, the Zagros mountains, and Central Asia – and there, particularly the Sakas. The territories they occupied, their social organization, and their mobility allowed them autonomy. Both the Sakas and the Zagros pastoralists had a historic relationship with earlier imperial rulers, especially in Mesopotamia but also in Central Asia, which continued with the Achaemenians and which involved exchanges of gifts and services rather than taxes. The pastoralists were especially valued for their horses and their military role. Their ability to maintain order and to allow transit through their regions, often difficult in access, must have been important in the empire’s ability to function, which would help explain why some of the nomads received gifts from the king and paid no taxes. How the various satrapies and regions of the empire viewed the Achaemenian center and self-image cannot be established with certainty. Persia itself may have had a special position in the empire and in relation to the king. Sources from two of the regions, Babylon and Egypt, show how the Achaemenian ruler deliberately accommodated himself to their traditions in order to maintain the social and political orders there to continue economic and political stability, which, of course, was in Achaemenian self-interest. Egypt has been viewed as being especially seditious, but this reflects classical sources and more modern nationalist notions of the Achaemenian king as the non-Egyptian tyrant. But the loss of Egypt or Mediterranean coastal regions, even for long periods of time, did not threaten the empire, so consequently the Greek war, though important,

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Figure 2.6 Persepolis reliefs of Persians and Medes (photograph by author)

was not central to Achaemenian imperial concerns. The only successful outside threat to the Achaemenians came with Alexander and the Macedonians; Alexander deliberately accommodated himself to Achaemenian traditional political culture. The sole exception may have been the Central Asian Scyths, but their challenge was not consistently sustained and probably served more as a persisting irritant. The Achaemenian system was surprisingly stable, and what challenges there were after Darius came from within the imperial family itself; none of these, however, succeeded. The purpose of Achaemenian administration, including the maintenance of garrisons throughout the empire, was to ensure order, to facilitate trade, and to collect tribute/gifts in face of the autonomy that characterized the empire. Even Persepolis’s purpose may relate to an economic role in terms of storage of goods for redistribution for allotments, wages, and rations, but also in establishing a standard for exchange rates within the empire. Administrative differentiation appears to have emerged with the office of “Treasurer” at Persepolis, which may reflect economic differentiation and specialization and the need to establish empire-wide standards to maintain exchange rates if only for the collection of tribute/gifts and the distribution of them within the imperial family and to satraps.

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The Achaemenian army, or armies, and its hierarchical, even decimal, organization also represent constituencies of rulership. The military organization included the Persians and the Medes, or the “Immortals,” supposedly 10,000 in number, and then the king’s guards, who were horsemen and bowmen. The king’s army included large numbers of mercenaries, even as officers, although the higher ranking officers were typically Persians/Medes and, at the very highest levels, Achaemenian family members themselves. The military like the bureaucrats represented constituencies of Achaemenian universal rulership; created and defined by it. Little is known about Zoroastrianism either as a religion or as an institution in the Achaemenian period. But Zoroastrianism and its priesthood likely constituted yet another of the ruler’s constituencies. Late in the Achaemenian period, for example, rulers favored sectarian developments despite a deep-seated conservatism. Darius appropriated Zoroastrian ideas of morality and ethics to legitimize his rule. Zoroastrianism, however, long predates the Achaemenians. Recent scholarship has established that Cyrus the Great and Zoroaster were not contemporaries; furthermore, no evidence indicates that Cyrus was Zoroastrian, though Darius and subsequent rulers most likely were. Boyce presents the case that Zoroaster lived about 1100 bc, if not earlier, on the basis of the Gathas, hymns traditionally accepted as having been written by Zoroaster, and the most ancient of the Avesta, the Zoroastrian scriptures. The Gathas’ social context is a Central Asian pastoralist steppe society. There the ancient Iranian and Indo-Aryan religious traditions had a common origin that developed separately during the second century bc; the reconstruction of early Zoroastrianism relies on the Rig Veda and other Vedic works. It is also accepted that Zoroaster was a priest in that ancient tradition and saw himself as a reformer. He preached that Ahura Mazda was not only the paramount god of the cosmos, who would emerge victorious over his opposition and over evil, but also the creator of the world – an idea that appears not to have been part of the ancient Iranian tradition. This is the Ahura Mazda in Darius’s and Xerxes’ inscriptions with their ethical imperatives and universalism. During the reign of Artaxerxes II, however, significant changes seem to have occurred: cultic practice was elaborated to include veneration of Mithra and Anahita, especially as represented by statues. Mithra was a legacy from the ancient tradition and associated with sun/fire, while Anahita, identified with water, probably represents an assimilation of the Assyro-Babylonian goddess Ishtar, who is only mentioned in the Younger Avesta and not in the Gathas.

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Figure 2.7 Achaemenian ruler, fire altar, and Ahura Mazda, rock-cut tomb (photograph by author)

In reaction to such unorthodox practice, the fire temple emerged as central to Zoroastrianism, and fire on an altar replaced statuary as the focus of worship. Fire had long been part of Zoroastrian ritual, but private devotion was now transformed into public and ceremonial worship. The emergence of a priestly group and the centrality of fire may have coincided as a means to maintain an earlier orthodoxy and to block further innovations, both of which characterize Sasanian and subsequent Zoroastrianism. The changes, which seem to have appeared during Artaxerxes II’s reign, brought Zoroastrian practice more in line with Mesopotamian traditions. Pragmatism characterizes all successful governments and administrations; the Achaemenians were no exception. Cyrus II, regardless of his religion, when he conquered Babylon “took the hand of Marduk” and did so for quite pragmatic reasons. The Cyrus Cylinder records this event and anticipates the ideas and patterns expressed in Darius’s Bisitun inscription as well as in many others. The autonomy that so characterized simultaneous rulership in the empire also represents a kind of pragmatism and recognition of limits, of realism in governing that vast region of west and Central Asia which was so dominated by pastoral nomads.

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Maintenance of the Achaemenian system was dependent upon the well-being of its subjects and the taxes, tribute, and gifts they submitted. Unfortunately, neither amounts levied nor collected nor annual receipts, whether in coin or kind, can be established. According to Herodotus, Darius I instituted tax and administrative reforms. There are no recorded revolts that can be attributed to the extraction of taxes and tribute from the population. Over time the accumulated wealth of the Achaemenians was considerable, for Alexander’s sack of Persepolis supposedly yielded some 4,680 tons of silver and a tenth of that in gold. The end of Achaemenian rule was unexpected, and Alexander the Great’s appearance on the Iranian scene was a very brief one. Given his reputation, even if posthumous, as a charismatic leader, his impact on Persian history has been greatly romanticized. Alexander’s victory over the Achaemenians at Gaugamela in 333 bc resulted in the death of Darius III and the end of that dynasty. Alexander ascended the Achaemenian throne, however, as the legitimate ruler through the performance of burial rituals as the legitimate heir. His conquest of the empire did not alter the Achaemenian administrative satrapy structure save for the replacement of governors by his own military favorites and supporters. His greatest effect could well have been on Zoroastrianism through extermination or suppression of the magi, the repositories of the oral traditions of that religion. The long-lasting significance of their persecution cannot be adequately measured but must have been profound. Following Alexander’s death, his generals established hegemony over a fragmented empire, and ultimately the Seleucids – named for Seleucus, one of those generals – established their rule from Mesopotamia through Central Asia from the end of the fourth century bc through the midsecond century, or 312–129 bc. By 247 bc the Parthians emerged from western Central Asia to rule a reconstituted if smaller Achaemenian empire, which was based on Central Asian pastoral nomadism grafted onto Achaemenian rulership rather than a Hellenized Achaemenian one. Under the Achaemenians a historical tradition of rulership was expanded to an unprecedented degree to extend from Western Asia – and Egypt for much of the 200 years of the dynasty’s rule – well into Central Asia and to encompass a multitude of peoples, languages, religions, and social and economic forms. Rulership was identified with a specific place, Persia. Identification with Persia and Zoroastrianism, effective administration and acceptance of autonomy, including the development of institutions of government, and pragmatism characterize Achaemenian rule. Revolts seem to have been rare; the Achaemenian family’s dominance was never successfully challenged until Alexander the Great. Alexander’s

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success was far from obvious, and support for Darius III continued until Alexander had penetrated into the Achaemenian heartland and Darius was assassinated. Significantly, too, the Macedonians, and particularly the Seleucids, built upon Achaemenian precedent, institutions, and infrastructure. The Achaemenian empire was still vital and hardly in a state of decadence and decline. Furthermore, an oral tradition of Achaemenian rule persisted even after the Achaemenian name and its kings had long been forgotten. And the myths of rule associated with Persia/Iran and reinforced by its society and economy would persist.

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Alexander (330–323 bc), the Seleucids (312–129 bc), and the Parthians (247 bc – ad 224) Achaemenian dynastic history ended with the death of Darius III, at which time Alexander the Great declared himself to be the legitimate Achaemenian successor. Although he conquered and occupied the Achaemenian empire, his rule over it lasted but seven years. Despite his brief reign, Alexander – known throughout the Middle East as Iskandar – still stands as a great hero there. Following Alexander’s death (323 bc), his generals competed to succeed him, and by 311 bc one of them, Seleucus, emerged as victor over a region that would stretch across the central and eastern Achaemenian empire from Syria to Central Asia. Macedonia and Egypt were divided between two other generals, Antigonus and Ptolemy. Simply, what did this period of almost 200 years mean for Persian history? Only recently have scholars viewed the Seleucids as an Achaemenian successor empire and suggested that Hellenization there was limited, even superficial. The empire that they – and Alexander before them – had conquered and reconquered was vast and consisted of many peoples and cultures. The Seleucids accommodated themselves to that reality; ironically, and contrary to the earlier historiography, their failure to centralize and Hellenize made them successful rulers. The two-tiered Achaemenian system continued under Seleucus and the Seleucids. In this system Achaemenian and Persian elites ruled through the imperial administrative and military institutions, with the regional elites mediating between the empire and their respective regions. But

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under Seleucus and then his successors, their Hellenized elites coexisted along with the indigenous Persian ones, and at this elite level a degree of Hellenization – adoption of the Greek language, in particular, but also Greek cultural values – occurred. Achaemenian administration continued, as did the economy and organization of society itself under regional and local elites. In this context, what does Hellenistic/Hellenized mean? Far less than the transformation and homogeneity implied by those terms. Seleucid history – here we are concerned only about its eastern Persian component, where sources are most limited – cannot be easily reconstructed; even its chronology is uncertain. Local rulers usurped Seleucid sovereignty only to disappear and then reappear, which seems to indicate continuity of autonomy regardless of who held central power. This problem of overlapping dynasties is seen clearly when the Seleucids became caught between, in the west, the Romans and, in the east, the Parthians, the next dynasty that would rule the Persian empire. For example, in 247 bc, Arsaces, a Seleucid underlord/general, seized control between the Caspian Sea and Central Asia from a base in Parthia; hence the name Parthian for the territory and dynasty, or, sometimes, Arsacid for the dynasty. Only during the reign of Mithradates I (171–139/138 bc) did the new Arsacid dynasty establish undisputed rule over western and eastern Iran and Central Asia, while the truncated Seleucid empire continued for another century and a half in the west, even though faced with increasing territorial losses to Rome. The Parthian empire endured for some 500 years. The Parthian era ended in ad 224, when a new dynasty was established by the Sasanians, who emerged from Fars on the basis of Achaemenian-Seleucid-Parthian traditions with Zoroastrianism as the state religion. Little remains in either indigenous Seleucid or Parthian sources – far less than for the Achaemenians – upon which to base even the most rudimentary history of the Persians for some 500 years. From c.330 bc to ad 224 coins, or numismatics, provide an important indigenous source for chronologies – some of this evidence, however, can be disputed. Coins prove to be equally invaluable for representation of rulership. In the twentieth century limited archaeological excavations supplied additional information, but of a very limited nature. Numerous Greek and Latin texts describe the Seleucid and Parthian empires but as usual from the perspective of rivals if not opponents, with all their stereotypes and biases. The very designations Seleucid or Parthian imply a kind of unity that probably never existed, and the discontinuity of their histories makes the

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Achaemenians seem highly centralized in comparison. Parthian rule, for example, seems to have been especially decentralized. While the Parthians neither achieved the degree of control over their empire nor unity through rulership that so marked the Achaemenians, the ideas of Achaemenian rulership and hegemony had not disappeared. For example, the use of Old Persian vanished, but in the late Parthian period Middle Persian had emerged. The centrality of Fars was eclipsed, but Fars continued to be represented on the coins of the so-called petty “kings,” regional notables who ruled there under the Parthians. Even though the Parthians modeled themselves on the Achaemenians, actual names and accomplishments of the Achaemenians had disappeared; the Achaemenians were only remembered in an oral tradition and through myth in eastern Iran as the “Kayvanids.” Perhaps the central question for the Seleucid and Parthian periods of Persia’s history has been the issue of continuity from the Achaemenian period to the Sasanians in the third century ad, or, to rephrase it, how Persian were the Seleucids and the Parthians? The consequences of the fourth century bc change of empire and rulership from the Achaemenians to Alexander the Great and then to the Seleucids were probably far fewer than conventional accounts indicate. One important shift began with the Parthians, when the center of government moved from the west to the eastern part of Iran but then back again to Mesopotamia. At elite levels change was greatest in terms of dynastic families and presumably less so at lower levels of society. The essential political culture likely continued. Most significantly, the socio-political organization, the diversity of society and culture, the importance of pastoralists, and the autonomy of regions, groups, and peoples remained unchanged. Elites at the regional level continued in their same comparable roles. While Alexander was later execrated for having killed large numbers of Zoroastrian clergy, Hellenism’s impact on Zoroastrianism was minor. There was some syncretism and equation in images of Ahura Mazda with Zeus, or Anahita with Aphrodite in the Parthian period, but there appears to have been no changes in ideas or practice. Even the founding of new cities by Alexander and the Seleucids – often cited as a major difference and as evidence of Hellenization – had their earlier precedents in Iran and in Mesopotamia, though these new cities were Hellenistic in terms of plan and architecture and reflected the values of the ruling elites. The Seleucids’ new cities included Seleucia, near Babylon, Rayy, just to the south of modern Tehran, and Ai Khanum, between Bactria and Sogdia. Ai Khanum has become of special importance for understanding Seleucid Persia because of recent archaeological excavations there. The Seleucid empire was centered in western Iran,

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Mesopotamia, and north Syria with shifting frontiers in Anatolia and Central Asia. However, the Seleucids never incorporated Egypt into their empire nor were the eastern territories lost to the new Maurya dynasty in India ever regained. A far more significant change in this period of Persia’s history was the emergence of two new empires: Rome to challenge the Seleucids and Parthians – and then the Sasanians – militarily, and China to engage them in trade. Parthian history, or what has survived of it, would be written by the Romans rather than the Greeks. The continuing oral tradition would not be recorded until well into the next millennium and long after the defeat of the Sasanian dynasty by the Arabs and the collapse of their empire in ad 641. Historical generalizations and periodization are arbitrary and even misleading. Alexander the Great’s military success and brief reign gave rise to the supposed new era in Persia’s history only because Alexander ended the former one. Alexander was very familiar with political tradition and Achaemenian political culture. Hellenization of the Achaemenian empire would come later. Alexander valued the traditions of the Achaemenian great kings. Astutely, he first presented himself as a worthy challenger to Darius III, then as the avenger after his assassination, when he performed the burial rites as successor to legitimize his role as ruler. Alexander took an Achaemenian wife and married his officers to other Persian women. Moreover, Alexander appeared in Persian clothes, co-opted Persian notables to his service, and enlisted local peoples for his army. Achaemenian universal rulership remained and cleared the way for Alexander’s assumption of it, which may have proved vital in his military success. A crucial additional factor in his extraordinary military accomplishment was his generalship. His stature as leader grew incrementally with each victory, and he may have been perceived as a charismatic leader. Alexander was successful both as a general and as a politician in adopting Achaemenian rulership. He possessed a royal lineage, but the Achaemenian one was the universal one notwithstanding. Darius and his successors had anchored that universal rulership in a Persian ethnicity; consequently, Alexander, despite his own lack of an actual Achaemenian, Persian, and Iranian lineage, presented himself in those terms to win the support of the Achaemenian and Persian aristocracy and peoples of the empire. This support was critical for his success in the short and in the long term. Alexander’s legitimacy was further strengthened by adopting Achaemenian institutions and manner, and by his military success, granted to him by divine will, which had earlier been bestowed on the Achaemenians. Alexander, through his assumption of

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Achaemenian universal rulership, accepted the responsibility for the equipoise between the cosmos and Eurasia. In the aftermath of the Macedonian conquests and, especially, Alexander’s death in 323 bc, rivalries between generals and insurrection in the provinces would divide the empire. Alexander’s charisma was not institutionalized before his death, and his personalized rulership could only have been transferred had his generals been united. In the end, Alexander’s vaunted military divided along loyalties to three generals – Antiochus, Antigonus, and Seleucus – and essentially on a regional basis. Seleucus emerged as the consolidator of the Asian part of Alexander’s empire, and he and his successors accommodated their rule to Achaemenian rulership and administration. There are two related central questions for Seleucid rule: why were the Seleucids so successful in maintaining their rule over such a vast empire and for such a long period of time? and how Hellenized was it? Before answering these questions, it is necessary once again to deal with sources. Even more than in the case of Achaemenian history, these few sources are Greek ones that are primarily concerned with power, especially the politics of accession, and military matters and warfare. Social, economic, and even cultural history can only be retrieved indirectly. There are almost no Seleucid records extant given the perishability of the materials on which they were presumably kept, materials such as papyrus or parchment. Archaeological excavations have been quite limited, and there are few inscriptions from the period. Seleucus first consolidated his hold on Babylon from about 319–311 bc, which was central for its strategic and economic importance. From this base and within some eight years, Seleucus was able to establish control next over western Iran – Media, Persia, and Susa – and then moved on to control much of the region from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean, save for the Punjab which was relinquished by treaty to Chandragupta, the founder of the new Maurya dynasty there. Seleucus’s most important challenger was Antigonus, one of the two other potential successors to Alexander. Antigonus controlled Anatolia, and his base was ultimately to be in Macedonia. He was defeated in 301 bc and Seleucus acquired the northern Levant, Syria, Anatolia, and Armenia. Key Achaemenian provinces and the dominant trade routes were under Seleucus’s control and, in effect, he re-established much of Alexander’s empire. Earlier, about 305 bc, Seleucus had assumed the title of king and built his new capital, Seleucia-on-Tigris, near Babylon. With his newfound supremacy, Seleucus decided to move his capital to Antioch, on the Mediterranean, that is, to the edge of his empire, rather than keep it

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at the center. This move, which greatly extended lines of communication and support with the eastern provinces, would eventually cost the Seleucids the great eastern portion of their empire. But at the end of the fourth century bc the challenge to Seleucus’s hegemony still came from Macedonians, a continuing aspect of Alexander’s legacy. However, Seleucus still controlled the Achaemenian empire, because he had adapted to its political culture and dominated its administration. Before Seleucus died in 281 bc he had consolidated his rule through military power, and minted coins and issued decrees in his own name. Seleucus may not have consciously sought to establish a new dynasty, but his son and successor, Antiochus I (281–261 bc) clearly did. Seleucus’s coins bore images and symbols of the anchor, the bull, and horned horse’s head specific to him, and his son’s coins bore his own image and that of Apollo, whom Antiochus had declared to be the family’s eponymous ancestor. Moreover, Antiochus instituted a new calendar. And this new dynastic family is legitimized both as a successor to Alexander – interestingly, the Seleucids labeled their cities with their own dynastic name – and as a successor to the Achaemenians and that earlier tradition of rulership. One further point – and it is not evident that Seleucus was following Cyrus II’s precedence in Babylon where he declared Cambyses as co-ruler – Seleucus had designated Antiochus not just as his successor but co-ruler, which would argue that Seleucus himself thought very much in dynastic terms. Although both were to be mentioned together, Seleucus was probably the dominant ruler, as in the case of Cyrus. Despite designation as co-ruler, Antiochus faced insurrection when he came to the throne following Seleucus’s assassination. Troops led by Macedonian-Greek officers, from their Bactrian base, supported by pastoral nomads, successfully launched a military attack deep into Khurasan in northeastern Persia that was repulsed by Antiochus. He was then forced to return to the west to deal with provocation from Ptolemaic Egypt. Successive Selucid kings faced challenges from their furthest frontiers, with the consequent difficulty of shifting military resources from one region to the other across huge distances. Continuous challenges to the Seleucids suggest that they were less successful in legitimizing their rule and institutions even though they adapted to Achaemenian ones. In the end, dynastic legitimacy in the Seleucid family and overt use of power sustained them for more than two centuries. Movement of troops from Central Asia to the west impaired Seleucid defenses against nomadic incursions in the east or against fractious Macedonian-Greek generals who had settled there. The breadth of empire gave Seleucid military commanders considerable independence

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and the ability to establish their own regional autonomy, especially at times of dynastic succession. All of which emphasizes that Seleucid government was decentralized. Central Asia, Bactria in particular, was important for the Seleucids; its wealth and resources were critical for them in maintaining their military forces and hegemony in the west. The pattern established during the reigns of Antiochus I and Antiochus II (261–246 bc) of over-extended lines, western and eastern challenges to their rule, including a breakaway satrapy, came together with issues of succession at the time of Antiochus II’s death in 246 bc. A Macedonian rump kingdom had been founded in Bactria; the satrap of Parthia rebelled and was killed by Arsaces and his Parni, or Parthian, forces. Arsaces, in turn, was stymied when the Bactrians and the Seleucids came together as allies. Arsaces would later be regarded as the founder of the Arsacid, or Parthian, dynasty, which would successfully break away from Seleucid control about 212 bc. Seleucid kings pursued military campaigns to re-establish their hegemony in eastern Iran, but events in the west always kept them from maximizing their effort and forces in the east. In the last decade of the third century bc Antiochus III, or Antiochus the Great (223–187 bc), briefly re-established a Seleucid presence in Bactria. His success there came with a price; he was forced to recognize Arsacid control over Parthia to prevent an attack by them on his rear flank. With the Arsacid threat lessened and aided by Bactria’s resources, Antiochous III defeated Egypt, and in 200 bc established his control over Palestine and northern Syria, only to be defeated by Rome in 189 bc. Rome gained control over western Asia Minor and at the same time Antiochus lost his hold over eastern Iran. In mid-century Seleucid dynastic struggle, especially between Demetrius II (145–141 bc) and Antiochus VI (145–142 bc), was compounded by the losses of western and southwestern Iran that allowed the Parthians to take over western Persia in 148 bc and Babylonia in 141 bc. It appears that Demetrius II’s brother, Antiochus VII (138–129 bc), was able to rally support and regain territory temporarily lost to the Parthians. In 129 bc, nevertheless, he fell to the Parthians: Seleucid rule over Iran was irretrievably ended. Seleucid rule over Iran lasted from 312 bc until 129 bc, some 182 years! Nevertheless, the unifying term Seleucid for this period masks disunity. While autonomy characterized Iran’s political culture under the Achaemenians, it was a political culture that accepted Achaemenian family dynastic control and ideology that linked that rulership with Ahura Mazda, Persian centrality, and a tradition of rule. The Seleucids had no identification with Persia and were alien to its language, religion,

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Figure 3.1 Heracles at Bisitun (photograph by author)

and culture. In their cities their own Macedonian-Greek culture dominated; however, there is no evidence that Macedonian-Greek culture was viewed negatively or “nationally” by indigenous elites. In Persia’s multiethnic society, Macedonian-Greek culture was yet one more culture, albeit that of the rulers. The Achaemenian tradition of administration continued; however, the relationship between the Seleucids and Iran’s political culture was based more on power than the accepted Achaemenian tradition of rulership. The Seleucids, unlike the Achaemenians, faced frequent challenges from within their family – Seleucid family descent maintained its legitimacy, although of the 15 kings only two did not meet violent deaths – and from regional military officers and peoples within their empire, and from external foes. The Seleucids have been likened to warlords or to condottiere, as mercenaries or guns for hire. They ruled on the basis of force rather than legitimacy and authority; their power was personal rather than institutionalized; and the basis for their legitimacy was a narrow one. Long-term relationships between ruler and ruled were sacrificed for short-term political expediency, exacerbated by the peripheral setting of

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the capital at Antioch in the extreme west. Self-interest and patron–client relationships characterized the links between ruler and the elites. In their administration, the Seleucids continued the satrapy system – and the satrap was primarily a military commander – but was further divided and subdivided. In addition, Greek cities with their military settlements were established across Iran, and these cantonments held the empire together. Nothing is known in regard to the internal organization of Seleucid cities, and little is known about Achaemenian cities and their organization. Achaemenian and Seleucid cities, apart from architecture and specific Hellenic institutions such as gymnasia and theatre, might well have been quite similar. In eastern Iran and Central Asia, Achaemenian and Seleucid cities had similar roles, for they served as military cantonments to defend imperial interests, trade routes, and agricultural areas from pastoral nomads in areas adjacent to them. Typically their administrative and military elites were Achaemenian /Persian or Macedonian, and both relied on elite imperial corps as well as local militia. The Greek cities were settled with Greeks/Macedonians whose attitudes toward the indigenous peoples were little different from that of the Achaemenians/Persians. There was little interference in local autonomy and matters so long as there was public order, the taxes were gathered, and trade and its routes were secure. The Greeks spoke and wrote their own language; the indigenous population spoke Iranian dialects, and for record keeping Seleucid administration continued to use Aramaic. The Seleucids continued to follow the Achaemenians general forebearance in terms of religion. They themselves were polytheists, but tolerated local religious practices. Achaemenian and local law seem to have continued alongside Selucid law. One could worship the Greek gods, while retaining one’s own, and a non-Greek could become a citizen of the Greek polis. A significant difference between the Achaemenians and the Seleucids was that while local elites could never become “Persian,” which was an attribute of birth and status relating to the Achaemenian family, they could become Greek, by adapting to, or using, the Greek language and culture. It has been observed that “the real Hellenization of Iran began only after the end of the Seleucids; when the Iranian rulers, beginning with Mithridates I of Parthia, the ‘Philhellene’, as he called himself, needed bright men of Greek education to manage the Seleucid inheritance.”1 Seleucid administration thus broadly followed Achaemenian precedent. The relation between the ruler and subjects in regard to taxes remained little changed, as did the financing of military units through

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land grants. However, the Seleucids made a break and set a precedent in minting coins. The Seleucids established a uniform silver standard for their coins, and that the standard was the Attic one meant that trade flowed freely from the western Mediterranean to the Indus Valley. Trade was facilitated, too, by the maintenance of roads, canals, and harbors. Lower Mesopotamia, particularly Seleucia and Susa – a canal was built linking Susa to the Karun river – grew in importance with the increased spice trade with India following Antiochus III’s consolidation of Seleucid control over that part of the empire bordering India. While some trans-Central Asian trade by caravan shifted to the seas, Central Asian trade continued to be of utmost significance. The importance of Mesopotamia and trade continued in the second century bc with the Chinese silk trade and the establishment of weaving centers in Mesopotamia itself. Silk cloth was traded with Rome and in the eastern Mediterranean. The Seleucid military was built around the phalanx of heavy infantry made up from Macedonian colonists and supported by heavy cavalry and cavalry composed largely of pastoral nomads. There was always the danger that local militia under their own leaders would be more of a threat than an asset. Like much else in Parthian history, Parthian dynastic origins remain unclear. The specific dates of its first three rulers are not known. Despite the loss of eastern Iran to the Parthians, the Seleucid dynasty continued through the reign of the seventh Arsacid, Artabanus I (128–124/123 bc). Parthian derives from a geographical term, Parthia, that is, roughly the central region between the Caspian Sea and the Oxus (Amu Darya) river but whose boundaries varied from ruler to ruler and source to source. The period is sometimes known by the dynastic designation of Arsacid from the names of its founder, Arsaces (Greek) or Arshak I (c. mid-third century – 217 bc), who established the ruling descent lineage. For the Parthians, sources are fragmentary at best, and, except for a few inscriptions, were written by their Greek and Roman rivals in Greek or in Latin. Consequently, the extant sources are strongly anti-Parthian and are concerned primarily with military and political events. There is almost nothing regarding Parthian society and culture save for sculpture and architecture. Moreover, some of the original classical sources have been lost and are known only through later epitomes. Some contemporary Greek stone inscriptions have been uncovered on sculpture and building in western and southwestern Iran, at Nihavand, Bisitun, and Susa. A limited number of contemporary Parthian and Aramaic inscriptions engraved on gemstones have been found. In addition, archaeological

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excavations at Nisa in central Parthia have uncovered a large number of pottery shards with Parthian inscriptions that record wine consignments. Other pottery fragments, and in some cases coins, refer to rulers’ names and regnal dates and titles. Presumably, too, an oral tradition continued, but this was not written down until well into the next millennium. Parthian, too, designates a northwest Iranian dialect. And in the course of nearly 500 years of Parthian history, Old Persian evolved into Middle Persian, or Pahlavi. Parthia as a geographic place was recorded in Darius’s Bisitun inscription, and Xerxes registered the Daha as one of his peoples in his list of nations at Persepolis. The Daha were one of Parthia’s many pastoral nomadic confederations that included the Parni, or Aparni, who were led by Arsaces. The year 247 bc as the Parthian origin date is problematic, but between that date and 171 bc, the start of the reign of Mithradates I (171–139/138 bc), the Arsacids consolidated their power over five Seleucid rulers within Parthia and expanded its boundaries to include Khurasan and the eastern Alburz mountains. In 148/147 bc Mithradates seized Media from the Seleucids, who were once again caught up in a succession struggle. Mithradates pushed further west, conquering Babylonia, and occupying Seleucia. He minted coins there with dates from 141 bc to 138 bc. Mithradates returned to Hyracania – the region immediately between Parthia and the Caspian Sea – while his troops proceeded to take Susa, where coins were minted in his name. Demetrius II (145–141 bc and 129–125 bc), while attempting to reestablish Seleucid rule in Mesopotamia, was captured. Supposedly he had been supported by Bactrians, still under Seleucid rule, Persians, and other peoples of western Iran. At this point Mithradates ruled Parthia south to the Indus and to the Persian Gulf, including central and southern Mesopotamia. He died in 139/138 bc, after having ruled for some 43 years, and was succeeded by his son, Phraates II (139/138–c.128 bc). Meanwhile, peoples in the most eastern parts of Central Asia created a ripple affect as they moved west. One powerful tribal confederation, the Yueh-chi, had been attacked by another confederation, the Hsiung-nu (later the Huns), who displaced them from their pastures in Kansu province to the west. They in turn ousted the Scyths, or Sakas, who began to encroach on the Parthians early in the reign of Phraates II. Phraates II was challenged by his Seleucid rival, Antiochus VII (138–129 bc), who had won the succession struggle in Antioch and asserted his rule over Syria. With his unbeaten army still mobilized, he advanced victoriously through Babylon and on into Media, where the Parthians had no choice but to sue for a settlement. The conditions to

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be imposed on the Parthians included the release of Demetrius II, Antiochus’s brother. In addition, the Parthians were to abandon all territory seized from the Seleucids and to return to Parthia, from which they were to pay their customary tribute. For unknown reasons, Phraates freed Demetrius, but broke off negotiations. During winter 130 bc and spring 129 bc the Seleucids lost their support in Media, and were defeated in battle by the Parthians. Antiochus was slain and important hostages were taken. Then, while Phraates was leading his troops through Babylon to Syria, the Sakas attacked Parthia’s eastern frontier. Phraates had enlisted Sakas in his campaign against Antiochus, but he had dismissed them for turning up late. These Sakas in retaliation rebelled, and Phraates conscripted his Seleucid prisoners against them, but the Seleucids deserted him for the Sakas, who then defeated the Parthians in 128 bc. Phraates himself was killed. Artabanus II (128–124/123 bc) suceeded his father and also had to contend with federations of nomads on his eastern frontiers; he too was killed. He was succeeded by Mithradates II, or Mithradates the Great (124/123–87 bc), who successfully secured the eastern frontiers and Babylonia in the west, which he made his administrative center. He assumed the Achaemenian title, king of kings. Ctesiphon, near Babylon, became the new Parthian capital – probably under Mithradates’ successor, Gotarzes I – and this city would continue as the Sasanian capital until the Arab conquest in ad 641. Ecbatana would serve, as it had for the Achaemenians, as the Parthians’ summer capital. There were two, possibly three, reasons to move the capital from Nisa in Parthia to the west: Nisa’s vulnerability to raids from nomads; the accessibility of the new sites in Mesopotamia and western Iran for trade and administration; and a historic tradition of imperial rule from that region. Consolidation of Parthian control in Mesopotamia resulted, however, in an increased likelihood of conflict with Rome and with Armenia. Armenia would increasingly play a balance of power role between Parthia and Rome. Mithradates II not only dominated Armenia in the west but also repulsed the Sakas in the east. Between Sistan and the Indus Valley, a new Indo-Parthian dynasty governed in conjunction with the Arascids in Iran. It is during the last quarter of the second century bc that the earliest extant sources record trade with China, but even then the Chinese were seeking allies against the Hsiung-nu. (Trade had most probably preceded diplomacy, as early as the fourth century bc, when Greek sources first described silk.) The Chinese were particularly interested in the fabled horses from Ferghana, and in 115 bc horses and plants such as alfalfa

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and grape vines were exported to China. Early in the first century bc Chinese ambassadors arrived at the head of the Persian Gulf, presumably after following combined land and sea routes. The Indian Ocean’s monsoon winds were now understood and would facilitate sea trade with India and East Asia. The importance and control of Mesopotamia and the Gulf grew and intensified the competition between Rome and Parthia. Luxury goods included spices, perfumes and aromatic woods, cotton, medicine, and sugar cane, but silk from China was valued over all other imports. Gold was the medium of exchange in this trade, given the demand for such items and the costs of shipping. Rome incurred a significant trade imbalance to obtain silk. Sea routes or combined land–sea routes were not competitive with camel caravans across the Silk Road that extended from China across Central Asia through to Persia until the sixteenth century. The northern location of Arsacid power – unique in Persian history – enabled them to control the western Silk Road routes, which probably gave the Arsacids economic and military advantages in trade with China directly and indirectly through taxation. Numismatic evidence supports the importance of Parthian and Chinese trade; Parthian coins have been discovered in Chinese hoards. After his death Mithradates was succeeded by Gotarzes I (91/90–81/80 bc), but then the succession becomes unclear as the result of contradictory numismatic evidence, the only contemporary source. Rome confronted Parthia first in the reign of Phraates III (c.70–58/57 bc) – the third ruler after Gotarzes I – and from this period contemporary Roman accounts are extant, but even these are open to dispute. In 53 bc the Parthian army led by Suren, during the reign of Orodes II (57–38 bc), overwhelmingly defeated the Roman army under Crassus at Carrhae/Harran, despite the Roman alliance with Armenia. Suren was a brilliant military leader – possibly the prototype for the mythical Rustam so central to the Shahnamah – of the equally famed Parthian cavalry. Parthian cavalry was composed of an armored cavalry and, especially important, a light cavalry whose primary weapon was the compound bow that was capable of firing armor-piercing arrows. Roman sources note that the light cavalry was composed of commoners, and the heavy cavalry, with lances and armor of plate and mail, was composed of notables. These Roman sources also emphasize the centrality of horses and cavalry in Parthian society and culture. Parthian rulers are portrayed on their coins as warriors on horseback carrying a bow that is reminiscent of the Achaemenian symbolic importance of the bowman. The warrior king on horseback legitimized the ruler, and the cavalry

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represented his extension and stood as a critical constituency for him. The location of Parthian/Arsacid power, the significance and size of cavalry and its extraordinary mobility pointed toward Parthian political culture that was most likely dominated by pastoral nomads. The Roman army favored infantry and personal combat and had had less experience with cavalry and bowmen; indeed the Romans relied on allies, such as the Armenians, for cavalry. Furthermore, the Roman practice of forming a long line of infantry with cavalry on both flanks exposed them to Parthian mobility and swarming in which mounted archers moved freely around firing fusillades of endless supplies of arrows from the accompanying camel trains. Not only were the Romans unable to fight the Parthians on their own terms – the Parthians eschewed close combat – but they had to fight them on foreign ground. At Carrhae, according to Plutarch, Parthian armored cavalry directly faced the Romans and, together with the light cavalry on the flanks, created a great din and dust during which arrows rained down on the Romans. Presumably, too, the Parthian shot – when a cavalryman would charge forward as if to attack directly, and at the last minute would wheel and fire an arrow back toward the enemy while escaping from the enemy’s range – was utilized. The actual Roman fatalities at Carrhae – 20,000 dead – together with the apparent collapse of Roman morale in face of the seemingly unlimited Parthian supply of arrows, resulted in the great Parthian victory. In addition, 10,000 Romans were captured and transported to Central Asia. As the result of this battle, the Euphrates river came to define the frontier between Rome and Parthia, but Crassus’s defeat took on great symbolic power as Parthia was recognized by Rome as an equal and worthy enemy – an imperial power that was never decisively defeated by them. Carrhae marked increasing interaction between Parthia and Rome. Orodes II (58/57–38 bc), to strengthen his position, took his army into Armenia and through diplomacy convinced the king there to break his alliance with Rome. Armenia would continue to support the Arsacids, with some notable lapses, but even after the Sasanians had defeated the Arsacids, they would find a refuge in Armenia. Toward Syria, Parthia adopted policies that successfully exploited the divisions within the Roman empire until the second Roman civil war of 43 bc. Parthian domination of Rome in its eastern empire, however, was also affected by internecine Parthian politics. Orodes was predeceased by his designated heir; in his place he chose another son, Phraates IV (38–3/2 bc), who on the death of Orodes in 38 bc murdered his brothers to eliminate any possible rivals.

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At this time, a strengthened Rome re-established its domination over Palestine. With some 14 legions, Mark Antony and his Asian allies led an attack against the Parthians across central Anatolia into Azerbaijan. Despite Armenian support, Mark Antony suffered defeat with major losses which continued as his army retreated to Syria. Again in 34 bc and then 33 bc Mark Antony engaged the Parthians but failed to recoup his first defeat. The Parthians themselves, however, were unable to take advantage of their victory due to court intrigue – the customary explanation in western sources when actual facts were not known. Phraates lost the support of his subjects, fled, but was restored to power by the Scyths. As a point of honor, the Romans demanded vengeance for Crassus’s and Antony’s defeats. The two protagonists reached a settlement in 20 bc in which Phraates formally returned the captured Roman standards and surviving Roman prisoners. Peace was achieved. To cement the agreement Phraates’ four sons were sent to Rome, and he received a slave girl, who became the mother of his successor at his death in 2 bc, Phraates V (2 bc – ad 2). Interestingly, a coin struck in the year ad 2 bears the double portrait of mother and son; this has been taken by some as evidence for their co-rulership. Phraates V proved unpopular, and he escaped to Syria where he died. Succession was contested, and the throne was ultimately won by Artabanus II (ad 11–38) despite Roman support for other candidates. Artabanus had been king of Azerbaijan. For the last two centuries of Parthian history, Roman sources become less reliable, confusing, and even more narrowly focused on the western part of the Parthian empire and on military matters and court intrigue. Parthian control of upper Mesopotamia – and near to Ctesiphon – became increasingly problematic as the competition between elites there was exacerbated by neighboring Roman intervention. In addition, Rome attempted either to destabilize Armenia or win it over as an ally. Parthia’s ability to counter Rome was complicated by its own internal politics and instability on its eastern frontiers, especially as the result of continuing nomadic incursions. The picture that emerges is one of great political fragmentation, uncertainty in the ruling institution, and disorder in the empire. Armenia, even with Arsacid family members on the throne, was susceptible to Roman blandishments, though it should be noted that Armenia generally preferred the more tolerant Parthian hegemony to the Roman, presumably because of political and cultural similarities with the Persians. The reign of Vologeses I (ad 51–79/80) must have been of some significance. The prominence of Parthian script over nearly illegible Greek

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inscriptions on coins minted with his name may indicate a new emphasis on Parthian identity. The magi, Zoroastrian priests, too, may have had greater status, and it has been asserted that Vologeses I made an effort to compile Zoroastrian texts which in the Islamic era became the Avesta; presumably, the Zoroastrian tradition was still an oral one. He is also credited with building a new city in Babylon to replace Seleucia, which may have also been an attempt to assert a new identity. Numismatic evidence would indicate that there were at least three challengers to Vologeses I; although the minting of coins was a royal monopoly, regional kings did issue coins in their own name. It is from Roman sources that we know that in ad 114 Emperor Trajan retook Armenia, and turned his army south to occupy Ctesiphon and continued on to the Gulf – possibly, in yet another attempt to control trade with the east. Once more, he was indirectly aided by Arsacid competition for the throne. Revolts, however, in the recently conquered provinces forced Trajan to return to them. In the end, Trajan was unsuccessful, retreated, and died in ad 117, and his successor, Hadrian, once again accepted the Euphrates as the border between Roman and Parthian territories. In ad 161 Marcus Aurelius resumed fighting and took Ctesiphon four years later. Smallpox entered Roman history, when soldiers became infected while fighting in Seleucia and were forced to retreat. The disease spread to Rome and the rest of the empire. Apparently, smallpox entered Parthia along the trade route from China to Babylon. At the end of the century hostilities were renewed, and in ad 211 the emperor, Caracalla, was able to re-establish Roman control over Armenia. In the last years of Arsacid sovereignty over Parthia, there are even fewer sources aside from coins, and again this evidence provides only for a disputed chronology. The last two rulers were Vologeses VI (ad 207/208 to 221/222 or 227/228) and Artabanus IV (ad 213–224), and their overlapping regnal dates suggest the ongoing rivalry within the Arsacid family for the throne. In addition, Vologeses VI’s brother proclaimed himself king of Media in ad 211 as Artabanus V. At the very end of Parthian history a new factor emerged: Manicheanism. Mani was born in ad 216 and claimed descent from a Parthian princely family. His religious ideas represented an amalgam of Zoroastrian and other traditions current in the Parthian period. Mani’s extreme dualism would be repressed by the Zoroastrian Sasanians, but would leave its imprint in Rome and in Europe. It is Manichean texts, however, that preserved a record of the Persian language in the Parthian period.

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The Arsacid-ruled Parthian empire was overthrown in ad 224 by the Sasanians, when Ardashir I emerged as the dominant leader from Fars to dethrone Artabanus IV. The Parthian era of Iran’s history ended after some 470 years! Arsacid rule did continue in Armenia. The Arsacid dynasty was ended because of the internal fragmentation within the empire and because of rivalries and discord within the dynasty itself. Arsacid Parthia was further weakened by protracted conflict and intrigue with Rome – a problem that would confront the Sasanians throughout their rule as well – and by frequent incursions of nomads in Parthia’s eastern provinces. Administration, defense, and trade were all impaired by these internal as well as western and eastern challenges. The Arsacids consciously sought to re-establish Achaemenian universal rulership, just as Seleucus and his heirs had adapted themselves to that Achaemenian tradition. The Seleucids’ immediate precedent was, of course, Alexander, who emulated the Achaemenians and established himself as the legitimate Achaemenian successor. For both Alexander and Seleucus, their first priority after gaining power was stability and then access to the wealth of the empire. Most likely, Alexander and Seleucus needed to obtain at least the passive support of local elites and of the population as a whole across vast regions without forcibly confronting them and turning them into enemies. Consequently, they needed to accept the existing political culture with recognition of regional and local autonomy to maintain continuity in rulership and, pragmatically, in administration. Like Alexander, Seleucus and his successors co-opted indigenous elites by marrying into their families and through administrative and military appointments alongside the Macedonian-Greek elites. Median and Persian military units – especially the bowmen – continued to play key, if not dominant, roles. The Seleucids continued to use Achaemenian cities and palaces, but their new cities incorporated Greek architecture and institutions. Moreover, the much-vaunted autonomy of these new cities – supposedly a Hellenic contribution to Asia – in fact characterized an earlier Middle Eastern urban tradition not only in terms of their autonomy but in their social bases and in their roles as military and administrative centers. Existing administrative, military, and trade centers and routes continued to be utilized by the Seleucids, and the satrapy system of the Achaemenians, even though new cities were added to it, remained essentially the same. Even Achaemenian tax administration was broadly followed by the Selucids. Pastoral nomads, on the other hand, often paid tribute. Land, too, was awarded in return for government and military service. The population, unless exempted, were subject

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to a land tax, import and export levies, and sales and poll taxes, among others assessed for special purposes such as war. Following Achaemenian practice, entire areas – specifically pastoral nomadic ones in the Zagros and Central Asia, but also Arab lands – were outside Seleucid direct control and administration. This adaptation to the autonomy of such groups resulted in the stability and order necessary for trade, and for general security to collect taxes from settled and agricultural populations. Again, military garrisons in cities and trade route locations also contributed to the maintenance of good order and security upon which the economy and life in all sectors of society was dependent. There is no evidence that the Seleucids followed Achaemenian archetypes, symbols, and ceremonial to legitimize their rule. While there was an investiture ceremony, there was no coronation along Achaemenian lines. The absence of a coronation may be explained by the Seleucid practice of the ruler designating his eldest son as successor. Inscriptions and coins, despite the use of Greek language and symbols, emphasized the Seleucids as great kings in the Achaemenian tradition – even though they did not use Achaemenian titles. As legitimate Achaemenian successors the Seleucids accepted existing cultural traditions, including the role of Zoroastrianism and its priests. Seleucid pragmatism in adapting to Achaemenian rulership and practice was reciprocated by local and regional leaders, who saw advantage in Seleucid military and administrative service. And some of these elites could well have adapted to Seleucid culture and to Hellenism. But emphasis on either Seleucid Hellenism or Parthian Iranism reflects twentieth-century concerns rather than the admittedly limited sources, which suggest continuity in Iran’s political culture. The distinction between the Seleucids and the Achaemenians and their Iranian and Central Asian subjects or that between the Parthians and the Seleucids distorts historical reality. The fragmentation that characterized the Seleucid–Parthian and then the Parthian–Sasanian transitions was probably a norm in the continuity of Iran’s political culture, and emphasizes the significance of pastoral nomads and regional autonomy regardless of dynasty. Essential rulership values continued, as did the roles and nature of the military and administration. Zoroastrianism survived Seleucid rule inside and outside Iran. Greek influence on the faith was quite limited and superficial. Apparently, Hellenism had no impact on ideas. In sculpture and on coins, composite forms can be explained by the use of Greek craftsmen, a tradition that goes back to the Achaemenians, in which Anahita is conflated with

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Aphrodite, Ahura Mazda becomes Zeus, and Mithra becomes Apollo. Armenian Christian chronicles identify western Iranians as Zoroastrians, which meant they did not worship Greek gods. And Plutarch, ad 46–120, and thus contemporary with Parthian rule, identifies Iranians with Zoroastrianism, and other sources note the existence of fire temples and the patronage of them by the Parthian king of kings. There seem to have been no changes in doctrine or in practice. And it seems likely that the magi, or Zoroastrian priests, constituted a major institution and constituency, especially given Zoroastrianism’s importance in early Sasanian history. All of the problems inherent in Parthian history are exemplified in Parthian art. Implicitly it is still measured against Greek art. Just as Achaemenian art and architecture are composite in form and immediately recognizable as Achaemenian, so Parthian art and architecture, or what little remains of it, represents adaptation of Achaemenian and classical forms to a new Parthian style. Until recently both Achaemenian and Parthian art were criticized for lack of originality save for their composite nature, and not valued for themselves. But the fact that the term Parthian – as in the case of Achaemenian – can be used descriptively for such a long period of time and over such a vast area with regional variations says something about the distinctiveness of Parthian style, which does mark a break with the past. Moreover, Parthian art has value in itself and not just as the transition from Achaemenian to Sasanian art. Whether in Central Asia at the fortress at Kui-Kala, or southern Syria at the Temple of Bel in Palmyra, or in northern Mesopotamia at Hatra, classical, Achaemenian, and regional elements – or in the case of KuiKala, South Asian ones – are combined to form a Parthian style of architecture that is both eclectic and diverse. Most importantly in Parthian architecture is the development of the ivan, or large-scale audience hall, supported by arches or barrel vaults. Such rooms can be found in Achaemenian building, but not on the Parthian scale. Monumentality of scale can also be seen in the colossal statues and heads of deities and local rulers at Nimrud Dagh in southern Anatolia or in Parthian wall paintings. Another defining characteristic of the Parthian period is frontality, in which the face, bust, or full-length human figure, standing or seated, faces the viewer directly. This Parthian innovation is found in sculpture and coins. Its art is also distinguished by characteristic Parthian details of decoration and ornament, costume and hairstyles. Diversity – not just in terms of style – could be the most defining aspect of Parthian art. Such diversity and range in architecture and art – buildings of all types and their decoration with reliefs, paintings,

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mosaics, and objects, especially sculpture – indicates the complexity of Parthian society, economy, and politics about which we know so little. The subject matter too in reliefs and on coins suggests a complex social and administrative hierarchy that constituted a source of patronage as well as a market for such artistic production. Parthian rulers like their predecessors were conscious of earlier traditions of rulership and had reliefs carved of themselves at Bisitun even though they could not read Darius’s inscriptions there. Other Parthian sculptural forms are found there as well. Similarly, in what was ancient Elam and also at Susa further west, reliefs depict investitures and the ring/diadem of authority being transferred from local rulers – not the Parthian king of kings – to subordinates. Local rulers also exercised sovereignty in the minting of coins with their own images and inscriptions. Aramaic inscriptions accompany some of the reliefs and sculpture; however, no trilingual ones have been found, though bilingual inscriptions in Greek and Parthian/Middle Persian have been. Rulers are also depicted with attendants, or hunting, or in combat. In inscriptions and on coins, the Parthian rulers identify themselves as “Great King,” and later as Great King of Kings:2 “[Coin] of Arsaces, Great King of Kings, [divinely] Manifest”; [Coin] of Arsaces, King of Kings, the Benefactor, the Just and Philhellenic”; and “Arsaces, Great King, son of a deified father, Benefactor, [divinely] Manifest and Philhellenic.”3 Such expression of rulership and of tradition, including Iranian and Hellenic ones, evoke an historical consciousness. Most importantly, this expression is located in the region of the southwestern Zagros immediately adjacent to Fars, providing continuity and new direction in the succeeding Sasanian period. Parthian history underscores the centrality of Iran’s interaction not just with its past but with Central Asia to the east and Mesopotamia to the west, and with the whole range of peoples and culture that interacted in its history.

4

The Sasanians (c.224–651) The Sasanians stand as the last great Persian dynasty of antiquity, and its vast empire – the largest in its contemporary world – and rich culture clearly recall the glory of the Achaemenians. In a pattern familiar in both Achaemenian and Parthian history, Ardashir, the first Sasanian ruler (ad 224–239), at best a regional king, a native of Fars, overthrew his Parthian ruler suzerain, consolidated and expanded his power over much of the Iranian plateau, established a new dynastic family, and founded an empire that would last for some 400 years. This new empire, which was similar to the Achaemenian empire in area and size, was based on an effective bureaucracy and military, on the wealth and trade of the Middle East and Central Asia, and on an alliance between rulership and Zoroastrianism. It was in this period that Zoroastrianism was institutionalized. Although a limited number of Zoroastrian texts survive from this period, they began to be recorded in Pahlavi, or Middle Persian. Universal rulership continued, the titles of the great king were invoked, and, like the Achaemenians, the Sasanians asserted their Persian identity and the centrality of Persia – but more generally now in terms of Iran, or Iranshahr. Moreover, the Sasanians built great monuments and cities, many of which survive today, and patronized a varied material culture produced by their multi-ethnic subjects. Iran’s characteristic political culture continued, but what was the relationship of the Sasanians to their past? Sasanian history survives largely in sources written either by their Roman enemies or by their Muslim conquerors and successors. The former regarded them as worthy, if barbaric, opponents, and the latter initially regarded them with awe. One of the most important of the Sasanian sources is Shapur I’s (ad 239/240–272) stone-carved trilingual inscription on the walls of the so-called Ka‘ba-yi Zardusht at Naqsh-i Rustam in Fars. At Naqsh-i Rustam, Shapur recorded his victories over the Romans in Parthian (an eastern Iranian language), Pahalvi (a western

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Iranian language), and Greek. Significantly, too, inscriptions by nonroyal notables such as Kartir, the powerful Zoroastrian high priest, were also carved on the Ka‘ba-yi Zardusht at Naqsh-i Rustam. More Sasanian imperial inscriptions are to be found on their other reliefs. Some of these reliefs are carved seriatim – almost in panorama-style – to record the events and magnitude of Sasanian triumphs. Others depict the investiture of the ruler, generally by Ahura Mazda but also by lesser divinities, Anahita and Mithra. In addition, coins, seals, silver vessels and objects, glass, ceramics, textiles, and architecture provide us with different kinds of sources and insight into Sasanian culture, society, and history. Some Sasanian sources, including important Zoroastrian ones, have survived in translation in Arabic or Persian but none earlier than from about the ninth century. There are some Chinese sources that describe Sasanian power and wealth that are contemporary with the late Sasanian period. There are also records from the sizable Christian population in the Sasanian empire. Their loyalty became suspect and politicized after Emperor Constantine’s conversion to Christianity in ad 312. Their persecutions were recorded in martyrologies such as Acts of the Martyrs and Saints and provide additional insight into Sasanian politics and society. Hebrew sources are important, especially the Babylonian Talmud for the Jewish community’s life in southern Mesopotamia. The majority of extant sources, however, were written by contemporary classical observers such as the Greek soldier, Ammianus Marcellinus, and historians, including Dio Cassius, Herodian, and Agathias. Such sources, like classical accounts in earlier periods, focus on the western part of the Sasanian empire, primarily on military and diplomatic matters, and from a Roman perspective. Sources with a broader range, if fragmentary, are to be found in the work of Arab historians such as al-Tabari, ninth century, or al-Mas‘udi, thirteenth century, which are well after the fact and with their own biases. Firdausi’s great Iranian national epic of the eleventh century, the Shahnamah, was not only history in a national framework, but also a moral history compiled and recast from an oral tradition. Given the general absence of sources, that oral tradition cannot be verified, except in the most general terms. On the one hand the Shahnamah is not demonstrably contemporary with the history it narrates, on the other it looks forward and also stands as the first major literary work in modern Persian. Although Ardashir I founded the empire, he traced his family and dynastic origins to a supposed grandfather, Sasan, through his father, Papak. This genealogy is not without problems despite being confirmed by contemporary sources such as the Letter of Tansar and in royal

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Figure 4.1

Investiture of Bahram I (photograph by author)

inscriptions. Sasan could simply have been an eponymous ancestor or merely the name of a local leader. However, Ardashir rose up against his Parthian overlord and presumably against dynasts in Fars who were called king and who minted coins. Achaemenian names, Darius and Artaxerxes, were struck on these coins. Moreover, the Achaemenian sites of Pasargadae, Persepolis, and Naqsh-i Rustam were known to Ardashir in his own province of Fars and recalled a glorious past even though the historical association with the Achaemenians was lost. Indeed, Istakhr, his birthplace, was immediately adjacent to Persepolis and Naqsh-i Rustam. Both Ardashir and his son and successor, Shapur I (239/240–270/272) had reliefs carved at Naqsh-i Rustam on the Achaemenian model and in appropriation of their rulership. While the battle, Hormizdagan, in which the Parthians were defeated and Ardashir killed their king, Artabanus/Ardavan IV, is certain, its date is not, but it probably occurred about 224. Most likely, Ardashir formed and led a coalition against the Parthians, and members of the Parthian elite were slain or fled. Some sought sanctuary in Armenia, whose Arsacid king gave them refuge and joined the fray against Ardashir. Probably, most of the Parthian elites out of self-interest accepted Ardashir as ruler.

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Figure 4.2

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Ardashir I receives the diadem (photograph by author)

The extent of Ardashir’s empire is not known, but included much of the Parthian empire – save for Armenia – and stretched from Mesopotamia, including Bahrain and a large part of the Persian Gulf, east well into Central Asia, according to later Arab historians. Ctesiphon, near Baghdad, was adopted as the Sasanian administrative capital, and the rulers again summered at the more temperate Hamadan or at Istakhr. Ctesiphon had been a Parthian capital, and its location was important for strategic and economic reasons. Canals linked the Tigris and Euphrates rivers at that point where they almost meet, and the river site allowed for trade and access north and south. This region, moreover, was agriculturally productive and could support a concentrated population. Ctesiphon’s drawback was its proximity to Roman territory and it was especially exposed to the north. Subsequent Sasanian rulers established new cities and centers, notably in Fars where their ruins are still to be found, but Ctesiphon’s centrality was never challenged by these other cities. It seems, too, that the Sasanians were crowned there. Rome loomed large for Ardashir as this great rival had for the Parthians. In 230 Nisibis was first taken and then lost to the Romans. Later in that same decade, it was retaken by the Sasanians along with Carrhae/Harran. About this time, too, Ardashir designated his eldest son,

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Figure 4.3 Little remains of Khusrau I’s palace, Taq-i Kisra, at Ctesiphon save for the remnants of its facade and monumental arch (photograph by author)

Shapur, as co-ruler; they reigned together for some five years. Designation of the eldest son as successor and co-ruler had precedence in earlier Iranian history, although there is no evidence that Ardashir was acting on that basis. Shapur continued the Sasanian offensive against the Romans, and, when Hatra was conquered, the Romans launched a successful counterattack and even regained Carrhae and Nisibis. Roman victory was then reversed near Ctesiphon in 244 when Shapur defeated the Roman army. Emperor Gordian III was killed, or murdered, and Philip the Arab replaced him; he in turn submitted to Shapur and paid him 500,000 dinars ransom. This encounter is described in Shapur’s Ka‘ba-yi Zardusht inscription at Naqsh-i Rustam and is then depicted in Shapur’s investiture relief, at Bishapur. Just as in the Parthian period, Armenia – located at the juncture where Roman and Sasanian imperial interest met – played both sides and suffered the consequences. The Armenian king, Khusrau, was from the Arsacid family, and had supported the Romans. Consequently, Shapur had him killed. Shapur successfully engaged the Romans once again, in 256, when some 60,000 Roman troops were killed by the Sasanians in

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Figure 4.4

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Shapur I’s triumph over Rome (photograph by author)

Syria. About 259 Emperor Valerian advanced against Shapur’s forces, but his army was defeated and he was captured. The way was open for the Sasanians to press through Syria into Central Anatolia. These victories over Rome are inscribed at Naqsh-i Rustam, and depicted in that famous relief of Shapur’s humiliation of Rome. In the third war when we attacked Carrhae and Edessa . . . Valerian Caesar came upon us having with him . . . a force of 70 thousands . . . a great conflict took place. And Valerian Caesar himself with our own hand we made captive. And the rest, the praetorian prefect, senators and generals, and whatever of that force were officers, all we made captive . . . In the Aryan’s empire in Persis, Parthia, Khuzistan, Assyria, and others, land by land, where our own and our father’s and our grandfathers’ and our forebears’ foundations were, there we settled them.1

Roman-style construction, particularly of bridges and dams in Khuzistan, give credence to Shapur’s word, and represent the contribution of Roman prisoners who were settled there and in other parts of the empire. Little is known regarding Shapur’s actual administration. According to later Islamic sources, underlying Sasanian successful administration was the principle that has become known as the circle of equity:

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“There is no kingdom without an army, no army without wealth, no wealth without material prosperity, and no material prosperity without justice.”2 Shapur followed earlier precedents in appointing close family members, especially his four sons, to important administrative positions: Hormizd-Ardashir, his eldest, king of Armenia; Narseh, king of the Sakas and eastern Iran; Varahran/Bahram, king of Gilan; and Shapur, king of Mesene/Characene. Moreover, Shapur’s brothers continued in their appointments awarded by their father, Ardashir. Shapur listed other princes and Iranian notables in his Naqsh-i Rustam inscription. During Shapur’s reign of some 30 years he devoted himself to the construction of the city of Bishapur, his main residence in Fars. Here he was following in the immediate steps of his father, Ardashir, who built the palace-fortress complex at Firuzabad in Fars. Bishapur’s site was well chosen and could be easily defended. The region supported agriculture, and also provided a range of game for hunting. It is located on the plains where the mountains rise abruptly and are pierced by the Shapur river, and the resulting canyon walls were covered with reliefs of Shapur’s – and his successors’ – exploits. Bishapur contains a large palace complex, including a large ivan with barrel-vaulted rooms, and a subterranean building interpreted as a temple. Animal supports for beams bring to mind Persepolis, but the architectural source is to be found in Parthian buildings and their use of barrel vaults and domes rather than Achaemenian porticoes. Construction methods and mosaics indicate that Roman prisoners were among Bishapur’s workmen. In Khuzistan, Shapur built the city of Gundeshapur near Susa that became famous as a center of learning and of silk production. A number of its residents had been settled there from Antioch, including its Christian bishop, and subsequently scholars from other centers of learning, including India, moved there. Shapur could stand as a model simultaneous ruler. He allowed the practice of the range of religions found in his empire, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Judaism, and Buddhism. Significantly, Shapur defended Mani (c.216–277), whose teachings achieved a new synthesis of Zoroastrian, Christian, and Buddhist themes and ideas. Critical to Mani’s synthesis was the thought central to Zoroastrianism that the cosmos was engaged in the epochal conflict between light and darkness, good and evil. Prophets, including Zoroaster, Jesus, and Buddha, taught the same essential truths that would guide humanity in this world through the conflict. Mani saw himself as a guide to the established truth that had been lost and now could be recovered. In addition, Mani instituted ritual and established a hierarchical organization, or “church.” When Shapur I died

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(272), religious toleration died with him. In an attempt to establish the Zoroastrian orthodoxy of the traditional priests, Mani was imprisoned and his followers were persecuted in an attempt to stamp out his ideas. In addition, Jews, Christians, and adherents of other religions were persecuted and killed. The key figure behind these persecutions was the Zoroastrian priest, Kartir. Kartir had become a priest during Ardashir’s reign, and had made little headway against Manicheanism so long as its royal advocate was alive. Moreover, Manicheanism’s universalism suited Shapur’s universal rulership. Not only did Kartir have the power to suppress Manicheanism – it continued, of course to influence Islam and Christianity – but he also had significant political power and may have been something of a king maker with Shapur’s death. Our knowledge of Zoroastrianism to this point in history is still somewhat problematic, because of the absence of contemporary texts and problems of historiography. While there are references to Zoroastrianism and even the use of terms and ideas of what has come to be regarded as Zoroastrianism from the Achaemenian through the Sasanian periods, Zoroastrianism is essentially a post-Sasanian construct. There has been a living Zoroastrian tradition – essentially oral until the Sasanian era – within the Zoroastrian community, but the re-creation of pre- and early Zoroastrianism was largely the product of nineteenth- and twentiethcentury scholarship. Institutionalization of Zoroastrianism, or its formation as a church, paralleled the institutionalization of Sasanian rule and probably also paralleled the institutionalization of eastern Christianity. Sasanian Zoroastrianism, in addition to the problem of historical evidence, presents three issues: its origin and transmission of the tradition; its actual ideas and practice; and its institutionalization. These issues, resolved in the Sasanian period or after it, allow for discussion of Zoroastrianism here. There is little certainty regarding Zoroastrianism. To begin with, the date of Zarathushtra/Zoroaster’s life is disputed, but he most likely lived in the mid-to-late second millennium bc in eastern Iran/Central Asia. His ideas came into the Iranian plateau region along with, or shortly following, the immigrants at the end of that second or the beginning of the first millennium bc. His dualistic worldview of the cosmic conflict between good and evil is resolved with the victory of good in an apocalyptic end. Zoroaster’s teachings are preserved in the Gathas, 17 of which he is supposed to have written himself, and in the Avesta, teachings inspired by Zoroaster and his life. The Gathas, hymns or poems in eastern Iranian, had been difficult to interpret, and the Avesta was used to explicate them. The Zoroastrian texts were transmitted

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orally, and not written until late in the Sasanian period, and the earliest extant texts date only from the early fourteenth century. Other ancient Zoroastrian texts, including those dealing with liturgy, were also transmitted orally. Some of these deal with less important, local deities. Until late in the Sasanian period, when a canon of the Avesta was established and recorded in a modified Middle Persian, fluidity characterized the Zoroastrian tradition. The Avesta consisted of Yasnas, or liturgical texts, Zand commentaries from the Parthian period, and other works. Unfortunately, all of the copies of the Avesta were destroyed in the Islamic conquest. The portions of it that survived were the ones in regular liturgical use, and fragments that have survived in other sources. The Denkard, a ninth-century history of Zoroastrianism in Pahlavi – which includes a summary of the Avesta – records that Ardashir ordered a canon to be compiled, and his son Shahpur I had the authorized text placed in the royal treasury. The link between the dynastic family and Zoroastrianism was established then, if not earlier: a canonical text, forms of public worship, and institutionalization of the magi, Zoroastrian priests, were established early in the Sasanian period. According to the Letter of Tansar, Ardashir restored Zoroastrianism – Tansar was Ardashir’s high priest. Consequently, the establishment of state orthodoxy can be seen as an attempt by the new dynasty to legitimize itself in opposition to its former Parthian overlords. Zoroastrianism had been adopted by the Achaemenians, presumably first by Darius, and through Achaemenian rule became identified with Persia. Greek historians refer to the faith as the Persian religion, and Herodotus equates Zeus with Ahura Mazda. Significantly, elements of Zoroastrianism can be found in Achaemenian texts and reliefs. The Arsacids/Parthians, too – eastern Iranian speakers – espoused Zoroastrianism. In addition to Greek references, there were then Latin ones, and remnants of Zoroastrianism are to be found in the few Parthian texts that survived. However, Zoroastrianism, as we know it today, is essentially the product of the Sasanian era and early Islamic times. Sasanian royal inscriptions, and one by Kartir, the high priest after Shapur I’s death, attest to Zoroastrian centrality in that period. Furthermore, there are many more references to, and elements from, it in Greek, Latin, and Armenian from the Sasanian period. At about the same time that the Avesta was written down, the clergy began to compile a historical chronicle that is lost save for Arabic translations and, ultimately, the history set down in Firdausi’s great eleventh-century epic, the Shahnamah. The oral transmission of the Zoroastrian tradition had continued.

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In addition to the historical problem of transmission of the Zoroastrian tradition, there is the problem of its content as expressed through practice, belief, theology, and law. Zoroastrianism shares origins with the Vedas, and something of that ancient, or proto-Zoroastrian, past can perhaps be reconstructed from them. Historical references affirm practice in the tradition. Cosmological ideas were highly developed, including apocalyptic ones. Ahura Mazda (lord of wisdom) was identified as the chief transcendental being, who, along with a hierarchy of lesser divinities and beings such as Mithra and Anahita, was responsible for maintaining the cosmic order and its essential qualities, including truth. In addition, there were cultic gods and regional figures and shamanism. Hymns were sung, ritual offerings were made to fire and water, family and ancestors were revered, and there was belief in resurrection and in an afterlife, which one attained through action and which mirrored the happiness of this world. The central ethics included right deeds, thought, and speech; right deeds, action, were emphasized in the Gathas. Similarly, Darius’s Bisitun inscription exhorts the upholders of truth to action, to fight. Even though Zoroastrianism was especially identified with Persia and the Persians, Zoroaster saw his role in universal terms, as did the Achaemenians and the Sasanians. Zoroaster’s own social background is presumed to have been pastoral nomadic – there are numerous references to the animals of Central Asian pastoral nomadism in Zoroastrian texts – which can be seen in the complementary ideas of individual responsibility and social interdependence. Finally, his Central Asian society has been reconstructed as having but two components, warrior/pastoralists and priests. Later in the Sasanian period, Zoroastrianism conceived of a society as having four constituents – or castes, for some interpreters – priests, warriors, bureaucrats, and artisans and farmers. Regardless of the nature of early Zoroastrianism, versions of it were manifested in historical periods. Ahura Mazda himself conferred rulership on the Achaemenians and then on Sasanians as shown in their reliefs and inscriptions. Magi, in their several categories – so vital in the oral transmittal of the faith, and in the rituals, including the characteristic cultic fire practice – are also identified in the Parthian and Sasanian periods. Central, too, were ethical injunctions involving truth and justice, which were linked with rulership. Probably beginning in the late Achaemenian era, and continuing down into the Sasanian period, Zurvanism, a distinct form of Zoroastrianism, prevailed, presumably with royal patronage. While Zurvanism is commonly identified as heretical,

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heterodoxy cannot exist without institutionalization of an orthodoxy, which did not occur until the early Sasanian period, when their government and rule themselves were institutionalized. Zurvanism was monistic in that Zurvan, conceived as time and predating the creation of the world itself, was the father of both Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu/Ahriman. Too little is known about the relationship of belief with practice, but it is possible that the adherents of Zurvanism saw Ahura Mazda as the prime mover for good and thus its adherents could worship with traditionalists who also shared in this idea of Ahura Mazda’s role, even though traditionalists regarded Ahura Mazda as creator. Zurvanism persisted through the Sasanian era, and possibly dominated the Sasanian rulers in the fourth and fifth centuries, who gave their children Zurvan-related names. Late in Sasanian history, during the reign of Khusrau I, there was a return to Zoroastrian orthodoxy, and he was given the title of Anushirvan, “Of Immortal Soul.” In addition, in late Achaemenian and Parthian times down through the reign of Shapur I, cultic practice and change in the relative positioning of Ahura Mazda with Mithra and Anahita could have given rise to sectarian disputes with important political as well as cultural consequences. (Mithra, best-known to us because of his popularity in the Roman world and even identification with Christ as savior, was a divinity who embodied many qualities concerned with the cosmic order, including change from night to day, or birth–rebirth, and in the seasons, and his equation with the sun. And Anahita stood as the goddess of water and source of the cosmic ocean.) Mani’s and Kartir’s appearances during Ardashir’s and Shapur’s reigns reflected the cultural and political uncertainty of late Parthian and early Sasanian history, and, indeed, emphasize the variant strands of Zoroastrianism that went back at least to the Achaemenian period. Ardashir and Shapur, in the process of consolidating power, achieved a balance of their interests as rulers with urban centers where Mani’s ideas were acceptable, and with notables and their rural and regional bases and links with the traditional priests. All of which would suggest the importance of religion, even as an institution, in the political realm. Tied in with religion were issues of succession, regional power bases and rivalries, and in the end, Sasanian legitimacy. The challenges from Rome in the western provinces of the empire and those from Central Asia were additional, persisting factors throughout Sasanian history. Religion and regional factors can be seen in the dynastic succession at Shapur’s death in 272. He was immediately succeeded by his son, Hormizd I, who reigned for about a year. He was succeeded by his

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brother, Varahran/Bahram I – the king of Gilan in Shapur’s inscription – and not his own son. In the course of Bahram I’s reign, Kartir consolidated his own power, Mani was jailed and executed, and persecution of Manicheans, Christians, Jews, and Buddhists was carried out. Bahram I, before dying after only three years on the throne, designated his son, Bahram II (276–293), as his successor. Narseh, king of the Sakas and eastern Iran, another of Shapur’s sons thus Hormizd I’s and Bahram I’s brother, then challenged the accession of Bahram II. Kartir dominated the reigns of the two Bahrams, and was possibly responsible for the succession of Bahram II rather than Narseh. Both Bahrams granted titles and honors to Kartir, and Bahran II included Kartir on all his reliefs save one. Meanwhile, about 270 a strengthened Rome under Emperor Aurelian had emerged, and Rome was able to assail even Ctesiphon in 283. In a treaty Bahram II conceded much of northern Mesopotamia that had been under Sasanian control since Shapur’s victories there. More might have been lost, had not Emperor Carus died. In addition, Bahram may have had little choice, for he had to turn his armies to the east to put down yet another challenger but one who was supported by the Sakas, Kushans, and Gilanis. Here Bahram II was successful and commemorated that victory with reliefs. He appears not, however, to have resisted the appointment by Diocletian, the new Roman emperor, of the Arsacid prince, Tiridates, who had fled to Rome in 252, as king of Armenia about 288. There is some confusion over succession again following the death of Bahram II. When he died in 293, he was immediately succeeded by his son Bahram III, who was deposed three months later by Narseh his uncle, the last of Shapur’s sons. And it is Narseh (293–202) who re-established his father’s policy of religious toleration and reversed the Bahrams’ religious persecutions. Narseh may have governed much of the empire, especially in the east, on behalf of Bahram II. According to Narseh’s own inscription near Paikuli in Kurdistan, he was in Armenia, as designated heir (Armenia was considered part of Iranshahr in the third century) when his brother died. Had he been designated king, or was he leading an army against Tiridates? Or did he have support from Tiridates against Bahrman III? At Paikuli, notables pledged their support to Narseh, and in the inscription they are listed and Narseh identified himself as “king of kings.” Generally those listed came from regions peripheral to the Sasanian center: representatives from Baluchistan, the king of the Kushans, the Khvarazmian king, and the kings of two Arab groups, including the Lakhmids. Several possibilities are suggested by this Paikuli

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list. Perhaps Bahran III had support in the central regions and Narseh used his power in the east to overcome it. Once Narseh (293–302) had secured the throne, his armies regained Mesopotamia from the Romans and established control over Armenia. In 298 his armies were routed – and in the process, his family was captured. In the concluding peace, the Romans regained Armenia and northern Syria. Narseh was succeeded at his death by his son, Hormizd II (302–309). Sasanian domestic affairs in this period remain essentially undocumented. Kartir’s religious persecution was ended for as yet undetermined reasons. On the foreign front with Rome, peace lasted for 40 years. Late in Narseh’s reign, the king of Armenia accepted Christianity, and in 312 Emperor Constantine would himself convert to Christianity and commit his empire to this faith. Consequently, the significant number of Christians in the Sasanian empire could be regarded as a potential fifth column in future conflicts with Rome. The dynastic principle of succession in the Sasanian family through its first eight rulers, typically from father to son, prevailed, as had been the case in earlier Persian dynasties. However, there were two exceptions – first, Bahram I succeeded his brother Hormizd and, second, Narseh successfully challenged his nephew, Bahram III. Was the notion of family seniority being presented as an alternative principle of succession? Or does the case of Narseh represent center–periphery or regional tensions, or possible religious divisions, or a rejection of Bahram I’s military incompetence or domestic policies, or simply ambition on Narseh’s part? The first two rulers, Ardashir I and Shapur I, reigned for relatively long periods – the former ruled about 18 years and the latter about 31 years – while only one of the next six sat on the throne for longer than nine years. There was some type of internal instability during the period of the Bahrams and Narseh that could well have been compounded by religious and regional factionalism, attempts by notables to play more important roles, and the continuing Roman threat – as well as possible threats from the east. Dynastic succession was one legitimizing factor; another was the empire’s well-being. The circle of equity postulated a linkage between rulership and prosperity. Regardless of the period in which its notions were current, it implied the importance of stability and centralization. Only with stability and some centralization would the government have the means to maintain itself, and, particularly, to wage war on the scale necessary to deal with the Romans or in the east with various groups of Kushans, Huns, and Turks. Given, too, the importance of agriculture to

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the Sasanian economy, could long-term work projects counterbalance the vagaries of geography and climate and justify necessary expenditure? The Sasanian period saw a great expansion of arable land along the rivers of Khuzistan and in the Diyala region northeast of Ctesiphon. Enormous expenditure and labor were invested in designing, digging, and maintaining irrigation systems to support agriculture and the cities of Mesopotamia, among other places. Increased agricultural production could support larger populations and could meet the needs of administration and defense of the empire. Such an investment in increased agricultural production in Mesopotamia also emphasized the importance of trade there and to the whole of the Sasanian economy. The Sasanians controlled the land routes across Asia to Mesopotamia as well as the increasingly important sea routes from India, across the Indian Ocean into the Persian Gulf and the Arabian and Red seas. Luxury goods such as incense, spices, and silk fabric and thread were again central to this commerce. In the next stage, silk thread would be woven into cloth in Mesopotamia for internal consumption and for export. Sasanian textiles, especially brocades, were highly valued in both Europe and China. And the imbalance of silk thread imports was offset by Sasanian export of textiles, cobalt, silver vessels, glass, and horses to China. The significance of trade and the effects of Sasanian agricultural development in Mesopotamia continued well into the Islamic era, and allowed the ‘Abbasid caliphate (750–1258) to center its power and capital near Ctesiphon, in Baghdad. During the early period of Sasanian rule, there was continued spread of the fire ritual. The maintenance of sacred fires in specific places and in honor of members of the dynasty replaced regional and cult images as the focal point in worship. While fire altars long predate the Sasanians, altars took on new significance in the legitimization of Sasanian rule and institutionalization of Zoroastrianism. In this process, Kartir may have played a notable role. Sasanian coins show the profile of the ruler – each with his own distinctive crown – on the obverse, and a fire altar with attendants on the reverse. Actual altars in the same style as those found on coins have been excavated. While the growth in the importance of fire altars would suggest a heightened Zoroastrian identity, the Sasanian ruler’s self-image – even with religious persecution and factionalism – necessitated toleration and some form of universalism. Without toleration for the empire’s ethnically and religiously diverse population, centralization of authority and administration, limited though it was, would not have been possible, nor would there have been the requisite stability to maintain it.

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The significance of this first period of Sasanian history is underscored much later by Khusrau I, Anushirvan (531–579), who ascribed all achievements and precedence to Ardashir I. The first eight Sasanian rulers, particularly Ardashir I, Shapur I, and Bahram II, represented themselves as simultaneous rulers in their inscriptions and reliefs, on coins and silver vessels, in building new (or refurbishing earlier) urban centers, palaces, garrisons, and temples, and in titles. Beginning with Ardashir, they ruled the empire as “Shahanshah/King of Kings,” and through close family members, who ruled large provinces and regions – Armenia, the Sakas, or eastern Iran – and who were entitled “Great Kings.” As with the Achaemenians, and unlike the Parthians, the Sasanians maintained close control over appointments of governors, who were chosen from within the dynastic family for the larger provinces, or from regional elite families for smaller ones. Regional notables, including those whose families had played important roles for the Parthians, were given positions in the military and in administration. Autonomy of regions continued to be tolerated during the Sasanian period, and there may have been fewer rebellions than in the Parthian period as a result of more centralized control. In addition, administrative control would have been reinforced by the linkage of rulership with terms such as khvarnah and farr (or in middle Persian, khvarrah) (literally “divine fortune/blessing”), and symbolically and visually represented in reliefs that show the Sasanian shahanshah being presented with the circle, or diadem, of sovereignty by Ahura Mazda to emphasize Sasanian dynastic legitimacy. Significantly, in the relief representation of investiture both Ahura Mazda and the shahanshah are shown wearing crowns that symbolize the former’s authority over the cosmos and the latter’s, as vicegerent, over this world. Authority and power centered on the Sasanian shahanshah, and all institutions and constituencies proceeded from and were dependent upon him. Similarly, descent in the Sasanian family was a prerequisite to be shahanshah. The only successful revolts were internecine within the Sasanian descent group. Some rulers designated sons, but designation, or accession in its absence, seemed to require acknowledgment of fitness to rule and support for the Sasanian religious establishment and regional notables. The balance of power between Sasanian rulers and Zoroastrian clergy seems to have shifted. Early shahanshahs appointed priests, mobad, and awarded them titles, but with the institutionalization of Zoroastrianism and the emergence of a pre-eminent priest, the mobadanmobad (Middle Persian, mobadan mobed), whose title approximated the shahanshah’s,

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Figure 4.5

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Investiture of Ardashir II (photograph by author)

the clergy developed a more independent sense of themselves. The ruler required clerical instruction in Zoroastrian tenets, ritual, and law, and symbolized the community as he performed the fire ritual. At the shahanshah’s coronation – and each Sasanian ruler had his own distinctive crown and mace, both symbols of sovereignty – the link between Ahura Mazda’s grace and legitimacy was made in the eyes of the ruler’s subjects. Moreover, the linkage between government and religion was made when the mobadanmobad crowned the shahanshah. Much of what we know about the nature of Sasanian rulership and its attendant symbols and roles dates from the post-Sasanian period in Persian and Arabic sources, including manuals of rulership, or the socalled mirrors for princes, and in Firdausi’s Shahnamah. The symbols can be seen in Sasanian reliefs, their inscriptions, and on coins. In Sasanian – even in Achaemenian – Iran, before the development of Islamic political theory, mutuality between government and religion had been established. The innate and essential qualification to rule, chosen both by God and recognized by the people, was known as farr, and by necessity the ruler had to be obeyed. And the ruler had the obligation to maintain and defend society. Such mutuality – ruler and religion or ruler and society – always carried with it the potential to limit the ruler’s power.

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The culmination of Sasanian power was achieved during the 70-year reign of Shapur II (309–379) which inaugurated the second period of Sasanian history. Narseh had been succeeded by his son Hormizd II (302–309), but after his death the succession was disputed. Ultimately support was given to the infant who became known as Shapur II. There are no contemporary sources, save for Roman ones, to provide insight as to how Shapur II achieved and then maintained his power. Nevertheless, if centralization was ever attained in the Sasanian period, it would have been during his reign, which also represents the apogee of Sasanian cultural achievement. Early in his reign Shapur II had to deal with the empire’s two ongoing confrontations: one on the eastern frontiers and the other with the Romans in the west. It was Shapur who broke the long-standing peace with Rome. However, it was a different Rome. The Roman empire had not only adopted Christianity under Constantine, but he had established a new center for Roman power in the east, at Constantinople, or Byzantium. With the shift of the Roman center from the west to the east, Armenia, now Christian, allied more closely with its co-religionists. In addition, the Romans had consolidated their military position and strengthened their fortifications in Syria to face the Sasanians to their south. Shapur was diverted from the Roman challenge with the arrival of the Chionites in the east – possibly the first Huns to confront the Sasanians. That campaign ended successfully, with the agreement that the Chionites assist him in the west. In 359 the Iranians took Amida, but a Roman counterattack led by Julian the Apostate in 363 brought the Romans to the walls of Ctesiphon. Their advance was stopped when Julian was wounded and died. Emperor Jovian, in return for a truce and safe conduct for himself and his forces, transferred to the Sasanians all Roman provinces east of the Tigris river, including Nisibis. There, and in the Caucasus, the Sasanians built fortifications, established alliances with Arab tribes to offset similar Byzantine–Arab alliances, and continued to resettle Christians in Mesopotamia, Khuzistan, and Fars. Bishops were to be found in Ctesiphon, northern Mesopotamia, and in Fars at Bishapur. Shapur II was known for his suppression of the Arab tribes. During the last half of his reign, Shapur levied extortionate taxes against Christians to offset his military expenditures. Their revolts were suppressed, but he also renewed persecution of the religious minorities. Institutionalization of Zoroastrianism, significantly, Adurbad-i Mahrspand’s codification of the Auesta, continued under Shapur II. References from the Acts of the Martyrs confirm the establishment of a clerical hierarchy headed by the mobadanmobad. Zurvanism continued

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to be opposed by traditionalists, but Shapur himself and one of his great mobads adopted a policy of government and church protection, and possibly support, for Zurvanism. All of which suggests the importance of Zoroastrianism as an institution with its own self-interest in which it could support the ruler in general but oppose him in specific instances. Shapur II was succeeded by Ardashir II (379–383), who may or may not have been a son, who was deposed and succeeded by Shapur III (383–388), son of Shapur II. During these and the next several reigns, Armenia and the Huns – this time the Hephthalites – re-emerged to trouble the Sasanians. Seemingly out of nowhere, the Huns appeared in parts of northern Iran, the Caucasus, and Anatolia, and defense of Sasanian territory was complicated by Byzantine attempts to control Armenia, and by continuing threats on the western frontiers. Bahram IV (388–399) followed Shapur III and was probably his son. Eleven years later he was murdered and succeeded by his son Yazdgard I (399–421). Yazdgard has been charged with being pro-Christian and having persecuted Zoroastrians, but the Acts of the Martyrs record continued Christian persecutions. Yazdgard seems to have tolerated religious minorities so long as their behavior was not anti-Zoroastrian. He took a Jewish wife, and other Jews held high offices, which earned him the title, too, of Jewish King. During his reign, in 410, he convened the Council of Seleucia that accepted the provisions of the Council of Nicaea, including the Nicene Creed, which ended Christian doctrinal differences and allowed for the establishment of a single church in the Sasanian empire. Isaac, Bishop of Seleucia, headed and organized the church there. Here, the shahanshah was playing out his role as simultaneous ruler, when he represented his rulership for the Christians, one of his constituencies, as well. Succession following Yazdgard is again clouded in obscurity. One son was killed. And a relative supported by notables abdicated when another son, the famous Bahram V (Gur) (421–439), appeared outside Ctesiphon supported by Arab troops. He had been sent to Hira in Arabia as a ward of the Lakhmid king there. Bahram Gur – the onager/wild ass – was a legendary hunter and ruler, hence his name. Succession after Bahram’s death fell on his son Yazdgard II (439–457). War with Byzantium began again but was broken off when the Hephthalites challenged the Sasanians from their base in present-day Afghanistan. When the Hephthalites were brought under control, Yazdgard turned back to Armenia to deal with yet another revolt there. Christian Armenians were killed or taken as prisoners back to Iran; meanwhile, Jews and other Christians in the empire were also persecuted; some of them fled to Byzantium.

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For the next 50 years the Hephthalites were the greatest external threat to the Sasanians, and they and Armenia figured in disputed successions. At Yazdgard’s death, his two sons competed for the throne. Hormizd III (457–459) became the ruler, but was overthrown by his brother Piruz (459–484), who was allied with the Hephthalites. Piruz turned against his allies, and was initially successful, but was captured, and was released only after paying ransom, leaving his son Kavad as a hostage. In 484 Piruz faced the Hephthalites once again, despite the earlier compounded disasters of military defeat in the face of prolonged drought and famine, only to lose his army and his life in battle. A peace was concluded with the Hephthalites, including a tribute, and with the Armenians. In the case of Armenia, the Sasanians assented to the destruction of all fire temples in Armenia. In addition, Armenians were allowed to practice Christianity, and Armenia was to be administered directly by the Sasanian ruler. Succession after Piruz’s death was once again confused. Notables first elected one of Piruz’s brothers, only to depose him in favor of Piruz’s son, Kavad (488–496 and 499–531). He too was deposed and imprisoned, but escaped to the Hephthalites, who may have helped in his restoration to the throne. In the fifth century there were no fewer than eight rulers, three of them in its last decade. Nevertheless, this is the century in which the Sasanian administrative and religious institutions were regarded as having reached their full development. If this was the case, does this represent the culmination of a process set in place during Shapur II’s long reign? Or, was it in reaction to fragmentation and a weakened throne? There is no clear answer to these questions. The number of honorific titles in sources, including seals, would indicate bureaucratic differentiation and organization, including the already cited mobadanmobad, or head of the Zoroastrian hierarchy; “the great commander,” buzurg farmadhar, approximating prime minister; and the dabirbid, chief scribe or head of the bureaucracy and even head of the judiciary. The military, too, had its own hierarchy, headed by eranspahbad, general. Such bureaucratic differentiation was also found at provincial and regional levels and survived well into the Islamic era. The fifth century was also significant for the development of an autonomous Christian church in the Sasanian empire, when a synod at Ctesiphon – at the end of Piruz’s reign in 484 – accepted Nestorianism. This created an independent Iranian church, which may have been an attempt to separate Iranian Christians from the Christians in enemy empires, especially Constantinople. Moreover, the Iranian church, since its recognition in 410 at the council convened by Yazdgard at Seleucia,

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was institutionalized within the Sasanian governmental structure, when the church becomes a constituency of the shah as simultaneous ruler. Kavad faced significant problems during his first period of rule (488–496), not the least of which were his own legitimacy, despite the fact that he was Piruz’s son, and the need to develop a political base from which to reign. Finally and in addition to continuing external challenges, was the problem of recovery from long drought and famine. In this troubled time, the radical religious leader, Mazdak, preached a new Zoroastrianism. What little is known about him comes essentially from his enemies, in some cases long after the Sasanians, which would indicate the continuing appeal of his ideas. Mazdak challenged the entrenched privilege of notables, including Zoroastrian priests. He himself may have been one. He called for a new egalitarian society in which the rich would share with the poor and violence would end. He won the support of Kavad, who used Mazdak to undermine the power of the clergy and notables and to institute reforms that would be completed by his son, Khusrau I. Khusrau’s succession in 531 was not supported by Mazdakites, who were then suppressed. At this point Kavad was deposed, jailed, and escaped to the Hephthalites, who restored him to power. He married a Hephthalite princess and incorporated Hephthalite units in his army. Throughout his second reign (499–531), Kavad was confronted by continuing internal opposition on the part of the notables, economic crises, and ongoing conflict with Byzantium. The appeal of Mazdakism continued, and that threat to the establishment may have forced Kavad’s opponents to accept him as the lesser evil. When his reign ended Mazdak was executed and many of his followers were slaughtered. Kavad, before he died, designated his youngest son, Khusrau I (531–579), as his successor. Kavad’s armies found new success in the Caucasus, but before he could follow that up against Byzantium, he died. Khusrau I, known always with his sobriquet, Anushirvan, inaugurated the last period of Sasanian history. He succeeded his father but had to put down insurrections led by his brothers, after which he won the support of notables including the clergy, paid the Hephthalites their tribute, and immediately made peace with Byzantium to be free to launch his famous centralizing reforms. Critical for the empire’s well-being and administration was tax reform. Political instability had affected the economic base, including taxes and land tenure, and Kavad introduced major tax reforms and inaugurated a major land survey before he died. Khusrau’s reformed agricultural tax addressed inequities and regularized payment in cash; consequently, both agriculturalists and the bureaucracy

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Figure 4.6

Dish with Khusrau I (courtesy of The Hermitage)

could plan more effectively, and the state was assured a stable cash income. In addition, adult males were levied a poll tax, but notables, clergy, and bureaucrats were exempt. Again, following that ancient historical pattern, it was Mesopotamia, with its rich alluvial soils, rivers, and Sasasian-developed irrigation systems that returned the largest income and tax. With a reformed administration and regular income, Khusrau expanded government projects, including irrigation construction, and set about reorganizing his army. The most significant and most long-lasting of his military reforms was the creation of a new land-based class, the dihqan, who had both regional military and administrative responsibility. Khusrau equipped and paid these small landowners, in return for which they collected taxes and provided for defense, especially on the frontiers. This new class – sometimes identified as gentry to distinguish them from the great landed notables – played important governmental roles, added a base of support for the ruler, and undercut the power of notables. Traditionally, the great landed notables had had their own followers, whom they maintained from their own incomes and led in military service. The dihqans would be the transmitters of the Iranian tradition of rule and culture long after

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the collapse of the Sasanian empire. In Khurasan they provided the context for the Persian revival that culminated in Firdausi’s great national epic, the Shahnamah. Khusrau also instituted a basic redivision of the empire into four sectors with a spahbad, or general, in command of each. The eastern sector included Khurasan, Sistan (Sakastan), and Kerman; the southern was made up Fars, Khuzistan, and the Persian Gulf coastal region; the west consisted largely of Mesopotamia; and the north included today’s Luristan, Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and the Caucasus. Both the east and the west were critical for the defense of imperial interests against nomads and against the Byzantines. In addition to the west’s strategic location, it was also of great importance because it was central to the empire for agriculture, administration, and trade. Presumably, it was Khusrau who built and maintained defensive lines and garrisons throughout, but especially on the frontiers of, the empire. (Arabs discovered that the interior of Iran was relatively empty of troops, for the soldiers were concentrated on the frontiers; once frontier armies were defeated the way to the interior was open.) With reforms under way, in 540, Khusrau launched an attack against Byzantium, and his army quickly reached Antioch. The Iranians returned to Ctesiphon with vast amounts of plunder and prisoners. In the next 20 years the western and northern frontiers experienced a kind of war of attrition with neither side clearly dominant. Truces were broken, land was exchanged, but Khusrau gradually gained control of the regions immediately to the west of the Euphrates. In 561 a comprehensive truce was agreed upon, partly because Khusrau had found a new ally in the east, the Turks, who now appeared in Transoxiana to confront the Hephthalites. The Sasanians and Turks together annihilated the Hephthalites, thus ending that very major threat to the Sasanians and the trade routes across Central Asia. But this victory also meant the end of their annual tribute. Hephthalite territory was divided between the two victors; the Sasanians seem to have come away with territory south of the Oxus, essentially Afghanistan, while the Turks acquired the area north and east of the river. Conflict, however, broke out between the two in 569–70, and hopes for the security of trade routes across Central Asia with the Hephthalite defeat were not met. Arabia had long been a bone of contention between the Sasanians and the Romans and later with the Byzantines. The primary issue was the long-standing one of security for trade routes, but there were also important strategic and military implications. From the beginning of the Sasanian dynasty, Ardeshir I sought to control lower Mesopotamia, the

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Persian Gulf, and the maritime trade there, as did later rulers when the arrival of the Huns and Hephthalites threatened the security of trade across Central Asia. Similarly, Shapur II became allied with the Arabs when they threatened Sasanian monopoly of maritime trade in the Gulf. Bahram V (Gur) carried Sasanian policy to the next step when he extended his control from the Gulf to the Indus river. Late in his reign Khusrau I consolidated the Sasanian position in south Arabia to block a possible alliance between Byzantium and its coreligionists in Ethiopia, which would have circumvented the Gulf–India route and would have resulted in an Ethiopian presence in the Yemen. During 575–7 south Arabia became a Sasanian stronghold that persisted into the seventh century with Sasanian control of the southern Red Sea and trade routes to India and Ceylon. Byzantine and Sasanian interaction in Arabia and with their client tribes there played a role in the emergence of Islam and Arab power. The termination by both empires of their patronage for these border Arabs was a factor in the success of early Arab victories in the seventh century, and indeed of Islam itself, and opened the way for the Arab conquest of Mesopotamia, and the subsequent end of the Sasanian dynasty and occupation of the empire. In addition to conflict over Arabia and trade, the Byzantine emperor, Justinian II, had long been a thorn in Khusrau’s side. He fomented troubles in the Caucasus and Armenia, and in Armenia Sasanian problems were exacerbated by its governor, who was killed in a rebellion in 571. Justinian sent his army south, but the Sasanians counteracted through Syria, and Byzantium agreed to a peace. In 575 the Sasanians invaded Armenia and seemed on the verge of incorporating the eastern parts of Byzantium, when their luck changed. Peace was concluded in 576, but fighting broke out again in 578. The Armenian rebellion ended; Khusrau granted them amnesty. He died in 579. Khusrau was as mighty in death as in life, and became the mythical just ruler. The name “Khusrau,” like caesar, became generic for king – kisra – in Arabic. During his 48 years on the throne central power was re-established. Both the power of notables and of those who challenged the structure of society in the name of Mazdak were curtailed. He is supposed to have enforced a strict Zoroastrianism, including a fixed, castelike system of priests, warriors, scribes, and artisans and farmers, but he is also credited with religious toleration. As in the case of subsequent rulers who achieved mythical status, buildings, fortifications, bridges, and roads are all attributed to him. Indeed, Khusrau was a great centralizer, builder, and military leader. There was expansion of agricultural production in Mesopotamia following vast investment of government

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resources in infrastructure and planning; the population increased. Moreover, he seems to have understood and supported a trade policy that worked to Iran’s benefit while it frustrated its Byzantine opponents. Importantly, Khusrau encouraged learning. When Justinian closed the academy at Athens in 529, its scholars and philosophers were welcomed to Sasanian Iran along with those from India. Khusrau’s Gundeshapur/ Jundeshapur became a center of learning, including translation of scholarly texts, particularly in medicine and science, that long outlived the Sasanian empire. This reign may have been an important one for Zoroastrianism, as well. Royal and non-royal production of silver vessels and work in glass, gemstones, and textiles, and architecture demonstrate wealth and power and underscore Sasanian patronage and rulership. Khusrau was succeeded by his son Hormizd IV (579–590), born to a Turkish princess. Throughout his reign, he was preoccupied with wars against Byzantium; he was also threatened in the east by Turks until Sasanian forces led by Hormizd’s general, Bahram Chubin, defeated them – here was another Sasanian who reappears as a heroic figure in the Shahnamah. Bahram Chubin was also successful in the Caucasus and against the Byzantines. Hormizd, fearful of his general’s growing standing, tried to dismiss him. When Bahram Chubin rebelled other Sasanian troops joined him, and the combined forces proceeded toward Ctesiphon, where other elites, including religious leaders, gave him their support. Hormizd IV, before being executed, was blinded and replaced by his son Khusrau II (590–628). In 591 Khusrau II set out to confront Bahram Chubin, but he himself ultimately fled to Byzantine protection. Bahram Chubin declared himself king; he had been born into an Arsacid family. Maurice, the Byzantine emperor, threw his support to Khusrau, who with Byzantine and Armenian forces defeated Bahram Chubin in Azerbaijan. Bahram Chubin escaped and found refuge with the Turks, but was assassinated a year later. Not until 601 did Khusrau II establish suzerainty over all of Iran. The last member of the dynastic family to hold out against him was an uncle, who established himself in Rayy and minted coins there. Khusrau also had problems with his Lakhmid tribal clients in Arabia; he deposed the king and appointed a governor in his place. Again, this significant challenge foreshadowed the growth of united Arab power and the decline of Sasanian power in the next several decades. Until 602 good relations prevailed between Khusrau and Maurice, the Byzantine emperor, to the extent that some Armenian writers thought that Khusrau had converted to Christianity. He did have a Christian wife and seems to have maintained a policy favorable for Christians. In 602,

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however, Maurice was killed along with his five sons, and replaced by Phocas, which gave Khusrau cause to avenge the murder of his benefactor–ally. In 604 the Sasanian army successfully defended Edessa – it had refused to recognize Phocas who sent his army against the city – and defeated the Byzantine army. Khusrau II then capitalized on Byzantine disorder and led his army to conquest across Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Syria. Near anarchy continued in Byzantium, and in 610 Sasanian forces crossed the Euphrates, and Heraclius, the new emperor, tried to negotiate a peace, but the Sasanian military machine marched on to victory on all fronts. Antioch, then Damascus, fell; Jerusalem (and the true cross) was taken in 614; much of Anatolia in 615; and in 619, Egypt. In effect, the Achaemenian empire was restored in the west. Despite the loss of Egypt, with its vital cereal grains, and the other territories, the Byzantine navy still dominated the seas. From the Black Sea, Heraclius led his reorganized army into Armenia and defeated the Sasanians in 622, and again in 623, Heraclius was victorious over the Sasanians even when they were led by their most renowned generals, Shahrbaraz and Shahin. Indeed the Sasanians retreated into Azerbaijan from Armenia, and the Byzantines ravaged the Sasanian fire temple at Shiz (Takht-i Sulaiman). In 624 Byzantine authority was restored over Anatolia. A Sasanian-led coalition with the Avars failed to take Constantinople, and in 627 Heraclius’s forces once again moved into Azerbaijan and from there into Mesopotamia, where the Byzantine army defeated the Sasanians. Khusrau in the end fled back to Ctesiphon, where in desperation he tried to regroup his military, but in the ensuing insurrection – even joined in by his son, Shiroe – Khusrau himself was imprisoned and executed late in February 628. Shiroe succeeded his father as Kavad II (628); he sued for peace and withdrew from all the newly conquered territories of Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Anatolia. Prisoners were exchanged along with booty, including the relics of the true cross that had been seized in Jerusalem. The Sasanians would never recover from Heraclius’s success against them, and in the next 15 years there would be no fewer than nine monarchs, including two queens and an ambitious general, on the Sasanian throne. Kavad II reigned but one year and died, most likely from the plague. His infant son, Ardashir III (628–630), succeeded him, but he was killed by Shahrbaraz (630), Khusrau II’s key general. Shahrbaraz was assassinated within two months. The next claimant, Khusrau III (630), Khusrau’s nephew, was assassinated even before he was crowned. At this point and with no immediate male heirs, and given the importance of dynastic descent in the Sasanian family, notables chose Khusrau II’s

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daughter, Puran (630–631), as queen, who ruled for some two years. Puran was succeeded first by her sister and then by two, possibly three, others who are assumed to have been family members, for only their names are known. Finally, Yazdgard III (633–651), Khusrau II’s grandson, was placed on the throne. He survived by hiding at Istakhr, the Sasanian’s original home. Arab armies under the banner of Islam defeated the Sasanian army first at Qadisiya, near Ctesiphon, in 637, and then in Nihavand, in the western Zagros, in 642. Yazdgard III fled to Marv in Central Asia, fruitlessly sought military support from China, and was murdered in 651; thus the dynasty came to its end. Expectations for a Sasanian restoration seem not to have died, however, with Yazdgard. From Chinese sources we learn that Piruz, Yazdgard’s son, took his father’s title and tried to muster Sogdians and Hephthalites in today’s Badakhshan on his own behalf. Twice he appealed to China for their support. After he was defeated by the Arabs, he petitioned to construct a temple in the Chin capital of Ch’ang-an. Piruz’s son also failed in his attempts to oust the Arabs. Chinese diplomatic recognition of a Sasanian king continued well into the eighth century, which must indicate some Sasanian presence in eastern Central Asia. In Sian there is a late-ninth-century tombstone that marks the burial of a woman from the Suren family of Sasanian notables. Generally, three broad arguments are advanced for the Sasanian collapse after 400 years of rule: decadence and degeneration; military overextension and exhaustion; and Zoroastrian intolerance and rigid orthodoxy with profound social and political implications. Khusrau II was the last of the rich and powerful Sasanian great kings. His court was fabled for its brilliance and opulence. He himself was a great patron of the arts and architecture, and his reliefs and statue at Taq-i Bustan indicate the rich culture that produced them. Such material culture was the product of the wealth from booty, trade, and taxation, the fruit of Khusrau’s policies and reforms. His personal military and leadership role, and that of notables, makes the decadence theory seem implausible. Neither does legitimacy–rulership seem to have been a problem (see below). Military overextension and exhaustion could well provide partial explanation for the Sasanian collapse. Until the tide turned in Heraclius’s favor, the Sasanian military machine had the resources, leadership, and tactics to conduct war on an imperial scale. The Sasanians seem to have shifted from defensive tactics to secure traditional borders between their empire and the Byzantines to a strategy of expansion that had its own

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momentum. With that momentum, Khusrau chose to reject the possibility of negotiation and diplomacy, and Clausewitzian principles were violated. Initially, the Sasanians took advantage of Byzantine internal disorder, but in one victory after another lost sight of their objectives, overextended themselves territorially, disregarded their own maritime shortcomings, and failed to develop coalitions that would have ended the Byzantines once and for all. Two additional factors worked against the Sasanians after they had so quickly reconstituted the Achaemenian empire: numbers and time. There were too few administrators and too little time to bring the new and very large provinces under Sasanian control. Most significantly, Khusrau seems to have disregarded the importance of the balance of power between the Sasanians and their western rivals. Disruption of the equilibrium would have consequences in the form of coalition building against them or even in the threat of imminent defeat. In addition, the Sasanians may have disregarded the ideological and psychological opposition of Byzantine Christians to Zoroastrian rule – that, too, strengthened Heraclius against them. Zoroastrian intolerance and rigid orthodoxy and its identification with ruling elites could have been factors and may be indicated by the spread and growth of Christianity in the Sasanian empire and beyond it into Central Asia. Khusrau II seems to have shifted between a policy of toleration for Christians early in his reign to one of persecution. He patronized the construction of fire temples and the Zoroastrian religious establishment, which may have antagonized the general population. Furthermore, subjects in the empire may have resented the costs both of war and of the maintenance of the religious establishment. Khusrau I’s reforms regularizing tax collection could well have resulted in resentment or even opposition to the government. There may have been other unintended consequences of Khusrau I’s reforms. Division of the empire into four parts, each with its own general, greatly strengthened those generals, and one of them, Shahrbaraz, claimed the throne, if only for two months, even though he was not a member of the dynastic family. The creation of the dihqans seems not to have offset the power of the great landed notables and their own self-interest, and with the empire in defeat these internal tensions may have been exacerbated. Such centralizing reforms could also have violated the traditional autonomy enjoyed by the empire’s regions. The causes of the reversal of Khusrau II’s extraordinary military success and territorial gains are too easily collapsed into the demise of the empire and along with it the ruling dynasty. The centrality of dynas-

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tic legitimacy continued to the end. That two women were chosen to rule, and that very powerful generals were not, underscores the importance of this dynastic principle. Nor were the Sasanian rulers inept imperial administrators. Either in terms of political culture or in practice, they generally balanced imperial needs and forces with regional and local ones. According to the much later Persian historian, Ibn Balkhi, and the first to write about the Sasanians: “The foundation of the kingdom of the Persians was based on justice and their way of living on equity and liberality.”3 The point is not that the late Sasanian rulers, especially Khusrau III, achieved that ideal of justice or that they deviated from it. Conditions in the second quarter of seventh-century Iran were probably little different than in other, earlier periods of crisis such as those during the third century. Too much emphasis has probably been placed on Zoroastrianism and its relationship to the ruler in both instances. Moreover, in the second quarter of the seventh century the eastern frontier seems to have been in a quieter phase. The conflict on the western frontier with Rome, or Byzantium, was one that had also waxed and waned, and earlier Sasanians had been able to regroup after territorial losses and defeat. What is different in 638 and 642 is a new and utterly unexpected factor – the Arabs, and particularly, the Arabs appearing after the Byzantine recovery and the disarray in all the institutions central to the Sasanians, including the dynastic family, the military, and ultimately in society as a whole. Moreover, the Arabs were victorious in Mesopotamia, which was the economic and administrative heart of the Sasanian empire. Given the other conditions, recovery was not likely, but without the Arabs, a recovery might have been possible. The Sasanians clearly call to mind the Achaemenians in many ways. Parallels can be explained by an oral tradition that has left no record and a common political culture. Even though direct links had long been broken, the Sasanians from Istakhr in Fars would have known Persepolis and Naqsh-i Rustam – Istakhr was in immediate proximity to them. At Naqsh-i Rustam they recognized its importance by carving their own reliefs and inscriptions below the Achaemenian ones. It is especially in self-representation in inscriptions, art, and architecture, all of which relate to rulership, that the Sasanians engaged the Achaemenians, even without direct knowledge of them. Shahpur’s inscription at Naqsh-i Rustam mirrors Darius’s Bisitun inscription, with several exceptions. “I am the worshipper of Ahura Mazda, the lord Shapur, King of Kings of Iran and non-Iran, of divine origin, son of the worshipper of Ahura Mazda, the lord Ardashir, King

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of Kings of Iran.”4 Then the inscription continues with an account of his battles and victories in 244. Moreover, the trilingual inscription is in Parthian, Middle Persian, and Greek. Shapur’s self-reference as a “divinity” relates not to the fact that he is Ahura Mazda, but refers to his role as his vicegerent in his earthly realm and to Shapur’s role as the equipoise between his realm and the cosmos – again, both ruler and Ahura Mazda wear complementary crowns. The most significant difference is the contrast of Iran, or Iranshahr, with non-Iran. Darius identified himself first with Fars and then the other parts of his empire, but for Shapur – and very early in Sasanian history – the empire for the first time is Iran in its entirety, Iranshahr. Similarly, Sasanian reliefs, despite significant differences, including stylistic ones, recall Achaemenian and in some instances even Assyrian ones. Many of the Sasanian reliefs depict Ahura Mazda investing the ruler by handing him a beribboned diadem. In some of these, Mithra or Anahita are also shown. Vanquished leaders such as Philip the Arab kneel in submission. Jousts and whole battles portray the Sasanian ruler in his power and military glory. The narrow and panoramic nature of Shapur’s reliefs at his city, Bishapur, show an event in progress, typically military, in contrast to the heroic-sized investiture, submissions, or joust scenes that record a single event. These diorama scenes recall the Achaemenian ones in which subject peoples are bringing representative gifts to the king. Most remarkable of all Sasanian reliefs – if not of all Sasanian sites – are those at Taq-i Bustan at the foot of Kuh-i Parau, only some 20 miles from Bisitun. The site includes a large hunting park, or firdaus/paradise, a very large spring and pool, several grottoes, and sets of reliefs from the fourth century – including those of Shapur II (309–379), Ardashir II (379–383), and Shapur III (383–388) – and the late sixth and early seventh centuries with the reign of Khusrau II (590–628). Of the reliefs the most interesting are those depicting the investiture of Ardashir II by Ahura Mazda, who extends to him the diadem of sovereignty. Mithra is shown standing on an inverted lotus and holding the barsum, or sacred branches, which appear in late Achaemenian reliefs. Clearly, this refers to the simultaneous ruler and his relationship to religion in general. Finally, king and god stand on a fallen foe, presumably Roman. Most extraordinary are the reliefs in the largest of Taq-i Bustan’s grottoes. The entrance to the grotto itself is arched in shape, and panels with a treeof-life pattern extends half-way up on either side, and above them inverted ribbons of investiture that terminate at the feet of two angels/victories who hold out beribboned diadems – clearly, this is an

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Figure 4.7

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Khusrau II, Taq-i Bustan (photograph by author)

investiture commemoration. At the top and at the back of the grotto is the investiture relief of Khusrau II, which is analogous to the immediately adjacent investiture of Ardashir II, made some two centuries earlier. Khusrau extends his arm to receive the diadem from Ahura Mazda, and behind him Anahita extends yet another diadem. On either side of the grotto are large relief panels that depict a boar hunt on one side and a deer hunt on the other. Both hunts take place within a paradise, and both show the king in pursuit accompanied by others, including women playing stringed instruments; the women in the boar panel are seated in a boat in the midst of a swamp. All the accoutrements of ruler as hunter are here, and the detail in both is very fine; the sculpting of the deer hunt is unfinished. What is extraordinary is not just this juxtaposition of investiture and hunting but the depiction of the ruler as heroic warrior, who is shown mounted and in full body armor – larger than life-size and almost in full relief – at the back of the grotto and beneath the investiture relief. Only the glint of the shahanshah’s eyes can be seen behind the lowered visor that intensifies the mystery of kingly power and authority there. The two hunt reliefs of this grotto are very significant, because besides their representation of rulership, they provide a record for

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Figure 4.8

Dish with Shapur II on a lion hunt (courtesy of The Hermitage)

costume, textiles, and ornament and an insight into courtly life and ritual and all that must have been necessary to support it. The royal hunt was also depicted on silver vessels and plates. There is also a record of royal banqueting and drinking on silver and in wall painting. The Bamiyan caves in Afghanistan – now destroyed by the Taliban – may even have recorded a banquet that celebrated a Sasanian treaty of alliance. The abundance of portable Sasanian cultural production – silver, textiles, glass, and stucco ornament and pottery – found across Iran and in the west and especially in Central Asia and China indicate its importance as an economic commodity and in trade. These objects suggest social hierarchy and organization in both their production and use. While some of this production – reliefs, sculpture, paintings – was for decorative and political purposes, other items – silver, textile, glass, coins, seals, gems and gemstone carving, and ceramics – were made for use or for exchange. Judging from the objects themselves, and the context in which they have been excavated or found, some were for the use of notables and non-royals. Artistic and cultural patronage was not just a royal prerogative. Cities and palace complexes such as Ctesiphon, Bishapur, Firuzabad, and key religious sites owed their

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existence to royal foundations, but notables mirrored these with their own buildings. Kartir’s great power is shown by the inclusion of his cameos on the reliefs of the several Bahrams whom he placed in power and by own inscription at Naqsh-i Rustam. Like Achaemenian, Sasanian art and architecture are immediately recognizable, but are rooted in the immediate Parthian rather than the more distant Achaemenian past. Like both Achaemenian and Parthian art and architecture, Sasanian cultural production is a composite and reflects the nature of empire and its multicultural population. There is regional variation, and external influences from craftsmen and laborers incorporated from imperial expansion. Bridges, dams, and barrages, not to mention mosaics, indicate Roman workmanship, and Central Asian paintings show Buddhist influences. Sasanian art, sculpture, and architecture developed from Parthian precedent in use of such characteristics as stucco, barrel vaults, domes, and human frontalism in sculpture and relief. The Sasanians, however, took these elements to unprecedented scale and monumentality, even refinement, for example, in the great vault at Ctesiphon. The use of the squinch, by which a square room supports a round dome, was one of the Sasanian’s important contributions, and one that came to characterize much of subsequent Iranian architecture. Similarly, the Sasanian delight in all-over patterning in decoration and textiles had a continuing impact in Iran and beyond it. Moreover, Sasanian influence, whether in the arts or in government or in many other ways, continued long after the dynasty’s and the empire’s end. Given the Sasanian legacy and continuity, and given that the context for most extant objects has been lost, attribution and dating are problematic at best. In the case of textiles, extant fragments can be dated to the Sasanian era rather than the Islamic period by comparing the details with those in hunting reliefs at Taq-i Bustan. One final issue, related to the interpretation of evidence, is once again twentieth-century values and taste. For many, Sasanian art, with its robust and florid style, may be something of an acquired taste. The Sasanian rulers marshaled all aspects of Iran in history – political, social, economic, cultural and religious – to implement their imperial representation of power and authority and expression of simultaneous rulership. Their Arab conquerors were staggered by the material wealth of Ctesiphon. In the end, the Sasanian legacy was less in terms of their wealth or themselves and dynasty – than in the reinforcement of identification of their culture with Iran, Iranshahr, as a place and for its peoples. The memory was revived after the dynasty and empire had long passed, and continues.

5

“Non-Iran”: Arabs, Turks, and Mongols in Iran Persia/Iran and the Persians/Iranians did not disappear with the collapse of the Sasanian empire in the mid-seventh century. Place, of course, continued; identity as a people and culture persisted and would be revived in government but neither on an imperial nor geographic basis until the sixteenth century. Moreover, the essential social structure – with a new governing elite – and economy remained. While the Arabs and, in particular, Islam would have a profound impact on the Iranians, they, too, had a profound impact on the Arabs and Islam. Significantly, too, there are increasingly more contemporary and secondary sources for the history of the Iranians, although there are still gaps in our knowledge and understanding of complex historical processes. Remarkably, Persian universal rulership, and the necessary ethnic and religious qualifications to rule, was revived by the ‘Abbasids (750–1258). Persian rulership survived even in that first century of Islamic rule, because of the continued utilization of Sasanian bureaucrats and administration, the very slow process of Islamic conversion of the peoples of Iran, and Islamic rulers’ patronization of the arts and learning. Muslim scholars, especially in the Golden Age of the ‘Abbasids, looked to the classical tradition of antiquity, Sasanian, Indian, and Islamic values and ideas to shape and understand their present. It is in this process that Persian rulership acquired Islamic legitimacy and the Iranian historical memory acquired its mythical power. In the tenth century, when Persian principalities emerged once again, the Persian past was crystallized in the great national epic, the Shahnamah, by the poet Firdausi, which has had a profound impact in shaping Persian identity down to the present. Also in the tenth century, the great Turkic migration of pastoral nomads from Central Asia began and moved across Iran and northern Mesopotamia into Anatolia. Turkic-Mongol rulers, like the ‘Abbasids

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Figure 5.1 The Shahristan Bridge crosses the Zayandah river just to the east of Isfahan. Its piers are Sasanian with a Saljuq superstructure (photograph by author)

before them, incorporated both Persian administration and values of Persian rulership. Just as tenth-century Persian dynasts traced descent from the Sasanians, or the mythical kings that were being set down in the Shahnamah, so did these new Turkish and Mongol rulers. And just as the Arabs accommodated Persian ideas, so did the Turks and Mongols, albeit Islamicized. Although the Sasanians were destroyed and defeated militarily, and although Islam gradually supplanted Zoroastrianism, Iran’s political culture and universal rulership persisted and was even reinforced. The Arabs themselves were surprised by the ease of their military conquest of Ctesiphon in 637, then Nihavand in 642, and the subsequent

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collapse of the Sasanian dynasty. The new conquerors accepted the Iranians and Zoroastrianism for what they were, a large non-Arabicspeaking essentially Zoroastrian community. Within four years of the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632, under the leadership of ‘Umar, the second caliph (essentially, successor to the Prophet) (634–644), the Arab armies burst out of Arabia to challenge first Byzantium and then the Sasanians. While the Arabs were initially successful against Byzantium, that advance was halted at Anatolia. Greater Syria and Egypt were conquered and occupied, and their Christian and Jewish populations were accepted as People of the Book, monotheistic peoples to whom God had revealed his will in the form of a book, even though his message had become distorted over time. Therefore People of the Book were not to be persecuted nor need they be converted even though they faced some social restrictions and paid a poll tax. Jews and Christians in the Sasanian empire, too, were recognized as People of the Book. Zoroastrianism, however, presented something of a dilemma, for Islam regarded that faith as dualist, but at the same time Zoroastrian Iranians far outnumbered the new conquerors. Consequently, and on the basis of a tradition attributed to the Prophet himself, Zoroastrians were accommodated as People of the Book. Moreover, the new Arab government accepted existing Sasanian administrative and legal practice. Initially, the Arabs were pragmatic, or even expedient, in absorbing the newly conquered territories and their multiethnic populations, and categorized them on the basis of religion. The peoples of the Middle East also accommodated themselves to the Arabs and to Islam. Conversion to Islam occurred over a long period of time, but was perhaps more accelerated in the former Byzantine provinces, where acculturation took place more quickly with greater Arab settlement there. In addition, those populations essentially became Arabic-speakers from their own Semitic family languages of Coptic or Syriac. Although many Arabs settled in Iran, the Iranians, on the other hand, retained their own language, which is an Indo-European one, although they did adopt Arabic script for writing it. Presumably former Sasanian administrators and legal scholars utilized Arabic as part of the process of retaining their positions. Although Arabic as a language was in a sense rejected, Iranians over a very long period of time incorporated much of its vocabulary, and, as they gradually converted to Islam, they came to use the language of their new religion. A small Zoroastrian population is to be found in Iran today, and of course, the far larger one, the Parsees, in India. The process of conversion is difficult to reconstruct and cannot easily be documented

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and dated. Probably it occurred first among the elites and in urban centers; there were both economic and status advantages to conversion from whatever religion. These general remarks still leave open the question of Iranian adherence to Zoroastrianism in late Sasanian history and its hold over the population. Historians commonly conclude that a rigid, official Zoroastrianism could not survive the demise of the Sasanian empire with which it was so closely linked. This conclusion may spring from the Arab historian, Mas‘udi, who cites Ardashir I for the pronouncement: “Religion and kingship are two brothers, and neither can dispense with the other. Religion is the foundation of kingship, and kingship protects religion. For whatever lacks a foundation must perish, and whatever lacks a protector disappears.”1 Nevertheless, this central idea of the close relationship between religion and kingship, despite kingship becoming anathema in Islamic political theory, was incorporated into medieval Islamic political theory. It could well be that Zoroastrianism was largely the religion of the ruling elites and of residents of cities or of settlements and shrines closely associated with the administrative and religious leaders, and that it had had little appeal for most Iranians. Perhaps the population, in rejecting a Zoroastrian-identified inflexible caste-like system of priests, warriors, scribes, and peasants, rejected Zoroastrianism altogether. Simply, we do not know. One could also surmise that the majority of the population followed local religious practice that contained elements from Zoroastrianism, shamanism, or from whatever other religious traditions of the locality, but this, too, cannot be documented. Well into the eleventh century large numbers of people in Iran had yet to become Muslim, and widely varying heterodox religious practice characterized rural and remote regions of Iran even into the twentieth century. Early Islamic history is commonly periodized as follows: Jahiliyya/age of ignorance, or the period preceding the time of the Prophet Muhammad; 570–632, the lifetime of the Prophet and of God’s final revelation to him in the form of the Qur’an; 632–661, the Rashidun or the rightly-guided caliphs; 661–750, the Umayyad caliphate whose capital was Damascus; and 750–1258, the ‘Abbasid caliphate whose capital was Baghdad. The first Arab expansion occurs during the reign of ‘Umar (634–644), the second caliph, when the armies were quartered in military cantonments adjacent to major administrative cities. Iran, as it had been under the Sasanians, was governed from Iraq, and was called ‘Iraq-i ‘Ajam (non-Iraq or outside, beyond, Iraq), and was divided into provinces. Iran was governed by Arab governors who relied upon the

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indigenous administrators, traditional Sasanian bureaucrats or the dihqans. Such an administration provided essential continuity (especially taxes) necessary for the new government and its military. In that first century of Arab and Islamic rule, Iran, above all, was an identifiable place whose traditional administration continued and whose population continued to be Zoroastrian, Christian, and Jewish. The existing economy of agriculture, pastoral nomadism, and commerce persisted, and the autonomy of groups, peoples, and region continued. Government and its military in the first Islamic century and a half was in the hands of Arab Muslims and reflected the tensions and conflicts within that group, and these tensions emerged quite early and later took on religious implications. The first significant break occurred with the death of the third caliph, ‘Uthman (644–656), and the succession of the fourth, ‘Ali (656–661). The Shi‘a (literally, partisans of ‘Ali) asserted the right of ‘Ali and then his sons, grandsons, etc. to the caliphate on several bases, but essentially descent in his family. Shi‘ism becomes identified with Iran after the sixteenth century, but before then the Shi‘a were predominantly Arab, and constituted a minority as against the Sunni majority. In the mid-eighth century an ‘Alid revolutionary movement emerged in Khurasan which overthrew the Umayyad caliphate in 750 and established the ‘Abbasid caliphate. The ‘Abbasids soon repudiated their Shi‘i supporters, most of whom were Arabs, though some were Iranian Muslims, and patronized the Sunni establishment. Descent in specific families was central for both the Umayyads and for the ‘Abbasids. When the ‘Abbasids established their new capital, Baghdad, in Iraq where their support was located, the Sasanian past came to the fore. Ctesiphon was close by and, along with other Sasanian cities and buildings, it served as the model for the new, circular city and its palaces and other structures. The old Sasanian bureaucratic tradition survived there and certain families, in particular, continued to play their long-established administrative and elite roles. This clerical class brought with them a rich cultural tradition. The ‘Abbasid caliphs patronized this tradition and Baghdad became synonymous with a glittering cosmopolitanism and intellectual and scholarly learning from the Sasanian past and with an openness toward learning regardless of its origins, including classical and Indian culture. In many ways the ‘Abbasid caliph became the great king of kings from the ancient Persian tradition: descent in an Arab dynastic family with links to the Prophet, elaborate court ceremonial and ritual, remote and distant from the population as a whole, and connected to the bureaucracy and the military and through them to the empire as a whole. In

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other ways, however, there were significant differences as a consequence of the Islamic faith. Suffice it to say that in an idealized Islamic context the caliph was neither an autocrat nor were he and his administration the source of law and the tradition. The caliph was the successor to the Prophet Muhammad, but, except possibly in the early period and then largely symbolically, he did not inherit his religious and legal roles. The purpose of the caliphate was to defend and protect the community of believers, the umma, and to provide for the functioning of the Shari‘a, the law, based on the Qur’an, the word of God revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, and the Hadith, the tradition of the sayings and actions of the Prophet and his companions. The development of the Shari‘a, which took place during the ‘Abbasid period, and its interpretation was the prerogative of the ulema (sing. ‘alim), who were trained in the Islamic sciences, theology and jurisprudence; they were primarily legal scholars responsible for the morality of the umma. Both the ulema and Shari‘a constituted the basis for “Right Religion” and was independent of government; however, it was the caliph’s responsibility to protect “Right Religion” and provide for the functioning of Shari‘a. The caliph did not interpret the Shari‘a; he was subordinate to it. The ulema, in addition, were closely linked to education and learning, and in politics their outlook was generally conservative. And this conservative outlook could be reinforced through caliphal patronage and manipulation. The ulema was not a “church” and was not an institution of government, even though judges were selected from its membership. Two institutions, however, that could be directly controlled and manipulated by the caliph were the bureaucracy and the military, and the relationship of the caliph to them was similar to the Sasanian king of kings’ relationship to them. Consequently, in practice, the ‘Abbasid caliph was an autocrat; his power was derived from his symbolic authority and from his military forces. Recent scholarship has convincingly demonstrated that the ‘Abbasid administration was not an exact copy of the Sasanian one, especially in regard to the key office of the vizier, chief minister. Broadly, however, the tradition of bureaucratic families and of administrative differentiation and specialization, hierarchy, and self-interest continued. The caliph’s control of the military was critical when succession disputes arose, or when rebellions broke out. The Khurasanian army that brought the ‘Abbasids to power quickly adopted its own agenda and became a threat. So Caliph al-Mu‘tasim (833–842) made the critical decision to replace the central corps of his army with mamluks, Turkish slaves, who had been either captured as prisoners of war in Central Asia

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or purchased in the slave markets. After their enslavement, the mamluks were converted to Islam and trained in the arts of war. In theory the slave’s loyalty lay with his master, the caliph, but in short order the mamluks were no more reliable than the Khurasanian army had been. Under the very next caliph the mamluks so dominated affairs that the court had to be moved north to Samarra, and then when the new caliph attempted to control them, he was killed. The mamluks deposed, murdered, and replaced caliphs, and became the center of power. Caliphs were deemed to be necessary, if only in their idealized and legitimizing roles. In the first centuries of the caliphate, Iranians played roles in every aspect of government and society, in the ulema, in the bureaucracy, in the military, and in intellectual life. Manicheanism re-emerged in urban centers, especially within the bureaucracy. Iranian scholars and men of letters, however, wrote in Arabic and not in Persian. Nevertheless, something more than resentment against the Iranian literati emerged among Arabs early in the ‘Abbasid era, when they believed their privileged position was threatened. Too much has been made of the nationalist components involved in this movement that had its own name, the shu‘ubiyya. The unity of ‘Abbasid rule began to fragment early in the ninth century – first in North Africa in 800 – during the reign of the most brilliant caliph, Harun al-Rashid (786–809). Following the struggle over succession between his two sons, al-Amin and al-Ma’mun, the Tahirids – the first of several Iranian dynasties that emerge after the Sasanians – established their autonomy in Khurasan in 820; it would last for another 50 years. The Tahirids, themselves from a dihqan family, are illustrative of the kind of roles that the Iranian elite played in the first Islamic centuries. Their first Muslim ancestor had been a client, mawla (pl. mawali) – that is, a client/convert to Islam under the patronage of the Umayyad governor of Sistan. Tahir himself served with distinction under alMa’mun, who, after his victory over his brother, appointed him as governor over ‘Iraq-i ‘Ajam, or the whole of the Iranian plateau. And others of the family held important positions, including the military governorship of Baghdad itself. The Tahirids achieved actual independence just to the south of Khurasan, in Sistan in 861, under the leadership of Yaq‘ub Saffar (coppersmith), self-entitled amir (general or governor or, figuratively, prince). The Saffarids challenged the Tahirids in Khurasan, and Yaq‘ub’s army marched almost to Baghdad before being destroyed in 876. Tahir’s brother and successor, ‘Amr, held onto Khurasan until 900, and the Saffarid family retained its influence in Sistan for another half century.

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The origins of the Saffarids are to be found in an urban context and with an artisanal class rather than the Tahirid rural and dihqan background. The Saffarids rode to power on the religious dissent of the Kharaji, who espoused notions of caliphal rule contrary to both the Sunni and the Shi‘a. Significantly, the Tahirids claimed descent in the Sasanian dynastic family, hence legitimacy to rule, and although their relationship to the ‘Abbasid caliph was ambiguous – their coins were minted in his name – they regarded themselves as independent dynasts based in an Iranian historical tradition. An approximation of the Iranian great king tradition, on a reduced geographic scale but with its historical, political, and cultural consciousness and traditions, re-emerged in Iran with the Samanids, who ended Saffarid control in Khurasan. The Samanids, another dihqan family but from Balkh, had served as governors in Transoxiana. In 875 a member of the next generation was appointed governor of the whole of Transoxiana, the center of the important trans-Asian trade and the outpost against the growing power of the Turks. In 893 his son, the famed Isma‘il b. Ahmad, attacked the Qarluq Turks beyond the Syr Darya, and secured the trade routes and Transoxiana’s well-being. It was through this region that the caliph acquired most of his slaves, thus adding to its fabled wealth and importance. Isma‘il next defeated the Saffarids, and was made governor of Khurasan. Isma‘il thus governed in the name of the caliph over a vast region that extended east from Khurasan to Khvarazm and south to India, a region that gave him authority over many local dynasties and principalities. Isma‘il was even compared with Khusrau I, Anushirvan, but later in the tenth century Samanid fortune and power resulted in divisions within the family, which were exacerbated by the self-serving of landed and military notables, including the Samanids’ own Turkish mamluks. Khurasan was lost to them, and finally Samanid lands were divided between the Qarakhanids and the Ghaznavids (Turkish dynasties from Central Asia) at the end of the century, while the Buyids (another Persian dynastic family) controlled central and western Iran. The Samanid relationship to the ‘Abbasid caliphate, also threatened by their own mamluks, was strengthened by their own and Transoxiana’s commitment to Sunnism. The Samanids played a pivotal role in Iranian history between the Sasanian period and the Safavid period, when earlier elements of Iranian rulership and political culture re-emerged in the sixteenth century in the hands of a Persian dynastic family. These elements included not only continuity in social and political institutions, but also a shift of Iran’s center toward Central Asia. In addition, Samanid rule, administration, and

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roles could well have served as a model for subsequent rulers of Iran and Central Asia, including the Saljuqs, the Ghaznavids, and the Ilkhanids. Most importantly, the stability and wealth of the Samanids allowed them to maintain and patronize a rich cultural life, and it is through patronage that the Samanids left their mark on all subsequent Iranian history as they laid the definitive basis for Iranian identity over and against the Turks of Central Asia and the Arabs to the west. The Samanids were patrons first of the poet Rudaki, whose unfinished Shahnamah was taken up by the great Firdausi (d. 1020), who would complete it under Ghaznavid patronage. Firdausi’s Shahnamah was the first major literary work in what has become known as New Persian; it has provided a standard for literary Persian ever since. The Samanids, in addition, were the patrons of Bal‘ami’s history, which expanded on alTabari’s history – al-Tabari, himself Iranian, wrote in Arabic – and provided much additional information, especially about Iran after the Islamic conquest. Bal‘ami also wrote in New Persian. He also served as an official in the Samanid government. In addition to the great significance of the Shahnamah’s contribution to the Persian language, it also established an Iranian historical and mythical basis for rulership in which two strands of the Iranian tradition – one from Sistan, or the east, the so-called Kayvanian tradition, and the other from the west – were inextricably linked just as history and myth were co-joined in it. This rulership was embedded in the Shahnamah and, despite its tension with Islamic values, profoundly influenced all Iranian political culture well into the twentieth century. And now five hundred years have passed The authority of the Sasanian crown has grown cold Now it is our time for the throne and the crown Authority and the fortunes of victory are ours When we see your face and your fortune Your army and crown and your throne I stretch out my hand toward this Sasanian glory Like a disturbed lion that grows furious.2

Possibly more importantly, Iran became a metaphysical concept – perhaps not for the first time – in Firdausi’s Shahnamah, an enduring touchstone for conceptualizing all aspects of Iranian history, culture, and society, even by those who themselves were not Iranian or Persian-speaking. Finally, the Shahnamah provided continuity with the past, for, although he re-created a mythical past, that past took on historical reality for those who read, or more likely heard, Firdausi’s words.

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One of the Shahnamah’s important themes is the conflict between Iran and Turan, or the Turkish world of Central Asia. While the context for this theme is as much the contemporary tenth-century Samanid world as the historical past, it also anticipates the great Turkish impact that began with the Saljuqs and has persisted into the modern era. The predecessors to the Saljuqs were the Turkish Ghaznavids, two of whose leaders had been mamluk generals for the Samanids. Mahmud of Ghazni (998–1030), the son of one of those generals, can be seen as something of a Samanid successor. He ruled over much of the former Samanid territory from eastern Iran to the Aral Sea and south to India and adopted their administrative practice. From his base in Afghanistan, Mahmud mounted numerous campaigns into India ostensibly in the name of Islam, but more likely for gold and slaves. Mahmud and then his son and successor, Ma‘sud (1030–1041), were both important patrons of culture. Firdausi’s Shahnamah was completed for Mahmud, who – if tradition is correct – viewed this great epic with indifference. Another great historical work, that of Bayhaqi, was written in Persian under Ghaznavid patronage. Despite the loss of major portions of it, it is of immense historical and literary significance. In 1040 the Saljuqs defeated Mas‘ud’s Ghaznavid army and Khurasan was lost to the Saljuqs; however, the Ghaznavids maintained a hold over eastern Afghanistan and parts of north India for many more years. The Buyids were the rival power to the west of both the Samanids and the Ghaznavids. The Buyids, or sometimes Buwayhids, were an Iranian family with roots in Daylam. This is the Caspian Sea’s southwestern coastal and mountainous region rife with tribal, ethnic, and religious dissension and divisions. The Buyids were but one of several dynasties from that region of the greater Caspian littoral, but the most important for both Islamic and Iranian history. The Buyids were Shi‘a, whether Zaiydi or Ithna ‘Ashari/Twelver is not clear but more than likely the latter. Significantly, the Buyids patronized the Shi‘i ulema, and, ironically, it was the Shi‘i Buyids who propped up the declining ‘Abbasid and Sunni caliphate for some additional 110 years. The Buyids got their start in the armies of Mardavij, the founder of a Sunni Ziyarid dynasty – yet another Daylami dynasty. About the mid-tenth century the three Buyid brothers – Ahmad, ‘Ali, and Hasan – controlled Fars and central and western Iran, and in 945 Ahmad took control of Baghdad and the caliphate. Between 949 and 983 his son, ‘Adud al-Daulah, combined all Buyid territory – Iraq, southern Iran, and, across the Gulf, Oman – under his power. The Buyids, save for ‘Adud al-Dawlah, were usually divided, and such fractiousness allowed the

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Ghaznavids to make inroads against them in central and western Iran. Significantly for Iranian history, the Buyids harkened back directly to the great pre-Islamic past. Rukn al-Daulah, son of ‘Ali, had a medal struck using Pahlavi for the inscription, “May the glory of the shahanshah increase.” ‘Adud al-Daulah, his cousin, used that same inscription on his own coins. Moreover, a genealogy linking the Buyids with the Sasanians was drawn up. There was Ziyarid precedence for this Sasanian revival, for Mardavij, the Buyids’ original patron, was shown seated on a throne and wearing a Sasanian-style crown; in addition, he had celebrated the Iranian No Ruz/New Year festival, as would the Buyids. Despite Buyid representation as being Shi‘a and as something of Sasanian successors, they seem not to have concerned themselves with supplanting the Sunni ‘Abbasid caliphate, and even defended it against the Fatimids – Isma‘ili Shi‘a – of Egypt. The Saljuqs, however, would play their Sunni card, when they claimed, in 1055, that in defeating the Buyids they were releasing the caliph from Shi‘i hegemony. The Saljuqs inaugurated a new phase in Iranian, indeed, in Middle Eastern, history. Although Turks had confronted the Sasanians in Central Asia and had entered the military service of the ‘Abbasids and local dynasties, such as the Samanids, the arrival of the Saljuqs signaled the immigration of Turks with family and flocks in and across Iran into the whole of the Middle East. Their numbers would be greatly augmented in subsequent centuries. From this point on, the Turks would come to constitute the third most dominant linguistic/ethnic group in the Middle East, along with the Arabs and Iranians. After 1071 and the Turkish victory over the Byzantines at Manzikert, Anatolia would ultimately become Turkish, but the battle of Manzikert would also inaugurate the Crusades that would weaken Byzantium further. The arrival of the Saljuqs was fortuitous for Sunni Islam and the caliphate, for the Saljuqs reinvigorated both with their own political, military, and cultural patronage of Sunni Islam and the development of critical institutions. Significantly, too, the Isma‘ili/Sevener Shi‘a potential for domination over the ‘Abbasids would be thwarted by the Saljuqs. Somewhat ironically, through Saljuq patronage and administration – again, the Samanid model – the Persian language and culture of Iran would be extended across Anatolia, India and Central Asia. Consequently, Saljuq political culture not only reinforced Iranian political culture, but also added to it. Turks would play a dominant role in Iran’s history down to the present time. Turkish history is characterized by a plethora of family, tribal, and geographic names complicated by steppe political culture. In the

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Figure 5.2 Stucco mihrab (niche that indicates the direction of prayer) and inscription commemorating the conversion of Oljeitu Ilkhan (1306–1316) to Shi’ism, dated July 1310 (photograph by author)

Sasanian period, with far fewer sources, there is more uncertainty in identifying the peoples of Central Asia, in particular the Turks. The eastern limit of Transoxiana, the Amu Darya, or the Jaxartes river, marked the limits of the Sasanian empire and that of the ‘Abbasid caliphate. It was in this region in the mid-tenth century that the Saljuqs – pastoral nomads of the Ghuzz or Oghuz confederation and named for an eponymous ancestor – were converted to Islam and began to move west. Presumably, they had been shamanistic and shared in a popular Central Asian culture, including the calendar based on a 12-year cycle, each year identified by a different animal. Presumably, too, they had been converted to Islam by Sufis, Muslim mystics, who have historically been

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key missionaries in Central Asia and elsewhere. Sufis were commonly found in the military and among merchants in the borderlands and along trade routes. Sufis generally had begun to organize themselves into orders, and each had its own leader and characteristic initiation and rituals. Often, the Sufis incorporated indigenous religious practice and ideas, which made them suspect in the eyes of the more legalistic and urban-centered ulema. Steppe political culture had long interacted with Iran’s political culture, even predating the Achaemenians; indeed, they share key elements that include interaction of cities, agriculture, pastoral nomadism, and trade; rulership; and social and political organization, including hunting and warfare. Historians of Central Asia emphasize the patrimonial nature of Saljuq and subsequent Turkic rulers and dynasties which divide sovereignty and territory on the basis of family membership and descent. Patrimonial attitudes and administration can also be seen among the Buyids and Samanids and even earlier in the Achaemenians: differences were probably in degree rather than kind. The Saljuqs were drawn westward through military service as mercenaries with the Samanids, then with the Qarakhanids – the Turkish dynasty that rivaled the Samanids and then established itself in Transoxiana after them – and finally with the Ghaznavids, their successors. After the death of Mahmud of Ghazni in 1030, the Saljuqs took over Khurasan and then Nishapur under the leadership of two brothers, Toghril Beg and Chaghri Beg, and in 1040 they decisively defeated the Ghaznavids. Saljuq military success continued against the Buyids. In 1055 Baghdad and the caliph were freed from Buyid hegemony when Toghril entered Baghdad in Sunni triumph. The caliph invested him with the title of sultan, and in 1058 with the title of “King of the east and west,” which recalls ancient Mesopotamian titles. While the theoretical case is made that in Islam there is no separation between religion and affairs of state and that in the caliphate there is no distinction between spiritual and secular roles, the sultan in practice assumed the secular role in providing military and administrative leadership. Essentially, the title of sultan was used after this to legitimize rulers who had seized power through military force. After the Mongols killed the last caliph in 1258, and ended the caliphate, the title would be used by those who held de facto power. Toghril and Chaghri were co-rulers until the latter died in 1060, which raised the issues of succession and the relation of rulership to territory. Toghril died three years later, when succession passed to Chaghri’s eldest son, Alp Arslan – Toghril had no sons. Alp Arslan had a claim based on

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seniority, but he also had the most powerful political base in Khurasan. In 1072 Alp Arslan was succeeded by his son, Malikshah (1072–1092). By the early twelfth century the Saljuq empire was effectively divided within the family on a geographic basis. While the idea of dynastic rule and succession, generally from father to son, was an ancient one, historians often cite the Saljuqs as the beginning of rule as a family patrimony, a system with Central Asian steppe origins. As family patrimony, the realm was to be divided up within it, and the strongest and best suited would be chosen as the paramount ruler – again, a practice seen in earlier Iranian history. The Saljuqs were not separated from a tribal past and lacked a tradition of rule over a complex empire. These empires of the Turkic Saljuqs, Ilkhanids (successors in Iran to the Mongols), Timurids, and others are vital to Iran’s history for, like the Arabs, they relied on Persian bureaucratic tradition and became transmitters of Iranian culture. And like others in the Iranian tradition of rulership, to forestall weak and unstable government, the ruler necessarily had to transfer his power base from himself and his family and tribal confederation, in which family and tribal identity and loyalty were paramount, to institutions – the military and the bureaucracy. These central institutions, especially the military, necessarily had to be linked to the ruler himself or family members to whom he delegated his authority. Internecine challenges were the norm, especially on the occasion of the ruler’s death. These characteristics reinforced regional autonomy and government in the absence of a strong ruler. Alp Arslan’s great success, the defeat and capture of the Byzantine emperor, Romanus Diogenes, and his army at Manzikert in 1071, opened up Anatolia to the Turkic tribes for settlement and the Byzantine empire for Islamic conquest. Stability of government and control was central for Alp Arslan and his son, and to the man who was great vizier to both of them, Nizam al-Mulk, who represented that earlier Iranian tradition of rule. He, with Saljuq support, institutionalized the military and bureaucracy on the basis of that earlier tradition of Iranian rule and political culture. Essentially, Nizam al-Mulk Iranicized government by adapting the government practice of the Ghaznavids, the Samanids, the ‘Abbasids, and the Sasanians. Nizam al-Mulk, in his famed Siyasatnamah (The book of government), written between 1086 and 1091, sets out in the first half of this treatise to establish the bases for good government. In the second part, there is a shift in tone to criticism over the neglect of his advice. Not unexpectedly, there is major emphasis upon right religion as a pillar of government and the dire consequences of heterodoxy. Topics are

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diverse: the relationship between God’s will and the ruler; assigning land and collecting taxes; spies and pages; wine and boon companions; judges and government officials; and “the arrangements for setting a good table.” Nizam al-Mulk was especially concerned about the relationship of justice to security and good administration – reminiscent of the socalled circle of equity of the Sasanians. Nizam al-Mulk re-established a distinction between order and disorder, between urban and tribal culture: a tribal leader to succeed as a ruler had to be remade in the image of Iran’s historical tradition of rule and autonomy of administration. What is perhaps surprising is Nizam al-Mulk’s emphasis on Khusrau I, Anushrivan (Nushirvan in the Siyasatnamah), as the model just ruler rather than a Muslim one. At the same time it was Mazdakism, or related Muslim sects, that threatened good government. The Siyasatnamah had numerous antecedents in an earlier traditional Persian genre of “mirrors for princes,” or manuals to educate princes in the tradition of good government. There is, however, no direct evidence for historical links between the Siyasatnamah and Nizam al-Mulk’s actual administrative practice, or for links with the Sasanians, references in the Siyasatnamah aside, or even the Samanids. Central to the role of the ruler, including the Saljuq sultanate, was the maintenance of justice. In the case of Islamic law, justice was meted out by judges, qadis, and based on Shari‘a, which was in turn derived from Qur’an, the Hadith or sayings of the Prophet, and from the traditions of interpretation. And the sine qua non for the Islamic ruler was to defend the Islamic community and to allow Islamic law to function. Here Nizam al-Mulk played another role in strengthening Islam and in combating heresy – and in strengthening his sultans’ Islamic legitimacy – and that is in founding the madrasah, a seminary or institution of higher learning, to inculcate Sunni teachings. Similarly, Saljuq patronage of learning – yet another aspect of that Iranian tradition of rule – included support for such important figures as the great philosopher, al-Ghazali (d. 1111). The Saljuq ruler, echoing especially their tribal-leadership background, sat over his own court of judgment, in which his decisions were based on tradition, or customary law, ‘urf. But to exercise authority the ruler also had to have power, which derived from the military support he could command. The ruler’s own qualifications and military abilities and skills, coupled with political acumen, were the starting points toward achieving and maintaining power. Malikshah succeeded Alp Arslan, his father, but only after he had defeated his uncle, who had been governor of Kirman. Internecine chal-

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lenge, along with Alp Arslan’s problem with his tribally based military, spurred on centralization and military reform. Traditionally, tribal levies were motivated in battle out of personal and tribal loyalty to their leaders and by the likely reward of booty. Both of these motivations were contingent on freedom of action or being able to take the opportunity to loot. The transformation from tribal levies to an army, from booty to state maintenance, was achieved by adoption of the iqta‘, an assignment of land, or its usufruct, in return for government service. While long associated with the Saljuqs, the iqta‘, or variations of it, predated them. There were several forms of iqta‘, but the two most important were grants of land or its income to a military tribal leader in place of salary and in return for specific military duties, and as a grant in return for bureaucratic services. Other versions were awarded to individuals and to members of the Saljuq family. The ruler had no obligations to the iqta‘ holder and the iqta‘ reflected the notion that all authority resided with the ruler. Immediately following Malikshah’s death, and also under weak rulers, iqta‘ holders treated them as their own property by refusing to carry out the stipulated responsibilities or by bequeathing them to descendants. For the iqta‘ to function, government had to be strong otherwise it could be subverted by grantees. Despite the frequency with which the nature of iqta‘ was violated, they continued to be awarded – perhaps, with a different nomenclature such as tuyul or suyurghal and sometimes with different purpose – until the early twentieth century. Iqta‘s, too, gave tribal leaders access to the ruler, a critical aspect of successful tribal leadership. Access to the ruler and his power and authority through the iqta‘ established something of a reciprocal relationship despite the technicality that such grants were given only through the ruler’s arbitrary grace. The ruler demonstrated his power by commanding someone’s presence, or even by keeping hostages, and tribal leaders could use such access to their own advantage with their own followers. The Saljuqs and their successors had to deal with two problems significant for tribal leadership: their personal qualities of leadership, including direct contact with their tribal followers, and their Central Asian base with its numerous tribal groups whose own leaders were always potential rivals. Success in battle and the hunt, marriages, appointments and awards, booty, and pastures were expressions of such leadership. Tribal challenges could be met with force or diverted to other goals, and they could be subverted by appeal to loyalty, religion, or ideology. Tribal threat could also be diminished by maintaining

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capitals away from borders, or by maintaining them in regions of strength, and by moving the court among them. Saljuq capitals tracked west with their success from Nishapur to Rayy and then to Isfahan, but later back even to eastern Khurasan, to Marv. Saljuq power was fragmented, and the Saljuqs of Rum in Anatolia, who survived until the early fourteenth century, would long outlast the so-called Great Saljuqs of Iran. The ruler’s personal relationship with his vizier and bureaucracy, who were responsible for good administration, stability, and income, was crucial. The bureaucracy, divan, balanced off the military and tribal leaders and the sultan’s family within the court, but in that role the bureaucrats were subject to and victims of court politics and intrigue. Typically, too, administration was in the hands of families, who trained the next generation in the necessary skills for the bureaucracy to function. The effective vizier who could maintain the sultan’s support was rare, as the case of Nizam al-Mulk emphasizes. Little wonder that Nizam al-Mulk stressed the importance of the just ruler. In the end, despite Nizam al-Mulk’s attempt to institutionalize rule, what mattered was the person and personality of the Saljuq ruler, the power he could exercise, and his ability to maintain authority in a political culture in which there were so many challenges to power and authority. Shortly after Nizam al-Mulk was assassinated by a member of the Isma‘ili Nizari sect – known to us as the Assassins – Malikshah died and the Saljuq empire became increasingly fragmented, especially in the west. “Centralization” and stability were built on such a tenuous basis. Rather than consider Saljuq rule as a family patrimony to be shared, it is better to view Saljuq rule as the balance of power within the family to resist concentration of power in the hands of any one member of the family. In other words, the Saljuqs, like the Buyids before them and the other steppe dynasties after them, maintained personal rule at the expense of institutionalization of rule. Malikshah was succeeded by two sons, then a grandson, and yet another son. Finally his last son, Sanjar (1118–1157), was recognized as Great Saljuq sultan, the descent line traced back to Chaghri Beg. Shortly after his father’s death Sanjar had been appointed governor of Khurasan, and when he was recognized as sultan his realm consisted of Khurasan, the center of his power, and Iran; he left the western part of the Saljuq realm to squabbling relatives to concern himself with that old problem of Turkic challenges to his east in Central Asia. Saljuq fragmentation allowed the ‘Abbasid caliphate to reassert its political and military power. Even under Shi‘i Buyid domination – and

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then the Saljuqs – the caliphate had been retained because of its symbolic importance in legitimizing a sultan’s authority even in the absence of effective caliphal power. Even caliphal authority was in question, however, for a competing Isma‘ili caliphate had emerged in Fatimid Egypt in 969 to threaten Baghdad. Again, Islamic sectarian divisions centered on the issue of the rightful leadership of the umma. The first fracture between the Sunni and the Shi‘a in the mid-seventh century was broadened when the Shi‘a underwent further division of the Fivers/Zaidi, the Seveners/Isma‘ili, and the Twelvers/Ithna ‘Ashari. The number in each case refers to differences over the rightful claimant to the imamate, the imam being the authoritative interpreter of the Shi‘i tradition. For the Isma‘ili – the Fatimids – the imam must be present and living in the community. At the very end of the eleventh century a dispute over succession to the Fatimid caliphate between two brothers split the Isma‘ilis. Their Nizari branch holds significance for Iranian history. Hasan-i Sabah, an Iranian dai, or Isma‘ili missionary, had taken over the mountain fortress of Alamut near Qazvin – just to the south of Daylam – in 1090. In 1094, when a succession dispute erupted with the death of the Fatimid caliph, the Iranian Isma‘ili acknowledged the caliph’s eldest and designated son, Nizar, as the lawful successor. His younger brother, with the support of the Fatimid vizier, acquired the throne, and in 1095 Nizar died. Hasan-i Sabah and his immediate successors claimed to be representatives of Nizar’s infant son, said to have been smuggled out of Egypt to Iran, but then after 1162 the Grand Master of Alamut claimed to be the spiritual successor to the Nizari line of imams. From Alamut the Nizaris spread to other remote areas, including Syria. Nizari power was not based on territory, but on the terror they struck among Sunni and Crusader leaders, for they adopted assassination – hence, their other name, the Assassins – as a tactic in a larger strategy to subvert their enemies. In addition to their assassination of Nizam al-Mulk, they are supposed to have killed one caliph and one Crusader king. In the thirteenth century the Grand Master proclaimed himself to be Sunni, and allied the Isma‘ili with the ‘Abbasid caliph against the Central Asian Khvarazm-Shahs. In 1256 Hulegu Khan captured Alamut in the name of the Mongols and its last Grand Master was killed the following year. (Isma‘ili continued to live in Iran until the midnineteenth century when they emigrated to India.) The territorial successors to the Great Saljuqs were the KhvarazmShahs, but not until after Sanjar’s defeat by the Qara Khitai, the descendants of the ruling Liao dynasty of northern China. (The Liao dynasty of the Khitan people was overthrown in 1125 by what became known

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as the Chin dynasty of China.) The Qara Khitai moved west from China – and may have been a factor in pushing the Ghuzz further west – to occupy Muslim Transoxiana. Sanjar, both to defend his interests there and to maintain his credentials as a Muslim ruler, confronted the Qara Khitai near Samarqand, where he was defeated in 1141. The Khvarazm-Shah acceded to Qara Khitai control of Transoxiana until the early thirteenth century, when they occupied it. The Qara Khitai were important for the subsequent Mongol period. Their rule combined Chinese, that is, bureaucratic, and steppe practice in administration and in armed conflict. Chinese was the dominant language, but their administration also used Persian and Uighur. Chinese-style infantry and siege tactics were supplemented by cavalry and mounted bowmen – the Khitans were originally a steppe people. The military were organized on a decimal basis, a system that would be followed by Chingiz Khan. Khvarazm was located where the Oxus entered the Aral Sea, and it was a well-watered rich agricultural region. Furthermore, it was surrounded by steppe or desert, and its isolation allowed for the persistence of a rich Iranian culture that was not Islamicized until the ninth century. Its location was also important for trade across Central Asia and into southern Russia and Siberia. A tenth-century Khvarazm dynasty, the Ma’munids, were the great patrons of Islamic culture, especially of the great philosopher, Ibn-i Sina (Avicenna). Mahmud of Ghazna had taken control of Khvarazm in 1017, and in 1041 it passed to the Saljuqs. Malikshah appointed one of his Turkish slaves as governor of Khvarazm, giving him the province as his iqta‘. That governorship and the iqta‘ became hereditary in that slave’s family, who became known as the Khvarazm-Shahs. After first subjecting themselves to the Qara Khitai, they acquired increasing autonomy, and by the early thirteenth century they had displaced the Saljuqs in all of Iran and as far as Anatolia and had forced the Ghurids into India. Control over this vast empire was short-lived in face of the first Mongol attack in 1220. Also, there had been significant internal uncertainty under the penultimate KhvarazmShah concerning the loyalty of the army and antagonism with his religious policy. The dynasty came to an end, although the title survived into the fifteenth century, and this Iranian enclave was assimilated into an increasingly Turkish Central Asia. The Mongols’ extraordinary success in forging an empire across Asia and Europe, the likes of which had not and has not been seen since, can be attributed to Chingiz Khan’s mastery of steppe political culture. Iran, with its fragmentation among competing dynasties, along with Eurasia,

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was quite unprepared for the speed, scale of destruction, and the longterm consequences of the Mongol onslaught. Chingiz Khan’s early background was relatively modest. We have two invaluable Mongol sources documenting his rise to power, The Secret History of the Mongols and the Altan Debter (Golden book), and two important Persian chronicles, Juvaini’s The History of the World Conqueror and Jami al-Tavarikh, written by Rashid al-Din, who became an important Mongol vizier. The Secret History of the Mongols has survived in Mongolian, but in Chinese script, and the Altan Debter has survived in Chinese, and indirectly in Persian. Its use was restricted to the court and to the eyes of the Mongol rulers, but Rashid al-Din utilized it for his history. Mongol origins are obscure, but the Mongols appeared in eastern Mongolia when the Khitan Liao dynasty ruled in Mongolia and north China in the tenth to twelfth centuries. After the Liao dynasty was overthrown by the Chin – and then moved westward where they became known as the Qara Khitai – the Mongols began to assert their power. Mongol strength was derived from their social organization so well suited to the steppes, that vast grassland that extended from China well into eastern Europe. Steppe economy was pastoral and based largely on sheep and horses, and society was nomadic, moving cyclically following the seasons in search of pastures for their flocks, and organized on that basis. Their organization needed to be flexible for defense, for movement in migration, and for raiding, and to take into account the varying numbers of individuals and groups in collective action. At one level it could involve only the family or extended family and at another a number of tribes, or even confederations. The early Mongols interacted with China to obtain metal, especially for weapons, and luxury items. Some of this interaction was by trade and some by raiding. Raiding China required co-ordination and political and military skill, as did defense from enemies and rivals. Even hunting helped hone Mongol political and military organization. Other nomadic groups, or China itself, sought to manipulate and influence federation building in Central Asia to their own advantage by giving support to elite steppe families in their competition for leadership, or by undercutting concentration of power. Leaders with demonstrated political and military skills were a special threat because of two mechanisms for federation building: the anda and the noker relationships. The anda was a “sworn brother,” and the noker was an attendant, or follower and partisan, who forswore his own tribal affiliation for that of his leader. Com-

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parable relationships were found in other tribal traditions with a basis in kinship, and both the anda and the noker allowed for an allegiance even when there was no kin basis yet in kin terms and structures. An additional factor in Mongol success was the cumulative effect of military success with booty and access to leadership with great power, which attracted those who had no kin or affiliated relationships. On all these bases, Chingiz became the brilliant, possibly even charismatic, leader and world conqueror. Temuchin – Chingiz’ given name when he was born about 1167 – started out with the odds against him. His father, Yesugei, a tribal/federation leader but not of sufficient rank to be called a khan, was murdered when Chingiz was still a young boy. He must have shown his leadership ability early and acquired nokers. Moreover, one of his father’s anda, now an important Mongol khan, gave him his support. In 1206, by which time Temuchin had created his great confederation, a quriltai, assembly of notables, declared him their ruler: the basis for his administration and rule were established. By the time he was about 40, Temuchin had united all the Mongol and Turkish tribes of the eastern steppes and commanded them as a military force. By then he also had acquired the two titles that have significant rulership implications and by which he has subsequently been known: “Chingiz” and “Khan,” meaning the universal, all-encompassing leader. Chingiz’ government was military, mobile, and dependent upon him. Men from tribes that had provided early support to Chingiz Khan formed their own military components, while the others were organized as new ones. The key military unit consisted of his own imperial guard of 10,000 that immediately recalls Achaemenian precedent. The imperial guard’s leaders also served as his first administrators, and the most important positions were filled by Chingiz Khan’s closest and most loyal associates. The Mongol army was organized on a decimal basis of 1,000 and then 10,000 men – a tumen. Specialists disagree as to its size and whether or not tumens were maintained at full strength; nevertheless, regardless of its actual size – one chronicler cites 800,000 men – the Mongol army was formidable in its number and ability, speed of movement, agility in its maneuvers, and the brilliance of its tactics, strategy, and leadership. The Mongols fused the bowman to his horse, and each cavalryman traveled with up to four or five horses, which helps to account for the speed and effectiveness of Mongol might. And the Mongol army willingly utilized Chinese and Iranian siege technology against cities. Despite the fact that Mongol forces were motivated by booty and, in effect, lived off the land and pastured their horses on avail-

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able grazing land during an offensive, logistical support for a military undertaking that stretched across Asia and Europe represented a formidable task. The resources necessary for such military operations and the maintenance of the empire help explain the Mongol extractive attitude toward conquered areas and peoples – what was not destroyed was carried off. Initially, Chingiz Khan relied on Uighurs and Khitans for his bureaucrats, and then his Mongol successors utilized Uighurs and Iranians. In newly conquered areas, existing administration essentially continued. In other words, the Mongols relied on professional bureaucrats; while professional experience, along with loyalty, were essential, the tribal link was not. Chingiz Khan and his forces struck first in northwest and north China, whose wealth and political condition was familiar to the Mongols. The Chin northern capital fell in 1215. Chingiz diverted a small force toward Central Asia, and the Qara Khitai empire was seized. This brought the Mongols face to face with the Khvarazm-Shah, and, save for a diplomatic slight on Chingiz’ part and a Khvarazm-Shah diplomatic provocation, the Mongols may not have proceeded any farther west. Chingiz had sent a letter proffering peace to the Khvarazm-Shah, but referred to their shah as his son, which placed him in a subordinate relationship to Chingiz’ universal rulership. The Mongol attack was instigated by the Khvarazm-Shah’s execution of one of the Mongol ambassadors. In 1219 the Mongols attacked Transoxiana, the Khvarazm-Shah army collapsed, and the shah fled to the Caspian Sea, where he died. Khurasan was next in the Mongols’ path, and here they utilized terror as a strategy. Khurasan was laid waste under the command of Tolui, the youngest of Chingiz Khan’s four sons, and whole cities were leveled and the countryside was devastated. In the future, only peaceful submission would spare such overwhelming destruction. About this time, 1223, Chingiz Khan returned to Mongolia and focused his attentions once again on China. He died in 1227. Chingiz Khan’s conquests provided his four sons with a basis for continued expansion and rule. Descent in the Chingizid family became the necessary criterion for rule, and Chingizid rulership and military and administrative institutions were the models to be followed. The initial Mongol impact on Iran was experienced in Khurasan and in the east, but a quarter of a century later all of Iran would experience Mongol conquest and devastation under the leadership of Hulegu, Chingiz Khan’s grandson and the son of Tolui. In the intervening period the Khvarazm-Shah made something of a recovery. Northern Iran was

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under nominal Mongol control, and because of its pastureland was used as a staging ground for attacks against the Saljuqs of Rum (Anatolia), who were defeated in 1243. Hulegu’s invasions inaugurated significant change in Iran’s status, and his story begins with decisions made at the time of Chingiz’ death. Before Chingiz Khan’s death he had selected his third son, Ogedei (1229–1241), as his successor as Great Khan. Chingiz’ other sons were apportioned territories in the Mongol empire. Tolui, the youngest, received the Mongol home region of Mongolia, according to Mongol custom, and Jochi, the eldest, received the remotest region, southern Russia. Jochi died immediately after his father, and his share was then inherited by his son, Batu, the progenitor of the Golden Horde. Chaghatai, the second son, from whom the Chaghatai Khans trace their descent, and Ogedei were awarded Central Asia. While Tolui (d. 1233) was never elected Great Khan, his first and second sons, Mongke (1251–1259) and Qubilai (1260–1294), were – after Ogedei’s son Guyuk (1246–1248). Qubilai was the Mongol who conquered south China, ruled over a reunited China, and became the progenitor of the Yuan dynasty. And it was under Tolui’s third son, Hulegu, that the Mongols played their most important role in Iran, and through him the Ilkhans trace their descent. Hulegu’s goal was to vanquish the Assassins and the ‘Abbasids; it is not clear whether he purposely sought to found his own dynasty to rule over Iran. In 1256 the Assassins were effectively eliminated. The Mongol army continued west and laid siege to Baghdad, after the caliph refused to capitulate. The city fell in 1258 with great carnage, the last caliph was executed, and the ‘Abbasid caliphate was ended, although remnants of the family purportedly fled to Egypt. There, the idea of ‘Abbasid dynastic legitimacy would persist to be revived by the Ottomans in the early sixteenth century when they conquered Egypt. Hulegu proceeded into Syria and then into Palestine, where the Mongol advance into the Middle East finally halted. In Egypt the Mamluk sultanate had established itself. The Mamluks were the slave praetorian guard to the Ayyubid dynasty which they overthrew, and it was the new Mamluk sultan that faced down and defeated the Mongol army at the battle of ‘Ayn Jalut and established Mamluk hegemony over Syria. Two other factors figure in Hulegu’s decision to withdraw his forces to Azerbaijan. One was the death of Mongke in China in 1259 that necessitated a quriltai and the presence of leading family members to elect a new Great Khan. The other factor was the intensifi-

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cation of family rivalry for control of Azerbaijan’s rich pasturelands and the adjacent regions. What dynastic unity there had been, collapsed about 1261. Berke, who was brother of Batu and son of Jochi and now khan of the Golden Horde, sided with the Mamluks against Hulegu. Berke had converted to Islam, and the Golden Horde region of southern Russia was an important and continuing source of slaves for the Mamluks. It was from Azerbaijan – first from Maragha – that Hulegu established his and Ilkhanid rule over Iran, Iraq, the Caucasus, and parts of Anatolia. And it was in the Caucasus and in northeastern Iran that the Ilkhans came into conflict with their kinsmen, the Golden Horde, as well as the Chaghatai Khan. In theory, the Ilkhans assumed the title of ilkhan, tribal leader, and ruled this vast region as subordinates to the Great Khan, who for much of this period was Qubilai Khan. His death in 1296, and then Ghazan’s conversion to Islam about 1295, weakened the Ilkhans’ link with the Great Khan and the Mongol tradition. Hulegu died in 1265 and was succeeded by his son Abaqa (1265–1282) and then another son, Teguder Ahmad (1282–1284). The fourth and fifth ilkhans were Abaqa’s two sons, Arghun (1284–1291) and Geikhatu (1291–1295), followed by Arghun’s two sons, Ghazan (1295–1304) and Oljeitu (1304–1316), and the latter’s son Abu Sa‘id (1316–1335). The first principle of succession here was descent within the family. Whether succession was determined by seniority within the extended family or from father to son was not fully resolved and must have been a major source of family tension. To state that the Ilkhans followed principles of succession is perhaps too generous. Of the five ilkhans between Hulegu and Ghazan, three of them were overthrown and executed by rival claimants from within the family. Of the other two, one died from alcoholism and the other from self-administered poison. The lives of their viziers were equally precarious and short. One Mongol notable, Buqa, served as Argun’s vizier for several years as a reward for supporting him and unseating Teguder, but such viziers were to be avoided given that they had a potential power base independent from the Ilkhan. While military control was the ilkhan’s primary purpose, the vizier’s was to provide the resources for the army and the court, and Mongol/Ilkhanid administration was possibly even more destructive of Iran’s economy than their conquest had been. The peasantry bore the brunt of agricultural and poll taxes, which resulted in rural depopulation. The economy further deteriorated during the early 1290s in the

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reign of Geikhatu, whose minister hit upon the expediency of paper currency, a practice that had been used in China. Metal currency would be exchanged for paper, which would then be used for all economic transactions. Paper money was quickly abandoned in the face of a commercial collapse. Hulegu aside, the next five ilkhans were hardly effective military leaders. The Mamluk–Golden Horde alliance continued to repulse successive Ilkhanid advances into Syria. In addition to political and military advantages in gaining control of Syria, the Ilkhans may have used the Syrian campaigns to support their forces with booty and to preoccupy them in order to reduce the possibility of internal challenges. To offset persistent Golden Horde hostility, the Ilkhans maintained lasting ties with Qubilai Khan. From Hulegu on, the Ilkhans sought Qubilai Khan’s recognition and consent in the succession process. Moreover, he maintained an ambassador at the Ilkhans’ court. The Ilkhan–China link was important for both as they faced common Chingizid enemies in Central Asia. The Ilkhans also sought allies in the Christian west against the Mamluks, but with little result. Most remarkably, the Ilkhans used Nestorian Christians as ambassadors – a traditional role for them in the steppes – to Europe. Vitally important for links with the Mediterranean world and the Far East was trade. Iran played a central role in its transmission and production, as it had in earlier periods of history. The rich cultural life of the ‘Abbasids and the period of political fragmentation when provincial centers mirrored Baghdad had stimulated extraordinary production of textiles, especially silks, ceramics, glass, and wood and metal objects. This production was prized beyond the Islamic world and, given its beauty, high quality, and portability, was highly desirable for luxury trade. These objects were often utilitarian, in addition to their aesthetic desirability, and of higher quality than materials produced in Europe. Moreover, their decorative qualities were typically abstract and cut across cultural divisions, but at the same time were foreign and prized for their rarity. Production and trade were built on labor and materials and contributed greatly to the general economy of the production centers. Finally, just as philosophy shared a common vocabulary that was cosmopolitan in nature and shared in a Mediterranean culture that was open to other cultures, so too was this material cultural production. Europe’s appetite for such costly and status-enhancing objects was whetted by the returning Crusaders. European demand for Middle East luxury goods paralleled its growing wealth after the Crusades, particularly in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Trade also stimulated the

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exchange of ideas and technology, diplomatic ties, and, ultimately, exploration itself, which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries resulted in even greater globalization and impact on Iran. Despite European hopes that the Ilkhans would become Christians as well as partners, traditional Central Asian shamanism prevailed among them. Rule over a vast multi-ethnic population once again produced the expedient response – a general acceptance of existing religious practice. The Ilkhan court, like earlier Mongol ones, included Christians, Muslims, and Buddhists, but the ilkhans remained uncommitted to any of these religions with some exceptions. Ilkhan Teguder himself converted to Islam and took the name of Ahmad, but without any impact on the Mongols. Arghun espoused Buddhism, adopted policies favorable to Christians, and a Jew served as his vizier, but again without lasting effect. Ghazan came to the throne in 1295 as a Muslim, and his Mongol leaders followed in his stead. Christians and Jews reverted to traditional protected status under Islamic law as dhimmi, People of the Book, and once again paid a head-tax, jizya. Buddhists were given the choice between conversion and expulsion, and their temples were destroyed. The reasons and circumstances of Ghazan’s conversion are unknown; however, it would fit with his general policy of Mongol accommodation to Iranians and Iranian culture. For the next several centuries Mongol, Timurid, and Turkish rulers favored Sufi shaikhs, or leaders, and Sufism rather than the ulema and their Shari‘a, or urban-based Islam. Sufism is characteristically eclectic and more accepting of popular religion and practice. Sufi ritual and leadership centered on shaikhs, who often commanded great followings. In some cases, their charismatic power and grace and ability to work miracles continued even after death. It was probably for all these reasons that the Mongols and Turks were drawn to Sufism, and they could well have seen parallels between the shaikhs and the shamans from their own steppe backgrounds. As a Muslim ruler, Ghazan should not have waged war against his fellow Muslims, but he did when he resumed war against the Mamluks. In 1300 he forced them from Syria back into Egypt. In addition, he sought alliances with Christian Europeans against them, but at the height of Ghazan’s power in the west he was compelled to return to the east – in an all-too-familiar pattern of earlier rulers – to face down a challenge from Central Asia, in this case Chaghatai kinsmen. More importantly, Ghazan’s reign altered the Mongol relationship with Iranians through the internal reforms he pursued with the aid of his extraordinary vizier, Rashid al-Din. Rashid al-Din, in his Jami‘al-

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Tavarikh, describes Ghazan’s motivations for economic and administrative reforms, echoing Nizam al-Mulk’s Siyasatnamah and the Sasanian circle of equity. To restore justice and guarantee revenues every aspect of taxation had to be regulated; officials could no longer exploit their positions to extort payments or to wreak havoc; tax advantages were to be given for the extension of arable land; market ethics were to be enforced; mints were to strike coins of standard weights; and administration in general was to be more systematic. Ghazan and his minister sought to control the army and to regularize the ruler’s relationship with it; central here was military financing and the revival of the Saljuq iqta‘. The military had been dependent upon booty, which in turn was dependent upon an expanding frontier, and without which there was the probability of disorder or even rebellion. Given military stalemate in both the west and the east, land was granted to military units, still tribally based, in the vicinity of their pastures, from which they would derive a livelihood in return for their service and good order. Other contemporary historians, particularly Hamd Allah Mustaufi Qazvini, who was also a member of Ghazan’s bureaucracy, noted that government revenues did increase following these reforms. Ghazan died shortly after inaugurating the reforms, but his minister, Rashid al-Din, continued in that critical role under Ghazan’s successor and brother, Muhammad Khudabanda Oljeitu. Oljeitu (1304–1316) came to the throne only after assassinating two rivals – Ghazan supposedly rid himself of 10 members of the Ilkhanid family. Oljeitu’s first year was spent confirming key officials in their offices, including Rashid alDin; receiving ambassadors from fellow Mongol rulers, re-establishing more amicable ties with them, and gaining support from them against the Mamluks; and observing family obligations such as visiting Ghazan’s burial place. Oljeitu’s father had moved the Ilkhanid capital from Maragha to Tabriz, the center of trade routes. From early in his reign Oljeitu focused his attention on a new capital in Sultaniyyah, where he would build his vast mausoleum and greatest monument. In 1307 Oljeitu turned to the conquest of Gilan, which had successfully held out against Mongol conquest. After initial success in the southern part of the region, the Ilkhanid army suffered defeat and major casualties, among them key officers. Oljeitu mounted only one campaign against the Mamluks, and despite correspondence with European Christian rulers, the grand alliance with them never materialized. A more sustained and successful military effort was maintained in Khurasan, and even in Transoxiana against the Chaghatai. In this instance he favored a Mongol amir, who would rise up against Oljeitu’s son Abu Sa‘id when

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Figure 5.3

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Oljeitu’s tomb (photograph by author)

he succeeded his father in 1316. It was over the financing of the army in Khurasan, however, that Rashid al-Din had come into conflict with another of Oljeitu’s viziers, ‘Ali Shah, and the realm’s administration was divided between the two of them. Oljeitu’s religious history is somewhat mixed. He was baptized a Christian, became a Buddhist, and then a Sunni Muslim. Caught in a conflict between two of the four Sunni schools of law, he was urged by Mongol supporters to return to steppe shamanism. In the end he espoused Shi‘i Islam. Possibly, he was motivated by the notion of posthumous self-aggrandizement, because the proposed reburial of the Shi‘i imams ‘Ali and Husain in his own great new mausoleum in Sultaniyyah would enhance its importance. In addition to the building of a new

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capital, Sultaniyyah, and the mausoleum, he built a second capital, now in ruins, near Bisitun. His patronage of Rashid al-Din as historian also resulted in an invaluable cultural contribution. Within a year of Abu Sa‘id’s accession in 1316 there were two significant deaths. First, his Atabeg, guardian, died, and then Rashid al-Din was dismissed through the machinations of ‘Ali Shah, and executed. Until 1327 effective power was in the hands of Amir Chopan, who served as commander-in-chief. He successfully defended the ilkhan’s territories, and then divided them up among his own sons. Abu Sa‘id’s other amirs continued in support of him, and Amir Chopan was defeated and fled to Herat, where he was captured and executed. His powerful son, Amir Timurtash, who had earlier proclaimed himself sovereign of Rum and even the Mahdi, or messiah, fled to Mamluk Egypt. There he was killed by the Mamluk ruler who sought to maintain the peace that had been established in 1322 between the Mamluks and the Ilkhans. In 1335 Abu Sa‘id died without an heir; the Ilkhanate effectively came to an end, although amirs attempted to support claimants. While Abu Sa‘id’s reign was remembered as something of a golden age, the problem of factions among the various Mongol amirs remained unresolved. Abu Sa‘id’s last minister, Ghiyath al-Din, son of the great Rashid al-Din, supported a Chingizid khan. Other Mongol notables advanced themselves, and from the mid-fourteenth century until the rise of Timur Ling, or Tamerlane, in 1370 power over the Ilkhanid territory was held by four competing Mongol factions – the Jalayirids of Baghdad and Tabriz, the Muzaffarids of central Iran, the radical Shi‘i Sarbadars of western Khurasan, and the Karts of Herat. Mongol rule began with the all-powerful Chingiz Khan and ended a century later with the great Eurasian empire in fragments. Despite the fragmentation, however, trade and the exchange of ideas in technology, medicine, science, and art moved from China, across Central Asia into Iran. Religious ideas, except where they reinforced indigenous ones, seem to have been identified with specific peoples, and were not transferable even though the Ilkhanids were generally tolerant of religious practice, as the Sasanians had been. Ilkhanid Iran not only approximated the Sasanian empire, but like it had links with both Europe and China. Diplomatic ties with Europeans are clearly documented, especially since they were sought as allies against the Mamluks, but trade was also conducted. Italians were especially important and were used by the Ilkhans in their relationship with China. This was the age of Marco Polo and his family. While the papacy hoped to convert the Ilkhans to Christianity, Nestorian Christians played ambassadorial roles, but with seemingly

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little cultural impact beyond their own confessional group. Members of Christian religious orders must have accompanied Italian merchants, for Rashid al-Din’s History of the Franks was based on a Latin source presumably translated by one of them. From the mid-fourteenth century until the sixteenth direct links with Europe were to be blocked by the emerging Ottoman empire. The Mongols and then the Ilkhans maintained important commercial links with China and India. Such diverse commodities as horses and cobalt continued to be traded to the east. Chinese accompanied the Mongols westward as military engineers. Steppe shamanism and Buddhism also came with the Mongols, with the former reinforcing indigenous popular religion, most likely Sufism. Indirectly Central Asian Buddhist art – presumably executed by Chinese – may have influenced painting, for in this period there is a very significant Chinese impact in painting and design. In Maragah the great astronomer Nasir al-Din Tusi had direct contact with a Chinese astronomer, and Chinese physicians were represented in Mongol courts. Recognizable Mongol and Ilkhanid styles in painting and architecture represent significant cultural exchange during the Pax Mongolica that extended well into the Safavid period. The overwhelming Mongol impact on Iran, however, was negative. Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people were killed or displaced. Cities were leveled, and land was laid waste directly by invasions and nomadic incursions, or indirectly with the flight of peasants from the breakdown of irrigation systems, or through extortionate taxation. Ghazan’s reforms came too late. Any subsequent agricultural recovery was offset by late Ilkhanid factionalism and misrule and then by the rise and ravages of Timur Ling at the end of the century. What from Iran’s past continued in the Mongol century? A complex society and economy based on pastoralism, agriculture, and commerce; a military tradition with emphasis on cavalry and bowmen, but based more on nomads; acceptance of religious and ethnic diversity; under the Ilkhans the centrality of Iran between west and east Asia; acceptance of autonomy; a tradition of Iranian administration and a consciousness of that historical tradition; financing of the military and administration through land grants; and patronage of architecture, the arts, and learning. Significantly, the Mongols fit the prevailing historical pattern of universal/simultaneous rulership that was vested in the Chingizid family. While there was agreement on that principle for succession, the increasing number of family members and internecine rivalries exacerbated factionalism, and worked against the concentration of power beyond the

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second and third generations. What separates the Mongols from earlier Iranian rulers and dynasties was their more pervasive factionalism and extortionate administration, which compounded their devastating invasions. Centralized power ended with Abu Sa‘id’s death in 1335 and would be re-established by Timur Ling. Timur’s tribe, the Barlas, had Mongol origins but had become Turkic-speaking and Muslim. The home territory of the Barlas was in Transoxiana, an area dominated by pastoral nomadic tribes and their leaders, who exercised authority as Chaghatai, or in the name of a Chaghatai khan, hence by descent, Chingizid. Timur, who was not Chaghatai, claimed to be Chingizid. He also told Ibn Khaldun, the great Arab historian, that he was descended from Chingiz through his mother. According to Timurid sources, Timur’s rise to leadership of the Barlas, and then of Transoxiana, parallels to a remarkable degree Chingiz Khan’s own historical development. Again, this was a process of federation/confederation building that started with kin and personal followers, and proceeded with political and kin alliances with other tribal leaders and their tribes. By 1370 Timur had emerged as the pre-eminent power in Transoxiana. His army, decimally organized, was based on earlier steppe precedent with an emphasis on cavalry and bowmen, and with siege engineers to invest cities. Like Chingiz’, Timur’s military prowess relied on speed and mobility and terror; cities that capitulated on demand would be spared. The size of his army was huge and may have numbered as many as 200,000 men. While Muslim, Timur felt no compunction in attacking and looting other Muslims, and Islamic ideology played an insignificant role in legitimizing his authority. Like other tribal leaders, Timur’s only effective control over such a disparate and loosely aligned military force was to demonstrate his continuing military leadership through successful conquest and the resulting booty. Chingiz, in effect through military reorganization, institutionalized his authority, and created new tribes with leaders loyal to him. Timur, even more than Chingiz Khan, relied on his own personal qualities as a military leader and on personal loyalty rather than institutionalizing his leadership, military or administrative. At the same time, he valued existing tribal structures and recognized their autonomy, while always dominating them. Timur utilized family members and maneuvered other tribal leaders of proven loyalty to positions of authority, and kept his forces in continuous campaign. Not only was his army on constant campaign, but he always led it, which shows the importance of personal leadership in the steppe’s political culture and the personal nature of Timur’s rule.

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Timur’s campaigns ultimately brought him to the Ilkhanid lands of Iran about 1380 and he moved to and fro across it for the remainder of his life. Just as fluidity characterized his conquests so did it characterize his control over tribes and provinces. He showed no concern for the havoc wreaked on a settled society and its economy, and his depredation of Khurasan possibly exceeded Chingiz Khan’s. He defeated the Muzaffarids of Fars, and moved north across the Qipchaq steppe to Astrakhan and Moscow. Timur also ventured south, deep into India and plundered Delhi of its fabled wealth in 1398–9. For a brief time he wrested Syria from the control of the Mamluks, but unlike Chingiz Khan he never tried to threaten the center of Mamluk power, Egypt. He displaced two Turkmen confederations of Anatolia, the Qara Quyunlu and the Aq Quyunlu, both of which would continue to play significant political and military roles throughout the fifteenth century. In 1402, only three years before his death, Timur defeated the Ottoman Turks at Ankara and captured their sultan, Bayizid, but Timur had no interest in ruling Anatolia. He turned from this great military achievement to a yet greater challenge, China. Whether his goal was Chingizid in scope, or only to raid deep into China as he had in India, remains unknown. He set off from Transoxiana on his last military expedition and died in 1405, far short of China. Despite a later notion that he was a successor to Chingiz Khan, re-establishment of the Mongol empire seems not to have been Timur’s goal. He saw greater Iran – Mesopotamia east into Khurasan and Transoxiana – as part of his empire, while areas outside of it where he was equally successful – the realms of the Golden Horde, India, Anatolia, or Mongolia, for example – were not. Also, Timur used Transoxiana with its large sedentary population as his base of operations, whereas Chingiz struck from his steppe base and controlled the steppes in general much the way the British were to control the seas. In conquered and occupied areas Timur established a system of checks and balances to offset political and military challenges to his authority. Whole tribal populations were resettled in the newly conquered territories where they lacked political networks. Timur’s sons and grandsons were appointed as governors, but under the supervision of loyal tribal leaders. With his death, his descendants positioned themselves to inherit his mantle of rule. Timur saw himself as the legitimate successor to Chingiz Khan. He took the honored Mongol title of guregan, son-in-law, after his 1370 marriage to Saray Malik Khanum, a daughter of the Chaghatai khan Qazan who had ruled until 1346. Similarly, his sons and grandsons

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married Chingizid women. Moreover, he claimed to uphold the yasa, Mongol law, as well as the Shari‘a. Like the Chingizids, the Timurid descent line becomes critical for rule, but there were no institutions to support it. In this, Timur was perhaps most unlike Chingiz. Timur controlled his empire as if it were a military unit. Little distinction was made between traditional Iranian bureaucrats who had managed administration and tax collection for the Ilkhanids and Chaghatai/Turkish amirs of Transoxiana who were given bureaucratic roles along with their military ones. Similarly, governors were given military responsibilities. Little differentiation was made between civil and military affairs; what was critical was the personal relationship between Timur and his officials. Clearly, Timur could suffer neither rivals nor potential rivals, including members of his own immediate family. One group that he seems to have both feared and favored, but could not directly control, were Sufi pirs or shaikhs – both terms identifying Sufi leaders. Although Muslim, Timur’s actual religious beliefs, or even inclinations, are not known. The inscription on Timur’s tombstone, placed over his grave some 20 years after his death, traces his descent from both Alanqoa, the mythical goddess of Central Asia, and ‘Ali, fourth caliph and first Shi‘i imam. Expediency – possibly, Timur’s most consistent character trait – led him to attack both Sunnis and Shi‘a in the name of the other. The hold of pirs over Timur cannot be fully explained: he was buried next to one of them, Sayyid Baraka. Indeed, there could well be no functional answer; simply the Sufis were the missionaries in Central Asia where they mingled popular Central Asian religious ideas and practice with Islam. From birth he was acculturated in this eclecticism, and Timur could have seen something of the power of steppe shamans in the Sufi shaikhs as they mediated between the observable and spiritual, between the known and unknown. Timur’s role as architectural patron, particularly the building of his mausoleum and great mosque, the Bibi Khanun, in Samarkand, relate directly to a concern for leaving a lasting tangible record in this world, and to establish his worthiness as a universal ruler. These same concerns for fitting into the role of ruler and for establishing a record can be seen in his patronage of historians. Timur hardly gave coherence to his reign and domain during his lifetime, even in terms of his own person, except through his dominating military leadership and presence over all that he conquered. With his death, that unity, such as it was, ended. Largely as the result of the long reign of Timur’s youngest son, Shahrukh (1405–1447), a Timurid historical pattern can be established in Khurasan and Transoxiana; but

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not in the other parts of Timur’s empire, especially in the west. There, two competing Turkish dynasties – known often as Turkmen – the Qara Quyunlu and the Aq Quyunlu, prevailed and continued to play a critical role in Iran throughout the fifteenth and into the sixteenth century. From his deathbed Timur by-passed his two surviving sons, Amiranshah and Shahrukh, in the succession in preference for a grandson, Pir Muhammad, which made internecine conflict all but certain. Three groups, in the context of tribal and regional politics, played roles in the power struggle: Timur’s sons and grandsons; his close followers; and local notables whom he had favored and who now threw in their lot with Timurid successors. Amiranshah’s son, Khalil Sultan, was in Transoxiana for Timur’s projected China campaign, and he declared himself sultan, but was challenged by Pir Muhammad and Shahrukh. Shahrukh had been governor of Khurasan, Sistan, and Mazandaran for over 10 years and held onto power there despite threats from local notables. In Azerbaijan, Amiranshah and two other sons competed among themselves and with the Qara Quyunlu. Pir Muhammad was betrayed and killed in 1407, after having been defeated by Khalil Sultan. Khalil Sultan himself was probably betrayed, and in 1409 submitted to Shahrukh. Shahrukh was forced to face down local notables and his own disloyal amirs, but succeeded because of his own political and military skills from his established base in Khurasan. By 1420 he had re-created Ilkhanid Iran, including Transoxiana, the Caspian Sea provinces, Fars, Kirman, Azerbaijan (shortly to be lost), and, of course, Khurasan. While Shahrukh failed to establish uncontested control in western Iran, he controlled the dominant Qara Quyunlu by playing them off against the Aq Quyunlu. In the east Shahrukh focused his attention on Khurasan, where he relocated his capital at Herat. He left his son and successor, Ulugh Beg (1447–1449), behind in Samarqand as governor of Transoxiana, which became to all purposes autonomous. In Herat, Shahrukh, along with his wife Gauhar Shad, made Khurasan, particularly Herat, major architectural and artistic centers. The Timurids are best remembered as great patrons of the arts, and the Timurid fifteenth century was a glittering one despite the fragmentation of Timurid unity and power. Indeed, it recalls ‘Abbasid fragmentation when each of the regional courts sought to emulate the culture of Baghdad. The Timurids build great mosques and other buildings and decorated them with wondrous mosaic tiles. Ulugh Beg, like his father, left an important architectural legacy in Samarqand and Bukhara, but he also served as a significant patron of science, especially astronomy in his observatory at Samarqand. Astronomical tables charted and compiled

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there were still in use in Europe 300 years later. Under the Timurids, great poets, notably Jami, flourished, as did miniature painters, for example the renowned Bihzad. In Herat, Chaghatai Turkish first became a literary language under the patronage of Husain Bayqara. Indeed, Timurid architecture, literature, and the arts would have a profound influence on subsequent Safavid and Mughul art, literature, and history in Iran and in India. When Shah Rukh died in 1447 the issue of succession once again divided the Timurids and resulted in political uncertainty and instability. Even though Ulugh Beg was Shah Rukh’s only son and designated successor, he was challenged by his own son, ‘Abd al-Latif, and then killed by his order. Moreover, during Ulugh Beg’s reign of but two years, his control did not extend beyond Transoxiana, the traditional seat of Timurid power. ‘Abu al-Latif had also killed his brother before he himself was murdered. Finally, in 1451, the throne was captured by Abu Sa‘id, Timur’s great-grandson, and he ruled Transoxiana and Khurasan until 1459. Contending for power in this last half century of Timurid rule were the rival Aq Quyunlu and Qara Quyunlu in the west and the Ozbegs/Uzbeks – or the Shaybanids, the descendants of Jochi, Chingiz Khan’s eldest son – in Central Asia, who had assisted Abu Sa‘id. The Uzbeks would continue to be a major threat to Iran throughout the sixteenth century. Fragmentation of Timurid power and authority was so great, even in Transoxiana, that the leader of the great Sufi Naqshabandi order, Khwaja Ahrar, wielded significant political power. Abu Sa‘id managed to dominate them all, despite military defeat when he attempted to re-establish the Timurid empire in Azerbaijan. During his reign of 18 years, he, too, was a patron of the arts. After Abu Sa‘id’s death another of Timur’s great grandsons, Husain Bayaqara, became ruler; he governed Khurasan from Herat. Despite the longevity of his reign, 1470–1506, he was unable to extend his power further, and the Timurid line would end with him. The Uzbeks would take over eastern Iran from the Timuirds, and in the west the Safavids would emerge to establish a new dynasty. Husain Bayaqara is best remembered not as the last Timurid, but as a great patron of art and culture. One of his ministers, ‘Ali Shir Nava’i, was not only a distinguished poet but the father of literary Chaghatai Turkish. Jami, possibly the last of the great Persian classical poets, was the beneficiary of Husain Bayaqara’s patronage, as were other writers and historians – the Timurids, like the Chingizids, were committed patrons of history. Of equal importance was his patronage of miniature painting. Chaghatai poetry would be written by the first Safavid ruler, Shah Isma‘il, and

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Bihzad, one of the greatest painters, would move from Herat to the new Safavid capital, Tabriz, providing direct artistic continuity from the Timurids to the Safavids. The fragmentation of fifteenth-century Iran, of Timur’s empire and legacy, was hardly out of the ordinary. The idea of descent in a particular family – Timur’s and in some instances, Chingiz’ – continued as a condition of rule. The absence of a succession principle beyond descent, so that any member of the descent group was eligible to rule, was nothing new. The appointment of family members to important military positions or governorships was a characteristic of Iranian rule beginning under the Achaemenians. Some historians assert that the suyurghal, the extension of the Saljuq iqta‘, or land grant in exchange for government service, was more pervasive and generous under the Timurids, which provided a larger local power base. As a consequence of Timurid rule, there may have been expansion of pastoral nomadism that would have allowed them an increased number of potential cavalrymen. That fact that fragmentation resulted in a cultural renaissance, with each court patronizing artists and architects, poets, and historians, was not an unusual phenomenon. The fifteenth-century period of the Jalayirids, Qara Quyunlu, and Aq Quyunlu is significant in ways that relate to the emergence of Safavid Iran. These three dynasties pre-empted Timurid control over western Iran and then ended it altogether. The competition between the Timurids and the three dynasties in the fifteenth century resulted in western Iran’s political instability and exacerbated existing social and cultural divisions. Political instability and social fragmentation had four significant consequences: increased pastoral nomadism and tribalism; a related military patronage of them that exacerbated instability; religious sectarianism that expressed itself politically; and continued demographic shift toward a Turkic-speaking population in western Iran, especially in the northwest. The religious factor aside, Turkish tribalism and military and political power had dominated Iranian history since the arrival of the Saljuqs in the tenth century. Moreover, this tribal–military Turkish factor is commonly set in apposition, if not opposition, to an urban, or settled, Persian bureaucracy, and the inability of governments in this period to synthesize these two cultures is used to explain their political instability. Such ethnic differences are overemphasized; rather, the problem could be seen in terms of regional autonomy over and against centralization or concentration of power. The conflict of tribal versus sedentary was largely in the sense that political instability related to the tension of tribal short-

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term interests versus the government’s longer-term ones and the government’s need to maintain support among tribes and allow them access to pastures. Moreover, government was seen as suppressing the sectarianism expressed by competing tribal confederations. The Jalayirids probably first appear in the mid-thirteenth century as one of the Mongol tribes making up Hulegu’s army. In the fourteenth century the Jalayirids prevailed over parts of Anatolia, then Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Fars. They gave up Baghdad to Timur, only to retake it and then cede first Azerbaijan and then Baghdad to the Qara Quyunlu in 1412. The last Jalayirid governed lower Iraq on behalf of the Timurid, Shah Rukh, until 1432. Qara Quyunlu fortunes were intertwined with both the Jalayirids and the Aq Quyunlu. Qara Quyunlu origins are lost, but they constituted a recognizable Turkmen tribe late in the Ilkhanid period. Their first leader rose under the Jalayirids, but their next, Qara Yusif, established Qara Quyunlu independence from them in Azerbaijan. He mistakenly challenged and then escaped from Timur, but in 1408 reestablished himself in Tabriz under the nominal suzerainty of Shah Rukh, and two years later effectively eliminated the Jalayirids. Qara Yusif and his successors fought against all comers: their Timurid suzerains, the Aq Quyunlu of Diyarbakir, and the Georgians and Shirvanshah in the Caucasus. By the mid-fifteenth century, Jihan Shah Qara Quyunlu (1438–1467) had established control over Iraq and western Iran, Kirman, and parts of the Persian Gulf. He owed his success not only to his descent in the Qara Quyunlu lineage, but also to his appointment by Shah Rukh as governor of Azerbaijan. From this position, he eliminated the Timurids from western Iran. Significantly in terms of rulership, Jihan Shah legitimized his rule not only through descent and directly through his Timurid appointment, but also indirectly through his succession to rulership from the Jalayirids, whom he had vanquished, and ultimately from the Ilkhans. Jihan Shah’s Qara Quyunlu chancery practice seems to reach back to Timur’s and to the Ilkhans. Jihan Shah’s appropriation of the title khaqan (Persian) or khaghan (Mongolian), emperor, goes back to Chingizid usage to indicate a ruler in that lineage and implies universal lordship; this tradition would be followed by the Safavids, then the Afshars in the eighteenth century and the Qajars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Like his Timurid predecessors, Jihan Shah patronized art, architecture – particularly in Tabriz – and literature. Dispute dogs his religious affiliation. He is reputed to have shown respect for the Shi‘a in his territories, which could have simply been expediency on his part. Some coins struck in his name bear Shi‘i inscriptions, but some of these same coins also have

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Sunni ones. The population of western Iran and eastern Anatolia accommodated divergent Islamic practice, whether Shi‘a or Sunni, but shared reverence for the ‘Alid family. Consequently, the names of Shi‘i imams do not necessarily denote Shi‘i allegiance. Jihan Shah was caught unawares and killed in 1467 by his Aq Quyunlu rival Uzun Hasan; the Qara Quyunlu dynasty ended with him. Aq Quyunlu origins are also unknown. Their centers of power were to the west of the Qara Quyunlu, especially Diyarbakir. Like other Turkish tribal counterparts, the Aq Quyunlu were fragmented, and accession to leadership was especially contentious; between 1435 and 1453 there were 11 contenders for it. Consequently, Aq Quyunlu leaders sought allies in unlikely places, including important marriage and political links with the Byzantine imperial family at Trabizond. Aq Quyunlu leaders served Ghazan Khan Ilkhan and later – unlike the Qara Quyunlu – Timur and some of the Timurids. During his long reign from his capital in Tabriz, with the help of such patronage, Uzun Hasan (1453–1478) extended his control over Iraq, south and southwestern Anatolia, and Iran, as far east as Kirman at the expense of the Qara Quyunlu and even the Timurids. Despite Uzun Hasan’s success in enlisting arms from Venice, he was unsuccessful against the Ottomans. He was defeated by them in 1473 at Terjan as a result of the superiority of Ottoman artillery, but he remained in power another five years; nor did he cede territory to the Ottomans. The Aq Quyunlu identified themselves with Sunni Islam, and would be undermined by Safavid appeal to the Shi‘a in their midst. Their major weakness was their own political fractiousness. Uzun Hasan died in 1478. The complete demise of the dynasty took place in 1501, when Isma‘il Safavi defeated Alvand Aq Quyunlu and took Tabriz, which he made his capital, to become the first Safavid shah. Remarkably from 641, with the defeat of the Sasanians, until 1501, with the rise of the Safavids, Persian universal rulership and its link with Iran and its political culture did not disappear despite the ending of the Sasanian dynasty, the conversion of the Iranians to Islam, and the onslaught of the Turko-Mongol invasions. Continuity in historical memory was tied to a popular oral tradition that emerged with New Persian and its literature, notably Firdausi’s Shahnamah, in the tenth century, to political and administrative culture in which Sasanian elites continued to serve the Islamic dynasties, and to a synthesis of pre-Islamic universal rulership with its antithesis in Islamic religious and political values. This same process was repeated with the Turkic-Mongol dynasties which even reinforced hierarchy, family descent, and the idea of the autocratic ruler and his realm as the equipoise between God and the uni-

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verse: the shahanshah became the Shadow of God. Pragmatism and political culture came together in the likes of the Barmakids, the ‘Abbasids, the Samanids, and the Buyids, and linked up with the political philosophers/historians, for example, Ibn Muqqafa, al-Mas‘udi, al-Ghazali, Nizam al-Mulk, and Rashid al-Din, who provided Persian universal rulership with an Islamic foundation. Historical continuity can also be seen in the relationship between the universal ruler and his constituencies, with which he is in dialogue. The universal ruler projects, even creates, these constituencies and they in turn project back onto him, and this is done at the level of ideology and in practice. The ruling family, the bureaucracy, the military, religious groups and their elites – in the case of Islam, the ulema and even the Sufis – tribes, peoples and ethnic groups, provincial officials and elites, artists and artisans, merchants, ambassadors, even foreign ambassadors, and thinkers and writers were these universal ruler’s constituencies, regardless of title, whether caliph, sultan, governor, or shah. The universal ruler was identified with Iran even though there was no Iranian government.

6

The Safavids (1501–1722) The Safavid period, perhaps more than any other, has defined how the world views Iran’s history. Safavid reunification of Iran and reestablishment of monarchy, Shah ‘Abbas, Isfahan, Shi‘ism, and Safavid art and architecture have shaped our notions and images of what Iran is and was. Safavid Iran does mark a significant break with the past, not unlike the seventh-century break when Sasanian rule ended and the Arabs and Islam took over. The re-emergence of an Iranian political unity reflects essential internal and external developments that bear on Iran’s subsequent history. The Safavids are credited with not just re-establishing what we know as a geographically defined Iran under an Iranian government with an Iranian dynasty and through the revival of the title of shahanshah and re-institution of rulership, but with establishing Shi‘i Islam as the official faith. In short, the twentieth-century Iranian and Shi‘i nation-state has been seen as the logical extension of this sixteenthcentury foundation. Iran’s historical process is not as simple as seemingly self-evident logic might suggest. Although Shi‘ism became the state faith under the Safavids and important religious ideas and institutions developed at that time, even during the Safavid period itself and as late as the early nineteenth century, all of these critically important changes could have moved in quite different directions. The first century of Safavid history, however, marks less of a break with the fifteenth century than is commonly assumed. Aside from an officially imposed Shi‘ism, there was continuity in Iran’s rulership and political culture. Changes within Shi‘ism and the challenges posed by the ulema to authority become significant only later in Safavid history. Importantly, the internal debates within Shi‘ism about its institutional and political roles, particularly its relationship with rulership, have continued up to the present time. Shi‘ism was hardly affected by the emergence of Europe as a major external factor in Iran’s history, which began to intensify in the Safavid period, though throughout the nineteenth

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century every aspect of Iranian life – society, national and international politics, economics, and culture – would be challenged. One consequence of an increasing European and western presence in Iran was the increasing impact of westernization on the debates taking place within Shi‘ism, which led to changes in the way in which Iranians identified themselves in relationship to rulership. Those changes led, in the early twentieth century, to constitutionalism, which marked a profound break with Iran’s long tradition of simultaneous rulership. There are more extant sources for the Safavid period than for any earlier period of Safavid history – these include European and Ottoman ones, in addition to the far greater number of Safavid sources themselves. And there has been a major resurgence of scholarly activity in Iran, in Europe, and in the United States utilizing and interpreting these sources in light of recent changes in historical thinking. For example, a group of scholars began to organize periodic conferences known as the Safavid Round Table, first publishing their findings in 1990.1 Consequently we possess a far better historical understanding of the complexity and richness of this era. Nevertheless, major gaps in sources, knowledge, and interpretation, particularly of the first Safavid century, persist. The dating of the Safavid period typically begins with Shah Isma‘il’s reign, 1501–1524. Isma‘il’s emergence to Safavid family leadership occurred when he was only seven. His father, Haydar, was killed by the Shirvanshah while on jihad, or ghaza, in the Caucasus in 1488, and then Sultan ‘Ali, the eldest of the two sons, succeeded his father as leader of the Safavid order, but in 1494 he too was killed by the Aq Quyunlu. Before his death he had designated his younger brother, Isma‘il, as his successor. After a brief period in hiding, in 1499 the 12-year-old Isma‘il began his military campaign, first against the Shirvanshah to avenge his father’s death. The success of that campaign allowed Safavid forces to attack Alvand Aq Quyunlu and take Tabriz in 1501, the capture of which is used to mark the beginning of the Safavid dynasty. To this point little differentiated Isma‘il from Sultan Alvand, his cousin – both were grandsons of Uzun Hasan Aq Quyunlu, and Isma‘il’s forces and reliance on tribal confederation-building and political culture placed him in the Aq Quyunlu tradition. Why then was Isma‘il able to best Sultan Alvand, and then to transcend Aq Quyunlu political limitations? Leadership itself may have set Isma‘il apart from Alvand, especially given that Alvand fled from battle, and Isma‘il may have had, or attracted, more able tribal military leaders. Isma‘il’s contemporary supporters could well have seen him as a charismatic leader even without radical Shi‘i longings. That no contemporary evidence supports his

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father’s or grandfather’s Shi‘ism suggests that like theirs Isma‘il’s appeal cut across Sunni–Shi‘i divisions. He was the surviving scion of the Safavid family, with all the aura of legitimacy that descent in the leadership family of that Sufi order gave him. Secreted away as an infant after his father’s untimely death, his reappearance as a military leader under the authority of the Safavid order at the age of 12 and his initial success reinforced his charisma. Courage and leadership in the hunt and war were widely ascribed to him. Booty from jihad against the Shirvanshah or from raiding would only have strengthened his charisma in the eyes of his Turkmen tribal followers. Like earlier Iranian rulers, whether on a regional or an imperial basis, Isma‘il’s military was based on tribal elements that had long been affiliated with the Safavid Sufi order. Historians agree that the Safavid Sufi order had been Sunni from the time of its founding by Shaikh Safi alDin (1252–1334) until the generation of Isma‘il’s grandfather, Junayd, or possibly even Isma‘il’s father, Haydar. What and when was the process that transformed the order to Ithna ‘Ashari Islam/Twelver Shi‘ism or even more radial heterodoxy? The commonplace explanation is cultural and political: the Turkmen of eastern Anatolia and northern Mesopotamia, the supporters of the Safavid order, espoused heterodox ideas and practice as part of their resistance to Ottoman hegemony and control. Isma‘il, even as a youth and as a descendant of Shaikh Safi, led the Turkmen to military victory. From the indoctrination during his youth and early military success, he consolidated his roles and proclaimed Shi‘ism as the established faith after his capture of Tabriz in 1501. Subsequently, a dynasty was established on that basis, Iran as a political entity was re-established, and Shi‘ism was imposed. Safavid history begins with the Safavid family’s religious leadership, and their tribal and urban bases came together in religion, particularly with the Safavid order and its Shi‘i transformation. The Safavid family’s base of power sprang from a Sufi order, and the name of the order came from its founder, Shaikh Safi al-Din. The shaikh’s family had been resident in Azerbaijan since Saljuk times and then in Ardabil, and was probably Kurdish in origin. Safi al-Din rose to religious prominence after he had become an adept of Shaikh Zahid, married his daughter, and became head of his father-in-law’s order known by his name, the Zahidiyya. After the Shaikh’s death in 1301 the order became known by Safi al-Din’s name, hence, the Safaviyya, or the Safavid order. It prospered under its early Safavid leaders, and acquired large land holdings and followers in Azerbaijan. Starting with Safi al-Din the Safavid leaders were known for their piety and power among the

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Turkmen tribes. Importantly, Shaikh Safi was clearly identified as Sunni in his nearly contemporary biography–hagiography. Not until the midfifteenth century were there suggestions of militancy and possibly heterodoxy among the Safaviyya. The pivotal figure in this process of heterodox tendencies may have been Junayd (d. 1460), Isma‘il’s grandfather, who missionized among the Turkmen of eastern Anatolia, where he acquired heterodox ideas. What did heterodoxy mean in fifteenth-century Iran? Among the Turkmen, popular Islam combined a variety of traditions and practices that would have been at odds with urban, establishment Islam. Popular Islam, whether Sunni or Shi‘a, shared the importance of dream interpretation, syncretism, and charismatic leadership, including reverence for the family of ‘Ali, the first Shi‘i imam, and descent within it as an important factor for leadership. Later Safavids would claim such descent, and their followers would ascribe saintly, or even possibly divine, attributes to the order’s and family’s progenitors. A further difficulty in separating out the Shi‘a from the Sunni in early Safavid history was the Shi‘i practice of taqiyya, or dissimulation, that had allowed the Shi‘a to survive in a Sunni-dominated world but complicates the problem of reconstructing that history and understanding religious affiliations. It was Junayd who established the Safavid relationship with the Aq Quyunlu and married Uzun Hasan’s sister. Junayd was killed when he and his forces launched attacks – ghaza (a synonym for jihad ), hence ghazi, or warrior in the faith – against Christians in the Caucasus, and ghaza/ghazi become a factor in later Safavid identity and legitimacy. The Safavid–Aq Quyunlu relationship continued when Junayd’s infant son, Haydar, was raised in Uzun Hasan’s court and ultimately married one of his daughters. Later tradition depicts Haydar as Shi‘a and as the originator of the distinctive red turban with its twelve folds – emblematic of the twelve Shi‘i imams – worn by later Safavid supporters, which gave them their name of Qizilbash, or red-headed ones. Uzun Hasan and his court, however, were Sunni, and it was unlikely that Haydar was exposed to Shi‘ism there. Haydar, at a young age, emulated his father and led his followers into the Caucasus where he, too, was killed by the Shirvanshah in 1488. Haydar must have been seen as a rival to Uzun Hasan’s son Yaqub, who had the support of the Shirvanshah. Yaqub, following Haydar’s death, captured his young sons, Sultan ‘Ali, who had succeeded his father as head of the Safaviyya, and Isma‘il. Yaqub had them imprisoned in Fars far from Tabriz and Ardabil and the family’s base of support. In

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1494 Sultan ‘Ali was killed by Aq Quyunlu forces, and Isma‘il succeeded his elder brother as head of the Safaviyya. Isma‘il’s supporters spirited him off to Gilan, where he was given refuge in Lahijan by the local ruler who was Shi‘i and who claimed descent from Imam ‘Ali, and where, over the next five years, Isma‘il was presumably inculcated with Shi‘ism. The young Isma‘il served as the rallying point for his family’s Turkmen followers who were embroiled in Aq Quyunlu factionalism in Azerbaijan and for those Turkmen in eastern Anatolia who were resisting Ottoman administration and centralization. Consequently, Isma‘il’s base of power was the Safaviyya, and particularly its Turkmen adherents within it, who were also tribally organized. A charismatic link between religion and dynasty was once again established, but this time on a Shi‘i basis. Historians typically divide Isma‘il’s life around four themes: extreme heterodoxy in the origins and founding of the dynasty and Safavid rule; the Iranian–Turkmen, or Tajik–Turk, dichotomy of the Safavid military and bureaucracy throughout his reign; the battle of Chaldiran in 1514, in which Shah Isma‘il’s forces were defeated by the Ottomans, regarded as the turning point in that reign, with the loss of his charisma; and Isma‘il’s subsequent withdrawal from affairs of state to a life of indifference, at best, or indulgence. Sunni–Shi‘i differentiation was probably of little importance for most peoples of Iran, eastern Anatolia, and northern Mesopotamia in the fourteenth century. The populations shared common popular beliefs and practices. Theology and law were the mark of that very small number of people with education and training, who were identified with urban institutions. The new shah’s subjects experienced little change when he decreed Shi‘ism as the state faith, but did he need to make it official? In the larger historical and Iranian/Central Asian contexts, the universal/simultaneous ruler transcended specific religions, especially established religion, to dominate all religions and their institutions. Given the establishment nature of Sunni institutions, this would not have been possible had Shah Isma‘il accepted Sunnism. Moreover, Isma‘il through descent had inherited leadership of the Safaviyya. Clearly, Isma‘il and his closest supporters had had a problem with “established religion.” There could well have been a socio-religious tension between the ulema and the Safavids, as leaders of their Sufi order, between official, more legalistic, and popular Islam, and between the established political order and challengers to it. Unfortunately, we have little evidence about the formation of Isma‘il’s training, development, and ideas, particularly that critical Lahijan phase of his upbringing.

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One commonly cited source for Isma‘il’s heterodox views is his Divan, or collection of poetry, written in Chagatai Turkish – the language of his Qizilbash supporters. But to what extent does it reflect his beliefs, or was it an appeal to the heterodox notions of his followers, or both? How was it to be understood by those, presumably his followers and members of the order, who heard it? Are the images and ideas to be understood literally, or metaphorically, or mystically? Moreover – in terms of heterodox, or even radical, Shi‘ism – how different were the popular beliefs of the Sunni and the Shi‘a in eastern Anatolia and northwestern Iran, the population so germaine to Isma‘il’s early success? What was the relationship of Isma‘il’s poetry to other similar poetry of that period, to its genre in general, or to the tradition of ruler-composed poetry? There was a well-established tradition of rulers patronizing poets or even composing poetry. A well-known example is Isma‘il’s Ottoman rival, Sultan Selim I, who composed Persian poetry. Perhaps more importantly, Sultan Husain Mirza, the late-fifteenth-century Timurid ruler of Herat, not only served as patron to poets composing in Persian but encouraged the novel idea of composing poetry in Chagatai Turkish. The radical heterodox content of Isma‘il’s poetry and its propagandist purpose have long been emphasized in Safavid studies. Isma‘il’s Divan2 recalls Sufi poetry, for example the poetry of al-Hallaj (who may have thought of himself as God’s manifestation) or of Rumi, the great Persian mystic (who certainly did not). From the perspective of their adepts, both al-Hallaj and Rumi acted and wrote through God’s grace, and their lives and poetry expressed that grace; however, neither one was God. The Sufi goal is gnosis, or becoming one with God, the ground of being. In Sufi poetry God is the beloved, the object of the lover, who longs for that union or oneness, and through participation in that process the lover becomes the beloved. In the end, the interpretation was left to the hearer or reader. Given his Safavid descent, Isma‘il’s followers saw him as a charismatic leader, and possibly some of them saw him as god-king. But his followers could also have understood the images used in his poetry in metaphorical terms and regarded Isma‘il as the manifestation of God’s grace. Clues to Isma‘il’s purpose can also be found in the political culture of the fifteenth century. Isma‘il’s invocation of history and rulership in his Divan reflects that culture, and his writings would have been decoded by his different constituencies. For example, in no. 195,3 he invokes heterodox Shi‘i images – which some scholars have interpreted literally – but he also invokes images from Firdausi’s Shahnamah, which can only be read metaphorically.

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My name is Shah Isma‘il. I am God’s mystery. I am the leader of all these ghazis. My mother is Fatima, my father is ‘Ali; and eke I am the Pir [mystical leader] of the Twelve Imams. I have recovered my father’s blood from Yazid [the Sunni ruler responsible for the death of the third imam, Husain]. Be sure that I am of Haydarian essence.4

In these lines Isma‘il articulated his descent through his Shi‘i, Sufi, and Safaviyya lineage. To claim or ascribe descent, actual or fictive, from the imams would be the next logical step to situate his legitimacy as a leader not only of an order but also of the dynasty that had established Shi‘ism in Iran. There are direct and indirect references to his father, Haydar (also, by inference, to Imam ‘Ali), and allusions to Isma‘il’s – and his family’s – leadership of the Safaviyya, the order, and more generally the mystical path. What should be emphasized here as crucial to the political culture is descent in the dominant lineage separate from any religious ideas. Elsewhere, he even suggests the ruler as shaman, a quality of rulership found in Iran and Central Asia, and in so doing Isma‘il goes beyond justifying his role as rightful successor through the Safavid lineage and Shi‘ism and justifies the present through past rulership in general (not only Islamic) to link himself with God and divine purpose. Importantly, Isma‘il’s poetry links him to the earlier Iranian political tradition and to the Shahnamah’s rulers and heroes, which was another tradition and past that justifies the present rulership.5 “I am Faridun, Khosrau, Jamshid, and Zohak [!]. I am Zal’s son [Rustam] and Alexander.”6 In this line, Isma‘il establishes his descent within Iranian rulership that represents him to all his constituencies by utilizing Firdausi’s Shahnamah rulers – Zohak, however, was an Arab usurper. This is not simply an appeal to the non-Turks, the Tajiks/Tats or urban, literate administrators – the other so-called ethnic group that provided necessary support for Shah Isma‘il and a balance to the Turkmen – but can be read more broadly. The Shahnamah was recited in both Persian and Turkish before troops went into battle. Moreover, the Ottoman sultan, Selim I, in his correspondence with Isma‘il, invoked some of the very same names from the Shahnamah and Iranian political tradition that would indicate the commonality of rulership. At the same time, however, both Selim and his father, Bayizid, acknowledged Iran as being apart from the Ottoman empire, and for Selim that was reinforced by Shi‘ism. The Shahnamah’s shahs ruled by birthright through farr, God’s grace and designation. The heroes Zal and Rustam rescued the shahs from their

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own shortcomings and thus save the realm of Iran.7 Like Alexander, Isma‘il’s self-image as a leader combines both farr – grace and, in Isma‘il’s case, lineage – and courage, cunning, and loyalty. Alexander was seen, too, as a founder of a dynasty. Commenting on the first half of Shah Isma‘il’s reign, historians typically emphasize the politics of the Qizilbash/tribal/rural/radically heterodox Iran as opposed to the Persian-speaking/urban/bureaucratic/ temperately orthodox Iran, and indicate that the former dominated the military and the latter the bureaucratic Iranian tradition. If this were the case, one cannot but admire Isma‘il’s balancing and political skills. This dichotomy, related to ethnic identities, reflected fourteenth- and fifteenthcentury historical, political, and social reality. The Turkmen were armed and mounted, had acquired military skills defending individual and federation interests, and had carried on ghaza earlier with Isma‘il’s grandfather and father, Junayd and Haydar, in Georgia. Given the Turkmen’s role in the history of the Safaviyya and in Isma‘il’s conquest, little wonder that they dominated the military. Given their own sociopolitical organization, it is not surprising that the Turkmen acted in terms of their own self-interest, which could have threatened Isma‘il’s. The administrative and bureaucratic tradition was centered in urban areas and dominated by men of the pen who commonly used three languages – Persian, along with Arabic and Turkish. Some of Isma‘il’s bureaucrats played military roles, too; differentiation between the two groups, bureaucratic and military, was not always a distinct one.8 For his military, Isma‘il relied upon Turkmen, and seems not to have established military units separate from them; the Safavid family was nontribal, even though the Safaviyya in many ways functioned as one, and he lacked the resources – save for the possibility of booty following military success – to maintain an army. Had he created new military units such as those established by his descendant, Shah ‘Abbas, their loyalty would have freed Isma‘il from dependence on the Turkmen and their politics. It is important to note that in the political culture of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, no one, including the ruler, had a monopoly of power. Isma‘il’s defeat at Chaldiran in 1514 is usually explained by several factors. The Safavids were routed by the Ottoman use of artillery and their troops outnumbered Isma‘il’s by two to one. Moreover, the Safavids utilized poor planning and tactics through their dependence on irregular and ill-disciplined tribal levies in contrast to the Ottomans. (While the Ottomans were the victors, they failed to follow up on it for fear of the approaching winter and anxiety about their long supply lines were their

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army to remain in Azerbaijan.) The Safavids’ first defeat at Chaldiran destroyed Qizilbash confidence, if not belief, in Isma‘il’s invincibility. There is only one source, and a weak one, that mentions that Isma‘il’s troops went into battle without armor subsequent to Chaldiran as proof of their belief in Isma‘il’s divinity,9 and that defeat brought the belief in Isma‘il’s invincibility to an end. Although religion was a strong motivating factor, it was no doubt sobering for Isma‘il’s irregular tribal cavalry to be defeated by the more disciplined and experienced Ottoman forces, supported with artillery. Isma‘il’s military could match its opponents so long as the encounter was on its terms: speed, flexibility, and of short duration. Moreover, there were two factors which tend to make tribal fighters unreliable. While leaders might have been required to produce a specific number of armed and mounted men there was no certainty that they could deliver at the specified time given the leaders’ oftentimes tenuous relationships with their followers. Impinging here were tribesmen’s self-interest with regard to the demands of the pastoral or agricultural economy, and then always the issue of the potential for alternative leadership. And the second factor relates to booty, a critical motivation for fighting to gain or to offset what might be lost from the pastoral or agricultural economy while fighting. Military success meant booty; defeat meant cost and economic losses. Regardless of any ideological motivation for fighting on behalf of Shah Isma‘il up to and including the battle of Chaldiran, defeat could have resulted in some kind of cost-benefit analysis, or simply pragmatism on the part of the Safavid participants. Such pragmatism in face of Ottoman military superiority and effective use of artillery was a key factor for Isma‘il and his tribal contingents and may explain the relative absence of military campaigning after 1514 and up to his death a decade later. Why face the Ottomans and possible defeat and loss, except when fighting could be done on your own terms? Historians collapse Isma‘il’s reign after Chaldiran into a decade of indulgence and escape from state affairs, which is a contrast with his engagement during the first decade of his reign. His followers’ disillusionment in Isma‘il’s charisma seems to be part of the general explanation; interestingly, defeat did not apparently damage the charisma of his father and grandfather, Junayd and Haydar, who had earlier suffered defeat in the Caucasus.10 Hunting and carousing were certainly part of what it was to be a confederation leader and ruler. Could it be, too, that Chaldiran brought home to Isma‘il the limitations of Iran’s earlysixteenth-century political culture and what it could achieve – he was

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not Faridun, Khusrau, Jamshid, or Zohak. Of course, like Alexander, he founded a dynasty, but Isma‘il’s was to endure far longer. How did the Safavids successfully rule for over two centuries? Safavid success was built on their dynastic base identified with Shi‘ism, on their ability to manage Iran’s political culture in practical terms and understand Iran’s historic rulership and its symbolic representation, and on their political and military leadership skills at key points. Shahs Tahmasp and ‘Abbas I, in particular, but others as well, were especially adept at representing themselves and their program11 to key constituencies that identified themselves with Safavid descent and rulership. Throughout the Safavid era all contenders for power, be they Qizilbash or other Safavid elites and officials, always did so in the name of a member of the Safavid lineage, but for one possible exception – the Nuqtavi movement.12 Even in the eighteenth century, after the Afghan conquest of Isfahan in 1722 and the demise of Safavid dynastic rule, revolt would be raised in the name of Safavid pretenders. Early Safavid history remains elusive given the problem of sources, yet Shah Isma‘il’s accomplishments are certain. He established and maintained Safavid political control with his Qizilbash supporters. His legitimacy with them was based on his descent in and on his leadership of the Safavid order, and on his initial success as a military leader. For the first time since the Sasanians, historic Iran was reunified under Iranian dynastic and simultaneous rulership. Shi‘ism had been established as the state religion. Isma‘il’s immediate successor was his 10-yearold son, Tahmasp. While the young shah possessed dynastic charisma in the eyes of the Qizilbash tribes, would their factionalism result in instability? And would instability give advantage to the Ottomans and to the Uzbeks and result in the fragmentation of the Safavid enterprise? What would be the relationship between rulership and the ulema, a newly emerging religious institution concerned for its own authority? The newly established Shi‘i ulema was subordinate to Isma‘il, but what would be its relationship to subsequent rulers? The year 1514 was an auspicious one for the Safavids: Isma‘il was defeated by the Ottomans at Chaldiran; his heir and successor, Tahmasp, was born; and the Portuguese occupied the island of Hurmuz in the Persian Gulf. The period from 1514 to 1524, when Isma‘il died, was relatively free of both external and internal challenges, but that changed dramatically with Tahmasp’s accession. The first several decades of his reign were characterized by a delicate balancing of internal and external threats to Tahmasp as ruler and to Safavid sovereignty.

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The most serious internal factors related to Iran’s political culture and centered on Tahmasp’s minority. This problem was partly solved by his growing maturity, and like his father he acquired status leading his troops in battle. Although the legitimacy of Safavid dynastic descent was unchallenged, Tahmasp was challenged from within his own family. In 1534 his brother, Alqas Mirza, sided with the Ottomans in return for support for his claim to the throne, and there was always the risk that one of the Qizilbash confederations, given their own factions and rivalries, would give support to a rival Safavid claimant. During Tahmasp’s long minority his first and greatest challenge then was to control Qizilbash factionalism, which weakened Iran politically and militarily in the face of continued Ottoman and Uzbek challenges. While the Qizilbash tribal confederations had been the first supporters of the Safavids in northwestern Iran and eastern Anatolia, their origins were Central Asian and from the Timurid fourteenth century. The leading Qizilbash tribal groups included the Shamlu, Rumlu, Ustajlu, Takkalu, Afshar, and Qajar confederations, most of whom were active throughout the Safavid era and the eighteenth century, and, in the case of the Qajars, into the nineteenth century. Qizilbash power and influence derived from their mounted and armed followers and from their control of vast pastures, especially in northwestern Iran, granted them for their military roles. The Qizilbash competed amongst themselves and with other similar tribal confederations for land and power. They also guarded their autonomy from attempts to circumscribe it. Furthermore, there had been a long tradition among Turkic tribes of Central Asian origin of awarding governorships to minor sons and then appointing tribal amirs, elders or commanders, as atabeg (literally, guardian), who governed on the behalf of these minor princes. Such a guardianship over Tahmasp was controlled first by the Rumlu, followed by the Takkalu, and then back again to the Rumlu, as Qizilbash amirs, or leaders, competed for authority over the young shah. Tahmasp would hardly be secure until he established his own power over the Qizilbash. Contested authority and power and the resulting chaos only served to profit the Ottomans and Uzbeks. The Ottoman sultan, Selim I (1512–1520), after his Chaldiran victory, focused his attention on the conquest of the Arab Middle East, and in 1520 he was succeeded by Sulaiman II, Qanuni (law giver), or “the Magnificent”(1520–1566), as he is known in the west, who was primarily engaged on his western frontier with Europe even though eastern Anatolia continued to be a contentious issue with the Safavids. The

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Balkans were always central for the Ottomans given their populations and wealth and proximity to Europe, and while the Ottomans were always more powerful militarily than the Safavids, they were always at a disadvantage in fighting the Safavids in eastern Anatolia given continued support of the Safavids by the Turkmen tribes there, who were closely related to the Qizilbash. Moreover, geographic factors put the Ottomans at a disadvantage in eastern Anatolia, where Ottoman supply lines were necessarily extended to their limits when on campaign there, and by the Ottoman practice of engaging in campaigns in the summer and withdrawing in the face of approaching winter with its extreme conditions. In addition, the Safavids quite successfully combined their mobility with a scorched-earth policy while in retreat, which exacerbated the problem the Ottomans had with supply lines. The Uzbeks to the east of Safavids, like the Qizilbash, were the product of a tribal and pastoral nomadic political culture, characterized especially by factions and military mobility. For many years the Uzbeks had launched military forays into Khurasan, and for the most part they were bested by the Safavids, who early in Tahmasp’s reign used artillery against the Uzbeks, presumably acquired from the Portuguese. Tahmasp proved his mettle in battle against the Uzbeks, and victory further legitimized his rulership. The Ottomans were always the more important foe, because of their greater military power and the proximity of Tabriz, the Safavid capital, to Ottoman territories; consequently, Tahmasp always had to be able to divert forces from the Uzbeks to confront the Ottomans in the west whenever they appeared there. Tahmasp effectively secured independence from Qizilbash factions in the early 1530s, just when he faced the most serious challenge from the Ottomans. Peace on their European front allowed Sulaiman to turn to the east and the Safavids. In 1534 Ottoman forces once again occupied Tabriz, but with the problems of extended supply lines and the approaching winter, they decamped and occupied Baghdad – a prize along with Iraq not to be relinquished again to the Safavids, except briefly in the seventeenth century to Shah ‘Abbas. Fortunately for the Safavids, after 1540 the Uzbek threat diminished, when their leader, Ubaid Allah, died. But further Ottoman military campaigns against Tahmasp were mounted in 1548, when Tabriz was briefly occupied – and the Ottomans had the support of Alqas Mirza, Tahmasp’s brother – and again in 1554. In 1555 Sulaiman and Tahmasp agreed to the Treaty of Amasya that in effect defined the boundaries between the two empires – Azerbaijan was within the Safavid realm and Iraq, including Baghdad and the Shi‘i shrine cities, notably Karbala and Najaf, under Ottoman sovereignty – and provided

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for three decades of peace. The loss of the Shi‘i shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf, where the early imams were buried, and therefore important for Shi‘i pilgrimage, may have been a factor in Tahmasp’s increasing support for the Safavid ulema; patronage in those shrine cities would continue regardless of their political control. Importantly too, Tahmasp moved his capital from Tabriz south to Qazvin, just beyond the reach of the Ottomans and of the Qizilbash. The very basis of Safavid legitimacy and rule played itself out through Tahmasp’s successful balancing of internal and external forces. The Uzbeks, as Sunni, especially challenged the Shi‘i nature of Safavid rulership. The Ottomans, also Sunni, posed an even greater challenge on that basis and through their own claim to universality and to rule over all Muslims. The greatest challenge to Tahmasp’s legitimacy and to Iranian stability, however, was internal, and came from the Qizilbash, whose continued representation of radical Shi‘i notions reinforced by their military power combined with Iran’s potential political fragmentation to undermine Tahmasp’s rule. Radical Shi‘ism, moreover, undermined Tahmasp’s representation as a universal and a simultaneous ruler, and, in practical terms, undermined his relationship to the broader population and especially with the urban Shi‘i ulema, which itself was evolving and establishing its own relationship with the Safavid government. For the Qizilbash, their authority was linked to the Safavid family and to descent within it. Isma‘il and Tahmasp had become central to Qizilbash identity and legitimacy as warriors in the faith; in effect, the shah was at least a charismatic leader. Tahmasp, like other Safavid rulers, used the title Sultan-i Zaman, Ruler of the Age, with the implication that the shah was the imam’s representative. Tahmasp, however, rejected the title of Mahdi, messiah (both the Sunni and the Shi‘a shared messianic notions, but for the Shi‘a the twelfth imam’s return as Mahdi is an especially potent idea), possibly in an attempt to appease the ulema and to subvert Qizilbash power. The ulema represented a very broad urban constituency that included not only legal scholars and theologians, but also like-minded scholars, philosophers, and those linked to them in terms of education and administration. This constituency not only represented Islamic continuity, but the transmission of notions regarding Iranian rulership extending back at least to the Sasanians. Furthermore, with their economic and social ties, the support of the ulema, urban elites, and their bazaar network were important in the Safavid shahs’ representation of themselves to the broader society. Tahmasp’s shift from the sectarian extremism that had characterized Safavid rule to the Iranian model of simultaneous rulership had its most

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immediate precedent with the Timurids. Tahmasp’s political shift and rulership were represented in his patronage of the great new edition of the Shahnamah, originally commissioned by Isma‘il in 1522, presumably for his young son. Tahmasp in taking on and then completing the project of the Shahnamah – it was ultimately given as a gift to the Ottoman sultan Selim II in 1567–8 – legitimized the ruler within the tradition of Iranian rulership through identification with the Shahnamah’s mythical rulers. The Tahmasp Shahnamah – until recently known as the Houghton Shahnamah – stands as one of the great artistic achievements not just in Safavid but also in Islamic art. The Tahmasp Shahnamah consisted – unfortunately, its leaves were recently separated and dispersed to several different collections – of some 759 folios with 258 miniatures painted by the greatest artists of the time. Later in his reign Tahmasp shifted again, in a more pietistic direction, which may indicate further distancing from the grandeur and richness depicted in his Shahnamah and from radical Shi‘i notions. Tahmasp may have been the patron of the great Ardabil carpets. These were woven during the middle part of his reign, and may be another expression of Safavid rulership. The Ardabil carpets could well represent an act of familial piety – the pair were woven for the Safavid shrine in Ardabil – and in recognition of his descent. Critical here, too, was patronage of a continuing artistic tradition that embodied past notions of Iran’s glory and at the same time sustained artisans, another of the ruler’s constituencies. Whereas Shah Isma‘il’s Shahnamah – of which only isolated pages remain – was based on the Turkmen (here, a generic cultural term) tradition of northwestern Iran, centered in Tabriz, Tahmasp’s drew on Mongol/Ilkhanid artistic traditions in the Timurid tradition of Herat. The universality of Tahmasp’s rule can be seen in other ways as well. The Mughul emperor, Humayun, found refuge in Tahmasp’s court in 1540, and regained the Mughul throne with his assistance in 1555. In 1559 – four years after the Treaty of Amasya – Sulaiman’s son Bayizid and some 10,000 troops sought refuge with Tahmasp, who after two years returned him to his father. In this later case, too, the Treaty of Amasya was reaffirmed. Tahmasp’s campaigns in the Caucasus before Amasya had been conducted in the guise of jihad, consequently these campaigns constituted an affirmation of Tahmasp’s family’s basis and also of traditional Islamic ideology. Tahmasp’s success in the Caucasus – and Amasya recognized that that contested region, particularly Georgia, was an area of joint interest – testified to his armies’ military prowess. The thousands of slaves captured in the Caucasus were returned to Iran, where many of them were incorporated into an elite imperial

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Figure 6.1

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Ardabil carpet (V&A Picture Library)

guard, whose commander, qurchibashi, acquired growing power. This guard constituted not only an important new constituency in representation of Tahmasp’s rulership, but also provided a counterbalance to his tribally based military, particularly the Qizilbash. The full expression of Iranian rulership in the Safavid era was achieved not by Tahmasp, but by Shah ‘Abbas I (1588–1629), commonly known as “the Great.” Like the Sasanian Anushirvan the Just, Shah ‘Abbas’s

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reputation is grounded both in popular imagination and in accomplishment. Tahmasp’s immediate successors – Isma‘il II (1576–1578) and then Muhammad Khudabandah (1578–1588) – provide sharp contrast with both Tahmasp and ‘Abbas. Tashmasp’s long reign of 52 years had resulted in essential stability, and power had become concentrated in his person because of his descent and his demonstrated leadership skills. Propinquity meant power and elite status, and his patronage and representation of his authority and power had broadened the groups that had vested interest in succession. No longer were the Qizilbash the determining group. Moreover, with Tahmasp’s death there was no single heir but nine, and of these nine only two had Qizilbash mothers, and the other seven had mothers of Caucasian origin. The two with Qizilbash mothers were Muhammad Khudabandah and Isma‘il. The former was nearly blind and not a contender. Tahmasp, on suspicion that Isma‘il was planning patricide, had him imprisoned in Khurasan. Before Tahmasp’s expected death and thus early in the succession struggle, the Qizilbash had formed two factions, one of which supported Isma‘il and the other another prince, Haydar, whose mother was Georgian. Haydar was the immediate successor, having the support of the Qizilbash Ustajlu and the Georgians, but was quickly killed by Isma‘il’s faction which included members of the Afshar, Rumlu, and Bayat tribal confederations. Another son also had Rumlu backing, as well as support from the Circassian constituency, but he failed and the Qizilbash rallied around Isma‘il, who became shah in late August 1576. In the three months that had passed between Tahmasp’s death and his accession, Isma‘il killed or blinded five bothers and four other members of the Safavid family who could possibly have served as centers of opposition. But in so doing Isma‘il was purported to have alienated some Qizilbash supporters who, allied with his sister, Pari Khan Khanum, had him killed in late November. Isma‘il’s adherence to Shi‘ism was also suspect and may have been an additional factor. Muhammad Khudabandah and his three sons, including the one who would become Shah ‘Abbas the Great, had not been murdered by Isma‘il, and as the sole heir Muhammad Khudabandah became shah with the name Sultan Muhammad Shah. An essential participant in this succession struggle was the new shah’s wife, Khair al-Nisa Begum, known also as Mahd-i ‘Ulya, herself the daughter of a regional magnate of Mazandaran. Mahd-i ‘Ulya was successful in forging a broad coalition to overcome all rivals – Isma‘il’s sister, a key rival for power, and infant son were both murdered – and secure the throne for her husband and family. The important role of royal women

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underscores, too, that the harim was yet another representation of Safavid rulership. Sultan Muhammad Shah reigned for 10 years, but it was a decade of factionalism. Once again, the Ottomans and Uzbeks took advantage of Safavid weakness to invade and occupy Azerbaijan and Khurasan. Once more a revolt was raised in the name of one of the shah’s sons, in this case ‘Abbas. He had been named governor of Khurasan, and his atabeg from the Shamlu proclaimed him shah. He was proclaimed shah again in 1587, at the age of 16, this time by an Ustajlu amir and new guardian. He was successfully enthroned in Qazvin, resulting in the deposition of Sultan Muhammad Shah, who then went into retirement. Shah ‘Abbas’s (1588–1629) accession seems to have been but a reprise of Tahmasp’s and of Isma‘il I’s. Power was in the hands of the fractious Qizilbash, but authority was vested in a scion of the Safavid family, while much of the realm was threatened or occupied by the Ottomans and Uzbeks. ‘Abbas’s success in subordinating the Qizilbash and driving the Safavid’s traditional foreign enemies from Iran marked him as the second founder of the Safavid empire. ‘Abbas’s reign not only signaled a critical change in Safavid history, but his reign inaugurated Iran’s early modern historical period. His consciousness and achievements invite comparison with his Stuart, Bourbon, and Hapsburg contemporaries in Europe and with his immediate Muslim Ottoman and Mughal neighbors. Shah ‘Abbas’s period was not merely the product of exploration and expanding horizons, but of increased trade and contact, of changing technologies in transport and warfare, and a new consciousness regarding rulership with centralization of authority and power that would lay the basis for the modern state. As a result of increased global interaction, a wide variety of European sources now augment the small but vital extant Safavid chronicles along with Ottoman and Mughal ones. European accounts were recorded by merchants, diplomats, military personnel, missionaries, and travelers, who often served in several of these capacities and who in some instances had long periods of residence in Iran. Like Isma‘il I and Tahmasp, ‘Abbas came to power as a Qizilbash protégé and had had military and governing experience, but he was somewhat older than his father and grandfather when they established their power and authority. Consequently, he seems to have had greater awareness in gaining and retaining power and in dealing with external and internal obstacles to his rule. ‘Abbas had no choice but to deal first with the Uzbeks and the Ottomans. Iran’s military inferiority prevented him from confronting both the Uzbeks and the Ottomans – the latter

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were always the major threat, so he reached an agreement with them in 1590 when he ceded Azerbaijan, including Tabriz, to the Ottomans. Khurasan’s recovery was long delayed, but in 1598 Herat was once again under Safavid control. Uzbek political culture and factionalism aided ‘Abbas, and by 1603 the Uzbek threat was greatly diminished, but it would be two more decades before Qandahar would be regained. Beginning in 1603 ‘Abbas launched a counterattack against the Ottomans and most of the territory ceded them in 1590 had been regained by 1607. In 1603–4, Safavid forces took Armenia and with it large numbers of slaves who would be important in recasting the military. In the early 1620s ‘Abbas led his forces as far west as Diyarbakr, and in 1623 Baghdad was once again secured for the Safavids. Through military success in the Gulf and with British assistance, Hurmuz, strategically significant and important for trade, was also regained. With diminished external threats, ‘Abbas was able to turn to his internal ones. Iran’s political culture in which tribal military units, in particular the Qizilbash, continued to play major military roles was the most obvious problem. A new basis for the military would require a basic administrative reorganization to allow for its funding, and restructuring the land-based fiscal system would profoundly change all the essential economic and power relationships within Iran. This would be Shah ‘Abbas’s mechanism to subordinate the Qizilbash by creating new nontribal groups as military units, or as representations/constituencies of his ruling, universal/simultaneous persona. Historically – especially since the Saljuq period – the usufruct of land grants had financed the military, whether tribal or not. These iqta‘, or suyrghals, and now in the Safavid period known as tuyul, had served as bureaucratic devices to support military service indirectly. Such practice could increase the power and autonomy of the holder and regions and had the potential to alienate land from the ruler and his administration. Often, too, the grantee’s interests were short-term, and he would seek to extract as much as possible as quickly as possible. There were two important categories of the land system that would figure in Shah ‘Abbas’s reorganization. One was mamalik (provinces or areas), granted to tribal leaders who would maintain themselves and followers from mamalik revenue. And the other was khassa (crown lands). Khassa was directly under the shah, whose royal expenses were met from it, while mamalik was administered by a special bureaucratic office. ‘Abbas ordered the transfer of land from mamalik to khassa, and vast properties and even provinces were incorporated under his direct control.

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These new incomes were redirected to finance new military units, whose members were generally known as ghulams (slaves) and whose loyalty was owed solely to ‘Abbas. The ghulam units were composed largely of Georgians, Circassians, and Armenians from the Caucasus in the cavalry, infantry, and artillery corps which were part of the royal household and which included an elite unit that constituted a royal bodyguard. The ghulams totaled some 40,000 men, and their leaders wielded great power and often gained great wealth. Increasingly, these new military elites were appointed to other administrative posts, including provincial governorships to displace Qizilbash and other tribal and regional elites. Shah ‘Abbas centralized and reallocated power to an unprecedented degree. His implemented policies went beyond military and administrative reform to affect Iran’s society, economy, and culture, and further invites comparison with other early modern leaders. As part of his centralization, Shah ‘Abbas broke up tribal confederations and transferred whole tribal populations to new areas with the continued obligation to provide military levies. In addition, populations were removed from the Caucasus to Iran, notably the Armenians who were resettled in New Julfa, a suburb of Isfahan. Their resettlement was a consequence of what we would call today the implementation of economic policy: their handicraft skills would be used both for the development of a new capital and to advance Iran’s economic and diplomatic standing. Whether in the case of tribal or ethnic populations, Shah ‘Abbas was representing his rule through the creation of new constituencies. Shah ‘Abbas’s greatest legacy could well be in architecture and city building, whether in his great Isfahan or in his many caravanserais that provided a trading link between his new capital and all parts of Iran and the world beyond it. Tahmasp had moved the Safavid capital from Tabriz to Qazvin, and in the 1590s ‘Abbas developed the more centrally located Isfahan as his capital. His reasons for such a move are not immediately evident, but were linked to economic policy and to representation of rulership. Isfahan was already an established city in a well-watered and fertile plain and had a venerable history – expressed notably in its great Saljuq Friday mosque. The center of the new Isfahan was shifted south from the Friday mosque to a new vast rectangular maidan, or square, called Naqsh-i Jahan, Design of the World. The maidan was linked to the older mosque, square, and markets by a mile-long bazaar with vaults, domes, caravanserais, baths, schools, shrines, and smaller mosques, all of which underscored the importance of trade and the legitimacy of the

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Figure 6.2

Masjid-i Shah, Isfahan (photograph by author)

ruler. In addition, the maidan was ringed by two-storey arcades for shops, and monumental buildings punctuated its four sides. At the southern end a great domed royal mosque, Masjid-i Shah, was built, and sited on the east was the Shaikh Lutf Allah Mosque, which looked like a jewel box, and facing it on the west the Ali Qapu was constructed, originally as a gate to palace gardens beyond it. The maidan itself served a variety of functions both by day and night (when it was illuminated), including military drill, festivals and celebration, and polo field. The maidan never failed to elicit marvel from all who saw it, as did Isfahan’s bridges, palaces, and especially the Chahar Bagh, the Four Gardens, with its water channels, trees, and gardens. Shah ‘Abbas’s economic and trade program, if not policy, was explicitly expressed in Isfahan and its workshops, especially those involved in silk weaving, which was a state monopoly. Textiles and other crafts, especially those items to be exported beyond Iran, brought production and trade together with diplomacy. This was the era of greatly increased trade and contact with Europe, when European governments and merchants sought goods and markets the world over. Exports were encouraged to offset the outflow of specie, a perennial problem for the Safavid economy

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with its silver base. This is the period, too, of the founding of the European trading companies, beginning with the Portuguese at the beginning of the sixteenth century – only governments or great companies had the necessary capital. A century later in 1600 the English East India Company was founded, and two years later came the Dutch East India Company. The Portuguese occupied Hurmuz in 1507, and after 1515 maintained it as a military base for over a century, until in 1622 they were forced out by a joint Safavid and English East India Company force. Increasingly, trade followed sea routes, but some trade continued across Anatolia and through the Caucasus by caravan. European rivalry and increasing contact and interaction with Iran always held the potential for conflict – a potential that would dramatically increase in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – and for diplomacy as Europeans sought Iran as an ally, particularly against the Ottomans. These foreign missions had little actual diplomatic impact, but diplomats, merchants, a growing number of travelers, and missionaries exposed Europeans to the richness and variety of Safavid culture. Shah ‘Abbas’s reign combined a kind of realism coupled with political acumen and ambition. His ambition centered on establishing, centralizing, and increasing his own power, be it military, political, or economic, which marked him again as an early modern ruler. He developed new institutions or transformed old ones, and all of them, including the ulema, were subordinated to his rule. He was intent, too, on memorializing that power in Iranian culture and society, and their architectural and artistic forms remain, although literary historians decry the absence of literary achievement throughout the Safavid period. His realism is best seen in dealing with his Ottoman and Uzbek enemies, but it is also seen in terms of the necessity of developing a balance among military units through their reorganization and administration by the creation of a new basis for them. In the end, the reorganized military would owe their allegiance to him. Shah ‘Abbas revealed a signal shortcoming and lack of realism, however, in dealing with the matter of his successor to the throne. Fourteen years before his death in 1629, ‘Abbas had his heir and eldest son, Sam Mirza, killed out of fear that he was plotting to overthrow him. Such paranoia was surely based on ‘Abbas’s memories of rebelling against his father, Muhammad Khudabandah. In addition, despite Shah ‘Abbas’s military and administrative reforms he did not wholly trust groups with power, who might use the heir to their advantage rather than to his. Of his other four sons, two of them predeceased their father and the other two were blinded to make them ineligible for succession. Early

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Figure 6.3 Si-u-sih Bridge is named for its 33 arches. It connects New Julfa, Shah ‘Abbas’s Armenian suburb, with Isfahan. It was built by Shah ‘Abbas’s favorite governor and military commander, Allahvardi Khan, in 1602, and is an example of non-royal private patronage (photograph by author)

in his reign, following the practice of his Safavid and even earlier predecessors, his sons – under guardianships – had been appointed governors of key provinces, but as his megalomania developed potential heirs were brought up in the harim where they were denied experience in governing and in acquiring political ties and relationships. Consequently, subsequent rulers lacked leadership experience and allies. Deservedly, Shah ‘Abbas the Great stands at the apogee of Safavid history: centralized power; established borders; new institutions and infrastructure; patron of culture, especially architecture; and general stability. This legacy, with some exceptions, persisted well after his own reign and into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As a consequence of ‘Abbas’s achievement comparison with the Ottomans has been inevitable. Indeed, there are striking parallels, but there were significant differences as well. Both of these great rival empires developed out of a common Muslim and Middle Eastern political culture, both relied on remarkably similar institutions, and both encountered expanding and

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increasingly powerful European states. And since Shah ‘Abbas’s rule is seen as the Safavid high point and coincided with a comparable Ottoman period, what followed in both instances has been seen as evidence of inevitable, unquestioned decline with blame falling on decadence, harim upbringing, and factionalism. Despite evidence to the contrary, this view of decline continues to be dominant. Between 1629, Shah ‘Abbas’s death, and 1722, the Afghan occupation, there were four ruling shahs: ‘Abbas I’s grandson, Safi I (1629–1642); ‘Abbas II (1642–1666); Sulaiman I, also, known as Safi II (1666–1694); and Sultan Husain (1694–1722). In addition, there was Shah Tahmasp II (1722–1732), who was essentially powerless. All of these Safavid rulers were the products of the harim and consequently inexperienced; however, both Safi I and ‘Abbas II were well served by capable ministers. In contrast, ‘Abbas II emerged as a capable ruler in his own right despite his harim upbringing. The Ottomans were always responsive to Safavid weaknesses, so the fact that there was relative stability between the empires later in ‘Abbas’s reign testifies to his success in rebuilding the Iranian military and administration. With his death and Safi’s accession, however, the Ottomans renewed hostilities, first by invading and then withdrawing from western Iran. In 1635 the Ottomans moved into the Caucasus and then took Tabriz only to retreat in face of Safi and his army’s counterattack. Late in 1638 the Ottomans successfully re-entered Iraq and captured Baghdad, and in 1639 the Treaty of Zuhab acknowledged that Ottoman gain. The border was effectively established between the Ottomans and Iran that would endure into the twentieth century, and there would be no further military conflict between them. On the eastern frontiers, there were no serious challenges from either the Uzbeks or the Mughals until the early eighteenth century. The Treaty of Zuhab, and the resulting loss of a significant Arab population, had the consequence of emphasizing the Iranian nature of the Safavid realm, though it still retained significant Turkic and other ethnic groups, whose elites continued to play key military and administrative roles both at the center and in the provinces. The exercise of power continued to depend on royal favor, and the lives of the powerful – the shah’s constituencies – were in his hands, and the response to any perceived threat was execution. Safi ordered the execution of most princes as well as key administrators such as Imam Quli Khan, governor of Fars, yet the key minister Saru Taqi, or Mirza Muhammad Taqi, survived into the reign of ‘Abbas II. Saru Taqi substantially increased government incomes, and provided critical administrative continuity during the first three years of Safi’s reign, after he had

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acceded to his father’s throne as a boy. Saru Taqi was killed by members of the shah’s guard, and he was followed by another capable minister who allowed the young shah to mature as a political leader and to be regarded as the most effective shah after ‘Abbas I. ‘Abbas II benefited from peace with the Ottomans and was involved militarily only with the Mughals. He took Qandahar from them, but in the absence of major external military threats ‘Abbas II allowed his army to begin a process of decline. ‘Abbas continued ‘Abbas I and Safi I’s administrative practices of increasing khassa, state land holdings, and he followed in his namesake’s role as architectural patron, notably when he built the great garden pavilion, Chihil Sutun, just to the west of Isfahan’s maidan, and the famous Khaju Bridge. While he shared his predecessors’ paranoia, he himself gained a reputation for just rule and religious toleration that exposed him to challenges from the ulema, who were increasingly playing a role independent from the ruling institution. Ulema charges in regard to his personal behavior may also have stemmed from their changing relationship with the monarch. ‘Abbas II died prematurely at the age of 33, and he was succeeded by his eldest son, Safi Mirza, who ascended the throne as Safi II, but who a short time later chose to be crowned a second time on a more auspicious date and with the name Sulaiman. He ruled for 28 years, no small achievement in itself, despite a variety of natural calamities, but his was a reign devoid of serious external threats. Internal stability in the same period was the result of Safavid institutions and administration, which argues against the notion that a decline took place after the rule of Shah ‘Abbas. Sulaiman was succeeded by his eldest son, Shah Sultan Husain, who was something of an absentee ruler. Sultan Husain, in addition to being the last actual Safavid ruler, permitted greater ulema power, and during his reign the great cleric, Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, attempted to impose an official kind of Shi‘ism that would shape future clerical roles and government relationships. Two years before Shah Sultan Husain was deposed, Iran was engulfed with revolts: in the Caucasus, Kurdistan, Khuzistan, the Persian Gulf, Qandahar, and Khurasan. Russia, aware of Safavid Iran’s disarray, contemplated invasion; in addition, there was always the potential of an Ottoman attack. However, the final strike against the Safavids came from the east in 1722, and was led by Mahmud, a Ghilzai Afghan of Qandahar. For several preceding years, Sultan Husain had been concerned with divisions in the royal family and the possibility of a coup against him. In addition, Safavid administrative and military divisions precluded concerted action in the Safavid provinces of Herat and Qan-

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Figure 6.4 Madrasah-yi Madar-i Shah, the theological school of the mother of the shah, was built in 1706–14 by Shah Sultan Husain as an act of piety and patronage. It is the last major Safavid building and is on the Chahar Bagh, Isfahan’s Safavid avenue (photograph by author)

dahar while Mahmud was consolidating his power among the Ghilzai in the face of Mughal weakness in India. Mahmud marched on Isfahan, routed the Safavids despite their military superiority, and laid siege to Isfahan. During the siege Isfahan’s population was decimated by disease and starvation, and the city’s recovery was problematic until the twentieth century. Seven months later that once proud city capitulated when Sultan Husain abdicated. He declared Mahmud as shah, even so one of his sons, who had escaped from Isfahan, proclaimed himself shah as Tahmasp II. Afghan control over central Iran was tenuous at best, and when Qazvin’s population forced them out, Mahmud feared that the Isfahanis

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would rebel as well. Mahmud then ordered the deaths of the Safavid elites, when yet another Safavid heir escaped. Mahmud himself was overthrown in 1725, killed by his cousin Ashraf, who succeeded him. Meanwhile, the pretender Tahmasp II sought Ottoman support for a Safavid restoration. Ottoman support was conditional, and, like Peter the Great’s, never materialized, and northwestern Iran was saved from a joint Ottoman–Russian partition only by Peter’s death in 1726. Ashraf – as all rulers of eighteenth-century Iran would be – was bedeviled by the same problems that had confronted Mahmud, and in the end he, too, failed: a weak regional base; contested power and legitimacy; continued legitimacy of Safavid pretenders, at least among notables in Iran; and Ottoman and Russian power and expansionism. Two tribal confederations, the Qajar and Afshar, had been numbered among the Safavid’s Qizilbash and both would provide support for Tahmasp II, first, under the leadership of Fath ‘Ali Khan Qajar and then under Nadir Quli Khan Afshar. Ashraf Ghilzai suffered successive defeats in Iran in 1729, and was killed ignominiously, probably by his own brother’s troops, in his attempt to return to Qandahar. The Afghans controlled only a portion of Iran for only seven years. Their initial and limited success was due to political and military tactical leadership and a short-lived unity among them. The Safavid failure, on the other hand, was due to the absence of leadership and unity. Clearly, during the Safavid era descent in the Safavid family was a prerequisite to rule Iran. Nadir Quli Khan Afshar entered Isfahan and enthroned Tahmasp II, whose father, Sultan Husain, had been murdered by Ashraf when the Ottomans promised to restore Sultan Husain to power. Within 10 months, however, Nadir installed Tahmasp II’s infant son, ‘Abbas, as ‘Abbas III, and in 1736 Nadir freed himself from even a boy-puppet when he proclaimed himself shah. Throughout the eighteenth century, a number of revolts would be raised in the name of one or another Safavid. Even though the Safavid dynasty had lost its effective power in 1722, its authority resonated in Iran. Reputedly, Mirza ‘Abd al-Husain, a leading cleric, was executed by the soon-to-becrowned Nadir when he uttered: “Everybody is in favour of the Safavid dynasty.”13 Nadir Shah’s power base grew out of his position as an Afshar tribal leader in northern Khurasan. He is often remembered as the last of the great Central Asian conquerors, and, like his predecessors, he possessed the requisite military and political skills of confederation building and the demonstrated tactical and strategic military skills to achieve and to maintain power. Like earlier leaders, he seemed to sweep across vast dis-

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tances at great speed with mounted tribesmen to devastate his opponents. What legitimacy he possessed was based on Afshar power, his leadership skills, and the promise of booty. Without Safavid legitimacy he sought to establish his own legitimacy as a universal ruler, which helps to explain his attempt late in his reign to accommodate Shi‘ism to Sunnism and to reject any possibility of Shi‘i radicalism. Nadir Quli was audacious from the point when he first supported Tahmasp II, whom he served as Tahmasp Quli (the slave of Tahmasp). In recognition of his military success against the Afghans, Tahmasp appointed him governor of such key provinces as Khurasan and Mazanderan across the north and Kirman and Sistan in the critical east. Their resources allowed him to increase his power, and with it he minted coins in his own name, which usurped Tahmasp’s legitimacy as ruler. Nevertheless, Nadir continued to serve him and forced the Ottomans from western Iran and Azerbaijan in 1730, and then he led his troops into the Caucasus. Two years later he faced the Ottomans in Baghdad, and though victory eluded him there the Ottomans agreed to the boundary terms of the 1639 Treaty of Zuhab. Subsequently, the Russians withdrew from those parts of northern Iran that they had occupied. With such military success – and bearing in mind that in 1732 Nadir had deposed Tahmasp for his infant son, ‘Abbas III – he assembled tribal leaders, notables, and ulema who proclaimed him shah in 1736 at a great assembly, quriltai. This quriltai, that harkens back to Mongol practice, legitimized Nadir’s rule and family in the absence of a Safavid, or any other, legitimizing descent. In Nadir’s next campaign, in 1738, he turned to regain Qandahar and simply continued on deep into India to sack Delhi with no intention of occupying this very rich prize or of adding it to his empire. In 1740, however, he extended Iran’s boundary to the Amu Darya, the Oxus river, which was the logical extension of his own base in Khurasan and Iran’s historic most eastern limit. After this subordination of the Uzbeks, they effectively disappear from Iran’s history. Isfahan was further marginalized when Nadir chose Mashhad, Khurasan’s major city and the location of the Shrine of the Imam Riza, the Ithna ‘Ashari’s eighth imam, as his capital. Nadir relocated tribal populations such as the Kurds and Bakhtiyari in Khurasan and in the other eastern provinces. For the last time, Iran’s center shifted east toward Central Asia, and as a consequence a significant Sunni population was incorporated into what was a Shi‘i polity. A last attempt at securing legitimacy may have motivated Nadir Shah to abandon Shi‘i exclusivity, when he advocated the recognition of

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Shi‘ism as a fifth Sunni school of law, to be called the Ja‘fari school, after the sixth imam, Ja‘far al Sadiq. In addition, the Shi‘a would abandon their practice of cursing the first three caliphs who had preceded ‘Ali, who from the Shi‘i perspective should have been the first caliph. Nadir may have been motivated to institute such a change as an attempt to mollify the Sunni Ottomans or the large number of Afghans under his direct rule. Here, with a new basis for Shi‘ism – a new constituency – he represented himself as a universal ruler. In doing so, Nadir added the ulema and Iranians in general to the groups and elites who were becoming alienated from his increasingly arbitrary and oppressive rule. As early as 1741 his son, Riza Quli, was implicated in an attempt to assassinate Nadir. Finally, in 1747, leaders of the Afshars and Qajars, Qizilbash stalwarts of the Safavids, assassinated him. Two nephews, and then his blind grandson, Shah Rukh, who maintained Afshar rule from 1748 to 1796, but only over Khurasan, succeeded Nadir Shah. Shah Rukh’s mother had descended in the Safavid family, emphasizing the family’s continued legitimating importance. With Nadir’s death, the fragmented eighteenth-century Iran shifted back to the center of the Iranian plateau under the leadership of two other tribal leaders, Karim Khan of the Zand and ‘Ali Mardan Khan of the Bakhtiyari. While the tribal title of “khan” was Turkish, both the Zand and Bakhtiyari tribal confederations were Iranian – the Zand were originally from Luristan in the west-central Zagros, and the Bakhtiyari were from further to their southwest in the central Zagros. Some 3,000 Bakhtiyari families had been resettled in Khurasan by Nadir Shah for having opposed his rule, and after his death 2,000 of these families are supposed to have returned to the Bakhtiyari. In the anarchy following Nadir’s assassination, and despite Bakhtiyari factionalism, ‘Ali Mardan Khan and Karim Khan established joint suzerainty over central and western Iran in the name of Isma‘il III, yet another Safavid puppet. The continuing importance of Safavid legitimacy for ‘Ali Mardan Khan was demonstrated in coins that were struck with the inscription bandah-ye Isma‘il, or “slave of Isma‘il,” and in his use of the title, vakil-i Isma‘il, or “regent of Isma‘il,” which had been used earlier by Nadir Quli, before he became shah. The diarchy ended in 1754 after only some four years when Karim Khan killed ‘Ali Mardan Khan and bettered other former commanders of Nadir’s army, including Muhammad Hasan Khan Qajar of Mazandaran and Azad Khan in Azerbaijan. In 1759 Karim deposed Isma‘il III, but he did not appropriate the title of shah; instead he first assumed ‘Ali Mardan’s title vakil-i daulat, or “regent/deputy of government.” Karim Khan moved his capital to

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Shiraz, where in 1765 he took the unusual title of vakil-i ra‘aya, or “regent/deputy of the people.” With this title – he is generally known simply as Vakil – Karim Khan inverted the notion of universal and simultaneous rulership used by Nadir Shah and the Safavids in which the shah was positioned as the equipoise between the cosmos, or God, and their realm and which permitted absolutism. Indeed, Karim’s rule until his death in 1779 was more akin to earlier Islamic notions of the just ruler rather than the monarchical and arbitrary universal ruler. His period of rule was characterized by a modesty that was reflected in the buildings he built in Shiraz. Moreover, he continued to patronize Shi‘ism, although by now the ulema was quite independent from the ruler. Once he eliminated his rivals, he was less bellicose and only once attacked the Ottomans. And in that instance – against Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf – the Vakil may have sought to develop trade in the Persian Gulf and to make Bushire, with its close proximity to Shiraz, the dominant port there. Following Karim Khan’s death the Zands competed among themselves for succession. The most competent of them, Lutf ‘Ali (1789–1794), grandson of Sadiq (1779–1781), who was Karim Khan’s youngest brother and an early successor, was killed by Muhammad Khan Qajar, and with his death not only was the short-lived Zand dynasty brought to its end, but with it the last vestige of Safavid Iran. The anarchy and fragmentation of late-eighteenth-century Iran recalls the late fifteenth century, but Iran’s reunification would now be brought about by the Qajars, the last dynasty in Iran’s history to be formed from a tribal base. While the Qajars constituted one of the Safavid Qizilbash tribal confederations, there was little pretense on the part of the Qajars to link themselves with Safavid legitimacy. Power would be legitimized on a Shi‘i basis, but it would be a Shi‘ism that had undergone an extraordinary transformation, a transformation that reaches to the present. The Safavid legacy, despite the ignominious eighteenth century with its fragmentation, decentralization, and anarchy, is widely recognized to encompass one of the apogees of Iran’s history: geographic reunification of an Iran under a reconstituted Iranian monarchy; Shi‘ism as the state religion; and a new flowering of Iranian art, architecture, and culture. In the early nineteenth century Iran’s eastern border would recede and the Caucasian provinces would be lost; nevertheless, the western border established at the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639 would stand. The monarchical institution headed by the shah would effectively continue until 1979, regardless of the dynastic family’s origins. The vast majority of Iran’s peoples continued to profess Shi‘ism, which, along with Persian

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culture, would become a critical component of Iranian nationalism as it developed in the nineteenth century. Not to be overlooked in the Safavid era is the tension that emerged between the two institutions of rulership and of religion as the Shi‘i ulema underwent institutionalization. While there were significant doctrinal differences between the Shi‘i and Sunni ulema, little differentiated their roles and functions. Both drew on and interpreted the Shari‘a, the legal and theological foundation of fulfilling God’s intent for living in this world. The Shi‘a, unlike the Sunni, based their legal rulings on the practice of the imams, and with the lateninth-century occultation of the Twelfth Imam, the Shi‘i ulema were confronted by the issue of discerning his will in his absence. During the Safavid era, high ranking clerics began to assume more and more the twelfth imam’s prerogatives. The Shi‘i ulema, consequently, had greater flexibility in interpretation through recourse to the imam and through the role that philosophical thought and discourse continued to play in their education and legal interpretations. The Shi‘a had historically accommodated their minority status to Sunni rule by accepting the status quo, even when the Shi‘i Buyids dominated the caliph. The establishment of a Shi‘i Iran by the Safavids transformed the ulema’s relationship with government, which occurred in the context of a rulership that was potentially antithetical to Islam, and the Usulis came to function within state structures. Two other components of this tension would prove to be that between popular Islam and the legal and philosophically grounded Shi‘i ulema, with Sufism as something of a bridge between those two. Some clerics, too, were anti-Sufi and anti-Usuli, and a variety of views were expressed and often tolerated. Shi‘ism was imposed on Iran by a charismatic leader, Shah Isma‘il, who embodied political and religious authority. Such embodiment – characteristic of simultaneous and universal rulership – held out a danger to both the institution of rulership and to the ulema, which was essentially the question: who mediated on behalf of God? The danger to rulership would come from radical, or even millennial, expectations from popular religion that the shah, whether through descent or ascription, somehow represented the infallible imam. Equally important, there was no theological basis either for Shi‘i ulema support for monarchy itself or for the notion that the shah represented the Twelfth Imam – or the various titles by which he was known, for example the “Hidden” Imam, or the Imam of the Age. The danger of a charismatic leader to the ulema was not only doctrinal, it also held out the possibility of their subordination to a king who drew authority directly from God, or the possibility even of their irrelevance. Periodically, Safavid rulers stepped back

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from this potential tension with the ulema, whose support was essential for the stability of the realm. Another factor in stability was the ulema’s social role, particularly within the urban fabric and with merchant families. In addition, despite tension over rulership and the changing nature of the ulema, the ulema, from the Safavids through the Pahlavis, acquiesced to the shah and his pre-eminence. In the changing relationship between Safavid shahs and the ulema, ideas were expressed politically, and in those periods of Safavid centralization and concentration of power – Shah ‘Abbas’s reign – the ruler was less willing to concede authority to the ulema. Shah Tahmasp, for example, seemingly disavowed his father’s charisma when he rejected the title of Mahdi, and allied himself with the Shi‘i establishment to help counter the Qizilbash. At the same time and throughout much of Safavid history, the Safavids coupled the idea of descent from the imams, and its implications for Islamic just rule, with their domestic policies to consolidate power and their military campaigns against the Sunni Ottomans and Uzbeks. In both instances, the Safavids advanced the universality of their rule, and especially under Shah ‘Abbas’s administrative and military reforms that created constituencies, including the military as well as the ulema itself – but also administrative, economic and social ones – so that millenarian expectations, associated in particular with the Qizilbash, would be further separated from the ruler. The ruler’s representation went both ways, and in practice absolutism itself was tempered by these constituencies, whose support the shah required. In the process of the ulema’s institutionalization during the Safavid period, a theological–legal dispute, with potent and continuing political and social ramifications, divided the ulema. Furthermore, during the Safavid period, key theologians and thinkers articulated new ideas that centered on authority and were often at odds with the rulers’. There were parallel developments, too, in philosophy and within Sufism that also had political and social ramifications. The theological–legal dispute within the Shi‘i ulema centered on legal sources and their interpretation and was represented by two differing factions, the Akhbaris and the Usulis. The Akhbaris based their interpretations and rulings only on the traditions – akhbar or hadith, traditions – transmitted by the imams, and the Usulis – usul, roots/principles (of jurisprudence) – allowed for reinterpretation of the traditions by mujtahids. The Usulis are also known as the Mujtahidis – the highestranking members of the ulema, who exercised ijtihad, or disciplined reasoning, to arrive at a legal decision. On the other hand, the Akhbaris argued that ijtihad was restricted to the imams. The Usulis emerged as

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dominant in late Safavid history, and as an elite within the ulema they reflect a hierarchical view of authority and of society. Usulis were the group who challenged the shah’s authority, although like the Akhbaris the Usulis historically acquiesced to the reality of the shahs’ greater power. A third group emerged in the Safavid period as well, and these were the philosophers – particularly, Mir Damad (d. 1631) and Mulla Sadra (d. 1640) – whose mystical and philosophical bases could put them at odds with some Usulis; however, they were probably Usulis who favoured delegation of the imams’ prerogatives. Like the Akhbaris they were politically quiescent, but were often given high religious offices. Advocacy for clerical activism appeared early in the Safavid era and was led by al-Karaki (d. 1534), who first argued that the mujtahid was deputy to the imam. Not only was al-Karaki’s idea supported by Shah Tahmasp, but it meant that a living mujtahid would now have final authority over believers who were to model their lives on the rulings of a mujtahid. This transformation was expressed when Tahmasp allowed al-Karaki to appoint prayer leaders, judges, and other officials, which resulted in an institutionalized clerical hierarchy. On one level this development represented a kind of separation of religion from the state, with religious authority in the hands of al-Karaki and, ultimately, the highestranking mujtahids, who owed their rank in the hierarchy to the number of other clerics, students, and believers who followed their legal interpretations. In 1576 Isma‘il II is supposed to have addressed a mujtahid at his coronation: This kingship [saltanat] in truth belongs to the imam, the sahib al-zaman [Lord of the Age] . . . and you are the na’ib [deputy] appointed in his place . . . to put into operation the decrees of Islam and the shari‘a. You spread the carpet for me and seat me on the throne . . . so that I may sit on the throne of government and rule by your decision and will.14

And the mujtahid is quoted as muttering that he was no one’s servant; if true, this underscores the tension between competing authorities. Ulema authority was also translated into political, economic, and social power. Members of the ulema were given government positions and titles; they collected khums (the fifth) from followers and administered auqaf (charitable foundations); and stood as pillars of society through marriage and other ties with merchants. Another result of these changes was that the Shi‘i ulema in the great shrine cities of Iraq, including Karbala and Najaf, important centers for Shi‘i learning and pilgrimage, declared their independence from Safavid government when control

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over them was lost to the Ottomans. Safavid and then Qajar patronage of Mashhad, burial place of the eighth imam, Riza, and then of Qum, the location of the shrine to the imam Riza’s sister, Fatima, would strengthen legitimacy and help offset the loss of the shrine cities to the Ottomans. The independence of the ulema in the shrine cities would continue to rankle all subsequent Iranian governments. Shah ‘Abbas’s successors increasingly accepted Usuli pre-eminence, secured for them by the great mujtahid, Muhammad Baqir Majlisi (d. 1700), whose vast compendium of Shi‘i traditions have had far-reaching consequences. Majlisi wielded vast power within government as a whole. He attacked the Akhbari, philosophers, and Sufis and even appropriated popular Islam to centralize the Usuli position as the basis for Iran’s religious establishment. In his treatises – including those in Persian for more popular audiences – Majlisi wrote in traditional Islamic terms regarding justice and the responsibility of the ruler and his duty to protect the people. In centralizing the ulema under the authority of mujtahids, they were co-opted by rulers who associated themselves with both sides in theological polemics. The most perceptive European commentator on Safavid Iran, Chardin, observed late in the seventeenth century: The highest throne of the universe is only fit for a mouchtehed [mujtahid], someone who possesses more holiness and knowledge than common people. Since the mouchtehed is holy, and consequently a peaceable person, a king is needed who can wield the sword to exercise justice, but he can only be his [the mujtahid’s] minister and must be dependent on him.15

Government withered in eighteenth-century Iran, and the one institution that carried Iran into the nineteenth century and the era of the Qajars was the ulema, who had become centralized under the mujtahids during the late Safavid period. Ulema continuity over that period was covered by the lifespan of another great mujtahid, Aqa Muhammad Baqir Vahid Bihbihani (1705–1793), who was responsible for the ultimate Usuli victory over the Akhbaris in the shrine cities. The Akhbaris virtually disappeared; however, something of an amalgam of Akhbari thought with Safavid mystical philosophy would emerge in the early nineteenth century with yet another Shi’i faction, the Shaikhis. Most Iranians expressed their religious life through the many forms of Shi‘ism. While the martyrdoms of the early imams had long been commemorated, dramatic expression of them, taz’iya, emerged in this period of transition from the Safavids to the Qajars. The use of the various Safavid pretenders throughout most of the eighteenth century also represented the

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popular appeal of descent and of rulership legitimized by both religion and tradition. In this instance, too, Karim Khan Zand’s appropriation of the title vakil-i ra‘aya, “representative of the people,” possibly relates to the government’s inherent responsibility to its populace. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, populism would express itself in religious terms, but at the end of the nineteenth century nationalism would indicate a new direction for populism and Iranian identity.

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The Qajars (1796–1926)

Qajar tribal history long predates the dynasty whose name is so associated with nineteenth-century Iran. The context for Qajar rule is based in Iran’s eighteenth-century political culture which was still dominated by tribal elites and politics, but the context shifted throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to end with failed constitutionalism and the emergence of a new dynasty in 1926 that would unequivocally transform Iran’s ancient political culture. Qajar dynastic history is associated with this profound shift, usually in connection with the dynasty’s inadequate response to change and its failure to maintain Iranian territorial integrity and sovereignty. Consequently, the long century of Qajar rule is almost always characterized as misrule. Few contemporary observers and few historians mention any positive Qajar achievements, and their legitimacy, always problematic with contemporaries, has continued to be withheld from their century and a half of rule. Negative assessment of the Qajars began with the dynasty’s founder, Agha Muhammad Shah (1779–1797), and his name is synonymous with cruelty. The Qajars were a major tribal confederation in northern Iran – both Agha Muhammad’s father and grandfather were powerful political contenders for power – and a serious threat to continued Afshar power. Not only were the Qajars powerful, but they were also one of the original seven Safavid Qizilbash, which gave them a legitimacy that at least rivaled the Afshar’s. The Afshar ruler ‘Adil Shah, in order to eliminate Aqa Muhammad as a potential leader, had him castrated. Despite that handicap, Agha Muhammad welded an effective coalition from his Qajar tribal base in Mazandaran and then in Azerbaijan to establish a new dynasty. He defeated the Zands, ended Afshar rule in Khurasan, and even re-established Iranian suzerainty over Georgia. He achieved the reunification of Safavid Iran that had eluded the Zands and Afshars. Before being assassinated, he located his capital in Tehran, close to Qajar tribal

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pastures, and it grew exponentially in size and importance from village to city by the end of Qajar rule. Agha Muhammad was succeeded by his nephew, Fath ‘Ali Shah (1797–1834), who needed to establish power in opposition to other claimants and to gain legitimacy, yet his greatest challenge would be from Europe. This changed relationship with Europe was marked not only by an asymmetry in military and economic power but by the Qajars’ seeming inability to recognize this imbalance. Iran’s strategic location – and its decentralization – meant that British, French, and Russian governments could compete, at relatively low cost, among themselves there in terms of imperial ambitions in the Middle East and India. Early in his reign, Fath ‘Ali attempted to play France and Britain off against each other by entering into mutual assistance and contradicting treaties with both powers. Napoleon had invaded Egypt in 1797 and sought Iranian support against both Britain and Russia. Iran’s first diplomatic agreement had been with Britain, and then in 1807 Fath ‘Ali signed the Treaty of Finkenstein with Napoleon. The British had sought Iranian assistance in Afghanistan and against France, but all parties to all these conflicting treaties were frustrated in the end. Russia was Iran’s immediate neighbor and would successfully launch an expansionist policy, first in the Caucasus to end Iran’s suzerainty over its Caucasian provinces, and that loss was recognized by two treaties, Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchai (1828). The Treaty of Turkmanchai was necessitated by Fath ‘Ali Shah’s unrealistic and ill-fated attempt to regain territory that had been earlier lost in the Treaty of Gulistan. Later in the century Russia advanced into Central Asia. The asymmetry in power and inability to recognize it and the reliance on irregular troops and tribal levies resulted not just in permanent territorial losses but also a crushing indemnity as a consequence of the illconceived attempt to recover territory. One significant and long-term consequence of the indemnity and territorial losses was the emergence in Iran of anti-foreign populism, which was ulema led and motivated by the long-standing tradition of jihad, or ghaza, in the Caucasus. These Caucasian territorial losses, however, were permanent, and the Muslims living there were lost to Christian Russia save for the many that emigrated to Iran. In addition, the Treaty of Turkmanchai granted Russian subjects extraterritorial privileges – known later as the hated capitulations – that would be further extended to the other European powers. The capitulations had legal and economic implications. Some Iranian subjects, typically minorities, were free from Iranian legal jurisdiction, and imported goods were exempted from usual tariffs, which directly affected Iranian trade and products. Territorial losses, the capitulations,

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and increased European interference in Iranian domestic affairs reinforced through direct experience symbolic aspects of jihad and added the new psychological one of national and religious humiliation. Fath ‘Ali’s lack of realism was demonstrated by his inability to centralize power and to reorganize his government and military before launching another Caucasian campaign. Without administrative changes not only were resources unavailable to reform and centralize his government – necessary to forestall Russian advances – but he was incapable of transforming the basis of his army to fashion irregular forces into a disciplined force armed with modern weaponry. However, his son and heir, ‘Abbas Mirza, the governor of Azerbaijan, did modernize his own forces by utilizing French and British military advisors. Unfortunately for the Qajars and for Iran, he predeceased his father shortly before his father’s own death, otherwise as shah he might have extended such reforms across the government and military. Qajar lack of interest in initiating reforms raises the question as to why Iran did not inaugurate them, when both the Ottoman and Egyptian rulers, facing similar internal obstacles to change and European military and political challenges, initiated centralizing policies and military reform. The Ottoman sultan, Mahmud II (1808–1839), and Egypt’s Muhammad ‘Ali (1805–1848) reacted to the European threat and, also in the face of strong internal opposition from vested ulema, military, and other traditional elite interests, inaugurated sweeping military, administrative, and economic reforms in their respective states. Muhammad ‘Ali, like the Qajars, had only recently assumed power. But the Qajars’ means of gaining the throne only heightened their insecurity; moreover, not only was there the continuing problem of inadequate income for military modernization, but there was always the potential that a strengthened military would stage a coup d’etat against them. In 1807 the French sent General Gardanne on a military mission to strengthen Iran against Russia and, possibly, to threaten British interests in India, but the Gardanne mission was soon abandoned. Fath ‘Ali Shah was directly aware of Europe’s growing power and rivalries. British diplomatic overtures were made first in 1800, followed by French ones in 1802, followed by subsequent treaties. In 1810 the first Iranian students were sent to Europe, which implies awareness of the need for a kind of mutuality in gaining a direct understanding of Europe. However, though ‘Abbas Mirza understood the importance of military reform, his successors seemed unconcerned. The Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828 stands as an important mark in Qajar history, and it presages all the problems that confronted them

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during their rule of Iran. The two most important of these concerned rulership and national sovereignty, including territorial integrity. Intertwined with both of these issues would be identity and how to respond to the western impact and the internal changes that it provoked, albeit indirectly. When the Qajars extended their hegemony over all of Iran, they did so as tribal leaders, and there was no other legitimizing basis for their rule. Within the Qajar confederation, their legitimacy drew primarily on descent within the lineage of the Safavid’s Qizilbash. They expanded that legitimacy through political marriages. For example, one of Fath ‘Ali Shah’s wives was Bakhtiyari. In addition, the Qajars appropriated customary Islamic and Shi‘i symbols and titles and had them inscribed on documents and struck on their coinage. Fath ‘Ali Shah and ‘Abbas Mirza could claim legitimacy in pursuing jihad in the Caucasus and in ‘Abbas Mirza’s attempt to regain for Iran Shi‘i Herat in 1833 from the Sunni Afghans. ‘Abbas Mirza’s death in that same year and then Fath ‘Ali Shah’s in 1834 raised the question of legitimacy and precipitated yet another succession crisis. The challenge to succession came from within the Qajar descent line, but was resolved, as would be Nasir al-Din’s accession in 1848, through recognition by the great powers. Fath ‘Ali had produced a very large number of sons, and that further exacerbated the always vexing question of succession. In this instance, all of Fath ‘Ali’s sons were bypassed in favor of a grandson, Muhammad Mirza, the son of ‘Abbas Mirza, who succeeded his grandfather as Muhammad Shah (1834–1848). In both 1834 and again in 1848, Russian – as the consequence of Article 7 of the Treaty of Turkmanchai, the Russians recognized ‘Abbas Mirza, the presumptive heir at the time, as his father’s designated successor – and British backing assured Muhammad’s and then Nasir al-Din Mirza’s accession. As a consequence, the Qajars could ignore any internal threat to their rule and any need for significant military reform. Given this dependence on Russia and Britain, Qajar legitimacy was further weakened and linked with the broader issue of national sovereignty in the minds of their subjects – nationalism was a newly emerging factor in Iran’s history. Russia and Britain were seen as extending their power to encompass many aspects of Iran’s political economy, especially with the sale of concessions during Nasir al-Din Shah’s reign. One last consequence – also touching on national sovereignty and identity – of the Treaty of Turkmanchai followed in its immediate aftermath. In 1829 Russia sent a mission to collect the stipulated indemnity,

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and its head was Griboyedov, a most promising and greatly beloved young writer. Despite over five years’ experience in Iran, and a command of Persian, Griboyedov’s insensitivity to Muslim culture provoked a crisis in which he and some 44 of his mission, along with a number of Cossacks, were killed by a mob. Central to the crisis were the issues of apostasy and women, each of which was inflammatory in itself. The ulema had tried to play a mediating role, but then lost command of the situation – one member of the ulema issued a fatwa favorable to mob sentiments – and anti-foreign feelings aroused the mob’s fury, which went out of control when Russian Cossacks opened fire and killed a young man. Even Fath ‘Ali Shah felt threatened, and only after four days was order re-established. The ingredients here of xenophobia, ulema and bazaar, and a weak regime would be seen subsequently in mid-century with the Babi persecutions, in the 1890–1 tobacco concession crisis, and finally in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–6. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, British and Russian influence grew to the extent that individuals and groups sought to affiliate with one power or the other, and shahs and their governments attempted to play one off against the other. Muhammad Shah (1834–1848), Fath ‘Ali’s successor and grandson, vacillated between them. Initially, he moved more in the British direction and granted Britain extraterritorial privileges comparable with those earlier awarded Russia. Two developments, both beyond Muhammad Shah’s control, emerged in the last decade of his rule, and both would have early and profound consequences for his successor, Nasir al-Din Shah (1848–1896). The first was Russia’s emerging forward policy in Central Asia, which would threaten Iranian interests in Herat in mid-century, a process that had begun in the early nineteenth century in the Caucasus. The second was internal and related to the controversy about religious authority between the Akhbaris and Usulis in the Safavid period, which had populist as well as reformist implications. In 1844 a little-known sayyid – the title for the Prophet Muhammad’s descendants who were often held in very high esteem by the populace – Muhammad ‘Ali, proclaimed himself the Bab, or “Gate,” a messianic notion. The Akhbaris had virtually disappeared during the eighteenth century, and the Usuli position with mujtahid domination was essentially unchallenged, but the Usulis were now contested by the Shaikhis. The Shaikhis took their name from Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa’i (d. 1826), an Arab theologian from Bahrain who had settled in Iran. His theology bore the imprint of Safavid philosophical mysticism. The Shaikhis, like the Akhbaris, argued that each individual believer could interpret the faith

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Figure 7.1 Qajar rock-relief of Fath ‘Ali Shah and sons, Taq-i Bustan (photograph by author)

and need only acknowledge the authority of the twelfth imam and not the mujtahids. Shaikh Ahmad went on to assert that in every age, there was one – the perfect Shi‘i – to speak on God’s behalf. After the disappearance of the twelfth imam, the Bab would appear but remain unknown, and he would be the imam’s representative. Some of these elements were repeated in the teachings of Sayyid Muhammad ‘Ali. These notions were reflected more broadly by some within the ulema who would begin to advocate change and reform in the late nineteenth century. Some of the ulema, and others, came to articulate a kind of secularism. The early Qajars tolerated the Shaikhis as a counterbalance to the ulema. Such toleration for the Shaikhis and others demonstrated the simultaneous nature of Qajar rulership and its representation, and, in practical terms, demonstrated Qajar social responsibility for these constituencies. Sayyid Muhammad ‘Ali had received Shi‘i theological and legal education in the Iraq shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala, where he was attracted to the Shaikhis, who recognized his ability to interpret the faith. In 1844, after returning to Shiraz, he identified himself as the Bab, or

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possibly as a messianic precursor, or as the imam, or even a manifestation of God. His doctrine, expressed in The Bayan, advanced the idea of successive and superceding revelations appropriate to each age. The Bab articulated a number of progressive social values – including higher status for women – and economic policies, including free trade. His family’s social background as merchants in Shiraz may have been a factor here. He attracted a large following that may have been responding to the profound changes in early-nineteenth-century Iran. Not only were Babi doctrines anathema to the ulema, but they profoundly threatened the accepted social order. At the time of Nasir al-Din’s accession to the throne, the Babis began a series of revolts, which were brutally suppressed by the government, and in 1850 the Bab himself was captured and executed. Qajar legitimacy was always problematic, especially at the time of succession, but also the ulema saw the growing success and militancy of the Babis as a major threat to their authority and charged the Babis with apostasy. What put the Babis beyond the limits of orthodoxy was the concept that the Bab’s teachings superceded the Qur’an, God’s final and complete revelation to humanity. The courageous and extraordinary Babi preacher and poet Tahirah Qurrat al-‘Ain preached publicly unveiled, before she was executed in the aftermath of the Babi attempt to assassinate Nasir al-Din Shah in 1852. In mid-century the Babis were ruthlessly hunted down, and many fled Iran, especially to Ottoman territory. There the Babis split over the issue of leadership of the community, and out of this Baha’ullah declared a new dispensation that was liberal, humanitarian, syncretic, and pacific in nature to replace radical Babism. These ideas appealed especially to the newly emerging professional and business classes with western orientations and to reformers and even to elements in the ulema. Baha’ullah laid the basis for the new Baha’i faith, which many Shi‘a still regard as apostasy. The ferment and ideas of the Babis and Baha’is re-emerged in the lead-up to the Constitutional Revolution in the first decade of the twentieth century. Nasir al-Din (1848–1896), as the heir to the throne, had been appointed governor of Tabriz by his father, Muhammad Shah. There he was advised by the very capable Mirza Taqi Khan, known by his title, Amir-i Kabir, who continued as the young shah’s prime minister in Tehran. ‘Amir-i Kabir had trained under Qa’im-i Maqam, ‘Abbas Mirza’s very capable and reforming minister. Moreover, ‘Amir-i Kabir had been exposed to administrative and economic reform and modernization through diplomatic service in both the Ottoman empire and Russia, and he inaugurated a large number of potentially centralizing reforms in Iran.

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Figure 7.2 Nasir al-Din Shah on the Peacock Throne (Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur M. Sackler Gallery Archives. Smithsonian Institution, Washington D.C.; Gift of Jay Bisno, 1985. Photographer Antoin Sevruguin)

Amir-i Kabir’s suppression of the Babis may have been part of this effort. Like other contemporary Middle Eastern reformers, ‘Amir-i Kabir sought first to reorganize the army on a European model of education and training as a prelude to centralization of power. To finance the new military he enacted administrative and economic reforms that met with strong opposition, even within the court. In 1851 he founded Dar al-Funun, Iran’s first technical and military school. Its teachers and texts were mostly European and required translators and translation, a process that gradually broadened exposure to western ideas. Seven years after its founding, 42 Dar al-Funun graduates were sent to Europe for further training. The first girls’ school was opened in 1865, though most girls who received education were educated at home, often along with their

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brothers. Amir-i Kabir also advocated simpler usage in written Persian – an idea that started with Qa’im-i Maqam – and published Iran’s first official gazette. The first actual newspapers, or news-sheets, appeared during the Constitutional Revolution. The shah, fearful of ‘Amir-i Kabir’s power and the discontent his reforms generated among traditional elites, first dismissed him and then in 1852 had him murdered. Without the experienced ‘Amir-i Kabir and with an inadequate army, Iran tried to reassert hegemony over Herat in 1856, only to be thwarted by British imperialist concern for India and Afghanistan. Furthermore, Britain proceeded to occupy Iranian territory in the Persian Gulf as a means of applying additional pressure on Iran. Consequently, in 1857, Iran renounced its claims to Herat. Iran’s eastern boundary was essentially established, like those to the west with Ottoman Iraq and to the north with Russia along the Aras river. Modern Iran’s borders – yet to be internationally recognized – were essentially established. Nasir al-Din Shah exhibited realism in not attempting to reassert hegemony over a greater Iran, but lacked realism in terms of domestic reform. Iran’s inadequate military in face of the more powerful British and Russian armies was readily apparent. Less obvious, perhaps, was the necessity to respond to equally powerful economic and political changes. To some of the shah’s ministers – typically, those with experience informed by travel to the Ottoman empire or Russia – and to others in the Middle East, however, the need for reform was obvious. Despite the reduced size of his empire, Nasir al-Din Shah governed unchallenged in the context of Islamic and universal rulership. Moreover, traditional expectations for government were essentially met: defense, a problem essentially solved with all of Iran’s neighbors; upholding Shari‘a, demonstrated in suppression of the Babis and patronage of the ulema; and maintenance of order and the general well-being of his subjects. There were no expectations that traditional government had economic, educational, social service, or even legal roles, although government had an indirect impact on the economy in terms of order, through patronage, and through the need to raise revenues in order to provide for the court, bureaucracy, and the military. The ulema had legal jurisdiction over Muslims, and they, along with pious individuals, provided educational and social services to maintain the moral order that included accepting the political status quo. Maintenance and well-being continued to be seen in circular terms, and traditional Iranian government had been advised from Sasanian times to achieve a balance in which the government could support itself

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and the necessary military for defense and internal order without exploiting the peasantry. Land continued to be the basis for power and wealth and the primary source for taxation. Traditional administration, including taxation, was in the hands of bureaucrats. (Through long-standing historical precedent they constituted something of a closed hereditary guild and provided important institutional continuity.) Governorships were awarded to Qajar family members; the key province of Azerbaijan continued to be held by the heir-apparent with the title vali‘ahd. Nasir al-Din Shah’s eldest son (by a non-Qajar mother, so not his designated heir), Mas‘ud Mirza, Zill al-Sultan, was the long-term governor of Isfahan and much of southern Iran, and was thought by many of his contemporaries to be as powerful as his father, the shah. Provincial capitals and courts mirrored Tehran. Although the shah’s power was in theory absolute – arbitrariness might better describe its practice – because of Iran’s autonomy for groups and whole regions, its geography, and the limited nature of traditional government, compounded by Qajar reluctance to modernize its military and police, few actually felt absolutism outside of Tehran or the provincial capitals. Those who did were mostly notables who earned royal displeasure, were charged with corruption, and therefore had their property confiscated. Most Iranians had no direct contact with the shah or his government. At the same time, Iranians accepted the social order and the shah’s equipoise role in balancing and negotiating it. Significantly, one component of the shah’s many titles was, qutb, pivot around which the universe rotates. Balance and balancing became increasingly difficult for Nasir al-Din as the result of long-term changes. Many of the key long-term changes with negative consequences were not readily apparent. Disregarding the unreliability of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century statistics, Iran’s population would seem to have grown from about 6 million in 1800 to 10 million in 1900, despite disease and famine, especially the great famine in the early 1870s. Subsistence agriculture continued to dominate the economy and was exchanged locally. Nevertheless, agricultural productivity did not meet domestic needs. There seems, too, to have been a shift in consumption patterns as more sugar and tea were imported. Textiles from Russia and India, in particular, undercut domestic textile production in Iran, possibly the most important sector in manufacturing. Imports increasingly upset the balance of trade, resulting in the continuing outflow of specie and precious metals. The export of raw silk, which accounted for as much as a third of Iran’s total exports in the midnineteenth century, almost stopped when production was decimated by

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silkworm disease. Export of cotton and opium became increasingly important. The increasing value of carpet exports was another positive factor in Iran’s economy at the end of the century. Trade did grow at about 2.5 percent over the century, but the international fall in the price of silver weakened Iran’s currency and economy. Foreign capital, increased international trade, centralization of government, modernization of law, and investments in infrastructure provided inputs for economic development in other areas of the Middle East but not in Iran. There were other factors that inhibited Iran’s economic development. Traditional social attitudes and practices favored land as the primary form of long-term investment, but there was always concern lest it be confiscated. Consequently, land was alienated to pious foundations, vaqf (pl. auqaf ), administered by the ulema and shrine custodians. Official positions were auctioned, and their holders sought to maximize short-term returns at the expense of greater long-term potential. Capital was always in short supply and subject to high interest rates. Grain shortages were exacerbated not only by the difficulty of moving bulk goods over woefully inadequate roads, but also by hoarding to drive up prices. The most important factor that worked against any change was the vested interest of key social groups that included the court, notables and landlords, ulema, tribal khans, and merchants. Nasir al-Din Shah did initiate governmental reforms, usually at the behest of his prime minister who had traveled and served in the Ottoman empire or in Russia, only to ignore or end them in face of opposition to change. A cabinet with six ministers was promulgated in 1859 to be followed in the next year by a council of notables. In 1870 a privy council sat with the shah, and in 1871 another attempt was made to form a cabinet, which included nine ministers with defined responsibilities. In 1875 local administrative councils were established. European-style ministers and prime ministers were appointed, but such appointments, along with the other bureaucratic reforms, had little effect, for power continued to be seen as flowing from the shah. Qajar failure to initiate reform was related to this gap between authority and the means to implement it. The Qajars failed to develop effective institutions and infrastructure, not only because of their own self-image and notions, but also because of inadequate means of taxation and continuing shortfalls in state income. The problem, too, was instrumental in that Tehran continued to rely on irregular tribal and regional levies to assert royal authority (until 1878 when the Russian officered and trained Cossack Brigade was formed). Critically, the Qajars were ineffective in initiating let alone implementing reforms because of

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the resistance of vested interests to changes to the certainty of the status quo that would further threaten their legitimacy. And lastly, while the Qajar shahs themselves lacked the will to carry through change, they failed to support – even undermined – ministers who saw the necessity for change. Change necessarily occurs, and some technological reforms were even favored. In 1858 the first telegraph line was installed, and in 1864 it was linked to Baghdad and to India. The telegraph held out the possibility of greater governmental control and centralization in speeding communications and orders from Tehran, but it also hastened the dispatch of demands to the center. Otherwise, infrastructure, so vital for the growth of trade and economic modernization, was totally ignored, partly out of fear that the center’s power would be compromised and partly because of the lack of capital. There was some regional investment in infrastructure by local notables, but economic development was handicapped by disorder in the provinces, where tribal and regional leaders had their own military contingents. Although the Qajars always lived in fear of tribal revolts or uprisings, few occurred, and not only because of support for Tehran by the great powers. Nasir al-Din Shah did successfully utilize traditional administrative methods for controlling tribes and regions. Such means included divide-and-rule tactics; sons of notables were maintained at the royal courts as hostages to their fathers’ good behavior; political marriages were arranged; and favors, titles, land grants, and tax exemptions were granted. None of these practices were unique to the Qajars – they had long characterized Iran’s political culture and rulership. Moreover the Qajars continued time-honored administrative practices. Many of their bureaucrats, both in the capital and in the provinces, were experienced and capable. These administrators formed a self-perpetuating institution with some independence from the government in that skills, training, and office descended in bureaucratic families. These families constituted a traditional elite in Tehran and in provincial capitals, and provided important social continuity not just through their roles but also through marriage with ulema and bazaar merchant families. The Qajars were successful patrons of religion and its institutions. The ulema generally acquiesced not just to Qajar power but also to their authority, despite Shi‘i political doctrine that held that all government save for that of the imam’s was illegitimate. The Qajars patronized both the important Shi‘i shrines in Mashhad and Qum along with their schools, seminaries, and charitable institutions through endowments and

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Figure 7.3 Shrine of Fatima, Qum (photograph by author)

construction of buildings. Given the ulema’s central if independent role in Qajar society and administration, it would have been unlikely for the Qajars to implement any meaningful legal reforms that would undermine the Shari’a and the ulema. In 1889 talk of legal reform was just that. In addition, the Qajars provided support for expressions of popular Islam through the Muharram ritual observances and the taziyya, the Shi‘i passion plays, both of which commemorated the martyrdoms of the early imams, and by constructing venues for their performances. Most notably, Nasir al-Din Shah constructed the great Takiyyah Daulat, 1867–73, in the capital – a large, brick amphitheater of some three floors, covered by a huge awning – and many more takiyyahs were built in Tehran and in the provinces for public performances and ceremonies. But even the dramatic re-enactment of the early imams’ deaths held out the potential of providing a focal point for opposition by linking the names of the unjust perpetrators of those seventh-century martyrdoms with the contemporary Qajars and their injustice.

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Figure 7.4 Gathering of ulema (Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur M. Sackler Gallery Archives. Smithonian Institution, Washington, D.C.; Gift of Katherine Dennis Smith, 1973–1985. Photographer Antoin Sevruguin, negative number 0.5)

The Qajars were also patrons of the arts, notably painting in its many forms. Fath ‘Ali Shah understood the value of his own representation through portraits and in rock carvings that emulated Sasanian and Achaemenian rulers and rulership, in which he was depicted with all the symbols of his authority of crown, scepter, orb, and sword. His were the first coins to be struck with an image since the Sasanians. Qajar painting demonstrated most concretely the increasing interaction between traditional Iranian ideas and techniques and new ones from Europe. One new development included oil painting on canvas. European artists had begun to visit Iran in the Safavid period, but during the Qajar period Iranians were increasingly exposed to European art and tastes through their own travel to Europe, the Ottoman empire, or India. Elements and motifs from miniatures, such as botanical paintings and drawings of flowers, were scaled up to life size to stand on their own as individual works of art. On a larger scale, miniature painting was magnified as wall

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Figure 7.5 Central section of a contemporary copy of Fath ‘Ali Shah mural (courtesy of Brooklyn Museum)

murals. Portraiture became more common, and one mural painted for Fath ‘Ali Shah’s Nigaristan Palace in Tehran – destroyed but known by a contemporary copy – depicted him seated on his throne, surrounded by an entourage that numbers no less than 118 figures. The mural graphically depicts the shah’s constituencies and includes three British envoys. Moreover, Fath ‘Ali Shah recalled ancient representation of Iranian rulership by commissioning carved stone reliefs in the Sasanian manner. Papier-mâché pen boxes, book covers, and mirrors and other decorative and useful objects were prized in the Qajar period both within and outside Iran. In addition, glass, metalwork, and woodwork were produced along with carpets to make important commercial and economic contributions, especially to the local market. The revival of carpet production late in Nasir al-Din Shah’s reign was significant for trade and the economy in general, and, on the domestic level, carpet production allowed women and children to make a direct contribution to the family income. At the same time, weavers often worked under deplorable conditions.

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Nasir al-Din Shah patronized art and culture in its many forms, and seems to have been genuinely curious. He summoned Qurrat al-‘Ain to an audience before her execution because he wanted to meet first-hand this remarkable Babi woman. He was fascinated by western gadgetry and by photography; indeed, he was an amateur photographer. Curiosity lay behind his desire to visit Europe, and Nasir al-Din Shah traveled there three times, in 1873, 1879, and 1889, at considerable cost, and the matter of financing these and other growing costs of the court and government became central issues late in his and during his successor’s reigns. Nasir al-Din Shah would not risk financial reform and fell back on the sale of concessions, which was not unlike the traditional practice of selling/auctioning offices and awards. Possibly, too, one of his prime ministers, Mirza Husain Khan, commonly known by his title Sipah Salar, believed that concessions would allow for economic development at no cost to Iran. These concessions, however, were costly to Iran and to Nasir al-Din Shah’s own legitimacy and ultimately to Qajar power. The granting of concessions revealed the contradictions in Qajar policy and society and underscored the loss of national sovereignty, an issue throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first of these concessions, the 1872 Reuter concession – instigated by Sipah Salar – was notorious for its generosity in awarding to Baron Julius de Reuter sweeping rights to develop Iran’s natural resources, build railways, open a national bank, and create other agricultural, irrigation, and manufacturing projects. Immediate public outcry forced the shah to revoke the concession the following year and to dismiss his prime minister. In 1888 the Lianazoff fisheries concession in the Caspian was granted along with one in the south to a British firm, Lynch Brothers, to open the Karun river for trade. In 1889, as partial compensation for the cancellation of the first Reuter concession, Reuter was granted a new one for a bank, the Imperial Bank of Persia, which was allowed exclusive rights to issue bank notes. Also in 1889 the Russian Dolgorosky was given the first refusal rights for a concession to build a rail system. A Russian bank was also chartered. Most significantly for the shah, in 1890 he granted the tobacco concession to a British subject. This was a monopoly for the production and sale, including export, of all Iranian tobacco. Public reaction was so great that the shah was forced to cancel it in its entirety in 1892. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) preached the need for social and political reform to transform not only Iran but the whole of the Middle East to enable it to withstand western influence and to overcome the inadequacy and corruption of Middle Eastern government. Al-Afghani’s

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preaching and writing presented a critique of Iranian and Middle Eastern politics, society, and culture, a critique that has continued down to the present day. His impact across the Middle East remained unprecedented until the late-twentieth-century revolution and Khomeini’s role in overthrowing the Pahlavis and in establishing an Islamic Republic. To the British, Jamal al-Din was a dangerous agitator, and the governments of Iran, Egypt, and the Ottoman empire sought to control him at the same time they sought his advice, but in the end, they too, saw him as a dangerous agitator. Jamal al-Din was born in Asadabad (a community west of Hamadan) – and he is known as such, “Asadabadi,” in Iran. He traveled widely in the Middle East, including Afghanistan and India, after which he called himself “Afghani” as a basis to rally all Muslims against British imperialism and colonialism, and not just the Shi‘a, who would have related to him through his actual patronymic. Adding to the aura of ambiguity around him was that in his public preaching he presented himself in traditional religious terms, while his skeptical, rational views were expressed privately, for example in correspondence with the French philosopher, Ernest Renan. Al-Afghani’s own skepticism about religion was known to some of his contemporaries, but he believed that the peoples of the Middle East could only be politicized on a traditional, religious basis. Jamal al-Din was born into a sayyid family and was educated in traditional Islamic disciplines in Iran and in Iraq. He was attracted especially to Sufism and philosophy, and shared the traditional elitist attitude that religion was appropriate for the masses but not for rationally oriented philosophers. He also exhibited familiarity with Shaikhi and Babi ideas, and in India he was exposed to wide-ranging religious developments and to western ideas, particularly to modern science. He responded to westernization by undertaking a critical assessment of Islam and calling for its reinterpretation. Given his Shi‘i background and philosophical orientation, his call for greater emphasis on reason was characteristic. Jamal al-Din saw the importance of basing change and political mobilization on indigenous tradition and culture, and saw that only through such change could Muslims develop the military and political strength to counter the west. This had an impact across the Middle East, first in terms of a greater Islamic awareness and then increasingly in particularistic nationalism but also in terms of individual responsibility rather than reliance on religious authority, both of which would provide the basis for constitutionalism early in the twentieth century.

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The importance of al-Afghani’s notions – not yet nationalist and secular ideologies – and impact are still debated, as are the roles of other like-minded Iranians such as Malcolm Khan (d. 1908), who had not received ulema education. This group advocated reforms based on European and Ottoman models, particularly legal ones that were both antiQajar and anti-ulema, and asserted that such reforms were compatible with Islam. Others, like Akhunzadah (d. 1878), despite education in traditional Islamic sciences, were anti-Islamic. Akhunzadah was one who, despite Turkic ethnicity and Russian residency, asserted an Iranian identity. An important catalyst for change followed from the tobacco concession, which was awarded secretly in 1891, but was made public first in Akhtar, a Persian newspaper published in Istanbul and then in leaflets. This newly emerging journalism played an important role in broadening public awareness and participation. Public opinion was so quickly galvanized because the tobacco concession directly touched so many Iranians through the common use of tobacco and through the symbolism of granting control of it to Europeans. Ulema played key roles in Iran and in Iraq, where al-Afghani convinced a ranking mujtahid to denounce the concession and the “sale of Iran” by the shah. The protest spread to all major cities as the national boycott grew. Government forces fired on a mass demonstration in Tehran that resulted in several deaths and even bigger demonstrations. There was concern that even the shah and his prime minister might be threatened. The concession was canceled but only after payment of compensation raised by borrowing £500,000 from the British-owned Imperial Bank – Iran’s first foreign debt. The populist coalition included traditional ulema, merchants, and urban masses, all of whom had played roles in the Griboyedov crisis and in suppression of the Babis. Two new groups emerged by the early 1890s to join the loose coalition calling for the tobacco concession’s cancellation – radical or liberal ulema, some with Babi backgrounds, and a small but increasing number of secular liberals. These two new groups sought social and political solutions to the challenges posed by the west and by ineffective Iranian government. While most of them saw the necessity to frame reform in Islamic terms, some of them urged that only secularization of education and law would result in meaningful change. After cancellation of the tobacco concession, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and a small number of followers intensified their attempts to de-legitimize Nasir al-Din Shah, and one of them assassinated him in 1896. From the 1829 Griboyedov crisis, the mid-century persecutions of the Babis, and then the opposition to the tobacco concession, culminating

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in its cancellation in 1891, Iranians were mobilized on a religious basis and on the authority of the mujtahid-dominated ulema. In all three instances royal legitimacy was challenged. In the 1880s, in particular with the granting of concessions, national sovereignty became an issue and further undermined the shah’s legitimacy. Two critical developments had begun to emerge: one was the articulation of ideas about how best to respond to both internal and external problems, and the other was the emergence of new groups wanting changes such as ridding Iran of irresponsible government and developing economic and military means to end western domination. This demand for change provided a challenge to both royal and religious authority in calling for accountability. Moreover, there was a broadening of the base for political participation. The proponents for change included government officials, merchants, and workers from Azerbaijan who had found employment in Russia or who had contact with family members who lived there. The Azerbaijan conduit was especially significant in transmitting radical and socialist ideas to Iran. Many of these Azerbaijanis had secular backgrounds and had observed first-hand the defensive reforms in the Ottoman empire and Russia, or had read about them in a newly emerging Persian press published abroad. Other proponents for change, even very radical ones, emerged from the ulema, including Jamal al-Din al Afghani, and the new secular leaders came together in the Constitutional Revolution along with the ulema-based ones. Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1896–1907) succeeded his father, Nasir al-Din Shah, but only after the announcement of his death was delayed until the new shah had arrived in Tehran from Tabriz where, as vali‘ahd, he had been governor. There was fear that his succession would be challenged by two of his brothers. Any challenge, however, was thwarted by the prime minister, the Cossack Brigade, and Russian and British support for the Vali‘ahd. Muzaffar al-Din Shah continued his father’s pattern of indifference toward reform, while European involvement in Iran’s economy and domestic politics intensified, as did domestic demands for change. Muzaffar al-Din Shah, like his father, moved toward reform with encouragement from prime ministers only to back away from them. Similarly, he shifted between favoring Russia or Britain, as rivalry between them intensified. The new shah had been sickly and his physicians recommended that he travel to Europe for health reasons. He and his retinue made no less than three journeys to Europe from 1900 to 1905. In order to finance these travels the shah’s government borrowed money from Russia in 1900 and in 1902. In return for the second loan, Iran gave significant

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economic concessions to Russia, including an even lower import duty on Russian goods entering Iran. Earlier, Iranian customs had been handed over to Belgians, who were accused of favoring Russian over Iranian economic interests. Royal extravagance, unpopular ministers, and European control over customs and much of the economic life of the country aroused the ire especially of Iranian merchants, who would play a critical role in the mounting crisis. Protests began again, and escalated in 1905 after the bastinado of Tehran merchants who had refused government orders to lower their sugar prices. Ulema and merchants took bast, sanctuary, first in a Tehran mosque and then at a shrine outside the capital, from which they demanded an ‘adalatkhanah, or house of justice. The shah capitulated to their demands in early 1906, and the protestors returned to Tehran, but then nothing happened. Protests were followed by government suppression, and some 12,000–14,000 bazaaris – the collective term for all who worked in the bazaar, merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans – took bast at the British legation in July, effectively shutting down the economic life of the capital. A smaller group, largely ulema, had also taken bast in Qum. The demands escalated, and included dismissal of the prime minister and the formation of a majlis, national consultative assembly. Secular reformers, radical ulema, and an increasing number of writers, including those who wrote the clandestinely circulated shabnamahs, night-sheets, had been advancing notions of representation and even constitutionalism. In October the first majlis was seated – a preliminary electoral law had been approved and implemented to allow for parliamentary elections – and drafted the Fundamental Law, which was signed by the dying Muzaffar al-Din Shah in December. His successor, Muhammad ‘Ali Shah (1907–1909), signed the Supplementary Fundamental Law in October 1907, which, together with the Fundamental Law, formed the Constitution. The Fundamental Law essentially established the basis for the majlis and its right and authority to pass legislation that in turn required the approval of the senate and the signature of the shah. The Fundamental Law specified that legislative approval was required in raising all revenues and in their expenditure; for all government loans; for all treaties and concessions; and for construction of railways and railroads. The Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907 stipulated a tripartite separation of power and functions: a legislature, the national assembly and the senate; a judiciary, which allowed for both Shari‘a and civil jurisdictions; and an executive, the shah and then his ministers. The shah was given the responsibility for war and designated commander-in-chief of the mil-

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itary. The constitutional basis for separation of power along with checks and balances was laid here. The key question was whether or not the Constitution could transform autocratic government given Iran’s historic political culture. The idea of legislating was a radical one and posed an essential challenge to the Islamic notion that only God can legislate through the revealed Qur’an and the hadith, early Islamic tradition, and their interpretation by the imams, or qualified jurists. The Shi‘a allow for greater flexibility through interpretation by mujtahids, but only in that sense do they legislate. The 1907 Supplementary Fundamental Law recognized Twelver Shi‘ism as the official religion, and decreed that legislation could not be contrary to its teachings. To ensure this compliance the Constitution stipulated the formation of a committee of five mujtahids to determine whether legislation met that standard. A senate would not be seated for half a century, and the committee of five mujtahids was only formed in the final days of 1978 during the revolution. There were two equally radical ideas in the 1907 part of the Constitution: Article 8, “The people of Persia enjoy equality of rights before the civil law,” and Article 26, “The powers of the realm spring from the people.”1 Article 8 was the most contentious, and its ulema opponents argued that it was an affront to Islamic legal principles that afforded equality to Muslims but secondary if protected status to People of the Book, essentially Jews and Christians, but also Zoroastrians. Article 26 challenged not only Islamic values, which hold that authority belongs to God alone, but millennia of Iran’s history and culture. How a constitution with such radical innovations came into being, either in terms of its essential ideas or its politics, is not immediately apparent. Like other Middle Eastern constitutions it was based on the 1831 Constitution of Belgium. The 1876 Ottoman constitution, and the formation of its national assembly, was an immediate model in providing checks and balances against autocracy. The Ottoman Tanzimat, reorganization, and the intellectual and political currents of nineteenth-century Istanbul, which regarded European power, especially its technology and “progress,” with awe, were a source of inspiration for Iranians who traveled there. The Ottoman empire stood as a testimony to the importance of centralization and reform in the military, in administration and taxation, in education, and in law, and constitutionalism was one of the perceived secrets of European success. In addition, impetus for change came from the 1905 Russian Revolution and the victory of Japan over Russia, which meant that Russian interference in Tehran would be unlikely and showed that a small Asian country

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with a constitution could defeat a major European power that lacked one. The transfer of these ideas, and the equally important Enlightenment ones of equality and popular sovereignty, and their implementation in the process of constitutional revolution and then in the 1906–7 Constitution are not clear. A few Iranians had had direct experience of these ideas and reform in the Ottoman empire or in Russia, particularly inhabitants of Azerbaijan and its capital, Baku, which underwent profound modernizing changes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Far fewer still had had direct experience of France or Britain. Both the Ottoman and British diplomatic missions may have played roles, even in encouraging protests and demands. Most Iranian participants in the protests that resulted in constitutionalism were united by opposition to Qajar “injustice” and foreign influence, particularly economic interference, rather than by abstract notions of government and political values. “Injustice” framed misrule and corruption in traditional Islamic terms and linked Qajar government to economic issues, and both misrule and foreign influence had been directly experienced by urban populations, especially in Tehran and Tabriz. Both of these perceptions, too, reinforced anti-foreign sentiments around the issue of “the sale of Iran” to foreign interests and served to intensify Iranian nationalism. Some of these oppositional groups were traditional organizations such as the guilds or the bazaars themselves, and in the first years of the twentieth century there was much greater bazaar organization in opposition to the Belgians’ control of customs and domination of finances in general. Secret societies, anjumans, formed, too, and they provided an extraordinary forum for discussion and had access to modernizing and westernizing ideas and values. The new journalism and political writing provided yet another avenue for protest and organization, and was particularly influential in politicizing nationalism. Financial support for protests came from court notables, merchants, ulema, and merchant communities outside Iran, notably the Zoroastrians in India. The ulema may have constituted the most important traditional group in the constitutional process, but the very use of the term ulema disguises the heterogeneity of their views and even organization. While most ulema within Iran had acquiesced to Qajar authority and power and accepted the status quo, despite Shi‘i political theory, others were among the most radical proponents of revolutionary change. As the bazaaris unified in opposition to Muzaffar al-Din Shah and more of Tehran’s population joined with them in the call for an ‘adalatkhanah, most ulema, too, were

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swept along in the call for change. Tehran’s population had increased significantly at the end of the nineteenth century with a large influx of peasants and nomads. These recent arrivals with few employable skills were especially impoverished and affected by increases in the price of bread, the dietary staple. In 1903 there were bread riots in Tehran as the result of grain hoarding to drive up its price; these recent arrivals helped augment the number of street protestors. The composition of the Tabriz opponents to Qajar rule reflected demographic differences as well as more radical influences from Russian Azerbaijan, where a significant number of Iranian Azerbaijanis had migrated to work in Baku’s oil fields. In Baku they were exposed to the ideas and political organization that had resulted in the 1905 Russian Revolution, and some espoused socialism. Moreover, Tabriz had a Shaikhi population that supported constitutionalism financially. In addition, Tabriz had a significant Armenian population whose schools and contacts with their international community were yet another source of radical and secular ideas. The first majlis sat in October 1906 before the rolling electoral process had been completed, and the first to be seated were elected from Tehran. Even when elections were completed Tehranis were disproportionately represented in the 156-member majlis. Both the bazaar and the ulema were over-represented. There were a surprisingly low number of landowners in the first majlis, which would be reversed in subsequent elections. Peasants, by far the largest group in Iran, and others in rural areas, were not represented, except through landowners, who had their own vested interests. The first majlis drafted legislation for the shah’s signature that constituted the Constitution. The majlis’s revolutionary role was in transforming the Qajar autocrat into a constitutional monarch. The majlis maintained pressure on the shah, rejecting both tax increases and foreign loans and insisting on cuts in his budget and expenditures. Moreover, the majlis recognized its constitutional role in passing legislation to establish a national bank, army, and educational system even though the resources to implement them were not available. The majlis found itself under pressure from secret societies and journalists demanding greater freedom of expression. When Muzaffar al-Din Shah died in January 1907, a standoff developed between his successor, Muhammad ‘Ali Shah, and the majlis, but the majlis itself was split between conservative ulema and more liberal delegates, especially the more radical Tabriz delegation. The debate about the nature of the Supplementary Fundamental Law was vigorous and key articles were hotly contested by a surprisingly broad section of Tehranis

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and Tabrizis, and by other urban populations. Equality, freedom, liberty, state control of education, and universal education – including for women – represented a new direction and role for government. One group of conservative ulema sought bast outside Tehran to emphasize their opposition to liberal and democratic proposals. Although the new shah signed the Supplementary Fundamental Law in October 1907 and thereby completed the Constitution, he was opposed to constitutionalism. The shah’s appointment of an unpopular prime minister aggravated the situation and disorder prevailed in Tehran. The minister was assassinated, and after a failed attempt to kill the shah himself, the shah launched a coup d’etat by shutting down the majlis. Key radical leaders were imprisoned, and then executed, while others escaped. Resistance to Muhammad ‘Ali Shah’s coup began in Tabriz, but when royal forces took over the city, the revolutionaries, under Sattar Khan, sought refuge in Gilan and joined up there with nationalists to march on Tehran. At the same time, the Bakhtiyari – most unlikely nationalists, but under the leadership of Hajj ‘Ali Quli Khan Sardar As’ad from one of the elite Bakhtiyari families and a committed nationalist and secular liberal – took Isfahan. The Bakhtiyari left Isfahan and joined up with Sattar Khan’s Tabriz forces in Tehran in July 1909, at which point the shah fled to the Russian legation. His young son, Ahmad Shah (1909–1925), was declared shah under a regent, Abu al-Qasim Khan Gharagusulu, Nasir al-Mulk, the first Iranian educated at Oxford. The second majlis was elected and seated, and, despite a shift in membership toward landlords, there was still ulema and liberal representation. The second majlis, like the first, could be characterized as nationalist and constitutionalist. With a compliant shah, the majlis dominated, but faced inordinate problems of national disorder and an empty treasury. The majlis’s solution was to centralize the authority of the government in a radically reformed finance ministry under the leadership of an American adviser, Morgan Shuster. He proposed a special independent tax-collecting gendarmerie under his authority, but this threatened the vested interests of notables and of the Russians in the north. Russia demanded that Shuster be dismissed, and Britain acquiesced. The majlis rejected the ultimatum, but the majority Bakhtiyari cabinet – with their own Bakhtiyari interests – accepted the ultimatum. In December 1911 the Constitutional period came to an end when the majlis was dissolved and Shuster was dismissed. Iran’s traditional political culture reasserted itself; nevertheless, the Constitutional legacy would prove to be profoundly significant. The 17-year-old Ahmad was crowned shah in July 1914 just before the outbreak of the First World War. Ostensibly, Iran was neutral during

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the war, and weak government continued to plague Iran throughout its duration. Neither the cabinet, appointed in the name of Ahmad Shah, nor the majlis had the necessary power to maintain order or impose the government’s authority over Iran. Britain and Russia took advantage of the situation to justify their infringement of Iranian sovereignty, and preferred to work with the more amenable cabinet. The third majlis was elected in 1914, only to be dismissed the following year through Russian intervention and occupation in the north, Russia’s sphere of influence. The Russian sphere included Tehran, where the shah reigned and ruled along with his appointed cabinet. Meanwhile, nationalist leaders in the majlis were anti-Russian and set up a government first in Qum and then after 1917 in Kirmanshah, before they fled Iran altogether. Germany dispatched Wassmuss, Germany’s Lawrence, to foment Bakhtiyari and Qashqa’i revolts against the British in southwestern Iran. To counter the German presence in the British sphere of influence, in 1916 Britain organized the South Persia Rifles. Iran was under foreign occupation even after the Russian Revolution in 1917, as when Russian troops were recalled the British moved into much of the north. The new Bolshevik government renounced all unequal treaties, including the hated capitulations, loans, and concessions, which had little immediate impact, and Britain remained as the sole foreign power to dominate Iran. At the end of the war Britain sought to capitalize on its primacy by proposing the Anglo-Persian Agreement in 1919, which amounted to reducing Iran to protectorate status. The agreement’s aim was to centralize government under British advisers, to create a modern army with British advisers and arms, and to develop infrastructure, all to be financed by British loans and through tariff revisions. Nationalist reaction was immediate and negative, and hostility to the Anglo-Persian Agreement escalated. It was not ratified. During and after the First World War Iranians suffered grievously. Agricultural production was seriously affected as the result of disorder, fighting, disruption of distribution, and the commandeering of foodstuffs; even after the war, British and White Russian forces engaged Red Russians in the north. The 1918–19 famine and the influenza pandemic decimated the population. The government, if the term can even be used, lacked authority and power, and exercised little if any control over a country that was divided even more than before on regional and local lines. The war also speeded up social and political processes in Tehran and Tabriz and in the north in general, where the first labor unions were formed. In 1917 Kuchik Khan, leader of the Jangalis, a movement that called for reform and democratic government, seized control of Gilan as

Figure 7.6 Two cigarette papers, showing, above, portraits of Ahmad Shah (centre) and two nationalist leaders in the 1909 restoration of the Constitution, Sattar Khan (left) and Sardar As‘ad Bakhtiyari (right), and, below, poems in Persian and French reflecting Iranian nationalist sentiments.

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a prelude to a takeover of the nation. In the 1919–20 military engagement between the Whites with British support and the Reds, Kuchik Khan, with Bolshevik support, declared a Soviet Socialist Republic, but then its unity was split over the issue of land confiscation. In Tabriz in 1920 an autonomous government was formed there by Khiabani, who was killed, and the central government’s control was re-established by the Cossack Brigade. The war and its aftermath clearly demonstrate the depth of Iran’s political and economic structural problems, the shortcomings of Iran’s historical decentralization, and the continuing issue of the loss of national sovereignty. The Qajar era effectively came to its end in February 1921 with a coup d’etat led by Sayyid Zia al-Din Tabataba‘i, a journalist, and Riza Khan, commander of the Cossack Brigade. And with Riza Khan’s election as shah in 1925 by the majlis and his coronation in 1926, the Qajar dynasty was formally ended; he would address the central structural problems. Although the period of 1905–9 is commonly called the Constitutional Revolution, changes in this period were profound but not revolutionary. The old social and political order continued and was not replaced by a new one. Constitutionalism mobilized key urban populations, but most Iranians outside cities were not even aware of the Constitution’s radical assumptions, and its anticipated political and social changes would not be realized for a very long time. The essential arguments against constitutionalism, especially regarding authority and equality, were explicitly articulated by the mujtahid, Fazl Allah Nuri (1842–1909). Like most of the Tehran ulema, he initially supported the constitutional movement in 1905 as the means to defend Islam and re-establish justice. After the Constitution was promulgated in 1907, Nuri turned against it, arguing that the Constitution and its supporters were an affront to Islam and to Islamic government and law. In traditional Islamic terms and precedent he decreed the Constitution an innovation. Nuri argued that authority is God’s alone and only he “legislates.” God’s law is to be adjudicated only by mujtahids who possessed the proper qualifications and training; simply, representatives elected by the people cannot legislate. Moreover, while all Muslims are equal in the context of Shari‘i law, non-Muslims, as People of the Book, are protected by it, but are hardly equal to Muslims. Even Muslims cannot legislate. Nuri equated constitutionalism with injustice and apostasy and considered it anti-Islamic, despite the Constitution’s recognition of Twelver Shi‘ism as the state faith and the role of mujtahids in interpreting. In July 1909 Nuri was executed by nationalists after he had given his support to Muhammad ‘Ali Shah in his failed coup.

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The ulema were divided over constitutionalism. At the same time as they accepted the political and social status quo, they were concerned about injustice and welcomed a check on arbitrary and ineffective government. Moreover ulema had close social ties and shared values with the bazaar which had been squeezed by Qajar administrative and economic policies; consequently, the ulema in Tehran and Tabriz found themselves swept along by protests and demonstrations, many of which originated in the bazaars. The ulema were closely linked to their followers, and provided redress for those who had grievances. For higherranking ulema, the number of one’s followers and students added to one’s status and ranking. Followers’ contributions of khums, the fifth, to those ulema whose guidance they sought were an important source of income for ulema and the charities and social services for which they were responsible. While the ulema were swept along by street politics, some of them may not have initially realized the Constitution’s profound implications until Nuri turned against it. Consequently the nationalists had to silence Nuri before his support grew. Finally, like other traditional elites, the ulema did not expect change to affect their general role and status in society and assumed that Iran’s traditional political culture would continue. The external issue confronting Iran during the first two decades of the twentieth century was the imperial competition between Russia and Great Britain for dominance over Qajar Iran. In 1907 Britain and Russia signed the Anglo-Russian Convention with the aim of reducing their rivalry and tensions in Asia, including Iran, the two powers’ established spheres of influence. Russia’s sphere encompassed northern Iran, including Tehran, and southeastern Iran went to Britain, and in between the two was a vast neutral zone. In their respective spheres, each power was effectively free from interference by the other power. While Russia’s influence in the capital was increased as a consequence, nevertheless it was ineffective in assisting Muhammad ‘Ali with his coup. Russia underestimated nationalist sentiments in Iran, while Britain disappointed nationalists who had turned to sympathetic British supporters for, at the least, tacit encouragement. In 1915 Britain negotiated with Russia to include the neutral zone within the British sphere, because of the importance of its oil interests in Khuzistan. Oil, at least as surface deposits, had long been utilized by local populations, and during Muzzafar al-Din Shah’s reign had become part of the game for concessions. In 1901 William Knox D’Arcy, a British subject and entrepreneur, was granted a new concession for commercial exploitation of oil in Iran (exept for the five northern provinces). In the

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following year drilling began in the central Zagros foothills near the border and equidistant between Kirmanshah and Baghdad, only to be abandoned for Khuzistan in 1905. Orders had been telegraphed to end drilling there, too, when oil was discovered in 1908. The amount of oil assured commercial success. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was formed in 1909 and construction of pipelines and a refinery at Abadan followed. In 1912 the decision was made to switch the British fleet from coal-burning to oil-burning vessels, and in 1914 the British government became the majority shareholder in Anglo-Persian. Even though only a small number of Iranians appreciated the importance and wealth of oil at that time, oil quickly came to represent the loss of national sovereignty and was a key factor in political mobilization and the politicization of nationalism. Historians commonly observe that the Constitution was honored only in its breach and that it failed to establish constitutional government or to effect political, economic, and, especially, social change. Four points can be made in its defense. First, the demand for ‘adalatkhanah was based directly on economic and political frustration which was transformed into a constitutionalism with its checks and balances and expressions of representation and equality. This process mobilized the broadest participation in Iranian history and ranged across urban society, from traditional political and religious elites to the unemployed recently arrived in cities. It included Muslims and non-Muslims, women, and a newly emerging professional middle class with specialized, westernized education and values. Moreover, urban populations helped to thwart Muhammad ‘Ali Shah’s attempted coup, and maintained political pressure on subsequent parliaments. Political mobilization through public debate laid the basis for the subsequent political transformation of Iran, even though that transformation was cut short in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Second, despite continuous tension with Ahmad Shah and his ministers, the majlis passed significant legislation dealing with taxes and financial matters, education, and law that both set precedents and served as models for new governmental roles even if the legislation could not be implemented. Consequently, the majlis as an ideal with the expectation of reformed and centralized power would not be abandoned. Third, the idea that authority was derived from the people undercut the old order profoundly, along with the fourth, the concept of equality of all, which also was new and raised the basic issue of identity. How was the population to be identified and organized, if not by religion? The new basis would be an Iranian identity, but a politicized one. Iranian identity to

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this point in history was important but expressed largely in cultural terms and was intensified with the adoption of Shi‘ism. Earlier, it was expressed militarily and politically externally, against Sunni Ottomans or the Uzbeks of Central Asia. As the result of the Constitutional Revolution, an Iranian identity was politicized internally against autocracy and externally against European infringement of Iran’s sovereignty. And in both cases, religion would become less important as all Iranians claimed a nationalist identity. While all who lived in Iran called upon a range of identities, including ethnic and linguistic ones, depending upon context, an Iranian one could be shared across the nation. Although not yet a state, Iran had become a nation and potentially secular. Through the constitutional process and its immediate aftermath, constitutionalism and nationalism legitimized authority. Iran’s long history under a universal ruler was coming to its end.

8

Iran, 1921–2003: Pahlavi and Islamic Republican Iran Riza Shah Pahlavi (1926–1941) dominated Iran’s twentieth-century history. His nationalist, centralizing, and modernizing policies were responsible for the creation of the Iranian nation-state. Following his abdication in 1941, he was succeeded by his son, Muhammad Riza Shah (1941–1979), who reigned as a constitutional monarch from his accession until 1953 and the Musaddiq crisis, after which Muhammad Riza re-established his father’s autocracy and continued his program of modernization and westernization. While modernization and westernization no longer have analytical value, they are still useful as general descriptive terms. In the case of Iran, modernization describes centralization of government and new roles for it through active participation in all aspects of society, politics, the economy, and culture. Westernization characterizes attitudes, identities, and policies that look to the west for models of change. Science, the economy, education, law, notions of equality that cut across gender and groups, and culture, aspects of which range from dress to the arts to industrialization and commercialization to legal rights and citizenship are encompassed by westernization, which is often linked with modernization and with modernizing elites. Significantly, modernization and westernization signaled the end of Iran’s traditional political culture, including universal rulership, despite continuation of the monarchy until 1979. The foundation laid by Riza Shah resulted in very significant changes beyond politics. There were shifts in people’s sense of identity and sense of loyalty from family, religion, and ethnic group toward an Iranian identity with increased individualism and class identity. More and more Iranians expected greater political participation – even though denied that participation – and a political participation predicated on the notions that authority was derived not from God but from the people,

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with the corollaries of nationalism and economic and social egalitarianism. Finally, the state was centralized, territorially based, and played an active and central role in every aspect of life. The nation-state of Iran had been accepted broadly within Iran, and the idea of Iran as a nationstate has not been rejected by the Islamic Republic nor has it rejected the state’s active economic, social, and cultural roles. At the same time the Islamic Republic repudiated the secular, legal, and social changes of the Pahlavi period. However, formal and informal political participation in the past five years suggests that Riza Shah’s secular and western Iran may yet prevail, with Islam playing a reduced role in the public sphere. The theme of reading Iran’s twentieth-century history is an important one. Historians agree that Riza Shah was committed to Iran and to Iranian nationalism, and that his achievements were built on an Iranian base. This awareness of the necessity to build on Iran’s own political and historical culture and society began at least with Jamal al-Afghani, and has continued to the present. Riza Shah, very much like al-Afghani, saw a need to westernize in order to maintain Iranian national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In Riza Shah’s eyes secularization was more a means to reduce clerical power – and thus strengthen his own – than an attack on religion. More recently, Iranians – the educational product of Riza Shah’s changes – have placed their emphases differently. Jalal Al-i Ahmad (d. 1969), for example, warned Iranians about abandoning their own culture with their intoxication with the west – gharbzadigi, “westoxication” in his terms – and ‘Ali Shari‘ati (d. 1977) sought to build a new political activism on a desacralized Shi‘ism. Significantly, both were anticlerical. Even in the 1970s Al-i Ahmad and Shari‘ati were overlooked by many western observers even though their growing influence on high school and university students was reported. Also overlooked was the increased politicization and radicalization of students, who played such a critical role in the revolution. A major element in our tendency to overlook such changes relates to our acceptance of the overwhelming centralization of the state, one of Riza Shah’s changes. Even though Riza Shah effectively implemented the nationalist agenda and even some limited aspects of the liberal agenda, historians do not credit him with that significant achievement because of his autocracy. His autocracy, however, was no greater than that of his contemporary, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey; yet it is most unlikely that Riza Shah would be called the father of modern Iran. In both cases, their respective modern states are inconceivable without these two leaders. Ataturk was a visionary and could articulate a new Turkey that would be modern and western; whereas Riza Shah could not. And

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Riza Shah, unlike Ataturk – and to his credit – did not politicize the military, which continues to be a significant obstacle to increased democratization of Turkey. Most significantly, however, Ataturk institutionalized his vision for a modern Turkey that allowed it to move from autocracy to democracy. Iranian and western scholars alike have neglected Riza Shah – partly in viewing his rule through the lens of his son’s – and only grudgingly recognized his positive achievements. Less obviously, in casting Iranian history in positivist or, in some instances, progressive, terms, deviations from those utopian goals have been regretted: the failure of constitutionalism in the first decade of this century and then again under Riza Shah and Muhammad Riza Shah, the defeat of Kuchik Khan’s Jangalis by Riza Khan (as he was known before he consolidated power and became shah), the failure of labor to develop as a force in the late 1930s or early 1940s, and the CIA-led overthrow of Musaddiq in 1953 to thwart constitutional government. This is a view of history as it should have been and that disappointment is not only expressed by all current political factions in Iran, but it is how Iran’s history has been interpreted. I have already suggested another problem for Iran specialists, and that is looking backward from a specific vantage point and missing both complexity and that alternative developments and directions could have been taken. History is not quite as inevitable as our hindsight makes it. Another issue is that both Iranian and western specialists have utilized the same sources. Sources have long been a problem in Iranian history, being both ignored and destroyed. Furthermore, Iran, unlike Turkey, lacked until recently a significant cadre of trained archivists and historians. Every twentieth-century government discouraged all but official history, or their officially approved version of it and the nature of Iranian society. Nevertheless, a large body of far-ranging Iranian and foreign sources exist for the twentieth century that include governmental and diplomatic records, newspapers, and many personal journals and memoirs. Riza Khan – khan as a title had tribal origins but was used as a military one as well – came to power as the result of two significant changes in late Qajar history: the formation of the Cossack Brigade and the development of a small group of nationalists, committed to transforming and strengthening Iran in opposition to foreign domination and traditional groups, such as the ulema, whom they regarded as obstacles to effective change. The broad and weak revolutionary coalition that supported constitutionalism to bring about more democratic and effective government fragmented as the result of many factors between 1909 and 1920. The

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majlis was ineffective, given the inexperience and small number of its liberal advocates, in face of the monarch and royal family and the vested interests of powerful landowners, tribal leaders, and clerics. Moreover, there was continued European disregard for Iranian national sovereignty and territorial integrity. National government all but disappeared during and after the First World War, when neutral Iran became a battleground. Iran was ignored at Versailles, and the old elites planned to take Iran into a protectorate-like relationship with Britain in 1919 with the AngloPersian Agreement. The year 1921 marked a new beginning in Iran’s twentieth-century history. First, the majlis refused to ratify the Anglo-Persian Agreement and repudiated the triumvirate that secured it as being anti-nationalist and accused them of having been manipulated by the British. More importantly, however, Sayyid Zia al-Din Tabataba’i – a journalist and representative of the new professional middle class – with the aid of 2,500 Cossacks now under the command of Riza Khan, successfully staged a coup against the Qajar government. The coup itself was essentially bloodless and had the indirect, or possibly even the direct, acquiescence of the departing British military commander, General Ironsides. The Qajars lacked legitimacy, at best Ahmad Shah was disinterested and disengaged; moreover, the government was not only without power and authority but also without funds. Separatist movements had begun, or were about to begin, on all the frontiers – in the west, the north, the northeast and the southeast. No one foresaw that Riza Khan would emerge as the dominant figure despite his leadership of the Cossack Brigade – originally Russian-officered and maintained – the only modern and effective military unit in the country. Sayyid Zia ordered a sweeping policy of arrests and repression. Within months he was arrested by order of Riza Khan and sent into exile. In the new government, Riza Khan was appointed Minister of War and awarded the title Sardar Sipah to face the formidable task of establishing central control over the country and constituting a functioning government. Riza Khan‘s own background is obscure, other than his birth in the 1870s in Mazandaran; however, the Cossack Brigade provided him with military training and formed his manner and reinforced his aloof demeanor. In his Cossack role, he had earned the title Riza Khan Maxim, from his purported skill with the machine gun in putting down revolts, especially against the tribes. He also served all across Iran and thus became acquainted with its peoples and Iran’s political culture. His concern about Iran’s poten-

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tial for fragmentation and susceptibility to foreign domination only served to heighten his nationalism and his determination to centralize the government’s power. Riza Khan‘s first priority was to establish his own power. From the beginning he saw the need to reorganize the military by incorporating the gendarmerie within it, and then to expand and modernize the army. He required funding for these changes, and his subsequent success in overwhelming autonomous and potentially separatist movements gave him the necessary nationalist support to expand and maintain the military. Greatly enlarged and modernized, a strengthened military allowed Riza Khan when he became shah to concentrate his own power and then to centralize and transform Iran – to create a state. After the First World War, Iran was threatened by chaos and potential fragmentation. The most important revolts occurred across the north in Gilan and Khurasan, in the northwest in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, and then in the south and southwest. In 1921 Riza Khan defeated Kuchik Khan and his supporters, known as the Jangalis, in Gilan, and in 1922 he quelled the revolts in Azerbaijan led by Khiabani – and a subsequent one there directed by Lahuti. In several instances provinces declared their autonomy. Khiabani proclaimed a new government of Azadistan, which had an Azeri Turkish ethnic component and could have led to separatism, but failed. Simtqu in Kurdistan had rebelled against the central government in 1919, and his rebellion was crushed in 1922. Especially important in demonstrating his nationalist credentials by re-establishing the central government’s authority and sovereignty and in demonstrating his single-mindedness to Iranians and to the British, were Riza Khan’s successful maneuvers against the Bakhtiyari in 1922 and then against Shaikh Khaz‘al of Muhammarah in 1924. Riza Khan provoked the Bakhtiyari to attack a small number of government troops passing through the Bakhtiyari on their way to ‘Arabistan – the province later known as Khuzistan. The army’s success won majlis support in imposing a crushing indemnity on the Bakhtiyari. Three additional steps were taken to weaken and isolate the Bakhtiyari further: the Bakhtiyari khans lost key governorships outside their region; the Bakhtiyari region was divided into two districts; and Iranian governors, rather than Bakhtiyaris, were appointed to administer them. This action against the powerful Bakhtiyari signaled to Shaikh Khaz‘al that he, too, would be forced to give up his autonomy and British protection and submit to Tehran. The oil fields were located in Bakhtiyari winter pastures and the great refinery at Abadan and some of the pipelines were under the Shaikh’s

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jurisdiction. Iranians needed no convincing that Riza Khan fully understood Iran’s political culture and was intent on centralizing the power and authority of the state. These moves also convinced the British minister that Great Britain’s interests lay with a strong, centralized Iran. (Twice earlier, Britain had toyed with the idea of replacing the Qajars with a Bakhtiyari dynasty, but had despaired over their internal divisions and Iran’s decentralized political culture.) Riza Khan’s tactics were then repeated with equal success in 1924 against Shaikh Khaz‘al and then against the Turkmen and the Qashqa‘i. In the showdown with Shaikh Khaz‘al, whose autonomy was guaranteed by the British through treaty, the British, increasingly apprehensive about Riza Khan’s growing power, were forced to choose between the Shaikh and a centralized government dominated by Riza Khan. In the end, Britain decided that a centralized, stable Iran would be preferable to weak and unreliable tribal leaders. Riza Khan’s success against tribal autonomy not only centralized power but also transformed Iran’s ancient political culture of autonomy, and tribal power was subordinated to the modern state. In 1921, as part of the centralizing process in the dying days of Qajar Iran, another American reorganizing adviser had entered the scene with the Iranian government’s decision to appoint Arthur Millspaugh as financial adviser (1922–1927). Like Shuster, Millspaugh was given extraordinary powers to place the government on a sound financial basis and to reorganize its administration. Public health and education were addressed as part of reform and modernization in 1923. The Pasteur Institute was founded, hospitals were built, public health measures were instituted, and steps were taken to provide medical education for doctors in Iran. Riza Khan had the prime minister, Qavam al-Saltanah, arrested in 1923, and forced Ahmad Shah to appoint him in his stead. Even before this, there was concern about Riza Khan’s growing power, and he courted, with some success, nationalists – who were particularly concerned about issues of territorial integrity and strengthening central government – and important members of the ulema. He utilized his military role and success in the provinces to intimidate, divide, and isolate his opposition, including members of the royal family. Ultimately, Ahmad Shah appointed Riza Khan prime minister, and the shah immediately left for Europe, never to return to Iran. Early in 1924, after the opening of the fifth majlis, a campaign began to declare Iran a republic. There was clear model in Turkey, where Mustafa Kemal had established a republic in October 1923. Younger Iranian liberal nationalists and members of the majlis advocated the idea,

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and Riza himself saw this as a step to ridding Iran of the Qajars. Journalists, key members of the intelligentsia, and local leaders (with Riza Khan’s support) led the campaign for a republic in and outside the majlis; they, like their Turkish counterparts, equated republicanism with progress and as a step toward modernization and westernization. Opposition came from royalists, from nationalists concerned that Iran was not yet ready for a democratic republic, and especially from the ulema, who had supported Riza Khan up to this point. Most significant was the opposition from the prominent cleric, Sayyid Hasan Mudarris. And the ulema expressed their disfavor in moral terms, as an innovation against Islam. Riza Khan, generally known at this time by his military title, Sardar Sipah, ever the pragmatist and concerned for his own power – there was some republican opposition even within the army – accepted election by the majlis as shah in 1925. He was crowned in 1926, when he chose Pahlavi as the dynastic name, a word with presumed ancient Iranian associations. Constitutionalism had failed so far, but it had successfully articulated a broadly accepted agenda of nationalism, territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and centralization of authority and power. Liberalism, particularly democracy, had less support, although it was supported by the newly emerging middle class and notables. Few had illusions regarding Riza Khan‘s position on constitutionalism and democracy, but there were indications that the liberal nationalist agenda for modernization and westernization of education, society, and the economy would win his support, because such a program would strengthen Iran internally and externally, especially against Britain. By the time of his coronation Riza Khan had dominated a majlis that had regained some legitimacy. The majlis was typically dominated by great landlords and ulema, but liberal, even secular, constitutionalists were also represented. Parties were essentially factions formed around key individuals, such as Qavam al-Saltanah, who played a leading role in the early 1920s and again in the 1940s. Qavam was a leader of the so-called Democratic Party, and a powerful landlord as well as a nationalist. Moreover, the new shah had three able advisers – Davar, Firuz Mirza, and Taimurtash, who were liberal, secular nationalists and who played key ministerial roles for him into the early 1930s. Significantly, by the time of his coronation Riza Khan had established a pattern that indicated his political skill and single-mindedness: his nationalism was directly linked to his personal power; he successfully played liberals off against traditionalists; and he was willing to shift position and even to abandon key supporters in order to achieve strategic goals.

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Well before Riza Khan was elected shah, centralizing and modernizing steps had already been taken, for example, Millspaugh’s appointment with its sweeping economic and administrative powers. That appointment was essential for financing a transformed and growing army that allowed for government centralization. In addition, the fourth majlis passed the highly controversial legislation that instituted universal conscription. Universal conscription, in addition to its importance for the military, allowed for national integration and the breakdown of ethnic and regional barriers through military training. Military service included education and indoctrination to new Iranian values, including loyalty to Riza Shah. Universal conscription and then compulsory military service was opposed by the ulema and by the powerful landlord class, who were concerned about the loss of power and laborers. The fifth majlis, seated in September 1924, extended universal conscription to compulsory military service and took further steps to marginalize traditional groups and culture. The court budget was reduced, titles were abolished, family names were required, births were to be registered, standardized weights and measures were established, and the calendar was Iranianized (the Hijri, or Islamic, lunar calendar was adapted to the Iranian solar one and the months were given Iranian names). After his coronation Riza Shah inaugurated sweeping economic, legal, and cultural reforms that related to centralization of his and the state’s power, modernization, and westernization. A national bank was chartered, the trans-Iranian railway was approved and construction started, the road system was extended, and industrialization was encouraged and funded to a degree. The nineteenth-century capitulations that had given Europeans and their manufactures legal and economic advantages were ended in 1928. A European-style commercial code was promulgated, and Iran entered into commercial treaties with Russia and Germany. Trade and industrial monopolies were established. All of these economic policies were inaugurated to strengthen Iran’s economy and to establish national sovereignty. Central to economic reform was the establishment of the Bank-i Melli, the national bank, in 1928 to reduce the power and role of the British Imperial Bank of Persia. Significantly, too, Millspaugh was dismissed in 1927, as Riza Shah trenchantly observed that there could only be one shah. The adoption of a new legal system with commercial codes served both economic and sovereignty issues, and the secular civil code began to be implemented in 1928 – family and personal status law was based on the Shari‘a. Riza Shah had requested that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) agree to revise the concessionary agreement; it refused, and in 1932, the

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concession was cancelled. Riza Shah’s challenge was based on both economic and national sovereignty issues. He needed more income for his many reforms, and that the British government earned more from the profits of APOC than Iran was an affront. Furthermore, APOC discriminated against Iranians by refusing them positions of responsibility. A new APOC concession was signed in 1933, but Iran gained little from it – although the earlier royalty figure of 16 percent of annual profits was increased to 20 percent, the end-date of the concession was extended from 1961 to 1993. Also, APOC agreed to train more Iranians; however, Great Britain remained fully in control of its single most valuable economic asset, the oil fields of Khuzistan and the great refinery in Abadan, which was doubly important given its strategic location at the head of the Persian Gulf and close to India. Iran signed international treaties with all of its neighbors, and all border disputes save one were resolved. Education policies based on French models were implemented from elementary schools through university. Within the centralized educational system, nationalism and secularism were emphasized along with loyalty to the state and the shah. Education reforms took place in urban centers, where illiteracy rates for males began slowly to decline, but these reforms had little impact in rural areas or for women outside elite circles. A Persian language academy was established in 1933 and an attempt was made to Persianize all publications by replacing Arabic terms with Persian ones. In 1935 Riza Shah decreed that all diplomatic correspondence had to refer to the country as Iran rather than Persia. There is some irony here, for modern nationalism emphasized Iran’s great pre-Islamic past at the expense of its Islamic one, despite the fact that “Persia” was especially associated with ancient Iran. The nation-state, however, was to be called Iran – the term Iranians had used for themselves – and its language was Persian. Iranian nationalism and the Persian language were to be the vehicles for transforming the multi-ethnic population into a cohesive Iranian one. Adherence to Shi‘i Islam was not a necessary condition to be an Iranian, and had not the outbreak of the Second World War forced Riza Shah’s abdication, his nationalist and secular agenda might have escalated into a campaign against the ulema and Islam. Archaeological excavations were pursued and newly built government buildings incorporated motifs from Iran’s ancient, pre-Islamic past. All of these changes increased the roles of the state, whose influence for the very first time reached into every aspect and level of society and increasingly even into rural areas. The drive to westernize was most dramatically seen in the secularization of the law and related cultural

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reform, when European dress was decreed for men and, in 1936, the public wearing of the veil for women was actually banned. Once again Riza Shah came into direct conflict with the ulema, but whereas he had backed down in face of their opposition to Iran becoming a republic, in the mid-1930s, with his power unchallenged, he faced them down. The army fired on protesting rioters in the Shrine of the Imam Riza, Mashhad, and in Isfahan. The shah himself marched into the Shrine of Fatima, Qum, and publicly whipped the official who had refused his wife entry into the shrine on the grounds that she was not sufficiently veiled. Many traditional women in urban areas, where there were attempts to enforce public dress laws, refused to leave their homes, but these and other reforms were not generally enforced in rural areas. Ulema support for Riza Khan and for his later incarnation as Riza Shah was always problematic. The ulema valued his success in defending Iranian sovereignty, but were apprehensive about his consolidation of power. They were united in opposition to republicanism, secularization, conscription, and any attempts to reduce their power and income. Riza Shah on his part refrained from taking on the ulema, aside from the new dress regulations and his subsequent action at the Shrine of Fatima in Qum. Neither his language nor legal reforms went as far as Ataturk’s. In Turkey, Roman replaced Arabic script, Turkish words and neologisms swept aside Arabic and Persian vocabulary, law was secularized, and the western calendar was adopted. Earlier in the nineteenth century the Ottoman state had sequestered auqaf, religious foundations, but this did not occur in Iran until Riza Shah took over some control of auqaf and their revenues. Riza Shah’s educational and legal reforms further encroached on the ulema’s historical roles. The full impact of the centralized state, however, was felt in tribal areas and with dire consequences for tribespeople and Iran’s economy. Riza Khan’s anti-tribal reputation was well known, and as shah his brutal enforcement of the European hat requirements provoked violent opposition. Tribal dress and headgear were distinctive markers for identity, moreover, centrally imposed dress standards meant not only loss of identity but of autonomy. Many nomads were forcibly settled, and large numbers died or starved as a consequence of losing their flocks, which had to be confined to inhospitable pasture areas rather than being allowed to migrate. Such harsh treatment was foreshadowed in the earlier brutal suppression of tribes such as the Papi Lurs by the Cossacks. After his coronation Riza Shah not only regarded Iran’s pastoral nomadic tribes as anachronistic in a modern, western nation-state, but he saw their autonomy, political organization, and military ability as antitheti-

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cal to the centralized state. Tribal leaders of great confederations such as the Kurds, Bakhtiyari, and Qashqa’i were seen by him as personal threats and potential rivals for Iran’s political leadership. In the case of the Bakhtiyari, APOC in 1928 was instructed to lease oil lands through the governor of Khuzistan – formerly, Arabistan – and not directly from the khans. Following a Bakhtiyari revolt in 1929 at Safid Dasht, three khans were executed. Then in 1933 the two Bakhtiyari leadership positions were abolished, and three years later the Bakhtiyari region was placed in two separate administrative districts of Isfahan and Khuzistan, under civil administrators. Finally, in 1938–9, Riza Shah forced the khans to sell their estates – some of them controlled vast amounts of land – and oil shares to the central government. Internal Iranian and intra-tribal politics worked against the possibility of a united opposition to the shah’s centralization of power. Riza Shah adopted established Iranian methods of controlling tribes. After his coronation he appointed the important Bakhtiyari leader Ja‘far Quli Khan, Sardar As’ad III, as a minister of several posts in his cabinets, including War, and he was used to disarm and negotiate with a number of tribes. Once Riza Shah’s power was unchallengeable, Sardar As‘ad was disposable. He was imprisoned along with two other Bakhtiyari khans, and died, presumably poisoned by “Pahlavi coffee,” in 1934. In this same period, Riza Shah rid himself of three advisers – Davar, Minister of Justice; Firuz Mirza, Finance; and Taimurtash, Minister of Court – by imprisoning them. Taimurtash and Firuz died in prison in 1933 and 1938 respectively. Davar, the architect of legal reforms and the father of the modern justice system, committed suicide in 1938. Firuz, Taimurtash, and Sardar As‘ad were notables and, with Davar, committed nationalists, experienced and far more cosmopolitan and at home with the modern world and Europe than the shah. Indeed, they were charged with being too much under the European influence of one of the powers; nevertheless, all of them had demonstrated unwavering support for Riza Shah and his policies. And in the last years of Riza Shah’s reign their experience would be missed. Riza Shah’s paranoia grew apace, and anything foreign became suspect. Foreign properties, including schools, were sequestered. In the late 1930s, under the increasing shadow of another European war, Riza Shah drew closer to Germany, partly because he saw Germany as a balance against Britain and the USSR. German influence had been growing, but its influence over Riza Shah has probably been exaggerated. His nationalism and emphasis on the centrality of the state bear a resemblance to National Socialism, but both policies were independent

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of Nazism. When war broke out in 1939 Iran declared its neutrality. After Germany invaded the USSR in 1941 and Britain and the Soviet Union demanded the expulsion of German technicians from Iran, those two powers invaded and occupied Iran – primarily for its oil and its strategic location as a supply route to the USSR – and forced Riza Shah to abdicate in favor of his 21-year-old son, Muhammad Riza. Riza Shah left Iran first for Mauritius and then Johannesburg, where he died in exile in 1944. The two European powers were joined by the United States in occupying Iran throughout the war. During his reign Riza Shah failed to develop political and social bases. That traditionalists such as Qajar royalists, tribal leaders, ulema, and some great landlords, and liberals and leftists should oppose Riza Shah’s centralization and personalization of power, policies, and reforms comes as no surprise. Ironically, Riza Shah had taken on the manner of the Qajars themselves to become a major landowner through appropriation of land as his personal property and had come to share some traditionalist values. Land reform was not yet an issue, and tax policies favored landlords. The brunt of the tax burden to finance the trans-Iranian railway and other modernization projects fell on peasants and the urban masses in a most regressive way, for taxes were levied on tea and sugar, dietary staples, to finance it. There would be no foreign loans, because of late Qajar history and the fear of foreign domination. Also, inflation late in Riza Shah’s reign exacerbated poverty. While there are no reliable statistics, rural residents – peasants and pastoral nomads – constituted at least 80 percent of Iran’s 1941 population of about 15 million, and rural economic development was neglected, if not ignored, in favor of infrastructure construction and industrialization, symbols of modernization and westernization. Riza Shah’s favoring of landlords may have assured him their support, but such favoring may have also served as an indirect means of controlling rural areas. Moreover, land reform itself would have created an opposition that he did not want to confront. In dealing indirectly with the ulema and landlords, Riza Shah exhibited some caution and pragmatism; only in circumstances where he was assured control, for example, over the tribes and tribal elites, or over his ministers, did he assert his power. Again, here he functioned very much like his Qajar predecessors; he was most audacious in terms of defending his own power. He saw power strictly in personal terms and trusted no one, which helps to account for his failure to develop a social base for his power and to explain why Iranians denied him legitimacy. Despite Riza Shah’s nationalist credentials and modernizing and westernizing policies, secular and liberal nationalists joined ranks against him

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over his political repression and his failure to rule as a constitutional monarch, but he still had support from much of the urban middle class, and even from some nationalist modernizers. The peasantry and tribespeople, by the far the largest social groups in Iran, were apolitical and affected by his tax policies and conscription and the forced settlement of nomads. The population as a whole held him in fearful awe, and did not regret his decision to abdicate and go into exile. Riza Shah retained the loyalty of the military – numbering some 127,000 by 1941, a threefold increase from the 1920s – and its failure to resist the British and the Russians was realistic, but its ineffectiveness must have been devastating to him personally. Of all of the Pahlavi institutions, the army was closest to him and his self-image, and directly linked to his identification with Iran and his Iranian nationalism tied to centralization, modernization, and westernization. With the army’s collapse, what did his reign mean? Riza Shah’s intent for his economic, social, and cultural reforms was to produce that new professional middle class and the new worker who would be imbued with nationalist values and loyalty to him and the secular state. One unintended consequence of these reforms was that students and workers came to champion liberal and even radical political change. When workers attempted to form unions 53 of their leaders and intellectual supporters were arrested, notably in 1937, and strikes were suppressed. Indeed, communism and socialism were viewed as threats not only to Riza Shah’s power but also to Iranian sovereignty, given the European origins of leftist ideologies. The Communist Party had been banned in 1927, but the Tudah Party, the masses, was formed by those imprisoned in 1937. Riza Shah’s singular achievement was, first, Iran’s political culture was irrevocably transformed; second, the modern nation-state that was contiguous with its historic borders was established, and third, the basis for a modern legal system and economy was laid. Riza Shah’s economic policies underestimated the difficulties in economic modernization. Constitutionalism and democracy were clearly victims in Riza Shah’s Iran, and the majlis had become essentially a rubber stamp. Iranians, however, had entered into a new relationship between themselves and their ruler, a process that had begun in the Constitutional period and that would express itself in the decade of greater freedom after his abdication. Similarly, at his coronation Riza Shah represented himself with the symbols and emblems of former Islamic, Sasanian, and Achaemenian rulers of Iran in the form of the new Pahlavi crown and scepter, but with swords and weapons of Nadir Shah, Shah ‘Abbas and Shah Isma‘il from Iran’s more recent, Islamic past. Significantly, there was no Islamic basis

Figure 8.1

Riza Shah

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for the coronation, and in deference to Islam no music was played. The crown was carried by Taimurtash, Court Minister, who together with Azerbaijan’s ranking member of the ulema handed it over to Riza who crowned himself. The Imam-i Jumah, a government appointed cleric, spoke, the Qur’an was invoked, and verses from Firdausi’s Shahnamah were recited. The ulema were present along with notables and foreign representatives, and the new shah appeared in a public parade accompanied by 350 mounted representatives from the great tribal confederations in their respective traditional and identifiable dress. In Riza Shah’s coronation address, however, the past was ignored – he did voice respect for Islam and the role that it had played and would continue to play – but he focused on the future and the reforms he planned to implement. Riza Shah saw Iran in personal terms, almost as an extension of himself. He embodied elements of universal rulership in representing himself to all Iranians, but he was no longer the equipoise between Iran and the cosmos, and his representation could not be reciprocated. In the end he stood alone and isolated as the modern autocrat, with little connection either to the past or to the future. Had Riza Shah not disregarded the Constitution, he might have acquired the legitimacy of a constitutional monarch, but legitimacy eluded him, and continues to elude him and his significant achievements to this day. Riza Shah’s abdication raised critical questions in regard to the nature of governmental authority, national sovereignty and territorial integrity, Iranian identity, and the continued westernized direction of the government’s policies. The occupation during the Second World War and then events at its end brought all these questions into sharper focus. The USSR and Britain began the initial occupation in 1941 and were joined by the United States in 1943. Soviet troops occupied northern Iran and the British moved into southern Iran. All three occupying powers agreed to respect Iranian sovereignty and not to interfere in government affairs; however, they did interfere. The Allies sought to control government, nationally and regionally, and its policies. The United States, which had traditionally supplied economic and administrative advice and advisers, played that role again again when Arthur Millspaugh was reappointed to sort out Iran’s finances – its economy had been greatly weakened by war-time shortages and inflation. The Allied occupation during the war resulted in political freedom not seen before or since. The Allies had conflicting and competing national interests and jurisdictions while Muhammad Riza Shah’s inexperience resulted in a context that allowed the majlis to re-emerge to play its constitutional role and to force the shah to function as a constitutional

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monarch. The new shah did continue in his constitutional role as the commander-in-chief of the army, which was, however, greatly reduced in size and status. The new shah was barely 22 years old, and had had little governing or political experience, which, along with the Allied occupation, strengthened the majlis. From the perspective of the Allies, there was no viable alternative to Muhammad Riza. Republicanism had receded as a possible alternative. Muhammad Riza Shah possessed little dynastic legitimacy, and his inexperience helped separate him from his father’s autocracy, both of which factors may have worked to his advantage in that he was something of a blank slate, upon which groups could project their own expectations. A new generation who had developed under and benefited from Riza Shah’s modernizing and westernizing policies and institutions augmented the earlier generation of secular modernists. Labor and the left, suppressed under Riza Shah, emerged during the occupation as vital political forces to articulate social and economic egalitarianism. Newspapers sprang up and began to publish wide-ranging views. Political parties developed too, but tended to be volatile groupings around leading personalities, not necessarily representative of coherent ideologies or programs, with the exception of the Tudah Party. Following the Allied occupation, the founders of the Tudah were released from prison, and their call for radical reconstruction, including land reform, influenced the intelligentsia and the new professional middle class, and the new, and still small, modern working class responded to their call for trade unions. The Tudah was especially effective among workers in the oil fields, where a major strike was organized in 1946. The Tudah had moderate success in the 1944 elections and won eight majlis seats, and they were awarded three ministries in Qavam’s government in the summer of 1946. The Tudah alignment with Soviet policy and ideology alarmed traditionalists in Iran, the United States, and Britain. Political freedom also allowed traditional political elites – great landlords, bazaaris, regional notables, and tribal leaders – to re-emerge along with ranking ulema on the political scene. Indeed, the ulema regained official approval and control over religious schools and auqaf. The reappearance of such diverse groups on the political scene would, however, prove to be the swan song for Iran’s ancient political culture. The divisions between new and traditional groups were often not clear-cut. Two of Iran’s most important political figures, Qavam and Musaddiq, in the decade following Riza Shah’s abdication straddled both the secular modernist and traditional great landlord groups. Moreover, save for issues of national sovereignty, there was no political consensus in the majlis; con-

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sequently, increased political freedom resulted in political fragmentation and instability, and coalition governments became a necessity. Iran’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity continued as unifying political principles in Tehran. Even during the war, the majlis ended Millspaugh’s extensive powers over finances and refused to grant an oil concession to the USSR in the north. The Iranian government exercised little control in the south, where there was a resurgence of pastoral nomadism, and tribal politics returned as a significant force. In Kurdistan and in Azerbaijan the government was confronted by separatist movements which had encouragement and support from the Soviet Union. These crises of national sovereignty and territorial integrity were followed in 1949–53 by another, nationalization of oil, which also had profound international implications. The leadership in each of these crises came from the prime ministers and the majlis, but in each Muhammad Riza Shah emerged stronger, and his restoration to the throne in 1953 with United States support would prove to delegitimize him and to be a factor in the 1979 revolution. Both prime ministers – Qavam and Musaddiq – came from great landed Qajar families; both had been adversaries of Riza Shah; both were committed nationalists and constitutionalists, and determined that the Pahlavis rule as constitutional monarchs; both also alarmed Britain and the United States. Qavam had twice been prime minister during the early 1920s, and his political experience enabled him to follow a very complicated and risky set of maneuvers to force the Soviets out of Azerbaijan. After he became prime minister in early 1946 – by which time American and British forces had been withdrawn – Qavam began negotiations with the USSR for withdrawal of Soviet troops. Complicating the matter was that, in November 1945, the Democratic Party in Azerbaijan, under Pishivari, declared Azerbaijan’s autonomy, and Soviet troops barred the entry of Iranian forces to put down the revolt. Qavam agreed to Azerbaijani autonomy and promised the Soviets an oil concession in Iran’s northern provinces. The Soviets were cautioned that the concession had to have majlis approval, but the term of the current majlis was about to end and so ratification would have to wait until the sixteenth majlis was seated after elections early in 1947. Soviet troops left in May. Meanwhile, Qavam and Pishivari reached an agreement on Azerbaijan’s autonomy; strikes followed in the oil fields; three Tudah Party members were added to Qavam’s government, causing a rebellion by the Qashqa’i, whose demands included a call for their autonomy and expulsion of the Tudah members from the cabinet. For Qavam’s Iranian opponents, including the shah, and for American observers, Qavam was about to take Iran

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into the Soviet orbit. The Azerbaijan crisis of 1945–6 was the first to be presented to the UN Security Council, where the United States and Britain supported Iran even though skeptical about Qavam’s leadership, and was the first battle of the cold war outside of Eastern Europe. With the Soviet troop departure, Pishivari’s Azerbaijan had to stand on its own; when Iranian government troops entered Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, his and the Kurdish movement collapsed. Pishivari’s radical policies – including land reform, advocacy of Azeri Turkish in schools and government, workers’ and women’s rights – had support in Tabriz, but not in the rest of that large, important province. In addition, Pishivari’s heavy-handedness had been widely resented. The importance of the ethnic factor, or Azeri-Turkish ethnic nationalism, has probably been exaggerated, for Persian language and Iranian culture had been assumed by much of the urban population for a very long period of time. Similarly, the base of support for a Kurdish republic was a narrow one, given Kurdish factionalism and Kurdish internal politics. Qavam’s role in the crisis continued to be an enigmatic one, for he seemingly kept his agreement with the Soviet Union and presented the agreed oil concession to the majlis in October 1947, where it failed to pass. He then resigned his premiership. Qavam’s ploy of playing to the left and to the USSR had succeeded, and Iran’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty remained intact, but his own nationalist commitment was stained and questioned. Iran’s political factionalism continued. Given these divisions, Muhammad Riza Shah’s legitimacy strengthened because the monarch was still the primary symbol of the nation and its territorial integrity. He set about, much as his father had, consolidating his own power by rebuilding and strengthening the military, by dominating the majlis and Iran’s internal politics through constitutional changes, and embarking on a program of modernization and westernization. He shared his father’s shortcomings, however, and like his father seemed not to have trusted anyone. Muhammad Riza Shah continued to resist his role as constitutional monarch. He successfully suppressed the left, and he sought to repress liberal constitutionalists, but their nationalism made that difficult, for it would have called into question his own nationalist credentials – nationalism being the most powerful factor in Iranian politics. Two groups who had dominated the majlis from its beginning, landlords and ulema, supported the shah out of fear of any radical change. In 1946 Muhammad Riza Shah inaugurated an ambitious Seven-Year Plan for economic development. In his disappointment with the inadequate American response to Iranian requests for aid, he sought an

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increase of oil royalties from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. A new agreement was signed in 1949. In February 1949 the shah survived an assassination attempt at the University of Tehran that he blamed on a religious–communist conspiracy. This was the first but not the last time that he would put the blame on such a conspiracy and use it as a pretext to consolidate his own power by removing all opposition to his rule. Martial law was declared, anti-shah newspapers were closed, opponents arrested, the Tudah was outlawed, and a constituent assembly was called. Under extraordinary circumstances, the constituent assembly created a senate, half of whose members would be appointed by the shah, and gave him the power to prorogue the majlis so long as there were new elections and a new majlis met within three months. Consequently, the shah now controlled the instruments and institutions of power, but not nationalism. In the lead-up to elections for the sixteenth majlis, the shah was challenged to conduct free and open elections, and his own equivocation on oil and reliance on the army challenged his legitimacy, which was further damaged by his appointment of the French-trained General ‘Ali Razmara as prime minister in 1950. The transition from Iran’s long tradition of universal rulership to constitutionalism and the notion that authority was now derived from the people remained unresolved. Moreover, a new political force emerged which challenged the shah on the two essential principles of nationalism and constitutionalism, and that group became known as the National Front, Jabbah-yi Milli. The National Front, a broad coalition dominated by nationalists, modernizers, and that new generation educated in the 1930s and 1940s, emerged under the leadership of Musaddiq and set an uncompromising agenda in the majlis to nationalize oil. This agenda resulted in a direct confrontation with Muhammad Riza Shah, Britain, and the United States. The breadth of the National Front constituted both its strength and, ultimately, its weakness. The National Front’s two most important groups included the new professional middle class, from which its leaders were drawn, and small and medium-sized bazaaris, most effective in shutting down the bazaar in protest, but it also included socialists and progressive and liberal-minded landlords and ulema, such as Ayatollah Mahmud Taliqani (d. 1979). Dr Muhammad Musaddiq (1882–1967), a member of an important landowning Qajar family, had studied law in Switzerland. He was a long-standing Pahlavi opponent, and was one of five members of the fifth majlis who spoke out publicly and voted against the resolution to depose Ahmad Shah to end the Qajar dynasty.

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The period 1949–53 was characterized by political uncertainty and large protests, rallies, and strikes. Amid charges that he was a British front man, intending to establish a military dictatorship, General Razmara was assassinated in March 1951 by a member of Fida’iyan-i Islam, a small, radical Shi‘i and anti-western fundamentalist group with some support in the bazaar. At the same time, the shah was also opposed by Ayatollah Sayyid Abu’l Qasim Kashani, a majlis member whose followers represented a cross-section of Iran’s middle classes concerned with traditional religious solutions, rather than more radical ones. The majlis itself was alarmed by the chaos following Razmara’s assassination, which included popular eruptions of delight about his death. The Tudah organized demonstrations in key cities and strikes in Abadan where police shot six demonstrators. In desperation, the government declared martial law and, as an expedient the majlis turned to Musaddiq as prime minister. Oil was nationalized within two weeks of Razmara’s assassination. The next two years saw a standoff between Musaddiq and Muhammad Riza Shah. Musaddiq was less enigmatic than commonly characterized then or now in the west. Clearly, he was independent and determined; a committed nationalist and constitutional liberal; and less concerned about tactics than about principles, the primary one being a nationalist commitment to Iran. The struggle between shah and prime minister centered on constitutional issues of power and control of the army, and in this contest Musaddiq did not hesitate to use street demonstrations and the bazaar to his advantage, but in doing so he also threatened the National Front’s unity and risked alienation of key constituents that included some ulema as well as some landlords. Musaddiq failed to convince the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to accept what were essentially the terms already agreed upon by international oil companies in Mexico and in Saudi Arabia, that is, sharing profits 50/50. The great refinery at Abadan was shut down and an international boycott was imposed on Iran. The reasons for Musaddiq’s intransigence and unwillingness to back down to end the boycott and its costs are still disputed. At the same time, the Conservative Party’s victory that brought Churchill back to power, and the Republican Party’s victory in the United States that brought Eisenhower to the presidency increased the international political stakes. Churchill, mindful of the waning empire and India’s and Pakistan’s 1947 independence, was intent on maintaining Britain’s control over its single most valuable economic asset, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Eisenhower, under the influence of the Dulles brothers, who as Secretary of State and Director of the CIA

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together controlled US foreign policy, was determined to draw the line on Iranian nationalization lest a precedent be set. While the cold war was a factor, recent research demonstrates that control over Iran’s oil production was primary and instrumental in launching the coup to topple Musaddiq.1 July 1952 was pivotal in the continuing struggle between the shah and Musaddiq, who resigned when the shah rejected his nominee for Minister of War. After violent demonstrations swept Iranian cities, particularly Tehran, Musaddiq was reappointed and undertook an aggressive program against the shah, removing his recently won constitutional powers, and against the military, where Musaddiq made major changes. The majlis granted him emergency powers to rule by decree for six months and then extended that power for another year. In July 1953 Musaddiq called for a national referendum to legitimize the seventeenth majlis’s dissolution, which he won overwhelmingly in the rigged balloting. “Mossadeq [sic], the constitutional lawyer, who had meticulously quoted the fundamental laws against the shah, was now bypassing the same laws and resorting to the theory of the general will. The liberal aristocrat who had in the past appealed predominantly to the middle class was mobilizing the lower classes.”2 Musaddiq had overwhelmed all opposition, had reduced the shah to a figurehead, and had launched radical political and economic changes, but in the process he had divided his supporters in the National Front. He had alienated many in the traditional middle classes, and the ulema. Recent research indicates, however, that Musaddiq retained support in Tehran’s bazaar.3 Moreover, the army plotted against him, and on 16 August the shah dismissed Musaddiq and appointed General Fazlullah Zahidi in his place. Musaddiq refused to step down, and in the context of disorder and street demonstrations, the shah fled. The planning for an anticipated coup took place in London with MI6, but was carried out in Tehran by the CIA’s Kermit Roosevelt, who, when the planned-for coup failed, quickly improvised and with no little luck succeeded. With some irony, on 19 August, Musaddiq was brought down by a street mob, but this one was hired by the United States, and by the army under General Zahidi, who arrested him. The shah returned, and Musaddiq was tried, jailed for three years, and lived out his life under house arrest until he died in 1967. Musaddiq was uncompromising in his nationalism, but he compromised his constitutional principles. Consequently, divisions within his power base save for the street left him fatally weakened. Despite Musaddiq’s fall from power, his legitimacy grew. He is now a nationalist icon, almost beyond criticism and reproach.

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Muhammad Riza Shah was restored to the throne with ever-increasing power but with diminished legitimacy. The CIA-led coup and restoration would haunt the shah throughout his reign. Like his father, Riza Shah, he focused on the military as a bulwark for his own power, he identified the state and the nation with his own personal rule, and he embarked on an ambitions program of modernization and westernization with the assumption that a transformed Iran would legitimize his reign out of gratitude. Muhammad Riza Shah clearly understood the importance of broadening his base of support. He won the support of key ulema, particularly the highest-ranking marja‘ al-taqlid, Ayatollah Husain Burujirdi, who, along with the army and the increasingly feared secret security force known by its acronym, SAVAK, became the means of maintaining stability to keep the support of the traditional urban classes and the bazaar. The shah appointed Zahidi prime minister and appointed other coup leaders to important positions only to abandon them when they were no longer useful or became seen as potential threats. Only with Amir ‘Abbas Huvayda’s appointment as prime minister after the 1964 demonstrations did ministers and key advisers, often technocrats, stay in the government for long periods of time, but by then they had become mere ciphers under the shah’s very personal rule. The shah controlled all political parties and organizations. He selected an official opposition party, but in 1975 created by fiat a single party, Rastakhiz. Independent trade unions were not tolerated, and professional organizations of doctors, lawyers, teachers, and writers were all state-controlled, as were radio, film, and then television. Although the shah tried to control all formal institutions, there were social processes that he tried to manage, but could not control. SAVAK monitored individuals and groups such as daurahs, informal social groups, but the state had little control over broader social and demographic changes. Iran’s population in 1966 had grown to something over 25 million – Tehran’s population totaled 2,695,283, six times greater than the next largest city, Isfahan. Moreover, the movement of population from rural areas to cities, a process that had begun early in the twentieth century, accelerated. By 1966, 38 percent of the population lived in cities. Most of these migrants to cities were unskilled and found jobs in the increasing number of construction projects. There was a significant increase, too, in the number of workers in manufacturing. This urban influx, aptly characterized by Hourani as “the ruralization of cities,”4 has had profound social and political implications and divided urban populations between those who hold “traditional” and those who hold “modern/western” values. Education expanded, and literacy increased,

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Figure 8.2 The Shahyad Tower, Tehran, was built by Muhammad Riza Shah Pahlavi about 1974 to commemorate the 2,500th anniversary of the monarchy (photographer, Roloff Beny, 1924–1984/National Archives of Canada/ PA-199010)

but this had unintended consequences as the growing number of high school and university students became politicized over nationalist and economic issues. As a result of the expansion of education and the increasing number of Iranian students going abroad for university education, there was a significant growth of the westernized professional middle class and intelligentsia. Both of these groups, but particularly the latter, were frustrated by the absence of political development and their exclusion from meaningful political participation. As a consequence of

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these changes, too, there was an increased individualism – and in quite specific circumstances, class awareness – despite the continuing centrality of the family in society as a whole. An intelligentsia had begun to emerge in the early twentieth century. Despite Riza Shah’s repression, the numbers and importance of the intelligentsia increased during his reign and under Muhammad Riza Shah, particularly during the 1940s. These people were concerned especially with social and economic issues, politics and political participation, and with a nationalism that emphasized Iranian history, culture, and society independent of Pahlavi autocracy. Writers began to write prose in colloquial Persian. From the very beginning of Riza Khan’s rise to power, Muhammad ‘Ali Jamalzadah had advocated a simple style, and at the same time he presented a critique of society. Social and political criticism was necessarily indirect – except for the relative freedom in the early1940s – and often focused on the lives of ordinary Iranians. Here, too, leftist values could be disguised, and most writers, even those from notable families, shared in the same political and social values, along with a commitment to westernization and modernization. ‘Ali Dashti, writer and editor, represented another development that focused on the writer as individual, and in his first book, Prison Days (1921), recounted his own experiences. Dashti, along with many other modern writers and intellectuals, was powerfully drawn back to classical Persian literature. All members of the intelligentsia were committed nationalists, constitutionalists, and secularists, including those with traditional religious educations such as the distinguished historian and jurist, Ahmad Kasravi. Kasravi was assassinated in 1946 by a member of the Fida’iyan-i Islam. Sadiq-i Hidayat, Iran’s greatest modern novelist, eschewed politics altogether, and in his best-known work, the novel Buf-i Kur (The blind owl) – not published in Iran until after Riza Shah’s abdication – he not only utilized a European form but presented the psychological state of alienation, itself a modern focus on individual experience. This same individualism was remarkably seen in Parvin I‘tissami’s Divan, 1935, the first major poetry collection published by a woman, in which she incorporated her own name in her poems, an accepted practice in classical Persian odes. I‘tissami’s authorship was often contested, for it was held that no woman could write with such mastery. Persian poetry continues to be dominated by classical forms, but another woman, Furugh Farrukhzad (1935–1967), who wrote poetry in both traditional and modern forms, wrote not only about herself but about her sexuality. Furugh Farrukhzad’s use of irony and mocking satire has a long tradition in Persian literature.

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The poet Furugh Furrukhzad

The ulema continued to dominate traditional learning and thought. Many writers in the Pahlavi period had traditional clerical training and had been born into clerical families, including Dashti and Jamalzadeh. Despite such clerical backgrounds, writers and intelligentsia were typically anti-clerical and disdained clerical parochialism and obscurantism. Both Jalal Al-i Ahmad (1923–1969) and ‘Ali Shari‘ati (1933–1977) had clerical family origins. Al-i Ahmad is best-known for his Gharbzadigi (Plagued/intoxicated by the west), which is a systematic analysis of westernization in Iran. His term, gharbzadigi, came to stand as a critique of Iranians’ uncritical infatuation with all things western, which threatened Iranian culture itself. Al-i Ahmad also attacked the ulema for their obscu-

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rantism and failure to defend Iran and its culture. Shari‘ati obtained a PhD in Paris, where he was especially influenced by western social thought, and after his return to Iran he had a major impact on students both as the result of his lectures and his role as social and political critic, which resulted in his imprisonment. He called for a politicized Shi‘ism and argued that only a re-interpreted Islam could provide an indigenous basis for action that would liberate Iranians from tyranny. Further, he argued that the ulema trivialized Islam. The intelligentsia generally criticized the ulema for refusing to address Iran’s social and economic ills and for acquiescing to state power in an attempt to preserve their own. All members of the secular intelligentsia in the Pahlavi period struggled with their individual identities in the contexts of nationalism and the nature of rulership. Some argued that the basis for the new Iranian identity was to be found in secular, liberal values and Iranian history, and others – like al-Afghani – thought that such a basis could only be found in a desacralized Shi‘ism. Some of the intelligentsia joined with members of the ulema to protest against Pahlavi injustice in traditional Islamic terms and to discuss the regularization of the role of the marja‘ al-taqlid, the source of emulation, or pre-eminent mujtahid, in a modern society. This was partly about mujtahidi domination that had emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but mainly about concern lest Shari‘a and ulema suffer further subordination to the strengthened Pahlavi state and its secularization policies. Ayatollah Husain Burujirdi (1875–1961), the last generally recognized marja‘ al-taqlid, issued a fatwa declaring the 1960 land reform to be contrary to both Shari‘a and the Constitution, and with his death there was even greater urgency regarding the role of the marja‘. Significantly, Mahdi Bazargan (1907–1995), a member of the new professional middle class – he was a French-educated engineer, lay theologian, and Khomeini’s first prime minister – joined in the discussions that had been largely an ulema matter. For many the marja‘ represented the medieval notion of the philosopher-king. But what was his role to be in contemporary society, and should that role be played by a council rather than an individual jurist? Clerics including Taliqani, Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Bihishti of Isfahan (d. 1981), and Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari (d. 1979), who were to play critical roles in the Islamic Revolution, also participated in these discussions. Even in the major anti-Pahlavi protests of 1963, when the intelligentsia and the ulema challenged Muhammad Riza Shah’s increasing autocracy, they did so in the context of the Constitution, and did not call for an end to the monarchy. Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini

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(1902–1989), who in the 1963 crisis identified the shah with Yazid, the Umayyad governor responsible for Iman Husain’s death in the seventh century, did not call for constitutional changes until the early 1970s. His early 1940s treatise, Kashf al-Asrar (The unveiling of secrets), allowed for a monarch subordinated to Shari‘a, and in this same treatise he makes his first references to the rule of the vilayat-i faqih, the guardianship of the jurisprudent, among other translations, which represents a logical if radical development in mujtahidi thought. In the immediate aftermath of the 1953 restoration, martial law allowed Muhammad Riza Shah to crush all opposition, especially the leaders and members of Tudah and the National Front. An emergency loan from the United States rescued the economy. With US assistance the military was expanded, and with US and Israeli technical support and training the dreaded SAVAK was established in 1957. A new oil agreement was reached in 1954 which established an international consortium, including American oil company participation, in oil exploitation with 50/50 share of profits with Iran. The National Iranian Oil Company emerged from AIOC. Over the decade from 1950 to 1960, oil income increased fivefold, which made it possible to relaunch the Seven-Year Plan. The early 1960s were pivotal for the shah. In 1961 he dissolved the majlis, and appointed the respected ‘Ali Amini as prime minister; he was instrumental in adding reform-minded ministers to the cabinet to inaugurate a period of reform. The shah also rid himself of key officials who had been involved in the reimposition of royal power in post-1953 Iran and who had become identified with repression and corruption. The National Front survived as a greatly weakened political force, along with other groups, to oppose autocracy. To quell any suggestion of compromise, the shah brutally crushed student protestors at the University of Tehran in January 1962. Amini resigned, and loyalists regained power, although the Amini cabinet reforms were in place, including the White Revolution, the shah’s most far-reaching program for change, announced in January 1963 and approved by referendum later that month. Then in June 1963 widespread anti-shah protests broke out. Those protesting cut across groups and classes, including students and intelligentsia concerned about political repression and ulema and their traditional supporters. The ulema were concerned about modernization and westernization, including the right of women to vote. For all politically active Iranians, including the shah, the central issue was one of rulership, and the question of how political power and authority were to be shared. Security forces reportedly killed thousands

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of protestors, a figure now disputed, in suppressing demonstrations. In 1964 Iranians were again united in opposition to the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States, which the shah ultimately approved. This agreement granted American personnel extraterritorial privileges that recalled the hated capitulations and loss of national sovereignty of the Qajar era. Khomeini’s name had emerged as a leader in 1963, and in 1964, after a provocative speech in which he attacked the shah and the United States for compromising Iranian sovereignty, he was arrested and deported to Turkey. Simmering unrest and economic frustration surfaced again in January 1965 when the shah’s latest prime minister was assassinated by a member of a radical religious group with bazaar ties, and more dramatically in April when one of his vaunted Imperial Guard, who had ties to a group of young members of the professional middle class, failed in an attempt to assassinate the shah himself. The consequences included security changes, strengthening of the police, and continued repression, but with the concomitant emergence of guerrilla organizations. The majlis had again become a rubber stamp, and then in the autumn, of 1963 the twenty-first majlis was convened. Government ministries would now be dominated by technocrats from the professional middle class, many educated in the United States. The emphasis on economic and social reforms in the White Revolution signaled a shift in the shah’s thinking regarding his power base. The shah had already begun to abandon landlords and started to court the growing urban middle classes whom he thought could be satisfied by the security of a higher standard of living rather than political participation – a ploy that worked until the mid-1970s and inflation. The White Revolution, or the Shah and People Revolution, included six points of reform in 1963, subsequently more programs were added. It was “white” revolution to forestall a bloody or a leftist one. In almost Zoroastrian terms the shah decreed: “I cannot be an indifferent observer in the campaign of divine powers against evil forces, for I am carrying the banner of this battle.”5 Of the six points, the centerpiece in the initial White Revolution was land reform, legislation that had been approved earlier, in January 1962. Even earlier, an attempt in 1960 to enact land reform had been blocked by a majlis dominated by landlords, even though its members depended on the shah for their positions. Land reform was launched to increase agricultural production by giving peasants a stake in their own holdings and by freeing up capital for more productive investment outside of land. In addition, land reform was supposed to have two important political consequences: the new land-holding peasantry would support the shah’s

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Figure 8.4 Postage stamp showing Muhammad Riza Shah and the 12 component symbols of the White Revolution

regime and the great landlords’ power would be greatly weakened. Land reform went through several phases, and its results were quite mixed. There were a number of structural problems that included insufficient land to be redistributed, inadequate capital inputs, and poor planning and organization; nevertheless, a landholding peasant class did emerge. The White Revolution also encompassed electoral reforms that included women’s right to vote, nationalization of forests, sale of state industries and worker shareholding, and creation of literacy and health corps to increase literacy and standards of health care. In addition, the various national service corps were to play a significant role in bringing all parts of Iran together through university graduates interacting with rural society across the nation. Separately from the White Revolution, education was greatly expanded at every level throughout Iran. Women were granted the right to vote, but the most important legislation for them was the 1967 Iranian Family Protection Law, which gave them greater legal rights in marriage,

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Figure 8.5 Postage stamp commemorating the centenary of the birth of Riza Shah. It shows him with his successor, Muhammad Riza Shah, greeting schoolgirls. The son lived very much in his father’s shadow. The stamp bears the date of the new imperial era that began with Cyrus the Great, 2536/1978

divorce, and guardianships. Such secularization of family law impinged on Shari‘a and was bitterly opposed by the ulema; many of its members, including Khomeini, were opposed to women’s suffrage. The ulema had also opposed land reform, even though auqaf, land set apart as charitable foundations under ulema control, were initially excluded. The ulema – including Ayatollah Burujirdi who had opposed the 1960 land reform – took exception to land reform because they wanted to preserve the principle of private property, to safeguard private property from confiscation and redistribution. The 1960s and early 1970s were periods of significant economic growth, and all indices, including standard of living, education and students sent abroad, and health care and hospital construction, grew apace. Muhammad Riza Shah understood that aggrandizement of power and single-mindedness in pursuit of modernization and westernization in the White Revolution were insufficient to legitimize his reign. Particular policies, such as expanding the Iranian military both to ensure his own power and Iran’s regional pre-eminence, were tied into his personalization of the state and of nationalism, which he pursued as instruments of his legitimacy. He linked himself particularly with earlier Iranian rulers and dynasties, and used the language and symbols of universal rulership. But

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although his power and Iran’s wealth allowed him to represent himself to Iranians as universal ruler, the representation was not reciprocal because of the transformation of Iran’s political culture into a modern dictatorship and autocracy. He failed to recognize the changing political expectations of Iranians in general, but especially of the new professional middle class, and the value they placed on constitutionalism. Muhammad Riza Shah and particularly his Shahbanu, empress, Farah, emerged as important patrons of the arts, both western and traditional. Farah, and her office, were often identified as holding out the possibility of a more liberal Iran. State-sponsored spectacles, including the Shah’s long-delayed coronation in 1967 and the ill-conceived celebration in 1971 of 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy, sports, traditional arts, music, and crafts were staged to represent the monarchy to Iranians and the world. Iranians, however, increasingly saw monarchy as irrelevant and their monarch intent on consolidating his power even further. The shah’s identification of himself with Iran was stated in his invocation to Cyrus the Great at the opening of the 2,500th anniversary: O Cyrus, Great King, King of Kings, Achaemenian King, King of the Land of Iran! I, the Shahanshah of Iran, offer these salutations from myself and from my nation. At this glorious moment in the history of Iran, I and all Iranians, the offspring of the empire, which thou founded 2,500 years ago, bow our heads in reverence before thy tomb. We cherish thy undying memory, and at this moment when the new Iran renews its bond with its proud past . . . Cyrus! Great King, King of Kings, Noblest of the Noble, Hero of the history of Iran and the world! Rest in Peace, for we are awake, and we will always stay awake.6

This celebration and the above remarks proved offensive, in one way or another, to most Iranians and emphasized the contradictions that characterized the shah’s entire reign, not just its last eight years. The boom times of the early 1970s helped mask significant social and economic developments. Migration into cities, especially to Tehran, accelerated, as there were many more opportunities in cities than in rural areas. Increased and increasing oil incomes – international oil prices quadrupled in 1974 following the October 1973 war and the Arab oil boycott – seemed to allow the shah’s government to pursue ambitious economic, social, and cultural programs and at the same time to upgrade the Iranian military to world-class status through the acquisition of the most modern and sophisticated weapons. Impressive economic growth, nevertheless, could not sustain military budgets and domestic programs without severe

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inflationary dislocation and its political consequences. Inflation affected all Iranians, but especially the traditional middle classes associated with the bazaar. Government subsidies for cheap food imports undercut both the bazaar and food production in rural areas. In addition, the issues of popular sovereignty and the shah’s relationship with the US continued to be problems. After Muhammad Riza Shah’s 1953 restoration, Iranians perceived the United States as inheritor of the British imperial role in their country and as the power behind the throne; the shah himself was caught in a dilemma, given his personalization of nationalism. He was fully aware of Iranians’ concern about US dominance, and only with great reluctance and after intense American pressure did he allow the 1964 approval of the Status of Forces Agreement. Iranians had become cynical about American government support for their civil and human rights, although many Iranians continued to hold Americans in high regard. The shah was dependent upon the US, but at the same time needed to demonstrate his independence, which he did by reaching agreements with the USSR and People’s Republic of China, despite the cold war, and by pushing for higher oil prices. In the early 1970s the shah’s military policies came into accord with the Nixon Doctrine in a way that allowed the Iranian navy and military to assume some of the US military and security responsibilities in the Persian Gulf and eastern Middle East. As the US surrogate and with the dramatic increase in oil prices, Iran could purchase the latest US military technology – including many F-14s – and bring to Iran an even greater number of US military, advisers, and technicians, reaching a total of 25,000. This extraordinary relationship and American military presence were widely resented in Iran, and not just among the shah’s opponents. They were also questioned in the United States, though not in the White House and State Department. The early 1970s also saw increased radicalization of a growing opposition that focused on the shah’s autocracy and his US ties. Some of the groups were secular and Marxists, others combined Marxism and leftist thought with religion, and yet others gathered around ‘Ali Shari‘ati, very much in the al-Afghani tradition, arguing that social and political justice could only be built on a Shi‘i basis, though ulema-domination was rejected. Shari‘ati struck an especially responsive chord with high school and university students. Women were active in all of these opposition groups. Khomeini, too, began an anti-shah and anti-United States appeal to all Iranians. He had been exiled to Turkey in 1964, but after a year was allowed to go to Najaf, Iraq. From Najaf, Khomeini’s sermons and lectures were taped and then smuggled into Iran in increasing number

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after the mid-1970s. Read or heard – audiotapes were coming into use and modern media became increasingly important – they had a real impact and not just on traditional groups. In these sermons he attacked the shah’s injustice and tyranny in traditional terms, but with radical implications. In 1970 he delivered a series of sermons on Islamic government, known and published under the title Hukumat-i Islamic (Islamic government). Here he presented for the first time the fully developed and radical concept of vilayat-i faqih, the guardianship of the jurisprudent, that took the late Safavid and nineteenth-century mujtihidi position to its logical conclusion of clerical government, or a theocracy. Khomeini argued that the ranking jurist, as the result of his training and piety, had the sole responsibility to rule and to govern, even though most ranking jurists rejected clerical political and governing roles. No longer was a monarch necessary to wield the sword. The shah knew about the radicalization of his opposition, although he may not have concerned himself with Khomeini’s theological arguments regarding just government, and the security forces seemingly controlled the opposition through surveillance, repression, and arrests. Khomeni rejected any notions of monarchy in response to the 2,500 anniversary celebration of the monarchy when he declared: Tradition relates that the Prophet (upon whom be peace) said that the title of King of Kings, which is borne by the monarchs of Iran, is the most hated of all titles in the sight of God. Islam is fundamentally opposed to the whole notion of monarchy . . . Islam came in order to destroy these palaces of tyranny. Monarchy is one of the most shameful and disgraceful reactionary manifestations.7

With extraordinary indifference, if not arrogance, and with blind selfconfidence, Muhammad Riza Shah continued to consolidate his power. Whereas there had been two official political parties – even membership in the opposition party was designated by the shah – he now mandated a single party, Rastikhiz, to which all government officials and employees must belong. He declared a new calendar that started not with the Hijra, the beginning of the Muslim calendar that marked the Prophet Muhammad’s emigration from Mecca to Medina in 622, the year ah 1, but with the reign of Cyrus the Great, some 2,500 years before. The calendar maintained its solar base, rather than the lunar one observed for Muslim rituals and observances, and the names of the months continued to be the Persian ones that his father had decreed during his reign. While the calendar changes proved of nuisance value only, the shah’s scapegoating of merchants, including traditional bazaar merchants, was

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not. He blamed them for driving up prices and for the economy’s increasing inflationary trends. In the mid-1970s the bazaar joined with students, the intelligentsia, and groups from the National Front to form a loose coalition that would bring an end to the Pahlavi monarchy. Significantly, too, professional organizations of lawyers, writers, and others began to assert their autonomy from government control, and began to have meetings and readings, which, by virtue of the fact that they were meeting publicly, criticized the government. While government control was the ostensible issue for these professionals, the nature of government and their role in it were the real issues. They still sought change within the constitutional framework. These professional groups took heart from Jimmy Carter’s campaign for the US presidency, in which he advocated human rights, but their expectations for his support would remain unrealized after his 1977 inauguration. The shah invited Carter to Tehran for a December visit to celebrate New Year 1978, where he – with ill timing – identified Iran as an island of stability under a ruler beloved by his people; when Carter left, repression resumed. The spark for the revolution did not come from the professional middle class, but from students, not secular ones in schools and university, but seminarians in Qum, Iran’s most important and traditional religious center. What had ignited these students to protest in the streets was an official newspaper editorial that had identified the ulema as “black but red”: traditional clerical garb was but a disguise for their Marxist ideas. Several students were shot, and commemoration of their martyrdom followed a traditional mourning cycle, observed especially on the fortieth day following death. Public opposition and protests snowballed across Iran, and the revolution gained momentum from an unarmed grass roots, without discernible leadership until early autumn 1978, and within a traditional Iranian framework that is often called the Karbala paradigm – after the seventh-century martyrdom of Husain, the third Shi‘i imam. The shah vacillated between suppression and conciliation, and his defensiveness emboldened all Iranians, even those with court ties. Demands from striking oil workers were initially ignored, but then met lest the state’s income should be further cut. After the imposition of martial law, ministerial changes and proffered concessions were widely seen as too little, too late. Khomeini and the ulema emerged as revolutionary leaders after the Jaleh Square incident in Tehran, September 1978, during which a disputed number of demonstrators, including women and children, were gunned down, as a consequence of miscommunication regarding the banning of public protests by the martial law

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government. Demonstrations grew increasingly violent. Clearly by Muharram, the first month in the Muslim lunar calendar that was observed in December 1978, the shah had no choice but to leave Iran. Vast numbers of Iranians poured into the streets of Tehran to commemorate Husain’s death, and the present was linked with the past as the shah was compared once again to Yazid, the Umayyad governor whom the Shi‘a hold responsible for Husain’s martyrdom. Once again, the government vacillated, first to ban the traditional Muharram processions and then to allow them to occur; the processions proceeded without incident and clearly the ulema and their supporters, who policed them, had authority and the shah none. In January the shah left Iran never to return. Khomeini, who at the shah’s request had been exiled from Iraq to France, flew into Tehran to universal acclaim, and the shah’s power collapsed. Khomeini’s return marked the end of the first revolution and the beginning of the second, which led to the establishment of clerical rule. Both revolutions were and have been misread. In the case of the first, the overthrow of the Pahlavis, all western observers and many Iranians held that as long as Muhammad Riza Shah had the support of his military, he would prevail. The military leadership – the military had experienced desertions in the lower ranks – remained loyal to the shah until Khomeini returned, when a group of air force cadets gave their support to him. Significantly, too, for Iranians, US support in the end could not save the shah. Few Iranians foresaw a theocracy replacing the monarchy, but the successful Islamic Revolution that followed led to a misreading of the first revolution, one that overemphasizes religion and ideology and underestimates economic, social, and political factors in the overthrow of the Pahlavis. Moreover, the success of clerical domination of Iran and the establishment of the Islamic Republic were problematic until secured by the hostage crisis, the intense political infighting of the early 1980s, and then the Iran–Iraq war. The revolutions have continued to animate debate in Iran about the nature of government, identity, and social and economic change. In western academic circles, debate has focused on the nature of revolution, and among western governments, on the political consequences of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. The debate in Iran about change has been something of a work in progress in the last quarter century. For academics, the Iranian revolutions have been compared with the French and Russian revolutions, have renewed discussion on the relation between ideas and revolutionary action, have emphasized issues of political economy and mobilization, and raised questions about religion and society in a post-

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Figure 8.6 Poster showing Khomeini’s expulsion of the shah (photograph by author)

modern world. And for Iran’s neighbors and for western governments the consequences of the Islamic Revolution are still an ongoing issue. Khomeini returned to Iran on 1 February 1979, and all groups acknowledged him as leader of the revolution. The military collapsed and with it the Pahlavi order. Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiyar, despite good nationalist and National Front credentials, was too tahghuti, a pejorative identification with the demon of materialism and a synonym for those with close Pahlavi associations, and went into hiding and then fled to France, where he was subsequently assassinated. The questions

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were: what was Khomeini going to do? Would he play an active political role and implement his ideas in Islamic government? Who spoke on his behalf? What was to be the nature of the government? What was to be the relation and role of Iranians with the government? Before Khomeini left Tehran for Qum he appointed Mahdi Bazargan as prime minister, but both power and authority were vested in Khomeini, who was increasingly and reverently called “imam.” Imam has a variety of meanings depending on context. It was the title for the first twelve Shi‘i leaders, ‘Ali and his descendants, and was most commonly used for them. Imam was also the title of the individual who led others in prayer; in addition it was a reference to a model or to a leader. In reference to Khomeini, did it also hold out the eschatological possibility for some that he was the Imam returned? Clearly, he returned to Iran as a charismatic leader, one who out of the chaos of revolution might miraculously solve Iran’s problems and re-establish justice. Order was not easily restored, and the unity that had brought disparate groups together to oust the shah now split across lines of ideological differences, mainly about the economy and the role of religion in society. Recriminations were the order of the day, and hundreds of government officials, military leaders, and other opponents of the revolution were arrested. Many were given summary trials and executed in the name of the revolution, or of the Imam. Ten of thousands more fled into what would become permanent exile. Increasingly, so-called Islamic norms of public behavior were enforced by Islamist vigilantes, and while their ire was directed especially at women it also fell heavily on any manifestation of cultural westernization, including dress, music, alcohol, cinema, and literature. The Pahlavi bureaucratic and military elites were replaced by young revolutionary ones, though some semblance of continuity was maintained at lower organizational levels. Now the goal of the revolution was to undo Pahlavi political, social, and cultural transformations, but not Pahlavi political centralization, and to replace secular elites and values with religious ones. SAVAK, however, was merely renamed to continue its state security role. The differences between the shah and the ayatollah are a study in contrasts. During 1978 the shah was seen as indecisive and insecure in response to growing demonstrations and violence. Since his 1953 restoration Muhammad Riza Shah had been only too aware of opposition in important groups of Iranian society. He never seems to have trusted his subjects or even his own generals, who never met together, presumably so they couldn’t plan a coup. Nor did he trust his major international allies. In his Answer to History,8 the shah recounts that the

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Figure 8.7 The Imamzadah (shrine) near Shahr-i Kurd has revolutionary slogans painted on its walls: “Let us continue the revolution until the Mahdi [messiah] returns” and “One day in the life of workers and farmers is worth more than all the ages of the rich” (photograph by author)

United States and Britain must have other plans for Iran that did not include him. Indeed, President Carter received conflicting advice on how to respond to the shah’s deteriorating standing, and Washington, too, vacillated throughout the course of the revolution. Moreover, we know that the shah had kept his cancer diagnosis a secret and understood that succession would be problematic without popular support for the monarchy. The first revolution, despite widespread violence and disruption, resulted in a relatively modest number killed – some 3,000 by the most reliable calculations, far lower than estimates at the time. As indecisive as the shah was, Khomeini exhibited a singlemindedness and confidence in the correctness of his actions, even before he exercised power explicitly. Khomeini tolerated violence, often carried out in his name or in the name of the revolution, and when in office he tolerated the use of state power to crush any opposition to achieve his ends. Such determination was unprecedented save for Riza Shah, and even he was willing to compromise, as he did over the issue of the republic. The uncertainty as to what Khomeini would do reinforced what little

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was known about him in an almost mystical way. While the shah was the victim of the first revolution, Khomeini was the victor of the second. Would expectations for a better life and political participation be met in a possible Islamic context under his leadership? The second revolution was equally unexpected and possibly more profound than the first, and Shi‘i Islam, in the process of being newly defined, was poised to encompass all aspects of society and politics and even to dominate the other aspects of Iranian nationalism. Opposition to the unexpected religious focus did break out and was expressed in Tehran by leftist groups and women, and in rural areas by some of the tribes, notably the Qashqa’i in the south and the Kurds in the north. Women, who were involved in protests throughout the first revolution across the political spectrum, and who were fearful that their newly won freedoms would be repressed, organized a major demonstration in Tehran in the spring of 1979 to rally support, which did not materialize. Street thugs physically attacked the demonstrators and brought the march to an end; women’s roles were to be the traditionally defined ones. Opposition groups, especially radical leftist ones, went underground, while other wide-ranging and fragile factions formed around Khomeini and other leading religious figures to spar for power. Even religious leaders and their followers were divided on both short- and long-term goals, but all groups agreed that the Pahlavis and their associated elites were finished and that Khomeini represented the new revolutionary order. Yet it was not even clear that his radical vision for a mulla-directed theocracy would prevail, and Khomeini faced opposition not only from secular liberals, but also from other higher-ranking ayatollahs over the issue of direct and active political roles for the ulema. During the near-anarchy of 1979 delegates to a constitutional convention were convened to draft a new constitution that would be ratified by a national referendum in December 1979. Meanwhile, Khomeini’s dominant role and clerical leadership were assured by three crises, two of which were beyond his control – the hostage seizure at the American embassy in November 1979 and Iraq’s invasion of Iran in September 1980. The third crisis was political and internal – the June and August bombings that killed key Islamic Republic leaders and government officials – and provided the justification for the suppression of much of the leftist and secular opposition within Iran. The 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, amended in 1989, bears a resemblance to the 1906–7 Constitution with its division of power and checks and balances. Like the earlier constitution the new one does not resolve the dilemma of authority, whether it is derived from

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God or from the people. The second constitution places the government and law within a Shari‘i context to resolve the tension that had evolved from the first in terms of implementation of Pahlavi secularizing legal reforms. The 1979 Constitution’s most profound departure from that of 1906–7 is the establishment of the office of vilayat-i faqih, the guardianship of the jurisiprudent, that is, deputy of the infallible imam. Thus, Khomeini’s radical ideas of Islamic government, which had neither religious nor historical precedent, were institutionalized and implemented. This move was modern – hardly traditional – and a reaction to changes that had occurred under the Pahlavis. Khomeini’s ideas emerged from the mujtahidi position that was first articulated in late Safavid history and supported in the eighteenth century by leading mujtahids, in which the monarch was to be subordinate to the jurist, the government to the Shari‘a. Khomeini himself, like his Safavid predecessors, had been attracted to Islamic mysticism and neoPlatonic philosophy, the latter in particular providing the basis for the rule of the jurist. In practice, however, throughout the nineteenth century, and earlier as well, the ulema had acquiesced to monarchical power and had effectively withdrawn from the exercise of political power. Khomeini held that the jurist had to exercise power and authority. One problem this raises for jurists is that politics by its nature requires compromise, but there can be no compromise with Shari‘a; consequently, there is the danger that political compromise could undermine legal scholars’ moral bases. Like Ataturk, Khomeini institutionalized his charisma and embarked on a radical political program to remake Iran and Iranians. His goal was to unite believers in the new Islamic Republic, the kingdom of God on this earth, which would be led by the vilayat-i faqih, a kind of philosopher-king but one trained in jurisprudence who ruled on behalf of the infallible imam. For many Iranians, Imam Khomeini was infallible – especially so for the traditional, rural classes, where his aura as leader of the revolution legitimized a continuing political role. The position of vilayat-i faqih challenged the widely accepted idea that the government’s authority was derived from the Iranian people themselves and dashed the expectation that post-revolutionary government would draw its authority from the people. Significantly, too, while Khomeini’s position as vilayat-i faqih was accepted by the ulema, the concept of the vilayat-i faqih was rejected by a number of senior clerics, notably marja‘ al-taqlids such as ayatollahs Araki, Shari‘atmadari, Gulpayigani, and Khu’i, all of whom outranked Khomeini, and most of the marja‘s of the shrine cities in Iraq. During Khomeini’s lifetime and especially after, the

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position of vilayat-i faqih has continued to be a contentious one for many ulema. Even his first designated successor, Ayatollah Husain ‘Ali Muntazari (b. 1922), differed with him on the day-to-day role of the vilayat-i faqih. Muntazari broke with Khomeini and his circle on other issues, and was dropped as successor to live under surveillance until 2003. Traditional ulema apprehension, if not opposition, to their role in directly exercising governmental power, was based on two major concerns: the absence of precedent and historical acquiescence to government power in return for which governments allowed ulema jurisdiction in religious, moral, and most social matters, resulting in a kind of separation of church and state. But traditional ulema have had a third, less apparent concern. There is nothing in the Islamic tradition that stipulates a “constitution,” yet in 1979 a constitution that recognized the authority of both God and the people was adopted. In the 1979 Constitution ulema were responding to the social changes that had occurred during the twentieth century, and especially the high value placed on constitutionalism despite its earlier failures. More recently, in the 1990s, some ulema and lay thinkers continued to struggle to reinterpret the legal tradition in regard to government, the authority of the people in it, and, especially, the status of women in an Islamic society. The seizure of the American hostages from the US embassy in November 1979 provided Khomeini and his supporters both an opportunity and a challenge. Earlier, in February 1979, Marxist University of Tehran students had seized the American embassy, but after several hours were convinced by Foreign Ministry staff to leave. The Foreign Ministry and other ministries had still maintained a professionalism and continuity from the old to the new regime, but the Foreign Ministry’s attempt to re-establish a semblance of order after the hostage seizure was overcome by post-revolutionary fervor. The 4 November seizure of the embassy was provoked by the news that the shah had arrived in the United States. In this instance, the militants consisted of several hundred students who identified themselves as followers of the imam’s line, khatt-i Imam. The shah’s arrival for cancer treatment in the United States was dismissed by many Iranians, who believed that the status of his health was but a ruse for restoring him to the throne as had happened in 1953. Once again, and despite wide-ranging political differences, Iranians were united on a nationalist basis, particularly that of national sovereignty. Criticism of Khomeini and of his supporters’ failure to end revolutionary anarchy was muted by this newly perceived crisis. Iranians were concerned about his government’s failure to establish order, to deal with a declining

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economy, and they longed for normalcy. Yet the November seizure of American embassy hostages gave the Islamic Republic’s government some cover in the ensuing diplomatic crisis that culminated in the breakoff of relations with the United States, and it also served the government’s purpose in vilifying the United States as “the Great Satan” and the source of Iran’s ills. Great Satan rhetoric, too, was used in cultural terms to attack westernization and consumerism in order to uphold a kind of nativism. Parallel institutions to the established state ones emerged to compete for power during 1979, and typically the parallel institutions were streetbased – something of a tradition going back at least to the early nineteenth century. In the case of extra-legal arrests, trials, and executions by revolutionary committees, kommittees – typically based in local mosques and led by their clerics – the government relied on street activists as a morality police, to identify, disrupt, and arrest miscreants accused of being un-Islamic and antirevolutionary in both their public and private behavior. Government ministries – minus their key ministers – had to contend with revolutionary counterparts such as the kommittees, or revolutionary tribunals. In the immediate aftermath of Khomeini’s return and the collapse of military discipline and the command structure – again, exacerbated by the flight or arrest of ranking officers – weapons were widely available and distributed across society. Groups competing for power now had the means to achieve it. Groups were contesting ideological control as well, and even within the ulema they represented views from the traditional right to the left, all of them trying to win Khomeini’s support. Armed religious factions, often allied with kommittees, paralleled the police and gendarmerie. Khomeini, like the two Pahlavi shahs, first needed to control the security forces to establish his own power, a necessity for launching what would prove to be controversial political, economic, and social programs. Second, Khomeini and his supporters successfully monopolized the symbols of the revolutions, including his role as its charismatic leader, and appropriated the language of the left to undercut its appeal. During 1979 class rhetoric was increasingly utilized by Khomeini and other clerical supporters, with references to the mustazafin, the dispossessed, or the poor. Charity and expressions of concern for the poor and weak constitute important Muslim values reaching back to the Prophet Muhammad himself, and clerics acquired power from the traditional lower class through mosque-based social service networks that were especially important in urban centers. The rhetoric regarding the mustazafin was used to undercut and co-opt Marxists and leftists in general,

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including key religious leaders such as Ayatollah Hasan Mahmud Taliqani (1911–1979). Subsequently, a joke circulated in Tehran that the three ayatollahs, Khomeini, Shari‘atmadari, and Taliqani were riding in a cab. Shariat-Madiri told the cabbie to turn right, Taliqani said left, and Khomeini said flash the left-turn blinker but turn right. Khomeini as vilayat-i faqih was the equipoise between the infallible Hidden Imam and believers, and he was the infallible and unchallengeable leader of the revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran. With parallel institutions – state and street – he was also the balance between them, and this position allowed him a degree of detachment and time to choose which direction to take. During the 14-month hostage crisis, Khomeini placated the left, worked with liberal secularists only to undercut them, and began to consolidate clerical power. The December referendum overwhelmingly approved the 1979 Constitution. A number of essential questions remained, however, about how the new constitution would be implemented. The first major question was about the nature of the government and how the inherent contradiction regarding authority would be resolved. What was the role of the people and their elected representatives, and how were their expectations to be met in cases of differences with the vilayat-i faqih or the institutions, such as the Council of Guardians, that tilted power in the clerical direction? The second major question relates to the first, but was even less apparent in 1980, and that is identity: what is the balance between Islam and nationalism in the Iranian state? After the revolution some clerical supporters issued a call to bulldoze Persepolis, that great symbol of Iran’s ancient legacy. All Iranians have multiple identities, and most – even many secularists – acknowledge an important Islamic component in Iranian nationalism, but a politicized religious identity has profound implications for the nature of government. Both of these questions continue to be among the most contentious and unresolved issues in Iran down to the present. In January 1980 Abu’l Hasan Bani-Sadr (b. 1933), Iranian- and French-educated economist – his educational background was typical of the new secular, nationalist liberals – was elected the first president of the Islamic Republic. The first majlis elections in March were won by the clerically dominated Islamic Republican Party, and set the IRP on collision course with secular nationalists like Bani-Sadr. Meanwhile, in December 1979 the USSR had invaded Afghanistan, whose increasing political instability threatened Soviet interests. The Soviets also feared the spread of an Islamic revolution that would further destabilize Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics.

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During the early years following the revolution, Khomeini and many supporters of it had with justification developed a defensive mentality and lived in fear that the revolution would be undone as the result of international interference. To counter that fear, clerics and others advocated the export of the revolution to safeguard it in Iran and also to fulfill a dream of re-establishing a universal Islamic commonwealth, in this instance under Shi‘i leadership. While radical Islamists throughout the Middle East welcomed the revolution – subsequently, many regarded it as a model – they were not prepared to live under Shi‘i, or Iranian, domination. Bani-Sadr’s presidency lasted little more than a year. He and others from the professional middle class, especially those with National Front ties, who accepted clerical domination in the 1979 Constitution, expected to play a major role in the new government, hoping to establish a semblance of political stability and to rein in clerics who continued to act independently of the newly constituted government. Importantly, the secularists’ nationalism was at odds with Khomeini’s Islamic focus, although initially Bani-Sadr, too, had advocated export of the revolution. From the beginning, Khomeini had dismissed Musaddiq, the iconic nationalist, and when he mentioned him at all, Khomeini wrote him off as “that nationalist fellow.” Musaddiq’s National Front had resurfaced even before the revolution and after the Revolution it split into factions over clerical government. Nevertheless, Bani-Sadr and many other members of the professional middle classes who initially supported Khomeini now thought they had his support. Throughout 1979–81 Iranian politics were highly contentious. While Khomeini was the dominant figure, with all groups seeking to co-opt him, it was not at all clear which group would in the end succeed in gaining his approval. On one end of the spectrum were radical left groups and at the other the Hizbullah, the partisans of God (who were often little more than thugs), and kommittees representing street politics with clerical ties. In the center were the various secular nationalists, notably the National Front factions committed to nationalism and to constitutionalism, and opposed to the Islamic Republican Party, especially to its more recalcitrant elements that resisted control by the government. Khomeini needed the middle to balance the left, but he also used Hizbullah, the Islamic Republican Party, and other clerics against both the center and the left. Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, further complicating Iranian politics. The war, nonetheless, once again brought all Iranians together on a nationalist basis. Saddam Hussein had hoped to take advantage of

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Figure 8.8 Postage stamp showing a woman with a rifle barrel and wearing the hijab, or Islamic dress. It was issued during the Iran–Iraq war to emphasize modern roles for Muslim women

Iran’s revolutionary state, its greatly weakened military capability, and its international isolation, and was supported by the United States, which welcomed Iraq’s invasion as increased pressure on Iran to release the embassy hostages. War was launched to redress an Iraqi grievance over a boundary dispute; to end any threat to a secular Iraq from export of the Islamic Revolution; and possibly to overthrow the clerical government. Baghdad was also concerned lest Khomeini should gain support from the Shi‘a of Iraq, some 60 percent of Iraq’s population, the majority of whom lived in Baghdad and in the southern third of that country. In 1975, Iran, supported by the United States, had forced Iraq to accept a new boundary that shifted the line on the Shatt al-Arab river from the shore to its deep water point, which gave Iran access to the still-important port at Khoramshahr and to the refinery complex at Abadan, even though a new oil port and refineries had been developed by the shah further south along the Persian Gulf beyond the threat of Iraqi disruption. Iraq regarded the 1975 treaty as a violation of its sovereignty and as a humiliation. After the revolution a range of Iran’s leaders called on Muslims, including the Shi‘a of Iraq, to follow the Iranian example. While there was some support among the Iraqi Shi‘a for Islamic government, most Shi‘a remained loyal, and Saddam

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Hussein’s call to Iranian Arabs – who lived primarily in oil-rich Khuzistan – on an Arab nationalist basis similarly went unheeded. Despite the Iraqi army’s initial success and occupation of Khoramshahr, the Iranian army held its own despite its weakened state. Regrouped and reorganized Iranian forces regained lost territory and launched an offensive into Iraq, even reaching the Fao peninsula. Military units – the Pasdaran, Revolutionary Guard, and the Basij, adolescent and teenage irregular volunteers, both in parallel with the army – were created as well. The war dragged on for eight years to end in 1988 with horrific casualties on both sides. Late in the conflict the Iraqis launched missiles, some hitting Tehran and other cities, and did not hesitate to use chemical weapons. To compound Iran’s woes, the Iraqis expelled thousands of Iranians long resident in Iraq, while others sought voluntary refuge in Iran. In the mid-1980s there were some 4 million refugees in Iran from both Iraq and Afghanistan. The war exacerbated political divisions within the Iranian government and led to Bani-Sadr’s fall. Characteristically, Khomeini set up a parallel war council that challenged Bani-Sadr’s authority. Bani-Sadr was also beset by his prime minister and the Islamic Republican Party, and his appeals to Khomeini went unheeded. Bani-Sadr dramatically took on his opponents not in Tehran but from the front in Khuzistan, where he launched a media campaign as the nationalist leader. He successfully rallied and defended the army against differing opinions in Tehran as to how best to wage the war and in a remarkably public way attacked his enemies in Tehran, simultaneously carrying out his other responsibilities as president. The embattled president rallied center and left groups in a national atmosphere of increasing street protests and heightened repression that pitted him and his supporters – including important religious and majlis figures, many in the bazaar, and the army – against the Islamic Republican Party and the Revolutionary Guard. Bani-Sadr’s legitimacy was in question along with his loyalty to Khomeini and the revolution. In the end, the IRP was better organized across the country and controlled state institutions, including ministries, television, courts, the police, the Revolutionary Guard, and Hizbullahis (literally, part of God, who acted as enforcers of public morality). Despite his office, Bani-Sadr was forced underground by mid-June 1981, after Khomeini gradually withdrew his support. Key backing for Bani-Sadr came from the Mujahidin-i Khalq, commonly known simply as the Mujahidin. The Mujahidin had formed as a radical Islamic group after the 1963 suppression of all opposition groups and remained underground until the early 1970s. While denying being

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Marxist or even socialist, they called for a radical transformation of Iranian society and politics within an Iranian-Shi‘i context. Membership was drawn predominantly from the new professional middle class, the intelligentsia, and their younger members in school and university. The Mujahidin had played key roles before and during the revolution – many of them had been jailed – initially in support of Khomeini. Their disillusionment with him began in mid-1980, and after June 1981 they mounted massive street demonstrations against clerical political domination, and seriously challenged clerical legitimacy to rule. With BaniSadr’s defeat, however, the Mujahidin broke irrevocably with Khomeini and the IRP over the issue of clerical autocracy. Political instability increased during the summer of 1981 and violence reached new heights. The Mujahidin, frustrated by not achieving its political goals, mounted waves of bombings and assassinations against the religio-political establishment. In June a bomb killed leading IRP officials, and other religious and administration leaders were assassinated across the country. Then in August both the new president, Raja’i, and the prime minister, Bahunar, were targeted and killed. In acknowledgment of failure and inability to affect Iranian politics, the Mujahidin leader fled with Bani-Sadr in a commandeered plane to France. In October 1981 Hujjat al-Islam (a title below the rank of ayatollah) ‘Ali Khamenei was elected president, an office to which he was re-elected in 1985. War with Iraq dragged on, and it continued to dominate internal politics, while the other international factor, the US, became less important with the release of the 52 American hostages in January 1981. After Bani-Sadr’s fall, political repression of the opposition continued, including the house arrest of one of the most senior ayatollahs, Muhammad Qazim Shari‘atmadari of Tabriz (d. 1985), who had quietly opposed clerical political roles, but in so doing stood as Khomeini’s major and threatening religious opponent. At this same time, repression of minorities in general escalated. From the beginning of the revolution down through 1981, ethnic and minority groups had subordinated their identities and particular goals to national ones in expectation of some degree of autonomy and freedom in cultural and linguistic expression. The 1979 Constitution recognized the rights of Iranian Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians in traditional Islamic terms. The loyalty of other religious minorities, particularly Iranian Sunnis, Jews, and Baha’is, to the Islamic Republic was, however, suspect. Grave political, social, and economic restrictions were placed on Baha’is in particular, who were regarded as apostates, and many of their leaders were imprisoned and executed. Leaders of tribal, ethnic, and

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other minority groups were under suspicion as well, even when elected to the majlis. Kurdish leaders had demanded that the Constitution recognize Kurdish autonomy and Kurdish as an official language. Khomeini rejected both, and the army was used successfully to crush opposition not only in Kurdistan, but also in Baluchistan, in Mazandaran among the Turkmen, in the south against the Qashqa’i, and wherever resistance to centralization of state and clerical power broke out. Differences were still tolerated in the IRP-dominated majlis, and were expressed about government policies regarding the economy, particularly the government’s role in business, industry, and agriculture. Government monopolies and foundations were established and controlled by clerics, and individual ulema and associated followers acquired both wealth and power. Government control was broadly extended. The Pahlavis had subordinated all public institutions to the state, and the new Islamic Republican government similarly launched a cultural revolution to purge all government ministries, military and security forces, courts, provincial administrations, universities, and radio and television of their perceived opponents. A new elite, qualified through revolutionary experience and ties to clerical leaders – generally young – replaced the Pahlavi elites, who fled Iran or were arrested, hastily tried in vigilante-dominated courts, and often executed. Notably, the shah’s last prime minister, Amir ‘Abbas Huvayda, was tried and executed in 1979. Even some of those who played important roles in the revolution were brought before tribunals and summarily executed, such as Sadiq Qutbzadah, an early Khomeini adviser, in 1982. Later, alleged charges were often moral ones involving drugs, smuggling, prostitution, and homosexuality. “Islamic” dress was rigidly enforced. Arbitrary arrests continued and tens of thousands were imprisoned, where they faced torture and often death. Clerical government institutionalized mass demonstrations in the context of the Friday noon prayers that were conducted across the country. Friday prayer leaders, traditionally government-appointed, had historically wielded significant power, and now major clerical figures in the government used Friday prayers at the University of Tehran to launch policy initiatives or to identify enemies of the regime. There was a significant increase in the number of students seeking religious education in seminaries, and newly trained clerics were sent everywhere to socialize rural and tribal populations to approved Islamic norms. Qum emerged as the major center of Shi‘i learning during the Iran–Iraq war, replacing Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, the traditional centers of Shi‘i learning and power. Because of Iraq’s different cultural and historical contexts, most of the ranking Shi‘i ulema there had rejected the idea of the vilayat-i faqih and direct clerical political roles.

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The intelligentsia and the professional middle classes had supported Pahlavi modernization and westernization while rejecting Pahlavi autocracy. Although they had acknowledged Khomeini’s leadership late in the revolution and in the first months after his return to Iran, they advocated liberal and constitutional political values and did not expect that a clerical government and autocracy would be established and prevail. The broad coalition of the intelligentsia and students, the professional and traditional middle classes, and elements of the urban masses who had brought down the shah did not hold during the first half of 1981, and the IRP did not shrink from using the coercive instruments of government and the Hizbullahis on the streets to attack any perceived opponents. Khomeini commanded allegiance – surprisingly, he seemed above the ruthless suppression and state-instigated violence – but even many of his supporters began to tire of revolutionary change and state-directed violence and civil uncertainty. They now desired normalcy. At the end of 1982 Khomeini began to rein in the terror that had so convulsed Iran throughout 1981 and 1982. Increasingly, consolidation of clerical power had come at the expense of clerical authority. Khomeini had deliberately ignored the profound changes that had occurred in Iran’s political culture under the Pahlavis, and in the 1980s the modern middle class began to distance itself from the government, regarding it, and even religion, with deepening skepticism and cynicism. Almost one million middle-class Iranians left Iran to live in the west, and their talents and capital were sorely missed. The traditional middle class was also in danger of being alienated, and workers, along with most Iranians, were frustrated by inflation, shortages, unemployment, and a declining standard of living. Khomeini recognized that the need to return to normalcy had an economic dimension which was being affected by continuing political turmoil, not to mention the human and economic costs of the Iran–Iraq war. In December 1982 he issued an eight-point proclamation that called for an end to the government’s extra-legal interference in the lives of Iranians. In an effort, too, to standardize law and its application, which itself was contentious, law was effectively Islamized in accordance with Shari‘a. Although attempts were made to regain some normalcy, Khomeini, the Revolutionary Guard, and the Council of Guardians ceded no political power after 1982. Revolutionary leaders began to demonstrate for the first time a concern for economic results rather than self-aggrandizing ideology and a recognition of the need to rebuild their traditional bases of support. Differences in political ideologies and alignments were reflected in conflicting economic policies during the turmoil of the early 1980s as economic decline was reflected in all indicators – shortages and

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rationing, inflation, economic stagflation with high unemployment, budget deficits, price controls and subsidies for basic foods, decline in oil income, and expenditure of foreign reserves. Iran’s economic woes were compounded by other issues: economic costs from the war and the refugees it generated, failed government domestic policies, and Iran’s international isolation. The state’s role as primary economic actor had actually increased after the revolution as the government nationalized industry and manufacturing, banking, and large-scale businesses. Oil continued to be the government’s primary source of income, and oil production increased as did income, which then decreased by the mid-1980s as world oil prices fell. Inconsistencies in agricultural policies affected agricultural production in negative ways. Pre-revolutionary food imports and subsidies had been disrupted, and the government stepped in to control wheat prices through new subsidies so that the price of bread, the dietary staple, stayed low. This was done for social and political reasons. In the absence of meat imports, the price of Iranian lamb, for example, rose significantly, and pastoral production of sheep and goats increased in response, which placed added strain on already degraded pastureland. In some areas, pasture shortages were exacerbated when cropland was extended at the expense of pastures. Moreover, as the war continued with its increasing demands for young fighting men, there was a consequent shortage of shepherds. Finally, inconsistent land legislation also negatively affected agriculture. The development and implementation of economic policy is a complicated business at the best of times, never free from ideology and politics. In the mid-1980s the government turned control of the economy and planning over to technocrats. Even so, these technocrats, often western-trained, had to take into account the regime’s social policy, which included a commitment and subsidies to the mustazafin, to secure the clerics’ political base in Tehran and other large cities, and to the families of “martyrs,” or war casualties. In addition, groups and individual clerics had taken control of foundations, or bunyads, that encompassed whole industries and businesses, and they resisted interference in their management. Typically, these enterprises were inefficient and subsidized through access to credit and lower interest rates. Moreover, Iran had a long anti-clerical tradition, and charges of clerical corruption and incompetence were popularly expressed. Economic planning had to take into account Iran’s growing population. Initially, clerical government had discouraged family planning, but reversed that policy in the early 1990s when the population growth rate

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reached 41 per 1000 population. In 1970 the population was 28.7 million; in 1980, 39.3 million; in 1990, 55.6 million; and in 2000, 67.4 million. Rural–urban migration continued to grow, and today 64.2 percent of Iranians live in urban areas. Tehran’s population has grown significantly to number some 10–12 million. Moreover, Iran’s population is very young – one third under the age of 15 and two thirds under the age of 30 – which has exacerbated shortages of teachers, places in schools and universities, and jobs. Chronic unemployment and underemployment, coupled with a rapidly increasing young population, has also resulted in an increase of drug abuse, alcoholism, and prostitution which was only reluctantly acknowledged by an Islamic government. There were a number of achievements despite political obstacles and vested interests, income and capital shortages, war, and a rapidly growing population with many frustrated young people. Education at every level was greatly expanded across the country, and literacy increased dramatically. The infrastructure of roads, electricity, and communications was extended throughout Iran so that even remote regions were no longer cut off from the rest of the country. Expansion of the infrastructure also allowed for greater government control, including state intervention into the privacy of homes and individual lives, which had hitherto rarely been experienced. On the other hand, there was some devolution of power from Tehran to provincial centers, with provincial and local decision-making involving more and broader groups of Iranians. Devolution resulted in heightened ethnic and local identities as these regional centers emerged as brokers of power and patronage. Tehran’s importance as the center of power, the economy, and culture continued to grow. Mayors of key cities such as Isfahan and Tehran became important and popular figures as they made their cities more inhabitable. The cultural revolution inaugurated in the early 1980s was as profound and broad-ranging as the political one. The intent of the Islamic Republican government’s social and cultural policies was to replace Pahlavi westernization with an Islamic morality, but the clerical government moved back and forth on these policies. Purges of universities and other cultural institutions and organizations were ruthlessly carried out to rid them of faculty and members whose loyalties were suspect and to replace them with those who publicly espoused Islamic values and loyalty to the regime. At the popular level, less susceptible to direct state intervention, it was intended that Islamic values and identity should supplant traditional Iranian ones. Celebration of No Ruz, the pre-Islamic New Year, at the vernal equinox was discouraged but to little avail. Attempts

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were made to marginalize not only Iran’s pre-Islamic past but also the cultural production from the Islamic era that did not conform to new Islamic requirements. For example, even Firdausi’s Shahnamah was briefly proscribed. Pre-Islamic archaeological monuments were derided. Although children tended to be given Muslim names after the revolution rather than the names of pre-Islamic heroes, which were more popular before it, few Iranians took these attitudes that denigrated Iran’s past seriously. Even without the Iran–Iraq war in which Iranian nationalism proved to be the enduring identity, Iranian culture and identity remained paramount. The Islamic Republican government – like the Pahlavis – imposed direct censorship and restrictions on print media and newspapers; these were eased in the mid-1990s, only to be reimposed when these media proved effective in electing reformists to office. Writers and artists fled in the early stages of the revolution and in its aftermath, but some returned to Iran in the 1990s. Translations of foreign books abounded, as Iranians sought to overcome their isolation and travel restrictions. An official Islam became part of the curriculum and a requirement for government positions, school placement, and university admission. Arabic instruction expanded, but English continued to attract the largest number of students in language instruction centers. English acquired ever-greater importance, even in seminaries, as the use of computer technology expanded exponentially – and further complicated government control. Despite government censorship, a vibrant cinema emerged to win international acclaim. Television was directly controlled, with satellite dishes banned, but enforcement has been haphazard, and underground distribution of satellite dishes and banned films, compact discs and recordings, and television cassettes flourishes. Pilgrimages to shrines and visits to cemeteries have long been part of Iranian popular culture. The tombs of Fatima in Qum and the Imam Riza in Mashhad became more important as pilgrimage sites after the outbreak of war made travel to the burial places of the Imam ‘Ali in Najaf and the Imam Husain in Karbala impossible. Pilgrimages and commemoration of the dead had religious as well as social aspects, which were politicized by the Islamic Republican government. Cemeteries for war victims, such as Bihisht-i Zara on Tehran’s southern outskirts, had to be greatly expanded, and rallies and public commemoration of the dead buried there grew in importance. Khomeini’s life took on cultic characteristics even before he died in June 1989. After his death a vast mausoleum was constructed at Bihisht-i Zara which has become a major shrine and social center – women, in particular, bring children and food

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Figure 8.9 Two wall murals in Tehran, Khomeini and the Mother of Martyrs (photograph by author)

to meet others and to spend the day – for regime supporters and the lower urban classes. Friday sermons have always been important in legitimizing rulers, and they continue to play that role, but are also, as noted, important in propagandizing state policies. Muharram commemorations and taziyya, passion plays, still attract large numbers, but with the added fillip that unpopular leaders can be likened to the hated Yazid just as the shah had been. Anti-regime sentiment can now take on anti-Islamic tones, and many middle-class Iranians demonstrate their cynicism as they flout Islamic norms by drinking alcohol, by watching banned cassettes, or through public behavior. Many young urban women, in particular, have pushed limits as to what is acceptable Islamic dress.

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The social impact of the Islamic Republican government has been most obvious in its policies regarding the status of women. The Pahlavis through their modernizing and westernizing policies had encouraged greater public roles and participation for women, although urban middle- and upper-class women were inevitably more affected than were lower-class and rural women. Professional and young women played active roles in the revolution. During the 1970s some women adopted hijab, or Islamic dress (the wearing of a scarf or an all-enveloping chador), to express their opposition to the shah, while others continued to wear western dress. Some members of military or radical groups even wore military fatigues, but some of these radicals, too, adopted hijab. The chador continued to be worn by lower-class urban women as a sign of their piety even after Riza Shah banned veiling in 1936. Similarly, middle- and upper-class women often wore chadors at prayer or at religious observances during the Pahlavi period. The imposition of hijab – minimally, it includes a headscarf and a long loose coat – occurred in spring 1979. The subsequent enforcement of hijab by Hizbullahis and then morals police confused women who had hitherto worn western dress, just as the ban on hijab in public areas confounded women in 1936. Now middle-class women, particularly younger women, demonstrate their rejection of Islamic rule and identity by pushing the limits of hijab and outward rebellious behavior. For them hijab symbolizes their inability to make independent choices. Young people, male and female, from the middle and upper classes are fully aware of popular western tastes and fashion, and they value personal freedom as a sign of opposition to the regime, as an expression of economic and cultural frustration, and as an affirmation of their own place in a modern, if not western, world. After the revolution clerical leaders urged on women their traditional roles of wife, mother, and housekeeper, and with the outbreak of war they held up women as mothers of martyrs. Restrictions on women’s public and work roles had an important economic impact on families, but that eased when war and economic necessity in the face of increasing living costs brought women back into the workforce. The secularizing 1967 Family Protection Law was nullified, and women’s Shari‘i obligations were re-established, eroding their rights in marriage, divorce, and child custody. The legal age for marriage was dropped to thirteen – at one point, nine – and then changed to fifteen. Gender segregation was often required in schools, in the workplace, and in recreational areas, although women were allowed to vote and to hold public office. The literacy gap between men and women narrowed dramatically, and recently

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women have outnumbered men in university admissions. Beyond their social and cultural impact, gender and generational changes had a profound political impact when, in the late 1990s, women and young Iranians overwhelming elected a reformist president and majlis representatives, which for the first time since 1981 threatened clerical domination. With Bani-Sadr’s fall in 1981, Khomeini banned the Tudah as well, and condemned all dissent as traitorous. Just as the Pahlavis had identified nationalism and Iran with themselves, Khomeini now identified himself with Islam and the Islamic Republic. By the mid-1980s Khomeini, the Council of Guardians, the conservative clergy which dominated the IRP, and the Revolutionary Guard monopolized the government, and its institutions, all instruments of coercion, controlled the symbols of the revolution and Islam. In short, Iran had been transformed by the second revolution into a theocracy within the centralized structure of a modern state. This consolidation of power allowed for the integration into state structures of those ad hoc parallel institutions that had come into existence after the revolution, even though their freewheeling leaders resented the budgetary curbs and bureaucratic interference that government controls imposed. After 1982 the most significant conflicts surfaced within the clerical political elite over the key issues of the ongoing war with Iraq and international relations, the role of the state in Iran’s economy, and appointing a successor to the visibly aging Khomeini. Crosscutting and shifting clerical factions formed around these three issues and around leading personalities: Hujjat al-Islam ‘Ali Khamenei (b. 1939), the president; Husain Musavi, prime minister; Hujjat al-Islam ‘Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani (b. 1934), speaker of the majlis; and Ayatollah Husain ‘Ali Muntazari (b. 1922). Khomeini delegated important government responsibilities to Muntazari, who emerged as Khomeini’s designated successor after he had won his confidence. Muntazari, despite the title of ayatollah, lacked the requisite standing expected of a holder of that rank, and thus was a problematic candidate to succeed as vilayat-i faqih, but other likely successors – including Khamenei, Khomeini’s eventual replacement – lacked the appropriate credentials as well as the title ayatollah. There were questions, too, regarding Muntazari’s judgment, leadership, and lackluster personality. The Constitution provided that in the absence of one qualified to be vilayat-i faqih, a Leadership Council of ranking jurists, or assembly of experts, would be elected to choose one. Such a council had been elected in 1983. In 1989 Muntazari was forced to withdraw as heir, and after Khomeini’s death on 3 June 1989 the Leadership

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Council selected Khamenei as successor with the title of Rahbar, leader – the title of ayatollah, with some cynicism, would come later. In July, Rafsanjani became president; his power was based less on religious learning than on political pragmatism and his own considerable wealth and business acumen. Throughout the 1980s the Council of Guardians, composed of twelve legal scholars and lawyers, had emerged as a powerful institution. While the 1906–7 Constitution had called for a similar group of five members drawn from the ulema to determine that all legislation was in accord with Islam, it had never functioned, and the 1979 Constitution revived this idea with the Council of Guardians. Khomeini’s detachment and seeming reluctance to intervene at too early a stage in factional and ideological disputes kept options open but exacerbated uncertainty. There was less uncertainty with the Council of Guardians, who were uniformly conservative on all matters, for example, they consistently opposed radical solutions to economic problems. They emerged as a balancing force against the majlis. Before his death Khomeini accepted a UN Security Council ceasefire to end the war with Iraq, thus sparing his successor any opprobrium that might be attached to such an important decision. Recovering well from the initial attack, the military had regrouped and expanded to about 800,000 (including the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij). They had acquitted themselves well in recovering lost Iranian territory, but had been unable to secure advantage over Iraqi forces. Iranians had rallied on a nationalist basis, but became demoralized with casualties (300,000 killed, more wounded), the devastation in southwestern Iran where much of the fighting took place, the war’s costs and general economic impact, and a decade of chaos. Iraq’s use of missiles and chemical weapons added to insecurity, and this, along with the war’s psychological impact, was an important factor in Khomeini’s final decision to agree to a truce. Khomeini’s death was not unexpected, and when he died his supporters poured out into Tehran’s streets to escort his body to the cemetery just as they had turned out to hail his return from France a decade earlier. Immediately after Khomeini’s death the Leadership Council appointed, and in July 1989 confirmed, Khamenei as leader. Rafsanjani was elected president. The transition was remarkably smooth; constitutional changes ended the tensions between the offices of president and prime minister by abolishing the latter, but the tensions between leader and president persist to the present, although this tension has yet to break out into public conflict. A balance was reached between Khamenei and Rafsanjani, head of state and head of government respectively, and

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Figure 8.10 The cemetery near Junaqan, Chahar Mahal, contains a small shrine that includes photographs, memorabilia, and the flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran to commemorate the deaths of individuals in the Iran–Iraq war (photograph by author)

Rafsanjani was re-elected president in 1993. Rafsanjani not surprisingly focused on bringing order to Iran’s economy. He earned a reputation as a pragmatic and wily politician as he gained control over the Council of Guardians and Leadership Council through his appointment to both. In the early 1990s clerical membership of the majlis declined significantly to about 25 percent (a decline that paralleled the decline of landlords in the majlis in the 1960s); both of these changes centralized executive power. Out of fear of anti-government demonstrations and protests, Khamenei, supported by the Council of Guardians and the

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Revolutionary Guard, increased repression once again as Iranians’ hopes for greater political participation and economic change were disappointed. Disillusionment with government and its political and economic policies was especially evident among those under 25 and among women increasingly frustrated by their lack of opportunities. Significantly, the number of women in the workforce exceeded that in the 1970s; more women were working out of economic necessity. Post-Khomeini government continued to be divided over economic policies and international relations. The economy was bedeviled by high unemployment and underemployment, shortages of capital, inadequate infrastructure, continued rural–urban migration with the increased pressures this placed on cities, high military costs, and the failure of state revenues to meet planning goals. Economic growth was offset by high birthrates even though those rates actually declined from earlier highs. Moreover, the standard of living remained below that of prerevolutionary Iran. The government continued to be divided about solutions. Rafsanjani favored entrepreneurial and free market solutions, while other powerful factions favored continued state controls and intervention. It has been estimated that the state, together with the ulemadirected bunyads, now controls some four-fifths of the economy and directly employs one-fifth of the workforce. Such economic control is reinforced by the social, legal, and religious networks of the ulema, and has made them vulnerable to charges of corruption and increased public cynicism regarding clerical public behavior and misbehavior. The Iranian economy is directly affected by its international relations, in the region and globally, and especially by changes in the pricing of oil and natural gas, which provide the vast bulk of government revenue. To improve its international credit after the end of the Iran–Iraq war, Iran repaid much of its foreign debt. Iran’s regional standing was directly affected by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, but when Iraq agreed to accept the Shatt al-Arab river boundary of 1975 – one of Saddam Hussein’s justifications for launching the war in the first place – the two neighbors resumed diplomatic ties. During the 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath, Iran criticized both the United States and Iraq. Iran’s relationship with other neighboring states was complicated by the anti-Shi‘i policies of both the Taliban government in Afghanistan and Wahhabi Saudi Arabia. But by the early 1990s Iran had backed off from its politicization of the Hajj to Mecca and re-established diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia. At this time Iran had to cope with new influxes of refugees from Iraq and from Afghanistan.

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While Iran normalized its relations in the Middle East and with leading European states, Russia, and China, its relationship with the United States continued to be problematic at best, and deteriorated. Clerical hardliners remained adamantly opposed to any ties, but some in the government and many Iranians would have welcomed resumption of diplomatic relations. Similarly, US administrations were divided, and issues such as the hostage crisis, Iran’s support for terrorism, and its antiIsrael stance loomed large in American domestic politics. President Clinton’s Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, however, offered something of an apology to Iran for the US role in Musaddiq’s overthrow. While Tehran backed off from its most extreme “Great Satan” rhetoric, hardliners forestalled any rapprochement, even though the newly elected President Khatami indicated a possibility for a changing relationship. Tehranis responded spontaneously after 9/11 and held candlelight vigils out of sympathy for America. The US position hardened and became even more hostile with President George W. Bush’s State of the Union address of January 2002, which included Iran among the three states in the “axis of evil.” The coalition’s deposition of Saddam Hussein and occupation of Iraq (spring 2003) led to talk within the Bush administration of invading Iran to depose the clerical government and to prevent development of an atomic energy program that might lead to atomic weapons. It is not clear whether or not monarchist restoration rhetoric was taken seriously either in Tehran or Washington, but threatened American intervention weakened those in Iran who advocated more normal Iran–US ties and those who were challenging Khamenei and the hardliners. The 2003 war in Iraq further complicated the Iran–US relationship. The May 1997 national elections in Iran held out great expectations for change and an easing of government restrictions and controls. In a massive turnout of some 30 million voters – young people, the professional classes, and women, in particular – 70 percent of Iran’s voters across the nation overwhelming elected Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Khatami (b. 1943) president, and elected an overwhelming number of reformists to the majlis. Rafsanjani did not even make the initial cut for a parliamentary seat. In the early 1990s Khatami had served as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and despite his role in inaugurating a new cultural and social openness he slipped by the Leadership Council’s scrutiny to end up on the presidential ballot. His openness reflected his personality and his own broad philosophical interests and familiarity with Islamic culture as well as western political culture and

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thought. His electoral success did not translate into meaningful change; indeed, the role that newspapers and print media played in the electoral success of reformers resulted in media repression by regime hardliners, followed by arrests of leading intellectuals and dissidents. In July 1999, University of Tehran dormitories were invaded by vigilantes along with state security units following widespread anti-government demonstrations at the university. In the 2000 majlis elections, as in earlier local elections, reformists continued to be elected by two-to-one margins, and in June 2001, Khatami was re-elected by some 75 percent of voters, but with fewer voters participating at the polls. Voter apathy and public disillusionment sprang from Khatami’s and reformists’ inability to overcome the opposition of Khamenei and the Council of Guardians to meaningful reforms and Khatami’s reluctance to challenge the religious establishment, of which he is a member. Khatami has shown that he is not a Gorbachov and is no moderate except in comparison with the Council of Guardians and the dominant Khamenei; he understands that his authority rests on the expectations of liberal, even democratic, change and his power derives from his clerical status. Clerics continue to control the powerful symbols of the revolution and the instruments of power of the modern, centralized nation-state. Khatami’s emphasis on hukm-e qanun, rule of law, derives from his own broad reading of western political theory, but while he uses that term in an Islamic context to condemn arbitrariness, especially the security forces’ recent assassinations and repression, his supporters use it in the western liberal sense that no one is above the law. Regardless of how Iranians align themselves politically today, the central issues continue to be the nature of government and their roles and identity in it: participatory government, governmental accountability and transparency, and some measure of equality. Just as we misread the process leading to the 1979 revolution, are we now misreading recent history and contemporary events to miss equally profound changes? Are we missing the transformation of an ancient political culture that began in the first decade of the twentieth century, intensified under the Pahlavis, and, despite the upheavals of the revolution and the Islamic Republic, continues to form the expectations of politically aware twenty-first century Iranians? Few Iranians who experienced the 1979 revolution and its aftermath have much stomach for another revolution, and students, despite demands for change, have been powerless to form coalitions with other critical groups in Iran to unseat the clerics from power. Iranian cynicism has only increased with the ineffectiveness of Khatami and the

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so-called reformers round him in face of the continued hold on power of radical conservatives, particularly represented by the Council of Guardians. Significantly, an increasing number of clerics – including the still-vocal Muntazari – and lay leaders such as ‘Abd al-Karim Surush call for some kind of separation of religion from the state. Iranians across the political spectrum express cynicism about institutionalized religion and its political domination, but they accept Shi‘ism as an aspect of their national identity. As part of the synthesis of what it means to be Iranian in today’s world, the younger generation at least call for recognition of their authority, after a century-long quest for popular sovereignty, and for personal choice in their individual lives.

Notes Chapter 1

Persia: Place and Idea

1 P. Kingsley, “The Greek origin of the sixth century dating of Zoroaster,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 53 (1990), pp. 245–64. 2 Max Weber, quoted in Nikki R. Keddie, “The Iranian power structure and social change, 1800–1969: An overview,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2 (1971), p. 4. 3 Justin Stearns, “Reading history: Text and context in Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh” (Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, unpublished thesis, 1998). 4 Pamela Kyle Crossley, “The rulerships of China,” American Historical Review, 97 (Dec. 1992), pp. 1468–83. In addition, see Crossley, A Translucent Mirror (Berkeley, 1999), pp. 9–29. 5 Richard Tapper, Frontier Nomads of Iran: A Political and Social History of the Shahsevan (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 1–34. 6 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, MA, 1991), pp. 10–11. 7 Richard Tapper, “Ethnicity, order and meaning in the anthropology of Iran and Afghanistan,” Le fait ethnique en Iran et en Afghanistan, ed. J-P. Digard (Paris, 1988), pp. 21–34. Also, Richard Tapper, “Anthropologists, historians and tribespeople on tribe and state formation in the Middle East,” Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, ed. P. S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 48–73, esp. p. 51. 8 Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb, “Government and Islam under the early ‘Abbasids: The political collapse of Islam,” L’Elaboration de l’Islam (Paris, 1961), p. 119. Even here, an essential egalitarianism is offset by status. Louise Marlow’s Hierarchy and Egalitarianism in Islamic Thought (Cambridge, 1997) analyzes the meanings of egalitarianism and its tensions in early Islamic culture and society. 9 Notions regarding tribal egalitarianism most likely come into Middle Eastern historical analyses by way of anthropological literature from Africa – the idea of “tribes without rulers” – through anthropological studies of bedouin, and thence to Iran.

Notes to pages 15–56

283

10 Jean Aubin, Deux sayyids de Bam au XV siecle (Wiesbaden, 1956). 11 While Crone, Lindner, and Tapper may have their differences regarding “tribe,” each is well worth reading: Patricia Crone, States in History ed. John Hall (Oxford, 1986); R. P. Lindner, “What was a nomadic tribe?” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 24, no. 4 (1982), pp. 689–711; and Tapper, “Anthropologists, historians and tribespeople.” 12 T. Cuyler Young, Jr., “Migration,” Iran, 5 (1967), pp. 41–50. 13 Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Eurasia” (typescript in progress).

Chapter 2

The Achaemians

1 In this book I shall use Persia/Persian for the historical periods until the Sasanians of the mid-third century ad, partly because of convention and partly because the two great dynasties of the Achaemenians and the Sasanians both originated in Fars/Parsua/Persia. 2 Cyrus Cylinder in James B. Pritchard, ed., The Ancient Near East. Vol. 1, An Anthology of Texts and Pictures (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 207. 3 Amelie Khurt, The Ancient Near East, c. 3000–330 BC. Vol. 2 (London, 1995) p. 663. 4 Norman Cohn, Cosmos, Chaos and the World to Come: The Ancient Roots of Apocalyptic Faith (Yale, 1993), pp. 114–15. 5 Pamela Kyle Crossley, “The rulerships of China,” American Historical Review, 97 (December 1992) pp. 1468–83. 6 Pritchard, Ancient Near East, pp. 206–8. 7 David Stronach, Pasargadae (Oxford, 1978), p. 24. 8 “The Inscription of Darius on the Rock of Behistun,” in The Ancient Near East, ed. William H. McNeill and Jean W. Sedlar (New York, 1968), pp. 119–34, reprinted from The Sculpture and Inscription of Behistun, by L. W. King and R. C. Thompson (London, 1907), pp. 1–83. The same texts with some variation are also to be found in Roland G. Kent, Old Persian (New Haven, 1953). 9 Kent, Old Persian, p. 138. 10 Ibid., p. 140. 11 See note 8 above. 12 Khurt, Ancient Near East, p. 680. 13 Herodotus, The History, trans. David Grene (Chicago, 1987), line 136, p. 97. 14 Khurt, Ancient Near East, p. 681. 15 See note 8 above. 16 Kent, Old Persian, p. 144. 17 Khurt, Ancient Near East, p. 682.

284

Notes to pages 58–164

“Artaxerxes,” in Plutarch’s Lives, trans. Bernadotte Perrin. Vol. 11 (London, 1926), pp. 127–203. 19 Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire, trans. Peter T. Daniels (Winona Lake, Indiana, 2002), p. 65.

18

Chapter 3

Alexander, the Seleucids, and the Parthians

1 E. Yarshater, ed., The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 3, The Selucid, Parthian and Sasanid Periods (Cambridge, 1983), 2 Volume 3, p. 696. 2 Ibid., p. 42. 3 Ibid.

Chapter 4

The Sasanians

1 Georgina Herrmann, The Iranian Revival (Oxford, 1997), p. 97. 2 Ann K. S. Lambton, “Justice in the medieval Persian theory of kingship,” Studia Islamica, 17 (1962), p. 100, n. 2. 3 Ibid., p. 100. 4 E. Yarshater, ed., The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 3, The Selucid, Parthian and Sasanid Period (Cambridge, 1983), 2 Volume 3, p. 696.

Chapter 5

“Non-Iran”: Arabs, Turks, and Mongols in Iran

1 A. K. S. Lambton, “Justice in the medieval Persian theory of kingship,” Studia Islamica, 17 (1962), p. 96. 2 Firdausi’s Shahnamah from Dick Davis, Epic and Sedition: The Case of Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh (Fayetteville, Arkansas, 1992), p. 88.

Chapter 6

The Safavids

1 Pembroke Papers, I, ed. Charles Melville (Cambridge, 1990). 2 Madimir Minorsky, “The poetry of Shah Isma‘il,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 10 (1942), pp. 1006a–1053. 3 Ibid., p. 1047a. 4 Ibid., p. 1042a. 5 Justin Stearns, “Reading History: Text and context in Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh” (Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, unpublished thesis, 1998). 6 Minorsky, “The poetry of Shah Isma‘il,” 1042a. 7 Dick Davis, Epic and Sedition: The Case of Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh (Fayetteville, 1992).

Notes to pages 164–257

285

8 H. R. Roemer, “The Safavid period,” Cambridge History of Iran, 6 (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 189–350. 9 Vladimir Minorsky, ed. and trans, Tadhkirat al-Muluk (London, 1943), p. 13. 10 David Morgan, “Rethinking Safavid Shi‘ism” (unpublished paper, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, 1997). 11 Andrew J. Newman, Between Medieval and Modern: Iran in the Safavid Centuries (forthcoming). 12 Kathryn Babayan, “The Safavid synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to imamite Shi‘ism, Iranian Studies, 27 (1994), pp. 135–62. 13 Roger Savory, Iran under the Safavids (Cambridge, 1980), p. 253. 14 Ann K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists (Oxford, 1981), p. 277. 15 Heinz Halm, Shi‘ism (Edinburgh, 1991), p. 95.

Chapter 7

The Qajars

1 “Persian [Supplemental] Constitutional Law . . . 8 October, 1907,” in The Emergence of the Modern Middle East: Selected Readings, ed. Robert G. Landen (New York, 1970), pp. 141–2.

Chapter 8

Iran, 1921–2003: Pahlavi and Islamic Republican Iran

1 Ervand Abrahamian, “The 1953 coup in Iran,” Science and Society, 65, 2 (Summer 2001). 2 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, 1982), p. 274. 3 Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick, NJ, 1989), pp. 41–6. 4 Albert Hourani, “Political society in Lebanon: A historical introduction,” Papers on Lebanon (Cambridge, n.d.) pp. 14–15. 5 “Muhammad Reza Shah’s speech, 9 January 1963, excerpts,” in The Emergence of the Modern Middle East: Selected Readings, by Robert G. Landen (New York, 1970), p. 326. 6 Muhammad Riza Pahlavi, 13 October 1971, in Kayhan International Edition, p. 1. 7 “The incompatibility of monarchy with Islam,” October 13, 1971, in Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley, 1981), p. 202. 8 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York, 1980).

Further Reading

This Bibliography serves several purposes: to indicate those sources that were essential to the shaping of this book; to mark recent scholarly trends and important new work; and to suggest books that will allow the broadening or focusing of the reader’s understanding of the richness of Iran’s history. The books noted below, including those that are quite specialized, are generally accessible and of interest to all readers. In the end, the author’s idiosyncrasies are evident. The categories follow historical time periods, but some of the readings transcend specific time periods, so that there is some overlapping, and readers are advised to look under adjacent chapters for further suggestions. As an aside, some authors often ignore developments outside their own specializations. Increasing professionalization and specialization has resulted in the absence of more general studies, especially across time periods. Nevertheless, almost all the suggested readings look at Iran and its history in broader, often comparative, contexts.

Chapter 1

Persia: Place and Idea

There are few single-author studies now that attempt to comprehend the whole of Iranian history and culture, or even aspects of it over its long history. Two indispensable references for the whole of Iranian history are The Cambridge History of Iran, vols. 1–7 (Cambridge, 1968–91), parts of which represent scholarship that is now dated, and The Encyclopaedia Iranica, vols. 1–10 and in process (London, 1982–). Two journals also cover the breadth of Iranian history, Iran, Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies, 1963–, published annually, and Iranian Studies, 1965–. The latter has more of a twentieth-century focus, while the former centers especially on archaeology and is indispensable regarding recent excavations and reports, though every issue of Iran contains wide-ranging articles both in subject and historical period. For Iran’s context in Central and East Asia, see Frances Wood, The Silk Road: Two Thousand Years in the Heart of Asia (London, 2002).

Further Reading

287

Ann K. S. Lambton’s Landlord and Peasant in Persia (Oxford, 1953, 1969 and London, 1991), however, is something of an exception as it covers some 1,300 years and stands as a magisterial history of Iran’s agricultural economy from the time of the Arab conquest in the seventh century to the mid-twentieth century. Lambton’s The Persian Land Reform, 1962–1966 (Oxford, 1969) supplements that earlier study. The field of art and architectural history especially has produced important studies with broad and specialist interest over the breadth of Iranian history. One recent volume, The Arts of Persia, ed. R. W. Ferrier (New Haven, 1989), contains brief chapters by historical period starting with pre-Islamic Iran, and then presents chapters by genre covering the so-called major and minor arts in the Islamic period save for the twentieth century, which is only recently attracting scholarly interest. Penelope Hobhouse’s Gardens of Persia (London, 2003) presents an overview of this important if neglected art form that includes stunning photographs, illustrations, and line drawings; her succinct discussion of Iran’s varied geography and flora provides the background to factors that are too often assumed. Given the importance and richness of Persian literature, there is only one volume that reflects contemporary scholarship to introduce readers to this essential field: Persian Literature, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (Albany, NY, 1988). It covers the entire spread of Persian literary production from the Avesta – Zoroastrian texts from c.sixth–fourth centuries bc – through the late twentieth century. Persian Literature’s bibliography is a good starting point for further exploration of translations and criticism.

Chapter 2

The Achaemenians

The most comprehensive history for the Achaemenian period is Pierre Briant’s monumental Histoire de l’empire perse: de Cyrus a Alexandre (Paris, 1996), recently translated by Peter T. Daniels as From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire (Winona Lake, Indiana, 2002). Josef Wiesehofer’s Ancient Persia: From 550 BC to 650 AD, trans. Azizeh Azodi (London, 1996) succinctly traces Achaemenian history through the Sasanians and the Arab conquest of the seventh century. John Curtis’s brief Ancient Persia (London, 1989, 2000) presents a useful survey of Achaemenian history. Specific issues in pre-Achaemenian and Achaemenian history are examined in three volumes edited by John Curtis: Early Mesopotamia and Iran: Contact and Conflict, c.3500–1600 BC (London, 1993), Later Mesopotamia and Iran: Tribes and Empires, 1600–539 BC (London, 1995), and Mesopotamia and Iran in the Persian Period: Conquest and Imperialism, 539–331 BC (London, 1997). An entire issue of Iran, 21 (1983), “Sculptures and sculptors at Persepolis,” edited by Michael Rouf, is devoted to the subject of the title. Ancient Iran: The Art of Pre-Islamic Times (London, 1965) by Edith Porada presents a general and still-useful survey of ancient Iranian artistic achievement.

288

Further Reading

For Iran’s larger context in the ancient Near East, see Amelie Khurt’s authoritative and readable The Ancient Near East: c.3000–330 BC. Vols. 1 and 2 (London, 1995). Similarly, Dominique Collon’s Ancient Near Eastern Art (London, 1995) places Achaemenian art in its greater context, as does Art and Empire: Treasures from Assyria in the British Museum, ed. J. E. Curtis and J. E. Reade (New York, 1995). For recent scholarship in the field of archaeology, see monographs by David Stronach, especially his Pasargadae: A Report on the Excavations . . . (Oxford, 1978), William M. Sumner, T. Cuyler Young, and Henry T. Wright, and see Yeki bud, yeki nabud: Essays on the Archaeology of Iran in Honor of William M. Sumner, ed. Naomi F. Miller and Kamyar Abdi (Los Angeles, 2003). Mary Boyce stands as a pre-eminent authority on Zoroastrianism, and her many books and articles cover this important religion and the complexities of its historiography. See, for example, her multi-volume A History of Zoroastrianism (Leiden, 1975) and Zoroastrians, their Religious Beliefs and Practices (London, 1979). Margaret C. Root analyzes kingship and iconography in The King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art (Leiden, 1979), and culture and society are examined by Muhammad A. Dandamaev and Vladimir G. Lukonin in The Culture and Social Institutions of Ancient Iran, trans. Philip L. Kohl and D. J. Dadson (Cambridge, 1989).

Chapter 3

Alexander, the Seleucids, and the Parthians

This period of Iran’s history is less studied, partly because of the problem of sources. See Josef Wiesehofer, Ancient Persia (London, 1996), parts 2 and 3; E. Yarshater, ed., The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 3, The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian Periods (Cambridge, 1983), 1 Volume 3, chapters 1, 2, 8, 14 and 2 Volume 3, chapters 18, 19, 27, 28; and Richard N. Frye, The Heritage of Persia: The Pre-Islamic History of One of the World’s Great Civilizations (Cleveland, 1963). Susan Sherwin-White and Amelie Khurt’s From Samarkhand to Sardis: A New Approach to the Seleucid Empire (Berkeley, 1993) provides a new approach. Recent scholarship is also reflected in Mesopotamia and Iran in the Parthian and Sasanian Periods: Rejection and Revival c.238 BC–AD 642, ed. John Curtis (London, 2000) and in The Art and Archaeology of Ancient Persia: New Light on the Parthian and Sasanian Empires, ed. Vesta Sarkhosh Curtis, Robert Hillenbrand, and J. M. Rogers (London, 1998), though the latter is of mixed usefulness. Trudy S. Kawami, Monumental Art of the Parthian Period (Leiden, 1987), is to be recommended. Georgina Herrmann’s The Iranian Revival (Oxford, 1977) is all too brief, but presents key developments in this neglected but significant period of Iranian history as well as the subsequent Sasanian period.

Further Reading

Chapter 4

289

The Sasanians

There are many specialist monographs on the Sasanian period – see Wiesehofer’s bibliography in Ancient Persia. For a succinct survey see Georgina Herrmann’s The Iranian Revival (Oxford, 1997), but a general account with greater detail is provided by Richard N. Frye in The Heritage of Persia (Cleveland, 1963), which covers all of ancient Iranian history until the Arab conquests in the seventh century. The Royal Hunter: Art of the Sasanian Empire (New York, 1978) by Prudence Oliver Harper provides an excellent survey of Sasanian artistic production. The most recent scholarship on the whole of the Sasanian period is to be found in Touraj Daryaee’s many monographs, such as “Sasanian Persia (c.224–651 ce),” Iranian Studies, 31 (Summer/Fall 1998), “The effect of the Arab Muslim conquest on the administrative division of Sasanian Persis/Fars,” Iran, 41 (2003), and, especially, his forthcoming book, A History of Sasanian Civilization (224–651).

Chapter 5

“Non-Iran”: Arabs, Turks, and Mongols in Iran

Marshall G. S. Hodgson’s three-volume The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization (Chicago, 1974) continues to maintain its magisterial standing. A good starting point for Iran in the larger emerging Islamic world, however, is Hugh Kennedy’s The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century (London, 1986). A more focused study in this critical time period and transition is Jamsheed K. Choksy, Conflict and Cooperation: Zoroastrian Subalterns and Muslim Elites in Medieval Iranian Studies (New York, 1997). Another monograph, Roy Mottahadeh, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society (Princeton, 1980), analyzes the Buyids, an Iranian dynasty that ruled under the ‘Abbasid caliphate. Social, economic, and institutional history is explored by Ann K. S. Lambton in Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia (London, 1988) and Islamic political theory in her State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists (Oxford, 1981). Since the eleventh century, Firdausi’s Shahnamah has continued to shape Iranian historical and political consciousness, and these factors are explored by Dick Davis in Epic and Sedition: The Case of Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh (Fayetteville, AK, 1992) and by Justin Stearns, “Reading history: Text and context in Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh” (Dartmouth College Hanover, NH, unpublished thesis, 1998). A general starting point for the impact of Turks on Iranian history is David Morgan, Medieval Persia 1040–1797 (Harlow, 1988), and its bibliography guides readers into Central Asia, the Seljuqs, and others. Morgan’s The Mongols (Oxford, 1986) provides the best overview of the Mongols. Morgan’s two

290

Further Reading

volumes lead the reader to Mongol successors, including the Ilkhans, Timur and the Timurids, and Medieval Persia 1040–1797 also covers the Safavids and eighteenth-century Iran. Beatrice Forbes Manz, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane (Cambridge, 1989), examines this important ruler. John E. Woods, The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1976; rev. and expanded Salt Lake City, 1999), brings the fifteenth century to its close and covers the emergence of the Safavids. Study of the art and architecture of this period has mushroomed with publication of exhibition catalogs and monographs. The most general study is Jonathan Bloom and Sheila Blair, Islamic Arts (London, 1997), followed by Richard Ettinghausen, Oleg Grabar, and Marilyn Jenkins-Madina, Islamic Art and Architecture, 650–1250 (New Haven, 2001), and then Sheila S. Blair and Jonathan M. Bloom, The Art and Architecture of Islam 1250–1800 (New Haven, 1994). Encyclopaedia of Islam, Supplement, fasc. 7–8 (2003), pp. 448–58, “Art,” by Priscilla Soucek, and “Architecture,” by Sheila Blair and Jonathan Bloom, present the latest thinking and bibliographies for this important field. And for a sub-field of art history, carpets, see Encyclopaedia Iranica, 4, fasc. 8 (1990), “Carpets,” pp. 834–96; and 5, fasc. 1 (1991), “Carpets – Caucasian and Central Asian,” pp. 1–9. These articles, written by specialists, discuss history and techniques. Despite the importance of and interest in Persian carpets, scholarly literature lags behind the renaissance of Islamic and Persian art history. Other notable studies include: Robert Hillenbrand, Islamic Architecture (Edinburgh, 1984); Illustrated Poetry and Epic Images: Persian Painting of the 1330s and 1340s by Marie Lukens Swietochowski and Stefano Carboni with essays by A. H. Morton and Tomoko Masuya (New York, 1994); The Art of the Saljuqs in Iran and Anatolia, ed. Robert Hillenbrand (Costa Mesa, CA, 1994); Sheila S. Blair, Islamic Inscriptions (Edinburgh, 1998); The Legacy of Genghis Khan: Courtly Art and Culture in Western Asia, 1256–1353, ed. Linda Komaroff and Stefano Carboni (New Haven, 2002); and Thomas W. Lentz and Glenn D. Lowry, Timur and the Princely Vision: Persian Art and Culture in the Fifteenth Century (Washington DC, 1989). The beauty and importance of Persian literature from this period is to be found for non-Persian readers in the translations of Firdausi, ‘Attar, Sa‘di Rumi, Hafiz, Nizami, and Jami, to name only a few poets, or historians/chroniclers such as Nizam al-Mulk, Rashid al-Din, and Juvaini. E. G. Browne’s four volumes, A Literary History of Persia (Cambridge, 1928, reprinted 1929, 1951, 1956), still has use even though dated, but see also Yarshater’s Persian Literature noted above. Individual entries in The Encyclopaedia Iranica provides readers with the most recent criticism and bibliographies.

Chapter 6

The Safavids

The last general survey of Safavid history, Roger Savory, Iran under the Safavids (Cambridge, 1980), will soon be superceded by Andrew J. Newman, Between

Further Reading

291

Medieval and Modern: Iran in the Safavid Centuries (forthcoming), which provides a new synthesis to challenge long-held interpretations and an invaluable bibliography of new scholarship in this rapidly expanding and changing field of history. The impetus and the exciting directions have been generated by new scholarship supported by the ongoing Safavid Round Tables, totaling four at this date. Papers from three of them have been published: Pembroke Papers, 1, ed. Charles Melville (Cambridge, 1990), Safavid Persia, ed. Charles Melville (London, 1996), and Society and Culture in the Early Modern Middle East: Studies on Iran in the Safavid Period, ed. Andrew J. Newman (Leiden, 2003). In addition, many of these scholars have published some of their most interesting findings in articles or collected volumes, and they have also produced important monographs ranging from social and religious to economic history. A sampling would include: Kathryn Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs: Cultural Landscapes of Early Modern Iran (Cambridge, MA, 2002); Rudolph P. Matthee, The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver 1600–1730 (Cambridge, 1999); James Allan and Brian Gilmour, Persian Steel: The Tanavoli Collection (Oxford, 2000); Willem Floor, The Afghan Invasion of Safavid Persia, 1721–29 (Paris, 1998), The Economy of Safavid Persia (Wiesbaden, 2000), and Safavid Government Institutions (Costa Mesa, CA, 2001); and R. W. Ferrier, A Journey to Persia: Jean Chardin’s Portrait of a Seventeenth-century Empire (London, 1996). While Sir John Chardin’s – to use his English name – own account has been available in English since 1691, more accessible is Sir John Chardin’s Travels in Persia . . . (London, 1927), although greatly reduced. Other important primary sources in English include: The History of Shah ‘Abbas the Great . . . by Eskandar Beg Monshi, trans. Roger M. Savory (Boulder, CO, 1978); Membre’s Mission to the Lord Sophy of Persia (1539–1542), trans. A. H. Morton (London, 1993); and Shah Isma‘il’s own poetry in Vladimir Minorsky, “The poetry of Shah Isma‘il I,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 10 (1942), pp. 1006a–1053a. On Shi‘ism, see Juan Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War, The Politics, Culture and History of Shi‘ite Islam (London, 2002); The Heritage of Sufism. Vol. 3, Late Classical Persianate Sufism (1501–1750): The Safavid and Mughal Period, ed. Leonard Lewisohn and David Morgan (Oxford, 1999); and Andrew J. Newman, “The myth of the clerical migration to Safawid Iran . . . ,” Die Welt des Islams, 33 (1993), pp. 66–112 and “The nature of the Akhbari/Usuli dispute in late Safawid Iran,” parts 1 and 2, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 55, 1 (1992), pp. 22–51, and 55, 2 (1992), pp. 250–61. Of the many books and catalogs on Safavid art and architecture, see Oleg Grabar, Mostly Miniatures: An Introduction to Persian Painting (Princeton, 2000); Yolande Crowe, Persia and China: Safavid Blue and White Ceramics in the Victoria and Albert Museum 1501–1738 (La Borie, 2002); Sheila R. Canby, The Golden Age of Persian Art 1501–1722 (London, 1999); Safavid Art and Architecture, ed. Sheila R. Canby (London, 2002); Woven from the Soul; Spun from the Heart: Textile Arts of Safavid and Qajar Iran 16th–19th

292

Further Reading

Centuries, ed. Carol Bier (Washington DC, 1987); James Allan and Sheila Canby, Hunt for Paradise: Court Arts of Safavid Iran (London, 2003); or the studies that helped launch new scholarly interest in the Safavid period, Anthony Welch, Shah ‘Abbas and the Arts of Isfahan (New York, 1973), and “Studies on Isfahan,” parts 1 and 2, ed. Renata Holod, Iranian Studies, 7, 1–4 (1974). John Perry, Karim Khan Zand: A History of Iran, 1747–1779 (Chicago, 1979), is singular in the neglected eighteenth century. Laurence Lockhart, Nader Shah: A Critical Study . . . (London, 1938), is long out of date, but there is no other study of this military leader and shah. Although Mangol Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran (Syracuse, 1982), focuses on the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its background chapters are useful for the eighteenth century.

Chapter 7

The Qajars

The Qajar period has attracted considerable interest – but not on the scale of the Safavid era – as a backdrop to the twentieth century. Qajar Iran’s history and relationship to the changes that characterized the whole Middle East are well presented in Malcolm Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792–1923 (London, 1987). Nikki R. Keddie, Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan, 1796–1925 (Costa Mesa, CA, 1999), outlines key developments. Ann K. S. Lambton, Qajar Persia (Austin, 1987), brings together Lambton’s important articles on this period. Her Qajar Iran: Political, Social and Cultural Change, 1800–1925 (Edinburgh, 1983) again presents articles across the fields of history. Valuable monographs include: Abbas Amanat, Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarch, 1831–1896 (London, 1997) and Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844–1850 (Ithaca, 1989); Nikki R. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani:” A Political Biography (Berkeley, 1972), An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani”(Berkeley, 1968), and Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Iranian Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892 (London, 1966); Mangol Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran (Syracuse, 1982) and Iran’s First Revolution: Shi‘ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909 (Oxford, 1991); Shaul Bakhash, Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars, 1858–1896 (London, 1978); and Denis Wright, The English Amongst the Persians (London, 1977). Important studies on women in the Qajar era include: Farzaneh Milani, Veils and Words: The Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers (Syracuse, 1992); Parvin Paidar, Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-century Iran (Cambridge, 1995); and Taj al-Saltana, Crowning Anguish: Memoirs of a Persian Princess from Harem to Modernity, ed. Abbas Amanat, trans. Anna Vanzan and Amin Neshati (Washington DC, 1993).

Further Reading

293

For the role of Iran’s great tribal confederations of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Lois Beck, The Qashqa’i of Iran (New Haven, 1986); Richard Tapper, Frontier Nomads of Iran: A Political and Social History of the Shahsevan (Cambridge, 1997); and Gene R. Garthwaite, Khans and Shahs: A Documentary of the Bakhtiyari in Iran (Cambridge, 1983). Qajar art was long regarded as something of an acquired taste, but this condescending view is changing. The European impact was felt here, too, especially in terms of technology. See: Royal Persian Paintings: The Qajar Epoch, 1785–1925, ed. Layla S. Diba with Maryam Ekhtiar (London, 1998); Frederick N. Bohrer, Sevruguin and the Persian Image: Photographs of Iran, 1870–1930 (Seattle, 1999); and Leonard Helfgott, Ties that Bind: A Social History of the Iranian Carpet (Washington DC, 1994). For literature: Hassan Kamshad, Modern Persian Prose Literature (Cambridge, 1966); Kamran Talattof, The Politics of Writing in Iran: A History of Modern Persian Literature (Syracuse, 2000); and Milani, Veils and Words, noted above.

Chapter 8 Iran, 1921–2003: Pahlavi and Islamic Republican Iran To contextualize this period of Iran’s history, a general starting point is Malcolm Yapp, The Near East since the First World War (London, 1991), and an overview of Iran itself is provided in Ali Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After (London 2003), or in Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran (New Haven, 1981), recently updated as Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven, 2003). Comprehensive detail can be found in Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, 1982). For Riza Shah, see Donald Wilber, Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran, 1878–1944 (Hicksville, NY, 1975), and especially the more recent Cyrus Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah (London, 1998), which reassesses the pivotal twentieth-century modernizer and is based on contemporary sources. Still useful is Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921–1941 (Stanford, 1961). More specialized in focus are Stephanie Cronin, The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1910–1926 (London, 1997), R. W. Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company: The Developing Years, 1901–1932 (Cambridge, 1982), and J. H. Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company (Cambridge, 1994), with oil company perspectives. Of value and from a different perspective, see Laurence P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics (London, 1955). For the period of Muhammad Riza Shah, see Fakhreddin Azimi, Iran: The Crisis of Democracy, 1941–1953 (London, 1989), Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh, 1964), and James Alban Bill, The Politics of Iran

294

Further Reading

(Columbus, 1972). In addition, with a focus on Musaddiq and oil nationalization: Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil, ed. James A. Bill and William Roger Louis (Austin, 1988); Homa Katouzian, Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran (London, 1999); and, especially, Ervand Abrahamian, “The 1953 coup in Iran,” Science and Society, 65, 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 182–215, and Mark Gasiorowski, “The 1953 coup d’etat in Iran,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 19, 3 (August 1987), pp. 261–86. For the growing role of the United States and its impact on Iran, read James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, 1988); Neither East nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (New Haven, 1990); and Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca, 1991). A number of the studies above analyze Muhammad Riza Shah’s policies, but also see Eric J. Hooglund, Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960–1980 (Austin, 1982). For Iran’s minority peoples, see Eliz Sanasarian, Religious Minorities in Iran (Cambridge, 2000), and for contemporary tribal peoples, The Nomadic Peoples of Iran, ed. Richard Tapper and Jon Thompson (London, 2002). For intellectual history, read Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism (Syracuse, 1996). And in addition see Kamshad, Talattof, and Milani noted above. In the copious studies on the Islamic Revolution and the formation of the Islamic Republic start with Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick, NJ, 1989), probably the most solidly based on evidence that argues for social mobilization rather than religion and ideology, and then see his more recent States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua and the Philippines (Cambridge, 2000). Important, too, is Mangol Bayat, “The Iranian revolution of 1978–79: fundamentalist or modern?” Middle East Journal, 37, 1 (Winter 1983). And in placing the Islamic Revolution in a comparative context, consult in particular Nikki R. Keddie, Debating Revolutions (New York, 1995). For the plethora of accounts by or about key participants, see Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans. and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley, 1981); Ali Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shari‘ati (London, 1998); Abbas Milani, The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution (London, 2000); Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York, 1980); and Mangol Bayat, “Mahmud Taleqani and the Iranian revolution,” in Shi‘ism, Resistance, and Revolution, ed. Martin Kramer (Boulder, CO, 1987), pp. 67–94. A number of important monographs on Khomeini and the Islamic Republic include Baqir Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah (London, 2000); Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin (Tehran, 1989), Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley, 1993), and Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran (Berkeley, 1999);

Further Reading

295

Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran (London, 2000); and Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York, 1984). Especially important for understanding concepts dealing with Shi‘i hierarchy, see Linda S. Wallbridge, ed., The Most Learned of the Shi‘a: The Institution of the Marja‘ Taqlid (Oxford, 2001). Important studies on women in the revolution and in the Islamic Republic include Farzaneh Milani, Veils and Words (Syracuse, 1992); Parvin Paidar, Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-century Iran (Cambridge, 1995); Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran (London, 2000); and Women and Revolution in Iran, ed. Guity Nashat (Boulder, CO, 1983). Erika Friedl, Women of Deh Koh: Lives in an Iranian Village (New York, 1991), explores the elusive subject of rural women. For the exciting new field of Iranian film, see Annabelle SrebernyMohammadi and Ali Mohammadi, Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution (Minneapolis, 1994); Hamid Dabashi, Close up Iranian Cinema Past, Present and Future (London 2001); and The New Iranian Cinema: Politics, Representation and Identity, ed. Richard Tapper (London, 2002). Even contemporary art is receiving notice and raises profoundly important contemporary issues of identity, relationships, and politics in addition to artistic ones, see Iranian Contemporary Art, by Rose Issa, Ruyin Pakbaz, and Daryush Shayegan (London, 2001), and 12 Photographic Journeys: Iran in the 21st Century, by Anahita Ghabaian and Minou Saberi (Tehran, 2003). Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi’s Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in the Islamic Republic of Iran (New York, 1999) presents the art, especially posters, of the 1979 revolution in a variety of contexts, including traditional narrative paintings from the popular culture of the taziyya, shrines, and tea houses. Many journalists have covered post-Islamic Republican Iran, and the best of these is Elaine Sciolino, Persian Mirrors: The Elusive Face of Iran (New York, 2000).

Index

Abadan 219, 225, 229, 240, 265 Abaqa Khan 141 ‘Abbas I, Shah 19, 157, 164, 166, 168, 171, 173–9, 180, 187, 189, 233; assessment 178–9 ‘Abbas II, Shah 179, 180 ‘Abbas III, Shah 182, 183 ‘Abbas Mirza Qajar 193, 194 Abbasid caliphate 19, 99, 118, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 131, 134, 135, 140, 142, 151, 156 ‘Abd al-Latif 152 Abu Sa‘id 141, 144, 148, 152 Achaemenes 33 Achaemenian, Achaemenians 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 20–65, 68, 71, 86, 93, 94, 112, 113, 130, see also under individual rulers; administration 58–61, 64, 73, 83; art, architecture, and patronage 50–5, 117; economy 60, 64; military 62; sources and inscriptions 6, 37, 58, 60, see also under specific sites; succession and marriage 57; titles 55, 56; women 57 Achaemenid History Workshops 7 Acts of the Martyrs 102, 103 Adil Shah Afshar 191 ‘Adud al-Daulah 127, 128 Adurbad-i Mahrspand 102

al-Afghani, also known as Asadabadi, Jamal al-Din 206–9, 222, 246, 252 Afghanistan 3, 30, 103, 107, 116, 127, 199, 207, 263, 266, 278 Afghans 166, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 194 Afshar tribe and dynasty 10, 154, 167, 172, 182, 183, 184, 192 Agathias 87 Agha Muhammad Shah 191, 192 Ahmad [Buyid] 127 Ahmad Shah [Qajar] 214, 215, 216, 219, 224, 226, 239 Ahriman (Angra Mainyu) 96 Ahsa’i, Shaikh Ahmad 195, 196 Ahura Mazda 38, 41, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 55, 56, 59, 62, 63, 68, 72, 84, 87, 94, 95, 96, 100, 113, 114, 115 Ai Khanum 68 Akhbaris 187, 188, 189, 195 Akhunzadah 208 Akkad 30 Akkadian (Babylonian) [language] 26, 47 Alamut 135 Alanqoa 150 Albright, Madeline 279 Alburz mountains 2, 76 Alexander the Great 6, 22, 23, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41, 49, 58, 61, 64, 65,

Index 66–70, 68, 69, 70, 71, 82, 164, 166 ‘Ali, Fourth Caliph; First Imam for the Shi‘a 122, 144, 150, 161, 163, 257, 272 Al-i Ahmad, Jalal 222, 245 ‘Ali Mardan Khan Bakhtiyari 184 ‘Ali Shah 145, 146 ‘Ali Shir Nava’i 152 ‘Alid [supporter of the family of ‘Ali] 122, 154, 160 Allahvardi Khan 178 Alp Arslan 130, 131, 133 Alqas Mirza 167 Altan Debter (Golden book) 137 Alvand Aq Quyunlu 155, 158 Amasis 31 Amida 102 al-Amin, Caliph 124 Amini, ‘Ali 247 Amir Timurtash 146 Amiranshah 151 Amir-i Kabir, Mirza Taqi Khan 197, 198, 199 Ammianus Marcellinus 87 ‘Amr Saffar 124 Amu Darya (Oxus river) 2, 29, 75, 129, 183 Anahita 38, 62, 68, 83, 87, 95, 96, 114 Anatolia 23, 24, 29, 37, 38, 39, 43, 70, 80, 84, 90, 103, 110, 118, 120, 128, 131, 136, 140, 141, 149, 154, 159, 161, 167, 168, 177 anda 137, 138 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company [after 1935] 239, 240, 247 Anglo-Persian Agreement 215, 223 Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) 219, 228, 229, 230 Anglo-Russian Convention 218 Ankara 149 Anshan (Malyan) 11, 22, 25, 27, 28, 30, 42, 43, 46

297

Antigonus 70 Antioch 70, 74, 76, 107, 110 Antiochus I 71, 72 Antiochus II 72 Antiochus III, the Great 72, 75 Antiochus VI 72 Antiochus VII 72, 76, 77 APOC see Anglo-Persian Oil Company Aq Quyunlu 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 160 Arabia, Arabs 17, 20, 31, 60, 69, 83, 103, 107, 108, 109, 111, 113, 117, 118, 119, 120, 126, 131, 157, 266 Arabian Sea 99 Arabic language 120, 124 ‘Arabistan see Khuzistan Aral Sea 127, 136 Aramaic language/inscriptions/texts 6, 26, 49, 74, 85 Aras river 199 Ardabil 159, 160, 171 Ardashir I 82, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, 100, 107, 113, 120 Ardashir II 101, 103, 114, 115 Ardashir III 110 Arghun Khan 141, 143 Armenia/Armenian 33, 70, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 88, 89, 92, 97, 98, 100, 102, 103, 104, 108, 110, 174, 175, 213 Armenian language 5 Arsaces, Arshak I 67, 72, 85 Arsacids see Parthians Arsames 33, 44 Artabanus I 75 Artabanus II 77, 80 Artabanus IV 81, 82, 88 Artabanus V 81 Artaxerxes I 37, 38, 53 Artaxerxes II 27, 38, 39, 62, 63 Artaxerxes III 37, 38, 39, 40 As’ad II, Sardar Hajj ‘Ali Quli Khan 214, 216

298

Index

As’ad III, Sardar Ja’far Quli Khan 231 Asadabad 207 Ashraf Ghilzai 182 Assassins 140; see also Isma’ili Shi‘a Assur 24 Assyria 10, 24, 91 Assyrian [language] 6 Assyrian sources 6 Assyrians 23, 24, 46, 50 Astrakhan 149 Astyages 28, 56 Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal 222, 223, 226, 230, 260 Athens, Athenians 36, 37, 38, 109 Atossa 56 Aurelian, Emperor 97 Avars 110 Avesta 93, 94 Avesta, the Younger 62 ‘Ayn Jalut 140 Ayyubid dynasty 140 Azad Khan 184 Azerbaijan [Iranian province] 3, 80, 107, 109, 110, 140, 141, 151, 152, 154, 159, 161, 165, 173, 174, 183, 184, 191, 193, 200, 209, 225, 237, 238 Azerbaijan [“Russian”] 212, 213 Bab 195, 196, 197 Babi/Babis 195, 197, 198, 199, 207, 208 Babylon/Babylonia 22, 24, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 39, 41, 43, 46, 47, 49, 50, 56, 60, 63, 68, 71, 76, 77, 81 Babylonian [language] 6, 26, 44 Bactria 24, 40, 50, 68, 72 Baghdad 19, 34, 89, 121, 122, 124, 127, 130, 135, 140, 142, 146, 154, 168, 174, 179, 183, 202, 219, 265 Baha’i/s 197, 267 Baha’ullah 197 Bahrain 89, 195

Bahram I (Varahran) 97, 98 Bahram II 97, 100 Bahram III 97, 98 Bahram IV 103 Bahram V, Gur 103, 108 Bahram Chubin 109 Bakhtiyar, Shahpur 256 Bakhtiyari 10, 183, 184, 194, 214, 215, 225, 226, 231 Baku 212, 213 Bal‘ami 126 Baluchistan/Baluch 20, 97, 268 Bamiyan 116 bandaka 59 Bani-Sadr, Abu al-Hasan 263–4, 266, 267, 275 Bank-i Melli 228 Baraka, Sayyid 150 Bardiya/Smerdis/Gaumata 32, 34, 47, 56, 58 Barlas tribe 148 Barmakids [Sasanian family of bureaucrats that continued into the Abbasid period] 156 Batu 140, 141 The Bayan 197 Bayat tribe 172 Bayhaqi 127 Bayizid 149, 163, 170 Bazargan, Mahdi 246, 257 Belgium, Constitution of 211 Berke 141 Bessus 39, 40 Bibi Khanum Mosque 150 Bihbihani, Aqa Muhammad Baqir Vahid 189 Bihishti, Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad 246 Bihzad 152, 153 Bishapur 90, 92, 102, 114, 116 Bisitun/Bisitun inscription 6, 22, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 58, 59, 63, 73, 75, 76, 85, 95, 113

Index Black Sea 35, 110 Boyce, Mary 62 Buddha 92 Buddhism, Buddhists 17, 92, 143, 144, 147 Bukhara 151 Burujirdi, Ayatollah Husain 242, 246, 250 Bush, President George W. 279 Bushir 185 Buyids (Buwayhids) 18, 125, 127, 128, 130, 134, 156, 186 Byzantium/Byzantines 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 120, 128, 131 Cadusians 38 caliph/s 123, 124, 130, 135 Cambyses I 23, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34, 43, 48, 56, 71 Cappodocia 29 Caracalla, Emperor 81 Caria/Carians 29, 50 Carrhae/Harran 78, 79, 89, 90, 91 Carter, President Jimmy 254, 258 Carus, Emperor 97 Caspian Sea 3, 75, 127, 151, 206 Caucasus mountains/region 2, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108, 109, 141, 154, 160, 165, 170, 175, 177, 179, 180, 183, 192, 194, 195 Central Asia 2, 4, 11, 15, 16, 23, 27, 30, 35, 60, 62, 63, 64, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 78, 79, 83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 93, 95, 96, 107, 108, 111, 112, 116, 118, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 134, 136, 137, 139, 140, 142, 143, 146, 150, 152, 163, 167, 183, 192, 195, 220 Ceylon 108 Chaghatai 140 Chaghatai Khans 140, 141, 143, 144, 148, 149, 150 Chaghatai Turkish 152, 162 Chaghri Beg 130, 134

299

Chaldiran, battle of 161, 164, 165 Chandragupta 70 Chardin, Sir John 189 Chin dynasty 136, 137, 139 China 69, 77, 78, 81, 99, 111, 116, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 142, 146, 147, 149, 151, 252, 279 Chingiz Khan 15, 18, 136, 137–9, 140, 146, 149 Chingizid dynasties/descent 16, 139, 140, 141, 147, 148, 150, 153, 154 Chionites see Huns Chopan, Amir 146 Christianity, Christians 6, 17, 87, 92, 93, 97, 98, 102, 103, 104, 109, 111, 120, 122, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 160, 211, 267 Churchill, Winston 240 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 240, 241, 242 Circassians 172, 175 circle of equity 91, 92, 113, 144 Clinton, President William 279 Constantine, Emperor 87, 98, 102 Constantinople 102, 104 Constitution, 1906–7 210–12, 213, 214, 217, 218, 219, 227, 233, 246, 260, 276; Fundamental Law 210; Supplementary Fundamental Law 210, 211, 213, 214 Constitution, 1979 20, 259–61, 263, 264, 267, 276 Constitutional Revolution, 1905–6 195, 197, 199, 209, 210–14, 220 Corinth 36 Cossack Brigade 201, 209, 217, 230 coup d’etat, 1921 217 Crassus 78, 79, 80 Croesus 29 Crone, Patricia 15 Crossley, Pamela 12, 16, 42 Crusades/Crusaders 128, 142 Ctesias 27, 58

300

Index

Ctesiphon 77, 80, 81, 89, 90, 97, 99, 102, 103, 104, 107, 109, 110, 111, 116, 117, 119, 122 Cyaxares 24 Cyropaedia 27 Cyrus I 28, 56 Cyrus II, the Great 6, 9, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 50, 56, 58, 63, 71, 251, 253 Cyrus Cylinder 29, 30, 41, 42, 43, 47, 54, 63 Cyrus the Younger 38, 39 Daha 76 Damascus 110 Dar al-Funun 198 D’Arcy, William Knox 218 Darius I 6, 8, 9, 22, 23, 26, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58, 61, 62, 63, 64, 69, 94, 113 Darius II (Ochus) 38, 53 Darius III (Artashata) 39, 40, 49, 58, 64, 65, 66, 69 Dashti, ‘Ali 244, 245 Davar, ‘Ali Akbar 227, 231 Daylam 127, 135 Delhi 149, 183 Demetrius II 72, 76, 77 Denkard 94 dhimmi 143; see also People of the Book Diba, Farah, Shahbanu (Queen) 251 dihqan/s 106, 107, 122, 124, 125 Dio Cassius 87 Diocletian, Emperor 97 divan 134 Divan of Shah Isma‘il 162 Diyala region/river 99 Diyarbakir 154, 155, 174 East India companies 177 Ecbatana 23, 28, 34, 35, 39, 43, 59, 77; see also Hamadan

Edessa 110 Egypt 23, 26, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 39, 45, 47, 49, 50, 56, 59, 60, 64, 69, 71, 72, 110, 120, 128, 135, 140, 143, 146, 149, 192, 193, 207 Egyptian sources 32 Eisenhower, President Dwight D. 240 Elam 11, 23, 25, 33, 35, 55, 85 Elamite [language] 25, 26, 44, 47, 84 Elamites 6, 23, 43, 46, 51, 53 Elaphatine 36 Erastothenes 2 Eretria, Eretrians 36 Ethiopia 108 Esther 27 Euphrates river 2, 36, 79, 81, 89, 107, 110 Europe 99, 136, 137, 142, 143, 146, 147, 152, 168, 173, 192, 193, 198, 204, 206, 208, 209, 231 Ezra 27 Family Protection Law, 1967 249–50, 274 Faridun 163, 166 farr 56, 133 Farrukhzad, Furugh 244, 245 Fars 2, 9, 11, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 43, 51, 68, 82, 85, 86, 87, 92, 102, 107, 113, 114, 127, 149, 151, 154, 160 Fath ‘Ali Khan Qajar 182 Fath ‘Ali Shah 192–5, 196, 204, 205 Fatima (sister of the Imam Riza) 189, 203, 230, 272 Fatimids 128, 135 Ferghana 77 Fida’iyan-i Islam 240, 244 Firdausi 23, 87, 94, 101, 107, 118, 126, 127, 155, 162, 235, 272 First World War 214, 215, 224, 225

Index Firuz Mirza, Nusrat al-Daulah 227, 231 Firuzabad 92, 116 Fiver Shi‘a see Zaidi France 192, 212, 255, 256, 276 Gardanne mission 193 Gathas 62, 93, 95 Gaugamela 39, 64 Gauhar Shad 151 Gaumata/Bardiya/Smerdis 32, 47, 48, 56, 58 Geikhatu Khan 141, 142 Georgia, Georgians 164, 170, 172, 175, 191 Germany 215, 231, 232 Gharbzadigi (Plagued/intoxicated by the west) 245 al-Ghazali 132, 156 Ghazan Khan 18, 141, 143, 144, 147, 155 Ghaznavids 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131 Ghilzai 180, 181 Ghiyath al-Din 146 Ghurids 136 Ghuzz (Oghuz) 128, 136 Gilan/Gilanis 3, 92, 97, 144, 214, 215, 225 Gobryas 59 Godin Tepe 24 Golden Horde 140, 141, 142, 149 Gordian III 90 Gotarzes I 77, 78 Granicus river and battle 39 Great Britain 192, 194, 199, 207, 212, 214, 215, 218, 219, 224, 225, 227, 229, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 239, 252, 258 Great Khan 18, 140, 141 Great Saljuqs 134, 135 Greece 37 Greek-Persian wars 36, 37, 60 Greek sources 6, 26, 37, 38, 39, 47, 57, 67, 75, 85, 87, 94, 114

301

Greek view of Persians 37, 38, 57 Greeks 7, 36 Griboyedov, Alexander 195, 208 Grotefend 6, 7 Gulf of Oman 2 Gulf War, 1991 278 Gundeshapur/Jundeshapur 92, 109 guregan 149 Guyuk 140 Hadith, traditions 123, 132, 211 Hadrian, Emperor 81 al-Hallaj, Husain b. Mansur 162 Halys river 24, 29 Hamadan 23, 24, 28, 89, 207; see also Ecbatana Hamd Allah Mustaufi Qazvini 144 Harun al-Rashid 124 Hasan-i Sabah 135 Hatra 84, 90 Haydar, Safavi 158, 159, 160, 164, 165 Hebrew language 6 Hebrew sources 47, 87 Hebrews 3, 6 Hellespont 36, 39 Hephthalites 103, 104, 105, 107, 108; see also Huns Heraclius 110, 111, 112 Herat 146, 151, 152, 153, 162, 180, 194, 195, 199 Herodian 87 Herodotus 7, 24, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 46, 60, 64, 94 Hidayat, Sadiq 244 “Hidden” Imam see Twelfth Imam Hindu Kush 2, 40 Hira 103 History of the Franks 147 The History of the World Conqueror 137 Hormizd I, Hormizd-Ardashir 92, 96, 97 Hormizd II 98, 102 Hormizd III 104

302

Index

Hormizd IV 109 Hormizdagan 88 Hourani, Albert 14, 242 Hsiung-nu see Huns Hulegu Khan 19, 135, 139, 140, 141, 142 Humayun, Emperor 170 Huns 76, 77, 98, 102, 103, 108 Hurmuz 166, 174, 177 Husain, Third Shi‘i Imam 145, 247, 254, 272 Husain Bayqara 152 Huvayda, Amir ‘Abbas 242, 268 Hyracania 76 Hystaspes 33, 44, 50 Ibn Balkhi 113 Ibn Khaldun 148 Ibn Muqqafa 156 Ibn-i Sina (Avicenna) 136 ilkhan [title] 141 Ilkhans/Ilkhanid dynasty 11, 16, 126, 131, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 147, 149; administration 144 Imami Shi‘ism see Twelver Shi‘ism Imperial Bank of Persia 206, 208, 228 India 35, 69, 78, 92, 99, 108, 120, 125, 128, 135, 136, 147, 149, 181, 183, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 207, 212, 229 Indian Ocean 2, 70, 78, 99 Indus river, valley 2, 3, 29, 35, 40, 75, 76, 77, 108 iqta‘ 133, 153, 174 Iran, geography 2–5 Iran–Iraq war 20, 255, 259, 264–7, 268, 269, 272, 276 Iran, nation-state 222, 229, 230, 231 Iranian political culture 9–11, 191, 233, 251 Iranshahr 2, 86, 97, 114, 117 Iranzamin see Iranshahr

Iraq 4, 36, 38, 39, 122, 154, 179, 207, 252, 255, 264, 265, 266, 278 ‘Iraq-i ‘Ajam 121, 124 Iraq war, 2003 279 Ironsides, General 224 Isaac, Bishop of Seleucia 103 Isaiah 27 Isfahan 134, 157, 166, 175–6, 178, 180, 181, 182, 214, 230, 231, 242 Islam 6, 9, 17, 19, 93, 111, 118, 123, 124, 127, 130, 143, 157; Shi‘a, Shi‘i, Shi‘i Islam 18, 19, 122, 125, 127, 128, 135, 144, 154, 155, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 166, 183, 184, 185, 186, 194, 202, 203, 207, 211, 212, 220, 222, 229, 246, 252, 255, 257, 259, 264, 265, 268, 281; Sunni, Sunni Islam 21, 125, 128, 132, 135, 144, 150, 155, 159, 160, 161, 183, 184, 189, 194, 220, 267 Islamic Republic of Iran 1, 207, 222, 255, 260, 263, 267, 268, 272, 274, 275, 280; Council of Guardians 263, 269, 275, 276, 277, 280, 281; cultural revolution 271–3; economy 269–71, 278; hostage crisis 259, 261–2, 263, 267; institutions 261, 262–3, 275–8; international relations 259, 261, 278–9; Leadership Council 275, 276, 277, 279; political conflict 262–7, 275–8, 279–81; Revolutionary Guard 266, 269, 275, 276, 278; social change 271–5, 280–1; women 265, 272, 273, 274–5, 278 Islamic Republican Party (IRP) 263, 264, 266, 267, 268, 269 Islamic Revolution, 1978–9 20, 246, 254–7, 265, 267, 280; Karbala paradigm 254–5; two phases of 255–6, 259 Isma‘il b. Ahmad 125

Index Isma‘il I, Shah 18, 152, 155, 158–66, 186, 233 Isma‘il II, Shah 172, 188 Isma‘il III, Shah 184 Isma‘ili Shi‘a (Seveners), Nizari 128, 134, 135; see also Assassins Issus, battle of 39 Istakhr 89, 111, 113 Ithna ‘Ashari 127, 135, 159; see also Twelver Shi‘ism I‘tissami, Parvin 244 Ja‘far al-Sadiq, sixth Imam 184 Ja‘fari School of Law 184 Jahiliyya 121 Jalayirids 146, 153–5 Jamalzadah, Muhammad ‘Ali 244, 245 Jami 152 Jami‘ al-Tabarikh- 137, 143, 144 Jamshid 163, 166 Jangalis 215, 223, 225 Japan 211 Jaxartes river 29, 129; see also Syr Darya Jerusalem 27, 29, 110 Jesus 92 Jews 27, 29, 47, 87, 93, 97, 103, 120, 122, 143, 211, 267 Jihan Shah 155 jizya 143 Jochi 140, 141, 152 Jovian, Emperor 102 Judaism 6, 17, 92 Julfa, New 175, 178 Julian, Emperor, the Apostate 102 Junayd Safavi 159, 164, 165 Justinian II, Emperor 108, 109 Juvaini, ‘Ata Malik 137 Ka‘ba-yi Zardusht 53, 86, 87, 90 al-Karaki 188 Karbala 168, 169, 188, 196, 254, 268, 272

303

Karim Khan Zand 184–5, 190 Kartir 87, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 177 Karts 146 Kansu 76 Karun river 75, 206 Kashani, Ayatollah Sayyid ‘Abu al-Qasim 240 Kasravi, Ahmad 244 Kavad I 104, 105 Kavad II 110 Kayvanids 68, 126 Kerman 107 Khalil Sultan 151 Khamenei, Hujjat al-Islam [and Ayatollah] ‘Ali 267, 275, 276–8, 279, 280 Khan [title] 17, 18, 138 Kharaji 125 khaqan (khaghan) 18, 154 Khatami, Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad 279–81 khavarnah 56 Khaz‘al, Shaikh of Muhammarah, Sardar Agdas 226 Khitan/s 135, 136, 137, 139 Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhullah 18, 207, 246, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256–78; comparison with Muhammad Riza Shah 257–9; death 275, 276; vilayat-i faqih 260–1, 263 Khoramsharr 265, 266 Khurasan 71, 76, 107, 124, 125, 130, 134, 139, 144, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 168, 173, 174, 180, 182, 183, 184, 191, 225 Khurt, Amalie 46 Khusrau, Arsacid, King of Armenia 90 Khusrau I, Anushirvan 90, 96, 100, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 112, 125, 132, 163, 166, 171 Khusrau II 109, 110, 111, 114, 115

304

Index

Khusrau III 110, 112, 113 Khuzistan 25, 91, 92, 99, 102, 107, 180, 218, 219, 225, 229, 230, 266 Khvarazm 50, 97, 125, 135, 136 Khvarazm-Shahs 135, 136, 137 Khvaja Ahrar 152 Kirman 132, 151, 154, 155, 183 Kirmanshah 215, 219 kisra 108 Kuchik Khan 215, 217, 223, 225 Kuh-i Parau 114 Kuh-i Rahmat 51, 52, 53 Kui-Kala 84 Kurdistan, Kurds 20, 38, 180, 183, 225, 231, 237, 238, 259, 268 Kushans 97, 98 Kuwait 278 Lahijan 161 Lakhmid/s 97, 103, 109 League of Corinth 39 Lebanon 50 Letter of Tansar 87, 94 Levant 31, 39, 70 Lianazoff concession 206 Liao dynasty 135, 137 Libya 31, 35 Lindner, Rudi 15 Luft ‘Ali Zand 185 Luristan 11, 184 Lycia 29 Lydia/Lydians 24, 29, 47, 59 Lynch Brothers 206 Macedonia 36, 70 madrasah 132 Mahd-i ‘Ulya (Khair al-Nasa Begum) 172 Mahmud Afghan 180, 181, 182 Mahmud of Ghazni 127, 130, 136 Mahmud II, Sultan 193 majlis 210, 213, 214, 215, 217, 219, 225, 226, 228, 236, 239, 240, 241, 247, 268, 276, 279, 280

Majlisi, Muhammad Baqir 180, 189 Malcolm Khan 208 Malikshah 131, 132, 136 Malyan, Tepe or Tall-i 25, 27; see also Anshan Mamluk sultanate 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 149 mamluk/s 123, 125 al-Ma’mun, caliph 124 Ma’munids 136 Mani 81, 92, 93, 96 Manicheanism/Manicheans 17, 81, 92, 93, 97, 124 Mannaeans 24 Manzikert, battle of 128, 131 Maragha 141, 144, 147 Marathon, battle of 36 Marco Polo 146 Marcus Aurelius, Emperor 81 Mardavij 127, 128 Mardonius 37 Marduk 29, 30, 41, 43, 56, 63 marja‘ al-taqlid 246, 260 Mark Antony 80 Marv 111, 134 Marv Dasht 50 Mashhad 183, 189, 202, 230, 272 Ma‘sud, Ghazni 127 Mas‘ud Mirza, Zill al-Sultan 200 al-Mas‘udi 87, 121, 156 Maurice, Emperor 109, 110 Maurya/Mauryan dynasty 69, 70 mawla (pl. mawali) 124 Mazanderan 3, 151, 172, 183, 184, 191, 224, 268 Mazdak/Mazdakism 105, 108, 132 Medes 5, 10, 13, 23, 24, 28, 43, 46, 47, 50, 51 Media 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 33, 34, 35, 47, 55, 59, 70, 76, 77 Median [language] 6 Mediterranean 2, 28, 30, 35, 70, 75, 142 Memphis 30, 59

Index Mesopotamia 2, 4, 24, 25, 26, 27, 34, 40, 50, 55, 60, 64, 68, 69, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 84, 85, 87, 89, 97, 98, 99, 102, 108, 110, 113, 118, 149, 159, 161 Millspaugh, Arthur 226, 228, 235, 237 Mir Damad 188 Mirza Khusain Khan, Sipah Salar 206 Mithra 38, 62, 84, 87, 95, 96, 114 Mithradates I 67, 74, 76 Mithradates II, the Great 77, 78 Mongke Khan 140 Mongols 15, 130, 131, 135, 136–40, 143, 146, 147, 148, 149, 154; legacy 146–8; military 137–8, 147; sources 137 Moscow 149 Mudarris, Sayyid Hasan 227 Mughul dynasty 152 Mughuls 170, 173, 179, 180, 181 Muhammad, the Prophet 120, 121, 123, 132, 253 Muhammad ‘Ali [Egypt] 193 Muhammad ‘Ali, the Bab 195, 196 Muhammad ‘Ali Shah Qajar 210, 213, 217, 218, 219 Muhammad Hasan Khan Qajar 184, 185 Muhammad Khudabandah, Sultan Muhammad Shah 172, 173, 177 Muhammad Riza Shah Pahlavi 20, 221, 223, 232, 235–55, 257–9; cultural and social change 236, 242–6, 249–50; land reform 246, 247, 248, 249; modernization/westernization 236, 238, 242, 243, 246, 247, 250, 251, 269, 271; politics 235–42, 246–8, 250–5; White Revolution (Inqalab-i Safid) or Shah and People Revolution 247, 248, 249, 250

305

Muhammad Shah 194–5, 197 Mujahidin-i Khalq 266–7 mujtahid, mujtahidi 188, 246, 247, 260–1; see also usulis Mulla Sadra 188 Muntazari, Ayatollah Husain ‘Ali 261, 275, 281 Murashu family 26 Musaddiq, Muhammad 1, 221, 223, 237, 239–43, 279 Mutahhari, Ayatollah Murtaza 246 al-Mu‘tasim, caliph 123 Muzaffar al-Din Shah 209–10, 212, 213, 218 Muzaffarids 146, 149 Nabonidus 28, 29 Nadir Quli Khan Afshar, Shah 17, 18, 182–5, 233 Najaf 168, 169, 188, 196, 252, 268, 272 Napoleon 192 Naqshabandi order 152 Naqsh-i Rustam 40, 41, 45, 53, 54, 58, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 113, 114, 117 Narseh 92, 97, 102 Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar 194, 195, 197–203, 206, 208, 209 Nasir al-Din Tusi 147 Nasir al-Mulk, Abu al-Qasim Khan Qaragusulu 214 National Front, Jabbah-yi Milli 239, 240, 241, 247, 254, 256, 264 National Iranian Oil Company [after 1954] 247 nationalism, nationalists 1, 9, 186, 190, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 222, 226, 227, 231, 232, 238, 241, 244, 246, 250, 261, 266, 275, 280, 281 Nehemiah 27 Neith 32 Nestorian Christianity/Christians 104, 142, 146

306

Index

Nicea, Council of 103 Nihavand 75, 111, 119 Nisa 76, 77 Nishapur 130, 134 Nisibis 89, 90, 102 Nizam al-Mulk 131, 132, 134, 135, 144, 156 Nizar 135 Nazari see Isma‘ili Shi‘a No Ruz 128, 271 noker 137, 138 non-Iran 114 Nuqtavi movement 166 Nuri, Fazl Allah 217, 218 Nush-i Jan 24 Ogedei 140 Oghuz see Ghuzz oil 218, 219, 225, 232, 237, 239, 240, 241, 247, 251, 270 Oljeitu, Muhammad Khudabanda 18, 141, 144 Oman 127 Opis 29 Orodes II 78, 79 Ottoman constitution 211 Ottomans/dynasty 17, 140, 147, 149, 155, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 173, 174, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 193, 197, 199, 201, 204, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 220 Oxus river 29, 107, 136; see also Amu Darya Ozbegs see Uzbeks Padishah [title] 18 Pahlavi [language] see Persian language Pahlavis/Pahlavi dynasty 8, 9, 18, 20, 187, 207, 221–59, 260, 268, 269, 271, 274, 275, 280; see also Riza Shah Pahlavi, Muhammad Riza Shah

Paikuli inscription 97 Pakistan 3 Palestine 30, 36, 38, 80, 110, 140 Palmyra 84 Pari Khan Khanum 172 Parni [Aparni] 72, 76 Pars see Fars Parsees 120 Parsua, 2, 23; see also Fars Parthia 67, 72, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 91 Parthians/dynasty/empire 16, 22, 64, 67, 68, 75–85, 88, 89, 94, 95, 100; art and architecture 84, 85, 92, 117; language 86, 114; military 78, 79, 82 Pasargadae 27, 30, 34, 43, 44, 50, 54, 58, 88 Peloponnesian wars 37 Peloponnesus 36 People of the Book 120, 143, 211 Persepolis 6, 26, 27, 30, 35, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 50–5, 59, 61, 64, 76, 88, 92, 113, 263; Treasury and Fortification tablets/texts 6, 26, 57, 59 Persian language 26, 124, 136; Middle [Pahlavi] 68, 76, 85, 86, 94, 114, 128; New Persian, modern literary 126, 155, 199, 244; Old Persian 6, 25, 27, 34, 35, 44, 47, 49, 68, 76 Persian Gulf 2, 35, 76, 78, 81, 89, 99, 108, 127, 154, 166, 174, 180, 185, 199, 229, 252, 265 Persis 91; see also Fars Peter the Great 182 Philip II 39 Philip the Arab 114 Phocas, Emperor 110 Phraates II 76, 77 Phraates III 78 Phraates IV 79, 80 Phraates V 80

Index Pir Muhammad 151 Piruz, son of Yazdgard II 104, 105 Piruz, son of Yazdgard III 111 Pishivari, Ja‘far 237, 238 Plataea, Plain of 37 Plutarch 27, 38, 39, 58, 79, 84 political culture see Iranian political culture population 200, 213, 215, 232, 242, 271 Portugal, Portuguese 166, 168, 177 Psammetichus III 30 Punjab 35, 40, 70 Puran, Sasanian queen 111 Qadisiya 111 Qa’im-i Maqam, Mirza Abu alQasim Farahani 197, 199 Qajars/Qajar tribe and dynasty 8, 10, 111, 16, 18, 19, 154, 167, 182, 184, 185, 189, 191–220, 226, 227, 239; administration and reform 119–203; art, architecture, and patronage 203–6; economy 200–1; populist/nationalism opposition 208, 209, 212, 215, 217, 218; rulership 191, 194, 196, 199 Qandahar 174, 180, 181, 182, 183 Qara Khitai 135, 136, 137, 139 Qara Quyunlu 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155 Qara Yusif 154 Qarakhanids 125, 130 Qashqa’i 20, 215, 226, 230, 237, 259, 268 Qavam al-Saltanah, Ahmad 226, 227, 236–8 Qazvin 135, 169, 173, 175, 181 Qipchaq 149 Qizilbash 160, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 174, 175, 182, 185, 187, 192, 194 Qubilai Khan 140, 141, 142

307

Qum 189, 202, 203, 210, 215, 230, 254, 257, 268, 272 Qur’an 121, 123, 132 197, 211, 235 quriltai 138, 140, 183 Qurrat al-‘Ain see Tahirah Qurrat al-‘Ain Rafsanjani, Hujjat al-Islam ‘Ali Akbar Hashimi 275, 276–8, 279 Rashid al-Din 137, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 156 Rashidun, the rightly-guided caliphs 121 Rastakhiz party 242, 253 Rawlinson, Henry 6, 7, 27 Rayy 68, 109, 134 Razmara, ‘Ali General 239, 240 Red Sea 99, 108 Renan, Ernest 207 Reuter, Baron Julius de 206 Reuter concession 206 Riza, eighth Imam 183, 189, 230, 272 Riza Khan see Riza Shah Pahlavi Riza Quli Afshar 184 Riza Shah Pahlavi, also known as Riza Khan, Sardar Sapah 1, 10, 18, 19, 20, 221, 222, 223, 224–35, 237, 242, 243, 258, 274; legacy 232–5; modernization/westernization 221–31 Roman sources 102 Romanus Diogenes, Emperor 131 Rome/Roman empire 69, 72, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 89, 91, 96, 97, 98, 102, 113 Roosevelt, Kermit 241 Rudaki 126 Rukn al-Dawlah 128 rulership 11–13, 22, 64, 69, 101, 118, 126, 137, 150, 154, 155, 156, 183, 185, 186, 187, 199, 204, 220,

308

Index

rulership cont. 239, 247, 250–1; Abbasid 122–3; Achaemenian 41–58, 62, 69, 70, 72, 82, 204; Mongol 139; Qajar 199–200; Safavid 165, 166, 169, 170, 171, 175, 183, 185, 186, 187; Sasanian 100, 204; simultaneous 11–13, 22, 42, 47, 100 Rumi, Jalal al-Din 162 Rumlu 167, 172 Russia 136, 140, 141, 180, 183, 192, 194, 195, 197, 199, 201, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 218, 279 Russian Revolution, 1905 211, 213 Russian Revolution, 1917 215 Saddam Hussein 24, 165, 266, 278, 279 Sadiq Zand 185 Safavids/Safavid dynasty 8, 11, 16, 17, 18, 152, 154, 157–90; administration 174, 175, 180; art, architecture, and patronage 152, 157, 170, 171, 175, 176, 178, 180, 181, 185; economy 176, 177; legacy 185–7; millennialism 164, 165, 169, 186; Sufi order 159, 160, 161, 163, 164; mystical philosophers 188, 189; sources 158; ulema 169, 180, 186–9 Safavid Round Table 158 Safaviyya see Safavids; Sufi order Saffarids 124, 125 Safi al-Din, Shaikh 159, 160 Safi I, Shah 179, 180 Safi II, Shah, Sam Mirza 177, 180 Sais 32 Saitic dynasty 30 Saka Massagetae see Scythia/Scythes Sakastan see Sistan Saljuqs 11, 16, 17, 18, 126, 127, 128–35, 136, 153, 159, 174 Saljuqs of Rum 134, 140 Sam Mirza see Safi II

Samanids 125–6, 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 156 Samarqand 136, 151 Samarra 124 Sanjar 134, 135, 136 Saray Malik Khanum 149 Sarbardars 146 Sardis 29, 35, 50, 59 Saru Taqi, Mirza Muhammad Taqi 179, 180 Sasan 87, 88 Sasanians 8, 11, 16, 18, 22, 67, 69, 82, 84, 85, 86–117, 119, 122, 124, 128, 129, 131, 132, 146, 155, 157, 169; administration 91, 100, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 112, 113, 118, 120, 122; art and architecture 84, 109, 114–17; dynastic end 111–13; dynastic succession 98, 100, 101, 103, 110; economy 98, 99, 106, 108, 113; rulership 113–17; sources 87, 100, 101; Zoroastrianism 63, 87, 92–7, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105 satrap, satrapy, satrapies 12, 35, 59, 60 Sattar Khan 214, 216 Saudi Arabia 278 Savak, Sazman-i Ittila‘at va Amniyat-i Kishvar (National Security and Information Organziation) 242, 247, 257 Scythia/Scythes/Scythians/Saka 6, 13, 24, 30, 33, 35, 60, 61, 76, 77, 92, 97, 100 Scythian language 6 Second World War 229, 232, 235 Secret History of the Mongols 137 Seleucia 68, 70, 75, 76, 81 Seleucia, Council of 103, 104 Seleucids 11, 16, 22, 64, 65, 66–75, 76, 77, 82, 83 Seleucus 40, 64, 66, 67, 70, 71, 82 Selim I, Sultan 162, 167

Index Sevener Shi‘a see Isma‘ili Shi‘a Shah Rukh 150, 151, 152, 154 Shah Rukh Afshar 184 Shahin, General 110 Shahnamah 23, 78, 87, 94, 101, 107, 109, 118, 119, 126, 127, 155, 162, 163, 170, 235, 272 Shahrbaraz, General 110 Shaikhis 189, 195, 196, 207, 213 shamanism 6, 17, 143, 144, 147 Shamlu 167 Shapur I 86, 88, 90, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 100, 113, 114 Shapur II 102, 103, 104, 108, 114, 116 Shapur III 103, 114 Shapur river 92 Shari‘a, Islamic law 123, 132, 143, 150, 186, 199, 203, 217, 246, 247, 250, 260, 274 Shari‘ati, ‘Ali 222, 245, 246, 252 Shari‘atmadari, Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Qasim 260, 263, 267 Shatt al-Arab river 265, 278 Shaybanids 152 Shiraz 185, 195, 197 Shiroe 110 Shirvanshah 154, 158, 159, 160 Shiz (Takhti-i Sulaiman) 110 Shuster, Morgan 214, 226 shu‘ubiyya 124 Siberia 136 Silk Road 78, 107, 125 Sistan (Sakastan) 77, 107, 124, 151, 183 Siyasatnamah 131, 132, 144 Smerdis/Bardiya/Gaumata 32 Sogdiana 40 South Persia Rifles 215 Sparta, Spartans 36, 37, 38 Sufism, Sufis 128, 129, 130, 143, 147, 150, 152, 161, 163 Sulaiman I, Shah (Safi II) 179

309

Sulaiman II, “the Magnificent,” Sultan 167, 168 sultan [title] 130, 135 Sultan ‘Ali 158, 160 Sultan Husain, Shah 179, 180, 181, 182 Sultan Husain Mirza 162 Sultan Muhammad Shah see Muhammad Khudabandah Sultaniyyah 144, 146 Sumer 30 Suren, Sasanian family 78, 111 Surush, ‘Abd al-Karim 281 Susa 25, 27, 29, 35, 39, 40, 43, 50, 54, 59, 70, 75, 76, 85, 92 suyurghal 132, 153 Syr Darya (Jaxartes river) 2, 29, 125 Syria 30, 32, 36, 40, 59, 69, 76, 77, 79, 80, 82, 91, 98, 102, 108, 110, 120, 135, 140, 142, 143, 149 al-Tabari 87, 126 Tabriz 144, 146, 153, 155, 158, 159, 160, 168, 169, 174, 175, 179, 197, 209, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 238 Tahirah, Qurrat al-‘Ain 197, 206 Tahirids 124, 125, 163 Tahmasp I, Shah 166–72, 175, 187, 188 Tahmasp II, Shah 179, 181, 182, 183 Tahmasp Shahnamah 170 Taimurtash, ‘Abd al-Husain, Sardar Mu’azam 227, 231, 235 Tajikistan, Tajik/s 30, 161 Takkalu 167 Taliqani, Ayatollah Mahmud 239, 263 Tamerlane see Timur Ling Tapper, Richard 15 Taq-i Bustan 111, 114, 115, 117, 196

310

Index

Taq-i Kisra 90 taqiyya 160, 273 taz’iya 189, 203 Teguder Ahmad Khan 141, 143 Tehran 34, 68, 191, 200, 201, 202, 205, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 218, 237, 239, 241, 242, 243, 247, 254, 255, 257, 259, 266, 268, 271, 273, 276, 280 Teispes 22, 28, 30, 33 telegraph 202 Temuchin 138; see also Chingiz Khan Tengri 12 Tersan 155 Thebes 37 Thermopylae, battle of 36 Tigris river 2, 29, 89, 102 Timur Ling (Tamerlane) 146, 147–51, 154; legacy 149–51; military 148–9 Timurids/dynasty 16, 131, 143, 147–53, 167, 170; administration 150; art, architecture, and patronage 151, 152, 153, 170 Tiridates, King of Armenia 97 tobacco concession 206, 208 Toghril Beg 130 Tolui 139, 140 Trabizond 155 Trajan, Emperor 81 Transoxiana 2, 107, 125, 129, 130, 136, 144, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152 Treaty of Amasya 168, 170 Treaty of Finkenstein 192 Treaty of Guilistan 192 Treaty of Turkmanchai 192, 193, 194 Treaty of Zuhab 179, 183, 185 “tribe,” problems of 14–16 Tudah Party 233, 236, 237, 239, 240, 247, 275 tumen 138 Turan 127

Turkey 4, 38, 222, 223, 226, 230, 252 Turkic language 5, 10 Turkic-Mongol invasions 10, 17, 118, 119, 155 Turkmen 20, 151, 159, 160, 161, 163, 164, 168, 226, 268 Turkmenistan 2, 3, 30 Turks 98, 107, 109, 118, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 143 tuyul 132, 174 Twelfth Imam 186, 196 Twelver Shi‘ism 19, 211; see also Ithna ‘Ashari Ubaid Allah 168 Uighur language 136 Uighurs 139 ulema 123, 143, 185, 186–9, 195, 196, 197, 199, 203, 204, 208, 210, 212, 213, 217, 218, 230, 235, 236, 238, 241, 245, 246, 247, 250, 252, 254, 260, 261, 268, 278 Ulugh Beg 151, 152 ‘Umar, second Caliph 120, 121 Umayyad caliphate 19, 121, 122 umma, Islamic community 123, 135 United Nations 238, 276 United States 232, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 241, 247, 248, 252, 254, 255, 258, 259, 261, 262, 265, 267, 278, 279 ‘urf 132 USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) 231, 232, 233, 235, 237, 238, 252, 263 Ustajlu 167, 172, 173 usulis (mujtahidis) 187, 188, 189, 195, 246, 253 ‘Uthman, caliph 122 Uzbeks, Uzbekistan 30, 152, 167, 168, 169, 173, 174, 177, 179, 183, 187, 220 Uzun Hasan 155, 158, 160

Index vakil-i daulat 184 vakil-i ra‘aya 185, 190 Valerian, Emperor 91 Varahran see Bahram vilayat-i faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent) 247, 253, 260–1, 268, 275 vizier 123, 134, 141, 143 Vologeses I 80, 81 Vologeses VI 81 Wassmuss 215 Weber, Max 8 Xenophon 27, 39 Xerxes 6, 27, 36, 37, 41, 43, 45, 46, 49, 52, 53, 56, 62, 76 Yaqub, Aq Quyunlu 160 Yaq‘ub Saffar 124 yasa 150 Yasna 94 Yazdgard I 103 Yazdgard II 103, 104 Yazdgard III 111 Yemen 108

Yesugei 137 Yuan dynasty

311

140

Zagros mountains 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 16, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 34, 60, 83, 85, 111, 184, 219 Zahid, Shaikh 159 Zahidi, General Fazlullah 241, 242 Zahidiyya 159 Zaiydi (Fiver) Shi’a 127, 135 Zand commentaries 94 Zand dynasty 184–5, 191 Zayandah river 119 Zia al-Din Tabataba‘i, Sayyid 217, 224 Ziyarids 127, 128 Zohak 163, 166 Zoroaster 6, 17, 62, 92, 93 Zoroastrianism, Zoroastrians 6, 9, 18, 42, 63, 67, 68, 83, 84, 86, 92–6, 99, 103, 119, 120, 121, 122, 211, 212, 267; Achaemenian 62, 63, 64; Sasanian 63, 87, 92–7, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 109; texts 81, 93, 94, 95 Zurvan, Zurvanism 95, 96, 102, 103